Peter of Auvergne: University Master of the 13th Century 9783110228496, 9783110228489

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Peter of Auvergne

Scrinium Friburgense Veröffentlichungen des Mediävistischen Instituts der Universität Freiburg Schweiz

Herausgegeben von Michele Bacci · Hugo Oscar Bizzarri · Elisabeth Dutton Christoph Flüeler · Eckart Conrad Lutz · Hans-Joachim Schmidt Jean-Michel Spieser · Tiziana Suarez-Nani

Band 26

De Gruyter

Peter of Auvergne University Master of the 13th Century Edited by Christoph Flüeler · Lidia Lanza · Marco Toste English language editor Anne Marie Austenfeld

De Gruyter

Veröffentlicht mit Unterstützung des Schweizerischen Nationalfonds und des Hochschulrates der Universität Freiburg Schweiz.

ISBN 978-3-11-022848-9 e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-022849-6 e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-038489-5 ISSN 1422-4445 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A CIP catalog record for this book has been applied for at the Library of Congress. Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.dnb.de abrufbar. ” 2015 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/München/Boston Satz: Martin Rohde, Mediävistisches Institut der Universität Freiburg Schweiz Druck und Bindung: Hubert & Co. GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen 앝 Gedruckt auf säurefreiem Papier 앪 Printed in Germany www.degruyter.com

Contents Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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William J. Courtenay (Madison, Wisconsin) – Peter of Auvergne, Master in Arts and Theology at Paris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Luca Bianchi (Vercelli) – Peter of Auvergne and the Condemnation of 1277 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Roberto Lambertini (Macerata) – Peter of Auvergne, Giles of Rome and Aristotle’s ‘Politica’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Sten Ebbesen (Copenhagen) – The Logical Writings of Peter of Auvergne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Cecilia Trifogli (Oxford) – Peter of Auvergne on Place and Natural Place . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Henryk Anzulewicz (Bonn) – Peter of Auvergne and Albert the Great as Interpreters of Aristotle’s ‘De caelo’ . . . . .

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Cesare A. Musatti (Rome) – Peter of Auvergne and the Quaestiones on ‘De caelo’ in the Ms. Escorial, Biblioteca del Monasterio h. II 1, ff. 106ra–129vb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 Griet Galle (Leuven) – Peter of Auvergne on the Celestial Movers. Edition and Discussion of his Questions 8–11 on ‘Metaphysica’ XII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Fabrizio Amerini (Parma) – Peter of Auvergne on Substance . . . .

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Contents

Lidia Lanza (Fribourg) – The ‘Scriptum super III–VIII libros Politicorum’: Some Episodes of its Fortune until the Early Renaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Marco Toste (Fribourg) – An Original Way of Commenting on the Fifth Book of Aristotle’s ‘Politics’: The ‘Questiones super I–VII libros Politicorum’ of Peter of Auvergne . . . . . .

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Chris Schabel (Cyprus) – Peter of Auvergne’s Quodlibetal Questions on Divine Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Christoph Flüeler (Fribourg) – The Influence of the Works of Peter of Auvergne in the Scolastic Philosophy of the 13th, 14th and 15th Centuries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Lidia Lanza (Fribourg) and Marco Toste (Fribourg) – A Census of Peter of Auvergne’s Works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Foreword The second half of the 13th century at the University of Paris was a magic moment in the history of Europe. Few moments in its history proved as decisive in the shaping of this institution. A brief period of a few decades was decisive not only for the university, but for the entire city. Paris became the most important center of higher education in Europe. During the 14th and 15th centuries, when a new university was to be established in central Europe, its founders looked to the University of Paris as a model. As one of the oldest universities in Europe, the University of Paris formed the typical structures for such institutions: the creation of distinct faculties; offices such as Rector, Dean, and Chancellor; the division of teaching into lectures and tutorials involving discussion; and the degrees of Bachelor and Master. Though all of these structures and offices have altered greatly over the course of time, they are still discernible today. Arts and Theology were especially important to the character of the university in Paris. The curriculum developed by the Faculty of Arts during the 13th century was based for the most part on the study of philosophical works. Aristotelianism was prevalent in the university course of study until the 17th century. Courses of instruction created in Paris were adopted in other universities, and debates conducted in Paris were taken up throughout Europe. The Theological Faculty in Paris was especially famous and attracted the most distinguished scholars of the time. The high point not only for the history of philosophy but also for that of theology was the second half th of the 13 century. This period was regarded as so overwhelmingly important that earlier history was seen merely as a preparation and later history as only an echo. Paris, as the capital of higher education, was perceived, often unjustifiably as we now realize, to outshine other educational centers. It seems almost an afterthought to remind ourselves that during these decades, such prominent personalities as Albert the Great, Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome, Henry of Ghent and Meister Eckhart were teaching at the Theological Faculty, sometimes simultaneously. These famous masters often held a teaching chair for only a few years, however, after which they moved on to new employments, sometimes quite far from the ‘center’. At that time there were very few academics who taught for two

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or even three decades in Paris and who left an enduring mark on the institution. One of the few was Peter of Auvergne. Peter may already have been a Master at the Faculty of Arts in the late 1260s, when Thomas Aquinas was teaching in Paris for the second time. Peter continued to teach there for some 30 years before he moved to the ‘other’ faculty in 1296 as a Doctor of Theology and taught there until 1302. For more than three decades, Peter of Auvergne taught at what was then the most famous university in the Western world. Simply on the basis of his enduring presence during a period that was so decisive for the university and for the history of philosophy and theology, Peter is worthy of notice. Not only is such an enduring presence surprising, but, as the articles in this volume demonstrate, by continuing to teach for so long at the university, Peter contributed to its fame, left as lasting an influence on Aristotelianism as only a few other medieval philosophers, and – though teaching there only briefly – became a notable voice at the Theological Faculty. Nonetheless, Peter of Auvergne is not remembered as a famous University Master. This author was rediscovered in the 1930s by Edgar Hocedez. The little that was known about him can be found in what was then the most comprehensive survey of medieval philosophy, Bernard Geyer’s ‘Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie’ (1927), in which Peter is mentioned in an extremely brief section, eight lines long, closing with the words: “Näheres über seine Lehrrichtung ist nicht bekannt.” (S. 504). During the past 80 years Peter of Auvergne has been more thoroughly studied; in the process, little by little, an extensive and broadly disseminated oeuvre has come to light. The Census, compiled by Lidia Lanza and Marco Toste and appended to this volume, provides a comprehensive overview of his currently known manuscript tradition and of research that has been performed to date. Peter of Auvergne’s oeuvre may be divided into philosophical and theological works (an asterisk denotes an unedited or only fragmentally transcribed work; editor and publication year are included for critically edited texts; bibliographic information for all can be found in the Census).1 A. Philosophical Works: Works on Logic: *‘Eleven Sophismata’, the ‘Questions on Porphyry‘s Isagoge’ (Ed. Tinè 1997), the ‘Quaestiones super librum 1

Doubtful are attributions of the commentary on the *‘Glossa cum quaestionibus in Doctrinale Alexandri de Villa Dei’, the *‘Quaestiones super librum sex principiorum’, the *‘Quaestiones de universalibus’, the *‘Quaestiones super Analytics priora’ the *‘Quaestiones super libros Posteriorum Analyticorum’ and the *‘Quaestiones super Sophisticos Elenchos’ (Ed. Ebbesen 1977). The

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Praedicamentorum’ (Ed. Andrews 1987) and *‘Super librum Perihermeneias’. Metaphysics: the *‘Quaestiones in Metaphysicam’ survive in three different versions. Natural Philosophy: Question commentaries are to be distinguished from literal commentaries, often on the same works. Among the question commentaries are various versions of ‘De caelo et mundo’ (Ed. Galle 2003 and Ed. Musatti 2000, though Musatti’s edition treats only in part the work of Peter). In addition there are many treatises from the collection ‘Parva naturalia’, the ‘Quaestiones super librum De sensu et sensato’ (Ed. White 1986), the ‘Quaestiones super librum De memoria et reminiscentia’ in two versions (Ed. White 1986), and the ‘Quaestiones super libro De somno et vigilia’ (Ed. White 1986). Besides these we have the generously reproduced and distributed literal commentaries, *‘Expositio in libros III–IV De caelo et mundo’, *‘Sententia super libros Meteororum’, *‘Sententia super libro De somno et vigilia’, *‘Sententia super librum De longitudine et brevitate vitae’, *‘Sententia super librum De iuventute et senectute’, *‘Sententia super librum De respiratione et inspiratione’, *‘Sententia super librum De morte et vita’, *‘Sententia super librum De motu animalium’, and the ‘Sententia super librum De vegetabilibus et plantis’ (Ed. Poortman 2003), most of which have not been critically edited, but are available in early print editions. Attribution of the ‘Quaestiones super libros Physicorum’ (Ed. Delhaye 1941) and of one additional, as yet unedited version of the same work, which also indicates some relationship to Peter, is doubtful. Attribution of the *‘Quaestiones super librum De generatione et corruptione’ and the *‘Quaestiones super librum De motu animalium’ must also be regarded as uncertain. Works from the realm of practical philosophy include the quaestiones on the first and second book of the ‘Nichomachean Ethics’ (Ed. Celano 1986) and both commentaries on Aristotle’s ‘Politics’: the ‘Scriptum super libros III–VIII Politicorum’ (Ed. Lanza – at Press) and the *‘Quaestiones super libros Politicorum’ (Ed. Toste – in Preparation). B. Theological Works: Of the theological works only six *‘Quodlibeta’ survive. Peter’s *‘Sentence Commentary’ is witnessed and probably survives in excerpts. (Ed. Doucet 1954).

By all indications, Peter commented on a great many of the works of Aristotle which were part of the teaching material at the Paris Faculty of Arts. Most of the question commentaries are transmitted in few copies, but they nevertheless bear witness to a remarkable dissemination and reception on into the 15th century, in Paris and at other universities. His literal *‘Quaestiones super librum De causis’, should be regarded as spurious. In addition, the ‘Quaestiones super De anima’ as well as the ‘Quaestiones super librum De iuventute et senectute’ and the ‘Two questions on De animalibus’ should probably be withdrawn from the list of works by Peter of Auvergne.

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commentaries on many Aristotelian works of natural philosophy and Aristotle’s ‘Politica’ were more effectively disseminated and more influential. During those famous decades at the University of Paris, the commentaries on the Aristotelian works were as much a fundamental requirement as a focus for conflict. Peter had witnessed the Condemnations of 1277 (see the article by Luca Bianchi on this subject), although he seems not to have been as affected as were his polarizing colleagues Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia. All Peter’s works are clearly associated with his teaching activities at the University of Paris. No philosophical treatises, independent from the academic curriculum, are known to exist. It is difficult to discern Peter’s profile, what distinguishes him as a philosopher. This may be due to the fact that his work is still not well enough known or that only some of his commentaries have thus far been edited. However, the main reason may be found in the fact that he was much more a commentator than an author. Peter was influential since his commentaries enjoyed such a pronounced long-term impact, traceable into the 17th century. He truly flourished as one of the most influential commentators during the most important phase of medieval Aristotelianism. That his name was eventually forgotten, even as his works remained in use, is evidence that this learned man was not much interested in gaining attention as a prominent author, but was motivated to make central philosophical works understandable by commenting upon them. The volume you have in hand is a product of the research project ‘The political philosophy of Peter of Auvergne’, generously supported by the Swiss National Foundation from 2005 through 2010 as Projects no. 107943 and 117723. The primary goal of this project was to prepare critical editions of the two commentaries on Aristotle’s ‘Politics’: the question commentary which was previously unedited (or rather only edited as a sample of some questions) and is based on three extant manuscripts, and the extensive, highly influential and broadly transmitted literal commentary, often referred to in the manuscripts as the ‘Scriptum’. This volume was produced as part of the above mentioned research project and is a result of the international conference ‘Peter of Auvergne. University Master of the 13th Century’, held at the University of Fribourg, September 2–4, 2008. For a number of reasons, publication has taken an unusually long time and this book, originally planned and advertised for publication in early 2013, was not yet ready to print at that time. The editor would like to thank all authors, not least of all for their patience, and would like to apologize for the fact that the most recent research developments could not be included.

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In addition to the authors, I would like to thank all those persons and institutions that have helped bring this book to press: the Swiss National Foundation for supporting these projects, the members of the ‘Hochschulrat’ of the University of Fribourg, the Medieval Institute and especially Martin Rohde for his patient and friendly support, the Codices electronici AG which financed the work of translation, and my old friend Roberto Lambertini for help and assistance. Fribourg, July 4, 2014

Christoph Flüeler

Peter of Auvergne, Master in Arts and Theology at Paris William J. Courtenay (Madison, Wisconsin)

The main elements in Peter of Auvergne’s biography are well known and have been repeated frequently, largely following the thorough exploration and analysis of Edgar Hocedez in 1933, which corrected a number of points 1 in earlier accounts. I will be making some minor adjustments, correcting some details in his and subsequent accounts, as well as attempting to place Peter more precisely within the academic environment of the faculties of arts and theology in the late thirteenth century. The principal problem in reconstructing Peter’s life, of course, is that there were several Parisian masters by the name of Peter of Auvergne in the late thirteenth century. The Auvergne is a large region and ‘Peter’ is the second most common first name in the period, exceeded only by ‘John’. In addition to the Peter of Auvergne who was regent master in the faculty 2 of medicine in 1274 and the Peter of Auvergne who was elected rector 3 of the faculty of arts and thus of the university in June 1296, historians, including myself, are comfortable in assuming that the Peter of Auvergne 1 Lajard, Félix, Pierre d’Auvergne, in: HLF 25 (1869), pp. 93–114, with appendix by Le Clerc, Victor, pp. 114–118; Hocedez, Edgar, La vie et les œuvres de Pierre d’Auvergne, in: Gregorianum 14 (1933), pp. 3–36, exercised admirable caution in drawing conclusions where the evidence was insufficient. The most recent biographical sketch is by Galle, Griet, A Comprehensive Bibliography on Peter of Auvergne, in: Bulletin de philosophie médiévale 42 (2000), pp. 53–79, at 53–54. 2 Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis (subsequently cited as CUP), Ed. Denifle, Heinrich, and Châtelain, Émile, vol. I, Paris 1889, nr. 451, p. 516; Wickersheimer, Ernest, Dictionnaire biographique des médecins en France au Moyen Age, Paris 1936, p. 614. It should be noted, however, that there are numerous examples in the fourteenth century of medical doctors later becoming doctors of theology. This pattern may date back to the thirteenth century. 3 CUP II, nr. 590, p. 65.

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who as master of arts authored numerous commentaries on Aristotle in the 1270s and 1280s is the same individual who became a doctor of theology in or by 1296 and authored six Quodlibeta before his appointment as bishop of Clermont 1302. Any of the three could have been the Peter of Auvergne who owned a house in the rue St. Victor adjacent to the Cistercian convent 4 of St. Bernard in 1282–1283. And, with the exception of the doctor of medicine, either of the others could have been the one appointed rector in 5 1275. Similarly, two Peters of Auvergne are mentioned in the necrology of the Collège de Sorbonne, one of whom left 100 pounds in money and 6 books to the college and whose obit was remembered on March 30, and another who left ten pounds to the college and was remembered with a 7 mass on October 8. The early history of the college, however, identifies the first as the Peter of Auvergne active at the Sorbonne in the second decade of the fourteenth century, who, if that later account is accurate, could not 8 be the theologian and bishop who died in 1304. Hocedez concluded that the Peter of Auvergne remembered on March 30 was the same one who 9 was rector in 1296 and executor on the estate of Nicholas of Bar in 1311. But the other reference in the Sorbonne necrology or anniversary calendar to a Peter of Auvergne could either be the same individual or the Peter of Auvergne with whom we are concerned. The October 8 date was the date of a mass to be celebrated during Peter of Auvergne’s lifetime, to be shifted 4 CUP I, nr. 511, p. 597. 5 CUP I, nr. 460, pp. 521–530, at 530. Probability, however, points to the rector in 1275 being the Peter of Auvergne with whom we are concerned. While reelection as rector was not unusual, it normally happened within a five-year period after the first election, if fourteenth-century patterns are any guide – a very big ‘if’. The span of twenty-one years between 1275 and 1296 suggests that these rectors were two different individuals. 6 Glorieux, Palémon, Aux origines de la Sorbonne, vol. I: Robert de Sorbon, Paris 1966, pp. 161–162. 7 Ibid., p. 174. 8 Domus et societatis Sorbonicae historia, part III, Bibliothèque de l’Arsenal, Paris, no. 1022, p. 76: Obiit noster Petrus de Alvernia post annum 1310. Dies notatur in necrologio Prioris ad III Kal. Aprilis, annus vero colligitur ex eo quod executor factus cum Ioanne de Mariolo testamenti Nicolai de Barro Ducis [on March 12, 1311], transegit anno praedicto pro reducenda fundatione ab eodem facta duorum beneficiatorum in sorbonia [...]. The terms of Nicholas’ will are recorded in a document edited in Glorieux, Palémon, Aux origines de la Sorbonne, vol. II: Le cartulaire, Paris 1965, pp. 519–522. 9 Hocedez, La vie et les oeuvres (note 1), pp. 11–12.

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later to the anniversary of his death. Thus nothing prevents this Peter of Auvergne being identical with the theologian and bishop, but nothing proves it either. And beyond the probability that Peter of Auvergne, regent master in theology, had been a socius of the Sorbonne, which we might have assumed in any case, this entry in the necrology, without any further information, tells us nothing. There is also some uncertainty about the town and family from which Peter came. In his appointment on June 18, 1296, as canon with expectation of a prebend at Notre Dame in Paris, he is referred to as Petrus de Croc, which Hocedez, Glorieux, and others have assumed to be the small town of Crocq in the département of Creuse, on the western edge of the diocese of 11 Clermont, in the direction of Limoges. But the name is sometimes spelled Cros, which corresponds to two other towns in the diocese of Clermont and Limoges as well as a noble family of the region. The town of Crocq has the better evidential base, but the issue of social background is worth more attention than it has received. Insofar as Peter already held a canonical prebend in the cathedral chapter at Clermont before incepting as a doctor of theology at Paris, that appointment in this period of the thirteenth century bespeaks significant social status in the region of the Auvergne, independent 12 of his achievements at the University of Paris. Thus he probably came from 10 Glorieux, Aux origines de la Sorbonne (note 7), I, p. 174: Missa de Sancto Spiritu fiet pro magistro Petro de Alvernia socio nostro, quamdiu vixerit, ista die [October 8]. Post vero obitum suum fiet eadem die annuatim eius anniversarium, qui legavit domui decem libras par. 11 The occasional rendering of his name as Petrus Crocus or Petrus de Croco also points to Crocq, which in Latin is Crocum. In all probability the rendering of his name as Petrus de Croso (du Cros) is based on a confusion with the name of a noble family from the same region, one member of which, Pierre du Cros, was a nephew of Pierre Roger (later Clement VI) and played a prominent role at the University of Paris, including being provisor of the Sorbonne before becoming bishop of Auxerre and later a cardinal. 12 Peter of Auvergne had recently become doctor of theology when on June 18, 1296, Boniface VIII appointed him canon with expectation of prebend at Notre Dame in Paris, and allowed him to keep his canonical prebend at Clermont. Thomas, Antoine, Extraits des Archives du Vatican pour servir à l’histoire littéraire du Moyen-Âge, première partie, in: Mélanges d’archéologie et d’histoire II/2 (1882), pp. 113–135, see pp. 117–120: magistro Petro de Croc, [83] quod theologice facultatis magisterium laudabiliter obtinuisse dinosceris [...] Volentes [...] tibi gratiam facere specialem canonicatum ecclesie Parisiensis cum [...] prebendam [...] tibi cum vacaverit; non obstante [...] quod in ecclesia

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a prominent family of the region, as was true for many Parisian scholars 13 from the Auvergne in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.

I. Peter of Auvergne as Master of Arts Since we have no precise information on when Peter of Auvergne became a master of arts at Paris, assuming that he would have been in his early twenties at the time of inception, there is little point in conjecturing when he might have been born. Nor do we know when he began to combine his activities as regent master in arts with his studies in theology. Because he continued and completed Thomas’ commentaries on ‘De caelo’, the ‘Politica’, and the ‘Parva naturalia’ left unfinished at the time of the angelic doctor’s death in 1274, it is generally assumed that Peter was already an arts master in Paris at the time Thomas composed his commentaries at Paris, namely 1269 to 1272, and that he may either have studied with Thomas or followed his lectures on Aristotle during those years. It may well be that Peter’s close connection with Thomas’ literary ‘Nachlaß’ led to the mistaken notion that Peter was a Dominican. The relation of Peter of Auvergne and Thomas Aquinas poses an interesting issue inasmuch as the third quarter of the thirteenth century was a time of vehement opposition at Paris between secular masters, particularly theologians, and the mendicant orders, particularly the Dominicans. In addition to the extra-university issues, such as preaching wherever and whenever, licenses to hear confessions and whether they should be repeated to one’s parish priest, and burial of lay persons in convent cemeteries, there were the intra-university issues of obedience to the rector and corporation, Claromontensi canonicatum et prebendam nosceris obtinere. The papal letter was included, but without text, in: Les registres de Boniface VIII, Ed. Digard, George et alii, vol. I, Paris 1907, nr. 1116, col. 399, which states that Peter was to remit all other benefices once he had secured a canonical prebend at Paris. 13 Prosopographical studies of students and masters at the University of Paris in the early fourteenth century are revealing in this regard. See, for example, Courtenay, William J., Foreign Scholars at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century: The Crisis of 1313, in: History of Universities 15 (1997–1999), pp. 47–74; id., Parisian Scholars in the Early Fourteenth Century: A Social Portrait (Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought, 4th series, 41), Cambridge 1999, pp. 92–123, esp. 114–115, 118–119.

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particularly in obeying calls for suspension of lectures, and the number of professorial chairs in theology. The 1250s and 1260s were particularly volatile decades in the ongoing dispute between seculars and mendicants, and the 1260s were in all probability the years in which Peter began his studies at Paris and became regent master in arts. What changed the terms of that conflict, or at least the context of debate, was not simply or primarily the silencing of William of St. Amour or the growing prominence of Albert the Great, Bonaventure, and Thomas Aquinas, but conflicts over the interpretation of Aristotle within the faculties of arts and theology in the 1260s. Although the evidence is not as extensive or detailed as we would wish, it appears that several of the intra-university issues that pitted secular and mendicant masters against each other were resolved in the late 1250s or early 1260s. The Dominicans were allowed to retain two chairs in the faculty of theology, that is, to have two regent masters simultaneously, but they gave up the right to have two bachelors beginning their lectures on the ‘Sentences’ in the same year. They alternated, as was the case with the other orders, which had only one chair, so that in one year the master occupying the French Dominican chair could field a candidate, and in the following year that right would pass to the master occupying the non-French chair. More importantly, the increasing disputes over the interpretation of Aristotle and concerns over orthodox teaching, particularly in the faculty of arts, gave enhanced importance to the new translation of Aristotle’s writings by the Dominican William of Moerbeke, and to commentaries on the Aristotelian and other texts by Albert the Great and, from 1269 on, those of Thomas Aquinas. How long before 1270 Peter was at Paris is unknown. He would have belonged to the Bourges province of the French nation in the Faculty of Arts, which included all students and masters who came from central and southern France as well as students and masters from Spain and Italy. These would have been his most immediate associates, although he would of necessity have interacted with other masters in the French nation in the 1270s and 1280s. The two most controversial masters of arts in the 1270s, however, belonged to other nations: Siger of Brabant, who was a master in the Picard nation, and Boethius of Dacia, who was a master in the English nation. Henry of Ghent may still have been teaching in the Faculty of Arts in 1270, although he soon incepted in theology, and in any event would have belonged to the Picard nation. Peter would have determined and been licensed in arts under a master from his own nation, if possible under a master from the Bourges province of the nation.

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We know too few names of Parisian arts masters in this period to conjecture as to whom his teachers might have been, and I am inclined to view his relationship with Thomas not as a pupil/master relationship, although there are examples in the fourteenth century of secular students studying with a master outside their nation, and examples of a secular theologian being promoted by a master in a religious order, but no one who was not 14 a regent master in arts could promote in that faculty. Consequently Peter was, at most, an auditor of Thomas, as was the case with Henry of Harclay, a secular theological student at Paris at the beginning of the fourteenth century, 15 who attended and reported on the lectures of Duns Scotus, a Franciscan. I suspect that Peter’s connection with Thomas began when Peter was already a master of arts, and Peter may well have been one of those to whom or through whom Thomas directed his efforts toward masters and students in the Faculty of Arts on behalf of a better understanding of Aristotle, an understanding not leading in the direction of an unorthodox interpretation of Christian doctrine or away from true philosophy as Thomas understood it. While many of the leading figures in the faculty of arts in the 1260s were in the Picard nation (Henry of Ghent, Siger of Brabant), Peter’s master must have been in the French nation, preferably from the Bourges province. Peter of Limoges would be a good candidate, and although it is certain he was a master in arts at Paris and student in theology during the 1260s, he is known 16 primarily for his theological work ‘De oculo morali’ and his sermons. 14 For the latter, Bernard Macro, a secular theologian from the diocese of Amiens and thus a former member of the Picard nation, studied with and incepted under Gerard of St. Victor (CUP II, nr. 743, pp. 202–203). On promotions outside one’s nation, see Courtenay, William J., Michael de Montecalerio: Buridan’s Opponent in his ‘Quaestio de puncto’, in: AHDL 72 (2005), pp. 323–331. 15 Balić, Carolus, Henricus de Harclay et Ioannes Duns Scotus, in: Mélanges offerts à Étienne Gilson (Études de Philosophie Médiévale.Hors série), Toronto/ Paris 1959, pp. 93–121, 701–702; Maurer, Armand, Henry of Harclay: disciple or critic of Duns Scotus?, in: Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter ihr Ursprung und ihre Bedeutung. Vorträge des II. Internationalen Kongresses für Mittelalterliche Philosophie, Köln, 31. August – 6. September 1961 im Auftrage der Société internationale pour l’étude de la philosophie médiévale (S.I.E.P.M.), Ed. Wilpert, Paul in collaboration with Eckert, Willehad Paul (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 2), Berlin 1963, pp. 563–571; Henry of Harclay, Ordinary Questions I–XIV, Ed. Henninger, Mark (Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi 17), Oxford 2008, pp. xvii–xxiv. 16 Glorieux, Palémon, La faculté des arts et ses maîtres au XIIIe siècle (Études de Philosophie Médiévale 59), Paris 1971, p. 290; Weijers, Olga, Le travail intel-

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Peter of Auvergne, Master in Arts and Theology at Paris 17

Other masters in the French nation were Berthaud of St. Denis, John of 18 Ulliaco, and specifically in the Bourges province at this time, Adenulph 19 20 21 of Anagni, Arnulph of Provence, and Gerard of Brolio. There were, in fact, probably around fifty or more regent masters in the four nations of the Faculty of Arts in the 1260s, with the French and Picard nations being the two largest groups and probably therefore the most powerful. Among the few in the period from 1265 to 1275 whose names we know are Siger and Simon of Brabant, Henry of Ghent (although we think of him as regent in theology after 1275), all of whom were members of the Picard nation; Alberic of Reims and Peter of Auvergne in the French nation, and Boethius of Dacia in the English nation. Although the disputes among the nations in the Faculty of Arts between 1265 and 1275, particularly between masters in the French and Picard nations, have often been viewed as an ideological dispute over the interpretation of Aristotle, RenéAntoine Gauthier was undoubtedly correct in viewing the conflict as terri22 torial and political. It is possible that the 1266 statute under the papal legate, Simon de Brie, which stipulated a three-month term in office for a rector, may have been an innovation in order to reduce the political importance of the office and therefore the competition among the nations in the Faculty of Arts to control it. The fact that Simon had to intervene again in a disputed election in 1275 and solved it by appointing a third person, Peter of Auvergne, to be rector, shows that personal and political considerations were still intense, and remained so into the early modern period. It is important, however, to keep in mind the temporal and administrative limits of the office of rector. While the rector was the titular head of the lectuel à la Faculté des arts de Paris: textes et maîtres (ca. 1200–1500): P (Studia Artistarum 15), Turnhout 2007, pp. 196–199. 17 Glorieux, La faculté des arts (note 16), p. 112; Weijers, Olga, Le travail intellectuel à la Faculté des arts de Paris: textes et maîtres (ca. 1200–1500): A–B (Studia Artistarum 1), Turnhout 1994, p. 85. 18 Glorieux, La faculté des arts (note 16), p. 406. 19 Ibid., p. 69; Weijers, Le travail intellectuel (note 17), pp. 32–33. 20 Glorieux, La faculté des arts (note 16), p. 98; Weijers, Le travail intellectuel (note 17), p. 70. 21 Glorieux, La faculté des arts (note 16), p. 143; Weijers, Olga, Le travail intellectuel à la Faculté des arts de Paris: textes et maîtres (ca. 1200–1500): G (Studia Artistarum 6), Turnhout 1998, pp. 75–76. 22 Gauthier, René-Antoine, Notes sur Siger de Brabant. II: Siger en 1272–1275. Aubry de Reims et la scission des Normands, in: RSPhTh 68 (1984), pp. 3–49.

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faculty of arts who summoned and oversaw meetings of that faculty and of the University as whole, received the oath of those incepting in arts, and represented the University ad extra, he shared power with the proctors of the four nations, and all statutory decisions required the majority vote of the masters. Given those limitations and the brevity of his term in office, it hardly constituted a position of great or lasting power – another example supporting the truism that even today in academic meetings the amount of time and energy devoted to issues is usually in inverse proportion to their significance. The years of Thomas’ second sojourn at Paris, 1269–1272, were anxious years at Paris both in arts and in theology, within which the interpretation of Aristotle played a crucial role. James Weisheipl hypothesized that Thomas’ commentaries or sententiae written on various Aristotelian texts were in direct response to the needs of masters and students in the faculty of arts for a proper guide to the interpretation of Aristotle. Weisheipl described it as an apostolate, a mission on Thomas’s part. To the extent the demand was coming from the faculty of arts, which immediately after the death of Thomas sought access to his unfinished commentaries, we can assume that Peter of Auvergne was probably among those seeking Thomas’s insights in understanding both Aristotle and his commentators. Thomas and Albert were also sent lists of suspect articles being taught in the schools at Paris and asked for their opinion on their orthodoxy. In some cases, as with the list of articles taken from the ‘Sentences’ commentary of Peter of Tarentaise, the response of Thomas was to show that they could be interpreted in a way consistent with orthodoxy. In other cases the reports of Albert and Thomas found certain articles erroneous or heretical, although final judgment was left to the bishop of Paris, usually acting with the chancellor on the advice of masters of theology. A reduced number of articles from one such list were condemned by Etienne Tempier in 1270 – a prelude to the famous condemnation of 219 propositions in 1277. Despite the soundness of Gauthier’s conclusion that the conflict in the faculty of arts in 1275 was territorial and personal, not ideological, it may not be entirely accidental that the master of arts most closely associated with continuing in the commenting work begun by Aquinas was Peter of Auvergne, a master in the French nation and a member of the Bourges province, whose composition included students and masters from Italy who may have had links to Italian mendicants, such as Thomas. In addition to Peter’s role in completing some of the unfinished commentaries of Thomas, Peter contributed numerous questiones on Aristotle’s

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works, composed as lectures or disputed questions, as well as other works 23 in the area of philosophy. Considerable progress has been made in recent years in the editing of Peter’s works in logic, natural philosophy, metaphysics, and political thought, acknowledging his place among the modistae, 24 and in understanding his similarities and differences with Thomas. Many of these are issues that are addressed in other papers in this volume and lie outside the biographical context.

II. Peter of Auvergne as Doctor of Theology Peter probably reigned several years in arts before beginning his studies in theology. It seems likely that he had recently been licensed and become a doctor of theology in 1296, which, if he went through the program in theology in the shortest possible time, would mean he began his theological studies in the early 1280s. But, as is becoming increasing evident, students in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries usually took longer to complete their studies in theology than was required. In the case of Peter of Auvergne we simply do not know when he began his theological training or how long he took. We also have no detailed information on the program of studies in the faculty of theology in the second half of the thirteenth century. The 1215 statutes of Robert of Courçon, papal legate, which were still current in 1265, specified eight years of theological study and a minimum age of 35 before becoming a master of theology, but they say nothing about the texts to be

23 For the lists of works, manuscripts, and editions, see Glorieux, La faculté des arts (note 16), pp. 275–278; Galle, Comprehensive Bibliography (note 1); eadem, A Comprehensive Bibliography on Peter of Auvergne: Supplement, in: Bulletin de philosophie médiévale 47 (2005), pp. 87–96; Weijers, Le travail intellectuel (note 16), pp. 95–127. 24 See especially Flüeler, Christoph, Rezeption und Interpretation der Aristotelischen Politica im späten Mittelalter, Teil 1 (Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie 19.1), Amsterdam/Philadelphia 1992, pp. 94–97; Marmo, Constantino, The Semantics of the Modistae, in: Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition (Historisk-filosofiske meddelelser), Ed. Ebbesen, Sten and Friedman, Russell L., København 1999, pp. 83–104.

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studied or the stages or steps in the program. Manfred Gerwing assumed the eight years meant pre-baccalaureate study, and he combined that with the baccalaurate program as described in statutes from the mid fourteenth 26 century to arrive at a sixteen-year program. But that is a conjecture based on insufficient thirteenth-century evidence and an unwarranted assumption that the theological program described in statutes from the following century applied in the 1280s. We know that by 1250 Peter Lombard’s ‘Libri Sententiarum’ had become, alongside the Bible, the principal text to be commented on by bachelors preparing for the doctorate in theology, but we do not know the length of time devoted to that exercise. It is becoming increasingly clear that the Parisian theological statutes from the second and third quarters of the fourteenth century are of little help in determining the requirements of the theological program in the period of Peter of Auvergne except to say that a certain number of years attending lectures on the Bible and the ‘Sentences’ preceded a bachelor’s own lectures on those texts. Nor do we know if there was a waiting period between the completion of those lectures and receiving the license and inception into the magisterium, and if so how long. Realistically we have to assume Peter’s studies took some ten, perhaps fifteen years, which would place the beginning of his theological studies no later than 1285, probably in the early 1280s. But it is also possible for him to have begun his theological studies even earlier and to have moved at a slower pace because of his teaching and writing activities in the faculty of arts. Under whom did Peter of Auvergne study theology? Fortunately, thanks to the research of Glorieux and others, we are far better informed on the names of regent masters in the faculty of theology in the 1280s and early 1290s than we are for the faculty of arts. Although it is often stated that Peter studied under Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines based on his referring to them in his ‘Quodlibeta’ as magistri nostri, that is not a valid inference. Peter was not describing them as his teachers but as important masters among the secular theologians at Paris, just as Dominicans would describe Thomas as doctor noster or Augustinian hermits later would describe Giles of Rome the same way. Peter could certainly have attended lectures and 25 CUP I, nr. 20, pp. 78–80. Simon de Brie reaffirmed them in 1265; CUP I, nr. 405, p. 445. 26 Gerwing, Manfred, Vom Ende der Zeit. Der Traktat des Arnald von Villanova über die Ankunft des Antichrist in der akademischen Auseinandersetzung zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts (BGPhMA, n.f. 45), Münster i.W. 1996, pp. 449–555, at 453.

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disputations by Henry of Ghent, but all things being equal, Peter would have sought promotion in the faculty of theology under a master who had belonged to the French nation, not the Picard, although he was technically free to study under any regent master, even one belonging to a religious 27 order. The most likely master under whom he would have studied would have been Peter of Limoges, who taught in the faculty of theology from the mid 1280s to the late 1290s. Although known to have been a fellow of the Sorbonne and to have possessed contemporary works in scholastic theology that he donated to the library of the Sorbonne, Peter of Limoges left no ‘Sentences’ commentary, no summae in theology, and no disputed or quodlibetical questions of his own. So, while he is a likely candidate for being Peter of Auvergne’s official master, we have no way of tracing influence or compatibility of positions. After a number of years of study Peter would have commented on one or more books of the Bible (which and for how long we do not know) and lectured on the ‘Sentences’. Two commentaries have been attributed to a Peter of Auvergne. One of these is found in the Library of the University of Prague (now Prague, Národni Knihovna), Ms. 2297 [XIII.D.5], ff. 1–17, and described by Hocedez from the first folio of that manuscript as the 28 questions of Peter of Auvergne, O.P., on the first book of the ‘Sentences’. That short group of questions is now attributed to the Dominican Bernard 29 of Auvergne. Another group of questions is found in Bologna, Biblioteca dell’Archiginnasio, A 913, ff. 1r–12r, interspersed among questions from Dominican authors of the early fourteenth century. Inasmuch as the person

27 See above, note 14. 28 Hocedez, La vie et les oeuvres (note 1), pp. 8–9. 29 Stegmüller, Friedrich, Repertorium commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi, Würzburg 1947, nr. 98, p. 51; Friedman, Russell L., The Sentences Commentary, 1250–1320. General Trends, the Impact of the Religious Orders, and the Test Case of Predestination, in: Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. Current Research, Ed. Evans, Gillian Rosemary, Leiden/ Boston/Köln 2002, pp. 41–128, at n. 57. Bernard of Auvergne’s ‘Contra Henricum de Gandavo’ can be found in Bologna, Biblioteca dell’Archiginnasio, A 943, Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 15849 and lat. nouv. acq. 1465, Prague, Národní knihovna české republiky, 2453 [XIV.B.14], Troyes, Bibliolthèque municipale, 662, and Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Ottob. lat. 471; see Stegmüller, Repertorium (see supra), no. 99; Doucet, Victorin, Commentaires sur les Sentences. Supplément au Répertoire de M. Frédéric Stegmueller, in: AFH 47 (1954), p. 18.

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who assembled these questions accused Durandus of occasionally copying questions from Peter of Auvergne, Peter’s questions predate Durandus, i.e. 30 predate 1309. The brevity of the questions is not unusual for the late thirteenth century, but the fact that all the other questions belong to Dominican theologians raises the question of whether this is our Peter of Auvergne, even though his role as a continuator of some of Thomas’s Aristotelian commentaries might seem a sufficient link. As far as I am aware, no one has yet done a comparative study of these questions against related questions in Peter’s ‘Quodlibeta’ to see if similar or dissimilar positions are held. Without further investigation, it is impossible to prove that these questions belong to our Peter of Auvergne and not to the Sorbonne theologian of the same name who was active at Paris into the second decade of the fourteenth century, contemporary to Durandus of St. Pourçain. Peter of Auvergne joined the Paris magisterium in theology by or in 1296. It is probable that he was licensed late in 1295 and incepted early in 1296. When Boniface VIII in June 1296 made Peter a canon of Notre Dame with expectation of prebend, it was in response to a petition from Peter or his patron, probably occasioned by his recent inception as a master of 31 theology. The sequence of his six ‘Quodlibeta’, the last of which dates to 1301, also suggests that 1296 is the beginning date for his regency in theology. Peter’s letter of provision as a canon in the cathedral chapter at Paris was not an appointment to a chair in the faculty of theology, as has 32 been suggested. There was no set number of chairs of theology attached to positions as canons of Notre Dame, and what Peter was granted in 1296 was only an expectation of a canonical prebend which, as Hocedez realized 30 Bologna, Biblioteca dell’Archiginnasio, A 913, f. 4v, on inserting a text from Durandus: Hoc oportuit facere in hac questione, ne multoties idem scriberetur; quia ille Durandus est quidam latrunculus Petri de Alvernia, sicut sunt communiter omnes Gallici, utpote homines nullius inventionis exsistentes! 31 For details, see above, note 12. When in April 1297 Peter was awarded possession of a prebend at Paris as a result of litigation at the papal court, Peter also received papal support for his claim to the office of archdeacon of Brie in the diocese of Soissons, which lay within the gift of the king and had apparently been granted to Gerard of Collanduno, doctor of canon law (Les registres de Boniface VIII (note 12), cols. 674–75, where Peter is called “de Alvania”). Whether Boniface’s declarations bore actual results is another matter. 32 Schabel, Chris, The ‘Quodlibeta’ of Peter of Auvergne, in: Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Fourteenth Century, Ed. id. (Brill’s Companion to the Christian Tradition 1), Leiden/Boston 2007, pp. 81–130, at 82 and 84.

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as far back as 1933, Peter did not secure until after 1298. The canonical prebend at Notre Dame, like the one at Clermont, represented financial support, and in the case of Paris, increased status. It had nothing to do with his teaching position. Throughout the period of Peter’s studies in the faculty of theology and his six years as regent master, the most prominent or productive secular regents in that faculty, such as Gerard of Abbeville, Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines, and Peter of St. Omer had previously belonged to the Picard nation in the faculty of arts. Considering the tensions between the French and Picard nations in the 1260s and 1270s, and role Siger of Brabant’s teaching played in the crises of the 1270s, some of those divisions may have carried over into relations among secular masters in the faculty of theology in the 1280s and 1290s even though Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines were intellectually far removed from Siger. Godfrey of Fontaines and Peter of St. Omer continued to teach during the period of Peter of Auvergne’s regency in theology, joined by Simon of Guiberville in 1299, who later became chancellor. To the extent that present research on the theological thought of Peter permits, he shows compatibility with positions of Thomas and Giles of Rome, Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines, as well as important differences. Some of Peter’s quodlibetal questions have been edited, and thanks to the recent study by Chris Schabel we now have a fuller account of the structure and content of Peter’s ‘Quodlibeta’. More work clearly needs to be done, but two questions that have been studied are worth comment. In the first year of Peter’s regency he addressed the sensitive issue of whether a pope could resign his office, a question raised by the abdication of Celestine V and the election of Boniface VIII in 1294. Peter Olivi had addressed the question in the summer of 1295 and concluded that papal resignation (and thus the election of Boniface) was legitimate. Two Parisian masters in 1296–1297 in quodlibetal disputations arrived at the same conclu34 sion, one of them Godfrey of Fontaines and the other Peter of Auvergne. Not surprisingly Giles of Rome joined that consensus in 1297. Contrary to the impression given by John Eastman, Godfrey and Peter 35 were probably not in a minority among their theological colleagues. The 33 Hocedez, La vie et les oeuvres (note 1), pp. 14–15. 34 Peter of Auvergne, Quodlibet I, q. 15: Utrum Summus Pontifex possit cedere vel renuntiare officio suo in aliquo casu, was probably disputed in December 1296. 35 Eastman, John R., Papal Abdication in Later Medieval Thought (Texts and Studies in Religion 42), Lewiston, NY 1990, pp. 58–62.

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idea that the faculty of theology had, in response to a request from Philip the Fair, made a determination in 1297 against papal resignation and the legitimacy of Boniface’s election is pure fiction, unsupported by the docu36 ments. In all probability Godfrey’s and Peter’s position was shared by others; at minimum there is no evidence to the contrary. Papal legitimacy was not the only current issue disputed by Peter and his fellow regents in theology. Peter was undoubtedly among the masters of theology, along with the chancellor, Peter of St. Omer, who condemned Arnold of Villanova’s ‘De tempore adventus Antichristi’, completed in 1299, leading to Arnold’s arrest and imprisonment by the official at Paris on 37 December 25, 1299. Peter of Auvergne was also present along with the chancellor at the palace of the bishop of Paris on October 12, 1300 when Arnold 38 lodged his appeal to the pope. Peter mentioned Arnold’s views and these 39 events several times in his fifth ‘Quodlibet’ disputed in December 1300. It is less clear where Peter of Auvergne stood on other issues, such as mendicant privileges or the authority of doctors of theology to interpret scripture, issues that in 1290 had led to the confrontation between Henry of Ghent and the papal legate, Benedict Gaetani, and the latter’s angry response to the theologians followed by his suspension of Henry’s right to teach. As is well known, Peter’s regency as master of theology at Paris came to an end in 1302 through his appointment by Boniface VIII as bishop of Clermont on 21 January 1302 and his installation as bishop on 25 March 1302, an appointment that may have had the support of Philip the Fair, despite 36 See Courtenay, William J., Learned Opinion and Royal Justice. The Role of Paris Masters of Theology during the Reign of Philip the Fair, in: Law and the Illicit in Medieval Society, Eds. Karras, Ruth M., Kaye, Joel and Matter, E. Ann (Middle Ages Series), Philadelphia 2008, pp. 149–163, 280–285. See also Leclercq, Jean, La renonciation de Célestin V et l’opinion théologique en France du vivant de Boniface VIII, in: RHEF 25 (1939), pp. 183–192; Marmursztejn, Elsa, L’autorité des maîtres. Scolastique, normes et société au XIIIe siècle (Histoire), Paris 2007, pp. 11, 37–39. 37 CUP II, nr. 615, pp. 86–87. For a full discussion of the content and controversy surrounding Arnold’s treatise, see Gerwing, Vom Ende der Zeit (note 28), pp. 76–253, 449–489. 38 CUP II, nr. 616, pp. 87–90. 39 Peter of Auvergne, Quodlibet V, q. 4: Utrum angelo bono revelanti aliquid bonum de adventu Christi vel Antichristi futuris credendum sit; q. 15: Utrum Antichristus sit venturus in brevi; q. 16: Utrum expediat scire determinatum tempus adventus eius; q. 17: Utrum Antichristum venturum esse determinatio et signato tempore sit error in Scriptura Sacra.

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Peter’s quodlibetal conclusion in 1296 on the right of a pope to resign. 1302 is an important turning point in the intellectual history of the University of Paris. It marks the supposed end of Peter’s residency at Paris and the beginning of John Duns Scotus’ Parisian lectures on the ‘Sentences’. But whether Peter left Paris for good in 1302 is not certain. It is possible that after his consecration as bishop in Clermont, Peter returned to Paris and his episcopal townhouse for part of the 1302–1303 year. He was certainly in residence at Paris in June 1303 when he joined 21 other bishops (most of whom had residences in Paris) in signing their adhesion to Philip the Fair’s 41 call for a council against Boniface VIII. Peter probably returned to Clermont in 1303, where he remained until his death on September 25, 1304. However contextually important the details of Peter’s career as a master of arts and a master of theology, more important is the content of the philosophical and theological works he wrote, and their impact on his and subsequent generations. It is those issues that will be the subject of presentations in the remainder of this volume.

40 Registres de Boniface VIII (note 12), vol. III, cols. 247–248 (an. 7, ep. 357). An original bull of Boniface’s approval of Peter’s election and recommendation to the king is found in Paris, Archives Nationales, J. 702. He was still bishop elect on June 8, 1302 (Registres de Boniface VIII, vol. III, col. 497) and the first papal letter addressed to him as bishop of Clermont was on November 24, 1302 (Registres de Boniface VIII [see supra], vol. III, col. 556). For his confirmation in office see GChr, vol. II, col. 233. 41 Picot, Georges, Documents relatifs aux États Généraux et Assemblées réunis sous Philippe le Bel (Collection de documents inédits sur l’histoire de France, 36. Première série, Histoire politique), Paris 1901, pp. 53–55. The document with 40 seals is found in Archives Nationales, Paris, J. 478, n. 1; cf. Dupuy, Pierre, Histoire du differend d’entre le pape Boniface VIII et Philippes le Bel roy de France, Paris 1655, p. 112.

Peter of Auvergne and the Condemnation of 1277 Luca Bianchi (Vercelli)

In his renowned book ‘Maître Siger de Brabant’, while describing how the papal legate Simon of Brion settled the conflict between the two factions which in 1272 had caused the scission of the Parisian Faculty of Arts, Fernand Van Steenberghen wrote: Le légat désigne lui-même, à titre exceptionnel, le recteur et les autres officiers de la faculté des arts. Il choisit comme recteur maître Pierre d’Auvergne, connu pour la modération de ses idées et pour l’orthodoxie de son enseignement. Ptolémée de Lucques l’appelle ‘très fidèle disciple’ de Thomas d’Aquin et lui attribue l’achèvement de plusieurs écrits que le saint docteur avait laissés incomplètes.1

Further on in the same book, published in 1977, Van Steenberghen repeats literally what he wrote as early as 1942 in his first essay on Siger, and explains the latter’s ‘intellectual evolution’ as a result of Peter’s influence: On sait que, le 7 mai 1275, un acte d’arbitrage du légat pontifical Simon de Brion rétablit l’unité et la paix à la faculté des arts de Paris, troublée par une scission de plus de trois ans. Cet événement heureux a dû favoriser le rapprochement des maîtres de la minorité (dont Siger était le chef) et de la majorité. Des relations personnelles entre Siger et le nouveau recteur de la faculté, Pierre d’Auvergne, expliqueraient de la manière la plus naturelle un changement d’attitude de la part de Siger, sous l’influence de celui que Ptolémée de Lucques appelle le fidelissimus discipulus de S. Thomas.2

According to Van Steenberghen, Peter therefore played a decisive role in the institutional and doctrinal conflicts of the 1270s: as a distinguished 1 Van Steenberghen, Fernand, Maître Siger de Brabant (Philosophes Médiévaux 21), Louvain/Paris 1977, p. 130. 2 Ibid., p. 401; cf. Van Steenberghen, Fernand, Siger de Brabant d’après ses œuvres inédites (Les Philosophes Belges 12–13), Louvain 1931–1942, vol. 2, pp. 559–560; see also vol. 2, pp. 725–726.

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member of the ‘moderate party’, he managed, with the providential support of Church authorities, both to pacify the University and to temper the philosophical excesses of the rival ‘party’; as a faithful supporter of Thomas Aquinas within the Faculty of Arts, he affected with his Thomism even the supposed leader of the ‘radical Aristotelians’, i.e. Siger of Brabant, encouraging his move toward orthodoxy. Accepted by several scholars,3 such a picture is doubtless edifying, but in the light of recent research it appears quite implausible for at least three reasons. First of all, thanks to René-Antoine Gauthier we now know that the so-called ‘scission des Normands’ had nothing to do with doctrinal controversies, and that the institutional majority of the faculty (to which Peter surely belonged) was far from ‘moderate’ in philosophy: as a matter of fact, it had elected as rector Alberich of Reims, who had expressed his enthusiasm for this discipline in terms so extreme that they had disturbed the theologians, sparking the strong reaction of Bonaventure.4

3 See e.g. Eastman, John, Peter of Auvergne: Life, Master Regent, and the First Quodlibet of 1296, in: Forschungen zur Reichs-, Papst- und Landesgeschichte. Peter Herde zum 65. Geburtstag von Freunden, Schülern und Kollegen dargebracht, Eds. Borchardt, Karl and Bünz, Enno, Stuttgart 1998, vol. 2, pp. 583–593, esp. 583–584. Eastman, however, seems to ignore the criticism of Van Steenberghen’s picture provided by Flüeler, Christoph, Rezeption und Interpretation der Aristotelischen ‘Politica’ im späten Mittelalter (Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie 19), Amsterdam/Philadelphia 1992, vol. 1, pp. 96–97. Though repeating that Peter was a follower (“proche disciple”) of Aquinas, Constant Mews sees instead in Tempier’s intervention of March 7, 1277 an implicit censure of Peter’s supposed incapacity to defend orthodoxy: “Les accusations lancées en 1277 impliquent une critique du nouveau recteur, Pierre d’Auvergne, soutenu par Simon de Brie, pour n’avoir pas su faire prévaloir la défense de l’orthodoxie au sein de l’université”, Mews, Constant, Communautés de savoirs. Écoles et collèges à Paris au XIIIe siècle, in: Revue de Synthèse 129 (2008), pp. 485–507, see 501, 503. It is far from clear, however, to what extent, even after the controversial statute of 1272, the jurisdiction of a rector included the struggle against ‘heterodox’ teachings. Moreover, since Peter was appointed in May 1275 and must have been in office, like all rectors, only for a few months, how could he be held responsible for the intellectual climate which sparked the reaction of the ecclesiastic authorities two years later? 4 Gauthier, René Antoine, Notes sur Siger de Brabant. II. Siger en 1272–1275; Aubry de Reims et la scission des Normands, in: Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques 68 (1984), pp. 3–49, see 15–20 (on Alberich) and pp.

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Second, it is worth noticing that Simon of Brion’s decision to entrust Peter with the guidance of the Arts Faculty after three years of scission does not at all prove that, at this time at least, he was less ‘radical’ in his philosophical approach than some of his colleagues, including those that would be targeted by the Paris bishop Stephen Tempier in his great condemnation of March 7, 1277. As a matter of fact we cannot take it for granted that the papal legate, though notoriously sensitive to any deviations from Christian orthodoxy (or better, from theological tradition),5 selected the leaders of the university exclusively among the ‘moderates’. We know that, after appointing Peter as Rector Universitatis, Simon designated the Proctors of the four nations. The most outstanding figure among them was James of Douai, who has long been considered the author of a commentary on the ‘Meteorologica’ where two doctrines censured in 1277 – in articles 24 and 40, both dealing with the excellence of philosophy and its role in accomplishing intellectual perfection – are cautiously explained and qualified.6 Since Iacopo Costa has recently cast serious doubts on the largely received attribution of 20–25 (on the ‘scission des Normands’). For Bonaventure’s reaction to Alberich’s panegyric on philosophy, see Bianchi, Luca, Censure et liberté intellectuelle à l’Université de Paris (XIIIe – XIVe siècles) (L’Âne d’or), Paris 1999, p. 197. 5 One need only think of how he threatened Henry of Ghent in March 1277 in order to persuade him to adopt the doctrine of the plurality of forms. 6 For Simon’s designations see Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, Eds. Denifle, Heinrich and Chatelain, Emile, vol. 1, p. 530. After remarking that Simon nominated both Peter of Auvergne and James of Douai, Gauthier adds: “contemporains, les deux maîtres appartenaient à la même tendance modérée qui s’opposait aux excès du parti de Siger”. Cf. Gauthier, René Antoine, Les ‘Questiones supra librum Ethicorum’ de Pierre d’Auvergne, in: Revue du Moyen Âge Latin 20 (1964), pp. 233–260, see 243. One should note, however, that the existence of these two opposite ‘parties’ was later refuted by Gauthier himself (see note 4 above). On the prologue to the commentary on Aristotle’s ‘Meteorologica’, ascribed (mistakenly, as we now know) to James, and the articles censured in 1277 see Bianchi, Luca, Il vescovo e i filosofi. La condanna parigina del 1277 e l’evoluzione dell’aristotelismo scolastico (Quodlibet 6), Bergamo 1990, pp. 47–48, note 74; id., Censure et liberté intellectuelle (note 4), p. 74; id., Students, masters, and ‘heterodox’ doctrines at the Parisian Faculty of Arts in the 1270s, in: Recherches de Théologie et de Philosophie médiévales 76 (2009), pp. 75–109, esp. 86–89. All articles of the condemnation of March 7, 1277 are quoted according to the edition provided in: La condamnation parisienne de 1277. Texte latin, traduction, introduction et commentaire par Piché, David (Sic et Non), Paris 1999.

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this commentary,7 it is no longer possible to claim that James was responsible for disseminating these doctrines. Yet his commentary on the ‘De anima’ contains a disparaging remark about ignorant men who, neglecting their natural desire to know, are only potentially human and unworthy to be called ‘men’.8 Therefore one can still maintain that, being ready to accept the most provocative consequences of Averroes’ well-received idea that science is the “ultimate perfection of man”, James was, if not an ‘ethical Averroist’,9 at least a quite ‘radical’ supporter of the intellectualistic and aristocratic eudemonism disliked by bishop Tempier. Third, it is true that Peter’s questions on several of Aristotle’s works (e.g. his questions on the ‘Metaphysics’ and the ‘Politics’) borrow considerably from Aquinas’ commentaries; it is also true that here he often refutes Aristotelian and Neo-platonic doctrines which were potentially dangerous for the

7 See Costa, Iacopo, Anonymi Artium Magistri Questiones super Librum Ethicorum Aristotelis (Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 14698) (Studia Artistarum 23), Turnhout 2010. Costa challenges the attribution to James of the commentaries on both the ‘Ethics’ (see in particular pp. 80–88) and the ‘Meteorologica’ preserved in Ms. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 14698, and argues that they were authored by two different Arts masters who taught after 1277 and had different conceptions of the relationship between philosophy and theology (pp. 60–79). I discuss this last view in Bianchi, Luca, ‘Viri philosophici’. Nota sui prologhi dei commenti all’Etica e ai Meteorologica erroneamente attribuiti a Giacomo di Douai (Ms. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 14698), in: Scientia, fides, theologia. Studi di filosofia medievale in onore di Gianfranco Fioravanti, Ed. Perfetti, Stefano (Edizioni ETS), Pisa 2011, pp. 253–288. As the title of my article makes clear, however, I agree that the attribution of these commentaries to James was based on weak arguments and can no longer be maintained. 8 I called attention to and quoted this passage – now examined also by Costa, Anonymi Artium Magistri (note 7), pp. 81–82 – in: Bianchi, Il vescovo e i filosofi (note 6), p. 157. 9 The notion of ‘ethical Averroism’ was introduced by Alain de Libera, Averroïsme éthique et philosophie mystique. De la félicité intellectuelle à la vie bienheureuse, in: Filosofia e teologia nel Trecento. Studi in ricordo di Eugenio Randi (Textes et Études du Moyen Âge 1), Ed. Bianchi, Luca, Louvain-laNeuve 1994, pp. 33–56 (Peter is mentioned at p. 36). For my criticism see Bianchi, Luca, Felicità intellettuale, ‘ascetismo’ e ‘arabismo’: nota sul ‘De summo bono’ di Boezio di Dacia, in: Le felicità nel Medioevo, Eds. Bettetini, Maria and Paparella, Francesco D. (Textes et Études du Moyen Âge 31), Louvain-la-Neuve 2005, pp. 13–34.

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Christian faith and were therefore prohibited in 1277 by the bishop of Paris and his advisors. Nevertheless, recent scholarship has revealed not only that Peter, although largely influenced by Aquinas, is an independent thinker, ready to depart from his alleged ‘master’,10 but also that, at least at the beginning of his career at the Arts Faculty, he might have been much closer to ‘radical Aristotelianism’ than Van Steenberghen would have admitted. If Peter is indeed the author of the commentaries on the ‘De caelo’ and the ‘De generatione’ that have been attributed to him, this means that around 1275 he overtly taught doctrines that would shortly be censured by bishop Tempier, such as the impossibility of a plurality of worlds, the impossibility of a numerical plurality of separate substances within a single species, the impossibility for the first cause to produce temporal effects immediately, the creation of matter through secondary causes, the animation of the heavens.11 Moreover, the questions on Aristotle’s ‘Physics’ published by 10 Among the first historians to emphasize this point see Gautier, Les ‘Questiones supra librum Ethicorum’ (note 6), p. 243; Bazán, Bernardo Carlos, Introduction, in: Bazán, Bernardo Carlos, Giele, Maurice, Van Steenberghen, Fernand, Trois commentaires anonymes sur le traité de l’âme d’Aristote (Philosophes Médiévaux 11), Louvain/Paris 1971, pp. 382–385. 11 Donati, Silvia, A New Witness to the Radical Aristotelianism Condemned by Étienne Tempier in 1277, in: Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter? Qu’est-ce que la philosophie au Moyen Âge? What is Philosophy in the Middle Ages? Akten des X. Internationalen Kongresses für mittelalterliche Philosophie der Société Internationale pour l’Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale, 25. bis 30. August 1997 in Erfurt, Eds. Aertsen, Jan and Speer, Andreas (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 26), Berlin/New York 1998, pp. 371–382, esp. 373–378; ead., An Anonymous Commentary on the ‘De Generatione et Corruptione’ from the Years Before the Paris Condemnations of 1277 (Mss. Erlangen, Universitätsbibl., 213; Kassel, Stadt- und Landesbibl., Phys. 2° 11), in: Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales 65 (1998), pp. 194–247, esp. 202–203; Galle, Griet, The Autorship of One of the Sets of Questions on ‘De Caelo’ attributed to Peter of Auvergne (Mss. Cremona, Bibl. Governativa 80 (7.5.15), fols. 98ra–136ra, Erlangen, Universitätsbibl. 213, fols. 1ra–28rb and Kassel, Stadt- und Landesbibl., Phys. 2º 11, fols. 35va–55rb), in: Medioevo 27 (2002), pp. 191–260, esp. 208–210; ead., Questions on Aristotle’s ‘De Caelo’: A Critical Edition with an Interpretative Essay, Leuven 2003, pp. 54*–55*; ead., Peter of Auvergne’s Discussion concerning the Animation of the Heavens, in: Intellect et imagination dans la philosophie médiévale. Intellect and Imagination in Medieval Philosophy. Intelecto e imaginação na filosofia medieval, Eds. Pacheco, Maria C. and Meirinhos, José Francisco (Rencontres de Philo-

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Delhaye under Siger’s name and tentatively ascribed by Sajò to Boethius of Dacia present strong similarities not only with some questions contained in Peter’s commentary on the ‘Metaphysics’ (as noticed by Dunphy in 1953),12 but also with Peter’s commentary on ‘De motu animalium’ (as recently shown by De Leemans) and could therefore provide evidence of what he taught at the Arts Faculty.13 Now, there is no need to recall that these ‘Questions on the Physics’ are the source of several articles censured by Tempier, and that the sixth question on book VIII was partially struck off by a zealous reader, apparently shocked by its discussion of the eternity of motion.14 Because the authenticity of the aforementioned expositions of the ‘De caelo’ and the ‘De generatione’ has been convincingly challenged by several scholars, and the attribution to Peter of the ‘Questions on the Physics’, though plausible, remains uncertain, one might be tempted to remark that nothing definite can be said about Peter’s involvement in the condemnation of 1277, and leave it at that.15 Still, the problem of Peter’s relation to the condemnation remains. As a matter of fact, even a cursory look at recent literature on Peter of Auvergne shows that the condemnation of 1277 there plays a pivotal role, for at least three reasons. First, as we have seen, some works of, or attributed to Peter have been considered as possible sources of some of the ‘errors’ banned by bishop Tempier. Second, the hypothesis sophie Médiévale 11), Turnhout 2006, vol. 3, pp. 1463–1475, see 1474–1475; Musatti, Cesare, Celestial Movers and Animation of the Heavens in one Commentary on Aristotle’s ‘De Caelo’ ascribed to Peter of Auvergne, ibid., pp. 1447–1461, see 1460–1461. 12 Dunphy, William, The Similarity Between Certain Questions of Peter of Auvergne’s Commentary on the Metaphysics and the Anonymous Commentary on the Physics Attributed to Siger of Brabant, in: Mediaeval Studies 15 (1953), pp. 159–168. 13 De Leemans, Pieter, Peter of Auvergne on Aristotle’s ‘De motu animalium’ and the Ms. Oxford, Merton College 275, in: Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge 71 (2004), pp. 129–202, see 183–184. 14 Cf. Hissette, Roland, Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris le 7 mars 1277 (Philosophes Médiévaux 22), Louvain/Paris 1977, p. 314. On mutilations of texts after 1277 see Bianchi, Censure et liberté intellectuelle (note 4), pp. 38–39. As to the text discussed here see [Pseudo-] Siger de Brabant, Questions sur la Physique d’Aristote, Ed. Delhaye, Philippe (Les Philosophes Belges 15), Louvain 1941, VIII, 6, p. 199 (apparat). 15 As already noted by Flüeler, Rezeption und Interpretation der Aristotelischen ‘Politica’ (note 3), vol. 1, p. 97, and Galle, Questions on Aristotle’s ‘De Caelo’ (note 11), p. 23*.

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has been suggested of an evolution of Peter’s philosophy: in this perspective, the more prudent attitude of the later commentaries – where Peter, while introducing ‘heterodox’ philosophical theories, hastens to recall the teachings of Holy Scripture, the Fathers and the Sacred Doctors – has been seen as evidence of the impact that the limitations of intellectual freedom imposed by the 1277 decree had on his thought.16 Third, and consequently, this decree has been often used as a terminus ante or post quem for dating his works, arguing that, after the Episcopal intervention, he would not have risked statements too similar to the censured ones.17 Let me start, therefore, with a methodological remark on this last point, obviously related to both the first and the second. Introducing his edition of an anonymous exposition ‘In III de anima’, attributed to Peter of Auvergne by Palémon Glorieux but most probably not composed by him, Bernardo Carlos Bazán stated in 1971: Dans l’atmosphère créée par la condamnation, il est invraisemblable qu’un maître de la Faculté des arts se soit permis d’exposer et de défendre publiquement une des thèses condamnées; une attitude de prudence s’imposait, il fallait éviter les questions brûlantes et toute prise de position contraire à la décision épiscopale.18

Though largely (but not universally)19 received, this assumption is far from proven and – as I noticed about twenty years ago – has most likely introduced a dangerous circularity between our way of dating texts and our way 16 See e.g. Galle, The Autorship of One of the Sets of Questions on ‘De Caelo’ (note 11), p. 210: “If Peter is the author of the CEK-questions, he is an interesting witness to the way in which the Masters of Arts at Paris changed their teachings under the influence of the condemnations of 1277”. Ead., Peter of Auvergne’s Discussion concerning the Animation of the Heavens (note 11), p. 1475: “If this author is Peter of Auvergne, which is most probably the case, the shift from the statement that ‘the heavens are moved by souls’ to the statement that ‘the heavens are moved by souls in an equivocal sense only’ shows an evolution in Peter of Auvergne’s doctrine, probably under the influence of the condemnations of 1277”. 17 Several examples of this trend will be discussed below. 18 Bazán, Introduction (note 10), p. 375. 19 See criticism in Gauthier, René-Antoine, Trois commentaires ‘averroïstes’ sur l’‘Éthique à Nicomaque’, in: Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge 22–23 (1947–1948), pp. 187–336, esp. 219–220, 223–224; Wielockx, Robert, Commentaire in Aegidii Romani Opera omnia. III.1. Apologia (Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi 4), Firenze 1985, pp. 246–247.

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of interpreting the situation at the Arts Faculty in the last quarter of the 13th century. One might indeed wonder whether the impression that after 1277 Parisian philosophers tempered their positions reflects a real historical trend, or whether it is instead the predictable outcome of the widespread editorial tendency to place before 1277 all ‘radical’ texts composed at the Arts Faculty of Paris in the second half of the 13th century.20 As a matter of fact, we do know that some members of this faculty continued to teach – naturaliter loquendo or secundum philosophos – several doctrines which had been censured by bishop Tempier, without feeling much restrained by his prohibition. At least some of the so-called ‘Averroist’ commentaries on the ‘Nicomachean Ethics’ discovered by Martin Grabmann and studied by René-Antoine Gauthier were written after 1277. These commentaries often present various moral doctrines condemned by bishop Tempier, without making any attempts to reconcile the contradiction between philosophical teaching and theological orthodoxy.21 Another example of this relative freedom in expressing views attacked by bishop Tempier is offered by Radulphus Brito, who in his ‘Questions on Metaphysics’ openly accepts by faith that accidents might exist without a substance, but nevertheless emphasizes that Aristotle would have denied it, according to the principle that the first cause cannot produce directly all that he can do through secondary causes. In repeating this principle without qualifying it, Brito passes over the fact that it had been explicitly censured in article 63 of Tempier’s ‘syllabus’.22 In an anonymous commentary on the ‘Physics’ possibly authored by Giles of Orleans the numerical plurality of immaterial substances within the same

20 “Bisogna chiedersi in quale misura l’impressione di un prevalere, dopo il 1277, di posizioni moderate, dipenda in realtà dalla pervicace tendenza a collocare ogni testo ‘radicale’ prima di quella data; proprio presupponendo inverosimile che qualcuno si sia permesso di difendere pubblicamente una tesi condannata. Impiegato sistematicamente questo criterio discutibilissimo, ci si troverebbe di fronte all’immagine rassicurante di una Facoltà delle Arti ricondotta all’ordine dal provvidenziale intervento episcopale: quest’immagine sarebbe però il riflesso non della realtà storica, bensì di una petizione di principio storiografica”, Bianchi, Il vescovo e i filosofi (note 6), p. 24. 21 See Gauthier, Trois commentaires ‘averroïstes’ (note 19), and Hissette, Roland, La date de quelques commentaires à l’Éthique, in: Bulletin de philosophie médiévale 18 (1976), pp. 79–83. 22 On this point see Bianchi, Luca, New Perspectives on the Condemnation of 1277 and its Aftermath, in: Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales 70 (2003), pp. 206–229, esp. 223–224 (with note 41).

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species is denied, glossing as follows: Nescio tamen si est ibi articulus, dico tamen hoc secundum intentionem philosophorum. Is this claim the expression of a “cautious attitude”, as Silvia Donati has argued, or rather a case of feigned innocence?23 Since the list of prohibited articles was at that time easily accessible at Paris university, and at least two of them (81 and 96) deal with the problem of the numerical multiplication of immaterial substances, I find the second hypothesis more plausible. However it might be, I am convinced that if one can reasonably assume that texts presenting ‘heterodox’ opinions in terms strictly corresponding to those found in the articles censured by bishop Tempier were redacted before his intervention, one cannot take it for granted that this applies to every Aristotelian commentary exposing doctrines, principles, or philosophical sayings and topoi that recall some of these articles. Nor can one infer that every Aristotelian commentary free from such associations was necessarily composed after 1277. In other words, I am convinced that what I elsewhere called “the ‘pre-1277/post-1277’ paradigm”24 should be used with great caution as a criterion for dating texts, and I wonder whether this is always the case in Peter of Auvergne’s scholarship.25 A brief examination of two commentaries unanimously attributed to Peter and both dated after 1277 by their editors will show that his relation 23 Et ideo sequitur correlarie quod substantiae separatae a magnitudine non sunt divisibiles in partes consimiles ; et ideo in eis est tantum unum individuum sub una specie secundum philosophos […]. Nescio tamen si est ibi articulus, dico tamen hoc secundum intentionem philosophorum […], quoted by Donati, A New Witness to the Radical Aristotelianism (note 11), p. 378, note 25. 24 See Bianchi, Luca, 1277: A Turning Point in Medieval Philosophy?, in: Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter? (note 11), pp. 90–110, see 105–108. 25 See e.g. the ex silentio arguments recently suggested by Michael Dunne and Evert L.J. Poortman. The former argues that Peter’s ‘Expositio in librum Aristotelis de longitudine et brevitate vitae’ might be placed after 1277 since “there is no mention of Averroës nor any allusion to his commentary on Aristotle”: see The Commentary of Peter of Auvergne on Aristotle’s ‘On Length and Shortness of Life’, in: Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge 69 (2002), pp. 153–200, esp. 155. The latter suggests that the commentary on ‘De vegetabilibus et plantis’ was instead composed before that date because it does not make use of the distinction between felicitas in ista vita/in alia vita which, relying upon Celano, Peter is credited with introducing after, and because of, the condemnation: see Petrus de Alvernia Sententia super librum ‘De vegetabilibus et plantis’, Ed. Poortman, Evert L.J. (Aristoteles SemiticoLatinus 13), Leiden/Boston 2003, p. xxxi.

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to Tempier’s ‘syllabus’ is a rather puzzling issue, which hardly provides us with a reliable method for establishing a definite chronology of his works. By thoroughly examining Peter of Auvergne’s questions on Aristotle’s ‘De Caelo’, Griet Galle has shown that he often rejects some of the doctrines that were censured in 1277; that he openly accepts only one of them, namely that the first cause produces different effects through intermediate and lower causes, such as the heavenly bodies; and finally that when he exposes other Peripatetic theses which were included in Tempier’s list of ‘errors’ (e.g. that there is only one world, that matter is the principle of multiplication within a species, that accidents cannot exist without a substance) he qualifies his position by adding that he is considering only what is naturally possible, not what God could do.26 In order to explain this cautious approach, which aims at avoiding conflicts between Aristotle’s worldview and Christian beliefs, it is obviously possible to imagine – as Galle has done27 – that Peter was influenced by the condemnation of 1277, and to argue therefore that he must have commented upon the ‘De caelo’ after the intervention of the bishop of Paris. But is this the only way to explain his attitude? Peter’s remark that it is “prohibited” (inibitum) to the members of the Arts Faculty to speak about “God’s unlimited power” (potentia Dei indeterminata) is less an allusion to 1277 than – as Galle has carefully noticed – to the statute of 1272, which forbade the discussion of strictly theological questions.28 Other statements introduced by Peter (utrum autem deus extra universum posset causare quantitatem, non intromitto me, Quid autem sit tenendum et quid non, videtis vos, Utrum autem Deus posset plures mundos facere loquendo de potentia eius absoluta

26 Cf. Galle, Griet, Peter of Auvergne on the Unicity of the World, in: Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale 68 (2001), pp. 111–141, see 133–134; ead., Questions on Aristotle’s ‘De Caelo’ (note 11), pp. 63*–67*. See also Musatti, Cesare A., Il ‘De Caelo’ di Aristotele e alcuni suoi commentatori: Simplicio, Averroè e Pietro d’Alvernia, in: Quaestio 6 (2006), pp. 525–549, see 541. 27 See the previous note. 28 Cf. Galle, Questions on Aristotle’s ‘De Caelo’ (note 11), pp. 63*, 209*. For different perspectives on the statute of 1272 and its meaning see Putallaz, François-Xavier and Imbach, Ruedi, Profession: philosophe. Siger de Brabant (Initiations au Moyen Âge), Paris 1997, pp. 123–134; Bianchi, Censure et liberté intellectuelle (note 4), pp. 165–201. On its influence until the 16th century see Bianchi, Luca, Pour une histoire de la ‘double vérité’ (Conférences Pierre Abélard), Paris 2008, pp. 102–115.

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et non ordinata, nihil ad praesens, cum Deus sit infinitae potentiae)29 show a similar concern for making clear that he does not intend to exceed the bounds of philosophical teaching. In this perspective, these statements recall the well-known formula – nihil ad me de Dei miraculis, cum ego de naturalibus disseram – coined by Albert the Great, used by Siger of Brabant around 1274, included in the ‘Auctoritates Aristotelis’, and later repeated by generations of Masters of Arts in the 14th century.30 Even Peter’s occasional reference, in the last passage quoted above, to the distinction between the absolute and the ordained power of God is open to different interpretations: is it the effect of the so-called ‘spirit of 1277’,31 or simply further evidence of a practice introduced within the Aristotelian tradition in mid-13th century? One should remember that if one of the earliest examples of the use of the distinction between God’s ‘two powers’ in an Aristotelian commentary goes back to Roger Bacon’s questions on the ‘Physics’,32 in the exegetical tradition on the ‘De Caelo’ it had already been employed by Albert the Great. And it is worth bearing in mind that Albert distinguishes what God can do de absoluta potentia ipsius from what may happen naturally in the context of a long prudential clause, appended to the chapter where he examines Aristotle’s arguments against the actuality and possibility of a plurality of worlds. After arguing, in accordance with Aristotle, that there is only one world – as Peter will later do – Albert in

29 Galle, Questions on Aristotle’s ‘De Caelo’ (note 11), pp. 46, 113, 128. 30 See Bianchi, Luca, “Naturaliter loquendo”, in: Bianchi, Luca and Randi, Eugenio, Vérités dissonantes. Aristote à la fin du Moyen Âge (Vestigia 11), Paris/ Fribourg 1993, pp. 47, 59. Albert the Great’s expression is to be found in his paraphrase of the ‘De generatione et corruptione’, I, 22, in: Opera Omnia, Ed. Borgnet, Auguste, Paris 1890–1899, vol. 4, p. 363. 31 See Galle, Peter of Auvergne on the Unicity of the World (note 26), p. 133; ead., Questions on Aristotle’s ‘De Caelo’ (note 11), pp. 64*–65*. For a comparison between the treatment of God’s power in Peter’s questions on ‘De caelo’ and in the so-called CEK-questions possibly authored by him, see Musatti, Il ‘De Caelo’ di Aristotele (note 26), pp. 541–542. 32 Cf. Roger Bacon, Quaestiones supra libros octo physicorum Aristotelis, Ed. Delorme, Ferdinand M. (Opera hactenus inedita, fasc. 13), Oxford 1913, pp. 224–225: Unde de potentia primi absoluta bene posset esse et sic excedit omnem actum finitum. Set loquendo de debito potentie et ordinatione potentie [...].

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fact declares – as Peter will also do – that he does not intend to dispute on whether the Omnipotent could have made many worlds.33 Let us now move to Peter’s questions on the first two books of the ‘Nicomachean Ethics’. Anthony Celano, who edited them, maintained that they were composed between 1277 and 1283 because they make use of some conceptual distinctions (felicitas in via/in patria, felicitas in ista vita/in vita futura, finis cuius/finis quo) which he took as the hallmark of commentaries written after the condemnation, also employed by John of Tytynsale, who – so he argued – borrowed them from Peter.34 Jacopo Costa has recently and convincingly established that this argument is unfounded, and that the only reason to date Peter’s questions on the ‘Ethics’ around 1280 is their resemblance to those of the anonymous commentary preserved in Ms. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 14698.35 But are we sure that two texts similar in doctrine and literary structure are necessarily contemporary? If

33 Albert the Great, In De Caelo et Mundo, I, 3, 6, Ed. Hossfeld, Paul, in: Opera Omnia, Ed. Coloniensis, vol. 5.1, pp. 68–69: Si autem forte aliquis dicat, quod quidem possunt mundi esse plures, sed non sunt, quia deus posset fecisse plures mundos, si voluisset, et adhuc posset facere, si vellet, contra hoc ego non disputo. Cum enim hic concluditur, quod impossibile est mundos esse vel fieri plures et quod necessarium est esse unum solum, intelligitur de impossibili et necessario, quod est ex parte mundi quantum ad causas eius essentiales et proximas, et est magna differentia inter id quod deus potest facere de absoluta potentia ipsius, et inter id quod in natura potest fieri. Multa enim meo iudicio facere potest, quae tamen fieri non possunt. […] et ideo quantum est de natura mundi, dico non posse fieri plures mundos, licet deus, si vellet, posset facere plures. 34 Celano, Anthony J., Peter of Auvergne’s Questions on Books I and II of the ‘Ethica Nicomachea’. A Study and Critical Edition, in: Medieval Studies 48 (1986), pp. 1–110: see notably pp. 4–6 for the dating of the text. 35 See Costa, Anonymi Artium Magistri (note 7), pp. 91–101. On the relationship between the commentaries on the ‘Nicomachean Ethics’ ascribed to Peter of Auvergne and the one preserved in Ms. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 14698 (and once ascribed to James of Douai: see note 7 above) see also Wieland, Georg, The Perfection of Man. On the Cause, Mutability, and Permanence of Human Happiness in 13th Century Commentaries on the ‘Ethica Nicomachea’ (EN), in: Il commento filosofico nell’Occidente latino (secoli XIII–XV). The Philosophical Commentary in the Latin West (13–15th centuries), Eds. Fioravanti, Gianfranco, Leonardi, Claudio and Perfetti, Stefano (Rencontres de Philosophie Médiévale 10), Turnhout 2002, pp. 127–133, esp. 360–361.

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this were the case,36 and if the questions on the ‘Nicomachean Ethics’ of Ms. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 14698, as well as those ascribed to Peter of Auvergne were actually composed sometime after 1277,37 the problem of Peter’s attitude towards Tempier’s ‘syllabus’ would become more and more intricate. Celano tried to confirm his dating by presenting Peter’s reading of Aristotle’s moral philosophy as dominated by a constant effort to reconcile “Greek philosophy and Christian theology”: influenced by the commentaries on the ‘Ethics’ of Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, Peter’s commentary would disclose “a general tenor of ‘moderate’ Aristotelianism”.38 Yet, following a way of philosophising common among Parisian Masters of Arts in the 1270s, Peter shows no scruples in reporting several of Aristotle’s statements which troubled bishop Tempier and his advisors. In Book I, question 36, while explaining in which sense health and external goods are necessary for virtuous life, Peter quotes Aristotle’s maxim quod inpossibile est indigentem bene operari, which is close to proposition 170 banned by Tempier: quod pauper bonis fortunae non potest bene agere

36 Lottin had no doubts on this point and, while discussing precisely the dating of some late 13th-century commentaries on the ‘Nicomachean Ethics’, he formulated the following rule: “si un auteur du moyen âge suit servilement sa source d’information, c’est qu’il la suit aussi d’assez près dans le temps”. Cf. Lottin, Odon, A propos de la date de certains commentaires sur l’‘Éthique’, in: Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale 17 (1950), pp. 127–133, see 129. 37 In ‘Viri philosophici’. Nota sui prologhi dei commenti all’Etica e ai Meteorologica erroneamente attribuiti a Giacomo di Douai (note 7), I argue instead that one cannot rule out the hypothesis that both commentaries were redacted between 1272 and 1277, and I suggest precisely this dating as the most likely for the commentary preserved in Ms. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 14698, whose prologue seems to reply not to Tempier’s condemnation, but to the statute of 1272. 38 Celano, Peter of Auvergne’s Questions on Books I and II of the ‘Ethica Nicomachea’ (note 34), pp. 2, 4. This description is explicitly taken from Gauthier, Les ‘Questiones supra librum Ethicorum’ (note 6), who on p. 243 spoke of Peter’s commentary using expressions such as “tendance modérée”, “aristotélisme modéré”, and on p. 244 emphasized that he “évite soigneusement toute opposition entre l’enseignement d’Aristote et la foi”. Also Wieland, The Perfection of Man (note 35), p. 361, presents Peter’s commentary on the ‘Ethics’ as a “moderate” work.

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in moralibus.39 In question 40, considering the way in which happiness, once attained, can be lost, Peter remarks: Et dicendum quod homo potest amittere felicitatem que est in vita ista, et amittitur in morte quia ex quo est perfectio hominis et omne hominis amittitur in morte; quare, et felicitas. Et ideo dicit Aristotiles quod mors est ultimum terribilium.40

It is well-known that Aristotle’s conception of death as “the end of things to be feared” (or “the end of all terrors”) caused the reaction of the committee of theologians who prepared the list of articles censured by bishop Tempier: article 178 forbids to teach Quod finis terribilium est mors, adding the significant gloss: Error, si excludat terrorem inferni qui extremus est. René-Antoine Gauthier has shown that the idiosyncratic expression finis terribilium can be traced back to the ‘Tabula libri Ethicorum’, an alphabetical list of sentences which a secretary under the direction of Thomas Aquinas extracted from Aristotle’s ‘Ethics’ and Albert the Great’s commentary on it.41 Taking literally Tempier’s statement that the errors collected in his ‘syllabus’ were circu39 See Celano, Peter of Auvergne’s Questions on Books I and II of the ‘Ethica Nicomachea’ (note 34), q. 36, pp. 77–78: Dico igitur quod divicie naturales sunt necessarie ad felicitatem, quia sine illis non potest aliquis operari. Et hoc est quod dicitur decimo huius, quod sapiens et iustus et fortis indigent hiis que sunt necessaria ad vitam […]. Hoc etiam dicit Aristotiles quod inpossibile est indigentem bene operari. Apparet igitur que divicie necessarie sunt ad felicitatem, et que non, et qualiter. Needless to say, this Aristotelian maxim – included in the Auctoritates Aristotelis, Ed. Hamesse, Jacqueline (Philosophes Médiévaux 17), Louvain 1974, p. 234 § 18 – was often repeated before as well as after 1277. It is, however, worth noticing that in 1283/1284, in a letter addressed to the papal curia, the proctor of the Arts Faculty John of Malignes made clear that the impossibility referred to by Aristotle concerned only “the course of human nature”: […] quoniam sine victualibus impossibile est hominem aliquod bonum facere, qualecumque fuerit, seu operari; quoniam, sicut vult philosophus in libro Ethicorum, impossibile est bona operari indigentem entem, hoc intelligendo esse impossibile secundum cursum humanae naturae, que propter continuam sui humidi intrinseci deperditionem eget alimentali refectione, sicut philosophus videtur hoc in secondo de Anima innuere […], Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis (note 6), vol. 1, p. 609. 40 See Celano, Peter of Auvergne’s Questions on Books I and II of the ‘Ethica Nicomachea’ (note 34), q. 40, p. 82. 41 Cf. Gauthier, René Antoine, Préface to ‘Tabula libri Ethicorum’, in: Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera Omnia, Ed. Leonine, vol. 48, p. B 49–50.

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lating among the studentes in artibus, and that therefore a theologian such as Thomas was never directly the object of the condemnation, Roland Hissette has suggested that the source of article 178 might have been an unknown text where a Master of Arts had borrowed the formula finis terribilium from Thomas, who had often used it in his theological works. Ready to admit that some of the prohibited propositions were directly aimed at Thomas, John Francis Wippel has found this hypothesis “forced”.42 It should be noted, however, that Gauthier, Hissette and Wippel apparently ignore that one of the first evidences of the diffusion of this formula among the Arts Masters is precisely Peter of Auvergne’s commentary on the ‘Ethics’.43 If composed after 1277, this work would therefore prove that the condemnation did not prevent masters from repeating almost verbatim article 178; if composed before, it could even be considered as one of the possible sources of this article – at least by those unwilling to include among them several works authored by Thomas Aquinas himself.

42 See the following contributions of Roland Hissette, Enquête (note 14), pp. 306–307; id., Albert le Grand et Thomas d’Aquin dans la censure parisienne du 7 mars 1277, in: Studien zur mittelalterlichen Geistesgeschichte und ihren Quellen (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 15), Ed. Zimmermann, Albert, Berlin/ New York 1982, pp. 226–246, see 236–237; id., Saint Thomas et l’intervention épiscopale du 7 mars 1277, in: Studi (Istituto San Tommaso, Roma), 2 (1995), pp. 204–258, see 231–233, 254–255; id., L’implication de Thomas d’Aquin in les censures parisiennes de 1277, in: Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales 64 (1997), pp. 3–31, see 12–14, 18, 20–21; id., Thomas d’Aquin directement visé par la censure du 7 mars 1277? Réponse à John F. Wippel, in: Roma magistra mundi. Itineraria culturae medievalis, Ed. Hamesse, Jacqueline (Textes et Études du Moyen Âge 10), Louvain-la-Neuve 1998, pp. 425–437, see 435–437. As to Wippell, John F., see Medieval Reactions to the Encounter between Faith and Reason, Milwaukee 1995, p. 65, note 93, and id., Thomas Aquinas and the Condemnation of 1277, in: The Modern Schoolman 72 (1995), pp. 233–272, see 267–268. 43 Both Celano, Peter of Auvergne’s Questions on Books I and II of the ‘Ethica Nicomachea’ (note 34), p. 23, and Wieland, The Perfection of Man (note 35), p. 374, mention the expression ultimum terribilium without noticing its evident similarity with that (finis terribilium) used in article 178. Celano (p. 23) pretends instead to find in Peter’s claim that happiness can be lost through death “an implicit, but obvious, reference to the condemned proposition ‘man can be happy only in this life’”. The least one can say here is that the notion of “obvious” would deserve careful discussion.

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One might observe that in both cases examined above, Peter is not really disrespectful of Tempier’s strictures, because he simply quotes Aristotelian sayings. His treatment of the ideal of philosophical life is, however, a clear expression of his personal reading of Peripatetic intellectual eudemonism, which is all but ‘moderate’.44 Peter claims – without qualifications or restrictions – that through speculation man can attain the ultimate end and the supreme happiness available to him in this life, which consists in a sort of 44 Fioravanti, Gianfranco, Desiderio di sapere e vita filosofica nelle questioni sulla Metafisica del Ms. 1386 Universitätsbibliothek Leipzig, in: Historia Philosophiae Medii Aevi. Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, Eds. Mojsisch, Burkhard and Pluta, Olaf, Amsterdam 1992, pp. 271–283, qualifies Celano’s reading of the questions devoted to philosophical happiness as “francamente insostenibile” (p. 271, note 1). According to Fioravanti, the presence in these questions of some doctrines which are typical of radical Aristotelianism might even lead to challenges to the attribution of the work to Peter. As I have noticed in: Filosofi, uomini e bruti. Note per la storia di un’antropologia averroista, now republished in Bianchi, Luca, Studi sull’aristotelismo del Rinascimento (Subsidia Mediaevalia Patavina 5), Padova 2003, p. 44, note 7, the prologue of Peter’s ‘Quaestiones in Metaphysicam’ – edited by Monahan, Arthur P., in: Nine Mediaeval Thinkers. A Collection of Hitherto Unedited Texts, Ed. O’Donnell, J. Reginald (Pontifical Institut of Mediaeval Studies. Studies and Texts 1), Toronto 1955, pp. 145–181 – shows a similar, though more restrained attitude. Peter insists on the excellence of metaphysical knowledge; he considers it as the most perfect operation of man in this life, which gives him the greatest delight; and – relying upon Avicenna’s definition of delectatio (see Philosophia Prima, VIII, 7, Ed. Van Riet, Simone, p. 432), frequently used by Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas – he emphasizes that this delight is caused by the comprehensio […] unionis convenientis cum convenienti (see pp. 150–151). It might be added that also in his commentary on ‘De vegetabilibus et plantis’, recently edited by Poortman (note 25), Peter insists that through speculation man can attain, already in his mortal life, an intellectual union with God (assimilamur entium optimo et nobilissimo, videlicet primae causae, p. 1); and he claims that philosophy allows human beings to become similar to God (et per hanc Deo similes sumus maxime, p. 5). The idea that human happiness consists in an intellectual assimilation with God seems therefore to recur in several works ascribed to Peter. One should however acknowledge that the attribution of the questions on the ‘Nicomachean Ethics’ deserves further investigation, since the arguments in favour provided by Gauthier, Les ‘Questiones supra librum Ethicorum’ (note 6), pp. 239–240, and Celano, Peter of Auvergne’s Questions on Books I and II of the ‘Ethica Nicomachea’ (note 34), pp. 3–4 are not always convincing.

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intellectual union with the most perfect object of his knowledge, i.e. God.45 Hence, in a question specifically devoted to the possibility of being happy “in this life” (Book I, question 39) he concludes: Dicendum quod homo potest esse felix in hac vita felicitate que est perfectio hominis. Et huius racio est quia natura nichil facit frustra, nec deficit in necessariis. Appetitus autem naturaliter inest homini, et maxime appetitus est respectu primi scibilis. Et ideo non potest ille appetitus esse frustra, quia frustra dicitur illud quod natum est finem includere et non includit. Igitur in unione respectu primi scibilis cum consistat felicitas, manifestum est quod possibile est hominem felicitari in hac vita.46

Of course, Peter contents himself with saying that man can become happy “in this life”, without drawing the conclusion, condemned in 1277 by article 176, that happiness is to be had in this life “and not in another”: quod felicitas habetur in ista uita, et non in alia. Celano is therefore right when stating that “there is no question here of a denial of supernatural beatitude”,47 but the same could be said of the most famous treatise on happiness of the 1270s, i.e. Boethius of Dacia’s ‘De summo bono’, generally considered the source of the aforementioned article. As a matter of fact, Boethius not only carefully avoids asserting that man can be happy only during his earthly life, but – unlike Peter – he explicitly mentions the beatitude expected after death:48 should we therefore consider his treatise as a sample of ‘moderate’ Aristotelianism and date it after 1277? It is worth noticing that in this text, although affirming that the life of the philosopher who contemplates the separate substances is as voluptuosa as God’s life – a comparison clearly inspired by the Latin translation of Averroes’ ‘Metaphysics’ – Boethius completely disregards the Averroistic interpretation of philosophical felicity, and his sole explicit reference to Averroes is in all probability a second-hand

45 Celano, Peter of Auvergne’s Questions on Books I and II of the ‘Ethica Nicomachea’ (note 34), qq. 32–34, pp. 72–76. 46 Ibid., q. 39, p. 80. 47 Ibid., p. 23. 48 On the meaning of this reference in the context of Boethius’ treatise, see Bianchi, Luca, Felicità terrena e beatitudine ultraterrena: Boezio di Dacia e l’articolo 157 censurato da Tempier, in: Chemins de la pensée médiévale. Mélanges Zénon Kaluza, Ed. Bakker, Paul J.J.M. (Textes et Études du Moyen Âge 20), Turnhout 2002, pp. 335–350.

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quotation from Albert the Great.49 Peter, instead, openly sides with ‘ethical Averroism’ when he answers the traditional objection that human beings will never attain that happiness which consists in the perfect actualisation of reason, because they cannot know the separate substances: Ad secundum argumentum dicendum quod homo potest habere cognicionem substanciarum separatarum. Et quando dicitur quod intellectus noster se habet ad eas sicut oculus vespertilionis etc., dico secundum Commentatorem super istam eandem proposicionem quod Aristoteles non dicit hoc quia intendat quod inpossibile sit comprehendere substancias separatas, sed intendit difficultatem esse ad hoc. Unde licet oculus vespertilionis non comprehendat lucem solis visus claritate, tamen visus esse potest, et similier dico esse de intellectu respectu substanciarum separatarum.50

Celano pays no attention to this decisive claim which, as he himself knows, is based on Averroes’ commentary on a passage of the second introduction to the ‘Metaphysics’ (II, 993b9–11), where Aristotle compares the weakness of the human reason to the limited visual faculties of the bat (vespertilio or nycticorax, according to medieval Latin translations). Averroes argued that Aristotle considered human knowledge of the separate substances difficult, but not “impossible”.51 In his own commentary on the same Aris49 Cf. Bianchi, Felicità terrena e beatitudine ultraterrena (note 48), pp. 208–209, note 38, and Bianchi, Felicità intellettuale, ‘ascetismo’ e ‘arabismo’: nota sul ‘De summo bono’ di Boezio di Dacia (note 9), pp. 24–27. 50 Celano, Peter of Auvergne’s Questions on Books I and II of the ‘Ethica Nicomachea’ (note 34), q. 39, p. 81. 51 See Averroes, In Metaphysicorum libri, II, 1, in: Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis, Venetiis apud Iunctas 1562–1574 (reprint, Frankfurt a. M. 1962), vol. 8, f. 29C: hoc non demonstrat res abstractas intelligere esse impossibile nobis, sicut inspicere Solem est impossibile vespertilioni, quoniam, si ita esset, tunc ociose egisset, quia fecit illud, quod est in se naturaliter intellectum, non intellectum ab alio; sicut si fecisset Solem non comprehensum ab aliquo visu. Celano, Peter of Auvergne’s Questions on Books I and II of the ‘Ethica Nicomachea’ (note 34), p. 81, apparatus, makes reference to this passage from Averroes but, while discussing question 39 (ibid., pp. 22–23), he disregards the significant fact that Peter bases on it his answer to the objection concerning the possibility of knowing the separate substances. It is worth noticing, moreover, that despite the fact that he explicitly hints at a specific passage of the ‘great commentary’ on the ‘Metaphysics’ (dico secundum Commentatorem super istam eandem proposicionem), Peter does not quote it verbatim, but echoes a maxim extracted from it, which was largely

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totelian passage, Thomas Aquinas had criticized such a reading as “absolutely ridiculous” (valde derisibilis), and in his ‘Summa Contra Gentiles’ he had denounced Averroes for having tried to “manipulate” (depravare) Aristotle’s genuine thought, stating that the bat simile “is not about impossibility” (quantum ad impossibilitatem) but only “about difficulty” (quantum ad difficultatem).52 Peter of Auvergne – who in his questions on the ‘Metaphysics’ adopts a position clearly influenced by Aquinas’ ‘Contra Gentiles’53 – repeats here precisely Averroes’ interpretation, so sharply rejected by Thomas. Carlos Steel has recently shown that “the question on the (im-) possibility of knowing the separate substances and the interpretation of the ‘vespertilio-nycticorax’ becomes somehow the mark that distinguishes the opponents and the followers of Thomas, the Averroists and the antiAverroists”.54 Subjecting Peter to this test, one ought to conclude that, while diffused and was transmitted by the Auctoritates Aristotelis (note 39), p. 120 § 63: Quod Aristoteles nostrum intellectum assimilat in intelligendo substantias separatas oculo vespertilionis, non tamen in hoc impossiblitatem demonstrat, sed difficultatem. 52 Cf. In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio, II, 1, in: Opera Omnia, Ed. Marietti, § 286, p. 82; Summa Contra Gentiles, III, 45, in: Opera Omnia, Leonine Ed., vol. 14, pp. 117–118. One should note that the term here employed by Aquinas in order to define Averroes’ attitude towards Aristotle – i.e. depravare – is significantly the same that he later uses in his ‘De unitate intellectus’. 53 See the text edited by Dunphy, William, The ‘quinque viae’ and Some Parisian Professors of Philosophy, in: St. Thomas Aquinas 1274–1974. Commemorative Studies, Ed. Maurer, Armand A., Toronto 1974, vol. 1, pp. 73–104, see 95: Dicendum ergo est ad quaestionem quod substantiae separatae secundum naturam suam manifestissimae sunt, […] nobis autem immanifestae, ut quod sunt a sensibilibus remotae. Et hoc dicit Aristoteles secundo hujus, quod intellectus noster se habet ad manifestissima in natura sicut oculus vespertilionis ad lucem solis. For Dunphy’s commentary see pp. 80–82. 54 Steel, Carlos, Siger of Brabant versus Thomas Aquinas on the Possibility of Knowing the Separate Substances, in: Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte, Eds. Aertsen, Jan, Emery, Kent, Speer, Andreas (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 28), Berlin/New York 2001, pp. 211–231. I quote from pp. 212–213. Thirteenth- and fourteenth-century interpretations of Aristotle’s remarks on the limits of human knowledge (‘Metaphysics’ II, 993b9–11) have been recently examined by Falzone, Paolo, Desiderio della scienza e desiderio di Dio nel Convivio di Dante (Istituto Italiano per gli studi filosofici), Napoli 2010, pp. 257–277. Strangely enough, here Falzone does

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lecturing on the ‘Ethics’, he definitely looked more like an ‘Averroist’ than a “most faithful disciple” of Aquinas.55 not take into account Peter of Auvergne’s use of Averroes’ reading of this passage in question 39 of the first Book of the ‘Ethics’, which he had extensively quoted and discussed at pp. 164–168, 231–233. 55 It is worth emphasizing, however, that Peter’s attitude towards Averroes in question 39 of Book I is quite complex and puzzling, and would deserve a deeper investigation in the light of the crucial role that this text has recently acquired in Dante’s scholarship. In his commentary on the ‘Convivio’ (forthcoming in the Collection ‘I Meridiani’ by Mondadori, but already circulating among scholars) Gianfranco Fioravanti calls attention to the similarity between the controversial passage where Dante, though insisting on the limits of human knowledge, argues that they do not inhibit intellectual happiness (III.xv.7–11) and Peter’s answer to the third argument quod non. Here indeed Peter claims that if man, once he has achieved “in this life” knowledge of the first cause, wished to know more (adhuc quaeritur maior cognitio), his desire would be irrational because reason does not lead to desire what cannot be had (racio enim non dicit illud esse desiderandum quod inpossibile est haberi, licet appetitus possit hoc appetere): see Celano, Peter of Auvergne’s Questions on Books I and II of the ‘Ethica Nicomachea’ (note 34), q. 39, pp. 80–81. According to Fioravanti Peter is here defending an idea which was widely diffused among thirteenth-century Arts masters. Therefore, one should neither overestimate the originality of this position, accepted by Dante, nor see in it an implicit criticism of the Averroists’ conception of happiness. See also Falzone, Desiderio della scienza e desiderio di Dio (note 54), pp. 164–168 and 231–233. Pasquale Porro suggests instead a different interpretation of Peter’s answer to the third argument, claiming that Dante’s conception of the relationship between knowledge of the separate substances and human happiness is more ‘anti-Averroist’ than is often assumed: see Porro, Pasquale, Tra il Convivio e la Commedia: Dante e il “forte dubitare” intorno al desiderio naturale di conoscere le sostanze separate, in: 1308. Eine Topographie historischer Gleichzeitigkeit, Ed. Speer, Andreas and Wirmer, David (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 35), Berlin/New York 2010, pp. 631–659, esp. 645–646. As far as Peter is concerned, one should more carefully distinguish what he says about the possibility of knowing the separate substances (answering the second argument quod non) – and there is no doubt that here he follows Averroes’ reading of the bat simile – from what he says about the nature and the limits of such knowledge – which seems, to a certain extent, contrary to what many ‘Averroists’ assumed. The third argument is indeed based on the opposition between the limited knowledge of the separate substances – and notably of “the First” – that man can attain (habita cognitione primi in vita ista), and a “further cognition”, which is most likely the cognition of their essence: Et est

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Needless to say, additional research will be necessary to better understand not only Peter’s philosophical position in the 1270s and 1280s, but also his complex and still unclear attitude towards the condemnation of 1277. I hope nonetheless that my brief analysis may have shed light on two small but relevant points. First, it is evident that Van Steenberghen’s hypothesis that Peter of Auvergne gave a decisive impulse to the supposed movement toward Thomism of the ‘radical’ Aristotelians – Siger of Brabant included – is both unlikely and anachronistic. On the one hand, Peter’s institutional role in 1275 does not prove that he was then a ‘moderate’ in philosophy; on the other hand, even if we conjecture that, after 1277, he might have adopted several Thomist doctrines and made considerable efforts to distinguish his own views from the Peripatetic tenets censured by bishop Tempier, this does not necessarily imply that he had done so before 1277. Second, it is likewise evident that the chronology of Peter’s Aristotelian commentaries is far from established and deserves a deeper examination: while the attempt to solve this problem by relying upon the “‘pre1277/post-1277’ paradigm” has at times proved hardly conclusive, other useful elements should be taken into account. In particular, in the light of their considerably different treatment of the limits of human reason, I would be tempted to challenge the current dating of the commentaries on the ‘Nicomachean Ethics’ and the ‘Metaphysics’, which are generally

desiderium ad ulteriorem cognicionem, quia primum est quesitum desiderabile respectu intellectus nostri, sicut dicit commentator, see Celano, Peter of Auvergne’s Questions on Books I and II of the ‘Ethica Nicomachea’ (note 34), q. 39, p. 80. Although Celano refers in note to Eustratius, the ‘Commentator’ here mentioned should instead be identified with Averroes, who in his commentary on the ‘Metaphysics’ states that all men by nature desire to know “what God thinks”: see In Metaphysicorum libri, XII, 51 (note 51), f. 335D, Quia ista quaestio est nobilissima omnium, quae sunt de Deo, scilicet scire quid intelligit, et est desyderata ab omnibus naturaliter. If this is the case, and if therefore Peter’s third argument quod non evokes Averroes’ assumption that all men by nature desire to know God’s mind, there follows first, that his answer did have an ‘anti-Averroist’ flavour; second, that his position is different from that of several of his contemporaries, such as Albert the Great, Boethius of Dacia and Siger of Brabant, who repeated and endorsed Averroes’ claim, condensing it in the maxim: quaestio de intellectu divino est desiderata sciri ab omnibus hominibus: see Bianchi, Felicità intellettuale, ‘ascetismo’ e ‘arabismo’: nota sul ‘De summon bono’ di Boezio di Dacia (note 9), pp. 24–25 note 32; third, that Dante is closer to Peter than to the aforementioned thinkers.

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supposed to be roughly contemporary.56 I would suggest that the former should be predated, and that what Peter had taught there about the possibility of knowing the separate substances was tacitly recanted in the latter. However it may be, I wonder in conclusion whether all hypotheses for dating Peter’s texts by considering his doctrinal changes – the last one included – do not depend on a too teleological way of interpreting his intellectual evolution, and presuppose a notion of ‘coherence’ which does not apply to a 13th-century Aristotelian commentator. Of course, an evolution of Peter’s thought is more than plausible – especially if his career at the Arts Faculty was as long as is generally assumed – but are we sure that it can be envisaged as a linear movement from ‘radicalism’ to ‘moderation’, that it was the effect of external factors such as the condemnation of 1277 or Aquinas’ influence, and that it simultaneously concerned every field of his philosophy?

56 Since the relationship between the different versions of Peter’s ‘Quaestiones super Metaphysicam’ needs further investigation, their chronology has not been established yet. It is however striking that, in the lack of other evidence, historians have assumed 1277 as both a terminus ante and post quem.

Peter of Auvergne, Giles of Rome and Aristotle’s ‘Politica’ Roberto Lambertini (Macerata)

If scholars were allowed to indulge in their autobiographical memories, the most appropriate title for the present paper would be ‘Twenty Years After’. In the late Eighties of the past century I belonged in fact to a group known as the Three Musketeers,1 when I first crossed swords with Giles of Rome, trying to detect the actual role his ‘De regimine principum’ played in the affair called “Reception of Aristotle’s ‘Politics’ in the Latin West”. 2 Since then, scholarship has made some interesting steps forward. Two recent I would like to dedicate this paper to the two other Musketeers, both now in maioribus constituti and serving in the Army of Italian universities: Prof. Costantino Marmo and Prof. Andrea Tabarroni. I would also like to thank Christoph Flüeler, Lidia Lanza and Marco Toste for their patience and support. 2 Thanks to Francesco del Punta, I have been able to publish three related articles in Documenti e Studi: Philosophus videtur tangere tres rationes. Egidio Romano lettore ed interprete della Politica nel terzo libro del ‘De regimine principum’, in: Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 1 (1990), pp. 277–325; Il filosofo, il principe e la virtù. Note sulla ricezione e l’uso dell’Etica Nicomachea nel ‘De regimine principum’ di Egidio Romano, in: Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 2 (1991), pp. 239–279; Tra etica e politica: la prudentia del principe nel ‘De regimine’ di Egidio Romano, in: Documenti e Studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 3 (1992), pp. 77–144; a summary of these articles in English appeared under the title: The Prince in the Mirror of Philosophy. About the Use of Aristotle in Giles of Rome’s ‘De regimine principum’, in: Moral and Political Philosophies in the Middle Ages, Proceedings of the Ninth International Congress of Medieval Philosophy, Ottawa, 17–22 August 1992, Eds. Bazán, B. Carlos, Andújar, Eduardo and Sbrocchi, Léonard. G., New York/Ottawa/Toronto 1995, pp. 1522–1534. For a bibliographical introduction to Giles, see the entry by Lanza, Lidia, Aegidius Romanus, in: Compendium Auctorum Latinorum Medii Aevi, I/1, Firenze 2003; a selected bibliography by Noëlle-Laetitia Perret is also available online: http://www.arlima.net/eh/gilles_ de_rome.html (last visited on September 2014) 1

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efforts that promise, however, to substantially improve our knowledge of this subject are Lidia Lanza’s and Marco Toste’s projects – supervised by Christoph Flüeler – to edit critically both commentaries on Aristotle’s ‘Politics’ penned by Peter of Auvergne.3 Thanks to her generous kindness, I have access to Lidia Lanza’s almost finished edition in progress. The opportunity to read it has persuaded me that it is worthwhile to attempt a reassessment of the issue on this new basis. In the present paper I will therefore first briefly summarize some main results achieved recently by scholars. Second, on the basis of a textual comparison between Giles’s ‘De regimine principum’ and Peter of Auvergne’s ‘Scriptum’, I will point to some clues that could lead to a more detailed reconstruction of the reception of the ‘Politics’ in its first stages. First and foremost, Christoph Flüeler’s monograph shows beyond a doubt how Peter of Auvergne’s continuation of Aquinas’ commentary on the ‘Politics’ exerted such a long lasting influence on other commentaries as to become, so to speak, the ‘standard’ commentary in the process of the medieval reception of this Aristotelian text. As far as influence is concerned, the literal commentary authored for the first two books (and the beginning of the third) by Aquinas and for the rest by Peter largely superseded Albert the Great’s work.4 Peter’s questions also played a leading role in the parallel tradition of question commentaries on the ‘Politics’, so that this secular master occupies an important place in the mediation of Aristotelian political philosophy to the West.5 On the other hand, Giles of Rome’s ‘De regimine principum’ stands out as the first complete mirror for princes that consistently draws on the ‘Nicomachean Ethics’ and on the ‘Politics’.6 Judging from the number of manuscript copies that are still extant, Giles’s 3 See the website http://www.paleography.unifr.ch/petrus_de_alvernia (last visited on September 2014), which also provides the reader with an excellent updated bibliography on Peter of Auvergne. 4 Flüeler, Christoph, Die Rezeption der ‘Politica’ des Aristoteles an der Pariser Artistenfakultät des 13. und 14. Jahrhunderts, in: Das Publikum politischer Theorie im 14. Jahrhundert, Eds. Miethke, Jürgen and Bühler, Arnold, München 1992, pp. 127–138. 5 Flüeler, Christoph, Rezeption und Interpretation der Aristotelischen ‘Politica’ im späten Mittelalter, Amsterdam/Philadelphia 1992, pp. 120–131. 6 The first one is the fragmentary ‘De regno’ by Aquinas, cf. Miethke, Jürgen, De potestate papae. Die päpstliche Amtskompetenz im Widerstreit der politischen Theorie von Thomas von Aquin bis Wilhelm von Ockham, Tübingen 2000, pp. 25–45.

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mirror enjoyed an enormous success, witnessed also by several translations into the vernacular.7 Moreover, his ‘De regimine’, was used also for study purposes, as a sort of facilitated, or better ‘user-friendly’ access to Aristotle’s ‘Ethics’ and ‘Politics’, as Concetta Luna and Charles Briggs have shown.8 Later commentaries on the ‘Politics’ made intensive use of Peter’s groundbreaking commentaries; Giles was widely read also, so that many authors, such as Bartolus de Saxoferrato, were apparently acquainted with Aristotle’s political philosophy through his mediation.9 Giles’s attitude towards the text of the ‘Politics’ has already been investigated in many respects. The Augustinian master clearly had direct access to Moerbeke’s Latin translation and inserts many literal quotations into his own text. This does not mean, however, that his mirror can be judged a mere collection of excerpts from Aristotle’s ‘Politics’ in translation. On 7

It is impossible to list here all the publications concerned with the translations of Giles into European vernaculars: but see for example: Van den Auweele, Dirk, Un abrégé flamand du ‘De regimine principum’ de Gilles de Rome, in: Sapientiae doctrina. Mélanges de théologie et de littérature médiévales offerts à Dom Hildebrand Bascour, Eds. Hissette, Roland, Michiels, Guibert and Van den Auweele, Dirk, Leuven 1980, pp. 327–358; Kiviharju, Jukka, Las glosas del mestre Aleix de Barcelona en su edición catalana del ‘De regimine principum’ de Egidio Romano y su versión navarroaragonesa, ed. bilingüe, Helsinki 1995; Merisalo, Outi, De la paraphrase à la traduction: Gilles de Rome en moyen français (‘De regimine principum’), Traduction et adaptation en France à la fin du Moyen Âge et à la Renaissance. Acte du Colloque organisé par l’Université de Nancy II, 23–25 mars 1995, Ed. Brucker, Charles, Paris 1997, pp. 107–119; The Governance of Kings and Princes: John Trevisa’s Middle English Translation of the ‘De regimine principum’ of Aegidius Romanus, Eds. Fowler, David C., Briggs, Charles F. and Remley, Paul G., New York 1997; Fradejas Rueda, José Manuel, Acero Durántes, Isabel and Díez Garretas, Maria Jesús, Aprocimación a la traducción castellana del ‘De regimine principum’ de Gil de Roma: estado de la cuestión y análisis de las versiones, in: Incipit 24 (2004), pp. 17–37. 8 Luna, Concetta, Introduzione, in: Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia, I, Catalogo dei manoscritti (1001–1075). ‘De regimine principum’, 1/11, Città del Vaticano Italia, Eds. del Punta, Francesco and Luna, Concetta, Firenze 1993, pp. XXIV–XXXIII; Briggs, Charles F., Giles of Rome’s ‘De regimine principum’. Reading and Writing Politics at Court and University, c. 1275–c. 1525, Cambridge et alibi 1999. 9 Quaglioni, Diego, Regimen ad populum e regimen regis, in Egidio Romano e Bartolo da Sassoferrato, in: Bullettino dell’Istituto storico italiano per il medio evo e archivio muratoriano 87 (1978), pp. 201–228.

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the contrary, Giles adopts a very selective approach and on a closer reading reveals a strong inclination towards transforming Aristotle’s arduous, aporetic way of arguing into well-ordered lists of rationes, or viae, as the Augustinian friar put it. Such lists of viae were usually designed to support a claim concerning the most different topics, from the most fitting time of the year for sexual intercourse to the superiority of hereditary vis à vis elective monarchy. Albeit presenting his ‘Mirror of Princes’ as an Aristotelian work, Giles frequently did not refrain from bending Aristotle’s opinion to his own purposes.10 In this way, he shaped a reception of Aristotle’s political thought filtered through the point of view of an ambitious friar who had dedicated his work to the heir of the French throne. Giles contributed to an image of Aristotle as a monarchical, almost absolutist political thinker. Such an image probably met in some way the expectations of a wider part of the late mediaeval public, but was far from an accurate exegesis of the Aristotelian text as a whole. At a different level of analysis, Lidia Lanza remarks that Giles’s anthropology prevents him from absorbing Aristotle’s political philosophy in its integrity.11 Of course, the genre of the literal commentary bound Peter more than Giles to the text translated by Moerbeke; this notwithstanding, the master from Auvergne also shows an absolute preference for monarchy and for the regimen regale, also interpreting in this sense passages from the ‘Politics’ that seem to militate in the opposite direction.12 Christoph Flüeler has also highlighted Peter’s tendency to interpret political phenomena according to patterns taken from natural philosophy and cosmology.13

10 Cf. e.g. Lambertini, Roberto, Philosophus videtur tangere tres rationes. Egidio Romano lettore ed interprete della Politica nel terzo libro del ‘De regimine Principum’, in: Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 1 (1990), pp. 277–325, in part. pp. 307–324. 11 Lanza, Lidia, ‘La Politica’ di Aristotele e il ‘De regimine principum’ di Egidio Romano, in: Medioevo e Rinascimento XV /ns. XII (2001), pp. 19–75. 12 Lanza, Lidia, Aspetti della ricezione della Politica aristotelica nel XIII secolo: Pietro d’Alvernia, in: Studi medievali 35 (1994), pp. 643–695. 13 Flüeler, Christoph, Ontologie und Politik: Quod racio principantis et subiecti sumitur ex racione actus et potencie, in: Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 41 (1994), pp. 445–462.

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I. Giles and Aquinas Although confident of his own capacity to interpret Aristotle’s texts, Giles is likely to have relied on previous approaches to Aristotle’s practical philosophy. Richard Scholz, Wilhelm Berges and, more recently, Diego Quaglioni had already noticed his debts towards Aquinas’s own mirror for princes.14 ‘De regno’, however, is everything but a running commentary on the ‘Politics’. As it is rather usual for a mediaeval author dealing with Aristotle also to use available commentaries on the text, I have concentrated my interest on Aquinas’ ‘Sententia libri Politicorum’. The result of my first investigation is the observation that Giles made a silent and unostentatious use of Aquinas’ commentary on the ‘Politics’, as he did with the ‘Sententia libri Ethicorum’ for the sections of ‘De regimine’ concerning ethics.15 His acquaintance with Aquinas’ ‘Sententia’ surfaces mostly in exegetical details, that can prove dependence. There is, however, at least one passage where Giles literally quotes the ‘Sententia’. Comparing Giles’ text not only to Aquinas’ ‘Sententia’, but also with other commentaries which were, or could have been available to him when he wrote ‘De regimine’, shows clearly that he is using Aquinas’ commentary on the third book of Aristotle’s ‘Politics’.

14 Scholz, Richard, Die Publizistik zur Zeit Philipps des Schönen und Bonifaz VIII. Beitrag zur Geschichte der politischen Anschauungen des Mittelalters, Stuttgart 1903 (Amsterdam 19622), in part. pp. 96–119; Berges, Wilhelm, Die Fürstenspiegel des hohen und späten Mittelalters, Stuttgart 1938, in part. pp. 211–228. 15 Cf. Lambertini, Roberto, Il filosofo, il principe e la virtù. Note sulla ricezione e l’uso dell’Etica Nicomachea nel ‘De regimine principum’ di Egidio Romano, in: Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 2 (1991), pp. 239– 279; Lambertini, Roberto, Tra etica e politica: la prudentia del principe nel ‘De regimine’ di Egidio Romano, in: Documenti e Studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 3 (1992), pp. 77–144.

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56 Politica, 3, 5 (1278 b 9–10) Ed. Susemihl, p. 17316

Giles, De regimine, III, 2, 2, Ed. Samaritanus, p. 45517

Thomas, Sententia libri Pol., III, 5, Ed. Leonina, p. 20118

Albert, In octo libros Pol., III, 4, Ed. Jammy, p. 147a19

Peter, Scriptum, III, 5, Ed. Lanza20

est autem politia ordo civitatis aliorum principatuum et maxime dominantis omnium

Politia enim quasi idem est quod ordinatio civitatis quantum ad omnes principatus qui sunt in ea et principaliter quantum ad maximum principatum qui dominatur omnibus aliis. Politia enim consistit maxime in ordine summi principatus qui est in civitate. Omnis ergo ordinatio civitatis Politia dici potest

Politia nihil est aliud quam ordinatio civitatis quantum ad omnes principatus qui sunt in ciuitate, sed praecipue quantum ad maximum principatum qui dominatur omnibus aliis principatibus. Et hoc ideo quia politeuma ciuitatis tota consistit in eo quod dominatur ciuitati; et talis impositio ordinis est ipsa politia. Unde precipue politia consistit in ordine summi principatus.

Est autem politia ordo ciuitatis aliorum principatuum. In ciuitate enim sunt diuersi principatus, ut habitum est, scilicet Ephororum [...] et huiusmodi, quorum omnium ordo per leges iustitiae ad rem publicam vocatur politia siue ciuilitas. Nec est tantum ordo illorum principatuum, set et maxime dominantis omnium, supple, est ordo

Et ideo dicit quod politia est ordo diuersorum principatuum, et maxime est ordo primi dominantis et principantis. Et hoc patet quia principans in politia est politheuma ciuitatis, id est impositor ordinis ciuitatis.

16 In this paper I will consistently make reference to Aristotelis Politicorum libri octo. Cum vetusta translatione Guilelmi de Moerbeka, Ed. Susemihl, Franz, Lipsiae 1872. 17 Without repeating it at every occurrence, I will refer to Aegidius Romanus, De regimine principum, Ed. Hieronymus Samaritanius, Roma 1607; repr. Aalen 1967. 18 Thomas Aquinas, Sententia libri Politicorum, in: Opera Omnia iussu Leonis XIII edita, XLVIII, Romae 1971.

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Giles used Aquinas’ ‘Sententia’ as a desk companion. Such a result, besides being not very surprising, however, leaves many questions open. Since Aquinas’ commentary stops abruptly – as is well known, at chapter 8 (6 for Aquinas) of book III – it seems unlikely (although not impossible) that Giles had worked on the remaining books (he quotes intensively from books V and VII of the ‘Politics’) without any aid from a commentary. One could ask what happened for the part of the ‘Politics’ that is not covered by Aquinas. My first soundings had led me to the persuasion that evidence was at any rate significantly thinner than in Aquinas’ case and did not allow for univocal conclusions. Available evidence, in fact, could be interpreted in different ways: either Giles was not aware of other commentaries that – to our knowledge – could have been available to him, or he did not pay other commentators the same attention he thought Aquinas deserved.21

II. Giles and Albert the Great The purpose of the present paper is to examine again the evidence collected so far, in order to add some details – if possible – to the picture sketched above. In my article of 1990 I briefly mentioned a concurrence between ‘De regimine’ and Albert the Great’s commentary on the ‘Politics’ that, if taken alone, seemed to me insuficient for claiming that Giles had access to the work of Dominican master.22 A closer scrutiny of the issue, however, leads to a revision of that judgement. According to some details that emerged in this last comparison, it seems in fact very likely that Giles of Rome did make some – albeit parsimonious – use of Albert the Great’s commentary. At the beginning of what is, according to him, the eighth chapter of book V, Albert 19 Having no easy access to the Borgnet edition, I will refer (specifying book, chapter and page) to Albert the Great, In octo libros Politicorum Commentarii, Ed. Petrus Jammy, Lugduni 1651. 20 Lanza’s edition also supersedes Grech’s edition of the first chapters of Peter’s commentary: Grech, Gundisalvus Maria, The Commentary of Peter of Auvergne on Aristotle’s ‘Politics’, the Inedited Part, Book III, less. I–VI. Introduction and Critical Text, Roma 1967. 21 In his ‘De regimine’ Giles also makes extensive, although silent use of Aquinas’ ‘Summa theologiae’; cf. e.g. Lambertini, Tra etica e politica (note 15), esp. pp. 100–118. 22 Lambertini (note 10), p. 298.

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interrupts his exposition of the text of the ‘Politics’ to remark that Aristotle will go into detail because general statements are not sufficient in politics: he uses the expression universales sermones.23 Referring to the same chapter, Giles too says that universales sermones are not enough in morali negotio.24 Such statements find no direct counterpart in Aristotle’s text, at the beginning of the passage on which Albert is commenting on. In fact, Moerbeke’s translation reads: salvantur autem palam, ut simpliciter quidem est dicere, ex contrariis, ut autem secundum unumquodque eo, quod est regna quidem ducere ad moderatius.25 Rendering the opposition simpliciter/secundum unumquodque contained in Moerbeke’s translation appealing to the epistemological statute of practical science is not obvious. It is not impossible that the two authors independently have the same idea, and express it in quite similar words, but it is still a striking coincidence. Moreover, this happens in Giles and in Albert with reference to the same passages of book V, where Aristotle describes the two different strategies a tyrant can use to preserve his power, namely he can either sharpen the violent methods of his despotism or pretend to behave as a king. Giles presents the second strategy as a list of 10 duties of the good sovereign. By doing so, he speaks of cautelae of the tyrants; this word does not appear on Morbeke’s translation, but is used very often by Albert, whose exposition of this section of the fifth book takes the shape of several lists of cautelae.26 As I remarked at the beginning, Giles is particularly fond of rendering Aristotle by means of well ordered lists: in this case, the material was almost ready in Albert, and the Augustinian master could well have drawn on Albert, although adopting, for the ‘De regimine’, a different and more elegant numbering. Enlarging the

23 Albert the Great, In octo libros Politicorum, V, 8, p. 338a: Sed quia universales sermones non sufficiunt in politicis, sed oportet ad unumquodque particulare descendere, ideo subjungit, ibi, Ut autem secundum unumquodque, eo, scilicet salvantur quod est regna ducere ad moderatius. 24 Giles of Rome, De regimine, III, II, 9, p. 474: Narrare autem possumus decem quae debet operari bonus Rex et quae Tyrannus se facere simulat. Illa enim decem, licet in aliquo modo in universali contineantur in dictis, tamen quia (ut pluries dictum est) circa morale negocium universales sermones proficiunt minus [...]. 25 Aristotle, Politicorum libri octo, V, 11 (1313 a 18–20), p. 572. 26 These passages have been recently studied by Fiocchi, Claudio, Mala potestas. La tirannia nel Pensiero politico medievale, Bergamo 2004, esp. pp. 88–100.

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comparison to Peter of Auvergne27 for sake of thoroughness, one finds out the Parisian Arts Master does not use the term cautela and does not expand on the problem of universally valid statements in moral science, but limits himself to using the distinction in generali/in speciali.28 A further example emerges with reference to the passage in Book VI where Aristotle says that the oligarchs should organize sumptuous sacrifices at the beginning of their mandate and finance the construction of magnificent buildings, in order to impress the rest of the populace.29 Although it is a rather obvious conceptual connection, it is striking that only Albert and Giles use the term admiratio for the reaction of the populus to such initiatives,30 while Moerbeke and Peter don’t.31 A much more important 27 As we will see below, we do not know yet whether Peter of Auvergne wrote before or after Giles; Lidia Lanza showed that Peter borrows from Albert: Lanza (note 12), p. 671. 28 Peter of Auvergne, Scriptum, V, ch. 9 (Ed. Lanza): Et primo in generali. Secundo in speciali, ibi Vt autem secundum unumquodque. 29 Aristotle, Politica, 6, 7 (1321a, 33–39), pp. 483–484: Adhuc autem et principatibus praecipuis, quos oportet eos qui in politica obtinere, opus est apponere oblationes, ut voluntarius populus non participet et compassionem habeat ad principes tamquam pretium multum dantes principatus. Congruit autem sacrificia immittentes facere magnifica et praeparare aliquid communium, ut hiis quae circa convivationes participans populus et civitatem videns armatam haec quidem sursum suspensis, haec autem aedificiis gaudens videat manentem politiam: accidet autem et insignibus esse memoralia expensarum. 30 Albert the Great, In octo libros Pol., VI, 6, p. 379: Secundo ibi, Adhuc autem principatibus etc. ostendit quam munifici et magnifici muneribus debent esse principes oligarchiae [...] Et addit, quod etiam insignibus expedit habere memoralia, sicut actus triumphales, et huiusmodi. Ex hoc enim populus trahitur in admirationem et cupit eis principatum et sic firmatur; cf. Giles of Rome, De regimine, II, III, 3, p. 354: hanc tangit Philosophus 6 Politicorum, ubi ait, quod principes decet sic magnifica facere, et talia aedificia construere, quod populus ea videns, quasi sit mente suspensum propter vehementem admirationem, nam populus minus insurgit contra principem, videns ipsum sic magnificum. 31 Peter of Auvergne, Scriptum, VI, 6: Deinde cum dicit Adhuc autem. Ponit secundum elementum, dicens quod expediens est eos qui assumuntur ad precipuos et honorabiliores principatus in tali politia facere oblationes denariorum magnorum, uel Deo, uel communitati. Ex hoc enim sequuntur due utilitates: una quod populares non affectabunt principatus propter magnitudinem denariorum, et ideo magis quieti erunt: alia quia multum compatientur principantibus uidentes eos multa expendere in eis: pauperes enim diuitias magnum bonum reputant, ex quo sequetur maior quietatio ipsorum. Deinde cum

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clue emerges from the commentaries on the final sections of Book VII, where Aristotle expresses his opinions on the upbringing of children. After praising the utility of moderate movements for little children, he passes rather abruptly to mention the example of some people who at his times used mechanical instruments to keep the body straight and to avoid damages caused by immoderate movements. It is only understandable that a mediaeval commentator was confused when faced with the juxtaposition of remarks wich could seem contradictory. We see therefore Albert thinking of instruments designed to keep children in exercise; Giles follows him, misunderstanding the passage along the same lines. As one can grasp from the synopsis inserted below, in this case Peter of Auvergne interprets Aristotle’s statements in a more accurate way, seeing that the Philosopher is making two different points. Politica, 7, 17 Giles, De regimi- Albert In octo lib- Peter, Scriptum, VII, (1236 b 8–12) Ed. ne, II, 2, 15, Ed. ros Pol. VII, 15, Ed. 12, Ed. Lanza Samaritanius, p. 330 Jammy, p. 465 a–b Susemihl, p. 325 Adhuc autem et motus quoscumque contingit facere tantillos expedit. Ad non defluere autem membra propter teneritudinem utuntur et nunc quaedam gentium instrumentis quibusdam mechaniscis, quae faciunt impervertibile corpus talium.

Unde Philosophus 7 Politicorum ait, quod expedit in pueris facere motus quoscumque et tantillos ad solidandum membra et ad non defluere propter teneritudinem; moderatum enim motum in pueris adeo laudat Philosophus, ut ab ipso

[sententia: 465a] Et hoc probat ex eo quod quaedam gentes statim in pupilla aetate exercitant pueros suos motu mechanicorum instrumentorum, ut fabri motu malleorum et sutores motu punctarum et sic de aliis [littera: 465b] Et subdit secundo

In prima parte dicit quod adhuc pueros statim post natiuitatem expedit assuesci ad motus tantillos quoscumque et paruos, puta manuum, et pedum, et aliarum partium. Motus enim ipsarum partium excitatur et acuitur calor naturalis in eis, qui consumens humidum superfluum in

dicit Congruit autem. Ponit tertium, dicens quod adhuc expedit assumendos ad principatum sacrificia magnifica facere, et cum magnitudine expensarum, et facere aliquod conuiuium magnum toti ciuitati, ut sic populus participans conuiuio, et uidens ciuitatem bene dispositam et ornatam, et secundum edificia communia et propria, et etiam multa seorsum posita, et dedicata ad honorem Dei, congaudeat, et per consequens uelit manere politiam; et iterum magnitudo expensarum expediens est insignibus sicut memoriale, et ad diffusionem fame.

Peter of Auvergne, Giles of Rome and Aristotle’s ‘Politica’ primordio nativi tatis dicat fienda esse aliqua instrumenta, in quibus pueri vertantur et moveantur

de motibus in quibus oportet exercere infantes, ibi, Adhuc autem et motus quoscumque contingit facere tantillos, expedit, supple facere. Et ratio est, quia ex motu calor generatur, calor autem acuit virtutem. Et probat, quare hoc expedit, ibi, Ad non defluere autem membra propter teneritudinem: motus enim exciccat, et sic tenera membra et mollia minus defluunt. Et adhuc inducit signum, ibi, Utuntur et nunc quaedam gentium instrumentis quibusdam mechanicis, quae faciunt imperuertibile(?) corpus talium, scilicet puerorum; faci unt enim instrumentis exerceri pueros, ut talibus motibus attractis spiritu et sanguine, membra formentur et vigorentur ad debitas actiones, et ab illis non peruentantur

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eis exsiccat corpus et fortius facit. Et Auicenna adiungit quod cum motu procuranda est consonantia musice et uox cantilene ad delectandum in consonantiis musicis propter causam dicendam posterius. Ad hoc autem, quod membra puerorum propter fluxibilitatem humidi habundantis non effluant a figura debita, consueuerunt quedam gentes uti quibusdam instrumentis mechanicis, quibus cum alligantur membra puerorum, faciliter et subtiliter fiunt inperuertibilia; sicut cunabulo utuntur ad directionem totius corporis, et pilleo rotundo ad debite figurandum caput

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If this evidence – taken together – can be considered enough to justify the claim that Giles most probably depends on Albert, another, even more important question, remains open. Did Giles also have recourse to Peter’s commentary? As mentioned above, while it is sure that Albert’s commentary antedates the ‘De regimine’, more than twenty years divide the terminus post quem from the ante quem of Peter’s commentary: 1272–1296. 32 The ‘De regimine’ was written after 1276 and before 1282, most probably between 1277 and 1279.33 To the best of my knowledge, we simply can not say, as of now, whether Giles could have used Peter or not. In view of this state of affairs, the comparison between the two texts becomes a more difficult task.

III. Giles and Peter of Auvergne One of the first results of my latest evaluative attempt using the new textual basis provided by Lidia Lanza was the discovery that one of the few cases on which Peter and Giles seemed to concur against Aristotle and Albert, has simply ceased to exist. In one article published in 1990 I had pointed to the fact that, while Aristotle claims that a man should not engage in procreation before he is 37, and Albert follows him, Giles lowers the figure to 36, and Peter also concurs with Giles, at least in one passage.34 I was aware of the weakness of such evidence, but I could not imagine that it probably did not belong at all to Peter’s text, but rather goes back to Spiazzi or to the early prints from the beginning of the textual tradition upon which Spiazzi relied.35 In order to avoid, as far as possible, disappointments of this kind, 32 Flüeler (note 5), p. 119. 33 Del Punta, Francesco, Donati, Silvia and Luna, Concetta, Egidio Romano, in: Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, 42, Roma 1993, pp. 319–341. 34 Lambertini, Roberto, A proposito della costruzione dell’Oeconomica in Egidio Romano, in: Medioevo 14 (1988), pp. 315–370, in part. p. 353. 35 Aristotle, Politicorum libri octo, VII, 16, p. 319; Albert the Great, In octo libros Politicorum, VII, 14, p. 458; Giles of Rome, De regimine, II, II, 12, p. 321; Peter of Auvergne, Scriptum VII, 12 (Ed. Lanza): Virtutibus enim perfectis, perfectior erit actio, et etiam ipsum generatum; et iterum successio puerorum ad patres oportunius fiet, si statim, cum copulati sunt muliere 18 uiro 37 annorum existentibus, statim generent. Cf. S. Thomae Aquinatis in libros politicorum Expositio, V, 12, Ed. Spiazzi, Raimondo M., Turin/Roma 1951, p. 401.

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I did not focus on small details, avoiding in particular the slippery ground of etymologies and explanations of the meanings of Greek words, because it is almost impossible to exclude the possibility that they were transmitted in the margins of the translation. Still, it is possible to highlight some similarities between Giles and Peter, not present in Albert the Great. In Book VII, Aristotle argues that very young women should not procreate, because it is detrimental to their health and to the health of their offspring. He mentions an oracle given to the inhabitants of the city of Troezen, now a small town in the northeastern part of the Peloponnesis, but his reference is rather puzzling because he does not inform the reader about its contents. Only a marginal note transmitted by some Greek manuscripts tells us that its tenor was the following: “do not open the young furrow”. Apparently, Aristotle had interpreted the oracle in a gynaecological sense.36 The first medieval commentators, however, had no access to such information. Besides that, as Lanza’s edition shows, the copyists corrupted Trezeniis in such a way that Peter was aware of at least three litterae.37 In view of such a confused textual situation, Albert had resorted to his – overrated – knowledge of Greek history and civilization38 and decided that it must have been an oracle by Apollo, prohibiting marriages of young people. Influenced by the variant reading he found in his copy of the ‘Politics’, that is pro eximiis, he added that the oracle must have been given to noblemen, since too many persons among them died as a consequence of the practice of marrying women who were too young. According to him this passage was part of a list of three negative effects caused by

36 Aristotle, Politicorum libri octo, VII, 12, (1335 a 17–22), p. 318: Adhuc autem in partibus quaedam dolent magis et perimuntur plures: propter quod et oraculum quidam aiunt factum fuisse propter talem caussam Troezeniis, tamquam multis pereuntibus propter nubere magis iuvenculas, sed non ad fructuum productionem. Cf. Aristotle, Politica, Introduzione, traduzione e note di Viano, Carlo A., Milano 2002, p. 611. 37 In this passage, the shortcomings of Spiazzi’s edition come once more to light, since he tacitly suppresses all reference to variant readings discussed by Peter. Cf. Thomae Aquinatis In libros Politicorum Aristotelis Expositio, VII, 12, p. 401. 38 On this pecularity of Albert’s commentary, see Fioravanti, Gianfranco, Politiae Orientalium et Aegiptiorum, Alberto Magno e la Politica aristotelica, in: Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa (Lett. Stor. Filos.), III s 9 (1979), pp. 195–246.

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this wrong habit.39 Peter of Auvergne, who was acquainted with the variant reading pro eximiis (instead of Trezeniis) that is present in Albert’s text,40 but also with two other possibilities,41 chose another interpretation. In his opinion, Aristotle was listing four, not three disadvantages, while the oracle was an invitation to make offers in favour of the parturients.42 Giles takes a stance very similar to Peter’s: he also lists (although in a slightly different order) the same four disadvantages taken from the ‘Politics’ and offers an interpretation of the oracle that, albeit not identical, is very close to that of Peter.43 More over, both authors allow for exceptions to the Aristotelian rule concerning the most fitting age for the first sexual intercourse. Giles finds that vis generativa est nimis corrupta among human beings, and therefore it is sufficient to wait not as long as Aristotle’s opinion implies, but only until 39 Albert the Great, In octo libros Politicorum, VII, 14, p. 460: Et adhuc ponit aliud nocumento, ibi, Adhuc autem in partubus, id est, in pariendo, quaedam dolent magis et perimuntur plures. Et subdit de oraculo , quod propter hoc factum est ab Apolline, ibi, Propter quod et oraculum quidem aiunt factum fuisse, propter talem causam pro eximiis, nobilibus scilicet, tamquam multis pereuntibus propter nubere magis iuvenculas et non ad fructuum productionem, valere scilicet iuvencularum coniunctionem. 40 It must be remarked, however, that Albert’s text on which scholars still have to rely is not critical. Every comparison possesses, therefore, a certain degree of uncertainty. 41 Peter of Auvergne, Scriptum, VII, 12: Et propter hoc dixerunt antiqui apud Grecos factum esse oraculum pro encenniis, id est oblationibus faciendis, ut dolor eius adiutorio mitigaretur, et fetus ad ortum produceretur, cum multe in iuuentute nubentes morerentur, et fructus non ueniret ad productionem propter inperfectionem. Alia littera habet ‘pro eximiis’, et tunc potest exponi ut dicatur factum esse oraculum pro eximiis, id est pro magnis et nobilibus de quibus maior cura est quam de pauperibus. Alia uero habet ‘pro ixinis’, et tunc potest esse nomen illius oraculi. 42 Ibid.: Deinde cum dicit Est autem iuuenum, ostendit quod coitus iuniorum prauus est. Et diuiditur in quatuor partes, secundum quatuor rationes quas adducit ad hoc. Secundam ponit cum dicit Adhuc autem in partibus. Tertiam, cum dicit Adhuc autem, et ad temperantiam. Quartam, Et masculorum corpora. 43 Giles of Rome, De regimine, II, I, 16, pp. 265–267: Tangit enim Philosophus 7. Polit. quatuor rationes probantes quod in aetate nimis iuvenili non est utendum coniugio [...]Tertia via sumitur ex periculo mulierum. Unde et antiquitus (ut Philosophus recitat) fuit consuetudo apud gentiles speciale oraculum facere pro partu iuvencularum, in signum, quod iuvenculae plus periclitantur in partu, quam aliae. Quarta via sumitur ex malo ipsorum virorum.

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males are 21 years old. In some cases, however, when a corruptio concupiscibilis can be feared, the Augustinian friar suggests that the limit should be lowered. For his part, Peter inserts at this point of his commentary a short question, coming to the conclusion that Aristotle is right ut in pluribus, but accidentally, when a fornicatio cum alienis can be feared, the time for the first sexual intercourse can be anticipated or postponed.44 If taken alone, such a agreement would of course not rule out the possibility that the two authors independently reached a similar solution. Other passages, however, show similarities that are not likely to be completely fortuitous. One can for example compare how Giles and Peter concur in some expressions when referring to the same passage from Book V: Politica, 5, 10 (V, 1310 b 4 ), Ed. Susemihl, p. 555

Giles, De regimi- Albert, In octo li- Peter, Scriptum, V, ne, II, 2, 15, Ed. bros Pol., V, 7, Ed. 8, Ed. Lanza Samaritanius, p. Jammy, p. 324a 469

Tyrannis autem ex oligarchia extrema componitur et democratia

Hanc autem rationem tangit Philosophus quinto Politicorum, ubi ait tyrannidem esse oligarchiam extremam, id est pessimam, quia maxime nocivam subditis

Tyrannis autem ex oligarchia extrema componitur (Extremam autem dicit, id est, intensam secundum potentiam et oppressionem) et democratia

Tyrannis autem componitur ex oligarchia ultima, que pessima est inter omnes oligarchias, et democratia ultima, que similiter pessima est inter omnes democratias: propter quod tyrannis ipsa multum nociua est subditis, cum sit composita ex duobus malis, et habeat peccata et transgressiones utriusque illarum

44 Peter of Auvergne, Scriptum, VII, 12: Propter accidens tamen aliquo expedit tardius uel citius fieri in aliquibus, puta si tardius aut citius perficiantur corpora, aut si timeatur fornicatio cum alienis aut aliquid huiusmodi.

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There is also a further example that is of particular interest because Peter and Giles agree on a wrong interpretation. Most probably misled by Moerbeke, who had rendered diataseis with cohibitiones,45 both authors46 ascribe to the Stagirite the opinion that children should be compelled not to cry, because holding their breath would have fostered their bodily strength. In this case, Albert is alone in seeing that Aristotle meant exactly the opposite.47 In the following comparison, taken from a list of viae that should explain why winter is the best season to attend to procreation, Giles, introduces a ratio he himself attributes to quidam. Albert and Peter share substantially the same opinion, but the terms used by Giles are definitely closer to Peter’s than to Albert’s text.

45 Aristotle, Politicorum libri octo, VII, 17 (1336a34–39), p. 327: Cohibitiones autem puerorum in ploratibus non recte detestantur qui prohibent in legibus: conferunt enim ad incrementum: fit enim quodam modo exercitatio corporibus: detentio enim spiritus facit robur laborantibus, quod accidit et pueris, qui cohibentur. 46 Peter of Auvergne, Scriptum, VII, 12: Considerandum autem, a quorum conuersatione, auditu, et uisione cauendi sunt. Primo igitur dicit quod quidam politici seu legislatores non conuenienter detestantur in ordinationibus et politiis suis cohibitiones puerorum a ploratibus; hoc enim expediens est et conferens ad augmentum uirtutis et incrementum, fit enim per hoc quedam exercitatio corporis ad ista: cum enim cohibentur a ploratu, fit retentio spiritus interius, in ploratu autem diffusio exterius. Retentio autem spiritus interius robur facit; propter enim congregationem ipsius interius fortificatur, uirtus enim unita fortior est se ipsa dispersa, fortitudo autem spiritus ad incrementum et ad alia multa ualet. Cf. Giles of Rome, De regimine, II, II, 15, p. 330: Sexto sunt cohibendi a ploratu. Nam cum pueri a ploratu cohibentur, ex ipsa prohibitione fit, ut retineant spiritum et anhelitum; nam sicut cum plorare permittuntur, emittunt spiritum et anhelitum, sic cum plorare cohibentur, spiritum et anhelitum tenent. Detinere autem spiritum et anhelitum secundum Philosophum septimo Politicorum, facit ad robur corporis. 47 Albert the Great, In octo libros Politicorum VII, 15, p. 406: Et ex his increpat eos qui cohibent pueros a ploratibus: dicit enim, quod ploratus conferunt ad incrementum, eo quod est exercitatio quedam. Et hoc est. Cohibitiones autem puerorum non recte detestantur, qui prohibent in legibus , plorare scilicet pueros. Et subdit rationem ibi Conferunt enim ad incrementum, puerorum scilicet. Et subdit quomodo. Detentio enim spiritus, quo scilicet pueri plorantes in se detinent spiritum, facit robur laborantibus, et sic proficiunt pueri.

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Politica, 7, 17 (1235 Giles, De regimine, Albert, In octo Peter, Scriptum, a 37–38) Ed. Suse- II, 1, 17, Ed. Sama- libros Pol. VII, 14, VII, 12, Ed. Lanza ritanius, p. 268 Ed. Jammy, p. 460 b mihl, p. 320 [...] hiis autem quae circa temporaneitatem temporibus oportet uti, quibus multi utuntur bene etiam nunc, determinantes hieme fieri commorationem hanc

Possumus autem hoc triplici via venari. Prima sumitur ex parte mulierum [...] Prima via sic assignatur a quibusdam. Nam tempore calido aperiuntur pori corporis, exalat inde humidum: quare remanent corpora sicca. Rursus, apertis poris exalat naturalis calor, quo exalante corpora intrinsecus remanent frigida.

[sententia] Et utriusque est causa una; quia scilicet in hyeme propter frigus circunstans corpora calida sunt intus et matura semina concepta et ad sanitatem et ad euexiam, id est, ad bonum habitum disposita. In estate autem propter calorem circumstans, pori corporis sunt aperti, et corpora euanida, et propter hoc embrya siue semina concepta sunt torpentia et debiliter se habentia ad sanitatem et ad euexiam. [littera] Littera sic ordinatur: His autem quae circa temporaneitatem temporibus oportet uti, quibus multi utuntur, etiam nunc, non tamen scilicet antiqui, bene determinantes, supple, tempora generationis.

Et ideo dicit quod ad huiusmodi copulam uel coniunctionem faciendam oportet uti temporibus, et hiis que circa temporaneitatem, hoc est dispositionem aeris secundum tempus, quibus utuntur multi bene et rationabiliter, dicentes hanc debere magis fieri tempore hyemis: tunc enim frigiditate continentis clausis poris fortificatur calidum interius, et congregatur uirtus, et fortior est. In estate autem poris apertis exalat calidum interius; fortiore autem existente uirtute, et calido melius est commisceri ad generationem.

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If we could ascertain beyond any doubt that with quidam Giles is referring to Peter of Auvergne, we would have reached the solution of the problem. As a matter of fact, the opinion Giles mentions is not original enough to exclude that he has different authors in mind. Still, the presence of an almost identical expression poris apertis exalat (especially if considered together with the other examples mentioned above) strongly hints at a connection between the two texts, without, alas, offering any clue as far as the temporal relationship is concerned.

IV. Concluding remarks Summing up the results of the present investigation, I think it is very likely that Giles of Rome, for the books of the ‘Politics’ not covered by Aquinas commentary, had recourse to Albert the Great, albeit not following him slavishly, but rather picking up selectively only some suggestions of the Dominican master. As far as Peter of Auvergne is concerned, evidence collected so far shows, in my opinion, that there is indeed a connection between the ‘Scriptum’ and ‘De regimine’. For the present, however, I could not find any cogent proof of the fact that Giles used Peter and not the reverse. In the past I was inclined to think that Giles came first.48 Relying on the evidence collected so far, two scenarios seem possible. Commenting on the ‘Politics’ when the ‘De regimine’ was already well known and appreciated also in the academic milieu,49 Peter of Auvergne could well have been influenced by some of Giles’s interpretations, finding them more persuasive than those of Albert the Great. According to the second scenario, Giles worked on his mirror for princes with the aid of available commentaries, not only using Aquinas intensively, but also, from time to time, the continuation by Peter, as well as Albert the Great’s literal commentary. One aspect could argue in favour this second solution, namely that using an existing commentary while inserting into one’s own work relevant passages from an authoritative text 48 This surfaces, albeit indirectly, for example in my La monarchia prima della Monarchia: le ragioni del regnum nella ricezione medievale di Aristotele, in: Pour Dante. Travaux du Centre d ’Études Supérieurs de la Renaissance autour de Dante (1993–1998), Eds. Pinchard, Bruno and Trottmann, Christian, Paris 2001, pp. 39–75. 49 For this use see especially Briggs, Giles of Rome’s ‘De regimine’ (note 8), pp. 91–107.

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seems to have been a usual and accepted praxis in the Scholastic milieu.50 On the other hand, this would imply that Giles was extremely accurate, making use not only of one but of two commentaries, comparing them with much critical spirit. Not without disappointment, I am compelled again to leave the question open.51 If future research is able to find proofs in favour of this second scenario, a more precise dating of Peter’s work will be at hand. Given the period of time during which the ‘De regimine’ was written, the most likely period for the composition of Peter of Auvergne’s commentary would be the second half of the Seventies of the Thirteenth Century, as Christoph Flüeler already suggested almost twenty years ago.

50 For a stimulating introduction to the role of the commentary in medieval thought: Il commento filosofico nell Occidente medievale (secoli XIII–XIV). The Philosophical Commentary in the Latin West (13–15th Centuries). Atti del Colloquio Firenze/Pisa, 19–22 ottobre 2000, Eds. Fioravanti, Gianfranco, Leonardi, Claudio and Perfetti, Stefano, Turnhout 2002; particularly relevant for the present purpose: Lanza, Lidia, I commenti medievali alla ‘Politica’ e la riflessione sullo stato in Francia (secoli XIII–XIV), published at pp. 401–427. 51 One should not forget of existence of commentaries on the ‘Politics’ that are not available to us, such as that of Siger of Brabant, cf. Flüeler (note 5), v. II, p. 98; the discovery of a manuscript of these works could of course affect my reconstruction.

The Logical Writings of Peter of Auvergne Sten Ebbesen (Copenhagen)

Peter of Auvergne was a prolific writer. In spite of the apparent loss of most of his theological production, we have plenty of texts; in fact, the extant œuvre covers a large part of what was taught in the Parisian Faculty of Arts. Notably, we have commentaries in the form of questions or per modum expositionis on several of the authoritative texts. There are some remarkable gaps, though. His questions on the ‘Ars Vetus’ omit Boethius’ ‘De topicis differentiis’, but this may be because the book was on its way out of the curriculum.1 I have no idea why are there no questions on ‘Priscian Major’ or ‘Priscian Minor’, both of which seem still to have been standard texts at the faculty of arts in Peter’s days,2 but at least he was no stranger to grammatical problems, as he did compose a grammatical sophisma of some size and possibly also a commentary on Alexander of Villadei’s ‘Doctrinale’.3 The most puzzling gap in Peter’s long bibliography is the absence of questions on the ‘New Art’, that is the ‘Prior’ and ‘Posterior Analytics’, the ‘Topics’ 1 The last medieval commentary on the Boethian ‘Topics’ is the series of questions by Radulphus Brito, composed some 20–25 years after the floruit of Peter as a master of arts; edition by Niels Jørgen Green-Pedersen in: Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin (henceforward CIMAGL) 26 (1978), pp. 1–92. See further Green-Pedersen, Niels Jørgen, The Tradition of the Topics, München/Wien 1984. 2 A large question commentary on ‘Priscian Major’ was written by Peter’s contemporary Boethius of Dacia (ed. by Jan Pinborg in Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi [henceforward CPhD] 4, København 1969), and one on ‘Priscian Minor’ by Radulphus Brito a generation later (Eds. Enders, Heinz W. and Pinborg, Jan, Grammatica Speculativa 3.1–2, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1980), but then there are no more such works from the Parisian faculty of arts. 3 For the sophisma, see Rosier-Catach, Irène and Ebbesen, Sten, Petrus de Alvernia + Boethius de Dacia: Syllogizantem ponendum est terminos, in: CIMAGL 75 (2004), pp. 161–218. For the Villadei commentary, see Weijers, Olga, Le travail intellectuel à la Faculté des arts de Paris: textes et maîtres (ca. 1200–1500): P (Studia Artistarum 15), Turnhout 2007, pp. 97–98.

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and the ‘Sophistical Refutations’. Attempts have been made, notably by Jan Pinborg in the 1970s, to identify anonymous or pseudonymous collections of questions on the ‘New Art’ that might be claimed for Peter, but so far no convincing attributions have resulted. One reason for the failure to identify Peter’s products in the vast sea of unattributed or badly attributed question commentaries on the ‘New Art’ may be his less-than-sharply defined profile as a logician and as an ontologist. The works we can safely attribute to him yield a rather fuzzy picture of a man who seems to lack sharp personal convictions, a personal style of writing, and the dedication to consistency that characterized Boethius of Dacia, whose works are easily recognizable even when not attributed to him in the manuscripts. Peter never, or rarely, sticks out his neck when approaching dangerous ground. He does endorse Aquinas’ view that man has only one substantial form,4 but for all Étienne Tempier’s and Simon de Brion’s dislike of the theory, I doubt that anyone would have considered it a dangerous view to hold before 1277. Peter also declares that it is impossible that a new species be generated. He does so in connection with a thought experiment to the effect that only one animal exists, namely a man. On Peter’s understanding of the genusspecies hierarchy, the lonely man would not belong to the genus ‘animal’, as two species are required for there to be a genus. But couldn’t ‘animal’ be the genus of the actually instantiated species ‘man’ and some further potential ones? No, says Peter, that won’t work, for it is impossible that some species come into being: impossibile est aliquam speciem generari.5 That may seem like die-hard Aristotelianism, but Peter does not claim that the natural species are sempiternal,6 and he does not rule out that a new species 4 Peter of Auvergne, Quaest. Cat. 14: Non possunt esse plures formae substantiales in aliquo, in: Andrews, Robert, Petrus de Alvernia, Quaestiones super Praedicamentis. An Edition, in: CIMAGL 55 (1987), pp. 3‑84. 5 Peter of Auvergne, Quaest. Porph. 12, in: Tinè, Antonio, Le questioni su Porfirio di Pierre d’Auvergne, in: AHDLMA 64 (1997), pp. 235–333, at 296. 6 He does, however, come dangerously close to claiming sempiternity for man in Sophisma XIII, Determinatio, Ed. Ebbesen (see note 10): Suppono enim quod iste terminus ‘homo’ significet formam humanam prout est in supposito, sic enim in frequenti usu accipitur hoc vocabulum ‘homo’. Nunc autem forma hominis non potest salvari semper in aliquo uno supposito semper ente, cum sit forma animalis, et ita videtur semper esse in materia. Ratio autem est qua res potest esse et non esse, et ideo non manet forma humana salvata semper

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might be created, he only rules out natural generatio. Admittedly, his claim does commit him to the view that in philosophy you can take no account of possible miracles, but few would dispute that as long as you did not trumpet to the whole town that science cannot tolerate miracles. Actually, Peter was to return to the problem of creation in a question on the ‘Metaphysics’, in which he takes great pains to show that creation ex nihilo must be assumed for the world as a whole, but cannot be incorporated into natural science, which is about change, while creation is not a sort of change. Aristotle also thought so, Peter intimates, because whenever the Philosopher says Nothing comes out of nothing he adds something to indicate that the philosophical maxim is only meant to be valid in the natural realm.7 in uno supposito, sed per successionem [salvatur] individuorum salvatur in diversis. Licet enim omnes homines sint corruptibiles, non tamen omnes simul corrumpuntur, et ideo in aliquibus semper salvatur natura hominis ut in diversis temporibus in diversis suppositis. 7 Peter of Auvergne, Quaest. Metaph. 7.19: Utrum ex non praexistente quantum ad principium materiale possit aliquid fieri, et hoc est quaerere utrum ex non ente simpliciter possit aliquid fieri. The following extract is from the determination. Mss. O (= Oxford, Merton College 292, ff. 240r–323v), f. 311rB; P (= Cambridge, Peterhouse 152, ff. 117r–224v), f. 199rB; except when noted, I follow P): quaeratur utrum ex non praexistente quantum ad principium materiale possit aliquid fieri, et hoc est quaerere utrum ex non ente simpliciter possit aliquid fieri. […In the determination:] quare manifestum est quod ex non ente simpliciter poterit primum agens aliquod ens simpliciter producere. Sed utrum de novo possit hoc facere, non est curandum ad praesens. De hoc enim poterit videri XII huius. § Sed est intelligendum quod ista factio non est transmutatio seu mutatio, quia in omni motu et mutatione oportet aliquid se habere aliter nunc quam prius; hoc enim dicimus mutari. Sed in tali factione non est aliquid ens quod aliter se habet nunc quam prius, quia nec factum nec faciens nec illud ex quo; quare ista factio non est motus vel mutatio. § Et hoc declaratur ex alio: in omni motu oportet esse subiectum aliquod, est enim motus {motus O : unus motus P} actus entis in potentia secundum quod huiusmodi; huic autem factioni qua aliquid fit ex non ente simpliciter non praexistit subiectum aliquod, et ideo huiusmodi factio non est transmutatio, sed est absolute productio totius substantiae entis a primo principio cuiuslibet entis, et talem productionem quidam philosophorum creationem {creationem O : terminationem P} nominabant. § Quia vero naturalis non considerat aliquam factionem nisi quae est per motum et transmutationem, et omnis talis fit ex aliquo ente actu vel potentia, ideo naturalis accipit pro principio ex nihilo nihil fieri. Unde Philosophus quandocumque dicit quod ex nihilo nihil fit adiungit aliquid de {de O : se P}

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Peter sensibly denies that what is predicated in the proposition ‘man is an animal’ is the animal that is man. In some ways it might have seemed tempting to someone with Peter’s background to accept the thesis, but that would have had the effect of reducing all true predications to statements of strict identity and wreak havoc on syllogistics. Peter did not fall into the trap, but then I do not know anyone really to have espoused the rejected theory before the seventeenth century, when some would-be logicians introduced the notion of horometry, i.e. term-measuring, which cut every predicate to the exact measures of its subject.8 On the whole, Peter appears to have been a sensible man with hardly any really distinctive views to mark him off from his contemporaries. Yet, a number of views that he held with some consistency can be identified, perhaps even a loose overall conception of logical and ontological problems. As we now have editions of Peter’s questions on the ‘Isagoge’ and the ‘Categories’, we only lack those on the ‘Perihermeneias’ and the ‘Sex Principia’ to have a complete set of questions on the ‘Old Art’. I have, on earlier occasions, published a few of the ‘Perihermeneias’ questions. One striking feature of Peter’s questions on the ‘Old Art’ is that most of them are rather short, some longish ones on ‘Perihermeneias’ being the main exception. The average length of the questions on the ‘Categories’ is about half that of some roughly contemporary questions on the ‘Sophistical Refutations’.9 This could mean that Peter felt that ‘Isagoge’ or ‘Categories’

natura; unde etiam primo Physicorum dicit quod omnes qui dicunt de natura concedunt ex nihilo nihil fieri. Simpliciter ergo non est impossibile aliquid fieri ex non ente, sed quod aliquid per motum et transmutationem fiat ex non ente simpliciter impossibile est. 8 Peter of Auvergne, Quaest. Porph. 23, Ed. Tinè (note 5), p. 312: dico quod ibi {sc. in hac: homo est animal} non praedicatur animal quod est homo. The term horometria is used by the Dane Ludvig Hjort Lauridsen (Ludovicus Cervinus Laurentii f.) in two dissertations from the University of Copenhagen, 1689– 90. They, and a similar dissertation from the 1660s, are briefly discussed in Ebbesen, Sten and Koch, Carl Henrik, Dansk filosofi i renæssancen, København 2002, pp. 228–230. Danes at the time usually depended on ideas developed in Lutheran Germany, but I have not found the source(s) for this particular idea or term. 9 Average length of question: Incerti Auctores, Quaestiones super Sophisticos Elenchos, Ed. Ebbesen, Sten (CPhD VII), København 1977: 616 words; Peter of Auvergne, Quaest. Cat., Ed. Andrews (note 4) about 290 (qu. 23 contains just 88 words!).

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were not too exciting: the fun began in the ‘Perihermeneias’, and continued in the ‘New Art’ and, not least, in the sophismatic disputations. We have eleven sophismata with ascription to Peter, and in no case do I see any reason to doubt the attribution. With the exception of ‘Sophisma’ XIV, they all occur in two overlapping collections transmitted in a Florence and a Bruges manuscript. A few also show up in other manuscripts. These are the titles:10 II. Homo est species III. Album potest esse nigrum11 IV. Animal est omnis homo V. Omnis phoenix est VI. Nullus homo de necessitate est asinus VII. Socrates desinit esse non desinendo esse VIII. Tantum unum est IX. Syllogizantem ponendum est terminos12 XII. Omnis homo est omnis homo XIII. Omnis homo est 1374. Omnis homo de necessitate est risibilis A first sorting shows that just one sophisma is grammatical, namely Syllogizantem ponendum est terminos, the remaining ten being logical, and if the logical ones are sorted by syncategoreme, we have five about omnis, two about de necessitate, one apiece for nullus, potest, desinit and tantum, and finally one with no syncategoreme in it. Reckoned this way, the total is

10 The two main manuscripts are B = Brugge, Stedelijke Bibliotheek, 509 and Firenze, St. Croce, Biblioteca Medicea-Laurenziana, 12 sin., 3. The numbers of the sophismata are, as far as II–XIII are concerned, those that they will have in the forthcoming edition in Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi IX, from which I quote in this article. There is no No. I because that number is reserved for a sophisma by Boethius of Dacia transmitted by the same Bruges and Florence manuscripts. X is anonymous, and XI is by Nicholas of Normandy. ‘1374’ is a sophisma transmitted in Ms. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, N.a.l., 1374, ff. 90rA–94vB. 11 Partial edition in Ebbesen, Sten, Concrete Accidental Terms: Late Thirteenth‑Century Debates about Problems Relating to such Terms as ‘album’, in: Meaning and Inference in Medieval Philosophy, Ed. Kretzmann, Norman, Dordrecht 1988, pp. 107–174. 12 For this sophisma, see Rosier and Ebbesen (note 3).

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twelve instead of ten, but that is because one of the two about de necessitate also counts as a nullus sophisma, and the other also as an omnis sophisma. The next thing to notice is that all the sophismata are of the long variant, the super-sophismata in which the unit consisting of sophismatic proposition, proof, disproof and solution only serves as a detonator for the real fireworks, the discussion of problemata. The number of problems varies from one to six, the average being close to four, and in no less than six cases the number is exactly four. In seven of the eleven sophismata the first problem has received the luxury treatment with a bachelor respondent delivering a preliminary answer and being attacked by opponents before the magisterial determination. In two cases one of the later problems also receives the luxury treatment (III.3 and IV.4). In two cases (VI.2 and IX.2) it is explicitly mentioned that in the oral disputation there was a respondent and a debate with him, but that this has been omitted in the written form – and at least in the first case it is hinted that anyway the respondent’s performance was nothing to write home about: Quae autem dicta fuerunt respondendo ad ista et replicationes ad ista dimittantur propter brevitatem et quorundam facilitatem. All other problems are treated in the form of a regular quaestio: rationes principales, determinatio, ad rationes, occasionally reduced to a mere determination without initial arguments and final responses (e.g. II.4). A third notable feature of Peter’s sophismata is how little attention is paid to logic proper. Not that it is absent, but problems in the borderland between ontology and semantics are much more in evidence. In this respect, however, Peter seems to have been typical of the Parisian philosophers of his day. The following problems are discussed in Peter’s sophismata: II.1. II.2. II.3. II.4. III.1. III.2. III.3. III.4. IV.1.

Utrum illud quod significatur nomine hominis sit quiditas sola vel habens quiditatem U. illud quod significatur nomine speciei sit in intellectu sicut in subiecto (sc. ratio intelligendi) aut aliquid existens in eo de quo dicimus quod est species U. haec sit vera ‘homo est species’ U. haec sit vera ‘aliquis homo est species’ U. iste terminus ‘album’ significet tantum formam vel aggregatum ex subiecto et forma U. distinctio bona sit U. sequatur ‘quod potest esse album potest esse nigrum, ergo album potest esse nigrum’ U. haec sit vera ‘album potest esse nigrum’ U. hoc signum ‘omnis’ potest teneri collective vel distributive

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IV.2. U. istae propositiones ‘non animal est omnis homo’ et ‘nullum animal est omnis homo’ sint una negatio vel duae negationes et u. una aequipollet alteri IV.3. U. sequatur ‘animal est omnis homo, ergo aliquod animal est omnis homo IV.4. U. haec sit vera ‘animal est omnis homo’ V.1. U. determinatio immediate adiuncta suo determinabili restringit ipsum V.2. U. terminus supponens alicui verbo cuiuscumque temporis restring atur ad supponendum secundum exigentiam eius vel amplietur V.3. U. haec sit vera ‘omnis phoenix est’ [om. B] V.4. U. signum adveniens termino alicui substantiali distribuat ipsum indifferenter pro omnibus tam essentialibus quam accidentalibus [only B] VI.1. U. maiore existente vera de necessario et minori de contingenti sequatur conclusio de inesse VI.2. U. illud quod repugnat alicui per se possit inesse per accidens eidem [om. B] VI.3. U. haec propositio ‘materia potest esse homo’ sit vera de virtute sermonis [om. B] VI.4. U. homo possit esse asinus, et u. haec sit vera ‘nullus homo de necessitate est asinus’ [om. B] VII.1. U. sit dare ultimum instans vitae Socratis VII.2. U. sit dare paenultimum instans vitae Socratis VII.3. De significato istorum verborum ‘incipit’, ‘desinit’ (u. ‘incipit’ et ‘desinit’ significant motus) VII.4. U. ista verba ‘incipit’ et ‘desinit’ cuicumque adiungantur habent eandem expositionem. VIII.F1. Dato quod haec dictio ‘tantum’ excludit diversum ab incluso in forma substantiali et accidentali, u. hoc sit per rationem unam vel per diversas13 VIII.F2. U. sequatur ‘tantum unum est, ergo non multa sunt’ VIII.F3. U. haec sit vera ‘tantum unum est’ [= B5] VIII.B1 U. terminus concretus significet formam vel totum aggregatum ex forma et subiecto vel materia VIII.B2 U. li ‘tantum’ adveniens huic quod dico ‘unum’ possit excludere diversum ab ipso ratione formae vel ratione subiecti VIII.B3 U. ‘unum’ addit aliquid supra ‘ens’ 13 There are major differences between the F(irenze) and B(rugge) versions of Sophisma VIII, so I list the problems separately for the two Mss. The attribution to Peter only occurs in F (B never names the authors of its sophismata), and it is not certain that the problemata peculiar to B are by Peter.

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VIII.B4 U. dictio exclusiva addita ‘uni’ excludat multa (cf. F 2, but not identical) VIII.B5 U. haec sit vera ‘tantum unum est’ (= F 3) IX.1. U. hoc verbum ‘est’ possit impersonari IX.2. U. hoc verbum ‘est’ impersonatum retentum impersonaliter construatur cum obliquo a parte ante et intransitive IX.3. U. hoc verbum ‘est’ convenienter construatur cum hoc quod dico ‘syllo- gizantem’ a parte post IX.4. U. participium significet per modum substantiae IX.5. U. adiectivum possit habere rationem supponendi IX.6. U. gerundia sint nomina vel verba IX.7. De constructione gerundiorum a parte ante cum accusativo (NB non fuit disputatum) XII.1. U. haec sit vera ‘omnis homo est omnis homo’ XII.2. U. aliqua propositio potest esse vera per se et falsa per accidens vel econ- verso XIII. U. ille terminus ‘homo’ restringatur ad praesens quando supponit verbo de praesenti 1374.1 Quid sit medium in demonstratione potissima, u. definitio subiecti vel passionis vel definitio aggregata ex utraque istarum definitionum 1374.2 U. hoc signum universale ‘omnis’ adveniens termino communi distribuat pro suppositis in propria forma, et hoc est quia illud signum ‘omnis’ facit terminum teneri pro suppositis 1374.3 U. signum universale adveniens termino communi possit ipsum distribu- ere pro suppositis per accidens

What, if anything, binds Peter’s logical works together? One important element is the thesis that the same thing can have several sorts of esse. Thus: — Whatever may be an accident of animal is an accident of animal via the esse that animal has in the mind, or via the esse that it has in its supposits.14

14 Peter of Auvergne, Quaest. Int. 31: omnia quae accidunt animali aut accidunt ei per esse quod habet apud animam aut per esse quod habet in suppositis. See text in Ebbesen, Sten, Animal est omnis homo. Questions and Sophismata by Peter of Auvergne, Radulphus Brito, William Bonkes, and others, in: CIMAGL 63 (1993), pp. 145–208, at 157. The statement in qu. 31 is, however, somewhat weakened in qu. 5, p. 153: Habemus ergo duo, scilicet quod res intellecta est apud intellectum, sed non secundum veritatem et substantiam suam. Qualiter est ergo apud in­tel­­lectum? Dicendum quod per similitudinem suam. Unde sicut nos vi­de­mus de coloribus qui sunt in or­ga­no visus secundum

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— An accident has two sorts of esse, one in virtue of its own essence, and thus it is signified by an abstract noun, another esse insofar as it informs a subject and is signified by a concrete noun, i.e. an adjective.15 — As far as its esse essentiae is concerned an accident can be without a subject; but as far as the esse that is actualiter existere is concerned, it cannot dispense with a subject.16

suam si­mi­li­tu­di­nem et non se­cun­dum substantiam suam et veritatem, similiter nec res intellecta secundum substantiam suam erit in intellectu sed secun­dum similitudinem. 15 Peter of Auvergne, Sophisma III, Problema 1, Determinatio, Ed. Ebbesen (note 10): Accidens autem duo habet esse: est enim quid per essentiam suam a subiecto distinctum; est etiam informans ipsum subiectum, ita quod accidens sit non quod habet esse sed quo aliquid habet esse, sicut forma generaliter in compositis est non quod est sed quo aliud est, non quod operatur sed quo aliud operatur. Poterit igitur intelligi accidens ut est quod per essentiam suam distinctum a subiecto, et sic significari; hoc autem dicimus modo ipsum significari nomine abstracti. Poterit etiam intelligi aggregatum ex subiecto et accidente ut habet esse per formam accidentalem et aliquo modo ut unum; poterit etiam sic significari, et sic dicimus ipsum aggregatum significari concreti nomine, per formam tamen, quia sicut res se habet ad esse, si abstrahibilis sit, sic ad intellectum et ad significationem. 16 Peter of Auvergne, Qu. Sex Princ., Ms. F (= Firenze, St. Croce, Biblioteca Medicea-Laurenziana, 12 sin., 3) f. 13rA: Ad illud intellegendum quod forma accidentalis et substantialis duplex esse habet s..le ut vult Aristoteles primo Physicorum. Aliud est esse albo et susceptibili, aliud est esse accidentalis existentiae. Quod autem dicit Aristoteles album et musicum †unde sunt in formae.† Si ergo quaerit[ur] quaestio de esse essentiae, dico quod accidens potest esse praeter subiectum, quia aliud(?) est esse accident(is?) ab essentia substantiae, quamquam †secundum esse non possit quod est esse in subiecto.† Si autem secundo modo quaerat quaestio, non potest accidens esse praeter subiectum, quia actualiter {a.: accidentaliter F} accidens non existit praeter subiectum, et hoc vult Aristoteles quarto Metaphysicae quod substantia est primum est et accidens sive accidentia non nisi per attributionem ad substantiam. Unde esse quod est actualiter {a.: accidentaliter F} existere non possunt accidentia habere sine subiecto, et similiter accidentis esse est inesse substantiae.

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One striking feature, that I have had reason to comment on in a number of contexts, is Peter’s predilection for the distinction between per se and per accidens to solve all sorts of problems.17 Some examples: — Quantity comes in two flavours, per accidens and per se,18 and so does necessity,19 and, of course, predication.20 — A genus cannot be predicated of its difference per se, but it may be predicated of it per accidens.21 — Relations do not receive contraries per se, but they do so per accidens.22

17 See Ebbesen, Concrete Accidental Terms (note 10), pp. 143–144; id., Tantum unum est. 13th-century sophismatic discussions around the Parmenidean Thesis, in: The Modern Schoolman 72 (1995), pp. 175–199, at 195–196. 18 Peter of Auvergne, Quaest. Cat. 44, Ed. Andrews (note 4), p. 63: duplex est quantitas, proprie et per se, et alia per accidens. 19 Peter of Auvergne, Sophisma VI, 1.3, Ed. Ebbesen (note 10): Ulterius accipiendum quod necessarium dicitur dupliciter: uno modo per se et simpliciter, alio modo per accidens. 20 Peter of Auvergne, Quaest. Porph. 18, Ed. Tinè (note 5), p. 381: Duplex est praedicatio, praedicatio per se et praedicatio per accidens. Quaest. Porph. 24, p. 313: Duplex est praedicatio, scilicet per se et per accidens. praedicatio per se est in qua praedicatum est de essentia subiecti vel in definitione eius. Quaest. Int. 31, Ed. Ebbesen (note 14), p. 157: Dicendum quod haec simpliciter est falsa ‘animal est omnis homo’. Quod declaratur per duas rationes. Quarum prima talis est: quoniam omne quod praedicatur de aliquo aut inest ei per se aut per accidens, et appellatur aliquid per se inesse quod inest alicui secundum aliquem modum dicendi per se determinatum ab Aristotele primo Posteriorum; per accidens autem appellatur inesse aliquid alicui quod non insit ei secundum aliquem illorum 4 modorum. Si ergo omnis homo praedicetur de animali, aut inest ei per se aut per accidens. Nunc autem non inest ei per se, quia […] Nec etiam inest ei per accidens, quoniam […]. 21 Peter of Auvergne, Quaest. Porph. 18, Ed. Tinè (note 5), p. 302: genus non praedicatur de differentia per se, nihilominus tamen genus potest praedicari per accidens de differentia. 22 Peter of Auvergne, Quaest. Cat. 55, Ed. Andrews (note 4), p. 76: Ad quod dicendum est quod eodem modo quo ad relationem est motus, eodem modo dicitur suscipere contraria; ita quod si per se ad relationem sit motus, per se inest ei contrarium, et si per accidens, per accidens. Relationis autem non est motus nisi per accidens, et numquam per se, quia eorum, super quae fundatur relatio, dicitur esse motus, sicut albi et nigri est motus per se. Sic per consequens relationis est motus per accidens; ideo per accidens potest habere contrarium.

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— Propositions can be true per se and false per accidens (and vice versa ?)23 Peter also uses accidere and accidens in a number of cases where you do not quite expect the word. Thus he claims that since matter is no form and has no form, all forms are accidents of matter.24 And he holds that supposits, that is concrete individuals falling under a general term, are accidental to the significate of the term.25 Reduplicatives such as secundum quod and in eo quod also make a frequent appearance in Peter’s works, more frequently than I like. A reduplicative is often a way to conceal that one cannot decide whether to distinguish two items or to consider them identical. Another key notion in Peter’s works is aggregatum: — A universal is an aggregate of a thing underlying an intention and the intention itself.26 — The noun ‘genus’ is the name of an aggregate in the same way that ‘album’ is. It is derived denominatively from ‘generality’, and so by virtue of its

23 Peter of Auvergne, Sophisma XII, Problema 2, Determinatio, Ed. Ebbesen (note 10): Hiis visis dicendum quod aliqua propositio potest esse vera per se et falsa per accidens. Cf. the determination of problem 1 in the same sophisma: considerandum est quod possibile est quod aliqua propositio universalis primo sit vera, ut pro significato, pro suppositis autem falsa. 24 Peter of Auvergne, Sophisma VI, Problema 3, Determinatio, Ed. Ebbesen (note 10): Materia autem non est forma nec materia suam habet formam, quia omnes formae sunt accidentia materiae. Separate substances are, of course, excepted from this rule. 25 See Ebbesen, Sten, Essentiae accidit esse → Significato accidunt supposita, in: Compléments de substance: Études sur les propriétés accidentelles offertes à Alain de Libera, Eds. Erismann, Christophe and Schniewind, Alexandrine, Paris 2008, pp. 127–131. 26 Peter of Auvergne, Quaest. Porph. 5, Ed. Tinè (note 5), p. 282: Universale aggregat in se duo, videlicet rem subiectam intentioni et ipsam intentionem. Cf. Sophisma II, Problema 3, Ed. Ebbesen (note 10): si accipiatur hoc nomen ‘species’ pro ipsa similitudine quae est apud intellectum, secundum quod dicimus quod species lapidis est in anima, verum est quod sic accipiendo hoc nomen ‘species’ homo non est species, sicut patet ex pluribus; sic enim separata est ab homine, et homo quid separatum a specie. Si autem accipiatur nomen speciei secundo modo, sic non est intentio, sed habens intentionem, quia hoc modo ‘species’ est nomen totius aggregati ex ipsa re et intentione fundata supra ipsam rem, sicut ‘album’ est nomen aggregatum ex albo et suo subiecto, et hoc modo verum est dicere quod homo est species.

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formal significate it imports generality, by virtue of its material significate it imports a subject.27 — Concrete accidental terms signify aggregates of subject and accident.28 — Man is an aggregate of genus and difference.29 — There are three kinds of aggregate: one of matter and form, such as humanity = the quidity of man, (2) one of quiddity and supposit, such as man, and (3) finally one of subject and accident, such as white-thing (album).30

27 Peter of Auvergne, Quaest. Porph. 10, Ed. Tinè (note 5), p. 291: Hoc nomen ‘genus’ nomen aggregati est sicut hoc nomen ‘album’. Et dicitur denominative ab hoc quod est generalitas, ita quod de suo formali significato importet generalitatem, et de suo materiali significato importet subiectum. Cf. the quotation from Sophisma II in the preceding footnote. 28 Peter of Auvergne, Sophisma III, Problema 1, Determination, Ed. Ebbesen (note 10): dicendum [...] quod terminus accidentalis concretus totum aggregatum ex subiecto et accidente significat, cum per ipsum apprehenditur totum aggregatum, illud autem dicimus per vocem significari quod intellectus per ipsam apprehendit. Cf. Quaest. Metaph. V.18, Ed. Ebbesen, Sten, Termini Accidentales Concreti, in: CIMAGL 52 (1986), pp. 57–150, at 79–84. 29 Peter of Auvergne, Quaest. Porph. 18, Ed. Tinè (note 5), p. 302: Homo aggregat in se genus et differentiam. 30 Peter of Auvergne, Sophisma III, Problema 1, Determinatio, Ed. Ebbesen (note 10): Notandum etiam quod aggregatum est tribus modis ad praesens. Quoddam enim est ex materia et forma, sicut humanitas, quae est quiditas hominis, composita est ex materia et forma hominis. Aliud est aggregatum ex quiditate et supposito, sicut id quod significatur nomine hominis. Tertium est ex subiecto et accidente, ut album. Cf. Sophisma VIII, B-version (cf. note 13), Problema 1, Determinatio, Ed. Ebbesen (note 10): intelligendum quod quoddam est concretum ex accidente et subiecto, quoddam ex materia et forma, quoddam ex quiditate et supposito. Concretum autem ex accidente et subiecto, ut album, nigrum; concretum ex materia et forma, sicut quiditas composita, quae est aggregata ex materia et forma, ut humanitas animalitas (quiditas enim composita est, ut dicit Avicenna); ex quiditate et sup­posito, ut homo et Socrates (est enim aggregatum homo ex hu­ma­nitate, quae est eius quiditas, et supposito habente quiditatem). Et in omnibus istis verum est dicere quod nomen concretum sig­ni­fi­cat totum aggregatum, per formam tamen, ut ‘homo’ significat ag­gregatum ex humanitate et supposito habente humani­ ta­tem, per humanitatem tamen; ‘humanitas’ etiam significat ag­gre­ga­tum ex anima et corpore, per animam tamen; similiter ‘album’ sig­nificat aggregatum, per albedinem tamen. Causa huius est: vide­tur quod intellectus sequitur esse rei

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Claiming aggregate status for a number of important items makes it possible to assign incompatible properties to them. Thus (I quote):31 If we are talking about the universal with regard to the thing underlying the intention, then universals are substances; but if we are talking about the universal with regard to the intention, then they are accidents.

*** There may be a common denominator for much of what has struck me in my reading of Peter of Auvergne. This is his Avicennianism. By Avicennianism and Avicennian doctrine I do not here understand anything that Avicenna himself actually endorsed. Having no Arabic, I dare have no opinion about what the old boozer actually thought and said. I am simply referring to one particular doctrine that scholastics thought they had Avicenna’s support for. I am referring to the potent metaphysical thesis incorporated in the famous phrase equinitas est tantum equinitas. The thesis that there is something above such distinctions as universal or particular, existing or not-existing, namely a quiddity or essence, or common nature, or res in – well, I cannot say Adamic nudity, since all these words are feminine, so let it be res in Evan nudity.32

et actum; unumquodque in­tel­li­gitur per illud quod est actu; est autem res in actu per for­mam, et ideo intelligitur per formam; vox autem sequitur intel­lec­tum in sig­nificando; cum igitur intelligitur per formam, et signi­fi­ca­tur per formam. 31 Peter of Auvergne, Quaest. Porph. 6, Ed. Tinè (note 5), p. 283: Si nos loquamur de universali quantum ad rem subiectam intentioni, sic universalia substantiae {s.-ae scripsi: substantia ed.}; si autem loquamur de universali quantum ad intentionem, sic sunt accidentia. Cf. qu. 13, p. 297, and qu. 23, p. 311 about individuum. 32 See, e.g., Peter of Auvergne, Quaest. Int. 27, Mss. P = Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 16170, f. 105vA (basis), and B = Basel, Öffentliche Bibliothek der Universität, F.III.20, f. 122vB: quando quaeritur utrum aliqua res sit universalis, dicendum quod res de se nec est universalis nec particularis vel in actu vel in potentia {nec est – potentia P : non est universalis in actu sed tantum in potentia B}, quiditas enim participantium est secundum se una in omnibus participantibus et secundum se non est distincta ab ipsis participantibus. Nihilominus tamen, quamvis secundum se una sit non distincta ab ,

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We do not live in Eden, however, so it is doubtful whether we can fully see, that is conceptualize, the nude Eve, the naked common-nature-thing which is assumed to underly and bind together the clothed manifestations that are mentally accessible to us. We probably have to think of her always with this dress or that one, this set or jewelry or that one, and so on. This, however, was a matter that had not quite been decided when Peter was teaching.33 Anyway, in ordinary circumstances the lady would be dressed. With the assumption of nude common natures comes the assumption that the clothes of their manifestations are accidental to the nudes. The Avicennian principle essentiae accidit esse could be generalized so that all modes of being associated with a common nature might be seen as its accidents. Peter sometimes seems tempted to hold that the res signified by the word homo is the nude humanity,34 but his considered view is that the significate is humanity in the skimpiest attire possible, namely the aggregate habens humanitatem, where the habens-part, which indicates the materiality of man, is, if not strictly speaking accidental, then quasi-accidental to humanity, since it it something over and above the naked quidity.35 est tamen ab ipsis distincta per accidens ut per materiam, quare ad diversitatem participantium sequitur diversitas quiditatis, ad minus per accidens, et licet non secundum se. 33 Cf. Ebbesen, Concrete Accidental Terms (note 10). 34 Peter of Auvergne, Quaest. Int. 5, Ed. Ebbesen (note 14), p. 155: dicendum quod terminus communis, ut ‘homo’ vel ‘animal’ non signi­ ficat aliquid commune in actu sed tantum in potentia; sig­ni­ficat enim tantum quiditatem hominis vel animalis, et ista quidi­tas non est universalis nec particularis in actu, sed tantum in potentia se habet ad hoc quod sit universalis vel particularis. Et ideo dicendum quod nihil pro­hibet quin terminus communis, et quamvis sig­ni­ ficet aliquid quod sit in re, significet aliquid commune – in potentia. Sophisma V, Problema 1, Determination, Ed. Ebbesen (note 10): Intelligendum quod ‘ homo’ significat naturam humanam non ut de se determinatam ad aliquid eorum quae sunt extra ipsam, nullum enim eorum includitur in significato hominis, significat enim naturam humanam ut determinabilem per quodlibet accidentium sibi, ut per album et nigrum. 35 Peter of Auvergne, Sophisma II, Problema 1, Determination, Ed. Ebbesen (note 10): Intelligendum igitur est quod in separatis a materia quiditas et illud cuius est quiditas (sive quod quid est) sunt penitus unum, quoniam ibi non reperitur aliquid quod non pertineat ad ipsam quiditatem. […] In habentibus autem materiam non sunt idem quod quid est et sua quiditas. Cuius probatio est: ad quod quid est pertinet aliquid quod non pertinet ad quiditatem, sive de aliquo praedicatur quod quid est de quo non praedicatur quiditas, ut de

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This modified quiddity, the quod quid est, retains the ability of the nude quiddity to stay above the distinctions between universality and particularity, existence or non-existence, mental or real being. supposito; dicimus enim quod Socrates est animal rationale mortale, non tamen dicimus quod sit humanitas; ergo in istis non sunt idem penitus quiditas et quod quid est. Et praeterea, quid est se habet ad quiditatem sicut concretum ad abstractum; nunc autem concretum includit aliquid quod non pertinet ad abstractum ut sic; ergo quid est includit in se aliquid quod non pertinet ad ipsam quiditatem; hoc non videtur esse nisi habens ipsam quiditatem, quoniam de illo praedicatur quid est; ergo includit in se habens ipsam quiditatem. Definitio autem significat quid est res […]; ergo definitio significat habens ipsam quiditatem. Nunc autem idem significatur per nomen et definitionem, quoniam ratio cuius est nomen signum est definitio. Sequitur ergo quod nomen non tantum significat quiditatem sed habens ipsam quiditatem, ita ut quiditas sit illud quo totum, scilicet habens quiditatem, significatur, sicut albedo est quo significatur totum aggregatum ex albedine et subiecto. […] Et sic hoc nomen ‘homo’ significat habens humanitatem non ut determinatum ad unum vel ad plura vel ad omnia, sed per indifferentiam se habens ad omnia ista – et ideo ad unum numero ut ‘hic homo’, ad omnia ut ‘omnis homo’, ad unum sub indifferentia tamen aliorum per hoc quod dico ‘aliquis’; ut cum dico ‘aliquis homo’ significatur unum numero (sub indifferentia tamen), dicendo autem ‘homo’ non significatur unum numero nec determinate nec indeterminate. Sic igitur significat habens quiditatem, et hoc est quod quid est homo, quod est obiectum nostri intellectus per se et per se intellectum ab intellectu nostro. Et ideo verum est quod ‘homo’ significat intellectum – non dico passionem quae est apud intellectum, sed id quod per ipsam passionem intelligimus; rem autem non significat nisi secundum quod est intellecta; et ideo dicit Boethius supra librum Peri hermeneias quod voces praeter intellectum nihil significant, id est praeter rem intellectam secundum quod intellecta est. Sic igitur patet quod nomine hominis significatur habens humanitatem et non tantum humanitas, et concedantur rationes ad hoc adductae. Sophisma IV, Problema 3: qui intelligit significatum per hoc nomen ‘animal’ non intelligit quiditatem animalis absolute sed intelligit habens quiditatem. […] dicendum quod illud quod significatur nomine hominis est unum ex habente ipsam quiditatem et ipsa quiditate, sicut ex materia et forma fit unum per se: quiditas enim non est praeter habens quiditatem, habens etiam ipsam non est aliquid in actu praeter ipsam. Et cum dicitur quod quiditati accidit suppositum, – verum est quod accidit sibi pro tanto quia in natura eius non includitur, sicut generi accidit species. Cf. also the quotations in note 30, which call the aggregate a composite quiddity, and thus fail to distinguish between quiditas and quod quid est. In the text quoted in note 24 Peter makes form an accident of matter rather than the other way round.

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Actual habentes humanitatem, the supposits of homo, are indefinitely and potentially signified by habens humanitatem, but that also means that they are only accidental to the significate of homo, namely habens humanitatem.36 Similarly, the supposits’ temporal location in present, past or future is accidental to the significate and to the supposits alike.37 Peter decisively rejects the notion that words signify thoughts primarily and things only mediately.38 He does, of course, assign a role to the intellect in signification – a human intellect is needed to endow certain combinations of sound with meaning. But he does not need to make signification of things indirect, via thought, because the core-thing, the common nature – whether as a quiddity or as a quod quid est –, is one and the same in its nude or skimpily clad essential being and in its being-in-thought. Being thought of is just another accidental dress worn by Eve. And so is being signified. One way of being thought of is as a universal. And universality depends entirely on thought for its actuality. But once again the same pattern of explanation can be used: the aggregate habens humanitatem may be thought of as being predicable of numerically different entities only, and thus as a species. Being a species is just another accident of the almost nude homo (I quote):39 36 See Ebbesen 2008 (note 25). 37 Peter of Auvergne, Sophisma V, Problema 2, Determinatio, Ed. Ebbesen (note 10): Et ideo dicendum quod terminus supponens verbo cuicumque cuiuslibet temporis supponit suum significatum et per indifferentiam ad omnia supposita ad quae significatum se habet per indifferentiam, sive fuerint praesentia vel praeterita vel futura. Hoc enim accidit significato et suppositis termini, sicut enim significatum alicuius termini non includit aliquod tempus, ita nec suppositum, quod dicitur suppositum quia participat significatum per se. 38 Peter of Auvergne, Quaest. Int. 6, Ed. Ebbesen (note 14), p. 155: Unde, quando dicitur quod Aristoteles appellat passiones similitudines, dicendum quod quaedam voces sunt quae significant ipsas res, et tales voces sive talia nomina appellantur secundum grammaticum nomina pri­ mae impositionis. Sunt etiam quaedam voces quae significant pas­si­ones quae sunt in anima, ut ‘genus’ ‘species’ ‘nomen’ ‘pronomen’ ‘verbum’ et huius­modi, et talia nomina appellantur nomina secundae impositionis sive nomina nominum. See also the long quotation from Sophisma II in note 35. Cf. Pini, Georgio, Signification of Names in Duns Scotus and Some of his Contemporaries, in: Vivarium 39 (2001), pp. 20–51, esp. 44–45. 39 Peter of Auvergne, Sophisma II, Problema 3, Ed. Ebbesen (note 10): cum hoc nomen ‘species’ nominet aggregatum ex intentione et subiecto habente intentionem (†sicut† species enim est habens intentionem, intentio autem est

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The name ‘species’ names an aggregate of an intention and a subject that has the intention, for a species is that which has the intention and an intention is in that which has the intention in case. Therefore, the proposition ‘homo est species’ is true in the same way that ‘homo est albus’ is true, that is per accidens, for being a species is accidental to man in the same way as being conceptualized is accidental to man, since being a species is a consequence of being conceptualized.

It follows from this understanding of the proposition ‘homo est species’ that Peter does not need the concepts of simple and personal supposition to explain the difference between the predication in ‘homo est species’ and homo est albus. One of his contemporaries, a commentator on the ‘Sophistical Refutations’ who resembles Peter in so many ways that he has been strongly suspected of being Peter himself, treats homo est species in a traditional way, explaining that:40 In one way quale quid is the nature of the thing taken in its commonness, i.e. absolutely, for the simple nature, as when we say ‘man is a species’ […]. A term suppositing in this way is said to have simple supposition.

Peter rarely speaks about supposition, and in the case of ‘man is a species’ he must have disagreed with the colleague of his who commented on the ‘Elenchi’, for the whole point of saying that in ‘man is a species’ ‘man’ has simple supposition is to block the descent to the particular proposition ‘some man is a species’, or, in other words, to obtain a means to condemn the inference ‘man is a species, consequently some man is a species’.41 Peter,

in eo quod habet istam intentionem, sicut patet ex praedictis), erit igitur ista vera ‘homo est species’ sicut ista ‘homo est albus’, et etiam est vera per accidens, accidit enim homini esse speciem, sicut et accidit ei esse intellectum, quoniam esse speciem sequitur esse intellectum. 40 Incerti Autores, Quaest. SE 80, Ed. Ebbesen (note 9), p. 183: uno enim modo quale quid est natura rei sumpta in sui communitate vel absolute pro natura simplici, ut cum dicitur ‘homo est species’ et ‘triangulus habet tres’, et sic supponens terminus dicitur habere simplicem suppositionem. 41 See, e.g., Peter of Spain, Tractatus, Ed. de Rijk, Lambertus Marie, Assen 1972, VI.6, p. 81: Suppositionum simplicium alia est termini communis in subiecto positi, ut homo est species’ […] Unde non sequitur omne animal praeter hominem est irrationale, ergo omne animal praeter hunc hominem’, sed est ibi figura dictionis procedendo a simplici ad personalem. Simililter hic: homo est species, ergo aliquis homo est species’.

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on the contrary, brazenly – or foolhardlily – accepts the inference. ‘Some man is a species’ is true, he holds, and it follows from ‘man is a species’.42 It is not quite easy to decide whether to admire or condemn the man for sublimely disregarding common sense. Whichever one decides to do, I think we may probably see Peter of Auvergne as a harbinger of the very complex realist ontologies and semantics that were to appear in the fourteenth century.

42 Peter of Auvergne, Sophisma II, Problema 4, Ed. Ebbesen (note 10): Aliquis homo est species’ – De veritate istius quid sit dicendum, quod erat quartum quaesitum, apparet mihi quod ipsa sit vera. Subsequently Peter states his reasons for accepting the proposition and the inference Homo est species, ergo aliquis homo est species.

Peter of Auvergne on Place and Natural Place Cecilia Trifogli (Oxford)

I. Introduction It is a well-known feature of Aristotle’s physical world that for each natural body there is a privileged region – the so-called natural place – towards which it naturally moves and at which it is naturally at rest. For example, the natural place of fire is the concavity of the lunar orb in contact with the sphere of fire: if fire is not impeded it moves towards the concavity of the lunar orb and once it has reached that region it remains at rest there. Thus, in positing the existence of natural places, Aristotle assumes that there is somehow a natural connection between a body and its natural place.1 Although the assumption of the existence of natural places is a fundamental aspect of Aristotle’s natural philosophy, Aristotle himself does not give a satisfactory explanation of it. His remarks on this topic are brief and not very clear. In particular, there are two main issues about the natural connection between a natural body and its natural place for which Aristotle does not seem to provide an explicit answer. One is whether it is legitimate to assume the existence of this natural connection, and the other is what this natural connection exactly consists in. The first issue arises from Aristotle’s general theory of place as presented in his ex professo treatment in ‘Physics’ IV.1–5, where Aristotle defines place as the limit (i.e., the surface) of the containing/surrounding body.2 The standard example he uses to illustrate the nature of place is that of a vessel.3 1

For Aristotle’s discussion of natural place see especially Aristotle, Physics, IV.5 and ‘De Caelo’ IV.3–5. 2 Aristotle, Physics, IV.4, 212a2–7. 3 Aristotle, Physics, IV.2, 209b28–30; IV.3, 210a24, b27–30; IV.4, 211b1–5, 212a14–16. On Aristotle’s theory of place see especially Aristotle, Physics. Books III and IV. Translated with Introduction and Notes by Edward Hussey

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The internal surface of the vessel in contact with the water contained in the vessel is the place of that water. It is not easy to see, however, in what sense the surface of a surrounding body can have a privileged connection with the body surrounded by it. As Aristotle’s favourite example suggests, the same vessel can be the place of whatever body is contained in it. Medieval commentators often raise this issue by asking how it is possible that place defined simply as a quantity (a two-dimensional extension) can have the distinctive properties of a natural place. As to the second issue, about the exact nature of the privileged connection between a body and its natural place, it is not clear and in fact a controversial matter among modern interpreters whether Aristotle ascribes to natural place a causal role with respect to a natural body and its natural motion and rest.4 There are apparently conflicting claims by Aristotle on this central issue. For example, in the opening section of ‘Physics’ IV.1–5 Aristotle first remarks that the natural motion of the elements shows not only that place exists but also that place has a certain power.5 The appeal to the power of natural place seems to indicate that for Aristotle natural place exerts some causal power on the body of which it is a natural place, so that natural place is some kind of cause of the corresponding natural body and its natural motion. It also more specifically suggests that natural place is either an efficient or a final cause, that is, something that attracts the natural body either as a physical force or as an end. Shortly after, however, Aristotle makes the point that place – every place, either natural or not – is not one of the four causes.6 A similar conflict appears in Aristotle’s discussion of the relation between place and the form of the located body. Aristotle denies that place is the form of the located body, arguing that place must be a distinct thing from the located body and thus not something belonging intrinsically to it.7 He describes, however, the natural motion of a body towards its natural place as a motion towards its form.8 (Clarendon Aristotle Series), Oxford 1983, pp. xxvi–xxxii, 99–122; Morison, Benjamin, On Location. Aristotle’s Concept of Place (Oxford Aristotle Studies), Oxford 2002. 4 See, for example, Algra, Keimpe, Concepts of Space in Greek Thought (Philosophia Antiqua. A Series of Studies on Ancient Philosophy 65), Leiden 1995, pp. 195–221; Morison, On Location (note 3), pp. 25–53. 5 Aristotle, Physics, IV.1, 208b8–11. 6 Ibid., 209a18–22. 7 Ibid., IV.2, 209b17–31. 8 Ibid., IV.5, 213a1–4.

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In this paper I will try to reconstruct Peter of Auvergne’s view on these two central issues of Aristotle’s theory of place and natural place. I will start from the second issue, what I will call the ‘causal-issue’ (whether natural place is a cause and what type of cause).

II. Natural Place as a Cause The main sources for reconstructing Peter’s views on this topic are his Commentary on book IV of the ‘De Caelo’,9 the book on heavy and light bodies, and one of his two sets of questions on ‘De Caelo’ IV, the WP-questions.10 Although there is no section of these two works specifically devoted to the question of whether place is a cause, Peter clearly expresses his opinion on this problem. The occasion for clarifying this point is offered to Peter by Aristotle’s claim in ‘De Caelo’ IV.3 that the motion of a body towards its natural place is a motion towards its form or species, a claim implying that the natural place of a body is somehow the form of this body.11 This feature of the natural place of a body provides for Aristotle the explanation of the naturality of natural motion. The fact to be explained is why a body is by its nature inclined to move to its natural place, and Aristotle’s explanation is that this happens because the natural place of a body is somehow 9 Peter’s commentary on ‘De Caelo’, Books III–IV, is a continuatio of Thomas Aquinas’ unfinished commentary. It is edited in: Thomas Aquinas, Opera Omnia XXIII. In Aristotelis Stagiritae libros nonnullos commentaria, Paris 1875, pp. 222–266. All the references to Peter’s commentary are to the pages of this edition (henceforth: Peter of Auvergne, Commentary on ‘De Caelo’). 10 These questions are edited in Peter of Auvergne, Questions on Aristotle’s ‘De Caelo’. A critical edition with an interpretative essay by Griet Galle (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy. De Wulf-Mansion Centre, Series I, 29), Leuven 2003, pp. 9–376. All the references to Peter’s questions are to the pages of this edition (henceforth: Peter of Auvergne, Questions on ‘De Caelo’). 11 Aristotle, De caelo, IV.3, 310a33–b1. A similar but not exactly identical point is made by Aristotle in ‘Physics’ IV.5, 213a1–4, where Aristotle says that the naturally containing body is like the form of the body contained in it (e.g., air, which is the natural container for water, is like the form of water). The passage in ‘Physics’ IV.5 probably explains that in ‘De Caelo’ IV.3: natural place, which is the limit of the naturally containing body, is like the form of the body contained in it because the containing body to which this limit belongs is like the form of the contained body.

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its form, so that the inclination of a body to its natural place is analogous to the inclination of matter to form. Peter, however, finds Aristotle’s claim that the natural place of a body is the form of that body puzzling. He devotes to this claim both q. 4 of his WP-questions, which asks Utrum locus sit perfectio corporis locati,12 and the dubitatio in his commentary on ‘De Caelo’ IV.3 about Utrum moveri ad locum sit moveri ad speciem et perfectionem suam.13 The obvious problem with Aristotle’s claim is that the substantial form, or more generally a perfection of a thing is intrinsic to that thing, exists in that thing, whereas place is not something intrinsic to the located body. Place, for Aristotle, is the limit of the containing body and so something intrinsic to the containing body and not to the contained/located body. How can then place be a perfection of the located body?14 Although Peter’s replies to the WP-question and to the dubitatio in the commentary are not in contradiction, there is a different emphasis in the two cases. In the WP-question Peter’s main concern is to establish the negative point that place is not an intrinsic perfection of the located body, whereas in the dubitatio his main concern is to establish the positive point that place is a perfection, and a crucial one, of the located body, although it is not an intrinsic perfection. In the WP-question Peter distinguishes between place (locus) and being in a place (esse in loco), e.g., up and being up, and he makes the point that being in its natural place and not natural place as such is the perfection of a natural body. The difference is that while place is extrinsic to the located body, being in a place is something intrinsic to it, a property of the located body. Natural motion, like every other change, is the actualization of a potentiality in the body subject to motion; and this potentiality is to being in the natural place and not to place as such. Being in its natural place and

12 Peter of Auvergne, Questions on ‘De Caelo’, IV, q. 4, pp. 343–345. 13 Ibid., lectio 2, pp. 251b–252a. 14 In the dubitatio Peter raises this objection very clearly: Dubitabit autem aliquis utrum moveri ad locum sit moveri ad speciem et perfectionem suam, sicut Philosophus videtur dicere. Videtur enim rationabiliter quod non, quia perfectio et actus rei est aliquid intrinsecum informans. Eiusdem enim est actus cuius est potentia ad actum illum, per Philosophum libro ‘De somno et vigilia’. Locus autem est aliquid extrinsecum, puta ultimus terminus corporis continentis; ergo locus non est species vel perfectio rei. (p. 251b).

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not place as such is the act or perfection that a body acquires at the end of its motion.15 Peter also specifies that being in its natural place is not only an act or perfection of the located body in the general way in which every end-state of an Aristotelian change is, but also more specifically is the end in the sense of goal or final cause of the natural body. Being below – Peter says – is the principal end of a heavy body, an end intended by a principle intrinsic to that body, namely, its substantial form.16 This explains the teleological character of natural motion: it is a motion directed towards an end of the body, namely, towards being in its own place. What is then the role of place? Isn’t it an end too? Peter admits that place too is an end. On this point he appeals to Aristotle’s distinction between the so-called finis quo and the finis cuius, a distinction interpreted in a variety of ways by medieval commentators.17 For Peter, in this context the relevant difference between the two kinds of end is that while the finis quo is something intrinsic to the thing of which it is the end, the finis cuius is extrinsic to it. For example, God is the finis cuius of every creature: God is that for the sake of which every creature exists, although God is something separate from every creature. Health existing as separate entity would be the finis cuius of every thing participating in health. Now being in its natural place is the finis quo of a natural body but its natural place itself is the finis cuius. What is then the relation between the being in a place as finis quo and place itself as finis cuius? The example of God as finis cuius suggests that the finis cuius is somehow a higher ranked end than the finis quo. Peter in the WP-question recognizes this point. He claims that place as finis cuius is activus (productive) of the intrinsic end, namely, the finis quo or being in a place, thus suggesting that the causal role of being in a place does depend on the causal role of place: being in a place as 15 Questions on ‘De Caelo’, IV, q. 4, pp. 343.13–20: Intelligendum quod mobile secundum se est in potentia ad motum, quia motus est actus entis in potentia secundum quod huiusmodi, ut scribitur III ‘Physicorum’. Sed potentia de se dicitur ad actum et determinata potentia ad determinatum actum. Quare manifestum est quod illud ad quod mobile est in potentia est quaedam perfectio mobilis determinata. Nunc autem unumquodque corpus natura est in potentia ad esse in loco. Ideo esse in loco naturali est perfectio locati, et non locus. 16 Ibid., p. 344.28–29: cum esse deorsum sit finis principaliter corporis gravis, et hoc intentum a principio intrinseco […]. 17 On this point, see Maier, Anneliese, Metaphysische Hintergründe der Spätscholastischen Naturphilosophie (Storia e letteratura, Raccolta di studi e testi 52), Roma 1955, pp. 280–282.

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end depends on place as an end.18 In the WP-question, however, Peter does not expand on this important claim about the priority of place over being in a place. On the contrary, this priority is a central point of the dubitatio in the commentary on ‘De Caelo’ IV.3. In the dubitatio, too, Peter introduces a distinction between two kinds of end, which is not the same as that in the WP-question. The distinction is the following. One kind of end is a perfection informing the thing of which it is the end. This kind of end is posterior (either temporally or naturally/ ontologically) to the thing. Another kind of end is an end that exists before the thing of which it is an end (and so does not exist as inhering in the thing). The crucial property of this second kind of end is that of being that in virtue of which the first kind of end is an end (in habitudine ad quod existit finis primo modo dictus). Peter illustrates this distinction with an example taken from intellectual operations, i.e., intellectual acts. The end of the first kind of man is the most perfect intellectual operation, while the end of the second kind is the proper object of that operation. So if the most perfect operation of man is the contemplation of God, this operation is an end of the first kind, but God, which is the object of this operation, is an end of the second kind of man. Although God is not intrinsic to man, this of course does not undermine the ontological superiority of God with respect to man and to his end of the first kind, namely, the contemplation of God. Although the contemplation of God is an act intrinsic to man and so an intrinsic perfection of man, it is a lower ranked end than God himself because it is posterior to the thing of which it is the end while God pre-exists it, and more importantly because it is an end of man exactly because of its object, namely, God. Man strives towards God so that God is the primary end, but the way he can get

18 Peter of Auvergne, Questions on ‘De Caelo’, IV, q. 4, pp. 344.47–345.57: Ad secundum, cum dicitur quod locus est sicut finis, dicendum quod finis est duplex: finis quo et finis cuius, ut scribitur multoties ab Aristotele II ‘Physicorum’ et alibi. Finis quo est illud quo perficitur aliquid per principium rei intrinsecum. Finis autem cuius est quo perficitur unumquodque participans illud, sicut de sanitate supposito quod sanitas esset separata per se subsistens, ut dixit ipse Plato. Et isto modo Deus est finis cuius per principia extrinseca rei gratia cuius et in cuius ratione omnia alia fieri videntur. Eodem modo dicendum est quod locus non est finis quo per principia intrinseca, sed est finis cuius per rei extrinseca principia, activus finis intrinseci, esse locati in loco.

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closer to God is by contemplating God, and this makes the contemplation of God an end for man.19 It is worth noticing that the distinction between the two kinds of end in the dubitatio is the same as that used by the author of the Questions on the ‘Physics’ edited by Delhaye and attributed by him to Siger de Brabant, which, however, are probably by Peter of Auvergne.20 The author of these ‘Physics’-Questions uses this distinction in a question of Book VIII about the cause of the natural motion of heavy and light bodies (Book VIII, q. 19 Utrum locus sit movens grave et leve), where he argues that natural place moves the heavy and light bodies as a final cause.21 In the ‘De Caelo’-dubitatio Peter then explains how the distinction about the end applies to the case of natural bodies and their natural places. As in the WP-question, also in the dubitatio Peter associates the distinction between the two kinds of end to the distinction between being in the natural place and natural place itself. The end of the first kind of these bodies is the 19 Peter of Auvergne, Commentary on ‘De Caelo’, IV, lectio 2, pp. 251b–252a: Ad hoc est intelligendum quod perfectio dicitur de forma, quae est actus primus, et etiam de fine, qui est actus secundus… Finis autem dupliciter dicitur: uno modo perfectio rei informans ipsam rem, quae posterior est ipsa secundum generationem, sicut finem hominis dicimus aliquam operationem eius perfectissimam intellectualem. Alio modo dicitur finis aliquid praeexistens in habitudine ad quod existit finis primo modo dictus, sicut perfectissimum obiectum hominis secundum intellectum dicitur finis ipsius. Et ideo perfectio secundo dicitur et de operatione intrinseca et de objecto primo et per se illius operationis aliquo modo. 20 Siger de Brabant, Questions sur la Physique d’Aristote (Les Philosophes Belges. Textes et Études 15), Ed. Delhaye, Philippe, Louvain 1941 (henceforth: Siger of Brabant, Questions on the ‘Physics’). For references to the discussions about Peter’s authorship for these ‘Physics’-Questions, see Peter of Auvergne, Questions on ‘De Caelo’, pp. 20*–21*. 21 Siger of Brabant, Questions on the ‘Physics’, VIII, q. 19, p. 222: Intelligendum quod locus gravis et levis aliquo modo est finis ipsorum. Sed finis est duplex: quidam est finis qui est perfectio eius quod est ad finem, sicut ultima operatio hominis secundum quod homo dicitur esse eius perfectio et per consequens finis aliquo modo; alio modo dicitur finis obiectum alicuius operationis. Et differunt isti fines ab invicem, quoniam finis primo modo est posterior his quae sunt ad finem secundum esse; finis autem secundo modo dictus praeexistit his quae sunt ad finem et non est aliquid separatum ab eis. Et finis primo modo rationem boni accipit ex fine secundo modo. Ex his ad propositum dico quod finis ipsorum gravium et levium secundo modo est ipse locus.

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primary (essential) operation of these bodies, namely, being in their natural place. The end of the second kind is place itself. For example, being up and being down (esse sursum et esse deorsum) are ends of the first kind of a light and heavy body respectively, but the place up (sursum) and the place down (deorsum) are their ends of the second kind. And also in this relevant case Peter repeats the claim of the priority of place as end of the second kind over being in a place as end of the first kind: a natural body acquires being in a place as intrinsic perfection with its natural motion, but what makes being in the natural place a perfection for the body is the natural place itself. So being up is a perfection of a light body but it is ontologically a derivative perfection because it is a perfection in virtue of the place up.22 To get a less abstract view of Peter’s position we need to know more about the nature of natural place. The nature of natural place must be such that it explains the role of natural place as primary final cause or goal of the corresponding body. In the dubitatio Peter gives a brief indication on this point. He claims that place has the power (vis) to generate and preserve the body naturally located in it.23 Because of its power to generate and preserve in being the corresponding body, natural place is the primary end of this body, that which makes the being in natural place of a body its intrinsic end, or what makes good for the body to be in its natural place. The idea that natural place has the power to generate and preserve in being the corresponding body is not particularly original. It is suggested by Aristotle himself and often repeated by Aristotelian commentators especially in

22 Peter of Auvergne, Commentary on ‘De Caelo’, IV, lectio 2, p. 252a: Secundum hunc quidem igitur triplicem modum possumus considerare perfectionem corporum simplicium mobilium motu recto secundum quod huiusmodi. Perfectio enim prima ipsorum est forma, puta gravitas aut levitas. Perfectio autem secundo modo, quae est finis primo modo dictus, est operatio ipsorum prima, scilicet sursum aut deorsum. Gravi enim aut levi esse est sursum aut deorsum esse, secundum Philosophum in octavo ‘Physicorum’. Perfectio autem tertio modo, quae est finis ultimo modo dictus, est locus eorum naturalis […] Si autem loquamur de perfectione secundo modo dicta, quae est operatio, sic ferri ad locum non est ferri ad perfectionem formaliter et simpliciter, sed ad aliquid a quo sumitur ratio perfectionis secundum hunc modum dictae. Perfectio enim huiusmodi corporum secundum hunc modum est deorsum vel sursum esse, quorum ratio sumitur ex ipsis sursum et deorsum. 23 Ibid., p. 252a: locus enim qui continet et habet vim generativam et conservativam quodammo rationem perfectionis habet […].

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the 13th century.24 In a very rough approximation it originates from what empirical evidence suggests especially in the case of animate things. It is clear that there are privileged places where, e.g., animals of a given species are generated and survive. The main problem with this idea is how to reconcile it with Aristotle’s general theory of place as container. We shall see in the next section how Peter attempts this reconciliation. As a conclusive remark on this presentation of Peter’s view on the causal role of natural place it is relevant to point out how different Peter’s view is from the view that a modern interpreter, Keimpe Algra tends to ascribe to Medieval commentators.25 Algra argues that Aristotle was not committed to the idea that natural place is a final cause of natural motion.26 As to the question of how to reconcile the view that natural place is not a final cause with the undisputed teleological character of natural motion, Algra thinks that this can be done by distinguishing between being in a natural place and natural place itself: for Aristotle the goal/final cause of natural motion is being in a natural place and not natural place itself. Nor is natural place in any way responsible for the causal role of being in a natural place. What is responsible for this causal role is the substantial form of the natural body. For, according to Aristotle, being in its natural place is concomitant to the full actualization of the substantial form of the body. Accordingly, even being in a natural place is a final cause only in a qualified way, namely, not an independent cause from the form of the body.27 As to the evidence against this interpretation of Aristotle arising from the frequent claims in his medieval commentators that place is a final cause, Algra tends to dismiss it, maintaining that they do not clearly distinguish between natural place and being in a natural place. So, Algra says that Thomas Aquinas: [...] even if he does speak of locus as the goal of elementary motion, makes it very clear that he is taking locus to be equivalent to being in a place, for he explicitly regards it as an attribute consequent upon substantial form [...] For these thinkers the difference between place and being in a place was apparently not important enough to be consistently maintained, 24 Aristotle, Physics IV.5, 212b30–33. For some 13th-century discussions of this topic cf. Trifogli, Cecilia, Liber Quartus Physicorum Aristotelis. Repertorio delle Questioni. Commenti Inglesi ca. 1250–1270 (Subsidia al Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi 16), Firenze 2007, pp. 132, 209–210, 492–494. 25 In Algra, Keimpe, Concepts of Space in Greek Thought, Leiden 1995. 26 Ibid., pp. 199–207. 27 Ibid., pp. 208, 214–218.

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Cecilia Trifogli so that we should regard their talk about natural place being a final cause of natural motion as hardly more than a façon de parler [...]. For others, however, the distinction between natural place and being in a natural place may simply have been too subtle [...]”.28

It is disputable whether eminent Aristotelians like Averroes and Aquinas think that the distinction between place and being in a place is not important enough and that there are other medieval commentators for which the distinction may have been too subtle. It is undisputable, however, from what we have seen that for Peter of Auvergne the distinction is not too subtle and in fact of crucial importance. Being in a place is a perfection intrinsic to the body, while place is a perfection extrinsic to it. Also, Peter’s talk of natural place as final cause or end of the corresponding body is not at all a façon de parler of being in a natural place as final cause. Natural place is a genuine final cause and independent from being in the natural place as final cause. Following Aristotle, Peter does think that being in the natural place is a property of a body that derives from its form: it is because of its heaviness that a heavy body is naturally apt to be located below. He also thinks, however, that what makes being in the natural place an end for the body is natural place itself, so that the causality of being in the natural place is derivative not on the form of the body (or not only on the form) but on natural place itself. Accordingly, for Peter the existence of substantial forms that determine the natural location of bodies does presuppose independent ontological items with a causal role of their own, that is, natural places.

III. Natural Place and the Limit of the Containing Body While the main sources for reconstructing Peter’s view on natural place as a cause are works that are certainly authentic, the main source for reconstructing his view on the compatibility between the notion of natural place and Aristotle’s general theory of place are the ‘Physics’-Questions edited by Delhaye, which are only with probability ascribed to him. We have seen, however, that the distinction about the end introduced by Peter in the dubitatio in his commentary on ‘De Caelo’ and its application to the case of natural place are the same as those found in the ‘Physics’-Questions. Therefore, the attempt to fit natural place within Aristotle’s general theory 28 Algra, Keimpe, Concepts of Space (note 25), pp. 220–221.

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of place in the ‘Physics’-Questions, if not by Peter himself, is by someone who shares the same view as Peter on natural place as a final cause. For simplicity of reference I will call ‘Peter’ the author of the ‘Physics’-Questions. The ‘Physics’-Questions present an interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of place that puts a very strong emphasis on natural place. Rather than simply an attempt to reconcile Aristotle’s general theory of place with his assumptions about natural place the ‘Physics’-Questions are somehow an attempt to ‘transform’ Aristotle’s general theory into a theory of natural place. I will give two examples of this attempted transformation. (1) Peter raises the preliminary question of whether place is an object of natural philosophy (Book IV, q. 2, Utrum naturalis debeat considerare de loco).29 Aristotle’s reply to this question is that change is the primary object of natural philosophy and one kind of change is locomotion, that is, change with respect to place. Accordingly, place is the object of natural philosophy because of its essential connection with locomotion.30 Aristotle does not have in mind here exclusively or even mainly natural motion, motion towards natural place, and thus not exclusively or mainly natural place. His favourite example of locomotion is replacement: different bodies successively occupying the same place.31 Peter’s reply is different. He appeals to a distinction between two aspects of place: a quantitative aspect and a qualitative one. The quantitative aspect of place is that place is a container and a measure of the located body. This reflects Aristotle’s definition of place as limit of the containing body. The qualitative aspect of place is a power to preserve in being the located body. This is clearly a property distinctive of natural place. Peter then claims that place is an object of natural philosophy not because of its quantitative aspect as container but exclusively because of its qualitative aspect as power to preserve natural bodies. So not place in general as container but only natural place is an object of natural philosophy, according to Peter.32 (2) Peter devotes a question to Aristotle’s definition of place as limit of the containing body. “Is place such a limit?” the question asks (Book IV, 29 Siger de Brabant, Questions on the ‘Physics’, IV, q. 2, pp. 147–148. 30 Aristotle, Physics, III.1, 200b20–21. 31 E.g., it is replacement that provides a prima facie argument for the existence of place. See Aristotle, Physics, IV.1, 208b1–8. 32 Siger de Brabant, Questions on the ‘Physics’, IV, q. 2, p. 148: In loco etiam est considerare duo, quia locus continet locatum et ipsum habet mensurare, ipsum etiam habet conservare. Considerando autem ipsum secundum quod continet absolute aut mensurat, non est de consideratione naturalis neque sic respondet

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q. 8 Utrum locus sit ultimum continentis).33 Peter’s reply is very original: place is not the limit of the containing body but a passio (a property) of the limit of the containing body, the passio that gives to the limit of the containing body the power to preserve the body located in it. The limit of the containing body is place but only materially, that is, this limit is the subject in which place as conservative power exists. But place itself is the conservative power existing in this limit. Consistently with this, Peter maintains that as to its categorical classification, place is not a quantity but a quality, and more precisely a quality of the fourth species, a quality existing in a quantity, where the relevant quantity is the limit or surface of the containing body and the relevant quality is the conservative power.34 Thus, while in the question about place as object of natural philosophy Peter assumed that both the quantitative aspect – being a container – and the qualitative aspect – the preserving power – were intrinsic to place, although the qualitative aspect was regarded as the distinctive one, in the question about the definition of place, he takes a further step and identifies place properly speaking with the qualitative aspect, making the quantitative one not intrinsic to place, but rather its subject. Thus, for Peter the distinctive property of natural place of being a preserver is finally identified with place as such. The crucial notion of the preserving power of place – the distinctive property of natural place – deserves closer scrutiny. A general question is whether it is possible to accommodate this power within Aristotle’s general theory of place as limit of the containing body. For Aristotle this is locus rebus naturalibus. Si autem consideratur inquantum conservat locatum, sic locus est de consideratione naturalis et consequitur corpora naturalia secundum quod huiusmodi, quia naturaliter locus habet conservare contentum in loco. 33 Siger de Brabant, Questions on the ‘Physics’, IV, q. 2, pp. 154–155. 34 Ibid., p. 155: Propter hoc videtur esse aliter dicendum quod locus per se non est ultimum corporis continentis sed est passio ultimi continentis, passio dico causata in ultimo continentis per virtutem supracaelestem secundum distantiam debitam a primo locante et ab ultimo locato, quod est centrum mundi, ita ut ista passio ultimi continentis sit illud quo locus virtutem conservandi habet, passio per talem respectum et in quo habet virtutem generandi locatum et etiam quo locatum unigeneitatem habet cum loco suo. Et illud vult Averroes Quinto ‘Metaphysicae’ dicens quod locus non est quantitas sed passio quantitatis. Sed in Libro ‘Praedicamentorum’ dicit Aristoteles quod locus est quantitas. Non tamen hoc dicit secundum veritatem, sed secundum famositatem, ut secundum opinionem istorum qui dixerunt locum esse dimensiones etc […]. Ex istis etiam manifestum est magis locum esse in quarta specie qualitatis. Est enim locus passio ultimi continentis, ut patet ex praecedentibus.

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possible, because in his view place is not simply a geometrical entity – limit or surface as such – but the limit of a natural body, a natural body surrounding the located body. It is the natural body to which the surrounding surface belongs that makes it possible to differentiate between natural place, the place with preserving power, and non-natural place, the place without such a preserving power. Accordingly, depending on which natural body that surface/limit belongs to, place will have or will not have a preserving power: it will have this power if it is the limit of the ‘right’ body and will not have this power if it is the limit of the ‘wrong’ body.35 In the case of the elementary bodies, Aristotle gives some details about how this general idea applies. The natural ordering of the elementary spheres in the Aristotelian universe is such that the sphere of earth is at the centre, followed in order by that of water, that of air and finally that of fire, the outermost elementary sphere, surrounded by the lunar orb. This natural ordering for Aristotle defines the ‘right’ surrounding bodies and so natural places: water is the right surrounding body for earth, air for water, fire for air and finally the lunar orb for fire. So the general rule is that the element immediately containing another element in the natural ordering is also the naturally containing body for it. To the question of why this is the case, Aristotle’s reply is that the element immediately containing another element is somehow related to it as form to matter.36 Thus, there is an Aristotelian way to make sense of natural place and its preserving power within Aristotle’s general theory of place. This is not, however, the way that Peter wants to follow. Like Aristotle, he does assume that the preserving power of natural place exists in the limit of the containing body – e.g., the preserving power of air exists in the surface of fire in contact with the sphere of air – but unlike Aristotle he does not think that this preserving power originates from the containing body itself. It is not fire qua fire that has the power of preserving the air naturally located in it. As to its intrinsic qualities, fire does not preserve but destroys air. And the same is true for all elements: the proper natures of distinct elements are simply contrary one to the other. So the preserving power of natural place does not derive from the proper nature of the containing body. Where does it derive from? It derives from the celestial body – Peter replies. It is a virtus influxa by the celestial body in the limit of the containing body. It is not the virtus of the containing body as such. Nor does this power have a special connection 35 On this point, see Algra, Concepts of Space (note 25), pp. 206–207. 36 Aristotle, Physics, IV.5, 212b29–213a10. On this point, see also n. 11.

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with the nature of the containing body. Rather, it depends on the distance of the containing body from the celestial body. E.g., fire has the power of preserving air and so it is its natural place, but this preserving power does not belong to fire qua fire but it exists in fire only insofar as fire is at an appropriate distance from the celestial body. So that, if the natural region occupied by fire comes to be occupied by another body, because this other body has the same distance from the celestial body that fire had, it will have the power of preserving air, a power received from the celestial body itself.37 The preserving power conferred to the limit of the containing body by the celestial bodies is certainly not an Aristotelian ingredient of Peter’s account of natural place nor one that comes from Averroes’ interpretation of Aristotle. It is not, however, an innovation attributable to Peter himself. The appeal to the celestial power often appears in earlier 13th-century discussions of natural place and of other issues concerning place.38 I have the impression that the notion of celestial power originates from a non-Aristotelian context prior to the reception of Aristotle’s physical works in the Middle Ages. What seems to be very original in Peter’s account is that not even the appeal to this obscure celestial power is enough to give a completely 37 Siger of Brabant, Questions on the ‘Physics’, Book IV, q. 4 (Utrum locus habeat virtutem conservandi locatum), pp. 150–151: Dicendum ad hoc quod manifestum est locum habere virtutem conservandi locatum. Videmus enim quod aliquae res conservantur in loco suo quae si amotae fuissent, statim corrumperentur vel etiam non multum durarent, sicut apparet de quibusdam plantis et etiam de quibusdam animalibus [...] Est etiam considerare in loco duo: naturam quantitativam et mensurativam ipsum locatum, secundum quam habet tantum continere locatum, aut quantum ad aliquid additum naturae quantitatis, ut quantum ad aliquam virtutem per quam habet conservare suum locatum, et sic manifestum est quod virtutem naturalem habet conservandi suum locatum. Sed a quo habet istam virtutem? Dicendum quod non videtur esse ista virtus nisi influxa a corpore caelesti in ipso. Unde sciendum quod ipsa virtus quae est in corpore continente non est corporis continentis secundum quod huiusmodi sed est ipsius secundum quod est in tanta distantia ab orbe, quia, si quaeratur quare transmutatur talis materia in talem formam, dicendum quod est quia est in tali distantia ab ipso orbe, ita quod ignis conservat aerem et est locus eius, sed ista virtus non est igni secundum quod ignis, sed secundum quod est in tanta distantia ab orbe, et sic de aliis. 38 Cf. Trifogli, Cecilia, Liber Quartus Physicorum Aristotelis. Repertorio delle Questioni. Commenti Inglesi ca. 1250–1270 (Subsidia al Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi 16), Firenze 2007, pp. 45–55.

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satisfactory explanation of natural place. It is commonly assumed that an essential property of the natural place of a body is that of being where the natural motion of a body naturally ends and where the body then is naturally at rest.39 Peter admits, however, that this common assumption cannot be saved. It is refuted by the natural motions of all the elements, with the only exception being fire. Take for example the case of earth. Peter accepts as empirical evidence that a part of earth naturally moves downwards towards the centre of the universe rather than upwards towards the limit of the sphere of water (the element next to air). Yet, the limit of the sphere of water is the natural place of earth in Aristotle’s theory and also in Peter’s modified version of Aristotle’s theory. Indeed, for Peter it is also true that the limit of water in contact with the sphere of earth is the natural place of earth, although it is not such a natural place insofar as it belongs to water as such, but because it is endowed with the celestial power that preserves/ generates earth. If the limit of water, however, is endowed with the preserving/generative power of earth, the following question arises: Why is it the case that earth does not move naturally towards it but towards the centre of the universe?40 In replying to this question Peter introduces a distinction relative to the preserving/generative power of earth. The distinction is that between the region in which this power starts to exist and the region in which it is maximally concentrated. In the case of earth – as in the case of all other elements with the exception of fire – these two regions are not the same. The preserving/generative power of earth is maximally concentrated in the centre of the universe, so that there is more of this power in the centre of the universe than in the limit of water in contact with earth. This limit, however, is where this power starts to exist (first exists). The idea is that the preserving/generative power of earth does not exist above the inferior limit of water (that in contact with earth); it starts to exist in the inferior limit of water and then exists throughout the region that extends from the inferior limit of water to the centre of the universe, but in different concentrations, so that it is minimal in the inferior limit of water and maximal in the centre

39 Cf. Aristotle, Physics, IV.5, 212b29–34. 40 This question is raised in the following pro-argument of Book IV, q. 10 (Utrum ipsum centrum sit locus terrae), p. 157: Item, id ad quod movetur unumquodque naturaliter est locus eius; terra autem naturaliter movetur ad centrum; quare centrum erit locus ipsius terrae.

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of the universe.41 This distinction explains, for Peter, why it is the case that earth naturally moves towards the centre of the universe: it is there that earth is better preserved than in the limit of water because of the higher concentration of its preserving power, although its natural place is the limit of water.42 Accordingly, the commonly assumed property of natural place of being where natural motion ends must be replaced, in Peter’s account, with the less intuitive one of being where the preserving power of the corresponding body first exists. On the other hand, the place where natural motion ends is not the natural place but it is where the preserving power is maximally concentrated.43 41 Ibid., p. 158: Sciendum etiam quod aliquando contingit quod in eodem sit locus alicuius et etiam virtus generativa ipsius, sicut patet de ipso igne. Locus enim ipsius est in concavo orbis lunae, et etiam eius virtus generativa, virtus dico generativa iuxta (iuxta: fortasse pro influxa), et propter hoc dicitur quod ignis maxime locatus est, et ideo movetur simpliciter sursum. Sic autem non est de aliis elementis, quoniam aer non generatur, et hoc maxime, in suprema parte eius, quia est ibi minus calidus, neque etiam in infima, quia ibi est minus frigidus, et ideo eius virtus maxime generativa est in medio ipsius. Eodem modo est de aqua, consimiliter autem est de ipsa terra, quia ipsa maxime est frigida, et ideo eius virtus generativa maxime est ubi est frigiditas; hoc autem est in ipso centro, et hoc quia maxime remotum est ab orbe, nihilominus tamen ista virtus primo reperitur ubi deficit ipsa aqua, hoc autem est in ultimo terrae, non tamen ista virtus est ibi maxime. 42 Ibid., IV., q. 10, p. 158: Et ideo quia locatum movetur ad locum secundum naturam ubi est maxime virtus generativa ipsius locati, ideo partes terrae moventur ad partem illam ubi est maxime virtus generativa. Hoc autem est in centro, ut patet ex dictis, et ideo partes terrae naturaliter moventur ad centrum. Tamen, quia locus dicitur ultimum continentis etc., non dicitur esse locus ubi maxime manet virtus generativa sed ubi manet ista virtus primo. Quia igitur centrum mundi non est ultimum sive extra sed est infra terram, ideo locus terrae non dicitur, licet ibi viget maxime virtus generativa ipsius terrae. For the case of water, see ibid., q. 12 (Utrum locus sit idem ipsius aquae et terrae), pp. 160–161; for the case of air, see ibid., q. 13 (Utrum ultimum aeris sit locus aquae), p. 162; for the case of fire, see q. 14 (Utrum concavum orbis lunae sit locus ipsius ignis), pp. 162–163. 43 Peter makes this point clearly in q. 11 (Utrum locus terrae sit ultimum aquae), p. 160: Cum dicitur: omne corpus movetur naturaliter ad locum suum, dicendum quod omne corpus movetur ad locum suum vel ad aliud existens in quo est maxime virtus generativa et conservativa, et ideo non universaliter omne corpus movetur ad locum suum nisi corpora illa quae sunt verissime locata, cuiusmodi est ipse ignis.

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Conclusion In this paper I have investigated Peter’s views on two crucial issues of Aristotle’s theory of place. The first is whether natural place has a causal role with respect to the body naturally located in it and its natural motion. The second is, if natural place has a causal role, whether this causal role is compatible with the ontological status which Aristotle ascribes to place, namely, that of being the limit of the containing body. As to the first issue, Peter maintains that place is indeed a cause and more precisely a final cause. In his analysis, he distinguishes place from being in a place: only being in a place (either natural or not) is a perfection intrinsic to the located body, while place is something extrinsic to it. He points out, however, that the extrinsic quality of natural place does not prevent natural place from being a final cause of the body naturally located in it. Both being in the natural place and natural place itself are final causes, but of different kinds: being in a place is an intrinsic final cause while place is an extrinsic one. Peter also posits a hierarchy between being in the natural place and natural place as final causes. Natural place is the primary final cause in the sense that being in the natural place is a final cause because of natural place itself being a final cause. For example, it is because the place ‘up’ is a final cause for fire that being up is also a final cause for it. Accordingly, Peter does not reduce the final causality of natural place to that of being in the natural place but conceives of it as an independent causality. Following the common view, Peter maintains that the final causality of natural place consists in the fact that natural place preserves the body naturally located in it. As to the second issue, Peter does not think that the causal role of natural place can be accounted for by place conceived of as the limit of the containing body. Departing from Aristotle and also from the standard medieval interpretation of Aristotle, he posits that natural place is not the limit of the naturally containing body but a preserving power existing in this limit. Accordingly, for Peter, natural place is not a quantity but a quality. Furthermore, like some earlier commentators, Peter maintains that the preserving power or quality of natural place is not a quality proper to the naturally containing body. For example, the preserving power of air is not a quality proper to fire. Fire by its proper nature destroys air rather than preserving it. The preserving power is rather a virtus influxa by the celestial body in the limit of the naturally containing body. An original aspect of Peter’s view is that even the appeal to the celestial power existing in the limit of the

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naturally containing body is not enough to save the standard Aristotelian assumption that a body naturally moves towards its natural place. For Peter, it is a matter of empirical evidence that earth naturally moves downwards towards the centre of the universe rather than upwards towards the limit of the water naturally containing it, even if the limit of water is endowed with the preserving power of earth. In Peter’s explanation, this behaviour of earth is due to the fact that the preserving power of earth is maximally concentrated in the centre of the universe, although this power first exists in the limit of water. Accordingly, for Peter, it is the preserving power of a body with its diversified distribution in the universe rather than the limit of the containing body that explains the natural motion and rest of a body, even when this limit is endowed with the relevant preserving power.

Peter of Auvergne and Albert the Great as Interpreters of Aristotle’s ‘De caelo’ Henryk Anzulewicz (Bonn)

Peter of Auvergne, who was numbered among the more important Parisian masters of arts from the early 1270s on, and from 1296 among those of theology, has generally been seen by historians as closely linked to Thomas Aquinas, and sometimes described as a Thomist.1 After all, he completed two philosophical works Aquinas left unfinished at his death (the commentaries on Aristotle’s ‘De Caelo’ and ‘Politica’). However, neither these supplements to Thomas’ work, nor the reputation he was given by Ptolomaeus of Lucca for fidelity to the teachings of the Angelic Doctor, exhaust his significance for the history of philosophy and systematics. The recognition which he received in life was based both on his many years of teaching at the University of Paris, and of the views he taught there, which went beyond Thomas. His teaching, in particular, give him his own academic profile, which reveals him to be an independent thinker not dependent on any one school of thought alone.2 His scholarly development was indebted

1 Cf. Peter of Auvergne, Questions on Aristotle’s ‘De caelo’. A Critical Edition with an interpretative Essay, Ed. Galle, Griet (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy. De Wulf-Mansion Centre. Series I/XXIX), Leuven 2003, pp. 22*–23*; Galle, Griet, Petrus von Alvernia, in: Thomistenlexikon, Eds. Berger, David and Vijgen, Jörgen, Bonn 2006, pp. 486–493, here 489–493. 2 Cf. Hocedez, Edgar, La théologie de Pierre d’Auvergne, in: Gregorianum 11 (1930), pp. 526–552; Koch, Josef, Sind die Pygmäen Menschen? Ein Kapitel aus der philosophischen Anthropologie der mittelalterlichen Scholastik, in: AGPh 40 (1931), pp. 194–213, here 199–202, 207–208; Hocedez, Edgar, La Philosophie des Quodlibets de Pierre d’Auvergne, in: Aus der Geisteswelt des Mittelalters, vol 2, Eds. Lang, Albert, Lechner, Josef and Schmaus, Michael (BGPhMA, Suppl. III/2), Münster 1935, pp. 779–791; Medieval Latin Texts on the Eternity of the World, Eds. Dales, Richard C. and Argerami, Omar (Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History 23), Leiden 1991, p. 142.

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not only to Thomas Aquinas, but also to Godfrey of Fontaine and Henry of Ghent, under whom he studied theology.3 Peter chiefly distinguished himself as an academic and teacher in his commentaries on the most important writings transmitted as the corpus Aristotelicum. He did indeed take Aquinas as an example in these, and continued to work in his tradition, but it is also apparent that Peter consulted Thomas’ teacher, Albert the Great. This was particularly the case in the interpretation of those writings from the corpus Aristotelicum which Aquinas had not written commentaries for. Although this point has frequently been noted in recent scholarship, it remains largely unexplained.4 In what follows, the situation will be described, and the shortcomings of research into the question, as well as the problems such research faces, will be shown using a few examples.

I. Peter of Auvergne’s reception of Albert: Areas of Interest, and the Current State of Scholarship Peter of Auvergne’s philosophical work belongs to the second phase of the tradition of the interpretation of the full breadth of Aristotelian texts in the Latin West, which had begun in the thirteenth century.5 Thus, Peter could draw upon a body of recent commentaries, still small enough to be mastered by one person, and find in them direction and impetus for his own work. For him the works of Thomas Aquinas were, to a certain extent, 3 Cf. Koch (note 2), p. 199. 4 Some newer studies and critical editions of Peter specifically avoid discussing his relationship to Albert the Great, although it ought apparently to be assumed, and a study of the question would deepen our current understanding of both thinkers and their significance for intellectual history. One example of this is the study, and the edition, by Dunne, Michael, The Commentary of Peter of Auvergne on Aristotle’s ‘On Length and Shortness of Life’, in: AHDL 69 (2002), pp. 153–200; Dunne merely points out that Peter knew both the Translatio vetus of ‘De long. et brev. vitae’ and the earlier commentaries based on this version. 5 Lohr, Charles H., Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries. Authors: Narcissus – Richardus, in: Traditio 28 (1972), p. 281; Andrews, Robert, Peter of Auvergne (d. 1304), in: Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 7, Ed. Edward Craig, London/New York 1998, pp. 321–324, here 322.

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models, influencing and forming his own methodology to the extent that he saw himself as capable of completing two works which Aquinas left unfinished at his death, in Thomas’ own manner. Historians have always laid particular stress on this fact, which has become an unmistakable part of Peter’s academic identity. However, until now the question of which other commentators on Aristotle influenced Peter’s academic writings, and to what extent, has remained largely unexplored. This is, as has been said, particularly true of Albert the Great, whose influence on Peter appears to have extended across several areas of knowledge, as can be shown here through a few test cases from selected elements of natural philosophy. 1. Peter of Auvergne’s cosmology shows many similarities to positions held by Albert the Great. These include a series of themes which both authors treated in similar manner in their questions on and paraphrases of Aristotle’s ‘De Caelo’. As well as points of overlap, differences appear, connected to the progression of the argument and resultant developments in doctrine, such as on the question of the eternity of the world. In his first Quodlibet Peter’s solution goes beyond the position taken by Albert the Great in his early work ‘De IV coaequaevis, in II Sent.’, as well as his commentary on ‘De Physica’, and that of Thomas Aquinas in ‘De aeternitate mundi’.6 However, in the teaching of the Universal Doctor he found starting points which became a major element of his own view. Thus the distinction between the principles of duration and being, which Albert developed in nuce in his commentary on ‘De physica’, underlies Peter’s understanding of eternity and and his solution to the question, could God have created the world from eternity.7 But while Albert maintained the absolute eternity of God, i.e. according to being and duration (esse et duratione) and the creation of the world out of nothing (ex nihilo), Peter is of the opinion that the world is eternal in a secondary sense, that is according to its duration but

6 Cf. Albert the Great, De IV coaequaevis, tr. 2, Ed. Borgnet, Auguste (Opera Omnia XXXIV), Paris 1895, pp. 338–394; id., I Sent. d. 44, a. 1, Ed. Borgnet, Auguste (Opera Omnia XXVI), Paris 1893, pp. 388b–391b; id., Physica, l. 8, tr. 1, c. 12, Ed. Hoßfeld, Paul (Opera Omnia IV/2), Münster 1993, p. 574, v. 22–29; Dales and Argerami (note 2). 7 Albert the Great, Physica, l. 8, tr. 1, c. 13 (note 6), p. 574, v. 63 – p. 577, v. 50, esp. p. 577, v. 15–47.

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not its being.8 He developed Albert’s understanding of creation as an act proceeding from the will and the creative knowledge of the First Cause, which is actually merely a manifestation of things in being.9 This conception of the ideas as existing eternally in God’s mind is shared by Albert. However, regarding the question of creation, he maintains in distinction to Peter, and referring to ‘Liber de causis’ (prop. 19) as an Aristotelian work, that “the First Cause precedes its creation in terms of the natural order, as well as Being and Duration.”10 Griet Galle’s edition of Peter’s question commentary on ‘De Caelo’ makes a precise investigation of his reception of Albert’s commentary on ‘De Caelo’, and demonstrates that it was not Peter himself, but an anonymous redactor of the ‘Quaestiones supra Libram De caelo et mundo’ (Version III) who used Albert as a source, using extended passages almost word for word.11 The compilator remarks once, at the end of the first longer passage copied exactly from Albert, that he has reproduced Albert’s

8 Cf. Peter of Auvergne, Utrum deus potuerit facere mundum esse ab eterno, Eds. Dales and Argerami (note 2), pp. 144–145: eternum dicitur quasi entis ens, id est permanentem; vel quasi extra terminos, scilicet principium et finem. Et ideo dicitur uno modo eternum quod omnino principium non habet, nec in esse nec in duratione. Et sic deus solus eternus vere, nec creatura aliqua potest esse coeterna ei, quia ex quo creatura est, principium habet sui esse. Alio modo dicitur eternum quod non habet principium sue durationis, quamvis habeat principium essendi. Anzulewicz, Henryk, Aeternitas – aevum – tempus: The Concept of Time in the System of Albert the Great, in: The Medieval Concept of Time, Ed. Porro, Pasquale (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 75), Leiden 2001, pp. 83–129, esp. 109–113; Hoßfeld, Paul, Albert the Great über die Ewigkeit aus philosophischer Sicht, in: APraed 56 (1986), pp. 31–48. 9 Cf. Albert the Great, Physica, l. 8, tr. 1, c. 13 (note 6), p. 575, v. 44–49: Actus autem primae causae, qui est creatio, in nullo erat subiecto, quia nec proprie loquendo actio est, sed potius fuit demonstratio rei in esse, postquam omnino nihil fuit secundum imperium suae voluntatis et scientiae suae operativae perfectionem. 10 Ibid., p. 577, v. 37–40: prima causa non est solum ordine naturae praecedens sua creata, sed etiam esse et duratione. Sic igitur probatur et mundus esse creatus et deus duratione aeternitatis praecedere mundum. 11 Anonymus, Quaestiones supra librum ‘De caelo et mundo’, l. 2, q. 11, Ed. Galle (note 1), pp. 468–469; ibid., [additamentum ad q. 16] De causa scintillationis stellarum, pp. 483–484; ibid., q. 17–18, pp. 486–487, pp. 489–492;

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position.12 Whether he also used Albert’s early work, ‘De homine’, a question suggested by the parallels Griet Galle can show, cannot be decided.13 Since this case concerns, not reception of Albert by Peter, but that of an anonymous compilator, we will pursue his interest in Albert’s teachings on the heavens and interpretation of physiological aspects of optical perception no further. The question of whether or not Alberts’ writings on cosmology and, in particular his commentary on ‘De Caelo’ is used in Peter’s question commentary or in the parts of Aquinas’ commentary on ‘De Caelo’ which Peter wrote (Books III and IV) will be explored in what follows. 2. In psychology, a common interest in the question as to whether an active principal underlies the senses is immediately apparent. Peter discusses it in ‘Quodlibet II’, q. 11 under the heading Utrum sit ponere sensum agentem.14 His treatment corresponds to Albert’s discussion in the ‘De anima commentary’, book II, pt. 3, cap. 6, introduced by the heading Et est digressio declarans, utrum aliquod movens unum sit in sensibilibus, et de duplici esse sensibilis, quod habet in materia et in abstractione.15 In raising this question Albert was building on Averroes, who was probably the first person to ask the question, but could not find a solution. However, it was discussed in detail by very few thirteenth century authors other than Albert (one of the few who did was Giles of Rome).16 Further thematic and indeed terminologically specific similarities with Albert in psychology and psychophysiology can be found in Peter’s commentary on the ‘Parva naturalia’. This circumstance is occasionally noted by scholars, and first insights regarding it can chiefly be found in the works of Pieter De Leemans.17 ibid., [additamentum ad q. 18] De causa idoli quod apparet in luna, p. 493; ibid., q. 19, pp. 494–496; ibid., l. 3, q. 8–9, pp. 538–542; ibid., q. 34, p. 523; further pp. 357*, 359*, 360*, 362*. 12 Anonymus, ibid., l. 2, q. 11, p. 469, v. 44–45: Haec est positio Alberti. 13 Anonymus, Quaestiones supra librum ‘De caelo et mundo’, l. 2, Ed. Galle (note 1), [additamentum ad q. 16], p. 484, v. 25–26. 14 The questio is printed in Pattin, Adriaan, Pour l’histoire du sens agent. La controverse entre Barthélemy de Bruges et Jean de Jandun, ses antécédents et son évolution (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy. De Wulf-Mansion Centre. Series 1/VI), Leuven 1988, pp. 9–15. 15 Albert the Great, De anima, l. 2, tr. 3, c. 6, Ed. Stroick, Clemens (Opera Omnia VII/1), Münster 1968, pp. 104–107. 16 Cf. Pattin (note 14), pp. 1–31. 17 Cf. note 61 below.

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3. In anthropology, Peter’s ‘Quodlibet VI’, q. 14, attacks the question, rarely discussed in the Middle Ages, whether pygmies are human. This question also featured in Albert the Great ‘De animalibus’, book XXI, pt. 1, cap. 218 and in ‘De memoria et reminiscentia’, pt. 1, cap. 3,19 and Peter came to the same conclusion as the Universal Doctor.20 On this, Joseph Koch remarked: “Despite this, I still do not believe that Peter used the famous natural scientist’s book on animals, though it can hardly be doubted that he knew it”.21 Leaving aside the question of whether or not Peter used Albert’s ‘De animalibus’ or his commentary ‘De memoria et reminiscentia’, which Koch had not seen – both books which Peter apparently knew it cannot very well be doubted that he was inspired to tackle the theme by Albert. The fact that Peter gave the same answer to the question Utrum pygmei sint homines? as Albert, whose reasoning was apparently unique in this period, 22 seems to strongly suggest that he knew Albert’s opinion. However, Peter did not remain content with Albert’s level of knowledge, but enriched his own in several respects. It is thus apparent that he used another source, as well as Albert, and Albert’s own (which included Aristotle, ‘Hist. An.’, VIII.12, 597a4 ff.). These also included Augustine (‘De civ. dei’, XVI, 8), although the latter did not find himself in a position to decide whether pygmies were human, nor if they really existed. 4. As far as is known, Peter of Auvergne’s most thorough reception of Aristotle occurs in botany. In his studies connected with the critical edition of the ‘Sententia super librum De vegetabilibus et plantis’, E.L.J. Poortman 18 Albert the Great, De animalibus, l. 21, tr. 1, c. 2, § 11–14, Ed. Stadler, Hermann (BGPhMA XVI), Münster 1920, p. 1328, v. 2 – p. 1329, v. 32; cf. ibid., l. 14, tr. 2, c. 1, § 27, p. 963, v. 8–9. 19 Albert the Great, De memoria et reminiscentia, tr. 1, c. 3, Ed. Borgnet, Auguste (Opera Omnia IX), Paris 1890, p. 102b. 20 Cf. Koch (note 2), pp. 198ff. 21 Ibid., p. 199. Theodor W. Köhler agrees that Peter knew them: “Petrus scheint die Ausführungen Alberts des Großen über die Pygmei in ‘De animalibus’ gekannt zu haben.”, Köhler, Theodor W., Anthropologische Erkennungsmerkmale menschlichen Seins. Die Frage der ‘Pygmei’ in der Hochscholastik, in Mensch und Natur im Mittelalter, Eds. Zimmermann, Albert and Speer, Andreas (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 21/1), Berlin 1991, pp. 718–735, here 734. 22 According to current scholarship, other than Albert the Great and Peter, one other writer, a Franciscan anonymous, examined the matter in a ‘Quodlibet’ around 1286–87. However, he came to an opposite conclusion. Köhler (note 21), p. 734, concludes that Peter was not referring to the Anonymous.

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was able to show that while Peter conceived the formal structures of his work on botany independently, its contents owe a heavy debt to Albert the Great ‘De vegetabilibus’.23 Peter did not merely take from it the sources cited, but also Albert’s cross references to his own commentary on Aristotle, though he portrayed the latter as works of Aristotle himself.24 For our purposes, it is significant that thanks to this the reception of Albert’s ‘De vegetablibus’, he was also confronted with his ‘De Caelo’ commentary, but obscured the fact by citing Albert’s book as ‘liber Caeli et mundi’, which generally meant the work of Aristotle.25 As well as literal, mostly unacknowledged, borrowings from Albert’s ‘De Vegetabilibus’,26 similar echoes of opinion can be discerned in the prologue of Peter’s ‘Sententia super librum De vegetabilibus et plantis’. These relate to the doctrine of the science of natural philosophy, in which Peter, citing Avicenna (‘Sufficientia’ I.1) argues the necessity of completing general knowledge of natural things via knowledge of individual things, and thus takes the position of Albert, as argued in ‘De animalibus’.27 It is further possible that Peter was inspired in his theoretical reflections in the prologue to his book on botany

23 Cf. Poortman, E.L.J., Introduction, in: Petrus de Alvernia, Sententia super librum ‘De vegetabilibus et plantis’, Ed. id. (Aristoteles Semitico Latinus 13), Leiden 2003, pp. XIV–XXIII. 24 Cf. Poortman (note 23), pp. XVIII–XIX. 25 Cf. Poortman (note 23), p. 94, v. 28–32: ponit secundam rationem, quae talis est: omne corpus rarum in partibus suis naturaliter supernatat aquae et est aereum. Sic est planta, ut lignum, quia, ut ostensum est libro ‘Caeli et mundi’, hoc est per naturam sicut aer., cf. Albert the Great, De vegetabilibus, l. 4, tr. 1, c. 2, n. 20, Eds. Meyer, Ernestus and Jessen, Carolus, Berlin 1867 (reprint Frankfurt/M. 1982), p. 221: Amplius autem omne corpus, cujus est multa raritas in partibus, per naturam suam consuevit ascendere super aquam natando, sicut in coelo et mundo, ubi de gravi et levi sermo habitus est, determinatum est a nobis. Et hujus causam ibi ostendimus [...]. Albert the Great, De caelo et mundo, l. 4, tr. 2, c. 10, Ed. Hoßfeld, Paul (Opera Omnia V/1), Münster 1971, p. 272, v. 54 – p. 274, v. 40, esp. p. 274, v. 26–40; Poortman (note 23), p. XVIII. 26 While Peter does make several explicit references to Albert – six times in total – these do not make it clear that he has simply copied whole passages out of the ‘De vegetabilis’, especially the first and fourth books. 27 Peter of Auvergne, Sententia super librum ‘De vegetabilibus et plantis’, p. 3, v. 2–3, 11–23; cf. Albert the Great, De animal., l. 11, tr. 1, c. 1, § 5. 9, Ed. Stadler, Hermann (BGPhMA XV), Münster 1916, p. 762, v. 27–38, p. 764, v. 8–9: scire in universali naturas rerum non est scire eas nisi in potentia.

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by Albert’s in the ‘De animalia’, which, as even Josef Koch and Theodor W. Köhler assumed, he seems to have known well. If we look beyond Peter’s explicit references to Albert and his proven, word-for-word borrowings from the works of the Universal Doctor, then it is generally difficult to establish the latter’s influence on Peter. Gundisalvus M. Grech first noticed that a comparative reading of both authors immediately revealed differences in the style and method of commentary, even when they often concealed the same teachings. It is only in the commentary to ‘De vegetabilibus et plantis’ that we to date have been faced with such explicit links and word for word borrowings from Albert, to the point that, as E.L.J. Poortman remarked, modern standards would consider it close to plagiarism.28 However, Poortman judged it would be unjust to charge Peter with plagiarism, not merely because the mediaeval understanding of authorship cannot be understood using modern categories (although even then, critical consciousness on the subject was not lacking), but because of the different goals the two authors were following in writing. If one wishes, nonetheless, to make comparisons, then Albert appears as an intellectual giant, who in Poortman’s view is a more than equal counterpart to Peter.29 Can this assessment be confirmed and generalised by a comparison of the authors’ other works? With this question in mind, let us turn to the two forms of commentary on ‘De Caelo’ by Albert the Great and Peter of Auvergne, namely the question and the paraphrase or word commentary.

II. The Celestial Treatise in the ‘De IV coaequaevis’ of Albert the Great and the ‘Quaestiones supra librum De caelo et mundo’ of Peter of Auvergne 1. Scholarship has, up to now, rarely recognised that Albert’s early work ‘De IV coaequaevis’, was said in the uncritical editions to contain the ‘Summa

28 Poortman (note 23), pp. XIV, XIX. 29 Ibid., p. XXII: “What is clear, however, is that as regards originality and depth the ‘Sententia super librum De vegetabilibus et plantis’ of Petrus de Alvernia does not bear comparison with the commentary of Albert the Great – which outshines all other commentaries on the ‘De plantis’ anyhow. In intellectual superiority and erudition Albert was more than a match for Petrus.”

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de creaturis pars I’, questions on the heavens.30 As most of these questions are based on Aristotle’s ‘De Caelo’, they offer a unique parallel question commentary on that work, one of the earliest commentaries on it. In this part of his early work, Albert sketches out the first draft of his natural philosophical descriptions of the heavens, within the framework of a philosophical-theological synthesis discussing four created ur-realities – primal matter, time, the heavens and angels – on the basis of ‘De Caelo’. The philosophical questions inspired by Aristotle thus become an explicatory element of the teaching of creation found in biblical revelation. What inspired Albert to make a theological adaptation of Aristotle’s teachings on the heavens and to evolve a totally novel, philosophically based and complete theory of the astronomy? Which questions did he discuss in his treatment of Aristotle’s ‘De Caelo’ in this early work? Albert may have been inspired to look at the four coaequaeva in the context of the doctrine of creation by Philipp the Chancellor’s ‘Summa de bono’ or Alexander of Hales’ ‘Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi’. In both works, which were important resources in the first phases of his academic work, he found useful terminology, derived from Peter Lombard’s ‘Sententiae’ (Book II, d. 2, c. 2) and the ‘Glossa ordinaria on Genesis’ (1:1).31 Albert’s originality consisted in his approach to the question, which he, unlike his predecessors, turned into a philosophicaltheological synthesis based on the one hand on the Biblical doctrine of Creation, and on the other on the physics and cosmology of Aristotle. He discussed the term “heavens”,32 which had up until then been primarily used

30 Albert the Great, De IV coaequaevis, tr. 3, q. 7–18 (note 6), pp. 395–452. On the dating of the work, cf. Rigo, Caterina, Zur Redaktionsfrage der Frühschriften des Albertus Magnus, in: Albertus Magnus und die Anfänge der Aristoteles-Rezeption im lateinischen Mittelalter, Eds. Honnefelder, Ludger et alii (Subsidia Albertina I), Münster 2005, pp. 325–374, here 347–355. 31 Philippus Cancellarius, Summa de bono, Ed. Wicki, Niklaus, Bern 1985, p. 130, v. 2–3; Alexander de Hales, Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, l. 2, d. 12 and 13, Ed. PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae (Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi 13), Quaracchi 1952, p. 124, v. 30–31, p. 127, v. 6–7; cf. Alexander de Hales, Summa theologica II, n. 70, Ed. PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, Quaracchi 1928, pp. 93a (g), 93b (n. 8); Gilson, Etienne, Les ‘coaequeva’, in: Medioevo e rinascimento. Studi in onore di Bruno Nardi, vol. 1, Firenze 1955, pp. 375–384. 32 Cf. Alexander de Hales, Summa theologica II, n. 253, pp. 316–317, n. 266–270, pp. 327a–331b.

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with a focus on its theological meaning, in a broader perspective which for the first time drew in significant material from the natural philosophy of Aristotle.33 However, Albert did not follow the Philosopher’s ‘De Caelo’ so closely as to write his treatise as a question commentary in the strict sense. For this reason, we can dispense with a list of all the questions on the heavens which he discussed under the heading ‘De tertio coaequaevo, quod secundum Glossam est caelum empyreum’34 (they are included in the appendix). Instead, we will concentrate on a few of them, those which correspond in their content and are thus comparable to Peter of Auvergne’s ‘Quaestiones supra librum De caelo et mundo’. They deal with themes which Aristotle considers in Book I and II of ‘De Caelo’. They include, as the following synopsis will show, questions on the identity or difference of matter in the super- and sublunary world, the origins and transitory nature of the heavens, the different condition of its parts (above/below, right/left, before/behind), the First Mover, and the simple motion of the heavens.

33 Albert the Great, De IV coaequaevis, tr. 3, q. 7 (note 6), p. 395: Deinde quaeritur de tertio coaequaevo, quod secundum Glossam est caelum empyreum. Gratia cujus quaeritur de natura corporis coelestis. Et quaeratur primo, De natura ejus in se. Secundo, De partibus ejus. Tertio, De motore ipsius. Quarto, De motibus. Quinto, De effectu ejus in inferioribus. 34 According to the Ms. Oxford, Merton College O.1.7 (283), f. 7va; the (uncritica) printed edition of Borgnet offers the heading De tertio coaequaevo, scilicet de coelo empyreo, et aliis coelis, et stellis. Albert the Great, De IV coaequaevis, tr. 3 (note 6), p. 395.

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Albert the Great, De IV coaeq. tr. 3, Ed. Peter of Auvergne, Quaestiones supra Borgnet, Steph. Caes. Aug., Paris 1895: librum De caelo, Ed. Galle, Griet, Leuven 2003: Utrum coelum cum elementis sit ejusdem naturae, vel sit essentia distincta ab essentiis quatuor elementorum, q. 7, a. 1, pp. 396a–399a;

Utrum corpus caeleste sit alterius rationis a corporibus existentibus sub luna, I, q. 11, pp. 64–68;

Utrum sit generabile et corruptibile, q. 7, a. 2, pp. 399a–403a;

Utrum caelum sit genitum et corruptible, l. I, q. 15, pp. 84–92; Utrum caelum sit corruptibile, II, q. 21, pp. 207–208;

De partibus orbis, quae sunt principia dimensionis suae in omnibus orbibus, scilicet longitudinis orbis et latitudinis et profunditatis, quae sunt sursum et deorsum et dextrum et sinistrum et ante et retro, q. 8, a. 1, pp. 408a–412a;

Utrum istae differentiae positionis sursum, deorsum, ante, retro, dextrum et sinistrum per se inveniantur in omnibus corporibus, II, q. 1, pp. 149–150; Utrum in omnibus animatis inveniantur istae differentiae positionis, II, q. 2, pp. 151–152;

De ante et retro coeli, q. 8, a. 2, pp. 412a–413a; De sursum et deorsum coeli, q. 8, a. 3, pp. 413a–414b;

Utrum sursum et deorsum sint priora aliis differentiis positionis, II, q. 3, p. 153; Utrum istae differentiae positionis, sursum, deorsum, ante, retro, dextrum et sinistrum, sint in ipso caelo, II, q. 4, pp. 154–157;

Utrum motor primus sit deus, q. 16, a. 1, pp. 436a–439a; Utrum motor ille qui est intra, et non est divisibilis secundum quantitatem mobilis, sit anima coeli, vel non, q. 16, a. 2, pp. 439b–446a; De comparatione motoris primi ad motores inferiores, q. 16, a. 3, pp. 446a–447b;

Consequenter, cum dicit Aristoteles quod motor primus est immaterialis et non est virtus in magnitudine nec multiplicatur secundum speciem, ideo quaeritur utrum motor primus est omnino immaterialis, I, q. 27, pp. 138–140;

De simplicitate motus superiorum, q. 17, a. 1, pp. 447a–448b.

Utrum sit ponere motum simplicem, sicut tangitur in littera, I, q. 8, pp. 53–57; Utrum motus simplex sit simplicis corporis, I, q. 9, pp. 58–60.

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After a comparison of the first corresponding texts, we can draw the preliminary conclusion that while both authors follow Aristotle in offering the same answers, their argumentation and choice of sources corresponds only at a few points. It is noticeable that Albert uses both theological sources (Basilius ‘Glossa ordinaria Bibliae’) as well as, not only ‘De Caelo’ and other writings of Aristotle (‘De generatione et corruptione’, ‘De anima’, ‘Physica’), but also philosophical authorities, including Plato, Macrobius and Boethius. Peter, by contrast, confines himself exclusively to philosophical sources. He cites by name Aristotle (‘De Caelo’, as the text commented on, and two other texts, ‘Physica’ and ‘Metaphysica’), as well as Plato, Averroes (‘De substantia orbis’) and Simplicius (‘In De Caelo’). There is nothing in the composition of the question to suggest that Peter knew and used material from Albert’s treatment of the matter. An examination of Peter’s and Albert’s texts on the question of whether the heavens have an origin and are transitory reveals a similar picture. Albert’s starting point is the account of creation in Genesis, the Creed, and the Boethian understanding of “becoming” (generatio) as “entering into substantial being” (ingressus in esse substantiale).35 Thus, his starting point is that the heavens are created. He further argues, building on Aristotle’s ‘De Caelo’, that though the heavens are described as always existing (res semper existens), they are a work of nature and thus created. He supports this assertion with the evidence that the heavens are subject to change, as can be seen by the variable shape and position of the moon. Theological and philosophical authorities such as Gregory the Great and Plato testified that everything was created simultaneously in the form of an unordered mass, apparently of the same matter, and was equally mutable. Therefore the heavens too are created and finite, and according to Plato originated from the first matter (hyle), and existing eternally only because of the will of their Originator. The view that the heavens “become” is contradicted, according to Albert, by several philosophical arguments, which seem to carry even more weight given that they are taken from the Aristotelian works ‘Metaphysica’, ‘Physica’, and not least ‘De Caelo’. But as Albert shows, even these can be countered philosophically using Aristotle’s teachings on the heavens. He cites John Philoponus, who built upon the Philosopher’s statement that the heavens were not infinite the argument that the possible existence of the heavens was finite and thus the heavens too are not eternal. 35 Here and on the following: Albert the Great, De IV coaequaevis, tr. 3, q. 7, a. 2 (note 6), pp. 399a–403a.

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Albert saw the key to this theologically explosive and philosophically seemingly aporetic question as lying in a clarification of the terms of becoming and corruption (generatio and corruptio), which he gives a twofold sense. If we understand “becoming” in the sense of beginning to exist following a state of non-existence, then creation should be understood as generation and in this sense the heavens become.36 “Becoming” in the second sense means a transformation of matter into a substantial form due to the influence and effect of opposing characteristics which alter matter.37 In this sense, for Albert, the heavens do not “become”. Albert interprets corruption (corruptio) in an analogous manner: on the one hand as “ceasing to exist” (cessatio ab esse) – in this sense, through God’s will, all created reality could cease to exist, but some of it will not, such as the heavens, the angels, etc.38 On the other hand he interprets “corruption” as a transition from one state of being to another, where the same matter remains in existence in the being and non-being of its form. Only in the latter sense are the heavens eternal and, as a philosopher, Albert was only interested in the eternity of the heavens in this sense. This, as it were, weaker kind of eternity according to this interpretation of the immutability of the heavens, only applies to its substantial and accidental forms, which they posses due to the absence of contradictory characteristics.39

36 Albert the Great, De IV coaequaevis, tr. 3, q. 7, a. 2 (note 6), p. 401a: est enim generatio inceptio esse post non esse quoquo modo: et sic creatio est generatio, et sic coelum est generatum. 37 Ibid.: Dicitur etiam generatio transmutatio materiae ad formam substantialem per actionem et passionem contrariarum qualitatum alterantium materiam. 38 Ibid., p. 401a: Similiter corruptio duobus modis dicitur, scilicet cessatio ab esse quoquo modo: et sic omnia creata sunt corruptibilia voluntate divina: tamen quaedam eorum non corrumpuntur, sicut coelum, et Angeli, et quaedam alia. 39 Ibid.: Dicitur etiam corruptio transmutatio ab esse per actionem et passionem contrariarum qualitatum alterantium substantiam, remanente materia eadem numero sub esse et non esse ipsius formae: et hac ratione non est coelum corruptibile: et secundum hunc modum loquuntur Philosophi dicentes coelum esse perpetuum vel aeternum, nihil aliud intelligentes per perpetuitatem illam vel aeternitatem nisi intransmutabilitatem secundum formas substantiales et accidentales causatam ex privatione contrariarum qualitatum agentium et patientium in ipso.

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2. How then does Peter of Auvergne proceed in his discussion of the question as to whether the heavens become and are transitory?40 As can be shown from his introductory question, and the manner in which the follow-up integrates the Aristotelian standpoint, Peter was primarily interested in the interpretation of the text philosophically, and not – unlike Albert – in providing philosophical support for a theologically motivated and ultimately theological position. He quotes Aristotle: quaeritur utrum caelum sit genitum et corruptibile, quod pro eodem habet Philosophus.41 He backs up the theory that the heavens were generated and thus are corruptible, (genitum et corruptibile) with arguments from John Philoponus, Aristotle (‘Physica’ and ‘De generatione’) and Plato (‘Timaeus’), as well as a further argument from reason, which he probably thought out himself. He supports the antithesis, that of the eternity and the immutability of the heavens with three arguments, one of which is drawn from Simplicius.42 He begins his resolution from the same point as Albert, proceeding from two distinct meanings of “becoming”, which in terms of content are identical to those of Albert. In the first sense, something has become if it receives its subsistence from another, but not through a transition from one thing to another, and not through a motion, but without intermediary. In this sense the heavens, like a propria passio, are brought into being.43 The other 40 Peter of Auvergne, Quaestiones supra librum ‘De caelo’, l. 1, q. 15 (note 1), p. 84, v. 1 – p. 92, v. 188. Peter touches on two aspect of the question of the transitoriness of the heavens, which Alexander of Aphrodisias had derived from its contrary characteristics (constistency and colour) in book II of the quaestiones commentary, q. 21, pp. 207–208. In it, he follows Simplicius and Thomas Aquinas (‘In De caelo’). 41 Peter of Auvergne, ibid., l. 1, q. 15, p. 84, v. 1–2. 42 Later in Book II, q. 21, Peter again follows Simplicius in rejecting contrary characteristics of the heavens, and thus a natural cause of transitoriness; cf. note 40. 43 Peter of Auvergne, Quaestiones supra librum ‘De caelo’, l. 1, q. 15 (note 1), p. 85, v. 33–37: Intelligendum quod, cum generatum et genitum multipliciter dicantur, quantum est ad propositum, dicuntur duobus modis. Uno modo dicitur aliquid genitum quia habet aliquid a quo subsistentiam sui esse habet, non autem per transmutationem, sed sine transmutatione simpliciter. Ibid., p. 86, v. 58 – p. 87, v. 66: Si autem loquamur de generatione secundum quod dicit subsistentiam in esse recipere ab alio, sic caelum est genitum, non autem per motum, nec per transmutationem, sed sicut propria passio, quae immediate sine transmutatione ex consequenti in subiecto producitur in esse, sicut patet de habere tres respectu trianguli et de risibili respectu hominis. Sic autem caelum

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meaning of the term “becoming,” according to Peter, is a transition from something pre-existent to another form of being. In this sense, the heavens neither “became” nor can suffer corruption, but are eternal.44 The heavens did not originate in physical processes such as transformation (transmutatio) or change (alteratio) resulting from motion, because the primal, localised motion is the motion of the heavens. Peter believed that this solution did justice not only to the arguments of Aristotle and Averroes, but also to the intentions of Aristotle and Plato.45 The philosophical exploration of the generation and corruption of the heavens begins with the concept of generation in the sense of the reception of subsistence, and is clearly inspired by the Neoplatonists. The starting point is Proclus’ concept of participation,46 which is harmonised with the cosmological and metaphysical doctrines of Aristotle and Averroes, and deemed to be in harmony with Plato’s views, as well as those of theologians.47 Peter also pays some attention to the theological standpoint, in that he describes and explores the difference between the positions of Aristotle and the theologians (theologi doctores fidei) with regard to the origins of the heavens. Again like Albert, Peter handles the corruptibility of the heavens by analogy with the question of their origins, which he had previously discussed in the sense of reception of subsistence. His views are based on the Aristotelian pattern, but contain platonic or neo-platonic elements conformable with theology, which are inspired by Plato’s ‘Timaeus’, and possibly

44

45 46 47

est genitum, quod ut sic est possibile; omne possibile ex ente necessario suum participat; et quia caelum non est necessarium ut sit quin causam habeat, ideo ex se ipso subsistentiam sui esse non habet. Peter of Auvergne, Quaestiones supra librum ‘De caelo’, l. 1, q. 15 (note 1), p. 85, v. 37 – p. 86, v. 42: Alio autem modo dicitur genitum quod sumit suum esse per transmutationem cui etiam aliquid praeexistit a quo fit, sicut in generatione alicuius individui particularis hic inferius praeexistit materia in qua nata est ipsa forma introduci per transmutationem agentis. Et isto modo sumendo generationem, caelum non est generatum nec corruptibile. Ibid., p. 86, v. 42–57. Ibid., p. 87, v. 67–69: Unde dicit Proclus quod omnis multitudo aliqualiter participat uno quod est primum et causa omnium et in esse quorundam et in fieri, quorundam autem tantum in esse. Ibid., p. 87, v. 69–79.

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by the ‘Liber de causis’ or Proclus.48 Omitting discussion of the individual arguments which follow from the solution, the key point which remains is that while Peter predominately uses Aristotle and the philosophers in his tradition, including Simplicius and Averroes, that is not the whole story. It is characteristic that he systematically expands this tradition by co-opting Plato and Proclus. This brings him very close to the theologians. Is this where the justification for, and meaning of, the synthesis of philosophical traditions that both Peter and Albert were aimed? And does his willingness to consider the positions of the theologians not speak for this? Looked at from the perspective of Albert’s early works, this question seems trivial – the Universal Doctor was in any case concerned with a harmonisation of philosophy and theology, and a return of natural philosophy to the theological doctrine of creation.49 By contrast, Peter, the professor of philosophy who worked at the University of Paris at a time of repeated condemnations of philosophical teachings, was required, no matter what his views of the relationship between philosophy and theology, to obey the decretal of the Bishop of Paris, which among other things demanded that “a philosopher too is required to make reason obey faith.”50 As far as Albert goes, it should be stressed that as a theologian he was not merely concerned with obeying this command – which is in origin Pauline –51 but also with reason. He did not flee to the apparently safe ground of revelation in difficult philosophical questions, but looked for solutions which

48 Peter of Auvergne, Quaestiones supra librum ‘De caelo’, l. 1, q. 15 (note 1), p. 88, v. 97 – p. 89, v. 108. Cf. ‘Liber de causis’ § 1, Ed. Pattin, Adriaan, Leuven 1966, p. 46, v. 1ff. Albert the Great, Summa theologiae, l. 1, pars 1, Ed. Siedler, Dionysius, Kübel, Wilhelm and Vogels, Heinz-Jürgen (Opera Omnia XXXIV/1), Münster 1978, p. 195, v. 55–57, p. 197, v. 19–21; ibid., p. 122, v. 56–58: dicit Gregorius, quod 122 omnia in nihilum tenderent, si ea manus omnipotentis non contineret. 49 Cf. Albert the Great, De IV coaequaevis, tr. 3, q. 16, a. 2 (note 6), p. 443a–b, p. 445b; id., II Sent., d. 14, a. 6, Ed. Borgnet, Auguste (Opera Omnia XXVII), Paris 1894, p. 266b. Anzulewicz, Henryk, Zwischen Faszination und Ablehnung: Theologie und Philosophie im 13. Jahrhundert in ihrem Verhältnis zueinander, in: What is Theology in the Middle Ages?, Ed. Olszewski, Mikolaj (Archa Verbi. Subsidia I), Münster 2007, pp. 129–165, here 150–151. 50 Cf. Piché, David, La condamnation Parisienne de 1277, Paris 1999, p. 84, note 18: etiam philosophus debet captivare intellectum in obsequium fidei; ibid., p. 313, note 2. 51 Cf. 2 Cor 10:5.

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met the criteria of rationality.52 He did not view all the philosophical questions handled in the section on the heavens in ‘De IV coaequaevis’ as directly or equally theologically relevant. Hence it is unsurprising that his discussion of the distinction between parts of the heavens, its form and motions, are primarily based on philosophical sources and arguments, which form the basis for his position. The background in the history of ideas which he sketches out, and the resulting systematic discussion do partly overlap with the teaching of Peter, particularly with regard to Aristotle and Averroes, as well as a few other sources, such as Plato, Ptolemy, the ‘Liber de causis’, Avicenna, Alpetragius and Moses Maimonides. This results in a few points where there is a certain, at times astonishing, convergence of teaching in both authors.53 However, Albert’s questions on the heavens are, despite their selective character, more complex and significant than Peter’s ‘Quaestiones supra librum De caelo et mundo’, though that book, composed about forty years later, explored all four books of the Aristotelian work, and drew on the relevant commentaries.54

52 Cf. Albert the Great, De XV problematibus I, Ed. Geyer, Bernhard (Opera Omnia XVII/1), Münster 1975, p. 31, v. 42–49: Loquimur enim hic de cognitione, quae est per philosophiam, et non de ea quae est secundum fidem et secundum theologiam. Quae quamvis omnibus certior sit, tamen, quia a multis non capitur, ideo putatur difficultates velle evadere, qui ad theologiam se confert. Ideo ex intimis philosophiae rationes assumentes de natura intellectus loquentes de intellectu loquemur. Jorissen, Hans, Der Beitrag Alberts des Großen zur theologischen Rezeption des Aristoteles am Beispiel der Transsubstantiationslehre (Lectio Albertina 5), Münster 2002, pp. 8–9. 53 One example of a noticeable, point-for-point convergence of content is the explanation of dextrum and sinistrum: Albert the Great, De IV coaequaevis, q. 8, a. 1 (note 6), pp. 411b–412a. Peter of Auvergne, Quaestiones supra librum ‘De caelo’, l. 2, q. 1 (note 1), pp. 149–150. Something similar can be observed in the discussion of the direction of movement of the celestial spheres and the manner in which Albert and Peter give the views of Aristotle and Alpetragius: Albert the Great, De IV coaequaevis, q. 8, a. 1 (note 6), p. 409a (Sed contra), p. 411b; Peter of Auvergne, Quaestiones supra librum ‘De caelo’, l. 2, q. 7 (note 1), p. 164, v. 16 – p. 165, v. 25. 54 On the dating of Peter’s question commentary, cf. Galle, Griet, The Set of Questions in ‘De caelo’ in the Mss. Leipzig, Universitätsbibl. 1386, ff. 91va– 102vb and Praha, Knihovny Metropolitní 1320 (L. LXXIV), ff. 43rb–52va attributed to Peter of Auvergne. Its Autorship, Date and Relation to others Sets of Questions attributed to Peter of Auvergne, in: Il commento filosofico

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Using this first comparative overview of Albert the Great’s questions on the heavens and Peter’s question commentary on ‘De Caelo’, we can eliminate the possibility of a reception of Albert’s text by Peter. Peter had, apparently, used the Universal Doctor’s word commentary ‘De Caelo et mundo’ and some of his other Aristotle commentaries – ‘De natura loci’, ‘De causis proprietatum elementorum’, ‘Meteora’ and ‘Quaestiones super De animalibus’ – in preparing his own commentary. This is evident from the many parallels with Albert which Griet Galle has demonstrated and recorded in the apparatus of her edition of Peter. They differ quite considerably in terms of form and content, and thus their significance is variable. Some of them deliver identical factual information, others have recourse to the same sources, while in others there is indirect reference to other authors or texts (e.g. dixerunt alii/antiqui/quidam/omnes expositores). Such sections of Peter are highly significant, and their parallels with Albert are not directly related to the interpretation of Aristotle, but come from his characteristic excurses, sometimes short, and sometimes long chapters inserted into the paraphrases which go far beyond Aristotle in their content. One such digression, in which Albert discusses the question whether the light of the stars comes from the sun, as they have no light of their own,55 was the chief inspiration for two of Peter’s questions: once in Book II, q. 37 and again at the end of the work, in the appendix to the last question of Book IV.56 This double parallel, in which both content and sources are common to both authors, serves as an example proving both that Peter used Albert’s commentary on ‘De caelo et mundo’ and his other commentaries on Aristotle, and how he did so: he silently appropriated Albert’s digression, but cited Albert’s sources, giving the impression that he had found the sources himself. The true extent of Albert’s influence on Peter and other authors who are among the unnamed sources of his two commentaries on ‘De Caelo’, nell’occidente latino (secoli XIII–XV), Ed. Fioravanti, Gianfranco, Leonardi, Claudio and Perfetti, Stefano (Rencontres de Philosophie Médiévale 10), Turnhout 2002, pp. 253–309, here 255. On the date of Alberts work, cf. note 30. 55 Albert the Great, De caelo et mundo, l. 2, tr. 3, c. 6 (note 25), p. 53, v. 28 – p. 155, v. 6: Et est digressio declarans, qualiter stellae omnes illuminantur a sole; ibid., c. 5, p. 151, v. 67–78. 56 Peter of Auvergne, Quaestiones supra librum ‘De caelo’, l. 2, q. 37 (note 1), pp. 272–273: Est autem intelligendum quod omnes stellae lumen a sole suscipiunt; ibid., [additamentum ad, l. 4, q. 9], pp. 373–376: Quaeritur utrum cornua quae apparent in luna sint ibi secundum veritatem vel secundum apparentiam.

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can hardly be estimated. It is sufficient to mention here his division of the sciences in the question commentary, the natural philosophical elements of which are paralleled in Albert’s commentary on the ‘Physics’,57 and on two phenomena which Peter briefly discusses, the “infectious glance” (infectio per oculos) and “fascination” (fascinatio).58 No scholastic discussed these phenomena, drawn from Aristotle and Avicenna, as often, as thoroughly, as critically, and with such scientific rigour as Albert. 59 The Universal Doctor offered Peter assistance in many questions, particularly on natural history and practical philosophy, on which the Latin authors were either silent or unhelpful. These observations have already, rightly, been made by Gundisalvus M. Grech and Lidia Lanza in their studies of the political

57 Peter of Auvergne, Quaestiones supra librum ‘De caelo’, l. 2, q. 37 (note 1), prooem., p. 16, v. 233 – p. 20, v. 321. Cf. Albert the Great, Physica, l. 1, tr. 1, c. 4, Ed. Hoßfeld, Paul (Opera Omnia IV/1), Münster 1987, pp. 6–8. 58 Cf. Peter of Auvergne, Quaestiones supra librum ‘De caelo’, l. 3, q. 6 (note 1), p. 311, v. 24 – p. 312, v. 59. 59 Albert treats them in several of his works, beginning with his early anthropological work ‘De homine’ and the sentence commentary (book II) on the ‘Mineralia’, ‘De anima’, ‘De sensu et sensato’, ‘De intellectu et intelligibili’, ‘De somno et vigilia’ (Book III), ‘De motibus animalium’, ‘De fato’, ‘Quaestiones super De animalibus’ and ‘De animalibus’, ‘Metaphysica’ and ‘De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa’ up to ‘Summa theologiae’ I. Cf. Palazzo, Alessandro, Albert the Great’s doctrine of fascination in the context of his philosophical system, in: Via Alberti. Texte Quellen Interpretationen, Eds. Honnefelder, Ludger, Möhle, Hannes and Bullido del Bario, Susana (Subsidia Albertina 2), Münster 2009, pp. 135–214. With regard to this study, it should be remarked that Albert explains the natural processuality of both phenomena, the oculus menstruatae and oculus fascinationis in the same way. However, he does not equate the fascinator with the philosopher, but speaks of a phenomenon, a knowledge, a conjectural science and a capacity which some exceptional men acquire or posses from their birth. A man who understands and can exploit this phenomenon, resembles, for Albert, a magician (magus proprie vir magnus est, qui scientiam habens de omnibus, ex naturis et effectibus naturarum coniecturans, aliquando mirabilia naturae praeostendit et educit: Albert the Great, Super Matthaeum, Ed. Schmidt, Bernhard (Opera Omnia XXI/1), Münster 1987, p. 46, v. 23–26). Albert also keeps the shadow side of fascinatio, its dark, negative and obstructive effects, and thus achieves a comprehensive portrayal, which makes its ambivalence clear.

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commentary,60 and by Pieter De Leemans in his work on Peters’ commentary on ‘De motu animalium’.61 It is thus already established that Peter used the possibilities open to him, and we will confirm this in what follows, with an examination of his ‘Expositio in libros III–IV de caelo et mundo’. However, as has already been said, it is probably no longer possible to deduce from his works how strongly he was inspired by Albert, and how far he allowed himself to be led, with any precision.

III. On the trail of a subtle reception: Albert in the ‘Expositio in libros III–IV de caelo et mundo’ of Peter of Auvergne In the critical edition of the fragments of Peter’s ‘Expositio in librum De caelo et mundo’ III, 1 –362 there are, on a first or on a more detailed examination, no significant similarities with the equivalent passages in Albert’s paraphrase of the ‘De caelo et mundo’. Although the brief explanation of how the phenomenon of infectio speculi, allegedly caused by the glance of a menstruating women, might have been inspired by Albert, as is suggested by parallels in his ‘Quaestiones super De animalibus’, but the matter is not considered at all in Albert’s ‘De caelo et mundo’ commentary.63 Consequently we can assume that Peter used other material in his attempts to understand the text, and in making his commentary. These include, as well

60 Cf. Grech, Gundisalvus M., The Commentary of Peter of Auvergne on Aristotle’s ‘Politics’. The Inedited Part: Book III, less. I–IV, Roma 1967, pp. 57, 60; Lanza, Lidia, Aspetti della ricezione della ‘Politica’ aristotelica nel XIII secolo: Pietro d’Alvernia, in: Studi Medievali 35 (1994), pp. 643–694. 61 Cf. De Leemans, Pieter, Peter of Auvergne on Aristotle’s ‘De motu animalium’ and the Ms. Oxford, Merton College 275, in: AHDL 71 (2004), pp. 129– 202, esp. 132–133, 157, 167–168, 178, note 92; id., Peter of Auvergne on the Question Utrum Intellectus sit movens animalia, in: Intellect et imagination dans la Pilosophie Médiévale, vol. 3, Eds. Pacheco, Maria C. and Meirinhos, José F. (Rencontres de Philosophie Médiévale 11), Turnhout 2006, pp. 1477– 1489, here 1481. 62 Peter of Auvergne, Expositio in librum De caelo et mundo III, 1–3. Excerpta (Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine 3484, fols. 245rb–268rb), Ed. Galle (note 1), pp. 561–574. 63 Peter of Auvergne, ibid., III, 3, lect. 8, p. 573, v. 321 – p. 574, v. 333.

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as a number of writings from the Aristotelian corpus, the commentaries of Simplicius, Averroes, and Thomas Aquinas. However, we find a much more differentiated picture, unlike the one sketched above, when we compare Books III–IV of his ‘Expositio’, the conclusion of Aquinas’ commentary on ‘De caelo et mundo’,with Albert’s paraphrase.64 The first point, immediately noticeable, is that Peter’s Expositio (from Book III 3 209b10, the middle of lectio 8)65 is the formal and methodological continuity with the preceding books of Aquinas’ commentary. Like Thomas, he begins each interpretation by giving the lemma of the section to be explained, and with a structure of its contents, which gives the sequence the commentary follows. The vocabulary used in this introductory procedure is also very close to that used by Thomas. These elements are largely absent, in Albert’s commentary, which consists of a paraphrase interrupted by shorter or longer digressions; where they appear it is in rudimentary form, generally repeating the information given in the sources. They are not given as a precise, but from the position of the first person, that is they are given as if relating to and originating from the author of the paraphrase. Two further differences, dictated by chronology, between Albert’s and Peter’s commentaries should also be mentioned. The first is philological, but has philosophical consequences resulting from the respective translations the authors were using. While Albert chiefly used Gerard of Cremona’s translation of ‘De Caelo’ from the Arabic, with occasional reference to the more recent one by Michael Scot,66 Peter, like Thomas before him, was able to use William of Moerbeke’s translation from the original Greek. Peter may, like Thomas, have preferred to use the translatio Guillelmi,67 but he had all three translations available, and he clearly used them all. This was done on the one hand through the use of Averroes’ ‘De Caelo’ commentary, on which was based the translatio Michaelis, and which is transmitted with that commentary in the codices, and on the other through his use of older Latin commentaries based on the corpus vetustius, which relied on the

64 Peter’s commentary is found in the (uncritical) complete edition of Thomas Aquinas: Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia, vol. 23, Ed. Fretté, Stanislas E., Paris 1875, pp. 222–266. 65 Peter of Auvergne, Expositio in libros III–IV De caelo et mundo (note 64), p. 222b. 66 Cf. Hoßfeld, Paul, Prolegomena, in: Albert the Great, De caelo et mundo (note 25), pp. V–VII (§ 2); Opelt, Ilona, Prolegomena, in: ibid., pp. XIV–XVII (§ 7). 67 Cf. Hoßfeld, ibid. (note 66), p. VI, v. 27–29.

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translations of Gerard and/or Michael Scot from the Arabic.68 As mentioned above, these included Albert’s paraphrase. The manner in which Peter used him will be shown here by one significant example, supplemented by further cases which can only be described briefly. Peter’s ‘Expositio’ begins midway through Lectio of Thomas’ commentary on ‘De Caelo’ – where Thomas broke off –, by giving a lemma and a short description of the contents of the section of text to be explained from the Aristotelian source: Deinde cum dicit ‘utrum autem’, inquirit quot secundum numerum, et qualia sunt (elementa) secundum naturam. The pendant to this in Albert’s paraphrase is the beginning of the second chapter of Book III, tr. 2. Albert introduces this chapter with the heading Utrum sint elementa infinita, sicut dixerunt Anaxagoras et Democritus. There follows, as is characteristic for Albert’s commentary, a statement paraphrasing the Aristotelian source, which in places is word-for-word the same as Peter’s (direct or near direct quotations from Aristotle are given in italics in the edition): His autem habitis intendentibus nobis de numero elementorum et substantia prius occurrit quaerendum, an elementa sint infinita, quemadmodum dixerunt Anaxagoras et Democritus et alii quidam. Et consideremus primo hoc [...].69 The equivalencies we can observe in content and vocabulary in Peter and Albert can admittedly primarily be explained by the use of direct quotation of Aristotle, and, as can be seen again and again, through fact that both interpreters used Averroes’ commentary. But it must also be considered that Peter’s interpretation primarily used the Moerbeke translation, though taking over the readings of the corpus vetustius on the one hand from Averroes commentary, on which is based the translatio Michaelis, and on the other from the earlier commentaries based on the corpus vetustius, to which the paraphrase of Albert the Great belongs, which chiefly used 68 Cf. Dod, Bernard G., Aristoteles latinus, in: The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy from the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism 1100–1600, Eds. Kretzmann, Norman et alii, Cambridge 1982 (Reprint 1996), pp. 45–79, here 75; Lohr, Charles H., The new Aristotle and ‘science’ in the Paris arts faculty (1255), in: L’enseignement des disciplines à la Faculté des arts (Paris et Oxford, XIIIe–XVe siècles), Eds. Weijers, Olga and Holtz, Louis (Studia Artistarum 4), Turnhout 1997, pp. 251–269, here 256–258; Endress, Gerhard, Preface, in: Averroes Cordubensis, Commentum magnum super libro De celo et mundo Aristotelis, ex recognitione Francis J. Carmody, Ed. Arnzen, Rüdiger, vol. I (Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales. Bibliotheca 4.1.1), Leuven 2003, pp. 11*–42*, here 16*–23*. 69 Albert the Great, De caelo et mundo, l. 3, tr. 2, c. 2 (note 25), p. 221, v. 32–38.

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the translatio Gerhardi and occasionally the Averroes commentary, which transmitted the translatio Michaelis. Whether or not Peter’s commentary was in this instance really exhibiting similarities with Albert and the Averroes commentary both men used, or if it in fact highlights their differences, can be seen in the following synopsis: Albert the Great, De caelo et mundo, l. III, tr. 2, c. 2 (p. 221, v. 34–39):

Peter of Auvergne, Expositio in libros III–IV De caelo et mundo, l. III, lect. 8 (p. 222b):

Cap. 2. Utrum sint elementa infinita, sicut dixerunt Anaxagoras et Democritus

Deinde cum dicit ‘utrum autem’, inquirit quot sunt secundum numerum, et qualia sunt secundum naturam. Et quoniam alii aliter opinabatur, narrat in isto tertio opiniones aliorum, et reprobat pauca determinando secundum intentionem suam: quot autem sint secundum veritatem, et qualia, magis determinate ostendet in libro ‘De generatione’.

Averroes, Comm. magnum super libro De celo et mundo Arist., l. III, comm. 33 (p. 563, v. 8 – p. 564, v. 15):

Primo ergo inquirit de numero ipsorum. Secundo cum dicit ‘Quoniam autem neque infinita’, ostendit qualia sunt, quoniam generabilia, et quomodo. Crica primum primo praemittit intentionem suam, et ordinem considerandi. Secundo cum dicit, ‘Nullus enim sic’, prosequitur. His autem habitis intendentibus nobis de numero elementorum et substantia prius occurrit quaerendum, an elementa

In prima parte dicit quod ostenso quod sunt elementa, consequens est considerare d e n u m e r o quot sunt, utrum finita vel i n f i n i t a ; et si finita, quot secundum numerum:

Cum ignotus sit numerus elementorum, et fuit necesse ei, qui voluerit perscrutari d e n u m e r o eorum declarare quod non sunt i n f i n i t a ,

130 sint i n f i n i t a , quemadmodum dixerunt A n a x a g o r a s et D e m o c r i t u s et alii q u i d a m . Et consideremus p r i m o hoc q u o d dixit A n a x a g o r a s , qui partes similes infinitas dixit esse e l e m e n t a .

Henryk Anzulewicz et primo considerandum erit, quod non sint infinita, sicut crediderunt q u i d a m , puta A n a x a g o r a s , Democritus et Leucippus. Inter quae p r i m o considerandum erit q u o d non sunt infinita, sicut dixerunt ponentes e l e m e n t a e s s e homiomera, quemadmodum A n a x a g o r a s , et sequentes ipsum.

dixit ‘Sed primo prescrutemur’ etc., idest sed p r i m o perscrutandum est, cum sit perscrutandum de numero eorum, et declarandum est q u o d non sunt infinita, ut d i x i t A n a x a g o r a s , et quia dicentes elementa esse infinita sunt bipartiti, dicentes scilicet partes esse indivisibiles ut Democritus, et dicentes p a r t e s esse consimiles ut Anaxagoras et Leucippus.

The comparison of these first sections of text from Peter’s ‘Expositio’ with the equivalent passage from Alberts’ paraphrase and the Averroes commentary, which had an enormous influence on both authors, admittedly does not prove that Peter is dependent on the Universal Doctor. However, if one continues a line-by-line comparison of the ‘Expositio’ with the paraphrase of Books III and IV, then one encounters breathtaking similarities, which surely can be interpreted as evidence of a subtle reception of Albert in Peter. However, it must be stressed that there are few places in the ‘Expositio’ where a study of them securely proves Peter was drawing on Albert’s paraphrase. To what extent the evidence of such instances, such as those from Book IV, Lectio 2 is convincing, may be judged using the following overview of the texts compared – Peter’s ‘Expositio’, Albert’s paraphrase, and the commentary of Averroes:

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Albert the Great, De caelo et mundo, l. 4, tr. 2, c. 1 (p. 258, v. 57–70)

Peter of Auvergne, Expositio in libros III–IV De caelo et mundo, l. 4, lect. 2 (p. 250b)

Averroes, Comm. magnum super libro De celo et mundo Arist. IV, comm. 22 (p. 693, v. 80 – p. 694, v. 94)

Obicit autem Themistius hic dicens, quod non videtur esse causa id quod pro causa motus ad locum est assignatum. Si enim quis quaerat, quare sanabile sanatur, et respondeatur, quia aptum est sanari vel quia aptum est moveri ad sanitatem, nullam omnino taliter respondens reddidit causam. Et hoc quidem quod obicit Themistius, verum est in compositis, in quibus multa sunt moventia ad sanitatem et multi modi sanationis, sed in simplicibus perfecta est responsio, quia in illis movens non est, nisi unum et unicum habet finem, et ille redditur per aptitudinem moventis vel mobilis, quando quaeritur, quare grave movetur deorsum, et respondetur, quod natum sit moveri in hunc finem.

Opposuit autem Themistius hic contra Aristotelem, dicens quod non videtur esse causa motus gravis et levis quod assignatum est, quia scilicet grave et leve sic nata sunt moveri ad loca sua, sicut ad perfectiones suas. Si enim quaeratur propter quid sanabile sanatur, et respondeatur, quia aptum natum est moveri ad sanitatem, sicut ad perfectionem, non videtur proprie et determinate reddi causa. Respondet Commentator Averrois quod id quod dicit Themistius, veritatem habet in corporibus compositis, in quibus motus est a pluribus motoribus: puta sic sanatio a pluribus causis sanitatis: sed in simplicibus est solutio sufficiens, quia in illis non est nisi unus motor tantum, et unus finis, qui possunt reddi per aptitudinem per se mobilis. Et ideo, cum quaeritur quare grave movetur deorsum, convenienter respondetur, quia sic natum est moveri.

Et quia hoc occultum est de elementis, reprehendit Aristotelem Themistius, dicendo quod qui respondet taliter in his motibus, nullam causam reddit: qui enim dixerit respondendo huic questioni quare homo vadit ad sanitatem Quia habet naturam eundi ad sanitatem et quod sanitas est perfectio eius et quod est sanus in potentia, nullam causam dabit propriam nisi dicat quod natura est causa in hoc, aut sibi similia de causis agentibus sanitatem. Et hoc quod dixit verum est in compositis, non in simplicibus: sanitas enim in homine fit ex pluribus una causa, motus autem in simplicibus non habet tantum nisi unam causam et simplicem. Et cum declaravit quod nature locorum est causa diversitatis istorum motuum inquantum sunt fines et similes, incepit declarare ea loca, scilicet fines secundum perfectionem et formam; et hoc proprium est eis inter omnia mobilia in loco.

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Further comparable parallels in Books III and IV of Peter’s ‘Expositio’ with Albert’s paraphrase, be they terminological or phraseological, or in terms of teaching or of textual similarities, which are genetically significant, may be noted here.70

IV. Concluding Remarks Peter of Auvergne and Albert the Great, both of whom tended to appear in the older historiography in relation to Thomas Aquinas, rather than as figures in their own right, now appear to modern scholars not merely as independent thinkers with their own intellectual identity, but are increasingly seen in the context of the relationships between their works. While they are sometimes characterised as figures of very different magnitude (E.L.J. Poortman), they are nevertheless much closer to each other than was previously thought. Their academic achievements and their resulting significance for the history of ideas, which they earned through their long years of academic teaching and their work in the fields of philosophy, theology and in the case of the Universal Doctor almost all other intellectual fields of the time, will become even more apparent as the critical appraisal and assessment of their works, which has still not been completed, proceeds. Through this, the thus far little known, but increasingly acknowledged apparently fruitful relationship between Peter and the works of Albert can be seen in a clearer light. The intellectual profiles of Peter and Albert continue to grow in sharpness, so that both can now be properly assessed as key elements of the first and second wave of reception and assimilation of the Aristotelian corpus in the thirteenth century Latin West. Historical researchers, however, will still face many challenges in preserving and assessing the work of both these thinkers. 70 Cf. (1) Albert the Great, De caelo et mundo, l. 3, tr. 2, c. 2 (note 25), p. 222, v. 15–25; Peter of Auvergne, Expositio in libros III–IV De caelo et mundo, l. 3, lect. 8 (note 64), p. 223a; Averroes, Commentum magnum super libro De caelo et mundo Arist., l. 3, comm. 36 (note 68), p. 568, v. 4 – p. 569, v. 14; (2) Albert the Great, ibid., l. 3, tr. 2, c. 2, p. 223, v. 61 – p. 224, v. 9; Peter of Auvergne, ibid., l. 3, lect. 8, pp. 223b–224a; Averroes, ibid., l. 3, comm. 40, p. 577, v. 8–25; (3) Albert the Great, ibid., l. 3, tr. 2, c. 4, p. 229, v. 21–25. 75 – p. 230, v. 2; Peter of Auvergne, ibid., l. 3, lect. 10, pp. 228a–b, 229a; Averroes, ibid., l. 3, comm. 52, p. 597, v. 26–29. 35–36, p. 599, v. 102 – p. 600, v. 110; (4) Albert the Great, ibid., l. 4, tr. 2, c. 2, p. 258, v. 75 – p. 259, v. 53; Peter of Auvergne, ibid., l. 4, lect. 2, p. 252a–b; Averroes, ibid., l. 4, comm. 24, p. 702, v. 41 – p. 703, v. 98.

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V. Appendix The treatise on the heavens in Albert the Great ‘De IV coaequaevis’ an Overview of Structure and Content.71 De tertio coaequaevo, quod secundum Glossam est caelum empyreum 1. De natura corporis caelestis in se 1.1. Utrum ipsum cum elementis sit eiusdem naturae et unius vel sit essentia quinta distincta ab essentiis quattuor elementorum 1.2. Utrum sit generabile et corruptibile 1.3. Utrum simplex vel compositum 1.4. Quid secundum diffinitionem 2. De partibus caeli 2.1. Partes communiter determinantes omnes orbes 2.1.1. De partibus orbis, quae sunt principia dimensionis suae in omnibus orbibus, scilicet longitudinis orbis et latitudinis et profunditatis, quae sunt sursum et deorsum et dextrum et sinistrum et ante et retro 2.1.2. De ante et retro in caelo, quae secundum Philosophum sunt principia motus alterationis 2.1.3. De sursum et deorsum in caelo, ut dicit Philosophus 2.2. Pars ut terminus et figura/De figura caeli, utrum sit circularis 2.3. Pars quae dicitur orbis superior vel inferior sicut dicitur caelum empyreum et aequeum et ceterae sphaerae/Partes caeli, quae sunt orbes 2.3.1. De singulis horum caelorum 2.3.1.1. De caelo trinitatis 2.3.1.1.1. An sit corpus 2.3.1.1.2. Si non est corpus, utrum sit idem quod deus 2.3.1.1.3. Quae contineri habeant in caelo trinitatis 2.3.1.1.4. Secundum quam mensuram exaltationis sit elevatum super alios caelos 2.3.1.2. De caelo empyreo

71 Reconstructed using the text as found in Ms. Oxford, Merton College, O.1.7 (283), f. 7va–11rb; Cf. Albert the Great, De IV coaequaevis, tr. 3, q. 7–18 (note 6), pp. 395–452.

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2.3.1.2.1. Utrum sit corpus vel non 2.3.1.2.2. Utrum sit uniforme omnino vel non 2.3.1.2.3. Utrum sit mobile 2.3.1.3. De caelo crystallino sive aqueo 2.3.1.3.1. Quid habeat pro materia et forma 2.3.1.3.2. Utrum sit mobile vel immobile 2.3.1.3.3. Qua necessitate ponatur esse 2.3.1.4. De firmamento et septem sphaeris inferioribus 2.3.2. In communi de eisdem/De caelis VII quos enumerat Rabanus, qui sunt empyreum, aqueum, firmamentum, igneum, olympium, aethereum et aereum 2.4. De partibus quae sunt stellae/De stellis 2.4.1. De lumine et figura stellarum 2.4.2. De motu earum 2.4.3. De qualitatibus earum 3. De motore caeli 3.1. Utrum motor primus sit deus 3.2. Si non est deus, utrum sit anima caeli, vel natura alia 3.3. De comparatione ipsius ad motores inferiores orbium 4. De motibus caeli 4.1. De simplicitate motus superiorum 4.2. De ratione mensurae, secundum quam dicitur mensurare inferiora 5. De effectu motus caeli in inferioribus 5.1. Quis sit effectus motus caeli 5.2. Quis sit finis motus caeli

Peter of Auvergne and the Quaestiones on ‘De caelo’ in the Ms. Escorial, Biblioteca del Monasterio h. II 1, ff. 106ra–129vb Cesare A. Musatti (Rome)

The manuscript Escorial, h. II. 1 is rather well known among modern scholars, especially by those who are interested in the figure of Henry of Ghent. Besides many other works,1 this manuscript includes three commentaries on Aristotle (‘Metaphysics’, ‘De caelo’ and ‘Meteorology’), and one on the pseudo-Aristotelian ‘De Causis’.2 While the commentary on ‘Metaphysics’ has been ascribed by a modern hand to Henry of Ghent, an attribution still questioned by scholars,3 the three other texts are anonymous.4 1 2

3

4

For example some Opuscula and Aristotelian commentaries of Thomas Aquinas, and two works (‘De unitate intellectus’, ‘Quodlibet disputatum in capitulo generali Paduae’) of Giles of Rome. All the four commentaries are incomplete. The commentary on ‘De causis’ follows (f. 74ra–89va) immediately after that on ‘Metaphysics’ (f. 1ra–73rb), just as the commentary on ‘Meteora’ (f. 130ra–177ra) comes after that of ‘De caelo’ (f. 106ra–129vb). So far only the commentary on ‘De causis’ has been published: Les Quaestiones in librum De causis attribuées à Henri de Gand, Ed. Zwaenepoel, John P. (Philosophes Médiévaux 15), Louvain/Paris 1974. For a complete description of the manuscript see Macken, Raymond, Bibliotheca Manuscripta Henrici de Gandavo I: Introduction – Catalogue A–P (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, Series 2: Henrici de Gandavo Opera Omnia 01), Leuven 1979, pp. 253–259. Porro, Pasquale, Le Quaestiones super Metaphysicam attribuite a Enrico di Gand: elementi per un sondaggio dottrinale, in: Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 13 (2002), pp. 507–602; Pickavé, Martin, Heinrich von Gent über Metaphysik als erste Wissenschaft (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 91), Leiden 2007, pp. 369–374 (Appendix: Zur Authentizität des Metaphysikkommentars in Ms. Escorial h. II. 1). All the three anonymous commentaries have been mentioned as the work of the Pseudo-Henry of Ghent: Weijers, Olga, Le travail intellectuel à la Faculté des arts de Paris: textes et maîtres (ca. 1200–1500) IV. Répertoire des noms

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With respect to their possible authorship, I shall briefly recall that in the Catalogue of Latin manuscripts of the Escorial’s library by Father Antolín, Henry of Ghent was supposed to be the author of all four commentaries.5 Some years later, Martin Grabmann rejected that suggestion, claiming explicitly the Averroistic attitude of the Quaestiones on ‘De caelo’,6 and considering this commentary and that on ‘Meteora’ as written by the same author, who is distinct from the other author (Henry of Ghent?) who discussed the Quaestiones on ‘Metaphysics’ and ‘De causis’.7 Differing with Grabmann, Joannes Duin has considered the Quaestiones on ‘De caelo’ and on ‘Meteora’ as written by two distinct authors.8 Because in this paper I suggest that the Quaestiones on ‘De caelo’ are the result of two different commentaries linked together, probably written by two different authors (the first part of the commentary is written by an anonymous author with Averroistic attitude, while the second is the work of Peter of Auvergne), henceforth I will designate the anonymous author of the first part as the Anonymous of Escorial. The commentary on ‘De caelo’ is per modum quaestionis. It consists only of questions, and there is no trace of a previous literal commentary.9 The text is incomplete, and ends abruptly during the discussion of the third book. Some years ago, I pointed out in a note the textual correlation between some

5 6

7 8 9

commençant par H et J (jusqu’ à Johannes C.) (Studia Artistarum 9), Turnhout 2001, p. 60. Antolín, Guillermo, Catalogo de los códices latinos de la Real biblioteca del Escorial, vol. II, Madrid 1911, pp. 303–305. Grabmann, Martin, Mittelalterliche lateinische Aristotelesübersetzungen und Aristoteleskommentare in Handschriften spanischer Bibliotheken (Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-philologische und historische Klasse 5), München 1928, p. 79: “Unser Autor steht stark unter dem Einfluß des Averroes, wie denn auch häufig die Quaestionen mit den Worten beginnen: Consequenter queritur de dicto Commentatoris”. Ibid., p. 80: “Der Kommentar, der bis fol. 176v sich erstreckt, hat ohne Zweifel den nämlichen Verfasser wie der vorhergehende Kommentar zu De celo et mundo”. Duin, Joannes J., La doctrine de la providence dans les écrits de Siger de Brabant (Philosophes Médiévaux 3), Louvain 1954, pp. 154–157. For the complete list of questions: Musatti, Cesare A., Il ‘De caelo’ di Aristotele nella seconda metà del XIII secolo: le questioni di Pietro d’Alvernia e alcuni commenti anonimi, in: Cosmogonie e Cosmologie nel Medioevo, Ed. Martello, Concetto, Militello, Chiara, Vella, Andrea (Textes et Etudes du Moyen Âge 46), Turnhout 2008, pp. 269–308, see pp. 275–282. In that paper

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of the questions on the second and third book in the Escorial manuscript, and the corresponding questions in the commentary on ‘De caelo’ of Peter of Auvergne edited by Griet Galle.10 Afterwards, I have discussed this issue in more detail, and I have come to the following conclusions:11 (1) the textual correlation between the commentary on ‘De caelo’ of the Anonymous of Escorial and that of Peter of Auvergne starts up only in the second book with the question Utrum caelum moveatur super aliquod fixum et stans (Anonymous of Escorial, number 6/Peter of Auvergne, number 10); (2) this proceeds uninterruptedly until the question Utrum ignis divisibilis circumdans terram vel aliquod corpus fixum et stans in medio moveatur ad circumferentiam (Anonymous of Escorial, number 31/Peter of Auvergne, number 35). In this question the beginning of the determinatio is omitted by the Anonymous (Peter of Auvergne, p. 268, ll. 28–35), and shortly after (p. 269, l. 53) the text of the Escorial’s manuscript jumps forward to the enunciation of the title of question number 41 in Peter of Auvergne’s commentary (p. 283, l. 2). Therefore, after twenty-five questions whose text is uninterruptedly the same in both commentaries, the Escorial codex lacks the second part of question 35, and entirely lacks the questions 36–40 found in Peter’s commentary. After this long omission, the textual correlation between the two commentaries starts again (Anonymous of Escorial, number 32/Peter of Auvergne, number 41), and goes as far as the determinatio of the question 4 of the third book of Peter of Auvergne’s text. Just as before, we find another omission: most part of the determinatio in this question is indeed missing (Peter of Auvergne, pp. 305–307, ll. 47–100), and the next one is entirely missing (Peter of Auvergne, number 5: Utrum uni motui naturali possent plures motus violenti contrariari). Afterwards, the text of the Anonymous begins again with a new question (Anonymous of Escorial, number 5/Peter of Auvergne, number 6), but ends abruptly during the answer to (p. 278) the correct quotation of question number 3 of the second book is: ‘Consequenter queritur circa illud capitulum in quo Philosophus determinat de partibus situalibus ipsius celi siue mundi […]’. 10 Musatti, Cesare A., Il ‘De caelo’ di Aristotele e alcuni suoi commentatori: Simplicio, Averroè e Pietro d’Alvernia, in: Quaestio 6 (2006), pp. 524–549, see pp. 548–549. To prove that correlation, I have presented the text of one question (Utrum caelum stellatum sit primus orbis), which is discussed in both commentaries. The reference to Galle’s critical edition is: Peter of Auvergne’s Questions on Aristotle’s ‘De caelo’. A critical edition with an interpretative essay, Ed. Galle, Griet (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, Series I 29), Leuven 2003. 11 Musatti (note 9), pp. 282–290.

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the first argument (Peter of Auvergne, p. 312, l. 62), and on the next folio (f. 130ra) is the already mentioned anonymous commentary on ‘Meteora’.12 Therefore, the final part of question number six, seven more questions on the third book, and nine on the fourth, which are all included in Peter’s text, are, on the contrary, entirely missing from the Anonymous’s commentary. Summing up, although with some interruptions, the textual correlation between the two commentaries starts with question number six in the second book of the Anonymous of Escorial’s text, and proceeds to its abrupt end. Hereafter, for convenience, this section will be quoted as the second part of the commentary, while the Prohemium, the questions on the first book, and the questions on the second book, up to and including number five, will be designated as the first part.13

12 Like the second part of the commentary, the first one also has some missing parts. For example, the question Vtrum primum principium habet materiam (f. 116ra), is incomplete: within the responsio to the second of the three arguments quod sic, probably because of a long omission, there is the final section (part of the determinatio, responsiones ad argumenta) of another question, whose title is probably Vtrum omne corruptibile de necessitate possit aliunde perpetuari. Furthermore, it is remarkable that, unlike all the other contemporary commentaries on the first book of ‘De caelo’, the Escorial’s does not have any question on the extracosmic void. Consequently, it is likely that by a more exhaustive study of the first part of the commentary, other missing sections would be localized. All these omissions, together with mistakes and misreadings and, last but not least, the damage of some folia of the manuscript due to the dampness after the fire of 1671, will make any critical edition of the commentary a difficult task. 13 The full text of the Prohemium is edited in Musatti, Cesare A., Due prologhi al ‘De caelo’ di Aristotele: l’anonimo commento del ms. Escorial h. II. 1, e un commento attribuito a Pietro d’Alvernia, in: Medioevo e filosofia. Per Alfonso Maierù, Ed. Lenzi, Massimiliano, Musatti, Cesare A. and Valente, Luisa, Roma 2013, pp. 173–190, see pp. 182–185.

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Considering the first part of the Escorial commentary, I would like to submit the text of its last question ( Vtrum aliquod uiolentum possit esse perpetuum) together with that discussed by Peter of Auvergne in his commentary ( Utrum aliquid violentum sit sempiternum):14 14

Anonymous of Escorial

Peter of Auvergne

Vtrum aliquod uiolentum possit esse perpetuum (f. 121rb–121va)

Utrum aliquid violentum sit sempiternum (Ed. Galle, pp. 274–276)

Consequenter queritur utrum aliquod uiolentum possit esse perpetuum.

Consequenter quaeritur utrum aliquid violentum sit sempiternum.

Arguitur quod sic, quia ignis et aer manent supra cacumina altissimorum montium, et ibi mouentur motu circulari, scilicet raptu primi firmamenti; et iste motus est uiolentus, quia non sunt nati moueri circulari motu, set motu recto, et iste motus est eternus. Maior patet ex primo Metheororum, et hoc dicit Commentator secundo huius, quia ignis mouetur accidentaliter, et similiter aer usque ad magnam partem eius. Minor (maior cod.) patet, quia elementa sunt ab eterno, et motus celi est eternus, ut patet VIII Phisicorum, et per illum motum mouentur. Ergo ille motus circularis ignis et aeris est eternus.

Et videtur quod sic, quia generatio montium est violenta; elevatio enim montium est contra locum naturalem ipsius terrae; sed consistentia montium est sempiterna, quia, sicut semper durat terra, sic et montium elevatio; igitur aliquid violentum est sempiternum. Praeterea motus circularis est motus violentus ipsi igni, quia unius corporis tantum est unus motus naturalis; igni enim motus sursum naturalis est; nunc autem ita est quod ignis motu circulari circa medium movetur sempiternaliter, ut scribitur I Meteororum; quare et cetera.

I have already remarked that the commentary on ‘De caelo’ transmitted by the 14 second part of the Escorial’s codex lacks the end of question 35, and is entirely missing questions 36–40 of Peter’s Quaestiones on the second book. Therefore, Peter’s question number 38 (Utrum aliquid violentum sit sempiternum) is missing. However, if we suppose the presence of this question in the Escorial’s exemplar, or in some other codex which constitutes the stemma codicum of this text, we would find in the same commentary on ‘De caelo’ two discussions of this specific topic (whether something perpetual could be eternal). Shortly, we will see that this is also the case with some other questions in the commentary.

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Item consistentia montium (motuum cod.) uidetur esse preter naturam, et tamen est perpetua; ergo quod est preter naturam est perpetuum, et hoc est uiolentum. Maior patet, quia terra debet esse sperica a natura; ergo eleuationes et montuositates sunt ibi preter naturam. Minor patet, quia ex quo terra est eterna, et animalia debent in terra uiuere et ibi saluari perpetuo (quomodo possint saluari in aquis?). Et sic est montuosa propter salutem animalium. Item hoc arguitur de media regione aeris que est summe frigida, ut patet per effectum qui inde proueni[un]t, et tamen eterne durat. Et tamen hoc est preter naturam siue uiolentum, quia aer de sua natura est calidus, ut dicitur secundo De generatione. Oppositum dicit Philosophus: dicit enim quod nullum uiolentum est perpetuum. Dicendum quod uiolentum dupliciter potest accipi: proprie et inproprie. Vno modo dicitur uiolentum illud quod debetur alicui, et tamen debetur ei per inclinationem naturalem, quia habet inclinationem ad oppositum: sicut motus ignis deorsum dicitur uiolentus, quia inclinatio naturalis est ad oppositum. Violentum inproprie dicitur illud quod est preter naturam propriam, quod tamen alicui debetur per naturam communem. Modo, nature proprie non repugnat illud quod sibi debetur per naturam communem: sicut quod ignis moueatur circulariter, hoc sibi debetur preter naturam, quia alium motum habet a natura ut motus sursum, et unius nature unus est motus per propriam naturam; set sibi debetur per

Oppositum apparet hic ex intentione Philosophi. Dicendum est quod nullum violentum est aeternum. Violentum enim est illud quod est contra naturam. Sed differt aliquid esse contra naturam et praeter naturam vel extra naturam, quod idem est. Dicitur enim illud esse contra naturam quod est contra inclinationem naturalem, sicut motus terrae sursum est contra inclinationem terrae naturalem, et ideo dicitur esse contra naturam terrae. Dicitur autem aliquid praeter naturam album, quia de natura sua non est album. Dicitur autem, sicut patet libro Ethicorum, violentum cuius principium est ab extra non conferente vim passo. Modo dico quod tale violentum non est sempiternum. Et huius ratio est duplex, quia, si tale violentum esset sempiternum, tunc ens secundum naturam esset sempiternaliter impeditum, quia innaturale semper esset; hoc autem est impossibile et contra naturam. Probatio impossibilis consequentis, quia violentum est exorbitatio naturae, et omne tale posterius est natura, quia defectus est posterior suo habitu. Defectus autem sive privatio posteriores sunt suis habitibus et per consequens minus durantes; igitur violentum non est tantae durationis sicut ipsum naturale; nullum igitur violentum est sempiternum. Et item si naturalis inclinatio et habitudo vel potentia esset sempiternaliter impedita et suum oppositum, ut

Peter of Auvergne and the Quaestiones on ‘De caelo’ naturam communem, quia ex quo est in spera actiuorum et passiuorum, natus est obedire corpori celesti, sicut materia nata est obedire forme. et est propinquius corpori celesti, ignis (celum cod.) mouetur circulariter: non tamen hoc sibi debetur per naturam propriam, [121va] scilicet per naturam elementarem, set per obedientiam ad naturam communem. Ex quo ad questionem dicendum quod uiolentum primo modo acceptum perpetuum non potest esse, et hoc declaratur tripliciter. Primo sic: si uiolentum proprie dictum, scilicet quod est contra inclinationem, esset perpetuum, sic aliqua potentia esset frustra. Set hoc est falsum. Probatio consequentie, quia uiolentum isto modo acceptum est priuatio et defectus eius quod est secundum naturam: [in quod] nichil est uiolentum proprie dictum nisi quando aliquod natum est a natura aliquid habere et non habet tamen illud, set oppositum; unde dicit illud quod potuit esse naturale. Si ergo illud uiolentum esset perpetuum, illa potentia non reduceretur ad actum, et sic esset frustra, et hoc est quod ibi dicit Commentator. Secundo idem declaratur sic: uiolentum isto modo acceptum uelocius est in principio, et in fine deficit et debilitatur, ut patet ad sensum. Et hoc dicit Philosophus primo et secundo huius. Set omne deficiens de necessitate deficiet et corrumpetur, ut patet per dicta: dictum est enim quod omne corruptibile de necessitate corrumperetur; nullum tale est eternum. Quare etc. Tertio hoc patet, secundum quod declarat Commentator: quod est contra inclinationem naturalem, non

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violentum, esset sempiternum, iam aliqua potentia esset frustra in rerum natura, ut potentia naturalis. Deus autem et natura nihil faciunt frustra, quod cum hoc sit, impossibile est aliquid violentum esse sempiternum. Item alia ratio est ad hoc: omnis motus violentus fortior in principio quam sit in fine. Cuius ratio est, quoniam omne motum quanto propinquius est virtuti moventi, tanto fortius et velocius movetur. In processu autem ipsius motus debilitatur, quia quanto magis recedit ab impellente, tanto minus habet de virtute et velocius motus deficit. Si igitur violentum secundum remotionem ab agente naturali est deficiens vel in initio in motu debilitatur, quanto magis ei deficit virtus impellens, tanto magis debilitatur. Et tandem, cum contingat virtutem pausatione deficere, tandem finietur motus violentus; hoc autem non esset si violentum esset aeternum; quare nullum violentum est aeternum. Hoc etiam voluit Philosophus. Unde quod est iuxta naturam bene potest esse sempiternum, supposito quod causam suae continuationis in esse habeat; nec propter hoc impeditur inclinatio naturalis, quia praeter naturam inclinationem non vergit. Ad rationes dicendum quod generatio montium in terra non est contra naturam terrae unde terra considerata est ad motum supracaelestium, quoniam talis generatio ut sic est naturalis; est tamen contra naturam terrae unde terra. Et tu dicis quod sempiternaliter sunt montes; dicendum quod, licet terra

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potest esse essentiale alicui; set quod est uiolentum est contra inclinationem naturalem. Quare etc. Et ideo non poterit inesse alicui perpetuo.

sit sempiterna, subsistentia tamen montium non est sempiterna, quia, sicut patet II Meteororum, ubi non est aqua, est aqua aliquando, et aliquando non erit. Immo, terra habitabilis erit et e converso; similiter erit de montibus: ubi modo sunt montes, aliquando non erunt; quare non sunt sempiterni; quia igitur sunt (sint ed.) violenti, aliquando deficiunt. Ad secundum dicendum quod motus circularis ignis non est contra naturam, quia nihil est contra naturam nisi quod movetur extra locum naturalem; sed ignis non movetur extra locum naturalem, immo circulariter in suo loco; quare ille motus non est ei violentus. Item alio modo posset dici quod iste motus non est aeternus, quia nec ignis aeternus, quia aliquando corrumpitur secundum una partem et generatur secundum aliam; similiter et alia elementa, quoniam continue generantur et corrumpuntur ad invicem, ut patet III huius. Ideo, cum mobile non sit aeternum ut sic, nec motus aeternus qui dicitur violentus.

With respect to the question discussed by the Anonymous of Escorial, it may be noted that it is incomplete: the responsiones to the three arguments quod sic are indeed completely missing. Consequently, it is possible to point out that just before the beginning of the textual correlation with Peter’s Quaestiones, the last question of the commentary’s first part is incomplete. According to this, since the first part has to be considered as unfinished, it could be supposed that another text (that of Peter of Auvergne’s) was joined to it as its continuation. But due to the several omissions included in the commentary’s first part, this hypothesis is rather weak. However, one important element of evidence in support of the suggestion that the Quaestiones on ‘De caelo’ in the Escorial’s codex are the result of two distinct commentaries is that in the Anonymous’s first part of the text, just at the end of the commentary on the first book, there are two questions (

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Vtrum corpora celestia sint propter ista inferiora sicut propter finem, f. 117vb, Vtrum celum in suo motu indigeat fixo siue quiescente, f. 118rb) which are usually examined by the commentators in the second book.15 As a matter of fact, in the commentary on the second book they are discussed again: Vtrum celum moueatur super aliquod fixum, f. 121va; corpora celestia principaliter moueantur propter ista inferiora, f. 126ra. Therefore, in the same commentary on ‘De caelo’ we have two questions examined twice. First of all, I wish to show here a textual comparison between the two questions Vtrum corpora celestia […] of the Escorial manuscript, and the single question discussed by Peter of Auvergne in his Quaestiones on ‘De caelo’: Anonymous of Escorial

Anonymous of Escorial

Peter of Auvergne

Vtrum corpora celestia sint propter ista inferiora sicut propter finem (ff. 117vb–118rb)

corpora celestia principaliter moueantur propter ista inferiora (f. 126ra–rb)

Utrum corpora supracaelestia principaliter moveantur propter ista inferiora (Ed. Galle, pp. 240–243)

Consequenter queritur de partibus simplicibus celi, scilicet sursum et deorsum et huiusmodi. Et gratia huius queritur quomodo ponuntur (ponitur(?) cod.)

Consequenter queritur corpora celestia principaliter moueantur propter ista inferiora.

Consequenter quaeritur utrum corpora supracaelestia principaliter moveantur propter ista inferiora.

15 The beginning of question 28 refers to the second chapter of the second book of ‘De caelo’: Consequenter queritur de partibus simplicibus celi, scilicet sursum et deorsum et huiusmodi. Et gratia huius, queritur quomodo ponuntur (ponitur(?) cod.) in celo, et utrum corpora celestia sint propter ista inferiora sicut propter finem. Unexpectedly, the author discusses here only the second question (Vtrum corpora celestia […]), whereas the first one (queritur quomodo ponuntur […] ) seems to be examined only later: second book, question number 4 (Vtrum iste sex differentie positionum sint in celo, f. 120ra). The beginning of the commentary on the second book of ‘De caelo’ is instead clearly stated at f. 118vb: Consequenter queritur circa secundum huius, et primo de eo quod Philosophus dicit quod celum est eternum, existens sine principio et fine, continens omne tempus […] Ideo primo queritur utrum celum (tempus cod.) contineat tempus infinitum.

144 in celo, et utrum corpora celestia sint propter ista inferiora sicut propter finem.

Cesare A. Musatti Arguitur quod sic per Aristotilem et per Commentatorem. Hoc dicit Aristotiles superius in isto libro motum superiorum esse propter motum inferiorum; quare superiora sunt propter inferiora. Similiter Commentator in fine dicit quod superiora mouentur ad ubi gratia istorum. Item arguitur ratione Commentatoris, quia factum se habet ad faciens sicut finis ad id quod est super finem, quia duplex est finis: finis qui dicitur operatio, et finis qui dicitur operatum. Modo, uerum est quod omnia ista inferiora facta sunt per motum superiorum; quare et superiora sunt propter inferiora.

Et arguitur quod sic, quia factum est finis facientis; set ista inferiora facta sunt et causata a corporibus celestibus; ergo ista inferiora sunt superiorum. Quare etc. Maior patet primo Ethicorum: nam faciens finaliter ex se facit factum, quia non dicitur faciens nisi ut faciat; et si faciat aliquod, illud est factum, propter quod factum est finis facientis, Commentator recitat, et non illam proportionem. Minor patet in IV Phisicorum, quia nouitas que est in instanti reducitur in temporis (? cod.), sicut nouitas facti siue effectus in nouitatem Oppositum dicit Auerefficientis siue facientis. roys et omnes expoAristotilis. Item quando dicit Philo- sitores sophus quod in celo sunt plures motus propter ge- Item sempiternum non est nerationem corporum in- propter corruptibile, quia feriorum [corporum], di- nobilius non est propter cit Commentator causam ignobilius, set magis e co(constantiam cod.) esse nuerso; superiora et finalem, et hoc non esset motus ipsorum sunt eternisi celestia essent propter na, inferiora autem sunt ista inferiora sicut propter corruptibilia. Quare etc. suum finem; ergo ex intentione Commentatoris [118ra] patet quod sunt

Et videtur quod sic per Aristotelem et per Commentatorem. Hic dicit enim Aristoteles superius in isto libro motum superiorum esse propter motum inferiorum; quare superiora sunt propter inferiora. Similiter etiam habemus ex Commentatore ex fine, quia ista moventur ad ubi gratia istorum. Item hoc arguitur ratione Commentatoris, quia factum se videtur habere ad faciens sicut finis ad illud quod est propter finem, quia finis est duplex: finis qui dicitur operatio et finis qui dicitur operatum; modo verum est quod omnia ista inferiora facta (facta inferiora ed.) sunt per motum superiorum; quare et superiora sunt principaliter propter inferiora. Oppositum dicit Averroes et omnes expositores Aristotelis. Item sempiternum non est propter corruptibile, quia nobilius non est propter minus nobile, sed magis e conuerso; sed superiora et motus ipsorum sunt aeterna, inferiora autem sunt corruptibilia; quare non moventur propter inferiora.

Peter of Auvergne and the Quaestiones on ‘De caelo’ propter ista sicut propter finem. Item hoc arguitur ex alio dicto Commentatoris: dicit enim quod nisi corpora celestia essent propter ista inferiora sicut propter suos fines, tunc essent otiosa; set nichil est otiosum nisi respectu finis, scilicet quia non agit ad suum finem. Ergo corpora celestia ordiantur et sunt propter ista inferiora tamquam propter finem. Maior patet per Commentatorem. Minor declaratur, quia otiosum dicitur quod non includit finem quem natum est includere, ut habetur secundo (III cod.) Phisicorum dici per se frustra, quia frustra est quod agit propter finem, et tamen illud non consequitur. Set otiosum dicitur quod nec agit nec consequitur suum finem. Oppositum dicit Alexander, ut Commentator recitat: uult enim quod celestia non ordinantur ad inferiora ut propter finem.

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Intelligendum secundum Auerroym et Auicennam, et secundum omnes Perypateticos, quod corpora superiora primaria intentione non sunt propter ista inferiora, et hoc declaratur, quia uniuersaliter finis nobilior est eis (eum(?) cod.) que sunt ad finem, perfectio est nobilior perfectibili sicut actus potentia; set ista inferiora ignobiliora sunt quam superiora; quare non possunt esse propter inferiora per se et primo.

Intelligendum secundum Averroem et Avicennam et omnes Peripateticos quod corpora superiora primo vel prima intentione non sunt propter ista inferiora; et hoc declaratur sic: quia universaliter finis nobilior est quam ea quae sunt ad finem, perfectio nobilior est suo perfectibili, sicut actus potentia; sed ista inferiora ignobiliora sunt quam superiora; quare non possunt esse finis istorum superiorum per se et primo.

Item prius (? cod.) secundum (sx cod.) naturam non est propter illud quod est posterius secundum naturam, quia nobilius non est propter minus nobile; prius autem nobilius est posteriori; ideo non est propter posterius. Set superiora sunt priora secundum naturam, inferiora autem posteriora. Quare etc. Utrum autem sint propter intellectum qui est uirtus inmaterialis et separata, de hoc nichil ad presens.

Item prius secundum naturam non est propter illud quod est posterius secundum naturam, quia nobilius non est propter minus nobile; prius autem nobilius est posteriori; ideo non est propter posterius. Sed superiora sunt priora secundum naturam, inferiora autem posteriora sunt; ideo superiora non sunt propter inferiora. Utrum autem sint propter intellectum, cum sit virtus immaterialis et separata, nihil de hoc ad praesens. Ideo manifestum est quod superiora non sunt propter inferiora primo.

Dicendum quod corpora celestia esse propter ista inferiora tamquam propter finem dupliciter intelligi potest: aut sicut propter finem principale, aut Est tamen intelligendum Est tamen intelligendum sicut propter secunda- quod, licet hoc non con- quod, licet hoc non conrium finem, sicut distin- tingat (? cod.) primo, ta- tingat primo, contingit ta-

146 guit Commentator. Tunc ad questionem dicendum quod celestia non sunt propter ista inferiora sicut propter finem principalem, tamen sunt propter ista inferiora ut propter finem secundarium. Primum patet dupliciter. Primo sic, et est ratio quasi tacta, quia corpora nobiliora non sunt propter corpora ignobiliora sicut propter finem principalem; set corpora celestia nobiliora sunt istis. Maior patet, quia finis debet esse melior et nobilior eis que sunt ad finem, quia ista que sunt ad finem sumunt ueritatem et necessitatem ex fine, saltim principali. Minor patet, quia corpora celestia sunt eterna, set inferiora sunt corruptibilia; set eternum nobilius incorruptibili. Quare etc. Secundo sic: illa que primo sunt propter se, non sunt principaliter propter ista inferiora, quia inferiora sunt alia ab ipsis; celestia sunt primo propter se. Quare etc. Maior de se patet. Minor declaratur per Commentatorem secundo Methaphisice: dicit enim quod eterna sunt propter se, et propter perfectionem suam ut propter finem principalem, et ex consequenti sunt propter alia. Set corpora celestia sunt eterna. Quare etc. Se-

Cesare A. Musatti men secundario est, sicut generatio ignis principaliter est propter formam ignis, secundario tamen est propter aliud. Sicut dicitur concubitus maris et femine propter dilectionem est principaliter uel concupiscentiam (-scentie cod.); tamen secundario autem propter prolem e conuerso dicit Auicenna dans exemplum de patre familias uolente peregrinari habente duas uias per quas potest peruenire ad terminum, eligit unam in qua plura bona potest agere, et hoc secundario, ita et superiora; et sup[126rb]plet Auicenna ad istam partem quod superiora mouentur ut faciant plura bona ad generationem et corruptionem, et ita non principaliter ad hoc ordinantur, set secundario. Dicit tamen quod principaliter ordiantur propter motorem, et secundario (hoc cod.) propter inferiora quantum ad generationem et corruptionem, propter quod motus primi mobilis est propter mouens separatum; unde (ut cod.) dicit ipse quod eadem natura mobilis (ignis cod.) et mouentis (non et motus cod.): conueniunt in

men secundario, sicut generatio ignis principaliter est propter formam ignis, secundario tamen propter aliquid aliud. Similiter autem dicit Avicenna quod concubitus maris et feminae principaliter est propter delectationem vel propter concupiscentiam, secundario autem propter prolem vel e converso; sicut Avicenna dat exemplum de patre familias volente peregrinari habente duas vias per quas potest venire ad terminum, eligit unam in qua potest plura bona facere et hoc secundario, ita et superiora; et supplet Avicenna ad istam partem quod superiora moventur ut faciant plura bona ad generationem et corruptionem, et ita non principaliter ad hoc ordinantur, sed secundario. Dicit tamen quod principaliter moventur propter motorem et propter se, et secundario propter inferiora quantum ad generationem et corruptionem, propter quod et motus primi mobilis est propter movens separatum; unde dixit ipse quod eadem est ratio mobilis et moventis, sicut eadem natura mobilis et moventis; conveniunt enim in fine unius actionis. Movet autem primum propter

Peter of Auvergne and the Quaestiones on ‘De caelo’ cundo dicitur quod corpora celestia sunt propter ista inferiora ut propter generationem ipsorum sicut propter finem secundarium, et hoc patet dupliciter: quia si corpora celestia et motores ipsorum non essent propter generationem et corruptionem (causalitatem cod.) istorum inferiorum ut propter finem secundarium, tunc esset in corporibus celestibus et intelligentiis (-tes cod.) aliqua natura mota non ad largiendum. Set hoc est falsum et inconueniens dicere. Quare etc. Falsitas consequentis patet, quia inconueniens est quod illa que sunt perfectissima et optima non sit ad largiendum innata, quia bonum sui ipsius est diffusiuum, ut habetur libro Procli. Set superiora, ut intelligentie et corpora celestia, sunt perfectissima et optima. Quare etc. Et hoc est causando. Ideo falsum est dicere quod non sunt nata ad causandum fine secundario. Probatio consequentie: quia si celestia non essent propter ista inferiora ut propter finem secundarium, tunc non oporteret quod ibi esset alia natura que non esset apta nata semper causare[t], siue que esset nata ad causandum semper.

fine enim unius actionis. Mouet autem primum mobile propter principium in ratione amati et desiderati, et quod celum propter bonum separatum, et celum propter primum bonum separatum. Alii autem orbes inferiores propter bonum eis separatum determinatum in ratione finis. Set manifestum est quod separatum ab alio non est propter principium illius nisi ut ab eo causatur (causauit cod.) bonum aliquod ad finem suum: sicut motus grauis deorsum non est finis nec perfectio eius nisi in quantum termino motus graue (genere cod.) perficitur, et suam acquirit perfectionem, sicut est de felicitate homini. Deus enim dicitur felicitas hominis, et non dicitur nisi quantum in homine perfectio aliqua (-quid cod.) in ipsum contemplando uel appetendo acquiritur; sicut etiam uidetur de superioribus, quod ipsa ordinantur propter bonum separatum in quantum propter illud bonum aliquam perfectionem (aliquod perfectum cod.) acquiritur. Set ista perfectio diuersimode assignatur. Vnde dicunt quidam quod superiora reducun-

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primum principium in ratione amati et desiderati, ita quod caelum propter bonum separatum, et primum caelum propter primum bonum separatum; alii autem orbes inferiores propter bonum separatum eis determinatum in ratione finis. Sed manifestum est quod separatum ab alio non est finis illius nisi ut ab eo causatur bonum aliquod ad finem suum, sicut motus gravis deorsum non est finis nec perfectio eius nisi inquantum in termino motus grave perficitur et suam acquirit perfectionem, sicut est de felicitate homini. Deus enim dicitur felicitas hominis, et non dicitur nisi inquantum in homine perfectio aliqua in ipsum contemplando vel appetendo acquiritur. Sic etiam videtur esse de superioribus, quod ipsa moventur propter bonum separatum inquantum per illud bonum aliquam perfectionem acquirunt; sed illa perfectio diversimode assignatur. Dicunt enim quidam quod illa superiora reducuntur de potentia ad actum inquantum moventur a bono separato, quia in quocumque situ (sita ed.) sunt, in potentia sunt ad alium situm; et cum non moveantur nisi

148 Immo esset possibile quod ibi esset aliqua natura que non sit nata ad causandum, et huiusmodi natura non habet causare nisi per motum et generationem istorum inferiorum. Quare celestia erunt propter ista inferiora ut propter finem secundarium. Tertio hoc patet: corpora celestia siue motores eorum ex quo sunt diuina maxime appetunt (-tant cod.) assimilari primo, ut assimilando ei perficiantur; set primum est causa omnium; quare maxime assimilantur se primo in hoc quod sunt cause, et non sunt cause nisi causando per motum suum causando et primo genere istorum inferiorum. Quare cum per se intendunt (extendunt cod.) assimilari primo prout possunt (potest cod.) sicut propter perfectionem suam, et hoc non est nisi per motum, et propter hoc causant inferiora, et propter hoc ex consequenti intendunt generationem istorum inferiorum, et secundario intenditur illud ex quo non potest haberi finis suus intentus; quare corpora celestia sunt propter ista inferiora tamquam propter finem, et generationem ipsorum ex consequenti tamen. Iuxta illud quod dicit Commentator

Cesare A. Musatti tur de potentia ad actum quantum mouentur a bono (ab uno cod.) separato, quia in quocumque situ sunt, sunt (sint cod.) in potentia ad alium situm, et cum (tamen cod.) non mouentur nisi a bono (ab uno cod.) separato, in quantum reducuntur de potentia ad actum illam perfectionem acquirunt. Verius tamen uidetur esse dicendum quod dicit Simplicius, quod corpora superiora mouentur propter bonum separatum ut assimilabuntur ei; que assimilatio attenditur in causando (? cod.), eorum perfectio attenditur quantum acquirunt. Et ideo principaliter sunt propter bonum separatum et summam perfectionem; secundario autem propter ista inferiora.

a bono separato, reducuntur de potentia ad actum et illam perfectionem acquirunt. Verius tamen videtur esse dicendum, secundum quod dicit Simplicius, quod corpora superiora moventur propter bonum separatum ut assimilentur ei; quae assimilatio attenditur in causando et ideo in causando eorum perfectio attenditur quam acquirunt. Et ideo principaliter sunt propter bonum separatum et sui ipsius perfectionem, secundario autem propter ista inferiora.

Ad rationem: cum dicitur quod Philosophus dicit hoc, [hoc] dicendum quod intentio Philosophi fuit quod superiora moueantur secundario (-ria cod.) propter inferiora. Similiter dicendum ad dictum Commentatoris.

Ad rationes est dicendum: Cum dicitur quod Philosophus dixit hoc, dicendum quod intentio Philosophi fuit quod superiora moveantur secundario propter inferiora, primario autem non. Similiter est dicendum ad dictum Commentatoris quod non fuit eius intentio.

Ad aliud: faciens est Ad secundam rapropter factum, uerum est tionem est dicendum:

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XII Methaphisice ponen- uel principaliter, uel se- “faciens est propter factum” verum est vel prindo tale exemplum: aliquis cundario. cipaliter, vel secundario infimus primo et prinmodo; verum est quod, cipaliter intendit sanitatem quamvis superiora sint sicut finem principalem, causae efficientes istorum et hoc non potest haberi inferiorum, sunt propter nisi per ambulationem aut inferiora aut principalieuacuationem humorum; ter aut secundario; non ideo ex consequenti intenprincipaliter, ut visum dit illa. Sic dicendum est de est, ideo secundario. corporibus celestibus et intelligentiis quod intendunt suam [118rb] perfectionem que est in ado se cause sue, et hoc non habent nisi per motum et generationem. Ideo ex consequenti hoc intendunt. Quare ad hoc ordinantur ut ad finem secundarium, sicut infimus ad ambulandum aut aliquid huiusmodi. Hoc est quod uult Commentator primo Methaphisice: dicit enim super illud uerbum (uerbo cod.) Philosophi quod intellectus noster se habet ad manifestissima etc., sicut oculus nycticoracis (nothycis cod.) ad lumen (lux cod.) solis; et si non intelligerentur ab intellectu nostro, tunc essent otiosa, scilicet secundario fine, [scilicet] quia sunt intelligibiles. Intelligentie autem ordinantur ad hoc ut intelliguntur, et ideo primo intelliguntur a se ipsis, set secundario intelliguntur (-gitur cod.) ab intellectu humano, et

150 etiam quodlibet intelligibile, quia nichil est otiosum siue occultum intellectui nostro, ut dicit Commentator secundo Phisicorum. Et ideo si intelligentie non intelligerentur a nobis, essent otiose. Vnde quod istud intelligatur de otiositate que est secundo fine, isto modo est intelligendum dictum Commentatoris XII Methaphisice, quod si intelligentie non mouerent orbes essent otiose, set secundario fine, quia aliter non consequerentur perfectionem suam quam intendunt sicut finem principalem, quamuis istud aliquibus uideatur esse falsum. Tamen necessarium est, immo quasi principia phisice habent confirmari ex otiositate que nata est nimia euitanda. Ad primum: factum est finis facientis, et sic faciens est propter factum ut propter suum finem, uerum est saltim propter finem secundarium, et precipue si facienda sunt nobiliora, et sic est huiusmodi. Et cum dicitur inferiora sunt facta a celestibus, uerum est, et ideo concludit quod illud (illud quod cod.) otiosum est, scilicet quod superiora sunt propter ista inferiora ut (et cod.) propter finem secundarium.

Cesare A. Musatti

Peter of Auvergne and the Quaestiones on ‘De caelo’ Ad aliud: [Commentator] dicendum quod plures motus sunt in celo propter generationem inferiorum, propter dicit ibi Commentator causam (circumstantiam cod.) esse finalem, uerum est non principaliter, set secundarie, sicut satis patet ex Commentatore; et ideo sunt propter ista inferiora ut propter finem secundarium et non principalem. Ad aliud: nichil est otiosum nisi respectu finis, uerum est, scilicet quia non includit finem, ut dictum est, scilicet principalis et secundarius (-riis cod.) ; et ideo sequitur quod duplex est otiositas correspondens isti duplici fini. Et cum dicitur quod Commentator dicit quod nisi superiora essent propter ista inferiora tunc essent otiosa, uerum est, quia non includerent finem secundarium. Et ideo tamen sequitur quod non sunt propter ista inferiora sicut propter finem principalem, set propter finem secundarium.

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Considering the question of the second book (Anonymous of Escorial, number 24/Peter of Auvergne, number 28) we can claim that the text is the same in both commentaries. Furthermore, with a careful reading, it is possible to point out at least two remarks which are valid throughout the second part of the Escorial’s commentary: (1) in some passages the text of the Anonymous is shorter than Peter’s, but the missing words are usually of no importance for textual understanding (see for example the two responsiones ad argumenta); (2) the text of the Anonymous contains several mistakes, misreadings, and omissions.16 In contrast, the question in the first book is considerably different from the question in the second book. As we have seen, under the title ‘Questiones in librum De caelo et mundo’ the manuscript of Escorial seems to transmit two distinct commentaries, which are somehow linked together. Now I would like to investigate whether these two texts are written by only one author (in this case Peter of Auvergne alone, so that consequently the commentary’s first part must be considered as another version of Peter’s Quaestiones on ‘De caelo’), or whether the two sections are the work of two different authors.17

I. The first part of the ‘Questiones in librum De caelo’ With respect to the probable date of the first part of the commentary, I point out that throughout the text the book Lambda of the ‘Metaphysics’ is quoted as the twelfth. As far as we know the book Kappa was translated into Latin for the first time by William of Moerbeke in 1271, and it is only afterwards that Lambda is quoted as the twelfth book. Furthermore, 16 More examples confirming these two features are given in Musatti (note 9), pp. 284–287. 17 So far, three different versions of Quaestiones on ‘De caelo’ have been ascribed to Peter of Auvergne. Two versions have been edited by Griet Galle (note 10): while there is no doubt about the authenticity of the first version (pp. 7–372), the second (pp. 379–559) is instead the work of an anonymous compiler who makes an extensive use of the first version as his primary source, introducing at the same time some addictions drawn from Albert the Great’s commentary. On the other hand, Peter’s authorship of the third version is still debated. There is a provisional edition of this text: Pietro d’Alvernia e le Quaestiones super libros De caelo et mundo contenute nei manoscritti di Cremona, Erlangen e Kassel: edizione del testo e analisi dottrinale, Ed. Musatti, Cesare A., Università di Catania 2000.

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Simplicius’s commentary on ‘De caelo’ is quoted, even though only a few times. William of Moerbeke’s Latin translation of this text was achieved in June 1271, but it was probably unknown in Paris before the second half of 1274. Consequently, we may suggest the 1274–1275 as the terminus post quem of this work. But since 1277, the date of the Parisian condemnation by the bishop Stephen Tempier, is temporally very close, it could be asked whether this terminus has to be dated later, after that crucial event. According to Martin Grabmann, the commentary was written after the condemnations of 1270 and 1277.18 Grabmann’s statement follows immediately after a brief survey of the question Vtrum celum sit eternum a parte ante et incorruptibile ex parte post et non habens principium nec finem, aut utrum sit generatum et corruptibile habens uirtutem finitam (f. 111va). According to the German scholar: [...] daß unser Scholastiker keinen Versuch macht, irgend eine Konkordanz zwischen der aristotelischen Lehre und dem christlichen Schöpfungsgedanken, wie wir dies in den großen systematischen Werken des hl. Thomas von Aquin sehen, herzustellen, dann aber, daß er nicht, wie dies Siger von Brabant und die anderen Anhänger des lateinischen Averroismus an der Pariser Universität vielfach getan haben, sich der aristotelisch-averroistischen Lehre unbekümmert um die kirchliche Glaubenslehre angeschlossen hat. […] daß er mit der Feststellung des Glaubensstandpunktes sich begnügt und auf eine philosophische Widerlegung der aristotelisch-averroistischen Lehre verzichtet.19

First of all, I would like to stress that the main interest of the anonymous author of the first part of the commentary is to grasp the real thought of Aristotle, and to reach his aim he makes an extensive use (much more does of Peter of Auvergne) of Averroes’ commentaries.20 The most exhaustive example is probably given by the question Vtrum nouum a parte ante possit esse eternum a parte post, where the author explains his thought 18 Grabmann (note 6), p. 79: “Wir dürfen wohl als Verfasser dieses Kommentars einen Professor der Pariser Artistenfakultät sehen, der nach der durch den Pariser Bischof Stephan Tempier in den Jahren 1270 und 1277 vollzogenen Verurteilung des lateinischen Averroismus geschrieben hat”. 19 Ibid., p. 79. 20 The Anonymous refers explicitly to the Commentator almost 250 times throughout the text. This means that we have an average of more of seven references to Averroes in every question (besides the Prohemium, 34 are the questions of the first part of the commentary indeed). Conversely, in Peter’s of Auvergne’s commentary on ‘De caelo’ (Prohemium and 93 questions) there are only about 100 explicit references to the Arab philosopher. Furthermore,

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with regard to the ontological status of the intellective soul. In the third argument quod sic it is said: Item anima intellectiua est noua a parte ante, incorruptibilis tamen a parte post. Quare etc. Maior patet III De anima: dicit enim Philosophus quod separatur ab aliis potentiis anime sicut perpetuum a corruptibili, et loquitur de intellectiua. Et III De anima dicit quod intellectus est simpliciter inmaterialis, incorruptibilis, et sic eternus a parte post. Minor patet, quia forma non precedit corpus; set anima intellectiua est forma corporis, et corpus incepit. Quare etc. (f. 117rb)

The answer to this argument is mainly focused on how the intellective soul must be conceived as forma corporis, and at the end the author undoubtedly refuses a concordistic interpretation, probably referring implicitly to an anonymous expositor: Ad aliud: anima intellectiua est eterna etc. Et cum dicitur est noua a parte ante, Commentator interimit: immo dicit quod est eterna. Ad probationem: quod est forma corporis, et prout est forma et perfectio materie que est altera pars compositi nisi accipiatur pro motore, dicitur quod forma dicitur dupliciter: uno modo dicitur perfectio, et altera pars positi cadens in essentiam; modo dicitur motor appropriatus. Modo, dicit Commentator quod anima intellectiua non est forma corporis noui prout forma dicitur perfectio rei et est de essentia compositi cuiusmodi dicitur forma, set est forma accipiendo pro motore; unde dicit quod anima intellectiua est forma ultima hominis que se habet ut motor, et est anima siue forma sibi appropriata propter compositionem ut motor eius. Unde (ante cod.) ex isto capitulo patet quod intentio Philosophi est quod anima intellectiua non sit forma corporis, scilicet perficiens ipsum dando sibi esse, quia (quod cod.) non est materia cuius est forma. Cum ergo corpus sit (fit cod.) nouum, sic anima intellectiua esset noua, et tamen est eterna secundum Philosophum: uult enim quod nichil sit eternum a parte post, nisi sit eternum a parte ante. Et ideo dicere quod anima intellectiua sit forma corporis cadens (carens cod.) in essentiam compositi, esset contra Philosophum, propter quod ipsum exponendo non est trahendum aliter ad eius intentionem, quamuis istud sit falsum. (f. 117vb)

The intellective soul, says the Anonymous, is forma corporis only if it is conceived as its motor, and not as its perfectio dans sibi esse. This is for the author the true thought of Aristotle drawn by Averroes’ interpretation, and despite the fact that this doctrine is false secundum veritatem (quamuis istud sit falsum), any attempt to change it is evidently rejected (propter quod ipsum so far in the Anonymous’ text I have found no passages where it is said that Averroes is wrong. Peter of Auvergne, on the contrary, does this several times in his quotations: Galle (note 10), pp. 167, 177–178, 218, 228, etc.

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exponendo non est trahendum aliter ad eius intentionem).21 Here the author is probably referring to Thomas Aquinas, who considered the Aristotelian intellective soul as actus corporis dans corpori esse specificum.22 In my opinion, the argument just examined rules out the possibility of Peter of Auvergne’s authorship of the first part of the commentary. A similar attitude would not likely be ascribable to Peter indeed, at least to the author we know so far. While the commentary of the Anonymous of Escorial is an Averroistic commentary, in the sense that the true interpretation of Aristotle’s thought is always given by Averroes’ writings, on the contrary, in Peter of Auvergne’s Quaestiones on ‘De caelo’, we more often find a neoPlatonic exegesis of Aristotle;23 moreover, in his commentary show a remarkable effort (completely lacking in the Anonymous’ work) to harmonize the philosophical doctrines with the Christian faith.

21 It is interesting to stress that a similar attitude is well expressed in Siger of Brabant’s Quaestiones on ‘Metaphysics’: Siger de Brabant, Quaestiones in metaphysicam. Édition revue de la reportation de Munich. Texte inédit de la reportation de Vienne, Ed. Dunphy, William (Philosophes Médiévaux 24), Louvain-la-Neuve 1981, p. 132: […] sic autem velare philosophiam non est bonum: unde non est hic intentio Aristotelis celanda, licet sit contraria veritati.; Id., Quaestiones in metaphysicam. Reportations de Cambridge et de Paris, Ed. Maurer, Armand (Philosophes Médiévaux 25), Louvain-la-Neuve 1983, p. 110: Propter etiam ea quae fidei sunt non est velanda intentio Philosophi, sicut quidam voluerunt, dicentes Philosophum non intendere mundum simpliciter esse aeternum, et alia huiusmodi. 22 Thomas Aquinas, De unitate intellectus, I, Ed. Leonina (Sancti Thomae Opera Omnia 43), Roma 1976, p. 297; Id., Sentencia libri De anima, II I, Ed. Leonina (Sancti Thomae Opera Omnia 45,1), Roma/Paris 1984, pp. 70–73. A complete edition of this question with an interpretative study will be published soon in collaboration with Massimiliano Lenzi (University of Rome “La Sapienza”). 23 Long commentaries on ‘Physics’, ‘Metaphysics’, ‘De caelo’ and the opuscule ‘De substantia orbis’ are the primarly working tools of the Anonymous, while Plato and all the neo-Platonic tradition (Simplicius, Proclus, the ‘Liber De causis’, Avicenna) are mentioned a very few times, either to reject their theories, or to assume them only when are in agreement with Aristotle and Averroes.

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II. Conclusions (at the current state of this research): (1) in my opinion the set of Quaestiones on ‘De caelo’ transmitted by the manuscript of Escorial originates from two different commentaries on ‘De caelo’ which are somehow joined together; (2) whereas the author of the second part of the commentary is Peter of Auvergne, the Quaestiones of the first part are ascribable to an anonymous master of the Faculty of Arts, who produced his work sometime after 1274– 1275. Therefore, the two commentaries are more or less contemporaneous;24 (3) thanks to the discovery of this new witness, Peter of Auvergne’s Quaestiones on ‘De caelo’ edited by Griet Galle are now known to us through three manuscripts. With the exception of Thomas Aquinas and Albert the Great’s commentaries, some Expositiones or Quaestiones on ‘De caelo’ of the second half of the thirteenth century composed on the European mainland are (insofar as we know) transmitted only by one codex.25 This means that Peter’s text probably had some circulation, and confirms the importance of its author as expositor Aristotelis.26

24 For the dating of Peter’s ‘Quaestiones’: Galle (note 10), pp. 63*–67*. 25 Galle (note 10), pp. 41*–44*. 26 Peter is mentioned as expositor by John Buridan in his Quaestiones on ‘De caelo’: Ioannis Buridani Expositio et Quaestiones in Aristotelis ‘De caelo’, Ed. Patar, Benoît (Philosophes Médiévaux 33), Louvain-la-Neuve/Paris 1996, p. 468. So far, it is unclear to which version of Peter’s Quaestiones on ‘De caelo’ Buridan is referring.

Peter of Auvergne on the Celestial Movers. Edition and Discussion of his Questions 8–11 on ‘Metaphysica’ XII Griet Galle (Leuven)

This contribution contains an edition and discussion of four of Peter of Auvergne’s questions on ‘Metaphysica’ XII, which deal with the first mover, its relation to the primum mobile and, indirectly, with the proper movers of the celestial orbs. First I present some information on Peter’s questions on the ‘Metaphysica’ and on the manuscripts I have used for the edition of book XII, questions 8–11. Secondly, I briefly discuss Aristotle’s ‘Metaphysica’ XII, 6–8, the interpretations of this text by Avicenna and by Averroes, and Peter of Auvergne’s theory concerning the movers of the celestial orbs in his questions on ‘De caelo’. Thirdly, I examine in detail Peter’s questions 8–11 on ‘Metaphysica’ XII and compare them with parallel passages in his questions on ‘De caelo’. The appendix contains an edition of ‘Metaphysica’ XII, questions 8–11.

I. Manuscripts Used for the Edition of ‘Metaphysica’ XII, Questions 8–11 Peter’s questions on the ‘Metaphysica’ are transmitted in eleven manuscripts and preserved in at least three redactions,1 of which the terminus post quem 1 On the manuscripts and different redactions of Peter’s questions on the ‘Metaphysica’, cf. Hocedez, Edgar, Les ‘Quaestiones in Metaphysicam’ de Pierre d’Auvergne, in: Archives de Philosophie 9 (1932), pp. 179–234, esp. 179–185; Monahan, Arthur P., Quaestiones in Metaphysicam Petri de Alvernia, in: Nine Mediaeval Thinkers. A Collection of Hitherto Unedited Texts, Ed. O’Donnell, James Reginald, Toronto 1955, pp. 145–181, esp. 145–147; Dondaine, Antoine and Bataillon, Louis-Jacques, Le Manuscrit Vindob. lat.

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is the end of 1277.2 For the edition of questions 8 to 11 on ‘Metaphysica’ XII, I use the numbering of the questions that is based on the university (or common) tradition.3 My text of these four questions is based on Ms. Wien, Nationalbibliothek, 2330 (15th c.), f. 93rb–98ra (= W),4 which is for some questions on the ‘Metaphysica’ the only known witness. For book XII it contains almost the same text as the university tradition, but in addition it transmits seven questions that are absent in the other manuscripts: three between question 5 and 6 (q. 6a–d)5 and four after the last question, question 11.6 According to two marginal notes, the additional questions come

2 3

4 5 6

2330 et Siger de Brabant, in: Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum 36 (1966), pp. 153–261, esp. 171–173; Dunphy, William, The ‘Quinque viae’ and Some Parisian Professors of Philosophy, in: St. Thomas Aquinas 1274–1974. Commemorative Studies, Eds. Maurer, Armand A. et alii, Toronto 1974, pp. 73–104, esp. 94, n. 1; Donati, Silvia, An Anonymous Commentary on the ‘De Generatione et Corruptione’ from the Years Before the Paris Condemnations of 1277 (Mss. Erlangen, Universitätsbibliothek, 213, Kassel, Stadt- und Landesbibliothek, Phys. 2° 11), in: Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales 65/2 (1998), pp. 194–247, esp. 215–217. For a bibliography on Peter of Auvergne’s questions on the ‘Metaphysica’, cf. Weijers, Olga, Le travail intellectuel à la Faculté des arts de Paris: textes et maîtres (ca. 1200–1500), VII, Répertoire des noms commençant par P (Studia artistarum 15), Turnhout 2007, pp. 105–107. Since the tradition of Peter’s questions on the ‘Metaphysica’ is very complicated, only a detailed study of the relation between the manuscripts in all parts of the questions could lead to sound conclusions (cf. Dondaine and Bataillon, art. cit., p. 173). On the dating of Peter’s questions on the ‘Metaphysica’, cf. Donati (note 1), p. 228. For a list of the questions (in the university tradition and in another redaction, preserved in the Ms. Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine, 3481 and a summary of the content, cf. Hocedez (note 1), pp. 515–570. For a table of questions based on the Ms. Cambridge, Peterhouse, 152: Zimmermann, Albert, Verzeichnis ungedruckter Kommentare zur Metaphysik und Physik des Aristoteles aus der Zeit von etwa 1250–1350 (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 9), I, Leiden/Köln 1971, pp. 80–88. For a description of this manuscript, cf. Dondaine and Bataillon (note 1). The three questions between question 5 and 6 have been edited, together with question 6, by Dunphy (note 1), pp. 95–104. The titles of the four additional questions after question 11 are: utrum motor primus sit infiniti virtutis in movendo sive in vigore (f. 97va); utrum voluntas secundum quam celum movetur sit voluntas sensualis vel intellectualis (f. 97vb);

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from a reportatio antiqua.7 The text of W has been compared with the text in two manuscripts that contain the university tradition: the Ms. Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca apostolica vaticana, Vat. lat. 845 (14th c.), f. 269ra–271va (= V) and the Ms. Cambridge, Peterhouse, 152 (mid-14th c.), f. 222va–224vb (= C).8 In my copies of this last manuscript,9 the text near the margins is sometimes unreadable. I have used W as the basis of the edition because it is an important witness of Peter’s questions on the ‘Metaphysica’, because it has been used by William Dunphy to edit question 6a–d on book XII and because it should be used in the future to edit the four additional questions after question 11.

II. Aristotle’s ‘Metaphysica’ XII, 6–8 and its Interpretations In order to outline the context of Peter’s ‘Metaphysica’ XII, questions 8–11 on the first mover and the other celestial movers, I briefly deal with Aristotle’s ‘Metaphysica’ XII, 6–8 and its interpretations by Avicenna (with Maimonides’ critique on Avicenna) and by Averroes. I also present Peter’s theory concerning the movers of the celestial orbs in his questions on ‘De caelo’, because this provides a good background for understanding the questions on the ‘Metaphysica’ I deal with. II.1 Aristotle In his ‘Metaphysica’ XII Aristotle tried to explain the motions of the heaven of the fixed stars (i.e., the first heaven) and of the seven planets (Saturn, utrum motor primus qui movet in ratione amati et desiderati sit perfectissimum et nobilissimum omnium entium (f. 97vb); utrum primum sit vita (f. 98ra). 7 Ms. Wien, Nationalbibliothek, 2330, f. 95ra (at the bottom of the left margin, besides the first additional question on book XII): Iste tres questiones sunt de reportatione antiqua; f. 97va (in the left inferior margin of the first additional question after q. 11): Iste tres et sequens sunt de antiqua reportatione. 8 For a description of these manuscripts, cf. Pelzer, Augustus, Codices Vaticani Latini. II. pars prior. Codices 679–1134, Città del Vaticano 1931, pp. 210–215; James, Montague Rhodes, A descriptive catalogue of the manuscripts in the library of Peterhouse, Cambridge 1899, pp. 179–180. 9 I would like to thank Fabrizio Amerini for sending me copies of the Cambridge-Manuscript.

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Jupiter, Mars, the sun, Mercury, Venus and the moon). He tried to take into account the daily motion from east to west in twenty-four hours, which is common to the stars and the planets, as well as the different motions of the planets, one of which is the slow periodic motion from west to east around the zodiacal poles.10 Aristotle identifies desire as the cause of the motion of the spheres, in order to explain how an immaterial mover can move a body without coming into contact with it. According to the traditional interpretation of ‘Metaphysica’ XII, 6–8, the first unmoved mover, which is eternal and good, is the object of thought of the first heaven, and, since knowing the first mover produces the desire for it, it is the object of desire. It moves the first heaven as a final cause, by being the object of desire and love. Only by being a final cause is the unmoved mover an efficient cause as well. Besides the first mover, there is a plurality of immovable movers. Since a single motion is produced by a single mover, which moves a single orb, each planet has multiple orbs and each orb is moved by its own immobile substance. The planets are carried around the earth by means of fifty-five concentric orbs. Each immobile substance also moves as a final cause by being loved and desired. The spheres desire to imitate the life of their movers.11 II.2 Avicenna and Maimonides In his ‘Metaphysica’, book IX, 2–3 Avicenna argues that there is a first principle or mover which moves the entire heavens (all spheres) by being

10 On Aristotle’s astronomical theories, cf. Easterling, H.J., Homocentric Spheres in De caelo, in: Phronesis 6 (1961), pp. 138–153, esp. 138–148. 11 For the traditional interpretation of Aristotle’s theory concerning the movers of the celestial orbs, cf. Ross, William David, Aristotle, London/New York, 1964 (1st ed. 1923), pp. 179–186; introduction by Ross, William David in: Aristotle, Metaphysics. A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary by William David Ross, I, Oxford 1970 (1st ed. 1924), pp. cxxx–cliv; Natali, Carlo, Cause motrice et cause finale dans le livre Lambda de la Métaphysique d’Aristote, in: Essais sur la théologie d’Aristote. Actes du colloque de Dijon, Eds. Bastit, Michel and Follon, Jacques, Louvain-la-Neuve 1998, pp. 29–50, esp. 48–49. Berti gives a historical survey of the different interpretations concerning the way in which the unmoved mover moves the heavens, cf. Berti, Enrico, Da chi è amato il motore immobile? Su Aristotele, Metaph. XII 6–7, in: Méthexis 10 (1997), pp. 59–82.

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loved.12 The first principle is conceived as a final cause of motion, but it is not the immediate mover of the first sphere. Each sphere, which consists of soul and body, has its own incorporeal intelligence. These intelligences also move as final causes by being loved by the soul of their own sphere. Avicenna holds that there are ten intelligences, which necessarily proceed from the first cause through successive, necessary emanations. The nine celestial spheres13 are each moved by their own intelligence. The tenth intelligence is the emanating cause of the matter of the sublunary world and of the natural forms appearing in matter and it is the cause of the actualisation of the human intellect. Avicenna’s emanationist necessitarianism is a solution to the philosophical problem raised by the Neoplatonic principle that from what is one and simple only what is one and simple can come to be. According to Avicenna, plurality derives from the first principle because the intelligences have plural thoughts. Through its eternal thought of itself, the first cause emanates the first intelligence. Each intelligence has three thoughts. It has the first cause as the object of its thought, and it thereby necessarily emanates the subsequent intelligence (e.g. the second intelligence proceeds from the first intelligence). The intelligence has a thought of itself, which includes both its being necessarily existent by reason of its cause and its being possibly existent by reason of itself, and it thereby emanates its sphere, which is composed of soul and body (e.g. the first intelligence emanates the outermost sphere, the second intelligence emanates the sphere of the fixed stars). The second intelligence

12 Cf. Avicenna Latinus, Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina V–X, Ed. Van Riet, Simone, Louvain/Leiden 1980, pp. 447–476. 13 Whereas Aristotle only attributes to the fixed stars a daily motion from east to west, an additional motion, discovered by Hipparchus, was known during the Middle Ages, which is the precession of the equinoxes of 1 degree in 100 years, producing a complete revolution of the sphere of the stars in 36,000 years. Different medieval philosophers, among them Avicenna and Peter of Auvergne, explain the precession of the equinoctial points by arguing for nine orbs. They assign the daily motion to a single orb, the ninth orb, which imposes its motion as an improper motion to all inferior spheres. In addition, they attribute to the other orbs a proper motion from west to east. The precession of the equinoxes is attributed to the eighth orb, i.e., the sphere of the fixed stars. Cf. Grant, Edward, Celestial Motions in the Late Middle Ages, in: Early Science and Medicine 2, 2 (1997), pp. 129–148; id., Planets, Stars, and Orbs. The Medieval Cosmos. 1200–1687, Cambridge 1994, pp. 315–323.

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similarly has these three thoughts and emanates the third intelligence and the body and soul of the second sphere, and so on.14 Maimonides criticises this emanationism by refuting the Neoplatonic principle on which Avicenna’s theory is based. If one accepts this proposition, one cannot explain how a composite celestial sphere can emanate from a simple intellect. Maimonides argues that the multiplicity in the world can be explained by referring to the principle that an agent acting by will can accomplish different acts. Hence creation cannot be understood as necessary emanation, but as caused by the divine will informed by divine wisdom. Yet within the sublunary world necessary causation is at work.15 II.3 Averroes In his commentary on ‘Metaphysica’ XII Averroes presents his own interpretation of Aristotle’s theory about the movers of the heavens.16 The first mover, which is the intellect of the first heaven (i.e., of the sphere of the fixed stars),17 moves as an efficient cause and as a final cause by being the object of desire of the first heaven. The first mover imparts the daily motion from east to west to the first heaven. Each celestial sphere below that of the fixed stars has its own mover, which is a soul that only possesses intellect and desire. The intellects do not move as final causes, but as efficient forms. The spheres below that of the fixed stars move from east to west because their intellects desire the first heaven. Their proper motion (from west to

14 Cf. Davidson, Herbert A., Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, on Intellect. Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intellect, and Theories of Human Intellect, New York/Oxford 1992, pp. 74–76. My explanation of Avicenna’s emanationism is almost literally derived from this study. 15 Cf. Hyman, Arthur, Maimonides on Creation and Emanation, in: Studies in Medieval Philosophy, Ed. Wippel, John. F. (Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy 17), Washington, D.C. 1987, pp. 45–61, esp. 59–61; id., From What is One and Simple only What is One and Simple Can Come to Be, in: Neoplatonism and Jewish Thought, Ed. Goodman, Lenn Evan (Studies in Neoplatonism 7), Albany, N.Y. 1992, pp. 111–135, esp. 111–113, 122. 16 Cf. Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis, VIII. Metaphysica (= Aver., In Metaph.), Venezia 1562 (Reprint Frankfurt a. M. 1962), XII, com. 29, f. 313–com. 50, f. 334. 17 Averroes rejects the assumption of a ninth celestial orb.

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east) is due to the desire of the intellects for the first mover.18 Each intellect thinks and desires a specific aspect of the first mover and as a consequence moves in a specific way. The first mover moves the sphere of the fixed stars. According to Averroes the supposition of a first substance transcending the mover of the sphere of the fixed stars (cf. Avicenna) is false; the first cause would exist in vain if it did not move a sphere. II.4 Peter’s Questions on ‘De caelo’ Three sets of questions on ‘De caelo’ have been preserved which are ascribed to Peter of Auvergne.19 In this contribution, I only refer to two of these sets. The CEK-questions, which date from the early 1270’s, can most probably (but not with certainty) be attributed to Peter.20 The WP-questions on ‘De caelo’, which are composed between 1277 and 1289 (or 1296), can with

18 Cf. Aver., In Metaph. (note 16), XII, com. 36, f. 318H–K; com. 37, f. 320H–I. My interpretation is based on Genequand’s introduction, in: Ibn Rushd, Metaphysics. A Translation with Introduction of Ibn Rushd’s Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Book Lam by Charles Genequand, Leiden 1986, pp. 33–48. The text of com. 37, f. 320E (Alia enim videntur esse electa et desyderata, propter alia, scilicet principia aliorum motuum coelestium praeter motum diurnum), in which it is said that the intellects are chosen and desired, suggests that the intellects are final causes. According to Genequand, electa et desyderata is a mistake of the Latin translators, who should have used an active form of the verbs. 19 Cf. Peter of Auvergne, Questions on Aristotle’s ‘De Caelo’. A Critical Edition with an Interpretative Essay by Griet Galle (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy. Series 1, 29), Leuven 2003, pp. 45*–82. 20 Edition of the CEK-questions: Musatti, Cesare Alberto, Pietro d’Alvernia e le ‘Quaestiones super librum De caelo et mundo’ contenute nei manoscritti di Cremona, Erlangen e Kassel: edizione del testo e analisi dottrinale, Catania 2000 (unpublished doctoral dissertation). On the dating of the CEK-questions, cf. ibid., chapter 4; id., Le citazioni del libro Lambda della ‘Metaphysica’ in un commento per questioni al ‘De caelo’ di Aristotele, in: Bulletin de philosophie médiévale 42 (2000), pp. 81–90; Donati (note 1), pp. 200–203. On the authorship of the CEK-questions, Galle, Griet, The Authorship of One of the Sets of Questions on ‘De Caelo’ Attributed to Peter of Auvergne (Mss. Cremona, Bibl. Governativa 80 (7.5.15), fols. 98ra–136ra, Erlangen, Universitätsbibl. 213, fols. 1ra–28rb, and Kassel, Stadt- und Landesbibl., Phys. 2° 11, fols. 35va–55rb), in: Medioevo 27 (2002), pp. 191–260.

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certainty be attributed to Peter.21 When I refer to Peter’s questions on ‘De caelo’ without further specification, I am discussing his WP-questions.22 In his questions on ‘De caelo’, Peter holds, referring to Averroes’ commentary on ‘Metaphysica’ XII, that there are two kinds of celestial movers: the first mover and the proper movers connected with each of the nine celestial orbs. The first mover or intellect moves as an end (finis) in ratione amati et desiderati, i.e., it moves because it is loved and desired by the intellects of the different spheres. Since all orbs are ordered to the first good, they have one motion in common: the daily motion from east to west. The first mover is in some sense an efficient cause (agens), namely insofar as it is the final cause of the (intellects of the) first orb and of the inferior orbs. The different proper motions of the celestial bodies come from different proper movers or intellects, which move as efficient causes in ratione amantis et desiderantis, i.e., they move by thinking and desiring the first, each of them in its own way.23

21 Edition of these question: Galle (note 19), pp. 1–376. For an addition concerning the manuscript tradition of the WP-questions, namely that some questions on book II and III are also contained in the Ms. Escorial, Biblioteca del Monasterio, h. II.I, ff. 106ra–129vb, cf. Musatti, Cesare Alberto, Peter of Auvergne and the Quaestiones on ‘De caelo’ in the Ms. Escorial, Biblioteca del Monasterio h. II 1, ff. 106ra–129vb, in this volume. 22 On the complicated and confusing theory of the celestial movers in the CEKquestions, cf. Musatti, Cesare Alberto, Celestial Movers and Animation of the Heavens in one Commentary on Aristotle’s ‘De caelo’ Ascribed to Peter of Auvergne, in: Intellect et imagination dans la Philosophie Médiévale. Actes du XIe Congrès International de Philosophie Médiévale de la Société Internationale pour l’Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale (Porto, du 26 au 31 août 2002), Eds. Cândida Pacheco, Maria and Meirinhos, José F., Turnhout 2006, III, pp. 1447–1461. 23 Cf. Galle (note 19), pp. 203*–205*; Peter of Auvergne, Qu. DC (note 19) II, q. 16, pp. 193–195; q. 18, pp. 200–201.

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III. Discussion of Peter’s Questions 8–11 on ‘Metaphysica’ XII and Comparison with his Questions on ‘De caelo’ I shall examine Peter’s view on the first mover, on its relation with the primum mobile and on the other celestial movers, as it is presented in his questions 8 to 11 on ‘Metaphysica’ XII, which are edited in the appendix to this article (for the sake of clearness, question 11 will be discussed before question 10). Peter’s main sources of these questions are Averroes’ and Aquinas’ commentary on the ‘Metaphysica’. I shall compare Peter’s theory with the views he defends in his questions on ‘De caelo’, because Peter’s questions on the ‘Metaphysica’ and on ‘De caelo’ seem to be based on the same theory concerning the movers of the heavens and because obscure or brief passages in the questions on the ‘Metaphysica’ can be elucidated by means of the arguments in the questions on ‘De caelo’ and vice versa. III.1 Is the first principle immobile? In ‘Metaphysica’ XII, 6 (1071b37) Aristotle mentions that according to Plato the source of motion moves itself.24 Aristotle, on the contrary, holds that the first mover is an eternal immobile substance (1071b4–7; 1072a24–26). Because of this contradiction between two authorities, Peter investigates whether the first principle is totally immobile (question 8). III.1.1 Two signifcations of ‘motion’ Peter argues that ‘immobile’ is said because of the privation of motion and that ‘motion’ is said in two ways: (1) Aristotle frequently speaks about motion in the proper sense, which is the act of a being in potentiality (‘Physica’ III, 1, 201a10–11). A being in potentiality is imperfect and hence motion is the act of an imperfect being, of a being in potentiality to perfection. Motion in the proper sense goes from a contrary towards a contrary and through a middle member. (2) Plato and his followers use the term 24 Cf. Simplicius, In Aristotelis De Caelo Commentaria, Ed. Heiberg, Johan Ludvig (Commentaria in Aristototelem Graeca 7), Berlin 1894, III, 2, p. 585, ll. 1–3 (Latin translation: In ‘De caelo’ III: Derde boek van Simplicius’ commentaar ‘In De caelo’ in Latijnse vertaling van Willem van Moerbeke. Kritische uitgave, Ed. Mariën, Bruno, licentieverhandeling Leuven, promoter: Fernand Bossier, 1986, unpublished, p. 124, ll. 10–11); cf. Plato, Nomoi X, 894e–898d.

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‘motion’ in the improper or general sense by extending it to whatever operation. Motion in this sense is the perfection of a being in act. When one says, for example, that an intellect is moved by an intelligible thing, one means that an intellect is perfected by it. The distinction between motion in the proper and in the general sense is also present in Aquinas’ works 25 and is based on Aristotle’s ‘De anima’ II (5, 417b5–16), to which Peter refers. III.1.2 The first mover is immobile in the proper sense, but mobile in the general sense Is the first principle immobile in Peter’s opinion? (1) If we speak about motion in the proper sense, the first principle is totally immobile, for the following reasons. Everything that is moved is a body, which is divisible, because it is partly in its starting point and partly in its ending point. Yet the first principle is not a body. Further, everything that is moved in the proper sense is moved insofar as it is imperfect and has a passive potentiality, but in the first principle there is no imperfection and no passive potentiality. Next, everything that is mobile is mobile by something else, and this mover is prior to the moved. Yet nothing is prior to the first mover. Peter holds that Aristotle means this when he proves in ‘Metaphysica’ XII that the first principle is a totally immobile and eternal substance and when he argues in ‘Physica’ VIII (6, 258b10–16) that there is something that moves eternally but is neither moved per se nor per accidens. (2) If we speak about motion in the general sense, the first principle is mobile and is even moved, for the following reasons. If the first mover has the operation of the most perfect being, it is moved by such a motion, which is the perfection of a being in act. Further, according to Plato, everything that is moved by something else is traced back to something that is first moved by itself, in which the first mover and the first moved are the same. The heavens do not move by themselves, because the mover and the moved are not the same: a part moves and another part is moved. The first principle is something in which the first mover and the first moved are the same.

25 Cf. for example in: Thomas Aquinas, Opera Omnia, IV. Pars prima Summae Theologiae a quaestione I ad quaestionem XLIX (Ed. Leonina), Roma 1888, I, q. 18, art. 1, responsio, p. 225b: [...] sive accipiatur motus proprie, sicut motus dicitur actus imperfecti, idest existentis in potentia; sive motus accipiatur communiter prout motus dicitur actus perfecti, prout intelligere et sentire dicitur moveri, ut dicitur in III ‘De anima’ (cf. Arist., De an. III, 4, 429a16–18; 7, 431a4–7).

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III.1.3 Reconciliation of Plato (first mover moves itself) and Aristotle (first mover is immobile) Peter tries to explain why Aristotle argues against Plato’s opinion that the first mover moves itself. Since Aristotle speaks about motion in the first sense and rarely mentions motion in the second sense, he refutes in ‘Metaphysica’ XII Plato’s opinion. In ‘Physica’ VII, 1 and VIII, 5–6 he argues that everything that is moved is moved by something else, which is traced back to what is moved by itself. Contrary to Plato, he holds that the heavens are moved by themselves because a part of them moves and another is moved. Aristotle concludes that one must not further proceed to another mover that is moved, but that one must stop at the first immobile mover. Plato, who uses ‘motion’ in the second sense, is convinced that the first mover, namely the soul, moves itself, because it acts and operates, i.e., it thinks itself. By thinking and willing itself, the soul moves the body.26 Peter notes that when Aristotle refutes Plato, he does not proceed according to Plato’s intention. Peter continues by clarifying the controversy and agreement between Aristotle and Plato. In his opinion, they only disagree with respect to the signification of the word ‘motion’. They agree on two points. First, speaking about motion in the proper sense, one must come to a first mover that is totally immobile. Just as Aristotle meant that no body (corpus) could be first moved by itself with a motion in the proper sense, in the same way Plato meant this, because what first moves itself, first turns itself back to itself, as Proclus proves. But no body can turn itself back to itself and hence no body can move itself first. (The reader can add here that the incorporeal intellect can move itself). Secondly, everything that is moved per accidens or according to participation is traced back to something that is moved per se and according to its essence. Things that are moved in the sublunary world are traced back to the first principle, whose substance is motion. The first mover is moved by itself, but not by the same species of motion as the sublunary beings, but by a more perfect species, which is prior according to substance. Plato’s argument is true according to the intention of Aristotle, unless Aristotle spoke about motion with another signification. Peter’s reconciliation of Plato, who holds that the first mover moves itself, and Aristotle, who defends the thesis that the first is immobile, could

26 Cf. Plato, Nomoi X, 895e–898c.

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be inspired by Aquinas,27 who is at this point influenced by the Neoplatonic tradition (Plotinus, Simplicius, Proclus, Pseudo-Dionysius and Averroes, who is influenced by Ammonius or Themistius).28 The reconciliation between Plato’s opinion that the first mover is moved by itself and Aristotle’s view that the heavens are what is first moved by itself, is also present in Peter’s questions on ‘De caelo’, though in a briefer form. In one of the objections to the thesis that the heavens are animated because they are moved by themselves, Peter refers to Plato’s opinion that what is first moved by itself is the first mover, which is an intellect. Peter adds that there is not a real difference of opinion between Plato, who holds that the intellect is what is first moved by itself, and Aristotle, who states that the heavens are what is first moved by itself.29 In his questions on ‘De caelo’, Peter tries on several occasions to bring into agreement seemingly contradicting statements of Plato and Aristotle. He does this under the influence of Simplicius’ commentary on ‘De caelo’ and of Aquinas’ commentary on ‘De caelo’, which has also been influenced by Simplicius’ commentary.30 III.2 The first principle moves as an end (as something desirable) According to Aristotle, the first mover moves by being the object of thought and desire (1072a24–30). Peter investigates whether the first principle moves as an end (finis), as something desirable (question 9). 27 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Opera Omnia, XIII. Summa contra gentiles Lib. I et II (Ed. Leonina), Roma 1918, I, 13, p. 31b; id., Opera Omnia, II. Commentaria in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis (Ed. Leonina), Roma 1884, VII, 1, lect. 1, pp. 323b–324b, n. 7; VIII, 1, lect. 2, p. 371a, n. 16. 28 On the reconciliation (in the Neoplatonic tradition and Aquinas) of Plato and Aristotle by the notion of ‘motionless motion’, cf. Hankey, Wayne J., Aquinas and the Platonists, in: The Platonic Tradition in the Middle Ages. A Doxographic Approach, Eds. Gersh, Stephen and Hoenen, Maarten J.F.M., Berlin/ New York 2002, pp. 279–324, esp. 300–304. 29 Cf. Galle (note 19), pp. 101*–102*; pp. 214*–215*; Peter of Auvergne, Qu. DC (note 19), II, q. 31 (utrum corpora superiora sint animata vel ipsum celum sit animatum), pp. 258–259, ll. 207–213: Vel dicendum secundum Platonem quod primum motum ex se est primum movens in quo est ratio intelligendi, et intellectus et eius substantia essentialiter non distinguuntur; et ideo ad ipsum reducuntur omnia mota. Philosophus autem ponens motum localem motum primum, videns celum motu locali primo moveri, dixit celum esse primum motum. Et ideo inter istos non est recte controversia. 30 Cf. Galle (note 19), pp. 98*–102*; pp. 111*–114*.

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III.2.1 The heavens are moved by knowledge and desire Peter argues, following Avicenna’s ‘Metaphysica’ IX, 2, that the first motion of the heavens cannot be purely violent nor purely natural.31 It cannot be purely violent, because the motion of the heavens is perpetual and uniform, but nothing that is violent is perpetual and a violent motion is not uniform. The first motion of the heavens cannot be purely natural either. What is moved by a natural motion, like the heavy and light bodies, is moved to some natural place and is not moved away from it except by violence. The heavens, which have different places, are ‘naturally’ moved out of some place to some place, and hence their motion is not simply natural. Since every motion is either natural or violent or made by knowledge (1071b35–36), the motion of the heavens is caused by something that moves by knowledge. The heavens are not moved by sensitive knowledge, for in the celestial region there are no sensible qualities. They are moved by something that moves by intellect and knowledge. Yet intellect is not the proximate mover, for intellect only moves through the medium of desire. First the intellect judges something to be good and the desire is immediately guided by this good. Yet desire only moves when it is moved by the desirable and the intelligible. Hence the heavens are first moved by the first desirable, which is related to them as an end. The first desirable is the first intelligible, which is the first simple substance. One may suppose that, when Peter argues that the heavens are moved by something that moves by intellect, he is referring to the proper movers or intellects, which move by knowing and desiring the first mover. In his WP-questions on ‘De caelo’ Peter also holds that the first mover moves as an end.32 Yet while Peter here follows Avicenna’s thesis that the heavens are not moved naturally, he argues in his question on ‘De caelo’ “whether the motion of the heavens is natural” against Avicenna’s position. Peter objects that Avicenna’s proposition that “whatever is moved naturally is moved away from an unnatural position towards a natural position” is true with respect to simple bodies insofar as they are in the state of their becoming (in fieri) or in transmutation, but not insofar as they are in the state of their completion (in facto esse). Insofar as they are in facto esse, their acts happen in their natural places. Hence the proposition is not true with

31 Cf. Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima (note 12), IX, 2, p. 447, l. 52–p. 448, l. 79; p. 449, ll. 98–1. 32 Cf. Peter of Auvergne, Qu. DC (note 19), II, q. 18, pp. 200–201, ll. 24–26.

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respect to the heavens because they are a perfect body. The heavens do not move to their own place, but in their place. Peter continues by reporting that Avicenna thereafter changes his position and adds that the heavens are moved naturally. The reason Avicenna gives is that the heavens have an inclination towards their mover, and inclination is a kind of nature.33 The author of the CEK-questions on ‘De caelo’ (probably Peter) develops in his question “whether the first mover is particularly related to the first orb to move it” an argument that is very similar to the argument in the question on the ‘Metaphysica’. He argues that, according to Avicenna, the motion of the heavens is neither violent nor natural in the proper sense and that, hence, the heavens are moved by a soul, which is moved by will or desire.34 III.2.2 The first principle is the finis cuius of all beings In his questions on the ‘Metaphysica’ (question 9, ad argumentum 1), Peter specifies in which sense the first principle is an ‘end’. Like Aquinas, he

33 Cf. Galle (note 19), pp. 222*–223*; Peter of Auvergne, Qu. DC (note 19), I, q. 7 (utrum motus celi sit naturalis), pp. 51–52, ll. 64–71: Quando arguitur “omne quod movetur naturaliter movetur ab innaturali dispositione ad naturalem”, dico quod ista propositio intelligenda est de corporibus simplicibus secundum quod sunt in fieri vel in transmutatione, non tamen in facto esse, quia actus ipsorum ut sunt in facto esse sunt in locis naturalibus, quamvis per violentiam extra locum naturalem detineri possint. Non tamen est propositio intelligenda de corpore ente in actu simpliciter et maxime de ipso celo, cum sit corpus perfectum. 34 Cf. Peter of Auvergne, Qu. DC, Ed. Musatti (note 20), II, q. 17 (utrum motor primus approprietur ad movendum orbem primum): Ad hoc dicitur, secundum Avicennam, quod motus celi non est violentus cum sit eternus, et nullum violentum eternum ; nec etiam est proprie naturalis sicut gravium et levium, quod non fit a dispositione innaturali ad dispositionem naturalem, ad quam cum pervenit quiescit. [...] Relinquitur igitur quod motus celi est ab anima: anima autem non movet nisi per voluntatem, vel appetitum. Voluntas enim non movet nisi mota ab appetibili; propter quod in celo necesse est ponere motorem unum qui movet in ratione amati et desiderati, et hoc est motor primus, ut patet ex duodecimo ‘Metaphyisice’. The striking parallel between this passage in the CEK-questions on ‘De caelo’ and Peter’s question on the ‘Metaphysica’ could also be an indication that Peter is the author of the CEKquestions.

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argues that there are two types of finis.35 (1) The finis cuius is the end that exists before the motion towards this end and before the thing that is moved. This end is separate (separatus) from the thing that is moved and is not induced by the motion. The place down is, for example, the finis cuius of the heavy bodies. (2) The finis quo is a perfection of the thing that is directed towards the finis cuius. This end is connected with (coniunctus) the thing that is moved. The motion towards a place downwards is, for example, the finis quo of the heavy bodies. (1) The first principle is the finis cuius of all beings. The objection that the first principle does not move as an end because it is immaterial (and immobile) and in immobile beings there is no end (for there is no motion), is not valid. The finis cuius is present in beings that are separate from every kind of motion. (2) The first mover is only the finis quo of itself, not of other things. In this second sense, the different beings have different ends because they have different perfections. The perfection of these ends is observed in relation to the finis cuius. In one of his questions on ‘De caelo’ Peter uses the distinction between finis cuius and finis quo in order to explain that the perfection of the located body is not its place, but to be in its place. Being in its place (not moving to its place, as in the questions on the ‘Metaphysica’) is the chief end or the finis quo of a body and its first or intrinsic perfection. Its place as such is the end that follows the chief end; it is the finis cuius or its secondary and extrinsic perfection.36

35 Thomas Aquinas, In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio, Eds. Cathala, M. Raymundus and Spiazzi, Raimondo, Torino/Roma 1964, XII, 7, lect. VII, p. 591, n. 2528. 36 Cf. Galle (note 19), pp. 263*–264*; Peter of Auvergne, Qu. DC (note 19), IV, q. 4 (utrum locus sit perfectio corporis locati), p. 344, l. 47–p. 345, l. 57: Ad secundum, cum dicitur quod locus est sicut finis, dicendum quod finis est duplex: finis quo et finis cuius, ut scribitur multoties ab Aristotele II Physicorum et alibi. Finis quo est illud quo perficitur aliquid per principium rei intrinsecum. Finis autem cuius est quo perficitur unumquodque participans illud, [...]. Et isto modo Deus est finis cuius per principia extrinseca rei gratia cuius et in cuius ratione omnia alia fieri videntur. Eodem modo dicendum est quod locus non est finis quo per principia intrinseca, sed est finis cuius per rei extrinseca principia, activus finis intrinseci, esse locati in loco. On the distinction between finis quo and finis cuius in Peter’s questions and commentary on ‘De caelo’ and in the (anonymous) commentary on the ‘Physica’, of which Peter is probably the author, cf. Cecilia Trifogli’s contribution in this book.

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III.2.3 The first cause is an efficient and final cause In his questions on the ‘Metaphysica’ (question 9, ad argumentum 2), Peter further distinguishes between the end according to its being (secundum esse) and according to its conception (secundum intentionem). The end (finis), which is found in the end (terminus) of motion, is the last according to its being and cannot be the cause of motion. Yet according to its conception (preconceived in the soul) the end is the principle of motion: it is the cause that sets the agent in action. One could object that, since efficient and final causes are different, and the first cause, which is the principle of motion, is an efficient cause, it cannot be a final cause. Peter refutes this objection by means of an argument based on Averroes’ commentary on the ‘Metaphysica’ (ad argumentum 3).37 According to Averroes, in beings that act by the will, the difference between efficient and final cause only exists because of matter. Averroes and Peter illustrate this by means of a comparison with the form of the baths, which is the cause of a man’s desire to go to the baths. The form of the baths that is present in the intellect is the efficient cause. The form of the baths that is in matter (i.e. the real baths) is the final cause. If the form of the baths did not exist in matter, then it would be efficient and final cause in the same respect. Therefore, in things that are separate from matter, the ultimate end is the same as the first efficient cause. In the first principle, which only desires itself, this is most of all the case: the first is an efficient cause of motion because it is an end. This end is totally identical with the first. As stated above, in his questions on ‘De caelo’ Peter also states that the first mover is a final as well as an efficient cause of the motion of the heavens. III.3 The primum mobile has a proper mover Aristotle states that there are fifty-five spheres and that there are as many immovable substances of the spheres as there are spheres (1074a14–24). With respect to this passage, Peter investigates whether the primum mobile is only moved by the first mover or whether it has a proper mover as well. Formulated more technically: whether one must accept as true that besides the separate mover, which moves as an end, there is another mover, which is connected and moves as an efficient cause (question 11). 37 Cf. Aver., In Metaph. (note 16), XII, com. 36, f. 318I–K; Genequand, Charles (note 18), p. 37.

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Peter argues that the primum mobile has its proper mover. He holds that the first mover (God), which is separate, moves as a final cause, whereas the proper mover, that is particularly related to and connected with its orb, moves as an efficient cause. According to Peter this view is in agreement with Aristotle’s words, for it was Aristotle’s intention that the number of proper (not of separate) movers equals the number of mobile spheres. Peter defends the position that each sphere has its proper mover by means of two arguments. (1) Because the first mover only moves insofar as it is loved and thought (inquantum amatum et cognitum), there must be another mover that loves and thinks and, consequently, moves in ratione amantis et desiderantis. Peter adds that Simplicius in his commentary on ‘De caelo’ I holds that it is necessary to stipulate these two (kinds of) movers. Indeed, Simplicius comments there that, according to Aristotle’s ‘Metaphysica’ XII, the fixed sphere is moved by the first substance, but each wandering sphere by an immobile, eternal substance. He reacts against Alexander of Aphrodisias, who states that according to Aristotle’s ‘Metaphysica’ the mover of the revolving body is single and who doubts as to why one first mover could not move more revolving bodies, if they move out of desire for it as an object of love.38 (2) Peter’s second argument for the thesis that the primum mobile has its proper mover is inspired by Averroes’ commentary on ‘Metaphysica’ XII, to which he refers.39 The mover of the primum mobile that moves in ratione amantis et desiderantis must be particularly related to the primum mobile. In 38 Cf. Simplicius, In DC (note 24), I, 8, p. 270, ll. 9–18. Latin translation: Simplicius, Commentaire sur le traité ‘Du ciel’ d’Aristote. Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke, I, édition critique par Fernand Bossier, avec la collaboration de Christine Vande Veire and Guy Guldentops (Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum 8, 1), Leuven 2004, p. 374, ll. 88–p. 375, l. 11: In ‘Metaphisica’ autem, ut ait Alexander, ostendit quod unum est hoc motivum circulo feribilis corporis; [...] In quibus dubitat Alexander propter quam causam unum existens primum movens non poterit et plura circulo mobilia corpora movere, siquidem movebit desiderio sui ipsius et ut amatum; nichil enim prohibet plura appetere idem. [...] Exigo igitur primum quidem attendere quod non ait Aristotiles unum esse motivum circulariter mobilis corporis, sed simplicem quidem lationem que eius que sine errore a prima substantia moveri ait, unamquamque autem erraticarum moveri ab immobili et eterna substantia. Scribit autem in undecimo ‘Metaphisice’ hec: [...]. For an English translation, cf. Simplicius, On Aristotle On the Heavens 1.5–9, translated by Hankinson, Robert J., London 2004, p. 92, l. 6–p. 93, l. 28. 39 Cf. Aver., In Metaph. (note 16), XII, com. 41, f. 324E–F.

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its power to move, the first mover does not have a determined proportion to the primum mobile, for the first mover has an infinite power, whereas the motion of the primum mobile has a finite velocity. Hence there must be a proper mover of the primum mobile which has in its power to move a determined proportion to the primum mobile, i.e., which has a finite power. From the separate mover the primum mobile has a continuous motion that will never cease in some posterior time. From its proximate mover it has motion in time with a finite velocity. The power to move flows from the separate mover into the proper movers. Peter explains (question 10, ad argumentum 2) with respect to the relation between the mover and its orb that, as there should be a proportion between the mobile and the mover that is an efficient (but not a final) cause, there is a symmetry between the orb and its proper mover; as there should be no symmetry between the mobile and a mover that is an end, there is no symmetry between the primum mobile and the first mover, which has an infinite power. In his questions on ‘De caelo’ Peter defends the same view in “whether the first mover moves the primum mobile”. He argues there that there are two kinds of movers in the heavens, but he ascribes the distinction between the two movers to Averroes’ commentary on ‘Metaphysica’ XII instead of to Simplicius.40 In this question on ‘De caelo’ Peter also defends, by means of the argument of the determined proportion between the mover and the

40 Cf. Galle (note 19), pp. 202*–205*; pp. 206*–207*; Peter of Auvergne, Qu. DC (note 19), II, q. 18 (utrum motor primus moveat primum mobile), p. 200, ll. 21–25: Sed in caelo est duplex motor. Unus scilicet movens in ratione amati et desiderati et alius in ratione amantis et desiderantis, et hoc dicit Averroes supra XII ‘Metaphysicae’. Movens autem in ratione amati et desiderati non est motor appropriatus, sed est sicut finis. In the anonymous questions on the ‘Physica’ which can probably be attributed to Peter, the distinction between the two movers of the heavens is also attributed to Simplicius. Cf. Siger de Brabant, Questions sur la physique d’Aristote, Ed. Delhaye, Philippe (Les Philosophes Belges 15), Louvain 1941, VIII, q. 24, p. 229: Dico quod primus motor duplex est. Quidam enim est qui movet in ratione amati et desiderati, et sic dicimus quod primum movens movet caelum, sicut apparet ex Duodecimo Metaphysicae. Et quia amatum et desideratum non movet nisi quia est aliquid movens in ratione amantis et desiderantis, ideo necesse est esse aliud movens quod movet quia amans et desiderans, et hoc dicit Simplicius. In manuscript W of the questions on the ‘Metaphysica’ the distinction between the two movers is attributed to the commentary on ‘De caelo’ I by the Commentator. It is not clear whether Commentator refers to Simplicius or to

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mobile, that the primum mobile has its own proper mover. In his questions on the ‘Metaphysica’ his view is expressed in a more elaborate and clearer way.41 Peter’s view that the primum mobile has its own proper mover is in agreement with Avicenna’s opinion, to which he refers in both works, but his thesis that the proper movers move as efficient causes contradicts Avicenna’s thesis that the proper movers move as final causes. Peter does not seem to be aware of the fact that (or does not explicitly state that) his position that the primum mobile has its own mover is in disagreement with the view of Simplicius and Averroes. Peter concludes his solution to question 11 on the ‘Metaphysica’ by noting that according to some commentators, like Avicenna and Averroes, the proper mover is a soul of the heavens. In Avicenna’s opinion, it is connected to the heaven as its form and perfection, in Averroes’ view it is separate in being, but connected to the heavens as its mover. Peter holds that the first mover is particularly related to (appropriatus) the primum mobile because it is apt to move the primum mobile and the primum mobile is apt to be moved by it. In his questions on ‘De caelo’, in which Peter extensively discusses the question as to whether the heavens are animated, Peter refutes the opinion of Avicenna and Averroes concerning the soul of the heavens and argues that the movers of the heavens can only be called souls in an equivocal sense. He argues that the immaterial substances are separate and not connected to the celestial bodies as their forms, act or perfection. The celestial movers are particularly related to their mobile bodies because they are not apt to move something else and because the celestial bodies are not apt to be moved by something else. It is striking that in his question on the ‘Metaphysica’ Peter does not refer to the position of Simplicius and Alexander, which he discusses at length in his questions on ‘De caelo’.42 Averroes. If it means ‘Averroes’, one would expect a reference to his commentary on ‘Metaphysica’ XII. If it refers to Simplicius, it is odd that the Ms. uses the confusing Commentator, while on other places it refers to Simplicius. 41 Cf. Peter of Auvergne, Qu. DC (note 19), II, q. 18, p. 201, ll. 42–46: habet autem motus caeli ex ipso quod sit infinitae virtutis, et hoc in duratione. Quod autem determinate moveatur et non in instanti, hoc non habet ex illo motore, sed ex motore appropriato; et haec est intentio Averrois supra XII Metaphysicae, qui istum duplicem motorem distinguit. 42 Cf. Galle (note 19), pp. 213*–221; ead., Peter of Auvergne’s Discussion concerning the Animation of the Heavens, in: Intellect et imagination dans la Philosophie Médiévale (note 22), pp. 1463–1475; Peter of Auvergne, Qu. DC

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III.4 The relation between the first mover and the primum mobile Because according to Aristotle all celestial orbs are moved by movers that are particularly related to them (1073a26–b1), Peter investigates whether the first mover is particularly related to the primum mobile in order to move it (question 10). Is there a special relation between the first mover and the primum mobile? III.4.1 Avicenna’s opinion that the first mover is not particularly related to the primum mobile Peter starts by discussing Avicenna’s opinion and notes that Averroes mentions Avicenna’s view here in his commentary. Peter explains that, according to Avicenna, the first (principle) is one and from one thing can only proceed one thing immediately.43 Hence the first mover cannot immediately be the principle of many things. But from the mover that is particularly related to the primum mobile, there must proceed different things. Its mover must be the cause of everything that is in the primum mobile: of its substance, its soul and its motion. Hence the first mover cannot produce these different things immediately. From the first mover immediately proceeds some intelligence that moves the first heaven. Because this intelligence recedes from the simplicity of the first cause, it can be the cause of different things. Insofar as it thinks the first, it produces the second intelligence; insofar as it approaches the nature of composition and some diversity, it is the cause of the motion of the primum mobile. The second intelligence causes the third intelligence and the motion in the mobile orb that is particularly related to the second intelligence, and so on.44 The first mover moves in ratione amati et desiderati and is the universal end of all inferior movers (or intelligences). All intelligences that come after the first simple substance move in ratione amantis et desiderantis. By explaining Avicenna in this way, Peter misinterprets Avicenna’s view according to which each intelligence moves the soul of its sphere as a final cause by being desired. Peter seems to suppose that Avicenna shares his own theory. Yet, in another place (ll. 45–48) he suggests that, according to Avicenna, the first intelligence is the final cause of the lower intelligences: the first intelligence moves the first heaven in ratione amati et desiderati with respect to the inferior movers. Peter concludes that, according to Avicenna, it is not the first mover that is particularly related to the primum mobile, but the intelligence that proceeds immediately from the first mover. The first mover is not particularly related to anything insofar as it is, as an end, the common mover of all things. Peter refutes the principle, on which Avicenna’s argument is based, that ab uno non procedit nisi unum. III.4.2 Refutation of Avicenna’s principle that from one thing can only proceed one thing III.4.2.1 Refutation by Maimonides Peter gives a detailed analysis of Maimonides’ refutation of the proposition ab uno non procedit nisi unum. Maimonides starts, Peter explains, from several assumptions. First Maimonides supposes (accipit pro hypothesi) that from one being only one being proceeds. From a composite being insofar as it is one, only one being proceeds. If diverse things proceed from a composite being, this is insofar as it produces one thing through one part and another thing through another part. Maimonides further assumes that in the starry heavens there is a great diversity (The heavens are composed of matter and form, of substance and accidents; there is a difference among the celestial bodies and among the power of the celestial bodies). He also assumes that all celestial things have a cause per se. Hence each diversity in the heavens has a cause per se that is prior to the heavens. 44 Cf. Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima (note 12), IX, 2, p. 455, ll. 4–14; p. 463, l. 78–p. 464, l. 86; 3, p. 474, l. 97–p. 476, l. 36; 4, p. 481, ll. 50–51.

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Maimonides’ refutation of the hypothesis that from one being only one being proceeds is advanced as follows. The cause of the diversity in the heavens either (1) is totally simple and singular or (2) has diversity in it. If one accepts (1), then from one simple being, many things can proceed immediately, which counters the hypothesis. If one accepts (2), then (a) either in the cause there is as much diversity as in the heavens, or (b) this is not the case. If (b), then not every diversity in the effect is reduced to a diversity in the cause. Since each diversity in the heavens has a prior cause, then there will be some cause that is one with respect to this diversity. This contradicts the hypothesis. If (a), there will be a prior cause of this diversity and one can ask the same question. If (b), one has to confirm the proposition that one being can be the cause of diverse beings. If (a), either one proceeds in infinitum, which is impossible, or one arrives at a cause that is singular and simple and can immediately cause many beings.45 In his questions on ‘De caelo’ Peter also refutes this adage by referring to Maimonides’ argument, though much more briefly.46 45 Cf. Moses Maimonides, Dux seu Director dubitantium aut perplexorum, Ed. Augustinus Justinianus, Paris 1520 (Reprint Frankfurt a.M. 1964), II, 21–23, f. 52v–54r. Maybe Peter’s quotation is derived from another translation or relates to another treatise based on Maimonides’ work, cf. following note. 46 Cf. Galle (note 19), pp. 182*–183*; Peter of Auvergne, Qu. DC (note 19), I, q. 14 (utrum caelo sit aliquid contrarium), p. 82, ll. 83–94: Et quando dicit Philosophus: “ab uno inquantum unum non procedit nisi unum forte”, hoc esset negandum. Unde et rabbi Moyses in libello ‘De rationibus perpetuitatis motus’ arguit sic, contra illud dictum Philosophi: sumamus aliquem effectum; ille effectus aut habet in se aliqualem diversitatem, aut non. Si sic, quaeratur de eius causa, utrum diversitatem habeat vel non. Si sic, iterum de eius causa, et sic erit processus in infinitum, vel erit devenire ad primam causam quae sit causa diversorum, vel potest dici quod non omnis diversitas est a diversis, sed diversitas unde causatur ex eodem. Stella enim una secundum diversos eius situs causa est diversorum effectuum. Illam tamen causalitatem quam habet semper in primam reducere oportet. Görge K. Hasselhoff refers to this passage in: Dicit Rabbi Moyses. Studien zum Bild von Moses Maimonides im lateinischen Westen vom 13. bis zum 15. Jahrhundert, second extended edition, Würzburg 2004, pp. 402–403 and note 10 (I would like to thank the author for pointing me to his discussion of this passage in the epilogue to the second edition of his study). He notes that the title ‘De rationibus perpetuitatis motus’, which has no equivalent in other edited texts, needs a clarification. He adds that it should be checked whether the passage in the ‘Dux neutrorum’ to which I refer is correct and suggests that Peter could have used the

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III.4.2.2 Refutation by Averroes and Peter Peter follows Averroes in his criticism of the emanation theory of Avicenna and of the principle that from one only one proceeds. Referring to the refutation Averroes provides in his commentary on the ‘Metaphysica’, he argues that the principle ab uno non procedit nisi unum does not seem totally true, especially in separate beings. In separate beings the cause is the intellect (or thinking) and the effect is the intelligible. Hence, if in separate beings something can have the power to think many things, it will not be unreasonable that many things proceed from one thing.47 Peter concludes that the proposition ab uno procedit tantum unum is true in things that act by nature, but not necessarily in things that act by intellect and will. The first cause is able to think many things by means of one concept. It thinks one thing per se and first, namely itself (its own substance) and by its relation to other things it can think other things. (In other words: in the first cause, one concept of thought is different according to different relations.) Yet this difference of relations does not cause a difference in the first cause, nor does it add something to the first cause. Since the first cause can think many things by means of one concept, it can produce many things immediately by one power.48 Peter’s refutation of the Neoplatonic principle ab uno procedit tantum unum is in agreement with the condemnations of 1277. The proposition “that it is impossible that from one first agent a multitude of effects proceed” ‘Liber de uno deo benedicto’, in favour of which is the name ‘libellus’ and the content (motus, causa). The passage in the ‘Dux neutrorum’ has parallels with the presentation of Maimonides’ argument in Peter’s questions on ‘De caelo’ and on the ‘Metaphysica’, but Peter’s description indeed also contains many elements that are not contained in this passage. Yet the ‘Liber de uno deo benedicto’, a translation of the introduction and the first chapter of book II of the ‘Dux neutrorum’, does not seem to be the source either. For the edition of the ‘Liber de uno deo benedicto’, cf. Kluxen, Wolfgang, Rabbi Moyses (Maimonides): Liber de uno deo benedicto, in: Judentum im Mittelalter. Beiträge zum christlich-jüdischen Gespräch, Ed. Wilpert, Paul (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 4), Berlin 1966, pp. 167–182. Maybe there was circulating a (still unknown) translation of another part of the ‘Dux neutrorum’ or a small treatise based on a part of the ‘Dux neutrorum’? 47 Cf. Aver., In Metaph. (note 16), XII, com. 44, f. 327I–K. 48 Peter here seems to have reversed Averroes’ argument. Averroes argues that the first intellect can be the cause of many things insofar as the different movers of the celestial orbs think various aspects of the first intellect. Cf. Aver., In Metaph. (note 16), XII, com. 44, f. 327K–L.

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was condemned.49 In his questions on ‘De caelo’ Peter also distinguishes between the realm of beings that act through intellect, in which one cause can produce different effects, and the realm of natural beings, in which one cause can produce only one effect. He refutes the adage if it is applied to the realm of beings that act through intellect.50 III.4.3 The first mover is particularly (first and most principally) related to the primum mobile In his answer to the question “whether the first mover is particularly related to the primum mobile in order to move it as an end” Peter says that, as it seems to be the intention of Aristotle and Averroes, ‘the first mover is particularly related to the primum mobile’ can be understood in two ways: (1) the first mover is apt to move the primum mobile and nothing else, and (2) the first mover belongs first and most principally to the primum mobile, but by the mediation of the primum mobile, it moves the others. (1) The first mover is not particularly related to the primum mobile and to nothing else. If the first mover, as an end, would be particularly related to the primum mobile, one would have a problem explaining the motion of the inferior orbs. When they move their mobile bodies, all movers (efficient causes) aim at some end. The inferior orbs are moved because of separate ends, which all aim at one last end, the first mover. If it would not be the case that all inferior orbs are moved because of separate ends that all aim at one separate end, then the universe would not be one, and this is unreasonable. Hence, just as the first mover, as an end, moves the primum mobile, it moves all other mobile things. The first mover moves all other orbs besides the primum mobile insofar as the movers of the inferior orbs receive from the first mover the notions of the good and of the desirable and the power of movement. Whereas Peter here speaks about the proper movers as separate ends, he usually holds that there is only one separate mover, namely the first mover. He probably describes them as separate here because they 49 Cf. La condamnation Parisienne de 1277. Nouvelle édition du texte latin, traduction, introduction et commentaire par David Piché avec la collaboration de Claude Lafleur, Paris 1999, p. 94, art. 44: Quod ab uno primo agente non potest esse multitudo effectuum. 50 Cf. Peter of Auvergne, Qu. DC (note 19), IV, q. 6 (utrum gravia et levia moveantur ex se ad loca naturalia), p. 366, ll. 123–125: in naturalibus secundum Philosophum quod unum tantum est causa unius, licet tamen contingat oppositum in agentibus per intellectum.

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are immaterial and because they are not connected to the celestial orbs as forms, but only as movers. (2) In the second sense, the first mover is particularly related to the primum mobile as an end: it moves the primum mobile first, principally and immediately, and subsequently the other orbs. What moves as an end, first, most principally and most quickly moves that by which it is desired most. In the things that are moved by knowledge, what is moved more quickly is moved by a greater desire. The proper mover of the first heaven desires the first mover more strongly and thinks it more perfectly than the movers of the other orbs do. This is proven by the speed of the celestial motions. The primum mobile is moved more quickly than all other mobile orbs, because it is moved by a greater desire. In his questions on ‘De caelo’, Peter, following Averroes, also explains that the speed of the motion of the orbs is determined by the desire of their movers, but the theory he defends there is more complicated than what he presents here.51 At the end of his extensive solution, Peter goes back to the opinions of Avicenna and Averroes. He holds that the opinion of Avicenna agrees with the intention of Aristotle in the sense that the first mover moves the primum mobile and all posterior orbs as an end. In order to explain that all posterior motions are traced back to the first mover, Peter presents three comparisons, of which the second and third are deduced from Averroes’ commentary. In man the operation of the intellect is the end and cause of all other operations. In a state the things that are moved (changed) are moved by the will of the leader and the operations of all citizens are ordered towards his operation. Similarly in the arts there is a principal art which directs all other arts and imposes on them a determined end.52 Like Averroes, Peter disagrees with Avicenna’s view that the first mover is not particularly related to the primum mobile.

51 Cf. Peter of Auvergne, Qu. DC (note 19), II, q. 29, pp. 244–247; Galle (note 19), pp. 228*–231*; cf. Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis, V. De Coelo etc., Venezia 1562 (Reprint Frankfurt a. M. 1962), II, com. 58, p. 385, ll. 89–96. 52 Cf. Aver., In Metaph. (note 16), XII, com. 44, f. 328A–E.

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IV. Appendix: Peter of Auvergne, ‘Questiones super Metaphysicam’ XII, q. 8–11 In the edition of Peter of Auvergne’s questions 8–11 on the ‘Metaphysica’ the orthography has been classicised (except ‘e-’) and I have employed modern punctuation. All numbers that refer to a certain book of a treatise (e.g., by Aristotle or Averroes), which in the manuscripts are represented by a word (e.g., primo) or by an Arabic or Roman number, are indicated in the edition with Roman numerals. In order to make the structure of each questio clear, I have introduced paragraphs and I have numbered the rationes quod sic or quod non and the refutations of these rationes. Quotations that Peter cites ad verbum have been italicized. The following manuscripts have been used: W = Wien, Nationalbibliothek, 2330, f. 93rb–98ra V = Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca apostolica vaticana, Vat. lat. 845, f. 269ra–271va C = Cambridge, Peterhouse, 152, f. 222va–224vb The following abbreviations have been used: ac = ante correctionem add. = addidit al. man. = alia manu cf. = conferatur corr. = correxit del. = delevit exp. = expunxit hom. = homoeoteleuton i.m. = in margine inv. = invertit iter. = iteravit om. = omisit praem. = praemisit s.l. = supra lineam transp. = transposuit / transposuerunt x – y = x usque ad y1 < > = quod addendum esse videtur

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IV.1 The source apparatus refers to the following editions: Aristoteles, Opera I–V, Ed. Bekker, Immanuel, editio altera quam curavit Olof Gigon, Berolini 1959–1961. The text of Aristoteles’ ‘Metaphysica’ has been compared with the following Latin translation: Aristoteles Latinus, XXV. 3.1–2. Metaphysica Lib. I–XIV. Recensio et Translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka, Ed. Vuillemin-Diem, Gudrun, Leiden 1995. Les Auctoritates Aristotelis. Un florilège médiéval. Étude historique et édition critique, Ed. Hamesse, Jacqueline (Philosophes Médiévaux 17), Louvain 1974 (= Auct. Arist.). Averroes: Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis, V. De Coelo etc. (= In DC), VIII. Metaphysica (= In Metaph.); IX. Sermo de Substantia Orbis, Venezia 1562 (Reprint Frankfurt a. M. 1962). Avicenna Latinus, Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina V–X, Ed. Van Riet, Simone, Louvain/Leiden 1980. Moses Maimonides, Dux seu Director dubitantium aut perplexorum, Ed. Augustinus Justinianus, Paris 1520 (Unveränderter Nachdruck Frankfurt a.M. 1964) (= Dux neutrorum). Siger de Brabant, Questions sur la physique d’Aristote, Ed. Delhaye, Philippe (Les Philosophes Belges 15), Louvain 1941 (= Qu. Ph.). Proclus, Elementatio Theologica translata a Guillelmo de Morbecca, Ed. Boese, Helmut (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy. De Wulf-Mansion Centre 1, 5), Leuven 1987. Simplicius, In Aristotelis De Caelo Commentaria, Ed. Heiberg, Johan Ludvig (Commentaria in Aristototelem Graeca 7), Berlin 1894. —, In DC I (Latin translation): Commentaire sur le traité ‘Du ciel’ d’Aristote. Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke, I, édition critique par Fernand Bossier avec la collaboration de Christine Vande Veire and Guy Guldentops (Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum 8, 1), Leuven 2004. —, In DC III (Latin translation): In ‘De celo’ III: Derde boek van Simplicius’ commentaar ‘In De caelo’ in: Latijnse vertaling van Willem van Moerbeke. Kritische uitgave, Ed. Mariën, Bruno (promoter: Fernand Bossier), Leuven 1986 (unpublished master thesis). Thomas Aquinas, In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio, Ed. Cathala, M. Raymundus and Spiazzi, Raimondo, Torino/Roma 1964 (= In Metaph.).

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—, Opera Omnia, II. Commentaria in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis (Ed. Leonina), Roma 1884 (= In Ph.). —, Opera Omnia. IV. Pars prima Summae Theologiae a quaestione I ad quaestionem XLIX (Ed. Leonina), Roma 1888 (= S.T.). —, Opera Omnia, XIII. Summa contra gentiles Lib. I et II (Ed. Leonina), Roma 1918 (= ScG). —, Opera Omnia, XXIV, 1. Quaestiones Disputatae de anima, Ed. Bazán, Bernardo C. (Ed. Leonina), Roma 1996. —, Opera Omnia, XLV, 1. Sentencia libri De Anima (Ed. Leonina), Paris 1984.

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| Consequenter queritur secundum processum Philosophi utrum primum principium sit omnino immobile. Videtur quod non.

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Omne enim per accidens vel secundum participationem tale, reducitur ad aliquid quod est tale per essentiam, quia omne per accidens reducitur ad per se et quod est per essentiam tale est per se tale. Sed omnia que hic moventur sunt mota per participationem; omne enim quod movetur hic ab alio movetur; quare hic mota reducuntur ad aliquid in cuius substantia est motus et quod ex se totaliter movetur. Omnia autem reducuntur ad primum principium. Quare primum principium est mobile ex se; ergo etc. Item omne intelligens aliquo modo movetur, quia omne intelligens operationem quandam habet et operatio habet rationem motus. Sed primum est intelligens et volens primo. Quare primum ex se primo movetur; ergo etc. Oppositum arguitur.

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Omne quod movetur corpus est, ut patet ex VI Physicorum, quia omne quod movetur partim est | in termino a quo et partim in termino ad quem. Omne autem tale corpus est et divisibile. Sed primum non est corpus. Quare primum non movetur. Item omne quod movetur secundum quod huiusmodi est in potentia | passiva, quia motus secundum quod huiusmodi est actus entis in potentia, ut

1 Consequenter queritur] inv. C | 4 enim] om. V | reducitur] reditur C | 5 quia…essentiam] om. (hom.) sed al. man. add. i.m. C | omne] quod est add. W | 6 quod est] om. W | est2…tale] om. W (hom.) | hic moventur] inv. CV | 7 moventur] movetur C | sunt…8mota] om. V (hom.) | hic…movetur] om. W (hom.) | 8 quare] quia CV | hic mota] inv. CV | 9 reducuntur] reditur C | 10 ex…etc] om. W | 11 omne2…motus] intelligere rationem quandam habet motus W | 13 primum] principium V | ergo etc] om. W | 15 Omne] om. V | ex] om. CV | 16 a quo] ad quem W | ad quem] a quo W | 17 corpus1] om. V | divisibile] indivisibile V | 19 secundum quod huiusmodi] om. CV | 20 ut… huius] om. CV

2 primum…immobile] Arist., Metaph. XII, 6, 1071b5 | 15 omne…17 divisibile] Auct. Arist., Ph. VI (174), p. 154; Arist., Ph. VI, 4, 234b10–22; Auct. Arist, Ph. VI (172), p. 154 | 20 motus…potentia] Auct. Arist., Ph. III (99), p. 148; cf. Arist., Ph. III, 1, 201a10–11

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Griet Galle dicitur III Physicorum. Sed in primo non est potentia passiva, ut visum est in IX huius. Ergo primum non movetur.

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Cum queritur utrum primum sit omnino immobile, intelligendum quod immobile dicitur per privationem motus. Motus autem dicitur duobus modis. Uno modo proprie secundum quod motus est actus entis in potentia. Ens autem in potentia imperfectum est. Et ideo motus hoc modo dictus est actus imperfecti et entis in potentia ad perfectionem. Et talis motus, cum sit actus entis in potentia, est a contrario in contrarium, et per medium. Est enim subiectum quo movetur in potentia ad duo contraria que sunt termini motus. De tali vero motu loquitur Philosophus, ut frequentius cum dicit aliqua moveri natura vel arte. Alio modo dicitur motus apud Platonem et sequentes eum idem quod operatio ita ut quecumque operatio dicatur motus, et iste est motus magis improprie dictus. Et hoc quando dicitur intellectus moveri ab intelligibili et sensus a sensibili, non autem motu primo modo dicto. Unde Philosophus II De anima vult quod cum intellectus patitur ab intelligibili, aut non est ibi motus et alteratio, aut si est, alterum genus est alterationis et etiam motus; non enim intelligendo aliquod intelligibile intellectus patitur vel movetur ab intelligibili passione proprie dicta, sed magis perficitur. Et sic motus dicitur uno modo idem quod perfectio. Tunc ad questionem dicendum quod si loquamur de motu proprie dicto, primum est omnino immobile, quia omne quod movetur tali motu secundum quod huiusmodi imperfectum est, ut patet ex ratione motus; est enim actus 21 in…passiva] Arist., Metaph. IX, 8, 1050b4–8 | 23 Cum…immobile] om. W | intelligendum quod immobile] om. V (hom.) | 24 dicitur2] post modo transp. W | 27 ideo] om. V | 28 ad…potentia] om. V (hom.) | 29 enim] om. V | 30 quo] quod V | 31 aliqua] alis (?) V | 33 motus] om. V | et] om. V | 34 ita ut] et ita W | ut] quod V | dicatur] dicitur V | et… quando] om. V | 35 quando] agere Cac : motus add. W | 36 motu] om. V : post dicto transp. W | 37 II] 3° C : tertio W | 38 est1] ibi add. W | est alterationis] inv. CV | 39 intelligendo] cum intelligit CV | aliquod] aliquid V | intellectus] post enim transp. CV | patitur vel movetur] inv. CV | patitur] om. V | 40 dicitur] post modo transp. V | 42 dicendum] om. V | 43 primum] proprium V | movetur] in add. V | 44 imperfectum est] inv. V | est2] om. C 24 Motus…modis] cf. Arist., De an. II, 5, 417b5–16; Thomas de Aquino, S.T. I, q.18, art. 1, responsio, p. 225b; idem, Sentencia libri De an. I, c. 6, p. 30, ll. 219–225 | 31 aliqua…arte] Arist., De gen. II, 9, 335b27–29; Metaph., VII, 7, 1032a12–13; XII, 3, 1070a4–8 | 34 et…36 dicto] Arist., De an. III, 4, 429a16–18; 7, 431a4–7 | 37 cum…40 perficitur] Arist., De an. II, 5, 417b5–16

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imperfecti secundum hoc quod imperfectum est. Si ergo in primo non ponamus aliquam imperfectionem, tunc impossibile est primum moveri tali motu. Et hoc declaratur secundo, nam omne quod est mobile ab alio mobile est, ut patet ex VII Physicorum, et movens est prius et perfectius moto. Quare omni eo quod movetur est aliquid prius; sed primo movente non est aliquid prius, ut suum nomen dicit; quare impossibile est ipsum esse mobile hoc motu. Sic autem intendit hic Philosophus cum probat ipsum esse aliquam substantiam sempiternam immobilem omnino et VIII Physicorum cum dicit quod est aliquid sempiternaliter movens et ipsum non movetur nec per se nec per accidens. Si autem loquamur de motu communiter extendendo nomen motus ad quamcumque operationem, sic est dicendum quod primum movens non est immobile; immo ipsum movetur, quia motus hoc modo dictus est perfectio entis in actu. Si ergo primum habet operationem que est operatio entis perfecti, immo perfectissimi, tunc manifestum est quod primum tali motu est mobile. Item hoc arguitur ratione Platonis, nam omne quod movetur ab alio reducitur ad aliquid motum ex se primo. Illud autem est in quo | idem primum movens et motum primo, quod non contingit in motu celi. (Celum enim ex se non movetur, quia una pars movet, alia movetur.) Quare preter celum sic

45 est] om. V | 46 ponamus] ponimus V | 48 Et hoc] hoc etiam W | declaratur secundo] inv. CV | est mobile] inv. CV | mobile est] inv. W | 49 ex] om. CV | perfectius] posterius V | Quare] quia V | 51 suum] post nomen transp. W | nomen] om. V | dicit] post ut transp. CV | 53 hic] om. W | hic Philosophus] inv. V | ipsum] om. V | esse] post substantiam transp. V | aliquam] aliam V | 54 omnino] item add. CV | et] in add. W : Philosophus V | VIII] sexto V | 55 est aliquid] inv. W | 59 immobile] mobile V | 60 operatio] perfectio W | 61 perfectissimi] perfectissimum V | est] om. V | motu] movetur vel add. W | 62 est mobile] inv. CV | 63 alio] aliquo W | 64 reducitur] redditur V motum] quod movetur W | est] om. V | quo] est add. W | primum] primo V | 65 primo] om. V | contingit] potest esse W | 66 non] s.l. C, om. V | movetur1] primo add. W | movet] movetur W | movetur2] movet W

48 omne…mobile2] Arist., Ph. VII, 1, 241b24 | 53 ipsum…sempiternam] Arist., Metaph. XII, 6, 1071b4–7, 1072a24–26 | 55 est…accidens] Arist., Ph. VIII, 6, 258b10–16; Auct. Arist., Ph. VIII (217), p. 158 | 63 omne…primo] Arist., Metaph. XII, 6, 1071b37–a2 (cf. Plato, Phaedrus, 245c–d; Leges X, 894e–895d)

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Griet Galle motum est aliquid quod per se primo movetur in quo non differunt movens et motum. Hoc autem non est nisi primum. Quare secundum hunc modum movens primum non erit immobile omnino. Sed Aristoteles loquitur de motu in prima eius significatione | et de eo in secunda eius acceptione raro facit mentionem. Et ideo ex prima acceptione motus processit Philosophus contra Platonem hic. Et VII Physicorum probavit quod omne quod movetur ab alio movetur et quod omne motum ex alio, sicut etiam vult VIII Physicorum, reducitur ad motum ex se, quod dicitur motum ex se quia una eius pars per se movet et alia movetur. Nec est ultra procedendum ad aliquid movens motum, | sed standum est ad primum movens omnino immobile. Plato autem ponit primum movens movere se loquendo de motu in secunda acceptione eius. Primum enim se ipsum movet, quia se ipsum intelligit, et secundum hunc modum dixit Plato animam esse numerum se ipsum moventem. Intelligit enim se et intelligendo et volendo se movet corpus. Unde Philosophus improbans Platonem in hoc non recte processit ad intentionem Platonis. Sic ergo apparet controversia inter Aristotelem et Platonem et etiam convenientia. Conveniunt enim in hoc quod loquendo de motu proprie dicto

67 per…movetur] movetur ex se CV | differunt] dicuntur V | 68 et] om. V | Hoc] hec V | nisi] ipsum add. CV | 69 erit] est V | 72 hic] post Philosophus transp. C | 73 probavit] probatur W : enim add. V | omne2] om. V | 74 ex] ab V | vult] Philosophus add. V | reducitur] reditur C | 75 una] om. V | per se] om. CV | 76 aliquid] aliquod C | 79 modum] motum V | dixit] dicit V | 80 ipsum] ipsam V | se2] ipsam add. W | volendo] movendo W | se3] post intelligendo transp. CV | 84 Conveniunt] convenerunt V | enim] autem C : etiam V

70 Sed…significatione] cf. Thomas de Aquino, In Ph. VIII, 1, lect. 2, p. 371a | 72 contra…Physicorum] Arist., Metaph. XII, 6, 1071b32–a2 | Platonem…quod] ibid., 1071b31–a4 | 73 omne1…movetur2] Auct. Arist., Ph. VII (183), p. 155; Arist., Ph. VII, 1, 241b24; Auct. Arist., Ph. VIII (211), p. 157; Arist., Ph. VIII, 4, 256a2–3 | omne2…se] Arist., Ph. VIII, 5, 256a19– 21 | 75 motum…movetur] Auct. Arist., Ph. VIII (216), p. 157; Arist., Ph. VIII, 5, 257b12–13 | Nec…motum] Arist., Ph. VIII, 6, 256a28–29 | 76 standum…immobile] ibid., 258b10–12; Auct. Arist., Ph. VIII (217), p. 158 | 77 Plato…79 intelligit] cf. Thomas de Aquino, S.T. I, q. 18, art. 3, ad 1, p. 228b | 79 secundum…81 corpus] cf. idem, Quaestiones disputatae De an., q. 1, responsio, p. 8, ll. 255–260 | 79 animam…moventem] Simpl., In DC III, 2, p. 585, ll. 1–3 (translatio Guillelmi, p. 124, ll. 10–11); Thomas de Aquino, In Metaph. XII, lect. VI, n. 2505, p. 586 (cf. Plato, Phaedrus 245c–d; Leges X, 895e–896a) | 83 Sic… convenientia] cf. Thomas de Aquino, ScG I, 13, p. 31b

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est devenire ad movens primum omnino immobile. Et sicut Aristoteles voluit quod nullum corpus hoc motu posset primo a se ipso moveri, sic et Plato, quia quod primo movet se, convertitur ad se ipsum primo, ut probat Proclus; sed corpus nullum potest se convertere supra se; et ideo nullum corpus potest se ipsum movere primo. Conveniebant etiam in alio, quia movens motum ex se reducitur ad movens immobile in tali genere motus. Sed differentiam habuerunt tantum in significatione vocabuli. Plato enim vocavit motum quamcumque operationem, et sic posuit Plato primum movens moveri in quantum agit et operatur. Unde omne motum ab alio dicebat reduci ad motum ex se, sic accipiendo motum. Motum autem ex se dicebat esse primum movens. Et hec omnia vera sunt secundum intentionem Philosophi nisi quod Philosophus in alia significatione loquebatur de motu.

Ad primam rationem, cum arguitur omne motum per participationem reducitur ad aliquid motum ex se, dico quod verum est. Sed non oportet quod 100 reducatur ad motum ex se secundum eandem rationem motus. Unde primum movens ad quod reducuntur omnia alia moventia, movetur ex se, sed non eadem specie motus qua moventur hec inferiora, sed alia specie perfectiori et priori secundum substantiam. Ad aliud concedendum est quod ratio concludit. Probat enim quod 105 primum principium ex se movetur appellando motum operationem intelligendi, et hoc motu verum est quod principium primum ex se movetur.

85 movens primum] inv. CV | omnino immobile] inv. CV | 86 hoc] isto W | primo a se] ergo V | sic] sicut V | 87 movet] movetur CV : ex add. V | convertitur] convertatur C | primo2] om. CV | 88 Proclus] Procus W | corpus nullum] nullum corporeum C : nullum corpus V | se convertere] inv. CV | ideo] om. V | 90 reducitur] redditur V | 91 habuerunt tantum] inv. C | tantum] om. V | 92 quamcumque operationem] inv. CV | 94 Motum] om. V | 98 primam] om. CV | 99 reducitur] redditur VC | 100 ex se] om. W | 101 ad] post Unde transp. V | quod] om. V | alia] om. V | movetur] moventur V : enim add. V | non] om. V | 102 specie1] species W | perfectiori] om. CV | et] a V | 103 secundum] perfectionem et add. CV | 106 principium primum] inv. CV | ex se] om. W

87 quod…primo2] Proclus, Elementatio Theologica, prop. 17, p. 12, l. 1 | 88 corpus…se2] ibid., prop. 15, p. 11, l. 1 | ideo…primo] cf. Thomas de Aquino, In Ph.VII, 1, lectio 1, n. 7, pp. 323b–324a | 93 Unde…95 movens] cf. Plato, Leges X,894e–895b

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Consequenter queritur utrum primum principium moveat in ratione finis vel appetibilis.

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Videtur quod non, quia si primum moveret in ratione finis, cum primum sit de substantiis separatis a materia, tunc | in separatis a materia esset finis, quod falsum est, quia, sicut dicitur III huius, in immobilibus non est finis quia nec motus; ergo etc. Item illud quod invenitur tantum in termino motus non est principium motus. Sed | finis tantum invenitur in termino motus; ex hoc enim dicitur finis. Quare primum movens, cum sit ante omnem motum, non movet in ratione finis. Item idem non est ut agens et ut finis respectu eiusdem. Sunt enim efficiens et finis cause diverse et una invenitur ante rem, reliqua vero post, ut dicit Commentator. Si ergo primum est principium motus in ratione agentis, ergo non in ratione finis.

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In oppositum est Philosophus hic. Primum enim movet in ratione appetibilis et intelligibilis. Sic enim movet sicut contingit ipsum movere non motum. Finis autem habet rationem appetibilis. Quare movet in ratione finis. Et idem est arguere sic: primum movet omnino non motum. Sed movens non motum est appetibile. Ipsum appetens enim movet motum ab appetibili. Quare primum movet in ratione appetibilis et per consequens in ratione finis. Intelligendum quod, sicut dicit Avicenna in Metaphysica sua, motus celi primus non potest esse pure violentus nec pure naturalis et utrumque

1 Consequenter queritur] inv. C | 3 primum] om. CV | cum] et principium CV | 4 sit] est CV | substantiis] om. CV | esset] inveniretur CV | 6 ergo] quare V | ergo etc] om.W | 7 Item] Preterea V | 8 tantum invenitur] inv. CV | 9 omnem motum] inv. V | 13 dicit Commentator] inv. CV | 17 Finis autem] sed finis CV | 19 appetibile] appetere V | 22 quod] est V | dicit Avicenna] inv. CV | 23 primus] purus W | naturalis] essentialisV

5 sicut…finis] cf. Thomas de Aquino, In Metaph. XII, 7, lect. VII, p. 591, n. 2528 | in…motus] Auct. Arist., Metaph. III (72), p. 121; Arist., Metaph. III, 2, 996a22–23; 27–29 | 11 idem…eiusdem] Aver., In Metaph. XII, com. 36, f. 318I–K | 15 Primum…motum] Arist., Metaph. XII, 7, 1072a24–30 | 22 motus…naturalis] Avic., Liber de philosophia prima IX, 2, p. 447, l. 52–p. 448, l. 79; p. 449, ll. 98–1

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declaratur. Non enim potest esse pure violentus, quia nullum violentum est perpetuum, ut dicit Philosophus libro Celi et Mundi. Motum autem celi Philosophus dicit esse perpetuum. Quare motus celi non est violentus. Item motus violentus non est motus uniformis. Intenditur enim in principio vel in medio. Motus autem celi est uniformis, cum sit primus omnium motuum. Quare suus motus non est pure violentus. Item nec est pure naturalis, sicut est motus gravium vel levium, quia quod movetur motu naturali, movetur ad aliquem locum naturalem et ex illo non movetur nisi per violentiam. Sed celum, cum habeat diversa ubi, naturaliter ex quocumque ubi movetur ad quodcumque – est enim motus celi ab eodem in idem –, quare non est simpliciter naturalis. Si ergo omnis motus vel est violentus vel naturalis vel factus per cognitionem et motus celi nec sit naturalis nec violentus, sequitur ergo quod sit ab aliquo movente per cognitionem, sed non a movente per cognitionem sensitivam, quia talis non est in superioribus. Non enim sunt ibi qualitates sensibiles quibus propria est talis cognitio. Ergo est a movente per intellectum. Intellectus autem non est proximum movens, nam intellectus non movet nisi mediante appetitu. Primo namque intellectus iudicat aliquid esse bonum et tunc appetitus statim fertur in illud et sic est principium motus in habentibus intellectum et cognitionem. Appetitus autem non movet, nisi ut est motus ab appetibili et intelligibili, ita quod appetibile secundum quod est appetibile movet intellectum sub ratione boni. Bonum autem intellectum

25 dicit Philosophus] inv. CV | Celi et Mundi] capitulo iii V | 26 dicit] dixit CV | 29 suus] finis sed al. man. corr. i.m. C : primus V | pure] motus add. C | 30 est1] om. CV | vel] et CV | quia] quare V | 31 naturali movetur] om. V | aliquem locum] inv. CV | 32 movetur] moventur V | naturaliter…ubi] om. V (hom.) | 36 et] om. CW | aliquo] alio V | 37 sed] om. W | a movente] om. W | 38 enim] om. C | ibi] om. W | 39 propria] proprie W | 41 iudicat] indicat Wac | 43 habentibus] habente CV | nisi ut est] non est ut V | 44 secundum] om. C | 45 Bonum autem] Aut bonum V

24 Non…violentus] Avic., Liber de philosophia prima IX, 2, p. 449, l. 100 | 24 nullum…perpetuum] Auct. Arist., DC II (50), p. 163; Arist., DC II, 3, 286a17–18 | 25 Motum…perpetuum] Auct. Arist., DC II (56), p. 163; Arist., DC II, 4, 287a23–24 | 30 Item…34 naturalis] Avic., Liber de philosophia prima IX, 2, p. 447, l. 52–p. 448, l. 79 | 35 Si…cognitionem] Arist., Metaph. XII, 6, 1071b35–36 | 37 cognitionem2…superioribus] cf. Aver., In Metaph. XII, com. 31, f. 318G

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4346 movet voluntatem. Ergo quod primo movet ipsum celum est appetibile. Sed appetibile secundum quod huiusmodi rationem finis videtur habere. Quare 4 48 celum movetur primo ab aliquo quod se habet in ratione finis. Et hoc aut 49 est primum omnino, aut aliquod accidens. Non potest dici quod appetibile | 50 quod movet celum sit accidens aliquod, quia primum appetibile est primum 51 intelligibile. Quod autem est intelligibile primum est substantia prima 52 simplex. Et | ideo substantia prima simplex est que movet celum in ratione 53 finis. 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61

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Et tunc dicendum est ad rationem primam, cum dicitur «in immobilibus esset finis si primum moveret in ratione finis», dicendum quod, sicut Philosophus hic dicit et idem innuit II De anima, finis dicitur duobus modis. Aliquando enim finis dicitur quod preexistit ei quod est ad finem, separatum ab eo, nec inducitur per motum, sed preexistit motui et termino motus. Hoc autem modo locus deorsum est finis gravium. Aliquando autem dicitur finis aliqua perfectio eius quod ordinatur ad finem in ordine ad finem primo modo dictum, sicut motus ad locum deorsum est finis gravium et eius perfectio attenditur in ordine ad finem primo modo dictum. Et hoc est quod dicitur II De anima quod finis est duplex: finis cuius et finis quo, finis separatus et finis coniunctus. Loquendo autem de fine primo modo, dicendum quod primum est finis omnium entium et finis secundum hanc

46 Ergo quod] inv. CV | 47 secundum quod huiusmodi] om. CV | 48 aut] autem V | 49 aut] autem V | 50 primum1] principium V | 51 Quod…simplex] Primum autem est sibi simpliciter V | 52 substantia] omnino add. CV | prima] et add. CV | 54 Et…est] om. CV | primam] om. CV | dicitur] arguitur quod CV | immobilibus] rationibus W | 55 si…finis] tunc add. et post quod (v.l.) transp. CV | dicendum] dico V | 56 hic dicit] inv. C : hic innuit V | II] tertio V | anima] quod add. W | dicitur] post modis transp. W | 57 modis] Nota distincionem de fine al. man. i.m. add. W | finis dicitur] inv. CV | 58 termino] rationi W | 59 autem2] vero CV | 60 in ordine ad finem] om. V | 61 motus ad] om. W | ad locum] post deorsum transp. V | 62 attenditur] tenditur V | 63 II] primo V | cuius] quo W | quo] cuius W | 64 separatus] coniunctus W | coniunctus] separatus W | 65 primum] principium V

56 finis…modis] Auct. Arist., De an. II (82), p. 181; Arist., De an. II, 4, 415b2–3; 20–21; cf. Thomas de Aquino, In Metaph. XII, 7, lect. VII, p. 591, n. 2528 | 63 finis1…quo] Auct. Arist., De an. II (82), p. 181; Arist., De an. II, 4, 415b2–3; 20–21

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rationem reperitur in separatis et abstractis ab omni specie motus. Secundo autem modo loquendo de fine primum movens non est | finis aliorum a se, sed sic diversorum entium sunt diversi fines, quia diversorum sunt diverse perfectiones. Perfectio autem istorum finium attenditur in respectu ad finem primo dictum. Ad aliud, cum arguitur «quod invenitur tantum in termino motus non est principium motus», dico quod illud quod invenitur in termino motus potest considerari vel secundum esse vel secundum intentionem. Si consideretur secundum esse, sic ultimum est et non habet rationem cause. Si vero secundum intentionem, sic rationem cause habet et rationem cause moventis aliquo modo. Intentio enim finis preconcepta in anima est causa quare agens incipit agere et rationem causalitatis tribuit agenti. Sic ergo quod habet rationem finis potest esse principium motus. Et cum dicitur in minori quod «finis invenitur in termino motus», dico quod verum est si consideretur secundum esse. Secundum tamen intentionem invenitur ante omnem motum. Vel posset dici quod, cum duplex sit finis, (scilicet finis qui preexistit motui separatus secundum esse ab eo quod ordinatur ad finem, et sit etiam finis qui est terminus motus et perfectio eius quod est ad finem) ratio procedit de fine secundo modo dicto, non autem primo modo, cuiusmodi finis dicitur esse primum principium. Omnium enim est finis primo modo dictus. Ad aliud, cum arguitur «idem non est agens et finis respectu eiusdem», dico quod falsum est. Immo secundum Commentatorem hic diversitas finis et agentis in agentibus per voluntatem non est nisi propter materiam. Et hoc

66 separatis et abstractis] inv. V | 67 modo] om. sed i.m. add. C | 69 respectu] ordine V | 70 primo] modo add. V | 71 aliud] dicendum add. V | 72 principium] primum V | motus] om. V | illud quod] om. V | quod2] om. sed al. man. i.m. add. C | 73 considerari] considerare V | esse] se sed corr. i.m. V | 74 consideretur] consideratur V | 76 anima] communi W | 77 quare] qua W | tribuit] attribuit V | 79 finis] om. V | invenitur] tantum add. V | 80 si consideretur] consideratus CV | 82 finis2] om. W | qui] quo CW | preexistit] preexistens W | motui] et add. V | 83 et] cum add. V | 84 ratio] enim add. V | 85 non…modo] om. V | dicitur] om. V | 86 primum] om. V | Omnium] Omne V | enim est] inv. C | est] om. V | 87 arguitur] dictus W | 88 hic] hec W | 89 nisi] om. W

88 diversitas…96 habent] Aver., In Metaph. XII, com. 36, f. 318I–K; Auct. Arist. (Commentator), Metaph. XII (286), p. 139

194 90 91 92 93 94 95 96

Griet Galle apparet sic: forma balnei invenitur in intellectu et invenitur in materia. Ipsa vero ut est cognita et intellectu ens est ut agens respectu sui ipsius, secundum quod est in materia. Ipsa autem secundum quod in materia est rationem finis habet. Si autem forma balnei non inveniretur in materia, tunc secundum idem haberet rationem agentis et finis. Unde in talibus que sunt separata et maxime in | primo principio quod non appetit aliud a se, idem est finis ultimus et primum agens; nec in eo ista duo diversitatem habent. Ex hoc enim quod est finis, est agens et movens; finis enim movet. Primum autem agit et movet propter finem, non quidem qui sit aliud a se, sed omnino idem cum eo.

90 invenitur2] om. V | 91 secundum quod] ut CV | 96 ista duo] illa C | duo… habent] diversa sunt V | enim] post finis transp. V | 97 est1] om. CV | finis1] primum W | enim] autem V | movet] movent V | autem] movens add. CV | 98 omnino idem] inv. CV

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1 2 3

Quia Philosophus vult quod motus quorumlibet orbium in superioribus est a mo‑ | toribus sibi appropriatis, ideo queratur utrum motor primus approprietur mobili primo ad movendum.

4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Videtur quod non. Motor supremus et universalis non appropriatur alicui mobili particulari. Hoc enim repugnat rationi universalis secundum quod huiusmodi. Sed motor primus est motor universalis. Ergo non appropriatur mobili particulari. Quare non mobili primo. Item motoris appropriati ad suum mobile oportet esse proportionem determinatam huius quidem in agendo, illius autem in patiendo. Sed motoris primi ad quodcumque mobile non est determinata proportio, quia motor primus est infinite virtutis respectu ad quantamcumque aliam virtutem; quare etc. Item hoc arguitur ratione Avicenne quam tangit Commentator hic. Si enim motor primus appropriaretur mobili primo, tunc oportet motorem primum esse causam illius quantum ad omne quod est in eo. Sed habendo respectum ad mobile primum est ibi considerare ipsam substantiam mobilis primi et animam eius, item et motum quo primum movet ipsum. Quare primum movens immediate esset principium omnium istorum. Hoc autem est inconveniens ponere. Non enim immediate potest esse principium plurium; ergo etc. In oppositum est Philosophus hic. Dicit enim quod motor primus movet mobile primum sicut amatum et desideratum, quo moto alia movet. Item dicit Philosophus quod preter motum primum quem dicimus agere substantiam primam sunt plures alii motus in superioribus. Ergo de intentione 1 Quia Philosophus vult] iter. V | in superioribus] inferioribus V | 2 est] sit W | 3 approprietur] appropriatur V | movendum] modum V : ipsum add. CV | 4 Videtur] et praem. V | 7 mobili1] motui W | 8 motoris] motores V | esse] habere V | proportionem determinatam] inv. V | 9 motoris] motores V | 10 ad] om. V | 11 respectu] om. W : cuius C | quantamcumque] quamcumque V | virtutem] om. V | quare etc] om. CV | 13 tangit Commentator] inv. CV | 14 appropriaretur] approprietur CV | 15 primum] om. V | causam] activam add. C | 17 eius] om. V | primum] primo V | 18 immediate esset] inv. V | principium] et add. C | 21 hic] om. V | 22 quo] om. V | moto] vero add. V | 23 quod] om. V | primum] om. W | 24 sunt] inveniuntur V | in superioribus] inferioribus V | Ergo] om. V |

1 motus…appropriatis] Arist., Metaph. XII, 8, 1073a26–b1 | 14 Si…20 etc] Aver., In Metaph. XII, com. 44, f. 327H–I | 21 motor…desideratum] Auct. Arist., Metaph. XI (265), p. 137; Arist., Metaph. XII, 7, 1072b3–4 | 23 preter… superioribus] Arist., Metaph. XII, 8, 1073a26–b1

196 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

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Griet Galle eius est quod motor primus appropriate moveat mobile primum. Item Philosophus libro De Celo dicit quod motus primi est aliquid motor primus, et incorruptibilis motus motor incorruptibilis; quare etc. Avicenna voluit quod motor primus movendo nulli appropriaretur secundum quod esset motor communis omnium in ratione finis. A primo enim, cum sit omnino unum, non procedit immediate nisi unum. Sed a motore appropriato mobili primo oportet procedere motum talis mobilis et animam eius. Quare, cum ista sint diversa, non poterit primus motor ea immediate producere. Ergo non appropriabitur mobili primo ad movendum ipsum; quare a motore primo non procedit immediate motus celi, sed procedit ab eo immediate aliqua intelligentia que movet primum celum in ratione amati et desiderati et hoc respectu motorum inferiorum. Et quia intelligentia hec producta a primo recedit a simplicitate primi, sicut et omnino causatum ab eo, licet quedam secundum plus et quedam secundum minus, ideo potest esse causa diversorum; ita quod cum ipsa sit intelligens et non omnino | simplex, sicut et primum inquantum intelligit ipsum primum producit intelligentiam sequentem; inquantum vero aliqualiter recedit a simplicitate primi et accedit ad naturam compositionis et per consequens ad aliqualem diversitatem, est causa motus in mobili primo. Sic ergo secundum opinionem Avicenne mobili primo non appropriatur primus motor, sed intelligentia aliqua que immediate | procedit ab eo. Et hec intelligentia causat intelligentiam sequentem et motum primi orbis. Deinde secunda intelligentia causat tertiam et est causa motus in suo mobili

26 Celo] et mundo add. V | quod…motor] om. V | 27 motus] om. V | motus… incorruptibilis] om. C | 28 Avicenna…motor] Est aliquis V | primus] in add. V | appropriaretur] appropriatur V | 29 secundum] sed C | 30 unum1] om. C | 31 motum] motus V | 32 eius] om. V | sint] sunt V | poterit] ponit V | 33 primo] om. W | movendum] modum V | 35 immediate] post intelligentia transp. W | 36 hoc] est add. V | intelligentia] intelligenter CV | intelligentia hec] inv. CV | hec] hoc V | 37 recedit] recipit V | omnino] omne V | 40 intelligit] post primum transp. V | 41 vero] om. V | recedit] procedit V | 42 et] aut CV | ad aliqualem] aliquam V | 45 primus motor] inv. V | 47 mobili] in suo add. sed exp. C |

26 motus…incorruptibilis2] Arist., DC II, 6, 288a34–b4 | 28 motor…finis] Avic., Liber de philosophia prima IX, 3, p. 474, l. 00–p. 475, l. 9 | 29 A…43 primo] Avic., Liber de philosophia prima IX, 4, p. 479, l. 4–p. 484, l. 99 | A…48 deinceps] cf. Thomas de Aquino, In Metaph. XII, 8, lect. 9, p. 598, n. 2559 | 44 mobili…51 entium] Avic., Liber de philosophia prima IX, 2, p. 455, ll. 4–14; p. 463, l. 78–p. 464, l. 86; 3, p. 474, l. 97–p. 476, l. 36

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sibi appropriato, et sic deinceps. Omnes autem intelligentie que sunt post substantiam primam simplicem omnino movent in ratione amantis et desiderantis. Movet autem primus motor in ratione amati et desiderati et in ratione finis universalis omnium motorum consequenter entium. Sed propter necessitatem rationis quam Avicenna inducit non oportet hoc dicere. Quod enim ipse dicit, quod ab uno non procedit nisi unum, non videtur esse omnino verum, maxime in separatis, ut dicit hic Commentator, quia in separatis non invenitur causa et effectus nisi secundum rationem intellectus et intelligibilis. Et ideo in eis illud quod est causa est causa secundum rationem intelligendi. Si ergo in separatis aliquid potest habere virtutem intelligendi plura, nichil inconveniens erit in eis ab uno procedere multa. Item Raby Moyses libro suo arguit contra predictam propositionem sic: primo enim pro hypothesi accipit quod ab uno non procedit nisi unum. Et ex hoc concludit quod ab uno secundum quod unum non procedit nisi unum, puta a composito secundum quod unum est non procedit nisi unum, et si ab eo diversa procedant, | hoc est inquantum per unam eius partem producit unum et per aliam producit aliud diversum a primo. Tunc ulterius accipit quod in celo stellato invenitur diversitas magna. Nam ibi invenitur compositio materie et forme, item et substantie et accidentis, item diversitas stellarum et earum virtutis, quod etiam sensus docet. Item accipit quod omnia

48 autem] iste add. CV | 49 simplicem] simplicitatem Cac | movent] conveniunt W | 50 Movet] motor CV | primus] om. V | motor] movet CV | 51 universalis] om. V : iter. W | consequenter entium] conversentium V | 52 inducit] induxit CV | 54 esse] om. CV | maxime] autem add. CV | hic Commentator] inv. V | 58 nichil] om. V | ab uno procedere] unum producere CV | 60 accipit] post enim transp. CV | 61 Et…unum] om. V (hom.) | 61 concludit] ultimus add. CV | 62 puta…unum2] om. W | 63 diversa procedant] inv. W | 64 producit] procedit V | producit2] procedit V | aliud] aliquod V | Tunc] om. CV | 65 diversitas magna] inv. CV | magna] magis V | 66 item et] et etiam compositio CV | substantie et accidentis] inv. CV | item2] invenitur ibi add. CV | 67 earum virtutis] inv. CV | virtutis] virtus V | Item] Preter hec C : Preter hoc V

53 ab…unum] Avic., Liber de philosophia prima IX, 4, p. 481, ll. 50–51 | 54 in…58 multa] Aver., In Metaph. XII, com. 44, fol. 327I–K; cf. Thomas de Aquino, In Metaph. XII, 8, lect. 9, p. 598, n. 2560 | 60 primo…72 diversitas] Maimonides, Dux neutrorum II, 23, f. 53v–54r

198 61 62 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 80

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Griet Galle que sunt in celo causam per se habent. In celestibus enim nichil a casu nec a fortuna, ut dicitur VIII huius et libro Celi et Mundi. Omnis ergo diversitas que est in celo causam per se habet priorem ipso celo. Aut ergo illa causa est omnino simplex et una, nullam in se habens diversitatem, aut in ea est aliqua diversitas. Si concedatur primum, ergo ab uno simplici omnino possunt procedere plura immediate, quod est contrarium ypothesi. Si autem dicatur secundo modo, scilicet quod in causa sit diversitas, aut ergo in ea est tanta diversitas quanta est in celo, aut non. Si non, ergo non omnis diversitas in effectu reducitur ad diversitatem in causa, et cum omni diversitate que in celo reperitur sit aliqua causa prior, ut dicebat secunda propositio, tunc illius diversitatis | erit aliqua causa que causa respectu eius una erit in se, et sic unum poterit esse causa diversorum. Si vero dicatur quod in causa reperitur tanta diversitas quanta est in celo, tunc huius diversitatis erit aliqua causa prior, et fiet questio consimilis, quia aut in causa illa erit tanta diversitas quanta est in causa priori, aut non. Si non, propositum habe. Si sic, fiet ulterius questio de illa causa, et sic vel procedetur in infinitum, vel erit devenire ad causam aliquam que una existens et simplex omnino immediate potest multa causare, ita quod, licet hec propositio «ab uno procedit tantum unum» veritatem habeat in agentibus per naturam, | quia potentia naturalis tantum

68 sunt] post celo transp. CV | celo] et add. V | per] in V | nichil] nisi V : est add. W | 69 fortuna] est add. V | dicitur] etiam add. C | VIII] sexto V | 70 habet] et add. CV | ipso] ipsi V | illa] ista V | est] om. V | 71 simplex et una] inv. CV | una] et add. V | habens] habent V | ea] om. V : eo W | aliqua] alia V | 72 simplici omnino] om. V | 73 procedere] post immediate transp. CV | contrarium] contra V | dicatur] dicitur W | 74 scilicet] videlicet C | 76 omni diversitate] omnis diversitas est V | 77 reperitur] est V : post que transp. CV | aliqua] alia V | secunda] ista V | illius] alicuius CV | 78 aliqua] alia V | 78 una erit] est una CV | unum] una W | 79 reperitur] sit C: est V | 80 erit] est CV | aliqua] alia V | 81 fiet] fiat V | quia…illa] de causa illa: aut enim in ea CV | erit] est V | 82 causa…de] om. W | propositum habebitur] om. V | 83 illa causa] inv. CV | procedetur] proceditur CV | 84 causam aliquam] inv. CV | existens] om. V | et simplex] post una transp. CV | immediate potest] transp. CV | 85 ita quod] om. V | uno] non add. CV | tantum] nisi CV

68 In…fortuna] Arist., DC I, 12, 283a31–32; II, 1, 283b26–27; 8, 289b25–27; non inventus in Metaph. | 69 Omnis…celo2] cf. Maimonides, Dux neutrorum II, 21, f. 52v; 22, f. 53r | 85 hec…naturam] cf. ibid., II, 23, f. 54r | 86 potentia… unius] Arist., Metaph. IX, 2, 1046b5–7

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est una unius, ut dicitur IX huius, tamen non necessario veritatem habet in agentibus per intellectum et voluntatem; immo ab uno agente, cum multa 89 intelligat, possunt multa procedere secundum diversitatem intellectorum. 90 Primum ergo secundum quod una ratione intelligendi multa intelligit, 91 secundum hoc una virtute multa producit, et hoc non est inconveniens. 92 Primum scilicet una ratione intelligendi potest multa intelligere, una, inquam, 93 ratione intelligendi, que est sua substantia. Illa tamen ratio una intelligendi 94 differens est secundum respectus diversos. Et hec diversitas respectuum 95 in ratione intelligendi ipsius primi nullam causat in eo diversitatem, sicut 96 nec in aliis diversitas respectuum causat diversitatem in substantia. Si enim 97 accipiatur materia secundum se habens respectum ad centum formas, non est propter hoc compositorum secundum se, quia respectus non dicit aliquid reale, sed aliquid rationis solum, nec dicit aliquid ens in aliquo secundum 100 quod huiusmodi, sed habitudinem quandam ad aliud. Et ideo primum una ratione intelligendi secundum diversos respectus – que quidem diversitas non est res addita ei – potest multa intelligere. Et quantum ad hoc simile est quoddammodo de intellectu nostro qui per unam rationem intelligendi secundum tamen diversos respectus multa potest intelligere. Eadem enim est 105 ratio intelligendi habitus et privationis et duorum contrariorum, ut dicitur IX huius. Primum ergo unum per se et primo intelligit, scilicet se ipsum, et per respectum sui ad alia potest alia intelligere et per consequens multa immediate producere. Unde dicendum est alio modo, sicut videtur esse de intentione Aristotelis 110 et sui Commentatoris, quod motorem primum appropriari mobili primo potest esse duobus modis: vel quia natus est movere mobile primum, ita

87 dicitur IX huius] dicit Commentator V | tamen] homo praem. V | 89 possunt] et add. CV | procedere] producere V | 91 producit…multa] om. sed al. man. i.m. add. C | 92 scilicet] videlicet C : enim V | potest] om. CW | 93 ratio una] inv. CV | 94 est] respectu add. W | 94 Et…primi] om. V | 95 causat] post eo transp. C | eo] ea V | 98 compositorum] oppositorum V | respectus] respectum V | aliquid] quid V nec] ut V | 99 secundum quod huiusmodi] om. V | quandam] quam habet V | una] om. V | 101 que] qui C | 105 habitus et privationis] post contrariorum transp. CV | et2] om. CV | 106 Primum] primo C | 108 immediate producere] inv. V | 109 est] om. V | alio] aliquo W | 110 sui Commentatoris] secundum Commentatorem V | appropriari] esse appopriatum CV | 111 esse] intelligi CV | mobile primum] inv. V

87 non…voluntatem] cf. Maimonides, Dux neutrorum II, 23, f. 53v, propositio tertia | 104 Eadem…privationis] Arist., Metaph. IX, 2, 1046b7–15

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quod non aliud, vel quia primo et principalius est illius, quamvis mediante eo moveat alia. Et primo modo | loquendo de appropriatione motoris ad mobile motor primus non est appropriatus mobili primo ad movendum ipsum in ratione finis, quia si esset sibi appropriatus in ratione finis, tunc quereretur de aliis mobilibus inferioribus. Manifestum est enim quod moventur. Aut ergo moventur a motoribus suis propter aliquem finem, aut non. Si dicatur quod non propter aliquem finem, hoc est impossibile. Motores enim sui in movendo sua mobilia intendunt finem aliquem, quia impossibile est agens absolvi ab intentione finis, ut dicit Commentator super II huius. Si autem moventur propter finem, puta propter fines alios separatos, aut ergo moventur propter fines separatos qui tendunt ad unum finem ultimum, qui est principium omnium in virtute activa. Et tunc habebitur propositum, 125 quod scilicet primus motor qui movet in ratione finis, sicut movet mobile primum, sic movet omnia alia mobilia. Si autem non moveantur propter fines separatos qui omnes tendunt ad unum finem separatum, tunc universum non erit unum, quia unitas universi est ex ordine eorum que sunt in universo ad unum primum, et hoc est inconveniens, quare etc. 130 Si autem loquamur de appropriatione motoris ad mobile secundo modo, sic dico quod motor primus est appropriatus mobili primo in ratione finis, quia primo et principalius movet ipsum. Et hoc apparet: primum movet in ratione appetibilis. Et ideo quod movet in ratione finis, primo et principalius movet id a quo magis appetitur et velocius. Qui enim magis appetit, velocius movet | 135 vel movetur. Sed motor qui movet mobile primum in ratione amantis et desiderantis magis appetit primum motorem quam aliquis motor aliorum 101 102 115 116 117 118 119 120 121

112 et] om. C | mediante] mediate V | 115 ad movendum] quemadmodum V | 116 quereretur] queretur V | 117 inferioribus] in rebus V | 118 moventur] om. W | motoribus suis] inv. CV | 119 sui] om. W | 120 sua mobilia] om. CV | finem aliquem] inv. V | 121 dicit] dicat post huius transp. V | dicit Commentator] inv. CV | super] supra V | 123 fines] om. W | tendunt] reducuntur CV | 124 habebitur] habetur CV | 125 quod] qui sed exp. et quod add. al.man. i.m. C | primus motor] inv. V | mobile primum] inv. V | 126 omnia] et CV | moveantur] moventur V | 127 tendunt] reditur C : reducuntur V | 128 est] ex W | ordine] ordinatione V : unitate W | sunt] om. C | 129 etc] om. V | 130 secundo modo] post loquamur transp. CV | 131 est] om. W | 132 primum] finis CV | in] om. V | 133 quod] quid V | 134 id] aliud V : illud C | et] etiam add. CV | velocius movet] iter. sed del. C | 135 motor] primus add. V | 136 appetit] appetet Cac

119 Motores…129 inconveniens] cf. Aver., In Metaph. XII, com. 44, f. 327K– M | 120 impossibile…finis] ibid., II, com. 8, f. 33B

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122 123 139 140 141 142 143 144 145

orbium. Et huius probatio est ex velocitate motus quem causat in suo mobili. Quod enim velocius movetur in hiis que moventur per cognitionem ex maiori appetitu et desiderio movetur. Sed mobile primum velocissime movetur inter omnia alia mobilia. Motus enim eius est velocissimus. Ergo ex maiori desiderio movetur, quia motor suus proprius qui movet in ratione amantis et desiderantis magis appetit et desiderat motorem primum quam aliquis aliorum. Et hoc probatur ex tarditate motus quam faciunt alii motores inferiores. Si enim plus appeterent, velocius moverent. Sic ergo motor primus appropriatur mobili primo pro tanto, quia primo movet ipsum, ex consequenti autem movet alia, inquantum motores aliorum orbium ipsum primum sub ratione intelligendi | minus perfecta intelligunt et etiam minus appetunt; inquantum etiam motores inferiorum orbium rationem boni et appetibilis et virtutem etiam movendi recipiunt ex primo, hinc enim est quod 150 omnia alia movet; principalius tamen et immediatius tantum unum. In hoc autem quod primum sic movet mobile primum et omnia alia mobilia posteriora in ratione finis, concordat | opinio Avicenne cum intentione Philosophi. Omnes enim motus posteriores ad ipsum reducuntur tamquam ad primum movens, sicut etiam apparet in homine. Est enim in 155 eo aliquid principale et primum, puta intellectus, qui est quid dignissimum et divinissimum, cuius quidem operatio finis est et causa omnium aliarum operationum et omnes operationes alie speciem boni accipiunt ex ea. Similiter in civitate est aliquis principans et imperans, scilicet cuius voluntate moventur ea que moventur in civitate, ad cuius etiam operationem ordinantur 160 operationes omnium civium. Similiter apparet hoc in artibus. Est enim inter eas aliqua principalis et architectonica que omnes alias regulat et finem

137 motus] quan add. sed exp. C | 141 quia] quare C | suus] om. V | 142 et desiderat] om. W | 143 hoc] om. V | 144 plus] magis V | 146 motores] motorum V | orbium] mobilium C : vel mobilium add. V | 147 etiam] om. V | 148 etiam minus] inv. CV | 149 et] om. CV | 150 et] etiam V | tantum unum] inv. V | 151 autem] inter V | primum2] om. W | mobilia] om. W | 155 principale et primum] inv. CV | 156 et divinissimum] om. W | aliarum] operationem add. sed exp. C | 157 operationes alie] alie operationem V | 158 est] erit C | voluntate] voluntatem CW | 159 moventur2] post civitate transp. V | etiam] om. V | ordinantur] om. V | 160 operationes] operationem V | civium] civitatum V | Similiter] consimiliter C | 161 eas] ea W | aliqua] alia V

137 Et…144 moverent] cf. Aver., In DC II, com. 58, p. 385, ll. 89–96 | 158 Similiter…160 civium] cf. Aver., In Metaph. XII, com. 44, f. 328A–B | 160 Similiter…162 imponit] cf. ibid., f. 328B–C; E

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determinatum eis imponit. Et hec est intentio Commentatoris contra Avicennam. Apparet ergo quomodo motor primus est appropriatus mobili 163 primo et quomodo non. 164 165 Ad rationem, cum arguitur motor communis non appropriatur alicui mobili particulari, dico quod verum est, ita quod moveat ipsum et nullum aliud. Et cum dicitur in minori quod motor primus est motor universalis, dico quod verum est. Et ideo concedendum quod non appropriatur mobili primo sic quod non moveat alia. Ratio tamen non concludit quin sic approprietur 170 sibi quod immediatius et principalius inter alia ipsum moveat. Ad aliud, cum dicitur motoris appropriati ad suum mobile oportet esse proportionem, dico quod verum est de tali motore qui movet in ratione agentis, sic quod non in ratione finis, cuiusmodi motor est qui movet in ratione amantis et desiderantis. Sed veritatem non habet de eo qui movet in 175 ratione finis. Sic autem movens primus movet suum mobile, et ideo mobilis ad talem motorem non est proportio. Et si aliquis dicat, cum mobilis primi ad suum motorem non sit proportio, quia primum movens est infinite virtutis et quod est infinite virtutis potest movere in non tempore, quare movebit mobile primum in non tempore, ad hoc Commentator solvit dicens quod 180 motus celi componitur ex duobus motoribus, scilicet | ex motore appropriato sibi coniuncto et ex motore separato qui est motor primus. Ex motore autem separato habet | primum mobile quod motus eius semper continuetur et non deficiat in aliquo tempore posteriori. Ex motore autem appropriato habet quod ipsum in tempore moveatur et sic quia proximum movens est virtutis 185 finite, contingit quod motus eius motus sit finitus et in tempore.

162 determinatum] debitum CV | eis] om. W | imponit] imponat V | 163 est appropriatus] appropriatur V | 166 moveat] movet C | 167 est] erit C | 168 concedendum] erit add. C | 169 sic1] ita V | Ratio tamen] inv. V | 170 sibi] sic W | immediatius…moveat] ipsum principalius et immediatius moveat inter alia CV | inter alia] multa V | 171 aliud] secundum V | oportet] debet C | 172 proportionem] proportio V | 175 movens] motor V | 176 cum] quod V | 177 suum] ipsum C | primum movens] primus motor CV | movens] om. V | 178 et…virtutis] om. W (hom.) | quare] non add. V | 179 Commentator solvit] inv. CV | 180 scilicet] om. V | 184 moveatur] movetur post ipsum CV | quia] quod V | proximum] per operum (?) V | 185 motus eius] inv. W | eius motus] inv. CV | finitus et] om. CV

162 Et…164 non] cf. ibid., f. 327M–328D | 180 motus…185 tempore] cf. ibid., com. 41, f. 324E–F

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1 2 3

Consequenter queritur propter illud quod modo dictum est utrum preter motorem separatum qui movet in ratione finis sit in mobile ponere alium motorem coniunctum qui movet in ratione agentis.

4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

Videtur quod non. Natura non facit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora. Non enim gaudet in superfluis nec in necessariis deficit. Sed a motore primo potest sufficienter moveri mobile preter quemcumque alium motorem, tum quia est infinite virtutis, tum etiam quia movet in ratione finis, ita etiam movet in ratione agentis; quare frustra erit ponere alium motorem qui movet in ratione agentis. Item si preter motorem separatum esset ponere alium motorem ad movendum primum mobile, tunc unicuique mobili corresponderet duplex motor et sic esset in duplo plures motores quam mobilia; quare non esset numerus motorum secundum numerum mobilium, quod tamen est contra intentionem Philosophi; ergo etc.

15

In oppositum est Avicenna in sua Metaphysica.

16 17 18 19 20

Dico quod preter motorem separatum qui movet in ratione finis est ponere alium motorem qui movet in ratione agentis, quoniam primum movens qui movet in ratione appetibilis et intelligibilis non movet nisi inquantum amatum et cognitum. Quare oportet esse aliquid esse amans et intelligens et per consequens movens quod quidem movet in ratione amantis et desiderantis.

1 Consequenter queritur] inv. C | illud] id C : hoc V | 2 qui] quidem add. V | in mobile] om. CV | 3 movet] moveat C : post agentis transp. V | 5 in1] om. CW | superfluis] superfluit W | deficit] defiet V : post nec transp. CV | 6 moveri mobile] primum mobile moveri V | preter] principaliter V | 7 etiam] om. V | 8 movet] om. V | quare…agentis] om. V | erit] est W | 11 movendum] om. V | unicuique] unicuicumque W | corresponderet] correspondet W | 12 quare] quia V | 13 secundum] sed V | numerum] numerus V | 14 Philosophi] hic add. V | ergo] quare V | 15 sua Metaphysica] inv. V | 17 qui2] quod V | 18 appetibilis et intelligibilis] inv. V | 19 esse1] post aliud transp. C | aliquid] aliud add. CV | 20 quod quidem] quam V | movet] moveat C

12 non…14 Philosophi] Arist., Metaph. XII, 8, 1074a14–24 | 15 In… Metaphysica] Avic., Liber de philosophia prima IX, 3, p. 475, l. 20–p. 476, l. 21 | 17 primum…22 motores] cf. Aver., In Metaph. XII, com. 37, f. 320H–I | 19 Quare…22 motores] cf. Pseudo-Siger de Brabant (= Petrus de Alvernia ?), Qu. Ph. VIII, q. 24, p. 229

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22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39

Griet Galle Hoc autem dicimus esse motorem alium a motore separato; quare necesse est ponere istos duos motores. Et illam rationem tangit Simplicius super primum De celo. Item hoc apparet sic: motorem mobilis primi qui movet in ratione amantis et desiderantis oportet esse appropriatum mobili primo et iste est qui determinatam proportionem in virtute movendi habet ad mobile primum. Motor autem primus non habet determinatam proportionem, si quidem sit virtutis infinite et mobile finite. Quare preter istum motorem est ponere alium cuius ad mobile sit determinata proportio. Unde Commentator super istum XII dicit quod quamvis movens sit infinite virtutis, tamen non movet in non tempore, quia preter illum est motor appropriatus qui est virtutis finite ex quo habet quod in tempore moveatur. Hunc autem motorem appropriatum dixerunt aliqui esse animam celi, ut Avicenna et Averroys, nisi quod Avicenna posuit eam esse ipsi celo coniunctam | quia esset forma et perfectio eius; Averroys autem posuit eam separatam in esse, ita quod anima non sibi unitur ut forma et perfectio, sed sicut motor. Nos autem dicimus quod motor iste est appropriatus mobili primo pro tanto quia ipsum natum est movere mobile primum et mobile primum natum est moveri ab eo.

21 dicimus esse] inv. V | alium] aliquem V | quare] quia V | 22 duos] et V | illam] hanc CV | Simplicius] Commentator W | 24 mobilis primi] inv. V | amantis] agentis CV | 25 mobili primo] inv. V | 26 mobile primum] inv. CV | 27 si quidem] cum V | 28 virtutis] virtute V | infinite et] in fratasitate (?) V | finite] autem virtutis V | est] oportet V | 29 super] supra V | 30 virtutis] virtus V | 31 quia preter] principaliter V illum] illi V | motor] motus V | 34 et] etiam V | 35 coniunctam] post esse transp. CV | quia] quod CV | 36 in] om. CV | esse] post eam transp. CV | non] post unitur transp. CV | ut] sicut V | 37 iste] ille V | 38 quia] quod V | natum est] inv. V | primum] primo V | 39 natum est] om. W

21 motorem…motores] Simpl., In DC I, 8, p. 270, ll. 9–18 (translatio Guillelmi, p. 374, l. 92–p. 375, l. 1) | 30 quamvis…32 moveatur] Aver., In Metaph. XII, com. 41, f. 324E | 33 animam…34 celo] Avic., Liber de philosophia prima IX, 2, p. 454, ll. 86–90 | 35 eam…37 motor] Auct. Arist. (Aver.), De substantia orbis (16) (cf. apparatus criticus), p. 230; Aver., De substantia orbis I, f. 5H–K

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40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59

Ad rationem, cum arguitur “natura non facit per plura etc.”, dico quod verum est si eque bene potest fieri per pauciora sicut per plura. Et cum dicitur in minori quod primus motor potest movere etc., dico quod simpliciter hoc potuit, sed non ita bene. Vel dicendum quod non potest hoc facere. Si enim ipsum movet in ratione amati, tunc oportuit aliud esse movens quod moveret in ratione amantis. Hoc enim ad illud refertur quodammodo et unum requirit alterum in esse. Ad aliud, cum dicitur “si esset ponere tales duos motores etc.”, concedendum esset quod numerus substantiarum immaterialium non est secundum numerum mobilium et motuum. Contingit enim esse in superioribus aliquas substantias immateriales que ad motum ordinem non habent, maioris virtutis et nobilioris existentes quam ut sint proportionate ad motum. Verum est tamen quod hoc est contra intentionem Philosophi hic. Et ideo dicendum est quod intentio Philosophi non fuit dare numerum motuum et mobilium secundum numerum motorum separatorum, sed secundum numerum motorum coniunctorum eis, ita quod equalis est numerus mobilium et motorum qui appropriate movent suos orbes. Preter istos autem motores appropriatos est unus motor separatus simplex primus a quo influitur virtus movendi in singulos alios motores, qui est deus benedictus in secula seculorum. Amen.

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Expliciunt questiones reportate a magistro Petro de Alvernia.

40 etc] quod potest fieri per pauciora CV | 41 pauciora] plura W | sicut] etiam add. C | plura] pauciora W | 42 in minori] om. W | potest] potuit V | movere etc] preter quemcumque alium motorem movere mobile primum CV | 44 potest] potuit CV | hoc facere] inv. V | 45 tunc] om. V | oportuit] oportet V | aliud esse] inv. V | quod] qui W | 46 et] om. V | 47 tales] alios CV | etc] ergo (tunc V) numerus motorum non esset secundum numerum mobilium, sed motores essent in duplo plures quam mobilia CV | 48 esset] om. V | numerus] nullus V | 49 est] esset V | mobilium] sed motores essent add. sed exp. C | esse] om. C (?) : post inferioribus (v.l.) transp. V | in superioribus] inferioribus V | 50 que…51 habent] non habentes ordinem ad motum que sint CV | 51 existentes] nature V | ut sint] inv. V | 53 est] om. C | 55 motorum] om. W | 56 Preter] om. C (?) | 57 istos autem] inv. V | simplex] simpliciter CV | 58 influitur] derivatur CV | 59 Amen] add. quatuor questiones W | 60 reportate…Alvernia] super xm et xiim metaphisice reportate sub magistro petro de arvernia W, f. 98ra : super xii Metaphysice secundum magistrum petrum de avernia V

Peter of Auvergne on Substance Fabrizio Amerini (Parma)

I. Introduction: The Puzzle of Aristotle’s Doctrine of Substance Contemporary interpreters of Aristotle’s ‘Metaphysics’, book Z, have addressed a special attention to the problem of the continuity vs. discontinuity of the ‘Metaphysics’ doctrine of substance with respect to that of the ‘Categories’. In the ‘Categories’ Aristotle characterizes a primary substance as that which is neither predicable of a subject nor in a subject, but of which any other thing is predicated. In the ‘Categories’ this characterization of substance leads Aristotle to identify primary substances with the individual objects of the common experience, viz. with whatever can be designated by means of a linguistic demonstrative conjoined with a common noun, for example ‘this man’ or ‘this table’. It is clear that Aristotle has in mind the categorical context in which such an account is called to operate as he formulates this particular account of substance. This is to say that by such characterization Aristotle means to establish the primacy as a subject of each individual instance of substance over first, every individual and universal accident, such as this white, whiteness or colour, and second, every universal substance, such as man or animal, which is said to be a secondary substance. It is not obvious that Aristotle’s ‘Categories’ ought to be accounted for as a treatise of metaphysics. This is generally considered a very vexing question. But if an interpreter is inclined to read the ‘Categories’ in this way – or in any case as a logical or linguistic treatise entailing or presupposing a hylomorphic ontology – and hence to describe the items of the category of substance as compounds of matter and form, it is legitimate to assume that in the ‘Categories’ the phrase ‘primary substance’ signifies individual substantial compounds. In the ‘Metaphysics’ the referent of this phrase undoubtedly changes. On account of the ‘Categories’ characterization of substance, there is no doubt that form cannot be counted as a primary substance. Consider a form such as ‘man’. On the one hand, if ‘man’ is understood as a logical entity, i.e. as a specific, universal, and predicable form belonging to the category

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of substance, ‘man’ clearly fails the ‘Categories’ characterization, for it is predicated of every individual subject exhibiting such a form. On the other hand, if ‘man’ is understood in a more metaphysical fashion, i.e. as referring to the substantial form of a composite substance, ‘man’ again fails such a characterization, for it can be predicated of matter. While form cannot be a primary substance (in the ‘Metaphysics’, V, ch. 8, 1017b17 sq., Aristotle actually qualifies it as a ‘part’ of, or something existent within, a primary substance), it is not clear what happens to matter. For one thing, matter as well cannot be counted as a primary substance, since matter too is a part of a primary substance. For another thing, if one concedes that form is predicated of matter and that the compound is none other than form plus matter, matter turns out to be the authentic primary substance, for any other thing is ultimately predicated of it. This complication is exactly what Aristotle discusses in the third chapter of the ‘Metaphysics’, book Z.1 After recalling the ‘Categories’ characterization of substance,2 Aristotle begins Z 3 observing that such a characterization is inadequate, for it leads to an identification of the primary substance with matter.3 Here, Aristotle introduces a famous argument to prove that the ‘Categories’ characterization of substance makes matter the primary substance, viz. the so-called Stripping-Away Argument. The argument suggests that we can discover the primary substance by imagining a progressive stripping away from a thing of all of its properties (whether non-substantial or substantial). For example, if we imagine removing from a table its colour, its shape and so on for any other property, including substantial properties such as being a table, we reach the ultimate subject, which configures itself as the primary substance. In the case of a table, such a subject is matter, since

1 This chapter has been fully discussed by contemporary scholarship. For a good introduction to the problems of the chapter, see Loux, Michael J., Primary Ousia: An Essay on Aristotle’s Metaphysics Z and H, Ithaca/London 1991, cc. 1–2. 2 This is the first sense of ‘substance’ listed at the beginning of Z 3: substance as substrate or subject (upokeimenon). Cf. Met., VII, 3, 1028b33–36, 1029a7–9; Recensio Guillelmi, AL XXV 3.2, p. 134, ll. 67–68 and 75–76: Subiectum uero est de quo alia dicuntur, et illud ipsum non adhuc de alio. […] Nunc quidem igitur * typo dictum est quid est substantia, quia quod non de subiecto sed de quo alia. 3 Cf. Met., VII, 3, 1029a9–10; Recensio Guillelmi, AL XXV 3.2, p. 134, ll. 76– 78: Oportet autem non solum ita; non enim sufficiens. Ipsum * enim hoc immanifestum, et adhuc materia substantia fit.

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only matter can underlie both the substantial and non-substantial properties of table.4 Aristotle, however, argues that such a conclusion cannot be drawn. The main reason to reject it – Aristotle explains – is that by matter philosophers mean that which in itself is not any particular thing nor of any quantity nor otherwise determined. Thus, if one imagined removing from a thing all of its properties, one would not reach matter but something that is external to the categories. Since, however, nothing can exist outside the categories, the result is that a thing disappears if one imagines removing all the properties from it.5 Aristotle therefore suggests refining (or replacing, according to a more ‘discontinuist’ reading) the ‘Categories’ characterization of substance by introducing two supplementary conditions: it is not sufficient (or correct) to describe the primary substance as the ultimate subject of predication, but it is also necessary (or correct) to qualify it as something determinate (tode ti, a ‘this something’) and separate (choriston).6 At the end of the day, Z 3 draws the following conclusion: in the context of such a revised characterization of substance, form and the compound of form and matter (to eidos kai to ex amphoin) are more truly substance than matter is.7 According to this conclusion, an interpreter may legitimately assume that in the ‘Metaphysics’ Aristotle endows the phrase ‘primary substance’ with a different meaning, since it now signifies form in addition to the compound 4 Cf. Met., VII, 3, 1029a11–19; Recensio Guillelmi, AL XXV 3.2, pp. 134–135, ll. 78–87. On this argument, see Schofield, Malcolm, Metaphysics Z3: Some Suggestions, in: Phronesis 17 (1972), pp. 97–101; Stahl, Donald E., Stripped Away: Some Contemporary Obscurities Surrounding Metaphysics Z3 (1029a10–26), in: Phronesis 26 (1981), pp. 177–180; Wedin, Michael V., Subject and Substance in Metaphysics Z3, in: Metaphysik. Die Substanzbücher (Z/H/Q), Ed. Rapp, Christof, Berlin 1996, pp. 41–74. 5 Cf. Met., VII, 3, 1029a20–25; Recensio Guillelmi, AL XXV 3.2, p. 135, ll. 87–94. 6 Cf. Met., VII, 3, 1029a26–28; Recensio Guillelmi, AL XXV 3.2, p. 135, ll. 94–97: Ex hiis ergo speculantibus accidit substantiam esse materiam. Sed impossibile; et enim separabile et hoc aliquid inesse uidetur maxime substantie. 7 Cf. Met., VII, 3, 1029a27–30; Recensio Guillelmi, AL XXV 3.2, p. 135, ll. 97– 98: Quapropter species et quod ex ambobus substantia uidebitur esse magis quam materia. Aristotle specifies the relationship that form, matter, and the compound of matter and form bear to each other – with respect to the two additional conditions of being separate and being determinate – in the first chapter of book H (1042a24–31; Recensio Guillelmi, AL XXV 3.2, p. 169, ll. 24–32). I cannot dwell here on the complex classification given by Aristotle. For a detailed discussion of it, see Wedin, Michael V., Aristotle’s Theory of Substance, Oxford 2000, c. 6.

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of matter and form. An interpreter who takes it as Aristotle’s final word about substance would implicitly assume that in the ‘Metaphysics’ Aristotle has extended the doctrine of the ‘Categories’. While in the ‘Categories’ the phrase ‘primary substance’ only designates the compound of matter and form, in the ‘Metaphysics’ it also designates form. Unfortunately, things are not so simple. If an interpreter goes beyond Z 3, she/he can see that despite Aristotle’s final conclusion of Z 3, the rest of book Z is to a large extent devoted to showing that form rather than the compound deserves the title of primary substance. There is some evidence supporting the ‘extensive’ conclusion of Z 3,8 but the passages where Aristotle argues that only form without matter is the primary substance and the essence of a compound substance are much more numerous. Let me give a pair of examples. In Z 6, Aristotle elaborates a sophisticated argument (the so-called ‘Identity Thesis’) to prove that whatever can be counted as a primary substance must be the same as its essence; in Z 10–11 and then in H 3, Aristotle applies the ‘Identity Thesis’ of Z 6 to single out the items that can be genuinely classified as primary substances, and Aristotle here refers to the human soul as an instance of primary substance.9 At the end of Z 11, furthermore, Aristotle describes a primary being as that whose nature is not expressed by the fact that something is in something else as in its material subject,10 and on such a description, Aristotle denies that the compound of matter and form be the same as its essence, consequently conferring to the compound a different and secondary degree of substantiality: if a man is understood according to form – Aristotle argues –, he is the same as his essence, but if a man is understood according to matter, that is as a compound of matter and form, he is not the same as his essence.11 Already in Z 3, though, an interpreter can find some hints of the emergence of such a ‘restrictive’ view about the essence of sensible substances. At the very beginning of the chapter, for example, Aristotle seems to pursue a different line of reasoning. Aristotle says that if it can be proven that form is more being (and, arguably, more substance) than matter is, then by virtue of the same argument it can be also proven that form is more being (and, arguably,

8 Cf. e.g. Met., VII, 13, 1038b1–6; 15, 1039b20–26. 9 Cf. e.g. Met., VII, 6, 1032a4–6; 10, 1035b14–16, 32; 11, 1037a5–10; VIII, 3, 1043a29–b4. See also VII, 7, 1032b1–14. 10 Cf. Met., VII, 11, 1037b3–4; Recensio Guillelmi, AL XXV 3.2, p. 155, ll. 647–648: dico autem primam que non dicitur per aliud in alio esse et subiecto ut materia. 11 Cf. Met., VII, 11, 1037a21–b7.

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more substance) than the compound of matter and form (tou ex amphoin) is.12 According to this scheme of reasoning, in the ‘Metaphysics’ Aristotle would have been interested not in expanding the doctrine of the ‘Categories’, but, quite the opposite, in narrowing it down by removing both matter and the compound of matter and form from the set of primary substances. The Greek text is controversial on that point. The manuscript tradition is divided indeed, and according to some variant manuscripts of the tradition, which utilize the nominative ‘the compound of both’ (to ex amphoin) instead of the genitive ‘of the compound of both’ (tou ex amphoin), the starting argument looks like the final one.13 Obviously, to opt for one or the other variant permits different interpretations of the chapter as well as of Aristotle’s doctrine of substance. This is an important point for an Aristotelian interpreter. But for the historian of medieval philosophy it suffices to establish that a branch of the manuscript tradition has the variant with the genitive ‘of the compound of both’ (tou ex amphoin) and all the Latin translations of the ‘Metaphysics’ have read a text with this variant, which was translated into Latin in the ablative case. Such a variant clearly affirms the primacy of form over the compound of matter and form as well. Accordingly, when a Latin medieval commentator approaches the ‘Metaphysics’, book Z, he is called to explain three facts: first and generally, why in book Z Aristotle at times calls form ‘primary substance’; second and more particularly, why at the beginning of Z 3 Aristotle regards form as more being (and, arguably, more substance) than matter and the compound, while at the end of the chapter he contrasts form, and the compound of matter and form, to matter; third and finally, whether matter can be said to be substance. The clarification of these aspects is needed if an interpreter wants to reconcile the substantial primacy the ‘Metaphysics’ seems to assign to form with the substantial primacy the ‘Categories’ accord to the compound of matter and form. In what follows, I shall propose a reconstruction of Peter of Auvergne’s answer to this group of questions; then I shall compare his interpretation with that of Thomas Aquinas. In this article, I have confined my attention to the so-called ‘University tradition’ or first redaction of Peter’s Commentary 12 Cf. Met., VII, 3, 1029a5–7; Recensio Guillelmi, AL XXV 3.2, p. 134, ll. 73–74: Quare si species materia est prior et magis ens, et ipso quod ex utrisque prior erit propter eandem rationem. 13 For more details on this problem, see Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 2 vols., Ed. Ross, William D., Oxford 1924, vol. II, apparatus ad Z3, 1029a6, and p. 165. Also see Frede, Michael and Patzig, Gunther, Aristoteles ‘Metaphysik Z’. Text, Übersetzung und Kommentar, 2 vols., München 1988, vol. II, pp. 40–41.

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on the ‘Metaphysics’.14 Notably, I have based my reconstruction on the Ms. Cambridge, Peterhouse 152, which has been checked against the Mss. Città del Vaticano, Bibl. Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Lat. 845 and Oxford, Merton College 292, where necessary. I have not investigated whether Peter changes any aspect of his doctrine in the last two redactions, which are witnessed by the Mss. Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine 3481 and Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, lat. 2330, respectively. At a first reading, the answer is negative, since first, both the manuscripts retain the same questions, in the same order, and second, the questions that I have examined did not show any outstanding difference in content. Anyway, I defer this point to a separate paper. My goal in this article is preliminary and consists in reconstructing Peter’s general interpretation of the ‘Metaphysics’, book Z, doctrine of substance. My principal conclusion will be that Peter does not significantly diverge from Aquinas’s interpretation; nonetheless Peter rearranges things in such a fresh and systematic way that his interpretation will become a touchstone for some of the later commentators, the first being Radulphus Brito.15

14 On the different redactions of Peter’s ‘Questions on the Metaphysics’, see http:// www.paleography.unifr.ch/petrus_de_alvernia/opera.html#13 (see there for other bibliographical references). 15 Peter devotes to the problem of the order of substantiality between form, matter, and their compound three questions: VII, q. 4, Ms. Cambridge, Peterhouse 152, ff. 190vb–191rb (Utrum forma sit substantia); q. 5, f. 191rb–vb (Utrum materia sit substantia); q. 6, ff. 191vb–192rb (Utrum materia vel forma vel aggregatum sit magis substantia). Radulphus Brito treats the same topic on two occasions: VII, q. 5, Ms. Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, conv. soppr. E.I.252, f. 293ra–b (Utrum materia sit substantia), and q. 7, ff. 293vb– 294ra (De quo substantia per prius dicatur, utrum de materia vel forma vel composito). Nonetheless, in the fifth question Radulphus raises three different questions, that is, whether matter is substance, whether form is substance, and whether matter is something being. Peter deals with this latter problem in the seventh question (Utrum materia sit aliquid ens in actu: ff. 192rb–193ra), while he tackles the second problem in the fourth question (Utrum forma sit substantia: ff. 190vb–191rb). For a first assessment of the relationship between Peter and Radulphus, see Ebbesen, Sten, Radulphus Brito on the ‘Metaphysics’, in: Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte, Eds. Aertsen, Jan A., Emery Jr., Ken, Speer, Andreas, Berlin/New York 2001, pp. 456–492. For the numbers of Peter’s ‘Questions’, I refer to Zimmermann, Albert, Verzeichnis Ungedruckter Kommentare zur Metaphysik und

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II. Peter of Auvergne’s Theory of Substance After proving in the two opening questions on book Z first, that substance is the fundamental being,16 and second, that accidents concretely exist insofar as they inhere in a substance, although they are absolute natures of their own,17 Peter is motivated to comment on Z3, and this chapter gives him the occasion to investigate the relationship of substantiality that form, matter, and the compound bear to each other. Peter’s interpretation is in general very clear and simple. His argument includes two steps. First, Peter proves that both matter and form must be said to be substance. Second, Peter illustrates in what sense form, matter, and their compound can be said to be substance. Peter assumes that potentiality and actuality are the key notions for solving both questions. Since potentiality and actuality exhaustively divide the sphere of being and of each kind of being, if something is F, either what is potentially F or what is actually F must be said to be F. Such an intuition allows Peter both to attribute the title of substance to matter and form, and to qualify the degrees of substantiality of each of them. Let me follow Peter’s two-step argument more closely now.

Physik des Aristoteles. Aus der Zeit von etwa 1250–1350 (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters IX), Leiden/Köln 1971, pp. 86–87. 16 Cf. Questiones super Metaphysicam, VII, q. 1, f. 189rb–va (henceforth Qu. Met.): Dicendum quod substantia est primum et simpliciter ens. Quod apparet multipliciter. Primo per rationem primam Philosophi quam hic tangit, quia quod est ens secundum se et simpliciter, prius est eis que sunt entia secundum quid et per accidens [...] accidentia entia sunt in habitudine ad substantiam, sunt enim entia eo quod totaliter (pro taliter: see Recensio Guillelmi, AL XXV 3.2, p. 132, l. 11) entis [...] accidentia nec sunt absolute quid nec absolute entia, sed sola substantia est que talis est secundum se, propter quod substantia est primum entium. Hoc secundo determinatur ex alia ratione quam tangit Philosophus: quod est causa esse aliorum, est primum ens inter illa. For the critical signs used in the transcriptions of the texts quoted in footnotes, see below, Note to the Appendix. 17 Ibid., q. 2, f. 190ra–b: Intelligendum est quod accidentia ex propria ratione ipsorum nec habent esse nec non esse, puta albedo ex hoc quod albedo nec esse nec non esse. […] Dico quod accidens id quod est, puta albedinem esse albedinem vel albedinem esse qualitatem, non habet ex subiecto, quia illud quod inest alii ex propria ratione, non inest illi per aliud. […] Ex hiis ergo apparet quod accidentia ea que insunt sibi ex propria ratione habent preter ipsam substantiam; non tamen sunt in actu entia nisi per substantiam.

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II.1 Arguments for the Substantiality of Form and Matter There is no doubt that, for Peter, the basic item of the Aristotelian metaphysics is the compound. The compound of matter and form is capable of separate existence and this makes it the first thing with which our mind is acquainted. Interestingly enough, Peter abandons the most usual, i.e. Boethian, way of explaining the etymology of the term ‘substance’ (substantia), preferring to relate it to the verb ‘to subsist’ (subsistere) rather than to the verb ‘to stand beneath’ (substare). Peter holds that ‘substance’ does not mean what stands beneath the accidents (substans accidentibus) but what exists of its own (per se subsistens), so from Peter’s perspective the term ‘substance’, prima facie, does not indicate the hidden core of a thing but the thing itself as enveloped by its accidents. Such a conception of substance is instrumental to Peter’s interpretation of Z3, although it raises various complications of which Peter, however, shows he is aware. For example, since according to the above etymology it is difficult to differentiate a subsistent substance from the collection of a thing’s accidents, Peter reserves a long question to scrutinize the role played by accidents in individuating and differentiating substances.18 If medieval philosophers do not see any particular problem in granting the composite the title of substance, they instead express more doubts about the substantiality of matter and form, given that neither is capable of separate existence. In particular, Peter knows that there are strong arguments against the extension of substantiality to form and matter. Those arguments are recurrent in the tradition of the ‘Questions on the Metaphysics’. On the one hand, the most usual argument against the extension of substantiality to form is the following: form is something that is said of something else or, just like an accident, that exists in something else (i.e. matter); but according to the ‘Categories’ characterization of substance, a primary substance neither is predicable of something else nor is in something else, as stated earlier; hence, form cannot be a primary substance.19 On the other hand, if 18 Qu. Met., VII, q. 25 (Utrum accidentia sint causa individuationis substantie composite), ff. 203rb–205ra. 19 Ibid., q. 4, f. 190vb: Nihil quod est in subiecto est substantia […] forma autem materialis non per se existit sed est in alio ut in subiecto. One can find the same argument in the anonymous Qu. Met., VII, q. 5, Ms. Cambridge, Peterhouse 152, f. 34ra (see below, Appendix III, n. 1 = Anonymous Zimmermanni), and in the anonymous Qu. Met., VII, q. 5, Ms. Cambridge, Peterhouse 152, f. 313va (=Anonymous Domus Petri): Queritur utrum hoc sit verum, primo quidem utrum forma sit substantia. Et videtur quod non, quia proprium est

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one wants to deny that matter is substance, one can stress that matter is not anything in actuality, so matter cannot be substance in actuality.20 Despite such arguments, Peter thinks that it is possible to champion the substantiality of both form and matter. In particular, Peter devotes the fourth question to proving the substantiality of form. His argument is that form is that by virtue of which something is a being, thereby form is a kind of actuality (since actuality is that by virtue of which something is a being); but what is an actuality simply is a being; now, form is a kind of substantial actuality, therefore form is a kind of substantial being; the consequence is that form is substance.21 As to the opposing argument, Peter observes that substantie in subiecto non esse, ut dicitur in ‘Predicamentis’; sed forma est in subiecto et in materia; […] quare forma non est substantia. 20 Qu. Met., VII, q. 5, f. 191rb: Quod est in potentia substantia, non est substantia, sicut quod est potentia album, non est album; sed materia est in potentia substantia, ut Commentator dicet consequenter et Aristoteles hoc idem innuit hic; quare non est substantia. The same argument also occurs in Radulphus Brito’s Qu. Met., VII, q. 5, f. 293ra: quod est potentia tale, non est illud tale, sicut potentia album, non est album; sed materia potentia est substantia), and both in the Anonymous Zimmermanni’s Qu. Met., VII, q. 5, f. 34ra (see below, Appendix III, n. 1) and in the Anonymous Domus Petri’s Qu. Met., VII, q. 6, f. 313vb: Consequenter queritur utrum materia sit substantia. Et videtur quod non, quia quod est in potentia substantia, non est substantia, quia quod est in potentia, non est, dicitur 3° huius; sed materia est in potentia substantia, ut dicit Commentator hic et 5 huius; quare et cetera. 21 Ibid., q. 4, ff. 190vb–191ra: Intelligendum quod forma est id quo aliquid habet esse primo […] et quia quo aliquid habet esse est actus eius, ideo forma dicitur actus; sed aliqua est forma qua aliquid habet esse simpliciter et primo. […] Forma autem primo modo dicta est illa qua aliquid quod prius est ens solum in potentia habet esse simpliciter et in actu, puta forma hominis est qua homo est simpliciter et primo ens. Et istam formam qua aliquid primo habet esse dicimus formam substantialem. Forma autem secundo modo dicta est qua aliquid habet esse non simpliciter sed esse tale, puta esse album vel magnum. Hanc vero formam dicimus accidentalem. Et istam distinctionem inter formam substantialem et accidentalem innuit Commentator fine libri sui ‘De substantia orbis’. […] Tunc ad questionem, cum queritur utrum forma sit substantia, dico quod loquendo de forma substantiali, qua aliquid habet esse primo, forma est substantia. Nam sicut prius dictum est, forma est actus quo aliquid habet esse, et ideo sicut aliquid est forma, sic et actus. Forma igitur substantialis alicuius substantie est actus substantialis illius. Quod autem habet rationem actus in aliquo genere, est in illo; nam potentia et actus dividunt ens et unumquodque modum entis, […] unde reperiuntur in quolibet genere, ut vult Commentator super prohemium libri ‘De anima’. Et ideo cum forma substantialis sit actus

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form is not in matter in the same way in which accidents are in a substance, because matter, while being nothing in actuality, is not an entity that can be identified independently of form. Closely following Aristotle (see e.g. ‘Metaphysics’, Z 13, 1038b4–6), Peter distinguishes two senses of ‘subject’ and assumes that only according to the broader sense of it (viz. subiectum as that which stands beneath something while not being in itself anything determinate), matter can be said to be substance and the subject of form. Incidentally, Peter traces back to Avicenna the explanation of the different senses of ‘subject’ that Aristotle attributes to matter and to the compound of matter and form.22 In the fifth question, Peter moves to argue for the substantiality of matter. In particular, like Aquinas, Peter derives the substantiality of matter from change. His argument is standard: in each process of change it is necessary to posit an underlying subject that must be distinct from the extremes of change; but the extremes of change are forms: they are indeed the privation of the final form as well as the final form; therefore, if the underlying subject must be distinct from the extremes of change and these are forms, the subject must lack any form; since, as has been said, form is that by virtue of which something is in actuality, the underlying subject must lack any actuality as well; as a result, matter turns out to be something essentially potential.23 At this point someone might raise a question: if potentiality to be a substantie, manifestum est quod est aliquid substantie et poterit dici substantia, et huius non est alia ratio nisi quia forma est qua aliqua substantia habet esse. Sic igitur apparet quod forma est substantia et que sit illa forma. 22 Qu. Met., VII, f. 191ra–b: Ad rationem, cum arguitur: ‘nihil quod est in subiecto est substantia’, dico quod subiectum aliquando accipitur communiter, pro omni eo quod substat alii. […] Alio modo potest accipi subiectum, et magis proprie, secundum quod distinguitur contra materiam […] et si sic accipiatur subiectum, dico quod nihil quod est in subiecto est substantia. […] Propter quod et Avicenna dicit quod nihil quod est in subiecto habente speciem est substantia, sed accidens; hoc autem modo intellexit Philosophus substantiam in subiecto non esse. The same answer and the same reference to Avicenna can be found in the Anonymous Zimmermanni’s Qu. Met., VII, q. 5, ad rationem, f. 34ra (see below, Appendix III, n. 1). 23 Ibid., q. 5, f. 191rb–va: Intelligendum quod in omni transmutatione oportet esse aliquod subiectum. Motus enim est actus mobilis, ut dicitur 3° ‘Physicorum’, et mobile rationem subiecti habet. Subiectum autem in transmutatione est diversum ab utroque termino transmutationis, quia neuter terminus manet […] subiectum autem manet in tota transmutatione et etiam in utroque termino. Nunc autem in substantia invenitur transmutatio, […] quare oportet in tali transmutatione esse subiectum aliquod quod sit in potentia ad utrumque

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substance expresses the whole essence of matter, how is it possible for matter to be substance in actuality? Peter’s answer to this question does not sound completely satisfying. Peter actually states that it is necessary that matter is (actually) substance precisely because it is potentially substance,24 but clearly this answer is not compelling, for someone may continue to object to this conclusion simply by inverting Peter’s argument: what is potentially substance is not actually substance and what is not actually substance is not substance at all. Peter, however, insists that such a reply has no effect on his argument. For he is not deriving the conclusion that matter is exactly the same substance as the compound of matter and form from the premise that matter is potentially the compound substance: in fact, the compound of matter and form is not exactly the same as the matter from which it derives. He is simply stating that matter is substance insofar as it is potentially a substance, i.e. matter is that which can genuinely become a substance. To be precise, he says neither that matter in itself is a substance nor that matter is exactly the same substance as the compound of matter and form.25 It may be disputed whether Peter’s argument is conclusive or persuasive. This problem, however, need not hold our attention here any further. For our argument, it is enough to note that, for Peter, form and matter can be said to be ‘substance’ insofar they are the actuality and the potentiality of ‘a substance’, respectively. Although Peter is not as explicit as one would extremum; […] quod autem sic est in potentia ad utrumque extremum transmutationis substantialis non est nisi ens in potentia ad substantiam; tale autem quod sic est in potentia dicimus materiam. Materia igitur est id quod de sui ratione est solum in potentia ad substantiam. 24 Qu. Met., VII, f. 191va: Tunc ad questionem, cum queritur utrum materia sit substantia, dico quod materia hoc modo considerata, secundum quod est ens in potentia ad substantiam, de necessitate est substantia. Cuius ratio est: nam potentia et actus dividunt unumquodque genus entis et quamlibet speciem cuiuslibet generis entis et reperiuntur in quolibet genere, ut Commentator dicit super prohemium ‘De anima’, ita quod actus et potentia ad actum illum sunt eiusdem generis; potentia igitur ad substantiam est de genere substantie. Sed materia est in potentia ad substantiam: aut enim est substantia aut in potentia ad illam, et ideo materia rationem substantie habet, ita quod sicut forma prius dicebatur esse substantia quia dat esse actu substantie, ita materia dicitur substantia quia in potentia est ad esse per substantiam. Sic igitur apparet quod materia est substantia et quo modo. 25 Ibid., f. 191va: Ad rationem, cum arguitur: ‘quod est in potentia substantia non est substantia’, dico quod non est substantia illa ad quam est in potentia, nec rationem substantie secundum illum modum habet secundum quem illud ad quod est in potentia dicitur habere rationem substantie.

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expect him to be, nonetheless, the reference to potentiality and actuality allows an interpreter to hold that, for Peter, the sufficient condition a thing must satisfy for being a substance is to bear some ‘relevant’ relationship to what can be evidently and concretely pointed to as a substance. On the other hand, it is clear from the analysis of his questions that matter is the weak point of Peter’s doctrine of substance. Let me explain this claim. In the eighth question, Peter states that matter’s passive potency to be a substance is not anything different in reality from matter’s essence. If the opposite case held – Peter argues – either an infinite regress would occur, or matter in itself would be endowed with a certain degree of actuality. First, if the passive potency to be a substance were external to matter’s essence, matter would need a second and different passive potency for being related to its first passive potency to be a substance, and this would originate an infinite regress. Second, if every passive potency were external to matter’s essence, matter in itself would be something in actuality and since the cause of a thing’s actuality is form, matter would be essentially provided with a form.26 If one is not disposed, however, to concede both these counterfactual situations, then one must conclude that matter in itself is something merely potential. Specifically, Peter proves this latter point by means of three 26 Qu. Met., VII, q. 8, f. 193ra–b: Dicendum est quod potentia passiva prima non est aliqua res et natura addita materie nec differt substantialiter a substantia materie. Cuius ratio est: si enim potentia esset res addita substantie materie, tunc materia esset in potentia ad illam rem. […] Quare potentiam passivam materie precederet alia potentia in materia et tunc fiet questio de illa potentia; […] quare vel erit procedere in infinitum vel erit dare quod potentia materie nihil reale addat supra substantiam materie. […] Potentia passiva in re non differt ab ipsa materia, nihilominus tamen intelligendum est quod differt in ratione et ordine quodam. Nam potentia dicit respectum ad formam. Iste autem respectus non est in essentia materie. Unde illa eadem natura que dicitur materia absolute dicitur potentia per ordinem ad actum. According to Peter, the asymmetry between the mode in which matter really is and the mode in which we can conceptualize it explains why Averroes in the Prologue to his ‘Commentary on the Physics’ denies that matter’s potency be part of matter’s essence, while in ‘De substantia orbis’ he concedes it: Averroys considerans ad utrumque istorum quid includitur in ratione potentie voluit ‘Super primum Physicorum’ quod potentia non esset de essentia materie: potentia enim secundum quod respectum importat et ordinem corrumpitur apud adventum forme, materia autem non corrumpitur sed perficitur; in libro autem ‘De substantia orbis’ dicit quod materia substantiatur per posse et quod potentia est differentia et entitas materie. […] Et ideo dicendum est quod materia et potentia passiva materie sunt una natura, differentes ratione.

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arguments, which all insist that matter, lacking any form, necessarily lacks any actuality.27 Nonetheless, it can be noted that Peter also invokes such arguments to prove that matter is somehow endowed with being. Thus, at the end of the day, Peter makes two apparently clashing claims concerning matter’s essence: first, matter in itself is not anything existent in actuality, but second, matter in itself actually has some degree of being. Speaking this way, Peter seems to inherit and to replicate the same difficulties that Aquinas met in explaining the nature of matter. In one respect, Peter concedes that matter may be equated to nothing, for matter in itself cannot be identified independently of and prior to a form informing it.28 Since matter in itself is deprived of any kind of formal being, it seems to be 27 Qu. Met., VII, q. 7, f. 192va: Dico quod necesse est materiam non esse aliquid ens in actu. Quod probatur ex duobus vel tribus . Primo, quia unumquodque est in actu per formam; nam forma est id quo aliquid actu habet esse, ut prius accipiebatur; materia autem secundum se nec est forma nec formam habens, et ideo secundum se non est nec erit aliquid ens in actu. Et iterum hoc secundo declaratur sic: sicut Philosophus vult primo ‘Physicorum’, cum in omni transmutatione sit subiectum, illud oportet esse aliud ab utroque termino transmutationis; nam ipsum est quod manet in utroque termino, scilicet a quo et ad quem, et in tota transmutatione; terminus autem a quo non manet sed corrumpitur et terminus ad quem adquiritur, neutrum tamen existit in tota transmutatione, sed solum in termino transmutationis; in substantia vero est aliqua transmutatio; quare in ista transmutatione oportet ponere subiectum, quod etiam sit aliud ab utroque termino transmutationis. Termini autem transmutationis substantialis sunt forma et privatio forme. Subiectum igitur est alterum ab ipsa forma. Quare si per formam fit aliquid ens actu, tunc subiectum in transmutatione substantiali, quod dicimus esse materiam, non erit secundum se aliquid in actu. Tertio hoc declaratur ratione quam Philosophus ponit in littera: in predicationibus denominativis necesse est devenire ad aliquod subiectum primum, aliter enim predicationes procederent in infinitum, quod est inconveniens; in predicatione autem denominativa quod predicatur et de quo predicatur id quod predicatur est alterum ratione, quia in predicatione tali oportet esse subiectum aliquod de quo alia predicentur et ipsum non de aliis, quod etiam est diversum ratione ab illis; […] substantia autem composita predicatur de materia denominative, materia autem de nullo termino alio, et ideo materia diversum quid est ab omni alio quocumque; […] quare secundum se non est aliquid actu ens. 28 Peter discusses the relationship between matter and nothing in q. 5, f. 191va–b. We find a similar discussion in both the Anonymous Zimmermanni’s Qu. Met., VII, q. 7 (Utrum materia essentialiter distincta sit a privatione), f. 34va–b, and in the Anonymous Domus Petri’s Qu. Met., VII, q. 6 (Utrum materia sit substantia), f. 313vb.

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deprived of any kind of actual being as well, as previously stated. Nonetheless, the existence of change allows Peter to infer the existence of matter, as we have seen. Thus, in another respect matter can be said to have some kind of being to a certain degree. The procedure imagined by Peter for conferring being to matter is not different from the one imagined by Aquinas. Both suppose that form is the principle governing the process of constitution and identification of a material substance, and of each part and property of it. While guiding such a process, form is also intended to govern the process of constitution and identification of matter, so that the upshot of the process of actualization of the matter’s potentiality to be a substance is a thing composed of form and matter. At the end of the process, that is, both matter and form receive their own identity, albeit within a compound substance. Not only does matter acquire its own identity because of its relation to form, but form also undergoes a process of re-identification by virtue of its relation to matter. This identity-independency and the simultaneous reciprocal relation that matter and form have within a compound substance explains, for Peter, why matter must be included in the definition of a material substance as well.29 Specifically, the matter that must be mentioned in the definition of a material substance is what Peter calls the appropriate matter or the per se material parts of a substance, i.e. matter and the material parts inasmuch as they are functionally defined on the basis of form.30 This entails that, for Peter, matter is part of a material substance’s essence 29 Qu. Met., VII, q. 27 (Utrum materia pertineat ad quidditatem substantiarum compositarum), f. 205rb: Dicendum quod materia pertinet ad quidditatem substantie sensibilis, quoniam totum quod ponitur in diffinitione substantie sensibilis pertinet ad eius substantiam, quoniam substantia non diffinitur per rem alterius generis, sicut accidentia, quorum diffinitio datur per additamentum; substantia autem sensibilis per materiam diffinitur, ut visum fuit prius et apparet ex primo ‘De anima’; quare ad quidditatem substantie sensibilis non tantum pertinet forma, sed etiam materia. Item, hoc apparet ex alio: illa ex quibus resultat unitas substantie composite pertinent ad substantiam et quidditatem substantie composite; […] principia autem unitatis substantie composite non solum est forma, sed materia, ut ostensum est prius; quare non solum forma pertinet ad essentiam substantie composite, sed etiam materia. […] Materia igitur pertinet ad quidditatem ipsius rei, non autem quecumque materia, sed proportionata materia proportionate forme. 30 A material part of a man, say a piece of flesh and bones, can be called for example a hand when it is considered as able to fulfill the function, imparted and coordinated by human soul, of grasping objects. Peter calls such functionally organized matter an appropriate or per se material part of human body. On this aspect, see Qu. Met., VII, q. 26 (Utrum totum sit prius suis partibus), f. 205ra.

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as well, although it may be conceded that every material feature of a material substance ultimately depends on its form.31 Indeed no matter can exist without at least one form, while some form can exist without any matter.32 But once matter has received a form, it obtains a metaphysical identity that makes it really different, albeit not really separable, from form. On the one hand, this explanation of the relationship between form and matter shows that Peter shares the basics of Aquinas’s conception of substantial form. By substantial form, Aquinas and Peter mean that which endues matter, and the compound of matter and form, with absolute and primary being and identity. Some other typical claims of Aquinas ensue from this characterization of substantial form: first, prime matter can receive every form immediately, but can acquire the last form only by way of some other intermediate forms;33 second, prime matter receives a form 31 Qu. Met., VII, q. 26, f. 205rb–va: Quamvis ad quidditatem speciei materia et etiam forma \pertineant/, cum inter istas partes principalior dicatur esse ipsa forma, tum quia est principium essendi […], tum quia est principium nobilius essendi et etiam cognoscendi […], prius tamen et principalius pertinet forma, ex consequenti autem materia. Apparet igitur quod totum aggregatum pertinet ad quidditatem, sub ratione tamen forme, que pars principalior est in ipso aggregato. Ad rationes est dicendum, ad primam quod materia non est intellecta ex se, sed intelligitur per habitudinem ad formam, et sic sequitur quod non ita principaliter pertineat ad quidditatem sicut forma; quod tamen ad quidditatem non pertineat, hec ratio convincere non potest. 32 The existence of some form without matter does not entail that every form can exist separately of matter. For Peter, neither a substantial form (for example, the human soul) nor a specific form (for example, man) can exist without matter, although matter and form indicate two really different items in the extra-mental reality. Peter states this point in Qu. Met., VII, q. 23 (Utrum nature rerum sensibilium sint separate, sicut posuit Plato: f. 202ra–vb) and in VIII, q. 2 (Utrum forma sit aliquid preter materiam: f. 206rb). 33 Cf. Qu. Met., VIII, q. 5 (Utrum materia prima immediate vel ordine quodam recipiat omnes formas omnium generabilium), ff. 208ra–209ra, esp. f. 208ra–b: Si ergo queratur utrum materia immediate recipiat omnem formam, idest immediate perficiatur per quamlibet vel ordine quodam, dico quod immediate perficitur per quamlibet et non per aliquam formam mediam. […] Sic ergo patet quod si nominetur perfectio nomine receptionis, tunc materia immediate recipit omnem formam. Sed si consideretur receptio materie quantum ad transmutationem, cum materia secundum quod transmutatur sit sub forma contraria, et queratur tunc utrum materia ut est sub forma contraria immediate transmutetur ad quamcumque , dico quod non, sed transmutatur ad quasdam formas mediantibus aliis.

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in an instantaneous way; third, no accidental form can exist before a substantial form.34 On the other hand, one could get the impression that the procedure of metaphysical constitution of matter imagined by Peter is innocuous enough and ends with granting matter a kind of identity that, while being caused or at least occasioned by the form, is nonetheless independent of it. Quite the opposite is true; an interpreter must be cautious here because in Peter’s explanation of the process of matter identification, the relation between form and matter reveals some points of opaqueness. Consider more closely the relation between such notions. On two occasions, Peter discusses the question of whether form is an accident of matter. Again following Aquinas, Peter distinguishes two senses of the term ‘accident’: one stemming from the ‘Categories’ and the other one stemming from the ‘Topics’. In the first sense, ‘a’ is an accident of ‘b’ if ‘a’ adds something real to ‘b’: understood in this way, form cannot be an accident of matter, because matter does not exist alongside form. In the second sense, ‘a’ is an accident of ‘b’ if ‘a’ can be said to be somehow external to the essence of ‘b’: understood in this way, form can be said to be an accident of matter (just like matter’s passive potency to receive a form and to be a substance can be said to be accidental to matter), although form is not really separable from matter.35 Such a distinction confirms that, for Peter, form plays a core role in providing matter with its own identity. The action of matter-identification fulfilled by form, however, has two important and at the same time problematic implications for matter. First, Peter argues that form cannot be described as an accident of matter; hence form cannot be properly described as the form ‘of matter’. This implies that form does not confer to matter 34 Qu. Met., VIII, q. 1, f. 189va: Ad rationem, cum arguitur: ‘potentia ad formam precedit formam substantialem in materia’, potest dici uno modo quod ratio ista non concludit. Probat enim particulariter quod aliquod accidens precedit aliquam substantiam, puta potentia ad hanc formam precedit formam illam, sed universaliter non probat accidens precedere substantiam, et ideo non est ad propositum. Quamvis enim hoc accidens, scilicet potentia ad hanc formam, prius sit ista forma in materia, tamen posterius est quadam alia forma. Semper enim, cum materia est in potentia ad unam formam, actu est sub forma contraria. According to these lines, Peter accounts for Averroes’s doctrine of the so-called indeterminate dimensions and of their relation to substantial form. For Peter, indeterminate dimensions, inasmuch as they are accidents, necessarily follow and not precede substantial form (see f. 189vb). 35 On such double understanding of accident, see Qu. Met., VII, q. 1, f. 189va, and q. 4, f. 191rb.

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any kind of accidental or additional being. Second, Peter assumes that form cannot even be described as the substantial form of matter. This implies that matter does not realize its potentiality even when it receives a form. On the one hand, form does not actualize the potentiality of matter if by actualization one means that form confers to matter a kind of being that is actually different from the one which the compound of matter and form finally possesses, for matter does not have a form that is actually different from the one of the compound. On the other hand, we have seen that Peter infers the existence of matter from the fact that in every process of change there is a subject that endures across the process and that differs from the extremes of change. But as previously noted, Peter also uses this argument to prove that the subject in itself is something radically deprived of any form, so that it in itself can never be in actuality. Putting together these different statements, it may be concluded that the identity and the kind of being that matter acquires by virtue of form turn out to be indistinguishable, in reality, from the identity and the kind of being that the compound of matter and form exhibits. As a matter of fact, once matter receives a form, matter ceases to be what it is (namely, something merely potential) and actually becomes the material part of the compound of matter and form. In other words, when matter receives a form, it ceases to be ‘matter’ and becomes a suitable ‘material’ of and for a certain compound. When matter becomes the material part of the compound, moreover, matter is transformed into a substance that is functionally structured in accord with substantial form. This is to say that, at the end of the process of constitution of a substance, matter comes to coincide completely with the compound of matter and form. Precisely, matter ‘is’ the compound of matter and form qua materially considered, i.e. qua considered as opposed to its form. If this is the case, it turns out to be impossible to gain access directly to the essence of matter in itself. II.2 The Order of Substantiality Existing between Form, Matter, and their Compound: Peter’s Interpretation of Z 3 After proving that both matter and form can be said to be substance, in the sixth question Peter takes the second step of his interpretation and focuses on the topic of the order of substantiality between form and the compound. Peter’s doctrine is rather traditional and his solution to this problem very clear. The idea is that the term ‘substance’ can be predicated of matter, form, and their compound, neither in one and the same sense (i.e. in a univocal way) nor in many unrelated senses (i.e. in a equivocal way), but expressing three senses which are nonetheless related to each other (viz. in an analogical way). More specifically, Peter holds that both form and the compound

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can be said to be a primary substance if one looks at them from a metaphysical or a semantical point of view, respectively. Metaphysically speaking (secundum veritatem, secundum rem), the order of substantiality is, for Peter, the following: first, form; second, the compound; third, matter. The rationale behind such a hierarchy relies upon the explanatory power attributed to each item. As has been already noted, form is the cause of both the compound and matter’s being, since form, insofar as it is a kind of actuality, is a kind of being of its own. In turn, the compound’s being is none other than form’s being, since form is the actuality of the compound, and matter’s being is none other than the compound’s being, as previously stated.36 Semantically speaking (secundum significationem), by contrast, the order of substantiality is the following: first, the compound; second, form; third, matter. The rationale behind such a classification instead relies upon the empiric and hence epistemic value assigned to these items. The compound is intellectually cognized before form, while matter cannot be cognized if not in analogy to form or to artifacts. Since the compound is cognized first by us, it is primarily signified by a substantial noun, while form is cognized second and signified. Such a distinction of points of view enables Peter to account easily for the two different arguments of Z 3. Incidentally, it can be noted that Peter is one of the few medieval commentators who expressly pose the problem of reconciling the two arguments of Z 3. His proposal can be summarized as follows: when Aristotle says in Z 3, 1029a5–7, that “if the species is before and more being than matter, it is also before the compound”, Peter takes Aristotle as arguing that since form is before matter because it is the cause of matter’s being, this is the reason why form is also before the compound of matter and form. As a result, form is substance before the compound. When Aristotle instead says in Z 3, 1029a29–30, that according to the conditions of being separate and being determinate “the species and the compound appear to be more substance than matter is”, Peter understands Aristotle as concluding that the compound is more substance than form and matter. Is Peter advancing a reliable interpretation of Aristotle? As a matter of fact, one may note that Aristotle does not conclude in Z 3, 1029a29–30, that the compound is more truly substance than form is, but only that according to the two conditions of being determinate and being separate, form and the compound come out to be more truly substance than 36 See below, Appendix I, col. A, solutio. On the different kinds of identity between form, the compound and their essential features, see Qu. Met., VII, qq. 15–16, ff. 196va–197va.

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matter is. The conclusion of Peter is nonetheless easy to draw if one maintains, with Thomas Aquinas, that form can be said to be something determinate and separate only because it is a part or a principle of something that is completely determinate and separate. On the other hand, Peter does not clarify how the second argument is derived from what Aristotle previously said in the chapter. In fact, the two additional conditions seem to be introduced by Aristotle with the purpose of reaffirming the first argument of the chapter with respect to the provisional conclusion that matter is the most plausible candidate for the title of primary substance. To be clearer, Aristotle seems to introduce such additional conditions for restoring the primacy of the compound over matter as well, otherwise the connection of such conditions to the central part of the chapter would remain entirely unexplained. Both Averroes and Aquinas read the second argument of Z 3 as stating the primacy of the compound over matter as well.37 But if the connection between the second argument of Z 3 and the provisional conclusion of the central part of the chapter is granted, the final argument does not say anything about the primacy of the compound over form. This argument fits perfectly with the rest of the chapter, even if an interpreter reads it as reaffirming the primacy of form over the compound. This latter reading, for example, is the one which many commentators sympathetic to Averroes’s Commentary give to the chapter.38 37 See Averroes, Commentarium in Metaphysicam, VII, Ed. Venice 1572, t. VIII, p. 159F–G: Sed hoc est impossibile et cetera, id est, sed impossibile est ut materia sola sit substantia, cum opinatur quod intentiones separabiles in intellectu, scilicet que non intelliguntur in respectu aliorum, sicut est in materia, sed que intelliguntur per se, sunt magis substantie; et ideo existimatur quod forma sit etiam substantia, cum sit quidditas quam significat definitio, et congregatum etiam ex forma et materia est substantia, et quod hec duo magis sunt substantia quam materia (my punctuation); Thomas Aquinas, In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio, VII, lec. II, Ed. Spiazzi, Raimondo, Torino/ Roma 1961, vol. 2, n. 1291, p. 323: Ostendit contrarium huius conclusionis, dicens quod impossibile est solam materiam esse substantiam, vel ipsam etiam esse maxime substantiam. (punctuation freely modified). Notice that Aquinas is uncertain about Aristotle’s provisional conclusion: for him, the final argument could argue against the strong conclusion that exclusively matter is substance or against the blander conclusion that especially matter is substance. In that Aquinas diverges from Averroes, who instead adopted without hesitation the first interpretation. 38 See e.g. Ferrandus of Spain, Sententia super Metaphysicam, VII, c. 3, Ms. Oxford, Merton College 281, ff. 86rb–87ra: Quare si species, idest, si igitur forma, est prior ipsa materia et magis ens, ex hoc scilicet quod forma est in actu et actus,

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Moreover, the central part of the chapter seems to give no basis supporting a semantic interpretation of the second argument of Z 3. Most medieval commentators (including Aquinas) leave aside any reference to the mode of signifying of the term ‘substance’ when they explain the order of substantiality holding between form and the compound. In conclusion, needless to say, although Peter’s proposal is philosophically stimulating, it does not appear as a completely grounded interpretation of Aristotle’s text.

III. Peter of Auvergne and Thomas Aquinas’s Interpretations Compared Peter’s interpretation of Aristotle’s doctrine of substance shares many points with that of Aquinas. In general, the influence of Aquinas is a well-known et materia est in potentia et non habet actum nisi a forma, tunc ergo ipsa forma erit prior composito ex utrisque; nam compositum non est in actu nisi per formam. Et sic eadem ratione qua forma est prior materia, eadem est prior composito, scilicet quia nec materia nec compositum sunt in actu nisi propter formam. Et intendit sic Commentator, dicens quod cum forma sit prior composito ex materia et forma, et compositum est substantia, ut omnes concedunt et iam declaratum est supra, ergo sequitur quod forma sit magis substantia quam ipsum compositum, quia propter quod unumquodque tale, et illud magis. […] Deinde, cum dicit Sed impossibile, arguit ad partem affirmativam prius posite questionis, ostendendo scilicet quod forma est substantia et magis ens quam materia, dicens Sed impossibile est, scilicet quod materia sola sit substantia. Adam of Bocfeld, Sententia super Metaphysicam, VII, c. 3, Ms. Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellońska, 763, ff. 58vb–59rb: Consequenter cum dicit Si igitur forma, declarat quod forma est maxime substantia sic: si forma est ante materiam et magis substantia quam ipsa, et hoc quia est perfectio et actus eius, eadem ratione est ante compositum et magis substantia quam ipsum. […] Consequenter cum dicit Sed hoc est impossibile, dat rationem quod forma est magis substantia quam materia, et procedit sic: primo dicit impossibile esse sic esse, sicut rationes precedentes voluerunt; secundo, cum dicit Estimatur enim, declarat hoc sic: partes diffinitionis indicantes essentiam rei sunt maxime substantie; huiusmodi autem partes sunt forme aut partes forme; ergo forma est maxime substantia et ita magis substantia quam materia. Sic adhuc est compositum magis substantia quam materia propter formam quam habet. For the Aristotelian text commented on by Adam, see Averroes, Commentarium in Metaphysicam, VII, Ed. Venice 1572, t. VIII, pp. 157I and 158A–B; pp. 158H–I and 159F–G (see also the previous footnote).

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feature of Peter’s philosophy. As we have seen, when Peter argues for the substantiality of both form and matter, a reader may get the impression that Peter wants to limit himself to proposing anew Aquinas’s interpretation. This impression may be confirmed by other evidence. For example, if an interpreter looks through all the twenty-eight questions on book Z, he can easily see that Peter endorses most fundamental principles of Aquinas’s interpretation of the ‘Metaphysics’, book Z. In particular, Peter takes up the distinguishing thesis of Aquinas’s interpretation of the Aristotelian doctrine of substance. Like Aquinas, Peter holds that the essence of a material substance is what is expressed by the metaphysical definition of that substance. Since a metaphysical definition mentions both the material and the formal features of the defined thing, essence must also include both matter and form, otherwise definition would be ‘by addition’, i.e. would include something external to the essence of the defined thing, just as the definition of accidents does. This means that form does not exhaust the essence of a material substance; nonetheless form expresses the principal or primary factor of the determinateness of a material substance’s essence, as was noted above.39 Accordingly, when Peter finds Aristotle stating that form is the primary substance, following Aquinas, he takes Aristotle to mean either (i) that the substantial form (i.e. the soul, in the case of man) is the primary or principal explanatory principle of the substantiality of the compound of matter and form, or (ii) that the specific form (i.e. man) is the primary substance if it is compared with the individual compound, which is instead a secondary item with respect to the explanation of the essence of the compound of matter and form. Again following Aquinas, Peter subscribes to the Avicennian view that there is only a causal correspondence and a mereological relationship between the substantial form (i.e. the form of the part) and the specific form (i.e. the form of the whole). In the case of man, soul and humanity, for Peter, do not amount to one and the same thing. Peter displays an awareness that some Averroes-influenced thinkers championed the full identity between the form of the part and the form of the whole. Based on this identification, they suggested distinguishing the notion of essence (essentia) from that of quiddity (quidditas) of a material substance. Inheriting a qualification introduced by Aquinas in the ‘De ente et essentia’, Peter rejects such a position and argues that there is no remarkable difference between the notions of essence (essentia) and quiddity (quidditas). For Peter, the latter denotes the same thing denoted by the former, only connoting, in addition, 39 See above, notes 30–31.

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the thing’s relationship to the mind.40 As to their relationship to definition, Peter concludes that definition expresses both the essence and the quiddity of a material substance, thus both essence and quiddity encompass matter and form. Similarly, Peter does not diverge from Aquinas on some other related, topics. Let me give a pair of examples. First, Peter holds that no real difference must be posited between the references of a concrete and an abstract substantial term (such as ‘man’ and ‘manhood’, ‘being’ and ‘essence’, for example), although such terms differ according to the mode of signifying. Like Aquinas, Peter assumes that the abstract term signifies the same essential features signified by the concrete term, but by virtue of its mode of signifying it makes abstraction from the supposits (supposita) of which such features are concretely predicated. According to Peter, there is only a conceptual and semantic difference between being and essence.41 Second, like Aquinas, Peter endorses the Avicennian view that a thing’s essence in itself is neither universal nor singular. It becomes singular when it is realized extramentally, while it becomes universal when it is cognized. When a thing’s essence has been received by the mind, it exists within it; it can then be regarded as the underlying subject of some ‘intentional’ properties (such as being universal, being predicable, being a species and the like) that the mind, 40 Cf. Qu. Met., VII, q. 9, f. 193va: Intelligendum quod essentia et quidditas rei idem sunt secundum rem, unde diffinitio, quia significat essentiam rei, dicitur significare quidditatem: est enim diffinitio sermo indicans quid est esse rei. Differunt autem essentia et quidditas solum in modo: quod enim dicit essentia absolute illud idem dicit quidditas in ordine ad intellectum, et sic essentia rei in se et absolute dicitur quidditas secundum quod est obiectum intellectus et principium manifestativum aliorum que accidunt ei cuius est quidditas. Compare with Thomas Aquinas, De ente et essentia, c. 1, in: Opera Omnia, t. XLIII, cura et studio fratrum Praedicatorum, Roma 1976, pp. 369–370. 41 Cf. Qu. Met., VII, q. 9, f. 193vb: Ens autem et essentia in re nullam habent diversitatem, sed solum in modo significandi vel intelligendi; nam illud quod essentia dicit per modum abstracti, ens dicit per modum concreti. Et consimiliter est dicendum de quidditate et quod quid est.; also see q. 16, f. 197rb–va. On the signification of ‘being’ and ‘essence’ in Aquinas, see e.g. Exp. Met., IV, lec. II, vol. 1, n. 558 sq., pp. 155–156, and Expositio libri Boetii De ebdomadibus, c. 2. For details on the mode of signifying of substantial terms, see Peter of Auvergne, Qu. Met., VIII, q. 1 (Utrum nomen substantie significet formam tantum aut substantiam compositam), ff. 205vb–206rb. On this topic, see my The Semantics of Substantial Names. The Tradition of the Commentaries on the Metaphysics, in: Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales 75.2 (2008), pp. 395–440.

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by comparing it to the external things from which it has been abstracted or to other abstracted things, can attach to it. A cognized essence therefore results for Peter, just as for Aquinas, in an aggregate of a mind-independent thing’s nature and some mind-dependent properties. When a thing’s essence is considered in itself instead, it can be predicated of the external things from which it has been derived by means of the act of abstraction.42 We could quote many other cases, but these are sufficient to show the doctrinal proximity of Peter to Aquinas. One must not think, however, that Peter simply echoes Aquinas. Differences are present. Let me give another pair of examples. It is known that in his early ‘De ente et essentia’ (1252– 1256) Aquinas considered Plato as the most representative advocate of the identification between form and essence, while he still counted Averroes among the supporters of the Avicennian position on essence.43 In his late ‘Commentary on the Metaphysics’ (1269–1273), however, probably because of polemical reasons connected to the Parisian debates on the separateness of possible intellect, Aquinas changed his opinion and charged Averroes with having adopted a Platonic position.44 Aquinas’s implicit equation of Averroes to Plato will be severely criticized by Radulphus Brito.45 In his ‘Questions on the Metaphysics’, Peter follows Aquinas both in tracing back 42 Cf. Qu. Met., VII, q. 12, f. 195ra–b. 43 See Thomas Aquinas, De ente et essentia, c. 2, pp. 370–371, ll. 1–50. 44 See Exp. Met., VII, lec. 9, vol. 2, n. 1467–1469, pp. 358–359: Quidam enim dicunt quod tota essentia speciei est ipsa forma. […] Et propter hoc dicunt quod eadem secundum rem est forma totius, quae significatur nomine humanitatis, et forma partis, quae significatur nomine animae, sed differunt solum secundum rationem. […] Et ex hoc volunt quod nullae partes materiae ponantur in definitione indicante speciem, sed solum principia formalia speciei. Et haec opinio videtur Averrois et quorundam sequentium eum. Sed videtur esse contra intentionem Aristotelis.” (punctuation mine). 45 See e.g. Radulphus Brito, Questiones super Metaphysicam, VII, q. 11, f. 209ra–b: De talibus quidditatibus sunt diverse opiniones. Plato posuit quod quidditas talis substantie esset forma, sicut anima est quidditas hominis […] et quod ad quidditatem rerum sensibilium non pertinet forma. Alii dixerunt quod materia et forma idem sunt cum quidditate. Secundum primam opinionem quidditas et illud cuius est non sunt idem, quia substantia composita includit materiam et formam, cuius substantie est quod quid est proprie forma. […] Ista opinio est falsa et imponitur Commentatori ab Expositore propter hoc quia dicit Commentator de questione sophistarum quod quidditas hominis quodam modo est homo et quodam modo non: est enim homo qui est forma et non est homo qui est materia. For the reference to Averroes’s text, see below, note n. 48.

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the identification between form and essence to Plato and in assuming that Aristotle wrote the ‘Metaphysics’, book Z, precisely with the aim of criticizing Plato’s view of form and substance. Specifically, Peter takes up Aquinas’s conviction that in book Z Aristotle addresses three major criticisms to Plato.46 It is worth noting that Peter nevertheless explicitly detaches the position of Averroes from that of Plato.47 Not only does Peter place Averroes 46 They concern the impossibility for separate Ideas to explain the cognition and the generation of material things (Z 6 and Z 8), and the impossibility for universal Ideas to be substance (Z 13). Peter however adds a fourth criticism: according to him, in Z 10–11 Aristotle proves that the essence of a material substance must include both matter and form, and that for this reason a substance’s essence cannot be separated from that substance. See Qu. Met., VII, q. 23, f. 202va: Sicut ergo nihil est formaliter per illud quod separatum est, sic nec aliquid perfecte cognoscitur aut intelligitur. Si igitur nature horum sensibilium sint separate, non habent cognosci per illa. Sic ergo procedit Philosophus contra ipsum capitulo illo Utrum autem idem est. […] In sequenti capitulo ostendit Philosophus contra Platonem quod nature rerum, quas posuit, non valent ad generationem nec tamquam cause agentes generantes nec tamquam exemplaria. […] In sequenti vero capitulo procedit Philosophus alia via contra ipsum, accipiendo quod ad speciem substantiarum compositarum pertinet materia: non sensibilis, sed que proportionatur forme. […] Consequenter, capitulo de universali, procedit contra Platonem aliis viis. Compare with Thomas Aquinas, Exp. Met., VII, lec. 6, vol. 2, n. 1381, p. 342; lec. 7, n. 1429–1435, pp. 349–350; lec. 13, n. 1571 sq., pp. 378–381. Aquinas’s interpretation is widely inspired by the correspondent sections of Averroes’s ‘Commentary on the Metaphysics’. 47 See Qu. Met., VII, q. 15, f. 196va: Intelligendum quod, sicut Philosophus dicit inferius, in illo capitulo Quoniam vero diffinitio ratio est, de quidditate substantiarum compositarum fuit apud antiquos duplex opinio. Quidam enim dicebant quod [[diversitas]] quidditas substantiarum compositarum fuit forma tantum, ut Plato et sequentes ipsum: posuit enim Plato quod quidditas hominis est tantum anima hominis, et coactus fuit ad ponendum hoc quia posuit naturas rerum separatas ad hoc ut scientia et cognitio de rebus sensibilibus haberetur et per quarum participationem res sensibiles in suo esse existerent. […] Aliqui autem voluerunt quod et materia et forma pertineat ad quidditatem et substantiam rerum materialium. Et hec est intentio Philosophi. […] Secundum autem primam opinionem etiam in dictis per se quidditas et id cuius est quidditas in substantiis compositis non sunt unum; immo, secundum illos, substantia composita supra suam quidditatem adderet materiam, que non solum est ratione, sed etiam re differens a forma, que quidem sola ponitur esse quidditas substantie composite. Sed istud est contra rationem et contra intentionem Philosophi. Item et contra Commentatorem et Avicennam in ‘Metaphysica’ sua; etiam fere

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on the side of Avicenna (by way, however, of a disputable interpretation of a crucial text of Averroes’s Commentary),48 but, significantly enough, he also criticizes Plato in the same words with which Aquinas criticized Averroes in his ‘Commentary on the Metaphysics’.49 In this case, Peter seems to rectify Aquinas’s interpretation. With respect to the case discussed in this paper, the emphasis placed by Peter on the substantiality of form may mark another point of difference with Aquinas. Let us consider their interpretations of Z 3 more closely. As we have seen, Peter explicitly tackles the question of the inner consistency of the chapter. The first argument of the chapter is understood by Peter as asserting the (causal) primacy of form over matter and the compound of matter and form. Aquinas reads the text essentially in the same way, but

contra omnes expositores Aristotelis. Contra rationem est. Nam illa dicuntur pertinere ad quidditatem substantie composite per que diffinitur per se substantia composita; […] in diffinitione autem substantiarum compositarum non potest poni aliquid quod sit alterius generis, nam diffinitio substantie non est per additamentum sicut et diffinitio accidentis; […] sed ad diffinitionem substantiarum sensibilium pertinet materia et forma, ut patet ex primo ‘De anima’ et ex sexto huius, item et ex isto septimo. For more details on this point, see my Il problema dell’identità tra una cosa e la sua essenza. Note sull’esegesi medievale di Metafisica, Zeta 6, in: Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale XIII (2002), pp. 435–505. 48 See Qu. Met., VII, q. 16, f. 197va: Dicendum est quod Socrates et quod quid est Socratis sunt idem, quia sic Socrates et homo differentiam non habent. […] Si vero consideretur Socrates quantum ad accidentia consequenter, que sunt preter id quod pertinet ad suam substantiam, sic ipsum et suum quod quid est non sunt unum, ita \quod/ quod quid est hominis et iste homo sunt unum secundum speciem, secundum accidens non. Et hoc intendebat Commentator cum dixit quod quidditas hominis et homo sunt unum secundum formam, non autem secundum materiam, intendens per formam quidditatem hominis que aggregat in se materiam et formam in precisione omnium accidentium, per materiam autem intendens accidentia. Peter is here referring to Averroes’s ‘Commentary on the Metaphysics’, VII, t.c. 21, p. 171H–I: Et hoc indendebat cum dixit Et quod Socrates et essentia Socratis et cetera. Et forte questio Sophistarum est ista: quidditas hominis aut est eadem cum homine, aut aliud; si aliud, tunc homo non habebit quidditatem; si idem, tunc quidditas hominis est homo et homo habet quidditatem; ergo quidditas habebit quidditatem, et sic in infinitum. Et solutio est quoniam quidditas hominis est homo uno modo et non est homo alio modo, et est forma hominis et non est homo qui est congregatus ex materia et forma. (punctuation mine). 49 Compare above, notes 44 and 47.

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on the other hand, he also stresses that the argument reaffirms the idea that matter and form are none other than the principles of the compound. Insofar as they are principles, however, not only form but also matter, for Aquinas, is prior to the compound of matter and form.50 For Aquinas, the fundamental item of Aristotle’s metaphysics is not form but the compound of matter and form. In fact, when Aquinas explains the second argument of the chapter, he takes it as stating again the metaphysically central role played by the compound. Its primacy is due to the fact that the compound of matter and form is what perfectly satisfies the two additional conditions for substantiality given by Aristotle, i.e. being separate and being determinate; form, by contrast, can be said to be separate and determinate only insofar as it is what is responsible of the separateness and determinateness

50 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Exp. Met., VII, lec. 2, vol. 2, n. 1278–1279, pp. 321–322: Dicit ergo primo ‘quod species’, idest forma, prior est materia. Materia enim est ens in potentia et species est actus eius. Actus autem naturaliter prior est potentia. Et simpliciter loquendo prior tempore, quia non movetur potentia ad actum nisi per ens actu, licet in uno et eodem quod quandoque est in potentia, quandoque in actu, potentia tempore praecedat actum. Unde patet quod forma est prior quam materia et etiam est magis ens quam ipsa, quia propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis. Materia autem non fit ens actu nisi per formam. Unde oportet quod forma sit magis ens quam materia. Et ex hoc ulterius sequitur quod eadem ratione forma sit prior composito ex utrisque, inquantum est in composito aliquid de materia. Et ita participat aliquid de eo quod est posterius secundum naturam, scilicet de materia. Et iterum patet quod materia et forma sunt principia compositi. Principia autem alicuius sunt eo priora. Et ita si forma est prior materia, erit prior composito. (punctuation mine). The sentence I have emphasized in previous quotation does not commit Aquinas to any Platonic consequence. Aquinas clarifies this point when he is to comment on H 3: to say that if ‘a’ is the cause of the being of ‘b’ then ‘a’ is more being than ‘b’ does not amount to saying that ‘a’ has the same kind of being as ‘b’ (see VIII, lec. III, n. 1707 sq.). Traditionally, the opposite view is attributed to Averroes (see e.g. above, note 38). Such different interpretations are critically examined by Francis of Appignano; on this see my La natura della sostanza nel Commento alla Metafisica di Francesco d’Appignano, in: Atti del IV Convegno Internazionale su Francesco di Appignano, Ed. Priori, Domenico, Appignano del Tronto 2008, pp. 45–71. Aquinas’s inference is also endorsed by the Franciscan Alexander of Alessandria, Expositio in Metaphysicam, VII, c. 3, q. 5, Ed. Venice, 1572, f. 189ra and by the Augustinian Paul of Venice (see below, Appendix II).

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of the compound.51 For Peter, the secondariness of form is instead due only to an epistemic reason, which is reflected by the signification of the term ‘substance’. Unlike Aquinas, Peter seems to attribute less importance to the additional conditions for substantiality given by Aristotle. Thus, while Peter essentially reaches the same conclusion as Aquinas, his interpretation is distinguished by his emphasis on form.

IV. Conclusion: The Significance and Influence of Peter’s ‘Questions on the Metaphysics’ Much must be done to specify the relationship between Peter and Aquinas. Similarly, the influence of Peter of Auvergne’s ‘Questions on the Metaphysics’ is also a chapter in the history of Latin Medieval Aristotelianism that must be still written. As we have seen, Peter gives a qualified answer to the question of the order of substantiality holding between form and the compound of matter and form – summing up, the compound is more substance as perceived by us (quo ad nos), so it is what is primarily signified by a substantial term, while form is more substance in its own right (quo ad naturam) – presumably wanting it to be nothing but a clarification of Aquinas’s interpretation. Like Aquinas, Peter regards the ‘Metaphysics’ as perfectly in line with the ‘Categories’, and in order to state the doctrinal continuity of these works Peter emphasizes the explanatory point of view adopted by Aristotle in the ‘Metaphysics’. It is from this viewpoint that Peter formulates the argument that what is more being is more substance and since form is responsible for the compound’s being, then it is more truly substance than the compound is. This is to say that the compound exhibits a substantial kind of being inasmuch as there is a form that makes it as able to instantiate that kind of being. In his reading of Z 3, though, Peter does not conclude that form is more substance because it is more being, but that it is more substance because it is the ‘primary cause’ of the compound’s being. Thus, if form can be said to be a primary substance, it is not said to be primary in the same sense in which the compound of matter and form is said 51 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Exp. Met., VII, lec. 2, vol. 2, n. 1293, p. 323: Et ideo patet ‘quod species’, idest forma, et ‘compositum ex ambobus’, scilicet ex materia et forma, magis videntur esse substantia quam materia, quia compositum et est separabile et est hoc aliquid. Forma autem etsi non sit separabilis et hoc aliquid, tamen per ipsam compositum fit ens actu, ut sic possit esse separabile et hoc aliquid. (my punctuation).

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to be a primary substance. This consideration allows Peter to avoid introducing any discontinuity between the ‘Categories’ and the ‘Metaphysics’. As we have seen, Peter’s strategy of interpretation presupposes a change in the etymology of the term ‘substance’. If ‘substance’ is not synonymous with ‘what stands beneath’ (substans) but with ‘what subsists’ (subsistens, understood however in a negative sense, i.e. as what does not depend for its being on anything else), it follows that form and the compound of matter and form turn out to be more truly substance than matter is. Once he has established this point, Peter clarifies that both form and the compound can be said to be a primary substance if we consider them from different standpoints: metaphysically speaking, form is more substance than the compound because form is self-subsisting and the cause of the compound’s subsistence; semantically speaking, vice versa, the compound is more substance than form because it is the only thing empirically and separately subsisting. Thus, although both form and the compound are substance according to the same general sense of ‘substance’ (i.e. to subsist), nonetheless each of them qualifies that sense in a different manner: the form in a causal way (that is, form is substance insofar as it is the substance or the cause of the substantiality of the compound) and the compound in an existential way (that is, the compound is substance insofar as it is a substance). The distinction introduced by Peter for interpreting Z 3 and reconciling the ‘Metaphysics’ doctrine of substance with that of the ‘Categories’ will prove to be fortunate. It is not easy to follow the fate of Peter’s ‘Questions’ and especially to be sure about the real influence of them on later commentators. There are some commentators who do not consider Peter’s treatment at all and deal with the same topic in a completely different way. This is the case, for example, with Augustine of Ancona.52 But there also cases that bear witness to the fact that Peter’s solution was successful to a certain degree. The first is given by Radulphus Brito and the second by Paul of Venice. As to Radulphus, if Sten Ebbesen’s suggestion of identifying the anonymous author of the ‘Questiones Metaphysice’ conserved in the Ms. Firenze, 52 Notice that Augustine also refers to the different senses of the term ‘substance’ (viz. to stand beneath, to subsist, to be or to exist) for explaining how matter, form, and their compound can be said to be substance. Augustine’s final answer, anyway, looks very different from the one of Peter. See Augustine of Ancona, Questiones super Metaphysicam, VII, q. 4 (Utrum materia sit magis substantia quam forma vel compositum), Ms. Innsbruck, Universitätsbibliothek 192, f. 112va: Ideo dicemus, appropriate loquendo, quod materie competit substare, forme autem competit subsistere et composito competit esse vel existere.

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BNC, conv. soppr. E.I.252, as Radulphus Brito is correct, the influence exerted by Peter’s ‘Questions’ on those of Radulphus is massive. The comparison between their questions, which I have transcribed in Appendix I, shows in a clear way the deep impact of Peter’s text on Radulphus. It is a more tricky matter, though, to say whether Paul of Venice was directly acquainted with Peter of Auvergne. Probably, he was not. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the distinction between what is primarily being according to the modality of cognition and signification, and what is primarily being of its own – a distinction put forward by Peter and proposed again by Radulphus Brito (and, via Radulphus, taken up by the Franciscan Alexander of Alessandria, who is one of the main sources of Paul’s ‘Commentary on the Metaphysics’) – serves a key function in Paul’s interpretation, as the extracts quoted in Appendix II show. No decisive evidence, however, can be given for confirming this point. Paul may have derived such a distinction from Giles of Rome rather than from Peter of Auvergne, given that Giles too introduces such a distinction in book H, when he discusses the question ‘whether a substantial name primarily signifies form or the compound’. In any case, it is certain that Peter plays a role in elaborating such a distinction and especially in applying it to the interpretation of Z 3. This latter point ought to be kept in mind if one aims to assess Peter’s influence correctly. From another point of view, Peter’s interpretation bears witness that the ‘Metaphysics’ commentators approach the topic of the order of substantiality in a different way according to whether they belong to the Oxford or the Paris tradition. Averroes’s ‘Great Commentary on the Metaphysics’ seems to have exerted an enduring influence on the Oxford commentators. By contrast, the Parisian commentators prevalently go back to Avicenna and regard his doctrine of the indifference of essence as the clue to solving most problems raised by Z. For one thing, Peter bears witness to the influence exerted by Avicenna’s interpretation of substance on the Parisian commentators. For another thing, Peter also shows the independence of the two traditions, since he seems not to be completely acquainted with the Oxford tradition. Or at least, if Peter knows such a tradition, he appears not to be interested in taking it into consideration. Indeed, English commentators seem to wield different tools of interpretation and engage them in discussing very different questions. Richard of Clive, for instance, who probably composed his ‘Questions on the Metaphysics’ in the same years as Peter was composing his own questions, solves the above question concerning the order of substantiality by distinguishing different senses of ‘form’ and ‘priority’, and relating such distinctions to the vexed question of the identity

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between quiddity and essence.53 Some years before, Geoffrey of Aspall also advanced an articulate answer by distinguishing different meanings of the term ‘substance’ and relating them to the different metaphysical roles played by form.54 As the questions transcribed in Appendix III show, Peter seems to ignore or to neglect such a tradition. With respect to the specific solution adopted by Peter, the move of distinguishing between a metaphysical and a semantic viewpoint for reconciling the different kinds of substantial being that form and the compound display is not, absolutely speaking, a novelty of Peter. Some other commentators, like the Anonymous Domus Petri,55 have evidently adopted it. Nonetheless, most commentators seem to have opted for a different interpretation. Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus (‘Quaestiones in Metaphysicam’, VII, q. 6), for example, say nothing about such a distinction, but prefer accounting for the order of substantiality existing between form and the compound in terms of the different metaphysical conditions they satisfy. The explanations of Albert the Great56 and Antonius Andreae57 are not quintessentially different from that of Aquinas. Giles of Rome raises no question, in his treatment of Z 3, concerning the order of substantiality between form and the compound, although he introduces such a distinction in a different question, as stated earlier. Research is still needed, however, to reconstruct in all its details the context of Peter’s ‘Questions on the Metaphysics’.

53 See below, Appendix III, n. 4. 54 See below, Appendix III, n. 3. 55 See below, Appendix III, n. 2. The relationship between Peter’s ‘Questions’ and the Anonymous Domus Petri’s ‘Questions’ still needs to be clarified. 56 Cf. Albert the Great, Metaphysica, Lib. 7, tract. 1, c. 5, in: Opera Omnia, t. XVI/II, Ed. Geyer, Bernhard, Münster i. W. 1964, p. 323, ll. 22–34, and p. 325, ll. 5 sq. 57 Cf. Antonius Andreae, Expositio in Metaphysicam, VII, Summa II, cap. 1, in Ioannis Duns Scoti, In XII libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio, t. IV, Ed. Lugduni 1639, pp. 224a–225b.

Appendix Note to Appendix Appendix I–III contain the following transcriptions: Appendix I: a first complete transcription and a comparison of Peter of Auvergne’s ‘Questiones super Metaphysicam’, VII, q. 6, Ms. Cambridge, Peterhouse 152, and Radulphus Brito’s ‘Questiones in Metaphysicam’, VII, q. 7, Ms. Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, conv. soppr. E.I.252: both questions ask whether substance primarily refers to form, matter, or the compound of matter and form. In order to make clear the influence of Peter on Radulphus, common formulations have been italicized. Appendix II: an extract from Paul of Venice’s ‘Sententia super Metaphysicam’, VII, tr. 1, c. 3, q. 5, Ms. Casale Monferrato, Biblioteca del Seminario, I a (3–6). Appendix III: a first complete transcription of the following questions: Anonymous Zimmermanni’s ‘Questiones super Metaphysicam’, VII, q. 5, Ms. Cambridge, Peterhouse 152; Anonymous Domus Petri’s ‘Questiones super Metaphysicam’, VII, q. 7, Ms. Cambridge, Peterhouse 152; Geoffrey of Aspall’s ‘Questiones super Metaphysicam’, VII, q. 8, Ms. Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College 509; Richard of Clive’s ‘Questiones super Metaphysicam’, VII, qq. 5–6, Ms. Worcester, Chapter Library Q 13. In such transcriptions, as well as in the texts quoted in the footnotes of the present article, I made use of the following signs: [ ] my expunction [[ ]] copyist’s expunction < > my addition \/ copyist’s interlinear or marginal addition (?) uncertain reading

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Appendix I

Petri de Alvernia Questiones super Metaphysicam, VII, q. 6, Ms. Cambridge, Peterhouse 152, ff. 191vb–192rb.

Radulphi Britonis Questiones in Metaphysicam, VII, q. 7, Ms. Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, conv. soppr. E.I.252, ff. 293vb–294ra.

Queritur consequenter, cum secundum Philosophum substantia que non dicitur de alio dividatur in tria, scilicet materiam, formam et aggregatum, quid istorum magis est substantia.

Consequenter queritur de quo substantia per prius dicatur, utrum de materia vel de forma vel de composito; postea circa illud capitulum “Et primo dicemus de eo logice” (scil. VII, 4, 1029b13 sq.).

Et videtur quod materia, quia substantia a substando dicitur. Quod ergo magis substat, principalius est substantia; sed materia est que maxime substat: nam substat forme et toti aggregato; quare et cetera.

Arguitur quod per prius dicatur de materia, quia substantia dicitur a substando. Quod ergo principalius substat, est substantia prima; materia est huiusmodi, quia substat forme et aggregato, quia est primum subiectum substans omnibus; ideo et cetera. Item, quod est incorruptibile magis est substantia quam corruptibile; materia prima est huiusmodi, quia est ingenerabilis et incorruptibilis, ut dicitur primo Physicorum (scil. I, 9, 192a25–34), et forma \et/ compositum corrumpuntur; ideo et cetera.

Item, hoc arguitur ratione antiquorum, qui ponebant materiam esse magis substantiam, quam Philosophus tangit in littera (scil. VII, 3, 1029a10 sq.): illud maxime est substantia quod remanet in eo quod

Item, ad hoc videtur valere ratio antiquorum: non solum [[non]] quod sit primo substantia, sed quod solum sit substantia; nam in eis que ponuntur substantie, si auferantur sicut

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substantia est, remotis hiis que non sunt substantie; sed substantia composita manifestissime est substantia, et si ab ea removeantur illa que non sunt substantie, puta motus, passiones et quantitates, nihil remane[a]t nisi materia; quare materia maxime videtur esse substantia.

motus et passiones, non manet nisi materia; unde nisi istud quod manet sit substantia, diffugit cognitionem veram quid sit substantia.

Sed videtur quod aggregatum magis sit substantia et principalius, quoniam illa magis dicitur substantia que primo et principaliter dicitur substantia; sed talis est substantia aggregata: ipsa enim est que proprie et principaliter et maxime dicitur substantia, que neque dicitur de subiecto neque est in subiecto, sicut dicitur in Predicamentis (scil. 5, 2a11–13); quare et cetera.

Sed videtur quod compositum sit magis substantia, quia illud quod proprie et maxime est substantia, est per prius et magis substantia; compositum est huiusmodi, ut dicitur in Predicamentis (scil. 5, 2a11–13); ideo et cetera.

Sed videtur quod forma sit magis substantia, quia propter quod unumquodque tale, et illud magis; sed compositum est substantia per formam, nam per idem substantia composita est substantia et ens in actu; quare et cetera.

Item, de forma videtur quod sit magis substantia, quia propter quod unumquodque tale, et illud magis; compositum neque materia sunt in actu substantia nisi per formam; ergo sola forma magis et per prius est substantia.

Dico quod forma, aggregatum et materia est substantia. Ratio autem per quam forma dicitur substantia est quia est illud quo aliquid primo habet esse. Aggregatum dicitur substantia quia per aliquid sui habet esse, puta per formam. Item, materia dicitur substantia quia est illud quo aliquid potest esse. Iste autem rationes per quas forma dicitur substantia, et aggregatum, item

De ista questione intelligendum est primo quod substantia de istis non dicitur univoce, penitus per unam rationem, neque equivoce, sed analogice magis et quod ita sit patet, quia forma est illud per quod aliquid habet esse primo: illa enim forma que dat primo esse et per quam habet aliquid esse primo est substantialis; sed accidens (pro accidentalis) est que non dat esse sim-

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et materia, sunt rationes diverse, et ideo nomen substantie de hiis tribus non dicitur per rationem unam penitus eandem, nec per rationes diversas penitus et equivocas, quia que continentur sub aliquo nomine equivoce, unum non est principium essendi vel intelligendi alterum, immo penitus nullam habitudinem, ut sic, habent ad invicem.59 Sed ista tria, materia, forma et aggregatum, de quibus dicitur nomen substantie, sic se habent quod unum est principium essendi et intelligendi alterum. Forma enim est que dat esse materie et aggregato; nam aggregatum principaliter est per formam et etiam per formam intelligitur: materia enim cum solum sit in potentia, intelligendi aliquid. Et ideo nomen substantie dicitur de istis medio modo, scilicet secundum prius et posterius.

pliciter, sed tale esse, sicut album vel magnum. Ratio autem quare compositum dicitur substantia est quia per aliquid sui esse. Ratio autem quare materia dicitur substantia est quia est illud quo aliquid habet esse quod possit esse subiectum. Iste autem rationes non sunt unum neque pure equivoce, quia illa que importantur per aliquod nomen pure equivoce, unum non est principium cognoscendi alterum, quia in hoc differunt equivocatio et analogia quia in equivocatione est multitudo non ordinata, in analogia vero est multitudo ordinata. Nunc autem ita est quod ratio unius istorum bene est principium cognoscendi alterum. Materia enim cognoscitur in analogia et habitudine ad formam. Ergo substantia de istis pure equivoce non dicitur.

Item, intelligendum quod, sicut dicebatur quinto huius, non est idem aliquid esse prius simpliciter eorum que significantur per aliquod nomen et aliquid prius cadere sub significatione nominis, immo aliquid est prius secundum rem quod tamen est posterius secundum significationem. Et ratio huius est: cum enim nomen significet aliquid secundum quod intellectum est, quia

Secundo est advertendum quod non semper illud (semper illud non ms.) est simpliciter prius quod cadit sub significato nominis primo, ymmo bene est e converso. Cuius ratio est quia voces sunt signa passionum que sunt in anima, ut dicitur primo Peryermenias (scil. 1, 16a3–4); ergo illud quod per prius cognoscitur ab intellectu, est primo significatum per vocem.

59 Cf. also Anonymous Zimmermanni, Questiones super Metaphysicam, VII, q. 5, solutio, f. 34ra (see below, appendix III, n. 1).

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nomen imponitur ad significandum rem intellectam, illud tunc prius significatur per nomen quod primo cadit in intellectu. Aliquid autem prius est secundum rem et naturam et tamen posterius intelligitur a nobis et e contrario. Non enim eadem nobis nota et simpliciter nota, ut dicitur primo Physicorum (scil. I, 1, 184a10 sq.): que enim plus habent de ratione entitatis, priora sunt simpliciter et maxime intelligibilia quo ad naturam suam; que vero minus habent de ratione entitatis, puta sensibilia et que admixta sunt cum materia, priora sunt secundum intellectum nostrum; nam intellectus noster principium intelligendi accipit ex sensibilibus et in intelligendo procedit de potentia ad actum, propter quod prius occurrunt sibi [et] \que/ magis indeterminata sunt et magis accedunt ad naturam potentie. Manifestum est igitur quod non est necesse id quod prius est aliquibus secundum rem prius significari per nomen. Tunc ad questionem, cum queritur quid prius et principalius dicitur substantia, utrum materia vel forma vel aggregatum, dico quod illud quod prius est secundum veritatem eorum que significantur nomine substantie est forma, deinde vero compositum. Cuius ratio est quoniam substantia dicitur in relatione ad esse, quia substantia est secundum quam aliquid habet esse

Hiis visis dico quod forma secundum rem per prius est substantia, secundo compositum, tertio materia. Et ratio huius est quia per formam vel substantiam aliquid habet esse, unde in septimo (scil. VII, 4, 1029b13 sq.) dicitur quod unumquodque habet esse per suum quod quid est et etiam cognosci, et ideo illud in quo per prius invenitur ratio essendi, tale primo est substantia.

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primo, et ideo in eo primo invenitur ratio substantie in quo primo invenitur ratio essendi; sed illud in quo primo invenitur ratio essendi est forma: compositum enim non habet esse nisi quia includit formam; quare in forma primo reperitur ratio qua aliquid habet esse et ideo forma prius et principalius est substantia, deinde compositum, ultimo autem materia. Et hoc est quod Philosophus hic dicit: “si” enim “species” vel forma “est materia prior et magis ens, et ipso quod ex utrisque”, idest composito, “prior erit”.60 Ideo manifestum est quod illud quod est prius secundum rem eorum que cadunt sub significatione nominis est forma, nihilominus quod prius cadit sub significatione nominis substantie est substantia composita; nam quod manifestius est nobis eorum que cadunt sub significatione substantie, illud prius est secundum significationem; sed substantia composita manifestior est nobis eorum que cadunt sub significatione nominis: “posterior enim et aperta est”61 magis, ut Philosophus dicit in littera. Intellectus enim noster ex compositis incipit et ideo manifestum est quod substantia composita est que primo

Nunc autem materia et compositum non habent esse nisi per formam et primo in forma invenitur ratio essendi. Ergo secundum rem forma prius est substantia quam materia et compositum.

60 Cf. Met., VII, 3, 1029a5–7; Recensio Guillelmi, AL XXV 3.2, p. 134, ll. 73–74 (see above, note n. 12). 61 Cf. Met., VII, 3, 1029a31–32; Recensio Guillelmi, AL XXV 3.2, p. 135, l. 100.

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significatur nomine substantie, deinde autem forma, ultimo autem materia. Materia enim de se non est intelligibilis nisi per analogiam ad artificiata vel ad formas, ut apparet primo Physicorum (scil. I, 7, 191a8–11) et ideo ultimum est secundum veritatem eorum que significantur per nomen substantie et ultimo etiam significatur per nomen. Propter quod Philosophus, concludendo ex premissis, dicit: “quapropter species et quod ex ambobus substantia videbitur esse magis quam materia”.62 Sic igitur apparet quod forma secundum veritatem prius est substantia quam compositum, nihilominus compositum est quod primo per nomen substantie significatur, quia magis nobis innotescit secundum intellectum. Et hoc est quod Philosophus hic innuit. Dicit enim quod que maxime et manifestissime dicuntur substantie \ sunt/ sensibilia corpora (scil. VII, 2, 1028b8–9), et idem dicebat secundo (pro tertio) huius (scil. III, 1, 995b13 sq.). Item, in Predicamentis (scil. 5, 2a11–13) diffiniens substantiam particularem compositam, dicit quod substantia prima est que proprie et principaliter et maxime dicitur substantia. Dicit autem dicitur et non est, dans per hoc intelligere quod substantia composita, licet non 62

Cf. Met., VII, 3, 1029a29–30; Recensio Guillelmi, AL XXV 3.2, p. 135, ll. 97–98 (see above, note n. 7).

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sit primum secundum rem inter ea que significantur nomine substantie, tamen primo significatur per nomen substantie. Ad rationem, cum arguitur quod ‘materia sit primo substantia, quia substantia dicitur a substando’, dico quod substantia non dicitur a substando, sed a subsistendo. Subsistere autem est habere esse in se, non in alio, et hoc convenit primo substantie. Et cum dicitur in minori: ‘materia primo substat’, dico quod ratio substandi non invenitur primo in materia, etsi dicatur subiectum primum: ipsum enim non est substantia, quia nec est secundum se. Unde sicut ratio subiecti, secundum quod subiectum, non convenit primo materie, ita nec ratio substandi: substare enim est illius quod est aliquid actu in se. Istud autem primo convenit substantie composite, et concessum est quod hec substantia est que primo per nomen substantie significatur.

Ad illud quod dicitur quod ‘substantia dicitur a substando’, aliquis diceret quod non, sed magis dicitur a subsistendo (subsistando ms.); et tale quod magis subsistit est compositum, quod subsistit per formam. Vel possumus dicere quod materia non proprie sub[[si]] stat, quod per ‘substare’ intelligit Philosophus aliquid quod per se subsistat, quod substat suis superioribus et accidentibus.

Ad aliud contra, quod ‘substantia per prius dicitur de illa que est incorruptibilis’, verum est ceteris paribus, si utraque scilicet sit in actu. Sed si una sit in potentia et alia in actu, dato quod illa que est in actu sit corruptibilis et alia que est in potentia sit incorruptibilis, tamen quia actus est nobilior, non oportet quod illa que est incorruptibilis sit primo substantia, sed que est in actu, quia magis habet esse substantiale pro tanto quia est in actu; ideo et cetera.

Peter of Auvergne on substance

Ad aliud, cum arguitur: ‘illud maxime est substantia quod remanet in substantia, remotis hiis que non sunt substantie’, concedatur. Et cum dicitur in minori quod ‘si a substantia composita removeantur ea que non sunt substantie, nichil remanet nisi materia’, dico quod hec est falsa, immo si removeantur motus, passiones et dimensiones, remanet aggregatum ex materia et forma, et non materia sola. Et ideo aggregatum est quod primo et maxime dicitur substantia.

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Quod autem dicitur quod ‘ablatis per intellectum motibus et passionibus, non remanet aliquid nisi materia’, isti homines ignoraverunt formam substantialem et credebant quod totum compositum esset materia, et cognitionem suam effugiebant pro tanto, quid esset substantia †pro tanto quid debilis(?) erat†.

Quod autem dicitur de composito, quod ‘primo ita substat’, verum est, sed quia non habet esse in actu nisi per formam, ideo non valet, et verum est quod magis substabit. Quod autem dicitur de forma, quod ‘propter quod unumquodque et cetera’, concedo quod prius sit substantia secundum rem.

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APPENDIX II Pauli Veneti Sententia super Metaphysicam VII, tr. 1, c. 3, q. 5 Ms. Casale Monferrato, Biblioteca del Seminario, I a (3–6), ff. 9rb–10ra. Sed est advertendum quod dici de aliquibus secundum prius et posterius est dupliciter, scilicet quantum ad naturam rei et quantum ad nominis impositionem. Sicut scientia quantum ad naturam rei prius dicitur de scientia Dei, que est causa rerum, quam de scientia nostra, que causatur a rebus; sed quantum ad nominis impositionem est e converso: prius enim nostre scientie quam divine imponitur nomen scientie, quia ea que sunt in sensibus sunt magis manifesta nobis quam que sensum transcendunt et nostro intellectui preeminent. Nomina enim imponimus rebus quas nominamus, ideo primo imponimus ea rebus quas primo nominamus. Quantum ergo ad naturam significatam nomine substantie, prius dicitur substantia de forma, que est causa essendi et cognoscendi alia. Sed quantum ad nominis impositionem, prius dicitur de composito: ipsum enim compositum cognitione confusa et superficiali, non penetrante intrinseca principia et essentialia, prius est nobis notum quam forma et materia, dicente Philosopho, in prologo Phisicorum, quod totum nobis notius est quam partes et diffinitum diffinientibus. Constat autem quod substantia composita, que est subiectum in genere substantie, est aliquid sensu comprehensum. Inde est ergo quod Philosophus, diffiniens primam substantiam in Predicamentis, que est compositum, non dixit que proprie, principaliter et maxime est, sed que dicitur, per hoc innuens quod non est prima secundum naturam, sed secundum dici et significari vel cognosci. [...] Quarto arguitur quod substantia prius et magis dicitur de composito quam de forma. Nam compositum proprie et principaliter et maxime dicitur substantia, cum illud sit prima substantia, forme autem non competunt ille condiciones, ex quo non est individuum predicamenti substantie; ergo compositum est prius substantia quam forma. [...] Ad quartum est responsurum quod non est idem esse prius secundum naturam et prius secundum significationem aut nominis impositionem. Secundum naturam substantia prius dicitur de forma et materia quam de composito, sed secundum significationem et nominis impositionem prius dicitur de composito quam de forma, et prius de forma quam de materia, quoniam significatio et nominis impositio sequuntur intelligere. Constat autem quod prius cognoscimus et intelligimus compositum quam formam, et prius formam quam materiam. Cognoscimus enim materiam per transmutationem et formam per operationem. Constat autem quod prius

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cognoscimus rem operari quam ipsam transmutari. Cum autem arguebatur quod compositum est magis substantia quam forma, dicitur quod forma respectu compositi potest dupliciter considerari: uno modo ut habet rationem actus, et sic forma est magis substantia quam compositum, quia forma habet a se rationem actus ac etiam nomen et diffinitionem substantie; compositum autem recipit esse actuale a forma ac etiam nomen et diffinitionem substantialem. Secundo potest considerari forma ut habet rationem potentie, quoniam forma, ut est pars compositi et ut ordinatur in compositum tamquam in finem, habet rationem potentie, et sic est minus substantia quam compositum, quoniam compositum, ut est quoddam totum, habet rationem forme et forma, ut est pars et aliquid ordinatum ad finem, habet rationem materie. Constat autem formam magis esse substantiam quam materiam.

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APPENDIX III [1] Anonymi Zimmermanni Questiones super Metaphysicam VII, q. 5 (Utrum substantia vere dicatur de materia et forma) Ms. Cambridge, Peterhouse 152, f. 34ra. [cf. A. Zimmermann, Verzeichnis Ungedruckter Kommentare, p. 104] Queritur utrum substantia vere dicatur de materia et forma. Videtur quod non. Primo de forma: sicut dicitur in Predicamentis, quedam sunt que sunt in subiecto et dicuntur de subiecto, quedam que sunt in subiecto et non dicuntur de et cetera, ita quod vult quod quecumque sunt in subiecto sunt accidentia; sed forma est in subiecto: recipitur enim in materia, materia autem est subiectum primum; ideo et cetera. Item, hoc arguitur de materia: quod est in potentia aliquid non est illud; materia autem est in potentia ad substantiam sicut ad alia entia; ergo et cetera. Contra: divisum predicatur de dividentibus; sed substantia dividitur in materiam, formam et compositum; ergo et cetera. Item, ad primam partem arguitur: sicut materia et forma sunt principia substantie, sic punctus et unitas sunt principia quantitatis; sed non est verum dicere quod punctus et unitas quantitates sint; ergo et cetera. Intelligendum quod substantia dicitur de materia et forma non equivoce nec pure univoce, sed analogice. Ad rationem dicendum quod omne quod est in subiecto habente speciem est accidens, ut Avicenna dicit; forma autem substantialis, licet sit in materia, non tamen est in subiecto habente speciem; ergo et cetera. Vel dicendum sicut dicit Simplicius in Predicamentis: differt materia et substantia: materia enim significat aliquid ens in potentia simpliciter et solum, substantia autem significat aliquid ens actu, in potentia quid. Et per hoc ad rationem: forma enim substantialis solum est in aliquo sicut in materia, non sicut in subiecto; accidens autem solum est in aliquo sicut in subiecto. Ad aliud dicendum quod bene probat quod materia non est substantia in actu. Ad tertium dicendum quod substantia non similiter dicitur de substantia composita et de principiis substantie, sed substantia proprie dicitur de substantia composita, de forma autem dicitur sicut de eo quod est actus substantie et de materia sicut de eo quod est pars substantie in potentia, ita quod, quia substantia diversas habet rationes, tunc secundum diversas rationes potest dici de materia, forma et composito; sed quia quantitas tales rationes

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diversas non habet, quia scilicet quantitas dicatur id quod est divisibile et etiam id quod est principium divisibilis, ideo quantitas de linea et puncto non dicitur, que quidem sunt principia alicuius divisibilis. [2] Anonymi Domus Petri Questiones super Metaphysicam q. 7 (Utrum materia vel forma vel compositum sit prius substantia) Ms. Cambridge, Peterhouse 152, f. 314ra–b. [cf. A. Zimmermann, Verzeichnis Ungedruckter Kommentare, p. 111] Consequenter queritur quid istorum, scilicet materia vel (et ms.) forma vel aggregatum, sit principaliter substantia. Videtur quod [[non]] materia, quia ratio substantie est substare et ita primo convenit materie: materia enim substat (consistit ms.) forme et accidentibus, aggregatum autem non nisi accidentibus; quare et cetera. Item, illud, quo remoto, removetur substantia, et omnibus aliis remotis, non removetur substantia, primo et maxime est substantia; sed materia remota, substantia removetur, et remotis aliis, non removetur substantia sed manet; quare [[materia]] primo materia est substantia. Sed videtur quod forma sit [[substantia]] prius, quia ab ea (eo ms.) sumitur ratio et quod quid erat esse; tale autem primo substantia est et maxime et primo est ens. Sed quod aggregatum sit maxime substantia videtur, quia primo et principaliter et maxime substantia est que nec est in subiecto nec de subiecto dicitur, ut dicitur libro Predicamentorum; sed huiusmodi est aggregatum et non aliud; quare et cetera. Est dicendum quod materia est quo aliquid potest esse substantia et ideo est substantia. Forma est substantia quia est quo aliquid est substantia, et hec est ratio substantie eius. Compositum etiam substantia est et ratio substantie est quia per se subsistat et separabilis sit, ita quod sit in actu per aliquid sui. Et iste tres substantie ad unum attribuuntur, quia in ratione omnium videtur cadere esse, quia forma est quo aliquid actu habet esse, materia vero quo potest aliquid esse, compositum autem quod habet esse per aliquid sui. Tunc ad propositum dicendum quod non est idem esse prius natura et esse prius sub nomine illo, quia aliquando nomen dicitur primo de eo quod est posterius secundum naturam, sicut patet de ‘natura’ quinto huius: prius enim natura est forma et de ea primo non dicitur nomen nature, sed de nascentia. Si ergo querat questio quid istorum sit prius substantia natura, dico quod forma, quia est actus et precedit ens in potentia, scilicet materiam, ad actum; et cum ideo actus simpliciter sit prior potentia, quia quod est potentia non vadit ad actum nisi per aliquid ens in actu, ideo simpliciter prior est materia.

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Et iterum materia non est (est non ms.) ens nisi per formam, quia de se non est; quare forma magis est ens quam materia. Cum igitur forma prior sit materia, et magis est ens materia, quare est prius et magis ens toto aggregato: materia enim est quo aliquid potest esse et forma quo aliquid est et aggregatum est per aliquid vel per aliqua . Quare esse prius est in materia et forma quam in composito, et forma prior est materia et magis ens. Quare et toto aggregato est forma prior. In significatione tamen non est ita, quia intellectus noster procedit a posterioribus et sibi notioribus, et ideo cum composita sit notissima, ideo prius eam comprehendit intellectus et ei primo convenit nomen substantie. Unde libro Predicamentorum dicit Aristoteles quod compositum primo et principaliter et maxime dicitur substantia, non quod sit substantia, et est maxime et primo; et est illa que neque in subiecto est neque de subiecto dicitur. Et idem dicit hic, quod composita maxime dicuntur substantie, deinde simplicia. Idem dicit quinto huius. Secundum naturam tamen forma primo est substantia, deinde vero compositum, tertio autem materia. Et cum arguitur quod ‘illud quod primo sub[si]stat, primo est substantia’, non est verum. Et cum dicitur: ‘substantia dicitur a substando’, dicendum quod non, sed (et ms.) proprie a subsistendo, et hoc non reperitur primo in materia, sed in forma vel aggregato. Unde apud Grecos, materia et forma et compositum, secundum quod substantie sint, diversis nominibus nominantur: materia enim dicitur ‘ypostasis’, forma ‘usiosis’, compositum ‘usia’. Et cum dicitur quod ‘illud, quo remoto, removentur omnia alia, est substantia’, dicendum quod non est verum, quia non pertinet ad rationem substantie quia maneat remotis aliis. Et cum dicitur in minori quod ‘remotis omnibus aliis, remanet materia’, dicendum quod non est verum: corrupta enim forma utique in materia, non manet materia sed corrumpitur, quia non est ens nisi per formam, ut patet ex primo De generatione. Ratio alia de forma concedenda et simul illa de aggregato: contradicit quod primo est sub nomine. [3] Galfridi de Aspall Questiones superMetaphysicam VII, q. 8 (Quid istorum per prius sit substantia) Ms. Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College 509, f. 98vb. Consequenter queritur quid istorum per prius sit substantia. Et videtur quod materia, quia hoc est illud a quo non convertitur consequentia; sed posita forma, ponitur materia et similiter posito composito, ponitur materia, et non e converso; quare et cetera.

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Item, quod magis abstrahit se ab aliis quam alia ab ipso, illud est magis substantia; sed materia est huiusmodi. Et est argumentum Aristotelis in littera. Alia ratio in littera est: quod magis et per prius substat, magis est substantia; materia est huiusmodi; quare et cetera. Quod forma sit magis substantia videtur sic, quia quod verius est substantia; sed forma verius est ens; quare et cetera. Item, forma est perfectio tam materie quam compositi, sine qua nec materia nec compositum habent esse cognitionem; quare et cetera. Quod compositum sit magis substantia videtur: ut habetur in libro Predicamentorum, substantia prima est que proprie et principaliter dicitur , que nec est in subiecto nec dicitur de subiecto; sed prima substantia est substantia composita; quare et cetera. Item, dicit ibidem quod omnia alia a primis substantiis aut dicuntur de eis aut sunt in eis. Vult ergo quod prima substantia substet omnibus aliis aut quantum ad inherentiam aliorum in ipsa aut quantum ad predicationem aliorum de ipsa. Quare et cetera. Dicendum quod hec questio dupliciter potest queri. Si enim queritur quid istorum est dignius dici absolute illud, quod forma, quia, ut habetur primo Physicorum, et in fine, forma est quoddam divinum et optimum et appetibile. Si queritur quid istorum est prius in hoc nomine ‘substantia’, tunc distinguitur quod substantia dicitur vel a substando vel a subsistendo. Potest ergo considerari hoc nomen ‘substantia’ aut quantum ad illud quod primo reperitur in ipsa, et hoc quantum ad primum eius significatum, et hoc est substare; vel quantum ad illud quod ultimo reperitur in ipsa, et hoc quantum ad eius significatum secundum, et hoc est stare vel esse. Si primo modo, tunc dicitur quia aliquid potest substare dupliciter, aut secundum receptionem formarum inherentium per transmutationem, aut per forme perfectionem: si primo modo, est materia maxime substantia; secundo modo, est compositum maxime substantia. Si autem consideretur hoc nomen ‘substantia’ ratione eius quod est ultimum in ea, quod est stare (substantia ms.) esse, tunc dupliciter: aut enim dicitur esse vel stare causaliter aut formaliter. Si formaliter, sic composito maxime debetur hoc nomen ‘substantia’: esse [[ens]] enim vel stare attribuitur composito tamquam subiecto. Si causaliter, sic maxime debetur forme: esse enim attribuitur materie et composito per formam tamquam per causam.

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[4] Richardi de Clive Questiones superMetaphysicam VII, q. 5 (Utrum forma per prius dicatur substantia quam materia) and q. 6 (Utrum forma prior sit quam compositum) Ms. Worcester, Chapter Library Q 13, f. 139va–b. Queritur utrum forma per prius dicatur substantia quam materia. Et quod materia videtur sic: illud quod est ingenerabile et incorruptibile et perpetuum in sua essentia prius corruptibili; sed materia est ingenita et incorruptibilis, et omnis forma corruptibilis; ergo et cetera. Item, , quo posito, ponitur alterum, et non e converso, est prius; sed est materia huiusmodi, quia in aliquo est sine , ut intelligere hominem et animal sine homine. Ad oppositum est Auctor in littera, quia actus ante potentiam sit et \forma ante materiam/. Queritur utrum forma prior \sit/ quam compositum. Et quod forma sit posterior \videtur/: quod non habet \esse/ nisi per alterum, post\erius/ est ipso; forma habet esse per compositum, per quod \forma/ educitur in actum. Dicendum quod simpliciter compositum prius est forma \ut/ in diversis, non autem in eodem, ut compositum patris \tui/ prius fuit quam forma tui, sicut actus est ante potentiam in diversis sed non in eodem. \Sed/ quod in eodem sit forma prior (posterior ms.) videtur sic, quoniam compositum per se generatur, ut habetur in septimo, forma vero per accidens. Ad oppositum: quod non habet esse nisi per alterum est posterius; compositum non habet esse nisi per componentia, ut per materiam et formam; sed non per materiam, ergo per formam; ergo prior est forma. Notandum quod forma multipliciter dicitur. Uno modo pro eo quod est altera pars compositi. Et duplex est compositum, scilicet singulare, quod componitur ex quidditate et signatione, et non habet diffinitionem. Et dicitur talis forma ‘quidditas’ et a quibusdam dicitur ‘forma consequens compositum’. Et dicebant quod sola forma est. Et ipsi abutebantur, quia forma que est pars speciei \est/ forma tantum, quidditas vero aggregatum et non est forma nisi respectu signationis. Alio modo dicitur forma non quia est pars signationis sed speciei, et sic forma est pars compositi. Et sic sumitur in ista questione. Tertio modo sumitur non proprie, sed ad similitudinem huius: forma dicitur ab informando. Et sumitur tertio modo forma quia non habet inclinationem ad materiam ad hoc quod sit, ut intelligentie et prima causa. Et sic forma dicitur istis tribus modis, sicut compositum comprehendit sub se suppositum et quidditatem [[et formam]].

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Potest ergo questio \querere/ duobus modis. Primo modo potest querere utrum forma simpliciter dicta sit prior materia: sic credo quod loquitur Aristoteles; et sic forma prior est, quia aliqua forma sic est prior omni materia, quod videtur Aristoteles innuere, quia forma est separabilis, materia non. Et ideo intelligit de forma in generali, quia aliqua est forma que potest esse sine omni materia, materia non \sic/ potest esse actu sine forma. Prius dicitur tripliciter: aut quia est propinquius alicui principio creato(?); aut quia est propinquius \principio cognoscendi/; aut quia \est/ propinquius principio essendi, et sic forma prior, quia est principium essendi materiam. Et iste tertius modus tripliciter dicitur, aut quia est potentia, aut actu, aut scilicet ratione simplicitatis: primo modo, materia prior forma; secundo modo, forma prior est materia, quia forma dat actum. Per hoc patet ad secundam questionem quoniam illud quod potest esse sine materia et sine composito \est prius/, sic sumendo formam simpliciter dictam et similiter materiam. Si questio querat utrum forma que est pars compositi sit prior ipsa materia, sic possumus considerare materiam quantum ad esse vel quantum ad essentiam. Quantum ad esse, prior forma est quam materia et quam compositum, quia nec materia nec compositum est in actu nisi per formam (et hoc vult Aristoteles), quia dat actum et perficit. Si quantum ad essentiam, materia. Et tunc dicitur quod materia uno modo est prior, alio modo forma. Cum tertius modus prioritatis dicatur tripliciter – aut quia, ipso posito, non ponitur alterum, ut animal prius homine natura: sic essentia materie precedit formam simpliciter, quia ingenita et incorruptibilis; alio modo sicut principium accidentis est subiectum: sic non dicitur prior –, potest dici secundo modo forma prior materia, quia materia rationem privandi habet, quia materia non cognoscitur nisi per formam; ita quod potest dici materia prior forma tertio modo, ut \ratione/ simplicitatis, quia simplicior. Nam cum tertius dicatur tripliciter, materia dicitur prior primo modo, forma vero dicitur prior secundo modo. Et nota quod Aristoteles loquitur de materia et forma secundum quod comparationem habent ad tertium, ut compositum, et sic prius dicitur forma substantia quam materia, quia verius(?). Breviter ergo dicendum quod forma simpliciter prior materia [simpliciter] et similiter forma est prior in essendo, quia forma potest esse sine materia et non e converso, ergo prior. Ad rationes. dicendum quod illud quod est ingenerabile et cetera est prius secundum essentiam, sic materia aliquo modo prius est; non tamen quantum ad esse, quia sic materia posterior \est/, sicut patet ex prehabitis, quia forma dat esse materie.

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Ad secundam rationem dicendum quod prius est materia substantia in potentia quam forma sit substantia in actu, sed quia substantia secundum quid dicitur de eo quod est in potentia et \simpliciter/ de eo quod est in actu, et ideo, quamvis sit materia prior secundum quid, non tamen simpliciter: prius enim oportet esse [[materiam]] formam quam materiam actu intellectam esse, quia non intelligitur nisi per formam. Et sic secundum quid tantum prior est materia quam forma, absolute loquendo forma prior est materia, sicut patet. Ad rationes secunde questionis. Ad primam rationem dicendum quod simpliciter loquendo \de forma/ compositum non est prius, sed aliqua forma prior est omni composito. Si vero loquitur de forma in composito, sic prior est forma, sicut dictum est. Ad illud quod arguitur contra hoc: ‘compositum per se generatur’, dicendum quod forma prior est prioritate essendi; quantum tamen ad aliquam proprietatem potest esse compositum prius forma, quia est aliqua proprietas que inest composito et non forme nisi per compositum, ut generari et in esse perduci non inest forme per se. In causa essendi prius est forma, in causa generandi compositum est prius: prius est forma producta et perficiens quam compositum; et ita prior est forma in essendo, compositum vero in generando.

The ‘Scriptum super III–VIII libros Politicorum’: Some Episodes of its Fortune until the Early Renaissance Lidia Lanza (Fribourg)

1. Introduction An inquiry devoted to tracing the diffusion of the ‘Scriptum super III–VIII Politicorum’ and its presence in later political and philosophical reflection could be carried out from a number of different perspectives. Of these, we can single out three main lines of research: first, the tracking of the material circulation of the ‘Scriptum’, providing an account of both its manuscript tradition, from the thirteenth to the fifteenth century, and its editorial vicissitudes, from the end of the fifteenth century onwards; second, an examination of the presence of the ‘Scriptum’ in contemporaneous or nearly contemporaneous political treatises; finally, an investigation of its influence in works belonging to the same literary genre of the ‘Scriptum’ – the philosophical commentary – regardless of their purposes and audiences (whether extra or intra university). All three of these lines of scholarship have already been pursued by with greater or lesser intensity. I.1 The inquiry into manuscripts and the editorial diffusion of the ‘Scriptum’ This first line of research was undertaken by Antoine Dondaine and LouisJacques Bataillon in the preliminary research for their critical edition of Thomas Aquinas’s commentary on the ‘Politics’ 1 and has provided

1 Thomas Aquinas, Sententia libri Politicorum. Tabula libri Ethicorum, Ed. Dondaine, Antoine and Bataillon, Louis-Jacques (Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P.M. edita 48), Roma 1971, Préface.

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indispensable elements for the edition of the ‘Scriptum’ currently in preparation.2 Here I recall only the most relevant elements. The ‘Scriptum super III– VIII libros Politicorum’ was conceived by Peter of Auvergne as a continuation of the commentary on the ‘Politics’ left unfinished by Thomas Aquinas, and this explains why the ‘Scriptum’ does not cover the first two books of the ‘Politics’. It is not surprising, therefore, that Aquinas’s commentary and Peter’s ‘Scriptum’ share for the most part the same manuscript tradition. In fact, a great number of the codices that contain Aquinas’s ‘Sententia libri Politicorum’ also contain the ‘Scriptum’: in twelve of the manuscripts from its beginning (that is, from Book III, chapter 1) and in five of the manuscripts from the point at which Thomas Aquinas stopped his commentary (that is, from Book III, chapter 8 of the ‘Politics’, which corresponds to chapter 6 of both the commentaries of Aquinas and Peter).3 Thus the initial diffusion of the ‘Scriptum’ can be ascribed to the fact that it was conceived as part of a unitary work, in which the other part was made up of Aquinas’s ‘Sententia’. What is significant is that, from a certain moment on, it appears that the need to possess a unitary and integral commentary on the ‘Politics’ was more important in the university manuscript tradition than the impulse to preserve all of the original text of 2

3

I have been preparing the critical edition of the ‘Scriptum’, which is currently in its final stages. The work for the edition was made possible by the financial support of the Swiss National Science Foundation. Peter’s first six lessons are edited in: The Commentary of Peter of Auvergne on Aristotle’s ‘Politics’. The Inedited Part: Book III, less. I–VI. Introduction and Critical Text, Ed. Grech, Gundisalvus M., Roma 1967. The remaining portion is available in many editions of Aquinas’ works, of which the most recent and most often cited is the edition: Sancti Thomae Aquinatis [...] In octo libros Politicorum Aristotelis expositio, Ed. Spiazzi, Raymundi, Torino/Roma 1966. For the doctrines advanced in the ‘Scriptum’ see Lanza, Lidia, Aspetti della ricezione della ‘Politica’ aristotelica nel XIII secolo: Pietro d’Alvernia, in: Studi Medievali 35 (1994), pp. 643–694. This number does not comprise the manuscripts which contain only parts or abbreviations of the ‘Scriptum’. For a complete list of the extant manuscripts of Peter’s ‘Scriptum’ see Dondaine/Bataillon (note 1), pp. A10–A13 and Flüeler, Christoph, Rezeption und Interpretation der Aristotelischen ‘Politica’ im späten Mittelalter (Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie 19), Amsterdam/ Philadelphia 1992, vol. II, pp. 42–43. A full listing of the manuscripts is also contained in the Web page devoted to Peter of Auvergne, a listing which was prepared by the present author with Marco Toste: http://www.paleography. unifr.ch/petrus_de_alvernia.

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Aquinas. Indeed, beginning with the Paris stationer’s taxation list of 1304, the exemplar of Aquinas’s commentary is described as no longer comprised of 14, but of 12 peciae: this shows that the commentary of Aquinas on the first chapters of Book III had been dropped to make way for the entire commentary of Peter on Book III.4 The resulting text was made up of Aquinas’ commentary on Books I and II and Peter of Auvergne’s commentary on Books III–VIII. As in the case of Aquinas’s commentary, the manuscript transmission of the ‘Scriptum’ was initially confined to the university. Apart from one manuscript, all the testimonies of the ‘Scriptum’ derive from copies which were made directly from the university exemplar, as is evident from the marks of pecia present in those copies.5 Nevertheless, the resulting stemma of the ‘Scriptum’ cannot be established on the grounds of the stemma established for Aquinas’s commentary; this is because the manuscript tradition of the ‘Scriptum’, albeit a university tradition, is different from that of the ‘Sententia libri Politicorum’ of Aquinas. Though this is not the place for a detailed analysis of the ‘Scriptum’ manuscript tradition, some brief notes may be of interest: (1) one of the oldest testimonies, the manuscript Cambridge, Peterhouse 82, dating from the years in which Peter was still alive, is an important testimony to the interest in the ‘Scriptum’ in a geographical-institutional context other than the University of Paris. In the section of this manuscript that contains the Aquinas-Peter commentary, the fascicules are presented as peciae transcribed by two or three scribes. It is likely that this section, containing both commentaries (Aquinas and Peter), was divided for transcription. According to the reconstruction made by Roger Mynors and reported by Conor Martin, the person who requested these fascicules was Walter of Bosevile, a member of the Franciscan house of Cambridge who was also connected (ca. 1300) with the Franciscan house of Oxford. The codex is thus an important testimony to the interest the Cambridge Franciscans had in 4 5

Dondaine/Bataillon (note 1), p. A7. The manuscript which is not derived from the Parisian exemplar is the Città del Vaticano, Bibl. Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 777. In its first section, which contains Aquinas’s part of the commentary on the ‘Politics’, the manuscript bears pecia marks. As to the ‘Scriptum’, the preliminary research to its critical edition has showed that the Vat. lat. 777 is undoubtedly the most important manuscript of the whole manuscript tradition, because it contains the most complete and correct version of the ‘Scriptum’. It provides entire passages of the text which are missing in all the other manuscripts.

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the commentaries of Aquinas and Peter immediately after their appearance.6 (2) The manuscript New York, University Library, Plimpton 17, contains, in the margins of the Latin version of the ‘Politics’ made by William of Moerbeke, annotations written by Ermolao Barbaro (1453/4–1493), who drew them from the commentaries of Aquinas and Peter of Auvergne. As far as the ‘Scriptum’ is concerned, these annotations are so extensive that one could include this codex among the testimonies of Peter’s ‘Scriptum’. While these annotations are rare in Book IV, they intensify in Book V, and from Book VI to VIII they are no longer annotations, but a true transcription of the entire text of the ‘Scriptum’, the copyist leaving aside only a few sentences which he probably considered as redundancies.7 For the 1492 incunabulum edition prepared by the Dominican Ludovico Valenza of Ferrara, the edition from which all the succeeding editions available until the present derive, the ‘Scriptum’ was subjected to a series of complex edits which resulted in profound changes to its text.8 From this edition onwards, the name of Peter as author of the commentary on Book III–VIII disappears, and the commentary on the eight books of the ‘Politics’ begins to be published under Aquinas’s name.

6 I take these elements from the study made by Conor Martin, reported in the preface to the Leonina edition, cf. Martin, Conor, The Vulgate Text of Aquinas’s Commentary on Aristotle’s ‘Politics’, in: Dominican Studies 5 (1952), pp. 35–64; Dondaine/Bataillon (note 1), p. A10. 7 See Kristeller, Paul Oskar, Un codice padovano di Aristotele postillato da Francesco ed Ermolao Barbaro: il manoscritto Plimpton 17 della Columbia University Library, in: La Bibliofilia 50 (1948), pp. 162–178, reprinted in: id., Studies in Renaissance Thought and Letters, 4 voll. (Storia e letteratura 54, 166, 178, 193), Roma 1956–1996, I. 337–353; Lines, David A., Aristotle’s ‘Ethics’ in the Italian Renaissance (ca. 1300–1650): the Universities and the Problem of Moral Education (Education and Society in the Middle Ages and Renaissance 13), Leiden/Boston/Köln 2002, pp. 247–248, 430. 8 The different stages of the editorial history of Aquinas’s commentary and Peter’s ‘Scriptum’ have been detailed by Antoine Dondaine and Louis-Jacques Bataillon in the introduction to the critical edition of Aquinas’s commentary. See Dondaine/Bataillon (note 1), pp. A15–A21.

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I.2 The ‘Scriptum’ and its presence in contemporaneous or nearly contemporaneous political treatises The second line of research, devoted to tracking the presence of the ‘Scriptum’ in late medieval political thought, has been hindered by unreliable editions of the ‘Scriptum’ which prevent a full survey of its textual presence in later works. Additionally, the fact that the ‘Scriptum’ can only be dated roughly, to a span of years between 1274 and 1300, has impeded further analysis of its possible influence on contemporaneous works. Nevertheless, some progress has been made on this front. Doctrinal similarities between the ‘Scriptum’ and Marsilius of Padua’s ‘Defensor pacis’ have already been highlighted (Ferdinand E. Cranz, Christoph Flüeler).9 Such similarities are even more pronounced in the case of Giles of Rome’s ‘De regimine principum’, as Cranz and Roberto Lambertini have shown. Finally, Lambertini has also proven the use of the ‘Scriptum’ made by William of Sarzano and William of Ockham.10 I.3 The influence of the ‘Scriptum’ on medieval and early Renaissance philosophical commentaries There is a third line of research which considers the influence of the ‘Scriptum’ in the medieval and early Renaissance commentary tradition on the ‘Politics’. This article is intended as a further contribution to this line 9 Cf. Cranz, Ferdinand E., Aristotelianism in Medieval Political Theory. A Study of the Reception of the ‘Politics’, Ph.D. Thesis, Harvard University 1938, pp. 327–331; Flüeler (note 3), vol. I, pp. 120–131. 10 Lambertini, Roberto, Philosophus videtur tangere tres rationes. Egidio Romano lettore ed interprete della ‘Politica’ nel terzo libro del ‘De regimine principum’, in: Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale 1 (1990), pp. 277–325; id., Wilhelm von Ockham als Leser der ‘Politica’. Zur Rezeption der politischen Theorie des Aristoteles in der Ekklesiologie Ockhams, in: Das Publikum politischer Theorie im 14. Jahrhundert, Eds. Miethke, Jürgen and Bühler, Arnold, München 1992, pp. 207–224 (an Italian translation of this study appeared in: Lambertini, Roberto, La povertà pensata. Evoluzione storica della definizione dell’identità minoritica da Bonaventura ad Ockham (Collana di storia medievale 1), Modena 2000, pp. 269–288); id., I frati minori e la Politica di Aristotele: lo strano caso di Guglielmo da Sarzano, in: Ubi neque aerugo neque tinea demolitur. Studi in onore di Luigi Pellegrini per i suoi settanta anni (Biblioteca), Ed. Del Fuoco, Maria Grazia, Napoli 2006, pp. 407–423.

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of research, focusing on the literal commentaries.11 Scholarship has already shown the presence of the ‘Scriptum’ in some later commentaries of the fourteenth-century. Mario Grignaschi pointed out how Nicole Oresme, who at times quoted Peter by name, made use of the ‘Scriptum’;12 the same has been shown by Jean Dunbabin regarding Guido Vernani of Rimini’s commentary;13 Lowrie J. Daly provided evidence for the reproduction of the ‘Scriptum’ in Walter Burley’s commentary, and more recently Lambertini revealed the massive use the Franciscan Raimundus Acgerii made of the ‘Scriptum’.14 However, while it is clear that the ‘Scriptum’ was still the reference commentary for fourteenth-century commentators, scholarship has not yet established whether this influence was limited to that century or whether the ‘Scriptum’ remained influential in the following centuries. I shall therefore propose some preliminary observations about later commentaries of the fifteenth and early sixteenth-centuries. In this way, this study can also contribute to a grasp of continuities and changes between the medieval and the Renaissance commentary traditions. The way later commentators make use of Peter’s ‘Scriptum’ is not uniform, varying from the slavish reproduction of entire sections to the rearrangement of Peter’s exposition. Of all the commentaries, Walter Burley’s commentary, written between 1338 and 1342, is the one that reveals most clearly its dependence on the ‘Scriptum’. Structured as a hierarchy of treatises, chapters, principal parts and particulae, it is a terse commentary reduced to the essentials, wherein every section is preceded by a list of the main questions and followed by a set of the conclusions reached. This structure makes it easy to track the issues tackled in the commentary and 11 I do not deal here with the question commentaries. On the influence of Peter’s ‘Questiones super I–VII libros Politicorum’ see Flüeler (note 3) and Marco Toste’s article in this volume. 12 Grignaschi, Mario, Nicolas Oresme et son commentaire à la ‘Politique’ d’Aristote, in: Album Helen Maud Cam (Studies Presented to the International Commission for the History of Representative and Parliamentary Institutions 23), Louvain/Paris 1960, vol. I, pp. 95–152. 13 Dunbabin, Jean, Guido Vernani of Rimini’s Commentary on Aristotle’s ‘Politics’, in: Traditio 44 (1988), pp. 373–388. 14 Daly, Lowrie J., Walter Burley and John Wyclif on Some Aspect of Kingship, in: Mélanges Eugène Tisserant, vol. IV: Archives Vaticanes, Histoire ecclésiastique (Studi e Testi 234), Città del Vaticano 1964, pp. 163–184, see esp. pp. 179–184; Lambertini, Roberto, Raimundus Acgerii’s Commentary on Aristotle’s ‘Politics’: Some Notes, in: Vivarium 40 (2002), pp. 14–40.

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permits immediate comprehension of the thesis advanced by the commentator. The extreme conciseness and, even more, the exclusion of the historical-empirical passages of the ‘Politics’, which Burley claims to have deliberately omitted, probably played a major role in the extremely wide diffusion of this commentary, a diffusion that exceeds that of the ‘Scriptum’, if we take as our criterion the number (thirty-six) of manuscripts in which Burley’s commentary is extant. From Book III on, Burley intensely uses Peter’s ‘Scriptum’, many times copying it literally; indeed, this is the most common use throughout the major part of Burley’s commentary. Lowrie J. Daly has demonstrated Burley’s use of the ‘Scriptum’ for the discussion on kingship in Book III of the ‘Politics’.15 In fact, in chapter 17 of Book III of the ‘Politics’,16 the verbatim reproduction of the ‘Scriptum’ by Burley is quite evident.17 Nevertheless, this use is not limited to the passages pointed out by Daly. It occurs throughout Burley’s commentary and to such an extent that it is impossible within this article to offer an exhaustive account of Burley’s borrowings. However, in the samples which I present in the following pages of borrowings from the ‘Scriptum’ made by other commentators, I also include some passages from Burley in order to illustrate the degree of his dependence on Peter of Auvergne.18

15 Cf. Daly, Walter Burley and John Wyclif (note 14); id., Some Notes on Walter Burley’s Commentary on the ‘Politics’, in: Essays in Medieval History Presented to Bertie Wilkinson, Eds. Sandquist, Thayron A. and Powicke, Michael R. (Essays in Medieval History), Toronto 1969, pp. 270–281. Daly devoted further studies to Burley’s commentary, mostly focused on its methodological aspects. For the conclusions (conclusiones) inserted by Burley in his commentary, wherein he displayed the key doctrines of the ‘Politics’, see Daly, Lowrie J., The Conclusions of Walter Burley’s Commentary on the ‘Politics’, Books I to IV, in: Manuscripta 12 (1968), pp. 79–92; id., The Conclusions of Walter Burley’s Commentary on the ‘Politics’, Books V and VI, in: Manuscripta 13 (1969), pp. 142–149; id., The Conclusions of Walter Burley’s Commentary on the ‘Politics’, Books VII and VIII, in: Manuscripta 15 (1971), pp. 13–22. 16 Pol. 1288a15–29. 17 It is the passage of the ‘Scriptum’ III.16, nr. 525, Ed. Spiazzi (= Vat. Lat. 777, f. 70rb–71va), which corresponds to the section of Burley’s commentary contained at f. 48r of the codex which I have consulted (Città del Vaticano, Vatican Library, Borgh. 129). 18 See below pp. 271–272, 313–314.

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But while it is simple to trace the presence of the ‘Scriptum’ in Burley’s commentary, given their textual affinities, in other cases that presence is more complex. The literal commentaries analysed in the following pages offer only a set of initial possibilities. They were produced by four significant authors from two distinct areas of Southern Europe, Italy and Iberia. I shall begin with the ‘humanist’ commentary of Donato Acciaiuoli, composed between 1472 and 1474 at the request of Federico da Urbino, Duke of Montefeltro. Significantly, this commentary was written in the period of Donato’s most intense public activity in the Florence of Cosimo and Lorenzo de’ Medici.19 The second commentary to be dealt with here, the ‘Epythomata in octo Politicorum libros’, was written in 1532 by Crisostomo Javelli, a Dominican theologian living in Bologna, who was regent master of the Bolognese ‘Studio’ from 1518 to 1521.20 Among the Iberian commentaries, I shall deal with the commentary of Peter of Osma, which in its surviving form also includes the insertions of Ferdinand of Roa, which are nearly indistinguishable from Peter of Osma’s text.21 Peter of Osma was 19 For his life and work see Garin, Eugenio, Donato Acciaiuoli cittadino fiorentino, in: id., Medioevo e Rinascimento. Studi e ricerche, Roma/Bari 1987, 2nd ed., pp. 199–267. For a reappraisal of Donato Acciaiuoli’s traditional portrait see Ganz, Margery A., Donato Acciaiuoli and the Medici: A Strategy for Survival in ’400 Florence, in: Rinascimento 22 (1982), pp. 33–73. 20 Javelli’s career was in both Piacenza and Milan. He is the author of an ‘Epitome’ on Aristotle’s ‘Ethics’ as well as many ‘Epitomata’ in other Aristotelian works. Javelli is credited with having preferred Plato – to whose ethics and political works he also devoted an abbreviation (both published in Venetiis, in officina Aurelii Pincii, 1536) – to Aristotle in moral and political philosophy, but Aristotle to Plato in logic and physics. For a biographical sketch see DBI LXII.184–185 (D. von Wille). A more detailed biographical study, together with a full bibliography (updated only to 1991), can be found in Tavuzzi, Michael, Chrysostomus Javelli O.P. (ca. 1470–1538): A Biobibliographical Essay, in: Angelicum 67 (1990), pp. 457–482 and 58 (1991), pp. 109–121. His work ‘Epythomata in octo Politicorum Aristotelis libros’ is available in a Venetian edition, together with the ‘Epythomata’ on Aristotle’s ‘Ethics’ (per Stephanum de Sabio, 1536). On his work on Aristotle’s ‘Ethics’, see Lines (note 7), p. 499 and index. 21 Master of Moral Philosophy at Salamanca University from 1457, Peter of Osma is the main author of this commentary, which was supplemented with explanations by Ferdinand of Roa, Peter’s disciple and successor at the same chair (1473–1494). This work was edited by Martín Sánchez de Frías, disciple of Ferdinand of Roa, under Ferdinand’s name. For this paper I use the text now available thanks to José A. Labajos: Pedro de Osma y Fernando de Roa.

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a major philosopher and theologian of the early University of Salamanca, his commentary dating from 1460–63; Ferdinand’s insertions, on the other hand, date from 1483–94. Finally, I shall tackle the commentary of the Spanish Franciscan humanist Peter of Castrobol, commentator on most of the ‘Corpus Aristotelicum’, whose commentaries, according to some of their forewords, were written in accordance with the philosophy of Duns Scotus. His commentary on the ‘Politics’ was published in 1496.22 In order to appraise the different ways in which the ‘Scriptum’ was used, I shall deal with each author separately. Nevertheless, for the sake of brevity, and since the same idea of Peter can be found in more than one commentary, in some of the examples I provide below I shall present the ‘Scriptum’ along with more than one commentary at the same time. For this reason too, in the Appendix I present an example of how Peter’s ‘Scriptum’ was used in all the commentaries dealt with here. The example concerns measures suggested by Aristotle in the ‘Politics’ (VII.16, 1335b19–26) to avoid overpopulation in the political community. This issue obliged the commentators to address further problems, such as the upbringing of defective children and abortion.23

II. Donato Acciaiuoli’s ‘In Aristotelis libris octo Politicorum commentarii’24 Compared with the case of Walter Burley, it is much more difficult to determine the role played by the ‘Scriptum’ in Donato Acciaiuoli’s commentary on the ‘Politics’. This work on the ‘Politics’ is utterly different from Comentario a la ‘Política’ de Aristóteles, Ed. Labajos, José A. (Bibliotheca Salmanticensis. Estudios 294), Salamanca 2006, 2 vols. I shall refer to this edition as Osma/Roa, Comentarii. 22 Morale commentum magistri Castrovol in Politicam, Yconomicam, Pamplonae 1496. On Castrobol’s life and career see Pérez-Ilzarbe, Paloma, Pedro de Castrovol. Vida y obra, in: Los Franciscanos Conventuales en España. Actas del II Congreso Internacional sobre el Franciscanismo en la Península Ibérica. Barcelona, 30 de marzo – 1 de abril de 2005, Eds. Fernández, Gonzalo and Jiménez, Gallardo, Madrid 2006, pp. 735–753. I would like to thank the author for sending me an offprint of her study. 23 See Appendix II. 24 Venetijs, apud Vincentium Valgrisium, 1566 [henceforth Acciaioli Comm.].

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Acciaiuoli’s famous commentary on the ‘Nicomachean Ethics’ completed around a decade earlier, which is a re-elaboration of Argyropoulos’s commentary on the ‘Ethics’. Acciaiuoli’s commentary on the ‘Ethics’ was the result of two distinct versions, the first being the reportatio of the lectures Argyropoulos had given on the ‘Ethics’ in Florence and the second a later transcription in which the content of the former version was recast in such a way that it became impossible to distinguish between the contribution of the master, Argyropoulos, and that of the disciple, Acciaiuoli.25 In contrast, the commentary on the ‘Politics’ is far from problematic as regards the modalities of its composition, as it was conceived and composed as a typical expositio of the Aristotelian littera based on the Latin translation of Leonardo Bruni. It would exceed the scope of this article to deal both with the complex modalities and aims of Acciaiuoli’s ‘Ethics’ commentary and with the question of the relationship between his ‘Ethics’ commentary and the later ‘Politics’ commentary. Nevertheless, it is necessary to comment briefly on the ways in which scholarship has framed Acciaiuoli’s commentary on the ‘Politics’. According to Ubaldo Staico, the commentary on the ‘Politics’ represents Acciaiuoli’s definitive detachment from the perspective encouraged by Argyropoulos and his adherence to Bruni’s perspective. Staico grounds this idea on the fact that Acciaiuoli opted to comment on the very work which had been the highest peak of Bruni’s activity as a translator, the ‘Politics’, although this was a work that, though not completely dismissed, was considered by Argyropoulos to be of secondary importance. The commentary on the ‘Politics’ represents therefore, for Staico, a sign that reveals 25 See Bianchi, Luca, Un commento ‘umanistico’ ad Aristotele. L’ ‘Expositio super libros Ethicorum’ di Donato Acciaiuoli, in: Rinascimento 30 (1990), pp. 29–55, reprinted in: id., Studi sull’aristotelismo del Rinascimento (Subsidia Mediaevalia Patavina 5), Padova 2003, pp. 11–39. The ‘Ethics’ commentary was published for the first time in Florence in 1478. For other editions see Lines (note 7), pp. 489–490. On this commentary see also Lines, David A., The Commentary Literature on Aristotle’s ‘Nicomachean Ethics’ in Early Renaissance Italy: Preliminary Considerations, in: Traditio 54 (1999), pp. 245–282; id., Ethics as Philology: A Developing Approach to Aristotle’s ‘Nicomachean Ethics’ in Florentine Humanism, in: Renaissance Readings of the ‘Corpus Aristotelicum’, Ed. Pade, Marianne (Renæssancestudier 9), København 2001, pp. 27–42; id. (note 7), pp. 217–219, 489–490. Chapter 7 of Book X has been translated into English in Kraye, Jill, Cambridge Translations of Renaissance Philosophical Texts. Volume 1: Moral Philosophy, Cambridge et al. 1997, pp. 47–58.

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Acciaiuoli’s shift, which was complete by the early seventies of the fifteenth century. In Staico’s view, by rejecting Argyropoulos’s perspective, Acciaiuoli departed from a form of Aristotelianism which relied on the Byzantine and medieval scholastic commentators, considering these as indispensable for a full comprehension of Aristotle’s thought. According to Staico, Acciaiuoli departed from this approach, preferring the orientation promoted by the ‘anti-scholastic’ Bruni, for whom a good translation is the necessary and sufficient condition to restore the Aristotelian text. In this sense Acciaiuoli’s last commentaries on Aristotle disclose “all the weight of the humanistic problem of language”.26 However, analysis of Acciaiuoli’s commentary on the ‘Politics’ does not allow this interpretation. That “the lesson of the Bruni translator and of the Bruni theorist of the language is utterly evident”27 in Acciaiuoli’s commentary is arguably true, but Acciaiuoli’s statements in the commentary’s preface about his aims show a different preoccupation: In order to avoid someone being astonished because, when explaining the text, I have less regard for elegance than most people would expect, that person has to know that one thing is the task of the orator, another that of the commentator. [And in the latter] it is necessary to use customary rather than elegant words, especially in explaining these works of the Philosopher, where the assertions are for the most part so cryptic and obscure that the result is hardly intelligible.28 26 “[...] tutto il peso, decisivo, del problema umanistico della lingua”, Staico, Ubaldo, Esegesi aristotelica in età medicea, in: La Toscana al tempo di Lorenzo il Magnifico. Politica, economia, cultura, arte. Convegno di Studi promosso dalle Università di Firenze, Pisa e Siena (5–8 novembre 1992), Pisa 1996, vol. III, pp. 1275–1321, esp. 1299. 27 “[...] il Commento alla ‘Politica’ di Donato è scritto in una lingua nitida, che manifestamente mira [...] ad un intrinseco legame tra latino umanistico e dottrina [la lezione del Bruni traduttore e del Bruni teorico del linguaggio è del tutto visibile]”, Staico (note 26), p. 1310 (text in square brackets from the author). 28 Verum, ne quis forte miretur me in exponendo textu minus elegantie consulere, que fortasse plerique expeterent, sciat aliud esse oratoris, aliud expositoris officium. Vtendum est enim terminis non tam elegantibus, quam usitatis, presertim in explicandis huius Philosophi scriptis, quibus plerumque ita sunt abdite obscureque sententie, vix ut intelligantur, Acciaioli Comm., f. 10v. Jill Kraye’s statements regarding the ‘Expositio’ of Argyropoulos/Acciaiuoli on Aristotle’s ‘Ethics’ cannot be applied to Acciaiuoli’s commentary on the ‘Politics’: “Humanists like Donato Acciaiuoli, while not entirely shunning

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To render the structure and content of the Aristotelian text clear: this is exactly the same concern that animated those that produced commentaries on the ‘Politics’ in an abbreviated way, whether previously or subsequently to Acciaiuoli, including Walter Burley and, as we shall see, Crisostomo Javelli. That this is the main preoccupation of Acciaiuoli is revealed by the zeal with which, at the end of every chapter, he clarifies dubious sentences present in the littera. Thus it is misleading to consider care for the language or any other single factor as a safe criterion when distinguishing between medieval scholastic commentaries and ‘humanistic’ ones. Not only might these concerns not be primary – as in the case of language – but the very criteria that would seem characteristic of a humanistic sensibility can in fact be found in medieval commentaries. An example is the ‘surprising’ special philological diligence of Peter of Auvergne, who in diverse places in his commentary provides manuscript variants other than those present in the Latin exemplar of the ‘Politics’ on which he based his reading. So, as early as Peter of Auvergne, we find a commentator analysing and attentively comparing the different manuscripts he has at hand, long before any ‘humanistic’ commentary. In the case of the content of Acciaiuoli’s commentary too, the presumed distance from the medieval commentators is clearly disavowed when comparing his commentary with former medieval commentaries. Such a comparison is not without difficulties: first of all because whenever one of the texts is an abbreviated commentary, it is hard to point out precise textual correspondences between the two texts, whether the similarities are literal or doctrinal; moreover, while Peter of Auvergne based his commentary on Moerbeke’s translation, Acciaiuoli used Leonardo Bruni’s version. This difference among the Latin texts of the ‘Politics’ leads to variations in vocabulary and phraseology, resulting in a change of the terminology used in the commentaries. This renders textual collation more complex. At times this change allows Acciaiuoli to pass over exegetical problems which had raised considerable difficulties for Peter of Auvergne as a result of the Latin

scholastic argumentation and terminology, attempted to produce a clear exposition of Aristotle’s text written in an elegant Latin style, concentrating more on philological than logical analysis and citing classical rather than medieval authorities”, Kraye, Jill, Moral Philosophy, in: The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, Eds. Schmitt, Charles B. and Skinner, Quentin, Cambridge 1988, pp. 303–86, see 328.

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text he had at his disposal.29 Finally, it is even more difficult to identify the precise commentaries from the whole tradition Acciaiuoli drew on, as parts of the ‘Scriptum’ are literally reproduced in later commentaries. Unquestionably, Acciaiuoli makes use of other sources which were not previously used by earlier ‘Politics’ commentators. This occurs, for instance, when he explains marginal episodes present in the Aristotelian text for illustrative or clarifying purposes. In Book III, where Aristotle equates the multitude with a man who has many feet, hands and senses,30 Acciaiuoli introduces an allusion to the Greek mythological giants Argus Panoptes (with a hundred eyes) and Briareus (with a hundred hands) which is not found in the previous commentaries.31 In the same chapter too, Acciaiuoli compares the multitude to a picture that, though grounded on imperfect models, can render a perfect image, as in the tale of Zeuxis, who selected the best features from five beautiful women in order to create the ideal portrait of Helen of Troy for the city of Croton.32 But while these classical

29 This is the case of the passage from Book VIII where Peter of Auvergne faces a conundrum which arises from a lacuna in the Latin text of Aristotle: [...] est intelligendum quod secundum interpretem hic, post litteram istam Adhuc autem, erat spatium in exemplari greco, ac si aliquid deficeret. Iterum, post litteram sequentem, que est inmitationum fiunt omnes compatientes et sine, similiter erat spatium in eodem, et uidebatur aliquid deficere inter sine et le rithmis quod sequitur, et ideo bene non potest uideri ex uerbis intentio Aristotelis, Vat. lat. 777, f. 140rb; this passage is absent from Spiazzi’s edition. After this passage, Peter offers his solution to the problem (this part being also absent from Spiazzi’s edition, cf. VIII.2, p. 427, nr. 1306). Thus Acciaiuoli: Dicit Sanctus Thomas circa hanc partem quod secundum interpretem veterem videbatur esse spatium in exemplari Greco, ac si hoc loco aliqua pars textus deficeret, sed tamen nihil deest, verum est quedam verborum facta commutatio, quae sententiam nulla ex parte perturbat, Acciaioli Comm., f. 269r. 30 Pol. 1281b1. 31 Nam si vnus homo posset fieri ex multis, ille haberet plures pedes et plures manus, vt de Argo et Briareo dicitur in fabulis poetarum, Acciaioli Comm., f. 97v. 32 Ibid.; to my knowledge, this episode is not mentioned in previous commentaries on the ‘Politics’. Acciaiuoli’s source is likely to be Cicero, De Inventione II.1.1–3 or Pliny, Natural History XXXV.36.64. It is also mentioned in Matteo Palmieri, Vita civile, but with other purposes, cf. Matteo Palmieri, Vita civile, Ed. Belloni, Gino, Firenze 1982, p. 166.

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references can be seen as an embellishment of the text, they do not modify the doctrinal content. As regards this last aspect, it is even more difficult to establish whether Acciaiuoli’s outcomes really depend on Peter of Auvergne. This is because it is hardly discernible whether similar conclusions in both authors are due to a dependence of Acciaiuoli on Peter or whether they just reflect an interpretation of the Aristotelian text that had become a common legacy of the tradition when Acciaiuoli produced his commentary. Finding a solution to this question proves to be difficult, given the conciseness of Acciaiuoli’s text; often the Aristotelian text is much lengthier than the commentary of the Florentine. Nevertheless, it is clear that the possible direct presence of Peter’s ‘Scriptum’ in later commentators will be found not so much in those passages that deal with the fundamental principles of the ‘Politics’ – such as the autonomy of political science, the definition of citizenship, or the question of the best regime – but rather in those passages in which the commentator argues for or against Aristotle’s statements, as well as in the places where the commentator extends the corresponding passage of the ‘Politics’ by inserting his own considerations or curiosities. Conducted in this way, an analysis of the presence of the ‘Scriptum’ in Acciaiuoli’s commentary produces significant findings: (1) Peter’s interpretation is often explicitly quoted, though Acciaiuoli refers to Peter as Sanctus Thomas; (2) in the numerous mentions that Acciaiuoli makes of the interpretation of “some commentators” (aliqui expositores), he is referring to Peter’s interpretation, whether exclusively or alongside the interpretations of other commentators; (3) finally, Acciaiuoli again puts forward numerous notabilia from the ‘Scriptum’, though with no reference to his source.33 33 It is impossible to provide an exhaustive account of the occurrences, whether explicit or not, of the ‘Scriptum’ in Acciaiuoli’s ‘Explanatio’. For our purpose, the passages referred to later in this article will be sufficient. Further explicit quotations of the ‘Scriptum’, all under the name of ‘Saint Thomas’, can be found at the following folios of the edition used here: 120v, 126v, 137r, 140r, 228v–229r, 247r, 261v. In f. 126v, Aquinas (or better, Peter) is mentioned along with Burley (patet ratio ex sententia Sancti Thomae & Brulei). In f. 228v, the name of Aquinas is followed by the reference to Albert, which, as in Burley’s case, serves to confirm Peter’s interpretation (et idem videtur sentire Albertus). In f. 257r Albert is quoted alone, but only as a supplier of a detail ([…] ad pubertatem, id est usque ad xiiii, ut dicit Albertus). Albert is also quoted in folios 252r (alone) and 261v (here with other expositores). This means that

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Let us illustrate this dependence of Acciaiuoli on Peter with some examples, in which I present other commentaries too, to illustrate further the strong presence of the ‘Scriptum’ in the commentary tradition. The first relates to the passage where Aristotle values the opportunities and advantages of lordship exercised by the multitude. In favour of the opinion that it is better for the multitude, and not individuals, to hold public offices, the Philosopher adduces a comparison based on the mechanisms that rule nutrition and digestion: for harmonious growth of the human body it is preferable to ingest mixed aliments instead of single ones. Peter explains this further, and his explanation is taken up by Acciaiuoli, albeit not literally. This explanation had some success, because it also occurs in the commentary of Peter of Osma, who adds the precise indication of which aliments can be harmful: P e t r i S c r i p t u m I I I . 9 , Acciaioli Comm., f. 99r–v Osma/Roa, Comentarii, III.2.5, p. 453, ll. Vat. lat. 777, f. 52ra = 11277–11286 pp. 151–152, nr. 431, Ed. Spiazzi Sic enim est hic, sicut est de alimento: alimentum enim purum sumptum cum non puro plus proficit quam alimentum purum si per se assumatur, quia alimentum purum, cum per se assumitur, statim cumuertitur non completa digestione, et plus uel fere totum attrahitur a membro maioris caliditatis, nichil autem aut parum ab illo quod est parue. Et sic non nutriuntur membra, quod est detrimentum nature. Cum autem admiscetur impurum, pluri tempore

Notandum quod alimentum subtile non est utile sanitati, quia cum sit facilis digestionis resoluitur cito et trahitur a partibus calidioribus, et reliquae partes remanent sine nutrimento. Ex alia parte crassum, cum sit difficilis digestionis, non nutrit partes calidas, quae subtili nutriuntur: ergo utrumque seorsum sumptum est inutile, mixtum vero ex vtrisque erit vtilius sine controuersia, ob maiorem conformitatem ex illis

Notandum quod purum alimentum dicitur alimentum subtile, cujusmodi sunt ova sorbilia, testiculi gallorum, lac et similia [. . . ] et tale nocet corpori; mixtum vero ex puro et impuro corpori prodest; cujus causa est, quia purum alimentum per se assumptum statim convertitur, non completa digestione, et plus et quasi totum fere attrahitur (attrabitur in textu editionis) a membro majoris caliditatis, nihil autem aut parum a membro quod est

the ‘Scriptum’ is the reference commentary for Acciaiuoli and that the aliqui expositores to whom he refers are Peter (or Aquinas for the first two books), Albert and Burley.

270 digeritur, et ideo membra proportionaliter magis possunt attrahere, propter quod magis proficit. Similiter est in proposito.

Lidia Lanza resultantem.Hoc idem sentire videtur Philosophus in libro Meteororum.

parvae caliditatis, et sic non nutriuntur membra proporcionaliter; quod pervenit in detrimentum naturae; cum autem admixcentur purum impuro, tardius digeritur, et ideo membra proporcionaliter magis potent attrahere; propter quod magis proficit.

The second example is taken from the opening chapter of Book IV, where Aristotle affirms that political science cannot consider only the best form of government, but must consider which form of government is appropriate for differing political and social realities. The comparison with medicine and other arts and sciences is eloquent:34 Petri Scriptum, Vat. lat. 777, f. 72ra = Acciaioli Comm., f. 120v IV.1, nr. 530, Ed. Spiazzi Similiter medicina considerat sanitatem, et que et qualis, cui et quali corpori conueniat; considerat etiam dispositiones corporum, puta complexiones, et que complexio optima, et que sanitas optime complexionato congruit.

Eodem pacto medicina considerat sanitatem corporis humani, quae est varia: habent enim humana corpora compositiones atque complexiones diuersas. Itaque considerat sanitatem complexionis corporum, et quae sanitas opti-

34 All of this opening section of Book IV – including the final question concerning the necessity for each science to consider the best disposition of its subject-matter, even in the event that this disposition never occurs – also appears nearly verbatim in Burley’s commentary, except for the comparison with medicine, which is condensed by Burley. See the final lines of this section, which contains the objection: Nec obstat si dicatur quod nec exercitatiua nec medicinalis habet considerare dispositionem optimam, quia non potest attingere ad eam: istud non obstat, quia, quamuis nullus attingat ad dispositionem optimam, tamen habet considerare de ea et disponere potentiam exercitati seu corporis ad eam, Città del Vaticano, Vatican Library, Borgh. 129, f. 51va. The corresponding section in Peter’s ‘Scriptum’ is at IV.1, nr. 530, Ed. Spiazzi = Vat. Lat. 777, f. 71vb–72ra.

The ‘Scriptum super III–VIII libros Politicorum’ Similiter est circa artem faciendi uestes et circa omnes alias artes. Et ratio huius est quoniam, si aliqua scientia considerat aliquam naturam, considerat passiones illius, considerat etiam omnia illa que habent attributionem ad illam naturam, item passiones illorum attributorum. Sed passio primi in scientia est optima dispositio eius; passiones eorum que attribuuntur sunt quales illis congruunt. Et ideo eiusdem scientie est considerare et optimam dispositionem et que quali congruit.

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mo corpori, et quae cuique conueniat. Sic etiam fit in alijs artibus atque facultatibus. Ratio autem est, ut dicit Sanctus Thomas, quia si aliqua scientia considerat aliquam naturam, considerat etiam omnia, quae habent attributionem ad illam naturam, item passiones illorum attributorum, sed primi in scientia tali est dispositio eius optima. Passiones talium, que attribuuntur, sunt quales illis congruunt, et ideo eiusdem scientie est considerare optimam dispositionem et eam quae cuique conueniat.

A further example is taken from chapter 9 of Book VII. There Aristotle states that it is desirable for the ideal city to be raised in a place exposed to favourable winds, those from the east being the healthiest winds. In the ‘Scriptum’, Peter justifies this assertion by turning to Book II of the ‘Meteorology’ where Aristotle deals with the different winds. The reference and the reasoning are reproduced not only by Acciaiuoli, but also by Burley, who, nonetheless, admits his debt: Petri Scriptum VII.9, Vat. Gualteri Burley, Expo- Acciaioli Comm., f. 237v lat. 777, f. 124vb = p. 376, sitio super Librum Politicorum, Vatican Library, nr. 1157 Borgh. 129, f. 116vb [. . . ] si oportet ciuitatem ipsam situari ad uotum, oportet respicere ad quatuor principaliter: primo quidem quod declinationem habeat et sit propatula, si potest fieri, ad orientem et ad uentos flantes ab ortu, qui sunt saniores aliis, tamquam hoc sit oportunum ad bonam dispositionem ciuium, scilicet sanitatem. Sunt autem uenti orien- N o t a n d u m e s t h i c , [. . . ] vt quidam expositales saniores, quoniam secundum Petrum de tores dicunt, quia materia

272 plurima materia ipsorum plus moratur sub uia solis; et ideo calidiores sunt, secundum Philosophum II Metheororum. Propter caliditatem autem suam nubes resoluunt et aerem subtiliant et mundificant, que faciunt ad bonam dispositionem et ad sanitatem, siquidem aer paludosus, nubilosus et grossus est egrotatiuus.

Lidia Lanza Aluernia, quod materia uentorum orientalium plurimum stat et moratur sub uia solis, et ideo sunt calidiores secundum Philosophum II Metheororum, per quam caliditatem dissoluunt nubes et aerem subtiliant et mundificant, quod multum facit ad bonam dispositionem corporis. Aer autem pallidosus [sic] et nubilosus et grossus egrotatiuus est; uentus autem occidentalis frigidus est et parum moratur sub uia solis, nec est fortis, et ideo, propter frigiditatem, uapores congregat et aerem ingrossat, et propter paruitatem flatus non potest propellere nubes, et ista non conueniunt ad bonam dispositionem corporum. Et ideo loca propatula ad occidentem non sunt bene sanatiua, ut frequentius.

ventorum orientalium plurimum moratur sub via solis, ideo tales venti sunt calidiores: et Philosophus in Meteoris calidiores esse testatur, itaque ob suam caliditatem resoluunt nubes et aerem purgant. Aer vero purus multum confert ad sanitatem, nubilosus autem et palustris, ut plurimum obest.

Another striking example of Accaiuoli’s dependence on Peter is found in Book VII, chapter 16 (Pol. 1335b20–28). There Aristotle gives his opinion on the exposure and rearing of children and on their number for a couple.35 He declares in favour of laws according to which (1) no deformed child shall live and (2) an abortion has to be procured if couples have children in excess, though this can be performed only “before sense and life have begun”. On 35 For the medieval interpretation of this chapter of the ‘Politics’ see Biller, Peter, The Measure of Multitude. Population in Medieval Thought, Oxford 2000, pp. 363–382.

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this occasion Acciaiuoli makes use of both Albert the Great’s and Peter’s expositions. From the former – which he surely takes into account in his commentary, if we consider the allusions in other sections of his work36 – Acciaiuoli only retains the reference to the Slavs ( a [...] Sclavis statim interficiuntur), the reference to the impiety of these practices (they are contra naturae pietatem, in Albert’s words), the characterisation of abortion as an absolutely wicked act, though less wicked (minus malum) than the consequences that would derive from overpopulation (an idea present in the ‘Scriptum’ too). From Peter’s ‘Scriptum’, Acciaiuoli borrows all the remaining line of reasoning. In this argumentation, Acciaiuoli is not the only commentator to draw on the ‘Scriptum’. Quite the opposite, this is one section of the ‘Scriptum’ widely used by all the commentators. It is therefore instructive to note the privileged role accorded to Peter by later commentators in the explanation of Aristotelian text. I therefore present samples from different commentators on these lines of the ‘Politics’ in Appendix I, at the end of this article.

III. Crisostomo Javelli’s ‘Epythomata in octo libris Politicorum Aristotelis’37 The way Acciaiuoli deals with Peter’s text makes it easy to grasp the strategies adopted by other commentators who abbreviate the ‘Scriptum’. Some of the observations made above regarding Burley and Acciaiuoli can be applied to Crisostomo Javelli’s ‘Epythomata’. Despite the brevity of Javelli’s text, the presence of the ‘Scriptum’ is easily recognisable if we look for traces of Peter’s notabilia. And, in fact, the notabilia from the ‘Scriptum’ are found in Javelli’s ‘Epythomata’ in exactly the same place and in the same order as in Peter’s ‘Scriptum’, reproduced almost literally. This can be seen, for instance, in the notabile on the definition of nobility of birth in Book III:

36 See note 33. For Albert’s commentary I use the following edition: D. Alberti Magni [...] Commentarii in octo libros Politicorum Aristotelis, Ed. Borgnet, Steph. Caes. Aug. (Opera omnia 8), Paris 1891 (hereafter Alberti Comm.). 37 See above note 20.

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Petri Scriptum III.11, Vat. lat. 777, f. 54rb Javelli Epythomata, f. 43r = p. 160, nr. 452, Ed. Spiazzi Sed intelligendum circa hoc quod dicit, quod meliores ex melioribus generantur, quod bonus dicitur dupliciter: uno modo secundum actum perfectum, et sic bonus non generat bonum, quia bonus est secundum intellectum et secundum electionem et exercitationem: non ergo fit bonus aliquis secundum actum perfectum a parentibus; alio modo dicitur bonus secundum inclinationem ad uirtutem perfectam, et sic bonus uult bonum generare, quia uirtus existens in semine intendit per se generare simile ei a quo est ipsum semen, secundum omnes dispositiones ad quas potest attingere uirtus generatiua. Attingit autem ad omnes dispositiones materiales que inclinant ad dispositiones uoluntatis et intellectus; et ideo intendit generare sibi simile, secundum omnes dispositiones inclinantes siue in bonum siue in malum. Propter quod inclinatio ad uirtutem est aliqualiter ex parentibus. Bonus igitur isto modo generat, ut in pluribus, bonum. Si autem quandoque accidit contrarium, hoc est per accidens.

[...] tamen aduerte quod iste due propositiones Aristotelis, scilicet ‘ex (et in textu editionis) melioribus ortos esse meliores’, et ‘generis uirtus est nobilitas siue ingenuitas’, possunt bene et male intelligi. Nam prima potest habere duplicem sensum: unus est quod melior meliorem generet secundum actum perfectum, ita quod genitus trahat a generante virtutem perfectam, que actu fit melior, et sic non est vera. Nam declaravimus in libro 2° Ethicorum quod virtutes non insunt nobis a natura neque a genitura, sed eas acquirimus disciplina, ut intellectuales, et exercitatione in bonis actibus, ut morales. Alter est quod melior meliorem generet quo ad inclinationem ad perfectam virtutem, et sic est vera. Melior enim desiderat et intendit generare sibi similem quantum potest, quo ad omnes dispositiones suas, et propterea inclinatio ad virtutem perfectam aliquo modo est aparentibus. Melior igitur in hoc sensu presumitur qui est ex melioribus ortus; quod si contrarium quandoque accidit est per accidens et preter intentionem generantis.

There is however a difference between Acciaiuoli’s and Javelli’s use of the ‘Scriptum’. The latter makes use of the ‘Scriptum’ in a printed edition, not in its original form as transmitted through the manuscript tradition. As I have noted above, Ludovico Valenza profoundly changed the text of the ‘Scriptum’ for his incunabulum edition of 1492, on which all the subsequent editions hitherto rely. Valenza not only modified the terminology, but either reformulated or suppressed entire passages of the text. The following sample shows that Javelli’s terminology is closer to Valenza’s version of the ‘Scriptum’ than to Peter’s original text. In this example from Book IV, Peter deals with two kinds of tyranny which exhibit some features of monarchy. The original text of the ‘Scriptum’ is in the left column and

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Javelli’s ‘Epythomata’ on the right, so that the evolution of the text can be clearly observed: Petri Scriptum IV.9, Vat. Petri Scriptum IV.9, p. Javelli Epythomata, f. 58rb lat. 777, f. 80ra 218, no. 623, Ed. Spiazzi Iste autem due species differunt ad inuicem, quia in prima principatur aliquis secundum leges et consuetudines patrias, in secunda non. Et quia principantes secundum istas principabantur secundum legem et uoluntatem, uelut quedam monarchie regales erant; quia autem principabantur principatu despotico, scilicet propter suam utilitatem et secundum suam sententiam, tyrannides erant.

Istae autem duae species habebant in se quaedam opposita et differentia, quia videlicet, cum regerent huiusmodi reges secundum leges et volentibus imperarent, e r a n t e o r u m m o n a rchiae regales; cum vero, praetermissis legibus secundum quas regere debebant, plena potestate secundum arbitrium s u u m d o m i n a r e n t u r, tyrannice regnabant et monarchiae illae tyrannides erant.

[...] et tu vide illic (scilicet in tertio libro, tractato ultimo, cap. primo eiusdem Epitomatis) et inuenies quomodo iste due species possunt dici regie et tyrannice. Regie quidem, quoniam principans dominatur secundum leges et volentibus (valentibus in textu editionis). Tyrannice vero, quoniam in processu temporis, pretermissis legibus, principans dominari vult pro arbitrio suo.

The same occurs in the passage from chapter 4 of Book IV, in which Peter presents the different forms of democracy. In the sections below, Peter deals with the second form, in which a certain property qualification is required for access to public offices, and the third form, in which the law is supreme and all the citizens are eligible to be elected: Petri Scriptum IV.4, Vat. lat. 777, f. 75vb

Petri Scriptum IV.4, p. 203, no. 575, Ed. Spiazzi

Javelli Epythomata, f. 53vb

[. . . ] secunda species democratie est in qua assumitur aliquis ad principatum propter excellentiam aliquam, mediocrem tamen, uel diuitiarum uel nobilitatis. Assumitur tamen a populo, ita tamen quod in pauco tempore uel in breui dominetur,

[. . . ] secunda species popularis est in qua assumitur aliquis ad principatum propter aliquem terminum divitiarum parvum quidem. Et adiungit parvum, ad hoc, ut plures possint regere. Si enim non assumerentur nisi qui

Secunda species est in qua non equaliter, sed secundum censum patrimoniorum distribuuntur principatus, et sic in ea non principantur omnes de populo. Non enim egeni, sed diuites, sed non excessiue diuites – illi enim pauci sunt, et esset politia

276 et quam diu est in principatu regere potest, postquam depositus non potest ulterius assumi. Adiungit autem ista duo ultima quia, si aliquis principetur ad tempus breue, poterunt alii plures attingere ad principatum; et si nunquam possit iterum assumi ille qui semel assumptus est, adhuc plures poterunt attingere ad ipsum.

Lidia Lanza magnum possiderent censum, esset admodum paucorum, et sic non esset popularis.

paucorum –, sed communiter siue mediocriter diuites, quos contingit esse multos in populo.

The explanation of the third form of democracy begins as follows: Petri Scriptum IV.4, Vat. lat. 777, f. 75vb

Petri Scriptum IV.4, p. 203, no. 576, Ed. Spiazzi

Javelli Epythomata, f. 53vb–54ra

[...] tertia species democratie est in qua aliqui assumuntur ad principatum non propter honorabilitatem, sed quicumque bene sunt dirigibiles et aptitudinem habentes; sunt autem isti qui perfecte attingunt ad ciuilitatem, sicut liberi simpliciter, qui sunt ex utroque libero.

[...] tertia species popularis est, in qua omnes habiles sunt ad magistratus gerendos, dummodo non sint obnoxii ex aliqua causa; puta quia ex aliquo crimine civilitatem amiserint, ut contingit capite diminutis, aut quia servi sint vel aliquo alio modo civilitate careant.

Tertia est in qua omnes ciues habiles sunt ad principandum, siue diuites siue non, dummodo non sint obnoxii, id est criminosi tali crimine quod mereantur priuari ciuilitate, vt falsarii et proditores, paricide et serui.

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IV. Peter of Osma’s and Ferdinand of Roa’s ‘Comentarii in Politicorum libros Aristotelis’38 A rather different picture emerges with regard to Peter of Osma’s commentary.39 His work is unquestionably richer and more elaborate. The exegetical diligence is remarkable, devoted both to the comprehension of the Aristotelian text and to its use as a tool for understanding contemporaneous political reality. With this aim in mind, the author carries through a lengthy expositio, paying attention to every element of the Aristotelian text, including all the examples from classical Greek history with which the ‘Politics’ is overloaded, chiefly in its central books. Peter of Osma comments on these historical passages as well, but, aware of their exact value in the economy of the text, he never allows these passages to assume an improperly preponderant role. But though the interpretation of Aristotle’s thought is the main object of Peter of Osma, this does not preclude him from paying attention to the Aristotelian littera and its related questions. In fact, he appraises with meticulous care the reliability of Leonardo Bruni’s Latin translation of the ‘Politics’ – the version on which he bases his commentary – and on occasion carefully compares it with Moerbeke’s translation. Furthermore, Peter of Osma makes use of the interpretations advanced by the medieval commentators. Although, like Acciaiuoli, he evokes the commentators generically as ‘some commentators’ (aliqui) or as the “commentators of the old translation” (commentatores antiquae traductionis), in fact these commentators, as far as Books III–VIII are concerned, are but two: Albert the Great and Peter of Auvergne. The latter is explicitly quoted in many cases, sometimes by name (Alvernia, Petrus d’Albernia) and more often – but only with reference to Book III – as if the ‘Scriptum’ were a work of Thomas Aquinas. The care with which Peter of Osma collates the translation of William of Moerbeke (moerbekeana) with that of Leonardo Bruni (aretina) is one of the consistent features of his commentary. In many cases Bruni’s version does not raise problems of conformity with Moerbeke’s version, and so the text of the ‘Politics’ can be explained without ambiguities. These are the more numerous cases, in which, as Peter of Osma states, the “text is easy” 38 See note 21. 39 For the sake of brevity I shall refer to Peter’s and Ferdinand’s work as if the author was only Peter of Osma. On questions concerning its authorship and on the ascription of some parts of the commentary to Ferdinand of Roa see the introduction by Labajos (note 20).

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(littera est plana), and in these cases he goes ahead with his exegetical work. In contrast, when the text is not clear he gives vent to his dissatisfaction or anger: “this is what the text says, albeit not clearly” or “By Hercules! I do not understand our text; I presume it must be incorrect”.40 Again, in other places he points out the disparities between the two translations. In these cases Peter of Osma either states which of them he finds the most plausible, or merely observes that although the littera is changed, the meaning remains the same.41 There are also places where he draws attention to the discrepancy between the translations without revealing his preference. This occurs in the passage where Peter of Osma comments on one of the stratagems that, according to Aristotle, are used by tyrants in order to preserve their power, the cautelae tyrannicae. In this passage Aristotle states that the tyrant should impoverish his subjects and occupy them with time-consuming work, providing as an example the Pyramids of Egypt or the offerings of the 40 Et hoc est quod littera dicitur, quamvis obscure, Osma/Roa, Comentarii, III.2.5, p. 458, ll. 11469–11470; Et, Hercle! Nostram litteram non intelligo, et puto quod fuerit incorrecta. This sentence is followed by an attempt to correct the Aristotelian text: et ubi dicitur ab istis, ablativo, debet dicit istis in dativo; et tunc idem sensus est qui in alia, Osma/Roa, Comentarii, III.2.1, p. 413, ll. 10005–10007. Note that these are just two examples of an attitude frequently evident in this commentary. 41 As an example of this approach, we can point to the account that he provides of the two translations (the ‘aretina’ and the ‘moerbekana’) in Book III, chapter 5, where Aristotle deals with difficulties related to the assignment of the chief public offices. There, in Pol. 1282a30–33, Aristotle mentions the offices of treasurers and generals as examples of high offices in which a high level of qualification is required. These two offices are translated by Bruni respectively as quaestura and praefectura (quaesturam et praefectura [sic] [...] suscipiunt). In contrast, the ‘littera moerbekana’ does not distinguish these two offices (presunt autem opibus et exercitus ducunt). Moreover, in Moerbeke’s translation, these offices must be held a maioribus, while in Bruni’s version ex censu magno atque aetate. Peter of Osma minimises the effects of this difference: quamvis littera sit alia, sententia est penitus eadem. Instead, regarding the distinction of the offices, Peter shows his inclination for Bruni’s translation, though not unconditionally: sed secundum commentatores antiquae traductionis, exponenda est littera accipiendo et copulative; et appellatione praefacturae intelligendus est ducatus exercitus, quia ubi haec nostra littera dicit: et praefecturam, littera antiqua habet et exercitus ducunt. Sed credo primam expositionem magis convenire litterae Leonardi, Osma/Roa, Comentarii, III.2.5, p. 458, ll. 11439–11452.

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family of Cypselus (Pol. V.11, 1313b19–25). Regarding this second example, the ‘aretina’ presents donaria Cypselidarum, while the ‘moerbekana’ has anathemata Cypselidorum. Peter points out this difference, but also reveals how previous commentators intended the word anathema in this context. Although he does not quote them by name, Peter of Osma presents the interpretations of Albert the Great and Peter of Auvergne. The latter offers an explanation of the etymology of anathema, which can be found only in the manuscript tradition, as this passage was erased by Ludovico Valenza. Alberti Comm., V.8, p. 534 Petri Scriptum V.11, Vat. O s m a / R o a , C o m e n lat. 777, f.102va = Ed. tarii, V.4.4, p. 841, ll. (l) 23123–23133 Spiazzi nr. 896 [. . . ] et anathemata, id est, separationes Cypselidarum. Nomen est cujusdam gentis tyrannice imperantis, quae semper schisma ponit inter suos, ne eleventur contra tyrannum.

Similiter anathemata Kipsedorum – dicuntur autem anathemata ea que seorsum ponuntur uel sursum in aliquo loco ad faciendum aliqua magna; et dicuntur anathemata ab ‘ana’, quod est sursum, et ‘tesis’, quod est ponit, quasi sursum uel seorsum posita –.

Sed advertendum quod ubi nostra littera habet dona cypselidarum, littera antiquae traductionis habet anathemata cypselidorum; et hoc a diversi diversimodo exponitur anathema, id est, separationes et divisiones cypselidorum, id est, cujusdam gentis tyrannice imperantis, quae semper cisma ponit inter suos, ne rebellent contra tyrannum. Alii exponunt anathemata, id est ea quae sursum ponuntur in aliquo loco ad faciendum vel repraesentandum aliqua magna. Et dicunt isti: dicitur anathemata ab ana, quod est sursum, et thesis, positio; quasi sursum positio vel sursum posita. Sed Leonardus multum est diversus ab hac littera et ab expositio-

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Lidia Lanza nibus commentatorum antiquae traductionis; et forte est iste unus passus in quo antiquum interpretem emendavit.

Finally, on other occasions Peter of Osma remarks that dealing with the discrepancies between the translations may result in a sterile discussion. On these occasions, he gets out of trouble by proposing his own interpretation, which puts an end to what he defines as “useless chatter” (et cessabunt omnes istae garrulationes).42 The occurrences of the ‘littera moerbekana’ are therefore quite varied. Where the text raises problems, Peter of Osma assesses the different interpretations proposed by the commentators, without any bias, and always favours the one that, in his opinion, agrees best with the meaning of the Aristotelian text. Peter of Osma most often makes use of Peter of Auvergne’s interpretation, but he uses Albert the Great’s commentary in cases where the ‘Scriptum’ does not provide a complete or fully satisfying interpretation. Albert is also the privileged supplier of numerous scriptural, classical and medieval sources, which were added to the abundant sources already present in the text.43 The following two passages provide an indication of the way in which Peter of Osma makes use of Albert’s commentary. The first passage is found in the pages where Peter of Osma puts forward the interpretation of the ‘Scriptum’ regarding ostracism. According to Peter of Auvergne, ostracism can be just only under certain circumstances (secundum quid), and not 42 Et Thomas dicit [...] Sed dicet aliquis: non videtur quod istud ad plenum satisfaciat, quoniam si sic dicatur, non erit verum quod in fine § dicitur [...] Solutio: ubi haec littera habet [...] littera antiquae traductionis habet [...] Et exponitur secundum aliquos [...] Sed certe ista expositio videbitur parum consideranti nimis extorta et contra naturam terminorum nostri textus [...] Et ideo, forte dicendum, et melius [...] vel dic unico verbo, et cessabunt omnes istae garrulationes, Osma/Roa, Comentarii, III.2.5, ll. 11327–11339, p. 455. 43 The anonymous abridgement of the ‘Politics’ contained in the manuscript Brugge, Stadsbibliotheek 482, f. 1r–38v, dating from the end of the thirteenthcentury, confirms that Peter of Osma is not the first commentator to use Albert’s commentary as a source to display erudite details. This abridgment is mostly based on Aquinas’s and Peter of Auvergne’s commentaries, Albert being used merely as a supplier of quotations. Cf. Dondaine/Bataillon (note 1), p. A15.

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absolutely (simpliciter). It is an expedient used above all in deviant forms of government, in which justice is in force secundum quid. Albert is quoted by Peter of Osma in this doctrinal context as providing further corroboration of the conclusion already achieved with the help of Peter of Auvergne’s interpretation. The borrowing from Albert is limited to the words with which he qualifies the intrinsic justice of the politiae transgressae: Alberti Comm., III.8, p. 280 (ff)

Osma/Roa, Comentarii, III.3.8, p. 489, ll. 12462–12464

In trangressis quidem igitur, supple, politiis, quod quidem singulariter conferens expediat et justum sit, manifestum, supple, est: ibi enim lex justitiae est oppressio et fortitudo, sicut dicitur Sap. (II,11): Sit fortitudo nostra lex justitiae

[. . . ] lex justitiae est oppræssio [sic] et fortitudo; unde, Sapientiae secundo, in persona iniquorum dicitur: sit lex justitiae fortitudo et oppressio nostra

The second passage is taken from chapter 10 of Book III of the ‘Politics’, where the Stagirite raises the question of who should be assigned the chief office in the civitas.44 Given that it has to be assigned to one who exceeds all others regarding a given good, the heart of the matter is to define what this good is, so that it can be the criterion for distributing the main offices in the city. This is one of the passages where Aristotle denies the possibility that the multitude of the poor men might hold public offices, since its members could act against the wealthiest citizens. In fact, they would have the motive for that action (the necessity) and the means to carry it out (the power derived from public offices), without having the sole requisite to restrain themselves: virtue. The question “whether it is just that the multitude without virtue should command” is considered a rhetorical one by Peter of Auvergne, as it is indisputable that the supreme office of the civitas has to involve justice, that is, it has to be performed according to virtue.45 For his part, Peter of Osma illustrates this conclusion by making use of one notabile present in the ‘Scriptum’, but he adds elements taken from the 44 Pol. III.10, 1281a12–20. 45 Sed estne hoc iniustum? Quasi diceret: sic; secundum enim ueritatem ciuitas debet habere dominatiuum iustum. Quare manifestum est quod iniustitia extrema est hec, id est pessima, Petri Scriptum III.8, Vat. lat. 777, f. 51va = p. 147, nr. 415, Ed. Spiazzi.

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corresponding passage of Albert’s commentary (though he attributes the quotation present in Albert to Virgil and not, as would be correct, to Ovid, ‘Heroides’ IV). Albert’s assertions, which Peter of Osma assigns to undefined alii, are present in Peter of Auvergne’s commentary, as we can see in the table below. Nevertheless, Peter of Auvergne rejects those assertions because they do not conform to Aristotle’s intention. This criticism of Albert’s ideas in the pages of the ‘Scriptum’ provides a valuable clue supporting the temporal precedence of Albert’s commentary over the ‘Scriptum’ of Peter of Auvergne. In this case too, the passage at stake was deleted by Ludovico Valenza, and is therefore absent from Spiazzi’s edition:46 Alberti Comm. III.7, 256 (b)

Petri Scriptum III.8, Vat. Lat. 777, f. 51va = Ed. Spiazzi nr. 415

Osma/Roa, Comentarii, III.2.4, p. 443, ll. 10939–10948

Secundam probat in littera per Jovem qui statuit dominationem debere esse justam: sed injustitia extrema est diripere ea quae sunt civium [...] Et probat, ibi, Videbatur enim utique per Jovem dominatio juste, supple, debere fieri. Unde poeta: Juppiter esse pium statuit quodcumque juvaret. Et per oppositum quod noceret, statuit esse impium.

Ex hoc ulterius manifestum est quod iniustum est multitudinem dominari. Et est intelligendum quod illud quod dicit ‘per Iouem’ iuramentum est, quasi diceret ‘in ueritate’ uel ‘per deum’. Iouem enim opinantur esse deum antiqui et populares gentiles. Solet tamen exponi sic: Iupiter statuit regimen et principatum iustum esse in ciuitate, et dicit Philosophus quod per Iouem uidetur quod dominans debet esse iustus in ciuitate. Sed istud non est

Nota, secundo, quod ubi haec nostra littera habet decreverunt enim qui potestatem habent, littera antiquae traductionis habet videbatur enim utique per Jovem dominatio juste. Quod dupliciter exponi consuevit: aliqui dicunt, quod id quod dicit per Jovem, juramentum est; et est sensus in veritate vel per deum Jovem civitas debet habere justum denominativum, id est, dominativum, quod juste dominetur; alii exponunt, quod Jupiter statuit dominationem juste fieri debere, et allegant

46 Albert’s and Peter’s assertions are underlined in order to make them immediately recognisable in Osma’s and Roa’s text. I quote this text according to its modern edition, even though the punctuation and the adopted graphical criteria are sometimes misleading (as in the case of the quoted verse, whose second half – statuit quodcumque juvaret – should be in italics).

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Vi r g i l i u m , d i c e n t e m Jupiter esse pium, statuit quodcumque juvaret, et per oppositum, quod noceret statuit esse impium; et huic sententiae alludit littera nostra Leonardi.

The great dependence of Peter of Osma on Peter of Auvegne is even more evident if we consider the first eight chapters of Book III, which were commented on by Thomas Aquinas and Peter of Auvergne. Instead of following Aquinas, Peter of Osma relies upon Peter. This can be shown in numerous passages. For example, we can point out the notabile that Peter of Auvergne introduces in his commentary to clarify what one should understand by the word politheuma, rendered in this way in the Latin version of Moerbeke. Though missing in the commentary of Aquinas, who almost entirely limits himself to repeating the Aristotelian text, this explanation is advanced by Peter of Auvergne and reproduced by Peter of Osma: Thomae Sent., p. A201, ll. 23–5

Petri Scriptum III.5, Vat. lat. 777, f. 40ra = pp. 114 l. 27, p. 115 ll. 1–19, Ed. Grech

Osma/Roa, Comentarii, III.2.1, p. 413, ll. 9992–10001

[. . . ] politeuma ciuitatis, id est positio ordinis in ciuitate, tota consistit in eo qui dominatur ciuitati; et talis impositio ordinis est ipsa politia.

[...] principans in politia est politheuma ciuitatis, id est impositor ordinis ciuitatis. Et politeuma est politia, id est secundum politiam. Politia autem sumitur in ordine ad principantem, quare manifestum est quod ciuitas est ordo principantium uel principatuum, et maxime principantis primi [. . . ] Et est notandum quod politheuma est impositio ordinis politie primo et principaliter. Et hoc primo significat nomen, deinde transfertur

Notandum, secundo, quod ubi nostra littera habet principalissimum autem est id quod ubique gubernat, littera antiqua habet: dominans quidem enim ubique policheuma civitatis. Et exponitur secundum commentatores antiquae traductionis, dominans, id est, principans; ubique est policheuma civitatis, id est, impositor ordinis civitatis. Et est advertendum secundum Thomam et commentatores illius antiquae traductionis, quod policheuma est nomen graecum, et primo significat

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Lidia Lanza ad significandum ordinis impositorem. Et sic accipit Philosophus in prima propositione, que dicit: dominans ubique politeuma ciuitatis. Post translatum est ad significandum ipsum ordinem impositum, quod est politia. Et sic accipit in secunda, cum dicit: politia autem est politeuma.

impositionem ordinis civitatis; secundario transfertur ad significandum ordinis impositorem. Et sic accipitur hic, cum dicitur: Dominans ubique est policheuma. Primo modo, accipitur cum dicitur policheuma est politia.

Examples that prove a dependence on Peter of Auvergne and show distance from Aquinas are very numerous. Unlike Aquinas, who is more attached to the original text, Peter of Auvergne introduces a number of notabilia in which he departs from the text he is commenting on, raising questions and making analogies that attempt to explain or substantiate his own conclusions. These notabilia occur again in Peter of Osma’s commentary, for the most part in the same order as in the ‘Scriptum’. A major example can be found in the long notabile of the ‘Scriptum’ that precedes the definition of citizenship with regard to every form of government. The similarities are striking, and even more so if we consider that here Peter of Osma is still maintaining Moerbeke’s rather than Bruni’s terminology, as proved by the use of the words politia instead of respublica and principatus for magistratus. Petri Scriptum III.1, Vat. lat. 777, f. 35va = p. 78, ll. 21–8, p. 79, ll. 1–22, Ed. Grech

Osma/Roa, Comentarii, III.1.1, pp. 366, 368, ll. 8440–9, 8454–8465, 8527–8538

[. . . ] intelligendum est quod ciuis pars ciuitatis est; ciuitas autem determinatur per politiam; et ideo ciuis determinatur ex politia.

Pro intellectu primae partis inspicienda sunt cum diligentia quatuor aut quinque. Primum est, quod cum civis sit civitatis pars, et civitas determinationem et speciem recipiat ex republica quae est ipsius forma, necesse est civem ex republica speciem et determinationem recipere. Definiendus est, ergo, civis in unaquaque republica in ordine ad rempublicam sub qua vivit.

Vlterius intelligendum est quod unumquodque entium determinatur aliqua operatione, in quantum potest;

Secundum est, quod ut patet ex dictis supra, libro primo, capitulo primo [...] unumquodque entium definitur

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cum non potest, non dicitur nisi equiuoce, sicut dicitur in primo huius. Ciuis autem est aliquod ens; ergo habet aliquam operationem in quam, cum potest, dicitur ciuis, cum autem non potest, non dicitur, per quam diffinitur.

et determinatur aliqua operatione, in quam, cum potest, dicitur tale; cum vero in eam non potest, non est nec dicitur tale, nisi aequivoce [...]

Et ideo Philosophus, uolens dare diffinitionem ciuis, diffinit ipsum per operationem eius secundum quod ciuis est.

Tertium est, quod civis cum sit aliquod ens, necessarium est quod definiatur in ordine ad suam propriam operationem, in qua, cum potest, dicitur et est vere civis; qui vero in hanc non potest, non dicitur civis nisi aequivoce; id est, appellatur civis [...] et tamen secundum veritatem non est civis.

Operatio autem eius, secundum quod ciuis est, est operatio que conue-nit ei per formam ciuitatis, quia pars secundum quod huiusmodi non habet operationem nisi uirtute forme totius. Forma autem principalis ciuitatis est politia; operatio autem principalis que conuenit ei per huiusmodi formam est que conuenit ciuitati per illud quod principale est in ea, sicut operatio hominis propria est que inest ei per illud quod est principale in eo.

Quartum, quod operatio civis est operatio quae convenit civi secundum formam civitatis et secundum id quod in ea principale; sicut operatio propria hominis dicitur quae convenit homini secundum propriam formam et secundum id quod est in eo (ea in textu editionis) principale, hoc est, secundum intellectum.

Principale autem in ciuitate uidetur esse principans. Et ideo per operationes que pertinent ad principatum diffinit ciuem.

Quintum est, quod principale in civitate et in civitatis forma, sunt principatus; ergo, definitio et operatio civis accipienda est in ordine ad principatus et magistratus civitatis [...]

[...] Sicut enim nos uidemus in animali quod illa est pars simpliciter ipsius que attingit ad formam animalis et operationem, sic ciuis est ille qui attingit ad formam ciuitatis et operationem. Et sicut in animali sunt quedam partes que non attingunt ad formam animalis nec ad operationem, sunt tamen necessarie, sic in ciuitate sunt quidam qui non possunt attingere ad operationem ciuitatis, sunt tamen necessarii.

[. . . ] Attende, secundo, quod sicut animalis duae sunt partes: quaedam principales et formales; et sunt illae quae attingunt formam et operationem animalis, id est, motum et sensum, caro, manus, pes, et cetera membra corporis organica; aliae sunt materiales et minus principales, necessariae tamen ad animalis consistentiam et pulchritudinem, et sunt illae quae non participant formam et operationem

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Lidia Lanza animalis, scilicet, motum et sensum, ut ungues, cornua et ossa, sic civitatis duae sunt partium genera: quaedam sunt principales et formales, et haec sunt quae participant formam et operationem formae civitatis, et tales partes sunt cives; aliae sunt minus principales et quasi materiales, et sunt illae quae nec participant formam civitatis, nec operationem formae civitatis; et hujusmodi sunt quicumque habitantes in civitate, ut inquilini, servi, opifices et similes.

In those chapters of Book III for which we have the parallel commentaries of Aquinas and Peter of Auvergne, Peter of Osma always prefers to follow Peter. For example, commenting on the Aristotelian assertion that it is not enough to differentiate between the forms of government as correct and deviant forms, a deeper inquiry being necessary regarding each form of government, Peter of Auvergne argues for the need to study the causes and the rationales of things, not only their effects. This idea is found again in Peter of Osma. Thomae Sent., p. A204, ll. 77–84

Petri Scriptum III.6, Vat. lat. 777, f. 41rb–va = p. 126, ll. 24–7, p. 127, ll. 1–2, 5–13, Ed. Grech

Osma/Roa, Comentarii III.2.2, pp. 424–425, ll. 10340–10346, 10353–10358

Ille qui philosophatur in unaquaque arte quasi considerans ueritatem et non solum respicit ad id quod est utile ad agendum, nichil debet despicere uel pretermittere, set in singulis declarare ueritatem. Dictum est autem quod tyrannis est quedam monarchia despotica, id est dominatiua politice communitatis, quia scilicet utitur ciuibus ut seruis.

Ille autem qui considerare et philosophari uult circa unamquamque scientiam, et non solum aspicit ad effectus et opera, sed ad causas illorum et ad cognitionem ueritatis in illis, non debet despicere nec dimittere ueritatem, sed declarare ipsam circa unumquodque. Et ideo non sufficit dicere que sunt politie recte et que non recte, sed oportet dicere que est ratio uniuscuiusque earum. [. . . ] tyrannis est monarchia

Et causa hujus est, philosophi, cujus est veritatem circa singulorum disciplinam inquirere, proprium est non solum respicere ad opera et effectus ostendendo de re, quia est verum nihil negligere nec praetermittere de his quae ad veritatis cognitionem pertinent et demonstrare in singulis veritatem, ostendendo rei causam et rationem; et ideo, non sufficit ostendere quot et quae sint respublicae, sed oportet circa

The ‘Scriptum super III–VIII libros Politicorum’ despotica in communitate politica. Despotica autem dicit quia, sicut in principatu despotico principans intendit bonum suum, et subditus seruus est quo principans utitur propter proprium bonum principantis, non serui, nisi per accidens, in quantum sine seruo non posset esse bonum despotis, sic in tyrannide principans intendit bonum proprium et utitur subditis suis tamquam seruis, non intendens bonum eorum nisi per accidens, in quantum bonum suum non posset esse sine subditis.

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unamquamque causam et rationem dicere [. . . ] tyrannis est dominatio unius, id est, monarchia dominica sive despotica; per quod distinguitur a monarchia legali, ubi monarcha, hoc est, rex, intendit utilitatem subditorum et non propriam, ut tyrannus; quia tyrannus utitur subditis ut servis, non intendens eorum utilitatem nisi per accidens, in quantum bonum suum quod intendit esse non potest non existentibus subditis.

How can we explain Peter of Osma’s predilection, in the first chapters of Book III, for Peter of Auvergne’s ‘Scriptum’ and not for Aquinas? Peter’s way of arguing of is surely more congenial to Peter of Osma in comparison with the rigorous and concise approach of Aquinas in his commentary. In fact, Aquinas’s commentary is free of any redundancy that might encumber the expositio and also omits explanations of philosophical principles, as Aquinas takes for granted that his readers will be acquainted with them. Peter of Osma arranges his commentary in multiple ways: not only as a genuine literal commentary that clarifies the original, but also as a text that points out Aristotle’s fundamental thesis. He also provides plentiful notabilia (introduced with the words advertendum, attendendum, notandum, considerandum) and sometimes even genuine questions with arguments for and against the position. All this is surely more consonant with the approach to commentary proper to Peter of Auvergne. However, the reason why Peter of Osma prefers the ‘Scriptum’ to Aquinas’s commentary can possibly be found elsewhere. After all, Aquinas is one of the main authorities present in Peter of Osma’s commentary, his ‘Summa theologiae’ and his ‘Quodlibeta’ being often quoted. The reason for the preference accorded to the ‘Scriptum’ is arguably exclusively material. It has perhaps most to do with the manuscript(s) containing the commentaries

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of Aquinas and Peter of Auvergne that Peter of Osma had at his disposal while writing his commentary. Perhaps it is only a coincidence, but one of the manuscripts that hands down Peter’s ‘Scriptum’ from the very beginning of Book III is extant in Salamanca. In fact, in the manuscript Salamanca, Biblioteca Universitaria 2258, dated from the fifteenth century, Aquinas’s text stops at the end of Book II, being followed by the ‘Scriptum’ from the beginning of Book III.47 The presence of the ‘Scriptum’ remains unchanged throughout the entire commentary of Peter of Osma. In some cases the textual closeness merely reveals a common legacy of ideas belonging to the paradigm reliant on the ‘Corpus Aristotelicum’ or else unproblematic assertions that had become commonplace for any university master that commented on Aristotle. This is the case with the assertion according to which “every thing is mostly what is the most important in it, like man is mostly the intellect, because the intellect is the main thing in him” (unumquodque maxime est illud quod principale est in eo, sicut homo maxime est intellectus, quia intellectus est principale in eo). Peter of Auvergne repeatedly uses this principle, for example in order to assert that the civitas performs an act only if this act is performed by its leadership.48 Peter of Osma reproduces this explanation – which is used in other places as well –49 but also inserts a reference to Augustine.50 Besides these echoes of a common legacy, Peter of Osma includes many of the same partitions with which Peter of Auvergne divided up the text to be commented on. The Iberian author also presents copious explanations and arguments taken from the ‘Scriptum’, from explanations that border on pure 47 For a description of this manuscript see Dondaine/Bataillon (note 1), p. A12, nr. 16. 48 Petri Scriptum III.2, Vat. lat. 777, f. 36vb = p. 88, ll. 13–29, Ed. Grech. 49 See, for instance, Osma/Roa, Comentarii, III.1.1, p. 366, ll. 8458–8462. 50 Notandum [...] pro intellectu solutionis in littera positae, quod ut in IX Ethicorum dicitur, principale in re est quasi tota res, et quod principale in re operatur, tota ipsa res agere et operari dicitur; verbi gratia, in homine, ut ibi dicitur, principale est intellectus; et ideo, intellectus est quasi totus homo; et quod homo operatur et agit secundum intellectum et rationem, totus homo agere dicitur; quae vero ab homine fiunt non secundum ratione et intellectum, sed secundum sensualitatem, non dicitur proprie homo agere. Et ideo, pulchre, Augustinus distinguit hominem in hominem interiorem et hominem exteriorem [...] unde, quae homo agit per rationem et intellectum, dicitur homo interior agere; quae vero agit homo per sensualitatem, non dicitur homo agere, quia non agit homo interior sed exterior homo, Osma/Roa, Comentarii, III.1, p. 380, ll. 8941–8953.

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erudition, to the passages that are most significant from a doctrinal point of view. We may take as an example of this a few reproductions of partitions of the text that open the chapters of the ‘Scriptum’: the first case is taken from chapter 7 of Book III, the first chapter commented on only by Peter and not by Aquinas; the second precedes the interpretation of the chapters where Aristotle determines the advantages and inconveniences of lordship exercised by the multitude. Obviously the differences between the lemmata are due only to the different translations on which both authors rely. The same applies to the changes in terminology between the two texts: democratia, oligarchia in Peter of Auvergne; popularitas and paucorum potentia in Peter of Osma: Petri Scriptum III.7, Vat. lat. 777, f. 41vb = p. 142, nr. 400, Ed. Spiazzi

Osma/Roa, Comentarii, III.2.3, pp. 428–429, ll. 10428–10430, 10437–10439, 10447–10454

Sumendum autem est. Postquam Philosophus declarauit per quid distinguuntur democratia et oligarchia, in parte ista ostendit per quid antiqui istas politias determinauerunt. Et quia determinauerunt huiusmodi politias per iustum quoddam, ideo determinat in parte ista de iusto oligarchico et democratico, et quomodo uerum dixerunt et quomodo non. Et diuiditur in partes duas: in prima premittit intentum suum; secundo prosequitur, ibi Omnes enim [...]

Sumendum est prius [. . . ] Capitulum tertium in quo, ut aliquibus placet, exponit quale est illud justum per quod antiqui philosophi determinaverunt popularitatem et paucorum potentiam [...]

Deinde cum dicit Omnes enim, prosequitur intentum suum [...] Et primo ostendit quod sit iustum secundum quid; secundo specialiter quod non sit iustum simpliciter, ibi Quod autem principalissimum. Adhuc prima in duas, quoniam primo declarat quod isti tetigerunt iustum secundum quid, non simpliciter; secundo assignat causam cuiusdam dicti, ibi Causa autem quia.

Sequitur littera: Omnes enim attingunt [...] Hic prosequitur propositum. Et facit duo: primo, ostendit quod in his rebuspublicis, scilicet, in popularitate et paucorum potentia, reperitur justum secundum quid, quod non est perfectum nec proprie justum; secundo, exponit quod in praefatis rebuspublicis non reperitur justum simpliciter, ibi Ceterum quod est principalissimum non [...] Prima in duas: in prima facit quod dictum est; in secunda, assignat causam cujusdam dicti quod ultimo dicitur, ibi, Causa vero est [...]

Dividitur capitulum istud in duas partes. In prima, praemittit intentionem suam. In secunda, prosequitur, ibi: Omnes enim attingunt [...]

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Petri Scriptum III.8, Vat. lat. 777, f. 51rb = p. 146, nr. 414, Ed. Spiazzi

Osma/Roa, Comentarii, III.2.4, p. 441, ll. 10870–10880

Habet autem dubitationem. Postquam Philosophus distinxit politias secundum distinctionem principatuum et declarauit cuius gratia ciuitas est instituta, in parte ista inquirit quem oportet esse principantem in ciuitate. Et quia principatus debet distribui secundum excessum alicuius boni, inquirit secundum cuius excessum debeant distribui. Et secundum hoc diuiditur ista pars in duas partes: in prima inquirit quem oportet esse principantem in ciuitate; secundo inquirit secundum cuius excessum debeat distribui, ibi Quoniam autem in omnibus. Prima in duas: in prima mouet dubitationem, tangens quasi solutionem; secundo arguit contra solutionem, ibi Sed hec omnia.

Est autem dubitatio [. . . ] Capitulum quartum, in quo incipit secunda pars et principalis hujus tituli, in qua erat Aristotelis intentio, enumeratis speciebus rerumpublicarum, determinare de principatibus et dominantibus in civitate; et quia principatus distribuuntur secundum excessum alicujus boni, determinat etiam de illo bono, secundum cujus excessum bona communitatis distribuenda sunt; et ita materia ista continet duas partes principales. In prima, determinat de principantibus. In secunda, determinat de bono secundum cujus excessum bona communitatis distribuenda sunt, capitulo sexto: Cum vero in cunctis [...] Prima, in duas: in prima ponit dubitationem, et quasi subjungit solutionem; in secunda, contra solutionem arguit, ibi: Verum haec omnia [...]

Up to this point I have ascertained similarities regarding the formal features of the commentaries. Yet, the similarities concern the doctrine as well. A full account of these correspondences would exceed the scope of the present article. Here I provide a single example, taken from the notabile on nobility of birth present in the ‘Scriptum’: Petri Scriptum III.11, Vat. lat. 777, f. 54rb = p. 160, nr. 452, Ed. Spiazzi

Osma/Roa, Comentarii, III.2.7, pp. 474–475, ll. 11969–11976

[...] uirtus existens in semine intendit per se generare simile ei a quo est ipsum semen, secundum omnes dispositiones ad quas potest attingere uirtus generatiua. Attingit autem ad omnes dispositiones materiales que inclinant ad dispositiones uoluntatis et intellectus; et ideo intendit generare sibi simile secundum omnes dispositiones inclinantes siue in bonum siue in malum.

[...] ut dicit Thomas [...] virtus existens in semine deciso a patre, intendit per se generare simile ei a quo est ipsum semen secundum omnes dispositiones ad quas potest attingere virtus generatiua; attingit autem ad dispositiones naturales intellectus et voluntatis; et ideo, regulariter contingit, quod natus nascitur similis genitori quantum ad hujusmodi dispositiones inclinantes in bonum aut in malum; et ita patet, quod inclinatio sive

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Propter quod inclinatio ad uirtutem est aliqualiter ex parentibus.

dispositio ad virtutem sive ad vitium ex parentibus trahi potest.

ibid., f.54ra–b = ibid., Ed. Spiazzi

ibid., ll. 11941–11948

Et dicit quod liberi et ingenui tamquam uero sint propinqui adinuicem, inuicem altercantur de principatu: liber autem dicitur qui mente potest preuidere que agenda sunt et inclinatur ad uirtutem. Similiter ingenuus. Sed differunt, quia ingenuus dicitur qui habet huiusmodi inclinationem secundum uirtutem perfectam a parentibus, et illi ab aliis, et illi ab aliis, et sic secundum quamdam antiquitatem. Liber autem qui habet undecumque.

Attende, primo, quod nobiles et ingenui illi dicuntur, qui inclinationem aliquam habent ad virtutem; sed differunt, quia nobiles dicuntur illi solum qui talem inclinationem ex parentibus traxerunt primis, secundis, tertiis et quartis, et ita, secundum quandam antiquitatem; ingenui vero dicuntur qui hanc inclinationem et dispositionem ad virtutem undecumque traxerunt sive a parentibus sive a constellatione sub qua nati sunt, sive aliunde; et ita, secundum hoc, in plus videtur se habere ingenuus quam nobilis, quoniam omnis nobilis est ingenuus, non tamen contra.

The dependence of Peter of Osma on Peter of Auvergne having been established, it is nevertheless necessary to emphasise that this dependence is not slavish; it occurs only regarding points that Peter of Osma shares with Peter of Auvergne. It is therefore a selective process, not mere acquiescence. With the ‘Scriptum’ Peter of Osma manifests the same critical spirit he shows towards other auctoritates present in the text, from Thomas Aquinas to Albert the Great, or from Aristotle to his Latin translators. The interpretation of the auctoritas invoked is adopted only if Peter of Osma shares the same position; if found unconvincing, problematic, or in conflict with the political reality that Peter of Osma had before his eyes, then it is discussed and refuted. This is the case with the well-known lines of reasoning adopted to support lordship exercised by the multitude (Pol. III.11): the lordship of a “well regulated multitude” (multitudo bene ordinata) is to be preferred to the lordship of the “most virtuous man” (optimus vir). To support this conclusion, Aristotle asserts that the multitude combines the good dispositions of each element that is part of it. While the elements that constitute the multitude are, individually considered, by far and from many points of view, inferior with regard to the optimus vir, when considered collectively they exceed the qualitative deficiencies of single individuals. Hence, the lordship of the multitude is preferable to that of the optimus vir. This position is unanimously shared and considered as unproblematic by all the ‘Politics’ commentators quoted so far. However, for Peter of Osma this

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opinion is mistaken: that the many are, collectively considered, better than the single man that exceeds all others in virtue (unus studiosus simpliciter) is a misguided assertion (non recte in littera dicitur); it would be the equivalent of stating that many non-substances could give rise to one substance. The Aristotelian ‘littera’ is therefore incorrect, states Peter of Osma, who proposes a correction: that the many (plures) are better than each good man (meliores quam singuli studiosi), as the Aristotelian text says, is true only if meliores is intended to indicate the more useful citizens in the city (in civitate utiliores).51 The critical approach that Peter of Osma adopts towards the ‘Scriptum’ can be further seen in the lengthy passages where he deals with the question of whether speculative intellect can be universally considered as the first principle of action.52 This question is absent from the text of the ‘Politics’; it is a digression Peter of Auvergne introduces in order to decide whether contemplative life is superior to active life, both for individuals and cities. Once again almost verbatim, Peter of Osma uses Peter of Auvergne’s assertions. But this time Peter of Osma does not name his source, and builds up a further digression to refute it. In this Peter of Osma goes beyond the selfimposed methodological limit of Peter of Auvergne, who never deals with theological issues in his commentary.53

51 Nota [...] quod istud quod id [sic] dicitur de istis pluribus habentibus inclinationes ad diversas virtutes quod sint meliores simul collecti quam unus studiosus simpliciter, videtur habere dubium. Et ratio dubitandi est, quia iste unus est bonus simpliciter, et tamen illi plures simul collecti non potent dici unum aliquid studiosum simpliciter, quia ex non studiosis non potest fieri studiosum, sicut ex non substantiis non potest fieri substantia, ut dicitur primo Phisicorum; sed singuli hujus multitudinis non sunt studiosi, ut textus dicit; ergo, ex eis non potest resultare unum studiosum simpliciter, et per consequens, non recte in littera dicitur, quod illae [sic] plures in unum convenientes sint meliores quam singuli studiosi simpliciter [...] Litteram nostram, quae dicit ut in unum convenientes omnes meliores sint quam illi, puto exponendam esse meliores, id est, in civitate utiliores, quia in singulis agendis et consulendis efficacior erit illa multitudo quam unus studiosus simpliciter; et hunc arbitror verum intellectum textus, Osma/Roa, Comentarii, III.2.4, p. 448, ll. 11134–11144, 11148–11152. 52 Cf. Scriptum VII.2, Vat. Lat. 777, f. 117vb–118ra = pp. 349–350, nr. 1083, Ed. Spiazzi; Osma/Roa, Comentarii, VII.1.2, pp. 979–981, ll. 27509–27581. 53 On this see Lanza, Lidia, Il finis hominis nei commenti all’ ‘Ethica Nicomachea’ e alla ‘Politica’ di Aristotele (secoli XIII–XIV), in: Medioevo e Rinascimento 12 (1998), pp. 143–81, see pp. 175–178.

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In his commentary, Peter of Auvergne states that the practical intellect, as it relates to action, requires the will to perform an action; the will, however, requires the speculative intellect because it requires knowledge in order to know what to choose. Thus, for Peter, the speculative intellect is superior to the will, and the will superior to the practical intellect. This leads him to state that the speculative intellect is both the faculty through which man reaches his end, happiness, and “the first principle and rule of action”, as it is required to perform an action both by the inferior faculties of the will and by the practical intellect. Peter of Osma deals in detail with the conclusion that speculative intellect is the principle of action. In his own words, someone has tried to prove that the speculative intellect is superior to both practical intellect and will. But while Peter of Osma accepts its superiority over the practical intellect – which is undisputable and confirmed by the Philosopher –54 he states that as regards superiority over the will there are two different main theological positions. The first, maintained by many theologians, claims that this superiority cannot be held, because charity is the best virtue and action according to the will the best kind of action, which implies that happiness has to consist in an act of charity.55 In contrast, the second position absolutely accepts the superiority over the will; in this case, it is through an act of the intellect that man reaches happiness, while charity is the virtue that makes man deserve happiness (charity is the prima radix merendi).56 Peter of Osma reveals his inclination for this second position. Nevertheless, he rejects the notion that the speculative intellect might be the first principle and rule of human action. He characterises the line of reasoning advanced in the ‘Scriptum’ as ineffective (non videtur esse efficax), false and opposed to the true Aristotelian doctrine: if we admit that the superiority of a faculty is established on the grounds that it is required by other faculties, then the senses would be a nobler faculty with respect to the intellect.57 Furthermore, 54 55 56 57

Osma/Roa, Comentarii, VII.1.2, pp. 979–980, ll. 27509–27518. Ibid., ll. 27518–40. Ibid., ll. 27540–9. According to Peter of Auvergne: Intellectus [...] practicus, qui dirigit in operationibus exterioribus, supponit, sicut principium, rectum appetitum finis. Et rectus appetitus finis non est sine rectitudine uoluntatis, Scriptum VII.2, Vat. lat. 777, f. 118ra = p. 350, nr. 1083, Ed. Spiazzi. Peter of Osma refutes this as follows: Sed ratio praesuppositionis qua ostenditur intellectum speculativum esse excellentiorem potentiam voluntate, non videtur efficax; quoniam si praesuppositum esse medium sufficiens ad probandum unam potentiam esse

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according to the ‘De anima’, the speculative intellect “never says anything about an object to be avoided or pursued” (De Anima, III.9, 432b28–29).58 Nevertheless, at the end of this long digression, Peter of Osma inserts a clause thanks to which Peter of Auvergne’s theory can be considered valid. The entire discussion seems concerned with the consequences which can be inferred from the assertions made in the ‘Scriptum’ rather than with the assertions in themselves. For the Salamanca master, the speculative intellect cannot be “the first rule of action” unless it is understood as the first rule in the sphere of cognition (cognitiva), but not in the sphere of action (activa); in this case, Peter of Auvergne’s interpretation is correct.59

nobiliorem alia, sequeretur quod cum actio intellectus praesupponat actionem sensus, ut colligitur ex primo Posteriorum et tertio De anima et libello De sensu et sensato et aliqualiter ex sexto Ethicorum, sensu esset nobilior potentia intellectu; quod falsum est. Et ideo, aut illa ratio non est efficax, aut dicendum quod habet locum in his quae in ceteris sunt paria, Osma/Roa, Comentarii, VII.1.2, p. 981, ll. 27552–27560. 58 According to Peter of Auvergne, the prima regula agendi uniuersaliter est intellectus speculatiuus: secundum ipsum igitur agere dicimus. Quare optima actio hominis est speculatio, et per consequens ultimus finis eius. Non igitur meditatio de agibilibus est optima operatio hominis, sed consideratio uel speculatio speculatiua, et maxime illa que est de primis, aut de primo simpliciter, Scriptum, ibid. Here the objection of Peter of Osma: Dicebant praeterea isti, quod intellectus speculativus est prima regula agibilium; quod non videtur verum; immo, videtur contrarium doctrinae Aristotelis tertio De anima, ubi textus dicit quod intellectus speculativus nihil dicit de prosequibili et fugibili. Et potest talis ratio ex textu deduci sic: regula ad hoc est ut dirigat ac regulet; sed intellectus speculativus nihil dicit de prosequibili et fugibili; ergo, non habet rationem regulae, Osma/Roa, Comentarii, ibid., ll. 27573–27578. A similar criticism substantiated by reference to the same Aristotelian texts can be found more than a century later in the Italian treatise of Bartolomeo Cavalcanti, which is, for the most part, a kind of commentary on Aristotle’s ‘Politics’; see Bartolomeo Cavalcanti, Trattati o vero Discorsi sopra gli ottimi reggimenti delle repubbliche antiche e moderne, Ed. Fabbri, Enrica (Gioele Solari. Dipartimento Studi politici dell’Università di Torino), Milano 2007, pp. 169–173. Eugene E. Ryan has already called attention to this criticism: Ryan, Eugene E., Bartolomeo Cavalcanti as a Critic of Thomas Aquinas, in: Vivarium 20 (1982), pp. 84–95. 59 [...] et ita, non potest esse prima regula, ut isti dicunt, nisi forte dictum istorum intelligatur quod est prima regula non directiva sed cognitiva; et forte sic dicendo, verum est quod isti dicunt, ibid., ll. 27578–27581.

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To conclude, Peter of Auvergne’s ‘Scriptum’ provides the primary material on which Peter of Osma builds his own exegetical work. It is not the only material, of course, but it is by far the fundamental source for both the explanation of the littera and the passages in which the commentator departs from the littera, that is, the notabilia. As noted above, these notabilia appear in Peter of Osma in the same order as in the ‘Scriptum’. And sometimes, when part of the material from the ‘Scriptum’ is not taken into account, it reappears in other places within Peter of Osma’s commentary. For this reason, an exhaustive collation of these two commentaries cannot simply follow the sequence, paragraph by paragraph, of the texts.

V. The Best Regime A key issue to understanding the reception of the ‘Scriptum’ from a doctrinal point of view is the discussion of the best form of government. It is well known that Peter identifies the monarchy as the best polity, in which a virtuous man rules according to his will and reason and for the common good of his subjects.60 That this identification respects the intentio of the Philosopher is a belief shared by the successive commentators: it is not an accident that Donato Acciaiuoli opens the section devoted to discussing the superiority of monarchy by stating that from then on the Philosopher proceeds asserendo and no longer disserendo, as he does for the sections on the other regimes.61 60 This was one of the most influential doctrines contained in the ‘Scriptum’, cf. Lanza (note 2); Lambertini, Roberto, La monarchia prima della ‘Monarchia’: le ragioni del ‘regnum’ nella ricezione medievale di Aristotele, in: Pour Dante. Dante et l’apocalypse. Lectures humanistes de Dante, Ed. Pinchard, Bruno with the collaboration of Christian Trottmann (Le savoir de Mantice 7), Paris 2001, pp. 39–75; Lanza, Lidia, I commenti medievali alla ‘Politica’ e la riflessione sullo stato in Francia (secoli XIII–XIV), in: Il commento filosofico nell’Occidente medievale (secoli XIII–XIV). Atti del Colloquio Firenze/Pisa, 19–22 ottobre 2000, organizzato dalla SISMEL e dalla SISPM, sotto l’egida della SIEPM, Eds. Fioravanti, Gianfranco, Leonardi, Claudio, Perfetti, Stefano (Rencontres de Philosophie Médiévale 10), Turnhout 2002, pp. 401–427. 61 [...] et sic Philosophus venit paulatim ad regiam gubernationem, et regimen vnius optimi, quod caeteris alijs anteponit, nec obstat quod superius dixit expedire multitudinem potius dominari, quam vnum, vel paucos studiosos, et multa

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It is not possible to deal in depth with the numerous emphases, assertions and views that Peter of Auvergne strews throughout Books III–IV to prove the superiority of monarchy, of which the majority are taken almost literally by Burley, Peter of Osma and Javelli. It is perhaps enough to note here the extensive notabile with which Peter of Auvergne substantiates the superiority of kingly power and replies to objections that might be raised on the grounds of arguments present in the Aristotelian text. The following notabile is fully reproduced, albeit not in a strictly literal way, by Peter of Osma, who introduces it as if it were his very respondeo. Javelli’s dependence is also patent. Petri Scriptum III.12 = Vat. lat. 777, f. 56va = p. 167, nr. 473, Ed. Spiazzi Sed est considerandum quod Philosophus uidetur sibi contrariari. Dixit enim prius quod melius est multitudinem aliquam principari quam paucos. Dixit etiam quod, si unus principaretur, alii essent inhonorati, quod est inconueniens. In ista parte dicit quod iste qui sic excedit omnes alios non est ciuis ; sed ille qui non est ciuis non debet principari, quare iste non debet principari; cuius contrarium dicit hic.

Osma/Roa, Comentarii, III.2.8, pp. 490s., ll. 12489–12506, 12513–12516

Javelli Epythomata, f. 45r–v

Sed aduerte quod hoc ultimum determinatum ab Aristotele, videtur eidem contrariari: nam capitulo precedenti probatum est quod, si unus esset virtuosior aliis, non debet solus principari, quoniam alii, videntes se inhonoratos, mouerent seditionem, ergo non debet perpetuo principari vt rex. Preterea conclusum est in capitulo precedenti quod magis expedit multitudinem non bestialem principari quam paucos diuites aut nobiles aut virtuosos: ergo multo magis quam vnus solus virtuosissimus. Eius oppositum dicit hic.

alia superius allata, quae a Philosopho disserendo magis, quam asserendo sunt dicta. Apparebit enim inferius, quod gubernationem vnius optimi primum, deinde optimatum extollet Philosophus (Donati Comm., III, f. 108v).

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Preterea conclusum est in presenti capitulo quod talis non est nec permittendus est esse ciuis; sed qui non est ciuis non potest nec debet principari, vt declaratum est in primo tractatu huius quarti libri ex diffinitione ciuis, ergo talis non solum debet esse rex, sed nec vllo modo principari, cuius contrarium dicit hic. Ad hoc dicendum quod, si inueniatur unus qui excedat omnes alios in uirtute, iste debet principari. Et ratio huius est quia illum oportet magis principari qui magis accedit ad principatum naturalem et ad principatum uniuersi. Sed iste qui sic excedit omnes alios in uirtute est huiusmodi: ergo expedit ipsum solum principari.

Respondeo, dicendum quod si in civitate inveniatur unus excellens alios probitate, ita quod ejus virtus praeponderet virtuti omnium aliorum, justum est quod talis in civitate dominetur; immo, quod plus est, ejus principatus est optimus principatus, tum quia maxime accedit ad principatum naturalem, in quo principatur unum omnium principalissimum

In politia autem regali et optime ordinata, de qua loquemur in libro VII, expedit talem solum et perpetuo principari: nam in tali politia illum expedit principari qui magis accedit ad principatum naturalem et ad principatum uniuersi.

Maior propositio apparet in animali: pars enim que principatur cor est; cor autem unum est et principale, a quo deriuatur uirtus ad singulas partes corporis. Iterum in uniuerso est unus princeps: principatus autem uniuersi unus et optimus est. Quare ille in ciuitate qui magis unus et melior est accedit magis ad similitudinem principatus uniuersi et naturalis.

(patet hoc in animali in quo principatur cor, quod est membrum omnium membrorum principalissimum, a quo derivatur tota virtus ad singulas partes corporis), tum etiam quia accedit (accidit in textu editionis)maxime ad principatum universi, in quo est unus princeps, ut dicitur duodecimo Methaphisicae [...]

Vnde videmus quod cor in animali principatur omnibus membris eo quod est pars nobilissima, a qua fluit virtus ad omnes alias partes; in vniuerso dominatur vnus optimus, qui est Deus benedictus. Sed ille qui alios in virtute excedit est talis: se habet enim ad alios vt cor in animali et vt Deus in vniuerso, vnde diximus supra quod est quidam deus inter homines.

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Ergo ille principatus erit melior, in quo erit unus princeps. Et illum magis expedit principari, qui unus existens optimus est. Talis est ille qui excedit omnes alios in uirtute: ergo manifestum est quod istum expedit magis principari quam alium. Nec ualet quod primo obicitur, quod superius dixit, quod magis expedit multitudinem dominari, quia illud intelligendum est ubi est politia equalium et similium, et uirtus unius non excedat uirtutem omnium aliorum, quod in proposito non contingit.

Ad primum dicendum, quod dictum Philosophi intelligi debet de civitate in qua cives non multum se excellunt probitate, sed quodammodo sunt aequales; vel dic quod expedit civitati multitudinem dominari potius quam unum aut paucos, quando ille unus aut illi pauci non sunt excellentes virtute, illa excellentia de qua dictum est; quoniam si sic reperiantur virtute excellentes, magis expedit civitati unum aut paucos dominari quam quod dominentur multi.

Nec ualet quod secundo obiciebatur, quod si unus uel plures principarentur, quod omnes alii essent inhonorati, quia in politia recte ordinata quilibet diligit statum et gradum proprium et gradum alterius, et ideo uult honorem sibi secundum gradum suum et uult alii honorem secundum gradum illius, nec uult sibi honorem alterius.

Ad secundum, dicendum quod in civitate recte instituta unusquisque diligit gradum et statum suum et statum alterius, et unusquisque procurabit honorem sibi debitum, non autem honorem alteri debitum.

Vt igitur auferatur hec apparens et non vera contrarietas, aduerte quod aliud est loqui in politia equalium et similium, que est politia multitudinis popularis, et aliud est loqui in politia regali siue optima, de qua loquemur in sequentibus. Nam in politia multitudinis popularis non expedit talem excedentem in virtute omnes alios principari, eo quod, cum sit politia equalium et similium, omnes debent pro tempore participare principatu, aliter non seruaretur pax in civitate.

The ‘Scriptum super III–VIII libros Politicorum’ Et ideo, si sit unus excellens omnes in uirtute, omnes uolunt sibi honorem qui debetur ei, et ideo non sunt inhonorati, quia quilibet habet honorem qui debetur ei.

Et ideo, si in tali civitate sit unus virtute excellens, omnes dignificabunt ei parendum esse, nec propter hoc reputabunt se inhonoratos esse.

Nec ualet quod obiciebatur tertio, de hoc quod dicit quod iste non est ciuis: uerum enim est, quia sicut ille qui principatur propter excellentiam uirtutis non est ciuis, sed supra ciuem, eodem enim modo est aliquis ciuis, sicut se habet ad legem.

Ad tertium, dicendum quod excedens omnes virtute et probitate non est civis, seu supra civis, id est, excellentior quam civis; vel dic, quod talis est supra cives. Non enim talis legibus civitatis subjiciendus est, ut in littera dicitur, sed potius civitas suis legibus est subjicienda; et ipse est civitati superior, non autem civitas ipso.

Sed cum assumitur quod non debet dominari nisi ciuis, non habet ueritatem in politia regali et optima simpliciter, qualis est illa in qua dominatur ille qui dictus est.

Et cum ulterius dicebatur, si non est civis non debet dominari in civitate, dicendum quod hoc habet verum in omnibus rebuspublicis a regno; in regno est hoc solum speciale: quo dominatur is qui proprie non est civis nec civitatis pars, sed caput et dominus civitatis.

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Ergo constat quod in optima politia, qualis est regalis, expedit talem solum et perpetuo principari: et de tali politia intendit hic Aristoteles, cum dicit quod iustum est omnes alios illi parere talemque in ciuitate perpetuo esse regem.

The identification of monarchy as the best regime is therefore a view shared by all the commentators considered so far. However, according to these commentators, while this identification is valid in theory, it must nevertheless have a correspondence in practice: the statesman must attentively evaluate the elements he has at his disposal and arrange them in such a way that the resulting order is the best, not absolutely speaking, but with regard to the characteristics of those elements. This is one of the major contributions

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of the commentary tradition on the ‘Politics’ to medieval political thought, the assumption of what we could call ‘political perspectivism’. In accordance with this, Peter of Auvergne argues that while monarchy is absolutely the best form of polity, in some circumstances it is preferable to adopt another form of government.62 The same argument is found in Peter of Osma, but with a change that leads to the opposite conclusion. He asserts that, given that monarchy is the best form whenever there is a man who exceeds all others in virtue (vir superexcellens virtute), the historical circumstances in which he lives may make the adoption of the lordship of the multitude (gubernatio multitudinis) more suitable. Further, he argues, this is the more common form of government.63 On closer inspection, Peter of Osma’s preference for the respublica (or politia, according to Moerbeke’s translation) in relation to other regimes is strengthened by two further reflections he advances: first, the difficulty of finding someone who might exceed all the other citizens to such a degree that everyone accepts his power as legitimate64 – in fact, many regimes considered nowadays as kingdoms, Peter of Osma says, are nothing but voluntary tyrannies – ;65 second, the inherent risks of a concentration of power in the hands of one single man, no matter how virtuous he might be. Commenting 62 I have considered this aspect in Lanza (note 2) and in Lanza (note 60). In the Middle Ages, anyone who commented on the opening sections of Book IV of the ‘Politics’ had to deal with this fundamental issue, which remained a constant in political Aristotelianism. For its presence in Italian political thought in the sixteenth-century see Lanza, Lidia, Firenze e la lezione degli antichi: i ‘Trattati’ di Bartolomeo Cavalcanti, in: Thinking Politics in the Vernacular: From the Middle Ages to the Renaissance (Ludwig-MaximiliansUniversität München 24–25 November 2008), Eds. Briguglia, Gianluca and Ricklin, Thomas (Dokimion 36), Fribourg 2011, pp. 167–187. 63 Est autem respublica, gubernatio multitudinis, potens principari et subijci secundum legem distribuentem dignitates et principatus opulentis et pauperibus secundum virtutem [...] in hac republica non semper unus aut pauci dominari debent, sed omnes vicissim [...] Et haec est inter omnes communior, quae nostris temporibus et aliis regulariter loquendo, est magis conveniens, Osma/Roa, Comentarii, III.3.4, p. 541, ll. 14062–14071. 64 Any commentator had to face this difficulty, whether he supported monarchy or opposed it. In addition to the studies mentioned above (note 60), see Lanza, Lidia, La ‘Politica’ di Aristotele e il ‘De regimine principum’ di Egidio Romano, in: Medioevo e Rinascimento 15 (2001), pp. 19–75. 65 [...] pauci, immo paucissimi sunt digni regia dignitate, quia nulli aut saltem paucissimi reperiuntur qui talem excellentiam habeant in virtute. Patet, ergo, quod

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on the passage in which Aristotle states that the lordship of only one man would be dangerous,66 because the citizens excluded from public offices would constitute a danger for the stability or even the preservation of the regime, Peter of Osma warns that these possible consequences would only occur if the most virtuous man concentrates all the public offices in himself, without delegating anything to other citizens.67 In another passage he explicitly states that even though monarchy is the optima politia, nonetheless it is also the most dangerous; hence the other forms of government are safer and more advisable.68 It is rather surprising that a Castilian author, a subject of a monarchy, openly supported the republican regime in the fifteenth-century. Yet this support, along with the rebuttal of monarchy as the best regime, is a constant multae gubernationes quae hodie dicuntur regiae gubernationes, non sunt regiae gubernationes, sed tyrannides voluntariae, ibid., p. 542, ll. 14114–14119. 66 Once again, this passage is almost entirely a reproduction of the corresponding passage in the ‘Scriptum’, including the quotation taken from the ‘Liber de causis’: In prima dicit quod non expedit unum uirtuosum ualde principari, quia si unus ualde uirtuosus dominetur, plures erunt inhonorati honore principatus. Sed hoc est inconueniens. Ex hoc enim sequuntur dissensiones in ciuitate et turbationes [...] Item uidebitur politia peior esse quam oligarchia, quia in principatu oligarchico pluribus impenduntur, in ista autem uni soli. Hoc autem peius uidetur esse, quia malum quanto magis diuisum est, tanto minus existit et tolerabilius est, Petri Scriptum, III.8, Vat. lat. 777, 51vb = pp. 147–148, nr. 420, Ed. Spiazzi; [...] nec etiam expedit civitati quod unus omnium optimus dominetur, quia hoc adhuc esse gravius; quia si iste solus dominaretur, plures essent ab honoribus civitatis exclusi [...] et hoc videtur esse magis inconveniens, quia ex hoc plures orirentur dissensiones, et iterum videretur haec respublica pejor adhuc esse paucorum potentia, quia in paucorum potentia honores dantur pluribus, in hac vero uni soli; et malum, quanto magis divisum, tanto minus existit et tolerabilius est, Osma/Roa, Comentarii, III.2.4, p. 444, ll. 10969–10976. 67 [...] dicendum, quod istae duae rationes procederent, et praesertim ista ultima ratio, si iste unus optimus omnium omnes magistratus et omnia publica officia retineret in se, et nullum ipsorum aliis committeret; quod non est verum, quoniam quamvis apud se retineat majorem potestatem, aliis tamen committet minores potestates, ibid., ll. 10978–10983. 68 [...] regia gubernatio inter respublicas melior est; sed cum hoc est periculosior, quia, propter magnitudinem potestatis regi concessam de facili convertitur in tyrannidem; quod satis expraesse Dominus significat primo Regum, capitulo octavo. Aliae vero respublicae, etsi non sint meliores, sunt tamen securiores et civitatibus optabiliores, ibid., III.3.2, p. 517, ll. 13312–13316.

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in Peter of Osma’s thought, as he also maintains this view in a sermon extant in abridged form.69 The conclusions of Peter of Osma are therefore diametrically opposed to those advanced by Peter of Auvergne, though grounded on his premises. Interestingly, both commentators support monarchy as the best regime at a theoretical level, and both hold their positions on the grounds of ‘reality’: Peter of Osma is more concerned with the pitfalls derived from power concentrated in one man’s hands; in contrast, Peter of Auvergne only hints at the difficulty of finding all the necessary virtues required of the king in one single man, because he believes that it is much harder to find the necessary requisites for holding public offices in the multitude.70 The difficulty of finding an excellent man is faced by Giles of Rome in his ‘De regimine principum’. By portraying the princeps as a man who exceeds all others in virtue, Giles keeps in line with the commentary tradition on the ‘Politics’. Nevertheless, to prevent an inflated representation of the ideal king, Giles conceives of the virtue required of the princeps not just as a moral virtue, but also as strength, as a capacity to impose his own power.71 This idea recurs in Peter of Osma, who, as noted above, is aware of the pitfalls of kingly power. The suspicion that Giles, along with Peter of Auvergne, is one of the sources of Peter of Osma in his theorisation on monarchy is confirmed by the passage where Peter of Osma advances the qualities the ruler must have. He lists ten qualities, exactly the same – and reproduced almost literally – as Giles of Rome’s list in the chapter where he enumerates the qualities the true king must have and the tyrant must

69 It is the ‘Sermo corripiens eos qui indiscrete petunt’, edited in: SantiagoOtero, Horacio, Pedro Martínez de Osma. Sermón sobre la súplica indiscreta, in: Celtiberia 29 (1980), pp. 67–70, 83–87, reprinted in: id., Manuscritos de Autores Medievales Hispanos (Medievalia et Humanistica 3), Madrid 1987, pp. 175–183. 70 On the difficulties faced by Peter of Auvergne regarding his attempt to find in the multitude the necessary characteristics to hold public offices see Lanza (note 2). 71 On the characterisation of the king’s virtue proposed by Giles of Rome see Lanza (note 64) and Quaglioni, Diego, ‘Regimen ad populum’ e ‘regimen regis’ in Egidio Romano e Bartolo da Sassoferrato, in: Bullettino dell’Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medioevo e Archivio Muratoriano 87 (1978), pp. 201–228.

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pretend to have.72 The resemblance is so striking as to render it worthy of being reproduced here in its entirety: Aegidii Romani, De regimine principum libri III, III/2.9, pp. 280–281

Osma/Roa, Comentarii, III.3.4, pp. 542–543, ll. 14123–14165

Est autem primum quod spectat ad verum regem facere, ut maxime procuret bona communia et regni redditus studeat expendere in bonum commune vel in bonum regni; tyranni vero hoc simulant facere, non tamen faciunt: sed (vt ait Philosophus) eos tribuunt meretricibus et adulatoribus et aliis personibus inutilibus.

Primo: ad regem pertinet ut maxime bona communia procuret et regni redditus studeat in bonum commune expendere.

Secundo spectat ad rectum rectorem regni non solum redditus et oblationes ordinare in bonum commune regni, sed etiam bona communia et iura regni debet maxime custodire et obseruare, quod tyranny, licet se facere simulant, non tamen faciunt, immo bona aliorum rapiunt, et iura regni non obseruant.

Secundo: ad regem pertinet bona communia et jura regni maxime custodire et observare; et ideo, qui aliorum bona rapiunt et jura regni non observant non proprie sunt reges sed tyranni.

Tertio decet regem et principem non ostendere se nimis terribilem et seuerum, nec decet se nimis familiarem exhibere, sed apparere debet persona graui[u]s et reuerenda, quod congrue sine virtute fieri non potest: ideo verus rex vere virtuosus existit [...]

Tertio: ad regem pertinet non ostendere se nimis terribilem et severum subditis, nec nimis familiarem, sed apparere debet persona gravis et reverenda; quod congrue facere non poterit si virtuosus non sit.

Quarto spectat ad regem nullum subditorum contemnere, nulli iniuriari, nec in filiabus nec in uxoribus, nec in persona nec in aliquibus alijs; et si contingeret aliquem ex regno forefacere, non propter

Quarto: expectat ad regem nullum subditorum contemnere, nulli injuriari nec in uxoribus nec in persona, nec in filiis nec in aliquibus aliis; et si contingerit aliquem ex regno exulem facere, non debet hoc

72 Quot et quae sunt illa quae debet operari verus rex, et quod eadem simulat se facere tyrannus, Aegidii Romani, De regimine principum libri III, Romae 1556 (reprinted in facsimile: Frankfurt a.M. 1968), III/2.9, pp. 280r–282r.

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contumeliam vel propter aliquam libidinosam voluntatem explendam, sed propter bonum commune et iustitiae ipsum punire debet [...]

facere ut ei contumeliam inferat nec propter aliquam libidinosam voluptatem explendam, sed propter bonum commune et justitiae.

Quinto decet reges et principes non solum habere familiares et diligere nobiles et barones et alios per quos bonus status regni conseruari potest, sed etiam, vt ait Philosophus in Poli, inducere debent vxores proprias vt sint familiares et beniuolae vxoribus praedictorum [...]

Quinto: pertinet ad regem non solum habere familiares et diligere nobiles, barones et alios per quos bonus status regni conservare potest, sed etiam, ut ait Philosophus in primo hujus, inducere debet propriam uxorem ut sit obsequialis et benevola uxoribus praedictorum, quoniam mulieres multum inducunt homines ad hoc quod eos diligant quos et ipse diligit, quoniam viri plerumque nolunt contristari uxores suas, ut paret in Adam qui transgressus est Dei praeceptum ut non contristaretur uxorem suam.

Sexto decet verum regem esse moderatum in cibis et venereis, ne a subditis habeatur in contemptu: nam, vt dicitur V Poli, non contemnitur qui est sobrius, sed qui ebrius [...]

Sextum: pertinet ad regem moderatum esse in cibis (civis in textu editionis) venereis, ne a suis subditis contemnatur, quoniam, ut infra, libro quinto dicetur, omnibus in voluptatibus viventes efficiuntur facile contemnendi ac multas praebent occasiones opprimendi suis.

Septimo decet verum regem ornare et munire ciuitates et castra existentia in regno, vt appareat magis esse procurator communis boni, quam tyrannus quaerens vtilitatem propriam.

Septimo: pertinet ad principem statum reipublicae diligere, civitates munire et castra existentia in suo principatu, ut appareat (appereat in textu editionis) magis esse procurator boni communis quam proprii.

Octauo decet verum regem (vt ait Philosophus) sapientes et bonos, etiam extraneos, adeo honorare, vt putetur non sic honoratos esse a ciuibus proprijs, si inter ipsos existerent [...]

Octavo: pertinet ad principem studia generalia construere; sed hodie istud pertinet ad Papam, et sapientes in honore maximo habere et ut patres diligere, ut dicetur infra, libro quinto.

Nono decet verum regem per vsurpationem et iniustitiam non dilatare suum dominium. Nam, vt dicitur in Polit, durabilius est regnare super paucos quam super multos [...]

Nono: pertinet ad regem per usurpationem et injustitiam non dilatare regnum suum, quia, ut dicetur infra, libro V, moderabilius est regnare super paucos quam super multos.

The ‘Scriptum super III–VIII libros Politicorum’ Decimo et vltimo decet veros reges bene se habere circa diuina. Populus enim (vt recitat Philosophus) omnino est subiectus regi quem credit esse deicolam et habere amicum Deum: existimat enim talem semper iuste agere et nihil iniquum exercere. Possumus tamen ad hoc aliam meliorem rationem adducere, dicentes quod, si rex habeat amicum Deum, diuina prouidentia, cui omnia sunt nota, et eius potentia, cui nihil potest resistere, continget eum vt expedit suae saluti semper in suis actibus prosperari. Immo, propter sanctitatem regis, multotiens Deus multa bona confert existentibus in ipso regno.

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Decimo: pertinet ad regem bene se habere circa divina. Populus enim, ut Philosophus vult, omnino est subjectus regi quem credit deicolam esse et existimat amicum habere Deum; nam communiter homines existimant talem semper juste agere, aut dici potest quod, si rex habeat amicum Deum, divina providentia, cui omnia sunt nota et ejus potentia, cui nihil potest resistere, faciet regem ut expedit suae saluti semper in suis actibus prosperari; immo, propter sanctitatem regis multotiens Deus multa bona confert existentibus sub ejus principatu et propter maliciam multa mala, ut patet secundo Regum, capitulo ultimo de David.

At least in this section, devoted to delineating the figure of the princeps, Peter’s ‘Scriptum’ is used alongside Giles’s ‘De regimine’. The influence of Peter’s ‘Scriptum’ is not reduced to the chapters on monarchy, despite their importance for the medieval reception of the ‘Politics’. Its influence extends to the whole text of the ‘Politics’ commented by Peter (Books III–VIII) and concerns diverse aspects of the exegetical work: Peter’s emphases were taken up again by later commentators, as were his divisions of the texts. But, most of all, the political ideas of Aristotle on which the commentators concentrate are those singled out by Peter of Auvergne.

VI. Peter of Castrobol’s ‘Morale commentum in Politicam’73 Yet, against this homogenous background, in which Peter is the protagonist, another commentary broadens this picture further. This is the commentary by the Franciscan Peter of Castrobol, which is based on Leonardo Bruni’s translation. The presence of the ‘Scriptum’ in this commentary is not as easy to recognise as in Acciaiuoli, in Burley and in Peter of Osma. Its presence can be deduced in those cases in which the conclusions taken from the Aristotelian text are the same that we can find in the ‘Scriptum’, but it cannot be 73 See note 22.

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demonstrated by textual correspondences. Peter of Castrobol’s commentary is structured as a combination of a literal and a question form commentary: each chapter consists of a long and detailed section with questions followed by the literal exposition. The ‘Scriptum’ is at times present in the question form section: in many cases the arguments, for and against, mirror assertions and conclusions already present in the ‘Scriptum’, though there is no explicit quotation or literal reproduction of the ‘Scriptum’. In contrast, the commentary used by Peter of Castrobol in the literal part of his commentary is not the ‘Scriptum’, but Albert the Great’s commentary. A first examination of the text reveals Albert’s predominance. Peter of Castrobol omits Albert’s initial subdivision of the text and replaces the ‘littera’ of Moerbeke with Bruni’s version in the lemmata that mark the division of the text. But for the rest, Peter of Castrobol often reproduces the commentary of Albert verbatim. He reproduces classical or scriptural quotations from Albert which are absent in Aquinas and Peter of Auvergne, along with Albert’s explanations in the cases in which the ‘Scriptum’ seems cryptic or unsatisfactory. In fact he reproduces the entire core of the exposition. This can be seen in the example in Appendix II, where the passages underlined are taken verbatim from Albert the Great, the only significant replacement being the insertion of ‘policia popularis’ where Albert has ‘monarchia’. This is only one of the many examples of the extent of the material Peter of Castrobol takes from the commentary by Albert. In other cases, there is a fragmentation of Albert’s text, this being interspersed in Peter of Castrobol’s commentary. The adoption of Albert’s text is in any case filtered through a careful assessment.

VII. Conclusions A commentary tradition is by definition dependent on its founding works. Also, it is not unusual for one commentary – possibly one of the first to be written – to be given a unique status within the commentary tradition, in the same way as the text to be commented on. This seems to have occurred in the tradition of commentary on the ‘Politics’. As regards Books III–VIII, the ‘Scriptum’ of Peter of Auvergne is the reference commentary, surpassing Albert the Great’s commentary and even Aquinas’s initial chapters on Book III. No later commentator read the ‘Politics’ without simultaneously reading the ‘Scriptum’. In fact, its arguments and structure are reproduced

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in the major fourteenth-century commentaries, those of Vernani, Acgerii, Burley and Oresme. This influence continued in the following centuries. The fifteenthcentury commentaries of Donato Acciaiuoli and Peter of Osma/Ferdinand of Roa show that the ‘Scriptum’ is not only used, but even explicitly quoted. Furthermore, they reveal that although the commentators are acquainted with other commentaries, such as those of Albert and Burley, they still prefer the ‘Scriptum’ as the chief commentary. The commentaries of Acciaiuoli and Osma are also interesting, as they show us the diverse ways in which the ‘Scriptum’ was used. While the former makes use of the ‘Scriptum’ as a source when building a condensed commentary, the latter uses the ‘Scriptum’ as a work with which he has to conduct a dialogue, evaluating its arguments and then accepting or rejecting them. In other words, while Acciaiuoli establishes a work to be read alone with the Aristotelian text, the work of Peter of Osma can be fully understood and gains its real significance only within the intertextuality proper to the commentary tradition. Peter of Osma is a commentator at work: though he bases his commentary on Leonardo Bruni’s Latin translation, he carefully addresses Moerbeke’s and Bruni’s versions, as well as Albert’s and Peter’s commentaries. He also uses Giles of Rome’s ‘De regimine principum’ and Aquinas’s ‘Summa theologiae’ on a few occasions. Within all these works, it is still the ‘Scriptum’ which is followed as the commentary. Nevertheless, a commentary such as this seems to be rare until the second half of the sixteenthcentury. In contrast, a similar procedure to that of Acciaiuoli is found in the sixteenth-century commentary of Crisostomo Javelli, who summarises the ‘Politics’. But here, too, the notabilia are taken from the ‘Scriptum’. It would be inaccurate to look at this commentary tradition as a simple repetition of its founding works or to see the use later commentators made of the ‘Scriptum’ as limited only to formal and secondary aspects. Quite the opposite is true, as can be demonstrated with Peter of Osma’s commentary. Indeed, although he draws greatly on the ‘Scriptum’, he overturns some of the positions held there, as shown above with respect to the best political regime. In this case, Peter of Osma takes into account Peter of Auvergne’s arguments, but instead of supporting monarchy as the best regime absolutely, as Peter of Auvergne does, he limits the superiority of monarchy to a theoretical level, preferring the republican regime (respublica) for his contemporaneous political reality. It is noteworthy that an author living under a monarchy was able openly to show his preference for the republican regime, while a Florentine humanist, involved in the government of

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his city, endorsed monarchy. This warns us against some historiographic assumptions. All this also shows that Bruni’s Latin translation of the ‘Politics’ did not prevent the commentators from using the earlier translation and the commentary tradition and, finally, that the Renaissance commentaries have to be analysed in connection with the medieval commentary tradition.74 The current state of knowledge is such that we do not know whether Peter of Castrobol’s commentary is an isolated case in the commentary tradition. Based both on previous studies of the reception of the ‘Politics’ and on the results achieved in this article, Peter of Castrobol’s commentary seems to be an interruption in the main trend of the commentary tradition. In fact, it seems that the Aquinas-Peter of Auvergne commentary is the standard for the succeeding literal commentary tradition. With the exception of Peter of Castrobol, Albert’s commentary does not seem to have been widely used in the literal commentary tradition.75 Certainly it is used by Oresme, though almost always to criticise Albert’s positions,76 and by Peter of Osma and Acciaiuoli, though to a smaller extent, mostly as a source for erudite details with no weight in the argumentation. Whether the ‘Scriptum’ was always read directly or whether sometimes through another intermediate commentary remains to be seen. In any case, directly or indirectly, the importance of the ‘Scriptum’ cannot be diminished. Even in an indirect way the ‘Scriptum’ has a huge importance. Take the case of Burley’s commentary: if we bear in mind, on the one hand, that it is mostly a reproduction of the ‘Scriptum’ and is contained in thirty-six manuscripts, and, on the other hand, that the ‘Scriptum’ is extant in seventeen manuscripts, we can assume that the arguments of the ‘Scriptum’ circulated in more than fifty manuscripts, which, for a philosophical commentary, can be considered the equivalent of a best-seller. 74 The same conclusion was reached in the article Toste, Marco, Evolution within Tradition: The Vernacular Works on Aristotle’s ‘Politics’ in SixteenthCentury Italy, in: Thinking Politics in the Vernacular (note 62), pp. 190–212. There Toste shows that the vernacular Italian commentators also made use of the ‘Scriptum’. 75 Besides Peter of Castrobol, a further exception is the work of Paul of Worczyn extant in the manuscript Kraków, Biblioteka Jagielloska 502, f. 123–256r. This text, written in 1416, consists of glosses taken from Albert’s commentary; see Flüeler (note 3), vol. II, p. 41. 76 Cf. Menut, Albert Douglas, Nicole Oresme: Le livre de Politiques d’Aristote. Published from the Text of the Avranches Manuscript 223, in: Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 60 (1970), pp. 1–392, see p. 26.

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In conclusion, we can say that Peter of Auvergne established the standard interpretation of Books III–VIII of Aristotle’s ‘Politics’, at least from the end of the thirteenth century until the beginning of the sixteenth century.

Appendix I As noted in the text of the article, Peter’s interpretation of 1335b20–26 (Book VII, chapter 16) proved to be extremely influential; indeed all the elements of his reading are found in later commentators. In those few lines of Book VII, Aristotle addresses the topics of overpopulation and birth control and advances two ‘delicate’ solutions: a prohibition on feeding deformed children and the admissibility of abortion before the development of life and senses in the foetus. Peter of Auvergne builds his long explanation of Aristotle’s lines on the following six steps: (1) the clarification of Aristotle’s theoretical rejection regarding the upbringing of deformed children. For Peter, this rejection should not be intended in an absolute sense: children have to be raised according to their greater or lesser ability to reach a completely fulfilled life. In this way, it is not right to reserve the same care for disabled children as for children who, having their senses and members well developed, are able to reach a fulfilled life; (2) the consideration of the goal of the political regime. Since such a goal is not related with the afterlife, it justifies the employment of abortion (after all, Burley specifies, the afterlife can be reached even without the senses, Nam finem humanum post hanc uitam potest equaliter attingere priuatus sensu aliquo sicut et perfectus); (3) the emphasis on the danger of falling into poverty when the number of children born is so high that the state cannot guarantee their nourishment; (4) the consequent judgement that abortion is a necessary remedy against overpopulation; (5) the careful distinction between what Aristotle stated (ad mentem suam, in Javelli’s words) and what he simply limited himself to reporting (which is introduced in Aristotle’s text as vt recitatiua, in Javelli’s words); (6) the awareness that an act which is wicked in itself (absolute) has nonetheless to be carried out at times to prevent a worse consequence (non sicut bonum secundum se, sed sicut minus malum). In close connection with this discussion, Peter introduces a digression on heredity which finds no correspondence in the Aristotelian text. He then turns Aristotle into a supporter of the view that inheritance should not be limited to the first-born son.

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All these arguments, sometimes combined, recur in later commentators, from Burley to Vernani, from Acciaiuoli to Peter of Osma. The number of borrowings from the ‘Scriptum’ in these commentators is striking, ranging from the strict literality of Burley to Javelli’s rearrangement, which keeps close to Peter’s text. All this makes it difficult to assert whether later commentators, such as Acciaiuoli, used the ‘Scriptum’ through intermediary commentaries. At least from the following example, it seems that Guido Vernani’s commentary has to be excluded as a possible intermediary for Acciaiuoli. While Vernani combines Albert’s and Peter’s assertions in a summarised way, Acciaiuoli seems to have drawn directly on the ‘Scriptum’, given the order of the arguments and the exactness of the correspondences. Once again the weight of Albert’s commentary seems markedly inferior to that of the ‘Scriptum’. As for Crisostomo Javelli, he uses the same material, though in an abridged form. Javelli rearranges the material around three principles, which, he states, reflect Aristotle’s convictions (ad mentem suam) rather than the opinions the Greek Philosopher reports (non vt recitatiua alterius opinionis). In fact, these principles are just three of the main issues pointed out by Peter of Auvergne: the emphasis on the threat of poverty; the rejection of the notion that inheritance can pass exclusively to the first-born; the acknowledgment that a wicked practice can be accepted under certain circumstances (secundum quid). All these are understood as remedies against threats to the safety and self-sufficiency of the political community. Below I present Albert’s and Peter’s texts (the latter only in its main statements, given its extent) followed by the corresponding passages from all the commentaries dealt with in this article. This reveals the presence, in all of them, of the ‘Scriptum’, and more importantly, the different ways in which it is used. I. Alberti Comm., VII.14, pp. 739–740 (t–u): De reservatione autem et alimento generatorum, id est, natorum, sit lex, gentilium scilicet, nullum orbatum nutrire. Orbati sunt qui cum defectu membrorum nascuntur, qui a praeditis Sclavis statim interficiuntur, sicut etiam decrepiti senes inutiles ad labores. Et causa est, quia bonum reputant interficere eum qui in miseria vivit, ut absolvatur a miseria [...] Et hunc ritum hodie servant habitantes in confinibus Saxoniae et Poloniae, sicut ego oculis meis vidi, qui fui nuntius Romanae Curiae ad partes illas, filiis demonstrantibus mihi sepulcra patrum quos ita occiderant. Et subdit quid lex Gentilium statuit de multitudine puerorum, ibi, Propter multitudinem autem puerorum ordo Gentilium statuit,

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et prohibet nihil reservari genitorum, qui maxime cum membrorum defectu nascuntur. Et ostendit rationem istius legis, ibi Oportet enim determinatam esse multitudinem puerorum procreationis, ne scilicet excrescant ultra quam parentes possunt nutrire. Et quia haec lex est contra naturae pietatem, subdit: Si autem aliquibus fiant, multitudines scilicet puerorum, praeter hoc, id est, procreationem puerorum, combinatis, est, conjugio conjunctis, antequam sensus insit, membris scilicet conceptis, et vita, fieri oportet abortum; hoc enim minus malum est, quam quod jam natus occidatur. Et propter hoc secundum legem Domini (Exod. XXI,22): Qui percutit mulierem praegnantem quod facit abortum de puerperio nondum formato, id est, natu, non inducatur homicidii reus : si autem puerperium formatum est, reus inducatur homicidii.

II. Petri Scriptum, Vat. Lat. 777, f. 132vb–133rb = pp. 403–404, nr. 1240– 1241, Ed. Spiazzi (the emphasis on the main points of Peter’s argumentation is mine): Deinde cum dicit De reseruatione autem, declarat qualiter pueri, postquam sunt nati, disponendi sint, et quia non expedit de omnibus curare aut non equaliter, aut propter imperfectionem aut propter multitudinem [...] si contingat aliquem uel aliquos esse orbatos sensu aliquo uel sensibus, uel membro aut membris, quibus minus sint utiles ad operationes intellectus et politiam, de reseruatione ipsorum et alimento administrando feratur lex a legislatore nullum talem nutriri: quod est intelligendum cum tanta cura et diligentia cum quanta nutriendi sunt perfecti nati. Illud enim quod ordinatum est ad aliquem finem, quanto magis natum est attingere ad ipsum, tanto magis disponendum est ad ipsum; et quanto minus, tanto minus curandum. Sic enim uidemus naturam magis sollicitam esse de perfectioribus. Pueri autem nati perfecti membris et sensibus perfectius nati sunt attingere ad finem humanum, ergo magis disponendi sunt. Orbati autem aut sensu aut membro nati sunt attingere aliqualiter, ex quo animam et intellectum habent, sed non eque perfecte, et ideo curandum est de eis, sed non equaliter perfectis. Et uniuersaliter, in quantum unusquisque natus est attingere ad finem, in tantum disponendus est, cum sit propter ipsum. Loquimur autem hic de fine humano secundum uitam presentem, quia sic loquitur de ipso Philosophus. Deinde cum dicit Propter multitudinem autem, declarat quid faciendum est si excedant secundum multitudinem. Est enim intelligendum quod, cum ciuitas sit communitas per se sufficiens ad uitam, oportet ciues per se sufficientes esse et non pauperes; et ideo cauenda sunt illa in ciuitate que inopiam inducunt. Hoc autem est multitudo filiorum debentium succedere in hereditate: magna enim et multa hereditas parentum, cum diuidetur in multitudinem filiorum, ualde tenuis erit secundum unumquemque, maxime in tertiam uel quartam generationem, sicut ad sensum uidemus. Non enim placuit Philosopho lex seu consue-

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tudo de successione primogeniti secundum totum, tum quia, cum primogeniti sint singuli, posteriores autem multi, ut frequenter, sequeretur plures liberorum esse pauperes quam diuites; tum quia habentes possessiones sunt partes ciuitatis, non habentes autem non: ciuium enim oportet esse possessiones, ut dictum est prius, quare, si posteriores geniti non succederent in aliquo parentibus, plures liberorum non contingeret esse ciues, sed expelli a ciuitate; tum quia posterius nati, sicut et primi, possunt esse bene nati ad magna; non habentes autem unde operentur ad que nati sunt, compelluntur accipere undecumque, insidiantes ciuibus et aliis per furtum, per rapinam et homicidia, et coniungunt se aduersariis, que omnia sunt inconuenientia. Supposito igitur quod omnes succedere debeant in hereditate qualitercumque, primo proponit, ad uitandam superfluam multitudinem filiorum, legem seu consuetudinem quarumdam gentium; secundo [...] ponit documentum ad hoc secundum intentionem suam magis. In prima parte dicit quod, ad uitandam multitudinem puerorum superfluam, ordo – id est lex uel consuetudo gentium quarumdam – prohibet nullum genitorum ultra multitudinem determinatam debere reseruari: oportet enim, si debeat ciuitas esse diues, determinatam esse multitudinem ipsorum, aliter enim depauperaretur, si dimitteretur quilibet generare quantumcumque. Sed quia durum est pueros non reseruari ad uitam, declarat, si necesse sit istud fieri, qualiter cum minori culpa fiet, dicens quod, si aliquibus coniugatis fiant plures quam sit determinatum a lege et necesse est eos exterminari, magis procurandum est fieri aborsum antequam sensus et uita insint quam postquam infuerint: procurans enim aborsum postquam infuerint, homicida reputatur a lege, et magis peccat: semen enim et non semen determinatur per sensum et motum. Sic igitur Aristoteles non dicit secundum intentionem suam quod debeant exterminari aliqui nati, sed secundum legem gentium; nec quod procurandus sit aborsus absolute sed, si interficiendi sunt ab aliquibus, magis faciendum est hoc ante sensum et uitam, non sicut bonum secundum se, sed sicut minus malum.

III. Guido Vernani of Rimini, Super Politicam, Venezia, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, lat. VI.94 (2492), f. 140ra: De reseruatione autem et alimento genitorum infantium sit talis lex, quod nullus puer qui nascitur uno uel pluribus membris orbatus debeat nutriri, eo quod pertingere non potest ad finem ciuilis uite. Sed quia hoc crudelissimum est, aliqui intelligunt satis bene, scilicet quod non cum tanta diligentia nutriantur cum quanta nutriendi sunt integri (cod. inregri) et perfecti. Alii vero dicunt quod hoc dicit Aristoteles recitando legem quorundam Sclauorum, qui interimunt filios sic orbatos. Quia uero debita multitudo et determinata in ciuitate , lex quarundam gentium fuit quod nullus genitus vltra determinatam multitudinem reseruaretur; sed quia hoc nimis crudele uidetur et cetera, nititur Aristotelis quod, si aliqui coniugati ultra debitam multitudinem generent, magis procurandum est fieri abortium antequam (cod. autem quam) sensus insit et uita. Hoc

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dicunt quidam Aristotelem (cod. hoc add.) dixisse non secundum intentionem suam, sed secundum legem gentilium.

IV. Acciaioli Comm., f. 255v–256r: Dicit autem quod legum lator instituat orbatum natura non esse educandum, si talem aliquem nasci contigerit: quod intelligi debet, vt quidam expositores dicunt, non esse educandum cum tanta cura, quanta illi, qui integris membris sensibusque nascuntur: non enim deserendum censent: nam, et si tales non aeque perfecte apti sint attingere finem humanum, vt si qui sensus habent perfectos, sumendo finem hic, vt Philosophus sumit, secundum conditionem huius vitae, tamen quia, et ipsi animam rationalem, et intellectum habent, disponendi etiam sunt, quantum capere possunt ad talem finem consequendum. Sic enim sentire videtur Sanctus Thomas, considerando finem hoc loco, vt diximus, eo modo, quo Philosophus sumit. De multitudine quoque affert ea, quae patent in textu. Dicunt tamen expositores, quod Philosophus narrat haec secundum morem et institutionem quarundam gentium, non quod probet, vt orbati deserantur, aut concepti deseratur: sunt enim impia. Sed narrat ea, vt diximus, et affert quaedam, non vt bona eligenda, sed cogente necessitate, vt minus mala respectu illorum, quae sunt magis impia. At in praesentibus rebus, si verum quaerimus, magis mala, et minus mala sunt fugienda, quia ad alterum eligendum nulla vrgens necessitas cogere posse videtur.

V. Walter Burley, Expositio super Librum Politicorum, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Borgh. 129, f. 128rb–vb: [...] si contingat aliquem uel aliquos esse orbatos sensu aliquo uel sensibus, uel membro uel membris, per quem defectum sunt minus utiles ad operationes intellectus, oportet quod a legis (cod. lege) latore feratur lex de conseruatione ipsorum et alimento administrando, scilicet nullum talem nutriri, quod est intelligendum cum tanta cura et diligentia cum quanta nutriendi sunt perfecti nati cum ratio. Illud quod ordinatum est ad aliquem finem, quanto magis natum est attingere ad ipsum, tanto magis disponendum est ad ipsum et curandum de ipso. Sic enim uidemus naturam magis esse sollicitam de perfectioribus (cod. perfectionibus). Pueri autem nati perfecti membris et sensibus magis nati sunt attingere ad finem humanum, igitur magis curandum est de eis. Orbati autem aut sensu aut membro nati sunt attingere aliqualiter illum finem, ex quo habent animam et intellectum, ideo aliqualiter curandum est de eis, sed non equaliter sicut de perfectis. Et loquitur hic Philosophus de fine humano secundum uitam presentem. Nam finem humanum post hanc uitam potest equaliter attingere priuatus sensu aliquo sicut et perfectus. Propter multitudinem: hec est secunda particula huius partis, in qua docet quomodo est curandum de multitudine ne sit multitudo excessiua. Cum enim ciuitas sit communitas per se

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sufficiens ad uitam, oportet quod ciues sint per se sufficietes, et per consequens oportet quod non sint pauperes. Ideo cauenda sunt illa in ciuitate que inducunt paupertatem. Hoc autem est multitudo filiorum succedentium. Manifestum autem est quod multa hereditas parentum, quando diuiditur in multitudinem filiorum, erit ualde tenuis quod unusquisque habebit, et maxime in tertiam uel quartam generationem, sicut ad sensum uidemus. Non enim uoluit Philosophus quod lex uel consuetudo esset quod soli primogeniti succederent in totam hereditatem, tum quia geniti posteriores, ut communiter, sunt plures quam primogeniti, et tunc sequeretur inconueniens, scilicet quod plures liberorum essent pauperes quam diuites; tum quia habentes possessiones sunt partes ciuitatis, et non habentes non sunt partes ciuitatis, ideo, si posteriores geniti non succederent in aliquo parentibus, plures liberorum non contingeret esse ciues, sed expelli a ciuitate, quod est inconueniens, quia posterius geniti possunt esse bene nati ad magna uirtuosa opera, sed si habeant unde operentur ad que nati, compellentur accipere undecumque, insidiando ciuibus et aliis per furtum, rapinam et homicidia, et coniungerent se aduersariis, que omnia sunt inconuenientia. Supposito ergo quod omnes deberent succedere in hereditate, docet uitare superfluam multitudinem filiorum. Primo secundum legem et consuetudinem quorundam gentilium. Secundo ponit documentum secundum intentionem propriam. Consuetudo et lex quorundam gentilium quod aborsus procuraretur ad uitandum multitudinem puerorum superfluam: si enim ciuitas debet esse diues, oportet in ciuitate esse determinatam multitudinem puerorum. Si enim permitteretur quilibet generare, et omnes concepti et nati conseruarentur, diuitie non sufficerent ad tantam multitudinem, immo nimis depauperetur ciuitas. Et propter hoc non debent pueri reseruari. Ideo, si aliquibus coniugatis fiant plures filii quam lex ciuitatis permittit remanere, oportet aliquos exterminare. Et minor culpa est procurare aborsum antequam sensus et anima intellectiua insint quam postquam infuerint. Procurans enim aborsum postquam sensus et anima intellectiua insint reputatur a lege homicida, et magis peccat quam procurans aborsum ante (cod. post) infusionem anime. Intelligendum est quod Philosophus non dicit hic secundum intentionem propriam quod aliqui pueri debent exterminari, sed (cod. post infusionem add., sed del.) quod hoc est secundum legem gentilium, nec quod est procurandum aborsus absolute, sed quod, procurandus sit aborsus, hoc magis est faciendum ante sensum et uitam quam post, quoniam de duobus malis minus malum est magis eligendum seu minus uitandum.

VI: Osma/Roa, Comentarii, VII.3.3, pp. 1071–1072, ll. 30288–30318: Sequitur littera: Circa expositionem ..., ubi Philosophus prosequitur de cura puerorum postquam jam sunt nati. Et facit tria: primo, ostendit quod in civitate recte instituta, lege providendum est nullum natura orbatum educandum esse: et quia littera nihil aliud dicit praeter legem istam, ideo, pro ampliori ejus intel-

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lectu, attende quod lex ista dupliciter intelligi potest: uno modo, simpliciter et absolute, et sic intellecta, iniqua est, prout Doctor subtilis dicit libro primo Sententiarum, in prologo, quaestione prima; alio modo, potest intelligi cum moderamine, ita ut sit sensus: nullum orbatum natura educandum esse, tanta scilicet diligentia, quanta sunt educandi qui nascuntur perfecti in membris et virtutibus animae; et sic intelligendo, vera est, quia unusquisque tanto majori diligentia educandus est quanto magis attingere potest finem et perfectionem vitae humanae. Sed constat quod qui perfecte nascuntur, perfectius attingere possunt finem vitae humanae quam orbati, qui aut numquam attingent aut imperfecte attingent; et loquor de fine aut beatitudine quae in hac vita haberi potest; igitur [...] Secundo, ibi: In aliis vero..., ostendit, quid statui debeat circa multitudinem excessivam filiorum, ubi secundum commentatores antiquae traductionis innuit circa hoc consuetudinem quarundam gentium, ostendens melius esse abortum procurare ante faetus animationem quam postquam jam sunt animati, quamvis secundum veritatem et legem Dei neutrum expediat. Et dicit, quod in aliis qui non sunt natura orbati, si mores institutaque civitatis prohibeant natos exponere morti, ac multitudo tanta prolis alicui contingerit, ut duplicatus sit liberorum numerus qui determinatus est lege civitatis, nam numerus filiorum definitus et determinatus esse debet. In tali casu inquirit Philosophus ad multitudinem nimiam filiorum evitandam, quae certe evitanda est, ne prae filiorum multitudine civitas deveniat in paupertatem, oportet ante venire ne foetus concipiantur, id est, animentur, nam postquam animati sunt et sensum aut vitam acceperint, nefas est eos attingere, id est, tangere et interimere, ut quaedam gentes faciebant.

VII: Chrisostomus Javellus, Epythomata in octo libris Politicorum Aristotelis, Venetiis, per Stephanum de Sabio, 1536, f. 121va–122ra: [...] aduerte, ex intentione Aristotelis, quod pueri aliquando nascuntur orbati, id est carentes aliquo sensu vel membro, et de his, inquit Aristoteles, instituatur lex nullum orbatum natura fore educandum. Qui autem perfecti et integris sensibus ac membris nascuntur exponendi sunt educationi iuxta mores et instituta ciuitatis, quod dicit quoniam secundum aliquas nationes, quando ciuis tot habebat filios quot sufficiebant pro facultate et statu suo, si qui alii postea nascebantur, statutum erat eos non educandos, sed relinquendos aut proiciendos sicut catulos quod mater lactare non potest. Sed id vt inhumanum et ferum reprobat Aristoteles, et dicit quod, si alicui multitudo prolis adsit vt duplicatus sit filiorum numerus (nam determinatus esse debet ad multitudinem nimiam euitandam) preuenire oportet ne fetus concipiatur, id est procurandus est aborsus ante formationem et animationem fetus: nam, postquam conceptus est et sensum habet, nephas est attingere eum, id est occidere. Et tu aduerte quod ex hac Aristotelis sententia tria eliciuntur que sunt ad mentem suam, et non vt recitatiua alterius opinionis. Primo quod, cum ciuitas debeat esse

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communitas per se sufficiens ad ea que oportuna sunt humane vite, cauenda sunt omnia que inopiam inducunt, inter que precipua est excessiva filiorum multitudo debentium succedere in paterna et progenitorum facultate. Nam, si magna sit progenitorum hereditas, si in quamplures filios partita fuerit, cuilibet tenuis ac modica portio continget: et in quartam aut quintam generationem, sicut ad sensum videmus, successores inopes erunt, quorum antecessores diuites fuerunt. Secundo, quoniam posset quis dicere primogenitum solum debere institui heredem, et sic status domus non deficiet, posteriores autem filii ex industria querant sibi facultates, hoc non consonat vite politice, quoniam [...] qui possessiones habent debent esse pars ciuitatis et participare in republica ac regimine ciuitatis; et isti sunt proprie ciues, quorum pro tempore est dominari et subijci, vnde, si posteriores filii non succederent pro parte sua in facultate paterna aut maiorum, sed solus primogenitus, non possent esse ciues nec participare in republica, quod maxime dissensionis causa esset. Preterea: posteriores filij possunt esse bene ac forte melius nati ad virtutem et probitatem quam primogenitus, ergo iniuste priuarentur hereditate paterna. Preterea: datur eis occasio depredandi et occidendi multaque prophana perpetrandi: nam cum viderint se ad maiora progenitos ex naturali et benigna superiorum causarum dispositione, paupertatem ferre non poterunt qua a magnis operibus reuocantur. Ideo conuertent se ad rapinas, ad homicidia, ad lites iniustas, quibus nihil peius in optima ciuitate contingere potest. Vt igitur huiusmodi enormia euitentur, expedit omnes legitimos in hereditate paterna succedere. Tertio, quoniam excessiua filiorum multitudo etiam huic proposito obuiare possent – nam, licet hereditas paterna in singulos diuideretur, possent adeo multi esse quod nulli sufficeret, nec filiorum filiis –, ideo Aristoteles, contra hoc documentum, inuenit, non quidem approbatum in vera et christiana moralitate, sed vt minus nefarium quam institutum gentium quarundam, quas penitus inhumanas iudicare possumus. Ille namque, vt diximus, iudicabant filium natum post sufficientem priorum numerum non reseruandum, sed proiciendum vt catulum moriturum. Aristoteles autem remedium minus inhumanum inuenit, vt scilicet, quando quis sufficientem filiorum numerum habuerit et contigerit vxorem de vno concipere, procuretur ante vitam et sensum fetus aborsus. Hoc enim, etsi absolute non liceat, tamen minus malum videtur quam post natiuitatem exterminaretur, vnde Aristoteles id approbat et eligit non vt bonum in se, sed vt minus malum, cum vtrumque sit malum, sed illud maius et inhumanius.

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Appendix II Petrus de Castrovol, Morale commentum in Politicam, Yconomicam, Pamplonae 1496, III (the pages are not numbered; I have underlined the words/sentences which can be found exactly in the same way in Albert the Great’s commentary and doubly underlined words/sentences which are similar to Albert’s commentary (see Alberti Comm., pp. 279–280). Exception to this rule are the text’s last six lines, which reproduce Nicholas of Waudemont’s ‘Questions on the Politics’, edited under John Buridan’s name (see Johannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super octo libros Politicorum Aristotelis, Parisiis 1513, repr. Frankfurt 1969, f. 44va). These lines of Waudemont are very close to Peter of Auvergne’s ‘Questions on the Politics’): Propter quod et vituperant tyrannidem in qua vnus opprimit alium propter excellentiam aliquam qua eminet aliis. Et per Periandri consilium datum Trasibulo non simpliciter estimandi sunt recte dicere. Ille increpuit consilium quod eminentes personas de ciuitatibus eiecit. Aiunt enim Pyriadem [sic] dixisse quidem admissum illum de consilio, hoc est quod preco ciuitatis ad nullum consilium debet admitti, sed auferentes excedentes spicarum explanasse aeram: metaphorice loquitur, et vult dicere Trasibulus quod oportebat supereminentes ciues auferre ne super alios dominentur. Hoc enim non solum expedit tyrannis, scilicet ne ab eis in tyrannidem impediantur, nec solum tyranni hoc faciunt, sed similiter habet circa politias77 in quibus potentes et diuites principantur, et similiter circa politias populares.78 In omnibus hiis ab excellentibus personis impediuntur alii.79 Et quia dixit tales personas debere perimi, quod durum esse videtur, innuit quod sufficit relegare, et hoc, relegatio enim eandem habet potentiam modo quodam, scilicet cum peremptione, prohibere excellentes et fugare: hoc enim fit per relegationem. Et ostendit hoc factum esse in ciuitatibus et gentibus vbi timebatur oppressio maiorum. Idem autem circa ciuitates et gentes faciunt illi qui domini sunt politie. Semper enim eiiciunt preexcellere volentes. Et dat exemplum: sicut Athenienses circa Samios et Chios et Lisbios – erant tres insule quibus dominabantur –. Et ostendit in quo: cum enim magis imperialiter haberent principatum super dictas insulas, humiliauerunt ipsos habitatores earum preter pacta. Cum enim insule ille subderent se eis, pacta quidem80 fecerunt que Athenienses non seruauerunt, sed 77 78 79 80

politias] oligarchias (Alberti Comm., p. 279bb) politias populares] democratias (ibidem) alii] aliquando (ibidem) quidem] quaedam (ivi, cc)

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opprimebant eos preter pacta ne rebellare possent. Et dat exemplum in gentibus Persarum, ibi Persarum autem, ubi dicit quod rex Persarum, scilicet Darios, Medos et Babilonios et aliorum sagaces factos, scilicet qui preeminebant sagacitate et industria, qui fuerant aliquando in principatu, disperserat sepe, scilicet ne iterum eleuarentur contra eum. Ex hoc accipit quod vniuersaliter sic faciendum sit. Questio autem siue prouerbium semper est circa omnes politias, etiam rectas, scilicet quod eminentes persone semper deprimantur, ne se eleuent contra ciuitatem. Et ille politie que transgrediuntur, que sunt non recte, que respiciunt ad propriam vtilitatem, similiter hoc agunt sicut sunt tyranni. Similiter etiam et illi qui ad communem respiciunt vtilitatem hoc agunt. Hoc etiam probat per simile in aliis artibus, ibi Patet hoc, vbi dicit quod patet hoc in aliis artibus et scientiis: nec enim pictor sinet animal pictum habere pedem excedentem commensurationem aliorum membrorum, nec si differat pulcritudine sinet, sed semper vult commensurari et proportionari81 membra. Nec factor proram, id est anteriorem partem nauis, nec aliam partem nauis sinet excedere commensurationem aliarum partium nauis aliqua sinet excedere. Nec certe magister chori sinet eum qui altius toto choro cantat in choro esse, quia statim offuscaretur cantus aliorum, et sic solueretur chorus. Sed quia posset aliquis dicere quod (ed. quia) sic periretur politia popularis,82 que est principalis in ciuitate, ideo subdit Philosophus ibi, Itaque, quod propter hoc quidem nichil prohibet eos qui domini sunt83 conuenire cum ciuitatibus si proprio principatu seu proprie dominationis gratia que etiam que sunt vtilia ciuitatibus agant. Ex omnibus hiis concludit Philosophus ibi Quare secundum eas, intentum, scilicet quod secundum excessus excellentias in quocumque habet aliquid ciuile iustum, et melius relegare excellentes personas quam quod opprimant alios. Et si sic, tunc melius est ciuitatem a principio ex equalibus institui, et sic non erat opus relegare aliquos, et hoc est: melius legislatorem instituere politiam vt non indigeat tali medicina. Secundo autem loco, si tale accidat, conandum est tali aliquo remedio corrigere, scilicet repellendo tales superexcellentes, quod tamen factum non est a ciuitatibus antiquis, scilicet Atheniensium et reges Persarum. Non enim respiciebant ad communem vtilitatem, sed per seditionem vse sunt ciuium pulsione [sic]. Ecce quomodo est ostensum quod qui in politia vbi sunt excedentes sine comparatione alios in nobilitate et potentia, quod tales non sunt habendi vt pars ciuitatis. Instatur contra istam conclusionem, et primo sic: nam, si sic esset, sequeretur quod de bono suo aliquod incommodum reportaret. Sed consequens est falsum. Consequentia vero probatur, quia talis propter suam

81 proportionari] proportionati (ibid., p. 280dd) 82 politia popularis] monarchia (ibid., p. 280ee) 83 os qui domini sunt] monarchias (ibid.)

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bonitatem priuaretur dignitate. Secundo sic: nam, si talis propter habundantiam suorum esset non ciuis, sequeretur quod alius, propter defectum in talibus bonis, esset dicendus ciuis. Consequens est falsum, vt patet, et patet consequentia propter vnam regulam thopicam que est: si oppositum in oppositum, et propositum in proposito. Tertio sic: nam ille non est dicendus non ciuis, qui maxime tendit ad conseruationem boni communis. Sed habundans in bonis est huius, etgo et cetera.

An Original Way of Commenting on the Fifth Book of Aristotle’s ‘Politics’: The ‘Questiones super I–VII libros Politicorum’ of Peter of Auvergne Marco Toste (Fribourg)

I. The Fifth Book of the ‘Politics’ and the Commentary Tradition Of the eight books that constitute the ‘Politics’ of Aristotle, the fifth book is probably the most challenging to comment on. Here Aristotle offers a study of the causes of political revolutions and of the means of preserving different political regimes. The problematic nature of the fifth book arises from Aristotle’s endorsement of the preservation of both just and deviant regimes, which leads him to enumerate the means whereby rulers in democracies and oligarchies, and even tyrants, can prolong their power, regardless of the ethicality of those means. Although Aristotle does not defend the preservation of power and political stability as goods in themselves, he believes that men can be made virtuous only gradually and that certain types of polity cannot be imposed on unwilling subjects who are not themselves virtuous. In order to moderate their injustices and bring them closer to the conception of justice effective in the correct polities, Aristotle argues for a gradual correction of deviant polities. This explains the absence of any detailed theorising on the overthrowing of unjust political rulers in the ‘Politics’ and also accounts for Aristotle’s enumeration of the stratagems used by the tyrant in order to preserve his power. Hence it is not difficult to imagine the perplexity of the first medieval commentators on the ‘Politics’ when they approached the fifth book.1 They 1 On the medieval reception of the ‘Politics’ see Flüeler, Christoph, Rezeption und Interpretation der Aristotelischen ‘Politica’ im späten Mittelalter (Bochu-

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had to deal with a text in which tyranny and the other unjust polities were conceived not as divine punishment nor as evils to be brought down, but as polities forming part of the political phenomenon wherein each type of polity has its own form of justice.2 The commentators were confronted with a text in which ethics and politics did not always coincide and, as the main scope of a philosophical commentary was to render the intentio Philosophi, they had to justify Aristotle’s decision to defend moderate tyranny, under certain conditions, rather than openly condemn it.3 A further difficulty faced by a medieval author commenting on the fifth book was the large number of historical examples from classical Greece with which Aristotle loaded his text. The fact that these illustrations were derived from an unknown context sometimes made it more difficult for medieval commentators to understand the Philosopher’s intentions. For this reason, Albert the Great and Peter of Auvergne, the first two authors of literal commentaries, who dealt with the fifth book in the thirteenth century, occasionally included several lines of text to attempt to identify the geographical places and historical personages in these illustrations.4 The meaning of Greek public offices such as the phylarchs, completely strange to medieval political reality, was also a problem for these commentators,

mer Studien zur Philosophie 19), Amsterdam/Philadelphia 1992, 2 vols., and the bibliography cited in id., Politischer Aristotelismus im Mittelalter. Einleitung, in: Vivarium 40 (2002), pp. 1–13, see pp. 11–13. Specifically on the reception of the fifth book see Lanza, Lidia, I commenti medievali alla ‘Politica’ e la riflessione sullo stato in Francia (secoli XIII–XIV), in: Il commento filosofico nell’Occidente latino (secoli XIII–XIV). The Philosophical Commentary in the Latin West (13–15th Centuries). Atti del colloquio Firenze/Pisa, 19–22 ottobre 2000, organizzato dalla SISMEL e dalla SISPM sotto l’egida della SIEPM, Eds. Fioravanti, Gianfranco, Leonardi, Claudio and Perfetti, Stefano (Rencontres de Philosophie Médiévale 10), Turnhout 2002, pp. 401–427. 2 Cf. Aristotle, Politics, V.1, 1301a36. 3 For the treatment of tyranny in the commentaries on the ‘Politics’ against the background of political medieval thought see Lanza, Lidia, Luciferianae pravitatis imago: il tiranno tra alto e basso Medioevo, in: Mediaevalia. Textos e Estudos 24 (2005), pp. 131–171. 4 This is more apparent in Albert than in Peter, who is less willing to devote his commentary to these identifications. On this see Fioravanti, Gianfranco, Politiae Orientalium et Aegyptiorum. Alberto Magno e la ‘Politica’ aristotelica, in: Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa. Classe di Lettere e Filosofia 9 (1979), pp. 195–246.

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whose solution was to offer etymological explanations.5 In order to avoid having to deal with such questions, Walter Burley erased all the historical examples from his literal commentary, stating that they were of no use for better understanding of the Aristotelian text.6 5 Aristotle refers to the “phylarchs or heads of tribes” in 1301b22–23. This was naturally strange to medieval authors. Peter, for instance, explains the possible meaning of the office in this way: Pro philarchis enim consilium fecerunt. Et dupliciter potest exponi: uno modo ut philarcus sit nomen principatus, et tunc sensus est quod pro philarchis, hoc est pro illo principatu, fecerunt principatum consiliariorum. Aliter ut accipiatur pro amatoribus illius principatus, unde dicitur a ‘philos’, quod est amor, et ‘archos’ princeps, quasi amatores principatus, et tunc est sensus: pro philarchis enim, id est pro amatoribus principatus illius, fecerunt consiliatiuum; in illo enim principatu ille qui erat in principatu, cum deficiebat alius princeps, potestatem eligendi habebat, et apud se eligebat. This passage is absent from the existing editions of Peter’s literal commentary on Books III–VIII, which is entitled ‘Scriptum super libros III–VIII Politicorum’. Peter’s ‘Scriptum’ was conceived as the continuation of Thomas Aquinas’s commentary, left unfinished at lectio 6 of the third book. However, Peter preferred to start his commentary from the very beginning of the third book. The first six chapters on the third book are edited in: The Commentary of Peter of Auvergne on Aristotle’s ‘Politics’. The Inedited Part: Book III, less. I–VI. Introduction and critical text by Gundisalvus M. Grech, Roma 1967, pp. 73–129. For the remaining part I have used Sanctus Thomas Aquinas, In octo libros Politicorum Aristotelis expositio, Ed. Spiazzi, Raimondo, Torino/ Roma 1966. I took the passage quoted above from the transcripts of Lidia Lanza, who is currently preparing a critical edition of Peter’s entire ‘Scriptum’. Henceforth, in the quotations of the ‘Scriptum’, I shall refer to the main manuscript on which Lanza’s edition is based (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 777, f. 35ra–143vb) and between brackets to the available editions (Spiazzi and Grech for the first lessons of the third book). The present quotation refers to the first chapter of the fifth book of the ‘Scriptum’, Vat. lat. 777, f. 88rb. 6 Intelligendum quod in omnibus predictis modis transmutationis politiarum Philosophus exemplificat in factis particularibus que satis patent in textu et aliquando adducit multa exempla ad idem, et hoc quia doctrina bona moralis manifestatur in particulari; tamen, quia exempla de factis Grecorum et nationum remotarum non sunt nobis nota, et exempla ponimus propter noticiam habendam, non curam ponere exempla sua per que non poterimus melius cognitionem habere, Gualterus Burlaeus, Expositio super librum Politicorum, Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Borgh. 129, f. 75vb.

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But while the fifth book raised difficulties from a doctrinal point of view, its formal structure made it easy to comment on. Most chapters are organised in the form of lists of causes and means, interposed with historical illustrations. After the historical examples have been removed from the text, it is quite easy for readers to grasp Aristotle’s listings. Moreover, the twelve chapters of the book can easily be divided into clear-cut sections. In the first four chapters Aristotle provides a list of the causes of revolutions in general; in the following three chapters (5 to 8) he lists the causes of revolutions that apply to the different political regimes, such as democracies, oligarchies and aristocracies. From chapter 8 on, he starts to analyse the means of preserving constitutions in general, and for this reason chapter 9 is devoted to the listing of the political virtues required of the rulers. These chapters are followed by two chapters in which he advances the means to preserve monarchies and tyrannies. Finally, chapter 12 is devoted to a criticism of Plato’s theory on political changes. The fifth book can thus be divided into two distinct parts: the first, where Aristotle sets out the causes of revolutions, and the second, from chapter 8 on, where he provides remedies against the corruption of the different political regimes. If we focus on a single chapter, the straightforward structure of the fifth book becomes apparent. For example, if we leave aside the historical examples, chapter 3, on the causes of revolutions in general, can easily be reduced into the following list of causes: insolence and avarice (1302b6–10), questions related to honour and dishonour (1302b10–21), fear (1302b21–24), contempt (1302b25–33), disproportionate increase of a part of the political community (1302b33–1303a13), election contests (1303a13–16), negligence (1303a16–20), the lack of ethnic unity (1303a25–1303b3), the presumption of being unjustly treated (1303b3–7) and, finally, geographical obstacles that block the unity of the state (1303b7–14). So, while the commentators had to face doctrinal challenges when commenting on the fifth book, their task of highlighting the significant parts of that book was unproblematic. Unsurprisingly then, a number of commentators rearranged the Aristotelian text as if it were a collection of causes and means that had simply to be enumerated. This tendency is observable as early as Albert the Great, who organises the Aristotelian material by drawing up lists and dividing his text into numbered paragraphs. In chapter 2, Albert enumerates ten causes of revolutions and, what is more,

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the examples related to the ninth cause are enumerated as six.7 Likewise, in the chapter devoted to the stratagems used by the tyrant, which Albert calls cautelae (precautions), Albert enumerates fourteen precautions whereby the tyrant can intensify his power (cautelae per intensionem).8 This same tendency to make numbered lists, in places where Aristotle does not do so, is also found in the commentary of Guido Vernani, who reduces the chapters on tyranny to an enumeration of thirteen cautelae per intensionem and fifteen cautelae per remissionem (whereby the tyrant moderates his power).9 This approach would prove so successful that a later commentator, Virgilius Wellendörfer, would arrange his ‘Polilogium’ in numerated conclusions, and draw up lists whenever the fifth book allowed this.10 The fifth book could thus be reduced to a mere catalogue of causes of revolutions and means to prevent them, a catalogue liable to be used in political treatises emphasizing the preservation of power; and this is what occurred in some of the major texts of late German political Aristotelianism.11 7 Albertus Magnus, Politicorum libri VIII, Ed. Borgnet, Augustin (Opera omnia 8), Paris 1891, p. 438. 8 Ibid., pp. 533–536. The edition is clearly mistaken in this point, since after the undecima cautela the text has on p. 536 secundam, tertiam and quartam ponit, instead of twelfth and so on. 9 This commentary is extant in three manuscripts, see Flüeler (note 1), vol. 2, p. 22. I used the manuscript Venezia, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, lat. VI 94, f. 57rb–142vb. The commentary on the fifth book is on f. 109ra–125rb. For the cautelae per intensionem see f. 121ra–122ra, and for the cautelae per remissionem f. 122rb–123rb. 10 For example, the tyrant’s stratagems to moderate his power are rearranged in twenty-one numbered ways of doing so, cf. Virgilius Wellendörfer, Polilogium ex Aristotelis octo Politicorum libris etcetera operose manipulatum, Lipsiae 1513, f. 59ra. But Wellendörfer enumerates quite often: see, for example, f. 48ra–b (Septem et plura sunt ad seditionem mouentia que hominum corda et ad simultates sunt disponenda), f. 51vb–52ra (on the ways that oligarchies can change) and f. 53ra (In simplici optimatum statu seditio siue mutatio contingit. Penes quinque modos quos textualiter Philosophus distinguit). He also enumerates the examples adduced, see f. 50ra. 11 For instance, Jacob Martini presents the third book of his work (‘Liber tertii. De Reipublicae collapsae Correctione & Restauratione’) as a list, which is mainly drawn from the ‘Politics’, cf. Jacobus Martini, Politica in genuinam Aristotelis methodum redacta, [s.l.], sumptibus haeredum Clementis Bergeri, 1630. The same is seen in the seventh book (‘De causis et remediis mutationum in rebuspublicis’) of Wolfgang Heider’s work, cf. Wolfgangus Heiderus,

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This same tendency to make lists is found in the commentaries in question form. Although composed with a different approach from that of the literal commentaries, some also arrange the fifth book in the form of lists or deal with this book as if it had already been arranged in lists by Aristotle. This is observable in the fifteenth-century commentary of Vincentius Gruner12 and even more in an anonymous commentary, which though unpublished, enjoyed some circulation, wherein the fifth book is reduced to three simple questions, of which two are enumerations taken from the Aristotelian text.13 This means that the question form commentaries, like the literal commentaries, remained attached to the text of the ‘Politics’. The commentators focused on the key issue of the fifth book, that is, the change of the polities and the causes of corruption of those polities, paying attention to revolutions with regard to specific regimes. This attachment to the text, nevertheless, apparently occurs only in the commentaries written in the fifteenth century. The earlier commentaries have a rather different and more original approach. As is well known, the question form commentaries composed at the Faculty of Arts up until the second half of the fourteenth century depend mostly on Peter of Auvergne’s ‘Questiones super I–VII libros Politicorum’, the earliest extant question form commentary on the ‘Politics’, written at the Paris Faculty of Arts and datable between 1274 and 1296.14 Therefore, Philosophiae politicae systema, Jenae, impensis Johannis Reiffenbergeri, 1628, pp. 1004–1096. 12 See, for instance, the following questions: 2) Vtrum modi transmutacionis policiarum a Philosopho enumerati sunt sufficienter et bene positi; 5) Queritur, an undecim modi causantes transmutaciones policiarum et sediciones in civitatibus sint bene et sufficienter positi. For the complete tabula quaestionum of this commentary see Flüeler (note 1), vol. 2, pp. 148–154. 13 The commentary is transmitted in the manuscripts Colmar, Bibliothèque de la Ville, 456, f. 90v–95v; Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, 1470, f. 387rb–391ra (part is also found in Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, 1374). These are the questions on the fifth book: 1) Circa quintum Politicorum queritur primo, utrum possibilis sit aliquis modus, per quem perpetue possit aliqua policia conservari; 2) Queritur, quot sunt generales corruptiones monarchiarum sive policiarum; 3) Queritur, quot sit generales conservaciones tyrannidis. For the complete tabula quaestionum see Flüeler (note 1), vol. 2, pp. 155–158. 14 The ‘Questiones’ survive in two manuscripts and one fragment: Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 16089, f. 274ra–319ra (questions on the first seven books); Bologna, Biblioteca Universitaria, 1625, f. 68rb–79vb (on the first seven books, but the first two books and a large part of the third contain

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a full appreciation of the medieval reception of the ‘Politics’ requires an analysis of this work. This paper offers a study of Peter of Auvergne’s singular approach to the fifth book. The briefest glance at the tabula quaestionum of his commentary will reveal that Peter departs from the order of the Aristotelian text. In this, Peter’s interpretation of the fifth book of the ‘Politics’ is distinctive not only from the rest of his ‘Questiones’, but also from the type of commentary on Aristotle usual at the Faculty of Arts of Paris. Peter structures his commentary in a rather original manner based on concepts taken from Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle’s ‘Nicomachean Ethics’, such as peace, concord and political friendship. In this way he attempts to provide a theoretical foundation for understanding the causes of revolutions and the means of preserving the different political regimes. This new arrangement is certainly likely to have been influential for medieval political thought.

II. The arrangement made by Peter of Auvergne As we shall see, Peter’s ‘Questiones’ reveals a close connection with his literal commentary, the ‘Scriptum super III–VIII Politicorum’. Instead of enumerating causes and means, Peter attempts, within the structure of the literal commentary, to establish the chief principle that might explain all the political changes. As Lidia Lanza has shown, Peter identifies the main cause of all political upheaval with dissension of wills (dissensio voluntatum), that is, the lack of agreement among the citizens.15 This idea is repeatedly stated throughout his commentary on the fifth book.16 a different anonymous text from the Parisian manuscript); Frankfurt a.M., Universitätsbibliothek, Praed. 51, f. 172ra–179rb (only some questions from the first book). I am currently preparing a critical edition of this text. In the transcriptions on the following pages, I quote from my edition, making reference to the Parisian manuscript with the letter P and to the Bolognese with the letter B, followed by the indication of the corresponding folio. On the ‘Questiones’ and their authorship see Flüeler (note 1), vol. 1, pp. 86–131, and for the tabula quaestionum see vol. 2, pp. 101–112. 15 Cf. Lanza (note 1), pp. 416–417. 16 A few striking examples suffice: Alii habent contrarias uoluntates, ergo dissident uoluntates: sed dissensio uoluntatum radix est seditionis, Petrus (see note 5), V.2, Vat. lat. 777, f. 89va (Ed. Spiazzi, p. 253, no. 731); Cum enim

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The significance of this interpretative move can only be measured if it is compared to the Aristotelian text. For Aristotle each polity has its own sort of distributive justice. This means that in a polity in which the criterion for distributive justice is wealth, the allocation is made according to the citizens’ wealth. In this case, the wealthiest citizens will have more honours and benefits, for example, access to public offices. So, the wealthier a citizen is, the more he will have honours. Distributive justice therefore involves a certain proportion which reflects the inequalities among the citizens. For this reason, Aristotle speaks of the proportional equality necessary to each polity and not of numerical equality. Thus, according to Aristotle, revolutions arise whenever some of the citizens understand differently the necessary inequality existing in the city, for instance when they assume that if they are equal in one respect, like freedom, they have to be equal in all respects, including wealth.17 All this is accepted by Peter. In fact, the dissension of wills among the citizens (but also its contrary) derives from the acknowledgment of a certain type of justice by those citizens. In other words, at the core of every claim made by the citizenry lies a certain conception of justice, irrespective of whether it is correct. But Peter’s emphasis on the will has a consequence: distributive justice is not just imposed on the political community as a definitive mechanism, but it depends on the citizens’ will and accordingly on their union. Peter’s emphasis on the union of wills implies that every polity does not automatically abide by the rules: wills change and therefore the equilibrium within the political community is always delicate. It is true that Peter does not develop a theory of consent and consensus, but he does offer some indications in that respect throughout the ‘Scriptum’. In the third book he mentions consensus as acts achieved by the dominant part of the political community,18 while in other parts of the commentary he refers to aliqui non honorantur uidentes alios honoratos, faciunt seditiones; tunc enim dissident uoluntates. Hoc autem est radix seditionis, ibid., Vat. lat. 777, f. 89vb (Ed. Spiazzi, p. 253, no. 732); illi qui habent diuersos mores inclinantur ad diuersos fines. Ex hoc autem sequitur diuisio uoluntatis: hoc autem est causa dissensionis, ibid., Vat. lat. 777, f. 90va (Ed. Spiazzi, p. 255, no. 741). 17 Cf. Aristotle, Politics, V.1, 1301a25–1302a8. 18 […] quando politia oligarchica uel tirannis mutatur in democratiam, in ista politia quod fit ex consensu populi factum est ciuitatis. Similiter in politia in qua principatur tirannus quod fit de consensu tiranni, factum est ciuitatis […] Principales uero in ciuitate sunt principantes secundum unamquamque politiam. Quare manifestum est quod secundum unamquamque politiam illud

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the unanimity necessary to rule and impose polities such as oligarchy and democracy.19 For Peter, therefore, a form of agreement seems to be necessary within the groups of citizens that hold power. But while consensus seems to be important only for the leadership of the regime, consent is, for Peter, intrinsic to the role of every citizen. This is most apparent in the best regime. As is well known, Peter identifies the best regime as monarchy, wherein the king rules according to his will, but submitting himself voluntarily to the inner law of reason. Peter argues for monarchy as the best regime by making use of the theoretical example of the most virtuous man within the political community. If one man exceeds all others in virtue, then he will be condemned to ostracism in a deviant polity. However, in the best regime, which is organized according to virtue, he will hold the chief public office by virtue of the citizens’ acknowledgment of his superiority. For Peter, in the best regime, but also in other just regimes, the citizens or subjects give their assent to the regime; by their own will they recognise the intrinsic justice of the political order. In deviant polities, such as oligarchy and democracy, every man has a choice between being a good man or a good citizen, that is, between acting according to moral virtue or according to the criterion of the polity and thus against virtue.20 As a result, consent turns out to be a rather passive feature of citizens and consensus is limited to the dominant part of the polity. In this regard, it would be fruitless to seek for a coherent and extensive theory in Peter’s ‘Scriptum’, but what is remarkable is his introduction of concepts, such as unanimity and union of wills, which are external to the Aristotelian text. Likewise, these concepts are the cornerstones on which Peter grounds his commentary on the fifth book in his ‘Questiones’.

dicitur factum ciuitatis quod fit ex consensu principis, siue sit unus siue plures, Petrus (note 5), III.2, Vat. lat. 777, f. 36va–b (Ed. Grech, p. 88). 19 Tota enim multitudo, si presens et unanimis sit, sufficiens est ad expulsionem diuitum et corruptionem oligarchie, et maxime potens, ibid., V.5, Vat. lat. 777, f. 93ra (Ed. Spiazzi, p. 264, no. 778); Vbi igitur accidit esse regionem in qua sunt multi bellantes in equis secundum artem, contingit fortem oligarchiam facere, maxime si fuerint unanimes inter se, ibid., VI.6, Vat. lat. 777, f. 111ra (Ed. Spiazzi, p. 329, no. 1014). Note that Aristotle mentions unanimity in none of the correspondent passages of the text of the ‘Politics’. 20 For the issues mentioned in this paragraph see Lanza, Lidia, Aspetti della ricezione della ‘Politica’ aristotelica nel XIII secolo: Pietro d’Alvernia, in: Studi Medievali 35 (1994), pp. 643–694.

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The first striking characteristic of the ‘Questiones’ regarding the fifth book is that a considerable number of questions have no correspondence in the Aristotelian text, as is clear from the complete tabula quaestionum presented below, in which I indicate the corresponding Bekker numbers between brackets whenever it is possible to find even a loose correspondence. Here follows the tabula of the questions on the fifth book: 1. Thus it is asked about the fifth book of the ‘Politics’, and because there Aristotle argues that dissension is the corruption of the city, therefore the first question raised about any clear view of sedition is about its opposite, namely, peace, and it is asked whether peace is the aim of the city 2. Whether friendship is the cause of peace 3. Whether dissension is opposed to peace 4. Whether appetite is the cause of dissension 5. Whether unlikeness (dissimilitudo) is the cause of dissension (V.3, 1302b33–1303a13) 6. Whether place is the cause of dissension (V.3, 1303b7–8) 7. Whether the cause of the preservation of the polity is peace 8. Whether dissension among the notables and the most influential easily increases (V.4, 1303b19–21) 9. Regarding a certain sentence of the Philosopher that says “the common fear assembles also the most divided people”, about which it is asked whether fear is a passion (V.5, 1304b23–24) 10. Whether common fear brings together the most divided people (V.5, 1304b23–24) 11. Whether in order to rule correctly science is required for the ruler (V.9, 1309a33–39) 12. Whether love for the polity is required for the ruler’s perfection (V.9, 1309a33–35) 13. Whether power is required for the ruler’s perfection (V.9, 1309a33–35) 14. Thus it is asked, supposing that there are two men of whom one is powerful and vile, but the other good and careful of the polity, which of them has to be elected as a ruler (V.9, 1309a39–b3) 15. Whether tyranny is a polity (loosely V.10, 1310a39) 16. Whether tyranny is a natural polity 17. Whether tyranny is useful to anyone

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18. Whether tyranny can be preserved by its opposites, as the Philosopher states (V.11, 1313a34–35)21 We can divide this set of questions into three main groups, the first being constituted of questions 1–10 – which are related to the issue of dissension –, the second made up of questions 11–14 – which correspond to the opening paragraph of chapter 9 of the fifth book on the required qualifications for holding the main offices –, and the third group made up of the final four questions on tyranny (15–18), which can be explained by the fact that in chapter 10, and more specifically in chapter 11, Aristotle deals with the means to preserve tyranny. The second and the third groups are therefore limited to three chapters of the Aristotelian text (chapters 9–11). In contrast, the first group, which spans eight chapters, skips over several chapters, dealing only with issues related to three chapters (3–5). Remarkably, in this first group there is no single question on the first two chapters of the fifth book of the ‘Politics’, arguably the most significant chapters, in which Aristotle establishes inequality as the paramount cause of upheavals. There are only two questions on the causes of revolutions (questions 5–6) and apparently no question on the means to preserve the polities, which means that the main topics of the fifth book seem to have been left out of the ‘Questiones’. Instead, Peter’s first questions tackle topics such as peace, friendship and appetite, which have no correspondence in the Aristotelian text. It is not always easy to grasp the reasons behind a tabula quaestionum, why, leaving aside other more important themes, a medieval commentator chose a particular passage of the Aristotelian text, sometimes an odd sentence, to raise a question which from our point of view seems insignificant.22 This departure from the text of the ‘Politics’ in the ‘Questiones’ 21 The tabula regarding the fifth book is consultable in its Latin version in Flüeler (note 1), vol. 2, pp. 110–111. In the first question, where Flüeler has ideo primo ad civitatem seditionis, I have corrected the phrasing to accord with both manuscripts: ad evidentiam seditionis. 22 This is the case with some questions in Peter’s ‘Questiones’. For example, in the first book, Peter raises the question of whether nature makes all the plants and animals for the sake of man (q. 20), which a modern commentator would leave aside. Also, in the second book Peter raises the question of whether exercise in the military life is the principle of many virtues (q. 19). Though the question finds a correspondence in chapter 9 (1270a4–6), since that chapter is devoted to the analysis of the Spartan regime, a modern commentator might

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could be interpreted as one of those cases pointed out by Olga Weijers: philosophical commentaries produced at the Paris Faculty of Arts around 1270 in which the commentators departed from the Aristotelian text by introducing questions suggested by, but not necessarily related to the text to be commented on.23 However, careful attention to the tabula shows that a clear intention underlies the first seven questions. There is indeed a unique structure which revolves around a specific theme: peace as opposed to dissension. The questions are strictly bounded and follow a sequence: Peter starts by asking whether peace is the end of political activity (q. 1), then he deals with the possible cause of peace, friendship (q. 2), and after that with dissension, the opposite of peace (q. 3). He returns to deal with peace in q. 7, where he asks whether peace is the cause of the preservation of the polity. So, peace is analysed from a fourfold viewpoint: first Peter deals with peace as an effect (1) and as a cause (7), then he investigates its cause (2) and opposite (3). Having dealt with peace, Peter starts to treat dissension and its causes (questions 4–6). But while dissension can be considered one of the main themes of the fifth book, the concept of peace is alien to the Aristotelian text. It is introduced by Peter as the positive pole of the negative dissension that corrupts the polities. This topic thus replaces the listing of the causes and means of which the fifth book is made up. By leaving aside the historical examples too, Peter obliterates all the material on which subsequent commentators will concentrate. So, rather than enumerating causes and means or summarising the Aristotelian text – for this a literal commentary is more than sufficient – Peter intends to show the main principle that prevents dissension and the corruption of political regimes. It is noteworthy that Peter does not mention any polity in particular in the titles of the questions – nor in their content, as we shall see – which means that his thoughts are to be applied more generally; the concepts of peace, friendship and dissension have a general value and are to be linked to every kind of polity.

rather expect a question on that regime, perhaps also on the ‘mixed regime’ in connection with Sparta, but never exclusively on the military virtues. It is remarkable that Peter skips over the final chapters of the second book on the regimes of Crete, Carthage, and Solon’s constitution, without raising any question related to these regimes. 23 Weijers, Olga, La disputatio à la Faculté des arts de Paris (1200–1350 environ): esquisse d’une typologie (Studia Artistarum 2), Turnhout 1995, p. 29.

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III. The Concept of Peace Peace appears in the titles of four questions (1–3 and 7), and is mainly analysed in two of these: whether peace is the end of the polity (1) and whether the cause of the preservation of the polity is peace (7). Surprisingly enough, in both questions the answer is negative. Peter refutes the notion that peace can be the goal of the political community as well as the cause that permits its preservation. Basing his ideas on the ‘Nicomachean Ethics’, Peter starts with Aristotle’s famous assertion that happiness is the ultimate end of human activity because it is the only thing that is not desirable for the sake of something else, but is desirable in itself.24 So, peace, which is not desirable in itself, but it is wished for as a means to a further end, has to be subordinated to the true end, happiness. Peace turns out not to be the goal of politics, but a requirement for political happiness.25 While the idea of happiness as the ultimate end is taken literally from the ‘Ethics’, the view of peace as a requirement for happiness is not actually found in the ‘Ethics’ but is suggested by the passage in the tenth book where Aristotle affirms that “happiness is thought to depend on leisure; for we are busy that we may have leisure, and make war that we may live in peace”.26 However, for Peter, peace is not merely a condition for achieving happiness: once again basing his position on the tenth book of the ‘Ethics’, Peter attributes to peace the feature that Aristotle had ascribed to pleasure, that is, something bound up with an activity that increases, which therefore improves that same activity.27 24 Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I.3, 1097a33–b1, and X.7, 1176b3–5. 25 Petrus (note 14), V.1: Finis ciuitatis est eius felicitas. Sed pax non est felicitas, quia felicitas non queritur propter aliud, sed pax queritur propter aliud. Ad hoc enim querunt ciues tranquillitatem ut possint bene operari, ut dicitur X Ethicorum [...] Sed quoniam finis non est sine eis que illum finem inducunt, ut patet ex II Physicorum, et ideo finis ciuitatis, qui est felicitas politie, non est sine ordine in illum finem; et ulterius, quia ordo non procedit nisi habeatur pax, ideo ex consequenti felicitas ciuitatis non est sine pace. Et ideo, si ciuitas debet attingere ad finem suum, qui est felicitas, oportebit pacem esse, P 305rb–va, B 73ra. 26 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, X.8, 1177b4–6. 27 Petrus (note 14), V.1: dicendum quod pacem non querimus propter se, sed propter aliud. Sed quod ciues dicuntur querere pacem propter se, hoc dicitur quia non possunt attingere illud quod querunt sine pace; et iterum querunt

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Furthermore, as in Aristotle’s sentence, peace is envisaged mainly as a state of rest, just as leisure is the absence of activity: Peter conceives peace as the absence of movement, which involves tranquillity. He thus links Aristotle’s idea with Augustine’s famous definition of peace as “the tranquillity that comes from order”,28 conceiving peace as the absence of movement or rather as the rest (quietatio) that results from the end of movement.29 Yet, it would be mistaken to bring Peter closer to Augustine, first, because Peter conceives peace with reference to political activity – it is something that exists within the city – leaving aside any theological sense; second, because Peter rejects the notion that happiness can reside in tranquillity and quiet, as, according to the ‘Ethics’, happiness is the result of operations in accordance with virtue, being itself an operation.30 Since happiness involves activity, it cannot be identified with peace, the absence of activity, because in that case happiness would not be a virtuous act. As a result, in Peter’s hands peace turns out to be a condition and a complement to political happiness, just as pleasure is a condition and a complement to speculative happiness.31 Here, Peter’s innovation concerning the concept of peace lies as much in its use without any theological implication as in the removal of its teleological feature. Previous commentators on Aristotle’s ‘Ethics’, such as the Pseudo-Aspasius and Michael of Ephesus, identified peace with a political pacem ut ea existente melius possint operari, sicut etiam delectationem dicimur querere non propter se, sed quia melius operabimur habita delectatione; delectatio que est a studere magis facit studere, ut dicitur, VII Ethicorum, P 305va, B 73ra. For the idea that pleasure intensifies the activity, see Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, X.7, 1177b21–22 and X.5, 1175a29–31. 28 Cf. Augustinus, De civitate Dei, XIX.13, Eds. Dombart, Bernhard and Kalb, Alfons (CCSL 48), Turnhout 1955, p. 679, ll. 10–11. 29 Petrus (note 14), V.1: Dicendum quod pax est quedam quietatio et tranquillitas. Pacem enim dicimus quietationem a perturbatione, P 305va, B 73ra; V.2: pax est quietatio ordinis ciuium in suum finem. Quietatio autem priuatio est motus, P 305vb, B 73rb, V.7: pax habet rationem priuationis, est enim quietatio quedam. Quies autem priuatio est motus, P 307vb, B 74ra. 30 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I.7, 1098a16–18. 31 On this see Lanza, Lidia, Guerra e pace in Aristotele: alcune riflessioni sui commenti medievali alla ‘Politica’, in: Pace e guerra nel basso Medioevo. Atti del XL Convegno storico internazionale del Centro Italiano di Studi sul Basso Medioevo e dell’Accademia tudertina, Todi, 12–15 ottobre 2003 (Atti dei Convegni del Centro italiano di studi sul basso medioevo – Accademia Tudertina e del Centro di studi sulla spiritualità medievale, nuova serie 17), Spoleto 2004, pp. 53–77.

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end,32 a rather superficial identification when considered within the Aristotelian system, as happiness is the true end of human activity. In fact, from an Aristotelian point of view, the end of the political community can only be political happiness. However, while Peter denies that peace can be the goal of the polity, he nevertheless strictly relates peace to that goal. In the first questions on the fifth book he repeatedly stresses the link between peace and end; indeed he carefully states that the quiet in which peace consists is not mere rest, but is related to the goal of the polity.33 Peace exists as part of the goal of the polity,34 and as every type of polity has an end, so peace exists both in just and in unjust regimes.35 It is therefore something intrinsic to the political community.

32 Cf. The Greek Commentaries on the ‘Nicomachean Ethics’ of Aristotle in the Latin translation of Robert Grosseteste, bishop of Lincoln. Volume III: The Anonymous Commentator on book VII, Aspasius on Book VIII, and Michael of Ephesus on Books IX and X, Ed. Mercken, H. Paul F. (Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum 6,3), Leuven 1991, pp. 160 (Principatus enim finis est pax subiectorum et concordia) and 422 (pax vacatio, finis autem pax). On Michael of Ephesus’s commentary and his conception of political happiness see Ierodiakonou, Katerina, Some Observations on Michael of Ephesus’ Comments on ‘Nicomachean Ethics’ X, in: Medieval Greek Commentaries on the ‘Nicomachean Ethics’, Eds. Barber, Charles and Jenkins, David (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 101), Leiden/Boston 2009, pp. 185–201, see pp. 194–199. The same idea is put forward by contemporary commentators of Peter, cf. Lambertini, Roberto, La monarchia prima della ‘Monarchia’: le ragioni del ‘regnum’ nella ricezione medioevale di Aristotele, in: Pour Dante. Dante et l’apocalypse. Lectures humanistes de Dante, Ed. Pichard, Bruno with the collaboration of Trottmann, Christian (Le savoir de Mantice 7), Paris 2001, pp. 39–75, p. 47, n. 32. 33 Petrus (note 14), V.1: Pacem enim dicimus quietationem a perturbatione, sed et non a quacumque perturbatione, sed a perturbatione ordinis appetitus in finem [...] pax est quietatio ciuium a perturbatione ordinis in finem ciuitatis, P 305va, B 73ra; V.2: sic pax causam habet materialem subiectum in quo primo modo radicatur. Hoc autem est ordo ciuium in finem, P 306ra, B 73rb. 34 Ibid., V.1: pax est aliquid coniunctum fini ciuitatis, P 305va, B 73ra. 35 Ibid.: finis ciuitatis est illud quod a ciuibus communiter queritur propter se et non propter aliud. Hoc autem, ut dictum est in III, est recte uiuere, et hoc uel secundum ueritatem uel secundum apparentiam, ut in politiis transgressis, ut patuit in III, P 305va, B 73ra.

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This said, one might expect that peace could be the main cause of the preservation of a polity. However, in question 7, whether the cause of the preservation of the polity is peace, and in question 2, whether friendship is the cause of peace, Peter denies this possibility. If peace is rest and absence of movement, Peter defines it mainly as privation. Being a privation – defined by virtue of the absence of something – peace cannot be the cause of a positive effect.36 Peter explains this further with the example of blindness. Blindness, the privation of vision, cannot have a positive effect on sight, that is, cannot make our eye see. As a result, for Peter peace is neither the efficient nor the final cause of the preservation of the polity.37 He nevertheless admits that peace needs a material cause to exist, just as blindness, albeit a form of privation, needs the eye – the material cause – in order to exist as blindness. The material cause of peace is identified with the unity or consensus of the citizens regarding the end of the polity.38 Peace is therefore achieved through this consensus. How this consensus is achieved is the issue that occupies Peter in questions 2 to 5. Analysis of these questions will permit us to grasp the link between the ‘Scriptum’ and the ‘Questiones’.

IV. The Concepts of Political Friendship and Concord Though seldom used in the ‘Politics’, the concept of political friendship developed in the ‘Nicomachean Ethics’ is at the core of Aristotle’s political 36 Petrus (note 14), V.7: Nichil habens rationem priuationis est causa effectus positiui; sed pax habet rationem priuationis: est enim quietatio quedam. Quies autem priuatio est motus. Sed saluatio politie est effectus positiuus. Ergo pax non erit causa saluationis, P 307vb, B 74ra. 37 Ibid., V.2: Priuatio autem causam positiuam non habet, et ideo non habet causam formalem, nisi tunc ipsam carentiam formam priuationis dicamus, sicut dicitur II Physicorum. Et item priuatio non habet causam actiuam per se, ergo nec finalem, quia finis et agens proportionantur. Cecitatis enim nulla est causa per se, ut patet I et II Physicorum. Et ideo pacis, cum sit priuatio, non est causa efficiens nec finalis per se, P 305vb, B 73rb. 38 Ibid.: Priuatio enim uult habere subiectum in quo sit. Et ideo sic pax causam habet materialem subiectum in quo primo modo radicatur; hoc autem est ordo ciuium in finem, non absolute, sed ordo ille cum unione participantium ordinem secundum intentionem finis, P 305vb–306ra, B 73rb.

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thought. Unlike the virtuous, pleasant and useful kinds of friendship to which Aristotle devotes the major part of the eighth and ninth books of the ‘Ethics’, political friendship does not imply a limitation to just a few friends. In brief, political friendship can be defined as a mutual relationship established between citizens, which does not involve affection. It is based on acquaintance; hence it is broader than intimate friendship and closer to goodwill. Its chief characteristic is that although it is grounded in advantage and common interest, it requires a certain degree of virtue because it presupposes reciprocal trust. In this sense it involves moral character. At the beginning of the eighth book of the ‘Ethics’ Aristotle’s claim that “friendship seems too to hold states together, and lawgivers to care more for it than for justice”39 can be understood as the claim that because political friendship requires mutual advantage and trust, it goes beyond justice. Laws and contracts are not sufficient to bind the citizens; for this the goodwill of each citizen toward his fellow citizens is necessary. Political friendship is therefore close to justice, as the need for reliability requires that citizens agree on what the proper conception of justice is. However, the great difference between justice and friendship is that the former is based on proportion and on the idea of not harming, while the latter is grounded in equality and implies an active role towards other people. This close connection between justice and friendship has a political consequence. As outlined above, each polity has its own form of justice, varying in accordance with the polity. So, the more a polity is deviant, the less justice it offers. Accordingly, friendship too varies in accordance with the polity,40 and again, the more a polity is deviant, the less it involves friendship, tyranny being the polity in which justice and friendship are less present. 41 So, the kind of friendship among citizens that may arise in an oligarchy is certainly different from political friendship found in an aristocracy. Aristotle clearly states that every community has a need for justice and friendship. But for Aristotle, this tie between fellow citizens arises by virtue of their agreement.42 This agreement is also important in ‘concord’, which Aristotle distinguishes from political friendship, though he considers that they have a close connection. Concord is defined as a fundamental unanimous agreement on the main issues regarding the polity, such as the assumption that public offices should be elective, the criteria for electing someone 39 40 41 42

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VIII.1, 1155a22–23. Cf. ibid., VIII.11, 1161a10–11. Ibid., 1161a30–32. Ibid., VIII.12, 1161b11–15.

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to a public office, or decisions about alliances with other cities.43 If this is not too anachronistic, we could say that concord regards the constitutional principles of a polity. Concord, being a consensus about general matters, thus expresses a certain political and ethical homogeneity in the city. The difference between political friendship and concord is that the latter concerns only the main issues of the city, while the former reflects the cooperative relationship citizens establish for mutual benefit in everyday public life.44 In the early Latin medieval commentary tradition on the ‘Ethics’ these two concepts lost importance. Indeed, the political dimension of the eighth and ninth books of the ‘Ethics’ is absent from the commentaries produced at the Faculty of Arts and contemporaneous with Peter.45 This can be seen as a result of the positions advanced in the two most influential literal commentaries, those of Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, as political friendship is devalued in both these works. Albert vacillates between considering political friendship as a form of friendship in a certain respect (amicitia secundum quid) – which implies diminishing the role of virtue in friendship – and identifying it with the sort of friendship that does not involve affection, a form of friendship to which Aristotle refers in the fourth book,46 and 43 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, IX.6. 44 On political friendship and concord in Aristotle see, among others, Klonoski, Richard J., ‘Homonoia’ in Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics, in: History of Political Thought 17 (1996), pp. 313–325; Zanetti, Gianfrancesco, Ragion pratica e diritto: un percorso aristotelico. Practical Reason and Law: An Aristotelian Itinerary (Collana del Dipartimento di Scienze Giuridiche e della Facoltà di Giurisprudenza dell’Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia 57), Milano 2001, pp. 88–114; Bodéüs, Richard, La concorde politique, l’amitié parfaite et la justice, in: Analyses et réflexions sur Aristote, ‘Ethique à Nicomaque’ (livres VIII et IX), Ed. Samama, Guy, Paris 2001, pp. 71–78 (reprinted with modifications in: Bodéüs, Richard, Le véritable politique et ses vertus selon Aristote. Récueil d’études, Louvain-la-Neuve 2004, pp. 157–167); Irrera, Elena, Between Advantage and Virtue: Aristotle’s Theory of Political Friendship, in: History of Political Thought 26 (2005), pp. 565–585. 45 Cf. Toste, Marco, Utrum felix indigeat amicis. The Reception of the Aristotelian Theory of Friendship at the Arts Faculty of Paris, in: Virtue Ethics in the Middle Ages: Commentaries on Aristotle’s ‘Nicomachean Ethics’, 1200–1500, Ed. Bejczy, István (Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History 160), Leiden 2008, pp. 173–195, see pp. 185–190. 46 Cf. Albertus Magnus, Super Ethica commentum et quaestiones, Ed. Kübel, Wilhelm, Aschendorff 1968–1972 (Opera omnia 14), IX.12, vol. 2, p. 699, ll. 51–58.

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which Aquinas names affabilitas.47 In contrast, Aquinas, in his commentary on the ‘Ethics’, regards political friendship as being concerned with practical and advantageous matters (circa utilia).48 In any event, both these authors understand political friendship as a tie existing in every type of polity but tyranny.49 Nevertheless, while Albert, following Aristotle, distinguishes political friendship from concord, in his commentary Aquinas merges the two concepts.50 The fact that, for Aquinas, concord concerns “those things that have a certain magnitude”, or in Albert’s words, “great things”,51 means that both understood the idea of concord in Aristotle. Moreover, both authors are aware that concord implies consent and – Albert stresses this further – consensus.52 Against this background we can fully realise the significance of Peter’s input in his ‘Questiones’. This input is all the more noteworthy if we remember that references to political friendship are not so numerous in the ‘Politics’, although it is conceived as the binding tie of the city.53 This is accepted by Peter in the ‘Scriptum’. At the beginning of the third book, where Aristotle speaks of the necessary ethnic cohesion of the community, Peter explains this passage by using the Aristotelian theory of friendship. 47 Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, IV.6; Thomas Aquinas, Sententia libri Ethicorum, Ed. Gauthier, René-Antoine, Roma 1969 (Opera omnia, iussu Leonis XIII P.M. edita 47), IV.14, vol. 1, pp. 247–248. 48 Cf. Thomas Aquinas (note 47), IX.6, vol. 2, p. 521, ll. 38 and 81. Note that in the Latin translation concord is said to be circa operabilia (1167a28–29) and not circa utilia. 49 Cf. Albertus Magnus (note 46), VIII.11, vol. 2, p. 637, ll. 59–71; Thomas Aquinas (note 47), VIII.11, vol. 2, p. 482, ll. 125–129. 50 Cf. Albertus Magnus (note 46), IX.7, vol. 2, pp. 678–679; Thomas Aquinas (note 47), IX.6, p. 521, ll. 76–77 and 81–83: amicitia politica [...] videtur idem esse quod concordia [...] Est enim amicitia politica circa utilia et circa ea quae conveniant ad vitam humanam, circa qualia dicimus esse concordiam. 51 Cf. Thomas Aquinas (note 47), IX.6, vol. 2, p. 521, l. 43: ea quae habent aliquam magnitudinem; Albertus Magnus (note 46), IX.7, vol. 2, p. 679, ll. 37–39: [...] consentiunt; non tamen circa quaecumque operabilia, sed circa magna. 52 Cf. Albertus Magnus (note 46), IX.7, vol. 2, p. 678, ll. 30–34 and p. 679, ll. 18– 19: Concordia est consensus in bonum commune; Thomas Aquinas (note 47), IX.6, vol. 2, p. 521, ll.67–69 and 71–73: sed oportet ad hoc quod sit concordia quod consentiant in eodem secundum numerum [...] per hunc enim modum omnibus fit illud quod desiderant quando in eodem omnes consentiunt. 53 Cf. Aristotle, Politics, III.9, 1280b36–39.

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The idea expressed in the ‘Nicomachean Ethics’, that without likeness there is no friendship, allows Peter to associate ethnic cohesion with the likeness proper to friendship.54 But while in the ‘Scriptum’ there is no further use of the concept of friendship, in the ‘Questiones’ political friendship and concord turn out to be the key concepts in the arrangement of the fifth book. An outline of the first questions on the fifth book enables us to understand Peter’s creativity as a commentator. We have seen above that peace is caused by the unity of the citizens. Now, in question 2, whether friendship is the cause of peace, Peter explains further how this unity is achieved. Even more striking than his establishment of friendship as the cause of peace is the terminology used by Peter. To begin with, Peter considers friendship as the cause of the union of the citizens’ wills, which in its turn brings about peace.55 As in regard to peace, Peter repeatedly underlines that this union of wills does not concern every possible political measure, but is a union related only to the goals of the polity and to the means towards its end. Whenever there is agreement regarding the end, then there will be a union of wills liable to produce peace. In contrast, whenever there is enmity, then there will be dissension.56At this point two remarks are necessary. First, the terminology used here by Peter 54 Petrus (note 5), III.2: intelligendum est quod magis expedit in ciuitate esse unam gentem quam diuersam. Et huius ratio est quia similitudo causa est amicitie. Et ideo maior amicitia contrahitur inter illos qui sunt magis similes. Magis autem sunt similes qui unius gentis, quia sunt unius consuetudinis et unius moris, quam inter illos qui non sunt. Amicitia autem maxime requiritur ad politiam. Vnde ciuitates que constitute sunt ex diuersis gentibus propter dissensiones quas habuerunt propter diuersitatem morum plures destructe sunt, quia una pars adiungebat se inimicis propter odium alterius, Vat. lat. 777, f. 37ra (Ed. Grech, p. 91). For the need of likeness in friendship see Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VIII.5 and 6. 55 Petrus (note 14), V.2: Illud quod est causa unionis uoluntatum, illud est causa pacis. Ciues enim unam habentes uoluntatem in finem suum non turbant se nec impediunt ab ordine in finem suum. Sed amicitia est causa unionis uoluntatum, ut plane dicitur VIII Ethicorum; ergo est causa pacis, P 305vb, B 73rb. 56 Ibid.: Hoc enim est subiectum pacis, scilicet multitudo aliquorum unitorum in appetitu finis et eorum que sunt ad finem, quia ista causa posita, ponitur pax, et ea remota, remouetur pax [...] dum aliqui uniuntur in appetitu unius finis secundum uoluntatem, tunc fit unio; et tunc, cum hoc sit, pax erit [...] Talis autem est amicitia, quia ex hoc quod aliquis per amicitiam uult alii bonum secundum uoluntantem finis unius et eorum que in finem illum, ex hoc oritur talis unio. Si ergo pax immediate sequitur illam unionem, amicitia erit causa

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to a considerable degree resembles that of the ‘Scriptum’.57 Second, although the expression does not occur here, it is clear that Peter is referring to political friendship, as he intends to speak of the entire city and its end. Yet, though Peter uses the word friendship, he apparently means concord, in the Aristotelian sense. In fact, the end of the polity and the things that lead to such an end (ea que sunt ad finem) can be taken as the main principles of a polity, equivalent to the “great things” to which Aquinas and Albert refer. What the end of the polity actually is, Peter clarifies in the third book of the ‘Questiones’, where he asserts that polities are differentiated both by the end they aim at – and that end may be good or wicked – and by the mode whereby they reach that end,58 which corresponds to Aristotle’s quantitative and qualitative criteria with which to differentiate polities.59 Thus for Peter, a “union of wills regarding the end” means an agreement on the type of regime the citizens desire.60 For example, if they choose wealth as the effectiua pacis. Et per contrarium, quidquid destruit illam unionem, pacem corrumpit, ut dissensio in fine uel in eis que sunt ad finem, P 306ra, B 73rb. 57 See, for example, Petrus (note 5), V.5: [...] quia tales uniuntur in uoluntate finis et in uoluntate eorum que sunt ad finem, et unum finem intendunt et ea que sunt ad illum finem; politiam autem talium non est facile corrumpere ex se ipsa, Vat. lat. 777, f. 93vb (Ed. Spiazzi, p. 266, no. 785). 58 This is clear in question 13 of the third book (utrum politie sint multe): Dicendum quod politie sunt sex, sicut dicit Philosophus. Cuius ratio est quia ea que sunt ad finem essentialiter secundum finem distinguuntur, a quo habent rationem. Hoc autem contingit dupliciter: uel propter diuersitatem ipsius finis secundum se uel propter diuersum modum se habendi ad illum finem [...] Finis autem politie est bonum ultimum in politia intentum. Hoc autem in aliquibus est simpliciter et uere bonum, in aliis autem est bonum alicui tantum secundum apparentiam solum [...] autem distinguuntur ulterius. Nam politia est quidam ordo, et ideo, quod diuersimode ordinantur in illum finem, sic distinguuntur, Petrus (note 14), P 294rb–va. 59 Cf. Aristotle, Politics, IV.12, 1296b16–19. 60 As we shall see later in this article, Peter is not explicit about how this agreement is to be reached. At any rate, we may assume that the ‘agreement’ is reached and imposed by the weightier group of citizens. As we have seen in the second section of this article, Peter, in the ‘Scriptum’, limits consensus to the dominant part of the political community. Moreover, if, as I assume here, Peter has in mind the passage of the ‘Politics’ concerning the qualitative and quantitative criteria that differentiate political regimes (see previous note), then he surely also had in mind that in the same passage Aristotle states that “the portion of the city which desires the permanence of the constitution

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main quality in a polity, which in itself is wicked, then an oligarchy will occur. As to the “union of wills regarding the things that lead to such an end”, Peter does not make clear what he means by that, but we can assume that he intends to speak of agreement regarding the chief public offices, and how they should be instituted and carried out. As Peter states more than once in his commentaries, it is through the chief offices that a polity reaches its end.61 The “things that lead to such an end” can thus be interpreted as the chief political offices. This union of wills is therefore the agreement on the basic principles of the polity. As Peter restricts this union only with regard to its end, the union of wills does not preclude disunion and disagreement regarding particular measures of the polity where these measures do not go against the end of the polity. Further evidence showing that in his commentary Peter has in mind the Aristotelian ‘concord’ can be found in the fact that in the first question he indicates the need for unanimity,62 precisely as Aristotle defines concord, and in question 3, whether dissension is opposed to peace. In addition to giving an affirmative answer and making distinctions between the different forms of disorder in the city,63 Peter also contrasts dissension with peace and discord with concord, which he defines as a union of wills in accordance with the end, which leads to peace.64 It is evident that the terminology used by Peter is drawn from Aquinas. It is not Aristotle, but Aquinas, who more than once defines concord as a

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64

ought to be stronger than that which desires the reverse” (1296b14–16; this is the passage that in the Latin translation is rendered by the famous expression valentior pars). See for example Petrus (note 5), V.7: Principatus autem principium est eorum que ordinantur ad finem politie, Vat. lat. 777, f. 97vb (Ed. Spiazzi, p. 279 no. 828). Petrus (note 14), V.1: quando ad alium ita se habet quod ad inuicem non turbantur ab ordine in finem, sed unanimiter in illum finem proficiunt, tunc dicuntur pacifice uiuere, P 305va, B 73ra. Ibid., V.3: [...] turbatio diuersis nominibus appellatur [...] Quantum enim ad turbationem interiorem dicitur dissensio; quantum autem ad turbationem exteriorem dicitur guerra; quantum ad turbationem interiorem prout ordinatur ad exteriorem latenter et malitiose, sic dicitur seditio, P 306rb, B 73va. Ibid., V.3: dissensio non opponitur concordie, sed est consequens ad discordiam, sicut pax sequitur ad concordiam. Nam concordia est unio uoluntatum secundum ordinem in finem, et hanc unionem immediate sequitur pax, P 306rb, B 73va.

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union of wills.65 However, Peter’s debt to Aquinas goes deeper than mere terminology. First, Peter takes from Aquinas the idea that concord, as a union of wills, is a prerequisite for peace.66 Second, Peter employs Aquinas’s idea that charity is the cause of peace, but while Aquinas speaks of charity, Peter replaces this concept with friendship.67 The association Peter makes between peace and concord in the ‘Questiones’ is therefore based on Aquinas’s ‘Summa’. But it would be inaccurate to see this dependence on Aquinas as passive, because Peter re-elaborates the ideas he takes from the ‘Summa’. While Aquinas deals with concord and peace within a theological framework, Peter applies these concepts to a political text. Moreover, Peter merges Aquinas’s terminology – concord as union of wills – with Aristotle’s theory, because, unlike Aquinas, Peter limits concord to union regarding the end of a polity; in fact Peter’s concord is not an agreement with regard to any issue at all, as it is in Aquinas, it is only agreement as regards the end of the polity and the things that lead to such an end, as in Aristotle. The importance of the union of wills in politics is further stressed in question 4, whether appetite is the cause of dissension. While in the previous questions Peter emphasised the union of wills for the preservation of the polity, he now shows a contrario the disunion of wills as the cause of upheavals. Again, the union of wills concerns only the end and the things that lead to such an end,68 but, based on the ‘Politics’,69 Peter introduces a distinction: lack of agreement as to the end leads to ‘constitutional’ changes, to a complete change from one polity into another; in contrast lack of agreement as to the things that lead to such an end leads not to a change of 65 Cf. Schwartz, Daniel, Aquinas on Friendship, Oxford 2007, p. 23. 66 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (Opera omnia, iussu Leonis XIII P.M. edita 8), Roma 1895, II–II, q. 29, art. 1, p. 236: pax includit concordiam et aliquid addit. Unde ubicumque est pax, ibi est concordia, non tamen ubicumque est concordia, est pax, si nomen pacis proprie sumatur. Concordia enim, proprie sumpta, est ad alterum, inquantum scilicet diversorum cordium voluntates simul in unum consensum conveniunt. 67 Cf. Thomas Aquinas (note 66), II–II, q. 29, art. 3, p. 238. This use of the theological concepts from the ‘Summa’ in commentaries from the Faculty of Arts was quite common in the late thirteenth century. I have shown elsewhere the substitution of charity for friendship in the ‘Ethics’ commentaries, Toste (note 45), pp. 117–178. 68 Petrus (note 14), V.4: causa pacis est unio uoluntatum respectu finis et eorum que in finem. Ergo seditionis causa erit diuisio uoluntatum uel respectu finis uel respectu eorum que sunt in finem, P 306va, B 73va. 69 Cf. Aristotle, Politics, V.1, 1301b5–19.

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polity, as there remains agreement about its end, but either the intensification (intensio) or the slackening (remissio) of that form of government.70 For example, there may be a lack of agreement on the main value of a polity – freedom, wealth or good birth –, and if the value then changes from wealth to freedom, there will also be a change from oligarchy to democracy; in contrast, if there is a lack of agreement on access to the public offices, the majority still considering wealth to be the main value of the polity, then the oligarchy can either be intensified – if the wealthy people are in the majority – or be slackened and become less oligarchic – in cases where poor men form the bulk of society – and thus become closer to a constitutional form such as democracy or a mixed regime (politia). 70 Petrus (note 14), V.4: Ita hic ex diuisione illarum uoluntatum in alterutro illorum, uel in finem uel in eis que sunt ad finem [...] fit dissensio et seditio in ciuitate. Ex quo etiam apparet ratio cuiusdam alterius quod dicit Philosophus, scilicet quod aliquando fit mutatio politie in aliam omnino, et hoc per seditionem, et hoc est quando est uoluntatum diuisio circa finem. Tunc enim unus, impediendo uoluntatem alterius circa finem, si inualuerit, ducet politiam ad finem alium; et tunc necesse est politiam fieri aliam, quia alterius politie alter est finis, et econuerso necessario. Si autem fiat diuisio uoluntatum circa ea que in finem sunt, tunc qui inualuerit mutabit non politiam ipsam, quia de fine non dissentiunt, sed mutabit aliquem modum politie, et hoc secundum intensionem et remissionem politie uel secundum aliquid tale, P 306vb, B 73va– b. This passage of the ‘Questiones’ provides further evidence for interpreting the ‘things that lead to such an end’ as the chief public offices (see above note 61). In the passage of the ‘Politics’ referred to in the previous note, Aristotle distinguishes between two sorts of changes, just as Peter does in this question. It is not difficult to see an exact correspondence between the sorts of change indicated by the two authors. Aristotle indicates the first sort as a change of the existing political regime into another, which corresponds to Peter’s diuisio circa finem, which leads to a change of polity (necesse est politiam fieri aliam). Instead, the second sort indicated by Aristotle does not involve a change in the form of government, but occurs when a group of citizens attempt to get possession of the chief offices. In a corresponding way, for Peter, the second sort of change does not lead to a change of polity (mutabit non politiam ipsam), but is related only to the circa ea que in finem sunt. Therefore, the ‘things that lead to such an end’ must be the public offices to which Aristotle refers to. In fact, while commenting on this passage in the ‘Scriptum’, Peter writes: Et dicit quod aliquando transmutatur politia non in aliam politiam, sed manet eadem, et eligunt eamdem habere institutionem et ordinationem politie, sed principantes mutant et uolunt eamdem politiam regere obseruare per se ipsos uel per amicos suos, Vat. lat. 777, f. 88ra (Ed. Spiazzi, p. 247, no. 717).

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However, as in the ‘Scriptum’, for Peter, the union of wills implies the acceptance by the citizens of a certain type of justice and equality. To be more precise, Peter affirms that the will (appetitus or voluntas) is the cause of dissension, but only the will with respect to equality. In other words, dissension springs up when there is no will to respect the kind of proportional equality that exists in that polity.71 Further evidence for this can be found in question 5, whether unlikeness (dissimilitudo) is the cause of dissension. Making use of the Aristotelian theory of friendship, which places likeness and equality as the chief requirements for friendship,72 Peter again establishes friendship as the cause of peace and unlikeness as the cause of sedition. But Peter is careful to clarify how unlikeness or difference can lead to sedition. He distinguishes between two sorts of dispositions (dispositiones) toward diversity within the political community: the disposition of citizens toward different ends (in ordine ad fines diversos) and the disposition of citizens toward diversity in respect of each other (inter se). While the former disposition leads to sedition, as it involves no agreement on the end of the polity, the latter is indispensable for the preservation of the polity. This diversity of the citizens in respect of each other means, for Peter, the inequality that results from the allocation of resources found in every polity. To explain this further, Peter makes an analogy between these two dispositions toward diversity in the city and the diversity inherent to the body of the animal. Although the animal needs diverse members to live, it can have only one heart, otherwise it will perish. In the same way, the city needs different citizens but only one leadership and one goal.73 Again, Peter stresses the 71 Petrus (note 14), V.4: uoluntas per se est causa seditionis [...] sed determinata per respectum ad seditionem, ita ut dicatur quod uoluntas equalis secundum dignitatem seditionis causa est. Sed adhuc non proxima, quia posita causa proxima in actu, ponitur effectus; posita autem uoluntate equalis secundum dignitatem non est necesse seditio, immo hec causa et talis uoluntas stat bene cum opposito illius effectus, scilicet cum pace [...] Et tunc uoluntas habendi equale secundum dignitatem secundum quod illi uoluntati contrariatur uoluntas alterius primo et per se, et proxima causa erit seditionis, P 306va–b, B 73va. 72 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VIII.3, 1156b19–21; VIII.5, 1157b36–1158a1; VIII.8, 1159b2–4. 73 Petrus (note 14), V.5: Dispositio autem diuersa diuersorum potest esse dupliciter: uel inter se et etiam in ordine ad fines diuersos; uel etiam potest esse diuersa dispositio diuersorum inter se solum, ita quod tamen sit unitas in ordine ad unum finem, sicut patet: in partibus animalis est diuersa dispositio diuersorum membrorum, tamen est unitas in ordine ad finem uel ad unum

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need for unity, but unity with respect to the goal. Interestingly, Peter uses a feature of the Aristotelian theory of friendship – likeness – but with reference to concord, which means that for him ‘concord’ and ‘political friendship’ are somehow interchangeable concepts. But irrespective of whether Peter merges or distinguishes the two concepts, for him political friendship is the tie that binds the citizens. The agreement between citizens and between citizens and rulers is what holds the polity together and permits its preservation, as Peter states in question 7.74 Unity is thus the core of politics. But, as with the animal, this unity is not absolute, but must involve some diversity. At the beginning of the second book of the ‘Questiones’, where Peter also departs from the Aristotelian text, he raises two significant questions: whether the city is one and the same and whether the best thing for the city is to be as much as possible one and the same (1 and 2). Here Peter argues for the necessity of unity in the city, but a kind of unity that allows for diversity, because the city is made of distinct parts, persons of different kinds that perform different roles. For Peter this unity is not like the continuous unity of a line, but rather like the unity of numbers, characterised as ‘unity according to order’ (unitas secundum ordinem).75 In order to illustrate this, Peter again compares the principium, ut ad cor. Sed diuersorum animalium est diuersa dispositio et inter se et in ordine ad principium uel finem illius principii. Similiter autem oportet estimare in ciuitate sicut in animali [...] ista dissimilitudo est unitas secundum proportionem que necessario est in ciuitate, ut patuit in II, et secundum etiam hoc est causa conseruationis politie. Prima autem dissimilitudo, que est diuersa dispositio ciuium inter se et etiam in ordine ad diuersos fines, ista est causa seditionis ciuitatis, P 307ra, B 74vb. 74 Ibid., V.7: Sed causa politie est [...] unio ciuium secundum uoluntatem unius finis et habitudo inter se et ad principem. Politia enim est ordo illorum in illum finem et inter se ad unum principantem [...] Ergo sequitur quod per continuationem illa eadem unio erit causa saluationis politie, et ideo continuitas unionis uoluntatum aliquorum in finem et in eis que ad finem est causa per se saluationis politie [...] Et quecumque ulterius hanc unionem inducunt, per consequens nata sunt saluare politiam, ut amicitia inquantum huiusmodi, et ulterius omnia inductiua amicitie, P 307vb, B 74rb. 75 Ibid., II.2: Si ergo optimum est ciuitatem esse quam maxime unam, optimum erit unam esse indiuisibilem, quod falsum, immo tunc differretur ciuitas: iam enim non esset pluralitas hominum et personarum, quod non conuenit [...] Modo aliquid est indiuisum quantitate, ut punctus; aliquid ratione, ut species; aliud numero, ut unitas [...] Vnum autem ordine pluribus modis est diuisibile quam indiuisibile, quia et numero et quantitate diuidi habet, ut totum

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city to an animal: both have different parts that accomplish different functions for the sake of the whole.76 This plurality within unity is thus understood by Peter as an essential characteristic of the political community; unsurprisingly then he extends it to public offices. In fact, in the sixth book of the ‘Questiones’, in another section in which he departs from the text of the ‘Politics’,77 Peter states the need for a plurality of political offices within the city’s government, but only insofar as they aim at one single goal. In this case too, he explains his ideas by making use of the organic analogy.78 uniuersum; sola autem ratione, que est secundum ordinem, est indiuisibile, quia ad unum finem et ab uno principio est [...] Dicendum ergo ad questionem quod ciuitas non debet esse una simpliciter, quia tunc ciuitatem contingeret destrui si deberet redigi ad talem diuisionem, cum sit composita ex partibus materialibus – domibus et uicis – et etiam formalibus, scilicet principe et ciuibus. [...] Ad finem autem suum ciuitas maxime attinget si sit maxime una, scilicet isto modo ordine, scilicet ut uoluntas principis recte ordinetur in finem et subditi recte ad illum finem moueantur, et secundum uoluntatem principis et rationem sumptam ex fine, P 284ra. 76 Ibid., Item, libro ‘De Motibus Animalium’ dicitur quod estimandum est animal esse unum sicut ciuitatem esse unam. Accipiatur autem hoc econuerso hic. Modo in animali optimum est ipsum animal esse unum ordine, salua tamen distinctione partium. Nam operatio partium in operationem totius ordinatur, quia pes ita ambulat sicut toti expedit, et auris ita audit. Sic etiam oportet esse ciuitatem unam ut, licet sint partes, operationes tamen singulorum partium in operationem totius ordinentur, P 284rb. 77 The questions are q. 6: utrum aliquis principatus in ciuitate sit necessarius; q. 7: utrum necesse sit in ciuitate esse plures principatus; q. 8: utrum in ciuitate sit unus principatus primus; q. 9: utrum principatus posteriores et inferiores essentialiter ordinati sint sub primo. Only the first question has a textual correspondance in the ‘Politics’, namely VI.8, 1321b5–6. 78 Petrus (note 15), VI.7: [...] preter primum principantem summum, qui respondet fini ultimo, oportet esse etiam alios principantes ad particulares fines mouentes et dirigentes [...] Item, secundum diuersitatem mobilium in specie oportet esse distinctos motores et econuerso. Sed in ciuitate sunt diuersa mobilia, scilicet homines diuersorum officiorum quos non est possibile eodem modo attingere ad uirtutem et operationem uirtutis, propter diuersos actus. Ergo ipsorum necessario oportet esse diuersos motores, id est principes [...] Ad rationem dicendum quod uerum est quod non sunt plures principatus primi, sicut nec in animali plures partes principales, ut cor. Sed tamen, sicut in animali preter cor, quod est pars principalissima, sunt et alie partes principales et formales, ita et in ciuitate sunt plures principatus sub primo propter diuersitatem finium, scilicet finis ultimi et mediorum, P 314ra, B 77rb–va.

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All in all, we can understand why Peter stresses over and over again that the union of wills only concerns the end and the things that lead to such an end. The union of wills does not cover the totality of civic life, but only the main principles of political association. The existence of plurality, both in public offices and in citizenry, does not block the necessary unity proper to the maintenance of the polity.

V. Conclusions, with some Observations on the Connection between Peter’s ‘Questiones’ and Marsilius of Padua’s ‘Defensor Pacis’ The arrangement Peter provides of the fifth book is in accordance with the ‘Politics’, though he stresses the citizens’ will and concord. Peter knows Aristotle’s intention: although issues related to justice are the chief cause of sedition, laws and contracts are not enough to bind citizens in a community. Justice is necessary to prevent revolutions, but it is not enough to preserve polities. What is necessary is a relationship that goes beyond justice and therefore only political friendship and concord can preserve a political regime. This explains why Peter bases his commentary on the fifth book on the theory of friendship rather than on justice. Just as he was aware that peace could not be the end of political activity, because this contradicts the Aristotelian assumption that happiness is the ultimate end of man, he was also aware that according to Aristotle the chief means of preserving polities is not justice, but friendship. It is as if Peter, while commenting on the fifth book, had in mind two different sentences of Aristotle: the sentence from the second book of the ‘Politics’ that “for friendship we believe to be the greatest good of states and the preservative of them against revolutions”,79 and the quote from the eighth book of the ‘Ethics’, cited above, that lawgivers care more for friendship than for justice. Peter’s arrangement is arguably an attempt to comment on the fifth book without having to deal with the unethical strategies displayed by unjust rulers to preserve power or with the simple listing of the causes of revolutions. Thus, instead of following the Aristotelian text, Peter prefers to rearrange it and establish a chief cause of preservation of polities, the consensus reached by the union of wills. 79 Aristotle, Politics, II.4, 1262b7–9.

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Though in the ‘Scriptum’ Peter stresses the role of the union of wills, it is only in the ‘Questiones’ that he fully develops this idea.80 Far from giving rise to a contractualist theory, for Peter consensus is probably restricted to the rulers, the role of the citizens being rather to consent and recognise the end of the polity, as we have seen for the ‘Scriptum’. Peter represents his ideas on concord as general principles, with no exact indication on how this concord is to be attained. As Peter does not refer to any regime in particular, his conclusions are to be applied to every form of government but tyranny. In this he follows the Aristotelian idea that every form of polity can have a form of friendship and that the relationships between citizens depend on the form of government. In any case, for Peter, agreement on the main issues concerning a political regime is what permits the survival of that regime. Significantly, in the fifth book of the ‘Questiones’ Peter presents the normative principles of politics rather than a description of the political phenomenon; instead of enumerating the causes of revolutions and the means to prevent them, Peter establishes concord as the main expedient to achieve political peace. As Lidia Lanza has pointed out, this shift from a descriptive to a normative dimension is one of the main differences between literal commentaries and questions on the ‘Politics’ in the Middle Ages.81 So what is the significance of Peter’s questions on the fifth book of the ‘Politics’, that is, beyond the creative way in which he arranges his commentary with ideas taken from both the ‘Ethics’ and Aquinas? As we have seen, although he draws on Aquinas’s ‘Summa’, Peter thinks of peace in absolutely political and secular terms; peace is a condition internal to the city. As a result, the claim, so often repeated, that Marsilius of Padua was an innovator in his conception of peace as non-theological cannot be sustained. 82 80 This does not imply the precedence of the ‘Scriptum’ over the ‘Questiones’, a question which is still open. 81 Cf. Lanza (note 31), pp. 76–77. 82 This was principally asserted by Gewirth, for whom “Marsilius’ concept involves three important differences from the antecedent doctrines. First, it is entirely a secular political concept, a ‘civil peace’ Secondly, Marsilius’ peace is entirely internal to individual states Thirdly, Marsilius’ peace is entirely on the level of external functional interrelations among the various parts of the state”, Gewirth, Alan, Marsilius of Padua – The Defender of the Peace. Volume I: Marsilius of Padua and Medieval Political Philosophy (Records of civilization, sources and studies 46), New York/ London 1964, pp. 96–97. Since this has been often asserted, there would be

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Only a lack of knowledge of the commentary tradition on the ‘Politics’ can underlie such assertions. But could Marsilius have been influenced by Peter? The question is better formulated if, instead of just Peter, we consider the whole commentary tradition on the ‘Politics’. Scholarship has in fact already revealed some parallels between Marsilius and that tradition.83 Besides the idea of peace as purely political, we can point out further similarities between the ‘Defensor pacis’ and the ‘Questiones’ (or later commentaries) regarding the issues dealt with in this article: the analogy between the city and the animal to justify the diversity of the citizens in respect of each other; the equivalence of the peace and tranquillity of the city’s different parts with the health of an animal, conceived as the equilibrium of its different parts for the sake of the whole;84 the idea of ‘unity according to order’, which is called ‘numerical unity’ in the ‘Defensor pacis’,85 together little point in listing all the scholars who, following Gewirth, have maintained that Marsilius opened the way to a new conception of peace. 83 Cf. Cranz, Ferdinand Edward, Aristotelianism in Medieval Political Theory. A Study of the Reception of the ‘Politics’, Ph.D. Thesis, Harvard University 1938, pp. 327–331; Flüeler (note 1), vol. 1, pp. 120–131; Syros, Vasileios, The Sovereignty of the Multitude in the Works of Marsilius of Padua, Peter of Auvergne and Some Other Aristotelian Commentators, in: The World of Marsilius of Padua: The Life and Work of a Medieval Political Theorist, Ed. Moreno-Riaño, Gerson (Disputatio 5), Turnhout 2006, pp. 227–248. 84 See, for example, Petrus (note 14), V.7: Et quia hanc unionem sequitur pax, sicut priuatio sequitur generationem forme contrarie, ideo pax per accidens dicitur causa unionis illius et per consequens causa salutis politie per accidens, inquantum scilicet sequitur causam salutis politie, P 307vb, B 74rb. Cf. Marsilius de Padua, Defensor pacis, Ed. Scholz, Richard (Fontes iuris Germanici antiqui in usum scholarum ex monumentis Germaniae historicis separatim editi 7), Hannover 1932–1933, I.II.3, vol. 1, pp. 11–12. But the ‘Defensor pacis’ is even closer to the anonymous commentary on the ‘Politics’ extant in the manuscript Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 1ra–54vb. In the first question of the fifth book, the author writes: illa autem pax uel concordia est quando quilibet statu suo contentus in ordine ad bonum commune non molestat alium in suo nec uult ipsum transgredi ultra proportionale. Sic etiam uidemus in animali (cod.: animalibus) quod quando membra sunt in suis sitibus naturalibus habet quietem; si autem unum membrum dislocetur et exeat locum debitum sentit dolorem intolerabilem. Ita etiam ciues, qui sunt partes communicationis politice, uolentes (cod.: hrtes) sui ordinis exire, turbationem et seditionem (cod.: seductionem) faciunt in politica, f. 40ra. This passage is also quoted in Lanza (note 31), pp. 70–71. 85 Marsilius (note 84), I.17.11 and 13, pp. 119–120. See also note 75.

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with the use of the organic analogy to establish the need for a plurality of public offices subordinated to a main ruler and aimed at one single goal, a model which Cary Nederman has called ‘doctrine of vertically integrated jurisdictional pluralism’ with regard to Marsilius’s thought;86 and the fact that in both works the principles can be applied not to one form of government in particular, but to all in general. The comparison between the city and the animal, and between peace and health, has led scholarship to highlight medicine and natural philosophy as sources used by Marsilius. However, as Christoph Flüeler has suggested, it might be more fruitful to analyse some ideas of the ‘Defensor pacis’ against the background of the teaching of the Faculty of Arts.87 In fact, the ideas and even the terminology of the fifth book of the ‘Questiones’ are present in later commentators,88 sometimes, as in the ‘Politics’ commentary of the Anonymous of Milan, in such a way as to bring a commentator even closer to Marsilius of Padua. There are, nonetheless, remarkable differences between Peter and Marsilius. While the former argues that friendship is the efficient cause of peace per accidens, the latter states that the efficient cause of peace is the government of the polity.89 And while for Peter all forms of government except tyranny are voluntary, for Marsilius the consent of subjects is limited to the just polities.90 In any case, it is clear that Marsilius 86 See Nederman, Cary J., Community and Consent. The Secular Political Theory of Marsiglio of Padua’s ‘Defensor Pacis’, Lanham, MD/London 1995, pp. 137–139. 87 Flüeler (note 1), vol. 1, p. 130. 88 See for example the ‘Ethics’ commentary of the Anonymous of Erlangen: politicum habet considerare saluationem ciuitatis, ut dicitur quinto Politicorum. Sed amicitia est generatiua concordie et unionis uoluntatum in finem et in ea que in finem ordinantur, que unio inter ciues est cum salutis politie, Erlangen, Universitätsbibliothek, 213, f. 75va. 89 Cf. Marsilius (note 84), I.XIX.3, p. 127. Furthermore, Marsilius, contrary to Peter, seems to consider political friendship as the consequence of peace. Although Marsilius does not use the expression ‘political friendship’, he refers, in the previous paragraph of the same chapter of the ‘Defensor pacis’, to the civium conversacio mutua et communicacio ipsorum invicem suorum operum, mutuumque auxilium atque iuvamentum as consequences of peace. The expressions civium conversacio mutua and communicacio ipsorum invicem suorum operum can be easily taken as synonymous to ‘political friendship’, as it is described by Aristotle. 90 See, for instance, Petrus (note 14), V.16 (utrum tyrannidis sit naturalis) and Marsilius (note 84), I.VIII.2–3 and I.IX.5, vol. 1, pp. 37–38 and 43–44.

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has his own agenda and draws on multiple sources. The significance of the ‘Questiones’ for the ‘Defensor pacis’ lies chiefly on the fact that ideas advanced in the former are used as main principles in the latter. This can be easily illustrated: Peter emphasises the necessary agreement regarding “the end” and “the things that lead to such an end”; for him, a political regime cannot have more than one end, and for this reason all public offices and different sorts of citizens need to agree and to aim at the same single goal, otherwise dissension will arise. Therefore, if some other office or group in the city – let us say the priesthood, that is, the group that Marsilius has in mind – aims at a different goal, this part of the city will jeopardise the unity and inner peace of the political community.91 Despite these issues, what is important here is to underline that Peter’s interpretative move regarding the fifth book gave rise to secularised thinking on peace and concord well before Marsilius. Furthermore, the idea that peace is not the end but a condition for happiness, which is found in Dante’s ‘Monarchia’ (I.iv), may have as its source the commentary tradition. This should call our attention to the university commentaries and their possible influence, how the ideas articulated in those texts might have been used by other authors beyond the university framework. Scholarship devoted to the history of political thought tends to assume a direct reading of the Aristotelian texts, which, however, were often read with an accompanying commentary. There is no ground to assume that medieval political authors did not read the ‘Politics’ along with, and on occasion through the lens of, its commentary tradition. In fact, it is probably more than just coincidence that two distinctive traits of the ‘Defensor pacis’ – the topic of tranquillity and peace of the city, and the fact that Marsilius quotes the fifth book of the ‘Politics’ more than any other – can be also found together in the ‘Questiones’, the fifth book of which is partly devoted to stressing the importance of peace for the city. Moreover, the ‘Defensor pacis’ has points of contact with the ‘Questiones’ precisely in sections in which the latter departs from the ‘Politics’. Transformations in political thought are not abrupt; they should rather be seen as resembling plate tectonics. We have here an example of how changes can be made, not by a single author at a single moment, but rather by different authors in different contexts and times: first, Robert Grosseteste’s 91 Interestingly, well before Marsilius, Peter identifies the priesthood as one of the necessary parts of the city, cf. Peter (note 5), VII.6, Vat. lat. 777, f. 122va (Ed. Spiazzi, p. 367, no. 1132) and mainly VII.7, f. 123va–b (ibid., pp. 371–372, nos. 1141–1143).

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translation into Latin of both the ‘Nicomachean Ethics’ and its Byzantine commentaries in 1246–47, which introduced such concepts as political friendship and concord in connection with the political community; then, the translation of the ‘Politics’ into Latin around 1265; some years later, in 1271–72, the use Aquinas made of the concept of union of wills and the Augustinian idea of peace, which has no relation with the translation of the ‘Politics’; then Peter of Auvergne integrating those concepts into a commentary on the ‘Politics’, leaving aside any theological connotation related to those concepts, and highlighting the role of consensus regarding the end of the polity; finally Marsilius, some decades later, in 1324, continuing to see peace as merely political, but using the concept in a wider context and broadening the significance of consent in government. Peter of Auvergne rearranged the whole structure of the fifth book in order to advance one general principle – concord – in regard to the main issue of the book, the preservation of polities. By using material from another Aristotelian work, namely the ‘Nicomachean Ethics’, and merging it with ideas taken from Aquinas, Peter reshaped the text of the ‘Politics’, while still keeping it in accordance within Aristotelianism. A rearrangement of this kind was not common at the Faculty of Arts. For all this, we must consider Peter, at least as far as his commentaries on the ‘Politics’ are concerned, as a major Aristotelian commentator of the Middle Ages.

Peter of Auvergne’s Quodlibetal Questions on Divine Knowledge Chris Schabel (Cyprus)*

Peter of Auvergne’s properly theological ideas are expressed almost exclusively in his ‘Quodlibeta’, among the last works he composed. Peter conducted six quodlibetal sessions at the University of Paris, one per year from 1296 to 1301, some and perhaps all in Advent disputations. Each was redacted individually, I assume in the one-year interval between the sessions, and all six were available at University stationers by late February 1304, a few months before his death. They survive complete in ten medieval witnesses, and nine other manuscripts from the Middle Ages preserve substantial portions. It was thus one of the most popular series of quodlibeta ever written.1 In the fall of 1302, a few months after Peter concluded his sixth and final quodlibetal debate, and maybe around the time he had finished composing the written version, the Franciscan John Duns Scotus arrived in the Capetian capital to begin lecturing on the ‘Sentences’ at the Minorite convent, having already done so at Oxford.2 Thus at the point when Peter’s Parisian *

I thank Pasquale Porro for suggestions on this paper and the participants at the conference for their comments. 1 See Schabel, Chris, The ‘Quodlibeta’ of Peter of Auvergne, in: Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. The Fourteenth Century, Ed. Schabel, Chris (Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition 7), Leiden 2007, pp. 81–130, which builds on Cannizzo, Giuseppina, I ‘Quodlibeta’ di Pietro d’Auvergne. Problemi di storia letteraria e dottrinale. La tradizione manoscritta. Testo critico delle ‘Quaestiones de Verbo’, 1296, 1300, in: Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica 56 (1964), pp. 486–500 (part I) and 605–648 (part II); ibid., 57 (1965), pp. 67–89 (part III). 2 For the chronology, see Dumont, Stephen D., Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus (Chapter 13), in: Medieval Philosophy, Ed. Marenbon, John (Routledge History of Philosophy 3), London 1998, pp. 291–328, at p. 293; id., John Duns Scotus, in: A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, Ed. Gracia, Jorge J.E. and Noone, Timothy B. (Blackwell Companions to Philosophy 24), Oxford 2003, pp. 353–369, at p. 353.

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theological career was coming to an end, Scotus was about to transform theology, both orally and with the written products of his Oxonian lectures. Peter, therefore, ought to be a good gauge of Parisian theology on the eve of Scotism. The topic of divine knowledge will serve as a good test case, since Peter responds to no fewer than six questions pertaining closely to this issue: Quodlibet II, question 1: Are the ideas of particular accidents in God? Quodlibet III, question 4: Is the essence of a created thing an essence from eternity? Quodlibet IV, question 1: Are ideas in God the rationes of understanding creatures outside (extra)? Quodlibet IV, question 2: Are future contingents coexistent with God? Quodlibet VI, question 1: Can God produce in being anything He understands outside Himself? Quodlibet VI, question 2: Is the certainty of God’s knowledge compatible with the contingency of things? I have made full transcriptions of all these questions and, in the case of the two questions on divine foreknowledge of future contingents, I publish critical editions in appendices. Henceforth I shall cite these texts in square brackets according to quodlibet, question, article, and line numbers, e.g. [VI.2.3.59–61]. Piecing together a coherent theory of divine knowledge from a selection of smallish quodlibetal questions on disparate topics spread out over a fiveyear period is not a simple task. The inherent weakness and possible cause of the ultimate disappearance of quodlibeta as a genre of theological literature, as opposed to the oral disputations that continued to be conducted, consists in its unsystematic nature. The master could not fully control the questions, which almost invariably touched on a wide range of issues, and there were limits to how much organization he could impose on the material when redacting the written version.3 Since Peter did this on an annual 3 On the genre and its history, see Glorieux, Palémon, La littérature quodlibétique de 1260 à 1320, 2 vol. (Bibliothèque thomiste 5 and 21), Kain 1925 and Paris 1935; Wippel, John W., Quodlibetal Questions, Chiefly in Theology Faculties, in: Les questions disputées et les questions quodlibétiques dans les facultés de théologie, de droit et de médicine, Ed. Bazàn, Bernardo C. G. et alii (Typologie des sources du Moyen Âge occidental 44–45), Turnhout 1985, pp. 153–222; Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. The

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basis, and he was asked related questions each year, we find him citing previous quodlibeta, repeating himself, and reusing quotations, arguments, and entire articles, but he could not cover the subject comprehensively in a sensible fashion. It is up to the reader to create a unified doctrine. With a set of Quaestiones ordinariae on divine knowledge, such as those of Jean de Pouilly, one of Peter’s successors as secular master at Paris, the author could more easily present a coherent theory on the subject.4 This is not the case here. A second difficulty lies in Peter’s tendency to avoid conflict.5 Unfortunately for the historian of ideas, this is most pronounced here. He does not begin his questions as Jean de Pouilly does, by saying, “Certain people say...,” and responding, “But against these idiots...” Thus it is hard to align him to one side or another of any debate. In one case he clearly offers a certain interpretation of Aquinas and then adopts the position, but usually his references to others are vague and, as often as not, meant to show that different thinkers understand the same terminology in different ways, suggesting that any resulting discord may only be superficial. He seems to want to present a conservative doctrinal statement of unquestionable orthodoxy, and he reads his predecessors as if they, too, had that aim in mind.

I. A Neo-Platonic Approach One can start unraveling Peter’s theory by noting that he has pronounced Neo-Platonic tendencies. Peter cites Plato himself five times in these questions. Peter’s preference for Proclus6 is apparent here more than in most Thirteenth Century, Ed. Schabel, Chris (Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition 1), Leiden 2006 and: Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. The Fourteenth Century (note 1). 4 Not that easily: I am working on Pouilly’s questions, and he toyed with the series for a long time, making three separate redactions. 5 This Marco Toste points out in his paper with respect to Peter’s questions on the ‘Politics’. 6 Which Griet Galle and Henryk Anzulewicz touch upon in their papers. I have not checked all the references, but Peter’s citations of Proclus are as follows: For editions, see Schabel, The ‘Quodlibeta’ of Peter of Auvergne (note 1), n. 5: Quodlibet I: question 1: 91 conclusion (Ed. Schabel, p. 126, ll. 7–9); 11 conc. (Ed. cit., p. 127, ll. 3–5); [7] conc. (Ed. cit., p. 130, ll. 6–8) || 2: 28 conc. (1/3 into the

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places, with ten references. Peter’s favorite universal description of what is, omnia qualitercumque entia, “all things that exist in any way whatsoever,” comes from Proclus. “All things that exist in any way whatsoever proceed from one first cause,” says Peter paraphrasing Proclus.7 Since according to Proclus “everything that is created both remains in its cause and proceeds from it and is turned back to it,” Peter infers that “All things that exist in any way whatsoever are in the divine essence in some way,” and even “preexist in His essence.”8 After all, according to Proclus, “Everything that is produced preexists in the producer.”9 Peter asserts that, for Proclus, “secondary and particular causes act by virtue of the first cause, since they have substance and the power of acting, and the fact itself that they act, from the text) || 4: 9 conc. (1/3 in); 7 conc. (near end) || 5: 29 conc. (1/3 in); comment, conc. 1 (2/3 in) || 6: comment, conc. 1 (end) || 7: 168 conc. (1/2 in; Ed. Muller, p. 154, l. 43) || 12: secundum Proclum (1/5 in) || 21: 7 conc. (Ed. Cannizzo, p. 79, l. 44). Quodlibet II: 1: comment, conc. 1 (1/2 in); 12 conc. (ibid.); 30 conc. (2/3 in) || 2: 1 conc. (1/2 col. from end); comment, 1 conc. (ibid.) || 7: comment, 22 conc. (1 col. in); comment, 16 conc. (1/3 col. later) || 8: comment, 101? (“ivi”) conc. (2/5 in) || 9: 21 conc. (1/4 in) || 10: De fato, c. 11 (2? 11?) (2/5 in); same chapter (ibid.). Quodlibet III: 1: sicut dicit Proclus (1/2 in) || 4 comment, 34 conc. (1/2 in) || 5: 103 conc. (1/4 in); 105 conc. (ibid.). Quodlibet IV: 1: 2 (11?) conc. (near start); 35 conc. (1/3 in) || 2: 54 conc. (Ed. Schabel below, ll. 105–106) || 7: 56 conc. (2/3 in); 22 conc. (ibid.) || 8: 5 conc. (4/5 in) || 9: 5 conc. (1/2 in); 22 conc. (1/2 in) || 11; 168 conc. (2/3 in) || 14: 177 conc. (1/2 in) || 17: 116 conc. (1/4 in). Quodlibet V: 2: 11 (2?) conc. (2/5 in) || 3: 28 conc. (1/4 in); 29 conc. (ibid.) || 8: comment, 5 (?) conc. (1/3 in) || 10: 22 conc. (2/5 in; Ed. Cannizzo, p. 86, l. 18). Quodlibet VI: 2: 44 [read 124!] conc. (Ed. Schabel below, ll. 36–40); 56 conc. (2/3 in; Ed. Schabel below, l. 75) || 3: 7 conc. (1/4 in); 29 conc. (2/3 in); 5 conc. (end) || 4: 2 conc. (1/3 in) || 5: 89 conc. (1/5 in) || 6: 56 conc. (1/3 in); comment, 56 conc. (a bit later) || 14: 29 conc. (2/3 in; Ed. Koch, p. 212). 7 IV.1.1: Et secundum Proclum: Omnia qualitercumque entia ab una prima causa procedunt, conclusione [2] ; cf. II.1.2; Proclus, Elementatio theologica, Ed. Boese, Helmut (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, series 1, 5), Leuven 1987, p. 8. The text in the notes is based mainly on manuscripts BV (see below for the sigla). 8 IV.1.2: Si enim omnia procedunt ab eo sicut a causa agente prima, et effectus necesse est praeexistere qualitercumque in causa, dicente Proclo, 35 conclusione: ‘Omne creatum et manet in sua causa et procedit ab ea et convertitur ad eam,’ necesse est omnia qualitercumque entia aliquo modo praeexistere in ipsius essentia; Proclus, Elementatio theologica (note 7), p. 22. 9 II.1.3: Omne enim productum in producente praeexistit, secundum Proclum, 30 conclusione; Proclus, Elementatio theologica (note 7), p. 20.

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superior cause.”10 And since “everything that exists in any way whatsoever exists in eternity or in time” – for Proclus says that “These two are the only measures in things of life and death” – therefore they are present to God in His eternity [IV.2.4.103–106]. Finally, in this way, Proclus proclaims, “The [divine] intellect knows partibles impartibly, transmutables intransmutably, temporals intemporally, but non-necessaries necessarily, and universally all things more eminently than according to their own order” [VI.2.1.37–40]. Peter adds some quotations selected – sometimes repeatedly – from Aristotle, John, Paul, Augustine, Boethius, and Anselm, which for the most part reiterate these basic notions. For example, “All things are uncovered and laid bare to His eyes,” from Hebrews 4, we find in four separate questions. In sum, as eternal, unchanging first cause of all things that exist in any way, and source of all secondary causation, in His eternity God knows all things both as they preexist in His essence and as they are in time. Peter of Auvergne’s theory of divine knowledge – how and what God knows – thus builds explicitly on Proclus. But will he steer a controversial path from there?11 Let us begin with his question about the possible 10 II.1.2: Causae autem secundariae et particulares agunt virtute primae. Habent enim substantiam et potentiam agendi, et hoc ipsum quod agunt, a causa superiori, secundum Proclum, commento [1] conclusionis suae; cf. VI.2.3.59– 61; Proclus, Elementatio theologica (note 7), pp. 30–31. 11 For recent general studies on divine knowledge and ideas in the years around Peter’s Parisian teaching, see Hoenen, Maarten J.F.M., Marsilius of Inghen. Divine Knowledge in Late Medieval Thought (Studies in the History of Christian Thought 50), Leiden 1993, and Plevano, Roberto, Exemplarity and Essence in the Doctrine of the Divine Ideas: Some Observations on the Medieval Debate, in: Medioevo 25 (1999–2000), pp. 653–711. For thinkers active around Peter’s time, see Kobusch, Theo, Heinrich von Gent und die neuplatonische Ideenlehre, in: Néoplatonisme et philosophie médiévale. Actes du Colloque international de Corfou 6–8 octobre 1995 organisé par la Société Internationale pour l’Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale, Ed. Benakis, Linos G. (Rencontres de Philosophie Médiévale 6), Turnhout 1997, pp. 197– 209; Noone, Timothy B., Scotus on Divine Ideas: Rep. Paris. I–A, d. 36, in: Medioevo 24 (1998), pp. 359–453; Hoffmann, Tobias, Creatura intellecta. Die Ideen und Possibilien bei Duns Scotus mit Ausblick auf Franz von Mayronis, Poncius und Mastrius (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Neue Folge 60), Münster 2002; Sur la science divine, Ed. Bardout, Jean-Christophe and Boulnois, Olivier, Paris 2002, especially the introductions to and French translations of texts by Thomas Aquinas (Bardout), Peter Olivi (Sylvain Piron), Henry of Ghent (Tobias Hoffmann),

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eternality of the essences of created things, ‘Quodlibet’ III, question 4. Peter defines “essence” as “that by which something is what it is absolutely,” whether substance or accident, and “that by which something is the object of intellect.”12 But since God alone exists from eternity, this essence of a creature cannot be in extramental reality from eternity, and anyway, before its creation a creature’s essence exists only in the power of the agent cause. Nevertheless, since “God understands the essences of things distinctly from eternity,” these essences are eternally understood by God.13 Does this mean that they therefore exist eternally? Here there is a hint of controversy, but a weak one. “It seems to some that they do not,” since esse intellectum is merely diminished being, so in this sense an intelligized essence is not an essence absolutely. Peter disagrees, although without much conviction, since he begins, “it seems to me…” He reasons that when one understands an essence, “the act of understanding ends at that essence in itself as at its object in some way.” So the being of this essence is not thereby diminished. Indeed, following Augustine, “a created essence has been in a more excellent way in the divine intellect than in itself.” Of course this is not being in extramental reality, but for Peter it is still absolute, undiminished being.14 and John Duns Scotus (Boulnois), pp. 177–272; Gossiaux, Mark D., James of Viterbo and the Late Thirteenth-Century Debate Concerning the Reality of the Possibiles, in: Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales 74.2 (2007), pp. 483–522. 12 III.4.1: Primo igitur accipiendum est quod essentia est qua aliquid est id quod est absolute, sicut essentia albedinis est qua aliquid est albedo vel album [...] Unumquodque autem est quod est per suum quod quid erat esse quod inest ei secundum seipsum, sicut dicit nomen quod quid erat esse. Ergo essentia est id quo aliquid est id quod est. 13 III.4.2: Primo ergo dico quod essentia non est essentia ab aeterno in natura extra intellectum. Primo quidem quia essentia non existit in actu ab aeterno in rerum natura. Solus enim Deus existit ab aeterno simpliciter [...] Secundo, quoniam illud quod invenitur primo in natura in termino productionis alicuius ante terminum productionis per se nihil est nisi in potentia agentis tantum [...] Deinde videtur quod sit essentia intellecta ab aeterno. Deus enim intelligit essentias rerum distincte ab aeterno [...] Unde apparet quod essentia rei quaelibet est intellecta a Deo ab aeterno distincte. Sed non aliud quam essentia. Ergo essentia est essentia intellecta a Deo ab aeterno. 14 III.4.2: Sed tunc restat inquirendum de tertio, an sequatur ‘essentia est essentia intellecta a Deo ab aeterno, ergo essentia est essentia ab aeterno’. – Et videtur quibusdam quod non, quoniam esse intellectum est esse deminitum, sicut esse

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But the whole notion of essence is a little vague, despite Peter’s effort to define it. In other questions about divine knowledge Peter concentrates on ideas, not essences. The previous year, in ‘Quodlibet’ II, question 1, Peter had asked whether the ideas of particular accidents are in God. At one point he seems to equate essences with species, perhaps universals: According to this way, natures or existences are eternal insofar as they are known (intellectae). But they do not exist from eternity. Nor do essences exist such that it would be true to say that human nature or essence is from eternity. Nor is there any human nature or essence in nature. From eternity humanity is humanity known (intellecta) by God. But whether, if humanity is humanity known by God, it follows that there is humanity, has nothing to do with the question. But perhaps it will be seen elsewhere about this, if at some point it happens to be asked whether the essences of things are essences from eternity.15

As we have seen, this was asked the following year. It seems, then, that universals exist from eternity as known by God, although of course not extra.

in imaginatione. Propter quod non sequitur, ‘essentia est essentia intellecta et imaginata, ergo essentia est essentia absolute’ [...] – Sed e contrario, videtur mihi esse dicendum quod sequitur simpliciter ‘essentia est essentia intellecta a Deo ab aeterno, ergo essentia est essentia’, quoniam quandocumque in composito ex pluribus non est aliqua oppositio, nec deminutio, ex coniuncto, licet inferetur divisim [...] Primo quidem quia actus qui per se terminatur ad aliquod obiectum non ponit oppositum nec deminuit de ratione eius, sicut videre colorem non deminuit de ratione eius nec ponit oppositum, quia rationem habet ex illo. Sed actus intellectus quo intelligitur essentia terminatur ad ipsam per se sicut in obiectum eius secundum aliquem modum. Ergo non deminuit de ratione eius nec ponit oppositum. – Praeterea, id quod est excellentioris naturae secundum quod huiusmodi non deminuit de eo quod est minus perfectum nec adiunctum ei ponit oppositum. Sed essentia creata in intellectu divino excellentius esse habet quam in se, secundum Augustinum, IX De Trinitate, capitulo 11. 15 II.1.3: Et secundum hunc modum naturae vel existentiae aeternae sunt secundum quod intellectae sunt. Non tamen ab aeterno sunt. Nec essentiae sunt ut verum sit dicere quod humana natura vel essentia ab aeterno. Nec est natura humana nec essentia aliqua in natura. Et quod ab aeterno humanitas est humanitas intellecta a Deo. Utrum autem si humanitas est humanitas intellecta a Deo, sequitur quod sit humanitas, nihil ad propositam quaestionem. Sed alias forte de hoc videbitur si contingat aliquando quaeri utrum essentiae rerum sint essentiae ab aeterno.

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What about particulars? The quotation above is taken from Peter’s question “whether there are ideas of particular accidents in God,” the first question of ‘Quodlibet’ II, but the first question of ‘Quodlibet’ IV also concerns ideas, “whether ideas in God are rationes of understanding creatures extra.” In article one of both questions Peter tries to define what an idea is. Plato and Aristotle disagree, unfortunately, but Peter will try to harmonize them somehow. Building on the classic treatment of Augustine in question 46 of ‘83 Questions’, one could define an idea as “the forma or species that is the principle of understanding and producing that of which is it the formal species.” And one can bring in the term ratio, because “a forma or a species intellecta is a certain ratio.” These three terms, forma, species, and ratio, cover different ground, however, so that Peter concludes the article by saying that an idea as it pertains to the intellect is taken in three ways, as forma intellecta, as species intellecta, and as ratio intellecta.16 And “since all that is in God’s mind is eternal and immutable, these rationes must also be eternal, immutable, ingenerable, and incorruptable.”17 Peter attributes any disagreement to this trifold way of accepting ‘idea’. Plato and his followers, Peter claims, partial to the forma intellecta meaning, maintained that there are ideas of subsistent things alone, independently existing ‘universals’, one assumes. “Plato seems to have posited that ideas persist in being separately,” Peter relates, “but Augustine just posited them in the divine intellect.” Accordingly, “Some of our doctors (doctores nostri),” probably Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines, think of an idea as a species intellecta, not something for singulars, but just of species, more like universals in God’s mind. Still others, probably Thomas Aquinas, take ideas to be of all things that exist in any way whatsoever, which corresponds to the ratio intellecta interpretation. “And each [author] does so reasonably in this,

16 II.1.1: Forma autem vel species principium est intelligendi et producendi illud cuius est formalis species [...] Forma vero vel species intellecta ratio quaedam est [...] Et ideo videtur quod idea secundum quod est aliquid pertinens ad intellectum tripliciter dicitur: uno modo secundum quod est forma intellecta; alio modo species intellecta dicibilis de individuis immediate; alio autem modo secundum quod est ratio intellecta respectu cuiuscumque et qualitercumque entis; cf. IV.1.1. 17 IV.1.1: Cum igitur omne quod est in mente divina aeternum et incommutabile sit, huiusmodi rationes necesse est aeternas et incommutabiles esse ingenerabiles et incorruptibiles.

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according to the definition (ratio) of idea that he assumed beforehand.”18 Peter has little desire to pick a fight. Taken as ratio, since God knows all things and all things that exist in any way whatsoever are somehow in the divine essence, there are ideas of all things in God, universal and particular, even particular accidents. Moreover, all things that are producible by God have a ratio intellecta through which they can be produced. In sum, “God has rationes of all that exist or even that are able to exist in the universe in any way whatsoever.”19 All that are produced are in God’s active power, in the divine essence, before they are produced. “And in this way they are even the same in reality as the divine essence, having no diversity at all, either from themselves or from the divine essence.” For diversity in these would entail composition in the divine essence itself, which is contrary to the definition of God as first principle.20 Peter explains how one goes from this non-diversity to the variety in the world by adopting a view akin to Henry of Ghent’s: First and principally the divine intellect comprehends (intelligit) His essence as its first object, and in this way the one comprehending, what is comprehended, and even comprehension are in all ways the same. But comprehending His essence first, He comprehends all that are in it according to [His] power quasi as secondary objects. He comprehends them as distinct and as diverse from each other by the distinction they have or can have from Him in reality. And this puts no diversity in Him, because they are not compared to Him as something 18 IV.1.1: Has autem rationes seu formas Augustinus vocavit ‘ideas’, sequens Platonem, nisi quod Plato videtur eas posuisse separatas in esse per se subsistere, Augustinus autem in intellectu divino tantum. II.1.2: Et secundum hoc diversi diversimode accipientes rationem ideae diversimode dixerunt de his. Aliqui quidem quod tantum sunt per se subsistentium, sicut Plato et quidam sequentes eum. Aliqui autem quod specierum tantum et non singularium, sicut aliqui de doctoribus nostris. Aliqui autem quod omnium qualitercumque entium. Et rationabiliter unusquisque quantum ad hoc secundum rationem quam de idea praeaccipiebat. 19 II.1.2: Igitur Deus rationes habet omnium eorum quae qualitercumque in universo sunt vel etiam possunt esse. 20 II.1.3: De tertio intelligendum quod entia quorum sunt ideae sunt in essentia divina in virtute activa, sicut omnes formae materiales quarum materia est principium sunt in ipso virtute [...] Et sic haec etiam realiter sunt idem quod essentia divina nullam habentes diversitatem, nec a se invicem nec ab ipsa secundum actum omnino. Si enim aliquam diversitatem haberent quoquo modo in ea, esset in essentia divina aliqua compositio, et per consequens non esset principium primum.

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informing Him, but as a secondary object, not a primary one […] So these rationes of beings that can be produced by God, understood by Him insofar as they are the rationes of understanding the things of which they are, and as they are certain principles of producing, I believe that the philosophers call them ‘ideas’ in God.21

That is the wording in ‘Quodlibet’ II. Two years later he expressed it as follows: The divine intellect, comprehending His essence, perfectly comprehends actually and distinctly all that are united in His essence, actually indistinct, but distinct in potency or power. So if the rationes or naturae or formae of things are in His essence according to power, He distinctly comprehends all the formae or rationes of what exists.22

But because God must understand the thing as it would be in reality in order to produce it, these ideas that are in the divine essence before the production of things according to God’s virtue are the same as the things actually existing. Otherwise what God knows via His essence would differ in reality from the thing itself, and thus God would not know the thing in itself, but something else, something similar. Consequently, when He produced the thing in being, it would be through knowing something different.23 21 II.1.3: Intellectus autem divinus primo et principaliter intelligit essentiam suam sicut primum obiectum ipsius, et secundum hoc idem est omnibus modis intelligens et intellectum et etiam intelligentia. Intelligendo autem essentiam suam primo intelligit omnia quae sunt in ipsa secundum virtutem quasi quaedam obiecta secundaria. Intelligit autem ea distincta ad invicem et diversa distinctione quam habent vel habere possunt ab ipso rerum natura, et hoc nullam diversitatem ponit in eo, quia non comparantur ad ipsum sicut aliquid informans, sed sicut obiectum secundarium, non primum [...] Istae igitur rationes entium possibilium a Deo produci intellectae ab ipso secundum quod sunt rationes intelligendi ea quorum sunt et principia quaedam producendi, credo quod ‘ideae’ dicantur in eo apud philosophos. 22 IV.1.2: Propter quod intellectus divinus, intelligens essentiam suam, perfecte intelligit actu distincte omnia quae unita sunt in essentia eius, indistincta in actu, distincta tamen in potentia vel virtute. Si igitur rationes vel naturae vel formae rerum sunt in essentia eius secundum virtutem, omnes formas seu rationes entium distincte intelligit. 23 II.1.3: ³Si enim quod Deus per essentiam suam primo cognoscit de re differt ab ea realiter, tunc Deus ipsam rem secundum se non cognosceret, sed aliquid alterum et simile, et per consequens per id quod cognoscit de re, non produceret eam in esse. Hoc autem est inconveniens²; cf. IV.1.3.

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In both questions, Peter brings up an alternative view, roughly identifiable as that of Thomas Aquinas. In ‘Quodlibet’ II, he says: For some [doctors], however, the divine essence itself as first comprehended, in which all the aforesaid rationes are comprehended as in the first object, is said to be an idea, according to which it has a habitude toward the rationes or naturae themselves of existing things. And then [the idea] is the same as the divine essence itself, differing only according to different habitudes, and it really differs from the things of which it is an idea, just as the divine essence does.24

This is just one of the ways to understand ‘idea’, and Peter concludes the question just afterwards by repeating his view that all opinions make sense when properly understood. But in ‘Quodlibet’ IV Peter actually enters into a debate. “A common opinion, which even great masters still share, is that the divine essence itself is the idea of each creature insofar as the divine essence is imitable to any degree by a creature.” They claim that when the divine intellect comprehends the essence under some relation or other, it comprehends creatures. This seems to be the same basic Thomistic alternative theory he had brought up two years before, but Peter has given the position more thought.25 Peter does not like this notion, and he presents three arguments against it. First, because a relation requires a terminus ad quem and hence entails some reliance on the subject of the relation. But God cannot depend on creatures in order to know them. Second, because for the intellect to establish the relation, or respect, in the creature’s essence, it appears to require the intellect to comprehend the creature’s essence beforehand. It must comprehend the creature before it comprehends the creature. Third, the principle of being and the principle of knowing are the same thing, but on this scheme the essence would not be the principle of being for creatures, since what is said ad aliquid is not the principle of being for creatures. “Thus the divine

24 II.1.3: Apud aliquos autem ipsa essentia divina intellecta primo, in qua intelliguntur rationes omnes praedictae sicut in primo obiecto, dicitur idea, secundum quod habitudinem habet ad ipsas rationes vel naturas entium. Et tunc idem est re quod ipsa essentia divina, differens tantum secundum habitudines diversas, et realiter differt ab eis quorum per se est idea, sicut ipsa essentia divina. 25 IV.1.3: Ad tertium autem dicendum quod, secundum communem opinionem adhuc magnorum, quod ipsa essentia divina secundum quod imitabilis in tali gradu vel tali a creatura est idea huius vel illius creaturae. Propter quod intellectus divinus, intelligens essentiam suam sub hac relatione vel illa, intelligit creaturas.

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essence as imitable is not the ratio or principle of comprehending creatures per se.”26 The theory that the divine essence is the one idea or ratio of understanding of things would be taken up again by others later, but perhaps without the habitude or relation element. But for Peter the divine essence itself cannot play the role, so there must be ideas in God “as things’ formae or species or rationes existing in God’s mind,” Peter says, citing explicitly his earlier discussion in ‘Quodlibet’ II. These ideal reasons or forms are both the ratio of comprehending and the principle of producing creatures. After all, “A man is formed with one ratio, a horse with another,” according to Augustine’s ‘83 Questions’, repeated in four places in Peter’s quodlibetal questions on divine knowledge.27 In sum, Peter avoids controversy, but, to the extent that there is disagreement, he tacitly leans away from Aquinas and towards Henry of Ghent.

II. Modal Issues Although medievalists have dealt extensively with the mechanisms of divine knowledge, what we have been discussing, lately they have focused more attention on specific modal aspects of the issue, especially on the problem of divine foreknowledge of future contingents and the question whether medieval theologians believed that what is possible depends on God or is

26 IV.1.3: Sed contra: omne quod refertur ad aliud secundum quod huiusmodi secundum intellectum dependet ex intellectu eius quod est subiectum relationis [...] Idem etiam in parte sequitur si intelligat non per respectum fundatum in ipsa essentia sua, sed in essentia ipsa creaturae per se, quia ad hoc quod intellectus huiusmodi respectum fundet in essentia creaturae, necessario praeintelligit essentiam creaturae super quam per se fundatur [...] Sequeretur etiam quod prius intelligeret creaturam quam intelligeret eam [...] Praeterea, quod non est principium vel ratio aliqua essendi secundum quod huiusmodi creaturis non est principium intelligendi per se et essentialiter [...] Igitur essentia divina ut imitabilis non est ratio vel principium intelligendi per se creaturas. 27 IV.1.3: ‘Non enim eadem ratione formatus est homo qua equus,’ secundum Augustinum, 83 quaestionum quaestione 46 – videtur esse dicendum quod ideae in Deo sint formae vel species seu rationes rerum existentes in mente ipsius sicut intellecta secundario ab ipsa, sicut alias declaratum fuit in secundo Quolibet, prima quaestione.

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independent of God. The problem of divine foreknowledge was usually approached from two directions: first, how does God know what has not yet happened? Second, concerning future contingents, events or situations whose occurrence is not necessary, but rather may or may not come to pass, how can their contingency be reconciled with the fact that God knows the future? Peter of Auvergne’s treatment of divine foreknowledge of future contingents is the aspect of his theory of divine knowledge that has drawn the most attention, perhaps because Thomas Aquinas’ own opinion on the issue has been well served, but also because Peter makes a clear reference to Aquinas – or as clear as one can expect from someone who never mentions near contemporary thinkers by name. Already in 1938, Julianus Groblicki devoted several pages to Peter in his book on the doctrine of divine foreknowledge of future contingents of Aquinas and his first followers, although Groblicki assumed that Peter was, if not a Dominican himself, then at least educated in a convent of the Order.28 Aquinas’ theory was the starting point for many discussions in the following decades. Beginning from the common point of departure that he shared with his contemporaries, the notion that God is unchanging and eternal, in the sense of outside of time, and yet knows everything that has been, is, and will be in time, Aquinas had taught that God knows future contingents because they are somehow present to His eternity. What exactly he meant by this ‘presence’ was and is the subject of some discussion. Aquinas’ immediate successors, both supporters and opponents, usually interpreted Aquinas as saying that future contingents are already really and actually present in eternity in their own natures. In his ‘Correctorium’ 28 Groblicki, Julianus, De scientia Dei futurorum contingentium secundum S. Thomam eiusque primos sequaces, Kraków 1938, pp. 73–78. Groblicki employed manuscript Rome, Bibl. Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 932 unfortunately not a good witness to transcribe portions of the two questions on future contingents, noting that an article from the later question is repeated from the earlier one. In his 1967 book on James of Metz, Bruno Decker looked more briefly at Peter’s questions on divine foreknowledge: Decker, Bruno, Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz. Untersuchungen zur Dominikanertheologie zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 42.1), Münster 1967, pp. 184–185. Following Decker, Maarten Hoenen, Divine Knowledge in Late Medieval Thought (note 11), pp. 169–170, noted that Peter was one of the early critics of the theory of Thomas Aquinas that everything is present to God in His eternity.

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written against Aquinas’ opinions, the Franciscan William de la Mare at‑ tacked this notion as contrary to the faith, claiming that this would entail that things other than God are eternal. William countered that future contingents are only eternally present according to their “causal ideas or rationes.” The Dominican Richard Knapwell responded in one of the Correctoria against William’s own ‘Correctorium’ – now called the ‘Corruptorium’ – that William and earlier Dominicans and Franciscans had misunderstood Aquinas. For Knapwell, while Aquinas’ opponents correctly criticized the position that future contingents are eternally present in their actual being, which would also entail that God depended on their actual being for His knowledge, Aquinas did not mean that, but rather held that they are present to God in eternity as they are known or seen.29 Peter of Auvergne appears to fit into the minority Knapwell camp. His ‘Quodlibet’ IV, question 2, asks “whether future contingents are coexistent with God.” His argument Contra is that “what does not exist, does not coexist with God, as is obvious; but future contingents do not exist insofar as they are future; therefore they do not coexist with God” [IV.2.0.8–10]. Peter first defines eternity and how God relates to it, a nice presentation of the philosopher’s God, which he plagiarizes two years later in a different context [IV.2.1.15–38].30 Next he asserts, following Proclus again, that “all things that exist in any way whatsoever, living and non-living, immutable and mutable, and their dispositions and order proceed from God” [IV.2.2.39–41]. Third he offers a definition of contingents in the Thomist tradition: Contingents are able to be and not to be, not all of them, but those that frequently or usually do not proceed from causes with respect to which they are contingent, which causes are causes per accidens. So because God is the per se cause of all things that exist in any way whatsoever, and nothing is inordinate with respect to Him, nothing is contingent ad utrumlibet with respect to Him, but rather all things are per se ordered and come about immutably. But with respect to particular causes, which do not have a per se order toward their being, they are properly called contingent. For this reason future contingents are said 29 For the story, see the works cited above in note 28 and Schabel, Chris, Friedman, Russell L. and Balcoyiannopoulou, Irene, Peter of Palude and the Parisian Reaction to Durand of St. Pourçain on Foreknowledge and Future Contingents, in: Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum 71 (2001), pp. 183–300, at pp. 215–239. 30 VI.4.2: see text in Schabel, The ‘Quodlibeta’ of Peter of Auvergne (note 1), pp. 87–88.

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to be and are those things that are able to be and not to be in the future from particular causes that do not have an order toward them [IV.2.3.54–63].31

In answer to the question “whether future contingents are coexistent with God,” then, it depends on how one takes “future contingents” [IV.2.4]. There are three possibilities: first, according to the being they have in God as first cause; second, according to known being, esse cognitum; third, according to their own nature, which was what Aquinas’ immediate successors took to be his position. Taken in the first way, indeed future contingents coexist with God, since they must exist in God in some way in order to proceed from Him: “All things that proceed or are able to proceed from any cause preexist in it in some way” [IV.2.4.69–70]. Nevertheless, this is not really “coexisting” strictly speaking. Likewise, in the second way, according to their esse intellectum, future contingents coexist with God in eternity. God knows all things from eternity, so “future contingents, according to their esse intellectum, coexist with God from eternity, present to Him and always existing according to cognition” [IV.2.4.85–87]. But as far as their being outside the intellect is concerned, the answer is no: future contingents do not coexist with God. “What does not exist, when it does not exist, does not coexist with God. For what coexists with another, exists, when it coexists” [IV.2.4.90–91]. Future contingents neither 31 There were already more sophisticated formulations, for example by Siger of Brabant, and Scotus would reply that this sort of contingency is no real contingency at all, so he grounded contingency in God’s will. Later, the Franciscan Francis of Marchia and the Augustinian Hermit Michael of Massa would clarify that all secondary natural causation functions necessarily, given the first cause. The Franciscan Peter Auriol and others would go further and state that, therefore, even Scotus’ contingency is irrelevant, since what matters is the contingency of human willing. For the most past this discussion took place after Peter of Auvergne’s career, and the closest he comes to this fourteenth-century view is in his ‘Quodlibet’ V, question 4, on angels revealing the future. There he speaks of knowledge, Item, eorum quae supra facultatem naturae sunt, puta futurorum contingentium quae ex sola voluntate Dei dependent, possunt habere cognitionem [...], but this seems to refer merely to supernatural futures, not all futures. Generally, when Peter speaks of the divine will in this context, it is not connected to contingency. For some literature and the fourteenth-century discussion, see Schabel, Chris, Theology at Paris 1316–1345. Peter Auriol and the Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents (Ashgate Studies in Medieval Philosophy), Aldershot 2000, pp. 42–46, 76–87, 193–207, 215–220.

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exist nor coexist. If they did, then so would past things, and then past things would coexist with future things, and two different times would exist at once, circumstances that are impossible. For Peter, “it is impossible for future contingents to coexist actually with God as future” [IV.2.4.101–102]. Now if William de la Mare, Peter of Tarentaise, and many other early partisans and enemies of Aquinas were correct in their interpretation of the Angelic Doctor’s theory, that he meant that future contingents are really and actually present in eternity in their own natures, then Peter of Auvergne’s denial of this thesis would put him in the Franciscan camp as a strong opponent of Thomism. Whatever his motivations may have been, however, Peter does not want to be seen as attacking Aquinas. His conclusion is interesting: One should note, however, that everything that exists in any way whatsoever, according to the being that it has, coexists with God, because everything that exists in any way whatsoever exists in eternity or in time […] But God is in eternity, and eternity coextends with time. So since contingents are always either future, or presently existing, or past after they have been, according to one of these beings they are present and in some way coexistent as such. Hence, when they have future being, their futureness is present to God, for they are future when God is; when they have present being in act, according to this being they coexist with God, for they are in act when God is; but when they are past, their pastness exists when God is, and thus according to their past being they coexist with God. And I believe that this was the intention of that doctor who posited that future contingents coexist with God – or because they coexist according to cognition [IV.2.4.103–116].

So no matter what, it looks like Peter has tried to protect himself from criticism from both opponents and supporters of Aquinas. Although Peter of Auvergne is considered a university master of the thirteenth century, his second question on future contingents, his final question on divine knowledge, is from the fourteenth century. This time Peter deals with the other crucial issue. The first question asked how God knows future contingents, more or less, while this one asks how God’s knowledge can coexist, so to speak, with the contingency of things. The first two articles merely state the two horns of the dilemma: first, immutable God knows all things, including mutable things, with His immutable knowledge [VI.2.1]. Second, as he stated in ‘Quodlibet’ IV, future contingents can either happen or not happen – with respect to particular causes, that is, but not with respect to God [VI.2.2]. Finally, Peter provides proofs for how the two go together: knower and known are joined through knowledge, so God’s immutable and certain knowledge knows all, “even mutable and contingent things” [VI.2.3.64]. The second argument is hardly more convincing: God produces

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contingents through His knowledge, so His knowledge and the contingency of things are compatible. Third, “all intermediate causes have an essential ordering to divine knowledge.” So God knows them, they are responsible for contingency, and thus the two go together. Q.E.D. [VI.2.3.75–76]. Or maybe not. Since in essence these arguments merely state as fact that God’s foreknowledge is compatible with the contingency of the future, after the responses to the opening argument of the question, Peter adds the obvious doubt: “But perhaps someone will say: ‘If God foreknows that contingents will be, they will be in nature necessarily, since the antecedent is necessary, namely that God foreknows them’” [VI.2.Ad.Arg.107–108]. Peter gives the traditional reply, stemming from Boethius, that we must distinguish between the benign necessity of the consequence and the malignant necessity of the consequent. In the consequence ‘Socrates is running; therefore Socrates is moving’, ‘Socrates is running’ is the antecedent and ‘Socrates is moving’ is the consequent. In a good consequence, the consequent follows from the antecedent necessarily, by the necessity of the consequence: necessarily, if Socrates is running, Socrates is moving. But this is not absolute necessity, since the antecedent, ‘Socrates is running’, is by no means necessary absolutely, it being entirely possible for Socrates not to be running. Thus the consequent, ‘Socrates is moving’, is only necessary on the contingent condition that Socrates is running, not by the absolute ‘necessity of the consequent’, as it was termed. Peter is unconvinced: “But this does not seem to suffice” [VI.2.Ad. Arg.115], Peter says, because here the antecedent, for example ‘God foreknows that Socrates will run’, is necessary, and thus so is the consequent following from that antecedent in a valid consequence: ‘therefore Socrates will run’. Accordingly, Peter offers one final attempt to explain how God’s foreknowledge and the contingency of the future can be reconciled, before terminating the question abruptly: the contingent is necessary, eternal, and invariable with respect to God’s knowledge, in which it exists according to its ratio, but in its own nature in the world it is contingent. Although the argument is not satisfying, ultimately it may be the best one can do. The solution is a mystery to us, as Peter Auriol, William of Ockham, and Gregory of Rimini would later remark at some point in their discussions. The second modal issue that occupies modern students of divine knowledge in the late-thirteenth and early-fourteenth centuries is the ‘chickenand-egg’ problem with respect to what is possible. If these essences or forms or species or rationes exist in God’s mind, in some way, from eternity, Peter and other theologians are clear that they have no independent,

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logically “prior” existence outside of God’s mind. Their existence in eternity, however one understands that, is completely dependent on God’s mind, essence, and power, and not vice-versa to any degree whatsoever. But when medieval theologians ask about the criterion for what can and cannot have an essence, form, species, or ratio in God, their answers are often unclear. Peter of Auvergne is no exception. He has said repeatedly that God knows everything that exists or can exist in any way whatsoever. In the first question of his last ‘Quodlibet’, Peter asks “whether God can produce in being whatever He comprehends outside Himself.” The formulation of the question itself is curious: presumably we are talking in some way about the situation “prior” to production, so it seems he is being asked about things “outside Himself” prior to production. Now, in the second article Peter turns to “dissolving the argument ad oppositum, because of which, I believe, the question was brought up,” and this has to do with the infinite. The discussion of what kind of infinite exists actually or in potency is interesting, and in it Peter cites his treatment five years earlier in questions 2 through 5 of his first ‘Quodlibet’, but for this paper the important thing is in the introductory article one.32 Peter opens by declaring that “God comprehends outside Himself whatever has or can have the ratio of being in any way whatsoever.” Since He understands His essence perfectly, He also understands everything in it, to which His power extends, which is everything that “has or can have the ratio of being in any way whatsoever.” Likewise, “whatever does not have nor cannot have any ratio of being, per se or per accidens, is not understood by God or any intellect at all.” Fine, but what determines what can and cannot have this ratio? Negations, privations, and evils do, per accidens, and they are understood both by the uncreated and created intellect. What cannot is “what is per se prohibited from being, namely, what includes or posits a contradiction.”33 Peter does not ask the question whether God 32 VI.1: Quorum primum fuit utrum Deus possit producere in esse quicquid extra se intelligit; VI.1.2: Propter dissolutionem rationis quae est in oppositum, propter quam, ut credo, inducta fuit quaestio, est intelligendum quod ‘infinitum’ dicitur dupliciter [...] sicut ostensum fuit primo Quolibet, secunda quaestione et tribus sequentibus. 33 VI.1.1: Propter dissolutionem huius quaestionis est primo intelligendum quod Deus extra se intelligit quicquid habet vel habere potest rationem entis qualitercumque, quoniam intelligit perfecte essentiam suam [...] Ergo Deus extra se intelligit quicquid habet vel habere potest rationem entis qualitercumque [...] Ex quo apparet quod illud quod non habet aliquam

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decides what includes a contradiction, or whether God is constrained by what does or does not posit one. It appears that he would have said that God is constrained, and this seems to be the case when discussing the infinite in the next article. God can only understand the infinite that is possible; it is not what God determines to be a possible infinite that He then understands. It is interesting that, even here, Peter concludes his treatment with a difference of opinion on infinites concerning which, rather than supporting one side and refuting the other, Peter explains both positions and leaves it at that.34

rationem entis nec per se nec per accidens non intelligitur a Deo nec a quocumque intellectu [...] impossibile est illud quod non habet aliquo modo rationem entis intelligi ab intellectu quocumque [...] Negationes enim et privationes et mala universaliter quae apprehenduntur ab intellectu creato vel increato aliquam habent rationem entis, non per se, sed per accidens [...] illud quod nullam potest habere rationem entis non potest ab eo produci. Hoc autem est quod ex se prohibitum est esse, puta quod includit contradictionem vel ponit. 34 VI.1.2: Ulterius accipiendum est quod infinitum continuum in actu non intelligitur a Deo nec est ab ipso intelligibile, quoniam omne quod a Deo est intelligibile aliquam rationem entis habet, sicut ostensum est prius. Quantum autem continuum infinitum in actu nec est nec esse potest secundum quod huiusmodi. Igitur non est a Deo intelligibile [...] Item, nec infinitum secundum quantitatem discretam in actu a Deo est intelligibile, quoniam huiusmodi nec est nec esse potest in natura [...] Adhuc ulterius est accipiendum quod infinitum in actu permixto potentiae ad ulteriorem actum, sive in continuis sive in discretis, est intelligibile et a Deo intelligitur, quoniam ‘omne quod est vel potest habere rationem entis ab ipso est intelligibile et intelligitur,’ sicut prius ostensum est [...] Similiter autem et quicumque numerus ut in potentia est ad divisionem post quamlibet additionem hoc modo infinitus est, et est et potest esse in rerum natura. Huiusmodi igitur infinitum est intelligibile intelligitur a Deo [...] Utrum autem infinita multitudo differentium secundum numerum sub eadem specie sit vel etiam esse possit in rerum natura aliquibus videtur quod sic [...] Aliquibus autem videtur quod non potest esse multitudo differentium secundum numerum sub eadem specie nisi in actu permixto potentiae ad ulteriorem actum. Peter then responds to the opening argument.

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III. Conclusion Julianus Groblicki was quite unimpressed with the questions he examined, claiming that Peter did not understand Aquinas’ position correctly and that Peter and certain others who tried to follow Aquinas faithfully did not interpret him very clearly or in much depth. Groblicki surmised that Peter’s view may have been tainted because he had studied with Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines. It is more likely, however, given Peter’s general approach to theology, that he was being charitable to the Angelic Doctor, reading him in a way that made the most sense to Peter. Moreover, Peter criticized Aquinas’ position to an extent on the issue of divine knowledge in ‘Quodlibet’ IV, naming “great doctors” as adherents of the theory in question. There he indeed leaned instead toward Henry of Ghent. But this should not be seen as “tainting”, for Groblicki was wrong about Peter’s relationship to the Dominicans in the first place. As a theologian generally, however, rather than focus on conflict and engage in polemics, Peter wished to reconcile opposing positions, often by resorting to explanations of equivocal terminology. Peter thus gives the impression that Paris was calm before the intellectual storm brought by John Duns Scotus and the political tempest caused by the culmination of the dispute between Philip the Fair and Boniface VIII.35

35 On how this affected the University, see Courtenay, William J., Between Pope and King. The Parisian Letters of Adhesion of 1303, in: Speculum 71 (1996), pp. 577–605.

IV. Appendix The critical editions are based on all the witnesses known to carry the text.36 Notations in the apparatus are standard. The sigla and foliation for these questions are as follows: B =

Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, Preuss. Kulturbesitz, lat. fol. 428: 77rb–vb; 96ra–b

D=

Padova, Biblioteca Antoniana, XXIII. 662: 140vb–141va; 172vb–173va

E =

Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Dep. Erf. CA 2o 108: 200vb–201va (IV.2 deest)

M=

Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine, 3512: 91va–92ra; 111va–112ra

P =

Praha, Národní Knihovna, XIII.D.5 (Y.II. 3.n.1.) (2297): 45ra–va; 53ra–54ra

S =

Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, Preuss. Kulturbesitz, Magdeb. 149: 53vb– 54va; 86va–87rb

T =

Troyes, Bibliothèque Municipale, 269: 165rb–vb; 186rb–187ra

V=

Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 932: 141va–142rb; 162rb–vb

W=

Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. F 3121 A: 48rb–49ra; 77vb–78va

X=

Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 14562: 47vb–48rb; 75vb–76va

Y=

Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 15841: 28ra–va; 44va–b

Z =

Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 15851: 44vb–45va; 70ra–vb

36 See my The ‘Quodlibeta’ of Peter of Auvergne (note 1). pp. 98–108, for an analysis of the manuscript tradition, based primarily in these editions.

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Quodlibet IV, quaestio 2

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Postea quaesitum fuit de coexistentia creaturarum ad Deum, an scilicet futura contingentia coexistentia sint ipsi. Et arguebatur quod sic, quia quicquid coexistit aeternitati, coexistit Deo, quia Deus aeternus est, secundum illud Psalmi: “Tu autem in aeternum permanes.” Futura autem contingentia coexistunt aeternitati, ipsi enim non coexistit omnis differentia temporis, ei enim nihil futurum vel praeteritum est. Igitur futura contingentia coexistunt Deo. Contra: quod non est, Deo non coexistit, ut manifestum est ex se. Futura autem contingentia non sunt, secundum quod futura. Igitur non coexistunt Deo. Ad huius quaestionis dissolutionem primo accipiendum est quid est aeternitas et quomodo ad Deum se habet; secundo quomodo ad ea quae sunt sub ea; tertio quid dicimus ‘futurum contingens’; quarto ex hoc poterit apparere solutio propositae quaestionis.

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Ad declarationem primi accipiendum est quod Deum ex se necesse est esse, si enim non ex se necesse est esse, ex se possibile est esse. Quod autem tale est, ex alio dependet priori. Quod vero ex alio priori dependet in esse suo, primum non est, nec per consequens Deus, cum Deus sit primum simpliciter in entibus. Quod autem ex se necesse est esse, omnino est interminabile, nullam habens rationem termini, nec secundum causalitatem nec secundum durationem. Si enim hoc haberet, non esset necesse esse ex se. Tale etiam secundum omnem modum est incommutabile. Si enim mutabile esset, dependeret ex alio. Quod vero interminabile et incommutabile est, omnino totum esse suum perfectum simul habet, nihil acquirens in futurum nec amittens in praeteritum. Quod etiam ex se necesse est esse, omnino separatum est a materia. Si enim aliquam rationem materiae haberet, non esset ex se necesse esse. Omne autem separatum simpliciter intelligens est et vivens vita intellectuali. Deus igitur est intelligens et vivens vita intellectuali perfectissima interminabili et immutabili omnino. Haec igitur vitae interminabilitas ‘aeternitas’ dicitur. Unde Boethius, 5 De consolatione, eam definiens, dicit quod “aeternitas est interminabilis vitae possessio tota simul et perfecta.” Et hac Deus simpliciter aeternus dicitur et est. Et secundum rem est idem quod ipse, si enim esset aliud ab ipso secundum

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rem, esset in ipso aliqua compositio et dependeret ex alio et non esset ex se necesse esse. Differunt tamen secundum rationem, quoniam secundum essentiam consideratus dicitur ‘Deus’ vel ‘deitas’, secundum autem quod interminabilis ‘aeternus’ dicitur, quemadmodum secundum quod indivisus dicitur ‘unus’, secundum essentiam autem acceptus ‘ens’ vel ‘esse’.

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De secundo intelligendum est quod a Deo omnia qualitercumque entia, et viventia et non-viventia, immutabilia et mutabilia, et eorum dispositiones et ordo procedunt. Omnia enim per ipsum facta sunt, Iohannis 1. Unde Philosophus dicit, I Caeli et mundi: “Ab aeterno primo derivatum est singulis, his quidem proprie, his vero longius.” Et Boethius, I De consolatione: “O qui perpetua mundum ratione gubernas, terrarum caelique sator, qui tempus ab aevo ire iubes, stabilisque manens das cuncta moveri.” Ex quo manifestum est quod rerum immobilitas et motus, et existentiae motus secundum prius et posterius, quae ‘tempus’ dicitur, secundum Augustinum, II Confessionum, ab ipso sicut a causa prima et per se habent immediate vel per medium unum vel plura inde procedunt. Et ideo esse earum in actu non est sine esse illius. Et hoc dicendum de secundo.

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Propter tertium autem intelligendum quod aliqua sunt semper eodem modo entia quae sunt ex necessitate, alia vero semper non-entia quae impossibile est esse, alia vero media inter haec, aliquando quidem entia, aliquando vero non-entia – et in istis sunt contingentia, quae possunt esse et non esse, non quaecumque, sed illa quae ut frequenter et ut in pluribus non procedunt ex causis respectu quarum contingentia sunt, quae sunt causae per accidens. Quia igitur Deus est causa per se omnium qualitercumque entium, et nihil inordinatum est relatum ad ipsum, nihil est contingens ad utrumlibet respectu ipsius, sed omnia per se ordinata et immutabiliter evenientia. Respectu autem causarum particularium, quae non habent per se ordinem ad esse eorum, contingentia dicuntur proprie. Propter quod futura contingentia dicuntur et sunt quae ex causis particularibus non habentibus ordinem ad ipsa in futurum possunt esse et non esse.

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Chris Schabel Si igitur loquamur de ipsis quantum ad esse quod habent in sua causa, sic dicendum est quod coexistunt Deo. Si enim omnia quae procedunt vel possunt procedere ab aliqua causa, praeexistunt aliqualiter in ea, cum futura contingentia per se procedant vel possunt procedere a Deo, de necessitate aliquo modo existunt in eo. Non autem sunt aliquid in eo diversum ab ipso, sed ipsa eius essentia. “Creatura enim in creatrice essentia est creatrix essentia,” ut dicit Anselmus in Monologion. Tunc enim aliqua in eo esset compositio et penderet ex alio. Quaecumque autem sic praeexistunt in eo, coexistunt ei ab aeterno. Futura igitur contingentia secundum esse quod habent in sua causa prima coexistunt Deo ab aeterno, quamvis hoc non proprie dicatur ‘coexistere’. Si vero loquamur de eis quantum ad esse intellectum, sic praesentia sibi semper coexistunt ei. Omne enim intellectum est in intelligente secundum formam vel rationem eius. Deus autem intelligit contingentia futura ab aeterno, siquidem est producturus eorum per cognitionem et distincte, quia distincte producit. Unde Apostolus, Hebraeos 4, dicit: “Omnia nuda et aperta sunt oculis eius, ad quem nobis sermo.” Omne autem intellectum a Deo coexistit ei secundum quod cognitum vel intellectum. Futura igitur contingentia secundum esse intellectum eorum Deo coexistunt ab aeterno, praesentia ei secundum cognitionem semper existentia. Si vero loquamur de eis quantum ad esse in natura extra intellectum, sic videtur esse dicendum quod non coexistunt ei. Primo quidem quia, quod non est, quando non est, non coexistit Deo. Quod enim coexistit alii, existit, quando coexistit. Futura autem contingentia, quando futura sunt, non existunt, tunc enim futura non essent. Futura igitur contingentia, ut futura sunt, non coexistunt Deo. Secundo, quia qua ratione futura contingentia Deo coexistunt, eadem ratione et praeterita. Non enim aliter se habet aeternitas ad futura quam ad praeterita, cum eodem modo se habeat ad omnia. Quaecumque autem uni et eidem numero coexistunt, sibi invicem coexistunt, quemadmodum quaecumque uni et eidem sunt eadem, sibi invicem sunt eadem. Igitur futura contingentia et praeterita sibi invicem coexistent, et duo tempora simul erunt, et duae partes motus. Haec autem impossibilia sunt per se. Ergo futura contingentia secundum quod futura coexistere Deo in actu est impossibile. Advertendum est autem quod omne quod qualitercumque est, secundum esse quod habet, coexisit Deo, quia omne quod est qualitercumque, est in aeternitate vel tempore. “Hae enim duae sunt solum mensurae in entibus vitae et mortis,” 54 conclusione Procli. Deus autem est in aeternitate, et aeternitas coextenditur tempori. Cum igitur contingentia semper sint

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vel futura vel praesentialiter existentia vel praeterita postquam fuerunt, secundum aliquod istorum esse praesentia sunt et quodam modo coexistentia secundum quod huiusmodi, ita quod, cum habent esse futurum, futuritio eorum praesens est Deo, sunt enim futura quando Deus est; cum etiam habent esse praesens in actu, secundum hoc esse coexistunt Deo, sunt enim in actu cum Deus est; quando vero sunt praeterita, praeteritio eorum est quando Deus est, et sic secundum esse praeteritum coexistunt Deo. Et hanc credo fuisse intentionem illius doctoris qui posuit futura contingentia coexistere Deo, vel quia secundum cognitionem coexistunt.

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Ad rationem quae probat quod futura contingentia actu Deo coexistant, respondendum est. Cum dicitur primo, “quicquid coexistit aeternitati, coexistit Deo,” verum est. Cum autem assumitur quod “futura contingentia coexistunt aeternitati in actu,” dicendum quod non est verum. Nec etiam omnis differentia temporis actu coexistit aeternitati, sicut dictum est. Verum est tamen quod contingentia futura secundum futuritionem suam sunt praesentia, inquantum scilicet futura sunt, quando aeternitas est, sicut etiam cum praeterita sunt, praeteritio eorum praesens est aeternitati. Ratio in oppositum concedatur.

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Quodlibet VI, quaestio 2

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Secundo quaesitum fuit de Deo utrum certitudo scientiae eius stet cum rerum contingentia. Et argutum fuit quod non, quoniam scientiae certae et immutabilis est obiectum certum et immutabile. Ratio enim scientiae sumitur ex obiecto. Contingentia autem secundum quod huiusmodi incerta sunt et possunt aliter se habere. Igitur non sunt obiectum scientiae divinae. Non igitur stant simul cum ea. Contra: si contingentia ut contingentia sunt non stant cum scientiae divinae certitudine et immutabilitate, cum manifestum sit ea esse, evenirent de necessitate et non erunt contingentia, sed necessaria, et per consequens omnia erunt de necessitate. Hoc autem est impossibile. Ergo et primum. Ad solutionem istius quaestionis accipienda sunt quaedam, primo ex parte scientiae divinae; secundo alia ex parte naturae contingentium; tertio ex his poterit apparere ipsa solutio.

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Ex parte scientiae divinae accipiendum est primo quod ipsa universaliter se extendit ad omnia quae qualitercumque habent vel possunt habere esse, sicut ostensum est in praecedenti quaestione. Item, scientia divina est immutabilis omnino et invariabilis, quoniam scientia eius est substantia ipsius, quoniam si esset aliquid additum vel superveniens ei, esset in eo aliqua compositio et per consequens aliquid prius quod esset principium illius compositionis, propter quod non esset Deus, quem dicimus primum simpliciter in entibus. Hoc autem est impossibile per se. Ergo et primum. Substantia vero eius est omnino immutabilis et invariabilis per se et per accidens. Quare scientia eius est omnino immutabilis et invariabilis et per consequens certa. Per ipsam autem immutabilem et invariabilem existentem immutabiliter et invariabiliter intelligit omnia mutabilia et variabilia, quoniam rationes ideales secundum quas Deus intelligit alia a se omnia in intellectu divino existentes, non sicut inhaerentes eidem, sed sicut intellectum est in intelligente, aeternae sunt et immutabiles existentes, dicente Augustino, 83 Quaestionum 40 quaestione: “Ideae sunt quaedam formae vel rationes principales rerum stabiles et incommutabiles aeternae semper eodem modo se habentes, quae in divina intelligentia continentur, secundum quas

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oriri et interire dicitur quicquid oritur et occidit.” Et ideo, secundum eas immutabiles et invariabiles existentes, mutabilia et variabilia immutabiliter et invariabiliter intelligit. Et propter hoc Proclus, 44 conclusione libri sui, dicit: “Deus impartibiliter partibilia cognoscit, intransmutabiliter transmutabilia, intemporabiliter temporabilia, non-necessaria autem necessario, et universaliter omnia eminentius quam secundum ipsorum ordinem.” Item, per huiusmodi scientiam invariabilem existentem producit extra se quaecumque habent esse qualitercumque, sive sint necessaria sive contingentia. Ipse enim intellectus est. Intellectus autem per cognitionem et voluntatem producit quaecumque producit.

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Ex parte vero contingentium accipiendum est quod aliqua sunt eodem modo semper se habentia quae sunt necessaria, alia vero semper non-entia quae sunt impossibilia, alia vero media inter haec, quae aliquando quidem sunt, aliquando autem non sunt. Et in his sunt contingentia ad utrumlibet. Sed istorum quaedam contingunt ut in pluribus ex causis suis, sicut bipes generat bipedem ut in pluribus, alia vero non ut frequenter et in pluribus procedunt ex causis suis per accidens, et haec dicimus contingentia proprie. Quia igitur Deus est causa per se omnium qualitercumque entium, et nihil inordinatum est relatum ad ipsum, nihil est contingens ut ad ipsum relatum est, sed omnia per se ordinata et immutabiliter existentia. Respectu autem causarum particularium et mediarum quae non habent ordinem per se ad ea, dicuntur contingentia et sunt.

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His suppositis, dicendum est quod certitudo et immutabilitas scientiae divinae stat cum rerum contingentia. Primo quidem quoniam huiusmodi certitudo divinae scientiae stat cum eo cuius per se est ipsa scientia, secundum quod huiusmodi. Ex sciente enim et scibili per scientiam fit unum, sicut ex intelligibili et intelligente per intelligentiam. Sed probatum est prius quod Deus per scientiam suam invariabilem omnino et per consequens certam existentem invariabiliter novit omnia qualitercumque entia, etiam mutabilia et contingentia. Igitur certitudo et immutabilitas scientiae divinae stant cum contingentia rerum. Secundo, quia causa per se et in actu stat cum effectu eius per se, etiam in actu. Causa enim et effectus eius in actu sunt simul, secundum Philosophum, II Physicorum et V Metaphysicae. Sed Deus per scientiam eius certam et omnino invariabilem producit contingentia. Omnia enim qualitercumque

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Chris Schabel entia per scientiam eius producit, sicut declaratum est prius. Igitur scientia Dei certa et invariabilis existens stat cum contingentia rerum. Tertio, quia immutabilitas et certitudo scientiae divinae stat cum omnibus causis intermediis. In essentialiter enim ordinatis omnes causae intermediae substantiam et potentiam operandi et hoc ipsum quod operantur habent a causa prima, sicut probatur commento 56 conclusionis Procli. Sed omnes causae intermediae habent essentialem ordinem ad scientiam divinam immutabilem existentem. Igitur omnes causae intermediae stant cum certitudine scientiae divinae. Sed contingentia stant cum causis intermediis. Ab aliquibus enim eorum procedunt secundum quod huiusmodi, quamvis per accidens. Igitur contingentia rerum stat cum certitudine scientiae divinae. Quaecumque enim simul stant cum aliquo uno, inter se invicem simul stant. Sic igitur patet quod certitudo divinae scientiae stat cum rerum contingentia. Et concedatur ratio ad hoc adducta.

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Ad rationem in oppositum est dicendum supponendo prius quod obiectum primum intellectus divini est ipsa divina essentia. Et quia in ipsa sunt in virtute activa omnia qualitercumque rationem entis habentia vel possibilia habere, intellectus ipsius, intelligendo ipsam perfecte, distincte intelligit rationes omnium entium quomodocumque. Haec enim videtur esse vera intellectus: quod illa quae sunt virtute in aliquo distincte apprehendit, sicut intellectus intelligens rationem seminis intelligit distincte illud quod est in ipso virtute, quamvis ad hoc in nobis operetur sensus. Essentia autem divina aeterna et immutabilis et certa est omnino; rationes etiam entium exterius in ipso intellectu eius aeternae sunt et incommutabiles et certae, sicut ex praecedentibus manifestum esse videtur. Cum igitur accipitur quod “scientiae certae et incommutabilis est subiectum certum et immutabile,” verum est loquendo de obiecto per se et primo ipsius. Ab illo enim habet scientia speciem. Et cum assumitur quod “contingentia nec incommutabilia nec certa sunt,” dicendum quod verum est in rerum natura extra. Secundum esse tamen quod habent in natura divina, quia in ipsa sunt idem quod ipsa in actu – essentia enim creata in creatrice essentia non est aliud quam creatrix essentia, secundum Anselmum, quamvis sit aliud virtute – habent esse invariabile et certum. Iterum, in intellectu eius in quo sunt secundum eorum rationes, distincte sunt aeterna, invariabilia, et certa omnino. Ipsa autem secundum esse naturae non sunt primum obiectum scientiae divinae, sed magis materia. Sed dicet aliquis forte: si Deus praescit contingentia fore, in natura erunt

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de necessitate, cum antecedens sit necessarium, scilicet Deum illa praescire. Ad quod videtur respondere Boethius, V De consolatione, quod li ‘de necessitate’ potest dicere necessitatem consequentiae vel consequentis. Si dicat necessitatem consequentis, falsa est secundum hunc sensum: si Deus scit contingentia fore, contingentia in se erunt necessaria. Si vero dicat necessitatem consequentiae, est vera sub isto sensu: si Deus praescit etc., necessario sequitur quod contingentia erunt, contingenter tamen. Sed hoc non videtur sufficere, quoniam si antecedens est necessarium et consequentia necessaria, sicut in proposito Deum praescire futura fore est necessarium, consequens erit necessarium, scilicet contingentia esse, sicut in syllogismis, si principia sunt necessaria et etiam consequentia, necessaria conclusio est, sicut patet I Posteriorum. Propter quod ulterius dicendum videtur quod contingens potest considerari in habitudine ad scientiam divinam in qua est secundum rationem eius, et sic necessarium est. Secundum ipsam enim est aeternum et invariabile. Vel in se et secundum quod est in natura propria extra, et sic non est necessarium, ut sit verum dicere quod contingens quod est extra in natura secundum quod cognitum est a Deo vel intellectum est necessarium, non secundum se. Ratio in oppositum concedatur.

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Apparatus IV, 2 4–5 30–32 41 42–43 43–45 47–48 73–74 83–84 105–106 115–116 117 1 2 4 5 6 7 11 11–12 12 13 15 16 17 19 20 22 23 24 25

Ps 101.13. Boethius, De consolatione Philosophiae V, prosa 6. Io 1.3. Aristoteles, De caelo I, c. 9, 279a28–31. Boethius, De consolatione Philosophiae III, metrum 9. Cf. Augustinus, Confessionum libri tredecim XI, cc. 14–27. Anselmus, Monologion, c. 36, non verbatim. Hbr 4.13. Proclus, Elementatio theologica (note 7), propositio 54, p. 29, l. 2. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum in primum librum Sententiarum, d. 38, q. 1, a. 5; idem, Summa theologiae I, q. 14, a. 13. Hic supra, ll. 3–7. coexistentia] eo existentia M contingentia] sint s.l.2 add. M || sint ipsi] sicut ipsa ESVWZ; sicut ipsi M est] et T permanes] permanens EPTVZ || aeternitati] coaeternitati S || non om. B omnis] omnia V || ei om. DM || enim2 om. V; ii S || nihil] vel W || futurum] futuram S coexistunt] existunt V ad] respondeo M || est1 om. V ad ... habet] se habet ad deum D deum ... ad2 om. per homoio. M sub] un exp. P; s.l. Z || sub ea] substantia T || quid] quod V || poterit] potuit M declarationem] conclusionem D || quod] ex P non ex se] ex se non D; non est ex se M || necesse om. P || autem] ex BEDMSTY alio1] aliquo V || dependet1] a add. D || priori2 B, S p.c.; priore cett., S a.c. autem] etiam T || ex se om. P || est1 om. P || omnino om. V causalitatem] causalitate M omnem modum] omnimodum Z dependeret] dependentibus EPZ || interminabile] mitet minabile D perfectum om. DSTWY || habet] habens DV nec] vel M

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esse om. EPTWZ || omne om. V || intelligens] intellectus EPWZ(T?) est1 om. W || igitur est intelligens] intelligens igitur est P || intelligens] intellectus EMW(T?) || et2 om. DM interminabili] interminali DESTV; interminati Z 29 interminabilitas] interminalitas V || 5] 1 DMSW*Y 30 aeternitas] aeterni P || interminabilis] interminalis V 31 aeternus] aeterna V || aeternus dicitur inv. B || et3 om. V || est et om. B; est 32 etiam P 32–33 et secundum rem om. T esset1] esses E || compositio] secundum rem add. Y || et1 om. D 34 35 se BY; om. cett. || necesse] necessitate DSW || esse B; om. cett. || differunt] differt B; definit DSVWZ consideratus] consideratur MV || dicitur] dictus DSY; om. EPTVZ || deitas] 36 divinitas B interminabilis] intimat D; interminat M; interminalis SW || dicitur] deus P 37 dicitur om. S 38 secundo] autem add. Y || intelligendum est inv. S || est om. Y || omnia om. P 39 || qualitercumque] efficere add. M viventia] innentia Z || immutabilia] et mutabilia D; et immutabilia W || 40 mutabilia et] non mutabilia D || dispositiones] dispositione DMSWY; dispones P ordo] ordine W; omnia add. D || procedunt] a deo add. B || 1] 2 V 41 derivatum] demant D; determinatum V (*) 42 est] ens add. s.l. B || i om. T 43 qui perpetua] quam perpetue B || gubernas] gubernans P 44 sator] satorum Z || ire] enim D || iubes stabilisque] caubos stabilesque D || 45 das] dat P || moveri] momenta V est om. P || et1 om. DW || et2 om. DMP || existentiae] existentia BS; existentis D 46 47 dicitur] videtur V 48 causa prima inv. S 49 inde] vim M || et ideo] non + ? s.l. D 50 earum] eorum BSW (*) || dicendum] dicitur D 51 autem] est add. D || intelligendum] est add. P 52 ex] de W || vero] non add. B 53 est] esse P || quidem] quidam W 54 in istis om. W || quae] autem V 55 quaecumque] quaedam W || ut1 om. D 56 quae sunt om. D 57 est om. E || per se omnium] omnium per se P 58 inordinatum] inordinant E || relatum] realiter P 27 28

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utrumlibet] ultimum P; licet add. DP || per se] quidem Y eorum] earum BEPTVYZ || proprie] proprio EPVWZ id] illud V secundum] se add. V || causa] tam M esse2 om. V proprium] esse add. V habent] habet P sic om. S possunt procedere inv. P; possunt praecedere W || ea cum] ea tamen D; actum M 71 procedant] procedunt D || possunt procedere inv. P || necessitate] necesse P 72 sunt om. W || aliquid in eo] in eo aliquid BD; aliqui in eo P || diversum] divisum V (*) in om. D || creatrice] creatione* V 73 in monologion lac. Y || aliqua in eo esset] esset in eo aliqua S 74 compositio] cum ipso W; con Z || et om. D || penderet] dependeret DY 75 secundum om. DMSWY 76 causa prima inv. Z 77 77–78 non proprie] pro se non W coexistere] coexistentia V 78 sic praesentia (S a.c.)] simpliciter D; sint praesentia MZ; praesentia P; sic 79 praesentialiter Y, S p.c. semper] quod M || coexistunt] coexistent E || est om. V || intelligente] 80 intellectu Y intelligit contingentia inv. E 81 et om. E || distincte] distinctive M 82 82–83 quia distincte om. S; quia E ad V; om. cett. || hebraeos 4 dicit] dicit hebraeos 4 D 83 sunt oculis eius] oculis eius sunt S || quem] quod V || sermo] sine D 84 coexistunt] quo existunt EMPST 86 ei om. V 87 eis] his P 88 ei] et add. D 89 deo ... coexistit2 om. per homoio. D(W) || deo ... coexistit3 om. per homoio. 90 W || quod enim iter. Z || alii] aliquando V 91 existit] coexistit Y 92 essent] deo add. E (om. V) 92–93 existunt ... non om. per homoio. V 93 futura om. E(V) || deo om. DEMWY 97 eidem] eisdem P || numero] uno M 59 61 64 65 66 67 68 69 70

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eidem] eisdem P coexistent] coexistunt DMTVY, Wac; om. P (*) est] et add. S quod2 om. W in entibus] mentibus P coextenditur] coexistit B || cum igitur] cum B; cog’ Z sunt om. BETVZ et ... coexistentia om. B coexistentia] existentia M || quod cum] quod D; quantum* V cum etiam Z* (*)] lac. YZ*; om. BETV; consequens D; communis MP*S (*) coexistunt] coexistent P sunt enim] et D cum] quando Y || praeterita] potest ita PT est1 om. T credo] docre D || fuisse intentionem inv. V; esse intentionem Y coexistere] coexistunt D quod] quia W || coexistant] coexistunt DT; coexistat V cum om. D || dicitur] quod D || aeternitati coexistit om. per homoio. B est om. V || quod] quia W aeternitati in actu] in actu aternitati V contingentia] contIngentis M praesentia] principia V praeteritio] praeter con D || praesens] prius V || est om. P

Apparatus VI, 2 30–34 36–40 67–68 75 85 103 109 119

Augustinus, De diversis quaestionibus 83, q. 46 (!), PL 40, col. 29 Proclus, Elementatio theologica (note 7), propositio 124 (!), p. 62, ll. 1–4. Cf. Aristoteles, Physica II, c. 3, 195a16–18; idem, Metaphysica V, c. 2, 1014a21–23. Cf. Proclus, Elementatio theologica (note 7), propositio 56, p. 30, ll. 1–11. Hic supra, ll. 3–7. Cf. Anselmus, Monologion, c. 36. Cf. Boethius, De consolatione Philosophiae V, prosa 6. Cf. Aristoteles, Analytica Posteriora I, c. 6.

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autem] enim Z || incerta sunt inv. S || et possunt iter. M aliter se inv. W stant] stent V sunt om. S et] vel P || cum om. W || evenirent] evenient Y et non ... necessitate om. per homoio. V istus] illius PZ; huius VW alia] aliqua B || ipsa solutio inv. P ipsa om. M scientia] scium P || immutabilis] mutabilis V || omnino] omnis W est] aut W; ipsa add. PW || scientia ... quoniam om. per homoio. D eo] ea M || aliquid] aliquis P esset] esse M est2 om. P omnino immutabilis inv. V; immutabilis Z (om. P) || omnino ... est om. per homoio. P 24 quare] quia DVY (om. P) || certa] incerta W 26 immutabilem] immutabilitatem Y 26–27 immutabiliter et invariabiliter inv. Z 27 mutabilia] immutabilia DMTZ 28 alia a se omnia] omnia alia a se S; omnia a se alia Z || a se] animae* D; a te T; arem Z || in om. V 29 sicut1.... sed iter. V || sed om. P || in om. Z 31 83] sed P; lxxx Y || quaestionum] quantum P || 40] 80 Z || quaestione om. Y formae] forma Z 32 stabiles] substantiales M || et om. DMPSTW || incommutabiles] immutabiles Z, Tpc (incommutabiles T ac) 33 intelligentia] intellectiva MSTW 34 interire] interimi B 36 invariabiliter] variabiliter Z || 44] 134 P || conclusione] quaestione D 37 deus] intellectus V || impartibiliter] imparticulariter P; partibiliter V || partibilia] partibiliter M; particularia P || cognoscit] et add. P 38 intemporabiliter] intemporaliter BPVW, Yac || temporabilia] temporalia BVWY 39 omnia] omnium* P 41 producit] perducit T 42 sint] sunt T 43 est om. Z || autem] enim V 44 voluntatem] voluntate T || quaecumque] quocumque DMSTZ || producit] productum Z 5 6 7 8 9 10–11 12 13 15 18 19 20 22 23 23–24

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est om. M || sunt] sub MSTZ || eodem] eo M (om. W) eodem ... sunt1 om. per homoio. W et in his sunt om. per homoio. B bipes generat inv. W non] sunt add. W || alia ... pluribus2 om. per homoio. S || vero ... pluribus2 iter. V 51 suis om. T (M) || suis per accidens om. M 52 per se om. V 53 relatum1] velatum SZ || est contingens inv. W || ut om. P || ut ad ipsum om. S || relatum2] velatum SZ 54 sed] si P || et om. S 56 ea] quae add. S 57 his] istis Y || immutabilitas] mutabilitas DMSTW, Yac 57–58 scientiae divinae inv. Y 59 est om. T 63 existentem] existentiam Z 64 etiam] et D 64 immutabilitas] invariabilitas B 65 stant] stat BP || cum om. V 66 etiam] et B 66–67 stat ... actu1 iter. MSY || per se2.... eius om. per homoio. P 70 prius] primum* T 72 tertio] tertia P || divinae] dei D 73 causis] et add. T || enim] autem B || intermediae] inter mendie P 75 probatur] in add. Z || 56 S] 46 cett. || omnes] dicimus MTVYZ 76 causae BDPVWY] cetere STZ; ecice exp. M; ecce exp. T; ? mg. M || intermediae] inter mendie P 77 intermediae] inter mendie P || stant] stat V 78 scientiae divinae inv. M || cum om. DM || intermediis] inter mendiis P 78–81 sed ... divinae om. per homoio. V 80 rerum stat iter. T 81 aliquo] alio S 82 divinae scientiae inv. Y 84 ad hoc] adhuc MS || adducta] adduca Z 88 habere] hinc P 89 rationes] rationis* T* || entium om. B; eternum T || vera] natura BY (*); christiani D; veru P 90 quod] quae Y 91 rationem] rationis T 93 etiam om. M 45 45–48 48 49–50 50

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96 accipitur] accretur VZ || quod om. W || incommutabilis] incommutabiles P 97 immutabile] incommutabile P, Wac || de obiecto om. B 98 illo] ipso P 99 incommutabilia] commutabilia S; immutabilia Y 100 esse] omne B 101 sunt ... actu iter. M 102 creatrice] creante B; creature TVZ || aliud] alia M; ad Y || quam] quod D 104 iterum] item DPSVYZ || in1 om. MW 105 invariabilia] immutabilia VZ (*) || autem] enim Y 107 dicet] dices P 108 scilicet ... praescire om. S 109 V om. D || li] licet T 110 necessitatem] necessitate T 112 scit] sit T 113 consequentiae] consequentia T; consequentis V || isto] illo V 114 contingentia erunt om. B || contingenter tamen] contingentia tantum Y 115 antecedens] consequens BT 116 necessaria] necessarium P || sicut] sic T || futura] futurum Y 117 esse om. V || sicut] sic T; etiam add. VZ* 118 etiam om. B || consequentia] consequens B 118–119 necessaria conclusio inv. B; necessaria quasi* conclusio P 119 patet] apparet S 122 ipsam] rationem V || enim est inv. Y 123 et1] immutabile et add. D || in se] sic T || et2] vel W || quod om. T || propria extra] ipsa T 124 necessarium] manifestum Z || contingens mg. B; consequens cett. (B in textu)

The Influence of the Works of Peter of Auvergne in the Scholastic Philosophy th th th of the 13 , 14 and 15 Centuries Christoph Flüeler (Fribourg)

Like many other university masters of the 13th century, Peter of Auvergne was rediscovered in the early 20th century, after having been nearly forgotten for several hundred years. In this case it was Edgar Hocedez, a Jesuit, who 1 published five outstanding articles on our author during the early 1930s. Next to nothing was known before his research, as can be shown by a renowned manual published a few years before. Bernhard Geyer, the editor of the 11th edition of Ueberweg’s ‘Grundriss’ referred in 1927 with few words to Peter of Auvergne as a Parisian colleague and disciple of Thomas Aquinas at the Faculty of Theology (!). His very short paragraph in the section on secular priests concludes: “Näheres über seine Lehrrichtung ist 2 nicht bekannt” (Nothing particular is known of his doctrine). The last eight decades of research have significantly expanded our view of the Parisian master. The papers of the present congress, devoted exclusively to this eminent master of the Faculty of Arts and the Faculty of Theology

1 Hocedez, Edgar, La théologie de Pierre d’Auvergne, in: Gregorianum XI (1930), pp. 526–552; id., Les “Quaestiones in Metaphysicam” de Pierre d’Auvergne, in: Archives de Philosophie IX (1932), pp. 179–234; id., La vie et les oeuvres de Pierre d’Auvergne, in: Gregorianum XIV (1933), pp. 3–36; id., Une question inédite de Pierre d’Auvergne sur l’individuation, in: Revue de Néoscolastique de Philosophie XXXVI (1934), pp. 355–386; id., La philosophie des Quodlibets de Pierre d’Auvergne, in: Aus der Geisteswelt des Mittelalters. Studien und Texte Martin Grabmann zur Vollendung des 60. Lebensjahres von Freunden und Schülern gewidmet, Eds. Lang, Albert, Lechner, Joseph and Schmaus, Michael, Münster 1935, vol. 2, pp. 779–791. 2 Die patristische und scholastische Philosophie, Ed. Geyer, Bernard, Tübingen 1927 (Reprint 1951), p. 504 (F. Ueberwegs Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, Part 2. ,12th Edition). Peter is not included among the more important philosophers in the index.

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in a crucial period of the University of Paris are a very clear sign that Peter is no longer considered only a marginal author. Peter of Auvergne indisputably belongs to the most productive and influential interpreters of Aristotle during the Middle Ages, and his commentaries on multiple works, particularly those on ‘De caelo’, on the ‘Meteorologica’ and on the ‘Parva naturalia’, shaped the interpretation of these works on into the 16th century. Equally influential and possibly even more innovative was his influence on the interpretation of Aristotle’s ‘Politica’, for which Peter of Auvergne may be regarded as the founder of the discipline of political philosophy in the university curriculum. Finally, Peter was also active in a separate forum of discussion as Master of Theology, manifesting his presence through the presentation of various theses in scholarly theological debates during the first half of the 14th century. This study will focus especially on the reception of Peter of Auvergne in the 13th, 14th and 15th centuries. The story must begin, again, with Edgar Hocedez, who was able to show that the almost complete disregard of this medieval scholar by early modern scholarship was the result not only of ignorance, but also of persistent preconceptions. The most tenacious was certainly articulated by a contemporary, namely Ptolemy of Lucca, who called Peter the most faithful disciple of Thomas Aquinas. Hocedez was the first to point to the special character of Peter’s theology, passed down to us by a collection of six quodlibets disputed between 1296 and 1301, while he was teaching at the Faculty of Theology. Hocedez tried to show two things, firstly that Peter’s theology was influenced by two champions of theological dispute at the Faculty of Theology at that time, Henry of Gent and especially Godfrey of Fontaines, and secondly that his theology had a 3 stronger influence than his philosophical commentaries. Recent research has in fact shown a significant influence of his theology during the first half of the 14th century, but much more significant is the lasting and sometimes even dominant influence of some of his Aristotelian commentaries on the interpretation of the corresponding works of Aristotle until well into the 16th century and beyond.

3 Hocedez, 1933 (note 1), pp. 16–20, here p. 17: Mais si on prend pour critère les citations qu’on relève dans les auteurs, les Quodlibets paraissent avoir été le plus utilisés.

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I. The influence of this theology 4

Chris Schabel has shown in a recent article that Peter’s impact was pronounced, but apparently short-lived. Already in the 1340s such well-informed 5 theologians as Gregory of Rimini no longer refer to our author. But in the decades before, Peter was quoted by a large number of theologians, who wrote commentaries on the Sentences, theological summae, or like Peter himself, theological quodlibets. Hocedez has mentioned Gerard of Bologna (* ca. 1250 – † 1317), Robert Walsingham († in or after 1313), Johannes of Baconthrop (* ca. 1290 – † 1348), John of Pouilly († after 1321), Henry of Lübeck († after 1336), James of Metz (fl. 1302), Thomas of Strasburg (* 1300 – † th 1357), John of Marbres (fl. 14 c.), and Durandus of Saint-Pourçain (* ca. 1275 – † 1334). Durandus is an interesting case, since Joseph Koch had already called attention to the influence of Peter on James of Metz and later on Duran6 dus. The influence on Durandus still has to be studied in detail; it might be deeper than expected, even though Durandus is not so slavish as John of Sterngassen has railed against him for being, accusing him of being a plagiarist of Peter like all French, who are scholars without any ingenuity: […] quia Durandus est quidam latrunculus Petri de Alvernia sicut sunt com7 muniter omnes Gallici utpote homines nullius inventionis existentes. 8

Other theologians who quoted Peter can be added: one of the first who discussed the ‘Quodlibets’ seems to be John Scotus in the Parisian 4 Schabel, Christopher, The ‘Quodlibeta’ of Peter of Auvergne, in: Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Fourteenth Century, Ed. Schabel, Christopher (Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition 7), Leiden 2007, pp. 81–130 (here p. 97). 5 Ibid., p. 97. 6 Koch, Joseph, Jakob von Metz, O.P., der Lehrer des Durandus von S. Porciano, O.P., in: Archives d’histoire littéraire et doctrinale du Moyen Âge 4 (1929), pp. 169–232, especially pp. 193, 213, 216, 228. Hocedez agreed with Koch and saw Peter at the beginning of a philosophical movement which led to the terminism of Durandus, see Hocedez, 1930 (note 1), p. 527. 7 Grabmann, Martin, Mittelalterliches Geistesleben. Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Scholastik und Mystik, München 1926, p. 400, referring to Bologna, Biblioteca municipale, Cod. A 913, f. 4v. 8 Godfrey of Fontaines influenced deeply the theology of Peter, but on the question of the mental word, it seems that the influence went the other way around, see Cannizzo, Giuseppina, La dottrina del ‘Verbum mentis’ in Pietro

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commentary; at least one manuscript in Prague attributed the identifica9 tion of dilectio and delectatio explicitly to Peter. One must also add Gerard Odonis and Ockham, who in the fourth book of the Commentary on the Sentences refers to the same passage as does John Scotus. Dionysius de 10 Borgo San Sepolcro quotes him five times. The case of Peter Auriol, who quotes him twice, is illustrative. According to Chris Schabel the number of quotations in Auriol’s titanic Sentences Commentary indicates the major players at the time. Peter was therefore not among the top players, because Scotus, Aquinas, Henry of Gent, Hervaeus Natalis, Durand of Saint-Pourçain and Godfrey of Fontaines always outnumbered him by far, but Peter was regularly present with c e r t a i n arguments. In the ‘Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy’ Jan Pinborg 11 and Anthony Kenny state: It is interesting to note that the cluster of such opinions on a given question often varies little from one text to another, and that many authors are remembered only for their solution to one specific question. In this way, e.g. Radulphus Brito’s opinion on first and second intentions is bound to appear in any discussion on this subject although he is not quoted anywhere else, and the same holds true for Peter of Auvergne on the verbum mentis.

Peter claimed in his ‘Quodlibets’ that the interior, mental word is that which we think in a definition of a thing. Peter renders it thus: quod quid est, cuius per se est diffinitio or quod significatur per diffinitionem in habentibus ipsam. Peter’s argument was treated and refuted by Auriol, Durandus 12 and Hervaeus Natalis. Another argument, probably as prominent as the

9 10

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d’Auvergne. Contributo alla storia del concetto di intenzionalità, in: Rivista di filosofia Neo-Scolastica 53 (1961), pp. 152–168. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 1, pars 2, a. 1, in Ordinatio I, dd. 1–2, ed. Carolus Balić et al., Opera omnia II, Civitas Vaticana 1950, p. 57. Schabel, Christopher, Auriol’s Rubrics: Citations of University Theologians in Peter Auriol’s Scriptum in Primum Librum Sententiarum, in: Philosophical Debates at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century, Eds. Brown, Stephen F., Dewender, Thomas and Kobusch, Theo (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 102), Leiden/Boston/Köln 2009, pp. 3–38. The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, Eds. Kretzmann, Norman, Kenny, Anthony and Pinborg, Jan, Cambridge 1982, p. 32. Peter’s argument was studied by Guseppina Cannizzo in a set of articles: Cannizzo, Giuseppina, La dottrina del ‘Verbum mentis’ in Pietro d’Auvergne. Contributo alla storia del concetto di intenzionalità, in: Rivista di filosofia Neo-Scolastica 53 (1961), pp. 152–68; ead., Note su alcuni manoscritti contenenti le dispute quodlibetiche di Pietro d’Auvergne, in: Rivista di filoso-

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‘verbum mentis’ argument, is Peter’s understanding of the form as the per se 13 cause of individuation, or the argument on the relation between amor and delectatio, that both are the same ‘really’, but that nevertheless they differ in thought and argument, which probably refers to the third question of the 14 second ‘Quodlibet’, which was used by Scotus, Ockham and Auriol. The ‘Quodlibets’ were therefore widely utilized in the first decades of the 14th century to develop certain arguments. This influence of the ‘Quodlibets’ on theological debate during the first half of the 14th century is supported by the broad dissemination of manuscript copies and the fact that these quodlibets were never printed, a state of affairs which will be examined in the next section.

II. The diffusion of manuscripts containing theological and philosophical works of Peter of Auvergne I mentioned that Hocedez claimed that Peter exerted the greatest influence as a theologian, not as a philosopher. A look at the number of extant

fia Neo-Scolastica 54 (1962), pp. 181–185; ead., I ‘Quodlibeta’ di Pietro d’Auvergne. Problemi di storia letteraria e dottrinale. La tradizione manoscritta. Testo critico delle ‘Quaestiones de verbo’ 1296, 1300. I: Gli intendimenti fondamentali dell’edizione delle ‘Quaestiones de verbo’, in: Rivista di filosofia Neo-Scolastica 56 (1964), pp. 486–500; ead., I ‘Quodlibeta’ di Pietro d’Auvergne. Problemi di storia letteraria e dottrinale. La tradizione manoscritta. Testo critico delle ‘Quaestiones de verbo’ 1296, 1300. II. Il valore della tradizione manoscritta, in: Rivista di filosofia Neo-Scolastica 56 (1964), pp. 605–648; ead., I ‘Quodlibeta’ di Pietro d’Auvergne. Problemi di storia letteraria e dottrinale. La tradizione manoscritta. Testo critico delle ‘Quaestiones de verbo’ 1296, 1300. III. Cenni sui rapporti storici di alcune opinioni dottrinali di Pietro d’Auvergne, in: Rivista di filosofia Neo-Scolastica LVII (1965), pp. 67–89. 13 See Pickavé, Martin, The Controversy over the Principle of Individuation in ‘Quodlibeta’ (1277–ca. 1320): A Forest Map, in: Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Fourteenth Century, Ed. Schabel, Christopher (Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition 7), Leiden 2007, pp. 17–79, especially, pp. 44 and 50–51. 14 Peter Aureoli, Scriptum Super Primum Sententiarum, Ed. Buytaert, Eligius M., I. Prologus – Distinction 1, St. Bonaventure, Louvain/Paderborn 1953, pp. 383f., 392f. Here with reference to ‘Opinio Petri de Alvernia’.

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manuscripts suggests the contrary. Marco Toste and Lidia Lanza mention 15 137 different manuscripts, containing copies of 229 works. Future research will certainly find new ones, but I think that after 80 years of research the corpus of extant manuscripts is at least sufficiently known to make some general observations. The presence of 20 manuscripts with his ‘Quodlibets’ and 117 manuscripts with philosophical works (or 229 copies of works) is a clear sign that Peter was esteemed above all as a philosopher. It is worthy of note that no manuscript with the theological ‘Quodlibets’ contains one of his philosophical works. Peter clearly had a different sphere of influence as a philosopher than as a theologian. If Ptolemy of Lucca had not remembered in his ‘Historica ecclesiastica’ that the same Peter of Auvergne who finished some of Aquinas’ commentaries later became master at the Faculty of Theology and then bishop of Clermont, it would be difficult for historians to prove 16 that the philosopher and the theologian were in fact the same person. Actually there is – to my knowledge – no clear cross reference from his later theological works back to the earlier philosophical works. The manuscript traditions of the theological and the philosophical works have proceeded independently of one another, and even among the philosophical works there is a noticeable and marked difference between transmission of the literal commentaries and the question commentaries. 17 The ‘Quodlibets’ were distributed via the pecia system, which would 18 have brought forward a much broader dissemination. At the same time, use of such a distribution method and the number of copies it produced demonstrates that these questions were considered especially useful at the University of Paris during the first half of the 14th century. Two copies even seem to have been produced around the end of the 13th (Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Dep. Erf. CA 2° 108 und Paris, BnF, lat. 15350) and only one 15 Lanza, Lidia and Toste, Marco, A Census of Peter of Auvergne’s Work, on this volume, pp. 415–515. 16 Dondaine, Antoine, Les opuscula fratris Thomae chez Ptolémée de Lucques, in: Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum 31 (1961), pp. 142–203 (especially, p. 152). 17 Murano, Giovanna, Opere diffuse per ‘exemplar’ e pecia (Textes et Études du Moyen Âge 29), Turnhout 2005, pp. 664 f. 18 In Murano’s index (ibid.) pecia manuscripts of quodlibet collections by the following authors are listed: Aegidius Romanus, n. 20 (pp. 205–207); Gerardus de Bononia, n. 390 (p. 446); Godefridus de Fontibus, n. 398 (pp. 450–452), Henricus de Gandavo, n. 471 (pp. 509–514); Iacobus De Viterbo, n. 566 (p. 566), Johannes Duns Scotus, n. 615 (p. 604); Johannes Peckham, n. 634 (p. 616); n. 813 (p. 717); Thomas de Aquino, n. 881 (p. 767f.).

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manuscript (Paris, BnF, lat. F 3121A) has a 15th century creation date. Thus, in the 15th century the text fell into disuse, so that the ‘Quodlibets’, unlike many of Peter’s philosophical works, were never printed. Transmission of the philosophical works was markedly more influential. The number of works alone proves this: a series of sophismata, no fewer than 11 different question commentaries and 10 different literal commentaries have been attributed to Peter, and that does not count individually the various versions of any particular commentary nor include works of 19 questionable attribution. It should also be noted here that the history of transmission does not show any substantial overlap between the question commentaries (including sophismata) and the literal commentaries. With few exceptions, the tradition of question commentaries and that of the literal 20 commentaries are strictly separated. This could indicate that the question commentaries and the literal commentaries, though they treat, for the most part, the same works, were not composed simultaneously and did not necessarily have any direct relation to one another. Peter’s long employment as a teacher at the Faculty of Arts suggests that these commentaries may have been developed from lecture notes. It could also be, however, that they originated as written works, if we take for example the commentary

19 I omit here not only those doubtful works listed in the Appendix (nn. 27–40), but also the questionable attributions n. 6 (Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, version 1 and 2), n. 7 (Quaestiones supra librum ‘De caelo et mundo’, version 1 und version 3), n. 9 (Quaestiones super librum ‘De generatione et corruptione’) and n. 19 (Quaestiones super librum ‘De motu animalium’). 20 There are a total of five known manuscripts containing works encompassing both forms of commentary. Three of these manuscripts contain the question commentary on the Metaphysics, which is definitely an unusual case as a pecia manuscript. (Cambridge, Peterhouse 143, Paris, BnF, lat. 16158 and Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, lat. 2330). The three other manuscripts contain in one case commentaries on the ‘Parva naturalia’ (Oxford, Merton College 275), in another a collection of literal commentaries on the ‘Parva naturalia’ together with some question commentaries on the Logic (Paris, BnF, lat. 16170). The later case refers to a composite manuscript composed of various separately produced parts, see: Seńko, Wƚadysƚaw, Repertorium commentariorum medii aevi in Aristotelem latinorum quae in Bibliothecis publicis Parisiis asservantur (Bibliothèque Nationale, Arsenal, Mazarine, Sorbonne, Ste Geneviève) (Opera Philosophorum Medii Aevi. Tom. 5, Fasc. 2 – Textus et studia), Warszawa 1982, pp. 52–60.

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on the ‘Politica’, which is clearly designated as ‘Scriptum’, that is, as originally created as a written work. We turn now to the manuscript transmission of his philosophical question commentaries: 28 manuscripts, containing discussions of a series of questions addressing individual works by Aristotle, have been discovered so far. Most of these commentaries are only transmitted in a few copies, often two or three copies, which can be taken to prove at least some certain reception. These include three known manuscripts of the commentaries on Porphyry’s ‘Isagoge’, three copies of the ‘Categoriae’, and five copies of ‘Peri hermeneias’. In the area of natural philosophy, there are three copies of ‘De caelo’, but only one, or at most two copies of the three question commentaries on the books of ‘Parva naturalia’. Not many copies of questions addressed to the works on practical philosophy have been found either: there are two known copies of the commentary on the ‘Ethica Nicomachea’ and three copies of the commentary on the ‘Politica’. Then there is the separate case of the commentary on the ‘Metaphysica’, of which three versions have been transmitted. The University version enjoys the largest transmission, with eight manuscript copies, though this degree of dissemination can obviously be attributed to the fact that this version was transmitted by means of the pecia system, whose influence on the dissemination of Peter’s works will investigated later. The other versions, called versions two and three, only exist in one known copy each. From the perspective of time, almost all these manuscripts were apparently copied during the 14 th 21 century. A large percentage of the question commentaries transmitted in these 22 manuscripts are, in addition, presented as anonymous in origin. This should by no means be regarded as an accident, as if copies with attribution had half-accidently been lost, unfortunately leaving only a few copies, 23 which happen to lack explicit attribution. It is more important for us to 21 Only two copies can be dated to the 15th century: a brief fragment of the questions on the ‘Politica’ (Frankfurt a. M., Stadt- und Universitätsbibliothek, Praed. 51 [a. 1438–1443] and another brief fragment of the question commentary on ‘De memoria et reminiscentia’ at the Biblioteca Angelica (Roma, Biblioteca Angelica, 349 [s. XV]). 22 An exception is provided, on the other hand, by the commentary on the ‘Metaphysica’, many copies of which include clear attributions to Peter of Auvergne. 23 In the 14th and 15th centuries the phenomenon of doubtful and anonymous attribution is as widespread as in the 13th century. For example, in the Bibliotheca Jagellonica are many copies of question commentaries on the ‘Meta-

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ask why the scribes so often chose not to indicate any author, and whether seeking information about the authorship of a question commentary used in the Paris Faculty of Arts is to apply a historically inappropriate standard 24 of measurement. If, for example, three copies of the commentary on the ‘Politica’ have been preserved, only the Paris manuscript explicitly attributes authorship to Peter; the other copies are presented as anonymous. In the case of the literal commentaries, which shall be treated in more detail below, authorship can in each case be determined with surety. Unfortunately, to date it has been impossible to date a single copy of a question commentary with certainty within the period during which Peter was active at the University of Paris. Thus, no lecture notes in the true sense, recorded directly during actual classroom teaching time and displaying evidence of 25 being direct records of what was said, have yet been found. Nevertheless, it can be assumed that these question commentaries were originally created physica’, all of which were obviously produced at the University of Kraków. Of the sixteen Kraków question commentaries on the ‘Metaphysica’ with which I am familiar, only two are attributed to an author, and three additional commentaries have doubtful attributions. 24 In addition, it should be noted that the tentative attributions to our author, made by historians on more or less plausible grounds, apply mainly to the question commentaries; see on this matter Lanza/Toste (note 15). 25 In recent years I have devoted several articles to lecture notes. However, I have thus far been unable to find evidence of direct lecture notes or transcriptions made before the 1340s. Direct transcriptions first appear to have been produced as of the point in time when paper was first used by students of the university. During the 15th century, the number of lecture note manuscripts increases considerable. At the universities of Vienna and Kraków, for example, whole series of such commentaries have been preserved. See especially: Flüeler, Christoph, From Oral Lecture to Written Commentaries: John Buridan’s Commentaries on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, in: Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition. Acts of the Symposium ‘The Copenhagen School of Medieval Philosophy’, January 10–13, 1996, Eds. Ebbesen, Sten and Friedman, Russell L. (Historisk-filosofiske Meddelelser 77), København 1999, pp. 497–521; id., Ethica in Wien anno 1438. Die Kommentierung der aristotelischen ‘Ethik’ an der Wiener Artistenfakultät, in: Schriften im Umkreis mitteleuropäischer Universitäten um 1400. Lateinische und volkssprachige Texte aus Prag, Wien und Heidelberg: Unterschiede, Gemeinsamkeiten, Wechselbeziehungen, Eds. Knapp, Fritz Peter, Miethke, Jürgen and Niesner, Manuela, Leiden 2004, pp. 92–138 and id., Teaching Ethics at the University of Vienna: The Making of a Commentary at the Faculty of Arts (A Case Study), in: Virtue Ethics in the Middle Ages. Commentaries on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 1200–1500

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for use in teaching or recorded during instruction, even if the surviving 26 copies are only copies or revisions that were made later. It is no longer possible to determine how these were connected with instruction and set down in writing, how they were then revised in various copies, abbreviated, expanded, and combined with material from other sources. One peculiar feature of the entire transmitted tradition of question commentaries, which we encounter not only in those from the 13th century, but also in those from the 14th and 15th centuries, is found in the ‘composite commentaries’. These particular commentaries are actually after-the-fact combinations of various different commentaries. The following manuscripts, of which at least some parts have been attributed to Peter, contain such combined commentaries: a) Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. XII sin. 3 contains three commentaries on Aristotle’s Logic, which include questions from another commentary. b) El Escorial, Real Biblioteca de San Lorenzo, h.II.1 explicates two commentaries.While one part contains the same questions from the commentary of Peter of Auvergne as are transmitted in two other commen27 taries, the other part contains a separate anonymous commentary. c) The second part of Bologna, Biblioteca Universitaria, 1625 (li. III q. 20 – li. VII q. 7) contains the same questions found in Paris, BnF, lat. 16089. The first part of the commentary contains for the most part the same table of questions and many similar arguments. However, it is obviously a sepa28 rate commentary, whose relationship to Peter’s questions remains unclear. The phenomenon of ‘composite commentaries’ is, as I said before, in no way unusual. It appears often with question commentaries, but also appears sometimes with literal commentaries, including those of Peter. One only need recall the two literal commentaries on ‘De caelo’ and on the ‘Politica’, which have often been added in manuscripts of the commentaries of Thomas. A more thorough inquiry would certainly prove worthwhile, (Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History 160), Ed. Bejczy, István, Leiden/Boston 2008, pp. 277–346. 26 One exception, however, is the question commentary on the ‘Metaphysics’, of which many copies have been preserved and which was disseminated via the pecia system. The origin of this commentary has thus far not been more carefully researched, to explain, for example, whether it originated as a lecture transcription or as a written commentary. 27 See article of Cesare Musatti in this volume, pp. 135–156. 28 See Flüeler, Christoph, Rezeption und Interpretation der Aristotelischen Politica im Mittelalter, Amsterdam 1992, vol. 1, pp. 86–131 and vol. 2, pp. 101–112.

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especially in the case of the question commentaries. It is likely that important new information about the creation, use, and transmission of such commentaries could thus be gained. The transmission of the philosophical question commentaries of Peter of Auvergne does not stand out particularly in comparison with the commentaries of other masters of the 13th century. During this period there were other masters in both Paris and in Oxford whose series of commentaries have also been preserved. In this context, Peter appears to have been a prominent and yet typical representative of the Paris Faculty of Arts in the period between 1270 and 1290, who, in the course of his long service as a teacher there, produced commentaries on most Aristotelian works taught regularly in Paris, and perhaps even made multiple commentaries on some works.

III. Transmission of the literal commentaries on Aristotle While the number of surviving question commentaries is remarkable, but not unusual, the extensive and broad dissemination of the literal commentaries, which continued to be read and cited into the 17th century, may be regarded as unique, at least for a master of the Faculty of Arts. A total of ten literal commentaries have been attributed to Peter. Seven of these treat the ‘Parva naturalia’. Two commentaries, namely the commentary on ‘De caelo’ and the ‘Scriptum’ on the ‘Politica’, as continuations of the commentaries by Thomas Aquinas, have experienced an amazing reception and influence over time. There is in addition an extensive commentary on the ‘Meteorologica’. The great number of copies of all his literal commentaries is itself remarkable. Thus far we know of 90 manuscripts containing literal commentaries. They contain a total of 157 copies of individual works. A total of 27 copies of the commentary on ‘De caelo’ have been transmitted, 23 on the ‘Meteorologica’, 32 manuscript copies (a total of 85 copies) of individual commentaries on the ‘Parva naturalia’, and 20 copies of the commentary on the ‘Politica’. In additional there are also some excerpts and edited versions that are clearly based on Peter’s works. The period of production here is much broader than with the other works. According to the still tentative 29 dating of most of the manuscripts it may be assumed that six manuscripts th date from the 13 century, 18 manuscripts from before or after the turn of the century in 1300, 44 manuscripts from the 14th century, two from before 29 See Lanza/Toste (note 15).

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or after the turn of the century in 1400, and 19 manuscripts from after the 15th century It is useful to examine three distinctive characteristics of this particular tradition. On the one hand, it is notable that such a large number of manuscripts were produced during Peter’s lifetime. We should therefore ask ourselves whether some of these manuscripts indicate a particularly close connection to the author, and whether these can perhaps reveal something about the origins of the commentaries and the earliest history of this tradition. On the other hand, the broad dissemination of these manuscripts is closely connected to the use of the pecia system. Finally, it is notable that th only these works were printed in the 15 century, and only these were often re-issued in subsequent centuries as continuations of the commentaries of Thomas Aquinas.

IV. On handwritten and printed editions of the ‘Scriptum super libros Politicorum’ On the question of the manuscripts produced during Peter’s lifetime, we must await the results of historical-critical examination, which will provide more exact information about their transmission and editorial history. This history begins, depending on how the commentary originated, either with the written record of the spoken word – if a commentary began as a reportatio – or with a written original, ideally an autograph. In contrast to the question commentaries, which appear to be based on a reportatio of univer30 sity instruction periods, the literal commentaries clearly contain instead written interpretations of Aristotelian works. Such a transmission and editorial history could be reconstructed as part of the Swiss National Foundation 31 project ‘The philosophy of Peter of Auvergne’. Transmission of the ‘Scriptum super libros Politicorum’ begins with the central manuscript residing at the Biblioteca Apostolica del Vaticano, Vat. lat. 777 (V5). This is the oldest and undoubtedly the most important

30 See above, note 25. 31 I base this assertion on fundamental research done by Lidia Lanza, who worked under my supervision on the Swiss National Foundation project ‘The political philosophy of Peter of Auvergne’ (SNF-117723), and who edited the critical edition of the ‘Scriptum’.

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manuscript in the entire transmission history of this commentary. The portion of this manuscript containing Peter’s commentary shows evidence of editing and contains not only careful corrections, but also notes and many 33 additions, some of them substantial, in a second hand. The commentary, written in the first hand, was obviously made from an earlier version, which was then not only corrected, but carefully overworked by the second hand. The corrected and revised version then served as the direct copy model for the exemplar, that is, the manuscript of which fascicles, so-called peciae, were borrowed by a stationer in order to make multiple copies. Manuscript Vat. lat. 777 can thus be regarded as exemplar exemplaris, so to speak, and was certainly produced in the 13th century, at a time when Peter was still 34 teaching at the University of Paris. There is unfortunately no concrete evidence of exactly whose hands wrote Vat. Lat. 777. Even though there is no indication that the corrector of this manuscript could have been Peter himself, based on its special role in the transmission of the commentary, we still should not deny a certain close relationship to the author. This manuscript at least makes it possible to offer a concrete example of how an edition of a commentary was prepared at the University of Paris, and it shines a helpful light on the care, or rather the lack of care, that went into 35 the creation of an exemplar. While manuscript Vat. 777 was carefully edited, the exemplar of the stationer seems to have been rather casually prepared. The stationer’s exemplar has unfortunately not survived, but its general outlines can be detected via the surviving pecia manuscripts. These consist of 34 fascicles. Four copies 32 Of these 20 copies, only Roma, Archivio S. Maria sopra Minerva, s.num. could not be viewed. The close connection of Vat. lat. 777 to the university environment is demonstrated by the fact that the beginning of the manuscript contains a commentary on the ‘Politica’ by Thomas Aquinas (f. 1ra–34vb) that, according to the editors of the Leonina, turns out to be a pecia manuscript, that is, a direct copy of the University of Paris exemplar (ed. Leonina XLVIII [1971], A 13). 33 Additional evidence of use by later readers are infrequent and do not form part of the edition history presented here. 34 This dating follows the dating of Cambridge, Peterhouse 82, which was written in about 1300 by Franciscans in Oxford. Because this manuscript contains an indirect copy from the Paris exemplar, the production of the exemplar can be dated to the 13th century. 35 This is not to suggest that the preparation for the production of an exemplar always proceeded in the same way. Rather, we can assume a loosely regulated process with many individual cases.

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(Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Ross. 569 and Vat. lat. 775; Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek 1456; and Oxford, Merton College 273) contain pecia identifications and are thus direct copies of the exemplar. Although the Oxford manuscript, for example, is written in an English hand, we may still assume that all these copies were made in Paris. And not only these four: basically all copies – except for more extensive glosses in 36 a single manuscript – all direct or indirect copies of the Paris exemplar. Since even the exemplar was produced at a time when Peter was teaching at the university, one would like to assume that it presents an authoritative text and that the university only offered versions for copying that had been carefully corrected. Perhaps one would even like to imagine that the author, who would have been able to participate in the publication process of the exemplar which would then be used for multiple copies, would check it carefully. The painstaking editorial work on the model version transmitted in manuscript Vat. Lat. 777 actually supports this idea. It was actually the stationer’s exemplar that introduced serious errors. Thus, among other errors, no fewer than 17 homoioteleuta, sometimes long and departing from the original meaning, can be found throughout all copies of the entire work, which must obviously be understood as errors present in the exemplar, as these gaps in the model version from which they were copied are not found in manuscript Vat. lat. 777. Our exemplar was thus not as carefully proofread as was required in the statutes, leading to a first corrupt (manuscript) edition of the commentary. The next important step in the edition history of the ‘Scriptum’ begins with the print editions. The first print edition was made in Rome in the year 1492. Its history has already been explored repeatedly. It stands as an example of the ‘humanizing’ of a scholastic text from the 13th century during 37 the late 15th century. Ludovico Valenza, the editor of this first print edition, used a copy from the university tradition as a model, that is, a direct or indirect copy of the Paris exemplar. However, he subjected the commentary 36 This refers to the glosses in New York, Columbia University, Plimpton 17, which, as Lidia Lanza has indicated, include glosses based directly on glosses found in Vat. lat. 777. 37 The edition history has been researched in: Martin, Conor, The Vulgate Text of Aquinas’s Commentary on Aristotle’s ‘Politics’, in: Dominican Studies 5 (1952), pp. 35–64, remarks by the editors of the Edition Leonina: Dondaine, Antoine and Bataillon, Louis-Jacques, in: Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia, t. XLVIII (Sententia libri Politicorum), Romae 1971, pp. 17–21, and Cranz, Ferdinand Edward, Aristotelianism in Medieval Political Theory. A Study of the Reception of the ‘Politics’, Cambridge, MA 1938 (Ph.D. dissertation).

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to a thorough revision, utilizing not the medieval translation by Wilhelm von Moerbeke, but instead the humanist translation by Leonardo Bruni, altering his edition to correspond to it. Thus Ludovico not only replaced the lemmata which indicated corresponding text passages, but he also made further changes to the text, altering the entire terminology to correspond to the new translation. Latin transcriptions of Greek terms such as democratia, oligarchia, and principatus despoticus were replaced throughout the entire work with Latin terms such as status popularis, status pauperum, and principatus dominativus. Dozens, or even hundreds of specific terms were thus systematically replaced with new Latin equivalents that better reflected new humanistic translation ideals. He thus created a hybrid text in the true sense. It is however also a corrupt text, as the editor deleted a great many of Peter’s elucidations, in which Peter had tried to clarify the often obscure literal translations of Wilhelm von Moerbeke. Other passages, in which Peter had addressed problems with the legibility of his textual model – that is, the manuscript copies of the Latin translation that he had used for his commentary – and explained how for particularly illegible passages he used other versions of the text, were simply excised by Ludovico Valenza, who regarded such problems as being resolved by his substitution of what he saw as a better translation of the foundation text. He has replaced the original explications with his own, which are often simply paraphrases of the humanist translation. All further chapters in the edition history, from early print editions through the Spiazzi edition in 1951, depend on the alterations made in the first print edition. The first three books of all print editions have contained, like the first print edition, the commentary of Thomas Aquinas, up to the point where it breaks off, followed without a break by Peter’s continuation of the commentary. All print editions thus leave out the first part of Peter’s own commentary on the third book. Not a single print edition indicates that the second part of this commentary originated with a different commentator than Thomas Aquinas. Fourteen print editions were made, seven during the 16th century, all but two of them without notable changes. In 1558 Julius Martianus Rota of Venice published an edition to which he had appended the translation by Wilhelm von Moerbeke, and in which he reconstructed portions of the original text of the commentary with the help of a manuscript of the original text. The effort to reestablish a firmer connection to the original textual model can also be seen in the edition of 1570 (ed. Piana), though the corrections in this edition are not based on a manuscript source. All other editions, up to and including the last one by Raimondo Piazzi in 1951, are based directly on this 1570 edition. Manuscript copies

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were ignored. The historical-critical edition by Lidia Lanza will thus be the first edition that attempts to reproduce the oldest original text, in that it returns to using the central manuscript Vat. lat. 777.

V. The role of the pecia system in the dissemination of the literal commentaries The pecia system is another central characteristic of the history of Peter’s literal commentaries. Of his literal commentaries, the ‘Scriptum in libros Politicorum’ as well as the ‘Sententia super libros Meteororum’ and his ‘Expositio in libros III et IV De caelo et mundo’ were disseminated using this publication system. The transmission of the ‘Parva naturalia’, which was also disseminated at least partly using this system requires closer investiga38 tion. This typical method of publication, which strongly dominated manuscript reproduction at the University of Paris during the second half of the 13th century and the first half of the 14th century, is however not limited to Peter’s literal commentaries. In addition to these works – as we have seen above – his ‘Quodlibets’ were also divided into 20 peciae that were offered for copying, as well as his question commentary on the ‘Metaphyica’, which clearly consisted of 29 peciae. With at least four literal commentaries, one question commentary and a collection of quodlibets, Peter belongs, together with Aegidius Romanus, Albertus Magnus, and Thomas Aquinas, to those masters at the University of Paris whose writings were most broadly disseminated through this publication system. The dissemination of his question commentary on the ‘Metaphyisica’ via the pecia system is notable. Of a total of some 80 medieval commentaries on 39 Aristotle marked as pecia, only very few include question commentaries. Among them are Aegidius Romanus with his ‘Quaestiones super primo libro De generatione et corruptione’ and the various question commentaries 40 of Roger Bacon in the Amiens manuscript. In addition, we can determine 38 See Murano (see note 17), n. 736 (p. 667). 39 Here again, based on Murano, op. cit. 40 These question commentaries are found only in the manuscript Amiens, Bibl. Municipale 406, which research has identified a pecia exemplar, but of which no surviving copies have been found, see Destrez, Jean and Chenu, MarieDominique, Exemplaria universitaires des XIIIe et XIVe siècles, in: Scriptorium 7 (1953), pp. 68–80.

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that among the works offered for copying under the pecia system, only a few are works by masters of the Faculty of Arts. Commentaries on Aristotle in the pecia system actually consist mostly of works by theologians. In Peter’s case one might even ask whether these commentaries were first published during the period during which he held a teaching chair in the advanced Theological Faculty. At least the final editions could come from the period when Peter was already teaching in the theological faculty. The commentaries would thus have been composed by a well-known master of the Theological Faculty with long years of experience at the Faculty of Arts, 41 as exemplary models for use by younger members of the Faculty of Arts.

VI. The relationship of Peter of Auvergne’s literal commentaries to the commentaries of Thomas Aquinas. Aspects of the early print history The third aspect in which we must examine the transmission of Peter’s literal commentaries is their relationship to the commentaries of Thomas Aquinas. To fully appreciate the character and the early history of the influence of these literal commentaries, we must consider that both literal commentaries, which usually accompany the incomplete commentaries by Thomas, were not understood as continuations in the early stages of their transmission. In the 13th and 14th centuries Peter’s literal commentaries were considered independent works, not just an appendix to Aquinas. Recent research has revealed that every single one of these literal commentaries was marketed as a separate unit, meaning that the commentary of Thomas Aquinas was one set of peciae and the continuation of Peter was another set. Aquinas’ commentary on the ‘Politica’ was lent as a set of 14 peciae and the commentary of Peter was copied on loan in a separate set of 34 peciae, each starting with pecia one. Early copyists generally combined the two commentaries, however, the portion by Peter is never identified as a direct continuation, or continuatio. The same holds true for the literal commentaries on the ‘Meteora’, ‘De somniis et vigilia’ and on ‘De caelo’. The relationship of 41 The separate transmission of question and literal commentaries can be understood as an additional hint that Peter did not necessarily teach or write these two types of commentaries during the same period, and that in this case the more influential literal commentaries can reasonably be dated from the later period of his teaching career, after 1296, when he held a chair on the theology faculty.

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Peter’s work to that of Thomas arose during the early period of reception and cannot be explained away as mere de facto influence, but the enduring effect of Peter’s commentaries in the wake of Thomismus is more a phenomenon of early modernity, as we can clearly see from the reception histories during foundation and early print periods. Peter’s literal commentaries were all printed in the late 15th century and later, usually in connection with works of Aquinas. In this period, Peter was only remembered, whenever he was mentioned by name, as a disciple of Aquinas who completed his master’s works. Very often the publishers and scribes did not even make any mention of Peter’s contribution. The exposition of Aristotle’s ‘Politica’, for instance, was printed 14 times. The second edition of 1492, the basis of all later editions, ignores the fact that only the first part was written by the Dominican saint. Martin Grabmann only discovered in 1915, in the Vatican Library, a manuscript, the Rossiana manuscript (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Ross. 569), which finally called to mind the real author of the commentary on books three to eight. The fact that Aquinas did not interpret all Aristotelian books, concentrating on especially those treating natural and moral philosophy, and more notably the fact that Thomas left a number of works unfinished, certainly enticed early publishers to add missing commentaries, such as Peter’s commentaries on the ‘Parva naturalia’, in order to have a complete set of commentaries on all books. The reception of Peter’s works certainly benefited from the fact that his literal commentaries were used to complete Aquinas’ ‘Opera omnia’, but this dominating and overshadowing influence of Thomas on Peter belongs therefore much more to the printing history and the late and obscured history of his works in the 17th century.

VII. The impact of the philosophical works. The literal commentaries The impact of Peter’s Aristotelian commentaries has yet to be treated in writing, as the research has just started. We have to distinguish again between the impact of the literal commentaries and that of the question commentaries. Both were very influential, at least during the 14th century 42 and the 15th.

42 See Lanza in this volume, pp. 255–319.

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The reception of ‘De motu animalium’ has recently been studied in four 43 excellent articles by Pieter de Leemans. The teaching of this small treatise on the movement of animals does not belong to the standard medieval curriculum, but de Leemans has listed a considerable number of commentaries, both literal and question commentaries. Concerning the tradition of the commentaries per modum scripti his conclusion is unambiguous. The first commentary ever written was the ‘Sententia super de Motibus Animalium’ of Peter of Auvergne and this commentary was “without any doubt 44 the basic text for further study.” The commentary was used for the study of the Aristotelian text, which can be seen by the marginalia of some manu45 scripts, where traces, varying in length, of his commentary can be found. Peter’s literal commentary has become the standard commentary known by all who studied the Aristotelian text. Because the commentary was printed in the late 15th century and reprinted until the middle of the 17th century, it continued to influence the understanding of this Aristotelian text. The text was used by Walter Burley, who made an almost slavish paraphrase of Peter’s text. Other commentators, such as Jacobus Tymens de Amersfordia in the late 15th century, followed by Burley and used Peter’s ‘Sententia’ as the principle source and template. Other commentaries are recorded in de Leeman’s article, which proves the central position of Peter’s literal commentary in the reception of this small, concise and fascinating Aristotelian text. Peter is not quoted by name. The use of this first and central commentary was very different from the quotations of the ‘Quodlibets’. Single arguments were not used, and later commentators do not usually refer to a special opinio Petri de Alvernia as with his theological works, but rather the whole structure was tacitly adopted. The impact of Peter’s commentaries on the ‘Politica’ is quite similar. Again we have to distinguish between the literal commentary and the question commentary. The ‘Scriptum’ had, together with the commentary of Aquinas on book I to III c. 8, an important, if not predominant influence on later commentaries. Peter was not the first to write a literal commentary. As is commonly known, Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas came first

43 See the article of De Leemans in the Census of Lanza/Toste in this volume, p. 484. 44 De Leemans, Pieter, Medieval Latin Commentaries on Aristotle’s ‘De Motu Animalium’. A contribution to the ‘Corpus commentariorum medii aevi in Aristotelem Latinorum’, in: Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales 67 (2000), pp. 272–360, here 279. 45 Ibid., p. 299.

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and Peter probably knew not only Aquinas’ commentary but also Albert’s ‘Politica’. Albert wrote the first commentary on all eight books. However, later commentators did not base their own work on Albert, but preferred 46 Thomas and Peter. Several authors used the ‘Scriptum’ as a template. The most prominent example of Peter’s influence is probably found in Walter Burley’s exposition. Without indicating the author, Burley adapts from the third book onward Peter’s ‘Scriptum’. In the seventh book he even starts to copy it word by word. The work of Raimund Acgerii, another commentator on the ‘Politica’ from the second half of the 14th century, is based on Thomas/Peter and Burley. Roberto Lambertini has shown that in the first chapter of the third book the French Franciscan follows the parallel section exposed by Peter, even though Aquinas also commented upon the same 47 chapters. As Lidia Lanza has shown, Nicole Oresme refers in the seventies of the 14th century in this French commentary on the ‘Politica’ several times explicitly to Peter, as does Iohannes de Fayt at the beginning of the 15th century, or Peter de Osma and Ferdinand of Roa in the late 15th century, which proves that the fame of Peter of Auvergne as commentator outlived his reputation as theologian. Marco Toste pointed out to me that several commentaries and political works of the 16th and early 17th century refer to Thomas’ commentary on the ‘Politica’, which was in fact Peter’s. Among these are works by authors Antonius Montecatinus, 1587; Philipp Scherbii, 1610; Jacob Martini, 1630; Christoph Heidmann, 1638; Hermann Conring, 1639; Balthasar Cellarius, 1645; Gebhardus Theodorus Meier, 1659. The reading of Aristotle’s ‘Politica’ has become rather ‘standardized’, involving a shared knowledge shaped by reading a particular commentary, and Thomas and Peter together played pivotal roles in this process. When William of Ockham presented in the ‘Dialogus’ a short summary of political

46 The first print edition of the commentary on the ‘Politica’ by Thomas (Ed. Petrus Brun and Nicholaus Spindeler, iuxta emendationem Ioannis Ferrarii ciuis Barcinonensis, Barcinonae 1478) was then expanded by Albert, but this remains an isolated case. Also the second edition by Ludovico Valentie followed the practice of combining commentaries: Thomas (up to the Pol. III.6), followed by Peter (Ed. Eucharius Silber alias Franck, iuxta emendationem Ludouici Valentie O.P.), which was then used as the model for all later editions, as we have seen before 47 Lambertini, Roberto, Raimundus Acgerii’s Commentary on Aristotle’s Politics, in: VIVARIUM. An International Journal for the Philosophy and Intellectual Life of the Middle Ages and Renaissance XL No 1 (2002), pp. 14–40.

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Aristotelianism, he referred to and quoted Peter, as Roberto Lambertini 48 demonstrated twenty years ago.

VIII. The impact of the commentaries per modum quaestionis The influence of Peter’s question commentaries on disputations at the Faculty of Arts in Paris and at other universities has thus far been only partially researched. The prominent role that Peter played in the making of political Aristotelianism from the late 13th to the 15th century results not only from the fact that he continued Aquinas’ works. His 126 questions on the ‘Politica’ survived only in three manuscripts, but it is evident that they 49 influenced all later commentaries per modum quaestionis. Peter may not have been the first to dispute the ‘Politica’ at the university, but his commentary is certainly the first surviving commentary with a fixed list of questions that became the source of all later commentaries. The Milan commentary (Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A 100 inf., f.1ra–54vb) is influenced by Peter, as well as the Vatican commentary (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 1030, f. 14ra–19vb) or the commentary of Nicolas de Vaudémont and that of Vincent Gruner, who composed his commentary in 1418 at the University of Leipzig on the basis of Peter’s questions. In the first Discourse of the ‘Defensor pacis’ Marsilius of Padua dealt with the Aristotelian concept of political science. What Marsilius had in mind, was the political Aristotelianism of his time, which were articulated in the questions of Peter, and which be used in extenso to address the common opinion. Cesare Musatti has compared the Escorial anonymous with the WP-version of ‘De coelo’ most carefully edited by Griet Galle. Griet Galle mentions in her outstanding introduction to the critical edition of questions on ‘De coelo’ that the CEK-questions seem to have directly or indirectly influenced the selection of the questions that are discussed in the 14th

48 Lambertini, Roberto, Wilhelm von Ockham als Leser der ‘Politica’. Zur Rezeption der politischen Theorie des Aristoteles in der Ekklesiologie Ockhams, in: Das Publikum politischer Theorie im 14. Jahrhundert, Ed. Miethke, Jürgen, München 1992, pp. 207–224. 49 See Flüeler (note 28).

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century disputations on ‘De coelo’ by John of Jandun, John Buridan, Nicole 50 Oresme, Albert of Saxony and Marsilius of Inghen.

IX. Conclusion A reception history does not necessarily predicate an author’s overall significance. Some very widely known authors have had a minimal influence, and the reverse is also true. In this study, I have limited myself exclusively to the reception history aspect of Peter’s works. This history shows that Peter did exert great influence in a number areas. It has shown, however, that this influence must be reported as surprisingly varied across the different textual genres. The dissemination of the theological works, consisting, except for a previously unresearched fragment from a sentence commentary, exclusively of quodlibets, has proven to be limited to a particular time period. These questions experienced broad dissemination via the pecia system. The simple fact that the collection is transmitted in twenty manuscripts shows that Peter attained an impressive degree of dissemination in the area of quodlibet collections during the 13th century. As to reception of the content, one can talk about the selective reception of individual arguments. The Opinio Petri on some questions clearly played an important role for several centuries, but pales by the middle of the 14th century. These quodlibets are no longer present in the early print editions. Peter’s philosophical works clearly met with a very different reception. Here I have not treated the reception of his ‘Sophismata’, but only that of his commentaries on Aristotle. Among these there is a clear distinction between the question commentaries and the literal commentaries. The question commentaries were probably produced to fulfill teaching responsibilities at the Faculty of Arts. Peter taught for more than 20 years as a master at the Faculty of Arts. This could explain the rather large number of commentaries in question form that have survived. The simple fact that notes taken during the lectures were preserved, shared, probably edited, and preserved in multiple copies indicates considerable influence. The influence of some commentaries clearly remained definitive in the disputation of some books

50 Galle, Griet, Questions on Aristotle’s ‘De Caelo’: A Critical Edition with an Interpretative Essay (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy 29), Leuven 2003 (see especially, p. 88*).

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at the Faculty of Arts for a long time. Commentaries were often handed down to later generations of students at the bachelors and masters levels and further used for teaching. Such commentaries did not have the character of completed works, but were re-used in a relatively liberal manner. This is also true of other question commentaries of the 13th, 14th, and even 15th centuries. These commentaries should be regarded primarily as teaching tools, and as such Peter’s commentaries were astoundingly influential. In some commentaries, for example his foundational commentary on the ‘Politica’, his questions shaped the entire subsequent tradition of question commentaries on that work, in both form and content. In form, for example, the list of questions (tabula quaestionum) which we first see used by Peter has been for the most part adopted in later commentaries. It is amazing to note that this influence even extends to practices at other universities, lasting until the 15th century. Peter’s literal commentaries exert the most enduring influence of all. The time period of this influence must, however, be differentiated. The use of the pecia system, which functioned as a publication system at the University of Paris, was decisive in the broad dissemination of his commentaries. Through this system Peter was able to establish himself as one of the most copied and most influential commentators on Aristotle during the Middle Ages. These literal commentaries also came to possess the character of works, also as a result of the pecia system, so that they were not used in the same way as the question commentaries, which were simply teaching tools. The preparation of a series of literal commentaries via the pecia system leads us to believe that the final editing of these commentaries was only performed when Peter was teaching at the theological faculty. The broad manuscript dissemination and active use of these literal commentaries into the second half of the 15th century, finally, led in many cases to their being published repeatedly in print. In modernity, though Peter was still being used, his commentaries increasingly came to be regarded as mere continuations of the commentaries of Thomas, until Peter’s name completely disappeared from the print editions and his commentaries entered into a period of obscured influence within the ‘Opera Omnia’ of Thomas Aquinas.

A Census of Peter of Auvergne’s Works* Lidia Lanza (Fribourg) and Marco Toste (Fribourg)

From the pioneering work of Félix Lajard,1 through the input given by scholars such as Edgar Hocedez,2 Palémon Glorieux,3 and Charles Lohr,4 to the bibliographical articles of Gundisalvus Grech,5 and, more recently, Griet

*

1

2 3

4

5

Many people have assisted us during the compilation of this bibliography. We would like to thank the following: Fabrizio Amerini, David Bloch, Pieter De Leemans, William Duba, Griet Galle, José Meirinhos (who kindly described the part of the manuscript Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Barb. lat. 309 that contains Peter’s works on the ‘Parva naturalia’), Jaume Mensa i Valls, Cesare Musatti, Adriano Oliva (who put at our disposal the microfilm of Cambridge, Peterhouse 152), Martin Pickavé, Chris Schabel, and most especially Rafael Schwemmer and Roberto Lambertini. Lajard, Félix, Pierre d’Auvergne, in: Histoire littéraire de France. Tome XXV: Quatorzième siècle, Paris 1869, pp. 93–118. But see also Thomas, Antoine, Extraits des Archives du Vatican pour servir à l’histoire littéraire du MoyenÂge, première partie, in: Mélanges d’archéologie et d’histoire 2 (1882), pp. 113–135, see pp. 117–120. Hocedez, Edgar, La vie et les œuvres de Pierre d’Auvergne, in: Gregorianum 14 (1933), pp. 3–36. Glorieux, Palémon, Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au XIIIe siècle (Études de Philosophie Médiévale 17), Paris 1933, pp. 412–417; id., La faculté des arts et ses maîtres au XIIIè siècle (Études de Philosophie Médiévale 59), Paris 1971, pp. 43–45. Lohr, Charles H., Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries. Authors: Narcissus-Richardus, in: Traditio 28 (1972), pp. 281–396, see pp. 334–346. It is republished in: id., with the collaboration of Coralba Colomba, Latin Aristotle Commentaries. I.2. Medieval authors: M–Z (Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi. Subsidia 18), Firenze 2010, pp. 66–77. The entry on Peter is republished with slight updates and with no corrections.. Grech, Gundisalvus Maria, Appendix. Recent Bibliography on Peter of Auvergne, in: Angelicum 41 (1964), pp. 446–449.

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Galle6 and Olga Weijers,7 Peter of Auvergne’s philosophical and theological corpus, as well as the scholarly works dedicated to its study, has been presented several times. This census naturally owes a debt to those previous bibliographies. Yet, its scope is somehow different, as we have tried to be exhaustive not only with regard to the bibliography devoted to Peter, but with even greater regard to the manuscript tradition of Peter’s texts. Hence, we provide the full list of all known extant manuscripts and editions for each work of Peter of Auvergne, along with the scholarship specifically devoted to it. We have tried, as much as possible, to check every article and book at first hand, including doctoral dissertations. We have also examined some manuscripts (mostly on microfilm) in order to provide fresh information in this census (this is, for instance, the case for the ‘Quaestiones super Metaphysicam’) and to avoid repeating the same faults found in previous bibliographies, which were however of great help. In this way, we hope to have reduced the mistakes inevitable in a bibliographical work. In the lists of manuscripts containing Peter’s works, we have included manuscripts which contain rearrangements or abridgments of his texts and notices regarding different versions of the same work. This information will permit researchers to grasp more fully the diffusion of Peter’s texts (see, for instance, the list of manuscripts of the ‘Scriptum super III–VIII libros Politicorum’). This article is divided into three sections: the first is dedicated to presenting Peter’s extant works along with the bibliography dedicated to them; in the second part we provide a listing of doubtful, spurious and possible lost works;8 finally, in the third, we present the newly compiled bibliography of Peter editions and scholarship. Critical works included in the bibliography are limited to articles and books that deal with Peter’s thought at some length or that, despite the 6

7

8

Galle, Griet, A Comprehensive Bibliography on Peter of Auvergne, in: Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale 42 (2000), pp. 53–79; ead., A Comprehensive Bibliography on Peter of Auvergne: Supplement, in: Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale 47 (2005), pp. 87–96. Weijers, Olga, Le travail intellectuel à la Faculté des arts de Paris: textes et maîtres (ca. 1200–1500), VII: Répertoire des noms commençant par P (Studia Artistarum 15), Turnhout 2007, pp. 95–127. Usually, bibliographical articles provide notices of lost works and information about manuscripts which were once present in a given library, information normally taken from medieval and Renaissance catalogues. Following these notices, bibliographers tend to indicate those works as lost. Yet, such catalogues were not made according to ‘scientific’ criteria and the authorship of

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brevity of the reference to Peter, discuss an important issue or provide a significant detail, such as, for instance, the indication of the discovery of another manuscript containing Peter’s works. We have therefore excluded, except as necessary, the mention of works such as histories of medieval philosophy, catalogues, reference works, and repertoires. We have done this in order to focus the bibliography on the main and essential information. For each work, we present the incipit,9 the list of manuscripts10 and editions,11 and the scholarly studies.12

a work extant in a manuscript was often attributed without solid grounds. Therefore, it is an invalid inference to assume that just because a medieval catalogue indicates a given text as the work of an author, along with the fact that the manuscript in which it was extant is no longer available, that the author really wrote that particular text. Therefore, if a medieval catalogue indicates that a manuscript contained the ‘Questiones super libros Meteororum’ of Peter of Auvergne, there is no basis to assume that Peter had ever written such commentary. Hence, we have decided to draw together the doubtful, spurious and lost works in the second section of this article. However, for the sake of simplicity, in the first section, dedicated to listing Peter’s extant works, and whenever it is the case, we report old catalogues that indicate Peter as the auhor of a given text. This indication is provided at the bottom of the list of manuscripts of each of Peter’s works. 9 In some cases we indicate more than one incipit. These are the cases of Peter’s works which have more than one version or which were intended or served as continuations of Thomas Aquinas’s Aristotelian commentaries. 10 Whenever possible, for each manuscript we provide the indication of the manuscript, its date indicated between brackets, the folios that contain Peter’s work, and, in the cases in which the manuscript contains only a part of the work, which part of the text is contained. 11 We indicate early printed editions, critical editions, and also partial editions or transcripts of brief passages presented in scholarly articles and volumes. 12 To make reading this census easier, given that readers might be interested in information regarding one single work by Peter, we have decided to structure the secondary bibliography in a similar fashion to parenthetical referencing, that is, indicating only the author, the year of the publication and the pages in which Peter’s work is treated (where there is no indication of the pages, it means that the whole article deals with that work). At the end of the census, we provide the full bibliographic entry, where the complete reference can be found. Thus, readers need not search for the first occurrence of the bibliographic reference.

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1. Extant Works Quaestiones super Artem veterem 1. – Quaestiones super librum Porphyrii Incipit: Circa librum Porphyrii primo quaeruntur quaedam in generali, deinde in speciali. Et quia divisio ipsius logices accipitur penes eius subiectum, ideo quaerendum est primo de subiecto ipsius logices ... (according to the edition Tiné 1997). B = Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.III.20 (s. XIV in.), f. 109ra–113vb.13 F = Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. XII sin. 3 (s. XIV in.), f. 1ra–3vb. Ebbesen 2003, p. 32: “compared to BP the F version has an intrusive ques-

tion and a half [...] according to (Pinborg 1973, p. 47, n. 3) the intrusive material in F is from the MV commentary”;14 Pinborg 1973a, p. 49, n. 3: “here erroneously F adds the solution from M q. 6 and the entire M q. 9”.15

P = Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 16170 (s. XIII ex.–XIV in.), f. 82ra–89rb.16 Editions: Pinborg 1973a, pp. 48–60 (excerpts); Tiné 1997, pp. 267–333 (whole text). Studies: Ebbesen/Pinborg 1970, pp. 3, 5, 7; Pinborg 1973a, pp. 47–48, 67; Ebbesen 1981, pp. 100–101 (pp. 105–106 of the reprint); Libera 1996, pp. 13 This manuscript is available in digitized form in the website of e-codices at the following address: http://www.e-codices.unifr.ch/en/list/one/ubb/F-III-0020 (last consulted September 2014). 14 The MV commentary survives in the manuscripts M = Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional, 1565 (s. XIII–XIV), f. 13vb–18rb and V = Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Pal. lat. 1007 (s. XIII2), f. 5vb–10vb. Ebbesen indicates p. 47 of Pinborg 1973a, but actually it is p. 49. 15 This manuscript is available in digitized form in the website of the Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana at the following address: http://teca.bmlonline.it/TecaViewer/index.jsp?RisIdr=TECA0001429228 (last consulted January 2013). Regrettably, the digitization does not meet the highest standards of quality and hence the reading is quite difficult. 16 This manuscript is available in digitized form in the website Gallica of the Bibliothèque Nationale de France at the following address: http://gallica.bnf. fr/ark:/12148/btv1b90671771 (last consulted September 2014).

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204, 294–295; Tiné 1997, pp. 235–266; Pini 2002, pp. 34, 66–67; Ebbesen 2003, pp. 31–32, 35, 44; Ebbesen 2013. 2. – Quaestiones super librum Praedicamentorum Incipit: Aequivoca sunt quorum nomen est commune solum, etc. Circa librum istum, scilicet Praedicamentorum, quaedam quaeruntur in generali. Primum est utrum de praedicamentis possit esse scientia ... (according to the edition Andrews 1987). B = Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.III.20 (s. XIV in.), f. 113vb–119vb. Ebbesen 2003, p. 32: “the BP version ends in a question relating to chapter

8 (the category of quality) [...] B actually adds five short ‘Notabilia ad textum’ about quality, the first of which is found in F also”.17

F = Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. XII sin. 3 (s. XIV in.), f. 3vb–7va. In order to supply the part of Aristotle’s text which is absent in BP, the

creator of this manuscript used and adapted fourteen questions from the text extant in the manuscript Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional, 1565; cf. Ebbesen 2003, pp. 32–33.18

P = Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 16170 (s. XIII ex.–XIV in.), f. 89rb–99rb. This “version ends in a question relating to chapter 8 (the category of quality)”; cf. Ebbesen 2003, p. 32.19

Editions: Pinborg 1975a, pp. 41–46 (tabula quaestionum of F and P; excerpts based on P, except where otherwise indicated); Andrews 1987 (whole text based on F and P);20 Andrews 1988a; Andrews 1988b, pp. 101–106 (qq. 9–11 based on F and P); Andrews 2001, pp. 313–316 (q. 24: Utrum quantitas sit genus and q. 43: Quare Aristoteles non definivit sic quantitatem, dicendo: ‘quantitas est secundum quam quanti dicimur’, based on B, which contains a different version from the other two manuscripts).

17 18 19 20

See note 13 above. See note 15 above. See note 16 above. This edition is available at the address: http://gozips.uakron.edu/~mcmahon/ alvernia.html (last consulted September 2014). We owe this indication to William McMahon.

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Studies: Ebbesen/Pinborg 1970, pp. 3, 5, 7; Andrews 1987; Andrews 1988a; Andrews 1988b, pp. 91–100; Andrews 1988c; Ebbesen 1988a, passim; Marmo 1994, pp. 28, 85, 113–114, 267, 380; Ashworth 1997; Donati 1998b, pp. 229–230; Andrews 2001, pp. 285–287; Pini 2002, pp. 65–67, 150–152, 159 et ad indicem; Pini 2003; Ebbesen 2003, pp. 31–33, 35, 44; Tabarroni 2003b, p. 281; Ebbesen 2005a; Newton 2008; Pickavé 2008, pp. 189, 197, 214–215; Ebbesen 2013. 3. – Quaestiones super librum Perihermeneias Incipit of the Basel manuscript: Primum oportet constituere ... Quia iste liber Peryhermeneias dicitur de enuntiatione ut de subiecto sicut subponitur, ideo quaeritur de enuntiatione utrum de ea possit esse scientia ... Incipit of the Florence manuscript: Primum oportet constituere quid nomen et quid verbum, etc. Consequenter quaeritur circa librum Pery Ermeneias; et primo quaeritur, cum Aristoteles determinet hic de nomine et de verbo, utrum debeat hoc facere hic ... Incipit of the Paris manuscript: Primum oportet constituere, etc. Quia supponitur quod iste liber Peryermenias est de enuntiatione tamquam de subiecto, ideo primo quaeritur utrum enuntiatio possit esse subiectum in libro Periermenias ... B = Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.III.20 (s. XIV in.), f. 119vb–123va. Only qq. 1–33: it ends abruptly in the determination of q. 33; “Perhaps B represents a reportation that only keeps the essentials of the oral teaching whereas M and P contain a version written up by Peter for publication”: Ebbesen 1993a, p. 146; Ebbesen 2003, pp. 34–35, 44.21

F = Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. XII sin. 3 (s. XIV in.), f. 8va–11rb. Only 12 questions (= qq. 48–59); it is identical to the second half of the

commentary extant in P and M; the first part of the commentary contained here is made up of 26 questions of an unknown author; Ebbesen 1993a, p. 146; Ebbesen 2003, pp. 34, 44.22

L = Leuven, Abdij van ’t Park, 32, f. 32–35. M = Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional, 1565 (s. XIII–XIV), f. 2ra–13va. 59 questions. 21 See note 13 above. 22 See note 15 above.

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P = Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 16170 (s. XIII ex.–XIV in.), f. 99va–113ra. Set of 57 questions identical to the set contained in M; exceptions are qq. 1 and 37.23

Mention of a possible further manuscript: olim Canterbury, Library of St. Augustine’s Abbey (catalog ca. 1497: ‘Quaestiones Petri de Aluernia super librum Peryarmenias cum aliis’. Cf. James 1903, p. 316; not indicated in Lohr 1972). Editions: Ebbesen/Pinborg 1970, p. 17 (excerpt from Book II, based on F and P); Ebbesen 1986a, pp. 75–78 (q. 12: Utrum nomen infinitum aliquid ponat, based on P with some readings from M. F contains a partly identical text, cf. Ebbesen 2003, p. 44); Baccin 1986–1987 (excerpts); Ebbesen 1993a, pp. 150–171 (qq. 5–6: Utrum istud quod intelligitur ab intellectu secundum veritatem et substantiam suam sit apud intellectum, aut secundum suam similitudinem, Utrum voces significent passiones intellectus vel significent ipsas res, based on M, P and B, q. 31: De veritate istius ‘animal est omnis homo’, based on the same manuscripts, but chiefly on M, qq. 34–35: Utrum tantum unum uni opponitur, Utrum dictio aequivoca importet sua significata sub copulatione vel sub disiunctione, based on P and chiefly on M, q. 49: Utrum sequatur ‘Socrates est homo mortuus, ergo est homo’, based on F, P and chiefly on M); Pini 2001 (Utrum ipsae voces significent passiones intellectus vel significent ipsas res: determinatio, based on M); Ebbesen 2003, pp. 45–48 (tabula quaestionum); Tabarroni 2003a, p. 354, n. 44 (part of the solution of q. 42: Utrum ad negativam de praedicato finito sequatur affirmativa de praedicato infinito, based on M). Studies: Ebbesen/Pinborg 1970, pp. 4, 6, 7; Baccin 1986–1987; Ebbesen 1998a, pp. 146–147; Marmo 1994, pp. 155, 268–269; Pini 2001; Ebbesen 2003; Tabarroni 2003a, pp. 353–354; Marmo 2010, pp. 119–120.

23 See note 16 above.

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4. – Sophismata24 B = Brugge, Stedelijke Bibliotheek, 509 (s. XIV in.), f. 76r–107r, Sophismata. F = Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. XII sin. 3 (s. XIV in.), f. 63ra–78rb, Boethii, Petri de Alvernia, Nicolai de Normandia Sophismata.25 Editions: Ebbesen 1993a, pp. 57–60 (titles of the ‘problemata’ which are listed here below, with the exception of the sophisma ‘Omnis homo de necessitate est risibilis’); Ebbesen/Rosier (in prep.). For further editions see below under the entry for each sophisma. Studies: Ebbesen/Pinborg 1970; Ebbesen 1988a; Ebbesen 1993b; Ebbesen 2003; Ebbesen/Goubier 2010, vol. I, pp. 32, 55–56; Ebbesen 2013. 41. – Homo est species P1 = Utrum illud quod significatur nomine hominis sit quiditas sola vel habens quiditatem P2 = Utrum illud quod significatur nomine speciei sit in intellectu sicut in subiecto (sc. ratio intelligendi) aut aliquid existens in eo de quo dicimus quod est species P3 = Utrum haec sit vera ‘homo est species’ P4 = Utrum haec sit vera ‘aliquis homo est species’ Incipit: Homo est species. Circa istam orationem quattuor sunt quaesita. Primum utrum illud quod significatur nomine hominis sit quiditas eius tantum vel habens ipsam quiditatem ... (according to FB, but where F has sunt quaesita B has quaeruntur). B = Brugge, Stedelijke Bibliotheek, 509 (s. XIV in.), f. 85vb–87va.

24 For the description of sophisms’ sections we have used the following abbreviations taken from Ebbesen/Goubier 2010: D = distinction; C = corpus sophismatis; P = problema/problemata; S = sophisma/sophismata. The arrangment in which the sophisms are presented here follows the order of the forthcoming edition Ebbesen/Rosier, which follows the order of manuscript F. 25 See note 15 above.

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F = Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. XII sin. 3 (s. XIV in.), f. 64rb–65ra.26 Editions: Ebbesen 2013, n. 26, 35, 39, 42 (excerpts from P1, P3, P4). Studies: Ebbesen 1993b; Ebbesen/Goubier 2010, vol. I, p. 32, vol. II, p. 116, nr. 253.3. 42. – Album potest esse nigrum D = Li ‘album’ potest accipi pro forma vel pro subiecto P1 = De distinctione P1.1 = Utrum iste terminus ‘album’ significet tantum formam vel aggregatum ex subiecto et forma P1.2 = Utrum distinctio bona sit P2 = De probatione: utrum sequatur ‘quod potest esse album potest esse nigrum, ergo album potest esse nigrum’ P3 = De veritate Incipit: Album potest esse nigrum. Haec fuit oratio proposita. Et probatur sic: Quod est album potest esse nigrum (B: + vel quod potest esse album potest esse nigrum); ergo album potest esse nigrum. Alio modo probatur sic: quod potest esse album, potest esse nigrum: ergo album etc. (B has omitted what follows: Alio – etc.) (according to FB). Incipit: Album potest esse nigrum. Circa illud sophisma plura quaerebantur. Primum fuit de distinctione ... (according to C). B = Brugge, Stedelijke Bibliotheek, 509 (s. XIV in.), f. 96vb–99vb. C = Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College, 611/341 (s. XIII ex.), f. 59ra–60va (P1.1–1.2 and part of P2). F = Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. XII sin. 3 (s. XIV in.), f. 65ra–66rb.27 Editions: Ebbesen 1988a, pp. 162–174 (P1.1 based on F; “minor errors of F have been emended with the help of B, usually tacitly”: Ebbesen 1988, p. 162); Ebbesen 2013, n. 15, 28, 30 (excerpts from the determination of P 1.1).

26 See note 15 above. 27 See note 15 above.

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Studies: Ebbesen 1988a, esp. pp. 138–144; Ebbesen 1993a; Ebbesen 2006, p. 142; Tabarroni 2008, pp. 234–235; Ebbesen/Goubier 2010, vol. I, pp. 32–34, vol. 2, p.23, nr. 46.4. 43. – Animal est omnis homo D = ‘Omnis’ potest teneri collective vel divisive P1 = De distinctione: utrum hoc signum ‘omnis’ potest teneri collective vel distributive P2 = De improbatione P2.1 = Utrum istae propositiones ‘non animal est omnis homo’ et ‘nullum animal est omnis homo’ sint una negatio vel duae negationes et utrum una aequipollet alteri P2.2 = Utrum sequatur ‘animal est omnis homo, ergo aliquod animal est omnis homo’ P3 = De veritate huius ‘animal est omnis homo’ Incipit: Animal est omnis homo. Probatio: animal est Socrates, animal est Plato, animal est Cicero, et sic de singulis, ergo animal est omnis homo. Et videtur esse ibi locus a partibus sufficienter enumeratis ad suum totum ... (according to FB, but animal est Cicero and Et videtur ... ad suum totum are missing in B). B = Brugge, Stedelijke Bibliotheek, 509 (s. XIV in.), f. 76ra–79rb. F = Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. XII sin. 3 (s. XIV in.), f. 66rb–67vb.28 Editions: Ebbesen 1993a, pp. 172–181 (C and P3 based on F collated against B); Ebbesen 2005b, p. 250, n. 38 (excerpt from P1; p. 177, n. 39 of the reprint); Ebbesen 2008, pp. 128–129 (part of the determination of P2.1); Ebbesen 2013, n. 35 (excerpt from P2.2). Studies: Ebbesen 1993b; Ebbesen 2003, pp. 36–41; Ebbesen 2008; Ebbesen/ Goubier 2010, vol. I, p. 32, vol. II, p. 48, nr. 92.3. 44. – Omnis phoenix est Only three ‘problemata’; the fourth ‘problema’ is not of Peter’s authorship. Cf. Ebbesen 1993b, p. 58. 28 See note 15 above.

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P1 = Utrum determinatio immediate adiuncta suo determinabili restringit ipsum P2 = Utrum terminus supponens alicui verbo cuiuscumque temporis restringatur ad supponendum secundum exigentiam eius vel amplietur P3 = De veritate primae (missing in B) P4 (only in B and does not really belong to the sophisma) = Utrum signum adveniens termino alicui substantiali distribuat ipsum indifferenter pro omnibus tam essentialibus quam accidentalibus Incipit: Omnis phoenix est. Hoc est sophisma propositum, quod probatur sic: eius contradictoria est falsa, sc. ista ‘aliqua phoenix non est’, ergo haec est vera ‘omnis phoenix est’ ... (according to V). Incipit: Omnis – est (F: + etc.). Circa istam orationem multa fuerunt quaesita, sed solum prosecuta fuerunt quae circa veritatem quaerebantur . . . (according to BF). B = Brugge, Stedelijke Bibliotheek, 509 (s. XIV in.), f. 99vb–104ra (the ‘corpus sophismatis’ is missing). F = Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. XII sin. 3 (s. XIV in.), f. 67vb–68vb (the ‘corpus sophismatis’ is missing).29 V = Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 14812 (s. XIII ex.), f. 7r–8v30. Editions: Ebbesen 2008, pp. 129–130 (excerpts from P2); Ebbesen 2013, n. 37 (excerpt from P2). Studies: Ebbesen 1993b; Marmo 1999; Ebbesen 2008; Marmo 2010, pp. 123–124; Ebbesen/Goubier 2010, vol. I, pp. 32, 40–41, vol. II, pp. 369–370, nr. 678.29. 45. – Nullus homo de necessitate est asinus P1 = De modo syllogizandi ex ista propositione, utrum maiore existente vera de necessario et minori de contingenti sequatur conclusio de inesse 29 See note 15 above. 30 In Ebbesen 1993b, p. 45 it is mistakenly indicated that this ‘sophisma’ is extant in the manuscript Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 14718. Actually, this manuscript from the 19th century contains an Italian text by Agostino Pifferi on Leon XIII’s pontificate.

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P2 = De veritate et falsitate (missing in B) P2.1 = Utrum illud quod repugnat alicui per se possit inesse per accidens eidem P2.2 = Utrum haec propositio ‘materia potest esse homo’ sit vera de virtute sermonis P2.3 = Utrum homo possit esse asinus, et utrum haec sit vera ‘nullus homo de necessitate est animal’ Incipit: Nullus homo de necessitate est asinus. Circa istam orationem duo in generali quaesita fuerunt ... (according to FP, but while P has in generali, F has generaliter). Incipit: Nullus homo de necessitate est asinus. Circa istam orationem quaerebatur de modo syllogizandi ... (according to B). B = Brugge, Stedelijke Bibliotheek, 509 (s. XIV in.), f. 95rb–96vb. F = Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. XII sin. 3 (s. XIV in.), f. 69ra–70va.31 P = Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 16089 (s. XIII–XIV), f. 79ra–81rb.32 Studies: Ebbesen 1993b; Tabarroni 2008, pp. 225–226; Ebbesen/Goubier 2010, vol. I, pp. 32, 37, vol. II, p. 203, nr. 441.1. 46. – Socrates desinit esse non desinendo esse P1 = De veritate P1.1 = De positione P1.1.1 = Utrum sit dare ultimum instans vitae Socratis P1.1.2 = Utrum sit dare paenultimum instans vitae Socratis P1.2 = De significato istorum verborum ‘incipit’ ‘desinit’ P1.3 = De expositione istorum verborum ‘incipit’ ‘desinit’, utrum cuicumque adiungantur eodem modo exponantur P2 = De distinctione (only lightly touched on)

31 See note 15 above. 32 This manuscript is available in digitized form in the website Gallica of the Bibliothèque Nationale de France at the following address: http://gallica.bnf. fr/ark:/12148/btv1b9065948f (last consulted September 2014).

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Incipit: Socrates desinit esse non desinendo esse, etc. Ista oratio probatur facta positione, sc. quod Socrates sit in paenultimo instanti vitae suae. Inde sic: Socrates ... (sc. quod Socrates sit is missing in F). B = Brugge, Stedelijke Bibliotheek, 509 (s. XIV in.), f. 91vb–94va. F = Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. XII sin. 3 (s. XIV in.), f. 70va–71vb.33 Editions: Ebbesen 1989, pp. 157–180. Studies: Ebbesen 1992b; Ebbesen/Goubier 2010, vol. I, p. 32, vol. II, p. 507, nr. 972.18; Pérez-Ilzarbe 2013. 47. – Tantum unum est P1 (F) = De distinctione: dato quod haec dictio ‘tantum’ includit diversos, utrum hoc sit per rationes unam vel per diversas P2 (F) = De improbatione: utrum sequatur ‘tantum unum est, ergo non multa sunt’ (cf. B: P2.2) P3 (F) = De veritate et falsitate: utrum haec sit vera ‘tantum unum est’ (= B: P2.3) P1 (B) = De distinctione: P1.1 (B) = Utrum terminus concretus significet formam vel totum aggregatum ex forma et subiecto vel materia P1.2 (B) = Utrum li ‘tantum’ adveniens huic quod dico ‘unum’ possit excludere diversum ab ipso ratione formae vel ratione subiecti P2 (B) = Circa veritatem: P2.1 (B) = Utrum ‘unum’ addit aliquid supra ens P2.2 (B) = Utrum dictio exclusiva addita ‘uni’ excludat multa (cf. F: P2) P2.3 (B) = Utrum haec sit vera ‘tantum unum est’ (= F: P3) Incipit: Tantum unum est. Circa istam orationem tria fuerunt quaesita. Primum fuit de distinctione per quam solvebatur ... (according to F). Incipit: Tantum unum est. Deducto satis patet. Circa istud sophisma duo quaeruntur. Primum est de distinctione ... (according to B).

33 See note 15 above.

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B = Brugge, Stedelijke Bibliotheek, 509 (s. XIV in.), f. 79rb–82vb (anonymous; contains a different version than F). F = Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. XII sin. 3 (s. XIV in.), f. 71vb–72vb.34 Editions: Ebbesen 2013, n. 30, determination of P1.1 (B). Studies: Ebbesen 1993b; Ebbesen/Goubier 2010, vol. I, p. 32, vol. II, pp. 599–600, nr. 1184.34. 48. – Syllogizantem ponendum est terminos Ten ‘problemata’: seven – those listed below – are probably by Peter, while the remaining ‘problemata’ should be ascribed to Boethius of Dacia; cf. Ebbesen 1993b. P1 = Circa hoc verbum ‘est’: P1.1 = Utrum hoc verbum ‘est’ possit impersonari P1.2 = Utrum hoc verbum ‘est’ impersonatum retentum impersonaliter construatur cum obliquo a parte ante et intransitive P1.3 = Utrum hoc verbum ‘est’ convenienter construatur cum hoc quod dico ‘syllogizantem’ a parte post P2 = Circa hoc quod dico ‘syllogizantem’: P2.1 = Utrum participium significet per modum substantiae P2.2 = Utrum adiectivum possit habere rationem supponendi P3 = Circa hoc quod dico ‘ponendum’: P3.1 = Utrum gerundia sint nomina vel verba P3.2 = De constructione gerundiorum a parte ante cum accusativo (“non fuit disputatum”) Incipit: Syllogizantem ponendum est terminos etc. Circa istam orationem tria possunt quaeri. Primum est circa hoc verbum ‘est’, secundum est circa hoc quod dico ‘syllogizantem’, tertium circa hoc quod dico ‘ponendum’. Circa primum tria quaerebantur ... (Ebbesen/Goubier 2010, vol. II, p. 574: “Probably the original incipit of Peter of Auvergne’s sophisma”). Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. XII sin. 3 (s. XIV in.), f. 72vb–75vb.35 34 See note 15 above. 35 See note 15 above.

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Studies: Roos 1963; Rosier 1991; Ebbesen 1993b; Rosier Catach/Ebbesen 2004; Ebbesen/Goubier 2010, vol. I, p. 32, vol. II, p. 574, nr. 1127.3. 49. – Omnis homo est omnis homo P1 = Utrum haec sit vera ‘omnis homo est omnis homo’ P2 = Utrum aliqua propositio potest esse vera per se et falsa per accidens vel econverso Incipit: Omnis homo est omnis homo. Probatio et improbatio satis patent. Circa illam orationem primo quaeritur de veritate huius. Secundo, quia quidam ponunt ipsam veram per se et falsam per accidens, ideo quaeritur utrum aliqua propositio possit esse vera per se et falsa per accidens vel econverso falsa per se et vera per accidens ... F = Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. XII sin. 3 (s. XIV in.), f. 77rb–vb.36 Studies: Ebbesen 1993b; Ebbesen/Goubier 2010, vol. I, p. 32, vol. II, p. 324, nr. 613.30. 410. – Omnis homo est P1 = De veritate P1.1 = Utrum ille terminus ‘homo’ restringatur ad praesens quando supponit verbo de praesenti Incipit: Omnis homo est. Quaeritur de veritate huius propositionis, et quia difficultas huius quaestionis est in hoc quod ignoratur quomodo terminus supponit, utrum scilicet restringatur ad praesentia tantum vel non, sed stet pro praesentibus praeteritis et futuris, et propter hoc quaeritur ... F = Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. XII sin. 3 (s. XIV in.), f. 77vb–78rb.37 Editions: Tabarroni 2008, pp. 235–236, n. 30–32 (excerpts); Ebbesen 2013, n. 6 (excerpt from the determination).

36 See note 15 above. 37 See note 15 above.

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Studies: Ebbesen 1993b; Tabarroni 2008; Ebbesen/Goubier 2010, vol. I, p. 32, vol. II, pp. 296–297, nr. 590.9; Ebbesen 2013. 411. – Omnis homo de necessitate est risibilis Three ‘problemata’: the second and the third – P2.1 and P.2.2 – are likely to have a different origin with respect to the first ‘problema’; cf. Pinborg 1975b, p. 125. P1 = Quid sit medium in demonstratione potissima, utrum definitio subiecti vel passionis vel definitio aggregata ex utraque istarum definitionum P2.1 (= S4) = Utrum hoc signum universale ‘omnis’ adveniens termino communi distribuat pro suppositis in propria forma, et hoc est quia illud signum ‘omnis’ facit terminum teneri pro suppositis P2.2 (= S5) = Utrum signum universale adveniens termino communi possit ipsum distribuere pro suppositis per accidens Incipit: Omnis homo de necessitate est risibilis. Hoc est sophisma propositum quod probatur sic: omne animal rationale mortale de necessitate est risibile; homo est rationale mortale; ergo homo de necessitate est risibile. Ibi est demonstratio, ut apparet per Philosophum primo Posteriorum ... Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, Nouvelles acquisitions latines 1374 (s. XIV in.), f. 90rb–94rb (= P1), 94rb–95vb (P2.1, P2.2). Studies: Pinborg 1975b, p. 125; Ebbesen 1993b; Dahan 1997, pp. 56–57; Ebbesen/Goubier 2010, vol. I, p. 37, vol. II, p. 292, nr. 584.1. 5. – Quaestiones super Metaphysicam Transmitted through three different manuscript traditions: – University tradition (Books I–IX and XII. In this tradition, the questions regarding chapter 3 of Book I are discussed in Book II; cf. Hocedez 1932, p. 182; Donati 1998b, pp. 215–216): Incipit: Sicut dicit Philosophus in decimo Metaphysicae suae, in omni genere est aliquid unum primum quod est causa et mensura omnium aliorum in illo genere ... (this incipit is the same as that of the third tradition, see below).

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Cambridge, Peterhouse, 152 (s. XIV), f. 117ra–127ra (Book I), 129ra–134ra (the first 15 qq. of Book I again), 134ra–146ra (Book II), 146ra–224vb (Books III–IX, XII). Although scholarship has considered this manuscript as part of the university tradition, it has some peculiarities that must be remarked here, as some of them bring this manuscript closer to the third tradition: 1) The questions related to Book I, chapter 3 are copied twice. The first time they are included in Book I, as in the second and third traditions, and with the same order as they appear in those two traditions. The second time, the questions are found in Book II and with the same order as in the university tradition (see Donati 1998b, p. 216; the questions under consideration are 11–16 of Book I and 11–16 of Book II of the tabula quaestionum drawn by Zimmermann 1971, pp. 80–81). 2) Book I shares the same order of questions with the other two traditions. The order of the first ten questions of Book I of Zimmermann’s tabula (p. 80) should be in the following sequence in order to correspond with the university tradition: 1, 5, 6, 2, 3, 4, 7, 9, 10. 3) Unlike other manuscripts of this tradition (Ottob. 1145, Vat. lat. 845, and Paris, lat. 16158), this manuscript contains q. 8 of Book I – still according to Zimmermann’s numbering – entitled ‘utrum habens experimentum sit magis sciens aliquo habente artem sine experimento’, which is also found in the third tradition. 4) The question of Book I utrum scientia ista terminetur ad contrarium earum que a principio conclusionum is missing. 5) The second question of Book II: utrum consideratio veritatis sit difficilis sicut dicit Philosophus is missing. 6) Zimmermann lists the question utrum veritas, qua res refertur ad intellectum primum et etiam qua refertur ad intellectum nostrum, sit una veritas in re as question 10 of Book II. Yet, this is mistaken, as this ‘question’ is just the final section of the solution of question 9. 7) It shares with the third tradition the absence of q. 11 of Book III (Impossibile est fieri quod impossibile est factum esse ... utrum habeat veritatem), which is present in both the university and the second traditions. Instead, this manuscript, along with the manuscript of the third tradition, presents two further questions (numbers 11 and 12 of Zimmermann’s tabula): utrum universalia sint separata

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and utrum in istis sensibilibus, quae sunt composita ex materia et forma, sit aliquid separatum quod sit substantia (f. 150vb–151rb). 8) It shares with the third tradition the absence of the question utrum omnium entium sint eadem principia numero of Book III after the question 13 of Zimmermann’s tabula (Utrum eorum quae continentur sub una specie sit forma et numero). However, in the third tradition, this question is found at the end of Book III, as its last question (f. 70va–b). Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Ottob. lat. 1145 (s. XIV), f. 1ra–50vb (Books I–IX, XII). Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Pal. lat. 1059 (s. XIV1), f. 1ra–8vb (anonymous; Books I–II and the beginning of q. 1 of Book III – up to the first argument pro; the text stops with the end of the manuscript quire). Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 845 (s. XIV), f. 136ra–271vb (Books I–IX, XII). Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 2173 (s. XIV), f. 196r–198ra (anonymous; it comprises four of the six questions of Book VIII, that is, qq. 1, 2, 4, and 5), 198ra–203ra (Book IX), 204ra–209va (Book XII).38 Oxford, Merton College, 292, O.1.8 (s. XIV in.), f. 232ra–315vb (Books I–IX). Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine, 3498 (s. XIV1), f. 1ra–104vb (Books I– IX, XII). Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 16158 (s. XIV in.), f. 163ra–258vb (Books I–IX, and Book XII up to q. 6, which ends ex abrupto).39

38 Between the end of Book IX and the beginning of Book XII there is one question entitled utrum aliquid sit possibile in rerum natura quod numquam erit (f. 203ra–vb). This question presents a slightly different and sometimes abbreviated (for instance in the replies to the two final arguments) form of the homonymous question (Book IX, q. 5) present in John of Jandun’s commentary on the ‘Metaphysics’, cf. Ioannis de Ianduno, In duodecim libros Metaphysicae, Venetiis 1553, f. 114va–115vb, reprinted in: Johannes von Jandun, Quaestiones in duodecim libros Metaphysicae, Frankfurt a.M. 1966. 39 This manuscript is available in digitized form in the website Gallica of the Bibliothèque Nationale de France at the following address: http://gallica.bnf. fr/ark:/12148/btv1b9066629c (last consulted September 2014).

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– Second tradition Incipit: Omnes homines natura scire desiderant. Sicut dicit Philosophus in decimo Metaphysicae, in unoquoque genere est reperire unum primum quod est causa et mensura omnium aliorum in illo genere ... Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine, 3481 (s. XIV in.), f. 133ra–216ra (Books I–IX, XII. The text of Books II and VII–XII agrees with the university tradition). 1) It shares with the third tradition and Cambridge, Peterhouse 152 the order of the questions of Book I (see above). 2) Regarding Books I, III–VI, the text is different from the other traditions. 3) Question 11 of Book I utrum materia sit ens actu is copied twice, once in Book I and again in Book II, numbered as question 11, in the same place as it appears in the university tradition (cf. Donati 1998b, p. 216, n. 41). 4) Book I has an additional question (q. 24), also found in the third tradition (q. 25), entitled utrum ideae si essent haberent rationem principii activi ipsorum singularium (cf. Dunphy 1966). 5) Questions 20, 25–28 of Book II are missing. – Third tradition Incipit: Sicut dicit Philosophus in decimo Metaphysicae suae, in omni genere est aliquid unum primum quod est causa et mensura omnium aliorum in illo genere ... Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, lat. 2330 (s. XIII), f. 60ra– 82vb (from the beginning of Book I up to q. 35 of Book V), 84ra– 90vb (Book VII), 91ra–93rb (Book X), 93rb–98ra (Book XII). For this manuscript see Dondaine/Bataillon 1966b, pp. 171–173. Some of their conclusions, along with some further notes, can be summarized as follows: 1) See above point 2 of the features of Cambridge, Peterhouse 152. 2) See above point 4 of the second tradition. In Wien the question is found at f. 63vb–64ra. 3) Book II is incomplete, as qq. 17, 18 and 30 of the other versions are missing.

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4) See above point 7 of the features of Cambridge, Peterhouse 152. In Wien those questions of Book III are found at f. 68vb–69ra. 5) While the text of Books III–V agrees with the university tradition (Donati 1998b, p. 216), the text of Book VI has a different version from all the other manuscripts. 6) This is the only manuscript that includes Book X, made up of twenty questions.40 7) Book XII comprehends three further questions between questions 5 and 6 (according to the university tradition’s numbering)

40 As thus far there is no study on Book X, we provide here its tabula quaestionum: 1. Utrum ens praedicatum de aliquo praedicet aliquam naturam additam essentiae illius de quo praedicatur (f. 91ra). 2. Utrum ipsum unum praedicatum de aliquo praedicet aliquid additum essentiae ipsius (f. 91ra–b). 3. Utrum unum et ens convertantur (f. 91rb), although the title of this ques tion is exactly the same as q. 17 of Book II of the university tradition, the content of the two questions differs. 4. Utrum unum in aliquo ente et quod quid causat esse unius sint unum (f. 91rb). 5. Utrum unum in numeris habeat rationem mensurae (f. 91rb–va). 6. Utrum unum quod est principium numeri habeat rationem mensurae in aliis generibus (f. 91va). 7. Utrum unum quod est mensura in unoquoque genere sit aliquid indivisibile (f. 91va–b). 8. Utrum ipsum unum sit substantia (f. 91vb). 9. Utrum primum et minimum quod est mensura prima in genere substan tiae sit substantia prima (f. 91vb–92ra). 10. Utrum unum prius et notius sit ipso multo vel econverso (f. 92ra). 11. Utrum eadem sit materia duorum contrariorum (f. 92ra). 12. Utrum contrariorum sit genus unum (f. 92ra–b). 13. Utrum contrarietas sit maxima distantia (f. 92rb–va). 14. Utrum contraria reducantur ad privativa (f. 92va). 15. Utrum in substantia sit ponere contrarietatem secundum rationem con trarietatis hic ab Aristotele assignatam (f. 92va–b). 16. Utrum in contrarietate sit ponere contrarium secundum propriam rationem contrariorum (92vb–93ra). 17. Utrum media universaliter sint in eodem genere cum extremis (f. 93ra). 18. Utrum ipsum (iter.) medium contrarietur ipsis extremis (f. 93ra). 19. Utrum inter omnia contraria sit ponere medium (f. 93ra–b). 20. Utrum inter privative opposita sit ponere medium (f. 93rb).

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and four extra questions at the end.41 These seven additional questions have no correspondence in all other manuscripts, having been taken, according to two marginal notes (f. 95ra and 97va), from an ‘antiqua reportatio’.42 Editions: Hocedez 1932 (tabula quaestionum, with excerpts from questions from the university tradition, based on Vat. lat. 845, Ottob. 1145, and Paris, lat. 16158 and the second tradition); Hocedez 1934, pp. 379–386 (solution of Book VII, q. 25); Dunphy 1953a, part II (Book II, q. 18; Book III, qq. 3–4; Book XII, qq. 9–11 based chiefly on Ottob. 1145, Paris, lat. 16158, and Mazarine 3498, but collated with Vat. lat. 845, Mazarine 3481, Cambridge, Peterhouse 152, and Wien 2330; Book III, qq. 3–4 of the second tradition); Dunphy 1953b (excerpts from qq. 3–4 of Book III, from q. 19 of Book VII and from q. 6 of Book XII, based on Ottob. 1145 and Paris, lat. 16158); Monahan 1953, pp. 176–177, n. 88, 188, n. 65 (excerpts from Book I, q. 4 based on Paris, lat. 16158), 179, n. 98 (excerpt from Book I, q. 5 based on the same manuscript indicated in the previous note), 192–193, n. 11 (excerpt from Book IX, q. 2, as the previous note), 197–198, n. 43 (excerpt from Book IV, q. 5, as the previous note), Appendix, pp. (1)–(84) (proemium; Book I, qq. 1–3; Book IV, qq. 1–2; Book V, qq. 3, 11; Book VII, qq. 9, 25; Book IX, q. 3 based chiefly on Paris, lat. 16158, but collated against Ottob. 1145, Vat. lat. 845, Cambridge, Peterhouse 152, Mazarine 3481 and 3498, Wien 2330); Monahan 1955, pp. 148–177 (the exact same edition as Monahan 1953, Appendix); Dunphy 1964, pp. 289–301 (Book III, qq. 3–4 in both versions of the university tradition: Cambridge, Peterhouse 152; Ottob. 1145; Vat. lat. 845; Paris, lat. 16158; Mazarine 3498, along with Wien 2330 and the second tradition); Dunphy 1966, pp. 17–21 (Book I, q. 24: Si ideae sint, utrum habeant rationem principii activi ipsorum singularium, based on Mazarine 3481, with corrections from the Wien manuscript); Köhler 1971, p. 314 (excerpts from Book III, q. 12 based on Vat. lat. 845); Zimmermann 1971, pp. 80–88 (tabula quaestionum of Books I–IX and XII based on Cambridge, Peterhouse 152); Dunphy 1974, pp. 95–104 (Book XII, qq. 6a: utrum substantias separatas esse sit manifestum ex se, 6b: utrum possit demonstrari substantias separatas esse, 6c: utrum necesse sit ponere substantias separatas, and 6: utrum sit ponere primum principium in entibus of the third tradition; 41 For the title of these four questions see note 7 of Galle 2013. 42 The indication of a ‘reportatio antiqua’ together with the fact that Book X is contained only in this manuscript means that the third tradition is a later version of Peter’s commentary.

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cf. above the notes regarding this tradition); Ebbesen 1986a, pp. 79–84 (Book V, q. 18 based on Cambridge, Peterhouse 152 and Oxford, Merton College 292); Ebbesen 1988a, pp. 124–125, 143–144 (excerpts from Book VII, qq. 2, 12 based on Cambridge, Peterhouse 152 and Oxford, Merton College 292); Fioravanti 1991 (excerpts from Cambridge, Peterhouse 152); Donati 1998b, pp. 219, 221–225 (excerpts based on Mazarine 3498 and Paris, lat. 16458); Ebbesen 2000, pp. 78–88 (Book IV, q. 16 and Book V, q. 5 based on Cambridge, Peterhouse 152 and Oxford, Merton College 292); Ebbesen 2001, pp. 480–482, 484–486 (excerpts from Book V, q. 27 and Book VII, q. 19 based on Cambridge, Peterhouse 152 and Oxford, Merton College 292); Amerini 2002, pp. 463–464, 489–490, 503–505 (excerpts from Book VII based on Cambridge, Peterhouse 152); Donati 2003, p. 110, n. 98 (excerpt from Book VII, q. 2 based on Mazarine 3498); Amerini 2008a, pp. 438–439 (excerpts from Book VIII, q. 1 based on Cambridge, Peterhouse 152); Amerini 2008b, pp. 60, n. 20, 63, n. 30, 68, n. 40 (excerpts from Book VII, q. 6 based on Cambridge, Peterhouse 152); Amerini 2013 (excerpts from several questions of Books VII and VIII based on Cambridge, Peterhouse 152, collated against Vat. lat. 845 and Oxford, Merton College 292; Book VII, q. 6 based on Cambridge, Peterhouse 152); Ebbesen 2013 (excerpt from Book VII, q. 19 based on Cambridge, Peterhouse 152 and Oxford, Merton College 292); Galle 2013 (Book XII, qq. 8–11 of the third tradition); Toste (in prep.; excerpts from Cambridge, Peterhouse 152). Studies: Hocedez 1932; Dunphy 1953a, pp. 75–185; Dunphy 1953b; Monahan 1953, pp. 15–96, 108–109, 117–149; Monahan 1954; Monahan 1955, pp. 145–147; Gilson 1962, pp. 13–18; Dunphy 1964; Ermatinger 1964; Zimmermann 1965, pp. 211–216, 229–230; Dondaine/Bataillon 1966b, pp. 171–173; Bazán 1971, pp. 379, 381–382; Köhler 1971, ad indicem; Dunphy 1974; Dunphy 1981; Ermatinger 1981; Vuillemin-Diem 1982, pp. 205–207; Wippel 1985, pp. 323–334 (pp. 228–235 of the reprint); Andrews 1988b, p. 98; Ebbesen 1988a, pp. 115–116, 118, 143–144; Courtine 1990, pp. 130–137; Fioravanti 1991; Donati 1998b, pp. 214–229; Zimmermann 1998, pp. 260–267; Ebbesen 2001, passim; Pickavé 2001, pp. 494, 502, 515–518; Amerini 2002, pp. 463–464, 489–494, 503–505; Donati 2003, pp. 97–98, 110, n. 98; Galle 2003a, pp. 204*, 207*–208*, 296*, 298*; Murano 2005, pp. 665–666, nr. 734; Pickavé 2007a, pp. 115–118; Amerini 2008a, passim; Amerini 2008b, passim; Machamer/McGuire 2009, pp. 42–44, 50, 53; Amerini 2013; Bianchi 2013; Ebbesen 2013; Galle 2013.

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6. – Quaestiones super libros Physicorum (?) The text is extant in two different versions: one in the Erfurt manuscript and the other in the Munich manuscript. These two manuscripts share the same text in the following parts: Book I, q. 23 to Book IV, q. 30 of Munich corresponds to Book I, q. 18, 22 up to Book IV, q. 30 of Erfurt (there are however a few exceptions, cf. Ermatinger 1961, pp. 43–45 and Donati 1995, p. 148). The common part is most probably to be ascribed to Peter. – Version 1 Incipit: Quoniam quidem intelligere et scire contingit. Utrum de rebus naturalibus sit scientia ... München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, clm. 9559 (s. XIII), f. 18ra– 39vb (anonymous; Books I–IV. Book IV ends ex abrupto), 40ra– 44ra (anonymous; Book VIII, the text ends abruptly. This book is probably part of a commentary which has not yet been identified). – Version 2 Incipit: Quoniam autem intelligere et scire etc. Secundum quod dicit Algazel in principio Metaphysicae suae, cognitio sapientiae dividitur in duo, quorum primo facit cognoscere humanas actiones ... Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Dep. Erf. CA. 2° 349 (s. XIV), f. 1ra–68vb (anonymous; Books I–VIII), 69r–72r (tabula quaestionum). Mention of a possible further manuscript: olim Faenza, Biblioteca Dominicana (catalog of 1493: ‘Petri de Alvernia Scriptum super VIII lib. Physicorum’. Cf. Kaeppeli 1966, p. 15; Weijers 2007, p. 109). Editions: Van Steenberghen 1931, pp. 177–223 (tabula quaestionum of version 1; some brief excerpts from the solution and reply to the arguments of questions of the same version); Delhaye 1941, pp. 19–235 (whole text of version 1 under Siger of Brabant’s name); Ermatinger 1961, pp. 45–49 (incipit and explicit of all the 22 questions on Book I and incipit and explicit of Books II–VIII of version 2); Donati 1995, pp. 165–166 (excerpts from q. 8 of Book V and q. 11 of Book VIII of version 2), 220–227 (tabula quaestionum of version 2); Donati 1998b, p. 233 (excerpt from version 2).

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Studies: Grabmann 1924b; Grabmann 1924c; Van Steenberghen 1931, pp. 13, 177–223; Maurer 1946, pp. 68–77, 85, n. 62; Nardi 1947; Duin 1948; Maier 1949, passim; Dunphy 1953b; Duin 1954, pp. 121–130, 177–186, 193–195, 275–276, 279–284, et passim in 303–458; Zimmermann 1956, pp. 109–122; Sajó 1958, p. 22;43 Ermatinger 1961; Dunphy 1974; Donati 1995, pp. 148–150, 162–175; Donati 1998b, pp. 230–238; Donati 2003; Galle 2003a, p. 308*, n. 70; De Leemans 2004, pp. 183–184; Calma/Coccia 2006, pp. 284–288; Musatti 2006a, pp. 1455–1456; Musatti 2006b, pp. 530–531; Trifogli 2013; Toste (in prep.). 7. – Quaestiones supra librum De caelo et mundo Three versions ascribed to Peter; the versions are numbered here according to their chronological order. – Version 1 (?) Incipit: De natura scientia fere plurima circa corpora etc. Secundum Themistium super tertium De anima, unumquodque eorum quae fiunt praesumptam habet potentiam, sequentem autem perfectionem ... Cremona, Biblioteca Governativa, 80 (7.5.15) (s. XIV2), f. 98ra–136ra (ascribed to Peter). Erlangen, Universitätsbibliothek, 213 (s. XIII–XIV), f. 1ra–28rb (anonymous). Kassel, Stadt- und Landesbibliothek, Phys. 2º 11 (s. XIII–XIV), f. 35va– 55rb (anonymous). – Version 2 Incipit: De natura scientia fere plurima. Sicut dicit Philosophus in primo huius quem prae manibus habemus exponendum, ab ente divino omnia esse

43 Although Sajó asserts at p. 22 that, in his opinion, the commentary contained in the Munich manuscript (f. 18ra–44ra) must be ascribed to Boethius of Dacia, actually all through the article he never provides evidence for this claim. This is because Sajó deals only with the commentary transmitted in the same manuscript at f. 2ra–14ra and which has been edited in: Boethii Daci opera. Quaestiones De generatione et corruptione; Quaestiones super libros Physicorum. Voluminis V Pars II: Quaestiones super libros Physicorum continens, Ed. Sajó, Géza (Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi 5.2), København 1974.

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communicant, hoc quidem clarius, hoc quidem obscurius ... (based on the edition Galle 2003a). El Escorial, Real Biblioteca de San Lorenzo, h.II.1 (s. XIII–XIV), f. 106ra–129vb (anonymous). Inserted in a commentary in question form on the ‘De caelo et mundo’. Only the following two sections of the text agree with the text contained in the other two manuscripts: Book II, qq. 10–35 and from Book II, q. 41 up to Book III, q. 4; it also contains q. 6 of Book III, but in an incomplete form, as the text ends ex abrupto. The text is on occasion briefer than in the other two manuscripts. Cf. Musatti 2008, pp. 284–286.

Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine, 3493 (s. XIV), f. 95ra–136rb. Wien, Dominikanerkonvent, 150/120 (s. XIV), f. 47ra–68vb. – Version 3 This set of questions was “most probably composed by an anonymous compiler whose main source was another reportatio of the same or of similar lectures, taught by Peter of Auvergne, as the lectures noted down” in version 2. Seven questions of version 3 “are partly or totally based on parts of Albert the Great’s commentary on” the ‘De caelo et mundo’: Galle 2003a, pp. 78* and 68*–69*. Incipit: Dicit Philosophus primo Caeli et Mundi: ab ente aeterno aliis communicatum est, his quidem clarius, illis vero obscurius esse et vivere. Primum autem, cum sit aeternum, ipsum habet esse per sui essentiam ... (based on the edition Galle 2003a). Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, 1386 (s. XIV1), f. 91va–102vb (the attribution to Peter is erased). Praha, Metropolitní Kapitoly Pražské, 1320 (L.LXXIV) (s. XIV1), f. 43rb–52vb (anonymous). Editions: Donati 1998b (excerpts from version 1); Musatti 2000a (whole text of version 1 based on all manuscripts); Galle 2001a (q. 15 of Book I in versions 2 and 3); Galle 2001b (excerpts from version 2); Galle 2002a (excerpts from versions 2 and 3), pp. 283–290 (tabula quaestionum of versions 2 and 3); Galle 2002b (excerpts from version 2), pp. 239–246 (tabula quaestionum of versions 1 and 2); Galle 2003a, pp. 5–376 (whole text of version 2 based on Mazarine 3493 and Wien 150/120), 377–559 (whole text of version 3 based on both manuscripts); Musatti 2006a (excerpts from version 1); Musatti

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2006b, pp. 542 and 544 (excerpts from version 1), 548–549 (Book II, q. 33 of version 2 based on El Escorial); Musatti 2008, pp. 277–281 (tabula quaestionum of version 2, as contained in El Escorial), 283–289 (excerpts from Book II of El Escorial); Musatti 2009, pp. 262–263 (excerpts from version 1); Musatti 2012, pp. 221–223 (Book I, q. 32 of version 1); Musatti 2013a (Book II, q. 24 of version 2 based on El Escorial); Musatti 2013b (the prologues of version 1 and El Escorial). Studies: North 1986, pp. 88–89; Musatti 1995; Porro 1996, pp. 260–261; Donati 1998a; Donati 1998b, pp. 204–214; Galle 1998; Musatti 2000a; Musatti 2000b; Galle 2001b; Galle 2002a; Galle 2002b; Köhler 2002, ad indicem; Galle 2003a; Galle 2003b, pp. 343, 347, 355–358, 368–369; Bossier 2004, pp. xlix–l, lxxxvi; Galle 2006; Musatti 2006a; Musatti 2006b, pp. 529–531, 539–549; Musatti 2008; Musatti 2009; Musatti 2012, pp. 216–217; Anzulewicz 2013; Musatti 2013a; Musatti 2013b. 8. – Expositio in libros III–IV De caelo et mundo This commentary was intended as the continuation of Thomas Aquinas’s unfinished commentary. Aquinas’s text ends at the second half of lectio 8 of Book III, which corresponds to the end of the third chapter of Book III (302b9) of the Aristotelian text. Nonetheless, Peter started his commentary from the beginning of Book III. For this reason some manuscripts contain Peter’s text from the beginning of Book III, while others and all the printed editions comprehend it only from the second half of lectio 8 of Book III on (which corresponds to the beginning of the fourth chapter of Book III). There are two versions of Peter’s commentary: one is extant in almost all the known manuscripts and in all the hitherto available editions, the other is contained, at least, in the manuscript Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, 1405 (s. XIV in.), f. 57ra–62rb and regards the section that goes from the second half of lectio 8 of Book III up to lectio 2 of Book IV. Cf. Bossier 1987, p. 308, n. 29; Bossier 2004, p. lxxxvi, n. 114. Incipit of Book III, lectio 1: De primo quidem igitur caelo. Cum Philosophus complevit considerationem de corporibus simplicibus que mobilia sunt circa medium circulariter natura ... Incipit of Book III, lectio 8, second part: Deinde cum dicit ‘utrum autem’ inquirit quot sunt secundum numerum et qualia sunt secundum naturam. Et quoniam alii aliter opinabantur, narrat in isto tertio opiniones aliorum ...

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Bamberg, Staatsbibliothek, class. 61 (HJ.VI.2) (s. XV), f. 281r–301v (Books III.8, second part–IV). Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, lat. quart. 195 (Rose 970) (s. XIV–XV), f. 30v–44r (Books III.1–IV). Brugge, Stedelijke Bibliotheek, 496 (s. XIII–XIV), f. 126ra–146ra (Books III.1–IV). Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Borgh. lat. 114 (s. XIII–XIV), f. 110v–119v (Books III.8, second part–IV). Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Urb. lat. 24 (s. XV), f. 125r–167r (Books III.8, second part–IV). Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 770 (s. XIV), f. 55v–69v (Books III.8, second part–IV). Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 2181 (s. XIV), f. 94v–115v (Books III.8 second part–IV). Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Dep. Erf. CA. 2° 356 (s. XIV), f. 49r–61v (Books III.8, second part–IV). Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Fesul. 104 (s. XV), f. 192v– 208r (Books III.8, second part–IV). Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. XXIX dext. 12 (s. XIV), f. 38v–55v (Books III.1–IV; ascribed to a certain Robert). Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, 1402 (s. XIV), f. 85– (Books III.1–IV). Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, 1405 (s. XIV in.), f. 57ra–62rb (Books III.8, second part–IV.2). Liège, Bibliothèque du Grand Séminaire, 6.A.13 (s. XIII ex.), f. 60vb– 75vb (Books III–IV). Madrid, Archivo Histórico Universitario, Universidad Complutense de Madrid (olim Biblioteca de la Universidad Central), 124 (117.38) (s. XIII), item 8. Madrid, Archivo Histórico Universitario, Universidad Complutense de Madrid (olim Biblioteca de la Universidad Central), 3076 (s. XIV), f. 54ra–75va (Books III.8, second part–IV; incipit: Consequenter cum dicit: adhuc ...). München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, clm. 14246 (a. 1312), f. 94r–114v (Books III.8, second part–IV). München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, clm. 18907 (s. XIV), f. 1–44 (Books III.1–IV). Oxford, Balliol College, 108 (s. XIII–XIV), f. 42r–49v (Books III.8, second part–IV). Oxford, Balliol College, 278 (s. XIII), f. 239r–v (only one excerpt). Oxford, Balliol College, 312 (s. XIV), f. 219v–243v (Books III.1–IV).

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Oxford, Merton College, 274 (O.1.5) (s. XIV in.), f. 55–79 (Books III.8, second part–IV). Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine, 3484 (316) (s. XIII–XIV), f. 245–268 (Books III.1–IV). Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine, 3485 (363) (s. XIV), f. 37rb–53ra (Books III.1–IV). Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 14722 (s. XIII ex.–XIV in.), f. 52vb– 75vb (Books III.1–IV). Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 16154 (s. XIV in.), f. 124ra–135rb (Books III.8, second part–IV). Praha, Národní Knihovna Ceské Republiky, 905 (a. 1453), 108 f. (Books III.1–IV). Salamanca, Biblioteca Universitaria, 1747 (s. XIV), f. 50r–72v (Books III.8, second part–IV). Mention of two possible further manuscripts: olim Erfurt, Collegium Universitatis (MBKD, vol. II, p. 214. Cf. Lohr 1972, p. 338, nr. 4); olim Nürnberg, Franziskanerkloster (catalog ca. 1448. Cf. MBKD, vol. III, p. 1762; Lohr 1972, p. 338, nr. 4). Editions: Libri de celo et mundo Aristotelis cum expositione Sancti Thome de Aquino e cum additione Petri de Alvernia, Venetiis 1495 (cur. Hermanno de Virsen; mandato sumptibusque Octaviani Scoti per Bonetum Locatellum), f. 60vb–76ra;44 Venetiis 1495 (cur. Hermanno de Virsen; Johannes et Gregorius de Gregoriis de Forolivio); Thomae Aquinatis in libros De coelo et mundo Aristotelis, Venetiis 1506 (per Simonem de Luere); Venetiis 1516 (haeredes Octaviani Scoti ac sociorum); Parisiis 1536 (apud Iacobum Kerver), pp. 182–232;45 Divi Thome Aquinatis in libros Aristotelis De celo [et] mundo commentaria ... His addite sunt interpretations Petri Alvernatis ..., Venetiis 1537 (in officina Lucaeantonii Iuntae Florentini); Venetiis 1543 (apud Iuntas); Venetiis 1545 (apud Hieronymum Scotum); Venetiis 1551 (apud Iuntas); Venetiis 1562 (apud Hieronymum Scotum); Venetiis 1564

44 This edition is available in digitized form in the webpage of the digital library of the Universidade de Coimbra and can be consulted at the following address: https://bdigital.sib.uc.pt/bg6/UCBG-R-47-2a/globalItems.html (last consulted September 2014). 45 This edition is available in digitized form in Google Books at the following address: http://books.google.com/books?id=Dpsikab0HP4C (last consulted September 2014).

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(apud Iuntas), pp. 75rb–95vb;46 Venetiis 1565; Venetiis 1572 (apud Iuntas); S. Thomae Aquinatis In quatuor libros Aristotelis de Coelo et Mundi commentaria, quae, cum morte praeventus perficere non potuerit, absolvit Petrus de Alvernia, Venetiis 1575, pp. 138–176 (apud haeredem Hieronymi Scoti);47 Venetiis 1590 (apud haeredem Hieronymi Scoti), pp. 138–176;48 Antverpiae 1612 (Thomae Opera Omnia II); Parisiis 1649 (apud viduam Dionysii Moreau), pp. 163–210;49 Parisiis 1660 (apud Societatem Bibliopolarum; this edition is the same as the 1649 edition) (Thomae Opera Omnia II.2, pp. 163–210);50 Parmae 1866 (typis Petri Fiaccadori) (Thomae Opera Omnia XIX, pp. 164–207); Parisiis 1875 (Thomae Opera Omnia XXIII, pp. 222–266); Galle 2003a (excerpts from lectiones 3, 5, 7, 8 of Book III based on Mazarine 3484); Musatti 2009, pp. 271–272 (excerpts from lectio 12 of Book III based on Leipzig 1405). Translations: Cruz Cruz 2002, pp. 439–538 (Spanish translation: from Book III, lectio 8, second part up to the end of Book IV). Studies: Duhem 1958, pp. 75–76, 81, 132–133, 185, 245; Bossier 1987, pp. 308–311; Flüeler 1992a, vol. I, p. 88; Galle 2003a, pp. 45*–49*, 257*–260*, 269*–271*, 278*–281*; Bossier 2004, pp. lxxxv–lxxxvi; Murano 2005, pp. 668–669 (nr. 738); Musatti 2009, pp. 270–273, 280–281; Anzulewicz 2013. 9. – Quaestiones super librum De generatione et corruptione (?) Incipit: De generatione autem et corruptione, etc. Superius in libro Caeli et mundi determinavit Aristoteles de ente mobili ...

46 This edition is available in digitized form in Google Books at the following address: http://books.google.com/books?id=mLL_DKqRxwEC (last consulted September 2014). 47 This edition is available in digitized form in Google Books at the following address: http://books.google.com/books?id=1KNCAAAAcAAJ (last consulted September 2014). 48 This edition is available in digitized form in Google Books: http://books. google.com/books?id=Dm5E77a–t9oC (last consulted September 2014). 49 This edition is available in digitized form in Google Books: http://books. google.com/books?id=Ux9nO7PRhMcC (last consulted September 2014). 50 This edition is available in digitized form in Google Books at the following address: http://books.google.com/books?id=vXPTa2draEEC (last consulted September 2014).

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Erlangen, Universitätsbibliothek, 213 (s. XIII–XIV), f. 28rb–46rb. Kassel, Stadt- und Landesbibliothek, Phys. 2º 11 (s. XIII–XIV), f. 124ra–135vb (only Book I, qq. 1–56; the text ends ex abrupto). Mention of a possible further manuscript: olim Canterbury, Library of St. Augustine’s Abbey (catalog ca. 1497: Reportaciones super librum De generatione et corruptione secundum Petrum de Alvernia. Cf. James 1903, p. 317; Lohr 1972, p. 338, nr. 6). Editions: Donati 1998a (excerpts based on both manuscripts); Donati 1998b, passim (excerpts based on both manuscripts), pp. 242–247 (tabula quaestionum based on both manuscripts). Studies: Donati 1998a; Donati 1998b; Galle 2002b, pp. 197–199. 10. – Sententia super libros Meteororum This commentary covers the four books of the ‘Meteorology’. However, in a few manuscripts Peter’s commentary is incomplete, as it was used to complement the remaining part of Aquinas’s unfinished commentary. From the edition Venice 1532 onwards, the editors published, along with Aquinas’s commentary on the first book, a commentary on the other three books of the ‘Meteorology’ that draws chiefly, but not exclusively, on Peter’s commentary. This edition was composed by the professors of the Bursa Montana in Cologne and published there in 1497; cf. Dondaine/Bataillon 1966a, pp. 101, 119. Incipit of Book I: Philosophus in primo Physicorum proponit innata ex certioribus et notioribus via ad certiora et notiora naturae. Cuius ratio est et esse potest, quia omne quod movetur naturaliter ad unum oppositorum ... Incipit of Book II, lectio 6: De coruscatione autem. Postquam Philosophus determinavit de hiis quae generantur ex segregatione calida sicca circa terram et intra, puta de ventis et terrae motibus, nunc intendit considerationem facere de hiis quae generantur ex eadem in nube ... Incipit of Book II, lectio 11: De positione autem ipsorum. Postquam Philosophus determinavit de causa et modo generationis et motu ventorum adhuc autem de principio commotionis ...

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Incipit of Book III: De residuis autem. Postquam Philosophus determinavit de tonitruo et coruscatione in fine praecedentis libri, hic in principio istius tertii intendit determinare de aliis quae generantur ... Brugge, Stedelijke Bibliotheek, 482 (s. XIV in.), f. 111r–139r (abbreviation constructed from Aquinas’s and Peter’s commentaries; see the note below on this manuscript in ‘Scriptum super III–VIII libros Politicorum’). Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 2181 (s. XIV), f. 22v–94v. Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 2182 (s. XIII–XIV), f. 1r–58v. Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 3015 (s. XIV), f. 1ra–54vb (incomplete). Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 6758 (s. XIV), f. 98vb–100ra (only Book II, lectiones 11–12). Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. XXIX dext. 12 (s. XIV), f. 57r–121r. Madrid, Archivo Histórico Universitario, Universidad Complutense de Madrid (olim Biblioteca de la Universidad Central), 124 (117.38) (s. XIII), f. 1–69. Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional, 1427 (s. XIII–XIV), f. 142vb–152vb (it contains Peter’s commentary from the half of the first chapter of Book III – lemma ‘hic quidem enim’, which corresponds to Bekker 371a21 – up to the end of Book IV. In this manuscript, this section of Peter’s commentary was used, along with other anonymous commentaries on Book II and the beginning of the first chapter of Book III, to complement Aquinas’s commentary. Cf. Dondaine/ Bataillon 1966a, p. 87). Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, D 304 inf. (s. XIV), f. 1r–42v. München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, clm. 14416 (s. XIV), f. 57–120 (anonymous). Oxford, Balliol College, 108 (s. XIII–XIV), f. 50r–105r (incomplete). Oxford, Balliol College, 312 (s. XIV), f. 243v–328v. Oxford, Merton College, 274 (O.1.5) (s. XIV), f. 122r–222r. Oxford, Merton College, 281 (O.3.1) (s. XIV in.), f. 11v–37v (Book IV). Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine, 3485 (363) (s. XIV in.), f. 112ra–182va. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 12992 (s. XIV in.), f. 112va–187ra (Books II, partially–IV; incipit: Dicto de corpore mobili ...).

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Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 14722 (s. XIII ex.–XIV in.), f. 76ra–177rb. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 16097 (s. XIII–XIV), f. 149ra–182rb (Books II.9–IV; in this manuscript Peter’s commentary was used to complement Aquinas’s commentary).51 Salamanca, Biblioteca Universitaria, 1747 (s. XIV), f. 73ra–152vb. Wien, Dominikanerkonvent, 80/45 (s. XIV), 104 ff. Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, lat. 2302 (s. XIV), f. 47r–87r. Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, lat. 2310 (s. XIV), f. 1r–48r. Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, lat. 2335 (s. XV), f. 1r–55v. Mention of two possible further manuscripts: olim Erfurt, Collegium Universitatis (catalog ca. 1510. Cf. MBKD, vol. II, p. 214; Lohr 1972, p. 339, nr. 7); olim Mirandola, Biblioteca di Pico della Mirandola (Cf. Lohr 1972, p. 339, nr. 7). Editions: Salmanticae 149752 (Peter’s text goes from the end of Thomas Aquinas’s commentary, that is, Book I, lectio 15, up to the end of Book IV. Peter’s commentary starts, however, from the lemma ‘At vero neque quemadmodum’ – Bekker 348a11 –, which is also comprehended in Aquinas’s commentary, this lemma being thus commented on twice in this edition; cf. Dondaine/Bataillon 1966a, p. 97, n. 19); Dondaine/Bataillon 1966a, pp. 118–119 (two excerpts based on Mazarine 3485, Paris, lat. 14722, and Vat. lat. 6758), 148–149 (excerpt based on Paris, lat. 14722); VuilleminDiem 2004, pp. 14, 36, 60–61, 66, 68–70 (excerpts based on Balliol College 312 and Merton College 274, corrected with the Salamanca edition and with Paris, lat. 16097). Studies: Duin 1954, pp. 209–213; Duhem 1958, pp. 423–425; Dondaine/ Bataillon 1966a, pp. 87–88, 91, 101, 117; Bazán 1971, p. 380; Vuillemin-Diem 51 This manuscript is available in digitized form in the website Gallica of the Bibliothèque Nationale de France at the following address: http://gallica.bnf. fr/ark:/12148/btv1b90671756 (last consulted September 2014). 52 The question regarding the identity of both the printer and the editor of this edition is problematic. On this see Varona, Antonia, Identificación de la primera imprenta anónima salmantina, in: Investigaciones Históricas 14 (1994), pp. 25–33. This edition is available in digitized form at the web page of the library of the Universidad de Sevilla and can be consulted at the following address: http://fondosdigitales.us.es/books/search/digitalbook_view?oid_ page= 46377. Peter’s text starts at image 49 (last consulted September 2014).

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2004, pp. 13–16, 27, 35–41, 60–61, 66–72, 127–129 et passim; Murano 2005, pp. 666–667, nr. 735; Vuillemin-Diem 2008, ad indicem. 11. – Quaestiones super librum De sensu et sensato Incipit: Sicut dicit Philosophus in sexto Metaphysicae, tres sunt scientiae ... Oxford, Merton College, 275 (H.3.6) (s. XIII–XIV), f. 209r–217v (according to the new foliation). Editions: Bazán 1971, p. 381, n. 20 (excerpt from q. 54); White 1986, vol. II, pp. 1–112 (whole text); White 1990, pp. 453–456 (prologue). Studies: Bazán 1971, p. 381; White 1986, vol. I, pp. 178–228, 241–245; White 1990; Galle 2003a, pp. 280*–281*; Köhler 2008, ad indicem; De Leemans 2010, pp. 211–212. 12. – Quaestiones super librum De memoria et reminiscentia This commentary survives in two versions. Incipit of the prologue, which is absent in version 2: Sicut dicit Philosophus septimo De historia animalium, natura paulative procedit de inanimatis ad animata ... (according to the edition Bloch 2008). Incipit of the text in version 1: Quaeritur primo utrum de memoria sit scientia separata a scientia de anima, supposito quod de illa sit scientia ... Incipit of the text in version 2: Reliquorum autem etc. Circa istum librum, supposito quod de memoria sit scientia, quaeritur utrum sit separata a scientia de anima ... – Version 1 Oxford, Merton College, 275 (H.3.6) (s. XIII–XIV), f. 217vb–221ra, according to the new foliation (anonymous, but noted at f. 217vb secundum Petrum de Alvernia). – Version 2 Roma, Biblioteca Angelica, 549 (s. XV), f. 98ra–99va (anonymous; qq. 9–16).

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Roma, Biblioteca Angelica, 560, f. 105rb–106vb (anonymous; qq. 1–9). Editions: Pinborg 1967b, p. 383 (excerpt from q. 3 of version 2); White 1986, vol. II, pp. 113–202 (whole text of both versions); Bloch 2008, pp. 58–110 (whole text of both versions). Studies: Pinborg 1967b, pp. 382–383; White 1986, vol. I, pp. 229–245, vol. II, pp. i–xxii; White 1991; Bloch 2007, pp. 207–219; Bloch 2008; Köhler 2008, ad indicem. 13. – Quaestiones super libro De somno et vigilia Incipit: De somno autem et vigilia, etc. Quaeritur utrum de somno et vigilia sit scientia. Quod non de somno, probatio: quia omnis scientia est de ente ... München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, clm. 3852, f. 17. Oxford, Merton College, 275 (s. XIII–XIV), f. 221r–222r (according to the new foliation). Mention of a possible further manuscript: olim Erfurt, Collegium Amplonianum (catalog 1410–1412: ‘Quaestiones et sententiae super II libris De somno et vigilia’. Cf. MBKD, vol. I, p. 33; Lohr, p. 339, nr. 7). Editions: White 1986, vol. II, pp. 203–220 (whole text based on the Oxford manuscript). Studies: Köhler 2008, ad indicem. 14. – Sententia super libro De somno et vigilia It includes the ‘De insomniis’ and the ‘De divinatione per somnum’. Incipit: Secundum Philosophum secundo Physicorum quaecumque movent mota sunt naturalis considerationis. Quaecumque enim movent ... Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Barb. lat. 309 (s. XIV), f. 25ra–40ra + 41r–42r (excerpt; cf. De Leemans 2000, p. 303). Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, 1418 (s. XIV), f. 108ra–131rb (ascribed to Peter of Hibernia in f. 108ra but to Peter of Auvergne in the colophon in f. 131rb; 108ra–119ra: ‘De somno’; 119rb–125ra: ‘De insomniis’; 125ra–131rb: ‘De divinatione’).

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Oxford, Balliol College, 104 (s. XIII–XIV), f. 162ra–176rb (162ra–169ra: ‘De somno’; 169ra–173vb: ‘De insomniis’; 173vb–176rb: ‘De divinatione’). Oxford, Merton College, 274 (O.1.5) (s. XIV in.), f. 224r–252v. Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine, 3485 (363) (s. XIV in.), f. 204va–264ra. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 16158 (s. XIV in.), f. 82ra–106va.53 Salamanca, Biblioteca Universitaria, 2363 (s. XIV in.), f. 88ra–121vb.54 Editions: Toste (in prep.; excerpts based on Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek 1418 and Oxford, Balliol College 104). Studies: Lohr 1972, p. 340, nr. 12; Murano 2005, p. 667, nr. 736; Toste (in prep.). 15. – Sententia super librum De longitudine et brevitate vitae Incipit: Sicut scribitur quarto et sexto Metaphysicae, eiusdem scientiae est considerare subiectum et per se passiones illius subiecti, sicut primi philosophi est considerare ens secundum quod ens et passiones per se entis secundum quod ens est ... Brugge, Stedelijke Bibliotheek, 496 (s. XIII–XIV), f. 31ra–35rb. Cambridge, Peterhouse, 143 (s. XIV–XV), f. 87rb–89rb. Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 2181 (s. XIV), f. 8r–11r. Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Dep. Erf. CA. 4° 188 (s. XIV1), f. 89ra–91r (‘Explicit Sententia Thomae super De longitudine et brevitate vitae’). Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 16158 (s. XIV in.), f. 116rb–118rb (anonymous; incomplete, the text stops ex abrupto).55 53 See note 39 above. 54 Lohr 1972, p. 340, indicates a further manuscript: Troyes, Bibliothèque Municipale, 1374 (s. XIV) (this manuscript is not cited in Lohr’s reprint; cf. Lohr, with the collaboration of Coralba Colombo, note 4, p. 72). However, this manuscript conveys William of Moerbeke’s Latin translation of the ‘De somno’ (f. 1r–11r). It is available in digitized form in the website of the Médiathèque du Grand Troyes at the following address: http://patrimoine.agglo-troyes.fr/ simclient/integration/EXPLOITATION/dossiersDoc/voirDossManuscrit.as p?INSTANCE=EXPLOITATION&DOSS=BKDD_MS_1374_00 (last consulted January 2013). 55 See note 39 above.

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Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 16170 (s. XIII ex.–XIV in.), f. 5vb–7vb (anonymous).56 Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, lat. 2330 (s. XIII–XIV), f. 9va–12va.57 Editions: Patavii 1493; Venetiis 1507 (per Bonetum Locatellum, mandato sumptibusque Octaviani Scoti), f. 43rb–47rb;58 Venetiis 1525; Venetiis 1551 (apud Octavianum Scotum Amadei filium), f. 50va–55ra; Venetiis 1566 (apud Hieronymum Scotum), pp. 112–122;59 Venetiis 1588; Parisiis 1646 (apud Dionysium Moreau) (Thomae Opera Omnia II.2, pp. 127–138); Parisiis 1660 (apud Societatem Bibliopolarum) (Thomae Opera Omnia II.2, pp. 127–138);60 Dunne 1993, pp. 40–43 (proemium, lectio 1 and an excerpt from lectio 4 based on Wien 2330); Dunne 2002, pp. 173–200 (whole text based on all the manuscripts); Köhler 2008, pp. 261, n. 113, 707, n. 927, 790, n. 1267 (excerpts based on Brugge 496). 56 See note 16 above. 57 Lohr 1972, p. 341, indicates a further manuscript: Troyes, Bibliothèque Municipale, 1374 (s. XIV) (in Lohr, with the collaboration of Coralba Colomba, note 4, see p. 72). However, like in the case of the ‘De somno’ (see note 54 above), the text transmitted in this manuscript is just William of Moerbeke’s Latin translation of the ‘De longitudine et brevitate vitae’ (f. 11r–13v). 58 This edition, which also contains the ‘Sententia super librum De iuventute et senectute’, the ‘Sententia super librum De respiratione et inspiratione’, the ‘Sententia super librum De morte et vita’, and the ‘Sententia super librum De motu animalium’ (Recensio communis), is available in digitized form at the web page of the library of the Universidad de Sevilla and can be consulted at the following address: http://fondosdigitales.us.es/books/search/ digitalbook_view?oid_page=53474 (last consulted September 2014). It is also available in Google Books at the following address http://books.google.com/ books?id=2cFCAAAAcAAJ (last consulted September 2014). 59 This edition, which contains Peter’s other literal commentaries on the ‘Parva naturalia’, is available in digitized form in Google Books at the following addresses: http://books.google.com/books?id=IE3Mf4N7fn8C and http:// books.google.com/books?id=wKNCAAAAcAAJ (last consulted September 2014). It is also available in the Digital Collection of the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek: http://reader.digitale-sammlungen.de/resolve/display/bsb10139154. html (last consulted September 2014). 60 This edition, which contains Peter’s other literal commentaries on the ‘Parva naturalia’, is available in digitized form in Google Books at the following address: http://books.google.com/books?id=kK5KAAAAcAAJ (last consulted September 2014).

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Studies: Bazán 1971, pp. 379–380; Dunne 1993, pp. 38–39; Köhler 2002, ad indicem; Dunne 2002; Dunne 2003, pp. 324, 330–331; Köhler 2008, ad indicem; Dunne 2009, pp. 129–131; De Leemans 2010, p. 214. 16. – Sententia super librum De iuventute et senectute Incipit: Sicut dicit Philosophus in primo Physicorum, innata est nobis via ex nobis notioribus et prioribus in notiora et priora naturae. Sumus enim ... Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.II.9 (s. XV), f. 76r–77v. Brugge, Stedelijke Bibliotheek, 513 (s. XIII–XIV), f. 111ra–114ra. Cambridge, Peterhouse, 143 (s. XIV–XV), f. 79ra–87rb. Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Barb. lat. 309 (s. XIV), f. 46va–b + 49ra–52vb + 47ra (chapters 1–13; cf. De Leemans 2000, p. 303). Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 846 (s. XIII– XIV), f. 41ra–45rb. Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 2181 (s. XIV), f. 11r–14v. Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Dep. Erf. CA. 4° 188 (s. XIV 1), f. 86ra–88r. Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellonska, 1894 (s. XV1), after f. 331v. Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, 1405 (s. XIV in.), f. 99vb–103r. Oxford, Balliol College, 104 (s. XIII–XIV), f. 176rb–179ra. Oxford, Merton College, 274 (O.1.5) (s. XIV in.), f. 265r–271v. Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine, 3485 (363) (s. XIV in.), f. 271va–275rb. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 14714 (s. XIII ex.–XIV in.), f. 189ra–193va (anonymous).61 Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 16158 (s. XIV in.), f. 119ra–124ra (anonymous).62 Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 16170 (s. XIII ex.–XIV in.), f. 9rb–12rb (anonymous).63 Salamanca, Biblioteca Universitaria, 2363 (s. XIV in.), f. 121vb–128vb.

61 This manuscript is available in digitized form in the website Gallica of the Bibliothèque Nationale de France at the following address: http://gallica.bnf. fr/ark:/12148/btv1b9067139b (last consulted September 2014). 62 See note 39 above. 63 See note 16 above.

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Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, lat. 2330 (s. XIII), f. 40ra–42rb.64 Editions: Patavii 1493; Venetiis 1507 (per Bonetum Locatellum, mandato sumptibusque Octaviani Scoti), f. 47rb–51vb;65 Venetiis 1525; Venetiis 1551 (apud Octavianum Scotum Amadei filium), f. 55ra–60vb; Venetiis 1566 (apud Hieronymum Scotum), pp. 122–133;66 Venetiis 1588; Parisiis 1646 (apud Dionysium Moreau) (Thomae Opera Omnia II.2, pp. 139–151); Parisiis 1660 (apud Societatem Bibliopolarum) (Thomae Opera Omnia II.2, pp. 139–151);67 Lewry 1990, p. 34, n. 62 (excerpt from Oxford, Balliol College 274). Studies: Lewry 1990, p. 34; De Leemans 2000; Köhler 2008, ad indicem; De Leemans 2010, pp. 214–217. 17. – Sententia super librum De respiratione et inspiratione Incipit: Animalium autem. Postquam Philosophus declaravit qualiter fiat refrigeratio in plantis, ostendit qualiter fit in animalibus. Et circa hoc primo dat ... Brugge, Stedelijke Bibliotheek, 513 (s. XIII–XIV), f. 114ra–118vb. Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Barb. lat. 309 (s. XIV), f. 47ra (line 14–48vb + 53ra–54vb + (?) + 57ra–b (anonymous, without title; cf. De Leemans 2000, p. 303). Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 846 (s. XIII– XIV), f. 45rb–52rb. Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 2181 (s. XIV), f. 14v–20v. Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellonska, 1894 (s. XV1), after f. 331v. Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, 1405 (s. XIV in.), f. 103r–108v.

64 Lohr 1972, p. 341, indicates a further manuscript: Troyes, Bibliothèque Municipale, 1374 (s. XIV) (in Lohr, with the collaboration of Coralba Colomba, note 4, see p. 72). Nevertheless, this manuscript transmits in f. 13v–16r William of Moerbeke’s Latin translation of Aristotle’s ‘De iuventute et senectute’. See also notes 54 and 57 above. 65 See note 58 above. 66 See note 59 above. 67 See note 60 above.

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Oxford, Balliol College, 104 (s. XIII–XIV), f. 179ra–183rb (with no indication of the beginning of the text). Oxford, Merton College, 274 (O.1.5) (s. XIV in.), f. 269v–282r. Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine, 3485 (363) (s. XIV in.), f. 275rb–281va. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 14174 (s. XIII ex.–XIV in.), f. 193v– 200va (anonymous). Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 16158 (s. XIV in.), f. 124ra–131vb (anonymous).68 Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 16170 (s. XIII ex.–XIV in.), f. 12rb– 17ra (anonymous).69 Salamanca, Biblioteca Universitaria, 2363 (s. XIV in.), f. 128vb–139va. Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, lat. 2330 (s. XIII), f. 42rb–46rb. Editions: Patavii 1493; Venetiis 1507 (per Bonetum Locatellum, mandato sumptibusque Octaviani Scoti), f. 51vb–59rb;70 Venetiis 1525 (mandato sumptibusque haeredum Octaviani Scoti ac sociorum); Venetiis 1551 (apud Octavianum Scotum Amadei filium), f. 56ra–69va; Venetiis 1566 (apud Hieronymum Scotum), pp. 134–155;71 Venetiis 1588; Parisiis 1646 (apud Dionysium Moreau) (Thomae Opera Omnia II.2, pp. 151–175: the beginning corresponds to lectio 6 of the ‘De iuventute et senectute’); Parisiis 1660 (apud Societatem Bibliopolarum) (Thomae Opera Omnia II.2, pp. 151–175).72 18. – Sententia super librum De morte et vita Incipit: Est quidem omnibus, etc. Postquam autem Philosophus determinavit de infrigidatione et in animalibus habentibus pulmonem et in habentibus branchias, in parte ista determinat de morte et vita ... Brugge, Stedelijke Bibliotheek, 513 (s. XIII–XIV), f. 118vb–120va. Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Barb. lat. 309 (s. XIV), f. 57rb–60vb + 55ra–56vb + 61ra. Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 846 (s. XIII– XIV), f. 52rb–54vb.

68 69 70 71 72

See note 39 above. See note 16 above. See note 58 above. See note 59 above. See note 60 above.

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Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 2181 (s. XIV), f. 20v–22v. Erlangen, Universitätsbibliothek, 210 (Irm. 379) (s. XIII–XIV), f. 13r–16r. Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellonska, 1894 (s. XV1), after f. 331v. Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, 1405 (s. XIV in.), f. 108v–110v. Oxford, Balliol College, 104 (s. XIII–XIV), f. 183rb–184vb. Oxford, Magdalen College, 146 (s. XIV), f. 104r–107r. Oxford, Merton College, 274 (O.1.5) (s. XIV in.), f. 280r–285v. Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine, 3485 (363) (s. XIV in.), f. 281vb–283vb. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 14714 (s. XIII ex.–XIV in.), f. 200va–203rb.73 Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 16158 (s. XIV in.), f. 131vb–134va.74 Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 16170 (s. XIII ex.–XIV in.), f. 7vb–9rb.75 Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, lat. 2330 (s. XIII), f. 46rb–47rb. Mention of a possible further manuscript: olim Erfurt, Collegium Universitatis (catalog ca. 1497: ‘Scriptum super librum De morte’. Cf. MBKD, vol. II, p. 166; Lohr 1972, p. 342, nr. 18). Editions: Patavii 1493; Venetiis 1507 (per Bonetum Locatellum, mandato sumptibusque Octaviani Scoti), f. 59rb–61vb;76 Venetiis 1525; Venetiis 1551 (apud Octavianum Scotum Amadei filium); Venetiis 1566 (apud Hieronymum Scotum), pp. 155–161;77 Venetiis 1588; Parisiis 1646 (apud Dionysium Moreau) (Thomae Opera Omnia II.2, pp. 175–182: the beginning corresponds to lectio 27 of the ‘De iuventute et senectute’); Parisiis 1660 (apud Societatem Bibliopolarum) (Thomae Opera Omnia II.2, pp. 175–182);78 Lewry 1990, pp. 34–35, nn. 63–66 (excerpts from Oxford, Merton College 274). Studies: Lewry 1990, pp. 34–35.

73 74 75 76 77 78

See note 39 above. See note 39 above. See note 16 above. See note 58 above. See note 59 above. See note 60 above.

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19. – Quaestiones super librum De motu animalium (?) Incipit: De motu autem eo qui animalium quaecumque quidem, etc. Sicut patet per Philosophum in tertio Physicorum, considerantem de natura necesse est considerare de motu, quia natura per motum definitur ... Oxford, Merton College, 275 (s. XIII–XIV), f. 220ra–232vb + 233v. Roma, Biblioteca Angelica, 549 (s. XV), f. 115va–121va (one excerpt from q. 2 and qq. 10–20). Editions: De Leemans 2000, pp. 326–330 (tabula quaestionum); De Leemans 2004, pp. 186–191 (prologue and excerpts based on the Oxford manuscript); De Leemans 2006a (excerpts); De Leemans 2006b (excerpts based on both manuscripts); Toste (in prep.; excerpt from q. 16 based on Roma, Biblioteca Angelica 549). Studies: De Leemans 2000, pp. 322–326; De Leemans 2004; De Leemans 2006a; De Leemans 2006b. 20. – Sententia super librum De motu animalium This commentary is transmitted in three versions. – Recensio communis Incipit: De motu autem. Sicut innuit Philosophus in tertio Physicorum, volentem considerare de natura necessarium est considerare de motu, et ratio huius est: nam natura per motum definitur ... Admont, Stiftsbibliothek, 367 (s. XIV), f. 79va–86rb (anonymous). Bologna, Collegio di Spagna, 159 (s. XIV), f. 173ra–182ra (with “marginal corrections added by other hand[s]. Some of them (introduced by ‘alias’) give the text of the third recension”: De Leemans 2000, p. 301). Brugge, Stedelijke Bibliotheek, 513 (s. XIII–XIV), f. 120va–129ra. Cambridge, Peterhouse, 143 (s. XIV–XV), f. 20r–25v. Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Barb. lat. 309 (s. XIV), f. 40rv + 43r–44v + 35r–36v + (?) + 45r–46v (cf. De Leemans 2000, p. 303). Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Borgh. 128 (s. XIII), f. 226v–230v (“This commentary is very carefully written in the margins of the Moerbeke translation of the ‘De Motu Animalium’, f. 227r–231r”: De Leemans 2000, p. 303).

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Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 846 (s. XIII– XIV), f. 32va–40vb. Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 2074 (s. XIII), f. 179v (only one marginal gloss). Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 2181 (s. XIV), f. 1r–7v. Oxford, Balliol College, 104 (s. XIII–XIV), f. 184vb–190r. Oxford, Merton College, 274 (O.1.5) (s. XIV in.), f. 252v–264v. Oxford, Merton College, 275 (H.3.6) (s. XIII–XIV), f. 225r–237v (incomplete at the end). Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine, 3485 (363) (s. XIV), f. 264ra–271va. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 14714 (s. XIII ex.–XIV in.), f. 203rb–212vb.79 Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 16158 (s. XIV in.), f. 107ra–116rb.80 Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 16170 (s. XIII ex.–XIV in.), f. 1ra–5va.81 Praha, Metropolitní Kapitoly Pražské, 1298 (L.LIV) (s. XIV), f. 45r–53v. Cambridge, University Library, Ii.II.10 (s. XIV) contains the Latin text of the ‘De motu’ with glosses which are very similar, in their structure and wording, to Peter’s commentary. Mention of two possible further manuscripts: olim Canterbury, Library of St. Augustine’s Abbey (catalog ca. 1497: ‘Reportaciones parue super librum De motibus animalium post Petrum de A[l]uernia’; cf. James 1903, p. 317; Lohr 1972, p. 341, nr. 14. ‘Sententia P. de Aluernia super librum de motu animalium’: cf. James 1903, p. 316; not indicated in Lohr 1972). – Recensio altera Incipit: De motu autem eo qui est animalium, etc. Sicut dicit Philosophus in tertio Physicorum, considerantem de natura oportet considerare de motu, quia natura definitur per motum. Unde in definitione naturae ponitur motus ... El Escorial, Real Biblioteca de San Lorenzo, f.II.8 (s. XV), f. 212ra–215v + 192r–197va. München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, clm. 317 (s. XII), f. 199rb–208vb. Venezia, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, VI 105 (X 218), f. 187rb–193vb.

79 See note 39 above. 80 See note 39 above. 81 See note 16 above.

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– Recensio tertia Incipit: De motu autem eo qui est animalium, etc. Sicut dicit Philosophus secundo Physicorum, volentem considerare de natura necessarium est considerare de motu, et ratio huius est: nam natura per motum definitur ... Bologna, Collegio di Spagna, 159 (s. XIV), f. 173ra–182ra (cf. Recensio communis). Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, 1405 (s. XIV in.), f. 110vb–115vb (it ends ex abrupto. The remaining part of the commentary is given by another hand: f. 115v–117r, written in the inferior margin). Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, lat. 2330 (s. XIII), f. 12va–19rb (corrected in the margin with the text of the Recensio communis). Editions (Thus far, all the editions present the text of the Recensio communis, the exception is De Leemans 2004, see below): Patavii 1493 (under the name of Thomas Aquinas; per Hieronymum de Durantis); Venetiis 1507 (per Bonetum Locatellum, mandato sumptibusque Octaviani Scoti), f. 34rb–43rb;82 Venetiis 1525 (per haeredes Octaviani Scoti); Venetiis 1551 (apud Octavianum Scotum Amadei filium), f. 40ra–50rb; Venetiis 1551 (apud Iuntas; in this edition it is stated that Peter of Auvergne’s commentary on the ‘De motu animalium’ is a continuation of Aquinas’s work), f. 46r–57v; Venetiis 1566 (apud Lucam Antonium Iuntam; the same indication as in the 1551 edition); Venetiis 1566 (apud Hieronymum Scotum; the same indication as in the 1551 edition), pp. 89–111;83 Venetiis 1588 (apud haeredem Hieronymi Scoti); Venetiis 1597 (apud haeredem Hieronymi Scoti); Parisiis 1646 (apud Dionysium Moreau; the same indication as in the 1551 edition) (Thomae Opera Omnia II.2, pp. 101–127); Parisiis 1660 (apud Societatem Bibliopolarum; the same indication as in the 1551 edition) (Thomae Opera Omnia II.2, pp. 101–127); De Leemans 2000, pp. 311–312 (excerpts from the Recensio tertia); De Leemans 2004, pp. 193–202 (prologue of the Recensio communis and of the Recensio altera. The edition of the former is based on Paris, lat. 14714, Borgh. 128, Vat. lat. 2181; the edition of the latter is based on the three extant manuscripts). Studies: Duhem 1956, pp. 170–171; Dondaine/Bataillon 1966b, pp. 166–168; De Leemans 2000, pp. 278–279, 300–316; De Leemans 2004; De Leemans 2006a. 82 See note 58 above. 83 See note 59 above.

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– In addition to the manuscripts containing Peter’s commentaries on the ‘Parva naturalia’ indicated in the previous pages (numbers 11–20 of this list), we mention here one manuscript that contains Peter’s works on the ‘Parva naturalia’, but whose specific commentaries we have not been able to examine thus far: Napoli, Biblioteca Nazionale Vittorio Emanuele III, VII.C.9 (s. XIV), f. 101vb–112rb.84 21. – Sententia super librum De vegetabilibus et plantis Incipit: Oportet autem intellectus disciplinae amatorem prudentissime principalem naturae causam, non adminicula causae principalis inquirere. Verba sunt Platonis in Timaeo quemlibet discentem in philosophia praecipue naturali ... Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 16097 (s. XIII–XIV), f. 204ra–225vb.85 Editions: Wingate 1931, pp. 66–67 (excerpts); Poortman 2003. Studies: Wingate 1931, pp. 66–67, 98, n. 8; Poortman 2003; Köhler 2008, ad indicem; Anzulewicz 2013. 22. – Quaestiones supra librum Ethicorum This commentary covers only the first book and part of the second. It stops at chapter 8 of Book II (Bekker 1109a1–2). Incipit: Sicut dicit Philosophus secundo Physicorum, ars imitatur naturam. Et ratio huius duplex est. Vna est quoniam principans sic se habet ad principatum sicut principium ad principiatum ... Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, 1386 (s. XIV), f. 115ra–126va (prologue; 47 questions on Book I; 19 questions on Book II). Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 16110 (s. XIV), f. 237r (anonymous; f. 237r contains q. 12 of Book I, inserted at the bottom of the folio),

84 See Cenci, Cesare, Manoscritti francescani della Biblioteca Nazionale di Napoli (Spicilegium Bonaventurianum 7), Quaracchi 1971, vol. I, p. 400, e. 85 See note 51 above.

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276va–277vb (anonymous; prologue and qq. 1, 5, 7, 8, 16, 17, 22, 28 of Book I).86 Editions: Gauthier 1964, pp. 247–269 (tabula quaestionum, prologue, qq. 1, 7, 31 of Book I based on both manuscripts); Celano 1986a, pp. 32–110 (the whole extant text based on both manuscripts). Studies: Gauthier 1964; Celano 1986a; Celano 1986b, pp. 39–42; Lanza 1998, pp. 161–163, 169–171, 179; Köhler 2002, ad indicem; Wieland 2002, pp. 360–361, 366, 374; Bianchi 2003, p. 44, n. 7; Costa 2006, pp. 195, 201–202; Toste 2008, p. 192; Costa 2010, pp. 91–101; Bianchi 2013; Toste (in prep.). 23. – Quaestiones super libros Politicorum The commentary ends at chapter 7 of Book VII (Bekker 1327b16–20). Incipit: Philosophus in secundo De generatione animalium dicit quod quaecumque fiunt arte vel natura, fiunt ab actu existente potentia tali ... Incipit of the Bologna version (60ra): Quaeritur utrum civitas sit obiectum in politica. Arguitur quod sic ... B = Bologna, Biblioteca Universitaria, 1625 (s. XIV), f. 68rb–79vb (anonymous). It contains the same text of P from Book III, q. 20 up to Book VII, q.

7. However, in folios 60ra–68rb, this manuscript contains an anonymous commentary on Books I, II and part of III of the ‘Politics’, which bears similarities to Peter’s commentary, but which cannot be ascribed to him with certainty.

F = Frankfurt a.M., Stadt- und Universitätsbibliothek, Praed. 51 (a. 1438–43), f. 172ra–179rb (anonymous; prologue and qq. 1–17, 20, 22 of Book I). P = Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 16089 (s. XIII–XIV), f. 174ra–319ra (ascribed to Peter; the commentary stops at the end of q. 9 of Book VII).87

86 This manuscript is available in digitized form in the website Gallica of the Bibliothèque Nationale de France at the following address: http://gallica.bnf. fr/ark:/12148/btv1b9067176m (last consulted September 2014). 87 See note 32 above.

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Editions: Cranz 1938, pp. 283–289 (prologue based on P), 289–299 (tabula quaestionum of P), 301–302 (tabula quaestionum of Book I of B), 304–306 (q. 8 of Book II of B), 340–346 (q. 22 of Book III based on B but corrected with P); Lagarde 1948, pp. 87, 138 (excerpts from P); Martin 1949, pp. 262–272 (brief excerpts from P); Lagarde 1958, pp. 108–112 (excerpts from P); Grignaschi 1961, p. 74, n. 21 (excerpt from Book III, q. 13); Grignaschi 1966, pp. 94–100 (qq. 3–4 of Book III; q. 3 of Book III of B); Russel 1975, pp. 264–265 (excerpts from P); Fioravanti 1981, pp. 411–412, 417, 421 (excerpts from B); Dunbabin 1982, pp. 733–734 (two brief excerpts from Book III based on P); Grignaschi 1983, pp. 783–784, 794–795 (excerpts from P); Blythe 1992, pp. 80–81, 82–84, 88–89 (excerpts from some questions of Book III based on P; in the French translation: pp. 130, 133–136, 141, 143); Lambertini 1990, pp. 300, 311 (excerpts from q. 7 of Book II and from q. 28 of Book III, both based on B); Flüeler 1992a, vol. I, pp. 169–227 (prologue; qq. 8, 10–17, 29–31 of Book I; qq. 17, 22, 25 of Book III; qq. 1–2 of Book VI; qq. 7–8, 12–14, 27–29 of Book I of B; q. 17 of Book III of B), vol. II, pp. 101–112 (tabula quaestionum of P and B); Lambertini 1999a, p. 296 (excerpt from q. 26 of Book III based on P); Lambertini 2001, p. 55, 57 (excerpts based on P and collated against B); Lanza 2004, pp. 70, 72 (excerpts from Book V based on P); Toste 2005, pp. 280–282, 298–302 (excerpts from Book IV and VII based on P and B); Blazek 2007, pp. 318–319, n. 23, 321, n. 32, 326, n. 40, 328, n. 43 (excerpts from q. 7 of Book I); Fiocchi 2007, pp. 74–75 (excerpts from qq. 8 and 9 of Book VII); Toste 2007, pp. 78, 82, 88–89, 95, 97 (excerpts from P and B); Lanza 2010, pp. 55, 58–60 (excerpts from q. 27 of Book I); Toste 2012, pp. 399–402 (excerpts from q. 9 of Book I, qq. 3 and 19 of Book II and q. 4 of Book VII); Toste 2013a (excerpts from qq. 1–5 and 7 of Book V, from q. 2 of Book II, and from question 7 of Book VI based on P and B); Toste 2013b (excerpts from qq. 5–7, 9 and 13 of Book I, from q. 10 of Book II, from q. 11 of Book IV, from q. 3 of Book VI, and from q. 4 of Book VII; the full question 10 of Book I in the verson of B); Toste (in prep.; the whole text along with the work contained in B, f. 60ra–68rb). Translations: Conetti 1999, pp. 94–99 (Italian translation of q. 13 of Book I based on Flüeler 1992a); McGrade/Kilcullen/Kempshall 2001, pp. 249–256 (English translation of qq. 17, 22, and 25 of Book III based on Flüeler 1992a); Fiocchi 2006 (Italian translation of q. 13 of Book I based on Flüeler 1992a). Studies: Cranz 1938, pp. 154–155, 280–282, 299–300, 302–304, 312–314, 347–350; Lagarde 1948, pp. 87, 138, 157; Martin 1949, pp. 118–156; Martin 1951, passim; Lagarde 1958, pp. 108–112; Grignaschi 1961, pp. 73–75;

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Grignaschi 1966, pp. 76, 82–85; Russel 1975, pp. 264–265; Fioravanti 1981, pp. 411–412, 417, 420–421; Dunbabin 1982, pp. 732–737; Grignaschi 1983, pp. 785–787, 794–795; Lambertini 1990, pp. 297–304, 310–311, 315, 317–319; Blythe 1992, pp. 78–91 (French translation: pp. 126–145); Flüeler 1992a, vol. I, pp. 86–131, vol. II, p. 43, nr. 50; Flüeler 1992b, passim; Langholm 1992, pp. 400–402; Flüeler 1994, pp. 453–459; Meier 1994a, pp. 86–95 et ad indicem; Meier 1994b, pp. 51–54, 58; Cheneval 1996, pp. 20–21; Lambertini 1997, pp. 349–352; Lambertini 1999a, p. 296; Lambertini 1999b; Lambertini 2000, pp. 151–152, 154–158; Lambertini 2001, pp. 52–53, 55–58; Galle 2002a, pp. 275–276; Lanza 2004, pp. 70–72, 74–77; Murano 2005, pp. 667–668, nr. 737; Toste 2005, pp. 280–283, 297–302; Staico 2006; Blazek 2007, ad indicem; Fiocchi 2007, pp. 57–60, 65, 74–75; Köhler 2007, passim; Syros 2007b, pp. 232–233; Toste 2007, pp. 77–82, 87–89, 94–97; Köhler 2008, pp. 716–729, 735–740, 744–750, 762–772; Simonetta 2009, pp. 14–15; Lanza 2010, pp. 55–61, 65; Simonetta 2011, pp. 275–279; Toste 2012, pp. 398–402; Toste 2013a; Toste 2013b; Lanza (in prep.); Toste (in prep.). 24. – Scriptum super libros III–VIII Politicorum This commentary was intended as the continuation of the unfinished commentary of Thomas Aquinas’s on the ‘Politics’. Aquinas’s text ends at Book III, lectio 6, which corresponds to Book III, chapter 8 (1280a6) of the Aristotelian text. Nevertheless, Peter started his commentary from the beginning of Book III. Therefore, some manuscripts contain his commentary from its beginning, others only from lectio 7 of Book III on. All the printed editions, except where otherwise indicated below, contain Peter’s text from lectio 7 of Book III. Incipit of Book III, lectio 1: Ei autem qui de politia, etc. Postquam Philosophus pertransivit opiniones antiquorum de politia reprobando eas quantum ad male dicta ... Incipit of Book III, lectio 7: Sumendum autem est. Postquam Philosophus declaravit per quid distinguuntur democratia et oligarchia, in parte ista ostendit per quid antiqui istas politias determinaverunt ... Cambridge, Fitzwilliam Museum, C.F.M. 14 (s. XIII–XIV), f. 76va–118va (Books IV–VIII). Cambridge, Peterhouse, 82 (s. XIII ex.), f. 173va–284vb (Books III–VIII). Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Ross. 569 (s. XIV in.), f. 120rb–189va (Books III–VIII).

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Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Urb. lat. 214 (s. XV), f. 45rb–204ra (Books III–VIII). Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 775 (s. XIV), f. 28rb–95rb (Books III.7–VIII). Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 777 (s. XIII– XIV), f. 35ra–143vb (Books III–VIII). Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 778 (s. XV), f. 56v–241v (Books III–VIII). Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 2106 (s. XIV = c. 1317), f. 81ra–344vb (Books III–VIII). Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, 1456 (s. XIV), f. 35vb–148vb (Books III–VIII). Lilienfeld, Stiftsbibliothek, 155 (s. XIV), f. 148r–253r (Books III–VIII). München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, clm. 18458 (a. 1458), f. 211va–370ra (Books III–VIII). Oxford, Merton College, 273 (O.3.5) (s. XIV1), f. 143va–224vb (Books III–VIII; the last paragraph of Book VIII is missing). Paris, Bibliotèque Mazarine, 3483 (s. XV), f. 24ra–64vb (Books IV–VIII; incipit: Non expedit unum principatum in plures dividi ...). Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 6457 (s. XIV in.), f. 101ra–164ra (Books III.7–VIII).88 Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 16107 (a. 1455), f. 86r–208v (Books III.7–VIII).89 Ravenna, Biblioteca Comunale Classense, 409 (s. XIV1), f. 76ra–119vb (Books III.7–VIII). Roma, Archivio S. Maria sopra Minerva, s.num. (s. XV), f. 29ra–119va (Books III–VIII). Salamanca, Biblioteca Universitaria, 2258 (s. XV), f. 58ra–215rb (Books III–VIII). Tours, Bibliothèque Municipale, 762 (s. XV), f. 45vb–170vb (Books III.7–VIII). Trier, Stadtbibliothek, 1536 8° (650) (s. XV), f. 185r–220v (Books III.1–7).

88 This manuscript is available in digitized form in the website Gallica of the Bibliothèque Nationale de France at the following address: http://gallica.bnf. fr/ark:/12148/btv1b9066205k (last consulted September 2014). 89 This manuscript is available in digitized form in the website Gallica of the Bibliothèque Nationale de France at the following address: http://gallica.bnf. fr/ark:/12148/btv1b90678442 (last consulted September 2014).

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Mention of a possible further manuscript: olim Perugia, Biblioteca di Leonardo Mansueti, 62 (catalog of Leonardo Ser Uberti, 1474–1478: ‘Commentum S. Thomae de Aquino super libros Octo Politicorum Aristotelis’. Cf. Dondaine/Bataillon 1971, p. A14). Manuscripts that contain only parts or excerpts: Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Acquisti e Doni 4 (c. 1440), f. 83, 91 (only two excerpts). New York, Columbia University Library, Plimpton 17 (numerous excerpts from the ‘Scriptum’ written down by Ermolao Barbaro in the margins of the Latin text of the ‘Politics’). Sondershausen, Schlossmuseum, lat. theol. 13 (s. XV), f. 1rv– (some paragraphs from chapter 4 of Book IV). Manuscripts that contain abbreviations or adaptations of Aquinas’s commentary together with the ‘Scriptum’: Brugge, Stedelijke Bibliotheek, 482 (s. XIV in.), f. 1r–38v (Books I–VIII: for the most part, it is just an abbreviation of both Aquinas’s section and the ‘Scriptum’, although sometimes interpolated by biblical quotations and excerpts from Albert the Great’s commentary on the ‘Politics’, cf. Cranz 1938, pp. 164–168; Dondaine/Bataillon 1971, p. A15; Flüeler 1992a, vol. II, p. 58, nr. 77; Book III starts at f. 8v). Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College, 462/735 (C.M.A. 1005) (s. XV), f. 59–121 (Books I–VIII; the next manuscript in this list is a further exemplar of this abbreviation, see below. Cf. James 1908, pp. 536–537; Flüeler 1992a, vol. II, p. 59, nr. 82). Cambridge, Peterhouse, 208 (s. XV), f. 171r–200v (Books I–VIII; incipit: Addiscere quas artes debent ...; explicit: Tabula super processum Philosophi in octo libri Politicorum iuxta expositionem S. Thomae. Cf. James 1899, p. 250; Flüeler 1992a, vol. II, p. 59, nr. 80). Cambridge, Peterhouse, 208 (s. XV), f. 224v–225r (Books I–VIII; Incipiunt notabilia super libros Politicorum ex sententia Philosophi cum expositione Petri de Alvernia. Cf. James 1899, p. 250; Cranz 1938, p. 160; Flüeler 1992a, vol. II, p. 59, nr. 81). London, British Library, Add. 21147 (s. XV), f. 173r–183r (Books I–IV, 227v–238; Books VI–VIII. Cf. Flüeler 1992a, vol. II, p. 74, nr. 116). London, British Library, 10.C.IX (s. XV1), f. 145–174 (Books I–VII.4; the next manuscript in this list is a further exemplar of this abbreviation, see below. Cf. Cranz 1938, pp. 169–171; Flüeler 1992a, vol. II, p. 74, nr. 117).

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Oxford, Balliol College, 146A (s. XV in.), f. 238ra–281ra (Books I–VIII. Cranz 1938, pp. 169–171; Flüeler 1992a, vol. II, pp. 80–81, nr. 133). Editions: Romae 1492, f. 70v–252v (ed. Eucharius Silber alias Franck. Edition prepared by the Dominican Ludovico Valenza of Ferrara. Ludovico changed the text of both Aquinas’s section and the ‘Scriptum’ for this edition, according to humanist standards and Leonardo Bruni’s terminology used in his Latin translation of the ‘Politics’. He also eliminated some sections of the text. With the exception of Grech’s and Lanza’s, all the successive printing editions draw on this first edition, cf. Dondaine/ Bataillon 1971, pp. A15–A21; Lanza, in prep.);90 Venetiis 1500 (per Simonem de Luere), f. 43v–146r;91 Venetiis 1514 (ed. Georgius Arrivabenus, mandato haeredum Octaviani Scoti et sociorum); Venetiis 1558 (apud haeredes Lucae Antonii Iuntae); Venetiis 1568 (apud Iuntas); Romae 1570 (apud haeredes Antonii Bladii et Ioannem Osmarinum Liliotum socios); Venetiis 1593 (apud Dominicum Nicolinum) (Thomae Opera Omnia V, pp. 43–148);92 Venetiis 1595 (apud haeredem Hieronymi Scoti); Antuerpiae 1612 (apud Ioannem Keerbergium) (Thomae Opera omnia V.2); Parisiis 1645 (apud Dionysium Moreau) (Thomae Opera omnia VI, pp. 120–422);93 Parisiis 1660 (apud Societatem Bibliopolarum; this edition is the same as the 1645 edition),

90 This edition is available in digitized form in the webpage of the library of the Universidad de Sevilla and can be consulted at the following address: http:// fondosdigitales.us.es/books/search/digitalbook_view?oid_page=48119 (last consulted September 2014). 91 This edition is available in digitized form in the website of the Library of Castilla-La-Mancha and can be consulted at the following address: http:// clip.jccm.es/bidicam/es/consulta/registro.cmd?id=12252 (it is also available in the webpage of the Spanish Biblioteca Virtual del Patrimonio Bibliográfico: http://bvpb.mcu.es/es/consulta/registro.cmd?id=439331). A further digitization of this edition is found in the Digital Collection of the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek at the following address: http://daten.digitale-sammlungen. de/~db/0005/bsb00058772/image_1 (all these addresses were last consulted September 2014). 92 This edition is available in digitized form in Google Books at the following address: http://books.google.com/books?id=QHnBPo4OdLoC (last consulted September 2014). 93 This edition is available in digitized form in Google Books at the following addresses: http://books.google.com/books?id=vZJrqyIZ-QcC and http://books. google.com/books?id=YlhAAAAAcAAJ (last consulted September 2014).

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pp. 120–422;94 Parmae 1867 (typis Petri Fiaccadori) (Thomae Opera omnia XXI); Parisiis 1875 et 1889 (apud Ludovicum Vives) (Thomae Opera omnia XXVI); Cranz 1938, pp. 146–152 (excerpts from the first lections of Book III based on Vat. lat. 777), 169 (excerpt from Brugge 482); Grignaschi 1966, pp. 79, 81–82 (two excerpts: the first based on Vat. lat. 777 and Vat. lat. 778; the second based on these witnesses and also on Urb. lat. 214); Spiazzi 1966 (Books III.7–VIII, pp. 141–438); Grech 1967 (Book III.1–6); Lanza (in prep.; critical edition of the whole text: Books III.1–VIII). Translations: Mallea 2001, pp. 219–680 (Spanish translation of Books III.7– VIII); McGrade/Kilcullen/Kempshall 2001, pp. 219–249 (English translation of Book III, lectiones 8–9, 14). Studies: Hertling 1914, pp. 27–28; Grabmann 1915; Browne 1920; Cranz 1938, pp. 142, 145–160; Grabmann 1941, pp. 14–16, 19–23; Lagarde 1948, ad indicem; Martin 1949, pp. 87–117; Martin 1951, passim; Martin 1952; Lagarde 1958, ad indicem; Grignaschi 1960, pp. 101–104, 106, 112, 114–116, 125–151; Daly 1964, pp. 176, 179–183; Dondaine 1964; Grech 1964; Daly 1968a, pp. 42–44; Daly 1968b, pp. 84, 90–91; Daly 1969, pp. 279–281; Daly 1971, p. 15; Russel 1975, pp. 264–265, 280–281; Renna 1978, pp. 315–317; Fioravanti 1979, pp. 202–203, 206, 225–227; Fioravanti 1981, pp. 414, 426; Dunbabin 1982, pp. 725–731; Ryan 1982; Lambertini 1990, pp. 310–311, 317–319; Blythe 1992, pp. 78–91 (French translation: pp. 126–145); Flüeler 1992a, vol. II, pp. 42–43, nr. 49; Lambertini 1992, pp. 211–214 (Italian translation: pp. 273–277); Lanza 1994; Meier 1994a, pp. 86–95 et ad indicem; Meier 1994b, pp. 46–61; Lambertini 1996, pp. 418–420; Schreiner 1996, pp. 40, 42; Fioravanti 1997, pp. 23–24, 27 (French translation: pp. 17–18, 21); Vendemiati 1997; Klundert 1998, vol. I, pp. 152–207; Lanza 1998, pp. 160, 171–181; Gallo 1999; Lambertini 1999a, p. 296; Biller 2000, ad indicem; Lambertini 2000, pp. 154–158; Lanza 2000, passim; Fiocchi/Simonetta 2001, pp. 77–79; Lanza 2001, pp. 15–24; Brieskorn 2002; Fioravanti 2002, pp. 93–95, 105–108, 111; Lambertini 2002, pp. 28–35; Lanza 2002; Ubl/Vinx 2002, pp. 65–66; Fiocchi 2003, pp. 256–260; Fiocchi 2004, pp. 88–89, 93–97; Lanza 2004, pp. 62–64, 68–69, 73–77; Bull 2005, pp. 36, 30–31; Lanza 2005, pp. 142, 147–148, 158–159, 162–163, 166–168; Merlo 94 This edition is available in digitized form in Google Books at the following addresses: http://books.google.com/books?id=vpMcmig-cxgC, http://books. google.com/books?id=fqRKAAAAcAAJ and http://books.google.com/books? id=HNmjOmDFRkIC (last consulted September 2014).

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2005, pp. 40–41, 44–45; Toste 2005, pp. 277–279, 302–303; Crespo 2006; Fiocchi 2007, pp. 60–77; Syros 2007a, ad indicem; Syros 2007b, pp. 232–233; Toste 2007, pp. 92–94, 96–97; Köhler 2008, ad indicem; Jeffreys 2009, pp. 95–97; Simonetta 2009, pp. 11–16; Lanza 2010, pp. 48–51, 54–55; Sère 2010; Jeffreys 2011, pp. 157–161, 168; Lanza 2011, passim; Simonetta 2011, pp. 274–279, 281; Toste 2011, passim; Ossikovski 2012, pp. 139–141; Lambertini 2013; Lanza 2013; Toste 2013a; Toste 2013b; Lanza (in prep.); Toste (in prep.). 25. – Quodlibeta Incipit of Quodlibet I: Quaerebatur de potentia Dei. Et primo quantum ad immensitatem ipsius, utrum scilicet Deus sit infinitae virtutis in vigore ... Incipit of Quodlibet II: Circa Deum quaerebatur primo quantum ad principium cognitionis et operationis, an videlicet in ipso sint ideae particularium accidentium ... Incipit of Quodlibet III: Quaesita fuerunt quaedam de Deo, quaedam de creaturis. De Deo primo quaesitum fuit de potentia eius, utrum scilicet possit facere naturam intellectualem sine corporali ... Incipit of Quodlibet IV: In ultima disputatione communi, quaesita fuerunt quaedam de Deo in comparatione ad creaturas, quaedam de ipsis creaturis in se ... Incipit of Quodlibet V: In nostra disputatione communi quaesita fuerunt aliqua de hiis quae a Deo procedunt in esse, et primo de quisbusdam universaliter ad creata omnia pertinentibus ... Incipit of Quodlibet VI: In nostra communi disputatione quaesita fuerunt quaedam de Deo, quaedam vero de hiis que procedunt ab eo, aliquid vero commune utriusque ... Angers, Bibliothèque Municipale, 223 (214) (s. XIV), f. 34va–60vb (only Quodlibeta I and II). Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, B.V.22 (s. XIV), f. 230ra–vb (only a ‘tabula alphabetica aliquarum quaestionum’ of Quodlibeta IV and VI). Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, Magdeb. 149 (s. XIV1), f. 1ra–100rb. Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, Preußischer Kulturbesitz, lat. fol. 428 (s. XIV), f. 48ra–103rb.

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Brugge, Stedelijke Bibliotheek, 228, f. 61ra–86vb (only Quodlibeta I and II). Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Ottob. lat. 196 (s. XIV1), f. 51ra–75rb (only Quodlibeta I–III). Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 932 (s. XIV2), f. 102ra–170ra. Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Dep. Erf. CA. 2° 108, f. 200ra–231va (only Quodlibeta IV–V). Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, II.II.182, f. 419ra–433vb (only Quodlibeta I–II). Padova, Biblioteca Antoniana, XVII.373 (s. XIII–XIV), f. 128va–146vb (only Quodlibeta I–II). Padova, Biblioteca Antoniana, XXIII.662 (s. XIV), f. 97ra–186rb. Pamplona, Biblioteca de la Catedral, 28, f. 70r–72r, 76v–79v, 82r–84v, 86r–88v, 93v–94r (only the following questions: Quodlibet I, q. 15; Quodlibet II, qq. 13, 16, 18 and 19; Quodlibet III, qq. 14 and 16; Quodlibet IV, q. 16). Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine, 3512 (s. XIV), f. 59rb–119vb. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. F 3121A (s. XV), f. 1ra–91rb. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 14562 (s. XIV), f. 2ra–85vb (Quodlibet III is transcribed twice).95 Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 15350 (s. XIII ex.), f. 339–348 (only the following questions: Quodlibet I, qq. 1–5, 7–9, 11–14, 18, 20–21; Quodlibet II, qq. 1, 3–15, 18–19 in abbreviated form; this manuscript belonged to Godfrey of Fontaines). Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 15841 (s. XIV in.), f. 1ra–51vb.96 Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 15851 (s. XIV in.), f. 3ra–80vb.97 Praha, Národní Knihovna Ceské Republiky, XIII.D.5 (Y.II. 3.n.l.) (2297), f. 26vb–57vb (only the following questions: Quodlibet I, qq. 1, 7–8, 11, 15–16, 18, 21; Quodlibet II, qq. 1, 4–5, 7–11, 13; Quodlibet III,

95 This manuscript is available in digitized form in the website Gallica of the Bibliothèque Nationale de France at the following address: http://gallica.bnf. fr/ark:/12148/btv1b90666479 (last consulted September 2014). 96 This manuscript is available in digitized form in the website Gallica of the Bibliothèque Nationale de France at the following address: http://gallica.bnf. fr/ark:/12148/btv1b9067266k (last consulted September 2014). 97 This manuscript is available in digitized form in the website Gallica of the Bibliothèque Nationale de France at the following address: http://gallica.bnf. fr/ark:/12148/btv1b9067262x (last consulted September 2014).

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qq. 1–4, 6–9, 12–13, 17; Quodlibet IV, qq. 1–6, 11, 13–14; Quodlibet V, qq. 3, 6–7, 9–10, 15; Quodlibeta VI, qq. 2, 6–9, 12, 14–15. Troyes, Bibliothèque Municipale, 269 (s. XIV), f. 136ra–196ra.98 Editions: Glorieux 1925, pp. 258–263 (tabula quaestionum based on Firenze II.II.182, Mazarine 3512, Paris, lat. 14562, lat. 15350, lat. 15841, and Vat. lat. 932); Segarra 1933, pp. 119–124 (Quodlibet I, q. 20 based on Vat. lat. 932); Hocedez 1930 (througout the article transcription of brief passages from different questions, based on Paris, lat. 15851 and Vat. lat. 932); Koch 1931, pp. 209–213 (Quodlibet VI, q. 14 based on Paris, lat. 14562 and Vat. lat. 932); Hocedez 1934, pp. 370–379 (Quodlibet II, q. 5 based on Brugge, 228; Paris, lat. 14562, lat. 15851, and Vat. lat. 932); Hocedez 1935 (throughout the article transcription of brief passages from different questions, based on Paris, lat. 15851 and Vat. lat. 932); Graf 1935, pp. 20*–25* (Quodlibet V, q. 11 based on Paris, lat. 15851 and Vat. lat. 932); Groblicki 1938, pp. 73–78 (excerpts from Quodlibet IV, q. 2 and Quodlibet VI, q. 2 based on Vat. lat. 932); Leclercq 1939a, pp. 354–357 (Quodlibet I, q. 14 based on Paris, lat. 14562 and lat. 15851); Müller 1948, pp. 153–156 (Quodlibet I, q. 7 partial ed., based on Vat. lat. 932); Monahan 1953, Appendix, pp. (85)–(99) (Quodlibet II, q. 4 based on Troyes 269 and Vat. lat. 932); Monahan 1955, pp. 177–181 (the same edition as Monahan 1953); Guyot 1961 (Quodlibet I, q. 18 based on Paris, lat. 14562, 15350, 15841, 15851, and Mazarine 3512); Gusinde 1962, pp. 18–20 (republishes the edition of Koch 1931); Cannizzo 1965, pp. 72–89 (Quodlibet I, q. 21 and Quodlibet V, qq. 9–10 based on Paris, lat. 14562, lat. 15841, lat. 15851, Mazarine 3512, Ottob. 196, Troyes 269, and Vat. lat. 932); Brown 1972, pp. 585–587 (Quodlibet III, q. 14 based on Paris, lat. 14562); Weber 1973, pp. 372–376 (Quodlibet I, q. 20 based on Padova XXIII.662, Troyes 269 and the edition contained in Segarra 1933); Pattin 1988, pp. 9–15 (Quodlibet II, q. 11 based on Brugge 228, Paris, lat. F 3121A, lat. 14562, lat. 15350, lat. 15841, lat. 15851, Ottob. 196, and Vat. lat. 932); Perarnau i Espelt 1988–1989, pp. 213–214 (excerpt from Quoldibet V, q. 15 based on Vat. lat. 932), 214–218 (Quodlibet V, qq. 16–17 based on Vat. lat. 932); Eastman 1990, pp. 137–141 (Quodlibet I, q. 16 based on Paris, lat. 15841); Dales/Argerami 1991, pp. 144–148 (Quodlibet I, q. 8 based on Florence II.II.182 and Paris, lat. 14562);

98 This manuscript is available in digitized form in the website of the Médiathèque du Grand Troyes at the following address: http://patrimoine.agglo-troyes.fr/ simclient/integration/EXPLOITATION/dossiersDoc/voirDossManuscrit.as p?INSTANCE=EXPLOITATION&DOSS=BKDD_MS_0269_00 (last consulted September 2014).

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Hentschel 2000b, pp. 412–421 (Quodlibet VI, qq. 16–17 based on Berlin, lat. 428, Paris, lat. 14562, lat. 15851, Troyes 269, and Vat. lat. 932); Weill-Parot 2002, pp. 332–335 (excerpts from Quodlibet I, q. 14 based on Paris, lat. 14562 and lat. 15841); Schabel 2007, pp. 109–130 (tabula quaestionum and Quodlibet I, q. 1 based on all the known manuscripts); Toste 2012, p. 404 (excerpt from Quodlibet II, q. 14 based on Berlin, Magdeb. 149); Schabel 2013 (excerpts from Quodlibet II, q. 1; Quodlibet III, q. 4; Quodlibet IV, q. 1 and the entire Quodlibet IV, q. 2; Quodlibet VI, q. 2 based on all the known witnesses); Lanza (in prep.; excerpt from Quodlibet II, q. 14 based on Berlin, Magdeb. 149); Toste (in prep.; excerpts from Quodlibet I, q. 15, from Quodlibet II, q. 9, from Quodlibet III, q. 8, and from Quodlibet IV, q. 13). Translations: Gusinde 1962, pp. 21–24 (German translation of Quodlibet VI, q. 14 based on the edition Koch 1931); Costa 2004 (Portuguese translation of Quodlibet I, q. 8 based on the edition of Dales-Argerami 1991); Dal Lago 2007, pp. 212–224 (Italian translation of Quodlibet I, q. 18 based on the edition of Guyot 1961). Studies: Grabmann 1924a, pp. 178–179; Glorieux 1925; Koch 1931; Segarra 1933; Hocedez 1934; Hocedez 1935; Graf 1935; Groblicki 1938, pp. 73–78; Leclercq 1939a; Leclercq 1939b, pp. 186–189; Müller 1948, pp. 156–157; Monahan 1953, pp. 97–108, 110–116, 148–156; Cannizzo 1961; Guyot 1961; Cannizzo 1962; Gusinde 1962; Cannizzo 1964a; Cannizzo 1964b; Cannizzo 1965; Decker 1967, ad indicem; Köhler 1971, ad indicem; Brown 1972; Weber 1973, ad indicem; Wippel 1981, pp. xxvi, n. 51, pp. 351, 386; Wippel 1985, pp. 323–334 (pp. 228–235 of the reprint); Donati 1986, pp. 232, 242–243; Perarnau i Espelt 1988–1989, pp. 171, 173, 175; Dales 1990, pp. 197–198, 256; Eastman 1990; Köhler 1992, pp. 720–725, 732–735; Gerwing 1996, pp. 449–457; Eastman 1998; Mensa i Valls 1998, pp. 208–209; Hentschel 1999; Hentschel 2000a, ad indicem; Hentschel 2000b, pp. 395–397; Wei 2000, pp. 34–35; Weill-Parot 2002, pp. 350–358; Murano 2005, pp. 664–665, nr. 733; Scordia 2005, ad indicem; Lambertini 2006, p. 450, 459, 462–463; Solère 2006, pp. 513–516; Schabel 2007; Pickavé 2007b, pp. 50–51; Potestà 2007, pp. 447–448; Köhler 2008, ad indicem; Jeffreys 2009, pp. 92–97; Roling 2010, pp. 496–497; Jeffreys 2011, passim; Toste 2012, p. 404; Anzulewicz 2013; Schabel 2013; Lanza (in prep.); Toste (in prep.).

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26. – Sententia super libros Sententiarum (?) Incipit: Quid est subiectum, utrum uidelicet Deus aut non ... Bologna, Biblioteca Comunale dell’Archiginnasio, A.913 (s. XIV), f. 1ra–v, 3va–b, 4va–b, 5rb–va, 6vb, 7rb, 8ra–b, 8va–b, 12ra–b (only nine questions from the first book; the attribution to Peter is made in the outer margin beside the title of each question). Editions: Toste (in prep.; excerpts). Studies: Doucet 1954, pp. 65, 90–93; Decker 1967, pp. 84–85; Schabel 2007, p. 82, n. 2; Courtenay 2013; Toste (in prep.).

II. Doubtful, Spurious and Possible Lost Works 27. – Quaestiones grammaticales supra modos significandi A set of questions, not completely defined, ascribed to Peter and other authors.99 Saint-Quentin, Bibliothèque municipale, 110 (this manuscript was lost during the Second World War).100 Studies: Pinborg 1967a, pp. 86–87, n. 51, 316. 28. – Glossa cum quaestionibus in Doctrinale Alexandri de Villa Dei The text ends with the following words: Expliciunt notulae compositae a magistro Petro Croco et a magistro Petro de Herunco in Avernia [sic] quae apud Divionem fuerunt recitatae seu etiam reportatae.101 99 According to the Catalogue Générale des manuscrits des bibliothèques publiques de France, Départements, Tome III, Paris 1885, p. 247, the manuscript contained Questiones grammatice supra modos significandi, date quedam a Prisciano, quedam a Roberto, ejus commentatore, quedam a Britone et quedam a Petro de Alvernia. – Quoniam aliqua ... questionibus ... 100 See the following note. 101 Weijers 2007, pp. 97–98, identifies this work with the ‘Quaestiones grammaticales supra modos significandi’ (work number 27 of our list). However, this cannot be asserted, since the manuscript of the ‘Quaestiones’ is lost and there

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Incipit of the first proemium (f. 1ra): Sicut legitur in Genesi, Formavit Deus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem suam ... Incipit of the proemium to the Glossa (f. 2ra): Sicut dicit sapiens, Timor Domini fit negotiatio tua et erit tibi lucrum sine labore ... Troyes, Bibliothèque Municipale, 1142 (s. XIII), f. 1r–183ra.102 Studies: Pinborg 1967a, pp. 86–87, 316. – In his catalogue of the holdings of the Laurentian Library, Angelo Maria Bandini attributed to Peter the authorship of all the works extant in the manuscript Plut. XII sin. 3, with the exception of the anepigraphic work ‘De generatione syllogismorum’.103 However, only the ‘Quaestiones super librum Porphyrii’, the ‘Quaestiones super librum Praedicamentorum’, the ‘Quaestiones super librum Perihermeneias’ and the ‘Sophismata’ should be ascribed to Peter (see the works 1–4 above). The remaining texts, which we list here below, are definitely spurious: 29. – Quaestiones super librum sex principiorum Incipit: Forma est compositioni adveniens simplici, etc. Circa istum librum primo quaeritur utrum logica sit scientia sermocinalis ... (according to the Florence manuscript). Incipit: Secundum Aristotelem omne quod appetitur ... (according to the manuscript of Haute-Garonne).

is no indication that the two works were the same. Quite the contrary, if we take into account the information in the Catalogue of Saint-Quentin (see note 99 above). 102 This manuscript is available in digitized form in the website of the Médiathèque du Grand Troyes at the following address: http://patrimoine.agglo-troyes.fr/ simclient/integration/EXPLOITATION/dossiersDoc/voirDossManuscrit.as p?INSTANCE=EXPLOITATION&DOSS=BKDD_MS_1142_00 (last consulted January 2013). 103 A. M. Bandinius, Catalogus codicum Latinorum bibliothecae Mediceae Laurentianae, Florentiae 1777, vol. IV, columns 95–97. Bandini’s description is presented again in Tiné 1997, pp. 240–241.

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F = Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. XII sin. 3 (s. XIV in.), f. 11va–14va.104 Haute-Garonne, Archives départementales, 4 (F.2) (s. XIV), f. 73r–89 (cf. Lohr 1972, p. 336, nr. 2). Editions: Ebbesen 2013, n. 16 (excerpt from F, f. 13ra). Studies: Ebbesen/Pinborg 1970, pp. 4, 7; Ebbesen 1988a, p. 116; Ebbesen 1993c, p. 146, n. 48. 30. – Quaestiones de universalibus Anonymous; Ebbesen 2003, p. 35: “The Florence ms contains [...] some extra questions ‘De universalibus’ the origin of which has not been investigated”. Incipit: Circa quaestiones quas Porphyrius se tacere promittit aliquid inquiramus, et primo sine argumentis videamus de quibus fiant illae quaestiones, utrum scilicet de intentionibus secundis aut de rebus quibus attribuuntur intentiones ... Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. XII sin. 3 (s. XIV in.), f. 7va–8va.105 Editions: Pinborg 1973a, pp. 64–66 (excerpts). Studies: Ebbesen/Pinborg 1970, pp. 3, 7; Pini 2002, p. 64; Ebbesen 2003, pp. 35, 44. 31. – Quaestiones super Analytica priora Anonymous; Ebbesen 2010, p. 103, n. 25: the author of this text is known as “‘Pseudo-Boethius’ because once, for extremely weak reasons, the work was thought to be by Boethius of Dacia, which it certainly is not”. Incipit: Primum quidem oportet dicere. Circa librum Priorum primo quaeruntur quaedam communia, scilicet utrum logica sit scientia ... (according to F).

104 See note 15 above. 105 Ibid.

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Incipit: Primum oportet dicere. Secundum quod attestatur Aristoteles versus finem quarti Metaphysicorum, unumquodque naturalium determinatum est aliqua propria operatione ... (according to B, see Ebbesen 2010, p. 110). B = Brugge, Stedelijke Bibliotheek, 509 (s. XIV in.), f. 31ra–58vb (this manuscript has an ‘accessus’ which is missing in F; the last two questions are different from the last questions of F). F = Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. XII sin. 3 (s. XIV in.), f. 50ra–61rb.106 Mention of a possible further manuscript: olim Canterbury, Library of St. Augustine’s Abbey (catalog ca. 1497: ‘Quaestiones Petri de Aluernia super librum Priorum’, cf. James 1903, p. 316; not indicated in Lohr 1972). Editions: Pinborg 1971 (excerpts); Ebbesen 2010, pp. 110–115 (tabula quaestionum based on B). Studies: Ebbesen/Pinborg 1970, pp. 5, 7–8. 32. – Quaestiones super libros Posteriorum analyticorum This text, extant in MF (see the manuscripts below), is closely related to the anonymous commentary contained in the manuscript C (Córdoba, Biblioteca del Cabildo, 52, f. 80v–100v). According to Gauthier (1989, pp. 60*–61*) the text of MF is a rearrangement of the questions on Book I preserved in C; Marmo (1991) considers further that the MF version probably also had a different author; see also Ebbesen 2003, p. 33. Incipit: Omnis doctrina et omnis disciplina, etc. Sicut dicit Aristoteles primo et decimo Ethicorum, felicitas hominis est operatio perfecta secundum virtutem ... F = Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. XII sin. 3 (s. XIV in.), f. 27va–37va (ascribed to Peter of Ireland; Book I up to chapter 16 – Bekker 79b23; Book II consists of 28 questions; cf. Pinborg 1973b, p. 48; Ebbesen 2003, p. 33).107 M = München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, clm. 8005 (s. XIV), f. 1ra–16ra (only Book I, but with ten extra questions, with regard to F, on 106 See note 15 above. 107 Ibid.

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chapters 17–19; the text is “mutilated in the beginning and incomplete at the end”: Pinborg 1973b, p. 48; see also Ebbesen 2003, p. 33). Editions: Ebbesen/Pinborg 1970, pp. 17–22 (partial edition of the question Utrum sit vera per se ‘homo est homo’ vel ‘Caesar est Caesar’ sive Caesar sit in effectu sive non, based on F; Pinborg 1973b, pp. 60–62 presents the variants – without the text – of M; further corrections in Ebbesen 1998b); Pinborg 1973b, pp. 49–60 (based on both manuscripts, q. 23: Utrum signum universale adveniens termino communi distribuat ipsum pro omnibus suis suppositis tam substantialibus quam accidentalibus unica distributione, q. 24: Utrum signum additum termino communi distribuat ipsum pro suppositis praesentibus, praeteritis et futuris unica distributione, q. 25: Utrum aliquod quod est suppositum termini in aliquo tempore possit non esse suppositum eius in alio, q. 26: Utrum per signum distribuatur terminus de aliquo de quo non sit verum ipsum praedicari, et utrum dicendo ‘omnis homo’ li ‘homo’ distribuatur ibi pro supposito aliquo, de quo non sit verum hominem praedicari, and q. 31: Utrum ista ‘homo est, est in effectu, vel animal est’ sit per se saltem iuxta secundum modum vel quartum). Studies: Ebbesen/Pinborg 1970, pp. 4, 8; Pinborg 1973b, p. 48; Ebbesen 1986b, pp. 51–52; Gauthier 1989, pp. 60*–61*; Marmo 1991 (contains a comparative table of the questions as found in C against F and M. Marmo suggests that the FM version is a rearrangement of C); Ebbesen 2003, p. 33. 33. – Tractatus de generatione sillogismorum Incipit: Incipiamus cum auxilio Dei tractare de generatione syllogismorum ... Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. XII sin. 3 (s. XIV in.), f. 61rb–vb.108 Studies: Ebbesen/Pinborg 1970, p. 5. 34. – Quaestiones super Sophisticos elenchos Ebbesen 2003, p. 33: “F’s [. . . ] questions on ‘Posterior Analytics’ and ‘Elenchi’, both of which F attributes to Peter of Ireland, seem to be revisions of collections from the 1270s preserved anonymously in ms C (= Córdoba, Biblioteca del Cabildo 52, f. 65ra–80ra)”; Ebbesen 2003, p. 41: “Unless new 108 See note 15 above.

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evidence is produced, the notion that SF-commentator is Peter of Auvergne should be abandoned”. Incipit of the proemium (in F, it is not at the beginning of the text, but at f. 45ra: Secundum quod recitat Commentator supra principium Physicorum, ultima perfectio hominis est quod homo sit perfectus secundum intellectum quantum ad scientias speculativas ... (according to Ebbesen’s edition). F = Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. XII sin. 3 (s. XIV in.), f. 39ra–49vb.109 S = Salamanca, Biblioteca Universitaria, 1839 (s. XIV in.), f. 68rb–94ra. Editions: Ebbesen/Pinborg 1970, pp. 29–34 (q. 94: de veritate huius ‘Caesar est homo’ Caesare non existente = under nr. 92, pp. 209–219 in the edition Ebbesen 1977); Ebbesen 1977 (whole text). Studies: Ebbesen/Pinborg 1970, pp. 4–6, 8; Ebbesen 1977, pp. ix–lxi; Ebbesen 1993c, p. 167; Ebbesen 2003, pp. 33, 37–41. 34. – Quaestiones super librum De causis This commentary covers only the first fourteen propositions of the ‘Liber De causis’. The attribution to Peter in the manuscript is made by a later hand, hence there is no compelling argument to assure that Peter is the author of this text.110 Incipit: Circa introitum huius libri qui de causis intitulatur, primo quaeritur utrum de causis primis possit esse scientia ... Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, lat. 2330 (s. XIII), f. 107ra–109vb.

109 See note 15 above. 110 This commentary presents a question whose title (utrum sit ponere primam causam) is very similar to the title of q. 6 of Book XII of Peter’s questions on the Metaphysics (utrum sit ponere primum principium). However, comparison of the solutions of the two questions shows that they differ greatly from one another. This is a further hint that Peter is probably not the author of this set of questions.

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Editions: Dondaine/Bataillon 1966, pp. 220–222 (tabula quaestionum). Studies: Dondaine/Bataillon 1966, pp. 156, 174–175. 35. – Quaestiones super librum Meteororum olim Canterbury, Library of St. Augustine’s Abbey (catalog ca. 1497: Questiones Petri de Alvernia super librum Metheororum. Cf. James 1903, p. 317; Lohr 1972, p. 339, nr. 8). 36. – Quaestiones super III De anima olim Canterbury, Library of St. Augustine’s Abbey (catalog ca. 1497: Questiones Petri de Aluernia super tertium De anima. Cf. James 1903, p. 317; Lohr 1972, p. 339, nr. 9). 37. – Quaestiones super librum De anima Bazán has convincingly demonstrated that this work is, almost certainly, not composed by Peter. Incipit: Quaeritur circa librum De anima primo et principaliter utrum de anima possit esse scientia, et videtur primo quod non ... Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 16170 (s. XIII ex.–XIV in.), f. 42ra– 52vb (anonymous).111 Editions: Bázan 1971, pp. 389–514 (whole text). Studies: Bazán 1971, pp. 377–387. 38. – Quaestiones super librum De iuventute et senectute This set of questions has been tentatively attributed to Peter by De Leemans 2000, p. 324. However, Pinborg 1969 and Kouri/Lehtinen 2000 have ascribed its authorship to Henricus de Alemannia on the grounds that this text is identical to the one transmitted in the manuscript Città del Vaticano,

111 See note 16 above.

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Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 2070, f. 1ra–6rb, where the commentary is ascribed to Henricus de Alemannia. Incipit: De iuventute autem et senectute, vita et morte, etc. In isto libro Philosophus determinat de quibusdam passionibus quae sequantur ipsa viventia, scilicet de morte et vita, et quia per respirationem inest vita quibusdam viventibus determinat etiam ... Oxford, Merton College, 275 (s. XIV), f. 233ra–234vb (anonymous; only the beginning of the text). Roma, Biblioteca Angelica, 549 (s. XV), f. 122rb–128rb (anonymous). Studies: Pinborg 1969b, pp. 385–386; De Leemans 2000, p. 324; Kouri/ Lehtinen 2000, pp. 369–371. 39. – Quaestiones super libros De animalibus 15–16 It corresponds to the beginning of the ‘De generatione animalium’; the text is attributed to Peter in the tabula of the manuscript, f. 84vb; cf. Anzulewicz 1994, p. 244. Peter is most probably not the author of this set of questions. Nonetheless, it is certain that he commented on the ‘De generatione animalium’, because he asserts it in his commentary on the ‘De motu animalium’: ... consideracionem fecimus in libro generacione animalium, ubi consideratur de generacione ipsorum et natura et accidentibus et passionibus ..., quoted in Köhler 2008, pp. 28–29, n. 73. Incipit: Primo notandum quod animalia generata per putrefactionem in quo est masculus et femella habent generare sibi similia in specie ... Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, lat. 2303, f. 31rb–40rb. Studies: Wingate 1931, pp. 83–84; Lohr 1972, p. 345, nr. 31; Anzulewicz 1994, pp. 244–245; Köhler 2008, pp. 28–29, n. 73. 40. – Scriptum super libro De inundatione Nili olim Erfurt, Collegium Universitatis (catalog ca. 1497: Scriptum Petri de Alvernia super libro De inundatione Nili. Cf. MBKD, vol. II, p. 166; Lohr 1972, p. 342, nr. 20).

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III. Bibliography Amerini 2002 = Amerini, Fabrizio, Il problema dell’identità tra una cosa e la sua essenza. Note sull’esegesi medievale di ‘Metafisica’ Zeta 6, in: Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale 13 (2002), pp. 435–505. Amerini 2008a = Amerini, Fabrizio, The Semantics of Substantial Names. The Tradition of the Commentaries on Aristotle’s ‘Metaphysics’, in: Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales 75 (2008), pp. 395–440. Amerini 2008b = Amerini, Fabrizio, La natura della sostanza nel ‘Commento alla Metafisica’ di Francesco d’Appignano, in: Atti del IV Convegno Internazionale su Francesco d’Appignano, Appignano del Tronto, 15 settembre 2007, Ed. Priori, Domenico, Appignano del Tronto 2008, pp. 45–71. Amerini 2013 = Amerini, Fabrizio, Peter of Auvergne on Substance (published in this volume). Andrews 1987 = Andrews, Robert, Petrus de Alvernia. Quaestiones super Praedicamentis. An Edition, in: Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen Âge grec et latin 55 (1987), pp. 3–84. Andrews 1988a = Andrews, Robert, Peter of Auvergne’s Commentary on Aristotle’s “Categories”: edition, translation, and analysis, Cornell University, Ithaca 1988 (Ph.D. dissertation). Andrews 1988b = Andrews, Robert, Denomination in Peter of Auvergne, in: Meaning and Inference in Medieval Philosophy. Studies in Memory of Jan Pinborg, Ed. Kretzmann, Norman (Synthese Historical Library 32), Dordrecht/Boston/London 1988, pp. 91–106. Andrews 1988c = Andrews, Robert, Anonymus Matritensis. Quaestiones super librum Praedicamentorum: An Edition, in: Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen Âge grec et latin 56 (1988), pp. 117–192. Andrews 2001 = Andrews, Robert, Question Commentaries on the ‘Categories’ in the Thirteenth Century, in: Medioevo 26 (2001), pp. 265–326. Anzulewicz 1994 = Anzulewicz, Henryk, Neuaufgefundenes Textfragment von ‘De principiis motus processivi’ II,2 des Albertus Magnus im Kodex

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Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek 2303, in: Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale 5 (1994), pp. 241–258. Anzulewicz 2013 = Anzulewicz, Henryk, Peter of Auvergne and Albert the Great as Interpreters of Aristotle’s ‘De caelo’ (published in this volume). Ashworth 1997 = Ashworth, Earline Jennifer, L’analogie de l’être et les homonymes: ‘Catégories’, 1 dans le ‘Guide de l’étudiant’, in: L’enseignement de la philosophie au XIIIe siècle. Autour du ‘Guide de l’étudiant’ du ms. Ripoll 109, Eds. Lafleur, Claude and Carrier, Joanne, index and bibliography with the assistance of Gilbert, Luc and Piché, David (Studia Artistarum 5), Turnhout 1997, pp. 281–295. Baccin 1986–1987 = Baccin, Naida Anna, Problemi semantici e commenti modisti al “Perì Hermeneías”, Università degli Studi ‘La Sapienza’, Roma 1986–1987 (Ph.D. dissertation). Bazán 1971 = Bazán, Bernard, Un commentaire anti-averroïste du traité de l’âme (Paris, Bibl. Nat., lat. 16.170, f. 42–52), in: Trois commentaires anonymes sur le traité de l’âme d’Aristote, Eds. Giele, Maurice, Van Steenberghen, Fernand and Bazán, Bernard (Philosophes Médiévaux 11), Louvain/Paris 1971, pp. 349–517. Bianchi 2003 = Bianchi, Luca, Filosofi, uomini e bruti. Note per la storia di un’antropologia averroista, in: id., Studi sull’aristotelismo del Rinascimento (Subsidia mediaevalia patavina 5), Padova 2003, pp. 41–61; previously published in: Rinascimento 32 (1992), pp. 185–201, and in: Revista da Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas 1 (1994), pp. 105–125. Bianchi 2013 = Bianchi, Luca, Peter of Auvergne and the Condemnation of 1277 (published in this volume). Biller 2000 = Biller, Peter, The Measure of Multitude: Population in Medieval Thought, Oxford 2000, revised edition: 2003. Blazek 2007 = Blazek, Pavel, Die mittelalterliche Rezeption der aristotelischen Philosophie der Ehe: von Robert Grosseteste bis Bartholomäus von Brügge (Studies in Medieval and Reformation Traditions 117), Leiden/ Boston 2007.

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Bloch 2007 = Bloch, David, Aristotle on Memory and Recollection. Text, Translation, Interpretation, and Reception in Western Scholasticism (Philosophia Antiqua 110), Leiden 2007. Bloch 2008 = Bloch, David, Peter of Auvergne on Memory. An Edition of the ‘Quaestiones super De memoria et reminiscentia’, in: Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen Âge grec et latin 78 (2008), pp. 51–110. Blythe 1992 = Blythe, James, Ideal Government and the Mixed Constitution in the Middle Ages, Princeton 1992; French translation: Le gouvernement idéal et la constitution mixte au Moyen Âge (Vestigia: pensée antique et médiévale 32), Fribourg/Paris 2005. Bossier 1987 = Bossier, Fernand, Traductions latines et influences du commentaire ‘In De caelo’ en Occident (XIIIe–XIVe s.), in: Simplicius. Sa vie, son œuvre, sa survie. Actes du colloque international de Paris, 28 sept.– 1er oct. 1985, Ed. Hadot, Ilsetraut (Peripatoi 15), Berlin/New York 1987, pp. 289–325. Bossier 2004 = Simplicius, Commentaire sur le Traité du ciel d’Aristote, traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke, édition critique par Fernand Bossier, avec la collaboration de Christine Vande Veire et Guy Guldentops (Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum 8,1), Leuven 2004. Brieskorn 2002 = Brieskorn, Norbert, Die Grenze – Ihre Deutung im Kommentar des Petrus de Alvernia zur ‘Politik’ des Aristoteles, in: Grenzen und Grenzüberschreitungen. XIX. Deutscher Kongress für Philosophie 23. – 27. September 2002 in Bonn, Eds. Hogrebe, Wolfram and Booms, Martin with the collaboration of Joachim Bromand et alii, Bonn 2002, pp. 283–292. Brown 1972 = Brown, Elizabeth Atkinson Rash, ‘Cessante causa’ and the Taxes of the Last Capetians: The Political Applications of a Philosophical Maxim, in: Post Scripta. Essays on Medieval Law and the Emergence of the European State in Honor of Gaines Post, Eds. Strayer, Joseph R. and Queller, Donald E. (Studia Gratiana 15), Roma 1972, pp. 565–87; republished in: Brown, Elizabeth Atkinson Rash, Politics and Institutions in Capetian France (Variorum Reprints; Collected Studies 350), Aldershot 1991, item 2. Browne 1920 = Browne, M.-D., L’authenticité du commentaire de Saint Thomas sur la ‘Politique’ d’Aristote, in: Revue Thomiste 25 (1920), pp. 78–83.

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Bull 2005 = Bull, Malcolm, The Limits of Multitude, in: New Left Review 35 (2005), pp. 19–39. Calma/Coccia 2006 = Calma, Dragos and Coccia, Emanuele, Un commentaire inédit de Siger de Brabant sur la ‘Physique’ d’Aristote (Ms. Paris, BnF, lat. 16297), in: Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge 73 (2006), pp. 283–349. Cannizzo 1961 = Cannizzo, Giuseppina, La dottrina del ‘Verbum mentis’ in Pietro d’Auvergne. Contributo alla storia del concetto di intenzionalità, in: Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 53 (1961), pp. 152–168. Cannizzo 1962 = Cannizzo, Giuseppina, Note su alcuni manoscritti contenenti le dispute quodlibetiche di Pietro d’Auvergne, in: Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 54 (1962), pp. 181–185. Cannizzo 1964a = Cannizzo, Giuseppina, I ‘Quodlibeta’ di Pietro d’Auvergne. Problemi di storia letteraria e dottrinale. La tradizione manoscritta. Testo critico delle ‘Quaestiones de verbo’ 1296, 1300. I: Gli intendimenti fondamentali dell’edizione delle ‘Quaestiones de verbo’, in: Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 56 (1964), pp. 486–500. Cannizzo 1964b = Cannizzo, Giuseppina, I ‘Quodlibeta’ di Pietro d’Auvergne. Problemi di storia letteraria e dottrinale. La tradizione manoscritta. Testo critico delle ‘Quaestiones de verbo’ 1296, 1300. II: Il valore della tradizione manoscritta, in: Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 56 (1964), pp. 605–648. Cannizzo 1965 = Cannizzo, Giuseppina, I ‘Quodlibeta’ di Pietro d’Auvergne. Problemi di storia letteraria e dottrinale. La tradizione manoscritta. Testo critico delle ‘Quaestiones de verbo’ 1296, 1300. III: Cenni sui rapporti storici di alcune opinioni dottrinali di Pietro d’Auvergne, in: Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 57 (1965), pp. 67–89. Celano 1986a = Celano, Anthony J., Peter of Auvergne’s Questions on Books I and II of the ‘Ethica Nicomachea’. A Study and Critical Edition, in: Mediaeval Studies 48 (1986), pp. 1–110.

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Celano 1986b = Celano, Anthony J., The ‘finis hominis’ in the ThirteenthCentury Commentaries on Aristotle’s ‘Nicomachean Ethics’, in: Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge 53 (1986), pp. 23–53. Cheneval 1996 = Cheneval, Francis, Proclus politisé: la réception politique de Proclus au Moyen Âge tardif, in: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 78 (1996), pp. 11–26. Conetti 1999 = Conetti, Mario, in: Il pensiero politico: idee, teorie, dottrine, IV/1: Antologia, Eds. Andreatta, Alberto et alii, Torino 1999. Costa 2004 = Costa, Joice Beatriz da, Pedro de Auvergne. Se Deus teria podido fazer o mundo existir desde a eternidade, in: Veritas 49 (2004), pp. 569–572. Costa 2006 = Costa, Iacopo, Il problema dell’omonimia del bene in alcuni commenti scolastici all’‘Etica Nicomachea’, in: Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale 17 (2006), pp. 157–230. Costa 2010 = Anonymi Artium Magistri Questiones super librum Ethicorum Aristotelis (Paris, BnF, lat. 14698), Ed. Costa, Iacopo (Studia Artistarum 23), Turnhout 2010. Courtenay 2013 = Courtenay, William J., Peter of Auvergne, Master in Arts and Theology at Paris (published in this volume). Courtine 1990 = Courtine, Jean-François, Suarez et le système de la métaphysique (Epimethee), Paris 1990. Cranz 1938 = Cranz, Ferdinand Edward, Aristotelianism in Medieval Political Theory. A Study of the Reception of the ‘Politics’, Harvard University, Cambridge 1938 (Ph.D. dissertation). Crespo 2006 = Crespo, Ricardo, Tomás de Aquino y Pedro de Alvernia, Comentario a la ‘Política’ de Aristóteles, in: Sapientia 60 (2006), pp. 485–491. Cruz Cruz 2002 = Tomás de Aquino, Pedro de Alvernia, Comentario al libro de Aristóteles sobre ‘El cielo y el mundo’, introducción y traducción anotada de Juan Cruz Cruz (Colección de Pensamiento Medieval y Renascentista 34), Pamplona 2002.

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Dahan 1997 = Dahan, Gilbert, Une introduction à l’étude de la philosophie: ‘Ut ait Tullius’, in: L’enseignement de la philosophie au XIIIe siècle. Autour du ‘Guide de l’étudiant’ du Ms. Ripoll 109, Eds. Lafleur, Claude and Carrier, Joanne, index and bibliography with the assistance of Gilbert, Luc and Piché, David (Studia Artistarum 5), Turnhout 1997, pp. 3–58. Dales 1990 = Dales, Richard Clark, Medieval Discussions of the Eternity of the World (Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History 18), Leiden et alibi 1990. Dales/Argerami 1991 = Dales, Richard Clark and Argerami, Omar, Medieval Latin Texts on the Eternity of the World (Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History 23), Leiden 1991. Dal Lago 2007 = Dal Lago, Luigi, in: Congar, Yves, Insegnare e predicare. Aspetti ecclesiologici della disputa tra Ordini mendicanti e maestri secolari nella seconda metà del secolo XIII e l’inizio del XIV, pref. Roberto Lambertini (Studi francescani 10), Padova 2007, Italian translation of Guyot 1961, cf. below. Daly 1964 = Daly, Lowrie John, Walter Burley and John Wyclif on Some Aspects of Kingship, in: Mélanges Eugène Tisserant. IV: Archives Vaticanes. Histoire ecclésiastique 1 (Studi e Testi 234), Città del Vaticano 1964, pp. 163–184. Daly 1968a = Daly, Lowrie John, Medieval and Renaissance Commentaries on the ‘Politics’ of Aristotle, in: Duquesne Review 13 (1968), pp. 41–55. Daly 1968b = Daly, Lowrie John, The Conclusions of Walter Burley’s Commentary on the ‘Politics’, Books I to IV, in: Manuscripta 12 (1968), pp. 79–92. Daly 1969 = Daly, Lowrie John, Some Notes on Walter Burley’s Commentary on the ‘Politics’, in: Essays in Medieval History presented to Bertie Wilkinson, Eds. Sandquist, Thayron A. and Powicke, Michael R., Toronto 1969, pp. 270–281. Daly 1971 = Daly, Lowrie John, The Conclusions of Walter Burley’s Commentary on the ‘Politics’, Books VII and VIII, in: Manuscripta 15 (1971), pp. 13–22.

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Decker 1967 = Decker, Bruno, Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz. Untersuchungen zur Dominikanertheologie zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 42,1), Ed. Haubst, Rudolf, Münster 1967. De Leemans 2000 = De Leemans, Pieter, Medieval Latin Commentaries on Aristotle’s ‘De Motu Animalium’. A Contribution to the Corpus commentariorum medii aevi in Aristotelem Latinorum’, in: Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales 67 (2000), pp. 272–360. De Leemans 2004 = De Leemans, Pieter, Peter of Auvergne on Aristotle’s ‘De motu animalium’ and the Ms. Oxford, Merton College, 275, in: Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge 71 (2004), pp. 129–202. De Leemans 2006a = De Leemans, Pieter, Internal Senses, Intellect, and Movement. Peter of Auvergne (?) on Aristotle’s ‘De motu animalium’, in: Corpo e anima, sensi interni e intelletto dal secolo XIII ai post-cartesiani e spinoziani. Atti del Convegno Internazionale, Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze dell’Educazione e dei Processi culturali e formativi, 18–20 settembre 2003, Eds. Federici Vescovini, Graziella, Sorge, Valeria and Vinti, Carlo (Textes et Études du Moyen Âge 30), Turnhout 2006, pp. 139–160. De Leemans 2006b = De Leemans, Pieter, Peter of Auvergne on the Question ‘utrum intellectus sit movens animalia’, in: Intellect et imagination dans la philosophie médiévale. Intellect and Imagination in Medieval Philosophy. Intelecto e imaginação na filosofia medieval. Actes du XIe Congrès International de Philosophie Médiévale de la Société Internationale pour l’Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale (S.I.E.P.M.), Porto du 26 au 31 août 2002, Eds. Pacheco, Maria Cândida and Meirinhos, José Francisco (Rencontres de Philosophie Médiévale 11), Turnhout 2006, vol. III, pp. 1477–1489. De Leemans 2010 = De Leemans, Pieter, ‘Secundum viam naturae et doctrinae’. Lire le ‘De motu animalium’ et les ‘Parva Naturalia’ d’Aristote au Moyen Âge, in: Les ‘Parva naturalia’ d’Aristote: fortune antique et médiévale, Eds. Grellard, Cristophe and Morel, Pierre Marie (Série Philosophie, 28 – Université Paris 1-Panthéon-Sorbonne), Paris 2010, pp. 197–220. Delhaye 1941 = Siger de Brabant, Questions sur la ‘Physique’ d’Aristote, Ed. Delhaye, Pierre (Les Philosophes belges 15), Louvain 1941.

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Donati 1986 = Donati, Silvia, La dottrina di Egidio Romano sulla materia dei corpi celesti. Discussioni sulla natura dei corpi celesti alla fine del tredicesimo secolo, in: Medioevo 12 (1986), pp. 229–280. Donati 1995 = Donati, Silvia, Commenti parigini alla ‘Fisica’ degli anni 1270–1300 ca., in: Die Bibliotheca Amploniana. Ihre Bedeutung im Spannungsfeld von Aristotelismus, Nominalismus und Humanismus, Ed. Speer, Andreas (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 23), Berlin/New York 1995, pp. 136–256. Donati 1998a = Donati, Silvia, A New Witness to the Radical Aristotelianism, in: Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter? Qu’est-ce que la philosophie au Moyen Âge? What is Philosophy in the Middle Ages? Akten des X. Internationalen Kongresses für mittelalterliche Philosophie der Société Internationale pour l’Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale, 25. bis 30. August 1997 in Erfurt, Eds. Aertsen, Jan A. and Speer, Andreas (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 26), Berlin/New York 1998, pp. 371–382. Donati 1998b = Donati, Silvia, An Anonymous Commentary on the ‘De Generatione et Corruptione’ from the Years Before the Paris Condemnations of 1277 (Mss. Erlangen, UB, 213, Kassel, Stadt- und Landesbibl., Phys. 2° 11), in: Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales 65 (1998), pp. 194–247. Donati 2003 = Donati, Silvia, La discussione sull’unità del concetto di ente nella tradizione di commento della ‘Fisica’: commenti parigini degli anni 1270–1315 ca., in: Die Logik des Transzendentalen. Festschrift für Jan A. Aertsen zum 65. Geburtstag, Ed. Pickavé, Martin (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 30), Berlin/New York 2003, pp. 60–139. Dondaine 1964 = Dondaine, Hyacinthe-François, Le ‘Super Politicam’ de Saint Thomas: tradition manuscrite et imprimée, in: Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques 48 (1964), pp. 585–602. Dondaine/Bataillon 1966a = Dondaine, Antoine and Bataillon, LouisJacques, Le commentaire de Saint Thomas sur ‘Les météores’, in: Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum 36 (1966), pp. 81–152. Dondaine/Bataillon 1966b = Dondaine, Antoine and Bataillon, LouisJacques, Le manuscrit Vindob. lat. 2330 et Siger de Brabant, in: Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum 36 (1966), pp. 153–261.

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Dondaine/Bataillon 1971 = Dondaine, Hyacinthe-François and Bataillon, Louis-Jacques, Préface, in: Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P.M. edita, t. XLVIII: Sententia libri Politicorum. Tabula libri Ethicorum, Romae 1971. Doucet 1954 = Doucet, Victorin, Commentaires sur les Sentences. Supplément au répértoire de M. Frédéric Stegmüller, in: Archivum Franciscanum Historicum 48 (1954), pp. 88–170, 400–427. Duhem 1956 = Duhem, Pierre, Le système du monde: histoire des doctrines cosmologiques de Platon à Copernic. VII: La physique parisienne au XIVe siècle, Paris 1956, 1st edition: 1913. Duhem 1958 = Duhem, Pierre, Le système du monde: histoire des doctrines cosmologiques de Platon à Copernic. VIII: La physique parisienne au XIVe siècle (suite), Paris 1958, 1st edition: 1913. Duin 1948 = Duin, Joannes Josef, Les commentaires de Siger de Brabant sur la ‘Physique’ d’Aristote, in: Revue Philosophique de Louvain 36 (1948), pp. 463–480. Duin 1954 = Duin, Joannes Josef, La doctrine de la providence dans les écrits de Siger de Brabant (Philosophes Médiévaux 3), Louvain 1954. Dunbabin 1982 = Dunbabin, Jean, The Reception and Interpretation of Aristotle’s ‘Politics’, in: The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, Eds. Kretzmann, Norman, Kenny, Anthony and Pinborg, Jan, and Stump, Eleonore (assistant Ed.), Cambridge 1982, pp. 723–737. Dunne 1993 = Magistri Petri de Ybernia Expositio et quaestiones in Aristotelis librum de longitudine et brevitate vitae (ex. cod. Vat. lat 825, f. 92–102), edited with an introduction by Michael Dunne (Philosophes Médiévaux 30), Louvain-la-Neuve/Paris 1993. Dunne 2002 = Dunne, Michael, The Commentary of Peter of Auvergne on Aristotle’s ‘On Length and Shortness of Life’, in: Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge 69 (2002), pp. 153–200. Dunne 2003 = Dunne, Michael, Thirteenth and Fourteenth-Century Commentaries on the ‘De longitudine et brevitate vitae’, in: Early Science and Medicine 8 (2003), pp. 320–335.

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Dunne 2009 = Dunne, Michael, ‘The Causes of the Length and Brevity of Life call for Investigation’: Aristotle’s ‘De longitudine et brevitate vitae’ in the 13th and 14th Century Commentaries, in: Vita longa. Vecchiaia e durata della vita nella tradizione medica e aristotelica antica e medievale. Atti del Convegno internazionale (Torino, 13–14 giugno 2008), Eds. Crisciani, Chiara, Repici, Luciana and Rossi, Pietro B. (Micrologus’ Library 33), Firenze 2009, pp. 121–147. Dunphy 1953a = Dunphy, William, The Doctrine of Causality in the ‘Quaestiones in Metaphysicam’ of Peter of Auvergne, University of Toronto, Toronto 1953 (Ph.D. dissertation). Dunphy 1953b = Dunphy, William, The Similarity between Certain Questions of Peter of Auvergne’s Commentary on the Metaphysics and the Anonymous Commentary on the ‘Physics’ Attributed to Siger of Brabant, in: Mediaeval Studies 15 (1953), pp. 159–168. Dunphy 1964 = Dunphy, William, Two Texts of Peter of Auvergne on a Twofold Efficient Cause, in: Mediaeval Studies 26 (1964), pp. 287–301. Dunphy 1966 = Dunphy, William, Peter of Auvergne and the Twofold Efficient Cause, in: Mediaeval Studies 28 (1966), pp. 1–21. Dunphy 1974 = Dunphy, William, The ‘quinque viae’ and Some Parisian Professors of Philosophy, in: St. Thomas Aquinas 1274–1974: Commemorative Studies, Toronto 1974, vol. I, pp. 73–104. Dunphy 1981 = Dunphy, William, Doctrinal Perspectives of the ‘Quaestiones’ on ‘Metaphysics’ in cod. Vat. lat. 2173, in: The Seventh Saint Louis Conference on Manuscript Studies, in: Manuscripta 25 (1981), pp. 3–13 (5). Eastman 1990 = Eastman, John R., Papal Abdication in Later Medieval Thought (Texts and Studies in Religion 42), Lewiston/Queenston/ Lampeter 1990. Eastman 1998 = Eastman, John R., Peter of Auvergne: Life, Master Regent, and the First Quodlibet of 1296, in: Forschungen zur Reichs-, Papst- und Landesgeschichte. Peter Herde zum 65. Geburtstag von Freunden, Schülern und Kollegen dargebracht, Eds. Borchardt, Karl and Bünz, Enno, Stuttgart 1998, pp. 583–593.

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Ebbesen 1977 = Incertorum auctorum quaestiones super Sophisticos Elenchos, Ed. Ebbesen, Sten (Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi 7), København 1977. Ebbesen 1981 = Ebbesen, Sten, Albert (the Great?)’s Companion to the ‘Organon’, in: Albert der Grosse: seine Zeit, sein Werk, seine Wirkung, Ed. Zimmermann, Albert (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 14), Berlin 1981, pp. 89–103, republished in: Ebbesen, Sten, Topics in Latin Philosophy from the 12th– 14th Centuries. Collected Essays of Sten Ebbesen, vol. 2 (Ashgate Studies in Medieval Philosophy), Farnham/Burlington 2009, pp. 95–108. Ebbesen 1986a = Ebbesen, Sten, ‘Termini accidentales concreti’. Texts from the Late 13th Century, in: Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen Âge grec et latin 53 (1986), pp. 37–150. Ebbesen 1986b = Ebbesen, Sten, The Chimera’s Diary – Edited by Sten Ebbesen, in: The Logic of Being, Eds. Knuuttila, Simo and Hintikka, Jaakko (Synthese Historical Library 28), Dordrecht 1986, pp. 115–143, republished in: Ebbesen, Sten, Greek-Latin Philosophical Interaction. Collected Essays of Sten Ebbesen vol. 1 (Ashgate Studies in Medieval Philosophy), Aldershot/ Burlington 2008, pp. 35–57. Ebbesen 1988a = Ebbesen, Sten, Concrete Accidental Terms: Late Thirteenth-Century Debates about Problems Relating to such Terms as ‘Album’, in: Meaning and Inference in Medieval Philosophy. Studies in Memory of Jan Pinborg, Ed. Kretzmann, Norman (Synthese Historical Library 32), Dordrecht/Boston/London 1988, pp. 107–174, republished in: Ebbesen, Sten, Topics in Latin Philosophy from the 12th–14th Centuries. Collected Essays of Sten Ebbesen vol. 2 (Ashgate Studies in Medieval Philosophy), Farnham/Burlington 2009, pp. 109–151. Ebbesen 1988b = Ebbesen, Sten, Addenda et corrigenda to CIMAGL, 3–56, in: Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen Âge grec et latin 57 (1988), pp. 171–178. Ebbesen 1989 = Ebbesen, Sten, Three 13th-Century Sophismata about Beginning and Ceasing, in: Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen Âge grec et latin 59 (1989) pp. 121–180. Ebbesen 1993a = Ebbesen, Sten, ‘Animal est omnis homo’. Questions and Sophismata by Peter of Auvergne, Radulphus Brito, William Bonkes, and

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Others, in: Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen Âge grec et latin 63 (1993), pp. 145–208. Ebbesen 1993b = Ebbesen, Sten, Boethius de Dacia et al. The sophismata in MSS Bruges SB 509 and Florence Med.-Laur. S. Croce 12 sin., 3, in: Sophisms in Medieval Logic and Grammar. Acts of the 9th European Symposium for Medieval Logic and Semantics, Held at St. Andrews, June 1990, Ed. Read, Stephen (Nijhoff International Philosophy Series 48), Dordrecht 1993, pp. 45–63. Ebbesen 1993c = Ebbesen, Sten, Medieval Latin Glosses and Commentaries on Aristotelian Logical Texts of the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries, in: Glosses and Commentaries on Aristotelian Logical Texts. The Syriac, Arabic and Medieval Latin Traditions, Ed. Burnett, Charles (Warburg Institute Surveys and Texts 23), London 1993, pp. 129–177. Ebbesen 2000 = Ebbesen, Sten, Words and Signification in 13th-Century Questions on Aristotle’s ‘Metaphysics’, in: Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen Âge grec et latin 71 (2000), pp. 71–114. Ebbesen 2001 = Ebbesen, Sten, Radulphus Brito on the ‘Metaphysics’, in: Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts: Studien und Texte = After the Condemnation of 1277. Philosophy and Theology at the University of Paris in the Last Quarter of the Thirteenth Century: Studies and Texts, Eds. Aertsen, Jan A., Emery Jr., Kent and Speer, Andreas (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 28), Berlin/New York 2001, pp. 456–492, republished in: Ebbesen, Sten, Topics in Latin Philosophy from the 12th–14th Centuries. Collected Essays of Sten Ebbesen vol. 2 (Ashgate Studies in Medieval Philosophy), Farnham/Burlington 2009, pp. 197–208. Ebbesen 2003 = Ebbesen, Sten, Questions and Sophismata: Tracking Peter of Auvergne, in: Aristotle’s ‘Peri Hermeneias’ in the Latin Middle Ages. Essays on the Commentary Tradition, Eds. Braakhuis, Henk Antonius Giovanni and Kneepkens, Corneille Henri (Artistarium Supplementa 10), Groningen/ Haren 2003, pp. 31–49. Ebbesen 2005a = Ebbesen, Sten, Les ‘Catégories’ au Moyen Âge et au début de la Modernité, in: Les ‘Catégories’ et leur histoire, Actes du Colloque International ‘Les Catégories entre l’Antiquité et le Moyen Âge dans les

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Traditions Grecque, Latine et Orientale’, Genève, 28 – 30 juin 2002, Eds. Bruun, Otto and Corti, Lorenzo (Bibliothèque d’histoire de la philosophie: Antiquité), Paris 2005, pp. 245–274. Ebbesen 2005b = Ebbesen, Sten, The Man who Loved Every. Boethius of Dacia on Logic and Metaphysics, in: The Modern Schoolman 82 (2005), pp. 235–250, republished in: id., Topics in Latin Philosophy from the 12th– 14th Centuries. Collected Essays of Sten Ebbesen vol. 2 (Ashgate Studies in Medieval Philosophy), Farnham/Burlington 2009, pp. 163–177. Ebbesen 2006 = Ebbesen, Sten, By Necessity, in: Mind and Modality. Studies in the History of Philosophy in Honour of Simo Knuuttila, Eds. Hirvonen,Vesa, Holopainen, Toivo, J. and Tuominen, Miira (Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History 141), Paris 2006, pp. 141–151. Ebbesen 2008 = Ebbesen, Sten, ‘Essentiae accidit esse → Significato accidunt Supposita’, in: Compléments de substance: études sur les propriétés accidentelles offertes à Alain de Libera, Eds. Erismann, Christophe and Schniewind, Alexandrine (Problèmes et controverses), Paris 2008, pp. 127–131. Ebbesen 2010 = Ebbesen, Sten, The Prior Analytics in the Latin West: 12th– 13th Centuries, in: Vivarium 48 (2010), pp. 96–133. Ebbesen 2013 = Ebbesen, Sten, The Logical Writings of Peter of Auvergne (published in this volume). Ebbesen/Goubier 2010 = Ebbesen, Sten and Goubier, Frédéric, A Catalogue of 13th-Century Sophismata (Sic et non), Paris 2010, 2. vols. Ebbesen/Pinborg 1970 = Ebbesen, Sten and Pinborg, Jan, Studies in the Logical Writings Attributed to Boethius de Dacia, in: Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen Âge grec et latin 3 (1970), pp. 1–54. Ebbesen/Rosier (in prep.) = Boethii, Petri Alverniensis aliorumque ‘Sophismata’, Eds. Ebbesen, Sten and Rosier, Irène (Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum medii aevi 9), København. Ermatinger 1961 = Ermatinger, Charles J., A Second Copy of a Commentary on Aristotle’s ‘Physics’ Attributed to Siger of Brabant, in: Manuscripta 5 (1961), pp. 41–49.

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Ermatinger 1964 = Ermatinger, Charles J., in: Manuscripta 8 (1964), pp. 45–47, review of Maier, Anneliese, Codices Vaticani Latini: Codices 2118– 2192, Città del Vaticano 1961. Ermatinger 1981 = Ermatinger, Charles J., More on the Authors of the ‘Quaestiones’ on ‘Metaphysics’ in cod. Vat. lat. 2173, in: The Seventh Saint Louis Conference on Manuscript Studies, in: Manuscripta 25 (1981), pp. 3–13 (5). Fiocchi 2003 = Fiocchi, Claudio, L’arte del tiranno: letture delle ‘cautelae tyrannicae’ tra Duecento e Trecento, in: Potere sovrano: simboli, limiti, abusi (Percorsi), Ed. Simonetta, Stefano, Bologna 2003, pp. 253–269. Fiocchi 2004 = Fiocchi, Claudio, ‘Mala potestas’. La tirannia nel pensiero politico medioevale (Quodlibet 13), Bergamo 2004. Fiocchi 2006 = Fiocchi, Claudio, Libertà a confronto. Antologia di testi sulla libertà e il libero arbitrio nel pensiero medioevale (Filosofia), Milano 2006. Fiocchi 2007 = Fiocchi, Claudio, Dispotismo e libertà nel pensiero politico medievale. Riflessioni all’ombra di Aristotele (sec. XIII–XIV) (Quodlibet 15), Bergamo 2007. Fiocchi/Simonetta 2001 = Fiocchi, Claudio and Simonetta, Stefano, Il ‘principatus despoticus’ nell’aristotelismo bassomedievale, in: Dispotismo. Genesi e sviluppi di un concetto filosofico-politico, Ed. Felice, Domenico (Memo 3), Napoli 2001, pp. 71–94. Fioravanti 1979 = Fioravanti, Gianfranco, ‘Politiae Orientalium et Aegyptiorum’. Alberto Magno e la ‘Politica’ aristotelica, in: Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa. Classe di Lettere e Filosofia 9 (1979), pp. 195–246. Fioravanti 1981 = Fioravanti, Gianfranco, ‘Servi, rustici, barbari’: interpretazioni medievali della ‘Politica’ aristotelica, in: Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa. Classe di Lettere e Filosofia 11 (1981), pp. 399–429. Fioravanti 1991 = Fioravanti, Gianfranco, Il problema del male in alcuni maestri delle arti del XIII secolo, in: Il problema del male nel pensiero di San Bonaventura e in alcuni contesti della tradizione medievale. XXXVIII Convegno di studi bonaventuriani, Bagnoregio, 2–3 giugno 1990 = Doctor Seraphicus 38 (1991), pp. 37–55

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Fioravanti 1997 = Fioravanti, Gianfranco, La ‘Politica’ aristotelica nel Medioevo: linee di una ricezione, in: Rivista di Storia della Filosofia 52 (1997), pp. 17–29; French translation in: Fioravanti, Gianfranco, La réception de la ‘Politique’ d’Aristote au Moyen Âge tardif, in: Aspects de la pensée médiévale dans la philosophie politique moderne, Ed. Zarka, Yves Charles (Fondements de la Politique), Paris 1999, pp. 9–24. Fioravanti 2002 = Fioravanti, Gianfranco, Un trattato medievale di eugenetica: il ‘Libellus de ingenio bone nativitatis’, in: Mediaevalia. Textos e Estudos 21 (2002), pp. 89–111. Flüeler 1992a = Flüeler, Christoph, Rezeption und Interpretation der Aristotelischen ‘Politica’ im späten Mittelalter (Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie 19), Amsterdam/Philadelphia 1992, 2 vols. Flüeler 1992b = Flüeler, Christoph, Die Rezeption der ‘Politica’ des Aristoteles an der Pariser Artistenfakultät des 13. und 14. Jahrhunderts, in: Das Publikum politischer Theorie im 14. Jahrhundert, Eds. Miethke, Jürgen and Bühler, Arnold, München 1992, pp. 127–138. Flüeler 1994 = Flüeler, Christoph, Ontologie und Politik: ‘Quod racio principantis et subiecti sumitur ex racione actus et potencie’, in: Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 41 (1994), pp. 445–462. Galle 1998 = Galle, Griet, The Division of Science in the Prologue to the Questions on ‘De Caelo’ by Peter of Auvergne, in: Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter? Qu’est-ce que la philosophie au Moyen Âge? What is Philosophy in the Middle Ages? Akten des X. Internationalen Kongresses für mittelalterliche Philosophie der Société Internationale pour l’Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale, 25. bis 30. August 1997 in Erfurt, Eds. Aertsen, Jan A. and Speer, Andreas (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 26), Berlin/New York 1998, pp. 774–782. Galle 2001a = Galle, Griet, Peter of Auvergne’s Question as to Whether or Not the Heaven is Generated and Perishable, in: Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts: Studien und Texte = After the Condemnation of 1277. Philosophy and Theology at the University of Paris in the Last Quarter of the Thirteenth Century: Studies and Texts, Eds. Aertsen, Jan A., Emery, Jr., Kent and Speer, Andreas (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 28), Berlin/ New York 2001, pp. 535–576.

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Galle 2001b = Galle, Griet, Peter of Auvergne on the Unicity of the World, in: Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale 68 (2001), pp. 111–141. Galle 2002a = Galle, Griet, The Set of Questions on ‘De caelo’ in the Mss. Leipzig, Universitätsbibl. 1386, ff. 91va–102vb and Praha, Knihovny Metropolitní 1320 (L. LXXIV), ff. 43rb–52vb attributed to Peter of Auvergne. Its Authorship, Date and Relation to Other Sets of Questions Attributed to Peter of Auvergne, in: Il commento filosofico nell’Occidente latino (secoli XIII–XV). The Philosophical Commentary in the Latin West (13–15th centuries). Atti del Colloquio Firenze/Pisa, 19–22 ottobre 2000, organizzato dalla S.I.S.M.E.L. (Società Internazionale per lo Studio del Medioevo Latino) e dalla S.I.S.P.M. (Società Italiana per lo Studio del Pensiero Medievale), sotto l’egida della S.I.E.P.M. (Société Internationale pour l’Etude de la Philosophie Médiévale), Eds. Fioravanti, Gianfranco, Leonardi, Claudio and Perfetti, Stefano (Rencontres de Philosophie Médiévale 10), Turnhout 2002, pp. 253–309. Galle 2002b = Galle, Griet, The Autorship of One of the Sets of Questions on ‘De caelo’ attributed to Peter of Auvergne (MSS Cremona, Bibl. Governativa 80 (7.5.15), fols. 98ra–136ra, Erlangen, Universitätsbibl. 213, fols. 1ra–28rb, and Kassel, Stadt- und Landesbibl., Phys. 2º 11, fols. 35va–55rb), in: Medioevo 27 (2002), pp. 191–260. Galle 2003a = Galle, Griet, Questions on Aristotle’s ‘De Caelo’: A Critical Edition with an Interpretative Essay (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy 29), Leuven 2003. Galle 2003b = Galle, Griet, Scholastic Explanations of Why Local Motion Generates Heat, in: Early Science and Medicine 8 (2003), pp. 336–370. Galle 2006 = Galle, Griet, Peter of Auvergne’s Discussion Concerning the Animation of the Heavens, in: Intellect et imagination dans la philosophie médiévale. Intellect and Imagination in Medieval Philosophy. Intelecto e imaginação na filosofia medieval. Actes du XIe Congrès International de Philosophie Médiévale de la Société Internationale pour l’Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale (S.I.E.P.M.), Porto, du 26 au 31 août 2002, Eds. Pacheco, Maria Cândida and Meirinhos, José Francisco (Rencontres de Philosophie Médiévale 11), Turnhout 2006, vol. III, pp. 1463–1475.

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Galle 2013 = Galle, Griet, Peter of Auvergne on the Celestial Movers. Edition and Discussion of his Questions 8–11 on ‘Metaphysica’ XII (published in this volume). Gallo 1999 = Gallo, Franco Alberto, Anima e corpo nell’ascolto della musica: il ‘raptus’ secondo Pietro d’Alvernia, in: Anima e corpo nella cultura medievale. Atti del V convegno di studi della Società Italiana per lo Studio del Pensiero Medievale, Venezia, 25–28 settembre 1995, Eds. Casagrande, Carla and Vecchio, Silvana (Millennio medievale. Atti di convegni 3), Firenze 1999, pp. 231–233. Gauthier 1964 = Gauthier, René-Antoine, Les ‘Questiones supra librum Ethicorum’ de Pierre d’Auvergne, in: Revue du Moyen Âge Latin 20 (1964), pp. 233–260. Gauthier 1989 = Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia, iussu Leonis XIII P.M. edita, I*2, Expositio libri Posteriorum, editio altera retractata, Ed. Gauthier, René-Antoine, Roma/Paris 1989. Gerwing 1996 = Gerwing, Manfred, Vom Ende der Zeit. Der Traktat des Arnald von Villanova über die Ankunft des Antichrist in der akademischen Auseinandersetzung zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters. Neue Folge 45), Münster 1996. Gilson 1962 = Gilson, Etienne, Notes pour l’histoire de la cause efficiente, in: Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge 29 (1962), pp. 7–31. Glorieux 1925 = Glorieux, Palémon, La littérature quodlibétique de 1260 à 1320 (Bibliothèque Thomiste 5,21), Kain 1925. Grabmann 1915 = Grabmann, Martin, Welchen Teil der aristotelischen ‘Politik’ hat der hl. Thomas von Aquin selbst commentiert?, in: Philosophisches Jahrbuch 28 (1915), pp. 373–379. Grabmann 1924a = Grabmann, Martin, Doctrina S. Thomae de distinctione reali inter essentiam et esse ex documentis ineditis saeculi XIII illustratur, in: Acta hebdomadae Thomisticae: Romae celebratae 19–25 Novembris 1924 in laudem S. Thomae Aquinatis sexto labente saeculo ab honoribus sanctorum ei decretis, Romae 1924, pp. 131–190.

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Grabmann 1924b = Grabmann, Martin, Neu aufgefundene Werke des Siger von Brabant und Boetius von Dacien (Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-philologische und historische Klasse), München 1924. Grabmann 1924c = Grabmann, Martin, Neu aufgefundene Quaestionen Sigers von Brabant zu den Werken des Aristoteles, in: Miscellanea Franz Ehrle (Studi e Testi 37), Roma 1924, vol. I, pp. 121–130. Grabmann 1941 = Grabmann, Martin, Die mittelalterlichen Kommentare zur ‘Politik’ des Aristoteles (Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-Historische Abteilung 2,10), München 1941. Graf 1935 = Graf, Thomas Aquinas, De subjecto psychico gratiae et virtutum secundum doctrinam scholasticorum usque ad medium saeculum XIV, Pars prima: De subiecto virtutum cardinalium II (Studia Anselmiana 2–3/4), Romae 1935. Grech 1964 = Grech, Gundisalvus Maria, The Manuscript Tradition of Peter of Auvergne’s Inedited Commentary on Aristotle’s ‘Politics’, in: Angelicum 41 (1964), pp. 438–446. Grech 1967 = Grech, Gundisalvus Maria, The Commentary of Peter of Auvergne on Aristotle’s ‘Politics’: The Inedited Part, Book III, less. I–VI. Introduction and Critical Text, Roma 1967. Grignaschi 1960 = Grignaschi, Mario, Nicolas Oresme et son commentaire à la ‘Politique’ d’Aristote, in: Album Helen Maud Cam (Studies presented to the International Commission for the History of Representative and Parliamentary Institutions 23), Louvain/Paris 1960, vol. I, pp. 95–152. Grignaschi 1961 = Grignaschi, Mario, Le problème du contrat social et de l’origine de la ‘civitas’ dans la Scolastique, in: Ancien Pays et Assemblées d’Etats 22 (1961), pp. 67–85. Grignaschi 1966 = Grignaschi, Mario, La définition du ‘civis’ dans la Scolastique, in: Anciens Pays et Assemblées d’Etats 35 (1966), pp. 71–100. Grignaschi 1983 = Grignaschi, Mario, Quelques remarques sur la conception du pouvoir législative dans la Scolastique, in: Revue Belge de Philosophie et d’Histoire 61 (1983), pp. 783–801.

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Groblicki 1938 = Groblicki, Julianus, De scientia Dei futurorum contingentium secundum S. Thomam eiusque primos sequaces (Editio Facultatis Theologicae Universitatis Jagellonicae Cracoviensis. Ser. I, 3), Krakow 1938 (dissertation; Angelicum, Pontificia Università San Tommaso d’Aquino, Rome). Gusinde 1962 = Gusinde, Martin, Kenntnisse und Urteile über Pygmäen in Antike und Mittelalter (Nova Acta Leopoldina. Neue Folge 162), Leipzig 1962. Guyot 1961 = Guyot, Bertrand G., Textes inédits relatifs à l’étude précédente. Pierre d’Auvergne: Quodlibet I q. 17, in: Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge 38 (1961), pp. 153–161. Hentschel 1999 = Hentschel, Frank, ‘Affectus’ und ‘proportio’: Musikbezogene Philosophie der Emotionen um 1300 (Engelbert von Admont und Petrus d’Auvergne), in: Philosophischer Gedanke und musikalischer Klang: Zum Wechselverhältnis von Musik und Philosophie, Eds. Asmuth, Christoph, Scholtz, Gunter and Stammkötter, Franz-Bernhard, Frankfurt a.M./ New York 1999, pp. 53–68. Hentschel 2000a = Hentschel, Frank, Sinnlichkeit und Vernunft in der mittelalterlichen Musiktheorie: Strategien der Konsonanzwertung und der Gegenstand der Musica sonora um 1300 (Beihefte zum Archiv für Musikwissenschaft 47), Stuttgart 2000. Hentschel 2000b = Hentschel, Frank, Der verjagte Dämon. Mittelalterliche Gedanken zur Wirkung der Musik aus der Zeit um 1300. Mit einer Edition der Quaestiones 16. und 17. aus Quodlibet VI des Petrus d’Auvergne, in: Geistesleben im 13. Jahrhundert, Eds. Aertsen, Jan A. and Speer, Andreas (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 27), Berlin/New York 2000, pp. 395–421. Hertling 1914 = Hertling, Georg Freiherr von, Zur Geschichte der aristotelischen ‘Politik’ im Mittelalter, in: id. Historische Beiträge zur Philosophie, Ed. Endres, Josef Anton, Kempten/München 1914, pp. 20–31, reprinted: Hamburg 2011, first published in: Hertling, Georg von, Zur Geschichte der aristotelischen ‘Politik’ im Mittelalter, in: Rheinisches Museum für Philologie 39 (1884), pp. 446–457. Hocedez 1930 = Hocedez, Edgar, La théologie de Pierre d’Auvergne, in: Gregorianum 11 (1930), pp. 526–552.

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Hocedez 1932 = Hocedez, Edgar, Les ‘Quaestiones in Metaphysicam’ de Pierre d’Auvergne, in: Archives de Philosophie 9 (1932), pp. 179–234. Hocedez 1934 = Hocedez, Edgar, Une question inédite de Pierre d’Auvergne sur l’individuation, in: Revue Néoscolastique de Philosophie 36 (1934), pp. 355–386. Hocedez 1935 = Hocedez, Edgar, La philosophie des Quodlibets de Pierre d’Auvergne, in: Aus der Geisteswelt des Mittelalters. Studien und Texte Martin Grabmann zur Vollendung des 60. Lebensjahres von Freunden und Schülern gewidmet, Eds. Lang, Albert, Lechner, Joseph and Schmaus, Michael (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters: Texte und Untersuchungen. Supplementband 3), Münster 1935, vol. II, pp. 779–791. James 1899 = James, Montague Rhodes, A Descriptive Catalogue of the Manuscript in the Library of Peterhouse. With an Essay on the History of the Library by John Willis Clark, Cambridge 1899, reprinted: Cambridge 2009. James 1903 = James, Montague Rhodes, The Ancient Libraries of Canterbury and Dover. The catalogues of the libraries of Christ Church Priory and St. Augustine’s Abbey at Canterbury, and of St. Martin’s Priory at Dover, Cambridge 1903, reprinted: Cambridge 2011. Jeffreys 2009 = Jeffreys, Catherine, Traditions and Practices: Some Early References to Aristotle’s ‘Politics’ in Parisian Writings about Music, in: Identity and Locality in early European music, 1028–1740, Ed. Stoessel, Jason, Farnham/Burlington 2009, pp. 83–105. Jeffreys 2011 = Jeffreys, Catherine, The Exchange of Ideas about Music in Paris c. 1270–1304: Guy of Saint-Denis, Johannes de Grocheio, and Peter of Auvergne, in: Communities of Learning: Networks and the Shaping of Intellectual Identity in Europe, 1100–1500, Eds. Mews, Constant J. and Crossley, John N. (Europa Sacra 9), Turnhout 2011, pp. 151–175. Kaeppeli 1966 = Kaeppeli, Thomas, Antiche biblioteche dominicane in Italia, in: Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum 36 (1966), pp. 5–80. Klundert 1998 = Guido von Saint-Denis, Tractatus de tonis: Edition und Studien, Ed. Klundert, Sieglinde van de, Bubenreuth 1998, 2 vols.

498

Lidia Lanza and Marco Toste

Koch 1931 = Koch, Josef, Sind die Pygmäen Menschen? Ein Kapitel aus der philosophischen Anthropologie der mittelalterlichen Scholastik, in: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 40 (1931), pp. 194–213. Köhler 1971 = Köhler, Theodor Wolfram, Der Begriff der Einheit und ihr ontologisches Prinzip nach dem Sentenzenkommentar des Jakob von Metz O.P. (Studia Anselmiana 58), Roma 1971. Köhler 1992 = Köhler, Theodor Wolfram, Anthropologische Erkennungsmerkmale menschlichen Seins. Die Frage der ‘Pygmei’ in der Hochscholastik, in: Mensch und Natur im Mittelalter, Eds. Zimmermann, Albert and Speer, Andreas (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 21), Berlin 1992, pp. 718–735. Köhler 1999 = Köhler, Theodor Wolfram, Die wissenschaftstheoretische und inhaltliche Bedeutung der Rezeption von ‘De animalibus’ für den philosophisch-anthropologischen Diskurs im 13. Jahrhundert, in: Aristotle’s ‘Animals’ in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, Eds. Steel, Carlos G., Guldentops, Guy and Beullens, Pieter (Mediaevalia Lovaniensia. Series I, Studia 27), Leuven 1999, pp. 249–274. Köhler 2002 = Köhler, Theodor Wolfram, Grundlagen des philosophischanthropologischen Diskurses im Dreizehnten Jahrhundert: die Erkenntnisbemühung um den Menschen im zeitgenössischen Verständnis (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 71), Leiden/Boston/Köln 2002. Köhler 2007 = Köhler, Theodor Wolfram, Gleiche Menschennatur – naturgegebene soziale Unterschiede. Die Rezeption der aristotelischen Lehre vom ‘physei doulos’, in: Politischer Aristotelismus und Religion in Mittelalter und Früher Neuzeit, Eds. Fidora, Alexander et alii (Wissenskultur und gesellschaftlicher Wandel 23), Berlin 2007, pp. 47–64. Köhler 2008 = Köhler, Theodor Wolfram, ‘Homo animal nobilissimum’. Konturen des spezifisch Menschlichen in der naturphilosophischen Aristoteleskommentierung des dreizehnten Jahrhunderts. Teilband 1 (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 94), Leiden/Boston 2008. Kouri/Lehtinen 2000 = Kouri, Erkki I. and Lehtinen, Anja Inkeri, Disputed Questions on Aristotle’s ‘De iuventute et senectute’, ‘De respiratione’ and ‘De morte et vita’ by Henricus de Alemannia, in: ‘Sic itur ad astra’. Studien zur Geschichte der Mathematik und Naturwissenschaften – Festschrift für

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den Arabisten Paul Kunitzsch zum 70. Geburtstag, Eds. Folkerts, Menso and Lorch, Richard, Wiesbaden 2000, pp. 362–375. Lagarde 1948 = Lagarde, Georges de, La naissance de l’esprit laïque au déclin du Moyen Âge. II: Marsile de Padoue ou le premier théoricien de l’état laïque, Paris 1948, 1st edition: 1934. Lagarde 1958 = Lagarde, Georges de, La naissance de l’esprit laïque au déclin du Moyen Âge. III: Secteur social de la Scolastique, Louvain/Paris 1958, 1st edition: Paris 1942. Lambertini 1990 = Lambertini, Roberto, ‘Philosophus videtur tangere tres rationes’. Egidio Romano lettore ed interprete della ‘Politica’ nel terzo libro del ‘De regimine principum’, in: Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale 1 (1990), pp. 277–325. Lambertini 1992 = Lambertini, Roberto, Wilhelm von Ockham als Leser der ‘Politica’. Zur Rezeption der politischen Theorie des Aristoteles in der Ekklesiologie Ockhams, in: Das Publikum politischer Theorie im 14. Jahrhundert, Eds. Miethke, Jürgen and Bühler, Arnold, München 1992, pp. 207–224; Italian translation in: Lambertini, Roberto, La povertà pensata. Evoluzione storica della definizione dell’identità minoritica da Bonaventura ad Ockham (Collana di Storia Medievale 1), Modena 2000, pp. 269–288. Lambertini 1996 = Lambertini, Roberto, I Frati minori e la ‘Politica’ di Aristotele. Lo strano caso di Guglielmo da Sarzano, in: Ubi neque aerugo neque tenia demolitur. Studi in onore di Luigi Pellegrini per i suoi 70 anni, Ed. Del Fuoco, Maria Grazia, Napoli 2006, pp. 407–423. Lambertini 1997 = Lambertini, Roberto, Il re e il filosofo: aspetti della riflessione politica, in: La filosofia nelle università, secoli XIII–XIV, Ed. Bianchi, Luca (Biblioteca di Cultura 216), Firenze 1997, pp. 345–385. Lambertini 1999a = Lambertini, Roberto, Il cuore e l’anima della città. Osservazioni a margine sull’uso di metafore organicistische in testi politici bassomedievali, in: Anima e corpo nella cultura medievale. Atti del V convegno di studi della Società Italiana per lo Studio del Pensiero Medievale, Venezia, 25–28 settembre 1995, Eds. Casagrande, Carla and Vecchio, Silvana (Millennio medievale. Atti di convegni 3), Firenze 1999, pp. 289–303.

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Lambertini 1999b = Lambertini, Roberto, Governo ideale e riflessione politica dei frati mendicanti nella prima metà del Trecento, in: Etica e politica: le teorie dei frati mendicanti nel Due e Trecento. Atti del XXVI convegno internazionale, Assisi, 15–17 ottobre 1998 (Atti dei convegni della Società internazionale di studi francescani e del Centro interuniversitario di studi francescani, nuova serie 9), Spoleto 1999, pp. 233–277. Lambertini 2000 = Lambertini, Roberto, Lo studio e la recezione della ‘Politica’ tra XIII e XIV secolo, in: Il pensiero politico dell’età antica e medioevale, Ed. Dolcini, Carlo, Torino 2000, pp. 145–173. Lambertini 2001 = Lambertini, Roberto, La monarchia prima della ‘Monarchia’: le ragioni del ‘regnum’ nella ricezione medievale di Aristotele, in: Pour Dante. Dante et l’apocalypse. Lectures humanistes de Dante, Ed. Pinchard, Bruno with the collaboration of Christian Trottmann (Le savoir de Mantice 7), Paris 2001, pp. 39–75. Lambertini 2002 = Lambertini, Roberto, Raimundus Acgerii’s Commentary on Aristotle’s ‘Politica’. Some Notes, in: Vivarium 40 (2002), pp. 14–40. Lambertini 2006 = Lambertini, Roberto, Political Quodlibeta, in: Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Thirteenth Century, Ed. Schabel, Chris (Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition 1), Leiden/Boston 2006, pp. 439–474. Lambertini 2013 = Lambertini, Roberto, Peter of Auvergne, Giles of Rome and Aristotle’s ‘Politica’ (published in this volume). Langholm 1992 = Langholm, Odd, Economics in the Medieval Schools. Wealth, Exchange, Value, Money and Usure According to the Paris Theological Tradition, 1200–1350 (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 29), Leiden/New York/Köln 1992. Lanza 1994 = Lanza, Lidia, Aspetti della ricezione della ‘Politica’ aristotelica nel XIII secolo: Pietro d’Alvernia, in: Studi Medievali 35 (1994), pp. 643–694. Lanza 1998 = Lanza, Lidia, Il ‘finis hominis’ nei commenti all’‘Ethica Nicomachea’ e alla ‘Politica’ di Aristotele (secoli XIII–XIV), in: Medioevo e Rinascimento 12 (1998), pp. 143–181.

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Lanza 2000 = Lanza, Lidia, La ‘Politica’ di Aristotele nei commenti universitari (secoli XIII–XIV), Università degli Studi di Firenze, Firenze 2000 (Ph.D. dissertation). Lanza 2001 = Lanza, Lidia, La ‘servitus naturalis’ in alcuni commenti medievali alla ‘Politica’ di Aristotele, in: I Quaderni del M.AE.S. 4 (2001), pp. 7–25. Lanza 2002 = Lanza, Lidia, I commenti medievali alla ‘Politica’ e la riflessione sullo stato in Francia (secoli XIII–XIV), in: Il commento filosofico nell’Occidente latino (secoli XIII–XV). The Philosophical Commentary in the Latin West (13–15th centuries). Atti del Colloquio Firenze/Pisa, 19–22 ottobre 2000, organizzato dalla S.I.S.M.E.L. (Società Internazionale per lo Studio del Medioevo Latino) e dalla S.I.S.P.M. (Società Italiana per lo Studio del Pensiero Medievale), sotto l’egida della S.I.E.P.M. (Société Internationale pour l’Etude de la Philosophie Médiévale), Eds. Fioravanti, Gianfranco, Leonardi, Claudio and Perfetti, Stefano (Rencontres de Philosophie Médiévale 10), Turnhout 2002, pp. 401–427. Lanza 2004 = Lanza, Lidia, Guerra e pace in Aristotele: alcune riflessioni sui commenti medievali alla ‘Politica’, in: Pace e guerra nel Basso Medioevo. Atti del XL Convegno storico internazionale, Todi, 12–14 ottobre 2003 (Atti dei convegni dell’Accademia tudertina e del Centro di studi sulla spiritualità medievale 17), Spoleto 2004, pp. 53–77. Lanza 2005 = Lanza, Lidia, ‘Luciferianae pravitatis imago’. Il tiranno tra alto e basso Medioevo, in: Mediaevalia. Textos e Estudos 24 (2005), pp. 131–172. Lanza 2010 = Lanza, Lidia, ‘Ars acquirendi pecunias’. La crematistica nella ‘Politica’ di Aristotele e nei suoi commenti medievali, in: I beni di questo mondo. Teorie etico-economiche nel laboratorio dell’Europa medievale. Atti del XVI Convegno della Società Italiana per lo Studio del Pensiero Medievale (S.I.S.P.M.), Roma, 19–21 settembre 2005, Eds. Lambertini, Roberto and Sileo, Leonardo (Textes et Études du Moyen Âge 55), Porto 2010, pp. 39–65. Lanza 2011 = Lanza, Lidia, Firenze e la lezione degli antichi: i ‘Trattati’ di Bartolomeo Cavalcanti, in: Thinking Politics in the Vernacular. From the Middle Ages to the Renaissance, Eds. Briguglia, Gianluca and Ricklin, Thomas (Dokimion 36), Fribourg 2011, pp. 167–187.

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Lanza 2013 = Lanza, Lidia, The ‘Scriptum super III–VIII libros Politicorum’: Some Episodes of its Fortune until the Early Renaissance (published in this volume). Lanza (at press) = Lanza, Lidia, Petri de Alvernia Scriptum super III–VIII libros Politicorum (Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi. Opera philosophica mediae aetatis selecta 4), Tübingen. Leclercq 1939a = Leclercq, Jean, La théologie comme science d’après la littérature quodlibétique, in: Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale 11 (1939), pp. 351–374. Leclercq 1939b = Leclercq, Jean, La renonciation de Célestin V et l’opinion théologique en France du vivant de Boniface VIII, in: Revue d’Histoire de l’Eglise de France 25 (1939), pp. 183–192. Lewry 1990 = Lewry, Osmund, Study of Aging in the Arts Faculty of the Universities of Paris and Oxford, in: Aging and the Aged in Medieval Europe: Selected Papers from the Annual Conference of the Centre for Medieval Studies, University of Toronto, 25–26 February and 11–12 November 1983, Ed. McMahon Sheehan, Michael (Papers in Mediaeval Studies 11), Toronto 1990, pp. 23–38. Libera 1996 = Libera, Alain de, La querelle des universaux: de Platon à la fin du Moyen Âge (Des travaux), Paris 1996. Lohr 1972 = Lohr, Charles H., Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries. Authors: Narcissus–Richardus, in: Traditio 28 (1972), pp. 281–396. Maier 1949 = Maier, Anneliese, Les commentaires sur la ‘Physique’ d’Aristote attribués à Siger de Brabant, in: Revue Philosophique de Louvain 47 (1949), pp. 334–350, republished in: ead., Ausgehendes Mittelalter: gesammelte Aufsätze zur Geistesgeschichte des 14. Jahrhunderts, Ed. Paravicini Bagliani, Agostino (Storia e Letteratura 105), Roma 1967, vol. II, pp. 189–206, 501. Mallea 2001 = Tomás de Aquino–Pedro de Alvernia, Comentario a la ‘Política’ de Aristóteles, traducción de Ana Mallea, prólogo e notas de Ana Mallea and Celina A. Lértora (Colección de Pensamiento Medieval y Renascentista 22), Pamplona 2001.

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McGrade/Kilcullen/Kempshall 2001 = McGrade, Arthur Stephen, Kilcullen, John and Kempshall, Matthew, The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts. II: Ethics and Political Philosophy, Cambridge/New York 2001. Machamer/McGuire 2009 = Machamer, Peter K. and McGuire, James E., Descartes’s Changing Mind, Princeton 2009. Marmo 1991 = Marmo, Costantino, Anonymus Cordubensis, Questiones super primum librum Posteriorum. A Partial Edition: Prologue and qq. 1–5, in: Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen Âge grec et latin 61 (1991), pp. 107–139. Marmo 1994 = Marmo, Costantino, Semiotica e linguaggio nella Scolastica: Parigi, Bologna, Erfurt 1270–1330. La semiotica dei Modisti (Nuovi studi storici. Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medioevo 26), Roma 1994. Marmo 1999 = Marmo, Costantino, The Semantics of the Modistae, in: Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition: Acts of the Symposium ‘The Copenhagen School of Medieval Philosophy’, January 10–13, 1996, organized by The Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters and The Institute for Greek and Latin, University of Copenhagen, Eds. Ebbesen, Sten and Friedman, Russell L. (Historisk-filosofiske meddelelser 77), København 1999, pp. 83–104. Marmo 2010 = Marmo, Costantino, La semiotica del XIII secolo, Milano 2010. Martin 1949 = Martin, Conor, The Commentaries on the ‘Politics’ of Aristotle in the Late Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries, with Reference to the Thought and Political Life of the Time, Oxford University, Oxford 1949 (Ph.D. dissertation). Martin 1951 = Martin, Conor, Some Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle’s ‘Politics’, in: History. The Journal of the Historical Association 36 (1951), pp. 29–44. Martin 1952 = Martin, Conor, The Vulgate Text of Aquinas’s Commentary on Aristotle’s ‘Politics’, in: Dominican Studies 5 (1952), pp. 35–64. Maurer 1946 = Maurer, Armand, ‘Esse’ and ‘Essentia’ in the ‘Metaphysics’ of Siger of Brabant, in: Mediaeval Studies 8 (1946), pp. 66–86.

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MBKD = Mittelalterliche Bibliothekskataloge Deutschlands und der Schweiz, Ed. Königlich Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften in München (Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften in München), München 1918–. Meier 1994a = Meier, Ulrich, Mensch und Bürger. Die Stadt im Denken spätmittelalterlicher Theologen, Philosophen und Juristen, München 1994. Meier 1994b = Meier, Ulrich, ‘Burgerlich vereynung’. Herrschende, beherrschte und ‘mittlere’ Bürger in Politiktheorie, chronikalischer Überlieferung und städtischen Quellen des Spätmittelalters, in: Bürgerschaft. Rezeption und Innovation der Begrifflichkeit vom hohen Mittelalter bis ins 19. Jahrhundert, Eds. Koselleck, Reinhart and Schreiner, Klaus (Sprache und Geschichte 22), Stuttgart 1994, pp. 43–89. Mensa i Valls 1998 = Mensa i Valls, Jaume, Les raons d’un anunci apocaliptic: la polèmica escatológica entre Arnau de Vilanova i els filòsofs i teòlegs professionals (1297–1305): anàlisi dels arguments i de les argumentacions (Colelectània Sant Pacià 61), Barcelona 1998. Merlo 2005 = Merlo, Maurizio, La sintassi del ‘regimen bene commixtum’ e del ‘regimen politicum’ fra Tommaso d’Aquino e Tolomeo da Lucca, in: Filosofia Politica 19 (2005), pp. 33–48. Monahan 1953 = Monahan, Arthur Patrick, The Doctrine of Being in Peter of Auvergne’s ‘Quaestiones in Metaphysicam’, University of Toronto, Toronto 1953 (Ph.D. dissertation). Monahan 1954 = Monahan, Arthur Patrick, The Subject of Metaphysics for Peter of Auvergne, in: Mediaeval Studies 16 (1954), pp. 118–130. Monahan 1955 = Monahan, Arthur Patrick, Quaestiones in Metaphysicam Petri de Alvernia, in: Nine Mediaeval Thinkers: A Collection of Hitherto Unedited Texts, Ed. O’Donnell, J. Reginald (Studies and Texts. Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies 1), Toronto 1955, pp. 145–181. Müller 1948 = Müller, Jean-Pierre, Les critiques de la thèse de Jean Quidort sur la béatitude formelle, in: Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale 15 (1948), pp. 152–170. Murano 2005 = Murano, Giovanna, Opere diffuse per ‘exemplar’ e ‘pecia’ (Textes et Études du Moyen Âge 29), Turnhout 2005.

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Musatti 1995 = Musatti, Cesare A., Il primo ciclo di lezioni di Pietro d’Alvernia sul ‘De Caelo’ di Aristotele, Università degli Studi di Roma, Roma 1995 (tesi di laurea). Musatti 2000a = Musatti, Cesare A., Pietro d’Alvernia e le ‘Quaestiones super librum De caelo et mundo’ contenute nei manoscritti di Cremona, Erlangen e Kassel: edizione del testo e analisi dottrinale, Università degli Studi di Catania, Catania 2000 (Ph.D. dissertation). Musatti 2000b = Musatti, Cesare A., Le citazioni del libro ‘Lambda’ della ‘Metaphysica’ in un commento per questioni al ‘De caelo’ di Aristotele, in: Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale 42 (2000), pp. 81–90. Musatti 2006a = Musatti, Cesare A., Celestial Movers and Animation of the Heavens in One Commentary on Aristotle’s ‘De caelo’ Ascribed to Peter of Auvergne, in: Intellect et imagination dans la philosophie médiévale. Intellect and Imagination in Medieval Philosophy. Intelecto e imaginação na filosofia medieval. Actes du XIe Congrès International de Philosophie Médiévale de la Société Internationale pour l’Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale (S.I.E.P.M.), Porto, du 26 au 31 août 2002, Eds. Pacheco, Maria Cândida and Meirinhos, José Francisco (Rencontres de Philosophie Médiévale 11), Turnhout 2006, vol. III, pp. 1447–1461. Musatti 2006b = Musatti, Cesare A., Il ‘De caelo’ di Aristotele e alcuni suoi commentatori: Simplicio, Averroè e Pietro d’Alvernia, in: Quaestio 6 (2006), pp. 524–549. Musatti 2008 = Musatti, Cesare A., Il ‘De Caelo’ di Aristotele nella seconda metà del XIII secolo: le questioni di Pietro d’Alvernia e alcuni commenti anonimi, in: Cosmogonie e cosmologie nel Medioevo. Atti del convegno della Società Italiana per lo Studio del Pensiero Medievale (S.I.S.P.M.), Catania, 22–24 settembre 2006, Eds. Martello, Concetto, Militello, Chiara and Vella, Andrea (Textes et Études du Moyen Âge 46), Louvain-la-Neuve 2008, pp. 269–308. Musatti 2009 = Musatti, Cesare A., L’impossibilità del vuoto extra ed intracosmico: la testimonianza dei commenti al ‘De Caelo’ di Pietro d’Alvernia († 1304), in: Discussioni sul nulla tra Medioevo ed Età Moderna, Eds. Lenzi, Massimiliano and Maierù, Alfonso (Lessico Intellettuale Europeo 104), Firenze 2009, pp. 259–284.

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Musatti 2012 = Musatti, Cesare A., The Extracosmic Void in an Anonymous Commentary on the ‘De caelo’ (ms. Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 16160), in: La nature et le vide dans la physique médiévale. Études dédiées à Edward Grant, Eds. Biard, Joël and Rommevaux, Sabine (Studia Artistarum 32), Turnhout 2012, pp. 205–226. Musatti 2013a = Musatti, Cesare A., Peter of Auvergne and the Quaestiones on ‘De caelo’ in the Ms. Escorial, Biblioteca del Monasterio h. II 1, ff. 106ra–129vb (published in this volume). Musatti 2013b = Musatti, Cesare A., Due prologhi al ‘De caelo’ di Aristotele: l’anonimo commento del ms. Escorial h.II 1 e un commento attribuito a Pietro d’Alvernia, in: Medioevo e Filosofia. Per Alfonso Maierù, Eds. Lenzi, Massimiliano, Musatti, Cesare A. and Valente, Luisa, Roma 2013. Nardi 1947 = Nardi, Bruno, Note per una storia dell’averroismo latino. I: Controversie sigeriane, in: Rivista di Storia della Filosofia 2 (1947), pp. 134–140. Newton 2008 = Newton, Lloyd A., Duns Scotus Account of a ‘Propter Quid’ Science of the Categories, in: Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle’s ‘Categories’, Ed. Newton, Lloyd A. (Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition 10), Leiden/Boston 2008, pp. 221–258. North 1986 = North, John David, Celestial Influence: The Major Premiss of Astrology, in: ‘Astrologi hallucinati’. Stars and the End of the World in Luther’s Time, Ed. Zambelli, Paola, Berlin/New York 1986, pp. 45–100, republished in: North, John David, Stars, Minds and Fate: Essays in Ancient and Medieval Cosmology, London 1987, pp. 243–298. Ossikovski 2012 = Ossikovski, Martin, Some Medieval Readings of Aristotle’s Argument for the Collective Superiority of ‘the Many’, in: Studia Neoaristotelica. A Journal of Analytical Scholasticism 9 (2012), pp. 135–153. Pattin 1988 = Pattin, Adrien, Pour l’histoire du sens agent. La controverse entre Barthélemy de Bruges et Jean de Jandun. Ses antecedents et son évolution. Étude et textes inédits (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy 6), Leuven 1988. Perarnau i Espelt 1988–1989 = Perarnau i Espelt, Josep, Guiu Terrena critica Arnau de Vilanova. Edició de la ‘Questio utrum per notitiam sacrae scripturae possit determinate sciri tempus antichristi’, in: Arxiu de Textos Catalans Antics 7–8 (1988–1989), pp. 171–222.

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Pérez-Ilzarbe 2013 = Pérez-Ilzarbe, Paloma, ‘Socrates desinit esse non desinendo esse’: Limit-decision problems in Peter of Auvergne, in: Logic and Language in the Middle Ages. A Volume in Honour of Sten Ebbesen, Eds. Fink, Jakob Leth, Hansen, Heine and Mora-Márquez, Ana María (Investigating Medieval Philosophy 4), Leiden/Boston 2013, pp. 287–303. Pickavé 2001 = Pickavé, Martin, Heinrich von Gent über das Subjekt der Metaphysik als Ersterkanntes, in: Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale 12 (2001), pp. 493–522. Pickavé 2007a = Pickavé, Martin, Heinrich von Gent über Metaphysik als erste Wissenschaft: Studien zu einem Metaphysikentwurf aus dem letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 91), Leiden 2007. Pickavé 2007b = Pickavé, Martin, The Controversy over the Principle of Individuation in ‘Quodlibeta’ (1277–ca. 1320): A Forest Map, in: Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Fourteenth Century, Ed. Schabel, Chris (Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition 7), Leiden 2007, pp. 17–79. Pickavé 2008 = Pickavé, Martin, Simon of Faversham on Aristotle’s ‘Categories’ and the ‘Scientia Praedicamentorum’, in: Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle’s ‘Categories’, Ed. Newton, Lloyd A. (Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition 10), Leiden/Boston 2008, pp. 183–220. Pinborg 1967a = Pinborg, Jan, Die Entwicklung der Sprachtheorie im Mittelalter (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 42,2), Münster 1967. Pinborg 1967b = Pinborg, Jan, Die Handschrift: Roma Biblioteca Angelica 549 und Boethius de Dacia, in: Classica et Mediaevalia 28 (1967), pp. 373–393. Pinborg 1971 = Pinborg, Jan, Bezeichnung in der Logik des XIII. Jahrhunderts, in: Der Begriff der repraesentatio im Mittelalter: Stellvertretung, Symbol, Zeichen, Bild, Ed. Zimmermann, Albert, revised by VuilleminDiem, Gudrun, Berlin/New York 1971 (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 8), pp. 238–281, reprinted in: Pinborg, Jan, Medieval Semantics. Selected Studies on Medieval Logic and Grammar, Ed. Ebbesen, Sten (Variorum Reprints; Collected Studies 195), London 1984, item 4.

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Pinborg 1972 = Pinborg, Jan, Logic und Semantik im Mittelalter. Ein Überblick (Problemata 10), Stuttgart/Bad Cannstatt 1972. Pinborg 1973a = Pinborg, Jan, Petrus de Alvernia on Porphyry, in: Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen Âge grec et latin 9 (1973), pp. 47–67. Pinborg 1973b = Pinborg, Jan, A New Ms. of the Questions on the ‘Posteriora Analytica’ Attributed to Petrus de Alvernia (Clm 8005) with the Transcription of Some Questions Related to Problems of Meaning, in: Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen Âge grec et latin 10 (1973), pp. 48–62. Pinborg 1975a = Pinborg, Jan, Petrus de Alvernia on the ‘Categories’, in: Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen Âge grec et latin 14 (1975), pp. 40–46. Pinborg 1975b = Pinborg, Jan, Radulphus Brito’s Sophism on Second Intentions, in: Vivarium 13 (1975), pp. 119–152. Pini 2001 = Pini, Giorgio, Signification of Names in Duns Scotus and Some of His Contemporaries, in: Vivarium 39 (2001), pp. 20–51. Pini 2002 = Pini, Giorgio, Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus. An Interpretation of Aristotle’s ‘Categories’ in the Late Thirteenth Century (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 77), Leiden/Boston/Köln 2002. Pini 2003 = Pini, Giorgio, The Transcendentals of Logic: ThirteenthCentury Discussions on the Subject Matter of Aristotle’s ‘Categories’, in: Die Logik des Transzendentalen. Festschrift für Jan A. Aertsen zum 65. Geburtstag, Ed. Pickavé, Martin (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 30), Berlin/New York 2003, pp. 140–159. Poortman 2003 = Petrus de Alvernia, Sententia super librum ‘De vegetabilibus et plantis’, Ed. Poortman, Evert Lubbertus Jacobus (Aristoteles Semitico-Lantinus 13), Leiden/Boston 2003. Porro 1996 = Porro, Pasquale, Forme e modelli di durata nel pensiero medievale. L’‘aevum’, il tempo discreto, la categoria ‘quando’ (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy 16), Leuven 1996. Potestà 2007 = Potestà, Gian Luca, L’anno dell’Anticristo. Il calcolo di Arnaldo di Villanova nella letteratura teologica e profetica del XIV secolo, in: Rivista di Storia del Cristianesimo 4 (2007), pp. 431–464.

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Renna 1978 = Renna, Thomas, Aristotle and the French Monarchy, 1260– 1303, in: Viator 9 (1978), pp. 309–324. Roling 2010 = Roling, Bernd, Drachen und Sirenen: die Rationalisierung und Abwicklung der Mythologie an den europäischen Universitäten (Mittellateinische Studien und Texte 42), Leiden/Boston 2010. Roos 1963 = Roos, Heinrich, Ein unbekanntes Sophisma des Boetius de Dacia, in: Scholastik 38 (1963), pp. 378–391. Rosier 1991 = Rosier, Irène, Les sophismes grammaticaux au XIIIe siècle, in: Medioevo 17 (1991), pp. 175–230. Rosier Catach/Ebbesen 2004 = Rosier Catach, Irène and Ebbesen, Sten, Petrus de Alvernia + Boethius de Dacia: Syllogizantem ponendum est terminos, in: Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen Âge grec et latin 75 (2004), pp. 161–218. Russel 1975 = Russel, Frederick H., The Just War in the Middle Ages (Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought. Third Series 8), Cambridge 1975. Ryan 1982 = Ryan, Eugene E., Bartolomeo Cavalcanti as a Critic of Thomas Aquinas, in: Vivarium 20 (1982), pp. 84–95. Sajó 1958 = Sajó, Géza, Boèce de Dacie et les commentaires anonymes inédits de Munich sur la ‘Physique’ et sur ‘La génération’ attribués à Siger de Brabant, in: Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge 25 (1958), pp. 21–58. Schabel 2007 = Schabel, Chris, The ‘Quodlibeta’ of Peter of Auvergne, in: Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Fourteenth Century, Ed. Schabel, Chris (Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition 7), Leiden 2007, pp. 81–130. Schabel 2013 = Schabel, Chris, Peter of Auvergne’s Quodlibetal Questions on Divine Knowledge (published in this volume). Schreiner 1996 = Schreiner, Klaus, Teilhabe, Konsens und Autonomie. Leitbegriffe kommunaler Ordnung in der politischen Theorie des späten Mittel-

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alters und der frühen Neuzeit, in: Theorien kommunaler Ordnung in Europa, Eds. Blickle, Peter and Müller-Luckner, Elisabeth (assoc. Ed.) (Schriften des Historischen Kollegs, Kolloquien 36), München 1996, pp. 35–61. Scordia 2005 = Scordia, Lydwine, Le roi doit vivre du sien: la théorie de l’impôt en France (XIIIe–XVe siècles) (Collection des études augustiniennes. Série Moyen âge et temps modernes 40), Paris 2005. Segarra 1933 = Segarra, Francisco, Un precursor de Durando: Pedro d’Auvergne, in: Estudios Ecclesiásticos 12 (1933), pp. 114–124. Sère 2010 = Sère, Bénédicte, La compréhension médiévale du concept aristotélicien de ‘deliberatio’, in: Consulter, délibérer, décider: donner son avis au Moyen Âge (France et en Espagne, VIIe–XVIe siècles), Eds. Charageat, Martine and Leveleux-Teixeira, Corinne (Méridiennes. Série Études médiévales ibériques), Toulouse 2010, pp. 201–221. Simonetta 2009 = Simonetta, Stefano, Rimescolare le carte: il tema del governo misto in Tommaso d’Aquino e nella riflessione politica tardomedievale, in: Montesquieu.it: Biblioteca elettronica su Montesquieu e dintorni 1 (2009), pp. 1–30, available only in pdf format at the following address: http://www.montesquieu.it/files/Riviste/numero1.pdf (last consulted September 2014). Simonetta 2011 = Simonetta, Stefano, Searching for an Uneasy Synthesis between Aristotelian Political Language and Christian Political Theology, in: Christian Readings of Aristotle from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance, Ed. Bianchi, Luca (Studia Artistarum 29), Turnhout 2011, pp. 273–285. Solère 2006 = Solère, Jean-Luc, Was the Eye in the Tomb? On the Metaphysical and Historical Interest of Some Strange Quodlibetal Questions, in: Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Thirteenth Century, Ed. Schabel, Chris (Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition 1), Leiden/ Boston 2006, pp. 507–558. Spiazzi 1966 = Sancti Thomae Aquinatis . . . In octo libros Politicorum Aristotelis expositio, Ed. Spiazzi, Raimondo, Torino/Roma 1966. Staico 2006 = Staico, Ubaldo, La guerra giusta. Fine di un’ideologia?, Roma 2006.

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Syros 2007a = Syros, Vasileios, The Sovereignty of the Multitude in the Works of Marsilius of Padua, Peter of Auvergne and Some Other Aristotelian Commentators, in: The World of Marsilius of Padua: the Life and Work of a Medieval Political Theorist, Ed. Moreno-Riaño, Gerson (Disputatio 5), Turnhout 2007, pp. 227–248. Syros 2007b = Syros, Vasileios, Die Rezeption der aristotelischen politischen Philosophie bei Marsilius von Padua: eine Untersuchung zur ersten Diktion des ‘Defensor pacis’ (Studies in Medieval and Reformation Traditions 134), Leiden/Boston 2007. Tabarroni 1988 = Tabarroni, Andrea, Lo Pseudo Egidio (Guglielmo Arnaldi) e un’inedita continuazione del commento di Tommaso al ‘Peryermenias’, in: Medioevo 14 (1988), pp. 371–424. Tabarroni 2003a = Tabarroni, Andrea, The 10th Thesis in Logic Condemned at Oxford in 1277, in: Aristotle’s ‘Peri Hermeneias’ in the Latin Middle Ages. Essays on the commentary tradition, Eds. Braakhuis, Henk Antonius G. and Kneepkens, Corneille Henri (Artistarium. Supplementa 10), Groningen/Haren 2003, pp. 339–361. Tabarroni 2003b = Tabarroni, Andrea, “Utrum Deus sit in praedicamento”: Ontological Simplicity and Categorial Inclusion, in: La Tradition Médiévale des Catégories (XIIe–XVe siècles). Actes du XIIIe Symposium européen de logique et de sémantique médiévales (Avignon, 6–10 juin 2000), Eds. Biard, Joël and Rosier-Catach, Irène (Philosophes Médiévaux 45), Louvain/Paris/ Dudley 2003, pp. 271–287. Tabarroni 2008 = Tabarroni, Andrea, Contingenza e ‘virtus sermonis’ in alcuni ‘Sophismata’ del XIII secolo, in: Conoscenza e contingenza nella tradizione aristotelica medievale, Ed. Perfetti, Stefano (Philosophica 44), Pisa 2008, pp. 225–238. Tiné 1997 = Tiné, Antonino, Le questioni su Porfirio di Pierre d’Auvergne, in: Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge 64 (1997), pp. 235–333. Toste 2005 = Toste, Marco, ‘Nobiles, optimi viri, philosophi’. The Role of the Philosopher in the Political Community at The Faculty of Arts in Paris in Late Thirteenth Century, in: Itinéraires de la raison. Études de

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philosophie médiévale offertes à Maria Cândida Pacheco, Ed. Meirinhos, José Francisco (Textes et études du Moyen Âge 32), Louvain-la-Neuve 2005, pp. 269–308. Toste 2007 = Toste, Marco, Virtue and the City: The Virtues of the Ruler and the Citizen in the Medieval Reception of the ‘Politics’, in: Princely Virtues in the Middle Ages, 1200–1500, Eds. Bejczy, István P. and Nederman, Cary J. (Disputatio 9), Turnhout 2007, pp. 75–100. Toste 2008 = Toste, Marco, ‘Utrum felix indigeat amicis’: The Reception of the Aristotelian Theory of Friendship at the Arts Faculty in Paris, in: Virtue Ethics in the Middle Ages. Commentaries on Aristotle’s ‘Nicomachean Ethics’, 1200–1500, Ed. Bejczy, István P. (Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History 160), Leiden 2008, pp. 173–195. Toste 2011 = Toste, Marco, Evolution within Tradition: The Vernacular Works on Aristotle’s ‘Politics’ in Sixteenth-Century Italy, in: Thinking Politics in the Vernacular. From the Middle Ages to the Renaissance, Eds. Briguglia, Gianluca and Ricklin, Thomas (Dokimion 36), Fribourg 2011, pp. 189–211. Toste 2012 = Toste, Marco, ‘Pro patria mori’: The debate in the Medieval Aristotelian Tradition, in: Il bene comune. Forme di governo e gerarchie sociali nel basso medioevo. XLVIII Convegno storico internazionale del Centro Italiano di Studi sul Basso Medioevo e dell’Accademia tudertina (9–12 de Outubro de 2011), Spoleto 2012, pp. 391–418. Toste 2013a = Toste, Marco, An Original Way of Commenting on the Fifth Book of Aristotle’s ‘Politics’: The ‘Questiones super I–VII libros Politicorum’ of Peter of Auvergne (published in this volume). Toste 2013b = Toste, Marco, The Naturalness of Human Association in Medieval Political Thought Revisited, in: Nature, norme et morale à la fin du Moyen Âge, Eds. Van Der Lugt, Maaike and Paravicini Bagliani, Agostino (Micrologus’ Library 51), Firenze 2013. Toste (in prep.) = Toste, Marco, The ‘Questiones super I–VII libros Politicorum’ by Peter of Auvergne. Critical Edition and Interpretative Study, Université de Fribourg, Fribourg (Ph.D. dissertation).

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Trifogli 2013 = Trifogli, Cecilia, Peter of Auvergne on Place and Natural Place (published in this volume). Ubl/Vinx 2002 = Ubl, Karl and Vinx, Lars, Zur Transformation der Monarchie von Aristoteles zu Ockham, in: Vivarium 40 (2002), pp. 41–74. Ullrich 1966 = Ullrich, Lothar, Fragen der Schöpfungslehre nach Jakob von Metz O.P.: eine vergleichende Untersuchung von Sentenzenkommentaren aus der Dominikanerschule um 1300 (Erfurter theologische Studien 20), Leipzig 1966. Van Steenberghen 1931 = Van Steenberghen, Fernand, Siger de Brabant d’après ses œuvres inédites. I: Les œuvres inédites (Philosophes Belges. Textes et Études 12), Louvain 1931. Vendemiati 1997 = Vendemiati, Aldo, Le inclinazioni naturali e il bene. Letture parallele della ‘Politica’ di Aristotele da parte di Tommaso d’Aquino e Pietro d’Alvernia, in: Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 89 (1997), pp. 299–316. Vuillemin-Diem 1982 = Vuillemin-Diem, Gudrun, Untersuchungen zu Wilhelm von Moerbekes Metaphysikübersetzung. III. Das TheophrastScholion und seine Verwechslung, in: Studien zur mittelalterlichen Geistesgeschichte und ihren Quellen, Ed. Zimmermann, Albert (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 15), Berlin 1982, pp. 102–208. Vuillemin-Diem 2004 = Vuillemin-Diem, Gudrun, Anonymus Normannus (Mahieu le Vilain): ‘Super Meteora’ II.9–III. Identifizierung des Autors, zur Eigenart des Textes, mit einer Edition von zwei Kapiteln der noch unveröffentlichten Schrift, in: Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales 71 (2004), pp. 1–130. Vuillemin-Diem 2008 = Aristoteles, Meteorologica. Translatio Guillelmi de Morbeka. Praefatio, Aristoteles Latinus X/2.1, Ed. Vuillemin-Diem, Gudrun, Bruxelles 2008. Weber 1973 = Weber, Hermann J., Die Lehre von der Auferstehung der Toten in den Haupttraktaten der scholastischen Theologie. Von Alexander von Hales zu Duns Skotus (Freiburger theologische Studien 91), Freiburg/ Basel/Wien 1973.

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Wei 2000 = Wei, Ian P., Predicting the Future to Judge the Present: Paris Theologian and Attitudes to the Future, in: Medieval Futures. Attitudes to the Future in the Middle Ages, Eds. Burrow, John Anthony and Wei, Ian P., Woodbrige/Rochester 2000, pp. 19–36. Weill-Parot 2002 = Weill-Parot, Nicolas, Les ‘images astrologiques’ au Moyen Âge et à la Renaissance. Spéculations intellectueles et pratiques magiques (XIIe–XVe siècle) (Sciences, techniques et civilisations du Moyen âge à l’aube des Lumières 6), Paris 2002. Weijers 2007 = Weijers, Olga, Le travail intellectuel à la Faculté des arts de Paris: textes et maîtres (ca. 1200–1500), VII: Répertoire des noms commençant par P (Studia Artistarum 15), Turnhout 2007. White 1986 = White, Kevin, Two Studies Related to St. Thomas Aquinas’ Commentary on Aristotle’s ‘De sensu et sensato’, together with an Edition of Peter of Auvergne’s ‘Quaestiones super Parva naturalia’, University of Ottawa, Ottawa 1986, 2 vols. (Ph.D. dissertation). White 1990 = White, Kevin, St. Thomas Aquinas and the Prologue to Peter of Auvergne’s ‘Quaestiones super De sensu et sensato’, in: Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale 1 (1990), pp. 427–456. White 1991 = White, Kevin, Peter of Auvergne’s ‘Quaestiones on the De memoria et reminiscentia’ and St. Thomas Aquinas, in: Manuscripta 35 (1991), pp. 176–177. Wieland 2002 = Wieland, Georg, The Perfection of Man. On the Cause, Mutability, and Permanence of Human Happiness in 13th Century Commentaries on the Ethica Nicomachea (EN), in: Il commento filosofico nell’Occidente latino (secoli XIII–XV). The Philosophical Commentary in the Latin West (13–15th centuries). Atti del colloquio Firenze/Pisa, 19–22 ottobre 2000, organizzato dalla S.I.S.M.E.L. (Società Internazionale per lo Studio del Medioevo Latino) e dalla S.I.S.P.M. (Società Italiana per lo Studio del Pensiero Medievale), sotto l’egida della S.I.E.P.M. (Société Internationale pour l’Etude de la Philosophie Médiévale), Eds. Fioravanti, Gianfranco, Leonardi, Claudio and Perfetti, Stefano (Rencontres de Philosophie Médiévale 10), Turnhout 2002, pp. 359–377.

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Wingate 1931 = Wingate, Sybil Douglas, The Mediaeval Latin Versions of the Aristotelian Scientific Corpus, with Special Reference to the Biological Works, London 1931. Wippel 1981 = Wippel, John Francis, The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines. A Study in Late Thirteenth-Century Philosophy, Washington 1981. Wippel 1985 = Wippel, John Francis, Godfrey of Fontaines, Peter of Auvergne, John Baconthorpe, and the Principle of Individuation, in: Essays Honoring Allan B. Wolter, Eds. Frank, William A. and Etzkorn, Girard J. (Theologie Series 10), St. Bonaventure 1985, pp. 309–349, republished in: Individuation in Scholasticism: The Later Middle Ages and the CounterReformation, 1150–1650, Ed. Gracia, Jorge J. E. (Suny Series in Philosophy), Albany 1994, pp. 221–56. Zimmermann 1956 = Zimmermann, Albert, Die Quaestionen des Siger von Brabant zur ‘Physik’ des Aristoteles, Universität zu Köln, Köln 1956 (Inaugural dissertation). Zimmermann 1965 = Zimmermann, Albert, Ontologie oder Metaphysik? Die Diskussion über den Gegenstand der Metaphysik im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert. Texte und Untersuchungen (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 8), Leiden/Köln 1965. Zimmermann 1971 = Zimmermann, Albert, Verzeichnis ungedruckter Kommentare zur ‘Metaphysik und ‘Physik’ des Aristoteles. Aus der Zeit von etwa 1250–1350 (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 9), Leiden/Köln 1971. Zimmermann 1998 = Zimmermann, Albert, Ontologie oder Metaphysik? Die Diskussion über den Gegenstand der Metaphysik im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert. Texte und Untersuchungen (Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales. Bibliotheca 10), Leuven 1998.

Index

A Adenulph of Anagni 19 Alberich of Reims 30, 31 Albert of Saxony 412 Albert the Great 7, 17, 20, 39, 41, 42, 44, 46, 49, 57–60, 62–64, 66, 68, 107–116, 118–127, 129, 130, 132, 133, 156, 236, 268, 269, 273, 277, 279–282, 291, 305–308, 310, 317, 322, 324, 325, 338, 339, 341, 406, 409, 410 Alexander of Alessandria 232, 235 Alexander of Aphrodisias 120, 145 173, 175 Alexander of Hales 115 Alexander of Villadei 71 Alpetragius 123 Ammonius of Alexandria 168 Anaxagoras 129, 130 Anonymous Domus Petri 214, 215, 219, 236, 237, 249 Anonymous of Erlangen 351 Anonymous of Escorial 136–138, 142, 143, 152–155 Anonymous of Milan 351 Anonymous Zimmermanni 215, 216, 219, 237, 248 Anselm of Canterbury 359, 378 Antonius Andreae 236 Antonius Montecatinus 410 Aristotle 9, 10, 14, 16–20, 32, 33, 36, 38, 39, 41, 42, 46, 47, 51–

55, 58–60, 62–64, 66, 73, 79, 80, 86, 89–94, 96–103, 105– 107, 112, 113, 115–118, 120– 125, 127, 128, 131, 132, 135, 143, 144, 153–155, 157, 159– 161, 165–168, 171–173, 176, 180, 182, 188, 189, 199, 207– 211, 215, 216, 224–227, 230, 232, 233, 248, 250, 251, 253, 262, 263, 265–272, 274, 277, 278, 281, 282, 287–289, 291, 292, 296, 299, 300, 305, 308– 310, 312, 315, 316, 321–331, 333, 334, 336–339, 341–344, 348, 351, 359, 362, 392, 398, 401, 406, 407, 412, 413 Arnold of Villanova 26 Arnulph of Provence 19 Augustine of Ancona 234 Augustine of Hippo 112, 288, 334, 359, 360, 362, 363, 366, 377, 380 Averroes 32, 37, 45–49, 97, 98, 100, 102, 111, 118, 121–123, 127– 131, 144, 154, 155, 157, 159, 162–165, 168, 172, 174–176, 179–182, 204, 218, 222, 225, 227, 230–232 Avicenna 44, 82, 83, 113, 123, 125, 144, 146, 155, 157, 159–163, 169, 170, 175–177, 179, 181, 190, 195–197, 201–204, 216, 227, 228, 230, 231, 235, 248

518

Index

B

F

Bartolomeo Cavalcanti 294 Basil of Caesarea 118 Benedict Gaetani 26 Bernard Macro 18 Bernard of Auvergne 23 Berthaud of St. Denis 19 Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus 85, 118, 359, 371, 376, 377, 383 Boethius of Dacia 10, 17, 19, 34, 45, 49, 71, 72, 75 Bonaventure 7, 17, 30, 31 Boniface VIII, Pope 15, 24–27, 374

Federico da Urbino 262 Ferdinand of Roa 262, 263, 277, 282, 306, 410 Francis of Marchia 232, 369

C Celestine V, Pope 25 Cellarius, Balthasar 410 Clement VI, Pope 15 Conring, Hermann 410 Cosimo de’ Medici 262 Crisostomo Javelli 262, 266, 273– 275, 296, 307, 309, 310

D Dante Alighieri 48, 49, 352 Democritus 129, 130 Dionigi di Borgo San Sepolcro 394 Donato Acciaiuoli 262–269, 271– 274, 277, 296, 305–310 Durand of St. Pourçain 24, 393, 394

E Ermolao Barbaro 258 Etienne Tempier 20, 30, 72 Eustratius of Nicaea 49

G Geoffrey of Aspall 236, 237, 250 Gerard of Abbeville 25 Gerard of Bologna 393, 396 Gerard of Brolio 19 Gerard of Collanduno 24 Gerard of Cremona 127 Gerard of St. Victor 18 Gerardus Odonis 394 Giles of Orleans 36 Giles of Rome 7, 22, 25, 51–55, 57– 60, 62–66, 68, 69, 111, 135, 235, 236, 302, 305, 307, 396, 406 Godfrey of Fontaines 22, 25, 26, 108, 362, 374, 392, 394, 396 Gregory of Rimini 371, 393 Gregory the Great 118 Gruner, Vincent 326, 411 Guido Vernani 260, 306, 309, 310, 325

H Heidmann, Christoph 410 Henry of Ghent 7, 17–19, 22, 23, 25, 26, 31, 108, 135, 136, 362, 363, 366, 374, 392, 394, 396 Henry of Harclay 18 Henry of Lübeck 393 Hervaeus Natalis 394 Hipparchus of Nicaea 161

Index

519

J

N

James of Douai 31, 32 James of Metz 393 James of Viterbo 396 Jean de Pouilly 357 Johannes Peckham 396 John Argyropoulos 264, 265 John Buridan 156, 317, 412 John Duns Scotus 18, 27, 236, 263, 355, 356, 369, 374, 393–396 John of Baconthrop 393 John of Fayt 410 John of Jandun 412 John of Marbres 393 John of Pouilly 393 John of Ulliaco 19 John Philoponus 118, 120 Julius Martianus Rota 405

Nicholas of Bar 14 Nicholas of Vaudémont 317, 411 Nicole Oresme 260, 308, 410, 412

L Leonardo Bruni 264–266, 277–279, 284, 305, 307, 405 Leucippus 130 Lorenzo de’ Medici 262 Ludovico Valenza 258, 274, 279, 282

M Macrobius 118 Marsilius of Inghen 412 Marsilius of Padua 259, 348–353, 411 Martini, Jacob 410 Meier, Gebhardus Theodorus 410 Meister Eckhart 7 Michael of Ephesus 334, 335 Michael of Massa 369 Michael Scot 128 Moses Maimonides 123, 160, 162, 177–179

O Ovid 282

P Paul of Venice 232–235, 237, 246 Paul of Worczyn 308 Peter Auriol 369, 371, 394, 395 Peter Lombard 22, 115 Peter of Castrobol 263, 305–308 Peter of Limoges 23 Peter of Osma 262, 269, 277–284, 286–289, 291–296, 299–302, 305–309 Peter of St. Omer 25, 26 Peter of Tarentaise 20, 370 Peter Olivi 25 Petrus de Castrovol 317 Petrus de Croc 15 Philip the Chancellor 115 Philip the Fair 26, 27, 374 Pierre Roger 15 Plato 118, 120, 121, 122, 155, 165– 167, 186–189, 230, 262, 324, 357, 362, 363 Plotinus 168 Porphyry 398 Proclus 121, 122, 155, 167, 168, 189, 357–359, 368, 378, 381, 382 Pseudo-Aspasius 334 Pseudo-Dionysius 168 Pseudo-Henry of Ghent 136 Ptolemy of Lucca 29, 107, 392, 396

520

Index

R Rabanus Maurus 134 Raby Moyses 197 Radulphus Brito 36, 71, 212, 215, 234, 235, 237, 238, 394 Raimund Acgerii 260, 306, 410 Richard Knapwell 368 Richard of Clive 235, 237, 252 Robert Grosseteste 352 Robert of Courçon 21 Robert Walsingham 393 Roger Bacon 39, 406

S Sánchez de Frías, Martín 262 Scherbii, Philipp 410 Siger of Brabant 10, 17–19, 25, 29– 31, 34, 39, 49, 69, 95, 155, 369 Simon of Brabant 19 Simon of Brion 19, 22, 29–31 Simon of Guiberville 25 Simplicius of Cilicia 120, 122, 127, 148, 153, 155, 168, 173–175, 204, 248 Socrates 75, 77, 82, 85, 231, 371 Stephen Tempier 31, 33, 34, 36–38, 41, 42, 44, 49, 153

T Themistius 131, 168 Thomas Aquinas 7, 8, 16–18, 20– 22, 24, 25, 29, 30, 32, 33, 41– 44, 47, 48, 50, 55, 57, 68, 72, 91, 97, 98, 107–109, 120, 127, 128, 132, 135, 153, 155, 156, 165, 166, 168, 170, 211, 212, 216, 219–222, 225–233, 255– 258, 267–271, 280, 283, 284,

286–289, 291, 305–307, 313, 323, 327, 338, 339, 341–343, 349, 353, 357, 362, 365–370, 374, 391, 392, 394, 396, 401– 403, 405–411, 413 Thomas of Strasbourg 393

V Virgil 282

W Walter Burley 260, 261, 263, 266, 268–271, 273, 296, 305, 306, 308, 309, 323, 409, 410 Walter of Bosevile 257 Wellendörfer, Virgilius 325 William de la Mare 368, 370 William of Moerbeke 17, 53, 54, 58, 59, 65, 128, 152, 153, 258, 266, 277, 278, 283, 284, 300, 305, 307, 405 William of Ockham 259, 394, 395 371, 410 William of Sarzano 259 William of St. Amour 17