Philo of Alexandria On Planting: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary 9789004417519, 9004417516

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Philo of Alexandria On Planting

Philo of Alexandria Commentary Series General editor Gregory E. Sterling

Associate editor David T. Runia

Editorial board Harold W. Attridge – Ellen Birnbaum John Dillon – Annewies Van den Hoek – Alan Mendelson Thomas Tobin, S.J. – David Winston

volume 5

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/pacs

Philo of Alexandria On Planting Introduction, Translation, and Commentary

By

Albert C. Geljon David T. Runia

LEIDEN | BOSTON

The Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available online at http://catalog.loc.gov LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2019043290

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill‑typeface. ISSN 1570-095X ISBN 978-90-04-41685-7 (hardback) ISBN 978-90-04-41751-9 (e-book) Copyright 2019 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi, Brill Sense, Hotei Publishing, mentis Verlag, Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh and Wilhelm Fink Verlag. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

This book is dedicated to the memory of Jan den Boeft, esteemed colleague and friend

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Contents General Introduction to the Philo of Alexandria Commentary Series Gregory E. Sterling Preface xviii Abbreviations xx Introduction 1 1 The Place of the Treatise in the Philonic Corpus 1 2 The Genre of the Treatise 7 3 The Exegetical Structure of the Treatise 10 4 The Use of the Bible 16 5 The Main Themes of the Treatise 20 6 The Intellectual Sitz im Leben 25 7 The Nachleben of the Treatise 34 8 The Text of the Treatise 37 9 Status quaestionis: Previous Scholarship on the Treatise 38 10 Some Notes on the Method Used in the Translation and the Commentary 40

Translation: Philo of Alexandria, On Planting Part One: On Planting (§§1–138)

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Part Two: May a Wise Person Get Drunk (§§139–177) Notes to the Text and Translation

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Commentary Title of the Work

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Part One: On Planting (§§1–138) 85 I God as Planter (§§1–72) 85 A The Planting of the Cosmos (§§1–27) 91 a The Planting of the Greatest Plant, the Cosmos (§§ 1–10) 91 b The Formation of Plants and Living Beings (§§ 11–16) 107

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c The Creation of the Human Being (§§17–22) 119 d Divine Souls are Called Above (§§23–27) 127 The Creation of the Human Being, the Microcosm (§§ 28–72) 134 a The Trees in the Human Being (§§28–31) 134 b The Planting of Paradise: Rejection of a Literal Reading (§§32–35) 140 c The Planting of Paradise: Allegorical Reading (§§ 36–45) 145 d Moses Prays That Israel be Planted in Paradise (§§ 46–58) 158 e The Part That Belongs to God (§§59–61) 174 f The Portion of the Levites (§§62–72) 179 Abraham as Planter (§§73–93) 191 a Transition to a New Biblical Text and Outline of Its Interpretation (§§73–74) 192 b Explanation of “Field” (§§75–77) 194 c Explanation of the “Well of the Oath” (§§ 78–84) 196 d Explanation of “the Name of the Lord, God everlasting” (§§85–92) 201 e Summary (§93) 209 Human Beings as Planters (§§94–138) 210 a Citation of the Biblical Text (§§94–95) 211 b Explanation of “Entering the Land” (§§ 96–98) 213 c Explanation of “Cleansing the Uncleanness” (§§ 99–112) 216 d Explanation of “Three Years” (§§113–116) 230 e Explanation of “the Fourth Year” (§§117–131) 234 f Explanation of “the Fifth Year” (§§132–136) 244 g Explanation of “I am the Lord your God” (§§ 137–138) 250

Part Two: May a Wise Person Get Drunk (§§139–176) 253 I Introduction (§§139–148) 253 a Summary and Repeated Citation of the Biblical Text (§§139–140) 257 b Introduction of the Theme of the Inebriation of the Wise Person (§§141–142) 259 c Brief Overview of Two Contrasting Views of Philosophers (§§143–148) 262 II The Wise Person May Get Drunk (§§149–174) 268 a Setting Out the Two Positions of the Argument (§§ 149–150a) 269 b First Argument: “Wine” and “Drunkenness” are Synonyms (§§150b–155) 269

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Second Argument: In Earlier Times People Drank Wine in the Right Way (§§156–164) 274 d Third Argument: Wine Provides Relaxation (§§ 165–172) 283 e Fourth (Non-professional) Argument: Writers are Positive about Drinking Wine (§§173–174) 292 Counter-Argument: The Wise Person May Not Get Drunk (§§175–177) 293 a Introducing the Counter-Argument: Both Points of View Needed (§175) 294 b First Argument: No One Confides in a Drunkard (§§ 176–177) 295

Bibliography 297 1 Philo of Alexandria 297 2 Other Ancient Texts 298 3 Modern Scholarly Literature 306 Indices 327 Index of Biblical Passages Cited 329 Index of Philonic Passages Cited 331 Index of Ancient Texts Cited 336 Index of Subjects and Names 341 Index of Greek Terms 350

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General Introduction to the Philo of Alexandria Commentary Series Philo of Alexandria (c. 20 BCE–c. 50 CE) was a member of one of the most prominent families of the large and influential Jewish community in Alexandria. We know more about his brother and his family than we do about Philo. His brother, Julius Gaius Alexander, held a responsible governmental position (Josephus, AJ 18.159, 259; 19.276–277, 20.100) and may have been a substantial property owner (CPJ 420a and 420b) as well as the manager of the Egyptian estates of Julia Augusta, the mother of the emperor Tiberius (CPJ 420b). He had probably become known to the emperor’s family through Herodian intermediaries (Josephus, AJ 19.276–277). His praenomen and nomen suggest that the family was associated in some way with Julius Gaius Caesar. It may be that Caesar granted Roman citizenship to Alexander’s grandfather for assistance during the Alexandrian War (48–47 BCE). Alexander made the most of his position and contacts and became exceptionally wealthy (Josephus, AJ 20.100). He once loaned 200,000 drachmas to Agrippa I (Josephus, AJ 18.159–160). He covered nine of the temple doors in Jerusalem with gold and silver (BJ 5.201–205), an act of patronage that attests his immense resources as well as his commitment to Judaism. The rabbis later report that he had a Torah scroll with the names of God in gold letters (Sop. 1.9 and Sep. Torah 1.9). Alexander’s social and economic standing is confirmed by the roles of his two sons. The archive of Nicanor suggests that Marcus Julius Alexander, Alexander’s younger son, was active in the import-export business that moved goods from India and Arabia through Egypt to the West. He married Berenice, the daughter of Herod Agrippa I and later partner of the emperor Titus, but died prematurely c. 43 CE (Josephus, AJ 19.276–277). His older brother Tiberius Julius Alexander had one of the most remarkable careers of any provincial in the first two centuries of the Roman Empire. Tiberius moved through a series of lower posts until he held governorships in Judea, Syria, and Egypt. When he backed Vespasian in the Flavian’s bid for the throne, his career quickly rose to its apex: he served as Titus’s chief of staff during the First Jewish revolt in 66–70CE (Josephus, BJ 5.45–46; 6.237) and as prefect of the praetorian guard in Rome after the war (CPJ 418b). While his career strained his relationship with his native Judaism to the breaking point (Josephus, AJ 20.100; Philo, Prov. and Anim.), it attests the high standing of the family. The most famous member of this remarkable family was paradoxically probably the least known in wider circles during his life. This is undoubtedly due to

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the contemplative nature of the life that he chose. His choice was not total. He may have had some civic function in the Jewish community. At least this would help to explain why the Alexandrian Jewish community selected him to serve on the first Jewish delegation to Rome after the pogrom in Alexandria in 38CE, a delegation that probably included his brother and older nephew (Legat. 182, 370; Anim. 54). The political arena was not, however, where his heart lay; he gave his heart to the life of the intellect (Spec. 3.1–6). He undoubtedly received a full education that included training in the gymnasium, the ephebate, and advanced lectures in philosophy and rhetoric. His philosophical training was of enormous importance to his intellectual formation. While he knew and made use of different philosophical traditions such as Stoicism and Pythagoreanism, his basic orientation was Platonic. Middle Platonism (c. 80 BCE–c. 220CE) had become a vibrant intellectual movement in Alexandria in the first century BCE, especially in the work of Eudorus (fl. 25 BCE). Philo became convinced that Plato and Moses understood reality in similar ways, although he was unequivocal about who saw it most clearly. His commitment to Judaism is evident in his training in the LXX: he knew it with the intimacy of one who lived with it from the cradle. He also knew the works of some of his Jewish literary predecessors such as Aristobulus, Pseudo-Aristeas, and Ezekiel the tragedian. He was aware of a significant number of other Jewish exegetes to whom he alluded in his commentaries, but always anonymously (Opif. 26, 77, and Migr. 89–93). The most probable social setting for his literary work is a private school in which he offered instruction in much the same way that philosophers and physicians did. This was likely in his own private residence, but a setting in a house of prayer (synagogue) cannot be ruled out. One of the ways that he taught was through writing. His treatises constitute one of the largest Greek corpora that has come down to us from antiquity. We know that he wrote more than seventy treatises: thirty-seven of these survive in Greek manuscripts and nine (as counted in the tradition) in a rather literal sixth-century Armenian translation. We also have excerpts of another work in Greek and fragments of two more in Armenian. The lost treatises are known from references to them in the extant treatises, gaps in his analyses of the biblical texts in the commentary series, and testimonia. The treatises fall into five major groups: three separate commentary series, the philosophical writings, and the apologetic writings. The three commentary series are Philo’s own literary creations; the philosophical and apologetic series are modern constructs that group conceptually similar but literarily independent treatises. The heart of the Philonic enterprise lay in the three commentary series. Each of these was an independent work with a distinct rationale and form.

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Philo set each series apart through explicit statements about the design of the series (for the Exposition of the Law), the use of secondary prefaces to link treatises together (for the Allegorical Commentary and Exposition of the Law), distinct approaches to the biblical text (for all three series), the literary forms of the treatises in the series (for all three series), and the different implied audiences (for all three series). The most elementary of the three is the twelve (six in the manuscript tradition) book Questions and Answers on Genesis and Exodus that cover Gen 2:4–28:9 and Exod 6:2–30:10. As the title suggests, Philo used a question and answer format to write a running commentary on the biblical text. The questions are often formulaic, but demonstrate a close reading of the biblical text which is cited in the question. The answers typically introduce both literal and allegorical interpretations. Philo rarely used secondary or tertiary texts in these answers. While earlier Jewish authors such as Demetrius (FF 2 and 5) and Aristobulus (F 2) used the question and answer device within larger works, they did not write zetematic works. The closest literary parallel to Philo’s commentary series is the series of zetematic works which Plutarch composed. The pedagogical character of the format and the listing of multiple interpretations suggest that Philo’s Questions and Answers were written for beginning students in his school who needed to learn how to read the text closely as well as become familiar with the range of possible interpretations. The Allegorical Commentary shares some features in common with the Questions and Answers, but is profoundly different. Like the Questions and Answers these treatises use the question and answer technique in a running commentary. Unlike the Questions and Answers, the format is no longer explicit but is incorporated in a more complex form of exegesis. Literal readings are generally downplayed, although Philo sometimes includes them when he thinks they can contribute to the understanding of the text. The main focus, however, is on allegorical interpretations which are expanded through the introduction of secondary, or even tertiary, biblical texts (lemmata). While these expansions may give the treatises a meandering feel, in fact there is almost always a thematic unity that makes the treatise coherent. The scope is also different than in the QG and QE; the Allegorical Commentary provides a running commentary on Genesis 2:1–18:4 with some treatments of later texts in Genesis in the final treatises. Philo was by no means the first Jewish author to use allegory: earlier Jewish writers such as Aristobulus and Pseudo-Aristeas had used allegorical interpretation; however, they did not write allegorical commentaries. Philo’s allegorical commentaries are closer in form to commentaries in the philosophical tradition, e.g., the Platonic Anonymous Theaetetus Commentary, Plutarch’s On the Generation of the Soul in the Timaeus, and Porphyry’s On the Cave of Nymphs. Yet even here there are considerable differences; for

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example, Philo’s treatises have more thematic unity than his pagan counterparts. Philo also offered some hints that he saw a larger unity to his allegorical treatment of Genesis. He linked six of the treatises together with secondary prefaces. In particular, he linked four of the five treatises that dealt with the story of Noah together (Agr., Plant., Ebr., Sobr.). This suggests that Philo may have thought of the larger structure of the Allegorical Commentary in biographical terms: he devoted three treatises to Cain (Sacr., Det., Post.), five to Noah (Gig./Deus, Agr., Plant., Ebr. 1–2, Sobr.), and five to Abraham (Migr., Her., Congr., Fug., Mut.). Cain represented the embodiment of self-love, Noah who represented justice or perfection was part of Philo’s first triad of virtuous ancestors, and Abraham who represented virtue through learning was part of Philo’s second triad of ancestors. Philo prefaced these biographically oriented works with treatments on creation and the primeval history (Leg. 1–3 [originally 4 or 5 books], Cher.) and concluded it with a work on dreams that addresses multiple texts throughout Genesis (Somn. 1–2 [originally 5 books]). His work on Conf. is a transitional text moving from Noah to Abraham. The goal of this allegorical interpretation was the ascent of the soul or the experience of God achieved through virtue and contemplation. If the Questions and Answers were for beginning students, the Allegorical Commentary was most likely composed for advanced students or other exegetes in the Jewish community. It certainly places much greater demands on the reader, as any modern reader who has worked through these treatises can attest. The third series, the Exposition of the Law, is different yet. It is not a running commentary, but a systematic exposition of the entire Pentateuch. Unlike the Questions and Answers and Allegorical Commentary, the Exposition of the Law rarely cites the biblical text—except for an occasional word or phrase— but paraphrases or summarizes it and provides a commentary on the summary. The treatment may include both literal and allegorical readings and in some cases regularly alternates between them, esp. in the biographies. The scope of the Exposition of the Law is also quite different: it extends beyond Genesis and Exodus to include the entire Torah. Philo wrote an introduction to the Exposition in the form of a biography in the two volume Life of Moses. The work is similar in function to Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus which introduces readers to the Enneads. Philo organized his understanding of the law in three parts (Praem. 1–3; cf. also Abr. 2–5; Mos. 2.45–47). The first part dealt with creation, demonstrating the harmony between the cosmos and the law (Opif.). The second part is the historical or biographical section that consists of biographies that show how the ancestors embodied the law before it was given to Moses (Abr., Ios. [the works on Isaac and Jacob are lost]). The third and most complex part is the legislative. Just like some later rabbis, Philo worked through the decalogue

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(Decal.) and then used each of the ten commandments as a heading to subsume the remaining legislation in the Torah (Spec. 1–4). Unlike the later rabbis, he added a series of appendices under the headings of virtues (Virt.). He brought the series to a conclusion in a treatise On Rewards and Punishments in direct imitation of the end of Deuteronomy. The series was probably intended for a broader audience—both Jews and interested pagan readers—that included but was not limited to the school. It may be that Philo offered public lectures at his school or in a house of prayer. If the three commentary series accentuate Philo’s role within the Jewish community, the last two groups of his treatises reflect his efforts to relate to the larger world. The philosophical works use Greek sources and philosophical genres to address some of the major philosophical issues Philo and his students confronted. So, he wrote two dialogues (Prov. 1–2, Anim.) that featured his nephew, Tiberius Julius Alexander; two discourses that examined a famous Stoic proposition (Prob. and the lost Improb.), a thesis that set out arguments pro and contra (Aet. 1 and 2 [lost]), and an arithmology (Num. [only extant as an Armenian fragment]). The biblical text recedes and is replaced by citations from non-Jewish authors. These were probably for advanced students in his school. The apologetic works were probably written—for the most part—in connection with the events of 38–41CE. They were designed to assist Philo in his efforts to represent the Jewish community to the authorities. He wrote a work that was probably intended to help him with the embassy (Hypoth. [only extant in two Greek fragments]), a treatise holding out exemplars of Judaism (Contempl. and a parallel treatment on the Essenes now lost), and a five-volume treatment of the mistreatment of the Jews by Roman authorities who were punished by God (Flacc., Legat. [the five volumes were probably 1. Introduction and Pilate; 2. Sejanus, 3. Flaccus, 4. Embassy, 5. Palinode]). These works were most likely intended for non-Jews or Jews dealing with non-Jews who probably comprised the largest audience. This expansive corpus is the single most important source for our understanding of Second Temple Judaism in the diaspora. While some of the esoteric and philosophical aspects of his writings reflect a highly refined circle in Alexandria, the corpus as a whole preserves a wide range of exegetical and social traditions which enable us to reconstruct a number of beliefs and practices of Jews in the Roman empire. The difficulty that we face is the limited evidence from other Jewish communities. This can be partially solved by expanding the comparisons to early Christian writings which were heavily indebted to Jewish traditions. As is the case with virtually all Second Temple Jewish texts composed in Greek, Philo’s corpus was

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not preserved by Jews but by Christians who found his writings so irresistibly attractive that they gave him a post mortem conversion. In some Catenae he is actually called “Philo the bishop.” A number of important early Christian authors are deeply indebted to him: Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Didymus, Gregory of Nyssa, and Ambrose in particular. While there is no solid evidence to show that New Testament authors knew his writings, they certainly knew some of the same exegetical traditions that he attests. His writings therefore serve both as a witness to exegetical traditions known and used by first-century Christians and as a source for some second-century and later Christians. One of the factors that made Philo so attractive to Christians was the way that he combined Greek philosophy, especially Middle Platonism, with exegesis. The eclectic nature of his thought and the size of his corpus make his writings a particularly important source for our understanding of several Hellenistic philosophical traditions. The combination of Middle Platonism and Jewish exegesis also makes Philo important for the study of Gnosticism, especially for those scholars who argue that the second-century Christian Gnostic systems had significant antecedents in Jewish circles. It is remarkable that in spite of the obvious importance of these writings and their complexity, no series of commentaries has been devoted to them. The present series is designed to fill that void. Each commentary will offer an introduction, a fresh English translation, and a commentary proper. The commentary proper is organized into units/chapters on the basis of an analysis of the structure of each treatise. Each unit/chapter of the commentary will address the following concerns: the context and basic argument of the relevant section, detailed comments on the most important and difficult phrases, passages where Philo treats the same biblical text, the Nachleben of Philo’s treatment, and suggestions for further reading when appropriate. There will be some variation within the series to account for the differences in the genres of Philo’s works; however, readers should be able to move from one part of the corpus to another with ease. We hope that in this way these commentaries will serve the needs of both Philonists who lack sustained analyses of individual treatises and those scholars and students who work in other areas but consult Philo’s works. Most of the volumes in this series will concentrate on Philo’s biblical commentaries. It may seem strange to write and read a commentary on a commentary; however, it is possible to understand the second commentary to be an extended form of commentary on the biblical text as well. While Philo’s understanding of the biblical text is quite different from our own, it was based on a careful reading of the text and a solid grasp of Greek philosophy. His commentaries permit us to understand how one of the most influential interpreters of

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the biblical text in antiquity read the text. The fact that his reading is so different from ours is in part the fascination of reading him. He challenges us to enter into a different world and to see the text from another perspective. Gregory E. Sterling Yale Divinity School

Preface This is the second translation and commentary on an allegorical treatise of Philo of Alexandria on which the two authors of the present work have collaborated. In the years 2008 to 2012 we prepared a translation and commentary on De agricultura, the treatise that precedes De plantatione in Philo’s Allegorical Commentary. Encouraged by the positive response to its publication in 2013, we wondered whether we should continue working together and tackle the next treatise. This seemed a logical step to take. After all, already in the ancient world Eusebius had regarded these works as the two parts of a single treatise. They give exegesis of the same Pentateuchal verse and there is a clear affinity in their subject matter (although the second treatise does deviate towards its end). We decided that we would like to push on, and so proposed the idea to the editor of the Philo of Alexandria Commentary Series, Greg Sterling. He enthusiastically welcomed the proposal, and so a new project was born. Work was commenced at the beginning of 2014. An important milestone was the meeting of the Philo of Alexandria Group at the Society of Biblical Literature Annual Meeting in Atlanta, Georgia in November 2015, when we had the opportunity to present the results of our initial research and to benefit from the advice and insights of our Philonic colleagues. Publication of the final version was delayed in 2018 when it was decided that David Runia would test out the draft version in an educational setting while giving a graduate course as a Visiting Professor at Yale Divinity School together with its Dean, Greg Sterling. During the past five years, while preparing the new work, we have continued to work closely together, benefiting from the advances in modern technology (email, skype, dropbox) that allow such highly effective communication between scholars living on two different sides of the globe. Our method of working and the division of labour involved are basically the same as for the previous volume. Albert Geljon once again first prepared a literal Dutch translation, which assisted David Runia as he prepared a fresh English version. Both scholars contributed to the textual notes accompanying the translation. Albert Geljon is the primary author of the introduction and the commentary, but numerous additions have also been made by David Runia. The bibliography and indices are largely the work of Albert Geljon. Ultimately the entire work is a co-production of both authors, who readily take full and joint responsibility for the end product. In the course of the preparation of this volume we have incurred many debts to both persons and institutions. First we wish to express our thanks to Gre-

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gory Sterling (Yale) for supporting our proposal and accepting our work in the series that he launched over twenty years ago. The members of the Philo of Alexandria Group of the Society of Biblical Literature are to be thanked for their encouragement and constructive comments on our work. Over the years a group of scholars doing research on Philo has come to form a community, virtual much of the time but meeting each other in person at regular intervals. It is a community based on common interests and enthusiasms. In the course of time it has become a community of friends. Albert Geljon would like to thank the Christelijk Gymnasium in Utrecht, the Netherlands, for the support that they continue to give his research. The school management and his colleagues made it possible for him to take a period of sabbatical leave in 2015, during which he attended the above-mentioned meeting in Atlanta. He was also given leave to attend the Annual meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature in Boston in 2017. David Runia wishes again to express his appreciation to both Queen’s College at the University of Melbourne and the Australian Catholic University for the generous support that they offered him in doing his research during the past five years. He is also grateful to his co-teacher Greg Sterling and his students at Yale Divinity School for their attentive reading of the manuscript and their many creative ideas (with a special thanks to Chris Atkins for his list of errata and suggestions for additions to the commentary). Finally, both authors express their thanks to the publisher Brill (Leiden) and its friendly staff for publishing the book, and also to TAT (Utrecht) for typesetting it so well. Utrecht and Melbourne June 2019

Abbreviations Generally, the abbreviations of biblical books, ancient texts and modern literature follow the guidelines set out in the The SBL Handbook of Style, Second Edition. Atlanta: SBL Press, 2014, and in The Studia Philonica Annual, volume 30, 2018, pages 231–235.

Abbreviations of Philonic Treatises Abr. Aet. Agr. Cher. Conf. Congr. Contempl. Decal. Det. Deus Ebr. Flacc. Fug. Gig. Her. Hypoth. Ios. Leg. 1–3 Legat. Migr. Mos. 1–2 Mut. Opif. Plant. Post. Praem. Prob. Prov. 1–2 QE 1–2

De Abrahamo De aeternitate mundi De agricultura De Cherubim De confusione linguarum De congressu eruditionis gratia De vita contemplativa De Decalogo Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat Quod Deus sit immutabilis De ebrietate In Flaccum De fuga et inventione De gigantibus Quis rerum divinarum heres sit Hypothetica De Iosepho Legum allegoriae 1, 2, 3 Legatio ad Gaium De migratione Abrahami De vita Moysis 1, 2 De mutatione nominum De opificio mundi De plantatione De posteritate Caini De praemiis et poenis Quod omnis probus liber sit De Providentia 1, 2 Quaestiones et solutiones in Exodum 1, 2

abbreviations QG 1–4 Sacr. Sobr. Somn. 1–2 Spec. 1–4 Virt.

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Quaestiones et solutiones in Genesim 1, 2, 3, 4 De sacrificiis Abelis et Caini De sobrietate De somniis 1, 2 De specialibus legibus 1, 2, 3, 4, De virtutibus

Other Abbreviations ANRW ALGHJ BJS CCSL CRINT CSEL GCS HThR JSJ JSJSup LCL LSJ PACS PAPM PG PhA RAC RPh SAPERE SC SPhA SPhilo SPhiloA SPhiloM SVF

Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt Arbeiten zur Literatur und Geschichte des hellenistischen Judentums Brown Judaic Studies Corpus Christianorum Series Latina Compendia Rerum Iudaicarum ad Novum Testamentum Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller Harvard Theological Review Journal for the Study of Judaism in the Persian, Hellenistic and Roman Periods Supplememts to the Journal for the Study of Judaism Loeb Classical Library A Greek-English Lexicon. Edited by H.G. Liddell, R. Scott, H.S. Jones. 9th ed. with revised suppl. Oxford, 1996. Philo of Alexandria Commentary Series Les Œuvres de Philon d’Alexandrie. Edited by R. Arnaldez, C. Mondésert and J. Pouilloux Patrologiae cursus completus: series Graeca, ed. J.P. Migne Philosophia Antiqua Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum Revue de Philologie, de Littérature et d’Histoire Anciennes Scripta Antiquitatis Posterioris ad Ethicam REligionemque pertinentia Sources Chrétiennes Studies in Philo of Alexandria Studia Philonica The Studia Philonica Annual Studia Philonica Monographs Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, ed. J. von Arnim

xxii VC VCSup WUNT

abbreviations Vigiliae Christianae Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae Wissenschaftliche Unterschuchungen zum Neuen Testament

Introduction 1

The Place of the Treatise in the Philonic Corpus

Philo of Alexandria wrote a large body of writings and today we still possess nearly 50 treatises.1 Most of them are exegetical works in which the Pentateuch is interpreted and explained. In addition, he also wrote some works that can be labelled as philosophical or historical, but these treatises too have significant connections with his religious beliefs. It is generally acknowledged that Philo composed three different series of exegetical writings, which differ in aim and scope.2 (1) The Exposition of the Law.3 Having started this series by commenting on the creation account of Genesis 1, he describes the lives of the patriarchs, whom he sees as living laws who lived according to the law before the written law was given. He also discusses the ten commandments and the special ordinances set out in the Pentateuch. Usually, he offers a literal reading, to which an allegorical or symbolic exegesis is added. (2) The Allegorical Commentary.4 This series consists of a running commentary on Genesis, in which Philo explains the biblical text by means of allegory. In giving an allegorical exposition of a verse, Philo usually also involves the citation and interpretation of other texts, with the result that his line of thought is often difficult to follow. (3) Questions and Answers on Genesis and Exodus. In this series the biblical text is discussed in the form of posing a question and giving an answer. Generally, Philo offers both a literal explanation and an allegorical interpretation. The writings of this series, parts of which has been lost, have been for the most part preserved in an Armenian translation only.5 The Allegorical Commentary as it has survived consists of 18 treatises in 21 books. As Gregory Sterling has argued, it has a literary integrity which is evidenced by its method and literary form. Each treatise should be seen as an

1 For a list of works that have perished see Runia 1992b, 78. 2 The first classifications of Philo’s writings were made by Massebieau 1889 and Cohn 1899. Very good overviews are given by Morris 1987, 819–870 and Royse 2009. 3 The heading of this series is a modern invention based on Eusebius, who calls this series Τὰ εἰς τὸν νὸμον (“The books on the Law,” Praep. ev. 8.12.22). 4 This title is borrowed from the first work of the series The Allegories of the Laws. For the Allegorical Commentary see Cohn 1899, 393–402; Morris 1987, 830–840; Royse 2009, 38–45. 5 For the Quaestiones generally, see Hilgert 1991; Royse 2009, 34–38.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004417

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independent literary unit within a greater whole which Philo has shaped.6 The treatise De Plantatione belongs to the Allegorical Commentary and its place within this series can be seen in the following overview: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

Legum allegoriae 1–3 (The Allegories of the Laws)7 De Cherubim (On the Cherubim) De sacrificiis Abelis et Caini (On the Sacrifices of Abel and Cain) Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat (That the Worse Is Wont to Attack the Better) De posteritate Caini (On the Posterity of Cain) De gigantibus (On the Giants) Quod Deus immutabilis sit (That God is Unchangeable)8 De agricultura (On Cultivation) De plantatione (On Noah’s Work as a Planter) De ebrietate (On Drunkenness) De sobrietate (On Sobriety) De confusione linguarum (On the Confusion of Tongues) De migratione Abrahami (On the Migration of Abraham) Quis rerum divinarum heres sit (Who is the Heir of Divine Things) De congressu eruditionis gratia (On the Preliminary Studies) De fuga et inventione (On Flight and Finding) De mutatione nominum (On the Change of Names)9 De somniis 1–2 (On Dreams)

Gen 2:1–3:19 Gen 3:24, 4:1 Gen 4:2–4 Gen 4:8–15 Gen 4:16–15 Gen 6:1–4 Gen 6:4–12 Gen 9:20a Gen 9:20b Gen 9:21 Gen 9:24–27 Gen 11:1–9 Gen 12:1–6 Gen 15:2–18 Gen 16:1–6 Gen 16:6–14 Gen 17:1–22 Gen 28:12–15, 31:11–13, Gen 37, 40–41

Within the Allegorical Commentary Plant. belongs to a group of six works that deal with the figure of Noah (Gig., Deus, Agr., Plant., Ebr., Sobr.). In this group, however, it is striking that a discussion of Gen 6:13 to 9:19 is lacking. Probably between Deus and Agr. one or more works are missing, in which Philo discussed the construction of the ark and the flood. Indeed, we do have an indication for such a lost work. In Mut. 53, interpreting the covenant from Gen 17:2, Philo refers to his treatise On the Covenants and it is very likely that this

6 Sterling 2018, 1233. 7 It is not known whether this work was preceded by an allegorical exposition of Gen 1. Tobin 2000 argues that several remarks in Leg. appear to refer to a missing allegorical treatment of the chapter. 8 Originally Gig. and Deus formed a single treatise. 9 Likely the fragment De Deo belongs to a missing book on Gen 18:1ff.

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work should be placed between Deus and Agr. In it Philo will have discussed the covenant between God and Noah (Gen 6:18) and other covenants that are mentioned in the Pentateuch. Maybe he dealt with the flood in that treatise as well, or in a separate work that has also been lost.10 Because at the beginning of Plant. Philo refers back to the previous treatise Agr. (ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ βιβλίῳ), there is a close relationship between the two, and in fact Agr. and Plant. can be regarded as two books of single work. Eusebius certainly understood them to belong to a single work, since he refers to Agr. as the first book of On Cultivation (Praep. ev. 7.13.3) and Plant. as the second (Praep. ev. 7.13.4).11 There is also a close connection with the next treatise Ebr., since at the beginning of that treatise Philo refers back to Plant., remarking that he has discussed the views of other philosophers on the subject of drunkenness in the previous book (ἐν τῇ πρὸ ταύτης βίβλῳ) and will now go on to deal with Moses’s view on the subject. The views of other philosophers are treated in the second part of Plant. (§§139–177) as announced in a transitional sentence in § 141: “What is said by the lawgiver on the subject of inebriation we shall deal with thoroughly on a later occasion. At the present moment let us examine the views of others.” There can be no doubt that Philo here refers to the next treatise Ebr. According to Eusebius (Hist. eccl. 2.18.2) and Jerome (Vir. ill. 11) Philo wrote two books On Drunkenness, but we now only possess one book, Ebr. It is a matter of dispute whether our Ebr. is the first or the second. At the beginning of Ebr. Philo announces that he will discuss five aspects of wine but only the first three are dealt with in that treatise. At the opening of the next treatise Sobr. he refers back to the treatment of nakedness, the final one of the five aspects. It is likely that nakedness and also the fourth aspect, gladness, were discussed in the lost book that was the second book of Ebr. Furthermore, as we have seen, the opening sentence of Ebr. joins up with Plant. For that reason the lost (second) book of Ebr. has to be placed between Ebr. and Sobr. and the extant book of Ebr. is the first book. A different approach was taken by Maximilian Adler. In his 1929 study on Philo’s allegorical treatises he argued that Plant. 139–177 is in fact the first book On Drunkenness.12 According to him Philo’s references to a προοίμιον (§§ 149,

10 11

12

See Massebieau 1889, 23; Cohn 1899, 397–398; PCW 2.xxii; Morris 1987, 835; Royse 2009, 41. There may also be a reference to this lost work at QE 2.34. See further the discussion of the title of the work in the Commentary. For a more detailed discussion of the cluster of four (originally five) treatises Agr.–Sobr. see Runia 2017, 117– 121. Adler 1929, 53–67.

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150; Ebr. 11) indicate that Philo has begun a new book in § 139, because he would not have spoken about a προοίμιον if he had not just commenced on a new book. On his reading, the quotation of the main biblical lemma Gen 9:20–21 in §140 also suggests that Philo starts a new book at this point. Next, he discusses the indirect transmission and the evidence of the manuscripts but, as Morris remarks, they are not entirely conclusive. The evidence from a papyrus appears to show that the extant book is the second, which would mean that the first is either lost or is the second part of Plant.13 To make things even more complicated, on the basis of Philo’s references to subjects to be discussed or discussed already (Ebr. 4; Sobr. 1), we have to assume that there are lacunae at the end of both Plant. and Ebr. The fragments from the Sacra Parallela assigned to Ebr. but not found therein must be placed in these lost parts. Despite these uncertainties regarding the lost book of Ebr. and the lacunae it is clear that the four treatises—Agr., Plant., Ebr., Sobr.—form a single composition, which perhaps originally consisted of five books: two on cultivation, two on drunkenness (of which one is lost) and one on sobriety.14 Besides the Allegorical Commentary Philo composed another exegetical series, viz. Questions and Answers on Genesis and Exodus. The relationship between the two exegetical series is complicated.15 As noted above, in the latter work Philo as a rule proceeds more straightforwardly through the biblical books, explaining each verse separately and often presenting first a literal reading and then an allegorical interpretation. The regular involvement of other biblical texts and their interpretation, which is characteristic of the Allegorical Commentary, is absent in this work.16 The main biblical text of Plant. (Gen 9:20) is discussed in just two sections, QG 2.67–68. In § 67 Philo deals with the planting by Noah and gives a literal reading, setting out why Noah plants a vineyard (rather than wheat and barley) and God does not. Responding to this question, he explains that God bestows things that are necessary for human beings, but to human beings themselves are assigned the production of luxurious food and drink, which are superfluous. The next question deals with Noah’s drunkenness and Philo emphasizes that Noah drank a portion of wine. The wise Noah 13 14 15

16

Morris 1987, 836; Royse 1980, 160–161. Because of the brevity of the work Sobr. it has been suggested that a large part of it is missing; see PCW 2.xxxi. For the relationship see Borgen and Skarsten 1976–1977, and Méasson and Cazeaux 1991. Terian 1991 argues that the Quaestiones were written before the other series. Sterling 1991 agrees with this and regards them as a kind of prolegomena to the Allegorical Commentary which is composed on the basis of the Quaestiones; on their hypothetical context in Philo’s school see Sterling 2017b, 157–159. As demonstrated in Runia 1991; see the conclusions at 75–76.

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is said to be drunken, not by drinking wine to excess, but merely by partaking of wine.17 When we compare Philo’s treatment of Noah’s planting in Plant. with the exposition in QG, we may conclude that there are hardly any points in common between the elaborate allegorical explanation of planting in Plant. and the literal explanation in the Questions.18 Philo gives very little information about himself and the circumstances of his writing in the three exegetical series, so the chronological relationship between them remains controversial. Several attempts have been made to arrange Philo’s writings in chronological order.19 Basing himself on cross references in the series Leopold Cohn argued that the Allegorical Commentary is the oldest of the series, followed by the Questions. Philo composed these series at a time when he was able to devote himself wholly to studying, without being disturbed by political troubles. The Exposition, on the other hand, was composed at the end of his life, when circumstances forced him to be involved in politics, as he himself remarks in Spec. 3.1–6.20 A different approach was taken by Louis Massebieau.21 The French scholar divided the treatises of the Allegorical Commentary into four groups on the basis of references to persecutions of the Jews.22 The first group consists of the treatises Leg. up to Deus and they are written in a peaceful and prosperous time. The treatises Agr. up to Conf. form the second group and they contain strong attacks on rulers and allusions to struggles and conflicts. By way of contrast the treatises Her., Congr. and Fug. seem to be composed in a period of peace. Finally, the two books of Somn. refer to persecutions of the Jews. In trying to date the four groups, Massebieau looked for allusions and references to contemporary events and persons. Because he linked Philo’s attack on theatres in Agr. 34 with the conflicts between Jews and non-Jews in Alexandria in 37–38, in which the theatre played an important role, he assumed that the second group has been written during that time. The exhortation in Plant. 67 to rulers who have conquered the whole world not to be proud is directed to Roman emperors and especially Caligula. The implied reference to a king in §92 who causes harm to his subjects is in agreement with this. These interpretations, in which general statements in an allegorical

17 18 19 20 21 22

Brief fragments of the original text of this question are found in a Byzantine florilegium and in Procopius Commentary on Genesis; see Petit PAPM 33.121–122. A similar conclusion is reached by Cazeaux 1989, 194. See Morris 1987, 841–844; Royse 2009, 59–62. Cohn 1899, 431–435. Massebieau 1906. After his death (1904) the article was finished by E. Bréhier on the basis of his notes. Massebieau 1906, 170–177.

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exegesis are linked up with particular historical events or persons, are highly speculative and have not convinced scholars. Very recently Maren Niehoff has returned to the question of chronology and, agreeing with the views of Cohn and Sterling, made them the basis for an intellectual biography of Philo.23 She argues that the Allegorical Commentary shows an overall Platonic orientation and was written when Philo was a young man and was attracted to a mystical and introverted longing for God as the transcendent Other. The Questions were congenial to this approach but with their simpler form of exposition reached out to a broader public in Alexandria. A turning point in his life occurred when he travelled to Rome as leader of the Jewish embassy to the emperor. His involvement with politics and his exposure to a new environment, in which Roman and especially Stoic philosophy were dominant, stimulated the composition of the Exposition of the Law and a number of historical, apologetic and philosophical treatises.24 In this account of Philo’s intellectual development very little use is made of the contents of Plant. and the other treatises on Noah.25 This general outline of the chronological relationships between the three main commentaries has a degree of plausibility. It would mean that Philo composed the treatises of the Allegorical Commentary including Plant. in the full bloom of his life, before he was distracted by political and social concerns.26 The context of this writing activity may have been a kind of school, in which Philo’s treatises were studied by pupils who were able to make use of his personal library, as has been suggested by Sterling.27 But on all these matters the paucity of clear evidence means that we can have little certainty. There is no doubt that there are important differences between the method and content of the three commentaries. But to follow Niehoff and conclude from these differences that a significant change took place in Philo’s intellectual development28 is speculative and lacks supports in the evidence we have at our disposal. 23 24 25

26

27 28

Niehoff 2018, 3–11. See above nn. 15 and 20. See the appendix at Niehoff 2018, 245–246, in which she gives a reconstructed chronology of Philo’s life and works. Philo’s references to the psalmist in §§ 29 and 39 are noted at Niehoff 2018, 184 and on p. 239 she argues that the Stoic ideal of living according to nature as put forward by Cleanthes is applied to the God of Israel at § 49. The distraction is suggested by his famous autobiographical statement at Spec. 3.1–6, but this is not to suggest that he was not involved in community affairs before then. It goes too far to describe Philo as author of the Allegorical Commentary as ‘der junge Philon’, as Niehoff 2017, 22 does. Sterling 1999, 2017a and 2017b. Niehoff 2018, 11: “Philo changed dramatically as a result of his journey to Rome. The embassy to Gaius Caligula became a turning point in his life, drawing him out of his con-

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Finally we should mention the theory on the structure of the Allegorical Commentary very recently outined by Gregory Sterling.29 He argues that the larger work can be divided into three clusters centered around the figures Cain (Sacr.—Post.), Noah (Gig.—Sobr.) and Abraham (Migr.—Mut.). Each of these biblical figures has a different role in introducing approaches to virtue. This theory gives insight into the general structure and development of the larger work, without answering all the questions that can be raised.30 Certainly, the position of Plant. as part of a cluster in Noah is beyond all doubt.

2

The Genre of the Treatise

As we have seen in the previous section, Plant. belongs to the Allegorical Commentary. The majority of treatises belonging to this series consist of a running commentary on successive verses of Genesis, with a single treatise treating a number of consecutive verses. The twin treatises Agr. and Plant., however, are unusual in being devoted to the exegesis of a single biblical verse, Gen 9:20, and as a result they are more thematic in scope. The titles On Cultivation and On Planting reflect their thematic character. The next treatise On Drunkenness is also thematic, since it deals with Moses’s view on inebriation. This difference is reflected in their titles. Other writings in the Allegorical Commentary tend to have titles that describe the main content of the biblical verses, such as On the Sacrifices of Abel and Cain or Who is the Heir of Divine Things.31 The thematic approach leads to well-organised structural arrangement of the work. Throughout the treatise Philo writes transitional sentences, in which he makes explicit the transition from the discussion of one biblical verse on planting to another. This practice deviates from the method in the other treatises where he usually proceeds immediately from one biblical verse to another

29 30

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templative mode in Alexandria into Roman politics and discourses.” It is also worth noting that the final part of Plant. on the drunkenness of the wise man reflects Stoic discussions, and so does not fit very well into the scheme of intellectual development postulated by Niehoff. Sterling 2018a, esp. 1235–1237. For example, how to account for the place of Leg. at the beginning and Somn. at the end, and also for the transitional role of Conf. between the Noah and Abraham clusters. Sterling recognizes these issues ad loc. On the titles of Philo’s works, which in modern scholarly usage are mainly derived from early modern Latin translations, see Alexandre 1997. In the case of Plant. it accurately reflects the Greek title in the mss. except that we have not included the name of Noah. On the title see further below at the beginning of the Commentary.

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without making any remarks that indicate a transition. The second part of Plant. is exceptional because it deals with the views of philosophers on the question of the drunkenness by the wise person and does not set out the exegesis of a biblical verse. The structure of this part is more comparable to the philosophical treatise On the Eternity of the World. The difference between Agr. and Plant. on the one hand and the previous treatises of the Allegorical Commentary on the other led Maximilian Adler to a hypothesis on a development in Philo’s style of writing.32 According to this scholar Philo moved from a verse-byverse exegesis in Leg. to a more systematic and thematic structure in Agr. and Plant. The two treatises represent a turning point (Wendepunkt) in his development as a writer.33 In writing the two books Philo accomplishes a “new literary achievement.”34 Although Adler’s observations about the structure of Agr. and Plant. are correct, his hypothesis is not persuasive because in the treatises after Ebr. Philo returns to the looser structure of the earlier works in the Allegorical Commentary. A characteristic feature of Philo’s working method in the Allegorical Commentary is the practice that when interpreting a biblical verse he involves other biblical texts or secondary lemmata which he then proceeds to expound, sometimes at considerable length. A good example of this method can be seen in §§46–72. The starting-point is a brief reference to the planting of paradise by God (Gen 2:8) cited earlier in §32, following which Philo then proceeds to quote Moses’s prayer that God may plant the people of Israel on the mountain of God’s inheritance (Exod 15:17–18). He elaborates the Exodus text considerably, quoting Deut 32:7–9, where the people of Israel are referred to as the Lord’s portion. This verse is also explained and the mentioning of the Lord’s portion (Deut 10:9, Num 18:9) triggers Philo to speak about the tribe of Levi which has God as its portion. This whole complex of allegorical exegesis comes to an end in § 73, where, composing a transitional sentence, Philo rounds off the discussion of God as planter and turns to the treatment of the wise Abraham as planter. The intricacy of Philo’s allegory, in which several biblical verses are involved or alluded to, requires a great familiarity with the biblical text. For this reason it is commonly assumed that the Allegorical Commentary has been written for a Jewish audience and is often labelled as esoteric. By way of contrast, the Exposition of the Law, having a more exoteric character, is intended for a broader audience including Jews and non-Jews.35 32 33 34 35

Adler 1929, 48–53. Adler 1929, 52. Adler 1929, 51. For this distinction, see for example Goodenough 1933, 115–118; Morris 1987, 840; Royse 2009, 33, 47.

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Although Philo obviously prefers an allegorical interpretation, he does not reject a literal meaning totally.36 In Ebr. 130, for instance, he remarks that in a literal sense the command in Lev 10:8–10 (the prohibition for priests to drink wine) deserves admiration. Occasionally, he does exclude a literal meaning when the biblical text offers difficulties or seems to be strange and unworthy of God, as is the case with a literal reading of paradise: to think that vines and trees are planted by God is a great foolishness (§32). For that reason he proceeds to the allegorical interpretation. In Philo’s allegory biblical figures become universal and are regarded as prototypes of the soul. Abraham, for instance, is the example of the wise person and Philo assigns to him all the characteristics of a Stoic sage who is just, wise and has self-control. In the allegory he often uses etymology as an exegetical tool, by means of which names of biblical figures are translated and interpreted.37 He renders the name Isaac as “laughter” and therefore Isaac is a symbol of delight and joy. The presentation of Isaac’s wife Rebecca as patience is also based on the meaning of her name (§169). Philo’s method of allegorical interpretation has its origin at least partly in the criticism of the poets Homer and Hesiod in the early Greek philosophical tradition, starting with Xenophanes. In response philosophers and cultural critics developed interpretative strategies which enabled them to explain away the unethical and shameless behaviour of the gods as described by these early and highly authoritative poets.38 The discovery of the Derveni papyrus, however, has shown that there were broader currents in early Greek philosophy, particularly among the Pythagoreans, which engaged in symbolic interpretations of earlier poetry and perhaps even prose.39 Allegorical interpretation of passages from the Homeric poems is given by Heraclitus the allegorist in his work Homeric Problems.40 This author probably lived a generation or two after Philo, but refers explicitly to earlier allegorists. Another important allegorist was the Roman philosopher Cornutus, who was active in Rome in the second half of the first century CE and composed a treatise entitled Summary of the

36

37 38 39 40

For Philo’s allegorical interpretation and its background, see Hanson 1959, 37–64; Siegert 1996, 162–187; Kamesar 2009, 77–85. It is often thought that Stoic philosophers played a key role in this development, but this has been contested by Long 1997. Certainly its origin goes back beyond the third century BCE. See Runia 2004. See Siegert 1996, 130–187; Ramelli and Lucchetta 2004, 79–145. As demonstrated in Struck 2004. See Ramelli and Lucchetta 2004, 403–445; text and English translation by Russell and Konstan 2005.

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Traditions concerning Greek Mythology.41 Within a Stoic framework he offers allegorical interpretations of the Greek gods. A difference between Philo and these Greek allegorists is that they tend to reject a literal reading of the text. For example, Porphyry commences his symbolic interpretation of the Ithacan cave of the nymphs in Odyssey Book 13 by saying that the description is not based on factual information because no such cave is mentioned in accounts of the island.42 Philo on the other hand in principle accepts a literal interpretation and only rejects it when a passage is overtly mythical, as in the case of the serpent in the garden of Eden.43 Another difference is that Philo’s allegorical system is much more complex (and even convoluted) than anything we encounter in the Hellenic tradition. There is ample evidence that Philo’s allegorical method is rooted in Jewish exegetical practices that were developed in Alexandria in preceding centuries. An important witness is the Jewish author Aristobulus (second century BCE), who used allegory in order to explain away the anthropomorphisms in the Pentateuch.44 We have only fragments of his work in the church fathers Clement and Eusebius, but none of the fragments resembles the kind of allegory that is found in Plant. Philo frequently refers to other exegetes when presenting his own interpretations of Scripture, but these are always couched in anonymous terms. Passages in our treatise that refer to such exegetes are found at §§ 36, 52, 74 and 77.45

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The Exegetical Structure of the Treatise

In this section we present the structure of the treatise, following the method that has been developed by David Runia, and which has proved to be very helpful.46 In this approach the biblical quotations are essential for determining the structure of the work and form its “skeleton” as it were. The following abbreviations are used: 47 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

See Ramelli and Lucchetta 2004, 284–313; text Torres 2018, German translation by Busch and Zangenberg 2010, English translation Boys-Stones 2018. On this text see Lamberton 1983 (translation); 1986, 119–133. This aspect is emphasized by Pépin 1967. The fragments of Aristobulus have been collected by Holladay 1995. For a full list of such references see Hay 1979–1980, 42–43. See Runia 1984, esp. 241–244; 1987, 133–134. The method was previously used in Geljon and Runia 2013, 10–15. This terminology was introduced by Runia in his articles on Philo’s method of structuring his allegorical treatises; see Runia 1984; 1987; 1991; 2010; 2017. To call the biblical lemmata

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MBL

Main Biblical Lemma, the main biblical verse on which Philo comments. SBL Secondary Biblical Lemma, an additional biblical verse that is quoted in the explanation of the MBL. TBL Tertiary Biblical Lemma, another biblical text that is quoted to illustrate the meaning of a SBL. MOT Mode of Transition, the way in which the quoted verses are linked together. Note that a verbal MOT generally also entails a thematic MOT, but not vice versa. This structural analysis will form the basis of the divisions of our translation and the commentary based on it.48 Part 1: On Planting (§§1–138) Chapter 1: God as planter (§§1–72) Section A. The Planting of the Cosmos (a) The planting of the greatest plant, the cosmos (§§ 1–10) After treating the skill of cultivation we turn to that of planting vines. God created the cosmos out of earth, water, air, and fire. There is no need to look for a corporeal base. God’s eternal Word is the firm prop of the cosmos. (b) The formation of plants and living beings (§§ 11–16) God created living animals, which are assigned to the four divisions of the cosmos. Those in the air include incorporeal souls. He also produced plants which always stand in the same place. (c) The creation of the human being: citation of SBL Gen 2:7 and Gen 1:27 (MOT thematic) (§§17–22) The human being is a heavenly plant. His soul has been inbreathed by the divine spirit and so the human being has been made after the image of God’s Word. His body was made erect, so that he looks up to heaven and towards God.

48

“subordinate” or “auxiliary,” as Leonhardt-Balzer 1990, 245–246, does, is less exact, since they play a no less important role in the unfolding of the treatise’s structure and contents. For an alternative structural analysis of the treatise see Cazeaux 1989, 173–192. His analysis of Part 1 of the treatise bears similarities to our own, but we strongly disagree that in Part 2 there is a movement from philosophy (§§ 142–164) to scripture (§§165–177).

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(d) Divine souls are called above: citation of SBL Lev 1:1 and Exod 31:2 (MOT thematic, but note the verbal link between Gen 2:7 and Gen 31:3 which is implicitly cited in §23) (§§23–27) Those who long for wisdom are not focused on the body and earthly things but yearn for what is above in heaven. Examples are Moses and Bezalel, who are called upwards. Section B. The Creation of the Human Being, the Microcosm (§§ 28–72) (a) The trees in the human being: illustrated by SBL Ps 93:9 (MOT verbal φυτεύω) (§§28–31) The senses and the powers in the body are like trees or shoots planted by God, as illustrated by the Psalmist. (b) The planting of paradise, rejection of a literal reading: citation of SBL Gen 2:8 (MOT verbal φυτεύω, also ἔπλασεν) (§§ 32–35) God plants a garden (paradise) in Eden, but a literal interpretation raises theological problems, so we must turn to allegory. (c) The planting of paradise, allegorical reading: citation of TBL Ps 36:4 (MOT verbal τρυφή), continuation of SBL Gen 2:9 (MOT thematic ξύλον), and TBL Gen 25:27 (MOT verbal ἄπλαστος) (§§ 36–45) God has planted in the human soul a garden of virtues. The name Eden means “luxury,” a symbol of a joyful soul that rejoices in the Lord as the psalmist says. Further details explained are its position towards the East, the fact that only the human being is placed there and not animals, and that it is the moulded man who was introduced there. (d) Moses prays that Israel be planted in paradise: citation of SBL Exod 15:17– 18 (MOT verbal καταφυτεύω) (§§46–58) Moses prays that his people may be planted in the mountain of God’s inheritance (κληρονομία) so that they can imitate God and lead a good life. This world is the mountain of God’s inheritance because it is the possession and portion (κλῆρος) of its maker. God gives a portion since all things belong to him. The sacred band of wise souls is a special portion of God. (e) The part that belongs to God: citation of TBL Deut 32:7–9 (MOT thematic, but note that μερίς recalls κλῆρος, κληρονομία) and TBL Lev 16:8 (MOT verbal διακληρόω) (§§59–61) He who sees God is described as his portion and allotment/inheritance, whereas the sons of Adam are scattered. The former is symbolised by the goat that is assigned to the Lord on the Day of Atonement.

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The portion of the Levites: citation of TBL Deut 10:9 (MOT verbal μέρις, κλῆρος) and TBL Num 18:9 MOT verbal (μερίς, κληροδοσία) (§§ 62–72) The tribe of Levi, that is the purified mind, has the Lord as his portion, as stated in the two biblical texts. The name Levi means “himself for me.” To have the highest cause as one’s allotment is the greatest honour of all, reserved for those who seek wisdom.

Chapter 2: Abraham as Planter (§§73–93) (a) Transition to a new biblical text and outline of its interpretation: citation of SBL Gen 21:33 (MOT verbal φυτεύω) (§§ 73–74) Transition to the practices illustrated by the allegory of planting. Quotation of another biblical verse with the verb φυτεύω. The wise Abraham imitates the planting by God. Brief outline of main components of the allegorical explanation: tree, plot of land, fruit. (b) Explanation of “field”: SBL Gen 21:33 (§§75–77) The field representing the tree measures ten thousand square cubits. This is the most complete and perfect number and symbolizes that God is the beginning and limit of all things. (c) Explanation of “the well of the oath”: SBL Gen 21:33, to which is added the citation of TBL Gen 26:32–33 (MOT verbal φρέαρ, ὅρκος) (§§ 78–84) Those who investigate the nature of existing things resemble those who dig wells. Just as diggers of wells often do not find water, so researchers do not attain perfection of knowledge. The oath symbolizes the firm conviction of this fact, calling on God as witness. (d) Explanation of “the name of the Lord, God everlasting”: SBL Gen 21:33, to which is added the citation of TBL Gen 28:21 (MOT verbal κύριος, θεός) (§§85–92) The two names representing the fruit of the tree refer to the two powers of He who IS: Lord indicating him as ruler, God everlasting as bestowing benefits, which he does continuously. (e) Summary of allegorical exegesis of SBL Gen 21:33 (§ 93) The summary didactically lists the main points explained (cf. § 74). Chapter 3: Human Beings as Planters (§§94–138) (a) Citation of the biblical text: SBL Lev 19:23–25 (MOT verbal καταφυτεύω) (§§94–95) We, who are not yet perfect and are busy with our ordinary duties, also have to practise cultivation. (b) Explanation of “entering the land”: SBL Lev 19:23 (§§ 96–98) When the intellect has set out on the road of understanding, it will cul-

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tivate trees that bring forth cultivated fruit, and will strive for freedom from passions, knowledge, and good things. Explanation of “cleansing the uncleanness”: SBL Lev 19:23, to which is added the citation of TBL Gen 30:37 (MOT thematic) (§§ 99–112) Harmful shoots that grow among the ordinary duties should be cut away, such as hypocrisy and dishonesty. Note the practiser Jacob, who stripped rods to the white bark by tearing away the green, that is he does away with what is harmful in the duties and reveals what is good. Explanation of “three years”: SBL Lev 19:23 (§§ 113–116) Three years refer to the three parts of time: past, present, and future. The fruit of instruction does not need cleansing and will last forever. Explanation of “the fourth year”: SBL Lev 19:24 (§§ 117–131) Scripture recognizes the special significance of the number four, for example in the physical world, in ethics and mathematics. The fruit of instruction is “praiseworthy” in that it teaches praise and thanksgiving to God, the importance of which is shown by an ancient story. Explanation of “the fifth year”: SBL Lev 19:25, to which is added the quotation of TBL Gen 29:35 and Gen 30:18 (MOT thematic) (§§ 132–136) The number five refers to the five senses which nourish the mind. Judah, the fourth son of Leah, means “confession of praise to the Lord” and Issachar, the fifth, means “reward”. The cultivator receives a reward from the trees in the fifth year. Explanation of “I am the Lord your God”: SBL Lev 19:25, to which is added the citation of TBL Hos 14:9–10 (MOT verbal καρπός) (§§ 137–138) The fruit and the products belong to the One God. As the prophet states, the wise man who possesses the fruit of understanding will understand this.

Part 2: May a Wise Person Get Drunk (§§139–177) Chapter 1: Introduction (§§139–148) (a) Summary and repeated citation of the biblical text: MBL Gen 9:20–21 (§§139–140) We have now dealt with the most ancient form of cultivation utilized by the first cause and other related aspects. We will now examine a species of cultivation, viticulture. (b) Introduction of the theme of the inebriation of the wise person (§§ 141– 142) Noah cultivates the vine with knowledge and skill, but foolish persons do it in a unskillful way. We will later investigate what Moses said about

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drunkenness; now we discuss the opinion of the other philosophers on the question: will the wise man get drunk? (c) Brief overview of two contrasting views of philosophers (§§ 143–148) Some say that the drinking of wine befits a wise man, because his good sense will protect him from harmful results. Others say that a wise man should not drink wine, because he will no longer be able to control himself. Chapter 2: The Wise Person may get Drunk (§§149–174) (a) Setting out the two positions of the argument (§§ 149–150a) Our question clearly can be answered in two ways: the wise man will get drunk, or he will not get drunk. We start with proofs for the former position. (b) First argument: “wine” and “drunkenness” are synonyms (§§ 150b–155) There are homonyms and synonyms. “Drinking wine” and “getting drunk” are synonyms. Both words denote excessive indulgence in wine, which the wise man may wish to engage in for a variety of reasons. (c) Second argument: in earlier times people drank wine in the right way (§§156–164) In earlier times there was a more robust culture, in which wine was drunk with care and the appropriate decorum, as indicated by the etymology of the word μεθύειν as μετὰ τὸ θύειν describing the behaviour of the wise person. Nowadays people drink wine to excess with practices involving disgusting drinking contests. (d) Third argument: wine provides relaxation (§§ 165–172) Etymological argument: ἡ μέθη (drunkenness) is derived from μέθεσις (relaxation). Wine is the cause of relaxation for the soul. For Moses play and laughter belong to the goals of wisdom, as practised by Isaac (whose name means “laughter”) and Rebecca (meaning “patience”). Wine intensifies natural impulses for good or for the opposite. (e) Fourth (non-professional) argument: writers are positive about drinking wine (§§173–174) A non-professional argument: many writers have written about drinking wine, but they do not report about its misuse and that it would be a bad thing for the wise person to do. Chapter 3: Counter-argument: the Wise Person may not get Drunk (§§ 175–177) (a) Introducing the counter-argument: both points of view are needed (§ 175) It is also necessary to state the contrary position in the argument in order to reach a just verdict.

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(b) First argument: no one confides in a drunkard (§§ 176–177) No one will entrust a secret to a drunken man. But we should immediately state the opposed view. Absurd consequences for the wise person can be drawn from this argument. (End of Treatise) Philo himself gives indications for this structure, since in §§ 28, 73 and 94 he on each occasion writes a transitional sentence in which he rounds off the previous discussion and announces the new discussion. These sentences have been taken as indicating the beginning of a new chapter. In § 93 he rounds off Chapter Two by offering a summary. A key transitional passage is §§ 139– 140, in which he refers back to the entire treatment of planting in §§ 1–138, and announces the theme of inebriation by the wise person. It is clear that Philo here starts a new part. In fact, this second part of the treatise (§§ 139– 177) belongs more with the next treatise Ebr. than it does with the rest of Plant. It is difficult to determine why Philo placed it here. Perhaps he thought that the first part §§1–138 was too short for an entire treatise (but note that Sobr. is much shorter). The first part is thematically well integrated. It commences with the theme of God the planter, treating first the macrocosm and then the microcosm. It moves on to the planting carried out by the wise person, represented by the patriarchs Abraham (and also Jacob), and finishes with the treatment of human beings, including the author and his readers (note the use of the first person in § 94). The second part is also well arranged. After an introduction and the overview of two different positions (§§141–148) Philo presents four arguments for the view that the wise person may get drunk (§§ 149–174). These arguments are explicitly numbered (§§150, 156, 165 and 173). Next Philo goes on to give counter-arguments (§§175–177), but because he only presents the first argument very briefly, it is very likely that that part of the discussion and a concluding statement are missing.

4

The Use of the Bible

a Biblical Quotations It is now widely acknowledged that Philo is first and foremost an interpreter of scripture. In his exegesis of the Torah in the Allegorical Commentary he practises the rationale of explaining the Torah by the Torah, which he regards

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as written by one author, Moses.49 As we have already noted, while Philo is interpreting the biblical text that forms his starting point, the main biblical lemma (MBL), he regularly quotes other biblical verses, which are then expounded, sometimes quite briefly but not seldom at considerable length. These citations can be labelled as secondary biblical lemmata (SBL).50 The exegesis of a secondary biblical verse sometimes leads to the quotation of another biblical verse to illustrate or sustain the interpretation of the secondary biblical text. Because these verses are part of the exegesis of a secondary biblical text, they should be called tertiary biblical lemmata (TBL). Philo of course has his reasons for citing these texts and moving from the one to the other. Often verbal similarities prompt his choice, but on other occasions the link is only thematic and not verbal. These connections are indicated in the phrase “mode of transition.” In the following table all of Philo’s citations are summarised under the headings just outlined. Only those texts are included in which Philo cites or paraphrases the original text; short references or allusions are not included.

No

§

Text

Content

Kind

1 2 3 4 5 =4 6

§1 §19 §19 §23 §26 §26 §29

Gen 9:20 Gen 2:7 Gen 1:27 Lev 1:1 Exod 31:2 Lev 1:1 Ps 93:9

MBL SBL SBL SBL SBL SBL SBL

thematic thematic thematic thematic thematic verbal

7 8 9 =7 =8 10 11

§32 §36 §39 §41 §44 §44 §47

Gen 2:8 Gen 2:9 Ps 36:4 Gen 2:8 Gen 2:9 Gen 25:27 Exod 15:17–18

main biblical lemma God inbreathed the breath of life human being made after God’s image Moses is called up Bezalel is called up Moses is called up God plants the ears and forms the eyes God planted a paradise trees in paradise luxuriate in the Lord God planted a paradise trees in paradise Jacob as unmoulded man Moses’s prayer to plant Israel

SBL SBL TBL SBL SBL TBL SBL

verbal thematic verbal verbal thematic verbal verbal

49

50

Mode of transition

Here Philo is following established Greek method as practised in the interpretation of Homer and encapsulated in the formula Homerum ex Homero; see Schaüblin 1977; Porter 1992; Mansfeld 1994, 178–179. On the terminology see above n. 47.

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(cont.)

No

§

Text

Content

Kind

Mode of transition

12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

§59 §61 §63 §63 §73 §78 §90 §94

Deut 32:7–9 Lev 16:8 Deut 10:9 Num 18:20 Gen 21:33 Gen 26:32–33 Gen 28:21 Lev 19:23–25

TBL TBL TBL TBL SBL TBL TBL SBL

thematic verbal verbal verbal verbal verbal verbal verbal

20 21 22 23 24 25 =1 26

§108 §110 §111 §134 §134 §138 §140 §169

Num 5:15 Gen 30:37 Lev 13:12, 13 Gen 29:35 Gen 30:18 Hosea 14:9–10 Gen 9:20–21 Gen 26:8

Israel as the Lord’s portion allotting two goats the Lord is allotment of Levi God is portion of Levi Abraham planted a ploughed field well of the oath Jacob’s prayer: Lord may become God cleansing of trees at the entering of the promised land sacrifice of remembrance Jacob stripped rods command regarding leprosy Judah as offering praise to the Lord Issachar as reward fruit is from God main biblical lemma Isaac plays with Rebecca

TBL TBL TBL TBL TBL TBL MBL example51

thematic thematic thematic thematic thematic verbal thematic

The table demonstrates that in addition to the main biblical lemma Philo offers 26 different citations, nearly almost of which are from the Pentateuch. The division according to biblical books is as follows: Genesis 12 Exodus 2 Leviticus 4 Numbers 2 Deuteronomy 2 Psalms 2 Hosea 1

51

As noted in our commentary ad loc., this text is not really an SBL, because it is used an an example to illustrate an argument, and is not connected to the exegesis of the main text.

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The book of Genesis dominates this list with 12 citations, whereas only a few quotations are borrowed from each of the other books of the Pentateuch. Philo quotes the Psalms 18 times in the Allegorical Commentary, so two quotes in a single treatise is more than usual.52 Especially striking, however, is the citation from Hosea, since Philo seldom quotes the prophets, and in all his writings Hosea is quoted only three times. The distribution of biblical quotations in Plant. is fairly similar to that found in Agr.53 In the earlier treatise 24 different biblical verses are quoted, with again the largest number (9) from Genesis. The other books of the Pentateuch are similarly represented, apart from Deuteronomy, which is quoted no less than six times. There is also one quotation from the Psalms in Agr. There is much variation in the provenance of the citations. Some are taken from the narratives of the patriarchs, others are part of a prayer, but ordinances are quoted as well. The four most important secondary biblical texts are Gen 2:8; Exod 15:17–18; Gen 21:33; and Lev 19:23–25. These four citations are discussed extensively and their interpretation is illustrated and elaborated by tertiary biblical texts. The secondary citations have a structural role, as can be seen in the presentation of the structure of the treatise in section 3 above. Usually, the tertiary citations are only discussed quite briefly, as can be observed in §§ 61–63, where Philo quotes Lev 16:8; Deut 10:9; and Num 18:20. In § 108 Num 5:15 is only quoted without further explanation. At the end of the discussion of Lev 19:23– 25 Philo introduces Judah and Issachar as illustrations of the numbers four and five. As a rule, therefore, tertiary biblical texts play a less prominent role in the structure of the treatise. In the majority of cases the biblical quotations are linked together through verbal parallels. The importance of this mode of transition can be gauged from the fact that the verb φυτεύω appears both in the main biblical lemma and in the four most prominent secondary texts which play a key role in the treatise’s structure. Similarly, the quotations in §§61–63 are linked together by the occurrence of the words “lot” and/or “portion.” But as can be seen in the table above, there are quite a few occasions when the trigger to quote a verse is furnished by thematic agreement. For example, when discussing the creation of the cosmos Philo quotes two verses on the creation of the human being (Gen 2:7; 1:27; § 19). Clearly a verbal agreement implies a thematic agreement, but the reverse does not apply. Philo assumes that his readers are very well acquainted with the Pentateuch, because most citations are simply introduced by the words “he says” or “it is 52 53

See the listing at Runia 2001b, 104–105. See Geljon and Runia 2013, 16–17.

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said.” The name of Moses is only rarely named in the introductory remarks preceding the citation (§§108, 134). By way of contrast, on both occasions the author of the Psalms is fully introduced, as a divinely inspired man and as a member of the sacred band of Moses respectively (§§ 29, 39). It is apparent that Philo felt the need to emphasize the authority of the author of the Psalms. In one case only does he refer to the name of a biblical book, Leviticus (§ 26). In §59 he refers to Moses’s utterances in Deut 32 as the “Greater song.” b Philo’s Text of the Pentateuch Philo’s exegesis is based on the text of the Septuagint. It is noteworthy, therefore, that his quotations do not always correspond with the text of the LXX as we find it in our modern editions.54 Although we are not able to reconstruct the text of LXX in Philo’s time with full certainty, it is clear that he does not always quote exactly. Sometimes he changes the order of words, at other times he adds or omits words. These alterations may have been made for stylistic reasons. The citations of our treatise have been examined in detail by James Royse. He draws attention to the fact the biblical citations in the medieval manuscripts deviate at some places from the reading of the text of the LXX as we have it.55 It seems that the quotations have been retouched according to the Greek of Aquila’s version of the Bible, which is closer to the Hebrew. It has been suggested by Barthélemy that this was done by a Jewish scribe when copying out Philo’s writings.56 A good example is found in §47 where Exod 15:17–18 is quoted. The manuscripts read the translation of Aquila, but in one codex the text of the LXX is written over an erasure. In our commentary we systematically set out and discuss all the places where Philo’s text deviates from the transmitted Pentateuch text.

5

The Main Themes of the Treatise

Although Plant. is an exegetical treatise, Philo in his usual manner draws in numerous philosophical and theological themes into the exposition of the biblical texts which he has selected. In this section we set out in a systematic way some important themes that occur in our treatise.57 54 55 56 57

For the text of Philo’s LXX, see Sterling 2012a. Royse 2017. See Barthélemy 1967. In this section we do not give references to the secondary literature. These will be found in the commentary at the relevant places.

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a Planting Given the phrasing of the main biblical text on which the entire treatise is based, the theme of planting naturally occupies a central place. All the main biblical texts that Philo cites relate to planting and particularly to the skills of planting and looking after trees. It is a rich metaphor which he exploits in many different ways. The theme of the garden of Eden as paradise fits in well, though Philo feels the need to emphasize that it must not be taken literally (§§ 32–33). The theme of the planting and cleansing of fruit trees in Lev 19 is particularly suitable, because it elicits the religious motif of giving thanks to God (§ 126), as well as providing the opportunity for the number symbolism that he loves to use in his exegesis (§§120–125). Just as in the previous treatise Agr., there is a background of contemporary agricultural and botanical practice behind Philo’s metaphor, though it is not always easy to determine exactly what he is referring to (e.g. at §112). b Theology: God the Creator The theme that dominates the first part of the treatise is the presentation of God as creator and planter of the cosmos. Linking up with the biblical text in which Noah is referred to as a planter, Philo introduces God as the greatest planter, who is most perfect in his skill, while the cosmos is depicted as the largest and most fertile plant. Following Plato, Philo regards God’s creative act as bringing material which lacks order from disorder to order (§§ 2–4). Since the cosmos is the greatest plant, the living beings are seen as particular and smaller plants (§11). In creating the cosmos God employs his creative power, for which the name “God” (θεός) is used. By means of this power he disposed and ordered all that he brought into being. The title God (θεός) is thus connected with the verb τίθημι (to dispose), which indicates God’s creative act. Through this power God confers benefits to the created beings. This beneficent power is sometimes also called the merciful power (§§46, 90). The designation “Lord” (κύριος) refers to the power by which he rules the creation (§ 86). In explaining Gen 21:33 Philo interprets the title “God everlasting” (θεὸς αἰώνιος) as indicating that God always and continuously confers benefits without ceasing (§ 89). For God it is the most appropriate task to do good and for the creatures the most fitting task is to give thanks to the creator (§ 130). Human beings can offer sacrifices to God, but God looks only at the intention of the one who makes the sacrifice. He rejoices in altars without fire around which the virtues dance (§108). Basing himself on Exod 3:14, Philo calls God “the One who IS” (§§ 21– 22, 72), indicating his transcendence (but this aspect of his theology receives little emphasis in our treatise). Since God is the creator of the cosmos he is also referred to as the Cause (§27), the highest and greatest Cause (§ 64) or

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the most excellent of causes (§131). The titles “leader of the entire universe” (§§2, 14, 60 etc.) and “sovereign ruler” (§§33, 58) emphasize God’s rulership over the creation. By the same token he is named great king (§ 33). God’s care for human beings can be seen in his designation as father (§§ 9, 129, 135). Philo also presents God as the beginning and limit of all things (§ 77). c The Divine Logos God, the greatest craftsman, has created the entire universe, but the everlasting Logos of God functions as the most secure support of the universe (§ 8). Philo presents the Logos as stretching from the middle to the outer limits of the cosmos. Being an unbreakable bond of the Whole, he joins together and constricts all the parts (§9). Here the Logos obviously has an immanent function, but at the same time it signifies the divine presence in the world and so has a transcendent aspect. The Logos is also important in explaining the relationship between God and human beings. Philo explains that the soul of the human being has been formed as an image after the Logos of God (§§ 18–19). In this context the everlasting Logos is described as the impress of God’s seal (§18). d Anthropology Philo’s anthropology is based on the view that the human being consists of body and soul (§§79, 99). The soul has been formed as an image after the Logos of God and is the divine element in humans (§20). In this text the rational soul is meant. Elsewhere (§42) Philo calls the highest part of the soul mind or intellect, which is seen as the true human being. In this treatise the irrational parts of the soul are not emphasized, but instead the body is described as the place of the wild plagues of passions and vices. It is symbolized by Noah’s ark, into which wild animals were introduced (§43). When creating the human body God places the five senses in different parts of the body, and they nourish the mind (§§29, 83, 113). In Philo’s view the human being has a special position within God’s creation as being the only creature that stands upright and is able to gaze up at the heaven. Therefore the human being is called a heavenly and not an earthly plant (§17). As a result the mind can be lifted up and ascend through the entire universe until it sees God with the eyes of the soul (§§ 21– 25). Requisite for seeing and knowing God is complete purification from all that belongs to the realm of becoming (§64). The person who lives a life of virtue and has succeeded in seeing and knowing God attains perfect felicity (cf. §§ 37, 66).

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e Ethics: Living According to Nature and Overcoming the Passions Philo describes the aim in life and the end of philosophy as living according to nature. Because for him nature can be taken as a description of God himself, he explains living in agreement with nature as consisting in following God. One who follows God has a life that shows moderation and does not stumble (§49). He travels on the road of wisdom, controlling the passions and striving for freedom from their influence. This road is placed in opposition to the way that leads to evil and death (§ 37). He who travels on this path and glorifies the world of becoming tumbles into trackless regions full of ravines (§61). Interpreting the command to plant edible trees when entering the land (Lev 19:23), Philo explains that he who sets out upon the road of moral insight begins to cultivate impassibility instead of passions, knowledge instead of ignorance and good things instead of evil (§ 98). He interprets in a similar way the command regarding leprosy that the person who is no longer marked by a variety of colours but is completely white is cleansed. This person has annihilated the mind’s passion with all its variegated, unstable and evil characteristics (§111). Through living the ethical life in response to the divine commandments the human being can attain the life of perfection and felicity (§§37, 134). f Angelology In Greek philosophy it was thought that intermediate entities, called daemons or heroes, live in the air between heaven and earth. Philo joins in this tradition, identifying daemons with the angels in the Bible. He introduces them as reporting good things from God to human beings and telling God what his subjects are in need of (§14). In this way he clearly links the name “angel” with the verb ἀγγέλλω (to report). Angels are also mentioned in Deut 32:8 cited in § 59, but Philo does not comment on this feature of the biblical text. The “subordinate” who responds to God’s question in the story told in § 127 may well be identified with an angel, though Philo does not tell us this explicitly. g The Figure of Moses Philo regards Moses as the writer of the entire Pentateuch, which he describes as “the prophetic word” (§117) or the “oracles” (§§ 23, 36, 63, 109). Moses is referred to as all-wise (§27) and most holy (§§86, 168). He is the steward and guardian of the rites of God (§26). Because he has an insatiable desire for heavenly things, he is called upwards towards the divine (§ 26; Lev 1:1). Bezalel is also called up, but he is judged worthy of the second prize because he is called up for the task of constructing the tabernacle. This explains his name, for Bezalel is interpreted as “making in shadows” and bodily realities are shadowy compared

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with the higher realities. Since Moses is involved with the archetypal natures of the realities themselves, he wins the first prize (§ 27). h Other Biblical Figures In his exegesis Philo introduces several biblical figures, whom he explains briefly. The central figure in the treatise is of course Noah, but in fact Philo pays him very little attention, calling him the “just person” based on Gen 6:9 when he is reintroduced in §140. His position on the path to perfect virtue is left undetermined (in the second half of Agr. he was still a beginner). In § 73 Abraham is introduced as a wise man. For Jacob Philo draws on the standard interpretation of the one who acquires virtue through practice (§§ 90, 110). Jacob’s wife Leah is seen in allegorical terms as virtue. Her son Judah is explained as offering praise to the Lord, and the name of her son Issachar means reward (§ 134). Translating the name Isaac as laughter, Philo introduces him as a symbol of joy, while his wife Rebecca represents patience (§ 169). The final figure whose role should be noted is another of Jacob’s sons, Levi. Explaining the biblical datum that Levi’s tribe has God as its portion and inheritance (Deut 10:9, Num 18:20), Philo interprets the name of Levi as “himself for me.” Consequently, his tribe is the symbol of the purified mind that rejects all that belongs to the world of becoming and knows only God (§ 63– 64). i Israel The people of Israel are mentioned in the treatise only in two cited biblical texts, Deut 32:9 in §59 and Deut 10:9 in §63. Using his usual etymology of the word, however, Philo interprets the earlier of these references allegorically as “the visionary character that is his [God’s] true worshipper” and contrasts him with the “children of the earth” (i.e. Adam) who are identified with the world of becoming. The people or nation of Israel thus recedes in favour of the virtuous and pious person orientated towards right living and seeking to draw near to God. Nevertheless the focus on the tribe of Levi who are God’s suppliants and receive the priesthood as their prize (§63) introduces a collective element, which may refer to the Jewish people, but also to those philosophical souls who recognize God as the creator and highest cause of all things (§ 64). j Possessing or Attaining Wisdom The concept of wisdom plays a key role in the treatise. God the creator is allwise (§28, cf. §§38, 46). The biblical figures Moses (§ 27), Abraham (§§ 73, 94) and Isaac (§170) are examples of wise persons, as is also Socrates who is anonymously described as “in love with the beauty of wisdom” (§ 65, cf. § 80). There

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are those who have “an insatiable longing for wisdom and knowledge” (§ 23). They are called upwards (Lev 1:1), with Moses gaining the first prize and Bezalel the second. There is a “sacred band of wise souls” who receive God as an allotment, i.e. they have been given the privilege of a special place in his service (§§58, 71–72). But there are also souls, among whom Philo—using the first person plural—counts himself and his readers, who have not yet reached perfection and are advancing on the path to wisdom (§§ 94, 97). Through the allegorical interpretation of the commands for planting and growing fruit (Lev 19:23–25) they learn that their chief task is to give thanks to God for his goodness (§§130–131). Both Judah and Issachar receive the reward for carrying out this task (§136). Instruction and moral insight are the possession of God the sovereign ruler (§137). It is the mark of the wise person to understand this, as was recognized by the inspired prophet Hosea (14:9–10) when he asks the (rhetorical question): “who is wise and will understand these things?” These words are the climax of the first part of the treatise dealing with planting. By following the theme of wisdom we can see a trajectory from God and the wise who have attained wisdom and knowledge through the journey of the souls who have not yet attained perfect wisdom to the insight which will provide them with what they seek. The theme of wisdom thus gives this first part a thematic unity. In the second part the focus is entirely on the question of whether the wise person (σοφός) will become inebriated. But, as we have seen in section 3 above, this part belongs thematically more with the following treatise than the first part of the present treatise.

6

The Intellectual Sitz im Leben

As a philosophical and religious thinker it cannot be otherwise than that Philo has been influenced by the intellectual environment of his time. In this section we give an outline of the intellectual background which is important for a sound understanding of his work. Since Philo is a Jewish exegete of scripture who interprets the Pentateuch within a Greek philosophical framework, the Sitz im Leben of the treatise has two components: Judaism on the one hand, and Hellenism, especially the Greek philosophical tradition, on the other. a Judaism Philo is not the first Jewish exegete writing in Greek who interprets the Pentateuch in allegorical terms. He had predecessors of whom only fragments have been preserved. In section 2 we already referred to Aristobulus, who in all likelihood lived in the second century BCE during the reign of Ptolemy VI Philometer

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(180–145). From the fragments of his work that remain it appears that he, like Philo, seeks to connect together the Bible and Greek philosophy, going so far as to claim that Greek philosophers had borrowed their thought from the Bible.58 Just like Philo, he interprets the Pentateuch in allegorical terms, although in a much less complex way. Both authors base their exegesis on the Greek translation of the Hebrew Bible, which was gradually produced from the early third century onwards in Alexandria in order to keep the Jewish scriptures accessible for Jews in Alexandria who could no longer read it in the Hebrew original. It is very probable that Philo himself could not read and understand the Hebrew text.59 It is true that he frequently refers to etymologies of Hebrew names, but there is general agreement that he was dependent on etymological lists for this information.60 In contrast to Aristobulus, whose exegesis shows a philosophical bent, the writings of other Jewish authors of the second temple period consist for the most part in rewritings, explanations and expansions of the biblical story as told in the Pentateuch.61 They deal also with the story of Noah and the flood, but the planting of Noah and his drunkenness is rarely mentioned.62 It is retold in Genesis Apocryphon, a treatise written in Aramaic on a scroll that was found in Qumran. The manuscript is in bad condition and only fragmentarily preserved. We possess the fragment in which Noah tells us that he planted a vineyard and held a feast. The fragments of the text suggest that Noah also offered a sacrifice (Col. XII.13–19). The offering of a sacrifice by Noah when drinking the wine that he produced is not found in Genesis, where it is told that Noah built an altar directly after the flood (Gen 8:20). Noah’s sacrifice has a parallel in Jubilees, where it is recounted at considerable length (7:1–6), whereas his drunkenness is only mentioned en passant (7:7).63 In his short retelling of Gen 9:20 Jose58 59

60 61

62 63

See Holladay 1995, 43–75. For similarities between Philo and Aristobulus see Borgen 1984, 274–279. For some recent verdicts arguing Philo’s lack of knowledge of Hebrew Winston 2009, 235; Sterling 2012c, 427; Niehoff 2018, 4, 251. Rajak’s attempt, 2009, 149–150 and 2014, to question this consensus is not convincing. As demonstrated by Grabbe 1988. He notes, 15–17, that some of these lists have been found among the Egyptian papyri. Scholars have postulated the existence of a genre of “rewritten Bible”; see Alexander 1988, and the judicious remarks of Burnette-Bletsch 2012, 453–455. Note, however, that allegory is found in the Letter to Aristeas, where there is no direct connection with the biblical account. Sharon and Tishel 2010, 161–162. According to Burnette-Bletsch 2012, 460 it is omitted from Ps.Philo LAB because it is “embarassing.” The relationship between Genesis Apocryphon and Jubilees is a matter of dispute. For this discussion see Machiela 2009, 8–20, 140–142. He suggests that both texts originated

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phus also reports that Noah offered a sacrifice when the wine had matured. Thereafter he was drunken and fell asleep (A.J. 1.140–141). Besides the tradition of Noah’s sacrifice there is another tradition in which Noah is linked with Adam and according to which the tree of knowledge in paradise was a vine. This notion is found in 3Baruch, where an angel is presented as informing Baruch about it.64 The angel also relates that, having found the shoot of vine after the flood, Noah hesitates to plant it, knowing the danger of its fruit. He is commanded to plant the vine but receives a warning: “But beware, Baruch: the tree still possesses its evil. Those who drink wine in excess do all evil.” We may conclude that regarding Noah as a planter there are two striking additions to the Genesis narrative in the Jewish tradition: that he offers a sacrifice when he first drinks the wine, and that he plants the same tree as the tree in paradise. In spite of his knowledge of Jewish traditions, Philo does not make use of this extra-biblical material. It has already been mentioned when discussing the genre of the treatise in section 2 above, that Philo clearly stands in a tradition of allegorical exegesis of the Septuagint and that he was acquainted with work of other allegorists. Regrettably apart from the anonymous references that he gives, we do not know anything about these allegorists, whether they were active before his time or were his contemporaries, and whether there were different groups of allegorists. It would be surprising if others attained the degree of complexity and sophistication shown by Philo in his treatises and it may be safely assumed that his work represents the climax of this remarkable Alexandrian tradition. In this context we should mention another Jewish treatise written in Greek which shows the influence of Greek philosophy. 4 Maccabees uses the story of the martyrdoms during the persecution of Antiochus IV Epiphanes to illustrate how reason, i.e. the rational faculty of the mind, can exercise control over the passions through obedience to the commandments of the Law. The author writes:65 “When God fashioned human beings, he planted in them (περιεφύτευσεν) passions and inclinations, but at the same time he enthroned the mind among the senses as a sacred governor over them all. To the mind he gave the Law, and one who lives subject to it will rule a kingdom that is temperate, just,

64

65

around the same period and made use of common exegetical traditions of Genesis. He argues for an early to mid second century BCE date for the Apocryphon. 3 Bar. 4:8–17. We cite the translation of H.E. Gaylord, Jr in Charlesworth 1983, 1.668. Similarly in the Apocalypse of Abraham we are told that the fruit of the tree in Eden was like a bunch of grapes of the vine (23:6). It is also found in the rabbinic tradition, Sharon and Tishel 2010, 163. 4 Macc 2:21–23, translation de Silva, (slightly modified).

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good and courageous.” The term “planted” here recalls our treatise and especially the allegorical exegesis of Gen 2:8, but it is striking that this work does not contain any allegorical interpretation. It is thought to have been written in the second half of the first century CE and demonstrates the continuing influence of Greek philosophy in the Jewish diaspora.66 It is difficult to determine Philo’s relationship to traditions of exposition of the law as they developed in the pre-rabbinic period. In a unique reference Philo tells us en passant that he went to the temple in Jerusalem to pray and sacrifice (Prov. 2.107). This suggests that he may have been acquainted with the interpretations of the Law as these had been developed before the destruction of the temple. The state of our source-material, however, prevents us from reaching firm conclusions on this relationship. The rabbinic writings, in which interpretations and explanations of the Hebrew Bible are given, are written down much later than Philo, but they do contain material from earlier periods.67 As can be expected, the rabbis discuss the planting of Noah and his drunkenness.68 We are told that the vine that Noah planted has come from paradise and its fruit ripened the same day that it was planted (Targum PseudoJonathan Gen 9:20; Pirke de Rabbi Eliezer 23). At the same time Noah is blamed for not having taken a warning from Adam, whose transgression was caused by wine. The tree from which Adam ate was a vine, for nothing else but wine brings woe to a man (b.Sanh. 70a). These themes are familiar from the traditions of “rewritten Bible” discussed above.69 Noah is also criticized for planting a vineyard and not something valuable, for instance a fig shoot or an olive shoot. When he planted the vineyard, he was helped by Satan. Because he drank without restraint, he became drunk (Genesis Rabbah 36.3–4). It is Philo’s use of allegory to explain the planting of the vineyard and his partial evaluation of Noah’s behaviour in terms of Greek virtue ethics that sets him apart from later Jewish tradition in antiquity. A reminder, however, that we should not exaggerate the distance between Philo and the rabbis is the fact that both envisage a connection between the two names of God and the divine powers (§ 86), although they have different identifications.

66 67 68 69

For the date see de Silva 2013, 2363. He follows Van Henten 1997, 80–81 in arguing for an origin in Asia Minor rather than Alexandria. On Philo’s relationship to the rabbinic tradition see Winston 2009. For Philo’s relationship to the Dead Sea Scrolls see the special section in SPhiloA 19:81–142. See Amihay 2010, 212–214. See above at n. 61.

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b Hellenism In his writings Philo reveals a profound knowledge of Greek literature and philosophy, quoting from or referring to many Greek writers and philosophers.70 It indicates that he had had an excellent Greek education and was well acquainted with the various philosophical movements of his time.71 Of all the Greek philosophers it is Plato and the Platonic tradition derived from him that exerts the greatest attraction on Philo. This is hardly unexpected, for the Platonic view of a transcendent God, on whom the visible cosmos depends, and who is moreover described with the language of being, aligns well with biblical doctrines that are central to his thought.72 In his treatises there about 27 quotations from Plato, which have been taken from eight different works, for the most part from the celebrated dialogue the Timaeus.73 In Plant. too the Timaeus is prominently present, especially in the account of God’s planting the cosmos (§§3–7). Many aspects in this so-called “phytocosmological” passage are taken from Plato’s dialogue about the creation of the world, for example the idea that the creative act by God consists in bringing order from disorder (§3; Tim. 30a). Philo’s presentation of the divine Logos as extending throughout the whole cosmos reminds us of the world soul in Plato (Tim. 34b, 36e).74 In his description of the creation of the human being Philo literally quotes Plato’s characterization of human being as “a plant that is not earthly but heavenly” (§17; Tim. 90a6–7). A second citation from the Timaeus can be found in §131. In both cases Philo refers to Plato anonymously, but he will have expected the reader to understand where the quotation comes from. By Philo’s time Platonism had developed into what modern scholars now call Middle Platonism. A crucial figure in this movement is thought to have been Eudorus, who lived and worked in Alexandria perhaps a generation before Philo. Mauro Bonazzi argues that Philo is a witness to a “decisive moment” in the history of Platonism when various models and images of Plato were in circulation, not necessarily all consistent with each other but not incompatible either.75 Earlier John Dillon had devoted a chapter to Philo in his seminal handbook on Middle Platonism.76 The lack of evidence, however, makes it difficult 70 71 72 73 74 75 76

See the index by Lincicum 2013. The several philosophical schools and their influence on Philo are discussed by Sterling 2014. For an excellent account of Philo’s reception of Plato and the influence of Platonism on his thought see now Yli-Karjanmaa 2017. For Philo’s use of the Timaeus see Runia 1986. See Runia 1986, 389–392. See Bonazzi 2008, 250–251. Dillon 1996, 139–183.

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to determine exact relationships and affiliations. Whether Philo himself can be seen as a Middle Platonist is a disputed question.77 In our view this goes too far, since Philo’s first loyalty is to Judaism and scripture. But the importance of Platonism for Philo’s thought is beyond all doubt. An interesting example of the intermingling of Platonist and biblical themes is found in § 14 of our treatise. The doctrine that the air is inhabited by a kind of intermediate entities, called daemons or heroes, is prominent in Middle Platonist cosmology. Philo assumes that the air is inhabited by pure and incorporeal souls, stating that the Greek philosophers call them heroes, but Moses refers to them as angels. The description of angels as bringing good news from God to his subjects and reporting to God what the subjects are in need of has been borrowed from Plato’s Symposium (202e). Plato’s most famous pupil was Aristotle, and the Aristotelian school, the Peripatos, also had a revival in the first century BCE. In the middle of the century Andronicus of Rhodes published a new edition of Aristotle’s writings. In his philosophical treatise Aet. Philo names Aristotle explicitly four times (§§ 10, 12, 16, 18) and sets out various arguments for the Aristotelian doctrine of the uncreated and indestructible nature of the cosmos (but this may not be Philo’s final word on this question). In our treatise at §3 he introduces another prominent Aristotelian doctrine, the introduction of a fifth, divine element in addition to the four elements out of which the heavens are composed (Cael. 1.3; Mete. 1.3 340b6–11). Scholars have reached differing verdicts on the extent to which Aristotle’s thought had an impact on Philo.78 Noteworthy are the parallels between Philo and the small treatise De Mundo, included in the Aristotelian corpus but certainly not written by Aristotle himself.79 A doctrine that Philo and the author of De Mundo share is the concept of divine power permeating the entire universe. Philo’s comparison of God with the Great king (§ 33) is also found in De Mundo. Another philosophical movement that is of great importance for understanding Philo’s thought is the school of the Stoics. It can be argued that in the 77 78

79

For this question see Sterling 1993; Runia 1993b; and Dillon 1993, who gives a response to both. A.P. Bos, for instance, strongly advocates Aristotle’s influence on Philo, see Bos 1998. See also Glucker 2013. By way of contrast Lévy 2011 minimalizes Philo’s debt to Aristotle. On Philo and post-Aristotelian Peripatetic thought see Sharples 2008. An extensive overview of the discussion on its authorship and date is given by Reale and Bos 1995, 23–171. It has been dated as early as between 350 and 250 BCE (Schenkeveld 1991 on the basis of vocabulary) but most scholars date it closer to Philo’s time. Pohlenz 1942, 480–487 even suggested tentatively that the Alexander to whom the treatise is dedicated is Tiberius Julius Alexander, Philo’s nephew.

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first-century BCE Stoicism was the dominant philosophy in the Greco-Roman world and that in this century and the next a struggle for pre-eminence was taking place between Stoicism and Platonism.80 In our treatise the best illustration of the importance of Stoic doctrine is given by Philo’s approach to the passions, which has a highly Stoic imprint.81 Generally speaking, the Alexandrian models the patriarchs in according with the ideals of the Stoic sage, e.g. Abraham who is presented as the wise person who becomes perfect through learning (§73).82 Like the Stoics he promotes the ideal of freedom of passions (ἀπάθεια; §98). While explaining Moses’s prayer in Exod 15:17–18 as a call to follow God. he cites “the first thinkers” who say that “to live in agreement with nature is the final goal of felicity (§49).” Almost certainly he has the Stoics in mind here. He also offers a Stoic definition of goodwill in § 106. Referring to indemonstrable argument in syllogisms, Philo shows his familiarity with Stoic logic (§115). The terms that he uses to describe good people (σπουδαῖος, literally “serious” §69 and ἀστεῖος, literally “urbane” or “honorable” § 139) and worthless people (φαῦλος §172) are also familiar from Stoic texts.83 It must be borne in mind, however, that in Philo’s time Stoic terminology was widespread and was also in use outside Stoic circles (not least among Platonists). Finally, his treatment of the question whether a wise person may get drunk reflects the discussion on this issue in Stoic circles. We return to this topic in section 9b below. In Philo’s time there was a revival of interest in the doctrines of Pythagoreanism, resulting a movement now known as Neopythagoreanism.84 Followers of this school of thought, such as Moderatus and Numenius, were in practice closely aligned to the Middle Platonists.85 Prominent among these doctrines is the theory of numbers, in which numbers have a special meaning and are connected with philosophical concepts. Philo employs Pythagorean arithmology at some length in his explanation of “the fourth year” (Lev 19:24, §§ 117–125),

80 81

82 83 84 85

See the recent collection of articles by Engberg-Pedersen 2017. On the passions see Kerns 2013. Articles by Long 2008, Radice 2008, Reydams-Schils 2008, and Graver 2008 deal with different Stoic notions in Philo’s writings. Very recently Niehoff 2018 has strongly emphasized the importance of Stoicism for Philo’s intellectual development. In the Allegorical Commentary its influence is present, but limited. Later, when he spends time in Rome, the influence of Roman Stoicism in Niehoff’s view was profound. See also above section 1 at nn. 23 and 24. See Roskam 2005, 173–179. We translate these terms with “good,” “honourable” and “worthless” respectively. On this revival see Bonazzi et al. 2007. For Pythagorean influence on Philo see Dillon 2014, 263–266. Dillon 1996, 383 speaks of “the Pythagorean strand in Middle Platonism.”

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setting out many features of the number four, including its role as symbol of justice and equality. Many parallels can be found with Pythagorean sources on number theory, which demonstrates his familiarity with the writings of the movement. Clement of Alexandria sees such a close affinity between Philo and the Pythagoreans that he actually twice calls Philo “the Pythagorean” (Strom. 1.72.4; 2.100.3).86 The philosophical school which is almost entirely missing in Plant. is that of the Epicureans. Philo feels very little affinity with its doctrines on account of the denial of divine providence and the exaltation of pleasure.87 Nevertheless, Epicureanism forms a background to the discussion on whether the wise person will allow himself to get drunk (§§141–148). Finally, we mention the school of the Cynics, named after the Greek word for dog, κύων, because of their shameless and “doglike” behaviour. Philo mentions the famous Cynic philosopher Diogenes in § 151. Just like the Cynics, Philo denounces luxurious clothing and gastronomic excess (§§ 105, 159). The Sitz im Leben of the treatise is also illustrated by its vocabulary and style of writing. Everyone who reads the Greek of Philo will be struck by his expressive, rich and abundant style, in which he employs well-known figures of speech and makes abundant use of metaphors and comparisons. His vocabulary is based on the classical Attic Greek writers, but he naturally also uses words that have come into vogue during the Hellenistic period and are found in writers as Polybius, Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Strabo.88 In addition he occasionally employs poetic words.89 The theme of planting has caused him to employ some rare words that are found in the botanical treatises of Theophrastus.90 It is particularly striking that his vocabulary includes words that appear to be very rare in Greek literature before him.91 Most important of all, we come across a category of words that are not attested before him, some of which are even only found in his writings.92 Some of these words are specially related to his religious and theological world-view. These are later taken

86 87 88 89 90

91 92

On this epithet see Runia 1995 and Otto 2013. For Philo’s stance towards Epicureanism see Lévy 2000. For Philo’s vocabulary see Siegfried 1875, 31–137. Examples of Hellenistic words are ταλαντεύω (§ 7), ἀχθοφορέω (§ 8), συνήχω (§ 10), ἐνδιαίτημα (§53), τηλαυγής (§115). Examples are κατωκάρα (§ 16), γηθοσύνη (167). Ἀμπελουργός (§ 1; Caus. plant. 2.4.8), μόσχευμα (§ 4; Caus. plant. 3.11.5; Hist. plant. 2.2.5), παραφυάς (§ 4; Caus. plant. 1.2.2; Hist. plant. 2.2.4), βαθύγειος (§16; Caus. plant. 1.18.1; Hist. plant. 4.11.9), συναναβλαστάνω (§ 100; Hist. plant. 3.4.2). For instance ἀδιάστατος (§ 53, 89), διάρτησις (§ 60), κατασκευαστικός (§77), δυσκάθαρτος (§ 107), ἀποίκιλος (§ 111). Examples are ἀφηνιαστής (§ 49), ἀνηγεμόνευτος (§53), ἀγκιστρεύω (§102), ἀργαλεότης

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over by the church fathers who read him and other authors influenced by him. We can label these words as verba Philonica.93 It is probable that Philo himself coined many of these words, but we cannot be sure since the greater part of contemporary Greek literature has been lost. A fine example is the word πανηγεμών (§33), which is composed of the word πάν (all) and ἡγεμών (ruler) and indicates God’s rulership over the entire creation.94 At the same time Philo exploits the ease with which the Greek language can create new composite words, for instance the verbs παραναφύω (§107) and συναναφλέγω (§ 108). All in all, Philo’s vocabulary is extremely varied, diverging from poetic and rarely used words to which were most likely newly minted by him and can so be called verba Philonica. Philo’s style of writing also has a number of characteristics that are prominent in the language of our treatise. A good example is his frequent use of doublets, i.e. a combination of two words that are (nearly) synonymous.95 Furthermore, he adds colour to his text by employing metaphors and comparisons. A particular favorite is the comparison with athletes participating in an athletic contest (§§27, 76, 145, 175). Another example is his use of the noun “fruit” in a metaphorical way, speaking, for instance, of the fruit of instruction (§§ 114, 116 etc.) or referring to the mind that bears fruit (§§31, 77, 114 etc.) and cultivates the excellences (§42). This use fits in with the popular imagery of sowing, planting and cultivating that is very prominent in our treatise and also in other writings (e.g. Agr. 8–9, 17–19). Here he of course draws on the language of Pentateuchal (and also some extra-Pentateuchal) texts that he expounds and there is a strong connection with the process of allegorical exegesis. Prominent among these texts are the presentations of Noah and Abraham as planters (Gen 9:20; 21:33), while the narrative of the planting of paradise and the tree of knowledge is also a trigger (Gen 3:24). Thanks to his education Philo is thoroughly acquainted with rhetorical theory and employs numerous figures of speech, such as chiasmus (§ 9), tricolon (§§7, 60, 67 etc), apostrophe (§53) and so on. One of his favorite techniques is the use of a rhetorical question (§§147, 168), especially the phrase “who does

93 94

95

(§ 115). Words that are only found in Philo are νυκτίφορος (§40), παραναφύω (§107), συναναφλέγω (§ 108). Term introduced by Runia 1992a. Other examples are κοσμοπλάστης (§ 3), referring to God as moulder of the cosmos; ἀνθρωποπαθής (§ 35), referring to the notion that God has human passions; and διαιωνίζω (§93), indicating that God’s gift remains throughout the ages. Examples are ἀπόλαυσις/χρῆσις (§ 34), εὐσέβεια/ὁσιότης (§35), χλιδαί/θρύψεις (§39), ἀδούλωτος/ἐλεύθερος (§ 68). See Siegfried 1875, 132–135.

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not know?” to introduce a statement that cannot be denied (§ 172). The phrase is used as part of his strategy of argumentation.96 Rounding off this section on Philo’s intellectual environment we can say that Philo as a Hellenistic Jewish writer and thinker, stands in two worlds: the world of Jewish religious conviction, and the world of Greek philosophy. In his exegesis of the Pentateuch he owes much to the Platonic tradition and he often sounds Stoic in his ethics. Philo himself would have claimed that Plato, Zeno and other Greek philosophers were indebted for their true insights to Moses, the great Jewish legislator, or were inspired by the divine Logos.

7

The Nachleben of the Treatise

Philo’s writings left virtually no trace in Jewish literature until the modern period. But they did have a great impact on early Christian writers, who studied Philo’s treatises thoroughly, and took over numerous philosophical notions and allegorical exegetical themes.97 It is certain that they were also acquainted with the treatise De Plantatione. The first Christian author to refer to Philo by name and to quote him literally is Clement of Alexandria (c. 150–c. 215), who was working at the so-called catechetical school in Alexandria. He read Plant. carefully and a few times he quotes from the treatise without indicating his source. The quotations are presented in the following table:

Clement

Philo Plant.

Subject

Protr. 1.5.1

§§8–9

Paed. 1.22.1 Paed. 3.54.1

§170 §111

Logos as support of the universe and stretching himself through the universe playing suitable for the wise person law on leprosy

Besides these quotations Clement offers a Philonic interpretation of the paradise as the world (Strom. 5.72.2; Philo Plant. 45) and of Jacob’s prayer (Gen 28:21; Strom. 1.173.6; Philo Plant. 90). 96 97

For Philo’s use of figures of speech see Conley 1987, 8–14; for his knowledge of rhetorical theory Alexandre 1999. A brief overview of Philo’s use by early Christian writers is given in Runia 2009, based on the extensive study Runia 1993a. A list of explicit references to Philo is found in Runia 2014.

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Origen (c. 185–c. 254) was the intellectual heir of Clement and in the early part of his career was also attached to the school in Alexandria. He also employed Philonic exegesis and in his writings there are allusions to and correspondences with Plant., which are given in the following list:

Origen

Philo Plant.

Cels. 3.23

§148

Subject

interpretation of the names Mainoles and Maenads Hom. Gen. 1.11 §28 human being as microcosm Hom. Jes. nav. 3.2 §123 explanation of the number ten Hom. Jes. nav. 11.4 §133 number five as the number of the senses Hom. Lev. 5.2 §28 human being as microcosm Hom. Lev. 8.6 §110–111 allegorical interpretation of leprosy Hom. Lev. 9.1 §108 altar connected with virtue and purity Hom. Lev. 16.4 §28 trees in human being Hom. Num. 10.3 §108 altar as a place of prayer and virtue Hom. Num. 25.3 §133 number five as the number of the senses

Grade of dependency D D D C D A C C C C

This list has been drawn up on the basis of the descriptive catalogue composed by Annewies van den Hoek.98 In composing the list she establishes the degree of dependency, and indicates it with the letters A to D. The letter A means certain dependency; the letter C indicates that a relationship is possible but cannot be proven; D refers to a philosophical commonplace without a relationship with Philo. We observe that in this list for most passages the relationship with Philo cannot be proven. Only in Hom. Lev. 8.6, where Origen refers to “one of the ancients,” the dependence on Philo is certain. When Origen moved from Alexandria to Caesarea in Palestine, he took his copies of Philo with him, and it is likely that later on they became part of the episcopal library in Caesarea, where Eusebius, bishop of Caesarea, was able to read them.99 Eusebius (c. 260–c. 339) includes Plant. in his catalogue of Philo’s writings. It is apparent that he regards the previous treatise Agr. and Plant. as two books

98 99

Van den Hoek 2000. Runia 1993a, 157–158; Runia 1996.

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of a single work, because he records them as “two treatises on cultivation” (Hist. eccl. 2.18.2).100 On two occasions in the Praeparatio evangelica Eusebius records verbatim quotations from Plant. Just like Clement he cites Philo’s description of the divine Logos (7.13.4–6; Philo Plant. §§8–10). Philo’s notion of a divine Logos was attractive for both theologians because of the importance of the notion of the Logos in Christianity ever since the Gospel of John’s opening chapter. In addition Eusebius quotes Philo’s characterisation of the human soul as coinage of the divine spirit (7.18.1–2; Philo Plant. §§18–20).101 Standing in the same Alexandrian exegetical tradition, Didymus the Blind (313–398) was also acquainted with Philo’s writings as appears from references to him by name.102 He makes abundant use of Philo’s Agr. but employs Plant. to a lesser degree.103 Borrowings can be found in §§ 114 and 133. A Latin bishop who made extensive use of Philo is Ambrose of Milan (c. 339–397).104 In his treatise De Noe he employs Philonic material as well, especially from QG.105 A few sections of De Noe are devoted to an interpretation of Gen 9:20–21 (107–113), in which there is one possible connection with Philo’s Plant. Ambrose’s explanation of the twofold form of inebriation can be compared with the double meaning of being drunk in Philo (§ 142). Philo’s warm reception by the early Christian writers stands in sharp contrast with the rabbinical tradition, in which Philo is almost wholly ignored. There are no direct references to Philo in the rabbinical literature and no material that might go back to our treatise.106 One can only guess at the reason for this neglect, but maybe Philo was exploited to such an extent by the Christians writers and almost made a Christian himself that the rabbis were silent about him. Furthermore, he wrote in Greek and based his exegesis on the Greek translation of the Pentateuch.107

100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107

See also above section 1. On Eusebius’s quotations from Philo in the Praep.evang. see Runia 1993, 223; Inowlocki 2006, 139–222. See Geljon 2011; Rogers 2017, 75–118. For Agr. see Geljon and Runia 2013, 33; for Plant. see Rogers 2017, 209. See Savon 1977. See Lucchesi 1977, 39–42; Savon 1977, 87–139. See also our comments in section 6b above. Runia 1993a, 12–16; Winston 2009.

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The Text of the Treatise

The text of Philo’s writings has been handed down to us in medieval codices, which go back via Byzantium to the manuscripts in the episcopal library in Caesarea.108 In 1552 the French classicist Adrianus Turnebus published the editio princeps of Philo in Paris.109 A Latin translation was made by Sigismundus Gelenius (1554) and appeared together with the Greek text in Geneva (1613). Nearly two centuries after the first printed edition the English clergyman and scholar Thomas Mangey edited a new edition. In 1742 the two volumes of his edition appeared in London.110 Mangey improved the text enormously, including numerous reasonable conjectures on and emendations of the Greek of the manuscripts. At the end of the 19th century the modern critical edition was made by two German scholars Leopold Cohn and Paul Wendland, the six volumes being published in Berlin between 1896 and 1915. Wendland edited the text of Plant. in volume 2, utilizing five important codices (MGHUF), which date from the 13th to the 16th century.111 Two of them (mss. U and F) are closely related to each other. An important early witness to the text is Eusebius, who in his Praeparatio Evangelica makes two excerpts from our treatise, §§ 8–10 at 7.13.4 and §§18–20 at 7.18.1. Regrettably there is no Armenian translation from the early Byzantine period. In editing the Greek text Wendland made many more emendations and corrections of the Greek of the manuscripts, following the philological practices of his time.112 The text of Cohn and Wendland was republished in the 10 volumes of the Loeb edition of Philo’s works, which appeared for the first time between 1929 and 1962. Occasionally, the translators, F.H. Colson and G.H. Whitaker, suggest some alternatives to Wendland’s text. Our translation is based on the Greek text of Wendland, but we have taken into account the suggestions in the Loeb edition. A fair degree of confidence may be placed in the quality of Wendland’s critical text, but the user must always bear in mind the considerable degree to which it has been emended and altered.113 On some occasions we have preferred to follow the text of the 108 109 110 111 112 113

The transmission of the text is dealt with by Runia 1993a, 16–31. For Turnebus see Sier 2012 and Sterling forthcoming; discussion of Turnebus’s edition in PCW 1.lxx–lxxii. For this edition see PCW 1.lxxiv–lxxviii. On Mangey see Deconinck-Brossard 2004. PCW 2.xxiii–xxv. Description of the manuscripts in PCW 1.iv–xxxvii, and GoodhartGoodenough 1938, 137–177. On Wendland see Pohlenz 1916. In an article Wendland discusses some textual problems and his emendations, 1897, 496– 504. For a table indicating the extent of the changes made to the text see the appendix by

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manuscripts instead of the reading of the critical edition. Textual issues are discussed in the endnotes to the translation.

9

Status quaestionis: Previous Scholarship on the Treatise

a Translations In the first decades of the 20th century Plant. was translated for the first time into modern languages. The German translation was made by Isaac Heinemann and appeared in the fourth volume of the German translation of Philo’s writings in 1923.114 The translation is preceded by a short introduction in which it is suggested that in the first part (§§1–72) Philo uses a Jewish model, which is combined with the Platonic doctrine of creation and the Stoic idea of the Logos. The translation is supplied with explanatory notes, which also refer to parallel passages. Seven years later the English translation made by G.H. Whitaker appeared in the Loeb edition of Philo. The notes to the translation were added by F.H. Colson. In addition, there is a brief analytical introduction to the treatise. As already remarked in the previous section, the editors for the most part printed the text of the edition by Wendland but sometimes suggested their own readings. A translation into French was made by J. Pouilloux and appeared in 1963. The translator offers a short introduction and a limited number of explanatory footnotes. An Italian translation by Roberto Radice appeared in 1988 as part of a complete translation of Philo’s Allegorical Commentary in Italian. The translation is preceded by a structural schema of the treatise and a summary, with some explanations also given in the form of endnotes. The most recent translation that we have consulted is the reading into Spanish made by Marcela Coria, which is part of an integral Spanish translation of Philo under the editorship of José Pablo Martin. It was published in 2010 and its introduction sets out the contents and the structure of the treatise. Explanatory comments are provided in footnotes.115 b An Example of Quellenforschung In the second half of the 19th century, the heyday of classical scholarship in Germany, the second part of Plant. attracted attention within the framework of

114 115

D.T. Runia in Royse 2017 at 157–158. He concludes that there is a textual problem on average every two and a half lines of the 887 lines of the treatise in PCW. For references to translations of the treatise see the Bibliography section 1a. We have not been able to make use of the translation into modern Hebrew by Yonatan Moss, published in 2015.

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the frequently applied method of Quellenforschung (determining the sources of writings). In the second part of Plant. Philo deals with the question whether a wise person may get drunk and he relates the views of several philosophers without referring to them by name. It was no surprise, therefore, that classicists posed the question which sources Philo had used. The celebrated German scholar Hans von Arnim in his youth published the study Quellenstudien zu Philo van Alexandrien in 1888 as his Habilitationschrift.116 It discusses three passages in Philo, of which the last chapter is devoted to the above mentioned text.117 Von Arnim argues that Philo’s discussion of the philosophers’ view on drunkenness is largely borrowed from a popular treatment on the subject and that he has incorporated the material within his own thought without assimilating it properly.118 The author was a Stoic who adapted the old Stoic view that a wise person may not get drunk. It is possible that in his Letter 83 Seneca has used the same unknown source as Philo.119 Van Arnim concludes that Philo’s discussion is a chapter from a Stoic collection of Ἠθικὰ Ζητήματα composed by an eclectic Stoic philosopher.120 For that reason he later included some parts of Plant. in his fragments of the Stoics, which is still the standard source-book for the Stoic school up to this day (SVF 3.712; §§ 142, 149, 154).121 c Other Scholarly Literature on De plantatione Until recently there was very little scholarly literature specially devoted to the treatise. A few brief articles have been devoted to specific texts,122 but almost all discussions of individual passages or topics that we refer to in the Commentary are part of more general treatments. An exception is the structural analysis prepared by Jacques Cazeaux as part of his large-scale structuralist interpretation of Philo’s Allegorical Commentary.123 In 2015, as part of the Annual meeting 116 117 118

119 120

121 122 123

For Von Arnim see Berner 2012. Von Arnim 1888, 101–140. Von Arnim 1888, 101: “weil es ihm keineswegs gelungen ist, den fremden Stoff einigermassen zu verarbeiten und mit seiner eigenen Darstellung zu einer Einheit zu verschmelzen.” Von Arnim 1888, 138. Von Arnim 1888, 140: “Das Ganze ist anzusehen als ein einzelnes Kapitel aus einer Sammlung von Ἠθικὰ Ζητήματα, welche ein eklektisch angehauchter Stoiker der freisinnigsten Richtung nach Posidonius und Antiochus, aber vermutlich noch vor Christi Geburt für ein größeres Publikum herausgegeben hatte.” The standard modern work on Hellenistic philosophy, including Stoic philosophy, Long and Sedley 1987 includes many fewer passages from Philo and none at all from Plant. Lameere 1951; Radt 2014. Cazeaux 1989, 173–194; see also above n. 48. On his structuralist method see Runia 1984, 211–226.

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of the Society of Biblical Literature held in Atlanta, the Philo of Alexandria group devoted a seminar to the interpretation of Plant. in order to assist the authors in their preparation of the present work. The papers of the seminar have now been published in the 2017 volume of The Studia Philonica Annual. They include a treatment of the treatise’s structure, an examination of the biblical texts cited, and a study on the extent to which we can use parallel passages from other Philonic works in interpreting the treatise, with a special focus on the texts Plant. 14 and 18–25.124 We have made extensive use of this material in preparing the present work.

10

Some Notes on the Method Used in the Translation and the Commentary

The aims and methodology utilized in preparing the translation and commentary in the present work are identical to those used in our previous work on Agr.125 The task of presenting a readable English version of Philo’s Greek is fraught with difficulties. His style is very rich and syntactically complex, often involving long sentences with multiple use of participles within the same sentence. He tends to pile up descriptions, making copious use of synonyms or near synonyms, uncommon words and even words coined by himself (see above section 6b). There is also frequent use of similes and metaphorical language. Our chief aim in making the translation is to present a highly accurate and relatively literal rendering of the Greek text. Our motivation for this has been that many users of the translation will not be able to read the treatise in its original Greek. An accurate translation will best be able to convey its contents and also give an impression of its original style. Our version is thus somewhat more literal than the excellent, but now stylistically somewhat outdated, English translation of Whitaker and Colson in the Loeb Classical Library. In addition, a literal translation makes the task of the commentary based on the translation easier. We do, however, make some concessions to readability. Long sentences have sometimes been divided into shorter sentences and occasionally we use modern idioms that differ from the literal Greek. 124 125

Runia 2017; Royse 2017; Yli-Karjanmaa 2017. Geljon and Runia 2013. The present section basically repeats what was written for our first translation and commentary on Agr., 2013, 38–40. The methodology was first developed for the translation of Opif. in the first volume of the Philo of Alexandria Commentary Series; see Runia 2001, 44–45.

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An important aspect of a successful translation is the accurate rendering of terminology. We have tried to translate terms as consistently as possible, but there are limits to what can be achieved, since there is often not an exact one-on-one correspondence between Greek and English terms. For example we always translate νοῦς with “intellect,” and διάνοια with “mind.” But the term ἀρετή, which plays a crucial role in the treatise, is sometimes translated with “excellence” and sometimes with “virtue” depending on the context and subject-matter. Some points relating to matters of translation are mentioned in the endnotes of the translation. In preparing our translation we have benefited from consulting the other modern translations. A crucial foundation for our interpretation of the treatise is provided by the conviction that the biblical text plays a crucial role in establishing its structure and the development of its themes. We have tried to indicate this biblical foundation as accurately as possible in the translation. Words and phrases that are exact quotations of the biblical text are printed in bold, while paraphrases of and allusions to biblical texts are printed in bold italic. For our translations of the Septuagint we generally make use of the new English translation, edited by Albert Pietersma and Benjamin Wright (NETS), but sometimes we need to make our own translation in order to be consistent with Philo’s understanding of the text and the interpretation he bases on it. It is very important for the reader to recognize that the translation forms the basis for the commentary. There is an exact correspondence between the divisions of the translation, based on our structural analysis presented above in section 3, and the commentary that explains it. This also applies to the shorter sections within each chapter and even to the paragraphs within each section. In the commentary itself the treatment of each section consists of four parts. We start with an analysis and general comments. In the analysis Philo’s line of thought and argumentation are set out, followed by some remarks on the general background of the section. The general analysis is followed by detailed comments. In these comments we elucidate exegetical and philosophical themes, both in relation to Philo’s thought and the further Jewish and Greek background. Because of the primacy of the scripture in Philo’s thought special attention is paid to the treatment of the biblical text. Whenever Philo cites a text, we note any divergences from modern editions of the Septuagintal text. For the Greek background we refer to comparative material and particularly to borrowings from philosophical schools. In citing the frequent parallels in Philo’s other writings we have prioritized the treatises from the Allegorical Commentary, because Plant. belongs to this series. Because very little attention has been paid to features of Philo’s linguistic usage, we also frequently dwell

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on Philo’s use of words, expressions and images, making frequent reference to classical and Hellenistic authors.126 After the detailed comments there follows a section that deals with parallel exegesis. Here we briefly discuss Philo’s interpretation of the same primary and secondary biblical lemmata in other writings. We end each part of the commentary with the section entitled Nachleben, in which the influence of Philo’s exegesis of the biblical lemmata on Christian writers is investigated. For the division of labour between the two authors, the reader is directed to the description of our collaboration in the Preface to the volume. 126

See further above section 8b.

Translation Philo of Alexandria On Planting

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part one

On Planting (§§1–138) [Chapter One] God as Planter (§§1–72) Section A. The Planting of the Cosmos (§§ 1–27) a The Planting of the Greatest Plant, the Cosmos (§§ 1–10) (§1) In the previous book we discussed everything that was opportune in relation to the generic skill of cultivation. In this book we shall give an account, as best we are able, of the specific skill of viticulture. For he (Moses) introduces the just persona not only as a cultivator, but also individually as a viticulturist when he says: Noah began to be a human being who cultivates the earth, and he planted a vineyard.b (§2) Now it is fitting that the person who is about to give an exposition of the work of planting1 and of cultivation in its detailed aspects, should first gain an understanding of the plants of the universe that are most perfect and also of their great planter and overseer. The planter who is greatest and most perfect in his skill is the leader of the entire universe. But the plant, in turn, which contains within itself all together the countless individual plants that sprout like shoots from a single root is this very cosmos.2 (§ 3) When the worldfashioner commenced his formative activity, he took the material which of itself was confused and lacking order, and led it from disorder to order and from confusion to separation. He fixed earth and water as roots in the middle, drew up the trees of air and fire from the middle towards the upper part, and fortified the encircling ethereal region by making it into a border (horos) and guard post for that which lay within. From this the heaven (ouranos) also appears to have received its name. Moreover, the earth, which is dry, was held in place by water which threatens to dissolve it, while air, which is extremely cold, was held in place by fire which is hot by nature. What an extraordinary miracle this performer of miracles achieved! (§ 4) For how is it not a wonder that what dissolves is held together by that which is dissolved, water in relation to earth, and that the hottest nature is settled on the coldest without being a Gen 6:9. b Gen 9:20. LXX quotations have been checked against our Agr. translation and NETS. In many cases it is necessary to depart from the NETS translation because of the exigencies of Philo’s interpretation.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004417

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quenched. These are the perfect sprouts of the all, but the very largest and most fertile plant is this cosmos, of which the above-mentioned growths are offshoots. (§5) What we must investigate, then, is where he let down its roots and what the pedestal is on which it has been supported like a statue. It may be assumed that no body was left behind to wander about externally, since God had applied his work of creative ordering to all the matter that was universally present. (§ 6) After all,3 it was fitting that the greatest of works was formed in a fully complete state4 by the greatest craftsman, but it would not be fully complete if it were not fully made up of complete parts. The result was that this cosmos was established out of all the earth and all the water and air and fire, with not even the smallest part left outside it. (§7) It was necessary, moreover, that externally there be either void or nothing. But if there is void, how would what is full and dense and the heaviest of existents not through its own weight push the balance down with nothing solid to give it support?5 In that case the cosmos would seem to resemble an apparition, as the mind perpetually looks for a corporeal base which each thing may be assumed to have if it is in motion,6 and especially the cosmos, because it is the greatest of bodies and has embraced a multitude of other bodies as the parts belonging to it. (§8) If, therefore, one wishes to escape the embarrassment of these difficulties, let it be said in all frankness that there is nothing in the material realm so powerful that it has the strength to bear the cosmos’s weight, but that it is the eternal Logos of the everlasting God7 which is the firmest and most secure support of the universe.8 (§9) This Logos stretches himself from the middle to the outer limits and from the extremities back to the middle. He runs a course of nature that is invincible, joining together and constricting all the parts, for the begetting Father made him an unbreakable bond of the Whole. (§ 10) It is quite suitable, therefore, that neither will all the earth be dissolved by all the water which its recesses have stored up, nor will fire be quenched by air, nor again will air be set alight by fire, since the Divine Logos draws himself up as a boundary, just like vowels in between consonants, so that the All will make a collective sound like in a literary composition.9 In so doing he acts as an umpire by mediating between the threats of opposing parties with the use of persuasion that joins them together.10 b The Formation of Plants and Living Beings (§§ 11–16) (§11) This was the way, then, that the plant that is most fertile of all obtained its roots and with such roots was held fast. Of the particular and smaller plants some were created as being able to move by displacing themselves, while others were crafted without displacement as if standing in the same place.

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(§12) Those who possess freedom of movement, whom we call living beings, were assigned to the chief parts of the All, the land animals to earth, those that can swim to water, those that can fly to air and those that are fire-born to fire. It is reported that the origin of this last-mentioned kind is seen more clearly in Macedonia than anywhere else. The stars were assigned to heaven, for according to the philosophers they too are living beings who are intelligent through and through. Of these the planets are seen to change places of their own accord, but the fixed stars do so by being carried along with the movement of the All. (§13) The beings that were not furnished with the capacity for representation, which are called plants in the true sense of the word, do not share in movement from place to place. (§14) On earth and in the air the maker made two kinds. In the air he made the winged creatures which are sense-perceptible, and also other powers which can in no way be perceived by sense-perception. This is the band of incorporeal souls who have been arrayed in differing ranks. It is reported that some of them enter into mortal bodies and at certain appointed times depart from them again. Others who have obtained a more divine constitution disregard the earthly realm totally and reside in the highest place near the ether itself. These are beings of the greatest purity, whom the philosophers among the Greeks call “heroes,” but Moses names them with an accurate term “angels,”11 since they report as envoys the good things that come from the leader to his subjects, as well as reporting to the king what his subjects are in need of. To earth, however, he allotted land animals12 and plants, two kinds again, because it was his will that she be the same mother and nurse for both. (§ 15) For just as in the case of a woman, and indeed every female being, there are fountains that flow with milk when it is time to give birth so that these can shower their offspring with the necessary and appropriate nourishment, in the same way he allotted to the earth as mother of the living beings on land all the forms of plants, so that her offspring could gain nourishment that was akin and not alien to them. (§16) In addition, the plants he produced head downwards, fixing their heads in the deepest parts of the earth. But in the case of the irrational animals he drew their heads up from the earth and fitted them at the end of an extended neck, thereby making the front feet like a pedestal for the neck. c The Creation of the Human Being (§§17–22) (§17) The human being, however, obtained a structure that was exceptional. In the case of the other creatures he guided and bent their vision downwards and so inclined them towards the ground, but in the case of the human being he raised him up again so that he could gaze at the heaven, a plant, as the ancient saying goes, that is not earthly but heavenly.

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(§18) Others who state that our intellect is a portion of the ethereal nature have contrived for the human being a kinship to the ether. But the great Moses did not liken the form of his rational soul to anything that had come into being. Instead he said that it was the authentic coinage of that divine and invisible spirit,13 signed and marked by God’s seal,14 the impress of which is the everlasting Logos. (§19) For he says, God inbreathed into his face the breath of life.a As a result the recipient is necessarily formed as an image of the sender. For this reason it is also said that the human being came into being after God’s image,b and not after the image of anything that has come into being. (§20) It follows, therefore, that, since the soul of a human being has been formed as an image after the archetypal Logos of the Cause, his body too has been raised up and his vision extended toward the purest portion of the All, the heaven, so that what is not apparent could be clearly perceived through what is apparent. (§21) Since it is impossible for anyone to see the attraction of the mind to the One who IS15 except those only who have been led by him—for what each person has experienced is known to that person better than anyone else—he makes the eyes of the body a clear representation of the invisible eye (of the soul) by enabling them to incline away (from the earth) towards the ether. (§22) After all, when the eyes that are made from perishable material have achieved the feat of advancing from the earthly realm to the heaven that is so far distant and touching its limits, how great should we not consider the journey of the eyes of the soul to be in every direction? These are carried on wings by their great desire to clearly observe the One who IS. Not only do they extend to the very limit of the ether, but leaving the limits of the entire cosmos behind them they press on towards the one who is ungenerated. d Divine Souls are Called Above (§§23–27) (§23) On this account in the Oracles those who persist to the end with an insatiable longing for wisdom and knowledge are said to be called upwards.c It is surely16 right that those who are breathed upon by the spirit should be called upwards towards the Divine. (§24) It would be shocking, after all, if trees are lifted up roots and all by typhoons and whirlwinds, capacious ships laden with cargo are snatched up from the middle of the sea as if the lightest of objects, and lakes and rivers are borne on high leaving behind the recesses of the earth deprived of their flow, which is drawn up by the force of the most powerful winds and twisting

a Gen 2:7.

b Gen 1:27.

c Cf. Lev 1:1.

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whirls, but that the intellect, which is something quite light is not lifted up and raised to the greatest height by the nature of the Divine spirita which is all powerful and conquers what is here below. And this is especially the case for the one who genuinely philosophizes. (§25) This person is not tipped downwards through force of weight towards those things that are dear to the body and the earth. Separation and alienation from these have always been the focus of his labours. So he is carried upwards through his insatiable love for the most holy and blessed natures that live on high. (§26) This is the reason that Moses, the steward and guardian of the rites of the One who IS, will be called up.17 For it is stated in the book of Leviticus: he called up Moses.b But he that is judged worthy of the second prize, Bezalel, will also be called up. For God also calls him upc for the construction and preservation of the sacred works. (§27) But he will take away the call upwards as second prize, whereas the all-wise Moses carries it off as first prize. What he does is give shape to shadows, just like painters who are not permitted to craft anything that is ensouled. (The name) Bezalel is interpreted as “making in shadows.” But to Moses it was given not to mark out shadows but the archetypal natures of the realities themselves. The Cause, we should add, usually reveals his characteristics to some more clearly and distinctly, as if in the pure light of the sun, but to others more dimly as if in shadow.

Section B. The Creation of the Human Being, the Microcosm (§§28–72) a The Trees in the Human Being (§§28–31) (§28) Now that we have discussed the more comprehensive plants in the cosmos, let us now look at the way that the all-wise God also crafted trees in the human being, the miniature cosmos. First of all, he took our body like a piece of land with deep soil and fabricated the senses as receptors for it. (§29) Next he located each of them like a cultivated and most serviceable plant, hearing in the ear, vision in the eyes, smell in the nostrils and the others in the appropriate and relevant places. The divinely inspired man bears witness to my account when speaking in the Psalms as follows: he who plants an ear, does he not hear? he who forms eyes, does he not perceive?d18 (§30) In addition, all the capacities that pass through the body

a Cf. Exod 31:3.

b Lev 1:1.

c Exod 31:2.

d Ps 93:9 LXX.

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right down to the legs and hands and other parts, both internal and external, are in fact noble sprouts. (§31) The better and more perfect ones he fixed firmly as roots in that part which is in the very middle and especially capable of bearing fruit, the ruling faculty. These are intelligence, comprehension, shrewdness, practice, memory, habit, disposition, various kinds of skills, secure knowledge, unfailing apprehension of the principles of excellence in its entirety.19 No mortal has the ability to plant any of these. Of all of them together there is the single ungenerated artificer, who not only has created these plants once and for all, but also continues to create them when each person is born. b The Planting of Paradise: Rejection of a Literal Reading (§§ 32–35) (§32) Consistent with what has been said is also the planting of the paradise, for it is stated, God planted a paradise in Eden toward the east, and there he placed the human being whom he had moulded.a Now to think that vines and trees bearing olives, apples, pomegranates and other fruits are planted by God20 is a great foolishness that is difficult to heal. (§33) What would be the reason for doing this, one might ask. So that he (God) might have pleasant places for recreation? Would not the entire cosmos be reckoned a sufficient place of recreation for God the sovereign ruler? Would not even the cosmos appear to be lacking in numerous other aspects that are needed to make it suitable as a place to receive the Great king?21 Aside from the fact that it is neither lawful to think that the Cause can be contained by that which is caused, and also that trees do not actually bear their fruits in season.22 (§34) For whose enjoyment and use, then, will the paradise bear fruit? Not for any human being. For no one at all has been introduced into the paradise to live there, since he (Moses) saysb that the first man who had been moulded from earth, Adam by name, migrated from there. (§ 35) God certainly is in no need of nourishment, just as he does not need other things. Someone who is nourished must first have the need for it, and then must be equipped with instruments to receive it when it enters and to despatch it out of doors when it has been digested. These things are not in harmony with the blessed nature and the felicity that belong to the Cause. They are the truly lawless inventions of people who present the Cause in human form and even give it human passions, depictions which lead to the destruction of those great virtues, piety and reverence.23

a Gen 2:8.

b Cf. Gen 3:24.

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c The Planting of Paradise: The Allegorical Reading (§§ 36–45) (§36) We should proceed, then, to the allegorical interpretation that is dear to men of vision. The Oracles very clearly give us the starting-points for this method. For they speak of plants in the paradise that in no way resemble those in our experience, but those of life, immortality, knowledge, comprehension, understanding, representation of good and evil.a (§ 37) These plants would of necessity not belong to the soil, but to the rational soul, the one path24 leading to excellence with life and immortality as its end, the other leading to evil, flight from these goals and death. We should, therefore, understand that God in his generosity has planted in the soul a kind of paradise of virtues and their corresponding actions, a paradise that leads it to perfect felicity. (§38) On this account he also allotted to the paradise a most suitable location with the name Eden—this is interpreted as meaning “luxury”—, a symbol of the soul which sees things as they are, dancing with the virtues and skipping along with an abundant and great joy, after it has given preference to one enjoyment instead of the countless pleasures offered among humankind, namely the worship of him who is alone wise. (§ 39) Someone who partook of this undiluted delight, a member of the sacred band of Moses and not one to be overlooked,25 pronounced in the Psalms when speaking to his own intellect the words, luxuriate in the Lord.b Stirred with his voice to a heavenly and divine love, he despised the never-ending delicacies and luxuries prevalent among the so-called and apparent goods of humankind. His entire intellect was snatched away by divine possession, stimulated and rejoicing in God alone. (§ 40) And the statement that the paradise was situated towards the eastc is a demonstration of what has been said. Foolishness is a thing that is dark, sinks down and brings on night, whereas moral insight26 is a thing very bright and luminous that truly rises up.27 Just as the sun when rising fills the entire circle of the heaven with light, in the same way the rays of excellence lighten up the location of the mind and bring about that it is entirely filled with a pure gleam. (§41) Now human possessions have really savage wild beasts as watchers and guards to ward off attackers and interlopers, but the possessions of God have rational natures for this purpose. For he says he placed there the human being whom he had moulded,d which is to say that the trainings and exercises in the excellences that occur there belong to rational beings only.28 (§ 42) This is the exceptional privilege that they received from God, in contrast to the souls of the irrational creatures.29 For this reason it is also said in the clearest fashion that it was the true human being within us, that is the intellect, that he placede a Gen 2:9. bPs 36:4. c Gen 2:8. d Gen 2:8. e Gen 2:8. Philo alters the aorist middle form of the verb ἔθετο in the LXX to the aorist active form ἔθηκεν.

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among the most holy offshoots and plants of goodness, since nothing devoid of mind has the ability to cultivate the excellences,30 of which by nature it can gain no understanding whatsoever. (§43) There is no need to be puzzled, therefore, as to why all the kinds of wild animals were introduced into the arka which was constructed at the time of the great flood,b but not a single one entered the paradise. For the ark is a symbol of the body, which of necessity has room for the wild and savage plagues of passions and vices, whereas the paradise is a symbol of the virtues, and virtues never admit anything untamed or completely irrational. (§44) Paying great attention to detail, he says it was not the human being struck after the image but the one who had been moulded that was introduced into the paradise.c The one who has been marked with the spirit31 after the image of God in no way differs, it seems to me, from the tree that bears the fruit of immortal life. Both are imperishable and were thought worthy of the part that is most central and most directive, for it is said that the tree of life is in the middle of the paradise.d But the other human being in no way differs from the earthier body with its mixture of ingredients. He has no share in the unmoulded and simple nature, whose house and halls only the practiser knows how to inhabit—for Jacob is introduced as an unmoulded man living in a housee—, but has a variable disposition gathered together and moulded from all different kinds. (§45) It was suitable, therefore, that the intermediate intellect should be placed and fixed with its roots in the paradise, the entire cosmos. Subject to powers that draw him in opposite directions, he was invited32 to distinguish between them, so that in the process of choice or rejection, if he should welcome the better, he would enjoy immortality and fame, but if he should choose the worse, he would encounter a blameworthy death. d Moses Prays That Israel be Planted in Paradise (§§ 46–58) (§46) Such were the trees that the one who is alone wise fixed with their roots in rational souls. Moses, however, takes pity on those who had become migrants from the paradise of the virtues and calls upon the sovereign might of God himself and his merciful and gentle powers to plant the people of vision33 in the very place from which the earthy intellect Adam had been exiled. (§ 47) For he states: Bring them in and plant them on the mountain of your inheritance, in a ready dwelling place that you have produced, Lord, a holy precinct, Lord, that your hands have made ready. The Lord reigning as king for an age and an age and beyond.f a Gen 6:14 etc. b Gen 7:6 etc. c Gen 1:26–27, Gen 2:7–8. dGen 2:9. 15:17–18. A literal rendering of the final words is required for §53.

e Gen 25:27.

f Exod

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(§48) In the clearest fashion, therefore, he has understood like no other that by laying down the seeds and roots of all things God has caused the greatest plant of all, this cosmos, to spring up. In the actual words of the song he appears to hint at it, calling it a mountain of inheritance, since what comes into being is the possession and allotment34 that belongs most properly to its maker. (§49) He prays, therefore, that we be planted in this place, not so that we become irrational and unrestrained in our natures, but that we follow the governance of the one who is most perfect and imitate his constant and unswerving course, and so have a life that shows moderation and does not stumble. For, as the first thinkers have said, to be able to live in agreement with nature is the final end of felicity. (§50) Moreover, what is said next is in harmony with what was laid down earlier,a namely that the cosmos is God’s house in the sense-perceptible realm, well-prepared and ready for him, produced and not, as some have thought, ungenerated; that it is a holy precinct, an effulgence as it were of what is holy, the copy of an archetype, since what is beautiful for sense-perception is an image of what is beautiful for thought; and that it has been made ready by the hands of God, his cosmos-making powers. (§ 51) But to ensure that no one should suppose that the maker is in need of anything that has come into being, he adds the most necessary utterance: reigning as king for an age and an age and beyond. It is right and just that a king is in need of nothing, but that his subjects are in need of their king for everything. (§52) Some have said that God’s allotment both is and is said to be the good, and that Moses now prays that its use and enjoyment be made available. For he says, bring us in like children just beginning to learn through the doctrines and principles of wisdom and do not leave us ungrounded, but plant us in a lofty and heavenly logos. (§53) For this is the completely ready inheritance and the fully available house, a most suitable dwelling-place which you have produced as something holy. For you, Master, are the maker of good and holy things, just as the perishable realm of becoming in its turn is the maker of what is evil and defiled. Be king of the suppliant soul for an infinite age and do not leave it for an instant without a leader. For continuous slavery under you is not only better than freedom, but also than possessing the greatest authority. (§54) Many readers might ask the question what the meaning is of the words on the mountain of your inheritance.35 It is necessary that God should give inheritances, but that he should receive them might be unreasonable, since all things are his possession. (§55) But perhaps this is meant to apply to those who have him as their Master on account of a special affinity, as in the case

a For the biblical references in §§ 50–54 see Exod 15:17–18 quoted above in §47.

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of kings who rule over all their subjects but do this to a particular degree over the members of their household, whose services they are accustomed to using for the care of the body and the other practicalities of living. (§ 56) These kings are masters over all the property in the land, even that which private citizens seem to control. But they are regarded as possessing only what they entrust to supervisors and managers. These are the properties from which they collect their yearly income and to which they often go for purposes of relaxation and enjoyment, when they set aside the weighty burden of the responsibilities they have for the state and their kingship. It is these properties in their possession that are called “royal.” (§57) Indeed, the silver and gold and all other valuable objects that are stored up as treasures by the subjects actually belong to the rulers rather than those who possess them. Nevertheless, one speaks of the private treasuries of the kings, in which those who have been appointed collectors of tribute deposit the revenues from the land. (§ 58) Do not be surprised, therefore, if the sacred band of wise souls is said to be the special allotmenta of God the sovereign ruler who has obtained power over all things, the band which has vision of the sharpest kind, utilizing the flawless and pure eye of the mind, which never closes but sees with an overt and penetrating gaze. e The Part That Belongs to God (§§59–61) (§59) Is it not for this reason that in the Greater Song it is also said: Ask your father and he will inform you, ask your elders and they will tell you, when the Most High was dividing up nations, as he scattered the sons of Adam, he set boundaries of nations according to the number of God’s angels, and his people Israel became the Lord’s portion?b (§60) Note how once again he has described as God’s portion and allotment36 the visionary character who is his true worshipper. But, he said, the children of the earth, whom he named sons of Adam, have been scattered and dispersed and no longer gathered together.37 They became a crowd that is no longer able to follow right reason as its leader. For in reality excellence is the cause of harmony and unity, whereas the opposite disposition brings about dissolution and dislocation. (§61) A proof of what has been said is the event that occurs every year on the so-called day of atonement. For it is expressly stated that at that time one should allot two goats, one for the Lord and one for dismissal.c There is a double reasoning here, one for God, the other for the world of becoming. He who glorifies the Cause38 will be apportioned to him, but he who glorifies the world

a Cf. Exod 15:17 and anticipating Deut 10:9 quoted in § 63.

bDeut 32:7–9.

c Lev 16:8.

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of becoming39 will be exiled and driven away from the most holy places, tumbling into trackless and unhallowed regions full of ravines. f The Portion of the Levites (§§62–72) (§62) Yet Moses enjoys the superior status of the God-beloved to such a degree that, showing trust especially in this very fact, he was in the habit of using words and doctrines that are bolder and more elevated than is suited for the ears of us more feeble people.40 For he not only thinks it worthy of God to obtain an inheritance, but also—and what a paradox this is!—for him to be an allotment for others. (§63) He thought it right that an entire tribe, which had fled to him and became his suppliant, should not be granted an allotment of land, as happened to the other eleven tribes, but rather should receive the priesthood as an exceptional privilege, a possession that is not earthly but Olympian. For he says that for the tribe of Levi there will not be a portion or allotment among the sons of Israel, because the Lord himself will be their allotment.a And this is reinforced by the words in the Oracles that issue out of God’s own mouth: I am your portion and your inheritance.b (§64) In truth, the intellect that has been completely purified and rejects all that belongs to the realm of becoming knows only the One and makes acquaintance with the ungenerated, to whom it has drawn near and by whom it has been taken up. For who can say “For me there is God himself alone” except he who welcomes nothing that comes after him? This is the manner of the Levite, for his name is interpreted “himself for me,” the reason being that others have other objects of worship, but he alone has the highest and greatest Cause of all (as such). (§65). Indeed, they say that one of the ancients, who had fallen madly in love with the beauty of wisdom like that of a highly distinguished woman, on seeing the lavish trappings of an extravagant procession, looked away and said to some of his companions, “look, my friends, at how much there is that I do not need.” Yet the clothing he wore was simple and no more than was necessary, so that it would not seem that he was puffed up by a huge amount of wealth, as happens to countless people, and so was boasting with his pronouncement.41 (§66) The lawgiver teaches that this is the mentality that those should have who have no regard42 for anything belonging to the realm of becoming and reject all that has come into being on account of their kinship with the one43 who is ungenerated, whom they consider to be the only riches and the limit of a most perfect felicity. (§67) Let those who have taken hold of positions of kingship and leadership now no longer swagger, both those who do so because they have brought a a Deut 10:9.

b Num 18:20.

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single city or land or nation under their control, and those who do this because they have obtained as their possession all the regions of the earth up to its furthest limits, all the Hellenic and barbarian nations, as well as all the rivers and the seas that are without limit in number and extent. (§ 68) If, moreover,— which is impious even to affirm—they had gained authority over the heavenly realm, which alone of all things the maker made unenslaved and free, they would still be regarded as ordinary citizens in comparison with the mighty kings who obtained God as their allotment.a To the extent that the possessor is superior to the possession and the maker to that which has come into being, to this extent these last mentioned are more kingly. (§69) It has been thought by some that those who declare everything to be the possession of the good person are speaking paradoxically, because they look at external poverty and abundance, and consider no one to be wealthy who lacks money and possessions. But Moses thinks that wisdom is so splendid and worth fighting for that he regards the allotment that is worthy of it to be not only the entire cosmos but also the leader of the entire universe. (§ 70) These are the doctrines not of people who vacillate between two opinions, but who are held fast by a secure trust. For even now there are some people who feign piety and slander the literal meaning of the text, when they claim that it is neither sanctioned nor without risk to say that God is the allotment of a human being. (§71) To them I would say, “You have come to the investigation of these matters not from a genuine cast of mind, but from one that is false and spurious. You thought that God being said to be the allotment of wise persons was equivalent to vines and olive trees and other such things being the possessions of their owners, and you did not realize that the art of painting is said to be the allotment of painters and in general an art is said to be the allotment of artists, not as an earthly possession but as an Olympian prize. (§ 72) None of such things have a master, but benefit their possessors. Therefore, you slanderers, when you hear the One who IS44 also described as allotment, you should understand him not as a possession similar to the examples given above, but as being of the most benefit and the cause of the greatest goods to those who value serving him.”

a Deut 10:9.

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[Chapter Two] Abraham as Planter (§§73–93) a

Transition to a New Biblical Text and Outline of Its Interpretation (§§73–74) (§73) Now that we have stated what is fitting about the first planter and his plant, we proceed in sequence to the practices that involve learning from him and also imitating him. Straight away, therefore, it is said of the wise person Abraham that he planted a ploughed field45 at the well of the oath and called on the name of the Lord: God everlasting.a46 The particular nature of the plants has not been made clear, but only the size of the plot of land. (§74) Yet those who are in the habit of investigating such matters say that all aspects47 relating to estates are described with exceptional precision, the tree, the plot of land and the fruit of the tree. The ploughed field itself is thus the tree, but it is not the same as those that grow from the earth, but corresponds to the one that is rooted in the understanding of God-beloved; the well of the oath is the plot of land; and the transferral of the name Lord to God everlasting is the fruit. b Explanation of “Field” (§§75–77) (§75) We must now proceed to give a reasonable explanation of each of these proposals. The ploughed field is one hundred cubits in length and the same in breadth and so, if the numbers are multiplied according to the nature of the square, consists of a surface of ten thousand square cubits. (§ 76) This is the largest and most perfect limit of the numbers that have increased in size from the one, so that one is the starting-point of (the sequence of) numbers and ten thousand the end for those in the primary combination. For this reason some people have not been off the mark when they compared the one to the starting line, the ten thousand to the finishing line, and all the intermediate numbers to those participating in the race, for they begin the race from the one as if from a starting line and stop at ten thousand, the end. (§77) Some, treating these matters as symbolic, proceed to state that God is the beginning and limit of all things, a doctrine that produces piety. This doctrine, when planted in the soul, gives birth to a most beautiful and nutritious fruit, reverence.

a Gen 21:33.

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c Explanation of “the Well of the Oath” (§§ 78–84) (§78) A most appropriate place for the plant is the well that has been named oath, concerning which an account maintains that no water was found in it. For he says that the servants of Isaac arrived and reported to him concerning the well they had dug, and they said: we did not find water, and he named it oath.a Let us examine what this means. (§79) Those people who make a study of the nature of reality and are assiduous in their study of each of its aspects are engaged in similar activities to those who dig wells. For they too are looking for sources that are hidden. All of them have a desire in common, to find water to drink, but for the one group the water serves to nourish the body, for the other to nourish the soul. (§ 80) Just as some who open up wells often do not find the water they are looking for, in the same way those who make progress in the sciences and descend further into their depths are unable to attain their goal. They say indeed that those who know a great deal accuse themselves of a terrible ignorance, for the only thing they have perceived is how far they are removed from the truth. It is reported that one of the ancients who was admired for his wisdom said that it was reasonable for him to be admired, for the only thing he knew was that he knew nothing. (§81) Take any art or science48 that you will, whether small or large, and also a person who is excellent and most reputable in practising it, then examine whether what the art or science promises matches up with the achievements of the practitioner. In your investigation you will find that there is not just a small but a large distance between them, given that it is almost impossible to achieve perfection in any art or science, which just like a fountain is always renewing itself49 and pouring forth all kinds of theories. (§82) For this reason it was most appropriately named oath as the symbol of the most reliable conviction that involves witnessing to God. For just as the person who vouches for the truth of contested matters calls upon God as his witness, so there is no matter on which it is better to swear an oath than the fact that no science can be found in which the practitioner achieves its completion. (§83) The same principle applies to almost all the other faculties that we have. For just as they say that in the above-mentioned well no water was found,b so neither is sight50 found in the eyes, nor hearing in the ears nor smell in the nostrils nor in general is what is perceived found in the organs of senseperception nor analogously is understanding found in the intellect. (§ 84) For how did impaired vision or impaired hearing or wrong thinking occur, if the perceptions of each object were steadfast in these organs and had not come about through the fact that God sows reliability in them? a Gen 26:32–33.

b Gen 26:32.

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d Explanation of “the Name of the Lord, God Everlasting” (§§ 85–92) (§85) Now that we have thus sufficiently discussed the place in which the tree blossoms, let us examine as our last point the question of its fruit. As to what its fruit is, the author himself will instruct us. For he says51 he called upon the name of the Lord, God everlasting.a (§86) Now the designations in the text reveal the powers which surround that which IS.52 The designation “Lord” refers to the power by which he rules, the designation “God” to the power by which he confers benefits. It is for this reason that throughout the entire creation account of the most holy Moses the term “God” (theos) is utilised, for it was fitting that the maker be given the title53 of the power through which he disposed (etitheto) and ordered all that he brought into being.54 (§87) Inasmuch as he is ruler, he can perform both good and evil, adapting his actions to suit the recompense due to the doer. But inasmuch as he is benefactor, he wishes one of the alternatives only, to confer benefits. (§88) The greatest good that the soul could receive would be no longer to have any doubts about the might of the king in both directions, but to dismiss without any doubt the fear that hangs over it regarding the power of his rule, while kindling the most steadfast hope, based on his free choice to be a generous giver, that it will receive the possession and enjoyment of good things. (§89) The title “God everlasting” is equivalent to: he who does not sometimes bestow grace and sometimes not, but does so always and continuously, he who confers benefits without ceasing, who never stops linking together a constant flow of gifts, who causes his favours to follow upon each other in a circle, fitting them together with forces that unify them, he who never passes up any opportunity to do good, even though he is the one who is Lord and so can also do harm.55 (§90) This is also what the practiser Jacob requested at the conclusion of the most pious of prayers. For he said: and the Lord will become God for me.b This is equivalent to: in my case he will no longer demonstrate the lordly nature of his autocratic rule, but rather the beneficent nature of his mercy and salvific power in all things, destroying the fear I have as for a master, and bringing about love and goodwill in the soul as for a benefactor. (§ 91) Which soul could understand this, that the master and leader of the universe in no way departs from his own nature but, remaining in the same state, is continuously good and unceasingly generous, truly the most perfect cause of abundant and ever-flowing good things for those who enjoy a blessed life? (§92) To have trust in a king who is not incited by the greatness of his authority to cause harm to his subjects, but

a Gen 21:33.

b Gen 28:21.

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out of love for humanity freely chooses to restore to each what they need,56 is a very great protection that brings about cheerfulness and security. e Summary (§93) (§93) What we undertook to discuss, therefore, has now been as good as demonstrated: “plant” signifies that God is understood as the beginning and end of all things; consistent with this “place” indicates that perfection is not to be found in anything that belongs to the world of becoming but appears in that world from time to time through the gracious gifts of the Cause; and “fruit” means that the gracious gifts of God remain everlastingly and continue to rain down without ceasing.

[Chapter Three] Human Beings as Planters (§§94–138) a Citation of the Biblical Text (§§94–95) (§94) This was the way that the wise man too demonstrated the skill of cultivation, following the example of the first and greatest planter. But holy Scripture wishes that also we, who have not yet attained perfection but are still being reckoned in the middle stages57 of the so-called ordinary duties, should expend much labour on cultivation. (§95) For it says: when you have entered the land which the Lord your God is giving you, and you have planted every kind of tree for eating, you will fully cleanse58 its uncleanness. Its fruit will be uncleansed for three years, it will not be eaten.59 But in the fourth year all its fruit will be holy, praiseworthy for the Lord. And in the fifth year you will eat the fruit, its products will be an increase for you. I am the Lord your God.a b Explanation of “Entering the Land” (§§ 96–98) (§96) It is thus impossible to plant trees with edible fruits before migrating to the land given by God, for scripture says, when you have entered into the land, you will plant every kind of edible tree. So, if we spent our time outside, we would not be able to cultivate those kinds of trees. This is surely convincing. (§97) For as long as the intellect has not advanced on the road of wisdom but has turned aside and wanders at a distance, it will focus on the trees of the untamed kind, which are either sterile and without produce or bearing fruit that cannot be eaten. (§98) But whenever it sets out upon the road of moral a Lev 19:23–25.

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insight and it enters into its doctrines and runs with them all, it begins to cultivate the domesticated kind of tree bearing tame fruits instead of that untamed kind of tree, impassibility instead of passions, knowledge instead of ignorance, and good things instead of evil. c Explanation of “Cleansing the Uncleanness” (§§ 99–112) (§99) Since, then,60 the one who is just61 beginning stands far removed from the end, quite reasonably the command is issued to him, after he has planted, to remove fully the uncleanness of what has been planted. Let us examine together what this means. (§100) The intermediate ordinary duties seem to me to correspond62 to domesticated plants. Each of them brings forth highly valuable fruits, in the one case for bodies, in the other for souls. Many of the harmful shoots that spring up and grow amongst the intermediate duties must of necessity be cut away for the sake of not damaging the better growths. (§101) Or could we not speak of a domesticated plant of the soul as a returning of a deposit? This plant certainly requires cleansing and special attention. What then is this cleansing? When you receive a deposit from a sober person you do not give it back to him when he is drunk or wild or in a state of mental disorder, for when he gets it back he will not have the opportunity to benefit from its return.63 You will also not give it back to debtors or slaves,64 when creditors or masters are lying in wait, for this is betrayal rather than giving back. And do not be trustworthy in small matters in the hunt65 to gain trust in greater things. (§102) This is what fishermen do, letting down small bait in order to catch the fish that are larger, and they should not be blamed too much for it, declaring as they do that they are providing excellent supplies for the marketplace and so supplying people with an abundant daily diet. (§ 103) Surely no one should use the return of a deposit of little value as a lure in the hunt for something larger, offering with the hands what belongs to a single person and amounts to just a little, but with the mind appropriating what belongs to all, a vast amount. Whenever, therefore, you remove like from a tree what is unclean from a deposit, namely the harm from those lying in wait, unfavourable timing, trickery and all such matters, you will domesticate what was going to become wild. (§104) But in the case of the plant of friendship too it is necessary to cut away and remove these ancillary growths in order to preserve what is better. Such ancillary growths are these: bewitching of lovers by their companions; deception by parasites of those who are flattered by them. (§ 105) You can see women who make money with the beauty of their bodies embracing their lovers as if they are really in love with them, but it is not they whom they love but only themselves and their desire is fixed on their daily takings. As for flatterers, you will see them sometimes nursing an insatiable hatred against those whom they

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serve, but through their love for fine dining and overeating they persuade themselves to fawn on the purveyors of their immoderate desires. (§ 106) But the tree of unfeigned friendship,66 after casting off and letting these growths go, will bear fruit that is of the greatest benefit for its consumers, namely honesty. Goodwill after all is the wish that good things happen to your neighbour for his own sake, whereas it is for the sake of themselves that harlots and flatterers endeavour to confer benefits, in the one case for their lovers, in the other for those who are the object of flattery. From the plant of friendship, therefore, the twisted words and bewitchings must be cut away as evils that that are like ancillary growths. (§107) Now ritual observances and pious observance of sacrifices are a most noble growth, but beside it an evil one has sprung up, superstition, a growth which it will be profitable to cut away before it comes into bloom. Some have thought that the offering of cattle is an act of piety. They place on the altars parts of what they have obtained through theft or lying or fraud or robbery or plunder, and so they think—unclean persons that they are—that they can purchase immunity for their misdeeds. (§108) But I would say to them: you people, the tribunal of God is incorruptible, so he rejects those who have a blameworthy intent, even if they offer a hundred cattle every day, whereas he accepts those who are blameless, even if they sacrifice nothing at all. For God rejoices in altars without fire around which the virtues dance, not in altars with much fire that have been ignited with the unconsecrated sacrifices of the unholy bringing to mind the ignorance and sins of each person. Indeed, Moses has said somewhere that there is a sacrifice that brings to mind sin.a (§ 109) All such practices, therefore, are the cause of huge damage and they should be fully removed and cut away in obedience to the divine oracle, in which it is commanded to remove fully the uncleanness of the edible tree that has been planted.b (§110) But we, even though we are receiving instruction, do not make any progress in acquiring learning. Some, however, who have nature as their only teacher have extracted the good from the harm in which it has been enclosed, for example the practiser named Jacob. This man stripped rods to the white bark by tearing away the green.c As a result the variegation which occurs in the shadowy and dark intermediates was destroyed and the white form was revealed, not having become variegated through skill but arising from nature and cognate with it. (§111) For this reason in the law on leprosy too, it is commanded that the person who is no longer marked with a variety of colours but has become wholly and completely white from the head right down to the feet a Num 5:15.

b Lev 19:23.

c Gen 30:37.

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is cleansed.a67 Its purpose is that, corresponding to the change of the body, we set aside the mind’s passion which is variegated, evil, unstable and vacillating, and take upon ourselves the unvariegated, indubitable and simple colour of the truth. (§112) The statement that the tree is to be fully cleansed has an explanation that can be verified through the facts, but that this should happen to the fruit is certainly not confirmed by the evidence, for no cultivator fully cleanses figs or grapes or any fruit in general. d Explanation of “Three Years” (§§113–116) (§113) And yet he (Moses) says, its fruit will be for three years uncleansed it will not be eaten,b68 as if it were in fact the practice to cleanse it continuously. It must be said, therefore, that this too is one of the points that is explained allegorically because the literal reading is not at all in harmony with the facts. The wording is ambiguous. Taken in one way it reads something like: its fruit will be for three years, and then separately uncleansed it will not be eaten. Taken in another way it reads: its fruit will be for three years uncleansed, and thereafter, it will not be eaten.69 (§114) Now according to the former interpretation one might understand the text thus: the three years are taken to refer to the tripartite nature of time, which is divided into the past, the present and the future; the fruit of instruction will be and subsist and remain preserved during all the divisions of time, which is equivalent to: everlastingly it will not undergo destruction. After all, the nature of the good is indestructible. Uncleansed it will not be eaten, inasmuch as fine words that are cleansed and healthy nurture the soul and augment the intellect, but words that are the opposite despatch70 to the soul disease and destruction. (§115) As for the other interpretation, just as there are two ways in which an argument is called indemonstrable—in the one case when it is hard to demonstrate because of its inherent difficulty, in the other case from the fact that it is knowable of itself, guaranteeing its certainty not from the evidence of something else but from the clarity that is revealed in it, which is the kind of argument that dialectic usually uses in its syllogisms—, so uncleansed fruit can be fruit that needs cleansing and is not yet cleansed, and it can also be fruit that is absolutely lustrous. (§116) Such is the fruit of instruction for three years, that is for the three parts of time, the age in its entirety. It is wholly cleansed and lustrous, not tarnished by anything harmful, in no way whatsoever needing washing, sprinkling or any other kind of treatment that contributes to cleansing. a Lev 13:12, 13.

b Lev 19:23.

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e Explanation of “the Fourth Year” (§§117–131) (§117) But in the fourth year, he says, all its fruit will be holy, praiseworthy for the Lord.a The prophetic word appears to extol the number four throughout the legislation, but particularly in the record of the genesis of the universe. (§118) For he saysb that on the fourth day the sense-perceptible and precious light was crafted, that which makes itself and other things known in the clearest way, together with its parents, the sun and moon, and the most holy choir of the stars, who with their risings and settings have placed a limit on night and day as well as months and years, and has also revealed the nature of number, through which the soul’s greatest good71 has been established. (§ 119) Now (in this text) too he has given special honour to the number four, choosing no other time to dedicate the fruit of the trees to the Lord than in the fourth year of the planting. (§120) This has a meaning that is both highly physical and highly ethical. For example, the roots of the universe, which make up the cosmos, are in fact four, earth, water, air and fire, and equal in number are the times of the seasons, winter and summer together with the intervening spring and autumn. (§121) In addition, four is found to be the most ancient of square numbers, as the geometrical figure reveals. Its right angles are clear examples of the rightness of reason, and right reason is an ever-flowing source of virtues. (§ 122) The square necessarily has equal sides. Equality has given birth to justice, the ruler and leader of the virtues. In consequence the number four is shown, beyond the other numbers, to be a symbol of equality and justice and of virtue as a whole. (§123) The four is also called entire,c because it potentially contains the numbers up to ten and also ten itself. That this is the case for the numbers before it, is obvious to everyone. That it also applies to the numbers after it can easily be seen on the basis of calculation.72 If one, two, three and four are joined together, we shall find what we were looking for. (§ 124) One and four become five, two and four become six, and seven arises from three and four. By a double addition one and three and four give rise to eight, and similarly from two and three and four the number nine arises, while the number ten arises from all four numbers, since one and two and three and four generate ten. (§125) This is the reason too that Moses has said that in the fourth year all its fruit will be holy.d For the number four is even and complete and full and has, speaking in general terms, a universal significance, because ten, which is generated by four, stands as the turning-point of the numbers that are added from one onwards. Among numbers ten and four are said to be “entire,” but this applies to ten through completion and to four potentially. a Lev 19:24.

b Cf. Gen 1:14, 19

c Lev 19:24.

d Lev 19:24.

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(§126) Fittingly he says that the fruit of instruction is not only holy, but also praiseworthy. Each of the virtues is a holy thing, but thanksgiving is so to a special degree. It is not possible to give genuine thanks to God through buildings, dedicatory offerings and sacrifices, as the masses think—not even the entire cosmos could be a temple worthy to give honour to him. No, such honour must occur through songs and hymns of praise, not those which a resounding voice will sing, but those which the invisible and truly cleansed intellect will intone and chant. (§127) Indeed there is an ancient account that is sung, the invention of wise men but handed down the generations through memory as usually happens, which has not escaped our ears, eager as they always are for instruction. It goes as follows. When, they say, the maker had brought the entire cosmos to completion, he asked one of his subordinates whether there was anything he still desired that had not come into being among the creatures of the earth and the water and the air on high and the far reaches of the whole of heaven. (§128) He replied that everything was indeed thoroughly complete and filled, but there was still one thing he sought, namely the word to give them praise. This would not so much praise the excellence of all things, even those that were seemingly the tiniest and most insignificant, but rather communicate it. After all, the recitations of the works of God would be for them a more than sufficient praise. They did not need any cosmetic addition from the outside, but only the authentic expression of the truth as their most perfect encomium. (§ 129) When the Father of the universe heard this, he praised what was said and it did not take long before the entire race of the muses and hymnists came forth from one of the powers that surround him, the maiden Mneme (Memory), whom most people call by a different name, Mnemosyne. (§130) Such is the story of the ancients. Taking our cue from it, we declare that for God the most appropriate task is to do good, but for creation the task is to give thanks, since beside this there is nothing more that it can offer back in exchange. For it will discover that whatever else it might wish to give back as thanks is the personal possession of the maker of the universe, and not of the nature who brings it. (§131) Now that we have learnt, therefore, that in paying honour to God there is but a single task that falls to us, namely the task of giving thanks, let us at all times and in all places put this into practice through voice and through fine writings, and let us never cease composing encomiastic speeches and poems, so that with and without melody and through each kind of sound to which speaking and singing have been apportioned, the maker of the cosmos and the cosmos itself be given honour, the one, as someone has said, the most excellent of causes, the other the most perfect of things that have come into being.

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f Explanation of “the Fifth Year” (§§132–136) (§132) When, therefore, in the fourth year and in the number four all the soul’s fruit has been sanctified, in the fifth we ourselves will obtain the enjoyment and use of it. For he says in the fifth year you will eat the fruit, since it is an irreproachable law of nature that in all things that which comes into being is found to be of a lower rank than its maker, and so it is to be regarded as a wonder if we should obtain even the second prize. (§133) It is for this reason that he assigns the fruit of the fifth (year) to us, because five is the number that belongs to sense-perception and, if we are to speak the truth, it is sense-perception that nourishes our mind, whether it furnishes the qualities of colours and shapes through the eyes or the multivarious characteristics of sounds through the ears or smells through the nostrils or flavours through the mouth or what is smooth or rough and also what is cold or hot through the faculty distributed throughout the entire body which is usually called touch. (§134) A very clear example of what has been said are the sons of Leah, virtue, not all of them, but the fourth and the fifth.a In the case of the fourth Moses says that she ceased from giving birth,b and he is named Judah, which is translated as offering praise to the Lord.c But the fifth he gives the title Issachar, which means in translation reward. On giving birth to this character the soul immediately expressed what it had experienced, for he (Moses) says she called his name Issachar, which is reward.d (§ 135) Accordingly Judah, the intellect that blesses God and never ceases singing chants of thanks to him, was himself truly a holy and praiseworthy fruit,e produced not by trees from the earth but by a rational and virtuous nature. For this reason the nature that gave him birth is said to cease from giving birth, since she was no longer able to turn anywhere else because she had come to the limit of perfection. For of all the right actions that are brought to birth, the very best and most perfect productf is the hymn of thanks to the Father of the universe. (§ 136) The fifth song does not differ from the use in the fifth year of what was planted. After all, the farmer obtains a reward as it were from the trees in the fifth year, and the product of the soul, Issachar, is named reward. This is highly convincing, since he has been brought to birth after Judah, the giver of thanks, and for the person giving thanks the act of thanking is a more than sufficient reward.

a Gen 30:17. 30:17.

b Gen 29:35.

c Cf. Gen 29:35.

d Gen 30:18.

eLev 19:24.

fLev 19:25.

gGen

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g Explanation of “I am the Lord your God” (§§ 137–138) (§137) The fruits of the trees are said to be the products of those who possess them, but the fruit of instruction and moral insight is no longer called the possession of a human being, but only, as Moses says, of the sovereign ruler. For when speaking of his products, he adds: I am the Lord your God,a by which he indicates in the clearest fashion that he to whom the product and the fruit of the soul belong is the God who is One. (§138) The inspired statement by one of the prophets is in harmony with this text: Your fruit is found to be from me. Who is wise and will understand these things? Who is understanding and will know them?b After all, not everyone but only the wise person knows to whom the fruit of the mind belongs.

a Lev 19:25.

b Hosea 14:9–10.

part two

May a Wise Person Get Drunk (§§ 139–177) [Chapter One] Introduction (§§139–148) a Summary and Repeated Citation of the Biblical Text (§§ 139–140) (§139) We have spoken as best we could about the most ancient and sacred form of cultivation which the Cause utilises for the cosmos, the most fertile of plants, about the next kind of cultivation which the honourable person practises, and about the cultivation that wins the prize assigned to four and was practised according to the commands and injunctions of the laws.73 (§140) Let us now examine the viticulture practised by the just person Noah,a which is a specific form of the skill of cultivation. For it is stated that Noah began to be a human being who cultivates the earth, and he planted a vineyard, and he drank of the wine, and he became drunk.b b

Introduction of the Theme of the Inebriation of the Wise Person (§§141–142) (§141) The just person, therefore, tends the plant of inebriation with skill and knowledge, whereas the foolish give it unskilled attention of the wrong kind. So it will be necessary for us to state what is fitting about the subject of inebriation, for we will then immediately also know the power of the plant that provides the means for it. What is said by the lawgiver on the subject of inebriation we shall deal with thoroughly on a later occasion. But now us examine the views of others. (§142) The investigation has been pursued by many philosophers with a good deal of effort. It is put forward as follows: whether the wise person shall become drunk? Now being drunk has a double meaning: in the one case it is equivalent to drinking wine; in the other it is equivalent to being foolish while drinking wine. c Brief Overview of Two Contrasting Views of Philosophers (§§ 143–148) (§143) Of those who have argued the proposition, some have said that the wise person should not indulge in an excess of strong drink74 and also not say fool-

a Cf. Gen 6:9.

b Gen 9:20–21.

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ish things, for the latter is a moral failing, the former is what produces such a failing, and both are foreign to the person who lives in the right way. (§144) Others have declared that drinking wine is fitting for the good person, but speaking nonsense is unsuitable: his moral insight is sufficient to oppose the forces attempting to harm him and to put down their revolt against his soul. Being armed with moral insight gives him the ability to quench the passions that have been fanned by the goads of inflamed sexual desire or incited by the heat of copious amounts of wine. Through his moral insight he will come out on top. Of those who sink into the depths of a river or the sea, some who are unexperienced in navigation perish, but those who have knowledge of the craft very quickly reach safety. A large amount of strong drink certainly floods the soul like a deluge, sometimes sweeping it, weighed down as it is, into the utter depths of ignorance, at other times, when it is made light and raised above by the saving effect of instruction, unable to harm it in any way. (§145) The other philosophers75 have not, I believe, observed the extent of the wise person’s superiority over passion and have brought him down from his lofty eminence, like hunters who bring birds from heaven down to earth, in order to introduce him to similar evils. Having no regard for the height of his virtue, they said that in drinking an excessive amount of wine he will certainly lose control over himself and fall into error. Not only will he, like defeated athletes, drop his arms out of weakness, but he will also lower his neck and head and knees, and as he drags down his whole body, he will collapse. (§ 146) However (I would say), knowing this beforehand, he would never think it right to willingly enter into a drinking contest, unless there were important matters at stake, such as the security of the fatherland or the honour of his parents or the safety of his children and his close relatives, or in general the setting aright of matters private and public. (§147) After all, he would also not administer a fatal drug to himself unless compelled by extreme circumstances to depart from life as if leaving his fatherland. Strong drink is in fact a drug, if not the cause of death, then certainly of madness. And why should we not call madness death, when it kills off the best of what is in us, the intellect? If there was a choice, a person would quite reasonably choose without hesitation that which separates and divides body and soul as a lighter outcome than the heavier one involving delirium. (§148) This is the reason too that the earliest people called the inventor of wine production Mainoles76 and the women revellers (Bacchai) who were in a state of frenzy because of it Mainads,77 since wine is the cause of madness (mania) and derangement for those who consume it without restraint.

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[Chapter two] The Wise Person May Get Drunk (§§149–174) a Setting Out the Two Positions of the Argument (§§ 149–150a) (§149) Such considerations are, so to speak, the introduction of our investigation. Let us now set out in full the argumentation for it, which plainly has a double aspect, establishing on the one hand that the wise person will get drunk, then on the other hand affirming the opposite that he will not get drunk. (§ 150) It is fitting first to state the proofs of the former view, making our start from the following. b

First Argument: “Wine” and “Drunkenness” are Synonyms (§§150b–155) If we take things in general, it is a fact that some are homonyms, while others are synonyms. Homonymy and synonymy are recognised as opposites, because homonymy is a single noun covering a plurality of subjects, while synonymy is a plurality of nouns78 covering a single subject. (§151) The word “dog” is certainly homonymous, a plurality of dissimilar subjects falling under it, (all of) which are signified through its use. The barking animal that lives on land is a dog, as is the wild animal that lives in the sea and the heavenly star which the poets call “autumnal,” because, just when the fruit is reaching its prime, it rises for the purpose of bringing it to maturity and fully ripened. In addition, philosophers trained in the Cynic79 school of thought are given the name “dog,” Aristippus and Diogenes and an uncountable number of other persons who have chosen to practise this way of life. (§152) There are other differing appellations which signify a single thing, such as arrow, missile, dart. All these words are used for the object that is released from the string of the bow towards the target. Another example is that which has the same capacity to bring about travel on the sea as sails, namely oar, scull, blade. For whenever a ship is unable to use the sails because of a lack of wind or because of headwinds, the rowers with this task take their position, extend the banks of oars on both sides and force the ship to be borne along as if it had wings. Carried aloft, it races over the waves rather than slicing through them, and hastening along with all speed it makes its run until reaching a safe anchorage in the harbour. (§153) Another example: stick, staff and rod are differing names for the one object, with which you can strike, obtain sturdy support, lean on and do many other things. We have given these examples not because we want to give a lengthy general account, but in order to more clearly understand the object of our investigation.

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(§154) The ancients named strong drink as “wine, (oinos)” but also as “inebriant (methu).” It is to be found in many places in poetry bearing this latter name, so that if the two synonyms wine and inebriant are pronounced for the same object, then the words derived from these, “drinking wine (oinousthai)” and “being drunk (methuein)” will differ only in how they sound. (§ 155) Both words denote excessive indulgence in wine, from which the good person would not wish to desist for a multitude of reasons. If he will drink wine, he will also get drunk; his disposition will be none the worse for his inebriation, but he will experience the same as he would from wine-drinking80 on its own. c

Second Argument: In Earlier Times People Drank Wine in the Right Way (§§156–164) (§156) One proof that the wise person may get drunk has been stated; a second is as follows. Virtually all people nowadays, apart from a small group, do not wish to pursue the same kind of life and manners as those people who came before them, but both in their words and their deeds they exhibit what is contrary and divergent. (§157) Speech that was healthy and robust they have converted into a desperate and ruinous condition. A flourishing and truly athletic state of wellbeing they have made into something quite sick. What was, as someone has said, a full and, through its vigorous nature, solid mass, they have turned into an unnatural and bloated unwellness, which they can only blow up with empty conceit and which then through a lack of cohesive strength, when it is stretched to the outmost, bursts. (§158) Actions that were deserving of praise81 and emulation and could be described as manly they have made effeminate, doing what is disgraceful instead of fine, with the result that there are but few people in both areas, deeds and words, who take delight in pursuing the ancient ways. (§159) During their time, therefore, poets and writers of prose and all those who practised the other arts flourished, not charming and blandishing the hearing with rhythmical sound, but if there was any part of the mind that was broken and fractured, they would harmonize what it had that was out of tune82 with the instruments of nature and virtue. But in our case the ones who flourish are the chefs and cooks and all those who are experts in the arts of dying clothes and making perfumes, always contriving a new colour or shape or scent or taste for the senses in order to attack the intellect in charge and destroy it. (§160) What is the reason that have I recalled all these things? In order to show that people nowadays do not consume strong drink in the same way as the people of former times. Nowadays they drink copiously and without taking a breather until body and soul are quite paralytic. With their mouth still open

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they give orders to the stewards to bring more wine and, if there are delays, they complain that their so-called hot drink is cooling off. To those present they show off that travesty of athletic games, the drinking contest, in which they do grand and noble things to each other, biting off ears, noses, the tops of fingers and whatever other body part is available. (§ 161) These apparently are the contests that offer the gladness that is nowadays flourishing and reaching its peak, quite opposite to that of ancient and older times. The people of former times began every noble action with sacred rituals, thinking that such a procedure would be favorable for their enterprise. In every case they waited until they had prayed and sacrificed, even if the situation called for decisive action, convinced that a fast response is not always better than a slow one. After all, unpremeditated haste is a harmful thing, whereas slowness coupled with good expectation is advantageous. (§162) Knowing, therefore, that the enjoyment and use of wine requires much care, they did not consume strong drink either to excess83 or constantly, but with decorum and at the appropriate time. First they propitiated the divinity by offering prayers and sacrifices. After cleansing their bodies with baths and their souls with streams of laws and right instruction, glowing and jubilant they devoted themselves to a time of feasting and relaxation. Often they did not go back home but remained in the temples where they had sacrificed for the purpose of having a truly reverential festal meal, mindful of their sacred offerings and showing respect for the location, in all of this going astray neither in word nor in deed. (§163) It is in fact from this practice, they say, that the word “being drunk” (methuein) is derived, because the people of former times were in the habit of drinking wine “after sacrificing” (meta to thuein). And to which group of people would the manner of consuming strong drink that I have described be more appropriate than to wise men, who regarded the act of making a sacrifice as a fitting activity before drinking? (§164) After all, hardly a single worthless person makes a genuine offering, even if every day he continually leads thousands of cattle to the altar, for in his case the most essential offering, his intellect, has been defiled and it is not lawful for altars to come into contact with defilement. d Third Argument: Wine Provides Relaxation (§§ 165–172) (§165) This second argument has now been stated, demonstrating that being drunk is not alien to the good person. The third has exceptional persuasiveness attached to it through etymology. For some people think that inebriation (methê) is called such not only because it takes place after sacrifices, but also because it is the cause of relaxation (methesis) of the soul. (§ 166) The thinking of the unwise relaxes into an outpouring84 of numerous transgressions, whereas the thinking of the wise leads to an enjoyment of recreation, happi-

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ness and good cheer. When he has been drinking wine, the wise person becomes more pleasant than when sober, so that we would not go astray in saying that he will become drunk. (§167) In addition it should also be said that the nature of wisdom is not sullen and strict, constricted through anxiety and despondency, but rather it is cheerful and serene, full of delight and joy. Very often a person has been encouraged by these emotions to exhibit in a not uncultivated way playful and whimsical behaviour. Such play harmonizes with dignity and seriousness, just like in the case of a tuned lyre antiphonal sounds are mixed in a single melody. (§168) Certainly according to the most holy Moses play and laughter are a goal of wisdom, but not the kind practised by children who without exception are lacking in moral insight, but by those who have already become grey-haired not only through their age but also through their good judgments. Do you not see that he says that the person who has drawn from the well of knowledge, listening to himself, self-taught and self-activating, does not just participate in laughter but himself is laughter? (§169) This is Isaac, whose name means “laughter,” for whom it is fitting to play with patience, called by the Hebrews Rebecca. The divine play, however, it is not permitted for a private citizen to see, but this is possible for a king, in whom wisdom has dwelt for a very long time, even if she did not reside with him for the whole of the age. This person is called Abimelech, who looked through the window, the unshuttered and lightbearing eye of the mind, and saw Isaac playing with Rebecca his wife.a (§ 170) For what other activity would be suitable85 for the wise person than to play and rejoice and share delight with patience who awaits good things? From these considerations it is plain that he will get drunk, because inebriation develops character and produces relaxation and benefit.86 (§171) It is apparent, after all, that strong drink has the capacity to intensify and strengthen natural tendencies, whether these are good or the opposite, as is the case with many other agents. Take money for example—it is the cause of good things for the good person but of evil things for the evil person, as someone has said. Another example is fame, which makes the vice of the unwise person more conspicuous but the virtue of the just person more glorious. In a similar way, therefore, the consumption of strong drink makes the person who yields to passions more passionate, but the person who is in possession of good emotions more amicable and gracious. (§172) Who is not aware that, when one kind out of two opposites applies to many people, then necessarily the same will occur to the other kind? White and black, for example, are opposites, so if white applies to both honourable people a Gen 26:8.

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and worthless people, then black will surely apply to them both in equal measure, and not just to the one group. Being sober and being drunk are certainly opposites, and according to the report of our forbears both good and worthless people participate in being sober, so being drunk applies to both kinds of people as well. Therefore, the honourable person will get drunk without losing any part of his virtue. e

Fourth (Non-professional) Argument: Writers are Positive about Drinking Wine (§§173–174) (§173) But just like in a court of law, we should not only make use of professional proofs, but also of those that are non-professional. One of these is through the use of testimonies, and we shall call as witnesses numerous reputable pupils of physicians and philosophers who give testimonies not only in their words but also in their writings. (§174) For they have written and left behind countless treatises on inebriation, in which they only look at the consumption of wine and nothing else. They do not go on to investigate those who are in the habit of saying foolish things, but rather set aside this kind of misuse of wine altogether. We may conclude that they too very clearly recognized that getting drunk and drinking wine went together. In their view the occasional consumption of a large amount of wine would not be a bad thing for the wise person. We will not be in error, therefore, if we say that he will get drunk.

[Chapter three] Counter-Argument: The Wise Person May Not Get Drunk (§§175–177) a

Introducing the Counter-Argument: Both Points of View Needed (§175) (§175) But since no one is announced as the winner if he competes against himself, and if he does compete, he is quite rightly regarded as being engaged in shadow-boxing, it is necessary also to state the arguments which establish the opposite viewpoint, so that a truly just verdict can be reached, without one of the parties being convicted in absentia. b First Argument: No-One Confides in a Drunkard (§§ 176–177) (§176) The first and most powerful argument is this. If you would not reasonably entrust a secret to someone who is drunk, ⟨but you would entrust it to an honourable person⟩,87 it follows that the honourable person does not get drunk. But before we string together the other arguments in sequence, it is

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better to state the opposed view in relation to each of those put forward, so that we do not appear to be rather annoying by speaking at too great a length. (§ 177) Someone will say in opposition that according to the argument just stated the wise person will neither be depressed nor will he sleep nor will he die at all. Whatever does not have any such experience lacks a soul or is divine, but would in any case not be a human being. Emulating the procedure of the argument he will apply it in the following way to the person who is depressed or sleeping or dying: no one would reasonably entrust a secret to such a person, but only reasonably to the wise person. It follows that the wise person is neither subject to depression nor sleeps nor dies.88

Notes to the Text and Translation 1

2

3 4 5 6 7

8 9

10 11 12 13 14

In our translation we follow Wendland’s conjecture of φυτουργιῶν for the mss. φυτῶν. On the text of the treatise and the principles of our translation see the Introduction, section 10. The reading of the manuscripts φυτὸν δὲ οὐ περιέχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐν μέρει φυτά, ἀλλὰ παμμυρία … ὅδε ὁ κόσμος is perplexing. We follow Wendland, who changes οὐ into αὖ and ἀλλά into ἅμα; see Wendland 1897, 496–497. We occasionally use the phrase “after all” to render the Greek conjunction γάρ when it is not natural to use the usual translation “for.” The Greek term τέλειος means both “complete” and “perfect,” but this cannot be rendered by a single word in English. The parallel text in Cleomedes (see Commentary) supports Wendland’s conjecture ὑπερείδοντος for the mss. ἐπερείδοντος. We follow Wendland’s emendation ἐάν τι κινούμενον for ἐάν τε κινούμενον in the mss. The LCL reads ἐάν τι κενὸν μόνον. The two terms here are ἀΐδιος for the Logos and αἰώνιος for God. The latter anticipates the description ὁ θεὸς αἰώνιος given in Gen 21:33 and cited in §73. See further the Commentary. Translating τὰ ὅλα as “the Universe,” τὸ ὅλον as “the Whole” (and τὸ πᾶν as “the All”). The mss. read μούσης, which has been changed into φωνῆς by Mangey and after him Wendland, who refers to Agr. 136 where it is coupled with ἐγγραμμάτου (1897, 497). We follow the LCL’s suggestion of μουσικῆς, which is found in Eusebius’s quotation of this passage. The translators note that ἐγγραματὸς φωνή and ἐγγραματὸς μουσική mean the same, “except that while φωνή contemplates the letters as used for speech in general, μουσική contemplates them as used for the higher purpose of literary expression” (3.494). One might be tempted to translate the term with “musical,” but its import is broader and one should not forget that literary works were very often composed to be heard rather than read. We follow the reading συνόδῳ in the mss. and in Eusebius’s quotation. Wendland emends to συναγωγῷ. The Greek term ἄγγελοι used here literally means “messengers.” Mostly we translate ζῷα with “living beings,” but when the noun is qualified, as here and in §16 it is sometimes preferable to render the term with “animals.” The manuscripts are defective at this point. The word “spirit” (πνεύματος) is found only in the text preserved by Eusebius, as noted by Harl 1966, 158. The text here has been corruptly transmitted in the manuscripts but appears to be correctly quoted by Eusebius (Praep. ev. 7.18.1); see Wendland 1897, 497.

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16 17 18 19 20 21

22

23 24 25 26 27 28

29 30 31

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Translating τὸ ὄν as we did in our previous commentary at Agr. 52. As an alternative one might consider “the Existent One” as in the LCL. Neither rendering does justice to the fact that Philo uses the neuter form, easily rendered in German with “das Seiende” and in Dutch with “het Zijnde.” Another way to render the ubiquitous γάρ; see above note 3. This and the next two sentences are all connected to the previous sentence with this particle. Here and in the next sentence the Greek uses the future perfect, but this is awkward in English. Here we translate κατανοεῖ as in the LXX, not ἐπιβλέψει as in the mss. See the Commentary ad loc. We translate ἀρετή as “virtue” or “excellence,” depending on the context. The words “are planted by God” do not occur in the manuscripts but have been supplied by Wendland. The word χωρίον in the manuscripts has been changed into χωρίς by Wendland. We prefer the solution of Colson in the LCL, namely to retain the former as the final word of the first sentence and insert the latter as the first word of the next. The similarity of the two words would explain why one of them dropped out. In the one sentence Philo offers two quite different thoughts: (1) the Cause cannot be contained by what is caused; (2) the trees cannot bear fruit. The only connection between the two thoughts is that they both disqualify a literal reading. The German translator Heinemann suggests adding νομίστεον after καρπούς. See also the suggestions of the LCL (3.494). The two terms here are εὐσέβεια and ὁσιότης; similarly in §77 and cf. §70, where ‘sanctioned’ is ὅσιος. The relative ἧς is added by Wendland. Or perhaps less literally “and not one of the least of them.” Cf. LSJ II. This is our translation for φρόνησις, also in §§98, 137, 144, 168. There is a play on words here between ἀνατολαί (east) and ἀνατέλλον (rising up). The text is problematic here. The reading in the manuscripts is as follows: ὃ ἐπὶ λογικῶν μόνων τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐστιν. αἱ οὖν ἀσκήσεις τε καὶ χρήσεις … But this implies that the ἀσκήσεις τε καὶ χρήσεις are the receivers of the gift from God, which is clearly not the case. We therefore follow the suggestion of the LCL (3.495): ὅ ἐστιν, λογικῶν μόνον τῶν ἀρετῶν αἱ ἀσκήσεις τε καὶ χρήσεις. The rational souls receive from God the gift of making use of the garden and the trees within it. We follow the suggestion of Mangey to read ἀλόγων instead of ἄλλων in the mss. We here follow Wendland’s conjecture ἀρέτας γεωργῆσαι. Only one ms. reads πνεύματι here; the rest record σώματι, which seems quite impossible. Cohn suggested that the word (together with τῷ in the previous line) should be bracketed, but that is too easy a solution. Wendland rightly retains it in his text. See further the commentary ad loc.

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Reading μετακληθέντα for the defective readings μετακλιθῆναι, μετακληθῆναι or μεταβληθῆναι in the mss. Wendland’s emendation ἀνακληθέντα is more drastic than necessary. Unlike in §36 Philo does not specify here that the visionaries are “men”. In what follows we translate κλῆρος with “allotment” and μερίς with “portion.” Both terms occur in Deut 10:9 quoted in §63. A drawback is that this rendering of κλῆρος does not make apparent the link with κληρονομία, which we translate as “inheritance.” See n. 34 above. Here the Greek terms are μερίς (as in the text of Deut 32:9 just quoted) and κλῆρος. See above n. 34. We follow Wendland’s suggestion μηκέτι συνεχθῆναι for ἐπισυνεχθῆναι in the mss. We do not translate the word τιμήν, which is obviously out of place here and has been bracketed by Wendland. His conjecture in the apparatus which would allow the word to be retained is ingenious, but involves too great an intervention in the text. We follow Mangey and Wendland here in reading γένεσιν for the γενέσει of the mss. We accept Mangey’s conjecture ἀσθενεστέρων for ἑτέρων in the mss., which was not taken over by Wendland but included in the text of the LCL. The words τοῦ θεοῦ at the end of the sentence as printed by Wendland seem wholly out of place. We follow Heinemann and the LCL in reading τοῦτ’ and linking it to the first word of the next sentence, which then should be ὁ and not ὃ as in Wendland’s text. We follow Wendland’s emendation γνωρίζοντας for πορίζοντας in the mss. The text of the mss. reads τὸν ἀγενήτον. Wendland suspects that Philo may have written τὸ ἀγενήτον as in §64. But the masculine form was found in §23. Given that Philo regularly uses both masculine and neuter of God, the reading of the mss. should be retained. See above n. 15. In our rendering of ἄρουρα we follow the NETS translation. On the description of God as θεὸς αἰώνιος see above n. 7. As noted by Heinemann (167, n. 3), the reading θεοῦ ὅσα in the mss. appears to have been corrupted from πάνθ’ ὅσα. We follow the LCL in giving a double translation of τέχνη in order to cover the wide connotations of the term. Note that in §82 it is further explained with the term ἐπιστήμη. We accept Mangey’s emendation καινουμένην, followed by Wendland, for the κινουμένην in the mss. Literally “what is seen” (τὸ ὁρατόν). Mangey made the attractive conjecture τὸ ὁρᾶν

33 34

35 36 37 38

39 40 41

42 43

44 45 46 47 48

49 50

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51 52 53 54 55

56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63

64

65 66

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which would make the phrase parallel to the other verbs of perception that follow, but Wendland did not include it in his text. Wendland may well be right in surmising that the word φησί has fallen out of the text here. Philo uses the neuter form τὸ ὄν here (see above n. 15), but in translating the following sentence it is more natural to revert to the masculine form “he.” Translating Wendland’s conjecture ἐπικληθῆναι for the mss. κατακληθῆναι. The construction of this sentence would appear to be defective. We follow Wendland’s proposal to insert τὰ πάντα as object in the relative sentence. Because Philo lays much emphasis on the title God, the remark “He who is Lord” seems to be strange. The LCL suggests the insertion of οὐχ or οὐ τῷ before ὁ κύριος: “the title God eternal is equivalent to Benefactor etc., but not to Lord, which implies power to hurt. Negatives are frequently omitted in the mss. of Philo.” (PLCL 3.258 n. a). But as stated in the biblical text and alluded to in §§86 and 88, he is also Lord. So a simpler solution would be that a word such as καίτοι (although) has fallen out, and this is what we translate. We translate here Wendland’s emendation ἐνδεές for the reading ἀνενδεές of the mss. The text literally reads “numbers,” no doubt anticipating the numbers in the biblical text and Philo’s exegesis of them. We use the slightly archaic verb “cleanse” in order to retain the verbal connection between the verb περικαθαίρω and the noun ἀκαθαρσία. This sentence does not contain a comma in deference to Philo’s exegesis in §113. We follow Turnebus’s emendation ἐπεὶ οὖν for οἰκείων or οἰκεῖον in the mss. Accepting Wendland’s emendation ὁ ἄρτι for ἀρετῆς in the mss. The text is slightly disturbed here. We translate Mangey’s conjecture ἡμέροις φυτοῖς τὸν αὐτόν. The text reads literally “for he gaining benefit from the return will not have the opportunity to derive advantage.” Both Mangey and Wendland suspect that something has gone wrong with the text. But the basic meaning is clear. According to the German translator Heinemann (172, n. 2) the datives χρεώσταις and δούλοις should be changed into the accusatives χρεώστας and δούλους, because Philo has in mind Deut 23:16 (“You shall not hand over (οὐ παραδώσεις) to an owner a servant”), cf. Virt. 124. He translates: “ebensowenig darfst du Schuldner oder Sklaven ausliefern.” However, the combination with “debtors” makes the reference quite unlikely in this context. There is therefore no need to alter the reading of the manuscripts (see also PLCL 2.496). Following Mangey’s emendation ἐπὶ θήρᾳ for θήρας in the mss. Mangey’s emendation φιλίας for σοφία in the mss., as the final sentence of §106 shows, must be correct.

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Wendland’s inclusion of ἄκρας (qualifying κεφαλῆς), derived from the quotation in Clement, is unnecessary and we have not translated it. On the translation of the text without a comma after “for three years” see above n. 59. We accept the corrections to the text by Mangey and Wendland: οὕτως οὐ βρωθήσεται. Accepting Wendland’s emendation ἐπιπέμποντες for ἐπιλάμποντες in the mss. We follow Turnebus’s emendation ἀγαθόν for ἀπάτη in the mss. (very likely the wilful emendation of a Christian scribe). It is surprising, as Wendland notes, that there is no explicit reference to philosophy here, but it goes too far to conjecture its presence in the original text, i.e. ἀγαθὸν ⟨φιλοσοφία⟩, as he rather extravagantly conjectures. We do not translate the words ἐν ἀριθμῷ ἕξ, which are placed between brackets by Wendland as a gloss. The glossator means the six numbers from five to ten. The transmitted text is difficult here. We translate in accordance with the suggestion in the notes of the LCL (p. 497) which reads τῆς φερομένης τετράδος τὸ ἆθλον ἥ κατά, with the participle qualifying γεωργίας understood from earlier in the sentence. Literally “unmixed wine” (ἄκρατον); the term is repeatedly used in the remainder of the treatise. I.e. the first group of philosophers introduced in §143. The name Mainoles is derived from the verb μαίνομαι “to be mad.” The name Mainad is also derived from the verb μαίνομαι. We accept Mangey’s obvious insertion of πολλά in the text. The name of this school of thought (αἵρεσις) is derived from the Greek κύων “dog.” We translate Mangey’s emendation οἰνώσεως instead of γνώσεως as in the mss. We accept Cohn’s emendation ἐπαινέσεως for γενέσως in the mss. Wendland’s conjecture ἐκμελές, which we have translated, makes better sense than the reading ἐμμελές of the mss. We accept Wendland’s emendation ἄδην for ἄρδην of the mss. We accept Wendland’s emendation χύσιν for ἴσχυσιν in the mss. We accept Wendland’s emendation ἐμπρεπές for ἐμπρέπει of the mss. We agree with Wendland against Mangey and the LCL that the reading ὠφέλειαν should be allowed to stand and not be emended to ἀφέλειαν. There would appear to be a lacuna in the transmitted text. We translate Von Arnim’s conjecture included by Wendland in his text, ⟨τῷ δὲ ἀστείῳ παρακατατίθεται⟩. It is highly likely that the final part of the treatise is missing. See the commentary.

68 69 70 71

72 73

74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87

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∵

Title of the Work In antiquity books were usually written on papyrus or parchment. Living as he did in Egypt, the land in which papyrus was produced, Philo will have certainly written his treatises on rolls of papyrus. The length and height of a papyrus roll varied according to need. The treatise De Plantatione, consisting in 887 lines of text in Wendland’s edition, would have occupied a roll of three or four meters in length. This can be concluded from the fact that Plato’s Symposium, a work about twice the length of Plant., is preserved on a papyrus roll seven meters in length (P.Oxy. 843; on P.Oxy. see Grenfell and Hunt 1908, 243–244; for papyrus rolls see Van Groningen 1967, 20–23; Reynolds and Wilson 1974, 2). The treatise On Planting is entitled περὶ φυτουργίας Νῶε τὸ δεύτερον in most manuscripts and this title is printed by Paul Wendland in his edition (1897) and in the Loeb edition by F.H. Colson and G.H. Whitaker (1930). This surely means that Agr. must be considered as book one. However, it has as title περὶ γεωργͅίας in the manuscripts. The close connection between Agr. and Plant. also appears from the opening sentence of Plant., where Philo refers back to the previous treatise (“In the previous book”). The church father Eusebius regards the two works as two books of one work, since he refers to Agr. with the words ἐν τῷ περὶ γεωργίας προτέρῳ (Praep. ev. 7.13.3), and his quotation from Plant. 8– 10 is introduced with the words ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ (Praep. ev. 7.13.4). This may imply the title Περὶ γεωργίας for Plant. Furthermore, in his catalogue of Philonic writings he lists “two treatises on cultivation” (τὰ περὶ γεωργίας δύο, Hist. eccl. 2.18.2, cf. Jerome, Vir. ill. 11: de agricultura duo). In the manuscripts, however, the title Περὶ γεωργͅίας (On Cultivation) is only used for Agr., whereas Plant. is entitled Περὶ φυτουργίας Νῶε τὸ δεύτερον (On the planting of Noah Book II). Wendland (PCW 2.xxiv–xxv) argued that the original title of Plant. was Περὶ γεωργίας βʹ, noting that Philo uses the terms φυτουργία and γεωργία interchangeably. He also refers to Plant. 139–140, where Philo, rounding off the first part of the treatise, writes that he has discussed the most ancient and sacred form of cultivation (γεωργία) practised by the Cause (i.e. God), and the cultivation that comes next. Thereafter, Philo announces the second part: let us examine the viticulture (ἀμπελουργική) practised by Noah, which is a specific form of the skill of cultivation. Wendland’s conclusion that the original title of Plant. was Περὶ γεωργίας βʹ may be right, since it agrees with the testimonies of Eusebius and Jerome. It is possible to explain the title given in the manuscripts by the hypothesis that at some stage a scribe borrowed the title Περὶ φυτουργίας from the last sentence of Agr.: τὰ δὲ περὶ φυτουργίας εἰρημένα αὐτοῦ λέγωμεν αὖθις.

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For our commentary on this work we have decided to retain the conventional name as it is given in the manuscripts and has been accepted in Philonic scholarship since the Renaissance. There is little to be gained by taking over the name as reported by Eusebius, even if it is likely to be closer to what Philo actually wrote. The Latin translation of the title, De plantatione, was made by Sigismund Gelenius for his translation of Philo’s writings in Latin, which was published in 1554 in Lyon. The Latin title has been commonly used since, and was rendered in English as Concerning Noah’s work as a planter in the translations by C.D. Yonge (1854) and F.H. Colson & G.H. Whitaker (1930). We use the title On Planting. On the Latin titles of Philo’s works in common use see Alexandre 1997. The title περὶ γεωργίας and its Latin rendering De agricultura were current book titles in antiquity. Aristotle (Pol. 1.4, 1259b40–a2) remarks that Charitides of Paros and Apollodorus of Lemnos have written “about ordinary farming and tree farming” (περὶ γεωργίας καὶ ψιλῆς καὶ πεφυτευμένης). This distinction is similar to the difference between Agr. and Plant. The Roman writer Cato published a treatise entitled De agricultura. In contrast we have not found any ancient treatises entitled Περὶ φυτουργίας or De plantatione. The titles of the two works on plants by Theophrastus come closest: Περὶ φυτικῶν αἰτιῶν (On the causes of plants) and Περὶ φυτῶν ἱστορία (Enquiry into plants). Some of the technical terms that Theophrastus uses are also found in Philo’s Agr. and Plant. Of course the subject matter of Philo’s treatise is quite different from these botanical works. No doubt it would have come as quite a surprise to the Greco-Roman reader when the scroll was unwound and it was discovered that the work commenced with a quotation from the sacred scriptures of the Jews. See further our comments on Agr. in Geljon–Runia 2013, 86. It might finally be noted that in modern times the title is used in a metaphorical way, just as Philo did. The Dutch theologian Gijsbertus Voetius (1589–1676), Professor at the University of Utrecht, wrote a booklet De plantatione ecclesiarum, which is devoted to the Christian mission. In 1731 the Swedish writer Tobias Björk published a monograph on the Lutheran Church in America entitled De plantatione ecclesiae svecanae in America. The labour of Christian missionaries in founding new churches and spreading the Christian faith is compared with planting trees and cultivating new offshoots.

part one

On Planting Chapter One: God as Planter (§§1–72) We have already observed in our remarks on the title that the treatise Plant. is closely linked with the previous treatise De agricultura, as appears from its first sentence. In fact, Plant and Agr. are two treatises forming together one single work. In §1 Philo writes that in the previous book he has discussed cultivation generally, and he now wishes to deal with viticulture in particular, because Noah was not only a cultivator but also a viticulturist, as is said in Gen 9:20. Gen 9:20–21 forms the main biblical lemma in Agr., Plant. and the next treatise De Ebrietate. The translation of the biblical text in the LXX reads as follows: [20] And Noah began to be a human being who cultivates the earth, and he planted a vineyard. [21] And he drank some of the wine, and he became drunk and he was stripped naked in his house. tr. NETS altered

Here Philo quotes verse 20 only, but at the beginning of Agr. he had also cited verse 21, though omitting the expression “and he was stripped naked.” In § 140 Philo cites verse 20 and 21 until the words “and he became drunk,” here too omitting the final phrase. Remarkably he subsequently begins Ebr. without quoting the biblical verse, even though it represents the treatise’s main biblical lemma. Plant. is thus a sequel to Agr., in which Philo explains the cultivation by Noah in an allegorical way as the cultivation practised by the soul. Like a cultivator one should cut away and destroy the trees and shoots of passions and vices, and plant virtues. Noah, the cultivator who cultivates with knowledge and skill, is placed in opposition to Cain, who was working the earth, i.e. loves the earthy body and the bodily passions only. The words “Noah began to be a cultivator” indicate that Noah only begins but never reaches the end, because he has not gained complete possession of the knowledge of the cultivation of the soul (cf. Agr. 181, the final words of the treatise). As a result Noah, representing the man of progress, does not reach perfection. In Plant., in contrast to the previous treatise, no attention is paid to the figure of Noah. He is only mentioned in connection with the main biblical lemma in §1 and §140. Instead, in the first part of the treatise the focus is on the verb

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φυτεύω (to plant), but without any reference to the planting of a vineyard. The key term here is verb φυτεύω and its synonym καταφυτεύω. Rarely used before the LXX, they occur ten times in the Pentateuch. The occurrences are listed in the following overview, where in the final column the place is indicated in which Philo refers to the verse in our treatise and elsewhere in his corpus of writings (the MBL Gen 9:20, on which see the Introduction section 3, is not included). φυτεύω: Gen 2:8 Gen 21:33 Deut 16:21

God planted a garden of Eden Abraham planted a ploughed field prohibition to plant for oneself a grove beside the altar of the Lord Deut 20:6 he who planted a vineyard and has not had enjoyment is exempt from military service Deut 28:30 curse by God: you shall plant a vineyard and not harvest it Deut 28:39 curse by God: you shall plant and work a vineyard but you shall not drink the vine

Plant. 32 Plant. 73 Leg.1.48–51 Agr. 158 Praem. 128 Praem. 128

καταφυτεύω: Exod 15:17 Lev 19:23 Deut 6:11

Moses’s prayer: Israel may be planted prescript on planting trees in the promised country God’s promise to provide vineyards and olive groves that you did not plant

Plant. 47 Plant. 95 Deus 95–96, Fug. 175–176

It is fascinating to observe that Philo utilizes every one of these texts in his treatises. In Plant. all the occurrences in Genesis, Exodus and Leviticus are discussed, while the examples in Deuteronomy are treated or alluded to in other works. His use of the terminology commences in Leg. 1.48–49, where he discusses the prohibition to plant a grove given in Deut 16:21. Connecting this verse with Gen 2:8, he poses the question why it is forbidden for us to plant a grove, while God plants the garden. He explains that it befits God to plant and to build virtues in the soul. When God sows and plants good qualities in the soul, the mind that says “I plant” is guilty of impiety. Philo urges the mind not to plant by itself, when God is the planter. But if one does position plants in the soul, one should only do this for fruit-bearing plants. This allegorical interpretation of God’s sowing and planting virtues is also found in Plant. (see § 37).

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The next occurrence of planting is in Agr. 158, where it is part of an allegorical exegesis of Deut 20:5–7. These verses contain the prescription that three categories of men are exempted from military service: (1) those who built a new house but had not dedicated it; (2) those who planted a vineyard and have not had enjoyment from it; (3) those who became engaged to a woman but have not yet taken her in marriage. In his allegory Philo regards the last category as representing those who have just begun on the path to perfection. The person who planted a vineyard is he who makes progress towards perfection. Just as it is the vintner’s concern that the vines grow, so it is the lover of learning’s concern that the doctrines of moral insight (φρόνησις) make the lengthiest advance. Finally, the construction of a house relates to perfection. All these persons, beginners, those making progress and those who have reached perfection, should not wage war against the sophists. They will certainly be defeated, because they are not trained well in the tricks of the sophists (cf. Agr. 162). Generally, this allegorical reading of planting can be well compared to the interpretation given in Plant. Planting is explained in an ethical framework and it relates to making progress on the road to perfection and virtue. The explanation in Plant. 98 is close to the allegory in Agr.: … whenever it (i.e. the intellect) sets out upon the road of moral insight and it enters into its doctrines and runs with them all, it begins to cultivate the domesticated kind of tree bearing tame fruits instead that untamed kind of tree, impassibility instead of passions, knowledge instead of ignorance and good things instead of evil. The same allegorical reading is found in Fug. 175–176, where Philo explains Deut 6:10–11: And it shall be, whenever the Lord your God brings you into the land that he swore to your fathers (…) to give you large and fine cities that you did not build, houses full of all sorts of goods that you did not fill, dug cisterns that you did not dig out, vineyards and olive groves that you did not plant. tr. NETS

In Philo’s interpretation these verses refer to the many good things given to human beings. The cities are a symbol of the generic virtues, while the specific virtues are represented by the houses. The cisterns are likened to gifted souls who receive wisdom; vineyards and olive groves symbolize progress, growth and yield of fruits. The contemplative life is the fruit of knowledge, achieving unmixed joy as from wine. The same verses from Deut are also dealt with in

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Deus 94–96 along generally the same lines. The cities and the houses represent the generic and specific virtues. The cisterns are the prizes ready to be won without toil and they are filled with heavenly water. The virtues cause perfect joy for the soul, shining with the light of truth. The vineyard is the symbol of joy, while the olive grove is the symbol of the light. Finally, in the Exposition of the Law Philo offers a literal reading of the destruction of the vineyards (Deut 28:30, 39; Praem. 128). The context is formed by a discussion of the curse which occurs as famine. The entire lengthy chapter §§1–72 can be divided into two sub-chapters. In the former (§§1–27) God is presented as the great planter of the cosmos and its inhabitants, while the cosmos is described as the greatest plant. The idea of God creating the cosmos like a planter who cultivates a plant does not have a biblical basis. By way of contrast, this entire section can to a very considerable extent be regarded as inspired by and adapted from Plato. Especially we find many borrowings from his cosmological dialogue, the Timaeus. The specific text which may have been Philo’s initial inspiration is found at Tim. 90a, where Plato describes the human being as “plant that is not earthly but heavenly.” Philo cites these words verbatim and alludes to their source with the expression “as the ancient saying goes” (§17). But there are also other ideas taken from Plato’s account, e.g. the notion that creation by God consists in producing order out of disorder, and that the cosmos has been made from all the four elements, without leaving any part outside. See further Runia 1986, 389–392, who aptly calls this passage “the phyto-cosmological excursus” (though of course in the context of this treatise it is not really an excursus). Further details are given in the detailed comments. Philo’s description of the cosmos as a plant is discussed by the German scholar U. Früchtel in her monograph on cosmological representations in Philo (1968, 53–68). She retraces Philo’s view back to the Stoic philosopher Posidonius, following the once fashionable practice of observing traces of Posidonian influence everywhere in the philosophy of the first centuries BCE and CE. She refers, for instance, to the Stoic division of philosophy into physics, ethics and logic; physics is compared to a plant or a tree, ethics to the fruit, and logic to a protecting fence. This image is also found in Agr. 14. Früchtel (54) argues that Philo follows the same scheme in Plant. In §§ 1–72 he discusses physics; in §§73–92 he deals with logic, i.e. the fence; in §§ 93–138 he treats ethics, viz. the daily duties. She does, however, not make clear in which way logic is discussed in §§73–92, and how the planting of a plot of land by Abraham is related to logic. In her argumentation she also remarks that Posidonius compares the cosmos to a plant. The cosmos is a unified whole, which is compared to a tree or a living being (Sextus Empiricus, Math. 9.78–79). When she dis-

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cusses Philo’s idea of the Logos as a bond of the universe, she supposes that he bases himself on Posidonius’s theory of syndesmos, which seems to appear in Seneca Naturales quaestiones 2.21 and 24 (58). However, Früchtel’s discussion and Posidionian interpretation of Plant. is not satisfactory. As Runia (1986, 391 n. 137) argues, virtually none of the ostensibly Posidonian passages to which she refers is found in the collection of the named fragments of Posidonius by L. Edelstein and I.G. Kidd. Furthermore, in her argumentation she involves passages from Mos. without making clear in which way Mos. is related to the cosmological account in Plant. The text from Sextus Empiricus is included in the fragment collection of Theiler (F 354), but its Posidonian character is questionable. In Part 1A, therefore, Philo has dealt with the creation of the cosmos, the greatest plant, and its chief parts, including the human being, by God the planter. In the second sub-chapter Part 1B (§§28–72) he then moves from the macro-level to the micro-level and hones in on the formation of the parts of the human being. In this part too the several faculties of the human being are represented as plants. The treatment in Part 1B centres on the allegorical interpretation of two secondary biblical verses or lemmata (SBL, see the Introduction, section 3) about planting carried out by God: (1) Gen 2:8: “And the Lord God planted (ἐφύτευσεν) a paradise in Eden toward the East.” (2) Exod 15:17–18: “Lead them in, and plant them (καταφύτευσον) in the mountain of your inheritance, in your prepared dwelling place that you made, O Lord, a holy precinct, O Lord, that your hands prepared. The Lord, ruling for ever and ever and beyond.” tr. NETS; slightly altered

Philo has made the link to these two texts (MOT, see the Introduction, section 3) through the verb (κατα)φυτεύω. After the discussion of the planting of Eden (§§32–45), he then offers an elaborate exegesis of Exod 15:17–18, which takes up most of Part 1B (§§46–72). From these verses he picks up the word “inheritance” (κληρονομία) and equates it with “lot” (κλῆρος) and “portion” (μέρις). This forms the trigger to quote four other verses in which the words “lot” and/or “portion” appear (Deut 32:7–9, Lev 16:8, Deut 10:9 and Num 18:20) in order to illustrate and elucidate the interpretation of the Exodus text. These verses, by means of which he thus amplifies the secondary biblical lemma, can be named tertiary biblical lemmata (TBL); see further the Introduction, section 3. The verbal and terminological coherence between the several biblical verses can be seen in the following scheme, for which we need to quote the text in the

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original Greek. Note that the texts here are quoted according to the LXX; sometimes Philo quotes them differently. MBL Gen 9:20 ἤρξατο Νῶε ἄνθρωπος γεωργὸς γῆς καὶ ἐφύτευσεν ἀμπελῶνα. (“Noah began to be a human being who cultivates the earth, and he planted a vineyard.”) (§1) SBL Exod 15:17–18 εἰσαγαγὼν καταφύτευσον αὐτοὺς εἰς ὄρος κληρονομίας σου εἰς ἕτοιμον κατοικητήριόν σου ὃ κατειργάσω, κύριε, ἁγίασμα, κύριε, ὃ ἡτοίμασαν αἱ χεῖρές σου. κύριος βασιλεύων τὸν αἰῶνα καὶ ἐπ’ αἰῶνα καὶ ἔτι. (“Bring them in and plant them on the mountain of your inheritance, in a ready dwelling place that you have produced, Lord, a holy precinct, Lord, that your hands have made ready. The Lord reigning as king for an age and an age and beyond.”) (§47) TBL Deut 32:7–9 ἐπερώτησον τὸν πατέρα σου, καὶ ἀναγγελεῖ σοι, τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους σου, καὶ ἐροῦσίν σοι. ὅτε διεμέριζεν ὁ ὕψιστος ἔθνη, ὡς διέσπειρεν υἱοὺς Aδαμ ἔστησεν ὅρια ἐθνῶν κατὰ ἀριθμὸν ἀγγέλων θεοῦ, καὶ ἐγενήθη μερὶς κυρίου λαὸς αὐτοῦ [Ιακωβ, σχοίνισμα κληρονομίας αὐτοῦ] Ισραηλ. (“Ask your father and he will inform you, ask your elders and they will tell you: when the Most High was dividing up nations, as he scattered the sons of Adam, he set boundaries of nations according to the number of God’s angels, and his people Jacob became the Lord’s portion, Israel a measured part of his inheritance.”) (§ 59) Note: the words between brackets are not cited by Philo, but they may well have been in his mind. TBL Lev 16:8 δύο χιμάρους κλῆρον ἕνα τῷ κυρίῳ καὶ κλῆρον ἕνα τῷ ἀποπομπαίῳ. (“… two goats, one an allotment for the Lord and one an allotment for dismissal.”) (§61) TBL Deut 10:9 οὐκ ἔστιν τοῖς Λευίταις μερὶς καὶ κλῆρος ἐν τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς αὐτῶν· κύριος αὐτὸς κλῆρος αὐτοῦ. (“There will not be for the tribe of Levi a portion or allotment among their brothers; the Lord himself will be their allotment.”) (§63) TBL Num 18:20 ἐγὼ μερίς σου καὶ κληρονομία. (“I am your portion and your inheritance.”) (§63)

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An interesting parallel to Philo’s image of God as planter is found in the Neopythagorean and Middle Platonist thinker Numenius, who is dated to the mid second century CE. (For an overview of Numenius’s thought see Dillon 1996, 361–378; on his use of the theme of “divine agriculture” in relation to Philo see Calabi 2017.) Numenius was interested in Jewish traditions and it is very likely that he was acquainted with Philo’s writings. Since only fragments of his works have been preserved it is difficult to establish the relationship between Philo and Numenius exactly (see Runia 1993a, 8–9; Sterling 2015, 80–84). Numenius distinguishes between a first god, the Good and One, who is absolute, and a second god, the demiurge. The first god is the father of the creator god (fr. 12, 21). The first god stands still, whereas the second god is in motion (fr. 15). In fr. 13 he sketches the Philonic image: the first god has the same relation with the demiurge as a cultivator (γεωργός) has with the planter (ὁ φυτεύων). The former sows the seeds of every soul into all things which partake of him; the lawgiver plants and distributes and transplants into each of us what has first been sown by the first god. This passage is certainly reminiscent of Philo’s picture of God as planter, but in Philo it is God the creator who is called a planter on the basis of scriptural verses as Gen 2:8 and Exod 15:17. Furthermore, in Agr. Philo does not refer to God as cultivator, as Numenius does, but applies the image to the human intellect which has to destroy the passions like a good cultivator (Agr. 8–19). A number of key points are shared between Philo and Numenius: the distinction between the cultivator and the planter, the reference to the first God as “He who is,” the image of sowing and planting, and the cultivation of the soul by the Logos. On the basis of these parallels Sterling (2015, 83) concludes that Numenius was inspired by a reading of Philo, but this cannot be proven beyond all doubt.

A a

The Planting of the Cosmos (§§1–27)

The Planting of the Greatest Plant, the Cosmos (§§ 1–10) Analysis/General Comments This section describes the creation of the cosmos as the planting of the greatest plant. It focuses on the universe as a whole, whereas in the following sections the inhabitants of the cosmos, plants and animals, are discussed. We have divided this section into four subsections. (1) Philo begins with a transitional sentence, in which he refers back to the previous work Agr. and announces the subject of the treatise, the skill of viticulture. The main biblical lemma is quoted (Gen 9:20), in which Noah is presented as the planter of a vineyard (§ 1).

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(2) Because Philo thinks that it is fitting to start a discussion on planting by looking to the greatest plant, the cosmos, and the greatest planter, God, he gives an account of the creation of the cosmos by God. The cosmos was created when God imposed order on matter that was confused and without order. This ordered material was the four elements (earth, water, air, fire) which God used in order to structure the regions of the cosmos. The heavy elements earth and water are placed in the middle of the universe, the light elements air and fire are set on high. Philo regards it as a wonder that the cosmos does not fall apart, since the elements are able to attack and destroy each other; earth, for instance, is naturally dissolved by water. Keeping the image of the cosmos as a plant, Philo calls the elements the perfect branches of the whole universe (§§ 2–4). (3) Next Philo poses the question what is the support of the universe on which it rests. This support has to be external to the cosmos. Because God consumed all the matter to form the cosmos, it is necessary that outside the universe there is void or nothing. Philo rejects the existence of a void, because in that case the cosmos should fall due to its weight. He does not go into the other possibility, but he assumes logically that there is nothing outside the cosmos. One can conclude that no material support exists outside the universe (§§5–7). (4) Philo then offers the answer to his dilemma. There is no material support on which the cosmos rests, but the immaterial divine and eternal Word (Logos) is the firmest and most secure support. This Word is present in the cosmos as an immanent force, since there is nothing outside it. Philo regards the divine Word as the bond of the entire universe, extending itself from one end to the other. It causes the cosmos not to fall apart, acting as a mediator between the opposing elements (§§ 8–10). The opening of the treatise by a transitional sentence which refers back to the previous work and announces the new subject deviates from the opening of all previous treatises (Leg. 1–3, Cher., Sacr., Det., Post., Gig., Deus, Agr.), in which Philo starts by quoting the biblical text immediately without any introduction. This innovation coheres with the fact the Plant. is a sequel to the foregoing treatise Agr. Such transitional openings are also found in the next treatises Ebr. and Sobr. and these four treatises indeed form a unity, dealing with Noah as cultivator and viticulturist. For the coherence between the four treatises see the Introduction, section 1. Of the remaining treatises some start with a transitional passage (Conf., Her. (referring to a lost treatise), Somn. 1 (referring to a lost treatise), Somn. 2 (referring to the previous treatise), others with the main biblical text (Migr., Congr., Fug., Mut.)). On these passages, which one might call “secondary prefaces” within the greater work as a whole, and internal references in Philo’s treatises in general see Sterling 2012b.

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Although Philo’s description of the formation of the cosmos is cast in terms of the image of the planter and the plant, it assumes the features of the standard cosmological model that was developed by Plato and Aristotle (with some minor differences between them) and the scientists of the Hellenistic period. A key role is assigned to the four basic elements which correspond to the regions of the cosmos, although Philo here does not make it very clear whether the etherial heaven is a separate element from fire (as in Aristotle) or just a special kind of fire. He notes that it is miraculous that these elements with their opposing characteristics are held together and this might give rise to the question as to what holds the whole together, a role which in Plato’s cosmology is taken up by the world soul and in Stoic cosmology by the creative fire or the logos. At first in §5 Philo stays close to his plant metaphor and asks where the cosmos as plant places its roots and what provides it with support. There can be no question of an external physical support, since there is nothing outside the cosmos. Philo then chooses a theological answer in order to answer his question. In §8 he thus introduces the divine Word (Logos) as the immaterial support of the universe. The Logos plays a key role in Philo’s thought, but his views on it are complex and not easily summarised or systematised. In the most general terms it can be regarded as that aspect of God that is directed to and involved in created reality. Sometimes it is presented as an entity that is clearly distinct from God himself, but at other places a distinction between God and the Logos is difficult to make. In all cases, however, the Logos is subordinated to God. Philo often speaks of the Logos as the instrument through which God created the cosmos (Cher. 127; Spec. 1.81). Here in Plant. the Logos has another function: it serves as the immanent bond of the universe and causes the coherence and preservation of the cosmos. Philo’s description of the Logos as stretching itself and permeating the entire universe recalls Plato’s account of the world soul which uses similar language. We can say that the immanent Logos in Philo takes over the role of the world soul in Plato, but at the same time Philo shows the influence of the Stoic idea of an immanent, divine Logos (though it is not corporeal as in the Stoa). For Philo’s doctrine of the Logos see Winston 1985, 9–25; Runia 1986, 204–208 (discussion of the immanent Logos in relation to Plato), 446–451; Tobin 1992, 250–251; Hadas-Lebel 2003, 289–300; Radice 2009, 135–142; Hillar 2012, 55–70. Besides this, Philo’s presentation of the divine Logos has a certain similarity to the cosmology of De Mundo, a treatise included in the Aristotelian corpus but not written by Aristotle himself. Its author introduces a divine power which permeates all things, forces the opposite elements to be in harmony and so ensures the preservation of the whole (5, 396b28; 6, 398b7–8). This is quite

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close to Philo’s presentation of the Logos as permeating the cosmos, holding all things together and mediating between the opposite elements (§ 9–10). For the De Mundo and Philo see further Introduction, section 6b. Detailed Comments (1) §1. book. The word βίβλιον usually indicates a work that occupies a single book scroll (see, for instance, Polybius 4.1.1., and Josephus A.J 8.1). Philo employs it here to refer to his own book (also at Sacr. 51; Ebr. 1; Virt. 17). In the same way he uses the term σύνταξις, which he regards as synonymous with βίβλιον (for instance Her. 1; Mut. 53; Abr. 2, 13; Mos. 2.1) See Royse 2001, 67–70. that was opportune. The same expression (καιρὸς ἦν) is also found in Fug. 202 in a similar context where it rounds off a previous discussion (“All that was opportune in relation to springs has been said”). the skill of cultivation. Philo also uses this expression with reference to Noah in Agr. 4, where he explains it. Knowledge is required for the skill of cultivation, and Noah is an experienced professional who has that knowledge. The term used both there and here is τέχνη, which can also be translated as “art,” but is to be distinguished from ἐπιστήμη (“science”), the difference being that the one is more practical and the other more theoretical, though both are forms of knowledge. Similarly, when explaining Noah as a cultivator in Det. 104, Philo remarks that the cultivator is a skilled workman (τεχνίτης) because cultivation is a skill too. See also QG 2.66 (on Gen 9:20): the virtuous man cultivates like a skilled and experienced caretaker of plants. As a cultivator Noah is placed in opposition to Cain, who is merely a worker of the earth (ἐργάτης γῆς, cf. Gen 4:2) and being inexperienced in the skill of cultivation works the earth without knowledge. For the notion of skill see the comment at § 31 (“various kinds of skills”). as best we are able. A comparable expression of modesty with a reference to his own explanation is found in §139. Philo frequently makes such comments: see also Sacr. 1; Det. 79; Agr. 27, 124; Ebr. 1; Congr. 63; Somn. 1.1, 130. the specific skill of viticulture. Viticulture is thus a specific case of the generic skill of cultivation (γεωργικὴ τέχνη). In the next section he refers to αἱ κατὰ μέρος φυτουργίαι τε καὶ γεωργίαι, so there might also be a more generic skill relating to plants, but he does not use the term φυτουργικὴ τέχνη. Before Philo the word ἀμπελουργικὴ (τεχνή) is only attested in Plato Resp. 333d4. Philo’s use of the term, which is provoked by the reference to a vineyard (ἀμπελών) in Gen 9:20, returns at §140, where he begins the discussion on drunkenness. There he explicitly calls viticulture a specific form of cultivation. he (Moses) introduces. The subject of the verb is not mentioned but clearly Moses, the writer of the Torah, is meant, cf. §§41, 44, 78; Leg. 1.3, 22, 33, 77, 96, 107; Agr. 12, 84, 100; etc. See further below on “he says.”

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the just person. Philo bases himself on Gen 6:9, where Noah is called δίκαιος. He frequently attributes this epithet to Noah (Det. 170; Post. 48, 173, 175; Agr. 2, 20, 181) and interprets the name Noah as meaning justice or rest (Leg. 3.77; Det. 121; Abr. 27). Noah’s justice is part of the Jewish tradition (Wis 10:4, 14:6; Jub. 5:19; Josephus A.J. 1.75; 2 En. 35:1) and was discussed by the Rabbis (see Amihay 2010, 198–204). For the interpretation of the name Noah, see Grabbe 1988, 192– 193; Hille and Stone 2010. For a general discussion of the Philonic interpretation of the figure of Noah, see Geljon 2010. cultivator. The Greek word here (γεωργός) is rarely found in the Pentateuch, occurring only in Gen 9:20 and Gen 49:25, a text that is quoted in Leg. 1.80. Quite naturally Philo often uses it in Agr. (§§2, 4, 5, 22, 26, 27 etc.). viticulturist. The noun ἀμπελουργός does not occur in the Pentateuch, but it is found four times in later books of the LXX (2 Kgs 25:12; 2 Chr 26:10; Isa 61:5; Jer 52:16). Before Philo it is attested, among other places, in a botanical treatise by Theophrastus (Caus. plant. 2.4.8), who also employs the cognate verb ἀμπελουργέω (3.7.5). Just as ἀμπελουργική above, this word recalls ἀμπελών from the biblical text. Philo uses the word only here. he says. Generally, quotations from Genesis are given without specifying the book or the author. They are for the most part introduced by a phrase as “he says,” “he introduces,” or “it is said,” §§19, 32, 41, 44 and 78. (An exception is the introduction to the citation of Gen 29:35 in §134, where Philo writes “Moses says.”) This indicates that Philo’s audience was familiar with Genesis and knew that the “he” was Moses. Noah began … planted a vineyard. Philo’s quotation of Gen 9:20 deviates from the LXX in one respect. He adds the infinitive εἶναι after ἄνθρωπος, which he also does in §140. The infinitive is also included on the other occasions where he quotes the verse (Agr. 1, 20, 125, 181, probably in QG 2.66), but its location differs, so it is most likely a stylistic addition, as argued by Royse 2010, 112. He does not quote the words “and he drank of the wine, and he became drunk” (Gen 9:21) because they are not relevant for the discussion here. But when he starts the treatment of the drinking of wine in § 140, these words are quoted there. The last part of Gen 9:21 “he was stripped naked in his house” is not cited here or in §140, plainly because they are also not to the point. Since Philo refers to Noah’s nakedness in Leg. 2.60; Ebr. 4; Sobr. 1; QG 2.69, the reason is not that he wishes to conceal this aspect of the account. he planted. For the verb φυτεύω see the introduction to this chapter above. (2) §2. great planter. The noun φυτουργός (“planter”) does not occur in the LXX, but in Gen 2:8 God is recorded as planting a paradise (quoted in § 32) and in Ps 93:9 LXX God is described as “the one who plants” the ear (cited in § 32). The description of God the planter is also found in a key text in Greek philoso-

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phy. Remarkably Plato calls God the maker of the ideal bed its “planter” (Resp. 597d4), see Runia 1986, 159. In §73 God is called the first planter, cf. § 94. God is also called the planter with reference to Gen 2:8 in Conf. 63, cf. 196. overseer. The title ἐπιστάτης (“overseer”) does not have a basis in the Septuagint. At other places Philo uses it to refer to the mind, which as an overseer rules the passions, like a shepherd masters his sheep (Sacr. 45, 104; Agr. 45). In Agr. 48 and Mut. 14 Philo refers to God’s rulership as ἐπιστασία. leader of the entire universe. Philo often calls God ἡγεμὼν τῶν ὅλων (§§ 69, 91; Mut. 13, 61, 129; Somn. 1.93, 148; Opif. 78; Mos. 1.168) or ἡγεμὼν τῶν (συμ)πάντων (Cher. 99, 107; Sacr. 129; Migr. 62; Mut. 45, 127; Opif. 75). References to God as ἡγεμών abound in his writings (§14; Cher. 83; Det. 29, 114; Ebr. 199; Conf. 170, 174; Migr. 57, 171; Mut. 16,22; etc.). The title does not have a scriptural provenance. Billings (1919, 20) suggests a Platonic inspiration, referring to Plato Ep.6, 323d2– 3, τὸν τῶν πάντων θεὸν ἡγεμόνα τῶν τε ὄντων καὶ τῶν μελλόντων, but to regard this text as its origin would be too specific. Note, for example, the description of the highest good as ὁ πάντων ἡγεμών τε καὶ γενέτωρ in Ps.Aristotle Mund. 6, 399a30. But the plant … this very cosmos. Philo’s description of the cosmos is inspired by the wording of Plato’s description of the noetic cosmos as a living creature in the Timaeus. This cosmos embraces and contains within itself all the intelligible living creatures:

Plato Tim.

Philo Plant.

30d3 ζῷον ἓν ὁρατόν, πάνθ’ ὅσα αὐτοῦ κατὰ φύσιν συγγενῆ ζῷα ἐντὸς ἔχον ἑαυτοῦ a single, visible living being, containing within itself all other living beings which are in their nature akin to it

§2 φυτὸν δὲ αὖ περιέχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὰ ἐν μέρει φυτὰ ἅμα παμμυρία καθάπερ κληματίδας ἐκ μιᾶς ἀναβλαστάνοντα ῥίζης the plant which contains within itself all together the countless individual plants that sprout like shoots from a single root

31a4 τὸ γὰρ περιέχον πάντα ὁπόσα νοητὰ ζῷα that which contains all the intelligible living beings 33b2 τῷ δὲ τὰ πάντα ἐν αὑτῷ ζῷα περιέχειν μέλλοντι ζῴῳ for the living being that is to contain all the living beings within itself (see also 69c2, 92c6)

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Philo’s phraseology is thus Platonic (note especially the use of the verb περιέχω) but there is an important philosophical difference. Philo describes the visible cosmos, whereas Plato in his text depicts the noetic cosmos which the creator uses as a model; see further Runia 1986, 158–159. Philo does use this language of the noetic cosmos in Aet. 15 (πάνθ’ ὅσα ἐν ἐκείνῳ νοητὰ περιέχοντα αἰσθητὰ ἐν αὑτῷ), but there he is giving summary of the main doctrines of the Platonic dialogue. §3. the world-fashioner. Philo is the only attested user of the word κοσμοπλάστης in antiquity and it can rightly labelled as verbum Philonicum, a word that is only recorded in his writings or is attested by him for the first time and that is related to his theological thought. It is highly probable that the term here has been invented by him. Just as many other verba Philonica it is a composition of two words, viz. κόσμος (“world”) and πλάστης (“moulder”). Philo uses the cognate verb κοσμοπλαστέω in Migr. 6 and Her. 166. For verba Philonica see Introduction, section 6b and Runia 1992a. formative activity. Using the technological metaphor Philo presents creating as giving form or shape (μορφέω) to formless matter, cf. the expression τὰ ἄμορφα μορφοῦν in Aet. 41. See further next comment. the material. For Philo the creative act by God consists in bringing order to pre-existent matter, which was without order. The origin of this matter is not indicated. Philo usually describes it in a negative way using adjectives that begin with an alpha privative, ἄτακτος (“without order”: § 3; Opif. 22), ἄμορφος (“without form”: Her. 140), ἄποιος (“without quality”: Her. 140; Opif. 22), ἀσχημάτιστος (“without figure”, Somn. 2.45), ἀτύπωτος (“without form”, Somn. 2.45). In Opif. 21–22 Philo states that it did not possess any beauty of its own but was able to become all things. [22] Of itself it was unordered, devoid of quality, lacking life, dissimilar, full of inconsistency and maladjustment and disharmony. In his presentation of matter Philo emphasizes on the one hand its negativity, as if it did not have real existence, and on the other its potentiality, i.e. the possibility to become all things. The pre-existent matter is seen as a kind of stuff, lying ready at hand, as clay for the brick maker (Runia 1986, 142). God fashioned the four elements out of this matter, as Philo describes in Her. 140: God (…) divided the matter of all things, that was without form or quality, and the four elements of the cosmos which were separated from it, and the animals and plants which were made from them.

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For matter in Philo see Runia 1986, 451–456; on the controversy as to whether he does or does not subscribe to the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, see Runia 2003; Dillon 2005, 103–107; Radice 2013; Sterling 2017c. led it from disorder to order. The description of the creation as a change from disorder to order is clearly indebted to Plato Tim. 30a: the god took over all that is visible—not at rest, but in discordant and unordered motion—and brought it from disorder into order, since he judged that order was in every way the better. tr. Cornford

Especially the phrase εἰς τάξιν ἐκ ἀταξίας (literally “towards order from disorder”) is distinctively Platonic. He also uses the same Platonic verb ἄγω (“lead”), an indication of soft persuasion rather than the peremptory commands in the creation account in Gen 1. Inspired by Plato, Philo uses the same phraseology in describing God’s creative act at many places, for instance Her. 133– 134, 140, 157, 160; Fug. 8–10; Opif. 8–9, 21–22. See further Runia 1986, 140– 148. from confusion to separation. This description does not have a basis in the Timaeus, but has more biblical resonances, for example in the separation of day and night in Gen 1:4 (cf. Opif. 33) and the confusion visited upon the Babelbuilders in Gen 11:7–9 (cf. Conf. 188). He fixed … the upper part. The theory of the four elements has been developed by the Presocratic philosopher Empedocles, who calls them “roots” (ῥιζώματα, 6B15 DK; cf. Philo’s use of the verb ῥιζόω here and in §§ 11, 45, 46 and 74; ῥίζαι in §5). Cf. §48: the seeds and roots of all things. For the four elements out of which the universe was made, cf. Cher. 127; Det. 8; Her. 140 (quoted above), 152, 197; etc. In Her. 134 Philo sets out the forming of the four elements by God: First he made two parts, heavy and light, distinguishing the dense part from the part that was composed of small particles. Next he divided each of these two again, the light part into air and fire, the dense into water and land, and he laid down these as the sensible elements of the sensible world, as if they were the foundations. Air and fire are the lightest elements and therefore placed on high, whereas earth and water are the heavy elements and have the lower position (Det. 154; Her. 146; Aet. 33). In his description in Plant. Philo divides the universe in three parts: the earth, together with water, are in in the middle; air and fire are in

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the space on high between earth and heaven; the boundary of the cosmos is formed by the heaven. In his cosmology here Philo follows a Middle Platonic view which is also expressed by Alcinous, Epit. (15.4): The ether, finally, is in the outermost position, divided into the sphere of the fixed stars and that of the planets. Following on these is the region of air, and in the middle is the earth, with its wet element. tr. Dillon

the upper part. Philo’s use of the expression μετάρσιος χώρα agrees with the description by the Alexandrian astronomer Achilles Tatius (3rd century CE) as the place between ether and earth (Introduction to Aratus’s Phaenomena 32). Achilles heavily depends on the Middle Platonist Eudorus of Alexandria (1st century BCE; Dillon 1996, 129–130). the encircling ethereal region. Here in speaking of the αἰθέριος τόπος Philo seems to be alluding to the theory of ether as fifth element, following Aristotelian cosmology (Aristotle Cael. 1.3; Mete. 1.3, 340b6–11; the fifth element appears already in Epinomis 981c6, perhaps written by Philip of Opus), although in the previous description he takes the Platonic four elements for granted. Dillon (1996, 170) suggests that Philo here is reconciling the two views, seeing ether as the purest form of fire rather than as a separate fifth substance. Indeed, Philo sometimes assumes ether as the fifth element, sometimes he presents only four elements. In QG 4.8, for instance, he clearly makes ether a fifth, divine, element besides the four others, calling it unaltered and unchanged. Furthermore, ether is described as the finest and purest element, and it is situated at the very end of the universe beyond the air (Her. 79, 87– 88, 240; Mut. 179; QE 2.73). In these texts Philo follows Aristotle who states that ether moves in a circle and sees it as the element from which heaven and the heavenly bodies are made (Cael. 1.2, 269a6, 2.3, 286a11–12; De Philosophia fr. 21, 27 Ross). He links ether with fire, explaining that ether, a holy fire, is an unquenchable flame and that its name is derived from αἴθειν (“burn”; Conf. 156; cf. Anaxagoras fr. A73 DK; Cornutus 1.5). In Her. 152–153 when describing the work of the “cutting Logos” he assumes only four elements, but later on in the same treatise he ascribes the assumption of a fifth element to the men of old (i.e. Aristotle), who believe that ether moves in a circle. The stars and the heaven have been made from it, and the human soul is a fragment of it (Her. 283; see Pépin 1964, 238–239; Harl 1966, 90–92; cf. Deus 46). In our passage from Plant. we appear to find the same view: the ethereal region is circular and called heaven. Later on he argues that the ethereal region is the place in whose vicinity the purest souls reside because of the purity of ether (§ 14), and he refers to the

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view that the human soul is a part of ether (§18). To sum up, Philo vacillates between assuming only four elements and the acceptance of a fifth element, the ether, but it seems that for him the assumption of a fifth element does not contradict a four element view, for it can be seen as a special kind of fire. For a general discussion of ether as fifth element, see Moraux 1963; Hahm 1982; on Philo’s usage Sharples 2008. its name. The derivation of οὐρανός from ὅρος is found in Cornutus (1.1–2), who also connects οὐρανός with ὠρεύειν (“to take care of”), which means φυλάττειν (“to guard”), cf. Ps. Aristotle Mund. 6, 400a8. In our text Philo is clearly also alluding to this second etymology without making it very explicit. In Opif. 37 he gives the former etymology and also adds another one, linking the word with ὁρατός (visible); see the comments at Runia 2001, 176–177. air, which is extremely cold. For the coldness of air, cf. Deus 179; Opif. 161; Decal. 77; Aet. 67. It was a common notion in Hellenistic cosmology; cf. Ps.Aristotle Mund. 2, 392b6; Cicero Nat. d. 2.26. performer of miracles. The word θαυματοποιός, which means “doer of wondrous works” or “juggler,” is not used elsewhere in Philo for God. We might compare Abr. 73, where the mind is likened to a juggler, who prompts the faculties of the mind, while elsewhere the mind in the human being is compared with God in the universe (Migr. 192; Opif. 69; Abr. 74;). However, in this text it is not the aspect of rationality that is emphasised, but rather the seemingly miraculous way that oppositions are overcome and a stable structure is achieved. The descriptions θαῦμα ἔκτοπον (“extraordinary miracle”; § 3) and τεράστιον (“wonder”; §4) underline theses marvels §4. the very largest and most fertile plant. The same notion recurs in §§ 11, 48 and 139. offshoots. The noun παραφυάς is another example of a botanical term that is also found in Theophrastus (Caus. plant. 1.2.2; Hist. plant. 2.2.4), just as μόσχευμα (Caus. plant. 3.11.5; Hist. plant. 2.2.5) above and ἀμπελουργός (§ 1; Caus. plant. 2.4.8). Interestingly it is used in 4Macc 1:28 in a metaphorical (and Philonic) way for offshoots of the passions that have to be pruned. (3) §5. we must investigate. Philo frequently uses a verbal adjective in –τέον, in order to involve his audience in his line of thought. Other examples are found in §§36, 113, 147 and 167. See Conley 1987, 7, who remarks that Philo’s imperative techniques have for the most part a polite intention. pedestal. The term here is βάσις. It was a problem in early Greek cosmology, particularly when it used a vortex model to explain the celestial movements, to determine what supported the earth and prevented it from falling in space. See Furley 1987, 140–146.

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God had … creative ordering. Philo here employs two verbs ἐργάζομαι and διακοσμέω. The first is frequently used to indicate the creative act by God, Leg. 2.12, 3.50; Cher. 23; Sacr. 8, 40; etc. The verb διακοσμέω means “to order” or “to adorn.” Philo applies it to refer to the creation by God too. It underlines that the cosmos is an ordered whole and a beautiful arrangement, cf. Migr. 182; Opif. 40, 45 (creation of heaven), 53, 146. As such it was regularly used in Greek philosophy (Anaxagoras 59B12 DK, Plato, Tim. 37d5), but Philo is also thinking of Gen 2:1 “And the heaven and the earth were finished, and all their arrangement (κόσμος).” See Runia 2001, 183, and comment above at § 3 (“led it from disorder to order”). all the matter. The word ὕλη refers to the four elements; cf. Cher. 127, where Philo explains ὕλη as the four elements from which the cosmos was compounded. It is compared to stone and wood from which a house is built. In Opif. 171 he states that God used up all the matter for the creation of the whole. The use of the expression δι’ ὅλων is characteristic of Philo’s style, cf. § 111; Leg. 3.40, 134, 170; Cher. 84; Gig. 27; etc. Philo frequently uses the phrase ὅλος δι’ ὅλων as well, see §111 and comment ad loc. §6. was formed. The verb διαπλάττω means “to form, to mould.” It is often applied by Philo for the creation by God, especially the creation of the human being, §34; Migr. 3; Opif. 68, 134, 140, 148. Philo is triggered by Gen 2:7 ἔπλασεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον. This is the only occasion on which he uses it of the cosmos as a whole. We might speculate that, because he is here describing the cosmos in terms of a plant, and he will later depict the human being as a heavenly plant, he applies the verb to the creation of the cosmos. the greatest craftsman. Philo takes over the Platonic title of God the craftsman (δημιουργός; Tim. 28a6), which he employs on numerous occasions. However, the combination with μέγιστος occurs here only. See Weiss 1966, 44–52; Runia 1986, 107–108. The cognate verb δημιουργέω is found in §§ 11, 27 and 28. fully complete. Philo follows Plato here who argues that the cosmos is complete, consisting of complete parts, Tim. 32c–33d. was established … outside it. This notion has been taken over from Plato Tim. 32c: the frame of the world took up the whole of each of the four elements. The creator made it consist of all the fire and water and air and earth, leaving no part or power or any one of them outside. It is expressed in very similar Platonic terms in Det. 154: “the craftsman had left nothing outside, having entirely used up all the four elements for the formation of the cosmos, in order to make from perfect parts the universe the most perfect.” See further Runia 1986, 180– 182. §7. But if there is a void. Neither Plato nor Aristotle believes in the existence of an extra-cosmic void, but the Stoics postulate an infinite and incorporeal

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void because it is required for their theory of the universal conflagration (cf. Aet. 102). Philo refers to this Stoic theory in Her. 228, where he states that heaven, having an infinite magnitude, is neither surrounded by any material substance nor, as Moses shows (via a symbolic interpretation of the candlestick in the tabernacle), by a void as in the mythical fable of the conflagration. The text in Her. thus quite trenchantly rejects the existence of a void, but here in Plant. he entertains the possibility of a void and does not argue against it explicitly. We might compare the hesitant attitude found in Aet. 78 where he says there is nothing outside the cosmos except possibly a void. See further the brief remarks of Hadas-Lebel 1973, 76–78. full and dense and the heaviest. Philo often uses the rhetorical device of a tricolon, cf. §§60, 67, 112, 114, 125, 145, 166, 170, 177. For tricolon see Lausberg 1998, 326. The combination of πλήρης (“full”) and ναστός (“dense”) recurs in § 157. with nothing solid to give it support. As noted by Bréhier (1950) 86, this argument against the existence of the void is also found at Cleomedes 1.1.89–91 where the Stoic author places it in the mouth of his opponents: “But, they say, if there would be a void outside the cosmos, the cosmos would be borne through it, not having anything that would hold it together and support it.” The verb ὑπερείδειν (“support”) is basically the same as found in Philo’s text, ἐπερείδοντος. See also the note to the translation. solid. On Philo’s frequent and varied use of the adjective στερεός, see the analysis in Nikiprowetzky 1996, 177–178. has embraced. The verb ἐγκολπίζομαι occurs also in Conf. 137: “God holds the whole world in its embrace”; cf. Congr. 152; Aet. 66. The use of the middle voice of the verb is Hellenistic, cf. Plutarch Mor. 776A1. (4) §8. eternal Logos. Philo calls the Logos ἀΐδιος only here and in § 18. More often it is God who is called ἀΐδιος, for instance at Conf. 41; Decal. 41, 64; Spec. 1.20, 28; 2.166; 4.73. Philo relates God’s being everlasting with being ungenerated and imperishable (Ios. 265). In the LXX the term is only found in Sap 7:26 (wisdom as reflection of everlasting light), and in 4 Macc 10:15 (τὸν ἀΐδιον (ΑΕ ἀοίδιμον) τῶν εὐσεβῶν βίον). It belongs primarily to the Greek philosophical tradition (Xenophanes fr. A1, 36, 37 DK; Parmenides fr. A7 DK), and is frequently employed by Aristotle, Cael. 1.9, 277b28, 1.10, 279b13, 280a12 (cosmos). It is a key term in describing the Aristotelian position on the everlasting nature of the cosmos in Aet. In Rom 1:20 Paul refers to the everlasting power of God. everlasting God. God is named αἰώνιος in Gen 21:33, which is quoted later on in §73 and so it is likely Philo here anticipates that quotation. The expression θεὸς αἰώνιος is used in §§73, 74, 85, 89 within the context of the exegesis of Gen 21:33. There are no other occurrences of θεὸς αἰώνιος in Philo but he refers to God

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as ὁ αἰώνιος in Post. 121; Deus 142; Congr. 105. For αἰών and αἰώνιος in Philo, see Keizer 1999, 205–246. She concludes among other things that Philo interprets αἰώνιος “not as qualifying God’s being, but rather his doings which are directed towards his creation (229)” and thus the standard translation “eternal” is misleading. She emphasizes the link of the term with the noun αἰών, “age,” so a translation “age-long” could also be considered. See further on § 53 and § 89. support. In Somn. 1.158 Philo describes God as the support, the prop, the firmness and stability of all things. In Plant. the Logos is the support but the Logos is subordinated to God, who as the great planter and demiurge is in the final analysis the cause of the cosmos’s stability. §9. This Logos … the middle. Philo’s description of the immanent Logos as a bond, which permeates the whole cosmos clearly recalls the language used by Plato when describing the world soul in Timaeus:

Plato Tim.

Philo Plant.

34b3–4 ψυχὴν δὲ εἰς τὸ μέσον αὐτοῦ θεὶς διὰ παντός τε ἔτεινεν the soul he placed in the middle and stretched it throughout the whole

§9 οὗτος ἀπὸ τῶν μέσων ἐπὶ τὰ πέρατα καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄκρων ἐπὶ τὰ μέσα ταθεὶς δολιχεύει τὸν τῆς φύσεως δρόμον ἀήττητον συνάγων τὰ μέρη πάντα καὶ σφίγγων this Logos stretches himself from the middle to the outer limits and from the extremities back to the middle. He runs a course of nature that is invincible, joining together and constricting all the parts.

36e2 καὶ μέσον μέσῃ συναγαγὼν προσήρμοττεν: ἡ δ’ ἐκ μέσου πρὸς τὸν ἔσχατον οὐρανὸν πάντῃ διαπλακεῖσα κύκλῳ and joining middle to middle he fitted them together; it was woven together (with the body) from the middle to the outermost heaven in every direction in a circle

It is particularly the verb τείνω that Philo takes over, but in doing so he is also thinking of the Stoic notion of τόνος, the tension of the πνεῦμα that binds bodies together and causes them to be maintained in their existence (Plutarch, Mor. 1085C (= SVF 2.444); Clement, Strom. 5.482 = SVF 2.447). Similar words are used by Alcinous, Epit. 14.4: τῆς ψυχῆς ταθεῖσης ἐκ τοῦ μέσου ἐπὶ τὰ πέρατα. At other places Philo describes the immanent Logos with comparable terms (Her. 188; Fug. 112). In Her. 22–23 he explains the title “master” (δεσπότης) by which God is addressed in Gen 15:2. The name δεσπότης may be derived from δεσμός (bond),

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because God is the bond of all things and holds them together indissolubly and binds them fast (σφίγγων). The function of the Logos as the bond of the universe is sometimes performed by the divine powers, for instance in Post. 14, where Philo employs similar language. God stretched (τείνας) his powers throughout the whole universe to its utmost bounds (πέρατα). Cf. also Conf. 136, 166; Migr. 181. See further Runia 1986, 204–208. The image of a bond (δεσμός), ultimately inspired by the “golden chain” in Homer, Il. 15.20, is pervasive in Plato’s Timaeus, which is the strongest influence on Philo’s usage; see the detailed analysis in Runia 1986, 238–241. from the middle … to the middle. Philo uses the cross-arrangement of the chiasmus: ἀπὸ τῶν μέσων (A) ἐπὶ τὰ πέρατα (B) καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄκρων (B) ἐπὶ τὰ μέσα (A), ABBA. On this figure of speech see Lausberg 1998, 354–355. He runs. The verb δολιχεύω means “go through a long course” and so “to prolong one’s existence.” Since it is recorded for the first time in Philo, who employs it 8 times (Opif. 44, 113; Mos. 1.118; Decal. 104; Spec. 1.172; Aet. 109; QE 1.1), it may be considered a verbum Philonicum. In all occurrences in Philo the subject is associated with nature and the cosmos, see Keizer 1999, 236–237. The verb recalls fragments 21 and 22 DK of Empedocles, where the gods are described as δολιχαίωνες (long-lived), as observed by Saudelli 2011, 269. Later on it appears in Eusebius (Laud. Const. 1.5, 6.15), who probably derives it from Philo, because he quotes Plant. 8–10 in Praep. ev. 7.13.4–6. Cf. also Ps.Iamblichus, Theol. arith. 86.5 (on this text see our comment at §76 (“that comparison”), and I.3.e General Comments) and Johannes Damascenus, Parallela Rupefucaldina 540D. For verba Philonica see Introduction, section 6b. joining together … all the parts. This description (συνάγων τὰ μέρη πάντα καὶ σφίγγων) is reminiscent of Tim. 58a4–7: ἡ τοῦ παντὸς περίοδος (…) σφίγγει πάντα καὶ κενὴν χώραν οὐδεμίαν ἐᾷ λείπεσθαι, where περίοδος τοῦ παντός can be linked to the function of the cosmic soul. The verb σφίγγω, used by Plato, had become a key verb in Philo’s description of the Logos and the powers as a bond of the universe (Her. 23, 188; Fug. 112; Conf. 166). Philo also employs the two verbs συνάγω and σφίγγω together in Conf. 136: πάντα συναγαγὼν διὰ πάντων ἀοράτοις ἔσφιξε δεσμοῖς. Similar phraseology is used by the Platonist Numenius, who probably lived in the second century: τὰ σώματα … δεῖται τοῦ συνέχοντος καὶ συνάγοντος καὶ ὥσπερ συσφίγγοντος καὶ συνκρατοῦντος αὐτά, ὅπερ ψυχὴν λέγομεν. (fr. 4b). For Numenius’s relationship with Philo see introduction to part One. the begetting Father. The expression ὁ γεννήσας πατήρ is frequently found in Philo, Cher. 23; Post. 90, 135; Migr. 31; Her. 205; Somn. 1.35, 181, 190, 2.26; Spec. 3.189. The title father is derived from Plato, who calls God “maker and father” (Tim. 28c3), and is very frequently used by Philo, for instance Leg. 1.18; Cher. 44; Deus 47; Mut. 29. Philo’s use is not without a biblical background, since God is

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called father in Ps. 102:13. See further Billings 1919, 19; Runia 1986, 107–111. For a broader discussion of the religious and theological connotations of the term see Wyss 2014. unbreakable bond. The same idea is expressed with similar phraseology in Conf. 166: God has encircled all things with the unbreakable bonds of his powers, by which he binds all things tight (σφίγξας), cf. Migr. 181. The expression δεσμὸς ἄρρηκτος is also found in Det. 103 (of self-control), 158 (of the body). In Aet. 75 Philo refers to a αἰώνιος δεσμός which holds the cosmos together. See further our note above on Her. 22–23 where δεσμός is derived from δεσπότης. §10. the Divine Logos … as a boundary. Philo here presents the immanent Logos as standing on the border between the elements to prevent them from attacking each other. Elsewhere he portrays the transcendent Logos as being on the border between the creature and the creator and separating them (Her. 205). like vowels. In speech a vowel stands between consonants and enables the word to be pronounced, since a word that consists of consonants only cannot be spoken easily. In the same way the Logos stands between conflicting elements, ensuring the stability of the universe. The distinction between consonants and vowels is also found in Agr. 136; Congr. 150; Her. 210; Opif. 126. will make a collective sound. The verb συνηχέω is Hellenistic, Ps.Aristotle, Audi. 801b9; Polybius 2.29.6; 3Macc 6:17; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Comp. 14.8, 16; Josephus, B.J. 3.248, 262, 265. Philo uses it 22 times, also in this treatise at § 167. a literary composition. The word μουσική (sc. τέχνη) refers to the art that is devoted to the Muses, and it especially indicates poetry sung to music. ἡ ἐγγράμματος μουσική thus indicates a literary composition. See also note on translation. mediating. The verb μεσιτεύω is Hellenistic, Dionysius of Halicarnassus 9.59.5; Diodorus Siculus 19.71.6; Polybius 11.34.3, 29.7.7; Josephus, A.J. 16.118; Heb 6:17. Philo only uses it elsewhere in Migr. 158 and Spec. 4.31. Parallel Exegesis Philo discusses the main biblical lemma on the planting of a vineyard by Noah in QG 2.67, where he only gives a literal interpretation. The question is posed why Noah the righteous man first planted a vineyard. The answer is that God himself provides human beings with nourishment that is necessary to life, but he assigns superfluous things to human beings, and the use of wine is superfluous and not necessary. There is no overlap here with the interpretation given in Plant.

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Nachleben Philo’s discussion of the divine Logos in the first section of Plant. was attractive for Christian writers. The beginning of the Protrepticus by Clement of Alexandria shows resemblances with Philo, as has been shown by Van Winden 1978, 208–209. In 1.5.1 Clement writes that the Logos melodiously ordered the cosmos, and converted the discord of the elements to a concordant arrangement, so that the whole cosmos might become harmony. Clement’s description reminds us of Philo’s passage in §§3–4 where the Logos is presented as bringing order into chaos and causes a balance between the opposite elements. But, as J.C.M. Van Winden rightly remarks, on the basis of this passage one could have doubts as to whether Philo is Clement’s source, because the idea of a divine force bringing order into a situation of chaos is a commonplace in Platonist writings. Later on, however, Clement transcribes Philo literally, as can be seen in the following overview.

Philo Plant.

Clement Protrepticus

8 … λόγος δὲ ὁ ἀίδιος θεοῦ τοῦ αἰωνίου τὸ ὀχυρώτατον καὶ βεβαιότατον ἔρεισμα τῶν ὅλων ἐστίν. 9 οὗτος ἀπὸ τῶν μέσων ἐπὶ τὰ πέρατα καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄκρων ἐπὶ τὰ μέσα ταθεὶς δολιχεύει τὸν τῆς φύσεως δρόμον

1.5.2 Καὶ δὴ τὸ ᾆσμα τὸ ἀκήρατον (= the Logos), ἔρεισμα τῶν ὅλων καὶ ἁρμονία τῶν πάντων, ἀπὸ τῶν μέσων ἐπὶ τὰ πέρατα καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄκρων ἐπὶ τὰ μέσα διαταθέν, ἡρμόσατο τόδε τὸ πᾶν,

This further passage makes it indeed likely that the earlier one too was inspired by Clement’s reading of the Philonic text. More than a century later Eusebius turned to the same passage in his discussion on the divine Logos. He quotes the passage about the Logos as unbreakable bond of the universe (§§8–10) verbatim in Praep. ev. 7.13.4–6. In the previous section (7.13.3) he already quoted a text by Philo on the Logos as the first-born Son (Agr. 51). It is very striking that in the quotation of Plant. Eusebius reads the word λόγος twice (§§8 and 10), whereas all the Philonic manuscripts have the reading νόμος. Eusebius’s reading has been followed by Wendland and other modern editors. As G. Schroeder (1975, 233 n. 3) remarks there are two possibilities: (1) the reading νόμος is correct and λόγος is a Christian correction; (2) λόγος is the original reading and the manuscripts represent a text that has been corrected by a Jewish writer who wishes to make Philo free of Christian interpretations. D. Barthélemy (1967, 56–57) argues that the correction of λόγος into νόμος fits in with Jewish thought and he refers to similar passages. He sug-

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gests that the emendation has been made by a Jewish writer in Origen’s circle in Caesarea. Whether Barthémely’s suggestion is right or not, it is very probable that the original reading is λόγος because Philo describes the Logos with similar words in other passages. Furthermore, it is very likely that Eusebius was attracted by Philo’s passage because of the reference to the divine Logos. See further Inowlocki 2006, 197–200. b

The Formation of Plants and Living Beings (§§ 11–16) Analysis/General Comments Having described the creation of the greatest plant, the cosmos, Philo now discusses the formation of the smaller plants and animals. Maintaining the imagery of the cosmos as plant and its inhabitants as smaller plants, he calls both plants and living beings φυτά. This section can be divided into four subsections. (1) Philo distinguishes between plants that are able to move by displacing themselves, which are the living beings (ζῷα), and plants that cannot do so and stand in the same place, which are called plants (φυτά) in the true sense (§11). (2) Plants that can move are called living beings and each of the elements has its own proper kind: the earth is inhabited by land animals; the sea by fish; living beings that fly live in the air; fire-born animals live in fire; the living beings in the ethereal region of heaven are the planets. In this way the whole universe is inhabited by living beings (§ 12–13). (3) There are two kinds of living beings in the air: (a) the birds, which are visible; (b) the incorporeal souls, which are not visible. The last kind is subdivided into two: some incorporeal souls enter into bodies and leave them; other souls live near the ether for ever. Greek philosophers call them “heroes” but Moses calls them “angels.” They are messengers between God and his subjects (§14a). (4) Just as there are two kinds of living beings in the air, there are two kinds of living beings on earth: (a) plants; (b) living beings, viz. the irrational living beings and the human being. The creation of the human being is discussed in the next section (§§14b–16). This section has close parallel passages in Gig. 6–18 and Somn. 1.133–141. On these texts see Lameere 1951; Runia 1986, 227–231; Sterling 1998, 370–371; Eisele 2003, 196–227; Timotin 2012, 100–112; Yli-Karjanmaa 2015, 132, 144–145; for Gig. 6–18 see also Nikiprowtzky 1980. In Gig. 6–18 Philo interprets Gen 6:2 “And when the angels of God saw the daughters of humans, that they were fair, they took wives for themselves of all that they chose.” The LXX reads “sons of God” here, but Philo replaces this reading by “angels of God.” Explaining this verse, he

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remarks that it is Moses’s custom to call angels those whom other philosophers call daemons, and he explains angels as souls that fly in the air. It is necessary that the whole cosmos is filled with life, and each element has its own inhabitants. Philo than takes for granted the existence of five elements, the ether, from which the heaven is made, being the fifth element. The earth is inhabited by land animals, the sea and the rivers are inhabited by water animals, fire is the habitat of the fire-born, and finally stars are placed in heaven (§ 7). The air is also filled with living beings, although they are invisible for the senses. The souls in the air can only be grasped by the mind. Having given an argument that the air is filled with living beings (§§9–11), Philo offers a classification of the souls in the air, which is close to Plant. 14. Some souls have descended into bodies but others have never thought of being mingled with any earthy part. They are used by the creator as ministers and helpers (§12). The souls that have descended are subdivided into two classes: some are able to return to the place from which they came, others are always focussed on the body and earthy things (§§ 13– 15). Philo concludes that souls and daemons and angels are different names for the same thing. There are good and bad daemons, just as there are good and bad souls. By the same token some angels are worthy of that title and serve as ambassadors of God, but others are unholy and unworthy of the title (§ 16). The second parallel passage is Somn. 1.133–142, where Philo explains Jacob’s ladder on which the angels of God are ascending and descending (Gen 28:12). The ladder is a symbol of the air, which is the house of incorporeal souls (§ 134). Philo explains that all the parts of the universe are inhabited by living beings. Land animals live on the earth, aquatic animals in the sea, the heaven is inhabited by the stars, and immortal souls live in the air (§ 135). Philo now offers a classification of these souls: some souls descend to be bound in mortal bodies, while others ascend. Of the souls that ascend some hasten back and descend again, while others are lifted up and live on high for ever (§§ 138–139). But there are also souls that never desire for earthly things. They are very pure and perfect. Other philosophers call them daemons, but they are named angels in Scripture (§§140–141). They are messengers and therefore they are presented as ascending and descending (§142). In these three passages Philo develops the same line of thought and it is very probable that he bases himself on an existing philosophical tradition. And indeed the same ideas are found in De deo Socratis by the Middle Platonist Apuleius (2nd century CE). He explains that the elements have their own inhabitants. Just as Philo he names the fire-born creatures as living in fire. The stars are in the ether, which is the clearest flagrancy of fire. The opinion that birds are the appropriate animals of the air is false because birds are more terrestrial animals than animals of the air. The air is inhabited by daemons, which

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are not easily visible to the human eye (chapters 8–11). Because of the similarity of the Philonic texts and Apuleius’s argumentation we can say that both Philo and Apuleius reflect the same Middle Platonic doctrine on the inhabitants of the elements and the daemons as living beings in the air. The most striking aspect of the Philonic texts is the identification of daemons and heroes with the angels in Scripture. Philo seems to be the first to do so, but perhaps other Alexandrian exegetes before him had done the same (see Heinze 1892, 112–113). This allows him to make use of the Greek philosophical doctrine of daemons (δαίμονες), which has some important starting-points in Plato (for instance Diotima’s speech in Symp. 202e–203a) and then developed further in the Platonic Academy, starting with Xenocrates (fr. 33, 142, 145, 147, 148 Isnardi Parente; see Heinze 1892, 78–113; Brenk 1986; Dillon 1996, 31– 32, 2003, 128–131; Isnardi Parente 2012, 28–31; Timotin 2012, 85–99). Later the doctrine was incorporated in Stoic thought to some extent (Diogenes Laertius 7.151). The Stoic philosopher Posidonius wrote a treatise On Heroes and Daemons which has been lost (fr. 24 Edelstein/Kidd). Daemons were seen as messengers and mediators between the gods and human beings, transporting human things to the gods and divine things to human beings. Being invisible they live in the air near the moon. Often they were regarded as the souls of human beings who had died (Plutarch, Mor. 417B, Heinze 1892, 83). Philo’s description of angels in Plant. 14 and Gig. 16 recalls Plato’s explanation in Symp. 202e. The identification of angels and daemons recurs later in the Neoplatonic and Christian author Calcidius (4th century). He argues for the existence of intermediate beings between heaven and earth which are called daemons. Their name is derived from the Greek δαήμων (“knowing”) and they are called “angels” by the Hebrews (On Daemons 131–132; see Den Boeft 1977, 26–31). For Philo’s daemonology see Nikiprowetzky 1980; Dillon 1983b, 1996, 171–174; Brenk 1986, 2098–2107; Sterling 1998, 360–373. The passage in §14, where Philo writes about souls in the air which enter into mortal bodies and leave them at certain periods, plays a major role in the discussion on reincarnation in Philo’s thought; see Wolfson 1947, 1.407–409; Runia 1986, 347–348. An overview of the discussion is given by S. Yli-Karjanmaa 2015, 9–29, who himself strongly defends the view that Philo endorses the doctrine of reincarnation. His argumentation, however, is mainly based on indirect evidence. Generally, Philo is silent about reincarnation but here in Plant. 14 and in Somn. 1.139 he speaks about incorporeal souls that descend into bodies, and only at Somn. 1.139 does he refer to the process of the rebirth of souls. Because of the parallel between Plant. 14 and Somn. 1.139 Yli-Karjanmaa argues that Philo also in Plant. implicitly refers to reincarnation (2015, 144–146). We, however, think that as a follower of Plato Philo alludes to the idea of reincarnation, but

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does not consent to it explicitly. In our view he does not appear to have fully incorporated it in his thought; see further Runia 2019. Here in Plant. 14 he uses the expression λόγος ἔχει (it is reported) and this might suggest that he distances himself from the view that souls enter into mortal bodies and quit them again. For a very full discussion of this doctrine in Philo see the monograph of Yli-Karjanmaa 2015. Detailed Comments (1) §11. the plant that is most fertile of all. Philo refers to the whole universe, cf. the very similar expression in §4: the very largest and most fertile plant is the cosmos. Of the particular and smaller plants some were … same place. In what follows Philo calls those who are able to move from place to place (μεταβατικῶς κινητά) living beings (ζῷα), and those who cannot move plants (φύτα). The same distinction is made in Sobr. 34 where he discerns two kinds of movements: one is from place to place (μεταβατικόν), the other is a motion revolving round a fixed place (περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον εἰλουμένον). The definition of living beings that Philo provides as being able to move from place to place seems to be current. In Ps.Galen, Definitiones medicae, for example, we find a definition of animals as having a movement from place to place (μεταβατικὴ κίνησίς ἐστι τῶν ὅλων ζώων; 380.9 Kühn). We need to bear in mind, however, that in this passage Philo, because he is employing the metaphor of the cosmos as a plant, somewhat confusingly also describes the living beings as plants. were crafted. The use of the verb δημιουργέω, which recurs in § 28, recalls God’s Platonic title as δημιουργός in §6 (see comment “the greatest craftsman”). Although the verb has no scriptural basis Philo frequently uses it to refer to the creating of the world by God, Leg. 1.20, 34, 39; 2.19, 24, 73; etc. (2) §12. whom we call living beings. Though the term used here, ζῷα, is often translated, e.g. in the LCL translation, by “animals,” we prefer to render it with “living beings,” in order to avoid confusion with animals in the sense of mammals and other creatures living on land. Characteristic of ζῷα is that they have life and are ensouled; plants have the former, but whether they have the latter remained a controversy in ancient thought; cf. for example the quaestio devoted to this question in Aëtius Plac. 5.26. the chief parts of the All. The adjective ὁλοσχερής with a reference to the chief parts of the universe occurs also in Decal. 66. the land animals to earth … to fire. Philo is influenced by Plato who distinguishes four kinds of living beings: “one, the heavenly race of gods; second, winged things whose path is in the air (πτηνὸν καὶ ἀεροπόρον); third, all that

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dwells in the water (ἔνυδρον); and fourth, all that goes on foot on the dry land (χερσαῖον)” (Tim. 40a, tr. Cornford). The heavenly gods are the planets and the fixed stars, which are mainly made from fire. It is clear that Plato assumes a correspondence between the kinds of animals and the four elements, just as Philo presents here. The Jewish philosopher, however, implicitly assumes five elements (there is no explicit mention of the ether or fifth element). If we combine the two descriptions in §12–13 and §§14–16 we obtain the following classification: earth: water: air: fire: ether/heaven:

land animals & plants fish birds & bodiless souls fire-born animals stars

Of these categories the fire-born creatures and the bodiless souls are absent in Plato. Philo incorporates post-Platonic developments, such as the assuming of a five-element universe (Epinomis 984a–985b; see comment on § 3 (“the ethereal region”)), and the notion that incorporeal souls, called angels or daemons, live in the air. As mentioned in the introductory remarks, there are two other passages where Philo presents the same correspondence between the elements and the kinds of animals. The first is Gig. 7, where Philo writes as follows: It is necessary that the cosmos is filled through and through with life (ἐψυχῶσθαι), and that each of the first and elementary parts contains the forms of life that are akin to it and fitting for it. The earth contains the land animals, the sea and the rivers have the living beings that live in water, fire contains the fire-born—it is reported that they are found especially in Macedonia,—and heaven has the stars. The air has not yet been mentioned: it is filled with incorporeal souls, called angels or daemons. Just as in Plant. Philo assumes five elements with five corresponding kinds of animals. The subdivisions of the animals of the earth and the air are, however, absent. He does not mention the winged creatures in the air; only the bodiless souls inhabit the air. In the second parallel text Somn. 1.135 only four elements are mentioned, and the fire-born animals are absent. On these texts see further Méasson 1986, 269–281; Runia 1986, 227– 231. fire-born. Philo also refers to the fire-born creatures in Gig. 7 (see previous comment) and Aet. 45. Aristotle tells us about these animals (Hist. an. 5.19

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552b9–16): “In Cyprus (…) an animal is engendered in fire, somewhat larger than a large fly, furnished with wings, which can hop or crawl through the fire. (…) Now the salamander is a clear case in point, to show us that animals do actually exist that fire cannot destroy; for this creature, so the story goes, not only walks through the fire but puts it out doing so (tr. d’A.W. Thompson).” Jaeger (1948, 145) argued that Philo refers to the Aristotelian idea of fire-born animals but that he omits the name of his pagan source, and names the country instead of the man (also Méasson 1986, 272). It should be noted, however, that there are plenty of texts where Philo mentions Greek philosophers and other writers by name. The fire-born animals are also mentioned by Aelian (2nd–3rd century CE; NA 2.2, 2.31). It is reported. The expression λόγος ἔχει is regularly found in Philo (26 instances). Sometimes it refers to a biblical verse (Gig. 7 (see comment above on “living beings … to fire”), Ebr. 59; Her. 56; Somn. 1.36; Opif. 153); mostly, however, to a report such as a scientific theory or an anecdote (§§ 14, 80; Deus 146; Ebr. 174; Her. 14, 233, 280; Congr. 15; Somn. 1.1o, 49, 210; 2.121; Opif. 100; Mos. 2.59; Spec. 1.146; 4.81; Prob. 2, 127; Legat. 84). It is noteworthy that the majority of these texts are in the Allegorical Commentary, where Philo generally chooses not to be too precise in his references to non-biblical material. The stars. Following Greek astronomical theory as developed by Plato (Tim. 38c–40d) and his younger contemporary Eudoxus of Cnidus, Philo distinguishes eight heavenly bodies (ἀστέρες), viz. the seven planets, among which are the sun and the moon, and the fixed stars: Her. 280; Somn. 2.131; Decal. 53; Spec. 2.255, 3.187. Philo would have learnt the basics of astronomy at the gymnasium that he had visited in his youth (unless he had private tutors). He calls astronomy “the queen of sciences,” because it studies heaven, the best and greatest of created things (Congr. 50). For astronomy as subject of the educational program, cf. Congr. 11. For Philo and Greek education see Koskenniemi 2014; for his knowledge of astronomy Alexandre 1967a, 121–123; Mendelson 1982, 15–24; for Greek astronomy see Lloyd 1970, 80–98; Van Waerden 1988, esp. 93– 120. heaven. The stars have their place in the heaven. It is perhaps assumed that both heaven and the heavenly bodies are made from ether, although it is not explictly stated here. See our §3 and our comment there (“the ethereal region”). living beings. From Plato (Tim. 38e, 40a) onwards the heavenly bodies were regarded as living beings endowed with reason because of their perfect movements. In the parallel text Gig. 8 Philo refers to them with similar words: “the stars are souls that are pure and divine through and through, and therefore they move according to a movement that is most akin to mind, the circle.” Cf. Leg. 3.40; Gig. 60; Somn. 1.135; Opif. 73. For Philo’s view on the heavenly bodies, see

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Scott 1991, 63–75; Runia 2008, 54–57; their incorporeality is discussed by Dillon 1998. For the expression δι’ ὅλων (through and through), cf. § 5 and our comment (“all the matter”). the planets. These are the moon, Mercury, Venus, the sun, Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. In Her. 224 Philo applies non-mythological, scientific names to them because of his aversion of mythological gods, calling Mercury Στίλβων (“twinkling”), Venus Φώσφορος (“light-bringer”), Mars Πυρόεις (“fiery”), Jupiter Φαέθων (“shining”) and Saturn Φαίνων (“light-giver”); see also Cher. 22; Decal. 54–55. He regards the seven candle-bearers of the candlestick (Exod 25:37) as symbolizing the seven planets, Her. 221; Mos. 2.102. See further Runia 1986, 225–226. by being carried. The verb συμπεριάγω is rarely used before Philo; interestingly it is found in a fragment by the astronomer Eudoxus of Cnidus with a reference to the movement of the fixed stars, just as in Philo here (fr. 124 p. 68 l. 14 Lasserre = Simplicius, In Arist. De Caelo comm. p. 492 Heiberg). §13. The beings … to place. The same description of plants as τὰ ἀφαντάστῳ φύσει διοικούμενα is also found in Opif. 73: ἀφαντάστῳ φύσει διοικεῖται. Cf. Her. 137. (3) §14. the maker. On the basis of Gen 1:1 (ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐποίησεν ὁ θεός), Philo very often calls God ὁ ποιῶν, §86; Det. 14; Deus 41; Ebr. 133; Opif. 13, 28, 29, 35, 62, 140. Besides this he uses the titles ὁ πεποιηκώς (§§48, 130; also in Leg. 1.24; Ebr. 30; Migr. 135; Her. 156, 119; Fug. 95; etc.) and ὁ ποιητής (§§ 51, 53, 86; see comment on §51). In the air he made. Philo distinguishes two kinds of living beings in the air: birds and the bodiless souls. In Gig. 8–11 he offers an argument why the air is filled with living beings: because all creatures live by air, air is the source of all life. Therefore, it is reasonable that air brings forth living beings, viz. bodiless souls. The same argumentation is also found in Somn. 1.135–137. Cicero ascribes this argument to Aristotle (Nat. d. 2.42= De phil. fr. 21 Ross). the winged creatures. The birds are not mentioned in the parallel passages Gig. 7–8 and Somn. 1.135. in no way be perceived by sense-perception. Cf. Gig. 8–9: the souls in the air are invisible to the senses and are apprehended by the mind. band. Philo often uses the noun θίασος (33 times), which originally refers to a band of followers of the god Bacchus (Euripides Bacch. 45, 56, 221; Herodotus 4.79) but it has also the general meaning of “company.” The word has a religious connotation. Later in §58 it refers to the company of wise souls. of incorporeal souls. In Conf. 176–177 Philo refers briefly to the bodiless souls that fly in air and heaven. Not imprisoned in the body, they have no part in evil and have a pure state of blessedness as their lot.

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have been arrayed. As noted by Méasson 1986, 268, Philo’s use of the verb διακοσμέω (in the phrase ἀσωμάτων ἐστὶ διακεκοσμημένων οὐ ταῖς αὐταῖς ἐν τάξεσι) is an echo of Plato’s Phaedrus 246e, where the army of gods and daemons that travels through the heaven is arranged in twelve companies (κατὰ ἕνδεκα μέρη κεκοσμημένη). It is reported … with an accurate term “angels.” This long sentence has been interpreted in different ways: τὰς μὲν γὰρ εἰσκρίνεσθαι λόγος ἔχει σώμασι θνητοῖς καὶ κατά τινας ὡρισμένας περιόδους ἀπαλλάττεσθαι πάλιν, τὰς δὲ θειοτέρας κατασκευῆς λαχούσας ἅπαντος ἀλογεῖν τοῦ γῆς χωρίου, ἀνωτάτω δ’ εἶναι πρὸς αὐτῷ τῷ αἰθέρι τὰς καθαρωτάτας, ἃς οἱ μὲν παρ’ Ἕλλησι φιλοσοφήσαντες ἥρωας καλοῦσι, Μωυσῆς δὲ ὀνόματι εὐθυβόλῳ χρώμενος ἀγγέλους προσαγορεύει. The German translator Isaak Heinemann and the French translator Jean Pouilloux (followed by Méasson 1986, 282–283) read the sentence in such a way that Philo distinguishes three kinds of bodiless souls: (1: τὰς μὲν) souls that descend into bodies and return; (2: τὰς δέ) souls that have a more divine constitution and despise earthly things; (3: ἀνωτάτω δ’ εἶναι) the purest souls which are called angels. We, however, agree with Colson and Radice that the last part (3) is a sequel of and a further explication of part (2). So, Philo only distinguishes two kinds of souls: (1) souls that are united with bodies and leave them, and (2) souls that never descend into bodies, disregard the earth and are most pure, the socalled angels. The description of the angels here is thus fully in accord with the explanation in Somn. 1.140. There they are described as most pure, having higher and more divine thoughts, with nothing but contempt for the things of the earth (ἄλλαι δ’ εἰσὶ καθαρώταται καὶ ἄρισται, μειζόνων φρονημάτων καὶ θειοτέρων ἐπιλαχοῦσαι, μηδενὸς μὲν τῶν περιγείων ποτὲ ὀρεχθεῖσαι τὸ παράπαν). Generally, Philo’s description of the different souls that are in the air has been inspired by the myth in Plato’s Phaedrus about air-borne souls (246c– 248e): winged souls fly in the air, but some souls lose their wings, fall down and are united with a body (cf. Méasson 1986, 281–283); see comment above (“have been arrayed”). Philo divides the bodiless souls primarily into souls that descend to be bound into bodies and ascend after the death of the body, and souls that live in the air forever, despising earthly things; they are called angels. The division between souls that descend and those that live in the air is also found in Gig. 12 and Somn. 138–140 (cf. also QG 4.188). But uniquely in Somn. 1.139 the souls that descend and later ascend are subdivided: some souls descend again desiring for the mortal life, others are lifted up on light wings and inhabit the air forever. It is reported. Philo repeats the phrase λόγος ἔχει. See comment at § 12. some of them … depart from them again. These words may suggest the idea of reincarnation but here Philo does not say that souls re-enter into bodies,

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which is characteristic of reincarnation. He means that the soul enters into the mortal body when the body is made, and leaves the body at death. It is possible that with the expression λόγος ἔχει Philo distances himself from the belief in reincarnation or if Yli-Karjanmaa (2015, 146) is to be followed, deliberately obscures his view on the matter. See further general remarks above. enter. Philo uses the verb εἰσκρίνομαι in the same sense in Leg. 1.32 and Somn. 1.31. The term is traditional: in the doxographical tradition it is also used to indicate the entering of the mind into the body (Anaxagoras 59A93 DK [= Aëtius 4.3.2]; cf. SVF 1.523 [= Aëtius 4.5.11], Iamblichus, Myst. 1.8). at certain appointed times. Philo means the time of physical death of the body, and Yli-Karjanmaa (2015, 118) suggests Plato Tim. 89b as its source: “The composition of the living creature is so ordered as to have a regular period of life (τεταγμένους τοῦ βίου γίγνεται χρόνους) for the species in general; and also each individual by itself is born with its allotted span (tr. Cornford).” There is no reason to assume, as Colson does with a reference to Plato Phaedr. 248e– 249a (PLCL 5.600), that Philo is thinking of periods of reincarnation. Philo employs the same expression in Her. 283 when referring to the death of the body (see Harl 1966, 308 n. 3). The soul, however, will depart to the ether, the purest element, and to the father. For death as separation of soul from body, cf. Leg. 1.105, based on Plato’s classic formulation at Phaed. 67d. In the parallel text in Somn. 1.139 we find the expression κατὰ τοὺς ὑπὸ φύσεως ὁρισθέντας ἀριθμοὺς καὶ χρόνους (“according to the numbers and periods determined by nature”). For the expression κατὰ ὡρισμένας περιόδους cf. Leg. 1.20; Mos. 2.20; Spec. 1.16. depart from them again. The use of the verb ἀπαλλάττομαι (“to be set free, to be released”) is an echo of Plato’s use with a reference to the soul’s release from the body in the Phaedo (64c6, 67a7, 81b2, c2, 85b7, 114b8; Méasson 1986, 283). have obtained a more divine constitution. The same expression θειοτέρας κατασκευῆς λαγχάνω occurs also in Conf. 108 and 122, but not referring to the angels. Cf. the parallel text in Somn. 1.140: μειζόνων φρονημάτων καὶ θειοτέρων ἐπιλαχοῦσαι (“having obtained higher and more divine thoughts”). A similar hierarchical approach is shown in §17: ἐξαιρέτου τῆς κατασκευῆς ἔλαχεν ἄνθρωπος (“the human being obtained a structure that was exceptional”). disregard the earthly realm totally. The same is said in the parallel passages Somn. 1.140 and Gig. 12. the ether. The ethereal region refers to the heaven, which consists of ether and in which the heavenly bodies are situated. It is the boundary of the universe, cf. §3 (also Alcinous, Epit. 15.4: the ether is in the outermost position. Following is the region of the air). Because ether is the purest element, it is nat-

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ural that the angels, being also very pure, spend their time at the upper end of the region of the air and near the ethereal region. See also comment at § 3 (“the ethereal region”). whom the philosophers … call “heroes.” Philo makes the same remark in Somn.1.141. In Gig. 16 he explains that souls and daemons and angels are different names for the same thing. As noted earlier Philo appears to be the first to identify the angels from the Bible with the daemons in Greek philosophy but it is possible that earlier Alexandrian exegetes had already made this identification. There are a few passages in Greek philosophy where souls in the air are called heroes or daemons. In Tim. 90a Plato regards the rational part of the soul as the daemon of each human being. Souls of dead human beings are referred to as heroes in a fragment from the poet Pindar (fr. 133) as quoted by Plato (Meno 81b): Persephone accepts the atonement for ancient grief, in the ninth year she sends their soul up again to the sun above, and from them arise august kings and men swift in motion and matchless in wisdom; henceforth people call them holy heroes (tr. Sedley & Long). Diogenes Laertius reports that according to Pythagoras the whole air is full of souls which are called daemons and heroes (8.32). According to Augustine Varro (Roman scholar, 1st century BCE) says the souls in the air, invisible by the eyes, are called heroes and lares and genii (Civ. 7.6). For the doctrine of daemons, see Brenk 1986 (2098–2107 on Philo); Dillon 1996, 31–32; 2003, 128–131. an accurate term. The expression εὐθύβολον ὄνομα, which in the sense of “accurate name” is first attested in Philo, also occurs in Agr. 2; Ebr. 164; Migr. 145; Mut. 94; Opif. 15. Through his profound knowledge of the nature of things Moses is able to give accurate names to things (cf. Agr. 2; Cher. 56). This is a case of Jewish upmanship. Philo implies that the term used for these figures in the Bible more accurately represents their role. “angels.” Angels (literally “messengers”) play an important role in the Pentateuch. They are for the most time presented as individuals, for instance the angel of the Lord who speaks with Hagar (Gen 16:7–11) or with Abraham (Gen 22:11, 15). An angel is sometimes sent by God to protect humans on their ways (Gen 24:7, 40; Exod 14:19, 23:20–23, 32:34, 33:2). On occasion the angels are seen as a group, for instance the angels who descend and ascend on the ladder in Jacob’s dream (Gen 28:12). Generally Philo describes the angels as the army of God, incorporeal and blessed souls (Sacr. 5; Gig. 12–14; Somn. 1.140–141; Spec. 1.66; QE 2.1). They inhabit the air and stand between God and human beings. Being intermediate entities they serve as ambassadors of God (Gig. 16; Somn. 1.142). They are subordinated to the Logos, who is called “leader of the angels” (Her. 205; Somn. 1.157). For Philo’s views on angels see Dillon 1983b; 1996, 171– 174; Brenk 1986, 2098–2107; Decharneux 1991; Sterling 1998, 360–373.

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since they report … what his subjects are in need of. The same explanation of the name “angels” is given in Somn. 1.140–141 with a reference to the angels that ascend and descend on a stairway to heaven in Jacob’s dream (Gen 28:12): they are ears and eyes of the great king, reporting the orders of the father to the children and the needs of the children to the father. Cf. also Somn. 1.190; Abr. 115; QE 2.13. Philo’s description recalls Plato’s explanation of daemons as interpreting and transporting human things to the gods and divine things to human beings (Symp. 202e). the leader. For God as leader, see §2 and comment. the king. See comment below at §51. (4) two kinds again. Just as there are two kinds of animals assigned to the air (§14), so there are two kinds of animals that inhabit the earth: land animals and plants. Plants are defined in §15. In the parallel passages in Gig. 7 and Somn. 1.135 Philo speaks only of land-animals as living on earth, leaving out the plants. Their inclusion here is no doubt the result of the treatise’s botanical focus. mother. The image of the earth as a mother, which of course is quite natural, is explained with reference to Greek traditions in Opif. 133: “It seems that the earth too is a mother. For this reason the first human beings decided to call her Demeter, combining the word for mother (μήτηρ) and earth (γῆ). For, as Plato has said (cf. Menex. 237e–238a), it is not earth who has imitated woman, but rather woman who has imitated earth. The race of poets is quite correct in calling her ‘mother of all’ (cf. Aeschylus, Prom. 90) and ‘crop-bearer’ and ‘giver of all.’” On this text see Runia 2001, 319. nurse. Naturally mother earth is also a nurse. Philo may have in mind Plato, Tim. 40b8, where earth is called our nurse. The idea is also formulated in a saying by the comic poet Menander: earth the mother of all things and common nurse (Sententiae 511). For earth as nurse see also Sacr. 25. The image can also be used in other contexts: in Somn. 2.139 Philo calls paideia the mother and nurse of the soul-company (ψυχῆς θιάσου, for θίασος see comment above [“band”]) that yearns for knowledge. The combination of mother and nurse occurs also in Ebr. 61 and Mos. 1.18. §15. just as in the case of a woman. Philo expresses the same idea in the continuation of Opif. 133, already partly quoted above: “Nature has equipped every mother with a highly essential (bodily) part in the form of breasts like fountains (πηγάζοντας, cf. §15 πηγαί), and so has prepared food in advance for the child that will be born.” Cf. Spec. 3.199 and Virt. 129. In Aet. 66 he also likens earth to a woman who has breasts when she bore children in order that they have their proper food, but in that passage because of the context, he makes

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fun of the idea. Before Philo the imagery of the breasts as fountains occurs in the Platonic passage Menex. 237e cited in Opif. 133. the necessary and appropriate nourishment. The expression αἱ ἀναγκαῖαι τροφαί or ἡ ἀναγκαῖα τροφή seems to appeal to Philo. It occurs also in Congr. 29; Somn. 1.97; Mos. 1.195; 2.70, 222; Spec. 1.132; 2.247; Virt. 152; Prob. 121; Contempl. 35. all the forms of plants. In his descriptions of the features of the cosmos Philo likes to emphasize diversity. Similar expressions to the text here are found in Spec. 2.151, 172. Longer phrases involving animals as well as plants also occur frequently: Sacr. 97; Migr. 185; Congr. 133; Mos. 1.212; Spec. 1.322. §16. head downwards. The only other occurrence of the adverb κατωκάρα in Philo is in Det. 85, where Philo also presents all other land animals as having their heads downwards, except for human beings. Philo’s use is striking because before him the adverb is only attested three times in poetic contexts (Pindar fr. 161; Aristophanes, Ach. 945; Pax 153). It does not occur in the Platonic passage that is Philo’s inspiration here; see the next note. fixing their heads. Because the word κεφαλή can refer to the extremities of things, Philo here use it for the roots of plants, which are planted in the earth as their source of nourishment. By the same token, in the parallel passage in Det. 85 he says that God stretches the roots of human beings into heaven, using the word “root” in a non-literal way to refer to the head. Just as a plant gets its nourishment through the roots, so the soul is nourished by food from heaven through his head, especially by the eyes. Philo is here influenced by Plato, who also calls the head the “root” (Tim. 90a8). irrational animals. Until now Philo has not mentioned a distinction between rational and irrational beings, because his aim was to describe the cosmos and all its inhabitants as plants. Now, by referring to irrational beings he implicitly divides the land animals into irrational (beasts) and rational beings (human beings). Human beings are rational because they have a rational soul, as Philo explains in §18. A fuller set of distinctions is presented in Conf. 176: the nature of living beings was primarily divided into the irrational and the rational. The rational part was then subdivided into mortal and immortal. Human beings are mortal but the bodiless souls, which fly in the air and heaven, are immortal (cf. §14). like a pedestal. Philo pictures the feet of animals as a pedestal on which the neck is placed like a statue. The same imagery of a statue on a pedestal is found in §5 to indicate the basis on which the cosmos is supported like a statue, but in the case of the cosmos it cannot, Philo argues, be anything material.

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The Creation of the Human Being (§§17–22) Analysis/General Comments In the previous section Philo has described the formation of plants and animals and now he proceeds to discuss the creation of the human being, who is also a living being but differs in a significant respect from the others. The section can be subdivided into four parts. (1) Philo starts by explaining that the human being is the only living creature that has been given an upright posture in order that he may look upward to heaven (§17). (2) Assuming the human being to be a composite of body and soul, he states that the rational soul does not have an affinity with anything created but is akin to God. He defines it as an authentic coinage of the divine spirit and as marked by God’s Logos (§18). (3) Philo next offers the scriptural evidence for his conception of the human soul and quotes Gen 2:7 (God breathed into his face the breath of life) and Gen 1:27 (And God made humankind: according to divine image he made them; §19). (4) Finally, Philo makes clear the consequences (ἀκόλουθον οὖν) of the fact that the human being has an affinity with God. He stands upright and his vision extends towards heaven. In this way the human being can raise his eyes, observe the heaven and ascend to God. Because the eyes of the body are a representation of the eyes of the soul, he is able to aspire to the vision of the God who IS. (§§20–22). This is the first time that Philo cites Scripture since his quotation of the main biblical lemma in §1. He quotes two verses from the account of the creation of the human being, Gen 2:7 and 1:27. The mode of transition for these secondary biblical verses is thematic, in order to indicate the status of the human being which is created by God the planter and creator. In the MBL the status of Noah as a human being is of course strongly emphasized in the description Νῶε ἄνθρωπος. These verses, to which Philo frequently refers, form the basis for his anthropology. In general terms, he regards the human being as having a kinship with God, because God breathed into his face his spirit, and the human soul has been made after God’s image, which is his Logos. Because of the kinship with God human beings are able to see and to know God with the eyes of the mind, and knowing and seeing God is the goal (τέλος) of human life. At the same time, Philo’s exegesis of the scriptural verses bears the imprint of Platonic influence. The description of the human being as “a plant that is not earthly but heavenly” is literally quoted from Plato’s Timaeus (90a6–7). The motif of the ascent of the mind is indebted to the myth on the winged soul in Plato’s Phaedrus.

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Detailed Comments (1) §17. obtained a structure that was exceptional. A comparable expression is found in Deus 45: the human being obtained a gift that was exceptional, the intellect. The phrase κατασκευῆς λαγχάνω (“to obtain a constitution”) is repeated from §14; see the comment ad loc. he raised him up. As already remarked, the idea that the human being stands upright and in this way is directed to heaven in contrast with the beasts, whose heads are fixed downwards, is derived from Plato Tim. 90a. In what follows Philo quotes Plato verbatim, but refers to him in an anonymous way. The same notion is also expressed in Det. 85; Ebr. 156; Abr. 164; Opif. 147; Anim. 11. In Det. 85 he explains further that God “placed our feet as roots on the earth, keeping that part of our body that is totally without sense very far from the reasoning faculty. He removed, however, the senses that are bodyguards of the mind and mind itself very far from earth, connecting them to the imperishable circuits of air and heaven.” For a discussion of this motif in Philo see Runia 1986, 324– 329. The verb ἀνορθόω (“to raise up”; cf. Ebr. 156: ἀνωρθίασται) is a reminiscence of Plato Tim. 90b1: ὀρθοῖ. that he could gaze at the heaven. The same notion is met with in Det. 85 where Philo explains that God raised the head of human being that he may have heavenly and imperishable food, not earthly and perishable. The orientation of the human being towards heaven is also expressed later on in § 20. as the ancient saying goes. The same expression (ὡς ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος) occurs also in Ebr. 8 (referring to Plato as well); Conf. 184; Mos. 1.280; QE 2.107 Petit. Philo never mentions Plato by name in the Allegorical Commentary, but the veiled expression gives the reader a hint. that is not earthly but heavenly. These words (φυτὸν οὐκ ἐπίγειον ἀλλ’ οὐράνιον) are a literal quotation from Plato Tim. 90a6–7. Plato sees the human being as a plant, whose roots or head are directed towards heaven that he may be nourished by immortal and divine thoughts; see Runia 1986, 327–328. The expression φυτὸν οὐράνιον is also found in Det. 85 (quoted above) and Prov. 2.109 Aucher (2.66 in the Greek fragment preserved by Eusebius, LCL 9.503). The imagery of a plant occurs also in Congr. 56: God plants (καταφυτεύει, cf. MBL Gen 9:20 ἐφύτευσεν) the mind that truly loves God as a branch of good birth and stretches his roots into eternity. It is followed by the citation of Exod 15:17, quoted in Plant. 47. For Det. 85 see Parallel Exegesis below. (2) §18. our intellect. For Philo the intellect (νοῦς) is the ruling part of the soul (Leg. 1.61; Opif. 117) and is also called the rational soul. In § 147 he calls it the best of what is in us. See further Runia 1986, 331–332; Méasson 1986, 369–377. See also below the comment on “rational soul.”

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the ethereal nature. In Pythagorean and Platonist tradition the idea arose that the human soul was made from ether or has a kinship with ether. Diogenes Laertius reports that the Pythagoreans believe that the soul is a fragment of ether (8.28). Later on the notion is found in fragments of the fourth-century philosopher associated with the Academy, Heraclides of Pontus (fr. 99 Wehrli), and by the Peripatetic Critolaos (fr. 17–18 Wehrli). There is at least a starting point in the Aristotelian corpus (Gen. anim. 2.3, 736b29–737a1, but there the soul is described in terms of πνεῦμα, the terminology used later by the Stoa), and Cicero ascribes to Aristotle the notion that the soul is made from the fifth element, from which the stars are made as well (Cicero, Acad. 1.7.26; Tusc. Dis. 1.10.22, 1.26.65–27.66 = fr. 27 Ross). Because Philo makes an emphatic contrast between this viewpoint and that of Moses, which must be superior to it, it would seem that he rejects it. However, in other passages he does claim ether as the soul’s substance. Explaining Gen 2:7 in Leg. 3.162 he clearly states that the body has been made from earth and the soul is ethereal, a divine fragment (cf. also Det. 90). Because the soul is a part of the ethereal nature, it has ethereal and divine food. In Deus 46 he states that the soul has not been made of the same elements out of which all other things have been made, but the soul was allotted a purer and better substance, out of which the divine natures have been created. Finally, in Spec. 4.123 interpreting Gen 2:7 he explains that God breathed in an ethereal spirit, or, if such a thing exists, something better than ethereal spirit, which is a fragment of the blessed nature of the Godhead. It seems that Philo regards ether as a physical element, out of which the heaven and the stars have been made but also as something divine and pure. It would seem that the scriptural mention of spirit (πνεῦμα) in Gen 2:7 causes Philo to describe the soul on occasion in quasi-material terms, but that his further reflection on the relation of the intellect or rational soul to God which makes human beings special pushes him in the direction of Platonic doctrine in which it transcends material elements. kinship. The term συγγένεια here emphasizes a family relationship (it contains the root γεν- meaning “being born”). The human being does not have a kinship with anything that has come into being, but is akin to God, cf. Opif. 77: God granted to the human being kinship to himself. See Runia 2001, 342–343. the great Moses. A reference to the great Moses is also found in Sobr. 49; Opif. 12; Mos. 2.211; Spec. 2.51. rational soul. Philo’s psychology is fundamentally dualistic. Not only does the human being consists of a mortal body and an immortal soul (Leg. 3.161; Her. 155; Opif. 136–140; QG 3.11), but the soul is then further divided into a rational and an irrational part (Leg. 2.2; Det. 82, 91; Agr. 30; Her. 167; Congr. 26). However, other philosophical schemas are sometimes used. Following Stoic

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thought (cf. Diogenes Laertius 7.100), the soul can be divided into the ruling part, called intellect or reason (νοῦς, λογισμός), the five senses, and the faculties of speech and generation (Leg. 1.11; Det. 168; Agr. 30; Her. 232; Opif. 117; QG 2.12). From time to time Philo also refers to the Platonic threefold division of the soul into the rational, the appetitive and the spirited part (for instance Leg. 1.70–73; Agr. 72–73). The ruling part, also called intellect or mind, can be seen as equivalent to the rational soul. For Philo’s psychology, see further Runia 1986, 301–305; Dillon 1996, 174–178; Reydams-Schils 1999, 157–165. the authentic coinage. The imagery of the mark or stamp or seal which transfers an image from one object to another is very common in Philo and has strong Platonic (and to a lesser extent Stoic) roots. Typical terms are σφραγίς (“seal”) and χαρακτήρ (“impress”), while the more generic term is τύπος (“mark”) which lies behind the participle “marked” (τυπωθέν). The materialistic background of the image does not concern Philo, who uses it frequently in contexts where the mark is caused by an intelligible entity (Opif. 6, 25, 129; Fug. 12). On the general image of marking see further Popa 1999. Here a more specific image is used of the minting of a coin. The picture of the soul as a coin stamped by the divine Logos occurs also in Leg. 3.95–96, where Philo discusses Bezalel as the craftsman of the works of the tabernacle. God stamped the pattern of the works on the soul as on an authentic coinage. The name Bezalel means “in the shadow of God” (cf. §27) and Philo explains that the Logos is God’s shadow. Just as God is the pattern of the image, which is called shadow, so the image becomes the pattern of other things, as is made clear in Gen 1:27. The image was made after God and the human being, that is his intellect, was made after God’s image (cf. §44; Det. 86, 152; Post. 99; Deus 105). The picture of coining is also applied in ethics: one should not adulterate the coinage of virtue (Post. 89, cf. Sobr. 20; Somn. 2.90). In an ethical context (Phaed. 69a) Plato employs “authentic coinage” as a metaphor for real virtue, against which other coins can be exchanged. For the specific image of striking a coin see further Kohnke 1968. See also our comment below on §50 “archetype.” that divine and invisible spirit. Philo’s reference here to the θεῖον καὶ ἀόρατον πνεῦμα anticipates the quotation of Gen 2:7 in the following section § 19, but here he replaces the biblical “breath of life” (πνοὴ ζωῆς) by the more conventional (and philosophical) term πνεῦμα (“spirit”). For Philo the human being is composed of earthy substance and what is divinely “inbreathed.” God made the body when he took clay and moulded a human shape. The soul obtains its origin from the father of all things who breathed in the divine spirit (Opif. 135). Philo has no choice but to take over the biblical term pneuma (which of course has a good philosophical pedigree in the Presocratics and the Stoa), but, as YliKarjanmaa (2016, 281–283) has trenchantly pointed out, he regards the word

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as biblical, and then undertakes to translate it in terms of his own thought, which is thoroughly Platonist, implictly rejecting the materialistic psychology usually associated with it. See further comments by Runia 2001, 166–167, 326. Tobin (1983, 77–101) discusses the relevant passages looking for earlier, prePhilonic interpretations, which are reworked by Philo. See also Parallel Exegesis below. The word “spirit” in this passage is found only in Eusebius, not in the manuscripts. See notes to the translation. God’s seal … Logos. Philo makes use of the imagery of a seal that makes an impress on coins, likening the human soul to the coin that has been stamped by a seal. The soul is an impress, since it has been struck by God’s seal, the impress of which is the Logos. Philo also likens the Logos to an archetypal seal, by which everything that exists has been shaped (Fug. 12; cf. Somn. 2.45). The intelligible cosmos, consisting of ideas that are patterns of everything, is also an archetypal seal, Leg. 1.22; Migr. 103; Mut. 135; Opif. 25, 34, 129. The imagery of seal and imprint has its origin in Plato (Theaet. 191c–192a), but was considerably developed in Middle Platonism, cf. for instance Alcinous, Epit. 12.1. See further Dölger 1911, 65–69; Runia 1986, 163–165; Dillon 1996, 200; in Philo Popa 1999. everlasting Logos. Only here and in §8 does Philo calls the Logos ἀΐδιος. Elsewhere the term is usually applied to God. See further the comment at § 8. (3) §19. God inbreathed … the breath of life. This citation of Gen 2:7 is part paraphrase and part literal quotation. The verb ἐμπνεύω is a paraphrase of the biblical verb ἐμφυσάω. Wendland incorrectly places it in quotation marks as if it is part of the citation of Gen 2:7. In other quotations the biblical verb is cited literally: Leg. 3.161; Det. 80; Her. 56; Somn. 1.34; Opif. 134; Spec. 4.123. In Leg. 1.36, having quoted the verse in §31, he explains that ἐνεφύσησεν is equivalent to ἐνέπνευσεν. From “into his face” onwards it is an exact quotation. On Philo’s quotations of this text and the correct application of quotation marks here see Royse 2017, 142. formed as an image. By using the verb ἀπεικονίζω Philo anticipates the quotation of Gen 1:27 (κατ’ εἰκόνα θεοῦ). The verb recurs in § 21 and is used in the same context in Leg. 3.96; Opif. 69; QG 2.62 Petit. For the human being as a ἀπεικόνισμα cf. Det. 83; Opif. 139. The verb is attested in Philo for the first time, and is later on often used by Neoplatonic writers, particularly by Proclus. It is also found in Alcinous Epit. 12.1, and, as Dillon (1993, 116) remarks, it may be taken as part of the technical vocabulary of the exegetical tradition of which Philo and Alcinous are both members, with Philo of course regarding the Platonic language of the image (εἰκών, cf. Tim. 29b2–3, 29c3, 37d7, 92c7) as derived from or anticipated by Moses. On the importance of the terminology of the “image” in Philo see Runia 1986, 160–164.

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the human being … God’s image. Philo quotes Gen 1:27 freely, as can be seen as follows:

LXX Gen 1:27

Philo Plant.

καὶ ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον κατ’ εἰκόνα θεοῦ ἐποίησεν αὐτόν and God made the human being, after God’s image he made him

§19 κατ’ εἰκόνα θεοῦ τὸν ἄνθρωπον γεγενῆσθαι the human being came into being after God’s image

The verb ποιέω has been replaced by γίγνομαι with the result that the human being has become the subject instead of the object as in the LXX. In Philo’s exegesis it is the rational soul which is the true human being, as is clear from §§ 20 and 42; cf. Det. 22; Fug. 125; Her. 231. (4) §20. has been formed as an image. See comment above at § 19. the archetypal Logos. In contrast to §§8–9, where the divine Logos had a cosmological role as the “unbreakable bond of the Whole” holding the cosmos together, in this passage the Logos has an anthropological function: it is the paradigm or the image after which the human soul has been formed. According to Philo, interpreting Gen 1:27, the soul is not made as an image of God but after the image of God and so we have a set of three: God—the Logos—the human soul. Therefore, he can call the human being an expression at third hand from the maker (Her. 231; cf. Leg. 3.96; Opif. 25; Spec 1.81; 3.83). For the “archetypal Logos” cf. Leg. 3.96; Her. 230; Spec. 3.83, 207. For the Logos as God’s image, cf. Leg. 3.96; Conf. 97, 147; Her. 231; Fug. 101; Somn. 1.239; 2.45. See further the discussion in Tobin 1983, 57–68; for the diverse functions of the Logos, cosmological, anthropological and anagogical, see Tobin 1992, 350– 351. the Cause. Inspired by Greek philosophical tradition and especially Plato (Tim. 28a4–6) Philo frequently refers to God as the Cause (αἴτιος; see for instance §§27, 33, 35, 48, 61, 72, 93, 139 and numerous occurrences in other writings). In §64 God is named the highest and greatest Cause of all. See further Runia 1986, 104–105. his body … raised up. Philo repeats what he had already stated in § 18. the purest … heaven. Cf. §17. Heaven is the purest portion, because it has been formed out of ether, the most pure and divine element (QE 2.73). See further comment at §3 (“ethereal region”).

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what is not apparent … through what is apparent. Philo alludes to the theory that the invisible God can be known through his visible works. The argument is set out extensively in Leg. 3.97–99. Just as the person who sees a house that is constructed carefully will get an idea of its maker, in the same way the observer of the whole cosmos will argue that it has not been made without art. He concludes that the maker of the whole universe is God and that the maker can be discovered through his works (cf. Spec. 3.187–189; Praem. 41–42; Prov. 1.42, 72; 2.63). The same idea is also found in a text attributed to Aristotle’s lost De phil. fr. 13 Ross. §21. Since it is impossible … The argument here seems rather obscure, but can perhaps be paraphrased by saying that human beings can only experience God’s nature for themselves if God himself makes that possible, and so he endows them with two kinds of vision, first with bodily eyes that can contemplate the heavenly realm, and then eyes of the soul that can aspire to knowledge of Being. The verb “see” (ἰδεῖν) here in the phrase “see the attraction (or tendency) of the mind” must be taken in the sense of “understand” (cf. the LCL translation “discern”). the One who IS. Philo regularly uses the appellation ὁ ὤν for God, basing himself on Exod 3:14 LXX, where God makes himself known as: “I am the one who is (ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ὤν)”. But he also often, as here, uses the neuter form τὸ ὄν of the same expression, which is indebted to the Platonic tradition (Parmenides fr. B4; Plato, Soph. 237c10, 241b1, d7; Parm. 142e; etc.). For God as τὸ ὄν cf. §§ 22, 72, 86; Det. 153, 154; Post. 2, 9, 15, 21, 28, 168, 175; Gig. 52; Deus 4, 33, 52, 55, 69, 81; Agr. 171; etc. For Philo’s interpretation of Exod 3:14 see Starobinski-Safran 1978; Den Hertog 2012, 155–165. the invisible eye. Philo means the eye of the soul, which is able to see intelligible things, as is further developed in §22. Cf. Conf. 100: the eye of the understanding is invisible and more closely akin to the divine. the ether. See comment at §3 (“the ethereal region”). §22. advancing. The verb ἀνατρέχω is used within comparable context of the flight of the mind to God in Abr. 88 and Spec. 2.6. the journey. Philo briefly brings up the theme of the flight of the soul or mind through the universe. He describes this journey extensively in Opif. 69– 71, after having quoted Gen 1:27 (just as here) and explains that the term “image” refers to the director of the soul, the intellect. Philo narrates that having passed through land and see, the winged soul is lifted on high and explores the air. It sees the planets and the fixed stars in the heaven. Next it peers beyond the sense-perceptible reality and contemplates the intelligible realm. Then it becomes filled with a higher form of desire and it thinks it is heading towards the Great King himself. See further the comments by

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Runia 2001, 229–233; Sterling 2018b. Similar passages are found in Leg. 3.71, 84; Det. 27, 86–90; Her. 126–128, 230–241; Migr. 184; Mut. 66–67, 179–180. Here in Plant. the description is short; the contemplation of the intelligible realm, for instance, is not mentioned. The word δρόμος (“journey”) occurs in the parallel passage in Det. 89. In the following (§§24–27) he also refers to the flight of the soul and connects it with Lev 1:1 “he called up Moses.” The reference to “being carried on wings” makes it obvious that Philo has been inspired by the myth in Plato’s Phaedrus 246c–248e, where the souls are depicted as having wings and traversing the whole universe. They try to follow the procession of the gods, headed by Zeus. Divine souls are able to ascend to the summit of heaven, to see what is beyond and to contemplate true Being. For a discussion of the soul’s flight in Philo, see Jones 1926; Borgen 1993; Levison 1995, 294–298. the eyes of the soul. This Platonic expression (Resp. 533d2; Soph. 254a10) is frequently used by Philo (Sacr. 36, 69, 78; Det. 22; Post. 9, 118, 167; Deus 181; Ebr. 44; etc.). carried on wings. As noted above, this is a clear reminiscence of Plato’s description of the winged souls in the Phaedrus myth, Phaedr. 246c1, d4, 249a1, a4, d6. Cf. Her. 238; Opif. 70; Spec. 1.207. desire. The use of the word ἵμερος is also inspired by Plato’s Phaedr. 251c7, d4, e3 (cf. Opif. 71: “filled with another longing and a higher form of desire”); see Méasson 1986, 383–384. the One who IS. Plato too speaks of contemplating τὸ ὄν in the myth in of the Phaedrus at 247d4, but unlike Philo he is referring to the realm of the ideas in the ὑπουράνιος τόπος beyond the heavens (247c3). On τὸ ὄν see our comment above at §21. the one who is ungenerated. For God as ungenerated cf. Leg. 1.51; Cher. 44, 48; Sacr. 57, 63, 101; Gig. 43; Deus 56; etc. Note that here the masculine form (τὸν ἀγένητον), not the neuter, is used. Parallel Exegesis Philo offers the most extensive discussion of Gen 2:7 in Leg. 1.31–42, where he first explains why God gives the divine breath to the earthly and not to the heavenly human being. Secondly he remarks that the expression “he inbreathed” is equivalent to “he inspired.” In the third place Philo answers the question why the inbreathing is “into the face.” Finally, he sets out the difference between “breath” and “spirit.” Further references to Gen 2:7 are found in Leg. 3.161–162; Somn. 1.34; Opif. 134; Spec. 4.123; QG 1.4. The combination of Gen 1:27 and 2:7 as found here in § 19 is also commonly found in Philo. A key text is Det. 80–85. Starting point for the discussion is

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Lev 17:11 where it is stated that the life of all flesh is the blood, which seems to be contradictory to Gen 2:7. Philo explains that Scripture records two lifeprinciples: blood and spirit. The irrational faculties have blood as their essence but spirit has been assigned to the mind or reasoning faculty. The mind is seen as the impression and stamp of the divine power and is called God’s image. Just as in Plant. Philo in this passage calls the human being a heavenly plant. All other animals have the head bending downwards but God raised the head of the human being upwards. The combination of the two verses is also found in Her. 55–57; Opif. 139; Spec. 1.171. See further Tobin 1983, 56–101, who argues that Philo reworks earlies interpretations of Gen 1:27 and 2:7, which differ from each other; also Runia 2001, 321–324. Nachleben In his Praeparatio evangelica Eusebius after quoting §§ 8–10 (see above), also gives a verbatim quotation of §§18–20 (7.18.1–2) introducing it with the following words: “This is again the interpretation by the Hebrew Philo, who adds the following to his sayings that have been quoted.” Eusebius offers a longer quotation of Gen 2:7 than Philo, quoting also the words: “and the man became a living being.” This is likely to be his own addition. He ends the quotation in the middle of the last sentence of § 20 and the words “so that what is not apparent could be clearly perceived through what is apparent” are absent. See Inowlocki 2006, 167 (with an inaccurate reference to Plant. 8– 10). d

Divine Souls are Called Above (§§23–27) Analysis/General Comments This final section of the first chapter joins up with the previous section, where Philo has explained the special nature of the human being with reference to the two main anthropological texts in the Genesis creation account. The rational soul is the divine element in the human being and because of this divine portion he is able to obtain knowledge of God. The mind can be lifted up and ascend to God. Philo associates the flight of the mind with the notion in the Pentateuch that persons are called upwards and he quotes two texts Lev 1:1 and Exod 31:2 in which this is stated. These two verses can be labelled as tertiary biblical lemmata, because they illustrate the interpretation of Gen 1:27, a secondary biblical lemma. The mode of transition is thematic: previously the creation of the mind has been described on the basis of Gen 1:27. Now the flight of the mind to God is pictured with reference to being called upwards. This section, which forms an elaboration of the theme of calling upwards, can be divided into four subsections:

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(1) Announcement of the theme: persons who have a love for knowledge are said to be called upwards. The specific quotations on which this is based are given later in §26 (§23). (2) Philo offers an a fortiori argument: if the heaviest things are lifted up by winds, the more the intellect, which is very light, is lifted up by the Divine spirit. Especially the soul of a philosopher is carried upwards (§§ 24–25). (3) Quotation of the two relevant scriptural verses: “the Lord called up Moses” (Lev. 1:1); “and look, I called up by name Bezalel” (Exod 31:2) (§ 26). (4) Elaboration of the quoted verses and explanation of the difference between Moses and Bezalel. Moses works on archetypal natures and carries off the first prize, whereas Bezalel constructs things that are just shadows and therefore wins the second prize. God reveals himself to Moses clearly, but to Bezalel only as in shadow. The etymology of Bezalel as “making in shadows” supports the explanation (§27). In this passage Philo quite naturally combines a notion from Greek philosophy, viz. the flight of the mind, with the scriptural verses about being called upwards by God. These verses are thus interpreted philosophically as referring to the ascent of the soul to God. It is especially the genuine philosopher with a love for the natures on high who is lifted upwards. The special position of the philosopher once again recalls the myth in Plato’s Phaedrus. Plato describes the ascent of winged souls to the super celestial region, followed by the process of transmigration of the souls. Earlier than other souls, the soul of the genuine philosopher regains its wings and is liberated from the process of incarnation. The difference between Moses and Bezalel is also explained in a Platonic way. Bezalel constructs visible things, which are shadows of intelligible archetypal forms. His name means “making in shadows.” In the simile of the cave Plato also calls the visible objects “shadows” (for instance Resp. 515c2, 517d9). Moses in contrast marks out the archetypal natures of the realities themselves. Moreover, God reveals his characteristics to Moses more clearly as if in the light of the sun (cf. Plato’s image of the sun in Resp. 508d–509c), but to others such as Bezalel more dimly as in shadow. Detailed Comments (1) §23. in the Oracles. Philo often refers to scriptural verses as an oracle or oracles (χρησμοί); cf. for example §§36, 63, 109; Cher. 51, 108, 124; Sacr. 57; Deus 62. For the use of this term see Burkhardt 1992, 112–118. called upwards. A forward reference to the three texts Lev 1:1, Exod 31:2 and 35:30, which are cited more fully later on in §26. who are breathed upon by the spirit. A clear reference to the exegesis of Gen 1:27 as saying that God inbreathed his spirit into the human being. The verb

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καταπνευσθέντας is based upon the biblical ἐνεφύσησεν in Gen 2:7, but the prefix κατά- is chosen in order to form a contrast with the being called upwards of the texts just referred to (see previous note); cf. the LCL’s creative but unidiomatic translation “received His (i.e. God’s) downbreathing.” the Divine. The neuter expression τὸ θεῖον is a regular way of referring to God, e.g. in Leg. 1.20; 3.84, 97; Sacr. 71, 72, 95, 117; Deus 59; Agr. 80; etc. (2) §24. lifted up. Philo here employs the verb ἀνασπάω, and later on he uses two other verbs that begin with the prefix ἀνά (“up”): ἀναρπάζω (“to snatch up”) and ἀνιμάω (“to draw up”). This vocabulary allows him to emphasize the upward movement. roots and all. The adjective αὐτόπρεμνος is rarely used before Philo and mostly by poets, Aeschylus, Eum. 401; Sophocles, Ant. 714; Aristophanes, Ran. 903. Philo also employs it in Agr. 7 and Mut. 224, both times in combination with the verb ἀνασπάω. typhoons and whirlwinds. Philo uses colourful language making indirect reference to themes from Greek mythology. Typhoon was the last son of Gaia and fathered by Tartarus. The deadliest of all monsters, having a hundred snake’s heads which breath fire, he was defeated by Zeus (Hesiod, Theog. 820– 868). He is the father of the strong moist winds that scatter ships and destroy sailors (Hesiod, Theog. 869–880). Similarly the word ἅρπυια (“harpies,” literally “snatchers”) in Greek mythology signifies winged, dangerous beasts which personify whirlwinds or hurricanes (Homer, Od. 1.241, 20.77). The word is cognate to the verb ἀναρπάζω (“snatch away, taken by storm”) that Philo uses later on. capacious. The rare adjective μυριαγωγός, which means literally “carrying 10,000 measures,” is also found in Philo’s contemporary Strabo 3.3.1. In Philo it occurs only here. ships laden with cargo are snatched up. Philo often pictures the imagery of a storm at sea and shipwreck, cf. for instance Post. 100; Agr. 174; Mut. 215; Spec. 2.143, 225; 4.50; Virt. 49. is not lifted up. Philo’s use of the verb ἐπελαφρίζω is very striking. Before him it is only found in a fragment of Aristotle (fr. 20 Rose), but Philo himself uses it 17 times (in the Allegorical Commentary: e.g. §144; Cher. 82; Deus 21; etc.). After Philo it is attested again in Origen (Cels. 6.20). Divine spirit. It is not immediately clear what Philo is referring to here when he speaks of the “all-powerful divine spirit” which is compared with severe metereological phenomena. But assistance is available if we compare the more extensive account in Gig. 19–27, where he interprets Gen 6:3 “and the Lord God said My spirit shall not abide in these humans forever, because they are flesh.” Philo explains that the divine spirit will not dwell in human beings that are

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focused on pleasures. He describes this spirit as the pure knowledge in which every wise person naturally shares (§22). Quoting Exod 31:2 he says God called up Bezalel and “filled him with the divine spirit, with wisdom, understanding, and knowledge to think on every work” (§23). Moses also has such a spirit, which Philo describes extensively (§27): “But, in fact, the spirit that is on him is the wise, the divine, the indivisible, the unseverable, the excellent, filling all things entirely, the spirit that while conferring benefit remains unharmed, that though it be shared with or be added to others remains undiminished in understanding and knowledge and wisdom (tr. Winston).” This parallel text thus shows that the reference to the divine spirit here is inspired by the biblical text at Exod 31:2. What Philo emphasizes is that the divine spirit is expressed in wisdom and knowledge, and that love for knowledge forms a starting point for the soul’s flight to God and for knowing God. Both in Plant. and in Gig. Moses and Bezalel are named as examples of human beings that are filled with the divine spirit, though at different levels. The texts are discussed by Levison 1995, 290–294, who also points to parallels in Spec. 3.1–6, where Philo retells his own spiritual experience. For the role of the spirit see further Levison 1997, 137–160. He discusses the Platonic and Stoic background but states rightly that “Philo’s ultimate loyalty to his Jewish heritage rises, as he claims that the divine spirit alone has the power to come upon the philosopher and to lift him or her into realms divine” (p. 160). the one who genuinely philosophizes. The expression φιλοσοφέω ἀνόθως is also found in Gig. 14; Agr. 104; Decal. 85; Spec. 1.32. The adverb ἀνόθως occurs only in Philo, apart from a reference in the lexicon of Hesychius (s.v. ἀνόθως no. 5261 Latte). Philo’s use here is undoubtedly a variation on Plato’s phrase in Phaedr. 249a1 φιλοσοφέω ἀδόλως (“to philosophize unfeignedly”). §25. the body and the earth. The body has been made out of earth and is fed by what the earth yields. By way of contrast the soul has the divine spirit as its essence and is nourished by wisdom; cf. Leg. 3.161; Det. 163; Agr. 22; Her. 239. When one has freed oneself from the bonds of the body one will have a clear vision of God, cf. Det. 158. Separation. Plato uses this word (διάζευξις) to indicate the separation of the soul from the body (Phaed. 88b8). It is employed by Philo in the same sense in Abr. 258 and Virt. 76. alienation. The same notion is expressed in Cher. 41: knowledge is gained through alienation from sense-perception and body, and therefore a lover of wisdom must reject sense-perception. See also Post. 135: alienation from the world of being brings about fellowship with God, cf. Gig. 33 and Migr. 19. love. Philo here uses the verb ἐράω, which is cognate with the noun ἔρως, employed in §39 to indicate love for God; see our comment ad loc., where we

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draw attention to the Platonic background. Comparable use of the verb in Leg. 2.51 (love for beautiful things), 80 (for virtues), 83 (for endurance); Post. 137 (for incorporeal things); Her. 241 (for Olympian (i.e. celestial) things). the most … on high. Philo means the incorporeal souls that live on high in the air, cf. §14. The philosopher seeks to liberate his soul from the body and to fly upwards with his mind. the most holy. It is striking that the adjective ἱεροπρεπής (“holy”) occurs circa 15 times before Philo (including 4Macc 9:25, 11:20) but Philo himself employs it no less than 37 times (in the superlative Leg. 3.204; Deus 102; Migr. 99, 113; Somn. 1.256; 2.269; Decal. 33, 60; Spec. 1.185; 3.83, 187; Praem. 84). This high frequency coheres with the contents of his writings. (3) §26. the steward and guardian. Moses is given these titles because he is the one to whom the Jewish rites have been revealed in the first instance. Philo most often uses the term ἱεροφάντης, which occurs frequently in the Allegorical Commentary; cf. Leg. 3.173; Sacr. 94; Post. 16, 173; Gig. 54; Deus 156; Migr. 14. See further Riedweg 1987, 73, 97. The same combination of ταμίας and φύλαξ occurs also in Leg. 3.189; Det. 66; Deus 113; Ebr. 80 (plural); Somn. 2.272; Praem. 22, but here is the only place where it refers to Moses. The two terms form a doublet, that is a combination of two words that are (nearly) synonymous. This technique is very common in Philo; examples in our treatise are § 34 (enjoyment and use), §35 (reverence and piety), §39 (delicacies and luxuries), § 68 (unenslaved and free), §71 (false and spurious). See further Siegfried 1875, 132– 135. For synonymy as figure of speech generally see Lausberg 1998, 292–295. the rites. Philo has in mind the divine rites belonging to the Jewish religion, which are taught by Moses, cf. Gig. 54; Mos. 2.153. They will include all the forms of worshipping God, whether with the mind or through ritual actions. The latter take place in the tabernacle fashioned by Bezalel. Reference to the Jewish rites is also found in §§107–108. For the use of the term ὄργια in the context of Greek religious thought see Schuddeboom 2009, 155–156. the One who IS. See comment at §21. the book of Leviticus. Philo refers to the book of Leviticus by name only three times, here and also at Leg. 2.105 and Her. 251. See Cohen 1997, 62–64. She argues that Philo mentions the name of the biblical book so that the reader can more easily recall the reference to Moses’s being called up, since Moses is mentioned by name in the Pentateuch hundreds of times. he called up Moses. An exact quotation from Lev 1:1, which is the only place where the verb ἀνακαλέω is used with reference to the Jewish lawgiver. God also calls him up. An allusion to Exod 31:2 “Look, I have called up by name Bezalel” and Exod 35:30 “Look, God has called up by name Bezalel.”

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for the construction and preservation of the sacred works. Philo has in mind Exod 31:3–5: “And I have filled him with a divine spirit of skill and intelligence and knowledge in every work, to be designed and to construct, (…) to fashion according to all the works (tr. NETS).” The language of construction and preservation is precisely that used of God in his role as creator: cf. Opif. 10, 171; Abr. 70; Praem. 42. (4) §27. second prize … first prize. Philo often employs the image in which the effort to attain virtue is portrayed as an athletic contest. The adversaries are the passions and the prize in the contest is the crown of virtue. The image is sketched, for instance, in Sacr. 17, where the prize of precedence is given to Jacob: “he will not accept the prize until, as in a contest, his adversary has dropped his arms out of weakness (cf. §145), given up, and yielded the prize and the crown to him who has waged an implacable and unproclaimed war against the passions.” In Leg. 3.48 Philo presents the good man, who knows God, as running a noble race and winning the best of all contests. The first and second prize are also mentioned in Agr. 119–121, where the struggle for virtue is introduced as the holy and only true Olympic contest. Those who have strong souls win the contest and get the first prize. “But those who would be thought worthy of the second or third prize, let them not be downcast. These prizes too have been offered for the acquisition of excellence, and for those who are unable to reach the heights the acquisition of the intermediate stages remains valuable. Indeed it is said that such acquisition is more secure because it avoids the jealousy that is always intrinsic to success (§ 121).” In our passage in Plant. the first prize consists in seeing God clearly, which is granted to Moses, whereas Bezalel wins the second prize and sees God in shadows (the image of the second prize also occurs in §132). In Deus 12 the soul who rests in God, wins the first prize and those who are still busy with mortal things have to claim the second (cf. Somn. 1.132). The mention of minor prizes is striking, as remarked by Harris (1976, 81), because except for Philo and Josephus, they are mentioned in literature only in the epic poems. In the Pan-Hellenistic games second and third prizes were not awarded but in local games they were given. As suggested by Harris, Philo is probably thinking of local games in Alexandria, where second and third prizes were awarded. Athletic imagery occurs in §§ 76, 145 and 175; other examples in Leg. 3.14; Congr. 164–165; Migr. 27, 200; Mut. 81–82, 88; Somn. 1.130–132; Mos. 1.48; Praem. 5; Prob. 88. See Pfitzer 1967, 38–48; Harris 1976, 51–95. Philo’s imagery follows a widespread tradition. The image of athletics is popular with Stoic and Cynic philosophers: Seneca, Ep. 78.16; Epictetus, Ench. 51; Diatr. 1.18.20–23, 3.23.2–5; see Pfitzner 1967, 28–35; Brändl 2006, 54–68. It is found in other Jewish Hellenistic literature (4 Macc 17:11–15; Pfitzner 1967,

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48–69; Brändl 2006, 115–120) and in the New Testament (1 Cor 9:24–27; Phil 3:12– 14; Col 1:29–2:1, see Pfitzner 1967, 76–195). the all-wise Moses. Philo often calls Moses all-wise (πάνσοφος), for instance, Post. 28, 169; Det. 126; Agr. 20, 43; Migr. 45, 76, but Abraham (Cher. 18) and Isaac (Cher. 47; Sacr. 43) also receive the same epithet. In § 28 God is named all-wise; see our comment ad loc. Before Philo the adjective is attested circa ten times, mainly in tragedians, e.g. Aeschylus, Suppl. 320; Euripides, Herc. 188. In 4 Macc 2:19 it is used of “our father Jacob.” give shape to shadows. Philo here recalls Plato, who refers to the visible reality as shadows of the archetypal forms, Resp. 515c2, 517d9, 532c2. On the limitations of painters who cannot give life to their images see Tim. 19b. Bezalel. Philo explains the name Bezalel (Βεσελεήλ), who is presented as the craftsman of the tabernacle in Exod 31:2–5, as “making in shadows.” He is also contrasted with Moses in Somn. 1.206: Bezalel in constructing the copies draws an outline as it were of shadows, but Moses makes the archetypal natures. In Leg. 3.96 Philo explains the name as “in the shadow of God,” based on the Hebrew b (in), tsel (shadow), and el (God). Grabbe (1988, 144) suggests that the meaning “making in shadows” in Plant. represents a loose rendering rather than a different analysis. But to Moses it was given … Philo explains this notion more fully in Leg. 3.102–103. The tabernacle and its furniture were made in the first place by Moses and later on by Bezalel. Moses makes the archetypes and Bezalel the copies of these. Moses has God as instructor, when he says: “You shall make all these things according to the pattern that was shown to you on the mountain.” (Exod 25:40). In the same way, when Aaron and Miriam revolt, it is said that if there is a prophet for the Lord, God will be known to him in a vision and in a shadow, but God will speak to Moses mouth to mouth in visible form and not through riddles (Num 12:6–8). Both texts are cited in the Leg. passage. For the theme of Moses contemplating the immaterial patterns of the tabernacle, see Mos. 2.74–76; QE 2.82. the Cause. See comment at §20. more clearly … more dimly. Philo gives a second explanation of the difference between the first and second prize in terms of vision, but leaves the epistemological status of the knowledge received unspecified. In the parallel text Leg. 3.102 he is more specific: Moses sees God through a direct vision but Bezalel discerns the maker from created things through the use of reasoning. in shadow. Referring of course to the interpretation of Bezalel’s name as “making in shadows.”

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Parallel Exegesis The interpretation of the name Bezalel and the contrast with Moses is also found in Leg. 3.95–103 and Somn. 1.206; see comments on § 27. The calling of Bezalel is also referred to in Gig. 23; see comment at § 24 (“Divine spirit”). We note that all these passages are found in the Allegorical Commentary. Outside this work Bezalel is named once at QG 1.90, but there Philo only says he was filled with the spirit and omits the mention of his being called up. Nachleben Remarkably we have not found any reminiscences of Philo’s exegesis of the calling up of Moses and Bezalel in early Christian writings. Philo’s translation of Bezalel as “in the shadow of God” does appear in Jerome (Nom. hebr. 12.16), but it is unlikely that Jerome drew on Philo directly for this information; see Runia 1993a, 318–319.

B a

The Creation of the Human Being, the Microcosm (§§ 28–72)

The Trees in the Human Being (§§28–31) Analysis/General Comments In the previous sub-chapter 1A Philo discussed the creation of the macrocosm, portrayed as the greatest plant, and of its inhabitants which are described as smaller plants. Now he turns to the microcosm, the human being and treats the formation of the bodily parts and the intellectual and psychological capabilities. Continuing the metaphor of the plant, the faculties of the human being are sketched as offshoots. We divide this second part of the long first chapter into six sections (see the outline in the Introduction, section 3), of which the first section can be further divided into three subsections. (1) Philo starts with a sentence of transition in which he rounds off the previous sub-chapter and announces the next theme: the creation of the parts of the human being. Other examples of such transitional passages are found in §§73, 94 and 139–140 (§28a). (2) God makes the five senses and places them in the body. As scriptural evidence Philo quotes Ps 93:9 LXX, in which God is presented as planter of the ears and the eyes. The verse is linked to the main biblical lemma through the verb φυτεύω, but at the same time this verse speaks of the creation of the human being and so fits in well with the discussion of Gen 1:27 and 2:8 (§§28b–30). (3) God forms the intellectual capacities, which he plants in the ruling faculty. Philo lists ten examples of such capacities and emphasizes that

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God is the one who plants these, doing so each time a human being is born (§31). It is noteworthy that Philo here quotes from the Psalms and also does so a little later on when he cites Ps 36:4 LXX in §39, because he does not very often quote from the Psalms. Runia, who investigated Philo’s reading of the Psalms, lists 20 examples of direct quotations: 18 are found in the Allegorical Commentary, 2 in the Quaestiones, while no citation occurs in the Exposition of the Law (Runia 2001, 103–109). Generally, Philo presents the author of the Psalms as a prophet (Agr. 51; Her 290), a divinely inspired man (§ 29) or as a member of Moses’s sacred band (§39, cf. Conf. 39). This implies that Philo attaches great importance to the utterances of the Psalmist and regards it as justified to quote the Psalms in order to elucidate the text of the Pentateuch. Because the author of the Psalms is a disciple of Moses, he does not have the same status as his teacher, the promulgator of the Torah, but his sayings are trustworthy (Runia 2001, 111–112; see also Leonhardt 2001, 142–174, who discusses Philo’s use of the Psalms within the context of worship). The Psalm verse that Philo quotes here, which can be regarded as a secondary biblical lemma, has a verbal correspondence with the main biblical text Gen 9:20 cited in §1, namely the verb φυτεύω. This verb appears in the Psalms six times (1:3, 79:16, 91:14, 93:9, 103:16, 106:37) but Philo only quotes Ps 93:9, passing over Ps 79:16 in which God is also seen as planter. By way of contrast, all the occurrences of (κατα)φυτεύω in the Pentateuch are exploited in his exegetical works (see Introduction to Chapter One). Philo cites the Psalm verse here as a witness to his interpretation of God as planter. Detailed Comments (1) §28. the all-wise God. This is the only place where Philo calls God all-wise. The adjective is attributed mostly to Moses, see comment at § 27. The repetition of the epithet only 12 lines after its previous use is intriguing and it is difficult to determine whether it has any significance. To be sure, Moses is the supreme example of a human being who rises to a God-like status, while God as creator has given the human being faculties that make such an ascent possible (§ 31). But the repetition could also be regarded as an example of careless writing. crafted. For the verb δημιουργέω see comment at § 11 (“were crafted”). the miniature cosmos. Philo sees the whole cosmos as the greatest plant and a living being (§§2, 4) and therefore he is able to picture the human being as a miniature cosmos and his mind as the sun (Post. 58; Her. 155). At other places Philo compares the soul or the mind with the heaven (Her. 233; Somn. 2.34). Essential background to this depiction is the Greek philosophical tradition of the macrocosm–microcosm relation, in which the human being is regarded as a cosmos on a small scale. It is first found in Democritus 68B34 DK, but

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gained enormous popularity when it was used for the macrostructure for the account of cosmology and anthropology in Plato’s Timaeus. It is also referred to by Aristotle at Phys. 8.2, 252b25–27. For an overview of the motif see Gatzemeier 1980. (2) our body … deep soil. Having in mind the fundamental biblical text Gen 2:7a “and God moulded the human being by taking clay from earth,” but also finding support in Greek philosophical tradition (e.g. Phaed. 81c), Philo regards the body as primarily made of earth. In QG 2.66 he remarks that “symbolically the body is called ‘earth’ since by nature our body is earthy.” He also refers to the earthy body in Leg. 3.161; Det. 109, 163; Agr. 22; Congr. 20, 96; Migr. 3, 7; Her. 239; Opif. 135. In Agr. 25 he describes the body as “that composite of clay, that moulded statue, that dwelling-place so close to the soul.” fabricated the senses. God places the senses in the body, because they are bodily in nature and also allow material objects to be perceived (Det. 109; Ebr. 191; Somn. 1.177; 2.109). In Opif. 139, having in mind especially the senses of hearing, sight and smell, Philo explains that the face is the location of the senses, and he depicts them as bodyguards of the king, the ruling part. The senses are made for the apprehension of colours and sounds and tastes and smells and related sensations (cf. also Fug. 182). Later in the treatise Philo also refers to the organs of sense-perception in §83, and lists all five of them when explaining the number five (§133). See our comments ad loc. as receptors. The senses receive the impressions of objects. In Her. 185 Philo refers to the eyes and the ears as the fitting receptors of the senses; cf. also Fug. 91. §29. like a cultivated and most serviceable plant. Philo here presents the senses as domesticated and useful plants, but from another perspective the senses can be wild and harmful because they are the channels through which passions arise. Through sight, for instance, the passions of desire and fear can arise (Abr. 238). For this reason Philo calls sense-perception the cause of passions (Leg. 2.50). hearing in … relevant places. Philo also mentions the location of the senses in §133, and in Migr. 187–188, where he explains Haran as a place of senseperception. Haran means “hole” and holes are symbols of openings used by sense-perception. Eyes are holes of vision, ears of hearing, nostrils of smell, the throat of tasting and the whole body is a hole for touch. The divinely inspired man. Philo regards the author of the Psalms as a divinely inspired man; later on in §39 he calls him a member of the sacred band of Moses; see further General Comments above and Runia 2001, 111–112. The expression θεσπέσιος ἀνήρ here refers to an authoritative person in the Jew-

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ish tradition, whose words are true. The same use is found in Migr. 90, where Philo speaks about θεσπέσιοι ἄνδρες who fixed Jewish customs; see Du Toit 1997, 361–382. the Psalms. Philo employs the word ὕμνος or ὑμνῳδία to refer to the Psalms, avoiding the biblical term ψαλμός, which he never uses, and replacing it with the word in common use in Greek literary contexts (§ 39; Conf. 39, 52; Migr. 157; Fug. 59; Mut. 115; Somn. 1.75; 2.242, 245); see Lattke 1991, 129–132; Runia 2001, 113. he who … not perceive? A free citation of Ps 93:9 LXX.

LXX Ps 93:9

Philo Plant. 29 (mss.)

ὁ φυτεύσας τὸ οὖς οὐχὶ ἀκούει ἢ ὁ πλάσας τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν οὐ κατανοεῖ; He who plants the ear, does he not hear? or he who moulds the eye, does he not perceive?

ὁ φυτεύων οὖς οὐκ ἀκούει; ὁ πλάσσων ὀφθαλμοὺς οὐκ ἐπιβλέψει; He who plants an ear, does he not hear? He who moulds eyes, does he not observe?

As we can see there are some differences between Philo’s manuscripts and the LXX reading. The most significant is the use of the verb ἐπιβλέπω instead of κατανοέω. As noted by Barthelémy 1967, 51 and Royse 2017, 140, because the original Hebrew verb is translated by Aquila with ἐπιβλέπω at five places, it is very likely that the reading of the manuscripts has been altered according to Aquila’s translation and that Philo in fact in his text used the verb κατανοέω from the LXX. We have followed this insight in our translation. Furthermore, in Philo’s text the articles of οὖς and ὀφθαλμός are omitted. They are also missing in the Hebrew. The suppression of articles that are absent in the Hebrew is a characteristic of Aquila’s translation, so here too it is likely that Philo’s original text has been altered in the manuscripts to conform to Aquila’s translation. §30. sprouts. Philo returns here to the botanical terminology used above at §4. (3) §31. he fixed firmly as roots. Philo maintains the image of God as planter by using the verb προσριζόω based on the noun ῥίζα. The basic verb ῥιζόω is used in §§3, 11, 45, 46 and 74. in the very middle. The location of the ruling part (τὸ ἡγεμονικόν) in the human being was a matter of dispute in the philosophical schools. Plato locates it in the head, the most important part of the body (Tim. 44d5, 45b2) but the

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Stoics Zeno and Chrysippus, following Aristotle and criticizing Plato, place the ruling part in the heart (Galen, Plac. Hip. 2.5.8 (= SVF 1.148); 3.1.9 (= SVF 2.885)). A detailed overview of the various positions is given in the doxographical text at Aëtius, Plac. 4.5, on which see Mansfeld 1990, 3092–3108 and passim. The controversy is reflected in Philo, as we can see in Post. 137 where he leaves the question open for experts to discuss, while in Sacr. 136 he states that according to the lawgiver, i.e. Moses, it is located in either the brain or the heart. Here in Plant. he seems to place it in the middle of the body, i.e. the heart. This perhaps fits in best with the dominant image of the plant in our treatise, and also with the image of the ruling part as a spring which he utilizes in Fug. 182. See further Runia 1986, 266–267. bearing fruit. Philo here sketches the image of the mind that bears fruit, as he often does; see for instance §§77, 114, 116, 126, 132, 137. The verb καρποφορέω is used in the same metaphorical way in §44; Cher. 84 (to bear virtue); Congr. 41; Somn. 2.173 (virtue as fruit of the vineyard of the mind). The text at Ebr. 8 is particularly relevant to our passage: two shoots of vice and virtue spring forth from a single root in the ruling faculty, but they never sprout or bear fruit at the same time. The metaphorical use of the verb is also found in the New Testament (Matt 13:23; Mark 4:20; Luke 8:15; Rom 7:4–5; Col 1:6, 10). See further comments at §74 (“the fruit”). the ruling faculty. This is the rational soul, which is also called mind or intellect. See comment at §18 (“rational soul”). intelligence … excellence. In a rhetorical way without conjunctions Philo lists ten capacities of the ruling principle or intellect. They are described as “better and more perfect” because they involve the use of reason, which is the distinguishing characteristic of human beings (we recall the “eyes of the soul” in § 22). The extent of the list shows the greatness of God, who is the planter and creator of all these capacities. A comparable enumeration is found in Post. 36: thoughts, resolves, counsels, forethought, comprehension, knowledge, skills, disposition, other faculties too many to recount. Cf. also the list in Cher. 62. Later on in § 36 he lists various excellences which are symbolized by the plants in paradise, among which are knowledge, comprehension and understanding. intelligence. Intelligence (νόησις) is the result of thinking (νοέω), which is the primary activity of the intellect (νοῦς). comprehension. The familiar Stoic term for obtaining knowledge, κατάληψις, is listed in Post. 36 too. In Migr. 42 it is enumerated together with insight (εἴδησις) and knowledge (γνῶσις). In this treatise it recurs at §§ 36 and 42. shrewdness. This is the only occurrence of the noun εὐστοχία in Philo. The metaphorical use of the word, which means literally “skill in shooting at a mark,” is found earlier in Aristotle (Eth. nic. 6.9, 1142a3, b2,3,6). Chrysippus

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defines it as “knowledge that is able to attain the goal in every matter” (Andronicus of Rhodes, De passionibus 2.8.2 (27.25 Schuchhardt = SVF 3.268)). practice. Philo has in mind practice in moral excellences. Practice or training (ἄσκησις) is needed for the struggle against the passions and for attaining virtue (Agr. 147, 160; Conf. 110). In Philo’s allegory of the soul Jacob represents the mind who learns by practice (Somn. 1.270; §44 see comment ad loc.). Philo often uses the combination ἄσκησις—μελέτη (“training—practice”; Sacr. 85; Gig. 26; Agr. 91; Mos. 2.27). memory. In Leg. 3.18 Philo lists memory (μνήμη) of noble things as belonging to the parts of training, together with reading, practice, worship, and selfcontrol. Elsewhere he describes memory as the guarding and preservation of holy doctrines (Leg. 1.55). Memory is closely related to natural excellence (Mut. 101; cf. Somn. 2.37). Sketching the same image of bearing fruit (see comment above) he calls memory the best fruit of the soul (Mut. 98). habit. It is characteristic of a habit (ἕξις), which is closely related to disposition, that is a permanent state, Mut. 122. In Leg. 2.18 Philo explains that according to one’s habit someone is called pleasure-loving, licentious, just, brave or something else. See next comment. disposition. This term is basically synonymous with the previous one. In Leg. 3.210 Philo argues that the wise person is wise as a result of a habit and disposition (διάθεσις) of benediction. It is also found in the enumeration of intellectual faculties in Post. 36. various kinds of skills. Earlier Philo refers to the skill (τέχνη) of cultivation and of viticulture, both of which Noah possesses (§ 1). He is presented as an experienced professional who works with knowledge (Agr. 4). In the previous treatise Agr. Philo discusses the skill of shepherding (§ 64) and of horsemanship (§§68 and 71) in allegorical terms. In Congr. 141 he offers a Stoic definition of skill: it is “a system of conceptions co-ordinated to work for some useful end” (tr. LCL; cf. Ps.Galen, Definitiones medicae p. 350, l. 7–8 = SVF 2.93; Sextus Empiricus, Math. 2.10 = SVF 1.73). See also comments at § 1 (“the skill of cultivation”) and §81 (“art”). secure knowledge. Philo defines knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) in Congr. 141, part of which is quoted in the previous comment: “knowledge is a secure and certain comprehension that cannot be shaken by argument.” This definition is Stoic as well (Ps.Galen, Definitiones medicae p. 350, l. 3–4 (= SVF 2.93); Sextus Empiricus, Math. 7.151 (= SVF 1.69)). For Philo skill and knowledge are closely related to each other and they are also listed next to each other in Post. 36 (other examples of this in Det. 88; Her. 116, 160; Fug. 168; Mut. 220; Opif. 69, 88). See also previous comment and comments at §1 (“the skill of cultivation”) and § 81 (“art”).

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apprehension. The same ethical aspect of the term ἀνάληψις is found in Sacr. 80: “apprehension towards the strength of excellence.” By the same token Philo remarks that the soul is nourished with the apprehension of noble things (Leg. 1.97). ungenerated. See comment at §22. artificer. Philo often calls God τεχνίτης, which can also be translated “skilled craftsman”; cf. Leg. 1.18, 31; 3.99, 102; Cher. 32, 128; Congr. 105; etc. This title also appears in Wis 8:6; 13:1 and Heb 11:10. continues to create. The plants here are, as the context indicates, psychic faculties. The statement that God continues to make them when each person is born may seem to rule out the pre-existence of the soul or the possibility of reincarnation, but this would probably be pressing Philo’s words too hard. Parallel Exegesis As already remarked, Philo seldom quotes the Psalms, so it is not unexpected that he does not quote Ps 93:9 elsewhere. Nachleben Similarly to Philo in §28, Origen speaks about trees and plants in the human being in his Homilies on Leviticus (16.4; Borret 1981 2.276 n. 1): there are good and evil trees, to the former of which the trees of justice or prudence belong. Origen also uses the same imagery as Philo: God, the father, the heavenly cultivator, cultivates good trees in the soul and plants such trees in the mind. Van den Hoek 2000, 93 argues that in spite of the similarities, a dependence of Origen on Philo cannot be proven. Nevertheless, in our view a general indebtedness is probable. Origen, like Philo, also depicts human being as a microcosm (Hom. Gen. 1.11; Hom. Lev. 5.2), but this is a philosophical commonplace without any necessary relationship to Philo; see Van den Hoek 2000, 66. b

The Planting of Paradise: Rejection of a Literal Reading (§§ 32–35) Analysis/General Comments In this section Philo turns to another biblical verse in which God is clearly presented as planter, namely Gen 2:8: “And the Lord God planted a paradise in Eden toward the east, and there he placed the human being that he had moulded.” It is clear that this verse, which has the function of a secondary biblical lemma, is linked with both the previous quotation in § 29 and the main biblical lemma through the verb φυτεύω (“to plant”). Using rhetorical questions, Philo shows in this section that a literal reading of the planting of the paradise by God is without sense and therefore the interpreter should turn to an allegorical interpretation, which is offered in the next section.

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This brief section can be subdivided into three subsections. (1) Philo quotes Gen 2:8 and states that a literal reading is a great foolishness (§32). (2) He rhetorically poses the question whether the garden has been planted as a place for recreation for God. The implicit answer is “no” (§ 33). (3) Philo puts forward a second question: for whose enjoyment will the trees bear fruit? Neither for a human being because no human being lives in paradise, nor for God because God does not need nourishment (§§ 34– 35). Interpreting the Bible Philo usually favours the allegorical exegesis or deeper meaning, but this does not mean that he usually rejects the literal reading completely. Occasionally, however, he does exclude the literal meaning. He has criteria for rejecting a literal interpretation, the most important of which is— as on this occasion—that the literal meaning does not make sense. Thus in Leg. 1.43 he regards the idea that God plants a garden as mythical fiction. In the same way in Agr. 149–156 he rejects a literal reading of Deut 20:5–7, a prescript about exemptions from military service. Because the literal meaning is absurd, the text has to be interpreted allegorically. By the same token Gen 3:8, where it is written that Adam and his wife hid themselves for God, cannot be taken literally because God is everywhere and it is impossible to hide oneself for God (Leg. 3.4). For Philo’s rationale for allegorical exegesis, see Kamesar 2009, 77– 85; for his critical reading of the story of paradise, see Niehoff 2010. In the Hellenistic-Jewish text 4Maccabees 2:21 it is stated that “When God fashioned human beings, he planted in them (περιεφύτευσεν) passions and inclinations, but at the same time he enthroned the mind among the senses as a sacred governor over them all.” The author may well have Gen 2:8 in mind here, but he does not apply Philo’s method of allegorical exegesis. See further Introduction, section 6a. Detailed Comments (1) §32. Consistent with what has been said. The term ἀκόλουθος denotes in this context that there is a logical sequence in the exposition; similarly at § 93 (and note also ἑξῆς at §73). The term is prominent in Aristotelian and Stoic logic. See the note on Deus 20 in Winston-Dillon 1983, 286. God planted … had moulded. Philo quotes Gen 2:8, but he omits the title κύριος (Lord) before God, as he does in quotations of the verse at other places too (Leg. 1.41, 43; Conf. 61). This is not surprising because in other verses of Gen 2 (4, 5, 7, 9) only the name God is mentioned. This corresponds to the remark of Wevers (1993, 25–26) that “a popular tradition omits κύριος in line with the surrounding verses.” Royse 2017, 144 states that “we can suppose that

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Philo was simply following the biblical text as it was known to him,” a view with which Leonhardt-Balzer 2016, 251 implicitly agrees. But see further the comment at §86 (“the Lord … he rules”). It should be noted, however, that Gen 2:8 is the first verse where the title κύριος is used for God. As Philo will remark in §86, the title ὁ θεός is employed in the creation account and this is a main reason that Philo links θεός with the creative power of God. Because the present text refers to God’s further creative activity in planting paradise, it is possible that the omission here is deliberate. See further the comment at § 86 (“the Lord … he rules”) and the comments in Leonhardt-Balzer 2016, 251– 255. a great foolishness. The noun εὐθεία with a reference to a literal reading of the Bible is also found in Det. 155. difficult to heal. Before Philo the adjective δυσθεράπευτος is only attested in Sophocles (Aj. 608) and in the Hippocratic writings (Med. 10). Since it is not found in Philo’s contemporaries it is striking that he uses it five times. Philo is fond of adjectives that begin with the prefix δυσ-. (2) §33. one might ask. By these words Philo introduces an interpreter who poses questions regarding the literal interpretation of the planting of the paradise. A similar process of question and answer on the same text is found in Leg. 1.43: “We should at once be in doubt why he could do so. Not to provide himself with pleasant repose and comfort. Let no such making of myth even enter our mind. Not even the whole cosmos would be a place fit for God to stay, because God is his own place, and he is filled by himself, and is sufficient for himself.” God the sovereign ruler. The word πανηγεμών is attested in Philo for the first time and it can be rightly labelled as a verbum Philonicum. Philo employs the word no less than 17 times, for instance in §§58, 137; Post. 5, 9; Agr. 50; Ebr. 74; Sobr. 57, 64; etc. Later on it is used by the church fathers: Clement of Alexandria (Strom. 7.54.4), and esp. Eusebius (Praep. ev. 7.10.3, 7.15.16; 11.6.40; Dem. ev. 4.1.2, 4.15.15; 5.19.3). For verba Philonica see Introduction, section 6b. the Great king. Already earlier in §14 Philo has referred to God as king, and now he likens him to the Great king. In Greek literature this description is used above all for the king of Persia. The Persian monarch resides in his palace, invisible to his subjects, interacting with them through his ambassadors (Herodotus 5.49, 8.140; Xenophon, Anab. 1.2.8; in Philo Prob. 136). The image of God as Great king is also found in the later books of the LXX (Ps 46:3, 47:3, 94:3; Mal 1:14; Tob 3:16). Philo often depicts God as the Great king and the angels as informing the king about the things his subjects are in need of (Agr. 51, 78; Migr. 146; Somn. 1.140; Opif. 71; Mos. 1.166; Decal. 61, 178). God is invisible to created beings, just

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as the Great king of Persia was for his subjects (Decal. 60–61). The picture of God as Great king occurs also in Ps.Aristotle, De mundo (6, 398a11–b6); for this work see Introduction, section 6. See further the comment at § 14. The mention of God as king here also anticipates the biblical text Exod 15:18 quoted in § 47 and explained in §51. Aside from … in season. It is difficult to interpret this sentence, because two very different thoughts are expressed: (1) the Cause cannot be contained; (2) trees do not bear fruit. The Greek text seems to be corrupt and maybe there were two sentences originally. For suggestions to alter the text here see the note on the translation. the Cause. See the comment at §20. can be contained. The thought that God contains but is not contained by anything is frequently expressed in the Allegorical Commentary: see Leg. 1.45; 3.6; Post. 7; Sobr. 63; Conf. 136; Fug. 75; Somn. 1.64. (3) §34. enjoyment and use. Philo seems to be the first extant author to use the combination of the nouns ἀπολάυσις (“enjoyment”) and χρῆσις (“use”). It appears in his writings circa 20 times, for instance §§ 52, 132, 162; Leg. 3.155; Cher. 113; Sacr. 22; Agr. 24, 108; Sobr. 61. As is his common practice Philo combines two nearly synonymous words; see the comment at § 26 (“the steward and guardian”). who had been moulded from earth. The verb πλάζω (“to mould” or “to give form to,” cf. the English word “plastic”) is a key term in describing the human being created in Gen 2:7. The passive participle forms πλασθείς and πεπλασμένος are a shorthand way of referring to this man, e.g. at § 34 τὸν πρῶτον διαπλασθέντα ἐκ γῆς and at §44 τὸν πεπλασμένον. The former phrase occurs also in Congr. 90; Opif. 134, 140. In §6 the verb is applied with reference to the creation of the cosmos. See further Runia 2001, 321–324. Adam by name. Philo interprets the name Adam as earth and presents him as the earthy and perishable mind (Leg. 1.90, 92: 3.50, 185; Cher. 10, 57; cf. § 46). For the interpretation of the name see Grabbe 1988, 129. migrated from there. In Gen 3:24 it is stated that God drives Adam out of the paradise. It is surprising that Philo here describes the departure from paradise as a migration and not as an expulsion as in Genesis. But see further the comment on §46 (“the earthy … been exiled”). §35. God certainly … other things. The idea that God needs nothing because he is all-sufficient for himself is also expressed in § 51; see further Leg. 3.181; Cher. 44, 46; Det. 54; Deus 7; Spec. 1.271; 2,38, 174; Virt. 9. the blessed nature and the felicity. Philo also pairs μακαριότης and εὐδαμονία with a reference to God in Leg. 3.205; Det. 86; Deus 55; Somn. 1.94; Abr. 202; Spec.

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1.209. The attribution of the state of felicity to God is not biblical and betrays the influence of Greek philosophical thought; see Runia 2002, esp. 149–156. the Cause. See the comment at §20. They are the truly lawless inventions … A similar formulation is given in Deus 59: “These are mythical fictions of people who in word present God in human form but in fact give him human passions.” Both texts imply that attributing passions to the gods, as occurs in Greek myths, is worse than merely envisaging them in human form, as indeed occurs in the accounts of divine theophanies in Scripture. in human form. Philo’s conviction that God does not have the characteristics of a human being or suffer from human passions is lucidly summarized in Deus 56: “God being ungenerated and having brought into being all other things needs none of the properties that belong to creatures.” Thereafter he explains that in Scripture God is presented as being jealous and having wrath and anger in order that unwise people may fear him. He concludes that to love God is the most suitable for those who do not think of God in human form; to fear him is most suitable for others (§ 69, cf. Leg. 1.37; Conf. 134–135; Congr. 115; Mut. 54). For Philo an important principle is laid down in Num 23:19, “God is not as a man,” and for that reason the anthropomorphisms in the Bible have to explained (away) allegorically. They are employed for the sake of human beings who cannot look beyond themselves but frame their conceptions of God from their own experience (Conf. 98, cf. Sacr. 94; Deus 53; Migr. 113; Somn. 1.237). See Wolfson 1947, 2.127–130; Tobin 1983, 36–55; Williamson 1989, 74–85 (discussion of Deus 51–68); Sheridan 2014, esp. 250– 253. human passions. The adjective ἀνθρωποπαθής may well be an invention by Philo (Sacr. 95; Post. 4; Deus 59). Later on it and the cognate verb ἀνθρωποπαθέω (Leg. 3.237; Decal. 43; Flacc. 121) occur frequently in the Patristic tradition (e.g. Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 5.116.4; 7.22.1; Origen, Cels. 1.71.9; 4.71.2; Comm. Matt. 17.8, 17) but not outside it. Both words can thus be regarded as verba Philonica, on which see Introduction, section 6b. piety and reverence. As so often Philo joins together two (nearly) synonymous terms; see comment at §26 (“the steward and guardian”). The combination of εὐσέβεια (“piety”) and ὁσιότης (“reverence”) is frequently found, for instance in §77, Sacr. 27, 37; Det. 83; Ebr. 91, 92; Migr. 194; Congr. 98. In Decal. 119 he calls them the queens of virtues (cf. Spec. 4.147). In describing reverence in Det. 55 as “service to God, a means of providing what will profit God,” he offers the Platonic definition (Euthyphr. 12e). As noted by Sterling 2006, 105, Philo’s Judaism leads him to accord a higher significance to reverence than is the case in Greek thought, e.g. when he says that it is the highest and most prominent

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of all virtues (Abr. 60). This statement reveals the influence of Jewish thought. For Philo on piety see further Dillon 1996, 150; Sterling 2006. c

The Planting of Paradise: Allegorical Reading (§§ 36–45) Analysis/General Comments Having rejected a literal reading of the planting of the paradise, Philo now proceeds to give an allegorical exegesis: the plants in the paradise represent the virtues which God plants in the human being, and hence the paradise is seen as a place of virtues. The human being here has to be understood in allegorical terms as the intellect, because only the intellect can cultivate the virtues. In this section Philo interprets not only Gen 2:8 which he has cited in § 32, but also the following verse 2:9 which reads as follows: “And out of the earth God furthermore made to grow every tree that is beautiful to the sight and good for food, the tree of life also in the middle of the paradise and the tree for knowing what is knowable of good and evil (tr. NETS, altered).” This lengthy section can be subdivided into five subsections. (1) Philo starts by giving a general allegorical reading in which the plants in the paradise symbolize virtues and their corresponding actions. He finds a starting-point for this allegorical exegesis in Gen 2:9 where it is said that God made the tree of life and the tree of knowledge of good and evil. Since these trees do not resemble those in our experience they have to be interpreted in allegorical terms (§§36–37). (2) The location of the paradise in “Eden” and towards the east is explained. Philo interprets Eden as meaning “luxury,” regarding it as a symbol of the soul which rejoices in God alone and rejects pleasures. To illustrate this interpretation Philo quotes Ps 36:4 “luxuriate in the Lord.” These words also refer to someone who spurns the so-called goods of humankind and finds joy in God alone. This Psalm verse can be labelled as a tertiary biblical lemma which is cited to strengthen the exegesis of the secondary biblical text Gen 2:8. The mode of transition is thematic via the etymology of Eden as “luxury.” The paradise is placed toward the east which Philo associates with moral insight that—like the sun—rises up and illuminates the mind (§§38–40). (3) Having given an allegorical interpretation of the planting of the paradise, Philo now deals with the placing of the human being that God had moulded in the paradise. The human being is the intellect because it is the intellect or mind that is able to cultivate the excellences (§§ 41–42). (4) The idea that the rational intellect is planted in the paradise leads Philo to ask the question why irrational animals were introduced into Noah’s ark but not into paradise. The ark is a symbol of the body, where there

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is room for irrational passions and vices, but in paradise there are only virtues which cannot admit anything irrational (§ 43). (5) In the last subsection Philo continues his exegesis of Gen 2:8–9, but now seems to take it in a slightly different direction. He notes that it is not the human being created according to the image (Gen 1:26–27) who is introduced to the paradise, but the human being who is moulded from earth (Gen 2:7). Placed in the cosmos (the paradise), he is drawn into two opposite directions and has to choose: the way that leads to immortality and life, or the way that is focussed on earthy passions and leads to death. The verb πλάζω used in Gen 2:8 reminds Philo of the adjective ἄπλαστος (“unmoulded”) which is used of Jacob in Gen 25:27. Therefore he places the moulded human being, who has no share of the unmoulded and simple nature, in opposition to the unmoulded Jacob and cites Gen 25:27 as a tertiary biblical lemma (§§44–45). As noted at the beginning of our comments, Philo gives an allegorical interpretation of the human being’s introduction into paradise. In Philo’s anthropology the human being consists of two parts: the divine, immortal intellect and the earthy body. This duality, as often elsewhere in the Allegorical Commentary (cf. Tobin 1983, 24), is now allegorized into the opposition between two intellects, on the one hand the intellect which is marked with the divine image, i.e. the Logos (Gen 1:26–27) and resembles the tree that bears the fruit of immortality, on the other hand the earthy intellect that is made out of earth and its various ingredients (cf. Gen 2:7) which resembles the earthy body. This intellect is then called the “intermediate intellect,” because it has to choose between the path that leads to immortality (the tree of life) or the path that leads to death (cf. Deut 30:15, cited at Deus 50). It then appears at the beginning of the next section (§46) that the earthy intellect, i.e. Adam, made the wrong choice, because he has been exiled from paradise. The double nature of the human being is also mentioned in the exegesis of Gen 2:8 in QG 1.8. Philo explains there that paradise is a symbol of wisdom, and that the earth-formed man is a mixture, consisting of soul and body. He needs teaching and instruction in accordance with the laws of philosophy. Detailed Comments (1) §36. We should proceed. For the use of verbal adjectives see comment at § 5 (“we must investigate”). the allegorical interpretation. The term ἀλληγορία is a technical term to denote the deeper, hidden meaning of a text. It arose in the first century BCE, replacing the term ὑπόνοια (cf. §113 ἐν ὑπονοίαις), and is, for instance, used by the Alexandrian grammarian Tryphon (On Tropes 193.6, 206.5). Philo frequently

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employs both the substantive ἀλληγορία (e.g. Leg. 3.236; Post. 7; Fug. 179; Somn. 1.73, 102; 2.8) and the verb ἀλληγορέω (e.g. Leg. 3.60, Post. 60; etc.). For this term see Bitter 1985, esp. 373–375. men of vision. The method of allegorical interpretation of Scripture is a means to see and know God. The person who studies Scripture will ultimately be able to see God (but here Philo specifically refers to “men,” ἄνδρες). See Mackie 2012, 162–164, 178. A comparable use is found in Somn. 1.39: the four wells to which the biblical text refers (Gen 26:20–22, 32) are a subject of inquiry to people of vision and lovers of contemplation. They symbolize the four elements of the universe. There is also an implicit reference to the etymology of Israel as “the one who sees God”; see further on § 46. The Oracles. See comment at §23. starting-points. Philo discerns starting-points (ἀφορμαί) for his allegorical exegesis in Scripture itself. A comparable use is found in Conf. 191: the lawgiver himself gives starting-points for the allegorical reading to those whose understanding is not blind when he calls what was taking place “confusion” (Gen 11:7). paradise. The word παράδεισος is Persian in origin, and was used for the first time by Xenophon (Anab. 1.2.7) to refer to the gardens of the Persian kings. It scarcely occurs in Greek literature before Philo’s time. His readers will have understood the biblical context, so the notion of a royal garden would be only marginally relevant. resemble those in our experience. Nearly the same phrase in used in Opif. 153 when Philo introduces the interpretation of paradise. life … evil. A comparable explanation of the trees in paradise is found in Opif. 153: “… the plants in fact possess soul, bearing fruit in the form of virtues and in addition neutral understanding and keenness of mind—by which what is good and evil is recognized—, as well as life without disease and indestructibility and whatever is of a similar kind to these.” life, immortality. The tree of life placed in paradise (Gen 2:9) represents life and immortality. For Philo immortality consists in living according to virtue and so the practiser of virtue will never die (Leg. 2.87; cf. Agr. 97–100). By way of contrast one who has cut away the love for virtue has died as regards to the life of virtue (Det. 47). Philo also explains the tree of life as giver of immortality in Migr. 37: this tree not only gives food but also immortality, because it is said that the tree of life has been planted in the middle of the paradise. This tree is goodness and the particular virtues and the actions according to virtue are its bodyguards. Goodness has obtained the most central and honourable place in the soul. In Opif. 154 the tree symbolizes the most important virtue, reverence for God (θεοσέβεια), by which the soul is immortalized (also QG 1.10); cf.

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Leg. 1.59–60: the tree is virtue in the most comprehensive sense. In Leg. 2.53 the tree is explained as wisdom. See comments in Runia 2001, 366–367, and Harl 1962, 351–353. knowledge, comprehension, understanding. Basing himself on the mention of the tree of knowledge in the paradise (Gen 2:9), Philo lists three terms which are related to knowing and understanding. representation of good and evil. In his list of terms relating to knowledge Philo now comes closer to the biblical text. “Representation” (φαντασία) refers to process of mental depiction, and the phrase “good and evil” is taken directly from the description of the tree as being “for knowing what is knowable of good and evil” (τὸ ξύλον τοῦ εἰδέναι γνωστὸν καλοῦ καὶ πονηροῦ; Gen 2:9). By the same token in Leg. 1.101 he refers to this tree as the cause of evil and good. We note that in Opif. 154 the tree is a symbol of intermediate practical insight (μέση φρόνησις), through which things which are opposite by nature are discriminated. This interpretation of the tree as intermediate practical insight can be linked with Philo’s explanation in § 45 that the intermediate intellect was placed in the paradise. See comment ad loc. For the interpretation of the tree, see Harl 1962, 331–351, and the comments in Runia 2001, 367–368. §37. the rational soul. The trees in the paradise are explained as plants of the rational soul. The same allegorical interpretation is given in Opif. 154, where the paradise is interpreted as the ruling part of the soul. the one path. Philo often pictures the image of the path or road that leads to virtue, and the road that leads to vice and passion. To some people the road to virtue may first seem rough and difficult but God turns it into a highway, transforming the bitterness of their toil into sweetness (Post. 154; for the road leading to virtue, cf. Leg. 1.57; Congr. 10; Ebr. 150; Fug. 21; Somn. 1.179, 246). The way that leads to virtue is called a broad and straight highway and the road that leads to vice is called a no-road (ἀνοδία); cf. Agr. 101; Somn. 2.161; Mos. 2.138. Later on Philo mentions the road of wisdom, §97. The road of vice is also mentioned in Conf. 179 and Mos. 2.138. The imagery goes back to the famous story told by the fifth-century sophist Prodicus about Heracles on the crossroads where he has to choose between the way of virtue and the way of vice (Xenophon, Mem. 2.1.21). See also comments in Geljon and Runia 2013, 192–193, and comment at § 97 (“the road of wisdom”). God in his generosity. The adjective φιλόδωρος is rarely used before Philo, but it is a very common epithet for God in the writings of the Alexandrian exegete, e.g. in §§88, 91; Leg. 1.34; 3.40, 167; Cher. 20, 30; Det. 138; Post. 26; Agr. 137. God extends his boons and gifts, because he is by nature good and munificent (Fug. 66; cf. Mut. 46).

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paradise of virtues. Because virtues are plants of the rational soul, the paradise itself is seen as the place of (heavenly) virtues (Cher. 10; Conf. 61; Opif. 153). In QG 1.6 Philo interprets paradise as “wisdom or knowledge of the divine and human and of their causes.” perfect felicity. For the Greek philosophers (Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics) εὐδαιμονία (“felicity, well-being, happiness”) was the goal or end (τέλος) of human life, regarding it rather as a permanent activity of the soul than as a temporary, subjective feeling. Virtue or moral excellence is requisite for acquiring felicity. Similarly, Philo sees virtue as the source of felicity (Prob. 117), but at the same time he underlines that it consists of the practice and enjoyment of the virtues (Det. 60). In Agr. 157 he remarks that felicity arises through the exercise of perfect virtue. A symbol of felicity is Isaac (Cher. 8; Post. 134), who was brought forth by Sarah, a symbol of virtue and wisdom (Leg. 2.82; see comment at § 169 [“Isaac”]). The person who has become perfect and attained felicity is able to see God (Ebr. 82–83, cf. also QE 2.51). On “seeing God” see further our comment at §58 (“which has vision of the sharpest kind”). Philo’s concept of felicity thus combines a background in Greek ethics with a strong theological focus inspired by his reading of Scripture. On εὐδαιμονία in Philo’s thought see further Runia 2002; Graffigna 2004. (2) §38. Eden. This explanation of Eden is also given in Leg. 1.45; Cher. 12; Post. 32; Somn. 2.242; QG 2.7. We translate the term τρυφή as “luxury” rather than “delight” because, as Philo will observe in § 39, it can have both a positive and a negative connotation (in the sense of hedonistic enjoyment). In this passage it is of course positive: Eden is a symbol of the soul which sees things as they really are. Other symbolic interpretations are found elsewhere, but they are all related to the meaning “luxury.” In Cher. 12 it is a symbol of the virtue which obtains well-being and luxury. In Post. 32 it symbolizes right and divine reason and is literally translated “luxury” (see comment on right reason at §60). Finally, Philo interprets Eden as wisdom of God, because wisdom is a source of luxury or delight to God (Somn. 2.242). For Philo’s rendering see Grabbe 1988, 152; for the interpretation of Eden, Leonhardt-Balzer 2016. symbol. The word σύμβολον is a technical term to indicate the application of a symbolic or allegorical reading. In this sense it was apparently employed for the first time by the Stoics, cf. the quotation of Chrysippus’s interpretation of Hesiod in Galen, Plac. Hip. 3.8.4 (= SVF 2.908), 3.8.15 (= SVF 2.909). It is also used by the allegorist Heraclitus (24.3; 48.1) and the Stoic Cornutus (10.7; 16.13; 20.6). In Plant. it is found five times, also at §§43, 77, 82, 122. See further Struck 2004, 111–161; for Philo’s use Conley 1987, 62–63.

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which sees things as they are. Such a soul recognizes that the worship of God is the only real enjoyment, and that what generally is seen as pleasure is not real pleasure. dancing with the virtues. The verb ἐγχορεύω (“dance with, take delight in”) appears in Philo for the first time (Post. 137; Congr. 20; Fug. 187; Mut. 229). For its use in combination with the virtues see Sacr. 38; Ebr. 139. joy. The worship of God is a great joy, as Philo explains in Her. 7: one has more joy at being the worshipper of God than if one has been king over the whole human race. In Cher. 13 he connects joy with the name of Eden: stability of the soul is a gift of the joy that bears the name Eden. Joy is the “good emotion” (εὐπάθεια) associated with Isaac; see below on § 169. enjoyment. The noun ἀπόλαυσμα is very rare; it is found only 15 times in the TLG. Philo uses it twice (also in Deus 12o). Before him it is only found in a spurious letter by the orator Aeschines (5.4). In §34 he employs the more common term ἀπόλαυσις. the worship … alone wise. For the notion of the worship of God the only wise, cf. Conf. 94; Fug. 47. Philo often refers to God as the only wise being, § 46; Sacr. 64, 120; Ebr. 69, 106; Conf. 39, 94; Congr. 124. He here uses the general Greek term for worship, θεραπεία, and not the more specific biblical term λατρεία. In a similar way in §60 θεραπευτής (“worshipper”) is used; see Leonhart 2001, 9, 12. The group of devout Jews living outside Alexandria are called Therapeutae (masculine) and Therapeutrides (feminine). Their name is explained in Contempl. 2: they minister to the soul and worship Being (two meanings of the verb θεραπεύω). §39. undiluted delight. The word γάνωμα is rare and first found in Philo here and at Somn. 1.49, 2.249 (also six times in Plutarch). As noted by Boiché 2018, 216, it appears to combine the features of joy and brilliance. She notes, however, that both here and in Somn. 2.249 it is combined with ἄκρατος, which is usually associated with liquids, and suggests there may be the implication of the limpid brilliance of a liquid. In the Somn. text it is used of the divine Logos, who is the draught that he himself pours out for the soul. a member … be overlooked. Philo regards the author of the Psalms as a holy and divinely inspired man, whose sayings have authority, cf. § 29; Agr. 50. See Runia 2001, 111–112. a member. The noun θιασώτης has a religious connotation and refers to a member of a religious company (θίασος), cf. Euripides, Bacch. 548; Aristophanes, Ran. 327. See our comment at §14 (“band”). Philo employs the word θιασώτης 15 times, e.g. at Cher. 85; Sacr. 7 (Isaac); Det. 45 (Jacob); in Deus 120 it refers also to members of the band of Moses; in a negative sense referring to Cain in Det. 140. See Leonhardt 2001, 148–149. She argues that Philo deliber-

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ately employs the terminology that relates to Bacchus, the god of the wine, in a treatise on Noah who is said to be the first wine-grower. Philo, however, also employs the term in passages without a relationship with wine. The concept of a band of devotees or disciples of Moses can also be related to the Greek notion of the αἵρεσις (“school of thought” or “sect”). The tradition of interpreting the Mosaic texts is similar to what takes place on the Greek philosophical schools, which focus on studying the texts of their founders; see further Runia 1999. in the Psalms. Philo employs the term ὑμνῳδίαι (“hymns”) to refer to the Psalms, cf. Agr. 50; see further the comment at § 29 (“the Psalms”). luxuriate in the Lord. An exact quotation of the first part of Psalm 36:4 LXX. By quoting this verse as a tertiary biblical lemma Philo illustrates his exegesis of the name of Eden as “luxury.” a heavenly and divine love. This love (ἔρως) is love for God and consists in rejoicing in God alone, whom the lover of the divine regards as the only good and the real joy. The expression “divine love” occurs also in Cher. 20; Her. 70; Abr. 66; Mos. 2.67; Praem. 84; Contempl. 12. The expression “heavenly love” is found in Her. 14; Somn. 2.232; Abr. 170; Prob. 43. As Harl (1966, 132–133) remarks, the expression ἔρως οὐράνιος refers to the soul’s yearning for heaven but at the same time it indicates that that love has been sent from heaven and has a divine origin. Philo joins in with Plato, who regards love as a divine force to ascend to the world of Ideas and especially the Idea of beauty (Symp. 204c–206a; Phaedr. 266a7). The expression has been taken over by early Christian writers, Clement, Protr. 117.2; Origen, Comm. Jo. 1.55; Didymus the Blind, Comm. Iob. 92.6–7. For the theme of divine love in Philo see Nissen 1974, 429–445. delicacies and luxuries. The pair “delicacy and luxury” (χλιδή … θρύψις) is also found in Post. 182 (plural); Opif. 164; Spec. 4.102. For Philo’s doublets see the comment at §26 (“the steward and guardian”). the so-called and apparent goods. Philo has in mind external and bodily goods, such as glory, money, wealth, honour, health of the body, pleasure. They seem to be good to lovers of passions, but in reality they are not good. The earthy Edom (Num 20:18) is a symbol of these goods and the heavenly soul bids farewell to these goods, which are spurious (Deus 148–151). Elsewhere Philo declares bodily and external goods as nothing else but a shadow (Post. 112– 113). It is only possible to see God if you have freed yourself from the bonds of the bodily goods (Det. 157–158; cf. Det. 9; Gig. 15; Her. 92; Congr. 27; Conf. 11; Mut. 174). They are placed opposite to the things of the soul as Philo shows in Abr. 221: “The lovers of wealth and glory (…) love the external goods, but the lovers οf goodness and virtue love the things of the soul, not preferring the spurious to the genuine goods, but the genuine goods to the spurious.” Philo is not always consistent in his treatment of human “goods,” sometimes seeming

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to approve the Peripatetic view that there is a hierarchy of goods, but generally his view is the one expressed here, which has a Stoic background and adopted in Middle Platonism. See further Wacht 1986, 102–106; Dillon 1996, 146–149. divine possession. The psalmist is possessed and inspired by God, i.e. he has fallen into a state which Philo calls “ecstasy.” He who is under divine possession (κατοχή) becomes a prophet and does not speak his own words but God’s utterances. Abraham, Noah, Isaac, Jacob and Moses are examples of prophets (Her. 258–262). Such a person is stimulated by a heavenly love (Her. 69–70). In Migr. 35 Philo tells us his own experience of being possessed by God. Other references to divine possession are found in, for instance, Deus 138–139; Mut. 136; Somn. 1.254. For divine possession in Philo see Winston 1989; Levison 1995, 271–323; Nasrallah 2003, 36–44. stimulated. Literally “with a goad (or prick).” Philo employs Platonic erotic language in the context of the ascent of the mind to the divine; cf. Phaedr. 251d. rejoicing. In Post. 32 Philo interprets Eden as right and divine reason, because it rejoices (ἐνευφραίνεται) and delights (ἐντρυφᾷ) in good things. He clearly associates ἐντρυφάω (“to delight”) with τρυφή (luxury), the meaning of Eden. Before Philo the verb ἐνευφραίνομαι (“to rejoice in”) appears only in the LXX (Prov 8:31). Philo himself employs the verb 11 times (for instance Post. 32; Somn. 1.50; Mos. 2.210; 6 times in Spec.). Later it is used by the Christian writers (Origen, Comm. Jo. 1.11; Gregory of Nyssa, In Cant. 15 (p. 214.11 Langerbeck); Eusebius, Hist. eccl. 7.22.5). Its appearance in the pagan writer Heliodorus (Aethiopica 10.18.3) is striking, because he is the only pagan author of whom we can be certain that he read Philo (for Heliodorus and Philo see Runia 1990a, 134–139, 1993a, 12; Hilhorst 1992; Sterling 1999, 20–21). §40. the paradise … towards the east. Based on Gen 2:8. A similar interpretation of the location of the paradise is given in Leg. 1.46: “the paradise is planted toward the east, because right reason does not go down or is extinguished, but its nature is to rise always. Just as, I think, the sun rises up and fills the darkness of the air with its light, in the same way virtue also, when it has risen in the soul, illuminates its mist and disperses the profound darkness.” The comparison with the rising sun appears later on. demonstration. Philo is always keen to demonstrate that his allegorical interpretation is not arbitrary, but is supported by indications in the text. Foolishness. Philo calls foolishness (ἀφροσύνη) an “incurable sickness” (Cher. 10) and a “deathless evil” (Det. 178), and consistently opposes it to wisdom, Agr. 77; Ebr. 10, 20; Migr. 169; Her. 209; Mut. 197; Somn. 2.234. dark. Quite naturally, Philo associates foolishness and ignorance with darkness, cf. Spec. 1.288: foolishness is darkness of the soul.

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sinks down. Cf. Somn. 2.198: foolishness forces the soul down from the height. brings on night. This adjective (νυκτίφορος) is only attested here in Philo and illustrates his lexical creativity. moral insight. Together with courage, self-control and justice (cf. § 122) moral insight (φρόνησις) belongs to the four cardinal virtues found in Plato and later philosophers (Plato Resp. 427e; Diogenes Laertius 7.92). Philo lists all four in, for instance, Leg. 1.63; Cher. 5; Sacr. 84; Post. 128; Agr. 18. He calls φρόνησις “the best of possessions” (Ebr. 20) and describes it as the ability to discriminate between things which are opposite by nature (Opif. 154) and to determine what action needs to be done (cf. Leg. 1.65). Compared with the term σοφία it places more emphasis on the role of action, hence our translation. For the four cardinal virtues in Philo see Classen 1979, 70–75. just as … pure gleam. As we already saw in the comparison of Moses and Bezalel in §27, Philo often uses the imagery of the shining of the sun and the beams of light within the context of knowledge and wisdom. As example we refer to Deus 46, where mind is called the sight of the soul illuminated by the rays that are akin to it. They disperse the profound and deep darkness, thrown down by the ignorance of things. Cf. also the parallel passage Leg. 1.46 (quoted above); further Her. 263; Congr. 47; Abr. 71, 119; Spec. 1.288. For Philo’s use of the imagery of light see Klein 1962, 11–79; Arnaldez 1963; Kweta 1996, 323– 337. (3) §41. watchers … interlopers. Two examples of Philo’s practice of combining synonyms, which, with a superlative thrown in, gives his language here a baroque feel. We note that he employs the noun φρουρός only in an alliterative combination with φύλαξ (Det. 62, 165; Conf. 27). In § 26 he combines φύλαξ with ταμίας. See comment at loc. possessions of God. Philo means the intellectual faculties which are guarded by the rational soul or the ruling faculty. Guarding these possessions consists in training the virtues or excellences. In §36 he lists some of these possessions, e.g. knowledge, comprehension, understanding, which are symbolized by the trees in the paradise. At the same time they can be seen as the trees in the human being (the intellect) that are planted by God and therefore they are possessions of God. he placed there the human being whom he had moulded. An exact quotation of the second part of Gen 2:8. Philo immediately indicates that ἄνθρωπος here symbolises the intellect, but he waits until § 44 to explain how this human being relates to the double creation of humanity in the creation account. See the Analysis/General comments above. On the verb “moulded” see above on § 34.

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trainings and exercises in the excellences. The practising (ἄσκησις) of excellences or virtues is necessary for attaining felicity. For the exercise of virtue cf. Sacr. 63; Conf. 161; Mut. 75. See further comment at § 37 (“perfect felicity”). §42. the exceptional privilege. The expression ἐξαίρετον γέρας is very common in Philo, who uses it no less than 14 times. It returns in an important passage in §63; see also Det. 92; Post. 105; Deus 46; Congr. 108; Fug. 118; Somn. 1.35. γέρας can also be translated as reward or prize, and is a key concept in the Exposition of the Law, e.g. at Praem. 36 (on Jacob–Israel). We note also its prominence in the conclusion of Contempl. § 90, where in addition to the friendship of God the Therapeutae win the reward of goodness (cf. below on καλοκἀγαθία) which leads to the summit of felicity (on this text see Runia 1997). in the clearest fashion. Philo likes to emphasise with extravagant expressions the excellence and clarity of Scripture. He is the first attested user of the adverb ἐμφαντικώτατα, in most cases employing it with a reference to a scriptural verse, just as here: see Cher. 49; Migr. 81; Somn. 2.192. the true human being … the intellect. Philo regards the mind, the intellect or the ruling faculty as the true human being (Det. 22; Agr. 9; Fug. 71; Spec. 2.267) and this encourages him to identify Adam with mind in his allegories (§ 46; Leg. 1.90, 92; 3.50, 185; Cher. 10, 57). In so doing he draws on the Platonic tradition in which the human being is identified with his rational soul or intellect (Alc. 133c; Resp. 588b–e). goodness. The term καλοκἀγαθία refers to perfect moral excellence and it is attributed to various biblical figures in Philo’s writings. Noah, for instance, has καλοκἀγαθία because he is perfect, i.e. he has acquired not only one virtue but all of them, and he continues to practise them. Noah is, however, only perfect relatively, in comparison with his contemporaries (Abr. 34–36). Philo’s notion of goodness is in agreement with the description by Aristotle: καλοκἀγαθία consists in having the separate virtues. He who has καλοκἀγθία, must have the separate excellences as well (Eth. eud. 7.15, 1248b10–13, cf. Eth. nic. 4.3, 1124a4; 10.9, 1179b10–11). Noah’s son Shem is seen as a root of goodness from which the wise Abraham sprung up (Sobr. 65). In Ebr. 112 Philo depicts the image of a sweat stream of goodness, which springs from wisdom as from a well. Abraham (Migr. 120; Abr. 98, 271), Joseph (Ios. 37) and Moses (Mos. 1.148) also possess it. See further Runia 1997, 9–13. to cultivate the excellences. Philo uses the verb γεωργέω in a metaphorical way, cf. §98, Congr. 123 (cultivate the excellence); Spec. 4.75 (the soul); Contempl. 90 (philosophy). This fits very well his imagery of planting and sowing, which is also prominent in Agr.: the trees of passions and wickedness are destroyed through the skill of cultivation (Agr. 9). See further the comment at § 136 (“the product of the soul”).

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(4) §43. the ark. In his allegories Philo often likes to introduce examples e contrario, i.e. explaining why the opposite is not the case. The story of the ark, into which all kinds of animals were introduced (Gen 6:14–22) provides an example. The implicit question why wild animals were included is not asked in the treatment of the story in QG 2.1–11. great flood. The story of the great flood is found in Gen 7–8. Philo does not discuss the narrative in the existing books of the Allegorical Commentary. It falls in between the main biblical lemmata of Deus and Agr. and may have been treated in missing books. He does, however, retell it in Abr. 39–46 and Mos. 2.59–64 (cf. also Virt. 201; Praem. 22–23). For Philo’s interpretation of the flood, see Lewis 1968, 42–74. It is perhaps a little surprising that Philo feels the need to explain the ark’s construction, since he is writing for insiders who would immediately recognise the story. a symbol of the body. The interpretation of the ark as the human body occurs also in Det. 170; Conf. 105–106; QG 2.1–8, 25. For the term symbol see the comment at §38. See further the extensive treatment in Paramelle 1984, 175–204. the wild … and vices. Philo frequently compares passions and vices with wild, untamed beasts, since wild animals would appear to be irrational and impulsive just as the passions are: Leg. 2.9; 3.113; Cher. 70; Sacr. 104; Det. 25; Post. 66, 98; Gig. 35; Agr. 31; Conf. 110; Migr. 212; Her. 118; Somn. 2.267; Abr. 32; Spec. 2.142; QG 2.27; QE 1.19. The comparison has a Platonic background, because Plato situated the appetitive element (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν) of the soul in the belly, where it is tied like a wild beast (θρέμμα ἄγριον), Tim. 70e; cf. Phaedr. 230a; Resp. 588c. See Runia 1986, 309–310. Generally, Greek philosophers discern four cardinal passions: pleasure, desire, fear and grief (Plato, Lach. 191d; Diogenes Laertius 7.110) and Philo frequently refers to them, e.g. Leg. 2.8, 99; 3.250; Conf. 90. In addition, he regularly mentions the four cardinal vices from the same Greek philosophical tradition: foolishness, unrestrained behaviour, injustice and cowardice (Diogenes Laertius 7.92), for instance in Deus 112; Agr. 17, 83; Conf. 90. Explaining the destruction of the Egyptian horses in the Red Sea, he sees the four feet of the horse as referring to the four passions and vices, Agr. 83. See also our comments at §49 (“irrational”) and (“unrestrained”). For passions in Philo see Lévy 2006, 29–36; Winston 2008, 204–207. (5) §44. Paying great attention to detail. As in § 42 Philo uses a complimentary expression in praise of Moses. The adverb παρατετηρημένως is found in Philo for the first time, also in Leg. 3.144; Det. 160; Post. 137; Migr. 43; Spec. 3.77. It occurs almost exclusively in the Patristic and later Byzantine tradition (for instance Clement, Strom. 3.64.1; Origen, Comm. Io. 2.13; Eustathius, Comm. Hom. Il. 1.146.13) and may be regarded as a verbum Philonicum.

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he says. The wording in Scripture here gives rise to an exegetical question which demands clarification in order to reach a deeper understanding of the text. This quaestio is also posed and answered in a similar way in QG 1.8. the human being struck after the image. Based on Gen 1:26–27, already partly cited in §19. the one who had been moulded. Based on Gen 2:7, also already partly cited in §19. marked with the spirit after the image. It seems odd that the human being created in Gen 1:26–27 is described as being marked by the spirit (πνεῦμα), since in that text there is no mention of the spirit, in contrast to Gen 2:7 where the human being is inbreathed by God. There may be a textual problem here; see the notes to the translation. bears the fruit. See our comment on §31 (“bearing fruit”). the part that is most central and most directive. Philo regards the tree of life and immortality as belonging to the rational soul or intellect (§ 37), and he states that the intellect or ruling faculty occupies the middle part in the human being (§31). That the tree of life is said to have been placed in the middle of the paradise coheres with these thoughts very well. the tree … the paradise. Words from Gen 2:9 are not so much cited as integrated into Philo’s text: yet they are quite accurate: the verb ἐστιν is added for fluency and the genitive τοῦ παραδείσου is used instead of the dative as in the LXX. But the other human being. Philo means the earthy human being made from clay (Gen 2:7). the earthier body. See comment at §28 (“our body … deep soil”). the unmoulded and simple nature. The word ἄπλαστος (“unmoulded”) is provoked by both the biblical text Gen 2:8 cited in § 41 and the mention of the moulded human being a few lines earlier. Following Philo’s frequent practice, it anticipates the citation of Gen 25:27, where Jacob is called unmoulded. the practiser. In Philo’s allegory Jacob represents the person who acquires virtue through practice or training (ἄσκησις) and is called the “practiser” (ὁ ἀσκητής). He makes gradual progress on the road to virtue by practice and with great toil (Cher. 46; Det. 5, 51; etc.). A key characteristic is that he fights against passions through his entire life and Philo usually explains the name Jacob as “supplanter (of the passions)” (Leg. 1.61; 2.89; 3.15, 3.93, 180; etc.); see Grabbe 1988, 166. For Jacob as practiser, see, for instance, §§ 90, 110; Leg. 3.18, 93; Sacr. 5, 46, 47, 64, 81; Det. 45; Post. 59; Deus 92; Agr. 42. For Philo’s interpretation of Jacob, see Roskam 2005, 179–185. Training is one way by means of which one can become perfect. The other ways are learning and nature, which are represented by Abraham and Isaac respectively. Philo derives the schema learning—

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nature—training from Greek philosophy. Aristotle, for example, sees nature, teaching and training as different ways whereby one can become good (Eth. nic. 10.9, 1179b20; see also Protagoras 80B3 DK; Alcinous Epit. 28.4). For this triad in Philo see Birnbaum 2010. an unmoulded man living in a house. An exact quotation from Gen 25:27. The adjective ἄπλαστος is clearly suggested by the verb πλάζω (“to mould”) used in Gen 2:7 and 8 with reference to the making of the human being. The verse is also quoted in Congr. 61–62, where Jacob is placed in opposition to his brother. Esau takes no heed of the unmoulded nature that is without qualities and forms, the nature which the practiser Jacob loves. The opposition between Jacob, the man of wisdom, and Esau, the wicked human being, together with the quotation of Gen 25:27 is also found in Leg. 3.2 (cf. QG 4.165). Though younger, Jacob receives his father’s blessing because he is morally better (Leg. 3.191–192; Sacr. 17–18). §45. the intermediate intellect. The word intermediate (μέσος) indicates that the intellect stands before the choice between good and evil, being in the middle between them and not having made a decision in either direction. In Leg. 3.246 Philo states that Adam is the intermediate intellect, which now proves better, now worse. In so far as he is mind, he is neither bad nor good by nature, but through virtue and vice he is inclined to change towards good and bad. The same use of μέσος is found in Leg. 1.93; Mut. 30; see Harl 1962, 388. Similarly, the human being stands on the borderline (μεθόριος) between mortal and immortal nature (Opif. 135). in the process of choice or rejection. The expression “choice or rejection” (προς αἵρεσιν καὶ φυγήν) is also used in Virt. 205, where Philo describes the situation of the human being in paradise and his wrong choice: “Yet when the alternatives were set before him to choose or avoid (εἰς αἱρέσεις καὶ φυγάς), good and evil, excellent and shameful, true and false, he eagerly chose false and shameful and evil things, disregarding those that are good and excellent and true, on which account he fittingly exchanged an immortal life for a mortal one and, forfeiting blessedness and good fortune (εὐδαιμονία, cf. § 38), promptly changed to a life of pain and misfortune (tr. Wilson).” immortality … death. The same contrast between immortality and death is sketched at the beginning of this section in §37, see comments ad loc. When the human being has eaten from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, he knows both good and evil and since he knows evil he is prepared to do it. In a fine passage commenting on Gen 3:9 (Leg. 3.52) Philo addresses the soul that has chosen for the bad as follows: “When God invited you to participate in virtue, you went for wickedness; when God gave you for your enjoyment the tree of life, that is of wisdom, through which you can live, you filled yourself

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with ignorance and corruption. Did you not prefer misery, the soul’s death, to well-being, the real life?” Parallel Exegesis The planting of the paradise and the trees is discussed at greater length at the appropriate places in Philo’s three commentaries: Leg. 1.43–64; Opif. 153–156; QG 1.6–11. For the interpretations of the trees cf. Leg. 3.52, 107; Migr. 37; Somn. 2.70; QG 2.12. References to these texts are given in the detailed comments above. In these texts Philo offers different interpretations of the paradise, especially in QG 1.6–11, and this doubtless reflects the diversity of pre-Philonic exegetical traditions, see Tobin 1983, 143–145; Goulet 1987, 106–113. Nachleben The Philonic interpretation of the paradise as the cosmos (§ 45) is found in Clement of Alexandria (Strom. 5.72.2; Boulluec 1981, 2.249); for this passage see Daniélou 1961, 50–54. Gregory Nazianzus’s allegorical interpretation of the trees in paradise as Adam’s thought (Or. 38.12) has been borrowed from Philo, as noted by Moreschini 2014, 600–601. Philo’s translation of the name Eden as “luxury” occurs in several early Christian writers, for instance in Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 2.51.5, where Clement cites from Philo’s explanation of Gen 4:16 in Post. 22; see Van den Hoek 1988, 161–163. It is also found in Theophilus (Autol. 2.24) and Gregory of Nyssa (Hom. Opif. PG 44.196D). In more general terms, Christian mysticism often uses the language of enjoyment and love (ἔρως, cf. §39) to describe the relationship with God. Augustine’s frui Deo stands in a tradition that goes back to Philo. d

Moses Prays That Israel be Planted in Paradise (§§ 46–58) Analysis/General Comments After the discussion of God’s planting of the paradise Philo now proceeds to deal with another biblical text in which God is presented as planter, Exod 15:17– 18. In a translation of the LXX this text reads as follows: [17] Lead them in, and plant them in the mountain of your inheritance, in your prepared dwelling place that you made, O Lord, a holy precinct, O Lord, that your hands prepared. [18] The Lord, ruling forever and ever and beyond. tr. NETS

These words are part of Moses’s song to God after the destruction of Pharaoh’s army in the Red Sea (Exod 15:1–19). Towards the end of this song Moses prays

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that Israel may be planted on the mountain of God’s inheritance. These verses, which serve as a secondary biblical lemma, are again connected with the main biblical lemma by means of the verb φυτεύω (“to plant”). In the next two sections (§§59–61, 62–72) Philo goes on to expound Moses’s words by quoting and discussing other biblical texts that are related to the Exodus text. In this way the explanation of Exod 15:17–18 becomes lengthy and extensive, continuing all the way to §58. The passage can be subdivided into four subsections. (1) Philo rounds off the discussion of the paradise and announces Moses’s prayer that the men of vision may be planted in the place from which Adam has been exiled, that is the paradise. He quotes Exod 15:17–18 in full (§§46–47). (2) Next he offers his own exegesis of Moses’s prayer. The mountain of God’s inheritance (κληρονομία) is the cosmos because what comes into being is the allotment (κλῆρος) of its maker. Philo makes uses of the several meanings of the noun κλῆρος, which means “inheritance” but also “allotment.” The prayer has an ethical aspect. It is a wish to be planted in the cosmos in order to control the irrational passions and live in a rational way. According to Philo this can be achieved by means of the Stoic formula “living in accordance with nature.” At the same time the cosmos is God’s house in a visible form, for it has been made by God’s hands, that is by his cosmos-making powers. Philo interprets the final words in Moses’s prayer “the Lord, ruling forever” as meaning that God the maker is in need of nothing (§§48–51). (3) Philo also refers to an interpretation of other exegetes who say that God’s allotment is the good and that Moses prays for enjoyment of the good. The wish to be led in Moses’s prayer is taken to refer to being taught the doctrines of wisdom. The mountain is a symbol of a lofty and heavenly logos (§§52–53). (4) Having given a general account of the allegorical exegesis of the text, Philo proceeds to discuss a particular question about the meaning of the words “the mountain of God’s inheritance” which readers might pose. One can only receive something that one does not have and because God possesses all things he cannot receive inheritances. In presenting his solution to this problem Philo refers to the situation of kings, who are in fact rulers of all their subjects but especially rule over the members of their household. Furthermore, they are in fact masters over all the properties in their country, but are regarded as possessing only the properties that are called royal (§§54–58). In this section and the next two sections (§§59–61, 62–72) the noun κλῆρος plays a key role, appearing in total 14 times in §§48–72. Primarily the word κλῆ-

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ρος means “lot” (e.g., Lev 16:9, 10; Num 26:55), and next “that which is assigned by lot, allotment (of land)” (for instance Num 16:14, 26:62, 36:3, 9). Generally, it can indicate a piece of land, but also an inheritance. Inheritance can also be referred to with the cognate κληρονομία. In the Pentateuch κλῆρος is combined with μερίς (“part, portion”), cf. Deut 10:9; 12:12; 14:27, 29; 18:1. Especially the tribe of the Levites is presented as part and allotment of the Lord (Deut 10:9, 18:2). In Philo’s exegesis in §§48–72 all the various meanings of κλῆρος are involved and he clearly associates κλῆρος with κληρονομία and μερίς, seeing these terms as synonyms. See LSJ s.v. κλῆρος; Faivre 2006, esp. 75. In the allegorical exegesis God’s inheritance turns out to be those wise persons who see and know God. A key role in the explanation is the etymology of Israel as “he who sees God.” Basing himself on this, Philo presents the following line of thought: Israel and the Levites are God’s inheritance/portion; Israel refers to those who see God; God’s inheritance consists in persons who see God, that is those wise persons who have knowledge of God and see him with the eyes of the mind. See also comment at §58 (“which has … sharpest kind”). It should be noted that the notion of Israel here is not linked at all to the Jewish people, but is interpreted in philosophical terms. “He [Philo] does not deny that Israel is a nation that is chosen; he simply ignores the issue (Birnbaum 1996, 138).” On this aspect of his allegory, see further the next section and the detailed notes. Detailed Comments (1) §46. Such were … been exiled. Philo begins with a sentence that has a structural role, in which he refers back to the theme of the previous section (the planting of paradise) and announces themes that will be clarified in the exegesis. He also mentions Adam in anticipation of his appearance in the tertiary biblical lemma in the next section (§59). the One who is alone wise. See §38 and comment ad loc. Moses … takes pity. Deviating from the general tendency Greek philosophy, Philo sees pity (ἔλεος) as an important virtue. He presents God as being merciful and taking pity on human beings in order that they may become virtuous (Det. 95; Post. 31, 156; Somn. 1.181; Opif. 169). God’s mercy is based in his love for humanity, cf. §92. He shows his pity with the help of his merciful powers. For Philo’s positive view of God’s pity and mercy see Winston 1992, 31–32. become migrants. As in §34, Philo surprisingly at first speaks of “migration” from paradise, but then later, when introducing Adam, he uses the usual language of expulsion or exile. the paradise of the virtues. Philo repeats his interpretation of the paradise as a garden of virtues (§37), which he offers in Cher. 10 and Conf. 6 as well.

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calls upon. Philo regards Moses’s words as a prayer; see the comment at § 90 (“vows”). merciful and gentle powers. Moses calls upon God’s merciful powers because the human being has been exiled from the paradise of virtue, and in order to return there and become virtuous again the help of God is required. The transcendent God does not have contact with his creation directly, but his divine powers facilitate his actions in the created world. In this case Moses calls upon God’s merciful powers, in order that God may show mercy to those in need of it. The merciful power(s) of God are also mentioned in Migr. 124; Fug. 95; Mut. 129; Somn. 2.265, 292; Mos. 1.185; Spec. 1.229, 265, 294; 2.15. The starting-point for the identification of a separate merciful power is the role of the mercy of God in the LXX (Exod 32:12; Num 14:20 (cf. Migr. 122); Deut 21:8). See further the comment at §86 (“the powers”). the people of vision. In the background here is Philo’s usual etymology of Israel as “the one who sees God.” No doubt he primarily has in mind the people of Israel (cf., for instance Leg. 2.34; 3.186, 212; Sacr. 134; Post. 63, 92). But at the same time the expression “men of vision” can refer to wise persons or philosophers who know God and see him with the eyes of the mind. For Philo seeing God is the ultimate goal (τέλος) in life. Later on in § 58 he describes Israel as the sacred band of wise souls which has vision of the sharpest kind. The etymology is questionable from a linguistic point of view; see Grabbe 1988, 172–173. However, the connection which it allows between Israel and the ultimate goal of human life shows the prominence which Israel has in his thought. For Israel as seeing God see Birnbaum 1996, 61–77; for the notion of seeing God see further the comment at §58 (“which has vision of the sharpest kind”). the earthy intellect Adam had been exiled. In Gen 3:23–24 it is said that Adam has been driven out from the paradise. In general, Philo explains Adam as the earthy and perishable mind (§42; Leg. 1.90, 92; 3.50, 185; Cher. 10, 57). He represents the mind that is combined with the earthy body (cf. Leg. 1.88). Philo regards the expulsion from the paradise of virtue as the death of the soul, which consists in the decay of virtue and the bringing of wickedness. The soul dies to the life of virtue (Leg. 1.105–107; see Yli-Karjanmaa 2015, 65–67). §47. Bring them … and beyond. In the manuscripts the quotation of Exod 15:17–18 is taken from the translation by Aquila, which deviates at a number of points from the reading in the LXX. Because Philo himself would have read the LXX version, Wendland printed the LXX text. In one manuscript (codex G) the LXX text is written over an erasure. The various readings are given in the following table, in which the deviations are italicized:

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LXX

mss. MUFH

ms G in rasura

17 εἰσαγαγὼν καταφύτευσον αὐτοὺς εἰς ὄρος κληρονομίας σου, εἰς ἕτοιμον κατοικητήριόν σου, ὃ κατειργάσω, κύριε, ἁγίασμα, κύριε, ὃ ἡτοίμασαν αἱ χεῖρές σου. 18 κύριος βασιλεύων τὸν αἰῶνα καὶ ἐπ’ αἰῶνα καὶ ἔτι.

εἰσαγαγὼν καταφυτεύσεις αὐτοὺς εἰς ὄρος κληροδοσίας σου, ἕδρασμα εἱς καθέδραν σου, ὃ κατειργάσω, κυρίου ἁγίασμα, κύριε, ἥδρασαν χεῖρές σου. κύριος βασιλεύει τὸν αἰῶνα καὶ ἔτι.

εἰσαγαγὼν καταφύτευσον αὐτοὺς εἰς ὄρος κληροδοσίας σου, εἰς ἕτοιμον κατοικητήριόν σου, ὃ κατειργάσω, κύριε, ἁγίασμα, κύριε, ὃ ἡτοίμασαν αἱ χεῖρές σου. κύριος βασιλεύων τὸν αἰῶνα καὶ ἐπ’ αἰῶνα καὶ ἔτι.

Examining these deviations more closely we reach the following conclusions: (1) At the beginning of the citation all the manuscripts read κληροδοσίας, whereas the LXX has κληρονομίας. Philo would have written κληρονομίας because he quotes the word ὅρος κληρονομίας later on (§ 48). (2) Later on the manuscripts MUFH read κυρίου ἁγίασμα (“the Lord’s holy precinct”) but the LXX has κύριε, ἁγίασμα, (“O Lord, the holy precint”). Barthélemy (1967, 54) suggests that it is the reading of the tetragrammation by the retoucher of Aquila’s text. This is possible, but Royse (1992, 181–182) suggests that the transmitted text represents Philo’s own words, because the expression κυρίου ἁγίασμα fits with his interpretation of ἁγίασμα as οἶκος θεοῦ in §50. (3) At the end of verse 17 the manuscripts read the verb ἑδράζω, whereas the LXX has ἑτοιμάζω. Because Philo rewords the verse in § 50 using ἑτοιμάζω it can be assumed that Philo reads the LXX version. (4) Later on in his exposition (§51) Philo quotes verse 18 in the LXX version. We may conclude that Wendland is certainly right in printing the LXX version of the Exodus text. Philo does not quote the verses in full elsewhere. See Wendland 1897, 499; Katz 1950, 34–36; Barthélemy 1967, 47, 50 n. 8, 9; Royse 2017, 140–142. (2) §48. In the clearest fashion. Another superlative adverb used to indicate the excellence of Mosaic Scripture; see the comment above on § 42. laying down the seeds and roots. The roots were mentioned at the outset in §§2 and 5 but the seeds have not been mentioned so far. Philo depicts the same imagery of planting and sowing in the parallel exegesis in Congr. 56. See further below Parallel Exegesis.

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God has caused. For God as αἴτιος, cf. §20 and comment ad loc. (“the Cause”). the greatest plant. Philo returns to the cosmos as (the greatest and most fertile) plant which was introduced at the beginning of the treatise; see §§ 2 and 4. the song. Philo uses the word ᾆσμα to describe the song of Moses, as he also does in Leg. 2.102; Ebr. 111; Conf. 35. The singing of the song is discussed in Agr. 79–82, where Philo presents it as a hymn of thanksgiving. For this and other songs see Leonhardt 2001, 162–167; for the terminology Lattke 1990, 129– 132. to hint. The verb αἰνίττομαι is a technical term in Philonic and Greek allegory to indicate the process whereby the author places a hidden meaning in the text which the allegorical interpreter must uncover. Examples in Philo are found at Cher. 21, 60; Det. 178; Post. 18; Deus 21; Agr. 95, 110; etc.; cf. also Cornutus 1.4; 7.2; 17.6; etc. and Heraclitus 5.8; 39.6; 60.3. On the term see further Struck 2004, 142–161. mountain of inheritance. This is the only place where Philo interprets “mountain” as the cosmos. the possession and allotment. Philo interprets the word κληρονομία from the Exodus text as κλῆρος (“allotment”) and associates it with possession (κτῆμα), since that which is allotted to someone is also his possession. See further Analysis/General comments above. §49. that we be planted. Even though the subject of the sentence is Moses, Philo almost imperceptibly moves to the first person plural, thus involving the reader and implying that the author and his readers can aspire to the status of those who see God. irrational. Moses prays that Israel (and also the reader!) may be planted in the paradise of virtue and follow God. Because following God and being virtuous consists in, among other things, liberating oneself from irrational passions, Philo introduces the passions in his explanation of Moses’s prayer. For irrational passion(s) cf., for instance, Leg. 1.100; Cher. 12; Sacr. 80; Det. 46; Post. 46, 73; Migr. 26; Her. 109, 192. At Agr. 88 Philo offers the Stoic definition of passion as “the irrational, uncontrolled and disobedient motion in the soul” (Diogenes Laertius, 7.110). Earlier in §43 the passions are presented as wild beasts, see comment ad loc. unrestrained. The adjective ἀφηνιαστής means “without reins” or “rebellious” and fits in well with Philo’s frequent use of imagery in which the passions are compared with a horse that has to be checked by means of bridle and reins. This imagery is very prominent in Agr., the treatise prior to Plant.: see esp. §§ 83–84 (also with reference to the song of Moses), 88, 106, 109, 122. Other examples are found at Leg. 1.72; 2,99, 102; 3.128; Ebr. 111; Migr. 62: Somn. 2.269. Philo is the

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first extant author to record the word ἀφηνιαστής and after him it occurs almost exclusively in the church fathers. It can thus be called a verbum Philonicum. It occurs 17 times in his writings, for instance Leg. 3.136; Sacr. 45; Agr. 84; Ebr. 111. Within the same imagery he employs the cognate verb ἀφηνιάζω (“refuse to obey the reins, to be rebellious”), e.g. Leg. 1.73, 95; 2.104; 3.128, 193; Sacr. 105; Agr. 74; Ebr. 15; Migr. 62; Her. 245; Congr. 118; Mut. 115. For verba Philonica see the Introduction, section 6b. follow the governance … most perfect. These words recall the expression “following God” which Philo often uses (Migr. 131, 173; Abr. 60, 204; Decal. 98, 100; Spec. 4.187; Praem. 98), sometimes also within the context of the unswerving course of virtue (Migr. 146). Following God was the Pythagorean goal in life (Iamblichus, V. Pythag. 86). In Migr. 128 Philo connects it with the Stoic aim of life “to live according to nature,” a formula to which in our text he refers a few lines later. With the word “governance” (διοίκησις) Philo denotes God’s ruling and ordering of the world, Mos. 2.148; Spec. 4.187; Prov. 2.54; Aet. 83. The word has a Stoic background (SVF 2.945; Diogenes Laertius 7.88 quoted below, “the first … of felicity”). For God as most perfect cf. Cher. 86; Spec. 1.18; in § 91 God is called the most perfect cause. constant and unswerving. The phrase κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως is frequently used by Plato to indicate true Being and the realm of the ideas, e.g. at Phaed. 78c6; Pol. 269d5; Tim. 29a1, etc. Here it is transferred to God, whose Logos for Philo is the location of the ideas. shows moderation. Philo here uses the adjective σώφρων which is akin to σωφροσύνη, (“moderation, self-control”), one of the four cardinal virtues. It is the task of moderation to fight against passions and to control them (Leg. 2.79, 105). For the four cardinal virtues, see our comment on § 40 (“moral insight”). does not stumble. Philo often sketches the image of the road of virtue on which one can stumble and fall, for instance in the previous treatise, Agr. 101, 177; cf. Abr. 269. It is also intertwined with the imagery of running: imitating good runners, Abraham finishes the race of life without stumbling (Migr. 133). No human being is able to run the course of life from birth to death without stumbling (Deus 75). The soul can have a safe journey through the practice of excellence (Agr. 101). See also §37 and our comment (“the one path”). as the first thinkers have said. Philo here refers to the Stoic formulation of the goal of life as living according to nature, which he also quotes in Migr 128. Diogenes Laertius (7.87–88) reports on this as follows: This is why Zeno was the first (in his treatise On the Nature of Man) to designate as the end “life in agreement with nature,” which is the same as a virtuous life, virtue being the goal towards which nature guides us. […]

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Again living virtuously is equivalent to living in accordance with experience of the actual course of nature, […]. (88) And this very thing constitutes the virtue of the happy man and the smooth current of life, when all actions promote the harmony of the spirit dwelling in the individual man with the will of him who orders (διοικητής, cf. διοίκησις in § 49) the universe. tr. Hicks, LCL

Philo would agree with this Stoic doctrine to a considerable extent. In Migr. 128 he states that the best philosophers see living according to nature as the end, and he explains that it is attained when the mind walks in the road of right reason and follows God. By the same token he writes that believing in God is an act of justice and according to nature (Her. 94–95). He identifies nature with God’s law (Opif. 3). The “smooth current of life” in Diogenes’s report resembles Philo’s “life without stumbling.” He also shares the Stoic ideal of ἀπάθεια, that is to be completely free of passions (Leg. 3.129–131), but in sharp contrast with the Stoics he believes that the victory over the passions is a gift of grace given by God, although toil and labour is also required. See also comment at § 98 (“impassibility”). It is curious that Philo should use the phrase “first thinkers” (οἱ πρῶτοι) to describe the Stoics, for they are among the more recent philosophical schools. He may be thinking that the formula “living according to nature” goes back to earlier thinkers such as Heraclitus or Plato. It is also possible that he does not regard “first” in chronological sense but in terms of ranking, seeing the Stoics as important thinkers. As we saw above, in Migr. 128 he implicitly refers to the Stoics as the best philosophers. Niehoff 2018, 238–239 argues that by relating the Stoic ideal expressed here to the God of Israel, Philo may be following in the footsteps of the early Stoic philosopher Cleanthes, who as a “devout monotheist” placed a strong emphasis on the religious aspects of the school’s philosophy. This interpretation blurs the distinction between Cleanthes’s Greek and Philo’s Jewish piety. final end of felicity. See comment on §37 (“perfect felicity”). “Final goal” translates τέλος, the key term in Greek ethics for the goal or end of human life. §50. is in harmony. Philo is fond of the verb συνᾴδω, which he employs 29 times. By way of comparison Plato employs it five times, Dionysius of Halicarnassus six times, and Polybius only once. The verb is used within the context of harmony of interpretation in §§113, 138; Deus 133; Sobr. 65; Fug. 18; Opif. 133. laid down earlier. I.e. in the first part of the cited biblical text. the cosmos is God’s house. The idea that the cosmos is God’s house made visible by means of the senses occurs also in Post. 5; Somn. 1.185; Spec. 1.66.

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not … ungenerated. That the world has been made by God and is not ungenerated is an essential belief for Philo (Opif. 7, 9, 171; Fug. 12; Aet. 1–20; see comments in Runia 2001, 112–113). as some have thought. Just like in Opif. 7–12 on the same subject, Philo does not name the thinkers with whom he disagrees. Because he attributes the view that the world is ungenerated and indestructible to Aristotle (Aet. 10; see Runia 1981, 125–126), it is possible that he has Aristotle and his followers in mind. But the reference could also be more general. It is after all a very common doxographical theme; see for example Ebr. 199; Her. 246. an effulgence. The noun ἀπαύγασμα is a Hellenistic word, appearing for the first time in the LXX, Wis 7:26. Literally it means “something that shines forth,” with its root being the noun αὐγή, “light,” “flash,” “beam” or “gleam.” In our treatise Philo has used αὐγή of virtues lighting up the mind in § 40. Elsewhere Philo employs the word ἀπαύγασμα only twice, both times in relation to the creation of the human mind as a reflection of the divine nature: Opif. 146; Spec. 4.123. Here, however, the word refers to the cosmos. It is an explication of ἁγίασμα in the biblical text, and is further explained by the following phrase “copy of an archetype.” Maybe Philo sees the sensible cosmos as an effulgence or reflection of the intelligible cosmos, just as he sees the human mind as an image or reflection of God. See further the next comment. the copy of an archetype. Because Philo interprets the mountain as cosmos, he sees in the words of the biblical text “that you have produced” (ὃ κατειργάσω) a reference to the creation of the cosmos and hence he gives a very brief summary of his views on creation. Following Plato (Tim. 29–30), Philo regards the sense-perceptible and corporeal world as a copy of the intelligible and incorporeal world, which thus functions as a pattern or archetype (Conf. 172; Migr. 103; Her. 75; Opif. 16–25). Both the copy and its model are described as beautiful. The expression “copy of an archetype” also occurs in Leg. 1.43, 45; Post. 105; Migr. 12; Her. 127; Congr. 8; see further Dillon 1996, 158–160; Runia 1986, 158– 171 (92–93 on this text), 2001, 132–155. The term “archetype” (ἀρχέτυπον), which literally means “original marker” or “model” is another example of the imagery of marking or striking discussed above on §18. what is beautiful for sense-perception. In using the word καλός (“fine, beautiful”) Philo must have had in mind the sentence in the creation account in Gen: “God saw that it was beautiful” (Gen 1:4, 8, 10, 12, 18, 21, 25). But he is also influenced by Plato’s philosophy in which beautiful things in the corporeal world are seen as copies of the intelligible idea of the beautiful; see esp. Tim 28a8–b2, 29a2 where Plato uses the same adjective of the cosmos (superlative at 29a5). Philo uses almost exactly the same language at Cher. 86: “the beautiful things in

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the cosmos could never have become such, if they were not made in the image of the archetype, which is truly beautiful.” hands of God. By interpreting God’s hands as his cosmos-making powers Philo explains away the anthropomorphic expression. He frequently stresses that God is not a human being and has no a human shape (Conf. 98). See comment at §35 (“God in human form”). The association of God’s hand with his powers is also found in Somn. 2.265, where Philo speaks of the merciful hand and power of God; cf. also Mos. 2.291: Moses was buried not by mortal hands but by immortal powers. his cosmos-making powers. In creating the cosmos God had made use of his creative power as an instrument, whose source is that which is truly good (Opif. 21: see comments in Runia 2001, 143–144; Her. 160, referring to Gen 1:31). This power is also called goodness (Cher. 27) and is described as beneficent and bountiful (QG 1.57). God’s cosmos-making power is an example for parents to bring forth children (Her. 172; Spec. 2.225). Philo frequently presents God’s creative power together with the ruling or royal power as the two most high powers of God (Leg. 1.95–96; Cher. 37; Sacr. 59; etc.). Philo would have been struck by the occurrence of κύριος (“Lord”) in the text, because, as he himself remarks in §86, in the creation account the divine name (θεός) is utilised, which he connects with the creative power, whereas κύριος is usually associated with the ruling power. He is, however, silent about the question why the text has κύριος and not θεός. See further comments on §46 (“merciful and gentle powers”) and § 86 (“the powers”). §51. the maker. Philo frequently refers to God as ποιητής (maker), § 53, 68, 127; Det. 86, 124, 155; Deus 34. Under the influence of Plato Tim. 28c, he in many cases combines it with “father,” e.g., Post. 175; Conf. 144, 170; Her. 98, 200, 236. But his fondness for the term will also be due to the use of the verb ποιέω in the creation account in Genesis to describe God’s creative act. In § 14 God is called ὁ ποιῶν and in §48 ὁ πεποιηκώς. See Runia 1986, 108–111, and the comment at § 14 (“the maker”). is in need of anything. The thought that God needs nothing is also expressed in §35; see our comment ad loc. reigning as king … and beyond. The quotation repeats Exod 15:18 exactly, except that the first word “Lord” is left out. The deletion is surprising since the name associated with the ruling power well expresses God’s continuing rule. a king. Philo frequently employs the image of God as a king (§§ 14, 88, 92; Cher. 29; Post. 101; Gig. 45; Deus 159; Conf. 170; Congr. 116; etc.). The picture of God as king is found both in Greek thought (Plato Crat. 396a; Resp. 509d, 597e; Leg. 904a; Atticus fr. 4.12) and in Jewish tradition (Exod 15:18; Ps 5:3, 23:7–9, 83:4; 3 Macc 2:2, 13; Jub. 1:28;). In §33 God is called the Great king; Exod 15:18, the

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first text in the Pentateuch to affirm God’s kingship, is cited at § 47 and § 51; for the rulership of God as king in Philo, see Runia 1986, 168; Umemoto 1991, esp. 223–225; Niehoff 2014; for the Platonic tradition, Dörrie 1970. Niehoff 2014, 334 rightly observes that Philo, when using the kingly metaphor for God, alters the biblical emphasis: “In his view the image of the king indicates the existential superiority of God rather than His powerful involvement in human history.” his subjects are in need. Cf. §14: angels report to the king what his subjects need. (3) §52. Some have said. Following his usual practice Philo here uses a rather vague formula in order to refer to other allegorists without identifying them. Similar anonymous references are found in Leg. 1.59; Her. 280; Mut. 141–142; Somn. 1.118. In §74 there is another general reference to other allegorists. Most regrettably, however, we know nothing about these interpreters, whether they are, for instance, contemporaries of Philo, or were his predecessors in Alexandria (or elsewhere). Regarding the allegorical interpretation here David Hay (1979–1980, 55) suggests that the exegesis of the mountain as the lofty and heavenly logos or doctrine anticipates Philo’s doctrine of the divine Logos. He also adduces Somn. 1.118–119, where reporting the interpretation of others Philo speaks of a divine Logos that inspires Jacob. For Philo’s references to other allegorists, see Hay 1979–1980. use and enjoyment. See the comment on §34. bring us in. The verb εἰσάγω, which occurs in the biblical text, means “to bring in” but also “to introduce to,” “to instruct.” It is clear that Philo also has the latter meaning in his mind. In the same way the term ὁ εἰσαγόμενος refers to one who begins to learn, a pupil (§99; Sacr. 64, 65), while an introductory manual is called an εἰσαγωγή. Within this context the comparison with children (“like children”) is appropriate. The same meaning in Leg. 1.52 (εἰσάγω εἰς τὴν ἀρετήν), 1.54 (εἰσάγω εἰς τὰ δόγματα); 3.92; Agr. 44. the doctrines … of wisdom. Philo also refers to the doctrines and principles of wisdom (σοφίας δόγματα καὶ θεωρήματα) in Det. 66; Abr. 220 and Spec. 4.107. ungrounded. The adjective ἀστοιχείωτος means literally “without elementary principle” or “unlettered.” We have chosen to translate it with the former meaning because of its place in the sentence. If it was placed earlier with the children as beginners, the latter meaning would be more suitable. The term itself is very rare. According to the TLG it occurs elsewhere only three times in late texts (Cyril of Alexandria and in the lexica of Hesychius and the Souda). In Her. 102 Philo speaks of a στοιχειώδης εἰσαγωγή, an elementary introduction. a lofty and heavenly logos. In this interpretation, ascribed to others, the mountain of inheritance is seen as the lofty and heavenly Logos. The present

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context shows that being planted in the Logos means that one knows that God is leader and master, the cause of good things. The soul has to serve him, and service of God is, as Philo explains later on, better than freedom. The Logos is called heavenly because it leads to knowledge of the heavenly God, or perhaps also because it is knowledge that is beyond the limitations of earth-bound mortals. In Sacr. 86 Philo refers to the manna from heaven as the heavenly logos or doctrine of virtue and explains that the manna has to be crushed and ground in order that knowledge becomes firmer. §53. this is … something holy. This sentence is full of references to the biblical text Exod 15:17. the fully available house … Philo replaces the LXX phrase ἔτοιμον κατοικητήριον by a longer description. The noun is a typical a LXX term and it is replaced first by the more common word οἶκος (“house”), and then the Hellenistic word ἐνδιαίτημα (Dionysius of Halicarnassus 1.37.1, 2.32), which is also found in § 33. as something holy. The uncommon LXX term ἁγίασμα from Exodus is replaced by the more usual adjective ἅγιος. For you, Master. Using the technique of apostrophe, Philo now addresses God directly, inspired by the invocation of the Lord in the Exodus text. For Philo’s use of apostrophe see comment below at § 72 (“you slanderers”). The addressing of God as master is based on the term κύριος (“Lord”) in the biblical text. For God as master, cf. §91; Leg. 1.96; 2.83, 104; 3.9; Cher. 107; Sacr. 58; Her. 107. In Gen 15:2, 8 Abraham calls God master; in the LXX Wis 6:7, 8:3; 2 Macc 5:17. The direct address of God as Master is also found in Leg. 3.10; Her. 27; Mos. 2.239; Spec. 2.219. the maker of good and holy things. For Philo it is a key doctrine that God is the cause of good and noble things only and he regularly refers to it, §§ 72, 91; Sacr. 40; Deus 87; Agr. 129, 173; Conf. 180; Fug. 70. Mut. 32. The doctrine is one of Plato’s fundamental theological assumptions as set out in Resp. 379–381, but for Philo it is also profoundly biblical. the perishable realm of becoming. The realm of becoming (γένεσις) is seen as a source of evil and is opposed to God, the ungenerated (ἀγένητος; cf. § 22). In Platonic terms, because the world of becoming is subject to change and never continues in the same state (Post. 29; Somn. 2.290), it lacks the stability required for knowledge and so can be an impediment for the acquisition of virtue. For the opposition between the world of becoming and God, cf. § 61; Leg. 3.7; Post. 172; Gig. 42; Her. 206; Somn. 2.231, 290. The expression φθαρτὴ γένεσις occurs also in Ebr. 73, 208. On Philo’s ethical evaluation of the realm of becoming see Anderson 2011. the suppliant soul. The concept of suppliant souls plays a key role in Philo’s thought. In general terms, a suppliant soul takes refuge with God and is his

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servant and worshipper. In Egypt the Israelites were strangers and guests, suppliants and settlers, who took refuge with God, the protector of strangers and suppliants (Mos. 1.36). Philo envisages the image of the suppliant soul which travels on the royal highway of God. This road is the wisdom which will enable suppliant souls to escape to God (Deus 160, cf. Post. 31). In order to become a suppliant and worshipper of God it is necessary for the soul to set aside bodily pleasures (Det. 160) and become lovers of excellence of character (Virt. 79). Biblical characters are portrayed as examples of suppliants. Abel seems to be dead but he is alive because he is found acting as God’s suppliant (Det. 70). Tamar lived in a city full of gods but when she saw the truth she became pious and regarded her life as the service and supplication of the one Cause (Virt. 221, cf. Spec. 1.209). But it is the tribe of Levi that has been chosen to be the suppliant of God par excellence, as Philo indicates later on (§63); see the note ad loc. The notion of suppliants has partly its background in the Greco-Roman world, where strangers and homicides were able to take refuge in a temple and become suppliants of Zeus Hiketesios (Od. 9.270; 13.213; Herodotus 2.113). See further Nikiprowetzky 1996, 11–43, who draws attention to Philo’s description of the community of the Therapeutae in Contempl.: living in service of God, they are suppliants, just as the Levites are. for an infinite age. The expression τὸν ἄπειρον αἰῶνα is Philo’s rewording of τὸν αἰῶνα καὶ ἐπ’ αἰῶνα καὶ ἔτι from the Exodus text. As Keizer (1999, 212) has observed, before Philo the phrase τὸν ἄπειρον αἰῶνα occurs only once in a fragment from Aristotle (Eudemus fr. 6 Ross), where it means “for endless (or infinite or all) time.” It has the same sense in the passage here. She concludes that for Philo the biblical word αἰών refers to the time that is correlated with the created world (244) and not as it is usually taken to “eternity.” We agree with this view and so avoid translating the biblical text with this term, preferring the term “age,” which clearly refers to time in the created world. without a leader. The adjective ἀνηγεμόνευτος is found in Philo for the first time. It also occurs in Somn. 2.286. For continuous … greatest authority. The idea that the service of (or bondage to) God is better than freedom is also expressed in Cher. 107; Somn. 2.100; Spec. 1.57. The thought is put into words expressively in Her. 7: “When is it fitting for a slave of God to speak freely to him who is leader and master both of himself and the universe? It is not when he is pure from faults and is aware in his conscience that he loves his master, feeling more joy at being God’s servant than being king of the entire human race?” The conventional Stoic view is expressed at Prob. 50: “no good person is a slave, but all such persons are free.” Philo subverts the doctrine by giving it a religious application. The paradox is heightened

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if δουλεία is translated “slavery” rather than “service” (in the quote from Her. 7 Philo uses both δοῦλος and the less lowly θεράπων). (4) §54. ask the question. By these words Philo introduces a problem or a question (ζήτημα) raised by the biblical text. Similar phrases are found in Leg. 1.33, 1.48, 1.91; 2.103; Deus 122. It already appears in a fragment by the Hellenistic Jewish historian Demetrius (3rd century BCE; fr. 5 = Eusebius Praep. ev. 9.29.16), and so most likely indicates a common technique in Alexandrian exegesis. Philo’s method here recalls the genre of the zetema or quaestio, in which a question is raised and answer is given, just as he employs in his QG and QE. It has been argued that this method is origin of the method of the Allegorical Commentary: see Nikiprowetzky 1977, 180; 1983, 7–8. On the Greek background of this method see Niehoff 2011, 38–57 (including its use by Demetrius). On its use in Philo and early Christian writers see the essays in Volgers and Zamagni 2004. give inheritances. The verb κληροδοτέω is found for the first time in the LXX, Ps 77:55; 2Esd 9:12; Sir 17:11. Philo uses it four times (Sacr. 19; Sobr. 21; Spec. 2.119). all things are his possession. The doctrine that all things are God’s possession occupies an important place in Philo’s thought, cf. § 130; Leg. 3.32, 78, 195; Cher. 71, 124; Ebr. 107; Her. 103, 118. In his allegorical exegesis Philo explains the name Cain as meaning “possession” and Cain thus becomes a potent symbol of impious thinking, representing the foolish mind that regards all things as his own possession and not of God (Cher. 65; Sacr. 2, 72; Det.32). §55. But perhaps. Philo often uses phrases to suggest that his exegesis is tentative and probable rather than definitive. It is an indication of the subordination of the exegete before the authoritative text and the limitations of his interpretative insights; see Nikiprowetzy 1977, 191. affinity. The noun οἰκείωσις here denotes the affinity and kinship of the human being with God, as can be seen in Somn. 2.231, where Philo writes about the high priest: he is God’s minister, assimilated (οἰκειούμενος) through his mortal aspect to creation, but through his immortal aspect to the uncreated One; see further Cher. 18; Post. 135; Opif. 146. His use here may be inspired by the image of God as master ruling over the members of his household (οἰκέτης; cf. the noun οἶκος in the biblical text). In general Philo does little with the Stoic notion of οἰκείωσις, which indicates the natural affinity of human beings with themselves (but Sterling 1997 argues that he does accept it as part of his understanding of human friendship). In his thought the term comes close to the Platonic idea of ὁμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ. See Lévy 1998, who discusses our passage on 162–163. members of their household. In the comparison that Philo uses the king is God, while the members of his household (οἰκέται) may in the first place implic-

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itly refer to the Levites, who are special ministers of God and have the Lord as their allotment, as is told in Deut 10:9 and Num 18:20. This allotment is discussed in the next section (§§62–72). But the wise souls who serve God and of whom Philo speaks later on (§58) may also be seen as members of God’s household. the care of the body. The expression ἡ τοῦ σώματος ἐπιμέλεια occurs also in Legat. 250, where interestingly it is used to refer to the comforts demanded by the emperor Gaius, who of course was the earthly king and master in Philo’s own time. §56. These kings are masters. Philo here reflects the situation in Egypt under the Ptolemies, in which the king was regarded as the possessor of the all the land, see Huss 2011, 263–270. After Rome has annexed Egypt, a reform of the land tenure system took place. Royal land became public land, but was still called βασιλική γῆ; see Blouin 2012, 23–26. managers. In Ptolemaic Egypt the ἐπιμελητής was an official who was in charge of financial matters and among other things looked after the leasing of royal land and the collection of the income from it. See Huss 2011, 73–76. Although land reform took place at the beginning of Roman rule, Ptolemaic terminology was retained (Blouin 2012, 24) and it may be assumed that ἐπιμεληταί were still working in Philo’s time. As an upper-class citizen of Alexandria Philo would have been well aware of these arrangements, with which his family may well have been involved. Philo’s brother Alexander, one of the richest men in Alexandria, served as a high financial official. On Philo’s family and its social standing see Fuks 1951, 214–215. the weighty burden. The expression τὸ βαρύτατον ἄχθος is one of Philo’s favorites: cf. Gig. 16; Deus 2, 15; Agr. 49; Migr. 145; Somn. 1.110, 2.26; Abr. 14; Spec. 3.160; Mos. 1.231. §57. are stored up as treasures. The verb θησαυροφυλακέω, which Philo uses 11 times (Post. 62; Migr. 160, 204; Somn. 2.46; Spec. 2.92; Virt. 90, 140; Prob. 76), only appears prior to him in the slightly earlier author Diodorus Siculus (19.15.5). The composite verb is typically Philonic. collectors of tribute. In Roman Egypt the burden of taxation was very high and as a result collectors of taxes had a bad reputation. Philo himself witnessed the use of violence by a tax collector (Spec. 3.159). When some debtors were not able to pay due to poverty and fled, this man carried off their wives, children, parents and other relatives by force and maltreated them in order to compel them to say where the fugitives were. Lewis (1983, 159–176) discusses Roman taxation in Egypt with a reference to Philo’s text from Spec. Philo’s picture is confirmed by other documents. §58. the sacred band. See comment at §14

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is said … the allotment. Philo here anticipates the quotation from Deut 10:9 in §63: the Lord himself will be the allotment of the tribe of Levi. There is a verbal connection with Exod 15:17–18, the biblical lemma of this section, by means of the word κλῆρος (allotment) in Deut 10:9 and κληρονομία (inheritance) in Exod 15:17. the sovereign ruler. For this title of God see comment at § 33. which has vision of the sharpest kind. It is the wise person, who is able to see God with the eyes of his understanding (Post. 18; Deus 3; Abr. 84), whereas fools are blind or dim-sighted (Migr. 38). Philo describes philosophy as the desire to see God and his Word (Conf. 97). The seeing of God is a mental seeing and the vision of God consists in knowing him (Leg. 2.81), as is indicated in Mut. 6: “When you hear that God was seen by a human (Gen 17:1), you must think that this occurs without the sensible light, for reasonably the intelligible can only be comprehended by intelligence.” Other texts that refer to “seeing God” are Sacr. 60; Det. 30, 86; Ebr. 83; Conf. 105; Migr. 201; Fug. 141; Mut. 7, 201, 203; Somn. 1.117, 238, 240; Praem. 44; Legat. 4; etc. To see God is especially a characteristic of the people of Israel, whose name Philo explains as “seeing God,” e.g. Leg. 1.34; 3.15, 172, 186, 212; Sacr. 134; Post. 63, 92; Sobr. 13; Conf. 92. In Deut 32:9, quoted immediately afterwards in §59, the people of Israel are called the Lord’s portion and within Israel the tribe of Levi has a special place, elected for the service of God and therefore God’s portion (Deut 10:9, § 63). In § 46 he refers to Israel as οἱ ὁρατικοί (people of vision). For a penetrating analysis of the theme of Israel as seeing God see Birnbaum 1996, 65–127. She controversially suggests (118–120) that when Philo speaks of Israel as seeing God, he may have in mind all souls or wise persons, Jewish or non-Jewish, who are able to see God; for a critique of this view see Barclay 2016, 231; for a defence Sterling 2016. The adjective ὀξυωπής (“sharp-sighted”) is rarely used before Philo (e.g. Aristotle, Hist. an. 1.10, 492a9; 9.34, 620a2, referring to the eyes of animals), but Philo employs it 17 times and it is a favorite term in the context of seeing God with the eyes of the mind: cf. Sobr. 4; Conf. 92; Congr. 84; Migr. 46, 77, 222; Spec. 1.259. For the theme of seeing God see Birnbaum 1996, 77–90; Bradshaw 1998; Mackie 2009, 2012. eye of the mind. This expression is borrowed from Plato (Symp. 291a3) and occurs also in §169; Post. 18, 167; Somn. 1.199; Opif. 71; Ios. 106; Spec. 3.2. Philo more frequently speaks of the eye(s) of the soul; see § 22 and comment ad loc. which never … penetrating gaze. An earnest call for keeping open the eyes is formulated in Migr. 222, where Philo speaks to the mind directly: “O mind, be never weakly and slacken, but even if it seems hard to observe. Open that which sees in yourself, look to the inside and behold what really is more accurately, and never close your eyes willingly or unwillingly; sleep is a blind thing, as wakefulness is a thing of sharp sight (ὀξυωπές).”

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Parallel Exegesis Moses’s prayer in Exod 15 is also discussed in Congr. 56–58, where Philo’s starting-point is Gen 36:12: Timna, the concubine of Eliphaz, bore Amalek to Eliphaz. In his allegorical reading Amalek refers to the unreasoning impulse of passion. The name Amalek means “people licking up,” because passion licks up and destroys all that stands in its way. Philo explains the name Eliphaz as “God has dispersed me,” because passion is born when God disperses and scatters the soul. Philo then brings in Moses’s prayer and interprets Israel as the mind that sees God. God plants the mind that sees God as a branch of noble birth, stretching its roots into eternity and giving it fruitfulness for the acquisition and enjoyment of virtues. Moses prays that the divine offshoots may be not for one day but immortal and age-long. On the other hand, God banishes the godless souls far away from himself to the place of pleasures and desires. Next Philo quotes from Deut 32:8 “when he scattered the sons of Adam.” This verse is here verbally linked with the interpretation of Eliphaz as “God has dispersed me.” So, although the starting-point differs, we have a similar concatenation of secondary texts to what we find in Plant. A particularly significant passage in which Philo mentions Israel in connection with the etymology of seeing God is at Legat. 4. It is the only time that he refers to Israel in his apologetic works and there seems little doubt that he is thinking of the nation of Israel, i.e. the Jews. They are souls who “ascend beyond the created realm and are schooled to see the uncreated and divine, the primal good and excellent and felicitous and blessed …” (Legat. 6); cf. § 58 and earlier §§21–27. So here we have an allegorical theme which is put to use in a political context. Nachleben Exod 15:17–18 is seldom referred to by early Christian writers, but Origen discusses the verses in Hom. Exod. 6.10–13. His Christian exegesis, in which for instance the holy precinct indicates the Lord’s incarnation, does not show Philonic influence. By the same token, in his Homilies on Jeremiah the mountain is explained as Christ (18.5). In Origen Christ is often invoked in contexts where Philo might refer to the Logos (cf. §52). e

The Part That Belongs to God (§§59–61) Analysis/General Comments In this section and the following we move far away from the theme of planting. In the previous section Philo had quoted and explained Exod 15:17–18 on the planting of the people of Israel on the mountain of God’s inheritance. The word inheritance (κληρονομία) is clearly the trigger now to quote Deut 32:7–9,

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in which Israel is called the Lord’s portion (κλῆρος), so the mode of transition is verbal and of course at the same time thematic. The biblical text now quoted can be labelled as a tertiary biblical lemma, since it deepens the secondary biblical text (Exod 15:17–18) and has only an indirect connection with the main biblical lemma. At the same time the verse forms a contrast with the Exodus text: Israel is planted on the mountain of God, but the sons of Adam are scattered. In his interpretation Philo places those who are focused on earthy pleasures (called sons of Adam) over against those who are led by right reason; in other words, the passage is about the opposition between the bad and the wise person. Philo observes that the same opposition is also expressed in Lev 16:18 where it is prescribed that two goats should be allotted (διακληροῦν, so linked to κλῆρος again), one for the Lord and one for dismissal. This short section can be divided into two subsections. (1) Philo quotes Deut 32:7–9 and sketches the contrast between the sons of the earth, who are scattered and dispersed, and the true worshippers, the people of Israel (§§59–60). (2) Philo quotes Lev 16:8, which refers to the two goats, one for the Lord and one for dismissal. Philo interprets this as the contrast between God and the world of becoming, which is equivalent to the contrast between the worshippers of God, who are being led by right reason, and the sons of the earth, who are focused on the world of becoming (§ 61). Detailed Comments (1) §59. the Great Song. Since the LXX refers to the utterances by Moses recorded in Deut 32 as ᾠδή (“s0ng”; Deut 31:19, 21, 22, 30; 32:44), Philo calls Deut 32 the “Great Song” or the “Greater Song” (Det. 113; Post. 121, 167; Sobr. 10; Mut. 182; Somn. 2.191). The lesser song is the hymn sung by Moses at the Red Sea (Exod 15:1–21; cf. Mos. 1. 180). See the discussion at Leonhardt 2001, 162–163; and for Philo’s terminology see Lattke 1991, 129–132. Ask your … Lord’s portion. A quotation from Deut 32:7–9, in which Philo deviates from the LXX text in two minor points. First, the Hellenistic form ἐγενήθη has been replaced by the Attic form ἐγένετο, which Philo also substitutes in the citation in Post. 89. James Royse (2010, 115–121) argues that Philo avoids the use of the aorist passive of γίγνομαι and uses the aorist middle instead, observing that there are in Philo only three occurrences of the aorist passive (§ 175; Mos. 1.31; QG 2.16). The same substitution of the aorist passive of γίγνομαι in a LXX quotation by the aorist middle can be seen in Agr. 94. Secondly, Philo substitutes the name Israel for the name Jacob in the text, which can be explained since Jacob is renamed Israel in Gen 32:29. But he may also have in mind the

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second line of verse 9 in which the name of Israel does appear but which he does not quote. More striking is the occurrence of the word “inheritance” (κληρονομία) in that same line, which formed a keyword in the previous section, and had a parallel in the biblical lemma that it discussed. It is rather surprising, therefore, that Philo did not quote it as well (Wendland in his apparatus suggests that words may have fallen out), but he may have wished to avoid the complication of the two patriarchal names. In the quotation of the same verse in Post. 89 Philo does quote this last part of Deut 32:9. §60. portion and allotment. In using the words μερίς and κλῆρος Philo here anticipates the quotation of Deut 10:9 “there will not be a portion or allotment” and Num 18:20 “I am your portion and allotment” later on in § 63. the visionary character. For Israel as the one who sees God, see above § 58 (“which has vision of the sharpest kind”). “Character” here translates τρόπος, literally “manner” or “mode.” In the allegorical interpretation biblical characters represent “modes” of being and living. worshipper. Although the word θεραπευτής does not occur in the LXX, Philo often uses it referring to the worshipper of God, for instance Sacr. 118, 127; Det. 75; Post. 182; Ebr. 69, 210. In §38 θεραπεία indicates the worship of God. Because worship is often combined with supplication, he regards the worshipper as a suppliant of God (Det. 160; Congr. 105; Spec. 1.309; Virt. 185). For suppliant, cf. § 53 and comment ad loc. (“the suppliant soul”). the children of the earth … sons of Adam. Philo interprets the phrase “sons of Adam” as the children of the earth (also in Post. 91), presumably because Adam is said to have been moulded out of earth in Gen 2:7. The name Adam means earth (Leg. 1.90; Somn. 2.70; see also §34). Children of the earth are those who are being led by bodily and earthy passions. They are placed opposite to those who follow right reason. have been scattered … dispersed … no longer gathered together. A fine example of a tricolon, cf. cf. §§7, 67, 112, 114, 125, 145, 166, 170, 177. The first verb (σπείρω) is very common and recalls the biblical text (“he scattered the sons of Adam”) but the second (ἀνασκεδάννυμι) appears in Philo (five times in total) for the first time, aside from an occurrence in the Hippocratic corpus (Liq. 1). Philo thus here combines a current word together with a word that is not common, as he often does. The verb recalls the interpretation of Pharaoh’s name as “scatterer of good things” (σκεδαστὴς τῶν καλῶν), Leg. 3.236, 243; Sacr. 48, 69; Det. 95; Her. 60; Somn. 2.211. The third verb, as it is found in the manuscripts (ἐπισυναχθῆναι, “gather together”), does not make sense, because its meaning is quite the opposite of the previous verbs, and therefore we follow Wendland’s suggestion of reading μηκέτι συναχθῆναι (though Cohn’s conjecture ἐπισυγχυθῆναι (“to be in confusion”) is also attractive).

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right reason. Right reason is the criterion on the basis on which actions can be qualified as good or bad. Being an infallible law created by nature (Prob. 46), it forms the basis of a good and virtuous life and is the source of noble deeds (Leg. 3.150). Therefore bad people are enemies of right reason (Leg. 3.1; cf. 3.251, 252) and it is the nature of the foolish man always to move contrary to right reason (Post. 24). Right reason is like a good pilot who ensures a safe journey (Leg. 3.80; cf. Sacr. 51). Knowledge of it is a great source of profit to the mind (Cher. 9; cf. Leg. 1.46; 3.168; Post. 32 (Eden as right reason, cf. § 38); Gig. 48; Deus 129). Philo is indebted to Greek philosophy, in which right reason is regarded as fundamental for the virtuous life (Plato, Leg. 659d, 696c; Aristotle, Eth. nic. 3.11, 1119a19–20, 1119b13–18; see Moss 2014), and especially to the Stoic notion that right actions are done in accordance with right reason and wrong actions contrary to right reason (Stobaeus 2.7.11e, 2.96.20–97.3 Wachsmuth = SVF 3.501); see comment at §135. For right reason in Philo see further Martens 2003, 74– 77. (2) §61. A proof of what has been said. Just as in § 40 where the same term δεῖγμα is used, Philo is keen to show that the allegorical process is not arbitrary but has logical coherence. The assumption is that the text of the Torah forms a coherent whole, and so the one text can be used to prove the interpretation of another. the so-called day of atonement. The rites that should performed on that day in order to be cleansed from all sins are described in Lev 16. Aaron is to take two goats and place lots on them, one lot for the Lord and one lot for the one to be sent off. He will offer the goat upon which the lot fell to the Lord, and offer it for a sin-offering, but he will keep the other alive, make atonement over it, and send it away into the wilderness. Philo describes this day in Spec. 1.183–185. The name of the day (ἐξιλασμός; Lev 23:27) has been derived from the verb ἐξιλάσκομαι (“propitiate, make atonement”; Lev 16:6, 10, 11, 16 etc.), which Philo only employs in the parallel passage in Post. 70–72 in a quotation from Lev 16:10. Here he refers to the day by the noun ἱλασμός, which in the Pentateuch is only used in Lev 25:9 and Num 5:8. In Leg. 3.174 he links ἱλασμός with ἱλάσκομαι, replacing the composite ἐξιλάσκομαι from Lev 16:30 by the simplex and also associates both words with God’s mercy (ἵλεως). The noun ἱλασμός is also found in Leg. 3.174; Post. 48; Her. 179; Congr. 89, 107. It is surprising that Philo who often employs composite nouns and verbs here prefers the simplex. For the day of atonement in Philo see Leonhardt 2001, 43–45; Stökl Ben Ezra 2003, 46–48, 107–114. It should be noted that Philo’s interpretation of the injunction here has nothing to do with removal of sin, but is purely philosophical. As Stökl Ben Ezra 2003, 114 notes: “Atonement is not an important factor in Philo’s

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theology. Atonement by sacrifice is usually spiritualized. The confession atones, as do repentance, affliction and prayer. He prefers to look to the future instead of the past and regards repentance more highly than atonement.” one should allot … for dismissal. Philo paraphrases Lev 8:16:

LXX Lev 16:8

Philo Plant.

καὶ ἐπιθήσει Ααρων ἐπὶ τοὺς δύο χιμάρους κλῆρον ἕνα τῷ κυρίῳ καὶ κλῆρον ἕνα τῷ ἀποπομπαίῳ

§61 δύο τράγους διακληροῦν, τὸν μὲν τῷ κυρίῳ, τὸν δὲ τῷ ἀποπομπαίῳ

In his rewording of the text Philo replaces the verbal phrase ἐπιτίθημι κλῆρον (“place a lot upon”) by the verb διακληρόω, which has the similar meaning “assign by lot.” He refers also to the two beasts with τράγοι (“he-goats”), whereas the LXX speaks of χίμαιροι (“young he-goats”), replacing the less common word with a much more common one. one for God, the other for … becoming. For the opposition between the realm of becoming and God, see the comment on § 53 (“the perishable realm of becoming”). the Cause. For God as Cause see comment at § 20. will be exiled and driven away. The fate of the second goat recalls that of Adam who is chased out of paradise (cf. §46). In Leg. 3.1 Philo comments on his expulsion by stating that the wicked person is an exile and cannot live in a city. Therefore, he has been driven away and sent into exile (cf. also Congr. 58). tumbling … ravines. Philo often depicts the road of vice—which is actually a no-road—as bumpy, full of pits and ravines. This way is contrasted with the highway of virtue. See comments on §37 (“the one path”) and § 49 (“does not stumble”). Parallel Exegesis In Congr. 58 Philo quotes Deut 32:8 and offers a similar interpretation: God drove away all the earthly ways of thinking and scattered them. The wicked person is unable to live in a city, but is scattered without being able to settle anywhere. Just as in Plant. the verse is contrasted with Exod 15:17 (see above section d. Parallel Exegesis). However, in Post. 89–91 a quite different explanation of Deut 32:7–9 is given with a focus on “the father” (right reason) and “the elders” (friends of right reason), both of whom are not explained in Plant. They teach us essential lessons, namely that when God divided the nation of the soul

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and dispersed the children of the earth, he set the boundaries of the offspring of virtue corresponding to the number of the angels. There are as many nations or forms of virtue, as there are words of God. Philo offers a similar exegesis of Lev 16:8 in Leg. 2.52, linking it up with the mention of Levi in Deut 10:9 (cf. §63 below): passion becomes the portion of the lover of passion, but the portion of Levi the lover of God is God himself. In Post. 70–72 there is a further discussion of the goat which obtained the lot (i.e. for dismissal), interpreted as symbolizing the mode of life which is opposite to that of loving God (Deut 30:20). It is noteworthy that in these two passages, just like in Plant., the text about the goats is combined with quotes from the final chapters of Deut. Nachleben We were unable to locate any influence of Philo’s exegesis of the Deut 32:7–9 in the early Christian writers. Interpreting these verses, Origen speaks about the angels to whom the nations are assigned whereas Israel is assigned to God (Hom. Gen. 9.3; Hom. Exod. 8.2; Hom. Jes. Nav. 23.3; Hom. Luc. 35.6; Comm. Rom. 8.9). Generally speaking, early Christian writers interpret the rite with the two goats on the day of atonement in Christian terms without Philonic traces. In the Epistle of Barnabas, for instance, the goat that is sent into the desert is a type of Christ (7.6–7), while Justin interprets the two goats as referring to the two appearances of Christ (Dial. 40). f

The Portion of the Levites (§§62–72) Analysis/General Comments Philo continues his discussion of the notion of allotment (or portion) and now deals with the fact that the tribe of Levi has God as its portion. Earlier in § 59 he had quoted Deut 32:7–9 in which the people of Israel are said to become the Lord’s portion, so the discussion in this section links up with that citation. As scriptural evidence Philo quotes Deut 10:9 and Num 18:20, both of which have strong verbal parallels with the previous quotations as well as, of course, a thematic connection. All these biblical citations can be regarded as tertiary biblical lemmata because they further elucidate the exegesis of the secondary biblical lemma, Exod 15:17–18. This lengthy section can be subdivided into four subsections. (1) Earlier Philo had explained that it is reasonable that God receives an inheritance, although it may seem to be unworthy of God. Now, he takes a further step and states that God is a portion for others. (We have to bear in mind that the Greek word κλῆρος means both inheritance and portion or allotment.) God declares that the tribe of Levi is his own portion, as

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is written in Deut 10:9 and Num 18:20. Having quoted these verses, Philo immediately offers an allegorical interpretation: the Levite represents the mind that has been completely purified and rejects all that belongs to the world of becoming. This soul knows God only. The explanation of the name Levi as meaning “himself for me” fits well this view: the Levite worships God only and is focused only on God’s service (§§ 62–64). (2) The rejection of all things that belong to the realm of becoming by the Levites is illustrated by an anecdote about the Greek philosopher Socrates. Having seen the abundant wealth of a procession he said: “Look, my friends, at how much there is that I do not need.” Philo’s conclusion is that Socrates teaches the mentality of the Levites or of the wise persons who know God only (§§65–66). (3) Because worshippers of God despise all that has come into being, it is not appropriate to be proud of earthly possessions. Philo urges kings and leaders not to be proud of their power and might, even if they have conquered the entire world. They are ordinary citizens in comparison with kings who have God as their allotment. Because the maker is superior to what he has made, he who has God the maker as allotment is superior to him who has as portion that which has been made, even if he has conquered the whole world (§§67–68). (4) Having in mind the identification of the Levite with the wise person, Philo brings up the Stoic paradox that all things are the possession of the wise. Philo responds to those who regard this saying as strange and paradoxical. He explains the paradox, arguing that the critics look only at external goods such as money and wealth, but real wealth consists in God’s wisdom and having God as one’s allotment. On this basis it is possible to say that the wise person, having God as portion, possesses all things. Finally, Philo refers to persons who read the Bible superficially and have regard for the literal meaning only. They think that it is not pious to say that God is the portion of a human being. Responding to this criticism, Philo argues that there is a difference between having God as allotment and having, for example, an olive tree. Having God as allotment is as possessing an art, which is said to be the allotment of the artist as a painter who has the art of painting as allotment. The art of painting does not have a master in the same way as the olive tree does, but the art benefits his possessor. The critics’ mistake consists in understanding “possession” in a superficial and obvious way in terms of material goods. Philo rounds off the long chapter by speaking to his critics directly (“you slanderers”) and urging them to understand God as being of the greatest benefit to those who serve him (§§69–72).

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In this section Philo combines Greek philosophy with the Pentateuch in the smooth fashion which is often characteristic of his allegorical system. The mentality of the Levites, seen as the wise persons who reject material goods, is illustrated by an anecdote about the Greek philosopher Socrates, who also spurns material wealth. The story seems to have been widely circulated, because we also know it from other sources. Philo does not mention the name of Socrates but his readers, being at home in Greek philosophy, will have been expected to recognize the anecdote. Furthermore, he brings in the Stoic paradox that the wise person possesses all things and adapts the saying to those who have God as their allotment. In this manner, the Levite becomes a Stoic sapiens. By bringing in Greek philosophy in this way, the implicit message is that Greek philosophers at their best teach the same as the Pentateuch. Philo, however, would argue that the Greek philosophers have learnt their ideas from the Jewish lawgiver, Moses. Detailed Comments (1) §62. God-beloved. Philo often calls Moses θεοφιλής (Leg. 1.76; 2.79, 88, 90; 3.130; Cher. 49; Sacr. 77; Det. 13; Conf. 95; Migr. 67; etc). This epithet itself has no scriptural basis, but it is clearly inspired by the well-known text Exod 33:11, where God is said to speak to Moses as if to his own friend (φίλος). he was in the habit. At more places Philo praises Moses’s great ability and accuracy in using words and imposing names. In Agr. 1–2 and Cher. 56 his use of words and names is contrasted with the ignorance with which the majority of the people employs words. The originality of his exegesis is stressed at Deus 125 and Migr. 50. Here, however, the emphasis is on his boldness in introducing such a paradoxical idea about God. “Bolder” here translates θερμότεροι, literally “hotter.” In modern colloquial terms Philo is saying: “this is hot stuff.” words and doctrines. The combination of λόγοι and δόγματα is extremely common in Philo; see Post. 129; Conf. 36; Opif. 158; Ios. 86; Spec. 1.37; 2.61, 63; 3.1; 4.140; Praem. 122; Prob. 3. us feeble people. The reading of the text is not certain here and the translation is based on a conjecture of Mangey. The use of the first person plural is general, but does not necessarily exclude the exegete who is aware of the limitations of the human mind; see our comment above on § 55. to obtain an inheritance. That God can obtain an inheritance has been argued in §§54–58. §63. which had fled to him and became his suppliant. Because the Levites have disregarded their family (Deut 33:9a, see the citation below on § 64), they are suppliants who have taken refuge in God. This tribe had taken refuge at God’s footstool and has no allotment among the children of Israel because the

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Lord is their allotment. They are worshippers of the only wise being and as God’s servants and attendants have forsaken all things that belong to the world of becoming. The guardianship of the sacred objects is committed to their care (Num 28:24–25): Sacr. 119–120; Det. 62–63; Ebr. 94; Fug. 88–89; Mut. 127; Somn. 2.273. The combination of πρόσφυξ (“refugee”) and ἱκέτης (“suppliant”) with a reference to the Levites occurs also in Ebr. 94; Her. 124; Spec. 2.118 (in Sacr. 120 only πρόσφυξ). For the Levites as suppliants, see Nikiprowetzky 1996, 21–25. as happened … eleven tribes. The distribution of land to the other eleven tribes is told in Num 33:50–34:29; cf. Spec. 2.118. the priesthood. Philo narrates that the Levites have received the priesthood as a reward because they killed the worshippers of the golden calf (Mos. 2.161, 173, 274; Spec. 3.127). He bases himself on Exod 32:29 “You filled your hands today for the Lord, each one by the son or by the brother, for a blessing to be bestowed upon you” (LXX tr. NETS). The killing of brothers and neighbours by the Levites is explained allegorically as the cutting away from the mind all that is near to the flesh. The brother is not a human being but is brother of the soul, that is the body (Ebr. 67–72; cf. Fug. 90–92). The appointment of the Levites as ministers of God and servants in the tabernacle is told in Num 3:5–10 and 8:24–26. an exceptional privilege. For this expression see the comment at § 42. not earthly but Olympian. The adjective ὀλύμπιος originally referred to Mt. Olympus in northern Greece, where according to Greek mythology the celestial gods dwell, and therefore it also means “divine” or “heavenly” in opposition to earthly (Det. 85; Deus 138; Agr. 119). For this reason Philo sometimes combines it with “heavenly” (οὐράνιος): Deus 151; Somn. 1.84, 151; 2.242. for the … their allotment. A free rendering of Deut 10:9:

LXX Deut 10:9

Philo Plant.

διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν τοῖς Λευίταις μερὶς καὶ κλῆρος ἐν τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς αὐτῶν· κύριος αὐτὸς κλῆρος αὐτοῦ.

§63 οὐ γὰρ ἐσται τῇ φυλῇ Λευὶ μερὶς οὐδὲ κλῆρος ἐν υἱοῖς Ἱσραήλ, ὅτι κύριος αὐτὸς κλῆρος αὐτῶν.

Philo’s text shows a number of variations in wording: οἱ Λευίται has been replaced by ἡ φυλὴ Λευί, and οἱ ἀδελφοί by υἱοῖ Ἱσραήλ. The LXX reads κλῆρος αὐτοῦ, whereas the Philonic manuscripts have κλῆρος αὐτῶν. Because in the quotations elsewhere (Leg. 2.51; Somn. 1.159; Congr. 134, ms. GF; MAH αὐτοῦ) the manuscripts read κλῆρος αὐτῷ, Wendland (1897, 499) suggested κλῆρος αὐτῷ

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here, pointing to the use of the dative in the expression αὐτός μοι in Philo’s explanation in §64. The verse is obviously linked with the previous quotations (Deut 32:7–9 and Lev 16:8) by the key words μερίς and κλῆρος. the Oracles. See comment at §23. I am … your inheritance. A partial quotation of Num 18:20 but the noun κληρονομία in the LXX is replaced by κληροδοσία. The use of the word κληροδοσία links up with the remark in §54 that it is necessary that God should give inheritances (κληροδοτέω), but that it is not reasonable that he should receive them (κληρονομέω). This usage of κληροδοσία fits in well with the quotation because God gives himself as an inheritance or portion to the Levites. The word is rarely used: it appears for the first time in the later books of the LXX; in Philo it occurs only here. §64. the intellect … completely purified. The Levites are presented as representing the purified mind. Purification of the mind is a requisite for seeing and knowing God, and for the attainment of perfect felicity. Purification and perfection are closely connected. The process of purification consists in cutting away the branches of passions and vices (Agr. 10), and the exercise of virtue is a means to achieve this (Somn. 1.177; Spec. 1.201). A mind that has been thus purified has attained perfection and so is able to know God, not from created things but by obtaining a clear vision of the uncreated One (Leg. 3.100, cf. Somn. 1.148; Abr. 122). Such a mind does not pay regard to sensible things (Leg. 3.200), being glad about nothing more than when confessing that he has the Lord of all as his master (Cher. 107). For purified mind cf. also § 126; Congr. 110; Virt. 189; Praem. 120, 163. Philo also associates the Levite perfection with the prescript that they should cease from the ministry at the age of fifty and should keep watch (Num 8:25–26), because fifty is a perfect number. He who is perfect does not have to labour anymore, but to keep watch over all that he has acquired (Det. 63–64). rejects all … of becoming. Probably Philo bases the idea that the Levites have forsaken all what belongs to the realm of becoming (τὰ γενέσεως) on Deut 33:9: “He who was saying to his father and his mother, “I have not seen you,” and he did not acknowledge his brothers and did not acknowledge his sons—he guarded your oracles and kept your covenant” (tr. NETS). Philo alludes to this verse in Mut. 127 where he calls the Levite a human being who has not seen the kinship with the world of becoming (γένεσις) but has given himself as a portion to the ruler and father of all. The use of the verb “to see” is without doubt based on Deut 33:9 and the object of seeing is not one’s father or mother but the realm of becoming. Philo refers to the same verse in Fug. 89–90, where he combines it with the slaughter of the worshippers of the golden calf by the Levites. The Levites killed brother, neighbour and the nearest (Exod 32:27) and Philo

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interprets brother as the body, which is a brother of the soul, neighbour as the irrational, and the nearest as the uttered word (cf. Ebr. 67–72; Sacr. 129). In Leg. 2.51 quoting Deut 33:9 he interprets father and mother as mind and material body. Finally, in Sacr. 120 Philo states that the perfection of Levi is shown in that he had fled to God and had left behind all interaction with the world of becoming. So, in Philo’s allegorical interpretation family members are associated with the world of created things and this forms an essential background for the remark on the Levite forsaking of all what belongs to the world of becoming. rejects. The use of the verb ἀπογιγνώσκω is perhaps an echo of ἐπιγιγνώσκω in Deut 33:9, the verse that forms the background of this sentence; see previous comment. the One. Philo frequently underlines that God is One (e.g. Leg. 1.44, 51; 2.1; 3.82, 105; Cher. 27, 83; Conf. 171). In calling God the One he may be thinking of the shema Deut 6:4: “The Lord God our Lord is one”—which remarkably he never cites—, but sometimes, as here in our text, he changes the masculine εἷς into the neuter ἕν, which links up with Greek philosophical tradition in which the highest principle is also called τὸ ἕν (e.g. at Aëtius 1.7.18). For God as τὸ ἕν cf. Leg. 2.2; Cher. 87. On Philo and the Neopythagorean and Platonist traditions of monadic theology see further Runia 2007 and the note below on “the highest … of all.” the ungenerated. Philo here calls God the ungenerated (τὸ ἀγένητον) deliberately to form a contrast with the world of becoming (τὰ γενέσεως); for God as ungenerated see comment at §21. it has drawn near. In using the verb προσέρχομαι Philo is no doubt alluding to proselytes, with which he associates the Levites, because both have left their families (Deut 26:13; Somn. 2.273). that comes after him. Philo means the world of becoming, which is despised by the Levites. The same expression is found in Leg. 3.126 when describing the high priest as “he who does all things for God’s sake and overvalues nothing that comes after him.” is interpreted “himself for me.” Philo’s interpretation is clearly based on the Hebrew li (“to me”) in the name. This is the only passage in which Philo offers this rendering of the name Levi. According to Grabbe (1988, 179) it is possible that Philo’s etymology is based on Gen 29:34 (“my husband will be mine (…) therefore she called his name Levi”) alone, but this seems unlikely. the highest … of all. Philo hints at Plato’s remark that God is the best of causes (Tim. 29a5–6), a saying that he will quote in § 131 (see comment ad loc.). God is called αἴτιον τὸ ἀνωτάτω in Virt. 216; God is referred to as τὸ ἀνωτάτω καὶ περσβύτατον αἴτιον in Spec. 2.5; Virt. 34, 65. For God as Cause see comment

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at §20. The use of the term τὸ ἀνωτάτω in connection with the reference to the One brings to mind the Alexandrian philosopher Eudorus, who calls the One “highest principle” (τὸ ὑπεράνω θεός fr. 4 Mazzarelli = Simplicius in Phys. 1.181.19). (2) § 65. they say. Philo refers to a story about Socrates told among others by Diogenes Laertius, who reports as follows (2.25): “Often when he looked at the multitude of wares exposed for sale, he would say to himself, ‘How many things I can do without!’ And he would continually recite the lines: ‘The purple robe and silver’s shine, more fits an actor’s need than mine’” (tr. Hicks, LCL). Philo’s version is, however, closer to Cicero’s report (Tusc. disp. 5.91), who like Philo speaks of a procession which is seen by Socrates and provokes his remark. Philo embellishes the anecdote, adding that Socrates was a lover of wisdom and remarking that he was clothed very simply. Furthermore, he sketches the image of the beauty of wisdom as a highly distinguished woman. The story is also briefly told in Deus 146 in comparable language. The same picture of Socrates is sketched in Prov. 2.24 Aucher (= LCL vol. 9, 2.21). some of his companions. In the other versions of the anecdote Socrates’s friends are not mentioned, but Philo also includes them in Deus 146. he was puffed up. The verb ὑποφυσάω is attested for the first time in Philo, who uses it only here. He more frequently employs the simplex φυσάω in the same metaphorical way: to puff up oneself by arrogance and self-importance, for instance, Cher. 64; Post. 115; Ebr. 93; Congr. 107, 127; Somn. 1.211. In Legat. 69 it is used of Macro and explained as caused by not knowing the Delphi saying “know yourself.” In §157 Philo uses the noun φύσημα (“blowing, conceit”). wealth. Together with such things as power, glory and honour, wealth belongs to the external goods, which—consistent with Stoic doctrine—are not necessary for the virtuous life (Post. 112; Sobr. 61; Migr. 172). Philo does not reject wealth totally, but promotes modest possession. In Ios. 144 he says that the excellence of wealth consists not in a full purse but in helping the needy. Doubtless there is a social significance behind Philo’s remark, but as so often he speaks only in the most general terms. For external goods see comment at § 39 (“the so-called … goods of humankind”). boasting. Philo calls boastfulness (ἀλαζονεία) a bad thing (Spec. 2.83; 4.170) and a vice for the soul (Virt. 172). §66. The lawgiver. This is the first time in the treatise that Moses is called by this title. It also used in §141 and frequently elsewhere: Leg. 2,14; 3.145, 210; Cher. 40, 53; etc. For Moses as writer of the Torah, see Amir 1983, 77–106; Burkhardt 1992, 171–188.

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those should … into being. Using the same words as above in § 64, Philo again describes the attitude of the Levites, i.e. the purified mind which only knows the ungenerated. kinship with the one. Kinship with the one implies estrangement from the world of becoming and vice versa, as Philo remarks in Post. 135. Cf. Cher. 7 and our comment at §25 (“removal”). felicity. On felicity as the aim in human life which consists of seeing and knowing God see our comment above on §37. The Levites, belonging to Israel, whose name Philo explains as “seeing God,” have attained this goal. For seeing God see comment at §58 (“which has vision of the sharpest kind”). (3) §67. swagger. Following on from the previous paragraph Philo denounces arrogance or swagger (μεγαλαυχέω, μεγαλαυχία), which consists of puffing up oneself and thinking that one has obtained a status that is more than human. Arrogance brings a human to deify himself and claim that which belongs to God alone (Cher. 77; Post. 117). In Post. 52 arrogance is placed in the company of impiety, godlessness and self-love. In Somn. 1.211 Philo states that the beginning of wisdom is not to forget oneself, but always to bear in mind what one consists of. In this way one will purge away arrogance, the most God-abhorred of evil things. Arrogance is thus the opposite of knowing oneself and being aware of human nothingness (cf. also Ebr. 128; Conf. 5, 113; Somn. 1.131). The mentality of arrogant kings is expressed in Somn. 2.291: “We are the leaders, we are the powerful; all things are based on us. Who can cause good or its opposite, except for us? On whom does it really and truly depends to do good or bad, except for us? They talk nonsense who say that all things depend on an invisible power, thinking that this power controls the human and divine things in the cosmos.” Philo may well have been acquainted with the arrogance of highly-placed persons from his own experience. But we should also note how in these various parallel texts he theologizes the ethical condemnation, i.e. it is not just arrogance, but arrogance in relation to God. city or land …. and the seas. Employing tricola once again (cf. § 7) and anaphora (repetition of the same word: πάντα τῆς κλίματα … πάντα ἔθνη … πάντας ποταμοὺς), Philo once more shows his command of Greek literary style. A comparable description of the entire world is found in Mos. 2.20. On anaphora see Lausberg 1998, 281–283. obtained as their possession. That this has to be the meaning of προσεκτήσαντο is clear from the context. See the comment below on Philo’s argument in § 68. the Hellenic and barbarian nations. Taking a Greek point of view, Philo divides human beings into Greeks and non-Greeks, called barbarians (without

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the pejorative meaning it has today). He often does this in a neutral context, when not focusing on the position of the Jewish nation; cf., for instance, Cher. 91; Mut. 135; Opif. 128; Abr. 136, 267. On this division and its relation to the division between Jews and other nations, see Berthelot 2011; Runia 2013, esp. 41–44. §68. the heavenly realm. For the word μετάρσιος see comment at § 3 (“the upper part”). the maker. For the title ποιητής see comment at § 51. unenslaved and free. In Philo’s hierarchically ordered created universe the highest place is reserved for the heavens and the heavenly bodies that occupy it. Philo’s comment here is best understood in the light of his explanation of the first commandment in Spec. 1.13–20. It should not be supposed, as some do, that the heavenly bodies have absolute powers and should be worshipped for that reason. In the cosmos there are magistrates and subjects. The heavenly bodies are the former, serving as lieutenants of the Father of all. Their subjects are the beings that exist in the sublunary sphere (hence it is impossible for earthly kings to exercise authority over them). It might seem odd that Philo calls them “unenslaved and free” when their movements are fixed. But from the viewpoint of the Platonic-Aristotelian standard model, their movements are perfectly rational and so they would not wish these to be any different than they are. In addition, they are not subject to anyone else’s authority except that of God. On Philo’s view of the heavenly bodies see further our note above on § 12. these last mentioned. I.e. the kings who obtained God as their allotment. Philo, indulging in some rather extravagant hyperbole, is referring here to the Levites. The argument is as follows: (1) earthly kings are superior to their subjects and have obtained them as their possession; (2) God is superior to anything that is created because he is the creator; (3) therefore, if a group obtains God as their allotment, i.e. they are God’s possession (see our comment on § 63), they will be superior to those earthly monarchs who only have created things as their possession, even if the latter were—quite impiously—to claim authority over the heavenly realm. (4) §69. those who declare. Philo refers to the Stoics, who formulate this paradox; see Diogenes Laertius 7.125 (= SVF 3.590). Philo’s wording here is included as a Stoic fragment by Von Arnim, SVF 3.596. The Stoics were notorious for their use of paradoxes, leading Cicero to write a treatise devoted to this practice, the Paradoxa Stoicorum. Philo frequently makes use of Stoic paradoxes, a particular favourite being the one that only the wise person is rich (Cicero, Parad. 42; Sextus Empiricus, Math. 11.170 = SVF 3.598). The paradox that every good person is free is the subject of his treatise Περὶ τοῦ πάντα σπουδαῖον

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ἐλεύθερον εἶναι (Prob.); cf. Cicero, Parad. 33 and the introductory discussion on Prob. in Petit 1974, 46–57. the good person. To indicate the good or wise person Philo frequently employs the term σπουδαῖος, which was also popular among the Stoics (cf. §§ 144, 155, 165). The word is basically interchangeable with ἀστεῖος (honourable; §§ 139 [see comment ad loc.], 172, 176), σοφός (wise; §§ 58,71, 73, 94, 142, etc.) and δίκαιος (just; §§140, 141), but does retain its own particular connotation of being earnest and devoted to the cause of virtue. As noted above, the term is used in the title of his treatise Prob. Very often there is an antithesis between the good person and the worthless or foolish one (φαῦλος), cf. § 172, and also in Leg. 1.93; 2.60; 3.1; Sacr. 18, 81, 121, 128; Det. 43, 49, 95; Agr. 22, 29. Stoic use of the term is found in Diogenes Laertius 7.117, 119, 120 (SVF 3.606, 637, 731), etc.; Plutarch, Mor. 1038A (SVF 3.674). paradoxically. That which seems to be contrary to expectation or reason is called παράδοξος. The fourth-century BCE rhetorician Anaximenes of Lampsacus discusses the paradox in his Rhetoric to Alexander (included mistakenly in the corpus Aristotelicum): if you cite a well-known maxim, there is no need to bring forward any reasons for it, but when you utter a paradox, you have to give reasons for your saying in order to avoid prolixity and unbelief (ch. 11, 1430b2–5). Philo here follows Anaximenes’s advice, offering a reason for his statement. Philo draws attention to paradoxes more often, for instance in Post. 48, where he regards it as a paradox that Abel has been killed and is alive, cf. 49; Post. 50 (together with παράλογος); Deus 127; Congr. 2. who lacks money and possessions. Philo always uses the adjective ἀχρήματος (“without money”) in combination with ἀκτήμων (“without possession”); see Praem. 54; Virt. 98; Prob. 77. wisdom. It is perhaps a little unexpected that Philo here introduces wisdom, but it can be explained through the fact that wisdom is seen as the possession of the wise. Earlier when telling the story about Socrates, he described the philosopher as having fallen in love with the beauty of wisdom. On the basis of the identification of the Levites with wise persons, he regards the wise, who are in possession of wisdom, as having God as their allotment or inheritance. leader of the entire universe. See comment at § 2. §70. a secure trust. Trust or faith (πίστις) in God is central to Philo’s religious and intellectual life. Discussing Gen 15:6 (Abram believed in God) in Abr. 268 he describes faith as follows: “It is the only real and sure good, consolation of life, plenitude of good hopes, dearth of bad things, bringing in good things, rejection of the bad life, knowledge of reverence, inheritance of perfect felicity, all-round betterment of the soul which leans on and gains support from the cause of all things.” He then argues that trust in God implies distrust in external

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goods, a notion similar to what he sets out in §§64 and 66 (Abr. 269; cf. Her. 93; Mut. 201). He calls faith in the Existent the queen of virtues (Abr. 270; cf. Her. 91: the most perfect of virtues). Elsewhere he places faith opposite to boasting (μεγαλαυχέω; Mut. 155, cf. §67). In our text trust is called secure, implying that it cannot be dislodged by argument. It is significant that this emphasis on trust in God comes at the end of the long Chapter One (§§ 1–72). At the end of Chapter Two he reverts to the theme and states that to trust God is a strong bulwark of cheerfulness of spirit and freedom from danger (§ 92); cf. Post. 13; Conf. 31; Migr. 44; Fug. 150; Virt. 216. See further Noack 2000, 66–71, who focuses on Abraham’s faith; Morgan 2015, 152–155, 183–184. piety. For εὐσέβεια see comment at §35 (“the great virtues of piety and reverence”). slander. The verb παρασυκοφαντέω is only attested twice in Greek literature, here and in Plutarch, Mor. 73B4. The simplex συκοφαντέω (“to prosecute, to accuse falsely”) is a current verb with a negative association. In classical Athens a sycophant accuses somebody falsely in the hope of getting money if the prosecution is successful. This meaning is found in Spec. 4.40: “every sycophant is necessarily a perjurer having little respect for piety,” cf. Spec. 3.53. For sycophants in Athens see MacDowell 1977, 62–66. The prefix παρα- added to the simple verb adds emphasis to the wrongness of the action. the literal meaning. Philo uses τὸ πρόχειρον, the interpretation that is at first hand, thus obvious and superficial. Elsewhere he refers to those who interpret Scripture superficially and in a literal sense. Discussing the confusion of languages at Babel he disparages those who take the letter of the law in its outward sense and provide for each question superficial explanations (Conf. 14); for πρόχειρος cf. Post. 1; Agr. 3; Sobr. 33. The implication is always that one should move to an allegorical understanding of the text which reveals its deeper meaning, but this is not explicitly stated here. For a discussion of Philo’s references to literalists see Shroyer 1936; for his attitude towards the literal meaning see Niehoff 2011, 133–151. §71. a genuine … and spurious. The expression γνήσιον πάθος (“genuine cast of mind”) occurs also in Her. 19, 44; Abr. 194; Ios. 219; Legat. 195. Unusually the term πάθος is here used in a neutral sense (one could also translate “experience,” i.e. what happens to someone) rather than the customary negative sense of “passion.” The combination of ὑποβολιμαῖος (“false”) and νόθος (“spurious”) is also found in Mut. 147. Philo is fond of the contrasting pair γνήσιος and νόθος, which is also found in, for instance, Det. 11, 21; Congr. 35; Conf. 48; Migr. 94; Mut. 5; Somn. 1.23, 53, 2.47; Abr. 221. the allotment of wise persons. Actually, this is not literally said but in his allegory Philo identifies the Levites with wise persons.

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earthly possession … Olympian prize. The contrast between earthly and Olympian was also made in §63; see comment ad loc. §72. you slanderers. Philo here uses the trope of the apostrophe, addresses his critics directly (comparable use in Agr. 149; cf. Cher. 35: ὦ συκοφάντα). More often he uses this technique to address the soul or the mind, Leg. 1.49, 51; 2.91, 106; 3.17; Cher. 29, 48; Gig. 44; Deus 4, 114; Migr. 222; etc. Elsewhere this technique is common in synagogal sermons, and is also a feature of the genre of the Stoic and Cynic diatribe, a popular lecture; see Thyen 1955, 94–100; Stowers 1992. Conley (1987, 12–13) discusses the apostrophe as a means of communicating with the audience. For a general discussion see Lausberg 1998, 338–339. For the meaning of συκοφάντης see comment at §70 (“slander”). the One who IS. See comment at §21. but as … serving him. Conclusions of treatises and chapters within them are important for Philo. Here he concludes the chapter on God as planter by combining praise of God and—by implication—exhortation to become one of his servants or worshippers. cause of the greatest goods. See comment at § 53 (“the maker … holy things”). serving him. A reference to the interpretation of the Levites, and at the same time wise persons, as servants of God, which has been the leading thought of the final sub-chapter, §§62–72. See also Leg. 3.135; Sacr. 118, 120, 127; Post. 182. Parallel Exegesis At a few other passages Philo alludes to or cites the two biblical verses quoted in this section. Deut 10:9 is partly quoted in Congr. 134, where Philo explains that God gives himself as portion to him who serves him without ceasing, cf. Fug. 102. In Leg. 2.51–52 Deut 10:9 is combined with Lev 16:8 (the verse about the two goats), which had been quoted in the previous section (§ 61). The Levite represents the mind who forsakes the material body. He is a lover of God, who has God as his portion. By way of contrast the lover of passion has passion as his portion. The goat “for dismissal” is needed for the lover of passion because evil has to be dismissed. Similarly, in Somn. 1.159 Philo presents the lover of virtue as having God as portion or allotment. All these interpretations are consistent with the exegesis that Philo offers in Plant. Finally, in Spec. 1.131 he offers two reasons why the Levites are God’s portion. First, they share the thank-offering given to God; second, they perform the sacred rites, thus becoming in a sense managers of inheritances. This more literal explanation of their role fits in with the different purpose of the scriptural commentary in the Exposition of the Law.

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Nachleben Origen’s presentation of the Levites is in line with Philo, but it is unclear whether he derives his exegesis from him. Explaining the service of the Levites, he writes that they are not impeded by the obstacles of corporeal nature, but they go beyond the glory of all visible things. They live in God’s word only and look for nothing corporeal or irrational (Hom. Num. 21.1.3). In Hom. Lev. 15.3 he refers to the Levite as the perfect intellect. The Philonic interpretation of the name Levi as “himself for me” is not found in Origen, which supports the conclusion that he does not depend on Philo for his interpretation. It should be noted that the translation of Levi as “himself for me” is scarcely found in the church fathers, an exception being at Ambrose Exp. Ps. 118 8.4 (Grabbe 1988, 179).

Chapter Two: Abraham as Planter (§§73–93) Having discussed God as planter and his plant, the cosmos, in the first chapter (§§1–72), Philo now turns to figures from Scripture who are also presented as planters. The next mention in Scripture is Abraham, who is introduced as a planter in Gen 21:33: “And Abraham planted a ploughed field at the well of the oath and called on the name of the Lord: God everlasting.” Philo clearly bases his interpretation on the LXX translation, which deviates from the Hebrew original. In the Hebrew Abraham planted a ʾeshl, which is usually translated as tamarisk. The word occurs in the Hebrew Bible only three times (also in 1 Sam 22:6; 31:13), and on each occasion it is rendered by ἄρουρα. Furthermore, in the Hebrew text the place where this happens is called Beersheba. The LXX text, however, does not mention the name but translates it as “well of the oath” (ἐπὶ τῷ φρέατι τοῦ ὅρκου; see Wevers 1993, 313–315), based on the Hebrew words ber (“well”) and shvuʿa (“oath”). The discussion of this verse is carefully organized. Philo discerns three aspects requiring explanation, all of which he announces in § 74 and then treats after each other in a straightforward fashion as follows: (1) the ploughed field (§§75–77); (2) the well of the oath (§§78–84); (3) the names Lord and God (§§85–92). Philo himself set out this arrangement by means of a number of signposts. The entire discussion is introduced in §75. The treatment of (2) is signalled in § 78 (“let us observe”), while the transition from (2) to (3) is plainly indicated in § 85. He closes this chapter by giving a fine summary in which the essentials of the three points of discussion are mentioned. In accordance with his usual man-

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ner Philo refers to other scriptural verses. When dealing with the well of the oath he quotes Gen 36:32–33 (§78), where there is also a reference to the well of the oath, in order to substantiate his exegesis. In his discussion of the two names of God he cites the words by Jacob: “And the Lord shall be to me for God” (Gen 28:21). Both biblical quotations can be labelled as tertiary biblical lemmata, because they are used to illustrate the exegesis of the secondary biblical lemma, i.e. Gen 21:33. a

Transition to a New Biblical Text and Outline of Its Interpretation (§§73–74) Analysis/General Comments This brief section functions as an introductory passage to a new biblical verse on planting. Philo begins with a transitional sentence in which he refers back to the previous discussion and then announces his next theme. Such transitional sentences are also found in §§28, 94 and 139–140 and can be compared with the use of headings in modern textbooks. Thereafter Philo quotes the new biblical verse, Gen 21:33. This secondary biblical lemma has a verbal parallel with the main biblical lemma in the verb φυτεύω (“to plant”), and is of course also thematically related to the previous chapter. Finally Philo offers a general exegesis of Gen 21:33 by offering a symbolic interpretation of its main components in terms of his botanical theme: the field is the tree, the well of the oath is the plot of ground, and the change of the name Lord into God everlasting is the fruit. These three aspects will be elaborated in the following sections. This introductory section thus clearly consists of two subsections. (1) Philo introduces and quotes the new biblical lemma (§ 73). (2) He offers a general interpretation of the biblical verse (§ 74).

Detailed Comments (1) §73. the first planter. For God as planter see comment at § 2. his plant. The whole cosmos is a plant planted by God, cf. § 4. Straight away. Why does Philo introduce the next text in this way? Perhaps because this is the first time since the MBL Gen 9:20 that the biblical text speaks of someone “planting.” the wise person Abraham. Wise (σοφός) is the most frequent adjective of Abraham, cf. Leg. 3.210, 217, 244; Cher 7, 10, 31, 106; Sacr. 122; Det. 59, 124; etc. In Philo’s allegory Abraham is a symbol of the mind which becomes perfect through teaching and instruction (Congr. 35; Mut. 12), God himself being his teacher (Somn. 1.173). The presentation of Abraham as learning the skill of planting from God fits well into this interpretation. Philo explains the name Abraham as “elect father of sound” which signifies the wise person. Sound

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stands for the uttered word, whose father is the mind. Elect refers to the good person because the bad character is confused and the good is elected (Abr. 83; cf. Cher. 7; Gig. 64; Mut. 66–70). The visit of the three strangers at Abraham (Gen 18) is allegorically explained as the vision of God and his two powers (Cher. 106; Abr. 119–132). Later on Philo brings these two powers to the fore (§ 86). For Philo’s interpretation of Abraham see further Goodenough 1962, 141–142; Sandmel 1971, 96–211; Roskam 2005, 173–179. Abraham planted … God everlasting. A quotation of Gen 21:33. The two finite verbs have been changed into an infinitive because of the construction of the sentence (“Abraham is said to plant”). The last part of the quotation in the manuscripts deviates from the LXX text:

LXX

Philo mss.

Philo Mangey/Wendland

τὸ ὄνομα κυρίου θεὸς αἰώνιος τὸ ὄνομα κυρίου θεοῦ αἰωνίου τὸ ὄνομα κυρίου θεὸς αἰώνιος

Mangey (followed by Wendland) changes the genitive θεοῦ αἰωνίου in Philo’s text to the nominative in agreement with the LXX reading. This emendation is reasonable because later in the citations in §§85 and 89 the manuscripts read the nominative. It is obvious that in the manuscripts the words θεὸς αἰώνιος have been assimilated to the preceding genitive κυρίου. See further Royse 2017, 144–147, who agrees with the above; but see further below on the citation of the same text in §85. The LCL retains the reading of the manuscripts without comment. the size of the plot. Philo bases himself on the word ἄρουρα (“ploughed field”) in the LXX text, which means a plot of land, especially tilled land (Homer, Od. 6.10), but in Egypt the word can also refer to a measure of land that is 100 Egyptian cubits long by 100 Egyptian cubits wide (Herodotus 2.168; an Egyptian cubit is c. 52,5cm). Attracted by its allegorical potential, this is the meaning that Philo adopts. (2) §74. those who are in the habit. Philo’s words suggest that his exegesis is dependent on others, but it is unclear to what extent, and it is impossible to determine what exactly Philo’s own contribution is. Earlier in § 52 he also vaguely refers to other allegorists (“some have said”), but we know nothing about them. For Philo’s references to other allegorists see Hay 1979–1980. estates. The word κτῆμα means “property,” “possession,” but in the first century it also refers to an estate (Acts 5:1).

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the tree. Earlier in §28 Philo referred to trees that were planted in the human being as intellectual faculties. Maybe he has the same interpretation in mind here. in the understanding of the God-beloved. The mention of Abraham’s understanding or mind is doubtless a reference to the allegorical theme of the Patriarch as “learner.” On the allegorical interpretation of the three Patriarchs as learner, naturally endowed and practiser respectively see Böhm 2005; Birnbaum 2016. Philo is fond of the adjective θεοφιλής (Leg. 2.81; Det. 50; Post. 179; Deus 10; etc.), which he often employs with a reference to Moses; see our comment at §62. fruit. In interpreting the transferral of the name Lord to God everlasting as the fruit (καρπός) of what Abraham has planted, Philo as he often does employs fruit in a metaphorical way, cf. §§85, 93. Elsewhere in the treatise he speaks of the fruit of instruction: §§114, 116, 126, 137. In § 77 piety is seen as fruit. Other examples can be found in §§106, 138; Det. 111; Gig. 4; Agr. 9, 25; Ebr. 224; Migr. 140. Mut. 73; Somn. 2.272. In §36 he employs the verb καρποφορέω (“to bear fruit”) in the same way; see comment ad loc. This fits in very well with his rich and copious imagery of sowing and planting the seeds of virtue and of noble deeds in the soul, which is found time and again in his writings (Leg. 1.45, 48, 49, 56, 80; 3.181; Cher. 44; Det. 111; Post. 171; Deus 137; Agr. 8–9, 17–19, 25; Ebr. 211, 224). b

Explanation of “Field” (§§75–77) Analysis/General Comment Philo now discusses the first point of Gen 21:33, viz. the ploughed field. Basing himself on the meaning of ἄρουρα as a plot of land that has a surface of 10,000 cubits he relates the field with the number 10,000, which in his view is the limit of all numbers. Using this as the starting-point, he offers the symbolic explanation of the field as the doctrine that God is the beginning and final goal of all things. Because numbers are the basis for the interpretation, we can say that Philo uses theory of numbers as an exegetical tool. This very brief section can be subdivided into two parts. (1) Philo sets out the starting-points for the symbolic interpretation (§§ 75– 76). (2) He offers a symbolic interpretation which he ascribes to others: God is the beginning and the end, which is a doctrine that as a most beautiful fruit produces reverence and piety (§77).

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Detailed Comments (1) §75. proceed to give. The composite verb προσαποδίδωμι became current in the Hellenistic period (Polybius 31.22.4; Diodorus Siculus 31.26.2; Dionysius of Halicarnassus Demos. 54). In Philo it is found in Agr. 131; Ebr. 11; Migr. 136; Ios. 28; Mos. 2.66. are multiplied. The verb πολυπλασιάζω, which is a later form of πολλαπλασιάζω, is attested for the first time in the LXX, Deut 4:1; 8:1; 11:8, cf. also Diodorus Siculus 23.13.1. In Philo it is found at Fug. 186; Opif. 51, 93. according to the nature of the square. Probably this expression refers to the geometrical rule for measuring surfaces. §76. one is the starting-point. In Her. 190 Philo refers to specialists on numbers who declare that one is not a number at all, but the element and the beginning from which number springs (also Post. 65). ten thousand the end. Because the Greek has no term for numbers higher than ten thousand apart from terms compounded with μυρίοι, this number can be regarded as the end of the numbers. Philo offers a different view in Opif. 47, where, assuming that there are ten real numbers (from one to ten), he calls ten the boundary for the infinitude of numbers. He also uses the image of a race: the numbers wind around the ten like a turning post and turn back. the primary combination. Philo refers to the numbers one up to ten thousand, which he states as belonging to “the primary combination.” The meaning here is obscure. Perhaps he means those numbers that can be expressed without further qualifiers such as “twice” (twice ten thousand) or “and” (ten thousand and one). not … off the mark. Philo frequently employs the expression οὐκ ἀπὸ σκοποῦ, Ebr. 76; Her. 156; Congr. 50, 69; Fug. 64, 116; Mut. 81, 201; Somn. 1.151; Opif. 12, 41, 72, 79; etc. Before him the expression is rarely found, cf. Homer, Od. 11.344; Plato, Tim. 25e; Theaet. 179c7. The image is explained in Sacr. 82: we shall imitate the skilled archers who set up a mark and aim all their arrows at it. See Billings 1919, 100. some people … they compared. Philo refers clearly to a commonly used comparison, which is also found in Anatolius, On the first ten numbers (quoted by Ps.Iamblichus Theol. arith. 86.3–5): “It (sc. the ten) is the perimeter and limit of all number: for they run their course (δολιχεύουσι, see the comment at § 9 “he runs”) by winding and turning around it as if around a turning post. Moreover it is the boundary for the infinitude of numbers. It is also called “power” and “all-completing” because it limits all number.” See further Runia 2001, 192. The image of a turning-post recurs in §125. For Philo’s use of athletic imagery see the comment at §27 (“second prize … first prize”).

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finishing line. The word refers to the post at the end of a stadium at which the runners turn back. Philo here has in mind a δίαυλος, a race at which the runners run one length of the stadium and finish their race at the turning point. In Greek the numbers one, ten, hundred, thousand and ten thousand are all single words; as we already noted above, after that combinations have to be used. Relating this to the image, if the runners want to go further, they have to turn the corner and start running back. (2) § 77. Some … proceed. It is likely that Philo here refers to the same allegorists as at the beginning of the discussion in §74, but we cannot be certain. symbolic. See comment at §38. God is the beginning. In describing God as the beginning and the limit, Philo links up with his Jewish-Hellenistic environment (cf. § 93; Josephus, A.J. 8.280; C. Ap. 2.190). In the New Testament book Revelation God is the alpha and omega (1:8), the ἀρχή and the τέλος (21:6) and (in the mouth of Christ) the “first and the last” (22:13). But there is a precedent in the famous Platonic text Leg. 716a (quoting an earlier saying), “God who holds the beginning and end and intermediates of all existents.” For God as ἀρχή see also Leg. 1.5; Her. 172; Decal. 52. that produces. Before Philo the adjective κατασκευαστικός is rarely used, mainly in Aristotle (for instance Top. 2.1, 109a3; 5.1, 129b24; 7.2, 153a2). It replaces a participle and results in a rather artificial style of Greek. piety. See comment at §35. the fruit. For the metaphorical use of fruit see comment at § 74. reverence. See comment at §35. Parallel Exegesis Philo refers also to the ploughed field planted by Abraham (Gen 21:33) in Mut. 190 and QG 3.56. In both passages it is included as part of a discussion of the number hundred. c

Explanation of the “Well of the Oath” (§§ 78–84) Analysis/General Comments In this section Philo deals with the second point of his exegesis of Gen 21:33, viz. the place where Abraham did his planting. He brings in another biblical passage in which the same place Beersheba or the well of the oath is also mentioned, viz. Gen 26:32–33. In this case Isaac’s servants have dug a well and reported to Isaac that they found water, in response to which Isaac called the place oath. The words of the servants have been wrongly translated in the LXX as “we did not find water” (see Wevers 1993, 414). Because Philo’s interpretation

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is obviously based on the LXX rendering, it is clear that he did not consult the Hebrew original and this can be taken as yet another indication that he was not able to read Hebrew. Philo’s interpretation consists of a comparison between well-diggers and investigators of the nature of things. Just as those who dug a well did not find water, in the same way those who have advanced in learning are unable to reach the goal that they aim at. The section can be subdivided into three subsections. (1) First, Philo offers more information about the well, viz. that there was no water found in it, as can be read in Gen 26:32–33, verses that are quoted here (§78). (2) Next, he gives his interpretation of the fact that not water was found in the form of a comparison between well-diggers and researchers. Just as some diggers of a well do not reach their aim, i.e. finding water, in the same way learners fail to attain their goal, because the depth of any science is endless (§§ 79–81). (3) Finally, an explanation of the name “oath” is given. One can take the surest oath upon the fact that no practitioner of knowledge has reached the goal of perfection, i.e. it may be taken as certain. This applies also to the functioning of the senses. No sense-perception, e.g. hearing or seeing, is perfect, and mistakes will occur unless God assists (§§ 82–84). Generally speaking, in Philo’s allegory wells, which are mentioned several times in the Pentateuch, are a symbol of knowledge. At the beginning of Somn. 1, for instance, he discusses the well from which Jacob departed (Gen 28:10) and explains that the well is a symbol of knowledge because the nature of knowledge is very deep. It is discovered with much trouble and difficulty (§ 6). The diggers of the well say that they found no water in it (Gen 26:32) and this indicates that the ends of the branches of knowledge are not only hard to find but may even be beyond finding (§8). This is also expressed by the famous saying “life is short and art is long.” He who digs it like a well comprehends the greatness of skill in the best way (§10). The well is called oath, because an oath gives assurance and nothing can be asserted with more certainty than that wisdom is without end (§ 12). Explanation of the well as knowledge is also found in Post. 130; Somn. 2.271; cf. also the image in §168: drawing from the well of knowledge. Because knowledge is related to wisdom Philo also interprets the well as wisdom (Post. 151). This well gives a sweet stream of excellence for thirsty souls (Ebr. 122). The interpretation of the well of oath in Plant. is thus in agreement with the general allegorical interpretation of wells found throughout Philo’s writings. For purposes of comparison it is worth noting that in the sectarian writings of the Dead Sea Scrolls, the digging of a well is a common motif for the activity

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of searching the Torah for the depths of God’s revealed knowledge and wisdom, e.g. in CD III, 16, VI, 2–5. Detailed Comments (1) §78. an account maintains. The same expression (κατέχει λόγος) occurs in Post. 163 and Somn. 2.56. Since a quotation from Scripture follows, λόγος might even be translated as “a text.” he says. The subject is not expressed but Philo obviously means Moses, see comment at §1 (“he introduces”). the servants … he named it oath. A verbatim quotation of Gen 26:32–33, except that Philo replaces the LXX form εἶπαν by the classic form εἶπον. (2) §79. the nature of reality. The expression ἡ τῶν πραγμάτων φύσις is also found in Leg. 3.78; Post. 182; Congr. 144; Somn. 2.116; Praem. 11. to nourish the soul. Philo often uses the verb “to nourish” in a metaphorical way to refer to the soul which is fed by divine food, for instance Leg. 3.152, 161, 176; cf. Cher. 84; Post. 130; Congr. 167; Fug. 67. §114: cleansed words nurture the soul. The image has a Platonic background, Phaedr. 246e2, 248c2. In the context of this treatise nourishing or feeding is connected with the results of planting. §80. descend further into their depths. The use of the verb ἐμβαθύνω is well suited to the interpretation of the well as knowledge, since the depth of the well can be likened to the depth of knowledge, cf. Somn. 1.6: the nature of knowledge is very deep (βαθεῖα); Fug. 2oo. are unable to attain their goal. The notion that it is impossible to reach the aim reminds us of the interpretation of the figure of Noah. Noah strives for excellence but he has not gained complete possession of the knowledge of the cultivation of the soul. He is continually progressing towards perfection but he does not reach it (Agr. 125, 181). It is reported. See comment at §12. that he knew nothing. This is the famous saying of the philosopher Socrates, to whom Philo had also referred earlier (§65; see comment ad loc.), Apol. 21d7; Theaet. 150b5–7. Socrates does, however, know “that there is an objective standard between right and wrong, there are moral standards not dependent on the differing opinions of this or that individual” (Guthrie 1975, 88). Philo would agree with him in this respect. For an interpretation of the meaning of profession of ignorance made by Socrates see Vlastos 1985. Another important theme in his philosophy was his quest for self-knowledge and knowledge of his own soul, to which Philo refers in Somn.1.56–58: he who tries to know himself is called Terah by the Hebrews and Socrates by the Greeks. Socrates is also mentioned in Contempl. 57 and Prov. 2.24 Aucher.

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§81. art. Throughout his writings Philo regularly refers to various arts and skills. In Leg. 1.57 he distinguishes between theoretical arts, like geometry and astronomy, and practical arts, such as the skill of the carpenter and coppersmith. Besides music, grammar and geometry (Congr. 15, 16, 142, 144) he also mentions the skill of painting and sculpture (§71; Gig. 59; Ios. 39). Rhetoric and dialectic are also referred to (Congr. 17, 18). See further comment at § 31 (“various kinds of skills”). the practitioner. In Congr. 142 Philo describes artists (τεχνίτης; here translated with practitioner) as those who have reached fullness of accomplishment in the arts. This description seems to be contrary to Philo’s point here, that it is impossible to become perfect in any art but the contradiction can be explained by the different context. However this may be, it is characteristic of an artist to work with knowledge and skill (Det. 104; Agr. 4). Philo can also call God a τεχνίτης, §31 where we translate as “artificer”; see comment ad loc. fountain. Philo is fond of using the imagery of a fountain or a spring (πηγή). Inspired by Gen 2:6, he sketches, for instance, the image of the mind as a spring which waters the senses (Leg. 1.28–29; 3.185; Post. 126; Fug. 182), but he employs the image in other ways too. In Leg. 2.87 the virtuous person is presented as drinking a most excellent drink, viz. wisdom from the spring which God drew from his own wisdom. An important aspect in the imagery is that a fountain always gives water and never dries up, renewing itself continuously. In the same way a skill renews itself and offers new thoughts and theories without end, and therefore it is impossible to gain perfection in this skill. The association between knowledge and a spring is also made in Gig. 25. In a similar way Philo describes God’s gifts as ever-flowing from God’s spring (Conf. 182; cf. § 93). The image of a spring is also found in §121; Det. 40, 83, 92; Post. 69, 136; Gig. 25; Deus 155; Ebr. 12; Sobr. 53; Migr. 30; Congr. 120. renewing. In Agr. 171 Philo pictures education, which has a nature that never grows old, as renewing itself with continual exercises. The metaphorical use is also found in Sobr. 56. pouring forth. The verb ἀνομβρέω appears for the first time in the LXX, where it is used in a metaphorical way (Sir 18:29; 39:6; 50:27) and this is the way that Philo employs it too (Leg. 3.12; Det. 44; Her. 31; Fug. 193). In § 93 the simplex ὀμβρέω (“rain down”) is used in the same way. (3) §82. most appropriately. Philo is the first attested user of this superlative (προσφυέστατα) as adverb. He employs it eight times, mostly in a comparable way, remarking that something is called or named most appropriately, Post. 103; Agr. 101; Her. 47; Congr. 57; Fug. 196; Ios. 61; Aet. 54.

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oath. The same description of an oath (calling God to witness to a matter that is disputed) occurs in Leg. 3.205; Sacr.91; Decal. 86; Spec. 2.10. In contrast, calling God as witness to a lie is very unholy (Decal. 86). symbol. See comment at §38. §83. the above-mentioned well. See Gen 26:32–33, quoted above in § 78. organs of sense-perception. Philo refers also to the five senses in §§ 29, 133, cf. Leg. 1.11; Sacr. 73; Det. 168; Agr. 30; Conf. 90; Migr. 199, 203, 204; Congr. 92; Mut. 110. the intellect. The mind (νοῦς) or intellect (διάνοια) is the leading part of the human soul and it is its task to think, to purpose and to apprehend both senseperceptible and intelligible objects (Leg. 1.91; Deus 45; Migr. 78; Her. 74; Fug. 135; Mut. 257). To apprehend objects it cooperates together with the senses, which nourish the mind, as Philo says in §133. See comment ad loc (“that nourishes our mind”). The intellect or mind is called rational soul. See comment at § 18. §84. For how … thinking occur. The three verbs that Philo uses (παροράω, παρακόυω, παρανοέω) refer to making errors in perceiving sensible objects and in thinking. The prefix παρά indicates the incorrect functioning of the activity (compare, for instance, “paranoia” in English). Sight and hearing can make mistakes, for instance, thinking bitter flavours sweet and sweet bitter (Cher. 70). The mind which thinks that all things are its own possession and not God’s, makes an enormous mistake (Cher. 65–66), but the wise human being, because he has knowledge, “does not make errors in sight and hearing but surveys and observes all that is worthy to be seen and heard” (Ebr. 158–159). (This is a Stoic notion, cf. Stobaeus 2.7.11m (2.112.20–21 Wachsmuth = SVF 3.548.)) As Philo explains, God can cause the mind and the senses not to go astray, as he sows the seeds of certitude upon the organs. Here theological motifs trump any epistemological concerns about the possible fallibity of the senses. The collocution of παροράω and παρακόυω is also found in Her. 109 and Spec. 4.53; the verb παρανοέω occurs in Leg. 2.60; Cher. 116; Conf. 126, with mind or soul as the subject. the perceptions. The noun ἡ ἀντίληψις indicates the apprehension of an object by the senses and the mind, cf. Leg. 1.25, 29, 2.25, 36, 70, 71; 3.58; Sacr. 36; etc. God sows. Philo often pictures the image of God as sower, particularly as sower of excellences in the soul (Leg. 1.45, 49, 79, 3.181; Cher. 44; Post. 91; Migr. 142; Fug. 170). Billings (1919, 102) argues that the image has its background in Plato’s Phaedr. 276e–277a, where Socrates speaks about the sowing and planting of words in the soul. See also comment at §136 (“the product of the soul”). This is a fine example of how in Philo religious ideas can intrude upon what is usually the domain of philosophy, i.e. the question of the reliability of human sources of knowledge.

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Parallel Exegesis A reference to the wells of both Abraham (Gen 21:30) and Isaac (Gen 26:18) is found in Fug. 200. The wells that they dig are deep sources of knowledge. They are contrasted with cisterns, which do not have nourishment from their own but are in need of inflow from outside. The same interpretation for not finding water in the well as in Plant. appears in Somn. 1.8–13 and QG VI.9* (text at Mercier 1984, 535). See further the Analysis/General Comments above. d

Explanation of “the Name of the Lord, God Everlasting” (§§ 85–92) Analysis/General Comments In this section of Chapter Two Philo discusses the last aspect of Gen 21:33: Abraham called on the name of the Lord as God everlasting (θεός αἰώνιος). In his interpretation Philo focuses on the three divine epithets used here, explaining each one. Generally speaking, in Philo’s allegory the figure of Abraham is a symbol of the soul who strives for virtue and yearns to know God. This section thus might be understood as illustrating the kind of knowledge of God that the wise soul can obtain. This section can be subdivided into three subsections. (1) Philo begins with a transitional sentence, in which he refers briefly to the previous discussion of the two first aspects and announces the explanation of the final point. This last aspect of Abraham’s planting is the fruit, and the fruit consists in calling on God everlasting. Gen 26:33 is quoted. Comparable transitional sentences are also found in §§ 28, 73 and 94 (§85). (2) In the main subsection Philo interprets the biblical verse as referring to God’s two powers: the beneficent power, which is called God and by means of which God has created the world, and the reigning power, called Lord, through which God rules the created world. The name God everlasting, relating to God’s beneficent power, indicates that God is always gracious and bestows his gifts without end (§§ 86–89). (3) This is illustrated by Jacob, who says “the Lord will become God for me” (Gen 28:21), and these words show that God will be continuously beneficent and kind. God is a king who has a love for human beings and supplies what his subjects are in need of. To have trust in such a God brings about cheerfulness and security. Since Gen 28:21 illustrates the interpretation of the secondary biblical lemma Gen 21:33, it can be labelled as another tertiary biblical lemma. The final two sections of the exegesis can be regarded as a kind of peroration exhorting the reader to trust in God (§§90–92). In this section Philo refers to the divine powers, as he earlier does (§§ 46, 50). The doctrine of God’s two powers occupies a prominent place in his thought.

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In general, they represent those chief aspects of God that are involved with the created world: God created the world by means of his creating power and he reigns the world through his ruling power. In this way they can be seen as interfacing between the transcendent God and the world without being separate from God. Philo finds starting-points for the two chief powers in the Pentateuch, connecting the two titles of God (θεός and κύριος) with the two powers. In Gen 2:16 the two names are used: the Lord God commanded Adam. Philo explains that the exhortation is enforced by both divine titles. If Adam obeys he will be deemed worthy by God of his benefactions, but if he is rebellious he will be punished by the Lord as master, who has authority (Leg. 1.95; cf. 3.73). Philo also mentions the two powers in Sacr. 59–60, where he explains God’s visit to Abraham (Gen 18). God appears to Abraham attended by the two highest powers as bodyguards: sovereignty and goodness (cf. Abr. 121). God, being in the middle, is one, but he brings about a triple vision for the soul that can see. The powers are uncircumscribed, just as God is uncircumscribed. These three are the measurement of all things. God’s goodness is the measure of good things, his sovereignty is the measure of his subjects, and the ruler himself is the measure of all corporeal and incorporeal things. These three measures should be as it were blended in the soul that it may be convinced that God exists. God surpasses his powers, being visible without them and manifesting himself in them. Furthermore, the two Cherubim are also explained as a symbol of two powers (Cher. 27–29; Her. 166; Mos. 2.99; QG 1.57). Philo connects the creative power, also called God’s goodness, with the title θεός, the translation of Elohim, whereas the ruling power, God’s sovereignty, is expressed by the title κύριος, the rendering of YHWH. In the rabbinic tradition there was a comparable explanation of the two names of God, to which Philo was able to connect. In an earlier Palestinian tradition Elohim is connected with God’s goodness and YHWH with God’s punishment. Later on, the connection was the reverse: YHWH is associated with mercy and Elohim with justice and law (Wolfson 1947, 1.223– 226; Winston 1985, 21–22). The relationship between Philo and the doctrine of the rabbis is, however, complicated, all the more because the rabbinic evidence is at the earliest a century later than Philo. For this question see Dahl and Segal 1978. Other texts in which Philo refers to the divine powers are Sacr. 131; Deus 77– 81; Mut. 28–29. For God’s powers in Philo see Zeller 1990, 43–48; Dillon 1996, 161–166; Termini 2000, 46–59, 99–188.

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Detailed Comments (1) §85. the place in which the tree blossoms. The place was called the well of the oath and explained in §§78–84. Philo interprets the ploughed field as tree (§74) and discusses it in §§75–77. its fruit. The fruit consists in the change of the name of Lord into God. For the metaphorical use of fruit see §74. he called … God everlasting. Quotation of the last part of Gen 21:33. Unlike in §73, where the same text is cited, the Philonic manuscripts read the nominative κύριος, which has been altered by Wendland into the genitive κυρίου in accordance with the LXX and the citation in §73. Royse 2017, 146 remarks that it is possible that, if his copy of the LXX had the tetragrammaton in Hebrew letters instead of the Greek word κύριος/κυρίου, he may have interpreted it as a nominative both here and in §73, but that in the manuscripts the nominative only survived here. These complexities of the transmission of the text have no influence on its interpretation. See further on §73. (2) §86. the designations. Philo also employs the noun πρόσρησις to refer to the two titles κύριος and θεός in Her. 22; Mut. 12, 15; Mos. 1.76; 2.205. The titles refer to the divine powers; see above general comments. For the names of God in Philo, see Dahl and Segal 1978; Mazzanti 1981. the powers. Philo refers to the divine powers in § 46 (“merciful and gentle powers”) and in §50 (“his cosmos-making powers”). See comments ad loc and general comments above. that which IS. See comment at §21 (“The One who is”). “Lord” refers to the power by which he rules. The name κύριος appears in the LXX in Gen 2:8 (κύριος ὁ θεός) for the first time as translation of Yahweh Elohim, whereas ὁ θεός is used throughout Gen 1, rendering Elohim. Philo, however, consistently omits the title κύριος in his quotations of Gen 2:8, probably because he connects κύριος with God’s ruling power (see comment at § 32). The noun κύριος is cognate to the verb κυριεύω (“to be lord”), which is nearly synonymous with ἄρχω (“to rule,” cf. Leg. 3.187). In Her. 22–23 Philo explains that Lord (κύριος) and master (δεσπότης) indicate the same thing but the connotations of the two titles are different. Κύριος (“Lord”) is derived from κῦρος (“power”) which is something secure and is opposite to insecure and invalid; δεσπότης (“master”) is derived from δεσμός (“bond”) from which δέος (“fear”) comes. In Mut. 15 he states that the title κύριος is characteristic of sovereignty and kingship. The title κύριος is synonymous with ἄρχων (“sovereign”), βασιλεύς (“king”) and δεσπότης (“master”), as we read in Gig. 45. he confers benefits. It was regarded as a characteristic activity of Hellenistic kings to bestow benefits on their subjects, and so they were usually named

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benefactors (εὐεργέται). King Ptolemy III (246–221), for instance, was called Ptolemy Euergetes. See Bringmann, 1993, esp. 7–10. By portraying God as king, Philo shows himself to be influenced by these Hellenistic ideas, perhaps more than by ancient Israelite and Near Eastern notions of kingship (though this may be in his mind in a text such as Agr. 85–86). In the LXX God’s beneficence is only explicitly mentioned in the Psalms (12:6; 56:3; 77:11; 114:7), but in this case too references in the Pentateuch to God’s giving, e.g. the land, in Gen 12:7; 13:13; Lev 19:23 (cited in §95), Deut 1:36; 4:1; etc., certainly convey his beneficence through his actions. For God as bestowing benefits and as benefactor, cf., e.g., §§130 (to do good is a task most appropriate to God); Leg. 1.96; 2.56; 3.137, 215; Post. 154; Sacr. 10, 38, 97, 169, 171. the entire creation account. Philo uses the same term κοσμοποιία, literally “cosmos-making,” in the title of his commentary on the creation account, On the creation of the cosmos according to Moses. The word also occurs, for instance, in Opif. 3, 4, 6, 129, 170; Post. 64; Gig. 22; Fug. 68, 178; Abr. 2, 258. For the term see further Runia 2001, 97, 103. Since the second divine name κύριος (in combination with ὁ θεός) does not occur until Gen 2:8, it is likely that Philo regards the κοσμοποιΐα here as extending only to Gen 2:7, the creation of human being. Once the human being is placed in paradise a new titulature is required, since from that point on judgment of human behaviour will take place. (The fact that Philo may not have read κύριος at Gen 2:8 does not alter this observation: the formula κύριος ὁ θεός occurs repeatedly from Gen 2:8 right through to the end of Gen 11, after which it does not recur until Gen 24.) But Philo does not explicitly state this, and other interpretations are possible. The remark here is evidence of how carefully Philo studied the wording of the biblical text. of the most holy Moses. The expression κατὰ τὸν ἱερώτατον Μωυσῆν occurs also in §168; Leg. 3.185; Gig. 67; Agr. 85; Migr. 131; Mut. 30. Moses is called “most holy” in Cher. 44; Deus 140; Congr. 89. The purpose of the epithet here is to emphasise Moses’s authority as writer of the account of the creation of the cosmos; cf. esp. the statement of his credentials at Opif. 8. the term “God.” Philo derives θεός from the verb τίθημι, by which he indicates God’s creative act, Conf. 137; Migr. 182; Mut. 29; Abr. 121; Mos. 2.99; QE 2,62, 68. The same etymology is found in Herodotus (2.52). The creative power is called goodness, since God created the world because of his goodness, Leg. 3.78; Cher. 127; Deus 108; Mut. 46; Opif. 21. On God’s goodness see also the Commentary at § 91; and see also our comment at §50 on (“cosmos-making Powers”). the maker. For the noun ὁ ποιῶν see comment at § 14. he disposed and ordered. The combination of τίθημι and διακοσμέω, referring to God’s creative power is also found in Abr. 121. For the verb διακοσμέω see comment at §5 (“God had … creative ordering”).

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he brought into being. See comment at §3 (“led it from disorder to order”). §87. he is ruler. The title ἄρχων for God does not appear in the Pentateuch, but is regularly employed by Philo, who connects it with God’s ruling power, Leg. 3.73; Cher. 27, 29, 83; Gig. 45; Deus 110; Conf. 170; Migr. 169; Mut. 23. can perform both good and evil. It may cause surprise that Philo states that God can and apparently does do evil. But this pronouncement must be read contextually. The punishment that the ruling power metes out is not really evil, but is meant for the benefit of the recipient. Philo subscribes to the Platonic theological axiom that God cannot be the source of evil: see the comment above on §53. At the end of the chapter Philo states explicitly that God as king does no harm to his subjects but bestows on them what they need (§ 92). §88. the king. For God as king see comment at § 51. without any doubt. Philo is the first attested user of the adverb ἀνενδοιάστως, which he also employs in §147; Det. 148; Mos. 1.85; Spec. 3.118, 196. It is inspired by the verb ἐνδοιάζειν in the previous line. We retain the repetition in our translation. the fear. Some people recognize God through having fear for him as for a master or a lord, but a better way to approach God is to love him in light of his creative beneficence and in the hope of obtaining good things. Fearing God is associated with God’s ruling power and his sovereignty, loving God with his creative power and goodness, cf. Gig. 47; Deus 68; Fug. 98; Mut. 23; Somn. 1.162. For fearing God in Philo see Amir 1983, 177–183; Wiener 2011, 135– 139. the power of his rule. Sovereignty is the name of God’s ruling power, Cher. 28–29; Sacr. 59. The expression “force of his sovereignty” (κράτος τῆς ἀρχῆς) occurs also in Gig. 47 and Somn. 1.142. kindling. Philo likes the verb ζωπυρέω, which he uses 36 times. Metaphorical usage is found, for instance, in Leg. 2.26; Sacr. 55; Det. 74, 95, 178; Migr. 16; Her. 58, 309; Somn. 1.55. the most steadfast hope. Hope, associated with the biblical figure Enos (Gen 4:26 LXX), is a positive psychological trait in Philo’s thought, described as “like a highway which the virtue-loving soul cuts out and opens up in its eagerness to attain true goodness” (Abr. 7). Its opposite is the emotion of fear, as implied in our passage and explicitly stated in Abr. 14; cf. Det. 138–140; Mut. 163. On hope in Philo see Termini 2008 (but there is no study solely dedicated to Philo’s view); on hope in relation to the divine powers see Runia 2015, 252–253 (with analysis of this passage). generous. The adjective φιλόδωρος recurs in § 91. For God as φιλώδορος, see comment at §37.

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the possession and enjoyment of good things. The expression κτῆσις ἀγαθῶν occurs also, for instance, in Sacr. 41, 57; Det. 128; Agr. 157, 172; Her. 95; Fug. 176. The alliterative collocution κτῆσις καὶ χρῆσις appears in Ebr. 6; Conf. 161; Mut. 75; Abr. 261; Spec. 3.186; Legat. 11. §89. God everlasting. A quotation of Gen 21:33. Philo only refers to θεὸς αἰώνιος within the context of a discussion of Gen 21:33 (§§ 73, 74, 85), with the exception of §8, which can be regarded as an anticipation of the citation here. Philo interprets the title God everlasting clearly as always giving gifts, and the name God (θεός) refers to God’s beneficent power, by means of which God bestows benefits. By using several words that mean “always” or “without end” (ἀεί, συνεχῶς §91; ἀδιαστάτως, ἀπαύστως §93; ἀνελλιπῶς § 91) he emphasizes that God is always gracious. Cf. Spec. 1.285: the gracious gifts of God are ever-flowing (ἀέναοι), unfailing (ἀνελλιπεῖς) and unceasing (ἀδιάστατοι). See also comment at § 91 (“ceaseless flow”). For God as αἰώνιος and the link with αἰών see the comments at §8 and §53. bestow grace. Because God is bountiful and good, he bestows good things (χαρίζομαι) on his creatures, even on those who are not perfect (Leg. 1.34). He does, however, not confer his blessings (εὐεργετεῖ) in proportion to the size of his own powers of beneficence (χάριτες)—for these are without limit—but rather in proportion to the capacities of those who receive them (Opif. 23; see comment in Runia 2001, 146). His gifts of grace (χάριτες) are not imperfect but perfect and complete (Sacr. 57; Migr. 73). God’s goodness, which is his creative power, is also called χαριστική (Her. 166). See also § 93, where Philo summarises his interpretation. Other texts referring to God’s gifts of grace are Leg. 3.135, 196; Det. 161; Agr. 53; Ebr.32, 119; Migr. 53, 127, 183; Mut. 79. For χάρις in Philo see Zeller 1990, 33–128; Barclay 2009 (Philo in dialogue with Paul), 2015, 212–238 and passim. continuously. The adverb συνεχῶς recurs in §91. It is combined with ἀδιαστάτως in Her. 200, and with ἀπαύσατως in Det. 35; Decal. 57; Spec. 1.27. confers benefits. See comment at §86. of gifts. The word δωρεά is often synonymous with χάρις and Philo regularly uses both word within the context of God’s εὐεργεσία. In Leg. 3.78 he states that the origin of the creation is the goodness and grace of God, and that all things in the world and the world itself is a gift (δωρεά) and act of kindness (εὐεργεσία) and grace (χάρισμα) on God’s part. his favours. The noun χάρις is cognate to the verb χαρίζομαι; see previous comments. in a circle. Philo can use the image of a circle since a circle does not have any end, just as God bestows benefits without end. Metaphorical use of the verb ἀνακυκλέω is also found in the two other places where Philo employs the verb, Post. 83 and Spec. 1.219.

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to do good. The phrase ποιεῖν εὖ, which is synonymous with the verb εὐεργετέω (“to bestow benefits”), is also found in Opif. 23 with regard to God. can also do harm. See our comment above on § 87. See also our note to the translation. (3) §90. the practiser Jacob. In Philo’s allegory Jacob represents the soul that acquires virtue by practice and with great toil, making gradual progress. The passage here illustrates the progress that Jacob makes, no longer seeing God as master and fearing him, but recognizing him as bestowing good things. See further comment at §44 (“the practiser”). prayers. Philo refers to the prayer (ἐυχή; Gen 28:20) that Jacob made after his dream in Bethel (Gen 28:18–22). In Philo the term ἐυχή refers to a wish, a petition, and a vow, and he describes it as “a request for good things from God” (Sacr. 53; Deus 87; Agr. 99). Cf. the use of the verb εὔχομαι in § 49. For the term ἐυχή in Philo see Larson 1946; Leonhardt 2001, 101–141. and the Lord … for me. Quotation of Gen 28:21. The word order in Philo deviates slightly from the LXX text (Philo: ἔσται κύριος ἐμοί; LXX ἔσται μοι κύριος). the lordly nature of his autocratic rule. The expression αὐτοκράτωρ ἀρχή is also found in Sobr. 69 and Legat. 28. Philo refers only once to God as αὐτοκράτωρ (Congr. 116). Elsewhere the title is reserved for the Roman emperor, Legat. 29, 30, 53, 56, 69, 73; etc. merciful. Philo also calls the beneficent power merciful: Conf. 182; QG 1.57; QE 2.60. See further comment at §46 (“merciful and gentle powers”). Mercy can be related to grace, and the entire creation can be seen as an act of grace on God’s part; cf. Leg. 3.78. salvific. In Conf. 171 Philo refers to God’s powers that are numberless and protective (σωτήριος) of created being. Since the powers represent an aspect of God, God himself is also called σωτήρ, cf. Leg. 2.56; Sacr. 70, 71; Post. 156; Deus 156; etc. In the LXX God is called σωτήρ in Deut 32:15 (cf. Post. 121) and several times in the Psalms (for instance Ps 23:5; 24:5; 26:1, 9). The Greek gods were also called σωτήρ (Zeus: Pindar, Ol. 5.17; Apollo: Aeschylus, Ag. 512) and just like the epithet εὐεργέτης (see comment at §86 “he bestows benefits”) it was applied to rulers, for instance Ptolemy I Soter (reigned 323–282). The emperor Augustus is called σωτήρ in a first-century calendar inscription; see Evans 2000, 68–69. fear. See comment at §88. love and goodwill. The term φιλία is most often translated “friendship,” but here it describes a feeling or a sentiment (opposed to fear) rather than a relationship, so “love” is better, not of course in the sense of “heavenly and divine love (ἔρως)” as in §39, which is a spiritualized form of erotic love, but as a feel-

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ing or disposition towards God which, as will be explained in § 126 is given expression through thanksgiving and praise. On goodwill (εὔνοια) see below on § 106. §91. master. Philo connects the word δεσπότης (“master”) with δέος (“fear”) in Her. 23. See further comment at §51 and §88 (“fear”). leader of the universe. See comment at §2. in now way departs from his own nature. For Philo God is unchangeable, standing steadfast, whereas every created thing is subject to change (Leg. 1.51; 2.3, 83, 89; Cher. 52, 60; Sacr. 101; Post. 28 etc.). Because God is unchangeable it is impossible for him to turn his goodness into evil and therefore he always bestows gifts on created beings. Philo’s wording here (οὐδὲν τῆς ἑαυτοῦ φύσεως μεταβάλλων, μένων ἐν ὁμοίῳ) has a noteworthy parallel in Mut. 46 (ὁ αὐτὸς ἔμενεν, οὐ μεταβαλών; cf. Somn. 1.232: οὐ μεταβάλλοντα τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν—ἄτρεπτος γάρ). Unchangeability is another of Plato’s theological axioms at Resp. 380d– 381c; see our comment above at §53. continuously. The adverb συνεχῶς is also used in § 89; see comment ad loc. good. It is axiomatic for Philo that God is good (ἀγαθός); he calls God good in Leg. 1.47; Cher. 28, 29; Det. 93; Congr. 171. Because of his goodness God has created the world (Leg. 3.78, 105; Cher. 127; Deus 108; Opif. 21) and therefore his goodness is seen as expressed in his creative and beneficent power. Here too Plato’s influence is strong; cf. Tim. 29e, cited at Opif. 21. generous. See comment at §37. cause of … good things. For God as author of good things, see comment at § 53 (“the maker … holy things”). Comparable use of ἄφθονος (“abundant”) in Leg. 3.203: God bestows an abundance of good things, cf. Sacr. 10; Mos. 2.53; Legat. 118. ever-flowing. The same image in Cher. 123: God pours forth ever-flowing fountains of gifts (χάριτες); cf. Conf. 182; Somn. 2.138; Opif. 168; Spec. 1.285; 2.180; Virt. 79; Praem. 168. for those who enjoy a blessed life. Philo often introduces the theme of the good or blessed life (εὐδαιμονία; on the term see further on § 37) at the end of treatises or chapters (cf. §72 where it is implicit); see the comments on Opif. 172 at Runia 2001, 402. The effect is to exhort the reader to pursue the ethical and God-focused life which his allegory enjoins. See further Introduction sections 5e and 5j. §92. To have trust in a king. The expression βασιλεῖ πεπιστευκέναι is analogous to τῷ θεῷ πεπιστευκέναι in Leg. 3.228, where Philo refers to Abraham’s trust or faith (πίστις) in God (based on Gen 15:6). For trust in God see further comment at §70 (“a secure trust”). For God as king see comment at § 51. to cause harm. See our comment above on §87.

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love for humanity. Philo denotes God’s biblical love for humankind by the term φιλανθρωπία, cf. Cher. 99; Somn. 1.147; Opif. 81; Abr. 79, 203; Virt. 188. Human beings imitate God when they show φιλανθρωπία (Spec. 4.73). For φιλανθρωπία in Philo see Winston 1984, 391–400; for God’s φιλανθρωπία Söding 1996, 327–330; on the theme in ancient Judaism in general (including Philo) Berthelot 2003. very great protection. Just like the first chapter (§§ 1–72) Philo ends the second chapter (§§73–92) with an affirmation of what God means to those who trust and serve him. Parallel Exegesis Because of the importance of the two divine titles and the doctrine of the divine powers, it is rather surprising that Philo does not elsewhere refer to the mention of them in Gen 21:33. The prayer of Jacob (Gen 28:21) is also quoted in Somn. 1.163, where it is interpreted in the same way: Jacob wishes no longer to have fear for God as a ruler, but to love him as a benefactor. In his explanation Philo also brings to the fore the two divine powers. Nachleben Clement of Alexandria quotes Jacob’s prayer in Strom. 1.173.1–6, within a context that has many Philonic resonances. Clement states that the law is beneficent (εὐεργέτης), being able to make people just. To know the law is characteristic of a good understanding. Necessarily providence, which manages all, has authority (κύριος) and is good (ἀγαθός). The power of both dispenses salvation, the one correcting by punishment as having authority, the other showing kindness as a benefactor (εὐεργέτης). It is possible that someone first becomes a slave of God and then a faithful servant, fearing the Lord God. Finally, he may become the beloved of God, saying: “Let the Lord be my God.” The distinction between a punishing power, having authority, indicated as Lord, and a good and beneficent power is Philonic. As noted above, Clement, just like Philo, quotes Jacob’s prayer. The Philonic character is further strengthened when a little later Clement derives the word θεός from the verb τίθημι, as Philo does, and refers to God as the cause of all, who establishes order (τίθηται τὴν διακόσμησιν 1.182.2; Philo §86: ἐτίθετο καὶ διεκοσμεῖτο). On this passage see further Van den Hoek 1988, 180. e

Summary (§93) Analysis/General Comments At the end of the chapter, Philo summaries the whole discussion, listing shortly the three aspects of Gen 21:33 and their interpretations which have been set out in the three previous subsections (§93).

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Detailed Comments § 93. What we undertook to discuss. With this sentence Philo rounds off his discussion of the planting by Abraham. Comparable closing sentences are found in §§28, 73 and 139. plant. Philo here uses the word φυτόν (“plant”) but earlier in § 74 he employed δένδρον (“tree”) with reference to the ploughed field in Gen 21:33. The use of φυτόν may be triggered by the verb φυτεύω in the biblical text. The explanation to which he refers is given in §§75–77, especially § 77. place. In the biblical text the place is indicated by φρέαρ (“well”), cf. § 74. The interpretation is given in §§78–84, esp. §82. perfection is not to be found … through the gracious gifts. The English translators Colson and Whitaker (LCL 3.496) label this remark as an afterthought since “no such reservation is made in 79–84.” However, τὸ τέλειον here is probably meant to recall τέλος in §82 (τέλειος can mean both “complete” and “perfect”). As is stated in §84 only God is able to provide epistemic certainty, and this can be converted into the religious language of grace. Cause. For God as cause see comment at §20. fruit. Philo sees the change of the name Lord into God everlasting as the fruit of Abraham’s planting (§74; see comment ad loc.). The explanation of the name God everlasting is offered in §§85–92, especially § 89. remain everlastingly. The verb διαιωνίζω is first attested in Philo, who uses it 12 times; in Congr. 38 with a reference to God’s gifts of grace. After Philo it is employed by the church fathers (Gregory of Nyssa, Cant. 6.66.18; Inscr. Psal. 5.146.1; Eusebius, Vit. Const. 3.41.2; 4.60.1). The verb is cognate to the adjective αἰώνιος (everlasting) and is clearly inspired by the epithet used in the biblical text Gen 21:33. The word may have been coined by Philo himself and can certainly be labelled as verbum Philonicum. For verba Philonica see Introduction, section 6b. rain down. Philo often sketches the imagery of the bountiful God raining down (ὀμβρέω) his gifts and good things, Leg. 3.164; Sobr. 64; Migr. 30, 121, 156; Her. 279; Congr. 36; Mut. 141; Somn. 1.162; Spec. 1.203, 2.53. The picture of the everflowing gifts of God (§91) fits well into this image. The cognate verb ἀνομβρέω is used in §81.

Chapter Three: Human Beings as Planters (§§ 94–138) The last chapter of Part I forms a sequel to the previous two. In Chapter One Philo began by discussing God’s work as a planter, regarding the cosmos as God’s plant. Thereafter in Chapter Two he dealt with the planting practised by

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the wise Abraham, who imitates God’s planting. This practice consists of recognizing God as the beginning and end of all things, and of realizing that God continuously bestows gifts without end. Philo sees Abraham as an example for all persons who have become wise and perfect. Now he proceeds to treat the planting that has to be practised by human beings who have not yet become perfect and wise. In allegorical terms he interprets the planting as striving to become free of passions, for knowledge, and as doing good things instead of what is evil (§98). The scriptural basis is formed by Lev 19:23–25, part of a speech by the Lord to Moses, which contains commands and prohibitions when the people of Israel enter the promised land. The verses run as follows: [23] Now when you enter into the land that the Lord your God is giving you and plant any kind of tree for food, then you shall thoroughly purify its uncleanness; three years its fruit shall be impure to you; it shall not be eaten. [24] And in the fourth year all its fruit shall be holy, laudable for to the Lord. [25] But in the fifth year you shall eat the fruit, its yield is an increase for you; it is I who am the Lord your God. tr. NETS

It is obvious that this text has a verbal parallel with the main biblical lemma and the secondary biblical lemma in Chapter Two through the verb (κατα)φυτεύω. In the treatment of Lev 19:23–25 Philo discusses several aspects, beginning with the entering of the land and the planting (§§96–98) and followed by the process of purifying it (§§99–112). The numbers that are mentioned (three, four and five) are also explained (respectively §§113–116, 117–131, 132–136). Finally, the saying “I am the Lord your God” is interpreted. In this way the arrangement of this chapter is clear, although less well organised than Chapter Two, where the structure is explicitly made clear. According to his usual method of working Philo also involves other biblical verses to illustrate his exegesis, Gen 30:37; 29:35; 30:18; and Hos 14:9–10. It is noteworthy that in verses 23 and 25 the two titles Lord and God are mentioned, just as in the biblical lemma in Chapter Two, so we have also here another verbal agreement. Philo, however, neither dwells on the difference, nor makes any connections with his earlier interpretation. a

Citation of the Biblical Text (§§94–95) Analysis/General Comments This brief introductory section consists in two subsections. (1) Philo starts with a sentence in which he looks back to the discussion until now, and announces the next topic. Comparable examples of transitional

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passages are found in §§28, 73 and 139–140. Such transitional sentences have the same function as chapter headings in modern books (§ 94). (2) Thereafter he quotes the new biblical text, Lev 19:23–25. These secondary biblical verses have a verbal connection with the main biblical text through the verb (κατα)φυτεύω (§95). The arrangement of this section (transitional sentence–quotation of biblical lemma) is comparable to the way in which Chapter Two began. Detailed Comments (1) §94. the wise man. The term σοφός refers to Abraham who is introduced as a wise person in §73; see comment ad loc. But because the name Abraham is omitted, it can refer to every wise person. the first and greatest planter. The description of God here recalls § 2, where he is called “the great planter”; see comment ad loc. holy Scripture. Philo frequently refers to the Bible as ἱερὸς λόγος, cf. Leg. 1.76; 2.105; 3.11, 36, 106, 110, 118, 162; etc. the middle stages. This term μέσος means “middle, in the middle,” or “intermediate” and in this last sense it can refer to things that are neither good nor bad. This meaning is seen in §45: the intellect that has to choose between good and bad is called μέσος (see comment ad loc “the intermediate intellect”). Philo also refers to παιδεία as μέση (Congr. 12, 14, 20, 22, 145): the education can be focussed on the good or on the bad (see Alexandre 1967b, 47–48). In Prob. 60 he explains that there are right actions done by virtue, or faults by vice or actions that are intermediate (μέσα) and indifferent. Philo reflects the terminology of the Stoics, who call things that are neither good nor bad, intermediate (SVF 3.537, 538, 760). At the same time the term μέσος indicates the midway position between vice and virtue. He who stands there no longer indulges in the passions but has not yet become perfect (Fug. 213). So ordinary human beings who are on the road to perfection but have not yet become perfect are in the middle stages. See further next comment. The term recurs in § 100 (τὰ μέσα τῶν καθηκόντων) and in §110 (ἐν μέσοις). the so-called ordinary duties. The term καθῆκον (“ordinary duty”; often used in the plural form) is derived from Stoic philosophy. Speaking generally, ordinary duties are appropriate or natural for a living being and hence an ordinary duty accords with nature. The first duty is to preserve oneself. Other examples are honouring parents and brothers, treating friends sympathetically (Diogenes Laertius 7.108). It is described by Diogenes Laertius as an action which is urged by reason. Stobaeus (2.7.8 [2.85.18–86.4 W. = SVF 3.494]) relates the Stoic division of duties: they call some ordinary duties perfect, which are also named right actions (κατορθώματα). Right actions are done with virtue, whereas those

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which are not done with virtue are not called perfect right actions but intermediate ordinary duties, such as marrying, serving on embassies, talking, and the like. Obviously Philo here takes over this Stoic distinction: the wise person can do right actions but other human beings are still busy with the middle stages of the so-called ordinary duties. The same contrast is made in Sacr. 43, where he places the perfect virtues, which are the possessions of the wise persons only, in opposition to the middle stages of the ordinary duties that are fitting for the imperfect, who are yet busy with the primary education. He also refers to καθήκοντα in Leg. 1. 56 (“what philosophers call καθήκοντα”); 3.18, 126; Cher. 14. For the Stoic notion of καθῆκον see Long and Sedley 1987, 359–368. expend much labour. Philo here uses the verb διαπονέω, which implies working hard and with labour. He applies the verb relating it to the labours performed for the acquisition of virtue (Congr. 24; Ios. 230; Spec. 1.149; Virt. 4; Praem. 119). The verb is cognate to the noun πόνος (“toil”), which is requisite for becoming perfect. Toil is the beginning of all goodness (Sacr. 35, for πόνος cf. §§41, 112–113; Leg. 3.136; Det. 17; Congr. 162, 164; Mos. 2.184). (2) §95. When you … your God. A quotation of Lev 19:23–25 which is almost completely verbatim, except for a stylistic variation πρὸς τὴν γῆν (“to the land”) instead of the LXX εἰς τὴν γῆν (“into the land”) and also the substitution of the more common genitive of the noun βρῶσις (“eating”) for the adjective βρώσιμος (“eatable”). In §96, however, he cites ξύλον βρώσιμον according to the LXX, as he also does in Leg. 1.52. He also alters the Koine form in the LXX γενήματα to the more classical γεννήματα. b

Explanation of “Entering the Land” (§§ 96–98) Analysis/General Comments In this brief section Philo deals with the first point of Lev 19:23–25, viz. the entering of the land and the planting of trees that bear fruit. It can be subdivided into two parts. (1) First Philo quotes the relevant part of Lev 10:23, making some minor alterations to the text which he has just cited (§ 96). (2) Next he offers an ethical reading: the entering of the land means beginning to proceed along the way of wisdom. The planting symbolizes the cultivation of domestic trees which bear tame fruits. These fruits are impassibility, knowledge and doing good things (§§ 97–98). Basing himself on the mention of the tree for eating in the biblical text, Philo distinguishes between wild trees and cultivated trees that bear edible fruit, and offers an allegorical interpretation. The same distinction is found at the beginning of the previous treatise Agr. He writes there that a cultivator will be

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keen to cultivate the trees that are wild, while those that are cultivated he will increase in growth through his care (§6). So he will pull out with roots and all and throw away countless plants whose fruit-bearing growths are infertile and which cause great harm to those plants that do bear fruit (§ 7). After the literal description Philo turns to the skill of cultivation practised by the soul. Its practice is to sow or plant nothing that is unproductive, but rather all the cultivated and crop-bearing plants that bear yearly tribute to their sovereign, the human being (§8). Philo ends by remarking that through the skill of cultivation all the trees of passions and wickedness that sprout up and have grown tall bearing destructive fruits are cut away and destroyed, so that not even a small vestige is left behind from which new shoots of wrong deeds could rise up again (§ 10). It is obvious that both passages have many points in common, prominent among which is the interpretation of the wild trees as passions and vices, and hence the implicit association of the cultivated trees with freedom from the passions (cf. §103). Detailed Comments (1) §96. trees with edible fruits. Philo replaces the words πᾶν ξύλον βρώσεως from the quotation, which is not very elegant Greek, with τῶν ξύλων τὰ ἐδώδιμα, which also refer to trees that bear edible fruit. Both βρώσιμος and ἐδώδιμος mean edible. the land. Philo replaces the biblical γῆ with the word χώρα, which is used less often in the LXX and in the Pentateuch never refers to the land promised by God. when you have entered … edible tree. Philo quotes the first part of Lev 19:23, omitting the relative clause “that the Lord your God is giving you,” because it is not relevant for his discussion here. Furthermore, he uses the simplex φυτεύω instead of the composite καταφυτέυω. Finally, he writes πᾶν ξύλον βρώσιμον, having read earlier πᾶν ξύλον βρώσεως. See comment at § 95. (2) §97. the road of wisdom. Philo often pictures the image of the path or road (ὁδός) of wisdom or virtue along which the mind travels. The image is elaborated in Deus 140–145, where he discusses Gen 6:12: “all flesh destroyed his path on earth.” According to Philo all flesh destroys the path of the eternal and indestructible, the path that leads to God. This path is wisdom. The mind is guided along this straight highway, whose goal is recognition and knowledge of God. Every friend of flesh hates this road. Philo associates it with the royal road mentioned in Num 20:17, along which Israel wishes to travel. The same picture is sketched earlier in §37, where Philo speaks of the path leading to excellence, and the way leading to evil. See comment ad loc. (“the one path”).

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wanders. The verb πλανάω means literally “to wander” but Philo employs it here in relation to the mind that does not think right and does not know God (Leg. 3.180; Migr. 133; Her. 82; Congr. 108; Fug. 119, 131; Praem. 117). The verb is appropriate to the image of the straight highway which leads to knowing God. Philo may have in mind Gen 37:15: Joseph was wandering in the plain (Det. 5, 10, 22, 28), because Joseph is a lover of the passions and of the body and thus wanders (Deus 111). The verb recalls Odysseus’s wanderings, which were allegorically interpreted as the wanderings of the soul amidst vices and as a struggle against passions (Heraclitus, All. 70). trees of the untamed kind. The contrast between wild and cultivated trees is also found in Agr. 6–11, see Analysis/General Comments above. Generally, Philo associates wild and untamed trees with passions, and tame ones with virtue, cf. § 43 and comment ad loc. (“the wild … and vices”). sterile and without produce. The same image occurs in Leg. 1.49: to plant unproductive wickedness in the soul together with cultivated and fruit-yielding excellence is like leprosy. bearing fruit that cannot be eaten. Philo regards wild plants and trees as worthless because they do not bear fruit that can be eaten by human beings. From an anthropocentric view he only values trees that bear edible fruit and so are useful for humans. Wild trees are a “burden of the soil” (Homer, Il. 18.104; Spec. 1.74). §98. to cultivate. For the metaphorical use of the verb γεωργέω see comment at §42 and Analysis/General Comments above. impassibility. Philo joins in with the Stoics promoting the ideal of ἀπάθεια, total freedom from or extirpation of passion (Diogenes Laertius 7.117). In Leg. 2.99 he writes that the mind will get freedom from passion, the best thing, when it does not follow an impulse to an irrational passion but stays behind (cf. Leg 2.102). Moses is an example of the perfect person, who practises freedom from the passions, but Aaron, who makes gradual progress, practises moderation of passions (μετριοπάθεια). Philo emphasizes that God gives the wise person the power to cut out the passions (Leg. 3.131). Occasionally Philo prefers μετριοπάθεια (moderation of passions) above ἀπάθεια (freedom of passions). He praises the wise Abraham for not practising ἀπάθεια, but choosing the mean rather than the extreme and trying to moderate the passions (Abr. 257, see Dillon 1997, 191–192). See further Winston 1984, 400–405; Dillon 1996, 151; Roskam 2005, 191– 192; Winston 2008, 207–211. passions. See comment at §43. ignorance. Ignorance is the cause of indulgence in the passions (Somn. 1.109) and thus also not knowing God. Philo describes the effect of ignorance vividly in Ebr. 157: ignorance destroys the powers of seeing and hearing in the soul and

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lets in neither light nor reason. It sheds profound darkness and a great deal of unreason and makes the soul a block of stone (cf. Deus 46). Later on he calls ignorance the cause of all wrongdoings of the soul (§ 160). It is a serious disease of the soul but it can be cured (Leg. 3.6; Sacr. 47). For the contrast between ignorance and knowledge cf. Agr. 161; Ebr. 158, 161, 203. Parallel Exegesis A comparable interpretation of Lev 19:23 is found in Leg. 1.52, within the context of a discussion of the planting of paradise by God (Gen 2:8). Philo refers to Deut 16:21 as secondary biblical text, the explanation of which is illustrated by a quotation of Lev 19:23. The entering of the land is seen as being introduced to virtue and we should not plant a “fruitless thing” but “any kind of tree for food.” Philo interprets the command to cleanse the uncleaness of the tree as a requirement to cut away self-conceit, which is in its nature unclean. The “fruitless thing” can be compared with the untamed kind of tree in § 98 because the untamed tree bears only bad fruit such as passions and evil. c

Explanation of “Cleansing the Uncleanness” (§§ 99–112) Analysis/General Comments Having interpreted the entering of the land as setting foot on the road of wisdom and beginning to practise impassibility and good deeds, Philo now discusses the command to cleanse the uncleanness of the trees. He offers a symbolic interpretation in which the trees stand for ordinary duties. The duties are good but there are practices involved in them that should be avoided. The returning of a deposit, for instance, is a good thing but returning it to an insane person is not good. This last practice is an uncleanness that has to be removed. Philo’s treatment can be subdivided into six subsections. (1) First, Philo quotes Lev 19:23 and gives the general allegorical interpretation: the trees represent ordinary duties. The correspondence between them consists in the fact that they bring forth valuable fruit: the trees bear fruit for the body, the duties fruit for the soul. There are, however, harmful shoots amongst the duties and these should be removed, just as the trees should be cleansed (§§99–100). (2) Next, he gives three examples of uncleanness that should be removed. The first example is the returning of a deposit, an example borrowed from Plato and Aristotle. Returning a deposit is good, but not in all circumstances. One should not return a deposit to a drunken person, because he will not benefit from the return. Another poor practice is the giving back of a deposit of small value in the hope of receiving a deposit of great value (§§101–103).

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(3) The second example is friendship, which is a valuable thing but being friendly with someone in the hope of getting his money is bad and should be cut away. Flattery is also a branch of the tree of friendship that has to be removed (§§104–106). (4) The final example is the performance of rituals and offering sacrifices. This is a noble and good tree but superstition is a branch that should be destroyed. It is useless to offer a hundred cattle if one has not a pure and genuine intention because God looks only at the intent of the person who offers (§§107–109). (5) Philo illustrates the destruction of evil practices among the duties with the actions of Jacob, who has extracted the good from the harm. This is said in Gen 30:37: “Jacob stripped rods to the white bark by tearing away the green.” The white that appears is the good practice, and the green is removed, just as the evil branches in the trees are removed. In the same way in the regulations about leprosy (Lev 13:12–13) the white stands for the cleanness. The quotation of Gen 30:37 is a tertiary biblical lemma, since it illustrates the exegesis of the secondary biblical text Lev 19:23. A difference, however, is that Jacob practices virtue by nature, whereas the commandments in Lev 19 are addressed to humans who are just beginning on the road of wisdom and have not yet reached perfection (§§ 110– 111). (6) Finally Philo offers evidence that the explanation of the cleansing of the trees is true. It is confirmed by the fact that trees are cleansed but this is never done to fruit (§112). It should be noted that the treatment of the three examples in §§ 101–109 is well organised. The account of every example ends with a concluding sentence, indicated by the particle οὖν (§§103 106, 109). These final sentences are an exhortation to cut away the evil branches. At the end of the last example (§109) the biblical text is again quoted in full, just as in the beginning (§99). It is obvious that Philo here offers an allegorical reading of the cleansing of the trees but he explains it in a literal way in Virt. 156–157, where he writes: For he commands that the newly planted trees be tended for three consecutive years, both by cutting off excess growths, lest they be weighed down by the burden and exhausted through deficiency by the subdivision of nourishment, and also by making a circle and digging around them, so that nothing causing damage might shoot up beside them and impede their growth. § 156, tr. Wilson

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Although Philo does not explain in explicit terms what cleansing the uncleaness refers to, it seems that it indicates the practice of pruning and trimming in order to promote the growth of fruit-bearing trees, which was a very important part of the process of cultivation (for pruning see White 1970, 225, 239–240; for the prescripts in Leviticus see Eilberg-Schwartz 1990, 151–152; for Philo’s description see Wilson 2011, 334–335). Detailed Comments (1) §99. is just beginning. Or “being introduced.” For the verb εἰσάγω see comment at §52 (“bring us in”). to remove … been planted. This is a rewording of the biblical περικαθαριεῖτε τὴν ἀκαθαρσίαν αὐτοῦ in Lev 19:23. Philo here employs the verb περιαιρέω (“to remove”) as alternative for περικαθαρίζω (to cleanse) in Lev.; cf. also §§ 103 and 109. He combines it with ἀποκόπτω (“to cut away”) in § 109. This is an indication that for him the literal reading refers to cutting away wild and harmful growths; see Analysis/General Comments above. Let us examine together. Philo regularly employs a hortatory subjunctive to start his discussion, cf. §§140, 149. The form συνεπισκέψωμεθα is also found in Post. 32 and Deus 86. §100. ordinary duties. See comment at §94. domesticated plants. Philo clearly regards the “edible tree” in Lev as a domesticated plant. for bodies … for souls. Because the bringing forth of fruit (or fruitful results) can be applied both to trees and to duties, Philo is able to interpret the trees as duties. A similar basis for a symbolic interpretation is given in § 79. There is water that nourishes the soul, and water that nourishes the body. spring up. The verb συναναβλαστάνω is yet another example of Philo’s fondness for composite words. It is rarely used before Philo, but is found, for instance at Theophrastus Hist. plant. 3.4.2. Philo also employs it in Migr. 55. grow. Philo uses the verb ἐπιφύω four times (here, § 106; Somn. 1.223; 2.64), in all cases in a metaphorical way. Somn. 1.223: envy is a grievous enemy, which grows upon so-called successes (εὐπραγίαι). The metaphorical use is also found in Plato, Leg. 937d6–7: although there are many noble things in human life, yet upon most of them defects grow as it were (κῆρες ἐπιπεφύκασιν). Because later on in §106 Philo uses the same Platonic phrase (ἐπιφυομένας κῆρας; evils that are ancillary growths), he may be indebted to the Platonic example. be cut away … the better growths. A similar remark is found in the description of the task of a cultivator in Agr. 7: he will throw away countless plants whose fruit-bearing growths are infertile and which cause great harm to those plants that do bear fruit, because they have been planted close by.

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(2) §101. deposit. In Spec. 4.30–38 Philo deals with the process of giving and returning a deposit (παρακαταθήκη) with reference to Exod 22:8–11, where prescripts are given in relation to the practice of making a deposit. He describes the deposit as the most sacred of all transactions between humans, since it is based on the good faith of him who accepts a deposit. It differs from a loan, which is guaranteed by a contract. In the case of a deposit, however, a person gives something to another secretly, without witnesses. Only God is the witness (§§30–31). Examples of returning or not returning a deposit in specific circumstances are already given by Plato and Aristotle within the context of discussing just acts. Plato gives as an example not returning a weapon, when the lender has become mad, which can be regarded as a just act (Resp. 331c). Aristotle states that he who returns a deposit unwillingly does not act justly (Eth. nic. 5.10, 1135b4–9). Cicero has the Stoic Cato say that returning a deposit is a proper function. If it is done in the just manner, it is a right action (Fin. 3.59). Philo here is clearly offering a topical example. mental disorder. Just as in the example by Plato, see previous comment. debtors or slaves. Philo means that you should not return a deposit to someone who has debts, because the creditor will take the deposit. If you give it back to a slave, his master will take it. This is indeed betrayal, because you have broken the trust of him who gave you the deposit. to gain trust in greater things. Philo also refers to the same practice, which apparently he witnessed in Alexandria in Cher. 14 and Deus 101. Spec. 4.67 is a close parallel, since Philo uses there also the image of fishing (ἀγκιστρεύω) with the help of bait (δέλεαρ): “someone having accepted a deposit of little value, gave it back treacherously rather than to help him to whom he gave it. His aim was by baiting his hook with trust in little things to gain trust in greater things.” §102. to catch. The verb ἀγκιστρεύω is attested for the first time in Philo, who regularly employs it in a metaphorical way, Sacr. 21; Deus 115; Agr. 24; Mut. 172 (combined with δέλεαρ); Opif. 166; Spec. 4.67 (parallel passage, see above). marketplace. Philo has in mind the daily market in Alexandria with its abundant wealth of products. In Agr. 24 he refers to fishermen who cover a large expanse of the sea in order to catch the maximum amount of fish. He very often denounces excessive eating and drinking which he must have observed in Alexandrian society. See also comments at § 105 (“their love for fine dining and overeating”) and §159 (“chefs and cooks”). §103. a deposit of little value. The combination ὀλιγοχρήματος παρακαταθήκη occurs also in the parallel passages Deus 101 and Spec. 4.67. The adjective is only attested in Philo in these three passages.

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the harm from those lying in wait. Philo means that a master or a debtor immediately takes away the deposit that has been returned (§ 101). This can mean an unjust treatment for the recipient. unfavourable timing. A returning of a deposit to a person who is mad or drunk is ill-timed (§101). trickery. Giving back a small deposit hoping to be trusted with a more valuable deposit is an ensnaring trick (§101). (3) §104. friendship. Generally speaking Philo follows the conception of friendship found in Hellenistic and Stoic thinkers, who wrote individual treatises about friendship, for instance Theophrastus (fr. 532–546 = Fortenbaugh et al. 1992, 2.353–373). In Her. 83 he remarks that according to Moses a friend is so near that he does not differ from one’s own soul, for he says: “the friend, who is equal to your soul” (Deut 13:6). This closely resembles Aristotle’s description of a friend as another self (Eth. nic. 9.3, 1166a31–32). Philo regards φιλία (“friendship”) and εὐνοία (“goodwill”) as nearly synonyms and he offers the Stoic definition of goodwill later on in §106. Just like the Stoics he links friendship with oneness of mind (Spec. 1.70; Virt. 35; Praem. 154; Stobaeus 2.7.11m [2.108.5–25 W. = SVF 3.630]; Athenaeus 13.561C = SVF 1.263), harmony (Virt. 35; Stobaeus 2.7.5l [2.73.19 W. = SVF 3.112]; 2.7.11k [2.106.14–15 W. = SVF 3.661]) and partnership (Spec. 2.119; Diogenes Laertius 7.124). In Virt. 152 he relates an ancient saying: “in forming a friendship we must not ignore the possibility of enmity and we must engage an enemy as though a friendship lies in the future” (tr. Wilson). This saying was well known and is found in, for instance, Sophocles (Aj. 679–683), Demosthenes (Aristocr. 122) and Diogenes Laertius (1.87, 8.23). For friendship in Philo, see Sterling 1997 (discussion of Plant. 104–106 on 205–209). these ancillary growths. The metaphorical use of παραβλαστάνω is also found in Plato, who speaks about desires that shoot up beside (Resp. 563d7). bewitching of lovers. In classical Athens hetairai (“lovers”) were sophisticated courtesans who had relationships with men. Usually very well educated and accomplished in singing and dancing, they often played an important role in symposia. Because of their education and sophistication they differ from regular prostitutes (πόρνη). For hetairai in classical Greece see Reinsberg 1989, 80–162. Without doubt hetairai were also at work in Alexandria and Philo knew of their practice. He strongly condemns both courtesans and prostitutes. He remarks, for instance, that a courtesan is not even permitted to live among the Hebrews, and that death is the penalty laid down by law for those who engage in this practice (Ios. 43, cf. Spec 3.51). Here in Plant. Philo emphasizes the fact that courtesans earn money. For Philo on prostitution see Loader 2011, 218– 224.

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parasites. The adjective οἰκόσιτος usually means “taking one’s meals at home,” and before Philo it is mostly used by comic writers (Menander fr. 103, 286, 450 Kock). Here it is synonymous with παράσιτος (“parasite”). In Agr. 73 it means “eating up house and home.” §105. You can see … daily takings. The picture of hetairai as false friends who think only of their own interests seems to be a topos. Lucian narrates a story about a certain Deinias who is caught in the nets of a hetaira. This woman pretends to love him but meanwhile she deprives him of all his wealth (Tox. 12–18). See Sterling 1997, 206. make money. The verb μισθαρνέω means “work for hire” and is especially used of prostitution (Demosthenes, Neaer. 20). Philo also employs the verb in Ios. 43 and Mos. 1.296 with reference to this practice. their desire. The verb ἐπιχαίνω (“to desire greedily”) is a typically Philonic word that before him appears only once. Philo also uses it in Det. 108; Decal. 135; Spec. 4.5. After him it is again found in Lucian (Dial. mort. 15.1; 16.3; etc). flatterers. Elsewhere Philo also contrasts friendship with flattery. In Agr. 164, for instance, he writes that in flatterers the friendship of the soul that is healthy and true is driven out and overturned by the friendship that is harmful by nature; cf. Leg. 3.182: flattery is a disease of the soul (cf. Leg. 2.10). In Migr. 111 he sketches a picture of flatterers: “Do you not see the flatterers, who by day and night wear out and shatter the ears of those who are flattered? Not only do they approve everything that is said but also they spin out long speeches, recite poems, and many times they pray with their voice, while cursing in their mind” (cf. Conf. 48). Flattery was a subject that was discussed by several philosophers. The treatises written by Theophrastus and Philodemus have been lost (see Fortenbaugh et al. 1992 2.373; Tsouna 2007, 126–142). Plutarch deals with it in How One May Discern a Flatterer from a Friend (Mor. 48E–75A). For flattery (and friendship) in Philo see Sterling 1997, esp. 206– 208. insatiable. Philo is fond of the adjective ἄλεκτος, that is rarely found before him, but found in his writings no less than 29 times (Leg. 3.84; Post. 52; Gig. 51; Agr. 91; Migr. 217; etc.). their love for fine dining and overeating. The combination of ὀψοφαγία and λαιμαργία occurs also in Opif. 158. The noun λαιμαργία is Platonic, Resp. 619c1; Leg. 888a3. As an illustration of Philo’s negative attitude, characteristic of a philosopher, we quote Spec. 1.281, where he speaks of the gifts of the soul that has prostituted itself. Such a soul “has thrown itself away into shame and the lowest depths of violence, into drunkenness and love for fine dining (ὀψοφαγία), into the love of money, of reputation, of pleasure, and numberless other forms of passions and diseases and vices.” Philo shares this view with Stoic and

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Cynic philosophers; see for instance, Musonius Rufus, Diatribe 18b On Food. For Philo’s view compared with Musonius see Wendland 1895, 18–24; see further comment at §159 (“chefs and cooks”). §106. fruit. For the metaphorical use of fruit see comment at § 74. honesty. Philo associates honesty (τὸ ἀδέκαστον) with an unadulterated and pure disposition (Mos. 1.150) and combines it with ἀψευδής (“without deceit”; Post. 59; Migr. 115) and ἀκολάκευτος (“without flattering”; Somn. 2.292). Goodwill. The term is εὔνοια, for which Philo offers the Stoic definition (Andronicus of Rhodes, De passionibus 1.6.2 [20.12–13 K. = SVF 3.432], also found in Clement, Paed. 1.97.3; Strom. 2.28.3 [Van den Hoek 1988, 182]). Closely connecting goodwill with love and friendship (§ 90; Conf. 48; Somn. 2.108; Abr. 194; Ios. 74; Spec. 1.52, 317; 2.239–240; 3.155), he links up with Stoic and MiddlePlatonic thought (Cicero, Amic. 19–20; Plutarch, Mor. 480A, 481C, 482B; Alcinous, Epit. 33.1; Apuleius, Dogm. Plat. 2.13). See Sterling 1997, esp. 208–211. harlots. Using the word χαμαιτύπη here, Philo refers to the lovers mentioned above, §105. In the three other places where he uses χαμαιτύπη he combines it with πόρνη (“prostitute”): Sacr. 21; Somn. 1.88; Ios. 43. From the … ancillary growths. Just as in §103 Philo rounds off the example with a concluding exhortatory sentence. ancillary growths. See comment at §100 (“growths”). (4) §107. ritual observances … of sacrifices. Philo is thinking of prayer, sacrifices and other holy rituals, cf. Ebr. 66; Mos. 2.133, 174; Spec. 2.17. The combination of ἱερουργία (“ritual observances”) and ἁγιστεία (“pious observance”) is also found in Deus 132; Spec. 1.21, 100. Philo frequently uses the term θυσία (“sacrifice”), for the most part referring to Jewish worship. For a discussion of sacrifices in Philo see Leonhardt 2001, 214–255. has sprung up. The double composite verb παραναφύω here is a hapax, i.e. this is the only occasion in the whole of extant Greek and Byzantine literature that it occurs. It is likely Philo’s own invention and demonstrates once again his great liking for composite words. superstition. In Greek literature the noun δεισιδαιμονία and the cognate δεισιδαίμων are used either in a positive way to indicate piety (Xenophon, Ages. 2.8; Diodorus Siculus 1.70.8), or in an unfavourable sense, referring to exaggerated piety or excessive religious zeal (Strabo 7.3.3; Diogenes Laertius 6.37). In Philo we find the unfavourable meaning, where δεισιδαιμονία refers to different kinds of religious practice that have to be rejected. In Deus 164 he describes δεισιδαιμονία as lying in the middle between ἀσέβεια and εὐσέβεια (cf. Det. 24), while in Sacr. 15 it is called the sister of impiety. Here in Plant. δεισιδαιμονία is employed in another way: “it is the external form of religion that is character-

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ized by its formality and its lack of moral feeling” (Koets 1929, 49–50). By way of contrast Josephus employs δεισιδαιμονία in an approving sense (A.J. 10.42; B.J. 2.230). For a discussion of δεισιδαιμονία in Greek literature and philosophy see Koets 1929, who treats Philo on 47–51; for Philo also Nikiprowetzky 1980, 61– 63. the altars. Philo here uses the current word βωμός, which he usually applies to the altar in the temple (Agr. 130; Ebr. 87; Mos. 2.94, 106; Spec. 1.273, 276). In the Pentateuch, however, it is used in this sense only in Num 3:10; otherwise it refers to altars of enemies of Israel (Exod 34:12; in Num it refers to the altar of Balaam). On this deliberate distinction see Tov 1999, 263. It seems that Philo is not aware of the distinction. At Mos. 2.106 he writes that the βωμός is usually called θυσιαστήριον, which he interprets as “sacrifice-keeper.” obtained … through … fraud. This is the only place where Philo employs the Hellenistic verb χρεωκοπέω, which literally means “to cut debts” (4 Macc 2:8; Strabo 8.3.29; Plutarch Mor. 764A, 829C). §108. you people. Using the technique of the apostrophe, Philo addresses himself directly to these who sacrifice with a wrong attitude of mind. Apostrophe is used as a means to communicate with his readers. See further comment at §72 (“you slanderers”). tribunal of God. Philo uses the phrase divine court (θεῖον δικαστήριον) also in Spec. 4.34; Virt. 171; Praem. 69. By the same token God is presented as a judge (δικαστής; Leg. 3.205; Her. 271; Abr. 133; Opif. 11, 155; Mos. 2.217, 228), who is unbribed (Cher. 17; Deus 18; Conf. 25). a hundred cattle. Philo has in mind the pagan hekatombe, which properly indicates an offering of a hundred oxen, but generally means a sacrifice, see Stengel 1898, 105–106. Note that, in spite of the impression given by the term, it does not have to be a large sacrifice. For God … each person. In Mos. 2.106–108, where Philo discusses the great altar in the courtyard before the tent of the tabernacle (Exod 27:1–8), he expresses the same idea that it is the intention of the person who offers that matters: If he is senseless and unjust, the sacrifices are unconsecrated (ἄθυτοι θυσίαι), the holy rituals are unholy, the prayers are ominous, bringing total destruction. When they are offered for outward appearance, they do not effect remission of faults but remembrance of them (cf. Num 5:15). If the worshipper has reverence for God and is just, the sacrifice remains intact, although the flesh is consumed, or rather even if no animal at all was brought to the altar. For what else is the real sacrifce than reverence for God by a soul who loves God?

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This passage is related to the passage in Plant. here because of the use of the same oxymoron (ἄθυτοι θυσίαι) and the allusion to Num 5:15. In denouncing sacrifices of victims, Philo may have had in mind a text like Ps 39:7 (LXX): “sacrifice and offering you did not want, (…) Whole burnt offering and one for sin you did not request” (tr. NETS). We note also texts such as 1 Sam 15:22; Ps 49:7–15 (LXX); Hos 6:6; Amos 5:21–24; Mic 6:6–8, which put forward a prophetic critique of sacrifice (obedience is valued above sacrifice). Nowhere, however, does he quote these texts. For the attitude of the bringers of sacrifice see Leonhardt 2001, 235–241; see 238–239 for Plant. 107–108. For Philo’s view on animal sacrifice see Petropoulou 2008, 149–188. She observes that Philo shows a strong commitment to the biblical practice of animal sacrifice, but at the same time he also offers a symbolic interpretation of sacrificial regulations. The notion that the righteousness of him who sacrifices is more important that the quantity of the sacrifices he brings is also popular in Greek thought and is, for instance, worded in Alc. maior ascribed to Plato. “For it would be a strange thing if the gods had regard to our gifts and sacrifices instead of our souls, and the piety and justice that may be found in any of us (149e6–8; tr. Lamb, LCL).” In the same passage the gods are presented as being not to be won over by bribes (150a4–5). The orator Isocrates remarks that the most beautiful sacrifice and the greatest worship is to show yourself as a very good and just person (2.20). Philo may also have been aware of Theophrastus’s opposition to animal sacrifice (Porphyry, Abst. 2.32.3 = fr. 584A, Fortenbaugh et al. 1992, 2.428). the virtues dance. Using this image Philo emphasizes that the inclination of the person who makes a sacrifice matters. In Mos. 2.107–108, quoted in the previous comment, he refers explicitly to the just nature of him who sacrifices. The same image is found in Abr. 27: justice, the leader of the virtues, takes the first place like the most beautiful girl in a dance. unconsecrated sacrifices. Philo uses the same oxymoron (ἄθυτοι θυσίαι) in Mos. 2.107 (quoted above), 162; Spec. 3.124; Virt. 40. An oxymoron is a figure of speech that combines elements that are contradictory, see Lausberg 1998, 358. A remarkable series of comparable oxymora is found in Cher 94: θυσίας ἀνιέρους, ἱερεῖα ἄθυτα, εὐχὰς ἀτελεῖς, ἀμυήτους μυήσεις (“unholy sacrifices, unconsecrated sacrifices, ineffectual prayers, uninitiated initiations”). the unholy. Their unholy behaviour consists in sacrificing without having the right intention; see comment above (“For God … each person”). a sacrifice that brings to mind sin. Philo quotes Num 5:15 which is part of a command given by God about adultery. If a man becomes jealous of his wife, he shall bring his wife to the priest and he shall offer the gift concerning her. This is called a sacrifice of jealousy, a sacrifice of remembrance, bring-

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ing sin to remembrance. Philo discusses the whole command (Num 5:12–31) in Spec. 3.53–63 without mentioning the sacrifice of bringing sin to remembrance. §109. All such … been planted. Philo ends the final example by writing a concluding sentence just as in §§103 and 106. Because he is rounding off his last example, he partly quotes, partly rephrases the biblical text. the divine oracle. See comment at §23. to remove fully. Philo here again applies the verb περιαιρέω, where the LXX has περικαθαρίζω; see above on §99. the edible tree that has been planted. Philo’s words ξύλου τοῦ φυτευθέντος ἐδωδίμου are a variation of the biblical words ξύλον βρώσιμον. (5) §110. in acquiring learning. The term εὐμάθεια appears for the first time in Plato (Resp. 490c11, 494b1) and Aristotle (Rhet. 1.6, 1362b24, 3.14, 1415a38). In the Ps.Platonic Definitions it is described as a natural ability of the soul for quick learning (413d8). Philo’s description of εὐμάθεια as arising from teaching (Cher. 102) agrees with the use of the term here. nature as their only teacher. In general, Philo assumes three ways by means of which one can become perfect: learning, nature and practice. These three ways are symbolized by Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob respectively (Abr. 52; Mos. 1.76). Isaac acquires virtue by nature and hence he is his own teacher (§ 168– 169; Conf. 81; Migr. 29, 140; Mut. 88; Somn. 1.160; 2.10; see comment on Isaac at § 169). Here, however, speaking about a nature which is its own teacher, Philo refers to Jacob, who generally is a symbol of a soul that becomes perfect by practice. This shows that the three ways cannot be separated strictly. Learning, nature and practice are all three requisites for acquiring virtue, but one of them can prevail. See further our comment on § 44. He may have chosen Jacob as an example here because of the suitability of the (tertiary) texts that follow. the practiser named Jacob. See comment at § 44 (“the practiser”) and § 90. stripped rods … the green. Philo quotes part of Gen 30:37, which runs as follows: And Jacob took for himself a green rod of styrax and walnut and one of a plane tree, and Jacob stripped white stripes in them, tearing away the green. And the white that he had stripped appeared variegated on the rods. Philo adapts his quotation by introducing the word for rods (ῥάβδους) which had occurred earlier in the text. As Royse 2017, 148 notes, Wendland in his criti-

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cal edition has not taken this into account in his use of quotation marks. More importantly, Philo changes the meaning of the biblical text. In his interpretation the variegation disappears totally, whereas in Genesis the white becomes variegated. Philo refers to Gen 30:37 nowhere else. Here he associates the white stripes in Jacob’s rod with the purifying of the uncleanness of trees for food in Lev 19:23. The white is also a trigger for quoting a regulation about leprosy, according to which a leprosy sufferer whose body has become completely white is cleansed (Lev 13:12–13). variegation. This is an echo of the last part of Gen 30:37: the white appeared variegated (ποικίλον). Philo links the variegation on the rod with the variety of colours on the skin of a leprosy sufferer and interprets it as the mind’s passion, which later on (§111) he calls variegated, evil and unstable. intermediates. Philo means the middle stages of the so-called ordinary duties, which are done by people who have not attained perfection, see comment at §94 (“the middle stages”). through skill but arising from nature. Elsewhere Philo states that natural growths do not require skill, since God sows them (Fug. 170). It seems that he regards things that arise and develop naturally as the work of God, whereas skill implies human activity and therefore can be done well or badly. The contrast is also found in Leg. 3.64; Migr. 31; Mut. 260; Spec. 2.159, 161. §111. the law on leprosy. The prescriptions regarding leprosy and the leprosy sufferers are given in Lev 13. marked. The verb διανθίζω is Hellenistic; cf. Esth 1:6 (ποικίλως διηνθισμέναι); Diodorus Siculus 5.30.1; Josephus, A.J. 3.163; 8.139; B.J. 5.232. variety of colours. In Leviticus a lack of variety of colours is not mentioned, but a person who is completely white, as described in Lev 13:13, shows no variety of colours. Most likely Philo mentions the variety here because it can be associated with the previous biblical verse Gen 30:37; see comment at § 110 (“variegation”). wholly and completely. Philo bases himself on Lev 13:13 “it has all turned white.” The expression ὅλος δι’ ὅλων is characteristic of Philo’s style of writing, cf. Leg. 3.134; Sacr. 110; Det. 12, 154; Gig. 7, 8; Deus 127, 130; Agr. 30; etc. Cf. § 5 δι’ ὅλων and comment (“all the matter”). from the head … is cleansed. Philo quotes from Lev 13:12–13 freely, citing only some words as can be observed in the following overview:

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Philo Plant.

12 ἐὰν δὲ ἐξανθοῦσα ἐξανθήσῃ ἡ λέπρα ἐν τῷ δέρματι, καὶ καλύψῃ ἡ λέπρα πᾶν τὸ δέρμα τῆς ἁφῆς ˻ἀπὸ κεφαλῆς˼ ˻ἕως ποδῶν˼ καθ’ ὅλην τὴν ὅρασιν τοῦ ἱερέως, 13 καὶ ὄψεται ὁ ἱερεὺς καὶ ἰδοὺ ἐκάλυψεν ἡ λέπρα πᾶν τὸ δέρμα τοῦ χρωτός, καὶ καθαριεῖ αὐτὸν ὁ ἱερεὺς τὴν ἁφήν, ὅτι πᾶν μετέβαλεν λευκόν, καθαρόν ἐστιν. But if in breaking out, the leprous disease breaks out in the skin, and the leprous disease covers all the skin of the attacked area, from head to foot, so far as the priest can see, then the priest shall see, and look, the leprous disease has covered all the skin of the body, and the priest shall declare him clean of the attack; since it has all turned white, he is clean.

§111 ὅλον δὲ λευκωθέντα δι’ ὅλων ˻ἀπὸ κεφαλῆς˼ ἄκρας ˻ἕως ποδῶν˼ ἐσχάτων καθαρὸν εἶναι. the person who is no longer marked with a variety of colours but has become wholly and completely white from the head right down to the feet is cleansed.

variegated. Philo employs the adjective ποικίλος, variegated, i.e. having a variety of colours and other visual features, within different contexts. Among these the link with passion is prominent, for instance in Leg. 2.74 where in discussing the serpent in the paradise he explains that pleasure is likened to a serpent because the movement of pleasure is tangled and variegated (ποικίλος). Pleasure winds its way through the five senses, by sight, hearing, taste, smell and touch, cf. Leg. 3.61, 66; Gig. 18; Deus 188; Agr. 95. The same negative approach to variegation is also seen in his presentation of Joseph. His coat is described as variegated (Gen 37:3) and this indicates that he is involved in the varied activities of politics, which consist of a mixture of falsehood and sophistry (Somn. 1.220). Consequently Philo describes his character as the variegated delusion of life (Conf. 71). In the Pentateuch the adjective is also used in Gen 31:10, together with “pure white” and “ash-colorred” as referring to male goats and rams. Regarding these animals as a symbol of thoughts, he explains that thoughts have to be variegated, not in the manner of leprosy, but stamped with seals, and so producing a harmony. At the same time he recognizes the variegation in God’s creation, regarding God as the inventor of the variegator’s science (Somn. 1. 202–204). Occasionally, he employs the antonym ἀποίκιλος (Sacr. 26;

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Ebr. 86, 215; Congr. 19), which is found only once before him. We may conclude that on the one hand, he regards being variegated as someting negative, associating it with passion and other vices, but on the other hand under the influence of the biblical text and the line of thought he is developing, his approach is positive, seeing the variegation in God’s creation. (6) §112. the tree is to be fully cleansed. A quotation from Lev 19:23, cf. § 95. Philo employs the verb περικαθαίρω here and in §113, whereas the LXX uses the cognate verb περικαθαρίζω, which is used rarely and appears for the first time in the LXX. no cultivator fully cleanses. This statement might seem a little odd, since surely a cultivator of fruit would wish to clean it when picked. But we are probably meant to understand “cleansing” in terms of pruning away wild growths and not in terms of “cleaning,” i.e. the verb can be applied to trees but not to fruit. See the Analysis above. Parallel Exegesis In the Analysis/General Comments above we refered already to the literal interpretation of Lev 19:23 in Virt. 156–159, where Philo refers to the verse as an example of kindness to plants. The command to cleanse the uncleaness of the fruit-bearing trees is an order to cut away excess growths; see Wilson 2011, 334– 337. The only other place where Philo refers to the regulations concerning leprosy in Lev 13:12–13 is Deus 127–130. He gives a symbolic interpretation and explains that the leprosy which covers the whole body from the head to the feet is a symbol of involuntary wrongdoings. Such wrongdoings are devoid of guilt, no matter how wide their extent. Nachleben An exact quotation of §111 in its entirety (the reference to the law on leprosy), is found in Clement Paed. 3.54.1, as can be seen in the following overview:

Philo

Clement Paed.

§111 τὸν μηκέτι διηνθισμένον ποικιλίᾳ χρωμάτων ὅλον δὲ λευκωθέντα δι’ ὅλων ἀπὸ κεφαλῆς ⟨ἄκρας⟩ ἕως ποδῶν ἐσχάτων καθαρὸν εἶναι, ἵνα κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος μετάβασιν τὸ ποικίλον καὶ πανοῦργον καὶ

3.54.1 Τὸν γοῦν μηκέτι διηνθισμένον ποικιλίᾳ χρωμάτων, ὅλον δὲ λευκωθέντα δι’ ὅλων ἀπὸ κεφαλῆς ἄκρας ἄχρι ποδῶν ἐσχάτων καθαρὸν εἶναι ἐθέλει, ἵνα κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος μετάβασιν τὸ ποικίλον καὶ

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Philo

Clement Paed.

ἀντιρρέπον καὶ ἐπαμφοτερίζον τῆς διανοίας μεθέμενοι πάθος τὸ ἀποίκιλον καὶ ἀνενδοίαστον ἀληθείας ἁπλοῦν χρῶμα δεξώμεθα. the person who is no longer marked with a variety of colours but has become wholly and completely white from the head right down to the feet is cleansed. Its purpose is that, corresponding to the change of the body, we set aside the mind’s passion which is variegated, evil, unstable and vacillating and take upon ourselves the unvariegated, indubitable and simple colour of the truth.

πανοῦργον τῆς διανοίας μεθέμενοι πάθος τὸ ἀποίκιλτον καὶ ἀνενδοίαστον τῆς ἀληθείας ἁπλοῦν ἀγαπήσωμεν χρῶμα. therefore the person who is no longer marked with a variety of colours but has become wholly and completely white from the head right down to the feet wishes to be cleansed. Its purpose is that, corresponding to the change of the body, we set aside the mind’s passion which is variegated and evil, and be content with the unvariegated, indubitable and simple colour of the truth.

We can observe that Clement quotes Philo almost exactly, certainly having Philo’s text on his desk as it were. He adds the finite verb ἐθέλει because of the structure of the sentence and omits two adjectives (ἀντιρρέπος, ἐπαμφοτερίζος) whether deliberately or not. The rare adjective ἀποίκιλος has become ἀποίκιλτος, which is just as rarely used. Finally, he alters the verb in the final sentence (ἀγαπήσωμεν). In Philo’s text the word ἄκρας has been added by Wendland on the basis of Clement’s text. The context is formed by a discussion about the permission of using simple clothing and of a white colour and Clement refers to the law about leprosy because it rejects what has many colours and spots, like the various scales of the serpent. A reference to Philo’s allegorical interpretation of leprosy in Plant. 110–111 and Deus 127 can be found in Origen, Hom. Lev. 8.6, where Origen discusses leprosy in allegorical terms. He refers to “one of the ancients” who regards the “living colour” (Lev 13:14) as the rational principle. When it is not placed in the soul, he who makes a fault is not liable; when it is present, he is responsible. According to Van den Hoek (2000, 87) Origen is referring to Philo here. Possible influence of Philo’s statement that God rejoices in altars without fire around which the virtues dance (§108) may be discerned in Origen, Hom. Lev. 9.1 (Borret 1981, 2.72 n. 1; cf. Hom. Num. 10.3). Origen gives a spiritual interpretation of the altar and the sacrifices. Prayers to God are offered on the alter. Passions and vices are laid aside and one has to offer an offering of purity, of jus-

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tice and of holiness. However, it must be agreed with Van den Hoek 2000, 92, 98, that a direct relationship between Origen’s interpretation and Philo cannot be proven. d

Explanation of “Three Years” (§§113–116) Analysis/General Comments Philo now proceeds to discuss the last part of Lev 19:23: “its fruit will be for three years uncleansed it will not be eaten.” Because the text seems to refer to cleansing continuously, which is contrary to the facts, it has to be explained allegorically. The discussion of the verse consists of three parts. (1) Philo quotes the biblical verse and explains the need for an allegorical reading. The verse can be understood in two different ways, depending on where one makes the break between the two parts of the sentence (this we would now do with a comma, see further below): (a) – its fruit will be for three years, – uncleansed it will not be eaten. (b) – its fruit will be for three years uncleansed, – it will not be eaten. (§113) (2) Discussion of the first interpretation (a), in which “uncleansed” belongs to “it will not be eaten.” The three years indicate the three periods of time: past, present and future. The fruit is metaphorically understood as the fruit of instruction, which will remain forever during all the divisions of time. Regarding the cleansing Philo states that words that are cleansed and healthy nurture the soul, but words of the opposite kind cause disease and destruction (§114). (3) Discussion of the second interpretation (b), in which “uncleansed” refers to “fruit.” The expression “uncleansed fruit” has also two meanings: (a) fruit that needs cleansing and is not yet cleansed; (b) fruit that is absolutely lustrous. It emerges that Philo prefers the second meaning, namely the fruit of instruction is wholly cleansed and lustrous and it does not need any cleansing. This fruit remains for the three periods of time. In giving this interpretation he combines the two different readings of the biblical verse given in §113 (§§115–116). In this section Philo expresses the need for an allegorical explanation of the text because the biblical text is contrary to the facts. Generally, he has certain rules on the basis of which a text has to be understood in allegorical terms. A verse must be read allegorically when the literal reading yields problems or difficulties, for example, because it is absurd or, as here, runs counter to our experience. In the same way he rejects the literal meaning of the planting of

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the paradise by God (§32). On Philo’s rationale for allegorical interpretation see further Kamesar 2009, 77–85. Besides this Philo notes the ambiguous wording of the biblical text, since the verse can be read in two ways depending on how it is punctuated. M. Niehoff remarks (2011, 139) that “Philo is the first extant Bible scholar to have discussed a problem of punctuation, thus sharing another important concern of Homeric scholarship.” But J.R. Royse 2017, 149, is right in saying that punctuation is not quite the right term, since in Philo’s time commas would not be written. On this text see also Dawson 1992, 102–103. Detailed Comments (1) §113. its fruit … be eaten. An exact quotation of Lev 19:23 except that Philo omits the word ὑμῖν (“for you”) before “uncleansed.” The word ἀπερικάθαρτος in Lev can also be translated as “impure” and the order refers to the fact that generally newly planted fruit trees do not bear mature fruit during the first three years but only after four years and beyond; see Eilberg-Schwartz 1990, 150; cf. Virt. 158, see Parallel Exegesis below. to cleanse. For the verb περικαθαίρω see the comment at § 112 (“the tree … fully cleansed”). It must be said. Philo uses the verbal adjective λεκτέον as a way of communicating obligation in an impersonal way (cf. §§5 and 36). The construction with λεκτέον is a favourite: §§147, 167; Leg. 2.103; Sacr. 138; Agr. 94; Ebr. 68, being mostly used when Philo offers a solution to a problem (here that the text is contrary to facts). See Conley 1987, 7. allegorically. The term ὑπόνοια here refers to the deeper or allegorical meaning of a text and was already employed by Plato (Resp. 378d6) and Xenophon (Symp. 3.6). It began to be replaced by ἀλληγορία in the first century BCE. The expression ἐν ὑπονοίαις, which occurs here, is also used in Somn. 1.77, 120; Ios. 28; Contempl. 28. Philo more often uses the expression δι’ ὑπονοιῶν; cf. Cher. 21; Det. 155, 168; Agr. 28, 97, 131. Besides ὑπόνοια he also employs the term ἀλληγορία, cf. § 36, and comment ad loc. See further Bitter 1985. the literal reading. The term τὸ ῥητόν is standardly used to refer to the literal interpretation. It occurs frequently elsewhere, e.g. in Leg. 2.19; Det. 15, 95; Agr. 157; Ebr. 130; etc. is … in harmony with. For the verb συνᾴδω see comment at § 50. In Sobr. 65 it is also combined with τὸ ῥητόν. The wording is ambiguous. As noted above, in Philo’s time texts were written in capital letters only without any form of punctuation in the text itself, though sometimes marginal markings were used. Philo usually employs the noun λέξις with reference to a biblical text, e.g. at Leg. 1.65; 2.31; Det. 95; Her.

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102; Fug. 39; etc. Here the wording is ambiguous because the sequence of words can be construed in two different ways, depending on whether the adjective “uncleansed” (ἀπερικάθαρτος) is taken with the phrase before or after it. A similar grammatical observation referring to the λέξις of the biblical text is found in Deus 141–142, where Philo states that according to some the wording may appear to be erroneous on grammatical grounds. This of course is a conclusion that Philo cannot accept and is the pretext for an allegorical interpretation. The expression “ambiguous wording” is also found in Agr. 16 and 136 within a description of logic. See also the comments at Royse 2017, 149, who points to a similar text on ambiguity at Mut. 106–110. (2) §114. the tripartite nature of time. For other examples of how Philo exploits the occurrence of the number three in a biblical text as the trigger for speaking about the tripartite nature of time see Leg. 3.11 (Deut 16:16); Sacr. 47 (Gen 30:36); Somn. 2.208 (Gen 40:16). fruit of instruction. Philo refers also to fruit of instruction (ὁ τῆς παιδείας καρπός) in §§116, 126 and 137. For the metaphorical use of fruit see comment at § 74. will be and subsist and remain. Philo here uses a tricolon, perhaps joining in with the number “three,” which he is explaining. For tricolon see §§ 7, 60, 67, 112, 125, 145, 166, 170, 177. everlastingly. Philo here uses the common expression δι’ αἰῶνος (Aeschylus, Suppl. 574, 582; Euripides, Hipp. 1426; Deut 5:29; 12:28; Josephus A.J. 1.275; 4.116; 19.79), identifying αἰών with the three parts of time, as he also does in § 53 and in Sacr. 47. The expression δι’ αἰῶνος occurs in Cher. 9o and Mos. 2.212 as well; see Keizer 1999, 216–217. not undergo destruction. Philo is being very didactic here: that which remains throughout the ages is without destruction. The connection between the two is also found in Deus 142 and Mut. 180. the nature of the good is indestructible. The causal relationship between good and indestructible is also found in Gig. 45 and Ebr. 136. This pronouncement is rather vague and can be interpreted in various ways. Perhaps Philo is thinking in theological terms, for he often equates God and the good (though also saying that God might be beyond the good); see texts such as Leg. 1.47; Cher. 27, 29; Det. 93; etc., compared with Opif. 8; Praem. 40; Contempl. 2; Legat. 5; QG 2.44 (on these texts see Runia 2007, esp. 497–499). fine words that are cleansed and healthy. The expression ἀστεῖοι λόγοι is also found in Deus 154; Congr. 4; Somn. 2.134; Mos. 2.32. The expression λόγοι ὑγιαίνοντες is typically Philonic and occurs also in § 114; Abr. 223; Spec. 4.134. It also appears in the New Testament (2Tim 1:13). The comparable phrase ἀστεῖος

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λογισμός occurs in Didymus the Blind (Comm. Gen. 119.10–11) in a passage where Didymus explains Cain and Abel in an allegorical way, referring to Philo by name, see Rogers 2017, 85–87. By “words” here Philo probably has in mind words of instruction. nurture the soul. For the metaphorical use of “nourishment” see comment at §79 (“to nourish the soul”). (3) §115. indemonstrable. The term ἀναπόδεικτος derives from Stoic logic. Diogenes Laertius reports that the Stoics recognize statements that are indemonstrable because they do not need demonstration (7.79). A similar description is used by Philo here: an indemonstrable argument is knowable of itself. Philo shows his familiarity with Stoic logic in Agr. 141, where he sets out the division of propositions in Stoic logic. He will have learnt it from handbooks, to which he makes reference in Agr. 140 (“elementary handbooks”). The task of logic, he writes in Agr. 16, is to reveal arguments and indubitable demonstrations; to clarify ambiguous expressions with a double meaning. In this way it will destroy seductive deceit. It should be noted that Philo is not using logic here, but using the term ἀναπόδεικτος to illustrate the two ways in which an adjective with an alpha-privative (“not-x”) can be understood. A famous example is the Athenian altar to an unknown god (ἄγνωστος θεός) in Acts 17:23, where “unknown” can mean “not (yet) known,” as Paul takes it to mean, or “unknowable,” as for example in Philo Mut. 10 (God and the human intellect). kind of argument … in its syllogisms. Diogenes Laertius offers a Stoic example of a syllogism that is indemonstrable in respect of one or more of the premises: if Dion walks, Dion is in motion; but Dion walks, thus Dion is in motion (7.78). On Philo’s use of Stoic indemonstrable syllogisms see Vela 2010. dialectic. In Congr. 18 Philo describes dialectic, the sister of rhetoric, as distinguishing true argument from false, and refuting the plausible falsehoods of sophistic tricks. Thus dialectic will heal deceit, which is a great disease of the soul (cf. Agr. 13). Abel was defeated by the sophist Cain, because he has not practised the arts of words (Det. 37, 42; Migr. 74) For Philo on dialectic and logic see Mendelson 1982, 10–11. lustrous. Parallel to the second meaning of “indemonstrable,” the fruit is “uncleansable,” i.e. it does not have to be cleansed because it is already perfect. The adjective τηλαυγής is characteristic of Philo’s vocabulary. He employs it circa 40 times, whereas it is rarely found in contemporary authors (in Strabo twice, 1.1.17; 17.1.3o; in Dionysius of Halicarnassus twice, Thuc. 9, 30; in Diodorus Siculus once, 1.50.1). §116. the fruit of instruction. See comment at § 114.

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washing, sprinkling. The term περιρραντήριον (“sprinkling”) refers mostly to ritual purification, for instance, Det. 20 (with καθάρσιον); Mos. 2.138; Decal. 45, 158; Spec. 1.191, 261; 2.148; 3.63; see Leonhardt 2001, 261–269. The word λουτρόν also has a ritual connotation, §162; Cher. 95 (with καθάρσιος); Mut. 124; see Leonhardt 2001, 269–272. The combination of λουτρόν and περιρραντήριον appears also in Mos. 1.14; Decal. 45; Spec. 1.191, 258, 261; 3.63. Parallel Exegesis As already remarked in the previous sections, Philo treats Lev 19:23 in a literal way in Virt. 155–159. He observes that newly planted trees will bear perfectly formed fruit after three years, when the roots have dug deep and are anchored more firmly in the soil. The fruit is perfect according to the perfect number four (§158); see Wilson 2011, 336. e

Explanation of “the Fourth Year” (§§117–131) Analysis/General Comments Philo’s discussion of Lev 19:24—“in the fourth year all its fruit will be holy, praiseworthy for the Lord”—falls roughly into two parts. First, Philo gives a general treatment of the significance of the number four. Secondly, he discusses “praiseworthy,” which he interprets as “thanksgiving.” In a more detailed way this section can be divided into five subsections. (1) Philo starts by quoting Lev 19:24 and immediately underlines the importance that the number four has in Scripture. The celestial bodies were created on the fourth day and through their association with number bring about the greatest good for the soul. In the quoted biblical text too the number four has also received great honour. It has a physical significance because there are four elements and four seasons, and an ethical significance as a symbol of equality and justice (§§ 117–122). (2) Continuing the treatment of four, Philo explains why four is called “entire”: it potentially contains the numbers up to ten and also ten itself. Because four is complete and full, the fruit is holy in the fourth year (§§123–125). (3) After the discussion of the number four Philo explains the word “praiseworthy,” regarding it as equivalent to giving thanks. Genuine thanksgiving to God takes place through songs and hymns of praise which are sung by a cleansed mind. Within this context he recounts an “ancient story” about the origin of the race of hymnists, who are offspring of Mnemosyne (§§126–129). (4) Philo summarizes his point: it is God’s task to do good, and the task of creation to give thanks to God (§130).

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(5) Finally, Philo fulsomely urges his readers to pay honour to God and the thank him at all times and in all places by writing and singing, using as an anonymous example the praise of the creator and the cosmos in Plato’s Timaeus (§131). In the passage on the number four Philo makes abundant use of the Pythagorean theory of numbers. Just like Philo, the Pythagoreans attribute considerable value to numbers, and among these the number four has special significance. The number four was geometrically presented by means of a triangular figure, the so-called tetractys consisting of four rows.

Since there are ten points, this figure shows the connection between four and ten, as Philo also observes. It is said that the Pythagoreans swear by Pythagoras with the following formula: “No, by the inventor of the tetractys, the essence of our wisdom, perennial fountain and root of nature” (Iamblichus V. Pythag. 150). For a general discussion of the Pythagorean theory of number, see Guthrie 1962, 212–282; for Philo’s number theory see Staehle 1931 (26–31 on the number four with parallel passages in other authors); Moehring 1978. There are a significant number of ancient sources in which Pythagorean number theory is discussed and which yield copious parallels with the arithmological lore found in Philo. They include Varro (1st cent. BCE, cited in Aulus Gellius and others), Nicomachus of Gerasa (1st cent. CE), Theon of Smyrna (2nd cent.), Anatolius (3rd cent., bishop of Laodicea), ps.Iamblichus (3rd–4th cent.) and John Lydus (6th cent.). There can be no doubt that these authors share a common tradition, which developed in the course of time. Philo is thus an early witness to it. In the detailed comments references are made to these authors to illustrate Philo’s discussion. On this tradition and Philo’s relation to it, see Runia 2001, 25–29, 301–304 (with a focus on the very long excursus on the number seven in Opif. 89–127). Detailed Comments (1) §117. in the … the Lord. An exact quotation of Lev 19:24. In both Abr. 14 and Somn. 1.33 Philo again quotes this text in relation to the number four.

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The prophetic word. The same expression, which refers to Moses as writer of Scripture, occurs also in Leg. 3.43 and Sobr. 68. See Burkhardt 1999, 208. to extol. For the verb ἀποσεμνύνω see comment at § 61 (“glorifies”). throughout the legislation. Philo often employs the expression πολλαχοῦ τῆς νομοθεσίας, which refers to the whole Pentateuch, cf. Cher. 87; Det. 80; Agr. 2; Ebr. 2; Sobr. 2; Conf. 148; Virt. 15, 22. For the term νομοθεσία see Burkhardt 1999, 97–101. For Moses’s title lawgiver see §66 and comment ad loc. record of the genesis of the universe. This is the only time that Philo uses the term κατάλογος of the creation account in Gen 1. He wants to emphasize that the recitation of the seven days is like a list or register. He also does not use his usual term for the creation account, κοσμοποιία (as in § 86), but the term γένεσις, literally “coming into being.” §118. on the fourth day. The description of the creation of the heavenly bodies is found in Gen 1:14–19, and Philo discusses it in Opif. 45–61. the sense-perceptible and precious light. Philo means the light that we see through the eyes. The sun and the moon are the origin of this light, and they enable human beings to see. As he remarks in Deus 58, the eyes do not perceive anything without the sense-perceptible light (cf. Spec. 1.288). Light is precious: for this reason the eyes of the body and the sense-perceptible light are greatly honoured by all of us (Sobr. 4). The sense-perceptible light has been created with the intelligible and invisible light as model (Opif. 55), which as part of the intelligible cosmos was fashioned on day one of the creation and came into being as image of the divine Logos (Opif. 31). was crafted. For the verb δημιουργέω see comment at § 11 (“were crafted”). its parents. The sun and the moon are here called the parents of the senseperceptible light, because they are its origin. choir of the stars. The stars include the planets. Philo also speaks of the choir (χόρος) of the stars in Mos. 1.271 and Opif. 115 (Pleiades). Much more frequently he speaks of the choral dance (χορεία) of the stars (Opif. 54, 70, 78, 126; Spec. 1.34; 3.188). On this theme see Miller 1986, 56–80. See further comments at § 12 (“the stars”; “the planets”). a limit on night and day … and years. In Gen 1:14 the luminaries in heaven are signs for seasons, for days and for years. Philo comments on this text in Opif. 55. the nature of numbers. Cf. again Opif. 55: days, months and years have generated the nature of number. the soul’s greatest good. This is a reference to philosophy as Philo explains in Opif. 53–54. By means of the sense-perceptible light the soul is able to observe the harmonious motions of the heavenly bodies. As a result it obtained a desire for contemplation and it started to busy itself with enquiries, such as: what is the substance of the objects of sight? “From enquiry into these matters the

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pursuit of philosophy arose. No more perfect good than this has entered into human life.” This and similar texts (Congr. 21; Abr. 156–166; Spec. 3.184–192) are inspired by the famous Platonic passage in Tim. 47a–c; see further Runia 1986, 270–276. §119. the number four. Philo here starts his discussion of the special significance of the number four. A similar but more detailed treatment is found in Opif. 47–52 within the context of the interpretation of the creation of the heavenly bodies on the fourth day. On this text see Runia 2001, 191–192; for an overview of all Philo’s passages on the number four see Staehle 1931, 26–31. the planting. Philo uses the noun φυτεία four times; the other three in combination with σπορά (sowing; Opif. 41, 59; Praem. 155). §120. highly physical and highly ethical. The physical meaning is here connected with the physical world, viz. the four elements. The ethical meaning comes to the fore in the interpretation of four as a symbol of equality and justice, which both are ethical terms. The distinction between a physical and an ethical meaning appears in Leg. 1.39 and Mos. 2.96. Physics, the study of nature, is the highest part of philosophy, and includes theology as well, while ethics and logic are the other parts (Leg. 1.57; Agr. 14; Ebr. 202). For example. Philo refers to the four elements and the four seasons as examples of four in the physical world. Both are also named in the parallel passage in Opif. 52. They are also found in Anatolius (p. 8.6–7 Heiberg) and Ps.Iamblichus (Theol. arith. 23.19–22; 24.12). For the four elements see also comment at § 3 (“He fixed … fire”). §121. the most ancient of square numbers. A square is formed by four equal sides and four points: cf. Opif. 51: four is the first of the numbers that is a square. The number four is regularly referred to as the first square number in writings on number theory (Anatolius p. 8.1 Heiberg; Lydus 2.9; 4.64). The description “most ancient” (πρεσβύτατος) is used rather than “first” in order to emphasise the honour that the number deserves. Its right angles. Philo here moves to the ethical aspects of the number. We should note that there is a connection between the spatial “appearance” of the number and the ethical characteristics with which it is associated. “Square” is associated with “rightness” (unlike in modern colloquial parlance in which “square” can mean “old-fashioned”). It must be borne in mind that in the ancient world numbers were primarily envisaged in spatial terms, an example of which we saw in the diagram of the tetraktys portrayed above under Analysis/General Comments. right reason. See comment at §60. ever-flowing source. A similar picture occurs in Spec. 1.277, where God is presented as the ever-flowing fountain of wisdom, justice and all virtue. As we

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already have seen, Philo is fond of imagery of an ever-flowing fountain, see further comment at §81 (“fountain”). §122. Equality has … the virtues. Philo portrays justice as the leader of the virtues (Mut. 240; Abr. 27) and equality as the mother or nurse of justice (Her. 163; Spec. 4.231; Legat. 85). In Leg. 1.87 he offers the Stoic definition of justice: to assign to each what he deserves (Stobaeus 2.7.5b1 [2.59.9–10 W. = SVF 3.262]). Justice is one of the four cardinal virtues, together with courage, moderation and wisdom (see comment at §40 [“wisdom”]). Various aspects and examples of equality are discussed at great length in Her. 141–206, where his starting point is Gen 15:10: “He (God) divided them in the middle.” He observes that Moses praises equality above all others: he always glorifies justice, whose property it is to divide into equal parts things material and immaterial, and he censures injustice, the creator of inequality. Moreover, inequality is the mother of war, just as justice is the mother of peace (§§161–162). symbol of equality and justice. This is also stated in Opif. 51: four is a measure of justice and equality. Just like Philo, the Pythagoreans regard the number four as a symbol of justice (δικαιοσύνη), as explained by Alexander of Aphrodisias (Comm. Met. 38.10–16; see Runia 2001, 194): “They supposed that the distinguishing characteristic of justice was reciprocity and equality, so they looked for this in numbers and for this reason said that justice was the first number equal to the multiplication of itself … Some said that it was four, since this was the first square number and was divided into equal parts and was equal.” The arithmologist Anatolius (see above Analysis/General Comments) starts his treatment of four with the statement that four is called justice (page 7.22). (2) §123. entire. Having in mind the biblical text Lev 19:24 (πᾶς ὁ καρπός) Philo here calls the number four “entire” (πᾶς), whereas the Pythagoreans call ten “entire” (Ps.Iamblichus, Theol. arith. 80.3,10). However, four and ten are related to each other, see next comment. See also Philo’s remark at the end of § 125, which might be provoked by the discrepancy noted above. it potentially contains … ten itself. In Opif. 47 and Decal. 26 Philo also connects the number four with the number ten. Cf. Mos. 2.84 and Spec. 2.4. The link between four and ten, that is 1+2+3+4=10, is also regularly found in the arithmological handbooks; cf. Theon of Smyrna (93.18–20), Anatolius p. 8.1–3; John Lydus writes: “If the numbers from one till four are joined together, they will make ten (30.15–16).” §124. generate. The verb γεννάω with a reference to numbers occurs also in Leg. 1.15; Her. 49; Opif. 47, 51, 94, 99, 100, 101; Spec. 2.40, 59. §125. in the … be holy. An exact quotation of Lev 19:24.

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even and complete and full. With these words, which form a tricolon (cf. §§ 7, 60, 67, 112, 114, 145, 166, 170, 177), Philo explicates the word “entire” from the biblical text. stands as the turning-point. The number ten can be called a “turning-point” because for the Greeks only the numbers one till ten are real; eleven is “ten and one” as its name indicates (ἕνδεκα from ἕν + δέκα). The image, which appears also in Opif. 47, was a common place (Ps.Iamblichus, Theol. arith. 86, 4–5; John Lydus 30.19). See also comment at §76 (“they compared”). ten. In Philo’s theory of numbers, following arithmological convention, the number ten has special significance. As might be expected, in the treatise On the Ten Commands he discusses its features and qualities at considerable length (Decal. 20–31). Ten is called all-perfect (παντέλεια) and it contains all the different kinds of numbers (§20). Elsewhere he states that ten is the end of numbers that start with one and is most perfect (Congr. 90). For ten as τέλειος, cf., for instance, Post. 48, 173; Congr. 88, 116; Opif. 47; Mos. 1.96. Ten is also called παντέλεια in Opif. 47; Mos. 2.79, 84; Abr. 244; Spec 2.200. See Staehle 1931, 53–58, who gives an overview with parallels. entire. Congruent with Lev 19:24, as also in §123. but this … to four potentially. Cf. Opif. 47: for what the ten is in actuality, the four, it would seem, is potentially. See also above on § 123. (3) §126. Fittingly. Philo has a great liking for the adverb προσκόντως, which occurs no less 33 times in his writings. the fruit of instruction. Philo picks up his interpretation of the fruit as the fruit of instruction in §114; see comment at loc. holy, but also praiseworthy. In introducing the term αἰνετός, the exegesis picks up the SBL Lev 19:24 again, but we note that Philo does not quote the final words τῷ κυρίῳ, only making an oblique reference to them when explaining the etymology of Judah in §134. thanksgiving. The notion of thanksgiving has a prominent place in Philo’s thought, despite the fact that the term εὐχαριστία does not occur in the Pentateuch. The term came into use in late Hellenistic time to express gratitude for received benefits (see Laporte 1972, 23–32). Philo describes the giving of thanks in Spec. 1.210–211: it is given to God for the universe as a whole and for its parts. In the same way thanksgiving for the human being consists in thanks for men and women, for Greeks and barbarians. The connection between thanksgiving and singing hymns is also made in Leg. 2.82; Somn 2.268; Virt. 72–75. Although he here rejects thanksgiving by offering a sacrifice, he does connect thanksgiving closely to the ritual practice of sacrifices at other places (Migr. 142; Her. 199, 226; Mos. 2.148; Spec. 1.283). See further Laporte 1972; Leonhardt 2001, 175–189.

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the entire cosmos could be a temple. Although Philo here denies that the cosmos can be a temple worthy for the worship of God, the context needs to be borne in mind. The statement is part of a rhetorical passage that has the purpose of emphasising God’s greatness. Elsewhere the idea of the cosmos as God’s temple is presented without reservation. A fine example is found in Spec. 1.66–67: the entire cosmos is the higest and in the truest sense the holy temple of God; heaven is its most holy part, the stars are the ornaments and the angels are priests. At the same time there is also a temple made by hands. In Somn. 1.215 he also refers to two temples: the cosmos, in which the divine word is the high priest, and the rational soul, whose priest is the true human being. On Philo’s views on the temple in the context of second temple Judaism see Werman 2004. honour to him. Philo frequently refers to honour paid to God, § 131; Sacr. 69; Post. 37, 120; Agr. 128; Ebr. 37, 110; Conf. 129. songs and hymns of praise. The juxtaposition of ἔπαινοι and ὕμνοι is also found in Somn. 1.35; 2.38. For Philo’s use of the terms ἔπαινος and ὕμνος and synonyms, see Lattke 1991, 129–132. invisible. The intellect is just as invisible as God is, since what God is in the universe, is the intellect in human being; cf. Det. 87; Opif. 69. For God as invisible (ἀειδής) cf. Det. 31, 86; Abr. 75, 79; Spec. 1.20. cleansed intellect. See comment at §64 (“the intellect that … purified”). chant. The verb ἀναμέλπω, which Philo uses twice (Agr. 79), is hardly found before him (Theocritus, Id. 17.113). §127. an ancient account. On the phrase παλαιὸς λόγος see above in § 17, where it is used to allude to Plato (also in Ebr. 8). Here, as has been recently identified by Radt 2014, it refers to a mythological story which was told by Pindar, probably in his Hymn of Zeus. The fact that the story “is sung” is an indication that Philo knew its poetic origin. “Account” here translates λόγος, but after he has told it, when looking back he calls it a “story” (μῦθος). The original is lost, but we have a report in the second-century orator Aristides (Or. 2.420; Pindar fr. 31): Pindar for his part was extravagant enough to declare that the gods themselves at Zeus’ wedding, when Zeus inquired if they needed anything, asked him to make himself some divinities to glorify this great event, and indeed the whole of his creation, with words and music. And not only the poets, but all human beings make these professions. tr. M. Trapp, LCL

Philo’s use of the myth here illustrates his extensive knowledge of Greek mythology, but also shows that he interprets and adapts it to his own purposes.

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For example, when arguing that Cain never dies, he remarks (Det. 178) that this shows that, like the Scylla of the myth, folly is a deathless evil (Homer, Od. 12.118). In Prov. 2.40 Philo speaks about the reputation of Hesiod and Homer and their many interpreters who admire them. For Philo’s use of Greek myths see Boyancé 1967; Bloch 2011, 184–189. Cumont 1919 argued that the story has a Pythagorean origin: according to these thinkers the number ten is all, and the all encompasses the nine heavenly spheres which are then linked to the nine Muses. According to the Belgian scholar, Philo would have derived his myth from Posidonius but evidence is wholly lacking for this hypothesis. had brought to completion. The verb τελεσφορέω, which is rarely found before Philo, is characteristic of his vocabulary, since he uses it 26 times (also in § 151). God is called τελεσφόρος in Agr. 173; Migr. 31, 139; Somn. 1.115; 2.272; Spec. 2.204. This is excellent evidence that Philo retells the story in his own words. Similarly the word for creator ποιητής is, as we noted in our comment on § 14, characteristically Philonic. one of his subordinates. Philo uses the term ὑποφητής here, which usually means “prophet” or “interpreter,” but this meaning seems too specific in the present context. In our translation we follow the LCL. In Mut. 18 it is used of God’s interpreting Logos, and in Somn. 1.190 when speaking of dreams sent by God’s “interpreters and accompanying angels.” The identification with an angel or a logos is very well possible here, but Philo does not make this explicit (cf. his vagueness in Opif. 72 with regard to the plural in Gen 1:26). on high. For the term μετάρσιος see comment at § 3 (“the upper part”). §128. complete and filled. Philo here uses the adjectives τέλειος (“complete”) and πληρής (“full”). The translation of τέλειος poses a difficulty for the translator because it means both complete and perfect. The term in the superlative is used of the cosmos at Opif. 14 and Abr. 2. See further below on § 131. The combination of τέλειος and πληρής is also found in Agr. 53; Ebr. 135; Her. 306; Spec. 2.302; Migr. 73. to give them praise. To praise God is the only thing human beings can do in return for God’s blessings (Leg. 3.10; Sobr. 58; Congr. 97). any cosmetic addition. This expression recalls the verb κατακοσμέω (“to adorn”) in the account of Pindar’s story cited above. In showing his deference to the greatness of the creator, Philo uses hyperbole to go one better than the source: human praise cannot improve on the excellence of the works, so description will have to suffice. Cf. his remark on the temple above in § 126. the authentic expression of the truth. Philo here uses a kind of tautology— the truthfulness of truth (τὸ ἀψευδὲς τῆς ἀληθείας)—in order to emphasize the

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point he is making. Similar expressions in Somn. 2.253 (ἀψευδεστάτη καὶ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν); Spec. 1.191 (ἀψευδὴς καὶ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν); Legat. 44 (ἀψευδεστήτην ἀλήθειαν). encomium. Philo associates an encomium with songs of praise and thanksgiving, Ebr. 74; Her. 110 (honour the father of the universe with encomiums, hymns and benedictions); Somn. 2.38. §129. the Father of the universe. Philo also employs the expression ὁ πατὴρ τοῦ πάντος in Post. 175; Mos. 2.24; Decal. 51; Virt. 228. See further comment at § 9 (“the begetting Father”). It is another example of the adaptation of the story in his own terms, replacing the mention of Zeus. it did … long before. The expression οὐκ εἰς μακράν abounds in Philo’s writings (for instance Det. 106; Ebr. 208; Congr. 153; Mut. 62; Somn. 2.51; Abr. 37, 253). It is rarely found in classical writers, but appears often in Dionysius of Halicarnassus (1.78.3; 3.3.6; 4.66.3; etc.) and Josephus (A.J. 3.35, 298, 299; 6.38; etc.). musical. The adjective πάμμουσος is very rare, but Philo uses it six times (Conf. 43; Migr. 72; Her. 14, 266; Congr. 51; Somn. 1.35). Mneme … Mnemosyne. In Greek mythology the Muses are daughters of Zeus and Mnemosyne. This is the only place where Philo refers to Mnemosyne or Mneme (Μνήμη: Memory), the former being the more current name of the mother of the Muses (Hesiod Theog. 52–54). Plutarch (Mor. 743D) narrates that the Muses are also called Μνείας (= Μνήμη). It is noteworthy that Philo does not call them goddesses, though he does say that Mnemosyne is “one of the powers that surrounds him.” In using the term “power” (and also “subordinate” in § 127) Philo is using the terminology of his own theology. (4) §130. to do good. For God as bestowing benefits (εὐεργετέω) see comment at §86 (“he confers benefits”). to give thanks … in exchange. In Leg. 3.10 Philo even states that it is impossible in a worthy manner to recompense or to praise God who created the universe out of nothing. For giving thanks to God see comment at § 126 (“thanksgiving”). to give back as thanks. Philo often uses the verb χαρίζομαι (“to bestow grace”) to refer to the giving of goods by God; cf. §89 and comment (“bestows grace”). Quite naturally he employs the verb ἀντιχαρίζομαι to indicate the thanks given to God by humans. In Abr. 177 and 203 it is also used in a theological context. the personal possession of the maker. A similar line of thought is found in Leg. 3.78: all things are a gift (χάρις) of God, and the creation has no gift of grace (χάρισμα) that it can give, because it possesses nothing, but all things are God’s possessions. For this reason grace belongs to him alone. See further comment at §54 (“all things are his possession”).

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(5) §131. paying honour to God. See comment at § 126. fine writings. Is this the subtlest of hints that we may regard Philo’s own literary activity as a form of spiritual exercise (as well as fulfilling many other objectives)? speaking and singing. The juxtaposition of the two verbs (λέγειν, ᾄδειν) within the same context of thanksgiving God occurs in Somn. 2.38. The man of thanksgiving (i.e. Judah) lays hold of songs of praise, encomiums, hymns, and pronouncements of blessedness both in speaking and singing. For Philo’s interpretation of Judah see comment at §134. It is highly likely that the verbs speaking and singing refer to prose and poetry respectively. A remarkable parallel to Philo’s passage is found in Plutarch’s discussion of Plato’s Timaeus, where he says: “It is better to be persuaded by Plato and speak and sing that the cosmos has been brought into being by god, the one the fairest of things that have come into being, the other the most excellent of causes.” Just like Philo he combines the two verbs speaking and singing to introduce Plato’s saying (Tim. 29a) ὁ μὲν γὰρ κάλλιστος τῶν γεγονότων, ὁ δ’ ἄριστος τῶν αἰτίων, which Philo also quotes (Mor. 1014A–B; Runia 1986, 117). the maker of the cosmos and the cosmos. The combination of κοσμοποιός and κόσμος occurs also in Fug. 164; Opif. 7; Mos. 1.272; 2.135. as someone has said. Philo refers in an anonymous way to Plato’s saying in the Timaeus 29a5–6, where the cosmos and its maker are described as ὁ μὲν γὰρ κάλλιστος τῶν γεγονότων, ὁ δ’ ἄριστος τῶν αἰτίων. Philo reverses the order of the saying so that the creator is mentioned before his product. Furthermore, he replaces κάλλιστος by τελειότατος under the influence of 68e3, where the cosmos is described as τελεώτατον (cf. 92c8 cosmos is μέγιστος, ἄριστος, κάλλιστος, τελεώτατος). But the change also fits in with his emphasis on the perfection/completeness of the cosmos just stated in § 128. Plato’s saying is also quoted in QG 1.6, a passage that is very close to Plant.: But after the world wisdom came into being, since after the creation of the world paradise was made in the same manner as the poets say the chorus of Muses (was formed), in order to praise the creator and his work. For just as Plato said, the creator is the greatest and best of causes, while the world is the most beautiful of created things. tr. LCL

In both texts the creation of the Muses is combined with the saying by Plato within a context where praising the creator and giving thanks to him is the main theme. See further Runia 1986, 114–118.

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Parallel Exegesis The words “holy and praiseworthy” from Lev 19:24 are quoted in Somn. 1.33, where he elaborates the verse in the same way as in Plant., i.e. with reference to the praise of God through songs. He associates heaven and mind with the number four, stating that both are incomprehensible. For that reason the fourth year is called “holy and praiseworthy.” But Philo’s words are not accurate: in Lev it is the fruit that is holy and praiseworthy in the fourth year, not the year. Explaining the verse, he says that both heaven and mind are praiseworthy (or “for praise”) and are capable of honouring God with hymns (§ 35). After explaining that the heaven produces a perfect harmony through the movements of the heavenly bodies and so gives praise to God, Philo introduces the figure of Leah or virtue. She gave birth to Judah, whose name is explained as offering praise (§37). We note that just a few lines further in Plant. (§ 134) Philo again brings in Leah and her son, the latter as a symbol for offering praise to the Lord. Other texts where Philo refers to the fourth year from Lev 19:24 are: Abr. 12, illustrating that Enos is the fourth generation from Adam; and Virt. 159, where it is commanded in the fourth year to dedicate the whole crop as first fruits to God as a thank-offering for things received in the past and in the hope of productivity in the future. See also Parallel Exegesis in the previous sections. f

Explanation of “the Fifth Year” (§§132–136) Analysis/General Comments In this section Philo discusses the next part of Lev 19:23–25, viz. the words “in the fifth year you will eat the fruit.” Assuming that the fruit is symbolically the fruit of the soul, Philo states that in the fourth year the fruit is holy, i.e. dedicated to God, but in the fifth year the soul’s fruit is given to human beings. The reason for this is that five is the number that belongs to sense-perception. Philo’s discussion falls into two parts. (1) Philo begins by opposing the fourth year and the fifth year to each other, and arguing that in the fifth year the fruit of the soul is assigned to humans, because there are five senses that nourish the mind (§§ 132–133). (2) Next he illustrates his interpretation with the examples of the fourth and fifth son of Leah, the first wife of the Patriarch Jacob, who is seen as a symbol of virtue. Judah is the fourth son and, based on the translation of his name as “offering praise to the Lord” (Gen 29:35), he is interpreted as a symbol of the intellect that is always thanking God. Because of this connection, Judah is identified with the fruit that is holy and praiseworthy in the fourth year. For Philo it is no coincidence that Judah is the fourth son because everything in Scripture is carefully written and has a deeper meaning. Leah, that is virtue, brings forth Judah, a perfect fruit, which

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consists in giving thanks to God, and this is the very best and most perfect product. The fifth son is Issachar and Philo associates him with the fifth year, because his name means “reward” (Gen 30:18) and in the fifth year the farmer enjoys from what has been planted as obtaining a reward (§§134–136). Because Judah is here interpreted as giver of thanks, this section has a close connection with the previous one, in which giving thanks to God is the central theme. The biblical texts quoted, Gen 29:35 and 30:18, can be labelled as tertiary biblical lemmata, since they illustrate the interpretation of Lev 19:23–25, the secondary biblical text. Detailed Comments (1) §132. the soul’s fruit. Philo interprets the fruit from the biblical text in a metaphorical way, seeing it as fruit of the souls (cf. §§ 114, 116, 126, 137). For the metaphorical use of fruit see comment at §74. the enjoyment and use. See comment §34. in the … the fruit. An exact quotation of the first part of Lev 19:25. an irreproachable law of nature. The Stoics were the first philosophers to develop a theory about the law of nature, expressing the goal in life as “living according to nature” (Diogenes Laertius 7.87, 128); cf. § 49 and comment (“the first … of felicity”). Philo joins in with their thought and adapts it. In nature, God’s creation, certain inalterable laws are working (Ebr. 142; Opif. 61). Some laws of nature are physical, for instance the law by which the movements of the planets are led (Opif. 54, 70), but there exist ethical laws of nature too. Not touching a menstruating woman is a law of nature (Spec. 3.32), while excessive eating and drinking is against the law of nature (Abr. 135). When a man takes a wife he fulfils the law of nature (Abr. 249). An important difference between Philo and the Stoics is that the Stoics identify law with God, but in Philo’s view God is the true lawgiver and is thus higher than the law (Sacr. 131; Mos. 2.48). For Philo’s doctrine of the law of nature, see Martens 2003, 83–86; Najman 1999, 2003; Kullmann 2010, 59–69. Vander Waerdt 2003 discusses the Stoic theory. See also comment on “right reason” at §60. the second prize. See comment at §27 (“second prize … first prize”). §133. five. Philo also connects the number five with the five senses in Migr. 201; Opif. 62; QG 4.110; QE 2.97, 99. The notion is also common in arithmological literature (Ps.Iamblichus, Theol. arith. 34 etc.; see Staehle 31–32). In § 28 Philo discusses the creation of the five senses, to which he also refers in § 83. if we are to speak the truth. Philo is fond of the expression εἰ δεῖ τἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, which he uses more than 45 times, Leg. 3.224; Cher. 87; Sacr. 35, 108; Det. 138; Post. 185; Agr. 69; Ebr. 12, 79, 155; etc.

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that nourishes our mind. The senses receive impressions from the objects of sense and gives them to the mind, which then grasps the objects. In this way sense-perception nourishes the mind, Leg. 2.71. In Deus 42, associating αἴσθησις with εἴσθησις, Philo describes sense as a “placing in” (εἴσθησις) and introducing of what has appeared to it to the mind. In a similar way he calls mind the head and ruler of sense-perception (Mos. 2.88). God is, however, the ultimate Cause of the whole process of apprehension, Leg. 1.25. Philo is frequently very critical of the senses, but in that passage allegorical exegesis encourages a more positive view. whether it … called touch. A similar description of the different objects of the senses is found in Opif. 62. Note especially the close parallel with the objects of touch: for sight there were colours, for hearing sounds, for taste flavours, for smell aromas, while for touch there were things soft and hard, hot and cold, smooth and rough (cf. Opif. 165). The location of the senses is described in § 29. colours and shapes. Philo likes the combination χρῶμα and σχῆμα, which is found circa 20 times, for instance in §159; Leg. 3.15, 57; Sacr. 46; Det. 101, 173; Ebr. 46; Mut. 111. In most cases they are referred to as objects of sight. throughout the entire body. The same is said in Migr. 188: touch uses the whole structure of the body. (2) §134. A very clear example … been said. A similar phrase is found in Spec. 4.173: “very clear examples of each point of what has been said.” By using the word “example” Philo clearly indicates the illustrative character of the following biblical verses, which can be regarded as tertiary lemmata. Leah, virtue. Associating the name Leah with the Hebrew verb lʾh, “to be weary,” Philo translates the name as “rejected” and “growing weary,” see Grabbe 1988, 178. She is a symbol of virtue because we all turn away from virtue and think her wearisome (Cher. 41; Mut. 254). A different interpretation is found in Migr. 145: virtue regards the life of the wicked as being full of weariness and refuses to look at it. Central in Philo’s interpretation of Leah is Gen 29:31: “Now when the Lord saw that Leah was hated, he opened her womb, but Rachel was barren” (tr. NETS). He explains that God shows compassion for the virtue hated by the mortal race and honours her by causing her to bear first. Virtue is impregnated by God himself and bears noble deeds (Leg. 2.47; 3.180; Cher. 43; Congr. 7; Mut. 132–133). It is interesting that Philo does not regard Leah as needing any introduction. He is writing for readers who are expected to know the Pentateuch well. she ceased from giving birth. An exact quotation of the last sentence of Gen 29:35. In Leg. 2.95 Philo explains this verse. When the soul has given thanks to God and submitted everything to him, there is no better possession to be

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obtained. Therefore she ceased from giving birth when she has borne Judah. Elsewhere Philo interprets this verse as meaning that all things are thirsting for God, through whom created things are watered (Somn. 1.38). Judah. Philo’s interpretation of the name Judah is based on Gen 29:35: “And after she (= Leah) had conceived yet again, she bore a son and said, ‘Now yet again with respect to this I will praise the Lord,’ therefore she called his name Judah” (tr. NETS; slightly altered). The Greek verb ἐξομολογέομαι means “to sing praises” or “to give thanks” and the interpretation of giving thanks fits in very well with Philo’s line of thought in the previous section (§§ 126–131). The name Judah is linked with the Hebrew verb ydh, “to praise,” see Grabbe 1988, 170. The same explanation of the name occurs also in Leg. 1.8; 2.95; 3.26, 146; Congr. 125; Somn. 1.37. Judah is presented as singing songs, for instance in Ebr. 94, where he is referred to as the leader of those who sing hymns of thanksgiving. In Somn. 2.34 he is a symbol of songs and hymns to God. Cf. Somn. 2.38 quoted in comment at §131 (“speaking and singing”). the fifth. After twice recording that Leah had ceased bearing children (Gen 29:35 and 30:9), the biblical account describes an argument between Jacob’s two wives Leah and Rachel, and thereafter Leah invites Jacob to lie with her and she conceives and bears a “fifth son” (Gen 30:17). Issachar. Philo’s translation of the name as reward (μισθός) is clearly based on Gen 30:18 (Ισσαχαρ, ὅ ἐστιν Μισθός), see Grabbe 1988, 173. In Somn. 2.34 Issachar is a symbol of rewards which are given in return for noble deeds. Because he is introduced as subjecting his shoulder to toil (Gen 49:15), he is an example of those who are worthy of rewards and gifts because they have acquired virtue with toil (Ebr. 94; Migr. 221–222). §135. blesses God. The connection between blessing God and praising him is also made in Sobr. 58, where Philo comments on Gen 9:26 “blessed be the Lord, the God of Shem.” He remarks that it is fitting for him who has God as allotment (cf. §63) to bless and praise him, because this is the only thing he can do in return. See Laporte 1972, 53–54; and comment § 130 (“to give … in exchange”). singing chants of thanks to him. For Judah as giver of thanks see comment above (“Judah”). a holy and praiseworthy fruit. Judah is clearly interpreted as the praiseworthy fruit mentioned in Lev 19:24. In the same way Judah is called the perfect fruit in Somn. 1.37, also in an elaboration of Lev 19:24. a rational and virtuous nature. I.e. Leah, symbol of virtue, cf. § 134. to cease from giving birth. A reference to Gen 29:35. See comment at § 134. the limit of perfection. Perfection consists in being free from passions, giving up all that belongs to the realm of becoming, and exercising moral excellence continuously (§66). Levi is perfect virtue, because he has God as his refuge

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(Sacr. 120). The perfect wise person is able to see God with the eyes of his soul (Ebr. 82–83). He who is perfect has reached the end-point (τέλος), felicity. See comment at §37 (“perfect felicity”). Having reached this point, there is nowhere else to go except backwards, and this is not possible for the symbol of virtue. all the right actions. Philo here employs the Stoic term κατόρθωμα, which refers to an action that is done in accord with virtue and according to right reason. Examples of right actions are being prudent, showing self-control, acting honestly, being glad, conferring benefits. The opposite of a right action is a wrong action or moral failure and they are done contrary to right reason (Stobaeus 2.7.8 [285.20–21 W. = SVF 3.494]; 2.7.11e [2.96.20–97.3 W. = SVF 3.501]; cf. Leg. 1.56, 64 (virtue waters the right actions with a flow of noble deeds), 93, 97; Sacr. 73; Mut. 236; etc). For right reason see comment § 60 and on right actions see also our comment on “ordinary duties” in §94. brought to birth. Metaphorical use of ἀποκυέω is, for instance, also found in Det. 121: justice gives birth to reasoning. Cf. Sacr. 3 (giving birth to view), 103 (thoughts); Det. 116; Post. 63; Ebr. 30; product. Philo here picks up Lev 29:24 “its products will be an increase for you.” Both in the biblical text and in Philo product (γέννημα) and fruit (καρπός) are synonymous; cf. §137: the product and the fruit belong to God; see also Migr. 140; Decal. 160; Spec. 2.179, 181; 4.217. On the spelling γέννημα see above on § 95. Father of the universe. See comment at §129. §136. the use. Earlier Philo speaks about enjoyment and use of the fruit (§34). the farmer. Philo here does not use the usual term γεωργός (first in § 1, then often), but rather γεωπόνος, found only here in Plant. (in spite of the fact that Issachar is called a γεωργός in Gen 49:15). Hence we do not translate with “cultivator.” The term appears to be neutral here, but in Det. 104 it is placed in opposite to γεωργός. The latter works with skill, because γεωργία is a skill, but a γεωπόνος is untrained and performs unskilled labour. It is possible that he uses γεωπόνος of Issachar here because of his association with toil (πόνος, cf. Gen 49:15 and Leg. 1.80); see also on Parallel exegesis below. the product of the soul. Philo uses “product” (derived from the SBL, Lev 29:35) in the same metaphorical way as “fruit.” He refers also to products of the soul in Leg. 2.8; Migr. 140; Her. 247; Somn. 1.202. In the same way he speaks of products of virtue in Leg. 2.48; 3.150; Cher. 48; Her. 49; Congr. 6, 7. For the metaphorical use of fruit see comment at §74.

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Parallel Exegesis In Leg. 1.79–84 Philo offers an allegorical exegesis of Judah and Issachar which is more extensive and only partly along the same lines as in Plant. Judah is presented as a practitioner of wisdom, who praises God and gives him thanks, whereas Issachar is a representative of the person who performs noble deeds. When Judah had been born, Leah ceased from giving birth (Gen 29:35). It is said of Issachar that he subjected his shoulder to toil and became a tiller of the soil (Gen 49:15). When he has been sown and planted in the soul, “there is a reward” (Gen 30:18) that his labour is not in vain. Judah is exempt from body and matter because he who offers praise to God “goes out from himself” (§ 82). By way of contrast Issachar needs corporeal matter because of his labour. Nachleben We have not found any traces of the direct influence of Philo’s allegorical exegesis of Lev 19:23–25 in early Christian writers. Generally speaking, they offer number symbolism which reminds us of Philo. Origen is a case in point. According to Doutreleau (2001, 84 n. 1) there may be an allusion to § 133, where Philo links the number five with the senses, in Hom. Num. 25.3 (cf. Hom. Jes. Nav. 11.4; see Van den Hoek 2000, 83, 105). The number five is ascribed to the works done with the body, because there are five senses of the body. It is, however, questionable whether Philo has to be Origen’s source here, since the association of the number five with the bodily senses is quite natural (see Nachleben in the previous section as well). Origen does not discuss Lev 19:23–25 in his Homilies on Leviticus. A further echo of Philo may be found in Didymus the Blind, who explaining the fifth day of creation associates the number five with the senses and combines it with the Stoic notion of the movements of the soul (Comm. Gen. 44.8–11, 48.26–49.1; see Rogers 2017, 200–201). Besides this the church fathers offer a Christological interpretation of Lev 19:23–25, for instance Cyril of Alexandria in De adoratione et cultu in Spiritu et veritate, chapter 8. The years to which Leviticus refers are the times in history. First, there were three times during which the law was uncleansed and these were the times of Moses, Joshua and the Judges. The fourth time was the time of the prophets. In the fifth time Christ appeared, testified by the law and the prophets (PG 86.585A–588A). Philo’s translation of the name Judah as “offering praise” is found in Clement, Strom. 7.105.4. It is probable that Clement has taken over this from Philo, because in Strom. 1.31.6 he quotes literally from Philo’s interpretation of Judah in Congr. 124–125, including the meaning of the name; see Van den Hoek 1988, 40–41. The Philonic rendering is also found in Didymus the Blind, Comm. Zach. 1.52, 88, 165.

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Explanation of “I am the Lord your God” (§§ 137–138) Analysis/General Comments In this final section Philo ends the discussion of Lev 19:23–25 by dealing with the final part “I am the Lord your God.” This saying indicates that the fruit of instruction and moral insight is the possession of God, and this coheres with his view that all things are God’s possessions (§§ 54, 130; Leg. 3.32, 78, 195; Cher. 71, 124; Ebr. 107; Her. 103, 118). Although this section is very short, it clearly falls into two parts. (1) Explanation and quotation of Lev 19:25. Literally the fruits are the possession of those who own the trees, but in allegorical terms the fruit of instruction and moral insight is the possession of the ruler of the universe (§137). (2) As an illustration Philo quotes Hosea 14:9–10: “Your fruit is found to be from me. Who is wise and will understand these things? Who is understanding and will know me?” This tertiary biblical lemma has a verbal parallel with the Leviticus text in the word “fruit” and it expresses Philo’s view here that the fruit belongs to God (§138). The citation from Hosea is striking because Philo rarely quotes from the prophets. He cites this verse again at Mut. 139 (on which see below Parallel Exegesis) and another verse from the same prophet (14:6) in QE 2.76. Isaiah is explicitly quoted three times (Mut. 169; Somn. 2.172; Praem. 158), Jeremiah three times (Cher. 49; Conf. 44; Fug. 197), and finally Zechariah once (Conf. 62). Only Jeremiah is once referred to by name (Cher. 49). On Philo’s use of prophetic texts see Niehoff 2018, 183–184; see also Sterling 2016 on Jeremiah and Cher. 49. This final brief section rounds off the chapter on human beings as planters which commenced at §93. Philo does not refer back to that beginning of his treatment, where he emphasised that “we” have not yet reached the final stage of perfection (§94). Instead he refers here to the “wise person” who has God as the fruit of his soul. The implication is that the reader can aspire to achieving what “the wise person Abraham” is (cf. §73), or perhaps even to emulating God the alone wise (§46). So he ends with a paraenetic theme, exhorting the reader to aspire to the attainment of the knowledge of this theological truth reserved for the wise. Philo always pays particular attention to the way he ends treatises or lengthy parts of them. See further Introduction, section 5j. Detailed Comments (1) §137. products. See comment at §135 (“product”). fruit of instruction. Cf. §§114, 116, 126. For the metaphorical use of fruit see comments at §74. moral insight. For the term φρόνησις see comment at § 40.

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sovereign ruler. For God as πανηγεμών see comment at § 33 (“God the sovereign ruler”). his products. As noted by the LCL translation ad loc., Philo takes the word αὐτοῦ in Lev 19:25 to refer to κύριος (“Lord”) and not καρπός (“fruit”) as intended by the biblical text. I am the Lord your God. Exact citation from Lev 19:25. he indicates in the clearest fashion. The expression ἐναργέστατα παρίστημι occurs also in Cher. 108; Post. 16; Opif. 103, 134; Mos. 2.252; Prob. 136. God who is One. See comment at §64 (“the One”). It is difficult to determine why Philo emphasises this aspect of God in the present context. Perhaps he has been inspired by all the arithmological material in the exegesis of the Leviticus text. (2) §138. The inspired statement. In classical Greek the verb χράω was used for utterances by gods and especially by oracles (Homer, Od. 8.79; Herodotus 2.173; Aeschylus Eum. 798; Thucydides 7.62; etc.). Philo joins in this tradition employing the verb with a reference to divine, inspired Scripture, for instance in Det. 48; Gig. 49, 63; Conf. 81; Migr. 27, 168; Fug. 60; Mut. 34. one of the prophets. Philo describes a prophet as an interpreter of God who prompts the prophet on what he has to say, so that his sayings are in fact not his own. This is the way that the prophets are inspired and enjoy a divine possession (Migr. 84; Her. 249, 259–260; Spec. 1.65; 4.49; Praem. 55). The writers of the prophetic books of the Septuagint are presented as prophets (Cher. 49; Conf. 44; Fug. 197; Mut. 169; Somn. 2.172), just as the author of the Psalms (Agr. 50). It is, however, Moses who is the prophet par excellence (Mos. 2.6, 187). See also comment at §39 (“divine possession”). is in harmony with. For the verb συνᾴδω see comment at § 50. Your fruit … know them? Quotation from Hosea 14:9–10. In verse 10 Philo reads γνώσεται, whereas the LXX has ἐπιγνώσεται. He also omits the word “or” before the last sentence. the fruit of the mind. Because the mind is the rational part of the soul, the fruit of the mind is also the fruit of the soul, see comment at § 18 (“the rational soul”). In §31 he calls the ruling faculty capable of bearing fruit and offers some examples (see comment ad loc). For fruit of the mind cf. Cher. 102; Agr. 9; Congr. 56; Somn. 2.272. Parallel Exegesis The same verses from Hosea are cited in Mut. 139 in order to illustrate the view that it is God alone who sows and begets good things. Philo here also expands the image of fruit: the entire heaven and universe are God’s fruit, as it were a

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growth of the tree of his eternal nature. He thus briefly introduces the plant metaphor which is central to Plant. in a quite different context (the wisdom of the self-taught Isaac).

part two

May a Wise Person Get Drunk Chapter One: Introduction (§§139–148) Having dealt with the theme of planting based on the biblical presentation of Noah as planter (Gen 9:20), Philo now starts to discuss what Noah has planted, the vineyard, and the product of the vineyard, the wine, the drinking of which can result in inebriation, as is said of Noah in the main biblical lemma of the treatise Gen 9:21: “and he drank of the wine, and he became drunk.” But in Philo’s interpretation, Noah is a wise person (or at least well on the way to wisdom) and therefore the question arises: may a wise person get drunk? As Philo himself indicates, he will discuss Moses’s view on this matter on a later occasion (that is, in the next treatise Ebr., Περὶ μέθης), but he will first deal with the views of other philosophers (§ 141). The structure of the discussion is organized rather well, with the main transitions clearly indicated in §§149 and 175. Like a good rhetorician, Philo begins his discussion with a προοίμιον, i.e. an introductory section containing some preliminary remarks (Chapter One: §§139–148). Next he gives arguments in favour of the view that the wise person may get drunk (Chapter Two: §§ 149–174), and finally he gives counterarguments against this thesis (Chapter Three: §§ 175– 177). Philo’s presentation of the matter deviates greatly from his usual method in the Allegorical Commentary. The treatment in fact closely resembles his method in the philosophical treatises, especially De aeternitate mundi. In this treatise on the eternity of the world he also depends largely on Greek philosophical sources, and he follows the same way of presentation. As demonstrated by Runia 1981, 112–118, he makes use of the genre of the θέσις or quaestio infinita. This genre can be defined as the treatment of a general proposition by giving arguments pro and contra on a popular-philosophical level (see the description by Theon Rhetor, Progymnasmata 120.13–17). At the end it is decided which arguments are stronger, or the case is left open. As already mentioned the treatment in Plant. has a tripartite structure: introduction, arguments for and arguments against. The same threefold arrangement is also employed in Aet. together with clear indications of the transitions involved (Aet. 20, 150). Another example of a θέσις is Plutarch’s brief treatise Whether Fire or Water is more Useful (955D–958E), which has a tripartite structure as well (see Runia 1981, 114–115).

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At the end of Plant. the discussion is broken off abruptly after the first counterargument. Because Philo indicates that he will give more than one argument contra (§175) it is most likely that we are missing the end of the treatise in which the discussion was settled. We can assume that Philo’s own position is in favour of the thesis that the wise person will get drunk, because in the Bible the wise and just Noah is presented as being drunk. Furthermore, Philo refers to Isaac, whose name means “laughter” and who plays with Rebecca (§ 169; Gen 26:8), and play and laughter are a part of relaxation caused by the drinking of wine, as is explained in §§165–166. At the beginning of the next treatise Ebr. we read that Moses regards strong drink as a symbol of several things (§§4–6): (1) saying foolish things and raving, caused by lack of education; (2) complete insensibility, caused by ignorance; (3) insatiable greediness, caused by desire; (4) happiness and entertainment, which arise from the practice of virtue; (5) nakedness, which is manifest in the points mentioned, and was Noah’s condition when he was drunk. It is obvious that the first three points are negative, but the fourth point differs. It can reveal a positive aspect of inebriation, and is referred to as such in Plant. 165–172. Because wine provides relaxation, it may be permissible for the wise person to get drunk. In the extant text of Ebr. only the first three points are treated but remarkably without any reference to Noah’s inebriation. In the introductory remarks Philo says that in Scripture some persons are permitted to drink wine but others not. Furthermore, there are many virtuous persons who drink wine (Ebr. 2). Because we do not have any text in which Philo specifically evaluates Noah’s drunkenness, we are not able to know whether in the end he interprets it negatively or positively. It must be borne in mind that one of the two books of Ebr. is lost (see Introduction, section 1), so we may be missing the passage where he clarifies this question. At Ebr. 143–148 he discusses the case of Samuel, “the greatest of kings and prophets,” who does not touch wine (1 Sam 1:11). Though sober, he is drunk in a sense, i.e. receiving his drink from perfect virtue (§148). On Samuel’s “spiritual inebriation” see Friesen 2016, esp. 461–467. In some passages Philo speaks about inebriation in a metaphorical way, employing the oxymoron “sober inebriation” (μέθη νηφάλιος), a phrase which, if he did not invent it himself, he certainly popularised it among the early Christian writers; cf. Lewy 1929, who argues for Philo’s originality, but note Gutzwiller 1995 who notes its presence in an epigram on Cleopatra’s ring which may antedate Philo. The term is used as a metaphor for a kind of religious ecstasy. He who has drunk from God’s wisdom is drunk with a sober inebriation and becomes enthused like the Corybants (Leg. 1.84; 3.82; Ebr. 148; Fug. 32, 166; Mos. 1.187;

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Opif. 71; Prob. 13; see Lewy 1929, 3–41). Sober inebriation is clearly a positive state of mind. The phrase is not used in Plant. and in any case, Noah’s inebriation was of a different kind. The question of the inebriation of a wise person was disputed in the philosophical schools, especially in Stoic circles, and Philo’s discussion reflects those debates. We know that several authors composed a treatise Περὶ μέθης, just like Philo did, and he himself speaks of “countless treatises” on drunkenness (§174). Unfortunately, none of these treatises have been preserved and we only possess fragments and references to them in later authors. An investigation on Greek views on drunkenness was carried out by W.J. Schmidt (1947) in his Dutch dissertation, in which he also discusses Philo. H. von Arnim (1888) discusses the Stoic sources of Philo using the method of Quellenforschung that is not regarded as satisfactory today; see Introduction, section 9b. More recently T. Bénatouïl (2007, 279–320) has dealt with the question among the Stoics whether the wise person may drink within the context of good usage (χρῆσις). For his discussion the Philonic evidence is of central importance. Philo’s treatment of the question is also dealt with by T.E. Phillips (2008), who discusses it within the context of the philosophical discourse regarding the wise person’s conduct and drunkenness. He too examines Zeno’s view on the issue. He concludes that the philosophical discussion of the question whether the wise person may get drunk, which is reflected in Philo and Seneca, is the background of the proverb “wisdom is justified by its deeds” in Matt 11:19, a passage in which Jesus is called a glutton and a drunkard. It is reported that Aristotle wrote a book Περὶ μέθης (also entitled Symposium; fr. 99–111 Rose) in which, among other things, he explains that the verb μεθύω is derived from μετὰ τὸ θύειν (Athenaeus 2.40d = fr. 102 Rose), an etymology which is also known to Philo (§163). The compiler of the fragments of Aristotle, V. Rose, even included extracts from Philo in his collection of fragments from the last treatise (fr. 102). (His most recent successor, Gigon (1987) fr. 677, went a step further and including the whole passage §§ 142–177, but this is patently absurd.) The alternative title Symposium recalls Plato’s famous dialogue with the same title, in which each guest delivers a speech on Eros (love). Plato also discusses the drinking of wine at symposia in the Laws, arguing that the lawgiver has to enact laws (νόμοι συμποτικοί; Leg. 671c3) in order to moderate drinking at symposia (671b–672c, 673e–674c). Plato’s criticism is briefly discussed by Bernhardt 2003, 175–176. (Philo himself criticises the presentation of the symposiasts in the dialogue, comparing them unfavorably with the Therapeutae, Contempl. 57–63, cf. 89.) Aristotle’s pupil and successor as head of the Peripatos Theophrastus also composed a treatise Περὶ μέθης, to which Athenaeus refers a few times (fr. 569–

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579 = Fortenbaugh et al. 1992, 2.391–399). Treatises with the same title were written by the Peripatetic philosophers Chamaelion (fr. 9–13 Wehrli) and Hieronymus of Rhodes (fr. 25–28 Wehrli) as well. On the basis of the fragments we can conclude that these writings offer a cultural-historical and physiological treatment of the drinking of wine (Wehrli 1969, 73; see also Schmidt 1947, 17–24; Bernhardt 2003, 203–204). It was particularly in the Stoic school, it seems, that the question whether a wise person may get drunk was debated and different views regarding the question were held. Zeno, the founder of the school, argued that a wise person may not get drunk, using the following syllogism: No one entrusts a secret to a drunken person; but one will entrust a secret to a good person; therefore, the good person will not get drunk (Seneca, Ep. 83.9 = SVF 1.229). Having narrated Posidonius’s interpretation of this syllogism, Seneca argues that the conclusion is false. Because Philo also reports this syllogism and its criticism (§176), it would appear that he was acquainted with the discussion and the various arguments used. Cleanthes wrote a treatise Symposium (Diogenes Laertius 7.175). It seems that he permits a wise person to get drunk, because a wise person will never lose his virtue. By way of contrast, Chrysippus thinks that a wise person can lose his virtue as a result of inebriation (Diogenes Laertius 7.127). He regards passions as judgments: avarice is the assumption that money is something good. In the same way this applies to inebriation, intemperance and other things (Diogenes Laertius 7.111). His saying “inebriation is a small foolishness” (quoted by Stobaeus 3.18.24 [3.519.12–13 W. = SVF 3.713]) is along the same lines. To be noted also is the remark of Diogenes in his Stoic doxography that good persons will take wine, but not get drunk (7.118). In the summary of Stoic ethics generally regarded as drawn from Arius Didymus, Stobaeus lists drunkenness (οἰνοφλυγία) in line with love for money as diseases and illnesses (2.7.5f [2.71.10–14 W. = SVF 3.104]). He adds that the Stoics believe that the person with intelligence cannot get drunk, because drunkenness is included in what is wrong, and the good person does not act wrongly (2.7.11m [2.109 W. = SVF 3.643]). From these scattered remarks we can conclude that the question of whether wise persons would get drunk was a matter of dispute in the Stoic school and that different opinions were held and arguments pro and contra were drawn up. Not only the Stoics but also the Epicureans debated the issue. Epicurus also wrote a treatise Symposium (fr. 57–65 Usener), in which among others things he discusses the heat of wine (fr. 59–60). Diogenes Laertius reports that in his Symposium Epicurus states that the wise person will not say foolish things in his drunkenness (10.119 = fr. 63 Usener). The first-century BCE Epicurean Philodemus discusses the inebriation of the wise in De Ira, making an analogy between

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drunkenness and anger: what matters is the extent to which the wise person will get drunk (XLVIII.36–XLIX.26; see Tsouna 2007, 233–235). Philo also refers to writings on inebriation by physicians who quite naturally describe the physical consequences of drinking wine and drunkenness such as headaches (Hippocrates Morb. 3.8; Galen, De compositione medicamentorum. 12.572.9–573.4 Kühn). The Athenian physician Mnesitheus (4th century BCE), as Athenaeus reports, speaks positively on the drinking of wine in his letter on drinking (περὶ Κωθωνισμοῦ), stating that occasional drinking is good for one’s health. It causes purification of the body and recreation for the soul (Athenaeus 11.483f–484a). He also says that wine, as a gift of the gods, is the greatest good for those who use it in the right way, but for those who use it without measure it is the reverse. In medicine it is most beneficial and therefore Dionysus is called “physician” everywhere (2.36a–b = fr. 41 Bertier); see Schmidt 1947, 12–16. a

Summary and Repeated Citation of the Biblical Text (§§ 139–140) Analysis/General Comments This brief section is a transitional passage between the two parts of the treatise and can be divided into two small parts. (1) Philo offers a summary of the previous discussion in the first part, mentioning the three main points (§139). (2) Next he introduces the new subject: the viticulture practised by Noah, which is a special form of cultivation. The main biblical lemma is cited again (§140). The structure of this section—transitional passage, introduction of new subject, quotation—is comparable to the introductory sections of Chapter Two and Three of Part One (§§73 and 94). In §139 he explicitly refers back to the three main aspects of the discussion in Part I. The last part of the sentence does not make sense as transmitted in the manuscripts. According to Colson’s suggestion on the text which we follow (see note to translation), Philo summarizes the three chapters as follows: (1) the cultivation practised by God, i.e. referring to §§ 1–72; (2) the cultivation practised by the wise person, i.e. referring to §§ 73–93; and (3) the cultivation that wins the prize assigned to four and was practised according to the commands and injunctions of the law, i.e. referring to §§94–138 and esp. §§117–131. The description of the last kind of cultivation is somewhat problematic, because it is not mentioned who practises it, as is the case for (1) and (2), and the number four is explicitly mentioned and emphasized, whereas in the biblical text there are five years of cultivation in all. The text certainly underscores the importance that Philo attaches to the number four, which he treats much more

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fully than the numbers three and five. The “commands and injunctions of the law” obviously refer to Lev 19:23–25, the biblical lemma in the chapter. The long sentence in §139 is highlighted by Thomas Conley as an example of Philo’s capacities to compose periodic structures. He points to the suspension of the sense until the very end and the balance of the clauses (Conley 1987, 22–23). According to this scholar, “Philo is quite capable of composing periods which are satisfactory, if not outstanding, even when measured against the standards of a Dissen or Wilamowitz” (p. 22). After the summary and the announcement of the new subject Philo quotes the main biblical lemma Gen 9:20–21 again just as in the beginning of the treatise. In the quotation here Philo includes the words “and he drank of the wine, and he became drunk,” which he omits in §1. The quotation of the biblical text is clear evidence that a new part of the commentary starts here and this was the reason that Adler suggested, albeit not persuasively, that Philo now commences a new treatise viz. the first book of De ebrietate. See Introduction, section 1. Detailed Comments (1) §139. as best we could. The same expression of modesty is found in § 1. Cf. also Sacr. 1; Agr. 27, 124; Congr. 63; Ebr. 1; Somn. 1.1, 130. form of cultivation. See comment at §1. the Cause. For God as Cause see comment at § 20. the most fertile of plants. For the cosmos as the most fertile plant cf. §§ 4 and 11. the honourable person. Philo very often uses the Stoic term ἀστεῖος to refer to the wise person (cf. §§172, 176; Leg. 1.94; 3.23, 53, 67, 77, 167, 190, 191; Cher. 105; Det. 5, 52; etc; Stoic: Plutarch, Mor. 1038B3, 1046B8, F4). Abraham is called ἀστεῖος in Migr. 130; Her. 276; Mut. 175, 189, 193, 252; Somn. 2.244; 10 times in Abr. See also comment at §69 (“the good person”). wins the prize. As noted in our General comments above, the precise reference here is rather obscure. Judah, who is associated with the number four, is not said to receive a prize, whereas Issachar according to his etymology does obtain a reward. It is best to take the reference in more general terms. The concept of a “prize” (ἆθλον, cf. also §161) or “privilege” (γέρας, cf. § 42) or “reward” (μισθός, cf. §134) plays an important role in Philo’s presentation of God’s relation both to Israel and individual persons as his response to the observance of the laws and commandments, especially in the Exposition of the Law, e.g. Abr. 47; Spec. 2.257; Virt. 175; Praem. passim, but also in the Allegorical Commentary, Ebr. 74; Migr. 109; Her. 253; Fug. 40; etc. where it is generally connected to the practice of virtue. The Therapeutae receive God’s friendship as their reward; see Contempl. 90 and the analysis of this passage in Runia 1997.

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the commands … the laws. Philo refers to the prescripts about the planting and cleansing of trees in the new country given in Lev 19:23–25. The noun ὕφηγησις (“injunction”) with a reference to the laws of Moses appears also in Migr. 151; Her. 102; Congr. 134; Mut. 204; Spec. 2.64, 256; Virt. 15, 80. (2) §140. viticulture. See comment at §1. the just person Noah. In Gen 6:9 Noah is called δίκαιος. See further comment at §1. Noah began … became drunk. Philo quotes Gen 9:20 and 21a. Just as in § 1 he adds the infinitive εἶναι before γεωργός. In verse 21 the LXX has ἔπιεν ἐκ τοῦ οἴνου but Philo reads ἔπιε τοῦ οἴνου. One manuscript has, however, the LXX reading, mostly probable under the influence of the LXX. It is possible that the formulation ἔπιεν ἐκ τοῦ οἴνου appeared unusual to Philo and so he changed it (Katz 1950, 32). See further comment at §1 (“Noah began … a vineyard”); and on the text Royse 2010, 112–115 and 2017, 148. vineyard. Elsewhere Philo interprets the vineyard (Deut 6:11; Num 20:17) as a symbol of gladness (Deus 96, 154) and this explanation can be related to the argumentation that wine provides relaxation and gladness presented later in §§165–172. At the beginning of the next treatise wine is described as a symbol among other things “for cheerfulness and gladness,” Ebr. 4. In Somn. 2.172–173, referring to Isa 5:7 “The vineyard of the Lord Almighty is the house of Israel,” he explains Israel as the mind that sees God, and the house of the mind as the entire soul. The house of the mind is the most holy vinyard, whose fruit is virtue. In Fug. 176 vineyards and olive-yards represent moral progress, growth, and the yield of fruits. b

Introduction of the Theme of the Inebriation of the Wise Person (§§141–142) Analysis/General Comments As was usual in the genre of the θέσις, Philo begins the question of the inebriation of the wise person with an introduction (cf. Theon Rhetor, Progymnasmata 121.5; cf. §149 προοίμια), in which the question is formulated and key terms are defined. In the same way at the beginning of Aet. Philo gives definitions of key terms (Aet. 3–6; Runia 1981, 123). This section is built up in two stages, of which the latter can again be further divided. (1) First there is a structural remark: he will treat Moses’s view later on and now presents the views of other philosophers (§ 141). (2a) The question is then formulated: shall the wise person get drunk? (§ 142a). (2b) Finally, Philo offers a definition of the key term, making a distinction between two meanings of being drunk: (1) being drunk is drinking wine;

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(2) being drunk is being foolish and say foolish things. This distinction is immediately taken up in §§143–144: some philosophers think that drinking wine is suitable for the wise person, but saying foolish things not (§142b). The words with which Philo looks forward to the discussion of Moses’s view in Ebr. and announces the present discussion, have a close parallel in the reference back to the previous account in the opening words of Ebr.:

Plant.

Ebr.

§141 Τὰ μὲν οὖν εἰρημένα τῷ νομοθέτῃ περὶ μέθης εἰσόμεθα ἐπ’ ἀκριβείας αὖθις, νυνὶ δὲ ἐξερευνήσωμεν ὅσα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔδοξεν. What is said by the lawgiver on the subject of inebriation we shall deal with thoroughly on a later occasion. But now let us examine the views of others.

§1 Τὰ μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις φιλοσόφοις εἰρημένα περὶ μέθης, ὡς οἷόν τε ἦν, ἐν τῇ πρὸ ταύτης ὑπεμνήσαμεν βίβλῳ, νυνὶ δὲ ἐπισκεψώμεθα τίνα τῷ πάντα μεγάλῳ καὶ σοφῷ νομοθέτῃ περὶ αὐτῆς δοκεῖ. What is said by others on the subject of inebriation we have recorded, as best we could, in the previous book. But now let us investigate the views that the great and wise lawgiver has on the subject.

The words “what is said by the lawgiver on the subject of inebriation” correspond with “what is said by other philosophers on the subject of inebriation.” The sentence “But now let us examine the view of others” runs parallel with “But now let us investigate the view of the great and wise lawgiver.” According to the rhetorician Theon a thesis is formulated without specifying any persons and circumstance. He gives as examples whether one should marry, whether one should have children, whether the gods exist (120.13–15). Philo too formulates his thesis in an unspecific manner. The Latin term for the genre quaestio generalis draws attention to this feature; see also Cicero’s remark at Inv. 1.8 (citing Hermagoras) and Part. or. 61. Detailed Comments (1) §141. skill and knowledge. The wise and just person, such as Noah, cultivates with skill and knowledge, being a professional and having experience, whereas the unwise and foolish person, as Cain, works the earth without having knowledge (cf. Agr. 1–25, esp. 20–21). Knowledge is important when on the road to wisdom, as Philo remarks in §98, whereas ignorance leads to vice. A few lines

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later in §144 he presents an image of the soul which sinks down in the depths of ignorance by indulgence in a large amount of wine. Instruction and knowledge are able to save it, just as persons who have knowledge of the skill of swimming are able to survive in a shipwreck. The same opposition is expressed, for example, in Det. 109: the worthless and foolish person never stops spending unskilled labour on the body and the senses. In this way he harms his soul. But the wise person works on everything with skill. See further comment at § 98 (“ignorance”). the foolish. Just as the Stoics, Philo constantly places the foolish person, who through his ignorance does not know what he should do, in opposition to the wise, just and honourable person, Leg. 2.18; 3.67, 189; Det. 169; Post. 32; Migr. 38; Her. 83; etc. For the Stoic view cf. Diogenes Laertius 7.124; Stobaeus 2.7.11i (2.102.11–19 W. = SVF 3.614); 2.7.11k (2.104.10–105.6 W. = SVF 3.682); 2.7.11op (2.113.18–114.3 W. = SVF 3.529). the lawgiver. See comment at §66. on a later occasion. Philo discusses Moses’s view on inebriation in the next treatise. The description here, Περὶ μέθης (“On inebriation”), is its title (in Latin De ebrietate). (2a) §142. many philosophers. The question was especially disputed by the Stoics. See Introduction to this chapter. whether the … become drunk. As noted above, the question is formulated is accordance with the genre of the θέσις without specifying person or circumstances. Of course, the reason that Philo embarks on this discussion is the biblical text “and Noah became drunk,” which he has cited. Implicit is the question whether Noah should have become drunk, but this is not discussed. Now being drunk. The next step is to define any key terms that need clarification. See the remark in the analysis above. (2b) double meaning. Philo gives the same double meaning of being drunk in QG 2.68: in one sense it is being foolish while drinking wine, which is a sin and peculiar to the worthless person; in the other sense it is being engaged in drinking wine, which occurs in the case of the wise person (Greek fragment at Petit 1978, 121–122; cited by Procopius in his Commentary on Genesis, 221.91–93 Metzler). Perhaps inspired by Philo, Ambrose makes a comparable distinction in De Noe 29.111, discussing Gen 9:21. He remarks that the form of inebriation is double. One form causes staggering of the body, the other heats the mind and seems to avert every infirmity. being foolish. In relating being foolish or raving on (ληρέω) to inebriation Philo follows the example of Greek philosophers. According to Plutarch the

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philosophers define inebriation as foolishness when drunk (λήρησις πάροινος). Therefore drinking is not to be blamed, if the drinking is done without speaking, but foolish talk turns drinking into drunkenness (Mor. 504B). Similarly, Diogenes Laertius (10.119) reports the saying by Epicurus that the wise person will not be foolish in his drunkenness. In the next treatise De Ebrietate Philo returns to this notion, when he states that Moses regards strong drink as a symbol of, among other things, being foolish (λήρεω) and mad (παραπαίω). He sees lack of education (ἀπαιδευσία) as its main cause (Ebr. 4, 6, 11, 12). A great part of Ebr. (§§11–153) is devoted to the treatment of the theme of being foolish. c

Brief Overview of Two Contrasting Views of Philosophers (§§ 143–148) Analysis/General Comments In this section Philo presents a preliminary overview of two different views of philosophers on the question. His procedure here is parallel to what he does at the beginning of Aet., where he describes three different views of philosophers concerning the indestructibility of the cosmos (§§ 7–19; see Runia 1981, 124–127). His presentation can be subdivided into three parts. (1) First view: the wise person should not drink wine excessively or say foolish things. Saying foolish things is a moral fault, which is caused by drinking wine. Because moral faults and their origins are not appropriate for the wise person, he will not drink wine. This view is discussed later on in §§176–177 (§143). (2) Second view: the wise person may drink wine but should not say foolish things. His moral insight will prevent him from saying foolish things and behaving foolishly. In the next chapter (§§ 149–174) Philo presents the arguments for this view (§144). (3) Philo returns to the first view and criticizes it. Its adherents do not recognize the superiority of the wise person, wrongly thinking that if a wise person drinks an excessive amount of wine, he will lose control over himself and for this reason it is better not to drink wine at all. However, the wise person would only drink excessively in a drinking contest if important matters are at stake. One might compare the taking of a fatal drug. The wise person will only do this in exteme circumstances. In fact wine is like a drug. It is not the cause of death (as a real fatal drug is) but of madness, which is a kind of death, because it kills the intellect. Therefore, the inventor of wine is named Mainoles after madness (μανία) which is caused by drinking wine (§§145–148). In this exposition Philo as usual does not refer to philosophers by name and therefore it is difficult to determine to whose views he refers. Moreover, because

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the writings of Hellenistic philosophers have nearly all been lost, it is hard to know exactly what theirs views and arguments were in the controversies about this question. As already noted in the Introduction to the present chapter, it is likely that Philo reflects the discussion within Stoic circles. The first view that the wise person will not get drunk is represented by Zeno and Chrysippus, whereas the opposite view was held by Cleanthes. Detailed Comments (1) §143. the proposition. The term πρότασις recalls the verb προτείνεται used in §142 to introduce the subject of the θέσις. It is used as a technical term for the statement of the θέσις that is to be debated (Hermogenes, De inventione 1.5 (106.15)). In Her. 63 Philo uses the term for the question formulated in the title of the treatise, “who is the heir of divine things?” (cf. Gen 15:2–4). some have said. As noted above, Philo may be referring to the Stoics Zeno (Seneca Ep. 83.9 = SVF 1.229) and Chrysippus (Diogenes Laertius 7.127), who both discouraged wise persons from drinking wine and getting drunk. The pithy syllogistic formulation is reminiscent of the style of Zeno. a moral failing. Philo here uses the Stoic term ἁμάρτημα, which indicates an act that is done contrary to right reason (Deus 126). Mostly he employs the term in a general way (Leg. 3.241; Sacr. 132; Det. 146; Deus 134; Agr. 11, 123, 142; Her. 7, 173, 295, 299; etc.). It is combined with ἀδικήματα (wrong deeds; Leg. 3.77; Deus 138; Somn. 1.175) and placed opposite to a right action (κατόρθωμα, § 135, see comment ad loc.; Post. 11; Deus 72; Fug. 193; Her. 297; Somn. 1.198). For the Stoics cf. Clement of Alexandria, Paed. 1.101.1 (= SVF 3.443); Stobaeus 2.7.11a (2.14–14 W. = SVF 3.500); Plutarch, Mor. 1037C (= SVF 3.520). (2) §144. Others. Philo may have in mind the Stoic Cleanthes, who permits a wise person to drink wine and get drunk. See further Introduction to the chapter above. the good person. See comment at §69. to quench. Philo employs the same metaphorical use of σβεστήριος in Post. 71 the passions. Drinking excessive amount of wine and sexual desire arouse the passions. The combination of wine and sexual desire is also found in Leg. 3.183, where Philo speaks of persons being drunk with wine or sexual desire. For passions see comment at §43 (“the wild … and vices”). fanned. Comparable metaphorical use of the verb ἀναρριπίζω is found in Leg. 3.187: the war of the soul is fanned by passions (cf. Her. 296; Somn. 2.147). In Spec. 4.133 Philo presents persons who are drinking strong wine and are overeating as fanning the flame of insatiable desires.

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the goads … sexual desire. The same metaphorical use of οἶστρος occurs in Det. 174: the incurable goad for sexual intercourse with uncontrolled desire. floods the soul. Philo very often sketches the image of the river or sea of passions in which the soul sinks. As an example we quote Ebr. 22, where the image is depicted in connection with the drinking of wine: “It is indeed possible to see people preparing themselves for a contest of wine, every day exercising themselves and contending in the contests of gluttony. (…) They deluge their souls as in a winter river by excessive indulgence in food and enforce them to sink down into the depth.” In the image in Plant. Philo stresses that knowledge and instruction are able to save the soul. The imagery goes back to Heraclitus (fr. B12, 49DK) and Plato (Tim. 43a–d) and appears also in, for instance, Leg. 3.18; Deus 81; Agr. 89; Conf. 23; Mut. 186; Somn. 2.13; QG 2.9, 75. Philo employs it in the allegorical exegesis of the deluge as the flood of passions (Det. 170; Fug. 191–192; QG 2.1–55, esp. 9, 18, 25). The imagery has been taken over by Gregory of Nyssa, who, just as Philo, sees eduaction as a means of salvation for the soul from the passions and the stream of life (De Vita Moysis 2.7; see Geljon 2002, 84–86). For the imagery see Billings 1919, 69–70; Runia 1986, 260–262; Méasson 1987, 176– 192, 313–314. See also the following note. utter depths of ignorance. See comment at § 98. Philo uses here the term βυθός, which he also uses in a similar contact at Agr. 89. In our commentary on that passage (Geljon–Runia 2013, 182) we drew attention to a possible Homeric background to the image, when Odysseus nearly drowns in the Odyssey (5.291– 320), but, as noted by Y. Paz in his review (2013), we missed the reference to the use of the term in Exod 15:5 when the Egyptian riders “sink like a stone.” But βυθός in that passage is equated with the body, whereas here it is used of ignorance. is made light and raised above. The combination of the verbs ἐπικουφίζω and ἐπελαφρίζω is found in Cher. 82 and Deus 21 too. For the verb ἐπελαφρίζω see comment at §24 (“is not lifted up”). There is an allusion to the lifting up of the wings of the soul in the Phaedrus myth; cf. Plato Phaedr. 248c2 (κουφίζεται used of the soul). saving effect of instruction. Philo here employs the term παιδεία, which refers to education, learning and instruction. In the same way he remarks that want of education (ἀπαιδευσία) is the cause of errors of the soul, but from it, as from a spring, the deeds of life flow which do not give a sweet and saving stream (Ebr. 12). Education provides salvation for the soul; cf. Ebr. 141 where it is described as something healthy and salvific, whose absence causes disease and destruction. For the central role of education in the development of the wise person see Mendelson 1982, 67–79. The salvific role of παιδεία is emphasized by Plato in Resp. 429c and Leg. 968b.

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(3) §145. The other philosophers. There is a question here whether Philo introduces a third group of philosophers here, or returns to the view he has already set out in §§143–144 (the vague expression οἱ δε, also used in § 144 can refer to either). Von Arnim (1888, 109–114; also the German translation PCH 4.180) argues that a third group of philosophers is presented, who represent the view of Posidonius. It is, however, more likely that Philo refers back to the first group of philosophers because he pleads for the superiority of the wise person, who will not lose his self-control by drinking wine, and therefore he may drink wine (so PLCL 3.498; Schmidt 1947, 49). Thus the entire section §§ 145–148 must be taken as arguing that in certain circumstances the wise man may or even should get drunk. superiority. The noun μέγεθος referring to moral greatness is also encountered in Leg. 3.19; Somn. 1.94; Ios. 80. A few lines below Philo employs the synonymous expression “the height of virtue.” have brought … down to earth. The metaphorical use of the verb καταβιβάζω occurs in Deus 120: bringing down from more divine to human and mortal conceptions; Her. 316: bringing virtue down to bodily passions. his lofty eminence. The verb μετεωροπολέω, which means “walking in the air” or in a metaphorical way “busy oneself with higher things” is typical Philonic. Before him it is only found in Dionysius of Halicarnassus (16.1.2; varia lectio for μετεωροπορέω in Plato Phaedr. 246c1) but Philo employs it 11 times. In Her. 239 he speaks, for instance, about souls which are purified and have the strength to walk in the air, cf. Her. 128; Somn. 1.139. It is also a key word in the description of the flight of the mind through the universe, see comment at § 22 (“the journey”). Even if Plato did not use the verb, Philo’s use is nevertheless inspired by the Phaedrus myth. lose control over himself. The wise and good person maintains his selfcontrol, which is one of the cardinal virtues. See comment at § 40 (“moral insight”). like defeated athletes. Philo very often employs the comparison with athletes. Congr. 164 is very close to our passage: the trial of the soul consists in toil and bitterness. Some people lose heart, regarding toil as a strong antagonist, and they drop their arms out of weakness like tired athletes. They have determined to return to Egypt to enjoy passion. In Ebr. 207 drunken persons are compared with athletes: those who have overindulged in eating and are satiated, give their bodies a breathing space for a while like exhausted athletes, but then they prepare themselves again for the same contest. Because Philo so often describes the movements of athletes in vivid detail, it may be assumed that he had closely observed athletic contests. The comparison occurs, for instance, in Leg. 1.98; Agr. 120; Sobr. 65; Migr. 27; Somn. 1.59, 126, 129; Abr. 256; Ios. 26, 233; Mos. 1.106; Spec. 2.91; 4.214; Virt. 6; Praem. 29, 157. See further comment at § 27

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(“second prize … first prize”) and the reference to Harris 1976. On the image of athletics and moral effort see also Poplutz 2004, 174–202. drop his arms out of weakness. The expression καθίημι τὰς χεῖρας ὑπ’ ἀσθενείας is also found in Sacr. 17; Deus 15; Congr. 164 (see previous comment). §146. However … knowing this beforehand. Philo’s train of thought is not so easy to follow here. Contrary to appearances, he has moved from a negative view of what will happen to the wise man if he gets drunk to the positive view that he may and sometimes should get drunk, as defended by the second group of philosophers. Having knowledge or practical insight (cf. § 145), he will understand the dangers, and if due to circumstances there is a need to engage in heavy drinking (see next note), he will do so and perform well. drinking contest. Speaking about a drinking contest (πολυοινίας ἀγών), Philo continues the comparison with athletes (§145: like defeated athletes). The noun πολυοινία (“excess in wine”) appears before Philo only in Plato, Leg. 666b1. Philo employs it in Ebr. 22 too. Such drinking contests remain part of modern life. such as the security of the fatherland … A comparable list of important matters is given in Deus 17: honour of parents, good conduct of children, security of the fatherland, maintenance of the laws, stability of customs, setting aright of public and private things, sanctity of temples, reverence to God. Philo also refers to the setting aright of public and private things in Agr. 35, 47; Spec. 2.12. Such a list is a common place. Polybius, for instance, lists reverence to the gods, honour of parents, respect to elders, obedience to laws (6.4.5). The Stoics see honouring parents, brothers and country as a duty (Diogenes Laertius 7.108; Cicero, Fin. 3.32). §147. a fatal drug. In Ebr. 27 Philo refers to drunkenness as a drug (φάρμακον) that causes foolishness (ἀφροσύνη) and want of education (ἀπαιδευσία). The expression θανάσιμον φάρμακον recurs in Spec. 3.95. Here too the train of thought is convoluted. Participating in heavy drinking is compared with taking a fatal drug, the common element being the extreme circumstances. But then he moves to a different comparison, based on the similar properties of drink and drugs. to depart. In speaking about extreme circumstances that lead to departure from life Philo appears to agree with a view accepted in philosophical circles. Socrates, for instance, says that it is reasonable to say that one should not kill himself, unless a god sends some necessity (Phaed. 62c). The justification of suicide in certain circumstances was especially advocated by the Stoics. The philosophers Zeno and Cleanthes are reported to have committed suicide (Diogenes Laertius 7.28, 176), as did Seneca much later. Diogenes Laertius relates that according to the Stoics a wise person may depart from life on behalf of his

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country, or his friends, or if he suffers pain or has an incurable disease (7.130). See further Rist 1969, 233–255. madness. In Agr. 37 Philo presents madness (μανία) as a result of gluttony and drinking strong wine: “Gluttony’s natural associate then follows, pleasure in sex, bringing along with it an extraordinary madness (μανία), an uncontrollable goad (οἶστρος, cf. §144) and a frenzy (λύττα) that is really unpleasant. For whenever human beings have been weighed down with lots of fine food and strong drink, they are no longer able to control themselves and rush towards sexual intercourse.” In Contempl. 40 the effect of wine is compared with madness. Madness is thus quite opposite to self-control and moderation (cf. Spec. 2.135–136). However, Philo also uses madness in another domain, in which it refers to the madness that prophets have, when they are divinely inspired (ἔνθεος μανία; Deus 138; Migr. 85; Her. 249, 264, 265; Fug. 168; Mut. 39; Somn. 1.254; 2.2; see comment at § 39, “divine possession”). This combination of negative and positive views on madness goes back to Plato, who speaks of the different kinds of madness in Phaedr. 244–245. Plutarch refers to the view that inebriation is madness (Mor. 503E1). For madness in Philo see Lévy 2009, 161–164. death. Philo introduces madness as destroying the mind in Spec. 3.99: delirium, insanity and intolerable madness fall down and thereby the mind, the greatest gift of God to human kind, is afflicted with all kinds of plagues. the intellect. See comment at §18. without hesitation. See comment at §88. that which separates … body and soul. Philo’s description is similar to Plato’s definition of death as loosing and separation (λύσις καὶ χωρισμός) of the soul from the body (Phaed. 67d). The same description of death is found in Abr. 258. Death is not the extinction of the soul, but its separation from the body and its return to where it came from, i.e. from God. Philo here uses two nearly synonymous verbs διακρίνω (“to separate”) and διαλύω (“to divide”). The former verb is used in the same meaning in Agr. 163; cf. διάκρισις in Leg. 1.106; Conf. 36. delirium. In Her. 249 Philo distinguishes between different forms of delirium or ecstasy (ἔκστασις). Sometimes it is a mad frenzy (λύττα μανιώδης), causing derangement (παράνοια) because of old age, melancholy or a similar cause. The best form is divine possession and madness (μανιά), which the prophets have (see comment at §39, “divine possession”). Obviously the first form is present in Plant. In Ebr. 15 he explicitly mentions drunkenness as cause of delirium and derangement. §148. the earliest people. The expression οἱ πρῶτοι is rather vague. In § 49 it refers to Stoic philosophers. In Decal. 23 it indicates those who have given names to things, just as here.

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Mainoles. Philo associates μαίνομαι (to be mad) and μανία (madness) with the name Mainoles, just as Cornutus (30.12). Mainoles is another name for Dionysus, the god of wine who brings about intoxicated ecstasy and madness (Clement, Protr. 2.12.2; Origen, Cels. 3.23). Bacchai. Bacchai are the female followers of Bacchus or Dionysus and they are in a state of madness caused by the drinking of wine. They are usually called μαινάδες after μανία. madness. See comment at §147.

Chapter Two: The Wise Person May Get Drunk (§§ 149–174) Following the rules of the genre of the θέσις, Philo begins with an introduction (προοίμιον) to the question of the drinking wine by the wise person, as he himself indicates (§149). Immediately thereafter he starts the discussion by presenting the arguments pro and contra. In this chapter arguments in favour of the thesis that the wise person may get drunk are given (§§ 149–174), followed by the counterarguments in the next chapter (§§ 175–177). The presentation of arguments pro and contra resembles a juridical speech in a law court. Philo explicitly compares his treatment with an appearance in a court of law, and he uses technical terms borrowed from rhetorical theory. As he himself indicates (§173), he first offers three so-called professional (or technical) proofs (ἔντεχνοι ἀποδείξεις) and thereafter one non-professional (or non-technical) proof (ἄτεχνος ἀπόδειξις). This distinction was well known in rhetorical theory. In his Rhetorica Aristotle explains that professional proofs are invented and constructed by the rhetorician himself. Non-professional proofs are not supplied by the speaker, and have an external source, for instance witnesses and laws (Rhet. 1.2, 1355b36–40). There are three kinds of professional proofs: (1) proofs based on the character of the speaker; (2) proofs based on the putting the audience into a certain state of mind; (3) evident proofs which are based on the speech itself (Rhet. 1.2, 1356a2–4; Martin 1974, 95–101). It is clear that Philo offers only the third kind of argument, proofs that are based on logical reasoning. Aristotle divides the evident proofs into induction on the one hand and deduction or apparent deduction on the other. The example is an induction and the enthymeme is a deduction. He explains the latter as follows (Rhet. 1.2, 1356b15–19): “when it is shown that, certain propositions being true, a further and quite distinct proposition must also be true in consequence, (…) this is called deduction in dialectic, enthymeme in rhetoric (tr. Rhys Roberts)”; see further Martin 1974, 102. In his argumentation Philo makes only use of the enthymeme or deduction, drawing conclusions on the basis of certain propo-

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sitions. His use of rhetorical terms shows his knowledge of rhetoric, which he will have learnt during his school education; see Alexandre 1967a, 113–116; for Philo and Greek education see Koskenniemi 2014. a

Setting Out the Two Positions of the Argument (§§ 149–150a) Analysis/General Comments This very brief section is a transition between the introduction and the giving of the arguments pro and contra. There are two opposing views which form a contradictory pair of propositions: (1) The wise person may get drunk; (2) the wise person may not get drunk. Philo starts by defending the former thesis.

Detailed Comments § 149. the introduction. The noun προοίμιον is a technical term for an introduction to, for instance, a juridical speech or the argumentation (Aristotle, Rhet. 3.14, 1414b19–20; Demetrius, Eloc. 23; Theon Rhetor, Progymnasmata 121.5; see Martin 1974, 60–75). Philo employs the same wording in Ebr. 11 (τὰ μὲν οὖν ὡσανεὶ προοίμια). Let us now set out. The hortatory subjunctive (περαίνωμεν) is again used to introduce a new discussion, just as in §§99 and 140. See comments ad loc. establishing. In rhetoric the verb κατασκευάζω is applied to refer to the constructing of a positive argument, Aristotle, Rhet. 2.24, 1401b3; see Martin 1974, 95. Philo uses it in the same way in Aet. 20; cf. § 149. The verb is employed by Theon Rhetor when he describes the genre of the θέσις, Progymn. 121.1, 19; 123.8. §150. the proofs. Philo here uses the term πίστις in a technical sense, i.e. a means of persuasion, argument, or proof (Aristotle, Rhet. 1.2, 1356a1). b

First Argument: “Wine” and “Drunkenness” are Synonyms (§§150b–155) Analysis/General Comments Philo’s line of argument can be divided into four parts. (1) He begins by setting out the difference between homonymy and synonymy. Homonymy is a single word that refers to a plurality of objects. Synonymy is a plurality of words that refer to a single object (§ 150b). (2) He offers an example of a homonymous word. The word “dog” can refer to a land animal, a sea animal, a “dog-like” philosopher, or a constellation in heaven (§151). (3) Three examples of synonymous words are given: (a) arrow, missile, dart; (b) oar, scull, blade; (c) stick, staff, rod (§§152–153).

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(4) Philo now frames the following deduction: (1) “wine” (οἶνος) and “inebriant” (μέθυ) are synonymous; (2) “drinking wine” (οἰνοῦσθαι) and “being drunk” (μεθύειν) are synonymous; (3) a wise person may drink wine; Conclusion: a wise person may get drunk. As the result of this line of thought Philo affirms that a person who is drunk is in the same state as the person who drinks wine (§§ 154–155). A remark in Plutarch (Mor. 503E–F) furnishes evidence that there was a discussion about the difference between drinking wine (οἴνωσις) and inebriation (μέθη; cf. Diogenes Laertius 7.118). Philo argues that drinking wine and being drunk are synonyms because this supports his argument in favour of the thesis. The concepts of synonymy and homonymy, which provide the starting point for the present argument, would have been familiar to him as an educated person who had been trained in grammatical vocabulary. For grammar as part of education see Congr. 11, 15, 74, 148; Alexandre 1967, 112–116; Mendelson 1982, 5– 7. Detailed Comments (1) §150b. things in general. Note that here, consistent with ancient theory (cf. Aristotle, Cat. 1a1–15) it is the realia themselves which are homonyms or synonyms, not the words used to describe them. Cf. the discussion of Deus 86 at Runia 1986b, 214–216, where the present passage is also referred to. Unlike in the Deus passage, the distinction here does not seem to make much difference to the interpretation. homonymy. Literally ὁμώνυμος means “having the same name, namesake.” The grammarian Dionysius Thrax (2nd century BCE) defines homonymy as a word that refers to many things. As example he gives the name Ajax, which can refer to Ajax the son of Telamon, or Ajax the son of Ileus. Another example is μῦς which can indicate a μῦς θαλάσσιος (“file-fish”) or a μῦς γηγενής (“mouse”); see Ars grammatica 36.6. synonymy. Dionysius Thrax describes synonymy as different words that indicate the same thing. As an example he lists ἄορ ξίφος μάχαιρα σπάθη φάσγανον, which all are words that indicate a sword (Ars grammatica 36.7). In Leg. 3.251 Philo remarks that Moses uses grass and bread (Gen 3:18) as synonyms; they are the same thing. In that passage he employs synonymy as an exegetical tool. In a similar way he uses it in his explanation of names: Eden is a synonym of joy (Cher. 13). Another example is found at Det. 119, where he notes that fear is synonymous with groaning, and grief with trembling.

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(2) §151. dog. The example is the same as that used by Aristotle, Rhet. 2.24, 1401a15–15, how homonymy can be used as a logical fallacy of diction in rhetorical arguments. The same example is found in Galen (In Hippocratis de victu acutorum commentaria, 754.2–3 Kühn) and Simplicius (In Aristotelis categorias commentarium 24.12–13), who both mention the dog that lives on the land and the dog in the sea. The Neoplatonist commentator on Aristotle’s Categories, Dexippus, also refers to the example: “he who says ‘dog’ makes plain that what is signified is not an ox or a man, but does not signify what kind of ‘dog’ he means” (tr. Dillon; Dexippus, In Aristotelis categorias commentarium, 19.21–23). The example of the dog is parallel to that of the mouse, referring to a land animal or a sea animal, that we saw in Dionysius Thrax. wild animal … the sea. The dog-fish may be a kind of a shark, Aristotle, Hist. an. 6.11, 566a33. Oppian (2nd century) calls the dog-fish ravenous and shameless (Halieutica 1.373). the heavenly star. Philo refers to the dog-star, also called Sirius and which is referred to as the dog of Orion, the brightest of all stars (Homer, Il. 22:29, 18.486). In mythology Orion was accidentally killed by Artemis, whereupon the goddess, saddened by his death, placed him together with his dog Sirius in heaven as a constellation (Homer, Od. 5.121–124; Aratus, Phaen. 634–646; Apollodorus 1.4.3–5). Sirius rises in the heat of the summer and in the season of the harvest as Hesiod says: Sirius dries up head and knees, and the skin is dry because of the heat (Op. 587–588). which the poets call “autumnal.” Homer calls the star of Sirius ὀπωρινός (Il. 5.5). The word ὀπώρα refers to the later part of the summer between the rising of Sirius and of Arcturus (from the last days of July until the first part of September; cf. Olympiodorus, In Aristotelis meteora commentaria, 88.30–34). it rises … ripened. Hesiod describes the rising of Orion as the time for harvesting, Op. 599–600: the slaves are ordered to thresh the holy corn of Demeter, when for the first time mighty Orion appears. The verb τελεσφορέω (“to bring to maturity”) is rarely used before Philo; see comment at § 127. The combination of τελεσφορέω and πεπαίνω (“to ripen”) appears also in Deus 40; Spec. 1.179; 2.143. Following his usual manner, Philo combines a rarely used word with a common one. the Cynic school. The school of the Cynics was named after the word κύων (“dog”), by which their mostly well-known representative Diogenes was called on account of his dog-like behaviour and shamelessness. When Alexander the Great asked him what he has done to be named a dog, he said: “Fawning on those who give, barking to those who do not give, biting the worthless.” (Diogenes Laertius 6.60). Cynicism was primarily a way of living rather than an organised philosophical school. Generally, Cynics promoted the ideal of a prim-

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itive and frugal way of life according to nature. Philo obviously shares his severe denunciation of overeating and luxurious clothing with the Cynics; see comments at §105 (“their love … and overeating”), § 159 (“chefs and cooks”; “dying clothes”). The term αἵρεσις (“school”) refers to a school of thought but this was not a formally organized institution with registered members (Diogenes Laertius 1.18: αἵρεσις Κυνική); on the term see Runia 1995, 6–7. On the Cynic school in Hellenistic and Imperial philosophy see Branham and Goulet-Cazé 1996. Aristippus. Aristippus of Cyrene (c. 435–356), pupil of Socrates, was the founder of the Cyrenaic school, named after his home town. The Cyrenaics regarded bodily pleasure as the end of life (Diogenes Laertius 2.87). Aristippus himself was notorious for his extravagant living, for which he was reproached (Diogenes Laertius 2.68–69). He was called “a royal dog” by Diogenes (Diogenes Laertius 2.66) and this is the reason that Philo mentions his name here. It is obvious that Philo himself rejects the Cyrenaic thought. Diogenes. Diogenes of Sinope was the mostly noted Cynic philosopher (c. 412/403–c. 324/321). Various anecdotes are recorded about his primitive and ascetic way of life. When he saw a child drinking out of his hands, he cast away his cup and said: “a child has overcome me in plainness of living” (Diogenes Laertius 6.37). Philo’s admiration for Diogenes appears when he speaks of him “employing sublimity and greatness of thought” (Prob. 121, cf. 157). He also recounts the anecdote that Diogenes lit a lamp at midday because he was seeking a (true) human being (Gig. 34). uncountable. The adjective ἀπερίληπτος, literally “ungraspable,” is rarely used before Philo, who employs it six times. (3) §152. differing appellations … single thing. Philo now offers some examples of synonyms. arrow, missile, dart. All three nous (ἰός, ὀϊστος, βέλος: a tricolon) are current from Homer onwards. Philo’s example is closely parallel to the example in Dionysius Thrax, who lists five different words to indicate a sword, Ars grammatica 36.7. oar, scull, blade. Again a tricolon with words that indicate instruments for rowing (εἰρεσία, κώπη, πλάτη). The combination of the three words appear in the Etymologicum Magnum, which was compiled in the 12th century (s.v. Εἰρέσιον, 303.13–17). The words are found in the explanation of the name of Euresion, a town in Boeotia. The inhabitants of the country had contact by means of εἰρεσία, κώπη, πλάτη, and this became the basis of their names Eiresion, Kope, and Plataea! For whenever … the harbour. Philo composes one long sentence to describe the progress of a sailing ship when there is a lack of wind and the crew must

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resort to rowing. In constructing the sentence, he uses six participles, and as noted below he also employs a number of words that are rarely found in earlier authors. In the translation the sentence has been divided into two. Furthermore, he makes use of the poetical image of the ship as having wings and racing over the waves. Philo’s fondness for nautical imagery emerges in a large number of other passages, cf., for instance, Leg. 2.6, 104; Cher. 13; Sacr. 90; Det. 141; Deus 98; Agr. 69, 89; Fug. 27; Somn. 1.150, 157, 247; 2.86; Abr. 272; Decal. 14; Spec. 2.181, 225; Virt. 186. headwinds. The noun ἀντίπνοια is rarely found before Philo, who uses it only here. It appears in Strabo twice (6.2.8; 8.6.20). the rowers. Before Philo the word πρόσκωπος is attested once in Thucydides (1.10.4). as if had wings. We find the image of a winged ship also in the poet Pindar, Ol. 9.24. reaching a safe anchorage. The verb ἐνορμίζω is used by Philo 13 times, although it is rarely used prior to him. harbour. The noun ὑπόδρομος is earlier attested in Euripides only, Phoen. 1391. §153. stick, staff and rod. Philo mentions three different nouns (σκίπων, βακτηρία, ῥάβδος) that refer to a staff. From the three words the noun ῥάβδος is the most current. The word σκίπων is found about 25 times before Philo and appears in his works only here, which suggests that he is using a text-book example. The lexicon of Hesychius mentions βακτηρία and ῥάβδος in the entry on σκίπων. In his allegorical exegesis Philo explains the staff as a symbol of education, paideia, through which the deeds of the wise person are supported: Leg. 2.89, 90; Post. 97; Congr. 94; Fug. 150. sturdy. Philo is the first attested user of the adjective ἀκράδαντος, cf. Post. 25, 122; Conf. 87; Mut. 135 (referring to ῥάβδος); Abr. 269; Mos. 2.14. After him it again turns up in the second century. (4) §154. The ancients. Philo also refers to the use of words by the ancients (οἱ παλαιοί) in Deus 103; Her. 78; Virt. 152. The term is vague, but may be taken to refer to (in modern terms) the archaic and classical ages of Greek culture. “inebriant.” As Philo himself remarks the noun μέθυ is a poetic word for wine, Homer, Il. 7.471; Od. 4.746; 7.179, 265; Aeschylus, Suppl. 953; Sophocles, Oed. col. 481; Euripides, Alc. 757. Philo employs the word here only. “drinking wine” and “being drunk.” In spite of the equation here of drinking wine and being drunk, generally Philo himself does not use the verb μεθύω interchangeably with οἰνέομαι. He uses the verb μεθύω in association with being mad, foolish and frenzied: Leg. 3.210; Post. 175; Ebr. 27, 154. The other verb οἰνόω

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is only found in Plant. (cf. §§143, 144, 155, 163, 166, 174). So it seems that Philo is here composing an occasional argument (or taking it over from a source with a different language than his own). From Plutarch we know that the difference between the two verbs was debated by philosophers (Mor. 503E–F). The Stoics placed the two in opposition to each other: good persons will drink wine, but not get drunk (Diogenes Laertius 7.118). Philo here argues for the opposite. §155. the good person. See comment at §69. a multitude of reasons. The wise person may drink wine, because drinking wine is connected with sacrificing, which is an act appropriate for the wise (§163), or because it provides relaxation for the soul (§ 165). wine-drinking. The noun οἴνωσις is rarely attested and in Philo found only here (note, however, that οἰνώσεως is an emendation by Mangey for γνώσεως in the manuscripts). It is also found in Cornutus’s description of the god Bacchus (30.15). c

Second Argument: In Earlier Times People Drank Wine in the Right Way (§§156–164) Analysis/General Comments Philo’s exposition of the second argument can be divided into six parts. (1) He starts by stating that nowadays people do not live in the same manner as their forefathers in former days; they differ from the people then both in words and in deeds (§156). (2) There follows an elaboration of the difference between words spoken by people nowadays and in times past. Philo describes the speech of former days as strong, solid and robust, while he regards contemporary speech as ruinous, something sick, unnatural, filled with emptiness and not having strength (§157). (3) Another elaboration follows of the difference between deeds done today and in former days. Formerly deeds deserved praise and were manly and fine but today they are disgraceful and effeminate (§ 158). (4) Philo points to a further difference between now and then. In former years writers and other artists were held in high esteem. They acted as healers of the soul. Today, however, it is chefs, cooks, perfume makers, and fashion designers who flourish, focusing their activities on what is attractive for the senses in order to attack and destroy the intellect (§ 159). (5) Having pointed to the difference between then and now, Philo applies it to the manner of the drinking of wine. Nowadays people drink excessive amounts of wine and hold drinking contests in which everything (even biting off ears and noses) is permitted. By way of contrast, in ancient times

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people began every action with sacred rituals. After sacrificing and uttering prayers, they held a feast and drank wine in a moderate way (§§ 160– 162). (6) Finally, Philo offers etymological evidence for his argument: the verb μεθύω (“to get drunk”) is derived from μετὰ τὸ θύειν “after sacrificing.” Philo draws the conclusion that the wise person may drink wine in a moderate way, because making a sacrifice is an act appropriate for him. This means that drinking wine too is a fitting activity. Philo’s statement that hardly a single bad person makes a genuine offering makes explicit that it is only wise persons who are able to make a genuine offering and that sacrificing is fitting for them (§163). Philo’s second argument, which is mainly found in (5) and (6), can be summarized by composing the following deductive argument: (1) drinking wine took place after sacrificing; (2) sacrificing is appropriate for the wise person; Conclusion: drinking wine is appropriate for the wise person. In §157 Philo compares speech with a body that once was healthy, vigorous, athletic and firm but has become sick and turned into a bad and ruinous condition of unwellness. The body is now blown up by conceit and bursts. In this description Philo employs words that on the one hand relate to the body but on the other refer to speech in a metaphorical way. The noun ὄγκος, for instance, means mass of a body literally but metaphorically it indicates weightiness of style. The same comparison is found in the treatise On the Sublime, whose unknown author is usually referred to as (Pseudo-)Longinus. He was probably a contemporary of Philo and similarities between them have been observed; see Kamesar 2016. Ps.Longinus criticizes the style of some rhetoricians and remarks (3.3–4): “Generally, bloating (οἰδεῖν) seems to be a thing hard to avoid. All who aim at weightiness, avoiding the charge of weakness and aridity, slip into this fault … Empty and untrue masses (ὄγκοι), in bodies and in speech, are bad.” Ps.Longinus here disapproves of the style of rhetoricians who wrote in the so-called Asiatic style, which was characterized by bombast, rhythm and wordplay. An important representative of this style was the rhetorician and historian Hegesias (3rd century BCE). Asianism was contrasted with Atticism, the style of the fifth-century rhetoricians (see Norden 1915, 1.126–155; Kennedy 1994, 95–96). The difference between Atticism and Asianism is set out by Quintilian in a way that is comparable to Philo’s characterization. The Attic style is concise and healthy, but the Asiatic style is empty and inflated (12.10.16). He also presents the Asian writers as puffed up (12.10.17). In fact, if this distinction is

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applied to Philo’s own style, we might find it more Asianic than Attic, but most likely this would not have been his own verdict. On Philo’s style see further the comments in the Introduction, section 6b. Philo’s passage not only shows a resemblance to Ps.Longinus but also to Petronius’s Satyricon 1–2 as remarked by A.D. Nock in his review of the ColsonWhittaker edition of Plant. (Nock 1932). Following his suggestion E.J. Barnes describes various themes that are common between Philo and Petronius, e.g. current disregard for the past, contemporary lascivious passion for extravagance, and the metaphor of the disease of the body. A number of these themes are also found in Cicero, Seneca, and Persius. Barnes draws the conclusion that all these authors (including Philo) “are drawing upon a broadly based repertoire of general commonplaces that had been part of the arsenal of academic debate from before even the time of Plato, and which by the early Empire had come to form the automatic context of any argument having to do with the past vs. the present” (Barnes 1973, 797). Next to a difference in the style of speech writing, Philo also observes a difference relating to persons who have high esteem. In former days, artists such as poets and musicians, flourished, but nowadays it is cooks and chefs who thrive. In speaking about musicians Philo presents music as being able to influence— negatively or positively—the disposition of the soul or the mind. In this point he joins Greek belief that music affects the character or the soul. In his ideal state Plato, for instance, rejects music that has a negative influence (Resp. 398c– 400c). If Philo has made use of a philosophical source for this argument, as seems likely, he has certainly superimposed some of his favourite themes on top of it, revealing the elaborate style of Greek that is customary for him in such contexts. Detailed Comments (1) §156. proof. In this context the term ἀπόδειξις is synonymous with πίστις (§150); see Martin 1974, 102, cf. Ebr. 11. their words and their deeds. The combination of words and deeds is quite natural, and Philo often uses it, §158; Leg. 3.44; Det. 35; Post. 87, 181; Deus 7; Migr. 128; Somn. 2.302; Abr. 37; Ios. 64, 267; Spec. 1.205, 265; 4.68; Virt. 56, 190; Praem. 119 etc. Following widely held philosophical views, he argues that in the life of a wise person there is a harmony between words and deeds and vice versa: Mos. 2.48, 140; Spec. 2.52 (2) §157. Speech that was healthy. The expression λόγοι ὑγιαίνοντες is typically Philonic: cf. §114; Abr. 223; Spec. 4.134.

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athletic. Again Philo shows his preference for athletic imagery, see further comments at §§27 (“second prize … first prize”) and 145 (“like defeated athletes”). as someone has said. This phrase most likely is meant to point to a recognisable literary allusion. Exactly the same phrase is used at § 131 with reference to a quote from Plato’s Timaeus. Since it is unclear to whom Philo makes a reference, it is likely that we no longer have access to the literary work that Philo has in mind. full … solid. The combination of πληρής and ναστός is also met with in § 7. vigorous nature. The noun εὐτονία means “tension,” “vigour” and also “vigour of style” according to Hermogenes On Types of Style 1.11 (387.10). mass. Literally the word ὄγκος means mass of a body, but it can also refer to loftiness of style (Demetrius, Eloc. 36; Ps.Longinus 3.4). bloated. The verb οἰδέω means “to bloat” but can also indicate an inflated style (Aristophanes, Ran. 940; Ps.Longinus 3.3). Plutarch reports that Cicero calls the rhetorician Vatinius οἰδοῦντα ῥήτορα (Cic. 26.2). By the same token Seneca speaks about an inflated style of speech (Ep. 114.1). unwellness. The word καχεξία is the opposite of εὐεξία (“state of wellbeing”) used above and refers to a bad condition of the body but metaphorically to a bad style of speech (Philodemus, Rhet. 1.188.19). empty conceit. The noun φύσημα means “what is puffed or blown up” and metaphorically “conceit.” The expression “empty conceit” recurs in Ebr. 128; Somn. 2.46. In §65 Philo uses the verb ὑποφυσάω in a metaphorical way; see comment ad loc. (“he was puffed up”). bursts. The bursting of a body is described in Post. 122 with the use of the same verbs as here (οἰδέω, “to bloat”; περιτείνω, “to stretch”; (ἐκ)ρήγνυμι, “to burst”). People who enjoy overeating become bloated and stretched and finally burst. There Philo sketches the bursting of a human being as a result of indulgence in overeating; here in Plant. it is speech that bursts because it is swollen up by empty conceit. (3) §158. manly. Philo usually interprets manly as indicating virtue. The Egyptian midwives who save the male children build up the affairs of virtue (Leg. 3.3). For the explanation of the masculine as virtue cf., for instance, Leg. 3.243; Sacr. 103 (see next comment); Det. 28; Gig. 4; Deus 111; QE 1.8. have made effeminate. Because generally in his allegories Philo explains what is female as referring to bodily passions and pleasure, the verb ἐκθηλύνω has the connotation of indulgence in passions, whereas the male relates to reason and virtue. In Sacr. 103, for instance, he remarks that the female offspring of the soul are vice and passion, by means of which we are made effeminate in our

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doings. In contrast, the male offspring are good emotion and virtue. By the same token he writes that virtue cannot remain in people who live luxuriously, whose souls have been made effeminate and whose bodies run to waste because of endless luxury (Mos. 2.184), cf. Cher. 52; Post. 166; Somn. 1.126; 2.9; Spec. 2.193. The verb ἐκθηλύνω became current in Hellenistic times, Polybius 28.21.3; 31.21.3; Diodorus Siculus 1.81.7; 9.1.4; Dionysius of Halicarnassus 7.9.3; 14.8.1. For Philo’s interpretation of male and female see Baer 1970; Sly 1990, 99–110; Mattilla 1996, 112–120; Niehoff 2004 (on Sarah who on the literal level represents the ideal Jewish wife, but allegorically illustrates Philo’s concern about the threats posed by femininity to male rationality). the ancient ways. The adjective ἀρχαιότροπος is recorded only once (Thucydides 1.71) before Philo, who employs it three times, every case in combination with ζήλωσις, just as here (cf. Migr. 201; Prob. 82). (4) §159. not charming … and virtue. The implication here, though not made very clear, is that nowadays musicians with their music weaken the soul or mind and render it impotent. Weakening the soul occurs through making it susceptible to pleasures and other passions. A fine parallel is found at Agr. 35, where Philo denounces the performance of cithara players and singers in the theatres and describes their music as “broken and unmanly.” It is the task of music to heal the soul, as he makes clear in Cher. 105: music heals what is harsh, inharmonious and what is out of tune in us. blandishing. The verb ἀφηδύνω is very rare. The TLG lists four occurrences, the earliest in Philo, another in Ps.Lucian and two in later lexica. rhythmical sound. Philo divides the science of music into melody, rhythm and meter, cf. Cher. 105; Agr. 137; Sobr. 36; Somn. 1.205; Spec. 1.28, 342. In his writings he regularly refers to musical theory, of which he clearly has an extensive knowledge. For Philo on music see Levarie 1991; Ferguson 2003. harmonize. Philo means the tuning of the soul like a string instrument. A reference to this image already appears in Plato (Resp. 554e4; cf. the slightly different image of the soul as harmony in Phaed. 86c, 88d). The image is elaborated to a considerable extent in Ebr. 116, where he compares the soul with the lyre which has to be well tuned and to be in harmony: the instrument of the soul is “out of harmony when it is stretched too far by rashness and forced to the highest pitch, or is relaxed too much by cowardice and falls to the lowest pitch. It is in harmony when the strings of courage and every virtue are mixed and produce one single harmonious melody.” The same image appears in Sacr. 37 and Deus 24. instruments of nature and virtue. Living according to nature and virtuously will bring about the harmony of the soul.

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chefs and cooks. Philo often inveighs heavily against the copious and luxurious dinners prepared by chefs and cooks. He condemns cooks for being only focused on providing pleasures for the belly (Ios. 61). This view is vividly expressed in, for instance, Spec. 1.174: Dishes, honey-cakes, relishes, and all what is made by the skill of pastry makers and cooks bewitch the taste, which is rude, unphilosophical and the most slavish of all senses. It services nothing that is good to hear or to see, but only the desires of the wretched belly, causing maladies for body and soul that often cannot be cured. Superabundant and luxurious dinners are evoked extensively in Ebr. 214–219. Philo will have witnessed such dinners in the houses of the upper class in Alexandria. Philo writes in the first person about them in Leg. 3.155, describing how one should attend them with reason as one’s companion and so not be at the mercy of despotic pleasure. A biblical example of a cook is Potiphar, Pharoah’s chief cook, to whom Joseph was sold (Gen 39:1 LXX). The figure of Potiphar is interpreted as pleasure (Leg. 3.236; Deus 111). Being a eunuch, he is an example of an impotent and barren soul (Ebr. 211). Invectives against excessive eating and drinking are also found in Agr. 23–25, 36–37; Ebr. 210–222; Somn. 2.48–51, 115–168; Ios. 151–156 etc. The noun ὀψαρτυτής (“chef”) is rarely used but Philo employs it 14 times, while he is virtually the only author to use the word σιτόπονος (“cook”). The combination of the two terms also occurs in Leg. 3.143, 221; Agr. 66; Opif. 158; Spec. 1.174; 4.113; Prob. 156; Contempl. 53. See further comment at §105 (“their love … and overeating”); and also the comments at Geljon and Runia 2013, 113–114 where we note the polemic against luxurious living in contemporary diatribe literature. Musonius Rufus, Diatribe 18b On Food is specifically directed against overindulgence in food. dying clothes. Philo strongly disapproves of luxurious and costly clothing in Somn. 2.53, where he presents vainglory as cunningly indulging in costly purple robes, transparent and fine summer clothes, and fine-spun shawls. He shares the rejection of expensive clothing with Stoic and Cynic philosophers (cf., for instance, Musonius Rufus, Diatribe 19 On clothing and shelter); for the denounciation of luxurious clothing see further Bernhardt 2003, 207– 209. colour or shape. See comment at §133. in order to attack. Philo regularly pictures the image of the mind as a citadel or acropolis, which is attacked by the senses and will be destroyed. A key word here is the military term ἐπιτειχίζω (build a fort as a basis for operations against the enemy). Descriptions of the attack on the mind are found in Conf. 54, 128;

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Fug. 148; Mut. 33; Somn. 2.46, 276; see Pelletier 1965. The image of the mind as citadel is derived from Plato, Tim. 70a6 and occurs in Leg. 2.91; 3.115; Agr. 46; Somn. 1.32; see Runia 1986, 306. (5) §160. In order … former times. Just as Philo, the grammarian Seleucus, active at the emperor Tiberius’s court, is recorded as remarking that in former days people did not indulge in wine excessively except when honouring the gods (Athenaeus 2.40c). Nowadays they … is available. A considerable section of Contempl. is devoted to a comparison between the meals of the Therapeutae and the Greek symposia in favour of the former. In his evocation of the luxury of the symposia and drunkenness of the guests (§§40–56) there are many points in common with the text here. See following comments. body and soul are quite paralytic. Philo sketches the same image in Ebr. 131: being paralytic in body and soul from wine is ridiculous. Similarly, in a discussion of the prohibition of drinking wine by the priest Origen states that inebriation destroys body and soul (Hom. Lev. 7.1). In this passage there are some Philonic elements borrowed from Ebr. 127–131, see Van den Hoek 2000, 91. the stewards. The mentioning of highly attractive slaves at symposia who pour out the wine (οἰνοχοέω) is also found in Contempl. 50. that travesty. Philo is the only attested user of the noun παράκομμα which means “money with a false stamp” and metaphorically “counterfeit.” It is cognate to the common verb παρακόπτω (“falsify”). Philo sees the games at drinking meals as a false copy of the real athletic games. The word παράκομμα is also used in a metaphorical sense in Agr. 45; Her. 44; Somn. 2.184; Spec. 3.101; 4.48. The same imagery of drunken guests at a symposium as falsifying athletic games is also pictured in Contempl. 41–42, cf. Somn. 2.168. Likely, in his exaggerated description of fighting guests Philo has been influenced by the Stoic-Cynic diatribe, see Wendland 1895, 21–24. the drinking contest. Philo refers to a match in which the winner is the one who first empties his cup of wine (described by Aristophanes, Ach. 1000– 1002). biting off … is available. Philo narrates the same in Contempl. 40: the drunken guests bellow and are furious like wild dogs, attacking each other and biting off noses, ears, fingers and other parts of the body. Philo then compares them with the Cyclops who ate Odysseus’s friends (Od. 9.287–293). Philo’s language is similar to Plutarch’s description of mourning barbarians who deform their bodies by cutting off their noses, ears, and other parts of themselves (Mor. 113B8–10). Brawling at a symposium is also described by Lucian (Symp. 43–46),

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who depicts, for instance, one guest as biting off the nose and gouging out the eye of another. §161. gladness. Somewhat unusually Philo employs the word gladness (εὐφροσύνη) in a pejorative sense. Mostly he uses it in a very positive way, referring to the joy of wise persons. In his discussion of the sacrifices he sets out that the sin-offering (Num 28:15, 22, 30) is a feast that is a period of εὐφροσύνη, and true εὐφροσύνη is moral insight established in the soul firmly (Spec. 1.190–191). He explains the word εὐφροσύνη as εὖ φρόνειν, good thinking (Somn. 2.174) and εὐφροσύνη is a feast of the soul of the wise person (Sacr. 111; see comment at § 166 “of the wise”). On the question of whether the lost book of Ebr. may have contained a positive account of the effect of wine as described in Ebr. 4 with the term εὐφροσύνη, see Introduction, section 1. In every case … decisive action. The comment here brings to mind the attitude of the Spartans in the Persian War (480 BCE). When the Athenians demanded their help, they did not come until they had finished the Karneian festival for Apollo (Herodotus 6.106). §162. the enjoyment and use. For this expression see comment at § 34. First they … and relaxation. Philo is primarily thinking of the sacrifices as practised in Greek religon; see the discussion in Leonhardt 2001, 235–236. The participants usually start a sacrifice with prayer and cleansing. After the sacrifice they eat a meal, at which the pieces of meat that are not offered to the god, are consumed. A fine example of sacrificing and enjoying a meal as it took place in former days (from Philo’s perspective) is found in Homer, Il. 1.446–474. First the animals to be sacrificed are arranged around the altar and those present wash their hands to purify themselves. Then the priest prays and barley grains are sprinkled, after which the animals are slaughtered. Some parts of them are burnt, other roasted. Then, when they had ceased from their labour and had made ready the meal, they feasted, nor did their hearts lack anything of the equal feast. But when they had put from them the desire for food and drink, the youths filled the bowls brim full of drink and served out to all, first pouring drops for libation into the cups. 1.467–471, tr. Murray, LCL

For sacrifices in ancient Greece see further Burkert 1985, 55–66. Petropoulou 2008 (40–106) discusses animal sacrifice in the period 100BC–200 CE. After cleansing … their souls. Rituals of purification were common both in the world of the Hebrew Bible and in ancient Greece. In the Pentateuch several prescriptions for purification are laid down, while in Greece purifica-

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tion was connected with sacrifice. At the entrance of sanctuaries in the Greek world vessels (περιρραντήρια) filled with water were placed for washing. The ritual of purification has also an inner dimension, as expressed, for instance, by Plato: the wicked man is unclean of soul, whereas the good man is clean (Leg. 716e2–3). At the entrance of the sanctuary of Asclepius in Epidaurus an inscription was engraved, saying: “purity is to think holy things” (quoted in Clement of Alexandria Strom. 5.13.3). Occasionally, the Psalms refer to a “pure heart” (Ps 23:4; 50:12 LXX). In his discussion of Jewish sacrifices Philo emphasizes the need for purification of the person who brings a sacrifice. The law (Num 19) requires that the person be pure in body and soul. The soul is purged of passions, diseases, infirmities and vices in words and deeds, while the body is purged of that which usually defiles it (Spec. 1.257). Not only the victims should be without any imperfection (Lev 22:20–24; cf. Agr. 130) but also those who offer should not be blemished by any passions (1.260). For the purification of the mind and the soul in Philo’s religious thought see the comment at § 64 (“the intellect … completely purified”). For purification in ancient Greece see Burkert 1985, 75–84. For Philo’s view on purification in sacrifice see Leonhardt 2001, 235–241. baths. Philo regularly uses the noun λουτρόν within a ritual context, see comment at §116 (“washing, sprinkling”). Although the context seems very Hellenic, Philo may also be thinking of Jewish ritual baths in mikvot which date back to the Second Temple period. On purification by means of bathing and immersion during this period see Sanders 1992, 222–229. streams of laws and right instruction. Here too, despite the seemingly Hellenic context, there may also be a reference to the laws of Moses as laid down in the Pentateuch, which Philo generally interprets as calling for liberation from bodily passions. Instruction has also moral betterment as a goal. Often they … back home. In the Greek practice of sacrifice it often occurs that those who had participated in the sacrifice take the meat home for a meal, but sometimes they remain in the temple enjoying the festival meal there; cf. Stengel 1898, 95. As Leonhardt remarks, in Jewish worship only the priests have meals in the Temple (2001, 236). (6) §163. they say … “after sacrificing.” Athenaeus (2.40d) ascribes the etymology of μεθύειν from μετὰ τὸ θύειν to Aristotle (fr. 102 Rose). §164. worthless person. Philo very often indicates the bad and unwise person by using the Stoic term φαῦλος, e.g. at §172, and Leg. 1.76, 93, 99, 104; 2.17, 53; etc. For Stoic use cf. Diogenes Laertius 7.117, 119, 120; Plutarch, Mor. 1037B1, 1038A8; etc. See further comment at §69 (“the good person”). genuine. For the expression πρὸς ἀλήθειαν see comment at § 42 (“true”).

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every day … the altar. Philo had already referred with disapproval to the practice of bringing thousands of animals to the altars every day in § 108. it is not lawful … A specific application to the sacrificial process of the general dictum pronounced by Socrates at Phaed. 67b: “for it is not lawful for the impure to come into contact with what is pure.” d

Third Argument: Wine Provides Relaxation (§§ 165–172) Analysis/General Comments In the previous argument Philo uses the etymology of μέθη as derived from μετὰ τὰ θύειν. The argumentation which he now develops is based on another etymology: μέθη is linked with μέθεσις, “relaxation.” This section can be subdivided into five subsections. (1) Referring to the etymology that relates μέθη with μέθεσις, Philo states that inebriation is a cause of relaxation of the soul. The relaxation that a wise person enjoys is different from that of an unwise person. The relaxation of the latter results in transgressions, but the wise person relaxes by enjoying recreation, happiness and good cheer. For this reason a wise person may get drunk (§§165–166). (2) Philo offers an additional argument. The nature of wisdom is cheerful and full of delight and joy. These emotions encourage persons to engage in play in a way that harmonizes seriousness with delight (§ 167). (3) For the last additional argument Philo appeals to Moses, according to whom play and laughter are a goal of wisdom. In his allegorical interpretation of biblical figures Isaac is an example of one who acquires virtue by nature. His name means “laughter.” Philo then quotes Gen 26:8, in which Isaac is presented as playing with his wife Rebecca. For Philo Rebecca symbolizes patience. He concludes that it is fitting for a wise person to play and rejoice with patience. Although not said explicitly, the implication is that playing and rejoicing are a kind of relaxation brought about through inebriation. The allusion to Gen 26:8 is thematically linked with his line of thought in this passage (§§168–170). (4) Philo then brings in a new point that is loosely connected with the foregoing. Drinking wine can intensify natural impulses in a good and in a bad way depending on the nature of the person. Drinking wine makes a passionate person more passionate, but it makes the person who has good emotions (that is the wise person) more amicable and gracious. This applies also to money: it is the cause of good things for the good person but of bad things for the bad person (§171). (5) Finally, Philo refers to a rule of logic: if A applies to a group of people, the opposite of A applies also to the same. Just as being sober applies to many

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people, both wise and unwise, in the same way being drunk is applicable to both unwise and wise persons. A wise person may get drunk without losing any part of his virtue (§172). In this argumentation Philo employs various arguments which cohere with each other. His main argument, set out in §§165–166, can be summarized with the following deduction: (1) inebriation is the cause of relaxation; (2) the wise person may relax; Conclusion: the wise person may get drunk. Philo, however, does not explicitly formulate proposition (2), but implicitly states that the wise person relaxes in enjoyment through recreation. Beside this argument Philo offers two additional arguments (note § 167 “in addition”): (1) The nature of wisdom is full of delight, joy and play, which are caused by inebriation; (2) Inebriation intensifies natural impulses and makes the wise person more amicable. Argument (1) is illustrated by a reference to Isaac, who is recorded as playing with Rebecca in Gen 26:8. This verse is by implication linked with the main biblical lemma Gen 9:21 because Philo sees playing in this context as a result of drinking wine. Philo’s usual interpretation of Isaac as laughter and joy suits his argument very well. Finally, Philo gives a logical argument based on opposites: because being sober applies to bad and good persons, being drunk pertains also to bad and wise persons. The notion of inebriation as joy is also found in Plutarch’s treatise That it is not possible to live pleasurably by following Epicurus. A certain Aristodemus states that religious practices furnish us with great delight when for instance we visit a temple, perform a ritual or attend a sacrifice. At that moment the soul is not anxious or depressed, but indulges in inebriation, play and laughter (Mor. 1101E–F). In the next treatise Ebr. Philo returns to this idea, regarding strong drink as a symbol of, among other things, happiness (εὐθυμία, cf. Plant. 166) and gladness (εὐφροσύνη) which arise from the possession and practice of virtue (Ebr. 4, 6). Regrettably this discussion appears to be lost. Elsewhere he interprets the vineyard as a symbol of gladness (εὐφροσύνη; Deus 96, 154). The last part (§§171–172) is loosely related to the foregoing discussion. It is also possible to see the last words of §170 as a conclusion and §§ 171–172 as a new argumentation. We have included §§ 171–172 in the third argument

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because Philo does not explicitly indicate a new line of argumentation as he does in §§156 and 165. Detailed Comments (1) §165. the good person. See comment at §69. etymology. Philo most often employs etymology in relation to biblical names, which thus provide a basis for his allegorical interpretation. Occasionally, as here, he offers etymologies of Greek nouns in order to support his argument. Earlier, for instance, he derived οὐρανός (“heaven”) from ὅρος (“border”; § 3). In Leg. 3.183 he connects ὕφεσις (“relaxing”) with ὕπνος (“sleep”). The use of such (sometimes fantastic) etymologies is common practice in Greek philosophy (see for instance the etymologies given by Socrates in Plato’s Cratylus 408a–410e). For some … the soul. Philo is in line with current views about the benefits of relaxation as a result of drinking wine. As noted by Boyancé (1936, 212) the etymological relation between μέθυ (“wine”) and μεθίημι (“to relax”) is also given by Athenaeus (8.363b): “When the people gathered to honour the divine, and letting themselves go to entertainment (εὐφροσύνη) and recreation (ἄνεσις; cf. §§166, 170), they call the drink methu (μέθυ), and the god who had given it Methumnaios, Luaios, Euios and Ieios.” The physician Mnesitheus says that occasional drinking for some days appears to produce a recreation (ἄνεσις) for the soul (Athenaeus 11.483f = fr. 45 Bertier). §166. transgressions. For the term ἁμάρτημα see comment at § 143 (“moral failure).” of the wise. Philo’s remark about the joy of the wise is consistent with his general idea that rejoicing is a characteristic of the wise person. In this way the wise imitate God, who rejoices and is glad in the true sense. God alone holds a festival (Cher. 86; Sacr 111; Det. 138; QG 4.188; see Parallel Exegesis) and he is creator of laughter and joy (Det. 124). Explaining Sarah’s laughter in Spec. 2.55 (see comment on Isaac, §169), Philo distinguishes two kinds of joy (χαρά). One kind is unmixed and of the purest kind, and this joy belongs to God alone. The other kind of joy flows from it and is a mixed stream blended with pain. If there is more pleasure than pain, the wise person receives this kind of joy as the greatest of gifts. recreation, happiness and good cheer. Philo here employs a tricolon, just as in §§7, 60, 67, 112, 114, 125, 145, 170, 177. The combination of ἄνεσις (“recreation, relaxation”) and εὐθυμία (“happiness”) occurs also in § 56. Feelings of joy and happiness are connected with the holy festivals and the Sabbath. In Migr. 92 he states that the festival is a symbol of the gladness of the soul, cf. Congr. 161; Mos. 2.111; Decal. 161; Spec. 1.69; 2.156. For the joy at festivals see Leonhardt 2001, 19–21, 51.

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(2) §167. the nature of wisdom. The connection between wisdom and joy is also made in Det. 110, where joy is called the offspring of wisdom; cf. Mut. 264: wisdom shall bear joy. This is a result of his allegory, in which Isaac symbolizes laughter or joy, and his mother Sarah represents wisdom (Leg. 2.82; Cher. 9). See further comment on Isaac below. serene. The verb γαληνίζω (“to be calm”) is rarely used before Philo, who employs it only here. delight and joy. Philo combines a rare poetic word (γηθοσύνη) with a common synonym (χαρά). Using the word χαρά he anticipates the introduction of Isaac, who is a symbol of joy. Referring to Isaac he calls joy the best of the good emotions (Congr. 36; Migr. 157; Mut. 1, 131, 188; Praem. 32). On good emotions in general and joy as the good emotion corresponding to the passion of pleasure see below on §171. not uncultivated. Philo here employs the figure of the litotes (οὐκ ἀμούσως) in which the negative of the contrary is used in order to intensify the expression. The word ἄμουσος (“unmusical, discordant”) fits well the comparison with a tuned lyre. For litotes see Lausberg 1998, 268–269. tuned lyre. Philo draws his favourite comparison with a lyre that sounds a harmonious melody. The same image is sketched in Cher. 110; Sacr. 74; Post. 88. See also §159 and comment (“harmonize”). (3) §168. the most holy Moses. See comment at § 86. play and laughter. The combination of παιδιά and γέλως is also found in Cher. 8 (together with εὐφροσύνη, referring to Isaac); Her. 48; Mos. 1.20; 2.211. It also appears in Plutarch (Mor. 1101F10–11), where it is linked with inebriation, just as here in Philo. See Analysis/General Comments above. children. Philo takes over here the general Greek negative attitude towards children. Youth indicates thoughtlessness and foolishness, whereas old age offers moral insight and wisdom. This idea comes plainly to the fore in his interpretation of Joseph, in which Joseph is presented as focussing on the body and the bodily things, and therefore he is still young (Gen 37:2) although he has become grey-haired through time. He does not have the thoughts of riper age (Deus 120), cf. Her. 49; Sobr. 12–15. Philo regards the foolish person a child, although he is advanced in age. The wise person, however, is old (QG 4.14). The contrast is also clearly made in Abr. 271: persons who spent many years living according to the body must be called long-lived children, but he who has moral insight and wisdom may be rightly called “elder” (πρεσβύτερος). For Philo’s spiritual interpretation of old age, see Gnilka 1972, 75–87; Runia 1986, 74–77. Do you not see that … Philo frequently uses this form of rhetorical question in his allegory; cf., for instance, Leg. 1.52, 86; 2.46, 52, 69, 82; Cher. 31; Det. 38, 62, 159; Post. 143; Gig. 3; Agr. 131.

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the well of knowledge. The image of the well for obtaining knowledge is a commonplace in Philonic allegory; see Post. 130; Somn. 1.6; 2.271, and also Part I Chapter 2.c Analysis/General Comments. listening to himself, self-taught and self-activating. In order to characterize Isaac Philo employs three adjectives that all three begin with αὐτός (“self”). “Self-taught” (αὐτομαθής) is the most used epithet for Isaac (Sacr. 6; Det. 30; Deus 4; Ebr. 60, 94; Sobr. 65; Conf. 74, 81; Migr. 29, 101, 140; Congr. 36; etc.). The combination of “self-taught” with “listening to oneself” (αὐτήκοος) appears in Ebr. 94; Sobr. 65; Somn. 1.160, 168. The adjective αὐτουργός is only here ascribed to Isaac. For Philo’s interpretation of Isaac see the next comment. It is possible that the three epithets are meant to cover the three attributes which are usually allegorically distributed over the three Patriarchs, on which see our comment on §74. §169. Isaac, whose name means “laughter.” In Philo’s allegory Isaac is a symbol of the mind who acquires virtue by nature and by himself, teaching himself, and therefore he is called “self-taught.” He belongs to the triad of wise and virtuous men that consists of the Patriarchs Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. His father Abraham attains wisdom by learning and his son Jacob by practice (Abr. 52; Mos. 1.76). Isaac is perfect from birth, whereas Abraham and Jacob reach virtue after traversing a long and strenuous path. The name Isaac is related to the Hebrew ṣḥq (“to laugh”) and therefore Philo explains the name as meaning “laughter” or “joy,” using as biblical evidence Gen 17:17, where Abraham is presented as laughing after the promise of the birth of his child. In this context Philo also quotes Gen 21:6, where Sarah says: “The Lord has made laughter for me” (Leg. 1.82; 3.42, 87, 217–219; Cher. 8; Det. 124; etc.). Isaac is called after the feeling which he raises, viz. joy (Mut. 261). In Praem. 31 Philo defines laughter as the visible and bodily sign of the unseen joy in the mind. Isaac also personifies felicity (εὐδαιμονία; Cher. 106; Det. 60; Post. 134). Philo explains that felicity, joy and gladness belong to those who have ceased from the manner of women (Gen 18:11) and died to the passions (Cher. 8). For Philo’s interpretation of Isaac see Goodenough 1935, 153–166; Böhm 2005; Termini 2007, 186–187; for the explanation of his name Grabbe 1988, 171. patience called … Rebecca. Philo usually interprets Rebecca as a symbol of patience (ὑπομόνη; Sacr. 4; Det. 30, 45, 51; Migr. 208; Fug. 39, 194; Congr. 36; Somn. 1.46) or as steadfastness in good things (ἐπιμονὴ τῶν καλῶν; Cher. 41, 47; Fug. 24, 45). This meaning is based on the Hebrew qwh (“to wait”); see Grabbe 1988, 197. For Philo’s interpretation of Rebecca see Sly 1990, 154–160; Nikiprowetzky 1996, 145–169. by the Hebrews. In explaining Hebrew names, Philo often contrasts the language of the Hebrews with that of the Greeks; cf., for instance, Sobr. 45; Conf.

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68, 130; Congr. 42; Mut. 71; Somn. 2.250. Here the contrast is implied rather than made explicit. Introducing Rebecca in Congr. 36 he remarks that she is called “steadfastness” by the Greeks but Rebecca by the Hebrews. From Conf. 129 it appears that Philo identifies himself with the speakers of Greek: “it [the tower, cf. Judg 8:17] is as the Hebrews say Penuel, but as we say ‘turning from God.’” For Philo’s use of the term Ἑβραῖος see Birnbaum 1996, 46–47; Rosso Ubigli 2003, 54–55. private citizen … a king. The contrast between kings and private citizens in a philosophical context is also made in Ebr. 113. Referring to Num 21:18 (“kings hewed it”) Philo states that to dig a well is not permitted for citizens but only for kings and therefore it belongs to great leaders to look for wisdom. The connection between wisdom and kingship is also made in Virt. 216: Abraham was deemed a king because of the greatness of his soul; his insight was that of a king. Cf. Prob. 126: noble souls have something of a king. In the background we may discern the Stoic idea that only the wise person is a king (Diogenes Laertius 7.122), a theme to which Philo often refers (Post. 138; Sobr. 57; Migr. 197; etc). a king. In Gen 26:8 Abimelech is presented as the king of Gerara. Philo interprets his name as “father king” (QG 4.176). In allegorical terms Abimelech is someone who makes moral progress (QG 4.188). Abimelech. This is the only place in the Allegorical Commentary or the Exposition where Philo refers to the story of Abimelech and Isaac told in Gen 26:6–11. Having arrived in Gerara, Isaac presents his wife Rebecca as his sister. (This text is clearly a doublet of the sojourn of Abraham and Sarah in Egypt in Gen 12:10– 20.) Abimelech the king looked through the window and saw Isaac playing around with his wife Rebecca (a biblical euphemism for having sexual relations). After a discussion with Isaac about his lie, Abimelech gave him and his wife protection. This story is explained literally and allegorically in QG 4.188, where Philo elaborates the theme of joy. See Parallel Exegesis. It is rather surprising to read how positively Philo portrays Abimelech in this text, presenting him as a king (cf. Gen 26:8) in whom wisdom has dwelt for a very long time. Philo can associate a king with the wise person, since only wise persons can be a king (Post. 138; Sobr. 57; Migr. 197; etc). In Gen 20 a comparable encounter between Abimelech and Abraham is told which in QG 4.60–70 is expounded both literally and allegorically. In this interpretation, however, Philo portrays Abimelech in a negative way, presenting him as the fooolish mind who loves himself. For Philo’s interpretation of Abimelech see Geljon 2016, 312–317. Philo alludes to the same verse in Cher. 8: Isaac yearns for a game, not the game of children but a divine game. looked through the window … These words διακύψας τῇ θυρίδι are a paraphrase of the biblical παρακύψας … διὰ τῆς θυρίδος in Gen 26:8 but the final

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words of the section “saw … wife” are an almost exact quotation (slight change in word order). It would not be correct to regard the quote as a secondary biblical lemma, since it is not connected with the thread of the exegesis in this treatise, but rather inserts a most interesting biblical example in the discussion of “the views of others” (§142) on the subject of drunkenness. Somewhat similarly Philo inserts a biblical allusion at Prob. 57 in the context of a purely philosophical treatise. It seems that only here Philo interprets a window in a biblical text as the eye of the mind (διάνοια), giving access to knowledge. Elsewhere he likens the faculties of the senses to windows: apprehension of sensible things enters through the senses as through a window (QG 1.34). the unshuttered … the mind. For the expression “eye of the mind,” see § 48 and the comment ad loc. This is the only place where Philo employs the adjective “light-bearing” with a reference to the eye of the mind. But he does use it in the context of the contents of the (rational) soul; see Ebr. 44 (intelligible beams from God); Decal. 49 (laws as stars). saw Isaac … his wife. An exact quotation of the second part of Gen 26:8. Philo alludes to this verse in Cher. 8: Isaac yearns for a game, not the game of children but a divine game. §170. to play … share delight. Philo once again employs a fine tricolon (παίζειν, γανοῦσθαι, συνευφραίνεσθαι). The last verb (συνευφραίνομαι) is only found twice in Philo (also in Conf. 6). For the use of tricola, cf. §§ 7, 60, 67, 112, 114, 125, 145, 166, 177. For Philo’s style of writing and his use of figures of speech see Introduction, section 6b. (4) §171. to intensify and strengthen. Philo combines the rarely used verb σφορδρύνω (“to strengthen”) with the much more common verb ἐπιτείνω (“to intensify”). The only other place where Philo employs σφορδρύνω is in Mos. 1.120 in combination with the verb προσεπιτείνω. tendencies … agents. Note that Philo avoids technical philosophical terms here, just using unspecific neuter plural expressions. Take money for example. The same example is found in Eryxias, a Socratic dialogue ascribed to Plato, but which is regarded as spurious. Socrates reports the answer given by Prodicus to the question in what way being wealthy is a good and in what way it is an evil. Prodicus answers that it is a good for good and noble men and to those who know in what way they should use money, whereas it is an evil for those who are bad and ignorant. The same is true of all other things (397e). Similarly, Philo here sees money as the cause of good things for the wise person. Elsewhere he writes that the wicked person regards the possession of money as the most perfect good, whereas the wise person

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sees it as necessary and a means to an end (Leg. 2.17). In contrast, he standardly disapproves of money and wealth as being external goods which have nothing to do with the soul (Det. 136; Post. 117; Gig. 15). He calls money, glory and strength of the body the greatest evild (Gig. 37). See further comment at § 39 (“the so-called … humankind”). On this passage see now Donato 2016, who argues that a reminiscence of the Ps.Platonic text is possible, but not necessary. as someone has said. Perhaps a reference to the Eryxias text—and thus (Ps.)Plato—but it is more likely to refer to the pronouncement of Prodicus. fame. Philo normally considers fame or glory (δόξα) as an external good just as money, of which a wise person disapproves. Fame and money are listed together in Leg. 1.75; Det. 136; Post. 117; Gig. 15, 37; Her. 48, 92; Fug. 39; Somn. 1.124; Opif. 79; Decal. 153; Spec. 4.82. good emotions. The Stoics place good emotions (εὐπάθειαι) in opposition to the passions (πάθη) and recognize three good emotions: joy, caution and will. Joy is the counterpart of pleasure, caution of fear, and will of desire (Diogenes Laertius 7.116). This opposition is also found in Philo, for example at Migr. 119; Her. 77, 192. The wicked person suffers from the four passions but the person who yearns for virtue has the corresponding good emotions (Det. 119–120). In QG 2.57 he lists the three Stoic good emotions, but then adds a fourth, compunction (perhaps δηγμός); on this text see Dillon and Terian 1976–1977; for εὐπάθειαι in Philo see Winston 1984, 400–405. (5) §172. Who is not aware that. Using this rhetorical question Philo adds a further step to his argument. The same expression (τίς οὐκ οἶδεν ὅτι), which usually introduces a general observation that cannot be contested, is found in Leg. 1.9; Conf. 16, 100, 135; Congr. 161; Somn. 2.52; Opif. 41; Ios. 62, 131; Mos. 2.38; Spec. 3.193. See also above on §168. two opposites. In ancient rhetoric an argument based on contraries was a commonplace (τόπος; Aristotle, Rhet. 2.23, 1397a6–19) and Philo also employs it in several passages. As an example we refer to Agr. 118, where he states that it is impossible to apply two opposites to one thing. Other examples of arguments based on contraries are found in Gig. 1–3 and Deus 123. White and black. Philo offers a similar argument in Aet. 104. In pairs forming opposites, it is impossible that the one exists and the other does not. If white exists, it is necessary that black also exists. Black and white are listed in a series of opposites in Ebr. 186; Her. 209. honourable people and worthless people. For the use of the Stoic terms ἀστεῖος and φαῦλος see comments at §69 (“the good person”), 139 (“the honourable”) and 164 (“worthless person”).

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Therefore, the honourable person … his virtue. This seems to be the opinion of the Stoic philosopher Cleanthes, according to whom virtue cannot be lost because of the secure knowledge that the wise man possesses. Chrysippus opposed this view by arguing that virtue can be lost through drunkenness or depression (Diogenes Laertius 7.127–128 = SVF 1.568–569). See further the discussion in Bénatouïl 2007, 289–292. Parallel Exegesis The only other passage where Philo refers to Isaac’s playing is QG 4.188. He suggests that the game of Isaac is virtuous and praiseworthy because it is a sign of a heart that enjoys. The festive enjoyments of perfect persons is called a game. Worthless persons, however, do not participate in this but lead sorrowful and painful lives. The virtuous person always enjoys this game, whether in the body or after being released from it at death. So do the angels and the heavenly bodies, and even God the creator rejoices in life. Because the wise person strives for likeness to God, he wishes to have gladness and joy. Therefore, he plays this game of constant virtue with Rebecca. At the end of this text Abimelech is described as the person making progress (ὁ προκόπτων) who looks through the window and sees the game, but not all of it. Nachleben The influence of Philo’s exegesis of Isaac playing with Rebecca can clearly be seen in Clement of Alexandria, Paed. 1.21.3–22.3, where Clement even quotes Philo literally. Just as Philo, Clement explains the name Isaac as meaning “laughter.” The curious king saw him playing with his wife and helper Rebecca. The king, whose name was Abimelech, represents supramundane wisdom, seeing the mystery of playing. Rebecca means patience. The spirit of the children of Christ, who live in patience, rejoices, and this is the divine play. After this explanation Clement cites Philo: “What other activity would be more suitable for the wise and perfect person than to play and share delight with patience who awaits good things and with the administration of good things, holding festival with God?”

Philo Plant.

Clement Paed.

§170 Τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἐμπρεπὲς ἔργον σοφῷ ἢ τὸ παίζειν καὶ γανοῦσθαι καὶ συνευφραίνεσθαι τῇ τῶν καλῶν ὑπομονῇ;

1.22.1 Τί γὰρ ἄλλο εὐπρεπὲς ἔργον σοφῷ καὶ τελείῳ ἢ παίζειν καὶ συνευφραίνεσθαι τῇ τῶν καλῶν ὑπομονῇ καὶ τῇ διοικήσει τῶν καλῶν, συμπανηγυρίζοντα τῷ θεῷ;

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(cont.)

Philo Plant.

Clement Paed.

For what other activity would be suitable for the wise person than to play and rejoice and share delight with patience who awaits good things?

For what other activity would be suitable for the wise and perfect person than to play and share delight with patience who awaits good things and with the administration of good things, as he holds festival with God.

We can see that Clement makes slight alterations in the citation. To the wise person he adds the epithet “perfect.” He omits the verb “rejoice,” and to “patience” he adds “administration.” The last phrase “holds festival with God” is also an addition, though very much in a Philonic vein (see comment on § 166). In what follows Clement gives the Philonic interpretation a Christological turn, seeing in Rebecca a type of the church, the helper of our salvation. The king is then Christ, who from above sees our laughter, and looking through the window, as Scripture says, views the thanksgiving, the blessing, the rejoicing and the gladness. In his reference to Gen 26:8 Clement uses the verb διακύπτω, just as Philo, whereas the LXX reads the verb παρακύπτω. We may surmise that this is a result from Clement’s reading of Philo. The interpretation of Rebecca as patience is found in Origen, Hom. Num. 12.1.7, but it is not necessarily borrowed from Philo (cf. Jerome, Nom. hebr. 9.32 Lagarde; also Ambrose: Rebecca is patientia, Isaac 1.1). Because the meaning of Isaac as laughter is present in the LXX, it is found in several church fathers: Clement of Alexandria, Paed. 1.21.3; Origen, Hom. Jer. 20.6; Eusebius, Praep. ev. 11.6.29; Gregory of Nyssa, Eun. 2.357; Didymus the Blind, Comm. Eccl. 412.13–14; Ambrose Isaac 1.1. e

Fourth (Non-professional) Argument: Writers are Positive about Drinking Wine (§§173–174) Analysis/General Comments Having given three professional arguments, i.e. arguments or proofs that are devised by the speaker, Philo offers a final, non-professional argument. A nonprofessional proof is not an argumentation composed by the rhetorician but is based on external material, such as laws or witnesses (Aristotle, Rhet. 1.2, 1355b36–40). Philo’s non-professional argument consists in invoking writings about inebriation by physicians and philosophers, who did not disapprove

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of the drinking of wine by wise persons. On this basis he concludes that a wise person may get drunk. Detailed Comments § 173. professional proofs … non-professional. For these kinds of proofs see the Introductory section to Part 2 Chapter 1 above. Philo speaks about a nonprofessional proof in a deprecatory way in Spec. 4.40. A perjurer with little regard for piety takes refuge in the non-professional proof (an oath) because he lacks just arguments. §174. treatises on inebriation. On treatises entitled On Inebriation (Περὶ μέθης) written by philosophers and physicians see the Introductory remarks to Part 2 Chapter 1 above. The latter group deal mainly with the bodily consequences of being drunk and the use of wine as medicine. It is surprising to read about the writings of philosophers which, it would seem, contain testimonies rather than argument. We should perhaps think of treatises that were more anecdotal in character. They do … wine altogether. The implication is that the writers about inebriation do not dwell on the subject of drunken persons who say and do foolish things. Such behaviour does not fit a wise person and Philo here uses the term misuse (παροινία) to describe it. He distinguishes between being drunk without behaving foolishly on the one hand and being drunk and saying foolish things on the other (cf. §142). The first is appropriate for a wise person, the second is not. See further comment at §142 (“being foolish”). misuse of wine. Comparable use of παροινία as being heavily drunk is found in a purple passage at Ebr. 29. Philo combines παροινία with μέθη in Ebr. 138; Somn. 2.168, 200, 292; Spec. 1.206; Legat. 312, and seems to see there the two words as (nearly) synonyms. Here, however, he distinguishes between παροινία, which should be avoided, and μέθη, which is not per se a bad thing.

Chapter Three: Counter-Argument: The Wise Person May Not Get Drunk (§§175–177) Having set out the arguments in favour of the opinion that the wise person may get drunk, Philo now discusses counter-arguments. In the manuscripts the text ends at §177 abruptly, but it is almost certain that Philo wrote more and that we are missing some text. Because at the beginning of § 176 he refers explicitly to the first and most powerful argument, we can assume that he recorded more arguments. Besides this the extent of the exposition of the counter-argument is very short in comparison with the discussion of the arguments pro. It is impos-

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sible to know how long the missing text is, but it is very likely that, given Philo had written four arguments pro, he would have composed three or four argument contra. It is quite common for works from the ancient world to be missing their final part, since both the end of a book roll and the final leaves of a codex were vulnerable to damage and loss. It is likely, for example, that the final part of Sacr. has been lost, see Morris 1987, 832. Other examples are the final chapters of the Placita of Ps.Plutarch, where only the Arabic translation has the full text, and the final part of Book 7 of Diogenes Laertius’s Lives of the philosophers, where most regrettably a number of lives of post-Chrysippean Stoics are lost. a

Introducing the Counter-Argument: Both Points of View Needed (§175) Analysis/General Comments This introduction, in which Philo emphasizes the need for giving counterarguments, consists of a single long sentence. Again he makes use of his favourite imagery of athletics and boxing. Not giving arguments contra is like being the winner because the opponent has not showed up. It was indeed the practice in games that someone was proclaimed as winner when his opponent did not appear, for instance through fear of his adversary (Pausanias 5.21.14). The winner gains victory without any bloodshed and without raising a sweat. A few times Philo refers to this practice (Leg. 1.115; Deus 147; Agr. 150; Her. 47; Virt. 38; Praem. 31).

Detailed Comments § 175. he does compete. On Philo’s very frequent use of imagery drawing on athletics see our comment at §145 (“like defeated athletes”). shadow-boxing. This is the only place where Philo employs the rare verb σκιαμαχέω. He uses the cognate words σκιαμαχία (Cher. 81) and σκιαμάχος (Det. 41) referring to the practice of boxing without adversaries. Before Philo, we find it three times in Plato (Apol. 18d6; Leg. 830c3; Resp. 520c7). The use of composites such as σκιαμαχέω is characteristic of Philo’s style of writing. For composites ending in “μαχ” see ὀφιμάχος (“fighting with serpents”), which is typically Philonic (Leg. 2.105, 108; Opif. 163, 164; Spec. 4.114) and the comparable verb γνωσιμαχέω (“fight with one’s own opinion”), which is found in some classical authors and five times in Philo (Congr. 53; Somn. 1.32; Abr. 215; Mos. 1.220, 232). For Philo’s vocabulary see Introduction, section 6b. it is … opposite viewpoint. Note the parallel (though much shorter) sentence in Aet. 150 in which Philo announces he will give “the opposite arguments (ἐναντιώσεις) to each point.” For the verb “establish” see comment at § 149.

part two, chapter three, §§ 175–177

295

b

First Argument: No One Confides in a Drunkard (§§ 176–177) Analysis/General Comments As his first argument Philo offers the following syllogism, which however, is invalid: (1) a secret will not be entrusted to a drunken person; (2) a secret will be entrusted to a wise person; Conclusion: the wise person may not get drunk.

Exactly the same argumentation was given by Zeno, as reported by Seneca: no one entrusts a secret to a drunkard; but one will entrust a secret to a good person; therefore, the good person will not get drunk (Ep. 83.9 = SVF 1.229). Seneca refutes this argument in the same way as Philo has someone reply here: no one entrusts a secret to a man when he is asleep; but one entrusts a secret to a good man; therefore, the good man does not go to sleep. In his discussion of Zeno’s argument Seneca points to Posidonius’s solution to this contradiction (F175 Edelstein & Kidd; see comments by Kidd 1982, 2.645–646). According to the latter the word “drunken” is used in two ways. First, it refers to a person was has drunk a great amount of wine and has no control over himself. Secondly, it refers to a person who is in the habit of getting drunk. In Posidonius’s view Zeno means the latter. No one entrusts a secret to a person who is in the habit of getting drunk. Seneca does not accept this solution and concludes that Zeno’s syllogism is a fallacy (Ep. 83.10–11). The Roman philosopher also offers examples of secrets that were entrusted to drunken persons to show that Zeno’s conclusion is false (Ep. 83.12–17). In the text that we have Philo does not discus the refutation of the syllogism and it seems that his line of argument breaks off. Seneca’s treatment shows that Zeno’s syllogism was discussed in Stoic circles and very likely Philo was aware of the discussion and would have said more about in his treatment of the argument. Detailed Comments § 176. The first. As already stated above, these words indicate that Philo would have given more than one argument. If you … get drunk. As noted in the general remarks above, Philo reports the argument by the Stoic Zeno. Philo’s rewording has been included in the Stoic fragments by Von Arnim, SVF 1.229. honourable person. See comment at §139. speaking at too great a length. Philo is fond of the verb μακρηγορέω, which is found in his writings 16 times. Before him it is attested circa ten times.

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§177. Someone will say in opposition. The same refutation of Zeno’s syllogism is given by Seneca, who only offers the example relating to sleep. The examples of being depressed and dying may have been invented by Philo. But Chrysippus’s remark should be noted that virtue can be lost through inebriation or depression (Diogenes Laertius 7.127). Philo employs the verb μελαγχολάω (“to be depressed”) only in the present context, which might be the result of following a source causing him to depart from his usual vocabulary. such experience. Philo refers back to being depressed, sleeping and dying but particularly to dying because the soul and the divine do not die. the wise person … dies. It does seem rather odd to end a treatise with a counter-factual conclusion such as this. See above General comments on the likelihood that the end of the treatise is missing.

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Indices

∵

It should be noted that the first three sections of these indices do not contain all references to texts in the Commentary, but only those texts which are cited or discussed in some detail. All Bible references in the footnotes and the endnotes to the Translation and most Bible references in the Commentary are indexed. For ancient names see both the Index of Ancient Texts and the Index of Subjects and Names; repetitions are avoided where possible. In the Index of Ancient Texts English titles are preferred for well-known works, Latin titles are retained for works that are less well-known. Page numbers joined by a dash indicate a reference on each of the pages concerned, not necessarily a continuous discussion.

Index of Biblical Passages Cited Hebrew Bible Genesis 1 1:1 1:4 1:14 1:19 1:27 1:26–27 1:31 2:1 2:6 2:7–8 2:7 2:8–9 2:8

2:9 2:16 3:8 3:9 3:18 3:23–24 3:24 4:2 4:16 4:26 6:3 6:9 6:12 6:14 6:18 7:6 9:20–21 9.20

9:21 11:7–9 12:10–20 15:2, 8 15.2–4

236 113 98, 166 64, 236 64 11, 17, 48, 119, 121, 123–124, 126–128 52, 146 167 101 199 52, 157 11–12, 17, 48, 101, 119, 121– 123, 126–128, 143, 145, 176, 204 146 8, 12, 17, 19, 28, 50, 86, 89, 95, 140–142, 145, 152–153, 156, 203–204, 216 12, 17, 51–52, 147–148, 156 202 141 157 270 161 33, 50, 143 94 158 205 129 45, 68, 95, 259 214 52 3 52 14, 18, 68, 85, 95, 258–259 2, 7, 17, 26, 28, 33, 45, 85– 86, 90–91, 94–95, 120, 192, 253 253, 259, 261, 284 98 288 169 263

15:6 15:10 17:1 17:2 17:17 21:6 21:30 21:33

25:27 26:6–11 26:8 26:18 26:20–32 26:32–33 28:10 28:20 28:21 29:31 29:34 29:35 30:9 30:17–18 30:17 30:18 30:37 31:10 36:12 36:32–33 37:2 37:3 37:15 39:1 49:15 Exodus 3:14 15:1–21 15:5 15:17–18 15:17

188, 208 238 6 2 287 287 201 13, 18–20, 33, 57, 59, 76, 86, 102, 191–194, 196, 201, 203, 206, 209–210 12, 17, 52, 146, 157 288 18, 73, 254, 283–284, 288– 289, 292 201 147 13, 18, 33, 58, 196–198 197 207 13, 17, 59, 192, 201, 207, 209 246 184 18, 66, 211, 244–247 247 66 247 245, 247, 249 18, 62, 211, 217, 225–226 227 174 192 286 227 215 279 247–249

20, 125 175 264 8, 12, 17, 19–20, 31, 52–54, 86, 89–90, 158, 162, 175, 179 178

330 Exodus (cont.) 15:18 22:8–11 25:40 27:1–8 31:2 31:3–5 31:3 32:27 32:29 33:11 35:30 Leviticus 1:1 10:8–10 13:12–13 13:14 16:8 17:11 19:23–25 19:23

19:24 19:25 25:9 Numbers 3:5–10 5:15 8:24–26 12:6–8 18:20 20:17 20:18 21:18

index of biblical passages cited

167 219 133 223 12, 17, 49, 127–128, 130–131 132 12, 49 183 182 181 131

12, 17, 23, 25, 48, 127–128, 131 9 18, 63, 217, 226–227 229 12, 18–19, 54, 90, 178–179, 183 127 13, 18–19, 25, 60, 211–213, 244, 258–259 13–14, 23, 62–63, 86, 214, 216, 218, 226, 228, 230–231, 234 14, 31, 64, 66, 234, 238–239, 244, 247–248 14, 66–67, 245, 248–251 177

182 18–19, 62, 223–224 182–183 133 8, 13, 18–19, 24, 55, 90, 179, 183 214, 259 151 288

23:19 28:15 28:24–25 Deuteronomy 6:4 6:11 10:9

16:21 18:2 20:5–7 20:6 23:16 26:13 28:30, 39 30:15 30:20 32 32:7–9 32:8 32:9 32:15 33:9

144 22, 30 182

184 86, 259 8, 13, 18–19, 24, 54–56, 78, 90, 160, 173, 176, 179, 182– 183, 190 86, 216 160 87 86 79 184 86, 88 146 178 175 8, 12, 18, 54, 78, 90, 174–176, 178 23, 178 24, 173 207 181, 183–184

Psalms 23:4 36:4 50:12 79:16 93:9 102:13

282 12, 17, 51, 135, 145, 151 282 135 12, 17, 49, 95, 135, 137 105

Hosea 14:9–10

14, 18, 25, 67, 211, 250–251

Isaiah 5:7

259

Rev 21:6, 22:13

196

New Testament Acts 17:23

233

Index of Philonic Passages Cited De opificio mundi 3 7–12 8 21–22 21 23 31 45–61 47–52 47 51 53–55 62 69–71 133–141 135 139 153 154 171

165 166 204 97 167, 208 206 236 236 237 195, 238–239 238 236–237 246 125 117 122, 157 136 147 147–158 101

Legum Allegoriae 1.31–42 1.34–36 1.43 1.46 1.48–51 1.49 1.52 1.57 1.79–84 1.87 1.95 1.101 1.105 2.17 2.18 2.51–52 2.51 2.52 2.53 2.74 2.87 2.95 2.99

126 206–207 141–142 152 86 215 213, 216 199 249 238 202 148 115 290 139 190 184 179 148 227 199 246 215

3.1 3.3 3.10 3.11 3.18 3.48 3.52 3.78 3.78 3.95–103 3.95–96 3.97–99 3.102–103 3.126 3.129–131 3.131 3.155 3.162 3.210 3.228 3.246 3.251

178 277 242 232 139 132 157 206 242 134 122 125 133 184 165 215 279 121 139 208 157 270

De Cherubim 10 13 13 14 27–29 41 56–58 65–66 70 86 94 123 127

160 150 270 219 202 130, 246 181 200 200 166 224 208 93, 101

De sacrificiis 15 17 35 43 47 86 103

222 132 212 212 232 169 277

332

index of philonic passages cited

De sacrificiis (cont.) 120

184, 248

Quod deterius 55 85 104 110 154 178

144 118, 120 248 286 101 241

De posteritate Caini 14 22 32 4 52 89–91 122 130 151 154

104 158 152 188 186 178 277 197 197 148

De gigantibus 6–18 7 8 16 19–27 25 45 45

107, 113 111, 117 112 116 129 199 203 232

Quod Deus sit immutabilis 12 132 17 266 42 246 46 121, 153 55 146 56 144 58 236 59 144 69 144 86 270 95–96 86 96 259 101 219 127–130 228–229 126 263

140–145 141–142 146 148–151 154 160 164

214 232 185 151 259 170 222

De agricultura 1–25 1–2 4 4 6–11 7 9 10 14 16 24 34 35 37 79–82 83–84 85–86 88 89 101 118 119–121 125 140–141 149–156 157 158 164 171 181

261 181 94 139 214–215 218 154 183 88 233 219 5 278 267 163 163 204 163 264 164 290 132 198 233 141 149 86–88 221 199 198

De plantatione

passim

De ebrietate 1 2 4–6 4 6 8

260 254 254 4, 259, 262, 281, 284 284 138, 240

333

index of philonic passages cited 11–153 11 12 15 22 29 74 82–83 112 113 116 122 143–148 131 136 141 157 158–159 166 207 211

262 4 264 267 264 293 242 248 154 288 278 197 254 280 232 264 215 200 284 265 279

De sobrietate 1 4 34 65

4 236 110 231

De confusione linguarum 6 160 14 189 71 227 129 288 136 104 166 105 171 207 176–177 113, 118 191 147 De migratione Abrahami 35 152 37 147 128 164–165 188 246 222 173 245 246

Quis heres 7 22–23 63 83–84 94–95 110 134 140 141–206 152–153 185 190 205 224 228 249 283

150, 170 103, 105, 203 263 220 165 242 98 97 238 99 136 195 105 113 102 267 99, 115

De congressu 12 18 38 50 56–58 56 61–62 105 124–125 134 141 142 164

212 233 210 112, 120 174, 178 162 157 278 249 190 139 199 265

De fuga et inventione 89–90 170 175–176 176 200 213

183 226 86–87 259 201 212

De mutatione nominum 6 173 10 233 15 203 18 241 46 208 53 2

334

index of philonic passages cited

De mutatione nominum (cont.) 127 183 139 250–252 147 189 190 196 254 246 De somniis 1.8–13 1.33–37 1.33 1.38 1.39 1.56 1.59 1.109 1.118–119 1.133–141 1.135 1.139 1.140 1.141 1.158 1.163 1.190 1.206 1.211 1.215 1.220 1.223 1.202–204 2.34 2.38 2.53–55 2.172–173 2.208 2.231 2.249 2.271 2.273 2.291

201 244 235 247 147 198 190 215 168 107, 113, 117 111, 117 109, 114 114 116 102 209 241 134 186 240 227 218 227 247 242–243 279 259 232 170 150 197 184 186

De Abrahamo 7 13 14 14 27 34–36

205 244 205 235 224 154

52 73 121 221 257 258 268 270

287 100 204 151 215 267 188 189

De Iosepho 43 144

220–221 185

De vita Moysis 1.36 1.76 2.106–108 2.184

170 287 223–224 278

De Decalogo 20–31 23 26

239 267 238

De specialibus legibus 1.13–20 1.66–67 1.81 1.131 1.174 1.257 1.260 1.277 1.281 1.210–211 2.55 3.1–6 3.51 3.95 3.99 3.159 4.30–38 4.40–56 4.40 4.67 4.73 4.123 4.133 4.173

186 240 93 190 279 282 282 237 221 239 285 5–6, 130 220 266 267 171 219 293 189 219 209 121 263 246

335

index of philonic passages cited De virtutibus 152 156–159 156–157 159 174 205 216 221

220 228, 234 217 244 79 157 288 170

De praemiis et poenis 36 128

154 86–87

Quod omnis probus liber sit 46 177 50 170 57 289 60 212 117 149 126 288 De vita contemplativa 40 57 89 90 40–56 40–56 57–63 De aeternitate mundi 3–6 10

267 198 255 154 280 280 255

259 166

15 20 75 90 150

97 253 105 258 253, 294

Legatio ad Gaium 48 250

174 171

De Providentia 2.24 2.40 2.107 2.109

185, 198 241 28 120

Quaestiones in Genesim 1.6–11 158 1.6 243 1.8 146 1.90 134 2.66 95–96, 136 2.67 105 2.68 261 3.56 196 4.8 99 4.60–70 288 4.188 288, 291 VI.9* 201 Quaestiones in Exodum 2.34 3 2.67–68 4 2.76 250

Index Ancient Texts Cited 1

Greek and Roman Texts

Aëtius Placita 4.5 Alcinous Epitome 12.1 15.4

138

123 99, 115

Alexander of Aphrodisias Commentary on Metaphysics 38.10–16 238 Anatolius On the First Ten Numbers 8.1m, p. 8.6–7 237 Anaximenes of Lampsacus Rhetoric to Alexander 11 188 Apuleius De deo Socratis 8–11 Aristides Orations 2.420

108

240

Aristotle Categories 1a1–15 270 On the generation of animals 2.3, 736b29–737a1 121 Historia animalium 5.19, 552b9–16 112 Fragments ed. Rose fr. 102 282 fr. 201 255 Meteorology 1.3, 340b6–11 30 Nicomachean Ethics 5.10, 1135b4–9 219 9.3, 1166a31–32 220

On the Heavens 1.3 Politics 1.4, 1259b40–a2 Rhetorica 1.2, 1355b–1356b 2.24, 1401a14–15 Athenaeus Deipnosophistae 2.40d 8.363b 11.483f.

30 84 268–269, 292 271

282 285 285

Calcidius Commentary on Timaeus 131–132 109 Cicero On the Ends 3.32 3.59 On Invention 1.8 On the Parts of Oratory 61 Paradoxa 33, 42 Tusculan Disputations 5.91

266 219 260 260 187–188 185

Cleomedes Caelestia 1.1.89–91

102

Cornutus Compendium 1.1–2 30.12

100 268

Diogenes Laertius Lives of the Philosophers 2.25 185 2.87 272

337

index ancient texts cited 6.37 6.60 7.28 7.87–88 7.78–79 7.108 7.111 7.116 7.118 7.124 7.125 7.127 7.127–128 7.128 7.176 8.32 10.119 Dionysius Thrax Ars grammatica 36.6–7 Epicurus Fragments ed. Usener fr. 57–65

272 271 266 164–165, 245 233 212, 266 255 290 274 261 187 256, 263, 296 291 245 266 116, 121 256, 262

15.2 Odyssey 12.118

104 240

Iamblichus Life of Pythagoras 150

235

Lucian Toxaris 12–18

221

Numenius Fragments ed. Des Places fr. 4b 104 fr. 13 91 fr. 15 91

270, 272

Philodemus On Anger XLVIII.36–XLIX.26

256

Pindar Fragments ed. Maehler fr. 31 240

Eudorus Fragments ed. Mazzarelli fr. 4 185 Heraclitus the Allegorist Homeric Questions 70 215 Heraclitus of Ephesus Fragments ed. Diels-Kranz fr. B12 264 Hermogenes On invention 1.5, 106.15

263

Hesiod Works and Days 599–600

271

Homer Iliad 1.467–471

281

Plato Alcibiades 149e–150a Euthypro 12e Laws 673c 716a 716e 937d Letters 6, 323d Phaedo 62c 67b 67d Phaedrus 244–245 246c–248e 246c 246e 248c 276e–277a

257

224 144 255 196 282 218 96 266 283 115, 267 267 114, 126 265 198 198 200

338 Republic 331c 379–381 554e Symposium 202e–203a Theaetetus 150b 191c–192a Timaeus 28a 28a–b 28c 29–30 29a 29e 30a 30d 31a 32c–33d 33b 34b 36e 38c–40d 40a 40b 43a–d 47a–c 58a 68e 69c 70e 89b 90a 92c Plutarch Moralia 503E–F 504B 955D–958E 1014A–B 1101E–F Polybius Histories 6.4.5

index ancient texts cited

219 169 278 109 198 123 101, 124 166 104 166 184, 243 208 29, 98 96 96 101 96 29, 103 29, 103 112 111 117 264 237 104 243 96 155 115 29, 116–120 96, 243

267, 270, 274 262 253 243 284

266

Posidonius Fragments ed. Edelstein-Kidd fr. F175 295 Ps.Aristotle De mundo 5, 396b28 6, 398a11–b6 6, 398b7–8

93 143 93

Ps.Galen Definitiones medicae 122

110

Ps.Iamblichus Theologoumena arithmeticae 34 245 80.3, 10 238 86.3–5 195 Ps.Longinus On the sublime 3.3–4 Ps.Plato Epinomis 984a–985b Eryxias 397e Quintilian Institutio oratoria 12.10.16–17

275

111 289

275

Sextus Empiricus Against the Mathematians 9.78–79 88 11.170 187 Seneca Letters to Lucilius 83.9 83.10–17

256, 263, 295 295

Stoa Stoicorum veterum fragmenta, ed. Von Arnim 1.229 256, 263, 295 3.104 256 3.262 238

339

index ancient texts cited 3.432 3.494 3.501 3.529 3.548 3.568–569 3.614 3.643 3.682 3.712 3.713

2

222 211, 248 248 261 200 291 261 256 261 39 256

Theon Rhetor Progymnasmata 120.13–17 121.5

253, 260 259

Theophrastus Fragments ed. Fortenbaugh et al. fr. 569–579 256

Jewish Texts

Apocalypse of Abraham 23.6 27

Jubilees 7.1–7

26

3Baruch 4:8–17

27

Dead Sea Scrolls CD III, 16, VI, 2–5

4 Maccabees 1:28 2:21–23 2:21

100 27 141

198 Pirke de Rabbi Eliezer 23

28

Targum Ps.Jonathan 9:20

28

Talmud b.Sanh. 70a

28

Genesis Apocryphon XII.13–19 Genesis Rabbah 36.3–4 Josephus Jewish Antiquities 1.140–141

3

26

28

27

Christian Texts

Ambrose On Noah 107–113 36 111 261 Exposition on Psalm 118 8.4 191 Clement of Alexandria Paedagogus 1.22.1 34, 291–292 3.54.1 34, 228–229

Protrepticus 1.5.1 Stromateis 1.31.6 1.173.6 1.182.2 2.51.5 5.72.2 7.105.4

34, 106 249 34, 209 209 158 34, 158 249

340 Cyril of Alexandria De adoratione et cultu 8

index ancient texts cited

249

Didymus the Blind Commentary on Genesis 44.8–11 249 48.26–49.1 249 119.10–11 233 Commentary on Zechariah 1.52, 88, 165 249 Epistle of Barnabas 7.6–7 179

De nominibus Hebraicis 9.32 292 12.16 134

Gregory Nazianzus Orations 38.12

158

Gregory of Nyssa De hominis opificio PG 44.196D

158

Justin Dialogus 40 Origen Against Celsus 3.23 Homilies on Genesis 1.11 Homilies on Exodus 6.10–13 Homilies on Jeremiah 18.5 Homilies on Joshua 3.2, 11.4 Homilies on Leviticus 5.2 8.6 9.1 15.3 16.4 Homilies on Numbers 7.1 10.3 12.1.7 25.3 21.1.3

3

Procopius Commentary on Genesis 221.91–93 261

Eusebius Ecclesiastical History 2.18.2 3, 36, 83 Preparation of the Gospel 7.13.3–4 3, 83, 106 7.13.4–6 36, 106, 127 7.18.1–2 36, 76, 127 8.12.22 1

Jerome De viris illustribus 11

179

35 35, 140 174 174 35 35, 140 35, 228 229 191 35, 140 280 35 292 35, 249 191

Index of Subjects and Names Aaron 133, 215 Abel 170, 188, 233 Abimelech 73, 288, 291 Abraham 7, 116, 152, 154, 156, 164, 169, 189, 193–194, 201–202, 208, 225, 287–288 as planter 13, 18, 33, 57, 86, 88, 191, 193– 194, 196, 201, 210–211 wise 8–9, 16, 24, 31, 133, 192, 211–212, 215, 250, 258 Achilles Tatius 99 Adam 24, 27–28, 50, 141, 143, 146, 158–160, 174, 178, 202, 244 earthy intellect/mind 52, 141, 154, 157, 161 sons of 12, 54, 90, 174–176 Adler, M. 3, 8, 258 Aelian 112 Aeschines 150 Aeschylus 117, 129, 133, 207, 232, 251, 273 Aëtius 110, 115, 138, 184 Alcinous 99, 103, 115, 123, 157, 222 Alexander of Aphrodisias 238 Alexander the Great 271 Alexander, Tiberius Julius 30n79, 172 Alexandria 132, 150, 173, 219–220, 279 Jews in 5 Allegorical Commentary 1, 2, 4, 5–8, 16, 31n81, 171, 253 allegorists 168, 193, 196 allotment of God/the Lord 12, 13, 18, 25, 53–56, 90, 159–160, 163, 172–173, 176, 179–182, 187–188, 190 see also inheritance; portion Amalek 174 Ambrose 36, 191, 261, 292 Anatolius 195, 235, 237–238 Anaxagoras 99, 101, 115 Anaximenes of Lampsacus 188 Andronicus of Rhodes 30, 139, 222 angels 23, 30, 47, 54, 90, 107–109, 114–117, 142, 168, 179, 240–241, 291 anthropomorphism 10, 144, 167 Apollodorus of Athens 271 Apollodorus of Lemnos 84 Apuleius 108–109, 222 Aquila 20, 137, 161, 162 Aratus 271

arithmology see numbers, theory of argument/proof indemonstrable 63, 233 non-professional 74, 268, 292–293 professional 74, 268, 292–293 Aristides 240 Aristippus of Cyrene 70, 272 Aristobulus 10, 25, 26 Aristophanes 118, 129, 150, 277, 280 Aristotle 30, 93, 101–102, 113, 121, 125, 129, 136, 138, 149, 154, 157, 166, 170, 173, 177, 196, 216, 225, 290, 292 on drunkenness 255 Arius Didymus 256 ark 2, 22, 52, 145, 155 Arnim, H. von, 39, 265 Asianism 275–276 Athenaeus 220, 255, 257, 280, 282, 285 Atticism 276–276 Atticus 167 Aulus Gellius 235 Augustine 158 Augustus 207 Babel 98, 189 Bacchai 69, 268 Baccchus 113, 151, 268, 274 see also Dionysus Barnes, E.J. 276 Barthélemy, D. 20, 106–107, 137, 162 Beersheba 191, 196 Bénatouïl, T. 255 Bezalel 12, 17, 23, 25, 49, 122, 128, 130–134 Billings, T.H. 96, 200 Birnbaum, E. 160 Björk, T. 84 blessed life/blessedness 59, 113, 157, 208 see also felicity; well-being body 11–12, 48–49, 52, 54, 85, 108, 113–115, 121–122, 130–131, 136, 146, 156, 172, 190, 236, 246, 275–277, 286 and passim ark 52, 145, 155 brother of the soul 182, 184 soul and 22, 58, 61, 69–71, 119, 130–131, 136, 146, 216, 218, 257, 267, 279–280, 282 Boiché, A. 150

342 Bonazzi, M. 29 Bos, A.P. 30n78 Bréhier, É. 102 Cain 7, 85, 94, 150, 171, 233, 241, 260 Calcidius 109 Caligula 5 Cato 84 Cato, Stoic 219 Cazeau, J. 11n48, 39 celestial bodies 234 see also heavenly bodies Chamaelion 256 Charitides of Paros 84 Cherubim 202 Christ 174, 179, 196, 249, 291–292 Chrysippus 138, 149, 256, 263, 291, 296 Cicero 113, 121, 185, 187–188, 219, 222, 260, 266, 276–277 cleansing 14, 18, 21, 60–61, 63, 72, 216–218, 228, 230–234, 259, 281 Cleanthes 165, 256, 263, 266, 291 Clement of Alexandria 10, 32, 34–36, 103, 142, 144, 151, 155, 222, 249, 263, 268, 282 Cleomedes 102 Cohen, N.G. 131 Cohn, L. 1n2, 5–6, 37, 176 Colson, F.H. 37–38, 40, 83–84, 114–115, 210, 257 Conley, T.M. 100, 190, 258 Coria, M. 38 Cornutus 9, 99–100, 149, 163, 268, 274 cosmos 22, 29–30, 48, 50, 56, 64, 68, 92–94, 99, 101–108, 111, 135, 159 as plant 11, 21, 45–46, 53, 88–89, 91, 101, 107, 110, 118, 135, 163, 191–192, 210, 258 creation of 19, 91–92, 143, 166–167, 204, 243 God’s house/temple 53, 65, 159, 165, 240 indestructibility of 262 intelligible/noetic 96–97, 123, 166, 236 covenant 2–3, 183 Critolaos 121 Cumont, F. 241 Cynic(s)/Cynicism 32, 70, 132, 190, 222, 271– 272, 279–280 Cyrenaics 272 Cyril of Alexandria 168, 249

index of subjects and names daemons 23, 30, 108–109, 111, 116 day of atonement 12, 54, 177, 179 deducution 268 Demetrius 171 Demetrius of Phalerum 269, 277 Democritus 135 Demosthenes 220, 221 De Plantatione biblical quotations in 16–18 chronology 5–6 genre 7–10 manuscripts of 37 Nachleben 34, 40 place in Allegorical Commentary 2–4 scholarship on 38–40 structure of 10–16 text of 37 title of 83–84 translations of 38 Deuteronomy 18–19, 86 Dexippus 271 dialectic 199, 233, 268 diatribe 190, 279–280 Didymus the Blind 36, 151, 233, 249, 292 Dillon, J. 29, 99 Diodorus Siculus 105, 172, 195, 222, 226, 233, 278 Diogenes Laertius 109, 121–122, 153, 155, 163, 188, 215, 220, 222, 256, 263, 270–272, 282, 288, 294 Diogenes of Sinope 32, 70, 271–272 Dionysius of Halicarnassus 32, 105, 165, 169, 195, 233, 242, 265, 278 Dionysius Thrax 270–272 Dionysus 257, 268 Doutreleau, L. 249 drunkenness 3, 4, 8, 15, 26, 28, 39, 70, 94, 221, 254–257, 266, 269, 280, 289, 291 see also inebriation earth 11, 23–24, 45–50, 56–57, 64–66, 68–69, 92, 94, 98–101, 107–111, 114, 117, 130, 136, 143, 175–176, 260, 265 as mother/nurse 47, 117 ecstasy 152, 254, 267–268 see also possession, divine Edelstein, L. 89 Eden 10, 12, 21, 27, 50–51, 86, 89, 140, 145, 149–152, 158, 177, 270

index of subjects and names Edom 151 education 199, 212–213, 220, 254, 262, 264, 266, 270, 273 Egypt 83, 170, 172, 193, 265, 288 element, fifth 30 see also ether elements, four 30, 88, 92–94, 97–101, 105– 111, 147, 234, 237 Eliphaz 174 Elohim 202–203 Empedocles 98, 104 enthymeme 268 Enos 205, 244 Epictetus 132 Epicureans 32, 256 Epicurus 256, 262, 284 Epistle of Barnabas 179 equality 32, 64, 234, 237–238 Esau 157 ether 47–48, 99–100, 108, 111–112, 115–116, 121, 124–125 Etymologicum Magnum 272 etymology 9, 15, 24, 26, 72, 100, 128, 145, 147, 160–161, 174, 184, 204, 239, 258, 275, 283, 285 Eudorus 29, 99, 185 Eudoxus of Cnidus 112, 113 Euripides 113, 133, 150, 232, 273 Eusebius 3, 10, 35–37, 83–84, 104, 106–107, 120, 123, 127, 142, 152, 171, 210, 292 Eustathius 155 excellence(s), (moral) 33, 41, 50–52, 54, 65, 132, 138–140, 145, 149, 153–154, 164, 170, 198, 200, 214–215, 247 Exodus 18, 86 Exposition of the Law 1, 6, 8, 88, 135, 154, 190, 258 external goods 151, 180, 185, 188–189, 290 faith 188, 189, 208 felicity 22–23, 31, 50–51, 53, 55, 143–144, 149, 154, 165, 186, 188, 248, 287 see also blessed life; well-being figures of speech 32–33, 289 anaphora 186 apostrophe 33, 169, 190, 223 chiasmus 33, 104 homonyms 15, 70, 269, 270–271 hyperbole 187, 241

343 litotes 286 metaphor 21, 32–33, 93, 97, 110, 122, 134, 168, 254, 276 see also metaphorical use oxymoron 224, 254 rhetorical question 15, 33, 140–141, 286, 290 synonyms 25, 33, 40, 70–71, 86, 94, 131, 139, 143–144, 153, 160, 203, 206–207, 220–221, 240, 248, 267, 269, 270, 272, 276, 286, 293 tautology 241 tricolon 33, 102, 176, 186, 232, 239, 272, 285, 289 flattery 221 flood (great) 2, 3, 26–27, 52, 155 friendship 61–62, 171, 207, 220–222 of God 154, 258 Früchtel, U. 88–89 Gaius, emperor 172 Galen 138, 149, 257, 271 Gelenius, S. 37, 84 Genesis Apocryphon 26 gladness 3, 72, 259, 281, 284–285, 287, 291– 292 God all-sufficient 143 all-wise 49, 133, 135 alone wise 51–52, 150, 250 artificer 50, 140, 199 beginning and end/limit 22, 57, 60, 194, 196, 211 cause 13–14, 21–22, 24, 48–50, 54–56, 59–60, 65, 68, 83, 103, 124, 169–170, 178, 184, 208, 243, 246 craftsman 22, 46, 101, 110, 140 creator 21, 24, 91, 97, 101, 105, 108, 119, 132, 135, 138, 187, 235, 241, 243, 291 everlasting 13, 21, 46, 57, 59, 102, 191–194, 201, 203, 206, 210 Father 22, 46, 65–66, 104, 115, 117, 122, 140, 167, 187, 242 gifts of 59–60, 148, 199, 201, 206, 208, 210–211 (great) king 22, 30, 50, 117, 125, 142, 143, 167, 201, 204–205, 208 good 91, 148, 208, 232 goodness of 167, 202, 204–206, 208 honour to 65, 235, 240–244

344 image of 11, 17, 22, 48, 52, 119, 122, 124, 127, 156, 166 invisible 125, 142 leader of the (entire) universe 22, 45, 56, 59, 96 lawgiver 245 maker 12, 47, 53, 56, 59, 65–66, 96, 104, 113, 124–125, 133, 159, 167, 169, 180, 242– 243 master 53, 59, 103, 169–171, 183, 202–203, 205, 207–208 Most High 54, 90 the One 55, 184, 251 overseer 45, 96 performer of miracles 45, 100 planter 11, 15, 21, 45, 57, 85, 86, 88–89, 91, 95–96, 103, 119, 135, 137, 140, 158, 190, 192, 212 ruler 13, 59, 183, 205, 209, 250 service of 144, 169–171, 173, 180 sovereign ruler 22, 25, 50, 54, 67, 142, 251 sower 200 ungenerated 48, 50, 55, 102, 126, 144, 169, 184, 186 who IS 21, 48, 49, 56, 125, 126, 131, 190 world-fasioner 45, 97 worship of 51, 55, 131, 150, 176, 240 good emotions 286, 290 goodwill 31, 59, 62, 207, 220, 222 Gregory Nazianzus 158 Gregory of Nyssa 152, 158, 210, 264, 292 Gutzwiller, K.J. 254 Hagar 116 Haran 136 Harl, M. 151 Harris, H.A. 132 Hay, D. 168 heavenly bodies 99, 112, 115, 187, 236–237, 244, 291 Hegesias 275 Heinemann, I. 38, 114 hekatombe 223 Heliodorus 152 Heracles 148 Heraclitus, allegorist 9, 149, 163, 215 Heraclitus of Efese 165, 264 Heraclides of Pontus 121

index of subjects and names Hermagoras 260 Hermogenes 263, 277 Herodotus 113, 142, 170, 193, 204, 251, 281 Hesiod 9, 129, 149, 241–242, 271 Hesychius 130, 168, 273 hetairai 220, 221 Hieronymus of Rhodes 256 Hippocrates 257 Homer 9, 104, 129, 193, 195, 215, 241, 251, 271, 273, 281 Hosea 18–19, 25, 250–251 human being(s) 4, 21–22, 48, 52, 68, 85, 90, 116–124, 128, 157 and passim affinity with God 171 as heavenly plant 11, 47, 88, 101, 119, 120, 127 as microcosm 35, 49, 134–135, 140 as plant 11, 29, 88 as planters 13, 16, 60, 210 creation of 11–12, 17, 19, 27, 29, 47, 49–50, 101, 119–120, 134, 143, 146, 153, 156 Iamblichus 115, 235 imagery athletic 33, 132, 195, 265–266, 277, 294 bearing fruit 33, 53, 138–139, 146, 194, 214–215 circle 206 citadel 279–280 fishing 219 fountain 58, 117–118, 199, 208, 237–238 light 153 lyre 278, 286 marking/stamping 122–123, 166 nautical 261, 273 raining 210 running 164, 195–196, 239 sea 264 sowing/planting 33, 86–87, 93, 120, 134, 138, 154, 162, 194, 200, 215, 252 storm 129 inebriation 7, 14, 15, 68, 73–74, 254, 255– 257, 259–262, 270, 283–284, 292–293, 296 sober 254, 255 inheritance of God/the Lord 8, 12, 24, 52, 55, 89–90, 158–160, 173–174, 176, 179, 181, 183, 188 see also alottment; portion

345

index of subjects and names intellect 13, 22, 41, 48–49, 51, 58, 60, 63, 66, 69, 71–72, 91, 120, 125, 138, 145, 153, 240, 244, 262, 274 cleansed 65, 240 earthly 52, 146, 161 intermediate 52, 146, 148, 157, 212 invisible 65, 240 purified 55, 183 ruling part 122, 154, 156, 200 see also soul, rational intelligible world 151, 166 see also cosmos, intelligible irrational animals 47 Isaac 9, 15, 18, 24, 58, 73, 133, 149–150, 152, 156, 196, 201, 225, 252, 254, 283–289, 291–292 Isaiah 250 Isocrates 224 Israel 8, 12, 17, 18, 24, 52, 54–55, 86, 90, 147, 154, 158–159, 163, 165, 175, 179, 181, 211, 214, 223, 258–259 seeing God 24, 147, 160–161, 173–174, 176, 186, 259 Issachar 14, 18, 19, 24, 25, 66, 245, 247–249, 258 Jacob 16–18, 24, 34, 59, 90, 116–117, 132–133, 150, 152, 157, 168, 192, 197, 201, 209, 217, 225–226, 244, 247 Jacob’s dream 108, 116–117, 207 practiser 14, 62, 139, 156, 207, 287 renamed Israel 154, 175 unmoulded 17, 52, 146, 156 Jaeger, W. 112 Jeremiah 250 Jerome 3, 134, 292 Johannes Damascenus 104 John, gospel of 36 Joseph 154, 215, 227, 279, 286 Josephus 94, 96, 105, 132, 196, 223, 226, 232, 242 Jubilees 26 Judah 14, 18, 19, 24–25, 66, 239, 243–245, 247, 249, 258 justice 32, 64, 95, 140, 153, 165, 202, 224, 234, 237–238, 248 Justin 179

Keizer, H. 103, 170 Kidd, I.G. 89 law of nature 66, 245 Leah 14, 24, 66, 244, 246–247, 249 Leonhardt, J. 150–151 Leonhardt-Balzer, J. 11n47, 142 leprosy 18, 23, 34–35, 62, 215, 217, 226–229 Levi 8, 13, 18, 24, 55, 90, 170, 173, 179–180, 184, 191, 247 Levison, J.R. 130 Levites 13, 55, 160, 170, 172, 179–184, 186–191 Leviticus 18, 20, 86, 131 Lévy C. 30n78 Lewis, N. 172 literalists 189 logic 232, 237, 283 Stoic 31, 141, 233 Logos of God 22, 34, 36, 48, 91–93, 102–107, 116, 119, 122–124, 146, 150, 164, 168–169, 174, 236, 241 cutting 99 immanent 29, 46, 89, 92, 94, 103 Lord name/title of 21, 57, 59, 141–142, 167, 191– 192, 194, 201, 203, 209–210 portion of the 8, 13, 18, 54–55, 90, 173, 175–176, 179 love, divine 51, 151 love for humanity 209 Lucian 221, 280 Lydus, John 235, 237–239 madness 69, 262, 267–268 Mainads 69 Mainoles 35, 69, 262, 268 Mangey, T. 37, 181, 193, 274 Martin, J.P. 38 Massebieau, L. 1n2, 5 matter 97–98, 101 Menander 117, 221 metaphorical language, use of 33, 40, 84, 100, 138, 154, 185, 194, 196, 198–199, 203, 205–206, 215, 218–220, 222, 230, 232– 233, 245, 248, 250, 254, 263–265, 275, 277, 280 Middle Platonic/Middle Platonism/Middle Platonists 29–31, 91, 99, 108–109, 123, 152, 222

346 middle stages 60, 212–213, 226 mind 22, 27, 41, 48, 51–52, 86, 96, 100, 127, 143, 145, 154, 157, 166, 192, 199–200, 246, 251, 259, 289 and passim as citadel 279–280 as sun 135 eye(s) of 54, 73, 119, 160–161, 173, 289 flight of 22, 119, 125–128, 131, 152, 265 image of God 166 purified 13, 24, 180, 183, 186, 234 see also intellect Miriam 133 Mnemosyne 65, 234, 242 Mnesitheus 257, 285 Moderatus 31 Morris, J. 4 Moses all-wise 23, 49, 133 author of the Torah 17, 23, 94, 236 lawgiver 3, 55, 68, 131, 138, 181, 185, 260 most holy 23, 73, 204, 286 prophet 251 steward and guardian 23, 49, 131 Muses 65, 105, 241–243 music 276, 278 Musonius Rufus 222, 279 myth, mythical 10, 142, 144 Neopythagoreanism 31, 91, 184 New Testament 133, 138, 196, 232 Nicomachus of Gerasa 235 Niehoff, M. 6, 31n8, 165, 231 Nikiprowetzky, V. 170 Noah 2–7, 14, 21, 24, 26–28, 33, 45, 83–85, 90–92, 94, 105, 119, 139, 151–152, 154, 198, 253, 257 drunken 28, 254–255, 259, 261 just 68, 95, 254, 259–260 Nock, A.D. 276 Numbers 18 numbers, theory of 31, 194–195, 234–239, 249 five 14, 19, 35, 66, 244–245, 249, 258 four 14, 19, 32, 35, 64, 66, 234, 237, 238, 244, 257 ten 35, 64, 239 three 14, 63, 232, 258 Numenius 31, 91, 104

index of subjects and names Odysseus 215, 264 Olympiodorus 271 Oppian 271 ordinary duties 13–14, 60–61, 212–213, 216, 218, 226 Origen 35, 107, 129, 140, 144, 151–152, 155, 174, 179, 191, 229–230, 249, 268, 280, 292 Orion 271 paideia 117, 273 see also education paradise 8–9, 12, 17, 21, 27–28, 33–34, 50– 52, 89, 95, 138, 140–149, 153, 156, 161, 178, 204, 216, 227, 231, 243 Parmenides 102, 125 passion(s) 31, 63, 69, 73, 91, 100, 136, 141, 144, 174, 176, 212, 256, 263, 265, 276–278, 286–287 as beasts 155, 163 as horse 163 cardinal (four) 155, 290 controlling 96, 159 female 277 flood of 264 freedom of/impassibility 14, 23, 61, 87, 165, 211, 213–216, 247 lover(s) of 151, 179, 190 Stoic definition 163 struggle against 23, 27, 91, 132, 139, 156, 164, 215 trees of 85, 154, 214–216 variegated 226–229 see also vices patriarchs 1, 16, 19, 31, 194, 287 Paul 102, 233 Pausanias 294 Peripatos/Peripatetic 30, 152, 256 Persephone 116 Persius 276 Petronius 276 Petropolou, M.-Z. 224 Pharaoh 158, 176 Phillips, T.E. 255 Philo passim chronology of life 5 education of 33, 269, 270 exegete 16, 25 Hebrew, knowledge of 26n59, 197 style of writing 32, 33, 40, 101, 226, 294

347

index of subjects and names vocabulary 32, 233, 241, 294 Philodemus 221, 256, 277 piety 50, 56–57, 144–145, 189, 194, 196, 222, 224, 293 Pindar 116, 118, 207, 240–241, 273 planets 47, 107, 111–113, 125, 236, 245 Plato/Platonic 88, 93–94, 96–99, 101, 104, 109–112, 114–131, 133, 136–138, 149, 151– 155, 164–169, 171, 173, 177, 184, 195, 198, 200, 205, 208, 216, 218–222, 225, 231, 237, 240, 243, 255, 264–267, 276–278, 280, 285, 289, 294 Phaedrus 114, 119, 128 Symposium 30, 83, 255 Timaeus 29, 88, 98, 103, 104, 136, 235, 277 Plato(nism) and Philo 6, 21, 29–31, 34, 38 pleasure(s) 32, 51, 130, 145, 150–151, 155, 170, 174–175, 278–279, 221, 227, 272, 277, 285–286, 290 Plutarch 102–103, 109, 150, 188–189, 221–223, 242, 258, 263, 277, 280, 282, 286 pneuma 122 Pohlenz, M. 30n79 Polybius 32, 94, 105, 165, 195, 266, 278 Porphyry 10, 224 portion of God/the Lord 8, 12–13, 18, 24, 54– 55, 90, 160, 173, 175–176, 179–180, 183, 190 see also allotment; inheritance Posidonius 88–89, 109, 241, 256, 265, 295 possession, divine 51, 152, 251, 267 see also madness Potiphar 279 Pouilloux, J. 38, 114 power(s), divine 13, 52–53, 59, 142, 159, 161, 167, 193, 201–207, 209 prayer 8, 17–19, 31, 34–35, 59, 72, 86, 159, 161, 163, 174, 178, 207, 209, 222–224, 229, 275, 281 Proclus 123 Procopius 261 Prodicus 148, 289–290 progress, moral 85, 87, 156, 198, 207, 215, 259, 288, 291 proposition 68, 233, 263, 268–269, 284 Protagoras 157 Psalms 18–20, 49, 51, 135–137, 140, 150–151, 204, 251, 282

Ps.Aristotle 105 De Mundo 30, 93–94, 96, 100, 143 Ps.Galen 110, 139 Ps.Iamblichus 104, 195, 235, 237–239, 245 Ps.Longinus 275–277 Ps.Lucian 278 Ps.Plato 225 Ps.Plutarch 294 Ptolemy I 207 Ptolemy III 204 Ptolemy VI 25 purification 22, 183, 234, 257, 281–282 Pythagoras 116, 235 Pythagoreanism/Pythagoreans/Pythagorean 9, 31–32, 121, 164, 235, 238, 241 quaestio infinita 253, 259 Questions and Answers 1, 4–6, 171 Quintilian 275 rabbis/rabbinic 28, 36, 95, 202 Rachel 246–247 Radice, R. 38, 114 Rebecca 9, 15, 18, 24, 73, 254, 283–284, 287– 288, 291–292 reincarnation 109, 114–115, 140 reverence 50, 57, 144, 147, 188, 194, 223, 266 rhetoric 33, 188, 199, 233, 268–269, 290, 292 right action 66, 212–213, 219, 248, 263 right reason 54, 64, 149, 152, 165, 175–178, 237, 263 road of moral insight/virtue/wisdom 13, 23–25, 60, 87, 148, 156, 164–165, 170, 178, 205, 212, 214, 216–217 Rome 6 Royse, J. 20, 95, 137, 141–142, 162, 175, 193, 203, 225, 231, 232 Runia, D.T. 10, 88, 89, 135 sacrifice 21, 26–28, 62, 65, 72, 178, 217, 222– 225, 229, 239, 274–275, 281–282, 284 Samuel 254 sapiens 181 Sarah 149, 278, 285–288 Schroeder, G. 106 scripture allegorical interpretation 1, 9–10, 26–27, 51, 63, 141, 145–147, 189, 230–231 deeper meaning 141, 146, 189, 244

348 literal interpretation 9, 10, 12, 50, 63, 141–142, 145, 180, 189, 230–231 Seleucus (grammarian) 280 self-control 9, 105, 153, 164, 248, 265, 267 Seneca 39, 89, 132, 255, 256, 263, 266, 276– 277, 295–296 sense-perception 47, 53, 58, 66, 113, 130, 136, 166, 197, 200, 244, 246 senses, five 12, 14, 22, 27, 35, 49, 71, 108, 113, 120, 122, 134, 136, 141, 165, 197, 199–200, 227, 244–246, 249, 261, 274, 279, 289 Sextus Empiricus 88–89, 139, 187 Shem 154, 247 Simplicius 113, 185, 271 Sirius 271 Socrates 24, 180, 181, 185, 188, 198, 200, 266, 272, 283, 285, 289 sophist(s) 87, 148, 233 Sophocles 129, 142, 220, 273 soul 9, 12, 22, 25, 36, 48, 69, 86–88, 99–100, 115, 121, 123, 198, 201, 233, 236, 245, 264, 282, 285 and passim death of 158, 161 disease of 216, 221 division of 121–122 eye(s) of 48, 119, 125, 126, 138, 173, 248 flight of 125–126, 128, 130 incorporeal 11, 30, 47, 107, 109, 111, 113, 131 rational 48, 51–52, 118–122, 124, 127, 138, 148–149, 153–154, 156, 200, 240, 251, 289 suppliant 53, 169, 170 souls in the air 108–109, 112, 114–116, 118, 131 spirit, divine 11, 36, 48–49, 52, 119, 121, 122, 123, 126–130, 132, 156 stars 47, 64, 99, 108, 111–113, 121, 125, 236, 240, 271, 289 Sterling, G. 1, 4n15, 6–7, 91, 144, 171 Stoa/Stoic(s)/Stoicism 6, 10, 88, 103, 121– 122, 130, 132, 138–139, 152, 159, 163, 171, 177, 185, 200, 238, 248–249, 266–267, 278–279 aim of life 164–165, 149, 159, 245 apatheia 164–165, 215 daemonology 109 diatribe, Stoic 190, 280 duties 212–213, 266 on drunkenness 39, 255–256, 263, 274, 295

index of subjects and names on friendship 220 on goodwill 222 logos 38, 93 paradox 170, 180–181, 187–188 Philo and Stoa 30–31, 34, 88 sage/wise person 9, 181, 188, 258, 261, 282, 288, 291 void 101–102 worthless person 282 see also good emotions; logic, Stoic; right action; right reason Stobaeus 177, 200, 212, 220, 238, 248, 256, 261, 263 Stökl Ben Ezra, D. 177 Strabo 32, 129, 222, 223, 233, 273 superstition 62, 217, 222 suppliant 24, 55, 170, 176, 181 see also soul, suppiant sycophant 189 syllogism 31, 233, 256, 295 symbol 58, 87, 108, 149, 151, 159, 197, 202, 227, 273, 285 symbolic interpretation 57, 102, 113, 136, 153, 179, 192, 194, 218, 224, 228, 244 Greek 9–10 of ark 22, 52, 115 of biblical figures 24, 149, 171, 192, 225, 244, 246–248, 283, 286–287 of paradise 12, 51–52, 138, 145–146, 148– 149 of vineyard 88, 159, 284 of wine 254, 259, 262, 284 see also numbers, theory of Terah 198 Terian, A. 4n15 tetractys 235 thanksgiving 14, 21, 25, 65–66, 163, 208, 234, 239, 242–243, 245–247, 249 Theon of Smyrna 235, 238 Theon Rhetor 253, 259–260, 269 Theophilus 158 Theophrastus 32, 84, 95, 100, 218, 220–221, 224, 255 Therapeutae 150, 154, 258, 280 thesis 260 Thucydides 251, 273, 278 time, three parts of 14, 63, 230, 232 Timna 174

349

index of subjects and names Tobin, T.H. 123, 127 transgressions 72, 283, 285 tree of life 52, 145–147, 156–157 Tryphon 146 Turnebus, A. 37 Van den Hoek, A. 35, 140, 230 Van Winden, J.C.M. 106 Varro 116, 235 Vatinius 277 verba Philonica 33, 97, 104, 142, 144, 155, 164, 210 vices 22, 52, 85, 146, 183, 215, 221, 228–229, 282 as beasts 155 cardinal 155 trees of 214 virtue(s) 12, 22, 41, 51, 52, 85–88, 138, 139, 145, 147, 149, 224, 244, 246–247, 258, 287, 291 cardinal 152, 164, 238, 265 losing of 296 paradise of 160, 161, 163 manly 277

Voetius, G. 84 void 46, 92, 101–102 well-being 149, 158, 277 see also blessed life; felicity Wendland, P. 37–38, 83, 106, 123, 161–162, 176, 182, 193, 203, 225 Whitaker, G.H. 37–38, 40, 83–84, 210 Word, divine 11, 92–93, 173, 240 see also Logos world soul 29, 93, 103–104 Xenocrates 109 Xenophanes 9, 102 Xenophon 142, 147–148, 222, 231 Yahweh/YHWH 202–203 Yli-Karjanmaa, S. 109, 115, 122 Yonge, C.D. 84 Zechariah 250 Zeno 34, 138, 164, 255–256, 263, 266, 295– 296 Zeus 126, 129, 170, 207, 240–242

Index of Greek Terms ἀγαθός 208–209 ἀγγέλλω 23 ἀγένητος 126, 169, 184 ἁγίασμα 162, 166, 169 ἅγιος 169 ἁγιστεία 222 ἀγκιστρεύω 219 ἄγνωστος 233 ἀγὼν πολυοινίας 266 ἀδέκαστος 222 ἀδιάστατος 206 ἀδίκημα 263 ἀεί 206 ἀειδής 240 ἀέναος 206 ἀεροπόρον 110 ἆθλον 258 ἄθυτος 223–224 ἀΐδιος 102, 123 ᾄδω 243 αἰθέριος τόπος 99 αἰνετός 239 αἰνίττομαι 163 αἵρεσις 151, 157, 272 αἴσθησις 246 ᾆσμα 163 αἴτιος 124, 163, 184 αἰών 103, 170, 206, 232 αἰώνιος 21, 102–103, 105, 193, 201, 206, 210 ἀκόλουθος 119, 141 ἀκράδαντος 273 ἄκρας 229 ἄκρατος 150 ἀκτήμων 188 ἀλαζονεία 185 ἄλεκτος 221 ἀλληγορέω 147 ἀλληγορία 146–147, 231 ἀλήθεια 242, 282 ἀληθής 245 ἁμάρτημα 263, 285 ἄμορφος 97 ἄμουσος 286 ἀμπελουργέω 95 ἀμπελουργικὴ τέχνη 94–95

ἀμπελουργός 95, 100 ἀμπελών 94–95 ἀμύητος 224 ἀναγκαῖα τροφή 118 ἀνακαλέω 131 ἀνακυκλέω 206 ἀνάληψις 140 ἀναμέλπω 240 ἀναπόδεικτος 233 ἀναρπάζω 129 ἀναρριπίζω 263 ἀνασκεδάννυμι 176 ἀνασπάω 129 ἀνατρέχω 125 ἀνελλιπής 206 ἀνενδοιάστως 205 ἄνεσις 285 ἀνηγεμόνευτος 170 ἀνθρωποπαθέω 144 ἄνθρωπος 119, 153 ἀνίερος 224 ἀνιμάω 119 ἀνοδία 148 ἀνομβρέω 199, 210 ἀνορθόω 120 ἀντίληψις 200 ἀντίπνοια 273 ἀντιχαρίζομαι 242 τὸ ἀνωτάτω 184–185 ἄορ 270 ἀπάθεια 31, 165, 215 ἀπαιδευσία 262, 264, 266 ἀπαλλάττομαι 115 ἀπαύγασμα 166 ἀπαύστως 206 ἀπεικονίζω 123 ἄπειρος 170 ἀπερικάθαρτος 231–232 ἀπερίληπτος 272 ἄπλαστος 12, 146, 156–157 ἀπογιγνώσκω 184 ἀπόδειξις 276 ἀποίκιλος 227, 229 ἄποιος 97 ἀποκόπτω 218 ἀποκυέω 248

351

index of greek terms ἀπόλαυσις 143, 150 ἀπόλαυσμα 150 ἀποσεμνύω 236 ἄρουρα 193–194 ἅρπυια 129 ἀρχαιότροπος 278 ἀρχέτυπον 166 ἀρχή 196 ἄρχω 203 ἄρχων 203–205 ἀσέβεια 222 ἄσκησις 139, 154, 156 ἀσκητής 156 ἀστεῖος 31, 188, 232, 258, 290 ἀστέρες 112 ἀστοιχείωτος 168 ἀσχημάτιστος 97 ἄτακτος 97 ἀταξία 98 ἀτελής 224 ἀτύπωτος 97 αὐγή 166 αὐτήκοος 287 αὐτοκράτωρ 207 αὐτομαθής 287 αὐτόπρεμνος 129 αὐτουργός 287 ἀφάνταστος φύσις 113 ἀφηδύνω 278 ἀφηνιάζω 164 ἀφηνιαστής 163–164 ἄφθονος 208 ἀφορμαί 147 ἀφροσύνη 152, 266 ἄχθος βαρύτατον 172 ἀχρήματος 188 ἀψευδής 222, 241–242 βακτηρία 273 βασιλεύς 203 βασιλικὴ γῆ 172 βάσις 100 βέλος 272 βιβλίον 3, 94 βρώσιμος 213, 214, 225 βρῶσις 213–214 βυθός 264 βωμός 223

γαληνίζω 286 γανόω 289 γάνωμα 150 γέλως 286 γένεσις 169, 183–184, 236 γεννάω 238 γέ(ν)νημα 213, 248 ὁ γεννήσας πατήρ 104 γέρας 258 γεώπονος 248 γεωργέω 154, 215 γεωργία 83–84, 94, 248 γεωργικὴ τέχνη 94 γεωργός 91, 95, 248 γῆ 117, 213, 214 γηθοσύνη 286 γίγνομαι 175 γνήσιος 189 γνωσιμαχέω 294 γνῶσις 138, 274 δαίμονες 109 δαήμων 109 δεῖγμα 177 δεισιδαιμονία 222–223 δέλεαρ 219 δένδρον 210 δέος 203, 208 δεσμός 103–105, 203 δεσπότης 103, 105, 203, 208 δηγμός 290 δημιουργέω 101, 110, 135, 236 δημιουργός 101, 110 διάζευξις 130 διάθεσις 139 διαιωνίζω 210 διακληρόω 12, 175, 178 διακοσμέω 101, 113, 204, 209 διακρίνω 267 διάκρισις 267 διακύπτω 288, 292 διαλύω 267 διανθίζω 226 διάνοια 200, 289 διαπλάττω 101 διαπονέω 213 δίαυλος 196 δίκαιος 95, 188, 259 δικαιοσύνη 238

352 δικαστήριον 223 διοίκησις 164–165 διοικητής 165 δόγμα 181 δολιχαίωνες 104 δολιχεύω 104, 195 δόξα 290 δουλεία 171 δοῦλος 171 δρόμος 126 δυσθεράπευτος 142 δωρεά 206 Ἑβραῖος 288 ἐγκολπίζομαι 102 ἐγγράμματος μουσική 105 ἐγχορεύω 150 ἑδράζω 162 ἐδώδιμος 214, 225 εἴδησις 138 εἰκών 123 εἰρεσία 272 εἰσάγω 168, 218 εἰσαγωγή 168 εἴσθησις 246 εἰσκρίνομαι 115 ἐκθηλύνω 277–278 ἐκρήγνυμι 277 ἔκστασις 267 ἔλεος 160 ἐμβαθύνω 198 ἐμπνεύω 123 ἐμφαντικώτατα 154 ἐμφυσάω 123, 129 τὸ ἕν 184 ἐναντίωσις 294 ἐναργέστατα 251 ἕνδεκα 239 ἐνδιαίτημα 169 ἐνδοιάζω 205 ἐνευφραίνομαι 152 ἐνορμίζω 273 ἐντρυφάω 152 ἔνυδρος 111 ἐξαίρετον γέρας 154 ἑξῆς 141 ἐξιλάσκομαι 177 ἐξιλασμός 177 ἕξις 139

index of greek terms ἐξομολογέομαι 247 ἔπαινος 240 ἐπελαφρίζω 129, 264 ἐπιβλέπω 137 ἐπιγιγνώσκω 184 τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν 155 ἐπικουφίζω 264 ἐπιμέλεια σώματος 172 ἐπιμελητής 172 ἐπιμονή 287 ἐπιστασία 96 ἐπιστάτης 96 ἐπιστήμη 94, 139 ἐπιτείνω 289 ἐπιτειχίζω 279 ἐπιφύω 218 ἐπιχαίνω 221 ἐράω 130 ἐργάζομαι 101 ἐργάτης γῆς 94 ἔρως 130, 151, 158, 207 ἑτοιμάζω 162 εὐδαιμονία 143, 149, 157, 208, 287 εὐεξία 277 εὐεργεσία 206 εὐεργετέω 207, 242 εὐεργέτης 204, 207, 209 εὐθεία 142 εὐθύβολον ὄνομα 116 εὐθυμία 284–285 εὐμάθεια 225 εὔνοια 208, 220, 222 εὐπάθεια 150, 290 εὐπαργίαι 218 εὐσέβεια 144, 189, 222 εὐστοχία 138 εὐφροσύνη 281, 284–285, 286 εὐχαριστία 239 εὐχή 207, 224 εὔχομαι 207 ζήλωσις 278 ζήτημα 171 ζῷα 107, 110 ζωπυρέω 205 τὸ ἡγεμονικόν 137 ἡγεμών 33, 96

353

index of greek terms θαῦμα ἔκτοπον 100 θαυματοποιός 100 τὸ θεῖον 129 θεός 13, 21, 142, 167, 202–204, 206 θεοσέβεια 147 θεσπέσιος 136–137 θεοφιλής 181, 194 θεραπεία 150, 176 θεραπευτής 150, 176 θεράπων 171 θερμότερος 181 θέσις 253, 259, 261, 263, 269 θεσπέσιος 136 θησαυροφυλακέω 172 θίασος 113, 117, 150 θιασώτης 150 θρέμμα ἄγριον 155 θρύψις 151 θυσία 222–224 θυσιαστήριον 223 θύω 15, 255, 275, 282, 283 ἰδεῖν 125 ἱερεῖον 224 ἱεροπρεπής 131 ἱερὸς λόγος 212 ἱερουργία 222 ἱεροφάντης 131 ἱκέτης 182 ἱλασμός 177 ἵλεως 177 ἵμερος 126 ἰός 272 καθάρσιος 234 καθῆκον 212, 213 καῖρος 94 καλοκἀγαθία 154 καλός 166 καρπός 14, 194, 232, 238, 248, 251 καρποφορέω 138, 194 καταβιβάζω 265 κατακοσμέω 241 κατάληψις 138 κατάλογος 236 κατανοέω 137 καταπνεύω 129 κατασκευάζω 269 κατασκευαστικός 196

καταφυτεύω 12–13, 86, 89, 135, 211–212, 214 κατὰ ὡρισμένας περιόδους 115 κατέχει λόγος 198 κατοικητήριον 169 κατόρθωμα 212, 248, 263 κατοχή 152 κατωκάρα 118 καχεξία 277 κεφαλή 118 κῆρες 218 κληροδοσία 13, 162, 183 κληροδοτέω 171, 183 κληρονομέω 183 κληρονομία 12, 89–90, 159, 160, 162, 163, 173, 174, 176, 183 κλῆρος 12–13, 89–90, 159–160, 163, 173, 175– 176, 178–179, 182, 183 κοσμοπλαστέω 97 κοσμοποιΐα 204, 236 κοσμοποιός 243 κοσμοπλάστης 97 κόσμος 101, 243 κράτος ἀρχῆς 205 κτῆμα 163, 193 κτῆσις 206 κυριεύω 203 κύριος 21, 141–142, 162, 167, 169, 202–204, 207, 251 κῦρος 13, 203, 209 κύων 32, 271 κώπη 272 λαγχάνω κατασκευῆς 115, 120 λαιμαργία 221 λέγω 243 λεκτέον 231 λέξις 231–232 ληρέω 261–262 λήρησις πάροινος 262 λογισμός 122, 233 λόγος 106–107, 181, 240, 276 λόγος ἔχει 110, 112, 114–115 λουτρόν 234, 282 λύσις 267 λύττα 267 μακαριότης 143 μακρηγορέω 295

354 μανία 262, 267–268 μαινάδες 268 μαίνομαι 268 μάχαιρα 270 μεγαλαυχέω 186, 189 μεγαλαυχία 186 μέγεθος 265 μέθεσις 15, 283 μέθη 15, 270, 282, 293 μέθη νηφάλιος 254 μεθίημι 285 μεθόριος 157 μέθυ 270, 273, 285 μεθύω 15, 255, 270, 273, 275, 282 μελαγχολάω 296 μελέτη 139 μερίς 12–13, 89–90, 160, 176, 183 μέση φρόνησις 148 μέσος 157, 211 μεταβατικός 110 μετάρσιος (χώρα) 99, 187, 241 μετεωροπολέω 265 μετριοπάθεια 215 μήτηρ 117 μισθαρνέω 221 μισθός 247, 258 μνήμη 139 μόσχευμα 100 μορφέω 97 μουσική 105 μῦθος 240 μύησις 224 μυριαγωγός 129 μυρίοι 195 μῦς 270 ναστός 102, 277 νοέω 138 νόησις 138 νόθος 189 νομοθεσία 236 νόμοι συμποτικοί 255 νόμος 106–107 νοῦς 120, 122, 138, 200 νυκτίφορος 153 ξίφος 270 ξύλον 12, 214, 225

index of greek terms ὄγκος 275, 277 ὁδός 214 οἰδέω 275, 277 οἰκείωσις 171 οἰκέτης 171 οἶκος 162, 169 οἰκόσιτος 221 οἰνέομαι 270, 273 οἰνοφλυγία 256 οἰνοχοέω 280 οἶνος 270 οἰνόω 273 οἴνωσις 270, 273 ὀϊστός 272 οἶστρος 264, 267 ὀλιγοχρήματος 219 (ὅλος) δι’ ὅλων 101, 113, 226 ὁλοσχερής 110 ὀλύμπιος 182 ὀμβρέω 210 ὁμοίωσις θεῷ 171 ὁμώνυμος 270 τὸ ὄν 125–126 ὀξυωπής 173 ὀπωρινός 271 οἱ ὁρατικοί 173 ὁρατός 100 ὄργια 131 ὅρκος 13 ὅρος 100, 285 ὁσιότης 144 οὐκ ἀπὸ σκοποῦ 195 οὐκ εἰς μακράν 242 οὖν 217 οὐράνιος 182 οὐρανός 100, 285 ὀφιμάχος 294 ὀψαρτυτής 279 ὀψοφαγία 221 πάθος 189 παιδεία 212, 232, 264 παιδιά 286 παίζω 289 οἱ παλαιοί 273 παλαιὸς λόγος 120, 240 πάμμουσος 242 πανηγεμών 33, 142, 251 πάνσοφος 133

355

index of greek terms παντέλεια 239 παραβλαστάνω 220 παράδεισος 147 παράδοξος 188 παρακαταθήκη 219 παράκομμα 280 παρακόπτω 280 παρακούω 200 παρακύπτω 288 παράλογος 188 παραναφύω 33, 222 παρανοέω 200 παράνοια 267 παραπαίω 262 παράσιτος 221 παρασυκοφαντέω 189 παρατετηρημένως 155 παραφυάς 100 παροινία 293 παροράω 200 πᾶς 238 πατήρ 242 πεπαίνω 271 ὁ πεποιηκώς 113, 167 πέρατα 104 περιαιρέω 218, 225 περιέχω 97 περικαθαίρω 228, 231 περιακαθαρίζω 218, 225, 228 περιρραντήριον 234, 282 περιτείνω 277 περιφυτεύω 27, 141 πιστεύω 208 πίστις 188, 208, 269, 276 πηγή 117, 199 πλάζω 12, 143, 146, 157 πλανάω 215 πλάτη 272 πληρής 241, 277 πλήτης 102 πνεῦμα 121 ποιέω 167 ποικίλος 226–227 ὁ ποιητής 113, 167, 187, 241 ὁ ποιῶν 113, 204 πόνος 213, 248 πόρνη 220, 222 πρεσβύτερος 286 προοίμιον 3–4, 253, 269

προσκόντως 239 πρόσκωπος 273 προσριζόω 137 πρότασις 263 πρόχειρος 189 οἱ πρῶτοι 165, 267 πνεῦμα 103, 122, 156 πνοὴ ζωῆς 122 πολλαπλασιάζω 195 πολυπλασιάζω 195 πρεσβύτατος 237 προκόπτων 291 προσαποδίδωμι 195 προσέρχομαι 184 προσκτάομαι 186 πρόσρησις 203 πρόσφυξ 182 πτηνόν 110 Πυρόεις 113 ῥάβδος 225, 273 ῥητόν 231 ῥίζα 98, 137 ῥιζόω 98, 137 ῥιζώματα 98 σβεστήριος 263 σιτόπονος 279 σκεδαστὴς καλῶν 176 σκιαμαχέω 294 σκιαμαχία 294 σκιαμάχος 294 σκίπων 273 σοφία 153, 168 σοφός 25, 188, 192, 211 σπάθη 270 σπείρω 176 σπορά 237 σπουδαῖος 31, 188 Στίλβων 113 στερεός 102 στοιχειώδης 168 συγγένεια 121 συκοφαντέω 189 συκοφάντης 190 σύμβολον 149 συνάγω 104 συνᾴδω 165, 231, 251 συναναβλαστάνω 218

356 συναναφλέγω 33 συνευφραίνομαι 289 συνεχῶς 206, 208 συνηχέω 105 σύνταξις 94 σφίγγω 104–105 σφορδρύνω 289 σφραγίς 122 σχῆμα 246 σωτήρ 207 σωτήριος 207 σωφροσύνη 164 σώφρων 164 ταμίας 131, 153 τάξις 98 τείνω 103–104 τέλειος 210, 239, 241 τελεσφορέω 241, 271 τελεσφόρος 241 τέλος 119, 149, 161, 165, 196, 210, 248 τεράστιον 100 τέχνη 94, 139 τεχνίτης 94, 140, 199 τηλαυγής 233 τίθημι 21, 204, 209 τόνος 103 τόπος 290 τράγος 178 τρόπος 176 τρυφή 149, 152 τύπος 122 ὑγιαίνω 232, 276 ὕλη 101 ὕμνος 137, 240 ὑμνῳδία 137, 151 ὑπερείδειν 102 ὕπνος 285 ὑποβολιμαῖος 189 ὑπόδρομος 273 ὑπομόνη 287 ὑπόνοια 146, 231 ὑποφητής 241 ὑποφυσάω 185, 277 ὕφηγησις 259 ὕφεσις 285 Φαέθων 113

index of greek terms Φαίνων 113 φαντασία 148 φάρμακον θανάσιμον 266 φάσγανον 270 φαῦλος 188, 282, 290 φθαρτός 169 φιλανθρωπία 209 φιλία 207, 220 φιλόδωρος 148, 205 φίλος 181 φιλοσοφέω ἀνόθως 130 φρέαρ 13, 191, 210 φρόνησις 87, 153, 250 φρουρός 153 φύλαξ 131, 153 φυλάττειν 100 φυσάω 185 φύσημα 185, 277 φύσις πραγμάτων 198 φυτεία 237 φυτεύω 12–13, 19, 86, 89, 91, 95, 134–135, 140, 159, 192, 210–212, 214 φυτόν 107, 210 φυτὸν οὐράνιον 120 φυτουργία 83–84, 94 φυτουργικὴ τέχνη 94 φυτουργός 95 Φώσφορος 113 χαμαιτύπη 222 χαρά 285–286 χαρακτήρ 122 χαρίζομαι 206, 242 χάρις 206, 208, 242 χάρισμα 206, 242 χαριστικός 206 χεῖρας καθίημι 266 χερσαῖος 111 χίμαιρος 178 χλιδή 151 χορεία 236 χόρος 236 χράω 251 χρεκοπέω 223 χρῆσις 143 χρησμοί 128 χρῶμα 246 χώρα 214 χωρισμός 267

357

index of greek terms ψαλμός 137 ψυχόω 111

ᾠδή 175 ὁ ὤν 125 ὠρεύειν 100