Patton's War: An American General's Combat Leadership, Volume 2: August–December 1944 2021018747, 2021018748, 9780826222787, 9780826274830

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PATTON’S WAR

PATTON’S WAR AN AMERICAN GENERAL’S COMBAT LEADERSHIP

VOLUME 2

August–December 1944

KEVIN M. HYMEL

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI PRESS Columbia

Copyright © 2023 by The Curators of the University of Missouri University of Missouri Press, Columbia, Missouri 65211 Printed and bound in the United States of America All rights reserved. First printing, 2023. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Hymel, Kevin M., 1966- author. Title: Patton’s war : an American general’s combat leadership / Kevin M. Hymel. Other titles: American general’s combat leadership Description: Columbia : University of Missouri Press, [2023] | Series: American military experience | Includes bibliographical references and index. | Contents: v. 2. August -December 1944 -Identifiers: LCCN 2021018747 (print) | LCCN 2021018748 (ebook) | ISBN 9780826222787 (v. 2 ; hardcover) | ISBN 9780826274830 (v. 2 ; ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Patton, George S. (George Smith), 1885-1945. | Patton, George S. (George Smith), 1885-1945--Military leadership. | Generals--United States--Biography. | United States. Army--Biography. | World War, 1939-1945--Campaigns. Classification: LCC E745.P3 H96 2021 (print) | LCC E745.P3 (ebook) | DDC 940.54/1273092 [B]--dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021018747 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021018748 This paper meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, Z39.48, 1984. Typefaces: Minion and Museo Sans

THE AMERICAN MILITARY EXPERIENCE SERIES JOHN C. MCMANUS, SERIES EDITOR The books in this series portray and analyze the experience of Americans in military service during war and peacetime from the onset of the twentieth century to the present. The series emphasizes the profound impact wars have had on nearly every aspect of recent American history and considers the significant effects of modern conflict on combatants and noncombatants alike. Titles in the series include accounts of battles, campaigns, and wars; unit histories; biographical and autobiographical narratives; investigations of technology and warfare; studies of the social and economic consequences of war; and in general, the best recent scholarship on Americans in the modern armed forces. The books in the series are written and designed for a diverse audience that encompasses nonspecialists as well as expert readers. Selected titles from this series: Patton’s War: An American Combat General’s Combat Leadership, Volume 1, November 1942–July 1944 Kevin M. Hymel Patton: Battling with History J. Furman Daniel Lessons Unlearned: The U.S. Army’s Role in Creating the Forever Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq Pat Proctor Loss and Redemption at St. Vith: The 7th Armored Division in the Battle of the Bulge Gregory Fontenot Military Realism: The Logic and Limits of Force and Innovation in the US Army Peter Campbell Omar Nelson Bradley: America’s GI General, 1893–1981 Steven L. Ossad The First Infantry Division and the US Army Transformed: Road to Victory in Desert Storm, 1970–1991 Gregory Fontenot Bataan Survivor: A POW’s Account of Japanese Captivity in World War II Frank A. Blazich Dick Cole’s War: Doolittle Raider, Hump Pilot, Air Commando Dennis R. Okerstrom

To my friends Yakir Katz and Brigadier General Raymond E. Bell, Jr. (USA, Ret.). Yakir hired me as a historian/tour guide at Stephen Ambrose Historical Tours in 2004, while Ray proposed the “Patton’s Footsteps” tour in 2007 and helped me lead it when I was still building my confidence as a tour leader. Thanks, guys.

Contents List of Illustrations and Maps xi Foreword xv Preface xix

Introduction 3

Part I: FRANCE FROM NORMANDY TO THE MOSELLE Chapter One First Day of Battle on the Continent  11 Chapter Two West to Brest and East to Le Mans  27 Chapter Three Closing the Falaise Pocket  53 Chapter Four Skirting Paris and Racing to the Moselle River  73

Part II: The Mud and rain in Lorraine and the saar Chapter Five Capturing Nancy  111 Chapter Six Counterattacks at Nancy while Stymied by Metz  135 ix

x Contents

Chapter Seven The October Battles for Metz  157 Chapter Eight Preparing a Third Assault on Metz  169 Chapter Nine Capturing Metz in Two Weeks  201 Chapter Ten The Saar Campaign  233

Part III: The battle of the bulge Chapter Eleven Surprised by the Bulge  275 Chapter Twelve The Verdun Meeting  299 Chapter Thirteen Turning Two Corps North  311 Chapter Fourteen Dual Drives to Bastogne and the Sauer River  327 Chapter Fifteen The Drive North  351 Acknowledgments 367 Notes 371 Bibliography 433 Index 445

Illustrations and Maps Photographs 1.

Patton confers with Major General Lindsay Silvester and his 7th Armored Division staff

13

2.

Generals Hodges, Bradley, and Patton

15

3.

Patton and Brigadier General Otto P. Weyland

19

4.

Major General Troy Middleton pins a second star on Donald A. Stroh

23

5.

American GIs take in Mont-­Saint-­Michel

24

6.

Patton visits Major General Wade H. Haislip

30

7.

Major General Robert W. Grow promotes one of his officers

35

8.

Patton confers with Major General Hugh Gaffey and Major Melvin Helfers

43

9.

Major General Walton Walker greets French major general Philippe Leclerc at Normandy

49

10. Captured German lieutenant general Karl Spang enters Patton’s headquarters

51

11. Patton poses atop Château de Fougéres in Laval

59

12. American troops march past Chartres Cathedral

68

13. Patton escorts American labor leaders around Third Army headquarters

86

14. Patton pins a Silver Star on Private Ernest A. Jenkins

95

15. Patton crosses the Seine River

96 xi

xii

Illustrations and maps

16. Bradley, Weyland, and Patton discuss the fighting around Metz

99

17. Patton visits with Major General John Macon

104

18. Major General Lindsay Silvester looks out from a tank hatch

120

19. Patton poses with his staff and dog, Willie, in Étain, France

152

20. Wounded soldiers of the 35th Infantry Division in Grémecey Forest

154

21. McBride, Eddy, and Patton observe an attack east of Nancy

162

22. Patton’s photograph of a tire factory fire near Moivron, France

163

23. Patton and Hap Gay visit the train station at Clermont-­en-­Argonne

170

24. Patton and Eddy chat with Doughnut Dollies

181

25. Patton photographs an experimental flame-­throwing tank

183

26. The remains of a shelled apartment across from Patton’s Nancy residence

185

27. Patton speaks to troops about the plan to capture Metz

192

28. Major General Baade presents Patton with a cane

194

29. Bradley and Patton visit Eddy’s headquarters

213

30. Patton’s photograph of an abandoned German assault gun

215

31. Eisenhower and Patton visit with wounded soldiers

218

32. Soldiers from the 5th and 95th Infantry Divisions greet each other in Metz

224

33. U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Averell Harriman visits the front lines with Colonel James Gault and Patton

238

34. Patton meets with a delegation of American industrialist magnates in Nancy

240

35. Patton shakes hands with Lieutenant General Alexander “Sandy” Patch

249

36. Patton’s photograph of a newly built bridge over the Saar River at Saarlautern

266

37. Major General Troy Middleton greets Eisenhower in Saint Vith, Belgium

287

38. General Bradley’s Eagle Main headquarters in Verdun, France

300

Illustrations and maps

xiii

39. Portrait of Major General Kenneth Strong

302

40. Soldiers of the 80th Infantry Division head to the front northeast of Luxembourg City 321 41. Major General Willard S. Paul in his jeep

341

42. The 26th Infantry Division advances through Belgium toward Bastogne

343

43. Tanks and trucks of the 4th Armored Division head to Bastogne

347

44. The Pescatore served as Patton’s second headquarters in Luxembourg City

354

45. Major General J. Lawton Collins receives a visit from Field Marshal Montgomery

356

46. Patton receives an Oak Leaf Cluster from General Bradley

358

47. Patton congratulates two officers on their defense of Bastogne

360

Maps 1.

The Race to Brest and Le Mans, August 2–9, 1944

32

2.

Closing the Falaise Pocket, August 10–19, 1944

57

3.

Chambois to the Meuse River, August 20–31, 1944

76

4.

Crossing the Moselle, September 1–13, 1944

116

5.

German Counterattacks, September 14–30, 1944

138

6.

Operation MADISON, November 1944

174

7.

The Capture of Metz, November 8–23, 1944

203

8.

Operation TINK, December 22–24, 1944

265

9.

The German Counterattack, December 16–18, 1944

278

10. Turning the XII and III Corps North, December 19–21, 1944

316

11. Defending the Right Flank and Relieving Bastogne, December 22–26, 1944

330

Foreword According to the American novelist William Faulkner, “The past is not dead, it is not even past.” Nowhere is this truer than in the re-­evaluation of historical figures. The more impactful ones are with us still, for what they did and the way they behaved still affects us. In this sense, the past is unfinished business, which is why it is healthy to periodically take our favourite characters, dust them down, and see if we can learn anything new. Approaching 80 years after Patton’s death, his legacy endures, not only through the many lessons and maxims he left us about leadership and command, but in the family lore of those whose ancestors fought under him from1944 to 1945 in Third Army. In this book, Kevin Hymel has given us an important reassessment of one of the world’s foremost military commanders during the Allied European campaign of August–December 1944. Not only was Patton a legend during his own life, but the wartime generation and later ones fell under his spell immediately after his passing through works like his 1947 autobiography, War As I Knew It (which falls under the microscope in the pages that follow). George had generous biographers, too: Ladislas Farago (Ordeal and Triumph in 1963); Martin Blumenson (the two-­ volume Patton Papers of 1974 and his 1985 biography The Man behind the Legend); and Carlo D’Este (A Genius For War of 1995) all further cemented the Patton legend. Those who penned the legion of good Third Army memoirs also inserted the General’s name into the titles of their works to increase sales, as have regiments of historians and—inevitably—battalions of leadership scholars. If anything, the partnership of Francis Ford Coppola and George C. Scott that produced the movie Patton in 1970 (the same year xv

xvi Foreword

in which Catch-­22, Kelly’s Heroes, M*A*S*H, and Tora! Tora! Tora! appeared), gave the world a figure one critic deemed “histrionic, brilliant, bellicose, foul-­mouthed and more than a little insane,” only increasing the level of hagiography. My historian’s antennae immediately perked up at Kevin Hymel’s observation in his Preface that “the transcribed version of Patton’s diary, the resource for almost everything written about the famous general, was highly embellished from his original, hand-­written one.” It seems that the General’s wife, Beatrice, “added entire paragraphs to her husband’s writing, making him look brilliant, clairvoyant, and an excellent judge of other people’s failings. To say she embellished is an understatement.” In comparing the transcribed diaries with the General’s original ones, handwritten, and betraying his dyslexia, Kevin Hymel has unearthed some major discrepancies. The author’s scholarship is an abject lesson for our tribe of military historians, my own work included, that we should always trace as much as possible back to their origins, to primary sources. This is immediately evident in Volume 2 of Patton’s War. Here we have a very refreshing analysis of the General’s command, not just through his own (unvarnished) thoughts and deeds, but cross-­referenced with a vast trove of original archives from the era, and supported by a host of personal memoirs, from staff officers to GI drivers, tankers, paratroopers, and infantrymen. In many ways, this volume is as important a landmark in military writing as was the 2002 publication of Field Marshal Brooke’s War Diaries, edited by Alex Danchev and Dan Todman. As George C. Marshall’s opposite number in London, Brooke’s voice was important, yet the general reader and scholar alike was short-­changed with the appearance of two wholly misleading and sanitised volumes in the late 1950s, which are today regarded as worthless. Patton’s War is thus our new Year Zero in understanding the deeply complex Third Army commander. I am also reminded of a different soldier’s wife, married to another General George, who likewise carefully curated her husband’s posthumous reputation. In the case of Elizabeth Bacon Custer (who never remarried and died only in 1933), there was every need to falsify the historical record, because her husband’s name had already come under attack during his lifetime, and criticism only intensified after his and his men’s demise at Little Big Horn in 1876.

foreword

xvii

While Elizabeth Custer was ultimately unsuccessful in glossing over her late husband’s genocidal, wife-­cheating, and financial notoriety, it seems that Beatrice Patton had no need to purchase industrial quantities of varnish to alter her spouse’s legacy. Through Kevin Hymel’s assiduous consultation of every source I have read, and a great many I have not, we find that despite, rather than because of, Beatrice’s well-­intentioned efforts, the stature of George S. Patton, Jr., shines through intact. As Volume 2 of Patton’s War shows us, the cigar-­chomping (news to me) General was at times boastful then humble; ruthless with his men, though mindful of their needs for hot food and good boots; dismissive, but often attentive; confident, yet insecure; God-­fearing and full of profanities. He was a man of his time, with his prejudices (against Jews and African Americans). A bully largely remembered for striking enlisted men, never, as Hymel reminds us, never slapped a bedridden GI again, after Sicily, still early in Patton’s WWII active service. Neither does Patton spare himself, putting in long hours on the road in his Jeep. There were few units in Third Army he did not visit or praise. What we discover makes him more human, and as such, arguably a greater general, one in need of no varnish. We read of his good-­weather prayers. When the skies cleared, Patton beamed, “Print another 200,000 prayers. The Lord is on our side. We’ve got to tell him what we need.” Here, too is the inwardly religious man, attending Christmas Eve in Luxembourg City, but not for show. “He arrived late as the parishioners, mostly soldiers, sang the benediction, and stopped in the middle of the isle, stared up at the main window, before sitting in the same pew where Kaiser Wilhelm sat during World War I. Everyone recognized him. One witness said he looked fierce and dramatic—­as if he had come to demand God’s blessing for his sword.” Patton was famous for berating his subordinates. Near Bastogne, Patton eyed an immobile armoured vehicle and barked at the tankers, “What do you think? This is a God dammed Sunday school picnic? Get after those God damn Germans!” Yet when he visited Major General Willard S. Paul’s 26th Division headquarters, the latter felt sure his commander was about to fire him for his slow progress. Instead, Patton threw his arm around Paul’s shoulder and told him, “How’s my little fighting son-­of-­a-­ bitch?” Paul’s attitude changed. He later wrote, “I was so cheered for not getting relieved, there was nothing I wouldn’t have done for the man.”

xviii Foreword

The British had no equivalent of Patton, and Kevin Hymel is quite clear on the risk-­averse Montgomery’s inability to fight the same kind of battle. Yet Hymel unearths British newspapers praising Patton (thus implicitly criticising ‘Monty’). “There is a need for a quick thruster as well as a deep thinker to show the way to Berlin. A fine example of the thruster is Patton. As he led that smashing dash through the gap in the Normandy line right across the width of France, his soldiers said, ‘Give Georgie a pint of petrol and he’ll go anywhere.’ Patton’s vigor once caused controversy. There is nothing but praise for him today.” Historians will owe Kevin Hymel a debt of gratitude for years to come over his refreshing and authentic portrait of Patton, perhaps one as close to the General as we ever will get. Peter Caddick-Adams

Preface This volume of Patton’s War is radically different from the first volume. I wrote volume 1 with the intent of compiling every story about General George S. Patton Jr., that I could find to provide the most complete examination of his battlefield leadership in World War II. I began the second volume with the same intent, but I made a history-­altering discovery: the transcribed version of Patton’s diary, the resource for almost everything written about him, was highly embellished from his original, hand-­written diary. For decades, historians have been using Patton’s transcribed diaries as their primary source on Patton’s thoughts—­present company not excluded. It was easier to read the typed pages that Patton’s wife, Beatrice (with a few helpers), put together in 1953 than struggle through the poor handwriting that filled his actual diaries. Beatrice dictated the diary to a stenographer and, eventually, a woman named Ann Carrol typed up the stenography notes. Two of Patton’s staff officers, Paul Harkins and Hap Gay, contributed to the typed versions. The resulting transcribed diary was considered the singular primary source for our understanding of Patton.1 That changed when transcribers associated with the By the People project, working with the Library of Congress, transcribed the actual diaries word-­for-­word and posted them online, next to the hand-­written pages, in January of 2021 so historians like myself can factcheck the diaries transcribed by Beatrice Patton. The original diaries are plain and lack the vision of the embellished diaries, but they are a direct translation of what Patton wrote with his own hand. These are the diaries all future historians should use when writing about the general. In comparing the transcribed diaries with the actual diaries, I have found some major discrepancies. Beatrice added entire paragraphs to her xix

xx preface

husband’s writing, making him look brilliant and clairvoyant, as well as presenting him as an excellent judge of other people’s failings. To say she embellished is an understatement. One example from August 7, 1944, contains the following sentences: Generals Lee, Plank, and Hughes called. As usual, Lee was in a great hurry to do nothing and covered with smiles. I have seldom seen a man less suited for his job. Someone described him very aptly the other day; “He is a pompous little son-­of-­a-­bitch only interested in self-­advertisement.”2 The original diary simply reads: “Gens Lee, plank & Hughes called.”3 Another case of putting words in Patton’s mouth: For the date of August 13, 1944, during the race to close the Falaise Pocket, when Patton’s VX Corps was halted outside the city of Argentan, the following sentences appear in the typed transcript: This Corps could easily advance to Falaise and completely close the gap, but we have been ordered to halt because the British sowed the area between with a large number of time bombs. I am sure that this halt is a great mistake, as I am certain that the British will not close on Falaise. As a matter of fact, we had reconnaissance parties within a few miles of it when we were ordered back.4 None of this appears in Patton’s actual diaries. He may have been able to close the gap, but it would not have been easy. He was not certain the British/Canadian/Polish forces were incapable of closing the gap, and he did not have any reconnaissance parties near Falaise. Also, the British had not sewn the area with mines, but they were about to. General Omar Bradley, Patton’s superior, brought a note to Patton’s headquarters that day to the effect that the British were about to drop time-­delayed bombs on the area he was planning to attack and it was too late to call them back. Bradley’s order made sense, but not in the way Beatrice framed it in her version of the diary. Anyone reading volume 2 might question why I have left out famous quotes, insults, and predictions from this book. The answer: they were conjured after Patton’s death. Possibly the biggest revelation is that Patton did not predict the Battle of the Bulge the way previous historians have

preface

xxi

recorded. I have tried to do facts justice and explained exactly what happened in chapter 11, “Surprised by the Bulge.” There are more examples of sentences that Patton did not write in his diaries and I will explore and address them (in the endnotes) as they appear. Unfortunately, this resource was not available to me when I wrote volume 1. I invite future historians to check my work. Having explained all this, I should note that I did not ignore the embellished, transcribed diaries all together. Since two of Patton’s staff officers contributed to their creation, I sometimes used entries about locations or unit actions—­but always in the third person, never quoting the diaries directly. I used the information as sparingly as possible. Another difference between the two volumes is the extent to which they cover the actual combat Patton faced. My first volume covered his activities from the shores of Morocco to the hedgerows of France, but in that expanse of time, from November 8, 1942, to July 31, 1944, he only spent ten weeks and three days in combat. In this volume, there is no break from combat. Even between major campaigns, Patton’s Third Army still fought skirmishes and artillery duels. The difference in the amount of combat discussed between the two volumes is considerable. Now that I have explained the differences between the two volumes, allow me to present the similarities. This volume picks up where the previous one ended, with Patton taking the reins of Third Army. It proceeds much like the previous volume, relying on a combination of Patton’s diaries and letters, the diaries and memoirs of those around Patton, and a plethora of veteran interviews, veteran surveys, and official documents to tell the story. Like volume 1, this book looks intensely at Patton’s day-­to-­ day decision making and leadership style, both of which were unique to him. While I hope this volume offers the same amount of storytelling and analysis as the preceding one did, this book is much more about action. My subject was in constant motion, rarely sitting around contemplating his fate. I have done my best to keep up with him. Just like the first volume, all opinions and interpretations expressed in this book are mine alone and all errors, both of omission and commission, are my responsibility. Kevin M. Hymel Arlington, VA

PATTON’S WAR

Introduction I began the first volume of Patton’s War by describing an undocumented story about General George S. Patton’s battlefield leadership. I will do the same here: In late November 1944, two American soldiers from the 95th Infantry Division were walking the streets of the liberated but bombed-­ out city of Metz, France. New to combat, they had fought for two weeks to liberate the city from German control. An Army jeep rolled past, bearing Lieutenant General George S. Patton. The men barely noticed the vehicle until it stopped and backed up. Patton glared at them before ordering a salute. Both men raised their right hands to their helmets and held them there until their commander returned the salute. Even after intense, elongated combat, Patton still insisted on military protocols and discipline. How do I know this story? One of those soldiers was Private Roy Carlson, who, about forty years later, told me the story when I interviewed him for an article that was never published. Mr. Carlson lived across the street from my family. I was in my late teens or early twenties when I spoke with him. I remember he always wore long pants while painting his house, even in the steamy summers of Chevy Chase, Maryland. He finally explained why during my first attempt at interviewing a veteran for publication. He took a German bullet in the shin while charging across a bridge at Saarlautern, Germany. Brought to a hospital in Verdun, France, the doctor told him the X-­ray of his leg looked like a map of the Philippines. I’ll never forget him telling me that. But I digress. This book continues a study of Patton as a leader in World War II. As mentioned in volume 1, the U.S. Army defines a leader as a role model who serves through strong intellect, physical presence, professional 3

4 Introduction

competence, and moral character. A leader is also someone who is able and willing to act decisively, within a superior leaders’ intent and purpose, and in the organization’s best interests. Leaders recognize that organizations, built on mutual trust and confidence, accomplish missions. But the makeup of a leader goes well beyond the Army’s definition. Generals deal with much more than the description above. In World War II, just like the present, generals had families—­be they siblings, spouses, children, or parents—­to deal with. Patton had a wife and three children. He had to be a husband and father from half a world away. Some generals, like Patton, kept a mistress. Those factors could affect critical thinking and decision making. In addition, leaders in combat had to make life-­and-­death decisions while being shot at, often on little sleep while hopped up on caffeine and nicotine. Patton often came under enemy fire while smoking a cigar. Nothing in his diaries speaks to him of being a coffee drinker but he often went into battle with a flask. The battlefield made little accommodation for leaders suffering common illness—­like a cold or the flu—­or broken bones and other injuries. Patton suffered from Sandfly fever, sinus infections, head wounds, and a bruised coccyx bone during the war. And, like everyone else, leaders have good days and bad; days where they’re on the ball and focused, and days where they can’t seem to get themselves together. Patton was not immune to those factors either. All of these intangibles have to be considered when analyzing the unforgiving burden of combat leadership. Patton’s style of leadership remained the same in 1944 as it had in the previous two years of the war, but now he had a new audience. While he still worked and clashed with Generals Dwight D. Eisenhower, Omar Bradley, and Bernard Law Montgomery, a new cast of players served under him, most notably his corps commanders: Major Generals Gilbert Cook, Manton Eddy, Wade Haislip, John Millikin, and Walton Walker. Only Manton Eddy and Troy Middleton had served with him in the Mediterranean Theater. Patton pushed, cajoled, and cursed all of them, constantly urging them to attack and to stop worrying about their flanks. Whenever they asked to postpone an attack, he simply asked for their resignation. Under his corps commanders were division commanders, whom Patton gave the same treatment. Many often worried about being relieved and, more than once, Patton refused his corps commanders’ requests to fire them. For all of Patton’s harshness, he knew division commanders needed a chance to prove themselves or had more experience

introduction

5

than any possible replacement. Throughout the latter half of 1944, he only relieved one division commander: Major General John Wood. During the war on the Continent, Patton did not repeat the mistakes he made in the Mediterranean. He never harmed a soldier in a hospital, even though he continued to visit the wounded, often going into wards filled with soldiers suffering from post-­traumatic stress disorder. He refrained from talking politics or disparaging his superiors to the press (venting his true feelings to his diary or letters to his wife). He still, however, held onto his prejudices against African Americans and people of the Jewish faith, which surfaced from time to time, yet, with combat taking up so much of his time, he rarely dwelled, or wrote, about them. When Patton took command of Third Army on the continent of Europe in August of 1944, the war had changed from the one he started at the end of 1942. Back then, Allied forces were just taking their first tentative steps against the Axis countries of Germany, Italy, and Japan. In North Africa, green American troops had touched down in three locations, more than a thousand miles from their ultimate goal of Berlin. Meanwhile, German and Soviet forces fought in and around Stalingrad on the Volga River, also more than a thousand miles from Berlin. In the skies above Europe, the fledgling 8th Bomber Command had launched its first raid against German-­occupied Holland four months earlier. Small raids along the Dutch and French coasts followed. In the Pacific Theater, American ground and naval forces fought for control of the tiny island of Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands chain, more than three thousand miles from Tokyo.1 Now, in August of 1944, the Allies had turned the tide and were making substantial gains against Germany and Japan, having knocked Italy out of the war. In Normandy, American, British, and Canadian forces had secured their beachhead two months earlier and had pressed inland. General Omar Bradley’s U.S. First Army had captured Avranches while British and Canadian forces under Montgomery fought on the outskirts of Caen, now seven hundred miles from Berlin. In Italy, Allied forces had captured Rome, nine hundred miles from the German capital. Allied air forces dominated the skies over Europe. Three American air forces, the 8th and 9th in England and the 15th in Italy, bombed Germany and German-­held territory on a daily basis. Fleets of bombers, protected by hundreds of fighter aircraft, flew at will over enemy territory. On the Russian front, Soviet forces recaptured Sevastopol, on the Crimean

6 Introduction

Peninsula, and Odessa in the Ukraine. They drove deep into eastern Europe to the outskirts of Warsaw, as well as Minsk in Byelorussia, and Kaunas in Lithuania. At their nearest point, Warsaw, they were less than four hundred miles from Berlin, but they halted at the city’s gates while the Germans crushed an uprising inside the Polish city. In the Pacific Theater, after having captured vital islands in the Solomons, Gilberts, and Marianas chains, American forces completed the capture of Guam, more than fifteen hundred miles from Tokyo. Also, in a lopsided aircraft carrier clash, the Battle of the Philippine Sea—­ better known as the Great Mariana’s Turkey Shoot—­the Americans shot down 220 Japanese aircraft while the Japanese managed to shoot down only twenty U.S. Navy aircraft. In addition, American B-­29 Superfortress bombers began attacking Japanese cities from bases in India. Almost everywhere, it seemed, the Allies were on the advance while Germany and Japan retreated under thunderous blows.2 The United States had changed as well. A junior partner to the Allies in 1942, it was now a world power, eclipsing the United Kingdom economically as well as militarily, well on its way to becoming the dominant power in the West. The size of the U.S. Army had exploded during the previous two years. In 1942 it numbered about three million men and could field only two corps, both in North Africa. By 1944 that number had swollen to almost eight million, with six armies—­two in France, one in Italy, and one in North Africa—­poised to invade southern France. Two more armies fought in the Southwest Pacific.3 The American war economy, just gearing up in 1942, was now in full swing. Factories pumped out tanks, trucks, jeeps, and aircraft while shipyards delivered every imaginable kind of watercraft, from assault landing craft that held thirty-­five fighting men to aircraft carriers that were basically floating cities. The United States had put itself on the road to victory, but the bulk of the fighting still lay ahead. While Germany and Italy saw their empires in decline, Patton’s star was on the rise. He had already proven himself a wise battlefield commander with his own personal brand of leadership. In North Africa, in both Morocco and Tunisia, he proved he could win battles. In Sicily, he proved he could win campaigns with speed and flourish. The continent of Europe proved an even bigger challenge, and Patton rose to it. He raced across France, to its ports in the west while encircling two German armies in the east. He helped defeat a major German offensive at Mortain

introduction

7

while coming close to closing the trap behind the Germans at the Falaise pocket, and when he failed to do so, blamed his superiors for straightjacketing him, denying him the chance to do it. He could have liberated Paris had his superiors not changed army boundaries, confining him to pass south of the French city. East of Paris, the Moselle River proved a tough obstacle for him to cross at the end of a thinning supply line, made worse when supplies were shifted from his army to those further north. While his tankers and infantry captured the French city of Nancy, they had more trouble with the fortressed city of Metz. Finally, in early November, he captured it in two weeks of heavy fighting. He then pushed east until Third Army reached the Saar River. He was planning a war-­winning (he hoped) offensive when he learned of a German counteroffensive through Belgium and Luxembourg—­the Battle of the Bulge. Reluctant to join the fight at first, he eventually turned part of his Third Army north and, in driving snow, relieved the besieged Belgian town of Bastogne where the surrounded paratroopers of the 101st Airborne Division, as well as tankers from both the 9th and 10th Armored Divisions, fought off enemy attacks. The end of 1944 found Patton in Bastogne preparing a drive north to cut the Bulge at its waist. If 1942 proved that the war in the Mediterranean was Patton’s war, the war on the Continent sustained and improved upon his reputation as a battlefield leader. His was the army that maneuvered the fastest, fought in rainy, flooded, or snowy conditions that paralyzed other armies, and rode to the rescue of a besieged Belgian town while the world watched. His was the name in bold headlines in countless newspapers back home. And his iconic persona could be used to describe someone smart but colorful and overbearing. Everyone knew the name Patton, and the latter half of 1944 ensured that this was his war.

PART I

France From Normandy to the Moselle

9

CHAPTER ONE

First Day of Battle on the Continent

“What the hell is going on here?” a three-­star general shouted at a sergeant stringing communications wire along a road in Normandy, France. Nearby, U.S. Army trucks and jeeps idled bumper-­ to-­ bumper. The sergeant calmly explained that a stalled truck up ahead was holding up traffic. The general then asked the sergeant where he was from; when the man said “Georgia,” the general lied and told him he was, too. Suddenly, the general exploded, tossing out a string of curses, demanding to know exactly what the sergeant was doing. “We’re trying to find that stupid Patton’s 4th Armored,” the sergeant snapped. “I don’t give a damn if I never see ’em. The faster they go, the sooner I’ll get home.” Lieutenant General George S. Patton Jr. did not bat an eye. “That’s the spirit, soldier,” he told him. “That’s the way to talk.” Patton’s first day as commander of Third Army, on August 1, 1944, reflected well on him and his army. They both had swagger.1 The George S. Patton who stepped out of his mobile headquarters earlier that damp summer morning looked far different from the man who strode up Fedala Beach in Morocco on November 8, 1942. To start with, he had added another star to his rank insignia. Now a lieutenant general, rows of three stars shone on his shoulders, collar, and helmet. He had also exchanged his khaki uniform and baggy infantryman’s jacket for an olive drab wool uniform and an Eisenhower jacket, with four brass buttons and a tapered waist that gave him a sharp, smart look. He also clutched a swagger stick, a flashy testament to his cavalry heritage. At age fifty-­eight, he stood six feet, one inch tall and had slimmed down to 180 pounds—­at least that’s what he told the press.2 He also wore only one ivory-­handled pistol on his waist: his .45 caliber single action Colt “Peacemaker,” having 11

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decided back in Sicily that his Smith and Wesson .357 Magnum revolver was just too heavy. One pistol would do. But there was something else. Unlike the Patton of 1942, this Patton was an experienced battlefield commander—­possibly the most experienced senior American battlefield commander in the European theater—­with a string of victories under his belt. He had led four amphibious assaults, won a defensive battle before leading his troops to success—­literally driving through minefields ahead of his infantry—­in Tunisia. He also won a month-­long campaign in Sicily, reaching the port city of Messina before his British counterpart, General Bernard Law Montgomery. His name had been in the papers and on the radio. His face graced the covers of magazines and his image could be seen in newsreels in the United States. The man made for great press. But where he had battlefield success, he had also suffered through personal and professional failure. His draconian methods of discipline, combined with his volcanic temper, culminated in the shameful slapping of two hospitalized soldiers suffering from post-­traumatic stress disorder. He belittled and humiliated subordinates, peers, and (when out of earshot) his superiors. While in exile in Sicily he drank too much, suffering depression bordering on paranoia, as he watched other generals fight the war in Italy. Later, in England, he reunited with his mistress, twenty-­nine-­year-­old Jean Gordon, his niece (on his wife’s side), and renewed their affair.3 As the Allies launched their long-­awaited invasion of occupied France, he worried about irrelevance. But all that experience, the good and bad, had both hardened and tempered him. It also taught him how to fight the Germans, and he could not wait to prove it again. For almost a year, he had been spoiling for a fight. Now he had one. In August 1944 Patton commanded a much larger force than one he led into Morocco. Then, he had commanded a single corps, consisting of thirty-­five thousand men. Now he commanded a field army of four corps, more than 220,000 men.4 His army’s firepower had also improved. Gone were the obsolete M3 Lee tanks and M3 halftrack-­borne howitzers that served as tank destroyers, replaced by M4 Sherman tanks (which still left room for improvement) and M10 tank destroyers (which resembled Shermans but were equipped with a bigger main gun, less armor, and an open turret). The soldiers were also better trained than the men who charged the Moroccan beaches. These new soldiers had been trained by veterans in both the United States and England. Some of them had

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13

Figure 1. Patton confers with Major General Lindsay Silvester (left) and his 7th Armored Division staff at Silvester’s division headquarters, on July 26, 1944, six days before Third Army became active in France. Patton would spend most of the campaign in Europe visiting the front lines. Catalog number: 111-­SC 199840, National Archives and Records Administration.

already seen combat by the time Patton took command of them on the Continent. Patton’s Third Army consisted of four corps, all of which were commanded by major generals: Troy Middleton’s VIII Corps, Gilbert Cook’s XII Corps, Wade Haislip’s XV Corps, and Walton Walker’s XX Corps. The corps varied in strength but their armored and infantry divisions were also commanded by major generals: Middleton’s VIII Corps packed the most punch, with John Wood’s 4th Armored Division, Robert Grow’s 6th Armored Division, and Donald Stroh’s 8th Infantry Division, while Cook’s XII Corps consisted solely of Horace McBride’s 80th Infantry Division. Haislip commanded the largest force, with four divisions. His XV Corps consisted of Raymond McLain’s 90th Infantry Division, Ira Wyche’s 79th Infantry Division, John Macon’s 83rd Infantry Division,

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and Lunsford Oliver’s 5th Armored Division. Finally, Walker’s XX Corps consisted of LeRoy Irwin’s 5th Infantry Division, Paul Baade’s 35th Infantry Division, and Lindsey Silvester’s 7th Armored Division (in Army parlance, when not using the term “division,” armor and airborne divisions still use their branch designation, such as “5th Armored,” but infantry divisions simply use the word “division,” as in “35th Division”). Patton would switch divisions between his corps as needed and add other divisions in the weeks and months to come.5 The job of protecting the skies over Patton’s army went to Brigadier General Otto P. “Opie” Weyland, the commander of the XIX Tactical Air Command, a force of fighter aircraft specifically assigned to support Third Army. While Patton commanded an impressive force, his was not the only army on the Continent. That same day he took command of Third Army, Lieutenant General Courtney Hodges took command of the U.S. First Army, which had been under Lieutenant General Omar Bradley for the initial Normandy landings. Bradley took command of both the First and Third armies as the 12th Army Group commander, the U.S. counterpart to General Montgomery’s 21st Army Group. Montgomery commanded the British 2nd Army under Lieutenant General Miles Dempsey and the First Canadian Army under General H. D. G. “Harry” Crerar. But Bradley and Montgomery were not equals. With General Dwight D. Eisenhower—­ the commander of the Supreme Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF)—­still in England, Bradley would report to Montgomery until Eisenhower established his headquarters on the Continent.6 Unlike Sicily, where Patton led one of two armies fighting on the island, his was now one among four Allied armies, with more to come. On August 1, however, Patton’s only focus was his new army’s progress. For months, he had trained his soldiers, waiting for this day. While a number of them had already been fighting the Germans in the towns, hedgerows, and fields of Normandy, they had not been fighting under him—­until today. His army had been born on the run. Under Middleton’s VIII Corps, Wood’s 4th and Grow’s 6th Armored Divisions had blasted through the hole ripped open near Saint-­Lô. Wood had captured the towns of Coutances and Avranches and beyond, traveling some fifty miles in only four days. Grow kept apace.7 Now, as part of Patton’s Third Army, Grow headed west for the Brittainy port city of Brest, while Wood pushed southwest for Rennes, where he was to pivot west and drive on the port cities of Lorient and Vannes, both southeast of Brest. Patton knew he had

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15

Figure 2. The new American command in Europe: Omar Bradley (center) commanded Twelfth Army Group, in charge of Patton’s Third Army and Courtney Hodges’s (left) First Army. Catalog number: 111-­SC 192765, National Archives and Records Administration.

to capture the three ports quickly to prevent German sabotage, which threatened to deprive Eisenhower of the venues he desperately needed to supply the troops and keep the Allies moving. Both Wood and Grow would need to push their tanks west more than one hundred miles if Patton hoped to quickly capture the ports.8 The breakout from Saint-­Lô allowed Patton to escape the hedgerows, the checkerboard maze of earthen walls that separated the small farm fields of Normandy and served as perfect defensive fighting positions for the Germans. Bradley’s tenure as First Army commander came to be practically defined by the incremental and bloody progress his infantry made in the hemmed-­in terrain which neutralized many of the American army’s strengths. The terrain Patton would fight in for the next month was relatively flat, with modern roads leading into towns and cities dominated by church and cathedral towers. Under Patton, the war in Europe

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changed to one of maneuver, in which progress was no longer measured in yards but of miles, a lot of miles. At noon on August 1, Third Army officially became active on the Continent. Patton celebrated with a shot of brandy as he anxiously waited for field reports outside his mobile headquarters. “I could get no definite news,” he lamented.9 His headquarters consisted of two trailer trucks set up in an apple orchard outside the Normandy town of Beauchamps, twelve miles northwest of the recently captured Avranches. A converted ordnance trailer served as Patton’s parlor, bedroom, and bath. Inside, his workspace consisted of a desk and two telephones. His living quarters consisted of a closet, washstand, radio, and bed. One of Patton’s phones, a green phone, included a scrambling device for direct calls to Bradley and Eisenhower. Patton complained that the phone sometimes scrambled his own words before he could utter them. The stairs leading into the trailer had been covered with boards after his Scottish bull terrier, Willie, had lost a few claws in their open-­steel grating. The other trailer served as Patton’s headquarters, where he often held conferences. It contained map boards, another desk, and more telephones. The two trailers would be his headquarters through most of the war on the Continent. Only when the war of maneuver slowed due to logistical problems or determined enemy action would he move his accommodations to a chateau, castle, or large building. Patton’s headquarters was nicknamed “Lucky,” reflecting his attitude about war.10 Although Third Army had become operational, SHAEF released no official announcement to the press.11 Eisenhower wanted to continue the deception that Patton was still in England, preparing to launch an invasion of Pas-­de-­Calais. Allied leaders were determined to continue Operation FORTITUDE, the British attempt to convince the Germans that the real invasion of France was poised to attack some 345 miles east of Normandy, as long as possible. The ruse worked on D-­Day, paralyzing German armored forces and preventing them from heading southwest, and continued to sow confusion in the German high command throughout June and into July.12 While FORTITUDE’s usefulness had almost entirely been spent, Eisenhower preferred to keep the enemy confused about Patton’s whereabouts. It also served to keep Patton on his toes, as Eisenhower knew that Patton craved the attention that only his release for battle would bring. One of the few American officers who knew that Patton was picking up the reins of Third Army was Major General Everett Hughes,

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17

formerly commander of Eisenhower’s services of supply in North Africa and Sicilian campaigns. Now, he served as Eisenhower’s troubleshooter for all supply issues—­and his eyes and ears for detecting any problems.13 Hughes had been a friend, confidant, and shoulder to cry on for Patton throughout North Africa, Sicily, and Patton’s exile. Patton often raided his liquor cabinet on his darker days. Hughes boasted to his wife that he had kept Patton in the war. “I have fought him and the powers that be, I have kept up his morale, and that of his staff. I have succeeded in getting into this war the only American field commander who knows that the job is to kill Germans, and kill them fast.” Hughes trusted that Patton could get the job done but thought that he would not last the war. “Geo[rge] will probably get killed but he will have started the war for the Allies.”14 With the taste of brandy still in his mouth, Patton started issuing orders to let everyone in Third Army know who was in charge. He sent out a standing order to all his division commanders:: “Go where you can, as fast as you can.”15 Orders went out for all Third Army soldiers to wear neckties and keep shaven. MPs began stopping GIs crossing through the Third Army zone, ordering them to button their overcoats and tuck in their shirts. Patton personally made sure military comportment reached all assets of his army. Later, when visiting a Red Cross club for officers, he roared, “Stand up!” Everyone did. “Sit down!” They obeyed. Then he said aloud, “You’d think someone here would know enough to call ‘Attention’ when the commanding officer enters.” Then he turned and walked out. There was a new sheriff in town.16 Patton strode over to the tent used for briefings. When he entered, someone announced, “Gentlemen, the army commander.” His staff officers, who had been sitting around, chatting and smoking cigarettes, bolted to attention, some visibly nervous knowing they would have to address their gruff general. Patton’s seat was already occupied by Willie; the general cursed the dog until it meekly hopped off the chair, laying down at Patton’s feet as he sat down. The rest of the men sat. Many of them had served with him since the first day of his war in November of 1942. His closest confidants included chief of staff Major General Hugh Gaffey, deputy chief of staff Brigadier General Hobart “Hap” Gay, deputy chief of staff for operations Colonel Paul Harkins, intelligence officer Colonel Oscar Koch, supply officer Colonel Walter Muller, aide-­de-­camp Major Charles Codman, and Patton’s personal aide, Staff Sergeant George Meeks. The others had met Patton in England seven months earlier when he had first assumed command of Third Army. Almost everyone, to a

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man, considered their commander a battlefield genius and were proud to serve on his team.17 Patton started the meeting with his first speech as Third Army commander on the Continent. Standing in front of his men, he announced, “We are finally in it,” adding that they were going to crush the Axis. “There is very little in front of us and we must keep going hard. The Germans are groggy and we want to keep them that way. Do not give him a chance to catch his breath and balance.” He concluded by telling them that there were only ten German battalions facing Third Army, “but don’t tell the press.”18 Then he sat back down and the briefing commenced. Each officer stood in front of Patton, reporting on operations, personnel, the weather, and the enemy’s whereabouts. Each man spoke for only a few minutes while Patton sat silently, only asking a few questions at the conclusion of each presentation.19 Koch’s report on the Germans had all the accuracy of an economist trying to predict the future. The colonel explained that the Germans were capable of launching “a major armored counterattack against the army’s east or left flank, designed to drive to the sea, creating a wedge between Patton and Hodges that would sever the north-­south supply line.” However, he also noted that the Germans might evacuate to the south and west while using favorable terrain for sporadic defenses. As a third option, they might “withdraw into and defend the heavily fortified Brittany ports.”20 Patton appreciated the German army’s capabilities, but he knew that the Germans were in retreat, and he intended to press them. Patton then ordered General Weyland to make sure none of his pilots destroyed any bridges that lay in Third Army’s path. He wanted them intact for his own forces.21 When he told Weyland that his fighter planes would be protecting Third Army’s flanks as it raced in different directions, Weyland complained that this had never been done before. Patton was unsympathetic: “Well, it’s going to happen now.”22 Weyland’s fighter aircraft turned out to be one of Patton’s greatest battlefield advantages, for the U.S. Army Air Forces had finally solved the problem of poor air support that had plagued Patton in Tunisia, where it took sixty to eighty minutes to get aircraft to strafe a target, and in Sicily, where it took three-­ and-­a-­half hours. The problem had been solved just prior to Operation COBRA, the July 25, 1944, tactical bombing of the enemy lines. Bradley had given Major General Elwood “Pete” Quesada, the commander of the IX Tactical Air Command, a handful of Sherman tanks rigged with

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19

fighter-­bomber radios. Quesada put his pilots in the tanks and sent them to the spearheads of the Allied advance. There, they communicated with their brothers flying overhead, speaking their own language and calling out landmarks and distances to enemy targets. With pilots instead of tankers or infantrymen directing the fighter craft, strafing runs became more timely and accurate.23 To further improve results, Weyland now put his airbases close to the front, and his headquarters close to Patton’s. “We could never talk to each other,” Patton later explained, “but now we can curse the living daylights out of each other!”24

Figure 3. Patton and Brigadier General Otto P. Weyland, the commander of XIX Tactical Air Command, watch fighter-­bombers fly overhead. Weyland’s fighter aircraft became known as “Patton’s Air Force” and made it possible for Third Army to race across France. Catalog number: 342-­FH_000266A, National Archives and Records Administration.

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Once the briefing ended, Patton attended another, smaller, meeting with General Weyland and select members of his staff. This was Patton’s ULTRA briefing, where he would learn what the Germans were doing and planned to do, as well as how they were reporting on the results of what Third Army had done to them. The ULTRA system allowed the Allies to read German wireless messages. Because the British had cracked the code of Germany’s Enigma code-­scrambling machines, the Allies could now read German orders as quickly as they went out. The ULTRA intercepts let Patton know where certain enemy units were and where they might be going; they also allowed him to assess the results of Allied air and ground attacks. Even more beneficial was the July 20 bomb plot against Adolf Hitler, when Colonel Klaus von Stauffenberg tried to kill the Führer with a bomb during a briefing in his “Wolf ’s Lair” headquarters near Rastenburg, East Prussia. The attempt on Hitler’s life led him to distrust his generals even more than previously; as a result he now directed the war from his headquarters, which increased radio traffic. Thanks to ULTRA, Allied leaders would sometimes receive directives from Hitler before German field commanders saw them.25 Patton paid rapt attention during the meeting, where an unwritten rule required everyone to keep their mouths shut. The first nugget of German information presented at the first ULTRA briefing was a captured map showing the enemy’s defenses at Rennes, where Wood’s 4th Armored was heading. When the briefing ended, Patton asked questions and simply thought aloud to the staff, figuring out how best to react to the information.26 To keep in touch with his frontline troops, Patton sent armored cars with his cavalry squads, particularly Colonel Edward Frickett’s 6th Cavalry Group, to report back to him. Designated the Army Information Service, they were soon christened “Patton’s Household Cavalry,” a spoof on the king of England’s honor guard.27 To maintain his reach over his army, Patton employed a C-­47 transport aircraft. For short hops on improvised runways he also used an L-­2 Grasshopper to visit the front lines. To track both Patton’s and the enemy’s casualties, as well as prisoners taken and enemy equipment destroyed, Colonel Koch created a monthly chart, which Patton often copied into his diary, calling it his “scorecard.” When looking at the chart one day, Patton told Koch, “It would be ideal if we could have three sets of figures—­a low one for the troops, a high one for the press, and the real one for me.”28

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Around 3:00 p.m., three hours into Third Army’s existence, Bradley visited. Two of Patton’s corps commanders, Walker and Haislip, were there, waiting for their corps to be activated. Bradley told Patton about his concern of a possible German attack at the mountain-­top town of Mortain, twenty-­four miles east of where Patton’s forces were pouring into Normandy and Brittany at Avranches. To Bradley’s credit, he was right on the money. Hitler was planning Operation LÜTTICH, an ambitious strike west on August 7, designed to capture Mortain and Avranches, thus cutting off Patton’s advancing army from its supply lines and rolling up the American left flank. Orders had not yet gone out to Hitler’s supreme commander for the Western Front, Field Marshal Günther von Kluge, but they would come the next day.29 Patton did not give the prediction much credence. There was no way for von Kluge to launch a major offensive against such strong American forces. Patton was both wrong and right: the attack lacked enough strength and air cover to succeed, but Hitler never missed an opportunity to surprise his enemies. Despite his doubts, Patton was not about to downplay his superior’s concerns, not on his first day in command. He told Bradley he would push Major General Raymond McLain’s 90th Infantry Division to the front and swing it east to strengthen his left flank.30 Bradley could not have been happy with Patton’s choice. The 90th’s combat performance had been so poor under Bradley that he had considered breaking it up and feeding its men and equipment to other divisions. He had already run through two division commanders. But with McLain in charge, and answering to Patton, the division might yet prove itself in battle.31 Patton, Haislip, and Patton’s staff then prepared to leave for Middleton’s VIII Corps headquarters. Before he left, Major General Robert Littlejohn, the chief quartermaster for the European Theater of Operations, asked Patton why he dressed in what Littlejohn considered a “showman’s” outfit—­stars on his collar and his ivory-­handled pistol. “I want the men of the Third Army to know where I am,” he explained. “And that I risk the same dangers that they do. A little fancy dress is added to help maintain the leadership and fighting spirit that I desire in the Third Army.” To Patton, the way he dressed was just as important as the way he led. He had to dress the part if he was going to lead his army.32 To make himself even more visible on the battlefield, he ordered powerful horns installed on all his vehicles, unique to the U.S. Army. One fog horn–like blast

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would clear the road. His soldiers would know his whereabouts from a distance, and so would the Germans.33 Patton and his group headed out and cruised through the American lines, with his driver, Staff Sergeant John Mims, blasting the horn to move the traffic. When Patton spotted a vehicle breaking out of a convoy line, Mims chased it down, only to find it filled with reporters trying to get to the front, including Helen Kilpatrick of the Chicago Daily News. Patton lectured the rule-­breakers on the importance of staying in convoy, and the chastened reporters returned to their position.34 Soon after, Patton had his exchange with the sergeant laying wire for “stupid Patton’s 4th Armored.” At VIII Corps headquarters, Middleton told Patton he was preparing to send Ira Wyche’s 79th Infantry Division south to the town of Fougères, since Bradley had ordered him to guard his southern flank once he had captured Avranches. “Hell no,” Patton told him, “we’re going to Brest.” Patton wanted Middleton to drive east to Brest with a straight armored thrust, courtesy of Grow’s 6th Armored, which he wanted to “just get in the middle of the road and barrel on out to Brest.” Middleton thought the concept foolish. He wanted to capture the port city of Saint-­Malo to the north, again, on Bradley’s orders. “No,” Patton insisted. “Pass it up; there’s nothing there anyway; there aren’t five hundred troops in there.” A doubtful Middleton pushed back, asking him how many Germans were between them and Brest. “Oh,” Patton explained, using the latest ULTRA information, “about a thousand.” He was off by about nine thousand.35 When Patton learned that Wood’s 4th Armored tanks were strung out and pushing south to Rennes while enemy armor raced to intercept—­one of Patton’s worst fears—­he requested air support from Weyland. Fighter aircraft soon arrived over the area, only to discover the enemy tanks were actually Wood’s. With no immediate mission, the pilots went to work destroying German roadblocks and defensive positions in Wood’s path. Weyland’s pilots were doing an overwhelming job. Their presence was so dominant that the Germans covered their tanks and vehicles with tree branches and resorted to moving mostly at night.36 Obeying Bradley’s orders, Patton coordinated with Middleton and Haislip to squeeze McLain’s 90th Infantry Division through the gap between Avranches and St-­Hilaire-­du-­Harcouët—­a fifteen-­mile corridor—­ where four other divisions were doing the same. Patton knew such a maneuver would have failed him back at the Command and Staff College

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at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, but he had no other options. Only by cramming as many divisions through the corridor as quickly as possible could he maintain momentum. To prevent traffic jams and speed the infantry-­ laden trucks through Avranches, he sent Haislip and some staff officers ahead to direct traffic.37 But just pushing troops forward was not enough. To improve his armored divisions striking power, and to prevent an enemy counterattack, Patton added Stroh’s 8th Infantry Division to support Wood’s 4th Armored and Wyche’s 79th Division to support Grow’s 6th Armored. He then organized a force consisting of Brigadier General Herbert Earnest’s 15th Cavalry Group, a battalion of tank destroyers, and an infantry battalion from the Stroh’s division to drive along the north coast of Brittany, securing railway and other bridges, without which he explained, “the capture of Brest will have little value.”38 He designated the unit Task Force A.

Figure 4. Major General Troy Middleton, the commander of VIII Corps (left), pins a second star onto Donald A. Stroh’s collar, making him a major general in command of the 8th Infantry Division. Both fought to capture France’s Brittany ports. Catalog number: 111-­SC 193534, National Archives and Records Administration.

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Patton came away from his meeting with Middleton thinking his corps commander was “apathetic” for failing to do what seemed obvious to him. Still, Patton had to keep repeating to himself, “don’t take counsel of your fears” whenever he thought of the dangers of pushing so deep into enemy territory with exposed flanks.39 Patton later found Grow directing traffic at a crossroads. He told the armored commander that he had bet Montgomery five pounds that he would be in Brest in five days. Then he put his hand on Grow’s shoulder and told him, “Take Brest.” When Grow asked him his immediate objectives, Patton told him to focus on securing the Brest-­Rennes railroad and to ignore any resistance. “That’s all I wanted to know,” a satisfied Grow told his boss.40 Patton returned to his headquarters, where he mentioned in his diary that Grow’s 6th Armored had captured Pontorson: “Good work for first day.” He and Beatrice had spent a night there in 1913, when they toured the medieval monastery Mont-­Saint-­Michel on their honeymoon. The monastery had been built on a huge rock in Mont-­Saint-­Michel Bay west

Figure 5. American GIs take in Mont-­Saint-­Michel, the monastery built on a rock in Mont-­Saint-­Michel Bay. Patton and his wife, Beatrice, had honeymooned here in 1913. Third Army liberated the monastery on its first day of combat. Catalog number: 306-­ NYT, 3336, National Archives and Records Administration.

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of Avranches, which became an island during high tides. The Germans had retreated so quickly that they practically abandoned it. A single soldier, Private Freeman Brougher, accompanied by two reporters, captured the monastery by simply driving a jeep across the connecting causeway, over the drawbridge, and through the gate. The Germans immediately surrendered while civilians handed babies to Brougher to kiss.41 This was a far different fight than Tunisia or Sicily. Late that night, Patton received an ULTRA intercept revealing that the German high command had ordered the 116th Panzer Division to attack toward Avranches. This was just the kind of news he wanted to hear. Now he knew what was coming and how to prepare for it.42 He found his first day back in command refreshing and satisfying. “Compared to war,” he wrote in his diary, “all other human activities are futile, if you like war as much as I do.” And few people relished war more than he did. August 1 had proved that. For the next ten months, the war in Europe would be Patton’s war.43

CHAPTER TWO

West to Brest and East to Le Mans

Patton’s second day in command found him standing on the ancient Aubaud Bridge spanning the Sélune River at Pontaubault, envisioning a hawk balanced on William the Conqueror’s arm some nine hundred years earlier. Patton could see the debris of his own war on both sides of the bridge: dead Germans, horses, large caliber weapons, and a wrecked enemy ambulance. “Doubtless an accident,” he commented.1 General John Wood’s tankers had captured the bridge and found it damaged but intact and combat engineers were quickly making repairs. Patton had gambled that the bridge, so sturdily built, would withstand enemy air bombardment. It gave his army access to Brittany and the ports of Brest and Lorient that Eisenhower so desperately needed. Patton was on his way to General Raymond McLain’s 90th Infantry Division headquarters but had decided to take in the bridge’s history and its mere existence, which proved his gamble correct. While Patton took pride in his engineers and his armored division’s quick attacks, McLain’s division disgusted him. As his command vehicle headed toward McLain’s headquarters, Patton passed filthy looking soldiers and officers who were busy removing their rank from their uniforms. “Inexcusable!” he roared at one officer. “Do you want to give your men the idea that the enemy is dangerous?”2 Despite having landed in Normandy on D-­Day and having fought nonstop for two months, the men did not behave like hardened veterans. Some fled their vehicles whenever enemy aircraft flew over, while others rode atop large caliber-­ weapon carriers, preventing their use.3 When Patton came upon soldiers cowering in ditches on either side of the road, he asked, “Who’s in charge of this recon?” A shaken sergeant spoke up: “I am, sir.” “Can you tell me, 27

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sergeant, why you’re stopped here, sunning yourself in a ditch?” The nervous sergeant responded, “To reload and regroup, sir.” “Bullshit!” Patton snapped back and cursed him. Further on he came across a tank battalion defending the division’s right flank, protecting a bridge on the west bank of a river. “Get the goddamn tanks across that bridge on the east side and do it now!” he barked. The tank commander quickly complied.4 Patton then walked along the advancing column, shaming the men to get off their vehicles and walk, calling them babies.5 Yet, he occasionally tried to encourage the men. “Where you used to shoot one bullet, I want you to shoot ten,” he told one group of soldiers.6 He eventually found McLain and Haislip and coordinated their actions for the days ahead.7 His work done, Patton headed back in his vehicle with Haislip to Patton’s headquarters. Along the way, he spotted an American solider with a crushed leg on the side of the road. Ordering the driver to brake, and Patton rushed over to the man, personally injecting him with morphine. The man had fallen off a bulldozer and had been run over. Patton waited until an ambulance arrived, even though he knew the man was doomed. Despite Patton’s best efforts, traffic had slowed to a crawl south of Avranches as infantry, tanks, trucks, and artillery vied for positions, trying to reach the front. Assigning his staff to direct traffic was not enough. He jumped onto an umbrella-­covered police box in the middle of Avranches’s square and directed traffic himself for almost two hours. Many of the truck drivers’ jaws dropped when they realized the man shouting out directions and waving his hands was their army commander.8 “Goddammit!” he yelled to Paul Harkins “I don’t trust anybody!” to keep the columns moving.9 Back at his headquarters, he arranged to push more armor and infantry through his Avranches corridor and told Haislip to head east.10 To alleviate the traffic problem, he gathered his corps and division commanders. “Gentlemen,” he explained, “we are in a hell of a mess, and it’s all my fault.” He then explained that, in his haste to push units south, he had given his division commanders directions without informing his own staff. “Now we shall sit here until my staff can work out schedules and routes,” he declared. “Then we shall continue.” His declaration impressed General Lunsford Oliver, the 5th Armored Division commander. “It took a really big man to admit that he had made a big mistake, just as his army became operational,” Oliver wrote, “and to place not one bit of the blame on anyone else.” The divisions were rolling by the next morning.11

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Later in the day, an upset Omar Bradley visited and found Patton covered in dust from his day’s inspections. Bradley had just seen Troy Middleton, who was still concerned about the possibility of German counterattack against his left flank. While Patton had been forcing himself not to give into his fears, Middleton, a trained infantryman, openly worried that the Germans would attack Avranches, cutting his corps off from the rest of Third Army. “For God sakes George,” Bradley demanded, “what are you going to do about this open flank of Troy Middleton’s?” Bradley had already reacted, sending Ira Wyche’s 79th Division south of Avranches to Fougères as a blocking force. When he told Patton that he knew he would concur with the order, Patton snapped, “I would,” but he did not agree, thinking Bradley was “getting the British complex of over caution.”12 Patton had just placed Wyche’s division in support of Robert Grow’s 6th Armored. He knew he had the situation under control and did not appreciate Bradley’s meddling. The two then discussed Patton’s eastward movement, led by Haislip. Bradley wanted Patton to move Haislip’s divisions southeast of Avranches, rapidly drive the sixty miles east to the Mayenne River, and capture the three towns of Mayenne, Laval, and Angers.13 Patton later wrote of the encounter, “Just about a year ago to the day I had to force him to take a risk in Sicily,” he recalled. When it came to slights and petty revenge, Patton exercised extraordinary recall.14 As soon as Bradley left, Patton and Hap Gay jumped in a jeep and drove to Middleton’s headquarters, where they found Wyche. Patton countermanded Bradley’s order and rearranged his divisions, ordering Wyche’s 79th to Haislip’s XV Corps and, giving Middleton Macon’s 83rd Infantry Division.15 Middleton’s staff furiously wiped down their celluloid-­covered wall maps with wet sponges and, using colored grease pencils, updated them to Patton’s liking. They marked the enemy locations with red squares and the American locations with blue. Then, one of Middleton’s officers chimed in, “We’ve lost contact with the enemy.” The Germans were retreating. There was no threat from the south.16 While Patton had Middleton focused on the drive west, he set up Haislip in the east. Bradley envisioned using Haislip’s corps as a shield, protecting Middleton’s rear from a German attack. Instead, Patton saw the XV Corps as a straight saber he could use to thrust east. Haislip’s corps consisted of Oliver’s 5th Armored, McLain’s 90th Division west of Avranches and Wyche’s 79th east of Pontorson—­which Patton sent southeast to Fougères—­forming a seventeen-­mile-­wide front. Patton

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wanted Oliver’s 5th Armored to take Fougères and to be prepared to repulse any German attacks, but Oliver’s tanks got stuck in the Avranches bottleneck. It would take him a few days to reach Fougères but once there his division’s presence there signaled that Patton was ready to exploit the Germans’ open flank to the east.17

Figure 6. Patton visits Major General Wade H. Haislip, the commander of XV Corps. Haislip’s corps helped close the southern jaw of the Falaise pocket until his corps was split south of Argentan, France. Catalog number: OWI 208AA, 1986, National Archives and Records Administration.

While Bradley might have been upset with Patton’s tactics, Eisenhower certainly was not. After reading the latest updates in London, he grinned at an aide and said, “If the intercepts are right, we are to hell and gone in Brittany and slicing them up in Normandy!” At Eisenhower’s SHAEF war room, an RAF officer looked at the battle maps on the wall and asked whether the arrow toward Rennes should be labeled “Patton” and another halfway to Saint-­Malo should be marked “Patton’s aide.”18 Patton often found it difficult to push his divisions forward, a problem that triggered his famous temper. One of his staffers noticed that he “g-­ds [goddamns] everything from hell to breakfast, but mostly the weather.” To help relieve his stress, Patton often enjoyed putting his aides in awkward positions. On the road one day with Major Alexander Stiller, Patton had him interrogate a Frenchman, even though Patton spoke perfect French and Stiller did not. Patton thoroughly enjoyed Stiller’s difficulties.19

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An even better stress reliever was Willie, whom Patton always kept close. As the general sat working late at night, Willie would look at him from his bed and Patton would smile and say, “Willie, Willie, turn over.” When the dog did, Patton would chuckle, come out from behind his desk and pat him. But sometimes even Willie couldn’t curb his master’s temper. One morning, Willie flew out of Patton’s caravan, followed by Patton’s boot and several violent oaths. “No explanation was forthcoming,” commented one of Patton’s staffers, “even from Willie.” 20 Nor could Willie save Patton from his own personal vices. On August 3, he received a letter from Beatrice, informing him she knew that Jean Gordon had arrived in England. “The first I knew about Jean being here was in your letter,” he lied to his wife, before deflecting, “We are in the middle of a battle so [I] don’t meet people so don’t worry.” He reassured her in a follow-­up letter a few weeks later, writing, “you are the only one who really counts.” A week later General Hughes commented in his diary that Gordon had departed England for France, noting, “it should please Uncle Georgie.” Gordon would remain close throughout the war.21 That night, German bombers raided Patton’s headquarters, lighting up the sky with green and red flares before dropping bombs. Patton spent the attack in a deck chair outside his trailer, smoking a cigar. A nervous, sweating soldier brought him a message and noticed Patton looking up at the sky. “Those Goddamn bastards, those rotten sons of bitches!” he declared to no one, “We’ll get them! We’ll get them!” Patton counted at least 165 bomb blasts, “near enough to shake the truck,” he later wrote Beatrice.22 On August 3, Bradley brought official news Patton wanted to hear: he only needed Middleton’s corps to make the charge for Brest, the rest of his army could head east. Bradley reiterated his order for Patton to race for the Mayenne River, some sixty miles southeast, and secure its bridges. Next, he would stretch his army further south to Angers, where it could use the east-­west-­flowing Loire River to protect his right flank. Even Montgomery had signed off on the plan.23 Eisenhower, feeling that Brittany would “fall like a ripe apple,” wanted Patton to focus on “bold and continuous attacks against the Germans” to the east.24 Oliver’s 5th Armored had finally caught up with Haislip and joined his corps. Now Patton could turn his shield into a saber. In the west, Wood’s 4th Armored remained at Rennes, while Grow’s 6th Armored, followed by one of Macon’s regiments, passed Dinan, fifteen miles south of Saint-­ Malo. Patton left them alone. “I did nothing,” he wrote in his diary.25

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MAP 1. The Race to Brest and Le Mans, August 2–9, 1944.

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The next day, August 4, Patton moved his headquarters below Avranches, taking up residence in a building previously occupied by German commanders. As he and his general officers gathered around a map to discuss their next move, one of the staffers ordered a 4th Armored messenger to leave the room. Patton looked up and ordered the messenger to stay. “As a matter of fact,” he added, “go out in the hall and have the rest of those jeep drivers that deliver dispatches to come in.” The men gathered around Patton as he told them he wanted GIs to understand what went on at higher headquarters. He asked them to stay for the discussion and report back to their units what was expected of them. Likewise, he wanted his frontline men to know that he and his staff were not lying around in their sleeping bags.26 To help reinforce his armored spearheads, Patton issued new orders for his army. Where he had earlier reprimanded infantrymen for riding on tanks, he now ordered at least one infantry regiment to ride on the tanks of an armored division. Some of the soldiers from Irwin’s 5th Division complained that there was no place on a tank to hold on. Patton scoffed at the complaint, knowing that infantrymen would rather ride on any vehicle for twenty-­five miles than walk fifteen. Weeks later, Irwin changed his mind, praising Patton for the tank-­borne infantry concept. “The professional soldier is certainly conservative,” Patton wrote.27 As his army headed east and west, Patton issued a single order regarding enemy pockets of resistance: “Don’t stop.” In that vein he stayed focused on Brest as his ultimate goal in the west, refusing to engage enemy troops on his flanks. He ordered that Dinan would “not, repeat, not be attacked.” He had received an ULTRA message two days earlier that the German commander there planned to attack Grow’s right flank. He also bypassed the town of Carhaix, fifty miles southwest of Dinan, where German paratroopers also awaited Grow’s tanks. He believed that bypassing these German-­occupied towns would lead them to die on the vine, left behind in the dust. Patton had a date with the channel ports and he did not want to be late. In the east, he ordered Haislip to capture the bridgehead at Laval, proceed east to Le Mans, and keep pressing east. He warned Haislip that he might have to turn northeast in coordination with Montgomery’s push south beyond Caen. “Don’t be surprised,” he warned him, if the order to turn came suddenly.28 Again, Patton knew from ULTRA intercepts that the Germans were evacuating Laval and preparing to destroy equipment in Le Mans. He would not allow it.29

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Later that afternoon, Patton drove to Grow’s 6th Armored Division headquarters. He found the ride exciting, driving through a fluid battlefield, filled with isolated enemy soldiers, and almost no Americans. He stopped along the road to enjoy some local Calvados brandy with French Resistance fighters. He then rode on until an excited liaison officer flagged him down, warning that the road ahead was under fire. “Poor boy was touched in the head,” Patton said, so he pressed on cautiously for ten miles until finding Grow.30 He later discovered that he had driven right through a German division but did not have the heart to tell his intelligence officer, Koch, that he never saw a single German who wasn’t already a prisoner.31 At Grow’s headquarters, Patton learned that his tankers had cut off nearly ten thousand Germans on the Brittany peninsula and had raced some eighty miles in four days, but then Grow had stopped for the day. A frustrated Patton encouraged him to press the attack until one of Grow’s aides showed him a note from Middleton, ordering Grow to stop. After reading it, Patton said quietly, “and he was a good doughboy, too.” He then directly ordered Grow to keep attacking west. He wanted Brest in two days.32 “I’ll be having tea in Brest on Sunday,” he boasted to Grow’s men, “even if I have to slow down!”33 Oddly enough, even though he knew that Middleton had ordered Grow to stop, that night, Patton penned in his diary that “the 6th is too careful and so gets shot up.”34 To aid Grow’s drive, Patton ordered an air resupply. That afternoon, C-­47s arrived overhead and dropped bundles of ten five-­gallon gas cans wrapped in canvas bags. Patton rolled up to the frontline as gas tanks floated down under parachutes. German artillery exploded around him. Spotting a group of men in a ditch he yelled, “Get your asses up and go get that gas!” The men charged toward the cans and brought them back. Once the men gassed up a group of halftracks, each with four turreted .50 caliber antiaircraft machine guns, he ordered them to fire at enemy infantry. One of the gunners had to tell him, “We can’t depress them over the cab.” The guns automatically stopped when depressed. Patton may have known about tanks, but antiaircraft weapons were new to him.35 He then saw Colonel Embry Lagrew, Grow’s CCB commander, wounded and sitting in his jeep. “Lagrew,” Patton called to him, knowing that Lagrew had been recommended for the Distinguished Service Cross, “you’re an unlucky son-­of-­a-­bitch aren’t you?” The colonel grinned back, “Hell no, General, there ain’t no damn Kraut can kill me, I’m too tough for that.”

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Figure 7. Major General Robert W. Grow (left), the commander of the 6th Armored Division, promotes one of his division’s officers. Grow’s tankers raced to capture Brest, France, but were left to besiege the vital port. Catalog number: 111-SC 199839, National Archives and Records Administration.

Patton patted him on the back, saying, “Now that’s the kind of men we want to have.”36 If Grow’s pause frustrated Patton, it paled in comparison to General Wood’s insubordination north of Rennes. Wood hit stout German defenses and encircled the city in a counterclockwise sweep. He wanted to turn his tanks east and attack toward Chartres, some 160 miles away, where he eyed the undefended German left flank. But Wood was part of Middleton’s corps, heading west, not Haislip’s corps, heading east. Despite his assignment, Wood believed that if he could drive east quickly enough, he could replicate the chaos he had incited between Coutances and Avranches, something infantry generals could not understand. “The American high command from Marshall, Eisenhower, Bradley on down to army and corps commanders, except George Patton, was infantry school trained and rigidly infantry minded,” Wood would later disdainfully write. “[They] had no conception of proper use of armored forces. Patton understood it full well, but was submerged under the weight of rigid infantry conceptions.”37

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Lacking steady communications, Wood pushed east until Middleton showed up at his headquarters to make sure he was heading west. A shirtless Wood greeted his corps commander with a hug, telling him, “We’re winning this war the wrong way, we ought to be going toward Paris!” Middleton listened to Wood’s pleas, which included pairing Grow’s 6th Armored with his for the drive to Chartres (something Patton had proposed a month earlier), but Middleton simply ordered Wood west to Lorient and departed.38 When Middleton wired specific orders to Wood to make sure he understood his mission, Patton interpreted them as defensive (since Wood seemed to be making a U-­turn) and reminded Middleton to keep Wood pushing west. Wood’s maneuver had wasted a day that could have been spent pursuing the enemy, just as Grow had lost a day because of Middleton’s orders. Wood’s delay would prove fatal to the attack on Lorient.39 Wood’s actions infuriated Patton. He had been in command for less than a week and it already appeared he was defying Eisenhower’s orders. After all the trouble he caused his boss in Sicily and England, he knew the only way to secure his job was by proving himself in combat. While Patton probably agreed with Wood’s rationale, he could not ignore that Eisenhower was calling the shots. Eisenhower probably saw the opportunity too, but he also had learned, through bitter experience, the importance of ports. In North Africa, he had sweated through getting enough equipment to the front. The Italian campaign had taught him that the Germans, even when faced with certain destruction, still fought fiercely. Now he faced a German army resupplied directly from Germany. The only way he could defeat it was by isolating it, blasting enemy bridges from the air, and getting enough men and equipment quickly to the front. He had enough ships, but what he needed were French ports. As tempting as the German army’s left flank may have been, without the necessary tanks, ammunition, and gas coming through supply ports, the American army could not exploit it. Patton was also not about to go against Eisenhower’s strategy just as his own army was beginning to taste success. Even the smallest infractions prompted him into action. When Bradley called him to complain that a Third Army officer in Rennes was disarming French resistance units, Patton shouted, “Goddamn him!” and apologized profusely, promising to fix the matter.40 Later, when Wood finally met with Patton and expressed his displeasure with being denied the German open flank, Patton simply

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told him, “You almost got tried [by a court-­martial] for that.” Wood replied that someone should be tried for it, but not him. It would not be the first time Wood’s actions and stubbornness would land him in trouble.41 On the fifth day of Third Army’s war, Haislip commenced his drive east. McLain’s 90th Division, so shoddy and poor in combat, seemed to be turning itself around. A special task force under the deputy commander, Brigadier General Bill Weaver, advanced thirty-­five miles in one day, from Saint-­Hilaire-­du-­Harcouët to the city of Mayenne, where the Germans had blown up two of the three bridges spanning the Mayenne River and were preparing to destroy the remaining one. Weaver’s assault on the bridge broke down, but a single tank, followed by a lieutenant on foot, crossed the bridge under fire, soon followed by reluctant infantrymen who secured the city. Patton called the capture of Mayenne “the beginning of the making of one the greatest divisions that ever fought.”42 Patton’s name was even having an effect on the enemy. During the battle for Mayenne, an American captain ordered a group of Germans to put their hands up. When the Germans remained still, the captain barked out, “Patton sehr gross panzer! Erschiessen Sie!” [Patton has large tanks! They will shoot you!]” The Germans raised their hands and surrendered. Patton’s name carried weight. A similar incident occurred when Wood’s tankers captured a German SS tank commander. He requested to see the division commander, believing him to be under Patton. “General Patton must represent for your army what Rommel did for us,” the commander admitted to Wood, adding he was impressed with 4th Armored’s rapid advance, “which in many cases caught us completely unprepared.” Third Army soldiers found that surrendering Germans seemed honored to have been captured by Patton’s men. The German high command also seemed to take interest in him. ULTRA intercepted a German communique reporting, “It seems that Lieut.-­General Patton has now assumed command of the Third American Army.”43 While his two corps fought in different directions, Patton drove to Courtney Hodges’s First Army headquarters in Canisy, near Saint-­Lô. On the way, he drove through the bombed-­out city. “St. Lo is pretty well bashed in,” he later wrote. “Beatrice and I spent a night there in 1913 and bought a chair and a chest.”44 Upon arrival, he, Hodges, and Bradley mapped out army boundaries over a luncheon table. Bradley ordered Hodges to drive south through Vire to Ambrières, some forty miles, while simultaneously engaging the Germans and trying to flank them. Bradley

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told Patton that once he finished with Brest, he would swing south of Hodges’s army (even though Haislip’s corps was already there, having taken Mayenne) and drive for Le Mans. “This is exactly the boundary I desire,” Patton later boasted, “as it keeps me on the outside—­on the running end.”45 Yet despite Patton’s aggressiveness and bold maneuvers, the Germans in some locations put up stout resistance. At Saint-­Malo, the enemy barricaded themselves in the ancient walled port town and refused to surrender to Macon’s 83rd Infantry Division. Patton had ordered Middleton to bypass the city, but when the Germans fired on passing American vehicles, Middleton ordered Macon to take care of it. Frustrated by his infantry’s inability to quickly capture the port town, Patton decided on August 6 to go to Saint-­Malo “to kick someone’s ass.”46 He met with Middleton to discuss the situation and came away frustrated, excoriating Macon’s infantry for being mentally and physically slow and lacking self-­confidence. “Am disgusted with human frailty,” he raged to his diary about weaknesses only he could defy. “The lambent flame of my own self-­confidence burns ever brighter.”47 Later that day, Patton received a report that Grow’s tankers had captured Brest; he immediately called Bradley with the good news. Bradley doubted it, however, knowing the Germans would put up a tough defense for such an important objective. The report turned out to be false.48 While Grow’s tankers had advanced another eighty miles in a single day, an impressive achievement by any measure, they were still forty miles short of Brest. Patton visited Middleton to encourage Grow’s drive and to make sure Wood understood his orders to remain in Lorient “and await orders.” With his directives clear, Patton returned to his headquarters and was surprised to receive a message from Wood: “Trust we can turn around and get headed in the right direction.” Patton, not amused by Wood’s effort to bypass his direct superior, picked up the phone and relayed Wood’s message to Middleton.49 After only one week of campaigning, Patton’s Third Army had covered almost seven thousand square miles of French territory, an amazing accomplishment when compared to the only nine hundred square miles taken by Bradley’s First Army and Dempsey’s British Second Army from June 10 to June 30—­a full twenty days. Along the way, Patton had kicked and cajoled his troops to engage the enemy. He had directed traffic, yelled at officers and men, and pushed his generals in the right directions. In

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the skies above, his air force had shocked the enemy and left their tanks smoldering in the wake of advancing American troops. Yet he and his staff could not help but relish Montgomery’s difficulties around the town of Caen, which the British commander had promised to capture on D-­ Day, two months earlier. “Fore God, General,” Sergeant George Meeks told Patton, “if General Montgomery don’t get a move on himself, those British soldiers are going to have grass and limpets growing on their left foot from standing in the water.”50 On the morning of August 7, Patton caught a break. An American pilot who had been shot down over enemy lines near Angers reported to Patton that he and the French Resistance had encountered few Germans near the front between Châteaubriant and Angers, some forty-­five miles east. He explained that the Germans were retreating east, west, and north of the Loire River, which paralleled Patton’s east-­facing corps. More importantly, a bridge inside Angers remained intact. Patton knew through ULTRA that the Germans were preparing to demolish the city.51 Without telling Bradley, he immediately sent Gaffey and Colonel Bernard Carter to Vire, where they assembled a combat team from Irwin’s 5th Division to take Angers. The 5th was part of Walker’s XX Corps, which Patton had not yet put into the line. It was a risky move, “but so is war,” Patton reasoned. Upon receiving the word, Irwin loaded his soldiers onto trucks and traversed the seventy miles in one day with little difficulty; upon arrival, the exhausted men found the bridges blown. The next day, however, they discovered an intact railway bridge and fought across it, capturing the town two days later. Patton’s insight might not have been perfect, but his decisiveness brought his army that much closer to encircling the enemy.52 While Irwin’s force reached Angers, another 5th Division task force battled for Nantes, about sixty miles west of Angers. The Loire River ran through both cities and continued 160 miles east to Orléans. As Bradley had said, the Loire would help protect Patton’s right flank. Between the flowing river and Weyland’s fighter-­bombers, Patton could rest easy. Bradley, however, constantly worried the Germans would somehow cross the river and flank him.53 Patton spent part of the day inspecting the front. As he returned to his headquarters with Colonel Codman, they saw smashed enemy halftracks, trucks, and ambulances, filled with black, burned German corpses. Splintered barns lined the road and black patches marked where fires

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had scorched the grass. Bloated cow corpses stank in the summer heat. Above them contrails swirled from the latest air battle. Patton swept his arm across the desolate scene. “Just look at that, Codman,” he shouted, “Could anything be more magnificent?” The vehicle passed a concealed antiaircraft battery firing at enemy aircraft. Patton cupped his hands around his mouth, and Codman leaned in to hear his boss’s words over the din. “Compared to war,” he said with his voice shaking with emotion, “all other forms of human endeavor shrink to insignificance. God how I love it!”54 And Patton was truly loving it. He wrote his friend, General Kenyon Joyce, that he was fighting “one of the loveliest battles you ever saw,” likening it to an old cavalry trope: “The soldier went out and charged in all directions at the same time, with a pistol in each hand, and a sabre in the other.” He took time to explore ancient castles, bridges, cathedrals, and greet the locals, all of which hearkened him back to his readings on William the Conqueror. “Nearly everyone [sic] of these towns has all or part of a castle,” he wrote, noting the changes in warfare over nine hundred years. “One air bomb or salvo from our 240’s would breach any castle which in those days sustained sieges measured in years.” He also enjoyed joking with his soldiers. When a sergeant asked him why he wore an obsolete gun, he told him, “If I were seen without this gun, no one would know me. I might just as well go without pants.” Nothing could dampen his sprits. When the Luftwaffe blasted a nearby ammo dump on the night of August 6, he wrote that the bombs made “a funny noise I never heard before.” He was enjoying himself.55 Patton credited Opie Weyland and his pilots for much of his ground success. With pilots in frontline tanks guiding their fellow pilots to targets, Patton’s troops enjoyed knocking out enemy tanks, pillboxes, and roadblocks without firing a shot. Weyland joined Patton’s aggressive spirit and ignored the Air Forces practice of relying on ground artillery to destroy enemy defenses and, knowing that time was of the essence, sent in his fighter-­bombers. Tankers would often pull to the side of the road and call in air support. In less time than it would take artillery to set up, find the range, and fire, a fighter-­bomber would swoop down and strafe the target several times. The German defenders would then run forward with their hands up and the pilot would fly barrel rolls over the American tank columns while the tankers cheered. The airmen and Army reconnaissance officers developed a cohesive spirit. “They knew each other’s first names and joked together,” wrote

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Patton. Weyland’s pilots had to adjust from Bradley’s to Patton’s way of conducting war. Under Bradley, pilots would plan missions a day or two in advance. Under Patton, they planned as they flew. Pilots also visited the front lines where ground troops shared their “liberated” booze and booty. When pilots were later transferred to other armies, they often insisted on flying one last mission for Third Army. It brought tears to Patton’s eyes.56 The aerial success bonded Patton’s relationship with Weyland. “Opie!” Patton would call out after fighter craft had wrecked a German armored column, “Goddam, my goodness, the roads are just littered with German tanks and artillery and whatnot.” They developed a mutual respect, promising to work as a team, with no secrets between them. Weyland’s happy-­ go-­lucky attitude balanced Patton’s barking temper. Patton sometimes stayed up late with Weyland, trading stories while finishing off a bottle of bourbon, and, during briefings, they often sat with their arms around each other. One of Weyland’s commanders revealed that he would “jump through hoops” to help keep Third Army moving. Even more revealing, Weyland, unlike most subordinates, addressed Patton as “George.”57 Late on August 7, Patton returned to his headquarters where Bradley greeted him and the two discussed Third Army’s position. Bradley approved Haislip’s drive to Le Mans, some fifty miles away, but was more concerned about a German operation called LÜTTICH, Hitler’s attempt to cut off Patton by capturing the vital road net at Avranches. The enemy attack, launched that morning before sunrise, had already bogged down around the town of Mortain, where German panzer forces had surrounded a battalion from Major General Leland Hobbs’s 30th Infantry Division, part of Hodges’ First Army. He told Patton to prepare one of his corps to help. Patton was already on it. The night before, Gay had awakened Patton and told him of an UTLRA report about the imminent attack on Mortain. The order came straight from Hitler and claimed, “The outcome of the Battle of France depends on the success of the attack on the southern wing of the [German] Seventh Army.” Four days earlier, Koch had reported four enemy panzer divisions missing from the front lines and speculated they might be used to drive a wedge between Patton and Hodges. Patton, Gay, Koch, and Major Melvin Helfers, the intelligence officer in charge of ULTRA intercepts, squatted over a large map on the floor and discussed the situation. Gay recommended using General Baade’s 35th Infantry Division, under Walker’s XX Corps, since it stood directly south of the area in question.

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Early that morning, Patton called Walker, ordered him to stop his corps movement to the south, and to set up defensive positions facing east. At the meeting with Bradley, Patton put on a show, making sure Walker was present and ordering him to be prepared in case Hodges needed his three divisions. Walker showed Patton and Bradley his plan for attack with Baade’s 35th Division. Later that afternoon, Bradley called Patton and told him to send Baade’s combat team north toward Mortain. Patton, of course, was ready.58 With the plan for Mortain set, Bradley then revealed his bigger vision: he wanted Patton to swing south around Paris and then circle north all the way to the port city of Dieppe, a three-­hundred-­mile arc. Patton agreed but suggested on a lesser pivot south of the town of Falaise, south of Caen, which General Montgomery had finally captured the day before. The German attack on Mortain had formed a bulge—­or pocket—­in the Allied line. Patton wanted to turn north with Hodges’s army, closing the pocket at Falaise. Bradley wanted to do both. Instead of just focusing on the two German armies crammed into the Normandy area, he would now split his forces, or more specifically Patton’s force, allowing Walker to continue east, while Haislip turned north toward Argentan, fifteen miles south of Falaise. Bradley saw Hitler’s Mortain Offensive as the “greatest tactical blunder” he had ever seen, something that would not happen again for a thousand years. Almost the entire German force in France had stuck its head out of its defensive line and could now be lopped off. Yet, Bradley’s ambitions ended up weakening his southern pincer days later, delaying efforts to close the “Falaise Gap.”59 Later that day, Patton asked Helfers, his ULTRA man, about the value of reading German orders. Helfers explained that he usually knew what the Germans in front of Patton were up to twenty-­four hours ahead of time. Patton then asked Koch why he had never heard of Helfers, and Koch said that relations with British intelligence handlers had been so miserable in Tunisia and Sicily that he thought it better to hide the source of information. At that, Patton told Helfers to report to him every morning at 7:00 a.m. in his trailer for a short ULTRA briefing, and that if any important messages were intercepted, he was to get Patton or Gay at once. Patton had grasped the importance of ULTRA. From then on, he rarely missed a briefing, and if he did, would order an ULTRA officer to his office for a personal briefing. The Germans also assisted Patton in revealing their hand. As they fled from his onrushing tanks, they relied

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more and more on wireless communications, providing Patton with copious radio traffic on their plans. The only one who did not appreciate the ULTRA intercepts may have been Willie. When Patton’s dog urinated on an ULTRA map, Patton exclaimed, “You see major what Willie thinks of your map?”60

Figure 8. Patton confers with his chief of staff, Major General Hugh Gaffey, while Major Melvin Helfers looks on. Helfers, an intelligence officer in charge of ULTRA intercepts, kept Patton updated on enemy whereabouts and intentions. Catalog number: 111-­SC 199839, National Archives and Records Administration.

In the weeks ahead, Patton worked around the tight ULTRA secrecy protocols by having Helfers make small maps revealing German positions and intentions and bringing them to his corps commanders. When he first asked Helfers to make a map, the officer hesitated, reminding Patton that ULTRA information could not go below the Army level. Patton assured him, “Don’t worry about it. I’ll assume all responsibility. I’ll see that you get your map back.”61 Patton’s commanders probably thought him clairvoyant in his ability to direct them with such confidence or relieve their anxieties about blitzing forward while they worried about enemy

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flank attacks. ULTRA also gave Patton a degree of confidence that had more to do with him not taking counsel of his fears than his belief in his own destiny. On August 8, thanks to his Household Cavalry, Patton learned that Grow’s 6th Armored had finally reached the outskirts of Brest while Wood’s 4th Armored had also reached the outskirts of Lorient. Both divisions had reached their respective cities the day before and were exhausted after trekking two hundred miles in little more than a week. They spent the day investing the two cities while unsuccessfully encouraging the Germans to surrender. Wood’s tankers discovered that the Germans had mined the roads and set up defenses. Grow’s tankers faced a different threat. The German 266th Infantry Division under Lieutenant General Karl Spang, one of the divisions Patton had hoped would die on the vine, attacked Grow’s rear as his tanks surrounded Brest. Grow had to leave a screening force outside of Brest while turning the rest of his division east and attacking the next day. He routed the Germans, but the effort left his force too weak for a direct assault on the heavily defended city. Middleton had been correct to push back on Patton’s desire to blast directly west with only his two armored divisions and without securing his flanks.62 Meanwhile, with both ports invested by his armored divisions, Middleton decided to replace them with infantry for the sieges. He began transferring Wood’s tankers east to join Patton’s charge. Middleton now wanted to reduce the port cities one by one, focusing first on Saint-­Malo with Macon’s 83rd Division. With Middleton focused on Saint-­Malo, Patton, wanting to support Grow’s weakened force, sent a battalion from Major General Donald Stroh’s 8th Division to Brest to help with the siege.63 With those decisions made, Patton and some of his staff headed to Saint-­Malo, where General Macon’s men hammered away at the German fortress, its nearby islands, and peninsular strongholds. Macon had little to show for his efforts, having lost eight hundred men in street fighting. Reporter William Randolph Hearst Jr., the son of the famed newspaper publisher, joined Patton for the trip. Along the way, Patton’s jeep stopped at an overcrowded POW camp. When Patton asked one of the guards what he could do to help, the guard explained the crowded camp was expecting more prisoners. Patton immediately got word back to his headquarters to bring up trucks and, within thirty minutes, the POWs were being loaded and shipped further to the rear. He would visit the camp again two days later and ordered more trucks.64

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As Patton’s jeep arrived at the 83rd’s headquarters, General Macon, standing outside, turned pale, thinking he was about to be relieved. Patton saw the look on his face and realized his commander needed more praise than blame: “Fine work!” he shouted, putting Macon at ease.65 General Everett Hughes caught up with Patton and found him in good spirits. But after ordering the bombing of Brest and St-­Nazaire, Patton turned to Hughes and humbly admitted, “I have sealed the fate of a lot of French civilians.” He then complained that the Allies were attempting to encircle the Germans in “doughboy fashion,” with infantry, as opposed to “cavalry style,” with tanks.66 Patton, Macon, and their staffs reviewed the situation. Once completed, they walked toward the front. “Let’s go a little farther forward,” encouraged Patton. “General,” Macon replied, “if you just move up here forty yards you’ll be in the enemy front line.”67 Patton decided against it and instead sat down to lunch underneath a camouflage net. Suddenly, one of Patton’s officers collapsed. He rushed to the man’s side, took off his own jacket, placed it under the man’s head and called for a medic. A doctor arrived and explained that the man had fainted from exhaustion. “Hell, if I lose that guy I come to a stop,” Patton told Hearst. “He is my transportation officer.”68 A little after 5:00 p.m., an aide brought Patton a message from general Haislip, explaining that McLain’s 90th had captured Le Mans and wanted further orders. “Tell him to go on from there and keep going,” Patton ordered. “Tell him to take Chateaudun and go on and take Orleans.” He then told Hearst, “I am supposed to stop at Le Mans, but, damn it, we have got them on the run now and I do not believe in letting them stop to get their breath. When you have a guy on his heels, you have got him where you want him. Anyway,” he continued, “if I am going to get hell, I would rather get hell for advancing than for sitting still.”69 In fact, to stave off any hell from Bradley, he had stopped sending him position reports, worried that “some directive-­reading S.O.B” would halt him for having reached his objectives, telling him to wait for new orders.70 With Brest under siege and the rest of the peninsula stagnant, Patton gave his western theater little mind, if only trying to transfer the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions east. He would not visit Middleton for another month, although he did help him out in another way. Knowing that Middleton, and the entire Brittany peninsula, would soon come under Lieutenant General Bill Simpson’s Ninth Army, Patton let several of Simpson’s staff officers shadow his own staff to see how an army operated

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in the field. The tutorial aided Simpson’s staff immensely when his army became operational. Patton and Simpson got along well. When Simpson, who was balder than Patton, first entered Third Army headquarters, Patton introduced him to his staff, “Gentlemen, this is General Simpson. When he isn’t commanding Ninth Army, he acts as an advertisement for hair tonic.”71 Later that day, Patton traveled to the outskirts of Le Mans, where General McLain had set up his 90th Division headquarters after having captured Mayenne, already some forty miles in his rearview mirror. Patton hugged both McLain and Weaver for their quick actions at Mayenne and Le Mans, the latter of which was still partially under German control. “I knew you two [sons-­of-­bitches] would do it!” he told them.72 The feeling of elation was contagious. To illustrate Patton’s breakneck speed, and how it left even his superiors scratching their heads, an officer in Bradley’s planning section sent Patton a cartoon of a staffer, standing amid scattered papers, writing on a board, “Oh Lord, give me the strength to carry on another day. And may I yet succeed in getting one paper completed before it is out-­dated [sic].”73 By now, almost every German general in France could see Patton’s thrust threatening their position in Normandy, but Hitler decided not to deal with Patton and instead continued his sputtering western drive at Mortain. The surrounded American battalion atop the town held off repeated enemy attacks. When a German officer ordered the American lieutenant in charge to surrender “or be blown to bits,” the lieutenant snapped back, “Go fuck yourself.” He was a soldier after Patton’s own heart.74 The Germans fighting in and around Mortain never got close to Avranches. Worse, by launching their attack, they exposed much of their armor to Allied artillery and air attacks. Additionally, Hodges’s U.S. First Army and Montgomery’s entire 21st Army Group had been slowly driving the Germans south and east. The Germans were beginning to buckle under the Allies’ hammer blows. Patton wanted to take advantage of the situation by driving for Chartres, eighty miles northeast of Le Mans, or Dreux, a hundred miles northeast. Either maneuver would form a huge sweeping arc, encircling von Kluge’s two German armies: SS Lieutenant General Sepp Dietrich’s Fifteenth Panzer and SS Lieutenant General Paul Hausser’s Seventh, as well as an extra force, Panzer Group Eberbach, made up of two panzer corps under command of General Heinrich Eberbach. They would also place Third Army only fifty miles west of Paris, but Bradley denied permission for either move.

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That night, Bradley visited Patton and told him the bad news. With Montgomery pushing down from Caen, Patton’s southern pincer would end up twenty-­five miles east of Montgomery. If Patton could not reach the northern coast at Le Havre, one hundred miles away, the Germans would have a wide corridor to escape east. Bradley wanted a smaller goal. “We’ll go as far as Argentan and hold there,” Bradley told Patton and Weyland. “We’ve got to be careful we don’t run into Monty coming down from Falaise.” Patton stood agape. He was not worried about being careful or running into Montgomery. Weyland was much more demonstrative, acting like the Patton of old. Slamming his helmet to the ground, he erupted, “My God! This is a piecemeal meddle! We’re ruined.” He added, “Boy, General Bradley, why don’t you just let us keep going?” Patton, who knew better than to risk his career with such an outburst, said nothing. “Well, you’ve got a point,” Bradley told Weyland, “and it’s probably a good one, but that’s the way it’s going to be done.”75 With that, Patton and Weyland had their orders. Patton never recorded what was said in the meeting, only writing in his diary, “Brad won’t let me.”76 Likewise, he did not mention what he said to Weyland after the meeting but he probably told him to keep his big mouth shut. Patton wrote out the order for Haislip to head sixty miles north for Argentan. If all worked out well, the Germans would be trapped between Patton’s Third Army in the south and British general Dempsey’s Second Army in the north. General Hughes, who watched Patton sign the order, told him it was historic. “I hope so,” Patton wrote.77 He predicted the war might end in ten days and wrote to Beatrice, “I have been skating on the thin ice of self-­confidence for nine days.”78 That evening, while sharing a bottle of brandy with General Simpson, Patton reviewed both their careers. “Well, here we all are under Eisenhower and Bradley, both six years our junior.” He then recalled his, Simpson’s, and Hodges’s standings at West Point. “Hodges flunked out of the West Point class of aught-­eight [1908] and had to enlist and now he commands First Army. I was turned back from aught-­eight and it took me five years to graduate—­with aught-­nine—­but I command Third Army. And you came out second from the bottom in our class in aught-­ nine and you command Ninth Army.” Then Patton concluded, “Isn’t it peculiar that three old farts like us should be carrying the ball for those two sons-­of-­bitches?”79 Patton drove to Haislip’s headquarters in Le Mans on August 9. As his caravan approached, a jeep came speeding alongside. Noticing that the

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officer, a captain, had smeared waterproofing material over the bars on his helmet, Patton ordered all the jeeps to stop. When the captain came over, Patton yelled at him in his high-­pitched voice: “Are you ashamed to wear the insignia of the United States Army?” He kept up the barrage as the captain quickly took off his helmet and scrapped off the waterproofing, managing only to get a few “yes sir’s” in between Patton’s diatribe.80 Inside Haislip’s headquarters, Patton reviewed the corps commander’s plan of attack, scheduled for the next day. Haislip was to drive north sixty miles for Argentan, passing through the towns of Alençon and Sées along the way. Haislip’s XV Corps had grown in strength in the last week, now consisting of four divisions: Oliver’s 5th Armored, General Philippe Leclerc’s French 2nd Armored, McBride’s green 80th, and McLain’s 90th Infantry Divisions. Patton had added Leclerc’s 2nd Armored to give more punch to Haislip’s push north. A few days earlier, Patton had invited Leclerc to join the fight at once, even though the division had just landed on the Continent. He warned Leclerc the Germans might collapse any day, and that he “had the right” to be in on it. Leclerc jumped at the offer and Patton told him he would lead the charge to Falaise, earning the honor of trapping the Germans west of Paris. Leclerc asked about liberating Paris, his real goal, but Patton told him not to worry about that. They would address Paris once the trap was closed.81 Patton knew Haislip’s flanks would be exposed for the drive north, so he assigned McBride’s 80th Division to protect his rear and left flank and Colonel Vennard Wilson’s 106th Cavalry Group to protect his right.82 For further flank protection, Patton summoned General Weyland when he got back to his own headquarters, now in the town of Saint James. “We are taking a chance, but will depend on your planes, Weyland, to keep them off of us if they gang up on our right flank.” It was the right call. The day before, Weyland’s pilots had flown 717 sorties, destroying three bridges, 29 locomotives, 505 motor vehicles, 29 tanks, and an airdrome.83 Some of Patton’s superiors did not believe he could close the gap quickly. Montgomery, assuming his Canadian army would reach Argentan ahead of Patton, radioed London, telling Field Marshal Alan Brooke, the chief of the Imperial Staff, about his plans to drop an airborne division at Gacé, about fifteen miles east of Argentan, “in order to complete the block.”84 The airdrop never came. Patton returned to his headquarters to find Bradley, accompanied by General Carl “Tooey” Spaatz, the commander of Strategic Air Forces in

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Figure 9. Major General Walton Walker (left), the commander of XX Corps, greets French major general Philippe Leclerc (right), the commander of the French 2nd Armored Division, upon his arrival in Normandy on July 31, 1944. Walker would prove offensive minded until stymied at Metz. Leclerc was the same but proved cantankerous in his relationship with Patton. Catalog number: 111-­SC 199789, National Archives and Records Administration.

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Europe, and Air Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, Eisenhower’s deputy commander. Patton realized the last time he had seen the trio together had been in Gasfa, Tunisia, when the Germans bombed his headquarters after Spaatz assured him the Allied air force controlled the skies. For this gathering, Spaatz provided Patton a little taste of home: six bottles of beer from the United States.85 (Pilots always seemed to have the best supply lines). As the day ended, Patton met with Captain Ralph Ingersoll of the 23rd Headquarters Special Unit Troops, a unit composed of artists and technicians whose mission was to deceive the enemy into thinking the Americans were strong where they were actually weak, using dummy tanks and artillery, false communications, and sound effects. “I got the message you were coming to save me,” Patton sarcastically told the officer. The two sat down and Ingersoll explained his unit’s capabilities and how they could be used. Patton decided to use the 23rd in Brittany, where they would impersonate the 35th and 90th Infantry Divisions, as well as the 2nd Armored, which was not part of Third Army. As their meeting wrapped up, an armored vehicle rolled up and a lieutenant colonel escorted a captured German general to Patton. “Stop kissing that Kraut bastard’s ass!” Patton shouted. “Who do you think he is? Jesus Christ? Kick his goddamn ass over here and kick it fast!”86 The prisoner was Lieutenant General Karl Spang, the commander of the 266th Infantry Division, which had threatened Grow outside of Brest. He had been captured and now wore an American Army helmet to protect him from strafing Luftwaffe aircraft, but it proved useless against Patton’s curses. As he berated the German, Spang turned pale and shook, struggling to hold himself at attention. Patton quickly shifted his mood, shaking Spang’s hand and offering him a seat. “Sit down and rest a spell,” Patton told him. “There’s no reason we shouldn’t make some comradely conversation before you have to go.”87 He then interrogated him along with Colonel Koch and an interpreter. Almost every time Patton asked Spang a question, the German general saluted. Patton wanted to know why the German army continued fighting when it was obvious their cause was futile and their military outnumbered. Spang explained, “By orders of higher command we had to continue to fight”; he claimed that he had fought until his last bullet but was surrounded by Patton’s tanks. In actuality, his driver had stumbled into an armored field artillery position and, not realizing the Americans had driven so far west, quickly surrendered. The Americans immediately liberated him of his leather coat and watch. When Patton

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Figure 10. German Lieutenant General Karl Spang enters Patton’s headquarters area wearing an American helmet to protect him from enemy shelling. He was escorted by Colonel Oscar Koch. Patton berated Spang before chatting and dining with him. Library of Congress, OV 17, 25.

again pointed out that Germans were dying for a hopeless cause, Spang responded, “I cannot voice a personal opinion on that.” Before Patton dismissed him, he promised a dinner and breakfast, if neither of them died from German bombs before dawn. Upon hearing this Spang saluted twice.88 Later, Patton dined with Spang, albeit at separate tables. When he complained to Patton about his stolen items, Patton sent some of his staff officers to Grow’s 6th Armored headquarters but they came back empty-­handed.89 Spang learned the reality of defeat, while Patton’s soldiers enjoyed the fruits of victory.

CHAPTER THREE

Closing the Falaise Pocket

On August 10 Patton unleashed his tanks north for the drive to Argentan. Leclerc’s French 2nd and Oliver’s 5th Armored Divisions attacked abreast, clashing with two German armored divisions and taking light casualties. By the end of the day, they had advanced fifteen miles, about half the way to Alençon, the halfway mark to Argentan. To help Haislip, Patton ordered that the rail line from Avranches to Le Mans be rebuilt. Five engineer battalions, working around the clock and building seven railroad bridges, completed the task in forty-­eight hours.1 As he followed the action, Patton received an ULTRA intercept that the Germans were creating defensive positions along the Marne River, well east of Paris, preparing their next line of defense instead of looking for a way to disrupt his attack.2 Cut-­off German soldiers were either surrendering, wandering aimlessly, or fleeing as fast as they could. When he and a handful of staffers drove out to view the front, some locals waved down his vehicles and explained that the Germans had just passed. Everyone grabbed weapons, jumped out, and pursued, “but beyond good exercise,” he later wrote, “had no shooting.”3 Patton flew to Bradley’s headquarters to tell him about the enemy’s utter confusion and his concern about a thirty-­five-­mile gap separating his and Hodges’s armies, between Mayenne and St. Hilaire. Bradley was planning an airdrop on Chartres, further east, but was more engrossed with the fighting still going on around Mortain, where Baade’s 35th Division was fighting to break the siege around the elements of the 30th Division.4 Bradley did admit that at least Avranches was safe, implying that Baade’s troops would soon be returning to Walker’s XX Corps.5 As Patton returned to the front, he saw a wounded tanker fall from his tank. He and two staffers rushed to the man’s aid. The tanker could 53

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not feel his arm, so Patton lifted it into the man’s field of vision. He then pressed on an artery to halt the bleeding and escorted the tanker to a jeep, telling him, “Don’t worry soldier, everything is going to be alright.” The man later confessed, “I think I owe my life to him.”6 When Patton then sped by an exposed antitank gun situated beneath a large stone crucifix, he reprimanded the soldiers and ordered the gun moved to cover. The sergeant commanding the weapon agreed but added, “We’ve had good shooting here, general. Yesterday, we knocked out two panzers right from this spot.” Patton left without changing anything. “Perhaps the sanctity of the location saved the gun,” he later joked.7 When he came across a group of engineers gingerly digging into the ground, he roared, “What the hell are you doing? That’s no way to dig a slit trench!” A corporal replied that they were actually trying to remove two unexploded two-­hundred-­ pound German bombs. Patton apologized and departed.8 Whenever people complained that Patton visited the front too often for an army commander, he would vehemently argue that his presence was essential, or as he put it, “An army is like a piece of cooked spaghetti—­you can’t push it; you have to pull it after you.”9 On August 11, Patton visited Haislip, whose armored divisions were fighting around a forest. Despite Haislip’s progress, Patton came away dissatisfied (“Haislip is always complaining or asking for help,” he later wrote).10 Patton then inspected the 5th Armored and the 79th and 90th Infantry Divisions. Later that day, he visited the 5th Division’s 30th Field Hospital, which would soon be part of Major General Gilbert Cook’s XII Corps. When a doctor spotted Patton in a receiving tent, he saluted with his sleeves rolled up. “Roll down those goddamn sleeves, captain!” Patton barked. “What do you think this is—­a goddamn gypsy camp?”11 That same day, while Patton’s forces fought north, Montgomery continued to believe that General Harry Crerar’s First Canadian Army, still fighting north of Falaise, would have an easier time driving south to Argentan, thus cutting off the Germans fighting for Mortain. He ordered Crerar to capture Argentan, insisting that it “should be done quickly.” He planned for Patton to link up with Crerar somewhere south of the city, but the Canadians had their hands full with stout German defenders.12 About this time, the German news agency Transocean openly speculated about what the German army already knew: that Patton was in Normandy, commanding “the Third American Army.”13 But while the Germans could report their suspicions about Patton’s activities, American

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Closing the falaise pocket

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newspaper correspondents could not. They clashed with Patton’s public affairs officers, who refused to let them use his name. Some of the problems came from need for secrecy, others came from the inability of inexperienced and second-­string reporters to assert themselves.14 Yet, despite all of Patton’s battlefield success, his superiors seemed either to not believe he could deliver or were more concerned about the minutia of war. On August 11, General Montgomery sent out a letter regarding allegations of American soldiers looting around the French countryside, including what Montgomery referred to as “scoundeling,” which may have been code for rape.15 The next morning, August 12, Baade’s 35th Division breached the German line around Mortain and relieved the men of the 30th Division as the Germans retreated east.16 Even better news arrived when Patton learned that Leclerc’s tankers, after making a dash for Alençon the night before, had reached the Sarthe River, which bisected the city and captured its bridges before sunrise. They found Alençon undefended.17 Haislip instructed his units to make Argentan their new objective but Patton wanted more. “Upon capture of Argentan push on slowly [in the] direction of Falaise,” he wrote Haislip. “Upon arrival [at] Falaise continue to push on slowly until you contact our Allies.” Patton was forever optimistic about his army’s capabilities.18 When Bradley visited Patton’s headquarters, Patton embellished his report regarding Third Army’s progress: “We’ve got elements in Argentan. Let me go on to Falaise and we’ll drive the British back into the sea for another Dunkirk.” A furious Bradley refused. He pulled out a “Memorandum for the Record” showing that bombers with time-­delay-­ fuse bombs were scheduled to hit the area between Argentan and Falaise; it was too late to call them back.19 He also worried about U.S. troops accidentally firing on Montgomery’s troops and about the Germans stampeding out of the gap. Worse, he saw in Haislip’s drive north not a powerful force sealing off the pocket, but an isolated and exposed army corps, vulnerable to German counterattacks and possible encirclement. He wanted to reinforce Patton before allowing him further. Finally, Bradley, who had also been receiving ULTRA transcripts, knew that the German 116th Panzer Division was headed Patton’s way.20 Patton ignored Bradley’s orders as he awaited news from Haislip. Bradley, on the other hand, dispatched J. Lawton Collins’s VII Corps from Hodges’s First Army east to fill the gap between the two armies and

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protect Haislip’s left flank. Besides the potential for fratricide with the British on the ground, Bradley also worried that as the pocket shrank around the Germans, Allied artillery units might shell each other, or British and American fighter aircraft might clash: the scars from the COBRA bombing still haunted him. “Nothing is more demoralizing to troops than to see their men killed by friendly fire,” he later wrote. Confident that the Canadians fighting for Falaise would soon push down to Argentan and concerned for the German forces heading Patton’s way, Bradley ordered Patton to pull back from the city, stressing, “You better button up and get ready for them.”21 Meanwhile, Haislip was not making the progress Patton had promised. As Oliver’s 5th Armored prepared to attack Argentan, Leclerc’s French 2nd Armored bypassed a forest to the right and drove into the town of Sées, which Oliver’s 5th Armored had already captured. Unfortunately, the French tanks clogged the town’s roads, preventing fuel trucks from reaching Oliver’s tanks and delaying Oliver’s attack by about six hours, just enough time for the Germans to rush reinforcements into the city and blow up the bridges over the Orne River. Oliver’s tanks reached the Orne, but with no way to cross and facing stiff German resistance, they remained on the edge of the city. Bradley had read the ULTRA transcripts correctly. That night, the 116th Panzer Division rolled into Argentan.22 Patton’s optimism had been checked. Montgomery backed Bradley’s orders. When told that evening that Haislip had pushed through Argentan (which he had not), he told his chief of staff, Major General Freddy de Guingand, “Tell Bradley they ought to get back.” The order shocked de Guingand, who thought his commander was being “too tidy,” unwilling to take the risk of allowing Patton to capture Falaise.23 De Guingand and the staff begged Montgomery to reconsider, to no avail. Montgomery was either reacting to the same ULTRA intercepts as Bradley or deliberately denying Patton the prize for which he had fought so hard. Patton had beaten him to Messina in Sicily; it would not happen again at Falaise. By now, all four of Patton’s corps were in the field. His Third Army was more than twice the size of his Seventh Army in Sicily, and yet he could not cut off the fifteen-­mile-­wide German escape route between Argentan and Falaise. He paced his headquarters, clutching a fistful of intelligence reports informing him that nothing stood north of Argentan. “Hell! By now they’ve all gotten out!” he shouted to his staff. “Instead of waiting

57 Closing the falaise pocket CHAPTER three

MAP 2. Closing the Falaise Pocket, August 10–19, 1944.

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here for Montgomery, we ought to get moving again. There’s nothing out front, nothing at all between me and the Seine!” But that “nothing” was still keeping Oliver’s 5th Armored out of Argentan. Middleton and Cook visited to discuss their next moves in the east and west. In Middleton’s sector, both Saint-­Malo and Dinan were still holding out, as were Lorient and Brest. Patton reviewed plans to move Wood’s 4th Armor east to Cook’s corps and vowed he would get the British Royal Navy to bombard enemy boats off Saint-­Malo and have American aircraft bomb the islands off shore. Middleton seemed disappointed to lose the 4th Armored, but Patton found him “nice as usual.” To Cook, Patton explained that he would be getting both Wood’s 4th Armored and Baade’s 35th Infantry Divisions. His XII Corps would join Walker’s XX Corps, which would be jumping off the next day.24 Patton then departed for his new headquarters, northwest of Le Mans. Along the way, he took a break from his frustrations about Argentan and visited the ancient French castle Château Fougères. “It has only been taken twice until we took it,” he later wrote, “although it dates from 1100.”25 The next day, August 13, the Germans sent two more panzer divisions to Argentan as Oliver’s 5th Armored again tried to smash its way into the now-­burning city. When that failed, Oliver tried circling around it, but massed enemy tanks repeatedly repulsed the American tanks and armored infantry. In fact, the Germans were barely holding on to the city. One of their army commanders called for pulling out, lest the two German armies become encircled. But as Oliver geared up for another attempt, Patton ordered him not to advance past Argentan.26 He had called Major General Leven C. “Lev” Allen, Bradley’s chief of staff, and asked for orders, adding that his troops had reconned areas north of Argentan. Allen told Patton to halt and consolidate. Patton would later consider the order “regrettable . . . never halt.”27 Bradley had decided to split Haislip’s corps, keeping McLain’s 90th Infantry and Leclerc’s 2nd French Armored Divisions south of the city while Oliver’s 5th Armored and Wyche’s 79th Infantry Divisions would head east. Haislip would take most of his staff with him east, leaving behind a few officers to make up a “provisional corps” south of Argentan. Bradley believed that Collin’s VII Corps, combined with the provisional corps, would be enough to shut the door on the Germans.28 Unaware that Bradley was sending Collin’s VII Corps east to seal the gap between his and Hodges’s armies, Patton committed Walker’s XX

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Figure 11. During the race to close the Falaise pocket, Patton stopped to pose atop Château de Fougéres in Laval. He considered it the most impressive fortress he had ever seen. Library of Congress, OV 20, 36.

Corps, consisting of McBride’s 80th Infantry Division and Silvester’s 7th Armored, to Haislip’s left. Around noon, one of McBride’s regiments tried to cross in front of McLain’s 90th Division, hopelessly entangling the two units. Leclerc’s 2nd Armored tanks showed up, exacerbating the situation. It took two days to clear up the lines. Of course, since Collins’s VII Corps had already shifted east to cover Haislip’s left flank, the whole XX Corps debacle proved unnecessary.29 Patton instead sent Walker northeast to Dreux, with Cook on his right flank, aiming for Chartres, both cities straddling the Eure River. With everyone heading in the same direction, he hoped there would be no more “crossing columns.”30 Meanwhile, north of Falaise, Montgomery’s forces battled south against stiff German resistance. Above the battlefield, fighter bombers pounded the Germans trying to escape the pocket. A squadron of P-­47s dove on about eight hundred enemy vehicles west of Argentan, burning or blowing up half the column. One pilot, out of ammunition, dropped his belly fuel tank on twelve trucks and watched them explode.31 Such was the spirit of American pilots. Yet Patton still wanted the action to be about him. “I have stolen the show so far,” he wrote Beatrice, “and the

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press is very mad that they can’t write about it. . . . This is probably the fastest and biggest pursuit in history.” With each passing day, Patton saw the opportunity to bag all the German forces in the west slipping away, and there was little he could do to stop it. He regretted the halt order and believed it came from Montgomery, later writing, “without [the halt order, I] could have gone to Falaise and made contact with the Canadians N.W. [northwest] of that point—­never halt.”32 As the Germans streamed east, he tried to put the best face on the debacle, telling his staff, “I once wrote a thesis that traps should not be closed. It was a mistake to do that, contrary to popular belief. The wiser course is to leave an opening and let the sons-­of-­bitches walk themselves to death.”33 Determined not to stand by waiting for orders, he continued to attack east. He hoped his new drive would succeed where closing off Falaise had apparently failed. “God helping and Monty keeping hands off.”34 August 14 began ominously when an American P-­47 fighter plane strafed Patton’s headquarters, knocking out a tank carrier. Angry antiaircraft crews shot it down, killing the pilot. Patton’s staff joked that if he went aloft, he might escape enemy ground fire, but not friendly fire. The joke gave Patton a premonition of his own death, but “it failed to materialize,” he later wrote.35 The open enemy corridor out of Falaise still burned him, compelling him to tell his staff, “If Montgomery does not get a move on, I’m going to drive those Germans right up his ass!”36 Patton flew to Haislip’s headquarters to tell him about his new plan. Haislip, energized by his corps’ success, told Patton an anecdote about Thunderbolt pilots who noticed German soldiers waving white flags and then radioed the closest American unit to pick up three or four hundred prisoners. Patton’s concept of using air power to protect his flank continued to prove itself.37 Inspired, Patton then drove to the front, where he found a regiment pinned down near a wooded area that he was told was “full of Germans.” He spied the woods and found only three sleeping enemy soldiers. “I feel that if only unaided I could win this war,” he wrote Beatrice. “But people evolve enemy armies and every one [sic] ducks.”38 United Press war correspondent Robert C. Miller spotted Patton watching soldiers marching down a road and asked how the campaign was going. “Hell, this is more like a rat race than a battle,” Patton told him. “It’s just a case of we’re moving too fast for the Germans. They simply refused to believe we could cover the distance we have in so short a time.”

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Pointing out the infantry, he added, “Those men marched twenty-­seven miles yesterday and probably will do as much today. They’re mad and they’re ready to fight.” Patton then climbed into his scout car, grinning with satisfaction and told Miller, “In all my eighteen months of combat, I’ve never seen an operation as pretty as this one.” Miller wrote up the story but withheld Patton’s name, referring to Patton only as the man “in command of the maneuver.”39 Patton flew back to his own headquarters, where he found Bradley and Lieutenant General John C. H. Lee, the commander of the U.S. Communications Zone (COMZ), which provided supplies for the American military in Europe. Patton had been confiscating Lee’s COMZ supply trucks, which should have been returning to the beaches to pick up new loads, and instead using them to speed infantry to the front. He made no apologies but explained his plan of attack. He offered that if Bradley would change the boundary between himself and the British, he could take Falaise and close the gap, although he cautioned that his army pushing north and the Canadians pushing south “must not be allowed to get mixed up and perhaps kill one another.”40 Bradley pointed out several faults in his plan, including that it looked like both Walker’s XX Corps and Haislip’s XV Corps would converge in Dreux, causing nightmarish traffic jams. Patton chuckled. “You’re right Brad,” he said, “goddammit, you’re always right.” They changed the three corps’ objectives. Walker was now assigned Chartres, while Haislip still aimed for Dreux.41 To the south, Cook was assigned Orléans as his objective. Patton later claimed he planned it that way but wanted Bradley to think it was his plan. Bradley also offered an infantry division to Middleton’s siege of the Brittany ports, of which Saint-­Malo had surrendered that day. An infantry division would allow Grow’s 6th Armored at Brest to join the drive east. Patton agreed and then boasted, “As of today Third Army has advanced farther and faster than any army in history.”42 Patton left the meeting elated, determined to get his forces moving before Montgomery could change his plans. But Montgomery changed more than Patton’s plans. The British general called Bradley to explain that his Canadian and Polish forces had pushed further east, negating Argentan as linkup location. Instead, he suggested Chambois, a small town eight miles northwest of Argentan. But Bradley did not follow up on this decision with new objectives to Patton for Oliver and Wyche’s divisions, both of which continued driving east. Instead, McLain’s 90th

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Division, which was fighting south of Chambois, would shift east to close the gap.43 Then Patton received some bad news. General Leclerc, who desperately wanted to liberate Paris, had refused Gaffey’s direct order to support McLain’s attack toward Chambois, claiming it would split his division. In front of a stenographer taking notes, Gaffey asked him point-­blank if he was refusing an order. Leclerc finally backed down, agreeing to attack but claiming the attack would fail and wreck his division in the process.44 To save face, Leclerc sent a message defending his actions to Patton, who thought it a “fool’s letter.” 45 Two days later, on August 16, Leclerc reported to Patton, who called him a baby and declared that no division commander would tell him where he wanted to fight. Despite the heated argument, Patton held no ill will toward Leclerc and even promised him Paris. Prior to their meeting, Leclerc had fretted when he spotted General Wood waiting to see Patton, assuming Paris would go to Wood’s 4th Armored. Wood relieved his worries by explaining he had already passed Paris and saw no need to visit the City of Light. When Wood finally got to see Patton as Leclerc departed, Patton told him, “You see, Wood. He is a bigger pain in the neck than you are!”46 While Patton dealt with politics inside Third Army, back home, the U.S. Senate confirmed his permanent promotion to major general, meaning that his three-­star rank was temporary for as long as the war lasted, but he would now be able to retire as a major general, with all the retirement pay accorded with the rank. Senator Albert “Happy” Chandler of Kentucky, the Democratic chairman of the subcommittee on nominations, claimed, “There was unanimous agreement that he is a great soldier.”47 In the House of Representatives, Democratic Representative John E. Rankin from Mississippi stood in the well of the House and declared Patton “a soldier with the brilliance of Stonewall Jackson and the tenacity of Ulysses S. Grant”—­high praise from a southerner. “Every red-­blooded American is thrilled over the vindication of General Patton,” he added. “He is one of the greatest soldiers of this day.”48 Meanwhile, the Allies opened another front against the Germans in southern France. On August 15 Major General Alexander “Sandy” Patch’s U.S. Seventh Army landed in France’s Provence region and made quick gains. Patton could take pride in his old army’s accomplishments, since most of its staff officers had served under him in North Africa and Sicily.49 In the east, Soviet forces had made major drives in Estonia and

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Lithuania and had entered Romania.50 The Germans were now retreating on all fronts. General Montgomery even reported to London that Patton was on his way to Paris “and is determined to get there and probably will.” Surprised by Patton’s stunning drive, Montgomery would later admit that Patton was a tremendous thruster but his ability to go off script and blast the enemy unrelentingly left him, the meticulous planner, in his dust. “Patton could ruin your battle in an afternoon,” he said.51 The same time that Patch landed in southern France, Patton may have received German visitors. Unconfirmed reports claimed that Field Marshal Günther von Kluge, the commander in chief of German forces in the west, departed his headquarters for twelve hours, looking to make contact with Patton to discuss unconditional surrender of his entire command, on the assurance that the Allies would quickly occupy Germany and protect it from the Soviets. But before von Kluge could make his rendezvous, American fighter-­bombers attacked his caravan, forcing him to retreat back to his headquarters. One of Patton’s officers, Major George Pfann, later claimed that Patton had disappeared for an entire day in mid-­August, and, upon returning, claimed to have been out at a rendezvous location but the German emissary had not turned up. This would have been a false claim since Patton’s daily movements on August 15 were well-­documented in both Third Army records and Patton’s own diary.52 Had Patton received Von Kluge, he would have sent him to Bradley. Patton did not have the authority to negotiate the surrender of all Germans in the west, even if he was mostly responsible for it.53 Von Kluge’s days, on the other hand, were numbered. His failure to press beyond Mortain had soured Hitler on him, even though he had lost his own son in the battle. “Avranches, Avranches!” Kluge told another officer. “This town has cost me my reputation as a soldier.”54 In Haislip’s corps area, McLain’s 90th Division finished replacing Oliver’s 5th Armored, allowing McClain to drive on Chambois while Oliver raced east for Dreux. Despite Patton’s best effort to avoid traffic jams, Silvester’s 7th Armored converged with Wyche’s 79th Division as they approached Nogent-­le-­Roi, also along the Eure River twenty miles north of Chartres, resulting in more roads clogged with tanks and infantrymen.55 In the west, Grow’s 6th Armored Division relieved the last elements of Wood’s 4th, allowing Wood to join the drive east in full strength as part of General Cook’s XII Corps. Middleton had already sent one of Wood’s combat commands east to help with the capture of

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Orleans.56 At his morning briefing, Patton estimated he would need at least three or four divisions to protect his right flank as he pushed east. General Weyland, emboldened by what his fighters had already achieved, remarked he could take care of the flank. “It’s your job,” Patton decided. American OSS commandos, called Jedburgh teams, added to the forces protecting Patton’s right flank. The commandos established outposts, occupied towns, and blew up bridges over the Loire River. They also harassed the Germans, keeping their focus away from Cook’s advance.57 As he had done in Sicily, Patton visited two hospitals, but this time the results were much more positive. He found the American wounded raring to get back into the fight. “The SIW [self-­inflicted wounds] have dropped markedly since we got moving,” he wrote in his diary.58 He was right. Under Bradley, American soldiers had endured shattering artillery barrages and cunning enemy counterattacks in Normandy’s dizzying hedgerows. Under Patton, Third Army soldiers raced across France, receiving heroes’ welcomes in cities large and small as the citizens tossed flowers and offered bread and wine to their liberators. Victory was in the air, punctuated by long lines of dirty German soldiers, their hands over their heads, marching west into Allied POW pens. The men in the hospital reflected the new atmosphere. Patton would later spend his nights writing letters to the mothers of some of the patients.59 Arriving back at his headquarters, Patton greeted Bradley, who had been waiting for him. Responding to reports that five panzer divisions were now in Argentan, Bradley ordered Patton to stop his eastern offensive until told otherwise. Patton was incredulous, thinking his commander was “suffering a case of nerves.” To him, his forces had idled for three days south of Argentan, waiting for the Canadians, while thousands of Germans escaped to the east. The Falaise pocket now looked like the letter “U” lying on its side, stretching some forty miles, with a width of only fifteen miles and one end wide open. The order burned Patton, but when reporters later asked him why he had stopped, Patton bit his lip and repeated what he told his staff. “Some of the greatest pursuits in history have been planned to leave an escape hole, through which the enemy forces funnel,” he justified, “only to be annihilated as they flow through.”60 But that night, he raged to his diary, accusing Bradley of using the motto “In case of doubt, halt” and confessed, “I wish I were Supreme Commander.”61 Amid this flurry of activity, Eisenhower decided to reveal the worst kept secret in Western Europe by releasing Patton’s name to the press. Ten

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days earlier, back in London, Eisenhower’s aide, Captain Harry Butcher, had asked him to release Patton’s name, but Eisenhower demurred. “Why should I tell the enemy?”62 he retorted. Bradley had also asked to release Patton and Haislip’s names to the press. “Not yet,” said Eisenhower, explaining that Patton stressed him to almost complete baldness, leaving him with “only a few more gray hairs left on this poor old head of mine.” Even General George Marshall, the Army chief of staff in Washington, had mentioned that press reports back home contained statements about “some general” assumed to be Patton. But by now, Patton’s presence on the battlefield had become an open secret.63 On August 16 Eisenhower finally announced Patton’s presence to the press, calling Patton one of America’s finest field commanders and noting that he was leading Third Army, “where he belongs.”64 The Germans had already been using his name over their radio broadcasts for more than a week.65 Lifting the ban on identifying Patton also benefited Bradley, since letting the world know that there were two American armies operating in France meant Bradley had stepped up to army group command, putting him on the same plane as Montgomery.66 Secretly, Bradley was grateful that Patton’s name had not been announced to the public earlier. “For had Hitler known it was Patton’s tanks which swarmed around von Kluge’s flank, he might have called off his attack at Mortain.” A chastened Patton merely mentioned in his diary that he heard his name on the radio.67 That same day, Patton’s name also appeared in a Stars and Stripes article about Bradley assuming command of 12th Army Group. Inside, an article by James Wellard, titled “Patton Rides Again,” praised Patton. “For us, who have followed the spectacular advance across hundreds of miles of beautiful French countryside, the story of the blitz has been the greatest we have ever covered—­and one which, because of the necessity of secrecy, we have not been allowed to tell.”68 The newspaper also quoted a combat commander as saying, “Officers with moral courage are the first need. That’s starting with George Patton and right on down to the last second lieutenant.”69 That night the BBC reported that Patton commanded Third Army. The British commentator covering the story claimed that “the credit is due to one man: Lieutenant General George S. Patton who by his initiative, forcefulness, military ability, and drive had caused the men of his army to accomplish the impossible.” Patton had to be pleased. But the acknowledgement was almost immediately tainted the next day by a memo from Lev Allen, asking Patton to lay low. “General Marshall has asked that you not spoil the record of a magnificent job by

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public statements,” he wrote. “Gen. Eisenhower asked that you avoid any public statements and keep out of photographs. Also, no statements for [the] press to be made by any general officer unless approved by Gen. Bradley.”70 Despite all his success, Patton’s superiors still wanted him to wear a muzzle. For the rest of the month, Patton’s name graced the front page of Stars and Stripes almost daily. The paper published his picture more often than Bradley’s, whose name practically disappeared from print. “George was stimulated by headlines,” Bradley wrote, “the blacker the headlines the more recklessly he fought.” Courtney Hodges’s picture and name appeared on the last day of August, but with his name only as a caption. Poor Hodges’s anonymity was so acute that a week later Eisenhower sent a Stars and Stripes reporter to Hodges’s headquarters to play up his name, but still many First Army soldiers had no idea who commanded them.71 It would not be until October 24 that Hodges’s face would make the cover of Time magazine.72 In a further effort to level the field of press coverage for Hodges and Bradley, Eisenhower ordered censors to strike any Patton quotations. Yet, when the stories arrived in the United States, editors simply reinserted his name. Eisenhower’s staff even encouraged First Army’s Public Relations Office to insert Hodges’s name into their stories, but Butcher admitted, “It takes a lot of color in any man to balance Patton.”73 Back home a few days later, the radio show This Moving World broadcasted a tribute to Patton, calling him a “roaring comet” on the battlefield. The embellished life story told of Patton throwing grenades at the enemy as he went down wounded in World War I and painted him now riding a tank around the battlefield. It quoted him as saying, “A man can be ferocious as hell back home on three hot meals a day, but it takes guts to live in a foxhole in the rain, eating cold rations.” The story began and ended with Patton’s unpopularity with his superiors. “The brass hats will always dislike him,” the report concluded. “But Patton—­like the soldier he describes—­can’t be stopped by smear. As General Patton has said, ‘Americans do not surrender.’”74 A few days later, Stars and Stripes cited a German newspaper as explaining that “Patton intends to leave the capital [Paris] alone for the time being, so he can use all the troops he has available to engage the Germans in a major battle for the control of the Seine line, before the rest of the [German] Seventh Army can reach the river.”75 Writing his memoirs years later, Bradley admitted, “When Third Army monopolized the headlines for a month after the breakout, even First

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Army became infected with this frustration that afflicted the British. For it, too, was limited by its mission to a less spectacular campaign.”76 The headlines particularly bothered Montgomery, who later complained that “the strategy of the Normandy campaign was British,” without ever admitting that if Patton had not raced across France, ignoring his flanks to the horror of his superiors and his subordinates, the British plan may have bogged down, stretching the war out for months.77 While Patton’s name made it to print and over the airways on August 16, he busied himself by visiting Walker’s and Haislip’s headquarters. Walker was in Chartres, which his forces had taken earlier in the day. His capture of the gateway to Paris had nullified the need for a paratroop drop.78 One of Walker’s staff officers had even saved the city’s famous cathedral. When Walker prepared to shell the building, responding to reports of German snipers, Colonel Welborn Griffith, Walker’s operations officer, raced to the cathedral, climbed one of the spires, and both rang the bell and draped an American flag to prove it was free of snipers.79 Patton arrived in the city and waited for enemy fire to abate before crossing a bridge to greet Walker, who surprised Patton by immediately asking if he could relieve Silvester from command of the 7th Armored. Walker felt he lacked the drive necessary to lead an armored division. Patton denied Walker’s request, thinking it too soon. He wanted to give Silvester another chance.80 Patton then headed to Haislip’s new headquarters, ten miles north of Chartres. Haislip had advanced seventy-­five miles from Argentan with only half his command in a mere three days and had captured Dreux. Oliver’s 5th Armored had encircled the city that morning and captured it by noon, giving Patton his fastest route to Paris.81 Pleased, Patton headed back to his headquarters, passing through Sées, about fifteen miles south of Argentan, where he found the officers of Haislip’s provisional corps, “holding the bottle neck partially shut and waiting on the Canadians.” Before leaving, he stopped to address some of the soldiers from McLain’s 90th Division who were on their way north to Sées. He explained to them his plan for attack and how they would contribute, concluding with, “I’ll see you in Germany.”82 After Patton returned to his headquarters, Bradley called around 7:00 p.m. and told him to close the pocket. The Canadians had finally captured Falaise and Bradley wanted the provisional corps to drive north to Chambois. With Haislip gone east, Bradley wanted Major General

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Figure 12. American troops march past Chartres Cathedral. One of General Walker’s officers saved the cathedral from destruction by waving an American flag from one of its spires and ringing one of its bells to prove the enemy had departed. Patton later prayed in the cathedral for continued success. Catalog number: 111-­SC 193305, National Archives and Records Administration.

Leonard T. “Gee” Gerow, whose V Corps had been pinched out of the shrinking pocket, to command the corps. But when he told Patton it would take a few days for Gerow to reach the corps, Patton immediately dispatched General Gaffey to take command so he could focus on the eastern drive. A few hours after Gaffey left for his new assignment, Bradley called back and told Patton that Gaffey was to wait until he gave the order to attack. Patton dutifully sent the order to Gaffey. That night, he sarcastically penned in his diary, “Life is never dull.” Bradley would later admit that splitting Haislip’s corps and giving part of it to Gerow “had gravely weakened the shoulder at a time when it was most vulnerable.”83 At 7:30 the next morning, August 17, Gerow called and told Patton he had arrived and could take over from Gaffey, who planned to launch his attack in two-­and-­a-­half hours. It had now been four days since Patton had first sought to close the gap. Not wanting to waste the unforgiving minute, he ordered Gerow to let Gaffey lead the attack and then take over at the optimal opportunity. Since he was about to fly to Bradley’s

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headquarters, Patton told Hap Gay he would call back with the code words “change horses” for the switch to Gerow if Bradley demanded it. As he focused on closing the pocket, Patton took a call from Middleton out west, who said he needed more than three divisions to mop up Brittany and take Brest, Lorient, and Saint-­Nazaire, which the Germans were holding to the last man. When he reported that he had suffered two thousand casualties trying to take Saint-­Malo, Major Robert Allen, one of Patton’s intelligence officers commented, “Costly business.” Patton told Middleton he would get two divisions and a Ranger battalion.84 Patton arrived at Bradley’s headquarters and found Bradley with Hodges, both assuming Gerow had already taken command. Patton quickly called Gay and gave the two-­word order, adding that the attack should launch immediately, “continue to the original objective, thence on.” When Gay asked him what he meant by “thence on,” Patton barked back, “Another Dunkirk. Do you understand?” Patton later wrote in his diary, “I doubt in the history of the world an attack order was ever shorter.”85 With Gerow now in command, the drive north officially became a First Army operation. But instead of attacking, Gerow rewrote the attack plan and waited another day for his corps artillery to reach the front, giving the Germans an additional twenty-­four hours to escape the cauldron.86 Bitter about the extra delay, Patton wrote Beatrice, “Courtney [Hodges] is really a moron,” adding, “Omar is O.K. but not dashing.” He considered himself the only truly dashing person in the war. When Bradley would call to warn him he was overextended, Patton would pretend not to be able to understand his boss and blamed poor connections. “Luckily, [the phone] is out for the time.”87 General Miles Dempsey, the commander of the British Second Army, felt that Patton’s departure from the Falaise battlefield left “a scene of intense military confusion.”88 As Patton now raced toward Paris, the Allies finally sealed the Falaise pocket in his rear. On August 19 the 90th Division entered Chambois. Captain Laughlin E. Waters crawled up the town’s main street under fire. Around him buildings burned, rifle and machine-­gun fire cut the air, and charred enemy tanks, trucks, cars, and wagons crammed the streets. Dead horses lay in pools of blood and dead Germans bled into gutters. As Waters reached an ancient castle dating back to William the Conqueror, he spotted a man in a British uniform walking down the street, ignoring the fire. Waters cautiously stood up, walked over to him and shook his hand. It turned out to be Major Wladyslaw Zgorzelski of the 1st Polish Armored Division. The Falaise gap had been closed. The Germans tried

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several times the next day to break the ring, but each attempt was turned back with losses. Finally, in late afternoon, the Germans began surrendering by the hundreds.89 The haul from the Germans was mind boggling: 220 tanks, 160 assault guns, 130 antiaircraft guns, 130 halftracks, and 2,000 horse-­drawn trucks. With thousands of Germans forced to retreat on foot, in only a week, ten thousand died in the Falaise pocket while fifty thousand were captured as the Allies sealed their escape route. But because of decisions taken by Eisenhower, Montgomery, and particularly Bradley, total victory eluded the Allies. It is estimated that as many as fifty thousand Germans escaped the cauldron, men who would show up four months later in the snowy Ardennes Forest in Belgium and Luxembourg in an effort to avenge Falaise.90 In his 1958 memoirs, Montgomery barely mentioned the battle to close the pocket. His one sentence about it called it “definite, complete, and decisive.” He did not mention the fifty thousand escaped Germans.91 General Hodges, or possibly his staff, took a page from Patton’s dialogue when he recorded in the First Army diary on August 19 that the gap was closed and “the British are advancing at what is, for them, considerable speed towards the east.”92 Years later, Bradley would famously claim, “I much prefer a solid shoulder at Argentan to the possibility of a broken neck at Falaise.” Yet Bradley himself made a “broken neck” much more likely by dividing Haislip’s XV Corps instead of ordering all of Patton’s army into the breach. He would also claim, in his second memoir, that Patton’s capture of Falaise would have been a slap in the face to the British, who had worked so hard to capture the city. Yet, at the time, Bradley said none of this to Patton.93 Bradley would almost immediately experience buyer’s remorse when he attended a meeting with Eisenhower at Montgomery’s headquarters, at which the British general proposed his own lunge east, practically ignoring Falaise and subordinating the American forces to himself. Montgomery’s move gravely disappointed Bradley. He had tried to play the good ally, sacrificing his hard-­driving army commander, Patton, to his British superior, giving him the rightful honor of capturing Falaise without the kind of embarrassment felt at Messina, only to discover Montgomery could care less about Falaise and had already moved on to other objectives. Bradley, playing both warrior and diplomat, had utterly failed at both. It was his lack of battlefield clarity that left the door open at Falaise, giving the Germans a needed escape corridor. If Bradley had been less concerned with Allied sensitivities and more willing to unleash

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Patton, the war in the West may well have ended that month.94 Bradley’s decisions on Falaise would later keep him up at nights.95 Patton was the only American general to come out the Normandy campaign with his reputation improved. For as much as German flank and counterattacks worried Patton’s peers, his sweeping, looping drives through Normandy and Brittany shocked the Germans. They had been unimpressed with the American Army in North Africa and Sicily, feeling that the Americans had yet to prove themselves on the battlefield and would buckle against the concentrated armored assault at Mortain. When the Americans held and Patton turned the crisis into opportunity, the Germans reversed their thinking. “The picture changed completely with the breakthrough,” admitted Field Marshal Alfred Jodl, who took command from von Kluge. “We experienced an operation that was first-­ class, courageous, with long-­range operational aims carried out more like our German methods than those of the English or French.” Words like “breakthrough” and “long-­range” only meant one man: Patton. As for the Allies, even Patton’s old nemesis from North Africa, Air Marshal Arthur Coningham, sang his praises. When a British officer, briefing a meeting of Allied air commanders, claimed that that Montgomery and various American corps commanders were “on schedule,” Coningham pointed at the map of Allied progress and said, “Here’s Patton ahead of schedule. Here’s Montgomery who’s been here for four to five days. I don’t know just what the schedule is, but I thought he’s supposed to be out here, and here are the scheduled positions of other people. The only one on schedule is Patton, and we’d better be damned thankful for that.”96 Eisenhower, as much as he may or may not have worried about Patton’s maneuvers, later admitted that Patton was “a great leader for a mobile situation.” But his assessment had one caveat: “Patton was an operational commander—­not an overall commander”—­ an insight Eisenhower may have regretted while closing the Falaise gap, for had Patton commanded 12th Army Group, the result may have been different.97 As Patton dealt with the death and injury all around him, he also had to deal with Father Time. At fifty-­eight years old, he found that his ivory-­ handled pistols were becoming too heavy. He had always worn two since his shootout in Mexico against Pancho Villa’s bandits in 1916, when he found himself having to reload his single revolver mid-­battle. But now the pistols were more of a symbol than anything else. While he had stopped wearing the two pistols after Morocco, he now made it official.

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He continued to wear the Colt but often wore a smaller, .38-­caliber pistol in a shoulder holster.98 Still, despite beginning to feel the effects of his age, the campaign had kept him in good spirits. To his brother-­in-­law Fred Ayer, he wrote, “I have had quite a lot of fun personally.” To Major General John Crane, an artillery officer, he wrote, “We are having a hell of a war here, out-­Sicilying Sicily.”99 With the battle for the Falaise pocket behind him, Patton now set his sights not on Paris but the German border. In many ways, the Normandy campaign was an upside-­down mirror image of the Sicilian campaign. Patton burst south in two directions, just as he had when he reached Palermo, while Montgomery just plowed forward in one direction. Patton covered more than twice the amount of territory as his British counterpart as he arced around the enemy. And where Montgomery had slogged his way to Messina and Falaise, Patton creatively used the Navy to hopscotch along the Sicilian coast and, in Normandy, employed air assets to protect his right flank. Of course, as Bradley’s boss in Sicily, Patton had captured Messina with little delay. In Normandy, Bradley held him in place. But despite Patton’s improved leadership and the spirit of success running through Third Army, his prejudices still cropped up. It had been his practice to not allow Jewish chaplains (mostly rabbis) at his headquarters, where they could be dispatched to his divisions or regiments; because of this, Patton’s corps commanders had to keep their own Jewish chaplains. Patton took his policy one step further, just to make Jewish chaplains uncomfortable. One day Haislip had called and angrily told Patton that his Jewish chaplain had been stopped and fined $50 for driving his own jeep. Officers were not supposed to drive but were to be driven by an enlisted man. Haislip raged, “George, you old bastard, it’s bad enough that you refuse to have a Jewish chaplain in your headquarters and bad enough that you keep borrowing ours so often that you are interfering with his work here, but now, instead of appreciating the help which our headquarters is giving you through him, you harass him by trying to impose the regulations of your headquarters on him.” Without letting Patton respond, Haislip continued, “Either have this fine revoked and have your MPs to lay off my officers or I will give a direct order to this Jewish chaplain that he is to ignore any future request for assistance that may come from your headquarters.” Patton rescinded the fine.100

CHAPTER four

Skirting Paris and Racing to the Moselle River By the time Patton had turned his back on Argentan and the Falaise pocket on August 17, his army was racing toward Paris. His three corps under Haislip, Walker, and Cook formed a seventy-­mile-­wide tidal wave crashing east. All three advanced on roads used by Julius Caesar’s Roman legions more than a thousand years earlier. “If Caesar chose those routes,” Patton explained, “they must be good, and the roads he built are still there.”1 The next day, Haislip drove thirty-­eight miles northeast toward Mantes-­la-­Jolie, where his cavalry reached the Seine River, putting him only ten miles northwest of the Paris—­eleven days earlier than the Allied timetable. Below him, Walker pushed east from Chartres despite heavy enemy opposition. To the south, Cook had captured Orléans, having traveled a hundred miles in a single day. Orléans contained a large civilian airport, ideal for supplying the front. Cook also captured a large number of German Gestapo personnel, which Patton felt “was a blunder,” preferring to shoot them. To conserve gas as his supply lines stretched back to the Normandy beaches, Patton ordered Cook to remain in Orléans.2 Patton spent August 19 visiting the front at Mantes, where he enjoyed urinating in the Seine River, which famously ran through Paris.3 Wyche’s 79th Division soldiers had found Mantes heavily bombed and the main bridge across the Seine destroyed. Wyche sent patrols north, only to find small groups of Germans retreating into Paris and no organized resistance. Wyche’s easy capture of Mantes did not surprise Patton. An ULTRA intercept had told him the Germans had withdrawn from the city, “in [the] face of Allied Pressure.”4 Patton wanted Wyche to cross the river but held off until he could secure Bradley’s approval.5 Third Army received an additional boost when twenty-­one supply-­laden C-­47s landed outside Le Mans, delivering forty-­seven tons of rations. The cancelled 73

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Chartres airdrop had freed the C-­47s for the mission.6 “Our supply people,” Patton wrote his brother-­in-­law, “have really done marvels and we have always had sufficient of everything.”7 Neither the surplus nor his praise for COMZ would last. Bradley came to Patton’s headquarters, “fit to be tied,” according to one of Patton’s officers. Bradley was concerned about enemy forces still west of Argentan and ordered Patton not to go beyond Dreux, Chartres, and the Seine, in hopes of destroying the Germans still trying to escape the Falaise pocket. Patton explained that he had already reached the Seine and asked if he needed to pull back. Bradley said no and ordered him to send Oliver’s 5th Armored racing northwest along the west bank of the Seine to Louviers.8 Bradley would have Hodges’s First Army, still catching up with Patton’s, swing north and meet Oliver’s tanks there, blocking off the German escape route. At least that’s the way Bradley hoped it would go. Earlier, he had met with Montgomery and Dempsey and offered Dempsey American trucks if he swung through Argentan, to Patton’s left, and headed north to cut off the Germans. Dempsey declined, explaining he simply did not have the soldiers for it. Bradley then offered to do it with Hodges’s troops, even though they would have to cross into British territory. This time both Dempsey and Montgomery agreed. Patton simply mused that Montgomery’s troops could not accomplish a mission that Americans could readily handle.9 Bradley then explained that once Lieutenant General William Simpson’s U.S. Ninth Army, soon to take charge of Middleton’s corps, completed the capture of Brest, he would send it east and join Montgomery’s 21st Army Group. Patton saw this merely as an attempt to placate the British general.10 As for the French, both Bradley and Patton agreed that only Leclerc’s 2nd Armored would “be allowed to go into Paris.”11 Patton then asked about Wyche’s division making a bridgehead across the Seine and Bradley gave him “reluctant permission.” Patton then pressed his luck and asked to take three towns—­Melun, Montereau-­ Fault-­Yonne, and Sens—­all running north to south along the Seine, until it branched into the Yonne River, southeast of Paris. By capturing all three he could turn north and encircle the German left flank, making the enemy’s southern defense line obsolete and creating a gap which he could use to drive north to encircle the Germans or head east to the German border. Bradley thought it too risky but when Patton said he would wait two days before attacking, he agreed.12 To keep up his momentum, Patton

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asked for boundaries and objectives well beyond his immediate goals so he could plan out his supplies. “The boundary has always stopped with the front line,”13 he complained. Patton pressed his luck again, asking for Grow’s 6th Armored to help him slash east, but Bradley refused, wanting to keep Grow in Brittany where his division could prevent attacks from the south. Patton thought the strategy foolhardy, since all the Loire River bridges were destroyed and ULTRA intercepts reported no substantial enemy forces south of the river. “Even if they cross the Loire,” Patton reasoned, “they can do no harm,” especially with Patch’s Seventh Army racing north from southern France.14 “He is too damn cautious,” Patton wrote in his diary.15 But Bradley had agreed to Patton’s counterclockwise northward sweep around Paris, which Patton likened to a reverse of Germany’s so-­called Schlieffen Plan of 1914, a plan to encircle Paris by driving west and then south to isolate the French capital. Patton’s attitude cheered Bradley, who told him, “It certainly is a pleasure to talk to someone who is sure and confident. The picture looks much different from here, but for God’s sake, stay put there now—­don’t advance any further across the river, I’ll try to sell them on this.” Before he left, Bradley mentioned his amazement about how German generals refused to surrender despite their desperate positions. Patton told him about General Karl Spang’s insistence on obeying orders.16 After Bradley departed, Stiller told Patton that without his successful crossing of the Seine River, “Montgomery might well be sitting on his ‘Caen.’”17 Returning to his headquarters, Patton came across a convoy of trucks driven by British soldiers. He had his driver stop and demanded, “Who are you, what are you doing, and where are you going?” The drivers told him they were delivering ammunition to U.S. forces since they did not need it for their relatively small battlefront, and since the Americans were short of transportation. Patton could not have agreed more. The incident further reinforced his feelings that the Americans were doing the majority of fighting.18 With Bradley’s approval, Patton ordered Wyche to cross the Seine immediately. That night, in pouring rain, one of Wyche’s regiments crossed over a partially destroyed dam, each man clutching the man in front of him. The next morning, another regiment followed in assault boats and rafts. Engineers built a Treadway bridge for the last regiment to cross in trucks, followed by tanks, tank destroyers, and artillery. The Luftwaffe

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MAP 3. Chambois to the Meuse River, August 20–31, 1944.

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intervened but antiaircraft guns, set up around the bridge, shot down a dozen of the would-­be attackers. Patton was across the Seine.19 While Patton focused on encircling Paris from the south, he had no desire to capture the city. Neither did Eisenhower. Back in late 1943, he had acquiesced to Charles de Gaulle’s request to let the French general liberate Paris. The Normandy Campaign’s high casualties, however, had changed his mind. By July of 1944, with his forces pushing across the Cotentin Peninsula, Eisenhower reviewed a top-­secret study on the cost of liberating Paris, which foretold street fighting “similar to that in Stalingrad.” The city would be leveled and, even worse, would need “a civil affairs commitment equal to maintaining eight divisions in operation,” basically tying up one-­fourth of the Allied forces. Liberating the city could easily prevent Eisenhower from reaching the Rhine River by early winter.20 And the city itself would need a daily supply of four thousand tons of food and fuel.21 The plan instead recommended encircling the city and trapping the Germans inside (like Patton planned to do). Even though the Germans might hold out for months, the move would enable Montgomery to wipe out the V-­1 and V-­2 launch sites to the north. To ensure no uprisings within the city, Eisenhower sent a strict order to French general Marie-­Pierre Koenig, the head of Paris’s Resistance forces, not to rise up against the occupiers.22 But Eisenhower’s decision could not prevent actual events on the ground in Paris. The city was starving. Meat rations were so small Parisians joked that if wrapped in a metro ticket, the meat would fall out of the punch hole. Other foods were similarly scarce; most Parisians received only two eggs a month, along with 3.2 ounces of cooking oil and two ounces of margarine, while only 25 percent of Parisians received any potatoes at all. Even worse, the city only had access to 6,000 gallons of milk daily, down from the prewar daily supply of 318,000 gallons. Approximately twenty-­ five thousand Parisian babies suffered undernourishment.23 Resistance fighters inside the city worried that Paris would become another Oradour or Warsaw. Oradour became infamous in 1944, as a symbol of German atrocities in France. Four days after the Normandy landings, the Resistance attacked the 2nd SS Panzer Division in Oradour as it moved north to attack the Allies. The SS retaliated by herding the town’s citizens into barns and the town church, where they opened fire and set the structures on fire. In Warsaw on August 1, the same day Third Army became operational in France, resistance fighters rose up against

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the Nazis as the Red Army approached. But when the Soviets stopped short of the city, the Germans crushed the rebellion. The majority of Resistance fighters in Paris were communists who feared the Americans would let them fight the Germans alone, allowing a slaughter similar to Warsaw. They believed that, once the communists had been wiped out, the Americans would escort de Gaulle, a known anti-­communist, into the city. Their fears had merit; Hitler had named General Dietrich von Choltitz a “commander of a besieged stronghold” on August 10, replacing a general Hitler felt did not have will to destroy Paris. Von Choltitz had already proved himself the man for the job on the Russian front. He rarely took prisoners while capturing the Black Sea port of Sevastopol and, when his forces later retreated, he oversaw a scorched-­earth policy. In Paris, von Choltitz’s men planted explosives in several iconic buildings, including Les Invalides (site of Napoleon’s tomb), the Senate, the palace cellars, the Chambre des députés, the Hôtel Talleyrand, and the Ministère de la Marine. German engineers also examined the Eiffel Tower to learn how to ensure its collapse.24 Other factors inside and outside Paris were forcing Eisenhower’s hand. While Patton met with Bradley on August 19, the police inside Paris went on strike and raised French flags over the police headquarters. Soon, French flags draped over almost all public buildings. Four days earlier, upon hearing the news of Patton’s approach, railway workers had gone on their own strike. Now, French police fought off a German tank attack on their headquarters by hurling gasoline-­filled wine bottles, or Molotov cocktails; the battle was on. Outside the city, de Gaulle pressed Eisenhower to capture Paris quickly to prevent it from falling into communist hands. General Leclerc, momentarily halted at Chambois, craved liberating the city.25 Patton had seen Bradley’s order of battle for a possible liberation of Paris and noticed a British corps attached to Hodges’s First Army. Assuming this was to allow the Allies to enter the city together, he vented about being left out of the liberation. Yet, despite his complaints against Bradley in his letters and diaries, he kept his mouth shut. After the war, one of Patton’s staff officers told Bradley about Patton’s tirades against his superiors, “And yet in all those outbursts I never heard the General speak an unkind word of you.”26 Patton instead focused on his own lightning drive, but all was not well in Third Army. General Cook, the commander of XII Corps, had taken

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ill with an arterial circulation problem. He could not feel his hands or feet, which had turned black, and he could only walk a short distance. It pained Patton to relieve Cook but the latter simply could no longer lead his corps. Patton had little choice but to replace him with Major General Manton Eddy, the 9th Infantry Division’s commander. Eddy had fought under Patton in North Africa and during the tail end of the Sicilian campaign. In Normandy, he had cut off the Cherbourg peninsula. He had the experience and, more importantly, he knew Patton. Eddy received word of his promotion while his division converged with a British division on the outskirts of the Falaise pocket. His corps commander, Major General Collins told him, “Georgie wants you up there tomorrow.”27 Eddy arrived at his new headquarters and immediately received orders to capture Sens, the first of Patton’s reverse Schlieffen Plan objectives. Accustomed to the slow grind of hedgerow fighting, Eddy was stunned by Patton’s order, especially when Patton’s intelligence staff informed him that ninety thousand Germans stood on his left and eighty thousand on his right. “What the hell kind of a war is this?” he asked his newly inherited staff. “I’ve been fighting for two months and have advanced five miles. Now in one day you want me to go fifty miles?” He might have felt even worse had he known Sens was actually ninety miles away. One of his staffers simply responded by handing him a map large enough to cover Sens.28 Obeying Patton’s orders, Eddy sent Wood’s 4th Armored forward, supported by a regiment from Baade’s 35th Division. Eddy got a double shock when he looked at his XII Corps map, showing his divisions loosely spread out. His communication center suffered from spotty connections. “If ‘Heinie’ knew what I know about our strength and dispositions,” he wrote in his diary, “I am sure that we would find it tougher going.” He did not yet realize he had capable commanders maneuvering his divisions. That night, when Eddy decided to use the trucks of the newly arrived 80th Infantry Division to help protect his southern flank, he called Patton for permission. That was his first mistake. “Ignore the bastards!” Patton roared at his worried commander. But Patton understood his predicament enough to tell Weyland to “put everything you’ve got” to cover Eddy.29 Eddy was not alone in worrying about his flanks. Haislip and Middleton worried, too, as did some of Patton’s division commanders. On at least three occasions, when division commanders asked him about their vulnerable flanks, he told them they had nothing to worry about

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and that his tactical fighters and bombers would tackle any would-­be assault on their flanks before they even knew of the threat, giving Patton time to “pull something out of my hat.” He always concluded his visits by ensuring his commanders, “Now get going. Let the enemy worry about his flanks.”30 Eddy almost immediately clashed with Wood. Two days after taking command, Eddy accused him of ignoring his radio messages. To prove it, Eddy sent a staffer to fire Wood’s operations officer. When it turned out Wood had been sending constant updates and that Eddy’s operations officer had failed to show him the communiques, Eddy fired his own operations officer, but as a consequence, he ordered Wood to never advance his headquarters without first reporting it to him, either in person from the new location or by telephone. With the 4th Armored in constant motion, and with a limited supply of communications wire, the order put a leash on Wood’s freedom of movement. Although Wood never complained about the order, it must have rankled him.31 The rift would only grow between the two officers, leaving Patton to referee their clashes. On the night of August 19, an old friend visited Patton: French General Jean-­Léonard Koechlin-­Schwartz, who had taught a young Patton at the AEF’s abbreviated staff school at Langres during World War I. The old general complimented Patton on his amazing progress but admitted if he himself had taught his students what Patton had done, he would have “been put in a madhouse.” He confessed that when he heard an armored division was headed toward Brest he knew it was Patton. When Patton asked him why the French army crumbled so rapidly against the Germans in 1940, Koechlin-­Schwartz told him that the French taught and practiced defensive warfare, never offensive. Patton reminded him of a maxim he had learned from the older man at Langres: the poorer the infantry, the more artillery it needs, something that applied equally to the American army in World War I. “He was right then,” Patton wrote, “and still is.” The conversation led Patton to reflect on a war-­free future. “Civil life will be mighty dull—­no cheering crowds, no flowers, no private airplanes. Quelle vie [What a life].”32 The next morning, August 20, Patton told his planning staff that Bradley had ordered him to eliminate pockets of German resistance along the Seine River. “We are to do what Montgomery hasn’t done yet,” he told them, “keep the Hun from escaping.”33 Patton visited Walker and Eddy and told them about his reverse Schlieffen Plan. Walker would aim

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for the two towns of Melun and Montereau, some seventy miles away, while Eddy would continue to press toward Sens, farthest south. The dual drives would put them on the Seine and Yonne Rivers south of Paris and below Haislip, who was already across the Seine northwest of the French capital. Three days earlier, an ULTRA intercept had reported that the Germans were rushing reinforcements to the Sens area. Patton wanted Eddy to beat them there.34 Concerned that Bradley would again lose “his nerve at the last moment,” Patton gave them the codeword “Proset,” to halt in place, just in case.35 Since this was his first meeting with Eddy since Sicily, Patton pulled him aside and told him what to expect from his division commanders. He warned Eddy that of his three commanders, McBride was the nitpicker. “He’s probably driving his regimental commanders crazy, though none have complained.” Patton explained. “He can’t delegate a job and leave it alone. I’ve warned him about this and maybe he got it. One thing in his favor; he knows what’s going on in his division.”36 Eddy did not record what Patton told him about Baade, or about Wood, who was already proving difficult. Patton worried about Eddy and Walker reaching the Seine and Yonne by his deadline. “I always have a funny reaction before a show like this,” he admitted to his diary. “I think of the plan and am all for it[,] then just as I give the order I get nervous and must say to myself, ‘Do not take counsel of your fears’ and go ahead.” Ever the cavalryman and horse-­lover, he compared the feeling to a steeplechase race. “When the saddling bugle goes [off] you feel scared and when the flag drops all is well.”37 He need not have worried about his two-­pronged offensive. By the end of August 21, Walker had taken Montereau, where the Yonne split from the Seine and was closing on Melun (which he would capture four days later), putting him twenty-­two miles south of Paris. On Eddy’s front, Wood’s tankers had captured Sens that afternoon, after traversing the ninety miles in just twelve hours, capturing an intact bridge over the Yonne River. Wood attacked so quickly that German officers were caught strolling the streets in dress uniforms. 38 As he had done roughly along the Mayenne and Eure, Patton would repeat his tactic of selecting three towns north-­to-­south along the river as his corps’ objectives. He would do it again with the Meuse and Moselle Rivers. Eddy radioed Patton to tell him of Wood’s success and asked, “What’s next?” Patton responded, “Hang up and keep going.”39 Third Army

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seemed unstoppable. French citizens were greeting and smothering their liberators with fruit, flowers, and kisses. Tricolor French flags and makeshift Stars and Stripes unfurled from buildings as bewildered Germans surrendered to the passing Americans. “We have at this time the greatest chance to win the war ever presented,” Patton cheered. His entire army was in the perfect position to drive east, with nothing in front of it. He felt great, writing that his figure was “getting better because in a campaign I have no appetite and feel swell and full of pep.”40 During the drive, Patton could be seen about his headquarters, casually walking around without his helmet, his hands in his pockets. One of his main worries became Willie, who would dash under his desk at the sound of machine-­gun fire. Willie also wandered into the woods once, disturbing a hornets’ nest. With the help of his staff, Patton burned out the nest with gasoline, then rubbed soda and water on the dog’s wounds.41 “He is really sick as a result of the bites,” Patton wrote Beatrice.42 Bradley next ordered Patton to move on Châlons-­en-­Champagne, west of Paris on the Marne River, and Troyes and Nogent along the Seine, three north-­to-­south towns some ninety miles east.43 But Patton, wanting to keep the pressure on the Germans, planned to drive twice the distance, 180 miles, and cross the Moselle at Metz, Nancy, and Épinal, three other French cities running north to south. ULTRA intercepts revealed that the Germans considered the Moselle Valley—­from Metz to Trier—­their Achilles heel. “We can be in Germany in ten days,” Patton wrote. To do it, he would need three or four armored and six infantry divisions. He hoped to borrow Collins’s VII Corps from Hodges for his operation. “It is such a sure thing that I fear these blind moles don’t see it,” he wrote. He spent the day preparing a campaign plan, then stayed up late, reading his Bible, hoping it would encourage Bradley to approve the plan.44 In planning his assault on the Moselle River and entry into Germany, Patton ignored two lines of defense his army would have to crack to make it all possible: France’s Maginot Line and Germany’s Siegfried Line. The Maginot Line, named for the one-­time French war minister André Maginot and completed in the 1930s, stretched along the French border from Luxembourg to Switzerland and consisted of old and new forts, some extending six miles underground and so large they required their own underground railways. The self-­sustaining forts could withstand a months-­long siege. Many of forts’ heavy guns were turreted, allowing them to fire in any direction.45 Germany’s Siegfried Line, also known as

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the West Wall, stretched longer than the Maginot Line, from the border with the Netherlands to Switzerland, and consisted of mine fields, tank obstacles, pillboxes, and bunkers. Both lines had been stripped of many of their armaments (and in the case of the Maginot Line, generators) and incorporated into Hitler’s Atlantic Wall. Still, the Siegfried Line was an important phycological possession for both the Allies and Germans. If the Allies could capture it before the Germans could man and arm it, they could easily reach the Rhine River. If the Germans could beat the Allies to the line, they could stave off invasion. Patton would obsess about the Siegfried Line for the next six months, although the Maginot Line proved more stubborn and cost him men, equipment, and time.46 That night, Patton was awoken from a dead sleep when a delegation of Frenchmen from Paris showed up at his headquarters. He emerged from his tent with unkempt hair and an untucked shirt. “Excuse me,” he told the delegation, “I’ve been sleeping.” Then he added, “Okay, I’m listening. What’s your story?” Roger Gallois, a French Resistance leader, explained that Gaullist and communist resistance fighters were battling the Germans in Paris, hoping to prevent another Warsaw. After hearing Gallois’s passionate argument, Patton told him, “You are a soldier and I’m a soldier. I’m going to answer you as a soldier.” A few days earlier, Major Robert Allen had asked Patton why Third Army had not taken Paris, with almost no Germans to block it. Patton had answered, “We don’t want Paris. The minute we take it, we have to start feeding them and we have our hands full feeding our own troops,” adding that supply was becoming a problem, with Third Army extended and Cherbourg the only working Allied port. “The thing we ought to do is bypass Paris and keep after the German army, killing as many of them as we can and running the rest to death. Paris isn’t the real capital of France right now and there is no political advantage in our taking it.”47 Patton told Gallois the same thing, adding that the Resistance had started the insurrection without orders. When he finished his explanation, Patton offered his hand to Gallois, who stood in stunned silence. Patton then asked his visitor if he would make his plea to Bradley. The meeting left the Resistance leader, by his own admission, “in a state of emotional collapse.” Yet, the meeting did bear fruit; Patton put Gallois on a plane to see Bradley. The decision went to Eisenhower, who had just learned that Paris was out of power and almost out of food. Chaos reigned in the streets, despite a temporary ceasefire. Eisenhower decided

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to rescue the city before von Choltitz followed through on Hitler’s orders to completely destroy it.48 Bradley immediately flew to Hodges’s headquarters and told him to take the city. To do it, he would place Haislip’s XV Corps, directly west of Paris, under Hodges, and use Leclerc’s French 2nd Armored to spearhead the attack. Yet, Bradley did not tell Patton about the transfer.49 The next day, August 22, Patton flew to Bradley’s headquarters with his plan to capture Metz, Nancy, and Épinal. But with Bradley still at Hodges’s headquarters, Patton handed his plans to Bradley’s staff.50 He spent the rest of the day with Eddy, visiting Baade’s 35th Division, telling the soldiers that at the rate they were going, the war should be over by Christmas.51 Patton later called Bradley, optimistically predicting that Third Army should at least reach Strasbourg, on the French/German border, before winter set in.52 Meanwhile, Montgomery lobbied Eisenhower for his own ideas. Only he did not make the argument in person, opting instead to send his chief of staff, Major General Freddie de Guingand, to Eisenhower’s headquarters armed with notes to argue his case. Montgomery believed that the quickest way to win the war was to clear the northern French coast, including Calais, of V-­1 rocket launch sites, and then continue as far east as Antwerp, Belgium. Much of the rest of his note begged and pleaded that he be left in command of the Allied armies, free to direct all ground operations while Eisenhower kept his hands off. The Allies “must operate as a whole,” Montgomery wrote, implying they would not under Eisenhower. He further argued that land operations needed to be under “single control,” adding, “This is a WHOLE TIME job for one man,” a direct jab at Eisenhower’s political responsibilities dealing with the likes of Churchill and de Gaulle. If none of that was clear enough, Montgomery basically told Eisenhower to leave the experienced British general in command: “To change the system of command now, after having won a great victory, would be to prolong the war.” Eisenhower, not surprisingly, sent de Guingand packing. Montgomery reported the results of the meeting as “negative.”53 But Montgomery was not finished. He asked to meet the following day. Eisenhower agreed, and, in a closed-­door meeting, Montgomery made the same plea in person. He told Eisenhower there was not enough fuel for all the frontline units, and it should therefore be concentrated in one place—­his. Montgomery wanted all the fuel and supplies, denying them

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to Patton’s westward attack south of Paris. Montgomery later admitted, “To adopt my plan he must stop the man with the ball: Patton, and his Third American Army.” As the meeting progressed, Montgomery told Eisenhower that his army group did not have the strength needed for his northern thrust and requested an American army of “at least twelve divisions” to advance on his right. Eisenhower patiently listened but agreed to nothing.54 Unaware of the machinations taking place above his pay grade, Patton greeted another delegation from Paris on the morning of August 23. This one included Rolf Nordling, brother of Raoul Nordling, the Swedish consul in Paris. Raoul had negotiated the shaky ceasefire and had received written permission from von Choltitz to cross enemy lines in search of de Gaulle. Von Choltitz had changed his mind about destroying Paris and wanted to hand it over quickly to the French general, even though Hitler had taken von Choltitz’s wife and daughter into custody to ensure his orders were followed. But before Raoul Nordling could begin his trek he suffered a heart attack. He gave von Choltitz’s note to his brother, who headed off in search of Eisenhower.55 Rolf Nordling told Patton that Hitler had ordered von Choltitz to defend Paris, even if it cost him 30 percent casualties, and that the shaky armistice between the Germans and Resistance would soon expire. Nordling then produced two documents from his brother: a letter to Eisenhower and the armistice agreement with von Choltitz. Patton had one of his French-­speaking intelligence officers read both aloud. The two men then discussed the food situation in Paris. When Nordling explained that the city was out of bread, something important to the average Frenchman, Patton told him he had the same problem when he took Palermo, “except there it was spaghetti.”56 Nordling then asked if they could speak alone and Patton ordered everyone else out of the room. Once their meeting ended, Patton called Bradley to let him know the visitors would soon be arriving at his headquarters. They flew to Bradley’s headquarters to learn that Eisenhower had already decided to liberate Paris.57 Patton spent the rest of the morning entertaining other visitors. French general Alphonse Juin, de Gaulle’s army chief of staff, showed up and pointed out a soft spot in the Maginot Line at Nancy, a piece of information Patton took seriously. A group of American labor leaders then showed up, and a surly Patton spoke with them, describing them as “over fed.”58

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Figure 13. Patton escorts American labor leaders around Third Army headquarters on August 24, 1944. He considered them all overfed. Catalog number: 111-­SC 193221, National Archives and Records Administration.

Later, Haislip called Patton to protest his separation from Third Army, effective the next day. Without Haislip, Patton’s entire army now stood south of the city. As the two generals talked, enemy rockets strafed Haislip’s headquarters. He asked Patton for some air support, but there was none to give. “As he was on Radio [sic] link,” Patton later wrote, “I could not tell him that our fields were so far in the rear that we had practically outrun air cover.”59 Even worse for Third Army, the Luftwaffe, which had previously confined itself to night raids, was now attacking Patton’s bridgeheads in broad daylight.60 That night Patton studied in fury and frustration an urgent report that highlighted that, for the first time since the breakout at Avranches, his army had consumed more fuel than it actually received. Soon, he would be angrily calling Eisenhower’s supply officer three times a day to demand more gas.61 Patton then headed to Bradley’s headquarters in Laval, where he found Bradley preparing to present his latest plan of attack to Eisenhower and Montgomery. Bradley told him that Haislip’s VX Corps had only

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been temporarily transferred to Hodges. Patton hoped to swap it with Collins’s VII Corps but dropped the request when he found Bradley worried and angry that Montgomery had gotten to Eisenhower first and requested American divisions, a drive through Belgium, and an attack on Calais. Eisenhower had agreed and now felt that capturing Calais would be a triple win: eliminating the V-­1 rocket threat to Great Britain, boosting the British people’s morale, and providing another vital port.62 Eisenhower had even written Marshall that day, admitting that he could not simultaneously drive northeast and east and would have to focus on one attack: the northeast drive to capture the war industries of the Ruhr. Montgomery’s plan, which would initially drive north and not east toward Germany, left no role for Bradley’s entire army group.63 Patton could not understand why Montgomery needed four armies to take Calais or to drive through the hills and forests of Belgium, “where tanks are useless.” Worse, Montgomery seemed to easily bend Eisenhower to his will. Patton considered Eisenhower, like tanks in Belgium, “useless.”64 Bradley, fed up as much at Montgomery’s pilfering of American forces as at Eisenhower’s seemingly constant capitulation to the British general, raged at Patton, asking what a “Supreme Commander amounted to?” Patton offered that he, Bradley, and Hodges should all offer their resignations if Eisenhower would not let them drive east, but Bradley demurred, explaining that Eisenhower had no other quality commanders to replace them. “No guts!” Patton later wrote about Bradley.65 What Patton did not know was that General Marshall back in the Pentagon, and not Montgomery, had Eisenhower’s ear. Five days earlier, Marshall had pushed Eisenhower into capturing Calais. “The better operation,” Marshall had written, “would be in the Pas de Calais area;” he also encouraged Eisenhower to assault Dunkirk, another port city in Montgomery’s area. In addition, whereas Montgomery’s plan led to Germany’s Ruhr industrial region, Patton’s route through Metz led to the Saar region, a much smaller industrial area whose capture would not significantly degrade German war production. Also, and despite Patton’s dismissal of its geography, Montgomery’s plan also covered relatively flat terrain and open fields, whereas Patton’s path was covered with forests, rough hills, and gorges, which made for poor tank country with fewer airfields. The deck was stacked against Bradley and Patton.66 After Bradley departed, Patton finally asked the 12th Army Group staff for Collins’s corps. They refused. But instead of returning to his own

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headquarters, Patton devised a new plan on the spot: instead of heading directly east, he would complete his encirclement of Paris by using Walker’s XX Corps to drive north, counterclockwise around the city, sealing off Paris from the west. If Walker could reach the town of Beauvais north of Paris, he could reach the Seine in the British sector, clearing the way for the approaching British and Canadian armies. The move would also shorten Patton’s own supply lines, something Eisenhower was sure to like, and allow him to pick up both the 4th Infantry Division and Haislip’s corps in the process, both of which were now fighting with Hodges. “This is the best strategical idea I have ever had,” he wrote. He quickly laid out the plan and told Bradley’s staff that if Bradley agreed, to call him and say Plan A. Plan B was to simply continue driving east.67 Nigel Hamilton, Montgomery’s biographer, believed that Patton should have flown to the meeting and presented his new plan, confident that if Montgomery had heard the plan, he would have consented to it, just as he had for Patton’s plan to capture Messina. Patton, however, knew that he was only an army commander, and it was not his place to interrupt an army group meeting, especially if it piqued Eisenhower.68 While Patton raged about his lack of air support and fuel, Eisenhower decided between Bradley’s and Montgomery’s campaign plans to assault Germany. Bradley had proposed a direct charge through the middle of France, crossing the Saar and Rhine Rivers, to the city of Frankfurt am Main, basically following Patton’s momentum. Montgomery presented his plan, slightly altered from his original proposal: capturing Antwerp (not Calais) and clearing out the V-­1 rocket launch centers in both Belgium and Holland. He would do it with his British Second Army, the Canadian First Army and Hodges’s First Army, while sidelining Patton’s Third. No mention was made of Simpson’s Ninth Army. Bradley had offered a compromise: lending Montgomery one of Hodges’s corps, but not his entire army. Bradley wanted to keep the other armies moving, while Montgomery wanted Patton stopped. To Bradley, Montgomery’s plan stank of arrogance, just like Sicily, “when he recommended that U.S. forces sit out the war on a defensive front while he went on alone to take Messina.”69 Eisenhower wanted to conduct both operations simultaneously, having adopted a broad front strategy well before D-­Day, but now, with almost all supplies coming across Normandy’s beaches or the slowly-­ repaired Cherbourg port, he only had enough fuel, ammunition, and

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supplies for one. Eager to open another port and to employ his airborne troops, on August 24 Eisenhower endorsed Montgomery’s plan, giving him priority on troops and fuel. Hodges’s army would receive more supplies than Patton’s. Not only did Patton lose a portion of his trucks to support Montgomery, he also lost his airborne supplies when the cargo planes bringing him gas were diverted for an airborne drop on Tournai, Belgium, scheduled for September 3.70 What went unspoken was that neither Montgomery’s or Bradley’s plans worked in coordination with each other, other than keeping the Germans off balance. Neither contemplated another encirclement since the botched effort at Falaise. True, ports needed to be opened, but those attacks would draw Montgomery’s momentum away from Bradley, and with gas running low across the Allied front, another pincer should have been considered before it was too late. Patton repeatedly saw the potential for pincer movements (Plan A) and would continue to employ them on his front, but a larger scale pincer was above his ability to implement. It was up to Bradley, Montgomery, and Eisenhower to decide the theater strategy, and they all came up lacking. Bradley’s attempt to scoop up the remaining Germans escaping the Falaise pocket by pushing American troops north into the British zone had come close to shutting the door on the Germans but failed. General Dempsey later accused the Americans of merely creating traffic jams in his sector, preventing his troops from capturing the remaining Germans.71 There would not be another pincer attack on an Army Group scale until January of 1945, six months later. The same morning Eisenhower made his decision, August 24, Patton heard a BBC radio report that his Third Army had liberated Paris. The report was one day premature and mentioned the wrong army commander but the news cheered him. “Poetic justice,” he mused. Leclerc’s tankers mistakenly told reporters they were under Third Army. Patton knew a retraction would soon follow, but it would go unnoticed.72 Knowing that Leclerc’s men would celebrate their victory in the capital city instead of continuing the fight, Patton told his staff, “Thank the good lord! He won’t be any good to anyone fighting the war for at least a month.”73 Even better, Montgomery played no role in the city’s liberation. Patton’s lightning drives, so far ahead of Montgomery’s progress, had seen to that, although the British press did accuse the Americans of stealing the show.74 Although the Allies welcomed the liberation of Paris, it strained

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their supply lines, as predicted. Days later, Eisenhower had to dispatch cargo aircraft filled with food and coal to the liberated city.75 Before Patton could get his August 25 attack started, Bradley ordered him to Chartres, where he and Hodges would receive new orders. Arriving in Chartres, Patton stopped off in the windowless cathedral (the staff had removed the famous stained-­glass windows to keep them safe) and said a prayer for continued success. He then found Bradley, who explained that Hodges would drive north, while Patton would continue east: Plan B. With Paris liberated, there was no need for encirclement. Hodges’s Army would now support Montgomery’s 21st Army Group. As for Patton, he would send Eddy east toward Troyes, while Walker went for Nogent-­sur-­ Seine, and then northeast to Reims. If Haislip’s corps returned to Third Army in time, it would head north for Reims and Walker would aim for Châlons-­sur-­Marne.76 Bradley gave Patton some good news: Brest had been captured on August 14 and Middleton’s VIII Corps was now heading east. But the report was premature. The Germans still held Brest and Middleton would have to stay in the east until it was captured. While Patton had to be upset that his war-­ending plan had been scrapped, he took pride in knowing Hodges, needing to align on his left, would have to advance his army through towns that Third Army had captured. Tactically, Patton had little to worry about. Before sun set, Wood’s 4th Armored, under Eddy, had pushed the ninety miles toward Troyes and now stood halfway to Nancy, fifty-­five miles ahead of the deepest Allied penetration. Now it was Bradley’s plan that was becoming obsolete.77 Back at his headquarters, Patton decided to fly out to see Walker, but his pilot erred, overflying the location. Soon, they both realized they were lost and low on fuel. The pilot spotted a column of vehicles and dropped lower to see that they were marked with swastikas. Patton and the pilot agreed the column must be retreating, so they followed the road back, finding friendly lines before they ran out of fuel.78 Patton celebrated his safe return with champagne liberated from an enemy train. Sipping on a glass of champagne in his mobile headquarters, Patton greeted Frederick Winterbotham, the British RAF officer in charge of ULTRA, challenging him to “tell me anything is better than this.” Then he quizzed Winterbotham on the Germans’ locations, and learned they were racing for the Siegfried Line. “I’ve got to get there first,” Patton explained, “if only I can get some gas.” Patton took off his jacket, stretched

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back in his chair, and clasped his hands behind his head. They both stared out of Patton’s mobile headquarters as Winterbotham spoke about the peacefulness of the countryside. “Sure, sure,” Patton agreed. “But we gotta get after them.” Later, a rumor circulated that a group of Germans offering an armistice had shown up at his headquarters, but it proved false. “Yellow bastards trying to bolt,” Patton wrote about it. A funny story from Grow’s 6th Armored’s siege of Brest cheered him up, however. A division chaplain had completed his benediction ceremony honoring the dead with a battery of tank destroyers firing a three-­volley salute into the German defenses. “Why can’t we promote that chaplain?” Patton asked. The promotion soon followed.79 While Patton lost his air resupply, General Lee’s COMZ tried to replace it with an ad hoc ground supply system for both Patton and Hodges. With France’s railway system wrecked by a combination of Allied bombings, German scorched-­earth policy, and Resistance attacks, the U.S. Army resorted to trucks. What became known as the Red Ball Express consisted of a nonstop one-­way convoy of trucks connecting supply dumps in Normandy and Brittany with the fighting front. Manned mostly by African American soldiers assigned to segregated units who faced both strafing attacks from the Luftwaffe and mind-­numbing fatigue, they delivered supplies to frontline units and helped distribute supplies and fuel. Launched on August 25, the route originally ended in Chartres but was extended to Paris and eventually branched off to Verdun for Hodges and Metz for Patton. The trucks cruised nearly bumper-­to-­bumper, stacked so high with supplies that a simple pothole could dump fuel, rations, or ammunition boxes onto the road.80 Trucks breaking down or suffering a blown tire were shoved aside to prevent gridlock. Engineers fashioned hundreds of “One Way” signs or signs warning the roads were designated exclusively for Red Ball trucks. The drivers often raced over speed limits to keep up with demand. The truckers created a slogan: “Petrol for Patton.” As one driver remembered it, “Patton wanted us to eat, sleep, and drive, but mostly drive.”81 The system was far from perfect. Three infantry divisions found themselves stuck in Normandy when Lee’s COMZ confiscated their trucks to expand the Red Ball’s capabilities. Three other active divisions lost a portion of their trucks to the endeavor. The Red Ball also consumed three hundred thousand gallons of gasoline a day, nearly the same amount Patton’s Army needed to advance. As the trucks worked their

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way through Paris, they succumbed to black marketeers. COMZ reported that, while Patton fought at the Siegfried Line, some Red Ball truck drivers, backed up the length of Paris’s Champs Élysées, sold jerrycans of gas and cartons of cigarettes to willing buyers. Rear echelon soldiers also pilfered the trucks for their own purposes.82 Patton understood both the importance and the fragility of his tenuous supply line. Throughout late August and early September, he raced up and down roads encouraging, cajoling, and threatening truck drivers. He sometimes personally led the convoys in his jeep to make sure they got to the front. Other times he would walk and talk with some of the men. At one point, he came across a line of gas trucks on the side of the road. “Well, what the hell are you sitting here for?” he asked the leader, who explained that he did not know if the road had been cleared of mines. “You take this Goddamn truck and you drive it down that road,” Patton snapped, “and we’ll find out whether it’s cleared of mines or not, won’t we.” The man obeyed.83 In another instance, while driving through the village of Mamers, Patton spotted a single truck stopped on the road, pointing west. “Captain!” he barked at an MP, “I want you to shoot the next son of a bitch that’s driving west on the Red Ball Road!” The MP, who was straightening out a traffic jam, spun around and snapped a salute, hitting his hand against his dust-­covered helmet. “Yes sir, general, sir.” Patton was not satisfied. “Goddammit, Captain, I gave orders that all traffic on the Red Ball Road must go east—­only east—­toward Germany.” Pointing at the errant truck he said, “Push that bastard off the road!” The truck’s driver acted first, quickly backing the vehicle into an alley. In another instance, when a column Patton was driving in came to a halt, he got out of his car and ran forward to find a Red Ball driver with a bad tire. Patton ordered him off the road. The man maneuvered his truck through a tight opening in a fence. Patton then bawled him out for holding up a column. Two hours later, on his way back from the front, Patton spotted the same driver parked on the side of the road with the tire repaired. Patton stopped and praised him. “When you drove though that fence,” he told him, “it was the best driving I’d seen in a long time.”84 Patton’s behavior toward the Black soldiers was often worse than toward white soldiers. He would often ride out to makeshift airfields to oversee the unloading of gasoline-­filled jerrycans, shouting and screaming at the Black soldiers while they transferred the cans from the aircraft to trucks. When a convoy of trucks loaded with rations arrived, he yelled

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at the drivers, “I’ll shoot the next man who brings me food. Give us gasoline; we can eat our belts.”85 In a particularly abusive case, he came across a group of drivers eating lunch next to a truck that partially blocked the road. Gripping his ivory-­handled pistol, he told them to move their truck to a nearby cemetery before he put them permanently in it.86 One African American driver said of Patton, “Two things Patton had: He had a dog and he had a .45. Willie was the dog, and Willie was just as mean as Patton. If you crossed Patton, he would sic the dog on you—­or he’d shoot you.”87 Patton could be just as vicious to soldiers who slowed down his supplies or defied Third Army speed limits. When a colonel stopped a fuel truck convoy, Patton drove up in his command car, standing on the passenger side. After exchanging salutes, Patton berated the colonel: “Don’t EVER stop one of my gas convoys!” He then ripped the eagles from the colonel’s shoulders, and called him sergeant. The former colonel waved the trucks through.88 To stretch the gas he did have, Paton imposed strict speed limits on Third Army.89 When he saw a sergeant speed by his headquarters, he roared, “Stop that goddamn vehicle!” The sergeant complied and Patton berated him. When the sergeant explained he was trying to find a pair of eagles for his newly promoted colonel, Patton told him, “I don’t give a damn if he was promoted to a four-­star general, you can’t speed in my town.”90 In another case, when a soldier sped his jeep past Patton’s caravan, Patton yelled for him to stop, and the driver did. He then marched over to the driver, a sergeant, and chewed him out, getting angrier with every word. “You’re broke to a private!” Patton shouted and tried to tear the man’s sergeant stripes off, but they were sewn on too tight. Furious that he could not rip them off, he told the man go back to his company headquarters and tell his captain that he was now a private.91 Making sure the supplies made it to the front was just as important to Patton. An MP, infantryman, or tanker would meet fuel trucks at night, often at a fork in the road, and direct them where to go. One night, a tank crew failed to properly direct a refueling truck, and the truck came under enemy fire. When Patton learned about the incident, he found the offending tank crew and told them, “When I tell you to be there, you be there. If you aren’t, those guys don’t have to leave you gas or ammo, and you’re going to be out there on your own.” His words had the desired effect. From then on, the tank crew always directed refueling trucks to the right spot.92

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The only thing more important to Patton than getting supplies to the front was getting the wounded to the rear. One day, when he saw a line of ambulances stuck in westbound traffic, he had his jeep stop at an intersection where he stood up and shouted to the tuckers, “Get these God-­dammed stinking trucks out of the way so these wounded can get through here!” The truckers pulled over and the ambulances proceeded. As the ambulance drivers rolled through the intersection, they marveled at Patton, who, to them, looked twenty feet tall.93 Patton appreciated anyone who brought him supplies. When a soldier and his driver from the 90th Division found Patton in his mess tent, Patton asked him, “How long has it been since you’ve eaten?” When the man explained that he had not eaten all day, he told him, “You go over there and tell the sergeant there to feed you and your driver.”94 Patton also offered bottles of liberated Cointreau, champagne, and vermouth to a medical officer in exchange for gas and some ambulances.95 Pilots who flew in gas received a case of champagne, “with compliments of General Patton.”96 Patton also appreciated any men who kept the frontline soldiers fed, clothed, and moving forward. On October 13 he pinned a Silver Star on Private Ernest Jenkins of the Quartermaster Corps. Jenkins, a Black driver, had helped his commanding officer kill a handful of Germans manning an artillery piece in the town of Châteaudun and accepted the surrender of fifteen more on August 16. The photograph of the event was well publicized but, to Patton’s assured annoyance, he was identified as “carrying a pearl-­handled revolver.”97 Patton even resorted to stealing supplies, or at least his staff did. His logistics officer, Colonel Walter Muller, became notorious for scavenging supplies. Hodges complained to Patton that Third Army men, disguised as members of his First Army, had nabbed a stock of gasoline from a First Army fuel depot. “I’m sorry to learn that First Army lost some of its gas; very, very sorry indeed,” Patton told Hodges, “but I know none of my officers would masquerade as First Army officers. They wouldn’t stoop to that, not even to get gas SHAEF stole from us.” A few days later, the accused officers all received promotions.98 Patton slyly wrote that he hoped the story was false, but if it was true, it was “magnificent.” To Beatrice, he wrote that some of his truck drivers “did steal some [gasoline] for me by careful accident.”99 He made a fuller confession to his brother-­in-­law, Fred Ayer, when he told him in October, “I’ve already stolen enough gas to put me in jail for life.”100

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Figure 14. Patton pins a Silver Star on Private Ernest A. Jenkins, a driver with the Red Ball Express, who helped his commanding officer kill and capture Germans in Châteaudun, France. Despite his prejudices, Patton needed Black soldiers to keep Third Army moving. Catalog number: 111-­SC 194836, National Archives and Records Administration.

While the Red Ball tried to keep up with Patton and his corps, the Army’s Signal Corps declared August 26 “A Day with General Patton.” Reporters were allowed to follow him as he visited units, inspected the front, and pinned medals.101 He made the most of it. First, he drove to Walker’s headquarters and told him to attack Reims the next day. Upon arrival, he personally congratulated Walker and presented his staff with a commendation but told them they would not be entering Paris. Then he took off for Irwin’s 5th Division, where he pinned more medals on soldiers. From there, he headed to Silvester’s 7th Armored headquarters. On his way, his vehicle drove through Melun, where the men of the 3rd Armored Division (one of Hodges’s divisions) cheered him. Upon reaching Silvester’s division, he noticed the armored infantry struggling to move with too much equipment.102 He told Silvester his division looked terrible and its progress was unsatisfactory. He ordered him to straighten matters up immediately and then flew to Eddy’s headquarters and ordered him to attack Châlons in two days.103 Eddy worried again that Patton was leaving his southern flank unprotected, comparing it to a similar incident in World War I. Patton assured him everything was well

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and to keep on pressing east. “He is not used to our speed yet,” Patton later wrote, “so was a little surprised.” As they talked, Wood called in to report he had taken Troyes the night before. If Eddy was having trouble with Patton’s lightning-­fast attacks, Wood certainly was not.

Figure 15. Patton crosses the Seine River on September 26, 1944, on what the Army called “A Day with General Patton.” Cameramen and reporters followed Patton as he visited his corps and division commanders and presented medals to his soldiers. Catalog number: 111-­SC 194836, National Archives and Records Administration.

When Patton got back to his headquarters that evening, he marveled at his own agility. “Perhaps someday I shall figure out the number of miles I drove and flew, trying to direct the campaigns of the Third Army. I bet it was about a million.”104 He happily wrote in his diary that “a flock of Red Cross doughnut girls had descended on us.” His niece, Jean Gordon, arrived with a contingent of Doughnut Dollies. “I am delighted,” he told her. “You know I love you.” For the rest of the European campaign, other visitors would comment on the pretty girls at Patton’s dinner table.105 Beatrice soon got wind of it and wrote her husband. He wrote

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back, telling her, “you are the only one who really counts.” Not the most reassuring message for a distant husband to write a worried wife.106 The next day, August 27, Walker’s corps, now consisting of Silvester’s 7th Armored, supported by McLain’s 90th Division (transferred from Haislip’s XV Corps) and Irwin’s 5th Division, drove for Reims.107 Meanwhile, Patton flew into Orleans to check on Eddy’s XII Corps. The city was still under enemy artillery fire, which did little to disrupt the six-­hundred American C-­47s delivering fifteen hundred tons of supplies that had flown in the day before. Patton had arrived there to check on Major General Horace McBride’s 80th Infantry Division, which he had transferred from Haislip’s VX Corps to Eddy, but when Patton stepped off his aircraft, it was not McBride who met him, but Grow, who had flown in from Brest.108 Grow begged to have his 6th Armored join the race in the east. Patton denied the request, though he understood the illogic of employing an armored division in siege operations. He told Grow his division had to stay put on orders from above, and besides, with the majority of the fuel going to the other armies, he could not burn the gas to move the division. When Grow told Patton his division had received some two hundred thousand gallons of gas earmarked for Middleton, Patton immediately changed his mind and ordered him to “slip” one of his combat commands to Orleans and promised he would get the rest of the division sent east as soon as possible.109 About this time, Patton learned that the famous author, Ernest Hemmingway, had gotten himself into trouble. Hemingway, who had written about the Spanish Civil War in his most recent book, For Whom the Bell Tolls, had come to France as a journalist but had helped French Resistance fighters clear the city of Fontainebleau, tearing off his correspondent’s and noncombatant patches before picking up a weapon. Patton ordered an investigation and requested that Hemmingway visit his headquarters. Hemmingway entered Patton’s tent grimy and unshaven. “Hemmingway,” Patton addressed him, “I have been wanting to see you for a long time; there are several questions I have to put to you.” The author nervously looked down, afraid to meet Patton’s gaze. “About this Spanish War business,” he continued, motioning to a chair and offering Hemmingway a cigar, “I’ve always wanted to speak to someone who had firsthand information on the siege of Madrid.” With that, the two men discussed for three hours some of history’s greatest military campaigns. When it was over, Patton got up to leave, but before he left the tent, he

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turned around. “Oh, about that Fontainebleau business, Ernie,” he said with a smile, “I’ve denied everything for you; no throwing of hand grenades, no ripping off of correspondent’s insignia, no personal war of any sort. Back me up.” With that, Patton departed.110 The next morning, Walker captured Château-­Thierry, one of the U.S. Army’s first battlefields in World War I, while Eddy captured the town of Vitry, a few miles short of Châlons. Wood’s tankers were not capturing towns as much as running over them. By now the Third Army’s front stretched 410 miles from one flank to the other. “It is so big,” Patton wrote his son, “that it is a little impersonal.”111 Bradley visited, and Patton urged him to allow his attack toward the Meuse River. “That’s their soft spot,” Patton explained, pointing at the area directly east of his army. “They’re off balance and I’ve got them on the run.” He guaranteed a crossing of the German border if he could keep his three corps. “I’ll stake my reputation on it.”112 Bradley approved but warned him that with Hodges retaining the priority for supplies, he could advance only as far as feasible. Worse, he gave Patton three orders: to provide three thousand tons of supplies for Paris; to place one of his armored divisions in reserve; and to move his infantry units on foot, not truck.113 “What a life,” Patton wrote. As he saw it, the Germans were abandoning France and leaving cities and swaths of territory undefended. This was no time to stop. “There is no real threat against us from anywhere,” he wrote in his diary, “so long as we do not let imaginary dangers worry us.”114 Patton then took off to visit Walker at his headquarters in Louvois, where he presented him with the Distinguished Service Cross for forcing an early crossing of the Seine at Melun and continuously exposing himself to enemy fire while pushing his men across the river. XX Corps had “been going like a house afire,” Walker wrote his wife, adding, “I’ve just gotten the most wonderful commendation for myself and the Corps from Georgie.”115 Later that day, Patton sat down to interview a captured German major general named Hans-­Georg Schramm, who snapped a Nazi salute. Like the interview with General Spang, Patton told Schramm he regretted that the outnumbered Germans were dying for nothing. Schramm replied that while the Allies were winning, “there are changes in war.”116 Patton then asked about the difference between the SS and the regular army. Schramm explained that the SS contained superior individuals who were all volunteers. Their officers received the same training as the regular army but had political associations. Patton explained that the American

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Figure 16. Bradley, Weyland, and Patton discuss the fighting around Metz at Patton’s Étain headquarters on September 29, 1944. Eisenhower and Bradley were visiting to learn Patton’s latest plans. Patton’s dog Willie was not impressed. Catalog number: 111-­SC 197145, National Archives and Records Administration.

army suffered the same problem during peacetime and that political officers tended to fail on the battlefield. Schramm said that Patton had “the extreme advantage of contacting our forces in the weakest spot.” That must have been music to Patton’s ears. The interview ended with Schramm giving Patton a military salute. At that, Patton gave him carton of cigarettes and Schramm snapped a second military salute.117 That night, Patton spent almost three hours reading fan mail. “Very pleasant occupation,” he wrote in his diary.118 When Patton wasn’t reading fan mail or visiting the front, he found unique ways to occupy his free time. Always fascinated with maps, one day he walked into his Third Army map room, where thousands of indexed maps were stored. A technical sergeant saluted and Patton handed him a number for a map. The sergeant headed into the stacks and Patton followed, spooking the man. When the sergeant could not find the particular map, Patton told him, “That’s not important. I just knew about the map there, and I was very anxious to see it because I think it has some obsolete s[hit] houses on it.” Patton’s language stunned the sergeant, who was not accustomed to Patton’s bilingualism: English and profanity. The

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two men chatted for a little while. “My business here is not in the line of duty,” the general explained. “I just wanted to stop by and shoot the [shit]. I don’t really need any maps. I’ll see you later.” With that, he left.119 On August 29, as Patton positioned his army to capture Nancy and Metz, Eisenhower dispatched a letter to his commanders stating, “We in the West, must seize this opportunity by acting swiftly and relentlessly and by accepting risks in our determination to close with the German wherever met.”120 That is exactly what Patton was trying to do. That morning he visited Eddy and told him to take Commercy, ninety miles east of Troyes and only thirty-­five miles west of Nancy, which would put him on the Meuse River. With elements of the German army retreating north, he planned for Walker to pursue and capture Verdun, also on the Meuse, placing him only fifty miles west of Metz. While Patton and Eddy discussed plans, Colonel Charles Reed of the 2nd Cavalry Group showed up and told Eddy that two German panzer divisions were heading to the Seine south of Troyes, aiming to destroy the American bridgeheads. Reed admitted that his unit had been driven back to its bridges but felt he could hold on until Baade’s 35th Division reached him. Eddy ordered Reed to hold the bridges and told him the entire corps would push to him the next day. “No, Eddy,” Patton piped in, “that’s just what the Germans want: to make you attack across the river there.” Patton knew that the panzer divisions Reed referenced were veteran units from the Italian front and would obliterate any attempt Eddy made to cross the river. Instead, he told Eddy to have Reed blow all the bridges in his sector and hold the river line, which would protect Eddy’s flank. With the bridges blown, Reed could move his unit to Troyes, cross the river there, and attack down the east bank. “You’ll catch them off guard and they’ll try to pull out,” Patton explained, “then we can get on to the Moselle without delay.” Eddy reviewed the situation with Reed, then relayed Patton’s orders. Eddy also dispatched trucks packed with demolitions to blow up the bridges; Reed destroyed the bridges before sunset. As the enemy settled into a defensive position along the Seine, Baade’s division arrived. Supported by Reed’s 2nd Cavalry, the 35th crossed bridges in Troyes and hit one of the German divisions in the right flank. Both enemy divisions retreated, opening the way to Commercy and saving Eddy two days and countless casualties.121

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Before Patton left, Eddy pressed him about more forces to protect his flank, more fuel supplies, and other urgent tactical needs, but Patton ignored them. He was too happy with his army’s lightning drive. Eddy would later write about Patton, “He is about the most optimistic man I have ever seen in my life.”122 But when the supply line failed to deliver 140,000 gallons of gas to Third Army and with the air resupply system shut down, Patton smelled a rat. “This may be an attempt to stop me in a backhanded manner,” he wrote, “but I doubt it.”123 He blamed General Lee and his COMZ, which had burned twenty-­five thousand gallons of gas moving Lee’s headquarters into Paris, where his men requisitioned all the best hotels. To deal with the situation, Patton stopped his armored divisions and attacked with infantry.124 That same day, Montgomery commenced his powerful drive east, supported by Hodges’s First Army. The attack made great progress, advancing 250 miles in six days. British forces crossed the Somme River and liberated Brussels, Belgium, as well as the port of Antwerp, but failed to drive the Germans from the banks of the Scheldt Estuary, a twenty-­five-­ mile-­long waterway that connecting the city to the North Sea, making it unusable. While Crerar’s Canadian First Army captured the port town of Dieppe, the Germans holed themselves up in other ports, such as Le Havre, Calais, and Dunkirk. Hodges’s forces, meanwhile, captured Mons, 180 miles from their line of departure. By September 12 Hodges could boast that he had troops in Belgium, Holland, northern Luxembourg, and Germany. Yet, when Montgomery’s offensive reached the banks of the Meuse, he had captured a great deal of territory but few vital ports. Additionally, he had failed to push through to the Rhine, only seventy-­ five miles away, even though his gas tanks were not dry like Patton’s.125 To Patton, the northern thrust was a huge mistake. “The British have put it over again,” he wrote, later calling Eisenhower’s decision to support Montgomery over Bradley “the momentous error of the war.”126 Patton then visited Wood’s 4th Armored and spoke with Colonel Bruce C. Clarke, whose Combat Command A had captured Troyes by storm with light casualties. When Clarke mentioned that he was having trouble getting promotions and battlefield commissions approved by headquarters, Patton dictated a note to one of his aides stating that henceforth Clarke would have the authority to make promotions up the rank of lieutenant colonel, adding, “Clarke, just send me a personal

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note on these and I’ll confirm each of them in orders.” As they departed, Patton interjected, “Don’t you make any colonels because Ike does not let me make colonels.”127 On August 30 Patton arrived at Bradley’s headquarters to present his case for cracking the German Siegfried Line. All reports told him it was unmanned. With Bradley was Major General Harold R. “Pink” Bull, Eisenhower’s operations officer. While Bradley seemed sympathetic to Patton’s plan Bull refused to entertain it, explaining that the main effort would be in Montgomery’s theater. “It is a terrible mistake,” Patton would write that night, “and when it comes out will cause a sensation.” The conversation turned to fuel and Bradley told Patton he would have no gas for the next four days.128 Patton begged Bradley, “You have my tanks stopped in their tracks, they are sitting ducks, could I at least move them into defensive positions?” Bradley agreed, adding that de Gaulle had decided to keep Leclerc’s French 2nd Armored in Paris. “I need them to relieve the 35th on the southern flank,” Patton complained, but Bradley could do nothing about it.129 Patton walked away furious. “We got no gas because to soothe Montey [sic],” he later raged. “The 1st Army must get most of it.”130 Frustrated by the meeting, Patton returned to his headquarters to learn that Eddy had balked on his Commercy attack, worried that his tanks would run out of fuel. A furious Patton shot off a message to his XII Corps commander to drive until his tanks ran out of gas, then have the tankers get out and advance on foot. “We must and will get to a crossing on the Meuse,” he wrote. In World War I, Patton had drained the gas out of three-­fourths of his tanks to keep the remaining tanks moving. Why couldn’t Eddy do the same? “No one realizes the terrible value of the ‘unforgiving minute’ except me.” Patton knew that the German retreat would not last forever and that the seconds were ticking away. He took to reciting Rudyard Kipling’s poem “If,” a practice he began in England when his career looked dim: “If you can fill the unforgiving minute / With sixty seconds’ of distance run, / Yours is the Earth and everything that’s in it, / And—­which is more—­you’ll be a Man, my son.” He was getting desperate. “If I could only steal some gas,” he wrote Beatrice, “I could win this war.”131 Patton need not have worried about Commercy. When General Wood heard Patton’s order to go on the defensive, he cursed, explaining about tanks, “Their defense is to attack!” He then calmed down and realized

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what Patton had done for him: by attacking with tanks, he would actually be defending his position. His tanks rolled forward the next day, capturing Commercy and discovering eighty thousand gallons of enemy gasoline in the process. Patton said of the windfall of lower-­grade fuel, “It is not good but it works.”132 Walker’s XX Corps also lacked fuel. While Irwin’s 5th Division had finally captured Reims, Silvester’s tanks were running out of gas as they raced for Verdun. To compensate, Walker put one of Silvester’s combat commands into reserve and used the other two to break into the city, followed by Irwin’s infantry. Walker’s achievement amazed combat veterans who knew that Verdun had been a black hole of death during World War I, where fifty French divisions fought for ten months, resulting in about 385,000 casualties. Walker captured it with only two divisions, in one day, and with only a handful of casualties. French Resistance fighters helped by cutting detonation wires under the main bridge into the city over the Meuse River. To sweeten the victory, Walker’s men found twenty-­five thousand cases of liquor, which Patton ordered sent to his hospitals.133 Unfortunately, Verdun was as far as Walker would go. His tanks had run out of gas and not a single gallon reached Third Army that day. Patton wrote Beatrice that she would learn why he was stuck and waiting for supplies in his future book, “Fear of Etc.”134 Patton spent the last day of August visiting his only truly stagnant corps—­Middleton’s VIII, which was still trying to crack the German defenses on the Brittany Peninsula. Along the -­way he saw Macon’s 83rd Infantry Division at Saint-­Malo. With Cherbourg still not delivering needed supplies, he needed Saint-­Malo’s port cleared. As he entered Macon’s command entrance, Patton noticed two German prisoners sitting and ordered them to stand up. They remained seated, so he told their guard they if they did not stand, he would personally shoot them. The guard tried to get them to stand up but still they refused. Finally, Patton unholstered his ivory-­handled pistol and the prisoners quickly stood up.135 Patton found Middleton optimistic about the inevitable fall of Brest, yet Saint-­Nazaire and Lorient continued to hold out (they did so for the rest of the war), as did parts of Saint-­Malo. “He is full of alibis and complains,” Patton later wrote. “Armored infantry are not really good.”136 Worse, Middleton was still holding onto most of Grow’s 6th Armored Division, which Patton desperately wanted in the east. On the flight back

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Figure 17. Patton spent the last day of August visiting Major General John Macon, the commander of the 83rd Infantry Division, who was trying to crack the German defenses around the port city of Saint-­Malo. Macon often worried that Patton would fire him for not taking the city quickly enough. Library of Congress, OV 20, 43.

to Bradley’s headquarters, Patton told Bradley he could not fight on four fronts indefinitely. Fortunately, Simpson’s Ninth Army would soon be coming online, and Middleton would be part of it.137 Patton’s eastern drive had blitzed so quickly across France that Allied aircraft had to parachute ten tons of maps to his forward units.138 He flippantly told his staff, “It would be a terrible thing if the ground forces should outrun their air forces, wouldn’t it?”139 But he spoke too quickly. Later, Bradley sent him a depressing message: Third Army would only be receiving two thousand tons of supplies while Hodges would receive five thousand tons.140 Patton’s Third Army, which had raced so brilliantly across France, was running out of gas. “The only thing for an army to do when it has the enemy on the run,” he told Frederick Ayer, “is to keep going until it runs out of gas, and then continue on foot, to keep killing until it runs out of ammunition and then go on killing with bayonets and rifle butts.” Third Army had reached the first phase of his concept.141

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Patton tried to end his day on a high note, celebrating the fact that the next day Eisenhower would officially take over direct command of all ground forces in western Europe from Montgomery. Patton saw the transition of command through his own lens: “This is the last day Monty commands the U.S. [troops]—­Thank God!” But it would not start off well. To smooth over Montgomery’s reduced role, Eisenhower held a press conference to praise the British general, in the process calling him one of the great generals of the war. Patton heard it differently. “Ike said Monty was the greatest living soldier,” he wrote in his diary. The British Army also promoted Montgomery to the rank of field marshal, putting him a rank higher than either Bradley or Eisenhower. The promotion almost made Patton sick.142 Despite his anger and frustration over the fuel problem, Patton should have been proud. After only a month, his army had raced across most of France and was nearing the German border. Thirty days earlier, his army occupied only a few miles south of Avranches. Now it stretched from the port of Brest to Verdun, some 525 miles, and his western front was thirty-­five miles wide. Back before Patton took command of Third Army, soldiers, mostly infantry, struggled to scratch out a few yards in the dizzying maze of hedgerows. After Patton took control, the war transformed to one of maneuver, advance, and success. Before Patton joined the battle, everyone worried about stalemate; after his Third Army became operational, they talked about the collapse of the Germany army and the possibility of being home for Christmas. Patton moved so quicky across France that two scheduled airborne drops were cancelled when his tanks overran their drop zones. When the paratroopers and glidermen learned why their drops were cancelled, they wanted to personally thank him. Third Army left a wake of burned-­ out tanks and halftracks, dead horses, and charred corpses in its wake. The Germans rarely stopped to fight. Patton’s tanks overran airfields with German fighter craft burning in hangers—­the German did not have time, pilots, or fuel to fly them out. His men advanced with cold-­blooded efficiency. When a German tank fell into a crater in the middle of a road, a bulldozer crew simply covered it with dirt, with the dead crew still inside. American soldiers who usually identified themselves with their regiment or division, now simply said, “I’m with Patton.”143 As Patton’s tanks and infantry freed French towns, locals rushed into the streets to see their liberators rumble through. They poured wine and

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champagne into the Americans canteens, receiving chocolate bars and chewing gum in return. Even before the Americans arrived, Resistance fighters and newly empowered local leaders dragged collaborators from their homes for beatings (at the least), while publicly shaving the heads of any women who had slept with German soldiers. The world had changed. A number of factors contributed to the new way of war, but the one common denominator was Patton. His kicking, screaming, and shaming of soldiers, his intricate knowledge of tanks, fighter aircraft, enemy capacities (and limitations), and his refusal to take counsel of his fears and advance in the face of the unknown had transformed the American army. If it had not brought the Allies close to an unexpected victory, it had surely shortened the war by months, if not years.144 By this point everyone could see how amazing Patton’s month-­long drive had been. An elated Churchill, who had seen his fill of war, noted in his diary, “Our armies are racing to the Belgian frontier, faster by far than went the Panzers in 1940. There is a feeling of elation, of expectancy and almost bewilderment, and it may well be that an end is now very close.”145 Gault McGown, a New York Sun reporter who had been captured two weeks earlier but managed to escape, reported that the Germans considered Patton the greatest American general, on the same level as Rommel.146 Patton’s friend French General Juin called Patton’s sweep across France “Napoleonic.” An interesting phenomenon occurred during the race across France. With every mile taken, Patton’s image seemed to improve. Doubters became believers and haters became relics. Patton the slapper, the big mouth, the bully, became Patton the genius, the bold, and the brave. The men stopped calling him “Old Blood and Guts,” replacing the moniker with terms of endearment like “the Old Man,” “the General,” and “the Fire Ball.” One soldier told reporters, “Patton can slap our whole damned regiment, one by one—­see? He can line us up and knock us in a heap, and we will still bounce along after him. You know why? Because he knows how to fight, that’s why, and we like guys who know how to fight.”147 One officer wrote home that “troops have moved so fast, thrust made, plans changed so swiftly, whole corps regrouped on such a vast and rapid scale that I know damned well the Germans couldn’t possibly know what happened; half the time we don’t know ourselves. None of us would have any other general.”148

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When Detroit News reporter John Carlisle interviewed soldiers, they praised their commander. “I brought my mechanized infantry ninety miles today,” one officer told him. “The Old Man wondered if our boys had the guts to do it, so we just showed him we could do it. All he’s got to do is give the word and we’ll take Berlin by ourselves.” Another officer explained, “General Patton told us that we had been in training for three years and now we were either good, or else, so we set out to show him, by God.” Soldiers who had fought yard-­by-­yard in the Normandy hedgerows thought then that the war would last twenty years. With Patton, they could suddenly imagine the war ending in a month.149 Even the British sang Patton’s praises. The London News Chronicle picked Patton as their “Man of the Week,” calling him Superman and describing his sweep to Argentan as “the swiftest outflanking move of any army in history.” It also paid tribute to his way of fighting: “Patton’s tactics have taken the German blitzkrieg of 1940 and, with America’s overwhelming war making resources, have forced it into an irresistible weapon to turn against the aggressor.” The London Evening Standard lauded both Patton and his men: “The same casual young men who lived among us and shared our trials and pleasures were now thundering out the annihilation of an army and the liberation of a country. And leading them was a legendary general—­Patton of the grim jaw and disconcerting manners.”150 Back home, Pittsburgh Press columnist Florence Fisher Parry expressed her happiness that Patton had redeemed himself. “I am so glad it was he who gave the Germans their greatest surprise.” She agreed that his personal lapses were inexcusable, but in times of war men like him were needed. “The world is full of useless good-­natured people with nice dispositions,” she wrote. “But when it comes to a showdown, you take them and I’ll take the General Patton.”151 Adding to Patton’s praises, a soldier’s father sent a record to Patton, parodying the song “Mother” but with revised lyrics: PATTON P is for the patience he is lacking, A is for Alexander—­also great—­ T is for his tankmen who adore him, T for the tales of him that they relate,

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O is for his password, which is “Onward,” N means nerve—­he’s got that, you’ll agree—­ Put them all together, they spell “HERO.” For that’s what Patton means to me.152

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“You son-­of-­a-­bitch!” Patton roared at Brigadier General Ewart Plank as he pulled him out of his chair by his lapels and held him up. “If you don’t get me some gasoline, you’re going to be a buck private!” Plank, the head of Bradley’s Advance Section for logistics, which included gas distribution, tried to explain that it would take several days to get any supplies from the Normandy beaches.1 Still in a rage, Patton stormed into Bradley’s office and shouted, “Dammit Brad, just give me four hundred thousand gallons of gasoline and I’ll put you in Germany in two days.” But to Bradley, Patton may as well have been asking for the moon. There was no fuel to give. C-­47 transports, which had earlier flown gas and supplies to Patton, were now assigned to an airborne drop at the city of Tournai to assist Montgomery (it was later cancelled). Bradley would later admit that if Patton had been given the aircraft he would have easily pushed past Metz.2 Patton now faced a different kind of war: one where he could not race from one river to the next; one where a rejuvenated German army would face off against his men and tanks; one where open fields, idyllic towns astride calm rivers, and sunny skies turned to rugged, muddy forests and washed out villages with heavy rains and swollen rivers; and one that would test Patton’s generalship in sundry new ways. Still, his sprint past Paris to the Moselle had been magnificent. His men had bypassed areas of resistance and kept driving into the enemy’s rear, gobbling up real estate and killing or capturing German soldiers. However, even while Patton impressed everyone with his sweeping and relentless attacks, his spearheads had rarely encountered hardened frontline troops to truly test his army. Patton biographer Ladislas Farago conceded that Patton’s infantry had not yet become as proficient as the Germans at their vocation and 111

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lacked the Germans’ do-­or-­die tenacity. Instead, Patton, a cavalryman at heart, had replaced aggressiveness with speed and mobility. The battles for Metz and Nancy would test Third Army and introduce Patton to the kind of warfare the Germans had long-­since perfected.3 Exacerbating Patton’s rage toward Plank and Bradley was the fact that he had given up smoking his cigars. He puffed an average of twenty cigars a day during the race across France, the same daily number as Ulysses S. Grant smoked during the Civil War. Patton smoked each cigar so quickly that the ends glowed red, never having a chance to become ash. When he gave up the habit, the nicotine withdrawal wreaked havoc on his humors. Staff members avoided him and his volatile temper, and even Willie wisely hid under his master’s bed instead of resting on the chair. Patton’s reign of terror lasted a week, finally breaking when he gave up, lit a cigar, and started playing with Willie. Word quickly spread that Third Army’s commander had returned to himself.4 On the morning of September 2, Patton phoned Walker, whose XX Corps had crossed into Luxembourg, and warned him not to let Prince Félix of Luxembourg, husband to the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg and a brigadier in the British army, cross the French border into his own country. Prince Félix would be visiting Walker’s headquarters and Patton did not want him going any further. “You will give him as an excuse the dangerous situation at the front,” Patton shouted over the weak connection, adding that he wanted Félix sent back to his headquarters that night—­the general did not want a Paris-­style uprising in Luxembourg to distract him from his war. Moments after he hung up, Prince Félix walked in to bid farewell. Patton reminded him he would be back in the evening. When the prince mused that he might press forward, Patton told him that he needed Eisenhower’s permission to do that. “See you this evening,” he reiterated as he headed out for a meeting with Eisenhower, Bradley, Hodges, and Major General Hoyt Vandenberg, the commander of the Ninth Air Force.5 At Bradley’s Chartres headquarters, Eisenhower forbade Patton from advancing until Canadian forces had cleared the Channel ports. Patton then misled Eisenhower, saying that his cavalry patrols had entered Metz but he needed gas for his armored divisions to catch up and reach the Rhine River. “My men can eat their belts, but my tanks have gotta have gas.”6 He begged for Eisenhower to keep his allotment of supplies to Third Army, declaring, “If you don’t cut us back we can make it on

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what we’re getting. I’ll stake my reputation on it.” Eisenhower shot back, “Careful George that reputation of yours hasn’t been worth very much.” Patton hitched up his belt and replied with a smile, “It’s pretty good now.” Bradley, who knew how much Patton’s name had electrified the press, agreed with him.7 Eventually, Patton and the others convinced Eisenhower to let First and Third Armies try to break the Siegfried Line and advance into Germany once Montgomery had captured Calais. Patton would aim for Mannheim and Frankfurt, 170 miles east, while Hodges would attack toward Koblenz and Cologne.8 Patton learned he would also soon be getting back Wyche’s 79th Division, which had been temporarily attached to First Army, as well as Leclerc’s French 2nd Armored, and the balance of Grow’s 6th Armored.9 Despite Eisenhower’s extreme anxiety about the gasoline situation, he gave Patton permission to cross the Moselle River once he had sufficient supplies. Several times during the meeting Eisenhower spoke about a future great battle for Germany. Patton disagreed, assuring him the enemy would have nothing to fight with if the Allies kept up the pressure. “If we wait,” Patton argued, “there will be a great battle of Germany.” He felt everyone but Eisenhower wanted to press ahead rapidly. Worse, in Patton’s opinion, “Ike did not thank or congratulate any of us for what we have done—­what a leader.” Infuriated by Eisenhower’s reluctance to press full steam against the Germans, he added, “Ike is all for caution since he has never been at the front and had the feel [for combat].”10 Eisenhower, for his part, came away from the meeting energized and optimistic. He wired Marshall that “all reports show that the enemy is routed and running on our entire front.11 Patton wasted no time getting new orders to his army. Before leaving the meeting, he called his headquarters, ordering that none of his divisions were to move beyond their bridgeheads, although cavalry reconnaissance teams could still push east. His orders were somewhat moot since his forward formations were already immobilized by a lack of fuel.12 Yet Third Army did not stop completely. By parking thousands of vehicles, his soldiers were able to squeeze what gas they did have to keep enough of their tanks on the move.13 Before Patton’s order went out, elements of Wood’s 4th Armored Division had gone twenty miles before running out of gas.14 Eddy found it strange that his corps had to halt, “while other armies are forging ahead, evidently with everything that is

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needed,” especially since the Germans did not seem to have any fight left in them.15 Walker found other difficulties. A diversionary advance on Sedan by Silvester’s 7th Armored tanks came to a stop when their gas tanks ran dry.16 But it was not all bad news for Walker. A small 3rd Cavalry Group patrol, consisting of three armored cars and six jeeps, all using captured enemy gas, sprinted seventy miles ahead of XX Corps and seized a bridge at Thionville over the Moselle River, eighteen miles north of Metz. The patrol crossed into Germany and even cut the retreating Germans’ demolition wires under the bridge, but with no support, it retreated under heavy enemy fire.17 Patton’s army was now so close to Germany that almost all reconnaissance flights flew over the country, sometimes to a depth of fifty miles. They reported that the Maginot Line seemed deserted and that the Siegfried Line appeared neither manned nor armed. Intelligence reports revealed that the Germans were arming civilians and training children to operate antiaircraft guns. The route into Germany seemed open.18 Bradley and Eisenhower referred to Patton’s situation as an active defense. Patton would later tell his staff he didn’t know what that meant since he associated defense with defeat. “Nobody ever successfully defended anything,” he told them as he launched into historical examples of defeat derived from defensive fighting, citing the Great Wall of China, Troy, Syracuse, and the Maginot Line. “An army is defeated when it digs in.”19 The next day, September 3, Patton received another blow. Eisenhower, desperate to crack the German defenses at Brest and open up an Atlantic seaport, had ordered the Ninth Air Force, including Weyland’s XIX Tactical Air Command, to fly west, some five hundred air miles from Patton’s front, to join in the fight at Brest. With that one order, Patton lost his most effective weapon: airpower.20 Brushing off this latest setback, he visited Eddy to compliment him on a job well done. Eddy informed him that General McBride’s 80th Infantry Division had just captured one hundred thousand gallons of gas, which immediately went to Wood.21 Patton then flew to Commercy, to learn how Colonel Bruce Clarke and his Combat Command A (CCA) of Wood’s 4th Armored had captured the town of Vitry. Clarke told him that by charging the town with all guns firing, his tankers knocked out four 88mm antitank guns. “He is a great officer,” Patton enthused.”22

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Patton and Eddy then flew to McBride’s headquarters, which they found in good form. Patton mentioned in his diary that “there were Red Cross girls right up in front.”23 Afterward, he and Codman drove the countryside to visit Patton’s World War I battlefields. They drove though Essey and Pannes, where Patton had personally led the fledgling American tank corps. “This is where we came in,” he told Codman. When Codman asked him what his response would be if someone had seen him there in 1918 and predicted that in twenty-­six years he would be covering the same ground as the head of an army driving for Germany, Patton retorted, “I would have said, ‘an intelligent and farsighted prediction, because that is exactly what I mean to do.’” To the east stood a huge monument to the American dead from the September 1918 Battle of Saint-­Mihiel. Patton credited Eisenhower with building the monument after the war, when Eisenhower had served with the American Battlefield Monuments Commission, but sarcastically noted that it was Eisenhower’s “only experience with that incident.” He believed Eisenhower’s lack of combat experience had led him to back Montgomery, which “will probably justify more memorials to American dead. Every war costs lives.”24 With the bulk of supplies going to Montgomery, Patton likened his efforts to reach Metz and Nancy to the “rock-­soup” story, in which a tramp knocks on a woman’s door and asks her for boiling water to make rock soup. Intrigued, the woman provides him the boiling water and the tramp places two polished rocks in it. Then he asks her for some potatoes and carrots to give it a little flavor, and eventually obtains some meat, tricking the woman into providing him with a whole meal. For Patton, the trick would be to feign reconnaissance efforts, then reinforce them to enable his troops to attack. “It is a sad method of making war.” He would even tell Bradley, “To hell with Hodges and Monty, we’ll win your goddam war if you’ll keep Third Army going.”25 Eisenhower finally gave Patton the green light to drive east to the German city of Frankfurt-­am-­Main on September 4. That day, C-­47 transports delivered 110,000 gallons of gas into the Reims airport, with more on the way. Within a week, the fuel drought would end.26 Eddy captured Toul on the Moselle River and was pushing toward Pont-­à-­ Mousson, north of Toul and only fifteen miles from Nancy. Thinking that the enemy was in full retreat, he ordered McBride’s infantry to cross the Moselle, but the Germans were ready for them. The next day, three daylight crossings at Pont-­à-­Mousson came under fire before they even

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MAP 4. Crossing the Moselle, September 1–13, 1944.

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reached the river, forcing the men to pull back. One battalion made it across but the Germans wiped it out. Hap Gay reported on the battalion that made it across: “It is not known how many of these troops were killed and how many captured, but none of them escaped.”27 Eddy blamed himself for not launching McBride’s attack a night earlier. German resistance was stiffening.28 That same day, Hitler reinstated Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt as commander in chief in the West. He had fired him in July but Patton’s race across France, which left the German army in ruins, forced Hitler to bring von Rundstedt back to restore order. As Montgomery and Bradley proposed different offensives in their own areas, one of von Rundstedt’s staff officers revealed how simple the Allies plan should have been—­a thrust to the Rhine anywhere. According to General Siegfried Westphal, von Rundstedt’s chief of staff, “A heavy defeat anywhere along the front, which was so full of gaps that it did not deserve the name, might lead to a catastrophe if the enemy were to exploit his opportunity skillfully.” Even though Montgomery was closer to the important Ruhr industrial area, it was Patton who had blazed a trail closest to the Rhine and had been stopped short of his goal by Eisenhower’s shifting of supplies, not by enemy resistance.29 Eisenhower wanted both the Ruhr and Saar regions, figuring that with both he would have a stranglehold on two of Germany’s main industrial areas while destroying the enemy’s ability to wage war. Yet, he also wanted, despite the logistical logjam, to crack the Siegfried Line, telling the Combined Chiefs that it was “a gamble which I am prepared to take.”30 Meanwhile, Patton moved his headquarters to Châlons-­ en-­ Champagne, south of Reims, in a building across a canal from the city’s Notre-­Dame-­en-­Vaux church. As his limousine sped him through the town of Montereau, where jeeps and artillery pieces lined the road, men snapped salutes. Up ahead, a 105mm artillery cannon, with “Big Bertha” painted on its barrel, jackknifed into the street. Patton’s driver swerved as the barrel missed the limousine by a few inches. The limo slowed and the soldiers watched as Patton frowned but continued to return salutes.31 Later that day Mrs. Anna Rosenberg visited Patton. As a member of President Roosevelt’s War Manpower Commission, she was in Europe to gauge soldiers’ reaction to the newly enacted Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944—­forever known as the GI Bill of Rights, which would help transition soldiers back into civilian life after the war.32 Patton should

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have been encouraged by her work, an attempt to prevent another Bonus March, like the one in 1932 when World War I veterans gathered on Capitol Hill to demand their promised war service bonuses early. Patton had been slightly involved in the violence that preceded evicting the veterans from the city. But Patton could not see past her religion, accusing her of merely sight-­seeing and referring to her as a “Jewy Jewess.”33 To make matters worse, Willie bit her leg. She screamed as Patton laughed at the situation.34 His racism and anti-­Semitism came out again when Catholic Archbishop Francis Spellman, the vicar for the U.S. Armed Forces, visited. Patton referred to him as “anti-­Roosevelt, CIO [Congress of Industrial Organizations], Negrow [sic], Jew, and English—­quite a man.”35 On September 5 Patton gathered his corps commanders to hear some good news from General Bradley, who told Patton that the northern front had stabilized, so Third Army would now be receiving half of all available supplies.36 Bradley wanted Patton to cross the Moselle River, crack the Siegfried Line, and aim for the German cities of Frankfurt, Mannheim, and Karlsruhe, some 150 miles away along the Rhine River. Patton immediately ordered Walker to strike Metz while Eddy captured Nancy, optimistically adding that their offensives should “take us all the way to the Rhine.”37 He expected Walker to break through the Siegfried Line before the Germans could man it.38 To help Patton, Bradley promised to return Haislip’s XV Corps, as well as Macon’s 83rd Division and Grow’s 6th Armored, once they were fully relieved in the west. Patton would lose Middleton’s VIII Corps, however, as Bradley placed it under Simpson’s Ninth Army. With Eddy still worried about his exposed left flank, Patton planned to place Haislip on his right.39 But the Germans had reinforced the Metz region. Units had been trickling into the area for weeks, eventually consisting of four divisions and an armored brigade, enough forces to reconstitute the German First Army and making it the strongest enemy army in the West. Two of the regiments consisted of soldiers from an officer candidate school and a noncommissioned officer school, battle-­hardened veterans who knew how to take the initiative in combat. Its new commander, General Otto von Knobelsdorff, was an optimistic leader with experience on the Russian front. The Germans began patrolling aggressively and even dropping agents behind Patton’s lines. Most were quickly picked up. One group of nine men, equipped with radios and codes, made a night drop near Nancy but were quickly found, thanks to a double agent.40

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Metz itself would prove a hard nut to crack. A double ring of forts surrounded the city. The inner ring contained fifteen forts dating to 1866. They could not house heavy weapons but served mostly as infantry strongpoints. The outer ring contained twenty-­six forts, which the Germans had built between 1871 and 1912. These were complex defenses that could stand alone in a siege. The heavy gun batteries within the forts, particularly Forts Driant and Jeanne d’Arc on the west bank of the Moselle, could easily fire on troops crossing the river.41 The Germans had reinforced the forts during their occupation, building walls and ceilings so thick they were immune to both artillery and aerial bombardment. In addition, part of the Maginot Line had been incorporated into the city’s defenses, as far north as Thionville and south to Boulay. Hitler declared Metz a fortress, meaning the defending troops could only surrender with his permission.42 The fortified city would prove a painful thorn in Patton’s side, eventually requiring the entire might of Third Army to capture it. Besides Metz’s formidable defense, the Moselle River proved difficult to cross without intact bridges. Unlike the other rivers Patton had crossed, the Moselle had a faster current and, in places, steeper slopes. Between Metz and Thionville the river widened to about 170 yards, the widest river Third Army had crossed since the Seine, which had been lightly defended.43 Even the ground leading to the river proved difficult. Heavy rains had turned it into mud, leaving tanks bogged down in the ooze. If in earlier phases of the campaign Patton simply bypassed defended cities in his drive toward Paris, now he no longer had that option. He needed Metz’s valuable road net to keep out of the mud. If he tried bypassing, he would have to surround Metz with three divisions while the rest of his army advanced east. Every fort would have to be eliminated through hard fighting under dark clouds and heavy rains.44 Patton traveled to Walker’s XX Corps command post, two miles west of Verdun on September 6. On his way there, he stopped near the town of Conflans, where he saw enemy machine-­gun and mortar fire hold up some 7th Armored tanks. Patton, standing in his vehicle, raced to the front line where he roared, “Who the Goddamn hell is in charge of this?” When a lieutenant popped his head up and claimed responsibility, Patton snapped off a series of cuss words at him before explaining, “You personally are holding up the advance of the entire Allied army.” More cusses followed. Then he ordered an immediate attack.45

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Patton showed up at Silvester’s headquarters and gave him “the divil” [sic] for his slowness. “I wanted him to make a real charging attack with tanks leading,” he later wrote.46 He reprimanded Silvester for telling the press that the enemy hadn’t stopped his tanks, that it was done by “higher authority,” implying Eisenhower, something Patton would not tolerate. When Silvester denied using the term, Patton believed him, having been a victim of such misreporting himself.47 He had recently reprimanded a reporter for writing that he carried pearl-­handled pistols. “Any fool would know that you can’t shoot straight with pearl-­handled pistols,” he told the reporter. “Mine are ivory.”48 At XX Corps headquarters, Walker promised to reach the Moselle and showed Patton his plan to take Metz. Two days earlier, he had sent Silvester’s 7th Armored against both Thionville in the north and Metz directly east. The two cities were about eighteen miles apart. Irwin’s 5th Division supported the attack on Metz, while McLain’s 90th supported

Figure 18. Major General Lindsay Silvester, the commander of the 7th Armored Division, often ran afoul of Walker and Patton for slowness and rumored criticisms. Catalog number: 111-­SC 279905, National Archives and Records Administration.

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Thionville. If they could cross the Moselle, both forces would be in an excellent position to commence their attacks. While Patton fumed at Walker for not having already captured Metz, he did not blame him (or Eddy for that matter) for his difficulty regaining momentum; instead, he blamed Eisenhower, whose order to halt Third Army was still “a fateful blunder.”49 The next day, September 7, Walker’s forces reached the Moselle after tough fighting. Elements of Silvester’s 7th Armored reached the town of Dornot along the river but had to withdraw when Germans in Fort Driant bombarded the town. An attempt to cross a patrol over the river failed under heavy enemy machine-­gun fire. Undeterred, Walker sent Irwin’s 5th Infantry forward to attempt a crossing the next morning.50 While Walker tried to cross the Moselle in his sector, Patton took a call from General McBride, in Eddy’s sector, who was fighting for Pont-­ à-­Mousson. McBride explained that a local Frenchman, calling himself General Houdemon, had rowed a small boat across the Moselle to warn that shelling the town would kill only French civilians, since the Germans were billeted in bomb-­proof shelters. McBride, who was preparing to shell the area, thought it a ruse even though the man claimed to be an old friend of Patton’s. “Quite right,” explained Patton. “General Houdemon is my dearest French friend; follow his orders as if they were my own,” he said and hung up. Patton had first met Houdemon in 1913 at the French army’s cavalry school in Saumur. McBride followed Patton’s orders, coordinated with Houdemon, and routed an SS unit from the rear. Houdemon rowed back to his side of the Moselle but the SS arrested him and he spent the rest of the war in a concentration camp. Upon his release, Houdemon wrote about Patton, “He appears as the wall of stone, like his model ‘Stonewall Jackson,’ hero of the War of Secession.”51 Later, two officers showed up from Bradley’s headquarters with orders for Patton to give them one of his cavalry troops, which he did uncharacteristically without question. Patton, who normally complained about inconveniences to his diary or letters to Beatrice, never mentioned it. Gay noted in the Third Army diary that they were forming a “T” Force “for the purpose of selecting and seizing important strategic documents and personages.” This was actually part of a mission code-­named ALSOS, which was searching for evidence of a Nazi atomic bomb and capturing German scientists to gage their progress. The men of ALSOS would eventually find their answers at a physics laboratory in Strasbourg, four

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months later. The Germans, it turned out, trailed the Americans in atomic research. Patton understood the mission’s top-­secret importance and thus stayed quiet about it and did not complain.52 Later in the day, Patton met with celebrities Bing Crosby and Dinah Shore before they departed for a show, and he for a press conference. Codman worried about the encounter. “Theater people seem to have a lingering effect on the General,” he wrote. “That of inciting him—­quite unconsciously—­to outperform them.” He had done the same thing with Bob Hope, Jack Benny, and Al Jolson in Sicily.53 Codman need not have worried. The meeting went well, although a rumor spread among Third Army soldiers that Crosby had infuriated Patton by wearing the dreaded wool cap, and that Patton almost court-­martialed him, something he could not do to a civilian. Ironically, Crosby would sport a wool cap while playing a soldier in his 1954 classic movie White Christmas.54 Pumped up from his celebrity run-­in, Patton headed to an off-­the-­ record press conference, or “inquisition” as he called it, to announce his reaching the Moselle River. He showed up with a bandage on his head, which he didn’t explain, and told the reporters, “I am not quotable, and if you want to get me sent home, quote me, goddammit.” He immediately praised Weyland’s flyboys—­“They have done a great job with us”—­and encouraged the correspondents to report their actions. When some reporters reacted negatively to Patton lighting a cigar, he told them, “Anybody who wants to have a big crucifixion, here I am.” When a reporter asked him to compare his current operations to his World War I experience, he explained that he had revisited two places where he jumped off in 1918. He pointed at his head bandage and said, “This is not a wound; I just ran into an airplane.” He then told them a story about his World War I injury. When staff officers accused him of being shot in his butt during the Meuse-­Argonne offensive, implying he was retreating, General John J. Pershing, the commander of the American Expeditionary Force responded to the smear, “You Goddamned bastards, if Patton had sat in an armchair as long as you have, the bullet would have bounced.”55 Patton then focused on reaching the Siegfried Line: doing so would signal that he had truly reached Germany. “I hope to go through the Siegfried Line like shit through a goose!” he said, with a quick follow-­ up: “That is not quotable.”56 When asked why he thought he could crack the line so quickly, he smiled, “My natural optimism.” When pressed, he explained, “You can’t have men retreating for three hundred or four

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hundred miles and then hold anything—­the psychological result in long retreats.” He extrapolated on his theory of retreat: “As soon as a man gets in a concrete line, he immediately says to himself, ‘the other man must be damn good, or I wouldn’t have to get behind this concrete.’” But this is exactly what the German army was about to do. Patton was right, in that he relied too heavily on his own natural optimism.57 He admitted that the lack of gasoline had cost him much time. “Had we hit the Moselle four days earlier, it would have been like pissing in the wind. We would have gone over.” He also admitted that he would not crack the Siegfried Line by his birthday, only two months away, although he had bet $75 he would. “I am going to lose that goddamn thing.” When asked if Montgomery or Hodges would flank the Siegfried Line in Holland, he admitted, “It will cost me $75 if they do.” He did not know if his Third Army or Hodges’s First Army would be heading to Berlin, only that “I’m going to lick the next son-­of-­a-­bitch in front of me.” He also referred to French Resistance help as “better than expected and less than advertised.” When asked if the Germans facing his army were not fighting as hard as they were on the Russian front, he told them, “I haven’t seen any German son-­of-­a-­bitch that wouldn’t quit yet.” He complimented Montgomery’s advance in the north, calling it phenomenal and saying that he had “completely buggered the whole show” for the Germans, while crediting Bradley for improvising while closing the Falaise pocket. When asked if the gap could have been closed more quickly, he refused to answer. “It is always easy to say what you could have done after you haven’t done it.” He also reported that Patch’s Seventh Army was only about ninety miles from Third Amy. When a reporter jokingly asked if he could slow down, Patton told him it would waste lives. “Up to present,” he explained, “we have traded about between ten or twelve [German lives] to one [American].”58 He also addressed his own coverage in the press and his thoughts about journalists in general. “I have the unfortunate ability to be good press,” he told them, even though, for his future, “it is not good for me to be in the press.” He considered himself generally cautious and claimed that he mostly sat around and cursed. When asked if bad headlines were behind him, he disagreed. “Oh hell no. I can be accused of sodomy or anything else.” He complained that the press failed to report that for every soldier he damned, he “patted a thousand on the back.” He admitted that it made better press to depict him cursing at everyone instead of visiting hospitals

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and writing letters to mothers of the dead. “I kick some son-­of-­a-­bitch in the ass that doesn’t do what he should, and it comes out all over the country.” He worried that negative stories would get him cashiered from the army. “I have got to get some retirement pay.”59 Despite the bad press, he appreciated frontline war correspondents. “What you gentlemen are doing is of incalculable advantage to us.” He credited their stories of brave soldiers, which inspired other soldiers to move forward. He also addressed the importance of medals, particularly their ability to inspire soldiers. “If five cents worth if ribbon can produce that effect, it is a goddamn good investment,” he said, adding that deserving soldiers who missed getting a medal were inspired by those who did. He then praised engineers and signal corps soldiers who “shovel shit and mend wires at all hours of the day and night.” He wanted stories about them, for without their work filling potholes, needed reinforcements and supplies would not reach the front. “These fellows deserve everything they can get, because they are great fellows . . . they are the unsung heroes of the war.”60 When asked broader questions about war and peace, he admitted, “Nobody can prevent another war,” adding, “There will be wars as long as our great-­great-­great-­grandchildren live. The only thing we can do is to produce a longer peace phase between wars.” To a question about the occupation of Germany after the war, he sneered, “I hope to Christ I am not occupying. I want to go and fight the Japanese.” When pressed about the army’s postwar demobilization, he answered by using a battle map analogy: “All I do is what I’m told between two black lines.” He declined to compare the American soldier from the last war to the soldier in this war, explaining wryly, “I might run for mayor some time.” Then he answered carefully, “I do say this: that the American soldier in this war, due to the length of time we have been in it, and due to the lessons learned in the last one, is much better trained.” He stressed that these Americans thought they could beat anything, an important mindset in war. He also praised the soldiers’ equipment, calling it “very amazing.”61 In comparing his blitz across France to Germany’s 1940 blitz, he credited the U.S. Army truck as the key to success. “The 2½-­ton truck is the greatest military vehicle ever devised by man.” He concluded the conference by telling the reporters that if they quoted him, to refer to him as a Third Army official or a high Third Army officer.62 During the conference, Codman left for a phone call. He got back in time to see the reporters leaving the press room, laughing. He asked one

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if he enjoyed it. “Enjoyed it?” The reporter shot back, “Listen buddy, that guy in there, all by himself, without benefit of high-­priced writers, music, or scenery—­that guy is EIGHT-­EIGHTY ENTERTAINMENT (a popular theater company).”63 The next day, September 8, Patton got back to the war. He visited Eddy, who explained his plan to capture Nancy by a pincer movement. McBride’s 80th Division and most of Wood’s 4th Armored would envelop the city from the north, while Baade’s 35th Division, with elements of one of Wood’s combat commands, would envelop from the south.64 Impressed, Patton told Eddy he was doing a great job and approved his plan.65 The two then showed up at General Wood’s headquarters as enemy artillery rounds exploded across the street. Patton felt the headquarters was too close to the front. “However,” he wrote, “it is refreshing to find somebody who will get up.”66 Wood was a completely different tank commander than Silvester. Later that day, Patton learned the Germans were rallying against Walker. One of Irwin’s regiments in Dornot crossed the Moselle at a horseshoe bend in the river, only to encounter stiff resistance by the Germans, who boxed in Irwin’s bridgehead. Further north, as McLain’s 90th Division pressed toward the Moselle at Thionville, a German armor/infantry unit attacked, making it as far as McLain’s headquarters, where German soldiers captured valuable documents. One tank even came within twenty feet of McLain. Fortunately, the next day, the 90th’s soldiers killed nine-­ hundred Germans and knocked out forty of their tanks.67 Patton blamed the enemy attack on Gerow’s V Corps, which had prevented Hodges’s army from advancing parallel to McLain, but Hodges refused responsibility for “such errors made by the Third.”68 Yet, despite all the action at the front, Patton focused his anger at his superiors, who, in his opinion, were failing to get him supplies and denying him the troops he needed. He called Bradley to ask for the promised 83rd Infantry and 6th Armored Divisions, but Bradley wanted Macon’s 83rd to patrol the Loire River and screen Hodges from a potential German counterattack. “Let the Loire take care of itself,” Patton vented in his diary. Bradley told him his plans were too risky. “And so by saying,” he wrote, “[Bradley] takes a much worse risk.” That night, he wrote to Beatrice, “God deliver us from our friends, we can handle the enemy.”69 The next morning, Patton flew to a meeting with Bradley at Versailles to again press for Macon’s and Grow’s divisions, only to find Bradley getting ready to fly to Brest and assess the situation there. He had bent on his

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earlier refusal and told Patton he would provide him with the divisions if the situation permitted. He then admitted that he had to capture Brest “to maintain the illusion of the fact that the U.S. Army cannot be beaten.” Bradley’s passion impressed Patton, who agreed with him, but Bradley’s determination also meant keeping a sizable portion of Weyland’s fighter aircraft away, which Patton desperately needed in the east.70 That same day, a German V-­2 rocket had exploded in England. The new rockets were long-­range ballistic missiles that could travel into space faster than the speed of sound. The Allies had no way to stop them once launched. The V-­2 would change the ground war and push Eisenhower to back Montgomery’s plans.71 Bradley and Patton then flew to Paris, where Patton found no evidence of food shortages. He was relieved to see the city looking just like he remembered it twenty years earlier. While he could not find a taxi, he did find the Maurice Hotel, where he and Beatrice had once stayed. The owner recognized Patton and provided him with a meal, even though it was against rationing laws. Patton and Bradley then called on French general Bernard Serrigny, who had served as an aide to Marshal Phillippe Pétain during World War I. The general told Patton that, while he admired General John J. Pershing, “my [Patton’s] tactics were a thousand times better—­French!”72 Patton then sent Hap Gay to see Leclerc to make sure the French general was drawing his fuel from First Army stocks, since his tanks were still under Hodges’s command but would be coming under Third Army the next day. Gay made sure Leclerc would bring as much gas with him as possible when he departed.73 Meanwhile, Walker’s forces were finding the Moselle crossing a tougher endeavor than expected. With one of Irwin’s 5th Infantry regiments stuck at the horseshoe bend opposite Dornot, Irwin crossed the river further south at the town of Arnaville, on September 10. Irwin had not gotten the help he needed from Silvester’s 7th Armored. The Combat Command B (CCB) commander, Brigadier General John B. Thompson, had stopped his tanks because he mistakenly believed that a bridge had already been taken. Patton summarily relieved him. At the horseshoe bend, the fighting became so close that American wounded were not permitted to moan or call out for aid, lest a German mortar find them. The bridgehead was so precarious that Bradley’s air operations officer, learning about Irwin’s difficulties, released a number of P-­47s to assist, if only for a day.74

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On September 11 the Germans counterattacked at the horseshoe bend, charging in waves and shouting “Heil Hitler!” The Germans, holding a fort on the high ground on the east bank, fired artillery into the Americans perimeter. Unable to build bridges due to heavy German fire, and with his men on the east bank taking heavy casualties, Irwin withdrew his Dornot force. Even though superior German firepower caused the failure, Patton, of course, blamed it on Eisenhower’s indecisiveness.75 “I wish people would stop changing their minds and always at our expense. . . . Some way I will manage to keep going,” he promised himself.76 In Eddy’s zone, elements of Baade’s 35th and McBride’s 80th Divisions secured bridgeheads south of Nancy. McBride’s men waded across an armpit-­deep canal. When the Germans attacked, McBride’s supporting tank destroyers retreated until a regimental staff officer returned them to the battle.77 Meanwhile, Bradley assigned Grow’s 6th Armored, on its way to Patton, to protect twenty thousand surrendering Germans under General Erich Elster, who wished to surrender to Patton’s Third Army and not Simpson’s Ninth. This was no mistake. More than two weeks earlier, General Weyland, using ULTRA intercepts, had learned that German troops under Elster were heading to the Swiss border. He had his pilots knock out bridges and railways ahead of the Germans’ path. They then strafed the troops unmercifully, forcing Elster to send a surrender notice to the Americans. Third Army had already moved further east, and Simpson’s Ninth had taken over the area occupied by Elster’s Germans. At the surrender ceremony, Elster handed his pistol to Weyland, not Simpson.78 But to Patton, Bradley’s action only delayed Grow’s tankers from joining him for another day. To make the Germans believe that the 6th was on the line and dangerous, Patton assigned the 23rd Headquarters Special Troops, the deception unit, to roll into the Belgian town of Bettembourg with 6th Armored patches on their arms. The men inflated dummy tanks, played audio recordings of tanks, conducted radio communications, and placed 6th Armored markings on their vehicles.79 That same day, Third Army and the entire western Allied command accomplished a singular success of the war. In the village of Saulieu, a patrol from Grow’s 6th Armored (which had finally reached Third Army) spotted French dragoons from Alexander Patch’s Seventh Army. Further south, tankers from Leclerc’s French 2nd Armored, part of Haislip’s XV Corps, linked up with scouts from General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny’s

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French 1st Infantry Division, also of Seventh Army, outside of Nod-­sur-­ Seine, forty miles north of Dijon.80 After landing in southern France to sparse opposition on August 15, Patch’s army drove quickly up the Rhone Valley some three hundred miles to Dijon in less than a month, and a month earlier than expected. Patton and Patch had closed the gap separating the last two major Allied commands. The western Allies now had a contiguous front against the Germans, from the Netherlands to Switzerland.81 Combat was all around. Nine parachutes popped open above Third Army’s line and the entire crew of a stricken B-­17 bomber safely floated to the ground. They had lost two engines on the way to target and one immediately afterward. Patton ordered the men to his command trailer where he commented on their heroics. The men stood awkwardly until one broke the silence by asking Patton to sign his short-­snorter bill (dollars taped together and signed by flight crews). Everyone broke out laughing and Patton signed everyone’s bills. Patton chatted with the men for a while before calling over one of his officers and asking for Bronze Stars for the flyers. Even though they were not authorized for the medals since they were not under Patton’s command, he pinned them on anyway. He then posed for a picture with the crew before providing them with his personal C-­47 to fly them back to England. But before they could depart, Patton’s MPs arrested three of them for failing to wear helmets, liners, and neckties.82 On the flight back to England, one of the fliers kept repeating, “What a guy!” Another commented, “I never thought I’d get a chance to meet him. It was worth being shot down for.” The other crewmen agreed.83 Patton later wrote General Jimmy Doolittle, “They did a very sporting job and showed great courage,” concluding, “It was a privilege and pleasure to decorate them.”84 He also sent the crew’s group commanders several cases of wine and cognac.85 A few nights after that, he dined with a downed RAF pilot he had met at a Third Army hospital. The pilot told Patton that when he was rescued, an American corporal warned him to improve his dress since “the bastard [meaning Patton] might be right behind you.” Upon hearing that, Patton burst out laughing and responded, “Young man, have you ever seen a dirty soldier with a medal?”86 On September 12 Patton and members of his staff drove to another meeting with Hodges at Bradley’s Chartres headquarters. Along the way, they passed engineers attached to Major General Norm Cota’s 28th

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Infantry Division extending a pontoon bridge over the Meuse River. Enemy artillery shells suddenly exploded in the water. Even though the men were part of First Army, Patton ordered a progress report from the lieutenant in charge, who had been in the middle of the river directing construction. The lieutenant pointed out a German observation post on the far bank and Patton called Cota, ordering him to take it out. With that, Patton continued to Bradley’s headquarters. That night, the lieutenant received a $50 fine for failing to wear a tie.87 Patton showed up at the meeting nervous and irritable. When Bradley asked for each of his army commanders’ status, Hodges reported that he had enough fuel and ammunition for five days fighting and could reach the Rhine. Patton reported that he had enough for four days and could also reach the Rhine.88 It did not go well from there. The day before, Hodges’s troops had crossed into Germany, earning Patton’s ire.89 Patton read aloud a list a list of supplies received by Hodges, which made it sound like First Army had received fewer supplies than Third Army, implying Hodges’s staff of falsifying records. Patton also fumed at a rumor that Eisenhower had chewed out Bradley for not taking away enough gasoline from Third Army and giving it to Hodges. He worried that news of Montgomery’s efforts to capture Germany’s Ruhr Valley would put him on the defensive again while Montgomery reached Germany. Bradley told Patton he had only two days to solidly establish Third Army on the east bank of the Moselle or he would have to go onto the defensive.90 Bradley knew how to push Patton’s buttons. By laying down a challenge to either attack or defend, he knew Patton would throw himself into an attack.91 Patton agreed, believing that the Germans had no reserves and once he cracked the line, there would be nothing to stop him from reaching the Rhine.92 At one point in the meeting, Patton blurted out that Eisenhower was “not a commander,” adding that the supreme commander was too influenced by Montgomery. Major General Everett Hughes, who was also at the meeting, refuted Patton’s assertions, later writing his wife, “I think George is unfair.”93 When Bradley related that Montgomery had complained to Eisenhower that Patton’s supply of gas was slowing his own offensive, Patton shouted out, “That’s a goddamned lie!” and explained the trickle of fuel he had received. “How the hell are those small quantities holding up him or First Army? That claim is absurd.” The meeting over, he returned to his headquarters only to learn that his ammunition supply was so low that his artillery gunners were reduced to a third of

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their usual weekly allotment. The ration supply was worse. Stocks were so low his men were living off of captured German rations. “Goddammit!” he snorted, “SHAEF is not only hog-­tying us but trying to starve us to death as well!”94 While Patton was attending the meeting with Bradley, Walker’s XX Corps finally achieved one of its goals. McLain’s 90th Division entered western Thionville to stay, finding only landmines in the streets. The Germans still held positions across the Moselle and blew up the bridge over the river that night.95 In Eddy’s XII Corps area, both his infantry divisions crossed the Moselle River north of Nancy. Meanwhile, McBride’s 80th Infantry crossed south of Pont-­à-­Mousson, after a local priest pointed out a ford that the Romans had used for attacks into Gaul.96 Two regiments managed to cross the river and build two pontoon bridges before the Germans attacked, pushing McBride’s men back to river’s edge. Fortunately, one of Patton’s favorite tankers, Colonel Bruce Clarke of the 4th Armored, arrived and crossed the river with guns blazing. His tanks drove the Germans back, capturing prisoners in the process. While Walker and Eddy made minimal gains, Haislip made truly impressive progress, driving some thirty-­five miles to Charmes, where his men crossed the Moselle. They were too late to save twelve members of the French Resistance, whom the Germans killed before the Americans liberated the town.97 The next day, Leclerc’s tankers took Épinal, the first of Patton’s three-­city objective. Patton considered it odd that some river crossings met with stiff resistance while others faced almost none. “In the books,” he later reflected, “we would have stopped the attack where the resistance was and pushed the attack where the going was easy, but the books don’t consider difficulty in communication and the difficulty, or danger, of stopping a night attack once it has been launched.”98 All three corps were across the Moselle with secure beachheads by sunset on September 13. Patton had kept his promise, with a day to spare. Even better, Germans were surrendering in large numbers.99 Still, despite this stunning success, Eisenhower issued a directive that day assigning priority for supplies to Montgomery’s 21st Army Group, limiting Third Army to holding its bridgeheads across the Moselle in hopes of preventing the enemy from reinforcing its troops opposing Montgomery. Only after the field marshal had captured bridgeheads across the Rhine would Patton be permitted to attack across the Saar and to the Rhine. Eisenhower did leave one caveat, that if Third Army found itself with enough gas, “this advance will be initiated at that time.”100

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Desperate for gas, Patton tried to obtain it from an unlikely source. He visited a B-­26 bomber base and ordered the major in charge to cough up as many gallons of gasoline as possible. The major denied him and Patton flew into a rage until the major produced a note from Eisenhower, explicitly instructing the major to provide Patton only ammunition, no fuel, until the supply problem had been solved. A frustrated Patton boarded his jeep and roared off.101 Still, his advance, on such meager fuel supplies, impressed Bradley. “A less aggressive commander than Patton would probably have hoarded the pittance that came his way and halted his line for winter safekeeping behind the Meuse River line,” Bradley wrote in his memoir. “But George plunged boldly on beyond the Meuse 30 miles farther.”102 That day, Patton flew to Eddy’s headquarters to see about capturing Nancy, which seemed ripe to fall. After reviewing the situation, Patton, Eddy, and their staffs drove to the front. When they came to a Bailey Bridge over the Moselle that engineers were completing under fire, Patton noticed three men blasting away at rocks with jackhammers. He looked over a railing at the men, then gave them the “halt” motion by passing a finger across his throat. Two of the men stopped, but the third kept hammering away. When the man finally turned off his jackhammer, he looked up at Patton and asked, “What the hell do you want?” “Looks like damn hard work,” Patton told him. The man shot back, “Maybe you’d like to drag your ass down here and try it.” Patton bounded down to the soldier, grabbed the jackhammer, and began blasting away at the rocks. After about ten minutes, he gave the hammer back. “You’re right soldier—­it is damn hard work. I needed the exercise, thanks.”103 With that, he headed to the bridge, where his staff begged him not to cross under fire. Patton waved them off as he walked across alone, not wanting a single artillery round to wipe out his entire group. Eddy did not cross but instead returned to his XII Corps headquarters.104 Patton reached Wood in Arracourt and congratulated him on his role in encircling Nancy. Both his northern and southern pincers had reached east of the city but were still ten miles apart. As the two generals inspected artillery positions outside Lunéville, Wood explained that he had met with the German commander and the town’s mayor earlier under a truce, only to learn the town’s warehouses were full of mustard gas. A stray round could have introduced gas warfare to the European war. Wood’s tankers would take the town the next day with little fighting and no damaged gas cannisters.105 Wood joined Patton for a visit to the front,

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where they watched a tank battle from a shallow observation post about fifteen hundred yards away. American tanks had already knocked out two German tanks, leaving them in flames. Beyond them, four American Sherman tanks charged up a wooded hill that reminded Patton of the backyard of his Boston home. He could see the muzzle flashes from the tanks and discern American and German machineguns from their different rates of fire. While Patton watched, he ate freshly picked wild plums from the trees around his observation post. While he considered the engagement “lovely,” he later told to Beatrice that the plums made him sick.106 Patton then flew down to Attignéville to see Haislip, but once on the ground, his driver got lost, as Haislip was in the process of moving his headquarters fifteen miles east. When Patton finally found Haislip, he exploded and accused him of “running away” from his commander. Haislip snapped back that communications were the responsibility of the army headquarters, not his, and accused Patton’s signal units of not being worth a damn if they could not keep up with him. The two shouted at each other until Haislip calmed down enough to ask, “Do you want me to sit back and wait for your lousy units to get their communications, or do you want me forward where the fighting is? You can’t have both.” Haislip’s logic brought his commander back down to earth. “You’ve got something there,” Patton told him. “Of course, I want you forward, but dammit, don’t you run away from me anymore, either.”107 On September 15 Patton established a new headquarters five miles south of Étain, about fourteen miles east of Bradley’s new main headquarters, dubbed Eagle Main, in Verdun. Shell holes and trenches from World War I surrounded Patton’s new grounds, spooking Sergeant Meeks, who was convinced ghosts would be out in force since they hadn’t seen any soldiers for twenty-­seven years.108 Once he settled his headquarters, Patton headed off to Bradley’s headquarters, bringing Willie with him. Bradley occupied a huge, four-­story French army barracks on the western side of Verdun, complete with separate administrative buildings, manicured lawns, and equestrian statues.109 Patton arrived to find himself in the middle of a firestorm between Bradley and Pink Bull, the SHAEF operations officer. Bradley complained about Eisenhower’s kowtowing to Montgomery, accusing him of agreeing with Montgomery’s strategic plans and providing him with whatever he wanted at the expense of Patton. Bradley even threatened to ask for his resignation if Eisenhower

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gave Montgomery two of Hodges’s corps. Bull defended his boss by explaining that Montgomery refused to take orders. This was obviously music to Patton’s ears. Finally, Bradley was facing what Patton had been dealing with since Sicily. Patton jumped in and offered to resign too, but Bradley quickly backed down. The argument went well into the night when the conversation switched to gasoline. Bradley was fierce. “Many of our ground forces have done the impossible,” he told Bull, “Let SOS [Supply and Services] try the impossible for a while.” Again, Patton chimed in: “Hell, have ’em get off their asses and work the way our troops have.” Bull asked Patton about his supplies and suggested that his situation might improve if he could capture the railway line into Nancy. Just then, one of Bradley’s aides walked into the room and announced that Eddy had captured Nancy and that Haislip had mauled an entire German division. Baade’s 35th Division had captured Nancy with almost no opposition. The Germans had pulled out the night before, leaving only a garrison in the western part of the city. A special task force, guided by French Resistance fighters, had entered the city around 10:30 p.m.110 “Damn!” Patton retorted to the news, “How do you like that? Better congratulate me.” He could not have staged it better; Bull had seen in real time what Patton could do. Not only had he captured his objective, he had deliberately placed Haislip on Eddy’s right flank for protection, knowing he could eliminate any threat from the south. After Bull left the meeting, Patton said, “Goddammit Brad, you kept the flag waving. I’m proud of you!”111 Patton left the meeting in high spirits, with his aide, Major Al Stiller, carrying Willie. “He’s a sodomy son-­of-­a-­bitch,” Patton told Bradley’s aide, Chet Hansen, about his dog. “Keep him away from the pups.”112

CHAPTER SIX

Counterattacks at Nancy while Stymied by Metz The same day that Eddy captured Nancy, Patton called Walker demanding to know “why he was so slow.” While Eddy and Haislip were racking up victories, Walker had been stymied trying just to reach Fort Driant, possibly the strongest fort in Metz’s defenses. That morning, Walker made his opening moves. Elements of Irwin’s 5th Division headed northeast from their bridgehead at Arnaville toward Metz while others focused on Fort Driant. Meanwhile, McLain’s 90th Division headed south from Thionville to encircle Metz, much like Eddy had done with Nancy. Silvester’s 7th Armored supported both attacks, but they came to nothing—­except casualties. “I hope to bomb [the] hell out of them tomorrow,” Patton wrote.1 With Nancy and Épinal in his hands, Patton now wanted to push for the Siegfried Line. If he could breach it quickly, it might relieve the German pressure on his forces attacking Metz, leading to its capture. With that in mind, he headed to Nancy on September 16 to see if Eddy could breach the line in his sector. But more importantly, Patton wanted to dodge a group of Russian officers coming to visit his headquarters. He left his staff a with a very simple map to give the Russians. “That is what they do to us,” he argued. When the Russians did arrive, they asked Patton’s staff, “What is the intent of Third Army?” One of the officers offered it was to advance on Germany and destroy as many Germans as possible until the signing of an armistice or peace terms.2 At Eddy’s headquarters, Patton learned that Wood’s tankers had caught up with a German infantry unit headed for Nancy and had torn into them, capturing more than four hundred prisoners and capturing or destroying 26 armored vehicles, 136 other vehicles, and 10 artillery pieces. A pilot flying over the area described the 4th Armored’s route as “a path 135

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of destruction.”3 Despite the success, Patton went a bit overboard, telling Eddy how to go about his next attack, prescribing methods even down to the employment of reconnaissance units and combat teams. He also reinforced Eddy’s corps with extra artillery units. To Patton, cracking the Siegfried Line was not enough. He wanted Eddy to cross the Rhine near the city of Worms, some one hundred and fifty miles east.4 When Patton said to attack the next day to the northeast, Eddy argued that he was just as anxious to get moving but not so quickly; knowing his boss, he promised he would move promptly. Earlier that morning, elements of McBride’s 80th Division had suffered heavy casualties outside the town of Moivrons in a friendly-­fire incident with Grow’s 6th Armored, which had finally fully closed in on Lorraine. Patton told Eddy to have a few drinks before going to bed early. Before he left, he told Eddy his was the only corps still on the move.5 Patton next showed up at Walker’s headquarters to find the XX Corps commander pessimistic about capturing Metz. Patton had ordered eleven groups of medium bombers to blast a hole in the German defenses, but rain kept the bombers grounded. Despite knowing this, he openly accused Walker of having lead in his pants and threatened to give Silvester’s 7th Armored Division to Eddy, hoping that would spur Walker into action. Worse, he threatened that if Walker didn’t cross the Seille River, a tributary of the Moselle south of Metz, he would leave him behind at Metz while the rest of Third Army drove for the Rhine.6 As Patton paced nervously around Walker’s headquarters, he tripped over a sleeping soldier. “Dammit!” called out the GI, “watch your step! Can’t you see I’m trying to sleep?” Nonplussed, Patton told him, “Well you’re the first silly son-­of-­a-­bitch around this place who knows what he’s trying to do.”7 Later, Patton drove to Walker’s front. When he came across soldiers from McLain’s 90th Division marching on both sides of the road, he had his driver stop so he could get out and march with them. “You guys getting everything you need?” he asked as they walked along. “You guys are good soldiers. Keep moving, move as fast as you can, because the faster you move, the better off you are.”8 As poor weather delayed Eddy’s attack toward the Siegfried Line, Patton became more concerned about the weather than about supplies. “If it would only stop raining I could go faster,” he wrote Beatrice. “It is so wet that we have to winch the tanks up hill.” Yet supplies remained

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a problem, for which Patton now blamed Montgomery, whose plan to advance through the Netherlands using three airborne divisions in conjunction with a ground attack—­Operation MARKET GARDEN—­ ensured that Third Army would lose its airborne supply line. Patton resorted to feeding his men two hundred thousand pounds of captured beef and fifty thousand liberated cases of champagne, while fueling his tanks on one hundred thousand gallons of captured German gas.9 “I wish to God I was a first priority on supply,” he wrote, “but I ain’t.”10 To make matters worse, Bradley called on September 17 to say that Montgomery had commenced operation MARKET GARDEN and wanted all American units to halt while he made his “dagger-­thrust” into Germany. Bradley sarcastically thought it was more like a “butter-­knife thrust.” The combined airborne-­armored operation in the Netherlands failed to impress Patton. He considered paratroopers “more trouble than they are worth.” While he considered them fierce individual fighters, their divisions were not equipped with any staying power; Patton wanted to turn them all into regular infantry.11 Not wishing to be a victim of Montgomery’s campaign, he asked Bradley not to call him for two days and Bradley agreed. Patton was making rock soup again. Before he went to bed that night, he penned in his diary, “To hell with Montgomery.”12 Ironically, an out-­of-­touch Eisenhower wired Marshall that day about his quarreling generals: “The team is working well. Without exception all concerned have now fully accepted my conception of our problem and are carrying it out intelligently and with energy.”13 The fuel Patton desperately needed went to Montgomery’s tanks and cargo aircraft. He bet one of his staffers $75 that the effort would fail.14 A week earlier, Montgomery had requested that Eisenhower put forth a false flag plan, that Patton would be concentrating his forces on the capture of Metz and Nancy, in hopes that the Germans would reinforce those areas, thus weakening the northern sector where he would attack himself. SHAEF refused the British request, justifiably countering that the American attacks at those two locations were producing results. A desperate Patton urged Eddy to stay on the attack, but Eddy refused; the weather was just too bad. One of McBride’s regiments had just finished fighting while surrounded for four days at Mousson Hill until clear skies finally allowed American aircraft to break the siege. Eddy offered to attack in two days. “That is too late,” Patton wrote, “but apparently the best we can do.”15

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MAP 5. German Counterattacks, September 14–30, 1944.

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It was also on this day that Patton mentioned to his son his favorite new infantry tactic: “marching fire,” where soldiers fired while advancing, sometimes with the assistance of mortars or tank machine guns. The tactic kept the enemy hunkered down until the attackers were right on top of them. The limited arms technology in previous wars had prevented such a tactic. Single-­shot weapons required a rifleman to stop and reload. During the Civil War, soldiers often marched with their rifles unloaded to prevent friendly fire or self-­inflicted wounds. The same was true for many World War I combatants whose commanders wanted them to close with the enemy. By World War II, however, semiautomatic and automatic weapons made it possible for infantry to fire on the move. Patton promoted marching fire throughout Third Army, where soldiers applied it with deadly intensity.16 Wanting some kind of attack somewhere along his line, Patton drove to Haislip’s headquarters on September 18 to press the XV Corps commander to attack the next day. While he decorated Leclerc and some of his tankers, reports arrived of a major German attack on Lunéville twenty miles east of Nancy, in Eddy’s area.17 General Hasso von Manteuffel’s newly refurbished Fifth Panzer Army, consisting of two panzer brigades and the panzer grenadier (mechanized) division, was on the attack. Hitler had wanted Manteuffel’s attack to commence a week earlier and drive to Reims; however, he had to keep pushing the date back after Patton’s multiple Moselle crossings around Nancy, as well as Haislip’s mauling of German units and Hodges’s offensive further north. By the time Manteuffel finally launched his attack, the goal had been reduced to just pushing Eddy’s corps back across the Moselle.18 To assist Eddy, Patton ordered Haislip to attack toward Lunéville. He then took off for Nancy where he found a worried Eddy working the problem. The Germans had hit Wood’s 4th Armored and had already recaptured Lunéville. Eddy explained that Lunéville was being taken care of and that he was feeding elements of the recently arrived 6th Armored into the fray. He assured Patton that his operation would launch the next day, even though he felt the attack premature. “I hope that the Germans agree with him,” Patton later wrote.19 Despite the attack, Patton spent the night studying road nets for a place to breach the Siegfried Line. “Roads govern war.”20 But Patton assumed too much. The Siegfried Line now lay beyond his reach. The defensive battles around Nancy and Metz had taken center stage. He even admitted that he needed a better strategy for

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capturing Fort Driant. “There is no use in making poor infantry worse by batting their heads against forts they won’t take.”21 The Siegfried Line would have to wait. The next morning, September 19, Patton returned to Eddy’s headquarters to find a dejected corps commander. The Germans had counterattacked against Baade’s 35th Division and pushed it off a hill overlooking Nancy. The same attack also slowed the advance by Wood’s 4th Armored. Patton admonished Wood’s slowness to Eddy.22 Then he drew on an example from the Civil War to buck up Eddy’s spirits, explaining that General Grant had once said that in every battle there comes a time when both sides consider themselves defeated and the one who continues the attack wins. He followed up the Grant quote with one from Robert E. Lee, from the 1863 Battle of Chancellorsville: “I was too weak to defend, so I attacked.” The quotes did the trick. Eddy called Baade and ordered him to retake the hill before nightfall. Patton, unsatisfied with Eddy’s choice of words, grabbed the phone and snapped at Baade, “Take it by dark or be relieved.”23 Patton then visited Wood’s 4th Armored outside Arracourt, where Wood was wrapping up one of the biggest tank battles of the war. Patton worried that Wood had stretched his division too thin but decided it was worth the risk if he could break through the German line and push east to Sarreguemines, some forty miles away.24 Patton then found Bruce Clarke, who led him up a hill to show where his tanks had destroyed ten enemy tanks. Burned out tanks and charred bodies littered the valley below. Patton asked the captain in charge what kind of ammunition had been used and if the men needed more. “We’re in good shape,” said the captain. Referring back to the battlefield, Patton told Clarke, “This is the kind of thing that’s going to end the war quicker than anybody hoped.” Then he got in his jeep and rolled off.25 On his way back to his headquarters, Patton visited a frontline hospital. As he strode through the hospital’s hallways, all the doctors and nurses snapped to attention, but he hardly noticed.26 Montgomery’s MARKET GARDEN, which by September 20 had failed to cross the Lower Rhine River at Arnhem and push into Germany, somehow emboldened Patton and Bradley to think they could bound into Germany, even though Patton could not break free of Metz or Nancy. Impressed with Wood’s success at Arracourt, Patton sent him an order, bypassing Eddy in the process, telling him to cross the Saar River,

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advance rapidly, and capture Mainz, Wiesbaden, and Frankfurt. When Wood received the order, he told his staff, “Now that’s the kind of an order that makes sense and the kind of order that I like.” The order probably did nothing to bolster Wood’s relationship with Eddy.27 Like Patton, Bradley wanted a grand American sweep into Germany. He drew up plans for Patton to capture either Mainz or Worms, both on the Rhine River and more than a hundred miles northeast of Metz, a wildly implausible dream. To do so would require Patton capturing Metz, which still stymied Walker, and attacking from Nancy, where Wood was still fighting off Manteuffel’s counterattacks. To reach the Rhine, Patton would also have to capture the city of Château-­Salins, almost twenty miles northeast of Nancy, and then the city of Sarreguemines, which Patton had already ordered Wood to capture. Once across the Rhine, he could head north out of the Rhine Valley and then east to capture Frankfurt. Patton reviewed the plan at Bradley’s Verdun headquarters and felt validated when Bradley approved a plan he had already created. To accomplish the mission, he wanted two additional infantry divisions as well as eleven bomber groups to strike Metz. Unfortunately, neither Bradley nor the weather would assist Patton. Hodges had failed to show up at Verdun due to weather, but he was still supporting Montgomery’s stalled offensive in the Netherlands. That day, Eisenhower, at his passive-­aggressive best, responded to Montgomery’s request for more supplies by noting that Patton had been succeeding with almost no supplies: “You may not know that for four days straight Patton has been receiving serious counter-­attacks and during the last seven days, without attempting any real advance himself, has captured about 9,000 prisoners and knocked out 270 tanks.” Montgomery did not mention Patton’s exploits in his response.28 Patton never accepted the merits of MARKET GARDEN. When his brother-­in-­law asked him about it a month later, Patton told him, “For the first time in his life Monty came forward with a daring plan involving himself and it was one of the worst ideas I ever heard. I did not believe it would succeed and said so. I thought it was a terrible mistake then, and I still think so today.”29 Back at his headquarters that night, Patton took a call from Eddy, still downbeat about Baade’s 35th Division, which struggled to retake the hill overlooking Nancy lost to the Germans at the onset of Fifth Panzer Army’s attack. He also reported that Wood was locked in a bloody battle with more German tanks. An empathetic Patton

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admitted that Eddy’s mission might be impossible, but he enthused, “We could kill a lot of Germans trying.” That night, Eddy penned in his diary: “Impetuous Georgie, also unpredictable.”30 Patton tried to cheer himself by writing in his diary, “I think the Germans fighting me now are all there is, that is why they have no depth.” His thoughts then drifted to the plights of Eddy and Walker. “The situation tonight is tense, but we will win out. We must.”31 The next day, September 21, Eddy reported better news. After hard fighting and many casualties, Wood’s 4th Armored had driven the enemy back with heavy tank losses, while Baade had recaptured his hill and drove the Germans back—­with the help of McBride’s 80th Division. Wyche’s 79th Division, under Haislip, wiped out so many Germans in one town (some in hand-­to-­hand fighting) that, according to Patton, “in the distance of two blocks there were 1,600 dead [and] there was actually blood running down the gutter.”32 Patton got more good news when he learned that Brest had finally fallen to Simpson’s Ninth Army. He enjoyed Simpson’s report that the German commander, Major General Botho Henning Elster, regretted that he was not surrendering to Third Army. The only bad news of the day came from Walker: some of Silvester’s armored infantry had made it across the Seille River, but a German artillery barrage destroyed three trucks carrying bridging equipment, forcing the infantry to pull back.33 The overall picture must have put Patton in a good mood. But when he learned that his West Point classmate General Jacob “Jake” Devers, the commander of the Sixth Army Group, had bragged about all the units he was going to take from Third Army, an angry Patton flew to Paris, where he told Eisenhower to “spike Devers’s guns.” Eisenhower acted cordially toward Patton and even invited him to lunch where he opened up about his cantankerous army group commanders, calling Montgomery a “clever son of bitch” and maligning Devers so much that Patton later wrote, “Ike hates him.” When Devers and Patch showed up after lunch, the four generals reviewed the combat situation, but nothing was said about the troop transfers Devers had boasted about. To keep Devers from pilfering his men, Patton asked Beetle Smith to help him out if the topic ever came up. That night, Patton penned in his diary, “One has to fight one’s friends more than the enemy.”34 Patton spent the next day, September 22, at Walker’s front. On his way to the front lines, he came upon a group of soldiers looking for mines along a deserted road. When the sergeant in charge explained that they

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had been searching for mines for the last three miles, Patton asked if they had found any. “No sir,” the sergeant told him. Patton then asked, “do you expect to find any up there?” When the sergeant assured him there were none up ahead, Patton had his driver lead his convoy of four jeeps forward. They eventually drove up a hill, where he surveyed the surrounding area, then ordered his convoy back. The mine clearing team saluted as the jeeps sped by.35 Patton then drove out to McLain’s 90th Division, where he lunched with Lieutenant Colonel Christian Clarke, whom he had known in Hawai’i when he served there in the 1930s. Clarke presented him with a Nazi dagger. “It’s a good thing to get down to the small units,” Patton later wrote, “and a great pleasure as they are always glad to see you.” On the way back, Patton passed some slovenly looking French soldiers attached to XX Corps. “They are an utter rabble,” he wrote. “I hope to get rid of them.”36 After visiting the 90th, Patton met with Colonel James Polk, the new 3rd Cavalry Group commander, the replacement for Colonel Edward M. Frickett, who had been wounded outside of Metz. When Patton learned Polk was only thirty-­two, he said he was too young for the job. Polk quickly pointed out that Patton had been the same age when he commanded a tank brigade in World War I. Patton laughed and explained he had only been thirty-­one but looked a good deal older. He then explained that if the group got overrun or beaten because of Polk’s bad decisions, he would be relieved and Patton would never want to see him again. On the other hand, if the unit was mauled because of a decision higher up the chain, he would still be relieved, since a defeated commander had no place in his army. Patton escorted Polk to his new command in Luxembourg. Once there, he inspected a map of enemy positions across from the 3rd Cavalry. After his examination, he quizzed the reconnaissance squadron officer. “I know where every German division is on my front but one. Do you think it could be over there?” he asked while pointing to some woods across the Moselle. The officer explained the poor road net and the fact that all German prisoners were from identified units. Patton agreed with the officer’s assessment. “I was here in 1918 and if you are going to be attacked, they will come right down that valley,” he said, pointing at the map. “And I expect you to whip ’em!”37 Before he left, Patton stressed to Polk the precariousness of his job by telling him that Field Marshal Montgomery should have been relieved after not taking Caen for more than a month, because he was a beaten

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soldier and his men had no confidence in him. With that, Patton shook Polk’s hand and departed.38 That night, Eddy called Patton to report that General Baade had referred to his soldiers as whipped and asked to have Baade relieved of command. Ironically, after his lecture that day about defeated commanders, Patton refused.39 While Patton toured his front, Eisenhower hosted a meeting at his new Versailles headquarters to discuss future operations with the service chiefs and army group commanders. Bradley and Devers attended, but Montgomery did not, preferring, as usual, to send Major General de Guingand in his place. A week earlier, Eisenhower had taken operational control of Devers’s Sixth Army Group, consisting of Lieutenant General Alexander Patch’s U.S. Seventh Army and French General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny’s French First Army. The meeting hinged on clearing Antwerp, on which the Germans still had a strangle hold with their control of the Scheldt Estuary. If the Allies could clear the Scheldt, they could supply fifty-­four divisions by rail alone.40 Eisenhower needed Antwerp’s port up and running for the drive into Germany. Without it, they could not move their fighter aircraft forward, supply the armies with replacements, winterize the troops and equipment, and reconstitute units. To end the war by December, Eisenhower wanted to attack Germany from Montgomery’s front in the Netherlands, where Operation MARKET GARDEN had ground to halt short of the city of Arnhem. In Bradley’s sector, Hodges got the green light to push to the Meuse River and capture Cologne. Patton, again, was left out in the cold. Not only was he ordered to go on the defensive, dashing his hopes of reaching Frankfurt, he would also have to give Silvester’s 7th Armored to Hodges. Eisenhower, by backing Montgomery yet again, violated the old military maxim of never reinforcing failure. According to historian John McManus, “by choosing to double down on troubled Market Garden, Ike was essentially guaranteeing failure of all Allied operations that fall. At least if defeating Germany in 1944 was the ultimate objective.” Patton would have to perform his rock soup method of war yet again.41 The next day, September 23, Patton awoke to some good news. A UPI reporter told him that, on his last trip to the United States, movie theater audiences applauded Patton’s appearance more than President Roosevelt’s.42 Patton’s day soon soured, however, when he learned he had to give up not Silvester’s 7th Armored but Grow’s 6th. He returned to Bradley’s Verdun headquarters, where he found Bradley depressed

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over Montgomery’s persistent demands to Eisenhower that Hodges’s army should continue to support him. Additionally, Montgomery was rumored to be getting the American 1st Infantry Division. He had finally captured the port cities of Calais and Boulogne, increasing the possibilities of more supplies for his army group, enabling a thrust to the Ruhr industrial area.43 Patton argued that if he lost Grow, he would have to go on the defensive. Bradley relented on the transfer of the 6th Armored but then laid out more bad news: Patton would be allotted thirty-­five hundred tons of supplies, allowing him to make limited attacks only as supplies permitted. Also, although Patton now had Grow’s 6th Armored and Macon’s 83rd Division, Devers had asked for Haislip’s entire XV Corps, explaining that he could supply it better via Dijon in the south. Eisenhower had agreed to transfer the corps in three days. Patton begged Bradley not to let go of Haislip as he could supply him just as well. The thought of losing a division and a corps, as well as being forced to go on the defensive, brought Patton down to Bradley’s level. Bradley said he would resign if he lost the 1st Infantry Division. They discussed traveling to China, or of offering to serve under Admiral Chester Nimitz in the central Pacific. “At the moment, I am being attacked on both flanks,” Patton later wrote Everett Hughes, “but not by the Germans. But I may yet make my getaway.”44 Patton later reprimanded himself for his negative assessment and feeling everyone was against him, writing, “I should have faith.” He tried to look on the bright side, reminding himself that every time he was denied an opportunity, like Italy, the D-­Day landings, and closing the Falaise pocket, things had turned out poorly for others while he succeeded. Frustrated by the turn of events, he wished for Devers’s plans to sour. Patton’s religion was less about karma and more about revenge. “The Lord is on my side,” he wrote, “but he has a lot of getting even to do for me.”45 To boost his spirits, Patton took Codman out to visit Walker’s units and drove perilously close to the front. As they approached the front lines, Patton’s driver, Sergeant John Mims slowed down until Patton told him, “Keep going.” After about ten minutes of driving, everyone in the vehicle realized they were in enemy territory. “Stop here,” Patton ordered; he told Codman he felt like Marshal Ney, one of Napoleon’s corps commanders, and launched into a story about how Napoleon, while riding a horse across a battlefield, came across Ney wandering by himself with a rifle over his shoulder. He asked Ney, “Is your rear guard adequate?” To

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which Ney replied, “Quite adequate, I am the rear guard.” Disappointed that no Germans showed up to fight, Patton climbed back in the vehicle and Mims returned him to the relative safety of the rear. Patton’s languid mood reminded Codman of Patton’s often-­cited credo that a professional soldier always wished for “a quick and painless death inflicted by the last bullet of the last battle.”46 That evening, Patton held another off-­the-­record press conference. He gave Bradley some cover when he admitted that Haislip faced a formidable and well-­ensconced enemy, and that he simply did not have the supplies needed to attack. “We can fight hard for five days and then we’ve got to throw rocks.” He blamed Walker’s problems at Metz on supplies and the weather but assured the press he had a plan. One of the biggest problems on his front was mud, he told them. He also denied that his forces had penetrated the Siegfried Line, though Eddy had reached it. Improving on one of his lines from the last press conference, he said that his new offensive would “go like shit through a tin horn.” Possibly he felt he had unfairly maligned geese. Patton called rumors that the Germans were building secret weapons “bullshit.” And he insisted that both the Tiger and Panther heavy tanks were “very bad and I would rather fight them than a Mark IV [medium tank],” adding, “these others are so damn slow and can be ditched easily.” He showed off his encyclopedic memory, explaining the Battle of Lützen and Caesar’s wars, and quoting from Edward Gibbon’s Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. He also quoted Admiral Lord Horatio Nelson and Robert E. Lee. When asked if he worried about Nazis going underground when he reached Germany, he snapped back, “Six feet.” When a reporter reminded him there were twelve million Nazis in Germany and that he would need a lot of grave diggers once he got there, Patton gave a response that would later get him into trouble. “The Nazis are a political party really and not a fraternity, and when they find out their people are out, they will join the other side.” He called the Moselle “a son-­of-­a-­bitch through all history” and said that his fighter/bombers were attacking railroad lines and not bridges since his army would need those bridges.47 The next day, September 24, Patton decided that, since the Germans held Metz, they were going to make Nancy their place of decision. “It was very apparent that Nancy, and more particularly Château Salins, was the doorway to the invasion of Germany.”48 With that in mind, he drove to Nancy where he met with Walker, Eddy, and Haislip to arrange a

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defensive front, but he wanted limited attacks to prepare a good jumping off point for his eventual offensive. His corps commanders brought him little good news. Haislip was depressed over leaving Third Army, while the others offered little. While the generals met, General Wood’s tankers fought off attacks all morning in Eddy’s sector. Fortunately, despite heavy cloud cover, two fighter squadrons found a break in the clouds and bombed the Germans, destroying all but two of the twenty-­six attacking enemy tanks. The air support helped Wood finally break the back of Manteuffel’s attack, at least for that day.49 The next day, September 25, Bradley made Eisenhower’s concept official by sending Patton a top-­secret letter ordering him to “assume the defensive” so Hodges could continue supporting Montgomery. Patton jumped on one phrase from the letter—­“rectifying the line”—­and would use it to justify his own attacks, helping his troops maintain their offensive spirit. Not wanting his men to become “pacifists,” he sent out instructions for concealing Third Army’s defensive stance. No one was to string barbed wire, dig foxholes, or lay mines. They would instead create outposts backed by mobile reserves, with all possible enemy tank routes of attack registered by division, corps, and army artillery. Everyone was to share artillery concentration maps with all concerned parties, especially Weyland’s pilots, to coordinate firepower on the attacking enemy. Any counterattacks against the enemy would be a double envelopment aimed at not just restoration of the front but destruction of the enemy formations. Frontline troops would conduct limited operations to keep the enemy off balance, while troops in the rear would be billeted, rested, and “given constant practice in offensive tactics.” Patton knew if he permitted his men to dig in, they would lose their offensive mindset, and only by constantly maneuvering in the open they would offer a less vulnerable target.50 With his plans set and his army going nowhere, Patton took a day off from the war and revisited several World War I locations where he, General Marshall, and General Pershing had stayed. Responding to a request from Marshall, he searched for Madame Jouette, in whose house Marshall had resided in 1918. Patton brought with him the universal currency—­three pounds of coffee and three pounds of sugar. Unfortunately, she had moved to southern France. He then moved on in pouring rain to Pershing’s old headquarters in Chaumont. There, he lunched with Codman at the Hôtel de France, where he noticed the

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menu hadn’t changed since 1917. He thought he recognized the owner, until the gentleman told him that it had been his father who owned the place during the last war. Finally, Patton traveled to the town of Bourg, where he had kept an office. When he saw an old man holding a pitchfork next to a manure pile, he asked him if he had been there in 1918. The man’s answer must have surprised him: “Yes, General Patton, you were then here as a colonel.” With a crowd in tow, the man gave Patton a tour of the area and helped him find his old office. Patton snapped pictures like a tourist. From there they visited Conflans, from where Codman had flown as an airman in 1918. It had been an emotional day for Patton. “The general got quite worked up about it,” Codman later wrote. Patton penned in his diary: “A full day of memories.”51 But the day was not all about yesteryear. When he returned to his headquarters, he learned that the enemy was circulating a story that his men had killed a group of surrendering Germans. He called it propaganda and reminded his corps commanders that any such action would be a serious violation of the rules of war, which “would be dealt with accordingly.”52 Patton did not want a repeat of Sicily’s Biscari massacre. On September 27 Bradley called Patton and told him Devers would get Haislip’s XV Corps. “May God rot his guts,” Patton wrote. Meanwhile, the Germans continued to hammer away at Eddy. Wood repelled three armored attacks that day, while elements of Baade’s 35th Division fought to capture a hill in the dense Grémecey Forest northwest of Château-­Salins. It took them until the end of the day to wrest it from the Germans. The situation depressed Patton. “Must trust in God and my destiny,” he told himself. In Walker’s sector, elements of Irwin’s 5th Division prepared an assault of Fort Driant while elements of McLain’s 90th prepared to attack Jeanne d’Arc.53 Worried about morale in Eddy’s corps, specifically McBride’s 80th, where the men lived in the cold, rain, and mud, Patton went to the front on September 28 with Major Al Stiller. His entourage picked up McBride at Pont-­à-­Mousson and drove to a forward observation post. The air was live with artillery and machine-­gun fire. McBride pointed out three hills he needed to take but worried aloud that his men were dead on their feet. Patton tried to encourage McBride by telling him that Major General Willard S. Paul’s 26th Infantry Division would soon arrive and that he could have one of its regiments. Patton then decorated three soldiers and

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presented battlefield commissions to several sergeants.54 He also ordered that every man receive an extra pair of socks to help ward off trench foot.55 Patton then toured the front. The soldiers, unshaven and missing their neckties, offered him their C rations and he readily ate them without commenting on their appearance. He understood that men in combat had more important priorities.56 He spotted two improperly placed machine guns. “Officers who place them do so standing where they can see a lot but at the level of a gun nothing can be seen.” The situation disgusted him. “Our officers are fools,” he wrote.57 Wanting to see the fight for Fort Driant, Patton drove out to Irwin’s 5th Infantry, in Walker’s zone. Before leaving he picked up reporter John Carlisle from the Detroit News. As they crossed a treadway bridge over the Moselle, the muddy, bareheaded engineers working on the bridge snapped to attention and, with smiles on their grimy faces, saluted the general. Patton heard one private say, “Cripes, there’s the old man right up here himself!” to which another replied, “It’s good to see him, pal, up here.” While guns boomed in the distance, Patton returned the salutes, smiled, and nodded at the men. At a regimental headquarters, Patton picked up Colonel Adolphus Worrell Roffe and, despite an officer warning that the road was under fire, ordered his driver forward to an observation post. The party dismounted at a pear orchard, where Major Stiller shot some pears off the branches with a pistol. While the men enjoyed their fruit, a German barrage crashed into a nearby hill. Patton never looked up but continued to eat several pears with relish. Once done, he and Irwin walked through the orchard until a battalion commander came running to them at a crouch, stopping behind a building. Patton and Irwin then walked the road to the high ground, while everyone else crouched at the edge of the orchard. Shells arced in as Patton stood exposed, looking at the battlefield through his binoculars. He watched as twenty-­one fighter bombers dropped napalm tanks on Fort Driant. Explosions ripped the horizon. Debris flew everywhere, yet the Germans responded with anti-­aircraft guns. Patton, Irwin, and Roffe then looked over a map before walking back to the orchard. A soldier turned to Carlisle and said, “It gives us guys a lift to see the old man up here.”58 On the way back, they drove through a five-­thousand-­yard gauntlet of German shells. Carlisle crouched behind Patton’s seat, scared to death, but noticed Patton sitting up calmly. An exploding shell threw dirt on

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the jeep, another dropped eight feet from the side of the road but failed to explode, a third detonated behind the jeep. When they came to a canal bridge, Patton had his driver stop so he could take a picture of a barge his troops were using as a ferry. At the end of the journey, Carlisle admitted, “I am completely sold on General Patton but I don’t think I’ll ever ask him for another ride.”59 Back from the front, Patton and Irwin met with Walker to assess the Driant situation. A single company, about one hundred men, had attacked that afternoon but had gotten bogged down in barbed-­wire fields and were forced to pull back to their starting positions.60 Walker and Irwin had already had a heated phone conversation, during which Walker accused Irwin of quitting the fight; Irwin angrily shot back that he had been given terrible intelligence on the fort’s strength. At the meeting, Patton sided with Irwin, suggesting his men recuperate before trying again. Walker disagreed, this time directing the blame at Irwin’s battalion and regimental commanders. The conversation may have become heated again since Patton failed to mention it in his diary.61 The loss of Haislip’s corps gnawed at Patton. He took a long walk without Willie to contemplate his changed situation. Along the way, he spotted two officers speeding in a jeep and arrested them for recklessly burning precious gas. It made him feel better. That evening, he got a shocking call from Colonel O. C. Harvey, who had served in his Seventh Army in Sicily as a logistics officer. Harvey warned that Patch would not have enough supplies to support Haislip’s XV Corps until October 1, and even then, it would take an additional ten days until Haislip would get any ammunition. Patton told Harvey he would hold onto Haislip for at least another day. “Devers as usual is a liar,” Patton wrote in his diary. Frustrated, he wanted to get drunk but decided instead to pop a green pill (possibly a tranquilizer). He wrote Beatrice, “If you were here I would cry on your shoulder.”62 The next morning, September 29, Eddy asked Patton to fly down to Nancy. He arrived in time to find Eddy’s corps under assault. The Germans were again attacking both Baade’s 35th Division and Wood’s 4th Armored. Patton ordered Eddy to send the rest of Grow’s 6th Armored to support Baade in the Grémecey Forest, but Eddy worried the tankers would first have to cross the Little Seille River, where they risked being cut off and surrounded. Patton snapped back that it would motivate them not to fail, comparing it to Cortez burning his ships when he arrived in

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the New World. Patton then called Gaffey and ordered him to direct all Third Army ammunition to Eddy, as well as the remaining 6th Armored combat command attached to Walker. The combat command was on the road within fifteen minutes. Almost no mention had been made about Wood’s situation, where the German 11th Panzer Division had pushed his men off a nondescript hill called Hill 318. Wood’s tankers had retaken it early that morning, fighting in heavy fog. The Germans fought to retake it but a timely break in the clouds allowed Weyland’s fighter planes to again strafe the enemy. When it was over, the Germans had been beaten back, with a loss of four hundred men and at least twenty-­four tanks.63 With the situation in hand, Patton returned to his Étain headquarters to host Eisenhower and Bradley for lunch. Patton served a drink his men had improvised called “170,” composed of half brandy and half champagne. “The results were exceptionally good,” Patton mused. But when casualty reports started coming in from Fort Driant, a worried Bradley spoke up: “For God’s sake, George, lay off,” adding, “I promise you’ll get your chance. When we get going again, you can far more easily pinch out Metz and take it from behind. Why bloody your nose with this pecking campaign?” Patton nonchalantly explained that he was simply using small-­scale attacks to give his new divisions some experience.64 Patton gathered several division and corps officers to hear Eisenhower explain the overall strategic situation. Eisenhower told the audience that Third Army would soon have the supplies needed to return to the offensive. He also assured everyone that the balance of new troops would be going to Bradley’s army group and that Simpson’s Ninth Army would soon relieve Patton’s men north of Metz, thus freeing them up to attack east. Patton took this last bit of news with a grain of salt. “This is very reassuring, if true,” he later wrote. Eisenhower then attended a staff briefing where Patton’s air intelligence officer reported, “Yesterday, XIX TAC continued to powerfully assist Third Army in making a greater wreck of the greater Reich.” Eisenhower smiled while Patton laughed.65 When Eisenhower left, Patton reassembled his commanders and reiterated what Eisenhower had said, adding that once he had received enough supplies, he would encircle Metz without losing any ground to the enemy.66 Patton decided to stay away from Eddy the next day, September 30, to show his confidence in him, but Gaffey called from Eddy’s headquarters, asking Patton to get to the area as soon as possible. Patton flew, despite Luftwaffe fighter planes swarming the sky. Upon arrival, he learned that

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Figure 19. Patton and his staff, including Major General Irwin (to Patton’s right) the commander of the 5th Infantry Division, and Major General Walton Walker (to Patton’s left), the commander of XX Corps, await Eisenhower’s arrival at Third Army headquarters in Étain, France. Catalog number: 111-­SC 232844, National Archives and Records Administration.

Eddy was pulling back two of Baade’s regiments from Grémecey Forest to protect his flanks. Patton exploded and phoned Eddy at Grow’s headquarters. “Withdraw hell!” he shouted into the phone. “No U.S. division has withdrawn yet in this theater and certainly none under my command will be the first to do so.” He added that no German division could whip an American one. Eddy explained that all his division

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commanders had agreed with him and warned that changing from a withdrawal to a holding action could lead to confusion. Patton would have no part of it. “Goddamn you, hold and counterattack,” he blasted. “To hell with your flanks! Flank is something to keep moving and not worry about.”67 To back up his words, Patton drove to Eddy’s headquarters, where he found him meeting with Grow, Baade, and Baade’s regimental commanders and their staffs. Shortly before Patton arrived, an enemy artillery barrage exploded outside Eddy’s headquarters, killing or wounding several aides and orderlies, some of whom had been with Eddy since North Africa.68 Entering the room, Patton immediately told them he was disgusted with their actions. He wanted Grow to attack as soon as possible and all the generals to personally lead their men. He specifically told Grow that if he did not retake the Grémecey Forest, there was no need for him to return. Baade, who had originally agreed with Eddy’s assessment, now said he was shocked at the withdrawal order and could hold. Patton dressed down Eddy in front of everyone then quickly moved on. He blamed all the generals for the poor situation, but Eddy stepped forward and said if there was any blame to be found, it was with him. Impressed, Patton told him that he was a braver man than he had thought.69 He concluded the meeting by telling everyone, “Now I will go home as I know you all will win.” Once back at his headquarters, he penned in his diary about Eddy: “He is manly but worries too much. I may have to get rid of him. I will do all the worrying necessary.”70 When Patton got back to his headquarters, he learned that General Lee had requested eight infantry battalions from Bradley for guarding prisoners and trains in Paris, and that Bradley proposed lending him the 84th Division, which would take that division out of fighting for at least two months. Patton fired off a letter to Bradley, forcefully protesting the idea, arguing that if Lee’s COMZ could use transportation to move soldiers to Paris, “the Armies can certainly find sufficient transportation to move the soldiers from Paris to the Armies.” He did not want troops preparing for combat distracted by other duties. “To take them to soft jobs in the cities will very adversely affect their efficiency when they return to the front.” He added that billeting newly arrived troops in cities would deprive them of ever truly getting into fighting trim, “and we are certainly going to need fighters.”71 Bradley ended up offering Lee artillery, quartermaster, and signal corps soldiers for the task. When Eisenhower

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Figure 20. Wounded soldiers of the 35th Infantry Division report to an aid station in the Grémecey Forest, France. The forested area stymied Patton’s army for almost a week in bloody fighting. Catalog number: 111-­SC 196349, National Archives and Records Administration.

learned of the situation, he decided to use fifty antiaircraft battalions whose soldiers were about to be reclassified as infantry anyway.72 Before dawn on October 1, Grow’s 6th Armored attacked through Baade’s 35th Division and, despite heavy German artillery fire, restored the line in some places and advanced it in others, killing about seven hundred German soldiers in the process (a week later, Patton would punch the number up to fifteen hundred). Grow captured most, but not all of Grémecey Forest.73 Many Germans broke and ran. “So much for hysteria,” Patton wrote in his diary. Had he allowed Eddy to pull back, the Germans would have heralded the action as a great victory. “I have again earned my pay,” he wrote, and spent the day visiting McBride’s 80th Division, which had started attacking pockets of enemy resistance on the west side of the Seille River.74 As Patton passed out medals, the men were surprised to see him cry as he read out each citation. Eddy later admitted

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he had made a mistake with the withdrawal order and assured himself it would never happen again. When Patton later learned that Eddy had almost been killed that morning by an enemy artillery round, he chalked up his reluctance to shattered nerves.75 The two weeks of fighting east of Nancy became known as the Battle of Arracourt, and it ended as an American victory, particularly for the well-­seasoned and well-­led tankers of Wood’s 4th Armored. General von Manteuffel cancelled any further attacks on October 2, when troops under Courtney Hodges attacked Aachen, the first German city threatened with capture by the Allies.76 Patton toured the battlefield with Wood, telling him that his unit was the finest armor unit in the U.S. Army. Wood had Patton’s words distributed to his combat commanders. He then asked Patton to briefly relieve his division so his men could rest and refit: Patton agreed.77 Patton then visited Baade, who had been wounded in the chin, and presented him with a Bronze Star for his actions. He visited the wounded in an evacuation hospital, which included ten German soldiers not yet old enough to shave. Among the two hundred wounded, mostly from Grow’s 6th Armored, he came across two soldiers with suspected self-­ inflicted wounds. He told them in no uncertain terms that if they had wounded themselves, he “could not despise them too much, but if I was mistaken, I apologize.” Among both the troops and the wounded in the hospital, morale was still high. Victory brought optimism.78 Throughout the September battles, Patton became less and less impressed with his German enemy. He saw hoards surrendering without a fight, amateurish battle tactics, and archaic equipment. So many Germans arrived at a POW camp at Remy that the few guards there wondered who was surrendering to whom. During counterattacks, one group of Germans, made up of student officers, charged Patton’s line while yelling, shaking their fists, and waving their rifles in the air without firing. The American infantry cut them down. “They were either drunk or doped,” Patton wrote. German doctors lacked blood plasma and penicillin, and, according to Patton’s doctors, they “use raw blood with the crudest known methods.”79 He felt confident that only a few more days of hard fighting would crack the German lines.

CHAPTER SEVEN

The October Battles for Metz

The German army’s resurgence blunted more than just Third Army’s advance. While Patton’s infantrymen and tankers slugged it out around Metz and Arracourt, Montgomery’s forces had been soundly checked in the Netherlands, where Antwerp’s Scheldt Estuary remained in German hands. Hodges’s First Army found itself stalled in the Hürgten Forest as German defenders chewed up division after division in a deadly campaign where progress was measured in yards. Meanwhile, the armies that made up Devers’s Sixth Army Group were brought up short near the Vosges Mountains.1 Making matters worse, the skies grayed and rain poured, turning the terrain into mud and making rivers swell. The temperature dropped, and the days grew considerably shorter, with the sun setting around 4:00 p.m.2 As a harbinger of things to come, by the beginning of October Patton could count approximately eighteen thousand of his soldiers out of action due to the flu, trench foot, or other exposure-­related ailments.3 On October 3 Walker launched his new attack on Metz, utilizing both Irwin’s 5th and McLain’s 90th Divisions. Patton traveled to the Driant front to watch the attack by one of Irwin’s regiments. He arrived in a good mood and told humorous stories to the officers at the regimental headquarters while supporting artillery began exploding in the distance. Soon, small groups of men and tanks breached the first line of defenses in several places, using small arms and Bangalore torpedoes. They reached the center of the fort before a German counterattack forced them back. The timely arrival of Weyland’s P-­47 Thunderbolts, dropping bombs and conducting strafing runs, forced the defenders underground. The fighting seesawed atop the fort as American tanks and assault guns chipped away at concrete buildings and men dropped Bangalore torpedoes down 157

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ventilation shafts. The Germans counterattacked repeatedly, supported by artillery from nearby forts. Patton, unable to see the action from his observation post, departed.4 While Irwin’s men fought it out at Fort Driant, elements of McLain’s 90th Division attacked at Maizières-­lès-­Metz, a mining town ten miles north of Metz that the men referred to simply as “Maizie.”5 The attack went well initially, with McLain’s men capturing the heights of a huge slag heap north of the town. But the Germans counterattacked again and again. Over the course of a month, the town changed hands eight times in bloody house-­to-­house fighting. At one point, the Americans resorted to depressing their artillery guns and firing into houses at point-­blank range.6 With Walker putting his best efforts into taking both areas, Patton returned to his headquarters, where he found Congresswoman Edith Nourse Rogers, a Republican from Massachusetts who advocated for veterans and had previously helped create the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps and its successor, the Women’s Army Corps. She was checking on the welfare and treatment of hospitalized soldiers. Patton claimed she asked for his advice on her own political advancement, a surprising statement given that she had already served almost twenty years in Congress. Patton may have resented the idea of a woman serving in Congress; in his diary, he described her as venomous and “a most dangerous woman and dishonest.” Despite his feelings, he gave her a souvenir of her visit to the front: the German dagger Lieutenant Colonel Clarke had given him.7 The next day, Patton boasted to his staff that his tanks had captured Driant, the only time in history that a fort had been taken by tanks. But he was wrong: the Germans still controlled the fort. He compared the interlocking tunnels within the fort to a rabbit warren, where his infantry resorted to pouring gasoline down ventilator shafts followed by grenades, quipping that this “should at least keep the Germans from getting cold feet.”8 He called Walker and told him to seize Fort Driant, “if it took every man in XX Corps.” He could not allow an attack by his army to fail.9 He then visited Macon’s 83rd Division, which had spent the last two months fighting in Brittany. The unit had been moved to Luxembourg, which had been barely touched by the war save for its railroad station. “There seems to be some sort of international ownership,” he later wrote, hinting at some underhanded agreement between the Allies and Axis. “Wholly undamaged.”10

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On October 5 Patton received some good news when Bradley called and told him he would be getting Major General William H. H. Morris Jr.’s 10th Armored Division. Patton knew Morris had fought in World War I’s Saint-­Mihiel and Meuse-­Argonne campaigns and had commanded a regiment in his 2nd Armored Division in 1941. Morris was supposed to command the XVIII Corps, but a new War Department rule dictated that only major generals with combat experience could command a corps, so he took the step down to command the 10th Armored while his corps command passed to Major General Matthew B. Ridgway. The XVIII Corps was then redesignated as an airborne corps.11 While Patton toiled in his mobile trailer over German counterattacks at Fort Driant, Eddy showed up. His corps was making progress around Nancy, but that’s not what he wanted to talk about. He requested permission to relieve McBride, complaining that the division commander focused too much on his battalions instead of his regiments, employing the penny-­packet method of committing small units instead of entire divisions. McBride had ignored his regimental commanders and showed little confidence in his own officers and men, to whom he could be vindictive. His ego never let him admit mistakes. Worse, Eddy had called McBride earlier and found him emotionally whipped and complaining that Wood’s victory at Arracourt came at his division’s expense. “They got there riding over our broken backs,” he told Eddy.12 McBride may have been upset that his unit now held the line while Wood’s tankers had been relieved from the front. Patton grudgingly agreed with Eddy that “we may have to relieve him,” but they both finally agreed that no one was better or as qualified to replace him. Patton would later claim that McBride became one of his best division commanders, thereby justifying the decision to keep him on.13 Eddy and Patton then moved over to Patton’s war room to discuss the overall situation. After the meeting, Eddy wrote in his diary, “George is certainly a hard man to understand.”14 Patton returned to his Fort Driant headache. The fighting had gone underground, with the Germans firing from fortified bunkers while Weyland’s fighter aircraft dropped napalm (jellified gasoline) on the fort. The exchange of fire was so intense reinforcements could only be brought forward by tank, crammed in like sardines. Heavy rains had made the ground, according to Patton, “slippery as grease,” slowing up an already-­ anemic resupply process.15 That night, Irwin added a task force to the fight under his assistant division commander, Brigadier General A. D.

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Warnock, consisting of an infantry regiment, an engineer company, and a tank company.16 Patton hoped it might break the deadlock. The task force slowly pressed through the fort’s tunnel system, destroying steel doors as the Germans retreated further in to the complex. The Germans retaliated by blowing up sections of American-­occupied tunnels. Patton realized he had been too optimistic about Walker’s attack and considered abandoning it. One thing kept him in the fight: “I hate to crush initiative.”17 The next day, Lieutenant General Doolittle and Major General Hoyt Vandenberg joined Weyland and Patton at his Étain headquarters for dinner. Afterward, Patton and Doolittle tried to see who could drink the other under the table. Codman joined them and bragged about how, as a pilot in World War I, he had destroyed Verdun’s train station. Doolittle challenged the story and claimed his bombers had done the same to the station only months ago. The argument became heated until Patton declared that they would drive to Verdun and find out. In blackout conditions, they raced to Verdun only to find the train station intact. A local resident told the party that it had never been hit in either war. Patton enjoyed rubbing it in the next morning at breakfast.18 On October 7 Prince Félix of Luxembourg, who still desperately wanted to return to his country’s capital, presented himself to Patton. By now Luxembourg City had been cleared of the enemy. “Your country awaits you, sir,” Patton told him and provided the prince with a limousine, a guard of honor, and a platoon of MPs. As Félix got in the limousine, Patton snapped him a sharp salute. Codman accompanied the prince to the royal palace, where guards saluted and maids stopped their cleaning and curtsied. He thanked Codman and smiled, “When we are a little more settled you must come and see us.”19 In a little more than two months, Patton would unexpectedly do so. Later in the day, Patton received a high-­powered visitor when General George C. Marshall, the Army chief of staff, arrived at his headquarters with Bradley in tow. Marshall had come to Europe at Eisenhower’s request to see for himself the army he had built, and to better understand its needs. Patton, wearing his shiny lacquered helmet but without his pistols, explained Walker’s situation at Driant and Eddy’s plan to clear the Grémecey Forest northwest of Nancy to straighten out his line.20 Patton took pride in answering everything Marshall asked him. Marshall, for his part, wanted to see Eddy’s attack kick off but regretted having to leave

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the next morning for Montgomery’s headquarters.21 Before Marshall left, Patton presented him with a silk scarf for his wife, made from a parachute. Patton later wrote that “it made quite a hit with George.”22 Marshall was not the only leader Patton sought to impress. That same day, he mailed President Franklin D. Roosevelt a fifteen-­foot scale model of a German naval surface raider that had been captured by one of his cavalry reconnaissance squadrons north of Thionville.23 Marshall may have missed Eddy’s October 8 attack but Patton did not. With Wood’s 4th Armored taking a well-­deserved rest, Eddy relied on McBride’s 80th Division, supported by elements of Grow’s 6th Armored, Baade’s 35th Division, and a combat team from Major General Willard S. Paul’s newly arrived 26th Infantry Division. Patton had served with Paul in Hawai’i in the 1920s and held him in high regard. He hoped that with Paul’s help he would drive the Germans to the east bank of the Seille River. That morning, before daylight, an intense artillery barrage hit the German lines, followed by the infantry advancing through a low-­lying fog. Patton arrived late and missed the kickoff but after visiting with Paul and deciding he had the situation well in hand, drove to McBride’s headquarters and found the division commander overseeing a disorganized attack. Patton immediately spotted four German outposts that needed to be taken. When he spotted Germans atop a nearby hill in a perfect counterattack position, he ordered McBride to push them off with his reserve tank force. The attack readily captured the hill. “It was quite inspiring to see them roaring up the road,” Patton admitted.24 Yet, the men’s performance disappointed Patton. “The whole tempo of our infantry attack is too slow,” he later wrote.25 He told a group of officers that if he had just four good days, he could knock the Germans out. He then visited one of the division’s observation posts near the town of Moivron, where he watched P-­47s strafe and bomb targets while he listened over the radio to pilots chatting as they did their job. He watched through a captured German trench periscope as Grow’s tanks rolled forward, fired tracers, and set four towns (possibly the ones he said needed to be taken) aflame. An American artillery round hit a factory, shooting flames and smoke four thousand feet into the sky. When German prisoners began filing past him, he took out his camera and snapped a few pictures.26 He knew that the battle would not get much press but believed more men were involved than in the 1863 Battle of Gettysburg.27 His only regret was that General Marshall had not been there. At the end of the

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Figure 21. Major General Horace McBride (left), the commander of the 80th Infantry Division, Major General Manton Eddy, the commander of XII Corps, and Patton watch McBride’s infantrymen attack a hill east of Nancy. Patton found the attack inspiring. Catalog number: 111-­SC 194533, National Archives and Records Administration.

day, he returned to his staff and joked that he had been at Montgomery’s headquarters. “We’re going to finish this business,” he told his officers. “I want you—­you—­you nice sons of nice men to fight like—­like vicious white rabbits!” He added with a wry smile, “Oh hell, I’ve got to keep away from that Montgomery.”28 The next day, October 9, Patton traveled to Bradley’s Verdun headquarters to meet with him, Hodges, and Simpson. Bradley explained that Montgomery had requested Hodges’s First Army again to help him capture the Ruhr industrial area, calling it a two-­army job. Eisenhower agreed but decided it would be two American armies; he sent Simpson’s Ninth Army north of Hodges’s First, which would soon receive Middleton’s VIII Corps and Macon’s 83rd Infantry, both of which had been promised to Patton (Hodges would eventually assign Middleton’s VIII Corps to occupy the Ardennes Forest and establish his headquarters at the small town of Bastogne). Montgomery’s attack into the Ruhr would tentatively take place at the end of the month. To make up for the loss of Middleton’s

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Figure 22. Patton took this picture of smoke rising from a tire factory near Moivron, France, after a strike from P-­47 Thunderbolts. He took the picture from a frontline observation post. Library of Congress, OV 20, 25.

corps and Macon’s division, Bradley gave Patton the green 95th Infantry Division, under Major General Harry L. Twaddle. He also confirmed that Patton would get Morris’s 10th Armored Division.29 The conversation then switched to logistics. Patton noticed two of Hodges’s supply officers, Brigadier General Robert Wilson and Lieutenant Colonel John Mederis, both of whom he knew from Tunisia and whom he considered skilled thieves. Pointing at them, he warned Hap Gay, “look out for that pair, I know them both. They used to work for me.”30 Bradley explained that Eisenhower’s headquarters, not General Lee’s COMZ, would supervise the distribution of supplies. Patton credited himself for the change, since he and Bradley had pushed Eisenhower on this point. On the negative side, Bradley told Patton that artillery ammunition would be listed in rounds per gun per day. “Which means nothing,” Patton wrote. Beetle Smith arrived and made it painfully clear that, because of the lack of supplies, there could be no major offensives

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until about October 22. Bradley pushed the date back to November 2. If that news was not bad enough, after the meeting Patton received a message from Hap Gay, explaining that the battle for Driant was not going well and recommending withdrawal. “The Fort Driant show is going sour,” Patton wrote in his diary. “We might have to pull out.”31 The addition of the 26th and 95th Infantry and 10th Armored Divisions brought about an important change in Third Army. Many of the soldiers and tankers who filled these units’ ranks had come from the Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP), which sent soldiers who had scored high on the Army General Classification Test (AGCT) to colleges around the country to learn engineering, foreign languages, medical, dental, and veterinarian skills before their induction to the military services. When the army curtailed the program in February of 1944 to overcome a growing shortage of riflemen, roughly 110,000 of the student-­soldiers received immediate induction notices. They were joined by about thirty-­six thousand surplus aviation cadets whose future services were no longer required (the Army Air Forces had also accepted many soldiers who scored high on the AGCT). With a backlog of Officer Candidate School candidates, the ASTPers joined the ranks as privates, having to prove their military value just like everyone else. By the time Paul’s 26th Infantry Division reached Patton, thirty-­five divisions across the army—­infantry, armored, and airborne—­averaged more than fifteen hundred former ASTPers and one thousand aviation cadets each. The addition of these men transformed not only Patton’s Third Army but the entire U.S. Army into a smarter force. All they had to do was survive combat.32 On October 10 Patton returned to Nancy, where he found Marshall at the Grand Hotel, fresh from visiting Devers’s forces.33 They took off and visited Eddy’s division commanders. Patton was pleased to learn McBride’s 80th Infantry had reached the Seille River, just as he had hoped two days earlier.34 Before Patton and Marshall left, the townspeople learned who was visiting and poured out of their homes to cheer Marshall; a young girl presented him with a bouquet of flowers. Patton could not have planned it better. While at Wood’s headquarters, Patton asked Marshall to promote Colonel Bruce Clarke, the commander of Wood’s CCB. Marshall asked Patton some questions about Clarke, trying to place the name with a face. Finally, Marshall admitted, “I don’t know him.” Patton asked him to

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look up Clarke’s file upon his return to Washington and stressed that the colonel’s name ended with an “e.” A few days later, Patton would show up at Clarke’s headquarters and tell him, “Clarke, you’re a dammed nobody” before relating the story. “Hell, Clarke,” he joked, “if you had been an infantryman instead of an engineer and had served at Benning [where Marshall had taught], you’d be a major general now!”35 Patton and Marshall then visited Paul’s, Baade’s, and McBride’s divisions. As they headed out to visit McBride’s headquarters, a salvo of enemy 170mm artillery shells burst about three hundred yards from the caravan. Patton worried that a hidden German forward observer had zeroed in their position but no more rounds came. At the 80th Division headquarters, McBride invited Marshall to pin Silver Star medals on three officers and one sergeant, named Moore. Each citation was read aloud before being presented. When they got to the sergeant and the citation read that he destroyed a gun nest while wounded, Patton spoke up. “As Army commander I am authorized to make the award of the DSC and I am changing the award from Silver Star to the DSC for Lieutenant Moore.” Moore stepped out of line and tried to explain that the citation had been embellished but Patton brushed him off and presented him with the Distinguished Service Cross. Marshall said a few words of appreciation, then offered Patton and Eddy a chance to speak. Patton stepped forward but as he spoke his voice choked with emotion. He finally managed to say that if it were not for men like these, the war would be more difficult to win. He explained that he changed Lieutenant Moore’s award because even though he was wounded he continued to lead his men.36 He then blurted out that he himself was doing a poor job.37 When it was over, Patton pinned Bronze Stars on Eddy and his two division commanders, telling them the awards were to be “what you might call a stop-­gap for something else that was in the wind.”38 Walker soon arrived and took Patton and Marshall to visit his own division commanders. At the 5th Division headquarters, Irwin explained the assault on Fort Driant, complete with a relief map of the area. They then went to McLain’s 90th Division headquarters, where Marshall confided to Patton that he hoped to promote McLain to corps command soon, owing both to his abilities and his National Guard status, the bane of regular Army officers. The news pleased Patton, who again invited Marshall to personally present some medals. Marshall went down a row of soldiers, presenting awards. One soldier, Colonel Jacob W. Bealke, who stood only

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five-­feet, six inches, received a Silver Star for knocking out three German tanks with a bazooka, thereby stopping a German attack. When Marshall finished, Patton asked him if he could make a presentation of his own. As he had done before, Patton produced a Distinguished Service Cross and presented it to Bealke. As he pinned it on the colonel’s chest, he kidded, “You little bastard, the only reason you’re still alive is that you’re not big enough for a bullet to hit.”39 Their final visit was to Macon’s headquarters in Luxembourg, where Patton bade farewell to Marshall who seemed delighted with his visit. Patton, too, was pleased with the events and his boss. “I have never known General Marshall to be so nice and human,” he wrote in his diary.40 Before leaving, Marshall said, “Well George, you are doing a grand job. Now is there anything I can have sent over to you, or anything I can do for you?” Without missing a beat, Patton responded, “Yes, there is one thing for me and all this fine staff of mine, general. After we have finished up over here, you can send us all to the Pacific to clean up those yellow bastards over there.” As everyone laughed, Marshall said, “Georgie, we will see about that later. Let’s get this job finished up first.”41 A few days after the visit, Marshall wrote Patton that he had forgotten to tell him that he (Marshall) had told the newspapers back home about Patton’s famous $1000 bet about beating Bradley and Montgomery to Paris and that it had appeared on the front pages of newspapers across the United States. “I think it is to your advantage,” he told Patton, “especially as I understand they are raising a couple of thousand-­dollar bills for you here and there.”42 Patton got an additional boost later that day when Detroit News reporter John M. Carlisle, who had spent the day with Patton back on September 27, published an article praising the Third Army’s commander. “I know that 3rd Army is a great army because of Liet. [sic] Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., its commanding officer. He is tough, rugged and fearless, and he inspired his army to be rough, rugged and fearless.” Carlisle admitted that he originally considered Patton too temperamental, too much of a showman, and had thought that Eisenhower should have sent him home. Now, after spending more than three months with Third Army, he had changed his mind. “Now I believe that Patton is one of the great masters of mechanized war.”43 Another reporter, United Press’s Robert Richards, found Patton’s men more worried about how their army commander felt about combat conditions than they did about the weather. When asked

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about the possibility of winter fighting, one man responded, “I wouldn’t like it at all, but it sure would burn the old man.” Richards concluded his report explaining, “They seem to believe that come mud or hell or high water, if the old man is happy, then everything is bound to be all right—­ even if the war is not over by Christmas.”44 Despite all the positive reinforcement coming from the American side, the Germans were not awed by either Patton or his army. By October 11, having suffered 50 percent casualties and shortages in artillery shells that reduced his artillery crews to firing only seven rounds a day, Irwin had only managed to secure a toehold on Driant’s southwest corner. Patton finally decided to withdraw from the fort, knowing that he would not be able to mount a serious attack until November.45 On October 12, the infantrymen from the regiment that had launched the initial attack pulled back, leaving Task Force Warnock to contain Fort Driant’s defenders from a distance. Engineers rigged the fort with almost three tons of explosives and set them to detonate at different times; they lit the fuses and ran west. Muffled explosions tore through the underground complex and continued to erupt into the next day.46 The withdrawal made things looked grim for Patton, who had to put a freeze on all ammunition larger than 3-­inch caliber. With so few resources, going on the offensive seemed unthinkable. Patton now worried a German attack might overwhelm his entire army. He unfairly blamed Lee for the delays, accusing him of giving all ammunition to Hodges and Montgomery.47 A week later, Task Force Warnock also withdrew from Driant, bitterly disappointing Patton’s hope that its fall would lead to the tumbling of other Maginot Line forts.48 Both Gay and Brigadier General Halley G. Maddox, Patton’s operations officer, who had been reconnoitering Walker’s front, urged Patton to cease the frontal assaults and consider enveloping Metz with no less than five divisions.49 Newspaper reporters were comparing Fort Driant to Stalingrad and calling the attempts to take the fort the “Battle of the Tunnels.” Patton himself compared the fighting to rat hunting, stating, “We poured gasoline and oil down the turrets and lit them, but for some reason we were not able to roast the Germans.” He forbade the men of Task Force Warnock to send letters to their hometown newspapers. In addition, he put out a statement claiming the casualties taken in assaulting Fort Driant were light, that Third Army engineers had gained valuable information, and that he had decided against taking the fort by frontal assault.50 Furious at the humiliation of being stymied,

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Patton told Weyland on October 13 that he wanted a “revenge” bombing of the fort; he would hound his air officer for weeks to do so.51 While the battle for Driant wound down, Patton moved into a new headquarters in Nancy, close to Eddy’s headquarters. He took up residence at #4 rue d’Auxonne on the northern edge of the city. Surrounded by heavy gates, the three-­story building included a turret atop the roof. Patton’s headquarters would remain here until the German attack through the Ardennes Forest drew him north more than a month later. He enjoyed the residence where he hosted generals, other officers, and American and local civilians. His staff also moved into housing in Nancy, grateful to no longer be living in tents with winter on the way. Within a week, however, everyone came down with colds. Harkins believed the change from outdoor living to quarters in heated houses brough on the illness. Patton now spent his days planning a new assault on Metz and its surrounding forts, especially Driant. He spent evenings in his bedroom sitting on a green leather chair and reading while Willie sat in an identical chair. Whenever Willie snored in his sleep, Patton would put down his book, reach over and give him nose drops, suggesting that not only his staff had colds.52

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Patton’s love of history and his passion for his own exploits continually drew him back to his old battlefields. With his army stymied and his headquarters moving to Nancy, on October 12 he took former Supreme Court justice James F. Byrnes, who was now Roosevelt’s director of the Office of War Mobilization, on a visit to World War I battlefields. Patton first took Byrnes to a train station in Clermont where, in 1918, he had unloaded his tanks prior to the Meuse-­Argonne Offensive. He told Byrnes how a German shell hit his train but failed to awaken his men, who were sleeping in a boxcar. From there they traveled to Neuvilly, where one of his tank battalions had been almost obliterated by enemy artillery. Patton pointed out where enemy fire had stopped one of his columns on a bridge and related how he used his stopwatch to time the enemy fire and passed all his tanks over without a hit. Patton could barely recognize his old battlefields; forests had grown over the torn-­up ground, war monuments blocked his views, and the railroad tracks he remembered had been removed.1 Patton wanted to see more, so after dropping off Byrnes he drove south to revisit the Saint-­Mihiel battlefield, where he had first entered combat as a thirty-­three-­year-­old battalion commander. The pouring rain, unfortunately, made it difficult to discern where he had fought around the towns of Essey and Pannes.2 That night, he and Gaffey dined at Eddy’s headquarters, where he told his two subordinates that he was on Marshall’s list to go to China when the war in Europe ended and that they would have a grand time there because “the Japs have no mines, anti-­tank and armor of any consequence and we could kill them by the millions.”3 On October 14 Patton flew to Hodges’s headquarters to see King George VI appoint Bradley an honorary knight commander of the Order 169

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of the Bath.4 Patton, the lover of medals, commented, “I wish I had one.” After the ceremony, Eisenhower gathered his generals and told them to keep on the attack, but also not to criticize General Lee and his COMZ. “Both things are easy to say,” Patton wrote his wife, “not so easy to do.”5

Figure 23. During a lull in the fighting, Patton visited his World War I battlefields, including the train station at Clermont-­en-­Argonne, where he detrained his tanks prior to the Battle of Meuse-­Argonne in September of 1918. Hap Gay joined him for this photo. Library of Congress, OV 20, 4.

The next day, Patton visited Paul’s 26th Division, which finished replacing Wood’s well-­worn 4th Armored on the line. He addressed one of Paul’s regiments about combat and offensive spirit, particularly fire and movement. He stressed staying upright when fired on and the need to keep attacking, moving forward under the protection of artillery and mortar fire.6 After his lecture, he penned in his diary, “If I could get the American infantryman to shoot his rifle, we could win the war much more cheaply.” On his way back to his headquarters, he stopped at an aid station and decorated a badly wounded man. While there, he spoke to a psychiatrist about battle fatigue. Whatever the man’s answers were, they did not impress him. “He was a nut himself,” Patton wrote.7

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The next day, Patton drove to Walker’s headquarters, where he bid farewell to McLain, who would be taking command of the XIX Corps in Simpson’s Ninth Army, and greeted Major General James Van Fleet, who would be taking over the 90th Division. A combat veteran from World War I, Van Fleet was a proven leader who commanded the assault regiment at Utah Beach on D-­Day and had soon after been promoted to assistant commander of the 2nd Infantry Division.8 After the ceremony, Patton drove with Walker to General Twaddle’s 95th Division headquarters, arriving with sirens screaming. He mounted a stage in front of a large field filled with officers and NCOs, and told them about marching fire. “Tell your men to forget everything they learned in the States,” he said. “They got a rifle in their hand and a bayonet; kill the son-­of-­a-­bitch in the blue uniform anyway you can. Forget this creeping and crawling and everything else they taught. Just kill the son-­of-­a-­bitch.”9 Stressing his point, he told them, “The old Bunker Hill crap of ‘don’t shoot till you see the whites of their eyes’ doesn’t work here. Besides, the Germans don’t have any whites to their eyes; the bastards have Goddamned yellow pig eyes!” He told the men that they were the ones who won wars, not the generals. “Jesus Christ!” he added, “Any old fart can be a general. Look at Walker here.” With that he slapped Walker’s stomach. The corps commander laughed but then winced at the humiliation. Twaddle, who abhorred profanity, looked on, pained.10 Patton told them to attack through a wooded area by loading an eight-­round clip into their rifles and firing every round before emerging on the other side, adding that if he could get every man to fire eight rounds of ammunition, he could walk into Berlin. “Every son-­of-­a-­bitch who comes out of those woods with any ammunition, I’m going to be on the side and if you come out without any ammunition, I’ll shoot you myself.”11 He encouraged them about their future objectives. “It is 132 miles to the Rhine from here, and if this Army will attack with venom and desperate energy it is more than probable that the war will end before we get to the Rhine. Therefore, when we attack, we go like hell!”12 His conclusion was blunt: “If you fuck up, I can get another division.”13 While Patton found the men’s performance satisfactory for a green unit, he did not feel the same about their commander. Twaddle had two strikes against him that Patton abhorred: he had not graduated from West Point, having gained his commission out of Syracuse University; nor had he seen combat in World War I, having been stationed at Fort Dix, New Jersey, during the height of the fighting. He had been peen preparing to

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ship out to France when the war ended. While briefing Patton on an upcoming attack, Twaddle outlined the zone of attack using his fingers on a wall map. “Do you realize how much space you’re talking about from your thumb to your forefinger?” Patton asked. “Yes sir,” said Twaddle, “about two thousand yards.” “Look at it again,” Patton retorted, “because you’re covering about five miles.”14 That night, Patton wrote in his diary, “Twaddle is not impressive.”15 That same day, German radio had announced that Field Marshall Erwin Rommel had died from head injuries incurred when his car was strafed by an Allied Typhoon fighter-­bombers back in July. Rommel was in fact dead, but the cause was a lie: the field marshal had been implicated in the July 20 attempt on Hitler’s life. Gestapo officers had shown up at his home, where he recovered from his injuries, and gave him the option of a public trial to be followed with his own death and the deaths of his wife and son, or an “honorable” death by cyanide, which would spare his family. Rommel chose the cyanide. While the true cause of his death would remain hidden until after the war, Patton made no comment in either his diaries or letters about the elimination of the man he had dreamed of confronting.16 Having assessed his new units, Patton prepared a new plan to capture Metz: Operation MADISON. Instead of a single thrust to knock out Fort Driant with a single division and a subsequent drive for the city, this time he would employ his entire army: eight divisions, on an eighty-­ three-­mile front, from Malling, twenty-­five miles north of Metz, to the Grémecey Forest, fifty-­seven miles south of the city. The whole operation was designed to accomplish three goals: to encircle and capture Metz in a double-­pincer movement; to prevent the enemy from reinforcing the city; and to bring Third Army to the German border. The plan would unfold on two successive launch days. On day one, Patton would send Eddy’s XII Corps into action south of the city, using McBride’s 80th and Baade’s 35th Divisions to cross the Seille River. Once they secured the east bank, Grow’s 6th and Wood’s 4th Armored Divisions would follow, with Grow racing northeast to take the high ground nine miles east of Metz while Wood charged directly east for the Saar River and, hopefully, onward to the Rhine. On day two, Walker’s XX Corps would go into action against Metz itself. Irwin’s 5th Division would also attack from the south but only partially encircle the city. Meanwhile, Twaddle’s 95th would contain the salient along the Moselle by sending a task force across the river

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at Uckange, fourteen miles north of Metz, then drive down the east bank to the city while the rest of his division encircled Metz from the north and linked up with Irwin’s 5th Infantry. Further north, Van Fleet’s 90th Infantry would cross the Moselle in two locations: northeast of Thionville, across from Fort Koenigsmacker; and southeast of Malling. Once across, it would head south to link up with Grow’s 6th Armored. Morris’s 10th Armored, with the help of Polk’s 3rd Cavalry Group, would follow Van Fleet’s soldiers and strike northeast toward Saarburg, Germany, hopefully also eventually reaching the Rhine. The double-­ pincers movement involved Irwin’s and Twaddle’s divisions tightly encircling Metz while Van Fleet and Grow’s forces cut off the city from further enemy reinforcement from the east.17 If all went as planned, the operation would put Third Army on the Saar River, eighty-­ five miles short of the Rhine. If it went as Patton hoped, the Rhine would be gained. Yet Patton worried that the conditions for MADISON were too different from his race across France, where his corps were already on the move when he took over. “In this operation we had to start moving from an initial disadvantage,” he later wrote.18 Patton presented his attack plan to Eisenhower and Devers when they visited him on October 17. He wanted to launch MADISON as soon as possible to prevent the Germans from mining the approaches and strengthening their defenses, but the lack of ammunition meant delaying the attack date. “I doubt if we do a thing till around my birthday [November 11],” he wrote Beatrice.19 He also worried about his men’s low morale, complaining to Eisenhower that someone at SHAEF had told the French to ban Third Army troops from using their brothels. Eisenhower said he had heard nothing about it, while Patton stressed that the ban could “result in a very sad situation.”20 He proposed providing brothels with penicillin and closing down any place where soldiers became infected. Eisenhower refused, explaining that Patton’s plan required too many MPs to monitor the brothels, along with massive amounts of penicillin otherwise needed to treat battlefield casualties. Eisenhower later admonished Patton for his blaming a SHAEF officer for the alleged ban, which “annoyed me very much,” since no one at his headquarters admitted to any such incident. “As I have told you in the past,” he scolded Patton in writing, “reports are valueless to me unless they are based on fact.”21 Undeterred, Patton worked two more days on MADISON, refining it and working out details with Eddy, Walker, and their division commanders. Walker, embarrassed by his earlier failures against Metz’s defenses,

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MAP 6. Operation MADISON, November 1944.

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provided detailed maps showing every city building known to house German troops.22 Patton arranged boundaries with Devers and Patch to his south but refused to share his railway lines with Patch, agreeing instead to give him one of his Treadway bridge companies. With no kickoff date set, he told Eisenhower that if he could receive two thousand tons of ammunition, “I can initiate an attack at any time.”23 When he was finally satisfied, he sent Harkins to Bradley’s headquarters with the plans. Harkins remembered it as a simple concept: “Attack! Attack!! Attack!!!! Use all fronts by all corps and all divisions.” Bradley looked them over and asked, “What’s the matter, hasn’t George had enough publicity recently?”24 Harkins, taken aback, having worked so hard on the plans, responded, “No sir, but I’ll tell him what you said.” Patton later wrote Bradley, asking him to coordinate his attack with Hodges so that “it would have a very excellent effect in disjoining the German scheme of defense.” Bradley approved the plan and set the tentative attack date for November 8.25 With his future plans complete, Patton returned to the present war. The next day, October 20, he met with Eddy and decided to bomb the dam at Dieuze, twelve miles east of Arracourt, in hopes that the water would flood and then drain out before Paul’s 26th Division attacked across the Seille. The subsequent flooding would also prevent the Germans from concentrating forces in the area, while allowing Eddy’s tanks to advance when the time was right. Eddy mentioned that his propaganda units would be delivering messages on the front in about a week, but Patton cautioned him not to wait that long. Later that afternoon, Patton learned that Weyland’s fighter-­bombers successfully breached the dam, tearing a fifty-­foot hole in its side. Within two days, the flooding stretched twelve miles.26 Operation MADISON’s complex maneuvering highlighted Patton’s experience and creativity as an army commander, and he was happy to show it off. When Lieutenant Colonel Fred Ayer Jr., Patton’s wife’s nephew and an FBI agent in charge of European affairs, visited Patton’s Nancy headquarters, Patton brought him into the guarded War Room, where Ayer examined wall-­mounted, plastic-­covered maps depicting troop, armor, transport, supply depots, rail, artillery, and air disposition for both Third Army and the Germans. Patton had Colonel Koch slide back two wooden panels, revealing the plan of attack map. “Now listen carefully,” Patton told his nephew as he tapped the map with a pointer, “what is

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important is where a roadway exists or where you can build one.” Patton knew logistics were the key. “That was true in the Caesar’s [sic] day and is true now,” he added. “Once the supplies are there, big hills, forests, or rivers won’t stop a determined army.” The lesson was not over. He brought Ayer to a staff meeting where his words left a strong impression on the young FBI agent, who thought it an excellent lecture about intelligence gathering. In particular, Patton noted, I have studied the German all my life. I have read the memoirs of his generals and political leaders. I have read his philosophers and listened to his music. I have studied in detail the accounts of every dammed one of his battles. I know exactly how he will react under any given set of circumstances. He hasn’t the slightest idea what I’m going to do. Therefore, when the day comes, I am going to whip the hell out of him.27 But Patton wasn’t whipping anyone without gas and ammunition, and his frustration showed. Earlier that day, General Tooey Spaatz arrived to congratulate Weyland’s pilots on their achievements in the race across France. When he told Patton and Weyland that they were the greatest example of air-­ground cooperation, Patton snapped, “General Spaatz, you are a liar. What we are going to do will make the crossing of France look like chicken shit.”28 He then telephoned the Army Air Forces colonel who had led the previous day’s raid on the dam at Dieuze and cheerfully congratulated the officer on his squadron’s success. After a few words of praise, Patton told him that someone else wanted to speak to him and handed the phone to Spaatz.29 Later, Patton held an off-­the-­ record press conference, greeting the reporters with: “When this war is over, I’m going to take these off,” he said, pointing to the stars on his shoulders, “and get a short coat so the press can kiss my ass.” When a reporter complained that the press was receiving so little information that they might as well head home, Patton shot back, “I’ll be glad to furnish the transportation.”30 Still angered about Driant, Patton sent Doolittle a personal note, pleading again for a revenge bombing of the fort that had given him a bloody nose, “to teach those sons of bitches that they cannot fool with Americans.” Still incensed by the setback, he wanted Doolittle’s planes to blow up the fort so that it became “nothing but a hole in the ground.” Doolittle, a wordsmith in his own right, responded that he did not want

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“the nasal proboscis of our favorite field commander to be sanguinated” [sic] by the Germans, who, he paraphrased Patton, were the “improper offspring of a long line of illegitimates [translation: sons-­of-­bitches]”; he agreed to bomb the area, but the mission never materialized.31 To escape his supply frustrations, Patton visited Paul’s 26th and Twaddle’s 95th Divisions on October 21, only to find the men miserable, living in the mud and incessant rains. He showed them how to arrange drying rooms by placing two potbelly stoves into the cellar of a house. “It is the only way to get men dried out,” he explained.32 He stressed to lower ranking officers their obligation to take care of their men. “This is more important for young officers to know than military tactics.” He also chafed at the poor quality of America boots, complaining that “the Germans have good boots. Why haven’t we? I told them you can’t make a waterproof boot with a turned heel.”33 Patton watched part of Twaddle’s 95th Division conduct a limited attack, admitting, “All units seemed good.” The division had relieved Irwin’s 5th on the front line for a well-­deserved ten-­day rest and training.34 Some of Twaddle’s men had already experienced combat, having volunteered as drivers for the Red Ball Express. Although static, Twaddle’s men continuously patrolled the front, clashed with the Germans, captured prisoners, and even, in one case, accidentally called artillery on their own men. The experiences hardened the green troops. Despite the miserable conditions, Patton called the visit to the rear areas “a mental rest.”35 The rest did not last long. At dinner that night, Patton crumbled a piece of toast on the table, flicked a piece to Willie sitting on a nearby chair, and bent a spoon in frustration. “How long, oh lord, how long?” he asked his staff and Willie. “We roll across France in less time than it takes Monty to say ‘regroup’ and here we are stuck in the mud of Lorraine. Why? Because somewhere up the line some [son-­of-­a-­bitch] who never heard a shot fired in anger or missed a meal believes in higher priorities for pianos and ping-­pong sets than for ammunition and gas!” He then went on a tirade about the poor quality of the wine at his table, blaming Lee’s COMZ men for scooping up all the good alcohol in Europe. When the phone rang and an orderly announced that General Bradley was on the line, a frustrated Patton picked up the phone and said, “Hello Brad, this is George. What does SHAEF want now?”36 Whatever SHAEF wanted was not fully addressed because Bradley paid a visit the next day, October 22, to explain that the supply situation prevented him from immediately green-­lighting Patton’s offensive. On

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the positive side, Bradley was working with Eisenhower to launch both Hodges’s First Army and Simpson’s Ninth and had asked Montgomery and Devers to go on the attack at the same time, explaining that if he could get all three army groups attacking together, the Germans would be doomed and the war could be won. Patton replied that the massive offensive should not be based on a date but on weather—­three or four days of clear skies. He felt the Allies were fighting three enemies: the Germans, the weather, and time. Weather was the more important battlefield factor, since weather delays allowed the Germans to reinforce their line. He again complained about supplies but promised that if his army received the bulk of supplies he could attack in twenty-­four hours. After much arguing, Bradley told Patton he could launch on or about November 10 at the earliest.37 While Patton continued to hone MADISON, he had to referee another spat between Eddy and Wood. The two commanders clashed on October 18 when Wood disapproved of Eddy’s latest attack plan after learning Eddy would provide him with no infantry. Wood derisively told his superior that it took infantry to win wars. Eddy, in turn, asked him how he was going to fight without any infantry if there wasn’t any infantry left. Wood snapped back that he didn’t see how he could.38 Patton had his own conflicts with Wood, but they were always professional. When Wood reported to Patton’s headquarters, they argued, exchanging a “now George” with a “now John.” Their voices rose until a soldier coughed to remind them they were not alone.39 Patton also had to reshuffle his commanders. Bruce Clarke, who had been promoted to brigadier general, had been sent to command the CCB for the 7th Armored Division, now in First Army. “This is a blow,” Patton admitted. “He was the sparkplug of all our attacks across France.” He also relieved Colonel Robert Sears, a regimental commander from Baade’s 35th Division. Sears was a solid leader and had personally killed seven Germans, but he had turned sixty and could no longer keep up with operations. He had also lost too much weight. “He is as thin as a snake,” Patton wrote. Worried that Sears would die at his post if left in command, Patton assigned him to an ordnance group.40 Patton also looked to add more infantry divisions to MADISON. When he learned that Terry Allen had arrived in theater commanding the 104th Infantry Division, he sent Hap Gay to lure Allen to Third Army. Allen had fought well in Tunisia and Sicily under Patton as the

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commander of the 1st Infantry Division and Patton wanted him back. Allen appreciated the offer, but Bradley had already assigned his division to Simpson’s Ninth Army. Still, Patton congratulated his old friend on being back in the fight.41 Patton then turned his attention to the newly arrived 94th Infantry Division, but Bradley kept it in the Loire Valley, which Patton considered a waste of an entire division. “I wish he had a little daring,” he wrote of Bradley. “It [the 94th] could be replaced by one light tank company.”42 Also on October 22, Patton got a new corps and corps commander, Major General John Millikin commanding the III Corps. Patton did not want him, preferring instead to promote Wood to the position, whom he considered his best division commander. “I believe that it is quite detrimental to morale,” he wrote, “to put an inexperienced corps commander—­who has never heard a gun go off in anger—­in command of battle-­tried Division Commander.”43 Millikin had served with the AEF in during World War I, but only as an executive officer at the General Staff School in Langres. When Bradley overruled Patton’s objections, Patton had Millikin’s senior staff officers come to Third Army headquarters and shadow their respective colleagues, as he had done with General Simpson’s staff. Still, Patton worried about his unblooded new commander. “He had better produce,” he wrote to Beatrice.44 Patton briefed Millikin and his staff when they arrived at his headquarters. “We have our own staff methods,” he told the gathering before launching into a speech. Do not become desk bound, the G-­2 [intelligence staff] and G-­3 [operations staff] must get out and see what is going on up front. And don’t overwork. You’re no good if you’re groggy. Make your enlisted men take care of themselves. Watch for trench feet. Make dry socks and clothes [a priority]. If you let them alone, they will fall asleep in wet clothes. You have got to make them dry. I was up on the lines and a regimental commander told me they had no way to dry men’s clothes. We were in a room that was so God-­dammed hot that it would have dried all the clothes in his regiment in a couple of hours. Don’t tell me it can’t be done. Always find a way.45 Millikin’s command of III Corps is suspicious, especially in light of Major General Major General William H. H. Morris Jr. losing command

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of XVIII Corps to Ridgway. No explanation was forthcoming, although Millikin had married the daughter of General Payton March, the Army chief of staff during World War I, which suggests he may have acquired the position through personal connections. Also, in the summer of 1943, General Leslie McNair, the commander of Army Ground Forces, recommended to George Marshall that Millikin be given command of III Corps. Marshall and McNair’s backing may have kept Millikin at the helm of III Corps despite the new regulation of giving corps to battle hardened veterans.46 While dealing with the reshuffling of his commanders, Patton also sought to improve his soldiers’ lot. Soldiers not in the front lines were billeted in villages and towns (and, for the lucky, Nancy), where they lived in homes, received clean uniforms, coffee and donuts, fresh bread, and meals containing captured enemy beef. He also designated a special train to deliver four hundred tons of letters and packages to the men. On October 25 he attended the opening ceremony for a Red Cross Club for the 26th Infantry Division, where he told the crowd that they might think of him as a son-­of-­a-­bitch, but the Germans thought he was twice as big a son-­of-­a-­bitch. The men gave that line a five-­minute standing ovation.47 Patton mentioned in his diary giving a rousing speech at a Red Cross Club, yet he failed to mention it in his letters to Beatrice.48 This is unsurprising, because in his diaries, references to Red Cross Doughnut Dollies was usually code for Jean Gordon’s presence. Several members of his staff also noted the Doughnut Dollies appearance in October. And while his monthly output of letters to Beatrice remained steady (fourteen letters in September, eleven in October, and twelve in November), he complained twice to Beatrice in October that he was having trouble finding time to write. Gordon’s presence usually buoyed Patton’s spirits. That night, he dined with the local prefecture as well as Eddy and Gaffey. Eddy confided to his diary that Patton was in his glory. “That man is never out of his element.”49 There were few things Patton would not do to buck up morale. One morning, coming out of church, a soldier asked Patton if he could have his picture taken with him. “How would you like me to stand, son?” he asked before posing with the soldier.50 When he came upon an Army Air Forces mechanic struggling with a bomber’s engine, he climbed up to the engine and stuck his hands in up to his elbows, trying to figure

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Figure 24. Patton and Eddy (to Patton’s left) chat with Doughnut Dollies at the opening of a Red Cross club for the 26th Infantry Division. The woman to Patton’s right seems to be Jean Gordon, Patton’s niece and mistress. Catalog number: 111-­SC 195868, National Archives and Records Administration.

out what was wrong with the machine. Without solving the problem, he walked away with his arms covered in grease, but he issued the mechanic a pass for any needed supplies. When the story later made the rounds and reporters questioned Patton about his deed, he told them: “I don’t know a damned thing about engines, but that whole Air Force will know that I’m interested in keeping them moving!”51 Patton also visited ordnance workshops, where he found an alarming rate of American equipment picked up from the battlefield. He furiously sent out a memo to his commanders to “immediately institute remedial measures,” adding that he would begin grading them by how well they took care of their equipment and that officers who allowed such waste “are not fit to wear the shoulder straps which they now possess.” He followed with another memo, explaining that he had examined division supply records for September and found that Wood’s 4th Armored and Baade’s 35th Division “were the least culpable,” while Irwin’s 5th Division

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and Silvester’s 7th Armored “were the greatest offenders.”52 He motivated by naming and shaming. But it was not only morale Patton sought to improve. To increase his tanks’ lethality, he added firepower, armor, and better tank treads. He wanted twin .30 caliber aircraft guns attached to tank turrets, but his ordnance officer, Major General L.H. Campbell, studied the request and eventually determined that a single .50 caliber aircraft gun offered double, and maybe triple, the firepower. Besides, Campbell wrote Patton, “we have on hand several hundred special barrels for this aircraft gun.” Patton liked the idea and approved it.53 For better protection, he had five-­and six-­inch armor plates welded to the front of tanks, giving them a better survivability against frontal fire.54 For traction, he added extensions to tank tracks called Duck’s Feet, which were being built in France and Luxembourg at a rate of two-­hundred a day, exclusively for Third Army.55 He brought General Spaatz to Wood’s headquarters to watch a demonstration of the extensions. Tanks with and without Duck’s Feet drove around in the mud, showing the benefits of the new extensions.56 Patton could not have picked a better place for the test. The terrain was muddier than he had ever seen. He was glad Spaatz, who commanded his air forces from the rear, got to see the living conditions for his men. He drove home the point by chiding Spaatz for his well-­pressed pants: “Tooey, the well-­dressed airman!”57 Patton also attended demonstrations for a flame-­throwing tank, an antiaircraft gun, and some old artillery pieces. He arrived at the flame-­ throwing demonstration just as a captain was explaining the weapon and asking everyone to step back. As the people started to move, Patton asked, “What do you mean, ‘step back?’ Don’t you have any confidence in this weapon working?” When the captain said he did, Patton responded, “Well, you damn well better have. You’re going to stand right next to that thing and I’m going to stand right over here too.” Everyone else remained where they were as the tank spat fire across the open field. The test was a complete success and nary an eyebrow singed.58 At the antiaircraft demonstration, Patton watched as a 90mm antiaircraft gun blasted an old French World War I fortification, leaving a hole in one of its walls. A reporter asked him what he thought of the weapon. “I conclude, young man,” Patton said, “that if we had been fighting the French with this gun in 1917, we would have beaten the hell out of them.”59

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Figure 25. Patton prepares to take a picture of an experimental flame-­throwing tank on October 25, 1944. He shamed the officer in charge to stand near the tank as it fired. Catalog number: 111-­SC 436535, National Archives and Records Administration.

Patton also visited a 100mm cannon battery at Fort de Guentrange in Thionville, which dated back to 1898. Cavalrymen from Polk’s unit had refurbished several of the old guns and helped Patton search for a target across the Moselle. When they spotted a lone German, Patton aimed his cannon while other cavalrymen aimed the other five. At Patton’s order they opened fire. With a roar, the six cannons fired, but the rounds were so slow, the men could actually see the shells as they arced toward the German, who ducked with time to spare. Still, Patton delighted in giving the enemy a good scare.60 He then told Polk about his participation in the third Battle for Gravelotte. Polk just stared blankly at his commander. Disgusted, Patton explained the decisive battle from the Franco-­Prussian War of 1870, which had been fought over the same area. He pointed out that the Germans had attacked north while the French attacked south,

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and that, in World War I, the Germans attacked south and the French attacked north. “Now,” Patton observed, “we will kick the hell out of the Germans while for the first time fighting an east-­west battle on this hallowed ground.”61 While Patton planned and readied his men, the Germans constantly reminded him that they were still dangerous. They began striking Nancy with 280mm shells fired from a railway gun, better known to Americans as “Anzio Annie,” after a similar enemy gun that had fired upon American positions at the Anzio beachhead in Italy. When shells dropped around Walker’s headquarters on October 16, Patton visited and took pictures. The Germans fired again two days later, dropping a railway bridge into the Moselle River. Patton wanted the bridge repaired immediately to evacuate his wounded. When his chief of engineers explained it would take two or three days, Patton scoffed: “Too damn long, you’ll work around the clock if necessary, and do it in twenty-­four hours.” The engineer warned Patton that round-­the-­clock work required floodlights, making the bridge an easy target for the Luftwaffe, particularly Heinkel 111 bombers. As a solution, Patton pooled his local anti-­aircraft units around the bridge. “We’ll have ourselves a dammed fine Heinkel shoot,” he said.62 And he was right. That night, as German bombers flew over, the sky lit up with anti-­aircraft fire. Gunners shot down three bombers and damaged three more. The next day, a train filled with wounded rolled across the newly constructed bridge.63 But the Germans were not done. In the early hours of October 24, sixteen rounds hit Nancy’s railway station, a bridge, and Patton’s staff ’s residence. One of the shells collapsed a house across the street from Patton’s quarters.64 An MP rushed into Patton’s room to find the general already up and dressed. The two ran outside to the house across the street and started digging into the rubble to rescue an old couple and a baby that lived there. Patton grabbed one of the Frenchman’s legs and, with another Frenchman holding the other leg, pulled until they realized they were choking the man, whose chin was pressed against a table. As they worked, another shell exploded nearby, showering everyone with stones and plaster. “They seem to have us zeroed in,” Patton told Codman, who had joined them. Fortunately, it was the last shell and they successfully freed the man. “There you are,” Patton told him as he helped the man to his feet, “should be alright—­except for a stiff neck.”

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Figure 26. The apartment across from Patton’s Nancy residence crumbled under fire from a German 280mm railgun, which missed Patton by yards on October 24, 1944. He helped pull a husband and wife from the rubble. Library of Congress, OV 20, 44.

They then went for the man’s wife, who was buried under a pile of bricks. Patton dug as she screamed that her grandchild was still buried. Her husband shouted to her, “The famous General Patton himself is helping.” As they dug, a small boy appeared holding the sleeping and uninjured baby.65 True to his nature, Patton made sure his public relations officer published that he personally pulled people out of the destroyed house. Newspapers accounts further embellished the story, with Patton dramatically wedging his shoulders under a beam and slowly raising himself to a standing position while others extricated the buried man.66 Despite the positive press coverage, Patton later admitted to Beatrice, “I was real[l]y scared.” He decided if the attacks continued, he would sleep in his cellar.67 The large artillery rounds continued to explode in and around Nancy until Patton’s map maker, Colonel Dan Kennedy, used topographical

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maps and his knowledge of the German map grid system to recompute the coordinates and find Anzio Annie in a railway tunnel. He also calculated that it took two hours to prepare the gun for firing. Kennedy briefed Patton and his staff about his findings. During the briefing, Patton kidded Weyland, “You’d better get busy or I’ll make you change billets.”68 Weyland sent his pilots aloft and they knocked out the railway gun by skip-­bombing both ends of the tunnel, sealing it off. “I hope we kill them all,” Patton wrote about the railway gun’s crew.69 At his next morning briefing, Patton awarded Kennedy the Bronze Star.70 While Patton had solved the problem of the German railway gun, supplies were still a thorn in his side. General Lee came to Patton’s headquarters on October 25 to talk solutions. Patton turned out his honor guard to greet him, but once the formalities were over he addressed Lee in less than honorable terms. Third Army ammunition and gasoline supplies were “practically nothing,” Patton complained. His gas supply was two million gallons short and he hadn’t received food or ammunition in three days. “There would have to be a great improvement before the offensive could be resumed.” To drive home his point, Patton showed Lee a letter he had written to Eisenhower about the lack of supplies. Bristling, Lee promised he was doing everything possible to furnish Patton with everything needed to get him moving again.71 While Eisenhower had earlier told Patton not to criticize General Lee and his COMZ, Patton had had enough. He waited two more days and, not seeing any improvement, sent a radiogram to Eisenhower.72 Part of the supply problem came from frontline combat with the Germans, which drained ammunition stocks. Van Fleet’s 90th Division continued to wrestle for control of Maizières-­lès-­Metz. Frustrated with the situation, on October 27 Patton told his staff at their morning meeting, “Organize patrols and go up there and kill every male on those hills. Kill them all. Wait until you get a forty-­minute alert and then nail them.” When one of his intelligence officers suggested they try to get a few prisoners Patton calmed down. “All right,” he said, “you’ll get your prisoners.”73 The next morning, Patton was still in a bad mood. His morning intelligence meeting was all about news of a V-­1 “buzz bomb” that had flown over the city the night before. “That was not a buzz bomb,” declared Colonel Nixon, one of Patton’s ordnance officers, “it didn’t sound like it.” Patton laughed and turned to face Nixon. “How would you know? You weren’t up then.”74 Later that day, having lost all patience with the fighting

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at Maizières-­lès-­Metz, he called Walker and told him to stop fooling around and to take the town.75 Van Fleet launched another attack.76 “We got into another pissing match with the Germans in a town up here called Maiziers [sic],” Patton wrote a friend, “where one of Little Bea’s old beaus [Colonel George Barth] got badly beaten up and will probably die. However[,] we took the town with some 57 Germans alive and some hundreds of corpses in the ruins.” Despite the victory, the Germans remained in the area, launching small attacks. Unlike Driant, where Patton soon realized the futility of going against fixed defenses, he failed to call off this battle. Fighting would continue for almost a month, reducing the town to rubble, with only a few buildings standing.77 Montgomery’s war plans continued to detract from Patton’s. On October 28, Eisenhower’s press aide, Navy Captain Harry Butcher, visited Third Army headquarters, where Patton embarrassed him by introducing him to his staff as an admiral. Later, in his office, Butcher told Patton that Eisenhower was giving Montgomery the First Allied Airborne Army to help him cross the Rhine. Patton, never wanting to dispute his commander—­especially in front of his staffers—­agreed with the strategy, saying he would not need paratroopers for his crossing. He planned on using bombers to suppress any defenders on the opposite shore so his men could row over unharmed. When Butcher mentioned that Patton had been quoted as saying that Eisenhower “is the best general the British have,” Patton lied and said he made no such statement, although some in his command were bitter about being stopped because of a lack of gas.78 That night, Patton dined with the famous singer, actress, and radio star Marlene Dietrich. The German-­born Dietrich was entertaining soldiers with the USO, risking her life, since she knew she would be executed as a traitor if captured by the Germans. She told Patton she was more afraid of being tortured than being taken prisoner. Patton, wanting to calm her nerves, smiled, reached into his field jacket, and pulled out a small pistol. “Here,” he offered her, “shoot rather than surrender! It’s small but it’s effective.” Dietrich accompanied Patton’s army for nine weeks, performing for an estimated thirty-­seven thousand troops.79 She and her troupe would put on a special show for the general and his staff about a week after their dinner together, but Patton did not enjoy it, calling it an insult to human intelligence.80 On October 29 Patton traveled to Bradley’s headquarters to review Operation MADISON. He wanted Macon’s 83rd Infantry for the

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operation but Bradley allowed him only two of Macon’s regiments, with the further caveat that he had to give them back to First Army once he crossed the Saar River. While Bradley gave Patton this asset, he took away one of Weyland’s fighter groups, despite Weyland’s efforts to retain it for the upcoming offensive. Patton tried to put the best face on the loss: “All the more glory to us when we go it alone.”81 Bradley added that Simpson’s Ninth Army would come under Montgomery’s control, making it harder for him to coordinate a larger offensive to accompany Patton’s.82 Bradley finally gave Patton his attack day: November 8. With that, Patton departed. On his way back to Nancy, he had what he described as “a sinister idea.” Back in the United States, the presidential election between Roosevelt or the Republican Thomas E. Dewey would be held on November 7, the day before Operation MADISON kicked off. During the 1942 midterm elections, Roosevelt had pressed General Marshall to launch Operation TORCH, the landings in North Africa before November 7 so the Democrats could reap the benefits of having American soldiers in action against Germany and Italy. But the earliest that Eisenhower could pull off the attack was November 8, one day too late. Now, Patton did not want to hand Roosevelt a victory. Even though the operation would be launched a day after the election, the bombing campaign would start a few days before it. Mistakenly thinking that the election was to be held on November 4 (Patton did have dyslexia), Patton wrote, “we are not going to be allowed to attack before that date.” He decided he might slow down his supply trains, delaying his attack until after the election. “The idea is too fantastic,” he admitted, even though his timetable was off.83 To confuse the Germans before the attack, Patton moved units around his front. He returned Irwin’s 5th Division to its old position southwest of Metz, replacing Twaddle’s 95th Division, which shifted north, taking over the line for Van Fleet’s 90th Division, including Maizières-­lès-­Metz with its infamous slag heap. The 90th moved north into a training area, while fake guns and other deceptive means covered their disappearance from the line. Polk’s 3rd Cavalry Group also took over part of the 90th’s sector. To keep the illusion real, 90th soldiers painted 3rd Cavalry markings on their vehicles whenever they visited the area on reconnaissance missions. Likewise, 95th men in Uckange wore 90th Division patches. The 90th would return to the line in time for the big assault.84

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With little more than a week before MADISON commenced, on October 30, Patton still wanted to bomb Driant, but low clouds and heavy rains delayed Allied bombers. Air commanders also may not have wanted to spend lives, aircraft, and bombs on a static fort to satisfy Patton’s desire for revenge while other, more important, targets needed neutralizing. Patton didn’t care; he snapped at Weyland for failing to get permission from Bomber Command for his bombing. “I want that remedied at once,” he told him, wanting Weyland to press his superiors every day until he succeeded. Robert Allen, who witnessed the exchange, thought Patton’s bull-­headedness a weakness of his personality.85 Later that day, Eddy and Walker met with Patton to refine their attack plans. The meeting became contentious when the two commanders argued about corps boundaries. When a staff officer mentioned that ULTRA intercepts showed that the Germans were suffering oil shortages, Patton shifted his focus to Weyland, “That may win the war,” he told him. “Be sure to impress that on your air people. Tell them to keep hammering those bastard’s [sic] oil supplies.” Along with his quarrelsome commanders, Patton worried about the weather. “If we can get a few good days at the right time, they can’t stop us,” he told everyone present. “We’ll kill the sons-­of-­bitches on the run as we did across France.” The meeting left Patton feeling sick and anxious.86 To Beatrice he wrote, “You better send me a couple of bottles of pink medicin [sic]. When I’m not attacking, I get bilious.”87 Further north, soldiers of the First Army watched a Signal Corps film about the liberation of Paris, which credited Patton for capturing the city.88 While that may have given Patton a chuckle, he did not like the idea of seeing himself being portrayed in moving pictures. When Beatrice wrote to him that film producers in Hollywood wanted to make a movie about his life, he refused. “Definitely I don’t want a movie written about me,” he wrote back, “I think they can be sued if they try.”89 Patton continued to greet new units to his army. On October 31 he inspected the 761st Tank Battalion, the first African American combat unit assigned to Third Army. Arriving outside of Saint-­Nicolas-­de-­Port, Patton mounted the hood of a halftrack to address the soldiers. Men, you are the first negro [some said he used the term “colored”] tankers to ever fight in the American army. I would never have asked for you if you weren’t good. I have nothing but the best in my

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Army. I don’t care what color you are, so long as you go up there and kill those kraut sons-­a-­bitches. Everyone has their eyes on you and is expecting great things from you. Most of all, your race is looking forward to your success. Don’t let them down, and, damn you, don’t let me down! Some of the men who witnessed his speech said that he used “only one good English word and the rest was all blasphemy.”90 When he finished his speech, Patton hopped down from the halftrack and engaged the men one-­on-­one. He spoke from his own experiences: “This is war,” he told one of them. “I want you to start shooting and keep shooting. Shoot everything you see. Whenever you see a German, if it’s male or female, eight to eighty years old, you kill them because they’ll kill you.” When he heard one of the Sherman tanks had a 76mm cannon—­larger than the standard issue 75mm—­he ran over to it, sprung up to its turret hatch, and dropped in. Turning to the gunner, he said, “listen boy, when you go up there, I want you shoot up every [curse word, curse word] Kraut you see. Do you hear me, boy?” The soldier, enraged at being called boy, refused to answer with a “Yes, sir.” Angry that he was not eliciting an answer, Patton leaned in and shouted, “I want you to shoot up every [curse word] thing you see! Do you understand me, boy?” The soldier then calmly responded, “Yes, general.”91 That night, in his diary, Patton wrote that 761st gave a good first impression of itself, but “I have no confidence in the inherent fighting ability of the race.” In his autobiography, War as I Knew It, he reinforced that idea. “Individually they were good soldiers, but I expressed my belief at that time, and have never found the necessity of changing it, that a colored solider cannot think fast enough to fight in Armor.”92 Earlier, Patton had met twice with Brigadier General Benjamin O. Davis, the only Black general in the U.S. Army: once in August, when he told Davis there were too many cases of rape, murder, and riot by Black troops; and a week before he addressed the Black tankers when Davis came to inspect the Third Army’s Black units. In his diary, Patton called Davis “a nice looking old nigger.”93 On November 1 Patton met again with his corps commanders and General Weyland to review the final plan for MADISON. Little had changed from the original plan, but this meeting finally established corps boundaries between Walker and Eddy. In addition, Bradley had

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gotten Hodges to attack simultaneously with Patton.94 The next day, Eddy showed up, looking nervous, along with his division commanders, who, Patton thought, made a much better impression. Eddy told Patton he was concerned the initial bombardment might land on his troops. Patton, in turn, asked Weyland what the safety range was for heavy bombers. When Weyland replied that it was three thousand yards, Patton said, “make it four thousand.” When Weyland explained that the range for lighter, medium bombers was two thousand, Patton told him to make it three thousand. “It is a worse effect on morale to bomb our own men than not to bomb at all,” he later wrote. “I would rather attack without bombing if there is any danger dropping on our men.” As the meeting broke up, General Bradley arrived and explained that Hodges could not jump off until November 10 and Montgomery could not attack until December 1. Montgomery had finally cleared Antwerp’s Scheldt Estuary of German troops (it would still take another two weeks to sweep the estuary for mines). With Antwerp secure, Eisenhower planned for Montgomery’s forces to advance about eighteen miles southeast of Nijmegen to the German city of Goch, and then to the Rhine River, while in Bradley’s zone, Hodges’s First Army north of the Ardennes would capture Cologne on the Rhine and Patton’s Third Army, south of the Ardennes, would capture the Saar region between the Moselle and the Rhine. Finally, Eisenhower wanted Jacob Devers’s army group to also advance to the Rhine near Strasbourg, while simultaneously defending Bradley’s right flank. Surprisingly, neither Eisenhower nor Bradley had any plans to fight through the Ardennes.95 Bradley asked Patton if he could attack alone, to which Patton emphatically said “yes,” with or without air support, since his army was already on twenty-­four-­hour notice. “Well,” Bradley grinned, “it’s certainly good to find one Army commander that’s willing and ready to fight.” Bradley told Patton he could have all the air assets he wanted, up to and until November 8, to prepare for MADISON. “Goddammit!” exclaimed an elated Patton, “I bet you we have good weather and get the best air-­ground effort in the world.” He told Bradley he had raised the minimum distance between bombers and his ground troops. “I want to kill Germans; that’s what we are bombing the sons-­of-­bitches for.”96 He then reviewed his plan with Bradley and Eddy, stressing he hoped to flank the Siegfried Line by reaching Trier, some sixty miles northeast of Metz, which would also put him just fifty miles from the Rhine.

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“General,” Patton beamed at Bradley, “if this plan goes through, we’ll make real history.”97 With that, the meeting broke up. “I feel forty years younger,” he wrote in his diary.98

Figure 27. On November 3, 1944, Patton visited three of his infantry divisions to prepare them for the assault to capture Metz. Here, Patton, flanked by Eddy (left) and McBride (right) tells the officers of the 80th Infantry Division that their drive to encircle Metz might end the war. Catalog number: 111-­SC 232581, National Archives and Records Administration.

Patton was a little too serious about killing Germans: on November 3 he ordered his troops to kill any captured members of the SS. “How do you spell Gestapo?” He asked the officers at his morning ULTRA staff meeting. “No prisoners from them, and we don’t give a goddamn what some chicken-­hearted people may say.” He got up and started puffing on a cigar. “I’m going down to XII Corps to address the officers and I’m going to tell them to kill every goddamn Gestapo they find. To hell with taking them prisoner.” He then turned to Weyland and asked him about any word from Bomber Command for his still-­expected bombing

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of Driant. When Weyland told him that approval had been received, Patton was pleased. “Now all we need is a day of good weather and then we’ll blow those sons-­of-­bitches to hell. I certainly don’t want to miss out on that.” At the regular staff meeting that followed, he decided it was time for one of his signature speeches. He stood up in front of the war map and began: Third Army has been given the great honor to lead the new offensive. Our D-­Day starts on the fifth—­depending on the weather. I don’t have to impress on you the vital necessity for complete secrecy. [The] enemy must not know our plans. Also, despite my talents for bullshit, I am unable to express my complete confidence that we will succeed in breaking through, and except possibly for a skirmish on the Rhine, we will go deep into Germany and end the war. [We] must make hard hitting and unremitting effort and to kill every German bastard between here and the Rhine. As I said, [there] may be some skirmishing on the Siegfried Line, but we are going to break through to the Rhine and from there into the heart of Germany if that is necessary to win the war. We are going to win. [I] have absolutely no doubt about it. We are going to win and end the war. Also, as a result of my intimate relations with God, I’m sure we’ll have the good weather we need for a lucky jump off.99 Everyone laughed at that last line. With that, Patton headed out to make speeches to the 26th, 35th, and 80th Infantry Divisions. He told the officers of the 26th that the more they fought and the more fiercely they attacked, the quicker the battle would be over and the less effective the enemy fire would be on them, resulting in fewer American casualties. He added that they were the best soldiers in the world, that their equipment was superior, and that he needed them to stress those facts to their men. When he finished, Eddy escorted him to his car, mentioning as he did that they could win the war by destroying all the enemy between their location and the Rhine River and not letting them escape. Patton thought it a good idea, turned around, and spoke to the officers about Eddy’s concept. He gave the same speech to the officers of the 35th and 80th divisions. He came away from Baade’s 35th particularly impressed, especially after Baade showed him a cane inscribed with every town his division had liberated.100

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Figure 28. Major General Baade presents Patton with a cane inscribed with all the French towns liberated by his 35th Infantry Division. Catalog number: 111-­SC 196063, National Archives and Records Administration.

Despite the coming battle, Patton was still a father and had to deal with family matters back home. When his son, George IV, decided to quit the U.S. Military Academy in his sophomore year and enlist in the U.S. Army, Patton urged him not to do so. The government had made a huge investment to make him a future leader, he wrote his son. He also listed a number of Army generals—­Marshall, Hodges, Truscott, and Eddy—­who did not go to West Point, but had graduated college, something necessary for a commissioned officer. He downplayed battlefield commissions, writing that they were temporary and only possible in foreign armies. He cited Major G. R. Pfann, the Third Army secretary of the general staff, an All-­American halfback, a Rhodes Scholar, Phi Beta Kappa, and PhD, who never regretted pursuing academia. “I am simply bringing these points to your attention,” he concluded, “because, as I said before, you are free, white, and twenty-­one, and can make your own decision.”101

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But Patton could not leave well enough alone. He had Gaffey and Gay also write his son advising him to stay at West Point. Gaffey warned young George he would not be able to make a career in the army if he enlisted, since there would be an excess of enlisted men after the war. He also assured him that the war might end soon and that there would be a next war. He ended with a punch: “It would be a great disappointment to him [young George’s father] if you make an unsound choice.”102 Gay, who also had a son at West Point, argued that only one man out of four hundred actually saw combat, that surprisingly little fighting actually took place, and that the war would last well past George’s graduation (it wouldn’t); he also reinforced Patton’s argument that by leaving the academy early, he would be breaking his contract with the government. Gay tried to get the cadet to look at the big picture: “In life most people find that a broken contract leaves forever in their mouth a bad taste, and once a contract is broken it is practically impossible to fully repair it.”103 The letter-­writing campaign worked: young George remained at West Point. Ironically, Patton wrote Beatrice about his son resigning, “I think it unwise but in his case I would do it.”104 Along with his son, Patton worried about his two sons-­in-­law, John K. Waters and Jim Totten. Waters, married to his oldest daughter, Little Bee, had been in German POW camps since being captured in Tunisia almost two years earlier. Patton wrote Beatrice, “I am getting pretty gloomy about John unless we win soon.” Totton, married to Patton’s second daughter, Ruth Ellen, had come down with infectious hepatitis, a little-­understood malady, in Italy. “I doubt if Jim goes to duty for some time,” he added. Patton was right. Totten would spend three months in the hospital.105 Back home, Little Bee spent her time raising two boys in Washington, DC, and working for the International Red Cross, helping wives of other POWs. Ruth Ellen, living at the family home in Green Meadows, Massachusetts, was raising her own one-­year-­old son. Beatrice divided her time between her three children and gave speeches at different patriotic events or over the radio. She became so obsessed with saving fuel for her husband’s tanks that she took to driving a donkey cart to Sunday church. When family members chided her, she explained, “If the Lord could enter Jerusalem on the rear end of an ass, I don’t see why I can’t go to church in a donkey cart.”106 Back in France, on November 4 Patton addressed the 5th, 90th, and 95th Divisions, as well as the 10th Armored and Walker’s XX Corps staff

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in a pouring rainstorm. One of Walker’s staffers said the speech made him feel like part of the family listening to their father; he found the speech filled with “encouragement, motivation, and inspiration, all laced with a colorful vocabulary that only George Patton could deliver.”107 Patton told the soldiers of the 95th Infantry, “It is 132 miles to the Rhine from here, and if this army will attack with venom and desperate energy, it is more than probable that the war will end before we get to the Rhine. Therefore, when we attack, go like hell!”108 While inspecting the soldiers, Patton noticed the medics’ helmets with large red crosses on white circles on the front and backs. They also had red crosses on their shoulders, backs, and chests. “You guys look like a bunch of Christmas trees,” he told them. “Do you know where you are? You’re at Metz, this is SS territory, get those things off!” Patton still considered the division a problem, “especially Twaddle.”109 Later, at a meeting in Van Fleet’s 90th Division headquarters, Patton told a group of officers they would be crossing the Moselle River at 9 a.m. the next morning to capture a fort across from Thionville. “You know I came up here not to tell you anything—­you sons-­of-­bitches already know how.” One of the officers said after the meeting, “Patton says we can do it, so I guess we can.”110 From there Patton drove over to speak with the men of Polk’s 3rd Cavalry Group. Polk worried that Patton would simply deliver the same, long speech; he need not have worried. After speaking to some of the NCOs, Patton stood up in his jeep and addressed the men sitting on a hill before him. “This is my old regiment,” he boomed in his high squeaky voice. “And you sons of bitches know what to do, now go do it.” With that he saluted and drove off. “We were far too respectful to applaud,” recalled Polk. “But we loved him for it.”111 In a meeting with the officers of the green 10th Armored, Patton was encouraging, educational, profane, and direct. “You and I are going to kick some German ass!” he began. He threatened to fire General Morris, their commander, if the division did not fight, explaining that he knew whether a division was fighting by the number of second lieutenants getting killed—­“that’s what second lieutenants are for!” He grinned for effect. He wanted his lieutenants to lead from the front, stand up in their tanks, and keep their ranks visible. “Let your men see you shine up that bar until the krauts can use it for an aiming stake.” He encouraged the men to blow any French refugees “off the road” if they blocked their progress. He wanted them to attack quickly and violently, and if anyone

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reported they were pinned down from enemy fire, they were a coward. “Get out of that hole and go kill the son-­of-­a-­bitch who is firing at you.” He also wanted them to fire as much ammunition as possible—­“Fire scares the heinies. Scare the shit out of them. . . . Shoot up all your ammo, I’ll get you more.” He added his famous lines about flanking the enemy, making the enemy die for his country, and not shoveling horseshit in Louisiana.112 He warned them it was going to be cold but it would be just as cold “sitting on your ass back here!”113 Patton next visited the 193rd Field Artillery Battalion in Reims, commanded by Colonel Harold Cooney, whom Patton knew from West Point. Cooney told Patton that his dental officer, a captain, had refused to lead a battery into position, citing his medical designation, which was against the Geneva Convention. “God dammit, Cooney!” Patton yelled, “you got enough artillery officers! Leave the Goddammed dentists alone.” He then marched out of Cooney’s command tent, turned around, and urinated on it. Unmoved, Cooney invited his boss to lunch. Surprised to be served steak at a forward post, where men should have been eating rations, Patton asked, “How come you guys get this kind of food? We’re not even getting this kind of food at SHAEF.” Coney directed him to the captain who had refused to lead the battalion, who was also the mess officer. “Captain,” Patton said, “this was a great lunch, now tell me how you get that kind of food.” The captain explained that he had traded rations and white bread with the locals for steaks. “Good thinking Captain,” Patton beamed, “that’s what I like, someone who uses his head.”114 During his review of the troops, Patton came across a company whose soldiers all kept a fork in their left breast pockets. When asked what the forks were for, a soldier explained that, in compliance with the general’s orders, they used forks to pluck slices of bread, instead of grabbing slices with their hands. Patton, quite impressed with the men’s sanitary practice, complimented the men and went outside, where he noticed that every soldier had a string hanging out of the lower part of his fly. When he asked the soldiers why the string, he was told it was for getting the penis out without touching it with the hand, again complying with Patton’s ideals of sanitation. But then Patton asked, “how do you get it back?” One soldier replied, “I don’t know what the others do, but for myself I use my fork.”115 True or not, the story became one of Patton’s favorites to tell. On November 5, with the bombers scheduled to hit the front lines, Patton donned his riding pants and high boots along with his blouse and his .38 revolver. But heavy rains forced a rescheduling. The heavy

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bombers flew over Metz and continued into Germany where they bombed secondary targets.116 Eventually, fighters swooped in and shot up enemy troop concentrations, vehicles, and supply dumps. The weather then cleared and more bombers followed, dropping their loads on Forts Driant and Jeanne d’Arc. Patton knew he was at the mercy of the weather. “We haven’t got much time,” he told Allen. “If we get a break today, we jump off tomorrow.”117 But Patton’s luck did not hold. The next day, clouds rolled in and the skies poured rain; yet he remained optimistic.118 As the days ticked down to the jump off, Patton continued to tweak his plan. He got the 5th Ranger Battalion to defend his communication lines and had Hap Gay call Bradley and work out artillery support from Hodges in support of Macon’s 83rd Infantry. Patton’s staff coordinated with Weyland’s staff and Walker’s operations officer to select ten targets for bombers to take out before the troops attacked. Devers showed up at Patton’s headquarters, saying that he would launch Haislip’s XV Corps within forty-­eight hours of Eddy’s attack. He also assured Patton his Army Group would assist Third Army in any way it could and would take advantage of any breakthrough made by Third Army. Patton, surprised by Devers’s generosity, called him “most cooperative.”119 When Patton learned that the tankers of the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions were upset that he did not address them before the big offensive, he headed to their headquarters on November 6, two days before the ground assault. He told both divisions that there was nothing he could tell them about war or valor that they did not already know. He told the 6th Armored tankers that he had confidence in them and that they would do a great job once they got going. He did not want them to be too easy on German civilians, concluding that it was possible to win the war in the next 132 miles to the Rhine River.120 He told the 4th Armored’s tankers that he wanted the first man across the Rhine River to receive the Medal of Honor and paraphrased a Bible quote: “The first shall be last and the 4th shall be first.” He concluded that the division was the greatest fighting machine in history and exhorted them to annihilate the Germans.121 Later in the day, Patton held another off-­the-­record press conference. This time, he asked his correspondents to lie and report the opening of his offensive as “correcting the line.” He did not want the Germans sending in reinforcements until all his northern units were safely across the Moselle and Seille Rivers. He also wanted them to report heavily on

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the corps, division, and regimental commanders, all except for the 95th Division and the 10th Armored, wanting to keep them secret. Then, after swearing the correspondents to secrecy, he surprised them by revealing the campaign map for Operation MADISON and explaining his double pincer. He hoped the Germans would see the jaws closing behind them, forcing them to abandon Metz instead of staying and fighting because, as he explained it, “a cornered rat fights.” The correspondents followed up with questions about timing, objectives, weather predictions, and enemy strength. Patton answered honestly, providing details and admitting he did not know all the answers. When he could, he quoted numbers and spun anecdotes from Alexander the Great to the present. He reminded the reporters that he wanted stories on junior officers. “They walk in the shit and sleep in the mud,” he said. “They don’t have a nice war office like this.” He concluded the conference by reminding them not to speak a word of what they heard, for it could cost thousands of lives. “I know I can trust you.”122 As November 8 approached, Patton’s emotions rose and fell. About two weeks before the jump off he wrote Beatrice that his attack would penetrate twenty miles into the German line, “and with luck much further.” A week before jump-­off, he admitted the wait was “very trying on the disposition.” Then, on November 5 he found himself short of breath, which he blew off as “my usual reaction to an impending fight or match.”123 He reminded himself that the operation would be launched exactly two years to the day that he landed in Morocco. “History has a curious way of repeating itself,” he wrote Beatrice. The next day, he repeatedly vomited “as I always do before a match,” he wrote, chalking it up more to anxiety over getting started than to any fear.124 Everything was set, except the weather. All the planning was complete and all adjustments made. Patton would attack with seven infantry divisions and three armored divisions, all supported by thirty-­five field artillery battalions, fourteen tank destroyer battalions, six tank battalions (including the first African American tank battalion), fifteen combat engineer battalions, twenty-­three antiaircraft artillery battalions, and three cavalry groups. The day before the attack, on November 7, as the skies poured rain, orders went out for engineer units to take over guarding the bridges in Eddy’s sector, freeing Wood’s and Grow’s tankers from the job.125

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Conditions did not look good, the rivers were rising not by inches but by feet. Water saturated the ground. At the morning staff meeting, Patton declared: Tomorrow we jump off. No conditions and no doubts. Doubt is a disease. We are not going to the Rhine but over the Rhine. This is the final beginning of the end of the war. I want to thank each and every one of you for your fine work in preparing this operation. You have worked very hard and effectively, and I expect you to keep it up harder than ever.126 While he admitted that the weather had not cooperated, and that more rain had been predicted, he had a solution: “I am sure the Lord will get around to us very soon and will make up for lost time.”127 He then sent out the code word to Eddy: “Play ball.”128 That evening, Patton read the Bible and prayed for clear skies. “The damn clock seems to have stopped,” he complained to his diary. His prayers were interrupted when Eddy and Grow showed up and asked to delay the operation until the rains ceased. Patton asked them who they would recommend as their successors since he was going to attack anyway. He reminded them that he experienced storms on the way into Morocco and Sicily but, in both cases, the skies cleared before the assaults. He also pointed out that First Army depended on this attack and that the weather had immobilized the Germans, making them easier to trap. He would rely on “Patton luck, which was the best in the world.” Eddy realized Patton just wanted to kill Germans. Before the two corps commanders left, Patton said with a smile, “Go back to your headquarters, have a big drink, and get some sleep.” When Eddy assured him the attack would go off on time, he shot back, “You’re Goddammed right it will.”129 Despite his bravado, Grow found Patton more worried than he had ever seen him, writing, “P[atton] is backing his luck against his judgement.”130 Before going to bed, Patton told Codman, “Today has been the longest day of my life. There is nothing I can do now but pray.” He went up to his bedroom, said his last prayers, and wrote in his diary four simple words: “His Will Be Done.”131

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Patton had trouble sleeping. He woke up at 3:00 a.m. on November 8 to the sound of pouring rain. Would his attack fail to launch in such horrid conditions? Should he have postponed, like Eddy had recommended? Seeking answers, he got out of bed and went into Willie’s room, where he found a copy of Infantry Attacks, authored by his favorite nemesis, Erwin Rommel. He thumbed through it until he found a section describing the fighting in September of 1914 and how the German army succeeded despite heavy rains. The reading calmed him and he went back to bed, “with out [sic] taking a drink or a green pill,” until the sound of heavy artillery woke him at 5:15 a.m.1 He again got out of bed and looked out the window. The rain had stopped and he could see the stars. The flashes from four hundred artillery barrels set the horizon aglow, followed by a sound he described as many doors slamming at once, shaking his quarters. For a second, he thought of the poor Germans on the receiving end of his big guns, knowing they had been dreading his attack. But that feeling was quickly replaced by satisfaction that he had held to his convictions about the attack date. He repeated to himself another Kipling line, this one from “Song of Diego Garcia,” about admiralty in the 1500s Spanish navy: “Had dared extreme occasion and never one betrayed.” Satisfied with his accomplishment, he said a quick prayer of thanks.2 Out in the darkness, the American artillery fired steadily for forty-­ five minutes.3 When the barrage lifted at 6:00 a.m., some two hundred thousand infantrymen from three of Patton’s divisions climbed out of their wet foxholes and advanced through the muddy terrain. Some German soldiers, devastated by the artillery barrage, readily surrendered, while others stubbornly held out. In Eddy’s sector, soldiers of Paul’s 26th Division captured some bridges intact but were held up 201

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by Germans occupying the high hilltops. Infantrymen of Baade’s 35th used prefabricated bridges to cross swollen streams while tanks from an independent tank battalion terrified enemy soldiers into surrendering. Other elements of Baade’s division met stubborn resistance, including minefields at the town of Fresnes and several wooded areas collectively called Bois d’Amelécourt. McBride’s men of the 80th bridged the Seille River in ten places and crossed against light enemy resistance. The men then crossed a canal in armpit-­high water. The Germans put up a fight at the town of Nomény, where they managed to drop artillery fire on the exposed Americans.4 As daylight broke, Bradley called to see if Third Army was attacking. Patton told him it was and asked, “Can’t you hear our guns?” Bradley was incredulous. “Without air support?” Patton promised if the clouds cleared, he would employ Weyland’s pilots. So worried was Patton that Bradley would halt him that he had kept the attack from his boss. Yet, Bradley was pleased that at least one of his armies was on the offensive. He passed the phone to Eisenhower. “I expect a lot out of you,” the SHAEF commander told Patton. “Carry the ball all the way.” Patton could not accept the praise graciously, instead accusing Eisenhower in his diary of being overly cautious. However, he followed Eisenhower’s orders and kept his units moving for one important reason. As he told one of his staff officers, “Dig in and you are dead! You will be a perfect target for enemy mortars. If you keep moving forward you will be a more difficult target for the enemy and he will be more nervous and unsteady in his aim, because you are getting closer and closer to him for the kill.”5 Patton took Codman and Stiller with him to visit Eddy and watch McBride’s attack. He donned a khaki raincoat for the occasion but did not wear the ivory-­handled pistol that normally helped his men identify him. The small party climbed atop Mount Toulon, which provided a view of the swollen Seille River. The Germans had blown a dam upriver to ensure a difficult time for McBride’s men, who had to wade through chest-­deep water just to reach the river. Unfortunately for Patton, artificial smoke obstructed his view of the action. Just then, American fighter bombers filled the sky and flew over enemy lines, strafing and bombing. Some aircraft dropped napalm on German foxholes and trenches, incinerating the enemy. “I hope they kill a lot of generals,” he wrote, but told Codman, “I’m almost sorry for those German bastards.” The early success put him in a great mood. “The day was brightest and best we have had in

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MAP 7. The Capture of Metz, November 8–23, 1944.

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two months.” He told one of McBride’s task force commanders to give the Jerries hell once he got going. When Eddy called General McBride, Patton relayed to him that he should push ahead to the high ground before the sun set. Patton then told Eddy that Eisenhower said that Third Army was the only army he could count on.6 From there, Patton visited Baade’s 35th and Paul’s 26th Divisions to check on their progress. Reaching Baade’s men, Patton cursed the infantry, accusing them of holding up his whole army. He then climbed a hill amid artillery fire to speak to a company commander. One of the men called to him to remove his rank before the Germans threw everything they had at him. Patton called back that the “kraut bastards” didn’t have anything that could hit him. “We know sir,” the man shouted back, “but what misses you might hit us.” Patton laughed and said, “I apologize gentlemen, I’ll quit showing off.” With that, he got down in a foxhole. Just then, three P-­47s screamed down and strafed the Germans to their front, making it possible for the infantry to advance.7 At Paul’s 26th Division, Patton entered an orderly room and asked, “Is there anybody around the Goddamn place?” After his inspection he went to the mess tent and spoke to the first soldier he saw. One of the men who witness it recalled, “I don’t know what he told the guy, but he scared the living daylights out of him.” Patton then sat down and dined with the men, enjoying a meal of hot C-­rations on captured French dinnerware. Before he left, he said to one of the officers, “Goddammit, Captain, be sure that those dishes get back to wherever the hell your men got ’em from.”8 His inspections complete, Patton returned to his headquarters, where he hosted a party celebrating the second anniversary of Operation TORCH. Amid the celebration Eddy called, worried about the next day’s attack. “Don’t worry,” Patton told him. “Everything is fine. You’re doing fine, fine. Keep up the good work.” Then he turned serious. “But get those tanks over the river. Get them over if you have to swim them. You understand?” With that, he hung up the phone and told the crowd, “That was Eddy—­having a case of the evening jitters.”9 To Codman he said, “There are more tired division commanders than there are tired divisions.” Before going to sleep that night, Patton found time to write to his son, correcting him for failing to put ranks before people’s names in his letters. “It is very cheap to speak of your seniors in the military profession behind their backs in a manner different from what you would speak to

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their faces,” he wrote. It had been a good day; his divisions had advanced more than three miles. That night, the rain started to fall again.10 The next morning, November 9, Patton returned to the front, this time in Walker’s zone, where he watched Irwin’s 5th Infantry cross the Moselle River on several bridges. The men struggled in the heavy mud, but because of McBride’s attack the day before, they faced little enemy resistance. They were further encouraged by the site of P-­47 Thunderbolts strafing targets up ahead.11 The flooded conditions, which the locals called the largest flood in history, disheartened Patton. Although Lorraine usually experienced between 2.4 and 3.0 inches of rain during September, October, and November, November of 1944 alone saw 6.95 inches of rain.12 When he learned that many of Irwin’s trucks, aircraft, and a hospital platoon had become swamped, Patton swore to find out whoever was responsible for failing to move equipment and men to higher ground. “Our chief trouble in this war is the inefficiency and lack of sense of responsibility on the part of company commanders,” he later wrote.13 Then, as he and Irwin watched the attack, more than twelve hundred bombers roared in overhead, preceded by pathfinder aircraft that dropped markers on German targets. To Patton, they looked like smoke corkscrews in the air, and, for a second, he thought the Germans were firing antiair rockets. Then the bombs began to fall on seven of Metz’s forts, shaking the ground under his feet. Satisfied with Irwin’s progress, Patton departed, but his jeep got stuck in a flooded area and a truck had to tow it out. He later came across tankers from Morris’s 10th Armored and felt they had excellent march discipline. Back at his headquarters, Patton learned that all of his bridges over the Moselle south of Nancy had been washed out, hindering his supply lines. To make matters worse, General Grow called to say he could not advance any farther because of the heavy rains. The bridges put up by McBride’s engineers were not stable enough for his tanks. Patton was having none of it. “The 6th Armored will move!” he demanded before hanging up.14 Other reports, however, boosted his mood. Elements of Twaddle’s 95th Infantry had crossed the Moselle at Uckange as it reached flood levels. Engineers constructed three different footbridges but the Germans knocked them all out with accurate artillery fire. To support the exposed troops, ten L-­4 Piper Cub aircraft swooped down to only twenty-­five feet off the ground and dropped small-­arms ammunition and rations to the men. “We have won the battle and are chasing them,” Patton wrote.

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Unfortunately, the Uckange attack did not tie down German forces as Patton had hoped.15 Meanwhile, Wood reported that he was moving up and engaging the enemy. Unfortunately, because of the mud, his tanks could not leave the roads, making them easy targets for the Germans. Still, by the end of the day, Wood’s tanks had advanced eight miles. Concurrently, Grow’s tanks started to cross and the Germans responded by blowing culverts, railroad overpasses, and bridges. Their actions, combined with the rains that at times turned to snow, stalled both the infantry and armor. That evening, Spaatz, Doolittle, and other air officers visited Patton’s headquarters. He thanked them for the day’s air support. “Individual personality plays a much greater part in warfare than most people realize,” he told them. Then he turned to Spaatz, saying, “I look upon yesterday’s bomber missions as so many expressions of your personal friendship, and that of Jimmie Doolittle, for me.” The airmen agreed and told Patton he was the kind of ground force commander they actually enjoyed helping out. When someone mentioned Eisenhower, Patton pulled out a cigar and said, “It is my considered opinion that said leader is the lousiest commander in all recorded history, both military and civilian.” Everett Hughes, who was with the group, found Patton nervous yet filled with his usual vitriol: “He so wanted to get thru and kill some of his favorite S.O.B.s.”16 Just before midnight, troops of Van Fleet’s 90th Division carried their boats down to the Moselle River. The recent rains had swollen it to almost twice its normal width, but the men made it across with few casualties. The elevated river enabled them to float over now-­submerged landmines on the far bank. The subsequent flooding also forced the German infantry to pull back from their inundated foxholes in search of higher ground.17 Van Fleet’s men attacked Fort Koenigsmacker from both the north and south, but instead of trying to occupy it, like Driant, engineers simply destroyed observation posts with satchel charges. They also sealed entrances and dropped charges and gasoline down ventilation shafts. Soon, Van Fleet’s bridgehead was six miles wide and two miles deep.18 At the next morning’s ULTRA meeting, November 10, Patton learned that Army Air Forces bombers had smashed two German division-­level headquarters. He let out a whoop. “Hot dog! That got them!” he shouted to Weyland. “We’d been laying for them for a long time and got the bastards. Good work.”19 Despite the success in the air, flooded rivers continued to vex Patton. The pontoon bridge by which he had crossed the Moselle had been washed out and rebuilt the next day. The same thing

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happened to one of Van Fleet’s bridges, forcing his men to use DUKWs (amphibious cargo trucks) for resupply. At one point Patton had only one bridge supporting his entire army. He spent the morning tracking Eddy’s two armored divisions, both of which had mostly crossed the Seille. Elements of Wood’s 4th had advanced ten miles despite mud, obstacles, and German counterattacks, while Grow’s 6th had gone into action after passing through Irwin’s 5th Division, catching a German column between the two divisions. The 6th then headed toward the Nied River. Haislip further encouraged Patton when he came by Third Army headquarters and swore that nothing would bother Third Army’s right flank.20 As his army began the encirclement of Metz, Patton took care of administrative matters. He held a ceremony in front of his office, suspending the five-­year sentences for twenty African American soldiers accused of rioting in England. “I have suspended your sentences,” he told the soldiers, “because I believe you contribute more to the war effort doing your duty than in a prisoner cage. But I want to warn you: The first crooked move you make, that sentence will be reimposed and you go to jail for five years with a dishonorable discharge. You have the chance to rehabilitate yourselves, and I expect you to do that and to be good soldiers.”21 Patton was less generous with two German spies captured in civilian clothes. “Will shoot the two spies tomorrow morning,” he penned in his diary. The next morning, a chaplain led the two Germans to the site of their execution in Toul, where they were shot by firing squads.22 Early on the morning of November 11, Patton’s third birthday of the war—­he was now fifty-­nine years old—­a battalion from Twaddle’s 95th Infantry Division crossed the Moselle south of Thionville. The day before, Walker decided he needed another bridge over the Moselle to get more of Morris’s 10th Armored across. Even though it was not in his assigned area, the battalion commander chose Thionville as the best place to cross, as its high banks narrowed the river’s flow and prevented flooding. As a bonus, there were still remnants of a bridge the Germans had blown. The battalion attacked Fort de Yutz on the east bank but German forces held out as American reinforcements arrived. Meanwhile, Van Fleet’s 90th Division needed artillery on the east side of the river. With no operable bridges, supplies were ferried by motorboats or by low-­flying aircraft; the current was too swift to cross by rowboat. Two enemy artillery rounds fell among troops assembling on the east bank, but they were both duds.23 Knowing his army was on the offensive cheered Patton, and he strutted around his headquarters, accepting birthday gifts from his staff. Even

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better, he learned from POW interrogations that the Germans had been completely surprised by his attack, figuring the rain was too serious an obstacle for a major offensive. They had also been terrified by the opening artillery barrage, which killed horses, destroyed heavy weapons, and cut communication wires. Donning the bomber jacket Jimmy Doolittle gave him, Patton visited Eddy’s front, or as he referred to it, “getting up where the dead are still warm.”24 At Eddy’s headquarters, Patton was disappointed to hear that the armor had been unable to break through. Like the Moselle, the Seille River had swollen with rain, frustrating bridge-­building efforts and reducing the number of tanks getting across. The rains had also saturated the ground, preventing any off-­road maneuvering. Yet Patton did not get angry and accepted what was out of his control. “He, being an old tanker, understood the situation,” Eddy confided to his diary.25 The two men visited Paul’s 26th and McBride’s 80th Divisions as well as Grow’s 6th Armored. While at McBride’s headquarters, Patton blew his stack when he learned that the first two bridges across the Moselle had been swept away. “I will strip the radio equipment out of all cub planes in the Third Army and fly more GIs across the river,” he told McBride’s staff. “I’ll get you across.”26 Fortunately, the enemy had it worse. “I saw so many dead Germans that it actually made me sick,” he wrote his sister Nita. “They were all piled like cordwood along the side of the road.”27 Later in the day, Grow’s tanks, supported by some of McBride’s infantry, captured two bridges: one over the Nied River near the town of Han-­sur-­Nied after a hard-­fought two hours; and the other seven miles north, at Sanry-­sur-­Nied. By night, the division had advanced five miles on a ten-­mile-­wide front.28 Patton visited Grow at his headquarters in an old chateau, where his demeanor impressed one of Grow’s officers: “Instead of a strutting, loud-­ talking leader of troops in the field, however, he was quiet and reserved and altogether a gentleman.”29 Patton had calmed down from his morning high, focused by the day’s combat. He then visited a medical clearing station in Nancy to talk with the doctors and patients. He asked one seriously wounded soldier, “Do you think you’ll be okay by Christmas?” The soldier nodded. “How would you like to spend Christmas at home?” The soldier simply replied with a questioning glance as Patton turned to one of his aides and ordered: “Let’s get this fellow on a fast plane to the states as soon as possible.”30 When he came across another soldier who wounded himself while killing a German with a grenade, he removed his helmet out of respect. According to Patton, the act “made quite a hit.”31

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Eisenhower wired birthday wishes to Patton and congratulated him on his success despite the heavy rains. “[I] know also that you will not let this get you down,” Eisenhower wrote. “The floods will abate and you will do your job as you always have.” Eisenhower even called that night to discuss Patton’s progress.32 Bradley also called to wish Patton a happy birthday but complained about Walker’s planned use of Macon’s 83rd Infantry. Patton assured him that he was misinformed, but when Bradley continued to complain, Patton blurted out, “If you are personally going to command the 83rd, it had better not be used.” Ironically, the division had not yet been committed to the fight. It was supposed to cross the Moselle four days after Morris’s 10th Armored. Bradley settled the matter by telling Patton that neither he nor Hodges could use Macon’s force. Patton fumed into his diary that night, calling it “one of the few times in the history of war when 1/10 of an attacking General’s command was removed after the battle had been joined.” He blamed Bradley’s timidity for the decision and accused Hodges and Middleton of working on Bradley for a week. “I hope history records his moral cowardice.” Later that night, Patton’s staff threw him a birthday party at Colonel Koch’s headquarters, where everyone drank “Armored Diesels,” a variant of whiskey sour lemon punch first concocted by one of Patton’s officers back when he commanded the 2nd Armored Division. “They were very good,” Patton recalled. Jean Gordon and her fellow Red Cross Donut Dollies showed up and Gordon, perfumed and wearing her Class A uniform, joked with Patton, calling him Uncle George. A cloud hung over the celebration, however. Patton had hoped to capture Metz on his birthday, his lucky day for taking Casablanca in 1942, but it was not to be. “I did not win it,” he later wrote. Driving back to his headquarters, he turned to Al Stiller and said, “I sure would have liked to have stayed and got drunk.” Still, he admitted in his diary, “I think we made a killing today.”33 He need not have felt so bad: everyone understood what he was up against between the Germans and the rain. Eisenhower wrote Marshall that Patton’s offensive had gotten off as planned but had been slowed by the rains and mud. “Nevertheless,” he wrote, “the peak of the flood should be passed in a day or so—­provided rain in that basin is not too great—­and Patton will get ahead all along his front.”34 Back home, the St. Louis Dispatch’s Joseph Driscoll, embedded with Third Army, honored Patton’s birthday with a profile, quoting Patton’s friends who described his two outstanding traits: “First, he knows exactly what he wants. Second, he is able to make people do more than they

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think possible—­not by kicking them, but by inspiring them to military miracles.” To Driscoll, Patton arrived in Europe “at the age of 59 with the stamina and spirit of a much younger man.” Possibly because of his recent victory, Driscoll called him a “happy man” and said that even Patton admitted he had a temper (in case anyone doubted it). He then explained what drove the general: He lives and breathes for his job, which absorbs him completely. He escapes the fatigue which comes to people who are pinned down to unhappy jobs. Patton is a professional practicing his profession, and doing it successfully. He brings to his work extraordinary enthusiasm and love for it. Doing what he wants to do, and doing it well, is the Patton formula for inner contentment.35 Despite the birthday cheer, Patton’s earlier discussion with Bradley still bothered him when he turned in for the night. To Patton, losing Macon’s division was a terrible mistake that would cost him capturing Saarburg. He would later claim that capturing Saarburg would have led to the fall of Trier, which would have prevented the Germans from launching the Ardennes Offensive. Patton was stacking the deck against Bradley. To Beatrice he wrote, “I love you and wish you were here to hold my hand till the river goes down and I get some guns over.”36 The next morning, Sunday, November 12, Patton attended church, where he found the chaplain so uninspiring he had him replaced. In a heavy downpour, he visited an evacuation hospital, where he walked through a ward of wounded men, followed by a visit to the wounded in a hospital train. Several of the men had lost limbs from an accidental bombing by American flyers. “They weren’t sore,” he later told Weyland, “[They] seemed to feel it was one of the unavoidable accidents of war.”37 Back at his office, the weather and flooding continued to frustrate Patton. To combat the increasing number of trench foot cases, he put out orders for all boots and shoes to be rubbed down with tallow and oil (dubbined) and for new socks to be issued daily. He put German POWs to work dubbing boots. His only consolation was that the enemy was suffering more. “It is a question of mutual crucifiction [sic] until he cracks,” he wrote Beatrice. He made plans to begin rotating Eddy’s divisions so at least some men could get a rest, hot food, and a chance to dry out. Eisenhower called to say that he had fired General Silvester from

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command of the 7th Armored and reduced him to his permanent rank of colonel, adding that Silvester had accused Patton of “personal animus against him,” even though it was Patton who had earlier denied Walker’s efforts to replace him. Still, Stars and Stripes reported that Silvester had been relieved because, “he didn’t get along with Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr.” even though he was no longer serving under Patton. Major General Robert W. Hasbrouck replaced Silvester.38 Patton visited Walker’s headquarters to see if he could do anything to help Van Fleet and Twaddle’s divisions. Both Van Fleet’s infantrymen and Morris’s tankers had been delayed by flooding. Later that day, spearheaded by tanks and assault guns, the Germans attacked Van Fleet’s men who were holding the small crossroads town of Petite-­Hettange, threatening the Malling bridge, which engineers were racing to repair. The Americans poured on enough small-­arms fire to slow the enemy down until a truck-­ towed anti-­tank gun arrived and knocked out the German’s lead armor vehicle. A German retreat soon turned into a rout. By night, the bridge had been repaired enough for Morris’s 10th Armored to cross. Patton visited the bridge crossing, where a lone MP tried to manage a traffic jam. Patton asked the MP if he could help, then found the commander of the disorganized unit and ordered him to space his vehicles. Within ten minutes the situation improved and vehicles were crossing the bridge. Before he left, Patton asked the MP if there was anything he could do for him. When the MP said no, Patton mumbled, “If those bastards don’t behave, let me know.”39 In Eddy’s sector, Grow’s engineers repaired a blown bridge at Baudrecourt, three miles south of the captured bridge at Han-­ sur-­ Nied. The Germans blew another bridge as armored infantry raced across. Despite snow and German shelling, the tankers headed east for Faulquemont, an important German communications center. Wood’s 4th Armored also had a fight on its hands as German forces counterattacked near the village of Rodalbe. Eisenhower called Patton to ask what Third Army might need, to which Patton said another infantry division and told him about Bradley’s withholding of Macon’s division from him. He assured Eisenhower that, despite the muddy conditions facing Van Fleet’s division, “it was successful and would be pushed on.”40 The next morning, November 13, Patton learned from ULTRA that German field marshal Gerd Von Rundstedt was worried about possible Allied airborne operations east of the Rhine and burst out laughing. “[I]

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certainly hope they keep him as commanding general. He is the best friend we have. Not only [a] dumb son-­of-­a-­bitch, but weak. [I] hope he stays. Be big help to us, like he was last summer.”41 Patton got other good news: Alexander Patch’s Seventh Army had started attacking the Germans south of Third Army. In Metz, Irwin’s 5th Infantry penetrated the outer ring of forts in the south, placing them about five miles from the center of the city. Hap Gay felt Metz’s surrender was in the offing, but admitted, “This is crystal ball gazing.”42 Bradley visited with Major General Charles Bonesteel, the commander of the Western Defense Command who had come to Europe as an observer, and the two headed off to visit Eddy’s front in the pouring rain, continuing on to Wood’s 4th Armored headquarters and Paul’s 26th Division. It pleased Patton that Bradley got to see the rainy and muddy conditions his men had to contend while fighting. “Tanks actually bellied down when off the roads,” Patton later wrote. Bradley told him that, within a month, he would be getting both an infantry and armored division, and that the Fifteenth Army would soon be stood up to take up some of Third Army’s territory.43 While Patton got help from Patch to his south, he was getting nothing from Hodges to his north. The next day, November 14, Patton called Bradley and asked him to find out from “Mr.” Middleton “what the hell is on his front?” Patton chose his words carefully, blaming only a corps commander, and not Hodges. With the Germans throwing two panzer divisions and one infantry division at him he wanted to know when he would get some support. “When are the others going to do something?” he asked. “We’re getting a lot of stuff thrown in our way.” Bradley explained that Hodges was dealing with eight inches of snow in his area of operation.44 Patton didn’t care. “[The] weather [is] lousy here as hell here, too. [We] haven’t been able to get a thing up in the air since Saturday.” Patton then called Eddy, who wanted to bypass Faulquemont but Patton told him to defeat the enemy there, in case they escaped and made it to better defensive positions on the Saar River or the German Siegfried Line. He also emphasized that Eisenhower wanted Metz to fall.45 Patton headed north, where he picked up Walker before heading to Twaddle’s 95th Division headquarters, where Twaddle explained that elements of the division had crossed the Moselle in Thionville the previous day and captured Fort de Yutz on the east bank, while General Morris’s 10th Armored had started to cross over the finished bridge. In addition,

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Figure 29. Bradley and Patton visited Eddy’s headquarters on November 13, 1944, where they met with Major General John “P” Wood (to Patton’s right) and Major General Charles Bonesteel (Patton’s left), the commander of the Western Defense Command, who had come to Europe as an observer. Catalog number: 111-­SC 193534, National Archives and Records Administration.

Twaddle had formed a special task force, Task Force Bacon, which was trying to capture Fort d’Illange, two miles south of Yutz. Yet, despite the green division’s success, Patton was not impressed. To him they had taken disproportionate casualties for their efforts. “I told Twaddle that he must do better,” he later wrote.46 Patton then visited an observation post where a captain was directing an attack on an enemy pillbox. Patton watched as the men assaulted the Germans under fire. One man placed an explosive charge against the pillbox and retreated. Once the charge blew, a white flag appeared and the Americans rounded up their prisoners. Patton congratulated the captain but had one complaint: “I’ve been talking to this lieutenant and he tells me he hasn’t killed any Goddamned Germans yet.” The captain explained that the lieutenant had reported for duty and hadn’t been assigned to a

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unit. “I see,” said Patton. “Well, captain, I am giving you a direct order, bypassing the chain of command. See that this officer kills lots of the sons of bitches. Understand?” The captain agreed and Patton departed.47 Patton then drove down to the Thionville bridge and watched with his chief engineer, Brigadier General John Conklin, as engineers wearing flak vests used a bulldozer to push a Baily Bridge across the river. Patton called it the largest Baily Bridge in the world. Although American artillery had earlier silenced enemy mortar attacks, German artillery rounds still exploded in the water and west bank. After a quick inspection, Patton rolled out. A few minutes after his party left, an enemy round exploded on the cobblestones where he had been standing.48 Patton then headed up to Van Fleet’s 90th Division and crossed the Moselle on a recently completed bridge at Cattenom under a smoke screen. As his driver took him across the bridge, his scout car headed the wrong way down a one-­way street to the Bailey bridge. An engineer officer ran to him, shaking his fist in the air and shouting that his car would block seven miles of backed-­up vehicles. Patton got out of the vehicle, directed his driver to get out of the way, and put his arm around the officer who had just yelled at him. Patton asked him where he was from, adding that he was aware of the difficulties of the flooded Moselle. He even explained to him the tactical situation facing Third Army.49 Once across the bridge, he almost lost his life in a car accident. When the Germans in Fort Koenigsmacker began shelling the area, an engineer lieutenant ordered a tank driving in front of Patton’s vehicle to back up; the tank crashed into Patton’s vehicle. The lieutenant began cursing at the command car, not realizing who was aboard until Patton dismounted and pinned a Silver Star on him. The lieutenant apologized but Patton told him, “You’re doing your job.” Patton then drove up and down the line, ordering his driver to pull over at any assembly of soldiers. He was proud of the 90th Division’s river crossing and the division’s fighting efficiency. At one intersection, he jumped out of his command car and, walking past some tank officers, visited the enlisted men. “What do you mean, you sons of bitches, killing all these Germans,” he told them, “I can’t even get my car along here on account of the dead Boches!”50 As he spoke, a German fighter plane strafed back and forth along the road. “They must know I’m here,” he told them. He asked the men about food, munitions, and supplies, finally asking if there was anything he could do for them. “Yes,” they joked,

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“send us home.” Patton then drove to Petite-­Hettange and Kerling-­lès-­ Sierck, where the Germans’ November 11 attack had been stopped. “I never saw so many dead Germans as I did when Van Fleet took us to Kerling,” he later wrote. “They extended for a distance of about a mile, practically shoulder to shoulder.”51 Van Fleet’s men continued to make progress: they captured Fort Koenigsmacker, using gasoline, thermite grenades and TNT blocks to blast their way into the fort.52 Meanwhile, Patton hoped Morris’s 10th Armored would start moving once all his tanks were on the Moselle’s east bank.

Figure 30. Patton took this picture of a German assault gun after a failed German attack on the 90th Infantry Division at Petite-­Hettange, France, on his birthday, November 11, 1944. Patton wrote that he “never saw so many dead Germans” as he did in this sector. His shadow can be seen in the photo. Library of Congress, OV 20, 33.

Overall, Patton’s Army was doing well. South of Metz, engineers with Irwin’s 5th Division bridged the Nied River, allowing his men to reach the town of Sanry-­sur-­Nied, where the Germans counterattacked in strength, yet could not force the Americans out.53 Irwin soon realized his troops were in a poor position to attack Metz and requested permission to pull back across the river. He had been given the option the night before by Walker but decided to stick to the plan. Now he changed his mind but Patton refused, arguing that if Irwin did that, he would leave Eddy’s corps exposed, something he would not allow now that his pincers

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were closing in around Metz.54 Eddy’s corps was also making progress. Grow’s 6th Armored reached the town of Landroff, six miles south of Faulquemont, where the Germans counterattacked around midnight. The fighting devolved into hand-­to-­hand combat, but by the next day the Americans held the town. Wood’s 4th Armored remained outside of Rodalbe, fighting off enemy counterattacks with the help of Paul’s 26th Infantry. Inside Metz, the situation was becoming desperate for the German defenders. The German commander, Lieutenant General Heinrich Kittel, had sent out orders that commanders who lost men as prisoners or deserters would be reported, while deserters’ families “will suffer the consequence of desertion.” If he learned that any soldier was caught loafing, “I shall have them shot.”55 In another desperate act, German aircraft dropped leaflets on captured Germans in an American POW camp at Toul, urging prisoners to escape since they were in the hands of America’s leading gangster and public enemy number one. On November 15 Patton received word that Germans were out of replacements as Third Army’s jaws closed in on Metz. Twaddle’s 95th Division captured Fort d’Illange, ending all resistance for the division east of the Moselle. The Germans attacked Van Fleet’s 90th but the infantry held its ground, then counterattacked, capturing forts Saint-­Hubert and Hackenberg. Also, Morris’s 10th Armored, now east of the Moselle, advanced four miles. Inside Metz itself, the Germans blew bridges, but the American resorted to boats. The fighting went house-­to-­house in some neighborhoods, with Americans tossing phosphorous grenades on Germans hiding in tunnels and basements. French resistance fighters walked openly in the streets, wearing their FFI (French Forces of the Interior) armbands while French tricolor flags began waving from atop buildings and windows. As sections of the city were cleared, people came out of their basements to celebrate their liberation. They hugged American soldiers and shouted “Vive la France!”56 Patton, still worried about the weather, sent an officer to query each of his corps and division commanders about their supplies of boots and socks in an effort to ward off trench foot. He also ordered all his division commanders to institute a system to pick up soldiers’ blankets every morning and return them at night. “I don’t care who gets whose blankets,” he told Gaffey, “Whether 95th go to 90th, or vice versa. What I want is to is get blankets to infantrymen.” Cases of trench foot infuriated

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him. When he came across an ambulance filled with wounded soldiers, he opened up the rear door, stuck his head in and asked a lieutenant what was wrong. The lieutenant answered, “Trench foot, sir.” Patton snapped back, “You son of a bitch, why didn’t you keep your feet dry?” and slammed the door.57 Later that day, Eisenhower came to Patton’s headquarters. It did not start off well, but not because of any conflict between the generals. While the two lunched, Willie trotted into room and spotted Eisenhower’s black Scottish terrier, Telek, sitting between the two men, catching small nibbles of food from each. Willie charged and a literal dogfight ensued. Both dogs were compact but strong. A cook thew water on the angry animals and staff members finally pulled them apart. Because Telek outranked Willie, Patton banished his dog from the room. He apologized and offered to court martial Willie, all to Eisenhower’s amusement. When it was all over, Patton couldn’t help but jab, “My Willie beat the hell out of your Scottie!”58 Their meal, and the dogfight, over, the two headed off to visit Eddy’s XII Corps. They reviewed the 26th and 35th Infantry Divisions, as well as the 4th Armored, which had had a tough few days of fighting, particularly at a small town called Guébling, yet Patton barely worried about his veteran armored division. “The 4th Armored got set back a little today, but otherwise fighting is going slow but steady,” he later wrote.59 While visiting Paul’s 26th Division, he told one platoon, “You boys cut out being cautious. There is nothing to be afraid of as long as you keep going and don’t let those bastards have the time to take an aimed shot at you. Don’t jump into any foxholes when you get shot at. Go out and kill the sons-­of-­bitches.” The platoon later attacked and killed forty Germans, capturing seventy-­three. To another large gathering of men he said, “You think I am a son-­of-­a-­bitch? I am—­to the Germans. And they are sons-­of-­bitches to you. And some Germans are sons-­of-­bitches to other Germans. Everyone is a son-­of-­a-­bitch to someone. The question isn’t if you’re a son-­of-­a-­bitch, but what you are doing about it.” Eisenhower had a different method for speaking to the men. He asked individual soldiers what they did in civilian life, followed by a few questions about their vocation, kidding with the soldiers by asking for a job once the war was over. “Meantime,” Eisenhower would conclude, “do me a favor, will you, soldier? Go in and get this war finished up, fast—­so I can go fishing.”60

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Figure 31. On November 16, 1944, Eisenhower and Patton visited Eddy’s XII Corps area and met with wounded soldiers at an evacuation hospital. Catalog number: 111-­SC 443095, National Archives and Records Administration.

Eddy reported that once he regrouped his divisions, he would send in Grow’s 6th Armored to exploit the situation. Despite his progress, Patton worried that Patch’s Seventh Army would not keep up with his and wondered if either Hodges or Simpson would ever get a move on. None of those problems appeared to bother Eisenhower, who seemed pleased to be standing in the mud, talking to frontline soldiers.61 Finished with their battlefield tour, the two generals returned to Eisenhower’s room at a nearby hotel. As they sat and talked, they noticed that the fire was dying so they loaded it up with wood. They did too good a job; flames burst from the fireplace and raged out of control. The generals doused the fire with water, beat it with pillows, and tore panels from the wall to use as pokers. After an hour of firefighting, the blaze went out, even though the room stank of burnt wood while smoke hung in the air. They wrapped themselves in blankets and sat down, continuing to talk until 2:00 a.m.62 The next day, November 16, Eisenhower addressed Patton’s staff, telling the men that the enemy was desperately throwing in its last reserves,

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consisting of old men and young boys. He emphasized doing everything to keep the frontline soldiers as comfortable as possible since “in the long run, the man in the front lines who feels he is better clothed and better equipped than the enemy is the man who will win.”63 He praised the air-­ ground teams, which he called the best in the world, and concluded by telling them, “I’m counting on you fellows to contribute greatly in this decisive common effort.”64 Throughout the meeting, Patton only referred to his boss as “general” and never “Ike.”65 Things were looking better. That morning both Hodges’s and Patch’s armies launched their offensives. Unfortunately for Hodges’s men, their attack concentrated on the dreaded Hürtgen Forest, where they had been fighting since late September and had taken horrendous casualties. Still, rumors ran rampant that the German army was falling apart and that Hitler was either dead or in an insane asylum. After the meeting, Eisenhower and Patton inspected Third Army’s rear echelon. They visited quartermaster and ordnance installations, as well as a hospital where doctors treated trench foot with tetanus serum, something Marlene Dietrich had told Patton she had seen in Germany during World War I, but the treatment yielded no results. They lunched with Third Army’s Red Cross women, where Eisenhower asked, “Well George, what’s your latest move now? What’s the plan?” Patton demurred: “Oh, it’s up to you, Ike.” Eisenhower shot back, “No, no, no, you do the strategic thing,” and the two laughed.66 Before Eisenhower left, he told Patton that he had gone farther than he had thought possible. Back at Patton’s headquarters, Eddy visited to explain that he was reorganizing and regrouping. In reality, he was stopping, but he knew if he actually admitted this, Patton “would raise the roof.” To please his boss, Eddy explained that he was preparing Paul’s 26th Division to go on the attack.67 Later that day, General Lee visited and Patton lit into him about the cases of trench foot. If the visit angered Patton, a phone call may have soothed his nerves: Walker called and asked what to do once Metz surrendered. Patton went to bed that night with one thought in his head: “I hope it does.”68 Patton visited Eddy the next day, November 17, and learned that the corps commander had an allowance of only nine thousand shells for the following day. Patton scoffed and told him to use twenty thousand. “If we win now, we will not need shells later,” he wrote in his diary. “If we do not use the shells now, we will not win the war.” He believed in fighting until

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he ran out of supplies, then digging in. Because of the high casualties, he initially put replacement captains under veteran lieutenants until they learned their trade, something that went against Army regulations.69 He then visited Grow and McBride. For the last three days they had worked well together capturing the high ground south of Faulquemont. Despite their progress, Patton sensed tension between the two as McBride’s infantry advanced faster in the mud than Grow’s tanks. “McBride seems fed up with Grow,” he recorded.70 Patton was right, but not because of McBride’s advances. Earlier that day, Eddy had decided to have Grow leave McBride and support Baade’s 35th Division in a northeasterly drive. McBride grumbled about the change and felt his infantry were not appreciated. “[McBride] has constantly belittled our efforts and magnified his own,” Grow recorded, “whereas everyone knows we have carried him along.” Patton asked McBride why he had not taken the town, prompting McBride to ask Eddy if he could take it. Eddy decided to rest McBride’s division and let it dry out, as per Patton’s orders, but told McBride Faulquemont would be his after a few days of recovery.71 Further north, in Walker’s zone, elements of Twaddle’s division found Fort Lorraine, one of the outer forts northwest of Metz, empty. Its two 100mm guns could have easily fired on the Americans in the city. As the German forts began to fall, Patton, in a rare demonstration of empathy for his enemies, ordered that they should be referred to as “captured” and not “surrendered,” having learned that the families of surrendering German commanders would be put to death.72 Twaddle’s 95th Infantry was now on the city’s western outskirts while Irwin’s 5th Infantry reached the southern inner circle of Metz’s forts. Some of the fighting had been particularly brutal, thanks to Patton’s orders. Knowing that the Germans tended to defend shell holes or caves with women and children in them, Patton put out the word for the men to suppress them with grenades until the screaming stopped. “We kind of hated doing that,” recalled a soldier with the 5th, “because we knew what it was doing.”73 Morris’s 10th Armored had advanced some twenty-­eight miles as it closed in on Metz. Patton meanwhile learned that Polk’s 3rd Cavalry had entered Germany near the French town of Apach, fourteen miles north of Thionville.74 In front of both units, the bulk of German forces began retreating from the Maginot Line in long columns, fleeing to the Saar River. All three other American armies were finally on the move, preventing German reinforcement against Third Army.75 Morale was high among Patton’s men, despite the mud, rain, cold, and heavy fighting.

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When a staff officer, who had noticed so many 90th Infantry soldiers smiling, asked Colonel Paul Harkins how they could be so cheerful, he explained, “Well, the old man knows that as long as they are winning and moving forward they will be happy and their morale will be high. That’s the reason he wants to keep moving and winning all through the winter.”76 Dawn broke on clear skies on November 18, allowing Weyland’s fighter planes to strafe and bomb retreating enemy columns and strongpoints all day and even into the night, utilizing night fighters. Patton learned that Hodges’s First Army, which had finally started its attack, found itself bogged down. “That’s strange,” Patton remarked sarcastically. “That’s where all the better people are fighting.” Yet he saw it as an opportunity, telling his staff, “If they bog down very long, I may get [Middleton’s] VIII Corps back again and then I’ll sideslip them and really kill Germans.”77 With both of his corps commanders making good progress, Patton decided to stay in for the day, feeling that going to the front too often would make him a nuisance. After reading news reports about himself he chuckled. “I don’t rush about the battlefield sticking out of a tank the way I am painted,” he wrote Beatrice. “I get out where it is unhealthy oftener than any other general to include division commanders.”78 The end was near. In the north, both Van Fleet’s 90th and Twaddle’s 95th Infantry made long strides. Van Fleet’s men captured two forts when their defending Germans surrendered without a fight. That night, the 90th finally reached Irwin’s 5th Infantry, which was pushing north, at the small town of Retonfey, some eight miles east of Metz, effectively surrounding the city and cutting it off from any reinforcement. In the process, Irwin’s men overran a series of fortifications. Now there were only five forts, out of forty-­six, still in enemy hands, and all of those were surrounded. Inside the city, Irwin’s men used tanks and artillery with timed air bursts to capture a bridge that connected an island in the Moselle to the city. The Germans had blown most of the bridges on the city’s west side. Walker had spent most of the day on the phone with Irwin, urging him north and complaining to Patton about Irwin’s slowness. Outside the encirclement, Morris’s 10th Armored also made strides, driving east for five miles and closing in on the Saar River near the German city of Merzig. Patton hoped the weather would hold so his men could continue to maneuver and Weyland’s aircraft could continue to fly. “We may yet get to or through the Siegfried Line soon,” he wrote that night.79

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In Eddy’s sector, Paul’s 26th and Baade’s 35th Divisions gained about four miles. Wood’s 4th Armored had been put in to reserve after its tough fights, but Grow’s 6th Armored passed through Baade’s 35th and traversed six miles in two days. German resistance was stiffening. Instead of low morale among prisoners, intelligence officers now found a desperate determination. They were fighting for their lives. Hap Gay considered the day the turning point of the battle, noting that “another victory has been won by the Third Army, as assisted by the XIX Tactical Air Command.” Patton also beamed at the day’s progress, believing the drive through the Siegfried Line would take a single day. “I was slightly overoptimistic,” he later admitted.80 November 19 dawned with clear skies again. At Patton’s morning ULTRA meeting he asked Weyland, “Did your cheeks itch about 0800? [They] should have, because your planes were over my billet then and I wanted to kiss you.”81 Then, Patton visited Fort Aisne, near the town of Verny, one of the outer belts of Metz’s defenses, about ten miles south of the city. With Walker and Irwin, he watched one of Irwin’s regiments assault one of the fortifications. “First there was a puff of smoke about the size of a hotel,” he wrote Beatrice, “then more and more till [sic] the whole place was a mass of flames and black smoke.” He witnessed a bomber drop its load on a fort. One bomb scored a direct hit but only partially crippled the position. “However,” he wrote, “the shock effect due to the detonation is probably very great.” He thought the assault “swell.” As he left, he turned to Walker and said, “Thank you for Metz.”82 Patton then climbed into a tank and rolled forward in a tank column to the front. Standing in the commander’s hatch, wearing his high-­gloss helmet liner, he made a perfect target for the Germans. As shells randomly exploded around him, some 5th Division soldiers yelled at him to take cover. The tank stopped and he bounded down from the hatch. “Who is the (swear word) that hollered at me?” he demanded. “I am going to have you all arrested!” One of the soldiers stepped forward and admitted, “I did, sir.” Patton shot back, “Well, you are a sergeant now! You are the kind of guy that we want.” He then confessed that he should have been wearing his helmet and passed out cigars and they all smoked and chatted. Before he left, he told them, “I’ll see you in Berlin.”83 Patton next visited a road where Grow’s 6th Armored tankers had opened fire on a German column trying to escape Metz. He recorded that he “seldom viewed a scene of greater devastation.” Back at his

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headquarters, he noticed that Weyland and his staff now used the word “liberated” in reference to bomber raids on the Siegfried Line instead of “removed.” Still, he complained that Hodges was doing nothing but fighting the weather. Cases of trench foot were becoming an epidemic, prompting Bradley to write to Patton that his Twelfth Army Group was seeing one thousand cases a day. Patton, who had already instituted health precautions for his own men, placed the blame on Hodges. “We beat the weather,” he wrote Beatrice.84 Eddy showed up at Patton’s headquarters to tell him that Wood had become too much of a problem and that his behavior had become downright insubordinate. The previous day, Wood had failed to execute Eddy’s orders to help Paul capture the city of Dieuze, where Weyland’s pilots had bombed the dam, and instead sent his tanks south of the city. Wood felt Dieuze unsuitable for tanks since it had been reduced to rubble, and the southern section was too flooded. The two men then argued about the division’s lack of progress. Hap Gay happened to be at Eddy’s headquarters and witnessed the orders given to Wood. Eddy had seen this coming for quite a while. As the campaign transformed from a blitzkrieg to a slog, Wood had become more and more difficult, “to the point of belligerency over the use of armor.” Wood felt his tanks were being wasted in the mud and minefields of Lorraine, something that should never be allowed to happen—­a jab at his infantryman commander. Now, Eddy explained to Patton, it was either him or Wood, and he knew that Wood and Patton were long-­time friends. Patton, in front of Eddy, dictated a letter to Wood and gave Eddy his personal guarantee that if Wood failed to carry out Eddy’s orders he would be relieved and Hugh Gaffey would take command of 4th Armored.85 The meeting shook Patton, but he did right by Eddy. In the letter, Patton was direct: “It is apparent to me that you are not complying with either the letter or spirit of instructions received by you from your Corps Commander. Furthermore, I believe that your actions toward him verge on insubordination.” Patton instructed Wood to explain his behavior to Gaffey, and if he could not assure him of his abilities to follow Eddy’s orders, “I will be forced to relieve you.” The whole incident made Patton uneasy. “I hate to do this as he is one of my best friends,” he wrote that night, “but war is war.”86 Wood apologized to Eddy for his outburst. “All seems well?” Patton wrote in his diary, although he started contemplating the best way to ease Wood from command.87

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The day wasn’t all bad. Infantrymen from Irwin’s 5th and Twaddle’s 95th Divisions linked up at the Metz suburb of Vallières, closing the second set of jaws, this time tightly around the city.88 The Germans who held out refused to surrender, blowing up a bridge over the Moselle and dropping artillery rounds on the attacking Americans from Forts Driant and Jeanne d’Arc. In the skies above, Patton’s air support had one of its busiest days, flying more than four hundred sorties, destroying railroad trains and cars and clearing a path for the 10th Armored, which crossed into Germany. Patton called Bradley and told him that Metz was completely invested, even though the Germans were not going to surrender. “But,” Patton explained, “for all intents and purposes, the city of Metz was now in the hands of the Third Army.” He asked Bradley to relay the news to Eisenhower.89 Whatever optimism Patton may have felt about the weather was crushed on November 20 when clouds closed in and the rains returned. There would be no air cover for his troops. The best news of the day was

Figure 32. Soldiers from the 5th Infantry Division (left) greet soldiers from the 95th Infantry Division, at a suburb of Metz called Vallières, signifying closing of the second set of jaws around the city. Fighting continued but the German defense of the city was doomed. Catalog number: 111-­SC 411773, National Archives and Records Administration.

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that French forces fighting under Jacob Devers were pushing ahead on Third Army’s right flank. Possibly because of this success, the Germans opposite Paul’s 26th Division began retreating, allowing Paul’s troops to advance ten miles. In Metz, elements of Van Fleet’s 90th, Twaddle’s 95th, and Irwin’s 5th Divisions had captured two-­thirds of the city and continued to reduce German holdouts. When the German commander, Lieutenant General Heinrich Kittel, refused to surrender, Patton ordered artillery and bombers to eliminate the pocket of resistance, wounding Kittel.90 Wanting to put the city behind him, and with Millikin’s III Corps lacking any divisions, Patton arranged to place Irwin under III Corps so that the rest of the army could continue east with Walker and Eddy. On the bright side, Third Army had bagged fifteen thousand prisoners since the launch of the operation. Patton hoped a quick strike in several locations against the Siegfried Line would produce some surprising results. “[We] may well find that line is not fully manned.”91 Patton planned to leave his headquarters for a lunch at Eisenhower’s Versailles headquarters with Eisenhower and King George VI, but before he left, Eddy called and told him Grow’s 6th Armored would be his main effort, along with a combat team from McBride’s 80th Division, which had taken Faulquemont the day before. Wood’s 4th Armored would now drive to Mittersheim, which would put him forty miles south of the Saar River at Sarreguemines. Grow was already eleven miles from Sarreguemines. Eddy hoped that with the two armored divisions pinching off the front line, his two infantry divisions would get a rest. Patton was pleased with the plan, though he thought the armored divisions would have to move in jumps instead of making a ponderous attack.92 Patton showed up at the lunch and boasted to the king that he had personally killed thirty Germans with his ivory-­handled pistols. Eisenhower, who was also in attendance, looked up and asked, “How many did you say, George?” Patton immediately retreated. “Well, maybe it was a half dozen.” Eisenhower was not about to let him get away with it. “How many?” he asked again. Patton just laughed and confessed, “Well, at any rate, I did boot two of them squarely in the . . . ah . . . street in Gafsa.”93 After lunch, Patton and Eisenhower went hunting at a preserve. When one of Eisenhower’s aides gave him a box of shells, Patton shook his head and told him to get more because “I’m a shootin’ son of a bitch.” The aide retrieved more shells and Patton bagged several rabbits.94 On the way back, Patton had the driver stop. He got out, waded into the Meuse River up to his knees, pulled down his fly, and urinated. “Take my picture,” he

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shouted to the photographers accompanying him. They did as ordered, but without film in their cameras.95 The weather worsened on November 21, denying Patton his aircover for a second day and increasing the flooded terrain in front of his troops. Still, Walker’s infantry worked hard to reduce the Germans in Metz and its remaining forts. Inside the city, soldiers from Twaddle’s 95th captured a badly wounded General Kittel in an underground hospital.96 Meanwhile, elements of Morris’s 10th Armored reached the jagged concrete dragon’s teeth of the Siegfried Line. The Germans counterattacked, driving some of Morris’s tankers back through a wooded area.97 As Eddy pushed east, a gap developed between his and Walker’s XX Corps. Gaffey wanted Patton to assign troops to plug the hole, but Patton, considering the enemy spent, chose not to, preferring to “trust to the Lord that Germans would not strike between them.”98 Despite this progress, resistance and mud continued to hamper Patton’s men. Blown bridges and rising waters limited Grow’s advance. “I wish things would move faster in this Army,” Patton penned in his diary, although he later admitted he had planned the entire offensive when the skies were clear and the roads dry, never contemplating that his blitz could become a slog. He worried Patch was stealing the show when French general Jean de Lattre de Tassigny’s I Corps reached the Rhine River before him. “The 7 Army and the 1st French seem to have made a monkey out of me this morning,” he wrote Beatrice.99 Yet, when he learned that General Haislip had captured the French city of Strasbourg, he placed a call to him. “I just want to congratulate you on a brilliant victory. It is the finest thing that has happened yet.” Haislip surprised him by saying that no one else had congratulated him; neither his boss Patch nor Bradley had said a word.100 Patton then visited a hospital. When he walked into the admitting tent, the entire staff snapped to attention. “At ease, go on with your duties I see you’re all busy,” he told them. He then thanked the patients laying in cots, shook their hands, and wished them good luck. He asked one soldier if he had heard that Metz had fallen. When the soldier smiled and said yes, Patton shook his hand, smiled, and told him, “Tomorrow, son, the headlines will read ‘Patton took Metz,’ which you know is a goddamn lie. You and your buddies are the ones who actually took Metz.”101 Patton went into a tent for battle fatigue psychiatric patients, where he repeated his comments, a far cry from the Patton of Sicily. Finally,

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he visited the station’s supply tent, where he asked the warrant officer in charge if he was getting the supplies he needed. The man explained that he couldn’t get any spiritus fermenti, used for preventing and treating trench foot, adding that frontline medical officers were also asking for it. “Spiritus fermenti is whiskey,” the warrant officer explained. Patton agreed. “Yes, spiritus fermenti. I know what that is, mister. Learned that a long time ago. No spirtus fermenti eh? And it treats trench foot.” Patton thought for a second and asked, “Is there anything else that can be used instead?” “Yes sir,” the warrant officer responded. “Anything with alcohol in it can be used. Gin or liqueurs or brandy.” Patton was quick to respond. “Brandy, eh? I know where I can get you some brandy mister and I’ll have it sent up.” Within the hour, a truckload of captured brandy arrived at the station.102 Although Patton considered his casualties light, the sight of so many soldiers suffering from trench foot prompted him to write a letter to his corps and division commanders on foot care and trench foot prevention. In fine detail, he explained proper treatments, such as plenty of clean dry socks. He wanted to rotate at least one division out of the line for rest, but the battle would not allow it. “The impetus of our attack is slackening,” he wrote, “due to the fatigue of the men.” To Beatrice he wrote, “We are having a hell of a time with Trench Foot[,] it costs us more men than do bullets.”103 That night he responded to a letter from Beatrice, who had written him some three weeks earlier about the women in Third Army. She knew Jean Gordon was around Patton and pressed her husband on it. Patton used semantics to dodge his wife’s inquiry: “I have no WAC [Women’s Army Corps] and there are none in this Army.” The “Donut Dollies” were with the Red Cross, not WACs. He also accused Virginia congresswoman Edith Nourse Rogers, who had visited him a month ago, of lying to Beatrice. “If the rest of E’s information was as untrue she could not have told you much of value.” He tried to soften his tone by writing, “I hate to think of you alone at G M [Green Meadows, their Massachusetts home] but if you like the country[,] that is the place to be.” He concluded by telling her, “I wish I could be there so you would not have to live the life of a bachelor girl.” Beatrice probably felt the same way about her husband.104 On November 22 Metz was considered in Patton’s hands, although the captured German commander, Kittel, refused to surrender the city. A few of the surrounding forts also continued to hold out. Kittel later

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admitted that the American tactics impressed him, comparing them favorably to those of the Red Army.105 But his refusal to surrender had little impact on events. The citizens of Metz, who had been trickling out of their homes since the start of the campaign, now emerged en masse, crying with joy and relief. Many dressed in their traditional Lorraine finest and sang “La Marseilles,” the French national anthem. A major anchor of the German defense line had been torn away. One German general credited the American victory to their incessant artillery “drum fire,” along with constantly advancing infantry “with their weapons at the ready and cigarettes dangling from their lips.” Walker entered Metz with Irwin and Twaddle where he formally turned the city over to the military governor.106 Patton did not attend. While Walker enjoyed his victory, his troops encountered trouble to the north. German counterattacks against one of Morris’s combat commands had pushed the tankers out of the towns of Nennig and Tettingen. Morris added a combat team from Van Fleet’s 90th Division to assist, but the tankers ended up firing on the infantrymen, resulting in friendly fire casualties. The combat commander, Brig. Gen. Kenneth G. Althaus, was soon relieved of command. The official reason was that he suffered from an arthritic shoulder, but the infantrymen of the 90th believed that Patton had dismissed him for the incident.107 Patton celebrated the capture of Metz by interrogating two captured German officers separately: Major General Anton Dunckern, an SS officer in charge of Metz’s military police, and Colonel Constantin Meyer, a regular army officer serving the city’s military governor. The two had been captured by 5th Division infantrymen while slipping across a Metz bridge. A rumor spread that Dunckern had been captured hiding behind a huge barrel of beer; the barrel story made it to the press. Once taken prisoner, Dunckern demanded an audience with General Irwin, which was refused. He then demanded special food, specially served. Again, his requests were refused. Instead, he was brought to a room for interrogation by the Third Army commander.108 In the presence of Koch (who was Jewish), Gay, an interpreter, and two armed guards, Patton began his line of questioning, with Dunckern forced to stand. “I always wear high boots,” he grinned to his officers, “when I talk to SS bastards.” Patton accused him of being untrue to his Nazi ideology by surrendering. He also warned the prisoner that if he lied to him, Patton would consider turning him over to the French,

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explaining, “They know how to make people talk.” Dunckern defended his surrender, claiming he could not reach his weapon to fight back. “He’s a liar!” declared Patton. Again, Dunckern defended himself but addressed a bigger concern. He declared that since he was captured by Americans, he was an American prisoner. The idea of being turned over to the French terrified him. He wanted to be treated like a soldier. “You also acted as a policeman,” Patton shot back, “a low type of policeman,” and continued to threaten turning him over to the French. He had a map brought forward so Dunckern could see “what the invincible German Army has lost in two weeks.” After Dunckern studied the map, Patton told him, “I have great respect for the German soldiers; but not for Nazis.” Then he ordered him out. “Tell him those bayonets on the guards’ guns are very sharp.”109 The interrogation of Meyer was not as harsh. Patton let him sit. He wanted to know why the German soldier continued to fight, even though “they are so palpably outnumbered and had so many young men killed for no purpose.” Meyer explained that they either hoped for an eventual victory or would fight until they were ordered to lay down their arms. Patton asked if there was anything he could do to facilitate that. Meyer said no, unless the German people were shown the power of the Allies and if there were acceptable peace terms, particularly with the Soviets. Instead of a map, Patton had Meyer shown Third Army’s score sheet. Meyer acknowledged that American forces were “the best equipped, best fit, and with inestimable possibilities for replacements of any other army in Europe,” and that the fear of the Soviet Union forced every man to carry a weapon. If the Soviet problem could be addressed, the American Army would be permitted to enter Germany unhampered. Gay asked which German general would be open to negotiations and Meyer mentioned either field marshals von Rundstedt or von Brauchitsch, or colonel generals von Blaskowtiz or Halder. Patton appreciated Meyer’s candor and asked him if he wanted to make any kind of statement. Meyer expressed his hopes that once the Russians reached Germany’s eastern border, “that somehow the U.S. and Great Britain would negotiate to keep Russia on the border and have the American and British forces come into Germany all the way up to the Russian sector, which would be on the border around Poland and East Prussia.” Meyer requested to be sent to the United States, accompanied by an aide who had also been captured. Patton explained that General Bradley

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would determine his destination and that if he could find the aide, he could take him with him. Patton then asked how best to get the remaining Germans in Metz to surrender. Meyer suggested he contact General Kittel, but Patton explained that he was wounded, captured, and in one of his hospitals. They discussed the forts that still held out and the delayed-­ fuse mines the Germans had placed in buildings. Meyer explained that only the post office had been mined, but there was too little time, too few engineers, and too many civilians within Metz for the Germans to effectively mine any other buildings or houses. He even told the interpreter the name of the officer who would know about mining the post office. “His name is Rehberger.” To Patton’s pleasure, Meyer thanked Patton for separating him from Dunkern. “I don’t blame you,” Patton told him.110 The interrogation over, Patton sent Dunkern to his doctor, Major Charles Odom, who had him strip and then examined him for tattoos. A rumor had spread that SS troops had their blood type tattooed on their armpits, making them easy to identify. Dunkern did not have such a tattoo and denied knowing anything about them. He had lied, but it was only the Waffen SS—­not the administrative officers—­who received the tattoos. Patton would later tell war correspondents about Dunkern, “He is a hotshot, that bastard. He is the lowest type of animal I have ever seen.111 With Metz subdued, Patton now planned to advance east for parts of the Maginot Line (about half had already been taken in Walker’s zone), followed by the Saar River, and finally the Siegfried Line. From north to south, he hoped to capture the six river cities of Saarburg, Merzig, Saarlautern (today’s Saarlouis), Saarbrücken, Sarreguemines, and Sarre-­ Union; a width of some seventy miles. Some of his units would have to travel fifteen miles to reach the Saar, others much less. In Walker’s XX Crops zone, Morris’s 10th Armored, with a combat team from Van Fleet’s 90th Division, riding on the tanks, would aim for Saarburg and Merzig, while the rest of Van Fleet’s force and Twaddle’s 95th Division would attack Saarlautern. In Eddy’s XIII Corps zone, Wood’s 4th Armored would attack south of Saarbrücken, while Grow’s 6th Armored and McBride’s 80th Division attacked in the vicinity of Sarregeumines. Patton would attach a combat team from Baade’s 35th to help Grow. The rest of the 35th and Paul’s 26th Division would get a rest. Meanwhile, Patton wanted Walker to keep one combat team from Irwin’s 5th Division in Metz while he gave the other regiments a rest.112 Patton thought Grow and McBride had the best chance of reaching the Saar, but there was no reason the river could not be crossed on a

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wide front, “with the hope that somewhere, somehow a foothold will be gained,” he wrote. It was not easy going, however. He still battled the weather and Bradley. The rain-­soaked fields and German counterattacks had slowed Morris’s 10th Armored to a snail’s pace. As for Bradley, Patton still blamed him for wrecking his battle plan by depriving him of Macon’s 83rd Division to attack Saarburg. “Had he [not] done so, the situation would now be better.”113 Patton cancelled the attack on Saarburg, instead sending Morris’s 10th Armored to Merzig. Patton knew better than to press the 83rd situation on Bradley. He needed to put behind him the things he could not control and focus on the task ahead and, more importantly, a celebration of what he had achieved. But not everyone was celebrating Patton. In far the far-­off island of Leyte in the Philippines, General Douglas MacArthur, the Southwest Pacific Theater commander, complained to a reporter a day earlier that Patton was hammering away, uselessly, at the Germans. “Patton’s army,” he explained to the reporter, “which is trying to batter its way through the Vosges in the Luneville-­Baccarat sector can’t do it, they can’t do it. No army could do it.” But Patton already had. MacArthur’s complaints about Patton were just part of a larger rant about all war theaters but his getting attention and supplies. To MacArthur, the entire American war effort had seen “every mistake that supposedly intelligent men could make.” He complained about Operation TORCH, two years in the past, and the situation in China, where Major General Albert C. Wedemyer had replaced General Joseph Stillwell as commander of U.S. forces in China and chief of staff to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-­shek. It seemed to MacArthur that every campaign against the Axis powers was just an excuse to starve his army, and those responsible were guilty of “treason and sabotage.” MacArthur’s ego and paranoia in 1944 matched those of Patton in 1943.114 On November 23, Thanksgiving Day, Patton ordered Walker and Eddy to his Nancy headquarters. When the two generals arrived, the army band played three ruffles and three flourishes, a sign that Patton expected his two two-­star generals to soon each earn a third star. Eddy then reviewed a formation of MPs as the conqueror of Nancy, followed by Walker, the conqueror of Metz.115 Once the ceremony ended, Patton brought them inside for a review of his Saar plan and to enjoy a Thanksgiving Day lunch. For as much as he wanted to celebrate his hard-­working warriors, praise rained down on Patton too. French General Henri Giraud visited to tell Patton he was the “Liberator of France,” adding that his plan to

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take Metz was sound, high praise from a French commander who once defended Metz. Patton found Giraud’s visit comforting. Eisenhower followed, with a wire of congratulations for “restoring to France the historic city of Metz.” The message frustrated Patton since Eisenhower failed to “mention the XX Corps, although I had asked him to do so.” The next day, a radio message went out from SHAEF that Patton’s Third Army had cleared Metz—­even though Forts Driant and Jeanne d’Arc still held out.116 Patton later visited Wood’s 4th Armored, with Bradley and Bonesteel, where they witnessed how Wood’s tanks had “bellied down” in the mud when they went off-­road.117 Despite the muddy conditions, Wood’s men reached the Saar River at the towns of Fénétrange and Gosselming, and captured an intact bridge. That night Patton attended a Thanksgiving dinner with his staff and about twenty nurses. Patton danced and stayed late, thoroughly enjoying himself. “What a bore it must be to have to maintain semi-­royalty status,” Lieutenant Colonel Bernard Carter, one of the attendees, wrote to his wife. “I’m sure he [Patton] would like to relax, but can’t very well in his position.”118 Patton was not the only soldier enjoying a Thanksgiving meal. Eisenhower saw to it that everyone on the front lines was given the opportunity to enjoy turkey for the holiday. The men were served a pound of turkey, a half-­pound of chicken, and as many trimmings as possible. Many suffered gastronomic distress from the rich meal, so different was it from the K-­and C-­rations they had been eating for months. Ironically, most Third Army soldiers believed that Patton had provided them the feast.119

CHAPTER Ten

The Saar Campaign

Patton’s Metz victory only increased his low opinion of other Allied generals. At his Friday morning ULTRA meeting, when an officer reported that Montgomery was building up his reserves in preparation of an attack but not doing anything else at present, Patton snorted, “[I] sure got him pegged right.”1 A call from Eisenhower to say he would be passing through Nancy with Bradley and wanted a meeting interrupted Patton’s plans to visit the front that day. Upon arrival, Eisenhower pinned a Bronze Star on Patton’s chest for capturing Metz. An aide read aloud the citation, which claimed Patton’s “brilliant victory has contributed materially, to the success of American forces in the campaign against Germany.”2 Patton accepted it with some derision, calling it “the least for the most in history.” But his spirits soared when Eisenhower told him, “George, I seem to have spent most of this war pinning things on your chest.”3 Following the ceremony he asked Eisenhower for medals for his staff officers who had planned and executed the operation and had been with him since before heading overseas. He later told Bradley that he was not in the habit of asking favors but would consider it “a personal favor.” Still, he prided himself on capturing a city that had not been taken by assault since 641 AD, when it was captured by Attila the Hun.4 Patton would later lobby hard to get his staff Distinguished Service Medals for Metz. He sent the list of names to Bradley, who forwarded it to Eisenhower, with a note: “I recommend that the attached cases be not favorably considered at this time.” Eisenhower wrote to Patton recommending that they substitute the Legion of Merit instead. “Please don’t misunderstand me,” he wrote, offering to take the case up with War Department at the end of the war. To appease Patton, Eisenhower and Bradley agreed to present him with the Oak Leave Cluster to his 233

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Distinguished Service Cross. Upon hearing the news, a disgusted Patton told his staff, “This wasn’t awarded to me. I am merely a peg. What was done could not have been done without the outstanding work of this staff. You made it possible and in decorating me, we honor all of you. I am merely a symbol.”5 During their visit, Patton showed Eisenhower and Bradley his plans for reaching the Saar. He intended for Irwin’s 5th and Twaddle’s 95th Divisions to turn east to join the other six divisions racing for the river.6 There was no start date for the offensive since most of his divisions were already headed in that direction. He still hoped to reclaim Haislip’s XV Corps and planned to include it in his drive. Eisenhower seemed to agree, but Bradley poured cold water on Patton’s scheme by suggesting shifting the boundary between Devers’s Sixth Army Group and Eddy’s corps, again depriving him of Haislip. Patton immediately objected, calling it a tactical mistake of the highest order, and complained that it was impossible to coordinate two armies, much less two army groups.7 His arguments failed to bend Bradley to his view. Haislip would stay with Devers. Undeterred, Patton later held a press conference to celebrate the capture of Metz. When a reporter asked whether he knew the Moselle River would flood, he grinned and said, “Shall I tell you I was a great strategist or that I really didn’t know? We got caught, just like the Germans did, but when it did happen, we used it to our advantage. They didn’t think we would attack and when we did, it caught them napping.” He spent the rest of the conference complimenting the 4th and 10th Armored Divisions and the 90th Division. The attack by the Van Fleet’s 90th, Patton told the reporters, “was the greatest surprise of the war. It was the snappiest operation we have ever put over.”8 Patton showed them an enemy propaganda pamphlet that compared him to gangsters Al Capone and John Dillinger. The pamphlet also claimed that he always carried three pistols and “treats them with more consideration than one would accord to a beloved woman.” It also read that “in an alcoholic frenzy [he] beat wounded American soldiers to cripples.”9 The next day, November 25, Patton took a train north to Thionville to visit Walker’s 5th, 90th, and 95th Divisions as well as the 10th Armored. He planned to pin medals on soldiers, review plans for his Saar offensive, and see the front. In Thionville, he switched to a vehicle. During the ride, three shells exploded near the road. “I don’t believe they were firing at

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me,” he wrote, “just map firing on the road.”10 Outside of Metz, he came across Colonel Robert Bacon enjoying a drink. Bacon commanded one of Twaddle’s regiments and had led his own task force down the eastern side of the Moselle River during the assault on Metz. He had performed his duties well, pushing his tanks and infantry hard to take objectives quickly. Patton, however, did not congratulate him for his success, instead telling him, “If you’d keep your nose out of that bottle, you’d have that star.” Bacon snapped back, “If you’d keep your mouth shut, you’d have four.”11 Patton did not record his reaction. Patton then arrived in Metz with sirens blaring to address Irwin’s 5th Division. He felt great, driving through a city that had not been captured for thirteen hundred years. After pinning medals on men, he addressed them as follows: “I am proud of you. Your country is proud of you. You are magnificent fighting men. Your deeds in the battle of Metz will fill the pages of history for a thousand years.”12 He then pinned more medals on soldiers. During an inspection, he noticed one man had a dirty rifle. “You can’t kill Germans with a dirty rifle,” he told the soldier. There was a moment of silence before the soldier replied, “I don’t know general, I’ve done okay so far.” Everyone froze, waiting for Patton to explode. He just laughed and continued with his inspection.13 While Patton inspected the infantry, the Germans counterattacked against Wood’s 4th Armored, which had just crossed the Saar River at the town of Fénétrange, eight miles south of Sarre-­Union. Eddy called Patton’s headquarters that morning, looking for help, but with Patton away, Gay contacted Patch’s Seventh Army and arranged for some infantry to assist. Clear skies later in the day brought in American air support, which helped Wood halt the Germans. By the next day, Wood’s tankers had erased the enemy’s gains.14 When word later reached Patton’s headquarters that Leclerc’s French 2nd Armored had crossed the Rhine River on a bridge at Strasbourg, Patton made no mention of it in either his diary or letters. The river swung west in Patch’s sector, making it closer to his advancing troops. The Rhine, however, was such an iconic landmark that Patton could not have felt anything but bested.15 When Patton got back to his headquarters, he learned that Devers had proposed shifting the boundary between Third and Seventh Armies, which he felt would pinch him out of the line. Worse, Eisenhower affirmed Bradley’s decision to keep Haislip’s XV Corps with Devers, which Patton considered stupid. “It can’t be helped, but I hate it,” he wrote. He called

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Bradley to protest, but Bradley countered that each American army on the line would consist of twelve divisions. This infuriated Patton, who incorrectly argued that his army was on a wider front than either Hodges’s First or Simpson’s Ninth. “What can’t be cured must be endured,” he penned in his diary before unloading on his commander. “Bradley is without inspiration and all for equality—­he may also be jealous.”16 Eisenhower, Bradley, and Bonesteel, now Bradley’s new quartermaster general, visited the next day, November 26, to review the strategic picture of the war. Bradley showed Patton the boundary between his Third and Patch’s Seventh Army, which was roughly what Patton would have made it had he retained Haislip’s corps. Eisenhower planned for Patton’s and Patch’s armies to head northeast instead of east, in order to draw more Germans from the north to the south and thus trap them on the west side of the Rhine River while Allied aircraft destroyed all the bridges.17 Patton saw (on the map) that Lucian Truscott’s VI Corps would turn northeast with Third Army but not cross the Rhine, which he thought a bad idea. Truscott, who had fought under Patton in Morocco and Sicily, had proven himself just as dynamic and aggressive as a corps commander as he had been as a division commander and deserved a crack at crossing the river. “We will see how it comes out,” Patton wrote.18 While Patton met with his superiors, at the front Grow’s 6th Armored reached the flooded Mutterbach River, eight miles west of Sarreguemines. It had been a tough advance over flooded roads and through German-­occupied forests. As Grow’s men tried to find a suitable place to cross, vehicles became stuck in the mud. The division would remain there for a week.19 Patton spent the next day acting as a tour guide. Averell Harriman, President Roosevelt’s ambassador to the Soviet Union, arrived around 10:00 a.m., accompanied by British lieutenant colonel James Gault, Eisenhower’s British aide-­de-­camp. Eisenhower had called and asked Patton to show Harriman the worst of the flooding. Patton obliged, taking him to Eddy’s front, through empty German defenses. They visited Wood at Mittersheim, thirty-­six miles south of Sarreguemines, where Patton asked one of Wood’s officers, “How many tanks are you short?” When the officer said thirteen medium tanks, Patton snapped back, “We’re not short thirteen medium tanks in the whole United States Army.” General Gaffey, who was present, explained that those tanks included ones undergoing major overhauls, to Patton’s relief. Wood, who was suffering from a cold, arrived and gave Patton a tour of the facilities as clouds rolled in

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and the rain poured. Patton also chatted with the troops. When he came across men in a chow line, he asked them about the quality of their food. The men, standing in the open with rain splashing into their mess kits, responded, “Fine, sir, fine.”20 They then roared over the Saar River in an M-­8 armored scout car, escorted by General Wood, while Patton pointed out that every field seemed to be a lake. They passed by an enemy tank ditch so poorly prepared that Patton told Harriman it was not worth a damn and stopped by some artillery firing on the enemy.21 Then it was off to Paul’s 26th Division, where Harriman witnessed Patton give Paul and his staff “unshirted hell for not driving ahead faster.” Closer to the front, Harriman watched as Patton addressed a group of exhausted soldiers who were waiting to be relieved. “If you can make it to the top of that hill,” Patton told the men as he pointed to a nearby rise, “it will make a hell of a difference to the unit that takes over from you.” He acknowledged the tough fighting they had already done and admitted it was a lot to ask, but encouraged them to attack, nonetheless. The men rose and charged the hill. The scene amazed Harriman, who saw Patton put the fighting spirit back into these men, “knowing exactly when to give them hell and when to encourage them.”22 They drove on to a village where Patton presented the Distinguished Service Cross to a lieutenant who had forced a crossing of the Saar. After presenting the medal, Patton turned to the gathered men and told them, “You have all done a great job. A lot of you sons of bitches may have deserved this medal,” but, he assured them, “don’t grouse about the fact that he got it and you didn’t, do the same job again and another one of you will get it.” Then he revealed why the medal was important to him. “It is the greatest honor anybody can get. I’d rather have it than eternal life.” He then turned to Harriman and told him he wanted to get his feet wet. With that he walked down to the Saar and waded into the freezing water. Throughout the day, Patton impressed Harriman by telling almost every soldier they came across that they were doing a great job or telling engineers the importance of their bridge-­building operations. He also asked soldiers if they had gotten the blankets he had sent to the front, and if they were getting enough sleep.23 After visiting Paul’s 26th Division, they headed back to Patton’s headquarters through Wood’s 4th Armored, coming across a Sherman tank that had knocked out five German Mark IV medium tanks. Fascinated, Patton got out of his vehicle and took several pictures of the tank and

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Figure 33. Averell Harriman (center), the ambassador to the Soviet Union, visited Patton’s front lines on November 27, 1944. With him were Colonel James Gault (left) from Eisenhower’s staff, and Patton. Patton’s leadership of his soldiers impressed Harriman, who wrote that Patton knew “exactly when to give them hell and when to encourage them.” Catalog number: 111-­SC 232768, National Archives and Records Administration.

the disabled German tanks. Wood was there and asked him to award a Distinguished Service Cross to the tank’s commander, a lieutenant, who was also the tank’s only survivor. Patton was happy to oblige. He then listened as the lieutenant told him how he knocked out two tanks at a range of more than one hundred yards, then charged into the middle of three enemy tanks, destroying them at ranges less than fifty yards. “It was a very great piece of fighting,” Patton later wrote.24 Thanks to Patton, Harriman got an important appreciation of what American soldiers were doing to win the war, something he could later speak of with authority to his Russian counterparts. Back at his headquarters, Harriman told Patton about his dealings with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, whom he described as a strong and ruthless revolutionary who could threaten the postwar peace. On the positive side, Stalin had praised Patton’s race across France, declaring the

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Red Army could not have conceived or executed such a maneuver. The comment stayed with Patton the rest of the day until he penned it in his diary that night. “I may get a Red Star yet,” he wrote Beatrice. In other good news, McBride’s 80th Infantry had advanced six miles and captured Saint-­Avold, seventeen miles west of Saarbrüken. When McBride’s infantrymen learned that the Germans had left delayed-­fused bombs in the town’s public buildings, they settled in French homes, many still occupied by French inhabitants. In addition, Paul’s 26th Division reached the west bank of the Saar, while in Walker’s XX Corps zone, both the 90th and 95th Divisions gained about four miles.25 Patton remained incredibly popular back home. The Fort Worth Star-­ Telegram sponsored an effort by more than five hundred Texas citizens to send Patton a thousand-­dollar bill after he was quoted as never having seen one. They wanted him to have it for his entrance into Berlin. “You may wave it or frame it in memory of your heroic deeds and struggles on the various battle fronts,” the paper wrote.26 Hughes sent Patton a letter from a friend in New York City predicting that “Patton for President” clubs would soon start forming. Patton wrote back, “I am like Sherman—­I would not run if nominated, nor serve if elected. As you know, at the close of the war, I intend to remove my insignia and wrist-­watch, but will continue to wear my short coat so that everyone can kiss my ass.” This was quickly becoming one of Patton’s favorite phrases.27 On November 28 Generals Ridgway and Lewis Brereton visited, offering to drop airborne troops on the German city of Worms on the Rhine River. Ridgway, who had commanded the 82nd Airborne Division so expertly in Sicily and Normandy, had been promoted to lead the XVIII Airborne Corps, commanding the 17th, 82nd, and 101st Airborne Divisions, while Brereton commanded the First Allied Airborne Army. Patton promised nothing but agreed that the area was flat, making it an ideal place for paratrooper drops and glider landing zones. He put his staff to work on the details, even though he still harbored serious doubts about airborne capabilities. “It is too ponderous in its methods,” he wrote. He wanted airborne regiments, available on twelve-­hour notice, attached directly to armies.28 Eisenhower may have prompted the visit to support Patton’s attack after he soured on Hodges’s stalled northern assault to the Roer River further north. Although noting that Patton’s sector was not the most important front, Eisenhower admitted, “it offers the best chance of quick returns and of getting the main offensive under way.”29 Beetle Smith then called and told Patton that Simpson’s and Hodges’s armies

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had become bogged down and that if Third Army broke though, it would be supported. “About time,” Patton thought.30 Soon after, Truscott visited Patton in company with Beetle Smith and a group of industrial magnates. Truscott and Patton spent much of the lunch talking about their sons at West Point. While Patton thought Truscott a great soldier, he considered Geoffrey Keyes, who had served as his chief of staff in the Mediterranean theater and was now the II Corps commander, better. He blamed the War Department for Keyes’s lack of promotion. According to Patton, Truscott was supposed to get the Ninth Army when he earned his third star and Keyes was supposed to get Fifth Army, but the War Department screwed up and sent Simpson to Europe to take over the Ninth. While Patton talked with Truscott and the industrialists, a supply truck filled with food rolled up. “What’s the matter with the supply man?” Patton asked his visitors. “Doesn’t he know we can get along without eating, but we can’t advance without gas?”31

Figure 34. Patton met with a delegation of American industrialist magnates on November 28, 1944, at his headquarters in Nancy, France, where he stressed to them the importance of gasoline for his tanks. Catalog number: 111-­SC 249018, National Archives and Records Administration.

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Eddy called and asked that Irwin’s 5th Division be pushed up to reduce a gap between his and Walker’s corps. Patton said that he didn’t like always calling Walker and asking him to do things for XII Corps. Eddy retorted that he was helping Walker since his drive was in Walker’s sector. Patton backed down and called Walker, telling him to move Irwin’s division immediately. Walker then asked for air support in his attack on Saarlautern. Patton told him to wait three days so he could secure the needed aircraft, but then to attack no matter what.32 However, bad weather prevented the kind of end-­run Patton sought. “It is so muddy,” he wrote Beatrice, “we can’t get back of these people so they keep falling back and we have to keep chasing them.”33 Patton got Walker the needed airpower. He planned to plaster Saarlautern with five hundred medium bombers around noon on December 1, followed by Twaddle’s 95th Division, which would cross the Saar north of the city and attack the Siegfried Line. Van Fleet’s 90th Division, on Twaddle’s left, would feint north while Morris’s 10th Armored, on Van Fleet’s left, would feint an attack on Merzig, fourteen miles north of the city. If, however, Twaddle’s men broke through the Siegfried Line quickly, Walker was to send Van Fleet and Morris over the same bridgehead.34 On November 29, frustrated with replacement shortages, Patton accused Eisenhower of being “caught short on both men and ammunition, because, after all, these are the two elements with which wars are fought.” He also blamed General Lee, who had overall responsibility for replacements, for the shortage of men. His mood lightened when he learned that the Hitler Escort Brigade (Führerbegleitbrigade) had entered his zone: “[I’d] like to see them and Lee’s MPs fight it out.”35 Instead of waiting for the higher-­ups to solve the replacement problem, Patton came up with his own solution. At his daily briefing he told his staff, “This army is fated with the unhappy task of making its own grease.” After reviewing all the other shortages and handicaps Third Army had overcome, he addressed the shortage of soldiers. “We had a call for volunteers. That was very productive but it was not enough. To be fair to everyone, this time we will draft. And if that is not enough, we will have another one.” He planned to make 5 percent of his headquarters staff into infantrymen, arguing that if the infantry can attack day after day with only 50 percent of its force, his staffs could function with 80 percent of theirs. He also ordered that any hospitalized soldiers who could still fight would be sent back to

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their units. “There will be no complaints and no arguments,” he told his stunned staff. “We are all soldiers and this is war. Third Army will not be stopped.”36 With his planned influx of soldiers, he and Eddy planned additional crossings of the Saar River in the XII Corps sector. Paul’s 26th Division would cross the Saar at Sarreguemines and then turn south, rolling up the Germans as they went and making it easier for Baade’s 35th Division and Grow’s 6th Armored to cross at Sarre-­Union, fourteen miles south, and join Wood’s 4th Armored on the east side of the Saar. After reviewing the plan, Patton traveled to McBride’s 80th Division, crossing a number of enemy antitank ditches along the way, which he mockingly called “Chinese Walls in reverse.” He found McBride’s soldiers cocky after having advanced through part of the Maginot line without even realizing it. While visiting the troops of the 3rd Cavalry Group, Colonel Polk complimented Patton on his sharp-­looking uniform and medals. Patton laughed and joked that he usually wore them just to irritate Montgomery.37 Patton then inspected Grow’s 6th Armored, where he ogled Grow’s detailed map of the front. Grow’s staff had run out of maps, having overrun most of their objectives, and had resorted to using a Michelin tour guide map they had picked up in a liberated town. Grow started each morning standing inches from the map, studying where his units had advanced and their next objectives.38 Patton then drove to the front, braving an enemy artillery barrage. He passed idling tanks and engineers scanning for mines. As his jeep approached enemy lines at the bottom of a hill, he found the line empty. Satisfied that the enemy had pulled back, he had his driver turn around. When they reached the engineers, he told them, “Move out. There’s nothing down there.”39 Patton then visited Baade’s 35th Division before heading to Eddy’s headquarters to review plans to get Paul’s 26th Division across the Saar. Patton mentioned to Eddy that because he and Walker were doing so well, they were considered his “fair-­ haired boys.” While Patton visited Eddy, Gay went to Metz, on Patton’s orders, to remind Walker that there would be no turning back once any part of a unit crossed the Saar. This order may have come from Patton’s unhappy memory of Irwin’s 5th Division having to withdraw units from the Horseshoe Bend on the Moselle back in September. Gay reiterated to Walker that when the remaining Metz forts fell, Third Army would claim that a combined ground and air action caused the fall, not a surrender

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by the German fortress commander.40 That evening, Twaddle’s 95th Division reached the Saar Plain, five miles short of the Saar River, but German forces counterattacked ten times until the setting sun put an end to the fighting.41 On the last day of November, Patton met with Generals Bradley, Hodges, and Brereton to discuss the situation and to consider possible airborne operations. Patton banned Willie from the meeting after he had jumped onto Bradley’s lap (Bradley, suffering a cold, was not amused). In the meeting, Patton declared that he wanted airborne troops to either clean up enemy pockets of resistance or drop in front of his armored division to provide them with a forward supply base. Brereton planned to take airfields behind enemy lines with his entire airborne army, form an airhead, and wait for Patton’s slashing tanks. He came out of the meeting greatly impressed with the Third Army commander. “Easy to talk to, General Patton will listen to anybody’s ideas,” Brereton penned in his diary. “He is a brilliant soldier and I doubt if there is a more capable field general and tactician in the world today than our own Georgie. He may put on an act at times, but don’t let that fool you. He is definitely a military genius.”42 After the meeting, Patton called in Weyland and his staff to review the next day’s bomber support for Walker. If the cloud cover was heavy, they were to use Oboe, the British technique of bombing through clouds, using two ground radio transmitters retransmitting the ground ahead to aircraft overhead. Patton decided that even if he could not get the needed bombers, both Van Fleet’s 90th and Twaddle’s 95th would attack. To add force to the attack, Patton tried to get a regiment from Major General Frank L. Culin’s green 87th Infantry Division to take over Metz, freeing up the rest of Irwin’s 5th Infantry. In addition, Patton moved Colonel E. M. Frickett’s 6th Cavalry Group to Walker’s right flank, helping to bridge the gap with Eddy’s Corps. Patton worried about the weather and the state of Walker’s troops. “XX Corps could well use one more day to get ready,” he wrote in his diary, “but I decided to shoot the works and so ordered.” He added that “Weyland felt that the medium bombers should attack to morrow [sic] by OBO, as if we waited we might not again get flyable weather.” Before the end of the day, Morris’s 10th Armored also reached the Saar at Merzig. As engineers raced for one of the only two standing bridges, the Germans blew it up in their faces. They subsequently blew the second bridge. Patton was on the Saar in strength, but not across. 43

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In the midst of his worries about Walker’s attack, as well as the problems with Wood, Patton received some good news. A French citizen in Morocco whose son was a POW in Oflag 64 (a prison camp specifically for Allied officers) in Szubin, Poland, wrote to report that Patton’s son-­ in-­law, John Waters, was alive.44 Other good news arrived from Walker. Elements of Van Fleet’s 90th Division captured the town of Fremersdorf, on the west bank of the Saar, five miles south of Merzig. Patton added Lieutenant Colonel Richard Sullivan’s 5th Ranger Battalion to Frickett’s 6th Cavalry Group to screen Walker’s southern flank. Third Army’s offensive thus far had rattled the Germans, as Patton’s series of assaults on a wide front kept them off balance. That night the German commander of Army Group G, General Hermann Balck, forbade his troops from withdrawing. They were to fight to the end to weaken Patton and buy time for a planned major counteroffensive further north.45 Walker’s offensive kicked off on December 1. Early in the morning, Patton wrote to a friend, calling it “biggest gamble yet indulged in, but being a good gambler I am sure it will win—­namely, we are assaulting the Siegfried Line and crossing a river at the same time. . . . The sun has come out for the first time in a week and we will probably get fighter-­bombers out this afternoon.”46 The bombers arrived over their targets, but because of radio failures, were only able to drop about half their loads. Twaddle’s 95th Division soldiers attacked through Saarlautern, finding the defenders scattered and disorganized. They cleared the western section of the city by the early afternoon but failed to cross the Saar.47 Several German women snipers were killed during the fighting. On the positive side, the Americans captured the city’s electrical plant, which the Germans were using to detonate the bridges over the river. All the bridges could now be taken intact. Patton had been concerned about launching the offensive too quickly but felt it the lesser of two evils. He hoped to get bombers again for the next day. “Perhaps our luck is still in,” he wrote in his diary. Further south, in Eddy’s sector, Wood’s 4th Armored held out against an enemy armored night counterattack near Sarre-­Union led by a German soldier walking a cow with a red lantern atop its head. Patton theorized that the enemy soldier must have been the least popular man in his outfit. “Our artillery got them,” Patton wrote.48 Still, the German attack prevented Wood’s tankers from entering the town. In times of doubt, Patton turned to history. While worrying if he had launched Walker’s attack too early, he quoted from Robert Henderson’s

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Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War, which referred to Union General Nathaniel Banks as “more afraid of losing a battle than anxious to win one.” Patton decided that if he were more like Banks, he would never have sent the 90th and 95th Divisions across the flooded Saar against the strongest part of the Siegfried Line. “I did it because a straight line is the shortest distance between two points,” he wrote Beatrice. “Also, it is so strong that it is probably not too well defended.” Despite his keeping company with Jean Gordon, he made sure to reference his wife’s special seal on her letter. “The imprint of your lips on a recent letter looked pretty attractive.”49 The next day, Patton returned to Walker’s front to make sure the attack continued to go forward. During his visit to Twaddle’s 95th Infantry Division headquarters, ten groups of medium bombers flew over on their way to bomb the eastern bank of the Saar River at Saarlautern. Confident the 95th would do its job, Patton drove north to visit the 90th. Along the way, he spotted a pillbox about two hundred yards in front of his vehicle. The sight terrified him but no fire enemy came. He later admitted that he “had a feeling in my stomach, [but it] felt smaller than I know it is.”50 He reached a regimental command post five miles south of Merzig at Fremersdorf overlooking the Saar. Although the Germans held Merzig, on the east bank of the river, Patton suspected they had abandoned the town. Upon his arrival in Fremersdorf, he told the commander, Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Bell, that he wanted to visit a forward observation post. Bell offered a discreet approach through an apple orchard but Patton refused, instead insisting on walking down an exposed road. Bell led Patton, with Codman and Stiller in tow, to a house overlooking the Saar. The house worried Patton, as he felt it was too high, giving him the feeling that he might fall. Inside, Bell pointed out a German pillbox on the opposite bank and a machinegun sweeping the area. “I never felt so large in my life,” Patton wrote. He asked Bell if the pillbox was manned and Bell answered in the affirmative. Just then, the Germans opened fire with machine guns. Then they added artillery, which exploded about seventy-­five yards away from the house, flushing two deer from the woods. The deer darted past the rear door as Patton, Bell, and their staffs dashed out and through the apple orchard. By the time they reached the rear, everyone was covered in mud. Bell stifled his laughter at Patton’s appearance. “I suppose Ball [sic] was trying to impress me,” Patton wrote Beatrice, “he did as a brave jack ass.” He was glad to leave the area but

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realized that his fears of Germans in the town were overblown: “The Germans are not in Merzig or I would be dead.”51 Still covered with mud, Patton visited Morris’s 10th Armored. He found the men in good shape, despite a heavy German artillery attack the night before. He returned to his headquarters where he got a call from Eddy, who again wanted to relieve Wood. For weeks Eddy had worried about the mental strain of excessive combat on Wood. Tensions had built to a fever pitch, with Wood again defying Eddy’s orders and acting on his own accord. When Eddy saw a crack in the German defenses outside of Sarre-­Union and ordered Wood to drive southeast to take it, Wood balked and asked instead to sweep south.52 Eddy’s desired route would have had Wood attacking through a heavily wooded area with only one usable road. The snow-­covered ground was too wet to support tanks, confining Wood’s tanks to the single road, an ideal killing ground for German anti-­tank gunners. Wood asked to use a road that bordered between Eddy’s XII Corps and Haislip’s XV Corps and successfully used it to skirt the forest and hit a German attack in the flank, but the tanks of his CCA later bogged down in the mud, blocking one of Haislip’s divisions.53 With CCA no longer on the attack, Major General Withers “Pinkie” Buress, commanding the 100th Infantry Division in Haislip’s corps, visited Eddy and told him to move Wood out of the way. “Wood had just come down into his area and had taken up road space and so far he had not done any fighting at all,” Haislip informed Eddy, adding that “P [Wood’s nickname from tutoring his fellow cadets at West Point, who called him ‘professor’] had missed quite a chance to hit the Panzer Lehr in the flank and do them a great deal of damage.” Eddy confronted Wood about blocking Buress’s roads and not fighting hard enough. “God damn it Matt,” Wood exploded, “my boys have bought every foot of this ground with their blood, they have done everything humanly possible and I will not ask any more of them. We will get out as fast as we can but no faster.” Wood stormed out of the room and Eddy picked up the phone to call Patton.54 Patton thought highly of Wood’s armored tactics but he knew what he had to do. “Unquestionably, in a rapid moving advance, he is the greatest division commander I have ever seen,” he later wrote, “but when things get sticky he is inclined to worry too much which keeps him from sleeping and runs him down, and makes it difficult to control his operations.” Patton called Bradley, who approved Wood’s relief.55 He then contacted Eisenhower and asked to send Wood home on a sixty-­day

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detached service. When the news reached Wood, he panicked, pacing his room and asking no one in particular, “Why have they relieved me? I can kill Germans. I can kill them by the thousands!” Army historian S. L. A. Marshall, who was with Wood at the time, deeply respected Wood as a tactician but could see that the armored commander was no longer in possession of his senses. “He was as batty as a bed bug,” admitted Marshall. Other officers disagreed with Marshall’s assessment, however.56 Wood’s men had no idea why Wood was really being relieved; few considered him sick or fatigued. Wood’s operations officer, Lieutenant Colonel John B. Sullivan, later wrote, “He was mentally and physically sound as at any time since I had known him.”57 The next day, December 3, Patton officially relieved Wood. The chastened 4th Armored commander visited Patton to say goodbye. “I doubt that he was really sorry to go,” Patton later wrote. Patton sent Wood to Paris in his own plane and replaced him with Hugh Gaffey, who had commanded the 2nd Armored Division during the Sicily campaign. Patton considered him able and a “great pinch hitter.” He hoped giving Gaffey the 4th Armored would put him in position to eventually command a corps. When Patton finally cut the orders for Gaffey to take formal command, he praised the new commander—­“I know of no officer in the U.S. Army who has had a more varied and brilliant experience”—­and concluded, “You are hereby most highly commended for your loyalty assistance and outstanding performance.”58 Patton sent the new commander off with a band playing “Auld Lang Syne.” The two generals saluted each other before Gaffey climbed into a truck and headed off to his new command.59 Gaffey would have his work cut out for him. The men of the 4th Armored took the news of their commander’s relief just as badly as Wood had. They had no idea that their division commander had been on such thin ice. Rumors flew of petty politics, personal jealousies, and backstabbing. More than one man cried. Yet, despite everything, Wood did not blame Patton for his relief. He wrote Patton five days later, telling him, “God bless you,” explaining that he felt like a dog for not being at the front. He offered to hold a horse, drive a truck, or clean a latrine “if it helps end this damn war.”60 Wood instead focused his anger at Eisenhower. When he read a story about Eisenhower trudging in the snow on the battlefield, he raged, “What snow?” and blamed it on Eisenhower’s butler not sweeping the snow off the sidewalk for the SHAEF commander. “I came out of the snow and slime and mud and blood of the Saar at that time; and the

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sight of [the] luxury of Eisenhower’s Versailles court was a nauseating experience for a soldier.”61 A few hours after Wood’s relief, Eddy came by Patton’s headquarters to discuss his corps’ tactical situation and the need for replacements. The situation was becoming desperate. Although his divisions had advanced, they were still short of Saarbrücken, Sarreguemines, and Sarre-­Union. Almost all the rifle companies were at half strength, with no replacements arriving. Patton decided to turn another 5 percent of his headquarters and rear-­echelon men, including African American soldiers, into riflemen. He also took soldiers out of nonessential units, such as antitank companies, and turned them into infantry.62 Eddy told Patton how Haislip’s XV Corps planned to support him in the upcoming attack and Patton agreed with the plan. They talked about defending bridges from German saboteurs, with Patton suggesting tying German prisoners to the bridges so the saboteurs would be killing their own in the process. “This is a typical Patton idea,” Eddy later confined to his diary. When Patton read a captured enemy document ordering German citizens to destroy all buildings and shelters when they were forced to leave—­basically a scorched-­earth policy—­he wondered if civilians would even follow the order. As Eddy tried to leave, Patton told him to continue his attack “even if he had to go on until there was just one rifleman left in each company;” he then wanted Eddy’s men to dig in and use all the automatic weapons at their disposal. Not until then would he permit Eddy to stop his advance. Patton then quoted Grant, explaining, “there are times in every battle when both sides think they are licked, but the side that continued the attack won the battle.” Patton invited Eddy to spend the night but Eddy begged off several times until Patton basically ordered him to remain and told him that he wanted to get him drunk. Eddy stayed for dinner, which included watching newsreels and dining with four Red Cross girls. Before going to bed, the two discussed events over brandies and Patton gave Eddy a sleeping pill; the corps commander slept for nine hours straight.63 While Patton dealt with Eddy, elements of Paul’s 26th Division, supporting Gaffey’s 4th Armored, finally captured Sarre-­Union, the first of Eddy’s three objectives.64 Walker’s men were also on the attack. Before dawn that morning, soldiers from one of Bacon’s battalions from the 95th Division paddled across the Saar River at Saarlautern. With artillery falling all around, the Germans did not see or hear the crossing. The Americans quickly captured outposts and overwhelmed guards at a stone

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bridge, taking only a few casualties. Engineers then disarmed the demolitions primed to blow. By nightfall, tank destroyers were crossing over. Now, both Merzig and Saarlautern were in Walker’s hands and Patton had both his corps in Germany.65 On December 4, when one of Patton’s staffers told him that the German general commanding Army Group G complained that he had no replacements or relief for his troops, Patton snorted, “That son-­of-­a-­bitch is as bad off as we are.”66 Patton’s divisions continued to press forward. Eddy launched an attack toward Sarreguemines led by Baade’s 35th Division before sunrise, followed by McBride and Grow’s divisions three hours later. Baade’s troops drove a deep salient into the German line, reaching Puttelange, eight miles short of Sarreguemines. Patton spent the day visiting Generals Patch and Haislip at Haislip’s XV Corps headquarters to review the Seventh Army’s supply situation. Patton found it much better than that of Bradley’s entire army group, chalking it up to Devers allowing his armies to deal directly with his supply headquarters, unlike Bradley who, according to Patton, “trys [sic] to administer too much.”67

Figure 35. On December 4, 1944, Patton visited with Lieutenant General Alexander “Sandy” Patch, the commander of U.S. Seventh Army, in Sarrebourg, France. Patch’s army covered Patton’s southern flank and would be part of Patton’s plans to reach the Rhine River. Catalog number: 111-­SC 193534, National Archives and Records Administration.

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The next day, Devers visited to discuss Patton’s plans for breaking through the Siegfried Line. He promised to support Patton any way he could. Devers impressed Patton enough that he considered fighting under his old West Point classmate. “He interferes less and is not as timed as Bradley,” Patton wrote, considering Bradley “a fine man, but not great.” That same day, Gaffey’s new command advanced seven miles into German territory while Paul’s 26th Division made the most progress it had up to that point.68 Worried about his manpower problems, Patton broke with the chain of command and wrote to Major General Alexander Surles, the War Department’s director of information in Washington, DC, “I don’t know what the young manhood of America is doing, but they are certainly not appearing over here.” He then recited the numbers and percentages of casualties facing Third Army: eleven thousand men short, 92 percent of whom were from rifle companies, equaling a 40 percent shortage of all rifle companies in his army. “This is very serious,” he concluded. “I do not know that there is anything you can do about it, but I know that I can’t talk to anyone else on the subject, so I am shooting my head off to you.”69 To address his lack of artillery, the slowness of his own ordnance department to improve the situation, and Jack Wood’s fate, Patton wrote to Lieutenant General Thomas Handy, General George C. Marshall’s deputy chief of staff. Gone was Patton’s gruff and profane language. The letter was upbeat with a “wink-­wink, nudge-­nudge” flavor to it. After summarizing Third Army’s victories and the need for replacements, Patton got to the point: “We would also be very much obliged for a little ammunition.” That was it. No diatribes about the lack of artillery or insults for the logistics commands. Next, he asked Handy about adding an additional machine gun to tanks—­preferably a .50 caliber but a .30 caliber would do. He had grown tired of his own ordnance officer, who only studied the problem without solving it. “I believe that if you would tell him to do it and be goddammed, something might happen.” Finally, he addressed the issue of General Wood’s relief. “I know that you are one of P’s greatest friends, and he is my best friend.” He wanted Wood to keep his two-­star rank. If Wood was to be demoted at home, he would take him back, “even if I have to personally command him.” Patton sweetened his three requests by telling Handy of the American tanker under Wood who had knocked out four German tanks. He included a

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picture of the German tanks with a note: “Would you please show this picture to General Marshall.”70 Patton immediately followed up the letter to Handy with a letter to Marshall, boasting that his army had killed 2,094 Germans and taken 27,954 prisoners. “Of course, this is only accounts for about a fourth of the German dead as they bury their own when they can.” He included some pictures he had personally taken. “This probably accounts for their being as bad as they are.” He then went on to claim 848 liberated towns, 1,463 square miles captured, 381 bridges built, and three crossings over the Saar River. The purpose for all this information? “I am taking the liberty of sending you this,” he concluded the letter, “as a sort of Christmas Card.” The letter might have been an attempt to smooth things over for breaking protocol with his letter to Handy.71 While Patton dealt with these administrative matters, Weyland attended a meeting in Paris headed by Eisenhower, Bradley, and Spaatz, with all the senior strategic and tactical air commanders in attendance: Doolittle, commanding the Eighth Air Force and Vandenburg, commanding the Ninth Air Force, as well as all the tactical air commanders: Weyland, Pete Quesada, and Dick Nugent. The British were represented by Air Chief Marshal Arthur “Bomber” Harris, head of the Royal Air Force Bomber Command, and Air Marshal Arthur Coningham, commander of the British 2nd Tactical Air Force. They met to discuss the use of strategic bombers in a tactical role to help the stalled armies break free and start moving again. Bradley wanted the air assets to support either Hodges’s First or Simpson’s Ninth Army; never mentioning Patton’s Third. Pete Quesada recommended bombing the Roer River dams, but that prospect seemed too risky. Then Weyland, a one-­star general surrounded by three-­and four-­star colleagues, spoke up. “Well, I’ve got an army that will fight,” he announced and explained that if both the Americans and British heavy bombers paved a path for Patton, it could end the war. “I will guarantee to cut the American Third Army right through the Siegfried Line and up to the Rhine River,” he assured everyone. Once the river was crossed, Patton’s army would slice and dice what was left of the German army. “And I think the war will be over.” Eisenhower laughed at the audacious scheme and said “okay,” then turned to Spaatz and asked, “What about it?” and Spaatz agreed. The other generals also agreed and pledged support for the plan.72 An excited Weyland called Patton and told him

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he had committed him to a pre-­Christmas operation, which he would christen “TINK,” the nickname for Weyland’s wife. “What are we going to do?” Patton asked. Weyland explained that they were going to crack the Siegfried Line and head for Berlin, supported by every aircraft in the European theater. Patton’s only response: “Hot damn!” Meanwhile, on December 6, Grow’s 6th Armored and Baade’s 35th Division entered the western section of Sarreguemines and commenced street fighting. By the end of the day, they held the west bank of the Saar River, which provided a view into Germany and the Siegfried Line. Eddy decided not to cross. With two of his three objectives taken (Saarbrücken still held out), he would wait two days until all his units were positioned to attack.73 Meanwhile, Gaffey’s 4th Armored had advanced seven miles before battling with German armor at Singling after driving the enemy out of Sarre-­Union, eleven miles northeast of the Saar. By the end of the fighting splotches of blood dotted the snowy landscape. To the north, in Walker’s zone, Van Fleet’s 90th Division crossed the Saar north of Saarlautern and headed into the town of Dillingen with its heavy Siegfried Line defenses, while Twaddle’s 95th enlarged its bridgehead. Both offensives ran into trouble at the Siegfried Line, where the men fought house-­to-­house. The Germans circled behind them, renewing attacks and occupying pillboxes and houses that had already been cleared.74 Back at Patton’s headquarters, a congressional delegation visited, including Clare Boothe Luce, a Republican from Connecticut. At the morning briefing, they asked questions like, “Where is the Rhine River, is it east or west of the Saar River?”, confirming many of Patton’s prejudices regarding their intelligence. He disliked them all and considered them troublemakers, but he held a special contempt for Luce, who had come to fame as a world-­traveling reporter for her husband’s magazine, Life. According to Gay, she was “definitely under the influence of alcohol and was treated by Col. Odom [Patton’s doctor].”75 To Patton, she “made a very unfavorable impression on me and, I think, everyone else.” When Luce noticed a Bible on Patton’s camp table, she asked excitedly, “General, do you read the Bible?” He snapped back, “Every Goddamned day.”76 Patton fed them a lunch of sandwiches (“preferably stale ones” he instructed his staff) with no water to wash them down. They discussed with him the concept of universal military training—­requiring all American males to take one year of military training as opposed to raising an army from scratch for the next war.77 To Beatrice, he explained, “They are in

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my opinion only in favor of token military training[,] not real enlistment.” He then pawned them off on Millikin to visit Metz. When he later learned that Luce and another congressman had pulled the lanyards on artillery pieces outside the still defiant Driant—­a violation of the Geneva Convention—­a furious Patton tried to censor the story but it had already gone out on the wire. “I have seldom seen the General angrier,” wrote Codman.78 That evening, Spaatz, Doolittle, and Vandenberg showed up at Patton’s headquarters, explaining that they were just visiting on their way to see Devers. They showed Patton the rough outline for TINK, which would involve bombing the enemy line in the vicinity of Kaiserslautern, some forty miles east of Saarbrücken.79 Patton considered it “the most ambitious air blitz ever conceived.” Their meeting over, Weyland threw a small party for the visiting brass. Patton attended, where he met with Colonel Philip Cochran. The general took off his pistol belt and the two sat on a flight of stairs, talking about Operation TINK. 80 Cochran, who impressed Patton with his detailed knowledge of air operations, wanted to drop paratroopers into Germany’s Kassel Valley, some two hundred miles away, and fly fuel and supplies to them, building up depots, which Patton could drive toward (instead of away from) fuel and supplies, roughly the plan Brereton had already suggested. Patton invited Cochran to present the plan to his staff the next morning, followed by a tour of the front to, as Patton explained, “get shot at.” Cochran jumped at the idea of seeing the battlefield from the ground. He had seen combat in North Africa and Burma from the air and was excited to see it up front.81 Patton may have had a few drinks at the party because after he finished his discussion with Cochran, he ascended the stairs in his blacked-­out headquarters only to fall down, bruising his coccyx bone. “It hurts like hell,” he wrote Beatrice. He would spend the next few weeks carrying around a donut-­shaped cushion on his arm, which he used when sitting in his jeep. He was not alone; Bradley was under a doctor’s care after suffering from hives that had swollen his face.82 Patton spent part of December 7 in bed with his sore lower back after having it x-­rayed. Although debilitated, he continued to receive reports about the house-­to-­house fighting experienced by Van Fleet’s and Twaddle’s divisions. Enemy artillery kept the 90th from constructing bridges across the Saar at Saarlautern, forcing the men to rely on boats to cross the river. The Germans also counterattacked with tanks

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in Dillingen.83 Despite his pain, Patton visited the wounded in a hospital near his headquarters. Coming across a wounded soldier from the 35th Division, he told the man that he had taken the division off the line for a well-­deserved rest. He told him that he could return to the unit without missing a thing. “Sir, why did you have to say that?” the soldier asked. “I was hoping to get a rest out of this.” Patton smiled, leaned over, mussed the man’s hair and said, “That’s my job son.”84 After a month of fighting, Patton’s forces had crossed the Saar River and captured all but one of the cities he had aimed for: Saarbrücken. He began replacing his frontline divisions with other units, some newly arrived, sending them to rest up, conduct repairs, and take on replacements for his push to the Rhine. The 6th Armored replaced the 80th Division, the 10th Armored went into reserve behind the 90th Division, the new 87th Division replaced both the 5th and 26th Divisions, and Major General Roderick Allen’s 12th Armored, from Patch’s army, relieved the 4th Armored. The relieved divisions were placed under Millikin’s III Corps, headquartered in Metz.85 As taxed and exhausted as his men were, the Germans were definitely in worse shape. Captured letters told the story: “The only thing we have now is the music of American artillery, mud, mire, water, bad weather, hunger and thirst.” Another wrote, “I am lucky to be still alive with all these planes circling around and that artillery!” A third lamented, “When I see how all my comrades die, I become sick and tired.”86 At the next morning’s meeting, December 8, Patton asked one of his staffers to find his pistol and holster. Once it was produced, he admitted, “You can see it was quite a party if I forgot my gun.” At the afternoon meeting, he learned that U.S. ground forces had shot down several American fighter aircraft. He wanted the story squelched, not only from the public but from Weyland’s fliers. “[I] don’t want them to know we are doing that,” he told his staff, “[it] makes them jittery.”87 Patton then headed out to the front with Cochran. They caught up with Baade’s 35th Division which had crossed the Saar River south of Sarreguemines. Cochran watched in awe as Patton stood in plain sight of the enemy. “I don’t know whether it was defiance or arrogance, or what it was,” Cochran remembered, “but he did it.” Cochran saw German snipers pick off combat engineers as they built a Bailey Bridge across a stream. The victims simply dropped into the water as the work continued. By the

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end of the day, the Baade’s infantrymen had cleared half the city.88 Paul’s 26th Division also participated in the river crossing and captured several Maginot Line forts.89 Patton wrote Bradley that night, worried about morale. “It seems to me that the people at home do not realize the necessity of backing up the fighting soldier, but apparently they do not.”90 Then he wrote to Eddy, commending him for thirty days of relentless fighting. Although Eddy’s corps crossed the Saar River, Patton could have been trying to encourage him to push further east. “Please accept for yourself and pass on to the heroic officers and men of your command my deep appreciation of your magnificent performance,” he wrote Eddy. “All ranks of the XII Corps are hereby highly commended for their super-­human and victorious efforts.”91 Patton also called Eddy the next morning after his ULTRA briefing. After congratulating Eddy again, Patton got down to business. “[You’ve] got to keep going. I want a hole in the line. Our future depends on it, so kick somebody in the pants and get them going.”92 That same day, Driant finally fell. More than six hundred lice-­covered, hungry Germans emerged with their hands up. At least a hundred of the wounded had not had any proper medical treatment. “The inhabitants of the fort live just like moles in a number of concrete tunnels,” Patton wrote. He credited the surrender to “lack of salt, lack of water, and lack of guts.” A few days earlier, Walker had sent a representative to each of the remaining defiant forts to negotiate with the fortress commanders. It wasn’t much of a negotiation considering the cold facts of their predicament. Walker’s emissary praised the Germans for fighting gallantly but urged them to accept that there was no use in continuing. Third Army was moving forward, leaving the forts to be surrounded by African American troops who would simply starve them out. They would also use the forts for target practice, firing captured German artillery guns at the forts. Their only option: “Surrender to a glorious fighting unit.” The tactic worked. When the news reached Bradley the next day, he asked Patton to speak to some reporters on how Weyland’s fighter aircraft supported Third Army. Instead, Patton and Weyland recorded statements to prevent any misquotes. “One can’t be too careful,” Patton later wrote.93 Still, Patton later decided to comply with Bradley’s order. The next day he held the requested press conference, with General Weyland at his side. Patton stressed that Weyland and his staff were included in every operations meeting, so that both branches could work, as Patton explained, in

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consonance. “We don’t say that ‘we are going to do this and what can you do about it,’” he told the correspondents. “We say that ‘we would like to make such an operation—­now how can that be done from the air standpoint?’” Weyland agreed, adding that the Third Army staff appreciated both the strengths of air power and its limitations. “They don’t call upon us to come in on an impossible situation and expect us to clear it up,” said Weyland. “When I explain to General Patton that a certain operation from our standpoint is not practical, they understand it.” Patton added that when American bombers fly overhead on their way to attack enemy targets, his artillerymen put down a special concentration, focused on German flak guns, making it safer for the bomber crews. Weyland credited the tactic to Eddy’s staff. “I did not even think of it, but somebody at XII Corps saw [to it] that when bombers came over the artillery would open on the flak positions.” He added that this occurred at a time when Third Army was short on ammunition. Weyland then launched into a detailed account of how air operation decisions made their way down to corps, divisions, and frontline troops. When Weyland declared, “My kids feel that this is their army, they feel quite a definite sense of superiority in that respect over their cohorts,” Patton leaned forward and said, “Don’t quote that.” Weyland amended his statement: “I think you can quote that our success is built greatly on mutual respect and comradeship between the air and the ground.” He told how his pilots constantly visited the frontlines, with bedding rolls and helmets, to see the effects of their bomb damage and how the combat soldiers lived. He explained that it worked both ways, telling a story about a pilot who was shot down behind enemy lines opposite the 4th Armored. When airmen contacted the tankers about their comrade’s location, the tankers rolled forward and rescued him. “That little thing spread all around and as a result when a ground unit gets in a jam, the pilots of the XIX TAC will stick their necks out to help them.” Patton spent the rest of the conference comparing American and German tanks. He credited German tanks with the ability to maneuver better in mud because of their wider tracks. “Our tanks, though are much better,” he noted. When told the Germans’ Mark VI Royal Tiger (“King Tiger” to the GIs) was the best tank in the world, Patton defended the Sherman tank. “I think American tanks are the best in the world.” He explained that German tanks fired too slowly. In addition, “They have a manual traverse [for the turret] on their tanks and we have a mechanical

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one. It is much better.” Enemy heavy tanks were also too cumbersome. “We use tanks as highly armored mobile squads, they use tanks merely as guns.” While he admitted that German heavy tanks could penetrate American tanks’ frontal armor and American tanks could not do the same to the Germans, he still would not give the Germans credit. “We can penetrate their sides when we get near them.” He stressed that some of the newer Shermans, particularly the heavily-­armored M4A3E2 Jumbo, could survive hits by high-­velocity 88 mm shells. “One reinforced tank stopped six projectiles,” he told the reporters. “After they [the American tank crew] cooled off, they dropped out. They [the German 88mm shells] were sticking in there like raisins in the bun. Another time they went through the front.” After a few more questions, Patton concluded the conference by telling the reporters that while he and Weyland did not mean to proselytize about air-­ground cooperation, he wanted the people at home to know about it. “However, don’t say we asked you to say it.”94 On December 10, Patton held a meeting with General Patch and several air generals to discuss Operation TINK.95 They planned for a three-­day blitz of the German line. Since most bombings were one-­ day affairs, Patton felt the three-­day bombardment would completely surprise the Germans. They decided to hold off any major decision for three days while they determined when Patton would kick off.96 The attack would be led by fifteen hundred bombers saturating the German lines. Forward observers would be sent up front to guide the bombers in. There would be no repeat of the disaster that befell the ground troops at St-­Lô. The troops were motivated and ready to land a killer blow to the Germans.97 While this meeting was going on, Patton’s corps and division commanders attended an important intelligence briefing, hosted, surprisingly, by German Lieutenant General Hans-­Georg Schaefer, standing in front of the American officers in his German uniform. Captured in August by French forces in Marseilles, Schaefer realized Nazi Germany was at an end, and that every German had a duty to end the war quickly in order to safeguard the German people from Nazi violence. Schaefer had been assigned to the Siegfried Line in 1940, and later, in 1943, he rode a horse along the line for months while he convalesced from an injury.98 Patton gave him his own villa in Nancy, where he enjoyed meals and an abundance of candy and cigarettes. Guarded by German-­speaking

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MPs, Schaefer spent several days pinpointing German strongholds in the Siegfried Line for Patton’s staff. He often dined with Patton’s intelligence officers, discussing German topics over apple pie. Hap Gay considered Schaefer a collaborationist, “willing and capable of giving valuable information to us.” When Schaefer spoke to Third Army leaders, he did so in English, which he had taught himself while imprisoned. When the briefing ended, one of the American generals commented that it was the ablest briefing he had ever attended.99 Meanwhile, Patton planned for his coming offensive, ever mindful that Christmas was near. He had written Beatrice during the Metz Campaign that he would not be able to send her anything for Christmas. But on December 10, he received four luxury Patek Phillipe watches from Lieutenant Colonel Prince Ali Salman Aga “Aly” Kahn, a Muslim officer serving as a British liaison with the Seventh Army and whom Patton referred to as “heathen.” Patton sent the watches to Beatrice with instructions to give the perpetual motion watch to his son, George IV, and let Beatrice and the girls pick from the rest. The only other gift that Patton mentioned was a check for twenty-­five dollars for Sergeant George Meeks. When he received twenty-­five fruit cakes from an admirer, he sent them to a frontline evacuation hospital. Patton himself had a stack of Christmas presents in his headquarters, many from Beatrice, but he resisted opening them. Detracting from the joy of Christmas, he reported one problem: “Willie has worms!100 On December 11 Patton made the rounds between Millikin’s forces in reserve and Walker’s frontline units. Before departing, he wrote a letter of instruction for his troops on how to envelop the Siegfried Line. He concluded it by trying to keep up the men’s morale. “There is no purpose in capturing these manure-­filled, water-­logged villages. The purpose of our operations is to kill or capture the German personnel and vehicles . . . so that they cannot retreat and repeat their opposition. Straight frontal attacks against villages are prohibited unless after careful study there is no other possible solution.”101 He then visited Gaffey’s 4th Armored as well as Culin’s 87th, Paul’s 26th, and Baade’s 35th Divisions. He came away furious about the weather, which “could not be worse.” He considered the entire rain-­soaked region “such a hell hole of a country there is about four inches of liquid mud over every thing [sic] and it rains all the time not hard but steady.” Despite the mud and rain, Culin’s troops advanced about

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a mile while Baade’s veterans advanced four miles to the Blies River, a tributary of the Saar. At least Patton’s men were making progress.102 Patton worked hard to provide his troops with proper rest facilities, with movies, dance halls, and hot food. One soldier made his day when he wrote Patton a thank-you letter for his time in the rear, prompting Patton to personally write to the soldier that his was the first such letter he had received in his thirty-­five years in the Army. “I am very appreciative of your having taken the trouble to write,” Patton wrote back, concluding, “I trust that you and your grand outfit will have continued success, and wish you and them a very Merry Christmas and a Happy and Victorious New Year.”103 Later that day, in a last-­ditch effort to stop the persistent rain, Patton turned to a higher power. He placed a call to Chaplain James H. O’Neill. “This is General Patton, do you have a good prayer for weather? We must do something about these rains if we are to win the war.” O’Neill explained that he knew where to look for such a prayer and would report back in an hour. After looking at the downpour for a while, O’Neill found a prayer he hoped the general would like: Almighty and most merciful Father, we humbly beseech thee, of thy great goodness, to restrain these immoderate rains with which he have had to contend. Grant us fair weather for Battle. Graciously harken so us as soldiers who call upon Thee that, armed with Thy power, we may advance from victory to victory and crush the oppression and wickedness of our enemies and establish Thy justice among men and nations. Amen. O’Neill typed the prayer onto a “3x5” card, but he worried about the prayer’s use. He suspected that the general intended to circulate the prayer rather than use it himself. Since Christmas was near, O’Neill also typed Patton’s Christmas greeting on the other side of the card: To each officer and soldier in the Third United States Army, I wish a Merry Christmas. I have full confidence in your courage, devotion to duty and skill in battle. We march in our might to complete victory. May God’s blessing rest upon each of you on this Christmas Day. G. S Patton, Jr., Lieutenant General, Commanding, Third United States Army.

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O’Neill reported to Patton and handed over the prayer. Patton read it over, handed it back and said, “have 250,000 copies printed and see to it that every man in the Third Army gets one.” O’Neill then pointed out the Christmas greeting on the opposite side. “Very good,” Patton said with a smile. At O’Neill’s suggestion, Patton signed it to add a personal touch. But Patton was not finished with the chaplain. He asked O’Neill to sit down and asked him, “How much praying is being done in the Third Army?” O’Neill said not much, and explained that men prayed during battles or in churches but not while they are sitting around waiting for rain to stop. “I am a strong believer in prayer,” said Patton. “There are three ways men get what they want; by planning, by working and by praying.” He then launched into a long explanation about the power of prayer and the lack of it in Third Army. “I wish you would put out a training letter on this subject of prayer to all the chaplains,” he told O’Neill. “Write about nothing else, just the importance of prayer. . . . We’ve got to get not only the chaplains but every man in the Third Army to pray. We must ask God to stop these rains. These rains are that margin that holds defeat or victory.” At the end of their talk, O’Neill went to work. The training letter went out to all 486 chaplains of the Third Army while the prayer cards were set to be distributed on December 14. That day, Patton reported to his diary, “It has certainly rained less since my prayer.”104 Meanwhile, Van Fleet’s 90th and Twaddle’s 95th Divisions continued to struggle in house-­to-­house fighting at their bridgeheads at Saarlautern and Dilligen as snow fell. Supplies were rationed since the Germans shelled anywhere engineers tried to bridge the river. P-­ 47 aircraft swooped down to tree-­top level dropping much-­needed medical supplies as Van Fleet’s men fought off German counterattacks.105 Reporters attached to Third Army noted the difficulties on Patton’s northern flank. When Patton declared to them, “We’ll go through the Siegfried Line like crap through a goose,” they began to say that Patton’s goose looked like it might be more constipated than he had anticipated.106 Finally, on December 12, heavy artillery was brought forward to blast the enemy pillboxes, silencing them for good. Despite the setback, Patton could be proud of what 90th had accomplished: its men had crossed the Saar by boat, a rather remarkable feat. Meanwhile, Patton had brought McBride’s and Irwin’s divisions up to strength with retrained rear-­echelon soldiers. Patton could not understand why Eisenhower failed to do the same thing for the entire European Theater. “All that is necessary is for

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them to have General Eisenhower issue an order for them to train 10% [of rear echelon soldiers],” he wrote in his diary. “For some reason, he is reluctant to issue such an order.”107 Patton visited Eddy that day to discuss the coming offensive. They drove out to review Gaffey’s 4th Armored and found the men well fed and under shelter, out of the rain. One of the units he visited was Major Albin Irzyk’s 8th Tank Battalion, occupying the town of Domnon lès Dieuze. Patton’s jeep, with Patton standing erect in the passenger seat, screeched to a halt in front of Irzyk’s command post, frightening three nearby farm horses, who stopped drinking from a trough and trotted off. “Ha, ha!” Patton cheered, “I guess I started a cavalry charge.” Then he hopped down from the jeep and the two men began their inspection, with Irzyk following one step behind Patton. As Irzyk remembered it, “He stopped at every vehicle, at every cluster of soldiers and had something to say to each—­a question; a word of encouragement or appreciation; a compliment; a wisecrack; a good-­natured dig. In an instant, he has established total and complete rapport with these men; they were literally eating it up.” Once the thirty-­minute inspection ended, Patton slapped Irzyk on the shoulder and told him, “Keep up the good work.” He then mounted his jeep, stood in the passenger side, and took off as quickly as he came.108 From there, Patton visited Paul’s 26th and Culin’s 87th Divisions. Culin had fought the Japanese on the island of Kiska and his unit was in the process of replacing Paul’s on the front line. Patton gathered a group of officers and gave them a pep talk, filled with stories of battle lore. He was happy to learn that one of the 87th’s regiments was already doing well in combat. He showed up in the 26th Infantry’s mess hall, where men lined up in the rain for their dinner. When the officer in charge offered to let him cut the line, Patton lit into him. “We eat after the men eat!” Instead of eating, he inspected the field kitchen. Once the enlisted men were served, he got in line with the officers, got his food, and ate with the officers. “We were so damn scared, we didn’t talk very much,” recalled one captain. “It was tough to eat when you’re that nervous.”109 Traveling to the front, he ordered a platoon of tanks to head across a field near Gros-­Réderching, eight miles southeast of Sarreguemines, to save about two miles on their drive, but a German 88mm gun crew spotted the tanks and knocked out all five.110 Patton then traveled to Baade’s 35th Division, where he found the men exhausted but still on the line, getting ready to attack and secure some high ground.111

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On his way back to his headquarters, Patton passed through Saint-­ Avold, where McBride’s 80th Infantry was resting and refitting. One of the regiments had fought constantly for a hundred and twenty-­two days. Patton addressed the first officer he saw, “What the hell is taking place here Captain?” He was told it was an equipment replacement before a medal presentation. “To hell with that trivial matter, bring your men over here, I have something I want to say to them.” With that the men gathered along a fence and Patton launched into one of his famous speeches, but this one was for veterans who had seen intense combat. In case you men don’t know it, you soldiers of the 80th Infantry Division are known to those heinie bastards as Patton’s Butchers. You are the best damn soldiers any officer could hope to command. In a few days we are going to open our offensive against those Nazi bastards again. I don’t want any of you getting captured. Knowing your reputation as good fighters, those S.S. devils will cut your liver out if they catch you when we get inside Germany. My objective is to be in Berlin by April. When we start this offensive we are going through those Heinie bastards like shit through a loose goose on green grass. We’re going to make that objective if they give me enough trucks to haul the dog tags back. We’re going to beat that April objective. You men go back to what you were doing. I’ll be in touch in due time. With that he climbed back into his jeep and sped off. One of the soldiers later said, “When General Patton spoke, you generally got motivated.”112 Patton returned to his headquarters, but his day was not over. Walker reported in, wanting to place Irwin’s 5th Division, recently replenished with replacements from the Metz fight, into the line at once to close the gap between the 90th and 95th Divisions. Once Irwin’s men were at the front, the 90th could take a much-­needed rest. Patton agreed to the move, proud that his method of creating replacements from within his own army had succeeded. “If Com Z [sic] would do as well we would have more replacements,” he wrote in his diary.113 With his army poised to exploit the bridgeheads over the Saar River and make the break into Germany, Patton issued special instructions on how to deal with a new threat: German civilians. “The friendship and cooperation of the French people will be replaced in Germany by universal

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hostility, which will require that we regard all Germans, soldiers and civilians, men, women, and even children, as enemies.” He threatened to punish any soldier caught either fraternizing or just acting friendly with Germans and warned them not to trust anyone claiming to be escaped prisoners of war, “until cleared by careful investigation.”114 On December 13 Jeanne d’Arc, the last of the Metz forts, finally fell.115 Had Driant and Jeanne d’Arc held out just two weeks longer, they could have caused a good deal of trouble for Patton as he dealt with a much bigger enemy offensive. Despite his success, Patton had had it with the Lorraine region of France. “If I have any thing [sic] to do with the peace terms,” he had earlier written Beatrice, “I will make the Germans keep Lorraine. It is the nastiest place I know of and rains all the time.” To Secretary of War Stimson, he wrote, “I look back with regretful feelings to the happy days when we [were] smothered with dust in Tunisia and Sicily.”116 Yet, despite the gloomy weather and the mud, Patton still looked tan. His medical staff had provided him with a sunlamp.117 That morning, Patton and Weyland reviewed plans for TINK. Patton envisioned Walker’s XX Corps, which was already across the Saar, breaking through the German line. If the Germans counterattacked from the north, he could turn Walker to the left to meet the attack while Millikin’s III Corps drove east, with Eddy’s XII Corps filling the gap between the two corps.118 Patton set TINK’s date for December 19. Hopefully, the attack would lead to another unstoppable blitz all the way to the Rhine River. If Eddy broke through, Patton would use his bombers in front of the VI Corps, now commanded by Major General Edward H. Brooks, part of Patch’s Seventh Army. But Patton doubted Brooks would succeed. “They are going fast now but have not hit the Siegfried Line.”119 Patton and Weyland then met with General Vandenberg and other Air Force and RAF generals to finalize Operation TINK. It would be bigger than operations COBRA or the British GOODWOOD (both attempts to break out of Normandy), and unlike COBRA, where the air forces carpet-­bombed a rectangular ground target on the front lines for a single day, TINK’s three-­day bombardment would hit a succession of enemy targets, such as barracks, ammunition dumps, ordnance depots, and fuel supplies. The front lines would be smothered by five to six hundred American medium bombers and twelve hundred to fifteen hundred heavy bombers, all supported by fighter-­bombers. Following up, and bombing farther behind enemy lines, would be six hundred to one thousand RAF

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bombers. The bombing would continue, dropping loads farther east to allow ground forces to advance. To ensure no Americans would be harmed by friendly bombs, frontline troops would be pulled back four hundred yards, as Patton had promised Eddy. To prevent the Germans from occupying the abandoned area, tanks would be positioned behind the bomb line to fire on any advancing Germans. “The chance of direct hits on tanks was small,” Patton reasoned, “and fragmentation has practically no effect against them.”120 The first day’s targets would be strongpoints along Siegfried Line surrounding Zweibrücken, Germany, twenty miles east of Saarbrücken. The second day’s targets would be vital German depots and troop concentrations in the cities of Kaiserslautern, Nohfelden, Bad Kreuznach, and Oberstein, creating a northeasterly path for Patton’s attack. The third day would see the broadest bombardment, hitting targets along the Rhine River, from Koblenz to Germersheim, a distance of more than one hundred miles. Heavy bombers would even bomb targets east of the Rhine, including Aschaffenburg, a major enemy supply depot forty-­five miles east of the river. Fighter-­bombers would constantly strafe anything on the ground, while night fighters would keep up the attack going around the clock.121 Once the bombing ended, Patton hoped to be through the enemy defenses by December 22.122 Gay pointed out that it would be the largest single air offensive of the war, and “this meeting, if its plans are carried out, might well turn out to be one of the most important meetings held during the entire war.” More importantly, he excitedly wrote in his diary, “It will breach the Siegfried Line, which means the advance of American troops to the Rhine and might well terminate the war.” Picking up on the potential for a war-­ending success, Vandenberg warned Patton, “The ground forces must realize that this provides the surest way to a quick and decisive breakthrough.”123 The next day, December 14, Patton, accompanied by Walker, visited Van Fleet’s 90th Division in Saarlautern, which was still trying to clear the Germans out of Dillingen. The men had been fighting in the town for almost a week and only that day had finally erected a bridge over the Saar. Walker tried to accompany Patton as he crossed a bridge but Patton told him it was not necessary for them to both risk their lives, since his real goal was to show the men that generals could get shot at too. Patton crossed alone in his command car and noticed only a single shot hit

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MAP 8. Operation TINK, December 22–24, 1944.

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near him. He then decorated several soldiers as enemy artillery rounds exploded a block away. “It was the funniest musical accompaniment to such a ceremony I ever heard,” he recalled. He inspected several houses and found that they were all concrete forts with openings for machine guns just above sidewalk level. “The Germans are certainly a thoroughgoing race,” he later wrote.124 Patton then visited the 206th Engineer Combat Battalion in the town of Wallerfangen. The battalion commander, Colonel Gilbert Pirrung, had set up his headquarters in the home of Franz von Papen, Germany’s chancellor in 1932 who had been instrumental to bringing Adolf Hitler to power. Pirrung’s engineers had destroyed a recently built brick wall in von Papen’s basement, revealing a hidden wine cellar. Pirrung invited Patton in for a drink. Patton arrived for his drink, the two officers then divided between them the bottles, as well as the silverware and linen, marked with a distinctive “P,” ideal for two Americans with the same last initial. As Patton pinned a medal on Pirrung, an artillery round exploded a block away. Soon after Patton left, the engineers demolished the entire mansion.125

Figure 36. Patton took this picture of a newly built bridge over the Saar River at Saarlautern on a foggy December 14, 1944. Patton crossed the bridge to show the soldiers of the 90th Infantry Division that generals could also get shot at. Library of Congress, OV 18, 45.

Patton then visited Twaddle’s 95th Division near Thionville. Afterward, he drove to Luxembourg City to see Bradley, who filled him in on Montgomery’s latest machinations. The field marshal and Churchill

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had successfully lobbied Eisenhower to assign Simpson’s Ninth Army to Montgomery on December 1. To support his offensive, Montgomery pressed Eisenhower to ensure that neither Patton nor Patch were conducting any operations and to publicly order that the Rhine would only be crossed at Cologne, under one army group commander: him, of course. Unbelievably, Montgomery again reminded Eisenhower and Bradley that when he commanded the ground troops there was nothing but success, but that under Eisenhower everything turned to stalemate. Montgomery could not have been more arrogant and insulting. “What a fool,” Patton later wrote.126 The whole event stressed Patton, who knew if his attack failed to break through the German line, he would again be forced to go on the defensive and lose several divisions.127 Two days earlier, when told that Montgomery’s forces were regrouping, he snorted in sotto voice, “He’s using a hell of a lot of gasoline while doing nothing.” Patton had earlier written Beatrice that “regrouping is the curse of war and a great boon to the enemy.”128 But Eisenhower had not followed Montgomery’s recommendations. Upon receipt of Montgomery’s suggestions, the SHAEF commander quickly responded, countering the field marshal’s ideas point for point. He reminded him that it was the Americans who broke out of the Normandy bridgehead, enabling all allied armies “which blasted France and Belgium and almost carried us across the Rhine.” Further, he had no intention on stopping Patton or Devers, “as long as they are cleaning up our right flank and giving us capability of concentration [Eisenhower’s italics].” He even gave Montgomery a friendly warning to watch his language. “I beg of you not to continue to look upon past performances of this great fighting force as a failure merely because we have not achieved all that we could have hoped,” a subtle swipe at the failure of Operation MARKET GARDEN.129 After reviewing TINK with Bradley, Patton made a final plea to return Haislip’s XV Corps to his command, since it would be taking part in the offensive. Again, Bradley refused. Patton then asked Bradley for one of the airborne divisions but, as Patton later reported, “won’t get it.”130 Realizing what he was up against, and that nothing could stop Montgomery from taking his divisions, Patton felt more than ever that his Rhine offensive would have to succeed. “It is certainly up to me to make a breakthrough and I feel that I will, God helping.”131 Patton also mentioned replacements, a problem he could not solve despite his best efforts. Third Army was still short thirteen hundred infantrymen but Bradley explained there

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would be no relief for several weeks. Instead, he would soon send Patton the 42nd Infantry Division. Patton was not alone in begging Bradley for replacements. A few days earlier, Hodges had asked Bradley if he could break up newly arrived divisions and feed them to the depleted veteran units, but Bradley refused, explaining that the practice was not economical. Since veteran divisions needed riflemen, forcing units to retrain hundreds of service troops into trigger pullers did not seem worth the time and effort, which Bradley described as “wastage.”132 Bradley congratulated Patton on his remarkable progress under such harsh conditions, especially since Montgomery’s offensive in the north had already stalled and Hodges was stuck in the mud. When he asked Patton to extend his good wishes to his division commanders, Patton snapped. Probably still stinging from the relief of Wood, Patton shot back, “Hell, a division commander doesn’t have to know anything. He can be as dumb as a son-­of-­a-­bitch just as long as he’s a fighter.” Bradley argued with Patton’s visceral description but secretly agreed they needed fighters in high command.133 Patton continued to worry about replacements. One of his doctors, Brigadier General Albert Kenner, suggested using newly arrived infantry division soldiers to serve as replacements for veteran divisions and later refilling them with returned wounded and new replacements from General Lee’s COMZ, “if we ever get them pried loose.” The plan would ensure that replacements for less-­experienced fighting divisions would be somewhat trained and experienced and would be qualified to train new recruits. Patton called Bradley with the idea on December 15, but Bradley, as with Hodges earlier, did not share Patton’s enthusiasm. When he told Patton he was meeting with Eisenhower in Paris the next day, Patton flew Kenner to the City of Light to put the plan directly to the SHAEF commander. “I fear that it is such a simple solution,” he penned in his diary, “that it will not be adopted.”134 Bradley had already shot down Patton’s request for COMZ to exchange some of its personnel for general-­service personnel, claiming that COMZ was “using all available limited-­assignment personnel to replace fully-­qualified personnel.”135 The next day, Patton took another 5 percent of his headquarters and corps soldiers out of their staff jobs and made them into infantrymen. This time he excepted medical personnel and African-American soldiers from the recruitment. It would still not be enough. Exacerbating the problem, Brigadier General Henning Linden, the assistant division commander for the newly arrived 42nd Infantry Division, told Patton that

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the division needed training and some experience before it could be put in the front line. “What a bunch of fools we have at home,” Patton complained to his diary. “The critical point of the war and after three years, no trained men.” Patton was more accurate than he knew regarding the critical point of the war.136 Bradley was planning to send his personnel officer, Brigadier General Joseph O’Hare, to the Pentagon to investigate the replacement problem. He theorized that “somebody in Washington had made a wrong guess as to the date on which this war will be over” and that premature optimism also contributed to the lack of replacements. “I imagine it had been difficult to convince Congress that we need more men.” He promised to let Patton know as soon as he heard anything.137 In addition to worrying about replacements, Patton now had to worry about Eddy. When Patton visited him on December 16, he found him depressed and nervous. Patton had already hosted him for two days at his Nancy headquarters to try to provide him with a little rest from his command responsibilities. It hadn’t worked. The clashes with Wood and Wood’s relief, the growing number of trench foot cases, the loss of several of his staff to enemy artillery, the poor weather, and Patton’s constant pressure had frayed Eddy’s nerves. Patton considered putting him on several days leave and giving Gaffey temporary command of XII Corps, but he worried taking Eddy out of command would make him more gun-­shy on the battlefield. To buck up Eddy’s spirits, and his corps, Patton ordered five hundred of his replacements in Metz to cut short their training and join Baade’s 35th Division. He then called Gay and ordered him to alert Grow’s 6th Armored to attack the next morning against the Germans defending Saarbrücken, preventing them from attacking Baade.138 The one thing that did cheer Patton was a new weapon of war. He attended a demonstration of the new proximity fuse artillery shell. Instead of detonating on impact, the proximity fuse emitted a radar beam from the shell’s nose toward the ground. Once the beam returned to the shell, it exploded. The beam could be adjusted to different distances from the ground. Patton witnessed shells of various sizes exploding approximately twenty feet above irregular ground. The results were almost perfect. But Patton, despite his elation, ordered the fuses to be kept secret until they could be used at a critical juncture. He would not have long to wait.139 Patton next visited Haislip and found him stymied at the Maginot Line and, according to Patton, “not over-­enthusiastic.” The sudden realization of how hard things had become forced Patton to delay TINK for three days, until December 22. “This is one of those days when every one [sic]

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but me has lost faith,” he wrote Beatrice. “I still have to push them over but it does not seem to bother me.” Having positioned his army for the coming offensive, he also decided to place Millikin’s III Corps directly behind Baade’s 35th Infantry in hopes that it could quickly exploit any breakthrough. “While Millikin is untried in battle,” he admitted to his diary, “he is at least not fatigued.”140 At his Nancy headquarters, Patton joined Weyland for another press conference, this time for reporters attached to Eisenhower’s headquarters. It went very much like the last one, except Weyland took the lead, explaining the principles of air support and using the same examples. He stressed that his fighter pilots did not duel in dogfights with the enemy; instead, their principal job was to strike hostile troops for Patton. Patton then spoke, calling himself “one of the oldest living fighters, also the oldest flyer who hasn’t been killed.” He gave a brief history of air support and its failings, particularly in Sicily. During the initial Sicilian landing, when the Germans counterattacked, he explained, he asked for air support at 8:30 in the morning. It arrived at 1:30 p.m., after the battle was over. Patton blamed not the pilots but the system they were working under, a system that had since been corrected. He talked about how, early in the war, pilots did not know what a tank looked like and tankers did not know what an aircraft looked like. Again, referencing the Mediterranean campaign, he reminisced that he was given Allied aircraft for only two weeks, and the results were ineffective. “That is strictly off the record!” he stressed. He compared early air-­ground coordination to “a Chinaman trying to talk to an American—­we had different kinds of radios and we could not talk to each other. Now we can cuss each other and joke with each other.” When a reporter asked to compare armored attacks with or without air support, Patton did not take the bait. “I can’t make an exact comparison,” he said, then launched into an explanation of destroying the enemy and the need for tanks to keep them on the run, and on the roads, while fighter aircraft strafed. “The air always leaves it’s special calling card of little round holes in the line right across the road—­we leave shell marks.” Infantry, he explained, just could not move as quickly as armor and would afford the enemy time to get off the roads and fight. He admitted that, at present, rain and mud had limited Weyland’s air force and his army’s ability to move quickly. He then ended the press conference with a flourish. After telling the reporters that anything profane or obscene he

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had said was not to be quoted, he told them, “when I was a plebe at West Point, there was a nasty first classman who used to say, ‘Is there any more milk; thank you, pass some.’ I say, ‘Are there any more questions; thank you, goodbye.”141 For the last three months, whatever the setbacks or lack of stunning breakthroughs, Patton had kept his army engaged and had thrown the enemy back from the Moselle, Seille, and Saar Rivers. He had deprived the German war economy of the factories, rolling mills, and coal mines on the German border.142 He had captured every major city along the Saar River, save Saarbrücken (it would not be until March of 1945 that elements of Patch’s Army finally took the city). Patton’s troops had battered and bruised the Germans so badly that on December 16, German general Erich Petersen, a corps commander facing Patton, warned his superiors that he would not be able to check any attempted breakthrough by Third Army forces. The Germans had been gutted. Strategically, Patton had weakened and delayed many German units scheduled to attack through the Ardennes.143 Although Patton had advanced his army sixty miles, he could not be happy about his prospects. He had failed to achieve the breakthrough he expected from his army’s capture of Metz and the following campaign to the Saar. His troops were exhausted and suffering from the elements almost more than from the enemy. Heavy clouds and constant rain made life uncomfortable for his men and prevented one of his best assets—­air cover—­from blanketing the battlefield. While Eddy’s troops were making mile-­a-­day progress, Walker’s troops remained bogged down in house-­ to-­house fighting in Saarlautern and Dillingen. Patton’s planned-­for attack, which he hoped would deliver the needed breakthrough, had to be postponed. On top of that, his corps commanders, whom he relied on to turn his ideas into action, were suffering signs of burnout. All this weighed on Patton when his phone rang. It was Major General Leven Allen, Bradley’s chief of staff, telling him to give Morris’s 10th Armored to First Army. The Germans had launched a major attack in Hodges’s area.144

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At 5:50 in the morning on December 16, 1944, two American soldiers sitting atop a water tower in the village of Hosingen, Luxembourg, watched as the eastern horizon illuminated with hundreds of lights. One of the men picked up his field telephone to report the phenomenon when enemy artillery began exploding around them. All along Hodges’s First Army zone, German artillery blasted front line units. American soldiers could see enemy tanks and self-­propelled guns silhouetted by the artillery flashes. Soon, German infantry and tanks smashed into the Americans. Most American units pulled back, but here and there, platoons, companies, and battalions stood and fought, like surfaced stones in a swift flowing river.1 The attack marked the commencement of Hitler’s last major gamble in the West. He called it his WACHT AM RHINE (WATCH ON THE RHINE—­a defensive-­sounding operation)—­and later Operation HERBSTNEBEL (AUTUMN MIST), an armored blitz on both Belgium’s Eifel region and the Ardennes Forest, which stretched between Belgium and Luxembourg. The Germans would drive 130 miles northwest, crossing the Meuse River that separated France from Belgium and capturing the recently opened port city of Antwerp. But Hitler had bigger plans. He foresaw driving a wedge between the American and British armies, leaving them reeling as his forces raced to the coast in a repeat of his 1940 victory. With the Western Allies either surrendering or banished from the Continent, he could turn the might of Germany’s forces against the Red Army in the East and crush Joseph Stalin’s Soviet Union. Hitler predicted the campaign would result in “another Dunkirk.”2 Hitler had assembled twenty-­five divisions, twenty of which were committed to the attack. All together he had amassed more than two 275

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hundred thousand troops.3 Organized in three armies, they comprised the Sixth SS Panzer Army under SS General Joseph “Sepp” Dietrich, the Fifth Panzer Army under General Hasso von Manteuffel, and the Seventh Army under General Erich Brandenberger. All three armies would smash into Hodges’s First Army. Dietrich’s Sixth SS Panzer Army would strike Major General Gerow’s V Corps, consisting of Major General Walter Robinson’s 2nd Division and Major General Walter Lauer’s 99th Division. Both von Manteuffel’s and Brandenberger’s armies would strike Middleton’s VIII Corps, consisting of Major General Allen Jones’s 106th Division, Major General Norm Cota’s 28th Division, Major General Raymond O. Barton’s 4th Division, and elements of Major General John W. Leonard’s 9th Armored. Once through the American lines in the Eifel region, Dietrich would drive northeast for Antwerp, with von Manteuffel and Brandenberger protecting his left flank.4 To help ensure success, the Germans planned two special operations, GRIEF and STÖSSER, to confuse and destabilize the Americans. GRIEF consisted of two groups of Major Otto Skorzeny’s English-­speaking SS commandos, wearing captured American uniforms, and driving captured American vehicles. One group would dash ahead of Dietrich’s army and secure bridges over the Meuse River. The other would roam behind American lines, cutting communications wires, switching signposts, radioing information to German units, and sowing general confusion. Operation STÖSSER would be a nighttime airborne drop under Lieutenant Colonel Fredrich Freiherr von der Heydte, in which paratroopers, touching down in the Ardennes woods, would capture road junctions and intact bridges.5 Finally, to keep the operation under wraps from the Allies, only select German officers were shown the operational plans of HERBSTNEBEL. They had to sign oaths of secrecy on penalty of death. Orders were transmitted via couriers instead of radios, telephones, or teletype machines, hiding the entire operation from ULTRA. To prevent the capture of German troops, no forward reconnaissance of American territory was allowed. Assembled equipment was extensively camouflaged and restrictions were put on noise and light. Fake radio traffic and troop movements hinted that Dietrich’s army was amassing in Cologne, sixty miles northwest of the Belgian broader. Luftwaffe aircraft traversed the front to provide noise cover for tanks and trucks. To prevent desertions to the American line, soldiers from Luxembourg or France’s Alsace and Lorraine regions were combed out of frontline units.6

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While the Germans planned the offensive, they focused their concerns not on Hodges, against whom their counteroffensive was planned, but there was only one general they really worried about: Patton. General Brandenberger would be advancing on the left flank of Manteuffel’s Fifth Panzer Army, thus the army commander closest to Patton. His mission was to destroy Patton’s artillery and protect Manteuffel from a Patton counterattack. Brandenberger had studied Patton, both his fighting style and his army’s abilities, and concluded that the American general would counterattack far quicker than the German brain trust expected.7 Brandenberger told his other two army commanders at a November 3 planning conference, “I don’t think we need anticipate a strong reaction coming from the north, or the east bank of the Meuse, but I am rather worried by the possibility of a strong enemy counterattack from the south,” and there was only one enemy army south of the Brandenberger. When General Alfred Jodl, the operations chief for the German army high command, encouraged Brandenberger by reminding him that he would have six infantry and one armored division to defend against Patton, Manteuffel chimed in with, “Yes, I know, but I have to anticipate strong enemy forces—­maybe even the bulk of his [Patton’s] forces—­in action in the Bastogne area by the evening of the third day of our attack.”8 (Manteuffel was a week off in his prediction). Brandenberger agreed. He later wrote, “The fact that these forces would probably be commanded by General Patton (who, in the Battle of France, had given proof of his extraordinary skill in armored warfare, which he conducted according to the fundamental German conception) made it quite likely that the enemy would direct a heavy punch against the deep flank of the German forces scheduled to be in the vicinity of Bastogne.” Unfortunately for Brandenberger, he would be deprived of the panzer division promised to him during the Ardennes Offensive.9 Patton has long been credited with predicting the German counteroffensive. He did not. Most of this speculation is drawn from his November 25 diary entry: “The First Army is making a terrible mistake in leaving the VIII Corps static, as it is highly probable that the Germans are building up east of them.” The sentence includes a footnote stating, “It was opposite VIII Corps that Von Rundstedt broke through 21 days later,” just in case future researchers did not get the hint. Yet, that sentence only appears in Patton’s transcribed diary, which was dictated by his wife Beatrice to a stenographer who typed the pages and completed it in 1953, well after the war. The damning sentence does not appear in Patton’s

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MAP 9. The German Counterattack, December 16–18, 1944.

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original, handwritten diary.10 The latter does contain a similar sentence written on December 27, the day after Patton relieved Bastogne. It reads, “Of course Bradley made a bad mistake in being passive on the front of the VIII Corps.”11 Beatrice had removed the sentence from December and advanced it to November, making her husband seem clairvoyant. Almost every book on the Battle of the Bulge or biography of Patton written after 1953 contains the prediction about Middleton’s corps, yet Patton never wrote it. Beatrice created it seven years after his death to add to the Patton myth, promoting him from military genius to prophet. Throughout late November, Patton believed the Germans were incapable of any kind of major action, freeing him up to focus on Operation TINK. On November 28 he concluded a letter to his wife writing, “Something may happen before Friday.” While this might also seem like a prediction of the Bulge, the Friday he referred to was December 1, 1944, the proposed kickoff date for TINK, before it was postponed.12 On December 9, a week before the German offensive, he wrote Bradley that “we must continue the fight until they break, which I am convinced will occur reasonably soon,” adding, “The caliber of their troops is getting worse every day,” not realizing the Germans were saving their best troops for the main effort up north, only a week away.13 That same day at his press conference, a reporter asked Patton if the Germans were going to “make another big tank effort.” Patton said no. “I personally don’t think that they will. I have been thinking that for a long time.” When another reporter asked if the Germans would make a major effort, Patton responded, “They will make a major defensive effort but not a major offensive effort.”14 Patton was convinced the Germans were too spent for offensive action. Colonel Koch, Patton’s intelligence officer, suspected the Germans were up to something, but he could not figure out what. Much like his intelligence counterparts in Hodges’s, Bradley’s, and Eisenhower’s headquarters, Koch traced the buildup of German forces throughout November. He had requested reconnaissance flights from Weyland’s pilots, starting on November 17, covering ground in front of both Patton and Hodges. Koch claimed to have done it because Weyland’s fliers were “in a location which permitted more extensive flying” than Hodges’s airmen. He wrote nothing about suspecting a counteroffensive. Flights over the German lines proved difficult due to heavy fog, but the few times planes did get aloft, flying at treetop level, they reported heavy concentrations of enemy

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artillery but no tanks. By December 2 the flights suggested “a definite buildup of enemy troops and supplies directly opposite the northern flank of Third U.S. Army and the southern flank of First U.S. Army.” But Koch did not speculate on what the buildup might be used for.15 On December 10 Koch and Allen conducted a special estimate of the enemy facing Middleton’s VIII Corps and the northern part of Third Army. They found the equivalent of seven enemy infantry divisions and two armored divisions either on the line or in reserve, and speculated the Germans might be planning a spoiling attack to slow or stop Third Army. No mention was made about a possible attack further north on Middleton. Patton listened to Koch’s report and asked a number of questions about the mysterious buildup. When the report was over, he stood up and, knowing he was about to launch a major offensive of his own, said, “We will be in a position to meet whatever happens.”16 The next day he told Walker about the enemy buildup; Walker, in turn, worried the Germans would hit his corps with that powerful force once he broke through the Siegfried Line. Patton brought Walker’s concerns to his intelligence staff. They studied the bridges near Middleton’s corps and deduced, “They have that capability.”17 Still, neither Koch nor anyone on Patton’s intelligence staff foresaw the Ardennes Offensive. While historians have focused on Koch’s examination of troop buildups, his assessment of enemy capabilities (a summation at the end of each daily intelligence report) were Patton’s only real concern, and every one of Koch’s daily G-­2 Periodic Reports from December 1 through to and including December 16 contained the same four-­point assessment of enemy capabilities: 1. The enemy is capable of defending and delaying from separated positions in an effort to block our advances and attacks on the SIEGFRIED Line. 2. The enemy is capable of counterattacking locally with Inf and Armor, particularly against our main efforts, in an effort to contain those advances and to continue to resist our assault on the fortifications of the SIEGFRIED Line. 3. The enemy is capable of a general withdrawal onto the SIEGFRIED Line. 4. The enemy is capable at any time of reinforcing against any section of our zone of advance with the equivalent of one Inf and/or one Pz [Panzer] division.

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No mention was made of a major attack, and certainly not on the scale of the three-­army offensive on the horizon. The capabilities assessments, in fact, became so repetitive that the staff would sometimes write entries like the one they wrote on December 16, the day of the German attack: “No change. See Third US Army G-­2 Periodic Report no. 186, 14 Dec 44.”18 The December 14 report contained the same four points. If Koch predicted an enemy offensive, he did not write it down in his daily reports. Two days after Koch’s intelligence estimate, on December 12, an ULTRA intercept revealed that the German 11th Panzer Division had been transferred from Italy to the concentration area (odd, since this division had fought in the battles of Grémecey Forest and Arracourt in September and October). Patton suspected the Germans were preparing to attack Colonel Polk’s 3rd Cavalry Group, east of Luxembourg. He notified Polk, who sent out a patrol that returned with a prisoner from the 11th Panzer. There was little else Polk could do. His regiment was stretched so thin that his cooks were pulling guard duty and his reserve consisted of six troopers.19 The revelation prompted Patton to write in his diary that night: “Decided to put the 6 AD [Grow] and 26 [Paul] in III Corps [Millikin] at least for the present. If the enemy attacks VIII Corps [Middleton,] 1st Army I can use III Corps to help.” Although this is the first evidence that Patton at least considered an attack on Middleton, he worried more that the enemy attack was aimed at his own grand offensive, writing in his next sentence, “If Walker gets jumped from his left after he breaks through[,] he can left face and III Corps can carry out the attack.”20 Reinforcing his focus on TINK, he wrote Beatrice the next day that “there is something in the ‘air’ which you will hear of long before you get this.”21 The quotes around “air” hinted at TINK’s three-­day air bombardment. Another piece of Patton lore holds that he held off moving his headquarters from Nancy seventy-­five miles northeast to Saint-­Avold on November 24 because his sixth sense about war “warned him against going to Saint-­Avold,” implying that he knew something was afoot and that moving to Saint-­Avold would interfere with his ability to deal with the Ardennes Offensive. This ignores the fact the Germans still held the town and that Patton openly admitted there was not enough communications wire for the move.22 Something besides intuition guided Patton’s hesitations. Throughout the Metz and Saar campaigns, the Germans constantly left behind time-­ delayed bombs in the cities and towns they surrendered to Third Army,

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making occupation unsafe. The delayed fuses, which could be set as long as twenty-­one days in advance, could demolish an entire house. In early December, Charles Codman drove to Saint-­Avold looking for a place to set up headquarters for his boss. Yet, Codman worried about the move, writing his wife on December 15, “One of the several depressing features of Saint-­Avold is the large number of timebombs left by the departing Germans.” One building that had been picked for Patton’s headquarters exploded. Codman and another staffer arrived in time to see it collapse off a hillside. “Well,” the staffer told Codman, “at least there is another house we won’t have to bother to look at.”23 Hap Gay reinforced Codman’s experience, reporting on December 9 that five delayed-­fuse bombs had gone off in one week in Saint-­Avold, killing twenty-­two Americans and wounding sixteen.24 The move would have made little difference. On December 20 Patton moved his headquarters to Luxembourg City to attack toward Bastogne. Finally, if Patton did foresee a German buildup on the horizon, why didn’t he tell anyone, like Hodges, Eisenhower, or Bradley? He communicated with Bradley almost twice daily, and, in fact called him on December 15, at which point Bradley explained that he was going to see Eisenhower, yet Patton said nothing about any suspicions of an enemy attack on Middleton. It was the perfect opportunity to display his battlefield prowess and prevent his bosses from being caught off guard, but no warning came. Bradley later pointed a finger at Patton when he wrote in his memoir, “But if anyone on the western front sniffed in those preparations an intent to mislead us on a German offensive elsewhere, he certainly did not share his suspicions with me.”25 Even when Patton was concerned the Germans might be up to something north of him, he did nothing. At his morning briefing on December 16, Colonel Robert Allen reported that German forces concentrating near Trier had gone radio silent. “What does ‘radio silent’ mean?” Patton asked. Allen admitted he did not know, but that Third Army should attack and find out. Patton pondered Allen’s words for a moment. “I bet you’re right!” he finally declared. “We will have to pull Hodges and Monty out of a hole.” Yet he did nothing. Eddy’s XII Corps pushed east two miles that day.26 Koch’s analysis showed a German buildup, but just like in the case of the intelligence officers in other commands, the clues left most scratching their heads, trying to figure out what the buildup meant. Still, there

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were specific hints of the coming attack. Hitler had actually planned for his offensive to take place before the end of November, but shortages and Allied offensives forced him to pull the launch date back to December 16. Major General Kenneth Strong, Eisenhower’s intelligence officer, had deciphered a transmission in September from Japan’s ambassador to Berlin indicating that the Germans planned to attack sometime “after the beginning of November.” And while Hitler’s tight lid on communications mostly put Allied commanders in the dark, pieces of information did find their way to ULTRA. In November, ULTRA picked up on a buildup of Luftwaffe aircraft on the front. Troop movements and buildups were also taking place in Koblenz, Prüm, Germünd, Münstrereifel, Gerolstein, and Trier, and German commanders requested air cover over those cities. But Allied commanders dismissed them as defensive measures to counter the Allied attack along the Roer River, near Cologne, well north of the Ardennes. A German request for aerial reconnaissance of the Meuse River bridges along a forty-­mile stretch between Namur and Liege also did not raise any concerns.27 Other sources intercepted information on AUTUMN MIST. In early December, Lieutenant Ray Walker, commanding the direction-­finding section of Hodges’s Radio Intelligence Company that monitored German radio communications, informed SHAEF that four or five panzer (armored) units had moved into the area. Also, a traffic monitoring unit with Gerow’s V Corps identified several units of the Sixth Panzer Army that were supposed to be on the Russian front or in reserve between December 9 and 14. The lieutenant in charge of the unit, however, refused to report the findings out of fear of embarrassing the unit with such an outlandish statement.28 Up and down the chain of command, the American generals wrestled with the idea of a German offensive. In late October, Eisenhower had warned Captain Harry Butcher that the Germans might launch a counterattack on Spa, Belgium, and that with the Ardennes lightly defended, the Germans could “swing a push through that sector if they chose.”29 On December 10, as he drove through the Ardennes Forest on his way to meet with Montgomery, Eisenhower remarked that the Germans could have themselves “a nasty little Kasserine.” Hodges became concerned enough to ask Bradley for two divisions to reinforce the line in the Ardennes, but Bradley had none to spare. He did at least provide Middleton with Major General John Leonard’s 9th Armored Division.

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Upon learning that Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt had taken command of the German western theater on October 27, Bradley’s intelligence officer, Major General Edwin Sibret, believed “that if given enough time, until 1 December, for instance, the Germans might be able to organize a sufficiently strong mobile force to stalemate this western front for the winter.”30 Bradley himself thought an attack through the Ardennes only a “remote possibility” and later admitted that keeping Middleton’s corps stretched thin was a “calculated risk,” although in early December he assured General Strong that he had “earmarked certain divisions to move into the Ardennes should the enemy attack there.” If he did, he never acted on it.31 The one person who truly saw AUTUMN MIST coming was not anyone on Patton’s staff, but Hodges’s chief of intelligence Colonel Benjamin “Monk” Dickson, who, over the preceding weeks, saw more and more ominous signs of the attack to come. On December 5 he reported to Hodges that “there are a thousand and one indications that the Boche has moved Fifteenth Army and most of the divisions therein from HOLLAND where they opposed a crossing.32 The next day, he presented Hodges with four options for the enemy. The first two mentioned the enemy running out of supplies and weapons, but option three suggested the Germans were shifting their focus of attack, while four declared, “He is building up gigantic reserve to let loose at one time.” When Hodges heard option four, he favored it.33 Then, on December 8, after intensely studying German troop and tank movements, Dickson presented Hodges a map showing enemy troop concentrations near railheads or rail junctions. Dickson wanted them bombed and Hodges agreed, sending a request to Spaatz. But Spaatz denied the request, calling the troop concentrations “targets unremunerative [not worth the effort].” But Dickson wasn’t done. Two days later he issued an intelligence estimate, in which he warned of an “all-­out counteroffensive,” but he had it placed in Montgomery’s area of operations. When his estimate was ignored, he attended Hodges’s briefing on December 14—­two days before the attack—­where he slapped his hand on the wall map and declared, “It’s the Ardennes!” His reports made it to Bradley’s and Eisenhower’s intelligence officers, where they were either ignored or met with derision. Dickson was labeled an alarmist.34 In short, all the American commanders suffered collective hubris when it came to the Battle of the Bulge. After their stunning success in

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August when the German army seemed to about crumble, followed by the tough bloodletting along the German border throughout September, October and November, everyone thought Nazi Germany was at an end. The war might not be over by Christmas, but the end was right around the corner. One last kick and the German house of cards would surely fall. The idea that the Germans could muster their forces to launch a major counteroffensive was beyond anyone’s imagination. Patton was not immune from this mindset. Still, while Patton may not have predicted the Bulge, his greatest contribution to defeating the Ardennes Offensive came with his Metz and Saar campaigns. By continuously pushing east and threatening the southern wing of the German offensive, von Rundstedt had to commit forces to stop, if not slow, Patton. Patton’s old maxim of pushing forward and not worrying about his flanks in order to keep the enemy off balance had proven its worth once again. The sheer force of his attacks drained AUTUMN MIST of its strength, condemning it to eventual failure.35 When Hitler launched his attack on December 16, only Eisenhower understood its enormity. He called a 2:00 p.m. meeting at his Versailles headquarters with Bradley, Beetle Smith, Spaatz, Air Marshal Tedder, and Strong, who reported that the Germans were attacking on a large front in the Ardennes. Bradley identified it as a spoiling attack to distract Patton’s Saar campaign, but Eisenhower was not having any of it. “That’s no spoiling attack,” he countered and began studying his battle maps. He had only two divisions in reserve and two uncommitted. The two reserve divisions were airborne, the 82nd and 101st, still recovering from operations in Holland. Eisenhower put them both on alert. The two uncommitted divisions were the 7th Armored in Simpson’s Army, and the 10th with Patton. He ordered them committed to Hodges. When Bradley objected, warning that Patton would be none too pleased to lose Morris’s tanks, Eisenhower snapped, “Tell him Ike’s running the damn war!36 After Patton took the call from Allen that day, telling him about sending Morris’s 10th Armored north, he immediately called Bradley to complain. He explained that his army had “paid a very high price in blood” in hopes of cracking the Siegfried Lines, and once it was achieved, “we will need the 10th Armored.” Patton argued that the attack was nothing major: “Hell, it’s probably mothing more than a spoiling attack to throw us off balance down here and make us stop this offensive.” But Bradley

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wouldn’t budge, saying, “I hate like hell to do it, George, but I have to have that division. Even if it’s only a spoiling attack as you say, Middleton must have help.”37 After the call, Patton took to his diary, complaining that moving Morris would play into the Germans’ hands, and that Bradley had taken counsel of his fears: “I wish he were less timid.” Patton did admit, however, that Bradley “knows more of the situation than he can say over the telephone.” During the conversation, Patton must have reflected on his morning briefing and the report of radio silence, for when he hung up, he told Codman, “I guess they are having trouble up there. I thought they would.”38 Patton then called Walker. He explained that Middleton was in trouble and that Bradley ordered Morris’s 10th Armored sent north. Worried that Middleton had simply been “unduly perturbed” by a local enemy attack and thinking that he might be able retain the 10th Armored, Patton told Walker to call Middleton to see if the situation was as bad as Bradley had made out. Patton hung up and Walker called a little later to explain that the situation was actually worse than Bradley had led on. Patton ordered Walker to send Morris north immediately. By now, only Colonel Maddox, Patton’s operations officer, saw the German offensive as an opportunity. With the Germans using all their reserves, he told his boss, there would be nothing in front of Third Army to stop Operation TINK, resulting in two major offensives in opposite directions—­one on top the other. “You’re right,” said Patton, “that would be the way to do it. But that isn’t the way the gentlemen up north fight. My guess is that our offensive will be called off and we’ll have to go up there and save their hides.”39 The next morning, December 17, as reports of the German offensive poured into Third Army headquarters, Patton could still not believe this was a major counteroffensive. He instead worried it was just part of a bigger attack aimed at him. At his morning briefing, his intelligence staffers pointed out that the Germans were moving additional units in front of Walker’s XX Corps. Patton was unsure if the Germans were attacking Hodges or himself. “One of these is a feint,” he told his staff. “If they attack us, I’m ready for them, but I am inclined to think the party will be up north. VIII has been sitting still—­a sure invitation to trouble.” He concluded by explaining that “[the] plans we have been working on may change, but whatever happens, we’ll keep going right along as we have always done, killing Germans wherever we can find them.”40 Patton did

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not mention his “up north” idea in his diary, only that the movement in front of Walker might be a trick. “This may be a feint, or the attack on the front of the VIII Corps and an attack on us.” Still, he blamed Hodges for the mess up north, which threatened his own plans. “Had the V [Gerow] and VIII [Middleton] corps been more aggressive the Germans could not have prepared this attack. One must never sit.”41

Figure 37. Major General Troy Middleton greets Eisenhower in Saint Vith, Belgium, during Eisenhower’s tour of the front on November 9, 1944. Prior to the Battle of the Bulge, Middleton worried he did not have enough troops for his front, prompting General Bradley to send him the 9th Armored Division. Six days before the Bulge, Eisenhower considered the Ardennes area another possible Kasserine Pass, where the Germans had mauled the American II Corps in Tunisia in 1943. Catalog number: 111-­ SC 232855, National Archives and Records Administration.

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Patton’s opinions of Gerow and Middleton were harsh. In fact, on December 1, Hodges’s staff accused Montgomery’s troops of doing the same: “Second British Army is standing still,” Hodges’s operations officer wrote in the army’s log book. Two weeks before the Bulge, a German commentator remarked that First Army was far more aggressive than the Ninth. Also, in the days leading up to AUTUMN MIST, Gerow had been on the attack. He kicked off on December 7, then made another lunge six days later. While he made some progress, he was eventually stopped cold by the Germans. Middleton was static, but for good reason. Of his four divisions, two were green and had just entered the line days before the attack. The other two were veteran divisions that had been mauled in the Hürtgen Forest. Both Gerow and Middleton’s corps had spent December 15, the day before the German attack, fighting through pillboxes, fortified positions, concertina wire, and mine fields.42 After the morning briefing, Patton, still unsure of the Germans’ intentions, worried that the only place he was weak was in front of Polk’s Cavalry Group, so he called Walker and ordered him to reconnoiter German positions and routes in that area.43 Having addressed the problem to the north, Patton returned to his own offensive east. Millikin came in to discuss his corps’ role in the coming attack. He now commanded Paul’s 26th, Baade’s 35th, and Grow’s 6th Armored. For TINK, Patton wanted Millikin to attack on Eddy’s right, while he placed the newly arrived 42nd Division in reserve in Saint-­Avold until it was considered ready for combat. To help bolster Millikin, Patton gave Paul’s division two thousand replacements and Grow’s division four hundred. Patton told Millikin he was responsible for the replacement training, which should consist exclusively of rifle practice. If Millikin needed it, he could take a training cadre from Twaddle’s 95th Infantry. All the plans they made were tentative. Patton still worried about Millikin’s lack of experience but felt confident that he was fresh and ambitious, unlike his other two burned-­out corps commanders.44 Still, Patton did not entirely ignore the problems up north. With reconnaissance aircraft grounded from fog, he asked Captain Edward L. Bishop, a P-­51 Mustang pilot, to fly over Luxembourg for an eyewitness report on what was going on. Bishop flew north and dipped under the clouds long enough to see large German units pushing west while scattered American units fought in surrounded villages. The fighting was like nothing the pilot had ever seen and it scared him. His mission complete,

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he turned south, landed back in Nancy, and reported to Patton what he had seen.45 Yet, even with this stark evidence, on the second day of the Battle of the Bulge, Patton did nothing to help and in fact, he turned his divisions away from the Ardennes, not toward it. Bradley called again and told Patton he might be taking away another two divisions and would have a better idea in forty-­eight hours. Instead of putting his divisions on alert, Patton called Eddy and ordered him to send Gaffey’s 4th Armored into combat, “so no one can steal it.” He later admitted that moving the 4th Armored showed “how little I appreciated the seriousness of the enemy attack on that date.” He did the same thing with Grow’s 6th Armored, ordering it to relieve pressure on the Baade’s 35th Division. But as Grow’s tankers revved up their engines, Patton finally changed his mind and cancelled it. He still insisted that one of Twaddle’s regiments continue to fight for a bridgehead at Ensdorf, five miles south of Dillingen. None of these moves helped the soldiers fighting desperately in the north and probably hampered them.46 That night, Patton took a call from Pink Bull who asked about pulling back to let the Germans stretch themselves out. “Christ!” Patton said into the phone, “Let them come on.”47 While Patton tried to figure out the magnitude and direction of the German offensive, Eisenhower released Major General James Gavin’s 82nd and Major General Maxwell Taylor’s 101st Airborne divisions from SHAEF reserve and gave them to Bradley to meet the enemy advance.48 But with Taylor back in the United States to defend airborne units to a doubtful Congress, Brigadier General Anthony McAuliffe, the division’s artillery officer, took over command of the 101st. On the battlefront, Hodges’s two corps, Gerow’s V and Middleton’s VIII, resisted the German onslaught. Both of Gerow’s two divisions lost ground but pulled back in good order. Robertson’s veteran 2nd Division pulled back to the twin villages of Krinkelt-­Rocherath, while Lauer’s 99th Division, after holding up a German division with a single platoon for an entire day, also pulled back. South of Gerow, the Germans were burrowing into Middleton’s corps. By that evening, two regiments of Jones’s 106th Division were surrounded while Cota’s 28th Division clung to small towns like Hosingen, Manarch, and Clervaux but was forced to surrender others after making the Germans pay dearly for their efforts. Further south, German assault regiments crossed the Sauer River on rubber boats and attacked Barton’s 4th Division. After overrunning several outposts, they were stopped by

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Barton’s men defending several towns, including Berdorf, Consdorf, Bettendorf, and Dickweiler. The Germans did manage to encircle the town of Echternach. Middleton sent two combat commands of Morris’s recently released 10th Armored to aid Barton in a counterattack.49 The next morning, December 18, Bradley called, asking Patton to bring his intelligence, operations, and logistics officers with him to Luxembourg for a conference that he warned Patton he would not like.50 For two days, things had been chaotic for Hodges’s army. If Bradley was calling an all-­hands meeting with Patton’s main staff, things had to be going badly and Third Army was about to be sucked into it. As a precaution, Patton called off an attack by Culin’s 87th Division.51 Before he left, Patton wrote his old mentor, retired major general Fox Connor, and after telling him that the Bulge reminded him of Germany’s failed last offensive in World War I, he wrote, “I have always felt that the war will be terminated east of the Rhine, and I am convinced that this attack by the Germans will be very thoroughly smashed, and they will have nothing left.”52 Then he put Jean Gordon into his own aircraft to fly her to Eisenhower’s headquarters in Reims, France, where she would be out of harm’s way. With that, Patton donned a parka coat and headed out for Bradley’s Luxembourg headquarters.53 After Patton departed to learn about the biggest campaign faced by the U.S. Army, Hap Gay received a letter signed by twenty-­three reporters asking to him to relieve Lieutenant Colonel Kent Hunter, Patton’s chief public relations officer. They did not explain why, only that it would be beneficial to both the Third Army and them. Gay wisely kept the letter from Patton. Besides, he had no idea there were tensions between Hunter and the press. Beetle Smith, who also received a copy of the letter, stepped in and sent an officer to Nancy to smooth over the problem, allowing Patton to focus on the battle at hand.54 After an hour-­long drive, Patton arrived at one o’clock at Bradley’s forward headquarters in a five-­story-­tall government building on Liberation Avenue across from the Place de Metz railway station in Luxembourg City. He was escorted into Bradley’s main office. Bradley looked exhausted. He had laid awake the night before, trying to figure out the German attack and, even when he did fall asleep, anti-­aircraft fire woke him. He incorrectly believed the attack had been the brainchild of Field Marshal von Rundstedt, not Adolf Hitler, and credited Patton’s Metz and Saar campaigns for forcing von Rundstedt into this desperate maneuver. “He

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[von Rundstedt] is getting worried about Third [Army],” Bradley told his aide, Captain Chet Hanson, “which is now up against the [Siegfried] wall and threatening to break through.” As for the ultimate goal of the offensive, Bradley also felt the attack was aimed at industrial city of Liège, Belgium, not Antwerp. When he looked at a map of German progress and strength, he said to Hanson, “Pardon my French—­I think the situation justifies it—­but where in hell has this son-­of-­a-­bitch gotten all his strength?”55 The reports that kept coming in over the last three days had painted a deteriorating situation: The Germans had attacked with fourteen divisions and paratroopers had dropped behind American lines. Bradley’s intelligence estimated the Germans had between 350 and 400 tanks. Enemy tanks were reported in Malmedy. As the armored thrust penetrated deeper into Belgium, Bradley worried about the safety of the civilian population in the face of German retaliation. Fighter aircraft had flown out of Verdun to keep them out of enemy hands and landed at a safer field at Étain, German bombing raids had threatened to cut off Bradley’s north-­south communications, and Middleton had called, warning he might have to pull his headquarters out of Bastogne and move southwest to Arlon. When news arrived that the Germans had gunned down two hundred prisoners (it was actually eighty-­four killed and fifty survivors) at a crossroad in the village of Baugnez—­in what would become known as the Malmedy Massacre—­Bradley’s staff collectively gasped.56 Bradley also worried about a possible second attack further north against Simpson’s Ninth Army, forming a typical German pincers movement that would connect with the present attacking force somewhere near Liège. Yet, Bradley remained focused on the offensive. Major General Barton, commanding the 4th Division, called a day earlier telling Bradley that he was holding the line along Sauer River but desperately needed tanks. “If we don’t get the armor up here quicky, you had better get set to move,” he said. But Bradley refused to pull back. “There is too much at stake,” he snapped. Barton was forced to put cooks, bakers, and clerks into the line.57 Bradley hoped to stop the attack without redeploying too many of Gerow and Middleton’s troops and quickly “slam right back.” He had already started to confine the German attack. In the north, he had sent Major General Leland Hobbs’s 30th Infantry Division to Eupen, Brigadier General Robert Hasbrouck’s 7th Armored to Saint Vith, and Major General Clarence Huebner’s 1st Infantry Division south to back up

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Major General Walter Lauer’s 99th Division. Gavin’s 82nd Airborne was expected south of Spa that evening. In the south, Morris’s 10th Armored had reached Luxembourg, and McAuliffe’s 101st was expected in Saint-­ Hubert (it would eventually make its way to Middleton’s headquarters in Bastogne). Bradley actually thought the German offensive might be a good thing, telling Hanson that von Rundstedt “might break his back on it.” But to do the breaking, he would have to launch a strong counterattack. He was preparing to drive to Hodges’s headquarters in Spa to discuss a counterattack when he changed his mind and ordered Patton to his headquarters.58 Bradley brought Patton and his staff into his private map room, excluding his own staff from the meeting. Once the door closed, he got right to the point: “I fear you won’t like what we are going to do, but I feel it is necessary.” With that, Bradley showed him the situation map. The Germans’ progress shocked Patton. The counteroffensive was larger than anything he had imagined. While the German penetration was not too deep, the map revealed the enormity of the operation: the Germans had attacked on a sixty-­mile-­wide front. Patton knew it spelled the end of his own offensive. Yet, he did not stay stunned for long. Ever the professional soldier, he sized up the situation and saw opportunity. “But what the hell,” he said with a shrug, “we’ll still be killing krauts.”59 After briefing Patton on the situation, Bradley asked, “What are you going to do, George?” Without missing a beat, Patton told him his plan. It boiled down to simple math: “Kill Germans, kill all they will send against us, and then I’ll counterattack and kill the rest of them, chasing them across Germany.”60 Then he went into detail. He would halt Gaffey’s 4th Armored and move it that night to the French town of Longwy, forty miles south of Bastogne. Next, he would send McBride’s 80th Division to Luxembourg City first thing in the morning. As an extra measure, he would put Paul’s 26th Division on twenty-­four alert. Patton’s cascade of ready-­made details satisfied Bradley. As soon as the meeting ended, Patton called Gay back at headquarters and told him, “This is the real thing,” then instructed him to alert Gaffey and McBride for movement and that they would be reporting to Millikin. He also wanted transportation for McBride’s entire division. Gaffey had his own. Finally, he told Gay he would be stopping to see Walker on his way back. “It will probably be late when I get home.”61 Gay hung up and relayed Patton’s instructions to Eddy, but before he could

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make another call, General Maddox, who was with Patton, called and asked if he understood Patton’s orders. Gay repeated everything back verbatim. Then Maddox told him to order Millikin and his staff to Third Army headquarters to spend the night in anticipation for a meeting the next morning. Gay did as ordered, but as soon as he finished his call to Millikin, Bradley called him and asked if he could move one of Gaffey’s combat commands north that night. Gay said he could and that both the 4th Armored and the 80th Division would be ready to move the next morning. Before hanging up, Bradley told Gay to remind Patton to call him when he arrived. Gay then called Gaffey and told him to get one of his combat commands ready to move, hung up, and waited for his boss’s return.62 Bradley walked Patton out to his jeep and told him he wouldn’t commit any more of Third Army than he had to. “I want to save it for a whale of a blow when we hit back—­and we’re going to hit the bastard hard.” Patton smiled and pulled his parka tightly under his chin.63 The meeting both relieved and refreshed Bradley. After Patton roared off, he decided to invite Eisenhower and his staff to his Verdun headquarters to brief him on Patton’s plans. Devers would be invited too. Bradley told his staff that the enemy was desperately afraid of Allied strength and that Patton’s assault to the Saar had “dealt the German a punishing blow and now threaten him with deeper penetrations.” He came back from dinner that night in good spirits, telling Hanson about the German offensive: “I don’t take too serious a view of it—­although the others will not agree with me.” This was a different Bradley from the man who could not sleep the night before, at least until more battlefield reports came in.64 Patton departed Verdun around 3:30 p.m. and drove south to Walker’s headquarters, where Walker reported that Twaddle’s 95th Division had successfully bridged the Saar River south of Saarlautern that morning and that the men reached Ensdorf, where they set up defenses. He added that he had visited Middleton the day before to assess the situation himself and relayed to Patton the bleak circumstances up north. Once briefed, Patton halted Walker’s offensive. He wanted to use Irwin’s 5th Division for his drive north and directed Twaddle’s division to cover Irwin’s place at the front. Further, he wanted Walker to attack north, into the German flank, between Echternach and Luxembourg City. His offensive would not include three divisions but four. Operation TINK would be indefinitely delayed. As Patton departed for Nancy, Walker looked at his new

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assignment as a “big job ahead,” writing his wife that “it looks as if I’m to be given another great opportunity.”65 Patton drove back to his Nancy headquarters in pitch black, pondering the very dangerous front, which, he admitted, “I hate.” He knew he had three uncommitted divisions ready to attack, but where? How would they proceed and who would command them? With Walker and Eddy holding fronts against the Germans, the obvious choice was Millikin, the inexperienced yet fresh corps commander. As for a point of attack, Patton simply did not know where to hit. Bradley’s map gave him some ideas, but he could not settle on one spot. He would have to figure something out. Patton reached his headquarters around 10:00 p.m. and immediately called Bradley. It was not good. “The situation up there is much worse than it was when I talked to you,” Bradley told him. Middleton’s VIII Corps had it especially bad. In Barton’s 4th Division area, the Germans had encircled Echternach, threatening its capture. In Cota’s 28th Division’s area, Clervaux, Hosingen, and Consthum had fallen and Cota’s headquarters in Wiltz was under artillery fire. But the German victories had come at a cost. In Hosingen alone, the Americans lost seven killed and twelve wounded compared to three hundred Germans dead. Further north, Colonel Joseph Gilbreth’s Combat Command Reserve (CCR) from the 9th Armored arrived in Longville, a scant six miles northeast of Bastogne. Gilbreath split his command into two task forces—­Rose and Harper—­and sent them northeast to defend the main road leading to Bastogne. The Germans shattered Rose and overwhelmed Harper as they pressed on Longville. On the positive side, Colonel William Roberts’s CCB from the 10th Armored had arrived in Bastogne, where he split his command into three teams—­Team Desobry, Team Cherry, and Team O’Hare (each named for their commander). Roberts sent Team Desobry to Noville, three miles north of Bastogne, Team Cherry to Longville, and Team O’Hare to Wardin, three miles southeast of Bastogne. Also, McAuliffe’s 101st Airborne arrived outside Bastogne to bivouac. The paratroopers would move in at daylight.66 Bradley listed his orders to Patton. He wanted Gaffey and McBride to move immediately to Longwy, Millikin to report to Lev Allen, and, most importantly, Patton and his staff were to report to Bradley’s Verdun headquarters at 11:00 a.m. for a meeting with Eisenhower. “I understand

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from General Eisenhower,” Bradley concluded, “that you are to take over [Middleton’s] VIII Corps as well as the offensive to be launched by the new troops coming into the area.”67 While Patton spoke to Bradley, Gay met with Millikin and his staff to provide what information he knew so the staffs could figure out the routes Gaffey and McBride would take to Longwy, including Brigadier General Holmes Dager’s CCB from Gaffey’s 4th Armored, which headed out at midnight as per Bradley’s special request. Patton hung up the phone and ordered a 7:30 a.m. meeting for the entire general staff, as well as Weyland’s and Eddy’s staffs. Patton could have ordered the meeting for that night but he wanted his staff well rested. The days ahead would not allow much sleep.68 Patton’s meeting with Bradley put a definite end to Operation TINK. Patton and Gay agreed the German’s Ardennes Offensive was just an attempt to distract from his and Hodges’s own offensives. “It appears that they are being hurt by these attacks,” Gay wrote, “and they are afraid we will make a breakthrough unless a diversion is made.” Gay then suggested to Patton that they let the Germans penetrate some fifty miles and then cut them off from the rear, “which in my opinion would end the war.” Patton did not react, but he made a mental note of the suggestion. Gay added that the entire offensive was Hitler’s last desperate lunge to win the war. “It is my opinion that if this thrust is not only stopped, but destroyed, it will end the war for Germany.”69 Before he went to bed, Patton, not knowing that Gay had already spoken to Gaffey, called the 4th Armored commander around midnight and ordered him to move to Arlon at once.70 Gaffey never mentioned that he was sending his Dager’s CCB north to Bastogne. Since the request came from Gay he assumed the order came from Patton, not realizing it really came from a worried Bradley. On the morning of December 19, Patton prepared for Walker’s XX Corps to go on the defensive. He ordered Van Fleet to pull out of Dillingen and create a defensive front on the west bank of the Saar. Since the Germans had knocked out the bridge, it took the men of the 90th three days to complete the maneuver. One of the division’s battalion staffers wrote in a unit log, “This is the first time this Battalion ever gave ground and even though it was a strategic retreat rather than tactical, it still hurt.”71 After making the XX Corps arrangements, Patton attended his 7:30 a.m. meeting with his staff, Eddy and Millikin, and their collective staffs.

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He christened the meeting with a rousing, yet serious and professional speech equal to the moment: Third Army has a chance to go down in history as the greatest Army of this war. We are going to attack the enemy on his exposed flank and end the war this side of the Siegfried Line. That is going to kill the Germans coming at us, instead of going after the bastards holed up in bunkers and pillboxes. Again, [I] want to caution you about getting excited. Excitement is a highly contagious disease that spreads with rapacious virulence. [We] must remain cool, calm, and collected, because if we don’t, it spreads to others below. [The] attitude of [an] Army Hq makes itself felt very quickly to those below it. Friends up north have their wind up and we don’t want any of that. We can do this because you have always done it better. Third Army is what it is because you have always done the impossible as of yesterday. We are going to do it again. Sorry, ‘[the] big air show is apparently off, but we will kill Germans up north instead of down here. There will be no prisoners taken from [the] SS.”72 He then explained the change of plans and told them Third Army would be making rapid movements. He also stressed that the situation was serious but not alarming. He reviewed the German breakthrough; the fragmenting of Alan’s 106th Division and the mauling of Cota’s 28th Division; and that both Hodges’s First Army and Middleton’s VIII Corps headquarters had abandoned their positions and no one knew where they were. Actually, Middleton had not yet departed Bastogne and was waiting on McAuliffe’s paratroopers, while Hodges, who was suffering from a case of either the flu or pneumonia so severe that he could barely keep his head up at his desk, had moved his headquarters from Spa to Chaudfontaine, eleven miles northwest.73 After telling them about Bradley’s order to turn three of his divisions north, Patton explained his plans by making a rough draft map.74 He began by saying that Middleton’s VIII Corps would come under Third Army command and then explained how he intended to reach him: both Paul’s 26th and McBride’s 80th Divisions would head west to Metz, while Gaffey’s 4th Armored would head west to Pont-­à-­Mousson. All three divisions would then head north to Longwy, where Millikin would decide the direction of their attack. Eddy’s XII Corps, fighting in the

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south, would have to swing north and take over Third Army’s eastern front. In addition, Irwin’s 5th Division and Grow’s 6th Armored would head west to Thionville and Metz, respectively, and then head north to Luxembourg City. To cover the corps-­sized gap, Patch’s Seventh Army would stretch itself to cover Third Army’s southern sector. Both Longwy and Luxembourg City provided the best roads to continue north into the Bulge. Walker’s XX Corps, which would change from Patton’s northernmost corps to his southernmost, would be left out of the drive and would instead hold Patton’s southern flank.75 Walker, who thought he was getting the most important role of the campaign, had been relegated to placeholder. Patton also stressed that Eisenhower had told Bradley, “I want to put as many troops as possible under Patton.”76 For the main thrust into the Bulge, Patton wanted three axes of attack, each with a well-coined code name. “Cent” called for an attack north through Diekirch, cutting the Bulge at its base. “Nickel” called for an attack from Arlon, thirteen miles north of Longwy to Bastogne. “Dime” called for an attack against the tip of the Bulge, wherever that might be. Patton jotted the three codes down on a piece of paper and handed it to Gay. Once he knew what Eisenhower and Bradley wanted him to do, he would simply call Gay and give him the chosen code word. He preferred Cent, cutting the Bulge off it its base, but told the staff to get cracking on all three contingencies.77 He considered his plan inspired but warned the staff, “Only they [SHAEF] don’t think that way up there. [They’re] not made that way.”78 Patton turned to Colonel Karl R. Bendetsen, Bradley’s chief combat liaison officer, whom Bradley had sent down to assist with any materiel Patton needed. “Bendetsen, there’s something you can do for me and I believe you can do it if you really want to.” When the colonel readily agreed, Patton told him, “I need a freight train.” He wanted his own train to guarantee Third Army got the supplies it needed for the coming offensive. He complimented Bendetsen for his knowledge of all the supply depots scattered around France and his ability to come up with equipment that did not seem available. “I do not know if there are any freight trains immediately available; nevertheless, I want one and I call upon you to provide it by all means, fair or foul.” Bendetsen would work his magic and made sure Patton had his train.79 Eddy spoke up, requesting that Patton relieve General Culin from command of the 87th Division and replace him with Brigadier General John

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Lentz, his corps artillery commander. Trench foot had become rampant among his frontline infantrymen despite repeated orders to address it to his NCOs. Eddy knew how seriously Patton took trench foot prevention and that it would be easy to get Patton’s approval.80 Patton hesitated—­he had a lot on his mind—­but decided, under the circumstances, to leave it up to Eddy since he was responsible for his own corps. Gay quickly typed up the relief order, making it effective immediately, but Eddy begged off, asking Gay to hold on to it for a day.81 Another officer requested they use the new proximity-­fuse artillery rounds, and Patton approved.82 He then rose from his seat and announced, “This will get the bastards out of their holes so we can kill all of ’em—­now go to work.”83 A correspondent in the room asked Patton about meeting the enemy attack. Without missing a beat, Patton told him: “If von Runstedt wants to stick his ass in the meat grinder, I’ll be more than happy to turn the crank.”84 With that, he exited the room. It was 9:15 a.m. Waiting for him outside was Captain Butcher, who was supposed to have breakfast with Patton that morning. As Patton hustled past him, Butcher called out, “Hello general.” Patton, seeing him, snapped back, “Hi Butch,” and continued walking.85 The breakfast was off, as was anything else Patton had planned for the rest of 1944.

CHAPTER twelve

The Verdun Meeting

On the morning of December 19, three German divisions, two panzer and one infantry, clashed with the smaller teams of Desobry, Cherry, and O’Hare in the snow-­covered and battered towns of Noville, Longville, and Wardin, respectively. The fighting had started at 5:00 a.m. and continued throughout the day, despite blinding fog that only lifted periodically. American infantry, tank, and tank destroyer crews fought desperately as the paratroopers from the 101st Airborne marched through Bastogne and fanned out to reinforce the teams, helping form Bastogne’s perimeter.1 Further north, the two surrounded regiments from the 106th Infantry also fought desperately in hopes of relief. The U.S. military’s greatest strength, ground-­support aircraft, played no role in the fighting, with all planes grounded in the pea-­soup fog. “Sure looks like the devil is helping his own,” Patton said as he glared up at the low-­lying clouds and fog over Nancy. He and his staff, consisting of Codman, Harkins, Muller, and Lieutenant Colonel Richard Stillman, climbed into two armored jeeps with mounted .30 caliber machine guns, side doors, and extended mud flaps, and headed out over snow-­covered roads for the sixty-­mile trek to Verdun.2 After about an hour and half, the jeeps drove through Verdun, turned off Goubet Van Heeghe Avenue, entered the gate, and drove though the muddy courtyard to the main entrance of Bradley’s headquarters. Two MP guards greeted them as they ascended the stairs to the entrance.3 Bradley had arrived first from Luxembourg City, having navigated roads filled with escaping civilians. When British signal equipment blocked the road, he impatiently leaned out the window and shouted at them to move.4 Jacob Devers arrived in a sedan escorted by two MP jeeps. With him were Brigadier General Reuben E. Jenkins and Major Eugene 299

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Lynch, his operations and intelligence officers.5 Eisenhower and Tedder arrived in a Packard and hurried up the stairs and into the building. Despite the seriousness of the situation, Eisenhower smiled as he shook hands with Bradley’s staff. The two men then ascended to the second floor and entered the room where the other officers awaited them.

Figure 38. Bradley’s Eagle Main headquarters in Verdun, France, where Eisenhower, Patton, Bradley, and Devers met to discuss containing the Germans’ Ardennes Offensive and the relief of Bastogne, Belgium. Author photograph.

Other American and British officers arrived and filed upstairs. From Eisenhower’s staff came Beetle Smith, British air marshal James Robb, and British colonel James Gault. Members of Bradley’s staff were also on hand, as were numerous lower-­ranking officers. Missing from the meeting were Montgomery, who had refused to attend any meetings unless they were held at his headquarters, and Hodges, who was busy fighting the onrushing Germans. Usually, General de Guingand represented Montgomery at such meetings, but he was stuck in London, unable to fly to the Continent due to heavy fog.6 Hodges was in contact with Bradley, although the communications link was at times poor and subject to interference. When Pink Bull and General Strong, also from Eisenhower’s staff, entered the room, Eisenhower said, “Well, I knew my staff would get here—­it’s only a question of when!”7 Altogether, there were at least sixteen men in the freezing cold room, twelve Americans and four British; others waited outside. The men kept

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their coats on to ward off the cold, which overwhelmed a small coal burning stove in the corner. The room filled with smoke as the men puffed away at cigarettes, cigars or pipes. Coffee and sandwiches were served. The room contained rows of simple wooden folding chairs in front of a huge map that almost took up the whole wall.8 Patton paced the room, puffing on a cigar. Despite his upbeat attitude, his face was etched with grim concern.9 Bradley looked stern. The confidence Patton had exuded to Bradley the night before had dissolved in the gloomy reports of the enemy’s rapid advance. He had spent the morning reviewing reports of deeper German penetrations, trying to get a picture of the confusing situation. Along with the bad news about the 106th Division’s two surrounded regiments, he had also been following the German drive on Bastogne and reports of Buzz bombs dropping on Liège. But the Americans were fighting back. Engineers were destroying bridges to prevent the Germans from reaching Hodges’s headquarters in Spa. Along with McAuliffe’s 101st, Gavin’s 82nd Airborne had reached the 7th Armored Division and was driving east, looking for the enemy. But when Bradley received a report that air operations had been stymied by bad weather, he just shook his head.10 Only Eisenhower seemed to be in a good mood. Seeing old friends and acquaintances lifted his spirits. He started the meeting by declaring, “The present situation is to be regarded as one of opportunity for us and not of disaster. There will be only happy faces at this conference table.” Patton, happy to see his commander in such an aggressive mood, blurted out, “Hell, let’s have the guts to let the bastards go all the way up to Paris. Then we’ll really cut ’em off and chew them up.” The exchange broke the tension in the room, if only temporarily. Eisenhower, remaining serious, told everyone that the enemy must not be allowed to cross the Meuse River separating France from Belgium.”11 General Strong stepped in front of the wall map and presented the situation as well as SHAEF knew it. He stated that the Germans had launched an all-­out attack aimed at Brussels in the hopes of splitting the British and American armies. While the Allies were holding firm on both shoulders of the penetration, in between, “German units were pushing ahead and already bypassing the resistance at St. Vith and Bastogne.” He would later admit that while his predictions seemed gloomy, everyone reacted with surprise, even though he was only repeating, according

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to him, “with greater confidence and in more detail,” what he had told Eisenhower on the afternoon of December 16.12 Strong also presented four possible options or goals the German might consider to reinforce their offensive: the almost defenseless city of Namur on the Meuse River, seventy-­five miles northwest of Saint Vith, the next major city on the way to Brussels; the German city of Monschau, north of Saint Vith, which, if the Germans captured it, would widen the mouth of the offensive; a secondary attack from Trier; and lastly, an attack somewhere north of Simpson’s Ninth Army (which meant a pincers movement), although Montgomery had enough forces to deal with such an attack.13

Figure 39. Major General Kenneth Strong, Eisenhower’s intelligence officer, failed to detect the German offensive in the Ardennes, like most other intelligence officers. He presented his latest findings at the Verdun meeting on December 19, 1944, and explained possible objectives for the German Army. U.S. Army photograph.

Eisenhower wanted to hold the shoulders of the German breakthrough and then attack the Bulge from both sides. While the first part of his idea was sound, the second part would be more difficult, with Hodges busy pulling units out of the Roer River line and sending them piecemeal into the German flank. Bradley worried that Hodges’s line would crack and the Germans would flood across the Meuse into France. There was, however, no talk of defense, which meant pulling back to the Meuse was

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not an option. Bradley’s operations officers considered that alternative “too unthinkable to merit consideration.”14 Bradley proposed that Devers gradually take over Patton’s southern front so Patton could focus on an immediate counteroffensive. The gradual takeover would prevent any confusion with supplies since Devers’s supplies came from southern France and Patton’s from the northern part of the country. Bradley explained that, for the northern side of the Bulge, he was adding two divisions to Major General J. Lawton Collins’s VII Corps and would expand Collins’s sector to allow Gerow and his V Corps to focus on the northern shoulder.15 Eisenhower asked Devers how much of Patton’s southern sector he could take over.16 After Devers told him that a salient in his lines—­the Colmar pocket—­restricted him from taking over Patton’s entire zone, Eisenhower told him to reach out as far as possible to his left—­about halfway between Saarlautern and Saarbrücken—­while giving Patton every division he could spare. Devers was not happy about relinquishing the offensive and losing divisions but was resigned to dealing with the crisis at hand. Eisenhower permitted him to give ground if necessary to keep his forces intact. He did the same for Eddy, telling Patton he could fall back in the Saar region if necessary.17 Throughout the meeting Patton sat still, only commenting that he needed replacements and suggesting using the soldiers from three recently arrived infantry divisions as replacements for his depleted army. Bradley agreed and said he would provide Patton a portion of the men that were to go to Hodges and Simpson. Bull recommended shipping nine infantry regiments from the newly arrived 42nd, 63rd, and 70th Infantry Divisions directly to Bradley, for a total of twenty-­seven hundred soldiers. He even suggested sending the regiments of the 66th Infantry, which was scheduled to relieve Paul’s 94th Division. All that was still not enough for Patton. He recommended using untrained personnel from COMZ. Devers too asked for more troops, but not as forcefully as Patton.18 “No,” Eisenhower responded, “I won’t admit we are that near beaten.” Patton quickly shot back, “We will be if we don’t get more.”19 Bradley expressed concern about Bastogne and its vital road net. Eisenhower agreed that protecting it should be the goal. The generals also discussed using Third Army to cut off the Bulge at its base, but with the threat of an additional German thrust out of Trier, Eisenhower decided that for the immediate future they needed to simply strengthen the southern shoulder while driving for Bastogne.20 He would later say of his

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decision, “I firmly believed that by coming out of the Siegfried [Line] the enemy had given us a great opportunity which we could seize as soon as possible.”21 Eisenhower turned to Patton. “George, you’re going to have to abandon your plan to break free of the Siegfried Line and attack north,” he told him. “I want you to go to Luxembourg and take charge.” Patton did not miss a beat, replying, “Yes sir.” Eisenhower needed to know how long it would take him to get back to Nancy, pack, get the word out to his staff, and move his headquarters fifty miles north to Luxembourg. “When can you start up there?” he asked. There is some confusion at this point. Eisenhower, Strong, and Bradley heard Patton claim that he could attack in forty-eight hours—­December 21—­while Codman and Harkins said December 22. According to Bradley, when Patton claimed he would be ready on December 21, Eisenhower accused him of being “fatuous.” If Patton had claimed December 21, it might have prompted Eisenhower’s concern that Patton would attack before he had a large enough force. To guard against that, Eisenhower specifically told Patton, “If you try to go that early, you won’t have all three divisions ready and you’ll go piecemeal. You will start on the twenty-­second and I want your initial blow to be a strong one! I’d even settle for the twenty-­third if it takes that long to get three full divisions.”22 According to Colonel Harkins, Patton responded to Eisenhower’s request by telling him, “I can put on a spoiling attack with three divisions in three days or a more concentrated attack by six divisions in six days.” Eisenhower said, “We can’t wait for six days. When can you get moving?”23 Patton turned to Colonel Harkins and said, “We can do that.” To which Harkins responded, “Yes, sir.”24 Patton turned back to Eisenhower. “If you’ll let me go to a phone we’ll be on the road in less than an hour.” (One account had Patton responding, “I’ll not only attack, I’ll shove von Rundstedt down Montgomery’s throat.”)25 Whether it was two days or three, Patton’s claim that he could rapidly launch an attack toward Bastogne caused quite a bit of commotion in the room. As Codman remembered it, “There was a stir, a shuffling of feet, as those present straightened up in their chairs. Patton later wrote, “Some people thought I was boasting and others seemed pleased.”26 Some of the British officers openly laughed. Others looked up excitedly. One staff officer remembered, “It almost knocked me out of my chair.”27 Patton was promising to turn part of his army 180 degrees north and attack in only three days. Yet, it was not impossible. He would use

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Millikin’s III Corps with three divisions—­Gaffey’s 4th Armored, Paul’s 26th, and McBride’s 80th Division—­which were behind the lines and had been resting (until he had alerted them the night before). The hard part would be getting the second corps, Eddy’s XII, disengaged and heading north. Only Irwin’s 5th Infantry was off the line in Eddy’s zone. Patton knew if he could launch his initial attack quickly, he would entirely surprise the Germans. Eisenhower still worried the attacking force was too weak and that Patton had underestimated the strength of the German assault.28 Tedder interjected, suggesting Patton turn over Walker’s XX Corps to Devers but Patton refused, wanting to use Walker’s zone as a possible rest area for his attacking divisions. Walker was also closest to Trier. With Trier captured, he could race across the German Palatinate region, something Patton yearned to return to.29 Eisenhower instructed Patton to advance by phase lines, keeping all his forces tightly together and avoiding wasting his divisions’ strength through dispersion. But where would Patton attack? While Patton wanted to attack the German offensive at its base, Bradley felt that by attacking toward Bastogne, Third Army would still threaten the enemy’s rear.30 Finally, Eisenhower assured everyone in the room that he would urge Montgomery to launch his own attack from the north as soon as the “German blow in that sector had spent itself.”31 Patton’s three-­division assault did not surprise Bradley. The two had discussed it the night before when he told Patton about the situation. He was surprised, however, at the speed with which Patton was promising to do it. When he asked about the feasibility of turning an Army around and going on the attack in two days, Patton responded by lighting a cigar and pointing at the bulge on the battle map. “Brad,” he told his commander, “This time the Kraut’s got his head in a meatgrinder.” Then he closed his hand into a fist, “and this time I’ve got hold of the handle.”32 With Patton now in command of Middleton’s hard-­pressed VIII Corps, he commanded four corps, including Millikin’s III Corps, Walker’s XX Corps, and Eddy’s XII Corps.33 When Patton predicted he could reach Bastogne in his first rush, Eisenhower told him that as long as he was advancing he would be satisfied.34 Bradley worried the attack would be hard to disguise, so he turned to Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Ingersoll of the 23rd Headquarters Special Troops, the deception unit that had worked so well for Patton in Brittany and outside Metz, and asked him if there was anything he could do to hide from the Germans where Patton would strike. Ingersoll promised

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to come up with something.35 Eisenhower summed up the meeting in a telegram to Beetle Smith: “The general plan is to plug the holes in the north and launch a coordinated attack from the south.”36 He would leave the details to Patton. Patton’s plan seemed to galvanize everyone in the room and they wanted to help. Two of Bradley’s logistics officers chimed in. Colonel Raymond Moses told Patton and Mueller that COMZ would cooperate fully on all transport and that they would keep up with Patton’s drive as closely as possible. Colonel William A. Barriger added that ten truck companies were already on the way to Third Army and the leading trucks should be through Verdun that evening.37 As the high-­ranking generals and their staffs filed out of the room, Patton was already in action. He called over to Harkins and ordered, “Telephone Gay, give him the code name [Nickel], tell him to get started. Then get back to Nancy yourself as soon as you can. You know what to do.” He wasn’t finished. He turned to Codman and barked out more orders. “Codman, you come with me. Tell Mims we start in five minutes—­ for Luxembourg. And telephone General Walker and tell him I will stop and see him in Thionville on the way.” Harkins called Gay, who then called Weyland and told him Operation TINK was off. Weyland pleaded for the operation to go forward since it would enhance Patton’s chances for success. Gay told him no and to start planning for operations up north. When the official cancellation later came down from Eisenhower’s headquarters, Weyland requested additional fighter and reconnaissance groups. Sounding very much like Patton, Weyland recorded in his diary that he would help Patton pull the “First Army’s chestnuts out of the fire.”38 As they left the room, Eisenhower told Patton, “Funny thing, George, every time I get promoted, I get attacked.”39 Eisenhower was referring to the Kasserine Pass debacle in North Africa in early 1943, when German General Irwin Rommel punched the center of the American II Corps and sent it reeling back a hundred miles. The military disaster occurred merely days after Eisenhower had been promoted to full general. It was Eisenhower’s first crisis as a war commander and he reacted immediately, firing commanders, racing reinforcements to the front, and bringing in Patton to command II Corps. Now, on the day the Germans launched the Battle of the Bulge, he learned that President Roosevelt had nominated him for the five-­star rank of General of the Army. “Yes,” Patton agreed, “and every time you get attacked, I bail you out.”40

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Historian Martin Blumenson called Patton’s claim to move his army in three days his sublime moment, but it was not. While it was dramatic and shocking, Patton’s real sublime moment came after he left the room, and lasted for the next three days as he turned most of his army north. It was one thing to claim he could pivot his army and go on the attack, it was another to deliver on the goods. And that he did. He never returned to his headquarters in Nancy, instead moving directly to Luxembourg City. He would also be close to Bradley’s headquarters, where he would spend much of his time. When not meeting with Bradley or the Third Army staff, Patton would be out on the road, directing, cajoling and physically moving his troops north, despite the snow and freezing temperatures. The Verdun meeting was also important to Eisenhower. In two hours he came to grips with his entire front and developed a plan of not just matching the German offensive but defeating it. Before the meeting he was using ad hoc methods to deal with the breakthrough; now he had an overall idea about the attack and how his forces would go about erasing the Bulge. It would be another week before the plan began to bear fruit, but the seed had been planted. In a way, Eisenhower and Patton were the star players of the meeting. Patton would lead the charge and Eisenhower would provide the means. It was just like their old, friendlier, days at Fort Meade in the 1920s.41 Would the Verdun meeting have been different had Montgomery attended? Possibly. The energy of Patton’s can-­do spirit may have prompted him to come up with his own offensive from the north, committing British forces between the American corps for an assault aimed in the direction of Bastogne. On the other hand, the meeting may have reinforced his attitude that Americans did not understand the European way of war and that Patton’s plan was unrealistic and foolhardy. Patton’s dynamic attacks in Sicily did not change Montgomery’s plans during that campaign at all. In fact, the Verdun meeting might have simply entrenched Montgomery in his own battle plan to wait out the German offensive until it had spent itself. While that battleplan would have frustrated Eisenhower, at least his American commanders would have seen for themselves what Eisenhower was up against and what Patton had been complaining about for the last five months. While the Verdun meeting was the pivotal moment for Patton and the Allied commanders, it was really the American soldiers, freezing and fighting along the snowy landscape of Belgium and Luxembourg,

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who slowed the Germans and made the Verdun battle plan possible. Dr. Russell Weigley explained it best in his book Eisenhower’s Lieutenants when he wrote, The victory in the Ardennes belonged preeminently to the American soldier. The generals failed to foresee the German counteroffensive, did not prepare for it as a contingency even to the extent they might have if they had been truly calculating the risks in the Ardennes, and then had to wait long and work hard before they could recapture a semblance of control over the shape of the campaign. They were able eventually to regain control because their soldiers’ stubbornness and bravery did most of the job for them, gradually wrestling the momentum of battle away from the enemy and in time restoring it to the Allied command.42 By the time the Verdun meeting ended, things had gotten worse for those freezing American soldiers. Around 4:00 p.m. the two surrounded regiments from General Jones’s 106th Division surrendered. Further east, the spearhead of the German attack toward Antwerp, Battle Group Peiper, reached its highwater mark at Stoumont, fifty miles into the American lines but thirty miles short of its goal. It had been stopped by an American armored counterattack, but no one realized at the time that the Germans would get no further. Around Bastogne, teams Cherry and O’Hare fought off repeated German armored attacks, while Team Desobry actually counterattacked in Noville with the help of a battalion of paratroopers from the 101st Airborne. The situation in Bastogne became serious enough for Middleton to relocate his headquarters eighteen miles southeast, to Neufchâteau. General McAuliffe took command of Bastogne.43 Patton walked Eisenhower out to his vehicle while Bradley remained inside, calling Hodges on the phone for updates.44 As Eisenhower prepared to leave, a jeep rolled up and off jumped a sergeant from a medical battalion. The sergeant did not approach Eisenhower and Patton for any medical crisis, instead he saluted and asked the two if he could have his picture taken with them. They both agreed, with Eisenhower telling Patton, “George, move over and let the soldier in the middle.” He did.45 As Eisenhower departed, Patton returned to Bradley’s side and lit up another cigar.46 Bradley then returned to his Luxembourg headquarters,

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passing III Corps vehicles along the way. Patton’s promise to move Millikin’s forces north reassured him. When he reached his headquarters, he found Millikin, who was awaiting orders from Patton on where to set up his own headquarters. Bradley’s staff set him up in an empty office. McBride showed up and spoke with Millikin before heading out to find his division, which was scheduled to support Barton’s hard-­pressed 4th Division.47 Patton, meanwhile, drove to Walker’s headquarters in Thionville and told him that since two of his XX Corps divisions had already crossed the Saar, he would have to hold his east-­facing line. He wanted Walker to refrain from attacking and remain on the defense, “until the situation up north cleared up.” A disappointed Walker promised to follow orders to the best of his ability. When Patton prepared to leave, Walker dissuaded him, explaining that the roads were too bad to drive at night and that Prince Félix was due soon and could update him on the situation in Luxembourg. “All right,” Patton agreed, “If you will lend me pajamas and a toothbrush I will spend the night and make an early start in the morning.”48 He sent Codman to Nancy to move the entire Third Army headquarters to Luxembourg City, including Irwin’s 5th Division, which Patton had left out of his earlier plans. He wanted Irwin to head to Luxembourg City, where his division would spearhead the effort to hold the Germans on the southern shoulder.49 Patton spent most of the evening on a field telephone, turning around Eddy’s divisions in Saarlautern and Sarreguemines. He called Gay to check on Gaffey’s and McBride’s progress. McBride’s men had begun a 150-­mile trek to Fischbach, Luxembourg. Patton wanted his supporting tanks to drive at full speed and not use the coverings over their front lights, called “Cat lights,” which directed the lights narrowly on the road ahead. Instead, the tankers would roll with their front lights blazing, since the heavy fog was keeping the Luftwaffe out of the sky.50 Paul’s 26th Division, which was replenishing itself in Metz, was also alerted to move.51 Grow’s 6th Armored was ordered to join Paul in Metz, where the armored division would be put into reserve until Patton could figure out where he wanted it.52 Patton also called Beetle Smith at SHAEF headquarters. He wanted the Germans to be allowed to drive west as far as possible so his and Montgomery’s forces could catch them in a “mousetrap.” He asked if SHAEF shouldn’t “bait the mousetrap.” Smith’s response was not

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recorded. After Patton hung up, Prince Félix finally showed up but was less concerned about reporting enemy movements than he was about seeking American asylum from the onrushing Germans.53 Reflecting on the day’s events, Patton wrote Beatrice, “Perhaps God saved me for this effort.”54

CHAPTER tHIRTEEN

Turning Two Corps North

On December 20 Third Army soldiers and vehicles pulled out of the line in blinding snow and headed west and then north to their assembly areas between Arlon and Luxembourg City. Patton, meanwhile, arrived at Bradley’s headquarters around 9:00 a.m. to learn that Bradley had halted McBride’s 80th Infantry Division in Luxembourg City and had sent Dager’s CCB from Gaffey’s 4th Armored to Bastogne. Patton fumed at Bradley’s weakening of the 4th Armored but said nothing. As long as the Americans held Bastogne and its strategic road net, they stymied any German movement in the area. If the Germans captured it, they could quickly advance east.1 While the two generals discussed the situation, Eisenhower called to tell Bradley he would be losing command of Hodges’s and Simpson’s armies. With three German armies between Bradley and his other two army commanders, Eisenhower made the crucial decision to put them both under Montgomery. The decision stung both Bradley and Patton. Bradley argued that he had excellent communication lines with Hodges, but he had shown his hand the day before at the Verdun meeting when he admitted to spotty communications with First Army. Patton figured Eisenhower had either lost confidence in Bradley, had given into pressure by Churchill, or had decided it was the only way to get Montgomery “to put in some British troops,” adding that Eisenhower “certainly can’t or won’t command M[ontgomery].”2 He could not imagine that Eisenhower had made his decision solely on military grounds, i.e., the need for a commander who could better communicate with and lead Hodges and Simpson. Bradley’s aide, Captain Hanson, admitted in his dairy what Patton and Bradley refused to admit: “It was felt that our headquarters is 311

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in danger of being overrun and should such a situation develop, control might suddenly become more difficult.”3 Having made the momentous decision, Eisenhower expected Montgomery to go on the attack. In a follow-­up message to clarify everything the army group commanders had agreed to in meetings and over the phone, Eisenhower sent out instructions to Montgomery, Bradley, and Devers, ordering them to drop what they were doing and address the enemy offensive. Bradley was to launch a counteroffensive against the enemy salient, “in conjunction with Northern Group of Armies.” If that was not clear enough, he specifically ordered Montgomery to “launch a counter offensive against the enemy’s salient. Submit outline of plan to include strength, direction, time.”4 Eisenhower would have to wait awhile for a response. Patton departed Bradley’s headquarters with only his driver, Sergeant John L. Mims, and arrived in Longwy, France, fifteen miles south of Arlon, to check on the progress of his assembling troops. He pulled up to a marble building belonging to a mining company, entered, and walked down a long hallway until he encountered an enlisted man reading a comic book. When the man recognized Patton, he stuffed the comic book into his desk, stood up, and saluted. “We’re gonna need a place where we have absolute privacy for a meeting, what have you got?” The soldier rushed off to a conference room with Patton in tow. Upon reaching it, the soldier told the men inside to pack up their gear and head out. The men laughed until Patton stepped forward. Then their faces turned to horror and, in seconds, they emptied the room. Soon, Millikin, Gaffey, and Paul arrived to discuss their readiness. After a fifteen-­minute meeting, Patton emerged and asked the soldier, “How do we get to Arlon?” The soldier provided directions before Patton and his staff departed.5 Patton arrived in Arlon and waited for Middleton, who must have known about the Patton-­Bradley December 18 meeting because, before he left Bastogne, he told McAuliffe, “Now Tony, you’re going to be surrounded here before long, but don’t worry; help is on the way from Patton.” He then gave the airborne commander a final standing order: “Hold Bastogne.”6 When Middleton entered Patton’s temporary headquarters, Patton greeted him with a blast. “Troy,” he barked, “of all the Goddammed crazy things I ever heard of, leaving the 101st Airborne to be surrounded in Bastogne is the worst!” Middleton calmly pointed out the importance of holding Bastogne and its seven converging roads.

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His demeanor had the desired effect, it took the rage out of Patton, who then got down to business. “All right Troy, if you were in my position, where would launch the attack? From Arlon, where we are, or from where you are in Neufchâteau?” To Middleton, the shortest way made the most sense. He wanted Patton to launch Gaffey’s 4th Armored from Neufchâteau and Paul’s 26th and McBride’s 80th Divisions from Arlon, to Gaffey’s right. As it turned out, only one of Gaffey’s combat commands would launch from Neufchâteau, while the other two launched from just west of Arlon. The 26th and 80th would launch east of Arlon. 7 Middleton briefed Patton on the situation. The 101st Airborne had joined the armored teams and filled out the rest of the perimeter around Bastogne. McAuliffe had taken over the Belgian barracks used for Middleton’s headquarters in the middle of town where he oversaw the 101st’s deployment. After two days of hard fighting, Team Desobry had pulled back from Noville to south of the small town of Foy, three miles north of Bastogne, Team Cherry had been pushed out of Longville and established its defensive line in Bizory, two miles northeast of Bastogne, and Team O’Hare had been driven out of Wardin to Marvie, less than two miles southeast of Bastogne. For the last five days Middleton had been fighting a retreat while the Germans smashed his troops, tankers, and artillerymen. True to his nature, he had remained calm through the whole campaign, finding units and feeding them into the rolling defense.8 Patton thought Middleton was fighting his front rather well, although most of his units were being destroyed. He told Middleton to give ground and demolish bridges to the rear. He hoped to stretch the enemy out, setting up the Germans for a flank attack by Millikin’s III Corps. Paul’s 26th Infantry had already arrived in Arlon, but, Patton learned, Gaffey’s 4th Armored was not whole. When he learned that Dager’s CCB had advanced into Bastogne without encountering the enemy, he ordered it pulled back immediately. He wanted a strong punch when the time came.9 But not all of Dager’s command had made it into Bastogne. Only an ad hoc task force of tanks and armored infantry under Captain Bert Ezell went into the town. Dager did not feel it militarily sound to commit his whole force without support from the rest of the division. When Patton’s order reached Ezell, he turned his task force around and headed south. Oddly enough, he returned to Dager with more vehicles and weapons than when he left. He and his men had come across a truck with a dead driver and several abandoned artillery pieces from the 333rd Artillery

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Group. German tank track marks crossed the road. Ezell had just missed a German panzer unit that had blasted through the area, and its supporting infantry would surely be soon to follow. The entire combat command returned to Arlon, making Gaffey’s 4th Armored whole again.10 Was Patton right to pull Dager’s command back to the division? If he had not, it would have increased the amount of armor inside of Bastogne to almost a division, adding to the other two combat commands from 9th and 10th already there, even though there was little left of the 9th’s CCR. In addition, a combat command fighting south out of Bastogne while the rest of the 4th Armored drove north might have sandwiched the Germans between them. But all that extra armor inside a perimeter that Patton could plainly see was about to be surrounded would need fuel and heavy ammunition. Airborne resupply would have enough trouble getting those supplies to the armor already in Bastogne. So, with so many unknowns in those early days of the Bulge, Patton arguably did the right thing. Bradley never mentioned in his memoirs or letters to Patton that he had any problem with Patton rescinding his tactical order. Patton gave Millikin detailed orders, almost too detailed for a corps commander. He wanted Gaffey’s 4th Armored to lead the attack with tanks, artillery, tank destroyers, and armored engineers in the van. He wanted the main body of infantry kept back. If Gaffey encountered enemy resistance, he wanted him to envelop it at right angles and not attack straight on. Finally, he wanted a newly arrived model of a Sherman tank, the Jumbo, to lead any attack since it had heavier armor and could absorb enemy rounds better. His last order to Millikin: “Drive like hell.”11 Patton headed back to Luxembourg. Along the way he came across Barton’s 4th and McBride’s 80th Infantry Divisions and elements of Leonard’s 9th and Morris’s 10th Armored Divisions. He pushed and cajoled them to keep moving, galvanizing them into action. While visiting the 4th Division, he ate lunch with a soldier in a jeep.12 He told the tankers of the 9th Armored’s CCA to hold the line at any cost, something he had also relayed to the division’s tankers inside Bastogne.13 When he realized the armored forces now under his command had become hopelessly scrambled, he called corps and division commanders as well as his staff from his jeep field telephone.14 He put Leonard’s 9th Armored under Middleton and put Leonard in charge of one of Morris’s 10th Armored combat commands. He did the same thing to Morris, putting him in command of Leonard’s CCR in Bastogne. He phoned the commanders of

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engineers, tank destroyers, tank battalions, and hospitals, ordering them north. He also shifted ammunition and bridging material to support his northern offensives.15 Desperate for more infantrymen, Patton ordered both Leonard and Morris to cannibalize their tank forces, turning as many men as possible into infantry. He also took an additional eight hundred men out of rear echelon areas and made them trigger pullers. “If others would do the same we could finish this show in short order.”16 He sent any uncommitted tank and tank destroyer battalions to Eddy’s corps, which was to hold the southern shoulder, and ordered Baade’s 35th Division to Metz, where it would pick up replacements before heading north. He also sent more replacements to Walker’s XX Corps and to Barton’s 4th Division.17 When he encountered remnants of units looking for direction, he pointed them north and encouraged them to become either “heroes or corpses.”18 While Patton worked his field telephone, Gay, back in Nancy, did the same, relaying his boss’s orders to whoever needed to hear them. He held a meeting with Patch’s Seventh Army staff, telling them that Haislip would take over Eddy’s front, freeing up Grow’s 6th Armored and Baade’s 35th Division so they could shift north. Task Force Frickett (part of the 6th Cavalry) would head north on December 24. Both Grow and Frickett would come under General Walker. In return, Patton would leave some of his artillery and combat engineer units to Patch. Gay called Eddy and told him to move his XII Corps headquarters the next day to Luxembourg City and to meet Patton at General Morris’s headquarters as soon as possible. Further, Eddy was to send a tank destroyer battalion to Neufchâteau, for the drive to Bastogne. Patton would send some of his operations men south to guide the crews. Soon enough, Eddy and Haislip were on the phone with one another coordinating their moves. Finally, Gay called Colonel Harkins before he left Nancy and had him expedite Devers move north.19 Logistics for Patton’s shift proved surprisingly easy. All the supplies and equipment he had gathered for his assault through the Siegfried Line were located in Nancy, Metz, and Verdun, making it painless for logistics officers to switch the flow from east to north.20 Also making the move easier, Devers proved as good as his word, quickly moving Haislip’s XV Corps into Eddy’s zone.21 Eddy also told General Culin, whom he had relieved the day before, that he would now remain in command of the 87th Division despite his problems with preventing trench foot, but warned

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MAP 10. Turning the XII and III Corps North, December 19–21, 1944.

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him to “crack down on those squad leaders.” Culin’s division would go to Haislip.22 With his army’s center of gravity shifting north and Haislip taking over the south, Patton relented on the bridgehead at Ensdorf, which Twaddle’s 95th Infantry had fought so hard for. He ordered the town evacuated and all troops pulled back to the west bank to create a solid defensive front at Saarlautern.23 Patton reached Luxembourg City in time to see Irwin’s 5th Infantry marching in double columns north across the arched bridges that connected the city over a huge gorge. Many of the men wore heavy coats caked in mud from the fighting along the Saar River. The men were in high spirits, happy to be out of the muddy Saar where they huddled in soaking and freezing foxholes. Now they were standing up straight and marching freely, reinvigorated by their new role as rescuers.24 American flags, welcoming banners, and signs stating “English Spoken Here” had disappeared days earlier, but now, as troops, tanks, vehicles, and heavy guns rolled through the streets, locals lined the way, cheering and chanting, “Patton! Patton!”25 As for Patton and his staff, they busied themselves moving into the Hotel Alfa where they shared billets with Bradley’s staff. The Twelfth Army Group staffers had been spending their day preparing to burn documents and loading their vehicles for departure. The sight of Patton’s staffers confidently filling the halls and offices of the Alfa and working quickly to coordinate the arrival of Patton’s units reinvigorated them. As Charles Codman remembered it, “a Third Army shoulder patch appears to be a sight for sore eyes.”26 For convenience, Patton moved into Bradley’s headquarters and would shuffle back and forth between there and the Alfa. When Patton spotted Codman and Stiller, he told them, with a big grin, “Mims claims the government is wasting a lot of money hiring staff officers.” Mims, who had stood in as Patton’s entire staff for the last forty-­ eight hours, added, “You and me, general, have been running Third Army all by ourselves for the last two days and doing a better job of it than they do.”27 When he noticed that the skies had cleared, Patton became ecstatic. “I knew it!” he declared. “I knew the Lord wouldn’t let us down. The Lord is on our side and he licked the devil. You watch and see now if we don’t have good weather right through Christmas.”28 He now referred to his mission as “a chestnut pulling expedition.” He should have added, “out of the fire.” He wrote Beatrice that while he earned his pay by visiting seven divisions and regrouping his army in one day, “I enjoyed it.”29

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At Bradley’s headquarters, Patton explained to his boss, “All the credit, all of it, one hundred percent, goes to Third Army staff, and in particular to Hap Gay, Maud Miller, Nixon, and Busch.”30 Patton assessed the troops now under his command. Third Army was larger than it had ever been, but it needed to be so for the campaign ahead. Altogether, he commanded four corps and thirteen divisions: Middleton’s VIII Corps, consisting of McAuliffe’s 101st Airborne, Cota’s 28th Division, and Leonard’s 9th Armored; Millikin’s III Corps, consisting of Paul’s 26th Division, McBride’s 80th Division, and Gaffey’s 4th Armored; Eddy’s XII Corps, consisting of Barton’s 4th Division, Irwin’s 5th Division, and Morris’s 10th Armored; and Walker’s XX Corps, consisting of Van Fleet’s 90th Division, Twaddle’s 95th Division, and Grow’s 6th Armored. Patton had yet to decide where to place Baade’s 35th Division, which was making its way up from Metz, but he knew it would go with either Millikin or Eddy. To shore up the southern shoulder of the Bulge, as Eisenhower had ordered, Patton sent Irwin’s 5th Division, still marching through Luxembourg City, to attack Echternach. Worried the Germans would hit Barton’s worn-­out 4th Division, he determined to hit them first.31 At Patton’s headquarters, reports kept arriving about paratroopers in American uniforms hunting for Eisenhower, Bradley, and Patton, an obvious melding of the enemy operations GRIEFF and STÖSSER. Yet the threat of assassination little worried Patton. “I hope I get one and get him first,” he wrote Beatrice. “Those SOBs certainly stoop to conquer and then get licked.”32 To counter the German saboteurs, both real and phantasm, GIs instituted passwords and a series of questions for any American who seemed suspicious. No one was immune from interrogation, not even Patton. While driving in his jeep one night, a jeepload of MPs in tow, a sentry stopped Patton’s vehicle and asked for the password. Patton gave it to him. The man went on, “Sir, does Bing Crosby have any sons, and if so, how many?” “My God son,” Patton snapped back, “I don’t know.” The sentry tried again. “Well, who won the Army Navy game?” Again, “I don’t know that either.” “Well, you should know,” explained the sentry, “because you are a West Pointer.” Patton agreed. At that, the sentry admitted he knew who he was, that Army had beaten Navy, and that Patton could pass but that he had better be more careful, lest a less intelligent sentry shoot him. Back at headquarters, Colonel Codman, who had rarely seen a soldier embarrass the “old man,” kept bursting into laugher every time he thought of it.33 But not everyone worried about the hidden enemy. One day, while Patton crossed one of Luxembourg’s expansive bridges, he

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passed by an MP on duty who did not salute. Patton took about a dozen more steps before wheeling around and charging back toward the MP. “Wake up soldier!” he yelled. “How long have you been dead?”34 The German offensive harkened Patton back to the similar offensive in March of 1918, when the Imperial German army stormed the Allied lines making a last, massive effort to win World War I. The attack succeeded until the Allies finally halted it with fresh troops from American Army and Marine Corps units. “I think the results will be similar,” he wrote Beatrice, implying that this was Hitler’s last gasp before ultimate defeat. “Remember how a tarpon always makes a big flop just fore he dies?” he asked her. And although Eisenhower had already decided on the relief of Bastogne as Third Army’s main objective, Patton still yearned to cut the offensive off at its base. “We should get well into the guts of the enemy and cut his supply lines.” Knowing that he probably would not be able to write her again for a few days, he concluded his letter, “It’s a hell of a way to spend Christmas.”35 That night at 8:00 p.m., Colonel Harkins arrived from Nancy, where he had briefed Patton’s staff on the move north. He spent the rest of the day trying to reach Luxembourg City on snow-­covered roads clogged with tanks and vehicles, getting out several times to direct traffic. “Where the hell have you been?” Patton admonished the exhausted officer. “Sergeant Mims and I have been running this war all by ourselves, without an army staff.” Patton asked Mims to brief Harkins, a humiliating exercise for an officer who had worked so hard to coordinate the movement of two corps. But before Mims could say anything, Harkins offered to head out in the snow to see for himself. “The hell you will,” Patton snapped. “No one goes out after dark, it’s too dangerous. There are German troops in U.S. uniforms all over the place. Wait till tomorrow.”36 Patton went to bed, but before he went to sleep, he penned in his diary, “A most wonderful move for the whole Army. Attack at 0400 Dec. 22.”37 The next morning, December 21, Harkins did as ordered and headed out to personally witness Third Army on the move. He marveled at what he saw amid the snowfall: men and machines moving up every street, ready to go into a new battle. He later wrote about Patton’s actions during the last two days: Gen. Patton in shifting units and appointing new commanders—­of makeshift units that could fight—­hadn’t made a mistake. I think his initial moves on the 19th and 20th put such strength in the resistance

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until help could arrive—­that he really blunted the German momentum that paid off in the days and weeks to come. It was a real masterpiece of handling the art and tactics of war, knowing what to do, doing it, and putting his personal touch here and there, with a pat on the back—­sometimes high and sometimes low—­to those who needed it. I think it was his greatest triumph—­what he did turned disaster into victory and truly shortened the war.”38 While Harkins checked out his boss’s work, Gaffey’s 4th Armored cleared Nancy around 9:15 a.m., on its way north to Arlon. The division had mounted up in blackout conditions soon after Patton’s call and had already traveled fifty miles.39 In Luxembourg City, Patton realized that he had ordered Eddy to move his headquarters there but had not prepared a place for him. He called for Maddox and told him, “Hallie, I just remembered, I told Eddy to bring his Corps up here. Fix them up when they get here.”40 Patton then spoke to Eisenhower and Pink Bull, both of whom worried that his attack was too weak and too rushed. Eisenhower particularly worried that Patton would launch the attack immediately without waiting for his forces to gather.41 Patton considered them both “gittery [sic],” knowing that if he waited, he would lose the element of surprise. He told them he planned to follow up Millikin’s December 22 attack to Bastogne with Eddy attacking north through Luxembourg City, to Echternach, using Irwin’s 5th Infantry and the rest of Morris’s 10th Armored to protect Millikin’s right flank. He still worried the Germans would attack through Echternach, spoiling his own attack. Worried that the Germans might try to introduce poisonous gas on the battlefield, he called Gay to put out the word that everyone pack a gas mask. When he didn’t think Gay was making it a priority, he had Harkins call and remind him, especially for men in Walker’s XX Corps, along a static line.42 Looking at the entire German offensive, he reviewed his battle maps and wondered why Hodges hadn’t moved. “1[st] Army could attack on 23 [December] if they were pushed,” an obvious dig at Montgomery.43 Patton then drove north to Larochette to meet with Eddy, Millikin, and Walker. The town would become Eddy’s headquarters. Patton reviewed his corps commanders’ progress. All three of Millikin’s divisions had reached their jump-­off positions—­Gaffey’s 4th Armored (which had arrived that afternoon) on the left, Paul’s 26th in the center, and McBride’s

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80th on the right. Gaffey would be the main effort, leading with two combat commands: Brigadier General Herbert Earnest’s CCA would attack up the wide, paved Arlon-­Bastogne Highway, while Brigadier General Dager would attack west of Earnest, over marginal roads. Colonel Wendell Blanchard’s CCR would join the assault the following day, defending the flanks wherever needed. So confident was everyone that Dager’s CCB would reach Bastogne first—­after all, he had already been there—­that Major General Maxwell Taylor, the 101st Airborne’s commander, had rushed back from Washington, DC, to join Dager’s headquarters in hopes of quickly rejoining his unit.44

Figure 40. Dressed warmly against the winter temperatures, soldiers of the 80th Infantry Division head to the front northeast of Luxembourg City on December 21, 1944. They would be part of the drive to Bastogne. Catalog number: 111-­SC 272425, National Archives and Records Administration.

Patton could sense that his corps commanders doubted their new assignment, showing little optimism for the coming battle. To counter their uncertainty and discouragement, he peppered his orders with fight-­ talk, pumping up everyone in the room.45 When an intelligence officer reported that the 101st had become surrounded, Patton snapped, “Just

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a minute. That’s not correct. Those men are not surrounded. They are just fighting in four different directions.”46 He later wrote, “I seem always to be a ray of sun shine, and by God I am.” He could not wait to get his offensive underway. “I wish it were this time tomorrow.” Amid all the chaos of the German attack and the effort to get troops north, Patton received a letter from Everett Hughes, pointing out that Third Army was ignoring a step in the evaluation of officers suffering from combat exhaustion: doctors needed to examine them to determine if they should be disposed of through medical channels or reclassified for other duties, “or whether or not the man can be saved by granting him a period of leave for recuperation.” Patton wrote back a few days later that in all cases involving combat officers, doctors were required to give them an examination to discover if those officers could be reclassified to other jobs. If the cases were too severe, they would be “disposed of through medical channels or given the proper treatment including a leave if that appears desirable.” Any officer receiving the examination would be retained in their division until a decision was made on their future. Patton assured Hughes that all reclassified officers within Third Army “have been carefully examined with a view to the reassignment of officers within this command and to the possibility that medical evacuation might be more appropriate than reclassification.”47 Patton had come a long way from the medical tents in Sicily. Back at his Luxembourg City headquarters, Patton took a call around 5:00 p.m., from Barton, who claimed he was again under attack. Despite this being one of Patton’s greatest worries, he doubted the veracity of the attack but sent reinforcements anyway. He wished the Germans had waited another day for their attack, when his army would be in full force. “When we are attacking,” he later wrote, “the enemy has to parry, while, when we are defending or preparing to attack, he can attack us.”48 Millikin called next, asking to postpone his attack two hours, to 6:00 a.m. Patton, knowing this was his corps commander’s first test in battle, permitted the postponement. Before going to bed that night, he called on a higher power to help him break the back of the German offensive. “We can and will win. God helping,” he wrote in his diary, concluding with the single sentence: “Give us victory, Lord!”49 He went to steep, confident of the next day’s success. He slept so deeply a German Luftwaffe attack did not even wake him up, until Willie, spooked by the bombers, woke up his master.50

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Not everyone shared Patton’s confidence. The same officers on Eisenhower’s staff who shuffled their feet in the Verdun meeting continued to worry about his attack. Air Vice Marshal Robb wrote in his diary on December 21, “Concern was expressed by the Deputy Supreme Commander [Tedder] and others that the counter attack being mounted by Bradley might be a piecemeal affair similar to the German counter-­ attacks in Normandy.” He included Eisenhower as one of the doubters, writing that he was afraid “that the imperious Patton would talk Bradley round into allowing him to attack at once with the object of going right through and not awaiting a fully coordinated counter-­offensive.” If Eisenhower had his doubts, he certainly did not share them with Marshall, to whom he wrote, “I am certain we can surprise and defeat the enemy.”51 Montgomery did worse than question Patton’s abilities, he doubted Patton’s attack would even have any effect on the German drive east, much less succeed in its mission. He complained about Patton to his boss: “I do not think Third Army will be strong enough to do what is needed,” he told Field Marshall Alan Brooke, the British Imperial Chief of Staff. “If my forecast proves true then I shall have to deal unaided with both 5 and 6 Panzer Armies.” The next day Brooke called Patton’s offensive “a half baked affair,” adding that “I doubt is doing much good.”52 Montgomery had his own plan for dealing with the German offensive. He moved an ad hoc British armored force and airborne division to the point opposite the German spearhead to prevent it from crossing the Meuse River into France. He also hoarded three divisions under Major General Lightning Joe Collins to create a corps reserve, which was, Montgomery ordered, “not to be used offensively until it is all assembled and ready for battle.” Behind Collins, he deployed British General Brian Horrocks’s XXX Corps. Unlike Patton, who cancelled all his plans to attack east and focused on eliminating the Bulge, Montgomery wanted to save Horrocks for his own attack east, after the German threat had been eliminated. Montgomery would use the available American division to fight the Bulge. Montgomery’s strategy might have been tied to the British Army’s lack of manpower after four years of hard combat.53 He pulled back from ground already taken by the Americans, arguing that the Ardennes was no place to launch an offensive since it would not lead to the Rhine River. If he could pin the Germans down in the forests of Belgium exclusively using American forces, he could outflank them with his British and Canadian armies. Any hopes that Eisenhower might

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have had that Montgomery would play down the image of a British officer coming to save his American allies were dashed when Montgomery drove up to Hodges’s headquarters with the largest Union Jack flag he could find fluttering from the hood of his Rolls-­Royce, just to remind the Americans who was in charge.54 What if Montgomery had committed his troops to flanking the Germans from the north, much like Patton wanted to do from the south? Maybe Eisenhower would have acquiesced to Patton’s desire to cut off the Bulge at its base. It would have shown the Allies working together in a common cause, taking advantage of a rare opportunity to crush and capture three German armies out in the open. It would have certainly put Montgomery in a better light to Eisenhower. For months, Montgomery had been pushing Eisenhower to make him the commander of all ground forces in Europe. Now Eisenhower gave him command of two American armies and command of most of the Allied front, but Montgomery refused to take the German offensive seriously, concerned only with his own drive to the Rhine. But that was the difference between Patton and Montgomery during the Battle of the Bulge: Patton saw it as a crisis that needed to be solved, while Montgomery saw it as a nuisance that could be waited out. While Montgomery took charge of the northern flank of the German offensive, Patton basically usurped Bradley in command of the southern flank. His offensive was the only game in town. While Bradley was still Patton’s superior and he respected that, it was Patton who oversaw the shift of men and tanks from the south to fighting positions in Belgium and Luxembourg; Patton who conferred with the four corps commanders and various division, regiment, and battalion commanders; and Patton who promised to relieve Bastogne. He kept Bradley informed of all his actions and included him in meetings, but it was to Patton everyone was looking to break the Germans and restore the lines. If Patton gained Bastogne it would be his victory. Likewise, if the Germans broke through the perimeter and captured the town, or if Third Army broke under the strain of combat, it would be Patton’s defeat. Still, he got along well with Bradley: when he visited his superior’s office, Bradley told him, “Don’t come in George,” with a laugh, “if you’re not bringing good news.”55 By the evening of December 21, Patton’s forces were set. Millikin was ready to charge to Bastogne while Eddy was ready to shore up the southern shoulder—­and it had only taken three days. The officers from

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the Verdun meeting were suitably impressed. “The amazing Patton said he would be there on time—­and he was,” Strong later wrote.56 Bradley later added to the praise in his memoir, writing, “The speed with which Third Army turned its forces north astonished even those of us who had gambled in the Ardennes on the mobility of our army.” He quoted another senior commander who said, “Patton can get more good work out of a mediocre bunch of staff officers than anyone I ever saw.” The five months of combat Patton and his staff had been through “had seasoned that staff and the greatly matured Patton succeeded in coaxing from it the brilliant effort that characterized Third Army’s turnabout in the Bulge.” That night, before he went to bed, Patton told Codman, “Be ready for an early start tomorrow. We attack with III Corps at six.”57

CHAPTER fourTEEN

Dual Drives to Bastogne and the Sauer River On the morning of December 22 at 6:30 a.m., just as promised, Patton launched his two-­pronged attack. Millikin’s entire III Corps pushed north toward Bastogne while Irwin’s 5th Division battled northeast toward Echternach—­a thirty-­mile front.1 While Patton had launched his November 7 attack on Metz under gray and rainy skies, this time he attacked in a snow storm. Gaffey’s 4th Armored, on the right of III Corps, got off to a slow start, stymied by craters and bridges blown by retreating Americans engineers, but as the day progressed his tanks got rolling. Earnest’s CCA reached Martelange, while Dager’s CCB reached Menufontaine, about seven miles northwest of CCA, which incidentally freed a number of captured 28th Division soldiers. Both towns bordered the Sûre River (which becomes the Sauer River as it bends south in Luxembourg), which needed bridging. Both commanders also fought through the night to establish bridgeheads, but Dager pushed further north to the town of Burnon, creating a gap between the two commands and forcing him to stop and wait for Earnest’s force to catch up.2 While Gaffey’s engineers raced to build bridges across the Sûre, Paul’s 26th Division, in the center of III Crops, made good progress against German delaying actions. McBride’s veteran 80th Division, on the right side of the of III Corps, had the toughest fight, running up against a defended river line that stalled the unit until after dark when the infantry finally broke through the German lines and pressed forward.3 To confuse the enemy about the offensive, the 23rd Headquarters Special Troops transmitted fake radio traffic between Gaffey and McBride’s headquarters, discussing how they were going into reserve, away from Bastogne.4 Realizing the importance of Patton’s drive, Eisenhower issued a statement to all American troops, warning them that the Germans were 327

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making a supreme and savage effort to reverse the war, and extolling them to squash the enemy and win. He alluded to Skorzeny’s Waffen-­ SS commandoes: “He is fighting savagely to take back all that you have won and is using every treacherous trick to deceive and kill you. He is gambling everything, but already, in this battle, your unparalleled gallantry has done much to foil his plans. In the face of your proven bravery and fortitude, he will completely fail.” He called for everyone under his command to “rise to new heights of courage, of resolution and of effort. Let everyone hold before him a single thought—­to destroy the enemy on the ground, in the air, everywhere—­destroy him!”5 Patton called a staff meeting at 11:00 a.m. and immediately referenced the weather. “The Lord kind of played me a dirty trick,” he said before breaking into a smile, “but maybe he knows better, but we sure could have used some good flying weather, [although we] killed a lot of Germans.” When a report arrived about the capture of German paratroopers, one of whom was killed, he snapped, “Why didn’t they kill the others? We don’t want any of that kind of prisoner of war.” By now, he had lost any sense of chivalry. It was now kill or be killed—­and not just in the case of the SS. “Of course, don’t kill them in cold blood like they have done to our men. Give them a chance. Take them out in the brush and give them [a] three-­foot head start.” When a message arrived from Millikin, Patton lamented the thought of him getting killed on his first day in battle. “This is a big day for him,” he told the staff. “[It will] make him or break him.” Patton then tried to call Bradley about the need for more artillery but was told by a staffer that Bradley was busy. “Tell him I phoned and said we have a serious artillery problem,” he told the staffer. “[I] only got a hundred-­and-­one artillery battalions. Be sure to put on a long face when you tell him that. Give him [the] idea I’m serious.” Patton hung up and headed out to visit Millikin.6 Six hours after Millikin’s tanks and infantry started pushing north, up at Bastogne a group of German soldiers carrying a white flag approached the American perimeter with a surrender ultimatum. Glidermen from the 101st Airborne blindfolded and escorted them to McAuliffe’s headquarters. McAuliffe had been asleep when word came through about the ultimatum. “Nuts,” he said as he rose from his sleeping bag. The Germans demanded he surrender by 4:00 p.m. or Bastogne would be annihilated by German artillery fire. McAuliffe had been in communication with Middleton, and although he never mentioned it, he had to know that

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Patton was on the way. At first, McAuliffe thought the Germans wanted to surrender to him. When one of his staffers explained that it was the other way around, he exploded with anger. “Us surrender, awe nuts!” He was not sure how to respond to the ultimatum until one of his staff officers suggested the word “Nuts.” The response was typed up and given to the Germans, who were blindfolded again and escorted out. When one finally read the message and asked what it meant, one of the American escorts told him, “It means go to hell.”7 The response became an inspirational mantra to both the men inside Bastogne and those fighting toward it. It went on to become one of the most iconic one-­liners to come out of World War II. Patton found Millikin doing better than he expected as his men and tanks pushed forward in the snow, fighting and overcoming destroyed roads and bridges. He encouraged his new corps commander “to go up and hear them whistle.”8 Patton then visited the forward positions. At one command post that had undergone a tremendous pounding from German artillery, he entered the cellar and soldiers began to stand up to salute. Suddenly, a shell slammed into a building across the street. The lights dimmed, dust poured down and everyone lay flat—­except for Patton. He just stood there, took off his helmet, and brushed off the dust. Three or more shells followed but Patton stood unshaken. “What’s the matter boys?” he asked. “Are you expecting trouble up here?”9 When he encountered a company of trucks pulling trailers slowly plodding north, he stopped one of them and ordered the driver to remove the trailer so he could advance faster.10 He also came across eight soldiers from the 28th Infantry and the 9th Armored who had spent the last four days walking southwest from Wiltz. While they had trekked through twenty-­seven miles of entirely enemy-­held territory, they only saw seven Germans, leaving Patton to speculate, “I think that perhaps there is less weight in the middle of the salient than we think.” While the German attack may have been a hollow shell, it was still strong in some places.11 Patton returned to the Alfa Hotel. “I think we achieved complete surprise,” he told his staff. “[With] no artillery preparation, [we] just moved off and caught them cold, tit for tat.” While Millikin made his move on the left flank, Patton wanted Eddy to attack on the right, but not enough of Eddy’s troops had arrived yet for a punch equal to Millikin’s. Instead, Patton would use elements of Irwin’s 5th Division to seize the high ground around Echternach, north of Luxembourg City, in preparation

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MAP 11. Defending the Right Flank and Relieving Bastogne, December 22–26, 1944.

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for Eddy’s XII Corps offensive. “[I] wish I could conjure up just one more good division [and] shove it through [the] hole XII [Corps] makes, and we’d go straight through to Berlin,” he wrote. When Harkins offered the 42nd Infantry, Patton reminded him they were “green, untrained recruits. Those new divisions are no good for this kind of fighting. [I] need tough, battle-­tested units.”12 Patton spent the later part of the day concerned about Irwin’s attack. It launched around noon and ran into an attacking German force, leaving Patton waiting for word of the battle’s results. Although Irwin had initiated the action, Patton decided to hold off any major offensive by Eddy until he had driven the Germans east across the Sauer River, the border between Luxembourg and Germany. Patton knew Eddy could not attack with Barton’s 4th Division or Morris’s 10th Armored. Both had been fighting since the start of the campaign and were exhausted and suffering high casualties. He decided to switch them out of the line, giving them to Walker in exchange for Van Fleet’s 90th and Grow’s 6th Armored, giving Eddy a much stronger and fresher punch. Patton also hoped to give Walker the new 11th Armored Division under Brigadier General Charles Kilburn, so he could still employ both 6th and 10th Armored together. Along with the extra armor, Patton did the math on his artillery. He had 108 battalions of artillery, comprising 1,294 big guns. If they could fire continuously while his troops averaged seven miles a day, attacking around the clock, he should be able to break the enemy’s resolve. “I don’t see how the Bosch can take it,” he admitted.13 Bradley called and said the 75th Division, which had been assigned to Patton, would be delayed. To fill the gap, Patton again employed the 23rd Headquarters Special Troops. Like they had done for the 6th Armored back in September, the deception soldiers sewed on 75th patches to fool the Germans into believing Patton was attacking east across the Sauer until Eddy was ready.14 As Patton’s forces jumped off that morning, Operation TINK was officially scrubbed and all target studies of the terrain were suspended. Patton hoped to return to it soon, writing Beatrice, “With a little luck I will put on a more daring operation just after Christmas.”15 Air commanders changed their plans to conduct a similar bombing mission a week later, providing the weather improved.16 And it did. Around noon the skies cleared and would remain that way for the next five days. The collective prayers of Third Army had been answered. Weyland’s fighter-­ bombers pounded German rear areas, averaging 570 sorties a day. Pilots

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shot down enemy aircraft, strafed troop and fuel trucks, tanks, railway cars, and gun emplacements. They blew up oil dumps and cut highways. Some pilots dropped napalm on antiaircraft units. They pulverized buildings at strategic intersections, making the roads impassable.17 Still, on December 22, despite the clear afternoon skies, the airfields where the C-­47s took off were too icy for operations, scrubbing an aerial resupply of Bastogne.18 The resupply cancellation chaffed Patton. With Willie in tow, he marched into the office of Major John Carvey, the officer in charge of the drop, and yelled at him, “Major, your Goddamed mission was a failure.” Carvey agreed, only to leave Patton glaring at him. “Well, what are you going to do about it?” Carvey, shaking and stammering, explained that he had already scheduled a second drop. “Are you scared of me?” Patton asked. When Carvey told him he was, Patton asked him if he was married. When Carvey responded in the negative, Patton smiled. “Major, I want you to make me a promise,” he told the young man. “When you get back to the states, the first thing you’re to do is to get married. After you’ve been through the hell of married life, there will be nothing that I can say to you that will frighten you again.” With that, Patton did an about-­face and marched away with Willie scampering after. Carvey actually knew he was in trouble even before Patton reached his office. He had heard Willie’s claws clicking on the hardwood floor as the dog and his master walked down the hallway. Carvey knew that only one person in Third Army owned a dog.19 Patton knew time was of the essence and hoped for Gaffey’s 4th Armored to break through. “The situation in Bastogne is grave,” he wrote. “I will try to get Dager [commander of CCB] there tonight.” Patton’s hopes were far too high for the situation. When he later realized the Germans were using the same delay and retreat tactics they employed against him at Metz, he exploded. “Hell, why didn’t those [blank] come at me? If they want to pick on somebody, I’ll take care of those [blank]!!” Finally, he calmed himself and admitted, “They must have some smart men running the show.”20 Patton, too had proved himself a smart man, having managed to move the bulk of his army, 250,000 men, from facing east along the Saar River to attacking north—­an impressive feat in any terms.21 Worried about relieving Bastogne, he sent a message to Millikin that the advance was to be continued through the night.22 That evening, Patton held a meeting with his staff to prepare the next morning’s attack. At its conclusion, a British liaison officer from

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Montgomery’s headquarters asked Patton if he could pass any messages to the field marshal. Patton thought for a minute, flicked his cigar and nodded. “You tell Montgomery that the Third Army is attacking north and for him to get out of the way, because I’m going to run the German army up his ass.” With that, the meeting adjourned. The officer relayed the message and, when Patton later asked him about it, the officer stutteringly explained, “I-­I-­I would say, sir, h-­h-­he was not h-­h-­highly amused.”23 Patton was satisfied, although not happy, with the first day’s results. “I should be content which of course, I am not,” he wrote Beatrice, knowing the difficulties of attacking in a snowstorm.24 “It’s always hard to get an attack rolling,” he wrote, yet he doubted if the Germans would be able to launch any kind of attack against him for the next thirty-­six hours. “I hope by that time we will be rolling. The men are in good spirits and full of confidence.” He described their condition to Beatrice, using a British Royal Navy term: “All ship shape and Bristol fashion.”25 If he doubted the effectiveness of his attack, the Germans didn’t. General Brandenberger, commander of the Seventh Army, admitted that day, “The flank attack of Third Army, under General Patton, began to make itself felt.”26 By the next morning, December 23, Patton’s prediction of reaching Bastogne again proved too optimistic. While 4th Armored engineers spent most of the day repairing bridges over the Sûre River, tankers and armored infantrymen fought on little sleep and temperatures cold enough to freeze the water in their canteens. Germans ambushed the tankers of Earnest’s CCA about two miles north of Martelange, hitting them with small-­arms fire, mortars, and Panzerfaust antitank weapons. Earnest struggled to advance one more mile to the outskirts of Warnach. Colonel Wendell Blanchard’s CCR tried to capture Bigonville, three miles west of Earnest’s force, but dueled with German paratroopers and tanks (and an American captured tank) just south at Flatzbour. Dager’s CCB took the worst hit. As Dager reached the outskirts of the small town of Chaumont, about six miles ahead of Earnest, it looked like CCB would bolt the last six miles into Bastogne before sundown. But as Major Irzyk’s tanks surrounded and entered Chaumont at the bottom of a bowl-­shaped depression, the Germans counterattacked with infantry, paratroopers, StuG III tracked assault guns, and Jagdtigers—­heavy tank destroyers resembling Royal Tigers tank but firing a 128mm shell (as opposed to the Tiger’s 88mm shell). By the time the smoke cleared, the Germans had destroyed or disabled eighteen of Irzyk’s tanks, roughly half his force. Patton’s best bet to quickly reach Bastogne had been stopped cold.27

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Patton tried to remain optimistic. At the morning staff meeting, his weather officer announced that the clouds would finally blow away by 10:00 a.m. that morning.28 To ensure clear skies, Patton wrote another prayer and got straight to the point: “I’ve sent Hugh Gaffey, one of my ablest generals, with his 4th Armored Division, north toward that all-­ important road center to relieve the encircled garrison and he’s finding Your weather more difficult than the Krauts.”29 Worried about Millikin’s lack of progress, he called the III Corps commander after the meeting but only reached his chief of staff, Colonel James Phillips. “The going wasn’t so good yesterday, I’m unhappy about it,” Patton told Phillips. “I want to emphasize that this is a ground battle and they must move forward. Get them to bypass towns and get forward. I want a definitive report at 1315 today on the situation.” Then he dropped the bomb: “I want Bastogne by 1350.” He wanted Millikin to traverse ten miles of German defenses and icy roads in less than three hours. Then he explained why. “I have to give it to my boss at that time.” He concluded, “Get those boys moving, tell Millikin to get them going if he has to go down to the frontline platoon and move them!” Phillips, agreed and Patton hung up.30 In case Patton’s Christmas prayer did not reach a higher power, and his prayer earlier that day did not work, he penned a third prayer, hoping it would help his army’s progress: Sir, I have never been an unreasonable man, I am not going to ask You for the impossible. I do not even insist upon a miracle, for all I request is four days of clear weather. Give me four days so that my planes can fly, so that my fighter bombers can bomb and strafe, so that my reconnaissance may pick out targets for my magnificent artillery. Give me four days of sunshine to dry this blasted mud, so that my tanks roll, so that ammunition and rations may be taken to my hungry, ill-­equipped infantry. I need these four days to send Von Rundstedt and his godless army to their Valhalla. I am sick of this unnecessary butchery of American youth, and in exchange for four days of fighting weather I will deliver You enough Krauts to keep your bookkeepers months behind in their work. Amen.31 Patton hoped for better success with Eddy. He brought the XII commander into his situation room to show him options to attack. While Patton sat on the edge of a desk, Major Allen, an intelligence officer, encouraged Eddy to launch a diversionary attack on Trier, thus enveloping

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Millikin’s western flank. Patton then went outside and saw the skies clear, declaring, “I guess I’ll have another 100,000 of those prayers printed.”32 C-­47s were able to drop supplies to the surrounded men in Bastogne, losing eleven aircraft in the process. Later that morning, Eddy’s XII Corps attacked northeast of Luxembourg City, driving the Germans east of the Sauer River. Walker would also make a limited attack toward Saarburg to prevent German forces from heading to the Bulge.33 Good news arrived from Devers, who turned over to Patton some eighteen hundred desperately needed infantry replacements meant for Sixth Army Group. More help was on the way as Grow’s 6th Armored, Task Force Frickett, and Baade’s 35th Division pulled out of the line and headed north. Unfortunately, Baade’s men were strafed by enemy aircraft as they departed Sarreguemines and headed to Metz to pick up replacements. Later in the day, Gay took a call from General Patch’s Seventh Army operations officer, who asked when Patton wanted Culin’s 87th Infantry Division, causing confusion in both Nancy and Luxembourg City as no one in Third Army knew about the transfer. It was later discovered that the division had been earmarked for Reims, where it would relieve the 11th Armored Division, waiting in reserve.34 Still, it was better to have more divisions than less. Captured enemy documents revealed that the Germans planned to drive east beyond Arlon and pivot left to hit Luxembourg from the west. Patton thought about reinforcing against the maneuver but decided if he could keep pushing to Bastogne, “we will force him to dance to our fiddling.” Still, he called Middleton to see if he could do anything about the suspected attack.35 Inside Bastogne, the surrounded, thinly stretched troops fought off local German incursions and survived artillery salvos. The line was so thin that the men at one post joked, “How are you doing on your left?” “Good! We have two jeeps out there.”36 One of McAuliffe’s officers contacted Middleton’s operation officer to inform him that “it’s getting pretty sticky around here,” adding, “The enemy has attacked all along the south and some tanks are through and running around in our area.”37 That night, McAuliffe sent a message to Gaffey: “Sorry I did not get to shake hands today. I was disappointed.” He sent a follow-­up message that jabbed at Patton, who promised to relieve Bastogne on December 25: “There is only one more shopping day before Christmas.”38 On December 24, Earnest’s CCA fought its way into Warnach but the Germans counterattacked, fighting for most of the day until the Americans took the town before sundown. Dager’s CCB remained south

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of Chaumont, spending the day fighting off German counterattacks and exchanging artillery fire. Blanchard’s CCR encircled and finally captured Bigonville, effectively blocking any German attempts to cut off the base of the 4th Armored’s attacks at Martelange. Paul’s 26th Division soon replaced the tankers in Bigonville, leaving Blanchard to believe his men would get a rest until he received orders that night to head west.39 As the Germans counterattacked all along Millikin’s front, Patton blamed himself. “This was probably my fault,” he wrote, “because I have been insisting on day and night attacks.” He felt the tactic worked when the Germans were surprised, but now he realized he was in error using exhausted men against defended positions, especially when there was no guiding moonlight. “It takes a long time to learn war.” While Gaffey’s men and tanks struggled to push forward, Patton sent McAuliffe, an optimistic message: “Xmas Eve present coming up. Hold on.” McAuliffe called Middleton and told him, “The finest Christmas present the 101st could get would be relief tomorrow.”40 While the Germans pushed back against Millikin, Eddy’s corps attacked a seventeen-­mile-­long line from Diekirch to Echternach and almost reached the Sauer River using Irwin’s 5th Division, elements of Morris’s 10th Armored and Barton’s 4th Division.41 Walker’s XX Corps front remained quiet. When Patton learned that German prisoners admitted that they hadn’t eaten in three days and that a German message from the 5th Parachute Division revealed that they could not hold on without help, he contacted his corps commanders about “this happy state.”42 He felt the Germans had staked everything into this one offensive to restore the initiative, but it would not work. “They are far behind schedule and I believe beaten,” he wrote in his diary. “If this is true the whole army might surrender.” Yet, he knew the Germans had done it before in 1940. “They may repeat but with what?”43 With all eyes on Millikin’s attack toward Bastogne, Patton wanted Eddy to continue pressing north. While Bastogne seemed like the obvious center of gravity, Patton knew that Eddy could choke off the German offensive at its base and possibly capture Trier. He declared to his staff, “[I] got two more regiments of engineers. That makes four. I want to use them in the Trier area.” He wanted his staff to provide Bradley with a situation report on Eddy’s offensive. “[The] future of this army depends on the impression we make regarding it. Be sure to emphasize the various danger spots—­Trier, [our] exposed flank on the west, Echternach, and

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others.” Bradley visited and the two reviewed the situation. Koch and his staff briefed the two generals on Eddy’s situation and answered any questions. Afterward, Bradley agreed to move Baade’s 35th Division to Eddy’s corps.44 Throughout the day, Patton wavered between confidence in the German collapse and worry about his army’s pace. He called Eisenhower, expecting to be fired. When Eisenhower asked him where his worry came from, Patton responded, “I’m going too slow.” Eisenhower disagreed. “You’re going as fast as I expected,” he told his frustrated army commander. “Keep it up, George.”45 Patton visited Bradley’s headquarters several times. Chet Hanson, Bradley’s aide found Patton “boisterous and noisy, feeling good in the middle of a fight.”46 Back at his own headquarters, Patton pinned a Bronze Star onto the chest of Chaplain O’Neill, who had written the weather prayer for him. Patton had ordered him up from Nancy to receive the award. “Chaplain, you’re the most popular man in this headquarters,” Patton told him. “You sure stand in good with the Lord and soldiers.”47 Around noon, Bradley went to the Alfa Hotel for lunch, where he and Patton poured over the situation map. Bradley worried about replacements while Patton focused on the southern elbow of the German offensive. They decided to speed a task force from the 35th Division to Eddy while sending the rest of the division to Millikin to aid in the drive to Bastogne. Patton called Gay to have Baade move his division headquarters to Millikin’s area in Arlon. Gay protested the 35th was still in Metz and would have to wait. He also felt it should be given to Eddy’s corps to cut into the German rear. He was at least right about the movement. Baade’s chief of staff, Colonel Maddrey Solomon, told Gay that the division was badly mixed up and still trying to incorporate its three thousand replacements. Strafing enemy aircraft had dispersed the division that day. Patton relented and changed his order for the division to be ready to move on Christmas Day.48 That evening, Patton paced his headquarters’ map room, chomping on a cigar, worried about his lack of replacements. Finally, he sat down on the edge of his desk and stared intently at the map. “I wish I had another two divisions,” he told Robert Allen. “I could wipe them out.” Allen suggested they get them from Devers’s army group but Patton reminded him that Devers had already given him two thousand replacements, the equivalent of two divisions. Allen did not give up. “How about from up

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north?” Patton shook his head. “They wouldn’t be much good if I could get them, but I can’t get them. They’re trying to get some of ours.” Allen tried to cheer his boss. “One thing that’s very reassuring is that we have a hundred-­and-­one battalions of artillery.” Patton corrected him: “A hundred-­and-­eight battalions now and they got fully into action today.” Patton thought about the situation, then concluded, “The 101st is doing a great job. They [the Germans] can’t wipe them out. We can supply them now with this good weather and the Huns can’t overrun them. They are better men and better fighters than the Hun. If we can only have a few more days of good weather like today, then the war will be over.”49 encompassing combat, Patton tried to find some Despite the all-­ Christmas cheer. He put a halt to air raid sirens at night in Luxembourg City so people could get some sleep, figuring it was better to have a few people die instead of stressing everyone out from sleep deprivation. His antiaircraft units still shot down German raiders. He also relaxed the curfew in Nancy, which allowed the mostly Catholic population to attend midnight mass. That evening, he roared away from his command post when an MP stopped his vehicle to ask for the password. After giving it, Patton said jovially, “Merry Christmas. Noel, Noel, this looks like a good night to give the Nazis hell.”50 Patton attended a late-­night Christmas Eve mass at a small Episcopal church in the heart of Luxembourg City. He arrived late as the parishioners, mostly soldiers, sang the benediction. He stopped in the middle of the aisle and stared up at the main window, before sitting in the same pew where Kaiser Wilhelm sat during World War I. Everyone recognized him. One witness said he looked “fierce and dramatic—­as if he had come to demand God’s blessing for his sword.”51 Late that night, Patton called for his private secretary, Sergeant Joseph Rosevich, and spent about an hour dictating Christmas greeting letters to friends in the United States. The events of the last week had left little time for such endeavors. Once he finished dictating, Patton went to bed, but awakened around 4:00 a.m. and summoned Rosevich again. Clad in a mix of pajamas and uniform, Patton this time dictated an operations order. He had a hunch the enemy would attack him on Christmas day (even though intelligence reports predicted no such attack) and he wanted his troops to be ready. With the order given, Patton went back to sleep.52 Christmas day dawned cold but with clear skies. “Lovely weather for killing Germans,” Patton wrote, “which seems a bit queer considering whose birthday it is.”53 The holy day energized him. At his morning

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briefing he declared, “Merry Christmas to you all! Here’s to hoping we spend the next one in Tokyo.” But his cheer turned to seriousness as he listened to updates on his troops’ trek to Bastogne. He worried that a combat commander of the 80th Infantry was “sitting on his ass.” A staffer reported that the unit was moving but he was not sure how far. “Get hold of him and tell him to get up there. I want every son-­of-­a-­bitch fighting. There are to be no reserves. Everybody fights. Tell him I’m coming out there to see what the hell is going on.” Then he addressed the staff: “I want everyone to understand we are not fighting this battle in a half-­assed way. It’s either whole hog or die. Shoot the works. If those Hun bastards can do it, so can we. If those sons-­of-­bitches want war to the raw, we’ll give it to them.”54 Then it was back to work, with Patton shifting units and bringing up more to the line. He did not intervene when he learned that Millikin had attached two infantry battalions from McBride’s 80th to Gaffey’s infantry-­depleted 4th Armored.55 When a report arrived predicting a few more days of clear weather, Patton beamed, “Print another 200,000 prayers. The Lord is on our side. We’ve got to tell him what we need.”56 He jotted down a quick message to Beatrice, apologizing for opening only one of her gifts—­a pair of socks. He told her the three consecutive days of clear skies had helped him in the attack but vented, “So far, I am the only one attacking.” He concluded, “I am going out to push it now.”57 Still desperate to get more troops into the fight, he ordered Gay, still in Nancy, to move Grow’s 6th Armored to Luxembourg City where it would relieve elements of Morris’s 10th Armored, which would go to Walker’s Corps. Baade’s 35th Division was expected to arrive by regiments the next day to Millikin’s III Corps, replacing McBride’s 80th Division, which would head to Eddy’s XII Corps. In addition, cargo aircraft began landing at airports in Nancy, Toul, and Étain, delivering some twenty-­ three hundred replacements directly from the French southern port of Marseilles. The men came directly from the United States and arrived without rifles.58 Still, the replenishment increased troop strength in all of Patton’s depleted divisions. Patton visited troops in both Millikin’s and Eddy’s corps. Along the way he crossed paths with a tank from the 702nd Tank Battalion on its way back from the battlefield. He put his hand up and the tank stopped. The men climbed out to greet him. “Where are you going with this vehicle?” Patton asked. When the tanker commander told him they were taking it to ordnance he asked, “Do you think this vehicle should go to

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ordnance, don’t you think it will last a little longer?” The men assured him it would not. Patton looked the tank commander up and down and suddenly turned deadly serious. “Where is your overshoes, soldier?” he asked the tank commander who responded that they never received any, adding his unit and location. Patton told him, “I went through the hospitals, and I find a lot of frozen feet, and you can’t cure them. The Doughs [a World War I slang for infantrymen] that get hit with bullets or shrapnel can get well, but those boys in there that have frozen feet have no way of ever getting well. You’ll have overshoes here tonight.” He then asked the commander how far to the front line and climbed into his jeep, where Willie waited, and drove away.59 Patton visited all three of Gaffey’s three combat commands, then Paul’s and McBride’s infantry. He found Gaffey’s tankers fighting hard but making incremental progress. He spotted an idling 4th Armored tank. He got out of his vehicle and marched toward it. The tank commander popped his head out of the turret and Patton demanded to know what was wrong. The commander explained that his tank had bogged down in the mud. “Goddamn!” Patton responded. “This is no time to get stuck! Get that Goddamn thing rolling!” The commander shot back, “Yessir!” and Patton continued on his way.60 Paul’s infantry made decent progress, but McBride’s men were stalled. “All, I feel, are doing their best,” he wrote. Earnest’s CCA, with an attachment from the 80th Division, had taken the town of Tintange, two miles west of Warnach, while the main force drove four miles north, reaching the high ground south of Hollange. Dager’s CCB spent the morning clearing the woods and plains around Chaumont, with the help of its attached 80th Division units. The infantry then attacked Chaumont, capturing it by nightfall. Blanchard’s CCR spent the day driving west. The Germans were threatening to capture the town of Sibret, on the southwest side of Bastogne and Blanchard’s mission was to blunt them.61 Patton visited Dager’s CCB, where he saw two American aircraft strafe and bomb the Germans, but to little effect. Then a few German fighter aircraft appeared and strafed the road where Patton stood. Fortunately, the pilots were poor marksmen and no one was hit. Patton, having braved numerous air attacks in North Africa and Sicily, appreciated the historical milestone: “This is the only time in the fighting in Germany or France that I was actually picked out on the road and attacked by German air.”62 He then visited Paul’s 26th Division headquarters. When he walked in, Paul felt sure his commander was about to fire him for

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Figure 41. Major General Willard S. Paul, the commander the 26th Infantry Division, made good progress toward Bastogne on the first day of the attack on December 22, 1944. Catalog number: 111-­SC 193534, National Archives and Records Administration.

his slow progress. Instead, Patton threw his arm around Paul’s shoulder and told him, “How’s my little fighting son-­of-­a-­bitch?” Paul’s attitude changed. He later wrote, “I was so cheered for not getting relieved, there was nothing I wouldn’t have done for the man.”63 In Eddy’s zone, Patton saw Irwin’s 5th Division, which had driven the Germans back to the Sauer River and was threating to retake Echternach. Permission had finally been given to use the proximity fuse. The infantrymen called it a “Christmas present, for the Germans.”64 Irwin’s artillerymen fired the new weapon from the hills overlooking Echternach, watching the shells explode over the Germans as they raced over a wooden bridge or paddled small boats across the Sauer. The fire became so deadly the Germans broke and ran back into the town. Patton put the German tally from the shells at seven hundred dead, but the enemy still held the town.65 Unfortunately, another air supply scheduled for Bastogne that day failed to get off the ground due bad weather in England.66 Overall,

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Patton was pleased to see his men were in good condition, cheerful, and eating at least one Christmas meal of turkey. He gave full credit to the Quartermaster Corps for providing rear-­echelon soldiers hot turkey while the frontline soldiers at least received turkey sandwiches. “I know of no army in the world except the American which could have done such a thing.”67 In Bastogne, however, there were no turkey sandwiches for the troops, only K-­rations and a scant hot meal, usually beans. The Germans launched a major panzer attack into Bastogne from the west but glidermen, paratroopers, and tank destroyers under Colonel Steve Chappuis stopped it cold. German tanks rolled over Chappuis’s glidermen on a downhill slope to the town of Champs. The glidermen suffered some casualties but after the tanks passed, the men stood up in their foxholes and cut down the enemy’s supporting infantry. Paratroopers in the woods added to the fire, cutting down German infantrymen riding on the tanks. When the tanks reached the town of Champs, American tank destroyers and bazooka-­wielding paratroops knocked them all out. It had been a major victory for McAuliffe’s command but he did not share in his men’s joy. When a lieutenant reported on the German defeat, McAuliffe only shook his head and interrupted the young officer. “Hell, I know that! I want to know where the 4th Armored is.” He contacted Middleton and told him, “We have been let down.”68 Arriving late Christmas night at the Hotel Alfa, Patton sat down to a Christmas dinner with the Third Army staff in the building’s banquet hall. He donned a dress uniform for the occasion. He and his men dined on chicken, rice, and wine, followed by turkey with vegetables. But before he could finish the desert of Christmas cake and candied fruits, he was handed a note that the Germans were attacking Ettelbruck, twenty miles west of Echternach, in a desperate attempt to hold onto Echternach by flanking Irwin’s 5th Division. The dinner table buzzed with conversation, then everyone stood and left the room. In seconds, the festive banquet hall was abandoned.69 Patton ate a second, later dinner with Bradley in the Twelfth Army Group mess hall. Afterward they talked about Montgomery, who had supposedly declared that Hodges’s First Army was in no condition to go on the offensive for at least three months. Furthermore, he had supposedly said that Patton should pull back to the Saar line, or maybe the Moselle, to obtain more troops. The plan did not sit well with Patton. “This is

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disgusting and might remove the valor of our Army and the confidence of our people,” he wrote in his diary. “If ordered to fall back I think I will ask to be relieved.”70 Eisenhower had actually gone to Montgomery’s headquarters that day to urge him develop his own drive south to meet Patton’s. Montgomery, however, was convinced that another heavy attack was coming against him and wanted to hold off until the Germans were defeated. Eisenhower agreed to give him a few days to find a favorable moment.71 That night, the Germans bombed around Luxembourg City. German prisoners, taking advantage of the moment, rushed the guards, who gunned down approximately a hundred would-­be escapees. “So far,” Patton later wrote, “we have taken almost 5,000 prisoners and have killed more.72 His spirits were further boosted when he received a Christmas letter from General Marshall. “Since landing in France your army has written a great page in history of which the American people will always

Figure 42. Soldiers of the 26th Infantry Division advance through a snowy landscape in Belgium on December 23, 1944, during the attack toward Bastogne. Catalog number: 111-­SC 270906, National Archives and Records Administration.

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be very proud,” Marshall wrote, adding: “Your recent advances despite most adverse conditions and the bitter fighting of the enemy have given us all great encouragement.” He thanked Patton for the pictures he had sent him and asked for more, “taken east of the Rhine.”73 The day after Christmas, December 26, commenced overcast and cold. Patton spent the morning rearranging his forces. Grow’s 6th Armored approached Luxembourg City to relieve the combined elements of 9th and 10th Armored Divisions.74 To help Gaffey’s 4th Armored reach Bastogne, Patton added the 9th Armored’s CCA to Gaffey and slid Baade’s 35th Division between Gaffey and Paul’s 26th Division. “This should be a help,” he wrote. Baade’s ability to pull out of his fight in Sarreguemines, travel 125 miles in three days, and reach a new front impressed Patton, who considered it “the most outstanding achievement,” admitting, “If you put such a solution at Leavenworth, you would go to the doghouse or St. Elizabeth’s [an insane asylum].”75 Eddy called with good news: Irwin’s soldiers had finally captured Echternach, obliterating the Bulge’s southern shoulder and ensuring the Germans could not ruin Millikin’s offensive. Even better, Irwin’s men reported entire enemy companies swimming the Sauer River under fire, which Patton considered “hardly a healthy pastime.”76 To help Eddy hold the town, Patton gave him the remnants of one of the 28th Division’s regiments. One of Patton’s personnel officers reported that he had commandeered a truck company in his name to rush replacements to McBride’s 80th Division. When Patton questioned him, the officer explained that the trucks were idling in a depot before he used them to move one thousand replacements to the front. “Oh,” Patton said. “That’s Goddamned good.”77 When Patton found out that the 4th Division’s General Barton, exhausted from the Hürtgen Forest and Bulge fighting, was now suffering from ulcers, he replaced him with Brigadier General Harold Blakeley. Patton held Barton in high regard, considering him a friend, but he knew Barton could no longer command in combat. He later wrote Barton that “your present relief is in no way a criticism of your fighting ability, but simply arises from the necessity of saving such a soldier for future operations.”78 Seeking to comfort Barton’s family, Patton wrote Beatrice that Barton’s son was a Plebe at West Point and to have his son, George IV, console the young student.79

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While Eddy’s attack had yielded progress, Millikin’s attack seemed to yield only frustration. The Germans continued to successfully block all the routes to Bastogne. With his tanks stalled, Patton flew two medical teams via glider into the besieged town. The gliders came under fire but landed safely. More help was on the way for both Bastogne and Patton. Eisenhower promised Patton two divisions, Brigadier General Charles S. Kilburn’s 11th Armored and Major General William M. Miley’s 17th Airborne Divisions, but neither were immediately accessible. Eisenhower would only allow Patton to use 11th Armored, stationed in Reims, at his discretion, while the 17th Airborne was being rushed to the front from England. Additionally, Patton was to get Major General Harry J. Malony’s 94th Infantry Division, once Bradley approved it. The three additional divisions would increase Third Army’s strength to seventeen divisions, making Third Army stronger than it had ever been as well as the largest army in American history.80 Patton finally got what he wanted, although these reinforcements would do nothing to help him right now. By the afternoon, he admitted, “Today has been rather trying as in spite of all our efforts we have failed to make contact with the defenders of Bastogne.”81 To make matters worse, a fighter aircraft bombed and strafed Patton’s headquarters. As the aircraft roared down, Willie panicked and people outside fled from their vehicles. While Patton escaped any injury, the attack still chilled him. “I don’t like it a bit better than I used to,” he wrote Beatrice.82 Although witnesses swore they could see German markings on the aircraft’s wings, it turned out to be an American. The pilot, according to Patton, “had gone nuts and was 800 miles from where he was supposed to be.”83 In the midst of all the combat and strafing, Patton received an odd letter from a twenty-­two-­year-­old French woman, asking him to put her in contact with one of his “soldier-­sons” from Third Army. “We fraternized,” she wrote. “We were attractive to one another, and I love him.” She provided that his name was Louis John, and he was twenty-­four, from New York, and drove automobiles. She wanted John to know that “in Paris there is a heart that beats for him.” Patton, with little time for such matters but not wanting to ignore an issue possibly important to one of his soldiers, circled the words “soldier-­sons” and noted, “who is this one?” and passed it to his staff.84

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While Patton fumed about Bastogne, Gaffey’s 4th Armored tankers and infantrymen fought to reach it. South of Bastogne’s perimeter, Blanchard’s CCR reached a crossroad at Remichampagne, only six miles from the heart of the town. Lieutenant Colonel Creighton Abrams, the commander of the 37th Tank Battalion, was preparing to head northwest to Sibret to protect the division’s left flank, when he saw a flight of C-­47s flying in supplies. The aircraft parachuted their cargos to the beleaguered defenders as towed gliders released and swooped down. Enemy anti-­aircraft fire hit some of the aircraft, dropping them out of the sky. The pilots’ bravery inspired Abrams. Realizing there was only one town, Assenois, between his force and Bastogne, he decided to try to do what the other combat commands had failed to do: relieve Bastogne. He radioed up the chain of command until his request reached Gaffey, who called Patton around 4:00 p.m. and asked if he would authorize the risk to break through to Bastogne. “Go to it,” Patton said. Abrams would be racing against the Germans and the setting sun to break the ring around the town.85 Before Abrams sent his tanks and halftracks north, he reviewed the situation with the lead tanker, Lieutenant Charles Boggess, concluding their discussion by telling him, “Get to those men in Bastogne.” Boggess’s Jumbo tank roared north to Assenois, followed by tanks and halftracks carrying armored infantrymen. American artillery slammed into the small town at the base of a hill, but an enemy shell killed the artillery observer who was supposed to call off the barrage. The tanks drove directly into artillery explosions. Some lost their way while halftracks stopped and their infantry dismounted to fight German infantry and paratroopers. When a telephone pole fell on a halftrack further back in the column, blocking the road, only three tanks, followed by a halftrack and two more tanks, made it out of the town. The artillery fire finally subsided when an American pilot flying over the battlefield realized what was happening and called it off. Abrams and some other tankers wrestled the pole out of the way to allow the rest of the column to pass. Patton’s entire drive to relieve Bastogne now consisted of five tanks and a halftrack. Boggess continued to lead the way, ordering his men not to stop but to fire into the woods on either side of the road as they went. The halftrack following the three lead tanks fell far enough behind that the Germans were able to throw a string of mines across the road. The halftrack hit one and exploded, causing the following two tanks to pull over and remove the other mines. Patton’s attack was now down to

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three tanks. Boggess continued forward until he spotted a pillbox on the right side of the road and sent three 75mm rounds into it. His tank then slowed down as he surveyed the area. On his left, he saw two soldiers in American uniforms. He ordered the men to show themselves, explaining that he was with the 4th Armored. One of the men responded, “I’m Lieutenant Webster of the 326th Engineers, 101st Airborne Division, glad to see you.”86 With that greeting, Bastogne was relieved. Gaffey called Patton again about three hours later and told him the good news. “It was a daring thing and well done,” Patton wrote. “Of course, they may be cut off, but I doubt it.” He immediately called Bradley to inform him of the breakthrough. Bradley had earlier heard from Major General Ernie Harmon, the commander of the 2nd Armored Division, that the German 2nd Panzer Division had been stopped on the northern side of the Bulge. Bradley called Beetle Smith at SHAEF and told him, “As near as we can tell, this other fellow has reached his high-­water mark today.”87 Soon

Figure 43. Breakthrough! Tanks and trucks of the 4th Armored Division head into Bastogne after it was relieved on December 26, 1944. Catalog number: 111-­SC 198451, National Archives and Records Administration.

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after, Patton received a note about the state of McAuliffe’s 101st: “Losses light/Morale high/Awaiting order to continue offensive.”88 Reaching Bastogne proved a harsh campaign. Because of the snow and cold, the normal killed-­to-­wounded ratio flipped. Instead of suffering one dead to three wounded, Patton’s infantry suffered three dead to one wounded. Snow would quickly cover wounded men, causing medics to miss them, leaving them to freeze to death.89 Despite the losses and Patton’s constant complaints about his army’s slowness, he proudly declared in his diary, “The speed of our movements is amazing even to me[,] it must constantly surprise the Germans.” He credited the breakthrough to Colonel Blanchard, the commander of CCR and Abrams’s commanding officer, whom Patton had served with at Fort Benning.90 Still, he worried it might be a trap. “I hope that the troops making the advance don’t get bottled up too,” he wrote Beatrice. “My prayer seems to be working.”91 Three days later, he would write Beatrice again, declaring, “The relief of Bastogne is the most brilliant operation we have thus far performed,” adding, “Now the enemy must dance to our tune not we to his.”92 Before Patton went to bed that night, he looked at the bigger picture of the campaign, realizing that he had made a mistake reinforcing Eddy with Grow’s 6th Armored. He decided to send it to Millikin, to help hold open the new narrow corridor to Bastogne. “I can still do it.” While he had spent the last four days shuffling troops to deliver the most strength where he thought they could make a difference, he blamed Eisenhower for not giving him any extra forces for the most important task of the campaign. “Why in hell the SHAEF thinkers hold the 11th AD, 17th AB [Airborne] and 87th Inf. is beyond me,” he wrote. “They should be attacking.” To Patton, he was taking the war to the enemy and winning. He deserved to get extra troops so he could complete the job. “The German has shot his wad,” he penned in his diary.93 Still, he should have been proud. The relief of Bastogne was Patton’s victory. While the 101st Airborne paratroopers and the 9th and 10th Armored tankers—­as well as the other soldiers from remnant units—­who coalesced in and around Bastogne could pat each other on the back for having outlasted the German SS, armor, and infantry, it was Patton, with his relentless attacks doubted by his superiors, who broke the German bond on the vital crossroads town on the snowy hills of Belgium. But he

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had little time to celebrate his achievement. The campaign to erase the Bulge would be a much harder fight. Bradley showered Patton with praise for his accomplishment: True to his boast at Verdun, Patton, having turned Third Army ninety degrees, attacked on December 22. His generalship during this difficult maneuver was magnificent, one of the most brilliant performances by any commander on either side in World War II. It was absolutely his cup of tea—­rapid, open warfare combined with noble purpose and difficult goals. He relished every minute of it, knowing full well that this mission, if nothing else, would guarantee him a place of high honor in the annals of the U.S. Army.94 Major General James Gavin, who had fought under Patton in Sicily and now led the 82nd Airborne Division on the northern section of the Bulge, praised Patton’s quick response to the Bastogne crisis: “The rapidity and violence of his attack took the Germans by surprise and completely upset their timetable,” he wrote. “Of all the army commanders, only Patton could have carried out such an operation.”95 An editorial in the Washington Post summed up Patton’s success in the relief of Bastogne and all his battlefields, likening him to America’s fireman. “It has become a sort of unwritten rule in this war that when there is a fire to be put out, it is Patton who jumps into his boots, slides down the pole, and starts rolling.” While the editorial did delve into Patton’s troubled past, it credited him with repeatedly demonstrating “that when a jam develops, he is the one who is called upon to break it.”96

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The relief of Bastogne did not mean the end of the Battle of the Bulge. Still, its success put Patton in a jovial mood. At the early-­morning staff meeting on December 27, he asked his antiaircraft commander, “How many Germans did you kill last night?” When the man told him forty-­ eight pilots and crews, Patton shot back, “What? Hot dog!” and shook the man’s hand. He became more serious when Bradley visited. Bradley, on his way to see Eisenhower and Montgomery to discuss the tactical situation, agreed with Patton that the crisis could be solved if Eisenhower would just give the First and Ninth Armies back to him, then, as Patton wrote, “we will bag the whole German army.” Beetle Smith was on their side, according to Bradley. To Patton, Montgomery simply could not see the big picture, being content with keeping two American armies static. “War requires the taking of risks and he won’t take them.”1 Patton urged Bradley to get Eisenhower to speed up the deployment of the 11th Armored and 17th Airborne Divisions along the Semois River, four miles west of Arlon, to both protect his left rear flank and defend the Meuse River if the Germans ever got that far west. He still craved more units. “If I could only get three more divisions,” he wrote, “I could win this war now.”2 He provided Bradley his plan to shift his army’s center of gravity from both Millikin and Middleton in the west to Eddy in the east. He proposed attacking north in four days from the now-­captured Echternach to Bitburg, Germany, some fourteen miles away and directly east of Bastogne, putting him well behind the bulk of enemy forces. From there, Eddy would continue his drive corps twenty-­two miles to Prüm, and then an additional twenty miles to Saint Vith, completely amputating the German Bulge and straightening out the line.3 351

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Before Bradley departed, Patton suggested they both have haircuts. While they sat with towels around their necks, as a barber trimmed, Eddy stormed in, his face red from riding in an exposed jeep, checking on his men. Patton called for a photographer and Bradley pinned a Silver Star on Eddy for his command of XII Corps. Eddy saluted, then Bradley shook his hand. Patton beamed and told Eddy, laughing, “We sure had to fake a helluva lot to get it for you!”4 A few hours later, Patton received a communiqué from Eisenhower outlining Field Marshal Montgomery’s plan for dealing with the Germans. It read that Hodges’s First Army had no offensive capability and would not for another three months. The only offensive possible was from the south and Patton lacked the troops to do it. Therefore, Montgomery proposed that the Americans abandon the Colmar pocket (south of Patton) and pull back to the Saar River or Moselle. In addition, he favored pulling back to shorten the battle lines, which would also shorten the lines for the Germans, but the Allies would benefit more since it would make more divisions available to hold the Germans back until the Allies could regroup for a spring offensive.5 Furious, Patton unleashed himself on Eisenhower, Montgomery, and Bradley. “I wish Ike were more of a gambler. If only I could get destiny [his codeword for Eisenhower] to attack and not to defend,” he wrote in his dairy. “Montgomery is a tired little fart.” He criticized Bradley not for his personality but for his actions: “Bradley made a bad mistake in being passive on the front of the VIII Corps.” Patton’s hindsight was an impressive twenty-­twenty. Now, he wanted to attack the next morning, convinced that if he could, it would be decisive.6 Patton called a staff meeting to discuss Montgomery’s ideas. He read the communiqué as the group listened in horror and astonishment. In one move, Montgomery wanted Patton to forget about the blood and sacrifice his soldiers endured to straighten out the northern line. Metz, Fort Koenigsmacker, the Maginot Line, the Saar—­all had been tossed aside in one casual flip. Finally, one of the staffers spoke up, explaining that the phycological effect of such a plan would be catastrophic in the United States. “That goes for the Third Army, too,” Patton retorted. “We’re just not trained—­we don’t know how to retreat. Our divisions fight by attacking, not retreating. As I see it, if we do this, the war is over and the Germans will win.” Patton was not done. “As regards to the First Army,

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hell, all those sons-­of-­bitches need to fight is an order to attack. But of course, they won’t if the British won’t give the order. It’s been tied up with them so long that all they know what to do is to sit on their asses and regroup and pivot on somebody else.” With that, Patton left the room.7 Later, Pink Bull called to say that Eisenhower was anxious about losing the tenuous link to Bastogne and to reinforce the corridor. “What the hell does he think I’ve been doing for the last week?” Patton asked in his diary. To relieve Eisenhower’s anxieties, he ordered seventy trucks, packed mostly with medical supplies, to Bastogne. He then demanded that another air drop be scheduled to the town’s defenders. When the air planners cut the lift by half, he called Lev Allen and insisted on the full lift: “We have the corridor,” he argued. “But it’s under fire and pressure, and I don’t want to take any chances. Better to be sure than sorry. Tomorrow I’ll do all the trucking, maybe, but today I need the air supply to avoid any slips.”8 Patton then drove to Arlon, where he met with Millikin and Middleton. With Gaffey’s 4th Armored widening the Bastogne corridor, he ordered Millikin to keep operational control of all of Middleton’s troops inside Bastogne until the situation cleared up. Wanting to keep the Germans reeling through a two-­pronged attack, he ordered Millikin to use an armored division (he didn’t specify which) to capture Houffalize, ten miles north of Bastogne, within the next four days (it would actually take twenty). Once Houffalize was taken, he would have Eddy use one armored and two infantry divisions to attack northeast from Echternach to Saint Vith on the Bulge’s northern shoulder, almost fifty miles away. Once Patton’s offensives were underway, Middleton would guard Third Army’s left flank with the depleted 101st Airborne and 9th Armored. If Montgomery would not help close the Bulge, Patton would do it himself.9 While Patton was in Arlon, his staff moved into a new headquarters in Luxembourg City. The Pescatore, J. P. Foundation, a four-­story turreted retirement facility dating back to 1892, offered Patton’s staff more room than the cramped Alfa Hotel occupied by Bradley’s staffers. The staffs of an army and an army group combined numbered more than a couple hundred men. Patton had hoped to move into the Pescatore earlier, but it had been reserved for Eisenhower and his staff, should he choose to move closer to the front. Eisenhower’s decision to remain in Reims finally opened up the facility for Patton.10

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Figure 44. Patton’s second headquarters in Luxembourg City, the Pescatore, J. D. Foundation. Patton had hoped to move into the building when he first transferred his headquarters to Luxembourg, but it was reserved for Eisenhower. When Eisenhower decided to remain in Reims, France, Patton and his staff moved in on December 27, 1944. Author photograph.

As the sun went down, seventy ambulances roared into Bastogne under the command of Colonel Charles Odom, Patton’s personal physician. The ambulance drivers had been given a brief order for their mission: “Get the hell in and get the hell out.” Once in the town, Odom met with McAuliffe and offered to set up a hospital. McAuliffe preferred to evacuate the wounded, reasoning a hospital was too risky with only a slim corridor connecting his command to Third Army. Odom provided a complete surgical team to McAuliffe. Then they unloaded the medical equipment, loaded the wounded into the ambulances, and got “the hell out” to Luxembourg City.11 That night at his new headquarters, Patton took a call from Bradley. He explained the plan he had reviewed with Middleton and Millikin. Bradley liked it but wanted more force. To help, Patton ordered Walker’s XX Corps to attack Saarburg, in an effort to pull enemy troops away from the Bulge. Patton then took a call from Grow and ordered him to

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Bastogne immediately, hoping to get his division there before sunrise, surprising the Germans. Before Patton went to bed, General Taylor, now back in command of the 101st, called to say his division was ready to resume the attack. While Taylor’s boast may have been made to impress Patton, it showed a commander wanting to prove himself after missing a great battle.12 The next morning, December 28, Eddy and Major General Frederick Anderson from the Eighth Air Force arrived at the Pescatore to discuss a bombing campaign to support Patton’s now expanded offensive. “The above operation will be very profitable,” Patton wrote in his diary before giving into his frustrations: “If only we can get the troops released by Ike[.] IF IF!” Later in the day, the “if ” became a reality. Bradley officially released Kilburn’s 11th Armored and Culin’s 87th Infantry Divisions to Patton, but only on the condition that they be given to Middleton’s VIII Corps for the drive to Houffalize. Bradley’s conditions were even more specific: he wanted Patton to use the divisions to seize the high ground west and southwest of Houffalize. The order was a slight, but at least Patton had his divisions.13 With the two fresh divisions on the way, he changed his plan of attack. He now wanted Middleton’s VIII Corps, consisting of Grow’s 6th Armored, Baade’s 30th Division, and Paul’s 26th Division, to attack northwest to Houffalize. On Middleton’s right, Millikin’s III Corps would push northeast up the Roer Valley. Eddy’s XII Corps would drive northeast from Echternach to Bitburg, while Walker’s XX Corps would mop up a German salient at the convergence of the Moselle and Saar Rivers, and then possibly link up with Eddy.14 At Bradley’s headquarters that evening, Patton noticed a reporter staring at his pistol, which he had removed for dinner and placed on a table. “You see that pistol?” he squawked. “Take a good look. By God, it’s ivory-­ handled, not pearl!” Then he launched into a tirade. “All that cockeyed nonsense about me . . . wearing a pearl-­handled revolver . . . ! Just a bunch of goddamned ignoramuses.  .  .  . Why, no real gunman would carry a pearl-­handled pistol. It’s bad luck! Besides, I wear that particular gun because I killed my first man with it.” After dinner, that same reporter asked him why the British Second Army was not attacking. “They’re just being true to form . . . afraid to take a chance,” he snapped. “Montgomery said he would begin to counter-­attack the Germans here eleven days from now . . . and I’ve been attacking for the past five days! If you’re going to win, there’s no fucking substitute for a goddamn two-­flanked offensive!”15

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At the same time Patton was criticizing Montgomery’s idleness, Eisenhower was visiting the field marshal to see about him going on the offensive. Both Hodges and Collins wanted to attack but Montgomery felt the Germans were planning another major attack. Eisenhower told Montgomery that if the Germans did not attack by January 3, Hodges was to drive south for Houffalize. In the meantime, Montgomery’s defensive measures would allow the Germans to turn more forces against Patton.16

Figure 45. Field Marshal Montgomery (right) visits Major General J. Lawton Collins, the commander of VII Corps at Collins’s headquarters on December 30, 1944. Collins and First Army commander Courtney Hodges wanted to go on the offensive on the northern side of the Bulge but Montgomery refused, convinced the Germans were preparing a second major attack. Catalog number: 111-­SC 200854, National Archives and Records Administration.

Patton awoke the next morning, December 29, with a head cold. The stress and frustrations of reaching Bastogne, along with his freezing cold trips in an open jeep, had finally caught up with him. Despite feeling run down, he hosted Bradley and his intelligence officer, Brigadier General Edwin Sibret, at the Pescatore. When Bradley arrived he went into Patton’s war room in the building’s theater. He called for Patton’s staff to assemble and, once all were gathered, pinned an Oak Leaf Cluster to Patton’s

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Distinguished Service Medal.17 After the ceremony, Patton showed Bradley his bombing campaign and the two discussed the attack to Houffalize and, optimistically, Saint Vith, some twenty-­eight miles further northeast. Patton still wanted to close the Bulge at its base, but Bradley preferred the drive through Bastogne. Patton may not have known it but Beetle Smith and Pink Bull both felt Bradley’s plan was wrong.18 Bradley warned Patton of a possible three-­division German attack beyond Bastogne in the next twenty-­four hours. He also told of an enemy plan to bomb the woods immediately north of Bastogne, to which Gay chimed in that the Germans already occupied the woods and would be bombing their own men. Still, Patton welcomed the attack. With the German numbers depleted while he planned his own attack, he saw the German attack as an opportunity. “It would be very nice to go in after him when he starts to retreat,” he wrote Beatrice. The real reason for the letter was to paint a sketch of his Bastogne exploits for an audience. He wanted his old World War I generals to know what he had done. “You might send to Nita [Patton’s sister], General [James] Harbold, General [Charles] Summerall, and General Henry [Patton’s name for Secretary of War Stimson],” he advised her, just as he had done with his report on capturing Sarreguemines.19 Early that evening, Middleton called Gay to report that Kilburn’s 11th Armored and Culin’s 87th Division had reached their assembly areas in Neufchâteau and would be ready to attack the next day, but when he told Gay he wanted Patton to be there for the launch, Gay refused, explaining that Patton was too sick for the long ride. Middleton worried that pushing two divisions through the small and damaged town of Bastogne would result in traffic jams and delays. Gay relayed Middleton’s request to Patton, who was standing nearby. Patton told him that he didn’t care how Middleton made the attack, “but he must make it, and he must take the objective.”20 Later, Eisenhower called and ordered that the 9th Armored’s CCR, serving under Middleton, become part of SHAEF’s strategic reserve, weakening Middleton’s drive.21 That night, Patton dined with Bradley and Bill Walton, a reporter from Time magazine. When Patton learned of Walton’s profession he became hostile. “Young man,” he asked him, “do you pretend to match your lack of information with my military knowledge?” The reporter laughed but Patton did not.22

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Figure 46. Bradley shakes Patton’s hand at the Pescatore on December 29, 1944, in front of Patton’s staff. He had just presented Patton with an Oak Leaf Cluster to his Distinguished Service Medal for “extraordinary heroism” during the campaign in Sicily on July 11, 1943. Catalog number: 111-­SC 200855, National Archives and Records Administration.

The next morning, December 30, Middleton launched his attack west of Bastogne. Kilburn’s 11th Armored and Culin’s 87th Division jumped off seven miles south of the town and ran directly into a flanking German attack, stopping the enemy cold. Patton prided himself on attacking while others urged him to postpone. “I held to my plan though I didn’t know the German attack was coming,” he later embellished. “Some people call it luck some jealousy. I call it determination.” Yet, Middleton must have misunderstood Patton’s objective. Instead of seizing the high ground south of Houffalize like Patton and Bradley wanted, he drove the enemy onto the high ground. Still, Middleton’s attack pleased Patton, who saw imminent danger if he had not attacked. “Had we not hit the flank of the Germans,” he later wrote, “they might have again closed the corridor into Bastogne.”23 As the sun climbed in the sky, the Germans launched an attack on Millikin’s III Corps. Two enemy infantry divisions hit Baade’s 35th and Paul’s 26th Infantry Divisions. The initial assault drove Baade’s men out of a village before the Americans retook it. Gaffey’s 4th Armored drove

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in to help and, according to Patton, destroyed fifty-­five enemy tanks. The German attack impressed Patton, who considered it the biggest counterattack Third Army had ever faced. Yet, his men prevailed. “We were successful at all points,” he later wrote. Third Army men were now capturing or killing Germans driving American jeeps and dressed in American Army uniforms. Prisoners taken admitted they had not eaten a meal in the last five days. “Many of them will never eat again,” Patton mused.24 Finally feeling better, Patton climbed into his jeep and took off for a whirlwind tour of the front, visiting Millikin and Middleton’s headquarters before heading north to Bastogne. With sirens wailing, he drove through the precarious corridor to the newly liberated town. He wanted to the see the fruits of his labors and pin medals on McAuliffe and Lieutenant Colonel Chappuis, the commander of the 502nd Parachute Infantry Regiment, who had thrown back the Germans’ last attempt to break into Bastogne on Christmas Day. Patton rolled into Bastogne, declaring, “The town is well ‘liberated.’” He reached the main intersection in the center of town where he spotted an MP and asked him where he could find McAuliffe’s headquarters. The MP told him where it was and began to explain how to get there, when Patton cut him off. “Don’t tell me!” he corrected the MP, “tell my driver.”25 Knowing where to go, Patton drove to the barracks serving as McAuliffe’s headquarters and knocked on the door. A sergeant answered and Patton asked the shocked man, “Where’s the commanding general?” The sergeant scurried off and alerted McAuliffe’s staff, one of whom woke up McAuliffe, who hugged Patton upon seeing him. The two then drove to Chappuis’s headquarters where Patton pinned Distinguished Service Crosses on their chests. “No citation is necessary,” Patton told the two commanders, “your deeds speak for themselves.” Both officers were pleased and asked Patton to drive slowly when he toured the front so the men could see him.26 As Patton exited the headquarters, he spied a soldier with a camera and told him, “Now get a good one.” After the photo op, he examined several knocked out German tanks. He began calling other division commanders on a field telephone and bawling them out. When they complained about his demands, he simply answered, “I am up here. Why aren’t you?” He then climbed in his jeep for a tour of the front. Arriving at a hill on Bastogne’s perimeter, he got out and trudged through the snow, climbing a hill with his staff in tow. As he neared the top, an airborne captain calling artillery on several approaching German tanks yelled at him to

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Figure 47. Patton congratulates Brigadier General Anthony McAuliffe (left), the temporary commander of the 101st Airborne Division, and Lieutenant Colonel Steve Chappuis (center) on their defense of Bastogne. He had just pinned Distinguished Service Crosses on both men. Catalog number: 111-­SC 592467, National Archives and Records Administration.

get down, which he ignored. As he walked up, the captain called into his radio, “Fire for effect!” Artillery shells rained down on the area, one round dropping directly into a German tank’s hatch and exploding the ammunition within. “Now by God, that is good firing,” Patton told the captain before leaving.27 Patton next rode up on a group of paratroopers lying in the snow on the western perimeter. He barked at them, “Your colonel [Chappuis] brought me out here to show me the brave paratroopers who knocked out all those tanks on Christmas morning. I find you all face down in the snow, get the hell up out of there before you all catch pneumonia and die!” What he did not know was that the men had been pinned down by a German machine gunner who only fled when he heard Patton’s jeep approaching. The paratroopers got up and crossed the road. No more Germans attacked the area the rest of the day. At the sight of frozen

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German bodies near their tanks, he commented, “Finest battlefield I ever saw.”28 He praised almost all of Bastogne’s defenders, with only a backhanded insult to the artillery units manned by African Americans. While comparing the Black artillerymen to the Black quartermaster troops who also fought surrounded, Patton later wrote, “In contrast to some of the colored artillery, the colored Quartermaster men provided themselves with rifles and fought very well.”29 Back in Bastogne, Patton eyed an idle tank from Grow’s 6th Armored, sitting at the bottom of a hill. He barked at the tankers, “What do you think? This is a God dammed Sunday school picnic? Get after those God damn Germans!” The tankers had just reached Bastogne and stopped to celebrate their arrival with men of the 101st. They explained that their tank could not climb the hill since it didn’t have metal cleats. Patton ordered some armored infantrymen to gather hay from nearby farms and spread it in front of the tracks. The method worked and the tank slowly climbed the hill.30 He then visited a medical station and asked the station’s chaplain for a drink, knowing that chaplains frequently kept booze on them. “Are you wounded, general?” the chaplain queried. “No, I am not wounded,” he shot back. “Only the wounded get any of my liquor,” the chaplain explained. The response took Patton back for a moment before he said, “Thank you very much, chaplain.” Then he took out his flask and gave it to the chaplain. He saluted, and left the station.31 While Patton toured Bastogne, General Walker showed up at the Pescatore and asked Gay about the timing of his upcoming attack. Gay had no answers for him, since his attack would be determined by Millikin and Middleton’s progress, which, in turn, relied on Hodges’s First Army making its own effort to push south to Houffalize. If Hodges acted, he and Patton might have the Germans on the run. If he did not, it almost assured a slow grind for Third Army. Even Bradley could not ensure Hodges’s attack since First Army was still under Montgomery.32 When Patton got back to the Pescatore that evening, he took a call from Millikin who explained that, with Kilburn’s 11th Armored now attacking west to defeat the German flank attack, Grow’s 6th Armored would be the only armored division attacking north. Grow had recommended using his division to help keep the corridor to Bastogne open but Patton wanted him spearheading the attack.33 Patton, busy fighting his war, was oblivious to the crisis in command at SHAEF. The day before, Montgomery had written to Eisenhower calling

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for direct command over all ground operations in Europe. “You cannot possibly do it yourself,” Montgomery wrote, “and so you would have to nominate someone else.” He also told Eisenhower exactly how to issue the order. “I suggest your directive should finish with the sentence: 12 and 21 Army Groups will develop operations in accordance with the above instructions. ‘From now onwards full operational direction, control, and co-­ordination of these operations is vested in the C-­in-­C. 21 Army Group, subject to instructions as may be issued by the Supreme Commander from time to time.’”34 The letter left Eisenhower in a rage and he wrote a letter to Marshall that either Montgomery had to go or he would. He recommended replacing Montgomery with Field Marshal Harold Alexander, who had commanded Patton and Montgomery in Sicily as the commander of 15th Army Group. Smith convinced him to hold off sending it. De Guingand learned about the tension flew to Eisenhower’s Versailles headquarters where Eisenhower showed him the letter he was preparing to send. De Guingand asked for twenty-­four hours to rectify the situation and flew to Montgomery’s headquarters where he explained to Montgomery his gaffe and offered him a letter he had already prepared for the field marshal to sign. It included the sentence, “you can rely on me one hundred percent to make it work.” The gambit worked. Montgomery would stay, but there was no longer a question of Eisenhower’s authority.35 Had Patton known about the blow up, he would have insisted that Eisenhower send the letter. He respected Alexander and got along with him far better than with Montgomery. While the command crisis swirled around SHAEF and Montgomery, Patton, oblivious to calamity, received some good news from England, where a British correspondent, describing that the German offensive had become a rout, admitted, “Overall gains of three miles have been made today, with most of the progress on the southern flank, where Lt. Gen. George S. Patton’s men are attacking.”36 Quite the opposite story to his rival Montgomery. An editorial in London’s Daily Express praised his battlefield victories in the past, present, and future: There is a need for a quick thruster as well as a deep thinker to show the way to Berlin. A fine example of the thruster is Patton. As he led that smashing dash through the gap in the Normandy line right across the width of France and his soldiers said, “Give Georgie a

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pint of petrol and he’ll go anywhere.” Patton’s vigor once caused controversy. There is nothing but praise for him today.37 The next morning, the last day of 1944, Millikin launched his attack northeast of Bastogne, using Grow’s 6th Armored, Baade’s 35th, and Paul’s 26th Divisions. Gaffey’s 4th Armored was supposed to join the attack but he and his men were exhausted and needed a break. The division, relieved by the 11th Armored Division, instead protected the Bastogne corridor.38 In Eddy’s XII Corps sector, Miley’s fresh 17th Airborne Division finally reached the front and began relieving Cota’s burned-­out and fragmented 28th Division, which had not only been one of the first divisions to face the German onslaught but had also fought every day without letup for more than two weeks.39 Millikin’s attack faced delays even before it began when Kilburn’s 11th Armored tankers blocked a road designated for Grow’s 6th Armored. The delay meant only one Combat Command was in place for the noon attack.40 In the snow and ice, the Germans counterattacked, driving back Paul’s 26th Division and Kilburn’s 11th Armored. Patton wrote that they “fought well but stupidly lost too many tanks.”41 The Germans also made several small attacks that evening against Baade’s 35th, leaving Patton to worry they might launch a large, single attack that night or early the next morning. “To day [sic] had been a slugging match,” he wrote Beatrice.42 Despite the hit, Grow’s 6th Armored launched on schedule, smashing into the flank of a German attack. “Had this not happened, this could have been critical,” Patton wrote. “As it was, we stopped the attack in its tracks.” He could not help but reflect on his own role, masking his pride in humility. “Historians will claim that such perfect timing was a stroke of jenius [sic]. It was just mulishness [stubbornness] on my part. I had no idea the Germans were attacking.” Grow’s tankers then managed to drive north and, by evening, had fought to Neffe, an advance of two miles. “This may pull the teeth of the attack,” Patton wrote optimistically in his diary. Still, he was not satisfied, wanting all of Millikin’s troops to stay on the offensive, driving and flanking the Germans before them. He believed the enemy was ready to break, explaining to his staff that the Germans had “shot their wad.”43 He wrote Beatrice, “Tomorrow will be the crucial test. I think, in fact know, we will stop them and attack at once.”44 While Millikin fought toe-­to-­toe with the Germans, Patton’s air support let him down. Eighth Air Force bombers hit Gaffey’s headquarters,

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as well as soldiers of the 4th Division in Echternach. The day before, American anti-­aircraft gunners in Luxembourg City shot down a P-­47 Thunderbolt aircraft, even though it was not firing on any Americans. Many of Patton’s staff witnessed the shootdown, which one of his offices described as “inexcusable.”45 Spaatz, Doolittle, and Vandenberg visited Patton to figure out how to stop the rumors of Germans flying captured P-­47s. Whenever aircraft strafed American troops, everyone assumed they were piloted by Germans. The generals decided not to fly any P-­47s above Eddy’s or Walker’s corps for one day to prove the point. They also decided that there would be no official reports of friendly fire cases, since it only hurt morale. Ground troops would be forbidden to fire on an aircraft unless attacked or the enemy aircraft was positively identified. Pilots would be better briefed before flights and told that in case of doubt, do not bomb.46 In a possible attempt to mollify Patton, General Vandenberg sent him a quote from one of his unit commanders: “That is the way to fight a war, keep driving. My pilots will fly their hearts out in a battle like that.” Vandenberg explained that the quote exemplified how everyone in the Ninth Air Force felt.47 That day, for the first time during the Battle of the Bulge, Patton’s Pescatore headquarters came under enemy artillery fire, rumored to be from a German 17cm Kanone 18, which could fire a shell nine miles. It was more of a nuisance than a serious threat and only caused light damage.48 Another rumor spread among the tankers of the 6th Armored Division that Patton had sent officers into several Belgian towns to ask the mayors to have the local women turn their white bedsheets into capes for Third Army infantry and tankers. That was something in fact done by McAuliffe’s 101st during the siege of Bastogne.49 Patton took a break from the war by accepting a party invitation from his Donut Dollies in Luxembourg City. They had decorated their billets with flowers and served roast beef and liquor. The women also pooled their Christmas packages to create hors d’oeuvres of peanuts, anchovies, and olives with thick slices of bread. “I guess them’s dainty enough for the old man,” commented a helping GI. After dinner, Patton regaled the women by singing “Lilly from Piccadilly,” beating the time with his finger—­substituting his own salty words for the song’s lyrics.50 Patton’s Third Army had one more surprise for the Germans. As the clock struck midnight, ringing in the new year—­1945—­every gun under Patton’s command fired rapidly for twenty minutes. When the barrage

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ended, forward observers reported they could hear Germans screaming in the woods.51 It was the perfect exclamation point to 1944 and a harbinger of the kind of death and destruction Patton would rain on the enemy for the next five months of the war in Europe. The previous five months of 1944 had seen Patton at the height of his powers. He was the risk taker, the daring commander who raced across France, who remained on the attack in the face of fuel and ammunition shortages, who fought through pouring rain and mud, who turned his army ninety-­five degrees north, who attacked the enemy three days after he boasted he would, who relieved the surrounded troops in Bastogne, and who continued to assault the enemy when no one else could. Both 1942 and 1943 had seen Patton learning how to work the levers of command as a corps and then an army commander in combat. He had fought Vichy French, Italian troops, and German regular army soldiers in North Africa and Sicily. In the latter half of 1944, on the continent of Europe, he faced a much more determined enemy, consisting of not only German regular army troops but paratroopers and the dreaded SS soldiers, who fought fanatically. Yet, Patton bested them, bypassing them, fighting them toe-­to-­toe, forcing them back through mud and rainstorms, and finally, cracking their vaunted Ardennes Offensive. By the time he pushed north of Bastogne, on the battle-­scarred and snow-­swept hills of Belgium and Luxembourg, he was the master of the battlefield, proving once again that World War II was truly his war.

Acknowledgments There were two people I left out of my volume 1 acknowledgments who greatly influenced and helped me, and I want to make up for that lapse: Martin Blumenson and Carlo D’Este. Although I did not work with Carlo much, he was always kind and encouraging to me. He even wrote a blurb for my first book. Martin was different: he became a mentor and a friend. He encouraged me to write my first book. He also helped me through the publishing process and wrote the book’s introduction. We later collaborated on a short Patton biography that we worked on together until his death. One of my favorite memories of Martin is going to his apartment every Wednesday night and him, once or twice, saying to me, “I don’t feel like working tonight, Kevin, let’s watch the Orioles game.” I will also always remember the first time I met him and he asked me to do some research for him. I was gobsmacked and I remember thinking, “He wants me to do research for him?” I wish Martin and Carlo could see this book. The folks at the Library of Congress Manuscripts Division cannot seem to get rid of me. They may have thought that all the research I’ve done over the years would satiate my need for more materials, but they were mistaken. My good friend there, Bruce Kirby, continued to help me with my research and provide an ear when I had to ramble on about my latest finding. He was the one who showed me how to access Patton’s actual diaries (and not the transcribed embellished one his wife put out). Lewis Wyman scanned numerous photo album pages for me and put up with my jokes. The rest of the staff includes Loretta Deaver, Patrick Kerwin, Edith Sandler, Lara Szypszak, and Kerrie Cotton Williams. The staff in the Main Reading Room got me everything I needed on my Saturday visits for years, and the team at the Veterans History Project, 367

368 Acknowledgments

especially Justina Maloney, helped me access the endless soldiers’ stories they had collected. Everyone at the National Archives and Records Administration has always been helpful to me, especially Alexandra Lange in Still Pictures. Tim Nenninger, the branch chief for Modern Military Records, offered advice and wisdom to my research. He would often show up at my research desk with a box of papers, telling me he had stumbled over some documents that were relevant to Patton. You can’t put a price on that. Mitch Yockelson is not only an expert on twentieth-­century warfare, he is also a great European tour guide, and an even better friend. He’s always good for a history chat in the Archives cafeteria or a café somewhere in England. Other people who helped me include: Robin Cookson, Mike Dolan, Sue Strange, Sim Smiley, and Nathan Patch. Other people and research facilities gave this book the color and layers needed to provide a better understanding of Patton. They include the staff of the University of Tennessee’s Special Collections: Justin Eastwood, Nick Wyman, Elizabeth Dunham, and William Eigelsbach. Dr. Jessica Sheets at the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, showed me Paul Harkins’s photo albums. The staff at the Patton Museum at Fort Knox, Kentucky, helped me with extant texts and veteran interviews. Carol Fowler at the National Guard Militaria Museum of New Jersey, worked hard to get me a soldier’s story. Luke Sprague, the oral historian at the Wisconsin Veterans Museum, sent me several excellent veteran interviews. Several professional soldiers/historians at the U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where I worked for three years, helped me with my research and writing, making me a better historian. They include Don Wright, Rod Cox, Carl Fischer, Kevin Kennedy, and Ryan Wadle. Kevin wore two hats as editor and running partner in numerous races and obstacle courses. Additionally, Fort Leavenworth’s Combined Arms Research Library helped me with endless research. Those helpers include Edwin Burgess, Mallory Owens, Theresa Taylor, Michael Browne, Russell Rafferty, and Joanne Knight. Although I did not lead any tours in 2022 for Stephen Ambrose Historical Tours, I still wanted to give everyone there a shout out since I’m sure this book will help grow my tour groups: Yakir Katz, Claire Heller Aubrey, Mark Bielski, Olga Degtjarewsky, Cheryl DalPozzal, Jenni DeLong, Terri Sercovich, and Carrie Williamson. I have shared a lot of laughs (and drinks) with my fellow tour guides, tour managers, and

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bus drivers. They have made me look good and broadened my historical horizons. They include Chris Anderson, Matt Broggie, Rick Beyer, Steve Bourque, Charles Bower, Hank de Jong, Alex Eversman, Eric Flint, Connie Kennedy, Richard Latture, John Mountcastle, Marty Morgan, Koop Steenbergen, Bryan Perissutti, and the late Steve Weiss. My buddy Keith Buchanan, who is now with Sharon Snow, gets a special shout out for always making my tours fun, even though he accuses me of looking like Pete Rose. My boss at Arlington National Cemetery, Dr. Steve Carney, the command historian, deserves special acknowledgement, for all his encouragement and compliments about how impressed he is at my historian talents and my well-­managed personal life. Although currently I rarely see my fellow historians because of Covid protocols, I look forward to seeing them when I can. They include Allison Finkelstein, Tim Frank, and Rod Gainer. My fellow contractor, Jenifer Van Vleck also helped with everything related to this book. In addition, Sovereign Media gang publish my articles in WWII History and WWII Quarterly magazines. The team includes Carl Gnam, Mark Hintz, Samantha Detulleo, Mike Haskew, and Flint Whitlock. Another special thanks goes to the Brothers family, Alan, Joan, Lindsey, and Zach, for letting me use their vacation house on St. Helena Island in South Carolina, twice. The uncluttered atmosphere, free of television and telephones, enabled me to concentrate and get this ball rolling and then to refocus when I needed to. Finally, Bobby Wright again provided the excellent maps in these pages. Bobby has been a pleasure to work with. I hope we can do it again, as soon as I complete volume 3. As always, it was a pleasure working with the team at the University of Missouri Press (and I’m sure it was for them). All have been tolerant of my sense of humor and some have even helped me play a few practical jokes on the team. They include Dr. John McManus, Curators’ Distinguished Professor of U.S. military history at the Missouri University of Science and Technology (Missouri S&T) and Andrew Davidson, the editor in chief. The rest of the staff includes Mary Conley, Tracy Tritschler, Robin Rennison, Deanna Davis, Megan Casey-­Sparrius, Drew Griffith, and David Rosenbaum. Dr. Irina du Quenoy did a lot of heavy lifting as my primary editor. She deserves a medal for all her work. Other friends who helped me out along the way include Bruce, Nancy, Jacqueline, and Hannah Hall, Dave and Amanda Rudolph, Jeff and Claire Noble, Lynn and Susan Berg, Joe Balkoski, Marianne Bella,

370 Acknowledgments

Douglas Bekke, Kevin Biscoe, Didier Burki, Mario Calonge, Kay and Camille Casey, Christian and Erin Chae, Lucio Corsini, Michaela Dean, Mike and Stephanie Delaune, Joël Denis, Raymond Denkhaus, Scott Devine, Don Fox, John Elliott, Carlota Espinosa, Jr., Geoff Emeigh, Liz Fraser, Adi Frimark, Harry Gilbert, Elisabeth Gozzo, Denny Hair, John Harlow, Vince Hodge, George Hoffmann, Jennifer Holik, Mike and Kate Hudson, Charles Ingram, Lena King, Cole Kingseed, Bob Knutsen, Renee Lambert, Rian Large, Richard Latture, Charles LaValle, Tim Lawson, Kerry Lynn, David Mansburger, John Marchetti, Annette McDermott, Don McKeown, Kerry Meeker, Eric and Peter Metz, Paul Minus, Pete Murphy, Mike Nadonley, Jonathan Neumann, Ward Nickdish, Les Owens, Don Patton, Helen Patton, Vince Pecoraro, Bill Perret, Tyler Perry, David Peterson, Carlton Philpot, Mark Pirrung, Clint Poole, Bob Quackenbush, Mark Reardon, Mike Riha, Steve Schaick, Rodney Scully, Matt Seelinger, Keri Selig, Mary Soule, Ron Stassen, Koop Steenbergen, Brooke Stoddard, Monika Stoy, Judy Taylor, Sheryl and Helen Tiseth, Ashley Topolosky, Jeff Trammel, Rob and Penka Trimble, Cyd Upson, Olivia Van Den Heuvel, Barbara Venske, Amber Vincent, Patricia von Papen, Larry Weinberg, Paul Woodadge, Mike Yarborough, Dave Zabecki, and Jim Zwit. Colonel Tom Hanson (USA Ret.) gave my manuscript a thorough scrubbing and compared me to Leo Tolstoy (and not in a good way). He used to be my boss, in charge of the U.S. Army’s Combat Studies Institute, including my Afghan Study Team. After the Army terminated the team, I used to spend my time in the Fort Leavenworth Library, working on the Patton trilogy. Tom came to visit me one day and told me he wished he had my job. I reminded him I didn’t have health insurance and he countered about how hard it was to manage historians. My buddy Tony Carlson was a constant source of encouragement but did not help me as much with volume 2 since he is busy writing his own book. My extended family gets another shout out: Amy and Robert Moorer, Beth, Joy, and Peggy Hymel, Madeline and R. J. Flieschmann, Judi and Jim Jacobs, and Greg and Rachel Hymel. Finally, my Pop, Gary G. Hymel, who now lives back in New Orleans, gave me the important first edit. He shares my fascination with American history and edits just about all my freelance writings. I don’t think anyone is more excited about volume 3 than he is.

Notes Preface

1. Inter-­Office Memo to BAP, January 2, 1953, box 2, file 13, George S. Patton Collection (hereafter GSP Collection), Library of Congress (hereafter LOC). 2. George S. Patton diary (hereafter GSP diary), August 7, 1944, box 3, file 7, GSP Collection, LOC. 3. GSP diary, August 7, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634.00110 /?sp=84&st=text. 4. GSP Diary, August 13, 1944, GSP Collection, LOC.

Introduction

1. Michael S. Sherry, The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 148; Norman Polmar and Thomas B. Allen, World War II: America at War (New York: Random House, 1991), 26–28. 2. Polmar and Allen, World War II, 38, 39; Barrie Pitt and Frances Pitt, The Month-­ by-­Month Atlas of World War II (New York: Summit Books, 1989), 134. 3. Russell Weigley, History of the U.S. Army (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 569.

Chapter One

1. John Bleggi, interviewed by Benjamin Bahlmann, December 7, 2000, Saving the Legacy: An Oral History of Utah’s World War II Veterans, tape number 397–380, Fort Douglas Military Museum and Marriot Library, Special Collections Department, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah. 2. Joseph Driscoll, “Birthday with Patton’s Army,” New York Herald Tribune, November 11, 1944, box 12, folder 13, GSP Collection, LOC; Elizabeth Mullener, War Stories: Remembering World War II (New York: Berkley Books, 2002), 155. 3. Kevin M. Hymel, Patton’s War: An American General’s Combat Leadership, vol. 1, November 1942–July 1944 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2021), 329. 4. Charles M. Province, Patton’s Third Army: A Chronology of the Third Army Advance, August, 1944 to May, 1945 (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1992), 17, 294. 5. Shelby Stanton, World War II Order of Battle: An Encyclopedia Reference to U.S. Army Ground Forces from Battalion through Division 1939–1946 (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1984), 53, 56–56, 89, 118, 147, 149, 154, 163.

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6. Martin Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit: The United States Army in World War II (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1989), 345. 7. Kevin M. Hymel, “Armored Blitz to Avranches,” WWII History 10, no. 1 (December 2010): 46–47. 8. Don M. Fox, Patton’s Vanguard: The United States Army Fourth Armored Division (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2003), 57. 9. GSP diary, August 1, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634.00110 /?sp=73&st=text. 10. GSP speeches and writings, [n.d.], box 64, folder 9, GSP Collection, LOC. 11. John Nelson Rickard, Forward with Patton: The World War II Diary of Colonel Robert S. Allen (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2017), 61. 12. Hymel, Patton’s War, 1:297–98. 13. D. K. R. Crosswell, Beetle: The Life of General Walter Bedell Smith (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2010), 652–53. 14. Everett Hughes to Theresa Hughes, August 2, 1944, box II:3, folder 4, Everett Hughes Papers, LOC. 15. James Wellard, General George S. Patton Jr.: Man under Mars (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1946), 161. 16. John Wolver, “A Man to Remember: Gen. George Patton,” unknown source, December 24, 1945, Patton’s Scrapbooks, reel 5, GSP Collection, LOC. 17. Mullener, War Stories, 157. 18. Robert Allen collection, unpublished diary, p. (2-­A) 16, the Patton Museum; Forrest C. Pogue, Pogue’s War: Diaries of a WWII Combat Historian (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2001), 182. 19. Mullener, War Stories, 157. 20. Bradford J. “BJ” Shedo, XIX Tactical Air Command and Ultra: Patton’s Force Enhancers in the 1944 Campaign in France (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2001), 29 21. Shedo, XIX Tactical Air Command and Ultra, 28. 22. Charles Codman, Drive (Boston: Little, Brown, 1957), 158; Lewis H. Brereton, The Brereton Diaries: War in the Air in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941–8 May, 1945 (New York: William Morrow, 1946), 324. 23. Omar Bradley, A Soldier’s Story (New York: Modern Library, 1999), 338. 24. Shedo, XIX Tactical Air Command and Ultra, 10. 25. Shedo, XIX Tactical Air Command and Ultra, 3, 4, 26. 26. Shedo, XIX Tactical Air Command and Ultra, 16; Rickard, Forward with Patton, 61. 27. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 349. 28. Oscar W. Koch, G-­2: Intelligence for Patton (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 1999), 85–86. 29. GSP diary, August 1, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634.00110 /?sp=73&st=text. 30. Alwyn Featherston, Saving the Breakout: The 30th Division’s Heroic Stand at Mortain August 7–12, 1944 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993), 48–49; GSP diary, August 1, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC.

notes to chapter two

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31. Kevin M. Hymel, “The 90th Infantry Division Comes of Age: One of the Worst Infantry Divisions in the U.S. Army Turned Itself Around during the Drive Across France,” WWII History 10, no. 3 (March 2011): 58. 32. Milton F. Perry and Barbara W. Parke, Patton and His Pistols: The Favorite Sidearms of General George S. Patton (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, 1957), 84. 33. Robert Allen collection, unpublished diary, p. (5) 3, the Patton Museum. 34. Nancy Caldwell Sorel, The Women Who Wrote the War (New York: Arcade, 1999), 250. 35. Frank James Price, Troy Middleton: A Biography (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1974), 187, 88. 36. George F. Hofmann, The Super Sixth: A History of the Sixth Armored Division in World War II (Nashville: Battery Press, 2000), 72, 343; GSP diary, August 1, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC; Brenton Greene Wallace, Patton and His Third Army (n.p.: War Vault, 2019), 52. 37. GSP diary, August 1, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC. 38. Jonathan Gawne, 1944 American in Brittany: The Battle for Brest (Paris: Histoire & Collections, 2002), 19; GSP diary, August 1, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC. 39. GSP diaries, August 1, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634.00 110/?sp=73&st=text. 40. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 370. 41. Kevin M. Hymel, “Freeing Mont Saint Michel,” WWII History 7, no. 4 (Summer 2016): 54–59. 42. Shedo, XIX Tactical Air Command and Ultra, 32. 43. GSP diary, August 1, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC.

Chapter Two

1. GSP diary, August 2, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634.00110 /?sp=75&st=text. 2. Charles Codman, Drive (Boston: Little, Brown, 1957), 158. 3. GSP diary, August 2, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634.00110 /?sp=76&st=text. 4. Aaron Elson, Tanks for the Memories: The 712th Tank Battalion during World War II (Hackensack, NJ: Chi Chi Press, 2001), 305. 5. Hobart Winebrenner and Michael McCoy, Bootprints: An Infantryman’s Walk through World War II (Albion, IN: Camp Camamajo Press, 2005), 97–98. 6. Gerald Ascher, WWII Veterans Surveys, 90th Infantry Division, box 1, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center (hereafter USAHEC), n.d. 7. GSP diary, August 2, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC. 8. Codman, Drive, 158–59. 9. Paul Harkins, When the Third Army Cracked Europe: The Story of Patton’s Incredible Army (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, 1969), 18. 10. Milton F. Perry and Barbara W. Parke, Patton and His Pistols: The Favorite Sidearms of General George S. Patton (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, 1957), 76; GSP diary, August 2, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634.00110/?sp=76&st=text.

374

notes to chapter two

11. Vic Hillery and Emerson Hurley, Paths of Armor: The Fifth Armored Division in World War II (Nashville: Battery Press, 1985), 47–48; Lunsford E. Oliver to John Stokes, Records of the Army Staff, Center of Military History, Breakout and Pursuit, RG 319, entry 93, box 9, n.d. 12. GSP diary, August 2, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC, , https://www .loc.gov/resource/mss35634.00110/?sp=78&st=text. 13. Martin Blumenson, The Battle of the Generals: The Untold Story of the Falaise Pocket—­The Campaign That Should Have Won World War II (New York: William Morrow, 1993), 159. 14. GSP diary, August 2, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC; Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier’s Story (New York: Modern Library, 1999) 363; George F. Hofmann, The Super Sixth: A History of the Sixth Armored Division in World War II (Nashville: Battery Press, 2000), 72; James Wellard, General George S. Patton Jr.: Man under Mars (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1946), 149. 15. GSP diary, August 2, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC. 16. Wellard, Man under Mars, 149. 17. Martin Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit: The United States Army in World War II (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1989), 426–28, 431. 18. Harry C. Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower: The Personal Diary of Captain Harry C. Butcher, USNR, Naval Aide to General Eisenhower (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946), 630. 19. William Upham, interview by James McIntosh, 2001, OH83, transcript, Wisconsin Veterans Museum Oral History Program, Madison, WI. 20. Larry Newman, “Only Pet Dog Defied Patton,” New York Journal of America, n.d.; “Death of ‘Finest Man I ever Knew’ Brings Patton’s Orderly His Saddest Christmas,” by MSG William Meeks, unsourced article, December 26, 1945, Patton’s Scrapbooks, reel 5, GSP Collection, LOC; Everett Hughes to Theresa Hughes, August 2, 1944, box II:3, folder 4, Everett Hughes Papers, LOC. 21. GSP to BAP, August 3 and 25, 1944, box 12, folders 5 and 7, GSP Collection, LOC; Denny G. Hair, The Third Army Goes to War (Houston: Third Army Publishing, 2018), 95. 22. Benton Greene Wallace, Patton and His Third Army (n.p.: War Vault, 2019), 201. 23. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 432. 24. Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower, 632. 25. GSP diary, August 3, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC 26. G-­3 Historical Subsection, Third Army Operations: Campaign of France August to September, 1944, a Brief Summary (G-­3 652nd ENGR [TOP.] BN); Peter A. Belpulsi, A GI’s View of World War II (Salem, MA: Globe Publishing, 1997), 87. 27. George S. Patton, War as I Knew It (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1975), 82. 28. Blumenson, Battle of the Generals, 167. 29. Bradford J. “BJ” Shedo, XIX Tactical Air Command and Ultra: Patton’s Force Enhancers in the 1944 Campaign in France (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2001), 33, 34, 37.

notes to chapter two

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30. Alden Hatch, George Patton: General in Spurs (New York: Julian Messner, 1973), 139. 31. Patton, War as I Knew It, 71. 32. Hofmann, Super Sixth, 74–75; Codman, Drive, 161. 33. Harkins, When the Third Army Cracked Europe, 18. 34. GSP diaries, August 4, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00110/?sp=80&st=text. 35. William C. Butz, World War II as I Saw It (Albany, NY: SpectraGraphics, 2005), 16; Matthew A. Rozell, The Things Our Fathers Saw, vol. 5, D-­Day and Beyond (Hartford, CT: Woodchuck Press, 2019), 268. 36. Embry D. Lagrew, interviewed by Richard Bean, May 21, 1986, Louie B. Nunn Center for Oral History, University of Kentucky. 37. John S. Wood, Memories and Reflections, unpublished memoir, 1956–1966, the Jack Hixson collection, Leavenworth, KS, 70. 38. Wood, Memories and Reflections, 75. 39. Russell Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants: The Campaign of France and Germany, 1944–1945 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 178–79; Martin Blumenson, The Duel for France, 1944: The Men and Battles That Changed the Fate of Europe (Lebanon, IN: Da Capo, 1963), 166–69; Don M. Fox, Patton’s Vanguard: The United States Army Fourth Armored Division (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2003), 66. 40. Telephone conversation between GSP and ONB, August 6, 1944, box 12, folder 5, GSP Collection, LOC. 41. Lt. Col. Kenneth W. Hechler to Charles B. MacDonald, June 22,1956, RG 319, Records of the Army Staff, Center of Military History, Breakout and Pursuit, Correspondence, Memorandum, Notes Relating to Seine, the Drive to-­Chapter 26, entry 93, box 9, NARA. 42. Patton, War as I Knew It, 70. 43. Kevin M. Hymel, “The 90th Infantry Division Comes of Age, WWII History,10, no. 3 (March 2011): 58; Roger Hasketh, Fortitude: The D-­Day Deception (New York: Overlook Press, 2000), 270; Wood, Memories and Reflections, 64; James L. Christopulos, Combat Engineer: A World War II Memoir (n.p.: independently published, 2019), 51. 44. GSP diary, August 5, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC. 45. John T. Greenwood, ed., Normandy to Victory: The War Diary of General Courtney H. Hodges and the First U.S. Army (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2008), 86. 46. Frank James Price, Troy H. Middleton: A Biography (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1974), 187. 47. GSP diary, August 6,1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC. 48. GSP to BAP, August 6, 1944, box 12, folder 5, GSP Collection, LOC; Bradley, Soldier’s Story, 365–66. 49. Blumenson, Battle of the Generals, 163. 50. Patton, War as I Knew It, 134. 51. Shedo, XIX Tactical Air Command and Ultra, 38.

376

notes to chapter two

52. GSP diary, August 6–7, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC; Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 561–62. 53. Wilson A. Heefner, Patton’s Bulldog: The Life and Service of General Walton H. Walker (Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Books, 2001), 69–70. 54. Codman, Drive, 159. 55. Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers, vol. 2 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974), 500, 502; Perry and Parke, Patton and His Pistols, 79; GSP diary, August 6, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634.00110/?sp=82&st=text. 56. GSP to Henry Arnold, August 17, 1944, box 12, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC; Shedo, XIX Tactical Air Command and Ultra, 10, 11, 28; A. C. Wedemeyer, Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, July 23,1943, the Papers of Everett S. Hughes, box 6, folder 4, LOC; Kevin M. Hymel, “Freeing Mont Saint Michel,” WWII History 7, no. 4 (Summer 2016): 57; David N. Spires, Patton’s Air Force: Forging a Legendary Air-­ Ground Team (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2002), 67; Stanley P. Hirshson, General Patton: A Soldier’s Life (New York: HarperCollins, 2002), 522. 57. Hirshson, General Patton, 506, 507. 58. Chet Hansen diaries, box 4, files 11, August 7, 1944, Chester B. Hansen Collection, USAHEC; Hap Gay diaries, August 7, 1944, p. 445, USAHEC; Oscar W. Koch, G-­2: Intelligence for Patton (Atglen, PA: Schliffer Military History, 1999), 77, 78; Shedo, XIX Tactical Air Command and Ultra, 46. 59. Omar Bradley, A General’s Life: An Autobiography by General of the Army Omar N. Bradley (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 293. 60. Shedo, XIX Tactical Air Command and Ultra, 26, 55, 57. 61. Shedo, XIX Tactical Air Command and Ultra, 56. 62. Hofmann, Super Sixth, 82; Fox, Patton’s Vanguard, 76. 63. Bradley, Soldier’s Story, 375; 64. Zeno P. “Buddy” King, interview, June 12, 2012, Nimitz Education and Research Center, the National Museum of the Pacific War, Fredericksburg, TX, 20, 21. 65. GSP diary, August 8, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC; Anthony Penrose, ed., Lee Miller’s War: Beyond D-­Day (London: Thames and Hudson, 2014), 33. 66. Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower, 637. 67. Alden Hatch, General George Patton: Old Blood and Guts (New York: Sterling Publishing, 2006), 147. 68. William Randolph Hearst Jr., “A Glimpse of Patton,” unknown publication and date, Patton Scrapbooks, reel 1, GSP Collection, LOC. 69. Hearst, “Glimpse of Patton.” 70. Frederick Ayer, Before the Colors Fade: Portrait of a Soldier, George S. Patton (Atlanta, GA: Cherokee Publishing, 1964), 151. 71. Hap Gay diaries, August 1944, p. 2, USAHEC; Robert S. Allen, Lucky Forward: The History of Patton’s Third U.S. Army (New York: Vanguard Press, 1947), 159. 72. Hirshson, General Patton, 513. 73. Kevin M. Hymel, Patton’s Photographs: War as He Saw It (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2006), 62.

notes to chapter three

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74. Conversation between ONB and GSP, August 7, 1944, box 12, folder 5, GSP Collection, LOC; Kevin M. Hymel, “Strong Stand atop Mortain,” WWII History 11, no. 5 (July 2012): 48–55. 75. Shedo, XIX Tactical Air Command and Ultra, 59, 60. 76. Bradley, Soldier’s Story, 375; GSP diary, August 8, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC. 77. GSP diary, August 8, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC. 78. GSP to BAP, August 8, 1944, box 12, file 5, GSP Collection, LOC. 79. Dennis W. Whitaker and Shelagh Whitaker, Rhineland: The Battle to Win the War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989), 14. 80. Horace Blaine Henry, interview transcript as told to David Strand, p. 15, Veterans History Project, LOC, n.d. 81. Blumenson, Battle of the Generals, 194–95. 82. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 497. 83. GSP diary, August 9, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC; Robert Allen collection, unpublished diary, p. 2-­A 21, the Patton Museum; Allen, Lucky Forward, 106. 84. Nigel Hamilton, Monty: The Battles of Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery (New York: Random House, 1981), 361. 85. GSP diary, August 9, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC. 86. Rick Beyer and Elizabeth Sayles, The Ghost Army of World War II: How One Top-­Secret Unit Deceived the Enemy with Inflatable Tanks, Sound Effects, and Other Audacious Trickery (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2015), 20, 70, 71. 87. Beyer and Sayles, Ghost Army of World War II, 71. 88. “Interview between General Patton and Captured German General,” August 9, 1944, 2030 hours, box 52, file 18, GSP Collection, LOC. 89. Robert Allen collection, unpublished diary, pp. 2, 5, the Patton Museum; Hofmann, Super Sixth, 83–91; Kevin M. Hymel, “Freeing Mont Saint Michel,” 58.

Chapter Three

1. John S.D. Eisenhower, The Bitter Woods (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1969), 78. 2. Bradford J. “BJ” Shedo, XIX Tactical Air Command and Ultra: Patton’s Force Enhancers in the 1944 Campaign in France (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2001), 72. 3. GSP to Fred Ayer, August 18, 1944, box 12, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC. 4. GSP to Fred Ayer, August 18, 1944, box 12, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC. 5. Hap Gay diaries, August 1944, p. 452, USAHEC. 6. “Soldier Says Life Saved by Patton,” Associated Press, February 21, 1945, Patton Scrapbooks, reel 1, GSP Collection, LOC; “Old Blood and Guts Saved ’Em for This GI,” Stars and Stripes, February 21, 1945. 7. George S. Patton, War as I Knew It (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1975), 73. 8. Robert S. Allen, Lucky Forward: The History of Patton’s Third Army (New York: Vanguard Press, 1947), 40–41.

378

notes to chapter three

9. Alden Hatch, George Patton: General in Spurs (New York: Julian Messner, 1973), 140–41. 10. GSP diary, August 11, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC. 11. William V. McDermott, A Surgeon in Combat: European Theater—­World War II, Omaha Beach to Ebensee, 1943–1945 (Dublin: William L. Bauhan, 1998), 125. 12. Martin Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit: The United States Army in World War II (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1989), 495. 13. Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers, vol. 2 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974), 508. 14. John MacVane, On the Air in World War II (New York: William Morrow, 1979), 268. 15. Bernard L. Montgomery to ONB, August 10, 1944, box 12, folder 5, GSP Collection, LOC. 16. Kevin M. Hymel, “Strong Stand atop Mortain,” WWII History 11, no. 5 (July 2012): 9. 17. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 501. 18. Hap Gay diaries, August 1944, p. 458, USAHEC. 19. Stanley Hirshson, General Patton: A Soldier’s Life (New York: HarperCollins, 2002), 515. 20. Martin Blumenson, The Duel for France, 1944: The Men and Battles That Changed the Fate of Europe (Lebanon, IN: DaCapo, 1963), 256, 269; Ronald Lewin, Ultra Goes to War: The First Account of World War II’s Greatest Secrets Based on Official Documents (New York: McGraw-­Hill, 1978), 344. 21. Omar Bradley, A General’s Life: An Autobiography by General of the Army Omar N. Bradley (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 297; Omar Bradley, A Soldier’s Story (New York: Modern Library, 1999), 376. 22. Vic Hillery and Emerson Hurley, Paths of Armor: The Fifth Armored Division in World War II (Nashville: Battery Press, 1985), 62; Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 502. 23. Martin Blumenson, The Battle of the Generals: The Untold Story of the Falaise Picket—­The Campaign That Should Have Won World War II (New York: William Morrow, 1993), 207. 24. GSP diary, August 12, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634.00110 /?sp=89&st=text. 25. Bradley, Soldier’s Story, 378; GSP diary, August 12, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC. 26. Hillery and Hurley, Paths of Armor, 64. 27. GSP diary, August 16, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634.00110 /?sp=94&st=text. 28. Blumenson, Duel for France, 274, 275. Patton’s transcribed diaries make references to “a large number of time bombs” and calls Montgomery’s plans to close the Falaise pocket “a great mistake.” These sentences are not found in the original diaries. 29. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 514–15. 30. GSP diary, August 13, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00110/?sp=89&st=text.

notes to chapter three

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31. Allen, Lucky Forward, 108. 32. GSP diary, August 16, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634.00 110/?sp=94&st=text&r=-­0.108,-­0.083,1.216,1.66,0. 33. Robert Allen collection, unpublished diary, p. 3, 1, the Patton Museum. 34. GSP to BAP, August 13, 1944, box 12, folder 6, GSP Collection, LOC; GSP diary, August 13, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC. 35. George S. Patton Jr., War as I Knew It (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1975), 74. 36. Shedo, XIX Tactical Air Command and Ultra, 64. 37. Phillip S. Meilinger, Hoyt S. Vandenberg: The Life of a General (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), 52. 38. GSP to BAP, August 15, 1944, box 21, file 6, GSP Collection, LOC. 39. “Patton Is Leading Armored Assault,” Hobart Democrat-­Chief (Hobart, OK), August 15, 1944. 40. Harry C. Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946), 641. 41. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 568. 42. Eisenhower, Bitter Woods, 50; GSP diary, August 14, 1944, LOC, https://www .loc.gov/resource/mss35634.00110/?sp=92&st=text. 43. Blumenson, Duel for France, 276; H. Essame, Patton: A Study in Command (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1974), 173. 44. Hap Gay diaries, August 1944, p. 2, USAHEC. 45. GSP diary, August 15, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC. 46. John S. Wood, Memories and Reflections, unpublished memoir, 1956–66, the Jack Hixson collection, 88. 47. “Eisenhower in Charge,” El Reno Daily Tribune (El Reno, OK), August 15, 1944. 48. “Representative Lauds General George Patton,” Times Dispatch (Richmond, VA), August 17, 1944. 49. Allen, Lucky Forward, 47. 50. Barrie Pitt and Frances Pitt, The Month-­by-­Month Atlas of World War II (New York: Summit Books, 1989), 134. 51. Nigel Hamilton, Monty: The Battles of Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery (New York: Random House, 1981), 376. 52. Correlli Barnett, ed., Hitler’s Generals (New York: Grove Press, 1989), 407. 53. David Eisenhower, Eisenhower at War 1943–1945 (New York: Random House, 1986), 407. 54. Shedo, XIX Tactical Air Command and Ultra, 53. 55. Hillery and Hurley, Paths of Armor, 69; Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 569. 56. Don M. Fox, Patton’s Vanguard: The United States Army Fourth Armored Division (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2003), 80. 57. William Colby, Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1976), 43; George F. Hofmann, The Super Sixth: A History of the Sixth Armored Division in World War II (Nashville: Battery Press, 2000), 105; C. A. Warner to Dr. Hugh Cole, Record Group 319, Records of the Army Staff, Center of Military History, Cross Channel Attack, Supporting documents, entry 92, box 5, NARA.

380

notes to chapter three

58. GSP diary, August 14, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00110/?sp=92&st=text; GSP to BAP, August 15, 1944, box 12, folder 6, GSP Collection, LOC; Bradley, Soldier’s Story, 356, 379. 59. Transcript of Conference between GSP and Third Army Correspondents, September 7, 1944, box 12, file 8, GSP Collection, LOC. 60. Blumenson, Duel for France, 1944, 277; James Wellard, General George S. Patton Jr.: Man under Mars (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1946), 165. 61. GSP diary, August 15, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634.00110 /?sp=94&st=text. 62. Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower, 635. 63. Larry I. Bland, ed., The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, vol. 4 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 546; Bradley, Soldier’s Story, 393. 64. “Patton Gets His Promotion as He Traps the Nazis,” Tampa Tribune (Tampa, FL), August 16, 1944. 65. Allen, Lucky Forward, 60. 66. Eisenhower, Eisenhower at War, 412. 67. Bradley, Soldier’s Story, 393; GSP diary, August 15, 1944, https://www.loc.gov/ resource/mss35634.00110/?sp=94&st=text. 68. “Bradley Heads Army Group; Equal Status as Montgomery,” Stars and Stripes, August 16, 1944. 69. “Teamwork Is Smashing Nazi Army,” Stars and Stripes, August 31, 1944. 70. GSP to Guy V. Henry, August 15 and 16, 1944, box 28, file 10, GSP Collection, LOC; Lev Allen to GSP, August 16, 1944, box 12, folder 6, GSP Collection, LOC; GSP to HLS, August 16, 1944, box 12, folder 6, GSP Collection, LOC. 71. William C. Sylvan and Francis G. Smith Jr., Normandy to Victory: The War Diary of General Courtney H. Hodges and the First U.S. Army (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2008), 121, 122. 72. Sylvan and Smith, Normandy to Victory, 154, 155. 73. Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower, 657. 74. Adele Ulman to Landon Morris, August 22, 1944, box 12, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC 75. “Patton’s Army across Seine, Germans Say,” Stars and Stripes, August 21, 1944. 76. GSP to BAP, August 13, 1944, box 12, folder 6, GSP Collection, LOC; Bradley, Soldier’s Story, 353. 77. Bernard Law Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field-­Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1958), 234. 78. GSP diary, August 16, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC. 79. Eugene G. Schulz, The Ghost in General Patton’s Third Army: The Memoirs of Eugene G. Schulz during His Service in the United States Army in World War II (Bloomington, IN: Xlibris, 2012), 317–19. 80. GSP to Bradley, November 5, 1944, box 12, folder 13, GSP Collection, LOC. 81. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 571–72. 82. Henry Williams, Combat Boots: A D-­Day Veteran’s Story (North Carolina: self-­ published, 1997), 55.

notes to chapter Four

381

83. Charles Codman, Drive (Boston: Little, Brown, 1957), 163; GSP diary, August 15, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC; Bradley, General’s Life, 302. 84. Robert S. Allen, Forward with Patton: The World War II Diary of Colonel Robert S. Allen (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2017), 66. 85. GSP diary, August 17, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC; Hap Gay diaries, August 1944, p. 465, USAHEC. 86. Blumenson, Patton Papers, 2:515; idem., Breakout and Pursuit, 530. 87. GSP to BAP, August 18, 1944, box 12, file 7, GSP Collection, LOC. 88. Hamilton, Monty, 376. 89. John Colby, War from the Ground Up: The 90th Division in WWII (Austin, TX: Northtex Press, 1991), 226–39. 90. Eisenhower, Eisenhower at War, 409. 91. Montgomery, Memoirs of Field-­Marshal the Viscount Montgomery, 235. 92. Sylvan and Smith, Normandy to Victory, 102. 93. Bradley, Soldier’s Story, 377; Bradley, General’s Life, 298. 94. GSP to BAP, August 18, 1944, box 12, file 7, GSP Collection, LOC. 95. Bradley, General’s Life, 298, 299, 303. 96. D. A. Lande, I Was with Patton: First-­Person Accounts of WWII in George S. Patton’s Command (St. Paul, MN: MBI, 2002), 137. 97. Eisenhower, Eisenhower at War, 392, 401. 98. Chet Hansen diaries, box 4, files 13, Chester B. Hansen Collection, USAHEC. 99. Blumenson, Patton Papers, 2:517. 100. David Max Eichhorn, The GI’s Rabbi: World War II Letters of David Mac Eichhorn (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 75.

Chapter Four

1. Alden Hatch, George Patton: General in Spurs (New York: Julian Messner, 1973), 141–42. 2. GSP to BAP, August 18, 1944, box 12, file 7, GSP Collection, LOC; Martin Blumenson, The Duel for France: The Men and Battles That Changed Europe (Lebanon, IN: Da Capo, 1963), 315, 318; H. Essame, Patton: A Study in Command (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1974), 195. 3. Stanley P. Hirshson, General Patton: A Soldier’s Life (New York: HarperCollins, 2002), 520. 4. Bradford J. “BJ” Shedo, XIX Tactical Air Command and Ultra: Patton’s Force Enhancers in the 1944 Campaign in France (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2001), 78. 5. George S. Patton, War as I Knew It (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1975), 78; Essame, Patton, 180. 6. Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier’s Story (New York: Modern Library, 1999), 385. 7. GSP to Fred Ayer, August 18, 1944, box 12, file 7, GSP Collection, LOC. 8. GSP diary, August 19, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC. 9. Bradley, Soldier’s Story, 381–83.

382

notes to chapter Four

10. GSP diary, August 19, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00110/?sp=101&st=text. 11. Martin Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit: The United States Army in World War II (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1989), 600. 12. GSP to George Patton IV, August 21, 1944, box 12, file 7, GSP Collection, LOC. 13. GSP diary, August 19, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634.00 110/?sp=101&st=text. 14. GSP diary, August 19, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC; Shedo, XIX Tactical Air Command and Ultra, 84. 15. GSP diary, August 19, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00110/?sp=101&st=text. 16. Manton Eddy diary, August 24, 1944, National Infantry Museum; Bradley, Soldier’s Story, 357. 17. Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers, vol. 2 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974), 521, 522; Denny G. Hair, The Third Army Goes to War (Houston: Third Army Publishing, 2018), 122. 18. Robert S. Allen, Forward with Patton: The World War II Diary of Colonel Robert S. Allen (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2017), 68. 19. Russell Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants: The Campaign of France and Germany, 1944–1945 (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1990), 241. 20. David Schoenbrun, Soldiers of the Night: The Story of the French Resistance (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1980), 423. 21. David Eisenhower, Eisenhower at War, 1943–1945 (New York: Random House, 1986), 415. 22. Schoenbrun, Soldiers of the Night, 424. 23. Schoenbrun, Soldiers of the Night, 420. 24. Schoenbrun, Soldiers of the Night, 376, 422, 430, 431, 436, 467. 25. S. Campaux, The Liberation of Paris, August 19–26, 1944 (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, 2019), 15–18; Schoenbrun, Soldiers of the Night, 447. 26. GSP to BAP, August 19, 1944, box 12, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC; GSP diary, April 18, 1944, box 3, folder 5, GSP Collection, LOC; Bradley, Soldier’s Story, 355. 27. Henry Gerard Phillips, The Making of a Professional: Manton S. Eddy, USA (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000), 152–53. 28. GSP diary, August 17–19, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC; Paul Harkins, When the Third Army Cracked Europe: The Story of Patton’s Incredible Army (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, 1969), 24. 29. GSP to BAP, August 20, 1944, box 12, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC; Manton Eddy diary, August 21, 1944, National Infantry Museum; Harkins, When the Third Army Cracked Europe, 24. 30. Charles Codman, Drive (Boston: Little, Brown, 1957), 160. 31. J. B. Sullivan to John A. Hixson, January 25, 1978, John A. Hixson Collection. 32. GSP diary, August 19, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634.00 110/?sp=102&st=text.

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33. Robert S. Allen, Lucky Forward: The History of Patton’s Third U.S. Army (New York: Vanguard Press, 1947), 115. 34. Shedo, XIX Tactical Air Command and Ultra, 82. 35. GSP to BAP, August 20, 1944, box 12, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC; Hap Gay diaries, August 19, 1944, p. 499, USAHEC. 36. Phillips, Making of a Professional, 163. 37. GSP diary, August 20, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00110/?sp=102&st=text. 38. Don M. Fox, Patton’s Vanguard: The United States Army Fourth Armored Division (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2003), 85; Shedo, XIX Tactical Air Command and Ultra, 84. 39. Harkins, When the Third Army Cracked Europe, 24. 40. GSP to Grace Allen, August 21, 1944, Papers of the Allen Family, LOC; Essame, Patton, 183. 41. Patton, War as I Knew It, 79. 42. Patton, War as I Knew It, 69. 43. Hap Gay diaries, August 19, 1944, p. 471, USAHEC. 44. GSP diary, August 21, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC; John Nelson Rickard, Patton at Bay: The Lorraine Campaign, September to December, 1944 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 57. 45. Norman Polmar and Thomas B. Allen, World War II: America at War 1941– 1945 (New York: Random House, 1991), 520. 46. Polmar and Allen, World War II, 733; Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 677. 47. GSP to BAP, August 20, 1944, box 12, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC; Robert Allen collection, unpublished diary, p. 3, 6, the Patton Museum. 48. Eisenhower, Eisenhower at War, 416. 49. Larry Collins and Dominique LaPierre, Is Paris Burning? (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965) 177–78. 50. William C. Sylvan and Francis G. Smith, Normandy to Victory: The War Diary of General Courtney H. Hodges and the First U.S. Army (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2008), 105. 51. Eugene Schwartz, Memoirs, unpublished, p. 70, MS 2550, the Center of War and Society, University of Tennessee. 52. Manton Eddy diary, August 22, 1944, National Infantry Museum. 53. Bernard Law, Viscount Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1958), 240. 54. Montgomery, Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery, 241–42. 55. Schoenbrun, Soldiers of the Night, 461. 56. “Meeting between General Patton ad Mr. Ralph Nordling, (Sec. Gen. Swedish Consulate in Paris),” August 3, 1944, 0830, box 53, file 4, GSP Collection, LOC. 57. Robert Allen collection, unpublished diary, p. 3, 7, the Patton Museum. 58. GSP to BAP, August 25, 1944, box 12, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC; Fox, Patton’s Vanguard, 82. 59. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 578; Patton diary, August 23, 1944.

384

notes to chapter Four

60. Charles M. Province, Patton’s Third Army: A Chronology of the Third Army Advance, August, 1944 to May 1945 (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1922), 28. 61. Collins and LaPierre, Is Paris Burning? 181, 219. 62. Alfred D. Chandler Jr., ed., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The War Years, vol. 4 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), 2072. 63. Hugh M. Cole, The Lorraine Campaign (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1984), 11. 64. GSP diary, August 23, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00110/?sp=111&st=text. 65. GSP diary, August 23, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00110/?sp=112&st=text. 66. Larry I. Bland, ed. The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, vol. 4 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 550; Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 658. 67. Hap Gay diaries, August 1944, p. 473, USAHEC. 68. Nigel Hamilton, Monty: The Battles of Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery (New York: Random House, 1994), 396. 69. Bradley, Soldier’s Story, 398–401. 70. Chandler, Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, 4:2090. 71. Bradley, Soldier’s Story, 383. 72. GSP diary, August 24, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC. 73. Harkins, When the Third Army Cracked Europe, 23. 74. John S. D. Eisenhower, The Bitter Woods (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1969), 70; Allen, Lucky Forward, 120. 75. Chandler, Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, 4:2098; Hap Gay diaries, August 24, 1944, p. 474, USAHEC. 76. Hap Gay diaries, August 25, 1944, p. 475, USAHEC. 77. Fox, Patton’s Vanguard, 87. 78. Carlyle Holt, “Patton and Pilot Were Lost for an Hour in Small Plane over Germans’ Territory,” unknown publisher, May 29, 1946, Patton Scrapbooks, reel 1, GSP Collection, LOC; Patton, War as I Knew It, 82; Eugene G. Schulz, The Ghost in General Patton’s Third Army: The Memoirs of Eugene G. Schulz during His Service in the United States Army in World War II (Bloomington, IN: Xlibris, 2012), 168; Patton diary, August 25, 1944, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634.00110/?sp=113&st =text. 79. F. W. Winterbotham, The Ultra Secret (New York: Dell, 1974), 232–33; George F. Hofmann, The Super Sixth: A History of the Sixth Armored Division in World War II (Nashville: Battery Press, 2000), 110. 80. Harry C. Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946), 669. 81. David P. Colley, The Road to Victory: The Untold Story of World War II’s Red Ball Express (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2000), xiv, 49. 82. Christopher Gabel, The Lorraine Campaign: An Overview, September–December 1944 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute, 1985), 4, 5, 6; Colley, Road to Victory, xiv, 100, 127, 128.

notes to chapter Four

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83. Elizabeth Mullener, War Stories: Remembering World War II (New York: Berkley Books, 2002), 177; Aaron Elson, Tanks for the Memories: The 712th Tank Battalion during World War II (Hackensack, NJ: Chi Chi Press, 2001), 304–5. 84. Robert Allen collection, unpublished diary, p. 3, 10 and 11, the Patton Museum. 85. Carlo D’Este, Patton: A Genius for War (New York: HarperCollins, 1998), 648. 86. Max Schwartz, Bridges to Victory: The Story of the 1306 Engineers in WWII (Los Angeles: Consulting Engineers, 2003), 90–91; Floyd H. Hogan, interviewed by Benjamin J. Bahlmann, September 27, 2002, Saving the Legacy: An Oral History of Utah’s World War II Veterans, U-­603, Fort Douglas Military Museum and Marriot Library, Special Collections Department, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah; Milton F. Perry and Barbara W. Parke, Patton and His Pistols: The Favorite Sidearms of General George S. Patton (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, 1957), 82. 87. Mullener, War Stories, 177. 88. Joseph F. Williams, interview, October 19, 2009, 4049th Truck Company, Nimitz Education and Research Center, the National Museum of the Pacific War, Fredericksburg, TX, 13. 89. Bradley, Soldier’s Story, 405. 90. Thomas Glass, The Trials and Triumphs of a Regimental Commander during World War II (Victoria, BC: Trafford, 2005), 172–73. 91. Verle Quigley, The Voices of WWII, Education/Research: Transcripts: Europe (Army), p. 9, accessed April 18, 2021, http://www.wwiihistoryclass.com/education /transcripts/Petersen_E_167.pdf. 92. Max E. Jordan and Gloria J. Knapp, Through My Eyes (n.p., 2006), 50. 93. Thomas Grasser, interviewed by Marcia Stevenson, May 11, 2015, LOC, https:// memory.loc.gov/diglib/vhp/story/loc.natlib.afc2001001.101117/sr0001001.stream. 94. William Upham, interview by James McIntosh, 2001, OH83, transcript, Wisconsin Veterans Museum Oral History Program, Madison, WI, n.d. 95. Tom Bigland, Bigland’s War: War Letters of Tom Bigland 1941–45 (Liverpool: Lingams, 1990), 73. 96. Forrest C. Pogue, Pogue’s War: Diaries of a WWII Combat Historian (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2001), 216. 97. Record Group 111-­SC, number 1943836-­5, U.S. Army Signal Corps Photograph, NARA; George Forty, Patton’s Third Army at War (London: Arms and Armour, 1990), 43, 44. 98. Allen, Lucky Forward, 47. 99. Colley, Road to Victory, 60. 100. Frederick Ayer, Before the Colors Fade: Portrait of a Soldier, George S. Patton (Atlanta: Cherokee Publishing, 1964), 164. 101. Perry and Parke, Patton and His Pistols, 79. 102. GSP to Bradley, November 5, 1944, box 12, folder 13, GSP Collection, LOC. 103. Hap Gay diaries, August 26, 1944, p. 477, USAHEC. 104. Patton, War as I Knew It, 83. 105. Martin Blumenson, Patton: The Man behind the Legend, 1885–1945 (New York: William Morrow, 1985), 240; Manton Eddy diary, August 24, 1944, National

386

notes to chapter Four

Infantry Museum; GSP diary, August 26, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC; GSP to BAP, August 25, 1944, box 12, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC. 106. GSP to BAP, August 25, 1944, box 12, file 7, GSP Collection, LOC. 107. Hap Gay diaries, August 27, 1944, p. 475, USAHEC. 108. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 665. 109. Hofmann, Super Sixth, 111. 110. Hair, Third Army Goes to War, 190–91. 111. GSP to George Patton IV, August 28, 1944, box 12, file 7, GSP Collection, LOC. 112. Allen, Lucky Forward, 127. 113. Hap Gay diaries, August 1944, p. 480, USAHEC. 114. GSP diary, August 29, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC. 115. Wilson A. Heefner, Patton’s Bulldog: The Life and Service of General Walton H. Walker (Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Books, 2001) 76, 77. 116. “Interview between General Patton and Captured German General, Brig. Gen. Schramm,” August 28, 1944, 1030, box 52 file 18, GSP Collection, LOC. 117. Hap Gay diaries, August 1944, p. 480-­e, USAHEC. 118. GSP diary, August 29, 1944, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634.00110 /?sp=116&st=text. 119. Dan Irwin, “At 100, WWII Vet Maps Out His Time in France,” New Castle News (Lawrence County, PA), June 2, 2021, https://www.ncnewsonline.com /news/local_news/at-­100-­wwii-­vet-­maps-­out-­his-­time-­in-­france/article_5b7c1130-­ c165-­11eb-­a61b-­fb388d8e4d20.html?fbclid=IwAR3KK4ZWPrwWpoKkEggK1lI_ sCJhgb-­-­_eGex1yBtWdG_SjkCIJqJqELGqs. 120. Cole, Lorraine Campaign, 6. 121. Harry H. Semmes, Portrait of Patton: An Intimate Biography by One Who Fought under Patton in Two World Wars (New York: Appleton Century Crofts, 1955), 201–2. 122. Manton Eddy diary, August 28, 1944, National Infantry Museum. 123. GSP diary, August 29, 1944, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634.00110 /?sp=117&st=text. 124. Allen, Lucky Forward, 127; Heefner, Patton’s Bulldog, 76; Essame, Patton, 186. 125. Sylvan and Smith, Normandy to Victory, 126; Omar Bradley and Clay Blair, A General’s Life: An Autobiography by the General of the Army (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 319. 126. Patton, War as I Knew It, 84; Essame, Patton, 193. 127. GSP diary, August 29, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC; Walter Andariese, ed., World War II thru Korea (Hastings, NE: Snell, 1960), 88. 128. Hap Gay diaries, August 30, 1944, p. 482, USAHEC. 129. GSP diary, August 30, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00110/?sp=119&st=text. 130. GSP diary, August 30, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00110/?sp=119&st=text. 131. GSP diary, August 30, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC; GSP to BAP, August 30, 1944, box 12, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC; Patton, War as I Knew It, 84.

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132. Gerald Zuck, unpublished memoir, pp. 4–5, Veterans History Project, LOC; GSP to BAP, September 1, 1944, box 12, file 7, GSP Collection, LOC. 133. GSP personal note, September 1, 1944, box 12, file 8, GSP Collection, LOC; Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 668; Schulz, Ghost in General Patton’s Third Army, 172. 134. Heefner, Patton’s Bulldog, 78; GSP to BAP, September 1, 1944, box 12, file 8, GSP Collection, LOC; Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 669. 135. William Farrell, WWII Veterans Surveys, 83rd Infantry Division, box 1, USAHEC. 136. GSP diary, August 31, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00110/?sp=120&st=text. 137. Eisenhower, Bitter Woods, 64; Patton, War as I Knew It, 84. 138. “Patton Runs Right off His Maps: Gets a New Issue by Air,” Stars and Stripes, September 4, 1944. 139. Harkins, When the Third Army Cracked Europe, 29. 140. Hap Gay diaries, August 30, 1944, p. 482, USAHEC. 141. Ayer, Before the Colors Fade, 152. 142. GSP diary, August 31–September 1, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC; Hamilton, Monty, 416–17; GSP to BAP, September 1, 1944, box 12, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC. 143. Ayer, Before the Colors Fade, 160; Brenton Greene Wallace, Patton and His Third Army (n.p.: War Vault, 2019), 51. 144. Wallace, Patton and His Third Army, 54, 60, 63, 183. 145. Hamilton, Monty, 414. 146. Hap Gay diaries, August 30, 1944, p. 482, USAHEC. 147. United Press, “Private Says Patton Knows How to Fight,” August 26, 1944, box 75, file 12, GSP Collection, LOC. 148. Hair, Third Amy Goes to War, 114. 149. John M. Carlisle, “3rd Army Is Great because It Shines in Patton’s Fighting Heart,” December 30, 1944, box 12, file 17, GSP Collection, LOC; John A. Santore, interviewed by Josselyn Davis, March 8, 2010, LOC, https://memory.loc.gov/diglib /vhp/story/loc.natlib.afc2001001.71694/mv0001001.stream. 150. “Patton a British Hero,” Kansas City Star (Kansas City, MO), August 19, 1944. 151. Florence Fisher Parry, “I Dare Say—­Dispositions and Character,” Pittsburgh Press (Pittsburgh, PA), August 27, 1944. 152. Nick Kenny, “Day unto Day,” [n.d.], box 75, file 12, GSP Collection, LOC.

Chapter Five

1. Hap Gay diaries, September 2, 1944, p. 486, box 2, USAHEC; Cropper, George Bertrand, transcript (n.d.), p. 9, Veterans History Project, LOC. 2. Omar Bradley, A Soldier’s Story (New York: Modern Library, 1999), 402. 3. Russell Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants: The Campaign of France and Germany, 1944–1945 (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1990), 244, 245. 4. Alden Hatch, George Patton: General in Spurs (New York: Julian Messner, 1973), 146.

388

notes to chapter Five

5. Third Army Memorandum, September 2, 1944, box 12, file 8, GSP Collection, LOC. 6. Anthony Kemp, Metz 1944: One More River to Cross (Bayeux: Heimdal, 2003), 59; D. K. R. Crosswell, Beetle: The Life of General Walter Bedell Smith (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2010), 698. 7. Bradley, Soldier’s Story, 358. 8. Martin Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit: The United States Army in World War II (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1989), 686. 9. Hap Gay diaries, September 2, 1944, p. 485, USAHEC. 10. GSP diary, September 2, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00110/?sp=122&st=text. 11. GSP diary, September 2, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC; William C. Sylvan and Francis G. Smith Jr., Normandy to Victory: The War Diary of General Courtney H. Hodges and the First U.S. Army (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2008), 117; Alfred D. Chandler Jr., ed., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The War Years, vol. 4 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), 2112. 12. Hugh M. Cole, The Lorraine Campaign (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1984), 13. 13. Bradley, Soldier’s Story, 405. 14. Manton Eddy diary, September 2, 1944, National Infantry Museum. 15. Manton Eddy diary, September 2, 1944. 16. Kemp, Metz 1944, 60. 17. Cole, Lorraine Campaign, 118. 18. Brenton Greene Wallace, Patton and His Third Army (n.p.: War Vault, 2019), 67, 68. 19. James Wellard, General George S. Patton Jr.: Man under Mars (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1946), 195, 192. 20. Cole, Lorraine Campaign, 20. 21. Manton Eddy diary, September 3, 1944, National Infantry Museum. 22. GSP diary, September 3, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC. 23. GSP diary, September 3, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00110/?sp=123&st=text. 24. Charles Codman, Drive (Boston: Little, Brown, 1957), 160; GSP diary, September 3, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634.00110/?sp=124&st=text. 25. GSP diary, September 3, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC; Bradley, Soldier’s Story, 405. 26. Cole, Lorraine Campaign, 52. 27. Wilson Heefner, Patton’s Bulldog: The Life and Service of General Walton Walker (Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Books, 2001), 80; Hap Gay diaries, September 4, 1944, p. 487, USAHEC; William Stuart Nance, “Patton’s Iron Cavalry—­The Impact of the Mechanized Cavalry on the U.S. Third Army” (MA thesis, University of North Texas, 2011), 67; H. Essame, Patton: A Study in Command (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1974), 204; Hap Gay diaries, September 4, 1944, p.487, box 2, USAHEC;

notes to chapter Five

389

John Nelson Rickard, Patton at Bay: The Lorraine Campaign, September to December, 1944 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 78; Hap Gay diaries, September 6, 1944, p. 487, USAHEC. 28. Dean Dominique and James Hays, One Hell of a War: Patton’s 317th Infantry Regiment in WWII (n.p.: Wounded Warrior Publications, 2014), 52–54; Chandler, Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, 4:2116. 29. Essame, Patton, 196, 204; Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants, 245. 30. Cole, Lorraine Campaign, 210. 31. Donald T. Peak, Fire Mission: American Cannoneers Defeating the German Army in World War II (Manhattan, KS: Sunflower Press, 2001), 22 32. “Anna Lederer Rosenberg Hoffman (1902–1983), Eleanor Roosevelt Papers Project, Columbia College of Arts and Sciences, accessed March 14, 2022, https:/ /erpapers.columbian.gwu.edu/anna-­lederer-­rosenberg-­hoffman-­1902-­1983. 33. GSP diary, September 4, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00110/?sp=125&st=text. 34. GSP diary, September 4, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC; George S. Patton, War as I Knew It (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1975), 88; Allison Wysong, memoir, 19, Veterans History Project, LOC. 35. GSP diary, September 14, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00110/?sp=136&st=text. 36. Manton Eddy diary, September 5, 1944, National Infantry Museum. 37. Hap Gay diaries, September 5, 1944, p. 488, USAHEC; Cole, Lorraine Campaign, 121. 38. Rickard, Patton at Bay, 77. 39. GSP diary, September 5, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC. 40. Robert S. Allen, Lucky Forward: The History of Patton’s Third U.S. Army (New York: Vanguard Press, 1947), 153. 41. Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants, 328. 42. Kemp, Metz 1944, 62, 63, 66, 69. 43. Cole, Lorraine Campaign, 27. Cole’s book incorrectly describes the Moselle River as “a width of between four or five miles.” According to Google Maps (and my own personal crossing of the river) the river is only about 170 yards wide. 44. Wellard, Man under Mars, 195–96. 45. Andrews Allen, interviewed by Douglas Bekke, Oral History Project, p. 51, Minnesota Greatest Generation, Minnesota Historical Society, n.d. 46. GSP diary, September 6, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00110/?sp=127&st=text. 47. GSP to Bradley, November 5, 1944, box 12, folder 13, GSP Collection, LOC; GSP diary, September 6, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC. 48. “Local News,” no newspaper title provided, Patton Scrapbooks, reel 1, GSP Collection, LOC. 49. GSP diaries, September 6, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00110/?sp=128&st=text.

390

notes to chapter Five

50. Cole, Lorraine Campaign, 132. 51. Harry H. Semmes, Portrait of Patton: An Intimate Biography by One Who Fought under Patton in Two World Wars (New York: Appleton Century Crofts, 1955), 206–7; Fred Ayer Jr., Before the Colors Fade: Portrait of a Soldier: George S. Patton, Jr. (Atlanta: Cherokee Publishing Company, 1964), 169. 52. Hap Gay diaries, September 7, 1944, p. 488, USAHEC; Peter Wyden, Day One: Before Hiroshima and After (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 107–8. 53. Codman, Drive, 182. 54. Eugene G. Schulz, The Ghost in General Patton’s Third Army: The Memoirs of Eugene G. Schulz during His Service in the United States Army in World War II (Bloomington, IN: Xlibris, 2012), 178. 55. Transcript of Conference between GSP and Third Army Correspondents, September 7, 1944, p. 1, box 12, file 8, GSP Collection, LOC. 56. Transcript of Conference between GSP and Third Army Correspondents, September 7, 1944, box 12, file 8, GSP Collection, LOC. Anthony Kemp’s Metz 1944 on p. 72 has a version of the quote that accuses Eisenhower of holding Montgomery’s hand. 57. Transcript of Conference between GSP and Third Army Correspondents, September 7, 1944, pp. 2–3, box 12, file 8, GSP Collection, LOC. 58. Transcript of Conference between GSP and Third Army Correspondents, September 7, 1944, pp. 6–7, box 12, file 8, GSP Collection, LOC. 59. Transcript of Conference between GSP and Third Army Correspondents, September 7, 1944, p. 6, box 12, file 8, GSP Collection, LOC. 60. Transcript of Conference between GSP and Third Army Correspondents, September 7, 1944, p. 8, box 12, file 8, GSP Collection, LOC. 61. Transcript of Conference between GSP and Third Army Correspondents, September 7, 1944, p. 10, box 12, file 8, GSP Collection, LOC. 62. Transcript of Conference between GSP and Third Army Correspondents, September 7, 1944, p. 8, box 12, file 8, GSP Collection, LOC. 63. Codman, Drive, 183. 64. Don Fox, Patton’s Vanguard: The United States Army Fourth Armored Division (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2003), 107–8. 65. Manton Eddy diary, September 8, 1944, National Infantry Museum. 66. Patton, War as I Knew It, 89. 67. GSP diary, September 9–11,1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC; Patton, War as I Knew It, 90. 68. Sylvan and Smith, Normandy to Victory, 122–23. 69. GSP to BAP, September 8, 1944, box 12, file 8, GSP Collection, LOC; GSP diaries, September 8, 1944, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634.00110/?sp=129&st=text. 70. GSP diary, September 9, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC; Bradford J. “BJ” Shedo, XIX Tactical Air Command and Ultra: Patton’s Force Enhancers in the 1944 Campaign in France (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2001), 107. 71. Bernard Law, Viscount Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1958), 246.

notes to chapter Five

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72. GSP diary, September 9, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00110/?sp=130&st=text 73. GSP to BAP, September 8–11, 1944, box 12, file 8, GSP Collection, LOC; Hap Gay diaries, September 7, 1944, p. 491, box 2, USAHEC. 74. Cole, Lorraine Campaign, 143, 145. 75. Hap Gay diaries, September 9, 1944, p. 492, USAHEC; Heefner, Patton’s Bulldog 84; GSP diary, September 6, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC; Anthony Kemp, The Unknown Battle: Metz, 1944 (New York: Stein and Day, 1981), 47; idem., Metz 1944, 72, 92, 94. 76. GSP diary, September 12, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00110/?sp=132&st=text. 77. Hap Gay diaries, September 11, 1944, p. 494, USAHEC; Robert T. Murrell, Stories of the Men of the 80th Infantry Division, World War II (Scotts Valley, CA: Robert T. Murrell, 2001), 10, 11. 78. Shedo, XIX Tactical Air Command and Ultra, 90–94. 79. Rick Beyer and Elizabeth Sayles, The Ghost Army of World War II: How One Top-­Secret Unit Deceived the Enemy with Inflatable Tanks, Sound Effects, and Other Audacious Trickery (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2015), 114–17. 80. GSP diary, September 11, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC; Essame, Patton, 205; Rick Atkinson, At Guns Last Light: The War in Western Europe, 1944–1945 (New York: Henry Holt, 213), 248. 81. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 685, 702. 82. Codman, Drive, 183. 83. Denny G. Hair, The Third Army Goes to War (Houston: Third Army Publishing, 2018), 174. 84. GSP to James Doolittle, September 11, 1944, box 12, file 8, GSP Collection, LOC. 85. James McLaughlin Jr., interview, the National World War II Museum, Charleston, WV, no date. 86. Ducken Taylor, audio interview, February 5, 1992, Imperial War Museum. 87. James L. Christopulos, Combat Engineer: A World War II Memoir (n.p.: independently published, 2019), 54–55. 88. Bradley, Soldier’s Story, 414; Everett Hughes diary, September 13, 1944, box I-­2, file 1, Everett Hughes Papers, LOC. 89. Sylvan and Smith, Normandy to Victory, 125. 90. GSP diary, September 12, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC; Bradley, Soldier’s Story, 414. 91. Crosswell, Beetle, 716. 92. Cole, Lorraine Campaign, 213. 93. Everett Hughes to Theresa Hughes, September 11, 1944, folder II-­4, file 13, Everett Hughes Papers, LOC; Everett Hughes diary, September 13, 1944, box I-­2, file 1, Everett Hughes Papers, LOC. 94. Allen, Lucky Forward, 139, 140. 95. Kemp, Metz 1944, 150

392

notes to chapter six

96. Hap Gay diaries, September 12, 1944, p. 495, USAHEC; Dominique and Hays, One Hell of a War, 63. 97. Memorial plaque in Charmes, France. 98. Dominique and Hays, One Hell of a War, 74, 82. 99. GSP to BAP, September 14, 1944, box 12, file 8, GSP Collection, LOC. 100. Cole, Lorraine Campaign, 211. 101. Alice Gerard, “Witness to History: World War II: Bud’s Long’s Story, Part 1,” Niagara Frontier Publications, https://www.wnypapers.com/news/article/featured/2022/10/29/152845/witness-­to-­history-­world-­war-­ii-­bud-­longs-­story-­p a rt-­i. 102. Bradley, Soldier’s Story, 412. 103. Robert Shelato, From Wheat Fields to Battlefields: A Narrative Based on the Adventures of an Indiana Boy (Fort Myers, FL: Robert Shelato, 1989), 280–81. 104. John K. Addison, WWII Veterans Survey, 3rd Infantry Division, USAHEC; Manton Eddy diary, September 13, 1944, National Infantry Museum; Wellard, Man under Mars, 187. 105. Peter Belpulsi, A GI’s View of World War II (St. Paul: Globe Publishers, 1997), 155–56. 106. Everett Hughes to Theresa Hughes, September 15, 1944, folder II-­4, file 13, Everett Hughes Papers, LOC; GSP to BAP, September 14, 1944, box 12, file 8, GSP Collection, LOC; GSP diary, September 13, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC. 107. Semmes, Portrait of Patton, 208. 108. GSP to BAP, September 15, 1944, box 12, file 8, GSP Collection, LOC. 109. Today, the Verdun barracks is home to the French army’s 1st Fighter Regiment. A World War II Sherman tank stands on the drill field in front of Bradley’s old headquarters. 110. Cole, Lorraine Campaign, 95; “Report of Action against the Enemy—­ September 1944,” 134th Infantry Regiment Website, October 9, 1944, http://www .coulthart.com/134/35-­aa-­44-­sept.htm. 111. Jonathan W. Jordan, Brothers, Rivals, Victors: Eisenhower, Patton, Bradley and the Partnership That Drove the Allied Conquest in Europe (New York: NAL Caliber, 2011), 405. 112. Chet Hansen diaries, September 15, 1944, box 4, files 13, Chester B. Hansen Collection, USAHEC.

Chapter Six

1. Wilson Heefner, Patton’s Bulldog: The Life and Service of General Walton Walker (Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Books, 2001), 81, 86; GSP diary, September 15, 1944, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634.00110/?sp=138&st=text. 2. Hap Gay diaries, September 16, 1944, p. 499, USAHEC. 3. Hugh M. Cole, The Lorraine Campaign (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1984), 87. 4. Cole, Lorraine Campaign, 215.

notes to chapter six

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5. Manton Eddy diary, September 14, 1944, National Infantry Museum; GSP diary, September 12, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC; Manton Eddy diary, September 16, 1944, National Infantry Museum; Dean Dominique and James Hays, One Hell of a War: Patton’s 317th Infantry Regiment in WWII (n.p.: Wounded Warrior Publications, 2014), 85, 88. 6. Manton Eddy diary, September 15, 1944, National Infantry Museum; Anthony Kemp, Metz 1944: One More River to Cross (Bayeux: Heimdal, 2003), 157. 7. Paul Harkins, When the Third Army Cracked Europe: The Story of Patton’s Incredible Army (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1969), 32. 8. William A. Biehler, U.S. Army, August 18, 2007, p. 39, Oral History of World War II, Rutgers University. 9. Bradford J. “BJ” Shedo, XIX Tactical Air Command and Ultra: Patton’s Force Enhancers in the 1944 Campaign in France (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2001), 111. 10. GSP to BAP, September 16, 1944, box 12, file 8, GSP Collection, LOC. 11. GSP to George S. Patton IV, September 17, 1944, box 12, file 8, GSP Collection, LOC. 12. GSP diary, September 17, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC. 13. Alfred Chandler Jr. ed., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The War Years, vol. 4 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), 2158. 14. Transcript of Conference between GSP and Third Army Correspondents, September 7, 1944, box 12, file 8, GSP Collection, LOC. 15. Roger Hasketh, Fortitude: The D-­Day Deception (New York: Overlook Press, 2000) 300, 301; Robert T. Murrell, Stories of the Men of the 80th Infantry Division, World War II (Scotts Valley, CA: Robert T. Murrell, 2001), 13, 14; GSP diary, September 17, 1944, LOC. 16. GSP to George S. Patton IV, September 17, 1944, box 12, file 8, GSP Collection, LOC. 17. GSP diary, September 18, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00110/?sp=142&st=text. 18. Don Fox, Patton’s Vanguard: The United States Army Fourth Armored Division (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2003), 129–30. 19. Manton Eddy diary, September 18, 1944, National Infantry Museum; GSP diary, September 18, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634.00110/?sp=143 &st=text. 20. GSP diary, September 18, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC. 21. GSP diary, September 18, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00110/?sp=144&st=text. 22. Manton Eddy diary, September 19, 1944, National Infantry Museum. 23. GSP diary, September 18, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC; GSP to BAP, September 21, 1944, box 12, file 9, GSP Collection, LOC. 24. Cole, Lorraine Campaign, 225. 25. Thomas Evans, Reluctant Valor (Latrobe, PA: St. Vincent College Center for Northern Appalachian Studies, 1995), 33.

394

notes to chapter six

26. David Wilmes, ed., The Long Road: From Oran to Pilsen (Latrobe, PA: St. Vincent College Center for the Northern Appalachian Studies, 1999), 53. 27. John B. Sullivan to John A. Hixson, January 25, 1978, John A. Hixson Collection. 28. GSP diary, September 20, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC; William C. Sylvan and Francis G. Smith Jr., Normandy to Victory: The War Diary of General Courtney H. Hodges and the First U.S. Army (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2008), 133, 136; Chandler Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, 4:2165; Bernard Law Viscount Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1958), 252–53. 29. Frederick Ayer, Before the Colors Fade: Portrait of a Soldier, George S. Patton (Atlanta: Cherokee Publishing, 1964), 155. 30. Manton Eddy diary, September 20, 1944, National Infantry Museum. 31. GSP diary, September 20, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00110/?sp=147&st=text. 32. GSP to BAP, September 21, 1944, box 12, file 9, GSP Collection, LOC; Hap Gay diaries, September 16, 1944, p. 500, USAHEC. 33. Kemp, Metz 1944, 161. 34. GSP diary, September 21, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC; Brenton Greene Wallace, Patton and His Third Army (n.p.: War Vault, 2019), 73. 35. Robert Miller and Andrew Wakeford, Portraits of Service: Looking into the Faces of Veterans (New Hope, PA: Patton Publishing, 2011), 73. 36. GSP diary, September 22, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00110/?sp=149&st=text. 37. D. A. Lande, I Was with Patton: First-­Person Accounts of WWII in George S. Patton’s Command (St. Paul: MBI, 2002), 145. 38. James Polk, “Patton: ‘You Might as Well Die a Hero,’” ARMY (December 1975): 43; George F. Hofmann, Through Mobility We Conquer: The Mechanization of the U.S. Cavalry (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2006), 343. 39. Manton Eddy diary, September 22, 1944, National Infantry Museum; Hap Gay diaries, September 19, 1944, p. 503, USAHEC. 40. Cole, Lorraine Campaign, 211. 41. Omar Bradley to GSP, September 23, 1944, box 12, file 9, GSP Collection, LOC; Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier’s Story (New York: Modern Library, 1999), 423; John C. McManus, September Hope: The American Side of a Bridge Too Far (New York: Nal Caliber, 2012), 342–43; Chandler, Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, 4:2200. 42. GSP diary, September 23, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00110/?sp=152&st=text&r=0.164,0.536,0.57,0.778,0. 43. Transcription of Conference between Patton and Third Army Correspondents, September 23, 1944, box 53, folder 2, GSP Papers, LOC. 44. GSP diary, September 23, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC; Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers, vol. 2, 1940–1945 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1974), 553; Hap Gay diaries, September 23, 1944, p. 507, USAHEC; Cole, Lorraine Campaign, 258.

notes to chapter six

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45. GSP diary, September 23, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00110/?sp=153&st=text. 46. Charles Codman, Drive (Boston: Little, Brown, 1957), 186–88. 47. Transcription of Conference between Patton and Third Army Correspondents, September 23, 1944, box 12, file 8, GSP Collection, LOC. 48. George S. Patton, War as I Knew It (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1975), 101. 49. GSP diary, September 23, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC; Cole, Lorraine Campaign, 242. 50. GSP diary, September 25, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC; Third Army Letter of Instruction, September 25, 1944, box 12, file 9, GSP Collection, LOC; Wallace, Patton and His Third Army, 76. 51. GSP diary, September 26, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC; GSP to BAP, September 27, 1944, box 12, file 9, GSP Collection, LOC; Codman, Drive, 190–92. 52. Hap Gay diaries, October 8, 1944, box 2, p. 525b, USAHEC. 53. GSP diary, September 27, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC; Steven J. Zaloga, Metz 1944: Patton’s Fortified Nemesis (Oxford: Osprey Books, 2012), 42; Kemp, Metz 1944, 161. 54. GSP diary, September 28, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC. 55. Harkin’s Photo Albums, vol. 2, USAHEC. 56. Lande, I Was with Patton, 133. 57. GSP diary, September 28, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00110/?sp=158&st=text. 58. Wallace, Patton and His Third Army, 78–79. 59. Jack Stenbuck, ed., Typewriter Battalion: Dramatic Front-­Line Dispatches from World War II (New York: William Morrow, 1995), 235–41; GSP diary, September 28, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC. 60. Zaloga, Metz 1944, 42. 61. Kemp, Metz 1944, 184; John Nelson Rickard, Patton at Bay: The Lorraine Campaign, September to December 1944 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 141. 62. GSP diary, September 28, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00110/?sp=159&st=text; GSP to BAP, September 27, 1944, box 12, file 9, GSP Collection, LOC. 63. Fox, Patton’s Vanguard, 164–65. 64. Jonathan W. Jordan, Brothers, Rivals, Victors: Eisenhower, Patton, Bradley and the Partnership that Drove the Allied Conquest in Europe (New York: NAL Caliber, 2011), 415. 65. Patton, War as I Knew It, 100; Robert S. Allen, Lucky Forward: The History of Patton’s Third U.S. Army (New York: Vanguard Press, 1947), 69; GSP diary, September 29, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC. 66. Hap Gay diaries, September 29, 1944, p. 516, USAHEC. 67. Robert Allen collection, unpublished diary, (5) 20, the Patton Museum; Manton Eddy diary, September 30, 1944, National Infantry Museum; GSP to Walter Dillingham, October 11, 1944, box 28, file 6, GSP Collection, LOC.

396

notes to chapter seven

68. Cole, Lorraine Campaign, 252. 69. George F. Hofmann, Super Sixth: History of the 6th Armored Division in World War II (Nashville: Battery Press, 2000), 142; Manton Eddy diary, September 30, 1944, National Infantry Museum. 70. GSP diary, September 30, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00110/?sp=164&st=text. 71. GSP to Omar Bradley, September 30, 1944, box 12, file 9, GSP Collection, LOC; Memorandum to: General Eisenhower, Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, October 1, 1944, box 12, file 10, GSP Collection, LOC. 72. Chandler, Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, 4:2198. 73. Hoffman, Super Sixth, 143–46. 74. Cole, Lorraine Campaign, 283. 75. GSP diary, September 29, 1944, box 3, folder 7, GSP Collection, LOC; GSP to Walter Dillingham, October 11, 1944, box 28, file 6, GSP Collection, LOC; Matteson, Robert, WWII Veterans Surveys, 80th Infantry Division, USAHEC; GSP diary, October 1, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC. 76. Correlli Barnett, ed., Hitler’s Generals (New York: Grove Press, 1989), 430. 77. Rickard, Patton at Bay, 141. 78. GSP diary, October 2, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC. 79. GSP to BAP, September 21, 1944, box 12, file 9, GSP Collection, LOC; GSP to BAP, September 14, 1944, box 12, file 8, GSP Collection, LOC; Hap Gay diaries, September 15, 1944, p. 498, USAHEC.

Chapter Seven

1. David Eisenhower, Eisenhower at War 1943–1945 (New York: Random House, 1986), 491. 2. Tobias O. Vogt, The Iron Men of Metz: Reflections of Combat with the 95th Infantry Division (San Diego: Aventine Press, 2005), 105. 3. Anthony Kemp, Metz 1944: One More River to Cross (Bayeux: Heimdal, 2003), 241. 4. Steven J. Zaloga, Metz 1944: Patton’s Fortified Nemesis (Oxford: Osprey Books, 2012), 42; Hap Gay diaries, October 3, 1944, box 2, page 521, USAHEC; GSP diary, October 3, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC; Kemp, Metz 1944, 187. 5. Hap Gay diaries, October 29, 1944, box 2, page 543, USAHEC; John Colby, War From the Ground Up (Austin: Nortex Press, 1991), 273. 6. Kemp, Metz 1944, 228–30. 7. GSP diary, October 3, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634.001 11/?sp=3&st=text; “Patton Sends Big Dagger to Little Woman,” Stars and Stripes, October 10, 1944. 8. GSP to unknown, October 4, 1944, box 12, folder 10, GSP Collection, LOC; GSP to son, October 4, 1944, box 12, folder 10, GSP Collection, LOC. 9. Russell F. Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants: The Campaign of France and Germany (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), 387.

notes to chapter seven

397

10. GSP diary, October 4, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00111/?sp=4&st=text; George S. Patton Jr., War as I Knew It (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1975), 102. 11. Hugh M. Cole, The Lorraine Campaign (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1984), 373; Hap Gay diaries, October 4, 1944, box 2, page 521, USAHEC; Robert S. Allen, Forward with Patton: The World War II Diary of Colonel Robert S. Allen (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2017), 84. 12. Henry Gerard Phillips, The Making of a Professional: Manton S. Eddy, USA (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000), 167. 13. GSP diary, October 5, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC; Patton War as I Knew It, 102; Dean Dominique and James Hays, One Hell of a War: Patton’s 317th Infantry Regiment in WWII (n.p.: Wounded Warrior Publications, 2014), 91. 14. Manton Eddy diary, October 5, 1944, National Infantry Museum. 15. GSP to unknown, October 4, 1944, box 12, folder 10, GSP Collection, LOC. 16. Kemp, Metz 1944, 188. 17. Kevin M. Hymel, “Fighting on the Surface of the Moon: The Grueling Battle of Fort Driant Proved a Formidable Task That Stymied the U.S. Third Army,” WWII History 9, no. 1 (January 2010): 44; GSP diary, October 6, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC; Robert S. Allen, Lucky Forward: The History of Patton’s Third U.S. Army (New York: Vanguard Press, 1947), 157. 18. Allison Wysong, memoirs, 19, Veterans History Project, LOC. 19. Charles Codman, Drive (Boston: Little, Brown, 1957), 195–96. 20. Kevin M. Hymel, Patton’s Photographs: War as He Saw It (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2006), 68; Hap Gay diaries, October 8, 1944, box 2, p. 525, USAHEC. 21. Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers, vol. 2 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974), 563; GSP diary, October 7, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC. 22. GSP to BAP, October 5, 1944, box 12, folder 10, GSP Collection, LOC. 23. GSP to George C. Marshall, October 12, 1944, box 12, folder 10, GSP Collection, LOC; GSP to FDR, October 7, 1944, box 12, folder 10, GSP Collection, LOC. 24. GSP to BAP, October 8, 1944, box 12, folder 10, GSP Collection, LOC; Patton, War as I Knew It, 104. 25. Hymel, Patton’s Photographs, 69; GSP diary, October 8, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC. 26. Ray Knight, Would You Remember This? Diary of a World War II Recruit (Unknown publisher and date), 117; Manton Eddy diary, 8 October 1944, National Infantry Museum. 27. GSP to BAP, October 8, 1944, box 12, folder 10, GSP Collection, LOC. 28. Larry I. Bland, ed., The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, vol. 4 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 624–25; “A Little This, A Little That,” New York Journal—­American, February 27, 1945, Patton’s Scrapbooks, reel 5, GSP Collection, LOC; Patton, War as I Knew It, 103. 29. Hap Gay diaries, October 29, 1944, box 2, page 543, USAHEC; Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier’s Story (New York: Modern Library, 1999), 437.

398

notes to chapter seven

30. Bradley, Soldier’s Story, 431; Patton, War as I Knew It, 104. 31. Hap Gay diaries, October 9, 1944, box 2, p. 526, USAHEC; GSP diary, October 9, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC; Bradley, Soldier’s Story, 432. 32. Louis E. Keefer, Scholars in Foxholes: The Story of the Army Specialized Training Program in World War II (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1988), 16, 24, 128–29, 174, 179–80. 33. Manton Eddy diary, October 9, 1944, National Infantry Museum. 34. Hap Gay diaries, October 9, 1944, box 2, p. 527, USAHEC. 35. Walter Andariese, ed., World War II thru Korea (Hastings, NE: Snell, 1974), 88. 36. Manton Eddy diary, October 10, 1944, National Infantry Museum. 37. Robert Matteson, WWII Veterans Surveys, 80th Infantry Division, USAHEC. 38. Manton Eddy diary, October 10, 1944, National Infantry Museum. 39. Hobart Winebrenner and Michael McCoy, Bootprints: An Infantryman’s Walk through World War II (Albion, IN: Camp Comamajo Press, 2005), 83; Thomas Glass, The Trials and Triumphs of a Regimental Commander during World War II (Victoria, BC: Trafford, 2005), 38. 40. Codman, 197; GSP diary, October 10, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC. 41. Brenton Greene Wallace, Patton and His Third Army (N.p.: War Vault, 2019), 210. 42. Larry I. Bland, The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, vol. 4 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 635–36. 43. John M. Carlisle, “3rd Army Is Great Because It Shines in Patton’s Fighting Heart,” Detroit News, October 10, 1944, box 12, file 17, GSP Collection, LOC. 44. Robert Richards, “Mile-­Chewing War Is Over; Mud Grips All Western Front,” Times Dispatch (Richmond, VA), October 12, 1944. 45. GSP diary, October 12, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC. 46. Zaloga, Metz 1944, 52; Hymel, “Fighting on the Face of the Moon,” 49. 47. Hap Gay diaries, October 12, 1944, box 2, p. 530, USAHEC; Kemp, Metz 1944, 230. 48. Paul Harkins, When the Third Army Cracked Europe: The Story of Patton’s Incredible Army (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, 1969), 33. 49. John Nelson Rickard, Patton at Bay: The Lorraine Campaign, September to December 1944 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 142. 50. GSP to Gordon Prince, October 31, 1944, box 28, folder 17, GSP Collection, LOC; James Wellard, General George S. Patton Jr.: Man under Mars (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1946), 199. 51. David N. Spires, Patton’s Air Force: Forging a Legendary Air-­Ground Team (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2002), 139; Allen, Forward with Patton, 71. 52. Jim Sudmeier, The General and the Giant Railway Gun: Patton’s Brush with Death in France (Luck Museum, 2018), 53, chrome-­extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/viewer.html?pdfurl=https%3A%2F%2Fjimsudmeier.com%2Fwp-­ content%2Fuploads%2F2020%2F04%2FPowerpoint-­Nancy-­S helling-­Luck-­2 .

notes to chapter eight

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pdf&clen=8303089&chunk=true; GSP to BAP, December 9, 1944, box 12, folder 15, p. 6, GSP Collection, LOC; Paul Harkin Album, 2 (Europe), p. 13, USAHEC.

Chapter Eight

1. GSP diary, October 12, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634.00111 /?sp=12&st=text. 2. Charles Codman, Drive (Boston: Little, Brown, 1957), 192; GSP diary, October 12, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC. 3. Manton Eddy diary, October 12, 1944, National Infantry Museum. 4. Codman, Drive, 197. 5. Hap Gay diaries, October 15, 1944, box 2, p. 532, USAHEC; GSP to BAP, October 15, 1944, box 12, file 10, GSP Collection, LOC. 6. Manton Eddy diary, October 15, 1944, National Infantry Museum. 7. GSP diary, October 15, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00111/?sp=15&st=text. 8. George Forty, The Armies of George S. Patton (London: Arms and Armour, 1996), 88; John Nelson Rickard, Patton at Bay: The Lorraine Campaign, September to December 1944 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 156. 9. Samuel Schmidt, interviewed by Nicholas Molnar, September 3, 2004, Rutgers University, Oral History Archives. 10. D. A. Lande, I Was with Patton: First-­Person Accounts of WWII in George S. Patton’s Command (St. Paul, MN: MBI, 2002), 105–6. 11. Paul L. French, interview with David Meyer, April 12, 2014, LOC, https:/ /memory.loc.gov/diglib/vhp/story/loc.natlib.afc2001001.95531/sr0001001.stream. 12. H. Essame, Patton: A Study in Command (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1974), 208. 13. William Bottomkey and Ben Shank, WWII Veterans Surveys, 95th Infantry Division, box 1, USAHEC. 14. Thomas Evans, Reluctant Valor (Latrobe, PA: St. Vincent College Center for Northern Appalachian Studies, 1995), 19. 15. GSP diary, October 16, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC; Data for Obituary of Harry L. Twaddle, Major General, USA, Ret’d A.S.N. 0-­3280, provided to the author by Clif Twaddle, Houston, TX. 16. Brenton Wallace, Patton and His Third Army (Nashville: Battery Press, 1981), 85. 17. GSP diary, October 17, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC; Steven J. Zaloga, Metz 1944: Patton’s Fortified Nemesis (Oxford: Osprey Books, 2012), 67. 18. George S. Patton Jr., War as I Knew It (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1975), 107. 19. GSP to BAP, October 15, 1944, box 12, folder 10, GSP Collection, LOC; Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier’s Story (New York: Modern Library, 1999), 437. 20. GSP diary, October 17, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00111/?sp=17&st=text.

400

notes to chapter eight

21. GSP to DDE, October 19, 1944, box 12, folder 11, GSP Collection, LOC; DDE to GSP, October 21, 1944, box 12, folder 11, GSP Collection, LOC. 22. Hap Gay diaries, October 16, 1944, box 2, p. 532, USAHEC; Russell F. Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants: The Campaign of France and Germany (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), 387. 23. GSP to DDE, October 19, 1944, box 12, folder 10, GSP Collection, LOC. 24. Harkin’s Photo Albums, vol. 2, USAHEC. 25. GSP to Bradley, Hap Gay diaries, October 17, 1944, box 2, p. 538a, USAHEC; Paul Harkin Album, box 2, USAHEC. 26. Robert S. Allen, Forward with Patton: The World War II Diary of Colonel Robert S. Allen (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2017), 73; Chris Bucholtz, Thunderbirds Triumphant: The 362nd Fighter Group vs Germany’s Wehrmacht (Philadelphia: Casemate, 2018), 116. 27. Frederick Ayer, Before the Colors Fade: Portrait of a Soldier, George S. Patton (Atlanta: Cherokee Publishing, 1964), 161, 164, 165, 166. 28. Bradford J. “BJ” Shedo, XIX Tactical Air Command and Ultra: Patton’s Force Enhancers in the 1944 Campaign in France (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2001), 134. 29. Bucholtz, Thunderbirds Triumphant, 116. 30. Robert Allen collection, unpublished diary, pp. 3, 11, the Patton Museum. 31. GSP to Jimmy Doolittle, October 19, 1944, box 12, folder 11, GSP Collection, LOC; James H. “Jimmy” Doolittle, I Could Never Be So Lucky Again (New York: Bantam Books, 1995), 420; Jimmy Doolittle to GSP, October 2, 1944, box 12, folder 11, GSP Collection, LOC. 32. GSP diary, October 17 and 21, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC; GSP to BAP, October 22, 1944, box 12, folder 11, GSP Collection, LOC. 33. Alden Hatch, George Patton: General in Spurs (New York: Julian Messner, 1973), 147. 34. Rickard, Patton at Bay, 156. 35. GSP diary, October 20, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634.00 111/?sp=19&st=text. 36. Codman, Drive, 203–4. 37. Hap Gay diaries, October 22, 1944, box 2, pp. 537, 538, USAHEC; Patton, War as I Knew It, 109. 38. Manton Eddy diary, October 18, 1944, National Infantry Museum. 39. Philip Costello, WWII Veterans Survey, 4th Armored Division, box 20, USAHEC. 40. Hap Gay diaries, October 31, 1944, box 2, p. 545, USAHEC; Patton, War as I Knew It, 111. 41. GSP to Terry Allen, October 13, 1944, folder 2, box 26, GSP Collection, LOC. 42. GSP diary, October 22, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC. 43. GSP to Omar Bradley, October 31, 1944, box 12, folder 12, GSP Collection, LOC; GSP diary, October 29, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC.

notes to chapter eight

401

44. Harold R. Winton, Corps Commanders of the Bulge: Six American Generals and Victory in the Ardennes (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007), 44; GSP to BAP, October 11, 1944, box 12, folder 10, GSP Collection, LOC. 45. Robert Allen collection, unpublished diary, pp. 3, 10, The Patton Museum. 46. Winton, Corps Commanders of the Battle of the Bulge, 47–48. 47. Manton Eddy diary, October 25, 1944, National Infantry Museum. 48. GSP diary, October 25, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC; Wallace, Patton and His Third Army, 85. 49. Manton Eddy diary, October 25, 1944, National Infantry Museum. 50. Walter Jones, unpublished memoir, p. 3, Veterans History Project, LOC. 51. “Inside Washington,” Chicago Sun Washington Bureau, n.d., Patton’s Scrapbooks, reel 1, GSP Collection, LOC. 52. GSP memorandums, October 26 and 27, 1944, box 12, folder 12, GSP Collection, LOC. 53. L. H. Campbell to GSP, November 14, 1944, box 12, folder 15, GSP Collection, LOC; GSP to L. H. Campbell, December 1, 1944, box 12, folder 15, GSP Collection, LOC. 54. Essame, Patton, 210; Wallace, Patton and His Third Army, 95. 55. Tobias O. Vogt, The Iron Men of Metz: Reflections of Combat with the 95th Infantry Division (San Diego: Aventine Press, 2005), 70, 87, 89; Patton, War as I Knew It, 107; Harry Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946), 693–94. 56. Patton, War as I Knew It, 107. 57. GSP diary, October 21, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC; Codman, Drive, 201. 58. Edward Bautz, U.S. Army, October 15, 1999, Oral History of World War II, Rutgers University. 59. Ayer, Before the Colors Fade, 168. 60. James H. Polk, World War II Letters and Notes of Colonel James H. Polk, 1944– 1945 (Oakland, CA: Elderberry Press, 2005), 113; Anthony Kemp, Metz 1944: One More River to Cross (Bayeux: Heimdal, 2003), 227. 61. James Polk, “Patton: ‘You Might as Well Die a Hero,’” ARMY (December 1975): 40. 62. Ayer, Before the Colors Fade, 166. 63. GSP diary, October 19, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC. 64. Hap Gay diaries, October 24, 1944, box 2, page 539, USAHEC; Allen, Forward with Patton, 74. 65. Codman, Drive, 210; GSP to GSP IV, October 25, 1944, box 12, folder 11, GSP Collection, LOC; Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower, 693. 66. “Life at the Front with Patton Recalled by Wounded Medic,” by PFC Peter Caparell, News Ledger, January 8, 1946, Patton Scrapbooks, reel 1, GSP Collection, LOC. 67. GSP to BAP, October 24, 1944, box 12, folder 11, GSP Collection, LOC; GSP to BAP, October 25, 1944, box 12, folder 11, GSP Collection, LOC; Patton, War as I Knew It, 109.

402

notes to chapter eight

68. Allen, Forward with Patton, 75. 69. GSP diary, October 16, 24, and 27, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC; Hap Gay diaries, October 28, 1944, box 2, p. 542, USAHEC; Zaloga, Metz 1944, 48; Codman, Drive, 202. 70. Cabannel Smith, My War Years (n.p.: self-­published, 1989), 81. 71. Hap Gay diaries, October 25, 1944, box 2, p. 540, USAHEC; GSP diary, October 25, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC. 72. Hap Gay diaries, October 28, 1944, box 2, p. 542, USAHEC. 73. Allen, Forward with Patton, 76. 74. Allen, Forward with Patton, 76. 75. Hap Gay diaries, October 28, 1944, box 2, p. 542, USAHEC; Patton, War as I Knew It, 110. 76. Hap Gay diaries, October 29, 1944, box 2, p. 543, USAHEC. 77. GSP to Gordon Prince, October 31, 1944, box 28, folder 17, GSP Collection, LOC; Hap Gay diaries, October 29, 1944, box 2, p. 544, USAHEC; Wallace, Patton and His Third Army, 84; Allen, Lucky Forward, 158; John Colby, War from the Ground Up: The 90th Division in WWII (Austin: Nortex Press, 1991), 268, 269. 78. Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower, 693–94. 79. Emily Yellin, Our Mothers’ War: American Women at Home and at the Front during World War II (New York: Free Press, 2004), 91–92; Hugh M. Cole, The Lorraine Campaign (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1984), 597. 80. Manton Eddy diary, October 28, 1944, National Infantry Museum. 81. GSP diaries, August 29, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00111/?sp=26&st=text. 82. Hap Gay diaries, October 29, 1944, box 2, p. 544, USAHEC; Patton War as I Knew It, 110. 83. GSP diaries, August 29, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634.00 111/?sp=27&st=text. 84. Kemp, Metz 1944, 244. 85. Allen, Forward with Patton, 77. 86. Allen, Forward with Patton, 78. 87. Hap Gay diaries, October 31, 1944, box 2, p. 545, USAHEC; Martin Blumenson, Patton: The Man behind the Legend, 1885–1945 (New York: William Morrow, 1985), 241. 88. William C. Sylvan and Francis G. Smith Jr., Normandy to Victory: The War Diary of General Courtney H. Hodges and the First U.S. Army (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2008), 159. 89. GSP to BAP, October 11, 1944, box 12, folder 10, GSP Collection, LOC. 90. Robert Andry, interviewed by Dan Usltead, the National World War II Museum, January 13, 2016. 91. George E. G. McConnell, interview, January 19, 2016, New York State Military Museum, https://museum.dmna.ny.gov/research/oral-­history-­project/oral-­hist ory-­program-­veteran-­interviews-­m.

notes to chapter eight

403

92. Kareem Abdul-­Jabbar, Brothers in Arms: The Epic Story of the 761st Tank Battalion, WWII’s Forgotten Heroes (New York: Broadway Books, 2004), 86–87; Patton, War as I Knew It, 111. 93. Hap Gay diaries, October 22, 1944, box 2, p. 537, USAHEC; Stanley P. Hirshson, General Patton: A Soldier’s Life (New York: HarperCollins, 2002), 524; GSP diary, October 22, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634.00111/?sp=20&st=text. 94. Hap Gay diaries, November 1, 1944, box 2, p. 546, USAHEC. 95. Alfred D. Chandler Jr., ed., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The War Years, vol. 4 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), 2257–59. 96. Allen, Forward with Patton, 79. 97. Allen, Lucky Forward, 163. 98. GSP diary, November 2, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00111/?sp=29&st=text. 99. Allen, Forward with Patton, 81. 100. Hap Gay diaries, November 3, 1944, box 2, p. 549, USAHEC; RG SC-­196063, NARA. 101. GSP to GSP IV, October 25, 1944, box 12, folder 11, GSP Collection, LOC. 102. Hugh Gaffey to GSP IV, October 27, 1944, box 12, folder 12, GSP Collection, LOC. 103. Hap Gay to GSP IV, October 25, 1944, box 12, folder 11, GSP Collection, LOC. 104. GSP to BAP, October 25, 1944, box 12, folder 11, GSP Collection, LOC. 105. GSP to BAP, October 25, 1944, box 12, folder 11, GSP Collection, LOC; Ruth Ellen Patton Totten, The Button Box: A Daughter’s Loving Memoir of Mrs. George S. Patton (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2005), 344. 106. Totten, Button Box, 329–34. 107. Eugene G. Schulz, The Ghost in General Patton’s Third Army: The Memoirs of Eugene G. Schulz during His Service in the United States Army in World War II (Bloomington, IN: Xlibris, 2012), 185. 108. Cole, Lorraine Campaign, 303. 109. Vogt, Iron Men of Metz, 77; GSP diary, November 4, 1944, LOC, https://www .loc.gov/resource/mss35634.00111/?sp=31&st=text. 110. William G. Weaver, Yankee Doodle Went to Town (Ann Arbor: Edward Brothers, 1959), 37; Thomas Glass, The Trials and Triumphs of a Regimental Commander during World War II (Victoria, BC: Trafford, 2005), 187–88. 111. Polk, “Patton: ‘You Might as Well Die a Hero,’” 43. 112. Eugene Patterson, Patton’s Unsung Armor of the Ardennes: The Tenth Armored Division’s Secret Dash to Bastogne (Philadelphia: Xlibris, 2008), 24–26. 113. Richard Cable, WWII Veterans Survey, 10th Armored Division, box 1, USAHEC. 114. Sidney LaPook, interviewed by Tom Ganz, the National World War II Museum, New Orleans, LA, March 29, 2012. 115. GSP to Henry Leonard, October 18, 1944, GSP Collection, LOC.

404

notes to chapter NINE

116. Hap Gay diaries, November 5, 1944, box 2, p. 551, USAHEC 117. Robert Allen collection, unpublished diary, p. (3) 32, the Patton Museum. 118. Robert Allen collection, unpublished diary, p. (3) 34, the Patton Museum; Allen, Lucky Forward), 165. 119. Hap Gay diaries, November 4–5, 1944, box 2, pp. 549a–51, USAHEC; GSP diary, November 5, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634.00111/?sp =31&st=text. 120. Manton Eddy diary, November 6, 1944, National Infantry Museum. 121. Harry E. Brown to John A. Hixson, March 4, 1978, John A. Hixson Collection. 122. Conference between General Patton and the Third Army Correspondents, November 6, 1944, box 12, folder 13, GSP Collection, LOC. 123. GSP to BAP, October 19, 1944, box 12, folder 10, GSP Collection, LOC; GSP diary, November 1 and 5, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC. 124. GSP to BAP, November 6, 1944, box 12, folder 13, GSP Collection, LOC. 125. Hap Gay diaries, November 7, 1944, box 2, p. 552, USAHEC. 126. Allen, Forward with Patton, 85. 127. Allen, Lucky Forward, 166. 128. Cole, Lorraine Campaign, 318. 129. Manton Eddy diary, November 7, 1944, National Infantry Museum; Codman, Drive, 212. 130. George F. Hofmann, The Super Sixth: History of the 6th Armored Division in World War II (Nashville: Battery Press, 2000), 178. 131. Codman, Drive, 212; GSP diary, November 7, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC.

Chapter Nine

1. GSP to BAP, November 8, 1944, box 12, folder 13, GSP Collection, LOC. 2. GSP diary, November 8, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC. 3. GSP to GSP IV, November 8, 1944, box 12, folder 13, GSP Collection, LOC. 4. Hugh Cole, The Lorraine Campaign (Washington, DC: U.S. Army, 1984), 320– 22, 338; George F. Hofmann, The Super Sixth: History of the 6th Armored Division in World War II (Nashville: Battery Press, 2000), 179. 5. Brenton Greene Wallace, Patton and His Third Army (n.p.: War Vault, 2019), 204; Charles Codman, Drive (Boston: Little, Brown, 1957), 213. 6. GSP diary, November 8, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC; Kevin M. Hymel, Patton’s Photographs: War as He Saw It (Dulles: Potomac Books, 2006), 72; GSP to BAP, November 8, 1944, box 12, folder 13, GSP Collection, LOC; Hap Gay diaries, November 8, 1944, box 2, p. 553, USAHEC; Codman, Drive, 213; Wallace, Patton and His Third Army, 97; Dean Dominique and James Hays, One Hell of a War: Patton’s 317th Infantry Regiment in WWII (n.p., Wounded Warrior Publications, 2014), 125–26. 7. William Kennedy, WWII Veterans Surveys, 35th Infantry Division, box 1, USAHEC. 8. D. A. Lande, I Was with Patton: First-­Person Accounts of WWII in George S. Patton’s Command (St. Paul, MN: MBI, 2002), 105–6.

notes to chapter NINE

405

9. Robert Allen collection, unpublished diary, p. (3) 35, the Patton Museum. 10. GSP diary, November 8, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC; GSP to GSP IV, November 8, 1944, box 12, folder 13, GSP Collection, LOC; Codman, Drive, 213; Wallace, Patton and His Third Army, 97. 11. Anthony Kemp, Metz 1944: One More River to Cross (Bayeux: Heimdal, 2003), 274. 12. Cole, Lorraine Campaign, 29. 13. GSP diary, November 9, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC. 14. GSP to BAP, November 10, 1944, box 12, folder 13, GSP Collection, LOC; Robert C. Russell, WWII Veterans Surveys, 5th Infantry Division, box 1, USAHEC. 15. GSP diary, November 9, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC; Kemp, Metz 1944, 253; GSP to GSP IV, November 8, 1944, box 12, folder 13, GSP Collection, LOC; Cole, Lorraine Campaign, 377. 16. Everett Hughes to Theresa Hughes, November 9, 1944, Everett Hughes Papers, LOC; Hofmann, Super Sixth, 183; Don M. Fox, Patton’s Vanguard: The United States Army Fourth Armored Division (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2003), 177; Codman, Drive, 214. 17. Kemp, Metz 1944, 257. 18. Kemp, Metz 1944, 259–60. 19. Robert S. Allen, Forward with Patton: The World War II Diary of Colonel Robert S. Allen (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2017), 86. 20. GSP diary, November 10, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC; GSP to BAP, November 10, 1944, box 12, folder 13, GSP Collection, LOC; GSP to GCM, November 18, 1944, box 12, folder 14, GSP Collection, LOC; Hofmann, Super Sixth, 186; Fox, Patton’s Vanguard, 181–84; Hap Gay diaries, November 10, 1944, box 2, p. 555, USAHEC. About this time, according to Robert Allen’s Lucky Forward, the 2nd Cavalry employed horses on its reconnaissance missions, something Patton loved. However, there is no reference to horses anywhere in the 2nd Cavalry’s records at NARA. 21. Robert Allen collection, unpublished diary, page (4) 2, Patton Museum. 22. Hap Gay diaries, November 11, 1944, box 2, p. 557, USAHEC; Allen, Forward with Patton, 88. 23. Kemp, Metz 1944, 267; Hap Gay diaries, November 11, 1944, box 2, pp. 557– 59, USAHEC. 24. GSP to BAP, November 12, 1944, box 12, folder 13, GSP Collection, LOC; Wallace, Patton and His Third Army, 98. 25. Manton Eddy diary, November 11, 1944, National Infantry Museum. 26. Gerald Zuck, unpublished memoir, p. 5, Veterans History Project, LOC. 27. Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers, 1940–1945, vol. 2 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974), 575. 28. Hofmann, Super Sixth, 187–91, 197. 29. Congressional Record-­Senate, May 27, 1963, 8923–8924, box 75, file 12, GSP Papers, LOC. 30. Peter Caparell, “Life at the Front with Patton Recalled by Wounded Medic,” News Ledger, January 8, 1946, Patton Scrapbooks, reel 1, GSP Collection, LOC.

406

notes to chapter NINE

31. GSP to BAP, November 12, 1944, box 12, folder 13, GSP Collection, LOC. 32. DDE to GSP and GSP to DDE, November 11, 1944, box 12, folder 13, GSP Collection, LOC. 33. GSP diary, November 11, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00111/?sp=40&st=text. 34. Martin Blumenson, Patton: The Man behind the Legend 1885–1945 (New York: William Morrow, 1985), 244; George S. Patton Jr., War as I Knew It (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1975), 118; Robert Allen collection, unpublished diary, p. (4) 3, the Patton Museum; Alfred D. Chandler Jr. ed., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, The War Years, vol. 4 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), 2297. 35. Joseph Driscoll, “Patton Again near Metz on His Birthday,” St. Louis Post-­ Dispatch (St. Louis, MO). 36. GSP diary, November 11, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC; GSP to BAP, November 12, 1944, box 12, folder 13, GSP Collection, LOC; Patton, War as I Knew It, 118. 37. Allen, Forward with Patton, 89. 38. GSP diary, November 12, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC; GSP to BAP, November 14, 1944, box 12, folder 13, GSP Collection, LOC; Patton, War as I Knew It, 119; Chandler, Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, 4:2309; “Silvester, Tank General, Demoted, Returned to U.S.,” Stars and Stripes, January 11, 1945. 39. Lande, I Was with Patton, 169; Kemp, Metz 1944, 266; Hap Gay diaries, November 12, 1944, box 2, pp. 561–62, 564, USAHEC; Wallace, Patton and His Third Army, 99; John Colby, War from the Ground Up: The 90th Division in WWII (Austin: Nortex Press, 1991), 291. 40. Hofmann, Super Sixth, 187–91, 201, 208; Fox, Patton’s Vanguard, 188; Hap Gay diaries, November 12, 1944, box 2, p. 563, USAHEC. 41. Allen, Forward with Patton, 89. 42. Hap Gay diaries, November 13, 1944, box 2, p. 564, USAHEC. 43. Patton, War as I Knew It, 119; GSP diary, November 13, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC. 44. Robert Allen collection, unpublished diary, p. (4) 8, the Patton Museum. 45. Manton Eddy diary, November 14, 1944, National Infantry Museum; Allen, Forward with Patton, 90. 46. GSP diary, November 14, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC; Kemp, Metz 1944, 267. 47. Lande, I Was with Patton, 180. 48. Max Schwartz, Bridges to Victory: The Story of the 1306 Engineers in WWII (Los Angeles: Consulting Engineers, 2003), 110; Kemp, Metz 1944, 272. 49. Lynn Henry Guilloud, unpublished memoir, p. 23, Veterans History Project, LOC. 50. William G. Weaver, Yankee Doodle Went to Town (Ann Arbor, MI: Edward Brothers, 1959), 38; Cole, Lorraine Campaign, 425. 51. GSP diary, November 14, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC; Aaron Elson, Tanks for the Memories: The 712th Tank Battalion During World War II (Hackensack, NJ: Chi Chi Press, 2001), 305; Patton, War as I Knew It, 120.

notes to chapter NINE

407

52. Cole, Lorraine Campaign, 386. 53. Kemp, Metz 1944, 267, 270, 274, 275. 54. Kemp, Metz 1944, 275. 55. Tobias O. Vogt, The Iron Men of Metz: Reflections of Combat with the 95th Infantry Division (San Diego: Aventine Press, 2005), 101–2; Hofmann, Super Sixth, 204–7; Fox, Patton’s Vanguard, 188; James Wellard, General George S. Patton Jr.: Man under Mars (New York: Dodd Meade, 1946), 209. 56. Cole, Lorraine Campaign, 404; Kemp, Metz 1944, 297–98, 318–19; Hap Gay diaries, November 15, 1944, box 2, p. 567, USAHEC. 57. GSP diary, November 15, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC; Third Army Memo, Provision of Bedding for the Front Line Infantrymen, November 15, 1944, box 12, folder 13, GSP Collection, LOC; Allen, Forward with Patton, 90; Erwin Blonder, interview with (interviewer unknown), 2015, National WWII Museum, New Orleans, Louisiana, https://www.ww2online.org/view /erwin-­blonder#trench-­foot-­patton-­and-­the-­442nd-­regimental-­combat-­team. 58. Richard J. Stillman and Mary F. Riggs, General Patton’s Best Friend: The Story of General George Smith Patton, Jr. and His Beloved Dog, Willie (New Orleans: R. J. Stillman, 2001), 65–68. 59. GSP diary, November 15, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC; Fox, Patton’s Vanguard, 193. 60. Robert Allen collection, unpublished diary, pp. (4) 16, 18, the Patton Museum; Codman, Drive, 218. 61. Manton Eddy diary, November 15, 1944, National Infantry Museum; GSP diary, November 15, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC. 62. Michael J. McKeough and Richard Lockridge, Sgt. Mickey and General Ike (New York: G. P. Putnam Sons, 1946), 145. 63. Hap Gay diaries, November 16, 1944, box 2, p. 567, USAHEC. 64. Hap Gay diaries, November 16, 1944, box 2, p. 567, USAHEC; Allen, Lucky Forward, 177. 65. RG 111-­SC 443101, November 16, 1944, NARA; Allen, Forward with Patton, 93, 95. 66. Lande, I Was with Patton, 160–61. 67. Stanley Hirshson, General Patton: A Soldier’s Life (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2002), 557; Patton, War as I Knew It, 120; Manton Eddy diary, November 16, 1944, National Infantry Museum; Hap Gay diaries, November 16, 1944, box 2, p. 568, USAHEC. 68. GSP diary, November 16, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC. 69. Harry H. Semmes, Portrait of Patton (New York: Appleton Century Crofts, 1955), 223. 70. GSP diary, November 17, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00111/?sp=48&st=text. 71. Hofmann, Super Sixth, 208–17; Cole, Lorraine Campaign, 480. 72. Kemp, Metz 1944, 293. 73. Robert Paulson, interview by John K. Driscoll, 2003, OH425, transcript, Wisconsin Veterans Museum Oral History Program, Madison, WI.

408

notes to chapter NINE

74. Kemp, Metz 1944, 293; GSP to BAP, November 17, 1944, box 12, folder 13, GSP Collection, LOC; Hap Gay diaries, November 17, 1944, box 2, pp. 570–71, USAHEC; Patton Jr., War as I Knew It, 121; Wellard, Man under Mars, 205. 75. Eugene G. Schulz, The Ghost in General Patton’s Third Army: The Memoirs of Eugene G. Schulz during His Service in the United States Army in World War II (Bloomington, IN: Xlibris, 2012), 191. 76. Wallace, Patton and His Third Army, 203–4. 77. Robert Allen collection, unpublished diary, p. (4) 15, the Patton Museum. 78. GSP to BAP, November 19, 1944, box 12, folder 14, GSP Collection, LOC. 79. Kemp, Metz 1944, 299; Cole, Lorraine Campaign, 438, 442, 444; GSP diary, November 18, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC; GSP to GCM, November 18, 1944, box 12, folder 14, GSP Collection, LOC. 80. Hofmann, Super Sixth, 222; Hap Gay diaries, November 18, 1944, box 2, p. 571, USAHEC. 81. Allen, Forward with Patton, 95. 82. GSP to BAP, November 19, 1944, box 12, folder 14, GSP Collection, LOC. 83. Wilson A. Heefner, Patton’s Bulldog: The Life and Service of Walton H. Walker (Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Press, 2001), 99; Robert Paulson, interview by John K. Driscoll, 2003, OH425, transcript, Wisconsin Veterans Museum Oral History Program, Madison, WI. 84. GSP to BAP, November 19, 1944, box 12, folder 14, GSP Collection, LOC; ONB to GSP, November 18, 1944, box 12, folder 14, GSP Collection, LOC; Patton, War as I Knew It, 121. 85. GSP diary, November 19, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC; Fox, Patton’s Vanguard, 194; Manton Eddy diary, November 19, 1944, National Infantry Museum; Hap Gay diaries, November 18, 1944, box 2, p. 573, 571, USAHEC; Hirshson, General Patton, 557. 86. Manton Eddy diary, November 19, 1944, National Infantry Museum; GSP diary, November 17, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC; Fox, Patton’s Vanguard, 194. 87. GSP diaries, November 19, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss356 34.00111/?sp=51&st=text. 88. Kemp, Metz 1944, 325; GSP to BAP, November 21, 1944, box 12, folder 14, GSP Collection, LOC. 89. Vogt, Iron Men of Metz, 140; Hap Gay diaries, November 19, 1944, box 2, pp. 574–75, USAHEC; Lester M. Nichols, Impact: The Battle Story of the Tenth Armored Division (Nashville: Battery Press, 1954), 35. 90. Hap Gay diaries, November 20, 1944, box 2, p. 576, USAHEC. 91. GSP diary, November 20, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC. 92. Manton Eddy diary, November 22, 1944, National Infantry Museum; Hofmann, Super Sixth, 233. 93. Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier’s Story (New York: Modern Library, 1999), 433; Harry Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946), 702. 94. McKeough and Lockridge, Sgt. Mickey and General Ike, 156.

notes to chapter NINE

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95. Albert Meserlin, interviewed by Sandra Stewart Holyoak and Cecilia Navas, March 23, 2001, p. 8, Rutgers University Oral History Archives of WWII. 96. Cole, Lorraine Campaign, 447. 97. Nichols, Impact, 41–42. 98. Patton, War as I Knew It, 122. 99. GSP diary, November 21, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC; GSP to BAP, November 21, 1944, box 12, folder 14, GSP Collection, LOC; Russell F. Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants: The Campaign of France and Germany, 1944–1945 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 404; Hofmann, Super Sixth, 226, 227. 100. GSP diary, November 21, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss356 34.00111/?sp=52&st=text. 101. Blumenson, Patton Papers, 2:577. 102. George R. Wren, Normandy to Czechoslovakia in World War II: A G.I.’s Memoirs (n.p.: G. R. Wren, 1989), 137–38. 103. GSP to BAP, November 21, 1944, box 12, folder 14, GSP Collection, LOC; GSP to Corps and Division commanders, November 21, 1944, box 12, folder 14, GSP Collection, LOC 104. GSP to BAP, November 21, 1944, box 12, folder 14, GSP Collection, LOC; Blumenson, Patton, 244–45. 105. Vogt, Iron Men of Metz, 141. 106. Schulz, Ghost in General Patton’s Third Army, 192; Dominique and Hays, One Hell of a War, 135. 107. Nichols, Impact, 35; Harold Schoenfeld, WWII Veterans Surveys, 90th Infantry Division, box 2, USAHEC. 108. Wellard, Man under Mars, 208–9. 109. Hap Gay diaries, November 22, 1944, box 2, p. 578, USAHEC; Wellard, Man under Mars, 207; Hymel, Patton’s Photographs. 110. Hap Gay diaries, interview between Patton and captured German Colonel, Colonel Constantin Meyer, November 22, 1944, box 2, p. 578a, USAHEC. 111. Robert Allen collection, unpublished diary, p. (5) 11, the Patton Museum; Interview between General Patton and Third Army correspondents, November 24, 1944, box 12, file 14, GSP Collection, LOC. 112. GSP diary, November 22, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC. 113. GSP diary, November 22, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC. 114. Walter Mills, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York: Viking Press, 1951), 17– 18; Norman Polmar and Thomas B. Allen, World War II: America at War (New York: Random House, 1991), 768, 889. 115. Manton Eddy diary, November 23, 1944, National Infantry Museum. 116. GSP diary, November 23, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC; DDE to GSP, November 23, 1944, box 12, folder 14, GSP Collection, LOC; SHAEF Radio Announcement, November 23, 1944, box 12, folder 14, GSP Collection, LOC; Patton, War as I Knew It), 122. 117. GSP diary, November 22, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC; Fox, Patton’s Vanguard, 189, 201.

410

notes to chapter TEN

118. Bernard Carter to Louise Carter, Bernard Shirley Carter Papers, November 25, 1944, box 2, folder 6, Manuscripts Division, USMA Library. 119. Angelo Demos, interview, Witness to War, accessed June 19, 2021, https:/ /www.witnesstowar.org/combat_stories/WWII/9052; Bill Newman, interview, Witness to War, accessed June 19, 2021, https://www.witnesstowar.org/combat_stories /WWII/8645; Cole, Lorraine Campaign, 596.

Chapter Ten

1. Robert S. Allen, Forward with Patton: The World War II Diary of Colonel Robert S. Allen (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2017), 98. 2. Citation for Bronze Star Medal, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC. 3. Jonathan W. Jordan, Brothers, Rivals, Victors: Eisenhower, Patton, Bradley and the Partnership that Drove the Allied Conquest in Europe (New York: NAL Caliber, 2011), 423. 4. GSP to BAP, November 26, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC. 5. Robert Allen collection, unpublished diary, p. (5) 25, the Patton Museum; Alfred D. Chandler Jr., ed., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, The War Years, vol. 4 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), 2340–41. 6. Tobias O. Vogt, The Iron Men of Metz: Reflections of Combat with the 95th Infantry Division (San Diego: Aventine Press, 2005), 143 7. GSP diary, November 24, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC. 8. Robert Allen collection, unpublished diary, p, (5) 4, the Patton Museum; Interview between General Patton and Third Army Correspondents, November 24, 1944, box 12, folder 14, GSP Collection, LOC. 9. Robert Allen collection, unpublished diary, p. (5) 4, the Patton Museum; Interview between General Patton and Third Army Correspondents, November 24, 1944. 10. GSP diary, November 25, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/ mss35634.00111/?sp=57&st=text. 11.Clark Byrd, “Dr. James E. Thayer, Sidney’s Physician: A Celebration of a Life Well Lived,” Sidney Sun-­Telegraph, February 16, 2011; GSP diary, November 25, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC. 12. Michael C. Bilder, A Foot Soldier for Patton: The Story of a “Red Diamond” Infantryman with the U.S. Third Army (Drexel Hill, PA: Casemate, 2008), 173; Carlo d’Este, Patton: Genius for War (New York: HarperCollins,1999), 669. 13. George S. Patton Jr., War as I Knew It (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1975), 123; David Hendee, “Doc Set Nebraska History to Music,” Omaha World-­Herald, February 12, 2011. 14. Hap Gay diaries, November 25, 1944, box 2, pp. 583–84, USAHEC; Hugh M. Cole, The Lorraine Campaign (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1984), 470. 15. Hap Gay diaries, November 25, 1944, box 2, p. 583, USAHEC. 16. GSP diary, November 25, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC. 17. Allen, Forward with Patton, 99. 18. GSP diary, November 26, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/ mss35634.00111/?sp=60&st=text. Patton’s transcribed and embellished diaries

notes to chapter TEN

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contains the following line not found in the original: “I personally believe the VI corps should have crossed the Rhine, but it was stopped by Eisenhower.” 19. George F. Hofmann, The Super Sixth: History of the 6th Armored Division in World War II (Nashville: Battery Press, 2000), 238. 20. Edward Bautz, U.S. Army, October 15, 1999, Oral History of World War II, Rutgers University, 48, 49. 21. Memorandum of Trip to General Eisenhower’s Headquarters from Paris, Sunday–Tuesday, November 26–28, 1944, p. 4, box 175, file 8, the Papers of W. Averell Harriman, LOC. 22. Stanley P. Hirshson, General Patton: A Soldier’s Life (New York: HarperCollins, 2002), 562. 23. Memorandum of Trip to General Eisenhower’s Headquarters from Paris, Sunday–Tuesday, November 26–28, 1944, pp. 4–6. 24. GSP diary, November 27, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC; Hap Gay diaries, November 25, 1944, box 2, p. 585, USAHEC. 25. GSP to BAP, November 28, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC; Dean Dominique and James Hays, One Hell of a War: Patton’s 317th Infantry Regiment in WWII (n.p.: Wounded Warrior Publications, 2014), 139; Hap Gay diaries, November 27, 1944, box 2, p. 585, USAHEC. 26. Phillip J. Prater to GSP, November 28, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC. 27. Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers, 1940–1945, vol. 2 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1974), 584. 28. Patton, War as I Knew It, 124. 29. Cole, Lorraine Campaign, 520–21. 30. GSP diary, November 28, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/ mss35634.00111/?sp=62&st=text. 31. GSP diary, November 28, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC; “Oil Might Have Ended It,” Stars and Stripes, December 11, 1945. 32. Manton Eddy diary, November 28, 1944, National Infantry Museum; GSP diary, November 28, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC. 33. GSP to BAP, November 28, 1944, box 12, folder 14, GSP Collection, LOC. 34. Hap Gay diaries, November 30, 1944, box 2, p. 588, USAHEC. 35. Allen, Forward with Patton, 101. 36. Robert S. Allen, Lucky Forward: The History of Patton’s Third U.S. Army (New York: Vanguard Press, 1947), 190–91; Joseph Summers, interviewed August 23, 2016, War Memorial Center, Milwaukee, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=_IQLpr5hTW4. 37. Patton, War as I Knew It, 125; James H. Polk, “Patton: You Might Die a Hero,” ARMY (December 1975): 43. 38. Bruce Henderson, Sons and Soldiers: The Untold Story of the Jews Who Escaped the Nazis and Returned with the U.S. Army to Fight Hitler (New York: HarperCollins, 2017), 318. 39. D. A. Lande, I Was with Patton: First-­Person Accounts of WWII in George S. Patton’s Command (St. Paul, MN: MBI, 2002), 186.

412

notes to chapter TEN

40. Hap Gay diaries, November 29, 1944, box 2, p. 587a, USAHEC. 41. GSP diary, November 29, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC; Vogt, Iron Men of Metz, 144. 42. Lewis H. Brereton, The Brereton Diaries (New York: William Morrow, 1946), 372; GSP to ONB, November 28, 1944, box 12, folder 14, GSP Collection, LOC. 43. Lester M. Nichols, Impact: The Battle Story of the Tenth Armored Division (Nashville: Battery Press, 1954), 36, 45; GSP diary, November 30, 1944, LOC, https:// www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634.00111/?sp=64&st=text&r=-­0.267,0,1.534,1.485,0. 44. Georges Poussier to GSP, November 1944, box 28, folder 17, GSP Collection, LOC. 45. Cole, Lorraine Campaign, 509–11. 46. GSP to Elenore Aleshire, December 1, 1944, folder 2, box 28, GSP Collection, LOC. 47. Cole, Lorraine Campaign, 514. 48. Patton, War as I Knew It, 125; GSP diary, December 1–2, 1944, LOC, https:// www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634.00111/?sp=66&st=text; Cole, Lorraine Campaign, 521. 49. GSP to BAP, 1 December 1944 box 12, folder 15, GSP Collection, LOC. 50. Allen, Forward with Patton, 102. 51. Kevin Hymel, Patton’s Photographs: War as He Saw It (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2006), 86–87; GSP diary, December 2, 1944, box 3, folder 9, GSP Collection, LOC; GSP to BAP, December 3, 1944, box 12, folder 15, GSP Collection, LOC; GSP notes, December 5, 1944, box 12, folder 15, GSP Collection, LOC; Hap Gay diaries, December 2, 1944, box 2, p. 590–91, USAHEC. 52. Henry Gerard Phillips, The Making of a Professional: Manton S. Eddy, USA (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000), 175. 53. John B. Sullivan to John A. Hixson, January 25, 1978, John A. Hixson Collection. 54. Hirshson, General Patton, 562–63; Hofmann, Super Sixth, 236. 55. Manton Eddy diary, November 30, 1944, National Infantry Museum; GSP to BAP, December 3, 1944, box 12, folder 15, GSP Collection, LOC; Hap Gay diaries, December 1, 1944, box 2, p. 589, USAHEC. 56. Vogt, Iron Men of Metz, 144; GSP diary, December 2–3, 1944, box 3, folder 9, GSP Collection, LOC; GSP to BAP, December 3, 1944, box 12, folder 15, GSP Collection, LOC; Hirshson, General Patton, 563. 57. John B. Sullivan to John A. Hixson, January 25, 1978, John A. Hixson Collection. 58. GSP to Hugh Gaffey, December 8, 1944, box 12, folder 15, GSP Collection, LOC. 59. Allen, Forward with Patton, 103. 60. John Wood to GSP, December 8, 1944, John A. Hixson Collection. 61. Nathanial Frankel and Larry Smith, Patton’s Best: An Informal History of the 4th Armored Division (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1978), 184; Hirshson, General Patton, 563.

notes to chapter TEN

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62. GSP diary, December 3, 1944, box 3, folder 9, GSP Collection, LOC; Hap Gay diaries, December 7, 1944, box 2, p. 597, USAHEC; Patton, War as I Knew It, 126. 63. Manton Eddy diary, December 4, 1944, National Infantry Museum. 64. Don M. Fox, Patton’s Vanguard: The United States Army Fourth Armored Division (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2003), 233. 65. Cole, Lorraine Campaign, 517–18. 66. Allen, Forward with Patton, 105. 67. GSP diary, December 4, 1944, box 3, folder 9, GSP Collection, LOC; Allen, Lucky Forward, 171. 68. GSP diary, December 5–7, 1944, box 3, folder 9, GSP Collection, LOC; Cole, Lorraine Campaign, 533. 69. Blumenson, Patton Papers, 2:586. 70. GSP to Thomas Handy, December 5, 1944, box 12, folder 15, GSP Collection, LOC. 71. GSP to George C. Marshall, December 5, 1944, box 12, folder 15, GSP Collection, LOC. 72. Danny Parker, To Win the Winter Sky: Air War over the Ardennes 1944–1945 (London: Greenhill Books, 1999), 107–8. 73. Cole, Lorraine Campaign, 529. 74. Frankel and Smith, Patton’s Best, 80; Cole, Lorraine Campaign, 557, 567. 75. Hirshson, General Patton, 564. 76. Lande, I Was with Patton, 162. 77. Richard W. Stewart, ed., American Military History, vol. 2, The United States Army in a Global Era (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2009), 210. 78. GSP diary, December 6, 1944, box 3, folder 9, GSP Collection, LOC; GSP to BAP, December 7, 1944, box 12, folder 15, GSP Collection, LOC; Charles Codman, Drive (Boston: Little, Brown, 1957), 222; Forward with Patton, 106. 79. Hirshson, General Patton, 559–61; Allen, Forward with Patton, 105–6. 80. Robert Allen collection, unpublished diary, p. (5) 18, the Patton Museum; Parker, To Win the Winter Sky, 107–8. 81. Philip Cochran, interview, October 21, 1975, Air Force Oral History Interview (#K239.0512-­876), Nimitz Education and Research Center, the National Museum of the Pacific War, Fredericksburg, Texas, 315, 318–22. 82. “People,” Time Magazine, January 22, 1945, Patton’s Scrapbooks, reel 1, GSP Collection, Library of Congress; GSP diary, December 6, 1944, box 3, folder 9, GSP Collection, LOC; William C. Sylvan and Francis G. Smith Jr., Normandy to Victory: The War Diary of General Courtney H. Hodges and the First U.S. Army (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2008), 197; GSP notes, December 5, 1944, box 12, folder 15, GSP Collection, LOC. 83. Cole, Lorraine Campaign, 567; GSP diary, December 8, 1944, box 3, folder 9, GSP Collection, LOC. 84. William Kennedy, WWII Veterans Surveys, 35th Infantry Division, box 1, USAHEC. 85. Hap Gay diaries, December 6–8, 1944, box 2, p. 596–99, USAHEC.

414

notes to chapter TEN

86. Hofmann, Super Sixth, 255–56. 87. Allen, Forward with Patton, 106. 88. Philip Cochran, interview, October 21, 1975, 315, 318–22; Hap Gay diaries, December 8, 1944, box 2, p. 599, USAHEC. 89. Cole, Lorraine Campaign, 537–38. 90. GSP to ONB, December 9, 1944, box 12, folder 15, GSP Collection, LOC. 91. GSP to Manton Eddy, December 8, 1944, box 12, folder 15, GSP Collection, LOC; Cole, Lorraine Campaign, 532. 92. Allen, Forward with Patton, 107. 93. GSP diary, December 9, 1944, box 3, folder 9, GSP Collection, LOC; GSP notes, December 5, 1944, box 12, folder 15, GSP Collection, LOC; Hap Gay diaries, December 12, 1944, box 2, p. 606, USAHEC. 94. Conference between General Patton, General Weyland and Third Army Correspondents, December 9, 1944, box 12, folder 15, p. 6, GSP Collection, LOC. 95. XIX Tactical Air Command, Operations for December 1944, IRISNUM no: 00238678, IRISREF no. B5936, December 6, 1944, 451, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB. 96. GSP diary, December 10, 1944, box 3, folder 9, GSP Collection, LOC. 97. Paul Harkin Photo Albums, vol. 2, USAHEC. 98. Allen, Forward with Patton, 102. 99. Allen, Lucky Forward, 1196–99; Hap Gay diaries, December 10, 1944, box 2, p. 602, USAHEC. 100. GSP diary, December 10, 1944, box 3, folder 9, GSP Collection, LOC; GSP to BAP, December 1, 1944, box 12, folder 15, GSP Collection, LOC; GSP to BAP, December 9, 1944, box 12, folder 15, GSP Collection, LOC. 101. Blumenson, Patton Papers, 2:589. 102. GSP to BAP, December 11, 1944, box 12, folder 15, GSP Collection, LOC; Hap Gay diaries, December 11, 1944, box 2, p. 603, USAHEC. 103. “Guest Toasts Host—­and Vice Versa,” Stars and Stripes, January 2, 1945. 104. James H. O’Neill, “The True Story of the Patton Prayer,” Armored Cavalry Journal, pp. 1–3, October–November 1948, Patton Scrapbooks, reel 1 (microfilm), GSP Collection, LOC; GSP diary, December 14, 1944, box 3, folder 9, GSP Collection, LOC. 105. Cole, Lorraine Campaign, 582, 584. 106. James Wellard, General George S. Patton Jr.: Man under Mars (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1946), 219. 107. GSP diary, December 13, 1944, box 3, folder 9, GSP Collection, LOC; Hap Gay diaries, December 11, 1944, box 2, p. 601, USAHEC; Wellard, Man under Mars, 225. 108. Albin Irzyk, He Rode Up Front with Patton (Raleigh, NC: Pentland Press, 1996), 228–29. 109. Lande, I Was with Patton, 144. 110. Martin Rayburn, interviewed by Richard Schachtsiek, February 25, 2009, interview #VR2-­A-­L-­2009-­008, Abraham Lincoln Presidential Library, https://www2.

notes to chapter TEN

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illinois.gov/alplm/library/collections/OralHistory/VeteransRemember/worldwarII/ Documents/MartinRayburn/Martin_Ray_4FNL.pdf. 111. Conference between General Patton, General Weyland and Third Army Correspondents, December 9, 1944, box 12, folder 15, p. 6, GSP Collection, LOC. 112. Orlindo “Lindy” Ferlo, interviewed by Tim Szczerba and Tom Wojdyla at Rome Free Academy High School, Rome New York, May 22, 2015, New York State Military Museum, https://museum.dmna.ny.gov/research/oral-­history-­project/oral-­ history-­program-­veteran-­interviews-­f; Interview, Gerald Virgil Myers, Company G, 2nd Battalion, 317th IR, 80th Inf. Div., July 11, 2006, Veterans History Project, LOC, https://memory.loc.gov/diglib/vhp/story/loc.natlib.afc2001001.31971/mv0001001. stream. 113. Hap Gay diaries, December 12, 1944, box 2, p. 605, USAHEC; GSP diary, December 13, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634.00111/?sp=76&st=text. 114. Blumenson, Patton Papers, 2:590. 115. Allen, Lucky Forward, 194–95. 116. GSP to BAP, December 7, 1944, box 12, folder 15, GSP Collection, LOC; GSP to Henry Stimson, December 9, 1944, box 12, folder 15, GSP Collection, LOC. Patton included a post-­it note that read, “Of course the remarks about Lorraine were intended for a joke. I label it because some of my jokes are not always appreciated.” 117. Robert Allen collection, unpublished diary, p. (5) 11, the Patton Museum. 118. GSP diary, December 12, 1944, box 3, folder 9, GSP Collection, LOC. 119. GSP diary, December 13, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/ mss35634.00111/?sp=76&st=text. 120. Patton, War as I Knew It, 126. 121. ADV Headquarters, XIX Tactical Air Command, OPERATION TINK, IRISNUM no: 00238678, IRISREF no. B5936, December 17, 1944, 785–91, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB; John Nelson Rickard, Patton at Bay: The Lorraine Campaign, September to December 1944 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 215. 122. Patton, War as I Knew It, 129. 123. Hap Gay diaries, December 13, 1944, box 2, p. 607, USAHEC; Hirshson, General Patton, 561. 124. GSP diary, December 14, 1944, box 3, folder 9, GSP Collection, LOC; GSP to BAP, December 15, 1944, box 12, folder 16, GSP Collection, LOC; Cole, Lorraine Campaign, 561, 586; Patton, War as I Knew It, 129. 125. John Keith Graham, History: 206th Engineer Combat Battalion (self-­ published, 2002), 117, 173; GSP diaries, December 14, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc. gov/resource/mss35634.00111/?sp=79&st=text; Interview with Mark Pirrung by Kevin M. Hymel, October 7, 2022. 126. GSP diaries, December 14, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/ mss35634.00111/?sp=78&st=text. 127. Patton, War as I Knew It, 129. 128. Robert Allen collection, unpublished diary, pp. (5) 4 and 21, the Patton Museum; ONB to GSP, December 8, 1944, box 12, folder 15, GSP Collection, LOC. 129. Chandler, Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, 4:2324–25.

416

notes to chapter eleven

130. GSP diary, December 14, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/ mss35634.00111/?sp=79&st=text. 131. GSP diary, December 14, 1944, box 3, folder 9, GSP Collection, LOC. 132. Hap Gay diaries, December 14, 1944, box 2, p. 609, USAHEC; Sylvan and Smith, Normandy to Victory, 203. 133. Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier’s Story (New York: Modern Library, 1999), 443–44. 134. GSP diary, December 15, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/ mss35634.00111/?sp=80&st=text. 135. ONB to GSP, December 8, 1944, box 12, folder 15, GSP Collection, LOC. 136. Hap Gay diaries, December 15, 1944, box 2, p. 610, USAHEC; GSP diary, December 15–16, 1944, box 3, folder 9, GSP Collection, LOC. 137. ONB to GSP, December 11, 1944, box 12, folder 16, GSP Collection, LOC. 138. Hap Gay diaries, December 16, 1944, box 2, p. 612, USAHEC. 139. Wellard, Man under Mars, 105–6. 140. GSP to BAP, December 15, 1944, box 12, folder 16, GSP Collection, LOC; GSP diary, December 16, 1944, box 3, folder 9, GSP Collection, LOC. 141. Conference between General Patton, General Weyland and SHAEF Correspondents, December 16, 1944, box 12, folder 16, GSP Collection, LOC. 142. H. Essame, Patton: A Study in Command (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1974), 214–15. 143. Cole, Lorraine Campaign, 547, 607. 144. GSP diary, December 16, 1944, box 3, folder 9, GSP Collection, LOC; Hap Gay diaries, December 15, 1944, box 2, p. 611, USAHEC.

Chapter Eleven

1. John McManus, Alamo in the Ardennes: The Untold Story of the American Soldiers Who Made the Defense of Bastogne Possible (Hoboken: John Wiley and Sons, 2007), 43; Peter Caddick-­Adams, Snow and Steel: The Battle of the Bulge, 1944–45 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 4; John S. D. Eisenhower, The Bitter Woods (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1969), 185. 2. Eisenhower, Bitter Woods, 115. 3. Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers, vol. 2, 1940–1945 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974), 598. 4. Russell Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1990), 458. 5. Caddick-­Adams, Snow and Steel, 99, 112. 6. Eisenhower, Bitter Woods, 156; Harold R. Winton, Corps Commanders of the Bulge: Six American Generals and Victory in the Ardennes (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007), 73–74. 7. Caddick-­Adams, Snow and Steel, 190–91. 8. Caddick-­Adams, Snow and Steel, 191. 9. Harry Yeide, Fighting Patton: George S. Patton Jr. through the Eyes of His Enemies (Minneapolis: Zenith Press, 2011), 364; Danny S. Parker, Hitler’s Ardennes Offensive: The German View of the Battle of the Bulge (London: Greenhill Books, 2006), 165.

notes to chapter eleven

417

10. GSP diary, November 25, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC; GSP diary, November 25, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634.00111 /?sp=59&st=text&r=0.037,0.168,0.984,1.5,0. 11. GSP diary, December 27, 1944, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634.00111 /?sp=99&st=text. While I made this discovery on my own, after I wrote this chapter I discovered an article by Daniel Feldmann titled “Fixing One’s History: George S. Patton’s Changes in His Personal Diary,” in War in History 28, no. 1 (2021), which addresses the changes in Patton’s diary. He credited author Jonathan W. Jordan as the first historian to discover the discrepancy in his book Brothers, Rivals, Victors: Eisenhower, Patton, Bradley, and the Partnership That Drove the Allied Conquest of Europe (New York: NAL Caliber, 2011). 12. GSP to BAP, November 28, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC. 13. GSP to ONB, December 9, 1944, box 12, folder 15, GSP Collection, LOC 14. Conference between General Patton, General Weyland and Third Army Correspondents, December 9, 1944, box 12, folder 15, p. 6, GSP Collection, LOC. 15. Oscar Koch, G-­2 Intelligence for Patton (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 1999), 90; David Spires, Patton’s Air Force: Forging a Legendary Air-­Ground Team (Washington, DC: Smithsonian, 2002), 173; Paul Harkin Photo Albums, vol. 2, USAHEC. 16. Koch, G-­2 Intelligence for Patton , 94. 17. Robert Allen collection, unpublished diary, p. (5) 20, the Patton Museum. 18. RG 407, Records of the Adjutant General’s Office, WWII Operations Reports, 1940–48, 3rd Army, 103-­2.1 DEC 1944 to 103-­2.1 JAN 1945, entry 427, HMFY 2005, box 1950, folder 301-­2.1 G-­2 Periodic Reports, NARA. 19. Paul Harkin Photo Albums, vol. 2, USAHEC. 20. GSP diary, December 12, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00111/?sp=75&st=text. 21. GSP to BAP, December 11, 1944, box 12, folder 16, GSP Collection, LOC. 22. GSP diary, November 24, 1944, box 3, folder 8, GSP Collection, LOC. 23. Blumenson, Patton Papers, 2:581, 589; Charles Codman, Drive (Boston: Little, Brown, 1957), 227. 24. Robert S. Allen, Forward with Patton: The World War II Diary of Colonel Robert S. Allen (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2017), 107. 25. Omar Bradley, A Soldier’s Story (New York: Public Library, 1999), 447. 26. Paul Harkins, When the Third Army Cracked Europe: The Story of Patton’s Incredible Army (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, 1969), 39; Hap Gay diaries, December 16, 1944, box 2, p. 612, USAHEC. 27. Charles B. McDonald, A Time for Trumpets: The Untold Story of the Battle of the Bulge (New York: William Morrow, 1985), 63, 66, 67 28. Caddick-­Adams, Snow and Steel, 147. 29. David Eisenhower, Eisenhower at War 1943–1945 (New York: Random House, 1986), 499. 30. Benton Greene Wallace, Patton and His Third Army (n.p.: War Vault, 2019), 80, 88. 31. McDonald, A Time for Trumpets, 68, 73.

418

notes to chapter eleven

32. William C. Sylvan and Francis G. Smith Jr., Normandy to Victory: The War Diary of General Courtney H. Hodges and the First U.S. Army (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2008), 199. 33. Sylvan and Smith, Normandy to Victory, 200. 34. McDonald, A Time for Trumpets, 77. 35. James Wellard, General George S. Patton Jr.: Man under Mars (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1946), 221. 36. Kenneth Strong, Intelligence at the Top: The Recollections of a British Intelligence Officer (New York: Doubleday, 1969), 213–14; Carlo d’Este, Eisenhower: A Soldier’s Life (New York: Henry Holt, 2002), 641–42. 37. Jonathan W. Jordan, Brothers, Rivals, Victors: Eisenhower, Patton, Bradley and the Partnership That Drove the Allied Conquest in Europe (New York: NAL Caliber, 2011), 441. 38. GSP diary, December 16, 1944, box 3, folder 9, GSP Collection, LOC; Codman, Drive, 230; Lester Nichols, Impact: The Battle Story of the Tenth Armored Division (Nashville: Battery Press, 1954), 59. 39. Wilson A. Heefner, Patton’s Bulldog: The Life and Service of General Walton H. Walker (Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Books, 2001), 109; Danny Parker, To Win the Winter Sky: Air War over the Ardennes 1944–1945 (London: Greenhill Books, 1999), 168. 40. Allen, Forward with Patton, 118. 41. GSP diary, December 17, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00111/?sp=83&st=text. 42. Sylvan and Smith, Normandy to Victory, 194–211; Winton, Corps Commanders of the Bulge, 138. 43. Codman, Drive, 230; GSP diary, December 17, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc .gov/resource/mss35634.00111/?sp=83&st=text. 44. Hap Gay diaries, December 17, 1944, box 2, pp. 613–14, USAHEC. 45. Parker, To Win the Winter Sky, 169–70. 46. Hugh M. Cole, The Lorraine Campaign (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1984), 547; Hap Gay diaries, December 17, 1944, box 2, p. 615, USAHEC; George S. Patton Jr., War as I Knew It (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1975), 130. 47. “The Winter Campaign,” p. 29, Office of the Center of Military History WWII, Europe Interviews, USAHEC. 48. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New York: Doubleday, 1948), 348. 49. Hugh M. Cole, The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief Military Historian, 1965), 166, 241, 245, 249–49; Winton, Corps Commanders of the Bulge, 123–26; McManus, Alamo in the Ardennes, 102, 120. 50. Patton, War as I Knew It, 130. 51. Cole, Lorraine Campaign, 547. 52. Blumenson, Patton Papers, 2:596. 53. Everett Hughes diary, December 18, 1944, box I-­2, file 1, Everett Hughes Papers, LOC. According to Hughes’s diary, Gordon would stay with someone on Eisenhower’s staff whose initials were J. P. This author could not figure out who that was.

notes to chapter eleven

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54. Third Army correspondents to GSP, [n.d.], box 12, folder 16, GSP Collection, LOC; General Smith to Hap Gay, December 18, 1944, box 12, folder 16, GSP Collection, LOC. 55. Chester B. Hanson Collection, Series II Official Papers, War Diaries, box 5, December 17, 1944, USAHEC. 56. Danny S. Parker, Fatal Crossroads: The Untold Story of the Malmédy Massacre at the Battle of the Bulge (Philadelphia: DaCapo Press, 2012), 253–59. 57. H. Essame, Patton: A Study in Command (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1974), 219. 58. Chester B. Hanson Collection, Series II Official Papers, War Diaries, box 5, December 17–18, 1944, USAHEC. 59. Bradley, Soldier’s Story, 469. 60. Robert S. Allen, “Caesar Couldn’t Be a Brigadier in My Army, Patton Held,” Evening Sun, December 22, 1945. 61. Hap Gay diaries, December 18, 1944, box 2, p. 617, USAHEC. 62. Hap Gay diaries, December 18, 1944, box 2, p. 618, USAHEC. 63. Bradley, Soldier’s Story, 463. 64. Chester B. Hanson Collection, Series II Official Papers, War Diaries, box 5, December 18, 1944, USAHEC. 65. Heefner, Patton’s Bulldog, 107, 109. 66. McManus, Alamo in the Ardennes, xxxii, xxxiv, 138, 147, 150, 154. 67. Cole, The Ardennes, 512. 68. GSP diary, December 18, 1944, box 3, folder 9, GSP Collection, LOC. 69. Hap Gay diaries, December 18, 1944, box 2, pp. 619–20, USAHEC. 70. Allen, Forward with Patton, 122. 71. Cole, Lorraine Campaign, 589. 72. Allen, Forward with Patton, 117–18. 73. David W. Hogan Jr, A Command Post at War: First Army Headquarters in Europe, 1943–1945 (Washington, DC.: United States Army, 2000), 215. 74. George Dyer, XII Corps: Spearhead of Patton’s Third Army (n.p.: XII Corps History Association, 1947), 284. 75. Heefner, Patton’s Bulldog, 109. 76. Allen, Forward with Patton, 118. 77. Paul Harkin Photo Albums, vol. 2, U.S. AHEC. 78. Allen, Forward with Patton, 119. 79. Stanley P. Hirshson, General Patton: A Soldier’s Life (New York: HarperCollins, 2002), 574–75. 80. Henry Gerard Phillips, The Making of a Professional: Manton S. Eddy, USA (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000), 176. 81. Hap Gay diaries, December 19, 1944, box 2, p. 621, USAHEC. 82. Wallace, Patton and His Third Army, 117. 83. Harry H. Semmes, Portrait of Patton (New York: Appleton Century Crofts, 1955), 231. 84. D. A. Lande, I Was with Patton: First-­Person Accounts of WWII in George S. Patton’s Command (St. Paul, MN: MBI, 2002), 191.

420

notes to chapter twelve

85. Harry Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946), 724.

Chapter Twelve

1. John McManus, Alamo in the Ardennes: The Untold Story of the American Soldiers Who Made the Defense of Bastogne Possible (Hoboken: John Wiley and Sons, 2007), xxxiv. 2. Robert Allen, In Memorium: George S. Patton Jr., General, U.S. Army, (pamphlet) page 23, the Center for the Study of War and Society, University of Tennessee; John Nelson Rickard, Advance and Destroy: Patton as Commander in the Bulge (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2011), 100; Richard Stillman and Mary Riggs, General Patton’s Best Friend: The Story of General George S. Patton, Jr. and His Beloved Dog, Willie (New Orleans: R. J. Stillmany, 2001), 73. 3. Chester B. Hansen Collection, Series II, Official Papers, War Diaries, December 19, 1944, box 5, USAHEC; Paul Harkin Album, 2 (Europe), p. 23, USAHEC. 4. Chester B. Hanson Collection, Series II Official Papers, War Diaries, box 5, December 19, 1944, USAHEC. 5. Chester B. Hansen Collection, Series II, Official Papers, War Diaries, box 5, December 19, 1944, USAHEC. 6. Kenneth Strong, Intelligence at the Top: The Recollections of a British Intelligence Officer (Garden City: Doubleday, 1969), 220; Francis de Guingand, Operation Victory (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1947), 425. Several people at the meeting claimed that de Guingand attended the meeting but his own memoir contradicts these claims. 7. Chester B. Hansen Collection, Series II, Official Papers, War Diaries, December 19, 1944, box 5, USAHEC. 8. Joseph Stillman interviewed by Kevin M. Hymel, New Orleans, LA, December 10, 2006. 9. Jonathan W. Jordan, Brothers, Rivals, Victors: Eisenhower, Patton, Bradley, and the Partnership That Drove the Allied Conquest of Europe (New York: NAL Caliber, 2011), 3; Rick Beyer and Elizabeth Sayles, The Ghost Army of World War II: How One Top-­Secret Unit Deceived the Enemy with Inflatable Tanks, Sound Effects, and Other Audacious Trickery (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2015), 154. 10. Chester B. Hanson Collection, Series II Official Papers, War Diaries, box 5, December 18–19, 1944, USAHEC. 11. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New York: Doubleday, 1948), 350; Martin Blumenson, Patton: The Man behind the Legend, 1885–1945 (New York: William Morrow, 1985), 247; David Eisenhower, Eisenhower at War (New York: Random House, 1986), 567. David Eisenhower’s book quotes Eisenhower’s response, yet he cites Eisenhower’s war memoir, Crusade in Europe, where Eisenhower does not quote himself. 12. Strong, Intelligence at the Top, 220–21. 13. Lord Tedder, With Prejudice (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), 626. 14. Omar Bradley, A Soldier’s Story (New York: Public Library, 1999), 470; Rickard, Advance and Destroy, 106.

notes to chapter twelve

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15. Chester B. Hanson Collection, Series II Official Papers, War Diaries, box 5, December 19, 1944, USAHEC. 16. GSP diary, December 19, 1944, box 3, folder 9, GSP Collection, LOC. 17. “Report by The Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force, 6 June 1944 to 8 May 1945,” p. 67, Dwight D. Eisenhower: Papers, Pre-­Presidential, 1916–52, Principal File, box 158, USAHEC; GSP diary, December 19, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource /mss35634.00111/?sp=86&st=text&r=-­0.324,-­0.082,1.648,1.648,0; Bradley, Soldier’s Story, 469; John S. D. Eisenhower, The Bitter Woods (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1969), 256. 18. Memo by H. R. Bull, December 19, 1944, Harold R. Bull Papers, box 1, file 1 (Miscellaneous Military Letters, June 1, 1944–December 20, 1944), USAHEC. 19. GSP diary, December 19, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00111/?sp=85&st=text&r=-­0.331,-­0.083,1.662,1.662,0. 20. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 352. 21. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 350. 22. Eisenhower, Bitter Woods, 257. 23. Paul Harkins Photo Album 2 (Europe), p. 23, USAHEC. 24. Oral History Transcript, Paul Harkins Collection, USHEC. 25. Alden Hatch, George Patton: General in Spurs (New York: Julian Messner, 1973), 150; Paul Harkins Photo Album 2 (Europe), p. 23, USAHEC. 26. Charles Codman, Drive (Boston: Little, Brown, 1957), 232; George S. Patton Jr., War as I Knew It (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1975), 131. 27. Edward D. Ball, “‘Pistol Packin’ Patton Acted Quickly in Crisis,” Evansville Courier and Press (Evansville, IN), December 29, 1944; Strong, Intelligence at the Top, 221. 28. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 351. 29. GSP diary, December 19, 1944, box 3, folder 9, GSP Collection, LOC; H. Essame, Patton: A Study in Command (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1974), 222. 30. Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, Pre-­Presidential, 1916–55, Principal File, box 169, file 4 (Butcher’s Diary, October 16–December 31, 1944), USAHEC. 31. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 351; Bradley, Soldier’s Story, 472; Strong, Intelligence at the Top, 221. 32. Bradley, Soldier’s Story, 472. Patton probably did not use the word “head” when he said, “head in a meatgrinder.” He would have used the same term to his soldiers but replaced “head” with “balls.” 33. Patton, War as I Knew It, 131. 34. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 358. 35. Beyer and Sayles, Ghost Army of World War II, 154. 36. Essame, Patton, 222. 37. Assembly: Association of Graduates, USMA 36, no. 3 (December 1977): 118– 19; Memorandum from R. G. Moses, December 20, 1944, Raymond G. Moses Collection, box 1, USAHEC; Alfred D. Chandler Jr., ed., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The War Years, vol. 4 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), 2646.

422

notes to chapter thirteen

38. Danny Parker, To Win the Winter Sky: Air War over the Ardennes 1944–1945 (London: Greenhill Books, 1999), 198; David N. Spires, Patton’s Air Force: Forging a Legendry Air-­Ground Team (Washington, DC: Smithsonian, 2002), 181. 39. Codman, Drive, 232. 40. Codman, Drive, 232; Carlo d’Este, Eisenhower: A Soldier’s Life (New York: Henry Holt, 2002), 639. 41. D. K. R. Crosswell, Beetle: The Life of General Walter Bedell Smith (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2010), 813. 42. Russell Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants: The Campaign of France and Germany, 1944–1945 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 574 43. Charles Whiting, Decision at St. Vith: The Story of the U.S. 106th, the Division Hitler Smashed in the Battle of the Bulge (New York: Ballentine Books, 1969), 132; Kevin M. Hymel, “Peiper’s Bloody Blitz through Belgium,” WWII History (Fall 2019): 59; McManus, Alamo in the Ardennes, xxxiv; Frank James Price, Troy H. Middleton: A Biography (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1974), 253. 44. Chester B. Hanson Collection, Series II Official Papers, War Diaries, box 5, December 19, 1944, USAHEC. 45. Harry Adams, interview with Kevin M. Hymel, Lititz, PA, March 18, 2015. After the war, Adams met Jean Gordon, who told him she could have Patton autograph the photo. He eventually came into possession of a special piece of memorabilia: a photograph of Patton and Eisenhower, autographed by both generals. Adams did not remember Gordon by name, but he remembered her as Patton’s niece who was a Red Cross Doughnut Dolly. 46. Chester B. Hanson Collection, Series II Official Papers, War Diaries, box 5, December 19, 1944, USAHEC. 47. Chester B. Hanson Collection, Series II Official Papers, War Diaries, box 5, December 19, 1944, USAHEC. 48. Codman, Drive, 233; Wilson A. Heefner, Patton’s Bulldog: The Life and Service of General Walton H. Walker (Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Books, 2001), 109–10; GSP diary, December 19, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss 35634.00111/?sp=86&st=text. 49. Patton, War as I Knew It, 134. 50. Robert T. Murrell, Stories of the Men of the 80th Infantry Division, World War II (Lewistown: Robert T. Murrell, 2001), 6. 51. GSP to BAP, December 29, 1944, box 12, file 17, GSP Collection, LOC. 52. George F. Hofmann, The Super Sixth: History of the 6th Armored Division in World War II (Nashville Battery Press, 2000), 272. 53. GSP diary, December 19–20, 1944, box 3, folder 9, GSP Collection, LOC; Walter Bedell Smith, Eisenhower’s Six Great Decisions (New York: Longmans, Green, 1956), 103. 54. GSP to BAP, December 21, 1944, box 12, file 16, LOC.

Chapter Thirteen

1. Martin Blumenson, Patton: The Man behind the Legend, 1885–1945 (New York: William Morrow, 1985), 250.

notes to chapter thirteen

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2. George S. Patton Jr., War as I Knew It (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1975), 134; GSP diary, December 20, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00111/?sp=87&st=text. 3. Chester B. Hanson Collection, Series II Official Papers, War Diaries, box 5, December 19, 1944, USAHEC. 4. Alfred D. Chandler Jr., ed., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The War Years, vol. 4 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), 2365. 5. Irving Pape, interviewed by Kurt Phiehler and Curtis Tao, January 3, 1995, p. 27, Rutgers University Oral History Archives of WWII. 6. Frank James Price, Troy Middleton: A Biography (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1974), 234; Hugh M. Cole, The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1965), 445. 7. Price, Troy Middleton, 262–63. 8. Kevin M. Hymel, “The Battle for Noville,” WWII Quarterly (Spring 2008): 76– 78; John McManus, Alamo in the Ardennes: The Untold Story of the American Soldiers Who Made the Defense of Bastogne Possible (Hoboken: John Wiley and Sons, 2007), xxxv. 9. GSP diary, December 20, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00111/?sp=87&st=text; Hobart R. Gay Papers, December 20, 1944, p. 622, box 2, USHEC. 10. Albin Irzyk, He Rode Up Front with Patton (Raleigh: Pentland Press, 1996), 238–42; Don Fox, Patton’s Vanguard: The United States Army Fourth Armored Division (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2003), 320. 11. Cole, The Ardennes, 515, 525. 12. William Heffington, WWII Veterans Survey, 4th Infantry Division, box 2, USAHEC. 13. Roland Gaul, The Battle of the Bulge in Luxembourg, vol. 2, The Americans (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military Press, 1995), page 136; Charles Codman, Drive (Boston: Little Brown, 1957), 234. 14. Paul Harkin Photo Albums, vol. 2, USAHEC. 15. GSP to BAP, December 29, 1944, box 12, file 17, LOC; Patton, War as I Knew It, 135. 16. GSP to BAP, December 22, 1944, box 12, file 16, LOC. 17. GSP diary, December 20, 1944, box 3, folder 9, GSP Collection, LOC. 18. Paul Harkin Album, vol. 2 (Europe), p. 23, USAHEC. 19. Harold Gay Collection, December 20, 1944, 623, box 2, USAHEC. 20. Paul Harkin Album, vol. 2 (Europe), p. 24, USAHEC. 21. Hugh M. Cole, The Lorraine Campaign (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1984), 547. 22. Henry Gerard Phillips, The Making of a Professional: Manton S. Eddy, USA (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000), 176. 23. Cole, Lorraine Campaign, 577. 24. Phillips, Making of a Professional), 1577; Omar Bradley, A Soldier’s Story (New York: The Public Library, 1999), 473.

424

notes to chapter thirteen

25. Peter Schrijvers, The Unknown Dead: Civilians in the Battle of the Bulge (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2005), 273; Codman, Drive, 233. 26. Codman, Drive, 234. 27. Codman, Drive, 235. 28. Robert Allen, In Memorium, George S. Patton Jr., General, U.S. Army (pamphlet), p. 23, Center for the Study of War and Society, University of Tennessee. 29. GSP to BAP, December 21, 1944, box 12, file 16, LOC. 30. Codman, Drive, 235. 31. Patton, War as I Knew It, 136. 32. GSP to BAP, December 21, 1944, box 12, file 16, GSP Collection, LOC. 33. James Polk, “Patton: ‘You Might as Well Die a Hero,’” Army (December 1975): 43. 34. Herman Berenson, U.S. Army, October 3, 2005, pp. 20–21, Oral History of World War II, Rutgers University. 35. GSP to BAP, December 21, 1944, box 12, file 16, LOC. 36. Paul Harkin Album, vol. 2 (Europe), p. 23, USAHEC. 37. GSP diary, December 20, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35 634.00111/?sp=88&st=text. 38. Paul Harkin Album, vol. 2 (Europe), p. 23, USAHEC. 39. Robert S. Allen, Forward with Patton: The World War II Diary of Colonel Robert S. Allen (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2017), 122. 40. Robert Allen collection, unpublished diary, p. (5) 34, the Patton Museum. 41. “Interview with Air Chief Marshal Sir James Robb, Fighter Command at Hq, Fighter Command, Prior Bentley, Stanmore, 3 February 1947 by F.C. Pogue, Robb Sir James M.: Narrative,” Higher Direction of War and other Memorabilia, 1944–45, box 1, p. 6, USHEC. 42. Hap Gay diaries, December 20, 1944, p. 625, box 2, USAHEC. 43. H. Essame, Patton: A Study in Command (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1974), 226; GSP diary, December 21, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss 35634.00111/?sp=89&st=text. 44. Fox, Patton’s Vanguard, 338, 370, 401. 45. George Dyer, XII Corps: Spearhead of Patton’s Third Army n.p.: XII Corps History Association, 1947), 284. 46. “Inside Washington,” Chicago Sun Times Washington Bureau, Patton’s Scrapbooks, reel 1, the Patton Collection, Library of Congress. 47. Everett Hughes to GSP, December 21, 1944, box 12, file 17, LOC; GSP to Everett Hughes, December 30, 1944, box 12, file 17, LOC. 48. Patton, War as I Knew It, 136. 49. GSP diary, December 21, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss 35634.00111/?sp=89&st=text; GSP diary, December 22, 1944, LOC, https://www .loc.gov/resource/mss35634.00111/?sp=89&st=text. 50. GSP to BAP, December 22, 1944, box 12, file 16, LOC; Essame, Patton, 226. 51. Chandler, Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, 4:2363. 52. Nigel Hamilton, Monty: The Battles of Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery (New York: Random House, 1994), 503–4; Stanley Weintraub, “’As Soon as You’re

notes to chapter Fourteen

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through with Me, I Can Attack the Day after Tomorrow’; George S. Patton and the Battle of the Bulge,” HistoryNet, Winter 2007, https://www.historynet.com/general -­george-­s-­patton-­and-­the-­battle-­of-­the-­bulge-­2.htm. 53. John S. D. Eisenhower, The Bitter Woods (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1969), 97. 54. Hamilton, Monty, 495–98. 55. Chester B. Hanson Collection, Series II Official Papers, War Diaries, box 5, December 22, 1944, USAHEC. 56. Kenneth Strong, Intelligence at the Top: The Recollections of a British Intelligence Officer (Garden City: Doubleday, 1969), 222. 57. Bradley, Soldier’s Story, 473; Codman, Drive, 235.

Chapter Fourteen

1. Hap Gay diaries, December 22, 1944, p. 627, box 2, USAHEC. 2. Don Fox, Patton’s Vanguard: The United States Army Fourth Armored Division (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2003), 342–43, 372–73. 3. GSP diary, December 22, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00111/?sp=89&st=text. 4. Rick Beyer and Elizabeth Sayles, The Ghost Army of World War II: How One Top-­Secret Unit Deceived the Enemy with Inflatable Tanks, Sound Effects, and Other Audacious Trickery (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2015), 154. According to the authors, historians question the effectiveness of the operation; still, they quote Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Ingersoll as saying, “When the first Third Army troops hit the flanks of the Bastogne besiegers, the German command was completely confused about where the others might be about to attack.” 5. Alfred D. Chandler Jr., ed., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The War Years, vol. 4 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), 2195. 6. Robert S. Allen, Forward with Patton: The World War II Diary of Colonel Robert S. Allen (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2017), 122. 7. Peter Schrijvers, Those Who Hold Bastogne: The True Story of the Soldiers and Civilians Who Fought in the Biggest Battle of the Bulge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 92–92; Kenneth J. McAuliffe, “The Story of the Nuts Reply,” U.S. Army, https://www.army.mil/article/92856/the_story_of_the_nuts_reply. 8. GSP to BAP, December 22, 1944, box 12, file 16, GSP Collection, LOC. 9. Larry Newman, “General George S. Patton, Jr., Soldier and American,” INS New York, December 24, 1945, Patton Scrapbooks, reel 1 (microfilm), GSP Collection, LOC. 10. Susan Bromley, “Novi Veteran Was at Battle of the Bulge,” Hometown Life, December 29, 2015, http://www.hometownlife.com/story/news/local/novi/2015/12/29 /frank-­buffone-­novi-­patton-­battle-­bulge-­world-­war-­ii/77964024/. 11. GSP diary, December 22, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35 634.00111/?sp=89&st=text. 12. Allen, Forward with Patton, 125. 13. GSP diary, December 22, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35 634.00111/?sp=89&st=text.

426

notes to chapter Fourteen

14. Beyer and Sayles, Ghost Army of World War II, 148–49. 15. GSP to BAP, December 22, 1944, box 12, file 16, GSP Collection, LOC. 16. Operation Tink, B5494, OITHE to USLIST, p. 1175, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, n.d.. 17. XIX Tactical Air Command, Operations for December 1944, IRISNUM no: 00238678, IRISREF no. B5936, December 6, 1944, 395–98, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB. 18. GSP diary, December 22, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35 634.00111/?sp=89&st=text. 19. Richard J. Stillman and Mary F. Riggs, General Patton’s Best Friend: The Story of General George S. Patton, Jr. and His Beloved Dog Willie (New Orleans: R. J. Stillman, 2001), 76. 20. Anne Kelly and Thomas Pellecha, eds., Writing the War: Chronicles of a World War II Correspondent (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 2015), 393. 21. Martin Blumenson, Patton: The Man behind the Legend, 1885–1945 (New York: William Morrow, 1985), 250. 22. Hugh Cole, The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge: United States Army in World War II (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1965), 526. 23. D. A. Lande, I Was with Patton: First-­Person Accounts of WWII in George S. Patton’s Command (St. Paul, MN: MBI, 2002), 192. 24. GSP to BAP, December 22, 1944, box 12, file 16, LOC. 25. GSP diary, December 22, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35 634.00111/?sp=89&st=text. 26. Danny S. Parker, Hitler’s Ardennes Offensive: The German View of the Battle of the Bulge (London: Greenhill Books, 2006), 198. 27. Fox, Patton’s Vanguard, 346–47, 360–63, 375–76, 377–86; Robert T. Murrell, Stories of the Men of the 80th Infantry Division, World War II (Lewistown: Robert T. Murrell, 2001), 6. 28. Brenton Greene Wallace, Patton and His Third Army (n.p: War Vault, 2019), 123. 29. Fox, Patton’s Vanguard, 344. 30. Leo Barron, Patton at the Battle of the Bulge: How the General’s Tanks Turned the Tide at Bastogne (New York: NAL Caliber, 2014), 121. 31. Fox, Patton’s Vanguard, 344. 32. Allen, Forward with Patton, 129; Paul Harkins, When the Third Army Cracked Europe: The Story of Patton’s Incredible Army (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, 1969), 44. 33. GSP diary, December 23, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35 634.00111/?sp=92&st=text. 34. Hap Gay diaries, December 22–24, 1944, pp. 629–32, box 2, USAHEC. 35. GSP diary, December 23, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00111/?sp=92&st=text. 36. S. L. A. Marshall, Bastogne: The Story of the First Eight Days (Washington, DC: Infantry Journal Press, 1946), 147. 37. John S. D. Eisenhower, The Bitter Woods (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1969), 326. 38. Fox, Patton’s Vanguard, 347–49, 387.

notes to chapter Fourteen

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39. Fox, Patton’s Vanguard, 347–49, 365–69, 387–88, 390, 397. 40. Fox, Patton’s Vanguard, 390; Eisenhower, Bitter Woods, 328. 41. George S. Patton Jr., War as I Knew It (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1975), 138. 42. GSP diary, December 23, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00111/?sp=95&st=text. 43. GSP diary, December 24, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00111/?sp=95&st=text. 44. Allen, Forward with Patton, 130. 45. Alden Hatch, General George Patton: Old Blood and Guts (New York: Sterling, 2006), 159. 46. Chester B. Hanson Collection, Series II Official Papers, War Diaries, box 5, December 24, 1944, USAHEC. 47. Eisenhower, Bitter Woods, 338. 48. GSP to BAP, December 29, 1944, box 12, file 17, LOC; Hap Gay diaries, December 24, 1944, pp. 630–31, box 2, USAHEC. 49. Robert Allen collection, unpublished diary, p. (5) 45, the Patton Museum. 50. Robert Allen collection, unpublished diary, p. (5) 46, the Patton Museum; Hap Gay diaries, December 24, 1944, p. 631, box 2, USAHEC; Wallace, Patton and His Third Army, 121. 51. Philip Gerard, Secret Soldiers: The Story of World War II’s Heroic Army of Deception (New York: Penguin Group), 236–37; Fox, Patton’s Vanguard, 390. 52. Denny Hair, A Prediction Ignored and a Prayer, Book Three (Houston: Third Army Publishing, 2018), 177. 53. GSP diary, December 25, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00111/?sp=96&st=text&r=-­0.178,0.08,0.704,0.74,0. 54. Allen, Forward with Patton, 132. 55. Fox, Patton’s Vanguard, 388–89. 56. Robert Allen collection, unpublished diary, pp. (5) 47–48, the Patton Museum. 57. GSP to BAP, December 25, 1944, box 12, file 16, GSP Collection, LOC. 58. Hap Gay diaries, December 25, 1944, p. 632, box 2, USAHEC. 59. Terry D. James, Patton’s Troubleshooters (Kansas City, MO: Opinicus, 1988), 167. 60. Nathanial Frankel and Larry Smith, Patton’s Best: An Informal History of the 4th Armored Division (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1978), 41, 55. 61. Fox, Patton’s Vanguard, 354, 399. 62. Patton, War as I Knew It, 139; Charles Codman, Drive (Boston: Little, Brown, 1957), 236. 63. Harry H. Semmes, Portrait of Patton (New York: Appleton Century Crofts, , 1955), 233; Henry Gerard Phillips, The Making of a Professional: Manton S. Eddy, USA (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000), 172. 64. Dean Dominique and James Hays, One Hell of a War: Patton’s 317th Infantry Regiment in WWII (n.p., Wounded Warrior Publications, 2014), 158–59. 65. Cole, The Ardennes, 504; GSP diary, December 26, 1944, LOC, https://www .loc.gov/resource/mss35634.00111/?sp=97&st=text. 66. GSP diary, December 25, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00111/?sp=96&st=text&r=-­0.178,0.08,0.704,0.74,0.

428

notes to chapter Fourteen

67. Patton, War as I Knew It, 139. 68. Barron, Patton at the Battle of the Bulge, 294; Marshall, Bastogne, 162–67, 169. 69. Gaul, Battle of the Bulge, 352–53. 70. GSP diary, December 25, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00111/?sp=97&st=text. 71. Walter Bedell Smith, Eisenhower’s Six Great Decisions (New York: Longmans, Green, 1956) 106. 72. GSP diary, December 26, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00111/?sp=99&st=text. 73. George C. Marshal to GSP, December 1944, box 12, file 17, GSP Collection, LOC. 74. George F. Hofmann, The Super Sixth: History of the 6th Armored Division in World War II (Nashville: Battery Press, 2000), 272. 75. GSP to BAP, December 29, 1944, box 12, file 17, GSP Collection, LOC. 76. GSP diary, December 26, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00111/?sp=97&st=text&r=-­0.332,-­0.083,1.665,1.665,0. 77. Lande, I Was with Patton, 207. 78. GSP to Raymond O. Barton, December 27, 1944, box 12, file 16, GSP Collection, LOC. 79. GSP to BAP, December 26, 1944, box 12, file 16, GSP Collection, LOC. 80. Hap Gay diaries, December 26, 1944, pp. 636–37, box 2, USAHEC. 81. H. Essame, Patton: A Study in Command (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1974), 230; GSP diary, December 26, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss 35634.00111/?sp=97&st=text&r=-­0.332,-­0.083,1.665,1.665,0. 82. GSP to BAP, December 26, 1944, box 12, file 16, GSP Collection, LOC. 83. Conference between General Patton and Third Army Correspondents, Luxembourg, Belgium, January 1, 1945, box 12, file 17, p. 5, GSP Collection, LOC. 84. Mlle. Josette Pierre to GSP, December 26, 1944, box 12, file 16, GSP Collection, LOC. 85. Fox, Patton’s Vanguard, 404–5; Codman, Drive, 237. 86. Fox, Patton’s Vanguard, 405–10. 87. Omar Bradley, A Soldier’s Story (New York: Public Library, 1999), 482; Eisenhower, Bitter Woods, 375. 88. Robert Allen collection, unpublished diary, p. (5) 52, the Patton Museum. 89. Dominique and Hays, One Hell of a War, 159. 90. GSP to BAP, December 29, 1944, box 12, file 17, GSP Collection, LOC. 91. GSP to BAP, December 26, 1944, box 12, file 16, GSP Collection, LOC. 92. GSP to BAP, December 29, 1944, box 12, file 17, GSP Collection, LOC. 93. GSP diary, December 26, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00111/?sp=99&st=text. 94. Omar Bradley and Clay Blair, A General’s Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 367. 95. William L. O’Neill, A Democracy at War: America’s Fight at Home and Abroad in World War II (New York: Free Press, 1993), 379.

notes to chapter fifteen

429

96. Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers, vol. 2, 1940–1945 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974), 609–10.

Chapter Fifteen

1. Robert Allen collection, unpublished diary, p. (5) 56, the Patton Museum; GSP diary, December 27, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00111/?sp=99&st=text. 2. GSP diary, December 27, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00111/?sp=99&st=text. 3. H. Essame, Patton: A Study in Command (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1974), 230; George S. Patton Jr., War as I Knew It (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1975), 142. 4. RG 111-­SC 333910, December 26, 1944, NARA; Hap Gay diaries, December 27, 1944, p. 633, box 2, USAHEC; Chester B. Hanson Collection, Series II Official Papers, War Diaries, box 5, December 27, 1944, USAHEC. 5. Robert Allen collection, unpublished diary, p. (5) 56, the Patton Museum. 6. GSP to BAP, December 29, 1944, box 12, file 17, GSP Collection, LOC. 7. Robert Allen collection, unpublished diary, p. (5) 56, the Patton Museum; GSP diary, December 27, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss3563400111/? sp=99&st=text. 8. Robert Allen collection, unpublished diary, p. (5) 48, the Patton Museum; GSP diary, December 27, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00111/?sp=100&st=text. 9. GSP diary, December 27, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00111/?sp=100&st=text. 10. Robert S. Allen, Forward with Patton: The World War II Diary of Colonel Robert S. Allen (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2017), 138. 11. Harry H. Semmes, Portrait of Patton (New York: Appleton Century Crofts, , 1955), 234; Charles B. Odom, General George S. Patton and Eisenhower (New Orleans: World Picture Productions, 1985), 67. 12. Hap Gay diaries, December 27, 1944, p. 638, box 2, USAHEC. 13. GSP diary, December 28, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00111/?sp=101&st=text&r=-­0.238,-­0.059,1.572,1.655,0; 14. Hap Gay diaries, December 28, 1944, p. 638, box 2, USAHEC. Robert Allen collection, unpublished diary, p. (5) 57, the Patton Museum. 15. Leland Stowe, “Old Blood-­and-­Guts Off the Record,” Esquire, October 1948, Patton Scrapbooks, reel 1 (microfilm), GSP Collection, LOC. 16. John S. D. Eisenhower, The Bitter Woods (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1969), 381. 17. Chester B. Hanson Collection, Series II Official Papers, War Diaries, box 5, December 29, 1944, USAHEC. 18. Hap Gay diaries, December 29, 1944, p. 641, box 2, USAHEC. 19. GSP to BAP, December 29, 1944, box 12, file 17, GSP Collection, LOC. 20. Hap Gay diaries, December 29, 1944, p. 641, box 2, USAHEC.

430

notes to chapter fifteen

21. Hap Gay diaries, December 29, 1944, p. 640, box 2, USAHEC; “The Winter Campaign,” 8, Office of the Center of Military History WWII, Europe Interviews, USAHEC. 22. Chester B. Hanson Collection, Series II Official Papers, War Diaries, box 5, December 29, 1944, USAHEC. 23. Hap Gay diaries, December 30, 1944, p. 642, box 2, USAHEC; Patton, War as I Knew It, 142–43. 24. Patton, War as I Knew It, 143; GSP diary, December 30, 1944, LOC, https: //www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634.00111/?sp=103&st=text. 25. George Merz, interview by the author, November 15, 2022. 26. Jack Bell, “McAuliffe Was Asleep When Patton Arrived to Present Him DSC,” Star and Chicago Daily News, January 1, 1945, Patton Scrapbooks, reel 1, GSP Collection, LOC; Ed Inlenfeld, interview, August 16, 2016, War Memorial Center, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RUfubpxqq4E; GSP diary, December 30, 1944, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634.00111 /?sp=104&st=text. Schrivers, Bastogne, 191. 27. George Koskimaki, The Battered Bastards of Bastogne: A Chronicle of the Defense of Bastogne, December 19, 1944–January 17, 1945 (Havertown, PA: Casemate, 2003), 352–54. 28. Eisenhower, Bitter Woods, 329. 29. Layton Black, The Last First Sergeant (Caldwell, ID: Griffith Publishing, 1989), 250; Patton, War as I Knew It, 135. 30. William C. Butz, World War II as I Saw It (Albany, NY: SpectraGraphics, 2005), 29. 31. Delmer O. Gasche, ed., Memories of World War II (Archhold, OH: Farmland News , 2002), 166–67. 32. Hap Gay diaries, December 30, 1944, p. 643, box 2, USAHEC. 33. George F. Hofmann, The Super Sixth: History of the 6th Armored Division in World War II (Nashville: Battery Press, 2000), 277. 34. Eisenhower, Bitter Woods, 382. 35. Eisenhower, Bitter Woods, 383; Francis de Guingand, Operation Victory (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1947), 434–35; D. K. R. Crosswell, Beetle: The Life of General Walter Bedell Smith (Louisville: University Press of Kentucky, 2010), 826–28. 36. “Rundstedt’s Spearhead Hurled Back Ten Miles by American Forces,” Sun Herald (Biloxi, MS), December 29, 1944. 37. “Yanks Squeeze the Nazi Bulge,” Kansas City Times (Kansas City, MO), December 30, 1944. 38. Hofmann, Super Sixth, 275. 39. Hofmann, Super Sixth, 278–79; Patton, War as I Knew It, 143, 610. 40. Hap Gay diaries, December 31, 1944, p. 643, box 2, USAHEC. 41. GSP diary, January 1, 1945, LOC, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mss35634 .00111/?sp=106&st=text. 42. Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers, vol. 2, 1940–1945 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974), 610.

notes to chapter fifteen

431

43. Charles M. Province, Patton’s Third Army: A Chronology of the Third Army’s Advance, August 1944 to May 1945 (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1992), 136. 44. Blumenson, Patton Papers, 2:610. 45. Hap Gay diaries, December 30–31, 1944, pp. 643–44, box 2, USAHEC. 46. Hap Gay diaries, December 31, 1944, p. 645, box 2, USAHEC. 47. Hoyt Vandenberg to GSP, (no date), box 12, file 17, GSP Collection, LOC. 48. Hap Gay diaries, December 31, 1944, p. 643, box 2, USAHEC. 49. William Christie Butz, interview, May 28, 2015, NYS Military Museum. 50. Betty South, “We Called Him ‘Uncle Georgie,’” Quartermaster Review (January–February 1954), 123. 51. Patton, War as I Knew It, 146.

Bibliography Archives and Manuscript Collections

Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB ADV Headquarters, XIX Tactical Air Command, OPERATION TINK, IRISNUM no: 00238678, IRISREF no. B5936, December 17, 1944, 785–91. Operation Tink, B5494, OITHE to USLIST. XIX Tactical Air Command, Operations for December 1944, IRISNUM no: 00238678, IRISREF no. B5936, December 6, 1944. Center of War and Society, University of Tennessee Eugene Schwartz (interview) Eleanor Roosevelt Papers Project Anna Lederer Rosenberg Hoffman (interview) Fort Douglas Military Museum and Marriot Library, Salt Lake City, Utah John Bleggi (interview) Floyd H. Hogan (interview) Imperial War Museum, London, England Dunken Taylor (interview) Jack Hixson Collection, Leavenworth, KS Harry E. Brown letters J. B. Sullivan letters John S. Wood letters John S. Wood, Memories and Reflections, unpublished memoir, 1956–66. Library of Congress, Washington, DC Allen Family Papers Averell Harriman Papers Everett Hughes Papers Patton Papers Louie B. Nunn Center for Oral History, University of Kentucky Embry D. Lagrew (interview) Minnesota’s Greatest Generation, Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul, MN Andrews Allen (interview) John J. Hinchliff (interview)

433

434 Bibliography National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD Lt. Col. Kenneth W. Hechler to Charles B. MacDonald, June 22, 1956, RG 319, Records of the Army Staff, Center of Military History, Breakout and Pursuit, Correspondence, Memorandum, Notes Relating to Seine, the Drive to-­Chapter 26, entry 93, box 9. Lunsford E. Oliver to John Stokes, Records of the Army Staff, Center of Military History, Breakout and Pursuit, RG 319, entry 93, box 9. RG 407, Records of the Adjutant General’s Office, WWII Operations Reports, 1940–48, 3rd Army, 103-­2.1 DEC 1944 to 103-­2.1 JAN 1945, entry 427, HMFY 2005, box 1950, folder 301-­2.1 G-­2 Periodic Reports. C. A. Warner to Dr. Hugh Cole, Record Group 319, Records of the Army Staff, Center of Military History, Cross Channel Attack, Supporting documents, entry 92, box 5. National Infantry Museum, Columbus, GA Manton Eddy Papers National World War II Museum, New Orleans, LA Robert Andry (interview) Erwin Blonder (interview) Sidney LaPook (interview) James McLaughlin Jr. (interview) New York State Military Museum, Sarasota Springs, NY Orlindo “Lindy” Ferlo (interview) George E. G. McConnell (interview) Nimitz Education and Research Center, the National Museum of the Pacific War, Fredericksburg, TX Philip Cochran (interview) Zeno P. “Buddy” King (interview) Joseph F. Williams (interview) Patton Museum, Fort Knox, KY Robert Allen Collection Rutgers University Oral History Archives, New Brunswick, NJ Edward Bautz (interview) Herman Berenson (interview) William A. Biehler (interview) Edwin Kolodziej (interview) Albert Meserlin (interview) Irving Pape (interview) Samuel Schmidt (interview) U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA Harold R. Bull Papers Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers Europe Interviews, Office of the Center of Military History WWII Hap Gay Diaries Chester B. Hansen Collection

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Paul Harkins photo albums Raymond G. Moses Collection Sir James M. Robb (interview) U.S. Military Academy Library, West Point, NY Bernard Shirley Carter Papers Veterans History Project, Library of Congress, Washington, DC George Bertrand Cropper (interview) Paul L. French (interview) Thomas Grasser (interview) Lynn Henry Guilloud (interview) Richard Nelms Jones (interview) Walter Jones (interview) John A. Santore (interview) Allison Wysong (interview) Gerald Zuck (interview) War Memorial Center, Milwaukee, WI Ed Inlenfeld (interview) Joseph Summers (interview) Wisconsin Veterans Museum, Oral History Program Horace Blaine Henry (interview) Robert Paulson (interview) William Upham (interview) WWII Veteran Surveys, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA John K. Addison (interview) Gerard Asher (interview) William Bottomkey (interview) Richard Cable (interview) Philip Costello (interview) William Farrell (interview) William Heffington (interview) William Kennedy (interview) Robert Matteson (interview) Ben Shank (interview)

Books

Abdul-­Jabbar, Kareem, Brothers in Arms: The Epic Story of the 761st Tank Battalion, WWII’s Forgotten Heroes. New York: Broadway Books, 2004. Allen, Robert S. Forward with Patton: The World War II Diary of Colonel Robert S. Allen. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2017. —. Lucky Forward: The History of Patton’s Third U.S. Army. New York: Vanguard Press, 1947. Andariese, Walter S., ed. World War II thru Korea. Hastings, NE: Snell, 1960. Army Leadership and the Profession. Army Doctrine Publication 6–22. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2019.

436 Bibliography Atkinson, Rick, At Guns Last Light: The War in Western Europe, 1944–1945. New York: Henry Holt, 2013. Ayer, Frederick. Before the Colors Fade: Portrait of a Soldier, George S. Patton. Atlanta: Cherokee Publishing, 1964. Barnett, Correlli, ed. Hitler’s Generals. New York: Grove Press, 1989. Barron, Leo. Patton at the Battle of the Bulge: How the General’s Tanks Turned the Tide at Bastogne. New York: NAL Caliber, 2014. Belpulsi, Peter A. A GI’s View of World War II. Salem, MA: Globe Publishing, 1997. Beyer, Rick, and Elizabeth Sayles. The Ghost Army of World War II: How One Top-­ Secret Unit Deceived the Enemy with Inflatable Tanks, Sound Effects, and Other Audacious Trickery. New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2015. Bigland, Tom. Bigland’s War: War Letters of Tom Bigland 1941–45. Liverpool: Lingams, 1990. Bilder, Michael C., A Foot Soldier for Patton: The Story of a “Red Diamond” Infantryman with the U.S. Third Army. Drexel Hill, PA: Casemate, 2008. Black, Layton. The Last First Sergeant. Caldwell, ID: Griffith Publishing, 1989. Bland, Larry I., ed. The Papers of George Catlett Marshall. Vol. 4. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. Blumenson, Martin. The Battle of the Generals: The Untold Story of the Falaise Pocket—­The Campaign That Should Have Won World War II. New York: William Morrow, 1993. —. Breakout and Pursuit: The United States Army in World War II. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1989. —. The Duel for France, 1944: The Men and Battles That Changed the Fate of Europe. Lebanon, IN: Da Capo, 1963. —. The Patton Papers. Vol. 2. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974. —. Patton: The Man behind the Legend, 1885–1945. New York: William Morrow, 1985. Bradley, Omar, and Clay Blair. A General’s Life: An Autobiography by General of the Army Omar N. Bradley. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983. —. A Soldier’s Story. New York: Modern Library, 1999. Brereton, Lewis H. The Brereton Diaries: War in the Air in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941–8 May, 1945. New York: William Morrow, 1946. Bucholtz, Chris, Thunderbirds Triumphant: The 362nd Fighter Group vs Germany’s Wehrmacht. Philadelphia: Casemate, 2018. Butcher, Harry C. My Three Years with Eisenhower: The Personal Diary of Captain Harry C. Butcher, USNR, Naval Aide to General Eisenhower. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946. Butz, William C. World War II as I Saw It. Albany, NY: SpectraGraphics, 2005. Caddick-­Adams, Peter. Snow and Steel: The Battle of the Bulge, 1944–45. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015. Campaux, S. The Liberation of Paris, August 19–26, 1944. Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, 2019. Chandler, Alfred D., Jr., ed. The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The War Years. Vol. 4. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970.

Bibliography

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Christopulos, James L. Combat Engineer: A World War II Memoir. Independently published, 2019. Codman, Charles, Drive. Boston: Little, Brown, 1957. Colby, John. War from the Ground Up: The 90th Division in WWII. Austin, TX: Northtex Press, 1991. Colby, William. Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1976. Cole, Hugh M. The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief Military Historian, 1965. —. The Lorraine Campaign. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1984. Colley, David P. The Road to Victory: The Untold Story of World War II’s Red Ball Express. Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2000. Collins, Larry, and Dominique LaPierre. Is Paris Burning? New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965. Crosswell, D. K. R. Beetle: The Life of General Walter Bedell Smith. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2010. De Guingand, Francis. Operation Victory. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1947. D’Este, Carlo. Eisenhower: A Soldier’s Life. New York: Henry Holt, 2002. —. Patton: Genius for War. New York: HarperCollins, 1995. Dominique, Dean, and James Hays. One Hell of a War: Patton’s 317th Infantry Regiment in WWII. N.p.: Wounded Warrior Publications, 2014. Dyer, George. XII Corps: Spearhead of Patton’s Third Army. N.p.: XII Corps History Association, 1947. Eichhorn, David Max. The GI’s Rabbi: World War II Letters of David Mac Eichhorn. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004. Eisenhower, David. Eisenhower at War 1943–1945. New York: Random House, 1986. Eisenhower, Dwight D. Crusade in Europe. Garden City: Doubleday, 1948. Eisenhower, John S. D. The Bitter Woods. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1969. Elson, Aaron. Tanks for the Memories: The 712th Tank Battalion during World War II. Hackensack, NJ: Chi Chi Press, 2001. Essame, H. Patton: A Study in Command. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1974. Evans, Thomas J., Reluctant Valor: The Oral History of Captain Thomas J. Evans, United States Third Army, 4th Armored Division, 704th Tank Destroyer Battalion (Code Name—­Harpoon). Latrobe, PA: St. Vincent College Center for the Northern Appalachian Studies, 1995. Farago, Ladislas, Patton: Ordeal and Triumph. New York: Ivan Obolensky, 1964. Featherston, Alwyn. Saving the Breakout: The 30th Division’s Heroic Stand at Mortain August 7–12, 1944. Novato: Presidio Press, 1993. Forty, George. The Armies of George S. Patton. New York: Arms and Armour, 1996. —. Patton’s Third Army at War. London: Arms and Armour, 1990. Fox, Don M. Patton’s Vanguard: The United States Army Fourth Armored Division. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2003. Frankel, Nathanial, and Larry Smith. Patton’s Best: An Informal History of the 4th Armored Division. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1978.

438 Bibliography Gabel, Christopher. The Lorraine Campaign: An Overview, September–December 1944. Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute, 1985. Gasche, Delmer O., ed. Memories of World War II. Archhold, OH: Farmland News, 2002. Gaul, Roland. The Battle of the Bulge in Luxembourg. Vol. 2, The Americans. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military Press, 1995. Gawne, Jonathan. 1944 American in Brittany: The Battle for Brest. Paris: Histoire & Collections, 2002. Glass, Thomas. The Trials and Triumphs of a Regimental Commander during World War II. Victoria, BC: Trafford, 2005. Griess, Thomas E. Campaign Atlas to the Second World War. Wayne, NJ: Avery Publishing Group, 1989. Hair, Denny G. The Third Army Goes to War, Book Two. Houston: Third Army Publishing, 2018. —. A Prediction Ignored and a Prayer, Book Three. Houston: Third Army Publishing, 2018. Hamilton, Nigel. Monty: The Battles of Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery. New York: Random House, 1981. Harkins, Paul. When the Third Army Cracked Europe: The Story of Patton’s Incredible Army. Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, 1969. Hasketh, Roger. Fortitude: The D-­Day Deception. New York: Overlook Press, 2000. Hatch, Alden. George Patton: General in Spurs. New York: Julian Messner, 1973. —. General George Patton: Old Blood and Guts. New York: Sterling, 2006. Heefner, Wilson A. Patton’s Bulldog: The Life and Service of General Walton H. Walker. Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Books, 2001. Henderson, Bruce. Sons and Soldiers: The Untold Story of the Jews Who Escaped the Nazis and Returned with the U.S. Army to Fight Hitler. New York: HarperCollins, 2017. Hillery, Vic, and Emerson Hurley. Paths of Armor: The Fifth Armored Division in World War II. Nashville: Battery Press, 1985. Hirshson, Stanley P. General Patton: A Soldier’s Life. New York: HarperCollins, 2002. Hofmann, George F. The Super Sixth: A History of the Sixth Armored Division in World War II. Nashville: Battery Press, 2000. —. Through Mobility We Conquer: The Mechanization of U.S. Cavalry. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2006. Hogan, David W., Jr. A Command Post at War: First Army Headquarters in Europe, 1943–1945. Washington, DC: United States Army, 2000. Hymel, Kevin M. Patton’s Photographs: War as He Saw It. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2006. —. Patton’s War: An American General’s Combat Leadership. Vol. 1, November 1942–July 1944. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2021. Irzyk, Albin. He Rode Up Front with Patton. Raleigh, NC: Pentland Press, 1996. James, Terry D. Patton’s Troubleshooters. Kansas City: Opinicus, 1988.

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Jordan, Jonathan W. Brothers, Rivals, Victors: Eisenhower, Patton, Bradley, and the Partnership That Drove the Allied Conquest of Europe. New York: NAL Caliber, 2011. Jordan, Max E., and Gloria J. Knapp. Through My Eyes. N.p., 2006. Keefer, Louis E. Scholars in Foxholes: The Story of the Army Specialized Training Program in World War II. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1988. Kelly, Anne, and Thomas Pellecha, eds. Writing the War: Chronicles of a World War II Correspondent. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 2015. Kemp, Anthony, Metz 1944: One More River to Cross. Bayeux: Heimdal, 2003. —. The Unknown Battle: Metz, 1944. New York: Stein and Day, 1981. Kindre, Tom. The Boys from New Jersey. Victoria, BC: Trafford, 2004. Koch, Oscar W. G-­2: Intelligence for Patton. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 1999. Knight, Ray, Would You Remember This? Diary of a World War II Recruit. Self-­ published, 1992. Koskimaki, George. The Battered Bastards of Bastogne: A Chronicle of the Defense of Bastogne, December 19, 1944–January 17, 1945. Havertown, PA: Casemate, 2003. Lande, D. A. I Was with Patton: First-­Person Accounts of WWII in George S. Patton’s Command. St. Paul, MN: MBI, 2002. Lewin, Ronald. Ultra Goes to War: The First Account of World Wat II’s Greatest Secrets Based on Official Documents. New York: McGraw-­Hill, 1978. MacVane, John. On the Air in World War II. New York: William Morrow, 1979. Marshall, S. L. A. Bastogne: The Story of the First Eight Days. Washington, DC: Infantry Journal Press, 1946. McDermott, William V. A Surgeon in Combat: European Theater—­World War II, Omaha Beach to Ebensee, 1943–1945. Dublin: William L. Bauhan, 1998. McDonald, Charles B. A Time for Trumpets: The Untold Story of the Battle of the Bulge. New York: William Morrow, 1985. McKeogh, Michael J., and Richard Lockridge. Sgt. Mickey and General Ike. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1946. McManus, John. Alamo in the Ardennes: The Untold Story of the American Soldiers Who Made the Defense of Bastogne Possible. Hoboken: John Wiley and Sons, 2007. —. September Hope: The American Side of a Bridge Too Far. New York: Nal Caliber, 2012. Meilinger, Phillip S. Hoyt S. Vandenberg: The Life of a General. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989. Miller, Robert, and Andrew Wakeford. Portraits of Service: Looking into the Faces of Veterans. New Hope, PA: Patton Publishing, 2011. Mills, Walter, ed. The Forrestal Diaries. New York: Viking Press, 1951. Montgomery, Bernard Law. The Memoirs of Field-­Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein. Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1958.

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Index Page numbers with “Fig.” refer to illustrations. Battle of the Bulge, Pont-­à-­Mousson, 296; Battle of the Bulge, second day of, 289; Harold Blakeley, 344; Coutances, 14; Fénétrange, German counterattack at, 235; Gaffey, 247; gas supply issues, 113; German SS tank commander on, 37; German territory, seven miles into, 250; Hill 318; Lorient, approach to, 44; Lunéville, 139–40; Metz, third attack on, 172; Nancy, 125, 131, 135, 142, 150; Operation MADISON, 172; Operation MADISON, Bradley and Bonesteel visit, 212, 232; Operation MADISON, day eleven, 222; Operation MADISON, day fifteen, Saarbrücken, 232; Operation MADISON, day sixteen, 232; Operation MADISON, day thirteen, Siegfried Line, 225; Operation MADISON, day three, 207; Operation MADISON, day two, 206; Operation MADISON, Eisenhower visit to, 217; Operation MADISON, Paris, 62; Patton visit before, 198, 261; Operation MADISON, Patton’s press conference and, 234; Operation MADISON, Rodalbe, 211, 216; Operation TINK, 258; Patton visit with Harriman and Gault, 237–38; Pont-­à-­Mousson, 130; Rennes, 14, 20, 22, 31, 35; Saarbrücken, 230; Saar River, 172, 242; Saint-­Lô, 14; Saint-­Malo, 58; Sarre-­Union, 244, 248; Sens, 79; Singling, 252; Troyes, 90, 96, 101; Vitry, 114; Wood, relief of, 223, 247. See also Clarke, Bruce and Wood, John

1st Infantry Division, 145, 179, 291 1st Infantry Division (French), 128 2nd Armored Division: 159, 209, 247, 347 2nd Armored Division (French): Alençon, 56; Argentan, 48, 53, 58, 59; Épinal, 130; 1st Infantry Division (French), 127–28; Nod-­sur-­Seine, 128; Paris, 84, 102; Rhine River, 235; Sées, 56; Third Army and, 113 2nd Cavalry Group, 100 2nd Infantry Division, 171, 276, 289 2nd Panzer Division, 347 3rd Cavalry Group: Battle of the Bulge, 281; Moselle River, 114; Operation MADISON, 173, 188, 196, 220; Patton’s visit to, 196, 242; Polk and, 143; Thionville, 183 4th Armored Division: 11, 23, 37, 45, 58, 80, 161, 170, 181, 246, 254, 256, 318, 321, 335; Arracourt, 140, 155; Avranches, 14; Battle of the Bulge, Arlon, 295, 313–14, 353; Battle of the Bulge, attack on, 358–59; Battle of the Bulge, Bastogne, 305, 311, 344, 346, 347 Fig. 43, 363; Battle of the Bulge, December 21, 320; Battle of the Bulge, December 22, slow start, 327, 332; Battle of the Bulge, December 23, Sûr River, 333, 334; Battle of the Bulge, December 24, 336; Battle of the Bulge, 80th Infantry and, 293, 339; Battle of the Bulge, Longwy, 292; Battle of the Bulge, Martelange, 336; Battle of the Bulge, Neufchâteau, 313; Battle of the Bulge, Patton and, 340;

445

446 Index 4th Infantry Division: 276, 309, 315, 318, 336, 346, 207; Battle of the Bulge, 289–92, 294, 331; Loire Valley, 179; Paris, 88; Patton visit to, 314. Barton, Raymond O., 344 5th Armored Division: 15; Avranches, 29–31; Argentan, 48, 53, 54,56 58; Dreux, 63, 67; heading east, 58, 63; Louviers, 74; Lunéville, 139. See also Oliver, Lunsford 5th Infantry Division: 14, 243, 181, 228, 241, 262, 293; Angers, 39; Arnaville, 126, 135; Battle of the Bulge, Bastogne, 305, 317; Battle of the Bulge, December 24, 336; Battle of the Bulge, Echternach, 318, 320, 327, 329–31, 341, 342, 344; Battle of the Bulge, Luxembourg City, 309, 317; Battle of the Bulge, Thionville, 297; Dornot, 125-­27; Fort Driant, 148–50, 157–58; Metz, 120, 135, 157, 172, 188, 254; Moselle River, 121, 205, 242; Nantes, 39; Operation MADISON, day eleven, 221; Operation MADISON, day fifteen, Metz, 225, 231; Operation MADISON, day thirteen, 225; Operation MADISON, day two, 205; Operation MADISON, Metz, 173, 212, 220, 222, 224, 230; Operation MADISON, Retonfey, 221; Operation MADISON, Sanry-­sur-­Nied, 215; Operation MADISON, un-­helmeted Patton in tank, 222; Patton’s visit, 54, 95, 149, 235; Reims, 97, 103; tanks, riding on, 33. See also Irwin, LeRoy 5th Ranger Battalion, 198, 244 6th Armored Division: 24, 51, 63, 75, 97, 103, 118, 125. 139, 145, 155, 198, 218, 254, 280, 318, 364; Avranches, 29; Battle of the Bulge, XII Corps, 331; Battle of the Bulge, attack northeast of Bastogne, 363; Battle of the Bulge, Bastogne, 355, 361; Battle of the Bulge, December 23, 335; Battle of the Bulge, December 26, Luxembourg City, 344; Battle of the Bulge, Houffalize, 355; Battle of the Bulge, Luxembourg City, 339; Battle of the Bulge, Metz, 297, 309, 310; Battle of the Bulge, Neffe, 363; Battle of the Bulge, second day of, 289; Battle of the Bulge, shifting north, 315; Battle of

the Bulge, to III Corps, 348; benediction ceremony, 91; Brest, 14, 22, 34, 38, 44, 61, 91; Dinan, 31; First Army, 144; Fort Driant, 161; friendly-­fire incident, 136; Grémecey Forest, 150, 154; Metz, third attack on, 172–73; Michelin tour guide map, 242; Mutterbach River, 236; Operation LÜTTICH, 22–24; Operation MADISON, day eleven, 222; Operation MADISON, day four, 208; Operation MADISON, day thirteen, 225; Operation MADISON, day three, 207; Operation MADISON, day twelve, 222; Operation MADISON, Landroff, 216; Operation MADISON, Patton visit, 198, 208, 222; Operation MADISON, rain, 205; Operation MADISON, 90th and, 172–73; Patton’s visit, 242; Rhine, push to, 254; Saarbücken, 269; Saint-­Lô, 14; Sarre-­ Union, 242; Sarreguemines, 230, 249, 252; Seventh Army, 127; surrendering Germans, 127. See also Grow, Robert W. 6th Cavalry Group, 20, 243, 244, 315 7th Armored Division: 13, 14, 67, 95, 114, 120, 135, 136, 182, 211 ; Battle of the Bulge, 285, 291, 301; Conflans, 119; Dornot, 121, 126; First Army, 144, 178, 285; Metz, 135; Nogent-­le-­Roi, clogged roads, 63; Reims, 97; Saint Malo, 59; Sedan, 113; supply issues, 103, 113; Thionville, 120 8th Infantry Division, 18, 23, 44 9th Armored Division, 276, 283, 294, 314, 318, 329, 344, 353, 357. See also Leonard, John W 10th Armored Division: 164, 199, 216, 224, 230; Battle of the Bulge, 271, 286, 290, 292, 294, 314, 318, 320, 331, 336, 339, 344, 348; First Army, 273, 285; Leonard and, 314; Malling bridge, 211; Merzig feint, 231, 241; Metz, third attack on, 173; Operation MADISON, Moselle, 207, 209, 215; Operation MADISON, day eight, 116; Operation MADISON, day eleven, 221; Operation MADISON, day fifteen, German counterattacks,

Index 228; Operation MADISON, day fifteen, Merzig, 231; Operation MADISON, day fourteen, Siegfried Line, 226; Operation MADISON, day seven, 212; Operation MADISON, day ten, Metz, 220; Operation MADISON, Patton’s press conference and, 234; Operation MADISON, preparation and, 196; Patton visit to, 195, 196, 205, 246; in reserve behind 90th Division, 254; Saalautern, 241; Saar at Merzig, 243; Third Army, 159, 163. See also Morris, William H.H., Jr. 11th Armored Division, 331, 335, 345, 351, 355, 357, 358, 361, 363 11th Panzer Division, 151, 281 15th Cavalry Group, Operation LÜTTICH, 23 17th Airborne Division, 239, 345, 351, 363 23rd Headquarters Special Troops, 50, 127, 327, 331 26th Infantry Division: 146, 164, 175, 219, 230, 288, 292, 318; Battle of the Bulge, Arlon, 313; Battle of the Bulge, Bastogne, 305, 344; Battle of the Bulge, Bigonville, 336; Battle of the Bulge, December 21, jump-­off position, 320; Battle of the Bulge, December 22, 327; Battle of the Bulge, Houffalize, 355, 358, 363; Battle of the Bulge, Metz, 296, 309; Fort Driant, 161; Maginot Line forts and, 255; Operation MADISON, Bradley and Bonesteel visit, 212; Operation MADISON, day eleven, 222; Operation MADISON, day thirteen, 225; Operation MADISON, Eisenhower visit to, 217; Operation MADISON, initial assault, 201–2, 204; Operation MADISON, Patton visit to, 208; Operation MADISON, Rodalbe, 216; Operation TINK, Patton visit to, 258, 261; Patton visit to, 170, 177, 193, 204, 208, 217, 237, 240, 258, 261; photo of, 343 Fig. 42; progress of, 250; Red Cross Club ceremony, 180; Saar River, 239, 242; Sarre-­ Union, capture of, 248; Sarreguemines, 242; III Corps, Metz, 254. See also Paul, Willard S.

447 28th Infantry Division: 318, 329, 344; Battle of the Bulge, capture soldiers of, 327; Battle of the Bulge, commencement of, 276; Battle of the Bulge, December 18, 294; Battle of the Bulge, mauling of, 296; Battle of the Bulge, relief of, 363; Battle of the Bulge, second day, 289; Meuse River, 128–29 30th Infantry Division: Battle of the Bulge, 291; Mortain, 53, 55; Operation LÜTTICH, Mortain, 41 35th Infantry Division, 14, 50, 84, 100, 102, 150 Fig. 20, 178, 181, 220, 230, 288, 355; Battle of the Bulge, attack on, 289, 315,318; Battle of the Bulge, Bastogne, 363; Battle of the Bulge, December 23, 335; Battle of the Bulge, December 26, 344; Battle of the Bulge, second day of, 289; Battle of the Bulge, shifting north, 315; Battle of the Bulge, III Corps, 339, 358; Battle of the Bulge, XXII Corps, 337; Fort Driant, 161; Grémecey Forest, 148, 154; Metz, third attack on, 172; Mortain, 53, 55; Nancy, 125, 127, 133, 140-­2, 150; Operation LÜTTICH, Mortain, 41–42; Operation MADISON, 172; Operation MADISON, day eleven, 222; Operation MADISON, day fifteen, Sarregeumines, 231; Operation MADISON, Eisenhower visit to, 217; Operation MADISON, initial assault, 202, 204; Operation TINK, 258, 261, 270; Patton’s visit to, 125, 242; Puttelange, 249; replacements, 269; Saar River, Patton visit, 193, 217, 254, 261; Saint-­Malo, 58; Sarre-­Union, 242; Sarreguemines, 249, 252; Seille River, 172; Sens, 79. See also Baade, Paul 37th Tank Battalion, 346 42nd Infantry Division, 268–69, 288, 303, 331 63rd Infantry Division, Battle of the Bulge, 303 66th Infantry Division, Battle of the Bulge, 303 70th Infantry Division, Battle of the Bulge, 303 75th Division, Battle of the Bulge, delay of, 331

448 Index 79th Infantry Division: 13, 23, 54, 113; Avranches, 29; heading east, 58; Mantes, 73; Nancy, 142; Nogent-­le-­Roi, clogged roads, 63; Operation LÜTTICH, 22; Seine, crossing of, 75 80th Infantry Division: 13, 79, 154, 230, 293, 318, 344; Argentan, 48; Battle of the Bulge, 314; Battle of the Bulge, 4th Armored, 339; Battle of the Bulge, Arlon, 313; Battle of the Bulge, Bastogne, 305; Battle of the Bulge, December 21, jump-­off position, 321; Battle of the Bulge, December 25, 339, 340; Battle of the Bulge, December, 22, 327; Battle of the Bulge, Luxembourg City, 292, 311; Battle of the Bulge, Metz, 296; Battle of the Bulge, photo of, 321 Fig. 40; Battle of the Bulge, XII Corps and, 339; Fort Driant, 161; friendly-­fire incident, 136; gasoline, 114; III Corps, Metz, 254; Maginot Line, 242; Marshall visit, 165; Metz, third attack on, 172; Moivrons, 136; Mousson Hill, 137; Nancy, 125, 127, 142; Operation MADISON, 172; Operation MADISON, day fifteen, Sarregeumines, 231; Operation MADISON, day four, 208; Operation MADISON, day thirteen, Siegfried Line, 225; Operation MADISON, initial assault, 202–4; Operation MADISON, Patton visit to, 208; Operation TINK, Patton visit to, 262; Patton’s visit to, 148, 193, 242; Pont-­à-­Mousson, 130; Reims, 97; Saint Malo, 59; Sanit-­Avold, capture of, 239; Sarreguemines, attack on, 249; Seille River, 164, 172. See also McBride, Horace 82nd Airborne Division, 239, 285, 289, 292, 301, 349 83rd Infantry Division: 103, 118, 125, 145, 187, 198, 231; Avranches, 29; First Army, Ruhr area, 162; Operation MADISON, 188, 209; Patton visit, 45, 158; Saint-­Malo, 38, 44. See Also Macon, John 84th Infantry Division, 153 87th Infantry Division: Battle of the Bulge, 290, 348; Battle of the Bulge, Culin

relieved, 297–98, 315; Battle of the Bulge, Houffalize, 357, 358; Battle of the Bulge, Lentz, 298–98; Battle of the Bulge, release of, 355; Battle of the Bulge, Third Army, 335; Metz, 243; Operation TINK, Patton visit to, 258, 261; Rhine, push to, 254 90th Infantry Division: 13, 50, 63, 94, 230, Argentan, 48, 58; Avranches, 29; Battle of the Bulge, 295, 318, 331; Chambois, 61–62, 69; Dillingen, 252–54, 264; Falaise pocket, closing of, 69; four-­mile advancement of, 239; Fremersdorf, 244; Jeanne d’Arc, 148; Le Mans, 45, 46; Maizières-­lès-­Metz, 158, 186; Mayenne, 37; Metz, 135, 157, 172, 225; Operation LÜTTICH, 21–22; Operation MADISON preparation and, 148, 196; Operation MADISON, Moselle, 173; Operation MADISON, confusion tactics and, 188; Operation MADISON, day eight, German attack on, 216; Operation MADISON, day eleven, 221; Operation MADISON, day fifteen, German counterattacks, 228; Operation MADISON, day fifteen, Saarburg, Merzig, and Saarlautern, 231; Operation MADISON, day four, 207; Operation MADISON, day thirteen, 225; Operation MADISON, day two, Moselle crossing, 206, 207; Operation MADISON, Fort Koenigsmacker, 206, 215; Operation MADISON, Patton visit to, 214; Operation MADISON, Patton’s press conference on, 234; Patton and, 27–28, 54, 67, 136, 143, 165, 195, 196, 214, 245; Petite-­Hettange, German attack on, 211; Reims, 97; rest for, 262; Rhine, push to, 254; Saar River, 252–54; Saarlautern, 241, 260, 264–65, 266 Fig. 36; Saint Malo, 59; Siegfried Line, 252–54; Thionville, 120–21, 125, 130; Van Fleet and, 171 94th Infantry Division, 179, 303, 345 95th Infantry Division: 3, 164, 177, 181, 195, 199, 230, 234, 262, 317, 318 ; Battle of the Bulge, 288, 293; bridgehead enlargement, 252–54; Dilligen, 260;

Index Ensdorf, 289; four-­mile advancement of, 239; Metz, third attack on, 172; Operation MADISON, Uckange, 172–73; Operation MADISON, Maizières-­lès-­ Metz, 188; Operation MADISON, day eight, Fort d’Illange, 216; Operation MADISON, day eleven, 221; Operation MADISON, day fifteen, Saarlautern, 231; Operation MADISON, day four, 207; Operation MADISON, day fourteen, Kittel, capturing of, 226; Operation MADISON, day fourteen, Metz, 226; Operation MADISON, day thirteen, 225; Operation MADISON, day two, 205; Operation MADISON, Fort Lorraine, 220; Operation MADISON, Metz, 172, 220, 224; Operation MADISON, Patton visit, 212; Operation MADISON preparation and, 196; Patton visit to, 171, 196, 212, 245; Saar Plain, 243; Saarlautern, 241, 244, 248–29; Siegfried Line, 241, 252–54; Thionville, Patton visit to, 266; Third Army, 163. See also Twaddle, Harry L. 99th Infantry Division, Battle of the Bulge, 276, 292, 289 100th Infantry Division, 246 101st Airborne Division; 7, 312, 318, 336, 347, 361; Bastogne, 294, 299, 313, 321, 348, 326–29, 364; bedsheets as capes, 364; Holland, 285; as left flank guard, 353; McAuliffe and, 289; Noville, 308; Patton on, 338; Ridgway and, 239; Saint-­Hubert, 292; 7th Armor and, 301; Taylor and, 289, 355 104th Infantry Division, 178 106th Cavalry Group: Argentan, 48 106th Infantry Division, 267, 289, 296, 299, 301, surrender of, 308 116th Panzer Division, Argentan, 25,55, 56 193rd Field Artillery Battalion, Patton visit to, Operation MADISON preparation and, 197 206th Engineer Combat Battalion, 266 266th Infantry Division (German), 44, 50 333rd Artillery Group, 313–14

449 502nd Parachute Infantry Regiment, Battle of the Bulge, Bastogne, 359–60 702nd Tank Battalion, Battle of the Bulge, 339–40 761st Tank Battalion, 189–90 I Corps, Rhine River, 226 II Corps, 240, 306 III Corps: 281, 309, 325, Battle of the Bulge, 328–29; Battle of the Bulge, Bastogne, 305, 327, 334, 345, 358, 363; Battle of the Bulge, December 22, 327; Battle of the Bulge, flank attack plan and, 313; Battle of the Bulge, German offensive and, 294; Battle of the Bulge, Houffalize, 353; Battle of the Bulge, Longwy, 296; Battle of the Bulge, makeup of, 318; Battle of the Bulge, Millikin’s command of, 179–80; Battle of the Bulge, Patton command of, 179, 305; Battle of the Bulge, Roer Valley, 355; Battle of the Bulge, 6th Armored to, 348; Battle of the Bulge, 35th Division and, 339; Irwin’s 5th Armored to, 225; Operation TINK, 263, 270; relieved divisions to, 254; Third Army, 179. See also Millikin, John V Corps: Battle of the Bulge, commencement of, 276; Battle of the Bulge, northern side of, 303; Battle of the Bulge, second day of, 289; Falaise pocket and, 68; Patton on, 125; Sixth Panzer Army and, 283 VI Corps, 236, 263 VII Corps, 55, 58–59, 82, 87, 303 VIII Corps: 14, 21, 22, 221, 277, 279, 281, 287, 305, 318, 352; Ardennes Forest, 162; Battle of the Bulge, Chaudfontaine, 296; Battle of the Bulge, commencement of, 276; Battle of the Bulge, December 18, 294, 295; Battle of the Bulge, 87th Infantry, release of, 355; Battle of the Bulge, 11th Armored, release of, 355; Battle of the Bulge, Houffalize, 355, 358; Battle of the Bulge, 9th Armored CCR, as strategic reserve, 357; Battle of the Bulge, second day of, 289; Battle of the Bulge, special

450 Index VIII Corps (continued) estimate of, 280; Battle of the Bulge, Third Army command of, 296; Brest and, 90; Brittany Peninsula, 103; First Army and, Ruhr area, 162; makeup of, 13; Ninth Army and, 118. See also 8th Infantry Division; 4th Armored Division; Middleton, Troy; 79th Infantry Division; and 6th Armored Division XII Corps: 13, 54, 63, 78, 80, 97, 102, 131, 192, 241, 246, 256, 269, 282, 318, 331, 339, 352, 363; Battle of the Bulge, Bastogne, 305; Battle of the Bulge, Bitburg, 355; Battle of the Bulge, December 19, 296–97; Battle of the Bulge, December 24, 336; Battle of the Bulge, December 27, shift of gravity to, 351; Battle of the Bulge, Luxembourg City, 315, 335; Battle of the Bulge, Patton command of, 305; Battle of the Bulge, Trier, 336; Chartres, 59; Commercy, 100; Metz, third attack on, 172; Nancy, 118, 130, 133; Operation MADISON, 172, 208, 217; Operation TINK, 263; Orléans, 61, 73; Patton, commending of, 255; Pont-­à-­Mousson, 115–17; Saar River, 242; Saint-­Malo, 58; 2nd Cavalry, 100; Toul, 115; Troyes, 90; XX Corps and, 58; Vitry, 98. See also 80th Infantry Division; 4th Armored Division; Eddy, Manton; 35th Infantry Division; and 26th Infantry Division XV Corps: 13, 29, 97, 118, 198, 246, 248, 249, 267, 315; Argentan, 47–48; “broken neck,” 70; Charmes, 130; Devers and, 235; Dreux, 61, 67; Falaise and, 70; Gerow and, 67–69; Lunéville, 139; Mantes-­la-­ Jolie, 73; Nod-­sur-­Seine, 127; Operation MADISON, 207; Paris, 73, 84; Sixth Army Group, 145, 148, 234, 235–36; supplies and, 150. See also Haislip, Wade H. XVIII Airborne Corps, 159, 180, 239 XIX Tactical Air Command: 14; air-­ground cooperation and, 18–19, 22, 41, 151, 176, 198, 255–57, 270; “Anzio Annie,” 186; Argentan and, 48; Battle of the Bulge, 279, 331–32; Brest, 114; Falaise pocket and, 64;

Fort Driant, 157, 159; friendly fire and, 210, 254; Metz and, 151, 157, 221; Oboe and, 243; Operation MADISON, 221, 222, 224; railway gun, 186; Spaatz, 176. See also Welyand, Otto P. “Opie” XX Corps: 39, 53, 119, 120, 136, 143, 158, 195, 226, 239, 243, 315, 318, 320, ; Battle of the Bulge, December 19, 295, 297; Battle of the Bulge, defensive position of, 309; Battle of the Bulge, Moselle and Saar Rivers, convergence of, 355; Battle of the Bulge, Patton command of, 305; Battle of the Bulge, remained quiet, 336; Battle of the Bulge, Saarburg, 335, 354; Chartres, 61, 67; Château-­Thierry, 98; Dreux, 59; gas problems and, 103; German troop movements and, 286; Luxembourg, 112; makeup of, 13, 14; Melun, 81, 98, 118, 135, 157; Metz and, 172, 232; Montereau, 81; Moselle River, 126; Nogent-­sur-­Seine, 90; Operation LÜTTICH, Mortain, 41–42; Operation MADISON, 207; Operation TINK, 263; Paris, drive to, 73, 88; Reims, 97; Saint-­Malo, 58; Seille River, 142; Seine and, 98; Thionville, 114, 130; XII Corps and, 58; Verdun, 100, 103. See also 5th Infantry Division, 90th Infantry Division; 95th Infantry Division, 6th Armored Division, 10th Armored Division, 35th Infantry Division. See also Walker, Walton XXX Corps, Battle of the Bulge, 323 A Abrams, Creighton, Bastogne, 346, 348 African American soldiers, 5, 91-­94, 189, 190, 199, 207, 248, 255, 261, 268 Alençon, 48, 53, 55 Alexander, Harold, 362 Allen, Leven C. “Lev,” 58, 65–66, 273, 280, 294, 353 Allen, Robert, 69, 83, 189, 282, 337–38 Allen, Roderick, 254 Allen, Terry, 178–79 ALSOS, 121–22 Althaus, Kenneth G., 228 Anderson, Frederick, 355

Index Angers, 29, 31, 39 Antwerp, 84, 88, 101, 144, 157, 191, 275–76, 291, 308 “Anzio Annie,” 184–86 Ardennes Forest, 70, 162, 168, 191, 271, 275, 277, 283-­85, 289, 308, 232, 325 Ardennes Offensive, see Battle of the Bulge Argentan, 53–56, 59 ; Bradley on, solid shoulder at, 70; XV Corps and, xviii, 42, 47, 48, 67; 5th Armored and, 58; linkup location, 61; Montgomery and, 48; panzer divisions and, 58, 64; Patton and, British press on, 107 “Armored Diesels,” 209 Army General Classification Test (AGCT), 164 Army Group G (German), 244, 249 Army Information Service, 20 Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP), 164 Arracourt, 131, 140, 155, 157, 159, 175, 281 artillery shell, proximity fuse, 269, 298, 341 Aschaffenburg, Operation TINK and, 264 Atlantic Wall, 83 Atomic research, 121–22 Aubaud Bridge, 27 Avranches: 4th Armored Division, 14; 5th Armored and, 30; First Army, capture by, 5; Kluge on, 63; 116th Panzer Division and, 25; Operation LÜTTICH and, 21, 41; Patton and Middleton discussion of, 22, 29; rail line of, 53; traffic and, 23, 28 Ayer, Frederick, 72, 94, 104, 175–76 B Baade, Paul: 140, 153, 155, ; cane of, 193, 194 Fig. 28; Mortain, 53; Operation LÜTTICH, Mortain, 41–42; soldiers, reference to as whipped, 144. See also 35th Infantry Division Bacon, Robert, 213, 235, 248 Bad Kreuznach, Operation TINK and, 264 Baily Bridge, 214 Balck, Hermann, 244 Bangalore torpedoes, 157 Barriger, William A., 306

451 Barth, George, 187 Barton, Raymond O., 276, 290, 291, 322, 344. See also 4th Infantry Division Bastogne, 162, 277, 279, 282, 291–92, 299– 349, 358, 365; Creighton Abrams and, 346, 348; aerial supply to, 335, 341, 353; attack on, preparation for, 294; Battle of the Bulge, December 25, 342; bedsheets, 364; Blanchard, 346, 348; Charles Boggess, 346–47; Bradley on, 303, 357; CCA (9th Armored), 344; CCB (Dager) and, 295, 311, 313–14, 321; CCR and, 346, 348; Steve Chappuis, Distinguished Service Cross, 359, 360 Fig. 47; VIII Corps and, 296; Eisenhower and, 319, 353; German army, state of, 336; German attacks and, 299, 301, 308, 342, 357; Gliders and, 345; inside troops, 335; killed-­to-­wounded ratio and, 348; McAuliffe, command of, 308; McAuliffe, Distinguished Service Cross, 359, 360 Fig. 47; McAuliffe, Middleton and, 312; McAuliffe, “Nuts,” 328–29; McAuliffe, German Christmas attack and, 342; Medical supplies to, 345, 353, 354; Middleton and, 308, 312; “Nickel” and, 297; Patton in, 359, 361; Patton on, 304–5, 314; Patton’s victory, 348; relief of, 347–48, 347 Fig. 43; III Corps and, 327; 35th Division and, 337; Webster and, 347. See also 101st Airborne Battle Group Peiper, Battle of the Bulge, 308 Battle of Saint-­Mihiel, 115, 159, 169 Battle of the Bulge: 210, 277, 280–81, 300, 365; Allied suspicions of, 279–85; Assenois, 346; bedsheets as capes, 364; “Cent,” 297; Christmas turkey dinner, 342; code names and, 297; commencement of, 275–76, 285; December 18, 290–95; December 19, 295–310; December 20, 311–19; December 21, 319–25; December 22, 327–333; December 23, 333–35; December 24, 335–38; December 25, 338– 44; December 26, 344–49; December 27, 351–55; December 28, 355–56; December 29, 356–58; December 30, 358–63; December 31, 363; Dillingen, 295; “Dime,”

452 Index Battle of the Bulge (continued) 297; Echternach, 290, 344; Ensdorf, 317; friendly air fire, 364; frozen feet, 340; Gay idea for pincer retaliation, 295; German forces of, 275–76; German saboteurs and, 318; Hosingen, 289, 294; Houffalize, 355, 357; Liège, 291; logistics and, 315; Longville, 299; Longwy, 296; Luxembourg City, 311; Malmedy Massacre, 291; Montgomery, 342; “Nickel,” 297; Noville, 299, 308; Patton, Bradley phone call with, 294–95; proximity fuse, 341; Saarlautern, 317; second day, 289; Stoumont, 308; Team Cherry, 313; Team Desobry, 313; Team O’Hare, 313; ULTRA and, 283; Wardin, 299. See also Bastogne BBC, 65, 89 Bealke, Jacob W., 165–66 Bedsheets, 364 Bell, Raymond, 245 Bendetsen, Karl R., Battle of the Bulge, 297 “Big Bertha,” 117 Bishop, Edward L., 288–89 Blakeley, Harold, 4th Division, 344 Blanchard, Wendell, Patton on, 348. See also CCR Blumenson, Martin, 307, 367 Boggess, Charles, 346–47 Bois d’Amelécourt, 202 Bonesteel, Charles, 212, 213 Fig. 29, 232, 236 Bonus March, 118 Bradley, Omar, 48–50; Argentan, 47, 55; Avranches, 29; Battle of the Bulge, Bastogne, 324, 349; Battle of the Bulge, brainchild of, 290–91; Battle of the Bulge, counteroffiensive, 312; Battle of the Bulge, December 18, 292–93; Battle of the Bulge, December 24, 337; Battle of the Bulge, suspicions of, 284; Battle of the Bulge, on Patton, 325, 356–57; Battle of the Bulge, XII Corps, December 27, shift of gravity to, 351; Brest, 126; Brittany campaign, 31; Eisenhower, Spaatz, and Weyland, meeting with, 251; Falaise gap and, 70–71; Félix of Luxembourg, 112; First and Third armies, 14; First Army commander,

tenure of, 15; Germany, assault plan for, 88; Germany, sweep into, 141; Haislip’s XV Corps, splitting of, 58; headlines and, 66; hives, 253; honorary knight commander, 169; Nov 26 meeting with Eisenhower and Patton, 236; Operation LÜTTICH, 21, 41–42; Operation MADISON, 175, 177–78, 187–88, 202, 223; Operation MARKET GARDEN, 137, 144–45; Patton, to Meuse River, 98; Patton, birthday wishes to, 209; Patton, congratulations to, 268; Patton, Siegfried Line plan of, 102; Patton, meeting with, 243; Patton’s European presence, announcement of, 65; Patton’s situation, as active defense, 114; photo with Patton and Hodges, 15 Fig. 2; photo with Patton and Weyland, 99 Fig. 16; photo with Patton, 358 Fig. 46; photo with Patton, Eddy’s headquarters, 213 Fig. 29; Pink Bull and, 132–33; Saar meeting, 243; as 12th Army Group commander, 14; Verdun headquarters, 300 Fig. 38 Brandenberger, Erich, 276, 277, 333 Brereton, Lewis, 239, 243, 253 Brest, 14, 44, 142 Brooke, Alan, 48, 323 Brooks, Edward H., 263 Brougher, Freeman, 25 Brussels, 101, 301, 302 Bull, Harold R. “Pink,” 102, 300, 132–33, 289, 303, 320, 353, 357 Buress, Withers “Pinkie,” 246 Butcher, Harry, 65, 187, 283, 298 Byrnes, James F., 169 C Caen, Montgomery and, 5, 39, 42 Calais, 84, 87, 113 Campbell, L.H., 182 Canadian First Army, 14, 48, 54, 88, 101, 324 Carlisle, John M., 107, 149–50, 166 Carlson, Roy, 3 Carter, Bernard, 39, 232 cartoon, planning staffer, 46 Carvey, John, 332

Index “Cat lights,” 309 Chandler, Albert “Happy,” 62 Chappuis, Steve, 342, 359, 360 Fig. 47 Chartres, 53, 59, 61, 67, 73, 90, 91, 112, 128 Chartres Cathedral, 68 Fig. 12 Château Fougères, 58, 59 Fig. 11 Choltitz, Dietrich von, 78, 84–85 Churchill, Winston, 84, 106, 266, 311 Clarke, Bruce C.: Patton and, 101, 140, 164– 65; Pont-­à-­Mousson, 130; 7th Armored Division, 178; Vitry, 114 Clarke, Christian, 143 Clervaux, 289, 294 Codman, Charles: 124, 184, 202, 245; Conflans, 148; frontline inspection, 145; Luxembourg City, 309, 317; Nantes, 39; Patton and Luce, 253; Patton and passwords, 318; Patton and theater people, 122; Patton on war, 40; Patton’s credo, 146; Saint-­Avold, delayed-­fuse bombs and, 282; Verdun, Bradley meeting at, 299–306; Verdun’s train station, 160; World War I locations with Patton, 17, 115, 147–48 Cochran, Philip, 253–54 Collins, J. Lawton, 303, 323, 356, 256 Fig. 45. See also VII Corps Communications Zone. See COMZ COMZ, 61, 101, 153, 306, 170, 177; Le Mans drop, 73–74; Red Ball Express, 91–92; replacements and, 268, 303 Coningham, Arthur, 71, 251 Conklin, John, 214 Connor, Fox, 290 Cook, Gilbert, 4, 58, 59, 61, 73; relief of command, 78–79 Cooney, Harold, 197 Cota, Norm, 128–29. See also 28th Division Coutances, 14, 35 Crane, John, 72 Crerar, H. D. G., 14, 54, 101 Crosby, Bing, 122 Culin, Frank L.: 87th Division, command of, 315–17; Metz and, 243; Patton visit, 261; trenchfoot and, 297. See also 87th Division

453 D Dager, Holmes, 313, 321, 327, 332, 333. See also CCB Daily Express, Battle of the Bulge, praise of Patton, 362–63 Davis, Benjamin O., 190 D-­Day, Operation FORTITUDE, 16 de Gaulle, Charles, 77, 78, 84, 85, 102 de Guingand, Freddy, 56, 84, 144, 300, 362 Dempsey, Miles, 14, 38, 47, 69, 74, 89 Devers, Jacob “Jake,” 142; XV Corps and, 145, 148, 198, 235; Metz, 225; Patton on, 150, 198; replacements, 335; shift north, 315; Siegfried Line, 250; Sixth Army Group, 157; supplies, 249; Third and Seventh Armies, boundary between, 235; Versailles, 144, 293, 299–306 Dewey, Thomas E., elections, 188 Dickson, Benjamin “Monk,” 284 Dieppe, 42, 101 Dietrich, Joseph “Sepp,” 276 Dietrich, Marlene, 187, 219 Dieuze, dam on, 175, 176, 223 Driscoll, Joseph, 209–10 Domnon lès Dieuze, 261 Doolittle Jimmy: capture P-­47s, 364; Codman’s train station boast and, 160; dinner with Patton, 160; language of, 176– 77; meeting with Bradley, Eisenhower, Spaatz, and Weyland, 251; Operation TINK, outline for, 253; Patton, bomber jacket to, 208; Patton, friendship with, 206 Dornot, 121, 125–27 Dreux, 46, 59, 61, 63, 67, 74 Drink “170,” 151 Duck’s Feet, 182 Dunckern, Anton, 228–29 E Eagle Main headquarters, Verdun, 132, 300 Fig. 38 Earnest, Herbert, 321, 333 Eddy, Manton, 181 Fig. 24, 162 Fig. 21, 192 Fig. 27; Battle of the Bulge, bombing campaign meeting, 355; Battle of the Bulge, December 19 staff meeting, 297;

454 Index Eddy, Manton (continued) Battle of the Bulge, December 23 meeting with Patton, 334; Battle of the Bulge, Larochette, 320; Battle of the Bulge, staff meeting, 295–96; Bronze Star, 165; Culin and, 315–17; Grémecey Forest, 152–55; on Horace McBride, 159; Nancy, 125; Operation MADISON, initial attack, 204; Operation MADISON, day thirteen, Siegfried Line, 225; Operation MADISON, Faulquemont, 212; Operation MADISON, resting McBride, 220; Operation MADISON, Thanksgiving Day ceremony, 231; Operation TINK, 261, 269; Patton and, 79, 81, 242, 248; Pont-­à-­Mousson, 115; Saar River, 252; Sarreguemines, attack on, 249; Sens, 79; Silver Star, 352; XII command, 79; Walker’s corps, gap between, 241; Wood, problems with, 80, 178, 223, 246 Eifel region, 275, 276 Eighth Air Force, 251, 355, 363–64 Eisenhower, Dwight D.: American Battlefield Monuments Commission, 115; Battle of the Bulge, Bastogne corridor, 353; Battle of the Bulge, December 19, Verdun, Bradley meeting at, 299–307; Battle of the Bulge, December 24 talk with Patton, 337; Battle of the Bulge, December 25, Montgomery and, 343; Battle of the Bulge, enormity of, 285; Battle of the Bulge, Montgomery, counteroffensive and, 311–12; Battle of the Bulge, Patton’s offensive, 323, 327–28; Battle of the Bulge, suspicions of, 283; Brest, 114; Calais, 87; Félix of Luxembourg, 112; First Army and Roer River, 239; ground forces, direct. Command of from Montgomery, 105; Guingand and, 84; Koenig and, 77; meeting with Bradley, Spaatz, and Weyland, 251; Montgomery and, 84–85, 89, 141, 267, 361–62; meeting with Patton and Bradley, 236; Middleton, photo with, 287 Fig. 37; on generals, 137, 142; on Patton, 71; Operation FORTITUDE, 16;

Operation MADISON, 191, 202, 209, 211, 217–19, 218 Fig. 31, 232; Operation MARKET GARDEN, 144; Paris, 77, 83; Patton, birthday wishes to, 209; Patton, Siegfried Line and, 113; Patton’s European presence, announcement of, 65; Patton’s sector, opinion of, 239; Patton’s situation, as active defense, 114; Patton’s tactics in Brittany, 30; Rennes, Patton and, 30; Ruhr and Saar Regions, 117; Siegfried Line, 117; Silvester, 210–11; Supreme Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF), 14; Telek, 217; V-­2 rockets, 126 Eisenhower’s Lieutenants (Weigley), 308 Elster, Botho Henning, 142 Elster, Erich, 127 Épinal, 82, 84, 130, 135 Essey, 115, 169 Estonia, 62 Ettelbruck, 342 Eupen, 291 Ezell, Bert, 313–14 F Falaise: American pilots, 59; fall of, 67; First Canadian Army and, 54; gap, closing of, 67–71; halt order, Patton and, 60; Leclerc and, 48; Montgomery, 59; Patton’s diary entries on, xviii; as pivot point, 42; shape of pocket, 64 Farago, Ladislas, 111–12 Félix of Luxembourg, 112, 160 Fénétrange, 232, 235 Fifth Army, 240 Fifth Panzer Army, 139, 141, 276, 277 First Allied Airborne Army, 187, 239 First Army: Aachen, 155; Antwerp and, 88; Argentan, 55–56; Avranches, 5; Battle of Bulge, commencement of, 271, 275–76; Battle of the Bulge, 88, 296, 311, 342, 352, 361; Bradley’s tenure as commander of, 15; Cologne, 191; drive east, 101; Falaise pocket and, 69; German commentator on, 288; Hosingen, 275; Houffalize, 361; Hürgten Forest, 157; Louviers, 74; miles

Index covered after first week, 38; Operation MADISON, 212, 219, 221; Patton on, 277, 352; Radio Intelligence Company, 283; Roer River and, 239; Ruhr area, 162; 7th Armored Division and, 178, 285; 79th Division and, 113; Signal Corps film, 189; 10th Armored and, 271, 285–86; Third Army gas heist, 94; Weyland on, 306 First Army (French), 144 First Army (German), 118 First Canadian Army, 14, 54 Fleet, James Van, 171, 215, 118 Fort Driant: 121, 140, 168, 172, 189, 193, 198, 232, 253; casualty reports from, 151; fall of, 255; 5th Division and, 148, 158, 165; Hap Gay, 164; media on, 167; October attack on, 159; Operation MADISON, 172; Patton visit to, 149–50; 7th Armored and, 121; XX Corps and, 135; withdrawal from, 167 Fort Koenigsmacker, 173, 206, 214–15, 352 Fort Worth Star-­Telegram, 239 Fremersdorf, 244–45 French First Army, Sixth Army Group, 144 French Resistance: Angers, 39; Charmes, 130; Roger Gallois, 83; Hemmingway and, 97; Metz, 216; Nancy and, 133; Patton, Calvados with, 34; Patton on, 123; Rennes, Third Army disarming of in, 36; Verdun and, 103 Fresnes, 202 Frickett, E. M., 20, 143, 243–44, 315, 335 G Gaffey, Hugh: Angers, 39; Bastogne, 321, 346, 347; Eddy, 151; Falaise pocket, 68; XV Corps, 68; 4th Armored Division, 223, 247; Harriman visit, 236; Leclerc and, 62; Longwy, 294–95; McAuliffe and, 335; Patton and, 17, 169, 180, 195, 334; photo with Patton and Helfers, 43 Fig. 8; XII Corps, 269. See also 4th Armored Gallois, Roger, 83 Gault, James, 236–37, 238 Fig. 33, 300 Gavin, James, 289, 292, 301, 349

455 Gay, Hap: Ardennes Offensive, 295; Battle of the Bulge, 295; Fénétrange, 235; Fort Driant, 164; and Kent Hunter, 290; Luce, 252; Metz, 167; Operation LÜTTICH, 41; Operation MADISON, 222; Operation TINK, 264; Patton’s son, 195; Pont-­à-­ Mousson, 117; Saint-­Avold, 282; Schaefer, 258; Walker, 242 George VI (king), 169, 225 German commanders, 220 German soldiers, captured letters of, 254 Gerow, Leonard T. “Gee,”: AUTUMN MIST, 288; Battle of the Bulge, 276, 289, 291; XV Corps, 68–69; V Corps, 125; Patton’s opinion of, 288 GI Bill of Rights, 117 Gilbreth, Joseph, 294 Giraud, Henri, 231 goose metaphor, 122, 260, 262 Gordon, Jean, 12, 181 Fig. 24; arrival in England, 31; Doughnut Dollies, 96; Patton’s birthday, 209; Reims, 290; 26th Division, Patton visit to, 180 Grant, Ulysses, S., 62, 112, 140, 248, Grémecey Forest, 148, 150–54, 160, 172, 281 Griffith, Welborn, Chartres and, 67 Grow, Robert W., photo of, 35 Fig. 7; Brest, Patton and, 34; directing traffic, 24; meeting with Patton, Baade, and Eddy, 153; Metz, 200, 205, 206; Operation MADISON, McBride and, 220; Reims, 97. See also 6th Armored Guingand, Freddy de, 56, 84, 144, 300, 362 H Haislip, Wade H.: Avranches, 22–23, 29; XV Corps, to Devers, 145, 147, 234–35; Le Mans, 33; Maginot Line, 269; Operation MADISON, 207, 226; Patton argument, 132; Patton on, 54; Patton, Jewish chaplain and, 72; photo with Patton, 30 Fig. 6; Third Army, separation from, 86; Thuderbolt anecdote, 60; Wood, call to Eddy about, 246. See also XV Corps Hamilton, Nigel, 88

456 Index Handy, Thomas, 250 Hanson, Chet, 133, 291, 311–12, 337 Harbold James, 357 Harkins, Paul, 17, 28, 168, 175, 221, 299–306, 315, 319–20, 331 Harmon, Ernie, Battle of the Bulge, 347 Harper, Battle of the Bulge, 294 Harriman, Averell, 236–39, 238 Fig. 33 Harris, Arthur “Bomber,” 251 Hasbrouck, Robert W., 211, 291 Hearst, William Randolph, Jr., 44–45 Helfers, Melvin, 41–43, 43 Fig. 8 Hemmingway, Ernest, 97–98 Henderson, Robert, Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War, 244–45 Henry (Secretary of War Stimson), 357 Heydte, Fredrich Freiherr von der, 276 Hitler, Adolf: bomb plot against, 20; Choltitz and, 78, 85; HERBSTNEBEL (AUTUMN MIST), 275, 285; Operation LÜTTICH, 21, 41–42, 46; on Manteuffel’s attack, 139; on Metz, 119; on Paris, 78, 85; rumors on, 219; Von Kluge and, 63; Von Rundstedt and, 117; WACHT AM RHINE (WATCH ON THE RHINE), 275 Hitler Escort Brigade, 241 Hitler’s Atlantic Wall, 83 Hobbs, Leland, 41, 291 Hodges, Courtney: army boundaries and, 37; Battle of the Bulge, 283, 300; on British army, 70; countries troops in, 101; enemy attack, blame for, 125; Félix of Luxembourg, 112; flu, 296; on gas stealing, 94; meeting at Bradley’s Chartres headquarters, 128–29; as Montgomery support, 90; Patton on, 69; photo with Patton and Bradley, 15 Fig. 2; replacements, 268; resignation offer, 87; Saar meeting with Patton, Bradley, and Brereton, 243; Stars and Stripes, 66; Time magazine, 66; U.S. First Army, 14; West Point and, 47, 194. See also First Army Horrocks, Brian, 323 Hosingen, 275, 289, 294 Houdemon (general), 121 Household Cavalry, 20, 44

Huebner, Clarence, 291 Hughes, Everett: background of, 16–17; combat fatigue and, 322; on Patton, 16–17, 47, 129, 206, 239; Patton’s diary and, xviii Hunter, Kent, 290 Hürtgen Forest, 157, 288 I Ingersoll, Ralph, 50, 305–6 Irwin, LeRoy: Dornot and, 127; Fort Driant, 150, 159, 165; Metz, 205, 215, 222, 228; pear orchard, 149; photo with Patton, 152 Fig. 19; tank-­borne infantry concept and, 33; III Corps, 225. See also 5th Infantry Division Irzyk, Albin, 261, 333 J Jeanne d’Arc, 119, 148, 198, 224, 232, 263 Jedburgh teams, 64 Jenkins, Ernest, 94, 95 Fig. 14, 299 Jodl, Alfred, 71, 277 Juin, 85, 106 K Kahn, Ali Salman Aga “Aly,” 258 Kaiserslautern, 253, 264 Kennedy, Dan, 185–86 Kenner, Albert, 268 Keyes, Geoffrey, 240 Kilburn, Charles S., 331, 345–55, 357–58, 361, 363 Kilpatrick, Helen, 22 Kipling, Rudyard, 102, 201 Kittel, Heinrich, 216, 225–27, 230 Kluge, Günther von, 21, 46, 63, 65, 71 Knobelsdorff, Otto von, 118 Koch, Oscar W.: Bastogne, 337; Battle of the Bulge, suspicions of, 279–83; British intelligence and, 42; Dunckern, 228; Operation LÜTTICH, Mortain, 41; Operation MADISON, 175; “scorecard,” 20; Karl Spang, 50–51, 51 Fig. 10; Third Army, first briefing, 18 Koechlin-­Schwartz, Jean-­Léonard, 80

Index Koenig, Marie-­Pierre, 77 Krinkelt-­Rocherath, 289 L Lagrew, Embry, 34 Lauer, Walter, 276, 289, 292 Leclerc, Philippe: Alençon, 55; Argentan, 53, 58–59; Chambois, 62, 78; decoration of, 139; Épinal, 130; XV Corps and, 48; gas and, 126; Nod-­sur-­Seine, 128; Paris, 74, 84, 89, 102; photo with Walker, 49 Fig. 9; Rhine River, crossing of, 235; Sées, 56; Third Army and, 89, 113 Lee, John C. H., 241; Patton, meeting with, 61 Lee, Robert E., 140, 146 Lentz, John, 87th Division, Battle of the Bulge, 297–98 Leonard, John W., 276, 283, 314–15 Liège, 283, 291, 301 Linden, Henning, 268–69 Lithuania, 6, 63 London Evening Standard, 107 London News Chronicle, Patton, 107 Lorient, 14, 27, 36, 38, 44, 58, 69, 103 Luce, Clare Boothe, 252–53 Lunéville, 131, 139, 231 Luxembourg, 275, 292, 324, 335 Luxembourg City: Battle of the Bulge and, 297; Christmas in, 338; 80th Division and, 292; Félix, return to, 160; 5th Division and, 297; German bombing of, 343; 6th Armored and, 297, 339 Lynch, Eugene, 299–300 M MacArthur, Douglas, 231 Macon, John: Avranches, 29; photo with Patton, 104 Fig. 17; Saint-­Malo, Patton visit to, 45. See also 83rd Infantry Division Maddox, Halley G., 167, 286, 293, 320 Maginot Line, 82–83; 80th Infantry and, 242; XV Corps and, 269; German retreat from, 220; Haislip at, 269; Metz and, 119; Nancy, soft spot at, 85; reconnaissance flights over, 114; 26th Division and, 255

457 Maizières-­lès-­Metz, 158, 186–88 Malmedy Massacre, 291 Malony, Harry J., 345 Manarch, Battle of the Bulge, 289 Manteuffel, Hasso von, 139, 141, 147, 155, 276–77 marching fire, 139, 171 Marshall, George C.: Calais, 87; Clarke and, 164; infantry minded, 35; Madame Jouette, 147; Nancy, 164; Operation MADISON, 188; Patton, Christmas letter to, 343–44; Patton, letter from, 251; Patton, public statements and, 66; Patton, visit to, 160–61; West Point and, 194; XII Corps division commanders, visit to with Patton, 165–66 Marshall, S.L.A., 247 Mayenne, 29, 31, 37–38, 46, 53, 81 McAuliffe, Anthony: Bastogne, command of, 308; Bastogne, evacuation of wounded from, 354; Bastogne, German surrender ultimatum, 328–29; Bastogne, major victory of, 342; Distinguished Service Cross, 359, 360 Fig. 47; Gaffey, message to, 335; Middleton, message to, 336, 342; “Nuts,” 328; 101st Airborne Division, 289; Patton, message to, 335, 348. See also 101st Airborne Division McBride, Horace: Battle of the Bulge, 295, 309; Bronze Star, 165; Eddy and Patton on, 159; General Houdemon and, 121; Grémecey, 161; Nancy, 148; Operation MADISON, 202–4, 220; Patton on, 81; photo with Patton and Eddy, 162 Fig. 21, 192 Fig. 27. See also 80th Infantry Division McGown, Gault, 106 McLain, Raymond: Patton and, 27, 46; promotion, Marshall on, 165; XIX Corps and, 171. See also 90th Infantry Division McManus, John, 144 McNair, Leslie, Millikin, 180 Mederis, John, 163 Meeks, George, 39, 132, 258 Metz: encirclement of, 151, 167; 5th Division, 120, 135; fortresses of, 119; German reinforcement of, 118; German warfare,

458 Index Metz (continued) kind of, 112; Maginot Line and, 119; Montgomery and, 137; 90th Division, 135; Patton’s plan to capture, 84, 87; “rock-­soup” story and, 115; 7th Armored, 120, 135; Supplies and, 146; Third Army, positioning before attack on, 100; third attack on, 172–75; XX Corps, 118, 157–58; Walker, initial attack on, 135; Walker, plan to capture, 120; Walker, second attack on, 157. See also Fort Driant and Operation MADISON Meuse-­Argonne Offensive, 122, 159, 169–70 Meuse River: AUTUMN MIST and, 275; Eisenhower on, 301; German aerial reconnaissance, request for, 283; Montgomery and, 101; Operation GRIEF, 276; Patton urinating in, 225; Patton’s river tactic and, 81; 28th Infantry Division, 129 Meyer, Constantin, 228–30 M4 Sherman tanks, 12, 18, 132, 190, 237, 256, 257, 314 Middleton, Troy: Avranches, 29; Bastogne, 291, 296, 312, 357–58; Brest, 22, 90; extra infantry division to, 61; 4th Armor, loss of, 58; Houffalize, 358; Mediterranean theater and, 4; Neufchâteau headquarters of, 308; Orleans, 63–64, 97, 103; Patton, meeting with at Arlon, 312–13, 353; Patton on, 24, 103, 288; photo of with Eisenhower, 287 Fig. 37; photo with Stroh, 23 Fig. 4; Saint-­ Malo, 38, 44, 61, 69, 103; Wood’s delay to Lorient, 36. See also 9th Armored Division Miley, William M., 345, 363 Miller, Robert C., 60–61 Millikin, John: Bastogne, 334, 336, 363; Battle of the Bulge, staff meeting, 295–96; Eisenhower, meeting with, 308–9; jump-­ off positions, 320, 322; meeting at Arlon, 312, 353; Operation TINK meeting, 28; Patton, orders from, 314; 6th Armor to, 348; III Corps, command of, 179–80. See also III Corps Mims, John, 22, 145–46, 306, 312, 317 Moivron, 136, 161, 163 Fig. 22 Mons, capture of, 101

Montgomery, Bernard Law: American soldiers looting, letter regarding, 55; Argentan, 48, 54, 56, 74; Battle of the Bulge, counterattack, 312; Battle of the Bulge, December 25, 342; Battle of the Bulge, defensive measures of, 356; Battle of the Bulge, First Army, 311; Battle of the Bulge, meetings and, 300; Battle of the Bulge, Ninth Army, 311; Battle of the Bulge, opinion of, compared to Patton, 324; Battle of the Bulge, own plan for, 323–24; Battle of the Bulge, post-­Bastogne plan of, 352–53; Battle of the Bulge, Union Jack flag, 324; Battle of the Bulge, view of, 324; boasting, 267; Brest plan, 31; British 2nd Army, 14; Brussels, liberation of, 101; Caen, 5, 39, 42; Calais, 84, 87–88; Chambois, 61; command of, 14; drive east, 101; Eisenhower and, 84–88, 105, 312, 361–62; Falaise gap, 59, 70; First Allied Airborne Army, 187; First Army and, 342, 361; First Canadian Army, 14; Gacé, 48; gas, 129–30; Germany, assault plan for, 88–89; Netherlands, 157; Ninth Army, 188, 266–67; on Normandy campaign, 67; Operation MADISON, 191; Operation MARKET GARDEN, 137, 140, 144–45, 157; on Patton and, 63, 67, 323, 333, 351; photo of with Collins, 256 Fig. 45; promotion, 105; Ruhr area, 162–63; 21st Army Group, 14; V-­1 rocket launch sites, 77, 84–85; Verdun meeting and, 307. See also Operation MARKET GARDEN Mont-­Saint-­Michel, 24, 24 Fig. 5 Morris, William H.H., Jr., 159, 179–80. See also 10th Armored Division Mortain, 21, 41–42, 46, 54, 56 Moselle River: Arnaville and, 126; Bailey Bridge over, 131; Cattenom and, 214; Charmes and, 130; difficulty of, 119; Dornot and, 126; east bank and, 129–30; Fort d’Illange and, 216; Fort Koenigsmacker, 173; Malling and, 173; Montgomery and, 352; Patton and, 7, 82, 111, 113, 131, 146, 149; Pont-­à-­Mousson and, 115–17, 130; railway bridge over, 184;

Index 3rd Cavalry Group and, 114; Thionville bridge and, 114, 125, 130, 196, 207, 212; Toul and, 115; treadway bridge over, 149; Uckange and, 173, 205; ULTRA intercepts and, 82; washed out bridges over, 205–7. See also Metz and Nancy Moses, Raymond, 306 Mousson Hill, 137 Moving World, This, Patton and, 66 M10 tank destroyers, 12, 23, 75, 91, 127, 249, 314, 315, 342 Muller, Walter, 17, 94, 299 Mustard gas, 131 N Nancy, 111–33, 135–55; American industrialist magnates at, 240 Fig. 34; Battle of Arracourt and, 155; capture of, 100, 118, 133; Eddy and, 125, 231; German assault, 150; German shelling of, 184–85, 185 Fig. 26; German warfare and, 112; Maginot Line and, 85; Manteuffel and, 141; Patton’s plan to capture, 84; 35th Division, 140; V-­1 “buzz bomb,” 186 Nantes, 39 Ninth Air Force, 112, 114, 251, 364 Ninth Army: Brest, 74, 142; German pincer, 291, 302; Metz, 151; Montgomery and, 188, 266–67, 311; 104th Infantry Division, 179; Ruhr area, 162; Simpson command of, 240; staff officers, Third Army and, 45 Nod-­sur-­Seine, 128 Nohfelden, Operation TINK and, 264 Nomény, 202 Nordling, Rolf, 85 Normandy, terrain of, 15 Nugent, Dick, 251 “Nuts,” 329 O Oberstein, Operation TINK and, 264 Oboe technique, 243 Odom, Charles, 230, 252, 354 O’Hare, Joseph, 294, 269, 299, 308, 313 Oliver, Lunsford, 28. See also 5th Armored Division

459 O’Neill, James H., 259–60, 337 Operation AUTUMN MIST, 275, 283–84 Operation COBRA, 18–19, 56, 263 Operation FORTITUDE, 16 Operation GRIEF, 276, 318 Operation HERBSTNEBEL (AUTUMN MIST), 275–76 Operation LÜTTICH, 21–25, 41–42 Operation MADISON, 172–75; Army Air Forces, 206; bombers and, 205; Bradley review of, 187–8; bridges, 207; day one (8th), 202–4; day two (9th), 205–6; day three (10th), 206–7; day four (11th), 207–10; day five (12th), 210–11; day six (13th), 211–12; day seven (14th), 212–16; day eight (15th), 216–18; day nine (16th), 218–19; day ten (17th), 219–21; day eleven (18th), 221–22; day twelve (19th), 222–24; day thirteen (20th), 224–26; day fourteen (21st), 226–27; day fifteen (22nd), 227–31; day sixteen (23rd), 231–32; Eddy and Wood problems, 223; elections and, 188; XV Corps, 207; French forces and, 225; German retreat from Maginot Line, 220; initial bombing, 197–98; Metz, 216, 222, 224–25, 224 Fig. 32; planning of, 188–91; rain and, 205; supply delay of, 177–78; Third Army, prisoners taken, 225 Operation MARKET GARDEN, 137, 140–41, 144, 267 Operation STÖSSER, 276, 318 Operation TINK, 251–52; delay of, 269–70, 293; end of, 295, 306, 331; Maddox on, 286; Montgomery and, 266–67; Patton on, 253, 279, 281, 288; Patton Patch meeting on, 257; review of plans for, 263–64; Schaefer intelligence briefing, 257 Operation TORCH, 188, 204, 231 Oradour, 77 Orleans, 39, 45, 61, 63–64, 73, 97, 370 OSS commandos, 64 P Pannes, 115, 169 Papen, Franz von, 266

460 Index Paris: air commanders meeting, 251; Choltitz, 85; Gallois visit to Patton and, 83; Leclerc and, 48, 62, 74, 102; liberation of, 89; marketeers and, 92; Nordling, 85; Patton and, 77, 88, 126, 166, 189; resistance fighters and, 77–78; situation in, 77–78; supply lines and, 90 Parry, Florence Fisher, 107 Patch, Alexander “Sandy”: meeting with Patton, 257; Operation MADISON, 219; Patton, boundaries and railway lines and, 175, 236; photo with Patton, 249 Fig. 35; Provence, 62. See also Seventh Army Patton, Beatrice: Jean Gordon, 31, 96–97, 227; Maurice Hotel, 126; Patton’s diary and, xvii–xviii, 277–79; Pontorson, 24 Patton, George, IV, 194–95 Patton, George S.: active defense, 114; African American soldiers, suspending sentence of, 207; age, effects of and, 71–72; aides, putting in awkward positions, 30; airborne capabilities, doubts on, 239; air power and, 60; American industrialist magnates, meeting with, 240, 240 Fig. 34; American newspaper correspondents and, 54–55; ammunition, British delivery of, 75; anti-­semitism and, 72, 118; antitank gun and stone crucifix, 54; Ardennes Offensive, 295; Argentan, halt order and, 64; Argentan, meeting with Bradley on, 47; armored warfare, German conception of, 277; Aubaud Bridge, 27; Avranches, 28–30, 53; Ayer, Operation MADISON, 175–76; Baade, cane of, 193, 194 Fig. 28; Robert Bacon, 235; on Barton, 344; Bastogne, attack on, planning for, 304–5; on battle fatigue, 170; battlefield commander experience of, 12; battlefield appearance of, 21–22; Battle for Gravelotte, 183–84; Bealke, 166; “Big Bertha,” 117; birthday, 208–9; bomber crew, 128; bomber’s engine, 180; on bombing and safety, 191; boots, 177; Bradley, XV Corps and, 234; Bradley, on Meuse River, 98; Bradley, Siegfried Line plan and, 102; Bradley, supply situation

of, 249; Brereton on, 243; Brest, 33–35, 44; Bronze Star, 233; B-­26 bomber base, 131; Captain Butcher, 298; Byrnes, 169; Caesar, roads of, 73; Carlisle article, 166; Château de Fougères, 58, 59 Fig. 11; Christmas presents, 258; cigars, 112; Bruce Clarke, 178; Clarke, request for promotion of, 164–65; Cochran, 253; Colt “Peacemaker,” 11–12; COMZ, Paris, 153; COMZ, praise of, 74; COMZ, supply trucks and, 61; credo of, 146; Bing Crosby, wool cap and, 122; daughters, 195; “A Day with General Patton,” 95; Devers, 142, 150, 250; Marlene Dietrich, 187; Distinguished Service Cross presentations, 237, 238; doctor’s sleeve, 54; Doolittle, 160, 176–77; drink “170,” 151; drying rooms, 177; Eddy, dressing down of, 153; Eddy, letter to, 255; Eddy, Saar planning and, 242; Eddy, and Wood problems, 223; effect on enemy, 37; VIII Corps, 295; 8th Tank Battalion visit, 261; 80th Infantry Division, speech to, 262; 83rd Infantry Division, 209–10; Eisenhower, Bradley and, November 26 meeting with, 236; Eisenhower, Brittany strategy and, 30, 36; Eisenhower, opinions of, 113, 202, 206; elections, 188; failures, personal and professional of, 12; Falaise, halt order and, 60; Falaise gap, closing of, 67–70; fall, 253; fancy dress and, 21; FDR, 161; “Fear of Etc.,” 103; Félix of Luxembourg, 112, 160; field army, description of, 12–13; 5th Division visit in Metz, 235; flanks, on protecting, 79–80; forks, 197; Fort Drian, 164, 149, 157, 161; Fort Driant, revenge bombing of, 192–93, 189; Fort Driant, withdrawal from, 166–68; Fort Worth Star-­Telegram, 239; French woman, letter from, on soldier-­son, 345; front, visit to with Cochran, 254; frontline inspection, Codman, 145; frontline inspection, Stiller, 148–49; fuel, 86; Gaffey, 4th Armored, 247; Grant (general), 140; General Houdemon, 121; George IV (son), 194–95, 204–5; German counteroffensive, prediction

Index of, diary entry and, 277–79; German officers, interrogation of, 228–30; on Germans, 176, 262–63; on Gestapo, 192; Jean Gordon, 12, 31; Grant (general), 140, 248; Grémecey Forest, 153; Haislip argument, 54, 132; Handy letter to, 250; Harriman and Gault, visit to 4th Armored with, 237–38; Harriman and Gault, visit to 26th Division with, 237; Harriman and Gault, visit to Wood with, 236–37, 238 Fig. 33; headquarters, bombing of, 31, 345; headquarters, “Lucky,” 16; headquarters, mobile, outside of Beauchamps, 16; headquarters, P-­47 fighter plane, 60; helmets, of officers and, 48; Hemmingway and, 97–98; on Hodges, trench foot and, 223; hospital visits, 64, 155, 254; Hughes, 17, 322; illnesses and injuries of, 4; jackhammer, 131; Jodl on, 71; Keyes, 240; Kipling, 102, 201; Leclerc, 48, 62, 89; Lee (general), 140; Lee, supplies and, 186; Le Mans, 46; on Lorraine region, 263; Luce, 252–53; machine gun placement, 149; on Macon at Saint-­Malo, 38; Macon command, German prisoners at, 103; Madame Jouette, 147; major general, permanent promotion of, 62; Mantes, 73; map room, 99–100; marching fire, 171, 139; Marshall, 160–61, 165–66, 251; McBride and Grow, 220; McLain’s division, disgust of, 27–28; medals for staff request, 233; media and, 65–67, 144, 239; mess hall line, 261; Metz, 172–75; Metz, press conference on capture of, 234; Meuse River pontoon bridge, 129; on Middleton, 103; Millikin and, 179, 270; mine clearing team, 142–43; mistake, admission of to division commanders, 28; Moivron, 163 Fig. 22; on Montgomery, 233, 267, 355; Mont-­Saint-­Michel, 24, 24 Fig. 5; Moore, silver star to, 165; on morale, 255; Moselle River, 82, 113, 130; “Mother” song with revised lyrics, 107–8; Nancy, 146–47; Nancy, German shelling of, 184–85, 185 Fig. 26; Nancy, headquarters in,

461 168; Nancy, with Marshall, 164; Nantes, 39–40; Napoleon, 145; 95th Division, visit to, 171, 177; Normandy campaign and, 71; Normandy road, communications wire, conversation with sergeant, 11, 22; Oak Leaf Cluster, 233–34, 356–57; off-­course flight, 90; O’Neill, 259–60; Operation AUTUMN MIST, draining strength of, 285; Operation LÜTTICH, 21–25; Operation LÜTTICH, Mortain, 41–42; Operation MARKET GARDEN, 141; ordnance workshops, American equipment at, 181–82; Paris, bet on, 166; Paris, liberation of, 89; Paris, Liberation of Paris film, 189; Paris, taking of, 77; Paris, visit to, 126; Patch, meeting with, 249, 249 Fig. 35; “Patton for President” clubs, 239; pear orchard, 149; physical description of, 11; pillbox, 245; pincer movements, 89; Pirrung, 266; pistols and, 40, 71–72, 120, 254, 355; Plank and, 111; plums, 132; POW camp, 44; prayer, 260; prejudices of, 72; press conference, off-­record, 122–25; press conference, tin horn, 146; press conference with Weyland, second, 270; racism of, 92–93, 118, 190; “rectifying the line,” 147; Red Ball Express, 92; Reed, 100; replacements, 241–42, 248, 250, 260–61, 268; reputation, rise of, 106–8; Rhine River, French 2nd Armored crossing of, 235; Robert Richards on, 166–67; Edith Nourse Rogers, 158; river crossings, 130; river tactic, 81; “rock-­soup” story, 115; Russian officer visit, 135; Saar River, 234, 242–45; Saarlautern, 241; Saint-­Avold, 261; Saint-­Lô and, 15, 37; Saint-­Malo, 38, 44; Schlieffen Plan, reverse of, 80–81; Schramm, 98; “scorecard,” 20; Seine River, crossing of, 76–77; Seine River, panzer battle at, 100; Seine River, towns along, 74; Seine River, urinating in, 73; short coat phrase, 176, 239; Sicilian campaign, 72; Siegfried Line, 113, 251–52; Silvester and, 13 Fig. 1, 120; Simpson and, 46, 47; Smith and Wesson .357 Magnum, 12; son-­of-­a-­ bitch speech, 217; sons-­in-­law, 195, 244;

462 Index Patton, George S. (continued) Spaatz friendship, 206; spaghetti metaphor, 54; Karl Spang, 50–51; staff meeting, messengers and, 33; Stalin on, 238–39; Stars and Stripes, 65–66; Stiller and, 30; sunlamp, 263; supplies, 93–94, 101, 104, 111, 118, 129–31; tanks, battle observation, 132; tanks, near Gros-­Réderching, 261; tanks, German, 146; tanks, German American comparisons, 256–57; tanks, infantry riding on, 33; tanks, upgrades to, 182, 183 Fig. 25; temper and, 30; theater people and, 122; Thionville, 125; This Morning World, 66; thousand-­dollar bill and, 239; Time magazine reporter Walton and, 357; transportation officer, collapse of, 45; trench foot cases, 210, 227; troops’ morale, 180–81; Truscott visit, 240; on Twaddle, 171, 196, 213; 26th Division, visit to, 170, 177, 180; 23rd Headquarters Special Troops, 127; Walker, headquarters of, sleeping soldier at, 136; Walker, 95th Division visit and, 171; war, love of, 40; war-­free future, 80; war in Europe, maneuver and, 15–16; watches, 258; weather prayer, 259–60; West Point and, 47; Weyland, relationship with, 40–41; Willie, 133; Wood, delay in Lorient, 36–37; Wood, relief of, 246–47, 250; World War I locations, revisit to, 115, 147–48, 169; Worms, paratrooper drop plan, 239; wounded tanker and, 53–54. See also Patton, George S., Battle of the Bulge; Patton, George S., Beatrice, letters to; Patton, George S., Operation MADISON; Patton, George S., Operation TINK; Patton, George S., photo; and Patton, George S., Third Army Patton, George S., Battle of the Bulge: air raid sirens, Christmas Eve and, 338; artillery count, 331; attacks, code names for, 297; Bastogne, on Black artillerymen, 361; Bastogne, Bradley and, 324; Bastogne, chaplain at, 361; Bastogne, corridor to, 358; Bastogne, prayers on,

334; Bastogne, relief of, thoughts on, 348; Bastogne, visit to, 359–60, 360 Fig. 47; Christmas dinner, 342; Christmas Mass, 338; counteroffensive claim, 306–7; day and night attacks, error with, 336; December 16, 285–86; December 17, 286–90; December 18, 290–93; December 19, 295–310; December 20, 311–19; December 21, 319–25; December 22, 327– 333; December 23, 333–35; December 24, 335–38; December 25, 338–44; December 26, 344–49; December 27, 351–55; December 28, 355–56; December 29, 356–58; December 30, 358–63; December 31, 363–65; Donut Dollies party, 364; Ensdorf, 317; first reactions to, 285–87; 4th Armored, December 25 and, 340; freight train, 297; frozen feet, 340; on biggest German counterattack, 359; headquarters lore, 281; logistics and, 315; Longwy, 312; Luxembourg City, 317; Marshall, Christmas letter to, 343–44; Middleton, meeting with at Arlon, 312; Millikin, orders to, 314; Montgomery, December 22 message to, 332–33; on Montgomery, 351; Montgomery’s post-­Bastogne plan, 352–53; opinion of, compared to Montgomery, 324; passwords and, 318; Patton nonchalance at shelling of command post, 329; Pescatore, 353, 354 Fig. 44, 364; poisonous gas worry, 320; post-­Bastogne plans, 353; staff meeting, 295–96; strafing of, 340; supplies and, 297; suspicions of, 279–85; 702nd Tank Battalion, 339–40; 10th Armored to First Army, 285–86; Trier, 336; Verdun, Bradley meeting at, 299–307 Patton, George S., Beatrice, letters to, 31, 37, 47, 59, 60, 69, 82, 94, 102, 103, 125, 132, 136, 150, 173, 179, 180, 185, 189, 195, 199, 210, 221, 222, 223, 226, 227, 239, 241, 245, 252–53, 258, 263, 267, 270, 281, 310, 317, 318, 319, 331, 333, 339, 344, 345, 348, 357, 363 Patton, George S., Operation MADISON, 172–75; Baily Bridge, 214; blankets, 216;

Index Bradley, complaints about, 231; Bradley, Metz, 224; call to Bradley and bout First Army, 212; car crash, 214; congratulations on, 231; day fourteen, hospital visit, 226; day seven visits, 212–14; day twelve, Metz, 222; day twelve, Patton visits, 222; Eisenhower, Metz, 224; evacuation hospital visit, 218 Fig. 31; Infantry Attacks and, 201; Kerling, 215; lunch with Eisenhower and George VI, 225; Malling bridge, 211; McBride’s attack, 202; medical clearing station visit, 208; Metz, 224; nerves before, 199; picture of German assault gun, 215 Fig. 30; planning of, 188–91; pre-­invasion speeches, 195–97; rain before, 199–200; review of, 187–88; speeches before, 193; Thanksgiving Day ceremony, 231–32; trench foot, 216–17, 227; unofficial press conference before, 198–99; visit to 5th Infantry Division, 205; visit to 35th Division, 204; visit to 26th Division, 204 Patton, George S., Operation TINK: end of, 295; XV Corps request, 267; outline for, 253; Patch, meeting with, 257; Siefgried Line envelopment instructions, 258; soldier review with Eddy, 261; Weyland, review with, 263; Weyland’s call, 251–52 Patton, George S., photo: with Bradley, 358 Fig. 46; with Bradley, Eddy’s headquarters, 213 Fig. 29; with Bradley and Hodges, 15 Fig. 2; with Bradley and Weyland, 99 Fig. 16; with Eddy and Doughnut Dollies, 181 Fig. 24; with Eddy and McBride at 80th Infantry Division, 192 Fig. 27; with Eddy and McBride, Nancy, 162 Fig. 21; with Gaffey and Helfers, 43 Fig. 8; with Gay at Clermont-­en-­Argonne, 170; with Haislip, 30 Fig. 6; with labor leaders, 86 Fig. 13; with Macon, 104 Fig. 17; with Patch, 249 Fig. 35; of Seine River, 96 Fig. 15; with staff, 152 Fig. 19; with Weyland, 19 Fig. 13 Patton, George S., Third Army: activation of, 16–17; commander, first briefing, 18; defensive stance of, 147; description of, 13; rest facilities of, 259; success of, 105–6;

463 support, press conference on, 255–56; ULTRA briefing, 20 Patton, Nita, 208, 357 “Patton’s Air Force,” 19 Fig. 13 “Patton’s Household Cavalry,” 20 Paul, Willard S., Patton visit with, 161, 312, 340–41, 341 Fig. 41. See also 26th Infantry Division Petersen, Erich, 271 Pfann, George, 63, 194 P-­47: 35th and, 204; Argentan and, 59; Arnaville and, 126; captured planes, rumor of, 364; Fort Driant and, 157; Moivron and, 161, 163 Fig. 22; Moselle River and, 205; Patton’s headquarters and 60; Saarlautern and, 260 Pirrung, Gilbert, 266 Pittsburgh Press, 107 Plank, Ewart, xviii, 111–12 Polk, James, 143, 183, 196, 242, 281. See also 3rd Cavalry Group Pont-­à-­Mousson, 115–17, 121, 130, 148, 296 Provence, U.S. Seventh Army landing in, 62 proximity fuse artillery shell, 269, 298, 341 Q Quesada, Elwood “Pete,” air cover and, 18–19, 251 R Rankin, John E., 62 Red Ball Express, 91–92, 177 Red Cross Doughnut Dollies, Jean Gordon and, 180 Reed, Charles, 100 Reims, 95, 97, 103 Remy, POW camp at, 155 Rennes, 4th Armored Division, 14, 20, 22, 24, 30, 31, 36 Rhine River: Bradley’s plan for, 88, 141; Eisenhower and, 191; Leclerc and, 235; Montgomery and, 101, 130, 187, 191, 267, 324; Operation TINK and, 264; Patton and, 141; Siegfried Line and, 83; Tassigny and, 226; WACHT AM RHINE, 275 Richards, Robert, 166–67

464 Index Ridgway, Matthew B., 159, 179–80, 239 Robb, James, 300, 323 Roberts, William, Battle of the Bulge, Bastogne, 294 Roffe, Adolphus Worrell, 149 Rogers, Edith Nourse, 158, 227 Rommel, Erwin, 37, 106, 172, 201, 306 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 117–18, 144, 161, 169, 188, 236, 306 Rose, Battle of the Bulge, 294 Rosenberg, Anna, 117 Rosevich, Joseph, 338 Rundstedt, Gerd von: Bradley on, 290–92; VIII Corps and, 277; Meyer on, 229; Patton and, 285; Rhine, Allied airborne operations east of, 211; Western Theater, command of, 117, 284 S Saarbrücken, 230 Saarlautern: bridge at, 253–54, 266 Fig. 36; capture of, 248–49; Roy Carlson and, 3; 90th Infantry Division and, 253, 260; 95th Division and, 230, 241, 244, 248, 260; Patton’s Saar campaign plan and, 230; XX Corps and, 241, 271; retreat to, 317 Saar River: Bradley on, 88; bridges, German blowing up of, 243; bridges over, electrical plant, 244; Eddy and, 212; Eisenhower and, 117, 130; Faulquemont, 212; 5th Infantry, 317; 4th Armored and, 232, 235, 242; Maginot Line, German retreat from and, 220; Metz, third attack on, 172; Montgomery on, 130, 342, 352; 90th Division, 244, 245, 253, 260, 264, 266 Fig. 36; 95th Division, 241, 243, 244, 245, 248; Patton and, 234, 237; 6th Armored and, 242; Patton’s route through Metz and, 87; 10th Armored Division and, 221, 243; Third Army, 7, 173, 188, 191, 230, 251–52, 254, 271; 35th Division and, 242; 26th Division, 239, 242; Wood and, 140, 172, 23; XII Corps sector and, 242; XX Corps and, 355 Saint-­Avold, 239, 262, 281–82, 288 Saint-­Hubert, 216 Saint-­Lô, 14–15, 37

Saint-­Malo, 22, 30, 38, 44, 58, 61, 69, 103–4 Saint-­Mihiel, 115, 159, 169 Saint-­Nazaire, 69, 103 Saint Vith, 291–92, 302, 351, 353, 357 Sauer River: Barton and, 291; Battle of the Bulge, 289; enemy companies swimming under fire, 344; 5th Division, 336, 344; 4th Division and, 289, 291, 336; German assault over, 289; 10th Armored Division, 336; XII Corps attack at, 335 Schaefer, Hans-­Georg, 257–58 Scheldt Estuary, 101, 144, 157, 191 Schlieffen Plan, 75, 79, 80 Schramm, Hans-­Georg, 98–99 Sears, Robert, 178 Sées, 48, 56, 67, 92, 157 Seille River: 80th Division, 154, 164, 172, 202; 4th Armored Division, 207; Metz, third attack on, 172; Patton and, 161, 198; rain and, 208; 7th Armored Division, 142; 6th Armored Division, 207; 35th Division, 172; 26th Division, 175 Seine River: XV Corps and, 73, 81; 5th Armored Division, 74; Montgomery and, 75; panzer battle at, 100; Patton, Bradley’s orders to on, 74, 80; Patton, crossing of, 96 Fig. 15; Patton urinating in, 73; 79th Infantry Division, 74; XX Corps and, 81, 88, 90 Serrigny, Bernard, 126 Servicemen’s Readjustment Act, 117 Seventh Army: Battle of the Bulge, 297, 315; Dijon and, 128; France, landing in, 62; Nod-­sur-­Seine and, 127–28; Operation MADISON, 212, 226; Operation TINK, bombers, 263; Patton on, 218; Rhine River, 226; Saarbrücken, 271; Saulieu and, 127; supply situation of, 249; Third Army boundary and, 235-­36 Seventh Army (German), Battle of the Bulge, 276 SHAEF, 14; Bradley and Pink Bull, 132; command crisis at, 361–62; Montgomery and, 137, 267; Operation FORTITUDE and, 16; Third Army, brothels and, 173 Sherman, William T., 239

Index Shore, Dinah, 122 short-­snorter bill, 128 Sibret, Edwin, 284, 340, 346, 356 Siegfried Line, 82–83; Bradley on, 118; Eisenhower and, 117; German racing to, 90; Koch’s G-­2 Periodic Reports on, 280; 95th Division and, 241; Operation TINK and, 252, 264; Patton and, 102, 113, 122, 123, 135, 139, 222, 250, 251, 260; reconnaissance flights over, 114; Schaefer and, 257; 10th Armored Division, 226; Third Army, casualties and, 285; XII Corps and, 136; XX Corps and, 118; Weyland on, 223, 252 Signal Corps, 95, 124, 153, 189 Silvester, Lindsay, 13 Fig. 1, 120 Fig. 18; firing of, 210–11; Patton on his division, 95; Patton’s wrath and, 120; Walker on, 67. See also 7th Armored Division Simpson, Bill: meeting at Verdun, 162; Ninth Army, command of, 45, 240; Patton and, 46, 47. See also Ninth Army Sixth Army Group, 142, 144, 157, 234, 335 Sixth SS Panzer Army, Battle of the Bulge, 276 Skorzeny, Otto, 276, 328 Smith, Beetle: Bradley plan, 357; Devers and, 142; Eisenhower, meeting with, 285; Eisenhower, problem with Montgomery, 362; Kent Hunter issue, 290; SHAEF, “mousetrap” and, 309; supplies, 163; Verdun, Bradley meeting at, 300, 306 Solomon, Maddrey, 337 Soviet Union, Estonia, xii, 62–63, 229, 236, 238, 275 Spa, Battle of the Bulge, December 18, 292 Spaatz, Carl “Tooey”: Bradley, Eisenhower, and Weyland, meeting with, 251; Eisenhower Bulge meeting, 285; 4th Armored, living conditions of, 182; Operation TINK, outline for, 253; Patton, meeting with, 48–50, 206; Patton, tank upgrades and, 182; on Patton Weyland cooperation, 176; P-­47s, 364; rail, bombing of, 284 Spang, Karl, 44, 50–51, 51 Fig. 10, 75

465 Spellman, Francis, 118 SS commandos, 276, 328 SS troops, tattoo and, 230 Stalin, Joseph, 238–39, 275 Stars and Stripes, 65–66, 211 Stauffenberg, Klaus von, Hitler, assassination attempt on, 20 Stiller, Alexander: 80th Infantry attack viewing, 202; Fremersdorf, 245; frontline inspection, 148–49; interrogation by, 30; on Montgomery, 75; pears, 149; Willie and, 133 Stillman, Richard, 299 Stimson, Henry, 263, 357 Stroh, Donald A., photo with Middleton, 23 Fig. 4. See also 8th Infantry Division Strong, Kenneth, 283–85, 300–4, 302 Fig. 39, 325 StuG III, 333 Sullivan, John B., 247 Sullivan, Richard, 244 Summerall, Charles, 357 Supreme Allied Expeditionary Forces. See SHAEF, 14 Surles, Alexander, 250 T tanks: German, 146; German American comparisons, 256–57; M4 Sherman tanks, 12, 257; tank-­borne infantry concept and, 33; upgrades to, 182, 183 Fig. 25 Task Force A, 23 Task Force Bacon, 213 Task Force Fricket, 315, 335 Task Force Harper, 294 Task Force Rose, 294 Task Force Warnock, 167 Tassigny, Jean de Lattre de, 127, 144, 226 Taylor, Maxwell, 289, 321, 355. See also 101st Airborne Team Cherry, 294, 299, 308 Team Desobry, 294, 299, 308 Team O’Hare, 294, 299, 308 Tedder, Arthur, 50, 285, 300, 305, 323 Thionville: Bailey Bridge across, 214; capture of, 130; 5th Division, 297; Maginot Line

466 Index Thionville (continued) and, 119; 90th Infantry Division, 120–21, 125, 130, 196; 95th Infantry Division, 212; Patton visit to, 183, 214, 234, 266; 7th Armored Division and, 120; 10th Armored Division, 207, 212; 3rd Cavalry Group and, 114 Third Army: activation of, 16–17; air power, appreciation of, 41, 256; ASTP, 164; August front, extent of, 98; Battle of the Bulge, assembly areas, 311; Battle of the Bulge, Bastogne, 319; Battle of the Bulge, make-­up of, December 20, 318; Battle of the Bulge, New Year’s Eve midnight barrage, 364; Battle of the Bulge, Patton on biggest German counterattack on, 359; Battle of the Bulge, reckoning before, 271; Battle of the Bulge, replacements, 339; Battle of the Bulge, turning north, 325; brothels, 173; casualties of, 250; combat exhaustion protocols, 322; contiguous front and, 127–28; Duck’s Feet, 182; VIII Corps, 296; Elster and, 127, 142; XV Corps and, 86, 90, 147; first African American combat unit and, 189–90; first week of campaigning, 38; French reception of, 64, 81; Hodges, 126; largest army in American history, 345; Luftwaffe and, 86; Luxembourg City, 311; make up, description of, 13; marching fire, 139; Metz and, 119, 224, 242; miles covered, after one week, 38; Montgomery’s post-­Bastogne plan for, 352–53; morale, 220–21; Moselle, 129–30; XIX TAC and, 255–56, 270; Operation MADISON, prisoners taken, 225; Paris, liberation of, 89; Petersen on, 271; prayer cards, 260; Rennes, French resistance units, 36; rest facilities of, 259; Rhine, 136; Russians and, 135; 761st Tank Battalion, 189–90; SIWs and, 64; speed limits and, 93; supplies and, 94, 101, 104, 118, 129, 151, 186, 297; Thanksgiving meal, 232; time-­delayed bombs and, 281 Thompson, John B., 126 time-­delayed bombs, xviii, 281–82 Time magazine, Hodges and, 66

Totten, Jim, 195 Totten, Ruth Ellen, 195 Toul, 115, 207, 216, 339 Transocean, Patton and, 54 trench foot: Culin, 315; Eddy and, 269, 298; 80th Division, 149; 87th Division, 315; Patton, ambulance and, 216–17; Patton, Millikin’s staff and, 179; “spiritus fermenti,” 227; tallow and oil (dubbined), 210; tetanus serum, 219; Third Army, in October, 157; Twelfth Army Group, 223 Troyes: Bradley on, 82; Combat Command A, 101; Eddy and, 90; 4th Armored, 90, 96; Reed and, 100; 35th Division, 100; Wood and, 96 Truscott, Lucian, 194, 236, 240 Twaddle, Harry L.: Metz and, 228; 95th Infantry Division, command of, 163; Patton and Walker meeting, 212–13; Patton on, 171–72, 196, 213; Patton’s language and, 171; Task Force Bacon, 213. See also 95th Infantry Division Twelfth Army Group, 223, 317, 342 U Uckange, 173, 188, 205–6 ULTRA, 20, 22, 25, 33, 37, 39, 41–44, 53, 55–56, 73, 75, 81, 82, 127, 189, 211, 276, 281, 293 V Vandenberg, Hoyt: Étain headquarters, dinner at, 160; Félix of Luxembourg, 112; Operation TINK, 253, 263, 264; P-­47s and, 364 Verdun, 103, 299–309 Vitry, 98, 114 V-­1, 77, 84, 87, 88, 186 Vosges Mountains, 157, 231 V-­2 rocket, 77, 126 W WACHT AM RHINE (WATCH ON THE RHINE), commencement of, 275 Waffen-­SS, 230, 328 Walker, Walton, 49 Fig. 9, 152 Fig. 19; Battle of the Bulge, December 18, 293; Battle

Index of the Bulge, German offensive, 286; Battle of the Bulge, suspicions of, 280; Battle of the Bulge, XX Corps, defensive position of, 309; Chartres and, 67, 68 Fig. 12; Distinguished Service Cross, 98; Eddy and, boundaries, 190, 195; “fair-­haired boys,” 242; Fort Driant, 150, 165; headquarters, shelling of, 184; Irwin and, 150, 221–22; Metz, 135–36, 141, 150, 157, 228, 255; Moselle and, 121, 126, 207; 90th Division, Saarlautern, visit to, 264–65; Operation AUTUMN MIST, 283; Operation LÜTTICH, Mortain, 41–42; Operation MADISON, 173, 189, 207, 221, 231; Operation TINK, 262, 263; Patton slapping stomach of, 171; Pescatore and, 361; Saar, Gay visit about, 242; Saarburg and, 335; Saarlautern, air support for, 241, 244. See also XX Corps Wallerfangen, 266 Walton, Bill, 357 War Manpower Commission, 117 Warnock, A.D., 159–60, 167 Warsaw, 6, 77–78, 83 Washington Post, on Patton, Bastogne’s relief and, 349 Waters, John K., 195 Waters, Laughlin E., 69 Waters, Little Bee, 195 Weaver, Bill, Mayenne, 37, 46 Webster (lieutenant), Battle of the Bulge, Bastogne, 347 Weigley, Russell, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants, 308 Wellard, James, 65 Western Defense Command, 212–13 Westphal, Siegfried, 117 Weyland, Otto P. “Opie,” 14, 19 Fig. 13, 99 Fig. 16; air-­ground cooperation and, 18–19, 22, 41, 64, 176, 198, 255–57, 270; Argentan, 48; Battle of the Bulge, Patton’s counteroffensive, 306; Bomber Command and, 189; Bradley and, 47; Dieuze, dam at, 175; Erich Elster and, 127; Étain dinner, 160; Fort Driant,

467 Patton’s revenge bombing and, 193, 223; heavy bombers and, safety range of, 191; Operation LÜTTICH, 22; Operation MADISON planning, 190–91; Siegfried Line, “liberated,” 223; Operation TINK, planning of, 251–53, 263, 295, 306; Patton and, 41, 255–57, 270; press conferences, 255–57, 270; Saar, 243; Sens, 79; Siegfried Line, as “liberated,” 223; tactics of, 40–41; Third Army, first briefing, 18–19. See also XIX Tactical Air Command Willie, 99 Fig. 16; as stress reliever, 31; Battle of the Bulge, bombers and, 322; Carvey, visit to, 332; hornets and, 82; in Nancy, 168; Patton on, 133; Patton’s trailer and, 16; Red Ball Express driver on, 93; Anna Rosenberg, 118; Saar meeting, Bradley and, 243; Telek and, 217; ULTRA map, urinating on, 43; worms, 258 Wilson, Robert, 163 Wilson, Vennard, 48 Winterbotham, Frederick, 90–91 Women snipers, 244 Wood, John “P,” 213 Fig. 29; Aubaud Bridge, 27; Commercy, Patton and, 102–3; Eddy, problems with, 80–81, 178, 223, 246–47; on Eisenhower, 247–48; headquarters of, 125; infantry minded commanders and, 35; Leclerc and, 63; Lorient, 36–38; Marshall on, 247; mental health of, 246–47; mustard gas, 131; Nancy, 131; Operation LÜTTICH, 22; Patton, letter to, 247; Patton’s order and, 140–41; Patton visit with Harriman and Gault, 236–38; relief of, 247, 250; Rennes, 31, 35; Sarre-­ Union, 246; tanks, as offense, 102. See also 4th Armored Division wool cap, 122 Worms, 136, 141, 239 Wyche, Ira, 29. See also 79th Infantry Division Z Zgorzelski, Wladyslaw, Falaise gap and, 69 Zweibrücken, Operation TINK and, 264