Peace and Security in the Western Balkans (Southeast European Studies) [1 ed.] 9781032232270, 9781032233048, 9781003276661, 1032232277

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This is a very timely collection of essays by regional experts. Individually, they show finger-on-the-pulse analysis, while collectively they show how the region continues to be unsettled. Key themes include democracy’s troubled path, the stubborn nature of nationalism, and an inconsistent international community. The book is a great reminder of the expertise that lies in the region. -Roger Mac Ginty, Durham University, UK This book is a very important and extremely timely contribution to the discussion about peace and security in the Western Balkans. Its unique value is in bringing together an excellent group of local scholars who provide deep and astute analysis about the main security challenges facing the region and ways to overcome them and work toward sustainable peace. -Jelena Subotic, Georgia State University, USA For too long, reigning approaches to peacebuilding have reflected the ideologies and assumptions of global elites at the expense of essential local perspectives. The rich, timely, and compelling essays assembled in this pathbreaking volume on the Western Balkans offer a powerful corrective, foregrounding the urgent value of local knowledge and insight of scholars anchored in and committed to the region. -Peter Locke, Northwestern University, USA

Peace and Security in the Western Balkans

This book outlines the main security threats, actors, and processes in the Western Balkans following the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Exploring the state of peace and security in the region it asks if a stable peace is achievable. The comparative framework explores state perspectives – from Serbia, Montenegro, Northern Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, and Kosovo – alongside military, political-societal, economic, and environmental security concerns. The interplay of international actors is also considered. Academics, scholars, and practitioners who deal with Balkan issues, either as a focus or comparatively, and have interests in security and peace studies will find the volume invaluable along with students of political science, security studies, peace studies, area studies (Eastern European studies and/or Southeast European studies), and international studies in general. Nemanja Džuverović is a Professor in Peace Studies at the University of Belgrade. His research areas include critical peacebuilding, political economy of liberal peacebuilding, international statebuilding in the Balkans, and sociology of international relations. He is co-editor of the Journal of Regional Security. Věra Stojarová works as an Academic Researcher at the Political Science and Security Studies Department at Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University in Brno, Czech Republic. The field of her professional interest lies in politics and security in the Balkan countries.

Southeast European Studies Series Editor: Florian Bieber

The Balkans are a region of Europe widely associated over the past decades with violence and war. Beyond this violence, the region has experienced rapid change in recent times though, including democratization, economic and social transformation. New scholarship is emerging which seeks to move away from the focus on violence alone to an understanding of the region in a broader context drawing on new empirical research. The Southeast European Studies Series seeks to provide a forum for this new scholarship. Publishing cutting-edge, original research and contributing to a more profound understanding of Southeastern Europe while focusing on contemporary perspectives the series aims to explain the past and seeks to examine how it shapes the present. Focusing on original empirical research and innovative theoretical perspectives on the region the series includes original monographs and edited collections. It is interdisciplinary in scope, publishing high-level research in political science, history, anthropology, sociology, law and economics and accessible to readers interested in Southeast Europe and beyond. Social Mobilization Beyond Ethnicity Civic Activism and Grassroots Movements in Bosnia and Herzegovina Chiara Milan Memory Politics and Populism in Southeastern Europe Edited by Jody Jensen Forging Transnational Belonging through Informal Trade Thriving Markets in Times of Crisis Sandra King-Savic Balkan Fighters in the Syrian War Tanja Dramac Jiries Peace and Security in the Western Balkans A Local Perspective Edited by Nemanja Džuverović and Věra Stojarová For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge.com/ Southeast-European-Studies/book-series/ASHSER1390

Peace and Security in the Western Balkans A Local Perspective

Edited by Nemanja Džuverović and Věra Stojarová

First published 2023 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2023 selection and editorial matter, Nemanja Džuverović and Věra Stojarová; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Nemanja Džuverović and Věra Stojarová to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. With the exception of Chapter 4, no part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Chapter 4 of this book is available for free in PDF format as Open Access from the individual product page at www.routledge.com. It has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book ISBN: 978-1-032-23227-0 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-23304-8 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-27666-1 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003276661 Typeset in Times New Roman by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India

Contents

Acknowledgements Illustrations Notes on the Contributors 1

How to Study Peace and Security in the Western Balkans

ix x xii 1

NEMANJA DŽUVEROVIĆ

PART 1

Local Level 2

Conflicting Peace in Post-War Serbia: Radicalisation and Extremism as Security Threats

13 15

GORAN TEPŠIĆ

3

Building Sustainable Peace and Security in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Dancing in a Vicious Circle

30

BOJANA ZORIĆ AND VĚRA STOJAROVÁ

4

Albania Moving from Security Receiver to Security Provider

50

DORIAN JANO

5

A Bottom-up Perspective on Peace and Security in North Macedonia: Turbulent Violent Past versus Uncertain Future?

70

IVAN STEFANOVSKI

6

Kosovo: The Achilles’ Heel of Balkan Security

88

JIŘÍ NĚMEC AND VĚRA STOJAROVÁ

7

Building Cohesive National Security and Stability: The Case of Montenegro OLIVERA INJAC AND TODOR GORANOVIĆ

106

viii Contents PART 2

Regional Level 8

Military Dynamics, Conventional Arms Control, and Regional Security in the Western Balkans

127 129

FILIP EJDUS, TIJANA REČEVIĆ AND MARKO KOVAČEVIĆ

9

Political and Societal Security in the Western Balkans: One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward

156

VĚRA STOJAROVÁ

10 From Confrontation to Cooperation: Economic Security in the Western Balkans

176

ALEKSANDAR MILOŠEVIĆ

11 From Reconstruction to Transition?: Environmental Security in the Western Balkans

191

EMMA HAKALA

PART 3

International Level

213

12 A Relay Race for Peace: The Approaches of the EU and the US to Bringing Stability and Democracy to the Western Balkans Region

215

JASMIN HASIĆ

13 Russia and China in the Western Balkans: The Spoiler Power and the Unexpected Power

234

VUK VUKSANOVIĆ

14 Partners or Security Challengers?: The Implications of the Presence of Turkey, the Gulf States, and Iran in the Western Balkans

255

MURAT ÖNSOY AND HAMDI FIRAT BÜYÜK

15 Sustainable Peace in the Western Balkans: Utopia or Achievable Future?

280

VĚRA STOJAROVÁ AND NEMANJA DŽUVEROVIĆ

Index

287

Acknowledgements

This book was written with the support of the Masaryk University and the Specific University Research Grant provided by the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports of the Czech Republic.

Illustrations

Figures 4.1 Albania’s fragility. Source: Fragile States Index 2021 4.2 Defence expenditure. Source: Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries (2009–2016) and (2014–2021) 4.3 Defence expenditure by main category as percentage of the total. Source: Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries (2009–2016) and (2014–2021) 9.1 Unemployment rate, % of labour force. Source: statista.com; for Kosovo tradingeconomics.com 9.2 Net migration from WB countries 2012 and 2017. Source: World Bank data 2019 9.3 Do you think that EU membership would be a good thing, bad thing, or neither good nor bad for your economy? Source: Regional Cooperation Council 2020 15.1 Scheme 1: External players competing for sphere of influence in the Western Balkans

52 59 60 165 166 168 283

Tables 4.1 Selected data on the crime situation in Albania 8.1 Military expenditures in the Western Balkans, percentage of GDP 8.2 Military expenditures in the Western Balkans as a share of government spending 8.3 Military expenditures in the Western Balkans, per capita in US$ 8.4 Reports to the UNROCA 8.5 The balance of conventional armaments in the Western Balkans 11.1 Environmental security impacts in the Western Balkans 12.1 Types of integrated-approach peacebuilding interventions by Ricigliano (2003), applied to the investigated cases 14.1 Western Balkan countries’ import and export shares with main trade partners in 2019 14.2 A detailed look at Western Balkan countries’ export and import with Turkey, Gulf countries, and Iran in 2018

54 142 142 143 144 144 194 220 267 269

Illustrations

xi

Boxes 9.1 Political-societal security in the Western Balkans 15.1 Security Threats in the Western Balkans 15.2 Four Strategic Scenarios for the Future of the Western Balkans

170 281 284

Notes on the Contributors

Nemanja Džuverović is a Professor in Peace Studies at the University of Belgrade – Faculty of Political Science. His research areas include critical peacebuilding, political economy of liberal peacebuilding, international statebuilding in the Balkans, and sociology of international relations. In 2019/20 he was Fulbright Visiting Scholar at Northwestern University. He has also been visiting researcher at the University of Manchester (Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute), the University of Bradford (Department of Peace Studies and International Development), the University of Uppsala (Department of Peace and Conflict Research), and the University of Granada (Institute for Peace and Conflicts). Nemanja is co-editor of the Journal of Regional Security. Filip Ejdus is an Associate Professor at the University of Belgrade – Faculty of Political Science. His most recent book is Crisis and Ontological Security: Serbia’s Anxiety over Kosovo’s Secession. He is Board President of the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy and (co)Editor in Chief of the Journal of Regional Security. Hamdi Fırat Büyük is a political analyst, a journalist, and a lecturer, currently working as a journalist with Balkan Insight and pursuing his PhD degree in political science at the University of Sarajevo with a thesis entitled ‘Turkey’s Policies towards Balkan Muslims during the AKP Era’. Prior to that, he worked as a political analyst with the International Strategic Research Organisation (USAK), an Ankara-based think-tank, and as editor-in-chief of Turkish Weekly. Büyük has been part of many projects, researches, and field studies in addition to his journalistic, policy, and academic papers on Turkish domestic and foreign politics, the Balkans, and Europe. Büyük also holds an MSc degree in international relations from the University of Essex. Todor Goranović is lieutenant colonel and since 2009 has served in the Ministry of Defence of Montenegro. Emma Hakala gained her DSocSci degree in political history from the University of Helsinki. She works as a Senior Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs and as a Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Helsinki on the project ‘Toxic Crimes: Legal Activism against

Notes on the Contributors xiii Wartime Environmental Destruction’. She is also a member of the interdisciplinary and independent BIOS Research Unit. Hakala’s research focuses on environmental security and the geopolitics of climate change, particularly with regard to exploring political and societal dynamics and possible policy responses. She has previously published research on sustainable water governance in Nepal, on the policy coherence of the EU’s renewable energy policies, and on the securitisation of the environment in the Western Balkans, among other things. Jasmin Hasić is an Associate Professor of International Relations and International Law at Sarajevo School of Science and Technology. He holds a Ph.D. in political and social sciences from the Universite libre de Bruxelles (ULB) and LUISS Guido Carli of Rome. His recent publications include Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Foreign Policy since Independence (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019, co-edited with Dženeta Karabegović). His research interests also include peacebuilding, diaspora studies, and demographic changes associated with post-conflict migration. Dorian Jano is a Marie Skłodowska-Curie postdoctoral research fellow at the Centre for South-East European Studies at the University of Graz, working on the project ‘Revisiting Europeanization in Southeast Europe: An Historical Approach’ funded by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie Fellowship Programme [grant number 891530]. He completed his studies in Italy and Greece and was a visiting fellow in the Clinton School of Public Service at the University of Arkansas (USA), the Institute for European Integration at the Europa-Kolleg Hamburg (Germany), and the Institute for Advanced Studies at the Collegium Budapest (Hungary). He was formerly a Jean Monnet Chair in EU Enlargement and its Impact on the Western Balkans. His main research interests focus on issues of democratisation and European integration of Southeast Europe. Marko Kovačević holds a PhD in International and European Studies, and is currently a Teaching Assistant at the University of Belgrade – Faculty of Political Science. His doctoral dissertation deals with identity-role construction in the foreign and security policies of small states at the United Nations. His research interests concern IR theory, international security studies, and foreign policy analysis – with a focus on comparative regionalisms, statebuilding, and various forms of state agency and practices within the UN system. Most recently, his articles have been published in the Journal of International Relations and Development, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, Journal of Contemporary European Studies, and Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal. He is a co-editor of the Journal of Regional Security and a member of ISA, ACUNS, EISA, and ECPR. Aleksandar Milošević is an Assistant Professor of International Studies at the University of Belgrade – Faculty of Political Science. He received his PhD in International and European Studies from the University of Belgrade. He is a

xiv

Notes on the Contributors

2019 alumnus of the US Foreign Policy Institute which is supported by the US State Department’s Study of the US Institutes programme. His current research interests include contemporary forms of economic nationalism, international trade policy, and economic dimensions of globalisation. Jiří Němec is a PhD candidate in Security and Strategic Studies at the Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University in Brno, Czech Republic. He focuses on conflict-related sexual violence and post-conflict reconstruction in the postYugoslav area and is interested in the Western Balkan states’ contemporary foreign and security policy. Jiří worked for the United Nations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was given an Award for Active Development of Civil Society for co-leading a volunteer project in northern Albania, maintains active relations with NGOs supporting survivors of sexual violence in Kosovo, and possesses an MA degree in International Relations. Murat Önsoy holds a BA in Political Science and an MA in International Relations from Bilkent University, Turkey. As a scholarship recipient of the Turkish Higher Education Council, he conducted his doctoral studies at the University of Erlangen/Nuremberg Institute for Contemporary Middle Eastern Studies. Since 2017 he has worked as an Associate Professor at Hacettepe University Department of International Relations. As an expert, Mr. Önsoy has written several articles on the Balkans, participated in several Balkan securityrelated forums and projects, and organised a series of seminars on the region. Mr. Önsoy is the director of Hacettepe University Research Center for TurkishGerman Relations (HÜTAİ) and the editor of the Journal of Gazi Academic View. Önsoy worked as a guest researcher at Hamburg University – ZEUS program from March 2015 to February 2016 where he conducted research on the peacebuilding and democratisation process of the Western Balkans. Tijana Rečević is a Junior Researcher and PhD candidate at the University of Belgrade – Faculty of Political Science. She studies Foreign Policy Analysis, focusing on the relations between political elites and the public, as well as institutional design and intergroup relations in divided and post-conflict societies. Ivan Stefanovski holds a PhD in Political Science and Sociology from the Faculty of Political and Social Sciences, Scuola Normale Superiore University (seat in Florence). He has a background in law and political science. Having over 15 years of research and teaching experience, his current interests lie in the fields of democratisation, Europeanisation, elections, security, and public policy. Currently he is an adjunct Assistant Professor in Political Science and Constitutional Law at the University American College Skopje (UACS). Věra Stojarová works as an Academic Researcher at the Political Science Department at the Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University in Brno, Czech Republic. The field of her professional interest lies in politics and security in the Balkan countries. In 2004, she received a grant to stay at the J.F. Kennedy Institute in Berlin. She also realised a study stay in Heidelberg,

Notes on the Contributors xv supported by a grant from the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in 2005–06 and Andrew Mellon Fellowship at IWM in Vienna in 2009. Věra Stojarová has been a visiting professor at several universities, including Belgrade University, Sarajevo University, University in Prishtina, Tirana University, and many others. Goran Tepšić is an Assistant Professor in Peace Studies and Conflict Analysis at the University of Belgrade – Faculty of Political Science and a Research Associate at the Center for Peace Studies (Belgrade, Serbia). His research areas include ethnopolitics, nationalism, and liberal peacebuilding and statebuilding in the Balkans. Other research interests and publishing activities include the IR profession, discourse analysis, war-identity nexus, and violent extremism. Vuk Vuksanović is a senior researcher at the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP) and an associate of LSE IDEAS, a foreign policy think-tank of the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). He got his PhD in international relations at the LSE. He has published widely on modern foreign and security policy issues. Bojana Zorić is a PhD candidate at the Political Science and Security Studies Department at Masaryk University, Czech Republic. Her academic interests include EU enlargement, EU-Russia relations, and the influence of third actors in the Western Balkans. She was awarded an MA degree in EU-Russia Studies at the Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies, Tartu University, Estonia, and an MA degree in Russian Philology and Pedagogy at the Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, University of Zagreb, Croatia. She works as a Senior Policy Analyst in the Regional Cooperation Council, where she follows the enlargement portfolio of Western Balkan countries.

1

How to Study Peace and Security in the Western Balkans Nemanja Džuverović

Introduction In the last couple of decades, academic and policy research on the Balkans, now framed by the term Western Balkans,1 has been largely characterised by the orientalist trope. For instance, the conflicts over the Yugoslav succession2 have been described as ‘regression from the civilised order’ and ‘primitive tribal conflicts only anthropologists can understand’ (Keegan 1993, cited by Haslam, Schafer, and Beaudet 2012, 422). Similarly, in one of the depictions, Serbs (as one side to the conflicts) were described as two-dimensional people with a craving for simplicity and an ideology so basic it can be understood without effort. They need enemies, not friends, to focus their two-dimensional ideas. Life for them is a simple tune, never an orchestration, or even a pleasant harmony. Animals make use of their resources with far greater felicity than these retorted creatures, whose subscription to the human race is well in arrears. (Ustinov 1993) Policymakers engaged in a similar discourse. Richard Holbrooke, former US Assistant Secretary of State and special envoy to the Balkans in the 1990s, described Serbs as ‘murderous assholes’ (Kelly 1995), while Tony Blair depicted the conflict between NATO and FR Yugoslavia as a ‘battle between good and evil; between civilisation and barbarity; between democracy and dictatorship’ (Abadi 2019). These and other similar descriptions strongly contradict reality, ignoring the intricacies of the region and its history. Also, engaging with the events in the Western Balkans in this way is to strip local actors of their agency and to analyse their actions by invoking primordial motives. Contributions contained in this book attempt to rectify this kind of biased and simplified understanding about the region by relying on the knowledge of local scholars, a contextual approach to peace and security-related processes in the region since the end of the hostilities in the early 2000s, and a novel understanding of the region that relies on scales rather than levels of analysis. DOI: 10.4324/9781003276661-1

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Local Turn3 The local turn4 can be understood as a paradigm shift in peace, security, and regional studies in which the dominant top-down approach has been replaced with a bottom-up approach. In other words, the local turn insists on a change in perspective, going from a state-centric to a people-centric approach and distancing itself from the mainstream international relations approach that sees a state, albeit in its reductionist form, as the principal agent of change or status quo. As a result, a rich body of literature has emerged focusing on these different aspects of the local. The first group of studies raised the question of ‘plurality of the local’. By employing ethnography (Millar 2011) and geography (Lepp 2018) as lenses of analysis, these studies have opened peace and security studies to a more nuanced understanding of the local. This has been achieved by re-discovering the heterogeneity of the local and stressing the importance of not labelling it as a singular phenomenon, but rather as a web of interconnected groups with their own complexities and diversities, depending on the case in question. The next group of studies is the literature on local social relations. This literature encompasses not only relations between international and local actors (Autesserre 2010; Brewer et al. 2018) but also local-local relations (Macaspac 2018), which are often not harmonious and suffer from sectarianism, cleavages, and division. In this respect, the inclusion of local researchers has been particularly fruitful for critical peace and security studies and the local turn debate, in particular. Local researchers’ knowledge of the context, language, and history provides a means for discovering the ‘hidden transcript’ (Scott 1992) of postconflict societies. This is something that international researchers are generally not able to penetrate. The concept of hybridity (Mac Ginty 2010; Richmond and Mitchell 2011) is probably the cornerstone of the debate about the local turn. The concept accentuates the agency of the local and its ability to resist and subvert, but also modify and accept what is being thrown upon it under the guise of liberal peace. Building upon this, the notion of friction describes international-local dynamics in which ‘global ideas pertaining to peace are charged and changed by their encounters with local post-conflict realities’ (Björkdahl et al. 2016, 1). These frictional encounters are seen primarily as a process with no predetermined outcomes, where two sides engage in communication in order to settle their differences and affinities. The two concepts have been instrumental in extending the scope of the local turn debate. Besides the above, the local turn literature has included research on social engagement (Vogel 2016; Lemay-Hébert and Kappler 2016) with findings, unsurprisingly, showing weak commitment of local actors to liberal peace. On the other hand, research on ‘post-conflict economy formations’ (Distler Stavrevska and Vogel 2018) shows that there is a high degree of empathy and solidarity among locals who are trying to navigate their everyday lives in a drastically changed economic environment into which harsh neoliberal measures have been introduced as part of the liberal peacebuilding agenda (Pugh, Turner and Cooper 2011; Martin and Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2017). In addition, research on gender, as one of the most

How to Study the Western Balkans 3 important aspects of the local turn, has been very successful in recognising the pitfalls of liberal peacebuilding embodied in post-conflict masculinity (Baker 2019; Stavrevska 2018). Still, it seems that there is much ambiguity about the local and its nature. As Paffenholz states, the local is usually perceived not independently but as part of hybrid regimes that ‘are presented as partnerships of outsiders and insiders beyond the naïve claim of “local knows best” and international technical superiority’ (2015, 864). However, it seems that this is as far as it goes when it comes to the locals, since strong caveats of ‘not romanticising the local’ are continuously repeated (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013). There is a paradox in this, since the principal agent of change is considered to be also potentially dangerous and detrimental to the change itself. It seems that the academic (and practitioner) community has an undisputed belief in the need for change, but not in those who are supposed to actually implement it.

Peace and Security in the Balkans When it comes to peace and security in the Western Balkans, most research is related to the processes of peacebuilding and statebuilding that have been present in the region since the early 2000s. The process of hybridisation during international interventions has been understood mainly by looking at Bosnia and Herzegovina (Mac Ginty 2011; Kappler 2012; Kappler and Lemay-Hébert 2015) and Kosovo (Richmond 2014; Visoka and Richmond 2017). The local researchers have been somewhat visible in this respect, offering their perspective and understanding of the same issue in relation to Kosovo (Visoka 2012b) or the entire region of the Western Balkans (Bojičić-Dželilović, Kostovicova and Randazzo 2018, Džuverović 2021). Apart from these few studies, local researchers have mainly shied away from using the concept to explain the post-conflict dynamics in the region. All in all, a common point in most of the analyses that employ the concept of hybridisation has been the emphasis on unequal power relations, where international actors mainly impose their vision of peace and security in different Western Balkans settings. In this respect, international and local researchers have a tendency to quickly come to a consensus. The richest body of literature deals with friction in the Western Balkans as a conceptual framework that describes international-local dynamics with various outcomes resulting from this form of discursive and performative dialogue. In this respect, the case of Kosovo takes the spotlight with numerous studies enlightening these encounters, describing them mostly by the lack of understanding or ignorance of international intervenors and the emergence of new power relations resulting therefrom (Björkdahl and Gusic 2015; Lemay-Hébert 2011, 2012; Stojarová 2020). Frictional processes in Kosovo have been illuminated also by local researchers, mainly through the work of Visoka (2011, 2012a, 2017), who has written extensively on the issue of statebuilding in Kosovo and the role of the international community in its state formation and subsequent international recognition. As with other concepts that could be related to the local turn, this one

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has been applied to Bosnia and Herzegovina (Chandler 2004, 2006; Björkdahl and Gusic 2016; Gippert 2018); however, very little attention has been paid to other countries in the region, with only a few studies (for example, Džuverović and Milošević 2021) trying to employ the concept to understanding ongoing challenges to peace and security in other countries of the post-conflict Western Balkans. The economy and economic formations have been fruitful areas of study, mainly due to poor economic indicators and performance after almost three decades of international involvement in the Western Balkans. Informal aspects of the economy (Danielsson 2016a, 2016b; Distler 2018), its corruptive nature (Divljak and Pugh 2008), or ill-designed economic arrangements (de Guevarra 2008; Pugh 2018) have been at the forefront of the thinking about economics in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. The general conclusion of these and other similar findings (see for example Pugh 2004, 2005) suggests that neoliberal transformation, characterised by deprivation of the state and its regulative instruments, the disappearance of public and collective spaces, and all-round implementation of deregulating policies, had detrimental consequences for the state of the economies, but more importantly for the well-being of citizens and societies in the Western Balkans, thus preventing any chance of attaining human security or positive peace in the region. Recently, a more nuanced understanding of the local economic processes appeared in the literature as a result of the introduction of the concept of economies of peace, viewed as the ‘interaction of economic reforms, socio-economic peacebuilding programmes and international interventions with people’s lived realities’ (Distler, Stavrevska and Vogel 2018, 139). In this respect, recent research on the role of shared historical experience (Ramović 2018) or gender (Stavrevska 2018) in the process of production in former Yugoslavia (now Western Balkans) has been instrumental in understanding alternatives and local resistance to the neoliberal project assumed by peacebuilding interventions. Finally, there is literature on social relations between international and local actors and social engagement in political and economic orders established in the Western Balkans since the mid-1990s. Unsurprisingly, research has shown that locals have not developed strong attachments to the socio-normative dimensions of liberal peace and have been reluctant to take ownership of the version of peace offered by international actors (Lemay-Hébert and Kappler 2016). Not only that, they have in many instances refused to cooperate with international agents, trying to resist peace and security arrangements that were thrown upon them (Belloni, Kappler and Ramović 2016) by creating semi-public or private spheres where they could act independently of international intrusion (Kappler 2013). Following up on this, local researchers have reflected not only on international-local relations but also on local-local dynamics, showing that this is not a binary relationship but a web of relations on both sides of the spectrum (Džuverović 2018; 2020). Local turn has been very vocal in emphasising the need for empowerment, but this need is yet to be fulfilled. Most localised knowledge about peace and security in the Western Balkans is still offered by Western scholars, while Balkan scholars

How to Study the Western Balkans 5 are yet to embark on a systematic study of the peace and security issues in their respective countries.

Politics of Scale The scalar turn draws on human and political geography findings, by defining scales as socially constituted areal spaces where social, political, and economic relations are contested (Hameiri, Hughes and Scarpello 2017). These areal spaces are not natural, but produced through agency and socio-political contestation, meaning that scales are created through social praxis. The political aspect of scales implies that they are in a permanent state of contestation because different scales involve different configurations of actors, power, resources, and political opportunity structures. This notion presupposes that scales are fluid, i.e., changing and changeable over time (Herod 2010). The change in political outcomes leads to rescaling, where power is moved to other scales or the existing scales are reconfigured. According to Hameiri and Jones (2017), this ‘politics of scale’ (Smith 2008) can have three possible outcomes when it comes to peacebuilding. The first is outright refusal of cooperation between internal and external actors. The second is selective cooperation on the side of internal actors who are, by doing this, trying to achieve as much as they can in terms of their interests and acquire as many resources as possible. Finally, localisation suggests that some internal actors may favour cooperation with external actors in order to improve their position and contest ongoing power relations. Which of these three outcomes will occur largely depends on pre-existing scalar structures (created by past processes of social construction), the creation of new scalar arrangements and configuration resulting from an interaction between the existing and emerging scales, and the strategic deployment of scales by each of the actors involved (MacKinnon 2010). In each of these outcomes and strategies, there are many internal and external actors who are contesting (or defending) present scalar arrangements and engaging in a struggle over resources. Based on these theoretical considerations, there has been a growing number of empirical studies on scalar politics in post-conflict and conflict-affected societies. In their study of public administration reform as part of peacebuilding and statebuilding interventions in the Solomon Islands, Cambodia, and Indonesia (Aceh), Hameiri, Hughes, and Scarpello (2017) showed that politics of scale has been a predominant feature of peacebuilding efforts, leading to very different results in the three cases, depending on the scalar arrangements and strategies employed by different internal actors. Similarly, Hameiri and Jones (2017) used the concept of scale politics to explain the results of a peacebuilding intervention in East Timor vis-à-vis the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) mission. The analysis clearly showed the diverging interests of local actors, who engaged in cooperation and a confrontation with UNTAET concerning decentralisation and land redistribution issues. Finally, Hameiri and Scarpello (2018) used the same concept, with the idea that different scales favour different interests

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and unevenly allocate power and political opportunities, to explain the uneven results of the governance reform that took place in Aceh after the end of the hostilities and the 2005 peace agreement between the Free Aceh Movement and the Indonesian government. What the debates and theoretical underpinnings of the scalar turn and the politics of scale (along with empirical studies) have shown is that scales are not the only appropriate supplement for the local turn debate, in respect to the local-international binary, but are an excellent way to transcend the rigid definition of the levels of analysis with which international relations almost exclusively engages (Waltz 1959). By applying the scalar turn, it is possible to understand the complexities of social reality where struggle between different actors occurs at the same time concerning different issues. The same applies to the Western Balkans and its complex web of relations.

Aim of the Book The aim of the book is threefold. First of all, it tries to give local researchers, who are often invisible in the debates about peace and security in the region, an opportunity to talk about issues they are researching and with which they are familiar. As previous sections of this chapter have shown, local researchers had very little influence on the production of knowledge about the Western Balkans. This is a worrisome sign, especially if one takes into account the simplistic views and analyses of the region and past events, and continuing efforts to orientalise local agency and actors (see for example Kaplan 1993). As chapters in the book will show, local researchers do not shy away from talking about sensitive issues such as reconciliation, violent extremism, corruption, or memory politics, and are able to also bring into the spotlight issues that are almost never present when the topic is the Western Balkans. The reason for the successful unlocking of the hidden transcripts is the context-awareness of local researchers and the fact that they are living in the environment they are researching, successfully navigating everyday peace (Mac Ginty 2014) in these divided societies. It is clear that the problem of reading the historical palimpsest of the Western Balkans, impenetrable and impermeable for international researchers, could be solved by relying on those who have the skills and appropriate glasses for these kinds of readings. Thus, this book can be used as a guide for graduate students, early career scholars, and all others who are only just embarking on their research journey into the Western Balkans. The second aim relates to the region as such. International involvement and subsequent peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Kosovo have brought about a plethora of thinking and writing about these two countries, focusing mainly on the international community’s success and failures to bring peace, security, and reconciliation in the post-conflict phase. Previous sections have shown that local agency and resistance to international statebuilding agendas have been prominent also in the research agenda on these countries. However, bringing these two cases into the spotlight has left other countries of the region mainly under-researched, regardless of the fact that the problems they are facing are often as challenging as those that are present in BiH

How to Study the Western Balkans 7 and Kosovo. This book tries to fill this gap and treat the region as an interdependent space where challenges and threats to peace and security are interconnected. It also provides the reader with in-depth studies on each country of this politically constructed region, thus illuminating the perspective that the Western Balkans are not only a peacebuilding and statebuilding (failed or not) attempt of international actors, but also a region in which life and social relations take place outside the realm of international involvement. Finally, instead of relying solely on traditional levels of analysis in peace and security studies (Buzan 1995), the book tries to approach the region of the Western Balkans in a novel way by relying on the scalar turn and the politics of scale that stems, as already explained, from human and political geography. In line with this, the region of the Western Balkans is understood in this book as a space of engagement, i.e., a space in which, and through which, actors build linkages with other actors located inside the region and elsewhere, but also as a space of dependence, where social relations determine the realisation of interests and define conditions of well-being and self-realisation (Cox 1998). In this networked understanding of the region, different actors (local, national, international) engage in constant competition and/or cooperation in order to achieve their interests and acquire necessary resources. Consequently, the three sections of the book (case studies, regional comparison, and foreign actors in the Western Balkans) should not be read (or understood) separately, but as three socially constructed scales, where actors in each of them constantly breach scale borders (i.e., perform socalled scale jumping) in order to achieve their goals. In this respect, international actors’ engagement in the Western Balkans cannot be fully understood without analysing and assessing local actors and their strategies, or without taking into account regional dynamics and relations among the states in the region. This change of ‘analytical lenses’ through which the region and actors located within (and around) are seen provides the reader with a nuanced understanding of the region’s social intricacies and brings about a paradigm shift (Kuhn 1962) in thinking about actors that are essential for peace and security in the Western Balkans.

Notes 1 The politically coined term describing the group composed of the following countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia. Croatia is also often included in this group, although Croatian policymakers (and public opinion) strongly oppose the notion of this ‘membership’, especially after the country joined the European Union back in 2013. For more on the genesis of the term and its meaning, see: Petrović 2014; Stojanović Gajić and Ejdus 2018. 2 Croatia (1991–95), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–95), FR Yugoslavia – Kosovo (1999), North Macedonia (2001). 3 This section has been published in a revised form as part of: Džuverović, Nemanja. 2021. “‘To Romanticise or Not to Romanticise the Local’: Local Agency and Peacebuilding in the Balkans.” Conflict, Security & Development 21 (1): 21–41. 4 For the overview of the local turn in peacebuilding and its effects on the ground, see also: Ejdus, Filip. 2021. “Revisiting the Local Turn in Peacebuilding.” In A Requiem for Peacebuilding, edited by Jorg Kustermans, Tom Sauer, and Barbara Segaert, 41–59. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

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References Abadi, Cameron. 2019. “The Small War That Wasn’t: Why the Kosovo Conflict Still Matters today.” Foreign Policy, January 2, 2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/02 /the-small-war-that-wasnt/ Autesserre, Severine. 2010. The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Baker, Catherine. 2019. “Veteran Masculinities and Audiovisual Popular Music in PostConflict Croatia: A Feminist Aesthetic Approach to the Contested Everyday Peace.” Peacebuilding 7 (2): 226–242. Belloni, Roberto Stefanie Kappler, and Jasmin Ramović. 2016. “Bosnia-Herzegovina: Domestic Agency and the Inadequacy of the Liberal Peace.” In Post-liberal Peace Transitions: Between Peace Formation and State Formation, edited by Oliver P. Richmond, and Sandra Pogodda, 47–64. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Björkdahl, Anika, and Ivan Gusic. 2015. “‘Global’ Norms and ‘Local’ Agency - Frictional Peace-Building in Kosovo.” Journal of International Relations and Development 18: 265–287. Björkdahl, Anika, and Ivan Gusic. 2016. “Sites of Friction: Governance, Identity and Space in Mostar.” In Peacebuilding and Friction: Global and Local Encounters in PostConflict Societies, edited by Annika Björkdahl, Kristine Höglund, Gearoid Millar, Jair van der Lijn, and Willemijn Verkoren, 84–103. Abingdon and New York: Routledge. Björkdahl, Annika, Kristine Höglund, Gearoid Millar, Jair van der Lijn, and Willemijn Verkoren. 2016. Peacebuilding and Friction: Global and Local Encounters in PostConflict Societies. Abingdon and New York: Routledge. Bojičić-Dželilović, Vesna, Denisa Kostovicova, and Elisa Randazzo. 2018. “EU in the Western Balkans: Hybrid Development, Hybrid Security and Hybrid Justice.” In EU Global Strategy and Human Security: Rethinking Approaches to Conflict, edited by Mary Kaldor, Iavor Rangelov, and Sabine Selchow. Abingdon: Routledge. Brewer, John, Bernadette C. Hayes, Francis Teeney, Katrin Dudgeon, Natasha MuellerHirth, and Shirley Lal Wijesinghe, eds. 2018. The Sociology of Everyday Life Peacebuilding. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Buzan, Barry. 1995. “The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations Reconsidered.” In International Relations Theory Today, edited by Ken Booth, and Steve Smith, 198–216. Cambridge: Polity Press. Chandler, David. 2004. “The Problems of ‘Nation-Building’: Imposing Bureaucratic ‘Rule from Above’.” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 17 (3): 577–591. Chandler, David. 2006. “State-Building in Bosnia: The Limits of ‘Informal Trusteeship’.” International Journal of Peace Studies 11 (1): 17–38. Cox, Kevin. 1998. “Spaces of Dependence, Spaces of Engagement and the Politics of Scale, or: Looking for Local Politics.” Political Geography 17 (1): 1–23. Danielsson, Anna. 2016a. “Informality and Peacebuilding: Field Notes on the Intrinsic Reproductive Principles of Informal Economic Practices in Post-Conflict Kosovo.” International Peacekeeping 23 (1): 1–28. Danielsson, Anna. 2016b. “Reforming and Performing the Informal Economy: Constitutive Effects of the World Bank’s Anti-Informality Practices in Kosovo.” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 10 (2): 241–260. de Guevara, Berit Bliesemann. 2008. “Material Reproduction and Stateness in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” In Whose Peace? Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding, edited by Michael Pugh, Neil Cooper, and Mandy Turner, 373–390. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

How to Study the Western Balkans 9 Distler, Werner. 2018. “‘And Everybody did Whatever They Wanted to Do’: Informal Practices of International Statebuilders in Kosovo.” Civil Wars 20 (2): 287–303. Distler, Werner, Elena B. Stavrevska, and Birte Vogel. 2018. “Economies of Peace: Economy Formation Processes and Outcomes in Conflict-Affected Societies.” Civil Wars 20 (2): 139–150. Divjak, Boris, and Michael Pugh. 2008. “The Political Economy of Corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” International Peacekeeping 15 (3): 373–386. Džuverović, Nemanja. 2018. “Why Local Voices Matter. Participation of Local Researchers in the Liberal Peace Debate.” Peacebuilding 6 (2): 111–126. Džuverović, Nemanja. 2020. “Confession of the Local.” In Companion to Peace and Conflict Fieldwork, edited by Roger Mac Ginty, Rody Brett, and Birte Vogel, 353–365. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Džuverović, Nemanja. 2021. “‘To Romanticise or not to Romanticise the Local’: Local Agency and Peacebuilding in the Balkans.” Conflict, Security & Development 21 (1): 21–41. Džuverović, Nemanja, and Aleksandar Milošević. 2021. “‘Belgrade to Belgradians, Not Foreign Capitalists’: International Statebuilding, Contentious Politics, and New Forms of Political Representation in Serbia.” East European Politics and Societies 35 (1): 190–209. Ejdus, Filip. 2021. “Revisiting the Local Turn in Peacebuilding.” In A Requiem for Peacebuilding, edited by Jorg Kustermans, Tom Sauer, and Barbara Segaert, 41–59. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Gippert, Birte Julia. 2018. “The Interaction Between Local and International Power in EU Police Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Contemporary Security Policy 39 (1): 51–71. Hameiri, Shahar, Caroline Hughes, and Fabio Scarpello. 2017. International Intervention and Local Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hameiri, Shahar, and Lee Jones. 2017. “Beyond Hybridity to the Politics of Scale: International Intervention and ‘Local’ Politics.” Development and Change 48 (1): 54–77. Hameiri, Shahar, and Fabio Scarpello. 2018. “International Development Aid and the Politics of Scale.” Review of International Political Economy 25 (2): 145–168. Haslam, Paul, Jessica Schafer, and Pierre Beaudet, eds. 2012. Introduction to International Development: Approaches to Actors and Issues. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Herod, Andrew. 2010. Scale. London and New York: Routledge. Kaplan, Robert. 1993. Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Kappler, Stefanie. 2012. “Liberal Peacebuilding’s Representation of the Local: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina.” In Hybrid Forms of Peace: From Everyday Agency to PostLiberalism, edited by Oliver Richmond, and Audra Mitchell, 260–277. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Kappler, Stefanie. 2013. “Everyday Legitimacy in Post-Conflict Spaces: The Creation of Social Legitimacy in Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Cultural Arenas.” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 7 (1): 11–28. Kappler, Stefanie, and Nicolas Lemay-Hébert. 2015. “Hybrid Local Ownership in BosniaHerzegovina and Kosovo: From Discursive to Material Aspects of Ownership.” In Local Ownership in International Peacebuilding: Key Theoretical and Practical Issues, edited by Sung Yong Lee, and Alpaslan Özerdem, 74–92. Abingdon: Routledge. Kelly, Michael. 1995. “The Negotiator.” New Yorker, November 6, 1995. Kuhn, Thomas. 1962. The History of Scientific Revolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

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Lemay-Hébert, Nicolas. 2011. “The “Empty-Shell” Approach: The Setup Process of International Administrations in Timor-Leste and Kosovo, its Consequences and Lessons.” International Studies Perspectives 12 (2): 190–221. Lemay-Hébert, Nicolas. 2012. “Coerced Transitions in Timor-Leste and Kosovo: Managing Competing Objectives of Institution-Building and Local Empowerment.” Democratization 19 (3): 465–485. Lemay-Hébert, Nicolas, and Stefanie Kappler. 2016. “What Attachment to Peace? Exploring the Normative and Material Dimensions of Local Ownership in Peacebuilding.” Review of International Studies 42 (5): 895–914. Lepp, Eric. 2018. “Division on Ice: Shared Space and Civility in Modern Belfast.” Journal of Peacebuilding and Development 13 (1): 32–45. Mac Ginty, Roger. 2010. “Hybrid Peace: The Interaction Between Top-Down and Bottom-Up Peace.” Security Dialogue 41 (4): 391–412. Mac Ginty, Roger. 2011. International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Mac Ginty, Roger. 2014. “Everyday Peace: Bottom-Up and Local Agency in ConflictAffected Societies.” Security Dialogue 45 (6): 548–564. Mac Ginty, Roger and Oliver Richmond. 2013. “The Local Turn in Peace Building: A Critical Agenda for Peace.” Third World Quarterly 34 (5): 763–783. Macaspac, Nerve Valerio. 2018. “Suspicion and Ethnographic Peace Research (Notes from a Local Researcher).” International Peacekeeping 2 (5): 677–694. MacKinnon, Danny. 2010. “Reconstructing Scale: Towards a New Scalar Politics.” Progress in Human Geography 35 (1): 21–36. Martin, Mary and Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic. 2017. “‘It’s not Just the Economy, Stupid’. The Multi-directional Security Effects of the Private Sector in Post-conflict Reconstruction.” Conflict, Security & Development 17(4): 361–380. Millar, Geroid. 2011. An Ethnographic Approach to Peacebuilding: Understanding Local Experiences in Transitional States. Abingdon: Routledge. Paffenholz, Thania. 2015. “Unpacking the Local Turn in Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment Towards an Agenda for Future Research.” Third World Quarterly 36 (5): 857–874. Petrović, Tanja, ed. 2014. Mirroring Europe: Ideas of Europe and Europeanization in Balkan Societies. Leiden: Brill. Pugh, Michael. 2004. “Rubbing Salt into War Wounds: Shadow Economies and Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Kosovo.” Problems of Post-Communism 51 (3): 53–60. Pugh, Michael. 2005. “Transformation in the Political Economy of Bosnia since Dayton.” International Peacekeeping 12 (3): 448–462. Pugh, Michael. 2018. “Precarity in Post-Conflict Yugoslavia: What About the Workers?” Civil Wars 20 (2): 151–170. Pugh, Michael, Mandy Turner, and Neil Cooper, eds. 2011. Whose Peace? Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Ramović, Jasmin. 2018. “Looking into the Past to See the Future? Lessons Learned from Self-Management for Economies in Post-Conflict Societies of the Former Yugoslavia.” Civil Wars 20 (2): 171–192. Richmond, Oliver P. 2014. Failed Statebuilding: Intervention, the State, and the Dynamics of Peace Formation. New Heaven: Yale University Press. Richmond, Oliver P., and Audra Mitchell, eds. 2011. Hybrid Forms of Peace: From Everyday Agency to Post-Liberalism. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

How to Study the Western Balkans 11 Scott, James, C. 1992. Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts. New Heaven: Yale University Press. Smith, Neil. 2008. Uneven Development: Nature, Capital and the Production of Space. Athens: The University of Georgia Press. Stavrevska, B. Elena. 2018. “The Mother, the Wife, the Entrepreneur? Women’s Agency and Microfinance in a Disappearing Post-Conflict Welfare State Context.” Civil Wars 20 (2): 193–216. Stojanović Gajić, Sonja, and Filip Ejdus, eds. 2018. Security Community Practices in the Western Balkans. London and New York: Routledge. Stojarová, Věra. 2020. “Moving Towards EU Membership and Away from Liberal Democracy.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 20 (1): 221–236. Visoka, Gëzim. 2011. “International Governance and Local Resistance in Kosovo: The Thin Line between Ethical, Emancipatory and Exclusionary Politics.” Irish Studies in International Affairs 22: 99–125. Visoka, Gëzim. 2012a. “The ‘Kafkaesque Accountability’ of International Governance in Kosovo.” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 6 (2): 189–212. Visoka, Gëzim. 2012b. “Three Levels of Hybridisation Practices in Post-Conflict Kosovo.” Journal of Peacebuilding & Development 7 (2): 23–36. Visoka, Gëzim. 2017. Shaping Peace in Kosovo: The Politics of Peacebuilding and Statehood. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Visoka, Gëzim, and Oliver Richmond. 2017. “After Liberal Peace? From Failed StateBuilding to an Emancipatory Peace in Kosovo.” International Studies Perspectives 18 (1): 110–129. Vogel, Birte. 2016. “Civil Society Capture: Top-Down Interventions from Below?” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 10 (4): 472–489. Ustinov, Peter. 1993. The European, 10 June 1993. Waltz, Keneth. 1959. Man, The State, and War. New York: Colombia University Press.

Part 1

Local Level

2

Conflicting Peace in Post-War Serbia Radicalisation and Extremism as Security Threats Goran Tepšić

Introduction In the past three decades, Serbia has changed its legal status four times; it went from being a federal unit of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (until 1992) and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY, 1992–2003), to a member of a state union with Montenegro (2003–6), and finally an independent state (since 2006). Simultaneously, it was involved, directly or indirectly, in four wars: The Slovenian (1991), Croatian (1991–5), Bosnian (1992–5), and Kosovar (1996–9). In the post-war period, it was confronted with the secession of its southern province of Kosovo (2008), whose independence it still disputes. Serbia is thus still struggling with legacies of wars, but also of the international isolation of the 1990s and the late democratic and economic transition, which started in the 2000s after the fall of then-president of FRY Slobodan Milošević. Conflicting historical narratives, competitive victimisation, and collective grievances combined with the poor economic situation, widespread corruption, and malfunctioning of state institutions are the main drivers of community vulnerability (Perry 2019). The official political discourse in Serbia only affirms this notion, as it emphasises the influence of historical legacies and consequences of recent conflicts on regional security, while listing separatism, ethnic and religious extremism, economic and social issues, migrations, organised crime, weakness of the state, natural disasters, and pandemics as the main threats to security and peace in the region of the Western Balkans (MORS 2019a). This chapter takes a look at peace and security dynamics in post-war Serbia, with a particular emphasis on underlying factors of political instability, namely radicalisation and extremism. Although radicalisation and extremism are listed as one of several security threats, we consider them a determining factor that could transform any political issue into a security threat or a challenge to peace (the issue of migrations, for instance). As Perry (2019) argues, in Serbia and the entire Western Balkans, radicalisation is embedded in the experience of violence and ethnic cleansing of the 1990s wars more than in any other factor that would be typical for Western Europe or the USA. Therefore, Serbia and the Western Balkans region are not confronting some sort of ‘new violent extremism crisis’ that started after the outbreak of wars in Syria (2011) and Ukraine (2014). Instead, DOI: 10.4324/9781003276661-3

16 Goran Tepšić Serbia is dealing with various manifestations of the socially embedded ‘culture of extremism’, present primarily as a consequence of the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia and the ensuing events. Our understanding of the problem is shaped by the contemporary literature on radicalisation, extremism, and cumulative extremism/reciprocal radicalisation (Halilović Pastuović et al. 2021; McCauley and Moskalenko 2008; Eatwell 2006; Ebner 2017; Perry 2019).1

Security Development in Post-War Serbia In the post-war period, the Serbian government adopted national security and defence strategies twice, in 2009 and 2019. A comparative analysis of these documents shows that security threats have remained the same after a ten-year period, while the national interests were slightly modified. As mentioned above, separatism, insurrection, terrorism and extremism, a proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organised crime, and demographic and economic underdevelopment have dominated Serbia’s security sector for the past few decades. Furthermore, both the 2009 and 2019 strategies were focused on regional security, particularly on issues related to the status of Kosovo, the political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), and the unresolved disputes with former Yugoslav republics (including the demarcation disputes with Croatia and BiH) (MORS 2009a, 2009b, 2019a, 2019b). The strategies list the independence of Kosovo as a threat to the national interests of Serbia that could further destabilise the country (particularly the Albanianpopulated parts of southern Serbia) and potentially lead to insurrection. Therefore, the protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia (including Kosovo) remains the most important national interest. Another national interest with regional implications, and a 2019 novelty (in comparison with the strategies of 2009), is the protection of the Republic of Srpska (RS) as an entity of BiH in accordance with the Dayton Agreement (MORS 2019a, 2019b), which is largely considered interference in the internal political affairs of BiH. These respective national interests are a direct consequence of the wars of the 1990s and an important subject of the post-war clash of narratives, competitive victimisations, and collective grievances in the region (for the case of BiH, see Tepšić and Džuverović 2018). The intractability of these issues inherited from the conflicted past perpetuates radicalisation and extremist narratives, and vice versa, thus creating a vicious circle as an inexhaustible source of security threats and peace unsustainability. The Serbian government partially addressed the issues of radicalisation and extremism (excluding far-right extremism) in the National Strategy for the Prevention and Countering of Terrorism, adopted in 2017. The Strategy recognises high standards of civil society, the protection of minority rights, and religious tolerance as advantages of Serbia; however, it also identifies insufficient integration of certain groups, the weakening of the role of family, and the abuse of social networks as its weaknesses in preventing and countering radicalisation and extremism. It names ethnically motivated extremism and separatist

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tendencies (particularly concerning Kosovo), activities of members and supporters of radical Islamic movements and organisations, propaganda activity of radical religious preachers, return of terrorist fighters, and the danger of terrorist infiltration during mass migration as specific terrorist threats to Serbia. As for the means of prevention, authors of the Strategy suggest the development of a security culture of the citizens (through formal and informal education, training, and spreading of information), early identification of causes and factors leading to violent extremism and radicalisation, development of an environment discouraging for the recruitment of youth, building the resilience of digital networks and communication systems to counter the spreading of violent extremism and radicalisation, and the advance of strategic communication skills (GRS 2017). Notwithstanding these strategies, the official discourse of the Serbian government seldom mentions the issues of radicalisation and extremism, particularly their prevention and countering. However, civil society organisations (CSOs) have emerged as ‘substitute service providers’ (Holmer 2013), turning the spotlight on these security issues (Perry 2016). The negative side of CSOs’ involuntary monopolisation of radicalisation and extremism issues is that they can easily slide into the ‘CSO bubble’, an exclusive CSO domain devoid of the involvement of other relevant security actors.

Serbia, a Tale of Two Extremisms As Perry argues (2019, 34), the case of Serbia is ‘a tale of two extremisms’: Farright nationalism and Islamist extremism. The former is more pervasive but has mainly been normalised in the post-war period (Stakić 2015), while the latter is of limited scope, although it attracts much more publicity and focus from both domestic and international actors (Perry 2019). Estimates from 2018 showed that about 7,000 Muslims in Serbia were considered radicalised, while the number of far-right extremists was slightly lower (Petrović and Stakić 2018, 13). Both forms of extremism refer to religion, although that is less obvious in the case of the far-right. While the Islamist extremism stems directly from specific interpretations of Islam, the relationship between far-right nationalism and Orthodox Christianity is not that apparent, apart from some far-right clerical organisations (Bakić 2013). Religious identity plays an essential role in this ‘culture of extremism’ since it was – as a constituent element of nationhood – often the main diacritic between the warring parties of the 1990s. On the other hand, it also served as a driver of solidarity. It attracted various foreign fighters, e.g., from Greece and Russia or the Middle East countries, who fought for the Serbian or Bosniak/Albanian side, respectively. The recruitment of foreign fighters from Serbia by ISIS in Syria or pro-Russian forces in Ukraine could also be viewed as an act of religious solidarity and a ‘repayment of debt’ (Bešlin and Ignjatijević 2017; Karčić 2020). The ideology of Islamist extremism first came to Serbia (Sandžak) through the jihadist presence in the Bosnian War (Perry 2019), while far-right organisations often emphasise religious elements of the Serbian

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identity in their political programmes and trace their origins to the wars of the 1990s (Bakić 2013; Stakić 2015).

State, Church, and the ‘Mainstreaming’ of the Radical Right/Far-Right Far-right extremist groups have been present in Serbia since the late 1980s and the beginning of the democratisation and liberalisation of former Yugoslavia’s political and economic system. The wars that followed in the 1990s played the role of catalyst in shaping the Serbian far-right since they placed (extreme) nationalism high on the political agenda, making it socially acceptable. Another factor contributing to the normalisation of the far-right was Serbia’s international position during the 1990s. Sanctions and the isolation of the state, which culminated in the NATO bombing in 1999 and the subsequent secession of Kosovo, increased xenophobia and produced a strong anti-Western and anti-globalist sentiment among the population of Serbia. Consequently, the Serbian public viewed Western politics as unprincipled and unjust, which – combined with the economic failures of the country – only fostered national frustration and strengthened far-right nationalism (Bakić 2013; Stakić 2015; Džombić 2014). In the 1990s, far-right extremists operated primarily as paramilitary formations, orbiting mostly around the Serbian Radical Party (see Stojarova 2013). Once the democratic transition in Serbia began (2000), they transformed themselves into various associations and movements. After a short period of optimism following Milošević’s fall, a new social context of political and economic transition, with all its shortcomings (corruption, unemployment, etc.), created an atmosphere of social and national frustration for the generations of people who grew up in the 1990s, making them more susceptible to radical right/far-right groups,2 namely SNP 1389, SNP Naši, Dveri, Zavetnici, Obraz, Nacionalni stroj, Krv i čast, or Srbska akcija (Bakić 2013; Stakić 2015; Džombić 2014; Wentholt 2019). They were all registered either as political parties or non-governmental and non-profit civil organisations, although some were not registered at all. The ideology of these movements could be summed up as ethno-nationalism, intolerance towards minorities (ethnic, religious, or sexual), anti-liberalism and anti-communism, hostility towards the West, militarism, glorification of war leaders (including war criminals) as national heroes, references to Orthodox Christianity and the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC), islamophobia, and unification (cultural or territorial) of the ‘Serbian territories’ (Stakić 2015; Džombić 2014; Biserko 2014; Barišić 2014). They are divided mostly by their feelings towards fascism and neoNazism. Organisations such as SNP 1389, SNP Naši, and Zavetnici declaratively reject fascism and could be labelled as radical ethno-nationalists (radical right), while Obraz, Nacionalni stroj, Krv i čast, and Srbska akcija are considered to be either clerical-fascist or neo-Nazi (far-right) (Stakić 2015). Obraz was a clerical movement (originating from an Orthodox missionary school) that labelled its ideology as ‘St. Sava nationalism’ (after the historical founder of the SOC), based on the teachings of Bishop Nikolaj Velimirović.

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However, most radical right/far-right organisations emphasise religious elements of the Serbian identity and include the values promoted by the SOC in their programmes and manifestos (Bakić 2013; Stakić 2015). Although they often express similar views when it comes to the issues of LGBT rights, the status of Kosovo, EU and NATO membership, the role of Russia, ‘war heroes’, etc., records of cooperation between the representatives of the SOC and these organisations are scarce (Barišić 2014). Far-right organisations were not attracting much attention from the state or public since they were institutionally marginal, except for a few violent incidents that led to the prohibition of two such organisations – Obraz and Nacionalni stroj – by the Constitutional Court (which refused to prohibit SNP 1389 and SNP Naši) in 2011 and 2012. The state’s earlier assessments showed that there were some 30 radical right/far-right groups with approximately 5,000 members (Stakić 2015; Bakić 2013; Džombić 2014). Pro-Russian foreign fighters in Ukraine were a new phenomenon in the Serbian radical right/far-right (Petrović and Stakić 2018). Besides Russia, Serbia is among the principal providers of foreign fighters in Ukraine, with 100 to 300 men (Bešlin and Ignjatijević 2017, 2; Murauskaite 2020, 8). According to the European Union Institute for Security Studies, these volunteers are primarily veterans of Yugoslav wars, social misfits connected to far-right organisations and criminal groups who glorify SerbianRussian ‘brotherhood’ (including the Russian support to Serbia against Kosovo independence) and want to ‘repay’ Russian fighters for their involvement in the Yugoslav wars. Still, indications that some of them were in fact paid mercenaries reveal that money was also a possible motivating factor (Bešlin and Ignjatijević 2017). Most researchers of the radical right/far-right in Serbia agree that its internal action potential is relatively weak and mostly dependent on the power of the related parties and movements in the EU and Russia (Bakić 2013). Although these actors do not often organise violent activities or participate in them, their narratives legitimise violence against minority groups, framing them as either a physical threat to the Serbian nation or a threat to social order. Benevolence of the state towards these actors and legitimisation of their narratives in the public discourse are also parts of the problem (Stakić 2015; Petrović and Stakić 2018; Bakić 2013; Stjelja 2014). Furthermore, the ruling (from 2012) Serbian Progressive Party (SPP) is led mainly by former members of the Serbian Radical Party. Although they have rebranded themselves to seem more moderate, they still have close ties with radical right/far-right organisations. SPP allowed them more space in the media, which led to the further ‘normalisation’ of their narratives in the public discourse and the establishment of new organisations of similar ideological affiliation such as Levijatan, Srpska desnica, and Nacionalna avangarda. One of the latest additions to the Serbian far-right scene is the informal anti-immigrant coalition named Narodne patrole. Although recent research demonstrated that the ‘European migrant crisis’ was not the main thing that fuelled the far-right sentiment in Serbia (Rečević 2019), its prolongation and the lack of exit strategy additionally

20 Goran Tepšić securitised the issue and drew the attention of the far-right organisations to it (Mitrović 2020).

The Islamic Community in Serbia between Pluralism and Radicalisation Islamist extremism in Serbia is mainly linked to the region of Sandžak, whose population is predominantly Muslim (over 50%), and to a lesser extent, to the Albanian-speaking south of the country (with some incidental cases in other parts of Serbia, such as Belgrade, Kragujevac, or Novi Sad). Sandžak is an internal part of Serbia, without any special (autonomous) status, which led to the so-called ‘Sandžak question’, which was raised during the conflicts and tensions of the 1990s. In 1991, the Muslim political elite proclaimed the autonomy of Sandžak and the establishment of the Independent Government of Sandžak (declared by the Belgrade government as a coup), which resulted in the almost complete isolation of this region from the political processes in Serbia (Ćorović 2017). Although this multiethnic region did not experience any armed conflicts, it was a venue of political violence and suppression (Perry 2019). Mistrust in the Serbian central government is exceedingly high in this part of the country, regardless of the fact that conflicts have not been only inter-ethnic but also intra-ethnic. The local Muslim community is polarised on religious and political grounds, which fosters instability and makes citizens vulnerable to radicalisation and extremism. Furthermore, Sandžak is one of the economically least developed regions in Serbia. It has a young population (more than 50% are younger than 30) and remarkably high unemployment (app. 50%) and poverty rates (Kisić 2015). A study of the opinions of the youth population in Sandžak (primarily Muslim) from 2016 showed that 30% of them see unemployment as the main problem of the community, that almost 60% feel incapable of changing anything, and that 41% believe that it is the state of Serbia that is most responsible for the local problems (9% opted for the local government) (Ilić 2016). The Muslim population in Serbia is also affected by the split in the Islamic community, represented by two rival organisations: The Islamic Community of Serbia (ICoS) and the Islamic Community in Serbia (ICiS). The division is essentially political. Once socialist Yugoslavia dissolved, its Islamic Community suffered a similar fate. The new Serbian Islamic Community emerged in Belgrade in 1992 (led by Mufti Hamdija Jusufspahić), but the Sandžak elite rejected it as Milošević’s political tool. A Bosniak leader from Sandžak, Sulejman Ugljanin, responded by establishing the Islamic Community in Sandžak (1993) and installing Mufti Muamer Zukorlić as its head. Instead of uniting Muslims under one banner, this led to new divisions when Zukorlić started to manifest political ambitions independent of Ugljanin (he later became president of a political party and MP). A new Law on Churches and Religious Communities, adopted in 2006, recognised the Belgrade-based Islamic Community as the only legal community. After several unsuccessful attempts to unite the two Islamic Communities, Zukorlić decided to form the ICiS (in 2007), which operates under the auspices

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of Sarajevo. The split continues despite various attempts to reconcile the two Islamic Communities, including the mediation of Turkey in the period 2010–14. Although there is no official data to support this, it is commonly believed that ICiS enjoys the loyalty of most of the approximately 250 mosques in Serbia (Perry 2019; Kisić 2015). This religious and political division made room for external fundamentalist influences, considered important drivers of radicalisation and extremism in the Muslim community of Sandžak. These foreign influences are viewed as part of the ‘democratisation of religion’ since religion became more open to plurality and flexibility after years of state control. Political and religious pluralism led to the introduction of more radical or extreme versions of Islam in Sandžak, as the entire region of the Western Balkans historically adhered to a more moderate, Turkishstyle (Hanafi school) Islam (Perry 2019). Zukorlić described these new forms of Islam as a ‘weed that has grown’ in the cracks between the two organisations that ‘now cannot be controlled’ (BIRN 2016, 41). The ideology of Islamist extremism first came to Sandžak in 1997, mainly through jihadists, foreign fighters in Bosnia, but also from the students who had an opportunity to study in the Middle East, where they learned about different perspectives on Islam (Morrison 2008; Perry 2019). Some of the Sandžak Muslims also attended extremist camps in Bosnia (Gornja Maoča) to learn the principles of takfirism. According to some sources, ICiS supported or tolerated these individuals and groups until the final split in the 2000s, when the Salafis/Wahhabis became more visible and influential (Kladničanin 2013; Ćorović 2017). They staged several incidents during the 2006 protests in Novi Pazar against the publication of cartoons depicting Prophet Mohammad and were involved in clashes against the supporters of Zukorlić. Later that year, Serbian police discovered a youth camp they believed was providing military training to young Muslims on Mt. Ninaja (located between the Sandžak cities of Novi Pazar and Sjenica) and arrested 15 Salafis (Morrison 2008; Ćorović 2017). Twelve of them were convicted in 2009 for the criminal act of planning terrorist attacks, including plotting to assassinate Muslim religious and political leaders in Novi Pazar (Morrison 2008; Wither 2015). Members of this group were accused of takfirism (declaring all other Muslims as takfirs, or apostates). Takfirism was later spread by two congregations of Novi Pazar: Al-Furqan and Al-Tawhid. The Furqan mosque in Novi Pazar was established in 2009 by a local who was later killed in Syria fighting for ISIS (Ćorović 2017, 128). This mosque was linked to Al-Furqan, an Islamic heritage foundation from Saudi Arabia, and the camp in Gornja Maoča. Together with the Tawhid mosque (Al-Tawhid was an Islamist brigade involved in the Syrian Civil War), it facilitated the spread of radical Islam and increased the number of youths showing interest in joining ISIS (Ćorović 2017). Salafis in Sandžak became better organised and started gaining more financial support in 2010 (mostly from Saudi Arabian charities, such as Al-Furqan, and Bosniak diaspora from Sweden, Austria, and the UK), coming into the spotlight with the beginning of the war in Syria and the founding of ISIS (49 of them went to Syria). Estimates from 2018 showed about 100 Islamist extremists (capable

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of committing violent attacks) grouped into 3 masjids in Novi Pazar (Morrison 2008; Petrović and Stakić 2018). Petrović and Stakić (2018, 13) concluded that there were at least three extremists’ masjids (mosques) in Novi Pazar, related to Al-Furqan (CSO) and Al-Tawhid. According to some of their interviewees, there were Salafi masjids in almost all the neighbourhoods of Novi Pazar, although not all of them were necessarily a security threat. Some Salafi masjids were parajaamats,3 but some were organised by the ICiS (Petrović and Stakić 2018, 14–15). A parajaamat used for recruiting members of the Roma population for the Syrian Civil War was also discovered in the Belgrade suburb of Zemun (BIRN 2016). In 2017, Serbian authorities demolished a religious building in Zemun officially belonging to ICoS with the explanation that it lacked a building permit. It remains unclear whether the real reason for the demolition of this improvised mosque was its utilisation for recruiting Islamist fighters (Smailović 2017). Salafi organisations usually target young populations with unfortunate financial situations and without much education, usually unemployed and coming from remote rural areas, using humanitarian and altruistic arguments alongside emotional motives such as stories and images of Muslim suffering in Syria, Palestine, and Bosnia, with particular emphasis on the genocide in Srebrenica (Kladničanin 2013; Bešlin and Ignjatijević 2017). An additional motive, as in the case of Ukraine, is the payment and provision of different material and non-material benefits to foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq (Speckhard and Shajkovci 2018). Recent reports show an increase in the recruitment of the urban population, primarily people living on the margins of the society (dissatisfied youth, often with a criminal past), and of the non-Muslim population – Serbian Orthodox, Roma, and others who have converted to Islam. The radicalisation process is related to social and personality problems such as identity crisis, family issues, discrimination, and poverty, which can lead a person to embrace Islam – usually its radical interpretations – as a framework for social regulation and a break from earlier life. That could further lead to a complete change of lifestyle, military training, and – as the last phase – the preparation and execution of violence (Ćorović 2017).

Reciprocal Radicalisation and Cumulative Extremism The Western Balkan Extremism Research Forum’s ‘Serbia Report’ marked the beginning of the focus shift from only one form of extremism, either far-right or Islamist, to cumulative extremism, without examining the far-right nationalism but merely using it ‘as a country-specific driver of Islamist extremism’ (Petrović and Stakić 2018, 7). As the authors explained: ‘this paper is aimed at identifying and analysing the major drivers of (violent) extremism and how these factors intertwine and strengthen each other in spreading extremism’ (Petrović and Stakić 2018, 6). The report found that extremism was not a grave problem in Serbia since only 49 individuals from Serbia joined the Islamic State or Al-Qaeda, and there were no more than 100 Islamist extremists in Serbia in total. Nevertheless, they concluded that there was a significant pool of not-yet extremists and a trend of spreading

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radicalisation and extremism in Serbia, especially among the youth and the Roma population. Their findings suggest that this trend could be best explained by the relative deprivation (constant worsening of the economic situation, corruption, and malfunctioning institutions) and the culturalisation of politics (naturalisation of economic and political inequalities as identitarian/cultural differences). The report stresses cultural factors as vehicles for exploiting grievances by extremist groups, facilitated by the poor quality of education and the lack of critical thinking in Serbia (Petrović and Stakić 2018; BIRN 2016). This study also underlined two specificities of Serbia related to the issues of radicalisation and extremism: Division of the Islamic community in the country into two formal structures, which leaves more space for extremists to attract dissatisfied believers; and the different treatment of pro-Russian (prosecuted as foreign fighters) and anti-Assad foreign fighters (prosecuted as terrorists) by Serbian authorities, which creates an impression among Muslims that the authorities are biased (Petrović and Stakić 2018).4 These factors can further boost both extremisms, leading to their mutual reinforcement and fuelling of domestic political tensions and inter-ethnic segregation (Bešlin and Ignjatijević 2017). As the critical drivers of radicalisation and extremism in Sandžak, the ‘Serbia Report’ lists those of a socioeconomic and political (corruption and crime, poor governance, unemployment, and relative deprivation), or identitarian nature (issues of religious and ethnic identification, the split in the Islamic community, foreign influences, isolation of the region, and negative image in the media). A survey from 2017 confirmed these notions since 41% of the respondents of Bosniak nationality were primarily concerned with corruption and crime. Twenty-seven percent of them listed poor governance, while almost 90% believed that the risk of corruption is extremely high. The same survey showed that Bosniaks trust state institutions less than members of other ethnic groups – such as the police (32%, compared to 39% at the national level), judiciary (15%, 20%), and military (36%, 56%). In comparison, they express more trust when it comes to religious institutions (54%, 42%), CSOs (39%, 15%), and local authorities (21%, 15%). The discrepancy between the national level and the level of the Bosniak ethnic group is striking when it comes to trust in the military (discrepancy of 20%) and CSOs (24%). Religious institutions and CSOs are, by far, the most trusted organisations among Bosniaks (Petrović and Stakić 2018). As regards identitarian drivers, a survey from 2016 demonstrated that most young people in Sandžak were highly religious (87%) and that they viewed their religion and affiliation to the Islamic world as the essential elements of their identity (64%), whereas 14% of them felt discriminated against because of their religion (and 11% because of their nationality). Approximately 64% of the respondents considered religious communities highly influential in their local area. One-fifth approved of using violence to protect their religion, and nearly the same percentage recognised terrorism as a threat to Serbia. More than one-third of the respondents were familiar with the struggle of ISIS and confirmed the existence of extremist groups in their community. Only 3% justified the activities of ISIS and expressed willingness to support or join them (Ilić 2016).

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Another survey from 2016 reaffirmed that the critical drivers of radicalisation in Serbia are ethnic fragmentation, lack of possibilities for the youth, and the role of global and regional politics and influences. Perceived religious discrimination was identified as the most critical driver of radicalisation among the Albanian and Bosniak young people, combined with ethnic discrimination in the Albanian case. Nevertheless, both the Albanian/Bosniak minority and the Serbian majority perceived themselves as victims of injustice since Serbian youth held that minorities enjoyed greater rights than the majority in Serbia. Perceived injustice was correlated to the interpretations of the past, especially the wars of the 1990s. Most Serbs saw their guilt as equal to that of other peoples, while Bosniaks were readier to perceive themselves as sole victims. Most Albanians rejected any responsibility for past events (CeSID 2016).

Regional Implications of Radicalisation and Extremism in Serbia Radicalisation and extremisms that feed off each other are not limited to the national level. On the contrary, most issues that concern the radical and the farright in Serbia are of a regional scope, as well as transnational. While the far-right groups in Serbia (such as Levijatan or Narodne patrole) are mostly marginal, the radical right is becoming mainstream, with significant space for further radicalisation. That space is reserved mainly for the issues of Kosovo and the Republic of Srpska (and, to a lesser extent, Montenegro). The status of Kosovo is the focal point of all radical right activities. Thus, potential concessions to the government of Kosovo or recognition of Kosovo independence by the government of Serbia would only intensify the radicalisation of these movements. For instance, Zavetnici, or the newly founded radical right movement Oslobođenje, state the reintegration of Kosovo into Serbia as their very raison d’être. Oslobođenje could be even described as a single case movement, focusing almost exclusively on the issue of Kosovo. The protection of RS was codified as a national interest by Serbia in 2019. The perpetual political instability in BiH largely affects the radicalisation of both Serbs and Bosniaks in Serbia. Qualifying the massacre in Srebrenica (July 1995) as genocide or contesting the RS’ status is unacceptable for the Serbian radical right/far-right, producing a strong impetus for their activities. Together with the relativisation or denial of the Bosnian state and language, and Bosniak identity, these issues represent the cornerstone of reciprocal radicalisation between Serbs and Bosniaks. A good example of this radicalisation is reactions to the High Representative’s recent decision to impose amendments to the Bosnian criminal law with the intention to criminalise genocide denial. This decision mobilised radical nationalists on both sides, reintroducing a ‘war framework’ and reinforcing mutual polarisation and dehumanisation. Another issue that could potentially fuel radicalisation in Serbia is new migrations. Although the radical right is rather moderate when it comes to this topic, at least publicly, some far-right organisations, with a Nazi or fascist background, are

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openly anti-immigrant. One of them, Narodne patrole, has local groups or gangs involved in various violent activities targeting immigrants. Levijatan, an openly fascist organisation, was also involved in such activities. New waves of mass migration would probably attract the attention of other similar organisations in Serbia and cause their further radicalisation. When it comes to the Islamist radicalisation and extremism in Sandžak, it seems that it has passed its peak. Internal potentials for religious radicalisation in Sandžak are low since most Salafis have integrated into formal Islamic Communities, becoming more moderate. Nevertheless, there is a relatively high potential for nationalist radicalisation, although it is not easy to make a clear distinction between religious and ethnic elements of the Bosniak identity. As explained above, Bosniak political parties from Sandžak have their role in competitive self-victimisation and reciprocal radicalisation processes. They consider themselves second-class citizens in Serbia, discriminated against and marginalised. The prolongation of the current situation and lack of political and economic reforms could lead to further radicalisation in this region of Serbia.

Conclusion For more than two decades now, Serbia has been confronted with two types of extremism. Both Islamist and far-right extremism/radicalism originated in the 1990s wars, either because of foreign influence through jihadists or the recruiting of paramilitary forces. State and religious institutions played a decisive role in both cases since their activity, or rather passivity, produced the main drivers of radicalisation and extremism. They fostered the production of narratives adopted by extremist organisations through their ‘normalisation’ and ‘mainstreaming’, and participated in various political conflicts that led to socioeconomic underdevelopment, the spreading of radical ideologies, interreligious/inter-ethnic discrimination, and hate speech. Radical right/far-right organisations have been regularly utilised by the Serbian state, and to a certain extent by the SOC, while the relationship between the ICiS and Islamist extremists varied from support to open conflict. As Stakić (2015, 142) concludes, ‘the “mainstreaming” of the radical/extreme-right in Serbia could be pinned down to two major contributing factors: the benevolence of the judiciary towards the far-right actors, and the normalisation of nationalism within the Serbian public discourse’, while the specific position of Sandžak and the conflict between the two Islamic Communities make the population of this region, especially the youth, an easy target of any sort of radicalisation (Ćorović 2017). Inherited collective grievances between Serbs and Muslims (either Bosniaks or Albanians) are only intensified by the unequal state treatment of the two extremisms, implying an anti-Muslim sentiment of the Serbian authorities. The state largely neglects the issue of preventing and countering extremism (P/ CVE), leaving it almost entirely to the CSO sector, which, despite all the efforts, lacks a holistic strategy on the prevention of violence. The contemporary literature on the P/CVE issues forms a consensus regarding the need for a multidisciplinary,

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holistic approach to the problems of radicalisation and extremism. A holistic approach should address the underlying socioeconomic and psychological factors and bring about a demystification and discrediting of radical ideologies, leading to a dialogue between the representatives of state institutions, religious communities, the academic community, and civil society (Ćorović 2017; Speckhard and Shajkovci 2018). That is to say that P/CVE could learn from the peacebuilding perspective. This perspective could provide them with a ‘more expansive understanding of violent extremism and its causes and a more localised, inclusive and sustainable approach to countering it’ since it has been concerned for quite some time with the various forms of violence and its prevention (Holmer 2013, 1). Most importantly, the peacebuilding community could provide the entire field of radicalisation and extremism with a more nuanced and contextualised (localised) approach.

Acknowledgements This paper is a result of research conducted in Serbia for the purposes of the ‘Preventing and Addressing Violent Extremism through Community Resilience (PAVE)’ project. This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 870769.

Notes 1 We define radicalisation as a ‘change in beliefs, feelings, and behaviours in directions that increasingly justify intergroup violence and demand sacrifice in defence of the intergroup’ (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008, 416), while we understand extremism as ‘the advocacy of a system of beliefs that claims the superiority and dominance of one identity based “in-group” over all “out-groups”, and propagates a dehumanising “othering” mind-set that is antithetical to pluralism and the universal application of Human Rights’ (Pastuović Halilović et al. 2021, 8). The definition of extremism is contextually dependent, as there is no universal definition of this phenomenon, although violence is the common denominator of all the definitions. Reciprocal radicalisation/ cumulative extremism is a situation where ‘one form of extremism can feed off of and magnify other forms’ (Eatwell 2006, 205; Ebner 2017). 2 For a discussion on the terminology of right-wing politics, see Mudde 2007; Stojarova 2013. 3 Mosque or a local community of believers not recognised by the religious authorities. 4 Although this could be interpreted as political discrimination, it is not uncommon in comparative legal perspective. Only Western Balkan countries have criminalised ‘travelling abroad to join a conflict irrespective of its connections with terrorism’ or other major criminal acts, while most of the UN members do not recognise fighting in foreign countries as a criminal act at all. For instance, Croatia refused to prosecute its citizens who returned from the war in Ukraine (Glušac 2020).

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Stjelja, Ivana. 2014. “Zločin iz mržnje i incidenti motivisani mržnjom u kontekstu delovanja ekstremističkih organizacija u Srbiji.” In Ekstremizam kako prepoznati društveno zlo, edited by Sonja Biserko, 99–113. Belgrade: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji. Stojarova, Vera. 2013. The Far Right in the Balkans. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Tepšić, Goran, and Nemanja Džuverović. 2018. “Bosnia and Herzegovina.” In The Elgar Companion to Post-Conflict Transition, edited by H. J. Giessmann, and R. Mac Ginty, 27–48. London: Edward Elgar Publishing. Wentholt, Nike. 2019. “Using the Past to Extremes in Serbia: Narratives of Historical Violence in Right-Wing Extremism and Islamism.” In Extremism and Violent Extremism in Serbia, edited by Valery Perry, 71–114. Stuttgart/Hannover: Ibidem Press/Columbia University Press. Wither, James Kenneth. 2015. “Salafi – Jihadists: a Threat to the Western Balkans?” In Violent Extremism in the Western Balkans, edited by Filip Ejdus, and Predrag Jureković, 57–86. Belgrade: Regional Stability in South East Europe Study Group.

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Building Sustainable Peace and Security in Bosnia and Herzegovina Dancing in a Vicious Circle Bojana Zorić and Věra Stojarová

Introduction It took Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) 25 years to reach the international headlines due to a political crisis (2022) that is said to be the worst since the 1990s. Although the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) ended the conflict in the Balkans in 1995, more than two decades later, BiH continues to be divided along ethnic and religious lines that transpose onto every political, economic, and social debate. The inflammatory rhetoric that is perpetuated by one of the country’s entities, Republika Srpska (RS), is causing disarray and sending red alerts to the international community. The talks of disintegration are a result of years of failure to address critical political, social, and economic problems. The international community also has its share of responsibility, as it brokered the deal in 1995 and facilitated the establishment of a multi-tiered system of governance arranged around three constituent peoples, two entities, and one central level. Although political conflict and deeply rooted division along religious and ethnic lines are two of the root causes of the present situation, BiH’s complexities lie also in the country’s inability to address persistent structural challenges related, but not limited, to fighting corruption, countering radicalisation, tackling migration challenges and organised crime, independence, and the impartiality of the judiciary. The reconciliation process is not yet finalised, much to the detriment of the country’s progress forward (Tepšić and Džuverović 2018, 42). These deficiencies are obstacles on BiH’s path towards joining the European Union (EU), which has been the country’s main foreign policy goal ever since 2016 when it applied for membership. This chapter explores the internal and external security challenges and threats in BiH in the context of current political developments. The DPA serves as a steppingstone and an important foundation for further analysis of contemporary debates on security issues originating from both inside and outside the country. This chapter will investigate different security constellations, including those related to BiH’s multi-system of governance, ethnic and religious factors, secession elements, and environment-related challenges. The analysis of BiH security threats will be considered within a broader geopolitical context, mainly dominated DOI: 10.4324/9781003276661-4

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by the country’s EU aspirations but also BiH’s collaboration with other regional and international players present in the Western Balkans.

A War That Predestines the Present To describe the centuries-long historical development within what is now the territory of BiH would require a separate book on the matter. Therefore, this subchapter omits the dominance of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires over BiH, the evolution of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, BiH during WWII, and even BiH as a part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) under Josip Broz Tito.1 This brief historical excursus begins only with the dawn of Yugoslavia itself and the onset of the 1992–5 war, intentionally providing only a cursory overview of the most recent course of BiH’s history. The beginning of the end of the SFRY may be symbolically marked with the death of Josip Broz Tito on 4 May 1980. As Tito’s days were coming to an end, the SFRY began to get bogged down in economic problems, high unemployment, and rising state debt. Structural financial problems created the conditions for the political crisis that broke out in the mid-1980s, starting primarily due to the leading elites’ debate over whether to maintain or change the up-to-that-time strictly communist system, eventually ending in the violent breakup of Yugoslavia. Notably, the decline of the SFRY occurred in the broader context of the end of the bipolar era, the overall weakening of communist ideology in the world, and accelerating European integration. Hence, the Cold War Yugoslav role as a balancer state between East and West came to an end, too (Hladký 2006, 224–225). The economic crisis also shook the League of Communists of Yugoslavia throughout the 1980s, leading to the collapse of the party at its very last congress in January 1990. Meanwhile, Slobodan Milošević came to power in 1987 in Serbia with an agenda pushing nationalism, Yugoslav centralism, and criticism of the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution that, inter alia, provided autonomy to the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. In 1990, the first plural multiparty elections were held across Yugoslavia, with BiH being the last republic to do so at the turn of November and December. Nationalist parties were the overwhelming winners, forming a bloc comprised of the Muslim Party for Democratic Action (SDA), the Serb Democratic Party (SDS BiH), and the Croat Democratic Party (HDZ BiH), the latter two having supportive sister organisations in Serbia and Croatia, respectively (Bieber 2019, 342–444; c.f. Hladký 2006, 243–255). A direct prelude to war was BiH’s declaration of independence in October 1991, when the republic’s parliament decided on sovereignty in a vote boycotted by the SDS BiH. However, the European Community requested BiH hold a statewide referendum to confirm this approval and otherwise supported the move. The referendum took place on 29 February and 1 March 1992, and again was boycotted by the Serb population, hence effectively endorsing the declaration. Meanwhile, Serbs in BiH started to form a parallel state – Republika Srpska. After BiH’s independence was formally proclaimed on 6 March 1992, an open war broke out (Bieber 2019, 344, 357). In the early stage of the war, RS – with

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extensive support from the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) and paramilitary groups – swiftly managed to extend its control over the vast majority of BiH’s territory. Although the cleavage also widened between the Croat and Muslim forces, especially over the Croat-dominated region in western BiH, a common Serb threat made the two join forces to regain half of BiH’s territory (Funk and Berry 2020, 3). The Croat-Muslim ‘coalition’ eventually eroded by 1993, and the war took on a three-way dynamic.2 In 1994, the conflict was to end with the Washington Agreement brokered by the United States, but the agreement allowed Croats and Muslims to join forces once again to recapture more territory held by Bosnian Serbs. When the massacre in Srebrenica was perpetrated in 1995, NATO stepped into the conflict, enabling further advancement of the Croat-Muslim coalition. Eventually, this sequence of events brought all three warring parties to the negotiation table in Dayton, Ohio, resulting in the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, formally affirmed in December 1995 in Paris (Bieber 2019, 344–345). During the war in BiH, media and propaganda played key roles both for combatants (accelerating ethno-religious hatred) and the international community, providing evidence of widespread atrocities, due to which the term ‘ethnic cleansing’3 was introduced into the glossaries of international relations and security studies. The scale of war atrocities in BiH is still a matter of discussion, mainly because thousands of people are still missing. The total death toll estimates vary from 100,000 (Bieber 2019, 345; Funk and Berry 2020, 3) to circa 150,000. As a part of ethnic cleansing and warring tactics, rape (and sexual violence in general) was used, directed mainly, but not exclusively, against Bosnian Muslim women. Again, clear evidence of these war crimes is not available, and estimates vary from 12,000 up to 20,000 or more cases (Burg and Shoup 1999, 170; c.f. Funk and Berry 2020, 4). Finally, more than 2 million people are believed to have been displaced both within (1.3 to 1.5 million) and outside (around 1 million) BiH (Burg and Shoup 1999, 171; c.f. Bieber 2019, 345). The peace agreement at Dayton predestined post-war BiH to be a complicated political system, reflecting ethnic divisions and pressing the once-warring parties into compromises, making any development nearly impossible. The provisions articulated in the Framework continue to be subjected to occasional questioning and revisionism. However, not only the recurring wartime tensions but also new security-related issues pose threats to the stability and development of BiH; these are addressed in the following sections.

Recurrent Threats of Dissolution The political landscape and ethnic structure of BiH go hand in hand with one another as a reflection of all the complexities of the internal system of governance. The DPA was signed in December 1995, ending more than three years of war in Bosnia, which was part of a broader Balkan conflict in the Former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. In order to establish peace in the war-torn country, DPA anticipated a multiethnic system of government with two largely autonomous entities:

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The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and RS, along with the Brčko District, which is autonomous. Against the background of warfare in the 1990s, a system of four-tier governance at the centralised state, entity, canton, and municipal levels was considered the only solution for peace between the three nations at war, that is, the Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serbs. Based on the last population census in 2013, the ethnic structure of BiH is comprised of 50.11% Bosniaks, 30.78% Serbs, and 15.43% Croats. Of the total population, 50.7% are Muslim, 30.75% Orthodox, and 15.19% Catholic (Sarajevo Times 2020). The complex institutional structure, coupled with persistent selfsegregation along ethnic lines, has created a toxic atmosphere in the country that frequently leads to dangerous tensions. To a large extent, it is the ethnic structure of the country that perpetuates political divisions, creating gridlock in the internal system of governance, which spills over into BiH’s relations in the international arena. Complexity characterises the highest level of representation, since BiH has a rotating tri-member presidency that consists of Bosnian Serb, Bosnian Croat, and Bosniak representatives, collectively serving as the heads of state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, rotating every eight months, and each holding office for fouryear terms. The Bosnian Serb representative is elected from RS, whereas the two remaining representatives are elected from the FBiH. This definition of the presidency was agreed in the DPA, giving preferential treatment to the three constituent peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and automatically excluding dozens of other national minorities from office. The same goes for the elections to the House of Peoples (considered to be the upper chamber4 and consisting of 15 members only) at the central level, as well as for the presidency and government at the (two) entity level. It was in this context that in 2006 the Sejdic-Finci case was heard by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), complaining of the lack of opportunity for other minorities to run for the BiH presidency by virtue of not belonging to one of the three constituent peoples. In 2009, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR issued its historic ruling, holding that certain provisions of BiH’s Constitution were in violation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and that prohibiting a Roma or a Jew from standing for election for high public office amounts to discrimination and a breach of electoral rights (European Parliament 2015). The ruling proved to be of significance for BiH for several reasons. As a member of the Council of Europe, BiH is committed to respect ECtHR judgements and fulfil its requirements; implementing the ECtHR ruling will be a crucial EU accession requirement. The European Commission and Council keep reminding the country of its breach of the ECtHR ruling and expect it to be addressed through constitutional and electoral reforms. Although there have been indications that the Sejdic-Finci case could be reflected in amendments to BiH’s Electoral Law, the Council of Europe is clear that without amendments to the Constitution, no enforcement of the Sejdic-Finci case nor any other related case will be considered. BiH leaders agree it is necessary to address this case effectively, but implementing it has proved to be harder than expected.

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Another major deficiency that has been repeatedly featured in Commission progress reports concerns recommendations by international institutions dealing with human rights and corruption-related matters. This criticism concerns BiH’s Law on the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council (HJPC), including the actual performance of the Council, conflicts of interest and transparency, disciplinary procedures for judges and prosecutors, judicial review of HJPC decisions, and removal of HJPC members. It also concerns the transparency and integrity of the electoral process (campaign costs, sanctions for breaches of political party financing, etc.) and the implementation of election results. To the present day, no concrete legislative steps have been taken to put these recommendations into practice. Apart from its structural and institutional dilemmas, the major concern for BiH is its internal security situation, which concerns the co-habitation of two entities and three constituent peoples. The most recent security alert and, it is fair to say, the last straw that broke the camel’s back came about in June 2021 after the former High Representative, Valentin Inzko, issued a decree, setting jail terms for up to five years for anyone denying the genocide or war crimes committed during the war in Bosnia. This was a trigger for the Bosnian Serb member of the presidency, Milorad Dodik, to publicly announce that RS had no option but to start the process of seceding from BiH (BBC 2021). Threats of secession are nothing new for Dodik, who over the years has repeatedly threatened to break away and join Serbia, seen as RS’s grand patron. The culmination these threats occurred in October 2021 when Dodik announced the withdrawal of RS from key state institutions, namely the armed forces, the top judiciary body, and the tax administration. Such a move would be a serious breach of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which has served as the principal framework for the normal functioning of BiH institutions for more than 30 years now. His statements created unrest in BiH society, which feared another political and migration crisis. Such a toxic political environment in BiH keeps religious and ethnic tensions high. One could argue that contemporary BiH is facing problems similar to those that the former Yugoslavia failed to resolve. The position of Bosniaks in BiH today is reminiscent of the position of the Serbs in Yugoslavia who strove to save Yugoslavia from dissolution (Dzalto 2021). Another piece of the puzzle concerns the representation of Bosnian Croats who, according to the DPA, did not get their own entity like the Bosnian Serbs, but instead were incorporated with Bosniaks within the FBiH. As the smallest ethnic group of the three constituent peoples, many Bosnian Croats see Croatia as their home country rather than BiH (Modrić 2020). Probably the best example of internal ethnic relations is the city of Mostar, considered to be the most divided city in BiH. The divisions in Mostar are a result of the war in the 1990s. An imaginary dividing line was drawn in the city, with Croats mainly inhabiting the left bank of the Neretva River and Bosniaks the right side. The divisions are so deep in Mostar that there is no shared public space where people of different ethnic groups can come together (Knezevic 2017). For the first time since 2008, local elections were held in Mostar in 2020 after almost a decade of standoff due to divisions over election precincts that were not proportional to the number of citizens living in each constituency. Holding municipal

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elections in Mostar was one of the 14 priorities stipulated in the Commission’s Opinion on EU membership. Hence, while many Bosniaks advocate a unified state, Bosnian Serbs keep insisting on respecting the DPA, which granted them their own autonomous entity, and Bosnian Croats meanwhile feel under-represented and as if they do not belong there. Under these conditions, where divisions along ethnic and national lines persist and are deeply entrenched in the political, economic, and social lives of the people, it is difficult to start laying the groundwork for real democracy in BiH. This reality, coupled with the fact that corruption keeps getting worse and all levels of government show signs of political capture directly affecting the daily lives of citizens (European Commission 2021), plays well for political elites who strive to misuse nationalist sentiments for their own benefit.

Islamic Radicalism Islam has many faces and the one in BiH has always been called ‘European’ or even oxymoronically ‘Secular Islam’ (Ramadan 1999; Bieber 2000; Stojar 2016); the Muslims there have always been praised for their moderate approach to the faith, referred to by non-Muslim authors as ‘our Muslims’ (naši muslimani). The first steps towards the modernisation of Islam were taken under the Habsburg occupation; the shari´ah courts were abolished in 1946, and so all legal matters came under the jurisdiction of secular legislation. The application of shari´ah norms is the responsibility of individuals and society without the involvement of state authorities (Karčić 2015). The first revival of Islam came with the 1974 Constitution and the liberalisation of the political regime, which brought the political emancipation of Bosniaks, the (re)construction of mosques, and also the emergence of a new generation of young Muslims graduating from both Yugoslav as well as Middle Eastern universities. The wars in the 1990s resulted in an unprecedented influx of radical Islam into BiH, as the conflict was widely covered by the media in the Islamic world, presenting the war as a modern-day Crusade targeting European Muslims (Stojarová and Stojar 2019). Foreign volunteers and jihadists flowed into the country along with financial and material aid, bringing a more radical face of Islam to BiH. The DPA explicitly stated that foreign combatants would have to leave the country within 30 days, but some decided to stay, opting for Bosnian citizenship, which was granted to those who served more than 2 years in the Bosnian army, or simply those who married a Bosnian woman. The post-war governments in BiH welcomed all forms of financial help, so numerous Islamic organisations established themselves in the country with the aim of establishing their conceptions of Islam. The post-war era was marked, therefore, by the building of a network of local Salafi NGOs aiming for ideological proliferation and capitalising on the religious and socio-economic weaknesses of post-war BiH (Metodieva 2021). The Salafi settlements were established in remote areas across the country (such as Gornja Maoča, Ošve, and Bočinja), and thus isolated from mainstream society. Besides these remote Salafi settlements, the parajamaat locations (religious spaces, that

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is, alternative to mainstream Islam, outside the jurisdiction of official religious institutions) were established throughout the whole country in an attempt to reach rural as well as urban areas, and expand their influence and followers. The importation of radical Islam therefore caused a schism within Muslim society at large, and in a religious and political organisation called the Islamic Community (Islamska zajednica), which played a prominent role in Bosnian politics and society. The Islamic radicals slowly rooted in the country and interlinked with those active in the European Union. The Islamic State and al-Nusrá Front gave another impetus for the boom in Islamic activity, and BiH became a country of origin for foreign fighters. Social media made it easier for radical influencers to connect to their followers, be it in BiH or elsewhere in the Balkan diaspora communities throughout the European Union. The estimates were that Bosnia had 85 foreign fighters per million residents (for comparison, Kosovo had 125) – in absolute terms, this was 330 foreign fighters (while Kosovo had 232), which was far behind France, leading with 1,910 foreign fighters (Kursani 2015). The most recent data show that 16 people were indicted in BiH for local terrorist attacks, and 28 for their involvement in Syria – the verdicts ranged from sentences of 1 year up to 7 years in prison (BIRN 2021). The post-war environment, with its high unemployment, declining presence of international forces, and lack of control over some areas, appears to be the ideal terrain for terrorist training and logistical security. Investments by Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern players are contributing to the rise of Islamic radicalism. The situation is also influenced by considerable tourism from Islamic countries. The ubiquitous Arab tourists, who are buying a large amount of real estate here and are in the country for several months of the year, understandably affect the self-perception of the Bosnian Muslim community. The younger generation in particular is often influenced by Arab culture, clothing, behaviour, and religious rituals. Arabs and Arab culture are synonymous with luxury, wealth, and an easy way of life, impressing many young people who try to imitate it. For girls, this means wearing the hijab, for boys, visiting madrasas or mosques.

Foreign Relations in the Regional Context Bosnia and Herzegovina actively participates in the existing regional frameworks and as such works on improving cooperation with its neighbours, with the objective of regional cooperation and reconciliation. One format is the South East European Cooperation Process (SEECP), started in 1996 as a Bulgarian initiative with a view to strengthen economic, political, and security relations among countries in Southeast Europe. Complementary to this is the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe, which was superseded by the Regional Cooperation Council in 2008 and which continues to support the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the Western Balkan countries. One example of BiH’s commitment is the regional economic integration framework, known as the Common Regional Market 2021– 2024, that was endorsed by all Western Balkan leaders at the Berlin Process Sofia Summit in 2020. As stipulated in the Leaders’ Declaration, the six Western

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Balkan countries, including BiH, are committed to inclusive regional cooperation in order to become fully fledged members of the EU and equal participants in EU policies, programmes, and the Single Market, and to align further with EU rules and standards and expand opportunities for citizens and business communities (Berlin Process 2020). Despite BiH’s commitment to regional cooperation, bilateral relations with the country’s immediate neighbours continue to pose challenges not only at the national level but also within bilateral and multilateral frameworks. Of all the Western Balkan countries, BiH’s relations with Kosovo are the most complicated. This stems from the fact that BiH does not recognise Kosovo’s independence, reducing bilateral relations to nil. The potential for breaking the impasse in diplomatic relations is highly unlikely, mostly because of the make-up of BiH and the fact that any attempts to improve diplomatic relations would be obstructed by RS. Moreover, BiH and Kosovo maintain a strict visa regime which prevents BiH citizens from freely travelling to Pristina, unless they are in possession of a Croatian or Serbian passport. This is another indication of the depth of political setback of regional relations that is deeply rooted in ethnic divisions. Another area of confrontation is of an economic nature. In 2018, Kosovo imposed a levy of 100% on the import of goods from Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, in response to Serbia’s efforts to block Kosovo’s membership in international structures, such as Interpol. This caused a standstill in the BelgradePristina dialogue and a cooling of relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although the Kosovar measures were a clear breach of the country’s obligations under the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), it was only in April 2020 that the government decided to lift all import tariffs, sending an important signal for the continuation of political cooperation in the region and the resumption of the Belgrade-Pristina talks. Bilateral relations between BiH and Serbia are reflected in the internal BiH dividedness between the FBiH and RS. Although relations are maintained at the highest level and tend to be regular, Serbia nurtures warmer relations with RS, with whom it tends to cooperate without the involvement of BiH state institutions. This was the case with the construction of three hydroelectric power plants on the upper Drina, which was followed by an appeal from the BiH Constitutional Court, ruling that approval from the Commission for Concessions is required at the state level (European Commission 2021). That the alliance between Serbia and RS is firm is confirmed through the entity’s stance on NATO, which is in line with that of Serbia. Namely, on various occasions, the member of the BiH presidency, Dodik, proclaimed that there is neither readiness nor support in RS to join NATO, whereas the president of the opposition Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), Vukota Govedarica, stated that the Serbian people have nothing to do with NATO and that they will follow all moves of Serbia regarding the next steps (Zivkovic 2019). The Srebrenica massacre was yet another contentious issue between the two countries, representing by far the largest atrocity on European soil since World War II, where approximately 8,000 boys and men were killed by Bosnian Serb forces (United Nations 2021). Just one month ahead of another anniversary of

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the Srebrenica massacre, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia rejected Ratko Mladic’s appeal against a 2017 conviction for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, thus confirming his role in the genocide through a life sentence. As a result, the Serbian media hailed Ratko Mladic as a hero, while Interior Minister Aleksandar Vulin said that the life sentence was ‘revenge, not a verdict’ (Stojanovic 2021). In the public defence of Mladic, Serbian politicians claim his prosecution was an ‘anti-Serb act’, which necessitates the political mobilisation of people on an everyday political level and the defence of Serbian national identity (Stojanovic and Kajosevic 2021). A similar stance on Srebrenica can be observed in RS, where the main political leader and member of the BiH presidency stated that Srebrenica is nothing but a “fabricated myth” supported by Bosniaks and invented by the former High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Paddy Ashton, and members of the international community. Such a stance resulted in 2018 in the withdrawal of a report drafted in 2004 by Milorad Dodik’s predecessor on acknowledging the genocide under the pretext of reviewing the number of victims in Srebrenica. Apropos Croatia, the relations are overall good at the diplomatic and political levels. During a working visit to Croatia in December 2021, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of BiH, Zoran Tegeltija, stated that Croatia is one of the three most important foreign trade partners for BiH, with the total foreign trade between the two accounting for more than 10% of BiH’s trade volume (Mondo 2021). Nevertheless, there are a handful of open issues between BiH and Croatia. The two countries do not yet have an agreement on dual citizenship, although some Croatian citizens have registered to live in BiH. Without any agreement, the number of persons with dual citizenship is unclear. This provokes debates during each election cycle in Croatia since ethnic Croats living outside the country have the right to vote – due to their unofficial dual citizenship – and the results are usually in favour of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), whose sister party under the same name gained popularity after the 1990s wars and remained prominent in BiH’s political landscape. A recurring issue between Croatia and BiH is the demarcation of land borders. It is with Croatia that BiH has the longest land border which to this day has not been resolved. An attempt to resolve the border markings occurred in 1999 between two presidents, Franjo Tuđman and Alija Izetbegović, the Chair of the BiH Presidency who signed the Treaty on the State Border between the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, neither of the two Parliaments ratified the agreement; the Croatian Parliament refused to do so, arguing that a mistake had been made by experts on the maps, resulting in a standstill to the present day. The disputed borders concern the Neum area, with two islands and the city of Neum (the only town on the 20-km-long coastline of BiH), as well as the border along the Una River in Kostajnica.5

Bosnia and Herzegovina: Everyone Wants a Piece of the Pie There are several international players that have been traditionally engaged in BiH. There is the EU or – to put it another way – the objective of joining the EU,

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which determines the relations between the two entities to a significant extent. Although the country formally applied for membership in 2016 it has a long way to go to achieve its goal. Another traditional partner is the United States of America (US), which has an interest in preserving stability and peace in the region and hindering the spread of Russian and Islamic influence in the country. The US was not only the central player which ended the war in 1995, but also played a large role in post-war reconstruction, including programmes in economic development, democratic reforms dealing with the media and elections, the building of infrastructure, and training programmes for Bosnian professionals. The US supports BiH in its aim to fully anchor the country in European and Euro-Atlantic institutions (US Department of State 2016). The integration of BiH into NATO and the EU is precisely what Russia wants to prevent at all costs. Therefore, Russia has not really strived to build relations with BiH, but rather with RS, supporting the secessionist tendencies there and trying to break BiH apart. The weaker Bosnia and Herzegovina is, the farther it is from joining NATO and the EU. Russia has therefore invested a significant amount of money into BiH, largely in the energy sector, to increase its political influence and extortion potential (Đorđević 2021). China has become another prominent actor in the country, taking a multilevel and long-term approach. China is trying to establish itself in key economic areas, and to build long-term institutionalised relations in politics, culture, and the media with the aim of becoming an indispensable actor. Chinese cultural diplomacy is aimed at building language-focused Confucius Institutes (in Sarajevo and Banja Luka) and building new relations with local universities. The heads of the Confucius Institutes regularly visit secondary schools to spark an interest in Sinology among students. China is also taking up positions in the media landscape that help it cast its actions in a favourable light (Shopov 2021), and establishing its presence in key areas of the national economy. Chinese lending is 3% of GDP in BiH (Unicredit 2021). The Gulf states (especially Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar) have been increasing their presence in the region. The Arab states support religious and cultural projects (schools of all levels, libraries, museums, cultural centres) and also economic projects. Bosnia and Herzegovina remains attractive for these countries for the purchase of real estate. The influx of tourists and residents from these countries who spend part of the year in BiH is increasing, and these visitors have significantly changed the concept of Islam in the country. The indigenous school of Islamic theology is seriously endangered by the Wahhabi narrative imported from the states of the Arabian Peninsula, and at the same time jeopardised by the Shiite spirit of the official discourse of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Berkolli 2021). Alija Izetbegović, a Bosnian politician prominent in the 1990s, strived for close relations with Iran, which resulted in a military presence by Iran during the war in BiH. The activities by the Iranians in the fields of culture and education continued after the war, promoting the Shia narrative. The Balkans also traditionally belong to the Turkish sphere of interest. According to estimates, 20 to 25% of the 83 million-strong Turkish population

40 Bojana Zorić and Věra Stojarová has some Balkan roots and migrated to Turkey in the last hundred years (Firat Buyuk 2021). Turkey has pursued a pro-active foreign policy in the Balkans, and President Erdogan has styled himself as the one who speaks on behalf of the Balkan Muslims. Turkey has been spreading its influence in politics, culture, and the economy, focusing not only on Bosnia but also on other countries with Muslim populations. On top of that, he also shows off that he can manage relations with the Serbs as well as building links with Milorad Dodik, and he is trying to act as a power broker between the quarrelsome ethnic groups. However, Turkey is busy not only in the Balkans, but is also preoccupied with its troubled neighbourhood in the Caucasus, Middle East, and Eastern Mediterranean, and with its own domestic politics. Last but not least, Turkey bases its Balkan policy on how it will influence its relations with Russia and the West. As has been seen, there are numerous players interested in the Balkans, and everyone wants a piece of the pie. The region has been caught in an endless spiral of competition between various foreign actors for hundreds of years. In order to stop the merry-go-round, the EU and the USA will have to step in decisively to demonstrate that the vacuum has been filled.

From Wartime Relics, through Earthquakes to Brain Drain: Assessing the Wider Security Threats in Bosnia and Herzegovina As a result of the post-Cold War rise in civil wars as a particular type of conflict, the traditional concept of security widened and deepened to incorporate environmental, economic, political, and social security threats and to recognise individuals and communities as referent objects of analysis. While BiH is indeed entangled in a net of complicated internal and external traditional security issues, human security aspects are not playing second fiddle either. Hence, selected aspects of environmental, economic, and energy security issues are addressed in this chapter. Although war-related relics fall into seemingly traditional security categories, military damage prevention and reparations often fall within the environmental security domain. And, if states are understood as responsible for securing peoples’ survival, livelihoods, and dignity, de-mining initiatives clearly concern the human security concept. As a result of the 1992–5 war, it is estimated that more than 4,000 square kilometres – about 8% of BiH’s territory – were contaminated with landmines and unexploded munitions. Minefields were installed by all three warring parties, mainly along what are now the borders of BiH’s constitutive entities (Arnautović 2021), with about 50% distributed in forests, nearly 37% in agricultural lands, and some 4% in infrastructural facilities (Musa, Šilkjović and Šakić 2017, 55). So far, the mine contamination in BiH has claimed more than 1,700 casualties, more than 600 of which were fatal. Nearly 1,000 square kilometres of territory containing an estimated 80,000 mines still need to be cleared. The Bosnian state failed to fulfil its Mine Action Strategy for the 2009–19 period,

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mainly due to a lack of funding. Hence the goal of BiH being a mine-free country is expected to be delayed till 2025 (Spaic 2017; c.f. Arnautović 2021). Importantly, mine pollution is not only a security threat due to possible detonations, but also has socio-economic and environmental impacts. In-site mine explosions contribute to biodiversity loss and cause chemical and heavy metals pollution of soil or underground water, subsequently endangering both animals and humans. In the social sphere, mine contamination affects demographic drain, inhibits displaced persons from returning, and interferes with transportation patterns and the general security situation in given areas. Since the vast majority of mines in BiH are concentrated in forests and agricultural lands, usually in rural areas where agriculture, livestock, and forestry are vital industries, it has a significant impact on peoples’ access to resources and economic activity. The mines and unexploded munitions contamination in BiH is also aggravated by ‘moving minefields’ caused by frequent landslides, erosion, and recurrent floods that transfer explosives to undocumented places, complicate de-mining efforts, and increase the possible threat (Musa, Šilkjović and Šakić 2017, 58–59; c.f. Svynarets, Arnoldova and Mikova 2018, 83–90). Recurrent floods notionally imply a more obvious domain of environmental security, where air pollution and earthquakes accompany high waters as significant risks. Air pollution in BiH often exceeds the norms stipulated by both the international community (World Health Organization, European Union, etc.) and domestic authorities, resulting in one of the world’s highest average mortality rates from air pollution. Furthermore, polluted air catalyses cardiovascular, respiratory, and lung diseases and contributes to cancer risk. Overexposure to high concentrations of particulate matter is expected to have caused more than 3,000 premature deaths in BiH in 2016, and imposed a cost of up to 10% of GDP (Strambo, Segnestam and Jahović 2021, 3). Such a dire state is caused mainly by inefficient heating systems, the use of polluting materials for household heating (coal, firewood), ageing vehicles, poor traffic management, and industrial sources (e.g., the steelworks in Zenica), and is aggravated especially during the winter and in the capital, Sarajevo. Regarding non-anthropogenic environmental threats, BiH lies in an active geotectonic zone and seismicity-prone area. The geographical distribution of relative seismic risk – an indicator of an earthquake’s potential impact, constituted by separate risk assessments for population and for buildings (since collapsing buildings and debris cause the most casualties during earthquakes) – shows six critical regions: The area north-east of Banja Luka, an area between Travnik and Zenica, areas around the cities of Tuzla, Sarajevo, and Trebinje, and the area from Mostar to the Croatian border. In these territories, earthquakes are also most probable (Ademović, Šipoš and Hadzima-Nyarko 2020, 1835–1863). Finally, shifts in hydrological cycles and alternation between severe droughts and intense rainfall cause flooding, flash floods and torrents, and landslides that threaten BiH’s security. In addition to the direct threat to peoples’ lives, the damage can impact agriculture (crop degradation), infrastructure (disruption of transportation and shipment), and the availability of clean water (due to contamination, reduced

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sanitation, or supply disruption), resulting in negative socio-economic consequences. For example, in 2014, BiH, Croatia, and Serbia were hit by severe floods accompanied by landslides and debris flows as a result of four days of heavy rainfall in the Sava River basin. In BiH itself, in several places, the Bosna River exceeded a 5,000-year flood return period and varied between 100- and 200-year return periods elsewhere along its course (Vidmar et al. 2016, 2244). About 50% of BiH’s territory was affected, 100,000 people displaced, and 23 killed (ibid., 2235; c.f. Kendrovski et al. 2017, 598). This major emergency revealed shortcomings in the ex-ante and ex-post preparedness of BiH for adequate crisis response, including a lack of clear definitions of roles, responsibilities, and procedures, a lack of human and financial resources and of public awareness, and a lack of adequate health and sanitary precautions during and after the event happened (Kendrovski et al. 2017, 601–602). Regarding energy security, BiH is similar to other states in the region in terms of deteriorating infrastructure, low distribution efficiency, insufficient maintenance, and lack of upgrading, resulting in BiH being the most energy-intense country in the Balkan region. In BiH, coal is the main energy-generating product, providing nearly 70% of the production and followed almost entirely by natural gas. This energy mix naturally affects air pollution and environmental degradation; however, there are plans to expand the capacity of coal-powered power plants. BiH seems to still perceive coal as a vital source for its power-generation system, despite acknowledging the need to reduce electricity generation from fossil fuels in the state’s strategy, and the potential for energy production from renewable sources. BiH has (together with Serbia) the greatest potential for generating electricity through wind farms in the Western Balkans, while occupying the fourth position in solar energy potential. Compared to the rest of the region, BiH is also the only state with enough electricity surplus to export. From an external point of view, possible future connection to gas pipelines (such as the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline via the potential Ionian-Adriatic Pipeline) and the influence of foreign actors are essential for BiH’s energy security. The latter mainly concerns the EU, China, and the Russian Federation. While the EU focuses on decarbonisation infrastructure projects, China favours thermal power generation and Russia the gas and oil sector, of which it has complete control in BiH through subsidiary companies. Hence, Russian companies have exclusive rights to explore and extract gas and oil in BiH’s RS entity, and fully own BiH’s only two oil refineries in Bosanski Brod and Modriča. On the other hand, Chinese influence is exerted through financial instruments and concerns two of BiH’s thermal power plants. In the case of the Stanari power plant, a Chinese loan financed its rebuilding; however, if the plant’s current owner cannot repay the loan, the Chinese development bank may take over both the power plant and the lignite mining concession. Secondly, in the case of the Unit 7 power plant in Tuzla, the government of the FBiH was accused of illicit state aid, backing up 100% of the Chinese loan for the power plant while the rules of the EU and the Energy Community allow a maximum of 80% loan guarantee. The strategic investments of both Russia and China, accompanied by political influence and soft power

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operations, aim to deter countries across the Western Balkans, including BiH, from converging towards the EU and from the implementation of the European energy strategy outside of the Union (Turčalo 2020, 3–10). In the domain of economic security, BiH’s economy is structurally weak and based on low value-added production, and is export-dependent (Lloyds Bank 2021). The unemployment rate is high both in total – nearly 16% (World Bank 2021a) – and concerning the youth – almost 37% (World Bank 2021b). A significant blow to BiH’s economy and future development has been struck by the brain drain phenomenon, i.e., the emigration of highly skilled and educated people. According to the World Economic Forum, BiH ranked among the countries most affected by brain drain in 2020, scoring 1.76 points, when one means that all talented people are leaving the country. To compare, the world’s worst rank was scored Haiti, with 1.70 points (European Western Balkans 2020). In the 2010–19 period, BiH experienced the highest net emigration of all the Western Balkan countries, driven by better work opportunities abroad, pervasive poverty in the homeland, unemployment, and extensive diaspora networks. While net emigration does not equal brain drain and refers to the outflow of mainly medium- and low-educated people, actual brain drain – the outflow of highly educated people – amounted to 6% of the net emigration of around 405,000 persons in this period (Leitner 2021, 28–38). Finally, in terms of cybersecurity, BiH occupied 110th place (out of 182) in the Global Cybersecurity Index in 2020. It scored 43rd among 46 states in the European region (International Telecommunications Union 2022, 26–30). While BiH has improved its cybersecurity legal and regulatory frameworks in recent years, the most significant and persistent deficiency is the lack of elaborated cybersecurity policy and strategy. One reason for falling behind is the complex system of BiH’s governance, posing a challenge to reaching a consensus on relevant policy issues among stakeholders. Nagyfejeo and Alfonso (2019, 16) identify five stages of cybersecurity maturity, ranging from start-up (no maturity, absence of cybersecurity capacity) to dynamic (existing well-developed mechanisms, dynamic adaptation, and rapid decision-making). BiH is evaluated as a start-up country in almost all aspects of cybersecurity policies, culture, and education, meaning nearly no structural measures have been implemented or advanced. Within the dimension of cybersecurity policy and strategy, there is no nationwide strategic document determining the national cybersecurity programme, nor is there a state-level registry of incidents and incident-handling coordination body. However, working groups concerning entities’ cybersecurity strategies were established at the entity level in both RS and FBiH. The Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) was established in 2015 in RS, while in FBiH, cybercrime is handled by dedicated police departments. Although BiH’s Ministry of Defence developed a cyber defence strategy, it is applicable only within the ministry itself. The state still lacks a thorough concept of critical infrastructure cybersecurity, there is a low level of cybersecurity awareness among the general public, and there is a lack of comprehensive cybersecurity education (Ibid. 2019, 24–52).

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Conclusion: Moving beyond the War Legacies – a Sisyphean Task? Throughout the years of democratic consolidation, Bosnia and Herzegovina became a victim of its own system that was re-institutionalised by the DPA back in the 1990s. The Dayton Peace Agreement was drafted with the best intention to bring peace to war-torn Bosnia and Herzegovina after the violence, bloodshed, and ethnic cleansing in the 1990s took place. Apart from being a groundbreaking document that preserved BiH as a single state, DPA also paved the way for the establishment of a multi-system governance structure that created deep divisions along ethnic and religious lines. Ever since, the agendas of political leaders in BiH have been driven by nationalist and ethnic rhetoric, resulting in state capture by ruling elites that manipulate every aspect of life in BiH. The introduction of a law in June 2021 that punishes genocide denial triggered a major political crisis, resulting in threats by RS to secede from BiH. It also caused disruptions in the work of government institutions, which are to bear the major economic repercussions. This is additionally aggravated by serious concerns over the deteriorating economic and social conditions in the country. In October 2021 the unemployment rate increased to 33.9%, while the share of longterm unemployed, i.e., persons without employment for more than 12 months, is still at around three-quarters of all those unemployed (OECD 2021). Economic and social instability continues to provide fertile ground for the preservation of extremist ideologies and regional nationalist movements connected with international terrorist groups. BiH is known to have the largest contingency of foreign fighters in the region who have travelled to the conflict zones of Iraq and Syria. There are a number of Islamist-dominated villages where recruitment of terrorist networks takes place (Mayr 2016). The fragility of the state is also reflected in BiH’s relations with its neighbours, with which the country has unresolved bilateral issues that are being exacerbated on a daily basis by the internal political strife. The country’s almost non-existent relations with Kosovo reveal the interconnectedness between internal political affairs and the external representation of BiH, whereas relations with Serbia and Croatia are influenced by unhealed wounds that have perpetually resurfaced for the last 25 years. Beyond the regional landscape, BiH’s ongoing economic and political stagnation leaves room for foreign powers, namely Russia, China, Turkey, and the Gulf states, to expand their influence and push for their own agendas which are not necessarily in line with Western priorities. Nonetheless, the numbers point in the direction of the EU. The EU remains BiH’s main trading partner, accounting for 65% of the country’s total trade in goods, although with a 10.2% decrease recently due to the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. In 2020, total trade was worth EUR 9.6 billion, while the country’s trade deficit with the EU amounted to EUR 1.5 billion (European Commission 2021). It is also the EU that, in cooperation with its US counterparts, seeks to step up its efforts through diplomatic and other channels to resolve the ensuing political crisis. Nonetheless, neither the country’s leaders nor the international community

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have managed to find a solution to the crisis that has persisted since the 1990s. One thing is certain, however: The longer the crisis is prolonged, the higher the chances that the rate of brain drain will surge, leaving the country without its most important intangible asset – human capital. Referring to the popular 1993 Hollywood film, the Bosnian journalist Boro Kontić recently said that BiH feels like a decades-long Groundhog Day: Agreements are being signed, institutions founded and built, applications submitted, elections won and lost, conferences convened, issues raised, evaluations prepared, and then – nothing. Twenty-six years since the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, everything is being repeated, as if there is no time, no memory, and no history (Pusic 2021). The Groundhog Day metaphor could not be more accurate. BiH has been dancing in a vicious circle for decades now, repeating the same days over and over again. Building sustainable peace and security in BiH remains the wish of some, though many citizens seem to have abandoned that wish and voted with their feet. Until the domestic actors show a common will to exit the vicious circle, the country will be trapped forever. What is more, the country must be aware of the fact that numerous friends abroad cannot only give a helping hand, but also can help you into the abyss. One can only hope that Bosnia and Herzegovina does not choose the latter option.

Notes 1 Tito was a partisan, communist, and army commander, and later premier and president (1953–1980) of the SFRY. 2 There was also a cleavage and security dynamic between different factions within the Bosnian Muslim group; but in this brief description of the war, only the three main inter-group vectors are considered. 3 For a detailed elaboration on the use, scale, impact, and geopolitical significance of ethnic cleansing in BiH, see Toal and Dahlman (2011). 4 The lower chamber is the House of Representatives with 42 members, two-thirds of whom are directly elected from the territory of the FBiH and one-third from the territory of the Republic of Srpska. 5 The Gacko thermal power plant is also causing a stir, where Croatia seeks financial compensation in the amount of EUR 100 million for pre-war investments on the basis of an agreement on the joint construction of the plant from 1983. The disagreement between two sides is likewise caused by plans to build a nuclear and radioactive waste disposal site at Trgovinska Gora near BiH, which the Bosnian side strongly disapproves of.

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Kendrovski, Vladimir, Franziska Matthies, Goran Cerkez, Maja Drahosavac, Dragana Dimitrijevic, Milan Rancic, Elizabet Paunovic et al. 2017. “Managing Health Risks during the Balkans Floods.” American Journal of Climate Change 6: 597–606. Knezevic, Gordana. 2017. “Mostar, Bosnia’s Most Divided City.” Radio Free Liberty. Accessed December 16, 2021. https://www.rferl.org/a/balkans-without-borders-mostar -bosnias-most-divided-city/28665807.html. Kursani, Shpend. 2015. Report Inquiring into the Causes and Consequences of Kosovo Citizens Involved as Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq. Prishtina: Kosovar Centre for Security Studies. Leitner, Sandra M. 2021. Net Migration and its Skill Composition in the Western Balkan Countries between 2010 and 2019: Results from a Cohort Approach Analysis. Vienna: The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies. Accessed January 17, 2022. https://wiiw.ac.at/net-migration-and-its-skill-composition-in-the-western-balkan -countries-between-2010-and-2019-results-from-a-cohort-approach-analysis-dlp-5695 .pdf. Lloyds Bank. 2021. “Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Lloyds Bank. Accessed December 15, 2021. https://www.lloydsbanktrade.com/en/market -potential/bosnia-and-herzegovina/investment. Mayr, Walter. 2016. “Bosnia’s Islamic State Problem.” Spiegel International. Accessed December 16, 2021. https://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/islamic-state-pres ence-in-bosnia-cause-for-concern-a-1085326.html. Metodieva, Asya. 2021. “The Radical Milieu and Radical Influencers of Bosnian Foreign Fighters.” In Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Online first. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 1057610X.2020.1868097. Modrić, Sanja. 2020. “Hrvati iz BiH ne trebaju glasati na izborima u Hrvatskoj naprosto zato sto oni nisu diaspora” (Croats in BiH should not Vote at Elections in Croatia Simply because they are not Diaspora). Telegram. Accessed December 21. https://www .telegram.hr/politika-kriminal/hrvati-iz-bih-ne-trebaju-glasati-na-izborima-u-hrvatskoj -naprosto-zato-sto-oni-nisu-dijaspora/. Mondo. 2021. “Plenkovic in Sarajevo: Croats as the constitutive nation need to be equal.” Mondo. Accessed December 14, 2021. https://mondo.ba/Info/Politika/a1088847/ Andrej-Plenkovic-u-posjeti-BiH.html. Musa, Snježana, Željka Šilkjović, and Dario Šakić. 2017. “Geographical Reflections of Mine Pollution in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia.” Revija za geografijo 12 (2): 53–70. Nagyfejeo, Eva, and Alfonso P. Sarah. 2019. “Cybersecurity Capacity Review: Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Social Science Research Network. Accessed August 31, 2020. https:// doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3658404. OECD. 2021. “The COVID-19 Crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” 31 January 2021. Accessed December 16, 2021. https://www.oecd.org/south-east-europe/COVID-19Crisis-in-Bosnia-and-Herzegovina.pdf. “Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina.” House of Representatives. General Info. Accessed December 16, 2021. https://www.parlament.ba/Content/Read/58? lang=en. Pusic, Vesna. 2021. “What Russia Really Wants in the Balkans.” Foreign Policy, November 23, 2021. Accessed December 17, 2021. https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/11/23/bosnia -russia-milorad-dodik-putin-wants-balkans/. Ramadan, Tariq. 1999. To be a European Muslim. Leicester: Islamic Foundation. Sarajevo Times. 2020. “When to Expect the Next Census in Bosnia-Herzegovina?” January 10, 2020. Accessed December 17, 2021. https://sarajevotimes.com/when-to-expect-the -next-census-in-bosnia-herzegovina-2/.

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Shopov, Vladimir. 2021. “Decade of Patience: How China became a Power in the Western Balkans.” European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2, 2021. Accessed December 17, 2021. https://ecfr.eu/publication/decade-of-patience-how-china-became -a-power-in-the-western-balkans/. Spaic, Igor. 2017. “Bosnia ‘Failing to Meet Landmine Removal Target’.” Balkan Insight: Balkan Transitional Justice. Accessed January 16, 2022. https://balkaninsight.com/ 2017/04/04/bosnian-citizens-still-endangered-by-landmines-04-03-2017-1/. Stojanovic, Milica. 2021. “Serbian Tabloids Hail ‘Hero’ Ratko Mladic After Verdict.” Balkan Insight. Accessed December 14, 2021. https://balkaninsight.com/2021/06/09/ serbian-tabloids-hail-hero-ratko-mladic-after-verdict/. Stojanovic, Milica, and Samir Kajosevic. 2021. “In Serbia and Montenegro, Srebrenica is Still Politically Toxic.” Balkan Insight. Accessed December 14, 2021. https://balkaninsight .com/2021/07/08/in-serbia-and-montenegro-srebrenica-is-still-politically-toxic/. Stojar, Richard. 2016. “Islámský radikalismus a jeho násilné projevy v kontextu balkánského regionu (Islamic Radicalism and its Violent Manifestations in Context of the Balkans Region).” Obrana a strategie 16: 61–78. Brno: Univerzita obrany. Stojarová, Věra, and Richard Stojar. 2019. “Balkan Regional Development: Moderate or Radical Islam for the Balkans. Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 21 (4): 384–402. Abington: Routledge. Strambo, Claudia, Lisa Segnestam, and Belma Jahović. 2021. “Air Pollution in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Gender Equality, Social Equity and Poverty Reduction Lens.” Stockholm Environment Institute: BiH ESAP 2030+ (discussion brief), May 2021, 1–6. Svynarets, Sehrii, Anastasiia Arnoldova, and Nadezhda Mikova. 2018. “Landmines in Post-War Bosnia and Herzegovina: Risk Identification, Assessment and Evaluation.” Grazer Schriften der Geographie und Raumforschung. Accessed January 16, 2022. https://unipub.uni-graz.at/download/pdf/3091803. Tepšić, Goran, and Nemanja Džuverović. 2018. “Bosnia and Herzegovina.” In The Elgar Companion to Post-conflict Transition, edited by Hans-Joachim Giessmann, Roger Mac Ginty, Beatrix Austin, and Christiene Seifert, 27–48. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. Toal, Gerard, and Dahlman T. Carl. 2011. Bosnia Remade: Ethnic Cleansing and its Reversal. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Turčalo, Sead. 2020. “Energy Geopolitics in the Balkans: Geopolitics and European Integration of the Western Balkans.” Friedrich Ebert Stiftung: Global and Regional Orders (analysis), April 2020, 1–11. U.S. Department of state. 2016. U.S. Relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina. Accessed April 26, 2016. https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2868.htm#relations. Unicredit. 2021. Western Balkans: The Amount of China’s Lending to Governments. Vienna: Unicredit Bank. United Nations. 2021. “From the Field: A Genocide Timeline; Srebrenica Massacre Remembered.” UN News, Global Perspective Human Stories. Accessed December 15, 2021. https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/07/1096092. Vidmar, Andrej, Lidija Globevnik, Maja Koprivšek, Matej Sečnik, Katarina Zabret, Blažo Ðurović, Darko Anzeljc et al. 2016. “The Bosna River Floods in May 2014.” Natural Hazards and Earth System Sciences 16: 2235–2246. World Bank. 2021a. “Unemployment, Total (% of Total Labor Force) (National Estimate) - Bosnia and Herzegovina.” The World Bank. Accessed January 17, 2022. https://data .worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.NE.ZS?locations=BA.

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World Bank. 2021b. “Unemployment, Youth Total (% of Total Labor Force Ages 15–24) (National Estimate) - Bosnia and Herzegovina.” The World Bank. Accessed January 17, 2022. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.NE.ZS?locations=BA. Zivkovic, Vukasin. 2019. “NATO Perspective of Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Balkan Insight, February 8, 2019. Accessed December 15, 2021. https://europeanwes ternbalkans.com/2019/02/08/nato-perspective-kosovo-bosnia-herzegovina/.

4

Albania Moving from Security Receiver to Security Provider Dorian Jano

Introduction Albania is a typical case of a state that is both small and weak, and faces specific insecurities after the fall of communism. Government discourse and strategic documents clearly state Albania’s intention to transform the country from a security receiver into a security provider. These convey the country’s willingness and commitment to establish partnerships with international collective security institutions, and to be a factor of peace and stability (Hide and Kamberi 2010, 13). Here, rather than the normative tenet of promoting security, Albania’s goal is largely instrumental: It seeks to further its own national interests and overcome domestic vulnerabilities and geopolitical insecurities (Gjevori and Visoka 2016). In its effort to move from a security receiver to a security provider, Albania has relied on the support of and alliances with the United States and the European Union. The country has also worked continuously towards joining Euro-Atlantic structures. However, despite adhering faithfully to the demands of the EuroAtlantic community, it has achieved only limited independence of action. Albania is increasingly becoming a geostrategic partner of the US and EU for security and peace in the region, which in turn does not coincide with improving its internal political cohesion and stability. At best, Albania has been described as a country ‘which provides stability externally but domestically oscillates between democracy and autocratic tendencies’ (Primatarova and Deimel 2012, 7).1 This chapter looks at developments in the security, defence, and foreign policy sectors in Albania, with a focus on recent internal and external threats, the reforms undertaken, and the challenges the country faces in its efforts to become a security provider. To analyse whether and how Albania consumes and provides security, the chapter considers the country’s defence spending and other material contributions, its ‘passive’ or ‘active’ role in the respective policies, the attitudes of the elites and citizens, and the geopolitical context (see: Longhurst 2002, 51). Of relevance here are not only the modernisation aspect of the reforms, but also the attributes and qualities of the security to be provided. The theoretical understanding is shaped by the Copenhagen School approach, in which the security agenda is widened and deepened – not only broadening the range of potential threats, but also moving analysis down to the level of the individual or up to the regional and DOI: 10.4324/9781003276661-5

Albania 51 international levels (Krause and Williams 1996, 229–230). Correspondingly, the chapter studies the security complex and context, including a broader range of domestic actors and international governmental organisations (e.g., NATO and the EU) (Kazharski and Tabosa 2018) – as these may frame both the discourses and practices of securitisation (Léonard 2010).

An Overview of Security Developments in Albania As part of the Balkans, Albania has experienced similar post-communist security concerns to those of its neighbours, yet the country possesses some distinct particularities. Throughout the 1990s, the entire region was exposed to instability and violent conflicts, causing many human victims, displacement of civilians, trauma, and immense economic losses (for example, Slovenia’s ten-day war 1991, Croatia 1991–5; Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992–5; Albania 1997; Kosovo 1997–9; Macedonia 2001). These early crises in the entire region were mainly the result of the weakness of the state and its failure to balance state politics with citizens’ security and rights (Jano 2009). In the spring of 1997, the Albanian state failed along with the collapse of the pyramid schemes, and the whole country fell into total anarchy.2 The violent clashes between state forces and the popular masses resulted in the deaths of some 2,000 people (Jarvis 1999). During its early post-communist period, Albania operated in ‘survival mode’. It was subject to tensions caused by domestic instability, surrounded by inter-ethnic conflict in its near neighbours, and a very distant approach from the EU despite Albania’s wish to join the Euro-Atlantic community.3 It is only after 2000 that the developments in the security, defence, and foreign policy sectors started to be largely shaped, if not determined, by the Euro-Atlantic integration processes.4 Since then, the country has been a step closer to meeting the Western standards and conditions in the fields of security, defence, and foreign policy. Albania’s long process of reforming the security/defence/foreign policy areas has provided concrete results and benefits (NATO membership in 2009, EU visa liberalisation in 2010). Albania now possesses a (relatively) comprehensive institutional and legal framework, which has allowed it to contribute actively and constructively to regional security and peace missions abroad. Yet it has failed to substantially transform its domestic normative behaviour and the internal civil-power relations. The country remains vulnerable in its ability to maintain the state’s monopoly over the legitimate use of force in a democratic and accountable manner. In the medium term, Albania’s future challenges will be dominated mostly by concerns about human security rather than issues of military or state security. From the perspective of Albania’s security, the country is facing few significant conventional risks but several domestic (human) insecurities, thus being less exposed to external threats than to internal ones. Over the last decades, Albania has successfully sought to become not only a receiver but also a net contributor to security in the region and beyond. However, domestically, the country remains politically polarised and democratically quasi-dysfunctional, despite certain measures of stability.

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0 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 E3: Human Flight and Brain Drain

P1: State Legitimacy

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C2: Factionalized Elites

Total State Fraility index

Figure 4.1 Albania’s fragility. Source: Fragile States Index 2021. https://fragilestatesindex. org/analytics/. The Fragile States Index (formerly Failed States Index) comprises 12 conflict risk indicators of state vulnerability across economic (E), political (P), social (S), and cross-cutting categories (cohesion: C and external intervention: X1) to measure trends in a state’s capacities and pressures which contribute to its levels of fragility or resilience. The index can be used to compare a country’s current performance with that of the past. The lower the score, the better a country is handling its vulnerability.

According to the Fragile States Index (Figure 4.1), Albania has improved its position towards becoming a more stable state. It is currently ranked the 59th least vulnerable to conflict or collapse, with a long-term trend of improving 9.6 points since 2006. If its fragility is calculated according to individual measures (the average throughout the years 2006–21), the country is much worse in terms of human migration and brain drain, state legitimacy, external intervention, and factionalised elites.

The Internal-External Security Nexus and the Tensions with Democratic Governance In-out Security Threats The major threats to security in Albania derive from the criminal activities of individuals or groups, with the line between internal and external threats becoming blurred. The security narrative of Albanian elites and that of the official documents shows a securitisation trend built on mutual dependency and linkages between the internal and external aspects of security.5 Such an approach is very much in line with the EU official agenda, which is transversal across all the latest

Albania 53 security strategies (see for example EU Security Union Strategy, COM 2020, 3; The European Agenda on Security COM 2015, 2). The overall security framework, including strategies and institutional capacities, has improved over the years. Yet public safety is not guaranteed, with domestic criminal threats fluctuating greatly over time. There is still a considerable risk of violent and serious crime in the country. Crime-related statistics indicate a continuous overall increase in criminal cases, especially since 2013.6 The criminality rate, the number of crimes per 100,000 inhabitants, is increasing by 1.87 points a year. The most notable crimes in recent years have been drug-related, followed by intentional homicide and theft. Homicide has dropped from 41% (2014) to 28% (2019) of the total criminal cases, whereas drug-related crimes have increased from 19% (2014) to 32% of the total cases. The numbers for theft have fallen, accounting for just 15% of the total domestic crimes (22% in 2014). Yet, this does not corroborate with citizens’ feelings of insecurity, as many of them (42%) perceive theft to be the greatest threat to their personal security (see: Dyrmishi 2021). Illicit trafficking of all forms, mostly of human beings and narcotics, has reemerged as a major concern, with multiple forms of coercion and exploitation taking place in and outside of the country. There is also drug-related crime, as the country has increasingly become a source of illegal production and consumption, especially cannabis production. Moreover, the country has also been a point of transition on the Balkan route of narcotrafficking.7 The form of drug-related criminal offenses is characterised by fluctuations over the years among different categories of drugs. Law enforcement agencies’ engagement in drug seizing has improved, especially in the last few years, confiscating large amounts of drugs, mostly cannabis. For example, in 2014 more than 100 tonnes of marijuana were seized during a large-scale police operation in the village of Lazarat, while in 2017, Albanian authorities seized the third-largest amount of cannabis herb ever found in Europe, or 19% of the European total (UNODC 2020, 65). About 100 new cases of human trafficking are being referred each year, with the highest number (125 persons) occurring in 2014. Almost half of the victims were children, and eight out of ten were women. Only a few of the trafficking victims are third-country nationals. Domestic criminal involvement in drug and human trafficking operates within a network of organised crime. Albania has been used by local gangs and criminal groups as a transit route for the trafficking and smuggling of illegal immigrants and drugs from countries in the Middle East, North Africa, and Asia. According to official data, the majority (80%) of the convictions for criminal activities linked to organised criminal groups were for narcotics and human trafficking (State Police 2019, 12). In addition to illegal trafficking and organised crime, the issue of terrorism has been added to the security agenda (see: Decision of the Council of Ministers, 2013), relating to the threat of violent extremism and radicalisation. While concerns about (religious) radicalisation date back to the 1990s, with minor and isolated events (see: Vurmo 2015, 32), the issue of violent extremism became an issue only later. There has been considerable public interest in news related to the issue of extremism, especially during 2014–15. According to Google trending data, the

7349 148 108

2008 6929 133 94

2009 8947 125 92

2011 2012

7857 8590 141 118 97 84

2010 7883 175 95

2013

2015

13617 15640 134 156 125 109

2014

2017

2018

2019 17304 12398 13827 11531 144 146 143 177 95 105 95 -

2016

39601 7554 24948 18539 16065 11048 9850 24739 20742 157539 11487 283732 86343 25219 82655

6268 129 -

2006 2007

6796 7088 129 142 74 69

2005

Source: (criminal cases and criminality rates) Ministry of Justice, https://www.drejtesia.gov.al/statistika/; (victims of human trafficking) Ministry of Interior, https://mb .gov.al/raporte-kombetare-e-nderkombetare/; (drug seizures) United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, https://dataunodc.un.org/. Notes: Criminality rate is calculated as the number of crimes per 100,000 inhabitants.

Criminal cases Criminality rate Victims of human trafficking Drug seizures (kg)

Total

Table 4.1 Selected data on the crime situation in Albania

54 Dorian Jano

Albania 55 number of citizens searching the internet about ISIS (e.g., individuals searching for the term ‘ISIS’) reached a peak in November 2015. During the war in Syria and Iraq, the proclamation of the Caliphate and the creation of ISIS attracted some foreign fighters from Albania. It is estimated that about 114 (according to official data) to 150 Albanian citizens joined the conflict, mainly in 2013; some of them set up an ethnic Albanian (sub)unit within IS, and 48 others returned soon after (Hide 2015, 18; Shtuni 2015). There has been a growing fear that the returned foreign fighters have been sufficiently trained and indoctrinated to recruit and radicalise others to engage in terrorist attacks upon returning home (Byman and Shapiro 2014). The latter events and international mobilisation not only made the government aware of the domestic threat, but also spurred the state to change its previous approach and measures from those directed against a ‘far outside’ terrorism threat to countering internal home-grown violent extremism and radicalisation (e.g., the approval of a new national strategy and action plan, the set-up of anti-terror directorates and the national coordinator against violent extremism; see: Decision of the Council of Ministers 2015). Although the returnees proved much less of a terrorist threat than originally predicted, the risk they pose is hardly eliminated and is still very real in terms of the radicalisation of certain parts of society. This is primarily because several Albanian extremists involved had a criminal past (Hide 2015, 6), and also due to their socio-economic isolation and the lack of institutional proximity (Vurmo 2015). Yet, the percentage of citizens perceiving terrorism (7.8%) and violent extremism (2.2%) as major threats to the country is very low and declining (Dyrmishi 2021, 43). Reducing Externalisation of Security Threats beyond Borders The major security concerns (illegal trafficking, organised crime, and terrorism) that the country faces require common actions and external cooperation with third countries and international organisations to combat them effectively. Moreover, the Albanian law enforcement institutions have been ineffective, inefficient, and unaccountable, with little formal training and considerable political obedience. The resources available (in terms of equipment and working conditions) and capabilities (number of staff and their professional training) of the Albanian police have been inadequate to address internal crime, let alone more organised crime. Thus, the reforming of the security sector has been led by several international agencies and actors (the EU, US, and United Nations Development Programme). The European police assistance missions started in the early 1990s with the Multinational Advisory Police Element (MAPE, May 1997–May 2001), followed by the PHARE EC-funded project of Police Assistance (ECPA, October 2001–August 2002) and, from December 2002 onwards, the Police Assistance Mission of the European Commission to Albania (PAMECA) (Schmidt 2004). The EU’s main objective in Albania has been to enhance the capacities of law enforcement institutions on a basic level (Trauner 2009, 72). The EU has attempted to shape the public security institutions through a combination of not only advice (e.g., ‘suggesting’ reforms) but also imposition (Ioannides and

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Collantes-Celador 2011, 417). The strategy of policy transfer (objectives, legislative and organisational approach) in the area of freedom, security, and justice was based not only on EU membership conditionality, but also on EC visa facilitation and readmission agreements. The latter has given the EU strong leverage to pressure for reforms and establish efficient return policies given the fact that visa liberalisation with the EU was ranked highly on the country’s political agenda (Trauner 2009, 76–77). Moreover, the first-ever Frontex-facilitated joint operation in border cooperation on the territory of a third country was launched in Albania in 2019. The aim of the reforms introduced through EU police assistance has been to reduce the externalisation of the Albanian internal threats to the EU, rather than dealing with the security concerns of Albanians. The country is perceived as ‘exporting’ a security problem to the EU, thus being pressured to minimise the current potential risks of migration, trafficking, and organised crime. The EU-led security sector reforms expect third countries to be the ‘providers of security’, whereas the EU acts more as a ‘security consumer’ out of its own security interests, without sufficiently taking the concerns of the third country or citizens into consideration (Barbé and Kienzle 2007). Critics argue that the EU’s top-down security-first approach has created externally directed police forces that are more concerned with securing their neighbours than securing their own citizens (Ryan 2009, 327–328). As such, the concept of security established in the relevant domestic strategies, the reforms undertaken, and the transformation process in the security sector, are all based on the threats primarily addressed by international institutions (mainly the EU), and only to a lesser extent on those perceived by the Albanian state or acute domestic needs and emergencies (see: Defence Directive 2021, 1; Hide and Kamberi 2010, 11). The Missing Link of Democratic Governance in the Security Sector The security-first agenda, its top-down approach, and the intention of pleasing the partners (e.g., the EU) rather than providing security have had the unintended consequences of causing the good governance and democratic principles in the security sector and more broadly to deteriorate. There has been a mutual need – from the EU side, to closely cooperate to secure its own border and, from the Albanian political elite, to deliver – which resonates in the content of the security reforms. The focus has been only on building and consolidating the law enforcement institutions in terms of internal capacities and infrastructure, with no crossing over into the issues of democratic oversight, accountability, and transparency. The latest programming (PAMECA V 2017–21) focuses exclusively on improving the capacities of the law enforcement institutions and the coordinating mechanisms for tackling organised crime, terrorism, and border management (see: PAMECA). Some previous projects (PAMECA IV, UNDP) tried to address the component of human rights and community policing by applying the principle of human security, yet achieved little in the way of results to improve the performance or accountability of Albanian

Albania 57 police (Ryan 2006). Guiding security reform in terms of capacity building has come at the expense of relegating good governance and democratic principles to second place (Ioannides and Collantes-Celador 2011). Prioritising security over the normative rights of its citizens is the Albanian path-dependent approach, associated with the state’s weakness in guaranteeing citizens’ security. Providing internationally required responses to terrorism, organised crime, and corruption prevails over instituting good governance principles that protect the normative rights of its citizens. The state’s collective conventional threats are depicted as more likely to occur and their consequences riskier than any violation of human and societal rights. This has often been the case, with citizens’ freedoms receding in the face of state or collective security concerns. There have been several instances of government using legal means against citizens. For example, the tragic explosion at an ammunition disposal factory in 2008 killing 26 people and injuring hundreds; the national guard killing 4 protesters and wounding others in the opposition-led riots in January 2011; the police using force and making arrests during the demolition of the National Theatre; the police shooting dead a 25-year-old man in December 2020 for not obeying the overnight curfew imposed to halt the coronavirus pandemic. The danger of the use of state force and restrictions on individual and group freedoms in the name of security is a serious setback to democratisation and could be instrumentally used for the preservation of political power, especially in new democracies (Cohen 2005, 47).

Defence Modernisation and Foreign Policy Directions Military Reforms and Gaps In the first decade of transition, the military inherited from the communist regime was indoctrinated, demoralised, impoverished, and politicised. The Albanian army has been loyal, with no tendencies to seize control over domestic politics, but prompt to be misused in harsh times of political struggle for power or government crises (Abazi 2004, 30). This was the case in the 1997 crisis, when the country was on the brink of a civil war. It was only after the crisis with the adoption of the Constitution (1998) that the country achieved an important democratic standard through separating the military from state police and national intelligence services. Since then, despite the legacies of the past and the recent constraints, Albania’s defence reform has experienced significant progress and culminated with NATO accession in 2009 (Gjevori 2015). Since becoming a NATO member, Albania has spent on average approximately $178 million annually on military expenditures, roughly 1.34% of its GDP.8 The country intends to gradually raise its defence budget to 2% of GDP with the final aim of upgrading the capabilities of the Albanian armed forces. This objective, to be achieved by 2024, is put forward in the new revised defence strategy, where 20% of the budget should be planned for the modernisation of operational capacities for missions: Equipment, techniques, and interacting systems of communication and information (Decision of the Council of Ministers 2019, 16).

58 Dorian Jano The country’s commitment to increasing defence expenditures and upgrading its capabilities has not been fulfilled yet. However, in the last years there has been a small gradual increase in the defence budget, whereas in the other countries from the region defence spending stagnated with budget cuts (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2021, 76). The armed forces personnel were reduced drastically after 2000, from 67,500 or 5.02% of the total labour force to only 9,000 personnel or 0.64% of the total labour force in 2018. Since 2010, Albania has had an allvolunteer professional army, and currently the strength of the active armed forces is mostly land forces. The country’s spending, mainly on personnel expenditures,9 restricts its ability to modernise the military in terms of improving infrastructure and equipment. The most noticeable initiative is the demilitarisation programme to get rid of old, unstable, and excess munitions. Some of the significant modern equipment procured includes naval patrol craft and helicopters, as well as an advanced airspace surveillance system (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2021, 84). Since the 1990s Albania has participated in all security initiatives and proposals initiating in the West. It was the first Balkan country that participated in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, joining the Partnership for Peace Initiative once it was formed and gaining full NATO membership in 2009, together with Croatia. Albania contributed to several international peacekeeping missions in various frameworks, such as the NATO mission in Afghanistan, the mission Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean, the EU missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Mali, and the UN missions in Chad, Iraq, and Georgia. Albania has made meaningful efforts to support international peacekeeping endeavours (Hendrickson, Campbell and Mullikin 2006, 249), with a total of more than 6,918 troops (1996-2018), while there were about 330 Albanian troops in Afghanistan alone (see Ministry of Defence). This contribution is limited in scope as Albania does not possess an independent expeditionary capability. The country must further develop its ‘niche’ capabilities and its role to provide a substantial benefit to the Alliance. For example, Albania could make an important contribution to maritime security across the wider Mediterranean, if the country manages to upgrade and modernise its naval military, through purchases of modern naval equipment and improving its ability to project forces (Polak, Hendrickson and Garrett 2009). With regards to democratic transparency and the accountability of the military, Albania has the necessary legal and institutional framework for civilian democratic control and oversight of the military. In addition to the parliament, the main body of control and oversight of the military, there are other public institutions (e.g., the Ombudsman and the Commissioner for the Protection Against Discrimination) serving as watchdogs for the protection of citizens’ interests visà-vis the military. Yet there is a notable inconsistency between the legal provisions and their weak implementation. The control and oversight procedures remain only formal, or at best they do not provide robust outputs because either the expertise is lacking or the process is being politicised (Kamberi and Memaj 2020, 33). For example, at the beginning of the coronavirus pandemic, the Albanian government

Albania 59 300 250 200 150 100 50 0

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020* 2021* Defence expenditure (in millions of US$)

2.00% 1.75% 1.50% 1.25% 1.00% 0.75% 0.50% 0.25% 0.00%

Defence expenditure (% of GDP)

Figure 4.2 Defence expenditure. Source: Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries (2009–2016) and (2014–2021), see NATO 2017 and NATO 2021. Notes: * for 2020 and 2021 figures are estimates.

deployed the military to enforce the curfew rule impeding certain rights in the cities, overriding the standard legal procedures of requiring a parliamentary decision to declare a state of emergency. Albania overall has made major steps in modernising its defence sector, following NATO guidelines of having a small, highly mobile, and better trained military force. The public perception has been improved during the last years, perceiving the military as the most trusted, least corrupt, and least politically influenced public institution (Vrugtman and Bino 2020, Dyrmishi 2021). Continuity and Change in Foreign Policy Another way to gauge how a prospective ally may contribute to peace and security in an international context is to examine its recent foreign policy directions. The aftermath of the post-communist regional context had been characterised by inter-state conflicts, ethnic grievances, and domestic weaknesses. Yet Albania did not intervene or meddle in the domestic affairs of its neighbours where its coethnics live (Gjevori 2018, 172). The post-communist elite discourse of Albanian nationalism and ‘national unification’ has been an ambiguous and unstable element of the Albanian parties’ ideological repertoires, mainly used for internal and external political leverage at particular critical moments, which did not articulate or mobilise into a nationalistic-securitising policy option or move (Barbullushi 2016). Public opinion also shows a wide discrepancy between people’s aspirations and the achievement of ‘national unification’. The majority of Albanians express an abstract desire (63%) and willingness to vote in favour of national unification (75%), yet very few of them believe this is possible (23%) and only if the international community will endorse it (70%) (Demi and Çeka 2019). Still, Albania has formulated and implemented a regional policy of non-intervention.

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Other (d)

Equipment (a)

Personnel (b)

Infrastructure (c)

Figure 4.3 Defence expenditure by main category as percentage of the total. Source: Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries (2009–2016) and (2014–2021), see NATO 2017 and NATO 2021. Notes: (a) equipment expenditures include major equipment expenditures and R&D devoted to major equipment; (b) personnel expenditures include military and civilian expenditures and pensions; (c) infrastructure expenditures include NATO common infrastructure and national military construction; (d) other expenditures include operations and maintenance expenditures, other R&D expenditures, and expenditures not allocated among above-mentioned categories. * Figures for 2020 and 2021 are estimates.

Even today, Albania supports and encourages the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue under the auspices of the EU, without any interference or effect on its relations with both countries. The overly constructivist role of the government and its insufficient support for Albanians in the region is considered by some of the Albanian diplomatic elite to constitute a failure of the country’s foreign policy to meet with the exigencies of national interests (Beshku 2016, 16–17). Under the regional cooperation initiatives, bilateral relationships with the countries of the region have been intensified, yet with some contradictory rhetoric and communication taking place. In 2013, the new government articulated a more constructivist and ambitious approach towards a policy of ‘zero problems with neighbouring countries’, committing to collaborate with other countries of the region, especially Serbia and Greece, to address unresolved bilateral disputes. Public discourse and media reporting were also intensified, reflecting the country’s interests, ties, and geopolitical strategy (Zguri 2016, 61). The media engaged more with Albanian-Greek relations, mostly displaying a negative connotation, albeit depending on specific issues (see: Lleshaj and Sulçebe 2014). To a lesser extent, there were also a few reports referring to Serbia, the majority of which had a neutral connotation (see: Krisafi 2017). Similar trends are reflected in citizens’ perceptions, where the majority of Albanians perceive Albania’s relations with Greece and Serbia as normal, without too much euphoria but still improving over the years (Armakolas et al. 2021; Çela 2015; Çela and Lleshaj 2014). Albania has

Albania 61 initiated bilateral cooperation with Kosovo since 2014, through regular meetings between the two governments. This practice was replicated in 2017 with the government of North Macedonia. The impact of the signed agreements and strategic projects of these bilateral meetings has been in general limited and slow in implementation. After 2017, the (same) government explicitly articulated its ambition to advance and protect the inalienable rights of all Albanians throughout the region, also committing to financially support projects initiated by municipalities, public institutions, or civil society in the region (Council of Ministers 2017, 23). In 2019, the Albanian Prime Minister, along with his counterparts from Serbia and North Macedonia, initiated the so-called Balkan ‘Mini-Schengen’ area (later officially called the Open Balkan initiative) intending to establish the free movement of people, goods, services, and capital (the four EU freedoms) between the countries of the region.10 This initiative was embedded into the government programme (2021–5) (Council of Ministers 2021, 35) despite harsh opposition and its assessment as a tactical move to impress the EU after the failure to open EU accession negotiations (Bushati et al. 2020, 17). The very few ‘internally driven’ bilateral and regional initiatives are neither genuine nor value-added to the EU’s (and member states’) existing initiatives of regional cooperation (e.g., CEFTA or the Berlin Process). Indeed, they are more a political ‘show off’ of the domestic leaders than the true responsibility of assuming ownership over regional integration and beyond. Albania’s foreign policy today has smoothly shifted from a ‘passive’, excessively neutral role in the region, towards a more pro-active – at least rhetorically – regional cooperation and bilateral relation, especially with the states where Albanians live (Jano 2018, 6). All domestic initiatives are considered in line with the framework of European integration and the principle of a good neighbourhood. The main objective of Albanian foreign policy, since the fall of the communist regime, has been the country’s European integration. For the countries aiming to join the European Union it is important to align with the political criteria on good neighbourhood relations and regional cooperation as well as comply with the EU foreign, security, and defence policy (Chapter 31). Albanian foreign policy for many years has been in line with EU foreign policy declarations and measures. It is among the few countries in the region that fully aligns with all EU declarations and the Council’s decisions on common foreign and security policy.11 This is a significant indicator of the country’s geostrategic orientation and the degree of influence of external actors, mainly the EU. The country’s desire to advance its integration into the European Union, in addition to NATO membership, has been the cornerstone of Albania’s foreign policy discourse and practice, gathering strong public support for its domestic reforms and its constructive standing in the region. In addition to the very pragmatic continuum of aligning with EU foreign policy, there have been moves towards challenging the status quo and building more positive prestige for the country in the region and beyond. In this spirit, for example, there was lobbying for several years and ultimately the election of Albania as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for the first time (during

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2022–3), which in the words of the Albanian Minister of Defence will serve ‘to further increase the prestige of Albania as a serious actor in the international arena’ (Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs 2021). Additionally, Albania’s chairmanship of the OSCE in 2020 was also portrayed as an historic opportunity for the country to show its multilateral diplomatic skills and leadership role on the international arena.12 The goal of increasing Albania’s foreign policy prestige is reflected in the new government programme (2021–5), which explicitly states the objective of continuing to consolidate the image and role of a regionally strong Albania that is considered a serious partner globally (Council of Ministers 2021, 37–38).

The Way Forward to Bridging the Gaps The latest development in Albania’s security, defence, and foreign policy is depicted in the interplay between three main frictions: Will versus capabilities, values versus interest, and local ownership versus internationally induced reforms.13 There is an unquestionable political will to be part of a collective security space, within the European and NATO context. This is backed by strong public support that membership in NATO and the EU will contribute very positively to Albania’s security (Dyrmishi 2021). The Albanian discourse and strategic documents rigorously follow NATO guidelines and the EU strategic security, defence, and foreign policy approach. It has adopted policies and built institutions conforming to EU requirements, but Albania still lacks resources and capacities to properly implement them in practice. The country is heavily dependent on the EU and other foreign aids. Work is needed to help bridge this gap, which currently persists between practice and rhetoric. Secondly, the challenge also rests on ensuring a degree of symmetry between security and freedom, the central tenet of liberal democracy. The foreign policy and the security and defence reforms often oscillate between the choice of interests over values and norms when it comes to practice. Security and collective interest are the key message of the current strand of reforms. Especially with the rise of unconventional and unpredicted threats, the collective security interest has seriously clashed with individual rights and freedoms, threatening individual protection. There is a constant need to reconcile the collective and individual security agenda and governance, without one prevailing over the other. They are mutually important, not only for the security sector, but to the country’s overall democratisation. The golden rule is to provide security in a way that is consistent with the principles of liberal democracy and thus ensure that human security and freedom priorities are in place. Albania continues to be a policy taker, and also a security provider externally. Domestic elites and security institutions are more oriented towards global security threats, and their major concern is compliance with international requirements. There is a tendency among the Albanian political elite to seek external rather than

Albania 63 domestic legitimacy in the reforms undertaken. Most of the reforms in security, defence, and foreign policy are being induced by the EU and NATO, promoted by the domestic political elite and policy experts, and in the end supported by citizens. It is high time that Albania reviews this ‘outside-in’ approach to security and foreign policy compliance. The strategies, capacities, and processes should be organised around the country’s specific needs and vision rather than simply being patchy copies from outside. For this turn on local ownership, the mobilising of politically autonomous agents of change and advocacy groups is necessary (Elbasani and Šabić 2018).14 In the end, rather than a top-down or bottom-up choice, a more realistic approach will be a cross-loading approach: A mutual exchange of norms and needs. This is because the sustainable success of reforms is intertwined with the reception of EU-set norms and the domestic projection of needs. The core challenge on security matters remains the question of security from what and for whom. The early transition in the field of national security in Albania ought to come to an end and the traditional, state-centred security approach needs to develop into a multidimensional and people-centred security goal. The current threats are more of an environmental, health, criminal, economic, and other non-military nature. Moreover, the entire security concept needs to be in some way liberalised as the state is no longer the only relevant subject and object of security, with the individual also emerging as such. The overall debate between human security and traditional national security discourse serves to broaden the security understanding to include a more community-based approach, incorporating political, social, and economic rights into the good governance, human rights, and participation aspects.

Conclusion Albania has made progress in this second wave of reforms, modernising security-defence-foreign policy especially in terms of policy adoption and institutional building. It still needs to do more in terms of democratic consolidation and domestic governance. The country’s membership in NATO and the opening of EU accession negotiations has been successful in transforming a former failed and small state into (at least formally) a Western-type security-providing country. In its role as a security provider, Albania is facing two main challenges. Firstly, Albania could be characterised as both an external security provider and an internal security receiver. The country continues to suffer from many of its previous domestic security deficiencies, and still, it is a considerable contributing factor in the security and peace of the region and beyond. NATO membership and engagement with the EU offer a reliable setting for Albania to pursue an active and greater role in peace and security. Yet, the country has not lived up to its ambitions of gaining prominence and leverage in the regional and international arena, mostly because of its internal political instability and deadlocks. Whether Albania will be able to manage the polarised and volatile domestic political situation will reflect also on the external relations and its role in the region and beyond.

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Secondly, Albania has prioritised external over internal threats; international demands over domestic needs; the regional over the domestic context; and thus, it ought to find a better balance. The major securitisation debates emerge from above, either from the US or the EU, and then diffuse into the national context. Following the international discourse and its requirements, the domestic political leaders frame the issues as domestic threats or obligations of the EuroAtlantic integration process, thus managing to translate a broader securitisation discourse into a range of domestic administrative practices (e.g., regulations, strategies, agencies) which then find (quasi-)unquestionable public support. EU and NATO membership should provide the framework within which Albania constructs its security, defence, and foreign policy. Yet, the prioritisation should come from the Albanian context and with the full involvement of other domestic actors. To achieve the very goal of collective security and make the shift from security receiver to security provider, Albania needs first and foremost to accelerate its pace of reforms with a focus on the domestic and democratic governance of the security-defence-foreign policy sectors. The point here is not to abandon all merits of the previous reforms but to refine and critically approach the current challenges. The new shift in prioritising and practising security in Albania should be informed and transformed following the local turn (Ejdus and Juncos 2018) and the normative turn (Richter 2012), respectively. These substantial shifts will increase both the country’s domestic legitimacy and its international credibility as a security contributor both within and outside its borders.

Acknowledgement This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 891530. This publication reflects only the author’s view, and the Agency cannot be held responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains.

Notes 1 To describe the semi-authoritarian regime in Albania, where undemocratic practices persist in part because of external support and legitimacy – particularly from the EU – the concept of ‘stabilocracy’ (Primatarova and Deimel 2012) or the very similar term ‘stabilitocracy’ has been used by Bieber and other scholars, to describe the type of regimes that emphasises geopolitical considerations over liberal democracy. Although the term was first used to describe the PD’s leadership, the importance of a strongman and party patronage still persist even with the latter socialist government (Bieber 2018, 179–181). On other more recent accounts of illiberal practices and strategies in Albania, see also: Kera and Hysa 2020. 2 In early 1996, the legitimacy of the Albanian government was contested and pyramid schemes flourished with a value estimated at half of the country’s GDP. By early 1997, the pyramid schemes collapsed, and the opposition parties led the popular protests,

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3 4 5

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combining their political agenda with the public demand for the return of their lost savings. The conflict between the state order forces and popular masses were violent. Thus, the state lost control over the country, the army and police had mostly deserted, and the armouries had been looted by rioters and government supporters, leaving the county in full chaos and civil disorder (for more see: Jarvis 1999). On the argument of the EU ‘distancing’ or ‘terra incognita’ approach in the entire region in the 1990s, see Smith (2000) who argues that the EU is willing to contribute only in post-crisis reconstruction, but not to engage in the acute phase of crisis management. For a detailed analysis of the developments and challenges in the Albanian security sector during the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, see Caparini 2004, 259–262. A review of the categorisation of threat in the Albanian strategic document seems to have been broadening the concept of security from internal/external (National Security Strategy 2000) to internal/transnational/global (National Security Strategy 2004), conventional-non-conventional ranked according to the likelihood and severity of the consequences (National Security Strategy 2014), the latest form (conventional/nonconventional) is also followed in the National Military Strategy 2015, as well as in the Strategic Defence Review 2019, with the difference of explicitly listing the seven nonconventional threats (terrorism, immigration, mass propagation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber threat, threat to communication lines and power supplies (critical national infrastructure), hybrid warfare, natural disasters, and epidemics). For data on criminal cases, the criminality rate and crime categories, we refer to the official statistical reports from the Ministry of Justice, https://www.drejtesia.gov.al/ statistika/. The increased number of criminal cases after 2013 is also due to the toughening of the criminal punishment for thefts of electricity and violation of road traffic rules, being no longer an administrative but a (minor) criminal offense. This trend reflects also on the exponential increase of the number of persons arrested; however the number of persons convicted guilty remains disproportionally very low. For a recent detailed report and data on drug trafficking in Albania and the Balkan region see: Kemp, Amerhauser and Scaturro 2021, 22–43. Own calculations of averages for 2009–2021, based on the data from Figure 4.2 Defence expenditure. In the last ten years, about 70% of the total military budget has been allocated to personnel, with an expected tendency to be reduced in the upcoming years. See Figure 4.3 Defence expenditure by main category as percentage of the total. The initiative was officially announced in July 2021, during the Skopje meeting of the three leaders from Albania, North Macedonia, and Serbia. It was accompanied by the signing of three initial agreements: Responding together to natural and other disasters, allowing citizens to work in one another’s countries, and helping goods move without delays. See: Government of the Republic of North Macedonia 2021. See Živković (2019), based on the yearly comparative assessment of the Balkan states’ alignment with the EU’s foreign policy declarations and measures, compiled by the International and Security Affairs Centre (ISAC). See detailed reports at ISAC – Policy Analyses and Policy Studies section https://www.isac-fund.org/en/library/policy-analyses-and-policy-studies. Albania’s chairmanship of the OSCE gained some credit for ending the leadership vacuum at the OSCE, forging consensus in the appointments of the Secretary General and the heads of the three autonomous institutions, the timely extension of the mandate and budget increase of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, and the facilitation of the dialogue in the Belarusian crisis – all despite the constraints posed by the coronavirus pandemic (Liechtenstein 2020). See also Collantes-Celador and Juncos (2012) on a similar argument about the EU’s security strategy in the region, exemplifying three main contradictions between the EU’s short-term, own security-first, interventionist approach, and the long-term nature

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of the challenges, the socio-economic development needs, and the necessity to advance local ownership of reforms in the countries of the Balkan region. 14 For a broader application of the notion of security ownership at the regional level, that is the regional ownership of maintaining security cooperation and building common security capabilities and responses within the European security governance system, see: Jelka, Hrabálek, and Đorđević 2021.

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A Bottom-up Perspective on Peace and Security in North Macedonia Turbulent Violent Past versus Uncertain Future? Ivan Stefanovski

Introduction This chapter aims at unpacking the complex security and stability setting of North Macedonia, caught between its violent and turbulent past, and uncertain future spanning the prospects for European integration and the foreign, oftentimes malign influence of illiberal state actors such as Russia and China, which recently became more appealing to the average Macedonian citizen. This work begins by elaborating on the ‘mechanistic approach’ to hybrid peace, decomposing the main components of the mechanisms through which stability and security are preserved. These mechanisms and processes are presented through two detailed examples which threatened to undermine peace and stability in the country – the ‘Kumanovo Incidents’ from 2015 and ‘Bloody Thursday’ from 2017. The chapter further elaborates on regional and country-specific polling data, which focuses on stability, security, economy, COVID-19, and regional economic integration. The personal security situation and the general perception of security, and safe living in the region also play an important role. This research is concluded with key takeaways and the proposal of avenues for further research. This chapter builds on rich data mostly acquired through analysis of newspaper articles, press releases, and several regional and country-specific opinion polls. The mainly qualitative approach to the research design, which represents a theory-building variant of the process tracing analysis, aims to provide a bottomup perspective on recent peace and security developments in North Macedonia, in the context of the country’s protracted commencement of the EU accession negotiations. What this work wants to try and answer is whether, and to what extent, are ordinary citizens ‘carriers of peace’ in North Macedonia? Through the elaboration of two case studies of violent outbursts undermining security and stability in the country, this chapter looks at two main mechanism which work hand in hand to make peace prevail – the mechanism of local ordinary citizens as ‘carriers of peace’, versus the incisive and vibrant international community unpacking the ‘mechanism of international intervention’. This leads us to the ultimate question: Who is the ‘carrier of peace’ in North Macedonia? Lauded international statebuilders, or local actors who ultimately realise that living peacefully together, or at least one next to the other, is where local peace stems from? DOI: 10.4324/9781003276661-6

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The ‘Mechanistic’ Approach to Hybrid Peace In his work, Mac Ginty (2010) highlights four factors that shape modern liberal peace:1 The compliance powers of liberal peace agents, networks, and structures; the incentivising powers of liberal peace agents, networks, and structures; the ability of local actors to resist, ignore, or adapt liberal peace interventions; and the ability of local actors, networks, and structures to present and maintain alternative forms of peacemaking. Presumably, these factors do not fully apply to North Macedonia, because even in the early 1990s, when almost the entire territory of former Yugoslavia was in flames, North Macedonia was labelled the ‘oasis of peace’. However, what continues to protract in the last two decades of the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA), a power-sharing peace agreement (Bogdanovski 2015), and the reconciliation of Macedonian society, is what Mac Ginty refers to as a ‘cycle of offering liberal institutionalist prescriptions for whatever the problem is’ (Mac Ginty 2010, 7). As will be seen below, this has often resulted in international liberal tacit support for endemic systemic corruption, regimes which opted for the organised and institutionalised violation of human rights, and policies which have resulted in economic failure and massive immigration, all that under the pretext of ‘stabilitocracy’ and liberal institutionalism. Yet, when the authoritarian regime of former PM Gruevski became a threat to national and wider regional security, the mechanism of international intervention facilitated his demise. Looking at the current modern threats to peace and security in the country, one probably needs to underline the criminal interplay between the triad of business, politics, and crime (Stefanovski 2019; Perry et al. 2021), the striking political, religious, and ethnic polarisation, as well as the remnants of right-wing radicalisation and political violence, especially in the realm of deradicalisation and resocialisation, societal process that have been largely neglected by Macedonian authorities (Stojanović Gajić 2021). In the case of post-2001 North Macedonia, what has still not been answered is how local communities which had been living together peacefully for decades continue to do so, amid politicised agents of disruption which are mostly located in bigger urban areas, and almost always, as a rule, linked to political parties which either want to cling to power, or push to transition from opposition to power. This might eventually lead us to the conclusion that local ordinary actors are indeed the ‘carriers of peace’ in the country. The two case studies operationalised below aim at contextualising Mac Ginty’s four factors of hybrid peace in North Macedonia. The sections below look at the interaction between these four factors in two particular contexts: The ‘Divo Naselje’/Kumanovo Incident from 2015 and the ‘Bloody Thursday’ violent storming of parliament in 2017. Lastly, the two case studies also look at the ‘five aspects or pillars of the liberal peace which are security, economics, statebuilding, governance, and civil society’ (Mac Ginty 2010), with an emphasis on security, statebuilding, and governance. The data from the polls is of utmost importance for this approach, paired with excerpts from semi-structured, in-depth, face-to-face interviews dating from two previous similar studies.

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The ‘Divo Naselje’/Kumanovo Incident: Reigniting the 2001 Fears and Trauma through Porous Institutional Misgovernance In the aftermath of the 5 May 2015 violent protests in front of the Macedonian government, triggered by one of the many wiretapped conversations released by the then-leader of the opposition and current Prime Minister Zoran Zaev, and on the eve of the largest anti-government protest on 17 May 2015 against the VMRO-DPMNE government led by Nikola Gruevski, the country was woken up and shaken by smoke and flames rising from the ‘Divo Naselje’/’Illegal Neighbourhood’ settlement close to Kumanovo, on a spring morning of 9 May. What at the beginning seemed a ‘routine police intervention gone bad’ was revealed to be a high-level police string of security errors and breaches, amplifying rumours of political plots aimed at distracting the public from the mal-governance produced by Nikola Gruevski’s political regime, which was at its peak, which had resulted in North Macedonia being labelled a ‘captured state’ by the European Commission (European Commission 2015). In a nutshell, the police intervention, which planned to detain several alleged drug traffickers, transformed into a day-long (more than 30 hours) street war between the Macedonian police security forces and heavily armed terrorists, resulting in 18 casualties – 10 terrorists and 8 policemen (Bogdanovski 2015, 3). This incident was preceded by another violent intervention which was largely downplayed by the state security forces and media alike. On 21 April 2015, a group of 40 heavily armed masked men wearing Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës/ Kosovo Liberation Army (UҪK) insignia took over a police station in the village of Goshintse, close to the triangle border region of North Macedonia, Serbia, and Kosovo (Deutsche Welle 2017). After four policemen were attacked, overpowered, wounded, and tied up, the armed group illegally acquired a large quantity of weapons and ammunition. The group demanded the creation of an Albanian state within North Macedonia (BBC 2015). The arms were not recovered until after the forensic report following the Kumanovo Incident, which testified that many of the weapons stolen from the police station in Goshintse were later used in the Kumanovo violent attack. What strikingly resembles the 2001 violent conflict is the timing and the target. One cannot ignore the symbolic fact that the two attacks, the first in 2001 and the latter in 2015, happened at 2:30 am and were aimed at the Goshintse police station. The attack in 2001 was labelled the ‘intro’ to the violent inter-ethnic conflict (Deutsche Welle 2017). The attack in April 2015 set the stage for the bloody game unravelling 20 days later. In this vein, when analysing the roles of the main agents of hybrid peace through the four main factors of hybrid peace, we always need to have in mind the memory and the trauma of the 2001 violent conflict. This calls for further explanation and elaboration of the ‘Albanian question’, the creation of the UҪK, and the signing of the OFA which set the stage for postconflict, multiethnic Macedonia. Since the beginning of the 1990s and the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the ethnic Albanian community in Macedonia had been

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marginalised, discriminated, and largely excluded from political and economic life. Any public grievances channelled through protests and dismay have been violently silenced by the Macedonian police. The most notable were the so-called ‘Bit Pazar incidents’ in Skopje, and the removal of the Albanian flags from Tetovo and Gostivar by enforcing a decision from the Constitutional Court, when several ethnic Albanians were murdered in Gostivar, and former mayors of Tetovo and Gostivar were imprisoned. The demand for a university teaching in the Albanian language was also institutionally silenced by the first Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) government. These strings of incidents led to the creation of the UҪK (National Liberation Army – NLA), the violent 2001 conflict, and the signing of the OFA, whose 20-years anniversary was marked in bizarre fashion amid the COVID-19 crisis and the polarisation in the ethnic Albanian political camp. While the ruling Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) which stemmed from the transformed UҪK has lauded the agreement, being in power since 2002 (with the exception of 2006–08), they claim that human and political rights of ethnic Albanians have exceeded the letter of the OFA. On the other hand, the opposition Alliance for Albanians (AA) and Alternativa claim that the OFA is very far from being fully implemented. However, strong grievances, stemming from DUI’s years-long ruling marred by corruption, cronyism, and nepotism, set the stage for the Kumanovo incidents and the strong polarisation among ethnic Albanians in North Macedonia. While analysing the Kumanovo incidents, at least three sets of actors must be thoroughly scrutinised: The citizens, as the main carriers of hybrid peace; the state institutions, providing the normative and institutional peace and security; and the international community, which largely models the operational environment in which Western Balkans societies function. The citizens proved to be much resilient to such security shocks, both in Kumanovo and across the entire country, especially considering the political crisis and the political polarisation, as well as the linguistic and the confessional divides which represent the traditional cleavages of Macedonian society (Perry et al. 2021). Turning towards new media and social networks where the first citizens’ reactions could be seen, activists and ordinary citizens alike tried to appeal to common sense and unity, immediately making the discursive reference to 2001, underlining that those events must never be repeated, and that ordinary citizens should not allow themselves to be manipulated and dragged into daily political gambits of political parties and party leaders. On the other hand, citizens also condemned some of their neighbours, relatives, and friends who had provided cover and shelter for members of the terrorist group in the time frame between 21 April and 9/10 May. Even some media outlets covering the Goshintse incident reported testimonies from inhabitants of smaller villages scattered around the Municipality of Lipkovo, who claimed that ‘it is no surprise that this incident had occurred, having in mind that a uniformed group had been moving around the region during the last month or so, pressuring the locals’ (Deutsche Welle 2017). This statement leads us to the conclusion that the group whose members had participated in the ‘Divo Naselje’ incident had been within the territory of North Macedonia at least since late March 2015. This paves

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the way to posing the crucial question leading us to the analysis of the role of the state institutions: ‘What were the state institutions, in particular those responsible for security, doing in the period between March and May 2015?’ For one to understand why the security institutions in that period were porous and ineffective, we need to firstly delve deeper into the political context and the political crisis described above. The regime of former PM Nikola Gruevski, ruling from 2006 to 2016, was at its peak, facing citizen pressure from below by many movements which had gradually united around a citizen-partisan platform named ‘Citizens for Macedonia’ (Stefanovski 2015, 2016). On the other hand, the opposition was already in its third month of airing the wiretapped conversations, also known as the political ‘bombs’, which had demasked Gruevski’s ruling based on manipulating election results, privatisation of the public administration and the regulatory bodies, massive violations of privacy and other human rights by wiretapping political opponents and critical journalists, opinion makers, and thinkers, as well as omnipresent corruption, primarily embodied in the Skopje 2014 construction project.2 Lastly, the international community, whose efforts were spearheaded by the USA and the EU, were also exerting pressure over the ruling regime to loosen its grip, looking for potential paths to open the closed political opportunity structures (Stefanovski 2019). Faced with this triangulation of pressure and external influence, the structures in power looked for opportunities to survive, by defocusing agents in the political system, mainly through creating fake news and using its media infrastructure to launch smear campaigns, but also making full use of its security apparatus. At the time of the ‘Divo Naselje’ incident, VMRO-DPMNE had absolute power, controlling parliament, government, and the presidency, as well as the vast majority of the municipalities. The Ministry of Interior was headed by Gordana Jankuloska, former Secretary General of the party and one of the closest aides of Nikola Gruevski, and the Agency for Security and Counterintelligence by Sasho Mijalkov, Gruevski’s cousin and one of the wealthiest and most powerful people in the country, while the Intelligence Agency, which is under the direct authority of the president of the country, was headed by Nake Chulev, a trusted person of several VMRO-DPMNE establishments.3 This vividly presents the total control which Nikola Gruevski had over the security apparatus in the country, therefore, making it difficult to shift responsibility for the events onto any stakeholder, apart from the institutions which he and his political party controlled. Trying to prove alleged democratic capacities and sense of responsibility, three days after the incident, Jankuloska, Mijalkov, and Mile Janakieski, the Minister of Transport and Communications, tendered their resignations (Makfax 2015). As presented below, Mile Janakieski had also allegedly played a crucial organisational role in the other security incident which destabilised security and peace in North Macedonia – the ‘Bloody Thursday’ storming of parliament. Looking back at the incident three years later, the Balkan Investigative Reporters Network (BIRN) tried to put together at least some of the missing parts in order to assemble the puzzle, which still has many blanks. What was secretively whispered in 2015, echoed much louder in 2018. An anonymous senior official from the Intelligence Agency (IA) told the BIRN reporters that ‘The

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Kumanovo conflict was entirely organized by the Intelligence Agency in North Macedonia. It was a badly organized scenario, which unravelled even worse in the field’ (Arifi 2018). Both former President Ivanov and VMRO-DPMNE leaders strongly denied these allegations. Furthermore, during the court proceeding in which 33 people were sentenced to a total of 745 years of jail, and 4 lifetime sentences were issued under terrorism charges, the defendants shouted ‘We are not terrorists; we are the National Liberation Army (NLA). The terrorists attacked parliament while you attacked us!’ (Marusic 2017). This once again shows the intertwining of the two incidents, both from a security and a political aspect. Several defendants, who had admitted participation in the ‘Divo Naselje’ shootout with the police, persistently claimed that they were victims of a politically motivated set-up (Ibid), an argument which is also set forth by the anonymous IA interlocutor. Suspicion continued to grow when newly appointed PM Zoran Zaev claimed that a retrial for the case is possible, and that the new government might also ask for assistance from an international commission which should shed full light on all details of this violent outburst. To this end, no international investigation was ever launched, and the public hasn’t received the answer to the questions of who was behind this incident and who ordered the armed terrorists to go to Kumanovo. The politicisation of the case by the state institutions and the political parties was there from the onset. In the aftermath of the shootout, PM Gruevski addressed the nation in a TV press conference, stating that the police had prevented a terrorist group that had infiltrated through the border, and whose plan was to commit mass killings in police stations, shopping malls and sports matches … whereas one thing was a certainty, that the final goal was to destabilize Macedonia! On the other hand, then-leader of the opposition Zoran Zaev initially stated that ‘Strong indications exist that this is a scenario planned by those in power’ (Arifi 2018). This brings us to one of our initial hypotheses that while often ordinary citizens are the main carriers of hybrid peace, it is the political parties and the politicised state institutions that often act as threats to peace, security, and stability in their pursuit of power and political dominance. Lastly, the embassies and international community followed how the incident unfolded, during their efforts to provide mechanisms for the gradual dismantling of Gruevski’s regime. The initial reaction of the US Embassy in Skopje was to offer condolences and sympathies to the families of those who had lost their lives in the incident. The press release noted that the Embassy was following the situation and was in close continuous contact with the authorities and the political leaders in the country. They urged citizens to remain calm and allow the facts to be established (US Embassy 2015). However, although incumbent Minister of Interior Oliver Spasovski, originating from Kumanovo, announced that he would personally call on an international investigation to establish the facts, more than six years after the incident, no international impartial investigation has been conducted, further enabling the environment for nurturing conspiracy theories

76 Ivan Stefanovski and scattered intelligence information. EU’s initial reaction came from the commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, Johannes Hahn. He stated his deep concerns regarding loss of life and injuries. He also urged authorities and political and community leaders to cooperate, to restore peace and calm, and to fully investigate the events transparently and objectively within the legal framework. Lastly, he called upon all actors to refrain from any reactions, and to avoid further escalation which could further undermine the overall stability of the country (European Commission 2015). One can easily notice that the two greatest political and economic partners of North Macedonia hold a rather similar position in their reaction. They call for calm and a decrease in tensions, try to prevent further actions and reactions, but also call for a swift, thorough, and impartial investigation, one of the pieces of this security puzzle which is still missing. As one could expect, this unfortunate shootout was also used for diplomatic and security geostrategic foreign influence. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not miss this opportunity to support Gruevski’s government, simultaneously hitting out at the opposition and the ‘western-inspired’ NGOs which have tried to destabilise the country. The eruption of anti-government activities in Macedonia over the last days is worrying … The choice of many opposition movements and NGOs, inspired by the West, that favour the logic of the street and the known scenario of a ‘colored revolution’, is full of dangerous consequences. The statement drew clear parallels between the human rights and anti-corruption movements in the country and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, being fully in line with the accusatory wording of Nikola Gruevski who attacked the SDSM for secretive collaboration with anonymous foreign secret services and agents whose goal is to destabilise Macedonia (Marusic 2015). This is one more vivid example where the Russian Federation holds a strikingly different position from Western actors who have been strong and devoted partners in North Macedonia’s quest for peace, security, and stability.

‘Bloody Thursday’: The Case of Domestic Terrorism Aimed at Undermining the Peaceful Democratic Transition of Power Following the January 2021 violent incidents at Capitol Hill, North Macedonia and the USA have another striking similarity, going beyond their strategic partnership and NATO membership – a violent effort aimed at preventing the peaceful transition of power. Building on the sentiments of the traditional carriers of peace, the ordinary citizens (Mac Ginty 2010) and the outgoing regime of VMRO-DPMNE misused the weeks-long protests of its supporters to prevent the incoming SDSM from assuming power. What initially seemed like a spontaneous citizens’ outburst and attempt to occupy the Macedonian cradle of democracy unfolded as a carefully designed and executed operation masterminded by intelligence and security forces which have bluntly abused their official competences and resource.

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As was presented in the previous case, the citizens remained the carriers of hybrid peace, resisting the political, partisan, and ethnic polarisation that had overshadowed the country in April 2017. Turning firstly towards the citizens who had protested in front of the Macedonian Assembly: The vast majority of the protesters who participated in the protests ‘For a Common Macedonia’ and who physically entered the Assembly building did not do anything apart from waving flags, singing the national anthem and other patriotic refrains. In the audiovisual and testimonial reconstruction of the violent events, an organised and handpicked masked group, consisting mostly of former and current perpetrators with criminal records, and rank-and-file operatives of the Agency for Security and Counterintelligence (UBK), coordinated by high-ranking police and security officials in coordination with VMRO-DPMNE party officials, were the ones who caused the mayhem. Most protesters were ordinary citizens following the crowd and channelling their political grievances. On the other hand, the supporters of the incoming ruling parties did not engage in any physical activities apart from online engagement, sharing the horrific photos and videos and condemning the violence. The most positive surprise, taking into consideration the main cleavages of Macedonian society, the historiography of the country, and the still fresh memories from the 2001 conflict and the ‘Divo Naselje’ incident described previously, was the cold-headed reaction of the followers and supporters of the Alliance for Albanians (AA) president and MP Zijadin Sela, who barely survived due to being heavily beaten by the insurging mob. As depicted in the previous case study, once again it was the state institutions and the political parties that largely tried to manipulate ordinary citizens by pushing them into potential intra- and inter-ethnic conflict for personal motives and gains. Looking at the make-up of defendants in the ‘Bloody Thursday’ court proceedings, one can easily recognise a former MP, former parliament speaker, former minister of interior and other ministers, a director of the Counterintelligence Agency (UBK), and a director of the Bureau for Public Safety (Mitevska and Samardziski 2021), being prosecuted hand in hand with ordinary local thugs. But the institutional ties are inevitably present and visible. One should firstly examine and try to understand the genesis and the role of the Macedonian Patriotic Organizations (the MPOs) which rapidly grew in numbers and visibility during 2016. Previous research has shown that the decision to form the MPOs came directly from the leadership of VMRO-DPMNE who tried to exploit the resentment of ethnic Macedonian nationalists. Interlocutors commented about the ‘need to raise patriotism’ among the rank-and-file party members. Immediately after the 2016 early parliamentary elections, many grassroots nationalist groups were formalised into MPOs such as ‘Andon Lazov Janev Kjoseto’ in Veles, ‘Vlado Chernozemski’ in Kumanovo, ‘Mishe Razvigorov’ in Shtip, ‘Nepokor’ from Struga, etc. (Perry et al. 2021). All were named after famous revolutionaries or assassins of the historical VMRO, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization. All notable and visible members of these organisations took part in multiple pro-VMRO-DPMNE protests, including those which preceded ‘Bloody Thursday’ (Magleshov 2019a). Some of the convicted MPO members such as

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Goran Angelov and Igor Jug already had criminal records and had been imprisoned. For example, Jug’s criminal activity dates from the times when a different VMRO-DPMNE establishment was in power, between 1998 and 2002 (Perry et al. 2021). Interestingly, the Macedonian Assembly was ‘invaded from the inside’. The reconstruction of the video footage showed that the doors of the Assembly were opened from the inside by VMRO-DPMNE MPs (Deutsche Welle 2015), who were later amnestied with a separate amnesty law, as a tit-for-tat for supporting the amendments to the Macedonian Constitution which paved the way to the name change stemming from the Prespa Agreement (Magleshov 2019b).4 This enabled the point of entry for the protesting mob, which was later guided through the Assembly corridors by aides collaborating with the secret services. In parallel, the director of the BPS, Mitko Chavkov, who attained the ‘golden command’ during the protest in front of the Assembly, refrained from taking any actions, and assigned a significantly small group of police officials to protect the Assembly premises, although he was fully informed and knowledgeable of the planned activities. In the crucial moments, he even failed to answer his cell phone. Looking at the seven court proceedings linked to ‘Bloody Thursday’, there is barely a former high security official, or former VMRO-DPMNE party official who is not prosecuted in these cases (Magleshov 2020). This once again points to the blurred lines between the party and the state during Nikola Gruevski’s reign and confirms international reports of a captured state serving only the interests of the political party in power, acting as an immediate threat to the safety and security of the citizens of North Macedonia. The vibrant and active international community in the country closely followed the developments in the Assembly, giving unequivocal support to the transition of power. The US Embassy in Skopje immediately issued a press release condemning the violent attack on the MPs who elected Talat Xhaferi as Speaker of the Assembly. The Embassy recognised the election of Xhaferi and expressed readiness to work with him to support democracy in the country and facilitate its progress on the European path. The US emphasised that there is no place for violence in the democratic process and called on the authorities to ensure the safety and security of all MPs, to thoroughly investigate the attack, and to hold the perpetrators accountable for the violence committed. Lastly, the Embassy urged all parties to remain calm, to peacefully resolve any differences and respect the country’s laws and democratic processes (US Embassy 2017). The same line was upheld by the Assistant Deputy Secretary for Europe and Eurasia, Mr. Hoyt Brian Yee, who visited Macedonia only few days after the incidents. He stated that following his meetings with most prominent political leaders and representatives, he was reassured that all parties were devoted to upholding a democratic and unitary state, based on fundamental democratic values, the peaceful transition of power, and peaceful conflict resolution. He added the creation of a new government with a new programme was needed to kick-start reforms, which is also very important for the economy. Lastly, underlining the Western discursive unanimity in terms of the 27 April events, he said that these attitudes, apart from the USA, were also shared by the EU, NATO, and Germany (Dimeska 2017). Furthermore,

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High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, lauded Xhaferi’s election as president of the Assembly, while the commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, Johannes Hahn, commented that, in fact, those who stood for and were committed to Europe were the ones who were attacked in the Macedonian Assembly (Deutsche Welle 2017). As expected, one of the rear voices of support for Gruevski’s outgoing regime came from the Kremlin. The Russian MFA raised its grave concerns about the 27 April incidents, because the opposition which had lost the parliamentary elections attempted to seize power in the country by electing the Speaker by force, violating established parliamentary procedures. The press release also referred to the violent protesters as protectors of constitutional values, and also raised the issue of Talat Xhaferi’s military past as a field commander in the ‘so-called pro-Albanian National Liberation Army’, underlining that he was supported by cynical Western leaders (Russian MFA 2017). The MFA’s comment further makes use of wording such as ‘Western foreign curators’, ‘tampering with elections results’, ‘operationalization of the Tirana platform’, ‘Western advocates of a Greater Albania’ (Ibid), and similar wording largely used by the outgoing VMRO-DPMNE. The mechanism of international influence, which is in continuous perpetual collision between the ‘East’, led by Russia, and the ‘West’, represented primarily by the USA and the EU, once again played the crucial role in securing stability by empowering citizens as carriers of hybrid peace. Yet, these two cases once again reaffirm the large dependency of the entire peace and security ecosystem in North Macedonia on foreign strategic influence.

A Regional Perspective on the Local Peace and Security Dynamics in North Macedonia Looking at the main threats to security and peace in North Macedonia, and having in mind the localised approach, one should firstly look at regional opinion polls, and later continue with zooming into national data which aims at diachronically presenting citizens’ grievances and concerns. The Regional Cooperation Council’s (RCC) newly launched Securimeter provides information on numerous indicators. For this chapter, we will present only several general indicators, without going deeper into thematic issues such as the fight against terrorism, border security, the use of firearms, the fight against organised crime, and similar topics. Security satisfaction in this poll is measured by looking at the satisfaction index related to the economy, the security satisfaction with the economy, individuals’ personal security situation, the general security expectations for the forthcoming year, security expectations in terms of the economy, the issue of safe living, and the main factors which contribute to the feeling of (in)security. Starting with the general satisfaction with the economy, 52% of the respondents in North Macedonia are either mostly or completely dissatisfied with the current economic situation. Considering the uncertainty stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the gloomy economic projections for the forthcoming period, it is fair to assume that these sentiments might further strengthen

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soon. This sets forward economic satisfaction as a factor contributing to peace and security. History teaches us that poor societies are more prone to radicalisation, nationalism, and violence (UNDP 2016). Taking into consideration the recent history and the political dynamics in the country described previously, economic well-being must be seriously considered when looking at long-term peace and security in North Macedonia. Furthermore, 37% of the citizens are either mostly, or fully dissatisfied with the security situation in the economy, contrary to 34% who are either mostly, or completely satisfied with this indicator. The results point to a clear division among the citizens of North Macedonia, which possibly stems from the very strong political polarisation in the country, which is one of the starkest in the Western Balkans (IRI 2020, slide 22). Things stand rather differently when personal security is at stake. A vast majority of the respondents (60%) feel either completely or mostly satisfied with their personal security situation, contrary to 20% which feel mostly, or completely dissatisfied (RCC 2021). This finding provides optimism that the ‘local carriers of peace’ (Mac Ginty 2011), as one of the main pillars of hybrid peace, can continue to perform their stability role in the foreseeable future. As presented further in this text, national results provide similar data in terms of attitudes to personal security. That being said, other stakeholders participating in the creation of hybrid peace, primarily state institutions, need to duly fulfil their roles to make ordinary citizens feel even safer. This will be one of the main future challenges for safeguarding peace and stability in North Macedonia. In terms of how the personal security situation will evolve in the next year, most of the respondents in the country (56%) believe that it will remain the same. Furthermore, optimism prevails among 26% of the citizens who believe that personal security will improve, while only 16% claim that the situation will worsen (RCC 2021). In line with the previously analysed results regarding current sentiments for personal security, it can be concluded that citizens generally feel personally safe and secure, and they expect this to continue in the foreseeable future. One of the possible explanations might be the country’s accession to NATO, paired with the extensive political promotion of this achievement by the current government, which seizes every opportunity to highlight and emphasise this event. Like the expectations regarding personal security, prospective sentiments for security in the economy are rather stable, and not quite in line with the citizens’ general economic satisfaction. Forty-nine percent of the respondents believe in the status quo, while 27% are optimists and claim that the situation will improve. On the other hand, 21% of the citizens in North Macedonia believe that the security in the economy will deteriorate in the next 12 months (Ibid). The uncertainties due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which further slowed down the rather miniscule economic growth of the entire region, leave many citizens puzzled in terms of their economic prosperity and the well-being of society. As mentioned previously during the analysis of similar economic indicators, societies hosting stagnant economies often provide fertile soil for instability and disruption of peace and security.

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Macedonian citizens are much more concerned about public and general security when the Western Balkans region is under consideration. Most of the citizens (52%) either totally disagree or tend to disagree that the WB6 region is a secure place to live in, contrary to 42% of the respondents who either tend to agree, or totally agree that the region is a safe and secure place to reside (Ibid). These results mirror the general polarisation of the population in North Macedonia, but past traumas stemming from the violent conflicts in the region and continuous security turbulence in neighbouring countries, as well as foreign malign influence tend to push the average citizen to perceive the region as unsafe and insecure. This is particularly important when the two most important geopolitical issues for the region are assessed: European integration, and NATO accession. The stalemate of the region’s European integration provides space and opportunity for other foreign players to intervene and substantially undermine security and stability. In terms of NATO, both Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina seem indefinitely far from joining the organisation. Focusing on the case of North Macedonia, the country’s accession to NATO has profoundly stabilised the general security. Yet only a small portion of the citizens know the full extent of benefits that come with NATO membership. For the vast majority of them, NATO does not contribute to their well-being, living standard, or quality of life. Furthermore, some states such as Russia have openly opposed North Macedonia’s NATO accession. On the other hand, the European Union is perceived in quite the opposite manner. Many citizens of North Macedonia see a correlation between the country’s potential membership in the EU and their living standard and wealth. The EUROMETER annual survey conducted by EUROTHINK – Centre for European Strategies in Skopje shows us that 26% of the respondents perceive the EU as a dominant economic factor. Furthermore, when asked to name three main reasons for their support of European integration, 79% mention better standards of living and 44% refer to reduction of unemployment, while 29% highlight easier access to the labour market abroad (Stefanovski 2020, 11). All responses of citizens fall within the realm of development, the economy, and living standards. These are also the main factors behind the wide support for European integration, which despite the derailing stemming from the Bulgarian veto,5 still amounts to more than 70% of the population. Undermining the country’s EU accession trajectory might cause turbulence in regard to safety and security. Foreign malign influence is one of the most important factors that could potentially trigger this disturbance. Russian, Turkish, and Chinese foreign malign influences in various forms are the most noteworthy examples (Political Capital 2020, 28–46). Although there are countries in the Western Balkans which are much more exposed and less resilient to foreign malign influence, prospective developments in North Macedonia need to be followed closely. When asked about the four main factors which have the most negative impact on the citizens’ feeling of security in the country, respondents highlight the following: ‘Crime, organized crime, drugs trafficking, violence or vandalism’ (54%), ‘Economic crises, poverty, social exclusion’ (52%), ‘the pandemic’ (41%), and ‘Terrorism, returning of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), extremist social groups

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(extremist ideologies)’ (24%) (RCC 2021). This shows that despite the relatively high confidence in the police described below, citizens still fear of the most traditional forms of organised crime. The Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime has recently put North Macedonia on the cocaine, heroin, and marijuana routes in the Western Balkans, but has also highlighted the emerging threats from illicit financial flows and money laundering (Reitano and Amerhauser 2020).

Local Security Pleas for European Integration Moving to polls conducted by national and international stakeholders active in North Macedonia, in exclusive reference to the public opinion of the citizens in the country, one can draw many interesting conclusions related to peace, security, and stability. Some of them coincide with the results from the regional surveys, while other substantially differ. One should first turn towards citizens’ sentiments about the two main state institutions that should be the guarantors of peace and security in one society: The army and the police. Interestingly, and probably because of its specific competences and lack of visibility and media coverage, the army is the most trusted institution in North Macedonia. A majority of the respondents (62%) trust the army, contrary to 14% who do not trust the army. This may be closely connected to the army’s professionalisation to comply with NATO standards, but also the actual accession of North Macedonia to NATO which occurred less than a year prior to the data collection process for this survey. On the other hand, the police enjoy the trust of 34% of respondents, as opposed to 38% who do not trust the police (Ibid). However, although the police have almost half as much trust in comparison to the army, it is still among the most trusted institutions in the state, when compared to other institutions such as the government, the Assembly, the judiciary, the political parties, etc. One of the greatest challenges of the Macedonian police, which is inevitably the pivotal institution responsible for the safety and security of the citizens, is the perception that citizens have regarding its dependence on political, government, and business interests. Sixty-three percent of the respondents believe that the police are dependent on politics, government, and business, while 17% claim that the police are immune to these external factors (Ibid). The Macedonian police still needs to go a long way in terms of reform, especially in the light of security sector governance reforms needed to adopt standards enshrined in the European acquis. Mostly falling under Chapter 24 dealing with freedom justice and security, which according to the new methodology for enlargement of the EU is part of the first cluster – Fundamentals – the reform of the police needs to become a priority for the Macedonian government sooner rather than later (Stojanović Gajić 2021). Only swift and thorough police reform can secure the crucial institutional role that the state needs to play in the puzzle of hybrid peace. Citizens are divided on the issue of whether the police will protect them if their security is threatened. Forty-seven percent of the respondents are confident that the police will do its job, while 39% do not believe that the police will protect their security. These results are probably closely linked to the politicisation of

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the police and the entire security sector, something which was already explained in-depth through the ‘Divo Naselje’ and the ‘Bloody Thursday’ cases previously. Having different political streams within the police, appointments made mainly due to political affiliation and driven by clientelism and cronyism, are just some of the factors which result in the polarisation of society when trust in the police is under consideration. Usually, the citizens who are in favour of and support the government traditionally have greater trust in the police, and vice versa. In terms of the safety and security of the places where they reside, the citizens of North Macedonia feel quite safe. Based on research conducted by EUROTHINK in December 2020, 82% of the respondents believe that their residential area is a secure place to live in, while 5% of citizens do not. These sentiments gradually decrease as the respondents are asked to climb and expand the territorial ladder. Thus, 76% of the respondents claim that their town/village is a secure place to live in, contrary to 6% of the citizens, while 60% of the respondents believe that North Macedonia is a secure place to live in, opposite to 10% of the citizens who disagree (Stefanovski 2020). This data clearly shows that the principal agents of peace in North Macedonia – the citizens – feel much safer and more secure when ‘closer to home’. This once again reaffirms the hypothesis that conflicts are often imposed top-down, and that ordinary people live and communicate in great harmony at the local level. External influence, most often political, is the factor of disruption which acts as a critical juncture to undermine peace and security. In the case of North Macedonia, this is often reflected through the deterioration of inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations, particularly on the eve of elections. Furthermore, citizens tend to feel less safe when moving further from their immediate place of residence, which often has much to do with fear of the unknown. What is very consistent with the data presented from the RCC survey is the economic hardship which the Macedonian citizens perceive as the greatest reason for their feeling of insecurity. Thirty-six percent of the respondents answered that economic reasons, i.e., their poor economic status, and unemployment, are the main reasons for them to feel insecure. Additionally 36% claim that crime is what causes them to feel insecure, while additionally 31% of the respondents state health/the COVID-19 pandemic, again, as one of the factors immediately associated with economic hardship and uncertainty (EUROTHINK 2020). The expansion of the COVID-19 pandemic and its devastating effects on multiple spheres of society pushed citizens’ concerns beyond the traditional understanding of safety and security, which is primarily linked to national security. This is something that theorists of hybrid peace need to include in their prospective research sooner rather than later, especially when the region of the Western Balkans is at stake. Lastly, the process of European integration is something which goes hand in hand with safety and security. However, this relationship is based on a two-channelled influence, and both are often dependent on each other. At times, good and stable safety and security enhances the European integration of the country, while sometimes the stalemate of the latter influences the safety, security, and stability of North Macedonia. In early 2021, amid the blockade of accession negotiations with the EU issued by neighbouring Bulgaria, over 70% of the respondents in

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North Macedonia agreed that the country’s accession to the EU would be a good thing. An even greater number of citizens (over 74%) claim that the country’s accession to the EU would be a useful and beneficial thing. These results indicate that a vast majority of citizens in the country remain convinced that North Macedonia belongs to the European family, despite the hurdles it faces in the accession process. From a more critical perspective, this data can be interpreted as an indicator of the uncritical attitude of the Macedonian citizens towards the EU. Furthermore, in late 2020 and early 2021, respondents in North Macedonia still showed high support for EU membership, which indirectly implied that the problem with the Bulgarian veto would soon be resolved, whereby the accession negotiations will begin (Stefanovski 2020). From a current perspective, these assumptions did not materialise, and the country remains side-lined on its path to European integration. This is the main factor which slowly opens the door for foreign malign influence which can seriously threaten safety and security. The recent alleged non-paper (Pusic and Biserko 2021) arguing for re-drawing borders in the Western Balkans along ethnic lines is only one of many provocations signalling that the Europeanisation of the Balkans is far from over, and the region is still prone to foreign malign influence.

Conclusions and Future Research Avenues In both elaborated examples it is clear that ordinary citizens in North Macedonia acted as true carriers of peace, remaining resilient to political and partisan gambits. On the other hand, it is the political parties and the politicised state institutions that often act as threats to peace, security, and stability in their pursuit of power and political dominance. While unpacking the processes, it is clear that the mechanism of ‘international intervention’, spearheaded by the USA and the EU, still acts as the crucial pillar of stability in the country and beyond. Conversely, being influenced both from the East and the West, Russia’s foreign influence to oppose NATO and destabilise the country is manifested through statements encouraging illiberal actions and the proliferation of fake news and narratives, as well as through diplomatic efforts often going beyond the usual diplomatic activities. Putting aside the two vivid examples, national and regional polls show entrenched polarisation between and across ethnicity and religion, with uncertainty about the security and stability prevailing in the citizens’ sentiments. In other words, although currently the Macedonian society is peaceful and stable, citizens worry that a potential critical juncture might seriously disrupt this stability. The bilateral dispute with neighbouring Bulgaria, the protracted prolongation of the EU accession negotiations, and the hot-cold relations with Serbia will continue to rattle the country’s stability and prosperity. This can be seen be in statements of Serbian President Vučić, as well as replies from Macedonian PM Zaev. This is also evident through the data acquired through regional and national polls which show clear and distinct cleavages among citizens. This research shows that conflicts are often imposed top-down, and that ordinary people in North Macedonia live and communicate in great harmony at the local level. External influence, most often political, is the factor of disruption

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which acts as a critical juncture to undermine peace and security. In the case of North Macedonia, this is often reflected through the deterioration of inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations, particularly on the eve of elections. Furthermore, citizens tend to feel less safe when moving further from their immediate place of residence, which often has much to do with fear of the unknown.

Notes 1 ‘The liberal peace is defined as the dominant form of peacemaking and peacebuilding favoured by leading states, international organizations and international financial institutions’ (Mac Ginty 2010). 2 The Skopje 2014 project was commissioned by the former VMRO-DPMNE government and included a complete rebuilding and refurbishing of the Skopje city center. It had a dual role: Money laundering and embezzlement, as well as attempts to redefine the Macedonian identity. 3 In 2020, prior to the early parliamentary elections, Mr. Chulev was VMRO-DPMNE’s cadre filling the position of Minister of Interior in the technical government. 4 The Prespa Agreement (2018) is an agreement between Greece and the Republic of Macedonia, under the auspices of the UN, resolving the long-term dispute between the two, changing the constitutional name of the Republic of Macedonia into the Republic of North Macedonia. Several VMRO-DPMNE MPs and other actors in the 27 April events were amnestied with a lex specialis, after they supported the constitutional amendments which changed the name of the country. Some of them even received hefty public procurements in return. 5 Following the unblocking of North Macedonia’s European integration processes through the Prespa Agreement, Bulgaria tabled a series of demands delving deeper into the national and historical identity of the country. Bulgaria insists on new definitions of the Macedonian language and revision of history textbooks.

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European Commission. 2015. “Statement by Commissioner Hahn on the Situation in Kumanovo, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.” May 9, 2015. https://ec .europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_15_4955. International Republican Institute. 2020. “Western Balkans Poll Shows Strong Support for the EU.” June 2, 2020. https://www.iri.org/resource/western-balkans-poll-shows -strong-support-eu. Mac Ginty, Roger. 2010. “Hybrid Peace: The Interaction Between Top-Down and Bottom-Up Peace.” Security dialogue 41 (4): 391–412. Mac Ginty, Roger. 2011. International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Magleshov, Vasko. 2019a. “Jug: Bea obvineti trojtsa milioneri i odlobodeni bez cent garantsija” (Jug: Three Millionaires Were Tried and Released without a Cent of Bail). Makfaks, March 15, 2019. https://makfax.com.mk/ makedonija/југ-беа-обвинети-тројца-милионери-и-ос/. Magleshov, Vasko. 2019b. “I amnestijata za 27 april na Mukoski, Vasilevski i Tarchuovski v sreda na sednitsa na Ustavniot sud” (The amnesty for April 27 of Mukoski, Vasilevski and Tarchulovski on Wednesday at a session of the Constitutional Court). A1onMK, November 29, 2019. https://a1on.mk/macedonia/i-amnestijata-za-27-april-na-mukoski -vasilevski-i-tarchulovski-v-sreda-na-sednica-na-ustavniot-sud/. Magleshov, Vasko. 2020. “Tri godini od krvaviot chetvrtok, rana shto ushte ne e zatvorena” (Three Years from the Bloody Thursday, a Wound Still not Healed). Prizma, April 27, 2020. https://prizma.mk/tri-godini-od-krvaviot-chetvrtok-rana-shto-ushte-ne-e-zatv orena/. Makfaks. 2015. “Ostavki na Mijalkov, Jankuloska i Janakieski” (Resignations from Mijalkov, Jankuloska and Janakieski). Maksfaks, May 13, 2015. https://makfax.com .mk/makedonija/ostavki-na-mijalkov-jankuloska-i-janakieski/. Marusic, Sinisa Jakov. 2015. “Macedonia Declares Mourning for Police Killed in Gunbattles.” Balkaninsight, May 10, 2015. https://balkaninsight.com/2015/05/10/ macedonia-mourns-for-killed-policemen-while-shootout-continues/. Marusic, Sinisa Jakov. 2017. “Macedonia Gives Kumanovo Gunmen Heavy Jail Terms.” Balkan Insight, November 2, 2017. https://balkaninsight.com/2017/11/02/macedonia -kumanovo-shootout-trial-verdict-11-02-2017/. Mitevska, Aleksandra, and Aleksandar Samardziski. 2021. “Chetiri godini podotsna: Shto se smeni po „krvaviot chetvrtok” (Four Years Later, what has Changed Since Bloody Thursday). April 27, 2021. https://360stepeni.mk/chetiri-godini-podotsna-shto-se -smeni-po-krvaviot-chetvrtok/. Perry, Valery, Senada Šelo Šabić, Kurt Bassuener, Saša Kulenović, and Alma Midžić. 2021. Sell Out, Tune Out, Get Out, or Freak Out? Understanding Corruption, State Capture, Radicalization, Pacification, Resilience, and Emigration in Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia. Sarajevo and Skoplje: Democratization Policy Council and Eurothink. Political Capital. 2020. “Foreign Authoritarian Influence in the Western Balkans.” Foreign Authoritarian Influence in the Western Balkans, September 14, 2020. https://www .politicalcapital.hu/foreign_authoritarian_influence_in_the_wb/about.php. Pusic, Vesna, and Sonja Biserko. 2021. “‘The ‘Non-Paper’ Carving up Balkans and Undermining Europe.” EU Observer, May 4, 2021. https://euobserver.com/opinion/ 151741.

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Reitano, Tuesday, and Kristina Amerhauser. 2020. Illicit Financial Flows in Albania, Kosovo and North Macedonia Key drivers and Current Trends. Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2017. “Comment by the Information and Press Department on Aggravated Domestic Political Situation in Macedonia.” April 28, 2017. https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/ content/id/2739769. Stefanovski, Ivan. 2015. “Citizens for Macedonia – From Citizen Mobilization to Democratization.” Annual of the Institute for Sociological, Political and Juridical Research XXXIX (5): 77–93. Stefanovski, Ivan. 2016. “‘From Shallow Democratization to Mobilization’ The Cases of the ‘Bosnian Spring’ and the ‘Citizens for Macedonia’.” International Journal on Rule of Law, Transitional Justice and Human Rights 7 (7): 43–52. Stefanovski, Ivan. 2019. “From Streets to Seats? The Influence of Social Movements over Policy Outcomes: The Cases of Macedonia, BiH and Bulgaria.” PhD diss., Scuola Normale Superiore, Florence. Stefanovski, Ivan. 2020. “Eurofilia Stronger than the Bulgarian ‘No’.” Eurothink, March 25, 2020. https://eurothink.mk/2021/03/25/5093/. Stojanović Gajić, Sonja, ed. 2021. Chapter 24 in North Macedonia – Pilot Study. Skopje: Eurothink – Center for Europen Strategies. UNDP. 2016. “Country Data on North Macedonia.” United Nations Human Development Reports, November 19, 2021. http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/MKD. US Embassy in North Macedonia. 2015. “US Embassy Statement.” May 9, 2015. https:// mk.usembassy.gov/u-s-embassy-statement/?_ga=2.19992829.471737607.1625510788 -1816156936.1501840044. US Embassy in North Macedonia. 2017. “Violence in Macedonian Parliament.” April 28, 2017. https://mk.usembassy.gov/violence-macedonian-parliament/?_ga=2.258735439 .471737607.1625510788-1816156936.1501840044.

6

Kosovo1 The Achilles’ Heel of Balkan Security Jiří Němec and Věra Stojarová

Introduction More than a decade ago, due to the favourable context and strong public backing, Kosovo succeeded in doing what is considered the greatest achievement in its history – proclaiming independence from the Republic of Serbia. At the time, few would have guessed that 12 years later Kosovo’s territorial integrity and statehood would remain contested, not only by Serbia but also by an important part of the international community. The question of Kosovo’s independence has penetrated every pore of the Kosovo community, from trade and investments, to foreign policy, to inter-ethnic relations and religious considerations. Ever since the NATO intervention in 1999 ended, Kosovo has seen an influx of different international actors, including the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) with its different agencies, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the World Bank (WB), and a myriad of bilateral actors which came to fill in the institutional vacuum (Tadić 2017). Security-wise, the issue of statehood transposes onto internal security arrangements, resulting in Kosovo being fully dependent for protection on NATO’s KFOR. Many forms of extremism, such as ethnic and religious radicalism, have found fertile ground in Kosovo, paving the way for internal divides across the Albanian-Serbian axis. Nevertheless, of all the peoples of the Western Balkans, Kosovars remain the most committed to European goals and the staunchest supporters of NATO. Today, Kosovo is worn out by endless debates about the same old statehood narrative, which is perpetuated from Belgrade and strongly accentuated by the international community, with the EU at the helm of the entire process. The signing of the Brussels Agreement was welcomed with great enthusiasm; however, along with defining the process of implementation, several provisions of the agreement of a solely technical character became impossible to fulfil once the provisions on territorial integrity and sovereignty kicked in, causing a heated debate on both sides and forcing Belgrade and Pristina to re-evaluate their positions (Beysolu 2017, 202). The legality of Kosovo’s statehood and the divided international community over the issue keep posing serious challenges for Pristina in any form of bilateral/regional/multilateral relations that the country seeks to pursue. DOI: 10.4324/9781003276661-7

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This chapter looks into the most recent developments and debates on Kosovo’s internal and external security arrangements within a broader framework of the country’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations. The security considerations in Kosovo are analysed through different security lenses, such as those stemming from religious extremism and ethnic radicalism, energy and environmental security, COVID19, territorial integrity, and statehood. Due to the interconnectivity of the actions taken by Kosovo and Serbia, the main contesting countries in the region, the chapter examines the complexities of the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue and gives an overview of the main ongoing security threats.

Kosovo’s Struggle for Independence: A Brief Historical Overview Similarly to other conflict-influenced areas, the farther back we look into ancient times, the more we skate on the thin ice of historiography burdened by politicisation and ethnification. Hence, this section focuses predominantly on the ‘modern’ part of the nation’s history – from 1989 till the declaration of independence in 2008. Nevertheless, crucial points from deeper history have to be briefly addressed first; then we can focus on the distinct periods of 1989–98, 1999, 2000–04, and 2008, respectively. The so-called ‘Kosovo myth’ refers to the notion that Kosovo’s territory constitutes ‘a symbol of nationalist aspirations for both Albanians and Serbs’ (International Independent Commission on Kosovo 2000, 33). For Albanians, due to the establishment of the League of Prizren; for Serbs, due to the first battle of Kosovo Polje/Fushë Kosovë of 1389, from which a nation-building legend providing a rich basis for contemporary ‘Serbness’ emerged. The creation of the League of Prizren is important per se. It represents the dawn of Albanian nationalism dating to 1878, when the League was striving for the unification of four predominantly Albanian vilayets of the Ottoman Empire and thus articulating the very first political programme of Albanian nationalism. The issue of Kosovo’s self-determination was set aside by the deciding powers during the post-war international conferences in London (1913), Versailles (1919), and Paris (1946), granting the province first to the kingdom of Yugoslavia, and later the communist regime. A turning point took place in 1974 with the adoption of the new Yugoslav constitution, granting socio-political, cultural, and economic autonomy for Kosovar Albanians (Demjaha 2017). This autonomy deteriorated after the death of Josip Broz Tito in 1981 and the arrival of Slobodan Milošević in power. His policy advocated a tense Serbian nationalism and supremacy rather than the salvaging of Tito’s former efforts to build a somewhat balanced multiethnic empire. On 28 June 1989, in Gazimestan, the location where the first battle of Kosovo Polje/Fushë Kosovë took place 600 years ago, Slobodan Milošević delivered an electrifying speech to a crowd of nearly one million supporters, attributing to Kosovo an essence of Serbness. On the other side of the barricade, Kosovo Albanians started to build a parallel, somewhat underground, state. The Democratic League of Kosovo, led by Ibrahim Rugova, was established in 1989, recalling the

90 Jiří Němec and Věra Stojarová sentiment of the League of Prizren by its very name. In 1991, after a failed attempt to establish Kosovo as an equal republic within Yugoslavia, Kosovo Albanians proclaimed the independent ‘Republic of Kosova’, backed by a popular referendum (Ibid. 67–70; see also della Rocca 2015, 44–45). In the pre-war years, two competing approaches to the ‘Kosovo question’ emerged among Albanians – Rugova’s peaceful resistance, and armed resistance led by Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës (the UÇK, or KLA for Kosovo Liberation Army). Two essential determinants then catalysed the conflict in Kosovo. The first was the Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995, ending the brutal war in Bosnia and Herzegovina but, once again, completely ignoring the issue of Kosovo. The second was the collapse of neighbouring Albania into a state of Hobbesian anarchy after a local financial pyramid scheme imploded in 1997. Consequently, irritated Albanians looted state armouries, among others. Stolen arms and ammunition then flowed across the border into Kosovo and the hands of KLA, enhancing its limited power (Judah 2008, 79–80). The ‘hot’ phase began in January 1999 after an incident in Račak/Reçak, where a Serbian offensive against the KLA-held village resulted in the death of 45 civilians. Although even this event is drenched in controversy, it constitutes a turning point regarding the direct military involvement of the international community, NATO in particular. After one last push from the international community for a diplomatic resolution made at a meeting in Rambouillet, France, failed, NATO’s bombing campaign began on 24 March 1999, lasting for 78 days. The war ended on 10 June under the terms articulated in the Military Technical Agreement between NATO and Yugoslavia (Irwin 2015, 114). The Kosovo Liberation Army tried to use the immediate post-war chaos and power vacuum to improve its own position, but at this stage the incoming UN administration managed to blunt the KLA’s initiative. In January 2000, the UN Interim Administration Mission (UNMIK) established quasi-ministries ruled by the UN delegate and local representative; then, Kosovo saw its first local elections in October. ‘In May 2001, a constitutional framework was adopted to lead to general elections, the creation of an assembly, a government and the presidency’ (Judah 2008, 95). Nevertheless, tensions remained high during the immediate aftermath of the war, including the occurrence of ‘revenge attacks’ on Serbs or Kosovo Albanians deemed as collaborators. The friction escalated on 17 March 2004, during the unrest, often recalled as the ‘March pogrom’ by the Serbs. The toll of violence and riots consisted of 19 dead people, 8 of them Serbs, circa 900 injured, and 29 Serbian church buildings were torched or damaged. The UN also reported that around 3,500 Serbs were forced to flee their homes (Ibid. 110; see also Demjaha 2017, 186). On 17 February 2008, after intense coordination with the international community, or, to say, its ‘western’ part, the Kosovo Assembly declared independence. The declaration was based on the Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, designed by the UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari, but was strongly opposed by Serbia and the Russian Federation’s obstructions in the Security Council. The new, so-called Republic of Kosovo was set to be a multiethnic, secular, and

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democratic entity (Tansey 2009, 159). How successful, if at all, Kosovo has been in achieving these goals will be discussed in the following subchapters.

Kosovo Statehood and Integrity The neuralgic point of Kosovo statehood is its recognition. Independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity lie at the core of the country’s national security interests (Republic of Kosovo 2014), contrary to the interests of Serbia, which claims that the unlawful unilaterally declared independence of the territory administratively covered by the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija jeopardises its national values and interests. Moreover, Serbia considers the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) a destabilising factor, which was formed contrary to UNSC Resolution 1244 (Republic of Serbia 2021). Nevertheless, compared to its previous (2009) strategic document, Serbia has taken a milder stance – ‘Serbia targets Kosovo, including KSF a direct threat to the existing mode of regional arms control which threatens the balance in the region’ (KIPRED 2014). Kosovo ignores in its strategic documents the fact that it is Kosovo that constitutes the problem in talks about the relaxation and normalisation of relations between the two states, while Serbia still sees Kosovo, or ‘the secessionist tendencies’ in Kosovo, as the primary security threat to its national values and interests, not as a neighbour with whom it shares the aim of integrating with the European Union. The declaration of independence by Kosovo is complicated by the fact that the state is not recognised by two permanent members of the UN Security Council (Russia and China) and five EU members (Slovakia, Greece, Spain, Romania, and Cyprus). The exact numbers vary as Serbia has campaigned to convince states that have recognised Kosovo to reverse their recognition; according to Kosovo sources, 117 states have recognised Kosovo to date (2021) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Diaspora Republic of Kosovo 2021). The Serbian Foreign Ministry claims that 18 states have withdrawn their recognition as of September 2021, and the claim is that 92 states recognise Kosovo, 96 do not, while 5 member states are uncommitted – they recognise but have not voted for Kosovo in the UN (Bami and Stojanovic 2021; Republika Srbija, Ministarstvo spoljnih poslova 2020). Some states accept the right to self-determination; however, there is a group of states contesting the Kosovo-Albanian nation as such. Such states prefer the immutability of borders, having significant national minorities themselves, thus facing secessionism. The question of statehood imposes serious restrictions for Kosovo in its bid for EU membership and its potential candidate status, which creates an unprecedented situation in the history of EU enlargement. On the one hand, Kosovo is deeply engaged with the EU through the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) and, on the other, the five EU non-recognisers could potentially veto any attempt to approve the country’s membership once it fulfils all the conditions. Furthermore, Albania and Kosovo view each other as sister countries. Even though it is constitutionally defined as a multiethnic state, Kosovo in practice, both separately from and jointly with Albania, plays the role of the mother country for Albanian ethnic minorities in the former Yugoslavia (KIPRED 2014).

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This means that not only ideas about a Greater Albania come up, but also those of a Greater Kosovo. For the last two decades, no serious player on the political scene in either Kosovo or Albania has advocated national unification, and we have only heard occasional cries from the darkness. However, in 2010 a new movement and later party, Lëvizja Vetëvendosje (the Self-Determination Movement, LV), emerged. It won the 2017 elections and in 2019 set up a government coalition advocating in its political programme a referendum on self-determination (Lëvizja Vetëvendosje 2019). In addition, the party actively established branch offices in Albania and Northern Macedonia, promoting its interests. According to a recent poll of 2,504 inhabitants of Kosovo and Albania, 74.8% of the Albanian respondents said they would vote for unification in a referendum, compared to 63.9% of the respondents in Kosovo favouring the same option (Kosovo Foundation for Open Society 2019). The poll shows that a double identity of Kosovars has emerged, and the self-identification with the new state is relatively high. According to the 1981 census, the population of Kosovo province was 77% Albanian and 13% Serb (Bugajski 2002). The following censuses were boycotted by the Albanians (in 1991) and by the Serbs (2011). The estimates vary, but around 146,000 Serbs are estimated to reside in Kosovo, making up around 7.8% of the total population (ECMI 2013). The largest Serb communities reside in the northern municipalities and the southern municipalities of Gračanica/Graçanicë and Štrpce/Shtërpcë. Smaller Serb communities are scattered throughout the whole of Kosovo, particularly in Eastern and Central Kosovo. After the proclamation of independence, the decentralisation process started, and six new Serb-majority municipalities were created – five of them south of the Ibar/Ibër River, namely Novo Brdo/Novobërdë, Gračanica/Graçanicë, Ranilug/ Ranillug, Parteš/Partesh, and Klokot/Kllokot, and they seem to be somehow participating in Kosovo political life. The North Kosovo Serb-dominated municipalities refuse to recognise the legitimacy of the Prishtina central authorities. Since 2011, the dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo has been EU-facilitated, and the most important moment was the signing of the so-called Brussels Agreement in 2013. As part of the agreement, the Government of Serbia agreed to dissolve local self-governments functioning according to the laws of Serbia. For the first time, the Serb-majority municipalities in the north of Kosovo participated in local elections under the laws of Kosovo. Four municipalities in the north were constituted, making for a total of ten Serb-majority municipalities in Kosovo (Jakovljević and Mijačić 2021). The creation of an Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo is one of the points stipulated in the Brussels Agreement. In line with the European Charter of Local Self-Government, the Association/Community would guarantee a broad set of powers to the local Serb community, including in the areas of healthcare, social care, education, culture, and others. The European Commission report on Kosovo (2020) noted that no progress had been made to fulfil this obligation of the Brussels Agreement, and it is up to Kosovo to engage more constructively in the establishment of the Association/Community (European Commission 2020). Although the Association/Community would have

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no legislative power, its establishment would, nonetheless, solidify the special status of the northern Kosovo province. This proposal meets with disapproval from the Kosovo government, which seeks to apply laws universally across the country, but would favour Serbia’s position of creating a buffer zone on the border with a minimum military presence from NATO on the Kosovo side. Quite often, we see disagreements in the interpretation of agreed provisions, making the realisation of the Brussels Agreement far from straightforward. Above all, in 2018, the Government of Kosovo imposed a tariff on imports of goods from Serbia, first at the rate of 10% and then of 100%. Consequently, Serbia withdrew from the Brussels dialogue. In 2020, Kosovo agreed to abolish the tariff on imported goods from Serbia; however, new barriers (e.g., reciprocity trade measures) to trade were introduced along with this decision. A new crisis escalated in September 2021, when the reciprocity agreement on vehicle license plates and removal of illegal license plates from 2016 expired. Kosovo decided to apply the reciprocity rule over cars entering Kosovo, thereby obliging Serbian drivers to have temporary Kosovo license plates. The entire conflict was given a geopolitical dimension with an official statement from the Russian Foreign Ministry on how ‘NATO’s Forces for Kosovo and the EU’s Rule of Law Mission have their mandates to prevent lawlessness, and therefore they bear full responsibility for protecting civilians, ensuring peace and security’ (RT 2021), clearly indicated the side the Russians are taking in this conflict. In 2018, when Kosovo-Serbian relations were not in the best shape, news broke that Aleksandar Vučić and Hashim Thaçi discussed an exchange of territories between Kosovo and Serbia as the ultimate solution to the irresolvable problem. The proposal was not new; it comes up from time to time and implies the annexation of certain parts of Preševo/Preshevë valley to Kosovo and, at the same time, recognition of Kosovo by Serbia, and therefore membership of Kosovo in the UN. Serbia would take part of northern Kosovo and thereby save face. The proposal initially received support from the USA but was vehemently opposed primarily by Germany and the UK, and by most of the political scene both in Kosovo and Serbia. Not surprisingly, the loudest criticism came from the representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church. The arguments in favour of the exchange of territory include establishing long-term stability, removing all the obstacles to Kosovo’s integration into international organisations, and bringing both Kosovo and Serbia into the EU. Most opponents argue that the plan could cause instability and population relocation and possibly open a Pandora’s Box of border changes in other cases, bringing the European integration of the Western Balkans into question (CDDRI and NSI 2019). The normalisation of relations within the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue will depend on the readiness of both sides to go beyond what is considered an acceptable solution. The potential obstacle lies in both sides seeing the Brussels Agreement differently, and therefore expecting contrasting outcomes. For Kosovo, normalisation of relations implies full recognition by Serbia. For Belgrade, normalisation is understood in purely economic terms, since the recognition of Kosovo statehood is a red line which Serbia is reluctant to cross. While economic normalisation

94 Jiří Němec and Věra Stojarová would bring benefits to both sides, it implies the facilitation of trade and investment, including the free movement of goods, integral to mutual political recognition (as seen in the example of the license plate conflict in September 2021). Paradoxically, any technical and economic cooperation raises the political question, adding to the pressure and creating an additional hurdle for the continuation of talks.

Kosovo in Geopolitics: Foreign Relations and Their Impact on Security The Government of Kosovo claims to remain strongly committed to full normalisation of interstate relations with Serbia and to continued dialogue aiming its finalisation by mutual recognition that would enable building sustainable peace between the two countries and establishing good European spirit-based diplomatic and neighbourly relations. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Diaspora 2021) Kosovo seems to be aware that the only way to membership in the EU, UN, NATO, and any other organisation is through the normalisation of relations with Serbia and the other countries in the region. The country successfully implemented a state border agreement with what was then the Republic of Macedonia in 2009. The border with Montenegro remained open for a long time, and Kosovo’s opposition Vetëvendosje, in particular, opposed the agreement. It was not until early 2018 that the Kosovo parliament ratified the border agreement with Montenegro. Serbia’s strengthened security cooperation with Russia (see the chapter by Vuksanović) seems to be of particular concern for Kosovo as it is moving increasingly towards a collision course with the EU and NATO. In 2013, Serbia gained observer status in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Russian-led intergovernmental military alliance – the Collective Security Treaty Organisation – which for some might be in contradiction with Serbia’s stated objective to become a full EU member and so part of the European Security and Defence Policy (KIPRED 2014). However, Serbia continues in its four-pillar policy – the EU, USA, Russia, and China – which gives space for manoeuvre, though it might keep many security analysts puzzled. Besides its military cooperation with Serbia, Russia also engages in spreading propaganda and pursuing a hybrid war. Various analyses of the general features of the clustered disinformation news published by Russia show that it aims to undermine the statehood and sovereignty of Kosovo, changing the narratives of the war and war crimes in the Former Yugoslavia and undermining the credibility of the Western engagement in the region. One exception is ‘Sputnik Serbia that gives a special attention to the disinformation aiming at portraying Serbian Community and Orthodox Church in Kosovo as oppressed and threatened’ (KIPRED 2021).

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As much as it may seem contradictory, Kosovo is the only country in the Western Balkans that has no institutionalised formal relationship with NATO and sees the US as its most important strategic partner. The US role – as the driving force behind the NATO intervention in 1999 – was perceived in Kosovo in the most favourable light, paving the way for United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244, authorising an international civil and military presence in FR Yugoslavia, the establishment of the UNMIK, and the deployment of KFOR (Kruijver Xhambazi 2020, 3). Although the US interventionist policies in the Balkans have ended and the USA left the main responsibility to the European partners, the USA remains the number one strategic partner for Kosovo (and Albania). Both countries are often considered the most pro-American Muslim states in the world. During the presidential term of Donald Trump, the US sought to break an impasse in the Belgrade-Pristina talks by initiating a trilateral meeting in Washington in September 2020 for the sake of the normalisation of economic relations. Although widely perceived as a successful step, the meetings resulted in only a legally non-binding agreement between Serbia and Kosovo, addressing mainly trade and business – points already under discussion in the EU-led framework. President Biden and Secretary of State Anthony Blinken are clear in their intention – supporting both countries in moving forward with the ultimate objective of mutual recognition. However, much of the work remains in the hands of Brussels, which will continue to be the main interlocutor in the Belgrade-Pristina talks, which are best described by the phrase, ‘US-supported, EU-facilitated talks’. Turkey considers the Balkans to be its natural sphere of influence dating back to the Ottoman Empire. A rift in Kosovo’s domestic political scene was caused when, in March 2018, the Turkish secret service, in cooperation with the Kosovo police, arrested and deported six alleged Gülenists to Turkey without Prime Minister Haradinaj’s knowledge. He responded by releasing Interior Minister Flamur Sefaj and Kosovo Information Service chief Driton Gashi. In this case, human rights organisations criticised the Kosovo government for deporting six Gülenist school employees to a state where they have no chance of a fair trial. Another consequence was dozens of Turkish applications for asylum in Kosovo. However, the deportation was quickly forgotten and did not cause serious negative effects on Kosovo-Turkish relations. President Hashim Thaçi went to the official inauguration of Recep Erdoğan in Ankara in July of that year, and the incident fell into oblivion. Political relations between Kosovo and Turkey are determined by several geopolitical, economic, and socio-historical factors. The large community of Turkish citizens with roots in Kosovo and the Turkish ethnic minority in Kosovo play an important role in this regard. The Turkish language is among the official languages of Kosovo. One Minister represents the Turkish community in the cabinet and two MPs in the Assembly. Turkey took an active part in the NATO intervention in 1999, and Turkey was one of the first countries to recognise Kosovo’s independence. The Free Trade Agreement between Turkey and Kosovo – the first FRA Kosovo signed with a second party – was signed in 2013. Approximately

96 Jiří Němec and Věra Stojarová 500 Turkish companies operate in Kosovo; the total value of their investment is around 340 million euros. Currently, Turkey is considered the third-largest foreign direct investor in Kosovo after Germany and the UK (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Turkey 2021). Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates have significant influence. In Kosovo’s eyes, Saudi Arabia is a ‘brother’, ‘partner’, and a ‘friend’, and was among the first countries to support Kosovo’s moves towards independence and to recognise the country. The field of cooperation between the two countries extends to economic, cultural, and political relations. In terms of economic cooperation, Saudi Arabia invests mainly in reconstructing schools, clinics, and mosques, with ever-growing tendencies towards trade and investments. Similar to Saudi Arabia, Qatar’s strategy is cultural and religious diplomacy in Kosovo. In April 2021, the Government of Qatar inaugurated the biggest five-floor mosque in Kosovo, considered to be a masterpiece of modern architecture. Funded by the Qatar Charity foundation with donations from the Qatari and Kosovar governments, the mosque is not the only project executed in Kosovo. Of all the Western Balkan countries, Qatar Charity has three offices in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. During the pandemic crisis, Qatar donated over $24 million in COVID-19 aid to 60 countries, among which was Kosovo, receiving $300,000 for the health sector to cope with the pandemic challenges (Ibrahim 2021).

Ethnic and Religious Extremism, Islamic Radicalism According to the Global Terrorism Index, Kosovo is ranked 135th, which is world’s lowest ranking score. Compared with the other five Western Balkan countries, as of 2020 Kosovo had a lower probability of a terrorist attack; the highestranked in the region are Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina, tied for 95th place (the higher the rank, the bigger the threat of terrorism) (Institute for Economics & Peace 2020). Although most people in Kosovo practice moderate forms of Islam, mainly the older generations who grew up in socialist Yugoslavia, Kosovo does not lack radicalised fighters (Stojar 2016). In 2012–17, around 400 Kosovo citizens travelled to the conflict zones in Syria and Iraq. Of these 400, 250 citizens were considered foreign fighters, whereas the rest were women and children (Jakupi and Kraja 2018). The problems of violent extremism and radicalisation have been issues in Kosovo, prompting the government to strengthen its policies on the repatriation of foreign terrorist fighters, on the one hand, and criticising the Kosova Islamic Community (BIK) for not being able to counter the extremist narratives coming from far-right religious groups, on the other. While the reasons for engaging in terrorist acts and accepting radicalisation may be various, from individual and social issues to institutional and structural factors, fragile and poor socio-economic living environments marked by a lack of life opportunities and a legacy of conflict and unresolved disputes as well as weak institutional reach in peripheral areas of Kosovo are considered influencing factors (Avdimetaj 2021). The potential for radicalisation might also be related to weak institutional capacities and a general lack of trust in institutions.

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Two-thirds of Kosovars do not trust the courts and judiciary at all, 71% distrust the government, and 63% do not trust local authorities (Regional Cooperation Council 2021). Violent extremism in Kosovo manifests along ethnic lines. In this respect, the provinces in northern Kosovo are much more prone to such incidents, accompanied by political tensions surrounding the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue. Mitrovica became a fertile recruiting ground for the Islamic State, and for the far-right Serbian ‘Kosovo Front’ that supplies fighters to Eastern Ukraine (Jakupi and Kraja 2018). Regarding religious extremism, Saudi Arabia is increasingly connected with propagating Wahhabism and spreading Salafi literature, including through the funding of mosques throughout Kosovo. Such donations are made through obscure channels by individuals, charities and associations. Wahhabism is also spreading through Saudi diplomacy; many contemporary imams have been educated in Saudi Arabia. Radical religious propaganda is mostly disseminated and propagated online, through Albanian-language portals and social media platforms where users propagate Islamic extremism, including through Twitter, Facebook, and Scribd accounts (Goshi and Van Leuven 2017, 21; Stojarová and Stojar 2019). The most targeted groups are the young and vulnerable, who are most often affected by unfavourable socio-economic circumstances, which, in turn, makes them vulnerable to extremist narratives spread by experienced propagators.

Enviro, Energy, Cyber and Econ: Short Nicknames for Severe Challenges? The soft dimension of security refers to a wide range of non-military threats, including, for example, environmental disasters, energy insecurity, or threats originating in the information or economic domains. In broad understanding, such threats can be referred to as human security, which, according to Beha and Visoka (2010, 86), is a term that is ‘increasingly employed in post-conflict situations’. Since human security accepts human beings as a referent object of analysis, both state and societal perspectives on threats are presented. In terms of environmental security, Kosovo suffers from severe air pollution, land degradation, and water pollution and scarcity. The latter is essential for both state and human security since the largest water reservoir in Kosovo (out of six in total) – Lake Gazivode/Ujmani – is situated on the border between Kosovo and Serbia. Circa one-third of the lake lies within Serbian territory, and the rest is located in Serb-dominated northern Kosovo. Around one-third of Kosovo’s population is supplied with water from this lake; thus, it constitutes an essential strategic resource (University of Gothenburg 2008, 2–3). Aside from the direct impact on human health, general water scarcity caused by increasing demand or shifts in hydrological cycles based on climate change and chemical or bacteriological pollution of available water may catalyse both internal and inter-state conflict along existing ethnic cleavages in Kosovo. It is expected that in 20 years, all of Kosovo’s water basins will become stressed (World Bank 2018, 10).

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Air pollution is caused mainly by Kosovo’s coal-powered power plants, the mining industrial complex in the Mitrovica region, transportation (aging vehicles and poor infrastructure), heating by firewood, and waste burning by households and in landfills. Open coal pits, lead poisoning in mining and industrial areas, and dumping or soot disposal sites degrade otherwise relatively fertile soil (University of Gothenburg 2008, 2). National-level environmental threats include seismic disturbances, deforestation, landslides, flooding, and unexploded war-related ordnance. Kosovo’s environmental security threats are further exacerbated by lack of proactive governance, efficient regulations, and control (Ibid. 4–5). Energy and environmental security are often closely interconnected, and Kosovo is no exception. The first issue concerns the above-mentioned Lake Gazivode/Ujmani, the primary cooling water source for Kosovo’s two lignitepowered plants – Kosovo A and Kosovo B (Voisin et al. 2021, 5). These power plants supply the vast majority of Kosovo’s power grid; thus, when the cooling source is cut off due to the hydrologic situation or intentionally during unrest or conflict, Kosovo is practically out of energy. The Kosovo A power plant, built in 1962, is considered one of the biggest polluters in Europe, and Kosovo B, built in 1983, is not far behind. Plans for constructing the Kosova e Re (New Kosovo) were halted after the World Bank dropped its support and the future operator withdrew from the project in 2020. The New Kosovo plant was expected to be less polluting and more efficient; hence Kosovo A was to be decommissioned. It is also important to note that Kosovo possesses the world’s fifth-largest lignite reserves (US Department of Commerce 2020), and hence is self-sufficient in supplying coal-powered thermal plants. However, Kosovo’s energy grid generally loses about 28% of electricity due to technical losses and lack of efficiency measures (CEE Bankwatch Network 2020). The Energy Regulatory Office of Kosovo further acknowledges that the distribution network remains in unsatisfactory condition and investments are needed to ensure the quality and sustainable supply of electricity. There are not enough production capacity reserves, especially flexible ones which can be activated in case of lack of electricity or low output from larger units. Thus, to diversify its portfolio, Kosovo by 2028 plans to introduce a new thermal power plant and flexible hydropower plant as primary sources of energy, and several renewables encompassing smaller hydropower plants, wind turbines, biomass-processing plants, and solar energy plants (Energy Regulatory Office of Kosovo 2019, 48–49). The sustainable development of Kosovo’s energy sector is vital for both state security and human security, and also for Euro-Atlantic integration and the ‘independence issue’ itself. How Kosovo meets such challenges will be seen in the upcoming decade. Regarding cybersecurity, the second phase of the war in Kosovo was one of the first conflicts that witnessed heavy employment of cyber warfare. Serbia used cyber attacks against NATO in response to its bombardment campaign; additionally, after the Chinese embassy in Belgrade got hit by a bomb, Chinese hackers conducted a strike against the White House website and the US Departments of Energy and Interior. The US response encompassed cracking into Serbian banks and the electronic isolation of Slobodan Milošević from the chain of command

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(Burton and Lain 2020, 456). Not being a direct part of such military exchanges in cyber domain, Kosovo only slowly adapted to the constantly evolving global cybersecurity threats. In 2016, the first National Cybersecurity Strategy (NCS) was adopted and the National Cyber Security Unit of Kosovo (Njësia Nacionale për Siguri Kibernetike, KOS-CERT) was established. KOS-CERT is a cyberincident response unit mandated to provide technical response and nationwide awareness-raising. However, it suffers from a critical staff shortage, as does the computer emergency response team (CERT) operated by the Kosovo Security Force, both having recruitment difficulties due to lack of qualified personnel. As of March 2020, two people operated KOS-CERT and three operated the CERT of the Kosovo Security Force. Furthermore, Kosovo’s National Cybersecurity Council, the ‘main coordinating body for cybersecurity policy, presently holds no mandate to prepare or coordinate a joint action to manage the response to a national-level crisis’ (Bund and Esteve-Gonzales 2020, 10–11). Despite good cybersecurity practices broadened, widened, and improved across governmental bodies and society in general, Kosovo internet users lack advanced cyberthreat understanding and have scant knowledge of online personal data protection. The channels for reporting cybercrime are mostly unknown to victims, and these issues are rarely discussed or presented in the media. Kosovo also lacks an adequate legal and regulatory framework concerning information and communications technology security (Ibid. 11–13). Finally, in terms of contemporary economic challenges, Kosovo’s economy heavily relies on remittances sent to the country from the diaspora and the donor assistance and spending of the international community. According to the US Central Intelligence Agency’s World Factbook (2021), such total income amounts to nearly one-third of the nation’s gross domestic product (GDP). Secondly, Kosovo suffers from a relatively high unemployment rate, amounting to 26% (higher among females, about 32%, than males, about 24%). The unemployment rate is especially high among youth – about 49% for the age category 15–24 and 34% for those age 25–34 (Hajrizi, Demaj and Thaçi 2021, 26–27). Thirdly, the economic weakness is aggravated not only along age and gender cleavages, but also by ethnicity. About 67% of the young Kosovo Serb population sees the lack of job opportunities as the main challenge of their prospective future, compared to 89% of young Kosovo Albanians. Lack of job opportunities and low family income are the leading drivers explaining why ‘young Kosovo Albanians more commonly opted for migration (30% definitely, 22% likely) compared to young Kosovo Serbs (22% definitely, 23% likely)’ (UNDP in Kosovo 2021, 28). Fourthly, the average monthly net wage was 416 euros in 2020 (Hajrizi et al. 2021, 8), and about 18% of Kosovo’s population fell below the poverty line in 2017 (Kosovo Agency of Statistics 2019, 14). To conclude, determinants such as unemployment, low income, and perceived lack of opportunities constitute a threat to human economic security, that is, the ability especially of young people to cover their essential needs with dignity. The same factors exacerbate economic emigration and brain drain, hence, lowering the performance and sustainable growth of the economy and thus threatening the state’s economic security.

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Kosovo Stability in the Face of COVID-19 Not long after the pandemic outbreak, amid the infection surge, the Kosovo government imposed strict restrictions on citizens, including a curfew allowing only 90 minutes per day outside the house. Justified by the worsening situation in the country, the punishment for disobeying the imposed measures was fines as high as 2,000 EUR for individuals and up to 8,000 EUR for legal entities (Bami 2020). The infringement on human rights in Kosovo vis-à-vis the pandemic goes against the Kosovo Constitutional Court and is not justifiable; nonetheless, the measures imposed by the government were driven by the fear of the worsening health situation in the country, leading to a set of autocratic measures. The strict imposition of measures amidst the pandemic was one of the breaking points between the coalition government, led by Prime Minister Kurti from Vetëvendosje and their smaller coalition partner, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK). Although the government’s fall was not a direct result of the pandemic crisis, the vote for no confidence was initiated after ex-Prime Minister Kurti sacked the Interior Minister Agim Veliu for declaring a state of emergency and transferring power to the Security Council, headed by Thaci, who was indicted for crimes in The Hague. Enforcing the COVID-19 measures proved challenging at the level of municipalities, which struggled to impose the measures due to their dependency on central authorities, the lack of protective and medical equipment, and weak public infrastructure. This was particularly true for the Serb municipalities in the north, which were rather detached from the central public health system due to the existing parallel operations of Belgrade-supported health structures (Kosovar Centre for Security Studies 2020). Contrary to the lack of communication between the municipalities in tackling the crisis, the trade between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo amid the COVID-19 pandemic yielded positive results. Namely, in the early stage of the pandemic, the trade between the two ethnic groups improved compared to the pre-pandemic period. In this respect, 19.2% of survey respondents believe that the commercial activities of Albanians in Serbian communities grew due to the pandemic, whereas 11.4% believe that the commercial activities of Serbs grew in Albanian communities in comparison to the pre-pandemic period (Jakovljević and Mijačić 2021). The COVID-19 pandemic also revealed the geopolitical elements intertwined in the process of getting through the crisis. An overwhelming majority, 78%, of Kosovars recognised the unwavering support of the EU in terms of medical, financial, and other donations throughout the pandemic crisis. As part of the response to the COVID-19 pandemic, EUR 5 million was reassigned for urgent medical equipment and EUR 62 million for socio-economic recovery measures under IPA II. Kosovo will also receive up to EUR 100 million in loans for macro-financial assistance (European Commission 2020). The level of trust in the EU, as the fiercest supporter of the Western Balkans countries during the pandemic crisis, reached as high as 78% in Kosovo. In contrast, the other five Western Balkan countries showed much less support for the EU, with Albania second after Kosovo (50%),

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and Serbia merely 16%. Serbia, on the other hand, leads by a wide margin in the share of those who see the most support coming from China (54%) and Russia (17%) (Regional Cooperation Council 2021).

Conclusion The continuous and undivided attention given to the international community by the population in Kosovo implies that Kosovo’s security and stability remain central for the security and stability of the Western Balkans. The fate of Kosovo is closely interconnected with the fate of Albanians in neighbouring countries, and so the country can influence the stability and security of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and North Macedonia. Kosovo politicians are aware that their security is inseparable from regional security and stability, and therefore they should be committed to good neighbourly relations. NATO’s KFOR remains the cornerstone of Kosovo’s security, enabling the country to continue the process of normalisation of relations with Serbia. Kosovo’s security and, therefore, Balkan security generally, is heavily dependent on NATO’s presence in the country, and therefore KFOR shall remain hostage to the unresolved conflict. The slow implementation of the Brussels Agreement, designed to ensure the peace and security of the country and the region, impacts both Kosovo’s domestic and foreign policies. This chapter demonstrated that security threats in Kosovo exist not only vis-à-vis Belgrade but those in the sectors of energy, environment, economy, democracy and the peacebuilding process, religious and ethnic conflicts, and statebuilding. The de-escalation of the conflict in northern Kosovo between Belgrade and Pristina over license plates in September 2021 proved once again that statebuilding and conflict resolution in Kosovo have a long way to go. Even a slight twitch in the wrong direction could lead to a serious escalation of the conflict with Serbia, bringing about serious security implications for Kosovo and the entire region. The essential problem for Kosovo remains its endless dispute with Serbia over its territorial integrity and statehood, thereby leading to unpredictable developments and presenting security risks for the entire region. Until the full normalisation of relations between Belgrade and Pristina is achieved, Kosovo’s security in the Western Balkans and its future in the EU remain far from assured. Hence, Kosovo’s history to date has been characterised by security challenges and uncertainties, most of which are not even the fault of the country itself but rather arise from broader geopolitical conditions.

Note 1 This designation is without prejudice to the various positions on the status of this territory and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence. The term Kosovo and Metohija (KiM) is used when cited from Serbian sources.

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Building Cohesive National Security and Stability The Case of Montenegro Olivera Injac and Todor Goranović

Introduction From the early 1990s, and especially since independence in May 2006, Montenegro’s national security has been shaped by the interests of a political elite led by the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) and their political leaders (Milo Đukanović, Duško Marković, Milan Roćen, Svetozar Marović, and others). The DPS was effectively in power from 19911 until August 2020, and the whole system of public institutions, including the national security system, was for 30 years under the control of the leading political actors. During their period of governance, the DPS created a discourse that the party and its leader are the protectors of the nation and state independence (Džankić and Keil 2017). Before August 2020 Montenegro has never experienced a change of government in free elections (Mijović-Tadić 2019). During the governance of the previous regime,2 Montenegro did not become a liberal democracy, because a system of corruption, cronyism, and control over institutions had been in place for decades (Andjelić 2020), which caused the institutional weakness of the police and judiciary. The country is facing enormous challenges as a result of corruption and organised crime, which is the most vulnerable issue for national stability and resilience. For instance, citizens have ranked corruption as the second most serious problem that Montenegro is facing, beside poverty and low living standards (UNODC 2011). As Morrison stated, the presence of blurred lines between the DPS, the government, and state institutions, to such a level that the party is the state, means that control over the instruments of power has significantly influenced the capabilities for stability of Montenegro (Morrison 2017). Until now, a decade and a half after the independence of Montenegro in 2006, national security and stability have been on an uneven track as a result of political tensions and the continual accentuation of identity themes3 which have deepened political and social fragmentation. In this regard, the much-needed political reconciliation and consolidation have not yet happened. Montenegro is a society divided by high political, ethnic, and social tensions which could lead to occasional violence. Despite the peaceful elections held in August 2020, Montenegrin society remains deeply politically divided. After the elections, the process of political DOI: 10.4324/9781003276661-8

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transition was beset by nationalistic tensions and polarisation based on ethnic differences and fuelled by the DPS and other opposition parties (SD and SDP).4 It is characterised by the absence of political and identity cohesion, that is to say the most significant condition for national stability and security. The main division is between two extreme blocs, one led by the DPS and satellite opposition parties which advocate to protect Montenegrin national identity, and the second led by the ruling Democratic Front, which has the support of, and relies on Serbian and Russian authorities. The most relevant internal security threats are corruption, various forms of organised crime, extremism, radicalisation, and political and social polarisation. Apart from those, the biggest threats come from activities of organised criminal groups (OCGs) related to drug smuggling on the territory of Montenegro and transnationally. Their activities also include many other security risks and criminal activities, such as vindictive murders and bombings and dominant are frequent gang-related murders, as was reported for the period 2012–2020 was recorded up to 44 gang-related murders (European Commision 2020). As regards external threats, the main ones are transnational organised crime, cyber risks, foreign fighters, and the influence of external actors. Finally, there is an external border issue owing to the bilateral dispute with Croatia about the Prevlaka peninsula. Although this issue does not pose a threat, for more than 20 years there has been no final demarcation, and the fact is that the dispute must be resolved before EU accession.

Historical Overview During the 1990s, until the fall of the Milošević regime in 2000,5 the national security and stability of Montenegro were framed by complex internal and regional political issues. The key events which had a pivotal role for Montenegrin security are the NATO intervention in 1999,6 the referendum on independence in May 2006, and NATO accession in June 2017. In 1999, the event that affected national stability most was the NATO intervention, which lasted from 24 March to 10 June. Although it had moderate consequences for Montenegro in terms of human and material casualties, its political effects are still predominantly present. Memories are still alive, and the character of that event is still causing a deep division in Montenegrin society, which was most obvious over the NATO membership campaign. During the NATO intervention, Đukanović7 had the support of Western politicians, who promised him that bombings would be limited because the strategy of targeting Montenegro was potentially counterproductive to the NATO membership campaign (Morrison 2017). At the same time, there were tensions on the ground between the Army of Yugoslavia and the Montenegrin police, stoked by Milošević’s constant attempts to exert political pressure on local authorities. In the years after the intervention, national tensions continued and the Army of Yugoslavia was used as a tool by Milošević to worsen the political situation in regard to statehood issues.

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The 2006 referendum on independence was also filled with tensions and concerns because of the two factions pro and contra state independence.8 The role of the European Union (EU) was important in reaching a consensus on the rules for the referendum as it was clear that the government and opposition could not reach an agreement. Also, the EU appointed a special envoy to Montenegro, namely the diplomat Miroslav Lajčak, who was responsible for following the situation and mediating in the pre-referendum and throughout the referendum process so as to reach a consensus between the polarised political factions. The most significant EU decision was to set a 55% threshold. Even if this was difficult to attain, and accepted with scepticism by the pro-independence bloc, it was a guarantor of political stability. In addition to the persistent political tensions between the two blocs, internal political issues in Serbia also reflected on the Montenegrin situation. For example, in 2006 it was the unresolved status of Kosovo which dominated the political discourse in Montenegro. The period from 2006 until the coup attempt in 20169 and NATO accession in 2017 was marked by waves of political turmoil and the struggle of the regime to stay in power, while at the same time the accumulation of problems with crime and corruption captured society and institutions. Due to the lack of functional institutions and their deficiency in independence, Montenegro was considered a ‘façade democracy’, which was obvious during the NATO integration process and afterwards. According to Pavlović, the desire for membership did not reflect a sincere determination for reforms, which could briefly be expressed as ‘with NATO, against reforms’ (Pavlović 2015). Political processes, directed by the DPS political elite during its multi-decade governance, especially after the independence of Montenegro in 2006, were based on the coalition structure which included national minority parties (Albanians, Bosniaks, and Croats). This ensured the DPS a stable and cohesive position. According to the results of the census held in 2011 (Radio Slobodna Evropa 2011), the Serbian national community represented 29% of the population. However, the politics of the ruling DPS did not reflect positively on the status of Serbs, who therefore considered themselves discriminated against and excluded, which further deepened the divisions in society. After independence, the regime failed to tackle national identity issues with appropriate measures, particularly in regard to complicated legal issues concerning the properties of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Montenegro and the Montenegrin Orthodox Church.10 Besides, there were tensions between the canonically recognised Serbian Orthodox Church and a self-proclaimed Montenegrin Orthodox Church over ownership of church properties (Freedom House 2019). Eventually, it was proven that the regime had been aware that this issue was the most threatening to their power, which was further proven during the parliamentary elections held in August 2020, when the leading DPS and its coalition partners11 became the political opposition. As Stojarova explains, in order to stay in power the DPS combined numerous sensitive issues, such as the imposition of national identity topics which produce deep divisions in society, control of opposition media, misuse of state resources,

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and pro or contra independence and NATO membership issues (Stojarova 2020). During the entire three decades, threats to political and social stability were constantly induced through identity issues and divisions based on Montenegrin and Serbian identity,12 enforced and awakened by multiple political actors as needed. The latest wave of nationalism and extremism, present since the parliamentary elections in 2020, further instigated by disinformation and media manipulations, contaminates public discourse and exacerbates the existing fragmentation of Montenegro. Predominantly present are two types of narratives: The old one, shaped by numerous myths from the political history of Montenegro, reaching back many centuries, and the newer one, which refers to the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s (for instance, the adoption on June 2021 of the Resolution on the Genocide in Srebrenica13). It can be stated without a doubt that in the 1990s and later after the independence of Montenegro in 2006, national security was shaped by the interests of the DPS, which had a particularly strong influence on political and societal security. Through their unrivalled political leadership, Đukanović and his party entrenched the power of what became the longest-lasting regime in the Western Balkans. The prominent feature of that regime was control over the intelligence and security sector, which enabled it to have a direct impact on crucial decisions affecting national security. The fact that the regime controlled and impacted the national security sector became particularly obvious after 1997 and the political split within the DPS14 caused by differences on the future political orientation of Montenegro. This saw the emergence of two factions, the ‘unionists’ and the ‘independists’. From then on, the ruling DPS was perceived as promoting statebuilding and a Montenegrin national identity distinct from Serb identity (Bieber 2018). In the decade following the referendum, Montenegro failed to seize the opportunity to continue on the development and stability path. Instead of democracy, the country turned to autocracy, kleptocracy, and anarchy, capturing both institutions and society as a whole, so much so that Montenegro became a ‘hybrid regime’ instead of a potential EU member. Indeed, as reported by Freedom House, Montenegro now stands among those countries qualified as ‘hybrid regimes’, due to the decline in democratic standards, especially in regard to good governance, judicial independence, elections, corruption, and media freedom (Stojanović 2020). In two consecutive Freedom House reports on Montenegro (2019 and 2020), although the country is labelled as a leader in the EU integration processes, it is considered as only partly free, primarily because of the widespread patronage system and corruption. The 2019 Freedom House report states that many members of the ruling party have alleged links to organised crime, while public and private sector employees are under strong pressure to vote for the ruling coalition parties. In its 2020 report, Freedom House even lowered Montenegro in the ranking, labelling it as a hybrid regime, which is the lowest rating that country has received since independence. Similar views and assessments of the level of political corruption are set by Transparency International (Zúñiga, 2020). Although little progress was made in 2020 compared to the region, positioning on

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the ranking list is still exceptionally low for the reform and integration phase in which Montenegro finds itself. The fall of the longest-lasting regime in the Western Balkans, which took place as a result of the free elections held in August 2020, was largely fuelled by the citizens’ dissatisfaction with the adoption of the Law on the Freedom of Religion and Belief and the Legal Status of Religious Communities (2019),15 as well as by other accumulated political, socio-economic, and security problems. A challenging period started after the parliamentary elections held in August 2020, when the DPS regime was removed from power. Even if a peaceful and stable political transition is expected, Montenegrin society remains exposed to manipulation by dangerous narratives which deepen political and social fragmentation.

Internal Security Challenges Internal security has a complex phenomenology in terms of political and social security. Prominent threats have existed for a long time and, because of the lack of political will, there was no serious effort to counter them during the previous regime. Montenegro is transnationally known for complex forms of organised and serious crime, especially cigarette and heavy drugs smuggling. Internally, drug trafficking remains the primary form of criminal activities. Apart from being the OCGs’ main source of revenue, drug trafficking is also responsible for many other security threats and a trigger for other types of crime, including serious criminal offences against life, money laundering, corruption, etc. (SOCTA 201716). The strategic documents of the national security strategy (2018) and SOCTA (2017) state that organised crime poses a complex and long-term threat both nationally and internationally (Strategija nacionalne bezbjednosti 2018). The SOCTA document emphasises that a large proportion of the organised criminal activities in Montenegro in recent years have been driven mainly by transnational security trends, such as drug trafficking, terrorism and extremism, illegal migration and human trafficking, smuggling of excise goods and cigarettes, and arms smuggling. Other threats listed in SOCTA are corruption, cybercrime, usury, and money laundering, which are characterised by sophisticated methods and excellent organisation. Immediately after independence, international actors reported poor results in the fight against organised crime and corruption, both of which have a strong impact on the internal security of Montenegro. Since 2008, European Commission reports have indicated that tackling the problems of organised crime and corruption depends on the independence of the judiciary. Today, the same threats are challenging the internal security of Montenegro and testify that organised crime and corruption are the main elements of the captured state. Montenegro has the characteristics of a captured state, namely abuse of power by the regime (Stojarova 2020). In its Integrated Strategy for Relations with Montenegro’ (2018–21), the United States Department of State indicates that endemic corruption and organised crime are the main obstacles to Montenegro’s integration

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into the EU (Department of State USA. 2018–2021). Corruption, as characteristic of transitional societies, such as those in the Western Balkans, almost as a rule goes hand in hand with politics and the political decision-making process (Đukić 2019). As a social phenomenon, corruption adversely affects Montenegrin society. It is endemic and takes a variety of forms depending on multiple factors, either political, economic, social, demographic, or cultural. According to the US State Department Human Rights Report on Montenegro (Department of State 2020), corruption remains a serious issue for Montenegrin society. There has been a plethora of evidence of corruption regarding hiring practices, health care, higher education, the judiciary, the police, the armed forces, urban planning, etc. EU statements continuously emphasise that problems of corruption are the most persistent ones, underlining the fact that corruption has far-reaching consequences for democracy, the rule of law, and law enforcement (European Commission 2019a). The EU recommends that the police should conduct proactive investigations, because the fight against corruption is a constant task. For example, the case of ‘Atlas Bank’17 was discovered in 2019, involving a certain amount of corruptive crime, with indications that other cases of corruption may follow as a result. However, the trial is a drawn-out affair and is far from over. As regards the media, the Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group report estimates that media freedom in Montenegro is restricted, underlining strong media control and open assaults on journalists (Bieber and Kmezić 2015). Over the last few years, there have been several cases of attacks on individuals investigating organised crime and corruption in Montenegro, such as the attack on journalist Olivera Lakić, who was wounded by a gunman in 2018 as she was investigating links between the corruption of top officials and cigarette smugglers in Montenegro. This is one of the most extreme examples of attacks against journalists in Montenegro. In addition, media properties have also been attacked a few times. All those cases have in common the fact that they remain unsolved, which leads to the conclusion that media representatives do not feel protected and have doubts about freedom of expression. As stated in the 2017 International Religious Freedom Report, the specificity of Montenegro is that issues of ethnicity and religion are in a strong correlation, which additionally creates a distance between ethnic and religious groups. National ethnic tensions and divisions of Montenegrin society pose a potential threat for stability and are exacerbated by frequently repeated identity narratives that have been present in public discourse for years. This is most prominent in periods of elections or when important political decisions such as the recognition of Kosovo18 need to be made. Extended ethnic tensions in Montenegro resulted in a boom in nationalistic rhetoric in the months before and after the August 2020 elections, and deeply polarised Montenegrin society along ethnic and religious lines. The trigger for the high tensions between on the one hand the previous DPS/SD government and its supporters (the ‘Montenegrin bloc’), and on the other hand the ruling coalition alliance and the supporters of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) was the

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adoption of the new Law on the Freedom of Religion and Belief and the Legal Status of Religious Communities (2019). In the period around the elections held in August 2020, statements of senior DPS leaders considered the SOC to be the largest opposition power in Montenegro. By passing the Law in December 2019, the government aimed to shake the SOC’s growing power and financial strength. The Law caused debate and widespread demonstrations (‘litije’) as the SOC regarded it as discriminatory and SOC strongly criticized the Law (Department of State USA 2019). The adoption of the Law definitely affected both the campaign and the 2020 election results.19 Despite long existing tendencies towards political violence, no violent acts were committed or attempted until 2016. On 16 October 2016, the day of the parliamentary elections in Montenegro, 20 citizens of Serbia were arrested for a suspected terrorist coup attempt, as well as for planning the liquidation of Montenegrin Prime Minister Milo Đukanović. Two Montenegrin opposition leaders of the Democratic Front (DF), Andrija Mandić and Milan Knežević, were also charged for plotting the attempted coup, as well as two Russian members of the secret service identified as leaders of a criminal organisation preparing to carry out terrorist acts. According to the indictment of the Special Prosecutor’s Office, their goal was to prevent Montenegro from joining NATO and to overthrow the government. In a long trial open to the public, both DF leaders were found guilty in May 2019 and sentenced to 5 years, while 2 members of the Russian secret service were sentenced to 12 and 15 years. Legal proceedings were controversial as throughout the case they were marked by confusion and opacity. For example, the identity of the two members of the Russian secret service was never confirmed, nor were the suspects extradited to Montenegro. In February 2021, the Montenegrin Court of Appeal overturned the decision, stating that there was no evidence the defendants were guilty of the crimes they had been accused of. The media in Montenegro exert a considerable impact, especially in circumstances where fragmentation and ethnic polarisation prevail. Although Montenegrin media have the freedom to criticise the authorities, they are marked by a lack of objective reporting and political partiality owing to the fact that many of them are state-owned, or work for the interest of political parties or powerful individuals, or are even financed from the state budget, as is the case for the daily newspaper Pobjeda and for RTCG, the public service broadcaster (Bieber and Kmezić 2015). The resulting tendency of the media to break professional standards and neglect matters of public interest has led to the concern that media reporting is coloured by imbalance and bias (Kmezić 2020). This is particularly dominant in media recognised as pro-Đukanović (for example the Pobjeda newspaper and internet portals such as ‘Analitika’, ‘CdM’, etc.), which also spread a lot disinformation and fake news in order to provide political support to the previous regime. This confirms that contemporary challenges posed by disinformation and fake news have not bypassed Montenegro. This creates an even more complex situation as the dissemination of fake news through media outlets has reached a worrying level, and contributes to inciting fear and uncertainty about issues such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the political power transition. The greatest

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impact of disinformation is on the fostering of nationalistic sentiments and the reawakening of inter-ethnic rivalry between ethnic Serbs and Montenegrins. Although the health and economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have not impacted national stability, they do pose a threat to social categories and the unemployment rate. Total employment in December 2020 had dropped by 13.2% compared to the previous year. During the first months of 2020, Montenegro experienced a lower form of crisis (Injac 2020) and by the end of May it had successfully achieved zero cases (OECD 2021). The second wave of infections happened in summer and autumn 2020, reaching peak levels in November. The situation was partially stable until the beginning of 2021, but in February–March 2021, Montenegro faced the worst scenario: It had the highest number of active cases and hospitalised persons per 100,000 inhabitants in the region, while in terms of the number of deaths it was in second position. Montenegro has been a NATO member since 2017, and the NATO system of collective defence provides a guarantee and protection from military threats. The Armed Forces of Montenegro are in a process of modernisation and capability building. In addition, they have successfully completed three main missions: (a) defence of Montenegro and NATO member states; (b) contribution to international peace and security; (c) support to civilian institutions (Vlada Crne Gore 2018b). During the management of the COVID-19 crisis, within the third mission, the Army of Montenegro provided assistance to civilian institutions and actively participated in decontamination activities.

Threats to External Security In terms of external security and external threats, Montenegro is exposed to different contemporary threats which endanger national security (Vlada Crne Gore 2018a). These are not classic or conventional threats. Rather, the country is exposed to a number of asymmetric threats which can be divided into several categories: Transnational organised activities, driven by a new wave of security trends in cybercrime; drug trafficking; terrorism and extremism; illegal migration and human trafficking; smuggling of excise goods and cigarettes; arms smuggling; and hybrid activities of state or non-state actors. The structural, political, and economic weaknesses of Montenegro make it acutely susceptible to exploitation by transnational criminal networks. Even though Montenegro is not a base for a great degree of radical extremist activities, threats of radicalisation and violent extremism have been recorded due to the global rise of those phenomena. The spread of religious radicalism and extremism that promoted affiliation to terrorist organisations has not bypassed Montenegro. However, the intensity of the influence of radical Salafist structures is much weaker than in neighbouring countries. Religious radical individuals and groups in Montenegro are organised under the strong influence of prominent religious extremist individuals. Besides, Salafi ideology is being spread in Montenegro through preachers from Bosnia, whose lectures are being streamed

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online, thereby gaining more attention than the official Islamic Community lectures. This influences local Salafist factions, though for now these factions do not pose a security threat in Montenegro. The phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters caused by the intense propaganda activities of terrorist organisations operating in Syria and Iraq was also recorded, and Montenegrin citizens travelled to conflict areas in the period 2013–14. Since the beginning of 2016, no departure of Montenegrin citizens to foreign battlefields has been recorded. Since the beginning of the conflict in Syria and Iraq, more than 20 Montenegrin citizens have participated in the battlefield, while 5 have participated in the battlefield in Ukraine. Following the amendments to the Criminal Code (2015), which treat participation in foreign armed conflicts as a criminal offence, two returnees were convicted (one for participation in Syria and one for participation in Ukraine). In the recent past, Montenegro has not been directly targeted by the processes of radicalisation, violent extremism, and recruitment on its territory. There have been no attempted terrorist attacks in Montenegro, although propaganda videos emanating from the terrorist organisation ISIL/Da’esh have targeted the country several times. A Montenegrin citizen also appeared in the video ‘Honour is a message to the Balkans in jihad’, and not only invited like-minded people to join them in Syria, but also encouraged attacks on Montenegrin soil. As part of the Western Balkan region, Montenegro is also along one of the main routes for people moving illegally from the Middle East and North Africa to the EU, either as smuggled migrants or victims of human trafficking. The transit position of Montenegro on the way to EU countries thus entails the risk of organised smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings, which are among the most profitable criminal activities. Illegal migration represents a moderate problem for Montenegro as it is primarily a transit country for most migrants. Due to the COVID-19 situation, there was a decline in migrant activity: In 2020, there were 3,149 registered migrants, while for the first half of 2021 there were 1,576. By comparison, in 2019 there were more than 7,000 migrants in the Reception Centre for Migrants, while in 2017 there were only 800. The smuggling of high profit goods (excise goods,20 cigarettes, and weapons) is a continuous risk, due to the constant demand and value of products on the black market, and Montenegro is assessed as a major hub for cigarette smuggling in the EU (European Commission 2019b), both smuggling legitimate and ‘fake’ brands. The Western Balkan is on route between the world biggest producer of opium (Afghanistan), and the biggest market for heroin (Western Europe), which makes Montenegro a significant transit point within the so-called ‘Balkan route’. Being part of the Western Balkan region and with its small mountainous territory and seaports, Montenegro is particularly attractive for trafficking various commodities and illicit goods such as drugs, weapons, and human beings. The Montenegrin OCGs are part of transnational crime and use the territory of Montenegro to traffic drugs coming from Asia and Latin America (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime 2019). One of the main organised criminal activities in Montenegro is drug-related, namely the production of cannabis and the

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trafficking of various drugs, primarily cannabis and cocaine. In that regard, the number of drug-related seizures shows an ascending trend, as in 2016 there were more than twice as many cases (815) as in 2015 (383) (Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova Crne Gore 2017), while this trend continued further in 2017 and 2018 respectively (CDM 2019). There are two main categories of drug trafficking in Montenegro: Smuggling within the country and local distribution on the one hand, and transnational smuggling via the Balkan route, as well as distribution to Western Europe, on the other hand. As cocaine is the most prominent drug smuggled in Montenegro, OCGs from Montenegro cooperate closely with their peers from Serbia and Croatia and are sometimes also members of international OCGs. Seizures of cocaine peaked in 2014 (228 kg), before falling in 2016 (0.3 kg), and then rising again to 35 kg in 2018 (UNODC 2020), while in 2019 more than 90 kg of cocaine were seized (31.5 and 60 kg respectively) in just two raids (Anadolu Agency 2019). According to the SOCTA 2017 report, there are 11 criminal gangs in Montenegro involved in international drug smuggling, which is a drop from 20 reported in SOCTA 2013 (Vlada Crne Gore 2017a). When it comes to the total illegal drug trade, according to a media report about 15% of the total amount of narcotics smuggled through Montenegro remains in the local market for consumption (RTCG 2014). Undoubtedly, cybersecurity is a challenge of the modern age, and as such it has not bypassed Montenegro either. As regards external threats, Montenegro is affected by an increasing number of cyber incidents, through various ways and means, namely ransomware campaigns, DDoS attacks on state infrastructure, various internet frauds, etc. (Vlada Crne Gore 2017b). The number of these cyber incidents is increasing significantly, as Montenegrin society is becoming more digitalised. Regarding the development of information technologies and cybersecurity, based on the UN International Telecommunication Union (ITU) report, Montenegro is ranked 87th out of 182 countries on the Global Cybersecurity Index for 2020. In the same report, looked at from a regional perspective, Montenegro is ranked 41st out of 45 European countries (Global Cybersecurity Index 2020). Based on a national analysis, Montenegrin society is increasingly targeted by cybersecurity incidents, on par with global trends. There have been several attacks on IT infrastructure and on internet service providers, as well as on the banking sector. In 2015, Montenegro started facing numerous state-sponsored cyberattacks, which was a novelty that caught institutions off guard to a degree. According to information provided by respectable international tech research companies, Montenegro was hit by the cyber group APT28 (‘Fancy Bear’), linked to the Russian military intelligence service GRU (Tomović and Zivanović 2018). With this novel cyber campaign against Montenegrin institutions, there was an increase from 22 similar incidents registered in 2013, to more than 400 in approximately 9 months in 2017. Afterwards, this cyber campaign was replaced by hybrid actions, predominantly framed around information operation campaigns, targeting various political, economic, and social sectors. Although Montenegro started with cybersecurity-related legislation as early as 2010, more specific steps were made in reaction to serious threats posed by

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groups such as APT28. With the second iteration of Cybersecurity Strategy (2018–21), Montenegro identified key principles that will contribute to the alignment of the terminology, methods, policies, and procedures with those seen in European and international standards, namely cyber defence capacities, centralisation of cyber expertise and resources, protection of critical information infrastructure, cross-institutional cooperation, data protection, cybersecurity education, public-private partnership, and regional and international cooperation (Vlada Crne Gore 2017b). The country is experiencing interference caused by a few external state actors. In the first place is Russia, which always seeks channels to influence policymaking in Montenegro. Russia has been actively using historical narratives in its attempt to revive the historical role of the Russian Empire. Russia is appealing to the late nineteenth-century key partnership with Montenegro, as it was the defender and ‘protector’ of its Slavic and Orthodox brethren in Montenegro. Today, Russia defends its Slavic brethren from the West and makes powerful appeals to a common Slavic identity and Orthodox culture to wield greater influence in Montenegro (CSIS 2019). Despite Montenegro’s pro-Western orientation and NATO accession, Russia continues to have substantial political and economic influence in the country. It persists in pressuring and influencing political processes in Montenegro using various tools, based on the Soviet tradition of instruments of so-called ‘active measures’ that are a combination of disinformation, penetration, provocation, and reflexive control (CSIS 2020). ‘Active measures’ was a term used by the Soviet Union (USSR)21 from the 1950s onwards to describe a gamut of covert and deniable political influence and subversion operations, including (but not limited to) the establishment of front organisations, the backing of friendly political movements, the orchestration of domestic unrest, and the spread of disinformation. Once traditionally good relations between the two countries have become tense over the past years, mainly due to several major events. Firstly, Montenegro joined the EU countries in imposing sanctions against Russia in 2014 over its annexation of Crimea and decided to go hand in hand with other non-EU member states to expel Russian diplomats after the “Skripal” incident.22 Secondly, some Russian nationals were suspected of plotting the failed coup attempt of 2016, and thirdly Montenegro joined NATO in 2017 (Tomović 2017). Beyond the political domain, Russia uses the economy as a tool to extend its influence. Contrary to some other Western Balkan countries, Moscow’s economic influence in Montenegro does not rely solely on Russian energy resources. In the economic sphere, sources of Russian influence in Montenegro are in the corporate economy, trade, and tourism. The most notable influx of Russian capital happened immediately after independence in 2006, when aluminium tycoon Oleg Deripaska purchased the largest state factory Aluminium Plant (KAP) (Centre for the Study of Democracy 2020). Russian participation in the economy of Montenegro decreased from 29.4% in 2006 to 3% in 2018. This was likely due to Russia pulling out of the KAP, which in 2005 represented 15% of the total GDP. The same happened to the Iron Factory in Nikšić and several other

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projects in heavy industry. Additionally, Montenegro’s nominal GDP significantly increased from 2.15 billion euros in 2006 to 4.95 billion euros in 2019 (MONSTAT Report 2020). According to the data from the Montenegrin Investment Promotion Agency (MIPA) for 2016, Russia was the second single largest direct investor in Montenegro, contributing 52.8 million euros in foreign direct investment (FDI). The data from the Statistical Office of Montenegro (MONSTAT) for 2015 show that 32% of foreign-owned companies in the country belonged to Russian citizens. Russians also possess large amounts of property in Montenegro and significantly contribute to the travel and tourism industry (Kajošević 2020). Thanks to visa-free travel, Russians are the second most frequent visitors and income from the Russian tourists play an enormous role for Montenegro national economy (Center for the Study of Democracy 2020). However, trade between the two countries is not significant, as Montenegro does not depend on Russian energy resources. Ever since the Russian annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the number of pro-Russian media outlets in Montenegro has been on the rise. Their main role is to disseminate Moscow’s agenda and pro-Russian sentiments by using local journalists and their own resources (Tomović 2017). The pro-Russian media in Montenegro can be divided into three groups: Online media, printed media, and radio. Unsurprisingly, the number of pro-Russian media outlets increased at the time when Montenegro was negotiating for NATO membership. Around this time, the ‘Sputnik’ agency, the online outlet ‘News Front’, and the website ‘Russia Beyond the Headlines’ opened their headquarters in Belgrade and engaged contributors from Podgorica. According to the Ministry of Culture of Montenegro, 15 printed media outlets in the Russian language have been registered in Montenegro since 2006 (Tomović 2017). In addition, “Russkoye Radio” (Russian radio station) also broadcasts in Montenegro. The second most influential player is China. Although Chinese presence in Montenegro has visibly increased in recent years, it is predominantly framed within the economic domain, with no interference in the Montenegrin political spectrum. Like other Western Balkan states, Montenegro plays an important role for China within their strategic corridor ‘Land-Sea Express’. Additionally, Montenegro has direct access to the sea, which poses a significant strategic advantage that China might be interested in using (Semanić 2019). The perception of China as a promising economic partner appears to obscure the awareness of all other forms of Chinese presence. Not much attention is paid to China’s cultural influence, which tends to be underrated in contrast to its economic influence. At the very beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, all Balkan countries struggled to obtain the most basic protective materials and equipment needed to deal with the new health threat (Latal 2020). China reacted swiftly, donating much-needed medical equipment to Montenegro. Economic cooperation between Montenegro and China is primarily focused on the development of infrastructure projects, specifically ‘17+1’ and the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI) (Brînză 2021).

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In 2014, Montenegro successfully concluded negotiations with Chinese partners to finance a highway project which would connect the Montenegrin coastal city of Bar with Serbia’s capital, Belgrade. The agreement included a 944 million US dollar loan from the Exim Bank with an annual interest rate of 2% and a six-year grace period, making the project the biggest in Montenegro since its independence in 2006. Even though the project was deemed economically unviable by two feasibility studies, Montenegro decided to move forward with it, causing the country’s debt-to-GDP ratio to peak at 105% of GDP in 2020, compared to 79% in 2019. The size of the loan was incredibly disproportionate to the size of the economy (Radio Slobodna Evropa 2014). This represents the biggest threat for Montenegro, one which is pessimistically labelled as ‘China’s debt trap’ (Deutsche Welle 2020), thus ensuring access to strategic infrastructure and, indirectly, the possibility of political influence. Chinese FDI in Montenegro has seen a rapid increase in the last several years. According to Montenegrin Central Bank data for 2020, China was the biggest investor with more than 70 million euros of FDI (Bankar 2020). In February 2015, China established the first ‘Confucius Institute’ in Montenegro, with the aim of promoting Chinese culture and language, connecting individuals and institutions dealing with Chinese language and culture, as well as organising various cultural and educational activities between the two countries. Additionally, Chinese language courses are offered at universities and in schools, not only in Podgorica, but also in several other towns. Both actors have an interest in having a dominating influence in Montenegro, and with their actions do not contribute to the stability and cohesion of the country. Beside malign Russian influence which seeks to exploit weaknesses and societal divisions within Montenegrin society (Conley 2019), Chinese influence poses a threat to the national infrastructure (Port of Bar) which is in danger if Montenegro is unable to repay Chinese loans (Deutsche Welle 2020).23 According to the US Center for Global Development, Montenegro is labelled as a ‘significant risk’ in terms of debt-to-GDP ratio, and it is among the countries that are at the greatest risk of falling into China’s ‘debt trap’. A positive development in an attempt to control Chinese debt was made in July 2021, as Montenegro managed to arrange a credit currency swap with two US and one French bank, which will help with lowering the overall debt for this loan, but will be less affected by EUR-USD exchange rate fluctuations.

The European Path and Potentials for Stabilisation and Cohesion The surest path for the stability and cohesion of Montenegro is to shortly become a member of the EU, which is the key for addressing both the internal and external threats we have analysed. The slow negotiation process and the country’s façade reforms have not discouraged Montenegrin citizens, who strongly support European integration. Based on recent polls from late 2020, the rate of support for EU membership is 74.8%, and 77.6% of the citizens have a positive attitude towards the EU (Vlada Crne Gore 2021). Since Montenegro joined NATO in June 2017, EU accession remains a key objective of national foreign policy. Although the processes of EU integration had

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already started back in the period of the state union with Serbia, their compliance and procedural form were only clearly profiled in the period after independence, with a more prominent focus on political aspects. The Declaration of Independence emphasises commitment to EU and Euro-Atlantic integration and determination to strengthen regional security and stability. In November 2006, Montenegro defined five key foreign policy priorities, the most significant ones being integration into the EU and NATO. In October 2007, Montenegro signed the ‘Stabilisation and Association Agreement’, officially starting work on obligations from the integration agenda, such as the harmonisation of legislation and strengthening of national capacities. In June 2021, nine years had already passed since Montenegro officially started negotiations, although two key chapters concerning the rule of law had already been opened at an early stage of the negotiations in December 2013. The reasons for this protracted process are the EU’s ‘new approach’ to the accession process, and the fact that major challenges are always identified in official EU reports. Reforms in the fundamental areas where weaknesses were observed by the European Commission (fight against corruption, fight against organised crime, and freedom of expression), need to be accelerated and accomplished very soon. The biggest challenge to the efficient fight against corruption has been identified as a lack of political will and a lack of robust criminal justice in response to highlevel corruption (European Commission 2019a). However, under the new government, the pace of reforms is expected to accelerate. In the opinion of two very active civil society activists (Muk 2019; Marović 2019), the negotiation process failed to meet expectations, compared to the resources invested by the EU and other international and local actors. Also, owing to a lack of interest in true transformation, the previous regime was not ready for the adoption of EU standards, as it is said that change only happens when the interests and monopoly of powerful individuals (politicians and businessmen) are not jeopardised (Muk 2019). Moreover, it is considered that corruption at all levels of society is the main reason for slow Europeanisation. Only limited results in the fight against corruption have been achieved because only the technical preconditions for combating corruption were fulfilled. In addition, there was a lack of political will and a lack of determination of political elites to get rid of undemocratic practice, as well as a lack of a rule of law culture (Marović 2019). Fostering and speeding up integration is not only essential to the political stabilisation and security of Montenegro, but could also contribute to resolving the fundamental issues outlined above and securing a general political consensus for EU membership, which could reduce tensions and create the conditions for reconciliation and social resilience. In this way, state and non-state actors will also have fewer opportunities to exert external influence.

Conclusion The interconnection between security threats exists in all Western Balkan countries, which are exhausted by the lengthy delay of reforms and non-resistance to destabilisation. The greatest number of threats clearly originates from inter-ethnic tensions. These are indeed the most vulnerable issue in the Western Balkans,

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especially bearing in mind the fact that memories of the ethnic conflicts of the 1990s are still alive. It is precisely lack of reconciliation and lack of trust (Injac 2014) that cause inter-ethnic tensions in all countries of the region. Due to the specificity of Montenegro’s internal threats, especially those from the political and social spectrum, there is a danger that these could reflect on the whole region. Also, Montenegro exports threats of organised crime because Montenegrin OCGs are famous for smuggling drugs, weapons, cigarettes, and other products. Their influence in all Western Balkans is considerable, which could affect the political stability of neighbouring countries. In recent years, a large number of murders committed by OCG members from Montenegro have been recorded in other countries in the region, so that the security of other countries in the region is already adversely affected. The prospects for security in Montenegro depend on the progress of reforms to fight corruption and organised crime. Those reforms will certainly reflect positively on neighbouring countries. In addition, regime change in Montenegro after 30 years of DPS rule has led to the assumption that the country is moving in the right direction. This trend could increase motivation and also strengthen the determination to intensify negotiations with the EU. This is a critical moment when it must be realised that all countries in the Western Balkans are responsible for each other’s security and stability. Internal national security threats in Montenegro are intensified by the captured state system, because power in the country had not changed hands for 30 years, which caused the multiplication of corruption, cronyism, control over institutions, institutional weakness of the police and judiciary, and inefficient rule of law. The long-term regime has not only influenced control over the instruments of power, but also encouraged political tensions and forced constant usage of identity issues for political purposes, which significantly influenced the stability and security of Montenegro. In the context of political security, political, ethnic, and social tensions are prominent, and Montenegrin society remains deeply politically divided. Political tensions fortunately did not result in violent acts, while in 2016 on parliamentary election day the regime discovered a coup attempt; according to the Special Prosecutor’s Office, the goal was to prevent Montenegro from joining NATO and to overthrow the government. After independence in 2006, the regime failed to seize the opportunity to continue on the development and stability path. In the years prior to and after NATO accession in 2017, instead of democracy, the country turned to autocracy, kleptocracy, and anarchy, and distinguished international actors reported that Montenegro had become a ‘hybrid regime’. As a consequence, the country was affected by an increase in organised crime, corruption, and attacks on journalists who were investigating organised crime and corruption. The lack of objective media coverage and partiality in reporting on political topics, but also challenges posed by disinformation and fake news distributed by media which support DPS, create additional obstacles to political stability and thus to national security. The fact is that the political, social, and economic weaknesses of Montenegro make the country acutely susceptible to external threats (cybercrime, drug trafficking, terrorism and extremism, illegal migration and human trafficking, smuggling

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of excise goods and cigarettes, arms smuggling, and hybrid activities of state or non-state actors), but also to external influence framed by the economic and political interests of great powers (Russia and China). Even though the health and economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have not impacted national stability, they do pose a threat to social security, because they caused an increase in the unemployment rate. Montenegro’s path to stability and cohesion is to become soon a fully fledged EU member. Citizens strongly support EU integration and consider it as a guarantee for the country’s future. For last three decades, national stability has been exposed to constant turbulence, due to political and ethnic tensions, as well as the growth of corruption, organised crime, and foreign influences. Without doubt, Montenegro has not built democratic resilience yet, which is a key condition for national security and stability.

Notes 1 The Democratic Party of Socialists was formed on 22 June 1991 as the successor of the League of Communists of Montenegro. 2 There was a change of regime following the parliamentary elections held in August 2020, as three coalitions won with an absolute majority, so that the DPS did not get the opportunity to garner a majority in parliament. 3 This refers to the constant forcing of divisions between Montenegrins and Serbs, and themes which refer to their identities, such as the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Montenegrin Orthodox Church. 4 After the election, the opposition parties (DPS, SD, and SDP) perpetuated the earlier discourse in which the DPS and satellite parties are portrayed as protectors of the Montenegrin nation and the independence of Montenegro. For them, all opposing parties and the government are considered as enemies of the state, and they radicalise their supporters through nationalistic feelings and aggressively labelling every decision and move of the government as a betrayal or an attack on the state. 5 Slobodan Milošević was president of the Presidency of Serbia 1989–91, president of Serbia 1991–7, and president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (constituted by two republics, namely Serbia and Montenegro) 1997–2000. During his 1997–2000 presidency, Milošević played a role in the political and security situation in Montenegro, which was obvious through the tensions and sporadic incidents in which the Army of Yugoslavia had a crucial role, for example in early 2000 when troops were provocatively deployed at strategic sites such as border crossings, airports, and roads throughout Montenegro. 6 From March to June 1999, NATO carried out an intervention in the form of an air bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) caused by the involvement of Yugoslav armed forces in the Kosovo ethnic conflict. 7 Milo Đukanović is the longest-lasting Montenegrin politician. He has been in power for three decades. Since 2018, Đukanović has been president of the state; this is his second mandate, as he also served as president in the period 1998–2002. Đukanović was also four times in the position of Premier (1991–8, 2003–06, 2008–10, and 2012–16). 8 It was the pro-independence bloc, or ‘independists’ who supported state independence, and ‘unionists’ who supported the continuation of the union with Serbia. 9 This refers to the controversial plotting of the ‘coup d’état’, discovered by security services on the day of the parliamentary elections in Montenegro in October 2016. The suspects are citizens of Serbia, Russian secret service agents, and two Montenegrin opposition leaders.

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10 The Montenegrin Orthodox Church was re-established in the 1990s and registered as an NGO. Until the twentieth century, the church was autocephalous and, based on this historical legacy, there was strong advocacy for the re-establishment of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church from the Liberal Alliance of Montenegro (Liberalni savez Cerne Gore) and liberal political activists who wanted the church to be the central pillar of Montenegrin national identity and national unity. 11 After the 2016 parliamentary elections until the next elections held in August of 2020, the DPS was in a coalition with the Social Democrats, the Liberal Party, the Bosniak Party, Albanian parties, and the party of the Croatian minority (the Croatian Civic Initiative). 12 Two identities which have symbolic differences, but are opposed in the political context of Montenegro. These two identities represent the identity of ethnic Serbs or Montenegrins, and partly include religious issues (Serbian or Montenegrin Orthodox Church), language (Serbian or Montenegrin), historic legacy, and traditions. Unfortunately, the issue of national identity has been used for political purposes and ethnic divisions (‘us’ vs ‘them’) and specific attitudes towards the state. The most serious threats to societal security in Montenegro are unresolved identity divisions. 13 In June 2020 the Parliament of Montenegro passed by a two-thirds majority the Resolution which bans the denial of the Srebrenica genocide. The Resolution was voted in coordination with the opposition (DPS, SD, and others), which provoked strong reactions from the parliamentary Serbian nationalistic parties (Democratic Front – DF) and from the authorities of Serbia and the Republic of Srpska, as well as from all those who deny the genocide in Srebrenica. 14 The 1997 political crisis and split within the DPS was induced by the interruption of relations between Montenegrin Premier Milo Đukanović and Slobodan Milosević, which was followed by the political breakup between the two DPS leaders, Momir Bulatović and Milo Đukanović. 15 The adoption of the Law on the Freedom of Religion and Belief and the Legal Status of Religious Communities in 2019 drove citizens to express their dissatisfaction by protesting for months because it was construed as an attempt by the government to seize the property of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Montenegro. This awakened the hitherto restrained civic consciousness that had suffered for a long time, and it attracted overwhelming support from the citizens, which later turned into a revolt against the current government. 16 Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA) is a national strategic document which presents an overview of the key risks in the field of serious and organised crime. 17 The case of ‘Atlas Bank’ is one of the biggest and most complex cases of corruption and money laundering ever discovered in Montenegro. The chief suspect is the bank owner, who had close relations with the DPS regime. 18 In 2008, the Montenegrin government decided to recognise Kosovo, although there were at the time mounting political tensions between supporters and opponents of the recognition. For instance, four pro-Serbian opposition parties staged massive protests against the recognition of Kosovo, attended by thousands of citizens. 19 The protests or ‘litije’ against the Law not only motivated citizens to overthrow the DPS regime which passed the Law, but also encouraged opposition parties to be united for parliamentary elections. 20 Excise goods are alcohol, cigarettes, mineral oils, and derivatives. 21 In Russian ‘Aktivnye meropriyatiya’. 22 On 4 March 2018, a former Russian military intelligence (GRU) officer and his daughter were found seriously ill on a bench in Salisbury, UK. They had been poisoned by a nerve agent in an attack ‘almost certainly’ approved by the Russian state. The British investigative group ‘Bellingcat’ identified two perpetrators as operatives of the Russian GRU, namely Alexander Mishkin and Anatoly Chepiga, who entered the UK under aliases: Alexander Petrov and Ruslan Boshirov

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23 The example of the ‘ugly’ side of ‘debt trap diplomacy’ is the Sri Lankan port of Hambantota. China pushed Sri Lanka into borrowing money from Chinese banks to pay for the project, which had no prospect of commercial success. Eventually, several difficulties to pay for the loan pushed Sri Lanka into default, at which point Beijing demanded the port as a collateral (The Atlantic 2021).

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Pavlović, Koča. 2015. “Montenegro and the EU: Living on the Frontline.” Open Democracy. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/montenegro-and -eu-living-on-frontline/. Portal Bankar. 2020. Kina ubjedljivo najveci investitor u Crnoj Gori, tajna gdje je ulozila 70 miliona, October 20. https://www.bankar.me/2020/10/20/kina-ubjedljivo-najveci -investitor-u-crnoj-gori-tajna-gdje-je-ulozila-70-miliona/. Radio Slobodna Evropa. 2011. Objavljeni rezultati popisa: Crnogoraca više, Srba manje nego prije, July 12. https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/objavljeni_rezultati_popisa _crnogoraca_vise_srba_manje_nego_prije/24263402.html. Radio Slobodna Evropa. 2014. Autoput Bar – Boljare: Ugovor sa kompanijama sa crne liste Svjetske banke, November 2. https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/autoput-bar -boljane-ugovor-sa-kompanijama-/26672288.html. Radio Televizija Crne Gore – RTCG. 2014. Fifteen Clans Trade Drugs in Montenegro. Podgorica: RTCG, March 4, 2014. http://www.rtcg.me/english/montenegro/43750/15 -clans-trades-drugs-in-montenegro.html. Semanić, Hana. 2019. “Country Report Montenegro.” In Western Balkans at the Crossroads: Assessing Influences of Non-Western External Actors, edited by Barbora Chrzová, Anja Grabovac, Martin Hála, and Jan Lalić. Prague: The Prague Security Studies Institute. Stojanović, Milica. 2020. “Freedom House: Serbia, Montenegro, Hungary “No Longer Democracies”.” Balkan Insight, May 6. https://balkaninsight.com/2020/05/06/freedom -house-serbia-montenegro-hungary-no-longer-democracies/. Stojarova,Vera. 2020. “Moving Towards EU Membership and Away from Liberal Democracy.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 20 (1): 221–236. Tomović, Dušica. 2017. “Pro-Russian Montenegrins Publish New Anti-Western Media.” Balkan Insight, October 18. https://balkaninsight.com/2017/10/18/pro-russian -montenegrins-publish-new-anti-western-media-10-17-2017/. Tomović, Dušica, and Maja, Zivanović. 2018. “Crna Gora na meti sajber špijuna: iz Rusije sa virusom.” Balkan Insight, March 5. https://balkaninsight.com/2018/03/05/crna-gora -na-meti-sajber-spijuna-iz-rusije-sa-virusom-03-01-2018/?lang=sr. United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime. 2011. Corruption in Montenegro: Bribery as Experienced by the Population. Vienna: UNODC. United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime. 2020. Measuring Organized Crime in the Western Balkans. Vienna: UNODC. https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and -analysis/OC/Measuring-OC-in-WB.pdf. Vlada Crne Gore. 2017a. SOCTA. Podgorica: Biro za operativnu koordinaciju. Vlada Crne Gore. 2017b. Strategija sajber bezbjednosti Crne Gore 2018–2021. Podgorica: Ministarstvo javne uprave Crne Gore. Vlada Crne Gore. 2018a. Strategija nacionalne bezbjednosti. Podgorica: Skupština Crne Gore. Vlada Crne Gore. 2018b. Strategijski pregled odbrane. Podgorica: Ministarstvo odbrane Crne Gore. Vlada Crne Gore. 2021. Veliki rast podrške članstvu Crne Gore u Evropskoj uniji. https:// www.gov.me/clanak/237641--veliki-rast-podrske-clanstvu-crne-gore-u-evropskoj -uniji. Zúñiga, Nieves. 2020. Examining State Capture: Undue Influence on Law-Making and the Judiciary in the Western Balkans and Turkey. https://images.transparencycdn.org/ images/2020_Report_ExaminingStateCapture_English.pdf.

Part 2

Regional Level

8

Military Dynamics, Conventional Arms Control, and Regional Security in the Western Balkans Filip Ejdus, Tijana Rečević and Marko Kovačević

Introduction1 In early 2016 media headlines were flooded with warnings about the looming arms race and threatened military balance in the Western Balkans established by the Florence Agreement some two decades earlier. Signed between the countries of the former Yugoslavia in 1996, as an obligation proposed by Annex 1-B of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), the Florence Agreement established the regional military balance in the Western Balkans. Moreover, it made all future efforts towards building regional peace and security possible. Perhaps paradoxically – since it regulates military relations that are often considered the most sensitive issues in every sovereign, let alone post-conflict state – this became one of the most successful aspects of the DPA. Even after its ‘mother agreement’, the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, started collapsing (Zellner 2012; Stefanović 2021), the sub-regional conventional arms control regime in the Western Balkans endured, keeping potential arms races and military securitisations off the table on which domestic and international stakeholders were trying to build a security community. Nevertheless, when recurring announcements by the Croatian and Serbian officials on the upcoming military upgrade aroused a cycle of military securitisations across the region, scholarly and policy circles rushed to see if this ‘discrete hero’ of regional security was indeed threatened and in need of fixing. Triggered by the events which point to both the resilience and vulnerability of the regional CAC established by the Florence Agreement, this chapter investigates the evolution of regional security in the Western Balkans and its implications for military dynamics since the end of the Yugoslav wars. While the literature on regional security in the Western Balkans is relatively rich, there has been a surprising lack of attention to its ‘hard’ dimension and the connectedness of military relations with the political, economic, societal, and other layers of regional and wider security regimes that intersect in this region. We, therefore, unpack the complex security developments in the Western Balkans by investigating the nexus between its military dynamics, reflected in its CAC regime, with the broader patterns of the region’s security transformation.2 Relying on the literature on different forms and levels of regional security cooperation (Deutsch 1957; Adler, Barnett and Smith 1998; Buzan DOI: 10.4324/9781003276661-10

130 Filip Ejdus, Tijana Rečević, Marko Kovačević and Wæver 2003), as well as on the literature about the international stakeholders’ role in it, we argue that post-war military dynamics in the Western Balkans have been strongly shaped by the strength of Euro-Atlantic penetration in the region. Initially intense penetration and overlay of NATO and the EU pushed the region to move from a conflict formation to a security regime (1995–2001), and even towards a nascent security community (2002–13), thus creating conditions for the successful conclusion and implementation of the Florence Agreement. Nevertheless, the recent disarray in this Euro-Atlantic overlay (2014–), followed by a stalemate in solving open regional issues and continued democratic backsliding in most countries, has put the Agreement on a test. Analysing the recent worrying trends, reflected in the heated rhetoric of the arms race, the rising military budgets, and military modernisation, we, however, conclude that the regional balance of power and the CAC regime have not yet been undermined. Nevertheless, by pointing towards looming threats to its spirit and weaknesses of its letter, we also warn against any excessive optimism concerning the risk of an arms race in this still volatile region. The structure of the chapter corresponds to three major phases of the evolving security and military dynamics in the Western Balkans. The first section deals with the region’s transformation from a conflict zone to a security regime during the stabilisation phase (1995–2001), marked by creating the sub-regional conventional arms control (CAC) regime. The chapter then analyses the consolidation phase (2002–13), when the region embarked on security community building, while the CAC regime was fully implemented and transferred to regional ownership. The third section focuses on the ongoing backsliding phase (2014–), unpacking the relapse of tensions and military securitisations that halt the building of the Western Balkans security community. After analysing developments in global affairs that marked the beginning of this phase, the section discusses whether the growing rhetoric of arms race and military build-up that has followed over the past six years have undermined the regional balance of power and its CAC regime.

Stabilisation (1995–2001) For most of Europe, the end of the Cold War was an event that brought peace and prosperity. In the Balkans, it led to the implosion of the Yugoslav Federation and a string of vicious wars for the Yugoslav succession. They started with a short armed conflict in Slovenia in 1991, continued with more protracted wars in Croatia (1991–5) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–5), ending with the war in Kosovo (1998–9) and armed conflict in FYROM (2001).3 The human toll of the wars was devastating, with approximately 140,000 dead and 4 million displaced people (ICTJ 2009). With shattered economies, war-torn societies, and regimes that were democratic only on paper, it was clear that rebuilding regional security would be neither straightforward nor linear. Since domestic drivers and resources for rebuilding regional peace were weak and scarce, the embarkment on stabilisation and post-conflict reconstruction

Military Security 131 occurred under the close guidance of the West. The cornerstones of the new security regime were laid by a set of peace accords – the DPA put an end to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995, the Erdut Agreement in Croatia in 1995, UNSC Resolution 1244 and the Kumanovo Agreement ended the war in Kosovo in 1999, as well as the Ohrid Framework Agreement which concluded the conflict in FYROM in 2001.4 The conclusion and the implementation of these agreements were made possible by the heavy diplomatic, military, and economic interventions of the UN, NATO, the EU, and their member states. Trusting ‘international civil and security presence’ with different peacebuilding tasks aimed at deterring renewed hostilities, these peace agreements served as a blueprint of a strong and long-lasting influence of key international actors in regional security dynamics. While NATO was in charge of hard military security of the region with its presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR) and Kosovo (KFOR), the EU took the responsibility to guide the political and economic transformation of the region (Ejdus and Kovačević 2019). In 1999, the EU coined the Western Balkans term to encompass the western part of the Balkan peninsula with countries that remained outside of the EU integration process – all former Yugoslav states, minus Slovenia plus Albania. The same year, the EU initiated the establishment of the Cologne-based Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe, with three working tables focusing on democratisation, economy, and security (Vučetic 2001). This and many following regional institutions and fora which the EU directly incentivised (Đukanović 2020, 143–164; Lopandić and Kronja 2011) were part of its ‘regional approach’ to the Western Balkans that aimed to bridge the bilateral relations which countries had with the EU and each other, hoping to foster not only a consolidated security regime but also the Western Balkans security community (Žarin 2007; Elbasani 2008). Recognising how important military balance and transparency are in the aftermath of war and how quickly the security dilemma can break the volatile peace, the aspect of the new security regime which this chapter focuses on is the CAC regime in the Western Balkans. Its foundation was laid by the DPA, which, besides its provisions on the government structure in Bosnia and Herzegovina, also contained provisions about regional stability. This was elaborated in Annex 1B to the DPA in which parties acknowledged that the ‘establishment of progressive measures for regional stability and arms control is essential to creating a stable peace in the region’ (DPA 1996, Annex 1-B, Article I). By binding the parties to establish confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Article II), sub-regional arms control measures among the states of the former Yugoslavia (Article IV), and wider regional arms control measures in the Balkans (Article V), the international brokers of these provisions were hoping to foster the mutual trust of warring parties in each other military intentions, without which the rest of the peacebuilding efforts were destined to fail. Article II was subsequently specified by the Vienna Agreement signed on 26 January 1996 and fully implemented in 2006 after Bosnia and Herzegovina integrated its defence system. The ambitious Article V aspired to establish ‘a regional balance in and around the former Yugoslavia’ but was never implemented. This is so mainly

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because many South-Eastern European countries were already parties to some (the CFE included) conventional arms control regimes and were not ready to commit to any additional military reductions.5 The remaining Article IV, aimed at establishing the sub-regional arms control regime, soon became the first post-war agreement on the military relations between the Western Balkan countries and the only regional arms control arrangement operating below the pan-European level. Acknowledging that ‘balanced and stable defence force levels at the lowest numbers consistent with their respective security’ and ‘the establishment of a stable military balance based on the lowest level of armaments will be an essential element in preventing the recurrence of conflict’ (Annex 1B, Article IV, 1), the parties agreed to start negotiations within 30 days, under the auspices of the OSCE and based on the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE). After six months of negotiations in Budapest, London, New York, Bonn, and Vienna, the Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control was signed on 14 June 1996 in Florence, which is why this Article IV Agreement is also known as the Florence Agreement. It was signed by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), the two entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Croatia, and witnessed by contact group countries (France, Germany, Russia, Italy, the UK, and the US).6 Such a wide international ‘co-sponsorship’ was yet another signal of major powers’ strong commitment to imposing and vigilantly monitoring the newly established arms balance in the Western Balkans region. The Agreement, consisting of the Preamble, 15 Articles, and 6 Protocols, came into force upon signature and is of unlimited duration. Mirroring the CFE Treaty that aimed to create a military balance among all participating states from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains through obligatory reductions in heavy weapons, the Florence Agreement established ceilings in the same five categories of conventional armaments: Battle tanks, artillery pieces, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, and armoured combat vehicles. Drawing on Article IV of the DPA, the Agreement establishes force levels for the FRY, Croatia, and BiH according to a ratio of 5:2:2. In absolute terms, in Article IV, each party was called to reduce its conventional armaments up to a certain percentage of the baseline defined as ‘determined holdings of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’ in 1996. This percentage was 75% of the baseline for the FRY, 30% of the baseline for Croatia, and 30% of the baseline for BiH.7 Although these ceilings were defined already by the DPA, they were further specified by the Florence Agreement by setting a precise numerical limit for each of the five categories of conventional weapons. Every surplus of weapons had to be destroyed, converted for civilian use, or exported. The limits on holdings are subject to a verification regime also similar to that of the CFE Treaty. To ensure compliance with the provisions, the Agreement introduced a verification system through notification, exchange of information, and an intrusive inspection regime. Information was to be exchanged annually by 15 December each year while each party had ‘the right to conduct and the obligation to accept within the area of application, inspections’ (Article 9, section 1) to verify and monitor the compliance and implementation of the agreement. According

Military Security 133 to the Florence Agreement, parties also created the Sub-Regional Consultative Commission (SRCC), composed of representatives of each party and the Personal Representative (PR) of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office tasked to handle compliance issues and differences that might arise during implementation, to revise and draw up additional measures to enhance its workability, and to take appropriate steps in the event of a dispute. It has the power to amend the agreement, but its decisions require consensus. Finally, the parties also agreed to convene Review Conferences at least once every two years. The agreement was quickly and successfully implemented. Information exchanged by the parties on their holdings, effective as of 1 July 1996, was the basis for the four-month baseline validation period for inspections, while the reduction period began on 1 November. During the first 16 months of the ‘reduction phase’, parties reduced 6,580 armaments and managed to reach their set ceilings. By November 1997, provisions from Article IV of the DPA on the regional balance of forces were fully implemented in a timely manner (Jopp 2000, 344). Moreover, the parties decided to reduce the level of arms far beyond the proposed ceilings, continuously exchanging information. It was beneficial for confidence, transparency, and stability in the Western Balkan region. Since then, in the course of the next 15 years, an additional 2,500 reductions have been made. While not open to the wider public, the meetings of the countries’ military officials were also regularly held. They were never followed by incidents, mutual public accusations of cheating, or announcements which would in any way challenge the importance or success of the Florence Agreement (Jopp 2000; Rothbacher 2001; Vetschera 2009). While the implementation process can undoubtedly be considered a success story, some minor challenges did occasionally occur. First, during the initial reduction phase, there were minor misunderstandings, allegedly due to different methods of calculations between parties to the contract, i.e., the manpower limits declared by the Federation of BiH and the Republika Srpska did not add up to those declared by BiH as a whole (Vetschera 2009). This challenge was solved with the assistance of German data experts and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in a mediator’s role. Another problem emerged during the Kosovo War, when the government of Yugoslavia declared suspension of the Agreement for its territory in April 1999. However, although other parties did not accept this move, they informally agreed to postpone planned activities until the hostilities were over (Jopp 2000, 345). FRY pledged to resume the implementation of the Florence Agreement in July 1999, a month after the end of the war and its withdrawal from the Kosovo province according to UNSC 1244 and the Kumanovo Military-Technical Agreement (Boese 1999). In sum, during the stabilisation phase, the region saw the establishment of a Western-supervised security regime in the Western Balkans. The cornerstones of this regime were the peace agreements that put an end to the armed conflicts and drew a blueprint of a complex interplay between the domestic and international actors in the regional security architecture. One of its core aspects is the sub-regional CAC regime, whose foundations were laid in the DPA and further

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developed in the CFE-inspired Florence Agreement. In the years that followed, the Agreement was smoothly implemented, promising to become one of the most successful parts of the otherwise shaky DPA (Ejdus 2012). Nevertheless, while heavy international presence and emerging trust of former warring parties in each other’s military intentions made relapse to conflict very unlikely, the recurrence of violence was still not entirely unimaginable. To reach such a stage, the region embarked on the next consolidation phase to build a veritable security community.

Consolidation (2002–13) The death of Croatian President Tuđman (December 1999) and the fall of FRY President Milošević (October 2000) facilitated the onset of democratic transition in the region. Accelerating their democratic reforms, both countries as well paved the way for further consolidation of regional peace. The EU summit in Zagreb thus concluded that these changes opened ‘the way for regional reconciliation and cooperation’, ‘strengthen regional security and are bound to assist the conclusion by the countries concerned of the negotiations on weapons control and reduction at the regional level, as provided for in the Dayton agreements’ (European Commission 2000). Three years later, in Thessaloniki, the EU unequivocally opened full membership prospects for the countries of the region by optimistically announcing that: ‘The future of the Balkans is within the European Union’ (European Union 2003). Hence, in the years ahead, the region was expected to consolidate peace and democracy and evolve under the tutelage of the EU, NATO, and OSCE into a veritable security community – a zone where war becomes unimaginable.8 The ‘induction’ of the Western Balkan security community was meant to come by accession into the EU and NATO and the consolidation of bilateral and multilateral security cooperation schemes. The unfolding of this plan has had mixed results (Stojanović Gajić and Ejdus 2018). In 2008, the Stability Pact transformed into the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), with stronger regional ownership over various regional cooperation schemes, including those proliferating in the field of security. Some of these initiatives were established in the field of soft security, such as the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative/Southeast European Law Enforcement Centre (SELEC) in 2011, the Migration, Asylum, Refugees Regional Initiative (MARRI) in 2004, and the Regional Anti-Corruption Initiative (RAI) in 2001 (Dehnert and Taleski 2013). Others were established in the field of hard security, such as the Centre for Security Cooperation (RACVIAC) in 2000, the Balkan Countries Chiefs of Defence Conference in 2006, the Balkan Medical Task Force (BMTF) in 2011, etc. While these regional initiatives have indeed created communities of practice among security and foreign policy elites in the region and, thus, contributed to the emergence of an ‘elite security community’ in the Western Balkans (Kavalski 2008; Grillot, Cruise and D’Erman 2010; Cruise and Grillot 2013), it seems like they hit a ‘glass ceiling’. Though reasons for their partial success are various (Stojanović Gajić 2018), what critically inhibits this process is that countries do not see a regional security community as an end goal

Military Security 135 (Dyrmishi and Qesaraky 2018; Koneska 2018; Knezović, Cvrtila and Vučinović 2018; Vučetić 2001), but only as a temporary process driven by their ultimate ‘desire to become part of security communities that extend beyond the Western Balkans region’ (Dyrmishi and Qesaraky 2018, 25). However, when it comes to NATO and EU enlargement in the region, the picture is even more mixed. While some states joined NATO (Croatia, Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia) Serbia declared military neutrality in December 2007, hindering BiH’s accession due to Republika Srpska’s foreign policy of persistent alignment with Belgrade. What, however, firmly held all countries in the region co-opted into ‘a NATO-centred grid of liberal security governance’ (Ejdus and Kovačević 2019, 9) was the fact that all countries – Serbia included – entered NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme by the mid-2000s. When it comes to the EU integration, only Croatia joined the EU in 2013 while the rest of the countries in the region remained stuck at different stages of the accession process, which signalled that the future enlargement of the EU would be much slower and much less predictable than initially assumed. However, although the rising enlargement fatigue might have undermined the strength of the Euro-Atlantic political and military overlay in the region, the EU continued playing a crucial role in prompting states to solve the open, bilateral issues that hinder the birth of a security community in the Western Balkans. Among the biggest successes of this phase was the EU-facilitated conclusion of the Brussels Agreement in April 2013. The agreement was hailed as ‘historic’ and a ‘huge breakthrough’ for the region and a triumph for EU foreign policy (Economist 2013). The 15-point bilateral agreement, brokered by the EU, aimed to defuse a potentially explosive situation over the status of North Kosovo with its local Serb majority and gradually integrate it into Kosovo’s legal and institutional framework. The key to the EU’s success in bringing the two sides to sign the Agreement was its membership-related conditionality policy and its ‘constructive ambiguity’ approach – an intentional avoidance of tackling the most sensitive issue of Kosovo recognition by Serbia (Guzina and Marijan 2014). Several elements of the Agreement, such as the local elections in the North, creation of regional police command, and integration of the parallel structures into Kosovo’s institutions, were more or less successfully implemented at the outset of the process (Đukanović 2013), but its further implementation soon faltered. During this phase, the implementation of the Florence Agreement continued smoothly. The independence of Montenegro in 2006 did not shake it, and the Agreement was amended to reflect the new reality. New concerns about the implementation were also raised following Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence in February 2008. However, during the 40th SRCC meeting held in March 2008 in Sarajevo, it became clear that implementation will continue unabated.9 Most importantly, the implementation of the Agreement followed the tendency described above to turn towards stronger regional ownership. In December 1998 already, the parties took over the responsibility of chairing SRCC from OSCE (Jopp 2000, 344). A decade later, parties expressed readiness to consider strengthening their ownership of the agreement following the regional trend towards more

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local ownership over security and peace issues. In June 2009, the OSCE PR for Dayton Article IV proposed a multi-year plan to transfer technical and administrative responsibilities to Article IV parties, also known as ‘the Ownership plan’.10 The first phase of the plan, which finished in 2011, consisted of transferring technical functions previously provided by the PR and OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina to the parties.11 The second phase, encompassing the development of the parties’ full autonomy in implementing the agreement, ended in 2015, marking the beginning of ‘a new era for the region’, in which its countries were supposed to become exporters rather than importers of security (OSCE 2014). What further testifies to the strength of the Florence Agreement’s ‘spirit’ in this period was an almost complete absence of references to military balance, power, or upgrades from the discourse of the regional political elites. As if they were trying to distance themselves from the former belligerent identities and corresponding stigma, the political elites avoided threatening with military means and even referring to their military power during the political crises over open regional issues (Krstić 2020). The military parades were equally rare in the region, as neither national nor war holidays were awaited as opportunities for demonstrating the countries’ military strength. The Florence Agreement itself was also rarely mentioned by the officials, with only a few technocratic and information-poor references to the countries’ adherence to the Agreement, which probably helped political elites avoid arousing domestic audiences’ potential resentments about the unpopular military downsizing. When made, the references to the Florence Agreement were often put in a positive context and portrayed as yet another proof of countries’ post-conflict transformation, constructive contribution to peace in the region, and ‘maturity’ in solving the remaining open issues (Al Jazeera Balkans 2014). In other words, both the letter and the spirit of the Sub-Regional Arms Control Agreement were as vital as fostering a kind of ‘armament taboo’ as proof of the emerging security community in the Western Balkans. Overall, the consolidation phase entailed democratic reforms at home, EuroAtlantic integration, the proliferation of regional security initiatives, and the beginning of security community building in the Western Balkans. In addition to this, the Western international community invested efforts in transferring the ownership over various multilateral forms of cooperation to the region itself. While the consolidation phase had mixed results, one of the most glaring – although little talked about – success stories in this process was the transfer of ownership over the sub-regional CAC regime to the region. The process of security community building was slow but seemed to move in the right direction. However, the war in Ukraine and the subsequent deterioration of the geopolitical situation in Europe will turn the tides.

Backsliding (2014–) The crisis in Ukraine, which erupted in 2014, was a geopolitical earthquake. It was interpreted by many as a return of geopolitics (Mead 2014) and the new Cold War in Europe (Lucas 2014).12 For the first time since the early 1990s, NATO

Military Security 137 and Russia saw each other as enemies again. The era of geopolitically benevolent expansion of the EU and NATO was over, reaching its geopolitical limit after taking over most of the power vacuum left behind after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Moreover, for the first time in its history, the EU neighbourhood and enlargement policies have become part of the security problem rather than the solution. The crisis and war in Ukraine had a three-fold negative influence on the Western Balkans. First, the crisis turned the Western Balkans into a zone of competition between Russia and the West. Since the very outset, the Western Balkans has been caught in the geopolitical crossfire and turned into a proxy arena for influence between Russia and the West (Weber and Bassuener 2014). Early on, Russia legitimised the annexation of Crimea by accusing the West of creating ‘the Kosovo precedent with their own hands’ and hypocrisy in denying the same right of self-determination to ‘a situation absolutely the same’ in Crimea (RT 2014). Banja Luka recognised the annexation of Crimea and pursued a proRussian policy of blocking Bosnia’s NATO membership and, in return, received full political backing from Moscow. Russia abstained from voting in the United Nations Security Council to extend the mandate of the EU peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Putin’s visit to Serbia’s Military Parade held in October 2014 was a signal that the more the West meddles in what Moscow construes as its backyard in the post-Soviet space, the less it can expect Russia to stay away from the Western Balkans. The rising influence of Russia in the Western Balkans did not pass unnoticed in the West. The German Chancellor Angela Merkel was among the first Western leaders to raise concerns about the growing influence of Russia in the Western Balkans. Already in November 2014, she warned that the crisis was not ‘just about Ukraine – this is about Moldova, this is about Georgia, and if this continues then one will have to ask about Serbia, and one will have to ask about the countries of the Western Balkans’ (B92 2014). A few months later, the US Secretary of State John Kerry used even harsher words. In his address to the Senate sub-committee, he warned that his visit to the region in the fall convinced him that ‘Russia is marching in Serbia with greater than ever influence’ (B92 2015a). Russia’s interest and influence in Montenegro caused equal distress in the Western capitals, especially after the alleged ‘Russian coup plot’ in August 2016 (CNN 2019; BBC 2019), due to the close connections between the Kremlin and the new ruling parties, the Serbian Orthodox Church in Montenegro, and the proRussians sentiments among a significant part of Montenegrin citizens (Bechev 2017; Garcevic 2019). Moreover, similar concerns are raised even about the EU part of the Balkans, most importantly Greece and Bulgaria, which both tend to hesitate between their Western orientation and friendship with Russia built on cultural affinity, historical ties, or economic and energy dependency (Tcherneva 2015; Groll 2015; Stavridis 2015). The second negative ramification of the crisis in Ukraine on the Western Balkans was that the EU shifted its strategic attention away from the region. Burdened with erupting crises in its neighbourhood, the EU had to deal with

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the rise of the Islamic State, state collapse in Libya, and the refugee crisis in the Mediterranean. In terms of their relevance for European security, all these developments dwarfed implementation problems of the Western Balkans region, characterised by HR Mogherini as ‘the most quiet place of our neighbourhood’ (Mogherini 2015). Moreover, following the accession of Croatia in 2013, the enlargement ceased to be among the priorities of the European Commission. One of the first messages of the European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, appointed in July 2014, was that ‘the EU needs to take a break from enlargement’ (Juncker 2014, 11). Although the enlargement portfolio was not entirely dropped, as some initially feared, it was merged with neighbourhood policy and downgraded from the top to the bottom of the EU’s priorities. Juncker clearly announced that ‘no further enlargement will take place over the next five years’, thus making his Commission the first one in decades not to envision EU enlargement during its mandate (2014–19). His message was seen by many as yet more proof that enlargement fatigue has grown into enlargement resistance (Economides 2020), certainly affecting ‘the cost-benefit calculations of already weakened EU-oriented Balkan reformists’ (Troncota 2014, 170). When the bloc failed to open accession negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania in 2019, a new wave of scepticism about the EU’s credibility spread across the entire region, and even beyond. As the EU foreign policy increasingly became concerned with geopolitical goals, its focus on promoting democracy in the Western Balkans receded into the background. As a result, both the EU and its member states were increasingly ready to turn a blind eye to democratic backsliding in return for stability, which led to a phenomenon some analysts call ‘stabilitocracy’ (BIEPAG 2017). Moreover, some recent studies claim that the way in which EU conditionality was formulated and implemented has effectively contributed to the ‘state capture’ in the region by unintentionally weakening political competition and mechanisms of internal accountability and deliberation (Richter and Wunsch 2020; Bartlett 2020). Around the same time, most countries in the region started a steady democratic backsliding (European Parliament 2019; Bieber 2018: Vladisavljević 2020). The latest Freedom House report, thus, places all six ‘Western Balkans’ countries in the category of ‘partly free’ countries, documenting heavy erosion of democratic foundations across the region (Freedom House 2021). Thirdly, the return of geopolitics and its zero-sum logic trickled down into the Western Balkan region. The geopolitical disorder ushered in by the crisis in Ukraine has had a direct effect on how Belgrade and Pristina perceive normalisation and how they weigh potential gains and losses they could have from it. After it continued for some time without tangible results, the dialogue stopped entirely due to the imposition of a 100% tariff on Serbian goods and services by Pristina in November 2018. Most importantly, the ‘cornerstone’ of the entire normalisation process, the Brussels Agreement, and its most important provisions regarding establishing the Community/Association of the Serb municipalities still remain unrealised. Although a US solo performance in moving Belgrade–Pristina talks from a standstill resulted in the signing of the ‘Washington documents’ in

Military Security 139 September 2020, these legally non-binding declarations of intent have remained mostly unmaterialised (CDDRI 2020). While Serbia’s alleged commitment to move its embassy to Jerusalem sparked controversies and criticism by many domestic and EU actors, the rest of the 15 provisions related both to economic rapprochement and political normalisation between Belgrade and Pristina have so far resulted in cosmetic changes and modest results. The above-described mix of unresolved conflicts, geopolitical tensions, enlargement fatigue, and the rise of nationalism and authoritarianism have all returned the spectre of war to the Western Balkans (Savković 2017). In recent years, tabloids in the region bombastically report about the looming war in the region almost daily. The threat of renewed armed conflict in the Balkans has returned to the imagination of international policymakers, as well. In 2017, the EC president Jean-Claude Juncker vividly warned that ‘If we leave them alone – BosniaHerzegovina, Republika Srpska, Macedonia, Albania, all those countries – we will have war again’ (EURACTIV 2017). Also, the public in the Western Balkans has most recently (in spring 2021) been disturbed by several ‘non-papers’ heating up the idea of border changes that can only create uncertainty and undermine the principles and practices of both the security community and security regime (Mujanović 2021). In the rest of this chapter, we analyse the ramifications of the regional security backsliding on the military rhetoric and practice, with a particular focus on the CAC regime. Rhetorical Arms Race The rhetoric of the ‘arms race’ started to appear in the Western Balkans in late 2015 when the Croatian media reported about the intention of the Croatian Armed Forces to acquire from the US M270 MLRS (Ejdus 2020).13 As a system with the capacity to deliver ballistic missiles in the range of 300 km, it was immediately framed as a weapon that could dramatically change the military balance in the region (Jutarnji list 2015). The Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić quickly responded that ‘Either they will give up on it, or we will have to find an answer to that, too’ (B92 2015b). Soon after that, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin of the Russian Federation visited Belgrade to discuss Serbia’s acquisition of arms from Russia, including the S-300 missile system (RTS 2016). While many in the national and international audience awaited these developments with particular cynicism – either refuting them as clear bluffs or mocking the quality of the weapons in question – it was clear that incendiary rhetoric on the regional balance of power was back on the table after a two-decade-long silence on it. Although neither M270 MLRS nor S300 was eventually acquired, Serbia and Croatia and other states in the region have stepped up their investments in the modernisation of their armed forces. Accordingly, the Western Balkan states have either bought, received as donations, or negotiated from their respective allies new aircraft, helicopters, tanks, armoured vehicles, and artillery systems over the past few years. Each new acquisition has been followed by bombastic media reports about the looming arms race and heated political rhetoric on both

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sides, with officials’ references to the superiority of their own armies and accusations of alleged preparations for war on the other side. Croatia’s announcement of a potential reintroduction of ‘military conscription light’ in 2017 (Večernji list 2017) seems to have provoked similar plans in Serbia in 2018 (Danas 2018; GRIP 2019, 20). Although Croatian officials have denied an arms race in the region (Jutarnji list 2017), the Croatian media have frequently warned of military competition with Serbia (HRT 2019). In Serbia, the head of the Military Intelligence Agency of the Republic of Serbia, Zoran Stojković, put it even more bluntly: ‘The arms race which is gaining steam in the world is reflecting on our region as well, and this is concerning for us as a neutral country’ (Politika 2019). The military build-up in the two countries has also raised concerns in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Beta 2017) and Kosovo, where it has been used as yet another justification for the longannounced transformation of the Kosovo Security Forces into the Kosovo Armed Forces (AP News 2017). When the Kosovo Parliament finally approved the move in December 2018, Serbia termed it ‘the most direct threat to peace and stability in the region’ and did not rule out military intervention if the new military is used in the Serb-populated north (Guardian 2018). Russian officials immediately warned that creating a new military force on the territory of one of the signatories would directly violate the Dayton Peace Agreement and Article 4 of its Annex 1B (Nezavisne novine 2017). Serbia’s shopping frenzy crossed the line in October 2019 when Russia brought its S-400 Triumph and Pantsir S to Serbia for a joint military exercise.14 While Serbia denied its interest in buying the long-range S-400, a contract was signed with Russia to acquire the 16 batteries of the short-range Pantsir S missile system (TASS 2019). Responding to the US Administration’s warnings that Serbia might be affected by the US secondary sanctions, Serbia’s President Vučić complained that Croatia and Albania arm without restraints and that he cannot allow Serbia to be a ‘Bambi for slaughter’ (Georgievski 2020). The purchase of the Chinese FK-3 medium-range air defence system also seems to have been agreed upon in that period (Marković and Perović 2021). Still, he eventually backed down and stated that Serbia would stop buying new weapons (European Western Balkans 2020). On the surface, it might seem that Serbia’s actions are aimed at balancing the rising threat from Croatia. A closer look at the evolving threat perception reveals a different picture. Croatia’s actions are driven mainly by its membership in NATO and a desire to close the 2% gap, increase its interoperability with its allies, and play a role in the alliance.15 On the other hand, Serbia seems to use Croatia’s actions as a pretext to build its military in the face of a potential conflict elsewhere, in Republika Srpska and North Kosovo. One indication of this might also be Serbia’s 2019 National Security Strategy, which mentions the threat of a Greater Albania for the first time.16 Its creation could not only be expected to become the plan B of the frustrated Kosovo Albanian elites once the Kosovo seat in the UN proves to be unattainable due to perseverant Serbian and Russian opposition but it could also be used as a pretext for a military takeover of the Serbian populated North Kosovo. Another indication of Serbia’s evolving threat

Military Security 141 perception is the unprecedented proclamation by the 2019 Defence Strategy that the protection of the status of the Republic of Srpska in accordance with the Dayton Peace Agreement is a defence interest of the Republic of Serbia.17 Given that these are the two most pressing security concerns, it is reasonable to speculate that as a militarily neutral state which cannot count on allies, Serbia aims to build capacities for the worst-case scenario of simultaneous conflicts on both fronts. The impression that countries have become more willing to, at least rhetorically and ceremonially, rely on their military capabilities is further strengthened by quite regular military parades in the region. Organised usually on the occasions of national holidays and war anniversaries, these parades were used as opportunities for demonstrating the strength of countries’ conventional armaments, but also for sending strong messages of their readiness to protect themselves with ‘the strongest army in the region’ and ‘among the strongest in the world’, with ‘the most modern aircraft in the region’, as well as with the help of their traditional security partners (DW 2019). While military parades are by no means a new or rare phenomenon, they have been absent from this region for quite a long time, mostly due to the associations they could have aroused in the aftermath of the conflict both among domestic and international audiences. Therefore, the last couple of years indicate that the countries in the region have been aware of hightening of tentions in world politics, which support that kind of tendency. In support of this also stand often officials’ references to the ‘changing international order’, ‘future constellations of powers in the world’, ‘stronger Russia’, or ‘rising China’ – all signalising that the endurance of the Euro-Atlantic overlay and governmentality in the Western Balkans might be less certain than only a couple of years ago. For instance, when talking about the rationale behind Serbia’s military upgrading, Aleksandar Vučić once said that he wants to avoid that, sometime in the future, ‘under a different constellation of powers in the world’, someone asks him what he did to protect his country (RTS 2015). Similarly, he recently stated that ‘in a turbulent world, in which we do not know what will happen tomorrow, we need to strengthen our security forces and protect our people from danger and possible threats’ (Radio Slobodna Evropa 2019). Moreover, whenever they talk about each other’s military plans, the Serbian and Croatian officials always bring the changes in the regional military balance into a relationship with the changing behaviour of the involved great powers, be it NATO, Russia, or China. Now that the analysis has confirmed that the spectre of war and the rhetoric of an arms race have indeed returned into the public and policy discourse in the Western Balkans, ‘undermining the hard-won trust that has been build up over years’ (Marković and Perović 2021), the next chapter probes whether the regional military build-up in practice matches the heated rhetoric. Military Modernisation in Practice Has the restored nationalist rhetoric on military competition, the threat of war, and the arms race been followed by practices that amount to an actual arms race

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in the Western Balkans? Several indicators can be used to test whether the abovedescribed rhetoric is serious sabre-rattling or just hot air. The first indicator is defence spending. As shown in Table 8.1, Western Balkan countries have slightly decreased the percentage of GDP earmarked for defence over the past five years. Their defence expenditures stand way below the NATO recommendation of 2%. As shown in Table 8.2, the percentage of government spending earmarked for defence has also remained constant across the region. This decrease happened even though global trends were also reflected across Central and Eastern Europe due to the heightened tensions with Russia over Ukraine (SIPRI 2019). Despite stagnating or even declining defence budgets in relative terms, most of the countries in the region have slightly increased their defence expenditures in absolute terms. This has been pushed by the above described geopolitical tensions, but also GDP growth across the region (World Bank 2019),18 and Croatia’s attempt to reduce the gap with NATO’s recommendation to its member states to spend at least 2% of their GDPs on defence (Total Croatia News 2018). This trend is well reflected in the gradual increase of Western Balkan defence spending per capita presented in Table 8.3. This increase of defence spending in absolute terms has been followed by the rise in the share of Western Balkan military expenditures devoted to equipment and modernisation. Although not all countries in the region have published their plans for developing the armed forces, those that have all Table 8.1 Military expenditures in the Western Balkans, percentage of GDP

Albania Bosnia and Herzegovina Croatia Kosovo Montenegro North Macedonia Serbia

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

1.3% 1.0% 1.8% 0.7% 1.5% 1.1% 1.9%

1.2% 1.0% 1.8% 0.8% 1.4% 1.0% 1.8%

1.1% 0.9% 1.6% 0.8% 1.4% 1.0% 1.7%

1.1% 0.9% 1.7% 0.8% 1.4% 0.9% 1.8%

1.2% 0.9% 1.6% 0.8% 1.4% 0.9% 1.6%

1.3% 0.8% 1.6% 0.8% 1.4% 1.2% 2.2%

1.5% 0.9% 1.8% 1.1% 2.1% 1.3% 2.1%

Source: SIPRI.

Table 8.2 Military expenditures in the Western Balkans as a share of government spending

Albania Bosnia and Herzegovina Croatia Kosovo Montenegro North Macedonia Serbia Source: SIPRI.

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

4.2% 2.2% 3.8% 2.7% 3.3% 3.4% 4.3%

3.8% 2.3% 3.7% 2.9% 3.0% 3.1% 4.3%

3.8% 2.2% 3.4% 2.7% 3.0% 3.1% 4.2%

3.8% 2.2% 3.7% 2.9% 2.9% 2.8% 4.6%

4.0% 2.1% 3.4% 2.7% 3.0% 3.1% 4.0%

4.4% 2.0% 3.5% 2.8% 3.1% 3.7% 5.3%

4.7% 2.0% 3.7% 3.2% 4.1% 3.6% 4.6%

Military Security 143 Table 8.3 Military expenditures in the Western Balkans, per capita in US$

Albania Bosnia and Herzegovina Croatia Kosovo Montenegro North Macedonia Serbia

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

61.5 55.8 249.9 29.4 107.8 59.8 102.6

45.8 54.7 208.6 30.0 90.7 48.1 81.6

45.3 47.3 198.8 29.2 98.4 49.8 80.2

50.1 46.6 220.1 32.0 104.7 48.4 90.8

61.0 51.8 232.5 35.2 125.7 57.4 92.9

68.5 50.1 242.6 36.6 123.7 70.1 130.4

77.2 51.1 252.1 42.2 162.5 75.8 128.3

Source: SIPRI.

prioritise the modernisation of armaments, military equipment, and infrastructure capacities as their main imperatives in the upcoming period.19 Accordingly, over the past few years, both Montenegro and Croatia (OBRIS 2019) have increased the share of their defence spending earmarked for equipment. While these figures stood at 14.3% for Montenegro and 11.6% for Croatia in 2019, this is still slightly below the NATO recommendation of 20%.20 Over the past several years, Serbia has also gradually increased the share of its defence budget used on equipment from a mere 3.8% in 2014 to 11.8% in 2019.21 On the other hand, Albania has slightly decreased its equipment expenditure, from 17.3% of the defence budget in 2017 to 14.4% in 2019. The second indicator that could be used to test the ‘arms race hypothesis’ is the quality and quantity of arms acquired. What kind of equipment did the countries in the region acquire? To begin with, it is important to note that countries have not been champions of transparency when it comes to their conventional arms acquisitions. For example, over the past several years, Western Balkan states have quite irregularly submitted reports to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA). While the detailed analysis of all conventional weapon purchases and donations in the Western Balkans over the past years falls beyond the scope of this paper, three major developments can be discerned based on SIPRI trade register databases and various cross-checked media reports. First, Serbia acquired most of its weapons through purchase or donation from the Russian Federation and Belarus, China, France, and Germany.22 Second, Croatia has acquired most of its new weapons from the US but also Israel, Germany, and Ukraine.23 Third, despite announcements by both Serbia and Croatia that they aimed to purchase completely new weapon systems (e.g., M270 MLRS, S300) that could change the military balance in the region, these plans fell through. Fourth, weapons acquisitions in all other countries of the region have been far less significant.24 The third question to ask when probing ‘the arms race’ claim is whether the above-described acquisitions have undermined the conventional arms control regime established in 1996 to maintain ‘a stable military balance’ in the Western Balkans. While the above-described rhetoric of arms race has already undermined,

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Table 8.4 Reports to the UNROCA

Albania Bosnia and Herzegovina Croatia Kosovo Montenegro North Macedonia Serbia

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

No No Yes n/a No Yes No

Yes Yes No n/a No Yes No

No No No n/a No No No

Yes Yes No n/a No Yes Yes

No Yes No n/a No No No

No Yes No n/a No No No

Table 8.5 The balance of conventional armaments in the Western Balkans Category of weapon Country

Battle tanks

Armoured Artillery combat vehicles

Serbia Croatia Bosnia and Herzegovina Montenegro

948/464 (49%) 786/562 (72%) 410/232 (57%) 340/219 (64%) 410/325 (79%) 340/272 (80%)

3375/2108 (62%) 143/80 (56%) 46/30 (65%) 1500/1397 (93%) 62/12 (19%) 21/16 (76%) 1500/1375 (92%) 62/19 (31%) 21/7(33%)

77/0 (0%)

375/107 (29%)

64/6 (9%)

Combat aircraft

12/4 (33%)

Attack helicopters

7/5 (71%)

in the words of Branka Latinović, ‘the spirit of the Agreement and its political relevance’, its letter is still complied with (Latinović 2018, 20). As Table 8.5 shows, the above-described acquisition of weapons in the region has not undermined the sub-regional conventional arms control regime. All the conventional forces are still well below the limits set by the Florence Agreement (Al Jazeera Balkans 2019). While it is by no means bad news that the letter of the Agreement has not currently been violated, one should not be too optimistic. One reservation regarding the ‘success story’ of the Florence Agreement stems from the fact that the Agreement sets very high ceilings on all five military categories, which are extremely difficult to reach in the conditions of relatively weak regional economies. The second reason for which the letter of the Agreement seems safe despite dangerous developments also stems from its somewhat weak design since the capture of the ‘qualitative arms race’ is not enabled by the Agreement’s propositions. In other words, the competition which occurs when the states start purchasing more modern and advanced weapons while getting rid of the old ones or start upgrading the hardware and software of the existing weaponry remains out of the Agreement’s scope. Moreover, many new categories of weapons exist, such as drones, that stay outside the Agreement. Therefore, the only issue that could realistically breach the letter of the Agreement in the near future would be the previously discussed establishment of the Army of Kosovo. For all these reasons, which suggest that the resilience of the Agreement might stem instead from

Military Security 145 its obsolescence than from the disciplined behaviour of the Parties, all relevant stakeholders should be more vigilant in monitoring the spirit of the Agreement. Furthermore, it would be good if a potential ‘update’ of the Agreement would soon come to the table of regional and international actors involved in security community building in the Western Balkans.

Conclusion The main goal of this chapter was to present and examine the complex and changing relationship between regional security, military dynamics, and conventional arms control in the Western Balkans over the past quarter-century. To do so, we proposed a tripartite periodisation of the security regime and community building that encapsulates the complex interplay between external and domestic factors that contribute to and unravel the overall efforts at stabilisation and development of security in the region. First, the stabilisation phase between 1996 and 2001 saw the building of the security regime based on the combination of external overlay and persuasion of the region’s countries to embrace the conventional arms control principles and practices based on the 1996 Florence Agreement. This was the time of post-conflict stabilisation when the the EU, NATO, and OSCE presssured the former belligerent sides within the region to commit toward establishing limits to their military capabilities. The consolidation phase between 2002 and 2013 saw the outset of an elite and nascent security community building. However, the partial and rather slowed-down integration of the region in the Euro-Atlantic space in the 2010s, combined with the impact of the global economic crisis and the geopolitical crisis between the EU and Russia over Ukraine, presented a challenge for the Western Balkans and its conventional arms control. This constellation of developments ushered in the period of backsliding (2014–) that is bounded by the erosion of democratic governance within the region, which can also be interpreted as a strong structuring challenge for the future of CAC in the region. Although the CAC regime caps on military capabilities of the Western Balkan countries remain respected, there are yet reasons to show some concern about the current upswing in the armaments dynamics and look at it critically. We show that these most recent military-related dynamics are composed of two processes that are convergent and contradictory when it comes to the letter and spirit of the Florence Agreement. The first one is the rhetorical arms race by Serbia and Croatia, whose securitisation in this domain is seen as mutually reinforcing, while the second is the modernisation of armaments in practice. In practice, the military sector is most notably back in the political discourse regarding the modernisation of their armies in cooperation with (the competing) allies and partners, and is still well below the thresholds regulated by the Florence Agreeement. Nevertheless, the adversarial spill-over effects of the rhetorical arms race are present to some degree in the political sector and in the public discourse, which are often amplified by the tabloid media and can be problematic if used for domestic political purposes outside of democratic political governance.

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This raises several questions that may be relevant for further theoretical research and analysis. For those interested in the regional security complex theory, an interesting question to ask which stems from our research is why the external overlay in the Western Balkans has been much more successful in suspending regional military dynamics than the security dynamics in other security sectors (political, economic, societal, etc.). Those interested in arms control should investigate why the factors leading to the demise of the CFE have had such a weak and delayed ramification for its sub-regional offspring in the Western Balkans. Future studies could also look at the nexus between peace, conflict, and democracy in the wider CAC agenda. Being a region within Europe’s margin still in transition, the Western Balkans has moved toward the elite security community. Still, in the period of backsliding, it seems to be edging back toward the security regime. This means that the post-conflict understanding of CAC that is relevant for some other regions in the world cannot apply to the Western Balkans. Here, what matters is looking at the ways to improve security governance at the regional level and seek for ways to safeguard and slowly improve the foundations of CAC and not to allow for it to crumble down. This means supporting the further improvement of the expert community as the guardians of CAC and working out what regional ownership means in the context of democratic retreat. One of the questions is whether the CAC is resilient to the aftershocks of the democratic backsliding in the region more widely. The CAC in the Western Balkans still seems to be at the present point somewhere in the middle along the peace, security and governance and development continuum. However, the developments since 2014 seem to give more reasons to see the trend as backsliding towards the peace and security side. Still, the region is far from the post-conflict context, but has still not fully overcome the bad consequences of the conflict (most notably, in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo). Although the promise of regional ownership is formally here, one still needs to ask what it means in practice, and can it be further advanced to reflect the advances in security sector reform and demilitarisation and demobilisation efforts that have been achieved between 1996 and 2013. There remains, most of all, to observe whether the subregional CAC is still regarded as the most important strategic framework and the normative bulwark of peace and security for all states in the region that have aspirations of regional leadership, be they militarily neutral or allied. So far, despite some elements of suspicion among the countries of the region regarding their military acquisitions, the question remains how to navigate the need for security and stability of the region and that of the modernisation cycle that is also characteristic of Europe more widely. What is needed, most of all, is transparency, communication, and both rhetorical and practical recommitment among the parties to the letter and spirit of the Florence Agreement while seeking a common path toward its upgrading and modernising to enhance collective security in the region. Yet, with necessary vigilance, it remains to be seen if the parties will be true to and recognise such a practical need as their strategic goal, thus also giving a fresh impetus to the currently paused, security-community building.

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Notes 1 This chapter is the result of the project ‘Military Dynamics in the Western Balkans’ implemented by the Center for International Security of the Faculty of Political Science in cooperation with the Center for OSCE Research at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, under the auspices of the OSCE Network. The authors would like to thank participants at a workshop titled ‘Enlargement Fatigue, Democratic Backsliding and Military Security in the Western Balkans’ which was organised at the Faculty of Political Science on 29 November 2019. Parts of this paper were previously published in Filip Ejdus, ‘The Spectre of an Arms Race in the Western Balkans’, 02/20, Hamburg: IFSH. 2 Observing regional security primarily through the processes of securitisation on the inter-state level, our focus remains on the types of conventional weaponry which were subject to the Florence Agreement since their possession, proliferation, and control are highly centralised at the government level. While we fully acknowledge security challenges that arise from illicit proliferation, possession, and misuse of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in the region (Prezelj 2010; Grillot 2010), also closely related to the armed conflicts that followed the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, we refrain from analysing them at this point due to their rather different nature and dynamics. Even if the precise estimation of stockpiles of SALW in the Western Balkans was less tricky (Čarapić and Gassman 2018), the horizontality, non-transparency, and ethnic heterogeneity of networks that characterise their illegal possession, proliferation, and use (as well as organised crime as such) rather elude the traditional regional approach taken in this chapter. A human security approach that would allow the analysis of various problems that stem from large stockpiles of SALW among the population across the region, or an approach that would illuminate inter-regional and global security dynamics that is influenced by a substantial export and smuggling of illicit SALW from the Western Balkans to various conflict-affected areas (Bošković 2020; BIRN 2018), would be far more suitable for investigating this important dimension of regional military dynamics. 3 Following the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the country constitutionally adopted the name the Republic of Macedonia. As a result of dispute with Greece over the name, the country was admitted to the UN under the name the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). In 2018, Greece and FYROM concluded the Prespa Agreement which resolved the name dispute and the country was renamed the Republic of North Macedonia. In the rest of the chapter, we will use the term FYROM for the period until 2018 and North Macedonia for the period since 2018. 4 Kosovo is an erstwhile province of Serbia which declared independence in 2008. Ever since it has been a disputed territory as Serbia still does not recognise its independence. According to the Serbian constitution the name of the province is Kosovo and Metohija. The authorities in Prishtina call the country the Republic of Kosova. In the rest of the chapter, we will use the term Kosovo which is used in English. 5 In early 1998, 20 states agreed to participate in the Article V negotiations. In addition to the former Yugoslav states which were obliged by the DPA to participate, 17 other states have voluntarily chosen to take part. These are Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Netherlands, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. For more about Article V scope and negotiations, see: Fladeboe 2001. 6 The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia came into existence in 1992 following the dissolution of the Socijalist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). It consisted of Serbia and Montenegro. In 2003, FRY was renamed the State Union of the two federal republics of Serbia and Montenegro which eventually also dissolved in 2006 into two independent states, the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro.

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7 ‘The allocations for Bosnia and Herzegovina will be divided between the Entities on the basis of a ratio of two (2) for the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and one (1) for the Republika Srpska’ Article 4, section 3, clause 5. 8 In this chapter, we chose the year 2002 as the beginning of the consolidation phase at the regional level since the last armed conflict in Macedonia ended in 2001. It should be said, however, that in Croatia and Serbia, the process of consolidation started earlier, in late 2000. 9 According to leaked US cables: ‘There was little talk of political issues such as the collapse of governments in Serbia or Macedonia, or of Kosovo’s independence’, 08USOSCE74: DAYTON ARTICLE IV: 40TH SRCC IS QUIET BUT BUSY, March 2008, Available at: http://www.leakoverflow.com/questions/495787/08usosce74-dayton-article-iv-40th-srcc-is-quiet-but-busy. 10 Both parties and Russia’s representative in the Contact Group expressed reservations regarding the pace and costs of the proposed plan. However, the personal representative soon managed to get them on board. 11 Those were, for example, formulating inspection plans, monitoring results, annual data exchange, interpretation and administrative support, etc. 12 Geopolitics, as a legitimate mode of thinking, started to return into academic fashion after 1989 (Guzzini 2012). 13 An arms race can be defined as an antagonistic relationship between two or more parties who rapidly compete in the quality or quantity of their armaments (Gray 1971, 40). 14 Serbian media also reported that in May 2021, for the purpose of the multinational NATO military exercise, ‘Patriot’ air-defence missiles were brought to Croatia. RTS 2021. 15 See ‘The Long-Term Plan of Development of Croatia’s Armed Forces for the Period 2015–2024’, (Ministarstvo obrane Republike Hrvatske 2014). 16 See National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia (Narodna skupština Republike Srbije 2019b). 17 See the Strategy of Defense of the Republic of Serbia (Narodna skupština 2019c). 18 According to the World Bank, the real GDP in the Western Balkans rose from 2.6% in 2017 to 3.8% in 2018, 3.5% in 2019, and is expected to rise further to 3.8% in 2020. 19 Montenegro 2015; Republic of Croatia 2015; Republic of North Macedonia 2019; Republic of Albania 2019. 20 Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2012–2019), NATO Public Diplomacy Division 2019, 3. 21 The budget for 2014 (Narodna skupština Republike Srbije 2014) and the budget for 2019 (Narodna skupština Republike Srbije 2019a). 22 Since 2014, the most significant weapon acquisitions by Serbia have been jets (6 Russian donated and 4 Belarus donated Mig29s), transport aircrafts (2 Russian donated An-26), helicopters (5 Mi-17V-5, 7 Mi-35M, 3 H215 ‘Super Puma’ helicopters, 6 H-145), air defence systems (18 Mistral 3 SHORAD), tanks (30 Russian donated T72B), armoured vehicles (21 BRDM 2), and drones (‘a set’ of CH-92A and 9 Chengdu Pterodactyl-1). 23 This includes armoured vehicles (212 US-donated MRAP vehicles), new helicopters (16 OH-58D ‘Kiowa’ and 2 US-donated UH 60 Blackhawks), and artillery pieces (12 Panzerhaubitzen 2000), as well as fighter jets (5 Mig-21s). In March 2018, Croatia tentatively agreed to buy 12 F-16 ‘Barak’ jets from Israel. The $500 million deal fell through in 2019 when it was blocked by the US on the ground that the Israelis upgraded the planes with their electronic equipment and hence persuaded Zagreb to buy planes from them rather than from Lockheed Martin. 24 Albania: 77 Humvees (US donation), 37 MaxxPro MRAP vehicles (US donation), 3 Black Hawk and 2 H145-M helicopters; Montenegro: 3 Bell 412 helicopters and 67 JLTV armoured vehicles and Bosnia and Herzegovina: 2 Huey II Bell helicopters (US donation).

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Čarapić, Jovana, and Remo Gassmann. 2018. Strengthening Resilience in the Western Balkans: Mapping Outreach and Assistance for Small Arms Light Weapons Control. Vienna: Austrian Federal Ministry of Defence, Department for Defence Policy. CDDRI. 2020. Analiza dokumenata potpisanih u Beloj kući. Accessed May 16, 2021. https://cddri.rs/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Analiza-dokumenata-potpisanih-u-Beloj -ku%C4%87i_WEB001.pdf. CNN. 2019. “Alleged Russian Agents Convicted for Masterminding Coup Plot in Europe.” Accessed May 16, 2021. https://edition.cnn.com/2019/05/09/europe/montenegro -attempted-coup-charged-intl/index.html. Cruise, Rebecca J., and Suzette R. Grillot. 2013. “Regional Security Community in the Western Balkans: A Cross-Comparative Analysis.” Journal of Regional Security 8 (1): 7–23. Danas. 2018. “Vučić: Razmatramo vraćanje obaveznog vojnog roka posle 2020.” August 21, 2018. Accessed May 16, 2021. https://www.danas.rs/drustvo/472081/. Dehnert, Stefan, and Dane Taleski, eds. 2013. Monitoring Regional Cooperation in Southeast Europe. Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Deutsch, Karl W. 1957. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area—International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Đukanović, Dragan. 2013. “Relations between Belgrade and Priština: From Technical to Political Dialogue.” Međunarodni problemi 65 (3): 365–385. Đukanović, Dragan. 2020. Balkan na posthladnoratovskom raskršću (1989–2020). Beograd: Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu i Službeni glasnik. DW. 2019. “Trka u naoružanju – Srbija protiv suseda iz NATO.” Accessed May 17, 2021. https://www.dw.com/sr/trka-u-naoru%C5%BEanju-srbija-protiv-suseda-iz-nato/a -49827239. Dyrmishi, Arjan, and Mariola Qesaraky. 2018. “Diplomacy and the Integration of the Western Balkans: Evidence from Albanian Diplomats.” In Security Community Practices in the Western Balkans, edited by Sonja Stojanović Gajić, and Filip Ejdus, 13–28. London and New York: Routledge. Economides, Spyros. 2020. “From Fatique to Resistance: EU Enlargment and the Western Balkans.” The Dahrendorf Forum IV, Working Paper No. 17, 20 March 2020. Accessed May 17, 2021. https://www.dahrendorf-forum.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/From -Fatigue-to-Resistance.pdf. Economist. 2013. “A Breakthrough at Last.” April 20, 2013. Accessed May 17, 2021. http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2013/04/serbia-and-kosovo-0. EURACTIV. 2017. “Juncker to US: If the EU Collapses, there will be war in Balkans.” March 24, 2017. Accessed May 16, 2021. https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/ news/juncker-to-us-if-the-eu-collapses-there-will-be-war-in-balkans/. European Commission. 2000. “Zagreb Summit Final Declaration.” November 24, 2000. Accessed May 17, 2021. https://www.esiweb.org/pdf/bridges/bosnia/ZagrebSummi t24Nov2000.pdf. European Parliament. 2019. “Serbia at Risk of Authoritarianism?” Author: Martin Russell, May 2019. Accessed May 17, 2021. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ BRIE/2019/637944/EPRS_BRI(2019)637944_EN.pdf. European Union. 2003. “EU-Western Balkans Summit Declaration.” June 21, 2003. Accessed May 17, 2021. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/ pressdata/en/misc/76291.pdf.

Military Security 151 European Western Balkans. 2020. “Weapon Procurement and Military Neutrality: Where is Serbia’s Defense Policy Heading?” January 10. Accessed May 16, 2021. https://eur opeanwesternbalkans.com/2020/01/10/weapon-procurement-and-military-neutrality -where-is-serbias-defense-policy-heading/. Ejdus, Filip. 2012. “Kontrola konvencionalnog naoružanja na Zapadnom Balkanu.” In Srbija u evropskom i globalnom kontekstu, edited by Radmila Nakarada, and Dragan Živojinović, 241–251. Belgrade: University of Belgrade – Faculty of Political Science. Ejdus, Filip. 2020. “The Spectre of an Arms Race in the Western Balkans.” Policy Brief 02/20. Accessed May 16, 2021. https://ifsh.de/publikationen/policy-brief/policy-brief -0220. Ejdus, Filip, and Marko Kovačević. 2019. “Penetration, Overlay, Governmentality: The Evolving Role of NATO in the Western Balkan Security Dynamics.” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 13 (5): 566–580. Elbasani, Arolda. 2008. “EU Enlargement in the Western Balkans: Strategies of Borrowing and Inventing.” Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans 10 (3): 293–306. Fladeboe, Jan Peter. 2001. “Article V of the Dayton Peace Accords: Review and Prospects.” In OSCE Yearbook 2000, edited by Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg. Baden-Baden, 307–315. Accessed May 17, 2021. https:// ifsh.de/file-CORE/documents/yearbook/english/00/Fladeboe.pdf. Freedom House. 2021. “Countries and Territories.” Accessed May 17, 2021. https:// freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores. Garcevic, Vesko. 2019. “Russia’s Soft and Sharp Power in Southeast Europe—The Russian Hybrid Influence Operation in Montenegro.” In Reality Check Series: Sources, Tools and Impact of External Non-EU-Engagement in Southeast Europe, Berlin, 71–83. Georgievski, Jovana. 2020. “Weapon Procurement and Military Neutrality: Where is Serbia’s Defence Policy Heading? European Western Balkans.” January 10. Accessed May 21, 2021. https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2020/01/10/weapon-procurement -and-military-neutrality-where-is-serbias-defense-policy-heading/. Gray, Colin S. 1971. “The Arms Race Phenomenon.” World Politics 24 (1): 39–79. Grillot, Suzette R. 2010. “Guns in the Balkans: Controlling Small Arms and Light Weapons in Seven Western Balkan Countries.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 10 (2): 147–171. Grillot, Suzette R., Rebecca J. Cruise, and Valerie J. D’erman. 2010. “Developing Security Community in the Western Balkans: The Role of the EU and NATO.” International Politics 47 (1): 62–90. GRIP. 2019. “Croatie-Serbie: une mini-course aux armaments dans les Balkans?” February 19, 2019. Accessed May 16, 2021. https://grip.org/croatie-serbie-une-mini-course-aux -armements-dans-les-balkans/. Groll, Elias. 2015. “Putin Lurks on the Sidelines as Greek Economic Crisis Heads Down to the Wire.” Foreign Policy, July 6, 2015. Accessed May 17, 2021. http://foreignpolicy .com/2015/07/06/putin-lurks-on-the-sidelines-as-greek-economic-crisis-heads-down -to-the-wire/. Guardian. 2018. “Serbia Talks Up Armed Intervention as Kosovo Approves New Army.” December 14, 2018. Accessed May 16, 2021. https://www.theguardian.com/world /2018/dec/14/kosovo-to-create-army-in-defiance-of-serbia-and-nato. Guzina, Dejan, and Branka Marijan. 2014. “A Fine Balance: The EU and the Process of Normalizing Kosovo-Serbia Relations.” CIGI Papers No. 23, January. Accessed May 17, 2021. https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/no23_0.pdf.

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Guzzini, Stefano, ed. 2012. The Return of Geopolitics in Europe? Social Mechanisms and Foreign Policy Identity Crises. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. HRT. 2019. “Ivanjek: Mi smo država koja čuva svoje nebo samo danju.” April 10, 2019. Accessed May 16, 2021. https://vijesti.hrt.hr/540822/mi-smo-drzava-koja-cuva-svoje -nebo-samo-danju. ICTJ. 2009. “Transitional Justice in the Former Yugoslavia.” 2009. Accessed May 16, 2021. https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-FormerYugoslavia-Justice-Facts -2009-English.pdf. Jopp, Heinz Dieter. 2000. “Regional Arms Control in Europe: The Arms Control Agreement under the Dayton Agreement (Mid-1997 until Mid-1999).” In OSCE Yearbook 1999, edited by Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, 341–347. Baden-Baden: University of Hamburg. Juncker, Jean Claude. 2014. “A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change, Political Guidelines for the Next European Commission.” European Parliament, July 15, 2014. Jutarnji list. 2015. “Veliki posao MORH-a i PENTAGONA: Hrvatska kupuje moćno oružje koje će potpuno promijeniti vojnu ravnotežu u regiji.” October 13, 2015. Accessed May 16, 2021. https://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/veliki-posao-morh-a-i-pentagona -hrvatska-kupuje-mocno-oruzje-koje-ce-potpuno-promijeniti-vojnu-ravnotezu-u-regiji /175255/?fbclid=IwAR0uqAOvd6h2M0QRmsz9Sdc_ZDEle1Xz3DYHghr0aTS5IfR yWBjXvsLcm8s. Jutarnji list. 2017. “Ministar obrane Krstičević za Globus: ‘Srbija nije prijetnja našoj nacionalnoj sigurnosti!” Accessed May 16, 2021. https://www.jutarnji.hr/globus/ Globus-politika/ministar-obrane-damir-krsticevic-za-globus-srbija-nije-prijetnja-nasoj -nacionalnoj-sigurnosti/5607143/. Kavalski, Emilian. 2008. Extending the European Security Community: Constructing Peace in the Balkans. London: IB Tauris. Knezović, Sandro, Vlatko Cvrtila, and Zrinka Vučinović. 2018. “Croatia’s Police and Security Community Building in the Western Balkans.” In Security Community Practices in the Western Balkans, edited by Sonja Stojanović Gajić, and Filip Ejdus, 72–88. London and New York: Routledge. Koneska, Cvete. 2018. “Norms and Sovereignty: Regional Security Cooperation in the Macedonian Police.” In Security Community Practices in the Western Balkans, edited by Sonja Stojanović Gajić, and Filip Ejdus, 88–101. London and New York: Routledge. Krstić, Milan. 2020. “Strategije destigmatizacije u spoljnoj politici država: Studija slučaja spoljne politike Republike Srbije od 2001. do 2018. godine” (Strategies of Destigmatation in State Foreign Policy: Case Study in the Republic of Serbia Foreign Policy from 2001 to 2018). PhD dissertation. University of Belgrade. Latinović, Branka. 2008. Compendium on the Negotiations and Implementation of the Agreement on Sub-Regional arms Control (Article IV, Annex 1b, DPA). Draft 2, December 2008 (internal document). Lopandić, Duško, and Jasminka Kronja. 2011. Regional Initiatives and Multilateral Cooperation in the Balkans. Belgrade: European Movement in Serbia and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Lucas, Edward. 2014. The New Cold War: Putin’s Russia and the Threat to the West. London: Macmillan. Marković, Andrej, and Jeronim Perović. 2021. Undermining Trust: Rearmament in the Western Balkans. CSS Analyses in Security Policy, 282.

Military Security 153 Mead, Walter Russell. 2014. “The Return of Geopolitics.” Foreign Affairs 93 (3): 69–79. Ministarstvo obrane Republike Hrvatske. 2014. “Dugoročni plan razvoja Oružanih snaga Republike Hrvatske za razdoblje od 2015. do 2024. godine.” Accessed May 16, 2021. https://www.morh.hr/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/dpr_osrh_2015-24_25112014 .pdf. Mogherini, Federica. 2015. “Speech by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the Munich Security Conference.” February 8, 2015. Accessed May 17, 2021. https://www.helsinki.org.rs/eu_t03.html. Montenegro. 2015. Dugoročni plan razvoja odbrane. Accessed May 17, 2021. http://www .mod.gov.me/ResourceManager/FileDownload.aspx?rid=230103&rType=2&file= Dugoro%C4%8Dni_plan_razvoja_odbrane_CG.pdf. Mujanović, Jasmin. 2021. “Slovenia’s ‘Non-Paper’ is no Stunt, but a Worrying Omen.” BIRN, May 3, 2021. Accessed May 17, 2021. https://balkaninsight.com/2021/05/03/ slovenias-non-paper-is-no-stunt-but-a-worrying-omen/. Narodna skupština Republike Srbije. 2014. “Zakon o Budžetu Republike Srbije za 2014. godinu.” Accessed May 16, 2021. http://www.parlament.gov.rs/upload/archive/files/lat /pdf/zakoni/2013/4174-13Lat.pdf. Narodna skupština Republike Srbije. 2019a. “Zakon o Budžetu Republike Srbije za 2019. godinu.” Accessed May 16, 2021. http://www.parlament.gov.rs/upload/archive/files/cir /pdf/zakoni/2018/budzet%202019.pdf. Narodna skupština Republike Srbije. 2019b. “Strategija nacionalne bezbednosti Republike Srbije.” Accessed May 16, 2021. http://www.parlament.gov.rs/upload/archive/files/lat/ pdf/akta_procedura/2019/2206-19%20-%20Lat..pdf. Narodna skupština Republike Srbije. 2019c. “Strategija odbrane Republike Srbije.” Accessed May 16, 2021. http://www.parlament.gov.rs/upload/archive/files/cir/pdf/ ostala_akta/2019/2207-19%20(RS60).pdf. NATO Public Diplomacy Division. 2019. “Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2012–2019).” June 25, 2019. Accessed May 16, 2021. https://www.nato.int/nato _static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_06/20190625_PR2019-069-EN.pdf. Nezavisne novine. 2017. “Sputnjik: Dejtonski sporazum prepreka formiranju vojske Kosova.” April 5, 2017. Accessed October 29, 2018. https://www.nezavisne.com /novosti/ex-yu/Sputnjik-Dejtonski-sporazum-prepreka-formiranju-vojske-Kosova /420691. OBRIS. 2019. “RH i NATO: pale maske s financijskih podataka.” December 6, 2019. Accessed May 16, 2021. https://obris.org/hrvatska/rh-i-nato-pale-maske-s-financijskih -podataka/. OSCE. 2014 [by Mersiha Čaušević Podzić]. “A New Era for South-East Europe Rebuilding Peace, Security and Stability in Aftermath of War.” November 25, 2014. Accessed May 16, 2021. https://www.osce.org/cio/126754. Politika. 2019. “Direktor VOA: Pratimo intenzivno naoružavanje zemalja Balkana.” March 5, 2019. Accessed May 16, 2021. http://www.politika.rs/sr/clanak/424229/Drustvo/ Direktor-VOA-Pratimo-intenzivno-naoruzavanje-zemalja-Balkana. Prezelj, Iztok. 2010. “The Small Arms and Light Weapons Problem in the Western Balkans.” In Transnational Terrorism, Organized Crime and Peace-Building, edited by Wolfgang Benedek, Christopher Daase, Vojin Dimitrijević, and Petrus van Duyne, 201–226. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Republic of Albania. 2019. Defence Directive 2019. Accessed May 17, 2021. http://www .mod.gov.al/eng/index.php/security-policies/strategies-of-mod/998-defence-directive -2019.

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Republic of Croatia. 2015. Dugoročni plan razvoja Oružanih snaga Republike Hrvatske 2015–2024. Accessed May 17, 2021. https://vlada.gov.hr/UserDocsImages//ZPPI/ Strategije%20-%20OGP/obrana//dpr_osrh_2015-24_25112014.pdf. Republic of North Macedonia. 2019. Long-Term Defence Capability Development Plan 2019–2028. Accessed May 17, 2021. http://www.mod.gov.mk/wp-content/uploads /2019/10/LTDCDP-2019-2028-finalna-verzija.pdf. Richter, Solveig, and Natasha Wunsch. 2020. “Money, Power, Glory: The Linkages Between EU Conditionality and State Capture in the Western Balkans.” Journal of European Public Policy 27 (1): 41–62. Rothbacher, Dieter. 2001. “Verification of the Dayton Arms Control Agreements.” In Verification Yearbook 2001, edited by Trevor Findlay, and Oliver Meier, 173–185. London: The Verification Training, Research and Information Centre. RT. 2014. “Putin: Crimea Similar to Kosovo, West is Rewriting its Own Rule Book.” March 18, 2014. Accessed May 16, 2021. http://rt.com/news/putin-address-parliament -crimea-562/. RTS. 2015. “Vučić: Nabavićemo defanzivno, a ne ofanzivno oružje.” October 28, 2015. Accessed May 16, 2021. https://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/9/politika/2085679/ vucic-nabavicemo-defanzivno-a-ne-ofanzivno-oruzje.html. RTS. 2016. “Vučić: Srbija odustaje od kupovine oružja ako to učini i Hrvatska.” January 12, 2021. Accessed May 16, 2021. http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/9/politika /2171522/vucic-srbija-odustaje-od-kupovine-oruzja-ako-to-ucini-i-hrvatska.html. RTS. 2021. “Američki ‘patrioti’ stigli u Hrvatsku.” May 15, 2021. Accessed May 16, 2021. https://www.rts.rs/page/stories/ci/story/3/region/4374357/hrvatska-sad-nato-patrioti -manevri.html. Savković, Marko. 2017. “How Might the Next War in the Western Balkans Look Like?” BFPE, June 8, 2017. Accessed May 17, 2021. https://en.bfpe.org/in-focus/bfpe -leadership-programme-focus/how-might-the-next-war-in-the-western-balkans-look -like/. SIPRI. 2019. “World Military Expenditure Grows to $1.8 Trillion in 2018.” April 29, 2019. Accessed May 17, 2021. https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2019/world -military-expenditure-grows-18-trillion-2018. Stavridis, James. 2015. “What are the Geostrategic Implications of the Grexit.” Foreign Policy, July 1, 2015. Accessed May 16, 2021. http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/01/ what-are-the-geostrategic-implications-of-a-grexit-greece-nightmare-eu/. Stefanović, Andrej. 2021. “Deterioration of the Global Arms Control Regime and the Role of the Vienna Document in Reviving Stability and Con dence in Europe.” Journal of Regional Security, Online First. https://aseestant.ceon.rs/index.php/jouregsec/article/ view/29804. Stojanović Gajić, Sonja, and Filip Ejdus, eds. 2018. Security Community Practices in the Western Balkans. London and New York: Routledge. TASS. 2019. “Russia to Deliver Pantsir-S Missile Systems to Serbia in Next Few Months.” November 6, 2019. Accessed May 16, 2021. https://tass.com/defense/1087064. Tcherneva, Vesela. 2015. “View from Sofia: A Difficult Choice between Russia and the West.” March 9, 2015. Accessed May 16, 2021. http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary _view_from_sofia_a_difficult_choice_between_russia_and_the_west31. Total Croatia News. 2018. “Prime Minister Explains Higher Defence Spending.” April 29, 2018. Accessed May 16, 2021. https://www.total-croatia-news.com/politics/27871 -prime-minister-explains-higher-defence-spending.

Military Security 155 Troncota, Miruna. 2014. “The Formation of the Juncker Commission and its Impact on the Western Balkans.” Europolity-Continuity and Change in European Governance 8 (2): 153–177. Večernji list. 2017. “Od 2019. uvodi se obavezni ‘light’ vojni rok do 30 dana.” January 30, 2017. Accessed May 16, 2021. https://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/od-2019-uvodi-se -obvezni-light-vojni-rok-do-30-dana-1145838. Vetschera, Heinz. 2009. “The Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control (Florence Agreement).” In Die Zukunft Konventioneller Rüstungskontrolle in Europa. The Future of Conventional Arms Control in Europe, edited by Hans-Joachim Schmidt, and Götz Neunceck, 450–465. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Company KG. Vladisavljević, Nebojša. 2020. Uspon i pad demokratije posle Petog oktobra. Beograd: Arhipelag. Vucetic, Srdjan. 2001. “The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe as a Security Community-Building Institution.” Southeast European Politics 2 (2): 109–134. Weber, Bodo, and Kurt Bassuener. 2014. “The Western Balkans and the Ukraine Crisis.” A DPC Policy Paper, September. Accessed May 17, 2021. http://www.helsinki.org.rs/doc /DPC%20Policy%20Paper%20Western%20Balkans%20&%20Ukraine%20crisis.pdf. World Bank. 2019. “Western Balkans Sees Rising Risks to Growth Outlook Amid Slowing Job Creation.” April 2, 2019. Accessed May 17, 2021. https://www.worldbank.org/en /news/press-release/2019/04/02/western-balkans-sees-rising-risks-to-growth-outlook -amid-slowing-job-creation. Žarin, Irina. 2007. “EU Regional Approach to the Western Balkans: The Human Security Dimension.” Međunarodni problemi 59 (4): 513–545. Zellner, Wolfgang. 2012. “Conventional Arms Control in Europe: Is There a Last Chance?” Arms Control Today 42 (2): 14.

9

Political and Societal Security in the Western Balkans One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward Věra Stojarová

Introduction The Western Balkans were very turbulent after the demise of communism in Eastern Europe and the region regained its historic ‘powder keg’ label1. The world observed the fight for independence by many nations and many conflicts – the ten-day war in Slovenia, conflicts in Croatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina (BiH), Kosovo,2 south-east Serbia, and North Macedonia.3 It has been two decades since the last armed conflict, and therefore it is legitimate to ask about the state of security in the region. Are there any threats in the region in the political and societal sectors, or can we talk about an oasis of peace? Looking at the post-war developments in the region, we have seen that much has been done in terms of peace building and security. Croatia became part of the Euro-Atlantic community, entering NATO and the EU. NATO also welcomed Albania, Montenegro, and North Macedonia, and the EU expects the eventual accession of all applicants from the Western Balkan region. Kosovo entered dialogue with Serbia, North Macedonia successfully reached an agreement with Greece in the name dispute, and great work has been done in post-war peace building in BiH – the last unrest in Bosnia dates back to 2014, and it was rather of a social character. However, there is still a lot to be done. The Western Balkans are not firmly anchored in Europe and more players are interested in the game of Balkan stabilisation, democratisation, and the elimination of security threats before the countries of the region join the EU. Existing scholarly accounts of security threats in the Western Balkan region suggest that ‘peaceful coexistence and national reconciliation’ is an oxymoron. Of greatest concern in the last decade have been the growth of Islamic radicalism and the returnees from ISIS (Stojarová-Stojar 2019; Wither 2016; Jureković 2016; Karčić 2011; Mayer 2013; Oluic 2008), democratic backsliding (Bieber 2018; Stojarová 2020; Kapidžić 2020), the influence of external actors (KAS 2018; Petritsch 2018), organised crime (UNODC 2020; Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime 2019), and regional security initiatives and integration into security structures (Vučković, Vučinić and Đorđević 2016; Đorđević, Klemenc and Kolářová 2018). DOI: 10.4324/9781003276661-11

Political and Societal Security 157 In this chapter, we argue that the countries of the region face an unfinished transition and that the main two issues remain the puzzles of Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The frozen and unresolved political issues are reflected in the societal sector and vice versa. The chapter is structured to account for the severe security implications of the political and societal threats, and ends with a simplified overview of the sector and concluding remarks.

Approach to Political and Societal Security According to the traditional concept of security, political security is an inseparable part of military security. The Copenhagen School formalised its broad understanding of security by introducing five sectors, each governed by ‘distinctive characteristics and dynamics’, and conceptualised around particular referent objects and actors (military, environmental, economic, societal, and political). As Buzan and his colleagues explain, the political security is about relationships of authority, governing status and recognition while the societal security is about the relationship of collective identity … Political security concerns the organizational stability of the states, systems of government and the ideologies that give them legitimacy … Societal security concerns the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity and customs. (Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998, 7–8) The main referent object of the political and societal sectors can be considered the state, quasi-states, clans, tribes, transnational movements, religions, sects or ideological movements, nations, ethnic minorities, civilisations, religions, and races. Clearly, the themes and actors of societal and political security quite often overlap. Societal security manifests itself in the political sector; threats to social identity quite often grow into the political threat of disintegration of the political system. State entities – namely Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo, and the nations and ethnicities inhabiting and securitising the threat to the nation’s identity – have been identified as the main reference objects of the Western Balkans in the political and societal sectors. The securitisation actors in the period under review (1990–) were the governments of these states and also representatives of the international community, especially the UN, the EU, and the USA, international and local organisations, think-tanks, and independent researchers. Functional actors included external political players such as the EU, NATO, UN, OSCE, ICTY, Russia, China, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, as well as the regional and local political and social actors, NGOs, and INGOs.

Cohesion of Bosnia and Herzegovina The democratisation processes in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the quest for independence in Croatia and Slovenia left Bosnia and Herzegovina in

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an awkward position. According to the census of 1991, 43.5% of the population claimed Bosniak/Muslim nationality, 31.2% perceived themselves as Serbs, 17.4% as Croats, 5.5% as Yugoslavs, and 2.4% as other nationalities (Ministarstvo za ljudska prava i izbeglice 2010). The declarations of independence by other republics created internal political cleavage over the issue of independence or staying in the federation. The subsequent referendum, which was boycotted by the majority of Serbs, led to the declaration of independence and internal conflict. The signing of the Dayton Agreement in 1995 by the presidents of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia brought an end to the bloodshed and established the basis for the future state. The Dayton Peace Agreement created a super-complicated system and implemented the so-called Lijphart model of consociation democracy4 in an effort to create efficient and at the same time fair power-sharing structures of government. The extremely complex system of government not only made governance very difficult but also failed to satisfy the demands of all parties, facilitated the geographical segregation of ethnicities, and BiH has fallen into a stagnation trap (Rice 2017). Twenty-six years after the end of the war, relations between the three ethnic groups cannot be considered consolidated and war narratives and nationalist discourse are constantly emphasised. De facto, there is no progress in society – Croats from time to time demand a third entity and consistent federalisation of the state, Serbs seek greater autonomy and do not rule out independence, and Bosniaks hope for a more centralised model within the current borders. State building is also hindered by the unfinished project of national reconciliation and the ongoing and incomplete war crimes trials. Elections to state institutions at all levels, i.e., the relations between Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs, are a constant challenge for the country. Political parties are established primarily on an ethnic basis. The fundamental premise for fair elections and a successful long-lasting peace – election law reform – is still unresolved. As for Serbian political parties and their leaders, RS President Milorad Dodik currently occupies the strongest position. Although the idea of independence for the Republika Srpska is very popular among its citizens, achieving independence is probably not entirely in Dodik’s interest, as he could thereby lose influence and status. Manifestations of hatred and nationalism are ubiquitous in the media, political, and societal discourse. The threat of secession by Republika Srpska, the presentation of Bosniaks as Islamic fundamentalists, the denial of the alleged genocide in Srebrenica, all have a significant impact on inter-ethnic relations. There are constant signs of vandalism targeting mosques, churches, cemeteries, and attacks on church leaders.

The Kosovo Puzzle Approximately 5 million Albanians are geographically distributed across the Balkan Peninsula, while according to estimates only 2.8 million of them live in Albania proper (Instat 2020). The rest are scattered in Kosovo, North Macedonia, and Montenegro and to a lesser extent in Croatia, Serbia, Greece, Romania, and

Political and Societal Security 159 Bulgaria. The unification of Albanians into one state was theoretically conceived by the League of Prizren. However, the Treaty of London in 1912 left out more than 40% of the Albanians living outside the borders of the newly proclaimed Albania. Kosovo was briefly under the jurisdiction of the German occupation in 1943–4 within an enlarged Albania. After the Germans were driven out, an Albanian uprising aimed to resist the incorporation of Kosovo into Yugoslavia. In 1945, the Yugoslav Partisans succeeded in establishing control over Kosovo. The calls for a Greater Albania, i.e., incorporation of all ethnic Albanians into one state, were voiced during the 1960s in Kosovo (Hradečný 2008). At the time of the dissolution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Kosovo Republic was promulgated in 1991. Nevertheless, the status of Kosovo according to the 1974 Yugoslavian Constitution was only as an autonomous province with no right of secession, so the only country that recognised Kosovo was Albania. The quest for the independence of the Kosovo Albanians and the unification of ethnic Albanians went on, and in 1999 NATO stepped into the conflict with a humanitarian intervention on the side of the Albanians. Yugoslavia conceded and an international protectorate was established over Kosovo. In 2008, Kosovo declared independence and by now around 100 states have recognised its independence (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Diaspora of the Republic of Kosovo). The declaration of independence of Kosovo also meant the evolution of a new Kosovar Albanian identity, which is being developed alongside Albanian identity. The concept of a Greater Albania was abandoned for a while, but resurrected in the programme of the Self-Determination Movement (Lëvizja Vetëvendosje, LV) and its campaign for a referendum on self-determination (Lëvizja Vetëvendosje 2019). LV also started to promote its interest in and plan for establishing branch party offices in neighbouring Albania. Kosovo remains a neuralgic point in the region, and there have been many proposed solutions put on the table, including the exchange of territory by Serbia and Kosovo. Former Kosovo President Hashim Thaçi himself acted as the final solver of relations with Serbia, stressing that any border correction would be conditional on Kosovo being recognised as an independent state, and thus an accord would be reached between the two independent and sovereign states by mutual agreement. Of course, questions of concern remain, in particular the status of the Albanian population living north of the Ibar River and the Serbian population living south of the Ibar, and in particular what mechanism would be applied in the event of a population change. The international community is somehow divided over the exchange of territory – the US does not rule out this possibility and many countries support any agreement between Kosovo and Serbia, while the UK and Germany oppose any change in borders that they consider destabilising. However, there is no important political player on the Kosovo political party scene (with the exception of ex-President Thaçi) that supports altering the border, and therefore this solution shall remain dormant for the time being.5 The analysis shows that central to Serbia, as well as to the entire Balkan region, is the normalisation of relations with Kosovo, which reflects the internal politics of both countries, the indictments and arrests by ICTY, and the influence of

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foreign powers in the region. The situation in Kosovo has a direct impact on the stability of all states in the region and vice versa. Without that, no accession into the EU and stabilisation of the region is foreseen.

Macedonian Name Quest Macedonia was ruled by Bulgaria during the First World War, but after the war, the territory became part of the newly formed Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Bulgarian rule returned during the Second World War, and in 1945 Macedonia was established as a constituent state within communist Yugoslavia, where it remained until its secession in 1991. Bulgaria was the first state to recognise an independent Macedonia. However, as a result of a dispute with Greece over the country’s name, the constitutional name, ‘Republic of Macedonia’, was used only in bilateral relations and the country became a member of the UN under the provisionally agreed name the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). The dispute originated in the ambiguity of the name Macedonia, which is a geographical region covering part of Greece, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Albania. The other reason was the legacy of the ancient kingdom of Macedonia, the dominant state of Hellenist Greece, with its great history and contributions not only in philosophy and literature. Macedonian governments were successfully promoting a policy of antiquisation by appropriating symbols and figures that were historically considered part of Greek culture (e.g., renaming the Skopje airport the Alexander the Great airport, rebuilding the centre of Skopje in the Hellenistic style, placing the Vergina Sun on the flag, etc.) during the process of state and nation building. The antiquisation was both a domestic and international assertion of Macedonia’s name, identity, and history amid Greek challenges and attempts to undermine Macedonia’s legitimacy in the eyes of the international community. However, this policy also increased tensions between ethnic Macedonians and Albanians in Macedonia, and deepened divisions among Macedonians (Vangelov 2019). Greece objected to its neighbour’s use of the term Macedonia and to the use of what it considered Greek symbols and history. The dispute lasted from 1991 till 2018, causing Macedonia to be excluded from EuroAtlantic integration, although it was the first ex-Yugoslav state to start with the integration process. In June 2018, the ground-breaking Prespa agreement was reached between Greece and Macedonia on the name of the Macedonian state, which was to be called the Republic of Northern Macedonia in the future, based on the compromise reached. Greece pledged to refrain from vetoing North Macedonia’s accession to the EU and NATO. The agreement had to be confirmed by referendum and amendments to the Constitution.6 The official renaming came into force in February 2019 and a year later North Macedonia became a member state of NATO and the European Council officially approved the start of accession talks. However, Macedonian society remains divided over the issue, and the polarisation among ethnic Macedonians is quite high. A poll conducted by NDI in 2020 suggests that 32% support the Prespa agreement, while 26% believe it was

Political and Societal Security 161 necessary, and 31% of the respondents oppose the Prespa agreement – note that the support for the agreement is considerably higher among ethnic Albanians: 5% of ethnic Albanian respondents oppose the Prespa agreement while 68% support it. Of ethnic Macedonians, 43% oppose the Prespa agreement while 17% support it (NDI 2020). The political party Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRODPMNE) appeals to voters who are enraged by its nationalist message about the state’s name change, while SDSM talks to its supporters through the lenses of necessity and Euro-Atlantic integration.7

Democratic Backsliding Throughout the region, there is an increase in autocratic practices and illiberal tendencies – democratic backsliding (Bieber 2018, 2020; Kapidžić 2020; Stojarová 2020a). Illiberal practices mainly concern the relationship of the ruling parties to the media (their direct or indirect control), judicial independence, free and fair elections, privileged access to public resources, and the suppression of the role of the civil society. The democratic backsliding seems to be deeply rooted in the unfinished transitions of the 1990s, which gave rise to new political and economic elites. Blending those two in one resulted in the dominance of the executive over the judiciary and legislature power (Stojarová 2020a: 221). Nepotism, corruption, increasing control of the state apparatus, and the party ruling over many aspects of citizens’ lives all together contribute to lowering the rating of democracy in the Western Balkans. While all the countries are moving closer to the European Union, the dichotomy between passed legislation and implementation remains a central issue. The existence of these illiberal autocratic regimes results not only in protests (e.g., Serbia 2018–20, Albania 2018, Kosovo 2020, Montenegro 2019– 20, etc.), but the fall of these undemocratic regimes would heighten the security threat of instability. The electoral processes during the most recent elections in the region were declared by international observers as meeting the requirements of democratic elections. Nevertheless, at the same time, the elections share similar flaws. The voter registers are often inaccurate, enabling multiple voting or voting of the dead, and the electoral commissions are quite often politicised.8 The media report vote buying,9 carousel voting, and voting linked to party employment or selective distribution of social benefits. What is more, the stories describe intimidation of voters with the threat of job loss. Transparent elections would not involve control of the media in relation to the elections and the blurring of state- and party-financed activities (Stojarová 2020b, 228). Demographic shifts and the enormous outflow of the population contribute not only to brain drain but also influence the results of elections and referendums and facilitate the falsification of ballot counting. Berlusconisation of the media seems to be on the rise throughout Europe, not only in the Western Balkans. We observe the political and economic influence of the media exercised by ruling parties or their proxies, biased coverage of politics,10 acceptance of verbal and physical attacks on journalists, arrests of investigative

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journalists,11 media regulatory bodies controlled by ruling parties, silencing critical media by use of defamation lawsuits, and encouragement of journalistic selfcensorship by political elites (Stojarová 2020b, 161–181). Verbal and physical attacks on journalists are quite common, the murder of journalists is not unknown in the region,12 and all this is done with the tacit support of politicians. The Western Balkan countries have successfully constructed a democratic façade in regards to judicial independence as well, and there seems to be a huge gap between policy and practice. What we observe is the politically motivated appointment of judges by governing parties, control of judicial institutions by the executive, pressure on prosecutors not to investigate or mishandle the investigations of politicians, disregard for judicial rulings, and direct or indirect pressure on judges in individual cases. The structural weaknesses of democratic institutions are thus purposefully exploited by domestic regimes, which are able to misuse these fragile institutions to their advantage (Kmezic 2020, 183; Stojarová 2020a, 230). All that described above seems to go in hand with privileged access to resources – the senior positions in public companies being filled with partisan appointments; public contracts and government spending are quite often nontransparent; economic subsidies are distributed as a reward for loyalty; party patronage in public employment as well as in private-sector contracts prevails.13 At the same time, civil society, which should act as a controlling factor on incumbents, is publicly intimidated by the politicians. The police use force quite often during protests, opposition leaders are put in detention or imprisoned, dismissal of public employees is threatened, and the media are used to obstruct the spread of civic movements (Stojarová 2020a, 231–232).

Organised Crime and its Nexus in the State Apparatus The Western Balkans has suffered from the collusion of the state apparatus and organised crime for more than three decades. This situation arose as a result of the involvement of states in armed conflict, international sanctions, isolation, and inability to supply markets through official channels, corruption, but also the rugged mountain terrain, which creates suitable conditions for the illegal movement of material and people (Krasniqi 2016). Non-democratic regimes very often use the services of the underworld to destroy political opponents. Despite the declarations of local government officials and the European Union’s efforts for regional cooperation in the fight against organised crime, positive results are not evident. The excess of roundtables and meetings of ministers at the regional level with the participation of the EU only made the problem visible, but did not solve it. While the nature of modern organised crime demands more coordinated enforcement, there are gaps in regional cooperation mechanisms and instances of inefficiency. There is a general reluctance by politicians to give up illegally acquired property, which hinders the fight against organised crime. We can recall the case of former Croatian Prime Minister Ivo Sanader, who was jailed for corruption, and the allegations against Montenegrin politician Milo

Political and Societal Security 163 Djukanović of promoting crime and corruption. It can be assumed that in the future we will witness accusations that high-ranking politicians and representatives of the state’s security forces are connected to organised crime. A study in Albania revealed that politicians, businesses, and criminal organisations are very much interlinked, and that they threaten public safety and pose a challenge to the state (Thilla and Lamallari 2016). This can be said for all of the Western Balkan states.

Nationalism, Radicalism, and Extremism: Ready for the Homeland and Faith? Nationalism has been part of political and social discourses in everyday life in all of the countries under our scrutiny. It has been promoted, tolerated, normalised; we could trace the origins of the current nationalism at least to the death of Tito. In Croatia, more than 30 years after achieving independence, society still seems to be flirting with ‘Ustaša-nostalgia’ (Pavlaković, Brentin and Pauković 2018; Pavlaković 2008; Đurašković 2016). Nationalism is widely present in the social and political life. Also, sport is a highly politicised form of national expression, where the official anthem of WWII Croatia, Za dom spremni (‘For the Homeland’) and musical hit ‘Bojna Čavoglave’14 by Croatian nationalist singer Thompson are intoned frequently by chanting crowds (Brentin 2016). At the local level, the public display of Ustaša insignia is commonly observed, and the glorification of the WWII regime at concerts and commemorations15 is highly tolerated (Milošević and Touquet 2018). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, nationalism is widespread in the everyday political discourse; far-right groups are tolerated and the far right is being mainstreamed. Nationalism in BiH is based on war events – with war criminals perceived as heroes, disputes about numbers of casualties, and the Srebrenica genocide. Serbian nationalism builds on a history starting with the 1389 battle of Kosovo, and the idea of Greater Serbia is related to the wars of the 1990s. St. Vitus Day (Vidovdan) gatherings in Gazimestan and the march to Ravna Gora are only two examples of the prominent display of Serbian nationalism. Extremist groups manifest themselves in the Balkans in two ways – in groups with a ‘Nazi or skinhead prefix’ as part of a broader European context, and those ‘with an ethnic prefix’, be it Serbian, Albanian, Croatian, Bosniak, Macedonian, or Montenegrin (Kuloglija et al. 2021). In Croatia, it is among the war veterans that we find the extremists. The extreme version of Bosnian nationalism is represented by the Bosnian Movement of National Pride (Bosanski pokret nacionalnog ponosa), a far-right political organisation operating in the whole BiH claiming that Bosnia should primarily belong to the Bosniaks (BPNP undated; Arnautović 2010). The extreme Serbian element is represented by the paramilitary organisation Serbian Honour (Srpska čast),16 which was founded in Serbia and has roughly 40,000 members and operates on the territories of Republika Srpska, Serbia, and Montenegro (Marković 2018). Albanian far-right organisations are currently the least active in the region. These groups have almost no support among the population, and their risk potential lies precisely in their connection to organised

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crime. The big challenge for the region remains the future activism of the Kosovar Vetëvendosje political party flirting with the Greater Albania idea. Although far-right parties are numerous throughout the region, they can boast no real successes, with the exception the far-right Serbian Radical Party (Srpska Radikalna Stranka, SRS), which became famous in Europe for winning 29.46% of the electoral turnout in Serbia in 2008. However, since then the party has been marginalised. Many other far-right political parties and organisations promoting Greater Serbia or Serbian nationalism have won some minor electoral gains.17 Some far-right politicians enjoy governmental support – e.g., Miša Vačić, the prominent leader of the SNP 1389 group (and contemporary leader of the farright party Serbian Right), who was briefly employed in 2016 as an adviser in a governmental office for Kosovo and Metohija. Radical political parties, veterans and patriotic organisations, and far-right movements operate throughout the whole of the Balkans, and egg on and breed foreign fighters. In Ukraine, about 300 Balkan fighters have joined various local units – Serbs have fought on the Russian separatist side in the name of a Pan-Slavic and Orthodox Commonwealth, while Croats have participated on the Ukrainian side as a gesture of friendship from the time of the Yugoslav wars (Metodieva 2019). Alongside nationalism, Islamist fundamentalism has taken root in the Balkans. Radical and extreme Islam and fundamentalist interpretations of the religion are something that is largely foreign to the Balkan region. The explanation for the increase in this phenomenon must therefore be seen in imports from elsewhere. Many Mujahideen remained in the area after the war in BiH and helped spread the radical Islamic creed. After 9/11, the United States government put pressure on the Bosnian authorities to take action against the newly formed Islamic organisations, resulting in the expulsion of dozens of people from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Investments by Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern players are contributing to the rise of Islamic radicalism, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, south-eastern Serbia, and Macedonia, which became one of the countries of origin for ISIS foreign fighters.18 There are several Islamist villages where recruiters posing a potential threat have settled. The post-war environment, high unemployment, and declining international forces contributed to recruitment to ISIS. The foreign fighters are now returning, and it is necessary to ensure their reintegration and de-radicalisation. In the literature, ongoing nationalism, radicalism, and extremism are explained by the concept of cumulative extremism as a form of political extremism, which occurs when one form of political extremism mobilises against another form of political extremism and produces a spiral of violence.19 The region is not stabilised, the nations and ethnic groups feel insecure and so are trapped in a vicious cycle of nationalism, which is being mainstreamed. Reciprocal radicalisation is taking place, and one cannot see light at the end of the tunnel.

Demographic Developments and Brain Drain The emigration of highly qualified and skilled labourers seems to be the biggest challenge for the Western Balkan countries, and the trend is not improving, rather

Political and Societal Security 165 the opposite. According to the 2019 Global Competitiveness report issued by the World Economic Forum, the Western Balkan countries are among the countries with the biggest brain drain in the world (Schwab 2019). The push factors include high unemployment, low wages, corruption, lack of opportunities, instability, and low quality of life. The labour market remains very inefficient, and the result is high unemployment, especially youth unemployment. Although unemployment declined in the last decade across the region, it remains high by international standards. Back in 2001, the unemployment rate in Kosovo approached almost 60% of the labour force, and since then the labour market improved so much that unemployment fell by half, though it still oscillates around 25–30%. Albania and Croatia have been the best performers in respect to unemployment, with an average unemployment rate of approximately 10% of the labour force. The unemployment rate among the youth remains alarming, though the estimated youth unemployment has seen sharp decline – in 2017 the World Bank estimated 63.21% of youth unemployment in BiH, which within two years dropped to 33.97%. We observe the same trend in the overall rate of unemployment in all of the countries. Youth unemployment remains highest in Kosovo and is around 50% of the labour force, while Croatia has the lowest at around 16% of the labour force, and rates fluctuate in the rest of the countries between 25% and 36% of the labour force (World Bank 2019). The brain drain trend seems to be very worrying: A study by the Gallup Institute conducted between 2015 and 2017 using a sample of half a million respondents in 152 countries shows that 42% of Kosovo citizens want to emigrate from the country, which is the worst rank in Europe and third worst in the world. In Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania, 32% of the population are eager to leave the country, in North Macedonia 30%, in Serbia 25%, and in Croatia 6%. The exception seems to be Montenegro, which receives 25% of its young and educated work force from other countries (Živković 2018; Popović 2018). However, it is not 60 2000

2010

2020

50 40 30 20 10 0

Croatia

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Serbia

Montenegro

Kosovo

North Macedonia

Albania

Figure 9.1 Unemployment rate, % of labour force. Source: statista.com; for Kosovo tradingeconomics.com.

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just unemployment that drives the youth to depart – social and political factors play roles. Compared to 2017, the region has seen a deterioration in citizen satisfaction across a number of key measurements. Job satisfaction has plummeted from a mean of 2.7 to 2.3, along with accessibility to public services via digital channels (down to 2.7 from 3.1). Satisfaction with social life has also declined, alongside happiness with schools, transport, and cleanliness. However, the region has recorded increases in satisfaction with administrative services and healthcare, while there has been no change in satisfaction with safety and public services in general (Regional Cooperation Council 2019). All of the countries, with the exception of Serbia, are experiencing negative migration flow that is demonstrating a decreasing trend. Nevertheless, one might point out that the Serbian migration rate is impacted by immigration from within the region and does not necessarily mean that Serbs do not emigrate; according to OECD estimates, between 2012 and 2016 around 245,000 people left Serbia (ECFR undated). Also, regarding the decreasing trend and looking at the overall percentage of the population that has already left these countries, one might sarcastically note that those who wanted to leave have already left. The European Institute for Security Studies projects that almost all WB states (with the exception of Kosovo and BiH) will experience population decline (by approximately 10%) in the next decade (European Institute for Security Studies 2018). There are multiple negative consequences of brain drain. These countries invest in highly skilled workers who then leave which means their skills cannot contribute to the system they were educated in. What is more, they do not contribute to the pension system and, like everywhere else, the population is ageing in the WB states. The departure of skilled workers leaves countries shouldering a major fiscal burden, hindering economic productivity and the development of important public services, including healthcare and education. However,

Serbia North Macedonia Monte Negro

Croatia Bosnia and Herzegovina Albania

2017

2012 –300000

–250000

–200000

–150000

–100000

–50000

0

50000

Figure 9.2 Net migration from WB countries 2012 and 2017. Source:World Bank data 2019.

Political and Societal Security 167 the consequences are not all necessarily negative. Firms in WB countries offer incentives for highly skilled workers, which might raise salaries. Furthermore, emigration brings valuable remittances which are sent to relatives back at home and spent locally. Even regional leaders are aware of the situation, the proposed policy measures are meaningless since the whole political/economical/societal situation must be improved in order to reverse the tide and prevent further brain drain.

Competition of External Actors20 The Balkan Peninsula has historically been an arena of geostrategic rivalry. The current players include the Russian Federation, Turkey, the People’s Republic of China, the Gulf States, the USA, NATO, and the EU. Russia is building its relations on historical and cultural ties, trying to promote its economic and energetic interests and weaken the West, investing mainly in Serbia and Republika Srpska; the strategic goal is to slow down the process of integration into the European Union and NATO. Turkey endorses Neo-Osmanism, strengthening its position in the region via economic, cultural, and personal ties (Madhi 2021; Rashid and Sheikh 2020). China uses the Balkans as a gateway to Europe as part of its overall strategy for European political-economic expansion. Chinese activities in the region (especially in infrastructure, the Balkan Silk Road) reduce transport costs and time, and assist with export diversification and regional interconnection and cooperation. On the other hand, Chinese investment is provided in the form of loans and thus contributes to the debt burden of states. The Gulf States (mainly Saudi Arabia and Iran) promote their daily practice of Islam which truly differs from the ‘secular Balkan’ experience of Islam. The economic investments of the Gulf States go hand-in-hand with cultural influence. Saudi Arabia not only funds the reconstruction of numerous mosques, but also provides free Arabic language lessons. There are still a number of Salafist villages in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially in remote rural areas. Americans were very much present in the WB in the 1990s and promote their interests through their allies (Croatia, Kosovo, Albania). The goal of the EU and NATO is to stabilise the region and hinder the expansion of the security threats in order to promote their economic and political interests. Serbia remains the only country in the region where EU accession is supported by fewer than one-third of all respondents, with those in favour and against split almost evenly (26% and 24%, respectively). Albania and Kosovo are the EU’s biggest cheerleaders, with 87% and 75%, respectively, viewing membership as a positive development. Bosnia and Herzegovina records a substantial increase in support for the EU with nine percentage points added at the expense of both neutrals and those opposing EU membership. In order of importance, Balkan citizens view as positive the economic benefits, ability to work and study abroad, travel, and peace and stability as reasons to enter the EU (Regional Cooperation Council 2020).

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120 100 80 60 40 20 0

Western Balkans

Albania

Good thing

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Kosovo

Neither good nor bad

Montenegro

Bad thing

North Macedonia

Serbia

I do not know

Figure 9.3 Do you think that EU membership would be a good thing, bad thing, or neither good nor bad for your economy? Source: Regional Cooperation Council 2020.

COVID-19 and its Potential Impact on Politics and Society The global COVID-19 pandemic poses an unprecedented challenge to humanity. Countries around the world face the historical dilemma of adopting and implementing stricter security measures aimed at ensuring the safety of the population, to some extent at the cost of partial suppression of fundamental human rights and freedoms. A wide range of measures have been adopted around the world, with each country approaching the crisis differently. As a result, policies range from the choice of relatively loose restrictions that rely on building the innate immunity of the population (Sweden) to extremely restrictive measures that result in limits on certain human rights and democracy. The approach of the countries of the Western Balkans during the first wave, although varying considerably from country to country, was one of the most restrictive, with severe limits on freedom of movement being monitored by the police and the army. The first consequence of severe restrictions imposed in the region was the end of protests against political incumbents.21 However, the COVID-19 pandemic also contributed to the outbreak of new protests, be it against the strict measures (Serbia) or related to the US pressure to change territory in Kosovo. Concerns arose about the misuse of restrictions by governments in relation to press freedom, monitoring of the population, and suppression of opposition activities. During the first wave of the pandemic, we could observe a governmental crisis in Kosovo and a vote of no-confidence.

Political and Societal Security 169 The decrease in foreign tourists, decline of remittances from the Balkan diaspora, freezing of the economies and subsequent crisis, deepening differences in society due to home-schooling and lack of knowledge and IT equipment for teachers and students, decline in migration, increasing activity of organised crime and its adaptation to new conditions, internet fraud, the temporary release of prisoners in Albania convicted of minor offences, uncontrollable nepotism in government contracts without tenders, and increased involvement of the USA, Russia, and the PRC in the region are among the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic (Angelovski et al. 2020; Djordjević and Dobovšek 2020; Juzová 2020).

Conclusion Since the 1990s, politics in the Western Balkans has been dominated by ethnonationalist parties who dominate the political and social discourse based on their nationalist agendas, and prevent post-conflict reconciliation and the establishment of positive peace. Despite some minor improvements, state institutions in the Western Balkan countries have been underperforming and do not deliver public goods according to the standards expected in mature democracies. What is more, we observe democratic backsliding throughout the whole region. The Western Balkan countries have successfully built a democratic façade – in theory elections take place, there is full range of media, judges are independent, and access to public resources is open for everyone. However, the reality is different. Incumbents misuse their power and try to control the media, judiciary, and elections, suppress civil society, and public resources are only for their supporters. There is nothing like positive peace and no light at the end of the tunnel. The COVID-19 pandemic seems to provide even more opportunities for incumbents to control society, and fears about Big Brother come to mind often. The national economies mirror the political situation – there are still structural problems; there is huge public debt and high unemployment. Political uncertainty, the spread of organised crime, and public acceptance of corruption may be obstacles to more foreign direct investment. Youth unemployment seems to contribute to the dissatisfaction of citizens, the rise of nationalism, political radicalism, radical Islamism, massive emigration, and brain drain. The conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina remains frozen, and the Kosovo issue is unresolved. Throughout the region, ethnic identity is preferred to identification with the state. Nationalism, radicalism, and extremism are widespread in daily social and political life. The only puzzle which has been solved is the name of the state in current North Macedonia – but still the cleavage in society remains huge. The Western Balkans remain the European Union’s Achilles’ heel, and reflections on redrawing borders or the revision of Dayton – if we stick to ancient mythology – might reopen Pandora’s box.

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Box 9.1: Political-societal security in the Western Balkans Countries

Political-societal security

Croatia

EU and NATO member, Croats in BiH, Serbs in Croatia, slight democratic backsliding Albania Albanians living beyond the borders, Kosovo, democratic backsliding, organised crime, brain drain Montenegro Montenegrin identity, organised crime, external actors, democratic deficit North Name dispute, polarisation of the country, Albanian national Macedonia minority, organised crime, democratic deficit, nationalism, Islamic radicalism, brain drain, external actors Serbia Kosovo, Serbs living beyond the borders, democratic deficit, nationalism, radicalism, extremism, Islamic extremism, brain drain, external actors BiH Autonomy/independence for Republika Srpska, emancipation of Croats, cohesion of the country, organised crime, democratic backsliding, nationalism, radicalism, Islamic extremism, brain drain, external actors Kosovo Recognition, Greater Albania, northern Kosovo, Kosovo Serbs, Albanians in south-eastern Serbia and western Northern Macedonia, democratic backsliding, organised crime, nationalism, radicalism, Islamic extremism, brain drain, external actors

The COVID-19 pandemic seems to rather worsen the whole picture. The number of foreign tourists has decreased, the remittances sent to the region have declined, and the economists foresee economic crisis. Organised crime is increasing, quality of education is deteriorating, deepening the differences in society, research and technology development are declining, and we observe further democratic backsliding. We might also expect higher involvement of the USA, Russia, and the People’s Republic of China in the region. All this could lead to further disruption of the fragile peace. If the European Union wants to keep the peace in this neighbourhood, more engagement is needed. Let us not forget that stability as well as democracy in Southeast Europe are important for the security of the whole of Europe.

Funding This text was written at Masaryk University with support from the Specific University Research Grant provided by the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports of the Czech Republic.

Notes 1 The term was used before the First World War due to overlapping claims to territories and spheres of interest between the major European powers and the growth of nationalism.

Political and Societal Security 171 2 This designation is without prejudice to the various positions on the status of this territory, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence. 3 The shortened version (Macedonia) of the constitutional name, Republic of Macedonia (Republika Makedonija), is used throughout the text for the period until 2019 when the new constitutional name, North Macedonia (Severna Makedonija), came into effect. When necessary, the acronym FYROM is used below. 4 Bosnia and Herzegovina comprises two entities: The Federation of Bosnia Herzegovina and Republika Srpska (RS). Formally, the Brčko District lies within both territories, a multiethnic self-governing administrative unit. For a detailed explanation of the BiH political system, see Banović, Garić, and Bareiro Marino (2021). 5 For analysis of the exchange of the territory, see New Social Initiative (2019). 6 In September 2018, a referendum was held, asking: ‘Do you support NATO and EU membership and accept the name agreement between Macedonia and Greece?’. In the referendum, 90.72% of voters (with the participation of 36.5% of eligible voters) agreed to change the name of the country under the above conditions. However, for the referendum to be valid, at least 50% participation was required. The change in the name of the state was decided by a vote in parliament on the Constitutional Act, amendments to the Prespa Agreement, and their subsequent ratification by Parliament on 11 January 2019, by a two-thirds majority. 7 For insights on events following the Prespa agreement, see Koneska (2019). 8 For example, some sources claim that in Serbia and Croatia there are more voters than inhabitants. In the 2017 elections in Serbia, it turned out that there were 800,000 more voters than adults living in the country (Bago 2009; Pavlović 2020; Stojarová 2020a). 9 For example, during the 2016 Montenegrin local elections, it is estimated that vote buying accounted for up to 24% of cast ballots (Komar 2020). 10 Several surveys from Serbia show a rather dominant presence of Aleksandar Vučić in the major national broadcasters as well as in the print outlets with the highest circulations, both of which are controlled by the executive. During the 2017 presidential campaign, Vučić received ten times more airtime than all other candidates combined (Pavlović 2020). 11 In BiH, a good example of this is the case of klix.ba. In 2014, this popular website published an audio recording of the former prime minister of Republika Srpska, Željka Cvijanović, implicating her in a corruption scandal; soon afterwards, klix.ba reporters were subjected to police interrogation and pressure involving threats of criminal charges for publishing unauthorised material (Stojarová 2020b). 12 Two of the most infamous journalist murder cases which provoked international outrage and condemnation were those of Serbian journalist Slavko Čuruvija in 1999 and the Montenegrin editor Duško Jovanović in 2004. 13 Citizens are more inclined to take part in the clientelism offered by the system than confront it. Hence in Serbia, for example, the ruling SNS has roughly 750,000 party members: 200,000 more than the party membership of Germany’s ruling Christian Democratic Union, and even 600,000 more party affiliates than the UK’s Conservative Party. Meanwhile, Serbia’s population is just over 7 million people, in comparison to Germany’s 83 million and the UK’s 66 million (Kmezić 2020). 14 The song became famous in the 1990s. It assures the Serbs that the Croatians will ‘get them in their homeland’. 15 The most prominent case was the unveiling of a plaque near the Jasenovac camp with the Za dom spremni slogan, which was heavily criticised but downplayed by thenPrime Minister Andrej Plenković (Beta 2017). 16 See their Facebook profile at https://www.facebook.com/SrpskaCast.rs/?ref=page _internal.

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17 A study from 2018 states that there are 23 far-right groups active in Serbia proper. https://uploads.knightlab.com/storymapjs/052a67a1f32f0485ca11202764d2ae60/gde -spavaju-ekstremisti/index.html. 18 As of the end of 2019, about 1,070 nationals from Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Northern Macedonia, Albania, Serbia, and Montenegro had travelled to fight in Syria and Iraq (Shtuni 2020). 19 For an interpretation of the concept of cumulative extremism, see Busher and Macklin (2014). 20 For a detailed analysis of each actor involved, see the respective chapters in the volume. 21 These include the #1od5miliona protests in Serbia (https://1od5miliona.rs/); protests in Montenegro associated with the adoption of the law on confiscation of property of the Serbian Orthodox Church; extremist protests as a spill-over of the Montenegrin protests (Crvena Zvezda Beograd) (Pravda za Davida in Banja Luka (http://pravdazadavida.com/)); oppositional protests in Albania against the government of Edi Rama organized by President Ilyr Meta; and protests organised by VMRO-DPMNE against the Zoran Zaev government in North Macedonia.

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10 From Confrontation to Cooperation Economic Security in the Western Balkans1 Aleksandar Milošević

Introduction It is very difficult to define the meaning of a complex conceptlike security. The traditional meaning of security as an object of analysis uses the state and implies the absence of military conflict, while more modern approaches extend their framework of study to relations between states or deal with security in a general sense through the concept of human security. In accepting the thesis that Wolfers’ definition of security, by which ‘security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked’, has become the standard in the theory of international relations, one should keep in mind the multidimensionality and evolution of the concept itself, from the exclusive focus on national security and the modern extension of its scope, to various domains such as food security, health security, income security, environmental security, etc. (Wolfers 1952; Baldwin 1997). When researching the concept of security, it is impossible to ignore the growing sense of insecurity that people face in everyday life, trying to fight for personal survival and the preservation of their own dignity as human beings. In an attempt to illustrate the expanded concept of security, Emma Rothschild uses four main forms: [In the] first, the concept of security is extended from the security of nations to the security of groups and individuals: it is extended downwards from nations to individuals. In the second, it is extended from the security of nations to the security of the international system, or of a supranational physical environment: it is extended upwards, from the nation to the biosphere. The extension, in both cases, is in the sorts of entities whose security is to be ensured. In the third operation, the concept of security is extended horizontally, or to the sorts of security that are in question. Different entities (such as individuals, nations, and ‘systems’) cannot be expected to be secure or insecure in the same way; the concept of security is extended, therefore, from military to political, economic, social, environmental, or ‘human’ security. In the fourth operation, the political responsibility for ensuring security (or for invigilating all these ‘concepts of security’) is itself extended: it is diffused in DOI: 10.4324/9781003276661-12

Economic Security 177 all directions from national states, including upwards to international institutions, downwards to regional or local government, and sideways to nongovernmental organizations, to public opinion. (Rothschild 1995, 55) The expansion of the meaning of the term security, through a sectoral approach, especially during the last few decades, has directed researchers’ attention especially to the concept of economic security, which, at least until now, has remained rather vague, so much so that the question arises as to whether it can be precisely defined at all. Various ambiguities and numerous debates are emerging due to the intertwining of the domains of international political economy and security studies. At the outset, it is possible to question the relationship between preferred policies and the influence of market factors in international relations. The second field of dispute certainly concerns links between economic security and other security sectors: Political, military, social, environmental, etc. The third domain of questioning refers to the number of different theoretical approaches in general, while the fourth dimension sheds light on the problem of the applicability of economic methods to the analysis of security phenomena. A special problem can arise in the case of loss of methodological sharpness when the analytical framework is obscured by normative deposits and discussions on poverty, unemployment, the connection between bioethics and environmental safety, etc. In any case, it is obvious that the notion of economic security is, to say the least, insufficiently clear, and is therefore very difficult to frame successfully. To define the notion of international economic security, Vincent Cable outlined four possible approaches (Cable 1995). The first refers to the aspects of trade and investment that directly affect a country’s ability to defend itself, including freedom to acquire weapons and procure adequate technological instruments in order to gain a technological advantage. The second approach concerns the use of economic instruments for the purpose of aggression or defence, with special emphasis on the use of economic sanctions through a boycott of trade and investment. During the last decades, the restriction of energy supply through the suspension of energy deliveries to countries that have been marked as enemies has become highly important. Through the third dimension of international economic security, Cable sees the possibility of the negative economic performance of a state impairing its military capabilities or the possibility of projecting its power into the world. This understanding of economic security is especially important at a time when the United States is increasingly turning inwards, leaving the areas in which it has been present for a long time and introducing instability into the international system, accompanied by the creation of insecurity among its own allies. By introducing the fourth meaning of the term, Cable broadens the notion of economic security by defining it as a fear of global economic, social, and environmental insecurity. This understanding of the concept expands its boundaries, encompassing different levels of analysis, from the individual to the global system, which can create additional problems in research and in attempts to apply the concept in practice. Having in mind the fact that systemic insecurity is a key

178 Aleksandar Milošević feature of modern society and the dominant capitalist system in it, vulnerability of the individual in such circumstances has become especially important.

Economic Security in the Western Balkans The security of the Western Balkans region has become the subject of research of numerous authors due to the Yugoslav wars fought in the 1990s, but also because of the current regional security challenges such as political and economic instability, widespread corruption, migration crisis, and high levels of organised crime. The issue of security is especially important in the context of the intention of all Western Balkan (WB) countries to become members of the European Union, but also because of the essential inseparability of their security policies. These two entities (the EU and WB) share common security challenges that require coordinated action, as stated in the Sofia Declaration of 2018 and reiterated in the Brdo Declaration of 2021 (Sofia Declaration 2018; Brdo Declaration 2021). The European Union emphasised the European perspective of the Western Balkans, expressing its commitment to the enlargement process based on ‘fair and rigorous conditionality and the principle of its own merits’ (Ibid, 1). However, the absence of a firm timeline for Western Balkan countries’ accession obscures the region’s European perspective despite the formal agreement on the need for joint engagement of both sides with the aim of political, economic, and social transformation of the region. Very slow and insufficient reforms, numerous security challenges in the region, and the lack of a clear time frame for Western Balkan membership, coupled with the need for internal consolidation of the Union burdened by the Eurozone situation, recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, and the slow progress in reaching a Green Agreement, further alienate countries of the region from membership in the European Union. A particular problem with the Western Balkan perspective of EU membership may be the fear of EU leaders of repeating the Hungarian and Polish scenarios if they accept leaders with questionable democratic credibility under their wing. The rapprochement of the Western Balkan countries with the European Union is further hampered by its reluctance to continue accession negotiations, which makes criticising the EU for the existence of double standards desirable from the point of view of domestic policy in the Western Balkan countries. The problem of accurately identifying countries that belong to this region poses a particular difficulty when researching economic security in the Western Balkans. At the heart of its name is the idea of a common title for countries with significant security risks that geographically belong to the region but are not members of the European Union. However, it is necessary to keep in mind that this is a region of variable geometry. The original seven countries of the region sought, with considerable external pressure, membership in the European Union through cooperation, most of them also aspiring to become members of the NATO pact. Joining the European Union and NATO would, in that case, mean leaving the Western Balkans. On the other hand, temporary regional affiliation is indicated by the fact that some of the countries that geographically undoubtedly belong to the region

Economic Security 179 are trying to isolate themselves from it, at least in terms of avoiding security risks associated with the region (North Macedonia and Montenegro, for example). The common opinion is that by joining the European Union in 2013, Croatia ceased to be a political part of the Western Balkans region, although it cannot avoid being connected with it through the common legacy of conflict and security threats that can spill over into its territory. Croatia’s interest in and security connection with the region are evidenced by the fact that some of the priorities of its presidency over the European Union in the first half of 2020 were the aspiration of conflict prevention and crisis management and the realisation of the European perspective of the Western Balkans region, because ‘supporting Croatia’s neighbourhood also guarantees Croatia’s security’, as stated by the Croatian Minister of Foreign Affairs (Croatian Presidency of the Council of the European Union 2019; N1 2019; Szerencsés 2021). Interest in the region is also shown by Slovenia, which strives to play a significant political role in this area, but also to be a prime actor in its stabilisation and active shareholder in its security. Slovenia’s idea of admitting all Western Balkan countries to the European Union by the end of 2030, presented at the meeting of ambassadors of EU member states in September 2021, has caused dissatisfaction in some of them, causing them to claim that Slovenia’s proposal was ‘entirely unrealistic given the economic and political challenges in the region’ (Fleming and Foy 2021). The pursuit of freedom from economic threats as a key determinant of economic security is particularly interesting to explore in the Western Balkans region, an area that has been faced with an economic downturn and serious negative consequences of the transition process since the collapse of the communist system (Ejdus 2012). The war conflicts in this area, with its numerous casualties and economic devastation, have further contributed to the creation of long-term tensions between the once warring parties, even during the post-conflict period of peacebuilding. Since economic threats can be observed on three levels – from the angle of the individual, the state, and the international system – we will apply this type of analysis to the case of this region as well.

Individual Level The most significant economic threats facing the people of the Western Balkans are poverty and disease. According to the World Bank, the poverty rate in the region at the end of 2021 should be 20.3%, i.e., should return to the level of 2019, maintaining the historically declining trend (World Bank 2021). Although a downward trend is indeed present, the figures point to still significant poverty rates in the region, compared to other regions in Europe. As a result of the loss of numerous jobs in the industrial and the service sectors, the COVID-19 pandemic has even led to an increase in the already high poverty rates. Since the key cause of poverty in the region is the high unemployment rate, it is completely understandable why the disappearance of many jobs due to the pandemic crisis further reduced the employment rate and led to a decrease in the economic security of individuals. Unemployment is the biggest problem in the countries of the Western

180 Aleksandar Milošević Balkans. The data for 2019 Q2 show that 13.29% of the population older than 15 is unemployed. The situation seems even more unfavourable when it comes to women (14.28% are unemployed) and young people aged 15 to 24 (30.45% are unemployed) (Meseli Tague 2021). Of course, the situation varies somewhat in the region’s different economies, but the available data provide serious reasons for concern. The decline in employment was recorded in most countries in the region, especially in Montenegro due to the impact of lockdowns and travel bans on tourism as a key sector of its economy. The only exception to this trend is Kosovo, which has experienced a growth in formal employment. According to World Bank data for 2020 the average employment rate of people over the age of 15 in the countries of the region is 46%, ranging from about 30% in Kosovo to 52.4% in Albania (World Bank 2021, 11). Of course, a special problem is the disproportionate unemployment in certain social groups such as women and young people. According to the World Bank’s semi-annual report, the poverty rate in the region at the end of 2021 should approach the values from 2019 (20.3%), which is essentially a change for the worse in relation to the pre-pandemic trends of poverty reduction (World Bank 2021, 16). The recovery of the labour market in the second year of the crisis, although expected, is not happening equally fast in all the countries in the region, deepening the differences that already exist between them. The poverty rate is highest in Albania (32.6% according to the 2020 data), and lowest in Serbia (17.4%) (World Bank 2021, 17). There is a fear that existing economic growth will not produce new and better jobs, as has been the case in the past. In other countries in the region, the new uncertainty will particularly affect vulnerable individuals and households in countries where economic recovery is slow and uncertain. Additional uncertainty introduces fear of the consequences of the gradual reduction of support measures provided by governments to their own economies and individuals, from fiscal benefits for companies, to subsidies for specific economic sectors (tourism, transport, construction, services), to universal money transfers.

National and Regional Level From the point of view of the economies of the countries in the region, the most important threats to their economic security are poverty, chronic lack of resources, weakened or collapsed industrial structure, very limited effects of existing economic integrations, insufficient competitiveness, and weak institutions. The fact that these are small countries, with different but not excessively rich resource bases, significantly contributes to the reduction of their economic security, especially in situations of political and economic instability and market disruption. It is interesting that all regional actors share the same economic problems, to a greater or lesser extent, which indicates the similarity of their economic structures and significant sensitivity to external shocks. The idea of establishing regional integrations and initiatives with regional ownership aims to connect the countries of the region for different reasons, under the influence of domestic interest groups but also with the involvement of interested foreign factors (Schneider 2017). The most common

Economic Security 181 political motive for establishing regional economic integration is to expand and deepen economic cooperation and build trust among stakeholders, while economic motives often include the possibility of achieving deeper economic integration, and creating larger markets and opportunities for foreign investment (Ravenhill 2020). The development of regional integration in the Western Balkans was accompanied by the aspirations of regional and external actors related to the need for establishing cooperation between the former parties to the conflict and building a post-conflict society. Twenty-five years have passed since the first post-conflict regional initiative (the Royaumont Process for Stability and Good Neighbourliness in the Southeast Europe), and more than 40 regional initiatives have emerged since, with questionable effects (Balkans Policy Research Group 2021; Delevic 2007). It is possible to identify several reasons for dissatisfaction with the regional initiatives’ performance. Some of them are related to the non-transparent structure of established regional organisations, their great sensitivity to political changes in member states, and the essentially questionable impact on deepening cooperation and building trust among regional actors, which was the most important reason for their establishment. One of the failures of the existing forms of regional organisation is certainly the low level of contribution to the increase of welfare in the member states. A special problem is the significant unrecognisability of the regional initiatives, which even knowledgeable observers often cannot distinguish from each other. From the perspective of the economic security of the region, the most important regional initiative is the Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA), created in 1992 as an economic component of the Visegrad Group (Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia) under the significant influence of the European Union. The European Union is ‘exercising’ free trade between the signatory states in order to avoid, as much as possible, its negative effects on their already weakened economies. Since the original members left the CEFTA agreement after joining the Union, it was decided at the summit of the heads of state and governments of the countries of Southeast Europe in 2006 to extend the existing agreement to Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia, and UNMIK (on behalf of Kosovo) and thus replace the existing network of 32 bilateral free trade agreements. This agreement entered into force on 1 May 2007. Bulgaria and Romania became members of the EU in 2007, while Croatia withdrew from this agreement on 1 July 2013, after joining the European Union. Although the CEFTA agreement has contributed to the growth of trade and economic openness among the signatory countries, membership in this regional initiative has also produced various challenges for them (Šiljak 2019; Uberti and Demukaj 2019). During the 15 years of this agreement, numerous conflicts and political tensions have occurred between the signatory states, with significant negative consequences for its functioning. The Secretariat of the CEFTA Agreement has collected data on approximately 100 non-tariff barriers that prevent free trade between the signatory countries. One of the problems with the implementation of the agreement arose when Croatia became a member of the EU, which caused a redistribution of its share in

182 Aleksandar Milošević trade relations to new partners. The migrant crisis from 2015 almost led to a customs war when Croatia accused Serbia of sending refugees exclusively to Croatia, in an organised manner and in agreement with Hungary. Hostile rhetoric escalated into a blockade of the two countries’ borders (which did not last too long), raising the level of mistrust between them. Frequent problems on the Serbia–Kosovo route also make the functioning of this agreement difficult. One of the most important problems occurred in 2018, when Kosovo’s candidacy for membership in Interpol was rejected for the third time. Kosovo’s government officials accused Serbia and its active campaign against Kosovo’s accession for this, after which Kosovo imposed a 100% tariff on all products from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. This measure was justified by the idea of protecting domestic producers and their products, but it was in direct violation of Kosovo’s obligations under the CEFTA agreement. One should keep in mind the fact that uneven economic exchange between the members of the CEFTA agreement, contrary to traditional interpretations of the direct link between trade and peace, can worsen relations between them (Milošević and Hrnjaz 2018). In addition to the expectedly strained relations between Serbia and Kosovo, numerous other tensions between the member states have also created problems with the implementation of this agreement (Serbia–North Macedonia, North Macedonia–Bosnia and Herzegovina). The existing non-tariff barriers among the signatories of the agreement are among the most significant obstacles to the normal functioning of this regional initiative. The way decisions are made happens to be a special problem since consensus has been established as the main principle, essentially preventing decision-making at the multilateral level through the Joint Committee and directing states towards bilateral arrangements and attempts at reconciliation. The proposals of some countries (Serbia, for example) regarding the introduction of the ‘consensus minus one’ rule, whereby the defendant would be exempt from deciding in a specific procedure, have not been operationalised. The significance of the CEFTA agreement is enormous, due to the fact that this is the first or second export market for the countries of the region. However, numerous problems in its functioning have led the signatories to consider alternative forms of economic integration. Dissatisfaction with the existing forms of regional organisation, accompanied by a long and slow process of accession to the European Union, has led to the emergence of new regional organisations with different scopes of action. One of them was the initiative, created within the Berlin Process, to establish a Regional Economic Area, which has grown into a Common Regional Market. The second initiative was the attempt to establish a business and tourist zone called Mini Schengen, which has grown into the Open Balkans due to ambiguities regarding the name. For now, the initiative includes Albania, North Macedonia, and Serbia, but it is trying to bring some other countries into its orbit as well, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro (Dunai and Pop 2021). However, insufficient transparency of the project, i.e., uncertainty about its perspective (as a kind of prelude to these countries’ membership in the European Union or as a substitute for full membership), regardless of public statements by European Commission

Economic Security 183 representatives about joining the Union as a key goal, reduces its attractiveness to other regional actors.

The Level of the International System The changes that are taking place in the international system significantly impact regional economic security. The already complex regional relations are further complicated by serious challenges that arose in the first two decades of the twentieth century. The global financial crisis of 2007–08, as the most serious economic crisis since the Great Depression, has produced significant short-term and longterm consequences. Advanced economies and commodity-exporting low-income developing countries suffered the greatest loss, depending on the type of shock they experienced (Koczan 2016). The key consequences affecting all Western Balkan countries are a decline in their economic output and rising unemployment (Levitin and Sanfey 2018). Recovery was extremely slow in the first few years after the crisis, with a low growth rate of 2%, which led to a double dip recession. This sequence of events also increased migrations from countries in the region (Živković 2018; King and Oruc 2019). However, some of the consequences of this crisis have a longer-term character. Confidence in global capitalism as an economic system declined sharply during the crisis, with two significant consequences: The first concerns the crisis of the existing democratic model, while the second concerns the cessation of China’s opening due to its doubts about the sustainability of the Western economic model (Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Bruegel, 2018). China’s reaction to the crisis has led to its turning to the model of state capitalism (Zadorian, Szanyi and Farazmand 2021). However, we should not ignore the fact that, during the crisis, large rescue packages were sent also to the financial institutions in Western countries. Yet the global financial crisis seems to have marked a turning point and the creation of a realistic alternative to the existing model of liberal capitalism. The convergence of economic systems, expected since China entered the World Trade Organization in 2001, has not occurred. On the contrary, China is becoming increasingly active in promoting its own economic model. The consequences of such actions of China were felt in the Western Balkans through the increased presence of Chinese investments in the region and the thinking of local leaders about the type of economic model they wanted to pursue, with their choice certainly moving away from accession the European Union due to the non-fulfilment of the second Copenhagen criterion, which requires the existence of a market economy in countries striving to become members of the EU (Szanyi 2019). The soft power of the European Union in the region of the Western Balkans is gradually diminishing, the United States is mainly dealing with its own problems, and China and Russia are now trying to fill the gap. In addition to this, it is especially interesting to analyse the Chinese presence in the region because it represents the engagement of a new actor that was not active in it before. However, it should be borne in mind that there is no formal structure for China’s cooperation with the Western Balkans, which has rather most often been based on bilateral negotiations

184 Aleksandar Milošević with individual countries. The only formal framework for cooperation between the countries of the Western Balkans and China is the 17 + 1 forum, which includes 17 countries of Central and Eastern Europe and China. Five of the six regional actors from the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia) are members of this framework, while Kosovo is not part of the mechanism because China does not recognise it as an independent state. China’s activities in the Western Balkans region are highly reminiscent of its presence in other regions (notably Africa) due to large investments in infrastructure projects that are part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and an element of China’s strategic positioning on the European continent (Zweers et al. 2020). Of course, another important reason for China’s engagement in the Western Balkans is the proximity and possibility of exporting to the European Union, China’s most important trading partner (European Commission 2021). As for the relations between China and the countries of the Western Balkans, in terms of financing significant projects, Serbia is China’s most important partner with EUR 1.6 billion in investments (according to the National Bank of Serbia), while overall trade amounts to EUR 2.5 billion (Vierecke and Rujević 2021). For these reasons, Serbia has been increasingly mentioned as an economic and political hub for Chinese engagement in the region (Standish 2021; Conley et al. 2020). However, other countries in the region have also financed significant infrastructure projects using Chinese loans. For example, Montenegro has borrowed predominantly from China to build the first highway in the country, which is an enormous burden to the Montenegrin budget because the offered loans could end up reaching 18% of Montenegro’s GDP (Matura 2021, 12). Fearing Chinese debt diplomacy, representatives of the new Montenegrin government have asked European institutions for help in repaying the loan, to diversify the debt to China and thus avoid increased Chinese influence in Montenegro. The EU refused to directly help with the repayment of this loan; instead, according to available information, it approached Germany’s Reconstruction Credit Bank (KfW), the French Development Agency (AFD), and Italy’s Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (CDP) with an application to propose a solution to this problem (Baczynska and Vasovic 2021). In any case, the attitude towards Chinese engagement is significant also because of its influence on various domains of governance in individual countries of the Western Balkans region that are striving to become members of the European Union (Shopov 2021). A study by the Centre for the Study of Democracy showed that the growing Chinese economic influence in the region is correlated with declining legal standards and deteriorating quality of governance, but also with negative consequences for the environment and the growth of public debt (Vladimirov and Gerganov 2021). Chinese activities in the region, based on the Belt and Road Initiative, can enhance future cooperation and in the long run improve relations between China and target countries (Zeng 2021). The pandemic crisis also provided an additional opportunity for China’s greater regional engagement and growing political influence, which of course may produce negative consequences for the European perspective of the countries in the region should relations between China and the European Union deteriorate.

Economic Security 185 In 2020 and 2021, the COVID-19 pandemic increased the role of governments in economies as a result of the need for rapid action to prevent economic slide, but also to provide support for the basic functioning of economic activities. States have tried to apply a wide scope of measures, such as the deferral of tax and social security contribution payments, extended short-time work schemes, direct lump-sum transfers, and moratoria on public utilities and rent payments to reduce the consequences of the crisis (OECD 2020). As these measures proved insufficient, governments began to provide direct assistance to individual sub-sectors within their economies, as well as cash transfers to various categories of population. All six Western Balkan economies experienced a deep recession in 2020, but in 2021 they are all experiencing a faster-than-expected recovery from the pandemic-induced recession.

Conclusion The end of the bipolar system has led to a reduction of military and political tensions in the post-Cold War period. Economic globalisation has additionally contributed to the strengthening of economic ties between countries and regions of the world, at the same time influencing the growing role of economic factors in international relations. The comprehensive process of transition and democratisation, present in the countries of the former Eastern Bloc at the time, additionally contributed to this development. The region of the Western Balkans, burdened by war conflicts, political tensions, and economic collapse, followed by an attempt to build a functional post-conflict society under the influence of internal and external actors, is a particularly challenging area of research. Although the rather vague concept of economic security is not easy to apply in the analysis of economic, security, and political processes in the Western Balkans region, it is still possible to draw significant conclusions. The pursuit of freedom from economic threats, as the most general definition of economic security, has taken on different meanings, depending on the level of analysis. Looking at the individual level of analysis, the key economic threats facing the people of the Western Balkans are poverty (very often caused by unemployment or inadequate work) and diseases. These problems were particularly emphasised by the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and the collapse of the health care system in the countries of the region. Economic instability and insufficient predictability, necessary for the region’s inhabitants’ planning for the future, threaten their economic security as the cornerstone of overall economic prosperity. The pandemic also has serious consequences for individual economic security. A large number of infections and COVID deaths in each of the WB countries particularly highlighted pre-pandemic fears of disease and inadequate services provided by deteriorating health systems. In fact, the pandemic further emphasised the region’s structural problems and contributed to their greater visibility, with a tendency to produce long-term negative economic and social consequences (Dafa et al. 2020). To support the domestic economies and protect households,

186 Aleksandar Milošević governments of regional actors applied various economic policy measures, from direct financial assistance to subsidies focused on specific economic sectors. Their effect has been a faster-than-expected recovery from recession caused by the pandemic, but with labour market problems accompanied by a disproportionate reduction in the unemployment rate for certain categories of the population, such as women and youth. From the perspective of the region’s economies, the main threats to their economic security are poverty, lack of resources, collapsed industrial structure, limited effects of existing economic integrations, insufficient competitiveness, and weak institutions. Almost all regional actors share these problems, to a greater or lesser extent, but the capacities of the countries in the region to solve them are not the same. The lack of a resource base in the region, especially in the energy sector, is likely to become particularly obvious during the current energy crisis. The dramatic growth of demand, accompanied by an astronomical rise in the prices of natural gas, oil, and coal, will have significant consequences for the already fragile economies of the countries in the region, but also for the political positioning of their governments. However, a joint response to common challenges is not possible because of the inefficiency and structural problems of the existing regional organisations. A significant number of regional organisations and initiatives have emerged in the past 25 years. Although they should have promoted regional cooperation, contributed to reconciliation, and led to an increase in economic well-being for the region’s inhabitants, their overall impact has been questionable (Balkan Policy Research Group 2021). Factors explaining this situation can be numerous, from their unclear structure to over-sensitivity to political tensions among key actors. Although the achieved level of regional cooperation has become an indicator for assessing the progress of countries undergoing the process of European integration, their insufficient political, economic, and administrative capacities accompanied by the unwillingness of regional actors to overcome obstacles that harm their bilateral relations, contributed to its limited success. Two key current regional initiatives, which are talked about quite extensively in public, are the Regional Economic Area (within the Berlin Process), which was promoted to the Common Regional Market in 2020, and the ‘Mini Schengen’, which changed its name to the Open Balkan Agreement at the end of July 2021. Although some regional actors are showing a desire to improve their economic relations through the establishment of the free movement of people, goods, services, and capital, it seems that problems that were the reason for the failure of previous regional initiatives hinder modern regional integration. Political tensions and poor bilateral relations remain key obstacles to improving economic relations and are contributing to a reduction in regional economic security. Changes in the international system also produce significant consequences for regional economic security. The challenges posed to global capitalism by the 2008 economic crisis and the coronavirus pandemic have further complicated the already complex regional dynamics. The global financial crisis has led to a decline in global confidence in capitalism as an economic model, but it has also negatively affected

Economic Security 187 the image of the West in the world. An additional consequence of the decline of the Western model is China’s abandonment of further progress towards a market economy and its increasingly strong reliance on its own model of state capitalism. This development turned state capitalism into a somewhat legitimate alternative to liberal capitalism and, instead of the expected convergence of economic models, created a field of competition between them. The coronavirus pandemic increased the direct role of governments in the WB economies, making elements of state capitalism present in the daily economic life of the population. Regional consequences of this dichotomy are also significant, given China’s increasingly active role in the Western Balkans (through the Belt and Road Initiative, increased investments, developed vaccine diplomacy) on the one hand, and the intention of all regional actors to become full members of the European Union, on the other. The possibility of sitting on two chairs has been exacerbated by the standpoint of the European Union, according to which China is being promoted to a systemic rival of the Union. Along with the already negative attitude of the USA towards China, this will further complicate the political and economic position of countries in the region and reduce their economic security (European Commission 2019). Although there are perceptions that the Western Balkans region is becoming a security provider (instead of a mere consumer of European security), political instability, inefficiency of the existing regional organisation, and the inability to provide a response in crisis seem to be reducing the region’s ability to play a more significant role in the European security system (Klemenc, Hrabálek and Đorđević 2021).

Note 1 By referring to the name or territory of a geographical area, the author does not intend to make any judgements or lend any credence to the legal status or name of any territory or state.

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11 From Reconstruction to Transition? Environmental Security in the Western Balkans Emma Hakala

Introduction In the spring of 2014, several Western Balkan countries were hit by severe floods for a period of several months. As the water receded, it left behind not only swathes of ruined agricultural land and destroyed infrastructure but also at least 60 people dead and some 22,500 displaced (WHO 2014). The gravity of the emergency – described as the worst case of flooding in the Balkans in 120 years – prompted a new kind of attention to the risks associated with environmental change. Regional media noted the threat of similar floods occurring in the future (B92 2014). Increasing flood risk is among the expected consequences of climate change in the Balkans, and some studies have directly linked the 2014 occurrence to this development (Stadtherr et al. 2016). Despite the recent experience of an ecological emergency shared widely in the region, environmental security has not emerged as a major policy issue in the Balkans (Hakala 2018). It has not been fully neglected, however, as some of the national security documents of the regional countries refer to environmental issues and climate change among factors influencing the broader security situation. In particular, the potential of natural hazards has been emphasised since 2014, although usually under the more technical term of disaster risk reduction (DRR) (ibid.). Despite this emerging recognition, environmental security remains a relatively marginal concept rather than a major policy area (ibid; see also, e.g., Vukmirović 2020). In the Balkans as elsewhere in the world, environmental issues increasingly constitute security threats. In particular, climate change is expected to increase the risk of extreme weather events, such as droughts, heat waves, and intense precipitation (Regional Cooperation Council 2018). This is not only a risk to human lives and health but also threatens livelihoods and many basic functions of society (ibid.). Other environmental pressures are also taking an increasing toll, as exemplified by the recent alarmingly high rates of air pollution (Čolović Daul, Kryzanowski and Kujundzic 2019). Meanwhile, the global geopolitical and societal ramifications of climate change and its mitigation are likely to have structural impacts that cross national borders and will be felt around the world. For the Western Balkans, the relatively recent past conflict may be a relevant background DOI: 10.4324/9781003276661-13

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factor, although studies suggest its influence lies more with regional relations and cooperation potential than large-scale environmental damage caused by military operations (Hakala 2018). The Western Balkans is an interesting region from the point of view of its capacity to prevent and adapt to environmental security impacts. Many of the problems it is facing will likely be shared by the countries in the region, suggesting they could benefit from cooperation. In fact, some international organisations included environmental security in their post-conflict cooperation programmes in the early 2000s, promoting it as a way to strengthen regional stability through shared environmental goals. Efforts to frame the environment as a security concern or build long-term cross-border cooperation around it remained incomplete, which goes to illustrate the obstacles of such an approach, especially when imposed from the outside. This background could also serve as a platform for the Western Balkan countries to formulate their own environmental security policy.

Approaches to Environmental Security The literature on environmental security focuses on the risks that environmental change poses to society and has come to incorporate a wide variety of topics and perspectives (e.g., Dalby 2002; Busby 2018). It is possible to trace two main themes: One focusing on the role of environmental issues in conflicts and the other on human security and the environment. Studies on environmental conflict have explored, among other things, how environmental factors like resource scarcity and drought affect the onset of conflicts (e.g., Homer-Dixon 1994; Diehl 2018) but also how they can give rise to cooperation and peacebuilding (Ide et al. 2021). Meanwhile, the human security approach has focused on the linkages between environmental change and health, welfare, livelihoods, and food, for instance (e.g., Barnett 2001; Sygna, O’Brien and Wolf 2013; Brauch 2005). Common to the outcomes of many of these analyses is the importance of the societal context in which environmental security impacts take place (Sygna, O’Brien and Wolf 2013). Moreover, climate change will have consequences for the broader geopolitical setting, both globally and regionally. Issues like energy, food systems, and infrastructure will increasingly influence international power relations and constitute concerns for foreign and security policy (Dalby 2020). In a largely interdependent global system, the impacts of climate change and other environmental problems may cascade through economic and political issues across national borders (Challinor et al. 2018). This is also the case with regard to the mitigation of climate change itself. Although urgent decarbonisation is vitally necessary, it may have security impacts either locally or through international relations (Selby 2014; Mirumachi et al. 2020). In order to provide a systematic approach to different environmental security risks, Hakala et al. (2019a) propose a framework of local, geopolitical, and structural impacts. Local impacts are caused by environmental change, such as floods, storms, or sea-level rise. They may affect human lives or well-being directly or through the loss of critical infrastructure. Meanwhile, geopolitical

Enviromental Security 193 impacts occur when environmental change is combined with socio-economic and political factors. These impacts often cross national borders and result from chains of events, such as conflicts or supply chain disruptions. Finally, structural impacts result from the measures that are taken to mitigate and adapt to environmental change. The structural change needed to globally achieve sustainable societies is so significant that it will have implications on security, such as increased societal polarisation within societies or changing power relations between countries. The framework emphasises that environmental security impacts are not limited to direct damage from extreme weather. Instead, they are linked to societal transformations that can challenge democratic decision making and bring about questions of socially just transitions (Hakala et al. 2019a). This does not mean that all environmental issues need to be considered primarily from the point of view of security. Yet, it is increasingly important for foreign and security policy to be able to recognise the implications of environmental change (Dalby 2020). In the discussion below, the three-level framework will be used to present an overview of environmental security impacts in the Western Balkans.

Environmental Security Impacts in the Western Balkans This section presents an overview of major environmental security threats in the Balkans. Rather than attempt to provide a comprehensive list of all impacts that could possibly occur in the region, the aim is to outline the most prevalent issues and their primary causes and consequences. More systematic assessments require further research, particularly with regard to the geopolitical and structural impacts that are still not adequately recognised. Table 11.1 presents an overview of the main environmental security impacts in the Western Balkans following the framework presented in the previous section. The impacts included in the table will be discussed in more detail in the subsections below. However, in order to present a comprehensive picture, the table features some additional local impacts that are possible to identify on the basis of previous research. These impacts are either less imminent in terms of the security risk that they pose – as in the case of land degradation and biodiversity loss – or primarily caused by a natural cause, which makes their prevention difficult – as in the case of earthquakes. Local Environmental Security Impacts in the Western Balkans According to various studies (European Environment Agency 2010; 2017), southeastern and southern Europe are particularly vulnerable to climate change. This will increase the intensity and occurrence of major environmental hazards in the Balkans. In addition, pollution remains a major threat to air, water, and soil. A majority of local environmental security threats in the Western Balkans are related to these two main pressures.

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Table 11.1 Environmental security impacts in the Western Balkans

Local

Impacts

Background factors

Floods and storms Drought, extreme heat, wildfires Air pollution Water pollution

Natural, reinforced by climate change Natural, reinforced by climate change

Land degradation Biodiversity loss Geopolitical

Structural

Earthquakes Governance of shared natural resources Cross-border environmental problems Supply chain insecurity Forced migration Pandemics and other health risks Local transition efforts Global transition pressures Systemic transition challenges

Industry, traffic, inadequate infrastructure Industry, agriculture, inadequate infrastructure Industry, agriculture, inadequate infrastructure, conflict-induced damage Unsustainable production and consumption practices Natural Potential disputes over ownership and user rights, inadequate infrastructure, conflict-related regional tension Pollution, inadequate infrastructure, conflict-related regional tension Climate-related disruptions Climate change, air pollution Biodiversity loss, climate change Local opposition to new energy production facilities International climate policy, geopolitical shifts related to energy transition Societal impact of decarbonisation

Floods and Storms Flooding constitutes a significant risk to both individual lives and critical functions of society, particularly because it has the potential to inflict damage at a large scale and over wide areas. During the floods of 2014, for instance, authorities feared that the damage to infrastructure could exceed that caused by the conflicts of the 1990s (Al-Jazeera 2014). Climate change will increase the occurrence and intensity of floods everywhere in the Balkans but particularly around the Rivers Danube, Sava, and Tisza (World Bank 2018a). In terms of the size of population at risk, the most vulnerable areas are in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. While snowmelt or heavy rainfall usually are the initial triggers for floods, unsustainable land use patterns may have a role in making them more intense (UNDP 2016). Flood damage, on the other hand, may be aggravated by the presence of other environmental hazards, particularly land mines and mining waste, which may get caught up and moved around with the water (ibid.; ENVSEC & Zoi Network 2012).

Enviromental Security 195 Storms are expected to become more frequent and intense throughout the region. This may have particularly harmful effects in coastal areas such as in Albania and Montenegro, where storms are associated with flood surges (Ministry of Environment of Albania 2016; Ministry of Sustainable Development and Tourism of Montenegro 2020). Storms threaten human lives and health as well as infrastructure and livelihoods, such as agriculture (UNDP 2016). Although their impact may be more limited spatially than in the case of floods, they are also more unpredictable because of their sudden character. Drought, Extreme Heat, and Wildfires According to some studies, the Western Balkans will be one of the heating hot spots in the world if the rise in global average temperature continues at the current rate (World Bank 2018a). This could lead to significant increases in the frequency of heat waves, droughts, and wildfires, all of which are linked to each other. By 2050, the number of very hot days may increase by 10–20 throughout the region at low altitudes and by 20–30 days in coastal and near-coastal areas as well as parts of North Macedonia, when compared to the baseline period 1986–2005 (Regional Cooperation Council 2018). Droughts will become more frequent, especially in Serbia, and very dry periods will increasingly be combined with very hot periods (ibid.). Meanwhile, an increase in the frequency and intensity of forest fires in all of the Western Balkans has already been observed and linked to climate change, and the trend is expected to continue (Alfthan et al. 2015). Extreme heat directly threatens human health and lives. For example, in a heat wave in Serbia in 2007, a 76% increase in the mortality rate was recorded in Belgrade compared to the reference mortality rate (Ministry of Agriculture and Environmental Protection 2015). Some parts of the population, such as the elderly, people with pre-existing conditions, and outside workers, are particularly vulnerable to heat effects (Ministry of Sustainable Development and Tourism of Montenegro 2020). Extreme heat also harms agricultural production, including crucial crops like maize, and therefore threatens food security and livelihoods (USAID 2017). Droughts have extensive impacts on several sectors. In eastern Serbia, the annual crop yield is estimated to have dropped by 40% on average during drought years, based on data from the period 1989–2000 (Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning of Serbia 2010). More frequent and severe droughts are likely to have even more significant consequences. They not only threaten agricultural livelihoods but may also have implications for national food security. Meanwhile, dry periods decrease the water level in rivers and thereby hydropower production, as observed, for example, in Montenegro in 2018 and 2019 (Ministry of Sustainable Development and Tourism of Montenegro 2020). This threatens energy supply especially in countries that rely heavily on hydropower, such as Albania and Montenegro (Bankwatch 2019). Forest fires constitute a major risk of losses to the forestry sector, especially in countries where it makes up an important sector of the gross domestic product

196 Emma Hakala (GDP), such as in Montenegro (Alfthan et al. 2015). Forest fires have wider repercussions on livelihoods like tourism and may lead to considerable losses of assets. In addition, they have vast impacts on the ecosystem and biodiversity, including loss of habitat and soil erosion, and contribute to further climate change through an increase in greenhouse gas emissions (ibid.). Air Pollution The problem of air pollution has increasingly gained attention in public discussion as several Western Balkan cities have appeared among the top ten of lists tracking pollution levels around the world (e.g., Prelec and Chrzova 2021). In October 2020, Belgrade, Priština, Sarajevo, Skopje, and Zagreb were all among the 50 most polluted cities in the world on the same day. Sarajevo, which had the highest ranking, had an air quality index of 153, categorised as ‘unhealthy’ (Spasić 2020). The pollution as a whole consists of several elements, but particulate matter (PM2.5 and PM10), nitrogen oxides (NOx), and sulphur dioxide (SO2) are among the most remarkable. The high pollution levels stem from several sources, including energy production, manufacturing, traffic, and heating. One major cause is coal power, which remains an important energy source in all Western Balkan countries except Albania (Čolović Daul, Kryzanowski and Kujundzic 2019). Its impact is accentuated by the fact that Balkan coal plants have very high emissions levels when compared with those located in European Union (EU) countries, mainly because the Balkan plants are usually not fitted with desulphurisation technology or other mechanisms for pollution control (HEAL, CAN Europe, Sandbag, CEE Bankwatch Network & Europe Beyond Coal 2019). Air pollution is a serious health risk that threatens the whole population exposed to it. Recent research suggests that as many as one in five deaths globally each year could be attributed to air pollution caused by fossil fuel production (Vohra et al. 2021). A UNEP study carried out in 19 Western Balkan cities suggests that 1 in 5 premature deaths could be linked to air pollution (Čolović Daul, Kryzanowski and Kujundzic 2019). Air pollution is estimated to cut life expectancy by around 1.3 years on average in the region (ibid.). By some estimates, the pollution from coal plants alone generates health damage costs ranging from 6.1 billion to 11.5 billion EUR annually (HEAL, CAN Europe, Sandbag, CEE Bankwatch Network, and Europe Beyond Coal 2019). Air pollution has an overall adverse impact on the quality of life in the Balkans, especially in urban and industrial areas (Čolović Daul, Kryzanowski and Kujundzic 2019). While this is not a security impact as such, it may indirectly contribute to societal inequality, dissatisfaction, or emigration decisions. Public resentment of air pollution has already given rise to repeated demonstrations, for example, in Belgrade, Sarajevo, Skopje, Priština, and Tuzla (Ciuta 2018; Prelec and Chrzova 2021), and a grassroots movement is beginning to evolve (HEAL, CAN Europe, Sandbag, CEE Bankwatch Network, and Europe Beyond Coal 2019). In the longer run, the inability of political leaders to bring down pollution

Enviromental Security 197 levels – for example through more stringent industrial regulations – may erode confidence in the credibility of democratic governance in the region. Water Pollution All Western Balkan countries suffer from relatively high levels of water and land pollution. The region has an extensive river network, which is crucial for livelihoods ranging from tourism to agriculture. While pristine rivers are still found especially in the mountainous areas of Albania and Montenegro, a large share of the waterways is exposed to pollution or modified due to hydropower production – sometimes both. The main pressures on water result from mining, agricultural runoff, and communal waste, which still often remain untreated in the Western Balkan countries (European Commission 2020). Mining poses the risk of toxic wastewater or heavy metal flows into rivers, which at worst have a devastating effect on the surrounding ecosystem and pose serious health risks to the local population. In rivers, the pollution has the potential to spread and contaminate large areas (ENVSEC and UNEP 2013). Vulnerable and marginalised groups are particularly exposed, such as in the case of a group of Roma camps in the city of Mitrovica in Kosovo. The nearby Trepca mining complex caused severe lead contamination of the water and soil, putting the lives and health of the camp inhabitants at risk (HRW 2009). Agricultural runoff, particularly from fertilisers, causes eutrophication and may degrade the quality of groundwater, which is an important source of drinking water, for example, in Serbia (European Environment Agency 2010). In addition, wastewater treatment is still often highly inadequate. In urban areas, wastewater is collected but often discharged untreated, while about 30–50% of the rural population only has access to a basic level of sanitation and wastewater collection facilities (European Commission 2020). Poor water management leaves the local population exposed to health risks and threatens livelihoods that depend on access to freshwater. An extreme example can be observed in Lake Gazivoda, where construction and mining waste has for years been dumped into a lake that serves as the source of drinking water for a large share of Kosovo’s1 population as well as for South Serbia (Aliu 2020). Meanwhile, Drina River has suffered from heavy pollution for years and is infamous for the so-called island of garbage that floats along the river (Đorđević 2021). This, however, is only the proverbial tip of the iceberg, as several landfills and industrial plants and mining sites release hazardous waste into the river (Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe 2011). Although less visible, this pollution may pose a more acute risk to the riverine population and environment. Geopolitical Environmental Security Impacts in the Western Balkans Geopolitical environmental security impacts in the Western Balkans are more difficult to trace than local ones. As discussed abovee, research overall has tended to

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neglect the kinds of impacts that are formed through complex chains of events and therefore difficult to predict. Yet the Western Balkan countries seem relatively exposed to geopolitical impacts because of their small size, geographical location, and reliance on international trade. In addition, the unresolved regional tensions that still exist may make it more difficult to deal with cross-border environmental problems and natural resources. This section will sketch out and provide examples of some of the main developments that may cause geopolitical environmental security impacts in the Western Balkans. Governance of Shared Natural Resources The Western Balkan countries share a great deal of natural resources across their national borders – water and forests in particular. In global terms, the control of natural resources has been recognised as a potential cause of conflict but also as a shared interest fostering cooperation (e.g., Bruch et al. 2016). After the conflicts of the 1990s, some efforts were taken, for example, by the Environment and Security Initiative, to build cooperation around natural resource management in the Western Balkans, although the concept did not become standard practice in the region (Hakala 2018). Water is perhaps the most important shared resource in the Western Balkans. Several important rivers traverse the region and are used for crucial societal functions, such as irrigation, hydropower, tourism, and water supply. Although severe disputes about water use have so far not emerged among the Western Balkan countries, pressure from climate change and overall ecological crises could make them increasingly likely in the future (Globevnik et al. 2018). This emphasises the importance of multilateral water governance. Such efforts have been made, for example, through the establishment of joint commissions for the Rivers Sava (International Sava River Basin Commission, ISRBC) and Danube (International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River) and through a transboundary cooperation project for the River Drina (Hakala 2018). These initiatives, however, have not turned into influential governance bodies (Hakala 2018) or managed to engage local civil society across borders (Fagan 2010). The region therefore lacks strong transboundary water governance mechanisms that could credibly process emerging disputes about water use. In the Western Balkans, the potential for cross-border disagreements over water use needs to be considered against the backdrop of past conflict. This is reflected, for example, with regard to Lake Gazivoda, which is partly located in the ethnically Serb-dominated northern region of Kosovo. An artificial lake originally created by a dam in the River Ibar, Gazivoda is a crucial resource for Kosovo. As mentioned earlier, it is an important source of drinking water for the local population, and it provides cooling water for the Kosovo A and B coal plants. Serbia, on the other hand, has claimed it has the right to control the lake on the basis of the financing it has provided for its construction in the past. The dispute also featured in the debate over a possible land-swap between Serbia and Kosovo, which heated up relations between the two parties in 2018 (see, e.g., AFP 2018). The case of Gazivoda shows

Enviromental Security 199 how questions about the control over natural resources can become entangled in regional relations and may even contribute to aggravating them. In some cases, the strategic interest in a resource may extend beyond the region but cause local environmental problems. Some concerns have been expressed about increasing Chinese investment in strategic sectors in the Western Balkans, especially Serbia. Since 2015, Chinese companies have acquired a number of key industrial plants in the region, such as a copper smeltery in Bor, Serbia, and a coal power plant in Tuzla, Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to some studies, Chinese investors tend to neglect environmental impact assessments and are not obliged to carry them out by host governments that are keen to welcome international funding (Prelec 2021). The investments may therefore lead to increasing levels of pollution. This is likely to contribute to the popular dismay over environmental degradation which, as noted above with regard to air pollution, has become increasingly vocal. The opposition is likely to be directed at the national governments in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which hold the final responsibility for not enforcing compliance with environmental regulations. Moreover, the protests could be combined with broader frustration over poor governance and corruption, as has been the case in other countries (ibid.). The increased foreign ownership of crucial natural resources may therefore fuel civil society activism but also increase dissatisfaction with and further weaken the legitimacy of national governments. Cross-Border Environmental Problems In addition to natural resources, environmental problems tend to cross national borders. Water plays a key role here because harmful substances easily travel across borders in rivers. Mining sites are one significant source of transboundary pollution because of the heavy metals and tailings they release into waterways. For example, the Ibar/Ibër River, which runs through Kosovo, Serbia, and Montenegro, has mining sites along the river in both Kosovo and Serbia. Especially in Kosovo, wastewater containing heavy metals is discharged into the river nearly untreated. The resulting pollution causes problems also in Serbia, making the water unfit for domestic use (World Bank 2018b). The tense relations between Kosovo and Serbia make the issue difficult to tackle, as even information sharing on technical issues does not always work (ibid.). In the Western Balkan countries, the problems caused by mining have been reinforced by the fact that a number of the sites are abandoned. In many cases, this has meant that pollution has continued undeterred, and it has not been possible to assign a responsible body to carry out appropriate closure of the sites. Work has since been done under the Environment and Security Initiative and UNEP to remediate the damage at several sites, like Reps in Albania and Rreshen in Kosovo. Serbia has also created a cadastre of mining waste to assist in waste treatment. However, it is possible that the impact of mining will only increase as new investment is coming in from countries like China (Balkan Green Energy News 2020).

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The lack of wastewater treatment is an additional factor facilitating the unwelcome flow of pollution across boundaries. This becomes apparent in the case of River Drina, where the island of garbage mentioned in the section on water pollution has formed largely as a result of poorly treated wastewater. All the riparian countries contribute to the problem, yet none of them are willing to take responsibility for tackling it (Đorđević 2021). Even the economic losses that the pollution is causing, such as hampering the efficiency of hydropower, have not motivated the countries to act. The situation has so far not created major tensions among the countries, but as long as the issue remains untreated, the potential for disputes exists. In addition, the inability of the national or local administrations to improve water quality, sometimes despite specifically allotted international financing (ibid.), is likely to contribute to public frustration and erode trust in governance, especially among the civil society actors that have been vocal on the issue. Supply Chain Insecurity The insecurity brought about by climate change is likely to increase the unpredictability of supply chains. Although no systematic assessments of climate risk to Western Balkan supply chains have been carried out, global studies suggest that new insecurities will be felt around the world (e.g., Bailey and Wellesley 2017). For example, the risk of disruptions affecting crucial chokepoints for the global trade of food is expected to rise. Due to a high reliance on specific production regions and trade routes, environmental hazards at these chokepoints could lead to severe delays and difficulties affecting food supplies around the world (ibid.). Such events especially affect countries that are relatively dependent on imports, as is the case in the Western Balkans (Uvalić and Cvijanović 2018). The onset of the global COVID-19 pandemic has very concretely shown the implications of disruptions in supply chains and drawn attention to the efforts to secure them. This also applies to the Western Balkans. Some studies suggest, for instance, that when compared to the EU, the Western Balkan countries currently are more vulnerable to disruptions in food trade (Matkovski et al. 2020). In order to prepare for future crises, the Western Balkan countries should aim to improve the security of their supply chains by diversifying them (OECD 2020). Although climate change will not necessarily cause such a long-term, singular halt in all activities as the pandemic has, similar adaptation measures may improve preparedness for dealing with its consequences. Forced Migration Climate change is expected to significantly affect global migration patterns. Sudden-onset disasters as well as slow-onset changes in the environment will make some areas inhabitable and disrupt livelihoods, potentially affecting hundreds of millions of people around the world (ODI/UNDP 2018). Primarily, this will affect the security of the people who are forced to leave their homes. Yet, increased migration will also have implications along the route and target areas,

Enviromental Security 201 especially if administrative measures to manage the situation are inadequate and if the migrants end up in a vulnerable position without a legal status (ibid.). Assuming migrant numbers will increase, the existing migration route through the Western Balkans is likely to remain active. The experience of the so-called migration crisis in 2015–16 suggests that this will be a concern for the countries of the region, as it will increase pressure on social services, border controls, and other authorities. About 764,000 people in 2015 and 130,300 people in 2016 crossed the Western Balkans on their way to the EU (RiVolti ai Balcani 2020). The situation has been further complicated by the reluctance of EU countries to allow migrants within their borders despite the fact that they usually are the intended target countries (Cocco 2017). The implications of migration, however, extend beyond security to questions about human rights, rule of law, and respect for international norms. Either in the Western Balkans or elsewhere, migration cannot be considered merely from the point of view of security or climate change but as a comprehensive phenomenon (e.g., Boas 2015). Meanwhile, environmental problems within Western Balkan countries could increase emigration and accelerate the so-called brain drain from the region. Some observations already suggest that the floods of 2014 contributed to emigration from Bosnia and Herzegovina (Montalto Monella and Carlone 2020). In addition, deteriorating environmental conditions, particularly caused by air pollution, may add to reasons to leave. Heavy outmigration, especially among young and educated people, is likely to have adverse impacts on social cohesion and well-being. Pandemics and Other Health Risks Although the COVID-19 pandemic has not been directly linked to climate change, recent research suggests that a connection exists between biodiversity loss and increased epidemic risk (IPBES 2020). Previous studies have pointed out that climate change will affect the occurrence of vector-borne disease in humans (Gage et al. 2008). The United States Department of Defense (2014) has named pandemic risk as a potential security consequence of climate change. The global health risks also concern the Western Balkans. The experiences and lessons learned from the COVID-19 crisis will therefore be important to assess in order to further develop measures to deal with pandemic situations. In addition, the Western Balkan countries are expected to suffer from more frequent outbreaks of vector-borne diseases, such as malaria, dengue fever, and the West Nile virus, in the future. Serbia already reported an increase in the incidence of West Nile virus during the 2010s (Petrović et al. 2018). More research is needed, however, to assess the more precise health consequences in the regional context. Structural Environmental Security Impacts in the Western Balkans The structural security impacts of environmental change remain the least explored in research as a whole. For the Western Balkans, previous literature on the topic is nearly non-existent. As concrete plans for large-scale decarbonisation are taking

202 Emma Hakala shape relatively slowly, it is difficult to estimate their potential impacts. Therefore, this section will propose three crucial perspectives that would benefit from further research in the Western Balkan context. Local Transition Efforts Structural environmental security impacts can be seen perhaps most visibly when they are associated with decarbonisation projects at the local level. A clear example of this in the Western Balkans is hydropower. Although water has historically been an important source of energy in the region, its utilisation has recently come to be justified with the need to shift to clean, renewable energy. However, plans to build more hydropower have been met with heightening opposition. In 2019, environmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs) organised joint protests in Tirana, Belgrade, and Podgorica under the title ‘Action Weeks for Balkan Rivers’ (Lakic 2019). Other protests have been organised locally, especially near potential construction sites (Bankwatch 2017). The opponents, who usually are local people and environmental activists, argue that, despite its status as a renewable and carbon-free energy source, hydropower has highly damaging impacts on river ecosystems and biodiversity. It also harms livelihoods like tourism and fishing (De Launey 2018). The protests reveal several risks that are associated with hydropower as a key to sustainable energy. First, the ecological problems could seriously hurt local ecosystems and reduce their resilience – also against environmental security impacts. Second, extensive hydropower construction in the face of continued protests may further alienate local people from political decision making and lead them to question the legitimacy of their elected officials. Third, the focus on hydropower may leave the Western Balkans excessively reliant on one source of fossil-free energy. Currently, hydropower makes up at least 80% of all renewable energy production in all the countries of the region. In Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo it also takes up a vast majority of the incentives for renewable energy (Bankwatch 2017). The regional countries are thus neglecting the development of other renewable sources, such as solar and wind, in which all countries have vast potential (ibid.). The disputes about hydropower illuminate the dynamics behind the structural environmental security impacts of rapid energy transition. All energy production, even carbon-free, has some adverse consequences. Therefore, it is necessary to carefully assess their impacts on different groups of the population and on the environment and to consider ways to avoid or compensate damages. Failure to do so may lead to dissatisfaction and protests or unexpected environmental risks. Global Transition Pressures Globally, energy transition towards sustainable production is already taking place, although at a varied pace. According to the literature, this will have geopolitical implications, if only because of the key role oil and gas have traditionally played

Enviromental Security 203 in international politics. The ways in which this shift will play out in different countries partly depends on their existing energy production and supply patterns but also on their ability to keep up with the rest of the world in the transition process (see, e.g., Scholten et al. 2020). The Western Balkan countries need to find their individual paths in the changing geopolitical and security installation. Although there are differences between the countries, they all share some characteristics that affect their strategic choices. First, they all have relatively carbon-intense economies at present (Sanfey and Milatovic 2018), suggesting that they need to achieve fast and effective transition if they aim to keep up with the kinds of emissions cuts envisioned, for example, in the Paris Agreement. Second, and directly related to the first point, they are all strongly influenced by the EU’s ambitious climate policy targets. Croatia, as an EU member state, is obliged to work towards the targets, but they also inform the policies of the candidate and potential candidate countries. A delayed or failed energy transition could therefore reflect negatively on the countries’ commitment to EU membership or on their accession path. Third, the whole region is relatively dependent on Russian energy imports, especially gas (ibid.). Efforts to increase the share of renewable and carbon-neutral energy could help the Western Balkan countries to reduce this dependence, but it may also have an adverse impact on relations with Russia. The above considerations show how effective climate policy inevitably must become energy policy and thereby also enter the sphere of foreign and security policy. As an increasing number of countries announce target years for reaching carbon neutrality (Darby and Gerretsen 2019), others may risk being left behind economically and technologically. In the Western Balkan case, this could temporarily lead to an increase in the kind of Chinese or other foreign investments in coal production, as described in the section on governance and shared natural resources, but reduced competitiveness, rising emissions, and even worse air pollution in the longer term. Systemic Transition Challenges Underlying both local and international transition pressures is the systemic challenge of governing the decarbonisation process. As discussed above with regard to the environmental security framework, it is necessary to find a balance between effective action and democratic processes. This is closely linked to the objectives of just transition, which aims to take into account the groups and regions that are most adversely affected and to ensure that the process is fair, equal, and participatory (e.g., European Commission 2019). One of the biggest structural risks in the Western Balkan countries is related to the significant role of the coal industry. This not only accounts for an important part of the energy supply but also provides jobs for a large number of people. Transition will inevitably mean increasing unemployment in this sector, as is already happening, for example, in Serbia and Montenegro (CEE Bankwatch Network 2018). Just transition mechanisms can help to alleviate the consequences

204 Emma Hakala by providing opportunities for retraining, for instance. However, it has been observed that the cultural and societal significance of coal plants in the immediate communities extends far beyond merely providing a job (Castan Broto 2013). Coal plant closures are therefore likely to lead to some degree of social insecurity. An additional challenge in the Western Balkans is posed by relatively widespread energy poverty, which means that for many households rising energy prices will be a matter of survival (Robić 2016). The societal pressures connected with the transition are likely to increasingly give rise to civil society action. As elsewhere in Europe, this may take shape as demonstrations either calling for more effective climate action or opposing it altogether. This will create an additional governance challenge especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia, where democratic performance has been stagnating over the past decade (Bieber 2020). Fragile democratic processes could imperil the effective governance of decarbonisation and the overall transition towards sustainability.

Opportunities for Preparedness and Prevention in the Face of Environmental Threats in the Western Balkans As the previous sections have shown, the dynamics behind different environmental security impacts are varied and therefore difficult to predict. This makes it challenging to come up with specific policies to prevent them, as examples from other countries also show (e.g., Hakala et al. 2019b). Yet, the need to incorporate environmental security into policymaking is pressing in the Western Balkans. Local environmental security impacts are the most straightforward when it comes to building preparedness. It is possible to create early warning mechanisms to improve foresight and preventive measures to mitigate the damage inflicted by floods, storms, wildfires, and other sudden-onset disasters. The events of 2014 in particular have drawn attention and channelled resources to flood defence but also to overall disaster risk management. The Western Balkan countries have improved their disaster response systems (UNDP 2016; Crnčević, Miljković and Dželebdžić 2020), and various international programmes have explored ways to build resilience, such as through nature-based solutions (IUCN 2019). Yet more remains to be done to further streamline crisis preparedness. For example, some parts of the population are more vulnerable to disaster risks, such as poor people, women, children, the elderly, persons with disabilities, and minorities. It is therefore necessary to ensure that environmental impacts do not aggravate societal inequality (UNDP 2016). Furthermore, some research suggests that the experience of the floods has not presented an opportunity for institutional learning but instead has led to an increase in authoritarian tendencies, at least in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Džihić and Solska 2018). Geopolitical and structural impacts pose a more complex challenge to policymaking. As they occur through intricate chains of events, it is difficult to predict their consequences and prepare for them through traditional foresight (Hakala et al. 2019b). The first priority, in the Western Balkans as elsewhere, is to improve

Enviromental Security 205 the knowledge base and contribute to a better understanding of the interactions between environmental and socio-economic factors and the implications they have for geopolitics and global security. Foreign and security policy also need to take environmental change and its mitigation efforts better into account in strategic planning. The Western Balkan countries would benefit from deeper and more deliberate regional coordination on environmental security. The impacts that they are facing are very similar and often shared across national borders. However, cooperation may be easier on some issues than others. It is easy to see that region-wide systems for DRR, for instance, would be more effective than national ones. Meanwhile, cooperation is likely to run into problems on issues where two countries’ interests come into conflict, such as the question of control over Lake Gazivoda. The existence of regional mechanisms can ensure that cooperation can continue on some issues even if tensions run high on others. At the moment, however, the Western Balkan countries seem to be lacking a clear commitment to regional cooperation. Most regional initiatives, such as DRR, rely on external financing and coordination (UNDP 2016). By taking more initiative themselves, the Western Balkan countries could take more control over the direction and emphases of the cooperation and thereby potentially improve its sustainability and effectiveness.

Conclusion As the discussion in this chapter has shown, environmental security impacts are expected to become increasingly concrete in the Western Balkans. The impacts go far beyond the direct damage from extreme weather and also affect the society and geopolitics. In addition, the mitigation of and adaptation to environmental change have security implications of their own. This is not to question the urgent need to promote decarbonisation and sustainability transition in the Western Balkans but rather to emphasise the importance of doing so in a deliberate, well-governed manner. Because of the variety of the security impacts linked to the environment, it is difficult to compare their severity or, in many cases, their probability. Floods or heat waves are a major threat as they may directly result in loss of life, while excessive or conflicted use of natural resources can affect the societal sustainability and stability in the long term. Therefore, risk assessments of environmental security need to take a comprehensive perspective and aim to build preparedness for various kinds of future developments. Regional cooperation could considerably contribute to any efforts to enhance environmental security preparedness in the Western Balkans. It can help to deal with common, transboundary risks and to make DRR more effective. However, because of the past conflicts and ongoing disputes between the countries, cooperation will not be easy to initiate, and it will not be a silver bullet to problems associated with bilateral relations between the countries. Finally, the outline of possible environmental security impacts in the Western Balkans presented in this chapter clearly shows that there is a need for further

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research on the topic. It is necessary to better understand the complex interactions between environmental change, socio-economic factors, and geopolitics. Interdisciplinary research can help to illuminate the different consequences and inform policy choices to build preparedness for them. For the Western Balkan countries, it would be beneficial to ensure that such analyses are carried out specifically in their own regional context.

Note 1 From here on, this designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with UNSC 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence.

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ENVSEC & UNEP. 2013. A Short Introduction to Environmental Remediation for Mining Legacies: Case Studies from ENVSEC Work in South East Europe. Report. http:// archive.zoinet.org/web/sites/default/files/publications/Mining-South-East-Europe_0 .pdf. ENVSEC & Zoi Network. 2012. Climate Change in the West Balkans. Report. http:// archive.zoinet.org/web/sites/default/files/publications/Climate-change-west-balkans .pdf. European Commission. 2019. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: The European Green Deal. COM/2019/640 final 11.12.2019 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1576150542719&uri=COM %3A2019%3A640%3AFIN. European Commission. 2020. Guidelines for the Implementation of the Green Agenda for the Western Balkans. Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans. Brussels 6.10.2020. https://ec .europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/green_agenda_for_the_western _balkans_en.pdf. European Environment Agency. 2010. Environmental Trends and Perspectives in the Western Balkans: Future Production and Consumption Patterns. EEA Report 1/2010. https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/western-balkans. European Environment Agency. 2017. Climate change, impacts and vulnerability in Europe 2016. An indicator-based report. EEA Report No. 1/2017. https://www.eea .europa.eu/publications/climate-change-impacts-and-vulnerability-2016. Fagan, Adam, and Indraneel Sircar. 2010. “Environmental Politics in the Western Balkans: River Basin Management and Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) Activity in Herzegovina.” Environmental Politics 19 (5): 808–830. Gage, Kenneth L., Thomas R. Burkot, Rebecca J. Eisen, and Edward B. Hayes. 2008. “Climate and Vectorborne Diseases.” American Journal of Preventive Medicine 35 (5): 436–450. Globevnik, Lidija, Luka Snoj, Gašper Šubelj, and Blaž Kurnik. 2018. Outlook on Water and Climate Change Vulnerability in the Western Balkans, edited by A. Künitzer, ETC/ ICM Technical Report 1/2018. Magdeburg: European Topic Centre on Inland, Coastal and Marine Waters. Hakala, Emma. 2018. Securitisation of Environment and International Organisations in the Post-Conflict Western Balkans. D.Soc.Sci. diss, University of Helsinki. Hakala, Emma, Ville Lähde, Antti Majava, Tero Toivanen, Tere Vadén, Paavo Järvensivu, and Jussi T. Eronen. 2019a. “Northern Warning Lights: Ambiguities of Environmental Security in Finland and Sweden.” Sustainability 11 (8): 2228. Hakala, Emma, Ville Lähde, Antti Majava, Tero Toivanen, Tere Vadén, Paavo Järvensivu, and Jussi T. Eronen. 2019b. “A Lot of Talk, but Little Action—The Blind Spots of Nordic Environmental Security Policy.” Sustainability 11 (8): 2379. HEAL, CAN Europe, Sandbag, CEE Bankwatch Network & Europe Beyond Coal. 2019. Chronic Coal Pollution - EU Action on the Western Balkans Will Improve Health and Economies Across Europe. Report. https://balkangreenenergynews.com/wp-content/ uploads/2019/02/Chronic-Coal-Pollution-report.pdf. Homer-Dixon, Thomas F. 1994. “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases.” International Security 19 (1): 5–40.

Enviromental Security 209 HRW. 2009. “Kosovo: Poisoned by Lead.” Report, 23 June 2009. https://www.hrw.org /report/2009/06/23/kosovo-poisoned-lead/health-and-human-rights-crisis-mitrovicas -roma-camps#. Ide, Tobias, Carl Bruch, Alexander Carius, Ken Conca, Geoff Dabelko, Richard Matthew, and Erika Weinthal. 2021. “The Past and Future (s) of Environmental Peacebuilding.” International Affairs 97 (1): 1–16. IPBES. 2020. “Workshop Report on Biodiversity and Pandemics of the Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services.” IPBES secretariat, Bonn, Germany. IUCN. 2019. ADAPT: Nature-Based Solutions for Resilient Societies in the Western Balkans. https://www.iucn.org/sites/dev/files/content/documents/adapt_flyer_v04.pdf. Lakic, Mladen. 2019. “Balkan Eco-Activists Protest Against Hydro-Power Plants.” Balkan Insight, June 10, 2019. https://balkaninsight.com/2019/07/10/balkan-eco-activists -protest-against-hydro-power-plants/. Matkovski, Bojan, Danilo Đokić, Stanislav Zekić, and Žana Jurjević. 2020. “Determining Food Security in Crisis Conditions: A Comparative Analysis of the Western Balkans and the EU.” Sustainability 12 (23): 9924. Ministry of Agriculture and Environmental Protection. 2015. Serbia’s First National Adaptation Plan. https://www.klimatskepromene.rs/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/NAP -UNDP-2015.pdf. Ministry of Environment of Albania. 2016. Third National Communication of the Republic of Albania under the United Nations Framework Conventionon Climate Change. https:// unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Albania%20NC3_13%20October%202016_0 .pdf. The Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning of Serbia. 2010. Initial National Communication of the Republic of Serbia Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/srbnc1.pdf. Ministry of Sustainable Development and Tourism of Montenegro. 2020. Montenegro Third National Communication on Climate Change. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/ resource/TNC%20-%20MNE_0.pdf. Mirumachi, Naho, Amiera Sawas, and Mark Workman. 2020. “Unveiling the Security Concerns of Low Carbon Development: Climate Security Analysis of the Undesirable and Unintended Effects of Mitigation and Adaptation.” Climate and Development 12 (2): 97–109. Montalto Monella, Lillo, and Marco Carlone. 2020. “How Climate Change Triggered a Second Exodus in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” News Report, Euronews March 23, 2020. https://www.euronews.com/2020/03/05/how-climate-change-triggered-a-second -exodus-in-bosnia-and-herzegovina. ODI/UNDP. 2018. Climate Change, Migration and Displacement. The Need for a RiskInformed and Coherent Approach. ODI & UNDP. Report. https://www.odi.org/sites/ odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/11874.pdf. OECD. 2020. COVID-19 Crisis Response in South East European Economies. https:// www.wb6cif.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Strategic-Response-to-Covid-19-in-SEE .pdf. Petrović, Tamaš, Milanko Šekler, Dušan Petrić, Sava Lazić, Zoran Debeljak, Dejan Vidanović, Aleksandra Ignjatović Ćupina, Gospava Lazić, Diana Lupulović, Mišo Kolarević, and Budimir Plavšić. 2018. “Methodology and Results of Integrated WNV Surveillance Programmes in Serbia.” PLoS One 13 (4): e0195439. Prelec, Tena. 2021. Eco-Monsters & Eco-Fighters: China’s Investments in Serbia’s Heavy Manufacturing Industry as seen through an Environmental Lens. Analytical

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Enviromental Security 211 WHO. 2014. Floods in the Balkans: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia. Situation Report No. 3, June 13, 2014. https://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file /0004/252094/Balkan-Floods-Sitrep-3-rev.pdf. World Bank. 2018a. Turn Down the Heat: Confronting the New Climate Normal – The Climate Challenge for the Western Balkans. Report. http://documents1.worldbank.org /curated/en/494741468189532505/pdf/98220-WP-P148173-PUBLIC-Box393168B -pdf.pdf. World Bank. 2018b. Water Security Outlook for Kosovo. World Bank. http://documents1 .worldbank.org/curated/en/496071548849630510/Water-Security-Outlook-for -Kosovo.pdf.

Part 3

International Level

12 A Relay Race for Peace The Approaches of the EU and the US to Bringing Stability and Democracy to the Western Balkans Region Jasmin Hasić Introduction Almost every modern internationally led peacebuilding mission in either conflict or post-conflict areas has been designed to foster economic and social cooperation, with the purpose of building confidence among (previously) warring parties, mainly by developing the basic preconditions to prevent any future violence and laying the foundations for a durable peace (Barnett et al. 2007, 49), as well as creating a sustainable transformation of structural conflict factors and patterns (Horst et al. 2010, 7). Peacebuilding engagements have ranged from highly fragmented, to ad hoc, to supply-driven ones. Some have required concerted multilateral action to assist local authorities and other international peace settlement administrations (cf. Hinton 2010). The majority of international peacebuilding engagements after the Cold War employed Western-led agency and neoliberal-democratic approaches, combined with the universalising ethics and logics, and followed liberal norms and values as key determinants of peace (Richmond and Mitchell 2011).1 Over time, the ‘liberal peace’ paradigm has slowly emerged as the most prominent form of internationally sponsored peacemaking and peacebuilding, conducted mainly through peacesupport interventions, the deployment of incentivising or coercive strategies aimed at producing stable outcomes (Joshi et al. 2014), and sometimes through the promotion of Western democratic institutions or as a universal model that implied a ‘triple transition’ of moving from war to peace through social, political, and economic spheres (Paris and Sisk 2009). In some cases, the imposition of liberal values in peacebuilding projects was construed as an invention of ‘traditions’ in areas that have fallen under the influence of the international community (cf. Kymlicka 2007). The critiques of this approach were particularly strong in Europe and in some other developing areas (Lee 2015). The structural limitations of international operations and peacebuilding programmes became evident during the conflicts of the 1990s, with increasingly critical approaches to liberal institutionalism. Several frequent unintended effects of this approach came to light, for instance in the recurrence of destabilisation and violence in the conflicts’ aftermath (Suhrke and Berdal 2013), or low levels of security (Duffield 2001), or opening up platforms for the empowerment of DOI: 10.4324/9781003276661-15

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uncooperative and unresponsive elites, as well as the weakening of local governance mechanisms (cf. Mac Ginty 2008; Richmond 2009). Available empirical research on external peacebuilding engagements in the Western Balkans region shows that the international and local agents do not share the same perceptions of the meaning of the peace and security. A long-term commitment, on the part of both local and external actors, to a process that simultaneously addresses the material and the attitudinal levels of conflict, palpably diverges depending on various contexts. Their deviating perspectives result in bargaining relationships, whereby each party attempts to promote its own values, norms, and practices (Jarstad and Belloni 2012). As a result, literature on peacebuilding in the Western Balkans has slowly begun to take into consideration the ‘unintended consequences’ of the international ‘intrusive agenda’, and to account for traditionally overlooked factors of ‘everyday peace’, as a critical research agenda that seeks to recognise the agency and significance of local actors (cf. Richmond 2009; Mac Ginty 2014). This chapter provides an overview of relevant academic literature pertinent for contextualising the peacebuilding approaches of the European Union and the United States of America in the Western Balkans region, and the roles they have respectively played in providing and endorsing security and stability initiatives in the past 30 years. The chapter also examines several aspects of peace, security, and ‘peacebuilding as security’ policies in the Western Balkans, as conditional and coercive forms of international assistance the EU and the US provided. The focus of this chapter is also set on exploring the dynamics and effects of EU and US peacebuilding approaches in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo, respectively, since these two case studies best highlight the contours the two external agents utilised.

Externally Driven Peace and Security Approaches and Initiatives in the Western Balkans Region The literature on international peacebuilding is predominantly tied to the notions of territorially bounded, sovereign, and state-centric international spaces, which facilitate the creation of particular types of war economies, political structures, ‘warlordism’, or ‘weak’ states (Bellamy and Williams 2004, 8). Many authors consider the process to be highly politicised, hierarchical, ‘self-referential’, and fundamentally impotent to expediently meet the needs of the people (Pugh 2011), while some claim it has almost no emancipative or alternative solutions grounded in the local need for stability (Boege, Brown and Clements 2009). Such international involvements are often considered to be tautological with regard to their policies (cf. Richmond and Mitchell 2011), and criticised for their ‘blank slate’ approach in resolving the major challenges in the field (Manning 2008). External actors have been increasingly dominant in developing the peacebuilding public discourses in the Western Balkans region in the past 30 years. Their role has expanded far beyond the initial roles they played at the time of ceasefire, and has evolved into all-encompassing peace-, nation-, and statebuilding processes

The EU, the US and the WB 217 (Call 2008; Paris and Sisk 2009). They reproduce the generalised breaches of sovereignty that influence the developments in post-conflict peacebuilding dynamics, led by core capitalist states or the international institutions that these states de facto govern. In that sense, peacebuilding has somewhat become co-opted by the statebuilding process (Richmond 2010). The evolution of peacebuilding developments in the Western Balkans region can be observed through the top-driven mandated sequence of multiple approaches taken by different actors within a distinct peacebuilding space, and is predominantly characterised by coercion and manipulation, as well as the presence of ‘neo-trusteeships’, ‘traditional paternalism’, ‘informal trusteeship’, or ‘parallel administration’ (Campbell and Peterson 2013; Hasić 2016). These peacebuilding initiatives included, but were not limited to, support for and management of electoral processes; reforms of institutions in the security sector; training of police, judges, and other law enforcement officials; promotion of human rights; drafting of national laws, including constitutions; and, on occasions, the administration of the most basic services in countries and territories (cf. Cavalcante 2019). The external decision-making locus in managing the peacebuilding processes in the Western Balkans region has also often neglected the empowerment of the local ownership and almost blocked the prospect of the efficient stabilisation of democracy. Different modalities of peacebuilding led to different types of social ‘attachment’ to peace built on the part of its subjects. The external peacebuilders sought a genuine appreciation of and engagement with how people locally understand their ‘community’. Acting otherwise meant marginalising people from their new institutions (cf. Krygier and Mason 2008). Available evidence on various peacebuilding initiatives in the Western Balkans region principally suggests that externally imposed peace had limited potential for the genuine transformation of post-conflict societies into sustainable democracies, mainly because often-employed strategies of simplistic ‘transplantation of Western norms’ and other externally generated policies or models cannot fully transform a locally present ‘culture of violence’ into a ‘culture of peace’ (Donais 2009). This is also because the success of externally led missions is almost excessively dependent upon the existing political dynamic of local actors (Chesterman et al. 2005) and international pull and push factors that have slowly evolved along with a domino effect of democratic backsliding (cf. Stojarova 2020). The subsequent sections will closely examine the dynamics of such processes through the lenses of the EU and US peacebuilding involvement in the Western Balkans region, followed by two additional segments specifically highlighting the EU’s peacebuilding approach in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the US approach in Kosovo.

The Fundamental Features of EU and US Approaches to Peacebuilding in the Western Balkans As SFR Yugoslavia disintegrated along ethnically induced conflicts, first in Slovenia and Croatia, then in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and finally in Kosovo, it

218 Jasmin Hasić slowly became the central element of the US’s stability-seeking foreign policy (Paquin 2010) and the EU’s strategic tendency to manage international conflicts, re-establish peace, and initiate democratic reforms abroad (White 2017). The US considered the Western Balkans to be an important geopolitical zone for preserving and expanding the Euro-Atlantic community and limiting the role of other competing powers (cf. Visoka 2013), while the EU decided to get involved in something consistent with the EU’s evolving foreign political interests (Joseph and Juncos 2019). Both approaches employed have relied on top-down mediation among power brokers and on the top-down building of state institutions, rather than on bottom-up, community-driven peacebuilding or the resolution of the fundamental sources of conflict (Newman 2013). For instance, the EU’s involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, and Kosovo suggests that EU-induced reforms have not pushed forward peacebuilding in the conflict-ridden societies, and therefore have not contributed sufficiently to the democratic and good governance agenda (Kirchner 2013). The EU decided to deploy several concurrent missions engaged in reforming police forces in Bosnia (European Union Police Mission, EUPM),2 North Macedonia (European Union Police Mission in Macedonia, EUPOL Proxima, later EU Police Advisory Team in Macedonia), and EULEX (EU Rule of Law Mission) in Kosovo (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2006). However, the EU’s engagement in North Macedonia demonstrated an over-emphasis on crime fighting rather than long-term police reform, while in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EU’s commitment to fight organised crime and corruption has gradually led to mandates narrower in scope and unsuccessful results (Voh Bostic 2010). On the other hand, the US approach, founded upon corporate neoliberalism, a militarist agenda, and development assistance, indicated a stronger involvement in the reconstruction of local governance and transition of economic systems in the Western Balkans towards a market economy, emphasising the dominance of a unilateral Western-centric security perspective (Ozerdem and Lee 2015). The EU has also strategically linked its Western Balkan peace and stability missions to the prospect of EU membership. Consequently, the EU developed a more balanced politics between security, active intervention, and peace. Through normative commitment, as an added value, the EU utilised opportunities to endorse global versions of peacebuilding through accession, and allowed for the creation of strong legitimacy on the ground (Björkdahl and Richmond 2009). In this context, the EU essentially behaved as an ‘ethical intervener’ in peacebuilding, where the objective was improving its own image, rather than achieving sustainable peacebuilding or statebuilding goals in the long run (Rutazibwa 2013). To that end, the Western Balkan leaders have learned that good relations with the EU are facilitated by the delivery of key EU needs, and that the accession perspective is a driver of transformation in the region, and not the peacebuilding process itself (Belloni 2020). On the other hand, the United States Administration’s involvement in peacebuilding efforts in the Western Balkans region has mostly been guided by the liberal peace approach, but the modalities of involvement in specific countries

The EU, the US and the WB 219 differed. In some cases, the overall engagement in peacekeeping and peacebuilding was characterised by direct diplomatic efforts and coercive methods in ending the locally induced conflicts, while the post-conflict involvement was predominantly carried out through close cooperation with other organisations and proxies who took on some responsibilities and deployed necessary assistance to local agents. For instance, the use of US peacekeeping troops to deliver aid in postconflict areas in the Western Balkans later transformed into the ever-greater militarisation of humanitarian and development assistance. Peacekeeping engagement focused on democratisation, human rights,3 and economic reform became the blueprint for the whole region (cf. Woodward 2013). The ambition was directed towards strengthening and stabilising the state apparatus, through encouraging other political and economic reforms. This was also done to alleviate the concerns that a partition of certain countries could be destabilising for the region as a whole (Woehrel 2011). The US record in these peace operations owes its successes to the extraordinarily high levels of political and financial support, as well as the sustained local consent to the statebuilding process (Richmond 2010).4 Overall, the EU’s and the US’s contemporary approaches to peacebuilding in the Western Balkans region, their basic performative functions, and their impact were limited to a number of actors, most commonly top-level elites who had developed excellent relations with international tutors, while the wider societal structures were left out or included only marginally. This is best demonstrable in the two most prominent cases where these two external peacebuilding agents have managed local peacebuilding affairs in the past decades by employing their own peacebuilding strategies – the EU’s engagement in Bosnia and the US in Kosovo. These two engagement types are considered to be the most pronounced examples of foreign-determined peacebuilding in the Western Balkans region, and best illustrate the notion of ‘short-termism’ in the peacebuilding process (Ignatieff 2003), and how the dispensation of soft power in post-conflict Western Balkans areas can lead to a disconnect between peacebuilding practices and intended impacts. Over time, both the EU and the US have manoeuvred their respective peacebuilding agendas in both BiH and in Kosovo, but with tailor-made approaches to each, and actively pursued their own political and security blueprints. Their presence and active engagement have evolved on a continuum between ‘involved’ and ‘present’ actors, and affected the overall dynamics of the peacebuilding process in the region. In general, the EU’s and the US’s integrated-approach peacebuilding interventions in the two countries are fairly comparable on their input side, but have produced some different outcomes. The tensions between the roles these respective external influences have exerted in the peacebuilding processes and the local elites’ visions and capabilities to take more effective control of the situation have not been fully reconciled yet. Achieving the appropriate level of willingness to compromise on this matter constantly raises issues of trust among those who govern the peacebuilding process, and those who want to progressively take over control. Understanding these two evolving relationships goes hand in hand with the prospect of a serious and sustained effort towards bridging divides between liberal and communitarian

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Table 12.1 Types of integrated-approach peacebuilding interventions by Ricigliano (2003), applied to the investigated cases The EU’s approach to peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina Political features

Social features

Structural features

The US’s approach to peacebuilding in Kosovo

Post-conflict peacekeeping Post-conflict peacemaking assistance assistance Partaking in formal peace processes (mainly in resolving ongoing political Mediation and direct engagement in formal peace disputes) processes Strong support in negotiations between Support in reaching agreements political leaders between political leaders Active role of police units Strong military presence (defence strategising) Direct support for capacity building Direct support for training (judiciary and police forces) judges and prosecutors, and Promoting inter-ethnic reconciliation on government officials state and sub-state levels Support for truth and reconciliation commissions Assistance in reform of the Funding human rights and democracy security sector and public initiatives and programmes administration Promoting and supporting rule of law, Relieving external debt through public administration reforms, and direct funding and assistance anti-corruption programmes Strengthening civil society Providing substantive pre-accession capacities funding to support various sectors Strengthening economic institutions and private sector

understandings of Western agents’ peacebuilding approaches, as well as the localised Western Balkans’ regional political and security dynamics. The following sections break down and analyse these two external approaches utilised in two of the most stark peacebuilding settings in the Western Balkans, and serve as the frame for understanding the wider scope of practices employed by international peacebuilding agents in the region.

The European Union’s Approaches to Security, Stability, and Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina In the 1990s, the EU’s role in promoting peace and stability in BiH was condensed to bystanding, and managing information and resource flows with NATO and the Contact Group members – the USA, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany (Skara 2014). During the four-year-long siege of Sarajevo, EU Commission officials engaged in humanitarian and other civilian tasks in, inter alia, keeping the supply routes open.5 In this case, the EU preserved its ethical foreign policy and status of a civilian and economic power that promoted humanitarian objectives, which would later evolve into a marginal role in the politics of

The EU, the US and the WB 221 peacebuilding. This has provided impetus for a number of the EU policymakers and shapers to rethink the already established security policies (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2006). The violent disintegration of Yugoslavia and the EU’s limited role in containing its negative effects has imprinted heavily on the EU’s own foreign policy. The observed disjointing between the EU’s alleged identity in engaging in international peacebuilding and its inability to act on it in the Bosnian conflict had pushed the EU officials to search for innovative resolutions and actions (Börzel and Grimm 2018). The launch of the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) in 2000 effectively implied intensive engagement by the EU in BiH, seeking to reinstate the EU’s tarnished reputation after it failed to stop the war in the 1990s (Juncos 2012). In 2002, the European Commission announced that the use of troops for civilian tasks in war zones would be the key component of international peacebuilding action and instrumental to its success. This required a closer cooperation among the EU member states to project a more stable image and actions in security spheres of engagement, as well as identifying and resolving shortcomings in what the EU’s role and capabilities in peace-supporting operations would look like. The debates evolved into two basic strands: One advocating for autonomous EU-led peace and capacity-building initiatives, and the other known as the European Security and Defense Identity (Kirchner and Sperling 2000). The EU’s peacebuilding role in BiH slowly resurfaced in 2003, after the Thessaloniki Summit and the establishment of the European Union Police Mission (EUPM), and in 2004 when the European Union Military Force (EUFOR) was deployed in BiH, replacing NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR) (cf. Bliesemann de Guevara 2008). The EU distanced itself from using administrative powers by the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) and shifted to informal mechanisms for the Europeanisation of the BIH institutional framework, i.e., making Dayton Peace Agreement goals run in parallel with the requirements of eventual EU membership for Bosnia and Herzegovina (Chandler 2006). The EU’s diplomatic mission actively worked on providing the support for the Stabilization and Association Process,6 and facilitated institution-building towards legal, economic, and political harmonisation with the EU standards. Ever since, the EU’s peacebuilding involvement in BiH follows the logic of appropriateness, and the main models utilised for norm diffusion are conditionality, transnational socialisation and social learning, and in some specific cases societal imitation (Hasić and Dedić 2019). The EU’s conditionality was particularly used to expedite a relatively easy alteration from international trusteeship in Bosnia and Herzegovina to locally supervised ownership, once the OHR and the EUSR offices began to communicate it more assertively, and once it was closely linked to BiH’s perspective membership in the EU (Monroy Santander 2018). Slowly but surely, policies on democratisation and reconciliation became the EU’s tools for claiming its legitimacy in BiH, rather than the imposition of norms. The EU’s peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina thus established ‘effectiveness’ as a tool for the

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development of functional and long-lasting public institutions, capable of sustaining and advancing basic democratic features, rather than undermining domestic capacities to complete the peacebuilding process (Recchia 2007), but it never managed to remove the ‘quasi-protectorate’ stigma from the equation (Tepšić and Džuverović 2018). As the EU’s technocratic approach in BiH progressed, officials began slowly to rely on ‘local ownership’ and building capacities as the cornerstone of their engagement. Ownership transfer and taking responsibilities have become the central feature of almost all reform processes (Lemay-Hébert and Kappler 2016). Local ownership in BiH was conceptualised as an expectation from international actors of local elites to accept and implement peacebuilding reforms conceptualised and controlled by outsiders (Parent 2016). For the EU, ownership referred to making politicians responsible for their own actions, making statebuilding a process of knowledge transfer from EU to BiH partners (Kappler and Richmond 2011). However, the EU practically engaged only with political elites, predominantly leaders of nationalist parties, and genuine engagement with BiH citizens was a rare instance, as most of it was done via NGO-based civil society. The EU’s interaction with local populations was thus rather limited, evidenced in a late acknowledgement of the need for public outreach to inform people of the work done in BiH (Kappler 2012). Distancing between the EU and local political elites became visible after the 2006 failure of the April package for Constitutional Reforms in BiH (Belloni 2009).7 International efforts have simply failed to both identify quick and painless solutions for the local parties, and to offer incentives in exchange for the implemented reforms. The approach failed because the EU’s popularity declined when locals realised that the EU-sponsored changes were not significantly improving their own lives. People’s trust in the political dynamics slowly declined and their frustration rose (Kappler 2013), which resurrected the view of the international community that the EU was not prepared to intervene as much as the Office of High Representative (OHR) had done before. The situation became even more complex when the so-called ‘5 + 2’ exit strategy for OHR was formalised in 2008, conditioned upon BiH’s progress in fulfilling the outlined objectives. The diminished utilisation of Bonn powers on the ground, coupled with a lack of political will in the EU capitals to tackle and handle the ‘filibustering’ and ‘obstructionist’ forces within BiH, led to political stagnation and created a vacuum for other international players to step into the game. The EU’s Stability and Association Agreement (SAA) with BiH, also signed in 2008, which accepted the inability to reach a compromise on the police reforms, also watered down the EU’s overall peacebuilding agenda in the country. Momentum that could essentially jumpstart the reform process again arrived in 2009 with the decision of the European Court of Human Rights (Sejdic and Finci v. BiH case8), pointing to the incompatibility of the BiH Dayton Constitution with the European Convention on Human Rights. In December 2010, the Council of the EU officially warned the BiH leaders that the implementation of the ruling was a condition of BiH’s ‘credible application’ for EU membership status,

The EU, the US and the WB 223 and failure to do so would result in temporary suspension of the integration process. To date, very little has been done to adequately address this complex issue. Another attempt to break away from the stalemate situation was the Butmir talks taking place ahead of the 2010 general elections in BiH. The EU pressured BiH to take decisive steps towards EU membership, and incentivised the process with a visa-free travel regime for short-term periods to Schengen countries. After another failed attempt, the EU’s externalised management agenda was revitalised after almost five years, when the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) between the EU and Bosnia and Herzegovina officially entered into force, and BiH’s subsequent membership application was submitted in the following year. Most recently, BiH, along with all countries from the Western Balkans region, has been dragged into a specifically designed prospect of enhanced regional cooperation closely tied with the EU integration process. BiH’s active participation in the Berlin Process and other related initiatives,9 the Connectivity Agenda, the REA Roadmap, and the Transport Community, serves as a litmus test for EU’s peacebuilding agenda, which is now externalised from the EU integration process itself and fully detached from the often negative internal dynamics within EU institutions on the prospects of EU enlargement. Overall, the EU’s institutional peacebuilding capacity in BiH stands, yet its performance is still unclear, particularly the way it will unfold in the coming years. The EU’s normative power, including its peacebuilding vision and dynamics, depends on its ability to diffuse its core values into the domestic socio-political contexts of its member states, as well as beyond, within the broader international community (cf. de Franco, Meyer and Smith 2015). However, the EU has not yet managed to overcome the internal struggles over priorities and preferences (Auel, Eisele and Kinski 2016), and most EU member states still clash about how EU-based norms are to be used beyond its borders (Hasić et al. 2020), which is in contrast with somewhat clearer goals of other international agents who simultaneously build their influence in BiH, primarily based on economic or military capacities.

The Evolution of the United States of America’s Approaches to Security, Stability, and Peacebuilding in Kosovo US interest in establishing peace and stability in the Western Balkans region was most prominently visible in resolving disputes in Kosovo. The peacebuilding process in Kosovo is large in scope, characterised by internal disagreements between Serb and Albanian communities on its basic end goals, and it occurred over a sustained period of time. The conflict in Kosovo was primarily about the political status of the territory, and the absence of a peace agreement and the decision to establish international stewardship, which makes the Kosovo case different from Bosnia and Herzegovina (Ozerdem and Lee 2015). The international community in Kosovo, headed by the US, was seen as the legitimate peacebuilder in this instance, and not the formal state apparatus (Campbell and Peterson 2013). US foreign policy alignment with Kosovo’s quest for independence played a significant

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role, but it equally antagonised many countries that opposed the Western dominance in the Western Balkans region (Visoka 2018). There have been different phases of international intervention in Kosovo, which can be divided into the US-sponsored NATO intervention in 1999: The first, with a bombing campaign followed by a peacekeeping role which continues at a lesser level today; the second, the UNMIK administration10 which lasted from 1999 to 2008 and included sweeping executive powers sanctioned by UN Security Council Resolution 1244, and a remit which covered physical security handled by KFOR (i.e., NATO) through governance to economic reconstruction.11 There was also a cross-organisational agreement on a common five-region plan for peacebuilding activities in Kosovo. This allowed for a joint operational language where civilian and military organisations used different geographical frameworks (Cockell 2002). Instability in Kosovo had begun after the collapse of the communist political structure in Yugoslavia, and after the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK, Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës) led by Ibrahim Rugova was established. The LDK set up an illegal government and held a secret referendum in September 1991. The tensions in Kosovo rose again in 1997 when the KLA Kosovo Liberation Army (UÇK, Ushtria Çlimintare e Kosovo) carried out attacks on Serbian civilians and militia forces, which soon met retaliation from the Serbian military, resulting in the mass displacement of Kosovars in the region (Hewer and Vitija 2013). The UN Security Council (Resolution n. 1160) imposed an arms embargo on both the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Kosovo. A US diplomat who led the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM)12 was deployed in the winter of 1998 (Bellamy and Griffin 2002). Soon after the UN’s Resolution was violated, the two sides were brought to the Rambouillet talks to deescalate the situation. The refutation of the interim peace agreement and the new waves of Serbian military attacks in Kosovo, amounting to grave violations of international humanitarian law, led to the NATO air strike responses on 24 March 1999. After a 78-day-long military operation led by NATO, in conjunction with the US Administration, Kosovo was transformed into an open-ended international protectorate (Batt 2005). These actions were afterwards legitimised by UNSC Resolution 1244. Even though Serbian titular sovereignty was protected, the future of Kosovo’s status remained undecided. The US-sponsored NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 has often been described as a key moment in the redefinition of civil–military relations in the context of peacebuilding. The US also launched its aid mission in Kosovo immediately after the 1999 armed conflict and the commencement of the UN’s supervision of peace developments. The top priority set for aid donors was providing emergency humanitarian assistance and establishing a secure environment for all citizens. USAID contributed to the stabilisation process by engaging in humanitarian aid, rebuilding the economy, and establishing democratic institutions and tools for effective processes. There was also high pressure exerted by NGOs on international peacekeepers and peacebuilders to respect and enforce equal treatment for different ethnic groups in Kosovo, which has not yet been effectively done by national forces (Richmond 2010). In the following period, the United

The EU, the US and the WB 225 Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was launched in cooperation with NATO and the OSCE with the disposal of all powers of government: Legislative, executive, and judicial. In the period between 1999 and 2005, the international administration of Kosovo focused on both statebuilding and peacebuilding processes. The US government has actively worked on creating conditions for dealing with the political status of the south Serbian autonomous provinces, and building up the necessary preconditions for the peaceful resolution of the ongoing situation. US external assistance for Kosovo’s recognition reduced significantly owing to changing global circumstances, shifts of foreign policy priorities, and the emergence of more urgent global crises (Visoka 2018). The Bush Administration, between 2003 and 2005, continued the implementation of the previously established peacebuilding efforts. The tendencies of political groups to keep the ongoing efforts visible and reach compromise pushed the US Administration towards stronger engagement and demands for immediate resolution. Noticing that reluctance to transfer powers to locals and the inability to build a unified system of governance in Kosovo have slowly prevailed in political life, US policy initiatives again resurfaced to push the peacebuilding process forward (Dalipi 2013). In December 2005, the US Administration appointed a special representative of the Secretary of State for talks on Kosovo’s status, as a part of shuttle diplomacy to facilitate the negotiations. Soon after, in 2006, while the Contact Group attempted to leave open the final status of Kosovo in public, the US and allies informally supported independence. Kosovo officials have simultaneously sought the assistance of the affluent Albanian diaspora in the US to lobby for activities for Kosovo’s independence.13 Following the publication of Martti Ahtisaari’s plan,14 which advocated for Kosovo’s independence with international supervision, the US Administration supported the solution and pushed Serbia to follow the Partnership for Peace programme and the EU path. This ‘lasting peace’ was the nominal phrase used specifically to indicate the necessity of reaching a final solution for the then ongoing talks, which the US had participated in on the future status of Kosovo (Đorđević 2016). Given that Ahtisaari’s plan was not adopted at the UN Security Council, Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence on 17 February 2008. The US Administration, along with most of the EU member states, officially recognised Kosovo as a sovereign and independent state just a couple of days after the declaration. The United States also proactively mobilised its diplomatic networks in support of Kosovo’s international recognition, which directly contributed to US impact on Kosovo’s internal stabilisation. However, the failure to attain overwhelming recognition around the world, and the absence of Russian and Chinese support within the UNSC have undermined Kosovo’s goal of becoming a fully fledged member of the United Nations, which further limits its stability, security, political, economic, and societal development. Since the pronouncement of Kosovo’s independence,15 and subsequent relational stabilisation efforts between Belgrade and Pristina, there have been several issues that surfaced in the peacebuilding agenda led by the US. The war crimes legacy remained a heavy burden for the security sector (cf. Gow and

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Zverzhanovski 2013). Additionally, the electoral participation rates have declined precipitously. In part, this is because citizens have begun to realise there is no link between democratic participation and an improvement in their material circumstances and everyday security. The post-conflict governments in Kosovo were unable to finance social provision because of restrictions by international financial institutions (Mac Ginty 2013). Since 2013, Kosovo’s final status has been also mediated by the European Union within the so-called Brussels Agreement agenda,16 which focuses on normalising the existing relations between the Belgrade- and Pristina-based governments. Between 2015, when the Association of Serb Municipalities was established, and 2018, when Kosovo’s government decided to impose full import tariffs on Serbian products as retaliation for Serbia’s intervention in blocking full membership of INTERPOL and the US Administration continued to fully support both state- and peacebuilding processes. It first supported the legislation passed by the Kosovo Assembly in 2018, which established a defence ministry and redefined Kosovo’s Security Force as a professional military force, and in 2020, it officially sponsored the Economic Normalization Agreement between Kosovo and Serbia, between Donald Trump, the President of the United States, Aleksandar Vučić, the President of Serbia, and Avdullah Hoti, the Prime Minister of Kosovo. This significant diplomatic achievement by the US effectively re-centred Kosovo’s peacebuilding dynamics from Brussels back to Washington, i.e., making Kosovo’s EU accession process effectively dependent on the goodwill of the US Administration and its direct involvement. The US engagement in Kosovo retained a discursive realisation of peacebuilding, where security and lasting and stable democracy, as well as true reconciliation, appeared to have a more unilateral and US-centric stance, and did not expand to other policy instruments and assets on which a peaceful society could be sustained in the long run. This essentially points to the necessity of addressing the questions on how ownership is to be conceptualised and what needs to happen when the internationals decide to withdraw from the process.

Conclusions This chapter presents and discusses the patterns connected to the impact of external agents on peacebuilding processes in the Western Balkans region. It outlines the evolution of these international agents’ engagements in promoting peace and security in the Western Balkans region and connects it to relevant narratives, actions, and outcomes of other relevant stakeholders in order to construct the system of evolving externally driven partnerships with selected countries in the Western Balkans. The focus is set on uncovering the origins and directionality of approaches, influences, challenges, contestations, and confrontations in the region. This chapter also focuses specifically on individual EU and US approaches to cultivating peacebuilding dynamics in BiH and Kosovo, respectively, as well as the strategic partnerships they have each developed with local agents towards

The EU, the US and the WB 227 creating longstanding structures for the sustained development of local post-conflict dynamics. It examines and elaborates on the nature of their participation and relationship with local actors, as well as the overall impacts of their actions on the issue of local agency and local ownership of the process. For both approaches, the peacebuilding process was not solely aimed at postconflict development, institutional capacity building, and governance restructuring. Ideally, the majority of peace-support engagements by any external agent are targeted towards preventing the reoccurrence of the conflict, stabilising the postconflict political and security environment, and improving the levels of democratisation, with an eventual goal of handing over the control to local agents, which effectively removes the decision-making role of the external agents. The reality in many post-conflict areas such as the Western Balkans region, however, has indicated the growing tendencies or continuation of dependency on external actors. The EU’s attempt to act as a normative power lacks full internal support in BiH, since Europeanisation fatigue and slow-evolving reform processes have failed to incentivise local agents to pursue their own peace- and stability-oriented initiatives when the EU conditionality tools are removed from the equation. The overall success of EU peacebuilding is limited, evidenced in the lack of progress regarding accession and a constant stalemate between the EU and its SAP partner, BiH. The EU peacebuilding norm diffusion mechanisms in BiH did not gain a foothold, which backfired, and reversed the directionality of influence the EU intended to have. This is why, in spite of the relatively stable security situation in BiH, the EU failed in its primary political objectives. The EU was trapped between its own insistence on being a normative power and its dependence on the member states’ approval, which reversed the intended and anticipated direction of influence in its policy norm diffusion process. In response to Europe’s peacebuilding framework, local peacebuilding agency was expressed as a form of resistance by at least one of the vital decision-making agents. The EU’s engagement limitations in BiH are most obvious in the security sector reform, which are layered on top of the complexities and the obvious need for the Dayton Peace Agreement’s reform. The US’s involvement in Kosovo has intensified the relations of external dominance installed within a small and dense network of the insecure peacebuilding structure. The US’s operational assumptions connected to structural peacebuilding processes in Kosovo are tied to the conflictual dynamics for its international recognition. The US presence and strong tutorship within the post-conflict context was essential for local organisation and Kosovo’s institutionalisation, as well as establishing connections with other global actors and new brokers that would potentially be able to provide inputs to other key decision-makers. Participation models within the collective peacebuilding action campaign are shaped by dominant ideologies, where the US as a prime supporter acts as gatekeeper, while the other agents, like the EU and the Belgrade government, which need to actively engage in resolving a number of structural issues, find conflicts within them. However, the US presence and involvement in Kosovo’s stabilisation paradigm have failed to produce the local-embedded ownership shift that could sustainably foster local conceptions of peace, leaving the interests of different communities

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constantly misaligned and marginalised. The US agents in Kosovo employed a peace-as-governance entrepreneurial strategy, mainly dependent on external visions of peace, and were unable to fully grasp the language of participation, political and civic culture, and the social and historical arrangements that are necessary to fully sustain their engagement and investments. Therefore, the practical and structural contexts of peacebuilding and Kosovo’s status resolution movements have a causal impact in explaining the ideational aspects of the US’s postconflict involvement.

Notes 1 Some critical theorists argue that peacebuilding missions in the post-Cold War period of the 1990s were also designed as tools of control and disorder in regions of conflict within a market-oriented liberal global order (cf. Duffield 2001). 2 The EU has set up the EUPM to tackle the issues of organised crime originating in Bosnia or transiting through it en route to the EU, and to build capacities of local law enforcement agencies to have a more active role in assisting, planning, and conducting crime investigations. 3 For instance, the Western Balkans saw the introduction of truth telling mechanisms when the United States Institute for Peace (USIP) attempted the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission focused on civil society (Porobic-Isakovic 2016). 4 The other four US-led missions have not produced successful outcomes (i.e., Somalia, Haiti, Afghanistan, and Iraq). 5 The absence of a consensus among EU members on the strategies of engagement diminished the capacity of the entire Union to remain an independent player in the peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts in the Western Balkans region. Some EU officials, like the Commissioner Hans van den Broek, openly voiced the European Union’s positions and strongly pushed for linking aid initiatives to peace implementation progress in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including respect for human, displaced persons, and refugee rights, and the surrender of indicted war criminals. In December 1995, just one week after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, international aid donors met in Brussels to discuss Bosnia’s post-war reconstruction . 6 The Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) was developed by the EU specifically for the Western Balkans accession process, with aims of stabilising the countries involved and assisting a swift transition to a market economy, promoting regional cooperation, and reassuring the prospect of EU accession. Comparably to the situation in BiH, a dialogue within the Stabilization and Association Process between the EU and Kosovo has been evolving since 2009, in spite of the fact that Kosovo cannot become an official EU candidate country until internal unanimity is agreed upon regarding its international legal status. The SAP dialogue with Kosovo focuses on a number of issues, primarily on the rule of law, institutional reforms and improvement measures, political processes with Serbia, and the human rights situation. 7 The US political role in the country has also weakened after the failure to reach agreement on constitutional reforms in 2006. The Obama Administration redirected its policy toward allowing BiH’s authorities to focus on the EU accession process. Nevertheless, the US kept providing significant amounts of post-conflict reconstruction aid to Bosnia, of more than $2 billion in the first 20 years of engagement (Woehrel 2011). The US applied a cookie-cutter approach to democratisation through USAID’s civil society sub-programme in areas in Bosnia to make the government publicly accountable (Hill 2010).

The EU, the US and the WB 229 8 The ECHR’s judgement confirmed the discriminatory nature of the electoral system in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which prevents citizens of BiH – who are not willing or able to affiliate with constituent people groups (i.e., Bosniaks, Croats, or Serbs) or who do not meet a combination of requirements of ethnic origin and place of residence – from standing for election to the Presidency and the House of the Peoples. 9 Other significant regional platforms BiH actively participates in are the Brdo-Brijuni Process, SEECP, RCC, CEI, MII, MAARI, RYCO, and WBF. 10 The details of UNMIK’s engagement, focused on strategy for police reform, were divided into three phases: Establishing law and order, institution-building, and then the gradual transfer of law enforcement authority from UN Civpol to the new Kosovo police. The OSCE Mission in Kosovo helped by setting up a police training school and began recruiting and training police cadets. Upon completion of their training, they were assigned a long-term position in the slowly growing Kosovo Police Service under the command of UN Civpol. This meant that the Kosovo police would grow from being an organisational unit within UN Civpol into an independent organisation (Eckhard 2016). 11 The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) marked the end of the NATO intervention. While UNMIK established its presence on the ground, a 50,000-strong NATO-led multinational Kosovo Force (KFOR) arrived to provide security (Tschirgi 2013). 12 KVM was tasked with verifying compliance by all parties in Kosovo with UN Security Council Resolution 1199, and reporting instances of progress. The Mission was also in charge of maintaining close liaison with FRY, Serbian, and, as appropriate, other Kosovo authorities, supervising elections in Kosovo, and making recommendations to the OSCE Permanent Council, the UN Security Council, and other organisations. 13 This process slowly surfaced in the early 1990s, when the nonviolent movement of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) created its own branches in the United States and Europe to internationalise the Kosovars’ abuse by the Milošević regime, and steadily continued after NATO’s 1999 military intervention (cf. Koinova 2013) 14 Known as the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status. 15 The US indeed supported the independence of Kosovo, but it is important to note that during the Cold War, the US did not support the efforts of Biafra, Eritrea, Kurdistan, and South Sudan for independent statehood, fearing that such territories would become allies of the Soviet Union and thus undermine its interests in postcolonial Africa (cf. Paquin 2010). 16 Some components of the Agreement have been implemented, for instance joint SerbianAlbanian police patrols, representation of Kosovo at regional platforms, integration of the Serbian courts, telecommunications. The resolution of other matters, like the status and rights of the Serbian minority in Kosovo, recognition of personal documents and diplomas, and daily crossing of the Kosovo-Serbia border, is pending.

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13 Russia and China in the Western Balkans The Spoiler Power and the Unexpected Power Vuk Vuksanović Introduction Since the global financial crisis of 2008, one of the defining characteristics of the Balkans’ regional geopolitical environment has been a power vacuum generated by the lack of strategic commitment by two relevant, Western players: The EU and the US (Bardos 2012). This vacuum has been filled by non-Western regional and global powers. Among these players, Russia and China have been particularly effective in exploiting the opening to conduct more assertive foreign policies in the Balkans. However, as should be expected, there is a significant difference in the interests guiding the policies of the two powers in the region and the instruments they use. Russia is a great power with historical experience as a geopolitical player in the Balkans, stretching back to the era of Tsarist Russia (Jelavich 1991). But, despite its long historical engagement in the region, Russian policy in the Balkans fits into the rubric of the post-Cold War world. Russia views its presence in the Balkans as part of the process by which it can reclaim the role of both a European and global power that it believes was denied to it by the West. There is a second element to Russia’s approach. Moscow acts as ‘a spoiler power’ in the region – trying to undermine Western interests to increase its leverage and bargaining power with the West (Bechev 2017b). This second element has become pronounced after the Ukraine crisis of 2014. Unlike Russia’s historical experience, Chinese presence in the Balkans is a more recent phenomenon. Beijing’s previous engagement with the region has been slight, making China ‘the unexpected regional player in the Balkans’ (Vuksanovic 2017). As opposed to Moscow, a power with limited capabilities whose strategic vision has been reduced to opposing the West, Beijing is a rising global power promoting its vision of the global order. Much of this vision is bound up with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The time of COVID-19 has seen China emerging as the primary challenger to Western pre-eminence in the Balkans. However, the Chinese challenge is primarily focused on the political and normative domain. Russia still contests the realm of more traditional geopolitics, utilising a limited toolkit. While neither power will replace the West, they will operate in the Balkans as long as they have the DOI: 10.4324/9781003276661-16

Russia, China and the WB 235 strategic leeway to do so. Nevertheless, the future of Russian and Chinese presence in the Balkans will primarily be determined by the Western ability to push back against the two, with the exercise (or not) of US power likely to be the decisive factor.

Russia’s Historical Credentials and China as the Newcomer The Balkans have always been a part of Russian diplomatic thinking. Russian’s historical roots as the great power in the region run deep. Tsarist Russia emerged as the great power in the region, starting with Catherine the Great and the 1774 peace treaty of Küçük Kaynarca with the Ottoman Empire (Bechev 2017a, 3). In a desire to have a defensive buffer zone and to gain access to vital maritime routes throughout the nineteenth century, Russia was engaged in geopolitical rivalry in the Balkans with other empires of the age, including the Ottoman Empire, Habsburg Empire, the British Empire, and France – making occasional alliances with local Slavic and Orthodox nations like Serbia and Bulgaria (Jelavich 1991, 27–32). This era ended with Russia’s backing of Serbia in the wake of the 1914 assassination of Habsburg heir Franz Ferdinand – an event that sucked Russia into war with Austro-Hungary and Germany through the rigid alliance system that helped unleash World War I (Kissinger 1994, 199–200). The Soviet Union, which succeeded Russia’s Tsarist Empire, and a potentially revanchist Germany were perceived as potential threats by many of the Balkan monarchies between the two world wars. This perception was symbolised by the Little Entente, a coalition of Yugoslavia, Romania, and Czechoslovakia backed by France, intended to be a buffer from Germany and the Soviet Union (Wandycz 1981). The Third Reich eventually devoured the Balkans. The defeat of Nazi Germany in Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union led to the historical apex of Russian geopolitical and security presence in the Balkans: The Cold War. However, the Cold War did not result in undisputed Soviet mastery over the Balkans. Two countries in the present-day Western Balkans managed to get free from the Soviet grasp: Yugoslavia and Albania. Yugoslavia, led by communist strongman Josip Broz Tito, wanted independence from Moscow. This led to the legendary Tito–Stalin split and Belgrade pursuing a policy of non-alignment between two superpowers, with the USSR always being the potential security threat to Yugoslavia (Vuksanovic 2018). After first being a Soviet satellite and a member of the Warsaw Pact, Enver Hoxha’s Albania started to distance itself from the Soviet Union in the early 1950s, as Nikita Khrushchev’s rapprochement with Tito’s Yugoslavia and his de-Stalinisation campaign were perceived by Tirana as ideological revisionism. This ultimately resulted in Albania leaving the Warsaw Pact in 1968 to protest the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia (Mëhilli 2017). However, the period of history that drives current Russian policy in the region can be traced neither to Tsarist Russia nor the Cold War. Contemporary Russian interests in the region are primarily the product of the modern era and the history of the post-Cold War world (Economides 2015). The collapse of Yugoslavia

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and the ensuing Yugoslav Wars corresponded with a period when Russian great power status was at its historical nadir. When it comes to regional security of the Balkans, Russia tried to participate alongside the West in conflict resolution mechanisms aimed to end wars in Croatia (1991–5) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–5). In Croatia, 1,000 Russian peacekeepers were deployed as part of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). In Bosnia, Russia was a member of an informal grouping of great powers, the Contact Group (alongside the US, the UK, France, Germany, and Italy) dealing with the conflict, and it deployed 1,200 peacekeepers in that country as part of the Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR), NATO’s peacekeeping mission under the UN mandate (Secrieru 2019, 2). However, in the course of the Bosnian War, it became evident that Russia had a less powerful role compared to the West, despite attempts by the Russia Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev to test the extent of Russia’s ability to work with the West – manifested through ‘smile diplomacy’ and ‘policy of yes’ (Buzan and Wæver 2003, 404). During this period, the Russian strategic community became even warier. Most of all, Moscow was troubled by its perception that NATO was becoming an instrument of military interventionism, starting with alliance intervention against the Bosnian Serbs in 1995 (Mearsheimer 2014, 78). The war in Kosovo and NATO’s intervention against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999 was one of the turning points in Russian foreign and security policy – particularly Moscow’s relations with the West. Before the NATO intervention against Belgrade, Russia, under the guidance of Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov, tried to form closer ties with the government of Slobodan Milošević since Yugoslavia was one of the rare countries that lacked both a history of Soviet domination and a desire to join NATO (Headley 2008, 6, 25). Russia was bypassed as the intervention was undertaken without UN Security Council approval. This was proof for Moscow that it had lost its status as a global and European power. NATO’s war against Belgrade was a sign of Moscow’s declining global relevance and American ability to act unilaterally (Vuksanovic 2018). The fact that NATO conducted military operations increased already heightened Russian security anxieties about NATO – as the intervention against Milošević’s regime happened in the same year as the first tranche of NATO expansion. This signalled two things to Russia. First, NATO moving towards its border. Second, the Alliance had been transformed from a defensive organisation into an offensive fighting group (Lukyanov 2016, 33). Russian grievances were increased further by what James Headley has called ‘mirror factors’. Headley referred to Moscow’s tendency to draw analogies between the USSR and Yugoslavia and between Russia and Serbia, reminding Russian leadership of the fate that it could have experienced if the USSR’s dissolution was less peaceful or of the possibility that Russia could suffer Serbia’s fate (Headley 2008, 61–66). The analogies between Kosovo and Chechnya, coupled with NATO intervention, had a major impact on the decision by Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin to escalate the war in Chechnya in late 1999 (Vuksanovic 2020d).

Russia, China and the WB 237 Russian modern-day interests in the region are shaped by these experiences, as is Moscow’s tendency to draw analogies between conflicts and territorial disputes in the former Yugoslavia and the former USSR. This came to the fore in 2014, when Moscow found the Kosovo precedent helpful in justifying the annexation of Crimea (Barlovac 2014). This rift with the West was symbolised through Primakov’s decision to turn his plane back to Russia upon the launch of the NATO air campaign, although Primakov was travelling to the US to seek financial aid (Paddock 1999). Diplomatically, Russia played a role in ending this conflict thanks to Russian envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin who worked alongside Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari and US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott (Drozdiak 1999). Indeed, within NATO’s peacekeeping mission Kosovo Force (KFOR) Russia deployed 3,150 peacekeepers to Kosovo (Secrieru 2019, 2). The Russian anger with the West was not reduced – as was demonstrated when Russian troops seized the airport in Priština in an attempt to carve out a Russian zone in Kosovo. The move failed due to NATO opposition, leaving Moscow with another painful memory from the Kosovo saga (Kaiser and Hoffman 1999). Regime change in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 2000 created distance between Belgrade and Moscow. The new government in Yugoslavia mistrusted new Russian President Vladimir Putin, largely for his neutral stance during the anti-Milošević revolution, while Putin saw the new government as allies of the West (Poolos 2000). For several years Putin’s main ally in former Yugoslavia was the regime of Milo Đukanović in Montenegro (Montgomery 2010, 132–133). During this period, Moscow was not interested in the region. Moscow’s primary goal was to get closer to the US after the attacks of 9/11 (Dougherty 2002). As a sign of reduced interest in the region, Putin’s Russia withdrew its peacekeepers from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo in 2003 (Nikitin 2004). As Russian security interests in the Western Balkans declined, its foreign policy in the region was based on expanding economic ties, particularly as the Russian economy was recovering from the woes of the 1990s (Secrieru 2019, 2–3). The famous symbol of Russian economic overtures towards the region was Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska acquiring in 2005 an aluminium plant and its associated bauxite mines in Montenegro (MacDonald 2008). Russia gradually engaged more energetically with the region as the international community began dealing with Kosovo’s future status. While Russia backed the Serbian side, the US supported the Albanian side (Ekinci 2013, 68). Unlike Russia, China is truly an ‘unexpected regional player’ or ‘the unexpected power’. During the Cold War, China was not interested in the region geopolitically but viewed it as part of the global communist political theatre. Tito’s Yugoslavia and Mao’s China had an uneasy relationship due to Mao accusing Tito of ideological revisionism and rivalry between Belgrade and Beijing for political influence in the Third World (Vuksanovic 2017). It was not until China began opening to the outside world and Mao’s death that the relationship improved. Tito did not visit China until 1977 (Le Corre and Vuksanovic, 2019). In contrast to the tense relations between Yugoslavia and China, Enver Hoxha’s

238 Vuk Vuksanović anti-Soviet and anti-Yugoslav Albania was close to Mao’s China – and the two communist regimes were partners in seeking independence from the Kremlin’s dictate (Mëhilli 2017). During the Yugoslav Wars, China kept a low profile and did not engage in conflict resolution, despite its permanent seat in the UNSC. The one time that China used its veto on the UNSC was when its interest was affected. To punish North Macedonia for diplomatic recognition of Taiwan, China vetoed the mandate extension of a successful conflict prevention mission, the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) (BBC 1999). There were also strong sympathies between Beijing and Belgrade, as demonstrated in 1997 when Slobodan Milošević visited China (Le Corre and Vuksanovic, 2019). The destruction of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade during the 1999 NATO intervention strengthened Chinese opposition to US military interventionism (Fox 2019). Indeed, the bombing of the Chinese Embassy significantly shaped the Chinese military and strategic posture, known as AntiAccess/Area Denial (A2/AD), aimed at curbing US intervention from air and sea (Kania 2019). Beyond that, Chinese foreign and security policy did not focus on the Balkans. Some countries like Croatia tried to improve ties with China, and in 2005 Beijing and Zagreb signed a joint statement to establish a ‘comprehensive cooperation partnership’ (Global Times 2016). However, in the years after the fall of Milošević, the policy community in the Western Balkans did not perceive China as a major player in the region, despite Beijing’s formally friendly relations with local nations (Vuksanovic 2017).

Russia Steps in A decisive watershed moment for both Russia’s and China’s engagement with the Balkans happened in 2008. The new systemic realities enabled Moscow and Beijing to be more assertive in the region, particularly regarding its most strategically consequential country, Serbia. For Russia, the global financial crisis of 2008 and the unilateral declaration of Kosovo’s independence were the two transformations that enabled it to step up on its Balkan policy. The global financial crisis impeded the ability of the West to give sufficient attention to the Western Balkans. During the Obama presidency, Washington put little strategic focus on Europe, let alone the Balkans (Hoagland 2016). The EU was even more distracted by the global financial crisis. As the crisis spilt onto Europe’s shore in the form of the Eurozone crisis, and most potently in the Balkan country, Greece, the EU’s ability to oversee local reforms and pursue enlargement was diminished – as was its status as the primary regional stabiliser (Panagiotou 2012, 1–16). In 2007 Romania and Bulgaria had joined the EU prematurely without completing the necessary reforms (Gotev 2016). The Romanian and Bulgarian experience certainly did not help the case of the Western Balkans in their aspirations to join the EU. This left an opening for Russia and China. In

Russia, China and the WB 239 the geopolitical context, where the Western Balkans became the EU’s periphery, local nations had an incentive to balance and play great powers against each other (Bechev 2012, 2). Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence was the second systemic transformation that allowed Russia to step up its game. Kosovo’s independence forced Serbia to rely on Russian diplomatic protection over Kosovo, particularly its UN SC veto. Before Kosovo’s declaration, Russia was not a factor in Serbian domestic and foreign policy, but Western support for Kosovo propelled Serbia to turn to Russia (Spasojević 2015). This made Serbia dependent on Russia while providing a cornerstone for increased Russian activity in the region. For Putin’s Russia, Serbia and the Balkans became a testing ground for Moscow’s vision of a multipolar system, with Russia once again a member of a great power concert. Russian support for Serbia fits into the rubric of Russia reclaiming its role as a European and global great power (Buzan and Wæver 2003, 430). By backing Serbia over Kosovo, Russia tried to portray itself as the protector of traditional international law against the West (Bechev 2017a, 60). This policy took place when Russian relations with the US were tense due to US support for the colour revolutions in the former Soviet republics and Washington’s backing for Ukrainian and Georgian membership in NATO. The Balkans also provided Russia with an area to exercise influence in the post-Soviet space by applying the Kosovo precedent in territorial disputes concerning former Soviet republics. For example, when Russia imposed the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after the Russo-Georgian war of 2008, it invoked the Kosovo precedent (Vuksanovic 2020d). Energy policy also allowed Russia to become an actor in regional geopolitics. After Russia’s dispute with Ukraine over gas prices in 2006 and 2009 disrupted Russian gas supplies to Europe, Russia came up with the idea of bypassing the Ukrainian corridor to supply its European customers. Starting in 2006, Russia began to promote the South Stream pipeline – which was intended to supply 63 billion cubic metres of Russian gas a year across the Black Sea to the Western Balkans and onward to Austria and Italy (Vihma and Turksen 2016). In Serbia, as part of the South Stream arrangement, Belgrade even agreed to transfer majority ownership in the Petroleum Industry of Serbia (NIS), the national oil and gas supplier, to Russia’s Gazprom Neft. This was a transaction guided not just by energy security considerations but also in the awareness of Serbia’s reliance on Russia on Kosovo (N1 2014). When Belgrade agreed in 2011 that responsibility for the Kosovo dispute should be transferred from the UN Security Council to the EU, Russia was temporarily sidelined (Bechev 2017a, 63–64). Russia was not out of the region, though. In 2009, during Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s (2008–12) visit to Belgrade, an initial agreement was reached to establish a humanitarian centre for emergency response in Niš, close to Kosovo and Bulgaria. In 2011 Serbian Minister of Interior Ivica Dačić and Russian Emergency Situations Minister Sergei Shoigu (later defence minister) signed an agreement on the centre’s establishment a couple of days after the European Commission blocked Serbia’s EU accession (Euractiv 2011).

240 Vuk Vuksanović During that period, an idea circulated in Belgrade about Serbian joining the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) but was rejected by the Foreign Policy Committee of the Serbian Parliament (Vuksanovic 2021c, 148). Russian soft power came on display in 2011 when Vladimir Putin (as Prime Minister) attended a friendly football match between the Serbian club Red Star Belgrade and a team from his hometown, Zenit St Petersburg. Red Star’s fans memorably chanted, ‘Putin, you Serb, Serbia is with you’ (Bechev 2017a, 225). Meanwhile, in 2012, Russia’s Sberbank and VTB began operating in the Western Balkans (Secrieru 2019, 2). As a new government came to power in Belgrade in 2012, composed out of former Milošević allies led by Aleksandar Vučić, Moscow slowly started being more active in Serbia, and by extension, the Balkans. In April 2013, Serbia became an observer in the Parliamentary Assembly of the CSTO. That same month Russia granted Serbia a ten-year loan of $500 million for the Serbian budget deficit, alongside an earlier loan of $800 million for railway overhaul (Korsunskaya 2013). The next month, an agreement on strategic partnership between Russia and Serbia was signed by the new Serbian government (B92, 2013). In November 2013, Russia’s Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu visited Serbia and signed an agreement on military cooperation, covering areas like the air force, air defence, military exercises, and training (TASS 2013). The Ukraine crisis of 2014 altered Russia’s role in the regional security architecture. As relations between Russia and the West deteriorated in the aftermath of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and Moscow’s backing of rebels in Eastern Ukraine, the Western Balkans became one of the battlegrounds. For Russia, the region was a suitable location to balance and push back against the West for its encroachment in the Russian sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space (Bechev 2017c). In that context, the Balkans are perceived by Russia as Europe’s ‘soft underbelly’, an area where Russia can provoke a controlled crisis to pressure the EU and the West and divert their attention from Ukraine and the post-Soviet space (Krastev 2015). At the same time, the EU’s clout has decreased in the region. This has provided Russia with another opening. Before assuming the position of President of the European Commission, Jean Claude Juncker told the European Parliament that there would not be EU enlargement during his time in office (Poznatov 2014). The migration crisis also created a vacuum in the region, as the EU started to perceive the Balkans as a buffer towards the Middle East and the migrant waves coming from that direction (Zaragoza-Cristiani 2017). The UK’s decision to leave the EU in 2016 (Brexit) has also diverted Brussels’ attention from the region and diminished its focus on enlargement (Stojanovic 2016). In this systemic environment, after the Ukraine crisis, invoking the Russian threat became a means for the local nations to garner Western support. Montenegro, Albania, Kosovo, and Croatia did so by trying to portray themselves as Western bulwarks in the face of Russia, while Serbia did so by balancing and playing Russia and the West against each other (Bechev 2017a, 83). Democratic backsliding in the region also helped Russia’s case, as local strongmen were willing to

Russia, China and the WB 241 engage Russia as a form of hedging and to deter the West from criticising local illiberal trends (Pula 2016). While the West was at loggerheads with Putin, he attended a military parade in Belgrade on the 70th anniversary of Belgrade’s liberation from Nazi occupation with the Red Army’s help (BBC,2014). Soon after, Russia demanded diplomatic status for its personnel stationed in the humanitarian centre in Niš, drawing analogies with the status that NATO troops have in Serbia and raising concerns in the West that the centre could be converted into a spy centre given its strategic location (Bechev 2017a, 187–188). Military cooperation between Moscow and Belgrade increased, as Russia saw this as an opportunity to provoke and Serbia to leverage the West. One example is the trilateral military exercise ‘Slavic Brotherhood’ involving the Russian, Serbian, and Belarusian armies, which have been held annually since 2015 (TASS 2019). Serbia also started using Russia to modernise its outdated military hardware. Another notable example was Russia agreeing to deliver six MiG-29 warplanes to the Serbian air force in 2016. Political and diplomatic spoiler tactics also came to the surface. In August 2018, Greece expelled Russian diplomats for communicating with political groups in Athens that wanted to sabotage the resolution of the name dispute between Greece and North Macedonia (Osborn 2018). As a jab against the West, in 2014, Russia abstained in the UN Security Council when a vote came on extending the mandate of EUFOR, EU’s stabilisation mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Secrieru 2019, 2). In 2018 Russia vetoed a UN Security Council resolution that qualified the Srebrenica massacre from the Bosnian war as a genocide (BBC 2015). Three years later, Russia allowed the extension of the EUFOR’s mandate in the UN Security Council but under the condition that the mention of the Office of High Representative (OHR) is omitted from the UN resolution and that the High Representative does not address the UN Security Council (B92 2021). On the economic front, Russia also scored points. In Croatia, the Croatian food company Agrokor, one of the largest companies in the region, went into bankruptcy and, after restructuring, was converted into Fortenova Group. The Russian Sberbank, formerly the biggest creditor, became the largest shareholder of the transformed company in 2019 (Reuters 2019). Russia has also boosted its soft power operations to sway local public opinion. In doing so, Russia nurtures ties with the Orthodox Church, nationalists, pro-Russian parties and movements, and businessmen while maintaining media presence through Sputnik and RT (Conley et al. 2016, 6–7). In 2014, Russian Radio Sputnik opened its Serbian bureau (Secrieru 2019, 2). Russia builds public support, influences domestic politics, and builds bargaining power with local governments (Bechev 2017a, 236). The Russian media presence should not be exaggerated. For example, the idea of an RT programme in Serbo-Croatian never materialised, showing that local authorities are more guilty of pushing pro-Russian media narratives than Kremlin (Vuksanovic 2021c, 226). Intelligence operations are also part of the Russian playbook. In 2019, a video emerged showing a Russian intelligence officer bribing a Serbian retired military

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officer (Deutsche Welle 2019). However, the local elites also frequently misuse the spectre of Russian intelligence to leverage the West. In October 2016, Montenegro arrested a Serbian nationalist group on the grounds that under the guidance of Russian intelligence, they plotted to overthrow the government and prevent the country’s accession to NATO. However, there are inconsistencies in the official narrative, leading to suspicion that the Russian threat was inflated for the self-serving interests of the Montenegrin regime (Hopkins 2017). In July 2020, Serbia faced violent protests against growing illiberalism and the government’s mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic. Pro-government tabloids accused proRussian forces of instigating the unrest, but no evidence of Russian involvement was produced. These reports came out as Serbian President Vučić was meeting his French counterpart Emmanuel Macron in Paris, showing that local elites scapegoat Russia to court the West (Vuksanovic 2020c).

China Joins the Game In 2008 China also started to emerge as a regional player in the Western Balkans, thanks to the independence of Kosovo and the global financial crisis. China’s rise was less conspicuous and more gradual than Russia’s. Belgrade was attracted to Beijing by the Chinese non-recognition of Kosovo and the perception that the global balance of power was shifting in China’s favour after the global financial crisis (Le Corre and Vuksanovic 2019). Nevertheless, unlike Russia, China does not engage in local disputes like Kosovo (Vuksanovic 2017). In 2009 Serbia and China issued a joint statement on strategic partnership and signed an agreement on economic, technological, and infrastructural cooperation, with Beijing pledging to finance the construction of a bridge across the Danube River in Serbia (Barlovac 2009). In 2012, China inaugurated the formation of the ‘16+1’ initiative (in 2019, this was transformed into ‘17+1’ with Greek membership, and in 2021 it reverted back to ‘16+1’ as Lithuania departed). This is a multilateral grouping intended to facilitate Chinese collaboration with Central and Eastern Europe, including the countries of the Western Balkans, except for Kosovo (Vangeli, 2017: 59). In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced a project that is today known as the BRI, a macro-project of Chinese-financed and -built maritime and land-based infrastructure, intended to tie China with the rest of Eurasia through a network of infrastructural connectivity (Chatzky and McBride 2020). From that moment on, unlike mainstream Western thinking that perceives the Western Balkans as ethically fragmented Euro-Atlantic periphery burdened with political disfunction, Chinese policymakers have perceived the region as a bridgehead between Europe and Asia (Vangeli 2017: 61). The decisive geographical line for the Chinese goes from the Eastern Mediterranean into Central Europe, including Greece, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Hungary. North Macedonia acts as the region’s connectivity conduit bordering Greece, Albania, Kosovo, Serbia, and Bulgaria, while Serbia is a lynchpin between the Balkans and Central Europe (Vuksanovic 2017).

Russia, China and the WB 243 Economic statecraft is a powerful Chinese instrument in the region. In the past decade, in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia, Beijing has made $2.4 billion in net foreign direct investments and $6.8 billion in infrastructure loans (IISS 2020). The list of Chinese economic projects is extensive. Notable examples in Serbia include the acquisition of a steel mill in Smederevo and a copper mining complex RTB Bor, building a tire factory in Zrenjanin, as well as financing and constructing the Belgrade–Budapest highway (Vuksanovic 2019e). In North Macedonia, China is financing the construction of two highways. It is also financing a highway in Montenegro that connects the Montenegrin port of Bar with Serbia (Vuksanovic 2017). The Chinese are also constructing a bridge in Croatia that connects the city of Dubrovnik with the Pelješac peninsula, bypassing the Bosnian Neum corridor that separates Dubrovnik from the rest of the country (Prtoric 2020). In Albania, Chinese Geo-Jade Petroleum owns Bankers Petroleum, the country’s largest oil producer, and in 2016 Chinese state-owned companies bought the concession to manage Tirana airport until 2027 (Madhi 2020). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chinese companies have built two coal-fired power plants, constructed two additional plants, and are planning to build four more (Rogelja 2020). Through the BRI projects in the Western Balkans, China wants to connect itself to European markets, build political influence with distant countries in Europe, and boost its soft power credentials (Vuksanovic 2017). Serbia, as the geographical heart of the Balkans and an EU membership candidate, is at the centre of Beijing’s policies, as China is convinced that if it succeeds in Serbia, its political and economic clout can be replicated both among Serbia’s neighbours in the region and among EU members. This logic now guides three new areas: The high tech industry, the defence industry, and, most recently, COVID-19 vaccines. The Chinese tech giant, Huawei, has been busy establishing partnerships with local capitals. In Albania, Huawei helped to upgrade the power transmission network. Huawei is a smart city solutions partner for the city of Dubrovnik, while in Bosnia and Herzegovina, both Huawei and telecommunications company ZTE Corporation are frequent guests at economic fairs (Vuksanovic 2019a). Serbia acts as a hub for Huawei’s regional ambitions given the country’s centrality in regional internet traffic. Namely, Serbia borders four EU member states, which is twice as many as any other Western Balkan country, including Croatia, which is home to two regional submarine internet cables (Conley et al. 2020, 17). In Kragujevac, Serbia Huawei plans to build a regional data centre for South and Southeast Europe, Huawei’s third regional data centre in Europe, after those in the Netherlands and Germany (eKapija 2019). Other Chinese technology companies are also present. By June 2020, Hikvision, China’s largest camera manufacturer, installed 900 internet-based surveillance cameras across Serbia (Conley et al. 2020, 17). Dahua Technology, a video surveillance company, blacklisted by the US for its participation in the persecution of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, is also active in Serbia. Its products can be found at the Belgrade airport (Vuksanovic 2019a).

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Cooperation in the realm of national security is a novel form of Chinese policy in the region. In Serbia, this cooperation takes three shapes: Chinese involvement in the Serbian surveillance ecosystem, joint Sino-Serbian police patrols, and military cooperation (Vuksanovic 2019d). Huawei has become a partner for Serbia on its ‘safe’ and ‘smart city’ projects. The company has installed 1,000 surveillance cameras equipped with facial and licence plate recognition software at mostly undisclosed locations in Belgrade. Other Serbian cities like Niš could join. To protect the rising number of Chinese tourists in Serbia and the Chinese capital, joint Sino-Serbian police controls were established in Belgrade, Novi Sad, and Niš. Military cooperation has also increased. According to data released by the Serbian Ministry of Defence, between 2008 and 2018, China became the largest military donor to Serbia after the US (Vuksanovic 2020e, 5–6). The purchase of the Chinese drones CH-92A is turning Serbia into the largest drone operator in the Western Balkans, and Chinese technology transfer is helping Belgrade to develop its own drone programme, ‘Pegaz’ (Pegasus) (Vuksanovic 2021e). The collaboration is mutually beneficial. Serbia uses its partnership with China to upgrade its military hardware, while China uses the partnership with Serbia to penetrate European defence markets (Vuksanovic 2019d). In March 2021, the Chinese defence minister Wei Fenghe visited Greece, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Hungary (Zhen 2021). This visit shows that Beijing does not want to stay focused solely on Serbia in its military policy in the region. Unlike hard power, Chinese soft power has not enjoyed much success despite increased Chinese activity on the public diplomacy front – seen most clearly through the opening of Confucius Institutes across the region. Beijing lacks a soft power strategy and instead focuses on public and cultural diplomacy within its bilateral ties. Consequently, while China is popular in the region, its soft power prestige cannot match that of the West (Tonchev 2020, 3–25). Even ‘mask diplomacy’, the Chinese campaign of acting as a medical equipment supplier during the COVID-19 pandemic, did not produce any notable soft power effect in Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. While Beijing’s campaign had success in Serbia, it was not a result of Chinese diplomatic prowess, rather of Serbian interest in playing the China card domestically and internationally (Vuksanovic 2020f).

Russia and China in the Western Balkans: Future Trajectory Russian influence in the region has limits. The Russian economy in recent years has grown at an annual average of 1%, held back by Russian’s one-dimensional economy, whose budget is largely dependent on the export of oil and gas (Bremmer 2021). In the Western Balkans, the EU remains the biggest donor, trading partner, and investor (European Commission 2020). In late 2021 Russian Sberbank faced with Western sanctions was forced to sell its subsidiaries in Southeast Europe (Reuters 2021b). The reach of the Russian military in the region is also limited, as Russia has no troops on the ground. Russian influence

Russia, China and the WB 245 has further declined as Montenegro and North Macedonia joined NATO in 2017 and 2020. Russian influence in Albania is non-existent due to Albania’s pro-Western course, differences over Kosovo, and underdeveloped economic ties (Bechev 2017a, 80). The closest Russia has to an ally is Serbia – a country encircled by NATO members. Still, Serbia holds more military drills with NATO than with Russia (European Western Balkans 2019). In this context, it is hardly imaginable that Serbia would grant diplomatic status to Russian staff in the Niš humanitarian centre as it would endanger Belgrade’s geopolitical balance act by attracting Western ire (Sherwin 2017). The Serbo-Russian military partnership is not altruistic. Although eight Mig29 jets were donated to Serbia in 2017 and 2018 for free, Serbia still had to pay close to $235 million for their assembly, repair, and refurbishment. Belgrade is more than willing to purchase weapons from the West, as with H-145M helicopters made by the European multinational Airbus (Vuksanovic 2021c, 216). In September 2020, as Belarus was undergoing domestic unrest, Serbia, under EU pressure, cancelled the ‘Slavic Brotherhood’ military exercise. To maintain a pretence of military equidistance, Belgrade suspended military drills with all military partners for six months, including NATO. Importantly, no drills were planned with NATO during that time (European Western Balkans 2020). Russia still has three influence instruments for the foreseeable future: Soft power, energy dependence, and the unresolved Kosovo dispute (Vuksanovic 2019c). Russian soft power is particularly potent in Orthodox-majority countries. In Serbia, in late 2020, 40% of Serbs believed Russia to be the country’s greatest friend: A product of memories of the 1990s and emotional backlash against Kosovo’s independence (Bjelos et al. 2020, 10–11). Energy dependence on Russia will also remain. In January 2021, Russian inaugurated the Gazprom-controlled natural gas pipeline TurkStream, a replacement for the defunct Southstream project running from Russia to Turkey. TurkStream has enabled Russia to bypass Ukraine and made Serbia, North Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina dependent on the supply of Russian gas (Reuters 2021a). In recent years, Moscow was displeased with Belgrade’s attempt to resolve the Kosovo dispute with President Donald Trump’s help and without Russian participation. Russia saw this as an attempt to deprive Russia of one of its last remaining assets in the region, and Serbia pivoting towards the US (Vuksanovic 2020b). The election of Joseph Biden as the new US president, who is expected to be tougher on Belgrade on Kosovo, has forced Belgrade to pivot back towards Russia. This change in position was illustrated by Serbia’s vote in the UN General Assembly in December 2020 against the condemnation of Russia over Crimea and the visit by Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov to Belgrade that same month (Vuksanovic 2021c, 229–230). In that same context, Serbia restored the practice of joint exercises with Russian security forces and is dispatching an ambassador to Syria to please Russia (Vuksanovic 2021a). Russia will not give up on the asset of the unresolved Kosovo dispute except in the case of hypothetical geopolitical bargaining with the US.

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Meanwhile, the COVID-19 pandemic has allowed Russia to score points in the region. After Serbia purchased Russian-made Sputnik V vaccines, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, and Montenegro did the same. Albania is now also considering purchasing the Russian vaccine (Reuters 2021c). In March 2021, Serbia signed an agreement with Russia regarding the manufacture of Sputnik V vaccines in Serbia (Ralev 2021). However, the COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated that China has replaced Russia as the primary challenger of the West in the Western Balkans and the region’s most consequential country, Serbia. In 2020, the Russian medical aid to Serbia was not greeted with the same enthusiasm as the Chinese aid, showing Russia’s limited power capabilities in the region, distrust between Belgrade and Moscow, and the fact that Serbia has replaced Russia with China as its leading partner outside the Western world (Vuksanovic 2020e, 3–10). Indeed, as the COVID-19 outbreak spread to Serbia, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić stated that ‘European solidarity does not exist’, calling it ‘a fairy tale on paper’. Vučić went further, referring to China as ‘the only country that can help us’, and calling Chinese President Xi Jinping ‘brother’. Soon after that, Vučić greeted Chinese medical aid at the Belgrade airport and in a powerfully symbolic way as he kissed the Chinese flag (Vuksanovic 2020f). The COVID-19 pandemic showed that China will use any opening left by the EU and the West to spread influence in the region. While the EU and the rest of the Western Balkans were struggling with vaccine procurement in early 2021, China’s ‘vaccine diplomacy’ campaign delivered one million Chinese-made Sinopharm COVID-19 vaccines to Serbia, with two million more doses to follow in 2021. The acquisition of Sinopharm vaccines has allowed Belgrade to exercise its own ‘vaccine diplomacy’ by donating vaccines to its neighbours, while a plan to open up a Sinopharm production facility in Serbia with financing from China and the UAE would turn Serbia into a regional vaccine supply hub (Vuksanovic 2021d). The presence of Russian and Chinese vaccines allows Serbian ‘vaccine diplomacy’ to become global as Serbia has a surplus of vaccines. This led Serbia to donate Sputnik V vaccines to countries of the Non-Aligned Movement to ensure these countries do not recognise independent Kosovo, to win new defence markets, and boost political prestige (Vuksanovic 2021b). With ‘vaccine diplomacy’, China is again showing that it is collaborating with Serbia – using the country as a springboard to spread influence in the immediate region and more widely in Europe. The nature of the Chinese challenge is different from that of Russia. Unlike Russia’s limited power capabilities and strategic vision that has been reduced to that of a ‘spoiler power’, China is the rising global power with a strategic vision of Eurasia unified under Beijing tutelage within the BRI, with the Balkans as a bridge between Europe and wider Eurasia. On that front, the Chinese challenge is less geopolitical and more normative and political as China promotes standards and policies different from the West (Vuksanovic 2019b). Consequently, Chinese projects impact the fragile rule of law and environmental and labour standards in the region.

Russia, China and the WB 247 Chinese projects in Albania are marred by corruption and mismanagement scandals (Madhi 2020). The Chinese equities in Tirana airport were sold in late 2020 to a local company (Everbright Limited 2020). The situation is no different regarding the Chinese-built highways in North Macedonia (Krstinovska 2019). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Chinese-built coal plants are making the country dependent on coal while the EU is moving towards clean energy sources, both degrading the environment while moving the country away from EU standards (Rogelja 2020). The situation is no different in Serbia. In April 2021, the Serbian government temporarily closed several production facilities owned by Chinese firms after environmental protests in Belgrade (Hopkins 2021). China’s state-controlled Zijin Mining Group Co., which owns the mining complex RTB Bor, keeps its Chinese workers in ‘prison-like’ conditions (Dragojlo 2021). In countries like Serbia, the influx of Chinese capital helps democratic ‘backsliding’ as it provides the incumbent elites with a source of capital and domestic legitimacy (Vuksanovic 2019e). By being able to offer projects guided by a different set of standards than those of the EU, China reduces the EU’s influence and leverage in the region, as local nations have less incentive to align with EU standards and policies when they have a Chinese alternative (Vuksanovic 2019b). The region is also at risk of falling prey to Chinese ‘debt-trap diplomacy’, where a country receiving Chinese credit accumulates so much debt that it is forced to surrender assets to China or move into ever greater economic dependency on Beijing. For example, Montenegro took a $1 billion loan from China for the construction of the highway to Serbia. The scale of the loan raised Montenegro’s government debt to 105 per cent of GDP. Podgorica is struggling to service the debt, raising the fear that China could seize critical national assets, like Adriatic ports (Xhambazi 2021). Serbia is increasingly willing to go against the EU by backing China on issues like Xinjiang and Hong Kong breaking its own practice of diplomatic neutrality (Conley et al. 2020, 6). The military domain will also be an area where China will be more assertive. Between 2008 and 2018, the US and China were the two largest military donors to Serbia, with Russia was ranked in a modest ninth place (Vuksanovic 2020e, 5–6). As a sign of the change, Serbia has decided to purchase the Chinese air defence system FK-3 instead of the Russian S300, angering the Russian media and presumably the Kremlin (Vuksanovic 2020b). Serbia’s purchase of Chinese drones shows that military cooperation with China can affect strategic equilibrium on the ground. A regional tour by Chinese defence minister Wei Fenghe in March 2021 proves that China wants to expand its military partnerships in the Western Balkans beyond just Serbia.

Conclusion: It Is the US, Not the EU, That Will Push Back against Russia and China Thе EU, burdened with current problems, is not showing enough signs that it has the willingness to counter Russia and China in the Western Balkans. The US

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is proving more capable than the EU in a push against Russia and China. The Ukraine crisis put the Western Balkans on the US radar in the context of countering Russian presence. In 2017, Montenegro joined NATO. US diplomatic intervention helped to end the political deadlock in Albania between the opposition and the government in 2017 and the name dispute between Greece and North Macedonia in 2018 (Gotev 2017). The resolution of the latter crisis paved the way for North Macedonia to join NATO in 2020. US financial sanctions also remain a powerful vital instrument at Washington’s disposal. In November 2019, Serbia announced that it would finalise remaining arms transactions involving Russia and abort further arms purchases from Moscow, a move motivated by Belgrade’s fear of US financial sanctions (Zivanovic 2019). The US has been pushing back against China as well. In September 2020, the Trump Administration mediated an economic normalisation between Belgrade and Priština that stipulates that the two parties would not install 5G equipment ‘from untrusted vendors’ – a clear reference to Huawei (Vuksanovic 2020a). The US has also co-opted Albania, Kosovo, and North Macedonia to join its ‘Clean Network’, an initiative aimed at cutting China and Huawei out of global 5G infrastructure (Clean Network – Department of State 2020). Meanwhile, Serbia is postponing its biding tender for the 5G spectrum, while Bosnia and Herzegovina is evasive on joining the ‘Clean Network’ on the account that fourth-generation networks are not fully functional (Đorđević 2021). Naturally, it would be more advisable and strategically prudent if the US were to counter Russian and Chinese influence in the Western Balkans, not just by exercising pressure on local nations, but by offering them alternatives, both individually and in conjunction with the EU. Two things are for certain. The first is that Russia and China will continue their current policies in the region as long as they have the strategic leeway to do so. The second is that the Western Balkans will be open to continued cooperation with Moscow and Beijing – as long as the risks of doing so are tolerable and until the West gives them a better offer.

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Russia, China and the WB 251 Madhi, Gentiola. 2020. “Story of a Chinese Airport in Albania.” CHOICE, May 19, 2020. https://chinaobservers.eu/a-story-of-a-chinese-airport-in-albania/. Mearsheimer, John J. 2014. “Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions that Provoked Putin.” Foreign Affairs 93 (5 September/October): 77–89. Mëhilli, Elidor. 2017. From Stalin to Mao: Albania and the Socialist World. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Montgomery, William. 2010. Struggling with Democratic Transition: After the Cheering Stops: A Memoir by the Last American Ambassador to Yugoslavia. Belgrade: Dan Graf. Nikitin, Alexander. 2004. “Partners in Peacekeeping.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), October 1, 2004. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_21119.htm ?selectedLocale=en. “Nikolić, Putin Sign Strategic Partnership Declaration.” B92, May 24, 2013. https://www. b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2013&mm=05&dd=24&nav_id=86333. Osborn, Andrew. 2018. “Russia Expels Greek Diplomats in Retaliatory Move.” Reuters, August 6, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-greece-russia-envoy/russia-expels -greek-diplomats-in-retaliatory-move-idUSKBN1KR1L2. Paddocks, Richard C. 1999. “Primakov Does U-Turn Over Atlantic, Heads Home.” Los Angeles Times, March 24, 1999. https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1999-mar -24-mn-20482-story.html. Panagiotou, Rita. 2012. “The Impact of the Economic Crisis on the Western Balkans and their EU Accession Prospects.” EUI RSCAS, 2012/64. http://hdl.handle.net/1814 /24557. Poolos, Alexandra. 2000. “Yugoslavia: Russia Plays Both Sides in Serbia.” Radio Free Europe, May 5, 2000. https://www.rferl.org/a/1094044.html. Poznatov, Maja. 2014. “Serbia Grudgingly Accepts Juncker’s Enlargement Pause.” Euractiv, September 16, 2014. https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/ serbia-grudgingly-accepts-juncker-s-enlargement-pause. Prtoric, Jelena. 2020. “In Croatia, China’s Building its Bridge to Europe.” China Dialogue, March 11, 2020. https://chinadialogue.net/en/transport/12005-in-croatia-china-s -building-its-bridge-to-europe/. Pula, Besnik. 2016. “The Budding Autocrats of the Balkans.” Foreign Policy, April 15, 2016. https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/15/the-budding-autocrats-of-the-balkans -serbia-macedonia-montenegro/. “Putin Guest of Honour at Serbia Military Parade.” BBC, October 16, 2014. https://www .bbc.com/news/world-europe-29641642. “Questions and Answers: Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans.” European Commission, October 6, 2020. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner /detail/en/qanda_20_1819. Ralev, Radomir. 2021. “Serbia Signs Agreement with Russia to Start Producing Sputnik V Vaccine.” SeeNews, March 25, 2021. https://seenews.com/news/serbia-signs -agreement-with-russia-to-start-producing-sputnik-v-vaccine-735794. Rogelja, Igor. 2020. “Why the Balkans is Struggling to Kick Coal.” China Dialogue, April 20, 2020. https://chinadialogue.net/en/energy/11969-why-the-balkans-is-struggling-to -kick-coal/. “Russia’s Gazprom Begins Gas Deliveries to Serbia, Bosnia via TurkStream Pipeline.” Reuters, January 1, 2021a. https://www.reuters.com/article/russia-turkey-gas -idUKL8N2JC08N. “Russia’s Sberbank to Sell Subsidiaries in Central and Eastern Europe.” Reuters, November 3, 2021b. https://www.reuters.com/article/sberbank-europe-idUSKBN2HO2H9.

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14 Partners or Security Challengers? The Implications of the Presence of Turkey, the Gulf States, and Iran in the Western Balkans Murat Önsoy and Hamdi Fırat Büyük Introduction The end of the Cold War created a dangerous power vacuum in various parts of the world including southeast Europe. In particular, it allowed the political crisis that started in Yugoslavia in 1989 to transform into a war. The conflict provided a historic opportunity for the post-Cold War foreign policies of Turkey, the Gulf states, and Iran, which were searching for a new role in the changing world. The absence of a superpower adversary raised the expectations of these middle and small power states regarding the benefits of developing a more assertive role in regional politics. Through their responses and direct and indirect interventions in the Bosnian War, they extended the reach of their foreign policy to the region. Since this first contact, they have been involved in the region’s security calculations for much of the post-Cold War era in different intensities and forms. Prior to 2008, in the golden years of EU enlargement, when the EU was a willing and able hegemonic actor in the region, the other powers had no alternative but to adjust their foreign policies according to the EU. However, the weakening of the EU’s transformative power and the absence of the US have given Turkey, the Gulf states, and Iran more room for manoeuvre in the Western Balkans. This chapter focuses on the security implications of the three countries’ foreign policy activities in the Western Balkans in a framework while taking into account their relations with NATO and the EU. The chapter begins by presenting a brief history of the Western Balkan states’ relations with Turkey, the Gulf states, and Iran in the post-Cold War period. The second part examines the current state of relations from different perspectives, including the role of assertive foreign policy choices, soft power institutions, religious institutions, and prestigious economic projects.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003276661-17

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Brief History of Relations since the End of the Cold War The 1990s In the 1990s, Turkey, the Gulf states, and Iran achieved influence in countries like Bosnia, Albania, and Kosovo in the Western Balkans. Yugoslavia’s violent disintegration was a regional crisis to which Turkey could not remain indifferent. Particularly the situation of the Bosniaks, the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter Bosnia), was of great concern due to Turkish people’s religious sentiment and the large Bosniak population in Turkey (Ekinci 2009, 46). Since the late 1980s, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been keeping a close watch on the political disorder in Yugoslavia. Until the beginning of the war, Ankara supported the integrity of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Ekinci 2018, 163). However, once it was realised that the country could not be kept together, the independence of each former Yugoslav Republic was recognised one by one. Meanwhile, Turkey pursued multilateral diplomacy to mobilise the international community regarding the situation in Bosnia at a time when other countries were aloof to the bloodshed. In June 1992, Ankara’s efforts culminated in the adoption of a resolution by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation on the situation in Bosnia. This resolution called on the United Nations to take all necessary measures to stop violence in Yugoslavia, including the use of force against Serbia (Demirtaş-Coşkun 2011, 7). All these efforts turned Turkey into an indispensable actor of the war in Bosnia. The country was invited to join the London Conference on 26–7 August 1992, organised by the European Community to discuss Bosnia (Bazoğlu Sezer 1996, 82). Turkey’s attempts to call the international community’s attention to Bosnia finally paid off in June 1993. The UN General Assembly passed a resolution urging the UN Security Council to take stronger action and set the Serbs a deadline to stop their aggression in Bosnia (Sayarı 2000, 169). In the post-war period, Turkey continued to play a role within a multilateral framework. Together with its Western allies under the umbrella of the UN, NATO, and the EU, Turkey was involved in post-conflict reconciliation, state building, and post-socialist transformation in the country. Turkey also became a member of the Peace Implementation Council’s (PIC) Steering Committee, which actively supported Bosnia’s unity and sovereignty. Apart from its diplomacy in the Bosnian War, Turkey was not very active in the region due to the unfavourable domestic and international situation until the 2000s (Ekinci 2018, 165). In the rest of the 1990s, Turkish foreign policy towards the region was based on the necessity to balance Greece’s influence by establishing friendly ties with its Western Balkan neighbours, such as Macedonia and Albania. Turkey played a limited role during the Kosovo War and regarding the name dispute between North Macedonia (then the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) and Greece (Vračić 2016, 5). Compared to Turkey, which has a centuries-long history in the Western Balkans, the Gulf states and Iran are relative newcomers. Their activities began by supporting the Bosniaks in the Bosnian War between 1992 and 1995 (Hänsel

Turkey, the Gulf States, Iran and the WB 257 and Feyerabend 2018, 7). Unlike Turkey, they did not engage in diplomatic activities; instead, they provided the Bosniaks with humanitarian aid, Muslim volunteer fighters, mercenaries, and arms (Ejdus 2017, 51). In 1992, the Saudi government created the Saudi High Commission for Aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina, which became the single largest Muslim donor to the country (European Parliament 2017, 2), primarily financed by Saudi Arabia (Malagić and Spaić 2014). Unlike the other Gulf states, whose presence in the region was motivated both religiously and economically, the Saudis were purely interested in spreading Wahhabi religious beliefs. This, however, started to change after the 9/11 attacks, when the Kingdom had to soften its foreign policy due to international pressure, as indicated by increasing Saudi investments in non-Muslim regions and the volume of trade with Serbia. The Bosnian War was the first time that the Western Balkans met radical Islam and the Wahhabi tradition. Although the majority of the volunteer fighters who came to fight alongside Sunni Bosniaks left the country after the war (Progonati 2016), the influence of radical Islam was maintained and developed through Saudi financial aid. In theory, this money was for post-conflict-reconstruction efforts in Bosnia. However, the Saudis concentrated on spreading Wahhabi Islam by constructing mosques and Islamic schools, and training imams (Mandacı 2018, 347). Accordingly, the Saudis allocated the funds to specific Islamic foundations, such as the Muslim World League, Al-Haramain foundation, the International Islamic Relief Organization, the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, Saudi Arabian Red Crescent Society, the Islamic Waqf Organization, and the Makkah Humanitarian Organization (European Parliament 2017, 2). Iran contributed to the Bosnian War by sending a large number of Revolutionary Guards, providing logistical support (5,000 tonnes of arms) to the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and training their special forces. While these activities increased its short-term influence on the government in Sarajevo (Bardos 2013), Iran could not maintain its influence after the war ended, primarily because of international sanctions and religious differences between Shia and Sunni Islam (Rustemi et al. 2019, 79). In addition, the EU and the US tried to prevent Iran gaining regional influence by pressuring Western Balkan governments. As a result, Tehran’s activities remained marginal and limited to cultural activities. Another important destination for Gulf states in the immediate post-Cold War Western Balkans was those regions inhabited by Muslim Albanians. The first interaction between Muslim Albanians and the Gulf states occurred in the early 1990s as Islamic charities and foundations infiltrated Albania, which was experiencing economic crisis and instability in the post-communist era (Mandacı and Rusi Karacalarlı 2018, 494). The Gulf states’ early efforts to start activities in Albania, particularly Saudi-based NGOs, were prevented by the Socialist Party government of Fatos Nano (Blumi n.d.). However, they were welcomed by the successive Sali Berisha governments as the country fell deeper into economic crisis (Mandacı and Rusi Karacalarlı 2018, 494). In the early 1990s, Albania received hundreds of million dollars from the Saudi government to finance religious institutions and reconstruct religious buildings. After the pyramid crisis of

258 Murat Önsoy and Hamdi Fırat Büyük 1997, Kuwait’s donations played an important role in Albania’s transition to a market economy. As they had in Bosnia, Saudis sent jihadists to the Kosovo War. During the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) years, Saudi Arabian charities and foundations sought to establish the cultural and social basis of their presence through Islamic foundations. The Saudi Islamic Joint Relief Committee gained access to Kosovo, working particularly to rebuild rural areas. The Gulf states also contributed to post-conflict reconstruction and peacekeeping efforts in Kosovo. The United Arab Emirates, for example, contributed over 1,000 troops to the NATO-led Kosovo Force, and all the Gulf states recognised Kosovo’s independence between 2008 and 2011 (Mandacı and Rusi Karacalarlı 2018, 494). Iran, on the other hand, did not recognise Kosovo because it viewed its independence as an American project. This stance improved relations between Iran and Serbia. The Gulf states also lobbied the Organization of Islamic Conference to adopt a resolution calling on Islamic countries to recognise Kosovo (Chrzová 2019, 3). The Gulf states also sided with Macedonia in its naming conflict with Greece by recognising Macedonia under the name of the Republic of Macedonia (Mandacı and Rusi Karacalarlı 2018, 494). The 2000s By the early 2000s, as the violence eased, the Western Balkans became relatively stable. Accordingly, as hard power became less relevant, all the foreign policy actors, including Turkey, turned to soft power tools in the region (Bošković, Reljić and Vračić 2015, 99–100). Meanwhile, the early 2000s was an era of rapid transformation in Turkey due to strong economic growth and consecutive single-party governments of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) from 2002. These developments increased Turkey’s foreign policy opportunities. In particular, it launched a more active foreign policy in the Western Balkans, focused on soft power instruments to achieve its objectives, such as media, trade, cultural engagement, and diplomacy. Between 2002 and 2009, Turkey accepted the EU and NATO’s vision for the region, acting as a partner in their initiatives, thereby becoming an important participant in stabilisation and economic development efforts (Dursun-Özkanca 2019, 42). Turkey also became a major contributor to regional peacekeeping and EU integration efforts. Throughout the 2000s, Turkey participated in various EU civilian and military missions, including EUPOL PROXIMA, and EUFOR Concordia in Macedonia, EUPM and EUFOR ALTHEA in Bosnia, and EULEX in Kosovo, and NATO operations, such as Essential Harvest and Amber Fox, and missions like KFOR and SFOR. Turkey also participated in EU-supported cooperation initiatives throughout the region, including the South East European Cooperation Process (SEECP), the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI), PIC, and the South-Eastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG) (Vračić 2016, 7–17). Turkey’s commitment and contribution

Turkey, the Gulf States, Iran and the WB 259 to the political and economic stabilisation of the Western Balkans were praised by the European Commission’s Turkey 2010 Progress Report (2010): Turkey has taken a number of initiatives in the Western Balkans, expressing commitment to promoting peace and stability in the region. Turkey supports integration of all countries in the region both with the EU and at the Euro Atlantic level. After military conflicts in the Western Balkans ended, the Gulf countries shifted from the role of donors to commercial partners during the 2000s. Their foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Western Balkans increased substantially to over 1 billion US$ in 2002 (Mandacı and Rusi Karacalarlı 2018, 495). Contrary to the 1990s, when their investments were predominantly directed towards Muslimpopulated countries and regions of the Western Balkans, Gulf investors, including Saudi Arabia, began investing in non-Muslim-populated areas like Serbia and Croatia. In particular, Gulf states invested heavily in Serbia, which they viewed as an important gateway to the EU market on the expectation that Western Balkan states would soon join the EU. Meanwhile, the activities of Wahhabi groups backed by the Gulf states in general and their foundations in particular became a regional concern after the 9/11 attacks. Under US and EU pressure, Western Balkan governments turned their backs on them due to their alleged links to al-Qaeda. In cooperation with NATO and EU forces, the houses and offices of Wahhabi individuals were raided. Bosnia’s government, for example, forcibly closed several Wahhabi institutions, including the Saudi High Commission for Aid to Bosnia Herzegovina and the Bosnia and Herzegovina office of the Saudi-based Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation. These actions weakened, though did not eliminate, the regional cross-border network established by Wahhabi groups and Islamic foundations while the region was no longer a safe haven for jihadists. The 2010s The 2000s ended with a major shift in Turkey’s Western Balkan policy. Ahmet Davutoglu, who became the architect of Turkey’s growing activism in the region, was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey in 2009. Under his leadership, Turkey shifted from a Western-oriented approach to a more independent, proactive stance in the Western Balkans. This activism should be understood in terms of both Davutoglu’s vision (Strategic Depth) and the power vacuum that emerged after the 2008 financial crisis (Dursun-Özkanca 2019, 42). Indeed, Davutoglu steered a more central position for Turkey in the region, thanks to the EU suspending its economic restructuring efforts in the Western Balkans. Turkey seized this opportunity to pick up where the EU left off in the crisis-hit Western Balkan states (Bartlet and Prica 2011, 4–5). Turkey’s effective diplomacy demonstrated its capacity to contribute to regional peace and stability. Ankara launched different Balkan initiatives and participated in attempts to reconcile conflicting

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ethnic groups, particularly between Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks. These attempts were significant in achieving cooperation between the parties and maintaining peace. However, Turkish activism and the increasing rhetoric of Davutoglu and other Turkish politicians alluding to the country’s Ottoman past and common cultural heritage with other Muslim communities led to doubts about Turkey’s real intentions. The EU, for instance, depicted it as a neo-Ottomanist power attempting to create a so-called ‘neo-Ottoman Balkans’ (Türbedar 2011). Turkey’s golden age of economic prosperity and foreign policy activism ended after 2013. Facing economic and social challenges at home, the country failed to maintain its active foreign policies. Both the size of Turkish investments and the number of bilateral agreements declined sharply. Nevertheless, President Erdogan’s personal initiatives maintained Turkey’s regional leverage and kept its interests alive. President Erdogan became much more active after Davutoglu resigned as Prime Minister in mid-2016. In the post-Davutoglu period, Erdogan established positive relations with regional leaders like Alexander Vučić, Edi Rama, and Bakir Izetbegović. A key initiative was the symbolic meeting between Serbian leader Aleksander Vučić and Bosniak leader Bakir Izetbegović. Erdogan’s attempts to mediate between Serbia and Bosnia reminded many of Turkey’s activism in the late 2000s and early 2010s (Bechev 2017). In addition, Croatian President Kolinda Grabar Kitarovic asked for Erdogan’s support to change the electoral law in Bosnia, which clearly showed Ankara’s continued political influence (HINA 2019). Another major issue was Ankara’s struggle against the Gulenist network in the Western Balkans, which the government described as a ‘parallel state’ and renamed as ‘the Fethullahist Terrorist Organisation’ (FETO). This struggle had started in late 2013 before intensifying after the failed coup of 15 July 2016 to become the main concern of Turkey’s Western Balkans policy. Turkey’s main aims were to root out Gulenist businesses and schools and extradite Gulen supporters by pressuring Western Balkan governments. Turkey adopted a carrotand-stick approach to curbing Gulenist influence in the region. For example, to encourage the authorities to close down Gulen-linked institutions, Turkey offered more investments and trade agreements whereas bilateral deals with uncooperative countries were annulled (Öztürk 2021, 161–163). The Gulf states increased the flow of FDI to the Western Balkans after 2013. This was a very timely move for the region, which was suffering from a sharp decline of FDI from the EU due to Europe’s economic crisis. Most FDI went to real estate as Bosnia became a favoured destination for tourists from the Gulf states. They also invested in other lucrative sectors, such as tourism (Montenegro), construction (Belgrade Waterfront), agriculture, aviation (Air Serbia), media (Al Jazeera Balkans), banking, transport, health care, and military technology (Mandacı 2018, 348). Since 2012, the Gulf states have also purchased large quantities of weapons from the Western Balkans. After easing export controls over arms exports, Serbia became the region’s main arms exporter. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are the largest customers while also investing in the region’s defence

Turkey, the Gulf States, Iran and the WB 261 industries (Ejdus 2017, 51), although Kuwait is the largest investor at 8 billion dollars. The second largest investor, the United Arab Emirates, has established the strongest economic ties with almost all the Western Balkan countries in various sectors while Qatar also has strong economic ties across the region. In 2013, the Albanian government, pressured by the Obama government, offered asylum to members of an Iranian dissident group called the Mujahedeen Khalq (MEK) or People’s Jihadists, who had been exiled from Iran during the early years of Khomeini’s regime. The group purchased large areas of land in a valley 15 miles west of Tirana and built a camp there. However, Albania’s government has become concerned by the security implications of the steady growth in their numbers from 250 initially. Another important issue is the numerous foreign fighters, about 1,070, from the Western Balkans that have joined Islamic State (IS) and other Islamic groups to fight in Syria and Iraq since the start of the conflict in Syria. Compared to its population, Kosovo sent the most European foreign fighters. The Kosovo Police Anti-Terrorist Directorate estimates that 316 Kosovars out of 1.8 million citizens are IS members. To prevent further IS recruitment of fighters, many Western Balkan states have criminalised fighting in conflicts abroad, with prison sentences of between 6 months and 15 years for participation in a foreign war, recruitment of fighters, or support for terrorist groups (Beslin and Ignjatijevic 2017). In 2015, North Macedonian police raided several Wahhabi mosques in Skopje while Saudi organisations in Bosnia and Herzegovina are under strict police control.

Current State of Relations Soft Power Approach Turkey, the Gulf states, and Iran have clearly prioritised soft power in their policies towards the region. These target predominantly Muslim countries and Muslim populations via mosque constructions and renovations, and the development of other Islamic centres and institutes to promote their culture and language, media houses, education, and scholarships. As part of its soft power policy, designed by former Turkish Prime Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkey has the most institutionalised influence in the region through its aid agency, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), Yunus Emre Institutes, schools, and universities, and state and private media houses using local languages. While other countries have employed soft power institutions to expand their influence, this has been to a lesser degree than Turkey. Development Aid While TIKA has operated in the region since the 1990s, its budget and activities exploded under President Erdogan’s AKP in various regions, including the Balkans, due to Turkey’s wish to pursue an active soft power strategy. Thus, Turkey’s development grew from about 85 million US dollars in 2002 to

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8.12 billion US dollars in 2017. Focusing on development cooperation, TIKA works in more than 150 countries and has offices in many of these. Through TIKA, Turkey shares knowledge and experience with many countries, from the Balkans to Africa, from the Middle East to Latin America. TIKA has offices in all the Western Balkan countries, and has conducted thousands of projects, including the renovation of historical monuments, mostly from the Ottoman era, and provided aid and donations to improve capacities in education, health, and agriculture. While the total number of projects is unknown because of a lack of transparency by the Turkish government, many examples can be given. For instance, over more than 24 years in Bosnia, TIKA has conducted more than 900 projects and other activities, valued at 90 million US dollars (Crnovirsanin 2020) in various sectors, such as education, health, and the development of administrative capacities. Schools were rebuilt in Novi Travnik, Bosanska Krupa, and Doboj Istok, along with assistance in special education, which included staff and expertise exchanges, and setting up specially equipped classrooms. TIKA has also rebuilt and re-equipped the library of Sarajevo University’s Faculty of Architecture and the Faculty of Political Sciences’ conference hall, and renovated several mosques and other Ottoman monuments, including Drina Bridge in Visegrad, Aladza Mosque in Foca, Sarena Mosque in Travnik, and Ferhadija Mosque in Banja Luka. Turkey has also completed 300 similar projects in Kosovo (Habertürk 2020), 900 projects in North Macedonia, and nearly 450 projects in Albania (Aliu 2018). Several other Turkish institutions have also supported Turkey’s development aid effort in the Balkans. For example, Bursa Orhan Gazi Municipality renovated Sarajevo’s old town in 2016 while the Turkish Mass Housing Development Administration built 500 houses in Albania in 2020 for people who lost their houses in a devastating earthquake (Aliu 2020). Following the collapse of Yugoslavia and the wars in the 1990s, the Gulf states also invested heavily in building mosques and other Islamic monuments in the region. Saudi Arabia’s projects include the large complex of King Fahd Mosque and a cultural centre in Sarajevo, and Ebu Beker Mosque in Skadar, Albania. Qatar constructed and donated a new library mosque for the Gazi Husrev Beg Foundation in Sarajevo (Aljazeera Balkans 2017). The Qatar Fund for Development also funded Slovenia’s first mosque in its capital, Ljubljana, including a library and Islamic cultural centre for the city’s Muslims, a majority of whom are Muslim Bosnians and Albanians (Qatar Fund 2018). Turkey and the Gulf states’ development aid policies have also been evident during the COVID-19 pandemic, when Western Balkan countries could not respond effectively because of weak health care and state capacities. While the EU was busy dealing with its own problems and slow to help the Western Balkans, Turkey (Buyuk 2020a), the Gulf states (Karcic 2020a), Russia, and China supplied medical equipment by air. These flights were welcomed by government officials with significant ceremonies and extensive media coverage. Consequently, despite ultimately providing the most help to the Western Balkans, the EU lost the PR game.

Turkey, the Gulf States, Iran and the WB 263 Culture and Education Turkey’s educational and cultural activities in the region are far more intensive than those of any other Middle Eastern or Western countries. Turkey’s cultural centres, Yunus Emre Institutes, have operated in the region since the early 2010s. There are currently ten branches in the Western Balkans (two in Albania, three in Bosnia, one in Croatia, one in Montenegro, three in Kosovo, one in North Macedonia, and one in Serbia) (Yunus Emre Institute 2021), offering Turkish language classes and cultural courses for locals. Demand for Turkish language and culture has increased in the region thanks to Turkey’s proactive foreign policy as well as popular Turkish soap operas. In Bosnia alone, 5,000 Bosnians have attended Yunus Emre Institute language and cultural courses while more than 15,000 students have chosen Turkish language as their second elective language thanks to an agreement between the institute and local schools (Bosnahersek.ba 2019). The Yunus Emre Institute also finances several Turkish language departments in the region through various agreements. While Iran’s Ibni Sina Institutes and Iranian Cultural Centres, and Saudi Arabia’s Cultural Centres also provide language and culture courses, their activities and student numbers are much lower. Turkish-funded schools are also increasing across the region. The Maarif Foundation, also known as Maarif Schools, which was established to replace Gulen schools, now has 353 educational institutions and 40 student dormitories in 67 different countries worldwide, educating more 40,000 students (Maarif Foundation 2021). In the Western Balkans, there are five schools and a university in Albania, four schools in Bosnia and Herzegovina, eight schools in Kosovo, four schools and a student dormitory in North Macedonia, and seven schools in Romania. In addition, thousands of students have now been educated at two universities owned by Turkish foundations: The International University of Sarajevo and the International Balkan University in Skopje. Despite Turkish government pressure, dozens of schools and universities owned by the Gulen network continue to operate, including the International Burch University in Sarajevo. Turkey also offers various scholarships to Balkan students to study in Turkey. According to official figures of Turkey Scholarships in 2020, nearly 10,000 Balkan students have graduated from Turkish universities while 1,375 students from the region continue their education in Turkey (Kadic 2020). However, these numbers only include students who studied as part of Turkey Scholarships since the mid-2000s. The total is at least double these official figures if Turkey’s previous state scholarship programmes at different levels, other institutions’ scholarship programmes, and military and police academy students are considered (Smajic 2020). These graduates have become important human resources for Turkey’s state-owned institutions and private companies in the region while those who have risen in politics often promote better relations with Turkey. Iran also has some schools in the region, mostly in Bosnia. The Persian-Bosniak College in Ljesevo is an affiliate of Iran’s Al-Mustafa International University, which maintains a network of Iran-backed educational institutions across the globe and invites thousands of foreign students to continue their studies in Iran

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every year. Registered in August 1999 as a private institution, it functions like an ordinary secondary school. Finally, several hundred Balkan citizens are estimated to have studied in Gulf countries, mostly in theology departments. However, none of those countries are as popular as Turkey among Balkan citizens while graduates from those countries are often considered sources of radical versions of Islam in their home countries because of theological differences between Balkan Islam and Gulf and Iranian versions (Hansel and Feyerabend 2018, 20). Media Qatar and Turkey appear to be the leaders in media initiatives. Aljazeera Balkans, which Qatar’s Aljazeera TV station launched in 2010, with its headquarters in Sarajevo and regional offices across the region, has become one of the most watched and high-quality TV outlets in the region. Aljazeera Balkans also runs several other activities, including Sarajevo Talks, an academic platform that organises conferences and seminars, and the Sarajevo Documentary Festival. Turkey has expanded the state-owned Anadolu Agency as part of its soft power strategy. It has an office for a Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian language service in Sarajevo and another office in Skopje for Albanian and Macedonian language services. Turkish Radio and Television (TRT) also operates in several local languages with a regional office in Sarajevo, and announced in early 2021 the launch of a new media platform called TRT Balkans in 2021. This will be a digital media platform broadcasting in Albanian, Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian, Macedonian, Bulgarian, Turkish, and English. TRT Balkans will be headquartered in Skopje with regional offices in Sarajevo and Belgrade. Turkey also finances private media outlets, such as STAV weekly magazine and Faktor daily news page, owned by Simurg Media Company in Turkey. Turkey’s growing active media role, which aims to promote the ambitious policies of President Erdogan in the region, is often described as ‘Turkey’s media invasion’ (Janusz 2015). While the media presence of the other countries is still at an early stage and cannot be compared with Turkish and Qatari activities, Iran’s activities should be mentioned. The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting’s (IRIB) BosnianCroatian-Serbian language radio programme is one of the most prominent Iranian state-funded propaganda organs in the region. Bosnian-language broadcasts began trials in May 1994 before developing significantly after 1996 in the postwar period. They mainly offer political and cultural news from Iran, and global news narrated from the Iranian regime’s perspective. The website, meanwhile, includes a section on Islam with articles on daily prayers, human rights, and the philosophy of Shia Islam (Karcic 2020b). IRIB also owns Sahar TV or Sahar Balkans, which has operated since 1995. However, its activities are very limited, broadcasting in slots purchased from small local TV stations in Bosnia, Serbia, and Montenegro. Other Iranian media publications include small Islamic cultural magazines, such as Signs of the Times. All these media houses operate in line with the political agendas of their founding countries’ governments while promoting the activities of those local

Turkey, the Gulf States, Iran and the WB 265 politicians who have good relations with them. Given that their coverage is sometimes aggressive, the EU and international experts define several foreign media institutions, including those run by Turkey, Russia, and China, as major sources of disinformation produced and disseminated abroad for domestic purposes (European Parliament 2020). Clashing Islamic Influences Following the demise of communism and the end of the Cold War, Islamic institutions in the Western Balkans were very weak and vulnerable to radical interpretations of Islam, especially due to foreign fighters, often called the Mujaheddin, who fought in the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo. Turkey’s state religious authority, Diyanet, was seen as a natural ally for countering foreign Islamic influences since Turkish and Balkan versions of Islam share many similarities due to centuries of Ottoman rule in the region. Accordingly, North Macedonia, Albania, and Bulgaria officially invited Diyanet to help their religious institutions increase their capacity and administer the religious affairs of their Muslim populations (Öztürk 2021, 12–13). Diyanet has also established strong links with Islamic communities in other countries, including Bosnia, Serbia, and Montenegro. It is the only foreign religious institution that supports ending the division of Islamic communities in Serbia1 and helps religious institutions counter radical versions of Islam (Demirovic 2019). In Montenegro, Diyanet is constitutionally accepted as a mediator between the government and the country’s Islamic community in case of disagreements. Ties between Montenegrin and Turkish religious institutions have deepened recently, with Turkish imams working in several mosques in Montenegrin cities and towns due to the lack of local imams. Ties between the Bosnian Islamic Community, which was the leading Islamic institution in former Yugoslavia, flourished after the Bosnian War. The nature of Bosnian-Turkish religious relations is different to other countries for several reasons. In particular, Diyanet could not establish the same hierarchical relationship model with its Bosnian counterpart because the Bosnian Islamic Community, like Diyanet, maintains its claim to be the centre of Islamic affairs in the Balkans. The Bosnian Islamic Community has branches (Mesihats) in Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia, and is the main religious body for the large Balkan diaspora in Western Europe, the US, and Australia. However, this did not stop good relations developing between Bosnian and Turkish institutions. As with other countries, many Bosnian imams and students have been educated in Turkey while Diyanet completed several renovation projects in Bosnia. Apart from training, education, and scholarships, Diyanet has become one of the biggest donors to Islamic organisations in Balkan counties. It is currently building the headquarters of the Bosnian Islamic Community in Sarajevo and the region’s biggest mosque in Tirana, for which it has donated 15.5 million euros so far (Bildircin 2019). Several other Turkish religious groups, such as Gulenists, Suleymancis, Semerkand, and Ismailaga, run dozens of Islamic cultural centres and student

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dormitories across the region (Karcic 2010, 159–160). Unlike Saudi-linked organisations, known for proselytising, these religious groups, which follow a Turkish style of Islam, are seen as only marginally motivated by religion. Instead, they primarily focus on providing high-quality educational and humanitarian services to local Muslims. Granted, these services were coloured by a moralist, quietist, neo-Sufi form of Islam. However, unlike the Saudi and Salafi ideologies, which are alien to Balkan Muslims, Turkish religious groups present their Islamic traditions as broadly identical to local practice (Rasidagic and Hesova 2020, 105–106). The Islamic influence of the Gulf states and Iran has remained rather limited due to significant theological differences. Furthermore, they are considered the main sources of religious radicalism inspired by Salafi-Wahhabi ideologies. Due to growing concern over the rise of Wahhabism in the Balkans, the issue is now recognised as one of the region’s key political and security issues (Morrison 2008, 1–2). Followers of Wahhabism established themselves and became increasingly active throughout the Western Balkans during and after the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, most notably in Bosnia, Sandzak in Serbia, and Montenegro, and also later in Kosovo, Albania, and North Macedonia. SalafiWahhabi ideologies are considered alien to Balkan Muslims, yet found fertile ground in the post-war context as Muslims remained neglected for decades (International Crisis Group 2013). Local Islamic communities have tried to counter these influences. In 2010, for example, the Bosnian Islamic Community closed mosques and masjids under control of a Salafi movement, also known as the Para-Jamaat structure. Other countries followed suit, but the issue became urgent again with the formation of IS after war broke out in Iraq and Syria. As already mentioned, hundreds of Balkan citizens joined IS in its global jihad while the presence of Salafis increased in the region, drawing international attention to Bosnian and Kosovar villages controlled by Salafi-Wahhabi followers (Dzidic 2016). According to a report published by the Regional Cooperation Council, at least 1,000 citizens from Western Balkan countries joined IS in its wars in Iraq and Syria (Azinovic and Becirovic 2017, 6–11). The return of these foreign fighters, radicalised by Salafi-Wahhabi ideologies, remains one of the region’s main security concerns. This has further limited the influence of the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia since their religious activities are often considered the main source of Islamist extremism (Chrzová 2019, 43–44). Nevertheless, Wahhabis still occupy prominent positions in the Islamic communities of both Bosnia and Kosovo while non-violent Salafi-Wahhabi imams were integrated into the Bosnian Islamic Community (International Crisis Group 2013). Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia continues to increase its stake in the region. In 2019, for example, it signed a memorandum of understanding with Albania to cooperate in Islamic work to counter Iran’s influence (Arab News 2019). While Iran competes with the Saudis, it has less influence than the Arab states (Progonati 2016, 178–179) in their competition for supremacy over Muslims. Supported by large amounts of Arab money, Wahhabism has entered the Western Balkans while Iran, propagating its Sufi legacy, has tried to expand its influence through cultural centres, publications, and seminars. This has obviously limited its

Turkey, the Gulf States, Iran and the WB 267 audience despite Iran’s early influence in Bosnia and Kosovo during their wars. However, Iran maintains good relations with the region’s clerics, intellectuals, academics, and journalists via seminars, magazines, and trips to Iran (Karcic 2021). Economic Influences Lack Real Leverage Although the political and soft power influences of Turkey and other Middle Eastern countries have grown, economic relations between Western Balkan countries and Turkey, the Gulf states, and Iran remain far from the desired level. The common feature of their economic activities is a focus on strategic and visible projects while trade relations lag far behind the attention given by Western countries. Thus, according to the European Commission’s 2020 figures, Turkey has only a 2.0% share in Western Balkan exports and a 6.0% share in imports. In contrast, EU countries account for 82.9 and 61.8% of exports and imports, respectively. Turkey’s share of exports is less than Russia’s, at 3.4%, while its share of imports is less than China’s, at 9.2%. According to World Bank figures for 2018, Turkey is only Bosnia’s seventh largest trade partner despite trade being the centre of Turkish foreign policy towards Bosnia. Additionally, Turkey’s FDI in Bosnia is only the 11th largest according to Bosnia’s Foreign Promotion Agency, at 199.1 million euro or only 3% of total FDI in Bosnia. The same features apply to economic relations between Turkey and other Balkan countries. According to the European Commission, Turkey had only 3% of Western Balkan countries’ FDI stock in 2018 while the Gulf states and Iran combined had less than 1%. However, Turkey continues to invest in grand construction projects, and the energy and banking sectors. For example, it currently finances the Belgrade–Sarajevo motorway project, which will cost 3.5 billion US dollars (Stojanovic 2020), while Turkish companies have completed Table 14.1 Western Balkan countries’ import and export shares with main trade partners in 2019 Import Partner

Export Value Share % Partner (million €)

30,267 1 EU27 2 China 4,497 3 Turkey 2,944 2,341 4 Russia 5 United Kingdom 1,397 6 USA 1,258 7 Switzerland 611 8 Ukraine 541 9 Iraq 10 Japan (EuroStat 2020)

466 392

61.8 9.2 6.0 4.8 2.9 2.6 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.8

1 EU27 2 Russia 3 Turkey 4 United Kingdom 5 China 6 USA 7 Switzerland 8 United Arab Emirates 9 Ukraine 10 Egypt

Value (million €)

Share %

22,890 943 561 528 504 364 357 170

82.9 3.4 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.3 1.3 0.6

158 102

0.6 0.4

268 Murat Önsoy and Hamdi Fırat Büyük similar projects, including the Tirana–Pristina Motorway, the International Pristina Airport, and the Pristina–Skopje Motorway Project (Enka 2021). Turkey’s stateowned Ziraat and Halk Bank operate in the region while Calik Company owns BTK Bank, which has operations in Albania and Kosovo. Turkish companies have also invested in transportation, energy, and telecommunications. However, although trade relations have significantly increased in the last decade, Turkey lags behind the EU and other countries. Moreover, growing economic crisis at home raises doubts about Turkey’s future economic role in the region. For the Gulf states and Iran, the situation is no better, with trade relations almost non-existent in some Western Balkan countries. However, Gulf states, especially the United Arab Emirates, have started to invest in Serbia’s construction and transportation sectors while Gulf states’ economic relations continue through private investments. One of the biggest was the contract for 3.5 billion euro, signed in April 2015 by the government of Serbia, to build a business, residential, and commercial area along Belgrade’s rundown riverfront. Another large-scale Arab investment in Serbia was the acquisition by the UAE’s state-owned national carrier, Etihad, of 49% of the Serbian national airline JAT in 2013. Etihad turned its loan of 40 million dollars into ownership of 49% of Air Serbia, and promised to give an additional 60 million US dollar loan to the indebted company (McGinley 2013). A few examples can also be seen in Bosnia, such as the construction of the Bosnian Bank International (BBI) shopping centre, which opened in March 2009 in central Sarajevo, funded by a 35-million-euro investment by the BBI Real Estate Company, which was established with capital from Saudi Arabia. The same company was involved in several subsequent projects to build residential complexes and reconstruct Sarajevo’s war-devastated Hotel Bristol. Another Saudi company, Al-Shiddi Group, invested over 75 million euros to build another major shopping mall in the centre of Sarajevo, called the Sarajevo City Centre. This also included a Swissotel, which officially opened in 2019. Despite its small size, Montenegro has also received private investment from Gulf states. Notable luxury development projects include the development of Capital Plaza by Emirati Abu Dhabi Financial Group, the acquisition of Porto Montenegro, a luxury yacht homeport and marina village in Tivat, by the Investment Corporation of Dubai, and the announcement of Plavi Horizonti by Qatar’s Diar (Radio Slobodna Evropa 2017). Western Balkan countries continue efforts to attract Gulf money. For instance, Macedonian Prime Minister Zaev welcomed a dozen Saudi businessmen in 2018 who had voiced interest in investing in North Macedonia. In an effort to strengthen North Macedonia’s economic ties to the Gulf states, the Economic Chamber of North Macedonia plans to launch new offices in Kuwait, Iraq, and Oman (Time. mk 2018). Iran, on the other hand, has had no discernible economic influence in Western Balkan countries given the minute trade volume between them. Increasing Military Relations In military relations, Turkey and the Gulf states differ. Turkey, as a NATO member, has long had military cooperation with almost all Western Balkan countries

8.45 4.54 1.07 3.45 4.70 10.05 3.80

Albania Bosnia Croatia Montenegro North Macedonia Kosovo* Serbia

9,404 4,197 127,758 139 8,873 10,734 33,613

1,316 51,463 77,271 0 648 3 140,291 0.16 0.04 1.08 0.00 0.10 0.32 0.13

0.05 0.72 0.45 0 0.0l 0.00 0.82 7,492 11,363 199,686 259 2,776 1,233 27,216

7,436 15,243 28,132 1,973 3,302 543 157,087

Share % USD '000

UAE

(World Bank, WITS and Kosovar Statistical Agency 2021) *Kosovo’s values are in euros

501,941 527,600 198,206 103,467 425,512 336,533 984,086

0.69 2.73 0.72 3.28 1.39 2.27 1.55

Albania 19,943 Bosnia 195,805 Croatia 123,075 Montenegro 15,265 North Macedonia 96,166 Kosovo* 8,354 Serbia 298,277

USD '000

USD '000

Share %

Saudi Arabia

Turkey

0.13 0.10 1.08 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.11

0.26 0.21 0.16 0.42 0.05 0.14 0.82 4,469 5.271 31,225 2.10 2,423 1,846 546

618 3,291 36,319 1.48 6,819 123 7,462

Share % USD '000

Qatar

Iran

0.08 0.05 0.17 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.00

0.02 0.05 0.21 0.00 0.10 0.03 0.04

2,240 91,398 52,384 770 12,339 10,653 42,397

137 1,857 7,612 0 1,200 0 9,772

Share % USD '000

Table 14.2 A detailed look at Western Balkan countries’ export and import with Turkey, Gulf countries, and Iran in 2018

0.04 0.79 0.28 0.03 0.14 0.31 0.16

0.00 0.03 0.04 0 0.02 0 0.05

Share %

Turkey, the Gulf States, Iran and the WB 269

270 Murat Önsoy and Hamdi Fırat Büyük thanks to international military missions, its donations and projects, and training and education for Balkan’s military personnel and cadets. Recently, Turkey has been aiming at a greater role in the region’s defence sector, based on its own growing domestic defence industry, through new kinds of defence donations, aid, and agreements (Buyuk and Jakov-Marusic 2020). In contrast, the Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, are major customers of Western Balkan countries rather than sellers, especially regarding the former Yugoslavia’s arsenal. As part of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s assertive foreign policy, Turkey has been involved in several conflicts, including Libya, Syria, and Nagorno Karabakh (Dragojlo, Jeremic and Buyuk 2020). These military engagements have provided a significant test of Turkey’s growing range of defence products, which the country has spent a lot of energy and money on in the last decade, and attracted attention to its defence industry. For example, Serbia’s President, Aleksandar Vucic, said that his country is considering buying Bayraktar armed drones, produced by Baykar Defence Company, owned by Erdogan’s son-in-law, Selcuk Bayraktar (Buyuk 2020c). These drones have already been deployed by Ukraine, Qatar, and Azerbaijan, and changed the course of the wars in Syria and Libya, according to experts. Turkey aims to develop its own defence industry to reduce its dependence on foreign countries while also gaining new arms customers, including in the Western Balkans. Given Turkey’s expanding foreign policy in the region, this is not unexpected because Turkey wants to be a regional power and authority. In line with the growth in its military industry, Turkey is trying to establish a firm foothold in the region through security links, in addition to economic, political, and social links (Huskic 2020). After the collapse of Yugoslavia and communist regimes in the 1990s, Turkey became a military partner to Balkan countries, with many initiatives taken in parallel with NATO. For example, many Balkan cadets and army officials attended military academies and other training in Turkey. According to Gulhan Yilmaz, the Turkish defence attaché in Bosnia, some 3,900 members of Bosnia’s armed forces had gone through different educational programmes in Turkey by 2019 (Faktor 2019). Turkey has offered mainly educational and logistical support to North Macedonia’s armed forces since it gained independence from former Yugoslavia in 1991 and is also a major donor of equipment for the Army of North Macedonia (ARM) which numbers some 8,000 personnel. Turkey was the first country to send a military attaché to Skopje, the first country to sign a deal on military cooperation, and the first to receive Macedonian officers for training. It was also among the first to offer military aid and donations. In December 2009, Kosovo and Turkey reached a bilateral agreement between the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) and Turkish Military Forces, which predicted collaboration in training and capacity building. Since then, around 140 members of KSF have been educated in the Turkish Military Academy. Turkey has also participated in NATO and other peacekeeping missions in the region. Since 1995, according to Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey has been part of every NATO-led operation in the Balkans. For example, Turkey provided 1,000 troops for NATO operations in Kosovo in 1999 while around 350 Turkish military personnel are

Turkey, the Gulf States, Iran and the WB 271 currently part of KFOR, Kosovo’s NATO operation, and 91 in the EU Rule of Law Mission, EULEX. Turkey has also established close military cooperation with Bosnia. It participates in the NATO-led Althea peacekeeping operation in Bosnia and champions Bosnia’s NATO membership application (Buyuk and Jakov-Marusic 2020). Over the past decade, in parallel with Turkey’s proactive foreign policy and growing defence industry, its defence involvement in the region has become more independent from NATO. For example, it donated military equipment to Balkan countries and signed several agreements, such as those with Bosnia, Albania, Montenegro, and North Macedonia in recent years. According to those agreements, Turkey will make significant donations of 100–200 million Turkish liras in return for buying Turkish defence products. Meanwhile, Turkish defence companies already sell defence products to Western Balkan countries while Turkish Otokar and BMC, which produce armoured vehicles and other military vehicles, have been negotiating with Balkan governments. However, Turkey’s souring relations with the West, its decision to buy S-400 missiles from Russia, and the resulting sanctions and removal from the F-35 fighter jet programme have cast doubt on its growing defence industry, which still depends on Western technology and critical equipment. In contrast to Turkey’s ambitions to sell weapons to Western Balkan countries, Middle Eastern countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, are customers because of former Yugoslavia’s vast military arsenal. According to an investigation by the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) and the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), weapons and ammunition exports to Saudi Arabia worth 806 million euros have been approved by Eastern European countries since 2012, citing national and EU arms export reports and government sources. Similarly, Jordan and the UAE secured export licences worth 155 million euros and 135 million euros, respectively, for a total of 1.1 billion euros in just those four years (Angelovski, Marzouk and Patrucic 2016). The Regional Report on Arms Exports, produced in 2018 by the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), further demonstrated the importance of Western Balkan states to Middle Eastern arms markets. For example, Eastern European states sold Saudi Arabia more than 118 million euros of weapons and ammunition in 2016 alone. Since then, Balkan weapons and ammunitions, sold under non-transparent agreements, have been used in conflicts in Libya, Iraq, Syria, and Azerbaijan and Armenia (Dragojlo, Jeremic and Buyuk 2020). Experts and international officials consider this a major threat to regional peace and security, describing it as ‘playing with fire’ (Jovanovic 2015; Vuksanovic 2020). Non-Transparent Leadership Networks Another important common point in relations between Turkey, the Gulf states, and Iran and Western Balkan countries is their leaders’ personal and non-transparent relationships, which are the main driving force of bilateral relations. For

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example, at an election rally organised by the Bosnian branch of the Union of International Democrats (UID) in Sarajevo on 20 May 2018, Bakir Izetbegović, then a Bosniak member of the Bosnian Presidency, declared that ‘President Erdogan was sent by God’. The UID, founded in 2004, has conducted propaganda activities in Western European countries as the long arm of Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party. After European countries stopped Erdogan from organising election rallies in Europe, the UID organized its Sixth Ordinary General Assembly in Sarajevo and invited Erdogan as a speaker. Bakir Izetbegović is a clear example of the selective policies employed by Erdogan in building Turkey’s relations in the Balkans. He has used the generous support of Turkey’s state institutions in various activities and campaigns, including the restoration of Bosnia’s monuments, zero-interest loans from Ziraat Bank, and support from Anadolu Agency’s Bosnian language service and other Turkey-funded media, such as STAV magazine and Factor website. Sebija Izetbegovic has also enjoyed Turkey’s support in building her political career. For instance, TIKA renovated and modernised a Sarajevo city hospital when Sebija Izetbegovic was director, an appointment that was criticised by the public for being due to her husband’s political influence. President Erdogan’s selective and personal relationships are also seen in Serbia with his counterpart Aleksandar Vucic and in Albania with Prime Minister Edi Rama. Bosniak leader Izetbegovic and Albanian Premier Rama were among the witnesses of the wedding of Erdogan’s daughter in 2016. There are many similarities between Erdogan and Western Balkan leaders, including building their own media houses, demonising opponents and critical media, using populist and nationalist discourse, establishing patrimonial networks within the state, undertaking ‘crazy’ mega construction projects, and sliding towards Russia. Under these kinds of relations, President Erdogan is often considered a role model for Balkan autocrats. The same practices are often seen in relations between Balkan countries and the Gulf states and Iran. For example, a majority of the Gulf companies operating in Bosnia are suspected of being linked with top Bosniak officials, although these claims have never been officially verified (Chrzová 2019, 42). In Serbia, the UAE-funded Belgrade Waterfront project has faced intense criticism from experts and opposition due to the non-transparent contract, the cost to local government for construction site preparations, and the illegal demolitions of buildings (Dzuverovic and Milosevic 2020, 9–10). Belgrade residents and activists organised protests over the destruction of several buildings by unknown masked people who had police impunity. While the project is now in its final stage, serious doubts remain about the credibility of the investors, and the lack of transparency, especially regarding the project’s budget and sustainability. Similarly, as a result of the personal relationship between Serbian President Vucic and the UAE’s ruling dynasty, the Al Nahyan family, Emirati companies Al Dahra and Al Rawafed have acquired important agricultural land from state institutions. The details of the agreements were not made public and, as seen with the Etihad and Belgrade Waterfront projects, Serbia lost millions of euros in potential profit to improve personal relationship between leaders (Dolapcev 2018).

Turkey, the Gulf States, Iran and the WB 273 In their relations with the region, Turkey, the Gulf states, and Iran have frequently exported their domestic problems into fragile Balkan countries. Erdogan, for example, has pressurised Balkan countries for years to extradite supporters of his exiled former ally, Gulen, accused of masterminding the failed coup in 2016. Since then, Ankara has renamed the Gulen network as the ‘Fethullahist Terrorist Organisation’ (FETO). This international network runs schools, NGOs, and other institutions, including in the Balkans. Although most Balkan countries have rejected these extradition demands, this has not stopped Turkey’s intelligence agency from bringing dozens of alleged Gulenists home by force from Albania, Kosovo, Bulgaria, and Moldova. Turkey also used the extradition of Gulenists as leverage with North Macedonia before ratifying its NATO membership protocol (Apostolov 2019). This has created tensions in the domestic politics of the affected countries and even caused a government crisis after Kosovo’s Prime Minister announced that he had not been informed of Turkey’s operations (Ahmeti 2019). These countries have also been criticised by international human rights groups and the EU. Turkey also hunts Kurdish and leftist exiles around the Balkans. For example, Serbia controversially deported a Kurdish politician to Turkey in 2017 despite warnings from the UN and human right groups (Zivanovic 2019). Turkey is not alone in demanding deportations of its critics. Palestine, for example, has demanded the extradition of exiled Palestinian politician Mohammed Dahlan, who has lived in Serbia for many years with support from the government (Middle East Eye 2017). The UAE and Egypt also support Dahlan, who allegedly brokered several deals between Serbia, Montenegro, and the Gulf states.

Long-Term Perspective As the EU’s Western Balkan hegemony has decreased, Turkey, the Gulf states, and Iran have played more active roles in the region, proving their capacity to contribute to security and development. However, their presence in the region has not been welcomed by the EU as it does not want a challenge to its regional hegemony. However, collaboration with these non-Western regional actors could be a cost-effective move, given the EU’s declining capabilities and chronic problems over the last decade. While their understandings of peace, stability, and security vary, all these actors wish to support these three goals within the region since their economic interests are also damaged without them. They all see the Western Balkans as a gateway to the EU market while Turkey’s security is closely linked to that of the Western Balkans. However, their policies and roles in the Western Balkans will continue to raise concerns as long as their relations with the EU continue to deteriorate and the EU continues to see them as malign influences rather than partners due to its own decreasing normative power and other international disputes. With its present foreign policy, Turkey appears to threaten the region’s security architecture constructed by the EU. However, the country is a regional insider and still a member of the Western Alliance. If a rapprochement can occur between Turkey and the Western alliance, Ankara will once again assume a supportive

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role in developing Western Balkan security as during the 2000s and early 2010s, which are accepted as a golden age of Turkish foreign policy. While Turkey is aware that its influence in the Western Balkan diminishes as it moves away from the EU and NATO, this has not stopped Erdogan from using the Western Balkans as leverage in Turkey’s relations with the West. Investments from the Gulf states in the region remain very limited while trade with the Gulf states and Iran is undeveloped. Although investments have increased with prestigious construction projects, the nature and sources of these investments remain non-transparent. Domestic reforms in Saudi Arabia show that it has taken steps towards modernisation, which may in turn affect foreign policy and push the country towards abandoning its attempts to spread Wahhabi ideology worldwide. This would enable the county to become a mainstream actor in the Western Balkans. The same is true for Iran, which is likely to have fewer tensions with the US administration after the election of Joe Biden as president.

Conclusion Security dynamics in the Western Balkans today are very different from the turbulent years of the 1990s. The region has become much more secure after the ending of conflicts in the early 2000s. Western Balkan states began to attract FDI, causing a period of high growth, low inflation, and European integration. However, this period ended in 2009 due to the effects of the 2008 global economic crisis. Since then, the region has faced growing hybrid security threats, such as economic weaknesses, democratic deficits, paralysed political systems, dysfunctional states, lack of sovereignty, unfree and manipulated media, frozen conflicts, increasing ethnic and religious tensions, and unresolved territorial disputes. After the 2009 eurozone crisis, the region’s economies were strained as FDI flows from the EU decreased significantly. In the golden years of EU enlargement, when the EU was a willing and able hegemonic regional actor, other powers had no alternative but to complement its policies. However, the weakening of the EU’s transformative power has given Turkey, the Gulf states, and Iran more room for manoeuvre in the Western Balkans. Consequently, depending on one’s perspective, they have become either guarantors of, or challengers to, Western Balkan security over the last decade. Turkey, the Gulf states, and Iran have had different impacts on the Western Balkan’s security architecture. As an integral part of the region and a member of the Western Alliance, Turkey has played the most important role. Notably, at least in the eyes of Western allies, its role has reversed from being a security guarantor in the 2000s to a security threat in the 2010s. In contrast to Turkey’s multi-dimensional role, the Gulf states have limited their participation to religion and the economy. After 9/11, the religious foundations of the Gulf states were largely put under government supervision. Therefore, since the early 2000s, they have focused on profit-oriented investments rather than investments aimed at changing the religion of Western Balkan societies. That is, they have changed from donors to investors (Mandacı and Rusi Karacalarlı 2018, 495),

Turkey, the Gulf States, Iran and the WB 275 with investments no longer limited to Muslim-populated regions as during the 2000s. Instead, their investments are found everywhere in the region, including Serbia and Croatia. To conclude, the roles of Turkey, the Gulf states, and Iran are more limited than assumed and presented in Western capitals. Nevertheless, their relations with the West and the West’s retreat from the Western Balkans have directly affected the region. Their cultural, religious, political, economic, and military influences will likely continue to increase under current international circumstances in parallel with developments in domestic and regional affairs. For a more secure, wealthier, and democratic Western Balkan region, the EU and the US must increase their presence. However, this should focus on cooperation with other countries in policies towards the Western Balkans instead of only trying to counter their influence.

Note 1 The collapse of Yugoslavia severely undermined the authority of the Islamic Community of Bosnia among Muslims in Serbia, where the government in Belgrade does not recognise its jurisdiction. This led to a split among Muslims in Serbia in 2007, with the Islamic Community of Serbia (Islamska zajednica Srbije) advocating greater independence from Sarajevo and the Islamic Community in Serbia (Islamska zajednica u Srbiji), which remains loyal to the Islamic Community of Bosnia but is largely controlled by former mufti and a local Bosniak politician, Muamer Zukorlic.

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Turkey, the Gulf States, Iran and the WB 277 Buyuk, Hamdi Firat. 2020c. “Serbia considers buying Turkish armed drones.” Balkan Insight, October 6, 2020. https://balkaninsight.com/2020/10/06/serbia-considers -buying-turkish-armed-drones/. Buyuk, Hamdi Firat, Sinisa Jakov-Marusic, Sasa Dragojlo, Gjergj Erebara, and Samir Kjaosevic. 2020. “With Arms Deals and Donations, Turkey Steps up Balkan Influence.” Balkan Insight, December 11, 2020. https://balkaninsight.com/2020/12/11/with-arms -deals-and-donations-turkey-steps-up-balkan-influence/. Chrzová, Barbora, Anja Grabovac, Martin Hála, Srecko Latal, Maja Bjelos, and Jan Lalić. 2019. “Western Balkans at the Crossroads: Assessing Influences of Non-Western External Actors.” Prague Security Studies Institute. https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd /2fb84c_3413f61e40554ace9f7af33d83372ed1.pdf. Crnovrsanin, Sanela. 2019. “TİKA Bosna Hersek’te 24 yıla 900 proje sığdırdı.” Anadolu Agency, January 9, 2020. https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/tika-bosna-hersekte-24-yila -900-proje-sigdirdi/1697363. Demirovic, Muhamed. 2019. “Deputy Mufti of Sandzak, Islamic Community of Serbia. Personal Interview by Hamdi Fırat Büyük.” November 2019, Novi Pazar. Demirtaş-Coşkun, Birgül. 2011. “Turkish Foreign Policy Toward the Bosnian War (1992– 1995): A Constructivist Analysis.” Karadeniz Araştırmaları 28: 1–18. Dr Lars, Hänsel, and Florian C. Feyerabend. 2018. “The Influence of External Actors in the Western Balkans, Kondrad Adenauer Foundation, 2018.” Dragojlo, Sasa, Ivana Jeremic, and Hamdi Firat Buyuk. 2020. “In Nagorno-Karabakh Fight, Serbian-Made Rockets and Links to Blacklisted Dealer.” Balkan Insight, October 2, 2020. https://balkaninsight.com/2020/10/02/in-nagorno-karabakh-fight-serbian-made -rockets-and-links-to-blacklisted-dealer/. Dolapcev, Vanja. 2018. “Sand Heavier than Soil: UAE Venture on Agricultural Land in Serbia.” European Western Balkans, October 29, 2018. https://europeanwesternbalkans .com/2018/10/29/sand-heavier-soil-uae-venture-agricultural-land-serbia/. Dursun-Özkanca, Oya. 2019. Turkey-West Relations: The Politics of Intra-alliance Opposition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dzidic, Denis. 2016. “Ošve – selo odvojene selefijske zajednice.” Detektor, Novermber 2, 2016. https://detektor.ba/2016/02/12/osve-selo-odvojene-selefijske-zajednice/. Dzuverovic, Nemanja, and Aleksandar Milosevic. 2020. “Belgrade to Belgradians, Not Foreign Capitalists: International Statebuilding, Contentious Politics, and New Forms of Political Representation in Serbia.” East European Politics and Societies and Cultures 35 (1): 190–209. Ejdus, Filip. 2017. “The Impact of Turkey and the Gulf States.” In Resilience in the Balkans, edited by Sabina Lange, Zoran Nechev, and Florian Trauner, 51–56. Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies. Ekinci, Didem. 2009. “The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Turkish Parliamentary Debates (1992–1995): A Constructivist Approach.” Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi 6 (22): 37–60. Ekinci, Mehmet Uğur. 2018. “Turkey and the Western Balkans: Stable Relations and Deepening Cooperation.” In Turkey and Transatlantic Relations, edited by S. Toperich and A. Ünver Noi, 163–182. Washington: Center for Transatlantic Relations. ENKA. n.d. “Portfolio.” Accessed January 25, 2020. https://www.enka.com/tr/portfolio -item/pristine-elez-han-otoyolu-guzergah-6/. European Commission Turkey. 2010. “Progress Report.” https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourho odenlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/tr_rapport_2010_en.pdf. European Parliament. 2017. “Saudi Arabia in the Western Balkans.” At a Glance. http://www .europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2017/614582/EPRS_ATA(2017)614582 _EN.pdf.

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Turkey, the Gulf States, Iran and the WB 279 Progonati, Erjada. 2016. “Iran’s Silent Revolution in the Balkans.” Journal of Security Strategy and Political Studies 1 (1 Summer): 177–192. Rasidagic, Esref Kenan, and Vera Hesova. 2020. “Development of Turkish Foreign Policy Towards the Western Balkans with Focus on Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Croatian International Relations Review 26 (86): 96–129. Rrustemi, Arlinda, Rob De Wijk, Connor Dunlop, Jovana Perovska, Lirije Palushi, Willem Oosterveld, Matthew Phillips, Hannes Roos, Bernhard Schneider, Hugo Van Manen, Bart Schermers, Michel Rademaker, and Dylan Browne-Wilkinson. 2019. “Geopolitical Influences of External Powers in the Western Balkans.” The Hague: The Hague Center for Strategic Studies 79. https://hcss.nl/report/geopolitical-influences-external-powers -western-balkans. Sayarı, Sabri. 2000. “Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: The Challenges of Multi-Regionalism.” Journal of International Affairs 54 (1): 169–182. Smajic, Merima. 2020. “President of the Association of Turkey Graduates in Bosnia (TUMED).” Personal Interview by Hamdi Fırat Büyük. January 2020, Sarajevo. Stojanovic, Bojana. 2020. “Zorana Mihajlović: Most preko Save u okviru autoputa Beograd - Sarajevo za dve i po godine.” Anadolu Agency, September 28, 2020. https://www .aa.com.tr/ba/balkan/zorana-mihajlovi%C4%87-most-preko-save-u-okviru-autoputa -beograd-sarajevo-za-dve-i-po-godine/1988313. Türbedar, Erhan. 2011. “Turkey’s New Activism in the Western Balkans: Ambitions and Obstacles.” Insight Turkey 13 (3): 139–158. Vračić, Alida. 2016. “Turkey’s Role in the Western Balkans - SWP.” https://www.swp -berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2016RP11_vcc.pdf. Vuksanovic, Vuk. 2020. “Serbia is Playing with Fire, Delivering Arms to Armenia.” Balkan Insight, October 2, 2020. https://balkaninsight.com/2020/10/02/serbia-is-playing-with -fire-delivering-arms-to-armenia/. World Bank, WITS, Kosovar Statistical Agency. 2021. “Data on Western Balkan countries’ import and export.” Accessed February 2021. https://wits.worldbank.org/; https://ask .rks-gov.net/en/kosovo-agency-of-statistics. Yunus Emre Institute. n.d. “About us.” Accessed February 15, 2020. https://www.yee.org.tr/. Zivanovic, Maja. 2019. “Serbia Must ‘Pay Price’ for Kurd’s Extradition.” Balkan Insight, March 7, 2019. https://balkaninsight.com/2019/03/07/serbia-must-pay-price-for-kurds -extradition/.

15 Sustainable Peace in the Western Balkans Utopia or Achievable Future? Věra Stojarová and Nemanja Džuverović

The demise of communism in the Balkans was followed by a series of wars and armed conflicts and resulted in the creation of many new independent states. The last armed conflict ended two decades ago, and it is therefore legitimate to ask about the state of peace and security in the region. Is sustainable peace achievable in the near future, or is it still only a utopian vision? The publication of this book is timely. The legacies of war, unresolved bilateral disputes, internal democratic and ethnic struggles, and countries’ EU aspirations come at a time of increasingly complex security environment, threatened by the presence of non-Western foreign policy actors, as was seen from the third section of this book. Many monographs have focused on the Balkan wars, nationalism, peacebuilding and statebuilding, organised crime, extremism, and EU enlargement, but there is a lack of comprehensive research on the current state of Balkan peace and security. This monograph is an attempt to address this gap by providing a contextual and nuanced understanding of the actors and processes that are shaping the region known as the Western Balkans by bringing together researchers who are from the region or who have focused their research exclusively in the post-Yugoslav space. The book provides a theoretical framework for analysis through six case studies on Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Montenegro, North Macedonia, Albania, and Kosovo, four comparative articles on political-societal security, military security, economic security, and environmental security, and the three chapters dedicated to the influence operations of the most important exogenous actors: The USA and the EU, Russia and China, and the Arab world, Turkey, and Iran.

Contemporary Security Threats in the Western Balkans After the post-conflict stabilisation and consolidation phase, when the EU, NATO, and OSCE paved the way for establishing the security regime, backsliding in the military sector came into play. This new worrying stage in the Western Balkans is bounded by the erosion of democratic governance (Kapidžić 2020; Bieber 2018; Stojarová 2020). Although the conventional arms control dynamic seems to be firmly anchored in the region, there are still concerns about an upswing in the armaments race. The experience in the Western Balkans shows how much these DOI: 10.4324/9781003276661-18

Sustainable Peace in the Western Balkans 281 sectors overlap – we cannot attempt to improve one sector without mentioning the others, and all are closely related. The political-societal sector still shows the unresolved conflicts in Kosovo and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In order to create a stable regional community, these issues must be solved. Regarding Kosovo, many solutions have been on the table, though the competing sides have not been able to find a working compromise. Serbia insists that Kosovo is part of her territory, while the Kosovo government argues for the self-determination of nations, with more than 100 countries that have recognised its statehood. Exchange of territory, which is from time to time on the table, could be accepted by the Serbian side, and may be a feasible solution for (part of) the international community, but does not have support in the Kosovo political scene, with the exception of ex-president Hashim Thaçi. Both the exchange of territory and the more controversial exchange of population could result in violence and the outbreak of a new conflict. In the long run, we see worrying activity by Vetëvendosje in Albania, the Preševo valley, and northern Macedonia. This should not be overlooked and must be taken seriously in any attempt at security building and resolution of the Kosovo conflict. Bosnia and Herzegovina seems to be a less complicated case, though again with no will from all three sides for compromise in sight. The representatives of Republika Srpska seek independence; Croats look for a third entity; while the Bosniaks would like to have a more centralised state. What is more, a new constitution, in particular a new electoral law, is needed in order to accommodate all the local ethnicities, and not only the Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks. The instability and insecurity in politics are mirrored in society – the wheels of radicalisation are spinning on all sides. Also, the national economy cannot develop properly without political stability, and the current high unemployment, low wages, and poor living conditions create conditions ripe for organised crime, trafficking and high emigration, and brain drain. As with the other countries in the region, security comes before democracy – the EU is happy to work with authoritarian leaders, which inevitably leads to democratic backsliding. This vicious circle is closed, and not enough attention is given to the security issues stemming from the environmental sector. The unresolved issues in BiH and Kosovo mean deadlock for the whole region on its path towards EU integration, and towards improving relations with the Western European states. The doors are open for other players – anyone who offers money, recognition, respect, and hope is welcome.

Box 15.1 Security Threats in the Western Balkans Security sector

Security threats

Military Political-societal

Potential upswing in armament dynamics Cohesion of BiH, Kosovo puzzle, polarisation in Northern Macedonia, nationalism, radicalism, extremism, brain drain, democratic backsliding, organised crime, competition of external actors

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Environmental

Poverty, failed transition, unemployment, lack of resources, collapsed industrial structures, insufficient competitiveness, limited effects of regional integration, weak institutions, Chinese investments contributing to high level of debt Lack of securitisation and regional cooperation on environmental threats (floods, storms, drought, extreme heat and wildfires, air and water pollution, earthquakes, pandemic)

The economic sector suffers, with high levels of poverty and unemployment on the individual level, while the national level is affected by a lack of resources, insufficient competitiveness, and collapsed industrial structures. The most important economic regional initiative is the Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA) – if we exclude Croatia (which was in CEFTA from 2002 to 2013), North Macedonia was the very first country from the region to join in 2006. However, during the last 15 years numerous conflicts have taken place between the signatories, which have had a negative impact on its functioning. One striking example is the constant political fights between Kosovo and Serbia and the imposition of higher import tariffs between the two countries. Also, weak institutions cause problems in both the political and economic sectors. A joint response to common challenges seems to be impossible due to the inefficiency and structural problems of the states as well as regional organisations. The environmental sector is highly under-securitised, and its biggest challenge is to bring environmental issues to the regional agenda. Local environmental security impacts (e.g., floods, storms, drought, extreme heat and wildfires, air and water pollution, earthquakes) are the most straightforward, as Hakala claims, when it comes to building preparedness, as it is possible to create early warning mechanisms to improve foresight and take preventive measures. Geopolitical and structural impacts (e.g., shared natural resources, cross-border environmental problems, supply-chain insecurity, migration, pandemics) present a more complex challenge to policymaking since they need regional cooperation and coordination of environmental security. One of the biggest structural risks in the Western Balkan countries is related to the significant role of the coal industry (especially regarding energy supply and jobs). The analysis from this book has clearly demonstrated that the Western Balkan countries would benefit from deeper and more deliberate regional coordination on environmental security.

The Role of External Players: Who Wins This Game? The geo-strategic importance of the Western Balkans is seen in the number of players who compete for influence in the region. On the one hand, we have the European Union and the USA with NATO, and on the other hand we have Russia and China. What is more, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Iran are all interested in their piece of cake as well.

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EU, NATO, USA Turkey, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iran

Russia, China

Sphere of influence Western Balkans

Figure 15.1 Scheme 1: External players competing for sphere of influence in the Western Balkans.

In their approaches to peacebuilding in the Western Balkans ever since the 1990s, the USA and the EU created a pattern of dependency, did not support each other, and failed to transfer ownership of sustained consolidation of peace and stability to the locals. The impact of the USA/EU reforms and actions was limited to top-level elites, while the wider societal structures were left out or included only partially. The EU has failed to incentivise local agents to pursue their own peace- and stability-oriented initiatives and the overall success of EU peacebuilding is limited. A very similar picture is portrayed for the USA involvement in the region – the US presence has simply failed to foster sustainable peace. To this end, the lack of strategic commitment by the EU and US created a power vacuum that was filled by non-Western regional and global powers which was thoroughly analysed in this book. The two countries that stand out are Russia and China who will continue their influence operations in the region as long as they have strategic leeway to do so. At the same time, the Western Balkans will be open to cooperation with Russia and China as long as the risk of doing so is acceptable and until the West gives them a better offer. On the other hand, foreign policy activities of Turkey, the Gulf states, and Iran in the Western Balkans have all different impacts on the security architecture of the region. Their relations with the Western Balkans are strongly influenced by the interests and activities of NATO, the USA, and the EU in the region. The struggle is ongoing. Even though Albania, Montenegro, and North Macedonia are now member states of NATO, there is still Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo left in the vacuum. While Serbia and the Serbs in Republika Srpska naturally lean towards Russia, Kosovo Albanians show their friendship with the USA in every step of the way, and Bosniaks welcome Arab players as money makes the world go round. Croatia is the only state in the region which became a member of the European Union, while all the others wait in the queue. Leaving aside internal EU problems, a lot has to be done on the WB side in order to change the dream of accession into reality. Local politicians blame the

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internationals and say that nothing has been done in the last 30 years, while the internationals complain about the lack of will from the locals. The EU should be aware of the fact that if these dreams remain unfulfilled, her place will be taken immediately by other players waiting in the wings.

Sustainable Peace in the Western Balkans: Utopia or Achievable Future? The key prerequisites for long-term peace and security in the Western Balkans are the final resolution of Kosovo’s status, political regulation of inter-ethnic relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the prevention of any potential arms race. With stable and recognised countries, one could expect the economy to grow, foreign investments to flow in, and low unemployment and high wages, thus hindering further brain drain. It could also be expected that more attention would be given to long-term issues such as protection of the environment. If this circle could be closed somehow, we could be optimistic about the future of the citizens of the Western Balkans. At the present pace of change, and with many problems at hand, a timeframe of three decades for these kinds of structural changes to take place seems to be realistic.

Box 15.2 Four Strategic Scenarios for the Future of the Western Balkans Scenario I Status quo (Very probable)

Scenario II All disputes solved by peaceful means (Not probable)

Scenario III Armed conflict (Less probable)

Scenario IV Partial changes and solutions for some disputes (Probable)

The first strategic scenario assumes the freezing of all unresolved conflicts (such as state organisation in BiH, and recognition of Kosovo’s independence) and maintaining the status quo in the region. The aspirant states will not join NATO, and there will be no major breakthrough in the medium term on the issue of accession to the European Union. At the same time, however, the EU will be willing to continue investing in the region, developing local infrastructure, and will continue to play a dominant role as an external guarantor of stability and the status quo, along with NATO, in order to avoid being supplanted by other external players. It is expected that the influence of external players such as China and Russia will continue to rise, especially in countries such as Serbia, Montenegro, and BiH. The second strategic scenario relies upon revision of the Dayton Peace Agreement and the adoption of a new constitution for BiH where the needs of all parties involved are satisfied. The Kosovo–Serbia dispute is solved by peaceful

Sustainable Peace in the Western Balkans 285 means, either by exchange of territory or by some other agreement, which would be a win-win outcome for both sides. The presence of foreign peacekeepers will continue for some time, although the tensions and conflict potential in the region will be significantly reduced. Unresolved border disputes between BiH, Montenegro, Serbia, and Kosovo are resolved peacefully. Also, in this optimistic scenario, we assume the collapse of illiberal regimes and the subsequent democratisation of states or semi-state entities with the aim of accession to the EU. The third strategic scenario assumes that Republika Srpska will try to withdraw from BiH, in which case we can expect an armed conflict with the engagement of foreign players such as Russia, Turkey, and the USA. The conflict would likely spill over into Kosovo, where ideas about a Greater Albania find fertile ground, and will destabilise inter-ethnic relations in neighbouring North Macedonia and Serbia. Given the membership of Albania and North Macedonia in NATO, the conflict could go beyond the regional dimension and lead to a confrontation between the Russian Federation and NATO, although this development would be one of the truly black scenarios. Increased political instability in the region might result in the fall of illiberal regimes, new demarcation of borders between states, and deterioration of the region’s economic, societal, and political conditions. This scenario is the least probable due to the presence of the security providers in the region – NATO and the EU. Once these two players decide to leave the region, the scenario becomes more probable. The fourth and final strategic scenario assumes that only some of the abovementioned changes and processes take place. The complexity of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina makes the adoption of a new constitution impossible, which would satisfy some of the parties involved. One solution for Kosovo might be an exchange of territory, which could be portrayed as a win-win outcome. At present, the politicians in Kosovo do not support this solution and also support on the part of the international community is missing. Such a solution will be feasible only when it is accepted by the political representatives of Kosovo. Regarding the unresolved border issues, the situation is complicated by the fact that Croatia has unresolved border issues with all of the countries in the region and, being in the EU, could abuse its position by blocking the accession of the other countries. We might see the fall of illiberal regimes in some countries, perhaps indicating a transition towards liberal democracies or further political instability. Two very probable outcomes in this scenario are increased dependence on China and more engagement by Russia in the region vis-à-vis the COVID-19 pandemic. There is an old joke – when Albania joins the European Union, the EU will fall apart. This scenario is still very long-term one regarding the unresolved disputes in the region. In the near future, we can expect the continued presence of the EU and NATO in the region as well as Russia, China, the Gulf states, and Iran trying to have their stake. Stability in the region will be preserved providing the EU and NATO remain present. If these two guarantors of peace and security leave, the whole region could become terra incognita when it comes to stability in Europe. At this point, sustainable peace in the Balkans seems rather as utopia. In order to

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Věra Stojarová and Nemanja Džuverović

turn this dream into a reality, the willingness and will of local and international actors to compromise are needed. Until then, we have to keep dreaming.

References Bieber, Florian. 2018. “Patterns of Competitive Authoritarianism in the Western Balkans.” East European Politics 34 (3): 337–354. Kapidžić, Damir. 2020. “The Rise of Illiberal Politics in Southeast Europe.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 20 (1): 1–17. Stojarová, Věra. 2020. “Moving Towards EU Membership and Away From Liberal Democracy.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 20 (1): 221–236.

Index

acquis 82 agriculture 41, 194–195, 197, 260, 262 Ahtisaari, Marti 90, 225, 237 Al-Furqan 21–22 Al-Nusrá front 36 Al-Qaeda 22, 259 Al-Tawhid 21–22 Alternativa 73 anarchy 51, 90, 109, 120 antiquization 160 arms: arms control 129–132, 136, 143– 146, 260, 271, 280; arms race 129–132, 143–146 Asia 53, 114, 242 Association/Community of the Serb municipalities 92, 138, 226 authoritarianism 71, 139, 204, 281 autocracy 50, 100, 109, 161, 272 Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija 31, 89, 91–93, 133, 225 balance: balance of power 130, 139, 242; military balance 129, 131–132, 136, 139, 141, 143 Balkan route 53, 82, 114–115, 201 Banja Luka 39, 41, 137, 262 Beijing 234, 237–238, 242–244, 246–248 Belgrade 20, 22, 88, 93, 98, 101, 117–118, 135, 195, 196, 202, 226–227, 235–248, 264, 267–268, 272 Belgrade–Pristina dialogue/Belgrade– Pristina talks 37, 89, 93, 95, 97, 138–139, 225 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 117, 184, 187, 234, 243, 246 Berlin Process 36, 61, 182, 186, 223 Biden, Joseph/Biden, Joe 95, 245, 274 Bloody Thursday 70–71, 74, 76–78, 83 Bosnian Islamic Community 36, 265–266

brain drain 43, 45, 52, 99, 161, 165–167, 169–170, 201, 281, 284; see also demographic drain Brussels Agreement 88, 92–93, 101, 135, 138, 226 capitalism 183, 186–187 captured state 72, 78, 110, 120 Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA) 37, 61, 181–182, 282 China 39, 42, 44, 70, 91, 94, 101, 117–118, 121, 141, 143, 157, 167, 170, 183–184, 187, 199, 234, 237–238, 242–244, 246–248, 262, 265, 267, 280, 282–285 civil society 16, 26, 61, 71, 119, 161–162, 169, 198–199, 200, 204, 220, 222 climate: climate change 97, 191–196, 198, 200–201; climate policy see policy: climate risk 200 Cold War 31, 40, 130, 136, 185, 215, 234, 235, 237, 255, 257, 265 Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) 94, 240 communism 18, 50, 156, 265, 280 computer emergency response team (CERT) 43, 99 Confucius Institute 39, 118, 244 consolidation 44, 63, 106, 134, 136, 145, 178, 280, 283 contamination 40–41, 197 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) 129, 132, 134, 146 Conventional Arms Control (CAC) 129–131, 133, 136, 139, 145–146 cooperation: economic cooperation 94, 96, 117, 181; military cooperation 94, 240–241, 244, 247, 268, 270–271; regional cooperation 36–37, 60–61,

288

Index

129, 134, 162, 167, 186, 192, 205, 282; security cooperation 94, 129, 134, 244 Coronavirus/Covid–19/COVID–19/SarsCov–2 44, 57–58, 70, 73, 79–80, 83, 89, 96, 100, 112–114, 117, 121, 168–170, 178–179, 185–187, 200–201, 234, 242–244, 246, 262, 285 corruprion 6, 15, 18, 23, 30, 34–35, 57, 59, 71, 73–74, 76, 106–111, 119–121, 161–163, 165, 169, 178, 199, 218, 247 coup d’état 20, 108, 112, 116, 120, 137, 260, 273 crime: crime against humanity 38; cybercrime 43, 99, 110, 113, 120; organised crime 15–16, 30, 53, 55–57, 79, 81–82, 106–107, 109–111, 119–121, 156, 162–163, 169–170, 178, 218, 271, 280–281; war crime 32, 34, 38, 94, 158, 255 cronyism 73, 83, 106, 120 cybercrime see crime cyber defence see defence cybersecurity 43, 98–99, 115–116 Da’esh see Islamic State Danube 194, 198, 242 Davutoglu, Ahmet 259–261 Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA)/Dayton Agreement/Dayton 16, 30, 32–35, 44–45, 90, 129, 131–134, 136, 140–141, 158, 169, 221–222, 227, 284 decarbonisation 42, 192, 201–205 defence 16, 38, 43, 50–51, 57–59, 61–64, 113, 116, 131–132, 140–143, 177, 240, 243–244, 246–247, 260, 270–271 demarcation 16, 38, 107, 285 demilitarisation 58, 146 democracy: democratic backsliding 130, 138, 146, 156, 161, 169–170, 217, 240, 247, 281; democratic consolidation 44, 63; democratic control 56, 58; democratic façade 108, 162, 169; democratic principles 56–57; democratic reform 39, 134, 136, 218; democratic transition 15, 18, 134; liberal democracy 62, 106, 215, 285 democratisation 18, 21, 57, 62, 131, 156, 157, 185, 219, 221, 227, 285 demographic drain 41, 111; see also brain drain dependency: economic dependency 62, 137, 247; energy dependency/ dependence 137, 203, 245, 247; export/ import dependency 43, 200, 203, 244

destabilisation 16, 74–76, 84, 91, 119, 159, 215, 219, 285 diaspora 21, 36, 43, 99, 169, 225 discrimination: ethnic discrimination 23– 25, 33, 73, 108; religious discrimination 23–25 disinformation 94, 109, 112–113, 116, 120, 265 Divo Naselje 71–75, 77, 83; see also Kumanovo incident Dodik, Milorad 34, 37–38, 40, 158 Drina River 37, 197–198, 200 drought 41, 191, 192, 195, 282 Đukanović, Milo/Djukanovic, Milo 106, 112, 163, 237 Dveri 18 election/elections 31, 33–35, 38–39, 45, 61, 74, 77–79, 83, 85, 90, 92, 106, 108–112, 120, 135, 159, 161, 169, 223, 245, 272, 274 energy: energy dependency see dependency: energy policy see policy: energy re/sources 98, 116–117, 196, 202, 247; energy sector 39, 98, 101, 186, 267; energy security see security: renewable energy 42, 98, 202–203 enlargement 76, 79, 82, 91, 135, 137–139, 178, 223, 238, 240, 255, 274, 280 Erdogan, Recep Tayyip 40, 95, 260, 261, 264, 270, 272–274 Erdut Agreement 131 ethnic cleansing 15, 32, 44 ethnic group 23, 34, 40, 100, 158, 164, 224, 260 ethnic minority 91, 95, 157 ethno-nationalism 18, 169 Euro-Atlantic community/structures/ institutions 39, 50–51, 156, 218; Euro-Atlantic aspirations 36, 89; EuroAtlantic integration 51, 64, 98, 119, 136, 145, 160–161 European Commission (EC) 33, 55, 72, 92, 110, 119, 138, 221, 239–240, 259, 267 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 33, 222 European Council 33, 160 European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 33, 222 European integration 31, 61, 70, 81, 83–84, 93, 118, 186, 274 Europeanisation 84, 119, 221, 227 European Union Military Force (EUFOR) 221, 241, 258

Index EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) 218, 258, 271 export 42–43, 132, 167, 182, 183–184, 244, 260, 267, 271 extremism: cumulative extremism 16, 22, 164; ethnic extremism 16; extremist group/organisation 23, 25, 81, 163; extremist ideology 44, 82; extremist narrative 16, 96–97; farright/far right extremism 16–18, 25; ismalist extremism 17–18, 20–22, 25, 97, 266; political extremism 164; religious extremism 15, 89, 97; violent extremism 6, 15, 17, 26, 53, 55, 96–97, 113–114 fake news 74, 84, 112, 120 far-right/far right group/organisation/ movement 17–20, 24–25, 96, 163–164; see also extremism, extremist fascism/fascist 18, 24–25; clerical fascism 18 Fenghe, Wei 244, 247 fighter/fighters/foreign fighter/terrorist fighter 17, 19, 21–23, 36, 44, 55, 81, 96–97, 107, 114, 164, 257, 261, 265–266 floods 41–42, 98, 191, 192, 194–195, 201, 204–205, 282 Florence Agreement 129–130, 132–136, 144–146 foreign direct investment (FDI) 117–118, 169, 259–260, 267, 274 forestry 41, 195 France 36, 91, 132, 143, 220, 235–236 Frontex 56 fundamentalism 21, 158, 164 Gazimestan 89, 163 Gazivoda lake/Gazivode/Ujmani 97–98, 197–198, 205 genocide 22, 24, 34, 38, 44, 109, 158, 163, 241 geopolitics 30, 50, 60, 81, 100–101, 136–139, 142, 145, 191–193, 197–198, 202–206, 218, 234, 235, 239, 245–246, 282 Germany 78, 93, 96, 132, 143, 159, 184, 220, 235–236, 243 Greater Albania 79, 92, 140, 159, 164, 285 Greater Kosovo 92 Greater Serbia 163–164

289

Greece 17, 60, 137, 156, 158, 160, 238, 241–242, 244, 248, 256, 258 Gruevski, Nikola 71–72, 74–76, 78–79 Gulen, Fetullah: Gulenist movement/ network/Gulenists 95, 260, 265, 273; Gulenist school 263 heat wave 191, 195, 205 High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council (HJPC) 34 Hoxha, Enver 235, 237 humanitarian aid 224, 257 human rights 34, 56–57, 63, 71, 73–74, 76, 95, 100, 168, 201, 217, 219, 264, 273 human security see security human trafficking see trafficking hybrid regime 3, 109, 120 hybrid war 94 hydrological cycle 41, 97 hydropower 98, 195, 197–198, 200, 202 Ibar/Ibër River 92, 159, 198–199 instability: economic instability 44, 178, 180, 185; political instability 15, 24, 63, 178, 180, 187, 285; social instability 44 intelligence agency/service 57, 76, 109, 115, 241–242, 273; see also secret service Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation–Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRODPMNE) 72, 74–79, 161 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 38, 157, 159 Interpol 37, 182, 226 interventionism 95, 236, 238 Islamic State (IS)/ISIS/ISIL/Da’esh 17, 21–23, 36, 55, 97, 114, 138, 156, 164, 261 Izetbegović, Alija 38–39 Izetbeković, Bakir 260, 272 jihad/ jihadism 17, 21, 25, 35, 114, 258, 259, 261, 266 Jinping, Xi 242, 246 Juncker, Jean-Claude 138–139, 240 Justice and Development Party (AKP) 258, 261, 272 kleptocracy 109, 120 Kosovo–Serbia dialogue 60, 92, 156; see also Belgrade–Pristina dialogue Kremlin 79, 137, 238, 241, 247

290

Index

Krv i čast 18 Kumanovo Agreement 131, 133 Kumanovo Incident 70–73; see also Divo Naselje League of Prizren 89–90, 159 Levijatan 19, 24–25 Middle East 17, 21, 35–36, 40, 53, 114, 164, 240, 262–263, 267, 271 Milošević, Slobodan 15, 18, 20, 31, 89, 98, 107, 134, 236–238, 240 Mini-Schengen 61, 182, 186; see also Open Balkan Initiative Mladić, Ratko 38 Mogherini, Frederica 79, 138 money laundering 82, 110 mortality rate 41, 195 Mujahideen 164, 261, 265 Nacionalna avangarda 19 Nacionalni stroj 18–19 narcotics 53, 115 Narodne patrole 19, 24–25 Nazism 18, 24, 63, 235, 241 neoliberalism 2, 4, 215, 218 Neo-Osmanism 167 nepotism 73, 161, 169 Obraz 18–19 Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) 71, 72–73, 131 Open Balkan Initiative/Open Balkan Agreement 61, 182, 186; see also Mini-Schengen Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 62, 88, 132–136, 145, 157, 225, 280 Oslobođenje 24 Ottoman Empire 31, 89, 95, 235, 260, 262, 265 parajaamat 22, 35 paramilitary 18, 25, 32, 163 Partnership for Peace 58, 135, 225 peacebuilding/peace-building/peace building 2–7, 26, 45, 94, 101, 129, 131, 156, 179, 192, 215–228, 280, 283 peacekeeping 58, 137, 219, 224, 236–237, 258, 270–271 peacemaking/peace-making/peace making 71, 215 policy: climate policy 203; defence policy 51, 61–64; energy policy 203, 239;

foreign policy 30, 40, 50–51, 60–64, 88, 118–119, 134–135, 138, 203, 205, 218, 220–221, 223, 225, 236–239, 255–258, 260, 263, 267, 270–274, 280, 283; nonintervention policy 59; security policy 51, 61–64, 192–193, 203, 205, 236, 238 pollution: air pollution 41–42, 97–98, 191, 193, 196, 199, 201, 282; mine pollution 41; water pollution 41, 97, 193, 197, 199–200, 282 poverty 22, 43, 81, 99, 106, 177, 179–180, 185–186, 204, 282 poverty rate 19, 179–180 Preševo/Presheve/Preševo valley 93, 281 Prespa Agreement 78, 160–161 Primakov, Yevgeny 236–237 Pristina/Prishtina/Priština 37, 88–89, 92–93, 95, 97, 101, 138–139, 196, 225–226, 237, 248, 268 proliferation 16, 35, 84, 134, 136 propaganda 17, 32, 94, 97, 114, 264, 272 Putin, Vladimir 137, 236–237, 239–241 Qatar, State of 39, 96, 261–262, 264, 268, 270 Rama, Edi 260, 272 Rambouillet 90, 224 rapprochement 139, 178, 235, 273 Ravna Gora 163 renewable energy see energy Republika Srpska (RS)/Republic of Srpska 16, 24, 30–31, 33–34, 37–39, 42–44, 133, 135, 139–140, 158, 163, 167, 281, 283, 285 Resilience 17, 81, 84, 106, 119, 121, 129, 144, 146, 202, 204 revisionism 32, 169, 235, 237, 284 Russian Federation/Russia 17, 19, 23, 39–40, 42, 44, 70, 76, 79, 81, 84, 90–91, 93–94, 101, 107, 112, 115–118, 121, 132, 137, 139–143, 145, 157, 164, 167, 169, 170, 183, 203, 220, 225, 234–242, 244–248, 262, 265, 267, 271–272, 280, 282–285 Salafism 21–22, 25, 35, 97, 113–114, 167, 266 Sandžak 17, 20–21, 23, 25 Sarajevo 21, 33, 39, 41, 135, 196, 220, 257, 262–265, 267–268, 272 Saudi Arabia 21, 36, 39, 96–97, 157, 164, 167, 257–263, 266, 268–271, 274, 282–283

Index Sava River 42, 194, 198 secessionism 34, 39, 91, 158–160 secret service 76, 78, 95, 112; see also intelligence agency securitisation 51–52, 64, 129–130, 145, 157 segregation 23, 33, 158 Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina/Sejdić-Finci case 33, 222 separatism 15–16, 164 Serbian Honour/Srpska čast 163 shari’ah 35 Shia (Islam) 39, 257, 264 Shoigu, Sergei 239–240 Skopje 73–75, 78, 81, 160, 196, 261, 263–264, 268, 270 smuggling 107, 110–111, 113–115, 120–121 SNP 1389 18–19, 164 SNP Naši 18–19 sovereignty 16, 31, 88, 94, 159, 216, 224–225, 256, 274 Soviet Union 116, 137, 235–236, 238–240; see also USSR Srbska akcija 18 Srebrenica 22, 24, 32, 37–38, 109, 158, 163, 241 Srpska desnica 19 stabilitocracy 71, 138 statebuilding/state-building/state building 3, 5–7, 71, 101, 109, 158, 217–219, 222, 225, 256, 280 Sunna (Islam) 257 supply chain 193, 200, 282 surveillance 58, 242–243 Syria 15, 17, 21–22, 36, 44, 55, 96, 114, 245, 261, 266, 270–271 takfirism 21 terrorism 16, 23, 53, 55–57, 75, 79, 81, 96, 110, 113, 120 Thaçi, Hashim 93, 95, 100, 159, 281 Tito, Josip Broz 31, 89, 163, 235, 237 trafficking: drug trafficking/ narcotrafficking 53, 72, 81, 110, 113– 115, 120; trafficking in human beings/ human trafficking 53, 110, 113–114, 120 transformation 4, 56, 119, 129–131, 136, 140, 193, 215, 217–218, 238–239, 258 transition 15, 18, 57, 63, 71, 78, 107, 110–112, 146, 157, 161, 179, 185, 193, 202–205, 215, 218, 258, 285

291

transparency 34, 56, 58, 131, 133, 143, 146, 161–162, 181–182, 271–272, 274 Trump, Donald 95, 226, 245, 248 Tuđman, Franjo/Tudjman, Franjo 38, 134 Turkey 21, 39–40, 44, 81, 95–96, 157, 167, 245, 255–275, 280, 282, 285 Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) 261–262, 272 Tuzla 41–42, 196, 199 Ukraine 15, 17, 19, 22, 76, 97, 114, 136– 138, 142–143, 145, 164, 234, 239–240, 245, 248, 270 unemployment 18, 20, 23, 31, 36, 43, 81, 83, 99, 165–166, 169, 177, 179–180, 183, 185, 203, 281–282, 284 unemployment rate 43–44, 99, 113, 121, 165, 179, 186 UN Interim Administration Mission (UNMIK) 90, 95, 181, 224–225, 258 United Arab Emirates (UAE) 39, 96, 246, 258, 260–261, 271–273, 268, 282 USSR 116, 235–237; see also Soviet Union Ustaša 163 vaccine diplomacy see diplomacy Vetëvendosje (LV)/Self-Determination Movement 92, 94, 100, 159, 164, 281 victimisation 15–16, 25 VMRO-DPMNE see Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation–Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity Vučić, Aleksandar 84, 93, 139–141, 226, 240, 242, 246, 260, 270, 272 Wahhabism 21, 39, 97, 257, 259, 261, 266, 274 war crime(s) see crime wiretapping 72, 74 World War I 160, 235 World War II 37, 160 Xhaferi, Talat 78–79 Yunus Emre Institute 261, 263 Zaev, Zoran 72, 75, 84, 268 Zagreb 143, 196, 238 Zavetnici 18, 24 Zukorlić, Muamer 20–21