People, Communities, and the Catholic Church in China (Christianity in Modern China) 9811516782, 9789811516788

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CHRISTIANITY IN MODERN CHINA

People, Communities, and the Catholic Church in China Edited by Cindy Yik-yi Chu Paul P. Mariani

Christianity in Modern China Series Editor Cindy Yik-yi Chu Department of History Hong Kong Baptist University Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong

This series addresses Christianity in China from the time of the late Ming and early Qing dynasties to the present. It includes a number of disciplines—history, political science, theology, religious studies, gender studies and sociology. Not only is the series inter-disciplinary, it also encourages inter-religious dialogue. It covers the presence of the Catholic Church, the Protestant Churches and the Orthodox Church in China. While Chinese Protestant Churches have attracted much scholarly and journalistic attention, there is much unknown about the Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church in China. There is an enormous demand for monographs on the Chinese Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church. This series captures the breathtaking phenomenon of the rapid expansion of Chinese Christianity on the one hand, and the long awaited need to reveal the reality and the development of Chinese Catholicism and the Orthodox religion on the other. Christianity in China reflects on the tremendous importance of Chinese-foreign relations. The series touches on many levels of research—the life of a single Christian in a village, a city parish, the conflicts between converts in a province, the policy of the provincial authority and state-to-state relations. It concerns the influence of different cultures on Chinese soil—the American, the French, the Italian, the Portuguese and so on. Contributors of the series include not only people from the academia but journalists and professional writers as well. The series would stand out as a collective effort of authors from different countries and backgrounds. Under the influence of globalization, it is entirely necessary to emphasize the intercultural dimension of the monographs of the series. With Christianity being questioned in the Western world, as witnessed in the popularity of Dan Brown’s books since some time ago, the Chinese have surprised the world by their embracement of this foreign religion. More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14895

Cindy Yik-yi Chu · Paul P. Mariani Editors

People, Communities, and the Catholic Church in China

Editors Cindy Yik-yi Chu Hong Kong Baptist University Hong Kong

Paul P. Mariani Santa Clara University USA

Christianity in Modern China ISBN 978-981-15-1678-8 ISBN 978-981-15-1679-5  (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1679-5 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Cindy Yik-yi Chu This Palgrave Pivot imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

To Sister Betty Ann Maheu, MM

Preface

This edited volume is a concerted effort of academics from various parts of the world to explore key issues in Sino-Vatican relations, Church leadership, and the development of local Catholic communities. The cooperation of experts across national boundaries is the main strength of the book. Among the authors are three Italians, four Chinese, one French, and one American. Together they contribute articles, which discuss the Chinese Catholic Church and the aspects of its activities such as politics, diplomacy, literature, charities, pilgrims, and youths. Most of the authors, of two nationalities, live in China and offer the insiders’ perspective on the Chinese Catholic Church and its relations with the Vatican. Two Italians write on the Church in the post-Mao era, providing readers with detailed analyses to further understand Sino-Vatican relations and the provisional agreement that Pope Francis reached with Beijing on the appointment of bishops in China in September 2018. Other authors consider the activities inside the Church. This volume is timely and approaches the topic of the Chinese Catholic Church from the viewpoints of policies, people, organizations, communities, and the landmark in Sino-Vatican relations in 2018. The editors would like to thank Rev. Peter Choy of the Holy Spirit Seminary and the Yuan Dao Study Society for the generous support of this book. They also appreciate the expertise and work of Mr. Tom Marling in preparing the volume for publication. Looking beyond the publication of this book, the editors would like to draw your attention vii

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PREFACE

to a much larger project in future, on the Catholic Church in China and other East Asian countries. Stay tuned for the news of the upcoming publications of the authors. Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong Santa Clara University, USA

Cindy Yik-yi Chu Paul P. Mariani

Note on Names

of

People and Places

Pinyin is used for the names of people and places in China mainland, for example, Xi Jinping and Sheshan, respectively. As for Chinese Catholics on the mainland, their Christian names appear before their Chinese names, for example, Aloysius Jin Luxian—Jin being his family name and Luxian being the combination of the two Chinese characters that follow his family name. There are exceptions, such as Ignatius Kung Pinmei and Dominic Tang Yiming. As for Chinese Catholics in Hong Kong and outside the mainland, their names are spelled in the way they prefer, for example, Joseph Zen Ze-kiun—whose family name is Zen and Ze-kiun being the two Chinese characters following his family name.

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Contents

1 The Chinese Catholic Church in Changing Times 1 Cindy Yik-yi Chu Part I  Policies 2 An Overview of the Catholic Church in Post-Mao China Gianni Criveller

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3 The Development of the Underground Church in Post-Mao China 29 Sergio Ticozzi Part II  People 4 Bishop Jin Luxian and the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association of Shanghai 45 Rachel Xiaohong Zhu 5 Joseph Cardinal Zen Ze-kiun of Hong Kong 61 Beatrice K. F. Leung

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CONTENTS

Part III  Organizations 6 The Studium Biblicum Franciscanum Sinense from 1976 to Present 81 Raissa De Gruttola 7 The Jinde Charities Foundation of Hebei Province and Catholic Charities in China 93 Zhipeng Zhang Part IV  Communities 8 Recent Developments of Youth Ministry in China 111 Bruno Lepeu 9 The Sheshan “Miracle” and Its Interpretations 129 Paul P. Mariani Index 153

Notes

on

Contributors

Cindy Yik-yi Chu is Professor of History at Hong Kong Baptist University. She writes on the Catholic Church and the Catholic sisters in China and Hong Kong. She has published 15 books and 50 some articles in edited volumes and journals. Her recent works include The Catholic Church in China: 1978 to the Present (Palgrave, 2012), Catholicism in China, 1900–Present (Editor, Palgrave, 2014), The Chinese Sisters of the Precious Blood and the Evolution of the Catholic Church (Palgrave, 2016), and Foreign Missionaries and the Indigenization of the Chinese Catholic Church (Editor, Centre for Catholic Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2017). She is interested in the history of the Catholic Church in modern and contemporary China and Hong Kong, Catholic sisters in Chinese societies, and Sino-Vatican relations. She is now working on a book on the history of Sino-Vatican relations in the contemporary period. Gianni Criveller is Dean of Studies and Professor of Theology at the PIME International Missionary School of Theology in Monza (Milan) and Advisor to the National Council of the Italian Theological Association. He specializes in the encounter between China and Christianity. He has taught and researched in Hong Kong and Greater China since 1991. He taught at the Holy Spirit Seminary College in Hong Kong and was a Research Fellow at The Chinese University of Hong Kong. He also served as a researcher at the Holy Spirit Study

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Centre in Hong Kong (1997–2013). He is a frequent speaker at academic symposiums around the world. He has published about twenty books and hundreds of essays in specialized journals in various languages. Raissa De Gruttola holds a Ph.D. in Asian and African Studies (Chinese) at the Ca’ Foscari University of Venice (2017) and is Adjunct Professor of Chinese Language at the University of Perugia. Her main research interests are Gabriele Allegra and the first complete translation of the Catholic Bible in Chinese. She has conducted extensive research in archives, presented in international conferences, and published articles in academic journals. Her fields of research also include the presence of Christians and Franciscan missionaries in China and the various versions of the Bible in Chinese. Bruno Lepeu is Researcher at the Holy Spirit Study Centre, Hong Kong. He is a French priest of Missions Etrangères de Paris. He has served the Church in Hong Kong since 1994 and has been involved in youth ministry. Lepeu obtained a Master’s degree in Agriculture (1987), a Master’s degree in Theology (1994), and the Doctoral candidature in Theology at the Institut Catholique de Paris since 2018 working on “The appropriation of the faith by young Catholics in China: a figure of the emerging Church?” Beatrice K. F. Leung is Research Professor of General Education at Wenzao Ursuline University of Languages, Kaohsiung, Taiwan. She obtained her Ph.D. from The London School of Economics and Political Science. Her research interest is church-state relations in the greater China region. She has authored and edited eleven books and more than seventy scholarly articles. Her latest works are two edited volumes: The Catholic Church in Taiwan: Birth, Growth and Development and The Catholic Church in Taiwan: Problems and Prospects (Palgrave, 2018). Paul P. Mariani is a Jesuit priest and the Edmund Campion, SJ Endowed Professor of History at Santa Clara University. He is the author of Church Militant: Bishop Kung and Catholic Resistance in Communist Shanghai (Harvard, 2011), which explores church-state conflict in the early years of the People’s Republic of China. His articles have appeared in the Journal of Church and State, the Review of Religion and Chinese Society, The Catholic Historical Review, Studies in World Christianity, Encyclopedia of Global Christianity, and America. He is

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS  

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currently working on a book on the Shanghai Catholic community in the early reform era. He has a B.A. from Harvard, an M.A. from Fordham, an M.Div. from the Jesuit School of Theology at Berkeley, and a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago. Sergio Ticozzi is Researcher at the Holy Spirit Study Centre, Hong Kong. He was born in Brugherio, Milan, Italy in 1943, and was ordained a Catholic priest in 1968. He completed philosophical and theological studies at the Pontifical Institute for Foreign Missions in Milan, and Chinese language and cultural studies at the New Asia College in Hong Kong. Since 1969, he has been working in Hong Kong in pastoral and educational fields. He also spent seven years as translator in Beijing and six years as educator in the Philippines. His interests are related to modern Chinese society, the history of Chinese religions, and the Catholic Church in Hong Kong and China. Rachel Xiaohong Zhu is Associate Professor of Religious Studies at Fudan University. She specializes in the methodology of religious studies, feminist theology, contemporary Catholicism, and the Catholic Church in China. She has published ten books and over seventy articles on Christianity and the Catholic Church in China. Zhu is a member of the editorial committee of the series of Systematic Theology of Brill since 2007 and of the Journal of Christian Thought Review in China since 2002. She is also a standing committee member of the Catholic Intelligentsia Association of Shanghai. Zhipeng Zhang teaches in Nanjing Institute of Technology. He is a member of the East Asian Society for the Scientific Study of Religion. His research interests are religion economics, religion and the rule of law, social change theory, and faith-based philanthropy. Zhang’s publications include Economics of Development: Elements, Paths and Strategies (Nanjing University Press, 2008) and forty some papers in Chinese. He has a regular column in China Ethnic News, publishing more than 200 essays on religion and economy as well as religion and society.

Abbreviations

BCCCC Bishops’ Conference of the Catholic Church in China CCAC Chinese Catholic Church Administrative Committee CCP Chinese Communist Party CCPA Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association CDPF China Disabled Persons’ Federation CRS Catholic Relief Services CTPM Committee of the Three-self Patriotic Movement of the Protestant Churches in China HKSAR Hong Kong Special Administrative Region NCEE National College Entrance Examination NGO Non-Governmental Organization NPO Non-Profit Organization OCLP Occupy Central with Love and Peace (also known as Umbrella Movement) PIME Pontifical Institute for Foreign Missions PRC People’s Republic of China PSB Public Security Bureau ROC Republic of China (Taiwan) SARA State Administration of Religious Affairs SBM School-Based Management SBV Studium Biblicum Version TCV  Today’s Chinese Version of the Bible (1975) Ucanews Union of Catholic Asian News UFWD United Front Work Department WTO World Trade Organization

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List of Tables

Table 7.1 Catholic welfare entities in China 97 Table 7.2 Catholic institutions for the adoption of abandoned infants in China 99 Table 7.3 Catholic health and rehabilitation institutions for the adoption of people with intellectual disabilities in China 100 Table 7.4 Leprosy rehabilitation institutions served by Chinese and foreign Catholic nuns 101

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CHAPTER 1

The Chinese Catholic Church in Changing Times Cindy Yik-yi Chu

Abstract In September 2018, the Vatican announced that Pope Francis had reached a provisional agreement with Beijing on the appointment of bishops in China. The Vatican expressed the hope that this breakthrough would lead to further improvements in its relations with Beijing. In a landmark in the history of the Catholic Church in contemporary China, the two sides agreed to allow for the ordination of bishops agreeable to both the Vatican and China. This book provides readers with the information and insights needed to better understand Sino-Vatican relations and the rationale behind the decisions taken by Pope Francis. It includes articles that discuss the Chinese Church as a whole and those that focus on particular aspects of its activities, including diplomacy, politics, leadership, pilgrims, and youths. Keywords China · Hong Kong · Shanghai · Catholic Church · Sino-Vatican relations

C. Y.-y. Chu (B) Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 C. Y.-y. Chu and P. P. Mariani (eds.), People, Communities, and the Catholic Church in China, Christianity in Modern China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1679-5_1

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Since 1979, the Chinese Catholic Church has undergone challenges far beyond anyone’s imagination. In September 2018, the Vatican announced that Pope Francis had reached a provisional agreement with Beijing on the appointment of bishops in China. The Vatican expressed the hope that this breakthrough would lead to further improvements in its relations with Beijing.1 In a landmark in the history of the Catholic Church in contemporary China, the two sides agreed to allow for the ordination of bishops agreeable to both the Vatican and China. The Vatican focuses on the ordination of bishops, which has a significant impact on the well-being of the Chinese Church and the Holy See’s relations with China.2 As part of the agreement, the Pope will recognize seven Chinese bishops who had previously been ordained without the Vatican’s approval and had therefore been illegitimate. In the future, the Pope will be able to participate in, and potentially veto, the appointment of a bishop nominated by Beijing. From the side of Beijing, the agreement will serve as a foundation for improvements in bilateral relations with the Vatican.3 This book provides readers with the information and insights needed to better understand Sino-Vatican relations and the rationale behind the decisions taken by Pope Francis. It includes articles that discuss the Chinese Church as a whole and those that focus on particular aspects of its activities, including diplomacy, politics, leadership, pilgrims, and youths. Together they constitute a vibrant portrayal of the Church.

The Chinese Church in Changing Times In Chapter 2, “An Overview of the Catholic Church in Post-Mao China,” Gianni Criveller begins with a discussion of the Chinese Church since 1979, when China opened to the outside world. Criveller is highly critical of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) policies toward religion and the Church, which have wandered between relaxation and strict control. He believes that the current situation is representative of a stricter policy turn. He argues that these policy fluctuations toward the Church have been the result of domestic concerns more than foreign relations and that China’s current attitude toward religion finds its roots under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership in the early-1980s. The CCP has made sure that religion is used to serve political interests. Criveller also goes into detail on issues related to the consecration of bishops, which have often been reflective of the wider climate of Sino-Vatican relations. He concludes that concerns

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related to modernization and Sinicization have hindered the satisfactory development of the Chinese Church in the post-Mao era. In Chapter 3, “The Development of the Underground Church in Post-Mao China,” Sergio Ticozzi describes the development of the underground (unregistered or unofficial) Church in China. The Chinese authorities, in alliance with the official leaders of the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association (CCPA), have repeatedly criticized the Vatican for “creating the underground Church.” Ticozzi points out that this was a mischaracterization, since the underground Church has existed since the 1950s, although he concedes that the Holy See’s open document (1978), “Faculties and Privileges Given to the Catholic Clergy and Faithful Who Live in Mainland China, While These Conditions Persist,” offered great support for the clergy and the faithful in China. Ticozzi traces the development of the underground Church, finding that it has behaved differently according to its circumstances, ranging from acting in secret out of fear of persecution to openly carrying out its activities. He concludes with a pessimistic analysis of the future for the underground Church in China.

Important Personalities in the Chinese Church In Chapter 4, “Bishop Jin Luxian and the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association of Shanghai,” Rachel Xiaohong Zhu argues that the CCPA — founded in the 1950s — was one of the major outcomes of the Socialist transformation of the Church in China. During the 1970s, it functioned as a bridge between the Chinese Church and the CCP, playing a role in the implementation of religious policies and in the re-establishment of the Chinese Church itself. However, its continued existence and function have been questioned by the clergy and the laity alike, and whether or not to join the CCPA has become a line of the demarcation between the open Church and the underground Church. The chapter focuses on the Shanghai diocese under the leadership of Bishop Aloysius Jin Luxian. As Zhu points out, the Shanghai diocese maintained a unique operational structure known as the “four-horse carriage” in which four organizations, including the diocese itself, the CCPA, the Chinese Catholic Church Administrative Committee (CCAC), and the Shanghai Catholic Intellectuals’ Association, cooperated effectively. In Chapter 5, “Joseph Cardinal Zen Ze-kiun of Hong Kong,” Beatrice K. F. Leung discusses the role of Cardinal Joseph Zen in the political development of Hong Kong. Leung is supportive of the political stance of

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Cardinal Zen. She states that the local Catholic Church under his leadership has been very vocal with regard to the ongoing democracy issues and debates in Hong Kong, a sharp contrast with Zen’s predecessor, Cardinal John Baptist Wu Chen-chung. Leung points out that Zen has maintained an adversarial relationship with the governments of both Hong Kong and Beijing. On social issues, Zen has accused the Hong Kong authorities of siding with business tycoons to the disadvantage of the general population and with eliminating the power of Christian Churches in primary and secondary education. He was an active participant in Occupy Central with Love and Peace (OCLP, also known as the Umbrella Movement) of September–December 2014. Leung also highlights Zen’s recent comments in opposition to the Pope’s aforementioned agreement with Beijing concerning the ordination of bishops.

Catholic Organizations The Franciscan missionary Gabriele Allegra (1907–1976) is known for having translated and published the first complete edition of the Catholic Bible in the Chinese language between 1955 and 1961. In “The Studium Biblicum Franciscanum Sinense from 1976 to Present,” Raissa De Gruttola looks at the history of Chinese translations of The Bible after the death of Allegra in 1976. Chapter 6 deals with the activity of the Studium Biblicum Franciscanum (Sigao shengjing xuehui) from 1976 to present and introduces other Chinese Catholic versions of The Bible. The analysis underlines the importance of the activities of the Studium Biblicum Franciscanum to Chinese-speaking Catholics. With the restoration of Catholicism in China, the traditions of charity and public service have developed since 1979. In Chapter 7, “The Jinde Charities Foundation of Hebei Province and Catholic Charities in China,” Zhipeng Zhang studies the charity and public welfare activities of Hebei’s Jinde Charity Foundation, one of China’s first non-profit organizations. On the basis of a general review of the development of Catholic charities in China since 1979, Zhang discusses the influence of Catholic charitable organizations on Chinese society and on the social image of Chinese Catholicism. The Jinde Charity Foundation has upheld the spirit of Catholic fraternity and promoted mutual understanding regardless of ethnicity, gender, or place of origin.

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The Increasing Diversity of China’s Catholic Communities In Chapter 8, “Recent Developments of Youth Ministry in China,” Bruno Lepeu states that the study of youth ministry is of crucial importance to understanding what is emerging in the Chinese Church at present. When young people have a rich community and spiritual life which brings them closer to their faith, their lives can undergo remarkable change. The experience of the youth fosters lay ministries and vocations, which contribute to the dynamism and renewal of the Chinese Church. Lepeu points out that although there have been difficulties in the youth ministry in China, it is starting to bear promising fruit, by helping the Church move toward a more participatory and collaborative fraternity. By 1980, the CCP had assumed that their decades-long campaign to eradicate religion had been successful, only to witness ten thousand pilgrims travel to Sheshan in March of that year. In Chapter 9, “The Sheshan ‘Miracle’ and Its Interpretations,” Paul P. Mariani offers several parallel perspectives through which to approach the event of, and circumstances surrounding, this Sheshan “miracle.” The Shanghai Catholic community has a strong affection for the Virgin Mary and was deeply devoted to Our Lady of Sheshan, yet by the end of the Cultural Revolution there had been no large-scale pilgrimage to Sheshan in over 25 years. Despite this, in 1980 the Sheshan pilgrims witnessed the miraculous re-emergence of publicly practiced religion in atheistic China. Mariani stresses the importance of the common people of China in upholding the Catholic faith.

Remarks Scholars have remarked on the relatively less scholarly attention given to the Catholics as compared to the Protestants in China.4 The editorial of the recent issue of Review of Religion and Chinese Society considers the research and publication of Chinese Catholics inadequate. As Carsten T. Vala says, field studies on Catholics have remained scanty. This refers to the current situation of Catholics in China, their problems, and challenges. It also points to the communication between Catholics and Protestants and the existence of the open Church (registered Church) and the underground (unregistered) Church. The registered and unregistered communities belong to one Chinese Catholic Church — there has

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not been any schism in the Church. However, there remains to be studied the differences between the two communities. There is also the question of how to possibly build communications between the open Church and the Vatican. With the rapidly changing circumstances both inside and outside China, scholars and commentators have reported on the developments and made speculations. There could not be one set of theories or one set of solutions to the increasingly sophisticated situations.

Notes 1. Harriet Sherwood, “Vatican Signs Historic Deal with China–But Critics Denounce Sellout,” The Guardian, September 22, 2018, https://www. theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/22/vatican-pope-francis-agreementwith-china-nominating-bishops. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 4. Carsten T. Vala, “Negotiations and Diversifications of China’s Christianities,” Review of Religion and Chinese Society, Vol. 4 (2019), pp. 1–4.

PART I

Policies

CHAPTER 2

An Overview of the Catholic Church in Post-Mao China Gianni Criveller

Abstract This chapter offers an account of the Chinese Catholic Church since 1978, when China opened its doors and John Paul II initiated his pontificate. John Paul II closely followed events in China, hoping to make a breakthrough in the relationship between the two sides. Pope Benedict XVI wrote a letter to Chinese Catholics in 2007. In 2013, the election of Pope Francis was compared to the inauguration of Xi Jinping. Ideological nationalism under the “Sinicization” program of Xi Jinping is a great challenge to Christianity today. The 2018 provisional agreement on the appointment of bishops was a breakthrough in Sino-Vatican relations. Nevertheless, the difficulties for the Catholic faithful, in both the official or underground communities, are far from being over. Keywords John Paul II · China · Official Church · Underground Catholics · Sino-Vatican relations · Sinicization of religions

G. Criveller (B) PIME International Missionary School of Theology, Monza, Italy © The Author(s) 2020 C. Y.-y. Chu and P. P. Mariani (eds.), People, Communities, and the Catholic Church in China, Christianity in Modern China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1679-5_2

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Deng Xiaoping and Pope John Paul II Since 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has taken measures to suppress religious activity, with the aim of eliminating religion from Chinese society. The peak of this anti-religious activity was during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) when the Red Guards destroyed churches, temples, and religious symbols and harshly persecuted believers. Beginning in 1978, the Reform and Opening-up Era has seen government control over both the Chinese Church and the organized religion in general, which fluctuate between periods of relaxation and tightening. We are currently in a tightening phase. When Deng Xiaoping inaugurated the Reform and Opening-up Era, Karol Wojtyla had only recently been elected Pope John Paul II. He followed events in post-Mao China closely and hoped to make a breakthrough in Sino-Vatican relations. On November 16, 1983, John Paul II wrote a private letter to Deng Xiaoping. Although that letter has never been published in its entirety, there is a brief reference to it in a book by Cardinal Roger Etchegaray, Verso i Cristiani in Cina, and a longer reference in Witness to Hope: The Biography of John Paul II by George Weigel. The letter, Weigel notes, was written in English, on the Pope’s personal stationery, and was replete with expressions of his respect for Chinese culture and history — “I am of the opinion that the pursuit of the common good of humanity encourages something that is also the object of my own lively desire: a direct contact between the Holy See and the authorities of the Chinese people ….”1 Pope John Paul II longed to visit China and repeatedly stated that he prayed for China every day. In order not to compromise his (already slim) chances of being allowed to visit China, he also avoided visiting Taiwan. During his pontificate, he either addressed China or publicly referred to it on at least sixty occasions. In about thirty official speeches, he expressed his desire for relations with, and collaboration between, the Holy See and Beijing.2 The Pope reiterated several themes when addressing China. These included his belief that China is a great nation; that there is no dichotomy between being authentically Catholic and authentically Chinese; that the Church seeks freedom and not privileges; and that the Gospel in China must be inculturated.3

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In 1979, John Paul II created a cardinal in pectore. On June 28, 1991, the same Pope publicly disclosed that he was Bishop Ignatius Kung Pinmei of the Shanghai diocese, who in 1979 was serving a life sentence after his arrest on September 8, 1955, together with priests, religious, and lay leaders accused of counterrevolutionary activities. Kung was released from prison in 1985, only to spend three more years under house arrest. In 1988, he was allowed to receive medical care in the United States. The ceremony in Saint Peter Square on June 28, 1991, was exceptionally emotional. When John Paul II presented Kung with his red hat, the 90-year-old raised himself up from his wheelchair and walked up the steps toward the altar to kneel at the feet of the Pope. Visibly touched, the Holy Father lifted him up, gave him his cardinal’s hat, and then stood as he returned to his wheelchair. The moment was followed by a very rare seven-minute standing ovation from the approximately nine thousand people in attendance. In 1980, the Jesuit bishop and apostolic administrator of Guangzhou, Dominic Tang Yiming, was released after spending 22 years in prison. The following year, Tang arrived in Rome, where he received the title of the archbishop of Guangzhou. The Pope meant to reward a man who had long suffered for his faith, but the Chinese government considered the decision to be an act of confrontation and refused to allow Tang to return to Guangzhou. He would from that point on live in exile in Hong Kong and later died in the United States. The Pope clearly held China close to his heart. On the Solemnity of the Epiphany in 1982, he urged the bishops of the world to pray for the Church in China, which he described as the “particular and constant anxiety of my pontificate.”4 In the same year, the Chinese government produced one of the most important religious policy documents of the post-Mao era: “Concerning our Country’s Basic Standpoint and Policy on Religious Questions during the Socialist Period” (Document No. 19). This document still largely provides the blueprint for the handling of religious issues in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) up to the present day. It states that attempting to wipe out religions is counter-productive. Instead, religions are to be publicly recognized and kept under strict control. It asserts that religions will eventually become extinct of their own accord, as the Socialist society and the modernization of the country are successfully implemented. In short, after the promulgation of Document No. 19, religions have been

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allowed more freedom, but the ideological arguments of religious policy and instruments of controlling religions are mostly still in place.

The Recent History of the Catholic Church in China Pope John Paul II One moment that showed the promise and peril of Sino-Vatican relations occurred during World Youth Day 1995 in Manila. An official delegation of Chinese Catholics could attend the event, and some priests from the open Church concelebrated with the Pope in a historic Mass attended by five million people on January 15, 1995, in Manila’s Luneta Park. The event aroused intense speculation from the media and the ecclesial community. Several questions were paramount: Did the Chinese priests concelebrate with the Pope? How were they allowed to concelebrate? Were they asked to make a profession of faith before Mass? I was present at the event and can attest that the Chinese priests participated alongside more than one thousand other priests and bishops, without any particular issues or any profession of faith. The actual drama occurred during the Mass, when the representatives of numerous delegations from around the world walked onto the stage with their flags, including a representative from Taiwan (Republic of China, ROC). When they saw this flag, the political heads of the mainland delegation forced the Chinese Catholics in attendance to leave the park immediately. A few members of the delegation did however remain behind until the end of the celebration, including some priests. Just one day prior, the Pope had delivered a new message to Chinese Catholics, appealing to them for unity among themselves and for unity of all Chinese Catholics with the Pope and the Universal Church.5 Three years later, the Pope invited two Chinese bishops — Bishop Matthias Duan Yinming of Wanxian diocese in Sichuan Province and his coadjutor Bishop Joseph Xu Zhixun — to attend the Special Synod for Asia in Rome in April 1998. However, the Chinese government refused to allow Duan and Xu to attend. At his own risk, Duan sent a fax to the Synod expressing his disappointment and his profound faith, stating “Sadly, I am unable to take part in the Synod for political reasons. My heart was so heavy with grief that for two nights I was unable to sleep.”6 In the same year, Ye Xiaowen, director of the State Administration of

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Religious Affairs (SARA) stated: “The long-term goal of the government regarding religion remains to eliminate the impact of religion in China.”7 President Jiang Zemin visited Rome in March 1999. World leaders, when visiting Rome, often take the opportunity to meet with the Pope during their visit. Jiang however did not. The Holy See sent a message to Jiang through the Italian Prime Minister Massimo D’Alema. The two usual pre-conditions of establishing diplomatic relations — breaking with Taiwan and not interfering in China’s internal affairs — were repeated to D’Alema on that occasion. Yet he seems to have persuaded Jiang to open a door to the Catholic Church, and following the visit, there were persistent rumors that diplomatic relations would soon be established between the Holy See and China. The fate of the underground Church was a stumbling block that could not be overcome. “A Proposal to Reinforce the Work on the Roman Catholic Church under the New Current of Changes” (Document No. 26) — issued on August 17, 1999 — asserted that the Chinese authorities sought relations with the Vatican only to eliminate the underground Church. On January 6, 2000, five bishops were illegitimately consecrated in the Cathedral of the Immaculate Conception in Beijing (otherwise known as the “south cathedral” or “Nantang”). The authorities had planned to ordain twelve bishops, mirroring the consecration of bishops that the Pope celebrates every year on that same day of January 6 in Rome. In Beijing, however, seven candidates refused to participate or went into hiding. Bishop Jin Luxian of the Shanghai diocese excused himself by entering hospital, while Bishop Li Du’an of the Xi’an diocese chose to disappear for several days, later to be severely reprimanded by political authorities. Five bishops were consecrated against their will, having been brought hastily and deceptively to Beijing and placed under formidable pressure to participate. The one hundred and twenty students of the National Seminary that also refused to take part in the illegitimate ceremony were severely reprimanded and underwent political study sessions. On October 1, 2000, the Pope canonized 120 martyrs of China (87 Chinese and 33 foreign missionaries, both men and women). The Chinese government reacted with hostility, labeling the Chinese martyrs as unpatriotic and as victims of foreign propaganda, while the foreign missionaries were characterized as imperialists. Three of them, including Alberico Crescitelli, a missionary of the Pontifical Institute for Foreign Missions (PIME), were characterized as outright criminals. Nonetheless, Chinese

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Catholics, in both the open Church and the underground Church, honored the saints in various ways. In Hong Kong, Cardinal John Baptist Wu Cheng-chung refused a request by the Hong Kong-China Liaison Office (the de facto embassy of China in Hong Kong) to celebrate the Mass in honor of the new saints in a low-key manner. The Chinese government accused the Holy See of choosing October 1, the National Day of the PRC, as a deliberate challenge to its authority. John Paul II once again sent a personal letter to Jiang Zemin, clarifying that his intention was to honor the Chinese people and not to pass judgment on complex historical situations, but Jiang did not reply. The Holy See did not choose the date out of disrespect for China. The Pope’s personal secretary, Stanisław Dziwisz, might have not even been aware of the significance of the date. In fact, in the Catholic calendar, October 1 is the feast day of Therese of Lisieux, one of the patron saints of the missions. This, quite simply, might be the motivation behind Vatican’s decision. The canonization of October 2000 caused relations between the Chinese government and the Vatican to reach their lowest point since Deng Xiaoping inaugurated the Open Door Policy in 1978. On October 24, 2001, John Paul II wrote a message to the participants of the International Convention celebrating the four-hundredth anniversary of Matteo Ricci’s arrival in Beijing. He affirmed that he wished to follow the way of Ricci, whose first book written in China was entitled On Friendship.8 The Church, said the Pope, does not seek privileges, but rather friendship, mutual respect, and freedom. He expressed regret for past mistakes made by missionaries. It was a gesture of magnanimity and friendship to which the Chinese authorities once again did not respond. The Pope stated: “I feel deep sadness for these errors and limits of the past, … For all of this I ask the forgiveness and understanding.”9 Another crisis followed. On March 21–22, 2003, a joint conference of the Bishops’ Conference of the Catholic Church in China (BCCCC) and the Standing Committee members of the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association (CCPA) released three documents on Church management in accordance with the policies of the United Front Work Department (UFWD) of the CCP. (The BCCCC is a body which includes only PRCappointed bishops, and it was implemented by the Chinese government and is disapproved of by Rome.) The documents advocated independence from the Universal Church and called on the Chinese Catholic clergy, faithful, and organizations to uphold the leadership of the CCP, adapt to Socialist society, and run Church affairs “democratically”. The purpose of

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the documents was to extend the power of the CCPA (which in article 3 of its constitution is enjoined to “support the leadership of the CCP”). When Pope John Paul II died in 2005, China was nearly alone among the nations of the world in not having a representative at his funeral. Yet he may have created a new cardinal in pectore in China prior to his death. I have previously expressed the opinion that this cardinal (whose name, of course, no one can confirm) was Archbishop Anthony Li Du’an of the Xi’an diocese.10 (My supposition is based on certain circumstances in which I was personally involved.) The then informal papal representative to China, Mons. Eugene Nugent, permitted me to express this hypothesis publicly, and I like to think that both the first and the last cardinals in pectore to have been created by John Paul II were both Chinese. Pope Benedict XVI Pope Benedict XVI was also attentive to Chinese Catholics and kept them high on his agenda. In a historic letter written to Chinese Catholics on June 30, 2007, he expressed his hope for a dialogue between the Chinese authorities and the Holy See. He asked the civil authorities in China to recognize the underground Church bishops, but he also admitted that open Church bishops in China were, “almost always [obliged] to adopt attitudes, make gestures and undertake commitments that are contrary to the dictates of their conscience.”11 (Part of this sentence was omitted in the earlier Chinese translation released by the Vatican, prompting protest from Cardinal Joseph Zen Ze-kiun.) In effect, when it came to whether to seek open recognition by the civil authorities or not, the Pope left the individual Chinese bishops to determine the best course of action to take in their own specific situations. Although the CCP made a great effort to diminish the letter’s significance, it contained the seed for accomplishing the unity and freedom of the Chinese Church. From June 2000 to April 2006, each new bishop in China had been ordained with the agreement of both sides. Although there were three illegitimate ordinations in 2006, from 2007 to late 2010 further ordinations were still carried out with the approval of both sides, although the approval was always given independently, without direct negotiation. After several years of “consensual ordinations”, the illegitimate consecration of Joseph Guo Jincai as a bishop in Chengde, on November 20, 2010, reflected the increasing deterioration of Sino-Vatican relations.

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In December 2010, the Eighth National Assembly of Catholic Representatives was held in Beijing, in spite of a call for its deferral. The agenda of the Assembly included the election of the new leadership of the CCPA and the BCCCC. The auxiliary bishop of Shanghai, Msgr. Joseph Xing Wenzhi, reluctantly attended the Assembly. Once there, according to what he himself declared once returned to Shanghai, he passively defied the government.12 When back in his diocese, he was quite depressed and apologized to his clergy for having not been strong enough to boycott the Assembly altogether. Soon after, he was forced to resign over allegations of an improper liaison with a woman, disclosed by the covert activities by authorities controlling religious personnel. It was a disturbing retaliation against Xing, who had displayed the courage to resist government policies. In 2011, two more bishops, Lei Shiyin in Leshan diocese and Huang Bingzhang in Shantou diocese, were consecrated without Vatican approval, on June 29 and July 14, respectively. In response, the Holy See publicly declared that the two bishops were excommunicated. It was the first time that this canonical measure of excommunication had been taken against a Chinese bishop since 1958. For its part, the Chinese government responded that this grave sanction was an interference in China’s internal religious affairs and was also “extremely unreasonable and rude.”13 In other words, China was asking the Vatican of staying out of the Chinese Church, but also approving its policy of independence. Beginning in July 2011, a number of Church leaders, mostly based in Hong Kong, were not allowed to enter mainland China, even when they had valid visas. It was informally reported by friends in the field that the UFWD had a list of about 23 individuals that were to be subjected to this restriction. Some of those blacklisted were laity, but most of them were priests that Beijing appears to have considered connected to the Vatican. Some blacklisted persons opted not to speak publicly, lest they prejudice their future chances of returning to China. The Holy See also opted not to comment. After five years, the ban was eventually lifted. Two consecrations of bishops in April 2012 — in Nanchong diocese in Sichuan Province and Changsha diocese in Hunan Province — were approved by both sides, but the ordained bishops were forced to accept illegitimate bishops as consecrators. On July 6, 2012, Yue Fusheng was ordained as a bishop in Harbin diocese in Heilongjiang Province, despite a request made to him by the Holy See to refuse the ordination. In the wake of his ordination, officers in charge of religious affairs detained two priests

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belonging to the underground Church in Harbin. Also, seven priests, who had refused to participate in the ordination Mass, were forced out of their parishes. To avoid being expelled from the diocese, they were asked to write a letter of apology and to concelebrate with Yue. The Holy See publicly announced the excommunication latae sententiae of Yue on July 10, 2012.14 The story of Bishop Thaddeus Ma Daqin of the Shanghai diocese, the successor of Bishop Joseph Xing Wenzhi, marked another dramatic deterioration for the Church in China. On July 7, 2012, in the St. Ignatius Catholic Cathedral of Shanghai, Ma was ordained with the approval of both the Vatican and the Chinese government. To the dismay of many priests, religious, and laypersons, the Chinese authorities imposed the presence of an illicit bishop. Ma, in an unusual stratagem, prevented the illicit bishop from placing hands on him during the consecration rite. Toward the end of the Mass, Ma declared that he would be a bishop of all of the faithful, and therefore, he would cease being a member of the CCPA. Many considered the gesture as courageous and prophetic, and Ma was forcibly taken away the same evening. An amateur video of his speech–which was openly applauded by the attendees in the cathedral — appeared for a few days on various Web sites until it became a casualty of censorship. The diocese was placed under investigation, and priests and nuns questioned. To this day, Ma is still under house arrest at the Sheshan Regional Seminary in Shanghai. In 2016 — while still in captivity — he admitted his faults and made a “confession”, although many doubted its sincerity. Pope Francis Pope Francis was elected in March 2013, at about the same time that Xi Jinping became president of the PRC. Francis wrote to Xi after his election, and Xi replied. In the summer of 2016, while flying to South Korea for World Youth Day 2016, Pope Francis could pass through Chinese airspace. Even so, there was no Chinese delegation at the event, as there had been in Manila in 1995, and only a handful of young Chinese risked going to South Korea to see the Pope. According to the testimony of friends present in Seoul, some pilgrims had even written out their last will and testament before departing, due to the Chinese authorities’ opposition to their attending.

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On November 8, 2015, Fr. Pedro Yu Heping, a very active and inventive 41-year-old priest from the underground Church, was found dead in the Ren River, near Taiyuan City in Shanxi Province. It is generally believed that he was the victim of a violent interrogation, the first priest to suffer a violent death in China in many years. In 2016, the CCP issued new regulations for its members, emphasizing that they were not allowed to practice religion. At the same time, the regime intensified its campaign against “Western infiltration” and against large public demonstrations of Christianity. Churches were demolished, crosses removed, covered, or destroyed, and Christian religious leaders arrested. This campaign started in Wenzhou (often known as “China’s Jerusalem”), before spreading across Zhejiang Province, and finally across the whole country. New regulations governing religious activities came into effect on February 1, 2018. Worship can take place only in designated churches and according to a schedule approved by government administrators. Private prayer groups are forbidden, and violators can be arrested. Worshipping in private homes is illegal. Minors are not permitted to attend religious activities, and churches must display a notice that the building is prohibited to minors under the age of 18. While most of these directives are no different from policies in existence since 1983, they are now implemented with unprecedented determination.

Catholic Life in the Open Church Members of the open Church want to be loyal to their faith and to the pope. They are the object of intense government pressure, control, and manipulation, be this through enticements or harassment. This control and pressure is exerted by the SARA. The enthusiasm and the zeal of young priests, nuns, and bishops are severely tested by a lack of real freedom in exercising their pastoral care. New ideas and initiatives are frequently rejected by conservative officials. In order to obtain the support of young priests, SARA officials offer enticements such as entertainment, travel, and even a political career. Some Catholics who are invited to attend meetings abroad are not permitted to go if they have not shown support for government policies. Chinese bishops cannot travel to Rome for ad liminia visits. This unfortunate situation breeds apathy and a lack of confidence in young Church leaders.

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Consequently, some priests and nuns are leaving the Church entirely, and there is a decline in candidates entering seminaries and convents. For the past thirty years, government officials have participated in the election and ordination of new bishops. The ceremonies for these ordinations, even when approved by both the CCP and the Vatican, have been one indicator of the ongoing conflict between government officials and Catholic communities. The government has imposed the presence of illegitimate bishops as co-consecrators, an intolerable abuse of Catholic doctrine and tradition. Many dozens of Public Security Bureau (PSB) personnel are present at the ceremonies, where a “letter of appointment” issued by the BCCCC is read before the people, rather than the mandate of the pope. The purpose of this on the part of the PRC is that no one can claim, before the Catholic people, of being uncompromised. Each bishop — even those approved by the Holy See — must have some stain, so as not to command the respect of the Catholic community and thus be more easily manipulated. I hold that there is no national (or “patriotic”) Church in China. Chinese Catholics have demonstrated that they do not want to be governed by illegitimate bishops. An illegitimately ordained bishop will become, in fact, a shepherd without a flock. Yet the CCP has been unable to acknowledge that their policy does not work. Bishops and priests that acquiesce are given assistance for their family and necessities such as cars, computers, and church buildings. Those who accept illicit ordination, or actively participate as consecrators, have been rewarded with a substantial stipend. It takes great strength to renounce these rewards. After all, it is easy to selfjustify on the pretext of acting in the “best interests of the Church.” They condemn themselves to a life of moral misery and new defeats. Cadres seize their lives and decide everything for them. Even in the final hours of their lives, they are deprived of the comfort of a confessor, of the sacraments, and of a truly religious funeral. This happened in 2007, to Bishop Michael Fu Tieshan of the Beijing diocese.15 In contrast, some young priests and bishops have resisted the harassment, refusing to participate to the illegitimate ordinations of bishops and refusing the material advantages offered by officials in charge of religious policy, displaying a virtue unknown to those ecclesiastics who turn their life into the pursuit of a career or a search for power and money.

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Catholic Life in the Underground Church The Chinese authorities’ final aim is the elimination of the underground Church and the forcing of its members to register in the CCPA. The registration of places of worship, opposed by the underground Church, is not an act of administrative protection and regulation of religious activities, but rather a means of control and manipulation, a limitation on the rights of the Church. Therefore, underground Catholics meet in private homes as they do not accept the legitimacy of the control exerted by government agencies and by the CCPA. Government officials involved in this do not spare repression or even violence. On April 16, 1992, the frozen body of 85-year-old Bishop Peter Joseph Fan Xueyan of Baoding diocese was left by police officers in front of his relatives’ home. Authorities said that he had died from pneumonia a few days earlier. His body appeared to have broken bones and injuries consistent with mistreatment. Fan had been a champion of the underground Church and was arrested five times in his life, spending nineteen years in detention and a further twelve years under house arrest. More than 30,000 Catholics took part in his funeral, defying a government request that the memorial be kept “low-key”. The resistance of the underground Church has made the Chinese government aware of the fact that they have not solved the Catholic issue and that the Chinese Church has not become “independent” of the Vatican. The underground Church has prompted the members of the open Church to seek the approval of the pope to command the respect of the faithful. Without the underground Church, communion with the pope and the Universal Church would not be so prominent on the agenda of the Church in China. The underground Church has prevented the official communities from succumbing to pressure to shift away from the Universal Church. While the “extreme measures” taken against the underground Church are not as widespread as in the past, they have not been eliminated altogether. There is a fluctuating number of about twenty individuals — including underground Church and open Church bishops and priests — that are still confined under house arrest, many of whose whereabouts are unknown (including Bishop James Su Zhimin and Bishop Thaddeus Ma Daqin). Many more are prevented from openly exercising their ministry. In the case of the aforementioned Fr. Pedro Yu Heping, the authorities hastily and conveniently classified his death as a suicide. No one in

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the Chinese Church — especially those closest to Yu — accepts this verdict. He was a strong person, never depressed, and devoted to his difficult ministry. A few days prior to his death, he had called friends and collaborators in Hong Kong to organize new training courses for young people and religious personnel in China. On the day of his death, he was about to travel to a distant province for a catechetical seminar. Yu had remained active in promoting the Catholic faith, publishing a theological journal and collaborating with cultural institutions in China, Hong Kong, and other countries.16 As the first priest to suffer a violent death in China for many years, many Catholic faithful — in both China and Hong Kong — consider him a martyr, in a manner akin to the Polish Jesuit priest, Fr. Jerzy Popiełuszko, who died at the hands of the Polish Communists in 1984.

Current Challenges for the Chinese Church The transmission of faith to the younger generations is the greatest challenge facing Catholicism in contemporary China. Traditional Catholic devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus, the Virgin Mary, and Saint Joseph, as well as to the pope himself, played a very important part in saving the faith in the years of Communist persecution. However, today it is very difficult to transmit the Catholic faith to the new “postmodern” generations of Chinese youths. As with elsewhere in the world, a rapid and all-encompassing process of modernization has become a serious threat to the practice and the transmission of the Catholic faith. Urbanization too challenges the Catholic faith, which has spread mostly (but not exclusively) in rural villages of China. Parents find it difficult to pass on their faith to their children, who are leaving the village for the city, where they are overwhelmed by the prevailing materialism. Quite obviously, secularization is having a negative impact on Chinese Catholicism. The number of faithful is not growing. The decline in candidates for religious service is a consequence of the difficulties that the Chinese Church is facing during the present social transformation. Churches are not well frequented, and even young people from families with a long Catholic tradition do not go to church. The process of modernization affects the Church worldwide, but the Chinese Church faces a further problem: There is insufficient freedom for responding to the challenges of a society in rapid transformation. Under pressure from ever-present cadres in charge of religious policy, Catholic

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bishops, priests, and nuns are prevented from taking new pastoral and formative initiatives and feel hindered in responding to the needs of their communities. New ideas and pastoral initiatives are denied, by officials determined to avoid any risk. A consequence of this unfortunate situation is discouragement and lack of self-confidence in young Church leaders in, to such an extent that a number of priests have left the priesthood. Another major challenge is that Xi Jinping has re-ignited ideological nationalism, intensifying a cultural campaign against “Western infiltration”, and elevated Confucianism as the sole representative of Chinese thought. Nationalism has become the ideology of Chinese governance. Marxist-Leninist language still exists, but the CCP is now a “ruling party”, rather than a revolutionary one. The philosophical and cultural foundation of this nationalism is Confucianism, a remarkable shift since the Cultural Revolution, during which Confucianism was labeled as a feudal superstition and the cause of China’s backwardness. Faced with the cultural and political rebirth of Confucianism, new difficulties have arisen for Christian believers and scholars. The nationalist agenda promotes the revival of Confucianism as the essential cultural heritage of China and its only fate. The superiority of Confucianism has been reinstated, and Confucianism is promoted all over the world through the Confucius Institutes. Another challenge is Xi Jinping’s policy of the “Sinicization” of religions in China, both a continuation and a stricter implementation of the policy of “adaptation”. Sinicization has been a core topic for the Chinese leadership in the last three years or so and is imposed very strongly on religions. So-called foreign religions, such as Christianity, are viewed with suspicion and are coming under growing control. Catholicism has been forced to adapt to national ideology as stated by the Communist Party and its leaders and to the present circumstances. A final challenge is the mounting degree of unwarranted control, manipulation, harassment, and even suppression of religion in China that has been discussed above. The paramount concern of the government remains maintaining control over, and the submission of, religion. Even when the authorities do temporarily relax their grip, this is done only to safeguard long-term control.

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The Sino-Vatican Provisional Agreement On September 22, 2018, after years of speculation, China and the Vatican reached a provisional agreement on the appointment of bishops in China. The signing of the agreement took place in Beijing, between Antoine Camilleri, Vatican undersecretary for the Holy See’s relations with states, and Wang Chao, deputy foreign minister of the PRC. This is certainly one of the most significant accomplishments of the pontificate of Pope Francis. The Holy See’s statement,17 released on the same day, affirmed that the appointment of bishops is “a question of great importance for the life of the Church” and that the agreement (the result of “careful negotiation”) can create “the conditions for greater collaboration at the bilateral level.” It expressed hope that the dialogue “may contribute positively to the life of the Catholic Church in China, to the common good of the Chinese people and to peace in the world,” and lead to “a new path, which will overcome the wounds of the past and achieve the communion of Chinese Catholics.” On the day after the agreement was signed, the CCPA and the BCCCC announced the agreement while asserting Chinese Catholics’ “love for the homeland and the Church,” and intention to, “maintain the principles of autonomy and independence in the administration of the Church.”18 The same document also states that Chinese Catholics will follow the program of Sinicization (implying the reshaping of universal religions according to Chinese characteristics) and the path of adaptation to Socialist society, under the leadership of the CCP. Other notable events followed at a rapid pace. The Pope admitted into the ecclesial communion eight bishops not yet recognized by the Vatican. Among them was even a deceased bishop, Bishop Antonio Tu Shihua, OFM, who had asked for reconciliation before his death. The Pope also established a new diocese of Chengde, regularizing the position of Bishop Joseph Guo Jincai. Pope Francis first spoke about the agreement just a couple of days after it was signed, when returning from a visit to Lithuania. Speaking spontaneously, he accepted full responsibility, stating “I signed the agreement…. I am responsible for it.”19 The Pope declared that he was fully aware of the implications and that he had studied, one by one, the cases of China’s illegitimate bishops. He recognized the value of suffering and resistance

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by Chinese Catholics. He even admitted that some Catholics may continue to suffer, stating “It is true, they will suffer. In an agreement there is suffering.”20 In the subsequent weeks, relations between China and the Vatican began to thaw. Two bishops from the mainland were able to participate, for the first time, at a Synod in the Vatican. The Chinese authorities had rejected similar invitations from previous popes. At the opening of the Synod, on October 3, 2018, Pope Francis greeted the two bishops with visible emotion. In spite of the agreement however, 2018 remained a very negative year for religious freedom in China and in particular for the Catholic faithful. The new regulations, which are mentioned above and have been implemented since February 1, 2018, furthered existing limitations on the practice of religion. What’s more, they have been applied with unusual zeal by local officials. Crosses have been torn down or burned; churches demolished or stripped; and minors prevented from attending Mass or removed from churches, even during the liturgical celebrations. In addition to numerous direct testimonies, amateur videos also attest to these abuses. It is now forbidden to organize study camps for young people. Churches have been forced to accept the national flag in the sanctuary. There has been a great effort to eliminate critical Catholic voices from the internet. By conceding to the involvement of political authorities in the process of selecting candidates to be presented to the Pope, the Holy See has made a gesture of great complacency toward China. It is not appropriate to invoke historical precedents to justify the role given to state authorities in the selection of candidates. While it is true that in the past temporal powers have heavily interfered with the appointment of (or even obtained for themselves the right to appoint) bishops, this was a negative situation which the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965) and the Code of Canon Law put an end to in very firm terms. It would be better to justify this agreement by reaffirming the extraordinary nature of the China case and the necessity, in this historical circumstance, of an exceptional concession for the supreme good of the people of God and in order to avoid greater evils. The complex and contradictory administrative and repressive machinery of Chinese religious policy might need time to deal with the agreement. While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, which signed the agreement, has sought to cast it as a diplomatic success for the sake of

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China’s international prestige, other power groups have expressed quiet opposition. The CCPA (which has an economic interest in controlling the Church) may fear a diminishing of its role. The same fear may be attributable to the officials of the SARA. This could have been one of the causes of the religious repression that erupted in the weeks and months after the agreement. That the agreement is an astute deception on the part of the Chinese regime — obtaining a prestigious international result while increasing internal repression — cannot be ruled out. There is also the Taiwan factor, which should not be underestimated. The Holy See has been one of the most significant sources of international diplomatic recognition for Taiwan. With this agreement, it finds itself in even greater isolation. Even admitting the possibility of good faith on the Chinese side, it is clear that the agreement does not mean that Chinese Catholics are now freer. The unresolved situation of the underground Church, and of the bishops and priests that have been kept in a state of detention or limited freedom, proves this. It is very much possible that Chinese Catholics will have, for some time, even more difficulties. But we know the moral strength and faith of the Catholics of China, who went through to so many trials. On June 30, 2019, the Holy See has released important “Pastoral Guidelines” concerning the civil registration of clergy in China. It deals with the request suffered by official and underground bishops and priests to subscribe to documents affirming China’s religious policy and the independence of Chinese Catholic Church. The guidelines suggest a flexible attitude but are judged by some commentators as ambiguous. The Vatican seems to believe that over time it will be possible to obtain from Chinese authorities a registration “more respectful of Catholic doctrine” and of the “consciences of those involved.” The Holy See declares its respect for those who conscientiously refuse to be registered. Bishops Anthony Yao Shun of Jining (Inner Mongolia) and Stephen Xu Hongwei of Hanzhong (Shaanxi) were ordained on August 26 and 28, 2019, respectively. They were the first Chinese bishops to be ordained after the Vatican–China deal in September 2018. The pro-Vatican commentators hailed it as evidence that the deal was working. The Vatican press office emphasized that the bishops were appointed by the Pope within the framework of the provisional agreement. Other commentators observed, however, that the bishops were appointed by the Pope before

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the Vatican–China deal and that the procedure for appointing bishops would continue in the same way as it was before the deal A huge number of articles have been published worldwide on the agreement. It has raised both excessive enthusiasm and unwarranted criticism. The Church knows no other way than to follow the Pope and to support its commitment in guiding the people of God. Pope Francis has affirmed that he knows what he is doing in China. This is the moment for unity.

Notes 1. George Weigel, Witness to Hope: The Biography of John Paul II (New York: Harper, 1999), p. 596. 2. Elmer Wurth, Papal Documents Related to China 1937 –2005, edited by Betty Ann Maheu (Hong Kong: Holy Spirit Study Centre, 2006). 3. See the ten documents by John Paul II, Papal Documents Related to China 1937 –2005, pp. 179–228. 4. Letter to the Bishops of the World Inviting Them to Pray for the Church in China, January 6, 1982. See Papal Documents Related to China 1937 – 2005, p. 190. 5. See Papal Documents Related to China 1937 –2005, pp. 208–09. 6. As reported by Fides Vatican Agency, May 8, 1998. 7. Gianni Criveller, “Pope John Paul II and China,” Tripod, No. 137 (2005), pp. 5–30. 8. On Friendship (Jiaoyou lun) was first published in Nanchang in 1595. 9. The entire message of the Pope is included in Papal Documents Related to China 1937 –2005, p. 317. 10. “Archbishop Li Du’an: A Great Model for Young Bishop in China,” Tripod, No. 143 (2006), p. 20. Archbishop Li was mourned by thousands in China, and throughout the world, when he passed away on May 25, 2006. Chinese Catholics of both the open Church and the underground Church not only held him in great respect, but even in veneration. They admired his zeal, courage, steadfast faith, and exemplary leadership. His tomb, located inside the village church of Gongyi in Xi’an diocese, has become a place of pilgrimage for many Catholics. 11. Pope Benedict XVI’s Letter to Chinese Catholics is included in Tripod, No. 146, 2007. For its online version, see http://hsstudyc.org.hk/en/ tripod_en/en_tripod_146_02.html. 12. This information is based on a personal conversation by the author with an eyewitness. 13. Xinhua Agency, July 25, 2011.

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14. Although he has come to represent weakness and closeness to the Chinese government, I can attest that as a young priest, Yue showed devotion to Pope John Paul II, as he concelebrated with him at World Youth Day 1995. After the Taiwanese flag incident, mentioned above, Yue did not leave Luneta Park, as most of the Chinese delegation did. At the end of Mass, he asked a European priest for the gift of a stole that was specially prepared for the occasion with the pontiff’s coat of arms. Yue might be a case in point of how the Chinese authorities are sometimes able to pull to their side priests who had previously been explicitly loyal to the Vatican. 15. Michael Fu Tieshan, bishop of Beijing, president of the CCPA, acting president of the CBC, and vice chairperson of the National People’s Congress, died of lung cancer at age 76 on April 20, 2007. Consecrated bishop of Beijing on December 21, 1979, without papal approval, the first episcopal ordination after the Cultural Revolution. He was a vocal supporter of the government and successively held higher positions. When in hospital, no fellow priest was allowed visiting him privately for hearing his confession and offering him the sacrament of the sick. On April 27, he was given an official funeral as a “state leader and a loyal patriot.” 16. Officials monitored Yu’s activism, especially his influence among young Catholics and his abilities in using the internet as a tool of outreach. On a few occasions, the authorities closed the Web site on which he published translations of papal speeches and writings. He was linguistically talented, and his Spanish name, “Pedro”, is a reminder of the years he spent studying in Columbia and Spain. In Europe, he learned about and appreciated the “Camino de Santiago” and taught about it in China. 17. https://press.vatican.va/content/salastampa/it/bollettino/pubblico/ 2018/09/22/0673/01468.html#IN. 18. See, among many others, the report by Hong Kong based South China Morning Post on September 23, 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/ china/politics/article/2165423/chinas-state-sanctioned-catholic-churchvows-remain-independent. 19. The Pope’s words were largely reported by media, see, among others, the report by South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/news/ china/article/2165743/pope-francis-defends-china-deal-bishops-says-hewill-have-final-say-names. 20. Ibid.

CHAPTER 3

The Development of the Underground Church in Post-Mao China Sergio Ticozzi

Abstract This chapter describes the development of the underground Church in China beginning from Deng Xiaoping’s liberalization of the religious policy in 1978. It points out the gradual buildup of communities around bishops and clergy just freed from prisons, who refused any compromise with the Communist authorities. The underground Church, then, became more organized with new priests and sisters formed in its own seminaries and convents and, mainly, with new bishops secretly ordained. The highest attempt on this line was the establishment of the Unofficial Bishops’ Conference in November 1989. All these efforts were carried out under threats, detentions, and persecution by Chinese authorities, who intended to force upon everybody the official registration and acceptance of their autonomy and independence policy. Recently, the soft attitude of the Holy See toward China became another source of worry for the unofficial Church.

S. Ticozzi (B) Holy Spirit Study Centre, Aberdeen, Hong Kong © The Author(s) 2020 C. Y.-y. Chu and P. P. Mariani (eds.), People, Communities, and the Catholic Church in China, Christianity in Modern China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1679-5_3

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Keywords Underground Church · Unofficial Bishops’ Conference · Religious policy · Official registration

This chapter will describe the development of the underground Church in China beginning from the launch of Deng Xiaoping’s liberalization of national religious policy in 1978. In tracing the development of the underground Church, the first question to be asked is: Why have portions of the Church chosen to remain “underground” even after the religious policy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was liberalized? The re-emergence of the underground Church after 1978 can be traced directly to the events of the 1950s, when Catholics opposed government efforts to create what was effectively a national Church that answered to the state alone. (These efforts included the movement for the reform of the Church and also the Three-Self Movement.) By 1958, the Chinese state had begun consecrating bishops without the approval of the pope. The events of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) only worsened the situation. Therefore, even with the efforts of liberalization in the early stages of the Reform and Opening-up Era, many Catholics felt that the government was still holding to the same objectives as it had in the 1950s. It was for this reason that these Catholics chose to remain underground. As Reform and Opening-up was beginning, the Holy See was concerned with the revival of the Chinese Church and wanted to help all Catholics in China. On June 27, 1978, in order to encourage Chinese Catholics and to assist the clergy in responding to the new situation, the Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples issued a document entitled, “Faculties and Privileges Given to the Catholic Clergy and Faithful Who Live in Mainland China, While These Conditions Persist” (hereafter, “Faculties and Privileges”).1 Its practical purpose was to facilitate the administration of the seven sacraments by simplifying the rites. It also afforded priests special faculties that were usually only granted to bishops. Furthermore, bishops were permitted to ordain priests even if their theological studies were not yet complete. Later, the Holy See also granted permission for the consecration of bishops. The Chinese authorities, along with the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association (CCPA), repeatedly criticized the Vatican for issuing these special faculties and blamed Rome for “creating the underground Church.” This was incorrect. The underground Church had already

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existed since the 1950s, even if “Faculties and Privileges” did provide strong encouragement for all Catholic clergy and faithful in China.

The Early Difficulties of the Underground Church The Church as an institution had almost disappeared during the Cultural Revolution. It survived only in the hidden life of faith. Yet while Catholics could pray in their hearts and in hidden corners of their homes, some even found themselves betrayed by their own families. With the liberalization policy, the Church could once again be visible, and believers could practice their faith openly. Rehabilitated bishops, priests, and sisters could now return to their own homes. Those who had joined the CCPA in the 1950s were reinstated in the officially open churches. They were now much older, and some of them had even married. Some of these priests at first refused active ministry because they were afraid that the faithful would not trust them. Eventually, some of them would accept the demands of active ministry, to provide the sacraments to the faithful and to assure their priestly life. On the other hand, the clergy of the underground Church, who had never compromised with the movement for the reform of the Church in China, returned to their native villages or to their places of ministry and restarted work. They were welcomed by their relatives and by the lay faithful who had survived. Consequently, small communities formed around them, especially in traditionally Catholic areas. Although held together by a solid loyalty to the pope, their psychological attitude was still one of mistrust and fear, and they revealed their activities and contacts only to trustworthy friends. (They also met with visiting relatives and foreign friends, albeit in a prudent manner.) In some areas, they even contacted priests who were working in the open Church. In other more sensitive areas — especially in the cities — they soon realized the danger of exposure and went underground. Since their activities were officially considered “illegal”, some were arrested. The underground Church clergy faced a number of challenges. In many places, the local church had either been destroyed or taken over by local authorities for other purposes. The faithful gathered in private houses or in courtyards or in makeshift structures for religious services. In many places, their activities were kept completely clandestine, but in areas

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where Catholics were the majority, religious activities were often practiced quite publicly. Regarding the practice of the religious ceremonies, the faithful first had to rely on memory or on handwritten texts for prayers and songs. Religious leaders were growing old and had not been able to stay updated during their long years of imprisonment. Therefore, these communities not only lacked books, religious articles, and financial resources, they were also short of learned guides who could provide good teaching and formation. Despite this, Catholic villages were full of religious zeal. According to many reports from the time, visitors discovered vibrant religious communities even in places without a priest. Seeing this extraordinary depth of faith, many witnesses reported being deeply moved. There were frequent reports of exorcisms, miracles, visions, apparitions of the Virgin Mary, healings, conversions, and the punishment of sacrilegious actions. These communities felt that they were open to the power of the Holy Spirit, which enabled them to strengthen their faith and make numerous conversions. Owing to ignorance and a lack of genuine religious formation, there were also negative developments in all of this religious ferment. Religious “messiahs” cheated people, Pentecostal and millenarian sects vied for attention, unorthodox doctrines spread, and some priests abused their authority by excommunicating the faithful without justification.

Gradual Development and Organization of the Underground Church Unofficial communities gradually became better organized. Religious books from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and the Philippines soon arrived. They provided a means to improve liturgical celebrations and to give an authentic Catholic formation. Underground Church communities soon shifted from Latin to the Chinese language when they celebrated the sacraments. These communities also took the initiative in copying by hand, and later printing, their own liturgical books. They did this because they did not trust the publications of the official Catholic press. They began with liturgical texts and sacred scriptures and then moved on to other spiritual and formational books. Later, Catholic Web sites would begin providing the basic Catholic texts, like The Bible, the documents of the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965), the Code of the Canon Law, the Universal Catechism of the Church, the Compendium of the Social

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Doctrine of the Church, the daily Eucharist, the Liturgy of the Hours, and other texts. Underground Church communities in Hebei, Fujian, Heilongjiang, and Shanxi were the most committed in the printing sector, while recently even the textbooks of the Hong Kong Holy Spirit Seminary College of Theology and Philosophy have been reprinted in Fujian and Hebei. Underground Church priests did a great deal of ministry in rural areas. In time, some younger priests began studying abroad. When they returned to China, they traveled far and wide throughout the country. Some unregulated activity brought problems, as communities often became divided against each other based on personal prejudices. Conflict and division were also caused by the rearrangement of the boundaries of the dioceses. Underground Church clergy maintained the traditional division of the ecclesiastical territories while the government often combined dioceses together. For their part, underground Church bishops, who were increasing in number, tried to develop their communities by avoiding division, improving the formation of the laity, establishing seminaries and convents, sending religious personnel abroad for study, and setting up networks of cooperation. The government soon became concerned with the re-emergence of the underground Church. In response, the Third Plenary Session of the CCPA — held in Beijing from May 22 to 30, 1980 — issued regulations forbidding those who had not joined the CCPA to act as priests. From then on, a priest could only practice with a permit from the local CCPAaffiliated bishop. This emphasis on control was made more explicit in a March 1982 directive entitled, “Concerning our Country’s Basic Standpoint and Policy on Religious Questions during the Socialist Period” (Document No. 19), which stated that: We are determined to crack down on all criminal and counterrevolutionary activities that hide under the cover of religion.… At the same time, reactionary religious groups abroad, especially imperialistic ones like the Vatican and Protestant foreign-mission societies, strive their best to infiltrate into our country.… Our policy is to develop fraternal international contacts with worldwide religions, but firmly resist infiltration by all hostile religious forces from abroad.2

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This directive sanctioned the government to deal with the underground Church in a heavy-handed manner, including recourse to detention, arrests, and re-education through labor. Underground Church priests were now aware that they could be betrayed even by someone who had pretended to make the sacrament of reconciliation. Underground Catholics reacted strongly to the new wave of oppression and arrests and to the role of the CCPA in this activity. In March 1988, a hardline document began to circulate. It recorded an interview with Bishop Peter Joseph Fan Xueyan and was drafted by underground Catholic circles in Baoding. Known as the “Thirteen Points”, this document effectively asserted that the open Church was no longer Catholic.3 Church leaders in China took different views on the “Thirteen Points”, which caused confusion. In order to clarify the situation, on September 3, 1988, the Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples sent to all Catholic bishops a directive entitled, “Directives on Some of the Problems of the Church in Continental China” (otherwise known as “the Eight Point Guidelines”).4 The directive “reaffirmed the Catholic position on the primacy and authority of the pope as successor to St. Peter and addressed the three questions raised by the existence of the ‘independent’ Church: the excommunication of the China appointed bishops, the validity of Sacraments administered by official clergy and the role of the official seminaries.” The government and the CCPA initially either ignored, or denied the existence of, the underground Church. However, in time, the existence of the underground Church became known both inside China and internationally. This caused much irritation in official government circles. In an open letter published on August 14, 1988, Bishop Philip Ma Ji of Pingliang in Gansu Province attributed the growth of the underground Church to the blunders of the CCPA. He announced his resignation from the CCPA and openly denounced the official Catholic leaders for creating a division within the Church, accusing them of immorality. In “My Statement”, he wrote, “The root of the problem of the division can be traced to the actions of some high authorities at the top of the three Catholic organizations, that is, to their betrayal and emptying of the teachings and commandments of the Church.”5 As a consequence, even those who had initially denied the existence of the underground Church had to admit to its existence, albeit with irritation. They put the blame on the Holy See.

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The first official acknowledgment of the existence of the underground Church came with the publication of “Stepping up Control over the Catholic Church to meet the New Situation” (Document No. 3) by the General Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on February 17, 1989.6 Document No. 3 states that: The Catholic Church in China has to keep firmly on the [three autonomies] road. However, the Vatican is again trying to wrest control over the Chinese Catholic Church. According to the facts we have at hand, the Pope has already appointed 15 underground bishops. These bishops in turn have ordained more than 200 priests who are dispersed through 17 provinces and cities. Underground Church groups have been organized in Hebei, Fujian, Shaanxi, Wenzhou in Zhejiang, and Tianshui in Gansu Provinces, respectively. They are a political force defying the government and an element that can seriously affect public security.

This document set off a new wave of oppression and arrests of underground Church Catholics. Further, on February 5, 1991, another directive was issued, “Destroy Completely the Organization of the Underground Religious Forces” (Document No. 6), which dealt directly with the Catholic Church.7 Document No. 6 is still in force. In the meantime, the Chinese authorities even tried to “convince” underground Church bishops to ask for government approval through the mediation of the CCPA. Some bishops accepted this, such as Bishop Shi Hongchen of Tianjin, Bishop Fan Yufei of Zhouzhi, and Bishop Zong Huaide of Sanyuan. The restrictions placed on underground Church bishops continued. Many were taken away or placed under strict surveillance, particularly during important government meetings, visits from foreign dignitaries, or the celebration of special Catholic events. The most frequently targeted bishops have been Bishop Julius Jia Zhiguo of Zhengding, Bishop Wei Jingyi of Qiqihar, Bishop Jin Lugang of Nanyang, Bishop Wang Ruowang of Tianshui, Bishop Zhuang Jianjian of Shantou, and more recently, Bishop Guo Xijin of Mindong and Bishop Shao Zhumin of Wenzhou. Several priests — especially the more active ones — have been arrested for “illegal activities”, while other priests and sisters have been required to attend ideological “updating courses”. Since the end of the 1980s, Public Security Bureau (PSB) officials have forcibly “invited” underground Church clergy to attend “workshops” and “visits” that can last up to several weeks.

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On August 16, 1999, the Chinese authorities issued “A Proposal to Reinforce the Work on the Roman Catholic Church under the New Current of Changes” (Document No. 26). It declared once again the intention of the PRC to eliminate all “underground Catholics” in China.8 In November 2004, Chinese authorities approved the new “Regulations for Religious Affairs,” which replaced those issued in 1994.9 The regulations were intended to curtail “dangerous trends” developing in areas of China where underground Church followers had been able to establish good relations with sympathetic local authorities and build up strong communities. On February 1, 2018, a new and yet more restrictive set of “Regulations for Religious Affairs” came into effect.10 Consequently, in several places, children are no longer allowed to attend churches, while catechetical courses and formation camps for students are forbidden, and public religious symbols are to be taken down.

The Opening of Seminaries and Convents In light of the aforementioned permission granted to ordain priests without a complete theological formation, underground Church bishops released from prisons or labor camps not only ordained several former seminarians who had also been imprisoned, they also opened up seminaries for younger candidates. They also encouraged young women to join older religious sisters to form new congregations. This was the beginning of a more organized structure in the underground Church. In fact, these clandestine seminaries pre-date the public ones.11 Beginning as early as 1979, underground Church bishops made strenuous efforts to form the new generation of the clergy in the best way possible, albeit with limited means. The first seminary was opened by Bishop Anthony Zhou Weidao of Fengxiang in Shanxi Province, followed by Bishop Zhou Shanfu in Hebei. Other dioceses soon followed, especially in traditionally Catholic areas: Baoding, Zhengding, and Yixian in Hebei; Fuzhou and Mindong in Fujian; Wenzhou in Zhejiang; Hongdong in Shanxi; Hohhot in Inner Mongolia; Qiqihar and Harbin in Heilongjiang; Fengxiang and Hanzhong in Shaanxi; and Anyang, Nanyang, and Xinxiang in Henan. Operating without the approval of the civil and religious authorities, these seminaries ran the risk of being closed down at any time. Frequently, they had neither a fixed location nor a set curriculum. Later on, teachers

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and texts improved, though the locations were often still transient. Seminarians often had to live in the private homes of Catholic families and come together for classes and spiritual activities (the length of training varied from two to six years). Bishops also sent their seminarians abroad — mainly to Italy, Spain, and France, and later to the Philippines and the United States. By 2007, foreign teachers were being invited to give courses in the seminaries, and by 2010, there were more than a dozen major underground Church seminaries. There were similar developments with the congregations of religious sisters in the underground Church. These congregations multiplied throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and by 2017, the total number had reached 37. In the early years, there was an abundance of vocations, and although the aspirants did not have a clear understanding of community life and their religious charism, they were rich in apostolic zeal and a spirit of service. The religious sisters often did pastoral work but had few possibilities for professional training, especially in social and charitable services. Much effort has been expended in clarifying their religious mission and in writing the statutes of their congregations. Problems have however emerged among these communities of religious sisters in the underground Church. Some members have left and many communities are aging. The need for medical care, human formation, and spiritual renewal of all members has always remained strong priorities, but they are impeded by financial limitations. A common problem among both priests and religious sisters is that new vocations are declining. Out of a total of 3870 priests in China, just 1300 are underground Church priests, while there are only 1400 underground Church religious sisters, out of a total of about 4500.

The Ordination of Bishops The origins of the ordination of underground Church bishops date back to permission given by the Holy See to Bishop Anthony Zhou Weidao of Fengxiang diocese to ordain Fr. Lukas Li Jingfeng as his successor, on April 25, 1980. In addition, Bishop Peter Joseph Fan Xueyan also consecrated bishops without permission from Rome. They were Caisimirus Wang Milu of Tianshui, on January 28, 1981; Julius Jia Zhiguo, on February 8, 1982; and Francis Xavier Zhou Shanfu of Yixian, on June

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16, 1982. Below is an account of Fan’s justification for these ordinations, in discussion with Pope John Paul II in 1981: After the ordinations, Bishop Fan said: “I was not lacking in doing my duty. I ordained a few bishops for China, but I did not receive the Pope’s approval before performing the ordinations. If it is against the Canon Law, I must denounce my violation to the Holy See. I am willing to accept any punishment….” The wise Holy Father answered him: “Dear Brother Peter Joseph, this action of yours is in complete accordance with my own thinking. Therefore, I bestow the Holy See’s eternal blessing upon you, and give you special powers. In all matters, you can first decide for yourself, and then later report to me.”12

After receiving the consent of the Holy See, a further 99 bishops were subsequently ordained between 1980 and the end of 2017. Ten of them sought government recognition and fourteen were ordained in an irregular manner, placing their ordination in doubt. By 2018, the total number of bishops in mainland China was 100 (the 3 doubtful excluded). Of these, 36 were from the underground Church and 64 from the open Church (of whom 7 were illegitimate, and 3 were even excommunicated). The active bishops number 76, of whom 19 are in the underground Church and 57 are in the open Church. There are 24 retired or irregular bishops, of whom 17 are in the underground Church and 7 are in the open Church.

The Episcopal Conference of the Underground Church Bishops On November 21, 1989, eleven underground Church bishops and a small number of priests gathered at Zhangerce village in Shaanxi to establish the Bishops’ Conference of the Catholic Church in China (BCCCC). Below is part of their founding statement: Successors to the bishops attending the 1st National Synod of the Catholic Church in Shanghai of 1924, we are again convening another Bishops’ Conference. This will put an end to the situation where the Chinese Church has been without a proper leadership. Under the present circumstances, we consider it to be our duty: to unite our leadership and create a common channel of communication open to all.13

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The conveners were Bishop Peter Liu Guandong of Yixian diocese in Hebei Province and his coadjutor bishop, Paul Liu Shuhe, along with several younger priests inspired by Bishop Peter Joseph Fan Xueyan, who was under surveillance at that time. The conveners thought that only a body of bishops that was openly in communion with the Pope would be in a position to speak for the Church in China. Bishop Liu Guandong was also assisted by Fr. Anthony Zhang Kangyi, a Franciscan who worked in Zhangerce.14 Liu prepared some points about the future BCCCC and drew up a list of possible participants. There were however practical difficulties in carrying out the plan, due to the strict control of the Chinese authorities (especially after the tragic events of June 4, 1989) and the sensitivity of the issue. But, in his strong faith and courage, Liu felt that the project of counteracting the initiatives taken by the open Church had been entrusted to him by the Holy Spirit. The Holy See soon found itself placed in an uncomfortable position. Some said that the Vatican had been contacted for permission. Others denied these reports. Some said that the Vatican did not support the establishment of the BCCCC, due to its reluctance to upset the Chinese government and the open Church. Ultimately, while the Vatican cautioned against the assembly, it afforded the Chinese bishops the freedom to decide for themselves. When the assembly convened, it named three leaders for the new organization: Bishop Peter Joseph Fan Xueyan, Bishop Dominic Tang Yiming of Guangzhou, and Bishop Ignatius Kung Pinmei of Shanghai. All three were absent. Fan was elected as president of the BCCCC, despite being under house arrest, while the other two bishops were named as “honorary presidents”. Giancarlo Politi has commented that, “Naturally, the action could be considered ‘imprudent’ or ‘inconvenient.’ However, we cannot but admire the courage of these persons who have felt the responsibility to be authentic shepherds of the Church of Christ.”15 Unfortunately, one imprudent act was allowing one of the lists of attendees to fall into the hands of the PSB. Five days after the end of the meeting, on November 26, 1989, Liu was arrested in Baoding. In the following weeks, all of the participants were detained by the PSB and kept in jail for several months. While their plight gained them worldwide sympathy, Bishop Paul Shi Chunjie died while under police custody, as did Bishop Peter Joseph Fan Xueyan.

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Present Problems and Future Prospects At present, the underground Church — and in particular the clergy — finds themselves in a situation characterized by oppression from the civil authorities. The threat of losing their freedom if they do not register is always present, since all of their activities are considered illegal. What’s more, they suffer undue interference and abuse at the hands of corrupt local authorities, especially under the current restrictive atmosphere toward religion in China. In light of these circumstances, and due to a lack of trust, the underground Church tends toward isolation. This has become a temptation for a few members of the underground Church clergy, who have become concerned with building up their own “small fiefdoms”. Lay Catholics, who are loyal to the pope but attend public churches, frequently feel quite confused in dealing with the bishops and clergy of the open Church, due to their double identity. Rather widespread is also the fear that the oppression of the underground Church will continue, if not increase, even with the recent SinoVatican agreement (September 22, 2018) on the ordination of bishops. The fear is based first of all on the forced registration, which is still imposed by the Chinese authorities, although the Pastoral Orientations of the Holy See (June 28, 2019) propose a free choice. It is increased by the recent restrictive policies and control measures officially implemented, which seem to aim at the elimination of the unofficial section of the Church in China.

Notes 1. Anthony S. K. Lam, The Catholic Church in Present-Day China (Aberdeen, Hong Kong: Holy Spirit Study Centre & F. Verbiest Foundation, 1994), pp. 247–51. 2. Ibid., pp. 271–72, 281–82. 3. See the Italian translation of the whole text in: AsiaNews, Cina Oggi, Vol. 4 (September 1989), pp. 73–76. 4. See a synthesis of this document in: Pro Mundi Vita Studies, Vol. 15 (June 1990), pp. 23–24. 5. See the Italian translation of the whole text in: AsiaNews, Cina Oggi, Vol. 2 (May 1989), p. 16. 6. See the full text, reprinted in: Lam, The Catholic Church, p. 289. 7. See the full text, reprinted in: Ibid., pp. 298–308.

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8. See a summary of the Chinese text in: Tripod, No. 115 (January–February 2000), pp. 25–30. 9. See the full English text in: Tripod, No. 136 (Spring 2005), pp. 5–18. 10. See the full English text in: Tripod, No. 188 (Spring 2018), pp. 103–24. 11. See Sergio Ticozzi, History of Formation of the Native Catholic Clergy in China (Aberdeen, Hong Kong: Holy Spirit Study Centre, 2017). 12. Quoted in Shi Fan, “A Solemn Remembrance of Bishop Fan Xueyan,” Christian Life Weekly, January 16, 1994. Reported by Anthony Lam, “Recalling the 1981 Episcopal Ordinations and Their Consequences for the Chinese Catholic Church,” Tripod, No. 163 (2011), pp. 22–23. 13. Quoted in Giancarlo Politi, “La Conferenza episcopale cinese,” AsiaNews, Cina Oggi, Vol. 11 (January 1991), pp. 226–27. 14. When I was working in Beijing, I made the acquaintance of Fr. Anthony Zhang Kangyi, whom I helped get the proper documents from the Italian Consulate in order to go to Italy. He was invited there to receive the medal of an Italian Resistance Hero, since, when staying in Italy during the World War II, he had helped many people. Through him, I was able to meet Bishop Liu Guangdong, in the house of a lay Catholic and was informed about his plan for the BCCCC. 15. G. Politi, “La Conferenza episcopale cinese,” AsiaNews, Cina Oggi, Vol. 11 (February 1991), pp. 226–27. The Holy See has not recognized the BCCCC. The motivation can be similar to that specified by Pope Benedict XVI in his 2007 letter to all Chinese Catholics, in which he states, “The present College of Catholic Bishops of China [BCCCC] cannot be recognized as an Episcopal Conference by the Apostolic See: the ‘clandestine’ Bishops, those not recognized by the Government but in communion with the Pope, are not part of it.…” (n. 8).

PART II

People

CHAPTER 4

Bishop Jin Luxian and the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association of Shanghai Rachel Xiaohong Zhu

Abstract The Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association (CCPA) was a significant result of the Socialist transformation of the Catholic Church in China. In what direction should the CCPA be going in the postprovisional-agreement period deserves discussion. This chapter introduces the so-called four-in-hand carriage model by Bishop Aloysius Jin Luxian in Shanghai Diocese, his efforts to rectify the name of CCPA and the dialogue mentality in the place of antagonism behind the structure. It also mentions the failure of the Christian leader K. H. Ting of the Chinese Protestant Church in transforming the Christian Three-Self Patriotic Movement Committee. This chapter points out that the attempt made by Bishop Jin is an exception as the effectiveness of the mechanism of such a transformation depends on the charisma of the leader. Keywords Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association · Shanghai Diocese · Bishop Jin Luxian

R. X. Zhu (B) School of Philosophy, Fudan University, Shanghai, China e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 C. Y.-y. Chu and P. P. Mariani (eds.), People, Communities, and the Catholic Church in China, Christianity in Modern China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1679-5_4

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Bishop Aloysius Jin Luxian and the Shanghai Diocese Bishop Aloysius Jin Luxian (1916–2013) is one of the most important figures in the Chinese Catholic Church. He was born to Catholic parents in Shanghai on June 20, 1916 and was admitted to the city’s Sacred Heart Seminary in September 1932. He joined the Society of Jesus (the Jesuits) in 1938 and was ordained a priest on May 19, 1945. From June 1947 to the end of 1950, he studied in Rome, at the Pontifical Gregorian University. He was also able to travel to France and Germany, before returning to Shanghai in 1951. After the expulsion or arrest of many missionaries, Jin was nominated the acting rector of the major seminary and vicar general of the city’s Jesuits. He was arrested on September 8, 1955, along with Bishop Ignatius Kung Pinmei. He was sentenced in 1960 and spent the following decades in prisons and re-education camps. Jin returned to Shanghai in June 1982 to reopen the Catholic seminary. On January 27, 1985, Jin became an auxiliary bishop without the approval of the Pope, with the expectation that he would succeed Louis Zhang Jiashu (1893–1988), then the open Church bishop of the Shanghai diocese. After Zhang’s death in February 1988, Jin succeeded him as bishop of the Shanghai diocese, existing alongside the underground Catholic community in the city, under the leadership of Bishop Joseph Fan Zhongliang.1 Jin joined the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association (CCPA) and was made the president of its Shanghai branch. He would eventually be recognized by the Pope in 2004. In the following year, he was invited to the 2005 World Synod of Bishops, although he was unable to attend. In June of the same year, with the support of both the Chinese government and the Vatican, Jin ordained Joseph Xing Wenzhi as the auxiliary bishop for the Shanghai diocese. Xing however was asked to step down in 2011 and on July 7, 2012, Jin nominated another auxiliary, Thaddeus Ma Daqin, who in turn was impeded in carrying out his duties, owing to the content of his inaugural remarks.2 Bishop Aloysius Jin Luxian died on April 27, 2013. After the death of Bishop Jin, and of Bishop Fan in 2014, the successor to both the open Church and underground Church communities in Shanghai has been Bishop Thaddeus Ma Daqin. Jin’s major contributions both as bishop of Shanghai and to the church in China as a whole were numerous. He reopened the Sheshan Seminary, from which more than 454 seminarians have graduated, and of whom 407 have become priests and 13 have become bishops (5 other bishops

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studied at the seminary through an exchange program). He was the first director of the Guangqi Press, the principal Catholic publishing house in China, which has published more than 700 books, as well as many periodicals and weekly magazines. Jin also initiated liturgical reform in China, according to the reforms of the Second Vatican Council (1962– 1965). He did so by printing and distributing without charge some three hundred thousand Sunday Mass booklets, for use in churches across the country. Jin was a supporter of Shanghai’s international Catholic communities. From 1993 onward, these communities have celebrated Mass in their native languages: English, Korean, German, French, and Spanish. In the 1990s, he opened several Catholic summer camps for children. Jin founded the Shanghai Catholic Intellectuals’ Association, gathering former students of Aurora University (founded by the Jesuits) and the School of the Sacred Heart. (The association founded an IT school in the 1980s and a music school in the 2000s, in addition to providing medical assistance in rural areas.) In addition to inaugurating two care homes for the elderly in the 1980s, Jin ran the Guangqi Center for Social Services from 2005, which today allocates more than 3.5 million yuan to charities across the country annually. Jin funded 28 projects aimed at helping the poor, subsidized 23 schools (primary and pre-school), 4 orphanages, 18 care homes, 5 rehabilitation centers for victims of leprosy, and 3 centers for the disabled. Moreover, he helped three thousand students, one thousand elderly people, and more than three hundred ill people across the country. From 1985 to 2003 (when he was between the ages of 69 and 87), Jin carried out more than thirty pastoral visits abroad, to the same number of countries, and he held more than sixty public conferences to spread awareness of the Catholic Church in China. Through an overview of the life and contributions of Bishop Jin, this paper will seek to answer how age-old tensions between Church and state have played out in Shanghai over the past forty years.

Bishop Jin and His “Four-Horse Carriage” The title of the first volume of Bishop Jin’s memoirs was translated into English as Learning and Relearning. A more accurate translation would have been Unexpectedly Rescued from a Desperate Situation, reflecting the difficult predicaments that Jin faced for most of his life. Jin often felt as if he was walking a tightrope between the Church and the state. In a 2007

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interview published in the Atlantic Weekly, he said that the Vatican did not believe that he was doing enough to prove his loyalty to the Holy See, while the Chinese authorities believed that he had done too much to prove his loyalty to the Vatican. It was extremely difficult to please both sides, Jin said. For this reason, a rumor spread — not only in his diocese but also abroad, and even among his Jesuit brethren — that Jin was a traitor. Even though he eventually traveled to over thirty countries, he was never able to go back to Rome. In the process of building bridges between the open and underground communities and restoring Catholic life in the Reform and Opening-up Era, Jin often used the image of a “four-horse carriage” to describe the complex situation in Shanghai. The “four horses” were the Shanghai diocese itself, the local branch of the CCPA, the Chinese Catholic Church Administrative Committee (CCAC), and the Shanghai Catholic Intellectuals’ Association. The Shanghai Diocese In the 1950s, a rising tide of anti-imperialist and patriotic sentiment in the Chinese Church led the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to break all ties with the Holy See. Shanghai’s bishop at the time, Ignatius Kung Pinmei, ended up in prison, and in 1960 he was replaced by Louis Zhang Jiashu, who did not have papal approval. Even after the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), when the Chinese Church was gradually allowed to resume its activities, it took a long time to repair relations with the Vatican. Jin was made coadjutor bishop in 1985, and the Chinese authorities named him Shanghai’s ordinary bishop in 1988. In the meantime, Bishop Kung was released in 1985, after which he moved to the United States in 1988, when Fan Zhongliang was nominated as his successor. The Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association (CCPA) of Shanghai The Shanghai CCPA was founded in 1960 — as the “Patriotic Catholic Association of Shanghai” — with the aim of uniting the clergy and laity of Shanghai to support the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).3 Under the guidance of this body, the Catholic population of Shanghai was to advance Socialism by assisting patriotic movements in favor of world peace, and to follow freedom of religious belief, which was included in the country’s constitution. After September 8, 1955,

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when Bishop Kung and hundreds of underground Church Catholics were arrested, thousands of open Church Catholics, including priests, held a demonstration in the People’s Square in Shanghai to denounce Kung’s “counterrevolutionary gang.”4 Soon after, a preparatory committee for the CCPA was first organized. A congress for the inauguration of the local CCPA branch in Shanghai was held on April 23–26, 1960, almost three years after the CCPA’s establishment at a national level. (During the Cultural Revolution, many members of the CCPA were persecuted and endured much suffering.) The Chinese Catholic Church Administrative Committee (CCAC) The CCAC was constituted during the second congress of the Shanghai branch of the CCPA in September 1982. It was a sub-branch of the National Administrative Commission of the Chinese Catholic Church, which operated side-by-side with the Bishops’ Conference of the Catholic Church in China (BCCCC), founded in Beijing in June 1980. The CCAC was not recognized by the Holy See. According to its own statutes, the main aims of the CCAC were to promote the biblical and ecclesiastical traditions; teach the faithful to respect both the Ten Commandments and the principles of an independent and democratic administration; forge a harmonious relationship with the Universal Church; and manage the Catholic Church in China. The first chairman of the CCAC was Shanghai’s official bishop, Louis Zhang Jiashu. During the Fifth National Congress of the CCPA, held in Beijing in September 1992, the CCAC was annexed by one of its six special committees, led by the BCCCC. At the local level, however, CCACs are still active and the one in Shanghai is no exception. The Shanghai Catholic Intellectuals’ Association When, in the late 1970s, the Church resumed its “open” path in Shanghai, as it did elsewhere in the country, some highly educated Catholic professionals who had been persecuted during the time of the anti-imperialist movements and the Cultural Revolution did not accept the principles of the CCPA, and for some reasons they also never took part in the underground Church. So that these individuals could contribute actively to the open Church and serve the community in a more constructive manner, Bishop Jin established the Shanghai Catholic Intellectuals’ Association

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with the de facto support of the Chinese government. Founded in June 1986, Shanghai Catholic Intellectuals’ Association was the first Catholic organization registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs.5 Its members’ intent was to glorify God through their love for their country and neighbors and to offer professional services to society. The association’s first president, when it numbered five hundred members, was a well-known physician and graduate of the Aurora Medical School. On several different occasions, Bishop Jin compared these institutions to four horses pulling a carriage driven by the bishop of the Shanghai diocese, and in which each institution must fulfill its own unique role and become an indispensable part of the ecclesiastic administration. In this vision, the diocese is a fundamental structure to support the bishop and to ensure pastoral service. In contrast, the local CCPA is a political organization, led by laypeople who bridge the gap between the government and the Church and promote religious freedom. “As a mostly lay organization,” Jin wrote, “in the last thirty years the CCPA has carried out countless projects and taken many ecclesiastic missions to completion. Without a system of this kind, it would be difficult to imagine the development of the Chinese Church.”6

“Rectifying the Name” of the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association (CCPA) As recounted by Fr. Jeroom Heyndrickx in the summer of 1990, Bishop Jin gave a very influential speech on the thirtieth anniversary of the foundation of the Shanghai CCPA. “Your task is to dedicate yourselves to the good of the Church,” he said in the speech, “You must serve both your Church and your country! If you only wish to serve your country and not your Church, then you should leave the Association and join one that is patriotic, not ecclesiastic.”7 Heyndrickx points out that because of his authority and the respect he received from the city’s authorities, only Bishop Jin could have expressed such an opinion in a public setting. The transcript of Jin’s speech is the only surviving document in which Jin addresses the CCPA directly.8 He opened by looking at the theme of reconciliation, asking his audience to leave painful memories behind to achieve what he called the “just cause” (“zhengyi de shiye”) of a better future.9 In the 1980s, prelates often claimed that the Catholic Church

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was the standard-bearer for the “just cause.” Jin saw the necessary cooperation between the Church and the CCPA as a just cause, meaning that the Chinese Church was not simply a patriotic Church. The second and more important part of Jin’s speech was dedicated to the principles of the CCPA. Bishop Jin introduced the topic by recalling the doctrine of Confucius on “the rectification of names” (“zhengming”).10 In Jin’s opinion, the CCPA was not, as many thought, an ecclesiastical institution. It was simply a political and civil organization meant to bridge the gap between the Church and the government. Therefore, he believed that members of the CCPA “should not encourage others into thinking that their Association operates at a superior level to the Church or that it controls the latter strictly.” Indeed, their main aim should be to serve the Church and not themselves. Moreover, he believed that members of the CCPA should not limit themselves to loving and serving their country, and they should consider it their primary duty to love and serve the Church. Indeed, Jin thought that if one did not feel profound love for the Church, one should not be a part of the CCPA. In the third part of his speech, Bishop Jin encouraged the CCPA to become a model of love for one’s country and neighbors. He also attacked the underground Church and its “thirteen points,” which said that those who join the open Church were condemned to Hell, because they had committed a deadly sin.11 Bishop Jin pointed out that a teaching such as this did not promote love but hate and he advised his audience to be patient, spread religious teachings, and promote the principles of freedom of belief, which would contribute to social stability. Finally, Jin declared that the independence of the local Church had its foundations in Canon Law. On several different occasions, Jin argued that Matteo Ricci owed his success to the respect he demonstrated toward Chinese traditions. “I wish to be an authentic Catholic in order to safeguard the purity of our faith, but it is necessary to keep our country in mind if we wish to be accepted by 1.1 billion other Chinese people,” he said. “I hope that we as Catholics will be respected by society, that we will no longer suffer discrimination, and that we will soon witness the disappearance of misconceptions such as the idea that Christianity is a foreign religion or that a Christian cannot also be a Chinese patriot.”12 This is an important speech, not just because it is the only one we have left in which Jin talks about the CCPA, but also because it is one of the few documents from the open Church that publicly discusses the CCPA in a manner distinct from the apologetic “political correctness” — the

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tendency to blindly follow the “party line” — that characterizes so many other speeches of its kind.

The Conflict Between the “Just Cause” and the Vatican The Vatican on the CCPA Shortly after the establishment of the PRC, Pope Pius XII promulgated an apostolic letter and two encyclicals in the country: Cupimus Imprimis (January 18, 1952); Ad Sinarum Gentem (October 7, 1954); and Ad Apostolorum Principis (June 29, 1958). The new government’s plans included a transformation of the Church. Missionaries were labeled as imperialists and expelled, many schools and associations affiliated with the Church were shut down or disbanded, and the principles of the Three-Self Patriotic Movement (Sanzi aiguo yundong) were gradually established.13 In response, Cupimus Imprimis and Ad Sinarum Gentem rejected accusations against Catholics and defended their loyalty to their country. They pointed out that the missionaries thought of China as their “home away from home,” and that their motivation in fostering the growth of the country’s clergy was a genuine desire for the Chinese Church to one day govern itself. The documents also encouraged Church members to side with the Church in its conflict with the CCP.14 The Ad Apostolorum Principis encyclical, which is still very influential today, criticized the CCPA.15 It was published in 1958, after the CCPA was founded, at a time when the Catholic Church was experiencing greater and greater challenges in China. The encyclical addressed each of the accusations made by the CCPA, and it argued that its aim was to lead Chinese Catholics to gradually embrace atheistic materialism and to place the Church under the control of the state. The encyclical reinforced that one’s obedience should be directed, “toward God more than toward other men,” and it denounced the illegitimate nomination of bishops as contrary to the will of the Holy See. Clearly, these documents were written at a time of clashing ideologies and broken communication between China and the Vatican. Some of the words that the pope used reflect a “Cold War mentality,” with a focus on the clash between the West and communism. Yet in time the Church

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began a dialog with other religions, and even with atheism and communism. From Pope John XXIII to Pope Francis, the Church has never interrupted its conversation with China and has made great progress. Nevertheless, its opinion on the CCPA has not changed significantly. In his historic “Letter to the Bishops, Priests, Consecrated Persons and Lay Faithful of the Catholic Church in the People’s Republic of China,” Pope Benedict XVI wrote that, “the claim of some entities, desired by the State and extraneous to the structure of the Church, to place themselves above the Bishops and to guide the life of the ecclesial community, does not correspond to Catholic doctrine.”16 Indeed, the problem remains that a political institution is limiting bishops’ activities, and that the government has de facto control over the Church. Bishop Jin’s Thoughts on the CCPA and Its Principles Having spent 27 years between prisons and labor camps, Bishop Jin reached two important conclusions on the Chinese Church. The first was that more dialogue was needed. In his view, the path of conflict had been a devastating one. Because of the clash with the Communist regime and the confusion over how much one should render unto God and how much unto Caesar (so to speak), the Chinese Church had lost itself and left its people behind. As a result, the Shanghai diocese lay in chaos, in part because the foreign missionaries had been sent away or imprisoned. The tragedy of 1955 had been the direct consequence of a conflict that had led the Chinese Church down a perilous blind alley. Jin claimed that Bishop Kung did not make his decisions on what was currently happening and that he also only followed Chinese law after he consulted with the Vatican. Bishop Jin did not explicitly say that the CCPA was a necessary mediator between the Church and the state, but neither did he say the opposite. Secondly, as already mentioned, Jin believed that the independence and self-governance of the Church was a just cause. He did not find it difficult to accept this founding principle of the CCPA and he managed to justify it in many ways. For example, he went so far as to say that the Chinese Church had been saved by following the path of independence and self-governance.17 He followed the same path, for in the early 1980s he would work with the CCPA. In fact, he outraged many Catholics when he allowed himself — without Vatican approval — to be made an auxiliary

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bishop in 1985, and a full bishop in 1988. Jin, however, argued that the Church’s unity in diversity must be safeguarded. He said that the Chinese Church was still evolving and local Church institutions lacked established models. According to Jin’s vision, it was crucial to establish local Churches that fit into the national context and that were under the guidance of the Holy Spirit.18 Moreover, Jin believed that many were unable to accept this diversity, and by emphasizing coherence and unity they were effectively emphasizing power and forgetting that love is the most important commandment.19 In response to the attacks he received from Catholic media, Jin said that articles dictated by public opinion, manipulation, and based on rumors instead of facts, had always existed. Nevertheless, Jin also believed that one must forgive one’s own attackers, because charity is the most important commandment, as Saint Paul teaches, and if one member suffers, all suffer together, and if one member is honored, all rejoice together.20

The CCPA as a New Problem A Similar, and Similarly Problematic, Attempt Within the Chinese Protestant Church There are some interesting parallels between Jin Luxian’s thoughts on the role of the CCPA and the thoughts of the Protestant bishop, Ting Kuang-hsun (1915–2012). Ting Kuang-hsun became the leader of the National Committee of the Three-Self Patriotic Movement of the Protestant Churches in China (CTPM).21 This organization was founded in 1954 and was revived again in the era of Reform and Opening-up. According to Bishop Ting, the CTPM’s principles of self-governance, selfsupport, and self-propagation eased the integration of both the Catholic Church and the Protestant Church in local contexts, freeing them from imperialist control. Protestant Churches became a model for decolonization, and some argue that they pointed to the future of the global Church. However, Bishop Ting also believed that the activities of the CTPM should be supervised by ecclesiastic authorities, since the Church had concluded its path toward independence, and that a new era should begin, in which the Church was not only self-governing, self-supporting, and selfpropagating, but also well-governed, well-supported, and well-promoted. In other words, having reached the three autonomies, it should now

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move on to the three “goods,” thereby demonstrating its strength to the world.22 Despite his observation on the specific limits that he believed should be imposed on the CTPM, Bishop Ting noted that the Three-Self Patriotic Movement had resulted from dialogue between the Church and the state. Some Chinese Christians believed that a true Christian must become a dissident, opposing the government, whose officials were, for the most part, atheists. Ting criticized this attitude, claiming that, if one truly wants it, there is always room for communication and dialogue.23 His own contribution to the 1983 amendment to the constitution demonstrates how much impact a religious figure can have when he or she participates, at any level, in the management of religious affairs. We can find similar statements in the speech that Bishop Jin made on the thirtieth anniversary of the Shanghai CCPA. Born in the same year, these two bishops were good friends and shared the opinion that the CTPM and CCPA were not ecclesiastic organizations. Having completed the task of making their respective Churches independent, they believed that they should no longer control them as they had in the past. For both, the Chinese Catholic Church and the Chinese Protestant Church needed to be reformed in such a way as to allow them to find their own dynamic strengths. Bishop Ting’s pioneering attempt was rejected however, and it was never put into practice. Bishop Jin showed sincere support for his friend’s efforts, attributing his failure to the increased rigidity of Chinese politics following the tragic events of June 3–4, 1989. The Alternative to the CCPA in Shanghai Having realized that there was no way to eradicate the influence of the CCPA on the Chinese Catholic Church, Jin encouraged the lay faithful of the Shanghai diocese to become members of the CCPA and to stop seeing it as an outsider organization. However, the CCPA had been founded only after the persecution of Catholics in the city, and the subsequent further retaliation against those who had opposed this persecution. Owing to this, the CCPA was a compromised body for some Catholics.24 Between the late 1950s and the early 1980s, the CCPA was the only national-level organization that the Chinese authorities recognized for the administration of the Catholic Church. Some CCPA members even believed that the Church should sever all political, economic, and religious ties with the Holy See. On his return to Shanghai, following his imprisonment,

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Jin collaborated with the CCPA and armed with patience and wisdom he managed to convince friends and students to also join the organization’s local branch. Many of these had been victims of the repression, and they were reluctant to join, and in some cases acquiesced only after Jin persuaded their families. Conversely, Jin asked those who belonged to the CCPA purely for their own political ambitions to leave and to join other patriotic and political groups. If they refused to do so, he believed that they should convert to Catholicism and study the catechism. At the end of this transformation, the Shanghai CCPA had become a diocesan organization made up of lay Catholics operating under ecclesiastic authority. Jin did not deny the positive achievements of the CCPA, and he acknowledged that it had played a seminal role in the “inculturation” process, as well as the spreading of Catholicism at the local level, allowing the religion to survive in China. However, he was also aware of the perils of bureaucratization, which were inherent in an organization that placed itself above the bishops and which managed ecclesiastic communities. He wrote little about this, but on many occasions, he unofficially stated that the CCPA could not be reconciled with Catholic doctrine and faith, at least at a national level. However, as a bishop who had survived the fragmentation of the Catholic Church, Jin was convinced that the principles of the independence and autonomy of the Church could also be explained by Christian “inculturation,” intended not just as the attitude necessary to maintain a position of political correctness with regard to the Communist regime, but also as the normal administrative autonomy that every local Church should enjoy in communion with the Universal Church. Such a principle would not necessarily lead local Churches to a split from the pope and the Holy See. Some bishops agreed with Jin. For example, Bishop Matthew Hu Xiande of the Ningbo diocese proclaimed publicly that he had fought in the same way to survive the Church’s fragmentation, and that he appreciated Jin’s pragmatic wisdom. Bishop Jin’s wisdom and pragmatism no doubt derived from his solid religious formation, his seniority, and that he was highly educated and had experienced personal suffering. If the CCPA were refuted a priori, it would be impossible to heal the division within the Church. Although local Church bishops, in Shanghai as in Ningbo, see the CCPA as an organization under diocesan authority, at the national level the situation is problematic. For example, in official events a bishop’s title within the CCPA is always placed before his title as member of the BCCCC, and the name of the CCPA itself

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comes before that of the BCCCC. For many Catholics, the CCPA is a political organization that interferes with their religious life, violating the integrity of the Chinese Church. When, in July 2012, Bishop Thaddeus Ma Daqin bravely declared that he would resign from the CCPA, the question emerged as to whether CCPA membership should be an essential prerequisite for a Chinese bishop. What happened afterward tragically confirmed that this was indeed the case. The CCPA still very much plays an integral role in religious politics in China. In conclusion, the Shanghai Catholic Church suffered greatly during the time of the Three-Self Patriotic Movement and the Cultural Revolution, and today many older Catholics still find it difficult to talk about the humiliations to which they were subjected at the time, nor can they find it in themselves to forgive members of the CCPA, whom they see as complicit in their persecution. I would venture that one should look at both the big picture and individual experiences, the underground Church and the open Church. How should today’s Catholic Church position itself in relation to this narrative? In my view, Bishop Jin went a long way in building the church in the era of Reform and Opening-up. But much work remains to be done. It is time to invite historians and Church people to reflect on the events of the past in a constructive and concrete way, for a future of reconciliation.

Notes 1. At the time, the ordinary bishop recognized by the Holy See for the Shanghai diocese was Ignatius Kung Pinmei (1901–2000), who however was unable to exercise his duties for political reasons. In May 1988, Kung left for the United States, months after Joseph Fan Zhongliang (1918– 2014) was secretly nominated as his successor. 2. Bishop Thaddeus Ma Daqin made the public announcement that he would resign all the memberships from the CCPA. 3. The original name of the CCPA itself was the Association of Patriotic Chinese Catholics (Zhongguo tianzhujiaoyou aiguohui). It was founded as a national organization in 1957, in Beijing. After that, each diocese founded its own local branch. In 1962, on the occasion of the second National Congress, the name was changed the CCPA (Zhongguo tianzhujiao aiguohui). In other words, the character “you” was eliminated, as it suggested that the association was made of Catholic laypeople. This change reflected increased rigidity in policies regarding the Catholic

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4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12. 13.

14.

Church in the early 1960s, and a more concerted effort to identify the CCPA with the Church more generally. Hundreds of clergy (including Bishop Kung Pinmei), nuns, and laypeople were arrested on September 8, 1955 in Shanghai. Many elderly Catholics see this as the crucial moment in the history of Shanghai’s Catholic Church, in which a “resistant” Church was made into an obedient Church. The Amity Foundation, the Protestant Church counterpart to the Shanghai Catholic Intellectuals’ Association, had been founded in the previous year. It is currently much more active than the Shanghai Catholic Intellectuals’ Association. Jin Luxian, “This Is Our Mission and Our Friends Are Found the World Over,” Collected Research Materials on the Catholic Church (Tianzhujiao yanjiu ziliao huibian), Vol. 7 (1987), p. 44. Jeroom Heyndrickx, “In Grateful Remembrance of Monsignor Aloysius Jin Luxian, Vescovo di Shanghai,” unpublished article written on the occasion of the centenary of Bishop Jin’s birth, 2016. Jin Luxian, “Introductory Note to the Symposium for the Patriotic Movement,” Collected Research Materials on the Catholic Church, Vol. 19 (1990), pp. 3–11. Unless otherwise indicated, all other quotes on this theme are taken from this article. On his return from his European travels, Bishop Jin gave an interview to a local religious publication, which was published under the title: “Our Mission Is a Just Cause,” Collected Research Materials on the Catholic Church, Vol. 7 (1987), p. 40. In Chapter 13 of the Analects (Lunyu), Confucius tells his disciples that the first thing a governor or official must do is to “rectify names,” that is, restore each name to its original meaning, so that words and facts once again correspond to one another. Fan Xueyan, “Thirteen Points,” in The Catholic Church in Modern China: Perspectives, eds. Edmond Tang and Jean-Paul Wiest (New York: Orbis Books, 1993), pp. 142–45. Ibid. The Three-Self Patriotic Movement aimed for the autonomy of the Chinese Catholic Church from the point of view of administration (zi zhi, self-governance), finances (zi yang, self-support), and evangelization (zi chuan, self-propagation). The original texts of the apostolic letter Cupimus Imprimis and the encyclical Ad Sinarum Gentem are available online at the following pages: http://w2.vatican.va/content/pius-xii/la/apost_letters/documents/ hf_p-xii_apl_19520118_cupimus-imprimis.html; https://w2.vatican.va/ content/pius-xii/la/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xii_enc_07101954_adsinarum-gentem.html.

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15. This document can be found online at: http://w2.vatican.va/ content/pius-xii/la/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xii_enc_29061958_ ad-apostolorum-principis.html. 16. Pope Benedict XVI, “Letter to the Bishops, Priests, Consecrated Persons and Lay Faithful of the Catholic Church in the People’s Republic of China,” May 27, 2007. This document can be found online at: http:// w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/la/letters/2007/documents/hf_ ben-xvi_let_20070527_china.html. See also Rachel Xiaohong Zhu, “The Division of the Roman Catholic Church in Mainland China: History and Challenges,” Religions, Vol. 8, No. 39 (2017), no pagination. Available online at: http://www.mdpi.com/search?q=&authors= RACHEL+xiaohong+Zhu&article_type=&journal=§ion=&special_ issue=&search=Search. 17. Jin Luxian, “Catholic Church in China Today and Tomorrow,” Collected Research Materials on the Catholic Church, Vol. 7 (1987), p. 34. The speech in question was given in France in May 1987. 18. Ibid., pp. 37–38. 19. Ibid., p. 39. 20. Ibid. 21. Zh¯ ongguó J¯ıd¯ ujiào S¯anzì Àiguó Yuˇ ndòng Wˇeiyuánhuì. 22. K. H. Ting, “Retrospect and Prospect,” in The Collected Works of K.H. Ting (Ding Guangxun wenji) (Nanjing: Yilin Press, 1998), pp. 292–307. The speech in question was given in October 1980 at the Third Congress of Chinese Christians. 23. K. H. Ting, “Letter to a Faithful,” in The Collected Works of K.H. Ting, pp. 340–41. 24. See Paul P. Mariani, Church Militant: Bishop Kung and Catholic Resistance in Communist Shanghai (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011).

CHAPTER 5

Joseph Cardinal Zen Ze-kiun of Hong Kong Beatrice K. F. Leung

Abstract After his episcopal ordination as Hong Kong’s coadjutor bishop in 1996, bishop of Hong Kong in 2002, and Cardinal in 2006, Cardinal Joseph Zen Ze-kiun retired in 2009. Zen had his intensive involvement in controversial issues; therefore, he conflicted with the Hong Kong government, when these issues were eroding human rights including religious freedom. He was against Sino-Vatican interactions. He stood on the side of the underground Catholics. He openly opposed the Sino-Vatican Agreement 2018 as the Holy See only has the veto power on China’s bishop appointment. However, together with Cardinal Sin of Manila, Cardinal Stephen Kim of Seoul, and Archbishop Pham Dinh Tung of Hanoi, he is honored as one of the four modern prophets in Asia after Vatican II. Keywords Joseph Cardinal Zen Ze-kiun · Prophet · Human rights · Sino-Vatican Agreement · Catholic Church in China

B. K. F. Leung (B) Wenzao Ursuline University of Languages, Kaohsiung, Taiwan R.O.C. © The Author(s) 2020 C. Y.-y. Chu and P. P. Mariani (eds.), People, Communities, and the Catholic Church in China, Christianity in Modern China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1679-5_5

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Introduction The Old Testament depicts prophets as messengers or servants of God interpreting God’s message for the people. Biblical scholars define prophets, priests, and kings as the three categories of leaders in the long history of the Israelites. Among them, prophets were the most prominent figures, sent by God to supervise the people’s observance of the law of God, and with a special duty to defend the orthodoxy of God’s teaching, even when this required risking their lives by attacking heresy. Prophets such as Isaiah and Jeremiah in the Old Testament and John the Baptist in the New Testament are prominent prophetic figures in Church history.1 In Avery Dulles’ basic text on the theology of ecclesiology, Models of the Church, he describes several models: institution, mystical communion, sacrament, herald, and servant.2 A model of the Church as “prophetic” is not included. However, throughout the long history of the Church, there have been prophetic figures who reminded the members of the Church of its proper role as sacrament, servant, institution, and mystical communion, while defending the orthodoxy of Church teaching in the context of these models. It might be said that the prophetic model applies to Church figures but not the Church as a whole. It is believed that prophets have a special power that allows them to convey their divine prognostications to the people.3 Often the words pronounced by these prophets are discomforting to the listeners and to authority. Consequently, prophets have been the object of persecution. For example, St. John the Baptist was beheaded by King Herod, because he warned Herod that it was against the law for him to take his sister-inlaw as his own woman.4 This chapter deals with a prophetic Church figure of modern times, Cardinal Joseph Zen Ze-kiun of the Catholic Church of Hong Kong (Bishop of the diocese from 2002 to 2009). Cardinal Zen is a prophet of a society in turmoil, and which is rapidly heading toward crumbling governance and the deterioration of social relations. The Old Testament prophet Jeremiah lamented the fall of Jerusalem and the desperation of Israel.5 Cardinal Zen laments the fall of Hong Kong.

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Cardinal Joseph Zen Ze-kiun, the Prophet Joseph Zen Ze-kiun was born in 1932, in Shanghai, into a traditional middle-class Catholic family. The resistance to Communist rule in Shanghai by Bishop Ignatius Kung Pinmei after 1949 made a great impact on Zen as a teenager. In the 1950s, he fled to Hong Kong and entered the Salesians of Don Bosco. The Salesian superior sent him to do his philosophical and theological studies and spiritual formation in Rome and Turin, the headquarters of the Salesians. After his formation in Europe, Zen returned to Hong Kong and began to teach in seminaries, preparing future Catholic priests. His anti-Communist mindset as well as his belief in advocating human rights was shaped by his experience of living under Communist rule in Shanghai after 1949, where the militant Catholic resistance deeply influenced his approach.6 Furthermore, Deng Xiaoping’s Open Door Policy in 1979 allowed him to spend ten years (1986–1996) teaching in various seminaries in mainland China, including in Shanghai. Zen’s teaching tours brought him to many provinces and offered him an excellent opportunity to understand the real lives of grassroots Catholics in both urban and rural settings, especially those of the underground Church members.

Catholic Church Preparation of Leaders for the HKSAR During the transitional period prior to the handover of Hong Kong (the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, or HKSAR) to China, the Church had to select a leader capable of coping with the new political situation under the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) governance, given that Cardinal John Baptist Wu Chen-chung — then Bishop of the Hong Kong diocese — was 75 years old.7 Most people expected that a diocesan priest who had parish experience would be the choice for Cardinal Wu’s successor. The Vatican however had its own considerations. The pope selected two priests who had no experience in pastoral work in the Hong Kong diocese, but who had extensive experience of dealing with China. The two episcopal candidates were Fr. Joseph Zen Ze-kiun and Fr. John Tong Hon, both of whom were born in China. Fr. John Tong knew the Chinese Church well because he had been the founding director of the Holy Spirit Study Centre — which conducts research on the Church in China — in 1980, and had been heading the Centre ever since.

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As previously mentioned, Fr. Zen had spent ten years teaching in various seminaries in China in the 1980s and 1990s. During his teaching tours, he lost no time in visiting the grassroots Catholic communities of many provinces in the mainland with the help of his students in the seminaries, including the underground Catholics.8 Fr. Joseph Zen Ze-kiun was consecrated as a coadjutor bishop in December 1996, six months before Hong Kong was returned to China, and was installed as Bishop of the Hong Kong diocese in 2002, after Cardinal Wu’s death. His knowledge of Chinese Catholic life was amalgamated from his ten years of teaching experience in China. During this period, Zen had been very circumspect, never criticizing China on religious suppression. However, once he took over the leadership of the Hong Kong diocese he began to play a prophetic role and became very vocal and critical toward the HKSAR government, notably when it launched its “mainlandization” policy of drawing the HKSAR nearer to China. Under the tenets of the “one country, two systems” arrangement, Cardinal Zen asserted that the “one country” was getting the upper hand while the “two systems” were being undermined. Under Zen, relations between the Church and the HKSAR government experienced a radical transformation from the contractual relations of the colonial period to a more confrontational stance.9

Zen’s Prophetic Mission in the HKSAR Zen’s first prophetic role was expressed in his views on the issue of the “right of abode” controversy in 1999, when the HKSAR government closed the door on residency for 1.6 million children of mainland Chinese parents with the right of abode who wished to settle in Hong Kong. In June 1999, Cardinal Wu issued a pastoral letter entitled “God is Love”.10 This Letter was penned by Zen and criticized the selfishness of the HKSAR government for rejecting the right of abode, considering that half of Hong Kong’s population were once refugees from China that had been allowed to settle there between the 1950s and the 1970s. Public opinion supported Zen’s arguments but Zen antagonized officials who cogently launched the “closed-door policy”. This was Zen’s first prophetic voice in the HKSAR: a humanistic approach that gained for the Church the reputation that it was the voice of the voiceless.

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Legislation of Article 23 of the Basic Law Article 23 is an article in the Basic Law of Hong Kong. It states that the HKSAR: shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People’s Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting political activities in the Region, and to prohibit political organizations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties with foreign political organizations or bodies.

The National Security (Legislative Provisions) Bill of 2003 was an attempt to implement this article, causing considerable controversy and a massive demonstration on July 1, 2003. Since then, the Bill implementing the article has not been reintroduced.11 In the struggle against this legislation, democratic lawyers and intellectuals were on the front lines of the confrontation. Zen forwarded the Christian principle on legality: That the law is for the promotion of human rights, but not for political purposes. He also assisted democratic lawyers and intellectuals by rendering philosophical or theoretical support behind the scenes. His Christian legal philosophy became one of the main pillars of support for the democracy advocates and lawyers who were struggling against the legislation. However, Zen truly became the archenemy of Beijing, as well as a headache for the HKSAR government, after he began criticizing the latter for siding with the rich and not caring sufficiently for the poor.12 Educational Reform Educational reform was the third major issue over which Zen came into confrontation with the HKSAR government, albeit without success. Education is a very important means by which to change the minds, hearts, and attitudes of the younger generation. Inherited from the Bolshevik tradition, the CCP decided that religious groups should not be involved in education, due to the ideological incompatibility between atheism and religion. Since 1949, throughout successive revisions of its constitution, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has firmly kept to the policy that religion should not interfere in education.13

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The mainlandization of education in Hong Kong began two years after the establishment of the HKSAR with an attempt to change the language of teaching from English to Chinese. This failed however because of opposition from parents.14 Another strategy was to decrease the dependence on Christian Churches in providing education. This policy had to be implemented on a step-by-step basis because it was inappropriate for the involvement of religious organizations in the running of schools to be effected immediately and completely. The School-based Management (SBM) program was drafted in 2001 and passed by the Legislative Council of the HKSAR in 2004, eliminating religious sponsorship in education. Christian educators viewed SBM as a direct challenge to religious freedom, because it opened the door to government control over Christian schools. The mission and vision of Christian education could easily be marginalized by a change of school management structure when schools’ sponsoring bodies were incorporated into an SBM system. Indirectly, SBM was viewed as a path to eventually elbowing out Christian Churches from the education system of the HKSAR.15 Zen demanded a judicial review of the SBM program on behalf of the Hong Kong diocese. He failed to win a repeal however, despite taking the case to the Supreme Court of Hong Kong, which delivered its decision that the government had won the case (an appeal was defeated in 2011). Zen commenced a three-day hunger strike in protest, making him one of the few cardinals in recent history to have gone on hunger strike. Students, young people, and democracy activists gathered around him to show solidarity, an indication of their support for his prophetic views. As early as 2004, during an interview with the author, Zen expressed his conviction that the conflict between himself and the HKSAR authorities was based on his opposition to socioeconomic policies that were undermining the “one country, two systems” principle, by allowing PRC infiltration into sociopolitical issues and furthering the erosion of human rights (which would eventually include religious freedoms).16 In 2012, he lambasted the HKSAR government’s refusal to grant political reforms,17 and in December 2015 he criticized the use of excessive police power toward the demonstrators during the Sixth World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong. Zen tried to visit the detained demonstrators, who included South Korean Catholics, two priests and a nun. Zen has been described as the “new conscience of Hong Kong” for his defense of human rights, political freedoms, and religious liberties in

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the face of criticism from the PRC. He is a vocal proponent of universal suffrage in Hong Kong, telling his flock in a 2005 homily that, “a path will appear when enough people walk on it.” He has publicly called on officials in Hong Kong to support the aspirations of the people, rather than function as spokespersons for Beijing. He was named the “Person of the Year” for 2002 by Hong Kong newspaper Apple Daily.18 Zen was honored as the fourth prophet in Asia after the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965). The prophet designation is given in recognition of those brave enough to speak truth to power. The first such prophet was Cardinal Jaime Sin of Manila, who helped overthrow President Ferdinand Marcos in the 1970s. The second was Cardinal Stephen Kim of South Korea, who sided with the South Korean people in the struggle for democracy in the 1970s. The third was Cardinal Pham Dinh Tung of Hanoi who protected the Vietnamese Catholic Church from the encroachment of the Vietcong. The fourth was Cardinal Zen, the protector of human rights in Hong Kong.19 Zen was careful not to get too involved in the issues of political reform for which most democracy activists struggled, because, as he acknowledged, he is not a political figure but a representative of the Church. For the sake of religious freedom, he supported the struggle for democratization in the HKSAR, because he believed that, without democracy, human rights — including religious freedom — would be endangered.20 When Beijing’s control over the HKSAR tightened after 2003, most Catholic leaders went silent. Zen was one of the very few who continued exercising his prophetic role to support social movements. The Occupy Central with Love and Peace Movement (OCLP) The Occupy Central with Love and Peace Movement (AKA, the “Umbrella Movement”) took place between September 28 and December 15, 2014, reacting to a range of political and socioeconomic issues. The movement was sparked by opposition to Beijing’s decision, taken on August 31, 2014, to reject universal suffrage in the 2017 election of the chief executive of the HKSAR.21 Student groups also raised demands for more freedom and democracy. The street protests were not confined to only the Central and Admiralty districts, but spread to commercial centers on Hong Kong Island and in Kowloon, including Causeway Bay and Mong Kok. The three founders of Occupy Central were Christians, and the Christian orientation of the

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movement was commented upon in the Wall Street Journal.22 At the age of 82, Cardinal Zen slept on the street overnight during the protests, becoming the symbolic figure of Catholic participation in the movement. Prayer areas were set up with Catholic priests and Protestant pastors stationing there for spiritual refreshment and consolation. Occupy Central would eventually fail when the HKSAR government followed the directives of Beijing and turned a deaf ear to the protestors. The leaders of the movement were sentenced to six-year jail terms, the longest in Hong Kong history for the same kind of offense.23 Consequently, young people and democracy movement leaders have suffered deep depression. However, senior figures in the democracy movement have tried to accompany the young people and students, to keep their spirits up for the struggle. Four types of leaders await an opportunity in the future. They resemble the fire under ashes for future struggle. They comprise action leaders, planning leaders, theoretical leaders, and spiritual leaders. Cardinal Zen is one of these spiritual leaders, playing the role of a prophet who speaks the truth.24 Translation of Christian Literature When Cardinal Zen plays the role of a prophet of God’s message in the modern world, he uses different strategies in different sociopolitical environments. After retiring in 2009 — meaning he could no longer have direct contact with the civil authorities on sociopolitical issues — Zen exercised the role of a prophet by providing the people with authentic teaching and reading materials. Beginning in 2011, he has tried to show God’s way in social justice, moral teaching and living a Christian life under a Communist regime. He has sponsored three volumes of serious books for translation. In 2011, the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church (published by the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace) was translated into Chinese to promote the teachings of the Church on social justice. In 2013, he translated Man and Woman He Created Them: The Theology of the Body — the English version of the moral teaching of Pope John Paul II on sexuality — into Chinese. This timely book in Chinese is for Catholics who are confused by the prevalence of homosexual love, same-sex marriage, cloning, abortion, and surrogate motherhood. Published in 2018, The End and the Beginning: Pope John Paul II — The Victory of Freedom, the Last Years, the Legacy is the story of Pope John

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Paul II’s experiences living in Communist Poland and coping with Communist rule while remaining a good Christian.

Confronting Beijing and the Vatican Zen has not only confronted Beijing on religious and political issues in the HKSAR, but has also stood out as the most strident and high-profile antagonist of the PRC government in general. He rendered support for the Catholic bridging endeavor, which aims at the development of the Church in China. This project does not coincide with the religious policy of the PRC, which aims at eliminating the growth of religion.25 Zen also crossed the Chinese government in defending the rights of the Church on the issue of ordaining five Chinese bishops without the consent of the Holy See in January 2000, and over his defense of the Vatican’s position on the canonization of 120 Chinese saints on October 1, 2000.26 Zen’s relationship with Beijing has been damaged by his support for the underground Church, and his prophetic interventions have not been confined to Hong Kong but have rather extended to the mainland, in the form of his opposition to the unilateral appointment and consecration of bishops without papal consent in China. After the unilateral appointment of bishops by China in 2006, Beijing suspected Zen of trying to persuade the government-chosen candidates (many of whom had been his students in the seminaries) not to accept their appointments, because doing so would result in excommunication. In 2007, Zen persuaded Pope Benedict XVI to issue the “Letter to the Bishops, Priests, Consecrated Persons and Lay Faithful of the Catholic Church in the People’s Republic of China.”27 This important document gave directives and guidance to the Chinese Church relating to Beijing’s attempts to gain fuller control over Chinese society (with Zen’s annotation and clarification of some ambiguous terms in the translation).

Zen and Recent Sino-Vatican Negotiations Sino-Vatican negotiations on the normalization of diplomatic relations have been on-and-off since 1987. Over the course of the ensuing 31 years, two stumbling blocks — sovereign rights and national security — have lain between the two parties.28 In terms of Church-state relations, the Vatican has a special problem dealing with China. It lacks China experts — like Henry Kissinger of the

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United States or Lord Carrington of Britain — who understood how to negotiate with China. There were people in the Vatican who had experience in negotiating with the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, but no one comprehended the non-transparent nature of Chinese politics (which a Communist political commentator in Hong Kong called “a heavenly book without words”).29 Cardinal Zen and another Chinese archbishop, Savio Hon, were not part of the recent negotiation team, after the Vatican decided to move the sluggish Sino-Vatican negotiations forward. It was reported that Pope Francis was determined to push for a breakthrough with China and to re-activate the nearly threedecades-long hiatus in Sino-Vatican relations.30 A pre-negotiation joint working group was formed with representatives from Beijing and the Vatican, to first thresh out thorny questions before the real negotiations took place in 2014. The question of the appointment of Chinese bishops was discussed, and in 2017, an agreement under discussion permitted the PRC the power of appointing Chinese bishops, while the pope would have veto power. Nothing was discussed in this agreement about underground Church bishops.31 In early 2017, an anonymous source confirmed that Vatican officials, with the approval of Pope Francis, had asked two veteran legitimate bishops in China to step down to allow the successions of two illicit bishops appointed by Beijing.32 The agreement under discussion has been heavily criticized outside of China by those who assert that the Vatican lacks understanding of Chinese political culture.33 Taiwan’s China Times touted it as a compromise which is not in the interests of the Church.34 The New York Times commented that it raised more questions than answers and suggested that the proposed compromise could draw fierce protests from Chinese Catholics.35 Willy Lam, a Hong Kong-based Catholic political commentator, argued that the agreement will not be successfully honored, given China’s declining record in honoring foreign agreements. Lam noted that even if the Sino-Vatican Agreement had been signed as a formal agreement, the political climate under the Xi Jinping administration is averse to its implementation, because religious security has been raised to the level of national security. As such, the Vatican should consider whether the PRC is a trustworthy negotiating partner.36 Frank Ching, a distinguished Catholic political commentator, proposed that the agreement would allow agents of the PRC to obtain total control over nominating bishops. “The price is too high,” he stated.37

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Zen went to the Vatican to discuss these issues with the pope, particularly the resignation of the two underground Church bishops and their replacement with two open Church bishops. After meeting the pope in January 2018, Zen found that the pope knew about the issue and disclosed that it was officials in the Vatican who had asked the underground bishops to stand aside.38 After this, Zen declared that the Vatican was selling out the Church in China,39 leading to a rebuke from the Vatican, orchestrated by Cardinal Parolin, the head of the State Council.40 As Zen was very much concerned about the underground Catholics, he spoke against the Vatican, whose officials had traditionally dealt with European Communists rather than Chinese Communists. In doing so, he not only antagonized China but also his colleagues in the Vatican. Zen further promised that if the agreement were signed he would only blame the Vatican, but would never openly oppose the pope.41 The Vatican has issued a series of in-depth articles to explain the reasons for the agreement and to justify its position in the dialogue with China. They cover the need for dialogue and negotiation between the Chinese authorities and the Holy See, the appointment of bishops and the current situation.42 No one would argue against the need for more dialogue. In fact, as early as 1987, dialogue had been proposed by Pope John Paul II, who being Polish knew Bolshevik Communism better than other popes had done. However, the Vatican’s articles do not produce convincing religious reasons to support the proposed agreement on the appointment of bishops, under the terms of which the power of appointment would rest in the hands of the Chinese government while the Holy Father could only veto. The underground Church was not mentioned in any of the articles, another point of concern for Cardinal Zen. The Sino-Vatican Agreement was officially signed on September 22, 2018. It was agreed that the government will appoint bishops, with the pope having the final right to approve them.43 This agreement suggests that the Chinese side effectively selects bishop candidates, while the pope only has veto power. Those who know Chinese politics have reasons to believe that, on the issue of bishop appointments, the veto power of the pope could easily become meaningless. The political environment in China is not conducive to the implementation of the religious freedoms agreed upon through Sino-Vatican negotiations. Under the authoritarian leadership of Premier Xi Jinping, religious security has been uplifted to the level of national security, suppression of religious activities has been tightened, and religions have been

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placed under the thumb of the CCP. In November 2018, Zen delivered a new letter to Pope Francis, again stating the abhorrent situation of the underground Catholics in China.44 In his 2018 book, For Zion, I Will Never be Silenced, Zen collected various public statements of Pope Benedict XVI — which he amalgamated from eight talks given between June 19, 2017 and June 28, 2017 — to support his stance of opposing the agreement.45 Cardinal Zen was awarded the Truman-Reagan Medal of Freedom from the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation on January 28, 2019. Marion Smith, executive director of the Foundation said, “Cardinal Zen has given voice to those denied religious liberty in China and has opposed the collusion of the Vatican and Chinese Communist Party on the matter of ecclesiastical appointments.” The foundation described Cardinal Zen as the “new conscience of Hong Kong” and a vocal proponent of human rights in Hong Kong and mainland China.46 On January 22, 2019, Cardinal Zen wrote a blog post in which he stated that the Sino-Vatican Agreement still leaves lots of questions to be clarified. These include: How should the open and underground Churches unite? Should the underground Church join the CCPA? This is the ongoing concern of the prophetic and emeritus bishop of Hong Kong, who continues lamenting not only the deteriorating of Hong Kong, but also the future of the Chinese Church in the coming days after the signing of the Sino-Vatican Agreement.

Conclusion Cardinal Joseph Zen has had dramatic relations with the government of the HKSAR, as well as with Beijing and the Vatican, relations that were shaped by his early experiences growing up in Shanghai. He was selected as the Bishop of Hong Kong due to his knowledge in the Catholic Church in China in the post-Mao period. His silence on the Communist treatment of Chinese Catholics when he was a teacher in Chinese seminaries was a contrast to his vocal criticism on the inhumane policy of the HKSAR on sociopolitical issues. In 1999, his involvement in the controversial “right of abode” issue marked his first foray into human rights advocacy. During the years of his leadership of the Hong Kong diocese (2002–2009), he transformed the contractual relationship between the colonial government and the Hong Kong Catholic Church into a confrontational one.

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In 2003, he supported popular opposition to “Legislation of Article 23 of Basic Law” by upholding that Catholic teaching is for the goodness of the general public but not for the service of politics. Zen’s Shanghai experience led him to notice that education was an important facet of the CCP’s mainlandization policy in the HKSAR, but despite struggling for several years (2004–2009) he would ultimately fail. His failure however brought renewed support to the movement from many democrats and young people. Zen retired as the bishop of Hong Kong at the age of 75. His retirement ensured that he was no longer provided with a prominent platform from which to advocate for the protection of human rights. After 2009, he did not directly confront the government on local issues, but his involvement in social movements carried on. During the Occupy Central protests, he slept on the street for a couple of nights with the democrats as a gesture of support to the movement. Zen was also involved in Vatican policy on China, supporting the underground Church in its conflict with Vatican officials of the and even the Holy Father himself. As a prophetic figure, he has sent very clear messages to the Church and society on what he believes, namely that respect for human rights is in full accordance with a Christian interpretation of social justice. Yet his interpretation has not been accepted by everyone, not even by those within the Church or in the upper echelons of the Vatican. Take Cardinal Parolin for example, the architect of the Sino-Vatican Agreement, who has not accepted Zen’s views on the PRC and the CCP. It was Parolin who believed in reconciliation but not confrontation in relations between the Church and the PRC, even when this required major concessions from the Church. Zen’s anti-Communist attitude has prevented him from thinking this way.

Notes 1. “Xianzhi; Xianzhi zhize” [“Prophet, Duties of Prophet”], in Shengjing Cidian (Dictionary of the Bible), Revised Edition (Hong Kong: Studium Biblicum OFM, 2004), pp. 457–59. 2. Avery Dulles, Models of the Church (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1988). 3. “Xianzhi; Xianzhi zhize,” p. 457. 4. Matthew 14: 3–12. 5. Laminations. In the Old Testament.

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6. Paul P. Mariani, Church Militant: Bishop Kung and Catholic Resistance in Communist Shanghai (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011). 7. It is the tradition that the Vatican, the administrative center of the Catholic Church requests local bishops to submit resignation at the age of 75. 8. Fr. Joseph Zen had to hop from one seminary to another in China’s nine major seminaries, where teaching programs were opened but without enough teaching staff. China allowed qualified teachers to enter China to teach, but teachers could not stay in one place more than three months. Therefore, Fr. Joseph Zen had to hop from one seminary to another. Through his visits to Catholic communities, he accumulated experience of Catholic life in different areas in China. 9. For the contractual relations between the British Hong Kong government and the Catholic Church, read Beatrice K. F. Leung and Chan Shun Hing, Changing Church and State relations in Hong Kong, 1950–2000 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2003), Chapter 3. 10. “Chronology of Leading Events of the Catholic Church in Hong Kong,” in Hong Kong Catholic Church Directory 2016 (Hong Kong: Catholic Truth Society of Hong Kong, 2016), p. 641. 11. Hong Kong Basic Law Article 23, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hong_ Kong_Basic_Law_Article_23. 12. Zen acknowledged it when he was interviewed by the author in July 2016 when both of us met in Vancouver, Canada. 13. In the various constitutions in the PRC, it was written that religion should not interfere in education. In the most recent one, the 1982 constitution, it is in Article 36. Read Article 36 of “China’s Constitution of 1982 with Amendments through 2004.” 14. Beatrice K. F. Leung, “Strategic Development of the Hong Kong SAR: Social Policy, EIB Model, and Implications,” in Hong Kong the Super Paradox: Life After Return to China, ed. James Hsiung (New York: St. Martin’s Press. 2000), pp. 125–52. 15. Joseph Zen, “Can We Still Run Schools According to the Vision and Mission of Catholic Education?” Sunday Examiner, October 5, 2003; Deborah Brown, “The Roman Catholic Church and Hong Kong’s Long March Toward Democracy,” Orbis Vol. 48, No. 20 (Spring 2004), pp. 263–74. 16. The interview was taken place in 2004, Hong Kong. 17. Apple Daily, June 22, 2010. 18. Joseph Zen from Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia, https://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/Joseph_Zen (accessed May 12, 2018). 19. Dorian Malovic, Mgr. Zen, Un Homme en Colere Entretiens avec le Cardinal de Hong Kong, trans. Wu Minsi et al. (Hong Kong: Yi Publications, 2007). 20. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Zen (accessed on May 12, 2018).

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21. One of the founders of the OCLP expressed this movement. Chan Kin Man, “Occupying Hong Kong,” Sur Journal, Vol. 12, No. 21 (August 2015). Many researches have been targeted on this movement. One of the recent articles is: Jermain T. M. Lam, “The Occupy Central Movement and Political Reform in Hong Kong,” in New Trends of Political Participation in Hong Kong, ed. Joseph Cheng (Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press, 2014), pp. 449–82. 22. Ned Levin, “Hong Kong Democracy Protests Carry a Christian Mission for Some,” Wall Street Journal, https://www.wsj.com/articles/hongkong-democracy-protests-carry-a-christian-mission-for-some-1412255663 (accessed January 20, 2017). 23. “Hong Kong Activist Edward Leung, the Face of City’s Independence Movement, Jailed for Six Years Over Mong Kok Riot,” South China Morning Post, June 11, 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/hongkong/hong-kong-law-and-crime/article/2150156/hong-kong-activistedward-leung-face-citys. 24. It was revealed by an anonymous university lecturer who among the 108 teachers in tertiary education takes up the mission of helping young democrats by accompanying them and forming groups to have mutual support among themselves to endure the darkest time. He was interviewed in June 23, 2018 in Taiwan. 25. Beatrice K. F. Leung, “The Catholic Bridging Effort with China,” Religion, State and Society, Vol. 28 (June 2000), pp. 185–95; Beatrice K. F. Leung “China’s Religious Freedom Policy: An Art of Managing Religious Activity,” China Quarterly, Vol. 184 (December 2005), pp. 894–913. 26. For Zen’s defense of the Vatican position in the canonization, read Zen Ze-kiun, “Women hai yiwei zelei yundong yichangliao lishi” [“We Even Thought That This Kind of Movement Has Gone to History”], Ming Pao, October 5, 2000. 27. Letter to the Bishops, Priests, Consecrated Persons and Lay Faithful of the Catholic Church in the People’s Republic of China (May 27, 2007), http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/ letters/2007/documents/hf_ben-xvi_let_20070527_china.html (accessed December 12, 2017). 28. Beatrice K. F. Leung and Marcus J. J. Wang, “Sino–Vatican Negotiations: Problems in Sovereign Right and National Security,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 25, No. 99 (2016), pp. 467–82. 29. The Communist political commentator in HKSAR expressed to the author that even they themselves have difficulties in discerning the nonetransparent Chinese politics which is “a heavenly book without words”. 30. Lisa Jucca, Benjamin Kang Lim, and Greg Torode, “Special Report: After Decades of Mistrust, Pope Pushes for Breakthrough with China,” Reuter, July 14, 2016, https://www.yahoo.com/news/special-report-

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31.

32.

33.

34. 35. 36.

37. 38.

39. 40.

41.

42.

decades-mistrust-pope-pushes-breakthrough-china-131020495.html?soc_ src=social-sh&soc_trk=ma (accessed September 2016). “Cardinal Zen: Vatican-China Deal Weakens the Church,” Catholic News Agency, March 8, 2018, https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/ cardinal-zen-vatican-china-proposal-weakens-the-church-94708. Eric Lai, “Chinese Catholics Will Not Gain Freedom from a VaticanChina Deal,” Union of Catholic Asian News (hereafter Ucanews), February 16, 2018, https://www.ucanews.com/news/chinese-catholicswill-not-gain-freedom-from-a-vatican-china-deal/81547. For this, Cardinal Zen went to the Vatican to meet the pope in January 2018 and discussed the issue with him. Steven Mosher, “Parolin and the China Negotiations: First, Do No Harm,” 1P5 One Peter, February 22, 2018, https://www.onepeterfive. com/parolin-china-negotiations/. China Times, November 1, 2016, p. 1, http://www.chinatimes.com/ newspapers/20161101000305-260108. New York Times, October 30, 2016. Willy Lam, “Zhongguo zonggiao xingshi fenxi” (An Analysis of the Religious Situation in China) in a seminar entitled “Zhongfan guanxi hechuqu” (Where Will Sino-Vatican Relations Lead to?) Organized by Peace and Justice Commission Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong, November 13, 2016. Frank Ching, “Vatican Should Tread Carefully in China Dealings,” Japanese Times, December 6, 2016. The cardinal revealed details of a private audience with Pope Francis. Catholic Herold (Britain), January 29, 2018, http://www.catholicherald. co.uk/news/2018/01/29/after-papal-meeting-cardinal-zen-says-vaticanselling-out-church-in-china/. Ibid. “Vatican Rebukes Retired Hong Kong Cardinal After Remarks on ‘Selling Out’ of Chinese Catholics,” South China Morning Post, January 31, 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/ 2131316/vatican-rebukes-hong-kongs-cardinal-zen-remarks-selling-out. Zen openly spoke to the Catholics many times about himself and his loyalty to the pope, and even told the author when he was interviewed in July 2017 in Vancouver. “Dialogue with China: There Is No Magic Wand”, https://www. vaticannews.va/en/world/news/2018-05/holy-see-china-diplomacy. html; “Dialogue with China: Small Steps toward Mutual Trust”, https://www.vaticannews.va/en/world/news/2018-05/holy-see-chinadiplomacy-mutual-trust.html; “Dialogue: Necessary for the Church’s Mission in China”, https://www.vaticannews.va/en/vatican-city/news/ 2018-06/holy-see-china-dialogue-pope-francis-catholic-church-vatican.

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44.

45. 46.

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html; “Protagonists of Dialogue: Chinese Authorities and the Holy See”, https://www.vaticannews.va/en/vatican-city/news/2018-06/ pope-francis-holy-see-china-dialogue-protagonists.html; “The Vatican and China: Dialogue and Negotiation”, https://www.vaticannews. va/en/vatican-city/news/2018-07/pope-francis-vatican-china-dialoguenegotiation.html; “China and the bishops: Why Is This Issue So Important?”, https://www.vaticannews.va/en/vatican-city/news/2018-07/ vatican-china-diplomacy-bishops.html; “Dialogue with China: Apostolic Succession and the Legitimacy of Bishops”, https://www.vaticannews. va/en/vatican-city/news/2018-07/dialogue-china-holy-see-apostolicsuccession-legitimacy-bishops.html; and “Dialogue with China: More fully Catholic, Authentically Chinese”, https://www.vaticannews.va/ en/vatican-city/news/2018-07/dialogue-china-holy-see-fully-catholicauthentically-chinese.html. “Historic Sino-Vatican Deal Set to Be Signed,” Ucanews, September 19, 2018, https://www.ucanews.com/news/historic-sino-vatican-deal-set-tobe-signed/83376. This author met Cardinal Zen a few days after he returned from Rome delivering the 7-page letter to the Holy Father. “Zen Presents Letter to Pope Warning Him on China,” ucanews.com, November 12, 2018, https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#label/Sino-Vatican+ relations/FMfcgxvzLXKqzXmPHjJkclNXRKNbJFTk. Cardinal Zen Ze-kiun, “Wèile x¯ı y¯ ong woˇ jué bù ji¯anmò” [“For Zion, I Will Never be Silent”] (Hong Kong: Chora Books, 2018). “Freedom Fighter Cardinal Zen to Be Honored in US”, January 25, 2019, https://www.ucanews.com/news/freedom-fighter-cardinal-zen-tobe-honored-in-us/84366.

PART III

Organizations

CHAPTER 6

The Studium Biblicum Franciscanum Sinense from 1976 to Present Raissa De Gruttola

Abstract In 1968, the first complete translation of the Catholic Bible in Chinese was published in Hong Kong by the Sigao Shengjing Xuehui. The institute is also known as Studium Biblicum Franciscanum Sinense and was established in 1945 in Beijing by the Franciscan missionary Gabriele Allegra (1907–1976). This chapter explores the activity of the Studium Biblicum from 1976 to the present. The projects undertaken after the publication of the single-volume Bible (1968) and the death of Allegra (1976) are presented. Among these, the interconfessional and ecumenical translation works are analyzed, together with the features of other Chinese Catholic Bible versions published and distributed after 1968. Keywords Chinese Bible · Gabriele Allegra · Bible translation · Missionaries in China

R. De Gruttola (B) University of Perugia, Perugia, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 C. Y.-y. Chu and P. P. Mariani (eds.), People, Communities, and the Catholic Church in China, Christianity in Modern China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1679-5_6

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Introduction The Franciscan missionary Gabriele Allegra (1907–1976) is known for having translated and published the first complete Chinese-language edition of the Catholic Bible. After some years spent in a religious community near his hometown in Sicily, Allegra studied biblical languages and exegesis in Rome. In 1931, he obtained permission to go to China as a missionary. In 1935, he started a translation of The Bible and completed a translation of the Old Testament in 1945. In the same year, he founded a biblical research center, the Studium Biblicum Franciscanum Sinense (Sigao Shengjing xuehui, hereafter, the Studium Biblicum). The aim was to bring together a team of collaborators to revise his translation of the Old Testament and to also translate the New Testament. Several translations of the Studium Biblicum were published between 1955 and 1961, which together constituted a complete edition of the Catholic Bible in Chinese in eleven volumes. The institute subsequently undertook a final revision of these texts, which were published as a single volume along with notes and appendices in 1968. As such, the first complete edition of the Catholic Bible in Chinese (hereafter, the Sigao Bible) was completed. Even though its work was officially completed at this point, the Studium Biblicum has continued its Bible translation work and has broadened its goals to include other means of spreading the Christian message in the Chinese language. After a brief presentation of the activity of the center up to the publication of the Sigao Bible in 1968, this chapter will explore the activity of the Studium Biblicum after the death of Allegra in 1976. It will use the primary sources held by the Studium Biblicum, along with oral testimonies of the friars who lived and collaborated with Allegra. Furthermore, the chapter will introduce and compare Chinese versions of the Catholic Bible that have been published after the Sigao Bible.

The Studium Biblicum: Foundation and Early Activity The Studium Biblicum was inaugurated on August 2, 1945, in a building of the Fu Jen Catholic University in Beijing. One of the patrons of the Studium was the medieval philosopher John Duns Scotus, and, as such, a Chinese short name for the institute and The Bible would become Sigao, which was based on the transliteration of his name: Ruowang Tong Sigao.1

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From the beginning, the principal aim of the Studium Biblicum was not only to support the translation project of Gabriele Allegra, but also to create a solid group of scholars and translators who would help spread biblical knowledge and Catholic doctrine in China and in the Chinese language. The first members of the institute tasked to work on the Chinese translation of the Catholic Bible were five Chinese Franciscan friars who were trained in Chinese literature and in biblical studies. In 1948, the Studium Biblicum was evicted from its Beijing base, forcing it to move to Hong Kong, where it remains to this day. As mentioned above, up to 1968, the main task of the Studium Biblicum was to produce a single-volume Chinese Catholic Bible. It was finally distributed on Christmas Day of that year. Allegra commented in his personal notebook, “The Chinese Bible is really born. The Word became a book in China on the same day it became flesh in Bethlehem.”2 This edition is known variously as the Sigao Shengjing, the Sigao Bible, the Scotus Bible, and the Studium Biblicum Version (SBV).3 Since its initial publication, it has become the reference text for Chinese Catholics. In 1969, the Congregation for Divine Worship and the Discipline of the Sacraments approved the Sigao Bible as the official one for liturgical celebrations in the Chinese language. Despite subsequent revisions, the Sigao Bible remains the official text used in Catholic liturgy in Chinese to this day. After the publication of the Sigao Bible, the institute went on to compile a dictionary of the most important biblical words along with the most relevant Christian terminology. This was published in 1975 as the Shengjing cidian. Beginning in 1971, the new prefect of the Studium Biblicum was Fr. Anthony Lee, a former student of Allegra’s, and one of the first members of the institute. Allegra, however, continued to work on biblical issues in Chinese. He also worked on a Greek–Chinese dictionary which remains uncompleted.

The Studium Biblicum from 1976 to the Present Since the Studium Biblicum was founded with the main purpose of publishing and distributing the Chinese Bible to Chinese-speaking Catholics, Allegra wanted its work to continue even after 1968. To this end, he had broad objectives and wanted to appoint new members who would master Chinese and biblical languages. He also wanted to enrich the center’s

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library and explore new themes in the Chinese language and biblical literature.4 Yet even in 1975, he asked whether the Studium Biblicum was at its sunset or sunrise (“Sigao Shengjing xuehui de zhanwang shi riluo, yihuo richu?”).5 One year prior to his death, Allegra proposed two paths for the institute: one research-based and the other pastoral. The research activity would include a series of biblical books and periodicals, together with a more detailed study and exposition of relevant topics such as the literary genres of The Bible, the comparison between Chinese and biblical history, and the respective cosmologies of East and West. In 1977, the Shengjing shuangyuekan (Bible Bimonthly) began publication. It was printed up to 1998, when it became a quarterly and was renamed Shengjing jikan (Bible Quarterly). The last issue of this periodical includes articles on topics such as the Canticle of Mary, some contents of the Gospel of Luke, the prayers in the Book of Tobit, and the life of Saint Bonaventure.6 The second path was more pastoral in nature. It included collaboration with the Chinese Biblical Association (Zhongghua Shengjing xiehui)7 and the creation of an ecumenical Bible. In 1985, Fr. Anthony Lee (Li Shiyu) listed the achievements of the Studium Biblicum up to that year: revisions of the Sigao Bible, articles on biblical theology, small Bible dictionaries, books of Bible questions and answers, and Bible textbooks.8 He mentioned also the foundation of the Chinese Biblical Association in 1972 in Hong Kong and 1974 in Taiwan, and their collaboration with the Franciscan institute. In the same article, the friar reported the growing creation of small groups of believers reading and sharing about The Bible, which also encouraged the reading of The Bible in families.9 Furthermore, frequent visits to the Holy Land were organized to deepen the knowledge of The Bible. In the same year, Fr. Ludovicus Liu Xutang quoted from Dei verbum (The Word of God), the Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation, a document of the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965): Since the Word of God should be accessible at all times, the Church by her authority and with maternal concern sees to it that suitable and correct translations are made into different languages, especially from the original texts of the sacred books. And should the opportunity arise and the Church authorities approve, if these translations are produced in cooperation with the separated brethren as well, all Christians will be able to use them.10

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Father Liu referred to Chapter IV of Dei verbum, which discusses the role of The Bible in the life of the Church and of the faithful. He mentioned that the Studium Biblicum had helped realize these goals by providing a high-quality translation of The Bible and in collaborating with the Protestants.11 This contextualizes Allegra and the Studium Biblicum in the wider background of the Universal Church. Few official sources describe the activity of the Studium Biblicum after the late 1980s. Nevertheless, it continued working on revisions to previously published volumes, as well as compiling pocket versions of several books, and continuing to spread the Gospel in Chinese. In 2015, data on the contemporary activity of the Studium Biblicum were collected during two research sessions at the institute in June and December. The center is still located on the island of Hong Kong (at 6 Henderson Road), and four Franciscan friars are currently living there. Br. Raymond Mary Yeung is the librarian and Fr. Placid Wong is the director. There is an official web site of the Studium Biblicum administered by the friars, which is available both in traditional and in simplified Chinese characters.12 The site offers an easily accessible online version of the Sigao Bible, whose text is constantly updated according to the changes in the print version. There are detailed pages on the history of the Studium Biblicum, the life of Allegra, the life of Duns Scotus, and the publications of the institute. The “News” section of the site reports the institute’s activities, and the page for published material includes links to available books. It is also possible to download documents on The Bible and similar topics. There are also daily liturgy readings with meditations and a calendar of events. Other contributions of the Studium Biblicum include a 2016 revision of the eleven volumes of the Old and New Testaments that were published between 1945 and 1961. Furthermore, in 2012, the Studium Biblicum collaborated with Hong Kong Baptist University and the Divinity Library of Yale University in a project entitled “Preservation for the Documentation of Chinese Christianity.”13 The purpose of the project is to preserve and make accessible books, periodicals, reports, and archival materials about Chinese Christianity, mainly through digitization. Most recently, the Studium Biblicum continues to proofread the last version of the Sigao Bible and a process is underway to fully convert it into simplified Chinese characters. The institute is also working on a version without cross-references and with a larger font size to meet the needs of the elderly and the young. The Studium Biblicum also hopes to exhibit Allegra’s materials and artifacts. Many of these materials were exhibited

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as part of the 1969 biblical exposition in Macau, and photos of the Holy Land, books and stamps of the Beiping Fangjitang (Franciscan church in Beijing) were included.14 In addition, the Sigao Bible is available as a free mobile app (name: Sigao Shengjing ), and a Studium Biblicum Facebook group was created in 2012 and now has more than three thousand members. The page shares relevant initiatives of the Studium Biblicum and the Hong Kong diocese, information on recently published books, photos, and news. Every Tuesday, the daily readings of the Holy Mass are posted. This Facebook group is in continuous communication with the Facebook account of the “Gabriele fra le genti” non-profit organization, which was established in 2015 in Sicily by some of Allegra’s relatives. In 2017, this group bought the house where Allegra was born in the small Sicilian village of San Giovanni La Punta. They began renovations in 2018 and on September 29, 2019 the renovated building was opened. Allegra’s beatification in 2012 gave rise to much interest in his life. The progress toward his eventual beatification began in 1984, with the collection of documentation and testimonies from the four dioceses of Hong Kong, Taibei, Rome, and Catania. The process also included the removal, in 1986, of his remains from St. Michael’s Catholic Cemetery in Hong Kong to a dedicated chapel in the church of the Franciscan convent of Acireale, Sicily. (This was the same religious community in which Allegra had spent the first seven years of his religious life.) Together with his remains, many documents and personal belongings of Allegra were brought from Hong Kong to Sicily and an archive was also created. The main purpose of the archive was to collect all the documents for his cause of beatification. In 1989, the promoters of the cause published the final report on the Christian virtues of the friar: the “Position on the Virtues of the Servant of God Gabriele M. Allegra, 1907-1976, professed priest, OFM.”15 In 1994, Allegra was declared “Venerable” by the Holy See. In April 2002, Pope John Paul II recognized that a miraculous healing could be ascribed to Allegra’s intercession. It was the last element necessary for his beatification. The beatification rites were performed near his hometown in Sicily on September 29, 2012. Since then, the feast day of Blessed Gabriele Maria Allegra is celebrated on January 26. Unfortunately, after his beatification, Allegra’s archive was rarely consulted and there was no archivist to take care of it. Because of this, in September 2017, it was moved to the Historical Archive of the Sicilian Province of the Friar Minors in Palermo. In May 2019, a new project was

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begun to store and preserve all the papers in an appropriate way, finding an archivist to use high-quality acid-free archival supplies. The material will still be available for consultation and research.

Other Biblical Translations and Activities16 After the publication of the Sigao Bible in 1968, other translations of The Bible have been compiled and published. A remarkable version is the translation of the New Testament produced in Sheshan Seminary, near Shanghai, by a team of translators guided by Bishop Aloysius Jin Luxian. The work was based on the structure of the French La Bible de Jérusalem. In 1986, the four Gospels were published, and the full translation of the New Testament came out in 1994. A revised version came out ten years later.17 During these years, there were also ecumenical efforts in Bible translation. For example, there was Today’s Chinese Version (1975) and a version organized by an interconfessional committee (1990, 2000). The first version (also known as TCV) was published to create a common Chinese text for all Christian denominations.18 The translators started meeting in 1971 and a translation with Protestant terminology was published a few years later. A Catholic edition was also printed. The ecumenical approach was accomplished by systematically using different terms for “God”: Tianzhu in the Catholic version and Shangdi in the Protestant one. This was probably one reason why this version was not a success. The other attempt at an ecumenical translation came after the formation of a commission of expert translators and was described by the Jesuit Fang Zhirong in a 2010 article.19 The translators, both Catholics and Protestants, had their first meeting in 1970 in Taizhong, Taiwan and among them were three members of the Studium Biblicum. Many meetings were held to work on the translation, but despite agreements on the use of many proper names, a common translation for the names of God and the Holy Spirit could not be agreed upon. (These were the same debates that had dogged missionaries for years, the so-called Terms Question.) The final decision was that to use Shangdi to indicate “God” and Shengshen to indicate “the Holy Spirit.” The bishops of Taiwan, however, considered it impossible to discard the word Tianzhu for “God”. This is because in China, Catholicism is called “Tianzhujiao”.20 The Catholic bishops wrote, “A common Bible is to be read by everyone. If every ‘Tianzhu’ is changed into ‘Shangdi,’

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the Catholics will not find ‘Tianzhu’ in the whole Bible. It is too dangerous.” 21 Nonetheless, groups of translators continued to meet in Hong Kong and Taibei. Students from Nanjing seminary, a major Protestant seminary, were also invited to attend, and further meetings were held in Shanghai in 1991 and in Nanjing in 1995. In 1997, the committee finally published the Gospels of Luke and John. The translations of the other two Gospels and of the Acts of the Apostles were also completed, but were not published, and the project was eventually abandoned. After the Sigao Bible, a translation of the Chinese Pastoral Bible — known as the Muling Shengjing — was successfully completed.22 The first version was published in Hong Kong in 1998, and two years later it was also printed in mainland China with simplified Chinese characters.23 This translation was based on the Spanish La Biblia Latinoamericana, which was published in South America in the 1970s. The aim of this Spanish version was to have an accessible text for the unlearned by incorporating pastoral notes to make the biblical contents easier to understand. In 2006, a new translation of the New Testament was undertaken. This was accomplished in 2014 and published by the Claretian Press in Macau.24 The Claretian New Testament includes notes on how to do “lectio divina,” a process of carefully meditating the words of The Bible. It is also available in both traditional and simplified Chinese versions.25 The Catholic or ecumenical translations completed after 1968 were not intended to replace the Sigao Bible, but to provide Chinese readers with alternative versions. In fact, the Sigao Bible is still used in the official documents of the Catholic Church and in the rite of the Mass and the Liturgy of the Hours. The Claretian New Testament, on the other hand, is often used for catechism and preaching, due to its clearer and simpler Chinese language, requiring fewer explanatory notes and comments.

Concluding Remarks A Catholic center for research and translation of The Bible in the Chinese language represented a concrete initiative to engage with a topic that had been neglected for centuries. The presence of Catholic missionaries in China dates to the thirteenth century but the Studium Biblicum was the first institute which was successful in publishing a complete Catholic Bible in Chinese. In previous centuries, missionaries, especially Jesuits, had worked far and wide in China. They had spread the Gospel and shown

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pastoral care for Chinese people by preaching; using images; writing Chinese narratives of The Bible; and translating catechisms, prayer books, lives of saints, and accounts of the life of Jesus Christ. The Bible was not initially translated because, after the Protestant Reformation, Church authorities determined that no other versions than the Latin Vulgate were to be used. Furthermore, it was believed that, for missionaries, there were tools much more effective than The Bible to transmit the contents of Christian doctrine. A few attempts at translating the Scriptures into Chinese were made in the eighteenth century by individual missionaries who made partial translations of the Latin Vulgate. However, they were never allowed to be distributed among the Catholics in China.26 At the beginning of the twentieth century, the need for a more direct contact with The Bible on the part of the Chinese Catholics was emerging, together with the development of biblical sciences and exegesis. These factors support the new attitude the Catholic hierarchies had toward biblical translation and the opportunity Allegra had to complete his translation project. After the publication and distribution of the singlevolume Bible, the readiness and openness of the Studium Biblicum and its members to continue their activities confirm the importance of this institution up to the present.

Notes 1. Sigao Shengjing Xuehui (Scotus Bible Association) and Sigao Shengjing (Scotus Bible). 2. MS II C, 6, “Diario” (Diary), Macau-Hong Kong, December 26, 1968, my translation. This and the following unpublished documents are stored in an archive set up after the transfer of Allegra’s remains from Hong Kong to Acireale (Italy) in 1986. Documents by and on the Friar were collected and stored in Acireale from 1986 to 2017 and were recently moved to the Historical Archive of the Sicilian Province of the Friar Minor in Palermo (September 2017). For details on the Archive see Chapter 2.1 of: Raissa De Gruttola, “And the Word Became Chinese.” Gabriele Allegra and the Chinese Catholic Bible: History, Process, and Translation Analysis [unpublished Ph.D. dissertation] (Venice: Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, 2017). 3. The Sigao Bible is also known as the Christmas Bible or the Bethlehem Bible referring to the day on which it was published.

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4. See the autograph documents: “Future ideal” in: MS XIV, 6, “Pensieri sullo Studio Biblico Cinese” (Thoughts on the Chinese Studium Biblicum), July 11, 1959–July 2, 1960; MS XIV, 15, “De future actuosistate Studii Biblici Sinensis” (On the Future Activity of the Chinese Studium Biblicum), Macau, December 23, 1971. 5. Lei Yongming, “Sigao Shengjing Xuehui de zhanwang” (The Future of the Studium Biblicum), Duosheng, Vol. 148 (1975), pp. 6–11. 6. Shengjing jikan (Summer 2019). 7. See Arnulf Camps, “Father Gabriele M. Allegra, O.F.M., (1907–1976) and the Studium Biblicum Franciscanum: The First Complete Chinese Catholic Translation of the Bible,” in Bible in Modern China. The Literary and Intellectual Impact, eds. Eber Irene Eber, Sze-Kar Wan, and Knut Walf (Sankt Augustin-Nettetal: Institute Monumenta Serica, 1999), pp. 70–72. 8. Anthony Li Shiyu, “Zuijin shi nian de yanbian yu gongzuo gaikuang” (“The Development of the Work of Studium Biblicum during the Last Ten Years”), Shengjing shuangyuekan, Vol. 53 (September 1985), pp. 22– 27. 9. The success of small groups of believers reading and studying the Bible in Taiwan is also mentioned in: Leonard Xu Yingfa, “Dui Shengjing shuangyuekan yin wang” (“Hopeful Expectations for the Biblical Bimonthly”), Shengjing shuangyuekan, Vol. 52 (July 1985), p. 27. 10. Ludovicus Liu Xutang, “Sishi nian de huigu yu zhanwang” (“Looking Back After 40 years and Looking Forward”), Shengjing shuangyuekan, Vol. 52 (July 1985), pp. 3–6, 5. The English text of the Dei Verbum is available at: http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/ documents/vat-ii_const_19651118_deiverbum_en.html#. 11. See the discussion of ecumenical translations of the Bible later in this chapter. 12. The URL of the Web site is: http://www.sbofmhk.org/. 13. See http://lib-nt2.hkbu.edu.hk/sca_fb/index.html. 14. Br. Raymond Mary Yeung, private correspondence with the author, May 14, 2018. 15. Congregatio De Causis Sanctorum. Positio Super Virtutibus Canonizationis Servi Dei Gabrielis M. Allegra, Sacerdotis professi O.F.M. (1907 –1976) (Position on the Virtues of the Servant of God Gabriele M. Allegra, 1907 – 1976, Professed Priest, OFM ) (Roma: Tipografia Guerra, 1989). 16. This paragraph is adapted from Chapter 3.3 of Raissa De Gruttola, “‘And the Word Became Chinese’ Gabriele Allegra and the Chinese Catholic Bible: History, Process, and Translation Analysis” (Ph.D. dissertation, Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, 2017). Any update is the result of further research.

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17. Daniel K. T. Choi and George K. W. Mak, “Catholic Bible Translation in Twentieth-Century China: An Overview,” p. 116, in Catholicism in China, 1900–Present. The Development of the Chinese Church, ed. Cindy Yik-yi Chu (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). The other volumes of the New Testament were published by the Guangqi Press in Shanghai in 1991 (Acts), 1992 (Pauline Epistles), and 1993 (other Epistles and Revelation). See Jost O. Zetzsche, The Bible in China: The History of the Union Version or the Culmination of Protestant Missionary Bible Translation in China (Sankt Augustin-Nettetal: Institute Monumenta Serica, 1999), 422. 18. Shengjing. Xiandai Zhongwen yiben (Bible. Today’s Chinese Version) (Hong Kong: United Bible Societies, 1975). 19. Fang Zhirong, “Jidu gongjiao yu xinjiao yijing jingyan tan” (“On the Experience of Catholics and Protestants Translating the Bible”), pp. 124– 41, in Shengjingxue daolun, Fuda shenxue congshu (Fu Jen Theology Series), ed. Gregory W. Dawes, No. 94 (Taibei: Guangqi wenhua, 2010). 20. See Fang, “Jidu gongjiao yu xinjiao,” pp. 134–38. 21. Ibid., p. 136. 22. I am extremely grateful to Fr. Alberto Rossa and Ms. Winnie Wong for their help in this section. 23. Muling Shengjing (Hong Kong: Tianzhujiao guoji Shengjing xuehui, 1998). 24. Xinyue Shengjing (Macau: Leren Chubanshe, 2014). 25. Ms. Winnie Wong, private correspondence with the author, Taibei, January 14, 2016. 26. Worthy of mention is the partial translations of the New Testament by Jean Basset, MEP (end of the seventeenth century), some books of the Old Testament in vernacular Chinese by the Franciscans Antonio Laghi and Francesco Jovino (first half of eighteenth century), and the partial Old and New Testament translations undertaken by the Jesuit Louis Antoine de Poirot (completed in 1803). For details see Nicolas Standaert, “The Bible in Early Seventeenth-Century China,” in Bible in Modern China, eds. Eber et al., pp. 31–54.

CHAPTER 7

The Jinde Charities Foundation of Hebei Province and Catholic Charities in China Zhipeng Zhang

Abstract The development of Catholic charities since 1979 can be divided into three stages, according to the institutional environment and practical work undertaken in different periods. With the development of charity and public welfare in mainland China, more and more organizations like Jinde Charities are becoming involved in various kinds of social services. Chinese Catholicism has some unique achievements and far-reaching influences in its social service program. Social services provided by the Church in China are a very important and effective way to witness the Gospel. On the basis of good servant service, some Catholic charities in China began to explore the provision of prophet service. Chinese Catholicism will continue to emphasize charity service in the future.

John Baptist Zhang, the founder of Jinde Charities, provided the author with a large amount of literature and materials and answered many questions raised by the author. However, the author is responsible for the text. Z. Zhang (B) Nanjing Institute of Technology, Nanjing, China © The Author(s) 2020 C. Y.-y. Chu and P. P. Mariani (eds.), People, Communities, and the Catholic Church in China, Christianity in Modern China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1679-5_7

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Keywords Catholic charities · Hebei Jinde Charities foundation · Social service · Prophet service

Introduction This chapter focuses on the development of Catholic charities in mainland China since 1979 through a close analysis of one Catholic charity — the Hebei Jinde Charities Foundation (hereafter, Jinde Charities). Jinde Charities has not been affiliated with a diocese since its inception in May 1997, but it is based in the heavily Catholic province of Hebei and provides a range of charitable and public welfare services, both within Hebei and beyond. Two principal questions will be addressed in this chapter. The first is that of assessing and judging the past performance of Catholic charities in China. Several sub-questions relate to this. What have been the significant implications of charity for the development of the Church in mainland China? Has it helped raise public awareness of Catholicism? Has it helped increase the number of believers? Turning to the future, will it help increase communication and cooperation with the government? Finally, will it help the Catholic Church develop a more favorable environment for cooperation with other organizations? The second question also relates to the future development of the Chinese Church. That is, is it possible for Catholics in mainland China to gradually change from the “servant Church model” to the “prophet Church model”? Furthermore, is the social remit of the Church shifting from traditional charity to broader public welfare? The dual concepts of the “servant Church model” and the “prophet Church model” have previously been forwarded by Fr. Zhang Shijiang.1 The “servant Church model” refers to the Church’s traditional charitable services to society, while the “prophet Church model” denotes a broader public welfare program, in which the Church plays a prophetic, critical role in maintaining social justice, protecting the weak, awakening conscience and purifying people’s hearts. This public welfare program is built on a sense of social responsibility and mission, as Church members act as self-governing citizens mobilizing social resources in pursuit of the promotion of public interests and lasting solutions to social problems.

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Restoration and Development of Catholic Charity Work in Mainland China Since 1979 Before 1949, Catholicism was deeply rooted in Chinese society, and the Chinese Church provided many charitable and public services. Despite drastic changes in Chinese society since 1979, this once profound tradition of charity and public welfare has been revivified, thanks to the work of clergy and laity alike. The development of Catholic charities since 1979 can be divided into three stages, according to the institutional environment and practical work undertaken in different periods. The Stage of Spontaneous Recovery, 1979–1998 In the early stages of Reform and Opening-up, the Chinese Church was mainly focused on (re-)building churches and cultivating young Church members. However, some spontaneous and decentralized charitable activities were also carried out, particularly in the Beijing diocese. In the early 1980s, despite facing perilous financial circumstances, the Beijing diocese still made sizable donations in support of education. In 1985, the Catholic Xiangbo Cultural Cram School was established, offering college entrance examination classes and foreign language training. In addition to this, Bishop Fu Tieshan took the lead with helping the disabled, as the director of the China Disabled Persons’ Federation (CDPF) in the early 1980s. Following Bishop Fu’s inspirational lead, the so-called two committees in Beijing — the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association (CCPA) and the Chinese Catholic Church Administrative Commission — have always paid attention to the disabled cause and have made donations to institutions working with disabled communities on many occasions.2 A charitable tradition exists in other parishes as well and has been gradually restored on a small, systematic, and informal scale. For example, several homes for disabled children and care homes for the elderly have been founded in Hebei Province, such as the Dawn Family Care Home in Daming and Ningjing (founded in 1988), and the Pingan Nursing Home (1986) and Lude Elderly Service Center in Hejian (1989).3 In 1985, Sr. Meng Weina founded Beijing Hui Ling Community Services for People with Intellectual Disabilities, then the first non-governmental organization (NGO) in China to serve people with intellectual disabilities. Today, it has spread to many cities. The Church’s traditional social service projects, such as clinics, have mushroomed in rural towns and cities across

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the country, laying a good foundation for further participation in social service provision. The Rapid Growth Stage, 1998–2012 In response to the need for the further development of the grassroots Church and social services throughout the country, the Chinese Catholic Commission for Economic Development and Social Services was established in 1998 (in 2004, it was renamed as the Chinese Catholic Commission for Social Services) as a guiding and coordinating body for Catholic social services nationwide. Under the guidance of the Chinese Catholic Commission for Social Services, Church social services began improving in quantity and broadening in scope. This was also thanks to active exploration at the grassroots level and the support of the so-called one committee and one conference (“Yihui yituan”, CCPA and Bishops’ Conference of the Catholic Church in China [BCCCC]). As of May 2007, the diocese, parish and social service organizations of China’s Catholic Church had set up 345 public welfare entities (excluding leprosy schools) across the country, according to incomplete statistics compiled by the Faith Institute for Cultural Studies. These include 212 clinics or hospitals, 68 nursing homes, 35 kindergartens, 4 schools, 13 centers for disabled children, 8 centers for people with intellectual disabilities, and 5 AIDS care facilities (Table 7.1).4 On July 14, 2005, the Chinese Catholic Commission for Social Services issued a “Written Proposal on Carrying Out Extensive Social Service Activities” to Church communities across the country. Following this, 18 diocesan social service organizations were established across the country.5 The Standardized Development Stage, 2012–Present In February 2012, the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA), together with five other departments of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, issued an opinion on encouraging and regulating the engagement of religious organizations in public welfare and charity activities. The opinion’s strongest show of support for religious charities was its approval of official registration, and subsequent eligibility for tax exemptions. In October 2013, Jinde Charities and several other organizations jointly sponsored a seminar on “Chinese folk child rearing”. Attendees

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Table 7.1 Catholic welfare entities in Chinaa Province Beijing Tianjing Hebei Shanxi Inner Mongolia Sichuan Anhui Liaoning Jiangsu Shanghai Shandong Shaanxi Gansu Henan Hubei Chongqing Guizhou Ningxia Yunnan Guangxi Jilin Fujian Zhejiang Guangdong Xinjiang

Centers for disabled children

6 2

3 2

Clinics or hospitals

Nursing homes

Schools

3 3 51 23 11 2 1 5 1

1 1 14 5 3 1

1

3 66 15 15 1 3 1 5 1 1 1

7 1 3 3 1 1 3 1 2 1

1

1

1

2 6 5 5 2

a Zhang Shijiang, The Path-Searching in the Wildness,

(Taibei: Fu Jen Catholic University Press, November 2019), pp. 138–39. Data accurate as of May 2007

included representatives of 47 civil society organizations, scholars, religious people, and leaders from civil affairs departments. Of the total number of non-governmental adoption agencies in China, 66% of them are run by religious groups. According to incomplete statistics compiled by the Faith Institute for Cultural Studies, as of October 2013, there were twenty institutions for the adoption of abandoned babies across Chinese Catholicism. Chinese Catholicism has also set up 19 health and rehabilitation institutions for the adoption of children with intellectual disabilities. By October 2013, there were between 80 and 120 Chinese and foreign

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Catholic nuns working in 27 government-run leprosy rehabilitation institutions in 11 provinces of China (Tables 7.2, 7.3, and 7.4). The number of Catholic charities in China is relatively small compared to non-religious charities and other charitable organizations. In October 2012, there were 2794 foundations in China, of which 1265 were publicly funded and 1529 were non-publicly funded. Of those, only 27 had a religious background, including twenty Buddhist foundations and four Protestant Churches.6 Jinde Charities was the only Catholic foundation. As of May 2017, the total number of foundations in China had risen to 5919, of which 62 had religious backgrounds, although Jinde Charities was still the only Catholic body.7 Nonetheless, China’s faith-based public welfare, “has already started, and is being actively integrated into Chinese society, with good momentum of development, and gradually moving toward institutionalization, planning, systematization and internationalization.”8

Developing Social Services of Jinde Charities Jinde Charities is the first non-profit civil society service organization of Chinese Catholicism. The word “Jinde” is a memorial to Bishop Hou Jinde of the Xingtai diocese, who died on May 21, 1994, and who was known for helping the poor. In August 1998, Jinde Charities was approved by the government as China’s first Catholic non-profit organization (NPO). On April 11, 2006, the Hebei Jinde Charities Service Center was officially registered, and on May 31, 2011, Jinde Charities was officially registered. There are many internal factors and external conditions which informed the establishment of Jinde Charities. The first was the needs of the masses. In April 1991, the Hebei Catholic Faith Editorial Office was set up to publish the Faith Newspaper. With more and more individual families turning to the newspaper for help, it began to plan to set up a professional social service organization. The second was the plight of the Chinese Church. Facing internal group disputes within Chinese Catholicism, it was believed that only charity work could resolve this enmity and promote understanding, acceptance, and cooperation through the teachings of Jesus Christ. Third, there was the important role of the personal vision of the founder, Fr. Zhang Shijiang. Finally, the trust and support of other social groups and institutions, both domestic and foreign, played a significant role. Jinde Charities has received strong support from local

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Table 7.2 Catholic institutions for the adoption of abandoned infants in Chinaa Province

Sponsor

Name

Founded

Registration

Shanxi

Family

Yuci Qixian Love Home Xinjiang Duanming Welfare Home for Children Taiyuan Bethany Home Changzhi Bethlehem Home Yuci Guangqi Kindheartedness Home Shijiazhuang Wuqiu Warm and Sweet Family Xingtai Ningjing Dawn Home Zhangjiakou Daoguang Home Cangzhou Renqiu St. Joseph Center for Disabled Children Handan Daming Scotch Rehabilitation Home Handan Wenai Orphanage/Ruoshi Health Service Center Zhangjiakou Yuxian Disabled Infant School (Nanyang) Pushan Orphanage Nanyang Love Home Ningde Tashan Love Heart Home Lanzhou Beitai Love Home Fengxiang Joseph Home Longjin Dran Love Heart Home Bingzhou Huiming Aili Kindheartedness Home

1982

Not

1995

Registered

1997

Not

2006

Not

2009

Not

1986

Not

1988

Not

1991

Not

1993

Approved

1994

Not

1997

Registered in 2007

2003

Not

1993

Closed in 2013

1998 1993

Not; Closed Not

1994

Not

1994

Not

1999

Not

2009

Not

Sisters

Virgins Sisters Sisters Hebei

Sisters

Sisters Family Virgins

Sisters Family

Diocesan Henan

Sisters

Fujian

Sisters Virgins

Gansu

Sisters

Shaanxi

Sisters

Jilin

Lay people

Shandong

Parish

a Ibid. Data accurate as of October 2013

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Table 7.3 Catholic health and rehabilitation institutions for the adoption of people with intellectual disabilities in Chinaa Province

Sponsor

Name

Founded

Notes

Jilin

Sisters

1994

Registered, 1994

Shaanxi

Sisters

Yanji Dawn Home (Rehabilitation) Xi’an Philanthropy Garden Fufeng Xinyue Inspiring Intelligence Center Fangzhou Inspiring Intelligence Center Dawn Home Gaoyi Rehabilitation Center Ningjin Dawn Function Rehabilitation Center

2001 2005

Registered, June 2006 Registered, 2006

2005

Registered, 2006

2006

Registered

2013

Registered

Jiangsu

Sisters

Hebei

Sisters of St. Teresa

a Ibid., p. 108. Data accurate as of October 2013

governments and the local Church, and non-local projects are generally jointly inspected and implemented by the Jinde Charities, the local Church and local governments.9 The organizational vision of Jinde Charities includes: carrying forward of the spirit of Christian fraternity; adhering to the principle of nondiscrimination on ethnic, religious, gender and regional issues; providing assistance to vulnerable groups in society; providing timely emergency assistance to individuals and families affected by natural and man-made disasters; providing opportunities for sustainable development to individuals and groups; and striving to build a caring and harmonious human society. The goals of the organization are to promote social balance and sustainable development; to strengthen friendly exchanges with domestic and overseas NGOs; to provide opportunities for believers and Church groups to serve the community; and to strengthen mutual understanding and cooperation between the Church and society. Immediately after its establishment, Jinde Charities mainly worked on three types of services: emergency assistance, including disaster relief and medical expenses for poor patients; raising financial aid for poor students,

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Table 7.4 Leprosy rehabilitation institutions served by Chinese and foreign Catholic nunsa Province

Name

Founded

Notes

Jilin

Yanji Leprosy Convalescent Hospital Shangluo Kindheartedness Convalescent Center

1991

Benedictines

1998

Hanzhong Leprosy Convalescent Hospital Nankang Leprosy Convalescent Hospital Liangshan Dechang Leprosy Convalescent Hospital Meigu Leprosy Convalescent Hospital and Primary School Zhaojue Leprosy Convalescent Hospital and Primary School Leibo Leprosy Convalescent Hospital and Primary School Mianning Leprosy Convalescent Hospital and Primary School Yuexi Leprosy Convalescent Hospital and Primary School Liangshan Meigu County Wajiji Leprosy Convalescent Hospital Yaxi County Leprosy Convalescent Hospital Huizhou Bailu Convalescent Hospital Dianbai Diancheng Town Liedashi Hospital Huilai Leprosy Convalescent Hospital

July 2002

1998–2009: South Korea Franciscans Sisters 2009–2010: Sisters of the Sacred Heart of Jesus FMCJ 2010–present: Protestant Churches Franciscans FMM

March 2000

Holy Family

May 2000

Holy Family

October 2002

Holy Family

December 2001

Holy Family

January 2003

Holy Family

August 2005

Holy Family

2005 (closed, 2012)

Sisters of Providence

2010 (closed, 2013)

Presentandines

2001 April 2002

Annie Daughters of Charity Holy Family

2003

Jesus Little Sisters

December 2004

Foreign Sisters

Shaanxi

Jiangxi Sichuan

Guangdong

(continued)

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Table 7.4 (continued) Province

Name

Founded

Notes

Hubei

Jingzhou Balingshan Town Leprosy Hospital Hanchuan Leprosy Convalescent Hospital Wangdu Skin Disease Prevention and Cure Center Wenshan Leprosy Convalescent Hospital

September 2002

The Little Servant of the Holy Family (South Korea) Sisters of the Sacred Heart of Jesus FMCJ St. Hope Will

Hebei

Yunnan

Liaoning Anhui

Guizhou

Shiping Leprosy Convalescent Hospital Malong Leprosy Convalescent Hospital Qiubei Leprosy Convalescent Hospital and Primary School Lufeng Leprosy Convalescent Hospital Shizong Leprosy Convalescent Hospital and Primary School Dalian Leprosy Convalescent Hospital Mingguang Leprosy Convalescent Hospital Liping Kindheartedness Convalescent Center

September 2005 November 2002

2003 (closed, 2013) June 2013 April 2004

Sisters of the Mother of God Theresian Sisters Holy Family

May 2004

Sisters of Charity

December 2004

Holy Family

2006

Sisters of Charities of Sacred Heart of Jesus Presentandine Sisters Convent

2008 (closed, 2009)

2005 May 2007

February 2012

Society of the Divine Word CSW Argentina Congregatio Discipulorum Domini Priest Shen dong-min of South Korea Inchon Diocese

a Ibid., pp. 139–40. Data accurate as of October 2013

including building the Hope Primary School and other educational programs; and poverty alleviation and development projects such as drilling wells for drinking water. At that time, funding was raised through the Faith Newspaper as well as via donations from individuals and other organizations. Jinde Charities is a grassroots public welfare organization with a very weak foundation. Based in Shijiazhuang, it relies on grassroots Churches and cooperates with NGOs and NPOs to provide services for people in

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many parts of China. Yet it has not always been plain sailing. Due to a lack of knowledge about this Christian NGO, the government initially refused to approve it. Furthermore, banks refused to open accounts on its behalf, and individual Church ministers did not understand, or even objected to, its existence. However, with the expansion in charitable and public welfare services provided by Jinde Charities, not only has the understanding and support of the government, the local Church, overseas organizations, congregants and the masses increased, but also the quality of these services has been enhanced. In addition to the daily programs of elderly care, education and personal emergency assistance, the following is a brief list of some important charitable and public service initiatives that Jinde Charities has engaged in over the past twenty years10 : • In January 1998, a 6.2-magnitude earthquake struck Zhangbei county and Zhangjiakou. Through the Xinde Daily, Northern Jinde (a precursor organization to Jinde Charities) raised 800,000 yuan and relief materials worth more than 400,000 yuan for areas affected by the disaster. • In 2002, Jinde Charities set up a special AIDS prevention and treatment organization. The Light of Hope organization participates in the prevention and treatment of AIDS through publicity, understanding, and care. • In May 2002, Jinde Charities founded the Jinde Elderly Home in Shijiazhuang. • In 2004, Guangxi and Chongqing Provinces were hit by devastating floods and Yunnan Province was hit by an earthquake. In collaboration with Caritas Asia, Northern Jinde raised more than 751,000 yuan for the disaster area and provided emergency assistance to more than 14,000 victims. • In August 2005, Jinde Charities distributed 640,000 jin of rice — worth 800,000 yuan — to nearly 40,000 flood victims in Guangxi. • Since 2005, Jinde Charities has held a Christmas Gala every year to raise money for elderly homeless people, girls living in poverty, disabled orphans and children from families affected by AIDS. • On August 29, 2006, a large-scale disaster relief activity was held in Hunan Province by Jinde Charities and The Amity Foundation.

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• On November 20, 2007, the Hebei Jinde Charities Service Center and Hebei Provincial People’s Hospital jointly held an activity to fund operations for one hundred patients with congenital heart disease. • On May 12, 2008, Jinde Charities took immediate actions up to assist the victims of the Sichuan earthquake. • On September 12, 2008, the Bringing Light Project was launched, which has successfully provided free surgeries for three thousand impoverished cataract patients. • On December 1, 2008, twelve pupils of Duiziliang Middle School in Shaanxi Province were poisoned by carbon monoxide. Jinde Charities provided psychological assistance for individuals and families. • Beginning in 2009, Fr. Joseph Loftus, C.M. led a team of nuns on a marathon run to raise money. • Jinde Charities’ Matteo Ricci Volunteer Project, launched in 2009, has trained a large number of volunteers and provided a wide range of high-quality volunteer services. • In April 2010, a 7.1-magnitude earthquake hit Yushu in Qinghai Province. Jinde Charities’ disaster relief team provided flour, cooking oil, and salt worth 100,000 yuan to the victims. • In response to widespread flooding in southern China in 2010, Jinde Charities immediately launched a corresponding emergency relief program. • In August 2010, Jinde Charities started the following three projects in cooperation with Chinese medical and educational charities: a secondary vocational education project, the Smile in the Teeth Project, and a congenital heart disease-related project in Tianjin. • On November 27, 2010, Jinde Charities, together with Beijing Qianhai Femoral Hospital, launched the Hiking Huaxia public welfare relief activity to support care for femoral necrosis in Shijiazhuang. • Jinde Charities distributed rice, cooking oil, salt, milk powder, and other necessities to almost 2000 families affected by the Sichuan earthquake disaster of April 2013. • In August 2014, Jinde Charities launched a project to build new homes for 23 poverty-stricken families in Minxian County, Gansu Province, after it was hit by an earthquake in 2013. • In November 2014, Jinde Charities began sponsoring the education of one thousand poor and minority high school-age girls.

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• In 2016, Jinde Charities implemented water conservancy, photovoltaic, aquaculture, and other poverty alleviation projects in remote mountainous areas. • On January 19, 2017, the staff of Jinde Charities’ financial aid department went to Shahe, Xingtai and distributed financial aid totaling 8200 yuan to eight students. • On the morning of August 2, 2017, the Tumor Alleviation and Treatment Project — jointly organized by Jinde Charities and the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry — was launched in Qingdao. The project plans to provide free treatment to 1000 cancer patients from poor families within three years. • In March 2017, Jinde Charities cooperated with the CCPA and BCCCC to launch the first national “disaster relief and donation day”. • In 2018, the Love Pilot assistance project for truck drivers distributed a care fund of 1.85 million yuan to 285 drivers and their families. As we can see, volunteers from Jinde Charities have been involved in a vast array of relief activities in recent years. During this time, Jinde Charities has expanded from three original services to eight: emergency humanitarian assistance (personal emergency assistance, disaster relief), social development, education training, grants, AIDS prevention, anti-human trafficking programs, and elderly services. The public welfare efforts of Jinde Charities have also been recognized by the government. In December 2010, the Ministry of Finance of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the State Taxation Administration, along with the Hebei Local Taxation Bureau and the Department of Civil Affairs of Hebei Province jointly published a list of 13 public welfare organizations that would be exempt from taxation, which included Jinde Charities.

Achievements and Influence of Catholic Charities in China With the development of charity and public welfare in mainland China, more and more organizations like Jinde Charities are becoming involved in various kinds of social services. Chinese Catholicism has some unique achievements and far-reaching influences in its social service program.

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Providing Services Without Competition The front-line charitable services of Chinese Catholicism — hospitals for children with disabilities, leprosy and AIDS prevention and treatment — are operating in sectors where there is little competition. For example, since 1991, Benedictine nuns have been quietly serving mainland leprosy sufferers in remote areas of China. The Society of Jesus was also one of the early groups that focused on Chinese leprosy sufferers. Domestic and Overseas Cooperation for Disaster Relief The long-standing relationship between Chinese Catholicism and the Universal Church enables it to mobilize international resources for disaster relief in China. For example, Pope Benedict XVI showed concerned over the frequent occurrence of natural disasters in China, offering prayers and sacrifices to the victims. During the 2008 winter storm crisis, and the Sichuan and Yushu earthquake disasters, the pope made three donations of $155,000 to the disaster areas through Jinde Charities. As early as 2005, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) in the United States established a partnership with Jinde Charities, and they jointly carried out a number of AIDS relief projects. Developing the Image of the Chinese Church Abroad Jinde Charities not only brings relief resources from overseas, but also provides channels between China and disaster-hit areas around the world. Along with the vast majority of clergy and laity, Jinde Charities has made many charitable contributions to overseas disaster areas, including the Taiwanese earthquake of 1999, the Southeast Asian tsunami of 2005, the 2009 earthquake in Italy, Typhoon Morakot in Taiwan, and the 2010 Haiti earthquake. In 2014, Jinde Charities launched an online donation channel to raise money for people affected by the Nepal earthquake. In February 2016, Jinde Charities appealed to the clergy and laity to pray for the people affected by the earthquake in Taiwan. Uniting Church Groups in China The development of social services has improved understanding and cooperation between domestic Churches in various regions of China. For

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example, after the 2013 Lushan earthquake, the “one committee and one conference” issued “A Call to Pray and Raise Money for the Victims in the Lushan Earthquake in Sichuan,” and called for the clergy and laity to send prayers and love to the area. Building Harmonious Religious Relations Chinese Catholic social service activities represented by Jinde Charities have also enhanced understanding and cooperation with other major religions in China under the banner of charity and public welfare. As early as in December 2004, the religious community jointly organized a charity performance for leprosy patients. On August 29, 2006, Jinde Charities cooperated with The Amity Foundation to provide disaster relief in Hunan. Likewise, during relief work responding to the 2015 Nepal earthquake, Jinde Charities cooperated with Buddhist religious organizations.

Summary and Outlook Social services provided by the Church in China are a very important and effective way to witness the Gospel. Catholic social services and public welfare undertakings have not only witnessed the Gospel but also raised the status of the Church in Chinese society, contributing to eliminating the prejudice and misunderstanding of the Church in Chinese society. Charity keeps the whole Church consistent in words and deeds. Servant service is a good channel to prophet service. In contemporary society, these two kinds of Church models are equally important and indispensable. The former is relatively safe, though it can be hard work and dangerous (such as the risk of dying from a deadly infectious disease while serving patients). The latter’s prophetic roles and voices are dangerous and expensive, and therefore more valuable. The two models, however, are not antagonistic but based on one other. On the basis of good servant service, some Catholic charities in China began to explore the provision of prophet service. Chinese Catholicism will continue to emphasize charity service in the future. On the one hand, such positioning is conducive to highlighting the social identity of Chinese Catholicism; on the other hand, it is also helpful to implement government policies in a better manner and with improved efficiency.

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Notes 1. Zhang Shijiang, The Path-Searching in the Wildness, (Taibei: Fu Jen Catholic University Press, November 2019), pp. 477–78. 2. Shi Hengtan, Wang Xiaonan, Zhao Jianmin and Deng Shaoxi, “Social Service and Practice of Catholic Diocese in Beijing Since Reform and Opening Up,” Chinese Catholicism, Vol. 6 (2001), pp. 21–27. 3. Xiong Guibing, “Comparative Study on Three Modes of Folk Aid for Abandoned Infants of the Sick and Disabled,” China Youth Social Science, Vol. 34, No. 117 (2015), pp. 62–68. 4. Zhang Shijiang, “The Development of Charity Based on Faith: The Case of Jinde Charities,” in Review and Prospect of China’s Religious Public Welfare, eds. Zhang Shijing and Wei Dedong (Beijing: Zongjiao wenhua chubanshe, 2008), pp. 1–24. 5. In Xi’an, Beijing, Shenyang, Hengshui, Handan, Chongqing, Wanzhou, Nanning, Kunming/Zhaotong, Shanghai, Shantou, Lanzhou, Jilin, Linyi in Shandong Province, and Taiyuan, Xinzhou and Changzhi in Shanxi Province. 6. http://crm.foundationcenter.org.cn/html/2012-07/239.html. 7. http://www.sohu.com/a/147066053_669645. 8. Zhang, The Path-Searching in the Wildness, pp. 138–39. 9. Ibid., pp. 81–106. 10. For more information on the projects undertaken by Jinde Charities please to see: http://www.jinde.org/Content/News/index/id/9.htm.

PART IV

Communities

CHAPTER 8

Recent Developments of Youth Ministry in China Bruno Lepeu

Abstract To understand what is emerging in the Church in China, the study of the development of youth ministry since the early 2000s is very enlightening. When young people have a rich experience of community life, with deep spiritual experience, proper training and accompaniment, which bring them closer to God and to others, it has a deep influence on their life and the local Church. It fosters lay ministries, vocations, and dynamism for the renewal of the Church. Youth ministry is facing important difficulties: the lack of support from the Church leaders, the difficulty to reach all young people, and the political restrictions. Nevertheless, youth ministry in China is starting to bear promising fruit, helping the Church to move toward a more participatory and collaborative fraternity. Keywords Youth ministry in China · Community life · Accompaniment · Participatory Church · Fraternity

B. Lepeu (B) Missions Etrangères de Paris, Holy Spirit Study Centre, Hong Kong, China © The Author(s) 2020 C. Y.-y. Chu and P. P. Mariani (eds.), People, Communities, and the Catholic Church in China, Christianity in Modern China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1679-5_8

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Introduction There are several reasons for focusing on Catholic youth ministry in China. First, in October 2018 the Fifteenth Ordinary General Assembly of the Synod of Bishops was held in Rome. The theme of the Synod was, “Young People, the Faith and Vocational Discernment,” focusing on young people aged 16–29: Also, the age range employed in this chapter.1 To prepare for the Synod, a questionnaire was filled-in by each Bishops’ Conference, which offers new insights into the perspectives of young Catholics, including those in China. In a recently published book of interviews with Thomas Leoncini, Pope Francis shared his understanding of young Catholics.2 Furthermore, in the Chinese context, Chiaretto Yan Kin Sheung has just published a small book on this topic, and several theology students in China are undertaking research into youth ministry.3 Second, young people are a natural laboratory. They live in our postmodern culture. They are surrounded by the important challenges for evangelization in China, such as secularization, urbanization, and globalization. The category of “young people” transcends many differences: clergy/laity, married/single, rural/urban, male/female, and official/underground. Some young people take hold of faith and establish a deep relationship with the Lord. They are sensitive to the needs of the world and of the Church. They do not hesitate to take on the responsibilities assigned to them. Thanks to their level of education, dynamism and creativity, and their capacity for teamwork, they are becoming important actors in the renewal of the local Church in China. Listening to these well-trained and committed young people is therefore a unique opportunity to see something important emerging in the Chinese Church. The growth of Catholic youth ministry in China must be seen in the context of the rapid urbanization that China has been experiencing over the past forty years (rising from 18% in 1978 to 58% in 2017).4 This has affected the Church greatly, as it is moving from a rural setting to an urban one. The transition has been a difficult one. Many dioceses are still operating on an institutional and communitarian model that predates the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965),5 or different ecclesial models are coexisting in the same local Church. In this context of profound change, it is possible to observe that new initiatives in the Chinese Church mostly come from the young clergy and laypersons, which is a testament to their dynamism.

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This chapter will focus on Catholic youth ministry in China. It will first present a historical background to this phenomenon, before reflecting on the ways in which young people in China are growing in faith. The chapter will end by giving some insight into a new way of being for the Church in China.

Historical Background From the Countryside In the 1990s, pastoral ministry among Chinese youth was mainly centered on catechism classes, and mostly held at summer and/or winter camps. Young people gathered to learn the basics of the catechism (often through a “question and answer” format), the basic prayers, and the Ten Commandments. These classes were often given by religious sisters and seminarians. The training was mostly undertaken through formal teaching. One of the main purposes was to prepare young Catholics to receive the sacraments. One drawback of this method, however, was that the faith of the students tended to remain on the superficial level of knowledge, without a deeper level, that of an encounter with God. Owing to poor local settings and a lack of awareness, no follow-up was organized during the rest of the year. Further, formalized youth groups were exceptional at that time. In fact, I came across only three examples of such youth groups in the 1990s, all from underground communities: The “Salt & Light Community” in the Baoding diocese; the “Association of the Rosary” in the Fuzhou diocese; and the “St. Damian Prayer Group” in the Shenyang diocese. Even these groups were quite basic and did not offer a more holistic youth ministry program.6 When I visited local Catholic communities in mainland China in the early 2000s, one of their biggest concerns was youth activities. As I was involved in youth ministry in Hong Kong, I shared some formation programs designed for teenagers. Yet on many occasions, I was surprised to see that the local “youth group” was in fact formed from adults in their thirties or forties. After decades of lay leaders who were already older, the local pastors usually regarded the middle-aged laity as “young” leaders.

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To the Cities In the early 2000s, three main factors influenced the growth of youth ministry in China. First, there was a transition from strictly catechism classes to youth ministry. In many dioceses, the Church was aware of the need to improve catechism programs, which were often only based on a question and answer format and which did not appeal to the new generation of young people. In some places, the search for better training for teenagers naturally turned to the possibility of moving beyond catechism. The number of new students enrolling in higher education in China increased from 2.2 million in 2000 to 7.5 million in 2016.7 Since some of these students were Catholics, beginning in 2005 several initiatives were launched to cater to college students. Some rural dioceses, like Xianxian diocese, which usually organized winter and summer youth programs, also established an association of college students from their diocese, so that they could remain in touch throughout the year on social media. Some priests and religious sisters got involved and even visited students where they were studying. In Shijiazhuang, the initiative came from seminarians studying in the same city, who would gather students from their own diocese on Sundays. It also came from clergy in urban areas, who also encountered the needs of these young people. At the same time, experienced facilitators from outside of mainland China began offering training in youth ministry. Short-term programs on basic youth ministry took place in some seminaries, and some priests and sisters were sent abroad to study youth ministry. Later, young people also joined some basic youth ministry programs in Hong Kong, Macau, and the Philippines. Inside China, some communities (with or without international assistance) — like “City of Joy” in Beijing — started in-depth three-month training programs which included personal growth, leadership training, faith deepening, and community life elements, to equip young Catholics to enter the adult world and to train youth leaders. These programs aim at a “holistic” form of youth ministry. Lively Youth Ministry Is Starting to Bear Fruit After 15 years of growth, youth groups and communities can be found in many cities in China. For young people coming to the cities for studies or work, they provide the fellowship of weekly gatherings for Bible

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sharing and other activities. On some campuses, there are prayer gatherings every evening, sometimes with lively Praise and Worship prayers. The special spirit of these groups often attracts other young people. The youth groups usually take an active part in the life of the local Church: Caring for other young people, teaching children, taking care of liturgical services (taking on roles as altar servers, readers, and members of choirs), and involving themselves in social services (like visiting homes for the aged or orphanages). Many young people born in the 1980s are now strong pillars of the local Church in China: They are involved in Marriage and Family Ministry, charity work, and Sunday schools. Some of them have become community leaders, taking up the torch from older generations. Some enter religious life or full-time pastoral work, mostly dedicating themselves to further developing youth ministry. Youth ministry is becoming more mature in many places, especially in urban areas with college campuses, like Xi’an, Shijiazhuang, Shenyang, and Fuzhou. But it is also strong in rural dioceses like Xianxian, Zhaoxian, and Handan. Some dioceses now have a youth commission or a youth center which provides training and support to youth groups. In fact, some more mature groups now provide support to other youth groups around China, since although young people are willing to dedicate several years of their life to working full-time as youth ministers, but they often struggle due to a lack of support. Having witnessed international youth gatherings — such as Taizé meetings, Asian Youth Day, and World Youth Day — members of some dioceses are now organizing large youth gatherings locally. There are still some challenges. In the early 2010s, with the rise of technology and the affordability of smartphones, Church youth activities have become less attractive to young people. The number of young people joining youth ministry programs has started to decrease, and youth ministers have begun to reflect on new ways of caring for young people. In many places, the local Church is not well equipped in terms of mindset and resources to face the specific challenges of youth ministry. In addition, young migrants working in the cities have mostly been forgotten by the local Church, while high school students are becoming harder to reach because of boarding school life, exam pressure, and atheist propaganda. Even so, starting in Hebei, the “Youth Christian Students” movement is developing in different places, with good results.

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Renewed Faith and the Expectations of Young People An overview of young people, including their spiritual expectations, is an important prerequisite to understanding the situation of young Catholics in China today.8 Yet few scholars have been involved in such work in the Chinese context (except for Chiaretto Yan Kin Sheung).9 My own research focuses on the journey of faith undertaken by young people in China today. In 2017, I traveled around China to conduct more than sixty interviews with young people and youth ministers. The purpose was to obtain a set of narratives on the topic of faith. Ultimately, I incorporated the views of around thirty young people. Although this sample included geographical and ecclesial diversity, there were some homogeneous factors. Each of the respondents was born between 1985 and 1999. They were engaged in the Church and most of them were college graduates who still lived in the city where they attended college. I will not attempt a sociological analysis of this group in this chapter but will engage in a narrative analysis to find out how they have been touched by the Church. It is still too early to share the final results of the study. Each story is unique but some common patterns can be identified. (The following is based on statements given by young people in interviews with the author. For the sake of confidentiality, names and places are usually not mentioned.) Traditional Rural Catholic Upbringing Even if some young Catholics now come from non-Christian families, most of the young people interviewed for this study come from traditional families in Catholic villages. Many of them were “left behind children,” as their parents worked far from home. Because of this, their relationships with their parents are usually difficult. In terms of the transmission of faith, it was done mostly by their grandparents and sometimes in a harsh way. Many of them recall the hours spent at church, kneeling and reciting prayers that they could not understand. They were usually forced to go to church and envied their friends who did not have to go. Religion was also seen as a burden, as they had to accede to numerous rules without knowing why. Even so, many young people acknowledge that the prayer habits of that time were useful to them later.

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Challenges of High School Young people today have many more opportunities to study than their parents. At high school, they are exposed to atheist propaganda and to the challenges of science. Most of them mention experiencing deep doubts without finding any support in their faith, as they were not properly trained and equipped. They would usually be the only Catholic in their class and would feel ashamed of their faith, not knowing how to answer challenges from teachers or classmates. They were also afraid that even if some of their friends might be interested in their faith, they would not know how to answer their questions. As most students boarded at their school, their connections with their home villages became weaker. Many young Catholics “disappeared” at this stage, especially if they dropped out of school and began working as urban migrant workers. Sometimes, the next time that they would encounter the Church would be for their wedding or their baby’s baptism. This would usually take place in their home village during the Chinese New Year. “Something” Happens The interviewees often mentioned that their faith was rekindled in a diocesan summer camp, which they attended after the National College Entrance Examination (NCEE, commonly known as the Gaokao). It was here that they met other Catholic young people. They often recalled the joy of these gatherings. It was the first time that they saw so many young people sharing the same faith, in a youth-friendly setting, and with ageappropriate programs and prayers. They started to once again feel pride in being Catholic. Some had a strong spiritual experience during a prayer meeting or a charismatic Praise and Worship meeting. Some mentioned encounters with God or with Mother Mary. One young man recalled how he felt the Holy Spirit come upon him. Later, he feared nothing as he was confident of its protection. For many, their faith became more personal. It was no longer an external belief forced upon them. At this stage, faith was described in positive terms (family, love, and joy). Some described this turning point as the beginning of a committed quest for spiritual food and a thirst for formation. Then, from the joy of being together and sharing, they progressively discovered the joy of believing in and following Jesus.

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Catalysts for Renewed Faith Community Life and Fellowship Summer camps are a good occasion for young people to network. When they arrive, newcomers are welcomed (even at the railway station) by fellow Catholics. This has a tremendous impact on them. They have left their family and arrive in a strange place. The enthusiastic care of elder students, speaking their own dialect, makes them feel at home. They treasure this community as their own family. One student even described his feelings as “falling in love” with the community, to the extent that it became his whole life and was more important than his studies and other commitments. In many places, parish priests provide a place for the young people to gather over the weekend. Activities like dumpling-making, camping, service, leadership training, and prayer meetings are important parts of community life. Pilgrimages have also become more popular among young people. They build character, create strong social bonds, and let the participants know more about the history of the local Church. Training During their childhood, many young people stated that they did not have an opportunity to study their faith and The Bible. Yet, among the youth, there is a deep thirst for faith formation programs and Bible studies. The years spent enrolled in college are the best time to provide young people with holistic Christian training. Young people are usually good at finding the proper means, and the most effective vocabulary, by which to address other young people’s doubts. One youth center provides online tools for Catholic teenagers to respond to atheist challenges. Leadership training also helps with personal growth as it covers such topics as social concerns, sexuality, family life, vocations, and interpersonal communication. Some in-depth programs (usually three months in duration) help young leaders to reflect deeply on their lives, their relationships with their parents and friends, and their mission in society as Jesus’ disciples. These kinds of programs help them integrate their faith into all aspects of their lives. Spiritual Experiences Young people insist on having concrete feelings of God (“he touched my heart”; “he softened my heart”; “[I am] in touch with Jesus”). “Without spiritual training, young leaders risk falling into ‘Christian activism,’ without any way to refuel,” said one young leader. Deep spiritual experiences,

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like retreats, prayer meetings, charismatic Praise and Worship meetings, pilgrimages, youth masses, and vocation camps, are important occasions to help young people to build a personal relationship with God. Good retreats have a strong impact on the lives of young participants. One young woman shared her belief that, “before it was the faith of my parents, now it is my faith, my Jesus.” But it is hard to find retreat centers which are willing to open their doors to young people (for financial reasons and out of fear that young people will not be able to respect silence), or to find retreat masters willing to preach at retreats for young people (most of the trained retreat masters are available only for priests, sisters, and seminarians). The Taizé prayer service format works well with young people in China. Each year, many young people join Taizé formation programs inside China. A few even go to Taizé in France for a few months of exposure. Other new ecclesial movements also provide young people with strong spiritual training and help them to integrate faith and life. Music ministry and youth-friendly songs have a strong impact on youth, helping them “feel God” and express their joy. Many songs are borrowed from Protestant groups, but in some places, young people have started their own bands and written their own songs. Service Young people also shared how they grew through service to others. Much service that takes place on a regular basis is parish-oriented, such as serving as altar servers, readers, choir members, ushers, and Sunday school teachers. Major activities like the Christmas celebration now usually require the involvement of young people. In doing so, young people bring their dynamism and enthusiasm to local communities. This renews the whole community and attracts even more young people. Children enjoy these lively services and admire these elder brothers and sisters in the faith. They have a strong desire to become like them when they grow up. Sometimes, through the example of young people serving in the Church, older adults discover that services in the Church are not only for priests and sisters. Laypersons can get also involved. Sometimes, they ask for advice from youth leaders, who are better educated and are more experienced. Charity work also has a deep impact on young people, but it is usually on an ad hoc basis. Service to orphans or the elderly is the most common forms of charity work for young people. One religious sister recalled

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encountering an old lady who was so dirty that they thought her skin was dark: After a good bathing with the help of the students, her skin became white again. Young people were moved to see how care to the elderly was important. Mother Teresa of Calcutta is cherished by young people who admire her selfless love. Some youth groups have chosen her as their patron saint. Some young people even went to Calcutta for a couple of months to serve the poor with Mother Teresa’s sisters. Accompaniment The most important issue raised by young people was the need for “accompaniment” (peiban) on a personal or a community level. This word came up often in sharing, even if it was only to express a sense that it is terribly lacking on the personal and community level. Many youth leaders expressed how important it is to be accompanied when they faced difficulties, although many expressed that they had not experienced such support in many cases. They described these as the most challenging times for them, and while some lost their faith as a result, others found an opportunity to grow. Accompaniment includes both pastoral care and companionship. It requires a lot of work. The support given by a priest to the community has a tremendous impact. Many times, priests are too busy to spend a lot of time with young people. Yet if young people are his priority, it gives a strong signal to the young people and to the entire community. The same holds for religious sisters, who can provide suitable accompaniment to young people. As one youth leader put it, “There is a sister in charge of some sectors, of some hundreds of young people, but if I have a difficulty, if I am not in a good mood, I can call her personally, she will come, no problem.” The challenge for religious sisters is the frequent changes of assignment by their superiors, sometimes as often as every one or two years, despite young people needing long-term accompaniment and youth ministers needing training and experience to care well for the youth. Fulltime pastoral workers have a specific role in accompaniment. As they are young themselves, coming from a youth community, they easily attune themselves to their fellow youth. But they complain of a lack of training. The whole youth community has also an important role in accompanying young people: It creates a support group where young people care for other young people, where they can trust each other and share deeply

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about their life, their expectations and difficulties. New social media platforms have however proven effective for accompaniment, including spiritual accompaniment when the young person lives far away from his or her spiritual mentor. In conclusion, if students have a good experience of community life during their college years, it will deeply influence their whole lives. Those born in the 1980s who benefited from youth ministry are usually proactive in their own ongoing faith formation. Some continue to have a support group, which is a crucial support for them. They are dedicated to the Church and take initiatives to develop new pastoral approaches. They treasure their family life and their Christian life and make some decisions accordingly. Some even noted that they had quit their jobs when required to work on Sundays. Others decided to care for their children by themselves as they understand the importance of parental love, thereby setting a good example for other couples, who often rely on their parents for raising their children. Finally, a holistic youth ministry influences families and future generations. In fact, some established youth ministries provide programs for graduates and accompany them in marriage and parenthood. One specific group targets young professionals arriving in the city, supporting them with housing, job applications, and matchmaking. Evangelization When young people build a happy relation with Christ, it is attractive to other young people. As Pope Benedict XVI says, “The Church does not engage in proselytism. Instead, she grows by attraction: just as Christ draws all to himself by the power of his love, culminating in the sacrifice of the Cross.”10 Chiaretto Yan Kin Sheung gives an example of this evangelization-by-attraction in China: Hongye was a young student from the southern province of Guangdong who entered college in Beijing. Through his cousin, he met a Catholic community with a small group of young people who often get together to share experiences on their life of faith. He found ideality in life and became a point of irradiation at his school. Jianchao already showed initial interest in Christianity and seeing Hongye’s behavior, he felt attracted to the group. Two years later, he was baptized a Catholic at Easter. Their good friend in school, Wentao, was wondering where they were going every Sunday. So, he joined them and started to attend the group regularly

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until he also embraced Catholicism. The story goes on as Yahui, a freshman at the college, met Jianchao during his volunteer working hours at school. He was also introduced to the Catholic group and became a committed Christian.11

Vocations Vocations to the priesthood and religious life have been declining tremendously in China. In just twenty years, the number of seminarians has fallen by four-fifths. Traditional ways of nurturing vocations are drying up. Does this mean that God is not calling anyone? Or is it that young people are not generous in answering God’s call? In my interviews, I heard many young people share their vocations. They feel called to follow Jesus. Consecrated life and priesthood are not the only way to answer this call. The examples of young people serving the Church full-time as laity opened new choices and possibilities for the young generation. Positive factors to nurture vocations are leadership and service experience, vocational camps with personal follow-ups during the year, testimonies of joyful and dedicated priests and consecrated persons, and personal faith with strong spiritual experiences, including retreats and international gatherings. But there are obstacles as well. Young people emphasize the lack of personal accompaniment, family opposition, and the pressure to find a good job. They also mention the bad examples of some clergy, the lack of enthusiasm of the sisters, the difficult situation of the Church in China because of government pressure and internal division. Seminarians traditionally come from rural settings, which still have minor seminaries. In many places, teenagers no longer live in the villages. But some college graduates are entering the seminary. How does the traditional way of training priests adjust to the challenge of these better educated and more mature young men? Young women usually do not feel attracted to local diocesan congregations, which they consider rigid. They prefer international communities. Some new ecclesial movements have also attracted young women, many of whom have a calling, but do not want to live in a convent. Youth Expectations One of the questions in the questionnaire distributed as part of the Fifteenth Ordinary General Assembly of the Synod of Bishops, asked: “What

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do young people really ask of the Church in your country today?” One response from mainland China is worth quoting in full: First, youth in Mainland China hope that the Church will listen, be tolerant, be concerned and accompany young people, trying to understand concretely their conditions of faith. They hope that they can communicate with priests face-to-face. They hope that the Church can establish communities and organize activities for the youth, according to their age, stage of life, and goals or directions. They hope that the Church can keep up with the times, providing training about understanding society and the Church, with focus on giving guidance on the view of life, values and moral issues. The Church can also set up structures and space that can facilitate the development of youth, such as providing better material support, setting up diocesan youth center, formation of youth, allowing young people to make good use of their talents and gifts. Second, about the Church itself. Mainland China youth hope to see the Church integrate tradition and creativity, inherit the valuable deposit of the Church’s teaching and liturgy, and move toward inculturation. The Church should emphasize more the formation of priests regarding personal quality and virtues. The youth in China hope that dioceses can improve the system of pastoral ministry, particularly concerning the youth. Concrete plans with proper personnel in charge should be set up, especially relating to marriage and vocations. They also hope to see more opportunities for international exchange for the Church in China. They would like to see the Church get involved in or initiate more services for the common good, schools (if possible), evangelization, and efforts to unite the Church in China (between open and underground communities).12

Difficulties and Challenges Lack of Support On a diocesan level, bishops, priests, and religious superiors may find that youth ministry is important for the Church. But when it comes to financial support, manpower, and premises, many other items seem more important than youth ministry. Parish priests may be happy to have young people come to church, and some make their premises available to young people. But they seldom provide them with suitable accompaniment. They are rarely prepared to pay for a pastoral worker serving the youth. As youth is a stage in life with specific challenges and needs, youth ministers need to be more specialized, with proper training and long-term plans. Transferring a priest or a religious sister after a few years

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can have dramatic consequences for youth ministry. This is particularly true with seminarians. After ordination, seminarians are often assigned to a “more important” mission, like being made parish priests. One young woman commented bitterly on this situation, noting that, “the bishop is using us as guinea pigs to train his seminarians. We are not worthy to have well-trained young priests to care for us.” Further, sometimes young people are not welcome because adults find them too noisy and perhaps too challenging. When young people are given leadership roles — such as chairman of their student community — they need special support to face these new challenges. They are “spiritual leaders,” who know only a little about their faith. Sometimes it is hard to cope with suffering. One young leader commented that, “young people today will not take the initiative to ask for help when they need it. The initiative should come from the adults who should be more proactive in their support to youth leaders.” In some places, especially in Hebei, the local Church (either on the diocesan level or parish level) has started to hire young adults as fulltime pastoral workers to care for the youth. It is fruitful, especially when networking among themselves. They share ideas, talents, and resources. Yet even if they are college graduates, they get a low salary from the Church. It is hard for them to make a living. Because of this, they may leave the pastoral field with bad feelings about the Church, whose leaders are ready to build cathedrals and diocesan centers but cannot afford to pay a just salary to their staff. How to Care for All Young People? Many youth groups focus on college students, but even if the number of college students has risen tremendously in the past twenty years, many young people are still not going to college. Some of them quit after junior high school. How does the Church take care of the youth who do not go on to college? In some large rural dioceses like Zhaoxian, Handan, and Xianxian, training programs called “100-day formation” are provided to young people. But they train at most one hundred young people each year in each diocese. What about the others? In some rural parishes, some young people have started to organize themselves to care for other young people. There is also growing concern for the young migrants in the cities. In big cities like Tianjin and Beijing, some young priests and religious sisters from rural dioceses move to the suburban areas of those cities to care for the young migrants from their home dioceses. Yet there are many

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migrants living in large cities without any religious support. As one young man from Gansu said with a sense of urgency, “It is a crucial moment. Our parents failed in transmitting faith to their children, they only transmitted prayers and rules. If those involved in the Church’s youth ministry relax efforts a little, then the faith of the young people today will collapse in China.” Implementation of New Religious Regulations Youth ministry is currently facing new challenges from the government. There is the reinforcement of Marxist education, what Xi Jinping calls “the faith of the people.” There is the implementation of the new religious regulations that were introduced on February 1, 2018. Beginning in April 2018, many schools told parents to keep children free of religious influence, under the “principle of separation of religion and education.” This principle used to be understood as intended on keeping religion out of schools.13 Now it is more about keeping religion out of the lives of students altogether. Youth ministers are worried that the movement to forbid youth under the age of 18 from joining any religious activities, which started in Henan Province, is now spreading to other provinces, and will be applied to children all over the country. During the summer of 2018, some youth camps and catechism programs were banned in different provinces. If such a ban becomes systematic, then the current way of doing youth ministry may be severely compromised. The Church will have to focus more on family faith training to help the younger generations grow in faith.

Conclusion: A New Way of Being Is Emerging for the Church We can now identify the key elements of a new way of being for the Church in China. “The Church as Communion” was an important insight of the Second Vatican Council. Community life is playing a tremendous role in helping young people in China to live their faith and to take an active part in the life of the Church. It is related to the importance of peers for youth, to the need of family bonds far away from home, but it is also a way of living the specificity of Christian life, in a society in which all relations are for a purpose: Young people treasure these relations of selfless love, where everyone is equal, like brothers and sisters, without any

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hidden agenda. This kind of Christian relationship brings young people deep joy.14 Fraternity in the community is based on the understanding of Jesus as “elder brother Su,” a name many young people love to call the Lord. Some priests rebuke young people for using a seemingly casual term, but other priests like to be called by the young people in a similar way, for example, “elder brother Song,” viewing it as familiar yet respectful. Emphasizing “the Church as Fraternity” (adelphotés in Greek) was common in early Christianity15 and can be useful to understand what kind of Church is emerging in China. Youth ministry in China still has a lot of room to grow and is facing many challenges, including the implementation of new governmental regulations. But it is already bearing a lot of fruits, deeply changing people, and raising young people to new lives in Christ. If those changes do not yet affect the structures of the local Church, they tell a lot, however, about a possible new kind of Church that is emerging in China, and it brings comfort and hope in a difficult period for the Church in China today. When young people discover the joy of being Disciples of Christ, they get very involved in the life of the church, which becomes a more participatory and collaborative Church. They start to care for each other; young people minister to other young people; young people evangelize other young people. They are ready to support the coming generations. Some young adults get involved in Sunday schools and others accompany younger brothers and sisters. When asked what it is that they can bring to the Church as a community, their first answer is always “dynamism” (huoli). As one young man emphasized, “if young people raise up, they become the main strength. What they do, other groups cannot do. The elderly want to do things but they do not have the energy; the kids do not have the capacity to do it, many things rely on young people, including evangelization.” With this young generation of Catholics, the Church in China is also moving toward the model of a servant Church.

Notes 1. “In the US, the term ‘youth’ designates adolescents approximately ages 13 to 18, sometimes younger. The term ‘young adult’ designates those in their late teens, 20s and 30s. Therefore, when speaking of the Synod and its focus in the US, it is best to use the phrase ‘youth and young adults’ (or ‘young people’) since the age range includes both

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groups,” see http://www.usccb.org/about/bishops-and-dioceses/synodof-bishops/synod-2018/index.cfm. Pope Francis states that, “A young person stands on two feet as adults do, but unlike adults, whose feet are parallel, he always has one foot forward, ready to set out, to spring ahead. Always racing onward. To talk about young people is to talk about promise and to talk about joy. Young people have so much strength; they are able to look ahead with hope. A young person is a promise of life that implies a certain degree of tenacity. He is foolish enough to delude himself, and resilient enough to recover from that delusion.” Pope Francis and Thomas Leoncini, God Is Young: A Conversation with Thomas Leoncini (New York: Penguin Random House, 2018), p. 4. Chiaretto Yan Kin Sheung, Season for Relationships: Youth in China and the Mission of the Church (Macau: Claretian Publications, 2018). “Accelerating urbanization ushers in new economic driver in China,” Xinhua, February 5, 2018, no pagination. Accessed at http://english.gov.cn/ news/top_news/2018/02/05/content_281476037070464.htm. As described by Avery Dulles in Models of the Church (Garden City, NY: Image Books, 1987). By “proper youth ministry” I mean a youth pastoral program which not only provides one-shot activities or catechism, but which cares for the need of the young people on a long-term basis, with appropriate programs, accompaniment, teamwork, focusing on young people’s holistic growth and vocational discernment. “21-7 Number of Entrants of Formal Education by Type and Level (1978–2016),” in China Statistical Yearbook 2017, no pagination. Accessed at http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2017/indexeh.htm. On this aspect, see the following interesting study: Lu Zun’en, “Women de nianqing ren zai xiang shenme? Qian tan ruhe xiang 80 hou, 90 hou, 95 hou chuan fuyin” (“What Are Our Young People Thinking? How to Witness Youth of the Post-1980s, 1990s and 1995s Generations”), Church China, Vol. 50 (November 2014), no pagination. Accessed at https:// www.churchchina.org/archives/141106.html. Yan, Season for Relationships. Benedict XVI, “Homily at Mass for the Opening of the Fifth General Conference of the Latin American and Caribbean Bishops” (May 13, 2007), AAS 99 (2007), p. 437. Accessed at http://w2.vatican.va/ content/benedict-xvi/en/homilies/2007/documents/hf_ben-xvi_hom_ 20070513_conference-brazil.html.Quoted by Pope Francis as, “It Is Not by Proselytizing that the Church Grows, but ‘by attraction,’” in Evangelii Gaudium, No. 14 (2013), no pagination. Accessed at https:// w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/apost_exhortations/documents/ papa-francesco_esortazione-ap_20131124_evangelii-gaudium.html.

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11. Yan, Season for Relationships, p. 58. 12. “Answers from the Church in Mainland China to the Questionnaire for the Preparatory Document of 15th Ordinary General Assembly of the Synod of Bishops on ‘Young People, Faith and Vocational Discernment,’” Tripod, Vol. 38, No. 90 (Autumn 2018), pp. 64–65. 13. See, for example, the official propaganda on the following Buddhist website, in March 2017, http://www.fjnet.com/ltanjh/ltrn/201703/ t20170331_244079.htm. 14. See the importance of joy for Christians, as emphasized by Pope Francis in The Joy of the Gospel, Evangelii Gaudium, 2013. 15. See the extensive study on fraternity in early Christianity in, Michel Dujarier, Eglise-Fraternité, L’ecclésiologie du Christ-Frère aux huit premiers siècles (Paris: Cerf, Coll Patrimoines, Christianisme, 2013).

CHAPTER 9

The Sheshan “Miracle” and Its Interpretations Paul P. Mariani

Abstract After China’s Cultural Revolution, long repressed groups such as the Shanghai Catholic community resurfaced. This was evidenced in the March 1980 Sheshan “miracle” where believers gathered at the most important Catholic pilgrimage site in the region in expectation of an apparition of the Virgin Mary. This chapter will investigate this “miracle” through three keys: the event (how the past has been historically reconstructed), the experience (how the past has been experienced through observers), and the myth (how the past has been reinterpreted to meet the needs of new audiences). It argues that the government wanted to produce a demythologized counter-narrative to the Sheshan “miracle” as it could not abide by the narrative that religion had sprung back to life so rapidly in the reform era. Keywords Catholic Church in China · Sheshan “miracle” · Shanghai · Virgin Mary · Sino-Vatican relations · Jesuit

P. P. Mariani (B) Santa Clara University, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 C. Y.-y. Chu and P. P. Mariani (eds.), People, Communities, and the Catholic Church in China, Christianity in Modern China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1679-5_9

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Introduction By the late 1970s, China had been liberated from its Maoist ideological straitjacket. In the ensuing political and spiritual relaxation, long repressed groups resurfaced. In fact, in the new dispensation, it seemed that the stronger the repression on these groups had been in the past, the stronger would be their re-emergence. One such long suppressed group was the Shanghai Catholic community. Their re-emergence was evidenced in the March 1980 Sheshan “miracle.” Sheshan — Zosé in the local dialect — is the highest hill in the Shanghai region. For Catholics, it is also the most important pilgrimage site in the region and is dedicated to the Virgin Mary. Ever since the famed scholar Paul Xu Guangqi was converted by the Jesuit Matteo Ricci in 1603, Shanghai Catholics have had a strong devotion to Mary. Their faith had enjoyed short periods of toleration and long periods of persecution, when missionaries were banished. In the 1840s, when Jesuit missionaries returned to the Shanghai region, they found that the faith of Chinese Catholics had survived, as did the strong attachment to Mary. Once the mainly French Jesuits had consolidated their position in the early 1860s, they began purchasing land at Sheshan. During that time, the Taiping Rebellion — a large-scale millenarian rebellion that threatened the central government — was raging. Catholics promised that — if they were spared — they would build a church there in honor of Mary. The Taiping were defeated and religious sites were built both at the mid-level point and at the top of the hill. For the next one hundred and fifty years, Sheshan’s “sacred power” took on an increasingly important role in the life of the Catholic Church in China. Mary provided the Catholics of China with guidance, support, and even protection not only from the Taiping and anti-Christian mobs but also from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In 1924, at a synod in Shanghai, the assembled bishops consecrated the nation to Our Lady of China. The church at the top of the hill was torn down and by 1935 a large baroque-style church — twice the size of the original — was erected on the same spot. The image of Our Lady Queen of China was placed inside.1 So, by the 1930s Sheshan was a veritable complex with a large church dedicated to Our Lady of Sheshan. In addition to the massive hilltop church and the small mid-level church (which functioned as the local

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parish), there was also a path which leads to the top of the hill with lifesize statues of the Stations of the Cross and a gathering place at the base of the hill. For generations, Catholics had traveled there to pray the rosary, sing songs, and chant their prayers as they ascended to the hilltop basilica along the well-worn pilgrim’s path. Making a pilgrimage to Sheshan was especially popular during May, the month dedicated to Mary. In 1946, after the Japanese occupation of China, the hilltop church was declared a basilica, one of a few in all of Asia, and the only one in China. It was worthy of its name. In May 1947, there was a solemn ceremony there to crown Mary as Queen of China. Archival footage shows up to 60,000 people walking slowly up the hill along with papal internuncio Anthony Riberi and some twenty archbishops, bishops, and high-ranking government officials.2 For over one hundred years, Sheshan had protected the Christians of the Shanghai region. But they would be sorely tried when the Communists came to power in 1949. For within a year and a half of its victory, the CCP tried to bring the Shanghai Catholic community under government control. By the early 1950s, the government made it harder for pilgrims to travel to Sheshan by limiting the number of buses. Modernization efforts also made the pilgrimage difficult as the canals throughout the area were drained. Earlier these canals had been ubiquitous and allowed fishing families from distant areas to travel to the base of Sheshan. These different circumstances all conspired to make made it harder to travel to Sheshan.3 From the loftiest of perches in the late 1940s, Sheshan, and all it represented, fell into the abyss. This was quite literally true during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) when Red Guards attacked the basilica by battering down the doors, shattering the magnificent stained-glass windows, destroying the sacred image of Mary, and toppling the bronze statue on top of the steeple of Mary triumphantly holding up the Christ Child. This statue used to be seen for miles around and, from a distance, looked like a giant cross with its outstretched arms. Now Mary triumphant had been deposed. Further, the mid-level parish church was also ruined, the large statues of the Stations of the Cross were destroyed, and the pilgrimage route became overgrown. The whole hill was declared off-limits and guarded by soldiers. There were reports that tunnels were burrowed into the hill and used by the military. The only ones who had access to the hilltop basilica were workers from the former Jesuit observatory, who used it as a

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gymnasium. Others were denied access. During the Cultural Revolution, the government was so confident of its achievements that Zhang Chunqiao, the CCP leader in Shanghai, declared that Red Guards had “wiped out” religion in the area “overnight.”4 Yet by the end of the Cultural Revolution, there had been a loosening of political control. There were now fewer guards at the site. It was a testament to the tenacity of the faith of some Catholics that they ventured up to Sheshan — under the pretense of picnicking — to pray. Other Catholics surreptitiously buried the remains of deceased relatives at the foot of the hill. Some traditions, it was clear, would die hard. Yet there had still been no large-scale pilgrimage to Sheshan in over 25 years. The authorities could safely assume that their decades-long campaign to eradicate religion was successful. But they would soon discover how misguided they were.5 For in March of 1980 up to 10,000 pilgrims traveled to Sheshan. They witnessed the miraculous: the re-emergence of publicly practiced religion in one of the most atheistic nations on earth. This paper will investigate the so-called Sheshan “miracle” through three “keys.” In doing so, it takes its lead from Paul A. Cohen’s History in Three Keys: The Boxers as Event, Experience and Myth.6 Cohen posits that we can look at the Boxer Rebellion in terms of event (how the past has been historically reconstructed), the experience (how the past has been experienced through observers), and myth (how the past has been reinterpreted to meet the needs of new audiences). In an analogous fashion, I will look at the Sheshan miracle through the same three keys. There are two major differences between my account and Cohen’s. The first is that I have fewer sources to work with. In fact, the same eyewitness source of the Sheshan miracle largely informs both my event and experience sections. Second, Cohen had nearly one hundred years of history to work with to see how the Boxers had been mythologized over time. My own historical arc is much shorter. Further, the main intent of the government in retelling the story of Sheshan was to demythologize the events at Sheshan, but, in the process, they tried to fit those events into their own mythic history. There is a compelling reason why the government wanted to demythologize the Sheshan miracle. It could simply not abide by the narrative that religion had sprung back to life so rapidly in the reform era. Surely thirty years of state-mandated atheism could not be cast aside in one fell swoop.

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The government sought answers in its recent past in how to deal with religion. In fact, even just after Liberation, the CCP was divided into two camps.7 The radicals argued that the revolution had been won and now religion must be extirpated through strict administrative fiat. The gradualists, on the other hand, argued that such an approach would backfire. Religion, they argued, would die out on its own accord, especially when people realized the benefits of socialism. What was necessary in the meantime was not to provoke religious believers, but to educate them, and have them join the common cause of modernization. This was the state’s version of the secularization thesis, which holds that as countries modernize, they become less religious.8 In the reform era, the gradualist school of thought once again became ascendant and produced three demythologized counter-narratives to explain the Sheshan “miracle.”

Sheshan as Event What happened at Sheshan? In mid-March, 1980 pilgrims arrived at the base of the hill by the hundreds and then by the thousands. (Some estimated the total to be as high as ten thousand.) They were young and old and arrived by boat and bus. They traveled from as close as Shanghai and as far as Guangdong and Hebei. Many of them were fisherfolk from the greater Shanghai region, including from the suburban area called Qingpu. There was also a sizeable contingent from the Wenzhou region several hundred miles south of Shanghai.9 This mass gathering of pilgrims was surely a shock to the assembled security forces and cadres from the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association (CCPA). Some months previously “rumors” had been circulated that Mary would appear at Sheshan in March accompanied by lights. In fact, it appears that, in the lead up to the events, the government became an unwitting accomplice in the religious manifestation, as it actively discouraged people from going. But in the religious landscape of the time, this only served to increase the curiosity of the people and spread the report far and wide. An extraordinary eyewitness account came from a Hong Kong Catholic businessman who was visiting Shanghai at the time.10 When he returned home, he gave his confidential report to Church leaders. (Much of the following relies heavily on this important document.) In his report, the businessman notes that he had trouble sleeping the night before, so he was at the Xujiahui (Zikawei in the local dialect) bus stop at 6:20 am on

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Saturday March 15. (He was fortunate enough to get a ticket because many of the later tickets were already sold out.) He noticed that many people on the bus were “diehards” from the Wenzhou area and others were fisherfolk. The businessman recalled that these other pilgrims were carrying all manner of religious items. (Apparently, the factories of Wenzhou had been producing this material for several years even before economic reform became a national policy.) The author of this account noted that a group of these pilgrims from Wenzhou had arrived in Shanghai the night before. Having never visited Shanghai before, they were unsure where to go and found their way to Xujiahui. It was no surprise. For Xujiahui rivaled Sheshan in importance. It was the ancestral home of Paul Xu Guangqi and the place where the Jesuits later built many of their institutions. By the eve of the Communist takeover, it was one of the largest Catholic mission compounds in Asia. It had a large theological library, convents, a flagship high school, several seminaries, and the towering St. Ignatius Church. But in the intervening years, things had changed. The priests and religious brothers and sisters who still lived there had been harassed during the Cultural Revolution. In more peaceful times, they had worked in an umbrella factory. Many of them were under the control of the CCPA. Thus, when the pilgrims went to the Xujiahui Church and asked the way to Sheshan, the four priests there dissuaded them from going. These “patriotic” priests said they should not believe rumors “spread by evil people.” When the eyewitness finally arrived at Sheshan, he was “stunned” to see the number of people. There were approximately two hundred boats moored at the foot of the hill and many others further away. There were also many bicycles and many people were already walking up the hill. One of the first signs that something significant was taking place was that the canals had come back to life. In the past, many city-dwellers had taken buses but the fisherfolk had for generations relied on the extensive system of canals in the Shanghai region. Yet these canals had not been used for years. Some had been filled in during recent government modernization efforts and the water level had also sunk. Many areas had begun to look like dead ponds. But in the preceding days, there had been heavy rains and the canals had come back to life. In front of the mid-level church, there were three shrines, but the original statues were long gone. To remedy this, someone put a small statue

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of Mary on the base of one of the shrines and the pilgrims recited prayers and sang for hours. They then moved on to the next shrine. At about 11:30 am a group of fishermen arrived at the mid-level church. They pushed away the barbed wire and opened the gates. “The doors of Heaven are open now,” exclaimed an old man in “tattered clothes.” They lit candles inside the church and set off firecrackers outside. The festive atmosphere was wedded to the recent economic liberalization: stalls were selling food and soft drinks. At that spot alone there were perhaps five to six thousand people at Sheshan. Detachments of the police also made their presence known, as did the CCP officials. They just stood there watching and taking photographs. The eyewitness was still at the midpoint of the hill and from that vantage point could see that there was a long “silk ribbon” of people slowly climbing up the hill and kneeling at each level to pray. The original path had become overgrown but the pilgrims were forging a new path to the top. By the time the eyewitness reached the hilltop, the basilica had already been opened. It was packed with people. The insides were bare but some people put up a makeshift altar with a picture of Jesus and lit candles. Members of the CCPA were also there. They wanted the pilgrims to leave. The pilgrims were weeping and praying but the “patriotics” were not. They were simply observing everything. At 3 pm, they went down the hill. The fishermen let these other pilgrims climb aboard their boats. Because of their hospitality, the boats became free hotels for pilgrims no matter their dialect. There was a strong feeling of camaraderie. The account further notes that March 16 was a Sunday and many more people arrived on this day. There were some tensions when twenty members of the CCPA arrived at the base of the hill. A group of fishermen formed a “human wall” to prevent them from going up. An argument ensued about the legality of setting off firecrackers. The pilgrims countered by questioning the government’s illegality in destroying the churches during the Cultural Revolution. They finally allowed some “patriotics” to go up the hill individually, but if they “opened their mouths, they were surrounded by the fishermen, and they had to shut up.” There were still some tense moments. At one point, some villagers thought the “patriotics” were insulting an archbishop or their ancestors. The “patriotics” felt threatened and ran down the hill to the police. The situation began to wind down on March 17. It was a rainy day and in front of the mid-level church there was a “carpet of mud.” It was

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the result of three days of “firecrackers mixed with the rain.” There were still groups of people praying inside in front of the small makeshift altars with the small statues of Mary. There were also batches of fresh flowers and many candles burning. The eyewitness noticed that the Shanghai people prayed silently and the villagers prayed together in a loud voice. He soon left Sheshan from the bus station at the base of the hill, where a large crowd had assembled. On the bus ride back to Shanghai, they had printed sheets and sang hymns to Mary. This eyewitness seems to have left Sheshan on the morning of March 17. He said nothing of any lights. But another observer noted that there were lights at 12:35 pm on the same day.11

Sheshan as Experience Now let us look at the past as experienced. I am still heavily dependent on the above account since it is one a few complete eyewitness accounts of what transpired at Sheshan in 1980 that I am aware of. But it is important to see how this eyewitness experienced this event and through what categories he viewed his experience — how he “made sense of the world,” as Cohen notes.12 The first of these categories is that of the Marian apparition. The fact that the eyewitness heard that Mary might appear at Sheshan should come as no surprise, as Catholics have long made pilgrimages to sites where Mary has purported to appear, like Lourdes in France in the midnineteenth century and Fatima in Portugal in the early twentieth century. These places are all well-known and are major places of pilgrimage to the present day. Besides these officially approved Marian pilgrimage sites, there are a host of others that attract pilgrims, but do not have official Church approval. There were also other Marian pilgrimage sites in Asia — such as Lavang in Vietnam that dated to about 1798 but gained greater popularity in the early twentieth century with the rise of mass communication and transportation.13 Sheshan, it seems, followed a similar trajectory. Further, these Marian apparitions draw on a common vocabulary of Mary as a guide and protector. They also speak of some sort of supernatural phenomenon such as lights or luminescence. There is also often the prior notice that Mary will appear at a certain time. Finally, there is the anticipation, the crowds, and the communal nature of the pilgrimage. And where else would Mary appear but at a well-known Marian site?

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Therefore, the apparition at Sheshan would fit easily into the category of a Marian apparition. A second related category is that of God’s sovereignty over nature itself, of the supernatural over the natural. This category provides a tidy answer to the materialism of the orthodox Marxists. Indeed, the crowds were assembled to pay witness to the miraculous event of Mary’s appearance at Sheshan accompanied by light. But even if they did not witness this, God’s sovereignty was already present in the bringing back to life of the arid waterways and canals that led to the base of Sheshan. It was for this reason that so many fishing people could make it to Sheshan. This was coupled with the fact that just as thousands of pilgrims started to arrive, the sun came out. The eyewitness saw in this the will of God, offering up the following rhetorical question: “Was it not the Will of Heaven?” In addition, God is sovereign over all of China. Returning to Shanghai by bus, the pilgrims all sang hymns to Mary, something that had not been seen for decades. The account adds, “Think about it! Who would have thought that a busload of passengers would sing hymns to Our Lady on Chinese soil in the 80s, here on the road between Zosé and Shanghai?” Third, there is the category of the “true Church.” For decades Shanghai Catholics had been beaten down and harassed. They were enticed to join what they felt was a counterfeit and government-controlled Church. But now after decades of state repression, the veil was lifted and they could see things are they really were. Mary had stood on the side of the true Church all along. She had renounced the patriotic Church. It was these humble Catholic villagers who were closest to her. She helped them confound the false Church. These villagers knew what real faith was. For example, on the morning that fishermen broke open the front doors of the mid-level church, an old man in “tattered” clothes said: “The doors of Heaven are open now.” There is a parallel here in the gospel where Jesus tells the disciples that they will be hauled before the authorities, but they will instinctively know how to respond to the charges made against them. In this case, the people are charged with lighting firecrackers, something forbidden by “Church” regulations, meaning CCPA regulations. And they respond quite naturally: “And you have smashed everything in our churches. Is this the rule of the Catholic Church?” Thus, the tensions of the past decades had not been resolved and were now bursting into the open. In fact, according to the observer, the Catholic masses deployed the same political language against the cadres and beat them at their own game.

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Such encounters drove the “patriotics” to exasperation, as the eyewitness quotes them saying: “These village folks, what do they know? They call us renegades although we love the country and love God and love the Communist Party.” There was further vindication of the true Church and shaming of the false Church in terms of the attitudes expressed. While on Sheshan, the mass of people was weeping and praying. In contrast, the “patriotics” had a lack of piety as they did not pray or kneel, and “only looked around, their eyes like search-lights, checking out what was going on.” The border between the true Church and the false Church could not be clearer. Because of this clear delineation between the real Church and the false Church, sometimes power struggles developed. At one point, twenty “patriotics” attempted to go up the hill. In response, the fisherfolk created a “human wall” to prevent them. Only later did they allow the “patriotics” to venture up the hill individually. But if they tried to say something out loud, they were immediately surrounded. There were still some tense moments. Once at the top of the hill, a cadre said: “Bishop Kung is a counter-revolutionary.” (Bishop Kung was Ignatius Kung Pinmei or Gong Pinmei who had been the first Chinese bishop of Shanghai and was still in prison for resisting CCP religious policy in the 1950s.) It was a deliberately provocative gesture and brought the old divisions in the Church into the open. In fact, the observer speculated that even if the pilgrims did not know Bishop Kung, they were still offended because the word for Kung sounds like the word for archbishop in the Shanghai dialect. The cadre might have well as attacked their ancestors. The cadre was soon in a “hornet’s nest” and ran to the police who watched with “ice-cold” eyes. For the observer, the conclusion was unmistakable: “This is the real Church of China, these poor people.” And the “real” Church had proven its mettle: there was the outpouring of religious faith, the singing of hymns on public buses, the days of non-stop prayers and devotions, the resistance against the authorities, and the forcible reopening of a religious site that had been closed for decades. Further, the zeal of these humble pilgrims was infectious. For while decades of hostility had sufficiently cowed the once-proud urban Shanghai Catholics: “Through the incidence of Sheshan, they are quite encouraged.”14 Thus, the “real” Church is the Church of the poor and humble. The fake Church is the “patriotic” Church. The observer deploys

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this language to drive home his point of the enduring strength of the traditional faith and the utter disaster of Marxist-Leninism, the God that failed. For their part, the “patriotic” priests at Xujiahui had a different view about Sheshan. They had tried to prevent some of the early arrivals from Wenzhou from even going to Sheshan. They urged them not to be fooled by “rumors” spread by “evil people.” Thus, a counter-narrative to Sheshan was already beginning to develop, a counter-narrative that we will now explore.

A Scientific Explanation The government could not let stand the narrative of Sheshan as a miracle. This had to be counteracted with the narrative of Sheshan as myth. And the best way for them to deconstruct a myth was through an appeal to science. The earliest such example seems to come from an April 1982 letter to the editor of the Chinese Youth Daily.15 In this letter, a certain Liang Jiadian asks what to do about some young people who have become Christians and joined a nearby Church. The writer manifests some anxiety in not wanting to violate the current policy on religion. On the other hand, the issue cannot be ignored. The editor’s response is rather lengthy. It first reassures the writer that since implementing the (new) policy on religion, this type of situation has occurred elsewhere. In the new policy, freedom of religion should be protected. It then gives the orthodox Marxist interpretation of religion. Its origin can be traced back to the fears primitive people had for natural phenomena. Later, they put hope in “gods” to free people from the depredations of the oppressing classes. While these classes are now gone in China, the influence of class struggle still exists, and old ways die hard. Therefore, youth league members should take an active role in raising people’s consciousness about the harmful effects of religion. The real answers are in atheism, materialism, and modern science, not in religion, or, worse yet, superstition. But discouraging religion should not be done in a “violent” manner. The response then uses the Sheshan event as an illustration. In 1980, “a few counterrevolutionaries hidden inside the Church” made up a “rumor” about a Marian apparition. Therefore, some pilgrims went on pilgrimage to see the “holy light” and get “holy water.”

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But there was a ready scientific explanation for these “rumors.” In fact, the phone company had a “microwave” station nearby. The Communist Youth League members worked with some people from the phone company — none of whom were drawn in by the rumors — to expose the true origins of the light. It turned out that, “sunlight reflected from the great glass expanse of the observatory window would reflect off the green glazed tiles of the church roof, causing a kind of halo visible to those standing in front of the church.” When the window was shaded, there was no light. This served as a scientific explanation for the “holy light.” As for the “holy water,” it was nothing more than polluted spring water. When these things were explained to the young people, they stopped going to Sheshan for either “holy light” or “holy water.” Whether one finds these “scientific” explanations convincing, their real purpose seems clear. They were designed to stop the youth from going to holy sites or attending church. Even in a period of more relaxed religious policies, the government was still anxious that young people might return to the old “gods,” rather rely on the Party to answer life’s pressing questions. Therefore, the full weight of “scientific” and materialistic reasoning was brought to bear on the Sheshan event.

A Social Scientific Explanation A few years later the government launched a more systematic investigation of the Sheshan miracle. The object of study was now not so much the phenomenon itself but a segment of the people who traveled to Sheshan to witness the lights, the Qingpu fisherfolk, most notably those from the town of Zhujiajiao. The results were published by the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences as part of a social scientific study of religious questions.16 The study itself was published in 1987 but was based on fieldwork conducted in 1983. What follows is a short section that explicitly describes the events at Sheshan. In March 1980, before any of the Shanghai district churches had reopened, Qingpu Catholics heard the rumor that the “Blessed Mother” would show her power and presence by appearing on Sheshan hill surrounded by a halo. For over ten years they had not gone to Sheshan to worship the “Blessed Mother,” so, when they heard the rumor passed around by some people, they quit working and went to see the “apparition and radiance of the Blessed Mother.” When they arrived at Sheshan, the people who had spread the rumor, hiding themselves among

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the crowd, shouted reactionary slogans, breaking, smashing, and abusing the government.17 Several things are worth pointing out in this narrative. First, it reiterates the standard line that it was a “rumor” that Mary would appear. But it situates this interpretation in the historical context that these rumors were spread before any of the district churches had reopened in Shanghai. Therefore, the government was partially to blame for this state of affairs. It had not yet proactively responded to the religious needs of the people in the new era. Second, there was a pent-up need to see Mary because these believers had not been permitted to travel to Sheshan for so long. (In fact, it had been longer than the ten years mentioned in the report.) Again, the government is partly to blame because of its religious policies. Finally, those who had spread the rumors are to blame for carrying on other counterrevolutionary activities. In this regard, they, and not the government, are to blame. Notice here that there is no attempt on the part of these social scientists to try to explain away or attack the phenomenon at Sheshan. Innocent people were simply responding to a rumor spread by reactionary rumormongers. But the government is to be blamed for allowing the preconditions to be set which provided fertile ground for those rumors. The report itself begins with a May 1983 pilgrimage by these Qingpu fisherfolk to Sheshan. It describes this “impressive” group in some detail. They were devout and orderly. They arrived at 5 am. They assembled at the base of the hill, formed a line, and walked slowly up the hill. Later they descended to the mid-level pavilion and knelt and chanted in groups. Some walked “prayerfully” along the Stations of the Cross. There were no reactionaries and troublemakers causing chaos. They expressed their piety in a controlled fashion and in a way approved by the government. Thus, the 1983 pilgrimage provided a counter-narrative to the “chaos and instability” of the events of just three years before. What had changed since then? In short, the government had corrected its failures. It had recognized that even though China had been socialist for over thirty years, these Qingpu fisherfolk had devoutly held on to their faith. In recognizing the reasons for the deeply rooted nature of their faith, the report gives some important historical background. These people had been Catholics for generations. They had a deeply traditional and culturally embedded faith. They had to fulfill the four precepts: attending Mass

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on Sunday and important feast days, fasting on Friday, going to communion and confession at least once a year, and financially supporting the Church. They also memorized their prayers and catechism. Sheshan itself was also important because they went there every year. The result of this intensive Catholic upbringing was clear since their whole lives were influenced by religion. With such an intense religious upbringing and with little secularizing influences from the outside world, these Catholic fishing villages were a special place. But there was a fatal flaw: “In the past hundred years, imperialism used the Catholic Church in its invasion of China. Qingpu’s Catholic fishermen knew nothing of this fact of history. They only knew that Catholicism was the ‘true religion,’ not that it was being used by the imperialists.”18 The report then explains how this worldview survived even Liberation. The short answer was that the fisherfolk had taken their devout faith with them over the 1949 divide. One gets the sense in this report that with the blessings of Socialism, their religious faith would gradually disappear or else they would at least “follow the patriotic road” while practicing their faith. Indeed, the narrative describes that this seemed to be the case, especially in the early and mid-1950s. At first, many of the Qingpu Catholics did not believe the Party. They were told that the Party wanted to wipe out religion. Then, there were the struggle campaigns in 1953 and 1955 to clean out “imperialist and counterrevolutionary elements” in the Church. Finally, many Catholics began to follow the “patriotic road.” Yet just as the government was achieving success, things went wrong. “Leftist” influences appeared. The proper exercise of religion was called superstition. Further, the villagers were told that religious practice would “hamper production.” The number of churches and Church activities was reduced. By 1958 nearly no one attended church. Thus, these leftist errors created a “barrier” between these Catholics and the government. They could see no way to love their country and their religion. Events took a turn for the worse in the Cultural Revolution. Churches were closed or destroyed. Thus, their worst fears at Liberation that the government would destroy religion were confirmed. Further, believers were now not allowed to read The Bible, wear holy medals, or hang holy pictures. Some were even denounced and imprisoned. The ultra-leftists were now ascendant. They thought they had rid China of religion. But this arrogance proved to be their undoing. “They did not know that it is precisely times like this…that the faith of devout believers is strengthened.” In fact, these devout fisherfolk simply read

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their prayers aloud on their boats, “out of earshot of the shore.” The report then drives home its point. “Thus, it turned out that while the ‘ultra-leftists’ attempted to stifle religion by administrative methods, the final results were exactly opposite to what they had intended. This proves that banning religion by administrative decree will not work.” The conclusion is clear: the Party must now return to a moderate line, one that these enlightened early reform era social scientists can provide.19 According to the report, it was this freighted historical background which helped explain some of the “chaos and instability” of the March 1980 Sheshan event. In fact, the Sheshan “miracle” occurred as the new religious policy was being promulgated. In implementing this new policy and making sure that “illegal activities carried on under the cover of religion” would be resolved, the cadres had their work cut out for themselves. To this end, sixty-five unjust cases involving the villagers were corrected. The cadres visited them to show friendship. Those who had earlier followed the government line were “welcomed home,” some were made people’s representatives in the government, and before the church in Zhujiajiao was reopened, some were brought to Shanghai city for Mass. All of this was done to show the goodwill of the government in making amends for past mistakes. But the government still had to point out the mistakes of others as well. There were those who had spread rumors about the Marian apparition and those deceived by such rumors. A clear line had to be drawn between the two groups. Thus, the cadres carried out their “painstaking” work of education with this latter group. Gradually many Catholics became convinced of the government’s sincerity, and they helped to expose others who had done illegal things under the guise of religion. A major act in winning over the people was when the Religious Affairs Bureau and the Shanghai CCPA returned the Zhujiajiao Catholic Church in December 1980 and reopened it on Christmas Day. More than one thousand people attended that Mass as it was the first church that had been reopened in the suburban districts of Shanghai. (That this happened so soon after the March events speak volumes about the government’s intention to right past wrongs.) These Catholics were quite thankful to the government, “and their relations with cadres became more and more intimate and friendly.” The people also began to distance themselves from, “the Vatican’s sabotage activities.” (This probably refers to recent resurgence of the underground Church.) As a result, about four

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thousand went to the Sheshan pilgrimage in May. This was all because of the “restoration of normal religious activities.”20 Further, as with all good materialists, the social scientist authors dutifully showed the economic side of the story as well. These Catholic fisherfolk were now abandoning fishing and working more in factories on the mainland. They had the government to thank for this progress. In fact, the moral of the story was that these fisherfolk were now, in the early reform era, allowed to go to church on the main feast days, and their work production had gone up as well. In addition, they have been sufficiently schooled by the Party. In the past, they had thought their religion meant obeying the pope and the Vatican. Now they knew that pure religion was to believe in God. They had to be taught that they are just “one component of the Chinese people” and so must support the Party and “obey the government.” The article then hints at the secularization thesis. It notes that while many in the younger generation had been baptized and did gather for “Bible reading,” it was hard to keep them there if there was a compelling television program on. “This tendency will continue,” the authors added. This is the narrative that the social scientists wished to tell. The fact is that in the early reform era the churches were reopened, young people were baptized, and the villagers could go on annual pilgrimages to Sheshan. But it was now a domesticated and orderly faith which did not interfere with production (and may in fact have increased it). It was also a faith shorn of counterrevolutionary troublemakers and “Vatican espionage.” Further, the faithful were now brought under the aegis of the CCPA and the government. They could thus unite with other Chinese and contribute to the modernization efforts. Finally, in time, this faith would die out among the younger people. What would ultimately be left would not be heaven, but a socialist paradise. And this was possible because the government had once again implemented a more moderate religious policy.

A Political Interpretation The final interpretation is a political one. It comes from the Pre-Trial Investigation Department of the Shanghai Municipal Public Security Bureau and is entitled: “What We Learned from the Trial of the Case of the Zhu Hongsheng Counterrevolutionary Clique.”21 It seems to have been published by 1990, not long after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

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The main purpose of this document becomes clear at the very end. Vincent Zhu Hongsheng and other counterrevolutionaries were trying to turn China into a “second Poland,” with the Church supreme over the state. This was the main anxiety animating the document and giving it its strong political hue. As such, the document mined the 1980 Sheshan event and the subsequent trial of the “Zhu Hongsheng Counterrevolutionary Clique” for important information as to how to prevent China from becoming another Poland. The government was clearly overstating its case. But it had a serious intention. It wished to explain the Sheshan miracle in purely political terms. It made clear that what happened at Sheshan was not a miracle at all but had come about through a small group of counterrevolutionaries who had pulled the strings from behind the scenes. It was they who had deceived many people. In this regard, it is like the core explanation of the social scientific explanation. But rather than blaming the government for creating the conditions for the event to take place and then launching into a long campaign to re-educate the masses, the solution here was a simpler and harder-nosed legal one: bringing these criminals to trial and exposing their crimes. The people would then no longer be deceived and the mystique of Sheshan would disappear. The document itself is based on the 1983 verdict against Zhu Hongsheng.22 (The court agreed to hear his case shortly after his November 1981 arrest.) Zhu Hongsheng himself was a prominent Shanghai Jesuit priest who had been in prisons and labor camps for decades for his resistance to CCP religious policies in the 1950s. He was released in 1979 and helped to re-animate the underground Catholic Church. This document reiterates some of the court verdict, in that it gives the background to how Zhu and his collaborators incited people to go to Sheshan. But the real purpose of the document is to go further than the court verdict. It is to make the verdict part of Chinese jurisprudence and case law.23 This was necessary because when pre-trial judges faced this type of politico-religious case so early in the reform era, they were “inexperienced.” They did not know how to deal with cases that dealt with “counterrevolutionary activities carried out under the cloak of religion,” language used extensively in the 1950s, but apparently forgotten by the young generation of legal professionals. Therefore, the pre-trial judges needed to be schooled by experts from the Public Security Bureau and the Religious Affairs Bureau. The knowledge gained could now be used by future legal experts in China to prosecute these types of cases.

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The case helped to illuminate five key principles. The first was to strip these religious believers of their legitimate cloak. The second was to collect the facts of the crimes before exposing their counterrevolutionary nature. The third was to conduct a thorough investigation and collect evidence that could be used in public. The fourth was to select powerful evidence to induce the principal defendant to confess. The fifth was to study the policy and draw a line between crimes and non-crimes. While this document gives a rather simple diagnosis of the Sheshan event (a handful of people who pulled the strings), it gives a rather lengthy treatment to be followed to remedy future cases. Let us return to the beginning of the document to see how it framed the background to the Sheshan events. It mentioned that these Catholics had been part of the Kung Pinmei counterrevolutionary clique in the 1950s but had served their prison time. Yet even after the third plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress (at the beginning of the reform era), they had persisted in engaging in “anti-China” activities, some of the most egregious of which related to the events at Sheshan. They also energetically engaged in counterrevolutionary propaganda and incitement, spreading such rumors as “the year 2000 will be doomsday,” and “[the] Virgin Mary will shine and make her appearance at She Mountain [Sheshan] on the 15th and 17th of March, 1980.” Deceived by such rumors, thousands of believers from Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, and Henan flocked to Sheshan. A handful of thugs took advantage of the confusion to rush and smash up the church, beat up the workers, and intentionally create disturbances to disrupt the political situation of stability and unity.24 The document also gives more interesting backstory on the Sheshan event. It says that in October 1979 the Jesuit priest Shen Baixun sent two of his followers to a commune near Sheshan to expel a demon from a mentally ill person. Based on this experience, they wrote and disseminated a pamphlet which stated that Mary would appear at Sheshan in mid-March. Because of this, thousands of believers went to Sheshan. They further sent some of this information out of the country. Some of it later was printed in a foreign Catholic publication. When questioned, Shen gave some further details. After the demon was expelled from the woman, she felt the presence of Jesus. Shen thought a miracle had taken place. He wrote up his findings and gave them to Zhu Hongsheng and others. Then, two days before the Sheshan incident, he

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went to Zhu who told him to record the event. He then reported to others “about seeing the resplendent Virgin Mary and smelling of fragrance.” The result of the fact-finding led to the conclusion that Shen had, “created the counterrevolutionary She Mountain incident with Zhu Hongsheng pulling the wires behind the scene.” Therefore, the solution would simply be to prosecute the handful of core counterrevolutionaries, after which the Sheshan miracle would be evacuated of its larger import. Further, the lessons learned would be helpful for future legal professionals in prosecuting these types of cases. However, while Zhu Hongsheng was vilified by the government for being a counterrevolutionary and for spreading rumors, his own early report of the Sheshan “miracle” was far less confident. While he did acknowledge the lights, he speculated that they could have even been a trick by the devil. This would appear to make Zhu more objective than the government credits him with being. He was not wedded to the idea that Sheshan was a miracle. However, he ultimately did believe in the piety of the pilgrims in their stance against the CCPA. Supernatural causes aside, Zhu gave three possible natural causes for the events. First, in the past thirty years, there had been many political ups and downs in China. But now there was peace and so the Church enjoyed peace. Second, China could not afford negative publicity now that it was opening-up. Third, the future was still unknown, so believers had to seize any opportunity to practice their faith.25 Zhu’s more sober-minded assessment of the Sheshan miracle seems to show that the real miracle of Sheshan was that religious belief in China had survived even the darkest of times. The Sheshan miracle could not be reduced to any single cause. This was something the government was having a hard time accepting.

Conclusion A great surprise in the reform era was that political liberalization and economic reforms led to the unexpected revival of religion in what had been one of the most atheistic societies on earth. The Sheshan miracle was one of these events. What is clear is that up to ten thousand people gathered at Sheshan hoping to witness a miracle. This caught the cadres and police completely by surprise. The crowds kept mounting and at some points the cadres tried to obstruct the pilgrims. There were some tense moments and some

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surreal scenes in which “patriotic” Catholics and police were in the awkward position of having to contain a spontaneous religious manifestation. This proved so embarrassing to the government that it had to seize control of the narrative. The narrative could not be that the Catholic masses had rejected thirty years of state-mandated atheism. Much less could it be that something spectacular and supernatural had manifested itself at Sheshan. Rather, the government had to explain the Sheshan miracle in a different way. So even within the first ten years of this event, the government had used three counter-narratives to explain the events. First, the scientific explanation sought the cause for the light in reflected sunlight from the phone company’s nearby “microwave” station. Second, the social scientific explanation held that counterrevolutionaries were to blame for spreading rumors. But the government was also to blame for creating the conditions for the event to take place. The aggressive anti-religious policies of the recent past had backfired. Third, the political explanation imputed blame to the core counterrevolutionaries who had worked behind the scenes. These three narratives implicitly acknowledged that the reform era had dawned. That is, they were all ideally suited for explaining and dealing with the “religious question,” without resorting to the harsh administrative fiat of the not-too-distant past. The hard-line approach was out. The government now countenanced an approach where the government simply explained the (spurious) reasons for religious belief. Religion would gradually die off on its own accord. But it was deemed counterproductive to try to attack it. The most punitive of these three approaches was the politico-legal approach, as it called for using the blunt legal instruments of the state against purported counterrevolutionaries. But here again the strategy was to prosecute “criminals,” so that the mass of believers would fall into line. Thus, the radicals had fallen from grace and the gradualists (with their version of the secularization theory) were ascendant. But there is a further lesson to the Sheshan “miracle.” By any telling of the story, most of the people who made that March 1980 pilgrimage to Sheshan were part of the “masses.” There is some irony here. Mao launched his revolution for the benefit of the peasants and with the strategy of, “using the villages in order to surround the cities and then taking the cities.”26 That is, he would mobilize the rural peasantry and only later launch his revolution on China’s urban centers. However, even in

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later years he reflected on his legacy and noted that he had only been able to really influence a small orbit around Beijing. Mao was being self-effacing. Surely, he had a great and even cataclysmic impact on China. But it is telling that while many urban Catholics were originally afraid to make the pilgrimage to Sheshan, thousands of poor fisherfolk from rural regions were not. Mao launched his revolution for them. But some had ostensibly rejected it. Old traditions die hard. And whether these people witnessed lights on those days in mid-March 1980 or not, perhaps this was the true Sheshan miracle.

Notes 1. Richard Madsen and Lizhu Fan, “The Catholic Pilgrimage to Sheshan,” in Making Religion, Making the State: The Politics of Religion in Modern China, eds. Yoshiko Ashiwa and David L. Wank (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009). See also Jeremy Clarke, “Our Lady of China: Marian Devotion and the Jesuits,” Studies in the Spirituality of Jesuits, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Autumn 2009). 2. Madsen and Fan, “The Catholic Pilgrimage to Sheshan,” p. 84. 3. For histories of the Shanghai Catholic community especially in the 1950s, see Jin Luxian, The Memoirs of Jin Luxian, Volume One: Learning and Relearning 1916–1982, trans. William Hanbury-Tenison (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2012); Paul P. Mariani, Church Militant: Bishop Kung and Catholic Resistance in Communist Shanghai (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011); James T. Myers, Enemies Without Guns: The Catholic Church in the People’s Republic of China (New York: Paragon House, 1991); and Eric O. Hanson, Catholic Politics in China and Korea, American Society of Missiology Series (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1980). 4. Xi Lian, Redeemed by Fire: The Rise of Popular Christianity in Modern China (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), p. 205. 5. For the persistence of religious belief and of “superstition” in Maoist China, see Steve A. Smith, “Local Cadres Confront the Supernatural: The Politics of Holy Water (Shenshui) in the PRC, 1949–1966,” The China Quarterly, No. 188 (2006). 6. Paul A. Cohen, History in Three Keys: The Boxers as Event, Experience, and Myth (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997). 7. B22-2-1 SMA, “Guanyu Tianzhujiao, Jidujiao wenti de zhishi” (Instructions on questions concerning Catholic and Protestant churches), July 23, 1950. 8. There is a large literature on the secularization thesis. For how it is relevant to China, see Vincent Goossaert and David A. Palmer, The Religious

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9.

10.

11.

12. 13. 14. 15.

16.

17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23.

Question in Modern China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012); Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); Mayfair Mei-hui Yang, “Introduction,” in Chinese Religiosities: Afflictions of Modernity and State Formation, ed. Mayfair Mei-hui Yang (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008); Yoshiko Ashiwa and David L. Wank, eds., Making Religion, Making the State in Modern China: The Politics of Religion in Modern China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009); and Michael Szonyi, “Secularization Theories and the Study of Chinese Religions,” Social Compass, Vol. 56 (2009). There is still good fieldwork being done on Christianity in Wenzhou. See Nanlai Cao, Constructing China’s Jerusalem: Christians, Power, and Place in Contemporary Wenzhou (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011). “An Account of an Eye Witness in March 1980 at the Marian Shrine in Zosé, Shanghai” (Taibei, Taiwan: Jesuit China Province Archives, 1980). It is in English. This is from a summary English translation of a the following letter: Vincent Zhu Hongsheng to Bernard Chu, 1981, transcript in the Jesuit China Province Archives. Cohen, History in Three Keys, p. xiv. Charles Keith, Catholic Vietnam: A Church from Empire to Nation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), pp. 162–65. Vincent Zhu Hongsheng to Bernard Chu. “What Should We Do About Communist Youth League Members Who Go to Church,” Chinese Youth Daily, April 6, 1982. Quoted in Donald E. MacInnis, Religion in China Today: Policy and Practice (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1989), pp. 433–35. The following section draws from this document. “A Study of the Religious Faith of Fishing People in Qingpu County,” in Religious Questions Under Socialism in China (Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, 1987). Quoted in MacInnis, Religion in China Today, pp. 272–83. Many of the citations in this section are from this report. MacInnis, Religion in China Today, p. 278. Ibid., p. 276. Ibid., p. 278. Ibid., p. 280. An English translation can be found in Continuing Religious Repression in China (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993), pp. 41–47. “Shanghaishi zhongji renmin fayuan xingshi panjueshu” (Shanghai City Intermediate People’s Court criminal verdict), March 25, 1983. For a discussion of Chinese law during this time period, see Pitman B. Potter, “Belief in Control: Regulation of Religion in China,” The China Quarterly, Vol. 174, No. 1 (2003).

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24. Continuing Religious Repression in China, p. 42. 25. Vincent Zhu Hongsheng to Bernard Chu. 26. Mao Zedong, “Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party in China, March 5, 1949,” in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. IV (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1961), p. 363.

Index

A Accompaniment, 120–123, 127 AIDS prevention, 103, 105, 106 Allegra, Gabriele M., 4, 82–86, 89 Aloysius Jin Luxian, 3, 46, 87 Aurora University, 47

B Banks, 103 Baoding, 20, 34, 39, 113 Basic Law, 65 Beijing, 2, 4, 10, 13, 14, 16, 19, 23, 27, 33, 41, 49, 57, 65, 67–70, 72, 82, 86, 95, 97, 108, 114, 121, 124, 149 Benedictine nuns, 106 Bible, 4, 32, 82–85, 87–89, 114, 118, 142 Bishops, 2, 4, 11–13, 15, 16, 18–20, 23–26, 30, 31, 33–40, 46, 49, 52, 53, 56, 69–71, 87, 122, 123, 130

Bishops’ Conference of the Catholic Church in China (BCCCC), 14, 16, 19, 23, 38, 39, 41, 49, 56, 96, 105 Bureaucratization, 56

C Camilleri, Antoine, 23 Catechism, 56, 113, 114, 125, 142 Catholic Church, 2, 4, 5, 13, 23, 35, 36, 46, 47, 49, 50, 52–57, 62, 67, 69, 72, 88, 94, 130, 142, 143, 145 Catholic Relief Services (CRS), 106 Changsha, 16 Charities, 4, 47, 94–96, 98, 104, 107 Chiaretto Yan Kin Sheung, 112, 116, 121, 127 China Disabled Persons’ Federation (CDPF), 95

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 C. Y.-y. Chu and P. P. Mariani (eds.), People, Communities, and the Catholic Church in China, Christianity in Modern China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1679-5

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154

INDEX

Chinese Catholic Church Administrative Committee (CCAC), 3, 48, 49, 95 Chinese Catholic Commission for Social Services, 96 Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association (CCPA), 3, 14–17, 20, 23, 25, 27, 30, 31, 33–35, 46, 48–58, 95, 96, 105, 133–135, 137, 143, 144, 147 Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 2, 3, 5, 10, 14, 15, 18, 19, 22, 23, 48, 52, 63, 65, 72, 73, 96, 130–133, 135, 138, 145 Chinese Pastoral Bible, 88 Christian Churches, 4, 66 Cohen, Paul A., 132, 136, 149, 150 Cold War, 52 Communist Youth League, 140 Communists, 71, 131 Communities, 5, 19, 20, 22, 31–33, 36, 37, 46–48, 56, 64, 95, 96, 113, 114, 119, 122, 123 Confucianism, 22 Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), 10, 30, 48, 131

D Deng Xiaoping, 2, 10, 14, 30, 63 Dominic Tang Yiming, 11, 39

E Elderly services, 105 Evangelization, 112, 121, 123, 126

F Fisherfolk, 133, 134, 138, 140–142, 144, 149 Fu Jen Catholic University, 82 Fujian, 33, 35, 36, 97, 99

G Guangdong, 97, 101, 121, 133 Guangqi Press, 47, 91 Guangzhou, 11, 39

H Harbin, 16, 36 Hebei, 4, 33, 35, 36, 39, 94, 95, 97–100, 102, 105, 115, 124, 133 Heilongjiang, 16, 33, 36 Holy See, 2, 3, 10, 13–17, 19, 23–25, 30, 34, 37–40, 48, 49, 52, 55, 56, 69, 71, 86 Holy Spirit Study Centre, 63 Hong Kong, 3, 4, 11, 14, 16, 21, 32, 62–70, 72, 73, 83–86, 88, 113, 114, 133 Hong Kong Holy Spirit Seminary College of Theology and Philosophy, 33 Hou Jinde, 98 Humanitarian assistance, 105 Hunan, 16, 107

I Ignatius Kung Pinmei, 11, 39, 46, 48, 63, 138 Inculturation, 56, 123 Inner Mongolia, 25, 36, 97

J Jiang Zemin, 13, 14 Jinde Charities, 4, 94, 96, 98, 100, 102, 103, 105–107 John Baptist Wu Chen-chung, 4, 63 John Tong Hon, 63 Joseph Zen Ze-kiun, 3, 15, 62–64, 72 June 3–4, 1989, 55

INDEX

L Louis Zhang Jiashu, 46, 48, 49

M Manila, 12, 17, 67 Martyrs, 13 Michael Fu Tieshan, 19, 27 Ministry of Civil Affairs, 50 Missionaries, 13, 14, 46, 52, 53, 87–89, 130 Modernization, 3, 11, 21, 131, 133, 134, 144 Mother Teresa, 120

N Newspaper, 67, 98 The Ningbo, 56

O Occupy Central, 4, 67, 68, 73 “One country, two systems”, 64, 66 Open Church, 3, 5, 6, 12, 14, 15, 18, 20, 31, 34, 38–40, 46, 49, 51, 57, 71 Open Door Policy, 14, 63

P People’s Republic of China (PRC), 11, 14, 17, 19, 23, 24, 30, 36, 48, 52, 53, 65–67, 69, 70, 73, 105 Peter Joseph Fan Xueyan, 34, 37, 39 Philippines, 32, 37, 114 Pilgrims, 2, 5, 17, 131, 133–139, 147 Pontifical Institute for Foreign Missions (PIME), 13 Pope Benedict XVI, 15, 53, 69, 72, 106, 121

155

Pope Francis, 2, 17, 23, 24, 26, 53, 70, 72, 112 Pope John Paul II, 10, 12, 15, 38, 68, 69, 71, 86 Pope John XXIII, 53 Pope Pius XII, 52 Priests, 11, 12, 16–20, 22, 25, 30–39, 46, 49, 53, 62, 63, 68, 69, 114, 118–120, 122–124, 126, 134, 139 Prisons, 46 Prophets, 62, 67, 68, 73, 107 Protestant Churches, 54, 98, 149 Public Security Bureau (PSB), 19, 35, 39, 145 Public welfare, 4, 94–96, 98, 102–105, 107 R Rectification, 51 Red Guards, 10, 131, 132 Ricci, Matteo, 14, 51, 104, 130 Rome, 11–14, 18, 30, 37, 46, 48, 63, 77, 82, 86, 112 S Saint Peter Square, 11 Second Vatican Council (1962–1965), 24, 32, 47, 67, 84, 112, 125 Seminarians, 36, 37, 46, 113, 114, 119, 122, 124 Seminaries, 19, 33, 34, 36, 37, 63, 64, 69, 72, 74, 114, 122, 134 September 22, 2018, 23, 40, 71 Shaanxi, 25, 35, 36, 38, 104 Shanghai, 3, 5, 11, 13, 16, 17, 38, 39, 46–50, 53, 55–58, 63, 72, 73, 87, 88, 130–134, 136–138, 140, 141, 143–146 Shanghai Catholic Intellectuals’ Association, 3, 47, 49, 50

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INDEX

Shanxi, 18, 33, 36, 97, 99, 108 Shenyang, 108, 113, 115 Sheshan, 5, 17, 46, 87, 130–149 Shijiazhuang, 99, 102–104, 114, 115 Sichuan, 12, 16, 97, 101, 104, 106 Sigao Bible, 82–89 Sin, Jaime, 67 Sino-Vatican Agreement, 70–73 Sino-Vatican relations, 70 Singapore, 32, 105 Sinicization, 3, 22, 23 Sino-Vatican Agreement, 40 Sino-Vatican relations, 2, 10, 12, 15 Sisters, 31, 35–37, 113, 114, 119, 120, 122–124, 134 Social service organizations, 96, 98 Social services, 47, 96, 105–107, 115 Socialism, 48, 133, 142 Society of Jesus (the Jesuits), 46, 106 South Korea, 17, 67, 101, 102 State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA), 13, 18, 25, 96 Studium Biblicum, 4, 82–90 Sunday Mass booklet, 47 Synod, 12, 24, 38, 46, 112, 122, 126, 128, 130 Synod of Bishops, 112

T Taiwan, 10, 12, 13, 25, 32, 70, 75, 84, 87, 90, 106 Taiyuan, 18, 99, 108 Taizé meetings, 115 Thaddeus Ma Daqin, 17, 20, 46, 57 Three-Self Movement, 30

Three-Self Patriotic Movement (Sanzi aiguo yundong), 52 Ting Kuang-hsun, 54 Trafficking, 105

U Underground Church, 3, 13–15, 17, 18, 20, 25, 26, 30–38, 40, 46, 49, 51, 57, 63, 69–73, 143 United Front Work Department (UFWD), 14, 16 The United States, 11, 37, 48, 70, 106 Universal Church, 12, 14, 20, 49, 56, 85, 106

V The Vatican, 2, 3, 6, 13–17, 19, 20, 23–25, 27, 30, 33, 35, 39, 46, 48, 52, 53, 63, 69–75, 144 Virgin Mary, 5, 21, 32, 130, 146, 147 Vocations, 5, 37, 118, 119, 122, 123

W Wang Chao, 23 Weigel, George, 10, 26 Wenzhou, 18, 35, 36, 133, 134, 139, 150 World Trade Organization (WTO), 66

X Xi Jinping, 17, 22, 70, 71, 125 Xu Guangqi, 130, 134 Xujiahui (Zikawei in the local dialect), 133

INDEX

Y Youth ministry, 5, 112–115, 121, 123–127 Youths, 113–115, 118–120, 123–127 Youths, 2, 5, 21, 139, 140

Z Zhang Shijiang, 94, 98 Zhu Hongsheng, 144–147

157