Perceptions of Islam in Europe: Culture, Identity and the Muslim ‘Other‘ 9780755625369, 9781848851641

Citation preview

NOTES ON CONTR IBUTOR S

Sia (Athanasia) Anagnostopoulou is a Professor in the Department of Political Science and History, Panteion University, Athens. Her current research interests focus on the impact of religion on the evolution of political notions. She is the author of, among many, From the Ottoman Empire to the Nations States: The Case of Greece and Cyprus (2004), and The Modernization of Turkey: Islam in Relation with Kemalism (2004). Çağla E. Aykaç is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Fatih University, İstanbul. She holds a PhD in Sociology from the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), Paris. Educated at Brown University and Boğaziçi University, she has worked as a researcher for private and public institutions such as the Open Society Institute (OSI), the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) and the European Research Council (ERC). Welmoet Boender holds a PhD in Religious Sciences from Leiden University. She carried out her research at the International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM). She is researcher at the Knowledge Centre for Religion and Development in Utrecht, the Netherlands. She also teaches on Islam in Europe and transnational

Prelims.indd vii

4/3/2012 11:13:21 AM

viii

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

Islam at Utrecht University and the University of Amsterdam. She is the author of Imam in the Netherlands: Views about his Religious Role in Society (2007; in Dutch). Kenan Çayır is Assistant Professor of Sociology at İstanbul Bilgi University. He holds a PhD in Political Science and International Relations from Boğaziçi University, İstanbul. His research focuses on contemporary Islamic movements, human rights education and textbooks. He is the author of Islamic Literature in Contemporary Turkey: From Epic to Novel (2007). Gerard Delanty is Professor of Sociology and Social and Political Thought, University of Sussex. In 2006 he was a visiting professor at Deakin University Melbourne and has previously held visiting professorships in Kyoto and Toronto. He has written on various issues in social and political theory, European identity and the cultural and historical sociology of modernity. He is editor of the European Journal of Social Theory, and author of numerous books including Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality (1995), Modernity and Postmodernity: Knowledge, Power, the Self (2000), and Cosmopolitan Imagination (2009). Katarzyna Górak-Sosnowska is Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology, Warsaw School of Economics and at the Department of Arab and Islamic Studies, Warsaw University. She holds a PhD in economics from the Warsaw School of Economics. Her research interests include: socio-economic problems of MENA [Middle East and North Africa] countries and Islam and Muslims in Poland and wider Europe. She is the author of Arab World towards Globalization (2007) and The Prospects of the Arab world through the Lens of the MDGs (2007; both in Polish). Jeffrey Haynes is Associate Head of Department Research and Postgraduate Studies and Director of the Centre for the Study of Religion, Conflict and Cooperation, Department of Law, Governance and International Relations, London Metropolitan University. His teaching specialties are globalisation and international relations, religion and politics, and the politics of developing countries. He is a wellpublished author, among which number Democracy in the Developing

Prelims.indd viii

4/3/2012 11:13:21 AM

NOTES

ON

CONTRIBUTORS

ix

World (2001); Politics in the Developing World (2002); and Religion and Development: Conflict or Cooperation (2007). Gerdien Jonker holds a PhD from Groningen (Holland) in the History and Science of Religion. Affiliated with various German research institutes since 1994, she combines historical philology with empirical research. Since June 2005, she has been affiliated with the GeorgEckert Institute for International Textbook Research in Braunschweig, Germany, where she does research on European scripts of inclusion and exclusion in education. Her latest publication is Narrating Islam. Interpretations of the Muslim World in European Texts (I.B.Tauris, 2009). Deniz Kandiyoti is Emeritus Professor in the Department of Development Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London. She was Chair of the Center of Contemporary Central Asia and the Caucasus (2001–04) and is currently the editor of Central Asian Survey. She is the author of Concubines, Sisters and Citizens: Identities and Social Transformation (1997; in Turkish), the editor of Gendering the Middle East (I.B.Tauris, 1996), Fragments of Culture: The Everyday of Modern Turkey (I.B.Tauris, 2002), and numerous articles on gender, Islam, development and state policies. Stephanos Pesmazoglou is Professor in the Department of Political Science and History, Panteion University, Athens. He was Visiting Professor at Princeton University in 1999 and at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) in Paris in 2005. His research, writing and teaching have focused on the political, ideological and educational aspects of South European societies (including the Balkan southeast) and Turkey in the post-Second World War period. He is the author of numerous articles in journals and collective volumes, including Current Trends in Greek Historiography (1988). Sara Silvestri holds a PhD on Muslim political mobilisation in the EU from Cambridge University, where she also held an ESRC PostDoctoral Fellowship. She also taught at the University of Bristol, has been an Associate Fellow at Chatham House (London) and has directed the Islam in Europe programme for the European Policy Centre in Brussels. She is now Senior Lecturer in International Politics at City

Prelims.indd ix

4/3/2012 11:13:21 AM

x

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

University, and Research and Teaching Associate of POLIS and the VHI at Cambridge University. She has published widely on Islam, religion and public policy in Europe and her book on Europe’s Muslim Women is forthcoming. Hakan Yılmaz is Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Boğaziçi University, İstanbul. Educated at Boğaziçi University, he holds a PhD from the Department of Political Science, Columbia University. He is conducting research on culture and identity dimensions of European-Turkish relations, contemporary Turkish politics, and the international context of democratization. He is the author of Placing Turkey on the Map of Europe (2005), as well as chapters in various books and articles in journals such as the Middle East Journal.

Prelims.indd x

4/3/2012 11:13:21 AM

PREFACE Hakan Yılmaz

This volume is the product of the collective work of a group of European scholars working on the processes and modes of encounters between Europe and Islam. It brings together theoretical studies of a more general nature as well as analyses of specific cases, including the institutions of the European Union, Britain, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and Turkey. By publishing this volume, we aim to explore the ways in which Europeans have come to rethink who they are, their historical origins and their future destinations by way of rethinking their experiences with Muslims and Islams (in the plural), both inside and outside Europe. It is hard to deny that today European publics and states are having a hard time finding the right way to accommodate Muslims and Islams in their political and cultural systems. Many people would now agree that the old-fashioned policy of total assimilation, sometimes couched in the terminology of universal citizenship, is no longer a feasible option, given the weakness and unwillingness of European governments to go that way and the almost certain resistance of the Muslim communities to such plans of conversion. However, multiculturalism, which had been launched as a liberal and left-wing alternative to the right-wing policy of assimilation, is also widely viewed as being defunct now, losing its supporters even in a country like the

Prelims.indd xi

4/3/2012 11:13:21 AM

xii

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

Netherlands that had until recently raised multiculturalism almost to the level of official ideology. What is to be done, then, while we are hearing the increasingly loud war drums of the post-9/11 harbingers of an impending clash of civilisations, if assimilation is not going to work and multiculturalism is dead? What other modalities of existence of Muslim communities in European contexts can we think of, if we want to keep social stability and democracy intact without sacrificing European norms and values? There is, obviously, a need for institutional and ideological innovation. This innovation, in its turn, calls for inquisitive minds engaged in critical rethinking. This book aims to explore at what levels and around which issues there has been such a rethinking and institutional innovation in different European countries in the recent years. Some questions the contributors to this volume open to discussion are the following: What are the issues and who are the agents of this self-questioning? Where has this self-questioning gone deep and where has it not yet started? What concrete cultural and institutional innovations have come out of this self-questioning? Although we continue to believe in the political, social and intellectual importance of micro perspectives, the outcome of our collective work turned out to be highly political and institutional. This is not surprising because today the encounters between Islam and Europe unfold in highly political terms. The chapters in this volume integrate cultural and religious issues as a constitutive part of the debates on Islam and Europe, while at the same time highlighting the need for a deeper and more complex analysis than one in which Muslims are considered primarily in religious and cultural terms, and Europe appears as a unified solid space of immaculate pluralism. Historically, the image of Islam and Muslims in Europe has not been particularly bright. As observed by many scholars of European identity, Islam for centuries represented the ‘other’ in European identity constructions. What exactly do the European publics mean when they talk about ‘Islam’ in particular or ‘religion’ in general? In a previous qualitative research that we conducted with citizens from five major EU countries (Britain, France, Italy, Germany and Spain) who

Prelims.indd xii

4/3/2012 11:13:21 AM

PREFACE

xiii

stayed in İstanbul for three months or longer, we observed that the European respondents interpreted religion not so much as a theological system, but as a way of life. As far as religion was concerned, for the modern Europeans, in contrast to their medieval counterparts, what really mattered was not so much the differences in the ways people understood and prayed to God. They said that they were opposed to Islam so long as it is mobilised as a social, political and cultural force to deny the rights of women and to drive people away from a modern life1. These observations are supported by the findings of two Europewide opinion polls. In a survey conducted in the spring of 2006 (Transatlantic Trends 2006 Survey) in nine EU member countries (UK, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain), Turkey and the USA, it has been found that 91 per cent of the people in the nine EU member countries surveyed believe that radical Islam poses an important threat to Europe. The figure is 91 per cent in France and 95 per cent in Germany. In a similar vein, according to the findings of the Transatlantic Trends 2006 survey mentioned above, 88 per cent of the people in the nine EU member countries surveyed believe that the values of Islam are not compatible with the values of democracy. The figure is 95 per cent in France and 98 per cent in Germany2. In another survey, conducted by the PEW Research Centre in 2006, the pollsters have found that the overwhelming majority of the public in the largest EU member countries are of the opinion that Muslims are not respectful towards women. The figure was 80 per cent for Germany and 77 per cent for France3. This brings us to the the issue of gender inequality and the headscarf as the symbol of the unequal relations between Muslim men and women. Islamic gender relations, for almost all European respondents, are built upon the subordination of women to men, and the headscarf is the very symbol of this relationship, which is often referred to as ‘gender apartheid’ by Western writers4. In other words, the headscarf and what it is believed to epitomise, women’s enslavement, is taken to be the very antithesis of European modernity, which has evolved, according to the narrative of modernisation, along with the liberation

Prelims.indd xiii

4/3/2012 11:13:21 AM

xiv

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

of women and the equalisation of gender relations. The idea that a woman could be both Muslim and modern, wearing a headscarf and at the same time being free of male domination, does not seem to have gained much currency beyond Western academic circles. Hence, many educated women vehemently oppose the headscarf out of the conviction that any tolerance for the headscarf today would strengthen the hands of not only the Muslim but also the Christian and other conservatives and would lead, sooner or later, to a deterioration of the hard-won women’s rights on the European plane5. The widening perceptual gap between Islam and Europe, as outlined above, certainly calls for further explorations, at the level of both historical as well as contemporary encounters between Muslims and non-Muslims in the European space. This book approaches this problem from two angles. In the first part, ‘Theoretical Studies’, some wellknown analysts of the field attempt to develop a conceptual toolbox that will help us in analysing the problematic cases. Here, the idea is to develop a critique of some of the widely used concepts in examining Europe-Islam encounters, such as secularism, laïcism, gender, integration, assimilation, multiculturalism, colonialism, and globalisation. The virtue of this critique is that most of these concepts, when used as clichés, tend to lose their explanatory power and become instruments in ideological and discursive struggles. In the second part of the book, ‘Case Studies’, the contributing authors choose interesting and significant cases of Muslim–Non-Muslim encounters from the various countries of Europe today, including the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Poland, France, Greece and Turkey. Here, the goal is again going beyond the dichotomy of ‘clash of civilisations’ and ‘cultural conflict’ and try to understand the numerous, diverse and multifaceted ways, some conflictual and some peaceful, in which cultural exchanges have taken place between Muslims and non-Muslims. When we look at the major types of books published in the area of Islam and Europe, we can highlight the following four categories. The first category consists of books on the ‘Islamic Threat’ to Europe or ‘Eurabia’ books. In this category are popular books that aim at warning and alarming the European publics about the ‘threat’ of Islam to ‘subvert’ European way of life and European civilisation6. Books

Prelims.indd xiv

4/3/2012 11:13:21 AM

PREFACE

xv

in the second category, which may be called ‘Historical Analyses of Islam-Europe Interaction’, involve monographic essays written by ‘great historians’ about the relationship between Islam and Europe over the centuries, some of them underlining the conflictual nature of this relationship and others putting the emphasis on cultural and civilisational exchanges between the two entities7. In the third category, we have what we may call ‘Free Essays on Islamic Movements and Communities in Europe’. This category consists of monographic essays dealing in a more or less objective way with the integration problems faced by the Islamic communities in European societies today, putting the emphasis on the conflicts between Islamic belief and Western secular institutions, as well as between Islamic political movements and Western democratic systems8. Finally, in the fourth category, which may be labelled as ‘Social Scientific Studies of Islam in Europe’, there exist monographs or a few edited volumes, dealing with the various problems faced by Muslim communities in Europe, from the perspective of sociology, politics and cultural studies9. Our book falls in the fourth category. It is a social scientific study of Islam in Europe, and aims to go beyond a descriptive account of the problems of Muslim communities in Europe. It will bring together both strong theoretical studies and in-depth case studies in the same volume. Secondly, the chapters in this book do not limit themselves to either the modernist ‘integration’ model or the post-modernist ‘multiculturalism’ model of the study of Islam in the West. Instead, our authors examine how in the practice of European daily life Muslim and European understandings of the sacred and the profane, sensitivities, rituals, cuisines, musical traditions, dances, superstitions, patterns of solidarity, work habits, political attitudes, sexual tendencies, and the like, interact and give birth to hybrid forms and contents. Thirdly, our book brings together cases that have not been sufficiently covered elsewhere, such as Italy, Greece, Poland, Turkey and the European Union itself. Given the social scientific character of the contributions and contributors of the book, we can expect the book to reach out to the general educated public who want to read not conspiracy theories but genuine and realistic analyses about the perceptions of Islam in Europe.

Prelims.indd xv

4/3/2012 11:13:21 AM

xvi

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

Notes 1 Yılmaz, H., 2005. ‘European Narratives on Everyday Turkey: Interviews with Europeans Living in Turkey’, in Yılmaz, H. (ed.). Placing Turkey on the Map of Europe, İstanbul: Boğaziçi University Press, pp.23–42. 2 Transatlantic Trends, Top Line Data 2006 (fieldwork coordinated by TNS Opinion, interviews conducted between 5 and 24 June 2006). Available online at www.transatlantictrends.org. 3 Pew Research Centre, Pew Global Attitudes Project, Spring 2006 Survey: Europe’s Muslims More Moderate, The Great Divide, How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other, 15-nation survey conducted in Spring 2006 and released on 22 June 2006. Available online at www.pewglobal.org. 4 For a discussion of the terms ‘gender apartheid’ or ‘Islamic apartheid’, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Criticism_of_Islam#_note-82. 5 Hymowitz, K.S., ‘Why Feminism is AWOL on Islam’, City Journal, Winter 2003. Available online at http://www.city-journal.org/html/issue_13_1.html. 6 Some well-known examples for this ‘Islamophobia’ or ‘Eurabia’ category of books are Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis by Bat Ye’Or Cranbury, New Jersey: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2005; While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam is Destroying the West from Within by Bruce Bawer, New York: Doubleday, 2006; The West’s Last Chance: Will We Win the Clash of Civilizations? by Tony Blankley, Washington, DC.: Regnery, 2005; The Rage and The Pride by Oriana Fallaci, New York: Rizzoli International Publications Inc., 2002; The Force of Reason by Oriana Fallaci, New York: Rizzoli International Publications Inc., 2006; Jihad in the West: Muslim Conquests from the 7th to the 21st Centuries by Paul Fregosi, Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 1999; Al Qaeda in Europe: The New Battleground of International Jihad by Lorenzo Vidino, Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2005. 7 Examples of these ‘grand narratives’ are: The Qur’an and the West by Kenneth Cragg, Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2006; Islam and the West by Bernard Lewis, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994; The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization by Richard W. Bulliet, New York: Columbia University Press, 2006; Islam in Europe by Jack Goody, Oxford: Polity, 2004; and Europe and Islam (Making of Europe) by Franco Cardini, Oxford: WileyBlackwell, 2001. 8 Some examples are: Allah in the West: Islamic Movements in America and Europe (Mestizo Spaces / Espaces Metisses) by Gilles Kepel, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997; Western Muslims and the Future of Islam by Tariq Ramadan, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003; God’s Continent: Christianity, Islam and Europe’s Religious Crisis by Philip Jenkins, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007; Islam in Europe: Integration or Marginalization? by Robert J. Pauly, London: Ashgate Publishing, 2004; The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe by Jytte Klausen, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008; and Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam: Politics, Culture, and

Prelims.indd xvi

4/3/2012 11:13:21 AM

PREFACE

xvii

Citizenship in the Age of Globalization (Transnational Perspectives) by Al Sayyad Nezar, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002. 9 Some works falling in that category are the following: Islam in Europe: Diversity, Identity and Influence by Aziz al-Azmeh and Effie Fokas, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008; Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space by John R. Bowen, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006; Islam, Europe’s Second Religion: The New Social, Cultural, and Political Landscape by Shireen T. Hunter, Oxford: Praeger, 2002; Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany by Joel S. Fetzer, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004; Women Embracing Islam: Gender and Conversion in the West by Karin van Nieuwkerk, Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2006; When Islam and Democracy Meet: Muslims in Europe and in the United States by Jocelyne Cesari, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004; Muslims In Western Europe (New Edinburgh Islamic Surveys) by Nielsen Jorgen, Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2005; Islam and the New Europe: Challenge for Continuity or Chance for Change (Yearbook of the Sociology of Islam) edited by Sigrid Nokel and Levent Tezcan, Baden-Wurttemberg, Germany: Transcript Verlag, 2005; and Between Europe and Islam: Shaping Modernity in a Transcultural Space (Series Multiple Europes, No. 14), edited by Almut Hofert and Armando Salvatore, Berlin: Peter Lang Publishing, 2000.

Prelims.indd xvii

4/3/2012 11:13:21 AM

Prelims.indd xviii

4/3/2012 11:13:21 AM

INTRODUCTION Çağla E. Aykaç

This volume proposes to explore sites for rethinking Europe through its encounters with Islam. It is based on the assumption that neither Europe nor Islam are fixed, established or essential categories, and that they are both continually changing and gaining new meanings and attributes that call for renewed critical rethinking. In this volume, we have asked European scholars to focus on how to rethink cultural and institutional changes in Europe through its encounters with Islam, rather than on the ways in which Islam is changing in the European context. The intensity of the debates around the encounters of Islam and Europe is motivated by the social consequences of years of demographic transformation in Europe, which has been marked by massive Muslim migration mainly from the former European colonies to the metropolitan areas of Western Europe, and they are highlighted by the current global context that tends to present the ‘West’ and ‘Islam’ in conflicting terms. They intervene at a key time in the process of construction and consolidation of the European Union (EU), and thus bear weight on the process of imagining this entirely original political project. Europe today also refers to ‘a novel experience in multiple, tiered, and mediated multiculturalisms, a supranational community of cultures, subcultures, and transcultures inserted differentially into radically different political and cultural traditions’ (Modood and Webner 1997). This ‘new’ character of Europe is multiple and has, despite its alleged newness, continuously been evolving over the past

Introduction.indd 1

4/3/2012 11:15:21 AM

2

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

fifty years. Islam today figures high in the European agenda in a multidisciplinary fashion, and poses the challenge of how to manage the European public space at the local, national and regional levels while accommodating the political, social, cultural and economic needs of all Europeans. The debate about Islam in Europe is in reality part of a wider questioning of the new meanings of citizenship, pluralism, the evolving form of the European project, the nature of ‘European values’ and the relation between the state and religion. This essential reformulation of European ideals and their universal applicability takes place in a global context marked by terror and violence, and concerns about diminishing freedoms and selective equality. Islam in Europe today appears as an ill-defined basket in which theological, political, social and cultural questions meet human rights issues, gender concerns, integration schemes and security concerns. Islam in Europe has many faces; European Muslims are a large and heterogeneous group that is highly diverse along ethnic, linguistic, cultural, generational and ideological lines. While academic studies in the field tend to concentrate on the social, political or ideological positioning of Muslims in Europe, in this volume, we choose to focus on the ways in which these communities influence a process of rethinking Europe. Gerard Delanty, in his chapter, ‘Islam and European Modernity in Historical Perspective: Towards a Cosmopolitan Perspective’, argues that the relations between Europe and Islam can be seen from three perspectives: xenophobia, fantasy and translation. He focuses on the third, which he sees as a process of cultural transmission and diffusion. Delanty goes beyond discussing the historical interconnectedness and [cross-fertilization] between Islam and Europe, and makes a clearer statement about the ‘interactive and transformative impetus that is the key dynamic of modernity’. According to Delanty, revisiting the highly ambivalent terms of European civilisation, secularism and modernity is critical for a rethinking of Europe through Islam. He develops an idea of Europe as ‘civilisational constellation’, which is formed by interaction and diffusion. Delanty observes that Islam today is being added to the list of European religions, following Catholicism, Orthodoxy, Lutheranism and Judaism. Referring to

Introduction.indd 2

4/3/2012 11:15:22 AM

INTRODUCTION

3

the era of totalitarianism, the Holocaust, and the history of colonialism, Delanty reminds us that the European capacity for dialogue and critique are not inherently ‘European’; they are rather the result of a cosmopolitan imagination that needs to be recreated whenever Europe faces a new challenge for integrating a new culture and religion within its civilisational boundaries. Deniz Kandiyoti, in her contribution, ‘Islam, Gender and Citizenship: Uneasy Encounters in Europe’, proposes a critical review of European debates from a perspective that is informed by the Middle Eastern, Soviet and Post-Soviet contexts. Kandiyoti argues that ‘culturalising’ the category of the Muslims marginalises issues that have to do with citizenship, ethnicity, class, gender and sexual orientation. Categories that are created in and by Europe, mostly as a result of struggles for political legitimacy, act on the channels through which people can pose claims on the political system. She sees the notion of citizenship as central to the rethinking process in Europe, and considers women’s rights as the most productive site for thinking issues related to Islam in Europe. According to her, gender relations are central in the ways in which European citizenship is being articulated in relation to Islam. Kandiyoti reminds us that political negotiations between European state leaders and local faith leaders are political projects that imply both inclusion and exclusion. The ‘us’ versus ‘them’ discourse, as well as the rapprochement between states and religious leaders, leaves little space for gender issues to be articulated. In his contribution, ‘Islam: Western Modes of Use and Abuse’, Stephanos Pesmazoglou, takes us through nine paradoxes (theoretical, historical, liberal-democratic, culturalist, strategic, tolerance, discursive, transparency/opacity, moral progress) that explore the ‘use and abuse’ of Islam in the construction of European identity. Pesmazoglou argues that thinking through tensions and paradoxes provides a fertile ground for rethinking Europe through Islam. He highlights a number of contradictory currents that run parallel in perceptions of the self and the other in Europe. Pesmazoglou addresses the question of the democratic challenges faced by Europe. He conceives these challenges as the products of the tensions between inclusions and exclusions in the process of European identity building; between the

Introduction.indd 3

4/3/2012 11:15:22 AM

4

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

need to protect liberal values at home and the necessity to cooperate with undemocratic regimes abroad; and between the need to safeguard public security while at the same time respecting individual rights. Jeffrey Haynes, in his chapter, ‘Islam, Pluralism and Politics: What is the Effect of Globalisation?’ contributes to setting our subject within in an era of globalisation. He situates his argument in a general framework of globalisation theories and highlights the ways in which ‘Globalisation leads to an expansion of channels, pressures, and agents via which various norms are diffused and interact.’ Within this framework, Haynes discusses the notions of Orientalism developed by Edward Said and the ‘clash of civilisations’ as conceptualised by Samuel Huntington. While giving a historical depth to the processes of globalisation, Haynes proposes to focus on the ways in which globalisation changes our understanding of Islam and religion in a more general sense and argues that religion acts as a soft power that bears on ideas, practices and experiences. According to Haynes, there are among Muslims two diverging interpretations of the effects of globalisation (Positive Globalisation and Negative Globalisation); while there are tendencies to integrate there are also arguments to resist the processes. Haynes concludes with a discussion of the democratic potentials of the articulation of Islam and globalisation. In ‘Europeanisation and de-Europeanisation of Islam’, Sia Anagnostopoulou discusses the place of Islam – and more generally of religion – in European civilisation. Her perspective incorporates Ottoman history, and takes us through the ways in which religion – once the main factor for identity in the region – was instrumentalised in the transition from empire to nation-state. All political actors in late Ottoman lands – Ottoman intellectual and political leadership, leaders of nationalist movements in Greece, Cyprus, Turkey and the Great Powers – used religion for political aims during the period of transition. While nationalists reinterpreted religion to legitimise authoritarian rule, colonial powers used religion as an instrument for domination. Anagnostopoulou highlights that Islam has historically been considered as European and anti-European at the same

Introduction.indd 4

4/3/2012 11:15:22 AM

INTRODUCTION

5

time, cooperative, on the one hand, and a banner for resistance on the other. She reminds us that the extreme nationalism and imperialism of the Great Powers was ‘translated or adapted’ in an Ottoman context where religion was the prime mode of identification, given the multi-ethnic and multi-religious character of the Empire. According to Anagnostopoulou, the instrumentalisation of religion has not been a ‘Muslim privilege’; it has been a part of the historical heritage of Europe. Rethinking Europe through Islam here involves accepting the highly ambiguous and shifting relations of Europe with Islam and religion in more general terms. In ‘Islam and the European Union: Exploring the Issue of Discrimination’, I propose to see the ways in which the EU rethinks itself in relation to Islam with a particular focus on the antidiscrimination framework of the EU, highlighting that issues that involve Muslims and Islam are treated in frameworks that go beyond those that the EU has devised to date to address issues dealing with religion and religious freedom in general terms. Within the field of anti-discrimination and anti-racism, the EU, besides its general work on racism and discrimination in Europe, has developed research that focuses on racism against Muslims in the post-9/11 period. I therefore argue that the rethinking process in Europe ought to address the history of European racism and nationalism. I highlight the current terminological and conceptual blurriness around issues that involve Islam and Muslims in Europe, and argue that methodological inconsistencies contribute to the culturalisation of political and social issues. I then go on to point to the dynamics in Europe that tend to handle racism and security within a single framework, and argue for the centrality of the notion of equality in the rethinking process. Katarzyna Górak-Sosnowska, in her chapter, ‘From Polish Muslims to Muslims in Poland: There and Back’, focuses on the ways in which Islam might be used to rethink individual and group identities in Poland. She highlights the Polish tradition of coexistence with Muslims through the history of Tatar settlement in Poland. With low visibility and strong linguistic assimilation, Tatars in Poland are considered to be fully integrated in an otherwise rather homogeneous Polish society. New waves of migration – principally students, political refugees and

Introduction.indd 5

4/3/2012 11:15:22 AM

6

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

businessmen from the Arab countries, Chechnya, former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Turkey – have introduced new dynamics and visibilities in the Polish public sphere. The presence of these new ‘Muslims in Poland’ has led to the emergence of tensions with the autochthonous ‘Muslim Polish’ population that used to be perceived more as an ethnic minority than a religious one. Górak-Sosnowska draws yet another picture of the intersections and interplays between visibility, religion and ethnicity on the one hand, and between good and bad Islam, local and foreign Islam on the other. In parallel, she also highlights the presence of Islam in Poland as a countercultural movement in which young Polish artists and consumers have been reinventing a ‘new Orient’ with music, clubs and associations. According to Górak-Sosnowska, the Polish experiences of Islam are linked to the factors related to the transformations within Poland, as well as to the atmosphere beyond the western borders of Poland. In ‘Imagining Islam: European Encounters with the Muslim World through the Lens of German Textbooks’, Gerdien Jonker discusses the evolving perceptions of the Muslim world in Germany through a critical overview of this country’s national textbooks. She explores the levels and conditions under which Europeans have come to revise their sense of historical genealogy in relation to Islam. She observes that the process of [nation-building] in Europe has been a constitutive element in the development of the ‘Islam narrative’, and reminds us that factors internal to Europe have been influential in the choice of the narrative forms in relation to Islam. While the Crusades, the life of the Prophet and military encounters between European and Islamic powers had formed the bases of the original nationalist narratives, in the 1930s the national socialists added an additional racist flavour to the way in which Islam was portrayed in the textbooks. Jonker notes a sobering up of the textbook approaches to Islam following the Second World War, and a widening and diversification of these approaches in the 1980s and 1990s, which she attributes to a rethinking triggered by the presence of migrant Muslim populations in Germany. Jonker underlines that 9/11 jeopardised these inclusive trends, and fostered the development of new narratives that set the Muslim world in opposition to European values such as the rule of law and gender equality.

Introduction.indd 6

4/3/2012 11:15:22 AM

INTRODUCTION

7

Jonker highlights that religion has been always at the forefront of all constructions of Muslims in German textbooks. Welmoet Boender, in her chapter, ‘Teaching Integration in the Netherlands: Islam, Imams and the Secular Government’, explores the different aspects of the imam training debate in the Netherlands. The imam in the Netherlands is seen, on the one hand, as a key figure for the integration of the Muslims to the Dutch society, and on the other hand he is feared as a potential promoter for the radicalisation of Muslim identity. Hence, training the imam involves not only educating him in religious matters, but also teaching him the ‘Dutch way’ of life. An ideal imam would be trained in the Netherlands, be fluent in Dutch and would contribute to the dissemination of the ‘Dutch values’ and a ‘Dutch Islam’. The training courses are presented as a step towards equal justice for Muslims and towards the development of a multicultural society, while at the same time reducing the influence of the third countries on religious education. Imams in Europe are considered to have more than a religious role, and they are also considered as potential partners or foes in issues of security, migration and integration. Boender stresses that these debates illustrate a rethinking of the boundaries between the principle of church-state separation, freedom of religion and citizenship. Sara Silvestri, in ‘Institutionalising British and Italian Islam: Attitudes and Policies’, addresses the issue of the institutionalisation of Islam in Great Britain and Italy. She argues that a common pattern of the institutionalisation of Islam can be identified within the borders of the EU since the 1990s and more urgently after 9/11. Silvestri presents the politicisation of Muslims in Europe as a relatively new phenomenon and highlights the difficulty for the European governments to relate to their Muslim populations and to produce appropriate responses to their claims, particularly because Muslim groups have not been led by church-like institutions. She discusses the different ways in which church-state relations have been regulated in Europe, and highlights that accommodations for other religious groups are built on the presupposition that all religions are organised in a way similar to that of the Christian churches. Western governments are involved in a selective process of promoting a ‘good’ and ‘domesticated’

Introduction.indd 7

4/3/2012 11:15:22 AM

8

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

Islam in order to stem radicalisation. Silvestri observes that selecting Muslim interlocutors, leaders and representative institutions in Europe has been largely a top-down process, without giving much voice and autonomy to the Muslim communities themselves. In his chapter entitled ‘The Transformation of Islamism and Changing Perceptions of Europe in Turkey’, Kenan Çayır reviews the ways in which Turkey’s Islamic actors have revised their approaches to Europe. Çayır argues that Europe, in Muslim contexts, emerged as a site of conflict in the debates over the meaning of modernity. Islamic actors in Turkey were traditionally anti-European and they positioned themselves as an alternative to the dominant modernist vision of Kemalism. Turkish Islamic actors were not keen on expressing their ideas through novels and fiction until the late 1970s, at which time they adopted this narrative mode. The ‘salvation novels’ of the 1980s focused on moral and religious issues and were organised around two competing value systems, Islamic and Modern/Western. Çayır traces the major shifts in the attitudes among the Turkish Islamic actors towards Europe since the late 1990s, with the emergence of novels and characters that are more critical of Islamist politics. Çayır attributes these changes in narrative forms to the state’s pressures on Islamic groups and the Islamic actors’ upward mobility. In this new environment, Europe is reconceptualised as a space where it is possible for Islamic actors to ‘further their economic and political interest while enjoying freedom of belief’. Çayır underlines that anti-Europeanism in the new Islamic fiction is being replaced by a vision of Europe as a plural and democratic society. The chapters within this book point to the fact that there is today a tendency to view issues related to Islam in Europe almost exclusively through ‘religious’ or ‘cultural’ lenses. ‘Muslims’ in Europe are increasingly presented as religious subjects only, and Islam, as a religion, as the prime explanatory factor for understanding issues or tensions related to the ‘Muslim world’. This religious or cultural turn can be understood partly as a reaction to trends in the 1960s and 1970s that considered Muslims in Europe primarily through their economic function, which allowed little space for negotiation on cultural or religious needs. Several authors here point to the fertility of going beyond

Introduction.indd 8

4/3/2012 11:15:22 AM

INTRODUCTION

9

culturalist spheres of thought that do not sufficiently account for the complexity of the issues at stake. The contributions to this volume further highlight the multiplicity and diversity of forms of encounters between Europe and Islam. They reflect the dynamic and rapid pace of change in the physical and intellectual boundaries of Europe, in the relations of power within Europe and in Europe’s relations with ‘others’.

Reference Modood, Tariq and Webner, Pnina (eds). 1997. The Politics of Multiculturalism in the New Europe, London: Zed Books.

Introduction.indd 9

4/3/2012 11:15:22 AM

Introduction.indd 10

4/3/2012 11:15:22 AM

CHAPTER 1 ISL A M AND EUROPEAN MODER NIT Y IN HISTOR ICAL PER SPECTIVE: TOWAR DS A COSMOPOLITAN PER SPECTIVE Gerard Delanty

Rethinking the nature of the relationship between Europe and Islam in our own time surely requires a re-evaluation of our perceptions of history. In this chapter, I argue that Islam is a part of the European civilisational heritage and that as a result of migration in recent decades, a European Islam now exists and can be viewed as the latest expression of a long history of EuropeanIslamic links. Central to my argument is the claim that modernity took many different forms and unfolded as a transformative logic within Europe and within Islam. This chapter is structured around three central questions: Did European modernity unfold in a way that excluded Islam? Did modernity emerge only out of the secularisation of Christianity and as a result is modernity secular? Is modernity European?

Yilmaz_Chapter 1.indd 13

4/3/2012 11:17:43 AM

14

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

European Modernity and Its Others It is often argued that Europe emerged out of a process of selfdefinition in which Islam served as the ‘Other’ of the European ‘Self’. Unfortunately, I have contributed to this argument myself with the claim that due to the highly differentiated and conflict-ridden nature of Europe, there was no central unifying cultural or political identity that could provide an identity for Europe for long (Delanty 1995). As a result, the West became defined by the East, whose referent was variously Persia, Islam, the romantic Orient, and communism. As the East changed, so too did the West. This argument, which was influenced by the notion that Europe is a discourse in which power and culture are mutually self-explicating, needs to be modified and nuanced in order to go beyond the wrong impression that the relation between East and West was always antagonistic and binary. So what was the relationship? I suggest that the relation between Europe and Islam was threefold and that these three modes of relating to Islam have been present in every era, with some being more pronounced than the others: xenophobia, fantasy and translation. The first two are probably more obvious and I will concentrate on the third. I argue that the nature of the relation between Self and Other was variable, with the Self also being in part an Other. There is no simple boundary between an European Self and an Islamic Other, rather Self and Other have been mutually implicated to a point that we need a new kind of analysis, which I call a cosmopolitan civilisational approach (Delanty 2006a). Islam has been an object of fear since its expansion into Europe in 711 CE, when the European frontier was effectively the Pyrenees. The Muslim conquest of Spain almost was extended to France until its defeat at Tours in 732 and although further expansion was halted by Charlemagne’s defeat of the Moors in 778, Europe was on the defensive against Islam. Later, to sum up a well-known story, the Fall of Constantinople in 1453 led to the rise of an Islamic power and the fall of eastern Christianity. On the western front, at much the same time, a much embellished Latin Christian civilisation defeated the Moors under the Spanish leadership. What emerged in the sixteenth century,

Yilmaz_Chapter 1.indd 14

4/3/2012 11:17:43 AM

ISLAM

AND

EUROPEAN MODERNITY

15

then, was a Western European civilisation that was temporarily united by Christianity. It is difficult to assess the extent to which the Christian West needed Islam to define itself and exactly to what degree it was a threat. By the time of the last onslaught on Vienna in 1683, the Ottoman Empire’s military strength had waned and probably did not present a threat to Europe. But it is possible to speculate that the image of the Other continued to exercise a certain focus of hostility for Europe (Sayyid 2003). This should not be exaggerated. There is in fact not a lot of evidence to show that this was the defining tenet of Western xenophobia. In fact, it was the Jews who were the Others, and it was often the enemy within rather than the enemy outside that was more significant in defining European self-identity. Indeed, when many Europeans referred to the despotism of the East, this was often in praise. As Clarke points out, Enlightenment intellectuals, who were mostly ancient regime supporters, looked to China for an ideal model of despotism, a despotism based on the exercise of legal authority rather than whim (Clarke 1997, p.4). The second aspect of the relation was one of fantasy. Since the outside lacked a certain reality, it had to be invented and imagined. Edward Said has written the most detailed examination of this culture of fantasy, which in his analysis was driven by the imperial quest to conquer the Other (Said 1979). Cultural and intellectual power invented the Orient in a way that prepared for its political and economic domination by the West. This thesis has led to a now huge literature on the unknowable Other where Islam appears to be an expression of the other face of the Enlightenment’s Reason. This could also take the form of self-critique, as in Montesquieu’s Persian Letters, where Persia becomes a foil for a critique of the court culture. This brings me to the third mode of relating to Islam, which I term the mode of translation. This is not so much a separate mode, but a mode of cultural transmission. The first point to make is that despite the religious hostilities between Europe and Islam, Christianity had not gained hegemonic status at the time of the spread of Islam. The relation between Muslims and other groups was a good deal more diffuse than it was to become in later centuries. As is well known,

Yilmaz_Chapter 1.indd 15

4/3/2012 11:17:43 AM

16

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

much of the culture of Greek antiquity, itself allegedly eastern in origin (Burkert 2005), was preserved by Muslim scholars, Cordoba and Toleda were important cultural centres, and until the early modern period, there was in Europe considerable borrowing from Arabic culture. Throughout the Middle Ages, Europeans were indebted to Arabic achievements in science and Arabic scholarship was represented at many European universities. Sicily was for long a meeting place of two cultures, and Islamic culture continued to be transmitted into Europe until the sixteenth century. According to Jardine and Brottom, the Renaissance was formed out of encounters between the Orient and the Occident and, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, East and West met on more equal terms than was later the case (Jardine and Brottom 2000). These authors have shown how some of the most potent symbols in European culture derived from the East and how the borders between East and West were more permeable than was later thought. It also needs to be recognised that Islam in the Middle Ages was a good deal more tolerant than what it later was to become and also more tolerant than Christianity as far as polytheism was concerned. This tendency within Islam, which also did not have a hierarchical ecclesiastical structure, in fact allowed for great cultural transfusion than often has been recognised. The Enlightenment, while being less influenced by the non-Western world, was in many respects possible only by a relation to otherness. The extreme interpretation, and in my view now discredited interpretation, is that the Enlightenment was based on an Orientalisation of the East, which was the necessary Other for the European ‘we’ to be defined and a strategy of colonial domination. While there is little doubt that the Western heritage was used to legitimate imperialism and that in many cases it entailed a fantastification of the nonWestern Other, a more differentiated analysis is needed. The category of Otherness in Enlightenment thought can equally well be seen as an expression of the distance that many Europeans were to their own culture, which they could view only through the eyes of the Other. This Other was indeed very often the Orient, as in Montesquieu’s Persian Letters, but in this case and in many others it was a critical mirror by which the decadence of Old Europe could be portrayed.

Yilmaz_Chapter 1.indd 16

4/3/2012 11:17:43 AM

ISLAM

AND

EUROPEAN MODERNITY

17

In many other cases the attempt for genuine understanding of the ancient cultures of Asia cannot be underestimated, not least because much of the Enlightenment culture was formed in pre-colonial contexts, such as eighteenth and early nineteenth century Germany (Clarke 1997; Halbfass 1988). There were many genuine attempts to understand Islam, especially prior to the colonial period. It would not be possible to explain all of this in terms of a hegemonic notion of Orientalism. The history of that relationship often has been misrepresented. A closer reading of Herodotus’s account of the Persian Wars reveals in fact his view that the Persians were often more civilised than the Greeks. Certainly a more differentiated reading of this text shows that there are no grounds to project the later East-West divide back on the Greek-Persian conflict, not least since the Greeks did not operate with such a distinction of East and West. The point, then, of the foregoing is to stress the three-fold nature of the relation between Islam and Europe, this is not something that can be reduced to xenophobia or the fantasy discourse of Orientalism. The third mode, that of transmission, is clearly less conflictual and less hegemonic. This longer perspective also highlights the contours of a civilisational constellation that may be the best way to characterise Europe. Its major geopolitical components would be the Western Judaeo-Christian, Russian-Slavic and Islamic-Turkish civilisations. Europe and its modernity have been shaped by not one, but by all three civilisations, which opened up different routes to modernity. I have argued elsewhere that any account of Europe will have to include the active relation with Asia and the wider East (Delanty 2006b). This is partly because the origins of European civilisation lie in the appropriation of eastern civilisations and because a large part of the European civilisation itself has been formed in relation to two Eurasian civilisations, the Russian and Islamic civilisations. Europe has been formed by precisely the interaction, cross-fertilisation, cultural borrowing and diffusions of its civilisations. What this suggests is that Europe must be seen as a constellation consisting of links rather than stable entities or enduring. In this view, the Ottoman tradition represents a third European civilisation and one based on Islam. This is also the position taken

Yilmaz_Chapter 1.indd 17

4/3/2012 11:17:43 AM

18

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

by Jack Goody, who has argued for a transcontinental European civilisation that includes Islam, which has the same roots as the JudaeoChristian civilisation. Bulliet too has argued for the essential unity of the Islamo-Christian civilisation (Bulliet 2004). Europe never has been purely isolated and purely Christian (Goody 2004, pp.14). I am proposing a view of European civilisation that stresses mutual borrowings, translations and hybrid cultural forms. Europe can be identified by a mode of cultural translation rather than by reference to a particular cultural content (such as Christianity) or to allegedly universal norms (such as human rights or democracy) or territory or forms of statehood. Because of the different civilisations that make up the mosaic of Europe and the fact these were embroiled in each other through centuries of translations, Europe must be seen as a constellation consisting of links rather than stable entities or enduring traditions.

Modernity and Secularism: European Paradoxes It is helpful to begin with some consideration of the origins of secularism within the context of European political modernity since the legacy of this tradition has shaped the current situation presenting both opportunities and disadvantages for cosmopolitan pluralism in which Islam might have a place. The history of church and state relations in Europe was a struggle between two forms of authority, one religious and one political. This was one of the defining features of European history prior to the modern period. Neither the church nor the state ever succeeded in dominating the other. With few exceptions, and then only for short periods, European states were confessional states, but the principle of statehood was never subordinated to ecclesiastical authority, with the possible exception of some bishoprics in the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, but even in these cases theocracy never took root in Europe. In addition, the history of Christianity in Europe has been a history of its divisions. While many churches have gained considerable political and social influence, no church actually has gained power over the state for long. This has been due in part to the nature of the state, but also to civil society as well as to divisions within the elites.

Yilmaz_Chapter 1.indd 18

4/3/2012 11:17:43 AM

ISLAM

AND

EUROPEAN MODERNITY

19

It was not until the principle of cujus regio, ejus religio, whereby the ruler decided the religion of the population that political authority established its final superiority over clerical authority. Since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, when the European states agreed not to wage war on another state on behalf of their co-religiosity that the interstate system became anchored in secular politics. Thus the peculiar feature of European secularism is that the state in establishing its superiority over the ecclesiastical authorities itself became the arbitrator of religion, for the ruler effectively decided the religion of the population. The history of Europe in the early modern period until 1648 was shaped by the conflicts and upheavals that resulted in changes in the religions of the elites and masses. Since 1054 there was no pan-European religion but three major religions: Catholicism, Orthodoxy and Lutheranism. In addition, Judaism can be mentioned, although this was not a confessional geopolitical bloc. Today, it is possible to add Islam to the list of European religions. The existence of a distinctive European Islam that has arisen out of several decades of migration into the societies of Western Europe is a good justification for a rethinking of Europe as a post-secular society. It would be a mistake to believe that Europe entered a postreligious age after 1648 with progressive secularisation. For centuries it was the state that established religion, thus beginning the age of established churches, that is, official state churches. Those countries shaped by the political modernity that arose from the French Revolution rejected established churches, but almost exclusively gave a privileged role to the religion of the majority of the population. On the whole, it was the Protestant states that established state churches, while the largely Catholic countries embarked on more radical separations of church and state. Thus it came about that two models of secularism were established from the late seventeenth century. The first, the constitutional conservative tradition whereby secularism entailed an official church established by the state and thus controlled by the state. The second, associated with the republican tradition, whereby the state separated the church from the public domain, in effect privatising religion. European secularism is a product of these two traditions.

Yilmaz_Chapter 1.indd 19

4/3/2012 11:17:43 AM

20

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

In both cases religion did not disappear from society, but was institutionalised: in the first case as an official religion, and in both cases in the privatistic domains of family, education and other social institutions, such as in health. Indeed, by keeping religion out of the domain of the state, the more it survived the transition to modernity. Churches also played key roles as charitable institutions. The Enlightenment itself was for the greater part fostered by the reformed Protestant churches in Western Europe. It was only in the France of the Catholic ancien régime that it took on an anticlerical form. Although it was to be one of the signatures of the Enlightenment movement, the anti-Catholicism of the French Enlightenment intellectuals was an exception. It was not long after the French Revolution that Napoleon re-established Catholicism as a state religion. The Enlightenment, along with the movement we now call modernity in which science and law were separated, or secularised, from religion, occurred precisely in order to preserve faith from the critique of science. Virtually all the major Enlightenment philosophers sought to place religious faith on a separate level from scientific reason or knowledge. This was encapsulated in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, who argued that religious belief and ideas could not be justified on the basis of reason. In this faith was protected from the critique of rationalists such as Voltaire, who argued only reason was a criterion of belief. The two pillars of modernity, belief based on faith and belief based on evidence-supported knowledge? have not always been equally acknowledged by the critics and defenders of modernity. In a dialogue in Frankfurt in 2002, the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, now Pope Benedict XVI, commented on this feature of modernity, which they both agreed could not be reduced to the culture of rational science. However, it would be wrong to see religion and reason as separate and thus assume modernity has simply two faces that never interact. Max Weber discussed the mutual implication of religion and rationality in what he called the ‘paradox of modernity’, the paradox that the very rationalisation or disenchantment that eventually eroded religion from society actually was produced by the tendency within Christianity, in particular in its Protestant forms, to intellectualise religious belief of all traces of magic (Weber 1946). The

Yilmaz_Chapter 1.indd 20

4/3/2012 11:17:43 AM

ISLAM

AND

EUROPEAN MODERNITY

21

progressive rationalisation of religious belief as a result of the belief in salvation by a personal God who awards worldly deeds cultivated a rationalistic work ethic and methodic approach to life that finally brought religion close to the capitalistic ethic. In Weber’s view, rationalism was present in all domains of life – religion, law, economic activity, culture – and religion was not exempt from it. Hans Blumenberg offered a related argument, claiming that the secularisation operated within religious doctrine in a growing intellectualisation and rationalisation (Blumenberg 1983). In this sense, one direction of religious secularisation is its progressive intellectualisation. A further example of the religious origins of European political modernity is the somewhat extreme thesis, generally associated with Karl Löwith, that modernity is itself a secularisation of Christianity (Löwith 1949). This is the view that modern Western democracy derives from Christian ideas. Thus the liberty of the individual derives from the belief that all people stand equal before the eyes of God. This is questionable in so far as the claim is that there has been a direct transformation of a religious principle into a political one. More plausible is the view put forward by Max Weber that an inner rationalisation is present in different spheres of life. Undoubtedly the values of solidarity and individual responsibility have a certain resonance in Christian ideas, but this does not mean that Christianity is the explanation. Many of these values can be related to pre-Christian traditions, such as the Roman and Greek traditions and have been transformed in the course of history (Brague 2002). Indeed, S.N. Eisenstadt has made the claim that the key impulse of modernity – the notion that the world can be fashioned by human agency – was born with the great religions in Axial Age with the discovery of transcendence and the desire to bring the kingdom of God onto earth (Eisenstadt 1986). All modern political movements, he has argued, have been driven by the numerous ways in which this antinomy can be worked out. As regards the religious origins of European political modernity, a differentiated argument that avoids some of the difficulties of the secularisation thesis can be proposed. There is much evidence to suggest that the modern quest for liberty was facilitated, although not necessarily caused, by religious struggles. The political demands of

Yilmaz_Chapter 1.indd 21

4/3/2012 11:17:43 AM

22

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

dissenters and much of the Protestant reformation for freedom of worship provided the conditions for the recognition of other kinds of liberty, although largely only for Christian churches. While this took many forms – in England leading to an established Church – the position that emerged from the end of the seventeenth century, while being very far from late modern pluralism, was part of the movement towards the democratisation of state power. Eventually too it led to the removal of the social and political exclusion of the Jews. In sum, secularisation means different things: it refers to the separation of the legal foundations of the state from religion, but it can also mean the separation of science and knowledge from faith, and it can mean the decline or rationalisation of religious belief in terms of the erosion of the difference of the sacred and profane. These remarks serve as a background to the current situation in Europe and hopefully put into context some of the inaccurate claims made about European secularism as a entailing the banishment of religion. I have argued that European political modernity to a very large degree has been influenced greatly by religion and the different forms of secularisation – the constitutional conservative and republican traditions – did not eradicate religion from society, but granted it a particular place and set conditions to its existence in the public domain. The separation of public and private was never complete and final in the way that it was in the United States and religion did exist within the public domain in most European countries. The result was that European secularism has been highly ambivalent; on the one side, the existence of either established churches or socially privileged churches often led to discrimination of members of other faiths, in particular Jews, while, on the other hand, European secularism has been such that there is no fundamental obstacle to a limited presence of religion in the public sphere and there has been a long tradition of the freedom of worship. This is one of the paradoxes of European secularism, but which should be understood as the containment of religion. There has never been an American style secularisation of church and state in Europe. Contrary to a commonly held view, France did not separate church and state until 1905, in the wake of the Dreyfus affair, although there was a gradual movement towards secularisation from

Yilmaz_Chapter 1.indd 22

4/3/2012 11:17:43 AM

ISLAM

AND

EUROPEAN MODERNITY

23

the late nineteenth century. Although the French Revolution was anticlerical, following the Concordat with the Vatican in 1801, Napoleon established Catholicism as the state religion. Only the Communist countries were atheistic, in the sense of actively discouraging religion. The European trend is one of neutrality, but this has been ambiguous since there mostly has not been a total separation of church and state and there are different interpretations as to the meaning of neutrality, ranging from non-recognition, to a principle of equality of all churches, to a position of privatisation. In Ireland, for example, state neutrality was a means of maintaining the power of the church, especially in social policy, while in the Netherlands it has been a means of giving equal support to the main churches. In sum, I hope to have shown in answer to the second question concerning the nature of European modernity to secularism that modernity developed in a way that was highly paradoxical and that religion is compatible with modernity. There is nothing in the secularising logic of modernity that requires the end of religion.

Is Modernity European? Islam and the Multiple Forms of Modernity Modernity is neither entirely singular nor plural, universal nor particular, but an ongoing process of transformation. Modernity entails a high degree of conflict, leading some to define it in terms of liberty versus discipline, autonomy versus fragmentation, democracy versus capitalism (Delanty 1999; Wagner 1994). As a ‘field of tensions’, to use Johann Arnason’s term, modernity is a process of on-going contestation arising as a result of dynamics of tensions and conflicts, between the pursuit of power and the aspiration towards autonomy (Arnason 2003). Modernity must be regarded as both multiple and hybrid. There is not one single societal model of modernity, but several. Relating the diverse forms of modernity to civilisational frameworks, a more deeply rooted historical sense of modernity as a transformative project becomes more plausible. One important aspect of this is the role of civilisational encounters, since as previously argued, the European civilisations have not been separated from each other, but have formed

Yilmaz_Chapter 1.indd 23

4/3/2012 11:17:43 AM

24

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

part of a constellation. For this reason, too, the modernities that developed in Europe have borne the imprint of their civilisational context and encounters. With new inter-civilisational encounters, major shifts in modernity occur. This is precisely what is happening today: major social transformations in modernity are leading to a reconfiguration of the European civilisational constellation. The civilisations of Europe are plural and characterised by cultures and political centres that extend beyond Europe. Contrary to the notion of the clash of civilisations, the borders of European civilisation are vague and ever-shifting. The civilisations of Europe have developed in interaction with each other, not in isolation. This hermeneutical notion of civilisations’ encounters is not intended to neglect the militaristic and colonial narrative. Rather the aim is to identify common roots and shared histories of an inclusive Europe of cosmopolitan possibilities. The implication of such an approach points towards a European-Asian inter-civilisational cosmopolitanism. With the borders of the EU moving closer to Russia and with the eventual entry of Turkey, the identity of Europe is becoming more and more ‘post-Western’ (Delanty 2003). This is not anti- or non-Westernism, but a condition defined increasingly by the legacy of earlier modernities that has to be negotiated with other modernities. There is now a wide literature on these other modernities, especially with regard to Islam. A general conclusion is that modernity can take place in any culture and a good deal of Islam cannot be understood without taking modernity into account. Both Europe and Islam are evolving as a result of the continued transformation of modernity. As a field of tensions, modernity brings about cultural contestation within and between different cultural arenas. The upshot of the civilisational approach I am taking is that the cultural diversity of Europe can be seen as an expression of the interaction of the civilisations that make up Europe. Rather than reducing such diversities to nation-states, a civilisational analysis suggests a deeper and also a wider level of analysis. Civilisations are developmental, cumulative and multi-linear. Furthermore, modernity can itself be conceived as a multiple condition, with the divergent patterns of modernity being to some extent grounded in civilisational frameworks. Modernity in Europe must be regarded as both multiple

Yilmaz_Chapter 1.indd 24

4/3/2012 11:17:44 AM

ISLAM

AND

EUROPEAN MODERNITY

25

and hybrid. There is no one single European modernity, but several. However, the argument must go beyond multiplicity and hybridity to a clearer statement of the interactive and transformative impetus that is the key dynamic of modernity. Relating the diverse forms of modernity to civilisational frameworks, a more deeply rooted historical sense of modernity as a transformative project becomes more plausible. One important aspect of this is the role of civilisational encounters, since as previously argued the European civilisations have not been separated from each other, but are part of what has been called a civilisational constellation. For this reason, too, the modernities that developed in Europe have borne the imprint of their civilisational context and encounters. This argument goes beyond the claim that the civilisations of Europe are connected as a result of cross-fertilisation, borrowings and encounters of various kinds. The stronger claim, which is not to be equated with hybridity, is that modernity itself was shaped by the hermeneutical interaction of the civilisations of Europe. In this view, the essential point is less the multiple expressions of modernity than the civilisational dynamic that gave to modernity its pluralism and self-transformative impetus. I see the tension between Europe and Islam as a tension within modernity and more specifically between the different forms of modernity takes rather than as a primordial clash of irreconcilable civilisations. There is no doubt, however, that modernity developed in a much more differentiated way in Europe and began at an earlier stage. It too may have been the case that modernity in Europe owes something to the fact that in Europe, possibly going back to its Christian roots, as Remi Brague’s argues, a culture evolved that had progressively distanced itself from its origin and constantly reinvented itself to a point that European culture simply became the appropriation of otherness (Brague 2002). The capacity for distance gave a crucial cultural foundation for the critical and reflexive dimensions of modernity to develop. European modernity thus came to be very strongly associated with the critique of tradition and scientific reason. This was as likely to be used against Europe and as much as against the non-European. However, it is important to note that the capacity for cultural dialogue, transcendence and

Yilmaz_Chapter 1.indd 25

4/3/2012 11:17:44 AM

26

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

critique is not something exclusively European and is present in many other traditions. Indeed, the history of European modernity – colonialism, totalitarianism, the Holocaust – is a reminder of how easily such capacities can be lost.

Conclusion What I hope to have identified in the foregoing is that viewed in the longer perspective of history Europe has been shaped by a model of modernity that itself has been influenced by civilisational encounters between West and East. While the relation between Europe and Islam has often been fraught with conflicts, there is nothing in it that forecloses possibilities for dialogue and mutual respect. The task today is to recover some of the cosmopolitan possibilities that have been a feature of the relation. The emphasis here is indeed one of dialogue rather than integration. Some of the modes by which Europe and Islam interacted have been far from xenophobic and there is evidence of the acceptance of differences that is an essential feature of the cosmopolitan imagination that is needed today. It would not be out of place to have a greater recognition of the place of Islam in European history than has been the case until now.

References Al Sayyad, Nezar and Castells, Manuel (eds). 2002. Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam, Lanham: Lexington Books. Arnason, Johann. 1991. ‘Modernity As a Project and As a Field of Tension’, in Honneth, A., and Joas, H., (eds), Communicative Action, Cambridge: Polity. Assmann, Jan. 1996. ‘Translating Gods: Religion as a Factor of Cultural (Un)Translatability’, in Budick, S. and Iser, W., (eds), The Translatability of Cultures, CA: Stanford University Press. Assmann, Jan. 1997. Moses the Egyptian: The Memory of Egypt in Western Monotheism, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Blumenberg, Hans. 1983. The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Brague, Remi. 2002. Eccentric Culture: A Theory of Western Civilization, South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press. Bulliet, Richard. 2004. Islamo-Christian Civilization, New York: Columbia University Press.

Yilmaz_Chapter 1.indd 26

4/3/2012 11:17:44 AM

ISLAM

AND

EUROPEAN MODERNITY

27

Burkert, Walter. 2005. Babylon, Memphis, Persepolis: Eastern Contexts of Greek Culture, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Chambers, Simone and Kymlicka, Will (eds). 2002. Alternative Conceptions of Civil Society, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Clarke, J.J. 1997. Oriental Enlightenment: The Encounter between Asian and Western Thought, London: Routledge. Cronin, Michael. 1998. Unity in Diversity: Current Trends in Translation Studies, Manchester: St. Jerome Publishing. Delanty, Gerard. 1995. Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality, London: Palgrave Macmillan. Delanty, Gerard. 1999. Social Theory in a Changing World: Conceptions of Modernity, Cambridge: Polity Press. Delanty, Gerard. 2006a. ‘The Cosmopolitan Imagination: Critical Cosmopolitanism and Social Theory’, British Journal of Sociology, 57 (1), pp. 25–47. Delanty, Gerard (ed.) 2006b. Europe and Asia beyond East and West, London: Routledge. Eickelman, Dale and Salvatore, A. 2002. ‘The Public Sphere and Muslim Societies’, Archives of European Sociology, 43 (1), pp. 92–115. Eisenstadt, S.N. (ed.). 1986. The Origins and Diversity of the Axial Civilizations, New York: SUNY Press. Eisenstadt, S.N. 2003. Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities, Vol 1 and 2, Leiden: E.J. Brill. Gaonkar, Dilip Parameshwar (ed.). 2001. Alternative Modernities, Durham, NC Duke University Press. Goody, Jack. 2004. Islam in Europe, Cambridge: Polity Press. Halbfass, Wilhelm. 1988. India and Europe: An Essay in Understanding, New York: SUNY Press. Hoexter, M., Eisenstadt, S.N., and Levtzion, N., (eds). 2002. The Public Sphere in Muslim Societies, New York: SUNY Press. Jardine, Lisa and Brotton, Jerry (eds). 2000. Global Interests: Renaissance Art between East and West, London: Reaktion Books. Kamali, Mohammad Hashim. 2001. ‘Civil Society and Islam: A Sociological Perspective’, Archives of European Sociology, 42 (3), pp.457–82. Löwith, Karl. 1949. Meaning in History: The Theological Presuppositions of the Philosophy of History, Chicago: Chicago University Press. Rémond, René and Nevill, Antonia. 1999. Religion and Society in Modern Europe, Oxford: Blackwell. Said, Edward. 1979. Orientalism, New York: Vintage. Sayyid, Bobby S. 2003. A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism, London: Pluto Press. Wagner, Peter. 1994. A Sociology of Modernity: Liberty and Discipline, London: Routledge. Weber, Max. 1946. ‘Religious Rejections of the World and Their Rejections’, in Gerth, H.H., and Wright Mills, C., eds. From Max Weber, New York: Oxford University Press.

Yilmaz_Chapter 1.indd 27

4/3/2012 11:17:44 AM

Yilmaz_Chapter 1.indd 28

4/3/2012 11:17:44 AM

CHAPTER 2 ISL A M, GENDER AND CITIZENSHIP: UNEASY ENCOUNTER S IN EUROPE Deniz Kandiyoti

In this chapter, I propose to view the encounter between Europe and Islam through lenses that are not ‘European’, since I have been working primarily on the Middle East and, more recently, on the accommodations of Islam in Soviet and post-Soviet contexts. I also have worked in Afghanistan, which displays a very different trajectory of state-society relations and where Islam continues to hold a stake in the struggles among factions competing for state power. I have a broad interest in diverse articulations between states and Islam as a religion in both its institutionalised and more ‘popular’ forms. Inspired by these nonEuropean perspectives, I believe that some discussions of Islam in Europe inadvertently hark back to an essentialist and homogenising language that predates current analyses of Islam in other contexts. In effect, it seems that the current European understanding of pluralism is now putting a notion of collective as opposed to individual rights on the agenda, which in the case of people from Muslim majority countries translates into specific religio-cultural needs. In other words, the right to ‘difference’ gets translated primarily into ‘rights of

Yilmaz_Chapter 2.indd 29

4/5/2012 9:28:14 AM

30

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

worship’. This is a relatively new trend since in the 1960s and 1970s; migrants were identified primarily as members of their countries of origin (as Bangladeshis, Turks or Pakistanis) rather than in confessional terms. This reminds me of Stuart Hall’s comment that whereas important distinctions and gradations of colour were recognised among people of African and Caribbean descent in their countries of origin, they all became ‘black’ once they arrived in the UK. Something similar has been happening to Muslim migrants in Europe, although the dynamics of their incorporation has been clearly different. There have been two stages to this process. In the first stage, host countries looked upon various forms of dissent within migrant communities as diasporas fighting out the political battles of their home countries on foreign ground. There was a distance from these problems which were seen as ‘proxies’ for political struggles elsewhere. The second stage, which involves second and third generation migrants, whose identities are no longer defined exclusively in terms of their countries of origin, has made European countries realise that this is a genuinely European problem: this is no longer about Turkey, Algeria or Morocco, but about the particular ways in which these diasporic communities are positioned within European contexts. Today Muslims in Europe are treated first and foremost as religious subjects. Questions thus invariably revolve on what types of apparatuses and mechanisms could be mobilised to respect religious ‘difference’ under terms that are acceptable to the host country. This approach implicitly assumes that citizens are equal in every other respect except for their presumed cultural and religious needs: catering to these needs thus becomes a form of pluralism that is purported to give people an equal voice. It is interesting to note that this conception neatly dovetails ‘neo-fundamentalist’ currents of thought that argue for a transnational Islam that assumes that all Muslims have commonalities based on faith whether they are from Bosnia, Indonesia or the Arab world. This understanding of pluralism tends to overlook differences both between and within communities. Europe thus creates the very categories that are acted upon and activated by people who want to press their claims. Claim-making may be channelled through religious communities even when the claims in question (such

Yilmaz_Chapter 2.indd 30

4/5/2012 9:28:14 AM

ISLAM, GENDER

AND

CITIZENSHIP

31

as rights to better education or social services) are perfectly secular in nature. In other words, both articulations of identity and processes of claim-making are framed by European countries in ways that promote the formulation of demands with reference to one’s religious identity. This becomes the established way to be heard and to have access to resources. This homogenising move implies that because a Turkish international banker working in the city of London and a former Punjabi villager residing in Bradford are both Muslims, they presumably share common concerns and interests. The Turkish international banker in question may be someone who decides to fast during Ramadan and relaxes by having a whisky after work, and is perfectly comfortable with both. This international banker would have to be expelled from the category of ‘Muslim’ altogether if the only kind of Muslim identity allowed for is that of a strictly practising subject. This is a high price to pay considering that Christian or Jewish international bankers are not bound by similar strictures and may vary considerably in the degrees of religious observance in their personal lives. The articulation of alternative Muslim identities is rendered both conceptually and, indeed, institutionally difficult by the way in which identities are framed in Europe. There are great benefits to being able to ‘culturalise’ the category of ‘Muslim’. For instance, if the positioning of Muslims in Europe were to be rethought in racial or class terms we might end up in the uncomfortable position of having to reevaluate the riots in the deprived migrant neighborhoods of Paris, triggered by the murder of a young man of North African origin? in the same frame of reference as the Los Angeles riots following the Rodney King affair. The questions to ponder, then, would not be whether to build more mosques and give people more freedom of worship, but rather whether affirmative action and anti-racist and anti-discrimination policies should be the order of the day. These would, of course, be deeply controversial and costly. Before the riots in Paris, the neo-liberal policies of the French state had targeted welfare spending and had cut funds for after-school programs and youth associations in deprived ethnic neighborhoods and instead invested exclusively in ‘policing’ migrants. Thus, the only manifestation

Yilmaz_Chapter 2.indd 31

4/5/2012 9:28:14 AM

32

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

of the state was through its coercive apparatus and through encounters between a criminalised youth and the forces of order. The paper on discrimination in the EU in this is particularly thought-provoking since it treats the issue of ‘Muslimness’ primarily as a question of discrimination.1 There is, indeed, a redistributive issue in Europe that is not being adequately addressed. The heart of the matter may not revolve around Islam but around contested notions of citizenship. An area that greatly facilitates the privileging of cultural difference is that of gender relations. Gender appears as the ultimate frontier, the impermeable boundary that separates ‘us’ from ‘them’. It is no accident that the film titled Submission that led to the assassination of the Dutch film maker Theo van Gogh took the oppression of Muslim women as its subject. The excellent chapter in this book on Dutch imam training courses2 and the sensation created by a Dutch imam who, when asked if he would shake hands with a woman, said, ‘No, I will not do that because it is against my religion,’ were quite revealing in terms of thinking about the position of gender in these debates. An excellent issue of Middle East Report on European Islam also features an article where the Dutch Minister of Integration, Rita Verdonk, visits a local imam in Tilberg and exclaims with surprise when he refuses to shake hands with her: ‘But why, we are equals aren’t we?’ (Aarts and Hirzalla 2005, p.21). What makes gender so important? I think gender becomes all the more salient in a globalised world where all sorts of accommodations are made in most aspects of public life. The ‘differencia specifica’ of Muslim communities manifests itself in the area of personal status. Muslim shopkeepers who get into debt do not contest the local legislation on contracts. Likewise, when they take out a bank loan, they respect the rules of the game. However, the one arena of autonomy that is accorded to Muslim communities and that has prompted debates concerning the development of a new Islamic jurisprudence in the West (as was the case in Canada when the application of shari’a law to Muslim citizens was considered) specifically concerns family and personal status. Today some communities demand the right to regulate their affairs according to shari’a-based codes, even in contexts where the shari’a is

Yilmaz_Chapter 2.indd 32

4/5/2012 9:28:14 AM

ISLAM, GENDER

AND

CITIZENSHIP

33

not the law of the land. This may present some serious dilemmas for the concept of citizenship, especially for women. What happens to citizenship rights in contexts where individuals, by virtue of being members of a collectivity, are deprived of the possibility of availing themselves of benefits of the law of the land? For example, in the UK, does the state have a role to play and can it interfere when, say, Pakistani-British girls are shipped off to Pakistan by their families to get married against their will? These dilemmas may not gain visibility as long as the girls in question acquiesce and we hear nothing further about them. We actually can live with a form of indirect rule whereby some community leaders are empowered as spokespersons because they can act as gatekeepers and vehicles of votes in a multiparty democratic system. When a Labour MP in Bradford talks to his constituency he knows it is best to accommodate the patriarchal sensibilities of such local gatekeepers. But what happens when one of the girls in question runs away and seeks protection from the state? You may well ask, at this point, what this has to do with Islam. Nothing on the face of it since forced marriages are, in principle, forbidden by religion. But it has a great deal to do with the cultural accommodations of Muslims in Europe – a complex and delicate matter that involves much more than issues around building mosques and going to hajj. It also implies ‘respecting’ a culture presumed to be Islamic by virtue of the fact that it involves the practises of people who come from Muslim majority countries. Thus, European multiculturalism founders on the rocks of women’s rights. Are we to sanction removing or restricting recourse to the secular laws of a given country in the name of the cultural authenticity of a particular community? What is the role of the state in this matter? This is an extremely complex issue, not least because there are groups of women in Muslim communities in Europe who are themselves actively mobilising against some of the most oppressive practises of their communities. In the UK, some are involved in organisations like the ‘Southall Black Sisters’, which includes many Muslim women. There are also groups like ‘Women against Fundamentalism’, and women mobilising within Islamist constituencies and trying to redefine the boundaries of the permissible within that envelope. It

Yilmaz_Chapter 2.indd 33

4/5/2012 9:28:14 AM

34

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

is important to tease out what lies behind the discourse of presumed European secularism and the specific ways in which minority rights are understood and acted upon. Pluralism can conceal forms of oppression and discrimination that are internal to communities and that do not dare to utter their own name from fear of what Leila Ahmed once termed a choice between ‘betrayal and betrayal’: a betrayal of their own communities, which may be exposed to censure and sanctions by the state, and a betrayal of themselves and their basic human rights as women (Ahmed 1992). In order to articulate a genuinely democratic interpretation of citizenship in Europe, it is necessary to take on board the issue of gender hierarchies and to acknowledge the ways in which these can disadvantage women systematically. It is clear that European countries are prepared to delegate the articulation of cultural authenticity and the representation of communities to people whom they endorse as legitimate representatives. However, choosing certain interlocutors also means marginalising others, so that the process of inclusion implicit in the idea of pluralism can also turn into a process of exclusion. One of the many grounds for impatience with categories such ‘us’ versus ‘them’ or the ‘West’ versus the ‘East’ is that these tropes authorise certain categories of people to define their boundaries. This homogenising move overlooks power relations within communities in ways that work to the detriment of women. All one has to do is to read newspapers for evidence of how women’s rights are disregarded on a daily basis under the rubric of ‘cultural difference’ – regardless of what the women at the receiving end might themselves think or feel. Yet this discourse cannot be given up easily since European bureaucrats are often complicit with spokespersons of minority communities who wish to maintain their control over people who may be suffering from multiple forms of discrimination: unemployed youth, women, or people with different sexual orientations. This brings us back to our central question: What are the stakes around defining Muslims in Europe as religious subjects? The stakes are very high and not only for Europeans, but also for the various gatekeepers of minority communities who jockey for power within the French, British or German states. Women in minority communities

Yilmaz_Chapter 2.indd 34

4/5/2012 9:28:14 AM

ISLAM, GENDER

AND

CITIZENSHIP

35

also have a stake in these struggles and stand to lose or gain a great deal from their outcomes. This is, therefore, not a question of ‘us’ versus ‘them’, but a complex scenario where different players are in contestation over different political projects. Different appropriations of Islam are at the heart of these political projects. If a woman with a headscarf elicits greater public unease in Turkey than in the UK, this is not because the British public is more tolerant than the Turkish one, but because Islamist platforms have a more realistic chance of capturing state power in the latter than they do in the former. However many cultural rights are accorded to Muslims, the possibility of Britain becoming an Islamic state is remote whereas that possibility is quite realistic in Egypt where the growing ‘Islamisation’ of daily life is a fact. In Turkey where constituencies that are concerned about that eventuality exist and express their concerns in often alarmist language, pressures for genuine pluralism and cohabitation are higher. In any case, when talking about inclusion, discrimination or marginalisation, we cannot assume that the politics of Islam plays itself out in similar ways in countries like Turkey, on the one hand, and Holland or Britain, on the other. The way in which the politics of minority groups – which have now become the politics of Muslim groups – are articulated in the context of Europe cannot be treated as interchangeable with the politics of Islam in Muslim majority countries. I will conclude by noting that one of the reasons I have been so interested in looking at gender over the years is that it constitutes a very productive point of entry in looking at issues of Islam, pluralism and citizenship. Gender is the ultimate litmus test that reveals whether Muslims in Europe can benefit genuinely from equal citizenship rights. Gender relations engage peoples’ deepest sense of self and their deep-seated habits that go beyond the tenets of religion per se. They represent a place where a dilution of identity can be unbearable to even contemplate and that is why they become so highly politicised. We must remind ourselves, however, that this politicisation takes place on the backs of certain subordinated subjects. The capture of the ground of ‘Muslim authenticity’ is a political project in which European states actively participate and for which they must share responsibility.

Yilmaz_Chapter 2.indd 35

4/5/2012 9:28:14 AM

36

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

Notes 1 Aykaç, Çağla, ‘Islam and the European Union: Exploring the Issue of Discrimination’, in this volume. 2 Boender, Welmoet, ‘Teaching Integration in the Netherlands: Islam, Imams, and the Secular Government’, in this volume.

References Aarts, Paul and Hirzalla, Fadi. 2005. ‘Lions of Tawhid in the Polder’, Middle East Report, 235, Summer, pp.18–23. Ahmed, Leila. 1992. Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate, New Haven: Yale University Press.

Yilmaz_Chapter 2.indd 36

4/5/2012 9:28:14 AM

CHAPTER 3 ISL A M: WESTER N MODES OF USE AND ABUSE Stephanos Pesmazoglou

Let me begin with one short preliminary remark: there is not one idea of Europe nor one idea of Islam, but many Europes and many heterogeneous Islams, usually conflicting more bitterly within, rather than between, themselves. Thus, I use the plural: European modes of use and abuse of Islam. In this chapter, I will concentrate on the aspects of the construction of European identity that have been affected by the use and abuse of Islam for very specific political-ideological ends. The political labyrinth of actual decisions and practical actions intervenes in the uncertain area of ambiguities, contradictions and paradoxes, i.e. the network in which society, its actors and their discourses are enmeshed. I have organised my chapter through nine interrelated and occasionally overlapping paradoxes in the literal ancient Greek sense of the word παράδo ξo, which means, either statements and/or tenets contrary to the received opinion or belief, or propositions seemingly self-contradictory or absurd in relation to what is reasonable or possible.

Yilmaz_Chapter 3.indd 37

4/3/2012 11:19:17 AM

38

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

A Theoretical Paradox The idea of the superiority of a nation or a civilisational/religious collectivity enthusiastically mobilises masses of people for a cause that simultaneously entails disdain and rejection of the ‘other’. This idea is at the core of all nationalisms and fundamentalisms. At the bottom line, it is the curse of relativism (not of relativity) of being nowhere while claiming to be everywhere. It is to embark from a partial, situated ‘knowledge’, or rather, a conviction to construct a usable (and abusable) doctrine of objectivity. The ‘just cause’ is certainly and only the national cause. The moral argument is solely the national argument. Invented artefacts and facts all become part and parcel of effective semiotics and rhetorics. One witnesses judgement of fact being suppressed by value judgment in the name of nationalistic ‘objectivity’. National flags, national hymns national commemorations all combine to mobilise an excess of memory here, and, at the very same time, to secure an excess of forgetting elsewhere. It is not memory versus forgetting but the dialectics between them. This dialectics is at the very core of Paul Ricoeur’s philosophical investigations, which end up paradoxically in the simultaneous mobilisation not only of feelings of hatred towards the ‘other’ but of feelings of love for one’s own nation or religion – creative for some and catastrophic for others (Ricoeur, 2004).

A Historical Paradox In the very long run of Christian-Islamic encounters, as depicted and constructed in the great bulk of European historiography and literature, a long list of poets, artists, scholars, popes, politicians and hundreds of travelers ineluctably have passed their ‘verdict’ on Europe and on the Islamic world. According to this verdict, Europe as an idea matured in the face of a perceived Islamic aggression (initially Arabic and later Ottoman) or what was perceived as such (e.g. the fall of Constantinople, the fall of Vuda and the sieges of Vienna). The historical paradox lies in that the Christian-European constructions rejecting Islam in the ‘longue durée’, occurred in exactly the same period

Yilmaz_Chapter 3.indd 38

4/3/2012 11:19:17 AM

ISLAM: WESTERN MODES

OF

USE

AND

A BUSE

39

during which the bloodiest wars did not take place on the commonly assumed Christendom-Islam fault-line but within European territory and between Christian Estates and irrespectively of their regimes (30-year wars and 100-year wars, First World War and finally the most bestial, Second World War). All these wars provoked an exponentially growing number of dead, injured and de-rooted. Only in the Second World War, it is estimated that 200 million people were killed, mutilated and displaced, altering radically the social and ethnic map of Europe. Therefore the historical paradox lies in the fact that, contrary to idées reçues, Christian-Islamic or European-Ottoman or European-Arab confrontations have no comparable data to display in terms of confrontations, wars and casualties. Nevertheless, an explicit or implicit dominant perspective of Islam in the West, seeing Islam as the cause of all evils, has prevailed until recently. I have in mind Pope Benedict XVI’s statement, in 2006, in reference to Orthodox Byzantine emperor Emmanuel Palaiologos some 600 years ago, of ‘an intrinsic-organic link between Islam and violence’, and the reactions the Pope’s statement provoked.1

The Liberal-Democratic Paradox For the greatest part of the twentieth century, the West, and since the Second World War, predominantly the USA, in the name of the safeguard of liberalism at home, a mark of Western identity now and in the past, has either backed or propped up client tyrannical regimes abroad and more specifically in the Muslim Middle East. More recently, again in the name of anti-terrorism and the protection of liberalism, human rights and democracy, Western governments restricted liberal values to such an extent that some critics accused them of restoring illiberal regimes. In many Western countries, parliaments and congresses passed racial and religious hatred bills that promoted an intolerant and reductionist approach towards Islam, despite the multifaceted and multilayered character of that religion. This new climate of religious intolerance, which was created in the name of tolerance, is spreading in Europe, with the spread of anti-terror legislations and the consequent restrictions that have been imposed on the freedom of expression.2

Yilmaz_Chapter 3.indd 39

4/3/2012 11:19:17 AM

40

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

The democratic challenge facing Europe is linked organically to the way it tackles Islam both abroad and at home. It is in a sense tantamount to the paradox of civility at home and incivility abroad. It is common knowledge that European citizenship requires European institutions to be less cumbersome and rigid, and more efficient and open. ‘Democratic deficit’ or ‘transparency deficit’ at the European level is by now a mot de passe. Democratic deficit in Europe, both at the national and trans-national levels, has been largely due to the way in which immigrants, Muslims and in general ‘others’ have been treated. This democratic deficit, at the level of many member-states and the European Union, surfaced during the last years of crises and interventions. The problem of double and multiple standards is much wider and deeper: a ‘civil society’ respectful of its civility runs the risk of being transformed into an ‘uncivil’ society in periods of crisis (We have to remember the torturing of the inmates in the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq; the prison camp at the Guantanamo3; and the secret CIA prisons for interrogating detainees in many European countries.4) ‘Civility’ at home cannot be safeguarded by uncivil means abroad. This constitutes the core of the liberal-democratic paradox.

The Culturalist Paradox This paradox can be considered as derivative of the previous one. Whereas many people in European countries have been defending ‘multiculturalism’ at home, the same people seemed ready to accept stereotypical images of Muslims abroad, which abstracted the Islamic world from its specific histories, diverse cultures and distinct societies. Multiculturalism at home was accompanied by monoculturalism and even military monoculturalism in the case of the Islamic world, aiming to impose Western culture and institutions on the Islamic societies. In the post-war decades, until the mid-1970s, this imposition was achieved either by means of provoking military coups5 in the Islamic countries, or by the West’s outright military invasions and occupations of the Islamic countries. Essentialism and reductionism have been the basic Western modes of understanding Islam, according

Yilmaz_Chapter 3.indd 40

4/3/2012 11:19:17 AM

ISLAM: WESTERN MODES

OF

USE

AND

A BUSE

41

to which, there is a Khomeini behind every Iranian, a Saddam behind every Iraqi and a Milošević behind every Serb. Liberal, empiricist Europe, though it is keen on seeing diversity when it looks at itself, tends to see Islam as a monolithic and unique phenomenon, and does not want to admit that that there is not one Islam but many. There is a world of difference between fanatic religious ruling groups of Iran, the reactionary dynasty of Saudi Arabia and the Turkish Muslims who largely want to live in a democratic society. A variety of Islams is also discernible among the Muslim immigrants in Europe: ethnic, national, sectarian allegiances play a much more important role than their theological beliefs in their political orientations. It is always necessary to remind the European publics that the unidimensional stereotype about the Muslims, i.e. that Muslims have always been, are and will remain resistant to change as they are, by nature, fatalists, is a meaningless generalisation. Pankaj Mishra, among other commentators, remarked that ‘as the ... bombings in London suggest, millenarian Islam may have a special appeal among uprooted Muslims struggling to invent new sources of moral and religious authority in their surroundings’ (Mishra 2005, p.16). And one remains perplexed: Which model to endorse? The English, the American or the French? Was it the end of the multiculturalist British model after the London carnage, which immediately led the British media to question the results of the politics of multiculturalism. Is it the end of the French republican model after the eruption of riots and rage in Paris and other French cities in 2005. Is it the end of both models? We don’t have recipes at hand. But surely the self-definition of Europe cannot continue by excluding millions of Muslim immigrants from Europe’s identity formula. It is not tenable to defend multiculturalism at home, while promoting dictatorship, tyranny and ‘just’ war in the Muslim world. (Speaking of the ‘just war’, we have to remember US President Bush’s specific ‘link’ with the Almighty in devising his foreign policy towards Iraq, which was depicted as God’s Foreign Policy on one of the witty cover titles of the Economist.) Multiculturalism started benevolently as a reaction to White Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP) monoculturalism, but it tends to be transformed paradoxically into the ‘curse of

Yilmaz_Chapter 3.indd 41

4/3/2012 11:19:17 AM

42

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

multiculturalism’, erecting barriers, building walls and reproducing segregation rather than promoting unity in diversity.

A Strategic Paradox This is a paradox linked with hard-core interests: economic, energy, military interests, which, nowadays, we tend to forget, as they are well hidden behind the emphasis given to culture and religion as the force motrice of all clashes. The use and abuse of Islam for political and ideological ends by the West runs parallel to the use and abuse of Islam by certain Islamic governments themselves, as an ideological resource for domination over their populations, energy resources and territories. We have to remember that in many Muslim societies, it is in the name of Islam that the most fundamental human and minority rights are violated. The most flagrant use and abuse of Islam by the West was the radical one used in the 1980s for a very tangible strategic interest, for stopping the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. And it was at this crucial moment that what I call the strategic paradox emerged, mainly due to a deeply unprincipled and self-defeating behaviour of the West and the USA. On the one hand, the West financed, armed and politically backed those who, at the time, were called ‘holy warriors of Islam’. The West’s allies in this endeavor were Pakistan’s dictator General Ziaul-Haq and Saudi Arabia’s dynasty. This was the first instance of the globalisation of the Islamic jihad, at that time against Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. This first experience of training and fighting together is what bound Islamic fundamentalists and radicals from different countries. This use of Islam by the West later paved the way for its abuse by terrorists against the West itself, leading to the growing fear of Islamic terrorism in the West today. If Europeans were to rethink their self-identification, they should distance themselves from this kind of strategic abuse of Islam and from today’s neo-conservative alarmism in which Islam is viewed solely and only as a ‘security threat’.

The Tolerance Paradox This paradox is of a compound cultural-historical nature. The European Union declarations present Europe retrospectively as ‘the

Yilmaz_Chapter 3.indd 42

4/3/2012 11:19:17 AM

ISLAM: WESTERN MODES

OF

USE

AND

A BUSE

43

continent of humane values, the Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the French Revolution and the fall of the Berlin Wall; the continent of liberty, solidarity and above all diversity, meaning respect for others’ languages, cultures, and traditions ... The European Union’s one boundary is democracy and human rights and, therefore, the Union is open only to countries which uphold basic values such as free elections, respect for minorities and respect for the rule of law.’6 This may be wishful thinking, since tolerance is certainly one of the threads in European political, cultural and intellectual history, but not the only one. There is also the dark side of the moon, or to use the title of a recent book, the Dark Continent (Mazower 2000). For centuries Catholic Europe was a bastion of intolerance whereas the Muslim, initially Arab, world, and then the Ottoman Empire was comparatively the domain of religious tolerance. We just have to remember that the Sephardic Jews, when expelled from Catholic Spain, Portugal and later from Italy, found refuge in the Muslim Ottoman Empire.

The Discursive (Lexical and Conceptual) Paradox ‘Anti-terrorism’, ‘rogue states’, ‘international community’, ‘perpetual peace’, ‘liberal values’, ‘universal principles’, ‘morality’, ‘God’: a whole discursive and textual armoury is being used to conceal actual practice, which consists of imperial state terrorism and an environment of perpetual war. New discursive strategies are being mobilised in an effort to conceal what actually is going on. Hence, the war on Iraq becomes ‘Desert Storm’ and the war on Afghanistan becomes a ‘Civilisation Crusade’, with analogous terminologies being used for aggression in former Yugoslavia. War, or rather the euphemistic discourses – such as the ‘clash of civilisations’ – that have been devised to portray aggression as something other than it actually is, have become part of our ‘normal and peaceful’ everyday life, a seemingly superficial paradox. European declarations tend to remind us that phenomena such as religious fanaticism, ethnic nationalism, racism and terrorism are on the rise, and regional conflicts, poverty and underdevelopment still provide a constant seedbed for them. What those EU documents seem to overlook is that another and more important source of the rise

Yilmaz_Chapter 3.indd 43

4/3/2012 11:19:17 AM

44

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

of global violence is imperial state aggression (mostly American, but many times supported by Europe), which has divided the world, in a simplistic and mechanistic way, between friends and foes.

The Transparency/Opacity Paradox The explosion of transparency has been trumpeted within liberal and neo-liberal discourse in the last two decades. It has been argued that we have been going through a revolution of transparency, thanks to the new technologies of communications, including television, the Internet and mobile phones. Yet, in all crucial issues, opacity has been the rule. The more and the faster we have been communicating with each other, the more opaque the world has become! Opacity of information and secrecy of the archives are often linked with the opacity of state-capital relations. It is a critical matter of European self-definition if Europe will distance itself from what Harold Pinter called, in his Nobel Prize speech, ‘a quite clinical manipulation of power worldwide masquerading as a force of universal good ... a highly successful act of hypnosis.’7 Opacity and not transparency is becoming the canon in the chain of Guantanamos all over the world. The Honour Based Institutions8 to defend freedom become the incarnation of this paradox.

The Morality-Progress Paradox It is a continuing paradox linked with modernity and the Enlightenment. It lies in that economic, technical and material progress does not always keep pace with moral progress. Some of the European Union’s official declarations tend to begin with self-gratifying assertions that the European Union is ‘a success story’, which is only relatively true: economically, and to an extent institutionally, and only within the Union’s strict boundaries. A gradual enlargement of the community from 6 to 15 and more recently to 27 is in itself a clear indication of a ‘success story’. However, this economic and institutional success has not been accompanied by moral principles and standards, and in particular by respect and tolerance for the ‘other’. For example, the main theme of the rejection of the Constitutional agreement in

Yilmaz_Chapter 3.indd 44

4/3/2012 11:19:17 AM

ISLAM: WESTERN MODES

OF

USE

AND

A BUSE

45

France and Holland was not the Constitution itself but the fear of the ‘other’. The ‘other’ was mostly the Muslim other, which was embodied by Turkey, which wanted to join the European Union. The very real economic, political and human rights reasons aside, there obviously are long-standing perceptions and prejudices in Europe against the inclusion of Turkey. We do have culturally biased and prejudiced statements by leading European politicians, personalities and institutions, such as Delors, Berlusconi, D’Estaing, the European People’s Party and, of course, Pope Benedict. In all these statements, Europe has been shown as the realm of Christendom and the inclusion of the ‘other’ (the Turk) has been portrayed as a threat to the cohesion and harmonisation of Europe. This line of thinking has certainly to be re-thought and abandoned in any exercise to re-define, or rather, reinvent Europe.

Inconclusive Concluding Remarks European self-determination or rather self-idealisation has become a common practice not only among Eurocrats and European politicians, but also among academic historians writing textbooks on the history of Europe and European civilisation (often subsidised by the European Union). The questions entail value hierarchies such as ‘what is and what ought to be Europe’s role in this changing world?’ and ‘what ought to be the new values and boundaries of Europe?’ The reply has to be sincere: there is no clear-cut answer. Only fragments of an answer can be envisaged. For example, Europe as a world power should devise policies to diminish the income gap between the rich and the poor countries. Secondly, Europe must be a social Europe, which decisively tackles inequalities of income, wealth, education and cultural capital among European citizens. Thirdly, Europe must devise ways to stop the exclusion and marginalisation of its immigrants and particularly its immigrants of Muslim origins. Any re-thinking of Europe should emphasise rules of thinking rather than focusing on practical solutions to concrete problems. I am afraid that such a re-thinking might never be the case and that the double and multiple standards Europe has always uphold in the name

Yilmaz_Chapter 3.indd 45

4/3/2012 11:19:18 AM

46

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

of universal values might well continue to be its future. I have not detected, yet, serious or systematic evidence that processes of ‘rethinking Europe’ or of ‘rethinking Islam’ are under way. What I suggest is that we can only hope for a Europe à venir and for a democracy à venir, both of which are closely interwoven with whether Europe will be able to re-think and revise its modes of use of Islam, in contradistinction with the modes of abuse of Islam up to now. We can only hope for a University à venir, for accomplishing the task for formulating our categories of re-thinking Europe. Most European universities, as they exist today, are not in a position to do the job, as they are busy closing down departments in the social sciences and the humanities in the name of productivity and cost-minimisation. Although, thousands of books have been written, and millions of words have been uttered in hundreds of workshops, conferences, seminars on the issue of Islam, racism, exclusion and xenophobia in Europe, I am not sure if our understanding of these issues has been really expanded. Paul Klee and Walter Benjamin’s much used and abused ‘angel of history’ is immortal. ‘This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. This storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call progress’ (Benjamin 1969, pp.257–8).

Notes 1 See ‘Critiques et colère des musulmans contre Benoît XVI’, in the French daily Le Monde, 16 September 2006, p.4. 2 For example, in the UK, after a new law propounding as a new crime ‘the glorification of terrorism’, The National Campaign for the Arts has cautioned that fear of prosecution could lead to self-censorship and the scaring away of sponsors. In France, conservative legislators accused rap artists of inciting riots among Muslim Arabs.

Yilmaz_Chapter 3.indd 46

4/3/2012 11:19:18 AM

ISLAM: WESTERN MODES

OF

USE

AND

A BUSE

47

3 Front page in the dailies Le Monde and The Guardian, November 2005. 4 Cover story in The New York Times, among other dailies. 5 Incidentally, all the references to 9/11 without specifying the year (2001) tend to forget that for Latin America 9/11 marks the anniversary of the military coup against the democratically elected President of Chile, Salvadore Allende, in which many more thousands died. 6 Taken from the Laeken Declaration of the European Council in December 2001. 7 See ‘Pinter attacks America in Nobel speech?’, in Manchester Evening News on 8 December 2005. Available online at http://www.manchestereveningnews. co.uk/entertainment/arts/s/ 190/190644_ pinter_attacks_america_in_noble_ speech.html 8 The title of a London play.

References Benjamin, Walter. 1969. Illuminations: Essays and Reflections, New York: Schocken Books. Mazower, Mark. 2000. Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century, Vancouver, WA: Vintage Books. Mishra, Pankaj. 2005. ‘The Misunderstood Muslims’, New York Review of Books, 52 (18), 17 November, pp.15–18. Ricoeur, Paul. 2004. Memory, History, Forgetting, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Yilmaz_Chapter 3.indd 47

4/3/2012 11:19:18 AM

Yilmaz_Chapter 3.indd 48

4/3/2012 11:19:18 AM

CHAPTER 4 ISL A M, PLUR ALISM AND POLITICS: WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF GLOBALISATION? Jeffrey Haynes

There are numerous definitions of globalisation. Many focus on the idea that globalisation is a continuing means by which the world is increasingly characterised by common activity, emphasising in particular how many highly important aspects of life – including wars, crime, trade and culture – are becoming increasingly globally interrelated. This implies that globalisation is also a matter of a change in consciousness, with people from various spheres, including business, religion, sport, politics and many other activities, thinking and acting in the context of what many would regard as an increasingly ‘globalised’ world. One result is that ‘territoriality’ – a term signifying a close connection or limitation with reference to a particular geographic area or country – now has less significance than it once did. Thus globalisation suggests greatly increased interdependence, involving both states and non-state: what happens in one part of the world affects others. Overall, then, globalisation encompasses the idea that humankind is currently experiencing a ‘historically unique increase of scale to

Yilmaz_Chapter 4.indd 49

4/3/2012 11:20:02 AM

50

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

a global interdependence among people and nations’. It is characterised by (1) rapid integration of the world economy; (2) innovations and growth in international electronic communications; and (3) increasing ‘political and cultural awareness of the global interdependency of humanity’ (Warburg 2001, p.1). Globalisation has deep historical roots, beginning in the 1500s and encompassing three interrelated political, economic and technological processes (Clark 1997). While it is appropriate to perceive of globalisation as a continuous, historically based, multifaceted process, it is important to note that there have been periods when it has been especially speedy. For example, its pace increased from around 1870 until the start of the First World War in 1914. This was partly because during those four decades, ‘all parts of the world began to feel the impact of the international economy, and for the first time in history it was possible to have instant long-distance communication (telegraph, radio) between people’ (Warburg 2001, p.2). After the Second World War, the speed, density and international impact of globalisation expanded again – as it did once more after the Cold War came to an end in 1989 (Haynes 2007, pp.65–95). According to Keohane, the overall impact of these processes of globalisation resulted in an end-state that he calls ‘globalism’. For Keohane, globalism is ‘a state of the world involving networks of interdependence at multicontinental distances, linked through flows of capital and goods, information and ideas, people and force, as well as environmentally and biologically relevant substances’ (Keohane 2002, p.31) Thus globalism refers to the reality of being interconnected, while globalisation denotes the speed at which these connections grow – or diminish. Overall, the concept of globalism ‘seeks to ... understand all the inter-connections of the modern world – and to highlight patterns that underlie (and explain) them’ (Nye 2002, p.2). In short, globalisation can be thought of usefully as a current, multidimensional process with historical roots, involving intensification of global interconnectedness between both states and non-state actors. It also suggests reduction of the significance of territorial boundaries and of state-directed political and economic structures and processes. Globalisation leads to an expansion of channels, pressures and agents via which various norms are diffused and interact. In Europe,

Yilmaz_Chapter 4.indd 50

4/3/2012 11:20:03 AM

ISLAM, PLUR ALISM

AND

POLITICS

51

globalisation was also characterised after the Cold War by real or imagined interaction between Islamist movements in various parts of the world. This perception led some observers to conclude that we are witnessing a worldwide ‘resurgence of Islam’ (Zemni 2002, p.158), leading to what Huntington (1996) has called a ‘clash of civilisations’. The alleged ‘resurgence’ of Islam is said to have engendered or facilitated ‘anti-Muslimism’ in some Western countries. A debate ensued, which can be seen in the context of historically-rooted Western cultural, political and economic domination over Islam, a process that can be seen as an intrinsic aspect over time of Western-dominated globalisation. This process and development involved what are often claimed to be essentially Western values and norms: pluralism, liberal democracy, relativism and radical individualism, coming into contact with different values that are perceived to be held by Muslims. Various critics, notably Edward Said (1978; 1993) and Bryan Turner (1978; 1994), have challenged this notion – Said called it ‘Orientalism’ – on various (empirical, theoretical and methodological) grounds. Said challenged the self-proclaimed objectivity of Orientalist accounts of the Middle East – and of Muslims generally – by deconstructing the assumptions and dominant themes of that discourse. The concept of Orientalism captures the idea that Islam is a body of religious and social thought inherently atavistic and at odds with Western thought and culture. Said (1978, p.2) defines Orientalism as a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between ‘the Orient’ and (most of the time) the ‘Occident’. For Said, while many Western politicians and academics had sought to essentialise both Muslims and Islam into unchanging categories, these assumptions were problematically rooted in historical generalisations – with little or no empirical foundation. His critique was damning: Orientalist thinking, built on depictions of the region as inherently backwards and barbarous as a result of supposedly inescapable characteristics of Islam, served the political prerogatives of colonialism well, since such intellectual discourse allowed the legitimisation of discrimination and exploitation (Said 1993, p.96). Said quotes Lord Cromer, the British governor of Egypt from 1882 to 1907. According to Cromer, ‘the Oriental generally acts, speaks

Yilmaz_Chapter 4.indd 51

4/3/2012 11:20:03 AM

52

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

and thinks in a manner exactly opposite to the European. While the European is a close reasoner and a natural logician, the Oriental is singularly deficient in the logical faculty’ (Said 1978, p.39). Cromer was not an isolated example, an aberration; rather, he was representative of a wider trend, carrying ideas that were dominant for long periods and show no signs of dying out a century later. As Heristchi and Teti (2006, p.25) note, Orientalism held a monopoly on the discourse on the Middle East, from history, culture and politics, to artistic expression. Lord Cromer was, of course, a product of his times, but there is no certainty that his prejudiced views are entirely extinct at the beginning of the twenty-first century. We can note continued use of Orientalist ideas and thinking in relation to the problematic use of the term ‘Islam’ to imply a unifying conceptual category predicating social and political order, with related political biases. The Muslim world still is often seen as a monolithic, unchanging, under-developed, violent, anti-democratic space as a direct result of the perceived characteristics of Islam. Consequently, the current relationship between politics and Islam in Europe is certainly not a new question – for various parts of the world, especially the Middle East, North Africa and parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, Islam has long been a central focus of political analysis, often with an Orientalist bias. Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilisations thesis is an example of what might be called New Orientalism. Huntington first presented his argument in an article in 1993, followed by a book three years later. He claimed that following the end of the Cold War, there was a new, global clash under way, replacing four decades of conflict between liberal democracy/capitalism and communism. Now there was a new clash between the (Christian) West and the (mostly Arab, mostly Muslim) East. The core of Huntington’s argument was that after the Cold War the Christian, democratic West found itself in conflict with Islamic fundamentalism, a key threat to international stability. The so-called Western values – strongly informed by Protestant and Catholic versions of Christianity – were said, as characterised by Huntington, to be conducive to the spread of liberal democracy. For evidence of his claims, he noted the collapse of dictatorships in Christian countries in southern Europe (Greece, Portugal, Spain) and throughout Latin

Yilmaz_Chapter 4.indd 52

4/3/2012 11:20:03 AM

ISLAM, PLUR ALISM

AND

POLITICS

53

America in the 1970s and 1980s, followed by the development of liberal democratic political systems and norms (rule of law, free elections, political rights and civil liberties). For Huntington, such democratisation was conclusive proof of the synergy between Christianity and liberal democracy, key foundations of a normatively desirable global order built on these (Western) liberal values. In addition, around the same time, the US neoconservative Francis Fukuyama argued that Islam is inherently undemocratic or even anti-democratic, while Islamic fundamentalism has a more than superficial resemblance to European fascism (Fukuyama 1992, p.236). New Orientalism was not restricted to a few – however notable – US academics, but was also influential among American and European politicians, articulating the view that Islam is the undesirable Other. For example, US Democratic Congressman Tom Lantos stated, in November, 2001, that ‘unfortunately we have no option but to take on barbarism which is hell bent on destroying civilisation ... You don’t compromise with these people. This is not a bridge game. International terrorists have put themselves outside the bonds of protocols.’ Similar, albeit more restrained comments were made by the former French president Valerie Giscard d’Estaing. However, it is one thing to argue that some Muslims have qualitatively different perspectives on liberal democracy than some Christians, but it is quite another to claim that all Muslims are about to enter into a period of serious conflict with the (Christian) West because of their differing political and social values. It is perhaps necessary to point out that there are in fact many Islams; and only the malevolent or misinformed would associate all Muslims and their political articulations – whether in the USA, Europe or elsewhere – with an undifferentiated and simplistic idea of an anti-Western Islamic fundamentalism. The idea of religious/cultural/civilisational conflict is also problematic for another reason: it is impossible to identify and articulate clear territorial boundaries between different civilisations/cultures/ religions, and thus unfeasible to perceive them as acting as coherent units. Huntington’s image of clashing civilisations focuses on an essentially undifferentiated category – a civilisation – and places insufficient emphasis on the various trends, competitions, conflicts

Yilmaz_Chapter 4.indd 53

4/3/2012 11:20:03 AM

54

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

and disagreements that take place within all such traditions, whether Islam, various Christianities (Protestantism, Catholicism, Orthodoxy), Confucianism, Judaism or whatever. In short, it is not useful to view civilisations/cultures/religions as closed systems of essentialist values and analytically unhelpful to perceive the world as comprising a strictly limited number of civilisations/cultures/religions, each with their own unique core sets of beliefs which necessarily contrast with others. Finally, Huntington’s image of clashing civilisations problematically ignores the fact that many Islamic fundamentalist groups primarily target not the West per se but unrepresentative, corrupt and illegitimate – in short, un-Islamic – governments, especially among the Arab countries of the Middle East. Many such groups emerged in the 1970s and 1980s as a result of serious domestic political and economic governmental failures, regimes that for the most part were supported by the US government, the European Union and/or individual European governments. This latter factor provides much of the context for anti-Western tendencies of many such groups, notably al-Qaeda. Overall, the arguments of Fukuyama and Huntington underline that there is a deep-rooted tradition in Western thought that sees the Orient – that is, for our purposes, the Arab/Muslim world – as distinct and distinctive compared to the Christian West. This is not, as already noted, a novel issue. During the centuries of Western imperialism, there were frequent debates about what rights non-Christian and nonEuropean peoples should be allowed to enjoy. The specific conflicts between Christianity and Islam was moulded dualistically by notions both of holy war – suggesting a special kind of conflict undertaken effectively outside any framework of shared rules and norms – and just war – carried out for the vindication of rights within a shared framework of values. The result was a strand of Western thought suggesting that, because of their nature, some forms of political power – such as states and /or ideologies – cannot realistically be dealt with on normal terms of engagement, that is, by accepted rules between civilised actors in international relations. Indeed, such international rules, norms and practices legitimately can be set aside when confronting and trying to deal with those perceived as non-civilised international entities. And this is not something of only historical interest. We

Yilmaz_Chapter 4.indd 54

4/3/2012 11:20:03 AM

ISLAM, PLUR ALISM

AND

POLITICS

55

have already noted, following 9/11, that similar ideas were expressed (see the remarks of US Democratic Congressman Tom Lantos above). Earlier, during the 1980s the Reagan administration in the United States averred that there was a basic lack of give-and-take available when dealing with Communist governments; consequently, if necessary it was appropriate to set aside basic notions of international law when dealing with them.

Globalisation: Challenges and Opportunities for Islam How does globalisation change our understanding of Islam – beyond the general idea that the core of globalisation implies increasing interdependence between states and peoples, including Muslims and non-Muslims, with what happens in one part of the world affecting what happens elsewhere. One focus is to see the position of Muslims in relation to a ‘globalisation’, which is often judged a (thoroughly malign and comprehensive) Westernising process. This form of globalisation is inherently undesirable, a process whereby Western – especially American – capitalism and culture seek to dominate the globe, including the Muslim world. A second aspect of this view is that the Western world is kept rich at the expense of the poverty of many nonWestern parts of the world and, once again, it is the Muslims who often bear the brunt. This is possible, it is asserted, because Western – not Muslim – interests determine trading terms, interest rates and dominance of highly mechanised production, via control of important international institutions, such as the World Trade Organisation (Held and McGrew 2002). An alternative view emphasises that globalisation offers enhanced opportunities for international cooperation in relation to various issues, including social development and human rights, as well as conflict resolution and peace building. In this way of looking at things, globalisation is thought to enhance chances of international cooperation to resolve a range of economic, developmental, social, political, environmental, gender and human rights concerns and injustices. In particular, the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s was seen to offer unprecedented opportunity for collective efforts involving both

Yilmaz_Chapter 4.indd 55

4/3/2012 11:20:03 AM

56

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

states and non-state actors, including religious ones, to tackle a range of pressing global concerns. For many, progress would be enhanced by bottom-up contributions from local groups and grassroots organisations around the world, including various religious organisations and movements. In sum, globalisation in both views is a multifaceted process of change, universally affecting states, local communities, industrial companies and individuals. Religious organisations and movements are not exempted from its influence and, as a result, like other social agents, such religious entities participate in and are affected by globalisation. Recent academic discussions of religion and globalisation – with Roland Robertson (1995), Peter Beyer (1994; 2006) and James Spickard (2001; 2003) as important voices – mainly concentrate on the trends towards cultural pluralism and how religions organisations respond to this development. Some react positively, by accepting or even endorsing pluralism, such as ‘some Christian ecumenical movements or the Baha’is. Other groups emphasise the differences and confront the nonbelievers in an attempt to preserve their particular values from being eroded by globalisation. The so-called fundamentalist Christian, Muslim and Jewish movements are well-known examples (Warburg 2001, p.3). In sum, there is growing awareness in international research of the importance of religion as a transnational actor in the context of globalisation, but little agreement regarding whether the insertion of religion into international relations leads to better or worse outcomes. Overall, the relationship between religion and globalisation is characterised on the one hand by tension between forces that lead to integration in globalisation and on the other hand to resistance to it. In this context, ‘integration’ refers to religious processes that both promote and follow from processes of globalisation. The concept of ‘resistance’ implies the opposite trend: explicit or implicit criticism of and mobilisation against some or all processes of global change manifested in globalisation. Both integration and resistance can be seen in relation to religious resources that generally represent various expressions of soft power. Several authors have noted religion’s soft power in relation to contemporary international relations. For Ferguson, it is important not to underestimate the power of ideology and religion – which

Yilmaz_Chapter 4.indd 56

4/3/2012 11:20:03 AM

ISLAM, PLUR ALISM

AND

POLITICS

57

certainly has proved more enduring than the power of the Red Army. Indeed, there are those who would say that, after Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan, no one did more to bring down communism in Eastern Europe than John Paul II. Faith, then, is perhaps as important a component of power as material resources (Ferguson 2003, p.3). According to Reychler, the growing impact of religious discourses on international relations is a response to a ‘world where many governments and international organisations are suffering from a legitimacy deficit ... Religion is a major source of soft power. It will, to a greater extent, be used or misused by religions and governmental organisations to pursue their interests. It is therefore important to develop a more profound understanding of the basic assumption underlying the different religions and the ways in which people adhering to them see their interests. It would also be very useful to identify elements of communality between the major religions’ (Reychler 1997, p.4). Also emphasising the idea that religious organisations and movements often enjoy more legitimacy than some governments and international organisations, Juergensmeyer contends that in particular ‘radical religious ideologies have become the vehicles for a variety of rebellions against authority that are linked with myriad social, cultural, and political grievances’ (Juergensmeyer 2005, p.2). It is possible to highlight three – not necessarily discrete – areas that not only generally emphasise the significance of religion in the context of contemporary globalisation, but also point to the actual or potential soft power of religious organisations to influence outcomes in the directions they prefer. They are: ideas, experiences and practices. Ideas Most religions traditionally comprise ideas, beliefs and practices of a particular community. That is, religions have provided what Peter Berger (1969, p.3) calls a ‘sacred canopy’, enabling followers to make sense of their world. Beyer (2003) explains that there were once many individual and different societies around the world, each with its own set of practices, some of which today we would call religious. As a result, religious ideas can be seen as ‘the major organising principles

Yilmaz_Chapter 4.indd 57

4/3/2012 11:20:03 AM

58

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

for explaining the world and defining ethical life’ (Kurtz 1995, p.3). Now, however, circumstances of globalisation dramatically undermine the notion that all members of a religious community must necessarily hold the same ideas, because globalisation encourages the free(r) circulation of ideas. At the present time, many religions compete for the attention of individuals and there is what might be called a ‘global marketplace of religion’ (Bruce 2003). The consequence is that the spread of various, sometimes competing, religious ideas leads to a situation where the once relatively autonomous sacred canopy is increasingly regarded as an artefact of the past. This process may be met with resistance, ‘countered by the revival of more localised practices in the form of religious fundamentalist and other protest movements’ (Kurtz 1995, p.99). Experiences There is a dynamic and dialectic connection between globalisation and religion. Globalisation may lead individuals and groups to increased self-reflection, as a result of the experiences they encounter following two simultaneous developments. On the one hand, cultural, religious and social differences between people have sometimes become increasingly visible as a result of globalisation. On the other hand, many people also experience direct or indirect pressure towards increased homogenisation and ‘free’ religious competition. This creates a field of tension where the value of religious belonging as identity-forming becomes more important, while at the same time it is rapidly changing. This is because globalisation facilitates the transmission of both nonmaterial – ideas, information and beliefs – factors, as well as material ones. Many religious actors seek to use any available opportunities to disseminate their religious ideas in various ways. Second, what religions do within a country is affected by social, political and economic experiences – and these in turn may well be affected by globalisation. As Berger notes, in some cases – for example, in relation to manifestations of Islamism (or ‘Islamic fundamentalism’) – this is a challenge that is seen to emanate from attempts to impose ‘an emerging global culture, most of it of Western and indeed American provenance,

Yilmaz_Chapter 4.indd 58

4/3/2012 11:20:03 AM

ISLAM, PLUR ALISM

AND

POLITICS

59

penetrating the rest of the world on both elite and popular levels. The response from the target societies is then seen as occurring on a scale between acceptance and rejection, with in-between positions of coexistence and synthesis’ (Berger 2002, p.1). Practices Religious ideas and traditions are often connected intimately to specific cultures, but this is not to imply that they are static. On the contrary, religious traditions are generally dynamic, changing as they encounter each other. As a result, there are no ‘pure’, unadulterated religious traditions preserved intact over long periods of time until now (Kurtz 1995, p.98). This implies that religious practices differ – even within the same religious traditions. Thus there may be various – associated but different – versions of the same religious tradition encompassing different groups, for example, dissimilar social groups and classes (Haynes 1996). Put another way, the ‘sacred canopy’ has generally not been uniform and religious practices vary from place to place and culture to culture, even among those ostensibly following the same religious tradition. As with ideas and experiences, the impact of globalisation is likely to be to make religious practice even more diverse.

Islam, globalisation, pluralism and politics Over the last three decades, democratic performances in Islamic countries have been affected by, on the one hand, various structuralcultural factors and, on the other hand, by their interaction with the global context of democratisation. The aim of this section is to examine how the issues of democracy and pluralism in the Islamic countries are affected, shaped and modified by the various global factors that go under the rubric of ‘globalisation’. While ‘globalisation’ names a process that is still unfolding, there has been no shortage of attempts to define it. Is it possible to understand the impact of globalisation as an ‘objective’ process that simply involves mapping the relevant ‘facts’ in order to assess key global trends

Yilmaz_Chapter 4.indd 59

4/3/2012 11:20:03 AM

60

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

in relation to social, political and economic organisation? Because analysis of globalisation is almost always cast in wider normative and ideological contexts, with value judgements to the fore, many would answer ‘no’. Reflecting such concerns, two schools of thought are polarised in their interpretation of the impact of globalisation upon politics and economies in the Muslim countries. I shall refer to the first as the ‘positive globalisation’ (PG) view, and the second as the ‘negative globalisation’ (NG) approach. In the PG view, the end of the Cold War clearly demonstrated the superiority of Western values and belief systems over its Communist rivals? Now, it was believed, we would see not only the final achievement of capitalism’s global expansion but also the universal extension of liberal democracy. The outcome would be a peaceful and prosperous new world order, a modern golden age. Globalisation would advance the well-being of millions of people around the world, through the liberating impact of the spread of markets, democracy and enhanced human rights. To further these developments, international organisations and global institutions would be strengthened, better focused to address pressing global problems. In addition, informal cross-border structures would develop further, involving interaction of local groups and grassroots organisations from all parts of the world. The notion of ‘positive globalisation’ comes with a powerful cluster of liberal assumptions. Globalisation is said not only to be irresistible but also to be welcomed, with overwhelmingly beneficial consequences, including: (1) more effective international institutions; (2) greater economic efficiency, via the spread of markets; (3) better mechanisms for problem-solving; and (4) more political choice and openness as a result of the spread of democracy (Haynes 2005, p.8–14). NG critics of the economic liberalisation/‘marketisation’ approach point to two problems in the PG view: (1) in practice, as opposed to theory, the benefits of marketisation misrepresent the past, exaggerating state economic failures in the Middle East and elsewhere in the developing world and (2) to remove, or even drastically scale down, the state’s economic role is problematic – not least because it removes the possibility of social measures to protect the weak from market failures and the (over-) exercise of political power by autocratic leaders. In

Yilmaz_Chapter 4.indd 60

4/3/2012 11:20:03 AM

ISLAM, PLUR ALISM

AND

POLITICS

61

addition, in the NG view, economic liberalisation, an integral aspect of globalisation, has been hijacked by a market liberalism that puts the mechanisms of the market before the well-being of communities. In short, the NG view sees globalisation as negatively affecting the well-being of millions of people around the world, including in the Muslim countries. The NG critique rejects the consensus acceptance of market capitalism and argues that globalisation leads to a grossly unfair system, structured to improve the position of powerful vested interests. Overall, the NG view is that it is erroneous to accept the claims of the PG school at face value: globalisation is a highly politicised process, based in specific conditions, that creates both winners and losers. In this context, democratisation per se is not the panacea it is claimed to be, as the structural conditions accompanying globalisation undermine the possibility that democracy has the capacity to improve the lot of the disadvantaged (Haynes 2005, p.141–3). The issue of political pluralism in the ‘Islamic world’, especially among the Arab countries of the Middle East, is a defining theme of several recent books (Akbar 2002; Diamond, Plattner and Brumberg 2003; Fuller 2003; Noyon 2003; Muqtedar Khan 2006; Fattah 2006). Implicitly or explicitly, each works from a key premise: there is nothing ‘inherent’ in Islam that means that Muslim countries will ‘inevitably’ lack democratic credentials. On the one hand, however, it is widely asserted not only that many Muslim countries have few structural characteristics conducive to both democratisation and democracy, but also that things have been that way for a long time. This situation did not widely change among the Muslim countries during the two decades of the ‘third wave of democracy’, from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s, a development stimulated by deepening globalisation (Huntington 1991). On the other hand, Muslim majority countries around the world – of which there are more than 40, from Morocco in the west to Indonesia in the east, collectively home to over a billion people – do not comprise an unchanging, undemocratic monolith. This is also a key theme of many recent works on the topic of democracy in the Muslim world in the context of current globalisation, a focus that also stresses that to understand why some countries in the Muslim world have democratised while others have not, we need to

Yilmaz_Chapter 4.indd 61

4/3/2012 11:20:03 AM

62

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

look for explanations to both internal and external factors, including globalisation. In the Middle East, the region perhaps most commonly associated with the theory and practice of ‘Muslim government’ or ‘government by Muslims’, we can note three periods, encompassing a period of around 120 years, of often profound political changes: the 1860s to 1930s; late 1950s to early 1960s; and the 1970s to 1990s. We noted above that each of these periods was notable for phases of deepening globalisation: 1860s to 1930s, characterised by the global spread of nationalism, including in the Middle East following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire; the deepening of the Cold War, and the subsequent battle of ideologies that took global form in the 1950s and 1960s; and, from the 1970s, the gradual demise of the Soviet bloc and the accompanying ideology of communism, with worldwide ramifications. The first phase was characterised by significant political changes in the region as Ottoman (Turkish) imperial rule came to an end. Between the 1860s and the 1930s, national assemblies were created in a number of countries in North Africa and in the Arabian peninsula. After Ottoman rule collapsed in the aftermath of the First World War, parliamentary regimes were created under mandated British or French rule, reflecting the aegis of a newly formed global body, the League of Nations, in a number of regional countries, including: Egypt (1924–58), Iraq (1936–58), and Lebanon (1946–75). Second, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, there was a further period of significant political amendments in the region. Within the space of a few years, radical, often junior, army officers overthrew conservative governments in four key regional countries: Egypt, Iraq, Libya and Syria. Influenced by the Soviet Union’s impressive anti-colonial and antiwestern credentials, a common goal was to oust what they regarded as unacceptably unrepresentative governments, widely regarded as unforgivably subservient to Western countries, especially the governments of Britain and the USA. However, over time, it became clear that the new rulers had no intention of democratising their political systems along lines familiar to Western governments and voters. Instead, they installed authoritarian or totalitarian regimes, with the political role of the armed forces well to the fore, and sometimes

Yilmaz_Chapter 4.indd 62

4/3/2012 11:20:03 AM

ISLAM, PLUR ALISM

AND

POLITICS

63

modelled on the Communist governments of the Soviet bloc. Despite their differing political characteristics, they were all regimes with few if any conventional attributes of democracy, beyond regular, albeit heavily controlled, elections. Third, while the third wave of democracy (1970s-1990s) was not overall a time of profound political changes in the Muslim and Arab world, some Muslim countries, notably Turkey (98 per cent Muslim) and Indonesia (88 per cent Muslim), did emerge from authoritarian rule to establish democratic systems during this time. As Noyon (2003) notes, Turkey has now been a ‘functioning democracy’ since 1983, with an increasingly strong case for membership of the European Union. Indonesia emerged in 1998 from three decades of personalistic rule under General Suharto and since then the country has gradually developed a flawed yet recognisably democratic system (Ananta, Nurvidya Arifin and Suryadinata 2005; Nyman 2006). Other Muslim countries that are also noted as having embarked upon political liberalisation or democratisation include: Kuwait (85 per cent Muslim), Jordan (92 per cent), Algeria (99 per cent) and, perhaps, Tunisia (98 per cent). Collectively, these countries have begun a process of unfinished political liberalisation that appears to denote real – if somewhat tentative – moves towards more democratic polities. However, despite clear signs of political liberalisation/democratisation among a small but not insignificant group of Muslim-majority countries, much conventional wisdom would continue to insist that the great majority of Muslim countries should be characterised in two general ways: their governments (1) resist meaningful democratisation and (2) exhibit little respect for citizens’ human rights. However, while various kinds of authoritarian regimes are still the norm among such countries, many observers, including Fuller (2003), would agree that this situation is primarily the outcomes of various historical and structural characteristics. These include the following: Political systems headed by personalistic leaders. Typically, in the Muslim world such rulers preside over very hierarchical, centralised states. In many cases, the extant political system depends on top-down power and as a result rulers are most unwilling to

Yilmaz_Chapter 4.indd 63

4/3/2012 11:20:04 AM

64

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

devolve any real power to other political institutions – if they meaningfully exist, which is often not the case. Politically significant militaries. Military men quite rightly see it as their job to protect the state from attack, from within and without. Among Muslim polities, there are significant examples of armies that exist primarily to thwart challenges for political control from groups wishing to change the political status quo via rebellion or revolution. Weak and fragmented civil societies. Civil societies in Muslim countries are often weak and fragmented; as a result, they do not present a challenge to incumbent governments to encourage them to amend undemocratic behaviour. There is, in addition, what might be called the cultural and religious hegemony of Islam approach, a culturalist argument that informs the essentialist claims of new Orientalism.1 In this approach, Islam is said to be a religious system that is not beneficial to democratisation. For example, in the Middle East, the regional ubiquity and sociopolitical significance of Islam – the dominant religion in all regional countries with the clear exception of Israel and debatable exemption of Lebanon – is said to help explain not only the authoritarian nature of most governing regimes in the region but also to significantly account for political cultures of repression and passivity that are antithetical to democratic citizenship. The consequence, Karl (1995, p.79) asserts, is that most Muslim countries – both in the Middle East and elsewhere – are characterised by ‘a culture of repression and passivity that is antithetical to democratic citizenship’. In addition, as Fattah (2006, p.1) notes, ‘[t]here is no question that Muslim countries are disproportionately autocratic ... no single Muslim country qualifies today as a consolidated democracy ...’. On the other hand, others emphasise the point we made earlier: potentially or actually significant political changes are beginning to take place in the many parts of the Muslim world, including the Middle East region. Political elites in various Muslim countries are now to varying degrees engaged in political liberalisation or democratisation. These include Turkey, which has gone by far the furthest

Yilmaz_Chapter 4.indd 64

4/3/2012 11:20:04 AM

ISLAM, PLUR ALISM

AND

POLITICS

65

down the democratisation road, stimulated in part by the desire to enter the European Union, and Kuwait and Jordan, which have tentatively begun processes of political liberalisation (Khan 2006; Fattah 2006). According to Fattah (2006, p.4), ‘three predominant worldviews’ within the Muslim world influence ‘religion and governance: traditionalist Islamists, modernist Islamists, and secularists’. Traditionalists believe that they are the keepers of the Islamic traditions. It should be noted, however, that there are various kinds of traditionalist Islamists. Some propose (and/or practise) armed struggle to wrest power from governments that are seen to be ruling in un-Islamic way, such as alQaeda; some believe in incrementalist change through the ballot box, such as the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria in the early 1990s; some seek to achieve their goals by way of a combination of extra-parliamentary struggle, societal proselytisation and governmental lobbying, including the Muslim Brotherhoods of various Middle Eastern countries, including Egypt and Jordan. But despite differences in strategy and tactics, such entities have two beliefs in common: (1) politics and religion are inseparable; and (2) shari’a law should ideally be applied to all Muslims. Many also share a third concern: Muslims as a group are the focal point of a conspiracy involving Zionists and western imperialists aiming to take over Muslim-owned lands and resources (notably oil). Such a concern is underlined by American transnational corporations exercising control over Arab oil, as well as by Israel’s implacable denial of political and civil rights for its (largely Muslim) Palestinian constituency. In sum, traditionalist Islamists believe that for something to be Islamic, it must be accepted by both shari’a and ulama (Muslim clerics) and democracy is anti- or un-Islamic. Second, modernist Islamists believe that ‘Muslims can learn about anything they believe is good for themselves and society regardless of its origins’ (Fattah 2006, p.17). In other words, unlike traditionalist Islamists, modernist Islamists do not reject democracy per se as they do not find either ethical or religious problems with adoption of democratic mechanisms – as long as they are generally appropriate to Muslim beliefs. They base their acceptance on two factors: first, early Muslims adopted non-Islamic innovations and, second, democracy is

Yilmaz_Chapter 4.indd 65

4/3/2012 11:20:04 AM

66

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

not a Western invention and as a result it can be Islamised. In sum, for modernist Islamists, for something to be Islamic, it must not contradict the shari’a, while democracy is Islamic or at least ‘Islamisable’. Finally, there are the (Muslim) secularists who start from two assumptions. First, Islam does not offer a concrete guide for governance, that is, Muslim holy texts do not tell Muslims explicitly how to run their societies, especially in the twenty-first century, a period marked by profound and continuing economic, cultural and social changes. While holy texts, including the Quran, are valuable sources of ethics and morality, they are not much help in running political or economic systems at the current time. The second assumption is that Muslims need to follow what the most successful societies have done in order to outdo them. This is said to be exactly what the West did in the past by learning from Muslims and others. In sum, for secularist Muslims, for something to be Islamic, it should be in the interest of society quite regardless of holy texts. In addition, democracy is widely regarded among secularists as necessary in order to provide representative, legitimate and authoritative governments in Muslim countries.

Conclusion To what extent have democracy and pluralism made progress in Muslim countries in recent years? How does globalisation affect Muslim populations? Diamond’s view is that ‘culturally and historically, [the Muslim Middle East] has been the most difficult terrain in the world for political freedom and democracy’ (Diamond 1999, p.270). Attempts to explain why this should be the case are often linked to the political importance of Islam, wherein strong, centralised states, often led by personalistic leaders, often bequeathed by colonialism or imperialism; and strongly politicised militaries are anxious to maintain the political status quo. In these contexts, democracy and associated human rights struggle to make progress, even when encouraged by globalisation. This is not to suggest that ‘Islam’ is inherently anti-democratic. While some kinds of political Islam have qualitatively different perspectives on (Western-style, liberal) democracy than, for example, some types of Christianity, this does not imply that political Islam

Yilmaz_Chapter 4.indd 66

4/3/2012 11:20:04 AM

ISLAM, PLUR ALISM

AND

POLITICS

67

necessarily denigrates ‘democracy’ per se. Current political struggles of Islamists are primarily directed against their own typically undemocratic rulers and political systems – precisely because they are undemocratic and, in many cases, egregiously corrupt. This fits in with a key historic characteristic of politics in the Muslim world, especially in what many would see as its heartland: the Arab countries of the Middle East. Since the beginning of Islam, nearly 1400 years ago, critics of the status quo have periodically emerged in opposition to what they perceive as unjust rule. The goal of the ‘just’ in Islamic history has been to form popular consultative mechanisms (shura) in line with the Quranic idea that Muslim rulers must not only be open to popular pressure but also seek to settle problems brought by subjects to a common satisfaction. However, the concept of shura should not be equated closely with the Western notion of popular sovereignty because to many Muslims – especially those we noted above as ‘traditionalist Islamists’ – sovereignty resides with God alone. Thus shura is a way of ensuring unanimity from the ummah, the community of Muslims, which allows for no legitimate minority position. However, ‘modernist Islamists’ and ‘Muslim secularists’ do not necessarily oppose ‘Western’ liberal interpretations of democracy, unless it is seen as a system that negates God’s own sovereignty. It is partly for this reason that traditionalist Islamists are often conspicuous by their absence in demands for Western-style democratic changes. On the other hand, many more moderate Islamists accept the need for earthly rulers to seek a mandate from their constituency.

Note 1 I am grateful for this point to Hakan Yılmaz.

References Akbar, Mobashar Jawed. 2002. The Shade of Swords: Jihad and the Conflict between Islam and Christianity, London and New York: Routledge. Ananta, Aris, Nurvidya, Evi Arifin, and Suryadinata, Leo. 2005. Emerging Democracy in Indonesia, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Yilmaz_Chapter 4.indd 67

4/3/2012 11:20:04 AM

68

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

Berger, Peter. 1969. Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion, New York: Anchor Books. Berger, Peter. 2003. ‘The cultural dynamics of globalization’, in Berger, Peter and Huntington, Samuel, Many Globalizations: Cultural Diversity in the Contemporary World, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 1–17. Beyer, Peter. 1994. Religion and Globalization, London: Sage. Beyer, Peter. 2006. Religions in Global Society, London: Routledge. Bruce, Steve. 2003. God Is Dead: Secularization in the West (Religion and Spirituality in the Modern World), Oxford: Blackwell. Clark, Ian. 1997. Globalisation and Fragmentation, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Diamond, Larry. 1999. Developing Democracy. Toward Consolidation, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Diamond, Larry, Plattner, Marc F., and Brumberg, Daniel (eds). 2003. Islam and Democracy in the Middle East, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Fattah, Moataz. A. 2006. Democratic Values in the Muslim World, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Ferguson, Niall. 2003. ‘What is power’, Hoover Digest, 2, pp.1–4. Available at: http://www.hooverdigest.org/032/ferguson.html. Last accessed 14 April 2006. Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. The End of History and the Last Man, London: Penguin. Fuller, Graham. 2003. The Future of Political Islam, New York and Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. Haynes, Jeffrey. 1996. Religion, Fundamentalism and Identity: A Global Perspective, Discussion Paper no.65, Geneva: UNRISD. Haynes, Jeffrey. 2005. Comparative Politics in a Globalizing World, Cambridge: Polity. Haynes, Jeffrey. 2007. An Introduction to International Relations and Religion, London: Pearson. Held, David and McGrew, Anthony. 2002. Globalization /Anti-Globalization, Cambridge: Polity. Heristchi, Claire and Teti, Andrea. 2006. ‘Rethinking the myths of Islamic politics’, in Haynes, J., (ed.), The Politics of Religion: A Survey, London: Routledge, pp.25–36. Huntington, Samuel. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. Huntington, Samuel. 1996. The Clash of Civilizations, New York: Simon and Schuster. Juergensmeyer, Mark. 2005. ‘Religion in the new global order’, 7pp. Available at: http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/programs/sac/paper%20pdfs/ marks%20paper.pdf. Last accessed 18 April 2006. Khan, Muqtedar M.A., (ed.). 2006. Islamic Democratic Discourse: Theories, Debates and Philosophical Perspectives, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.

Yilmaz_Chapter 4.indd 68

4/3/2012 11:20:04 AM

ISLAM, PLUR ALISM

AND

POLITICS

69

Keohane, Robert. 2002. ‘The globalization of informal violence, theories of world politics, and the “liberalism of fear” ’, Dialog-IO, Spring 2002, pp.29–43. Kurtz, Lester. 1995. Gods in the Global Village, Pine Forge: Sage. Noyon, Jennifer. 2003. Islam, Politics and Pluralism: Theory and Practice in Turkey, Jordan, Tunisia and Algeria, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs. Nye, Joseph. 2002. ‘Globalism versus globalization’, The Globalist (‘the daily online magazine on the global economy, politics and culture’), 15 April. Available at: http://www.theglobalist.com/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=2392. Last accessed 13 April 2006. Nyman, Mikaela. 2006. Democratizing Indonesia: The Challenges of Civil Society in the Era of Reformasi, Copenhagen: NIAS Press. Reychler, Luc. 1997. ‘Religion and conflict’, The International Journal of Peace Studies, 2 (1), pp.1–16. Available at: http://www.gmu.edu/academic/ijps/ vol2_1/Reyschler.htm. Last accessed 14 April 2006. Robertson, Roland. 1995. Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture, London: Sage. Said, Edward W. 1978. Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient, Harmondworth: Penguin. Said, Edward W. 1993. Culture and Imperialism, London: Vintage. Spickard, James. 2001. ‘Tribes and cities: towards an Islamic sociology of religion’, Social Compass, 48, pp.103–116. Spickard, James. 2003. ‘What is happening to religion? Six sociological narratives’. Available at: http://www.ku.dk/Satsning/Religion/indhold/publikationer/ working_papers/what_is_happened.PDF. Last accessed 2 January 2008. Turner, Brian S. 1978. Marx and the End of Orientalism, London: Allen and Unwin. Turner, Brian S. 1994. Orientalism, Postmodernism and Globalism, London: Routledge. Warburg, Margit. 2001. ‘Religious organisations in a global world. A comparative perspective’, University of Copenhagen, Denmark. Paper presented at the 2001 International Conference, ‘The Spiritual Supermarket: Religious Pluralism in the 21st Century, 19–22 April, London School of Economics and Political Science. Zemni, Samni. 2002. ‘Islam, European identity and the limits of multiculturalism’, in Shadid, Wasif and van Koningsveld, Pieter (eds), Religious Freedom and the Neutrality of the State: The Position of the European Union, Leuven: Peeters, pp.158–173.

Yilmaz_Chapter 4.indd 69

4/3/2012 11:20:04 AM

Yilmaz_Chapter 4.indd 70

4/3/2012 11:20:04 AM

CHAPTER 1 ISL A M AND EUROPEAN MODER NIT Y IN HISTOR ICAL PER SPECTIVE: TOWAR DS A COSMOPOLITAN PER SPECTIVE Gerard Delanty

Rethinking the nature of the relationship between Europe and Islam in our own time surely requires a re-evaluation of our perceptions of history. In this chapter, I argue that Islam is a part of the European civilisational heritage and that as a result of migration in recent decades, a European Islam now exists and can be viewed as the latest expression of a long history of EuropeanIslamic links. Central to my argument is the claim that modernity took many different forms and unfolded as a transformative logic within Europe and within Islam. This chapter is structured around three central questions: Did European modernity unfold in a way that excluded Islam? Did modernity emerge only out of the secularisation of Christianity and as a result is modernity secular? Is modernity European?

Yilmaz_Chapter 1.indd 13

4/3/2012 11:17:43 AM

14

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

European Modernity and Its Others It is often argued that Europe emerged out of a process of selfdefinition in which Islam served as the ‘Other’ of the European ‘Self’. Unfortunately, I have contributed to this argument myself with the claim that due to the highly differentiated and conflict-ridden nature of Europe, there was no central unifying cultural or political identity that could provide an identity for Europe for long (Delanty 1995). As a result, the West became defined by the East, whose referent was variously Persia, Islam, the romantic Orient, and communism. As the East changed, so too did the West. This argument, which was influenced by the notion that Europe is a discourse in which power and culture are mutually self-explicating, needs to be modified and nuanced in order to go beyond the wrong impression that the relation between East and West was always antagonistic and binary. So what was the relationship? I suggest that the relation between Europe and Islam was threefold and that these three modes of relating to Islam have been present in every era, with some being more pronounced than the others: xenophobia, fantasy and translation. The first two are probably more obvious and I will concentrate on the third. I argue that the nature of the relation between Self and Other was variable, with the Self also being in part an Other. There is no simple boundary between an European Self and an Islamic Other, rather Self and Other have been mutually implicated to a point that we need a new kind of analysis, which I call a cosmopolitan civilisational approach (Delanty 2006a). Islam has been an object of fear since its expansion into Europe in 711 CE, when the European frontier was effectively the Pyrenees. The Muslim conquest of Spain almost was extended to France until its defeat at Tours in 732 and although further expansion was halted by Charlemagne’s defeat of the Moors in 778, Europe was on the defensive against Islam. Later, to sum up a well-known story, the Fall of Constantinople in 1453 led to the rise of an Islamic power and the fall of eastern Christianity. On the western front, at much the same time, a much embellished Latin Christian civilisation defeated the Moors under the Spanish leadership. What emerged in the sixteenth century,

Yilmaz_Chapter 1.indd 14

4/3/2012 11:17:43 AM

ISLAM

AND

EUROPEAN MODERNITY

15

then, was a Western European civilisation that was temporarily united by Christianity. It is difficult to assess the extent to which the Christian West needed Islam to define itself and exactly to what degree it was a threat. By the time of the last onslaught on Vienna in 1683, the Ottoman Empire’s military strength had waned and probably did not present a threat to Europe. But it is possible to speculate that the image of the Other continued to exercise a certain focus of hostility for Europe (Sayyid 2003). This should not be exaggerated. There is in fact not a lot of evidence to show that this was the defining tenet of Western xenophobia. In fact, it was the Jews who were the Others, and it was often the enemy within rather than the enemy outside that was more significant in defining European self-identity. Indeed, when many Europeans referred to the despotism of the East, this was often in praise. As Clarke points out, Enlightenment intellectuals, who were mostly ancient regime supporters, looked to China for an ideal model of despotism, a despotism based on the exercise of legal authority rather than whim (Clarke 1997, p.4). The second aspect of the relation was one of fantasy. Since the outside lacked a certain reality, it had to be invented and imagined. Edward Said has written the most detailed examination of this culture of fantasy, which in his analysis was driven by the imperial quest to conquer the Other (Said 1979). Cultural and intellectual power invented the Orient in a way that prepared for its political and economic domination by the West. This thesis has led to a now huge literature on the unknowable Other where Islam appears to be an expression of the other face of the Enlightenment’s Reason. This could also take the form of self-critique, as in Montesquieu’s Persian Letters, where Persia becomes a foil for a critique of the court culture. This brings me to the third mode of relating to Islam, which I term the mode of translation. This is not so much a separate mode, but a mode of cultural transmission. The first point to make is that despite the religious hostilities between Europe and Islam, Christianity had not gained hegemonic status at the time of the spread of Islam. The relation between Muslims and other groups was a good deal more diffuse than it was to become in later centuries. As is well known,

Yilmaz_Chapter 1.indd 15

4/3/2012 11:17:43 AM

22

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

dissenters and much of the Protestant reformation for freedom of worship provided the conditions for the recognition of other kinds of liberty, although largely only for Christian churches. While this took many forms – in England leading to an established Church – the position that emerged from the end of the seventeenth century, while being very far from late modern pluralism, was part of the movement towards the democratisation of state power. Eventually too it led to the removal of the social and political exclusion of the Jews. In sum, secularisation means different things: it refers to the separation of the legal foundations of the state from religion, but it can also mean the separation of science and knowledge from faith, and it can mean the decline or rationalisation of religious belief in terms of the erosion of the difference of the sacred and profane. These remarks serve as a background to the current situation in Europe and hopefully put into context some of the inaccurate claims made about European secularism as a entailing the banishment of religion. I have argued that European political modernity to a very large degree has been influenced greatly by religion and the different forms of secularisation – the constitutional conservative and republican traditions – did not eradicate religion from society, but granted it a particular place and set conditions to its existence in the public domain. The separation of public and private was never complete and final in the way that it was in the United States and religion did exist within the public domain in most European countries. The result was that European secularism has been highly ambivalent; on the one side, the existence of either established churches or socially privileged churches often led to discrimination of members of other faiths, in particular Jews, while, on the other hand, European secularism has been such that there is no fundamental obstacle to a limited presence of religion in the public sphere and there has been a long tradition of the freedom of worship. This is one of the paradoxes of European secularism, but which should be understood as the containment of religion. There has never been an American style secularisation of church and state in Europe. Contrary to a commonly held view, France did not separate church and state until 1905, in the wake of the Dreyfus affair, although there was a gradual movement towards secularisation from

Yilmaz_Chapter 1.indd 22

4/3/2012 11:17:43 AM

Yilmaz_Chapter 1.indd 28

4/3/2012 11:17:44 AM

18 Comments of M. Marceau, correspondent of Le Monde in Athens. AMAE, Europe 1944–60, Grèce v. 141, 0217–0219. 19 AMAE, Europe 1944–60, Grèce, v. 141, pp.107–24. 20 AMAE, Europe 1944–60, Grèce, v. 141, pp.52–60. 21 For the term ‘Ethnarch’, see Anagnostopoulou (1997, pp.419–553). 22 For the nationalisation of the term ‘Ethnarch’, see Anagnostopoulou (2004, pp.37–55). 23 Cypriot Parliamentary Proceedings, v. 1, 1961, B’ Period, Nicosia 1990, p.370.

References Primary Sources AMAE [Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères-France], Europe 1944–60, Grèce, v. 140, pp.232–8. AMAE, Europe 1944–60, Grèce, v. 141, Consulat Général de France, İstanbul, le 12/9/1955. AMAE, Europe 1944–60, Grèce, v. 141, pp.107–4. AMAE, Europe 1944–60, Grèce, v. 141, pp.52–60. AMAE, Europe 1944–60, Grèce v. 141, pp.0217–9. AMAE, Europe 1944–60, Grèce, v. 141, pp.10–36. AMAE, Europe 1944–60, Grèce, v. 141, pp.52–60. AMAE, E-Levant: 1918–40, Turquie, v. 570 (Affaires musulmanes). Cypriot Parliamentary Proceedings, v. 1, 1961, B’ Period, Nicosia, 1990, p. 370. U.S.A. National Archives, Foreign Office Dispatch no. 138, İstanbul, 29 September 1955.

Books and articles Al-Ahsan, Abdullah. 1992. Ummah or Nation? Identity Crisis in Contemporary Muslim Society, Leicester: The Islamic Foundation. Anagnostopoulou, Sia. 1997. Μικρά Ασία, 19ος αι.–1919. Οι Ελληνορθόδοξες κοινότητες. Α πό το Μιλλέτ των Ρωμιών στο Ελληνικό Έθνος [Asia Minor, 19th c.–1919. The Greek-orthodox communities. From the Millet of Rums to the Greek Nation], Athens: Ellinika Grammata. Anagnostopoulou, Sia. 2004. ‘Eglise oecuménique, église nationale. Le problème des rapports entre religion et nation dans les Balkans, XIXème début XXeme siècles. L’exemple grec’, in Anagnostopoulou, Sia. The Passage from the Ottoman Empire to the Nation-States, İstanbul: Isis. Anagnostopoulou, Sia. 2004. ‘The Terms Millet, Genos, Ethnos, Oikoumenikotita, Alytrotismos in Greek Historiography’ in Anagnostopoulou, Sia. The Passage from the Ottoman Empire to the Nation-States, İstanbul: Isis.

Yilmaz_Chapter 5.indd 84

4/3/2012 2:47:48 PM

Berkes, Niyazi. 1998. The Development of Secularism in Turkey, London: Hurst and Co. Çetinsaya, Gökhan. 2001. ‘Islâmi Vatanseverlikten Islâm Siyasetine’ [From Islamic Patriotism to Islamic Politics], Modern Türkiye´ de Siyasi Düşünce [The Political Thought in Modern Turkey], v. 1, İstanbul: İletişim yayınları, pp.265–2. Davison, Roderic. 1963. Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856–1876, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Deringil, Selim. 1991. ‘Legitimacy Structures in the Ottoman State: The Reign of Abdül Hamid II (1876–1909)’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 23, pp.345–59. Deringil, Selim. 1993. ‘The Ottoman Origins of Kemalist Nationalism: Namık Kemal to Mustafa Kemal’, European History Quarterly, 23 (2), pp.166–91. Deringil, Selim. 1998. The Well Protected Domains: Ideology and the legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire 1878–1909, London and New York: I.B.Tauris. Duguid, Stephen. 1973. ‘The Politics of Unity: Hamidian Policy in Eastern Anatolia’, Middle Eastern Studies, 9, pp.139–55. Edwards, Michael. 1994. British India 1772–1947: A Survey of the Nature and Effects of Alien Rule, London: Sidgwick and Jackson. Engelhardt, Eduard. 1882–1884. La Turquie et le Tanzimat ou histoire des Réformes dans l´Empire ottoman depuis 1826 jusqu´ à nos jours, 2 v, Paris: A. Cotillon et cie. Findley, Carter V. 1982. ‘The Advent of Ideology in the Islamic Middle East’, Studia Islamica, 55, pp.143–69. Gedeon, Manouel. 1976. Η πνευματική κίνησις του Γένους κατά τον ΙΗ και ΙΘ αιώνα [The cultural movement of the Nation during the 18th and 19thc.], Athens: Ermis. Georgeon, Francois. 2003. Abdulhamid II. Le sultan calife (1876–1909), Paris: Fayard. Gürel, Şükrü Sina. 1984. Kıbrıs tarihi (1878–1960). Kolonyalizm, Ulusçuluk ve Uluslararası Politika [History of Cyprus (1878–1960). Colonialism, Nationalism and International Politics], v. I., Ankara: Kaynak Yayınları. Kara, İsmail. 2001. ‘Islâm Düşüncesinde Paradigma Değişimi. Hem Batılılaşalım hem de Müslüman Kalalım’ [The Change of Paradigm in Islamic Thought. Let’s Westernise and let’s stay Muslim], Modern Türkiye´ de Siyasî Düşünce [Political Thought in Modern Turkey], v.I, İstanbul: İletişim yayınları, pp.234–64. Kılıçbay, Mehmet Ali. 1985. ‘Osmanlı Batılılaşması’ [The Ottoman Westernisation], Tanzimat´tan Cumhuriyet´e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi [The Encyclopedia of Turkey from the Tanzimat to the Republic], v.I, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, pp.147–52. Kranidiotis, Nikos. 1985. Ανοχύρωτη ∏ολιτεία, Κύπρος 1960–1974 [Open City, Cyprus 1960–1974), Athens: ‘Vivliopolion tis Estias’.

Yilmaz_Chapter 5.indd 85

4/3/2012 2:47:48 PM

Mardin, Şerif. 1962. The Genesis of the Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernisation of Turkish Political Ideas, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Ortaylı, İlber. 1985. ‘Batılılaşma Sorunu’ [The Question of Westernisation], Tanzimat´tan Cumhuriyet´e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi [The Encyclopedia of Turkey from the Tanzimat to the Republic], v.I, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, pp.134–8. Ortaylı, İlber. 1999. Imparatorluğun En Üzün Yüzyılı [The Longest Century of the Empire], İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları. Papageorgiou, Spyros. 2000. Τα Κρίσιμα Ντοκουμέντα του Κυπριακού [The Critical Documents of the Cypriot Problem], I-III v, Nicosia: K. Epiphaniou. Pharmakides, Theoklitos. 1840. Α πολογία[Apology], Athens. Skopetea, Elli. 1988. Το πρότυπο βασίλειο και η Μεγάλη Ιδέα: όψεις του εθνικού προβλή ματος στην Ελλάδα 1830–1880 [The Prototype Kingdom and the Great Idea: Aspects of the National Question in Greece 1830– 1888], Athens: Polytypo. Stora, Benjamin. 2004. Histoire de l’Algerie coloniale (1830–1954), Paris: La Decouverte. Timur, Taner. 1985. ‘Osmanlı ve Batılılaşma’ [The Ottomans and the Westernisation], Tanzimat´tan Cumhuriyet´e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi [The Encyclopedia of Turkey from the Tanzimat to the Republic], v.I, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, pp.139–46. Valetas, Georgios. 1949. ∏ατρική Διδασκαλία [Fatherly Exhortation], Athens: Pigi. Vryonis, Spyros. 2005. The Mechanism of Catastrophe. The Turkish Pogrom of 6–7 September 1955, and the Destruction of the Greek Community of İstanbul, New York: Grekworks.com.

Yilmaz_Chapter 5.indd 86

4/3/2012 2:47:48 PM

CHAPTER 6 ISL A M AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: EXPLOR ING THE ISSUE OF DISCR IMINATION Çağla E. Aykaç

Rethinking Europe through rethinking Islam today involves asking whether and how the European Union (EU) ‘thinks’ about itself in relation to Muslims and Islam. The conjuncture is particularly significant as the EU is today trying to keep pace with the challenges posed by enlargement and the deepening of its institutional links, while struggling to position itself in a unified manner on the global scene. The EU is in a key phase of its construction where its relations with Muslims within and beyond its borders appear to bear influence on all the above cited challenges, and thus ultimately on the development of the Union. This chapter proposes to question the ways in which the EU thinks of Muslims through an analysis of the EU’s anti-discrimination and particularly its anti-racist agenda. We propose to question the basic assumptions, categories and terms used by the EU when thinking of Muslims in Europe with a focus on the activities, research agenda, conclusions and policy proposals of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC). Research on Muslims in

Yilmaz_Chapter 6.indd 89

4/3/2012 11:25:20 AM

90

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

Europe today understandably tends to focus on national frameworks, as there are very wide differences between EU Member States with regard to state-church relations, demographics, history, and social and political dynamics. The EU dimension should contribute to a crossnational thinking about whether and how Europe thinks of itself in relation to Islam and Muslims. Here, the competency of the EU is limited to guaranteeing respect for the religious rights of all European faith communities. Although religious issues remain within the competence of Member States, the EU has been undergoing a process of institutionalising its relations with religious communities (Silvestri 2005). In effect, the place of religion in the EU today increasingly is being questioned from a number of different perspectives. The last wave of enlargement and the process of deepening of the EU have brought with them new challenges, among which one finds religious matters. The debates that took place around the inclusion of a reference to the religious identity of the EU in the Constitutional Treaty, for example, are illustrative of the challenge that religion poses to a European identity in construction. While some argue in favour of a reference to the ‘Judeo-Christian heritage’ of Europe, others argue in favour of a political identity for the EU that would not incorporate religious references. Europe today is not uniform or homogeneous in terms of its relation or vision for its identity in general terms. The place of religion in Europe is thus a contemporary issue, independently of questions related to Islam. These debates highlight the historical and doctrinal fault lines and power dynamics that always have existed within Christianity in Europe. This said, Islam today seems to add nuances and a sense of urgency to the ways in which issues related to religion are considered in Europe. The debates that took place around the negotiation process between Turkey and the EU are quite illustrative of the ways in which Islam highlights contradictions and alters positions that seemed to be rigid, such as that of France on the question of secularism (laïcité). The fact that the majority of secular Turkey’s population is Muslim has in effect triggered wide public opinion/ reactions and has been used as a political tool by politicians throughout Europe. Reference to the Judeo-Christian heritage of Europe that was contested in the

Yilmaz_Chapter 6.indd 90

4/3/2012 11:25:20 AM

ISLAM

AND THE

EUROPEAN UNION

91

constitutional debates then appeared to more justified. Islam seems to highlight contradictions that, if explored, could prove to be extremely fertile in thinking Europe. Religion thus today figures as one of the issues debated in the process of the construction of the EU. Institutionalising relations with Islam, which also figures on the agenda of most EU Member States, is not an easy or an unproblematic task. The issues that involve Muslims and Islam in Europe go beyond the religious field and the issue of religious freedom. This can be illustrated best by the fact that they cut through different policy fields of the EU such as external relations, justice, security and liberty, and social and employment affairs. This means that issues dealing with Islam and Muslims are treated not only within structures that address questions related to religion, but also fall within frameworks that are concerned with such areas as security, employment, discrimination, racism and foreign relations. Islam in Europe today does not refer simply to religious practice. In this chapter, we will not address issues that concern Islam in the framework of the external relations of the EU, which are addressed principally through the European Neighborhood policies and more specifically through the Barcelona Process. We choose here to take a perspective that focuses on developments that are ‘internal’ to the EU, as Islam and Muslims can in effect no longer be considered to be ‘outside’ or distant to and from Europe. As underlined by Göle, it is in Europe that the question of the contemporaneity of Islam poses itself as a determining issue, as it is in Europe that proximity is greatest. It is because Europe is today home to Muslims and Islam that the question of cohabitation poses itself with such urgency (Göle 2005). The new challenges that emerge from the encounter thus come specifically from the interior of Europe. This perspective does not aim to argue that throughout contemporary history (and still today), Third World countries have not borne influence on the formations and formulations of Islam in Europe. Their role is undeniable and touches upon fields as diverse and controversial as the training of imams, contributions of all sorts to the construction of social networks, mosques, educational institutions and ideological formations. It also is hardly deniable

Yilmaz_Chapter 6.indd 91

4/3/2012 11:25:20 AM

92

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

that the minds and mentalities of all Europeans, irrespective of their religious affiliations, have been and are still being marked by international events such as the Iranian Revolution, the conflicts in the Middle East, or the ‘War on Terror’. In this chapter, however, we focus on the ways in which the EU thinks and conceptualises ‘its’ Muslims and ‘its’ Islam, independently from Third World countries, yet always in pace with global trends and international developments. It is in the Social and Employment Affairs DG of the European Commission that issues dealing with Muslims and Islam are being treated most explicitly. Research, projects and policy recommendations that focus on Muslims are the product of the work of the European Monitoring Centre on Race and Xenophobia (EUMC) in Vienna, the organ of the EU that deals with racism and xenophobia. The EUMC works through the European Information Network on Racism and Xenophobia (RAXEN) designed to collect data and information through 25 national Focal Points, one in each member state. Each National Focal Point (NFP) is commissioned to set up national information networks that include governmental institutions, NGOs, and research institutes. In legislative terms, issues dealing with racism fall under the anti-discrimination legislative framework of the EU that was developed in the late 1990s on the basis of the gender equality legislation of the 1970s. Article 13 of the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty and its two equality directives, the Racial Equality Directive (2000/43/ EC) and the Employment Directive (2000/78/EC), extended the field of competence of the EU with regard to discrimination on the basis of racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, age, disability, and sexual orientation. The EUMC holds a key position in this framework as it is vested with the mission of monitoring, evaluating, and devising policy on issues related to discrimination in Europe. Programs or punctual missions focusing on Islam come later and run parallel to other activities of the EUMC, which focuses on collecting data, determining methodology, constructing networks, and developing policy to address issues related to discrimination and racism in Europe. Although these general activities do not focus on Muslims in particular, they are highly relevant for the purpose of this chapter. The EUMC, in its general reports and activities, highlights the existence of

Yilmaz_Chapter 6.indd 92

4/3/2012 11:25:20 AM

ISLAM

AND THE

EUROPEAN UNION

93

both institutional and symbolic forms of racism in Europe, and poses racism and discrimination on the European agenda as a long-term concern. The structural aspects of racism that involve the functioning of institutions are addressed through a series of research activities on the situation of migrants and minorities in the fields of employment, education, and housing in Member States. Briefly, reports on discrimination in housing highlight that migrants and minorities live in comparatively poorer housing conditions than majority groups. Reports on education shows that educational achievement among minorities is lower than that of the majority groups. The report on employment highlights the relatively disadvantaged position of migrants and minorities in relation to employment with migrants disproportionately employed in low-skilled, low-paid professions. There are no references to Muslims specifically in these general studies about discrimination in Europe. Here, the EU prefers to use the terminology ‘minorities and migrants’ in order to refer to groups that are vulnerable to racism and xenophobia. The term tries to encompass all the different terms and categories used in all Member States when referring to groups that are vulnerable to discrimination. This said, the general trends about institutional discrimination cited above apply to Muslims, who in general terms fall into the category of ‘minorities and migrants’. Muslims in Europe are thus, as part of a larger group comprised of other migrants and minorities, faced with forms of institutional discrimination that puts them at disadvantage with regard to employment, education, housing, and thus social mobility in general terms. As underlined by Wievorka, such forms of institutional racism in Europe can exist without being related to racist discourse or ideology as they are embedded in the structures of and functioning of EU Member States (Wievorka 1998). In addition to these general studies where there are no references to specific groups, the EUMC produces targeted reports to address the situation of groups that are considered to be particularly vulnerable to racism in Europe. There are such reports on anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, and discrimination against Gypsies. Reports on ‘Islamophobia’ started in the post-9/11 period, when a series of country reports on Anti-Islamic reaction in the EU after the terrorist attacks

Yilmaz_Chapter 6.indd 93

4/3/2012 11:25:20 AM

94

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

were commissioned. These were first published in 2001 and then condensed in the Summary Report on Islamophobia in the EU after 11 September 2001 published in May 2002. European Commissioner for Employment and Social Affairs, Anna Diamantopoulu, further convened three workshops for expert academics and policy makers to discuss ethnic and religious discrimination in the EU with a particular focus on anti-Semitism (December 2002) Islamophobia (February 2003), and Intercultural Dialogue (March 2003). The 7/7 London bombings also were followed by a series of monitoring activities and reports on violence against Muslims in Europe.1 Thus 9/11 appears as the trigger to compiling data on racist violence targeted at Muslims in particular. Taking 9/11 as a starting point reflects a concern that Muslims in Europe will suffer increased levels of racist violence as a consequence of the terror attacks in the name of Islam. It points to a concern that terrorism and Islam might be equated, leading to associations that in turn have led to increased levels of racism directed at Muslims in particular. The outcome of the research on Islamophobia seems to legitimise the commissioning of these reports after 9/11. They highlight a number of different types of violence following the attacks. Mosques, Islamic cultural centres, schools, and businesses owned by Muslims have been damaged and made targets of racist graffiti. Verbal abuse, harassment, and physical aggression have been the most common types of violence experienced by individual Muslims. They also point to the importance of ‘visual identifiers’ as determining violence, and to the fact that it is not only Muslims but also migrants in general that have suffered the consequences of terror attacks. ‘Visual identifiers’ ranging from dress codes to physical appearance are identified by the EUMC as determining racist violence or harassment. Some reports, such as that of the Raxen point in Luxembourg, attribute the low instances of aggression and violence to the ‘invisibility of the Islamic community’. Muslims today in Europe mark the European public space with new symbolic forms (Göle and Amman 2006). As noted by Dassetto, the edification of prayer rooms and mosques in Europe have posed little problem as long as they remain in disaffected areas with low visibility (Dassetto 2005). It is when

Yilmaz_Chapter 6.indd 94

4/3/2012 11:25:20 AM

ISLAM

AND THE

EUROPEAN UNION

95

aesthetic and symbolic forms that are explicitly Muslim start altering the European public sphere that problems arise. Likewise, veiled women have been recognisably particularly vulnerable to aggression in the post-9/11 context. The wearing of the veil by women increases the visibility of Muslims in Europe. It is alternatively interpreted as a sign of an increasing Islamisation of Europe, a proof of the male domination and female subordination inherent in Islam, as a marker of religious freedom and belief, or as a tool for increased female mobility. The veil poses a challenge in most EU Member States, particularly when it comes to public instances. In our framework, it appears as an element that increases the vulnerability of women in face of racist and discriminatory practice. As such, it needs to be considered at a juncture where Muslim women face multiple forms of discrimination, which include gender and religious freedom issues. Women’s bodies clearly appear to be a primary site where the politics of Islam are being acted out. Interestingly, Sikh men wearing the turban, for example, also have been found to be victims of attacks. In addition, it was underlined in the reports that those that ‘look’ Muslim, including those that appear to be of ‘Arab descent’, were most targeted. Aesthetics thus appear to be fundamental in the expression of social tensions in Europe. Physical appearance and dress become determining. Assimilation and similarity of appearance therefore appear to be highly relevant factors in establishing to what extent ‘others’ are accepted in Europe today. These results thus legitimate the compilation of data and research on violence against Muslims in the aftermath of 9/11 and other ‘crises’ such as the 7/7 London bombings. While the outcome of these research activities prove their relevance, it is important to underline that the concept of ‘crisis’ can contribute to obscuring the debate on racism (Balibar 1989b). In effect, focusing on the post-9/11 context implies concentrating on a ‘racism of crisis’, in other words, forms of racism that appear in response to crisis. In such a context, the primary goal appears to be to trace anti-Muslims or anti-Islamic actions and reactions and to devise good practices for ‘reducing prejudice, violence and aggression’. Thus, 9/11 appears as the starting point of a global crisis provoked by terror, which has resulted in increased levels of suspicion, discrimination, and violence against Muslims in Europe.

Yilmaz_Chapter 6.indd 95

4/3/2012 11:25:20 AM

96

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

However, as underlined by Balibar, the concept of ‘crisis’ needs to be understood as a reciprocal relation between ‘racism of crisis’ and ‘crisis of racism’ in order to fulfill its descriptive function. In our context, this would imply widening our understanding the ‘crisis’ in question so as to incorporate its multiple dimensions. If there is a racism of crisis in Europe today, there is also a crisis of racism, and both need to be considered hand in hand in order to understand the issues at stake. In other words, the focus on the ‘crisis’ of 9/11 or the London bombings contributes to creating a sense of cause-effect relations between terrorism and Islamophobia if it is not considered within the wider context of a Europe where multiple forms of racism exist. The work of the EUMC underlines that the attacks were followed by temporary peaks in violence that were not particularly significant as there were already very high pre-existing levels of violence and discrimination before the attacks. ‘Islamophobia’ thus does not seem to be triggered by contemporary terrorism, it was a pre-9/11 European contemporary reality. It thus needs to be understood in relation to more general trends that highlight the multiple forms of discrimination and racism that exist in Europe not just against Muslims, but against migrants and minorities in general. It can be said, that the process of rethinking in Europe, from this perspective, involves recognition of both a crisis of racism through the general studies of the EUMC on racism and discrimination in Europe, and of a racism of crisis through its work on Muslims. However, it can also be argued that the recognition of the link between both remains weak and thus contributes to obscuring the current debate on the place and position of Muslims in Europe today. The way in which Europe contextualises its relation to Muslims is thus key considering whether and how Europe thinks or rethinks itself through its approach to Islam and Muslims. As Lentin notes in her work on anti-racism in Europe, the contextualisation of antiracist discourse also requires its historicisation (Lentin 2004). From the perspective of this chapter, it implies looking specifically at the ways in which Islamophobia is or is not historicised from an EU perspective. In general terms, it can be argued that historicisation does not figure as a real concern at the level of the EU. This said, there

Yilmaz_Chapter 6.indd 96

4/3/2012 11:25:20 AM

ISLAM

AND THE

EUROPEAN UNION

97

are discursive forms that appear repeatedly and take the form of canons that blur the need to recognise the highly political significance of the ways in which history is told in Europe today. Odile Quintin, Director General of Employment and Social Affairs in the European Commission, for example, in the context of her opening speech to the roundtable on Islamophobia, began saying, ‘In Europe, Islamophobia has a history almost as long as that of anti-Semitism.’ Her historical overview started with the Crusades, and ran through the expulsion of the Spanish Jews and the ‘reconquest’ over the Muslims. She then touched upon the times where the ‘border with the Ottomans were recognised to be those of Europe,’ and noted that Islam was then confined to Bosnia and Albania. Quintin then skipped to immigration from Muslim countries to explicate the ways in which Islam took place in ‘our society’. She then moved into a review of ‘contemporary history’ where the landmarks were the Iranian revolution, the Algerian Islamists, the Taliban, Afghanistan, Chechnya, and 9/112. With some variations, this mode of historicisation quite commonly has become taken for granted and seems to apply to all and every context where issues related to ‘Muslims’ and Europe are being treated. It is interesting to underline that this kind of periodisation rarely provides a historicisation of Islamophobia as a form of racism. Its focus is on the presence of Muslims on European soil, on landmarks of military and religious conflicts, and on violence perpetrated by Muslim extremists. While these references are necessary in understanding contemporary history, their exclusive use and their explicative assumptions pose a problem in the process of re-thinking Europe. Thinking about the history of Islamophobia in Europe ought to refer primarily to the ideological, historical, political, and economic developments of Europe. A rethinking would involve a context that incorporates a vision of European history with references to the intricate relations that exists between European nationalisms, colonialisms, and racisms (Balibar 1988; Lentin 2005). In addition, a rethinking also would involve a reformulation of historical symbolic forms in Europe. As underlined by Göle, for example, the destruction and reconstruction of the Mostar Bridge is not less significant than 9/11 is in terms of thinking about Europe through the lens of Islam (Göle 2005).

Yilmaz_Chapter 6.indd 97

4/3/2012 11:25:20 AM

98

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

However, as highlighted by Göle, Mostar does not seem to bear close to the weight of the Twin Towers in the construction of the European collective memory today. The current trends in the hierarchisation of sites of memory and symbolic forms in Europe influences the process of re-thinking Europe today in a way that does not truly transcribe the complexity of its historical heritage. An additional part of the rethinking process involves questioning the categories, terminology, and methodology used to gather information on Muslims in Europe. Robert Purkiss, Chairman of the EUMC Management Board, in his remarks on Islamophobia and European identity, says: ‘What we know is that Islamophobia directly affects European Muslims in many aspects of their daily lives, and has done so for a very long time. Europe is home to between 12 and 18 million Muslims, which makes Islam the second largest religion in Europe. Most Muslims live in France (3.5–4 million), followed by Germany (2.5–3 million) and Britain (1.8 million). Muslim citizens and residents are an integral part of our European population’. Again, as in the case of historicisation, this introduction to the numbers of Muslims living in Europe seems to have become common knowledge. There are around 15 million Muslims in Europe today. Some are European citizens, many hold temporary resident status, and yet others are ‘illegal’. Muslims in Europe vary greatly in terms of their rights and duties in Europe, be it due to their own personal trajectories, their generational determinants, social class, or the national political and social contexts in which they dwell. Fifteen million Muslims live in Europe today. These numbers refer to a category of the European population that is rarely questioned, yet is in reality quite ambiguous. Does it refer to practicing Muslims? To the number of people registered in mosques? Does this category refer to religious affiliation or practice, race or ethnicity, citizenship or descendence? In practice, it seems to refer to all people that originally come from countries where Muslims are in the majority. The vagueness of the term in itself highlights the ways in which the rethinking process ought to involve a terminological rethinking implying a reconsideration of categories. The issue holds a political significance when the numbers are used in devising policy or conducting research. They can create real

Yilmaz_Chapter 6.indd 98

4/3/2012 11:25:20 AM

ISLAM

AND THE

EUROPEAN UNION

99

methodological inconsistencies when it is assumed that the totality of these approximately 15 million people refer to their identity primarily in religious terms. In addition, this mode of categorisation implies that the Muslims in Europe are a homogeneous entity. It does not account for the differences in degrees and modes of worship, nor for the diversity in the class, languages, countries of origin, or generational differences that today exists in Europe and influence the lived experiences of ‘Muslims’ in Europe. The issue is particularly problematic when the category of the Muslim is interpreted solely in relation to religious issues or as a measure for the place and importance of ‘Islam’ as a religion in Europe and used as a basis for evaluating policy priorities. The problem of naming and categorising in the work of the EUMC is not particular to the Muslim population. It is a very contemporary problem in a multicultural Europe transformed both through the recent weakening of internal borders within the Union, and the migration trends of the past fifty years. For our concerns, it also applies in naming and targeting the populations that are vulnerable to discrimination and racism in Europe. At the level of the EU, the development and standardisation of data collection systems figure as one of the principal policy priorities in the field. Europe is today admittedly struggling to define and collect reliable data on social trends that involve ‘migrants and minorities’. All Member States have different categories, and methods for collecting data. Categories that hold different meanings in different contexts which brings into question the validity and comparability of research on the topic. As mentioned above, the process of rethinking in Europe also ought to include thinking about names and tags used. The category of ‘Muslim’ is ill-defined, and the tendency to revert into religious interpretations of their needs might blur the understanding of contemporary European society. The Islamisation of European public spaces clearly poses challenges in terms of the extent and nature of the accommodation of religious needs, yet the implantation of Muslims in Europe seems to call for a thinking that goes beyond this framework. As noted by Purkiss, ‘Religion is one aspect among a range of factors, which make minority groups appear different. It can add a layer to processes of exclusion or become a dominant element in these,

Yilmaz_Chapter 6.indd 99

4/3/2012 11:25:20 AM

100

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

but it does not displace disadvantages encountered on other grounds’3. It is interesting to note that in the 1970s European Muslims were perceived predominantly along racial, ethnic, or national lines. It is today acknowledged that the religious needs of the first waves of migrants were not a priority at the time, while their social and political figured on the forefront. The trend is attributable among others to the demographic profile, forms of settlement, and concerns of these migrants, as well as the newness that the challenge that waves of migration posed in the post-war Europe. Today Muslims in Europe increasingly are considered to be marked by their faith, and their political and social needs tend to be marginalised. The borders between faith, ethnicity, and race become increasingly blurred when it comes to the ways in which Islam is to be considered in contemporary Europe; the process of rethinking ought to take this complexity into account. The policy recommendations formulated by the European Union are illustrative of the ways in which this rethinking process manifests itself in practice. In general terms, policy recommendations in research that focuses on Muslims in Europe through the lens of Islamphobia advocate for increasing inter religious and intercultural dialogue, and increasing knowledge about Islam and the culture and traditions of Muslims. Although these policy recommendations bear no binding political weight, their formulations are informative. They, on the one hand, encourage a greater involvement of Muslim religious leaders and faith-based associations in national and European public spheres. Their focus thus proposes to give voice to Muslim leaders not only in their quality as religious leaders, but also as motors for the integration of Muslims in Europe. The imam is thus considered to be qualified to address all problems faced by all Muslims living in Europe, and he is asked to speak in their name. He is seen as both a potential threat, and as a partner in the fight against extremism. Increasingly, ‘Muslim leaders’ are taken as exclusive partners in the discussions of the issues faced by Muslims in Europe, to the disadvantage of other associative structures such as women’s groups or social action programs in migrant neighbourhoods. It thus seems that the current process of rethinking and devising policy, while addressing some of the issues faced by Muslims in Europe, also contributes to the weakening of alternative

Yilmaz_Chapter 6.indd 100

4/3/2012 11:25:20 AM

ISLAM

AND THE

EUROPEAN UNION

101

associative structures that were established previously to address the social, political, or economic needs of Muslims on platforms other than the religious ones. On the other hand, these policy recommendations imply that increasing information about Islam would decrease the levels of suspicion and animosity against Muslims. In these terms, it falls into the culturalist perspective of the ‘UNESCO tradition,’ which since the 1950s has been discredited by theorists of race relations among others as contributing to a depolitisation of race issues (Lentin 2005). Increasing knowledge about the culture and traditions of Muslims, and spreading information about Islam, appear as a preferred policy with the ultimate aim of fostering intercultural dialogue. These imply something other than the much needed positive public gestures that recommended general media officials and political figures to warn against considering all Muslims potential terrorists. These call for highlighting the fertile dialogue that historically has allowed Muslims and Christians to maintain their common Mediterranean heritage, and underlining the ‘bright’ side of Islam as a religion of tolerance. In themselves, these recommendations do not transcend the culturalist sphere and they imply a rethinking that focuses on Muslims and Islam rather than on Europe. Recommendations that focus on Europe would include putting equal weight on strengthening methods for countering openly racist discourse and action. This would imply recommendations such as the training of police forces in Europe to address Islamophobia, education about the legal framework for anti-discrimination of the EU, the development of measures to facilitate the process of undertaking legal action (such as increasing trust in institutions and providing financial resources for undertaking legal action). In other words, they would imply clearly posing racism in Europe as a legal offence that runs counter to the values of the Union. All these measures figure in the general work of the EUMC; they, however, seem to be marginalised as policy priorities when it comes to Islamophobia. The focus on inter-religious and intercultural dialogue proposes to give voice to religious leaders in general and not just Muslim faith leaders. Religious leaders of all faiths thus today appear to be increasingly legitimised and empowered to address social and political issues

Yilmaz_Chapter 6.indd 101

4/3/2012 11:25:20 AM

102

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

of national and European nature. This point put aside, it is interesting to indicate that the reports on Islamophobia underline that, in general terms, religious leaders have been the most open for debate and dialogue. In parallel, it also is emphasised first that extreme right parties in Europe are gaining in popularity, and that Europeans in general terms are growing increasingly tolerant of racist discourse. Policy recommendations that involve principally religious leaders do not reflect the outcome of a study that points to the growing vulgarisation of racist discourse on the part of political and social leaders, its growing acceptance in public opinion, and the use of communication tools such as the general media and particularly the Internet in the spread of racist discourse. Last, the outcome of the research highlights that the 9/11 attacks and other crises led to a rise in violence not only against Muslims, but more generally against asylum seekers, political refugees, and immigrants in general. In other terms, the 9/11 terrorist attacks perpetrated in the name of Islam have made more acute the pre-existing tensions in Europe in relation to migration and integration. The fact that the itineraries of some of the perpetrators of the New York Twin Tower attacks were traced back to Europe, and the fact that some of those that contributed to the London attacks were British, shifted the debate on questions of integration. The questioning of the place of Muslims in Europe and their allegiance to European ‘values’ takes place in a context where migration in general terms is presented increasingly as a problem in Europe. The attacks have legitimised a pre-existing sense of fear of ‘others’, or the ‘enemy’ within, and they have contributed to the slippery slope of associating not only Muslims but also migrants with security. As noted by Purkiss, ‘Asylum seekers therefore became, very crudely, potential terrorists who were willing and capable of inflicting similar attacks on Europe. Therefore 9/11 helped to reassert not only spatially, cross-national xenophobic assertions but also ethnic stereotypes that were by and large restricted to a particular national context’. By extension, it seems that there is an increased tendency to associate racism with migration and security. The trend gives a sense that racism in Europe is motivated by the growing presence of ‘others’ in

Yilmaz_Chapter 6.indd 102

4/3/2012 11:25:20 AM

ISLAM

AND THE

EUROPEAN UNION

103

Europe and thus fails, as noted to above, to recognise the very internal and historical precedents of racism in construction of European nation states. The above-mentioned associations can best be illustrated by the changing position of the EUMC within European Institutions. The EUMC, since its creation in 1997, developed within the Social Affairs and Employment Directorate-General (DG) of the European Commission. By 2007, the EUMC was converted into a Fundamental Rights Agency and will be transferred into the policy field of the Justice, Freedom, and Security DG of the European Commission. The shift implies the elimination of a space where race matters are treated independently from immigration and security issues and the fusion of agendas dealing with racism, immigration, and security. In conclusion, this chapter aimed to examine the ways in which the EU rethinks itself in relation to Islam with a particular focus on the anti-discrimination framework of the EU. The EU is undergoing a process of thinking about the place of religion in the Union independently of Islam. This said, an ill-defined Islam dimension adds particular nuances to the process by which the EU constructs its identity in relation to its religious and cultural heritage and creates new sites of tension. I argue that setting a context in which religion figures on the agenda of the EU, and where Islam appears as one determining factor among others provides a necessary framework to understand the dynamics at stake. In addition, it is highlighted that issues that involve Muslims and Islam are treated in frameworks that go beyond those that the EU has devised to date to address issues dealing with religion and religious freedom in general terms. In effect, they extend into policy fields that treat questions relating to foreign affairs, social affairs, migration, and justice and security concerns. Putting external matters on the side, the very internal and contemporary nature of the questions raised by Islam in Europe, thus ought to involve modes of thinking that go beyond the religious field. Yet policies devised to address these questions tend to be based on approach that focuses on religion and culture. While in practice the EU seems to recognise the multi-faceted nature of the issues at stake, in devising policy it tends to restrict itself to a one dimensional approach.

Yilmaz_Chapter 6.indd 103

4/3/2012 11:25:21 AM

104

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

Within the field of anti-discrimination and anti-racism, the EU recognises that there are among its Member States widespread forms of racism that affect migrants and minorities in general. Racism has been a long-term concern in the EU, although it is only in the late 1990s that a legal framework was devised to give competence to the EU to intervene with matters related to discrimination in general terms. Institutional and structural forms of racism in Europe put at disadvantage migrants and minorities irrespective of faith. The outcome of research on migrants and minorities also applies to Muslims in Europe. Situating research that focuses on Muslims alone within this wider anti-discrimination framework appears to be key in the process of rethinking. In effect, research on Islamophobia develops in the post-9/11, as Muslims have since then been expected to be particularly vulnerable to racist violence. The focus on the new dynamics that emerge following acts of terror in the name of Islam run the risk of overshadowing pre-existing discriminatory practices, and lead to associations where terror would be seen as a trigger to racism directed against Muslims and migrants in general terms. Such associations tend to justify and legitimise discrimination, and inevitably direct the focus on Muslims, Islam, and terror, rather than on Europe and racism. Here, I argued that in addition to contextualisation, a thorough historicisation of Islamophobia within a wider framework that addresses the history of European racism and nationalism would constitute important benchmarks in the process of rethinking Europe. I also underlined the methodological and terminological problems that are involved in the process of rethinking Europe through the lens of Islam. In effect, the category of the Muslim in Europe is today ill-defined, just as is that of ‘migrants and minorities’. The current terminological and conceptual blurriness around issues that involve Islam and Muslims in Europe allows for recurrent retreats into the cultural sphere. The focus on intercultural and inter-religious dialogue as the preferred policy recommendation reflect only a partial rethinking of the issues at stake as it focuses on increasing information about Islam rather than rethinking Europe. Last, I point to dynamics in Europe that handle racism and security within a single framework. I argue that overall, these trends shadow the larger problems that the

Yilmaz_Chapter 6.indd 104

4/3/2012 11:25:21 AM

ISLAM

AND THE

EUROPEAN UNION

105

EU has in adapting to its multicultural contemporary reality, and in recognising a much needed rethinking process on current issues such as migration, integration, and most of all equality.

Notes 1 All reports are available through http://www.eumc.eu.int 2 EUMC report, ‘The fight against Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia; Bringing Communities together’, Brussels, Vienna (Fall 2003), pp.57–61. 3 EUMC report, ‘The fight against Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia; Bringing Communities together’, Brussels, Vienna (Fall 2003), p.64.

References Amghar, Samir. 2005. Acteurs internationaux et islam de France, Politique étrangère, 1, pp.25–36. Balibar, Etienne. 1988a. ‘Y a-t-il un ‘néo-racism?’, in Balibar, Etienne and Wallerstein, Immanuel, Race, nation, classe: Les identités ambiguës, Paris: Éditions La Découverte, pp.27–41. Balibar, Etienne. 1988b. ‘Racisme et crise’, in Balibar, Etienne and Wallerstein, Immanuel, Race, nation, classe: Les identités ambiguës, Paris: Éditions La Découverte, pp.289–302. Dassetto, Felice, Maréchal, Brigitte, and Nielsen, Jørgen (eds). 2001. Convergences musulmanes, Louvain la Neuve: L’Harmattan. Göle, Nilüfer. 2005. Interpénétrations, L’Islam et L’Europe, Paris: Galaade Editions. Göle, Nilüfer and Amman, Ludwig (eds). 2006. Islam in Public: Turkey, Iran and Europe, İstanbul: Bilgi University Press. Lentin, Alana. 2004. Racism and Anti-Racism in Europe, London: Pluto Press. Maréchal, Brigitte, Allievi, Stefano, Dassetto, Felice, and Nielsen, Jørgen (eds). 2003. Muslims in the Enlarged Europe, Leiden and Boston: E.J. Brill. Silvestri, Sara. 2005. ‘EU relations with Islam in the context of the cultural dialogue and Euro-Mediterranean framework’, Mediterranean Politics, Special Issue on ‘The EU and the Mediterranean: Conceptualising Cultural Dialogue and Social Systems’, 10 (3), November, pp.385–405. Taguieff, Pierre-André. 1991. ‘Les métamorphoses idéologiques du racisme et la crise de l’antiracisme’, in Taguieff, P.A., (ed.), Face au racisme 2: Analyses, hypothèses, perspectives, Paris: Éditions La Découverte, pp.13–64. Wievorka, Michel. 1998. Le racisme, une introduction, Paris: Éditions La Découverte et Syros. EUMC (The European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia)

Yilmaz_Chapter 6.indd 105

4/3/2012 11:25:21 AM

106

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

Reports, available at http://eumc.europa.eu/fra/index.php Annual Report 2003–2004. Annual Report 2005 – Part 1: Activities of the EUMC Annual Report 2005 – Part 2: Trends, developments and good practice Comparative Report: Migrants, Minorities and Education Comparative Report: Migrants, Minorities and Employment Comparative Report: Migrants, Minorities and Housing Comparative Report: Migrants, Minorities and Legislation. Comparative Report: Policing Racist Crime and Violence Comparative Report: Racist Violence in 15 EU Member States Country Studies on Anti-Discrimination Legislation in EU Member States Majorities’ Attitudes towards Migrants and Minorities. Manifestations of Antisemitism in the EU 2002–2003 Situation of Islamic Communities in five European Cities – Examples of local initiatives Summary Report on Islamophobia in the EU after 11 September 2001 The Fight against Antisemitism and Islamophobia: Bringing Communities together (European Round Tables Meetings) The impact of 7 July 2005 London bomb attacks on Muslim Communities in the EU

Yilmaz_Chapter 6.indd 106

4/3/2012 11:25:21 AM

CHAPTER 7 FROM POLISH MUSLIMS TO MUSLIMS IN POL AND: THER E AND BACK Katarzyna Górak-Sosnowska

Until 9/11, rethinking Europe through rethinking Islam would not have made much sense in the case of Poland. Despite a long history of Tatar settlements dating back to the fourteenth century, the presence of Muslims in contemporary Poland is marginal and does not exceed one per cent of the population. That means that there are hardly any mosques (just three in the whole country, two of them being of Tatar origin in small villages in eastern Poland (Bohoniki and Kruszyniany)) or any sort of developed Islamic infrastructure, and hardly any veiled women or Muslim children in the schools. Even the autochthonous Tatar population is often considered an ethnic rather than religious minority and perceived as an element of Polish folklore rather than Islamic tradition. Is there any way at all to debate individual or group identities as a result of experiences with Islam? And what sort of experiences might be taken into account? This chapter aims to identify the ways Islam and Muslims might be used for thinking about the individual and group identities of certain social groups in Poland. One must bear

Yilmaz_Chapter 7.indd 107

4/3/2012 5:58:51 PM

108

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

in mind that the Polish case differs significantly from an ‘average’ Western European one because of, first, the much longer tradition of coexistence with Muslims, second, their marginal presence, and third, the homogeneity of Polish society in general (97 per cent of the Polish population declares to be of Polish (ethnic) nationality according to the 2002 Census). At the same time there is a great interest and demand for Orient – both in terms of international politics and culture. That translates into various strategies of dealing with Islam and Muslims – from searching a common link on the religious platform, through fighting ‘virtual’ Muslims for the sake of the EU. As the Polish case is unique, a significant part of this chapter will be devoted to presenting the background, focusing first on the autochthonous Polish Muslims, then on transformations within Polish Islam and finally on the attitudes of the Polish people towards Islam and Muslims.

The Tatars: Autochthonous Polish Muslims Tatars have been present in Poland for over 600 years as a direct result of the Mongol invasions, which penetrated as far as Eastern Europe. Their settlements in Poland were noted in 1397 by the famous Polish chronicler Jan Długosz in his Annals (Roczniki) (Dziekan 2003, p.202). Initially the Tatars were settled predominantly in the Great Duchy of Lithuania, but from the seventh century on – by that time the Tatar population in Poland was most numerous (Dziekan 2000a, p.40) – they also settled in the Crown. During these few centuries of Tatar presence in Poland, they became integrated fully into the mainstream society and in some respects even assimilated into it. First, they changed their way of living, from the traditional nomadic to the settled way of life. This was facilitated by land endowments granted by the Grand Duke Vytautas in return for military duty, which was for a long time the basic occupation of the Polish Tatars. Through all these centuries, the Tatars (at least the settled ones)1 were loyal to the Commonwealth and never revealed any tendencies to establish a separate country, even though they were aware of their ethno-religious identity. The

Yilmaz_Chapter 7.indd 108

4/3/2012 5:58:51 PM

FROM POLISH MUSLIMS

TO

MUSLIMS

IN

POLAND

109

change of lifestyle was followed by linguistic assimilation, thus by the eighteenth century the Tatars started to use Polish (or the Polish-Belarussian dialect)2. This assimilation progressed quickly. The Tatars, despite their common name, never constituted a homogenous ethnic group as they came from Turkish, Mongolian, as well as Tungusian peoples, and thus did not share a common language or culture. The Polish language was, therefore, not only a key to get in touch with Polish society, but also a tool with which to communicate with each other. Linguistic assimilation had also an important social outcome, that is, the Tatars never constituted a closed community. Just the opposite: they became involved in mixed marriages, and added the Slavic suffix – icz (e.g. Józefowicz from Yusuf, or Abrahamowicz from Ibrahim, etc.) to their family names (Dziekan 2000a, p.41). They adopted many other things from local cultures. In this way, often against the Sunni notion of Islam, Tatar rituals overlapped with local and Christian traditions. Polish Tatars celebrate Christmas, Easter as well as All Saints’ Day; following their Christian neighbours, they prefer to get married in mosques, where the newlyweds are showered with grain (Kamocki 2000, p.140) and pass through ‘gateways’ from which they have to ‘buy themselves out’ (Dziekan 1999, p.11). In Tatar funeral ceremonies, sometimes wreaths are placed, and women are allowed to participate in the procession. Tatar gravestones might be distinguished from the Christian ones only by the symbol of the crescent and basmala or shahada inscriptions (Drozd 2003, pp.49–50). Furthermore, one may find portraits of the deceased, which clearly contradicts the Muslim iconoclasm. The acculturation, however, has been visible two ways, even if the latter one is less visible: Poles also have adopted some Tatar customs. One example of this is the participation of Polish peasants in rain-making Tatar rites until the 1950s, which proves that they believed in this magic (Dziekan 2000b, p.46). Currently there are approximately 3,000–5,000 autochthonous Muslims in Poland. They are integrated fully into Polish society with religion – limited only to the private sphere – being the sole difference (and sometimes the appearance). Even though Tatar Islam became in some way ‘slavonicised’ (sometimes to the indignation of

Yilmaz_Chapter 7.indd 109

4/3/2012 5:58:51 PM

110

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

some devout Muslim immigrants)3, it was this feature that let them survive, preventing their complete assimilation. Religion is the most significant determinant of Tatar self-identification as Poles of Muslim faith. Nevertheless, one must bear in mind two factors: one is that this ethnographic description concerns a world that exists only in a few small villages and is being deconstructed and revised by the Tatar youth (Dziekan 2003, p.224); the other is the growing number of Muslim immigrants in Poland who influence not only Tatar Islam4, but also the general Islamic presence in Poland.

Introducing Greater Diversity: Islam in Contemporary Poland The last few decades have brought considerable changes to the legal, ethnic and social structure of the Muslim population in Poland. Beginning with the early 1970s, students predominantly from socialist Arab countries (Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Libya and Syria) came to Polish universities in pursuit of education. Many of them decided to stay in Poland. Presently these Arab immigrants, many of whom have taken Polish citizenship, belong to the Polish middle or even upper-middle class. Two factors made it possible: they had to learn the Polish language (there is an obligatory one-year Polish course every foreigner has to attend before starting his studies) and they are well-educated (master’s degrees and sometimes more). In most cases they are socially and to a great extent culturally integrated into the mainstream society. Many of them have Polish wives and their children barely know any Arabic. The early 1990s brought to Poland two other significant groups of Muslim immigrants. One was political refugees, mostly from Chechnya5, former Yugoslavia, as well as Afghanistan, Iraq and, to a lesser extent, Pakistan and Somalia. As one might guess, in most cases the country of destination was beyond the western Polish border. The other group consisted of private businessmen who, after 1989, decided to try their luck in the emerging Polish capitalist economy. Among this group prevailed people of Turkish, Arab and Bosnian origin (Nalborczyk 2003, p.229). Some of them were really successful, but

Yilmaz_Chapter 7.indd 110

4/3/2012 5:58:51 PM

FROM POLISH MUSLIMS

TO

MUSLIMS

IN

POLAND

111

most – especially the newcomers – made their living working in small shops or kebab bars as hired labour. According to the GUS (Central Statistical Office) data in 2002, there were over 6,000 residents in Poland who were born in Muslim countries (GUS 2003, pp.330–3).6 Taking into account that the actual number of Muslim immigrants in Poland was estimated between 15,000 and 20,000, many of the immigrant Muslims do not seem to have been included in the official statistics. Another important, yet far less numerous group, consists of the converts or the so-called ‘New Muslims’7. Most of them are the Polish wives of Muslim immigrants who decided to convert to Islam. According to Muzułmań ski Związek Religijny (MZR, the Muslim Religious Union), there are currently approximately 800 New Muslims in Poland. The emerging new Islamic presence in Poland and the fact that immigrants outnumber the autochthonous Muslim population has resulted in tension between these two groups. One of the most visible results was the establishment (2001) and official registration (2004) by the Ministry of Interior and Administration, of a second Muslim religious community – besides the MZR – namely the Liga Muzułma ń ska w RP (LM, Muslim League in Poland)8. The MZR was established in 1925 as a Tatar-oriented Muslim organisation. Creating a new Sunni Muslim organisation with a similar statute, aims, and activities challenged the legacy of the Tatar-dominated MZR9. Most of the LM’s members are immigrants and the New Muslims who do not feel satisfied by the ‘slavonicised’ Tatar Islam or are not able to join the MZR due to the requirement of Polish citizenship. This tension is being whipped up further by the mass media, which often juxtapose the ‘good, old, Polish’ Muslims (meaning the MZR) and the ‘bad, dangerous, alien’ Muslim immigrants (meaning the Muslim League)10. Only in June 2006, on the 80th anniversary of the MZR, did both organisations declare themselves willing to collaborate11. Apart from these two main Muslim organisations, there are several other ones, established in 1990s, which for the most part are registered as associations or unions. Two of them, Stowarzyszenie

Yilmaz_Chapter 7.indd 111

4/3/2012 5:58:52 PM

112

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

Studentów Muzułma ń skich (the Muslim Students’ Association) and Muzułma ń skie Stowarzyszenie Kształcenia Kulturalnego (the Muslim Cultural Education Association), are linked to the LM. There is one Shia organisation, Stowarzyszenie Jedności Muzułma ń skiej (the Association of Muslim Unity), and an organization linked to the Ahmadiyya school of Islam – Stowarzyszenie Muzułma ń skie Ahmadijja (the Ahmadiyya Muslim Association)12. Most of these organisations have fewer than 100 members (while the MZR claims to have 5,000, which is the number of Tatars in Poland; and the LM, about 300 true members). There are a number of other organisations that are however either not institutionalised (e.g. informal circles or online Muslim communities) or not transparent enough. Most Polish Muslims are not officially affiliated with any organisation, even if many of them lend their sympathies to one or the other.

Towards the Unknown and Hardly Existing: Polish Attitudes about Muslims Despite a long historical Islamic presence in Poland and the internal diversity of Muslims, one must bear in mind that they constitute merely 0.05 per cent of the Polish population. Compared to most West European countries, this situation is unique for at least two reasons. First, most Polish people have never met a Muslim in their own country, except maybe when buying kebab. Second, Poland has not (yet?) experienced any problems related to the socio-economic integration of Muslims: there are no Muslim ghettos, most Polish Muslims speak Polish, are well-educated and the Islamic identity is hardly visible in the public sphere. An opinion poll carried out by the Pew Research Center in 2005 found out that, compared to countries with significant Muslim minorities, Polish respondents are concerned less about the growing Islamic identity or worried about Islamic extremism in their country. Poles are twice less concerned than the Spaniards (and three times less concerned than the respondents from other countries) about ‘their’ Muslims’ growing sense of Islamic identity (Table 7.1). Poles

Yilmaz_Chapter 7.indd 112

4/3/2012 5:58:52 PM

FROM POLISH MUSLIMS Table 7.1 Country

TO

MUSLIMS

IN

POLAND

113

Concerns about Muslims (Per cent; 2005) Growing Islamic Identity among Muslims in Your Country?

France Germany Great Britain Netherlands Poland Spain

Worry about Islamic Extremism in Your Country

No

Yes

not too/at all concerned

very/ somewhat concerned

29 27 21 32 37 35

70 66 63 60 20 47

26 21 28 24 49 22

73 78 70 76 37 77

Source: (PRC 2005, pp.17–18).

Table 7.2 Attitudes towards Adherents of Various Religions (Per cent; 2005) Country

France Germany Great Britain Poland Netherlands Spain

Christians

Jews

Muslims

Fav

Unfav

Fav

Unfav

Fav

Unfav

84 83 85 86 83 80

15 13 6 5 15 10

82 67 78 54 85 58

16 21 6 27 11 20

64 40 72 46 45 46

34 47 14 30 51 37

Source: (PRC 2005, p. 4).

are also much less worried about Islamic extremism in Poland. This is hardly surprising when one takes into account the proportion of Muslims in the populations of these countries, and the fact that all of them but Poland (and maybe Germany) recently had hard times with some of their Muslim inhabitants. Taking a closer look at Polish attitudes towards Muslims reveals, however, another side of the story (Table 7.2). Polish respondents did not differ much from others in their views about Muslims, despite all the peculiarities mentioned above. They are maybe not as unfavourable

Yilmaz_Chapter 7.indd 113

4/3/2012 5:58:52 PM

114

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

about Muslims as the Dutch or Germans, but still more unfavourable than the British and less favourable than the French13. There are two patterns reflected in the Polish public opinion regarding Islam and Muslims, which are contrary to the results obtained in West European countries. In Poland, there is less concern than elsewhere regarding the growing Islamic identity or Islamic extremism, but this does not translate into a more favourable attitude towards Muslims as such. To some extent, it might be ascribed to the fact that Muslims happen to fall into a category of people whom Poles traditionally like less. CBOS (Public Opinion Research Center) results clearly indicate that Arabs (until 2005, the sole representatives of Muslims in the poll) are the least liked people by the Polish respondents (Table 7.3). In 2002, 16 per cent of the Polish respondents declared a favourable attitude towards Arabs, while over a half displayed an unfavourable opinion. Currently, there are even fewer people who like Arabs, while the proportion of those who dislike them rose to

Table 7.3 Attitudes towards Various Peoples in Poland (2002–05; Per cent) Nation

American Arab Chinese Czech French German Italian Japanese Roma Russian Swedish Ukrainian Turkish Vietnamese

Favourable

Unfavourable

2002

2003

2004

2005

2002

2003

2004

2005

58 16 26 50 51 38 54 39 15 24 46 22 – 24

56 13 22 50 48 36 53 36 16 22 48 19 – 19

45 11 20 49 45 33 50 32 15 18 42 29 – 17

46 8 16 46 43 34 52 31 13 16 39 23 14 15

12 54 32 15 12 31 10 21 60 43 12 48 – 35

17 60 39 18 19 38 12 25 61 49 17 51 – 42

20 59 37 14 19 34 11 22 56 53 13 34 – 38

24 70 47 22 25 38 15 33 65 61 22 50 53 49

Source: (CBOS 2005).

Yilmaz_Chapter 7.indd 114

4/3/2012 5:58:53 PM

FROM POLISH MUSLIMS

TO

MUSLIMS

IN

POLAND

115

70 per cent. One could notice a comparable growth rate of unfavourability only in the case of the Russians (from 43 per cent in 2002 to 61 per cent in 2005 – however, in this case, one might point to certain political matters that most probably were behind that rise). After all, comparing the unfavourable attitudes towards the Arabs with the size of their population in Poland does not seem to make much sense unless one more factor is taken into account, namely that of associating Arabs with Islam. This socalled ‘Arabisation of Islam’ (associating Islam first of all with the Arabs, and vice versa), which occurred in another opinion poll14, might offer an explanation of why the Turks are not as much disliked as the Arabs15. The marginal contact of the Polish people with the Arabs and hardly any economic, political or social threats being posed by the Arabs (or Muslims) in Poland can be termed as a rather platonic ‘arabophobia’ or ‘Islamophobia’16, meaning feelings of anxiety or even aversion towards virtually non-existent Muslims. If there are no Muslims, where does all the negative opinion about them come from? The obvious answer seems to be the mass media acting as the most significant agent and source of information about the Islamic ‘Other’. A booklet called Nie bój się islamu. Leksykon dla dziennikarzy (Don’t Be Afraid of Islam: A Lexicon for Journalists) seems to provide the answer to the question of the role of journalists in ‘otherising’ and demonising Islam. The other factor influencing this perception could be the geographical proximity of the Arab world and Europe. ‘Arabisation of Islam’ also occurs in textbooks. In the Polish school books, either the words ‘Muslims’ and ‘Arabs’ are treated as synonymous or the scope of the world of Islam is limited to the Middle East (GórakSosnowska 2007). It seems that the same pattern is reflected in the public opinion. An additional explaining factor could be the marginal number of Muslims in Poland. Probably a German citizen, if asked about Muslims would probably think of the Turks, and Frenchmen of the Tunisians or Algerians, as these communities are present in their daily lives and public discourses. The Tatar community in Poland is too small and insignificant, and the Muslim

Yilmaz_Chapter 7.indd 115

4/3/2012 5:58:53 PM

116

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

immigrants are not any bigger either. At the same time, most of the news and information about Muslims refer to international politics. The combination of these factors can help explain the current Islamophobia in Poland.

Rethinking Islam, Rethinking Poland: Searching for a Link There are virtually no Muslims in Poland, but a negative attitude towards Islam and a significant interest in Islam and Muslims, evoked by the international news, exist. A combination of these factors determines Polish reactions towards Islam. Most of these factors became even more significant after 2001. A Close Other, a Distant Other Having virtually no Muslims does not mean one cannot play on people’s Islamophobic fears regarding the Muslims’ actual number in Poland or the possible Islamisation of Europe, as do some rightwing Polish nationalists. By otherising and demonising Islam, they demonstrate the superiority of native and pure Polish culture and are able to strengthen their own group identity. Most of the examples they give derive from the alleged woes and misdeeds of Muslims in Western Europe (or the Arab world). The anti-Muslim nationalists thus kill two birds with one stone: they warn the ‘clear-headed’ Poles (since there is no real ‘Muslim threat’ in Poland) and show their sympathy for the other countries of the EU. In other words, otherising Islam allows them to strengthen either the Polish or the European identity (against the backdrop of the ‘Muslim problem’). Such a discourse actually is limited only to the Internet. The biggest Polish website of this type is Eurojihad.org. Belittling another culture helps to foster the in-group identity and, while warning the site’s readers against the Other, creates a sort of mission. In both cases, the Muslim becomes a new scapegoat that allows the website’s writers to express frustration and other irritations. What is interesting is that the authors of this website actually spend a great deal of time

Yilmaz_Chapter 7.indd 116

4/3/2012 5:58:53 PM

FROM POLISH MUSLIMS

TO

MUSLIMS

IN

POLAND

117

researching Islam, browsing Islamic websites, finding news, holding discussions with Muslims and even studying the religion in order to prepare content for the site. An argument took place on the ARABIA. pl Internet forum, where members of Eurojihad (E) and Muslims (M) met:17 E:

M: E:

M: E: M: E:

A strong delegation of Eurojihad will probably come [to the 20th Annual Muslim Reunion – KGS]. We are still discussing the details, but I guess it is worth it ... So I won’t come Why??? Dialogue between eurojihad.org and islam-inpoland.org! Under the patronage (or with the participation?) of arabia.pl! According to the Polish tradition, two monologues delivered simultaneously become a dialogue ☺ And what if we have a fight over there ? But we don’t want to fight! Well, yes , but maybe we want . You are allowed self-defense only ☺

In saying, ‘You are allowed self-defense only,’ the participant from the Eurojihad was referring to the notion of jihad, and in particular to the so-called ‘lesser jihad’ (qital), which Muslims indeed might perform only in the case of self-defense. That indicates that the Eurojihadist knew what he was referring to and was familiar with the two concepts of jihad. He could also use his knowledge with a sense of humor and to point a finger at the Muslim discussant about his inability to fight due to his religious beliefs. An evident boundary that exists between these two groups does not prevent them from having a bilateral communication while running (or adhering to – the staff of Eurojihad.org is anonymous so it is hard to tell) an anti-Islamic portal. It does not prevent one from using one’s knowledge in a witty and intelligent way. Much of these interactions take place on the Internet. Due to the marginal presence of both groups in Poland, there are hardly any possibilities for them to meet in the real life anyway.

Yilmaz_Chapter 7.indd 117

4/3/2012 5:58:53 PM

118

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

A Common Religious Platform The Poles are among the most religious nations of the EU, both in terms of individual and institutional religiosity. The high degree of religiosity shared by the Polish Catholics and Muslims may provide a useful shared value for mutual understanding or at least knowing each other. Despite the marginal number of Muslims there were several interfaith initiatives that resulted among others in establishing, in 1997, a Common Council of Catholics and Muslims, and in setting 26 January as ‘Day of Islam’ in the Catholic Church (Nalborczyk 2003, p.237). Both initiatives began before 9/11. In this case, the sense of belonging to a community of believers creates a new common identity, and the boundary seems to run between religiosity and secularism rather than between Muslim and Christian. One of the Polish imams recalled that just after the terrorist attacks many non-Muslims came to the mosque, not to blame Muslims (as he thought), but to pray with them. Respect for religious feelings explains also the involvement of the Polish government in the Muhammad cartoon affair after one of the Polish newspapers had published them18. One should also mention the peaceful co-existence of Christian and Tatar peasants in the villages of Eastern Poland and the process of enculturation that took place on both sides. As already mentioned, the Tatars are considered to be Polish people of Muslim faith and religion has never been a problem. Islam as a Way of Spiritual Reconciliation Just as the flower-power movement and other countercultural movements of the 1960s and 1970s appealed to people who wanted change and were fed up with the existing social order, nowadays Islam seems to be a new source of attraction. The possibility of exploring the next (after Jesus) level of religious revelation, a strong sense of community, a reliable set of rules around which one can organise one’s whole life, or simply pure interest in the exotic Other, all of these certainly contribute to people’s choice of Islam. In some cases, it refers merely to a temporary fascination19, while in others, it refers to socialisation into a new life where new rites and

Yilmaz_Chapter 7.indd 118

4/3/2012 5:58:53 PM

FROM POLISH MUSLIMS

TO

MUSLIMS

IN

POLAND

119

rules are followed according to an emerging set of values, behaviours and attitudes. Change is sometimes quite rapid. I can recall a girl who used to be a ‘normal’ Catholic. After converting to Islam, she completely changed her style of dress, and felt insulted by a question about her hair (she was wearing hijab), the reason being that a male was standing close-by and might have heard it. Such a rapid and complete change is, in the case of many Poles, something new and unique, all the more so because of the visibility of these New Muslims, especially the women. Even though they look Polish, they are looked at by the passersby because of their hijabs, and if they are accosted, it is often in English. This means that an average Pole can hardly conceive that a Polish native girl might convert to Islam. On the other hand, it would be interesting to track the way in which they learn their ‘Muslimness’ and their new identity, which, due to the marginal Muslim presence, could be quite difficult and fragmentary. Obviously it is the ‘Arab’ and not the Tatar (autochthonous) Islam with which Polish people are fascinated. Sometimes the borderline between fascination with Islam as a religion and fascination with Islamic culture or an Islamic partner is very thin. One might say that Islam has become to some extent fashionable among certain Poles. This phenomenon is, however, more of qualitative than quantitative importance. Inventing the Orient Fascination with the cultures of Islamic peoples has, apart from the religious, also a secular face. Through the general interest (or rather fashion) for the Orient, and the particular interest in Islam, the cultures of Islamic peoples have made their way into the show business. There are Oriental-stylised cafes and bars offering waterpipes (shishas), clubs playing contemporary Arab pop or Punjabi bhangra, belly dancers (the most famous one has even launched her own revue) and hennatattoo painters. Among some circles of the Polish youth, it has become trendy to go to such clubs, listen to Tarkan or Amr Diab, smoke shisha or even attend belly-dancing workshops. Many find in these places an alternative to the MTV pop culture, whether it is Polish or Western.

Yilmaz_Chapter 7.indd 119

4/3/2012 5:58:54 PM

120

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

The most successful Arabic-styled parties (Arabski Pępek – Arabic Naval, Masala, or Orient Express by ARABIA.pl) have now become established. The peculiarity of this sort of entertainment is that their main performers and consumers are Polish natives. These places are not designed for and by immigrants so that they feel ‘like home’, but they are meant to look like an ‘Oriental place’ for a Polish layman. A new brand of Orient is being invented, an Orient that does not exist in reality, one with no Orientals. Particularly in middle-sized cities it implies sometimes rather odd combinations of the ‘Orient’ and Orient representations, e.g. playing Arab pop with visualisations showing Quranic calligraphy, or belly-dancers performing with a cabaret-like stick. In the biggest Polish conurbations (Warsaw, Cracow), the Oriental market is quite professional, there are several bands inspired by Oriental rhythms (e.g. Ogrody Alamut, Shahid Project, Yerba Mater, Jahiar Group). Polish experiences with Islam are defined by two sets of factors. One – endogenous – is related to the internal transformation taking place within the Polish Muslim minority. The shape of Polish Islam is being negotiated between the Tatars who still cherish their historical position as the sole Muslim representatives in Poland and the newcomers, who already outnumber the previous group. The transformation goes therefore from Polish Muslims, meaning Polish citizens of Muslim faith, to Muslims in Poland, who derive the very foundations of their culture from foreign countries. The second set of factors is exogenous and covers Islam and the representation of Muslims in the Polish public opinion. International news and developments beyond the western border of Poland appear to be influential, much more than the activities of Muslims in Poland, in the debate on Islam and Muslims. Otherising Islam, fascination with the exotic, seeking common religious values and inventing a new Orient are just a few patterns used by different social groups to debate and define their identies. Considering the insignificant speed and scope of Muslim immigration to Poland, as well as the cultural homogeneity of Poland that dates back to the Second World War, it seems that the debates on Islam will nevertheless remain at the margin of the public discourse in Poland.

Yilmaz_Chapter 7.indd 120

4/3/2012 5:58:54 PM

FROM POLISH MUSLIMS

TO

MUSLIMS

IN

POLAND

121

Notes 1 There was an incident in the history of the Tatar-Polish relations called the Lipka Rebellion. About 2,000 mercenary Tatars revolted against the restrictions on their religious freedoms and their relatively poor treatment in comparison with the non-Tatars. In 1672 they abandoned the Commonwealth and joined the Turks – as people belonging to the same Ummah. A year later, their leader – Alexander Musa Kryczynski – was nominated Bey of the Bar fortress. 2 The sole exception of this assimilation was the religious literature of the Tatars, which was written in Polish but using the Arabic alphabet that was adjusted to the Slavic languages (including Polish ą, ę, ś, ć, dź, etc.). This might be explained by the notion of ijaz al-quran (the inimability of the Quran). Writing religious scriptures with Arabic letters (even though in the Polish language) was a way of showing respect to the Arab script (Dziekan 2002, pp.185–191). 3 For instance, during a lecture about Islam organised by the Muslim Students’ Association, it was stated that as a result of assimilation, the Tatars lost their ability to speak Arabic (sic!), which negatively influenced their religious observances – see K. Marek, M. Łyszczarz, ‘Polscy Tatarzy, polscy muzułmanie’ – sprawozdanie, http://www.arabia.pl/article.php?id=10921. 4 Some mosques are getting rid of candle holders and wreaths, and Tatar muhirs (pictures with Quranic calligraphy made by Polish Muslims) were being substituted by devotional items imported from the Middle East (Drozd 2003, pp.46–47). 5 According to the UNHCR data, refugees constituted over 90 per cent of the applicants in 2005 – Uchodźcy w Polsce 2005, http://www.unhcr.pl/aktualnosci.php?news=323&wid=618¤t_section=statystyki. 6 Author’s calculation. Unfortunately it was not possible to extract the number of Muslim residents from the countries with significant Muslim minorities – e.g. Chechens from Russia or Palestinians from Israel. 7 As one of them aptly noticed that ‘convert’ denotes conversion from one religion to another religion and therefore doesn’t refer to people who were atheists and became Muslim. 8 Some authors suggest that it was incompatible with the law of 21 April 1936 regarding bilateral relations between the Polish state and the MZR, which clearly states that the sole representative of Muslims in Poland in their relations with the Polish state is the MZR (see e.g. Nalborczyk 2003, pp.230–231). 9 For instance, according to one of LM’s brochures, they have their own mufti. The mufti has never been appointed, but members of LM several times called the Mufti of Poland (who, according to the Polish law, has to be a member of MZR). 10 See, for instance, A. Pakulska, Polskie dzieci Allaha, ‘Nowe Państwo’, 3 (357), March 2005 or D. Koźlenko, Dokąd zmierza polski islam?, ‘Ozon’, 16/05, 4 August 2005.

Yilmaz_Chapter 7.indd 121

4/3/2012 5:58:54 PM

122

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

11 During these celebrations the Mufti of Poland, Tomasz Miśkiewicz stated that one of the most important aims of MZR is to cooperate more closely with the other Muslim religious associations in Poland (the Muslim League) as well as with other Muslim organisations (see M. Kubicki, Plany MZR-u na najbliż sze lata, http://www.arabia.pl/content/view/283747/2/). At the same time, the Muslim League issued an official congratulatory letter to the MZR in which common goals and activities were emphasised (see: List do uczestników obchodów 80-lecia Muzułmańskiego Związku Religijnego, http://www. islam.info.pl/images/stories/islaminfo/list_do_mzr.pdf). 12 The members of the Polish Ahmadiyya are quite successful since they have published their own Polish translation of the Quran. Even though the translation was made from an English or French version and not from the Arabic original, for some time, it was the translation that was most available in the bookstores. Currently, however, the Arabic to Polish translation by Professor Józef Bielawski is considered to be the most authoritative version. 13 This Polish attitude is confirmed by the European Values Survey’s results of 1999/2000. Asked if they wouldn’t mind a Muslim neighbour, Polish respondents ranked on the 19th position (worse were only the Lithuanians, the Maltese and the Slovaks) in terms of their Muslim-friendliness. Author’s calculations based on the EVS SPSS dataset. 14 The question was about associations with the word ‘Islam’: religion – 66 per cent, terrorism – 18 per cent, Arabs – 12 per cent, Arab / Eastern countries – 12 per cent, wars in general – 11 per cent. It is worth noting that this opinion poll was conducted just a month after 9/11, which might explain the strong position of ‘terrorism’ (OBOP 2001, pp.2–3). 15 There is a significant 17 per cent of difference in the Poles’ unfavourable attitudes towards the Turks and the Arabs. Another reason might be the Turkish support for the Polish case during the partitions. 16 This wording is derived from the Professor Jerrold Post of the George Washington University, who first used it while analysing the revival of Anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe. ‘Platonic Anti-Semitism’ refers to AntiSemitism without Jews. 17 The discussion took place on 6 June 2006, in the forum of the ARABIA.pl Internet portal: http://www.arabia.pl/component/option,com_forum/ Itemid,84/page,viewtopic/p,40067/#40067. 18 The Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs apologised for the fact that the Rzeczpospolita newspaper published the cartoons, but he apologised to the ‘Muslim believers of Muhammad’, which again shows a peculiar union of inaccurate knowledge and common religious values. 19 According to MZR estimations, about 80–90 per cent of the new Muslims find their way back to the Catholic Church. However when I asked an MZR imam, he clearly stated that this information was incorrect since the MZR had never conducted any research of this type.

Yilmaz_Chapter 7.indd 122

4/3/2012 5:58:54 PM

FROM POLISH MUSLIMS

TO

MUSLIMS

IN

POLAND

123

References Drozd, Andrzej. 2003. ‘Współczesne oblicze kultury Tatarów Rzeczypospolitej’, [Contemporary culture of Polish Tatars], in Abbas, Adnan (ed.), Zagadnienia współczesnego islamu, Poznań: Uniwersytet im Adama Mickiewicza, pp. 41–58. Dziekan, Marek. 1999. ‘Religia Tatarów polsko-litewskich’, [The Religion of Polish-Lithuanian Tatars], in Andrzej Drozd, Marek Dziekan and Tadeusz Majda, Meczety i cmentarze Tatarów polsko-litewskich [Religion of PolishLithuanian Tatars], Warszawa: Res Publica Multiethnica. pp. 8–13. Dziekan, Marek. 2000a. ‘Tatarzy – polscy muzułmanie’, [Tatars – the Polish Muslims], Jednota, no.8–9, pp.41–4. Dziekan, Marek. 2000b. ‘Tradycje ludowe i folklor Tatarów polsko-litewskich’, [Traditions and folklore of Polish-Lithuanian Tatars], in Drozd, Andrzej, Dziekan, Marek and Majda, Tadeusz, Piśmiennictwo i muhiry Tatarów polskolitewskich, Warszawa: Res Publica Multiethnica, pp.44–7. Dziekan, Marek. 2002. ‘Einige Bemerkungen über die islamische Literatur der polnisch-litauischen Tataren’, in Leder, Stefan (ed.), Studies in Arabic and Islam: Proceedings of the 19th Congress, Union Europeennee der Arabisants et Islamisants, Halle 1998, Paris: Sterling, VA. Dziekan, Marek. 2003. ‘Historia i tradycje polskiego islamu’, [History and traditions of Polish Islam], in Parzymies, Anna (ed.), Muzułmanie w Europie, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Akademickie Dialog, pp.199–228. Górak-Sosnowska, Katarzyna. 2007. Wizerunek islamu w Polsce na przykładzie podręczników szkolnych, [The image of Islam in Poland through the lens of textboks], in Górak-Sosnowska, Katarzyna, Pędziwiatr, Konrad and Kubicki, Paweł, eds. Islam i obywatelskość w Europie, [Islam and Citizenship in Europe], Warszawa: Elipsa, pp.237–251. Migracje zarobkowe ludności 2002. [Economic migrations of population 2002]. 2003. Warszawa: Główny Urząd Statystyczny. Kamocki, Janusz. 2000. ‘Zderzenie obyczajów i zwyczajów muzułmańskich Tatarów ze zwyczajami ludowymi chrześcijańskiej ludności polskiej’, [The clash of customs and traditions of Muslim Tatars with customs of Polish Christian population], in Orient w kulturze polskiej. Materiały z sesji jubileuszowej z okazji 25-lecia Muzeum Azji i Pacyfiku w Warszawie. 15–16.10.1998, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Akademickie Dialog, pp.139–144. Marek, Agata and Nalborczyk, Agata. 2005. Nie bój się islamu. Leksykon dla dziennikarzy, [Don’t be afraid of Islam. A lexicon for journalists], Warszawa: Więź. Nalborczyk, Agata. 2003. ‘Status prawny muzułmanów w Polsce i jego wpływ na organizację ich życia religijnego’, [Legal status of Muslims in Poland and its impact on the organisation of religious life], in Parzymies, Anna (ed.), Muzułmanie w Europie, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Akademickie Dialog, pp.229–40.

Yilmaz_Chapter 7.indd 123

4/3/2012 5:58:54 PM

124

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

Stosunek do innych narodów. [The attitude toward other nations]. 2005. Warszawa: CBOS. Pew Research Center. 2005. Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics. 17-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey. Z czym kojarzy się Polakom słowo ‘Islam’. [What do the Poles associate the word ‘Islam’ with]. 2001. Warszawa: OBOP.

Yilmaz_Chapter 7.indd 124

4/3/2012 5:58:54 PM

CHAPTER 8 IM AGINING ISL A M: EUROPEAN ENCOUNTER S WITH THE MUSLIM WOR LD THROUGH THE LENS OF GER M AN TEXTBOOK S Gerdien Jonker

In the following pages, I will recount a history of perception of the Muslim world by analysing the longue durée of the ‘Islam’ narrative in German history textbooks. In view of the research question that forms the basis of this volume, ‘Which are the levels on which Europeans have come to revise their sense of historical genealogy as a result of their experience with Islam and Muslims?’ we ask: What do textbooks tell us about the evolution of the collective image of Islam in Germany? Which levels of revision can our analysis reveal? The chapter is divided into two parts. In the first, I sketch the meanderings of the narrative from approximately 1800 until the 1980s. In the second, I examine a span of contemporary history textbooks. Tracing the longue durée of the ‘Islam’ narrative will help to clarify with which instruments German and European views on Muslim peoples and cultures have been embedded in a religious frame juxtaposed with European ‘civilised’

Yilmaz_Chapter 8.indd 125

4/3/2012 11:27:11 AM

126

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

and ‘modern’ views. Currently, the narrative is being re-embedded in a political framework to which the religious framework still caters as a semantic reservoir. Simultaneously, the new framework transcends the old Islam-Europe juxtaposition and connects to global perceptions of threat. By way of introduction, I will explore the nature of history textbooks as a source for institutionalised perceptions of the self and the ‘other’. By way of conclusion, I will summarise what the study of path dependency of the German ‘Islam’ narrative tells us about European constraints in the perception of Europe’s Muslim neighbours.

Continuity and Contingency Some preliminary remarks may serve to explain this approach. The contribution intersects with the ‘Islam’ narrative at the start of the nineteenth century, when it already has a history of some 150 years.1 It is the period in which Western Europe develops a renewed economic and political interest in the Near East. European geographic expeditions to, and diplomatic, travel, artistic, and scholarly accounts of the region multiply. Although Germany does not succeed in establishing colonial claims, German poets and scholars take a deep interest in the languages, histories and religious traditions of the Middle East, adding their own flavour to Western constructions of the Orient. Simultaneously, the building of nation-states dominates Europe’s internal politics. Germany succeeded in building its own state with national institutions and a national mass education as late as 1871. I will argue that both nineteenth-century scholarship and the ideals of the nation-state left a lasting imprint on the ‘Islam’ narrative in the German history textbooks. In 1871, the narrative was anchored in the emerging curricula under the heading of ‘the Crusades’ and remained there for 130 years. This determined the path dependency of the ‘Islam’ narrative as an insoluble part of the Nation, modernity and Christianity in the twentieth century. The approach of the longue durée reveals the mechanisms for stability and persistence as well as the crossroads where major historic contingencies left their imprint on the narrative. I have identified four ‘hinges’. The first is the rise of the nation-state around the 1850s, culminating in 1871 when the

Yilmaz_Chapter 8.indd 126

4/3/2012 11:27:11 AM

IMAGINING ISLAM

127

narrative is anchored under ‘The Crusades’. The second is the rise of National Socialism in the 1930s, a period in which the narrative receives an intense nationalistic flavouring. The third is the defeat of Germany in 1945 and its subsequent division into two political systems. During this period, the narrative mirrors a changing awareness of Germany’s place in the world, which finds expression in the recounting of ‘cultural exchanges’ and the addition of a new narrative dealing with ‘third world countries in the Middle East’. The fourth hinge makes itself felt around the 1980s when school classes begin to turn multi-ethnic. The dawning awareness of world society sets into movement a new balancing which links the beginning of the narrative (‘Muhammed’) to the end (‘guest workers’). It introduces a new division between ‘us’ and ‘them’ that culminates provisionally and uneasily on 9/11. A study of German history textbooks after that date reveals that the building blocks of the narrative are swiftly losing significance. As a consequence, the curricula of the German Länder, in which it has been anchored for such a long time, are currently cutting the rope. The enormous impact of migration and global awareness on German history textbooks and curricula has tempted me to use it as a watershed and structure this chapter into two different parts. Books before that date fit a different framework to those afterwards. The curricula corroborate this observation. The division into a longue durée and a contemporary part helps to weigh the persistence of the narrative against its obstructing character in the age of globalisation. My questions will therefore be the following: How does the longue durée of the textbook narrative intersect with the present? In what ways does it influence present-day perceptions on Europe’s Muslim neighbours? At which moments in time was this image revised and why? Under what circumstances is new knowledge possible?

Textbooks and Narratives Let us firstly consider two elements that go into the making of the educational narrative: textbooks as a tool for imagining the ‘other’ and textbook authors as writers. Textbooks are an important source for

Yilmaz_Chapter 8.indd 127

4/3/2012 11:27:12 AM

128

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

the institutionalised perceptions of any given society. They are based on a canon of what is considered relevant knowledge. According to the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann, the sum of knowledge a society possesses is engendered by the mass media with the help of a selection process that discerns between ‘information’ and ‘non-information’ (Luhmann 2004, p.73). Information is what attracts interest, what is new, unexpected and able to link itself to the narrative that people already know. To be relevant it should also contain some element of sensation. In politics, information gains relevance when linked to accepted political interpretations and judgements. In scientific research, information gains relevance when it connects to scholarly knowledge and offers a basis for comparison. By contrast, the educational field considers relevant the information which ‘fits’ curricular constraints and the needs of the classroom. Textbooks must be considered the outcome of these institutional selections and the final point in the processing of information. One could say that textbooks present a special form of canonised knowledge. Repeating and condensing the selection processes of former generations, mirroring societies’ ideals and basic values, reducing academic knowledge to such an extent that it becomes unrecognisable to scholars, they present the bottom line of what a society ‘knows’. More than any text producer, textbook authors must select. First of all, they refer to and re-interpret the endeavours of earlier textbook authors. Except in times of national breakdown, no textbook is ever written wholly anew. It is not – and indeed cannot be – the original work of one single author. In a cycle that is constantly under revision and reminiscent of the mechanisms of oral tradition rather than modern authorship, narrative strands of earlier textbook authors are adapted to the needs of the present (Jonker 1995; Vansina 1985). Secondly, every new generation must come to terms with its own recent historic past, forcing textbook authors to add new narratives and reduce older ones. Finally, textbook authors face binding curricula and exact time frames prescribing teachers with directions on what they may teach and for how long. They are authors of a special kind who must come to terms with traditions, political expectations, limits and needs, all of them inhibiting the insertion of new knowledge.

Yilmaz_Chapter 8.indd 128

4/3/2012 11:27:12 AM

IMAGINING ISLAM

129

Beneath this complicated texture of information processing, narrative tradition and normative judgment, the narrative is a mental map that tells pupils who they are and where others must be placed. Textbook information about the ‘other’ is framed with images of the self and given a meaning that fits and resonates with the principles and judgements of the age. Textbooks are the instruments par excellence with which a society promotes its self-image and basic values. They mix information with normative discourse, educate pupils to discern and internalise the normative principles of the society they live in. Sequences in history textbooks dealing with Islam, Muslims and Muslim societies therefore first and foremost deal with images of national identity as distinct from the world of Islam. In view of their institutional context, they cannot but create an image of the Muslim ‘other’ in which the self – the nation-state or basic societal values – is implicitly confirmed. In the context of national education, this entanglement of different perspectives has been given the status of a narrative. Narratives describe ‘others’, at the same time ascribing to them features and characteristics that have their origin in the societies’ collective image of the ‘other’. Narratives are therefore more than generalisations. They form ‘schemes’ or ‘recipes’ of what a society perceives as taboo and consequently classifies as ‘not us’ (Douglas 1970, p.49). Deconstructing the longue durée of the ‘Islam’ narrative in German textbooks opens a new window on the history of perception of the Muslim ‘other’. Retracing the path dependency of this particular narrative brings to light past moments of fear, thrill and sensation that were turned into relevant textbook information, but also the crossroads at which the narrative could have taken a different course. It seems typical of the production mode of educational knowledge that generations of textbook authors have repeated the secured knowledge of their predecessors without leaving the narrative frame; that they remained close to the familiar and never strayed too far into unknown knowledge fields; that they successfully blended out knowledge on the Muslim world that did not fit their national and European identities. It is this longue durée that eventually produced the German perception of what is generally called ‘Islam’.

Yilmaz_Chapter 8.indd 129

4/3/2012 11:27:12 AM

130

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

The Invention of Inversed Europe-ness in the Nineteenth Century The nineteenth century produced a plethora of foundation myths on which the European nation-states came to rest. They all went through the same steps. They created a sense of group identity based on ethnic, linguistic and religious markers. They invented a historical genealogy that served to prove the continuity of the nation and they created mythical heroes as imaginative kernels in a narrative texture that allowed for collective identity. The key word they centered upon was ‘independence’ – independence from oppression, independence from imperial power and, above all, independence from ethnic and religious entities that were perceived as different (Etienne and Schulze 1998; Tororova 1997; Anderson 1983). In view of the patchwork of ethnic and religious groups that made up the European peninsula, one wonders why the foundation fathers and mothers still needed Islam as an adversary. But the awakening nation-states, although killing and excluding each other, needed a collective frame to stress their uniqueness as Europeans – civilised, rational, enlightened and essentially Christian. It made them imagine Islam as the garbage can of what they themselves were not. We suggest to call this estimate inversed Europe-ness. The French historian Fernand Braudel captured its sense thus: The Muslim world relates to the Occident like cat and dog. One could even speak of a Counter Occident, in which the bias of their relationship – a heady mix of opposition, enmity and cultural adaptation – resounds. Germaine Tillion would have called them ‘complementary enemies.’ The truth is, they are imperative enemies and rivals. Whatever one of them does is mirrored by the other (Braudel 1977, pp.139–58, translation GJ). This text aptly illustrates the sociological rule that identity cannot exist without alterity. The projection of a Counter Occident frames the old memories of Muslim adversaries and turns them into a tale of absolute otherness. Although from the fifth to the fifteenth centuries

Yilmaz_Chapter 8.indd 130

4/3/2012 11:27:12 AM

IMAGINING ISLAM

131

Arabs, Normans, Vikings, Huns and Slavs alike raided Europe’s borders or settled down on the periphery, many European nations created national narratives in which tales about Muslims were inflated into the significant enemy, the defense against whom had sharpened their own European identity. Spain, Austria and Russia inflated collective memories of military encounters that had once taken place on their territories. Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia took their point of departure in what they perceived as the centuries-long Turkish oppression (Todorova 1997). Other countries, like Belgium, Holland, Poland and Germany, which did not have historic experiences with Muslims (at least not in Europe, the colonial enterprise being interpreted in a totally different frame), transposed ‘their’ encounter with ‘Islam’ to the Crusades (Flacke 1999). Finally, the nineteenth century was also the age of mass education. Once they had become part of the educational system, perceptions of the Muslim other helped to mobilise the masses for the idea of the nation. Collective identification fascinated popular culture and scholarly efforts alike and it was only a matter of time before they inflated the textbook narrative. As a consequence, a narrative emerged in the history textbooks that localised the Muslim aggressor in the Middle Ages and pictured him as Europe’s (and Germany’s) Alter Ego. Part of it – the foundation stone so to say – was a heritage from former centuries. This is not the place to dwell on the earlier war propaganda against the Ottomans, which had mixed information about the strength of the enemy with outrageous accounts of ‘the religion of the Turks’ (Höfert 2003). In the nineteenth century, this story definitely belonged to the past. It had already sobered up somewhat during the eighteenth century and been reduced to (a) the life of the Prophet, (b) some facts of ‘his religion’ (in which polygamy and the prohibition of alcohol continued to play an important part), (c) the Arabs’ attempts to conquer Europe and (d) the Crusades. These four narrative strands made up the canonised knowledge about Islam that from now on would dominate the textbooks. As to the nature of Islam, Catholic and Lutheran textbooks represented rival views. Catholic editors were adverse to what they called

Yilmaz_Chapter 8.indd 131

4/3/2012 11:27:12 AM

132

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

‘a sect full of lies,’ whereas Lutherans in principle acknowledged its fundaments to possess ‘from all religions the best.’ Both placed the Prophet in line with other ‘famous rulers’ and deduced the religion of Islam from his biography. A quotation from each religious view may explain the difference in the textbooks. Here is the Catholic version: Mohammad wrote a book of law full of ridiculous insinuations; however adding the strongest law of all that nobody permits himself to question even one syllable. The main characteristics of this sect can be summed up in the following manner: There is only one God (only in this point they do not err). Mohammad is his prophet. Christ also is a prophet but only one of Mohammad’s servants. There will be a day of atonement when Mohammad is transformed into a large ram and the Turks into fleas who hide in his fleece and he will swim over the ocean to Paradise where there exists a source 70,000 miles in length, filled with honey-sweet wine. Otherwise he has forbidden his followers from drinking so that they may battle without drunkenness. This book of law is called Al-Quran (Oesing 1803, p.240, translation GJ). This account still echoes the inimical views of earlier ages. By contrast, the Lutheran has already sobered up: Concerning this religion, I will give you some basic facts: When founding his community, Mohammad remembered to give his people a religion that was not as severe as the Jewish, not as lofty as the Christian, and not as careless as the Heathen one, a law that befitted a sensual people best. He took from all three what he thought best and added many a thing of his own invention. His main doctrines are the following: There is one God and Mohammad is his prophet. One must pray three times a day and industriously give alms to the poor. Once a year, during the ninth month, one must fast, and at least once in a lifetime make the pilgrimage to Mecca. God has ordained everything beforehand; circumcision is heeded; one is not allowed to drink

Yilmaz_Chapter 8.indd 132

4/3/2012 11:27:12 AM

IMAGINING ISLAM

133

wine but may marry many women. All good people go to paradise after death and enjoy happiness that cannot be described in human tongue (Stein 1810, p.175, translation GJ). Accounts of Islam in principle focused on its legal character, the oneness of God, the pillars of faith, life after death, the prohibition of wine and the allowance of polygamy. Depending on the context, some versions became adorned with nonsensical details, and others with proven facts. By the end of the century, the Christian master narrative switched to a secular account of rulers and their empires. Textbook editors such as Friedrich Kohlrausch (1847), Georg Weber (1848), Wilhelm Pütz (1876) and David Müller (1888) set the beginning of their account in the classical age, without alluding to Christian salvation history any more. However, secularising history in schoolbooks did not change the structure and message of the Islam narrative. Rather, at the start of the twentieth century, its role in creating a national and European identity was further intensified.

The Crusades as Legitimate Defence In the classroom, the story of the Crusades was bound to be a success. It was a thrilling account about the cradle of Christianity being threatened by unbelievers. Its main characters were brave knights, poor pilgrims and a grim and merciless enemy; it was set in exotic faraway landscapes. Thanks to the diligent work of some 200 German scholars, textbook authors soon were able to choose between masses of gripping details. But more than the gripping details, Crusade stories offered German children room for identification where ‘our folk’ and ‘Christianity’ took alternate places. Usually in the textbook accounts, the desire of ‘all of Christianity’ to free the holy land came first: It was in this period that the thought, nourished by the popes for a long time, to unite all of Christianity in one procession to Jerusalem, was realised. During the Counsel of Clermont, Pope Urban II urged to undertake a war procession to the holy land to free it from the hands of the unbelieving Turks, and

Yilmaz_Chapter 8.indd 133

4/3/2012 11:27:12 AM

134

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

many French and Norman knights took the cross from his hands (Müller 1888, p.44, translation GJ). This little, often repeated sequence set the coordinates for the basic dichotomy between ‘us’ (all of Christianity) and ‘them’ (the unbelieving Turks). The actual combatants meanwhile were limited to a local group of knights from the northwest of France. The Germans certainly did not join them. However, notwithstanding the throes of nationmaking, which during the time in which these textbooks appeared, pitched the Germans against the French, it was ‘our folk’ who were treacherously attacked: As they left a hamlet during the second morning hour on Good Friday, they suddenly fell into the hands of the Arabs. These rushed on them, attacked them like wolves and wounded the first ones. Our folk tried to defend themselves at first, but soon enough were forced to flee back into the hamlet because they were not carrying any weapons. On their flight many were killed (Scheiblhuber 1928, p.141, translation GJ). Once the coordinates were set, the story just had to unfold. ‘Our folk’ were pictured as innocent pilgrims, who, on the very day Jesus had died on the cross, made their way towards Jerusalem, without any possibility of defending themselves. In this sequence, Turks were swapped for Arabs, who again were likened to wolves attacking the fleeing victims from behind. Not a very nice picture of the enemy, one would think. But demonising the Muslim foe by now had become part and parcel of the narrative: As a matter of course, the Crusader armies had at least been able to stop the threatening approach of the MongolMohammedan conquerors. In Spain, the call against Islam kindled among the rest of the Westgothic nobility the inspiration to re-conquer the empire. From the mountains in northern Spain, where they had found refuge, they branded against the Moors and, in a battle that lasted for centuries, ousted

Yilmaz_Chapter 8.indd 134

4/3/2012 11:27:12 AM

IMAGINING ISLAM

135

them from European soil (Lehrbuch der Geschichte 1937, p.181, translation GJ). In the ugly inflated language of the National Socialists, the Muslim enemy became a monster of mythical proportions, and its local defences in Palestine were equalled to the Mongolian hordes. The Crusader armies on their part were likened to the Spanish armies of the Reconquista. The message rings out loud and clear: it was ‘them’ attacking ‘us;’ ‘we’ only did what was necessary to safeguard Europe and keep it clean. As the last textbook was being written, Germany prepared itself to do just that, ‘cleaning up’ their own country and the rest of Europe of Communists, Jews, Gypsies, ‘asocial elements,’ homosexuals and the mentally ill. Incidentally, Muslims were not amongst their targets. For one thing, their numbers were negligible to a degree that they could not threaten the racist pedigree. Second, the European battle against Islam was of a mythical quality and had nothing to do with real Muslims. Like the world of the Greek Gods, Islam belonged to a symbolic sphere that served to demonstrate the difference between good and bad, them and us, or, in the racist perception, clean and unclean, masters and slaves. Third, canonised knowledge savoured a memory of Muslims as weaklings. After all, the Arabs had finally been driven out from Spain as the Ottomans from the Balkans. Because they had lost ‘their’ war, Muslims definitely were earmarked as the losers of history. So deeply rooted was this German ‘Muslim’ semantics that incidentally, detainees in the concentration camps who gave up their will to survive were generally called Muselmanner (the old word for Muslims), not only by the National Socialist perpetrators but also by their coprisoners (Anidjar 2003, pp.150–63). The National Socialist view imposed a racist perception, but they still acted within the coordinates of the Crusades’ logic. It taught children their place in the world, a place in which Germany, Christianity and Europe blended and were morally higher than the rest. In this scheme of things, Muslims were given the part of bad guys and losers just to demonstrate how good they themselves were. After the National Socialist regime was defeated, the Allied forces undertook the

Yilmaz_Chapter 8.indd 135

4/3/2012 11:27:12 AM

136

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

reform of the German educational system. The Russians were responsible for the East, the Americans, British and French for the West, and on both sides, new textbooks appeared. While the split between East and West Germany became firmly established, both Germanys continued to teach the established canon, reviving its parts – the origins of Islam, the biography of the prophet, the conquering Arabs and the Crusades – as if wedded and never to be parted again. When the Islam narrative became part of the subject matter for the seventh grade, however, its importance dwindled. Eastern textbooks – guided by translations from Russian textbooks – made some effort to break associations with superiority. The Crusades episode was judged harshly with terms like robbery, enrichment, looting parties, cruelties, religious zeal and delusion. Yet, ‘nonetheless, notwithstanding their lack of success, the meaning of the Crusades for the development of Western Europe cannot be underestimated. It contributed to the development of European commerce in the Mediterranean’ (Semjonow 1952, p.145). With these lines, a new theme made its entry in the narrative, economic – and, with some distance, also cultural – profit began to unfold. Under the heading ‘Islam threatens the Christian West’, while reproducing the canon in full, West German books inserted small sequences that addressed the culture of the other: Zealously, the Arabs learned from the defeated cultures, Persians, Indians, but also from the writings of ancient Greeks and Romans. The Arab scholars later conveyed to the inhabitants of the West the knowledge that they gleaned from astronomy, philosophy and medicine. We owe to the Arabs the ‘Arab numbers,’ which they had adapted from the Indians, and algebra. Many produces of trading diligence, like weapons and cloth, were superior to those of the West (Grundzüge der Geschichte 1965, p.10, translation GJ). The choice of words – zealously, convey, trading diligence – betrays that admitting to others a superior cultural knowledge still took a certain amount of teeth gritting. The text suggests that the Arabs just acted as a transit, passing on what other people had invented.

Yilmaz_Chapter 8.indd 136

4/3/2012 11:27:12 AM

IMAGINING ISLAM

137

This is not unusual in the textbook accounts of the 1960s and 1970s. They reveal the difficulty of taking one’s distance from the ‘we are superior’ spirit. In Western German textbooks, subject matter for the tenth grade also started to include some facts concerning the modern Muslim world, which, in line with the historical view, was limited to the Middle East. But when the oil crisis, the Iranian Revolution and the Israel-Palestinian conflict erupted, this neutral account changed into a tale of tensions and conflicts and accounts of the normality of Muslim lives disappeared from view. Involuntarily, this also fed the imbalance between ‘us’ and ‘them.’

‘Real’ Muslims in the Classroom It must be remembered that, during all this time, no lasting contact existed between Germans and inhabitants from Muslim countries. Of course, there had been geographers and other travelers who experienced the reality of the Muslim world and came back with accounts that differed from the established canon. Early on, some of these geographical accounts even made it into the textbooks (Jonker 2008). There had been diplomatic and other exchanges with the Ottoman Empire, as a result of which high civil servants spent their lives in Berlin where they founded their own cemetery. At the end of the Second World War, a considerable number of Tartar and other Muslim combatants who had sided with the German armies were left stranded in Munich and Aachen. But on the surface of public awareness, these remained incidents that did not leave a lasting imprint. As far as the textbooks were concerned, Muslims were hypothetical figures from a remote past. Whatever the collective imagination ascribed to them, one could be sure that they would not talk back. Between 1965 and 2000, due to a politics of importing ‘guest workers’ for menial and undesirable jobs, the Muslim population in Germany rose from an almost negligible number to three and a half million people. The newcomers were expected to stay on a temporary basis only and were hardly taken notice of. Remarkably, it was not anticipated that a change in law for unlimited residency would encourage them to reunite their families in Germany. However, after 1970, many Turkish

Yilmaz_Chapter 8.indd 137

4/3/2012 11:27:12 AM

138

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

men and women turned their backs on the basic dormitories in which they had been parked and founded family homes (Jonker 2005). In some federal states, especially North-Rhine Westphalia, they reached a critical mass that surfaced in the public realm. Its main channel was education. When the children of the first generation of foreign workers started to enter school in considerable numbers, educators were at a loss. Defined by menial work and increasingly on the dole, foreign workers by then represented Germany’s lowest social class. Teachers saw themselves confronted with language deficiencies, social problems with parents who did not respond to school requests of parent involvement, and a string of more subtle difficulties reaching from socialisation patterns to class differences. Textbooks responded to the changed equilibrium in the classroom through subsuming all these problems under the heading of Islam. As far as historical experience was concerned, the old Islam canon was their only resource to which to refer. Consequently, it was turned into an instrument with which the newcomers were encountered. In the final part of this contribution, we will inspect textbooks from North-Rhine Westphalia, a federal state with one million Turkish inhabitants, to see how this was done2. The first reaction was a careful assessment of the Crusades. The sermon of the Pope, who initially mobilised the masses, was severely questioned. ‘Was it propaganda?’ the authors ask. ‘Were the Crusades a mistake?’ is another question that surfaces. The story starts to shift its focus from the Crusades’ military character to its economic and cultural consequences. Underneath, there is a message that can be captured as follows: whatever happened back then, it was also an early multicultural experience, offering a projection screen for contemporary multicultural society. Next enters the double perspective: the textbooks offer ‘our’ as well as ‘their’ perception, backed up by sources from both sides. This time, the message runs: this is not only about ‘our’ German, European perceptions after all, ‘they’ had a view of their own, and ‘we’ have to make room for it. This, too, offers a blueprint for dealing with the present.

Yilmaz_Chapter 8.indd 138

4/3/2012 11:27:12 AM

IMAGINING ISLAM

139

Finally, reality itself is addressed with the appearance of sequences that capture the experiences of ‘Muslims among us’, ‘We get to know each other’ and ‘Visit to a mosque’ (Durchblick, Hauptschule 7/5, 2001: pp.140–173), or, in a slightly altered form: ‘Why did you come to us?’ ‘Being a foreigner in Germany’ and ‘Looking for Muslims in Germany’ (Mitmischen, Hauptschule 7/3, 1999, p.110). In other words, the classroom is transformed into an ethnographic expedition which produces its own knowledge. In theory at least, this opens up a window to the reality of the other, and offers a means to look beyond ascription. Leaving methodological difficulties aside (Muslims co-mates are being turned into learning objects, which, if anything, only strengthens the perception of ‘us’ and ‘them’), an opening to break away from the petrified knowledge structure finally offers itself. Leafing through the 12 to 15 pages that usually cover the Islam narrative, what strikes the reader is its 100 per cent focus on religion. The word Islam is very prominent and Turks and Arabs are pictured as religious as a matter of course. Illustrations show mosques, the Hajj, praying Muslims and covered women and generally serve to underline the religious character of the Orient. Often recurring titles run: ‘Islam becomes a world religion’ (Entdecken u. Verstehen, Realschule 7/2, 1995, pp.242–54), ‘Allah is great’ (Durchblick. Hauptschule, 7/5, 2001, pp.140–73), or ‘Jews, Christians and Islam’ (Geschichte Real, Hauptschule, 1/6, 2003, pp.218–70). Under these headings, the established canon is reinterpreted. There is the explanation of the Quran, the five pillars and their implications for daily life and the biography of the Prophet Muhammad. The expansion of Islam towards Europe is followed by an account on Islamic culture in Spain. The story ends in medieval times with an account of the Crusades. With this knowledge in store, it analyses the present, focusing on Islam in Germany as well as on differences, for which gender and the role of the family offer grateful subjects. Looking through this lens, it escapes from view that the objects of study frequently have taken their distance from religion. Turks, Iraqis, Palestinians or Egyptians and Iranians from before the revolution come from secular societies, and often just do not know all that much about Islam. Being a Muslim for them signifies a cultural membership

Yilmaz_Chapter 8.indd 139

4/3/2012 11:27:12 AM

140

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

in which religion plays a role, but not as large as that expected by German interlocutors. In terms of collective memory, however, Islam is the essence of what German society ‘knows’ about its Muslim population. In terms of relevant information, it is societies’ new fascination, flanked by political assessments and a growing scholarship. What society thinks it does not know yet can be found in a series of questions drafted for the German pupils: ‘Ask your Muslim co-mates how they pray,’ and ‘Ask your Muslim co-mates whether their family went to the Hajj.’ On the part of the Muslim pupils, the questions often evoke embarrassment. Meanwhile, at the other end of the textbooks, among subject matters taught in the tenth grade, a new narrative about the Muslim world has matured. Starting in the 1960s, it inserts information about Muslim countries and soon expands into an account of ‘international crises’. It addresses not only the Iranian Revolution and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but also the resurgence of Islam in the Muslim world, and the dangers of fundamentalism. Newer headings also capture ‘The headscarf debate’ (Durchblick, Hauptschule, 10/5, 2001, p.140), ‘Cause of conflict: the building of mosques,’ ‘Cause of conflict: Muslim festivals’ and ‘The EU membership of Turkey’ (Geschichte Real, Hauptschule, 3/7, 2005). By 2001, this has become the site in which contemporary problems are addressed, and offers room for discussion in the classroom. Instead of presenting the usual two views, pupils are being asked to adopt pro and contra roles and to defend different positions. Within this frame, which at the same time is a continuation and an enlargement of the old Islam narrative, appears the first photographs of Bin Laden and of the Twin Towers. Since 2003, 9/11 has broken into the accepted textbook canon. Its images defy the old image of Muslims as the losing party; its global scope defies the framework of the nation-state. The attack on the symbols of the Western world has caused a vacuum in which the old explanation models seem to lose their authority.

Summary and Conclusion What has been described in this text is the texture and workings of institutionalised perceptions resulting in textbook narratives. Our

Yilmaz_Chapter 8.indd 140

4/3/2012 11:27:12 AM

IMAGINING ISLAM

141

primary sources were German history textbooks only, but the rules apply to textbook collections anywhere in the world. A narrative presents a leading idea or opinion that came into existence at some point of the past, became institutionalised underway and presents the ‘right’ way to look at things (Meyer 1989, Thelen 2003). Narratives thus offer ready, prêt-a-porter answers to critical questions; they are part of popular knowledge, thus allowing for quick references without the need to re-consider the whole story time and again. Narratives, I argue, are relevant and useful as long as they present societies´ basic values, but they may become problematic when they include essential knowledge about others. What then did children, growing up during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Germany, incorporate as essential knowledge about Muslims? With the help of textbook knowledge, they internalised that: The religion of Islam is a direct consequence of the life of the Prophet. It prescribes daily conduct including praying, fasting, fighting for religion, the prohibition of wine and polygamy. As a result of this religion, Muslims attacked Europe. They are vicious, distrustful and barbarous. In the end, Muslims proved to be the losers of history (Muselmen). Morally, ‘we’ (Germans, Europeans, Christians) stand above ‘them’ (Turks, Arabs, Tartars, Muslims in general). This essential knowledge, stitched together in the seventeenth century when a feeling of acute threat dominated and institutionalised in the nineteenth century when nation-states looked for instruments to discern between ‘us’ and ‘them’, served to mobilise the masses. It helped to build the nation-state, deeply influenced twentieth-century perceptions, caused confusion when the institutionalised view did not ‘fit’ the reality of migrant families and finally offered a fertile manure for the growth of a new narrative of global threat after 9/11. Until the 1980s, Germans lacked direct contact with citizens from Muslim states, a circumstance that permitted the Islam narrative to remain

Yilmaz_Chapter 8.indd 141

4/3/2012 11:27:12 AM

142

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

intact. When confronted with the reality of a large Turkish population and the social and cultural conflicts involved, it still remained the major frame of interpretation, because there just was no other one available. As a result, the Crusades became a projection screen for intercultural contacts and exchanges. However, between approximately 1982 and 2002, textbooks also introduced new methods to gain knowledge about the ‘other’. In its wake, classrooms were transformed into ethnographical expeditions, which generated their own knowledge over and beyond the institutionalised perceptions. In view of the mechanisms of collective memory, in which crises more readily take root than good tidings, twenty years is a very short time in which to establish new knowledge. As long as it lasted, the textbooks absorbed information about the reality of the other. The events of 9/11 managed to bring this development to a halt. It also managed to create a vacuum. The old framework of threat had been modeled to suit the needs of the nation-state. Against this, 9/11 signaled a change in paradigm. The new threat has a global dimension for which no framework has been developed yet. On another level, 9/11 readily corroborated the historic semantics of Muslims. It is too early yet to say where the textbooks are heading, but already the extracurricula materials try to stitch together a new narrative, the main ingredients of which are: a foreign, warrior religion, a barbaric law (illustrated with photographs of whipping and stoning), the oppression of women and arbitrary rule. The semantic reservoir offers fertile soil for such ingredients. The only figure, which has disappeared from view, is the Muselman. In the logic of collective memory, the losers of history have been restored to their original threatening potential.

Notes 1 The first textbooks with contemporary history are introduced after the religious Thirty Years’ War that ravaged Germany during 1618–48. During the preceding century, the Lutheran foremen had already propagated the study of contemporary history, because, from the Lutheran perspective, history bore witness to God’s intentions and therefore served to strengthen Christian

Yilmaz_Chapter 8.indd 142

4/3/2012 11:27:12 AM

IMAGINING ISLAM

143

faith. This novel Lutheran focus on contemporary history coincides with the Ottomans in South-Eastern and Central Europe, who at the time are literally writing history. Had it been the Indians attacking Europe in rowing boats to revenge their discoverer, it probably would have been them. As it so happens, ‘Turks’ and, blending with them, ‘Musulmen’, become the essence of the nonChristian, non-European ‘other’. See Jonker (2009). 2 Each federal state has its own Ministry of Education and takes care of its own textbooks. Apart from primary school, there exist three school types: Hauptschule, Realschule and Gymnasium. For the learning period that interests us here, the seventh to tenth grade, several printing houses cater to the needs of the different states and the Ministries of Education admit new books each year. As far as history is concerned, North-Rhine Westphalia teachers momentarily choose between ‘Durchblick’, ‘Ansichten’, ‘Entdecken & Verstehen’, ‘Mitmischen’ and ‘Geschichte Real’ of which exist separate versions for each school type. In view of this exploding market, choosing books that present a period of eleven years (1995–2006) already becomes a hazard. I solved the problem by concentrating mainly on the lowest school level (Hauptschule) because it represents the canon in its most condensed form.

References Primary Sources (in chronological order) Desing, Anselm. 1803. Kurze Anleitung der Universalhistorie. Nach der Geographie der Landeskarte. Für die studierende Jugend herausgegeben, Augsburg. Stein, Karl. 1810. Allgemeine Weltgeschichte für die Jugend, Berlin. Kohlrausch, Friedrich. 1845. Chronologischer Abriß der Weltgeschichte, zunächst für den Jugend-Unterricht (2. Auflage), Leipzig: Friedlein & Hirsch. Weber, Georg. 1847. Lehrbuch der Weltgeschichte mit Rücksicht auf Cultur, Literatur und Religionswesen, und einen Abriß der deutschen Literaturgeschichte als Anhang. Für höhere Schulanstalten und zur Selbstbelehrung (2. Abdruck), Leipzig: Verlag von Wilhelm Engelmann. Wilhelm Pütz, Wilhelm. 1876. Die Geschichte des Mittelalters – in abgerundeten Gemälden (2. Auflage), Köln. Müller, David. 1888. Leitfaden zur Geschichte des deutschen Volkes, (6. Auflage), Berlin. Scheiblhuber, Th. 1928. Deutsche Geschichte. Das Mittelalter, (8. Auflage), Berlin. Lehrbuch der Geschichte. 1937. Oberstufe 1, Breslau: Diesterweg. Semjonow, W.F. 1952. Geschichte des Mittelalters, Leipzig. ‘Grundzüge der Geschichte’. 1965. Mittelstufe 2, Diesterweg. Entdecken u. Verstehen. 1995. Realschule 7/2, Berlin: Cornelsen. Mitmischen. 1999. Hauptschule 7/3, München: Klett. Durchblick. 2001. Hauptschule 7/5, Braunschweig: Westermann.

Yilmaz_Chapter 8.indd 143

4/3/2012 11:27:12 AM

144

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

Durchblick. 2001. Hauptschule 10/5, Braunschweig: Westermann. Geschichte Real. 2003. Hauptschule 1/6, München: Klett. Geschichte Real. 2005. Hauptschule 3/7, München: Klett.

Books and Articles Anderson, Benedict. 1983. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, London: Verso. Anidjar, Gil. 2003. The Jew, The Arab: A History of the Enemy, California: Stanford University Press. Braudel, Fernand. 1977. La Méditerranée, l’espace et l’histoire, Paris: ChampsFlammarion. Douglas, Mary. 1970. Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo, Middlesex, UK: Penguin. Etienne, Francois and Schulze, Hagen. 1998. ‘Das emotionale Fundament der Nationen’, in Flacke, Monika (ed.), Mythen der Nationen: Ein europäisches Panorama, München-Berlin: Koehler und Amelang, pp.17–33. Flacke, Monika (ed.). 1998. Mythen der Nationen: Ein europäisches Panorama, München-Berlin: Koehler und Amelang. Höfert, Almut. 2003. Den Feind beschreiben: Türkengefahr und europäisches Wissen über das Osmanische Reich 1450–1600, Frankfurt: Campus. Jonker, Gerdien. 1995. The Topography of Remembrance: The Dead, Tradition and Collective Memory in Mesopotamia, Leiden: E.J. Brill. Jonker, Gerdien. 2005. ‘From Foreign Workers to “Sleepers”: Germany’s Discovery of its Muslim Population’, in Césari, Jocelyne and MacLoughin, Sean, European Muslims and the Secular State, London: Ashgate, pp.113–26. Jonker, Gerdien. 2008 ‘El Islam en los libros de texto alemanes: La historia de una narración edicational’, in Cajani, Luigi (ed.), Conociendro al otro. El Islam y Europa en sus manuales de historia, Madrid: Santillana, pp. 37–73. Jonker, Gerdien. 2009. ‘The longue durée of the Islam-Narrative: The Emergence and Development of a Narrative Concept in European School Textbooks’, in Jonker, Gerdien and Thobani, Shiraz, Narrating Islam: Interpretations of the Muslim World in European Texts, London: I.B.Tauris, pp.19–40. Luhmann, Niklas. 2004. Die Realität der Massenmedien, Wiesbaden: VHS Verlag. Thelen, Kathleen. 2003. ‘How Institutions Evolve: Insights from Comparative Historical Analysis’, in Mahoney, James and Ruschemeyer, Dietrich (eds), Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.208–40. Todorova, Maria. 1997. Imagining the Balkans, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Vansina, Jan. 1985. Oral Tradition as History, Madison: James Currey Publishers.

Yilmaz_Chapter 8.indd 144

4/3/2012 11:27:12 AM

CHAPTER 9 TEACHING INTEGR ATION IN THE NETHER L ANDS: ISL A M, IM A MS AND THE SECUL AR GOVER NMENT Welmoet Boender

Teaching Dutch Ways to Foreign Imams In a television program broadcast on 17 September 2005,1 a Christian Democrat member of parliament, Mirjam Sterk, defended a proposal of the Dutch Parliament. The proposal stated that imams should no longer receive residence permits to work as imams in the Netherlands, starting from 2008.2 This would serve as a means to prevent mosque boards from recruiting their imams from abroad, and force them to find ‘home-grown’ imams.3 Those imams would be able to support especially the young in their integration into Dutch society. It would diminish the growing gap between Muslims and non-Muslims in the current climate of polarisation and radicalisation. During this television program, Sterk argued that ‘Islam must set roots in Dutch society. The imams who reside only on a temporary basis in The Netherlands obstruct this process. An imam training program is a way to achieve the rooting of Islam in Dutch society’.

Yilmaz_Chapter 9.indd 145

4/3/2012 11:27:45 AM

146

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

In her argument, Sterk insisted that training imams in the Netherlands are important for the integration of Muslims in the Netherlands, and for the prevention of radicalisation. Her opponent in the television program, Ahmed Marcouch, then chairman of the Union of Moroccan Mosques in Amsterdam, agreed with her about the importance of a Dutch imam training program. However, he regarded denying residence permits to foreign-born imams as a violation of the freedom of religion. The government is not entitled to interfere in the internal matters of a religious community, such as in the choice of its religious leaders. Besides that, he argued, it is not the imam who works in the mosque who causes the problems, but the preachers who move outside the mosques, in living rooms and on the Internet. During the program, a student of the Islamic University of Rotterdam – an ‘imamto-be’ – was invited to give his opinion on the matter. He agreed with the Member of Parliament, acknowledging that imams born and raised in The Netherlands would be better able to counsel second and third generation Muslims and communicate with them in Dutch. The (female) discussion leader then asked him if he would shake hands with a woman. At that time, this topic was particularly sensitive. At a formal meeting in November 2004 between several imams and the Minister of Alien Affairs and Integration, one of the imams refused to shake hands with the female minister. Her offended reaction was filmed and the incident caused moral commotion in society. It took place shortly after the murder of publicist and film maker Theo van Gogh by a young Moroccan-Dutch man, who legitimised his deed by referring to Islam. The student of the Islamic University replied to the discussion leader: ‘I would not shake hands with a woman who is not related to me ... This is purely a religious matter. I am a student of Islamic knowledge. So, if I myself do not obey what I believe, I would be a hypocrite. This is a step we have to overcome and we have to explain the background of our religious rules.’4 This thirty-minute discussion encapsulates the major elements of the Dutch imam training debate of the past twenty-five years. It shows how politicians have regarded imam training in the Netherlands as a panacea for integration. The imam is seen as key figure with a special responsibility in the integration process of Muslims. The government

Yilmaz_Chapter 9.indd 146

4/3/2012 11:27:46 AM

TEACHING INTEGR ATION

IN THE

NETHERLANDS

147

has hoped and expected that through the imam it will be able to reach Muslims and improve their integration. The imam should ideally not only have knowledge about Dutch language and customs, but also subscribe to the central values of the Dutch society. An ‘ideal imam’ preferably would be trained in The Netherlands. We recognise this in the dialogue between the Member of Parliament and the chair of Moroccan mosques in Amsterdam. Mirjam Sterk said: ‘Imams have a moral leadership in the mosques. But when a girl asks the imam “I am not admitted to that disco around the corner, because I wear a headscarf”, well, that is a very concrete question, which she should be able to discuss with him.’ Marcouch smiled and answered: ‘The imam will probably say that it is right that she is not admitted, because as a Muslim she should not go to a disco at all’. Discussion leader: ‘Would you expect a Dutch-trained imam to give a different answer?’ Sterk: ‘Well, I hope and expect that an imam trained in the Netherlands better understands and respects that question.’ (Debat op 1, 17 September 2005, translation WB). Also the fear that imams act as motors of radicalisation, either actively because they spread radical views themselves, or passively, because they are unable to communicate with the young and to present them moderate alternatives, has been clearly visible in the ‘imam debate’. Sterk: ‘It is a risk for society that the young who debate with each other on Internet and who show a spiritual hunger, are not corrected in their sometimes radical views.’ (Debat op 1, 17 September 2005, translation WB). Already since the early 1980s, the possibility of setting up an imam training program has been a crucial aspect of the public debate on the integration of Muslim migrants into Dutch society. Since 2002, special ‘citizenship courses’ have been compulsory for imams who reside in the Netherlands on a temporary basis. The government hopes that an imam training program and a ‘citizenship course’ might serve as an instrument of the government to direct the Muslims’ orientations towards Dutch society (see for more examples, Boender 2007, p.47–65). The question is, however, what role the government is legitimately allowed to play. In all arguments, the state appears to be bound to the principle of separation between church and state. As we will see, this principle is not static, nor univocally described. For example, where

Yilmaz_Chapter 9.indd 147

4/3/2012 11:27:46 AM

148

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

Marcouch argued that the right to choose the imam should remain with the religious communities and not with the state, for Sterk, the aim of integration and the prevention of radicalism prevailed and legitimises an active involvement of the government in the religious affairs of Muslim communities. In a parliamentary motion, Mirjam Sterk asked the government to impose a requirement to imams wishing to come and work here that they are trained in The Netherlands (Sterk 20 200 VI; motion 155). In this chapter, I will first shortly discuss the background of the imam training debate and of the ‘citizenship courses’ for foreign imams. I will summarise the main possibilities of the government to instrumentalise the imam in the integration process. Then, I go into several areas of tension which emerge from the idea of teaching Dutch ways to foreign imams. Finally, I argue that overall, the imam training debate is used to channel public and political controversies on possible positions of the secular government with regard to a specific religious minority, i.e. Muslims in Dutch society.5

Some Background about the Public Focus on Imam Training and Citizenship Courses for Imams In public debate about the integration of Muslims into Dutch society, the imam has received special attention as the perceived religious and socio-cultural leader of the Muslim community. He is considered to play a pivotal and responsible role throughout the process of the integration of Muslims into Dutch society.6 Such a key role is related to the recognition that mosques and imams not only fulfill religious but also socio-cultural roles in the diaspora. A 1998 report on The Netherlands’ integration policy regarding imams stressed that: The government considers it of high importance that the leaders of philosophical associations and organizations, including those which attract especially ethnic minorities, can communicate fluently with their Dutch surroundings and are also very well acquainted with the social structures and cultural characteristics of Dutch society. Here the government pays special attention to

Yilmaz_Chapter 9.indd 148

4/3/2012 11:27:46 AM

TEACHING INTEGR ATION

IN THE

NETHERLANDS

149

the social skills of imams since they belong to the largest philosophical stream among ethnic minorities. The present practice of recruiting imams from Turkey and Morocco should come to an end (Integratiebeleid 1998, p.17, translation WB). The Dutch imam training, as promoted by the government, would be aimed at substituting the current generation of imams with a ‘homegrown’ cohort. Imams trained in The Netherlands would obtain a thorough knowledge of the Dutch language as well as of Dutch society, both of which would be necessary for counseling Muslims who ask for the imam’s advice concerning problems emerging in the Dutch context. It must be noted that in public debate, despite a strong interest in the imam, his precise role, authority and influence in the Netherlands have remained unclear in a general sense (for a recent anthropological study as a modest attempt to fill in this gap, see Boender 2007). Several motivations can explain the eagerness of the government to stimulate the establishment of a Dutch imam training, some of which are summed up here. It is seen as a step towards equal justice for Muslims in the Netherlands and a concrete step in the development of a multicultural society. No new, strong Muslim intellectual elite that could speak out authoritatively on ethical matters and religious affairs in the public debate has yet formed. Indeed, analogous to Protestant ministers and Catholic priests, imams are considered to be the obvious figures to assume the role of pastoral caretakers in government-provided prisons and hospitals (Boender and Kanmaz 2002; Rath et al. 1996; Shadid and Van Koningsveld 1997). The imam, just as religious leaders within the Christian traditions active in the Netherlands, has been seen as the pastor of the community, with the accompanying socioreligious authority. However, imams do not appear to be trained for this new task as pastoral caretakers. It is thought that training in The Netherlands aimed at Muslim pastoral caretaking (geestelijke verzorging) would fill this need. Furthermore, in the 1980s and 1990s, a fear of a political-ideological influence and (state) interference from the countries of origin through so-called ‘import-imams’ from Turkey

Yilmaz_Chapter 9.indd 149

4/3/2012 11:27:46 AM

150

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

and Morocco became clearly visible. This influence was perceived to prevent migrants from fully adapting to Dutch society and to foster the possibility for foreign governments to reinforce their grip on their subjects in the diaspora (compare Rath et al. 1996, p.246; Rath 1999, p.60). After 9/11, a fear for radicalisation increased, as elsewhere in the world. Again, the focus was put on the imam in the local mosque. Though now it was no longer the perspective of integration, but of anti-terrorism that became the main focus of attention. It was feared that radicalisation would be brought by imams and preachers from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria and Libya. By closing the borders to new imams, these radical elements could be kept out, while – as we saw in Sterk’s argument – Dutch imams could act as a counterweight to radicalisation tendencies among young Muslims in society.7 Also after the murder of Theo van Gogh, which shocked the nation, the imam training program proposal was put forward as a possible answer to decrease the growing gap between Muslims and non-Muslims, and between the generations. A religious training institute which is made possible through state subsidies is not alien to Dutch society. A relevant remnant of the Dutch history of religious pluralism is that the government regards it as its duty to provide the necessary prerequisites for religious groups, such as pastoral caretaking in hospitals, prisons, the army and other public institutions. This rests on a long history of religious pluralism, which took the shape of a ‘pillarisation model’ in the twentieth century. ‘Pillars’ formed along the lines of religious and secular denominations became power blocks for socioreligious groups and contributed greatly to the emancipation of their members in Dutch society as a whole. Despite a strong secularisation since the 1970s, the financing by the state of academic education for clergymen, both at public and private confessional universities and seminaries, is institutionalised. An Islamic seminary could be established in the same manner. However, for a long time, the Dutch government has been unable and sometimes unwilling to organise an imam training program by itself, among others due to the separation between church and state. Furthermore, the cooperation and the initiative of Muslim organisations also are needed. This has been hampered by the cultural

Yilmaz_Chapter 9.indd 150

4/3/2012 11:27:46 AM

TEACHING INTEGR ATION

IN THE

NETHERLANDS

151

and confessional heterogeneity of the Muslim communities in the Netherlands and many other practical, emotional and moral arguments (see for example Boender and Kanmaz 2002, p.171). A training institute which would be facilitated financially by the state must fulfill certain requirements, such as Dutch as the language of instruction and a certain level of educational quality (Boender 2006). In 2005, the Christian Free University in Amsterdam was the first to be given governmental subsidies to run Islamic Studies aimed at Muslim students. A year later, Leiden University received subsidies to start offering a BA and an MA in Islamic Theology. A second important instrument of the government, in line with the aforementioned motivations, is the ‘citizenship course’ for foreign imams. This course focuses on teaching the Dutch language and adopting Dutch customs and values. The course prepares an immigrant ‘to realise his or her rights as a Dutch citizen and to fulfill his or her societal rights and duties’ (Tijssen 2001, preface). The problems which have long hindered the establishment of an imam training program (like the separation of church and state, the cultural and confessional heterogeneity of the Muslim communities, and the reluctant attitudes of both government and Muslim organisations) have not impeded the implementation of the law on ‘citizenship’ for imams. Muslim organisations have generally welcomed this initiative. Moreover, the social climate in 2001 accelerated the approval of the law on ‘citizenship’ for foreign imams. The government’s wish for an imam training program still existed, but the course on Dutch citizenship for imams was seen as a step in the right direction of improvement of the facilities an imam has in realising his special responsibility as religious leader of a community. Sufficient language ability and knowledge of laws, rights and duties were seen as prerequisites for citizenship. Since January 2002, this law on ‘citizenship’ applies to foreign imams as well. For them, the course not only involves the regular program for every newcomer, but includes teachings on religion and society as well. Topics in this program are, among others, the position of religion in society, the history of religious pluralism, and the political, legal and socio-economic aspects of ethnic minorities. In the language program, a vocabulary is taught with useful words in

Yilmaz_Chapter 9.indd 151

4/3/2012 11:27:46 AM

152

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

the (inter)religious dialogue. The Ministry of Internal Affairs finances the courses.8 To be able to respond to the abovementioned motions of Mirjam Sterk and of Wouter Bos,9 the Minister of Alien Affairs and Integration requested the advice of the Advisory Committee on Aliens Affairs (ACVZ). The ACVZ reacted as follows: The ACVZ strongly supports the government’s endeavour to support and encourage the establishment of training for imams in the Netherlands. However, it is of the opinion that the establishment of such training should not lead to a ban on the admission of imams from abroad, or to imposing on them the requirements that they follow a training course in this country. Such general prohibitions/requirements are incompatible with freedom of religion, in conjunction with the principle of equal treatment, and with the reserve which the government should exercise in relation to the choice of clergy made by a faith community (ACVZ 2005, p.99). The ACVZ added that a structural and general refusal of admittance of imams to The Netherlands as security measure for public safety is neither efficient nor effective.10 It states that ‘Because of the importance of religion and the need experienced by faith communities to choose their own clergy, such communities perceive having their own clergy as a significant part of freedom of religion. However, this freedom does not entail an unrestricted right to entry or residence in the Netherlands for foreign clergy’ (ACVZ 2005, p.92). In the Committee’s vision, the existing legal measurements of preventing imams with extremists views can be continued. They can be refused residence permits; this however should not mean that imams must be refused categorically. Apart from these recommendations, the ACVZ does promote the already mentioned extra civic integration programme for foreign clergy, the so called ‘citizenship courses’ for imams (ACVZ 2005, p. 97). The government took over the legal advice of the ACVZ and the aforementioned motions were not turned into policy.

Yilmaz_Chapter 9.indd 152

4/3/2012 11:27:46 AM

TEACHING INTEGR ATION

IN THE

NETHERLANDS

153

Areas of Tension Emerging from the Idea of Teaching Dutch Ways to Foreign Imams The debate on the imam training program shows how in the past twenty-five years the boundaries of the principle of separation between church and state have been explored. The emphasis on imam training has been an attempt to channel the anxieties about the compatibility of Islam and the West in a legitimate manner. It has left open the possibility of action by Muslim organisations, while at the same time allowing the government to play a stimulating and facilitating role, which takes into account the separation of Church and State. The state never tires to stress that it will not interfere in the contents of such program, since this would fall under the responsibility of the Muslim organisations. However, the way the government has dealt with the imam training file reveals several areas of tension. First of all, we must emphasise that one should not overestimate the influence of the imam in the local mosque upon the local mosque community, let alone upon the Muslim communities in the Netherlands. Empirical research shows that both imams and practising Muslims emphasise that his influence is limited and restricted to moral admonition and social advice. It depends very much on a particular imam to what degree he can assert his institutional, legal-rational and charismatic authority (Boender 2007). The government should not put all its eggs in one basket and should not have unrealistic expectations regarding the role of the imam. The second area of tension concerns the question to what extent the government is legally authorised to actively take measures in this field. Denying general and structural admittance of imams to the Netherlands is unauthorised, because of the constitutional rights of freedom of religion and equal justice (Advisory Council for Alien Affairs, ACVZ 2005). Third, already since the 1980s, religion has been regarded as an important factor in the emancipation of minorities (see for example the 1983 report on the formal minority policy: 110). On the one hand, there is a tradition of religious pluralism which has been

Yilmaz_Chapter 9.indd 153

4/3/2012 11:27:46 AM

154

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

institutionalised socially and politically. On the other hand, there has been a clear anxiety about Islam as a suppressing instead of a liberating religion, particularly towards women. The question of whether religion, i.e. Islam, can be a binding element in social cohesion or if The Netherlands is naively tolerant or ignorant, towards intolerance, was put on the edge after the murder of Theo van Gogh. Can this be cured by socio-cultural training of imams, or should one focus on other aspects, like the socio-economic aspects of integration? The fourth area of tension is related to the growing political tendency in the last five to ten years in favour of a form of secularism modeled after the French system of secularism (laïcité). Until the mid1990s, the governmental motto was ‘integration while preserving one’s own identity’. Nowadays, less space is given to collective and individual religious and cultural expressions in the public domain. Religion has been regarded increasingly as something which should be practiced in the private sphere. This does not leave much space to the existence of a pluralism of allegiances, hybrid identities or double nationalities. However, Islam is a religion which publicly manifests itself (e.g. headscarves). Moreover, opinions of politicians differ greatly in the question if religion can act as a binding element in social cohesion. Fifth, the fear of radical Islam has been an important motor in the imam training debate. However, this fear also has served as a motor for discussing the rights on subsidies for (other) religious organisations. As other confessional schools, Islamic schools are financed by the state according to Article 23 of the Constitution. Fear of radical Islam has caused debate on the question whether Islamic schools should be state-financed. In these discussions, the constitutional right for subsidy has been strongly defended. The underlying idea is that one should not deny certain rights to one (religious) group, and leave them open for other groups. In September 2005, Minister Pechtold (Minister of Kingdom Relations) reacted to this by warning that ‘one should not give away per meter those rights which have been hard-won per centimeter.’ The right on religious orthodoxy in general is currently being hotly debated, channeled and fuelled by discussions on the position of Islam. In all these

Yilmaz_Chapter 9.indd 154

4/3/2012 11:27:46 AM

TEACHING INTEGR ATION

IN THE

NETHERLANDS

155

arguments, in essence, the imam training could serve as a means of making ‘the Other’ look more like ‘the Self’ (see Amir-Moazami on France 2001, pp.324–5). It channels active deliberation upon ‘Islam as the other’, because it creates a way to include Islam in society. Imams trained in The Netherlands could act as new interlocutors. An imam training would be an institute where a Dutch Islam could develop. In such ‘Dutch Islam,’ ethnicity is de-linked from religion. It would also be de-linked from political and ideological influences and adapt to Dutch liberal values. As such, the imam training program has been seen – by Sterk and by others – as a governmental instrument to shift the orientation of future imams from an orientation towards the Muslim world to an orientation towards the West. An imam training program would lead to the formation of a ‘Dutch Islam’. But then the sixth area of tension comes up: what is a ‘Dutch’ imam? To which ‘Dutch’ criteria does he have to adapt? And who defines these criteria? Can it be the secular government, which is restricted to non-interference in the internal affairs of the curriculum? What role do Muslim communities and their representatives in umbrella organisations have?11 The government wants to facilitate a training program that would respond to objective educational criteria on didactics and quality of the curriculum. Such training, however, also would have to respond to objectives of creating a ‘moderate Islam’. What does this mean? The dilemma was illustrated clearly by the student of the Islamic University Rotterdam in the television show to which I referred in the introduction (also see Boender 2006). And finally: what does it mean to be Dutch? What does the Dutch national identity contain? Can integration be taught? Or is teaching integration a paradox in itself, because it could easily turn into assimilation? The conception of what is ‘real Muslim’ or ‘real Islam’ or ‘an ideal imam’ is a political issue for all actors. This is an ongoing discussion held in Dutch politics and in the Dutch media. The parameters of the present discussion on Dutch national identity are an integration of migrants, Islam and national security. The debate on imam training has formed, as we saw, an important catalyst to channel this discussion.

Yilmaz_Chapter 9.indd 155

4/3/2012 11:27:46 AM

156

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

Notes 1 Debat op 1, Nederland 1, EO/NCRV, 17 September 2005, 20:30–21:00. 2 Motion Bos c.s. 29 854, nt 10. This motion asked the government to stop granting residence permits to foreign imams by 2008 at the latest and in the transitional period to grant only temporary residence permits with a maximum expiry date of 2008 (ACVZ 2005:99). 3 In 2005, current policy stated that foreign imams who come to The Netherlands follow the laws and regulations as laid down in the Aliens Act 2000 and the Foreign Nationals Employment Act. In short, this meant that a mosque committee invites a certain imam, after which the government investigates whether there is no objection to his entry on issues of public order and national security. Furthermore, it must be proved that there is no imam available within the European Union to fill in the vacancy. Since January 2002, new imams are obliged to follow a course in Dutch language and customs designed for imams. 4 Translation WB. 5 This chapter is based on developments until 2006. 6 In other European countries, it has often been a different figure who was at the focus of attention, see Boender and Kanmaz 2002 for a comparison of The Netherlands and Belgium. 7 It is interesting to note that in many other European countries, the discussion on possible national imam training programs only came up after 9/11, as part of anti-terrorism measures. 8 See, for more information on civic integration requirements for foreign nationals admitted to their countries for religious purposes, a report of the International Centre for Migration Policy Development, January 2005. 9 The motion introduced by Wouter Bos asked the government to stop granting residence permits to foreign imams by 2008 (Motion Bos c.s. 29 854, nt 10). 10 ‘Both motions obviously aim to prevent the admission of imams who think and act in a way that is incompatible with public order and national security. Yet the measures they propose are not expected to be effective for this purpose. Nor can they prevent imams trained in the Netherlands from being subjected to influences in the country where their communities originate, through study trips or internships, or through modern means of communication such as the Internet. Finally, a large proportion of imams currently in The Netherlands are residing here on a basis other than for religious purposes. Imposing the requirements proposed by the motions would encourage this practice’ (ACVZ 2005, pp.99–100). 11 It must of course be noted that not only the government, but also Muslim organisations themselves have used the ‘imam training’ as a discourse to realise its demands within society (see Boender 2006 on the struggle for accreditation and accompanying financial governmental contribution of

Yilmaz_Chapter 9.indd 156

4/3/2012 11:27:46 AM

TEACHING INTEGR ATION

IN THE

NETHERLANDS

157

the Islamic University Rotterdam). Sara Silvestri pointed at this when she said: ‘Muslims increasingly use the Muslim identity to be heard, because they realise that this is a way to access [the public sphere] and realise their institutional demands. They use Islam to achieve something which might have nothing to do with Islam. They use very secular structures’ (see Sara Silvestri’s contribution in this volume).

References Adviescommissie voor Vreemdelingenzaken (ACVZ). 2005. Toelating en verblijf voor religieuze doeleinden. Den Haag [with English summary]. Amir-Moazami, Schirin. 2001. ‘Hybridity and Anti-Hybridity: The Islamic Headscarf and its Opponents in the French Public Sphere’, in Salvatore, Armando (ed.), Muslim Traditions and Modern Techniques of Power: Yearbook of the Sociology of Islam 3, Hamburg and New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. Boender, Welmoet. 2007. Imam in Nederland. Opvattingen over zijn religieuze rol in de samenleving, Amsterdam: Bert Bakker. Boender, Welmoet and Kanmaz, Meryem. 2002. ‘Imams in the Netherlands and Islam Teachers in Flanders’, in Shadid, W.A.R., and van Koningsveld, P.S. (eds.), Intercultural Relations and Religious Authorities: Muslims in the European Union, Leuven, Paris, Dudley MA: Peeters. Boender, Welmoet. 2006. ‘From Migrant to Citizen: The Role Played by the Islamic University of Rotterdam in the Formulation of Dutch Citizenship’, in Jonker, Gerdien and Amiraux, Valérie (eds), The Politics of Visibility: Young Muslims in European Public Spaces, Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag. Integratiebeleid. 1998. Nota van de minister van Binnenlandse Zaken en staatssecretaris Netelenbos van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschappen, Het integratiebeleid betreffende etnische minderheden in relatie tot hun geestelijke bedienaren, Den Haag. International Centre for Migration Policy Development. 2005. Comparative Study on the Admission of Clergy: Study on the Admission of Third Country Nationals for the Purpose of Carrying out Religious Work in 8 European Countries and Canada, Vienna, Available at: http://www.acvz.com/publicaties/VS-ACVZ-NRTG -2005.pdf. Minderhedennota. 1983. Tweede Kamer, zitting 1982–1983, 16102 nrs 20–21, Den Haag. Rath, Jan, Penninx, Rinus, Groenendijk, Kees, and Meijer, Astrid. 1996. Nederland en zijn Islam. Een ontzuilende samenleving reageert op het ontstaan van een geloofsgemeenschap, Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis. Rath, Jan, Penninx, Rinus, Groenendijk, Kees, and Meijer, Astrid. 1999. ‘The Politics of Recognizing Religious Diversity in Europe: Social Reactions to the Institutionalization of Islam in the Netherlands,

Yilmaz_Chapter 9.indd 157

4/3/2012 11:27:46 AM

158

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

Belgium and Great-Britain’, The Netherlands’ Journal of Social Sciences, 35(1), pp.53–68. Shadid, W.A.R., and van Koningsveld, P.S. 1997. Moslims in Nederland: Minderheden en religie in een multiculturele samenleving (tweede, geheel herziene druk), Houten/Diegem: Bohn, Stafleu, Van Loghum. Tijssen, Marli. 2001. Inburgering van geestelijke bedienaren. Een handleiding voor gemeenten, Den Haag, Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijkrelaties.

Yilmaz_Chapter 9.indd 158

4/3/2012 11:27:46 AM

CHAPTER 10 INSTITUTIONALISING BR ITISH AND ITALIAN ISL A M: ATTITUDES AND POLICIES Sara Silvestri

Introduction This chapter is concerned with the intensification of European governments’ forms of engagement with their Muslim minorities in the course of the 2000s, which culminated in a phenomenon that I call ‘institutionalisation’ or ‘normalisation’ of Islam. Whereas such a ‘mainstreaming’ and formalisation of Islam can be detected across the whole of Europe (see Silvestri 2005, 2010), underneath the situation is more complex and begs several questions. One recurrent question is whether these novel institutions are actually representative of the Muslim population or religious leadership. Other underlying questions concern the nature and purpose of these institutions (Are they projecting and producing religious or political norms? Are they there to answer Muslim social-cultural-religious needs, or for implementing government views and moulding ideal citizens ... or both?). Finally, we should ask whether it actually makes sense to address religious

Yilmaz_Chapter 10.indd 159

4/3/2012 11:28:32 AM

160

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

pluralism from the ‘organised religion’ perspective, at a time when religious belonging and beliefs have become very fluid in Europe. This chapter focuses on Great Britain and Italy as two exemplary cases of the internal diversity of Europe in dealing with these matters. Despite superficial appearances and similarities (e.g. the size of their Muslim population is not too dissimilar and both countries have a national body called ‘Muslim Council’) the two cases are considerably far away from each other in their conceptual approach to Islam and to religious pluralism more broadly and in the relevant policy instruments that they have developed. In order to understand and contextualise the similarities and divergences that emerge from my analysis of the recent and present situation in these two countries, it is important to appreciate the specific historical and socio-economic circumstances and the legal and political structures that have affected Muslim minorities as well as the establishment in each country, thus shaping different forms of identity politics, laws, and government policies.

Islam in the European Context Although popular discourse in Europe still considers Islam as ‘alien’ to Europe, as the ‘product’ of immigration, Muslims have been residing, working, forming families, and reproducing themselves in Europe for a few decades. In certain countries (e.g. Great Britain, France, Belgium) they have been citizens for at least two generations. In Italy most Muslims still fall in the legal category of ‘immigrants’ although naturalisation is beginning; in Bulgaria in the Balkan area and to a certain extent in Austria, Muslims are part of the indigenous population. There are approximately 15–20 million Muslims across the 27 EU member states. In terms of numbers, ethnicity, and cultural and religious traditions, they constitute a significant minority in this part of the world. More recently, they also became important communities in political terms because they have increasingly articulated their religious identity in the public sphere, be it to re-assert their rights (especially religious freedom) in their countries of settlement (e.g. with the Rushdie Affair in 1989, with Islamic veils demonstrations during the 1990s and 2000s, or in the repeated Mohammad cartoon crises

Yilmaz_Chapter 10.indd 160

4/3/2012 11:28:32 AM

INSTITUTIONALISING BRITISH

AND ITALIAN

ISLAM

161

since 2005), to demonstrate against global injustices and their governments’ foreign policies (e.g. during the Iraq war in 1990–91 and the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts since 2001), or to express their views concerning the political choices of their countries of origin (as it happened with the demonstrations in European cities against the Tunisian and the Egyptian presidents in early 2011). Consequences of the increasing visibility and political mobilisation of Muslims in the public sphere are the frequent common assumption and prejudice in the West that Muslims want to create an Islamic polity, a shari’a-based Caliphate supposedly in antagonism with the existing democratic political structures of the West. By embracing this simplistic supposition, however, the theological, ideological, and national differences that differentiate and fracture the Islamic ummah throughout the world are disregarded. People fail to understand that Muslims are interpreting their faith, expressing their identity, and articulating their claims in the public sphere in myriad ways, shaped partly by the precepts of their faith, partly by their personal experience of living in Europe, and partly by the socio-economic circumstances and political and legal structures dictated or made available to them in the country or region where their reside. Whenever security services discover terrorist groups that claim to be inspired by Islam, Western governments immediately urge religious and community leaders to isolate the ‘preachers of hatred’ and to monitor their Muslim ‘constituencies’. It is very difficult to do this when there is no overarching hierarchy in Islam, but instead a number of small communities with no or very limited leadership and central structures capable of attracting legitimacy and of exerting authority. Only a few extremist groups have organised an Islamic ‘offensive’ against the Western status quo with its political institutions. The vast majority of Muslim groups and individuals instead have mobilised peacefully in the socio-cultural sector, promoting awareness of Islamic culture and religion, becoming involved in the provision of social services, setting up advocacy groups, promoting religious education, establishing places of worship, and so on (see Allievi and Nielsen 2003, Maréchal et al. 2003). In the UK, where there is a long-term tradition of civil society and pressure groups, Muslim organisations

Yilmaz_Chapter 10.indd 161

4/3/2012 11:28:32 AM

162

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

have emerged and proliferated more easily and robustly than in other parts of Europe. However, whilst a lively civil society is normally a sign of a healthy democracy, the multiplicity of Muslim associations in this sector coupled with the absence of a strong religious leadership has led to a problem for European states. This is especially evident in security crises where governments are unable to relate to ‘one’ official interlocutor or representative of their Muslim population. Even in peaceful times, it is difficult for European governments to relate to their Muslim population and to produce appropriate responses to their claims in the absence of a reliable and widely recognised leadership or an institution that can speak on behalf of all Muslims with one voice. Compared to the status of other monotheistic religious groups, Muslims constitute an anomaly for European states. Although Europe is culturally secular, it has retained special institutional and juridical links with the religious traditions that have historically played a major role in Europe, i.e. the Christian churches. Throughout history, European states have devised three ways to regulate relations with religion: separation between state and church (e.g. in France), the established churches (e.g. Great Britain), and the concordat system (e.g. Italy) (see Robbers 1997, Ferrari 1996, Haynes 1998). As it is evident from the term that is used to define these mechanisms – ‘church-state relations’ – they have been shaped around the hierarchical structure and the predominant role of the Christian churches in European history. However, since European states have become guarantors of human rights and freedom of religion in the twentieth century, no faith or religious group should be discriminated against or enjoy special benefits. Therefore, the common practice in Europe has been to extend or modify the existing pattern of ‘church-state’ relations in order to accommodate other religious groups. This mechanism functions on the presupposition that all religions are organised in a way similar to the Christian churches, with their bishops, priests, pastoral councils, and so on. The various faith communities are thus expected to have similar representative bodies and religious leaders that can interact with the state as official interlocutors. However, it is almost impossible to apply this mechanism to Islam since there is no obvious hierarchy

Yilmaz_Chapter 10.indd 162

4/3/2012 11:28:32 AM

INSTITUTIONALISING BRITISH

AND ITALIAN

ISLAM

163

in this religion (although Shiism does have some forms and even in Sunni Islam, some ‘professional’ religious figures and institutions such as Al-Azhar have emerged with history) and Muslim individuals and communities are highly diversified across Europe and the globe. Very often, in the initial stages of the immigration process from the Muslim world into Europe, the governments of the countries of emigration have acted as intermediaries, through their diplomatic services, between their expatriates and the countries of immigration (see Silvestri 2005, Yılmaz 2005). But in the twenty-first century where Muslims are a full component of the population and citizenry of Europe, this mechanism of representation is no longer suitable. Muslims who are settled in Europe need to speak for themselves, and should be free to choose whether to identify themselves primarily as Muslims or not, rather than being ascribed this identity and being expected to produce adequate ‘Muslim answers’. It was in attempt to promote a more indigenous type of European Islam not commanded from abroad that, in the mid-1990s, European governments gradually began to promote the creation of organisations that would represent Muslims at the national level. European governments demanded (some more, some less explicitly, and insistently) that Muslim communities nominate or elect a group of representatives that would negotiate and act as an official interlocutor with the state. This need became more urgent after the worldwide series of terrorist attacks that were triggered off in September 2001, although it did not start then. Not only did Western governments continue to promote the creation of these ‘domesticated’ Muslim institutions, governments manifested their interest in becoming involved more directly in what appeared to have become a selective process; they were determined to establish official relationships with the ‘moderate’ Muslims residing in their countries, in order to isolate the troublemakers, to stem radicalisation, to control their citizens (Silvestri 2005, Haddad and Golson 2007, Modood and Meer 2010). There are contrasting views amongst Muslim groups and individuals as far as the promotion of ‘moderate’ Islam through national Muslim Councils is concerned. On the one hand, many welcome these initiatives as opportunities to have a voice in politics and in the society

Yilmaz_Chapter 10.indd 163

4/3/2012 11:28:32 AM

164

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

at large. On the other hand, sceptical Muslims question the various attempts to ‘domesticate’ and to ‘institutionalise’ Islam in Europe and accuse self-appointed Muslim leaders of being only concerned with acquiring personal power and privileges. Additionally, Muslims living in Europe are suspicious of the official and predominant role that Interior Ministers of certain EU member states are having in the whole process of setting up these consultative Muslim bodies. The whole idea of states interfering in what is supposed to be a private religious sphere, by dictating what type of Islam is good for Muslims in Europe appears to be problematic, alongside the fact that religion becomes instrumentalised in the implementation of certain policies (e.g. intelligence gathering and policing, see Spalek et al. 2008) and to attain government objectives.

Great Britain Laws and Policies The United Kingdom presents a rather peculiar setting as far as religion is concerned. Although highly secularised, this country still has an established church (the Church of England). Great Britain has been in close contact with the reality of Islam for decades (centuries if we include the history of the Empire) and received large numbers of Muslim citizens through immigration from the former Commonwealth. While it has informally promoted forms of ‘selforganisation’ in the Muslim parts of its Empire (e.g. in India, see Robinson 2003), it has never changed its laws specifically to recognise Muslims as forming a proper ‘religious’ community. Like all member states of the EU, Britain enforces the European Convention on Human Rights; thus anyone in the UK enjoys the right to practice his/her religion. Nevertheless, no general law against religious discrimination exists in the UK, except for special provisions against religious discrimination in the workplace (implemented after an EU regulation of 2000) and for the Racial and Religious Hatred Act (RRHA) of 2006: derived from a mix of concerns linked both to counter-terrorism and to discrimination and ‘Islamophobia’, it is aimed at punishing those who intentionally stir up hatred against people on religious grounds but

Yilmaz_Chapter 10.indd 164

4/3/2012 11:28:33 AM

INSTITUTIONALISING BRITISH

AND ITALIAN

ISLAM

165

excludes simple insults and abuse. Until very recently, issues pertaining to religious minorities in the UK were inappropriately considered under the expression ‘ethnic minorities’ by the Race Equality Unit (REU), according to the Race Relations Act (RRA) of 1976. Although the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC, which now incorporates what used to be the Commission for Racial Equality, CRE, set up with the RRA) deals with discrimination in a broad sense, Muslims do not feel protected enough ‘because religious discrimination is still not unlawful in Britain’ (Anwar and Bakhsh 2003, p.72). Some Muslim groups such as the MCB have called for a general law forbidding religious discrimination and extending the offences for blasphemy to Islam.1 However, in the context of the debates surrounding the approval of the RRHA, it emerged that this idea was not unanimously welcomed by other Muslim communities in Britain (see Muslim Parliament 2005). Under the succession of Labour governments, between 1997 and 2010, religion gradually came to the fore as a policy concern, alongside the much celebrated idea of ‘community cohesion’. Initially the concern with religion seems to have derived from attention to race relations. For instance, the Race Equality Unit of the Home Office had a ‘religious issues’ section focused on minorities, which in June 2003 developed into a proper Faith Communities Unit (FCU). The objectives of the FSU were to ensure respect and equal opportunities for all faiths as well as ‘to help people with different beliefs but shared values to build more cohesive communities’ (Home Office 2003). After the London bombings of July 2005, though, faith became a real policy priority and between 2006 and 2010, a Faith Communities Consultative Council was put in place, hosted in the department for Race, Cohesion and Faiths, which in turn was part of the then newly established Department for Communities and Local Government. Once the Muslim Task Force ‘Preventing Extremism Together’ published its report in October 2005 (Home Office 2005, see also below), engaging with Muslim communities became a priority of the counter-terrorism strategy CONTEST based on the idea of fighting terrorism along three pillars: Pursue, Prevent, Protect, and Prepare (HM Government 2006; 2009). Many government resources were

Yilmaz_Chapter 10.indd 165

4/3/2012 11:28:33 AM

166

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

suddenly directed, under the second strand, the so-called ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ (PVE) programme, at funding ‘de-radicalisation’ projects, such as ‘empowering’ Muslim youth and Muslim women, or developing ‘partnerships’ with Muslims and faith leaders (DCLG 2007). Also the Charity Commission, the statutory body overlooking all charities in the UK,2 was encouraged to support mosques engaged in the fight against extremism. Some of these government-sponsored initiatives aimed at Muslim communities, such as the ‘Radical Middle Way’ (with its trendy and youngish website, provocative talks, and ‘Scholars Roadshaw’) took off better than others and were successful in attracting youth. Yet the ‘Prevent’ agenda received a lot of condemnation by many quarters of society, as emerged from my numerous conversations with young and adult Muslims around the country and was then confirmed by an official review of the strategy’s effectiveness (Kundnani 2009). In January 2010, the Minister in charge of Communities, John Denham, reinforced the centrality of religion in governmental policies and engagements by appointing 13 ‘faith advisors’ to ‘act as a “sounding board” to advise on effective engagement with faith communities, and the impact of Communities and Local Government policy on faith communities’ (DCLG 2010). Although none of these specific initiatives appears to exist any longer under the government in place in 2011, faith has remained an important tenet of the ‘Big Society’ idea promoted by the Conservatives-Liberal Democrats coalition (DCLG 2011), and Islamist extremism remains on the government agenda too (Cameron 2011). Civil Society The UK multicultural policy of recognising distinct ethno-cultural communities and promoting racial equality (Modood 2005), combined with a lively civil society sector, has favoured the spontaneous creation of a number of Muslim organisations that function as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or pressure groups. These can have various degrees of attachment (or none at all) to mosques and transnational movements. There is a multiplicity of Muslim

Yilmaz_Chapter 10.indd 166

4/3/2012 11:28:33 AM

INSTITUTIONALISING BRITISH

AND ITALIAN

ISLAM

167

associations in Great Britain, some with an explicit religious or theological imprint, others more political; some are single-issue oriented, others are more ecumenical; some are devoted to lobbying and advocacy, others to providing services to the community or to promoting Islamic knowledge and education. They express diverse, diverging, and sometime conflicting interpretations of Islam. Broadly speaking, they can be regarded as instances coming ‘from below’, although it would be inappropriate to consider them as pure ‘grassroots’ organisations. Even if some of these organisations have the capacity to mobilise, on particular occasions, large numbers of British Muslims, they tend to emerge in elite circles and to draw their full members from professionals or university-educated individuals. Some of these organisations are, on the one hand, the product of the spreading of religious-based ideologies (for instance, various trends of Islamism) but, on the other hand, they are also the outcome of particular social conditions and political events that have marked the last two decades of the twentieth century and the inception of the twenty-first. The next paragraphs will outline the orientations and characteristics of some of the main Muslim organisations that are currently active in the UK as multi-issue pressure groups, which are arguably more ‘political’ in nature. Purely for space reasons, it leaves out other important single-issue advocacy and support groups such as the Muslim Women Helpline (MWH), the Forum Against Islamophobia and Racism (FAIR), I-Engage, or a number of Islamic educational institutions, whether schools or imams training centres. Yet it is crucial to remember that these organisations are also part of the mosaic of British Islam (cf. Gilliat-Ray 2010). It is thus important to understand that what is presented below is only a partial snapshot of the Muslim scene in the UK, also because there is no statistical evidence that the majority of Muslims actually relate to these organisations. They are indeed the most visible and vocal ones appearing in public events, in the press, and openly engaging with the government, but basically they are all self-appointed representatives of the Muslim population and there is no real evidence that the ‘silent majority’ of the Muslim population of Britain actually subscribes to one or another.

Yilmaz_Chapter 10.indd 167

4/3/2012 11:28:33 AM

168

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

The most visible, professionally managed, and probably also the most criticised Muslim association in the UK is the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB). Founded in 1997 and with its headquarters in London, the MCB claims to be a significant umbrella organisation with about 350 affiliated Muslim associations throughout the UK.3 The priorities, activities, and political interaction of the MCB with the British establishment are examined below, but in order to appreciate that, it is important to review the history of the Islamic presence and of Muslim associations in the country, considering their relationship with each other and with transnational or overseas Islamic movements. The Union of Muslim Organisations in Britain and Ireland (UMO), founded in 1970, is the earliest attempt to coordinate and represent British Muslims in negotiations with the British government and international bodies. The core issues at the heart of the UMO campaign are government funding of Muslim schools, outlawing religious discrimination, protection from blasphemy of Islam, enhancement of Muslim participation in decision-making, and the application of Muslim Family Law. Essentially, all the requests of the UMO can be reduced to demanding specific legal rights for Muslims. In a sense, both for its objectives and its pressure group strategy of bringing together smaller organisations in order to speak with a single voice, the UMO could be regarded as a precursor of the MCB. However, the MCB seems to have reached an outstanding organisational level and a much larger public visibility and platform of consent amongst Muslims. The Islamic Society of Britain (ISB) was established in 1990 and has a very active youth branch called Young Muslims UK (YM). ISB members tend to be Asian Muslims of Pakistani origin and the organisation is known for being a British branch of the Islamic Mission and the Jama‘at-i-Islami, the political party which was founded by Abu Ala Mawdudi in 1941 in what is now Pakistan.4 The Islamist character of ISB is easily recognisable because of the emphasis on the da‘wah (Arabic for ‘announcement’, ‘call’, ‘mission’) and the ‘promotion of Islam and Islamic values’. This association organises conferences and workshops, as well as prayers and pilgrimages, with the specific purpose of spreading the Islamic teachings and culture of Islam, facilitating

Yilmaz_Chapter 10.indd 168

4/3/2012 11:28:33 AM

INSTITUTIONALISING BRITISH

AND ITALIAN

ISLAM

169

the spiritual progress of its members, and promoting social concern and engagement.5 Of course, these initiatives are likely to stimulate discussion about Islamic identity in the contemporary world, but such reflection on the meaning of being a Muslim in Europe (ISB material insists widely on the compatibility of Islam with Britishness) does not seem to be an end in itself. Rather, it seems to serve the purposes of helping its adherents to become better Muslims, promoting Islam, and increasing the opportunities for Muslims to establish connections with the social and political institutions of Great Britain.6 The achievement of stability, cohesion, independence, solidarity and empowerment of the Muslim community in Britain are also clear objectives of ISB.7 The Federation of Student Islamic Societies (FOSIS), which is also connected with the ISB, is extremely active politically in British university campuses and many of its members are present in University Students’ Unions. The Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) is also focused on the da‘wah but combines it with more visible political activism than the ISB. It is interesting to note that MAB was established in the same year the MCB was created, 1997. MAB tends to attract Arab Muslims and follows the political line of the Muslim Brotherhood.8 This is clear from MAB’s determination to have an impact on public opinion and international politics and from the material that it publishes on the Internet and the events and talks it organises. Whilst ISB distributes material more centred on an internalised experience of Islam, MAB’s publications and tapes are by militant Muslim thinkers connected with the Muslim Brotherhood (e.g. Hassan Al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Sayyid Abul Ala Mawdudi, etc.) and the views of leading but controversial contemporary intellectuals such as Tariq Ramadan, Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, and Azzam Tamimi – who are all somehow connected, though in different ways, to the Muslim Brotherhood. MAB claims to encourage dialogue with other cultures and religions; yet, its priority is that to ‘assist the Muslim community in maintaining its integrity’.9 Despite being affiliated to the MCB and subscribing to the MCB campaigns, MAB also runs its own political ‘offensives’ in support of Palestinians and Iraqis, and has frequently positioned itself as an

Yilmaz_Chapter 10.indd 169

4/3/2012 11:28:33 AM

170

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

opposition force in relation to the British establishment. In terms of domestic British politics, MAB has been closer to the Liberal Democrats and to the Respect party rather than to Labour. It actively participated in and co-organised the anti-war demonstrations of February and March 2003, together with the Stop the War Coalition and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. It supported MP George Galloway and his ‘Respect’ party in the European elections of 2004 and in the general elections of 2005 and of 2010 although several Muslims became disaffected with Galloway when it emerged that he had expressed support for Saddam in his visit to Iraq in the 1990s and when, in 2006, he joined the reality TV show Big Brother. In 2004, MAB’s former president, Anas Al Tikriti, also stood as a Respect candidate for the European Parliament elections but was not successful.10 Still at the national level, the Muslim Parliament is yet another organisation based in London. It was established as an ambitious and challenging project in 1992 but is now almost defunct. Its founder, the Muslim intellectual Kalim Siddiqui, ‘believed in the necessity of developing the Islamic movement and providing a model of community organisation for Muslims which would be completely independent and detached from the mainstream political system in order to pursue its particular interest’ (Silvestri 2005, p. 115). This counter-establishment voice lost its pulse after the death of its founder. Contrary to expectations, the current leader of the Muslim Parliament, Dr Ghayasuddin Siddiqui, a renowned Muslim commentator and intellectual in Britain, thought the association itself has almost no following. He is seriously involved in dialogue with civil society and in frank intellectual debate, irrespective of religious background. In the early 2000s he organised in London, together with a King’s College academic and with BritishPakistani writer Ziauddin Sardar, inspiring talks for mixed assemblies of Muslims and non-Muslims on the challenges posed by globalisation to Muslims and human beings in general.11 The attacks perpetrated in London by some young Muslims claiming to act in the name of Islam, in July 2005, sent shockwaves throughout the Muslim population of Britain. Whether some reacted with withdrawal, many Muslims felt urged to respond by stressing their Muslim identity while cutting a clear demarcation between what

Yilmaz_Chapter 10.indd 170

4/3/2012 11:28:33 AM

INSTITUTIONALISING BRITISH

AND ITALIAN

ISLAM

171

the public had seen and what they believed Islam to mean. The terrorist attacks, for instance, gave impetus to the British Muslim Forum (BMF), which had been founded only months before, with the aim to present another facet of Islam, and as an alternative to the circle of the ‘usual suspects’ (i.e. the MCB, as most ordinary British Muslims say). The slogan of this new umbrella organisation is: Great Britain is our home and that of our future generations. We are proud to be British Muslims. Hence it is our right to live in Great Britain with dignity, likewise our duty to contribute to the well-being and prosperity of this country.12 The BMF, whose membership was initially composed of about 250 Sufi-oriented associations, primarily from the Birmingham and Midlands area, suddenly grew in importance at the national and international levels as a consequence of the London bombings of July 2005. In response to those events, the BMF became the promoter of a fatwa (‘legal opinion’), issued on 19 July 2005, condemning the terrorist attacks (British Muslims Forum 2005). The signatories were 500 Muslim leaders, mainly – but not only – BMF members. Most probably this was the first, largest, and boldest initiative of this kind done by Muslim leaders in Europe. The rising time of the BMF coincided with a declining moment for the MCB. The external observer of ongoing dynamics between Muslim organisations in the UK might read explicit competition in the relationship between the MCB and the BMF. However, a leading figure of the BMF denies such a relationship and stresses instead the fact that the BMF is itself a member of the MCB umbrella and is actually ‘helping’ the other in a particular situation when the MCB is under fire.13 Actually, the reasons for such careful attention to the fate of the other organisation could merely originate in self-interest, in the fear that ‘today this has happened to the MCB, tomorrow it might be us’.14 Until the London bombings, the MCB had been unofficially regarded as the main body representing Muslim interests in the UK and with a ‘direct line’ to Downing Street. The terrorist atrocities, however, provoked an earthquake in British Islam and brought to

Yilmaz_Chapter 10.indd 171

4/3/2012 11:28:33 AM

172

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

the fore rivalries among Muslim associations, as well as interesting political dynamics between mainstream British political parties and Muslim voters. The government, the media, and ordinary Muslim citizens began to question the work and the legitimacy of the MCB and to turn their eyes towards a wider pool of interlocutors, including Sufi-oriented ones, such as the BMF and the Sufi Muslim Council of Haras Rafiq. The MCB’s ‘self-appointed’ leaders were accused of being unable to listen to the grassroots and of having lost touch with the youth, thus facilitating the recruitment of disaffected Muslim youth on the part of extremist groups. However, at the same time, mainstream Muslim criticism (whether coming from the man on the street, intellectuals, or journalists) addressed the failures of all Muslim associations and leaders, not just the MCB, and provoked heated debates, also in the Muslim media, about the contested emergence of new Muslim voices and political actors such as Rafiq himself.15 Let us now come back to the MCB, to observe its composition and how its origins and activities have played in the British context described above. Despite its claims of being a significant umbrella organisation for British Muslims across the board, the MCB is essentially led by Muslim professionals and affluent individuals who are primarily UK citizens of Pakistani, Bangladeshi, or Indian descent. They present themselves as liberal progressive Muslims; however, an examination of MCB members and affiliated associations and mosques reveals that the organisation has evident connections with the Islamist movement of the Jama‘at-i-Islami.16 It is not by chance that the MCB has achieved a prominent position in the UK. In fact, the politicisation of the religious identity, engagement in the transformation of society according to the principles of justice expressed in the Quran, and emphasis on the education and formation of future Muslim leaders are the central tenets of the Jama‘at-i-Islami message. It is no wonder that the MCB has gradually become a very active lobbying organisation promoting Islam and advocating the needs of Muslims in the UK (see McLoughlin 2005). The MCB slogan around 2005 was ‘A step towards greater consultation, cooperation and coordination on Muslim Affairs in the UK’.17 It articulates the concerns of the Muslim community

Yilmaz_Chapter 10.indd 172

4/3/2012 11:28:33 AM

INSTITUTIONALISING BRITISH

AND ITALIAN

ISLAM

173

through national campaigns and official documents: responses to government policy papers, official declarations disseminated to the press, etc. The language the MCB uses to address politicians and the media is extremely refined and on the whole politically correct. It seemingly implies acceptance of, and adaptation to, the social and political system, of which British Muslims are a part and in which they intend to participate as citizens. This emerges from various statements and press releases of the MCB and especially from its campaigns urging Muslims to participate in elections: Electing to listen (2000), Electing to deliver (2005), and Muslim Vote (2010). A section of the Electing to Listen document in 2000 read: We hope to work constructively with the Government – of whatever party. And although our main concern is the welfare of British Muslims, we believe this must be sought by serving and sharing in the common good of our society as a whole.18 This shows how the MCB was initially asking for attention to the needs of Muslims and the acknowledgement of the contribution brought to British society by many immigrant communities, including the Muslim ones. But with the war in Iraq begun in 2003, and the anti-terrorism policies implemented after 2005, the MCB like many other Muslim actors became more concerned with political issues such as British foreign policy and the protection of human rights and civil liberties. Especially since 9/11, this institution has multiplied its initiatives and its contacts, both with the government and with other faith communities. Yet, both in terms of numbers and in mindset, the MCB is not truly representative of the Muslim population of Great Britain and is increasingly exposed to criticism and accusations of opportunism by ordinary Muslims and rival organisations. Nevertheless, amongst all the recent attempts to represent Islam in the UK,19 the MCB still constitutes the most successful experience of institutionalisation of Islam not only in the UK but in the whole of Europe. It is important to note that this is an example of institutionalisation of a Muslim voice that is active politically in a rather ‘secular’ way, and

Yilmaz_Chapter 10.indd 173

4/3/2012 11:28:33 AM

174

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

this should be differentiated from other attempts to establish Islamic ‘religious’ authorities. It has acquired remarkable access to media and political circles, nationally and internationally, and for many years has been considered ‘the’ Muslim voice in the UK. These achievements are due to a series of reasons: the drive provided by the particular version of Islam to which the MCB members adhere, the determination of its leaders, and the professional way the ‘business’ is managed: the MCB has ad hoc departments and committees, and stages impressive public relations events with carefully chosen keynote speakers from the political and media world. It has been pointed out that the MCB emerged at the same time when New Labour came to power in 1997 and many maintain that the MCB is de facto a ‘child’ of this party (see McLoughlin 2005). It therefore seems more than a curious coincidence that in June 2005, soon after the Labour victory in the May general elections, the then President to the MCB, Iqbal Sacranie, was knighted (Muslim Council of Britain 2005). Aware of the criticism surrounding his award, Sir Iqbal said in a TV interview that he would not dilute his criticism of the establishment (BBC News, 12 June 2005). We said above that the UK has never formalised relations with religious groups other than the Church of England. Nevertheless, all religious groups in the UK have mobilised as pressure groups in order to convey their concerns and to influence public life. This mobilisation was easy to organise for the Catholic church because of its clear and centralised structure. Despite sharing the same problem of fragmentation that Muslims are experiencing, the Jewish communities of the UK managed to create, in 1760, the Board of Deputies of British Jews. The Deputies, who are elected by synagogue congregations and communal organisations and work organised in committees, enjoy privileged access to the sovereign on particular occasions. The Board’s aims are to protect, promote, and represent UK Jewry and to maintain a lively interest in the lives of fellow Jews abroad.20 Although there is no official constitutional requirement to form a representative body for each religious group in the UK, it is often suggested that British Muslims should organise themselves in a similar way to the Jewish Board.21

Yilmaz_Chapter 10.indd 174

4/3/2012 11:28:33 AM

INSTITUTIONALISING BRITISH

AND ITALIAN

ISLAM

175

For a few years, the MCB filled the gap of a Muslim representative body but, after the London bombings of July 2005, it became a common urgency, for Muslims and for the government alike, to designate a more inclusive organisation representing, if not the full, at least a broader spectrum of Islamic traditions and groups. Thus, a Task Force to combat extremism was called up by the Prime Minister in August 2005. Unavoidably, as any state-sponsored initiative, it attracted criticism and suspicion on the part of many Muslims. They accused the government of engaging in yet another cosmetic PR event to regain the support of the Muslim community, which had been lost with the war in Iraq.22 Nevertheless, the ‘Preventing Extremism Together’ Task Force was the first attempt to gather different voices, interests, and expertise among British Muslims in order to identify and join forces together to combat the factors conducting certain Muslim individuals to extremism. The Task Force was divided into seven informal thematic working groups (on youth, education, women, local initiatives, imams and mosques, community security, extremism, and radicalisation), which produced a series of recommendations announced in September 2005 and published in October (Home Office 2005). On the basis of this material, the then Home Affairs Minister Charles Clarke proposed the establishment of a national council of imams and mosques ‘to prevent them from being used by extremists, to set standards and to reduce reliance on foreign clerics’ (Guardian, 23 September 2005). Thus, the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB) was formally established in June 2006 as a joint enterprise of the Sunni MCB, MAB, BMF, and the Shia Al Khoei Foundation. MINAB is an independent body whose main role and goals are to ‘provide guidelines on imams accreditation/eligibility’, to offer advice and provide training for imams and management of mosques, to be a ‘repository for good practice’, to ‘act as a voice for mosques and imams’, and, in general, to promote participation of youth and women (MINAB 2006). However, MINAB was not visibly active until its representatives were first elected in 2009. In the same vein of strengthening the government ‘partnership’ with Muslim communities and of ‘preventing radicalisation’ (cf. HM Government 2006), the Muslim Women’s

Yilmaz_Chapter 10.indd 175

4/3/2012 11:28:33 AM

176

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

Advisory Group and the Young Muslim Advisory Group were also established in 2008 (but were disbanded with the new government and its funding cuts in 2010). Arguably, these were more cosmetic than effective bodies, window-dressing opportunities for government officials and prospects of self-promotion for ambitious members of the British Muslim population, thus attracting considerable criticism on the part of the broader Muslim public and of those activists who decided to keep working at grassroots level without accepting government money linked to counter-terrorism concerns. Other interesting outcomes of this debate and of the dynamics of mobilisation among Muslim communities following the London attacks include the emergence of a range of new and very diverse organisations and social entrepreneurs, different from any organisations mentioned above. Three examples are the Muslim Women Network UK (MWNUK; initially established in 2003 but then re-energised after 2007), British Muslims for Secular Democracy (BMSD; established in 2006),23 and the Quilliam Foundation (established in 2008). The first two are advocacy groups, set up by some prominent and creative Muslim women (journalists, professionals, etc) to encourage Muslim participation in British society and raising awareness about Muslim needs but also educating Muslim communities. The MWNUK is concerned with empowering Muslim women, sharing knowledge, and seeks to ‘provide a channel between Muslim women and the government’ (MWNUK n.d.). The aims of the BMSF are to raise awareness within British Muslims and the wider public, of democracy particularly ‘secular democracy’ helping to contribute to a shared vision of citizenship (the separation of faith and state, so faiths exert no undue influence on policies and there is a shared public space (BMSD n.d.). The Quilliam Foundation defines itself as the world’s first counter-extremism think tank set up to address the unique challenges of citizenship, identity, and belonging in a globalised world. Quilliam stands for religious freedom, human

Yilmaz_Chapter 10.indd 176

4/3/2012 11:28:33 AM

INSTITUTIONALISING BRITISH

AND ITALIAN

ISLAM

177

rights, democracy and developing a Muslim identity at home in, and with, the West (Quilliam Foundation n.d.) Although de facto focused on issues affecting Muslims, the Quilliam Foundation is different from the other two in that it sees itself as being a religiously neutral think tank, albeit one whose main public faces are Muslims [ ... ] It is not a grass-root movement. It is not working specifically for the Muslim community – or for any other specific community – but for the national community in its broadest sense.24 Another major difference between these bodies is their relationship to the British government. Quilliam emerged at a point in which the ‘Prevent’ agenda and the problem of ‘radicalisation’ had been put on the priority list of the British government with big money attached to it. Together with the Radical Middle Way initiative,25 it became one of the main recipients of government’s ‘Prevent’ funding. So one could argue that these two organisations are a direct product of government initiatives, although their members are keen on denying this. BMSD and the MWNUK also applied for money from government but to support only a fraction of their operations and they funded themselves through a range of other sources such as charitable foundations concerned with social affairs; this has enabled these organisations to remain independent and to relatively distance themselves from government policies, whereas Quilliam has often been criticised for being too reliant on government funding and for being a key implementor of its Prevent agenda. Most importantly, Quilliam’s two founders, ex-Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT) radicals Maajid Nawaz and Ed Husain, have been accused of making ‘super-star-like careers’ out of demonising and betraying their Muslim brethren, such as the HT and the East London Mosque. However, with the change in government in 2010 and the subsequent funding cuts and shift in policy priorities, the Foundation said in 2011 that it was ‘entering a position of financial independence which allows us much more freedom to be critical

Yilmaz_Chapter 10.indd 177

4/3/2012 11:28:33 AM

178

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

of the government and of the Home Office in particular’.26However these groups also share some similarities in that none portrays itself as a ‘representative’ of the Muslim population of Britain, at some level they all operate as think tanks, stimulating debate, producing research, and raising awareness of the issues they are concerned, and all have tried to move outside the traditional lines of thinking and of mobilisation within the community thus attracting a certain degree of resentment. What is interesting to note in this overview of Muslim organisations in the UK is the multiplication of voices and initiatives and the energy that has emerged from within the Muslim population of Britain in the first decade of the twenty-first century: such dynamism constitutes a positive, unexpected, consequence of the tragic events of 9/11 and of 2005.

Italy Laws and Policies Despite the existence of an overarching concern with the fighting extremism and promoting ‘moderate’ Islam, each European country has developed its own peculiar approach to Islam, shaped by its specific history, political culture and socio-economic conditions, and legal structures. The Italian response has been partly dictated by the rapid growth of Muslims in the country in just two decades and partly by the indirect effects of events (e.g. 9/11) and policy concerns developed abroad. Totally new to the suddenly materialised reality of religious and cultural pluralism, Italy has looked for models in different parts of Europe, ending up developing a policy closer to France than to Britain; however, the trigger factor for implementing it appear to have been the London bombings of 2005. In September 2005, the Italian Ministry of the Interior announced the establishment of a government-sponsored consultative body called Consulta islamica (‘Islamic Advisory Board’, or ‘Islamic Council’; see Ministero dell’Interno 2005). The creation of this council had actually been planned since early 2003, when the then Interior Minister

Yilmaz_Chapter 10.indd 178

4/3/2012 11:28:33 AM

INSTITUTIONALISING BRITISH

AND ITALIAN

ISLAM

179

Giuseppe Pisanu (member of centre-right party Forza Italia) decided to follow and adapt the example of the Conseil Français du Culte Musulman (CFCM, French Council of Muslim Faith and Worship). The CFCM is a consultative elective body of French Muslims created with the support of the French Interior Ministry, in the spring of 2003, after roughly a decade of negotiations between the government and French Muslim associations (cf. Godard and Taussig 2007). Compared to his French counterpart, Pisanu announced his plan to create an Italian Muslim Council in a more forceful way, emphasising his intention to adopt a top-down approach. He firmly stated that the government should engage with the ‘moderates’ only and that he would personally select and appoint the ‘worthy’ ones (see Pisanu 2003, 2005, Silvestri 2005). Whilst the CFCM functions through an election system in which all grassroots organisations and individual Muslims are invited to participate, and with little interference on the part of the government, the Italian Consulta does not leave much freedom to the Islamic associations and Muslim individuals concerned, as they are appointed by the Interior Minister, not elected by their fellow Muslims. Originally, Muslim groups that belong to the Unione delle Comunitá ed Organizzazioni Islamiche in Italia (UCOII, Union of Islamic Communities and Organisations in Italy)27 were deliberately excluded from the pool of Muslim candidates to Consulta because of the shadowy past of UCOII’s chief leader and for the network’s alleged connection with the Muslim Brotherhood. UCOII members complained of being discriminated against and in the end were included in the Consulta. However, UCOII’s coordination of an antiIsrael campaign in the Italian press, in August 2006, put the organisation into trouble with public opinion and with Italian law and led centre-left Interior Minister Giuliano Amato (in office 2006–08) to call an emergency meeting of the Consulta. It is possibly in an attempt to reiterate the commitment of its members to the rule of law that the Carta dei Valori della cittadinanza e dell’integrazione (‘Charter of Values of Citizenship and of Integration’) was produced and put in the books between 2006 and 2007 (Ministero dell’Interno

Yilmaz_Chapter 10.indd 179

4/3/2012 11:28:33 AM

180

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

n.d.). This initiative also chimes with the British intention to ‘reprogramme’ potential radical Muslims into good citizens through its PVE policies. All this shows how, despite rapid changes in government and priorities in Italy, the idea of having some form of national Muslim body controlled by the state remained. Whereas the centre-left government in office between May 2006 and May 2008 kept the Consulta format and tried to make the most out of it by convening meetings regularly and developing the Carta dei Valori as a sort of manifesto for law-abiding Muslim Italian citizens, the following government initially dismissed the Consulta, only to reinvent it, in February 2010, with the establishment of the Comitato per l’islam Italiano (‘Committee for Italian Islam’, Ministero dell’Interno 2010). Amato’s Consulta incorporated 16 members, all of Muslim background, though not all were practicing. Instead, the new Comitato includes 19 members, of whom some are experts and academics and not all are Muslim. Whereas the French CFCM has always been a rather technical body in charge of coordinating ‘religious’ matters such as holy days, prayer times, and halal slaughtering, the role of the Consulta and of the Comitato has always been nebulous, possibly suggesting a window-dressing exercise. Moreover, either format is not the most straightforward way for Italy to institutionalise relations with its Muslim communities. According to Articles 8 and 19 of the Italian Constitution, all religious denominations are free before the law and everybody has the right to practice their faith and to worship in either public or private form as long as this does not contravene public order and decency. As far as secularism is concerned, the Italian Constitution does not contain any explicit reference to it (as laïcité is for France), but Article 7 states that the Italian Republic and the Catholic church are ‘independent’ and ‘sovereign’ and their relations are regulated by an international agreement. So, in Italy, there is technically no ‘established’ religion and the country considers itself de facto to be secular. This has been the source of various controversies, the case of the crucifix in Italian schools being the most glaring one.28 On several occasions, the Constitutional Court

Yilmaz_Chapter 10.indd 180

4/3/2012 11:28:33 AM

INSTITUTIONALISING BRITISH

AND ITALIAN

ISLAM

181

of Italy stressed the ‘secular’ status of Italy maintaining that laicità (secularism) is a founding principle of the Republic implicit in the Constitution (see Feliciani 2004). However, since Italy follows the Concordat system, the Catholic church enjoys a slightly privileged status and relations between the state and other faith communities are regulated by intese (agreements), which are stipulated between the state and the religious representatives of recognised beliefs.29 Up to now (2011), most religious groups have achieved an intesa, except Muslims. Since the early 1990s, several unsuccessful attempts to stipulate such an agreement have been made by the Muslim groups that are present in Italy. This failure can be put down to various factors: the lack of a hierarchical organisation with an institutional leadership in Islam, the modest number of Italian citizens practising Islam and involved in the negotiation process,30 and the internal competition (between Muslim associations and between them and Muslim states) for the social and political hegemony over Italy’s heterogeneous Islam. In addition, a further cause of tension, hampering the ‘regularisation’ of Islam in Italy, is rooted in the country’s political debate over immigration, citizenship, and pluralism. For Soysal, such tensions can be explained with the fact that we live in a period where the old concept of ‘national citizenship’ is challenged by that of ‘universal citizenship’, which is ‘anchored in deterritorialised notions of person’s rights’.31 Muslim Actors Throughout the 1990s, three drafts of intesa were produced and presented to consecutive Italian governments, to no avail, by four Muslim groups.32 Two of these groups, the Associazione Musulmani Italiani (AMI, Association of Italian Muslims) and the Comunità Religiosa Islamica (Co.re.is, Islamic Religious Community, proposal)33, were founded by and are chiefly composed of Italian converts. They issued their proposals for an intesa respectively in 1993 and 1998. A third group that produced an intesa draft, in 1992, is an umbrella organisation claiming to represent about 130 mosques and whose members are mainly foreign nationals originating from North Africa

Yilmaz_Chapter 10.indd 181

4/3/2012 11:28:33 AM

182

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

and the Middle East: the UCOII. This association has always been regarded with hostility by the Italian establishment as well as by Sufi-oriented Italian converts because of its alleged connections with the Muslim Brotherhood.34 UCOII originates from an association of Muslim students from the Middle East established in Italy in the mid 1970s. For many years, UCOII leaders claimed that the association represents 80–90 per cent of all Muslim mosques and associations in Italy but data circulating in the Italian press during 2005 showed that this is not true since mosques in the country seem to be over 500. UCOII includes a number of mosques and Islamic associations located and operating mainly in the central and northern part of Italy. It managed to overcome internal tensions and rivalries that were cutting through Muslim communities, especially in Milan, so that in the end, all the components agreed to confer their negotiating power to UCOII. A fourth Islamic body, the Centro Islamico Culturale d’Italia (Cultural Islamic Centre of Italy), has also repeatedly asked for an intesa without however proposing a draft version. This centre, which is based at Rome’s Central Mosque, is the first ente di culto (i.e. registered Islamic body with legal personality) in Italy. In spite of this, the Centro Islamico Culturale d’Italia cannot be considered a paradigmatic example of ‘Italian’ Islam, for it represents the will of the embassies of the Islamic states (Morocco and Saudi Arabia, the latter acting often through the World Muslim League) that sponsor the Moschea di Monte Antenne (another name commonly used to identify Rome’s Central Mosque). In 1998, UCOII and the Centro Islamico Culturale d’Italia made an attempt to collaborate and to submit a joint proposal of intesa to the Italian government. They formed the Consiglio Islamico d’Italia (Islamic Council of Italy), with a mixed administrative board composed of Italian converts and Muslim diplomats from Morocco and Saudi Arabia. The experience led immediately to a controversy about the issue of representation and hegemony over the Muslim faithful living in Italy. As a result, most members of the Council resigned. The Council has not been revoked but is de facto defunct.35 Ironically, the content, the requests, and the register of the three drafts of intesa do not differ very much from each other. They tend to

Yilmaz_Chapter 10.indd 182

4/3/2012 11:28:34 AM

INSTITUTIONALISING BRITISH

AND ITALIAN

ISLAM

183

insist on preserving the freedoms that are already mentioned in the Italian Constitution and to reiterate usual requests about Islamic burial, halal (prepared according to Islamic law) food, Islamic education, and places of worship.36 Different reasons can be identified for the failure to conclude an agreement with Muslims. The most conspicuous ones are problems internal to the Islamic communities. First, their members’ frequent status of aliens instead of Italian citizens precludes them from official recognition and from the ability to sign an intesa with the state. Second, there are several Muslim organisations following different traditions and competing for access to resources and to visibility. Third, Muslims representatives often complain that the whole Italian system is stiff and still shaped according to the former state religion, Catholicism. A potential alternative to the traditional intesa method is the Bill on Religious Freedom, which was put forward for Parliamentary discussion several times in the last fifteen years or so but was never approved. This bill, called Progetto di Legge sulla Libertà Religiosa, is intended to improve equal opportunities and equal respect for religions and beliefs, by abolishing discriminating practices which highlight ‘difference’ from Catholicism. It is also meant to fix clear guidelines and to create a sort of template for stipulating future intese with all religious groups. The intention is to minimise the risk of having official agreements that differ too much from one another, and to provide a space for religious groups to specify the features that characterise them. The need for such a new law has been emphasised in relation to the issue of regulating relations with minorities such as Muslims (cf. Silvestri 2005). No significant progress has been made as of 2011 either in signing intese or with the Bill on Religious Freedom, which is almost defunct.37 The only semi-achievement was a declaration made in March 2008 by eight members of the Consulta, who proposed the establishment of a Federation for Italian Islam. Although fully endorsed by then Interior Minister Amato (Ministero dell’Interno 2008), the centre-left coalition then in power lost the general election a few months later and the proposal was not carried forward. Against this backdrop, the strategy to set up consultative bodies to engage with Islam represents an alternative, a

Yilmaz_Chapter 10.indd 183

4/3/2012 11:28:34 AM

184

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

complement, and a challenge to the existing system of church-state relations. The creation of the Italian Islamic Advisory Council in 2005 sparked intense debate in the peninsula, meeting criticism and approval from all quarters, including Muslims and non-Muslims. In particular, it is interesting to note that this new institution was not revoked when a new left-wing government (hence ideologically opposed to Pisanu’s Forza Italia party) came to power in the spring of 2006. On the contrary, the new Minister of the Interior, former Socialist Giuseppe Amato, reconvened the Consulta in June 2006, by inviting the same group of people constituted by his predecessor but promising to take a more ‘concrete’ approach, for instance by prioritising the issue of acquiring Italian citizenship (ASGI 2006). This indicates that the urgency to relate to Muslims living in Italy is a political priority for all parties and that the strategies of the Left and of the Right concerning this issue do not differ much. The mechanics of organising and coordinating these initiatives, the selection of participants and the tones of the speeches and documents produced such as the Carta dei Valori show how paternalistic this approach remains regardless of the political orientation of those in government. It indicates the permanence of an Orientalist approach to Islam in Italy. Muslims keep being regarded as the ‘other’ who needs to be educated and led by the hand like an obedient child. It is striking to note that whereas in Britain the Muslim relationship with government is rather dynamic and more and more groups have been problematising the attempt to domesticate Islam by promoting a sort of artificially created state Islam, in Italy, a group of Muslims, including people of Moroccan origin, actually created a movement called Musulmani Moderati (‘Moderate Muslism’), which fully endorses the language and the priorities of the establishment. By pointing this out, I am not judging the fact that some Muslims explicitly declared their commitment to human rights and democracy (on the contrary!) but it is curious to notice that they felt that the best way to do this was to adopt the notion of ‘moderate Islam’. The discussions around the creation of an Italian Muslim Council have unveiled some discrepancies and problems concerning Italy’s

Yilmaz_Chapter 10.indd 184

4/3/2012 11:28:34 AM

INSTITUTIONALISING BRITISH

AND ITALIAN

ISLAM

185

position in regard to religious freedom. Additionally, the establishment of a body of moderate Muslims with the role of official interlocutor of the Minister of the Interior seems to reveal a clash of competencies and orientations within the structure of the Italian government. In fact, according to Italian law, the authority for dealing with religious and belief communities and entertaining institutional relations with them rests with the Prime Minister. The Minister of the Interior simply has the duty to check that the various versions of intesa presented by the religious subjects do not contravene law and order. In 1997, an inter-ministerial committee was created to deal with religious groups and with the stipulation of agreements made with them, so that the competence over religious issues was extended.38 No specific provision seems to exist for the Minister of the Interior to manage relations with religions groups. Hence, in bypassing the intesa method and in giving special powers to the Interior Minister, and the creation and existence of the Consulta challenges, the Italian Constitution (Colaianni 2006). However, Ferrari (2007) maintains that the Consulta should not be seen as an end for itself but as a path aimed, in the first instance, to the solution of urgent technical matters for the Muslim population of Italy (such as easing the establishment of places of worship or the naturalisation process for Muslims who are long-term residents but not yet citizens of Italy) and, with the necessary time, leading to the stipulation of a proper intesa for Italy’s Muslims.

Conclusions A striking conclusion that one can draw from comparing the Italian situation with the British one is the virtual lack on grass root Muslim mobilisation in Italy. This should not be misinterpreted: there are plenty of Muslims in Italy who are active in the cultural, social, and political sector, and there are plenty of associations and civil society organisations that are run by people who happen to be Muslim. But compared to the UK, the landscape of ‘Muslim’ mobilisation, i.e. where individuals get together on behalf of the Muslim community, to address its specific religious or cultural needs, or the create awareness of Islam is comparatively much weaker. The reasons that can

Yilmaz_Chapter 10.indd 185

4/3/2012 11:28:34 AM

186

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

be put forward are mainly two: the weak civil society sector in Italy, which was already detected by Putnam and colleagues (1994) several years ago and the lack of events specifically related to Italian Islam that might have otherwise polarised and mobilised people in a different way. Indeed the political discourse of certain political parties like federalist right-wing Lega Nord in Italy are explicitly anti-Islam but there seems to be little substance for these claims as Muslims in Italy are much more silent and less active than in other countries such as France or Britain. Certainly the burqa debate created considerable anxiety among the Italian population and the Committee for Italian Islam was called to express its (negative) position on this matter in the autumn of 2010. Yet, Islam does not appear to be a serious top policy concern for Italian policy makers, as it is instead in Britain and in other Nordic countries. Engagement with Muslim communities is still very much taking place in a top-down format, with a disproportionate number of converts present in these negotiations compared to the figures of the Muslim population of Italy. So the Italian public debate on Islam is rather remote from the British focus on preventing radicalisation, although prejudices around the supposed link between Islam and terrorism are indeed circulating among the Italian public. But no questions are raised about funding de-radicalisation programmes or indeed any programmes for Muslims. Occasionally, big debates on Islam and democracy or the burqa appear in the news but are more speculative than anything; they appear to be ‘imported’ from abroad, based on non-issues for the domestic Italian context. Occasionally, some money is made available by state or European Union institutions for social entrepreneurs working on integration projects that really have to do with immigration and not with counter-terrorism. Italy is still coming to terms with older domestic security issues, such as the mafia, or other forms of terrorism such as the Red Brigades. Concerns about Muslims are still primarily seen through the lens of immigration and citizenship until this issue is resolved, it is doubtful that Muslims will be able to participate fully in Italian society and politics. There are obvious pros and cons in this but for us what is important to note is the huge gap that exists not only in terms of what type of

Yilmaz_Chapter 10.indd 186

4/3/2012 11:28:34 AM

INSTITUTIONALISING BRITISH

AND ITALIAN

ISLAM

187

Muslim organisations exist in the two countries and what forms of state engagement with Muslim populations are in place. It is crucial to understand this in the light of the underlying differences that exist in terms of socio-economic structures, legal frameworks, past histories, political cultures, and opportunities available in the two countries and which in turn determine people’s attitudes, Muslim mobilisation, and government policies.

Notes 1 Bradney (1996, pp.201–203) explains that the law against blasphemy was abolished in 1967 but the crime has remained punishable according to common law. Yet, there is no clear definition of blasphemy and common law has interpreted blasphemy as an offence to Christianity and Christian symbols and feelings. 2 The notion of ‘charity’ in English incorporates several categories of (mainly non-profit) organisations, from religious institutions, to associations, to foundations. 3 MCB, ‘MCB History, Structures and Workings’, www.mcb.org.uk (accessed 16 February 2011). 4 The Pakistani writer and intellectual Abu Ala Mawdudi (1903–79) interpreted Islam as a tool of emancipation and transformed religion into ideology. He insisted on strict adherence to the Quran, rituals, and adoration in order to build a ‘Muslim society’ under the only possible sovereignty (hakimiyya), that of God. He also elaborated a notion of jihad (‘strife for spiritual purification’, hence ‘holy war’) encompassing various stages: from the spiritual mediation that keeps man away from sin and temptations, to physical war against the jahilite (literally meaning ‘ignorant’, ‘primitive’, but in a broader sense: ‘evil’, ‘anti-Islamic’) society. In order to undertake an Islamic revolution based upon these principles, he founded in 1941 a political party, the jama’at-i Islamya. However, among the various existing forms of Islamism, the one derived from Mawdudi’s jama’at does not practise violence and is therefore regarded as innocuous although of course extremist offshoots do exist. The influence of the Jama ‘at-i-Islami network in Britain has been studied by Lewis (2002 [1994]). 5 ISB ‘Method of Working’ (ISB website, www.isb.org.uk (accessed 17 May 2004). 6 The priority list of another Islamic organisation, MAB, is very similar: cf. ‘About MAB’, www.mabonline.info (accessed 30 March 2004) 7 See second paragraph of ISB, ‘Our Vision: The British Muslim Community’, ISB website, www.isb.org.uk (accessed 17 May 2004). 8 The Society of the Muslim Brothers (in Arabic al-Ikhwan al-muslimun), also known as Muslim Brotherhood (MB), was founded in Egypt in 1928 by

Yilmaz_Chapter 10.indd 187

4/3/2012 11:28:34 AM

188

9 10

11

12 13 14 15

16 17 18 19

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

school teacher Hasan Al Banna (1906–49). It is a reformist and modernist movement espousing many aspects of the political philosophy of Salafism (from ‘Salaf’, ancestors, an ideology stressing renewal and purification through return to the origins of faith). The MB became a large educational and charitable organisation with increasing political power. Influential figures of the second generation of the Muslim Brotherhood, such as Sayyid Qutb (1906–66), as well as the teaching of the Asian thinker Abu Ala Mawdudi, contributed to developing the activist character of the movement and reinterpreted the notion of jihad in violent terms. In 1954, Qutb was imprisoned (and later executed, in 1966) after his attempt to assassinate Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. As a consequence, the Brotherhood was outlawed between 1954 and 1984. In 1981, Egyptian President Sadat was murdered by the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, an organisation which originates in the MB thought (see Mitchell 1969). The prominent Al-Qaeda figure Ayman al-Zawahiri (born 19 June 1951) was formerly the head of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad paramilitary organisation. On the history of Islamism see Kepel (2000). MAB, ‘Aims and objectives of MAB’, About MAB, www.mabonline.info (accessed 30 March 2004). Sources: Personal interviews with MAB media officers, 14 May 2004 and 16 October 2004; regular monitoring and analysis of MAB websites (currently, 2011: www.mabonline.net; before: www.mabonline.info) and press releases. Muslim mobilisation against the war in Iraq has been studied by Werbner (2004). Sources: Personal interview with Dr Siddiqui (November 2004), participant observation in seminars, and analysis of regular bulletins by the Muslim Parliament and the Muslim Institute. From website of British Muslim Forum, www.britishmuslimsforum.org (accessed 12 August 2005). Personal exchange, Birmingham, November 2006. Expression used by a leading BMF figure during a conversation with the author, Birmingham, November 2006. See for instance the articles ‘Hear the true voices of Islam’, The Observer, 24 July 2005 and ‘New Sufis for New Labour’, Muslim News, 23 August 2006, http://www.muslimnews.co.uk/paper/index.php?article=2563 (accessed 4 February 2008). On this movement, see n.8 above. This sentence used to appear in all official documents and on the MBC website beneath the logo. MCB, ‘Introduction’, Electing to Listen, MCB website, www.mcb.org.uk (12 April 2003). E.g. the UMO, the Muslim Parliament, or the Muslim Public Affairs Committee UK (MPACUK). The MPACUK was established in 1988 and is still active, especially with its Internet campaigns and its media monitoring; some of its members then emigrated to found the MCB.

Yilmaz_Chapter 10.indd 188

4/3/2012 11:28:34 AM

INSTITUTIONALISING BRITISH

AND ITALIAN

ISLAM

189

20 See the British Jews website, http://www.bod.org.uk (last accessed 16 February 2011). 21 Source: Comments picked from a number of personal conversations with Muslim individuals in the UK during 2005 and 2006. 22 One interesting piece of criticism was expressed by Baroness Kishwer Falkner (Liberal Democrats) in a column of the Sunday Telegraph entitled ‘Another taskforce will solve nothing’ (24 July 2005). 23 I am grateful to BMSD Director Tehmina Kazi for providing me with a number of details about the organisation and its work in a personal interview on 16 February 2011. 24 James Brandon, Quilliam Foundation, Head of Research and Communication, personal interview, 16 February 2011. 25 RMW is older than Quilliam and its members and supporters have nothing to do with Quilliam. 26 James Brandon, Quilliam Head of Research and Communication, personal interview, 16 February 2011. 27 For a description of UCOII, see below. 28 In October 2003, Mr Adel Smith – head of the Union of the Muslims of Italy (an organisation which pretty much represents himself only) and already a notorious personality in the Italian public sphere for his fierce attacks against Christianity – demanded the removal of the crucifix from the school attended by his daughter. Crucifixes have traditionally been present in many public buildings in Italy although they went unnoticed for many decades. This occurrence triggered a serious national and European debate over the neutrality of the Italian state vis-à-vis religion, and the relevance of Italy’s (and Europe’s) Christian values and traditions in a secular and pluralistic society. 29 Intesa (pl. intese) is the technical term, in the Italian Constitution, to define an official agreement between the state and a religious group. 30 Italian law requires that only legally recognised religious entities whose members are Italian citizens can stipulate intese. 31 Other authors call this ‘cosmopolitanism’ (cf. Held 2003). 32 The various versions of these texts are available in COMECE (2001). 33 This name was deliberately chosen because it constitutes a pun reminding of the name of the tribe (Quraysh) of the Prophet Muhammad. 34 The leadership of the UCOII is composed of Jordanian and Syrian members of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) who fled prosecution from their home countries because of their political activism. As explained above, the MB does not preach political violence. It has focused on uprooting corruption in the Arab world and has embraced democratic discourses and practices. These activities go against the interest of most regimes in North Africa and the Middle East. Unsurprisingly, they consider the MB to be a threatening terrorist group and this image spills onto Europe. 35 A more accurate account of these dynamics can be found in Allievi (2003) and Guolo (2000).

Yilmaz_Chapter 10.indd 189

4/3/2012 11:28:34 AM

190

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

36 The full texts of the intese are published in COMECE (2001). 37 I would like to thank Prof. Silvio Ferrari for helping me navigate in the Italian legal system. 38 Commissione interministeriale per le intese con le Confessioni religiose established with Prime Minister’s decree on 14 March 1997.

References Primary sources BMF (British Muslim Forum). 2005. Fatwa: Religious Decree in Response to the London Bombings issued by the British Muslim Forum with the approval of over 500 clerics, scholars and imams throughout the United Kingdom, Retford, Nottinghamshire, July. BMSD (British Muslims for Secular Democracy). n.d. ‘Organisation Objectives’, http://www.bmsd.org.uk (accessed 16 February 2011). Cameron, David. 2011. ‘PM’s speech at Munich Security Conference’, 5 February, http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/speeches-and-transcripts/2011/02/ pms-speech-at-munich-security-conference-60293 (accessed 7 February 2011). COMECE (Commission of the Bishops’ Conferences of the European Community). 2001. Islam en Europe. Législation relative aux Communautés Musulmanes, Brussels. DCLG (Department for Communities and Local Government). 2007. Preventing Violent Extremism – Winning Hearts and Minds, London: DCLG. DCLG. 2010. ‘John Denham: Appointment of new faith advisers’, press release available on www.communities.gov.uk (accessed 10 April 2010). DCLG. 2011. ‘Andrew Stunell: Church groups can bond communities, regardless of faith’, press release available on www.communities.gov.uk/news/ communities/1821881 (accessed 14 Feburary 2011). HM Government. 2006. Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy, London: The Stationery Office, July. HM Government. 2009 Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare. The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism, London: The Stationery Office, March. Home Office (2003) Faith Communities Unit, leaflet. Home Office. 2005. Report of the ‘Preventing Extremism Together’ Working Groups, London, October. MCB (Muslim Council of Britain). 2005. Feature Item. Knighthood for Sacranie: Brief Profile, 13 June, MCB. Available online at http://www.mcb.org.uk/ features/features.php?ann_id=1009 (accessed 18 June 2005).

Yilmaz_Chapter 10.indd 190

4/3/2012 11:28:34 AM

INSTITUTIONALISING BRITISH

AND ITALIAN

ISLAM

191

MINAB (Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board). 2006. Independent Body Launched to Support British Muslims, publicity material, June. Ministero dell’Interno (Italian Ministry of Interior Affairs). 2005. Decreto, 10 September. Ministero dell’Interno. n.d. ‘Carta dei valori della cittadinanza e dell'integrazione’, www.interno.it (last accessed 16 February 2011). Ministero dell’Interno. 2009. ‘NOTIZIE. Proseguire i lavori per una Federazione dell’Islam moderato e pluralista: è l'auspicio espresso dai rappresentanti delle comunità musulmane ricevuti al Viminale dal ministro Amato’, press release, 23 April. Ministero dell’Interno. 2010. ‘NOTIZIE. Costituito al Viminale il Comitato per l'Islam italiano’, press release, 11 February. Muslim Parliament. 2005. Press Release. Muslims misled over religious hatred law, 15 March. MWNUK (Muslim Women Network UK). n.d. ‘Terms of Reference’, http:// www.mwnuk.co.uk (last accessed 16 February 2011). Pisanu, Giuseppe. 2003. ‘Capire la comunità islamica italiana per trovare al suo interno interlocutori rappresentativi e attendibili’ (Interview by M. Allam), La Repubblica. 21 January. Pisanu, Giuseppe. 2005. ‘Pisanu: ‘La repressione non basta. Subito la Consulta islamica’ (Interview by L. Contu), La Repubblica, 23 July. Quilliam Foundation. n.d. ‘About us’, http://www.quilliamfoundation.org (accessed 15 February 2011)

Newspapers and online media BBC News Il Corriere della Sera La Repubblica The Daily Mirror The Daily Telegraph The Guardian The Observer The Sun

Websites Board of Deputies of British Jews, http://www.bod.org.uk Islamic Society of Britain, www.isb.co.uk Muslim Association of Britain, www.mab.info Muslims Council of Britain, www.mcb.co.uk

Yilmaz_Chapter 10.indd 191

4/3/2012 11:28:34 AM

192

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

Sufi Muslim Council, www.sufimuslimcouncil.org

Secondary Sources Allievi, Stefano. 2003. Islam Italiano, Turin: Einaudi. Allievi, Stefano and Nielsen, Jørgen. (eds). 2003. Muslim Networks and Transnational Communities in and across Europe. Leiden and Boston: E.J. Brill. ASGI (Associazione Studi Giuridici Sull’Immigrazione). 2006. ‘Cittadinanza, Amato consulta l'Islam’, 15 June, Available online at http://www.asgi.it/ index.php?page=rss.home&idint=cn06061601&mode=detail&imm.14 December 2007). Anwar, Muhammad and Bakhsh, Qadir. 2003. British Muslims and State Policies, Warwick: Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations and European Commission. Bradney, Anthony. 1996. ‘Lo statuto giuridico dell’Islam nel Regno Unito’, In Ferrari, S., (ed.), L’Islam in Europa. Lo statuto giuridico delle comunità musulmane, Bologna: il Mulino, pp.171–211. Colaianni, Nicola. 2006. ‘La Consulta per l’Islam italiano: un caso di revisione strisciante della Costituzione’, Osservatorio delle Libertá e delle Istituzioni Religiose, OLIR, occasional paper, January. Feliciani, Giorgio. 2004. ‘La laïcité dans la jurisprudence constitutionnelle italienne’, Privately circulated paper, January. Ferrari, Silvio (ed.). 1996. L’Islam in Europa. Lo statuto giuridico delle comunità musulmane, Bologna: il Mulino. Ferrari, Silvio. 2007. ‘La Consulta islamica’, in Fondazione ISMU, Dodicesimo Rapporto sulle migrazioni 2006, Milan, Franco Angeli, pp.251–52. Gilliat-Ray, Sophie. 2010. Muslims in Britain: an Introduction, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Godard, Bernard and Taussig, Sylvie. 2007. Les musulmans en France, Paris: Hachette-Littératures. Guolo, Renzo. 2000. ‘La rappresentanza dell’islam italiano e la questione delle intese’, in Ferrari, S., (ed.), Musulmani in Italia. La condizione giuridica delle comunità islamiche, Bologna: il Mulino, pp.67–82. Haddad, Yvonne Yazbeck and Golson, Tyler. 2007. ‘Overhauling Islam: Representation, Construction, and Cooption of “Moderate Islam” in Western Europe’, Journal of Church and State, summer, pp.487–515. Haynes, Jeffrey. 1998. Religion and Global Politics, London and New York: Longman. Held, David. 2003.‘Cosmopolitanism: Taming Globalization’, in Held, D., and McGrewm A., (eds), The Global Transformations Reader, Cambridge and Oxford: Polity and Blackwell, pp.514–29. Kepel, Gilles. 2000. Jihad. Expansion et déclin de l’islamisme, Paris: Éditions Gallimard.

Yilmaz_Chapter 10.indd 192

4/3/2012 11:28:34 AM

INSTITUTIONALISING BRITISH

AND ITALIAN

ISLAM

193

Kundnani, Arun. 2009. Spooked: How Not to Prevent Violent Extremism, London: Institute of Race Relations. Lewis, Philip. 2002 [1994]. Islamic Britain. Religion, Politics and Identity among British Muslims, London and New York: I.B.Tauris. Maréchal, Brigitte, Allievi, Stefano, Dassetto, Felice, and Nielsen, Jørgen (eds). 2003. Muslims in the Enlarged Europe: Religion and Society, Leiden and Boston: E.J. Brill. McLoughlin, Seán. 2005. ‘The State, “new” Muslim leaderships and Islam as a “resource” for public engagement in Britain’, in Cesari, J., and McLoughlin, S., (eds.), European Muslims and the Secular State, Aldershot: Ashgate, pp.55–69. Mitchell, Richard P. 1969. The Society of the Muslim Brothers, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Modood, Tariq. 2005. Multicultural Politics: Racism, Ethnicity and Muslims in Britain, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Modood, Tariq and Meer, Nasar. 2010. ‘Britain: Contemporary developments in cases of Muslim-state engagement’, in Triandafyllidou, A., (ed.), Muslims in 21st Century Europe, London: Routledge. Putnam, Robert D., Leonardi, Robert, and Nanetti, Raffaella Y. 1994. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Robbers, Gerhard (ed.). 1996. State and Church in the European Union, BadenBaden: Nomos, in conjunction with the European Consortium for State and Church Research. Robinson, Francis. 2003. Islam and Muslim History in South Asia, Delhi: Oxford University Press. Silvestri, Sara. 2005. ‘The situation of Muslim immigrants in Europe in the XXI century: the creation of national Muslim councils’, in Henke, H., (ed.), Crossing Over: Comparing Recent Migration in Europe and the United States, Lanham, MD: Lexington, pp.101–29. Silvestri, Sara. 2007. ‘Asserting Islam in the EU: actors, strategies and priorities’, in Foret, F., (ed.), L’espace public européen à l’épreuve du religieux, Brussels: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, pp.159–177. Silvestri, Sara. 2010. ‘Public policies towards Muslim and the institutionalization of “Moderate Islam”: some critical reflections’, in Triandafyllidou, A., (ed.), Muslims in 21st Century Europe, London: Routledge, pp.45–58. Soysal, Yasemin Nuhoğlu. 1994. Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. Spalek, Basia, Awa, Salwa El, McDonald, Laura Z., and Lambert, Robert. 2008. Police-Muslim Engagement and Partnerships for the Purposes of Counter-Terrorism: an Examination, Summary Report, University of Birmingham and Arts and Humanities Research Council.

Yilmaz_Chapter 10.indd 193

4/3/2012 11:28:34 AM

194

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

Werbner, Pnina. 2004. ‘Theorising complex diasporas: purity and hybridity in the South Asian public sphere’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 30(5), pp.895–911. Yılmaz, Hakan. 2005. ‘Religion, sovereignty and democracy: observations on Islam and Christianity’, paper presented at the 3rd ECPR General Conference, Budapest, 8–10 September.

Yilmaz_Chapter 10.indd 194

4/3/2012 11:28:34 AM

CHAPTER 11 THE TR ANSFOR M ATION OF ISL A MISM AND CHANGING PERCEPTIONS OF EUROPE IN TUR KEY Kenan Çayır

From the first generation of Islamists of the late nineteenth century to the contemporary Islamism of the 1980s and 1990s, the theme of the West has been central to the Islamic agenda. What lies behind the centrality of the issue of the West for Islamic movements is the modernisation history of Muslim societies. Muslim societies, either by means of colonial power or through the voluntary action of local modernist elites, have undergone a process of adoption of European institutions, customs and manners in the name of catching up with the modern Western civilisation. Thus westernisation, modernisation and Europeanisation became synonymous terms for modernisers of Muslim-majority countries. The process of modernisation involved the weakening and mostly replacement of old traditional Islamic institutions with European ones. It resulted in the marginalisation of religious tradition, which

Yilmaz_Chapter 11.indd 195

4/3/2012 11:29:16 AM

196

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

in many contexts was considered as an obstacle to attaining modern civilisation. Islamism as a social and political practice emerged in this context as a response to challenges posed by such a modernisation process. Islamism thus, as rightly described by Göle, is about ‘the problematisation of the history of modernisation in Muslim countries and its disruptive effects on religious memory and traditions’ (Göle 2006, p.20). This problematisation necessarily involves a negotiation over the meaning and representation of Europe between Islamic and secular actors in Muslim contexts. Europe, in other words, emerged as a site of conflict in the midst of a debate over the meaning of modernisation and modern civilisation in Muslim contexts. Turkey, with its radical westernisation history, its political and cultural manifestations of contemporary Islamic movements and its current candidacy to the European Union, presents an invaluable case to study the relations between modernisation/Europeanisation and Islamism. Europe always has been an integral part of the history of Turkish modernisation. Faced with the supremacy of European countries in military and political spheres, the late nineteenthand early twentieth-century Ottoman/Turkish reformers chose to adopt European institutions selectively to modernise the country. The Kemalist reforms during the nation formation and modernisation process at the beginning of the twentieth century, however, were more radical in order to make a clean start by cutting the new nation’s ties with the traditional/religious Ottoman history on the way to civilisation (Kasaba 1997). According to the Kemalist paradigm, religious culture, with its particularistic stance was an obstacle to attaining a modern civilisation, which was equated by the Kemalist elite with Europe. Several reforms were undertaken to achieve a civilisational shift: new civil, commercial, and penal codes based on European models were adopted; a new Turkish alphabet (in Latin form) and the Western calendar (Gregorian) were introduced; the veiling of women was discouraged and Western clothing for men and women was promoted. By abolishing the shari’a law and closing down religious brotherhoods and schools, the Kemalist reforms disestablished the constitutional, legal and educational status of

Yilmaz_Chapter 11.indd 196

4/3/2012 11:29:16 AM

CHANGING PERCEPTIONS

OF

EUROPE

IN

TURKEY

197

Islam. The principle of secularism, formulated as one of the pillars of the new republic, reduced the role of Islam in the areas of governance and public life (Davison 2003)1. Islamic groups, however, have always been influential on the social and political levels throughout republican history. It was in the late 1970s and 1980s that contemporary Islamic movements began to gain public visibility in Turkey along with pro-Islamic party politics, new Islamic intellectuals, literary figures and headscarved actors. Islamism as a social movement refers to diverse and multi-layered phenomenon rather than a monolithic entity. There are several Islamic groups whose discourses differ from or sometimes clash with each other.2 However, until recently what united these diverse groups was their critical stance towards European civilisation. Islamic actors challenged not only Europe, but also the Kemalist elites, who the Islamic intellectuals argued had imported European civilisation and led to the marginalisation of religion (Dilipak 1988). Islamic writings involved an aim to represent a Europe that was totally different from that of the secular Kemalist agents. There were some nuances among the different groups’ perceptions of Europe. Islamic intellectuals, for instance, criticised European civilisation on the basis that it produced ‘materialist ideologies’ such as capitalism, socialism and fascism, and exploited non-Western countries with imperialism (Bulaç (1976 [1987]). Politicians of the National Outlook Movement, on the other hand, perceived Europe in religious terms, as exemplified with their labeling of the European Union as a ‘Christian Club’. These kinds of representations of Europe were also maintained by the literary figures of Islamism until the late 1990s. Recent developments, however, demonstrate that such an antiEuropean stance cannot be thought of as an inherent characteristic of the Islamic identity. The younger Islamic politicians who resigned from the National Outlook Movement and formed the Justice and Development Party have taken a pro-European stance. Islamic intellectuals who once imagined an Islamic self that was distinct from European frames of reference recently have begun to defend Turkey’s membership in the European Union (Duran 2004; Dağı, 2005). The

Yilmaz_Chapter 11.indd 197

4/3/2012 11:29:16 AM

198

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

attitude of many Islamic groups towards Europe has undergone major shifts since the late 1990s. This chapter examines the perception of Europe by Islamic agents in Turkey since the rise of Islamic movements in the 1980s. It focuses on the representation of Europe in fiction written by Islamic authors in the 1980s and 1990s. The chapter also refers to several statements by non-literary actors such as new politicians and religious leaders in order to explore current alterations in Islamic perceptions of Europe. The central argument of the chapter is that the conventional antiEuropean stance of Islamism that also constituted the central framing device of Islamic fiction of the 1980s has been in retreat since the late 1990s due to the Kemalist circles’ continuing pressures on Islamic groups in internal politics, the Islamic actors’ upward social mobility and their re-conceptualisation of Europe as a site where they can further their economic and political interests while enjoying the freedom of belief.

Europe in Islamic Literary Fiction Islamic fiction refers to a category of literature that emerged in tandem with the rise of Islamic movements in the late 1970s in Turkey. Until this period, the novel was criticised in Islamic circles since it was of Western origin. It also was deemed not fitting to the Islamic imagination since as a genre it exposed private lives. However, religious-minded authors in these years began to conceive of the novel as a tool to describe Islam to the masses (Yardım 2000). Islamic writers argued that they wrote novels to counter the novels of republican period, which for them were one of the major causes of ‘current social degeneration’ and weakening of Islam. The novels of the republican period, as one novelist contends, ‘represent human types and familial relations that are totally alien to us ... [and the novel of the republican period] caused degeneration in familial and social ethics since they encouraged sinful love and decadent social relations’ (Miyasoğlu 1999, p.250). Islamic novelists had a monolithic but productive perception of the republican novel as based on a misrepresentation of religious issues and promotion of a materialist vision of European civilisation. Literary

Yilmaz_Chapter 11.indd 198

4/3/2012 11:29:16 AM

CHANGING PERCEPTIONS

OF

EUROPE

IN

TURKEY

199

Islamism, in this vein, appeared with new novels taking a critical posture towards what Islamic authors called ‘the westernist (batıcı) novels’ of the republican period. Most of the Islamic novels of the 1980s fall into the category that Islamic circles call the salvation novel, which has a particular kind of narrative and ending. Many became best-sellers in Islamic circles with their easily read popular forms and message-conveying narratives. The narrative structure of Islamic salvation novels is organised around two competing value systems: Islamic and other (westernist or, as novelists often employ, European). In line with the dominant Islamic discourse of the 1980s, Islam is presented as the source of a value system that is totally distinct from secular/westernist visions of the world. These two different value systems engage in a competitive dialogue via the pious and westernised characters in novels. The pious characters are represented as victims of the modernisation process in Turkey. They are portrayed, however, as ‘strong and stable’ Muslim characters who convey the true message of Islam to the westernised characters, who are represented as the stereotypically degenerate and depressed characters of modern society. They are positioned against the Islamic figures along with a claim that associates civilisation with Europeanisation. However, the Muslim protagonists in all of the novels convey the true message of Islam to the westernised protagonists, who attain salvation at the end of the narratives. Through such a framework, the Islamic authors demonstrate how the equation of civilisation with westernisation has reproduced negative representations of Muslim actors. Such a framework also allows the authors to challenge the secular narratives of civilisation and to construct an alternative Islamic modernity. In other words, the salvation novel as a new genre rising in the 1980s represents the questioning of the narratives of Kemalist modernisation through a literary medium. Parallel to the Islamic agenda of the 1980s, negotiation over the representation of European civilisation holds a central place in these novels. The authors take every opportunity and scene to challenge the Kemalist westernist narratives of civilisation. At the beginning of novels, all of the westernised characters are made to have close contacts with Europe as a source of their alienation and wretchedness.

Yilmaz_Chapter 11.indd 199

4/3/2012 11:29:17 AM

200

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

In Müslüman Kadının Adı Var (The Muslim Woman Has a Name), a salvation novel by Şerife Katırcı Turhal, the westernised character, Dilara, is introduced to the reader as ‘she spent her youth in European cities due to her father’s job’ (Turhal 1999 [1988]; 8). This is the only sentence referring to the relation between Europe and Dilara. Nowhere else does the author mention Dilara’s years in Europe. However, this small note implies the salvation novelists’ eagerness to represent Europe as the source of degeneration of the westernised characters. Another salvation novel, Boşluk (Emptiness) by Ahmet Günbay Yıldız (2003), underlines more clearly the importance of Europe in the formation of wretched westernised characters. The novel narrates the story of Cihan, the son of a secular family that is ignorant about Islam. When Cihan is a boy, he begins to learn about Islam from some of his friends. This is frowned upon by his ‘civilised and secular parents,’ who decide to detach him from his friends by sending him to Europe to study medicine. After Cihan returns to Turkey as a doctor, he is portrayed as a degenerate character. One day Cihan meets his pious cousin Tuba. He is surprised because Tuba has begun to wear a headscarf. He finds this Islamic way of life ‘primitive’ and ‘uncivilised’ (Yıldız, pp.50–4) and he begins to insult her, ‘Are you kidding? We are a family that has attained European civilisation. How can you do that?’ (Yıldız, p.87). Like Cihan, after Dilara’s salvation and her covering her head, her ‘secular’ professors at the university aimed to persuade her to uncover her head, and address her through a civilisational discourse: ‘We have to be modern now! Look, Europe has been advancing rapidly in science and technology. We have to catch up with their civilisation. We cannot waste our time with rules made fifteen hundred years ago’ (Turhal, p.115). These excerpts are indicative of the salvation novelists’ portrayal of secular characters, who are made to invoke a certain perception of European civilisation excluding Islamic signs and personalities. The wearing of mini-skirts, drinking alcohol, attending parties where men and women freely socialise and condescending attitudes towards religion are portrayed as visible characteristics of these secular personalities. Cihan, educated in Europe and alienated from his ‘roots,’ is made to live a ‘modern life,’ represented in his case as flirting, drinking and

Yilmaz_Chapter 11.indd 200

4/3/2012 11:29:17 AM

CHANGING PERCEPTIONS

OF

EUROPE

IN

TURKEY

201

enjoying immoral love affairs. He makes money and ‘searches for peace in materialism’ (Yıldız, p.79). However, neither Cihan nor Dilara, as westernised characters pursuing materialist lives based on their perceptions of modern civilisation, are allowed to find happiness in the salvation narratives. They are made to fall into meaninglessness during the course of the narratives. At this point, westernised characters are made to meet pious ones through which the authors convey their messages on controversial issues such as the meaning of civilisation, Europe and the headscarf. The edifying mission of the novels is worked out through dialogues between westernised and Islamic characters. These dialogues lead all of the westernised characters, Cihan and Dilara in our cases, to Islamic salvation. Dilara, for instance, is made to question herself as a result of her meeting with a pious teacher. She decides to learn more about Islam. She asks a pious bookseller about books she should read to learn about Islam. The bookseller recommends her several books on Islamic history. Dilara’s response signifies a turning point in the construction of her Islamic identity: ‘So far we have read European history. From now on, let us read Islamic history’ (Turhal, p.35). A pious woman also refers to Europe when she teaches Dilara about the true Islamic identity: ‘We have to take not Europe’s but the Prophet’s and the four Caliphs’ period’s women as models’ (Turhal, p.78). These responses exemplify how differential thinking from Europe holds a central place for the construction of Islamic identity in these narratives. The Islamic identity, in other words, is imagined as distinct from and sometimes hostile to Europe. In line with this type of imagination, a great part of the dialogues between the westernised and pious characters revolves around the meaning of European civilisation. The novelists engage in a struggle over the representation of Europe. They generally portray a homogenous Europe in contradistinction to the Islamic world. The Islamic novelists often employ a conspiracy theory through which they present Europe as the major source of the weakness of the Muslim world. This homogenous representation of Europe is made up of two layers. In some of the more confrontational salvation novels, such as Müslüman Kadının Adı Var, the authors refer to the imperialism of Europe and depict Europeans as the eternal enemies of Muslims. During a dialogue

Yilmaz_Chapter 11.indd 201

4/3/2012 11:29:17 AM

202

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

in Turhal’s novel, the author replies to a little girl’s question of ‘Who are Europeans?’ as follows: The grandchildren of those who divided our country into seven regions before the War of Independence, and who jailed Muslims in mosques, here are those Europeans. Now, they pretend to be our friends, and our fellow men take them to be our friends ... [These Europeans] have always attacked this noble nation, sometimes by crusades, sometimes by cultural imperialism, immorality and the illness of fashion (Turhal, p.120). The second type of representation (and this is more common than the first one) is based on a religious perspective. In other words, Europe, in most of the salvation novels, is viewed in religious terms. Yıldız’s dialogue in Boşluk exemplifies such a representation. Cihan, in the process of acquiring an Islamic identity, engages in a dialogue with one of his pious friends. At the centre of the dialogue again lies a debate over the meaning of Europe and European civilisation. The pious character asks Cihan about Europe: –Were there not venerable fathers where you came from? –There were. –Did those illuminated people, among whom you got your education, urge you to follow their religion? –They did. –And then? –I refused. ( ...) –What did [those people] do on Sundays or Saturdays? –They used to go to certain places called Church or Synagogue. –What did they do there? –Probably worship. Those days, we used to invite their daughters to parties, but they would not attend ... –Did you ever ask why? –They used to say simply, ‘it is our holy day.’ –So, Europe is different. –Why?

Yilmaz_Chapter 11.indd 202

4/3/2012 11:29:17 AM

CHANGING PERCEPTIONS

OF

EUROPE

IN

TURKEY

203

–As far as we are concerned, they call people who worship ‘backward.’ But they observe the things that their religious beliefs require (Yıldız 2003, pp.163). Moreover, the author, through the mouth of Islamic character, refers to and quotes from several Western thinkers such as Carl Jung and Alexis Carrel to emphasise the importance of belief in human life. Such a representation of Europe, however, again is complemented with reference to a Western conspiracy. This is made explicit at the end of the dialogue by the pious character who says, ‘Aaah, Europe! It is Europe which prescribed us irreligiosity while preserving its own church’ (Yıldız, p.164). The representation of Europe in religious terms performs a double function for Islamic novelists. They, on the one hand, convey the message that it is the modernising elite who misunderstood and appropriated Europe in the form of a secular and irreligious civilisation. The novelists claim that they present the ‘real’ meaning of European civilisation in contrast to that of ‘imitative’ westernists. A perception of Christian Europe also serves the Islamic actors’ interests to argue that modern civilisation and religion do not conflict necessarily. Such a representation of Europe is limited not only to the literary sphere, but also extends into the discourse of politicians of the National Outlook Movement, which, as mentioned above, for long years identified the European Union in religious terms as the Christian Club. Parallel to the literary discourse, this political movement also employed a conspiracy theory in explaining Turkey’s backwardness that it had been prevented from developing by ‘capitalist-Christian interests in the West’ (Mardin 1983, p.152). However, both the novelists’ and politicians’ representations of Christian but technologically developed Europe signifies an important dimension of Islamism: its will to participate in modern life with a selective appropriation of the products of modernity.

The Institutionalisation of Islamism and the Redefinition of Europe The novelists’ and politicians’ confrontational stance towards Europe does not involve a total rejection of the agents and products of European

Yilmaz_Chapter 11.indd 203

4/3/2012 11:29:17 AM

204

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

modernity. The party politics of the National Outlook Movement, for instance, were not against industrialisation, but rather sought a policy that would combine industrialisation with spiritual and moral values (Gülalp 1999). Similarly, as Yıldız’s above reference to Jung and Carrel demonstrates, Islamic actors have interacted with many European thinkers whose works first were translated into Turkish by Islamic publication houses. In the literary field, Islamic actors also translated many Western classics such as Don Quixote and Robinson Crusoe, though with several ‘Islamic’ modifications in the translations. Islamic movements in Turkey, in this vein, can be described as ‘world-accommodating’ movements rather than being ‘world-rejecting’ ones (Toprak 1995). That means that the Islamic response to European civilisation does not involve a total objection to the products of modernity. Rather they are for their appropriation in an Islamicised fashion, as in the case of the appropriation of the novel for Islamic purposes. Accordingly, Islamic actors throughout the 1980s and 1990s studied at universities and acquired modern professions. They also benefited from the liberalisation policies of the 1980s and 1990s (Yavuz 2003; Kösebalaban 2005). The 1990s witnessed the formation of Islamic TV channels, holding companies, business organisations and Islamic hotels, which reflected the formation of an Islamic middle class and the pluralisation of life experiences. New life experiences led to the emergence of new self-critical narratives challenging the salvation discourse of the 1980s. New novels involved new critical Islamic voices questioning the old party politics or Islamic understandings of the early years of Islamic movements. Critical male and female authors began to make their inner conflicts explicit in the face of conflicts between religious ideals and new modern urban lives (Çayır 2007). Different from the salvation narratives, the oppositionary civilisational discourse to Europe does not constitute the central framing device of these self-critical novels. Islamic characters are made to focus on their questioning of inner-selves rather than invoking a ‘them and us’ discourse. An important event in the late 1990s leading to the proliferation of self-critical voices among Islamic circles was the Welfare Party’s success, followed by the 28 February Process.

Yilmaz_Chapter 11.indd 204

4/3/2012 11:29:17 AM

CHANGING PERCEPTIONS

OF

EUROPE

IN

TURKEY

205

The Pro-Islamic Welfare Party of the National Outlook Movement came to power as the major partner of a coalition government in 1996. When Erbakan, the party leader, became Prime Minister, his first state visits were made to Islamic countries such as Libya and Iran, representing his long-held desire to establish an Islamic bloc against the European Union. The Welfare Party’s politics and increasing public manifestations of Islam were regarded by secularist and military circles as a divergence from Turkey’s road to modernisation. As a result, the military, backed by the mainstream media and many civil associations, interfered in politics in 1997, in a move popularly referred to as the 28 February Process. The National Security Council, in this process, forced Erbakan to adopt several pro-secular measures in order to prohibit the perceived Islamic threat (irtica). The Process resulted in the limiting of public spaces available to Islamic actors. The headscarf was banned in all state as well as in private universities. Traditional religious brotherhoods were tightly controlled. The transactions of Islamic companies were scrutinised (Cizre and Çınar 2003). At the end of the process, the Erbakan government was forced to resign. This limiting process, however, led to self-questioning narratives in both the literary and political spheres. For instance, a self-critical novel, Yağmurdan Sonra (After the Rain) by Ahmet Kekeç (1999), narrates the ‘illicit’ love story of a married Islamic male character in the context of the 28 February Process. The protagonist of the novel, Murat, is portrayed as an Islamist who in the course of the story questions his revolutionary dreams, criticises Islamic party politics and gives up his Islamist identity. As in the case of the salvation novels, the author gives voice to a secularist discourse through secular characters. One of Murat’s neighbors, for instance, is made to talk to Murat: ‘[Referring to Erbakan’s visit to Libya] “Look what this man has done ... O my dear, such events make me fearful. Have you seen those women with black veils in the Sultanahmet area? They are encouraged by the government ... But they will go down soon with a military coup’ ” (Kekeç, pp.24–5). However, Murat no longer represents the assertive characters of salvation novels. He is portrayed as indifferent to debates over civilisation. He thinks about his unhappy marriage and revises

Yilmaz_Chapter 11.indd 205

4/3/2012 11:29:17 AM

206

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

his ideals. He is depicted with his desire to withdraw into his private boundaries. Parallel to the case in the salvation novels, the self-critical narratives of the Islamic actors also are not restricted to the literary field, but extend into the practices of Islamic agents in other fields. Islamic protagonists’ questioning of their revolutionary ideals in the face of new relations (and of the 28 February Process) finds its counterpart in the younger generation of Muslim politicians who criticised the Islamist policies of the Welfare Party and gathered around the Justice and Development Party, which no longer identifies itself within an Islamic frame, but within a ‘conservative democratic’ one. The self-questioning of politicians has involved a redefinition of Europe. Especially in response to the 28 February Process, which limited social and political space for Muslim actors, young politicians have altered their position on the European Union. The Justice and Development Party politicians, as Dağı notes, realised that ‘they could survive in a country that was democratically oriented, respecting civil and political rights and moreover integrated into the western world, particularly the European Union’ (Dağı 2005, p.31). Accordingly, while Erbakan started his first visits with Islamic countries, Tayyip Erdoğan, the leader of the JDP, after the election made immediate visits to European capitals. The party declared its priority of developing policies facilitating Turkey’s membership to the European Union, once called ‘the Christian Club’ by their old National Outlook Movement. It was not only young politicians who drew some lessons from the 28 February Process and altered their position. The perception of Europe also has undergone a re-conceptualisation in the narratives of Muslim businessmen and some religious leaders3. Esat Coşan, the leader of an influential religious brotherhood in Turkey who had the chance to spend some years in and observe Western countries during the late 1990s, exemplifies how pressures on the Islamic community in the name of secularism have caused him to alter his position on Europe. Whereas he adopted a clear anti-European stance during the 1980s, in 1997 he wrote in his community journal, Islam, as follows:

Yilmaz_Chapter 11.indd 206

4/3/2012 11:29:17 AM

CHANGING PERCEPTIONS

OF

EUROPE

IN

TURKEY

207

Our so-called secularists and modernists ... have no understanding of real secularism. Have they not seen Europe or America? ... Having seen and observed the West from within, I can state that the West is not the way our pro-Westernists describe it. One section of the people observes their religious duties and is sincerely religious. Another section of the people are secularists, liberals and atheists; however, they all respect the religious people ... If anybody were to suggest banning the religious schools or the teaching of the scripture, the whole society, including the atheists, would strongly oppose and defend the rights of all individuals (quoted by Henkel 2004, p.969). Thus the perception of Europe as the eternal enemy of Muslims has been replaced by a representation of Europe embodying democracy, secularism, multiculturalism, as values in which an Islamic way of life could find shelter. Accordingly, when the headscarf ban was applied nationwide during the 28 February Process, many headscarved girls migrated to European countries to continue their university education. The headscarf ban was taken to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). And when Erbakan was banned from politics and his Welfare Party was closed down, he took both cases to the ECHR. These cases, as Kösebalaban suggests, can be taken as an important point signifying the transformation of political Islam in Turkey (Kösebalaban 2005, p.34). This is because an Islamic movement, the National Outlook Movement, which for long years identified itself as an anti-European posture, appealed to a European institution to seek justice. My portrayal of the 1980s negative and the late 1990s more positive representation of Europe by Islamic actors is not restricted to the chronological transformation of Islamic discourse over the two decades. There are currently several anti-European groups among Islamic circles, co-existing and clashing with the pro-European posture of several Islamic groups. The rejection of the cases on the headscarf ban and the closure of the Welfare Party by the ECHR provide radical circles with firm ground to voice their anti-European discourse and prevent moderate Islamists from the further internalisation of

Yilmaz_Chapter 11.indd 207

4/3/2012 11:29:17 AM

208

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

European values. After the ECHR’s rejection of the cases, a columnist, for instance, in an Islamic daily reminds his readers of ‘the real face of Europe’: ‘Turkish elites have to question many clichés in their minds. On top of these clichés is that Europe and the Western civilisation are democratic, humanitarian, egalitarian and multicultural. This illusion prevents them from seeing the Westerners’ Eurocentric and ethnocentric ... structure. Yes, it is time for our elites and for the “Islamic” elites (who are surprised by the last decision of the ECHR) to see the real face of Europe’ (Yıldız 2005). Similar attitudes are maintained by several Islamic groups. Europe in the imagination of these groups still stands for the imperial, hostile and Christian other. However, several developments, such as the disappearance of the image of Europe as the enemy of Muslims in the literary field, the new positions of prominent Islamic intellectuals and the mainstream Islamic media in supporting Turkey’s membership to the EU and the success of the Justice and Development Party with its pro-European policies, suggest that the conventional anti-Europeanism of Islamic movements is in a retreat in Turkey.

Notes 1 This was not, however, a secularisation process in the form of divorcing religion and politics. In this process, Islam was not only disestablished but also reestablished as a phenomenon not separate from politics. Religion was defined as a site under severe state monitoring. The abolition of the Caliphate, for instance, was accompanied by the founding of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Davison 2003). 2 For instance, whereas prominent intellectuals consider the Ottoman period as a deviation from Islamic experience and insist on a model of the period of the Prophet, Islamic politicians of the National Outlook Movement and literary figures often glorify this period. 3 The 1990s witnessed the formation of Islamic capital with its economic relations with Europe. The economic engagements of Islamic actors made them realise that ‘they can not turn their back to Europe’. As the current president of MÜSİAD (Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association, an umbrella organisation for religiously minded capital) states: ‘As MÜSİAD we advocate a balanced approach to relations with the European Union. The EU is an important reality for Turkey. We enjoy 50–51 per cent of our entire foreign trade with the EU, have 60–65 per cent of all foreign capital and tourists

Yilmaz_Chapter 11.indd 208

4/3/2012 11:29:17 AM

CHANGING PERCEPTIONS

OF

EUROPE

IN

TURKEY

209

visiting our country every year [from the EU countries] ... We cannot simply turn our back to Europe’ (Kösebalaban 2005, p.33).

References Bulaç Ali. 1976 [1987]. Çağdaş Kavramlar ve Düzenler, İstanbul: Beyan Yayınları. Cizre, Ümit and Çınar, M. 2003. ‘Turkey 2002: Kemalism, Islamism, and Politics in the Lights of the February 28 Process’, The South Atlantic Quarterly, 102 (2/3), pp.309–32. Çayır, Kenan. 2007. Islamic Literature in Contemporary Turkey: From Epic to Novel, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Dağı, İhsan. 2005. ‘Transformation of Islamic Political Identity in Turkey: Rethinking the West and Westernization’, Turkish Studies, 6 (1), pp.21–37. Davison, Andrew. 2003. ‘Turkey, a Secular State? The Challenge of Description’, South Athlantic Quarterly, 102 (21, 3), pp.333–49. Dilipak, Abdurrahman. 1988. Bir Başka Açıdan Kemalizm, İstanbul: Beyan Yayınları. Duran, Burhanettin. 2004. ‘Islamist Redefinitions of European and Islamic Identities in Turkey’ in Turkey and European Integration, Uğur, M., and Canefe, N., (eds), London: Routledge. Göle, Nilüfer. 2006. ‘Islamic Visibilities and Public Sphere’, in Islam in Public: Turkey, Iran and Europe, Göle, N., and Amman, L., (eds), İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi University Publications. Gülalp, Haldun. 1999. ‘The Poverty of Democracy in Turkey: The Refah Party Episode’ New Perspectives on Turkey, Fall, 21, pp.35–59. Henkel, Heiko. 2004. ‘Rethinking the dar-al harb: Social Change and Changing Perceptions of the West in Turkish Islam’, Journal of Ethical Migration Studies, 130 (5), pp.961–77. Kasaba, Reşat. 1997. ‘Kemalist Certainties and Modern Ambiguities’, in Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey, Bozdoğan, S., and Kasaba, R., (eds), Washington: University of Washington Press. Kekeç, Ahmet. 1999. Yağmurdan Sonra, İstanbul: Şehir Yayınları. Kösebalaban, Hasan. 2005. ‘The Impact of Globalization on Islamic Political Identity: The Case of Turkey’, World Affairs, 168 (1), pp.27–37. Mardin, Şerif. 1983. ‘Religion and Politics in Modern Turkey’ in Islam in the Political Process, Piscatori, James (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Miyasoğlu, Mustafa. 1999. Sanat ve Edebiyat Konuşmaları, Ankara: Akçağ. Toprak, Binnaz. 1995. ‘Islam and Secular State in Turkey’ in Turkey: Political, Economic and Social Challenges in the 1990s, Balım, Ç., et. al, (eds), New York: E.J. Brill. Turhal, Ş. Katırcı. 1999 [1988]. Müslüman Kadının Adı Var, İstanbul: Adese Yayıncılık.

Yilmaz_Chapter 11.indd 209

4/3/2012 11:29:17 AM

210

PERCEPTIONS

OF

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

Yardım, M. Nuri. 2000. Romancılar Konuşuyor, İstanbul: Kaknüs Yayınları. Yavuz, Hakan. 2003. Islamic Political Identity in Turkey, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. Yıldız, Ahmet Günbay. 2003. Boşluk, İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları. Yıldız, Abdullah. 2005. ‘Avrupa’, in Vakit 30 November.

Yilmaz_Chapter 11.indd 210

4/3/2012 11:29:17 AM

INDEX

9/11, xii, 5, 6, 7, 47, 55, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 102, 104, 107, 118, 127, 140, 141, 142, 150, 173, 178 anti-discrimination, 5, 31, 92, 101, 103, 104 anti-terrorism, 39, 43, 150, 173 Arabs, 114–115, 120, 134, 136, 139, 141 assimilation, xi, xii, xiv, 5, 71, 72, 82, 95, 109, 110, 155 canon, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140 canonised knowledge, 128, 131, 135 Christian, xiv, 7, 17, 18, 21, 22, 25, 31, 38, 39, 52, 53, 54, 56, 71, 72, 73, 76, 79, 80, 81–82, 90, 101, 109, 113, 118, 130, 132, 133, 136, 139, 141, 149, 162, 197, 203, 206, 208 Christianity, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 20, 21, 52, 53, 54, 66, 71, 90, 126, 133, 134, 135 citizenship, xi, 2, 3, 7, 32, 33, 34, 40, 64, 98, 110, 111, 176, 179, 181, 184, 186

Yilmaz_Index.indd 211

citizenship courses 147, 148–152 civilisation, xiv, 2, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 23, 24, 25, 26, 38, 45, 53, 54, 71, 78, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205 clash of civilisations, xii, xiv, 4, 43, 51, 52, 53, 54 collective memory, 98, 140, 142 colonialism, xiv, 51, 66, 78, 97 Conseil Français du Culte Musulman (CFCM), 179, 180 cosmopolitan pluralism, 18 counter-terrorism, 39, 43, 150, 164, 165, 173, 176, 186 crisis, 40, 95, 96 Crusades, the, 6, 97, 126, 127, 131, 133–137, 138, 139, 142 cultural translation, 18 culturalisation, 5 Cyprus, 4, 80, 81, 82 democracy, xii, xiii, 18, 21, 23, 39, 43, 46, 51, 52, 53, 59, 60, 61, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 162, 176, 177, 184, 186, 207 discrimination, 5, 22, 34, 35, 51, 89–105, 164, 165, 168 ‘Dutch Islam’, 7, 145, 155

4/3/2012 11:30:22 AM

212

PERCEPTIONS

OF

education, 20, 31, 45, 78, 80, 93, 101, 110, 126, 129, 131, 138, 150, 175 mass education, 126, 131 religious education, 7, 167, 172, 183, 202 Enlightenment, the, 15, 16, 17, 20, 44, 72 equality, 5, 6, 23, 76, 92, 105, 165, 166 European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC), 89, 92, 93, 94, 96, 98, 99, 101, 103 European Union (EU), xiii, 1, 5, 7, 24, 32, 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 54, 63, 65, 89–105, 108, 116, 118, 140, 160, 164, 186, 196, 197, 203, 205, 206 Europeanisation, 4, 71–82, 195, 196, 199 exclusion, 3, 22, 34, 45, 46, 99 fantasy, 2, 14, 15, 17 fatwa, 171 foundation myth, 130 France, xii, xiii, xiv, 14, 20, 22, 44, 72, 90, 98, 113, 134, 155, 160, 162, 178, 180, 186 gender, xii, xiv, 2, 3, 6, 29–35, 55, 92, 95, 139 Germany, xi, xii, xiii, xiv, 6, 17, 78, 98, 113, 125–142 globalisation, xiv, 4, 42, 49–67, 127, 170 Great Britain, xi, xii, 7, 35, 62, 72, 98, 113, 160, 162, 164–178, 184, 186 Greece, xi, xiv, xv, 4, 52, 72, 131 historicisation, 96, 97, 98, 104

Yilmaz_Index.indd 212

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

identity, 4, 31, 35, 58, 73, 108, 116, 118, 154, 160, 172, 176 European identity, xii, 3, 14, 15, 24, 31, 37, 39, 41, 71, 72, 90, 98, 116, 130, 131, 133, 155, 202 Islamic identity, 7, 31, 99, 112, 113, 114, 119, 129, 161, 163, 169, 170, 177, 197, 201, 202, 205 imam, 32, 100, 118, 145–155, 175 ‘import-imam’, 149 training of, 91, 145–155, 167 information, 50, 58, 92, 101, 104, 115, 116, 128, 129, 131, 140, 142 institutionalisation, 7, 159, 173, 203–208 integration, xv, 2, 7, 26, 32, 56, 100, 102, 105, 112, 145–155, 179, 186 inversed Europe-ness, 130–133 Islam moderate, 67, 147, 155, 163, 178, 179, 184, 185, 207 political, xv, 42, 66, 76, 78, 161, 167, 168, 172, 207 Islamic extremism, 112, 113, 114, 175, 178 Islamic literature, 8, 198 Islamic movements, xv, 168, 195, 196, 197, 198, 204, 208 Islamism, 58, 167, 195–208 Islamophobia, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 101, 102, 104, 115, 116, 164, 167 Italy, xi, xii, xiii, xiv, xv, 7, 43, 160, 162, 178–185, 186 justice, 7, 91, 149, 153, 172, 207 Justice and Development Party, 197, 206, 208 Laïcité/Laïcism, xiv, 90, 154, 180, 181

4/3/2012 11:30:22 AM

INDEX marginalisation, 35, 45, 71, 195, 197 minorities, 6, 34, 35, 67, 99, 107, 120, 148, 153, 160 see also rights, minorities migration, 1, 5, 19, 97, 99, 100, 102, 103, 105, 120, 127, 160, 163, 164, 181, 186 modernity, xiii, 2, 8, 13–26, 44, 80, 126, 199, 203, 204 modernisation, xiii, 75, 79, 82, 195, 196, 199, 205 multiculturalism, xii, xiv, 1, 33, 40, 41, 42, 207 national Muslim councils, 160, 163, 168, 174, 175 nationalism, 5, 38, 43, 62, 75, 76, 79, 97, 104 Netherlands, the, xi, xii, xiii, xiv, 7, 23, 113, 145–155 oral tradition, 128 Orientalism, 4, 17, 51, 52, 53, 64 Orthodoxy, 2, 19, 54 Ottoman Empire, 5, 15, 17, 38, 39, 43, 62, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78, 81, 82, 97, 131, 135, 137, 196 Pan-Islamism, 75, 76 pluralism, xii, 2, 18, 22, 25, 30, 34, 35, 49–67, 150, 151, 153, 154, 160, 178, 181 Poland, xi, xiii, xiv, xv, 5, 6, 107–120, 131 policy, xi, 23, 41, 89, 91, 92, 94, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 148, 152, 153, 160, 165, 166, 173, 177, 178, 186, 204 private sphere, 73, 109, 154, 164 public sphere, 6, 22, 78, 80, 82, 95, 100, 112, 160, 161 Quran, 66, 67, 132, 139, 172,

Yilmaz_Index.indd 213

213

racism, 5, 43, 46, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 99, 101, 102, 103, 104 Ramadan, 31 Reconquista, 135 Religion, freedom of, 5, 7, 8, 22, 31, 72, 73, 91, 95, 146, 152, 153, 160, 162, 176, 177, 183, 185, 198 instrumentalisation of, 5, 73, 82 politicization of, 7, 35, 80, 172 rights, 31, 33, 35, 53, 54, 65, 79, 81, 82, 98, 103, 151, 154. 160, 164, 168, 181, 206 human, 2, 18, 34, 39, 42, 43, 45, 55, 60, 63, 66, 162, 164, 165, 173, 177, 184, 207 individual, 4, 29, 207 minorities, 34, 42, religious, 30, 79, 90, 153, 154 see also freedom of religion women’s, xiii, xiv, 3, 33, 34 see also gender riots, 31, 41 salvation novels, 8, 199, 200, 201, 202, 204, 205, 206 secular/secularism, xiv, 2, 13, 18–23, 31, 33, 34, 65, 66, 67, 71, 72, 73, 90, 118, 119, 133, 139, 145–155, 162, 164, 173, 176, 180, 181, 196, 197, 199, 200, 203, 205, 206, 207 semantic reservoir, 126, 142 separation between church and state, 7, 23, 147, 150, 151, 153, 162, 176 shari’a, 32, 65, 66, 161, 196 shura, 67 Tatars, 5, 107, 108–110, 111, 112, 115, 118, 119, 120 terror/terrorism, 2, 42, 43, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 101, 102, 104, 118, 161, 163, 171, 186

4/3/2012 11:30:23 AM

214

PERCEPTIONS

OF

translation, 2, 14, 15, 18, 76, 204 Turkey, xi, xiii, xiv, xv, 4, 6, 8, 24, 30, 35, 45, 63, 64, 78, 79, 80, 90, 140, 149, 195–208

ISLAM

IN

EUROPE

veil, 95, 107, 160, 196, 205 visual identifiers, 94

ulama, 83

War on Terror, 92 worship, 99, 161, 183, 185, 202, 203 see also freedom of religion

van Gogh, Theo, 32, 146, 150, 154

xenophobia, 2, 15, 17, 46, 92, 93

Yilmaz_Index.indd 214

4/3/2012 11:30:23 AM