Paths to Conflagration: Fifty Years of Diplomacy and Warfare in Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam 9781501732546

Citation preview

Paths to Conflagration

Mayoury Ngaosyvathn and Pheuiphanh Ngaosyvathn

Paths to Conflagration FIFTY YEARS OF DIPLOMACY AND wARFARE IN LAOS, THAILAND, AND VIETNAM,

1778-1828

SouTHEAST AsiA PROGRAM PuBLICATIONS

Southeast Asia Program Cornell University Ithaca, New York 1998

~----------------NH~I----------------~

Editorial Board Benedict Anderson George Kahin Stanley O'Connor Keith Taylor Oliver Wolters Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications 640 Stewart Avenue, Ithaca, NY 14850-3857 Studies on Southeast Asia No. 24

© 1998 Cornell Southeast Asia Program. Reprinted 2004. All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, no part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the Cornell Southeast Asia Program. Printed in the United States of America ISBN 0-87727-723-0

Cover art: "Ruined towers and pagodas in the forest (Vientiane)," picture by M.L. Delaporte, from "Voyage d'Exploration en Indo-Chine," by Francis Garnier, Le Tour du Monde XXII, 1870-71.

Maps © David K. Wyatt. The Cornell Southeast Asia Program thanks Professor Wyatt for permission to print these maps.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Forevvord Acknovvledgments Prologue Introduction Map of LanNa, Lan Sang, Siam, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Burma I. The Fabric of History 1. Lao and Thai Contemporaries of the Drama Speak Out 2. Narratives of Western Diplomats and Missionaries 3. Vietnam's Links to Chao Anou and Thai Perceptions of that Association 4. Mistaken Interpretations of Relations betvveen Laos and France

9 11 13 14 16 17 17 23

II. The Hegemonic Crisis of the "City of Angels" 5. The Conqueror Taksin 6. The End of the Fraternal Pact in 1778-1779 7. Bangkok's Policy of Divisiveness Leads to Dangerous Tension: Khorat Proves Irredentist 8. Slave Raids in Lao Areas 9. The Capture of Lao International Trade 10. The Loss of the Emerald Buddha and the Wat Ho Phra Kreo Building Policy 11. The Final Solution of 1827-1828

33 33 37

III. The Realignment of the Lao as Their Povver Disintegrates 12. Forefathers' Gallery 13. In the Machine Room of a Grand Design 14. The Symbolism of Wat Sisaket's Candle-Bearer 15. Accumulation of Capital in the Land of Courting Poetry

63 63 68 80 84

IV. The Alliance and the Nature of Things 16. Balancing Regional Povvers: Nanthasen Looks to Vietnam 17. Bangkok-Hue Relations Challenged at Burma's Bidding 18. Limited Cooperation betvveen Vietnam and Laos Under Bangkok's Eye 19. Chao Anou's Diplomatic Fiasco in Vietnam

91 91 96 100 105

V. The World Superpovver: Britain's Indochina Strategy 20. Siam and Great Britain Collide

109 109

26 30

42 45 50 55 60

6

Paths to Conflagration

21. Meeting of Chao Anou and Crawfurd in Bangkok 22. Cleavages at the Bangkok Court 23. The Siamese Arms Race 24. LanNa's Advances Toward the British 25. Destabilization Scenarios of Siam 26. Did Great Britain Hold a "Lao Card"? 27. A Diplomatic Breakthrough Comes to Naught

111 115 117 120 121 124 129

VI. Many Provocations and Anou's Response 28. Wily Enemies, Secret Schemes 29. Breaking Spirits, Crushing Bodies 30. Annexation of the Lao Miiang Through Tattooing 31. Increasing the Stakes: The Lao Demand the Return of Their Treasures 32. Lao Rulers Resist the Invasion and Commit to Freedom 33. Mapping out a Plan to Counter the Catastrophe on the Khorat Plateau 34. The Missing Links in the Lao Chain of Command

131 131 138 145

156 159

Map of Lan Sang in the Eighteenth Century VII. The Opening Phases of the 1827 Campaign 35. Chao Anou's Web of Communications 36. The Tyranny of Numbers 37. The Lao Armies Against All Odds 38. Khorat, the Site of the Lao Diplomatic Offensive

162 163 163 167 174 179

VIII. The Military Phase of the 1827 Campaign 39. The First Reverse: The Skirmish of Thong Samrit and the Battle of Mun Kheng 40. The Battlefield of Phetchabun-Lomsak-Lcei-Siang Khan 41. The Death of a Flamboyant Chief and the Martyrdom of a Hero 42. The Struggle for Thong Sompoi and Khao San: The Turning Point of the 1827 War 43. The Struggle to the Finish After Vientiane's Fall and the Terreur Blanche 44. Omissions in Bodin's War Memoirs and Questions about Tissa's Loyalty

189

148 152

189 194 197 202 210 215

IX. Vietnam's Emperor Chooses Bangkok 45. Coping With the Aftermath of Chao Anou's Fait Accompli 46. Laos as a Buffer Zone 47. The Status of Laos Relative to Vietnam 48. Bangkok's Military Victory, Hue's Political Gains, and Anou's Last Stance

223 223 227 230

Conclusion

238

Bibliography

244

232

DEDICATION

We could not have brought our nearly lifelong research to its natural conclusion without the generosity of others. It is impossible to name them all, but we would like to express our deepest gratitude to our colleagues from Australia, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Quebec, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and Vietnam. We also would like to extend this gratitude to our fondly remembered friends who now live their life after life in God's Kingdom. This book is wholeheartedly dedicated to them all as well as to those who willingly or unwillingly were actors in or victims of the 1827 conflagration, and who by their tears and with their blood, flesh, and bones created the Southeast Asian history this book endeavors to recover, reappraise, and resurrect. For our parents, who created what we are and do. To them we dedicate this book. And to our sons, Youraphanh, Anouraphanh, Boraphanh, Souryaphanh, and Kummankham so that they remember.

FOREWORD

Early in this remarkable book there appears a nineteenth-century Western missionary's judgement with reference to Laos that "None of the nations of Asia has attracted so little attention as this numerous race." (p. 125) This applies equally to the writing of serious history about Laos prior to the French occupation of that state from the 1890s. One might easily find several shelves of books in the library, but these are almost exclusively the uninformed judgments of passing visitors, and rarely based upon indigenous materials such as inscriptions, manuscripts, or books. I thought so when in 1962 I first wrote on Lao history in the period 1777 to 1827, when the only materials available seemed to be books of assorted Thai-language documents and memoirs. This impression was hardly modified-much to my regret-when I spent a summer searching for historical materials in Vientiane and Luang Prabang in 1972. I then pretty much despaired of ever being able to work on Lao history. It was for this reason that my reactions were so strongly positive when the manuscript of this book by Mayoury and Pheuiphanh Ngaosyvathn first crossed my desk about five years ago. What this book did was to completely open up a field of historical study that previously had been closed. This is no small achievement, not the least because it was attained in the face of numerous obstacles and was successful in part because of the authors' ability to blend an enormous range of materials from a formidable array of languages. The book rests heavily upon the rich archives of the Thai Government, but it would not have been possible without the authors' use of widely scattered materials in French, English, Thai, Northern Thai, Vietnamese, and, especially, Lao. These have by no means been easily digested and woven into their narrative, for they are drawn from enigmatic and momentary military records, Lao historical poetry, contemporary Thai poems, and the passing comments of visiting missionaries, diplomats, and mariners, to name but a few. Even if their achievements were limited to these, we would be applauding warmly the way in which they have set a new and higher standard against which the writing of the history of Laos must be measured. But Mayoury and Pheuiphanh have done more than that. While they have redefined the scope and standards of Lao historiography, they have also introduced a new perspective into the subject. This is not simply a matter of inducing the reader to understand a Lao point-of-view, but rather a matter of defining a radical Lao perspective, rooted in a sense of the Lao past rarely articulated even by the most loquacious of modern politicians. This Lao patriotism is grounded on Lao soil, and is still enraged by the events of 1826-27. Though based in a continuing sense of Lao social solidarity, it requires a bond that cuts across the social and even ethno-

10

Paths to Conflagration

linguistic lines that have so divided the modem history of Laos. Its strongly antiSiamese stance gives, in a way rarely seen in other modem writings, substance to the otherwise-vacuous preachings of politicians of various stripes. The authors' treatment of the events bracketing the tum of the nineteenth century thus help us to understand where modem Lao are coming from, and where they are going. No, this is not the definitive history of the Lao-Thai relationship in the early nineteenth century (nor of the role of the West, or of Vietnam). It is inconsistent in defining "Lao," which sometimes ignores separations between Lan Sang and LanNa (which were considerable); and when it does speak of LanNa it includes Nan (and Phrre) at a time when they were not included in the same entity as Chiang Mai. More to the point, many readers will take issue with the authors' tendency always to interpret Lao documents positively and Thai documents negatively. To cite but one example, they dwell considerably on the grievance Lao felt at the loss of the Emerald Buddha to Siam in 1778 (pp. 55-60), but tell the reader nothing about where the Emerald Buddha had been before it came to Laos in the sixteenth century. Thus we read Mayoury and Pheuiphanh not for the definitive "last word" on the episode involving Chao Anou in 1827-28, but rather do we read them in order better to appreciate the past, and to dispel some of the darkness and vacuity that had flawed what we thought to be the "truth" about the past. This is a particularly readable book, filled with well-crafted and flowing narrative, on every page of which there is new information and new insights, as well as an implied answer to the longstanding question of modem Lao consciousness. David K. Wyatt January 1998

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Our warmest thanks to all those who, like true friends, have sometimes disagreed with us but have always supported us. These friends, each bringing his or her own style and possibilities have devoted themselves to helping us materialize a dream we have nurtured for more than twenty years: the dream to write this book. We have called upon the facts and retrieved the truth about Chao Anou, Vientiane's last monarch, from a kind of archival purgatory. This book is, in a sense, about the politically and historically sensitive issue of his life and work. We might just as easily have entitled this book "Laos Under the First Three Reigns of the Bangkok Dynasty," or "A Political Biography of Chao Anou, the Last Monarch of the Lao Kingdom of Vientiane." Of our friends worldwide, we want to thank in particular Dr. Martin Stuart-Fox, Dr. Kennon Breazeale, Achan Chalong Soontravanij, Achan Dhawaj Poonothok, Ambassador Bernard Dobbs, Dr. Grant Evans, Dr. Bernard Gay, Sathou Yai Maha Khamchanh Virachit, Maha Kikeo Oudom, Professor Pierre-Bernard Lafont, Achan Prathip Chumphol, Maha Sila Viravong, Mr. Sisana Sisane, Achan Sujit Wongthes, Achan Sulak Sivaraksa, Dr. Sunet Phothisane, Dr. Christian Taillard, Professor Andrew Turton, Maha Vankham Souryadet, Professor Constance Wilson, and many other friends we cannot mention by name here. To all we wish to express our heartfelt gratitude. It is a most pleasurable honor to pay a special and quasi-filial tribute to Professor David K. Wyatt for laying the editorial groundwork. The manuscript, originally written in French, no doubt presented a time-consuming challenge for him. Despite his Presidency of the Association for Asian Studies and his research and teaching load, Professor Wyatt nevertheless devoted his time, energy and utmost patience to this tedious labor. Our whole-hearted gratitude to Dr. Audrey R. Kahin and her staff, as well as to Dolina W. Millar, who volunteered with kindness and spontaneity to undertake the editorial work necessary to refine the English version of our manuscript. We would also like to express our deep appreciation to Dr. Anne Foster and Tamara Loos for their work on the final round of editing. We are indebted to Deborah Homsher, the new managing editor, for her meticulous preparation of this volume. Our thanks also go out to the two anonymous referees who advised Cornell University's Southeast Asia Program concerning our manuscript. We want to express our thanks to the British Council (London), l'Ecole Franc;aise d'Extreme Orient (Paris), the Service d' Accueil des Personnalites Etrangeres of the Quai d'Orsay (Paris), the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS, Paris), and the Centre d'Etudes d'Histoire et de Civilisations de la Peninsule Indochinoise

12

Paths to Conflagration

(Paris) which provided us with fellowships that enabled us to conduct our archival research and to the Toyota Foundation for the grant to study the Short Chronicle of Vientiane. The Fulbright Program also deserves our sincere thanks; by awarding us the Senior Scholar Fellowships, the program enabled us to spend one unforgettable year at Harvard University where we wrapped up our nth draft of this book. All responsibility for the content and the form of this book remain entirely ours.

PROLOGUE

A watershed event in the history of mainland Southeast Asia, the 1827 conflagration left lasting, vivid scars on the soul and spirit of the people in the region. When tensions flare up today, people from both shores of the Mekong River still tend to refer back to it, and virtually every book on Thai or Lao history or politics covers it to some extent. It is "the" conflict, a matrix of divisiveness. When we first embarked on research aiming to elucidate questions left unanswered by widely accepted historiography dealing with this event, we did not realize that a full-scale history about the art of peace and war over a span of half a century would emerge from our search, a history encompassing not only tales of Laos and Thailand, but of Burma, Vietnam, and the English in the Malay Peninsula as well. We also did not expect the two dividends that would result from our research, dividends which need to be accounted for at the very beginning of this book. Politics in Laos and Thailand today are still spoiled by miscues, misrepresentations, and conflicting assertions regarding the 1827 conflict, and these lapses continue to mar relations between our two neighboring countries, just as they also influence Thailand's relationship with Vietnam. These topics have been politicized for years, and they continue to rouse fervent emotions. We hope that this book will help to dispel myths and uncover facts, and in this way will represent an intellectual contribution to the burgeoning ASEAN-ization of the region. It should contribute as well to the quiet efforts of Lao and Thai to get their facts straight. And, at last, we hope that our research will assist Lao and Thai scholars and a host of other professionals in repositioning national attitudes, so that our two countries may come to look on one another with mutual respect, as was epitomized in 1994 when King Bhumibhol Adulyadej visited Laos: the first visit by a Thai king in recorded history and the first trip abroad for the King himself in twenty-five years. On another count, the release of this book should break a spell of curses that seem to have frustrated individuals who have attempted to reexamine the conflict of 1827. Some notable works have been published: we think especially of the pioneering article written by David Wyatt in 1963; the works of Thai professors, Prathip Chumphol, Dhawaj Poonothok, Pansa Sinsawat; the studies by Vietnamese scholars Pham Nguyen Long and Bui Quang Tung; and work by members of the Lao literati such as Maha Sila Viravong or Maha Samrit Boisisawat. Yet many other efforts have been aborted by bad luck, exhaustion, frustration, political turmoil, and even death. It is thus with profound relief and gratitude that we feel our own book taking form and coming into the light.

INTRODUCTION

The war between Siam and Laos during 1827-1828 spawned a conflagration that spread through mainland Southeast Asia. For Laos, the war resulted in the disappearance of the Lao kingdom of Vientiane and the virtual annexation of other Lao kingdoms and principalities by Siam in 1827. In the rest of the region, Cambodia was marginalized and both Vietnam and Siam were weakened during their subsequent struggles against each other between 1831 and 1841. This war was the prelude to the expansion of rival European colonial powers, which began to supersede the indigenous ones in this part of the world. One cannot delve into the history, society, or politics of this region without coming to terms with this watershed event. Much has been written on this cataclysmic event. We begin this study by pursuing an intellectual pilgrimage through a variety of reports describing the conflict and its aftermath; we then move backward and forward to analyze the interpretations that were ingrained in the minds and the hearts of the peoples concerned. What actually occurred in 1827-1828? Though this is a simple question, we find it difficult to give even the beginnings of a satisfactory answer. We are committed to the effort because" ... the only way to understand the events as they exactly happened is to recall them in their own time and place" 1 and " ... the overarching goal of the historian is to know and to make known 'wie es eigentlich gewesen ist,' how it really happened."2 We allow the documents, the archives, and the testimonies to speak for themselves. Let us listen to the voices that come to us from the distant past. They are familiar to us. It was yesterday. It is today. Man is always the same, whether he is Plato's "political animal" or Hobbes's "homo homini lupus." The French academician Bertrand Poirot-Delpech asserts, "We are all carnivores, aren't we? Even Anna Karenina, under her lace."3 It is well known that scholars devoted to the study of history inevitably tend towards autobiographical explora-tion and discover themselves through their studies. But, our avowed ambition is even greater, for it aims to restore to the Lao people, rendered amnesic by the shock therapy forced upon them by the victor of the day, a part of their roots and a piece of their lost history. We hope to contribute to this history as well as to reconcile the Lao with the Thai, for so many things have been written about this crisis that they have been misled and set against one another. By this effort, we hope that we can boost the Thai 1 Aron (1961), p. 171. 2 Aron (1961), p. 13. For applicaton to Southeast Asia, see Nepote (1984). 3 Poirot-Delpech (1986).

Introduction

15

and Lao peoples' desire for, and begin the work toward, a healthier, revitalized kith and kin intercourse. The fact that our comparatively brief book, written in Lao, on this same issue, has been purchased by more Thai than Lao readers suggests that these questions do involve and concern the Thai people. Born of the same legendary ancestor, Khun Borom, the Thai and the Lao are not just descendants politically and culturally, but genealogically as well through the Lao king, Chao Anou.4 Chao Anou's full name was "Phrachao Anuruttharat, Phrachao Lan Xang Hom Khao Vientiane." 5 In Lao and Thai political culture, everything begins with Chao Anou and all refers back to Chao Anou. Let us go backward and forward to Anou. 4 Let us offer an interesting anecdote on this issue. In 1976, we interviewed Prince Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Laos until1975. He says that the daughter of the present King of Thailand wrote in a book titled My Mother Told Me that she is a descendant of Chao Anou. After investigation, we found that it is the sister and not the daughter of King Bhumiphol Adulyadej who wrote the book, in which the passage concerned reads as follows: "My parents from the maternal side have said that their family came from Vientiane. My mother says that this is plausible, for we like to eat glutinous rice at our home." Kanlayaniwathana (1985) (T), p. 17. Kukrit Pramoj (Thailand's Premier from March 1975January 1976) also assured us that he descended from the lineage of Chao Anou. Another member of the Thai royal family, Dr. Sumet Jumsai (1984) writes, "In that war, I had ancestors fighting on both sides and although my allegiance must ultimately rest with Bangkok, I cannot help but admire the intrepid Laotian army ... " For more on the genealogy of Anou's descendants in Thailand, see Pramuanwichaphun (1937) (T), and also Khamman (1973) (L). After Anou's death, those who returned to settle in Laos, on the left bank of the Mekong, encountered little success in their professional life. Raquez mentioned that one of Anou's descendants worked in the lower levels of the French administration, while his son sold bananas at the Vientiane market. See Raquez (1902), p. 325. However, Aymonier writes that "After the catastrophe, the family of Chao Anuh of Vienchan had only two branches, one in Bangkok, and the other at Khamthong, and they were about extinct." Aymonier (1885), p. 156. In 1883, Auguste Pavie by chance met Anou's relative, the last Lao prince ruling at Ubon, who died afterward. His last words, as quoted by Pavie, were "I have the conviction that the populations of the two banks of the Mekong will be happy in the future, [and] thanks to this thought I will leave life without regret." Pavie (1906), pp. 72, 74. Francis Garnier had previously attended his enthronement in January 1867. 5 The Southern Thai call him merely "Chao Anu" or, as his Thai disciple and biographer put it, "Chao Anuwong." Pramuanwichaphun (1937) (T), 43.

:-:

·~ ~::

·:::· --·

...

~:.

:-:!: ;::: .;. ~:: :-:· ·.:.

·»··.·

50

:•.•

,·

100

150

290 mi.

0 2~oo~-~3oo~ km. ti 0~1lllll!l•llii:::~&il 100

:;~· c.,...,. o a"'Dwol'-~

THE FABRIC OF HISTORY

1. LAO AND THAI CONTEMPORARIES OF THE DRAMA SPEAK OUT It is said that a fortunate people has no history, but we have found that an unfortunate people may be in even greater danger of losing the record and memory of their own past. 1 When we had the opportunity to lay our hands on a venerable palm-leaf manuscript from the Chotmaihet yo Mil.ang vientiane (Short Chronicle of the Vientiane Kingdom)/ we could not help but feel a pang in our hearts when we read the final line: "The king returned defeated after having gone to fight the king of the South." 3 The king referred to by Lao chroniclers is none other than Chao Anou. 4 Born to Siribunyasan (r. 1760-1779), the last independent king of Vientiane, and a princess from the principality of Nang Bua Lam Phu, Chao Anou eventually presided as monarch over both sides of the Mekong River. His mother's principality was a Lao stronghold, close to the edge of the frontier on the Khorat Plateau. Nang Bua Lam 1 He who seeks does not always find, as Deydier remarks, "Moreover, I understand that in Laos as soon as one touches on the history of the events concerning the last one hundred or one hundred fifty years, one is ensnared in current politics, and also in the history of families. All the records concerning the provinces [of Vientiane] have disappeared. Some aspects of the history of Laos are just family records. All the quarrels of yesterday are still present." Deydier (1954b), p. 117. Manich expresses the same feeling when he states, "My first real contact with Lao history was when I spent three happy years in Laos. Of course I made a study of the Thais long before this. During these three years I came across many materials in the Lao language, most of which are not yet printed, since printing in Laos in Lao language is of recent date. Many families and many private libraries in Laos still keep manuscripts among their proud possessions which they guard as great treasures, and which they will not disclose if they suspect that the foreigners are coming to take them away. Some of the manuscripts are quite old, written or copied out by hand, generation after generation on local mulberry paper made from tree bark by their ancestors quite a number of years back and still kept as family treasures. Some of these valuable manuscripts were taken away from time to time by collectors abroad and a number were destroyed during the country's unsettled situation which has ravaged the country continuously, and is unluckily still despoiling this unhappy country." Manich (1967), pp. 1-2. 2 Chotmaihet yo miiang vientiane (L), Wat Ho Phra Kreo, Vientiane. 3 Chotmaihet yo miiang vientiane (L), Wat Ho Phra Kreo, Vientiane. 4 Apart from several manuscripts of Chotmaihet yo miiang Vientiane (L), see also Phongsawadan yo miiang wiangchan (1969) (T), as well as Bok sakkarat khwam khluan wai khong lan chang (T).

18

Paths to Conflagration

Phu's current claim to fame and source of local pride stems from being the birthplace of the now nationally renowned poet, Pangkham, author of the immortal Sang sinxay. Chao Anou's life began in 1767, a year of intense regional politics, when the Siamese kingdom of Ayudhya fell to the Burmese. Twelve years later, in 1779, the Thai army, victorious in a recent war, took Chao Anou as a prisoner to Bangkok. They returned him to Vientiane as vice king in 1795 when he was in his late twenties. Then in 1804, when Chao Anou's reigning brother, Inthavong, died, the Bangkok court nominated Anou to succeed him as ruler over Laos, Siam's vassal kingdom. References to Chao Anou's royal, kingly status abound in the chronicles and historical documents. Chao Anou's Lao biographer, Maha Sila Viravong, reminds us of his title: "Somdet Phrachao Anouvong."S The annals of Siang Khuang give him the title, "Phrachao Anuruttharaja."6 Those of Nakhon Phanom refer to him as "King Anuruttharaja," 7 while the chronicles of Mukdahan refer to him simply as the "King of Vientiane." 8 The Chotmaihet miiang wiangchan of Chao Khattiya, although written long after the fall of the kingdom of Vientiane, brazenly challenges Siam's victory over Laos by calling Chao Anou "Chao Maha Sivit Vientiane. " 9 Significantly, Chao Anou's title of nobility is written with the Dhamma script that is used for official and religious matters. His title runs for several lines on the stele of Wat Ho Phra Kreo of the town of Srichiangmai (now located in Thailand),lO as well as on the stele of his royal pagoda, Wat Sisaket, located in Vientiane.ll The most important and meaningful appellation, however, was given to Anou by the inhabitants of the Khorat Plateau. In their narrative, the Phiin viang, this population established a cult to Chao Anou and conferred upon him the royal title of "Somdet Phrachao Sivit Anurutthathiraja."12 The Bangkok court usually referred to him as "Chao Anou," which meant "puny one, the youngster." It is a symbolic name, which presaged the diminutis capitio reserved for this king's country. Because he is best known by this appellation, we shall for simplicity's sake refer to this king as Chao Anou, or simpler still, Anou. The Lao chronicles customarily refer to Chao Anou's successful Siamese opponent as "the King of the South." In its annual chronicle of world events, the Paris-based Societe Asiatique reported on the Siamese monarch in 1833, saying: "Kro-ma Mon-Tchit, aged forty-nine years, is now on the throne; he took prisoner and executed the king of Laos and his family in 1829."13 This king, usually referred to by the Thai as the "Third King of the Chakri Dynasty of Bangkok," bears the royal title Rama III.1 4 Born in 1787, he was given a nickname, Prince Thap, which literally means "sitting on." His regnal name, Phrachao Nangklao, has a related meaning, "sitting on the heads of others." Prior to his accession to the throne in 1824, he bore 5 Sila (1969) (L), p. 15.

Phongsavadan miiang phuan (1969) (L), p. 15. 7 That phanom chronicle (1976), pp. 68-69. 8 Bok sakkarat khwam khluan wai khong /an chang (T). 9 Phongsawadan yo mil ang wiangchan (1969) (T), p. 135. 6

10 Dhawaj (1987) (T), p. 355. 11 Tamnan vat sisaket (1954) (L), pp. 1-2. 12 Khamphon (1936) (T). 13 Nouveau Journal Asiatique (1833), vol. 11, Paris, p. 15. 14 The title was retroactively given by his great grandson, King Vajiravudh.

The Fabric of History

19

the title of Krommamiin Chetsdabodin. His lengthy royal title runs for several lines as recorded in his biography by Walter V. Vella. 15 As we have chosen to dispense with the full royal title when referring to Chao Anou, we will do the same when speaking of Phrachao Nangklao, and refer to him simply as the King of Siam, Somdet Phrachao Nangklao, King Rama III, Nangklao, or Rama III. We refer to name alone, rather than full title, throughout this book. It is not easy to discover trustworthy contemporary reports of the epic struggle between Chao Anou and Prachao Nangklao. The chronicles of Chiang Mai, generally glib when reporting events unfolding in the sister cities of Wiang Chiang Mai (Lan Na) 1 6 and Wiang Chan (Vientiane), manifest an unusual discretion-an eloquent silence-regarding the conflict and its aftermath.l7 The annals of the kingdom of Luang Prabang, written under Bangkok's orders, are suspiciously blithe when detailing the deception by certain members of the royal house who attempted to thwart Anou's struggle to free the Lao from Bangkok's suzerainty. 18 Finally, the annals of Siang Khuang, displaying the retrospective self-recriminations and evasions of the elite, befuddle readers with their narration of events surrounding the capture of the illustrious vanquished Anou and his followers in 1828.19 Bangkok's perspective on the conflagration of 1827 has been documented in the Royal Chronicle of the Third Reign, authored by Chaophraya Thiphakorawong, a nephew of Rama III and a high-ranking official during the reign of Rama IV. Until recently, mainstream Western historiography has relied on this influential source. Yet it is our opinion that this document, itself the product of a precise social milieu, merits the same kind of critique scholars have leveled at similar "palace histories" and "works of piety."20 Another influential Thai historian, Prince Damrong Rajanubhab, also produced work that must be critically scrutinized for biases. Known as the father of Thai history, Prince Damrong professed the view that Thailand historically had been victimized, not only by the Burmese and their allies, but also by treacherous rulers in the Cambodian and Lao tributary states. Confronting this interpretation of Thai and Lao history, a twentieth-century scholar, Breazeale, has critically responded that "Perhaps, it never occurred to him [Prince Damrong] to examine further the warlike nature of the Thai themselves. Rather than attempting to justify the subjugation of many ancient peoples by Ram Kamhreng and other rulers, he merely gloried in it because it was Thai."21 Despite our own reservations about the objectivity of The Royal Chronicle of the Third Reign, it has been rewarding to read it as the "official" gazette and to check it (1957), p. 3. King Mangrai, the "first Lao monarch" of LanNa as recorded in the chronicles of Chiang Mai, calls his town "Wiang Chiang Mai." Cf. Notton (1932), p. 63. 17 Notton (1932), p. 254. 18 Saveng (1980), pp. 105-107; Phongsawadan miiang luang prabang (1969) (L), p. 42; Phongsawadan miiang luang prabang (1963) (T), pp. 350-351. 19 Phongsawadan miiang phuan (1969) (L), p. 18; Archaimbault (1967), pp. 580, 581, 620, 621, 627, 628,654. 20 Trocki (1980), pp. 64, 68. 21 Breazeale (1971), pp. 165-166. lS Vella

16

20

Paths to Conflagration

against extant Thai primary sources. 22 If while reading we take into account and adjust for the conformism of such official Thai historical documents as the Royal Chronicle of the Third Reign, the official dispatches included in the Chotmaihet ratchakan thi 3, and other precious chotmaihet (chronicles) related to this matter, we can use these documents as lenses through which to glimpse the Bangkok establishment's lively, varied reactions to the conflict. For example, one can read the recollections of Princess Narinthonthewi, sister of King Rama I, the progenitor of the Chakri Dynasty of Bangkok. She devoted detailed passages in her memoirs to those terrible years. In the following pages we frequently quote the rare and highly valuable writings of this female Asian memorialist whose journals fill out the events described at greater length in the Royal Chronicle of the Third Reign mentioned above.23 The responses of Prince Mongkut, legitimate heir to the Bangkok throne and a future king [Rama IV, 1851-1868], were also recorded. On October 30, 1831, the Prince confided to the first American missionaries in Bangkok (who would introduce him to western culture and language) that, "His own nation, the Siamese ... have also been very cruel in their wars against the Birmans and Laos." 24 One of the first Siamese female poets, Khun Phum (1815-1880), was a lady-inwaiting to Mongkut's consort, a Lao princess named Duangkham. Khun Phum could not restrain herself from expressing her disapproval of Chao Anou's political undertaking. One excerpt from her poem, "Nirat bang yikhan," named after the Lao kings' residence in Bangkok, chides him for his impetuous rebellion: "If the prince of Vientiane had relied on the power of the Thai, he could still exist; [instead] he took on a ferocious air and he collapsed ... "25 However, Khun Phum's critique of Chao Anou was tempered by her wariness of the brutality displayed by Siam's warrior chief, Chaophraya Bodinthondecha (shortened, Bodin). Natthawut Sutthisongkhram, Khun Phum's biographer and commentator, describes Bodin in these terms: "Chaophraya Bodinthondecha had the habit of brutalizing everyone, and no one within reach of his hand could fail to boast of having had his back striped from the strokes of the whip, which he always had in his hand."26 As our story unfolds, we shall learn that this strongman was none other than the victor over the Lao, the captor of Anou, and the man who torched Vientiane. 27 A dissident in her own way, Khun Phum indirectly registered certain objections to Thai aggression against Laos; she refused to write the required encomium for King Rama III while he was still alive. She complicated her career and existence by 22 Thailand's Department of Fine Arts has published several valuable first-hand documents, the most recent of which is the Chotmo.ihet ratchalam thi sam. This collection includes most of the

documents extant in the National Library which are related to the first years of the reign of King Rama Ill, and was edited for the bicentennial of the birth of Rama Ill. We have worked from the original documents preserved in the Thai National Library, and in this book we will refer to these archival documents with the abbreviation "TNL," and also to the Chotmaihet

ratchakan thi sam. 23 Narinthonthewi (1963) (T), pp. 36-39. 24 Tomlin (1832), p. 57. 25 Quotations of Khun Phum are from Schweisguth (1951), p. 266. Especially on this Siamese poetess see Natthawut (1974) (T), p. 169. 26 Natthawut (1974) (T), p. 36. 27 Schweisguth (1951), p. 264.

The Fabric of History

21

launching sharp criticism against the governor of Khorat, Bodin's associate in politics as well as in speculation, but also the bete noire of the Lao.28 She and her Bangkok friends were truly horrified by the carnage inflicted on the Lao and scandalized by the booty brought back by Bangkok's armies, the secular arm of "Thai power." Khun Phum moored her barge on the banks of the Menam Chaophraya, near the center of power, but situated so that the Bangkok establishment could not easily reach it. However, she was unable to sever herself from taking pride in her country's power and missions. Her etat d'ame was shared by a large portion of the Bangkok elite, which never doubted its manifest destiny, its mission civilisatrice. 29 Her attitude can be characterized as the archetype of "Bangkok chauvinism rather than of Thai nationalism. "30 But in fact cultural influences did not all flow in one direction. The violent conflict between these two kingdoms left lasting marks on the Thai as well as on the Lao. For example, the Thai military expedition against the Lao and subsequent annexation of Lao territory deeply imprinted a Lao cultural identity on the population in Thailand's northeast, Isan, and ironically transferred some traditions into the region that were originally generated by a passionate Lao resistance and the memory of that resistance. "The original character of the Northeast, in a sense, was revived during the first half of the nineteenth century as a result of the annexation of the principality of Viang Chan [Vientiane] and the deportation of part of its population to the right bank of the Mekong."31 Generations upon generations of the Isan people, as well as their ethnic relatives on the east bank of the Mekong River, have delighted in chanting the rebellious Phiin viang (Chronicle of the Vientiane Kingdom) or Thao lao kham, Phiin chao ratsavong (Chronicle of Chao Ratsavong; Chao Ratsavong was Chao Anou's son).3 2 The Phiin viang and Thao lao kham, Phiin chao ratsavong crystallize the rancor and the hatred experienced by the Lao while simultaneously detailing the revolts that began during the Siamese invasion in 17781779. In these epics, the Lao exalt the exploits of Chao Anou and his people, who rose up to defend themselves, arms in hand. The epigraph on the cover of a book, authored by Phrathip Chumphol, identified the Phiin viang as "a literary masterpiece about the first instance of Thai exploitation of Lao people living on both banks of the Mekong."33 Prince Damrong Rajanubhab brought the Phiin viang from the Khorat 28 Natthawut (1974) (T), p. 37. 29 On this "mission civilisatrice" of Bangkok, see Breazeale (1975), particularly the chapter on "Political Philosophy of Thai domination." See also, Youn (1971) (L) and Sammana pavatsat lao (1971) (L), pp. 135-158. 30 Kochapun (1980), p. 21. 3 1 Fistie (1967), p. 33. 32 Interview with Pa Phiou Magnola (District of Khua Luang, Vientiane, 7 Aug. 1976), aged

eighty-five years. When a youngster, she often had opportunities to hear the chanting of the Phun viang. Other elders we have interviewed in the Vientiane region say the same thing. For more general information on this issue, please see Institut de Recherches en Sciences Sociales (1987b) (L), pp. 288-296; Dhawaj (1980) (T), pp. 31, 124; Prathip Chumphol (1982) (T), p. 14. This oral tradition was later transcribed on palm leaves totaling six to seven bundles and was sung to animate religious or profane festivals. At these festivals, the manuscripts are laid on a legged tray of rattan and the manuscripts are unfolded, leaf by leaf, as the reading progresses. White flowers and scented beeswax candles are placed in front of the manuscript to stress the holiness of manuscripts written in sacred script. 33 Prathip (1982) (T).

22

Paths to Conflagration

Plateau to Siam in 1873 and had it translated into Thai so that Siam's authorities might assess its contents. The Thai elites found the Phiin viang to be subversive because it testified against the dominant official Thai historiography, and so the chronicle was put away under seal in the Thai National Library in Bangkok, and another title intended to be more stem and proper was substituted: Phongsawadan chao anou wiangchan (Chronicle of Lord Anou of Wiangchan).34 From that time, the historian prince, Damrong Rajanubhab, circulated his own version of Chao Anou's story. 35 The Phiin viang's significance as a historical document should not be underestimated. It comes from the region of Pak Nam Mun (the mouth of the Mun River), the center of its propagation.36 This is not surprising, for the Brahmans who had formerly consorted with the dynastic inner circle of the kingdom of Vientiane had been taken captive and resettled precisely in this region. 37 They assumed the role of astrologers, doctors and presumably, chroniclers of the dynasty. Furthermore, during the reign of Rama IV [1851-1868], Chao Anou's nephew Chao Nokham was made governor of Ubon, the center of the Pak Nam Mun area. The oral history conveyed by the Phiin viang embodied the political culture and value system omnipresent in the daily lives of the inhabitants of the two banks of the Mekong River.3 8 Millenarian phu mi bun [holy men] movements drew intellectual references from it and, perhaps most importantly, a source of legitimacy from it. Repeatedly, leaders of these movements presented themselves as the heirs, by bloodline or politically, to Chao Anou himsel£.39 An expert on social phenomena in the region has clarified both the limits and breadth of this epic's influence: ... although there were references to Vientiane in a number of the [phu mi bun] revolts, there were no concrete attempts to establish an administration modeled on the dynastic state of Vientiane as it existed during its period of prosperity under Prince Anou. In only one case were Northeasterners persuaded to return to Vientiane. The references to Vientiane were, 34 Prathip (1982) (T), p. 8. 35 See his preface to Chotmaihet riiang prap khabot wiangchan (1926) (T). 36 See Dhawaj (1980) (T), pp. 122-124. 37 Brengues (1904), p. 736. 38 For instance, Taupin (1888), p. 63, relates, "The Lao people does not possess any of these

great historic traditions which used to be the basis for patriotic feeling and the idea of nationality. Therefore the instinct of the race can not completely be absent. It owns in this field a feeling intense enough, and its regrets expressed in its elegies about the ancient Vien-Chan resemble the lament of Jeremiah." 39 Dhawaj (1980) (T), pp. 124-129. According to Bernard Gay (Interview, Vientiane 13 and 24 March 1988), an anti-French revolt broke out in the Hua Phan (Sam Niia) as early as 1895. Its chief was Ong Luang, alias Bac Thong, who claimed to be Anou's son. The last trace of Ong Luang was reported from Dasia (province of Saravane) in 1901. See also, Gay (1987) vol. 1, pp. 34, 46 and 55. The French documents of this time refer to Ong Luang as Ong Kum Somdet. "Born in Bangkok, his father should be Chao So Pha, his mother Nan Chan Ta; his father is the son of Chao Southesan [Sutthisan], himself son of the last king of Vien Chan, his parents have been brought to Bangkok where he would be hom; Ong Kam Sam Dit [the other name of Ong Kum Somdet or else Ong Luong] has been a monk at Wat Si Saket; he came to Laos seventeen years ago." Residence Superieure au Laos. No. 90. Affaire du Phomiboun (Khong, 6 sept. 1895). Par le Commandant Superieur du Bas-Laos, a Resident Superieur au Laos. Depot National des Archives d'Outre-Mer, Aix-en-Provence. Fonds Amiraux, Dossier 20850.

The Fabric of History

23

therefore, attempts to achieve cultural cohesiveness rather than to forge identity with a dynastic state. In other words, Vientiane was used as a symbol for unity, and the city could exist anywhere: a "new Jerusalem" to use the idiom of some millenarian movements.40 2. NARRATIVES OF WESTERN DIPLOMATS AND MISSIONARIES

Besides indigenous witnesses, there were also foreigners in Bangkok at the time of the conflict. Their reports were necessarily shaped by their professional and ideological (generally European) frameworks, which had the merit of being more consistent and detailed than those of some indigenous observers. The French archbishop Bruguiere, resident in Bangkok, was an eyewitness to events in the Thai capital. In a letter dated April 1, 1829, addressed to the Missions Etrangeres in Paris, he reported the arrival of the captured Lao king, Chao Anou, and his entourage in Bangkok on January 15, 1829. Bruguiere provided details about the treatment the prisoners received, including the torture of Chao Anou and his death seven or eight days after his arrival. Bangkok officials executed Chao Anou, descendant of a two thousand year-old royallineage, 41 as though he were a common criminal. More than two months later, the public confinement of his relatives and collaborators in iron cages continued, exposing them to insults hurled by the populace.42 Anou's death occurred during the Year of the Ox, Chulasakkarat 1191, which corresponded to the night of January 25-26, 1829. At the time of his death, Chao Anou had reached the age of sixty-one "Phansa" (Lenten seasons, the Lao counting of years).43 A journalist from the Singapore Chronicle, J. H. Moor, observed that he found Chao Anou a "mild, respectable-looking, old, grey-headed man." 44 Alongside this report, we read accounts of the torture suffered by the grey-headed king. For example, another foreigner, F. A. Neale, wrote that Chao Anou had his "eyes put out by the application of searing-irons .... Without food, with no protection from the fierce sultry heat at the noontide sun, with his brain racking and burning, and suffering from the acutest agonies that thirst can impart."45 The missionaries Jacob Tomlin and Karl Friedrich August Gutzlaff provided further details: The horrible barbarities practiced in their iniquitous war with the Laos [sic],-their treatment of the king and his family, who were betrayed into 40 Chatthip (1984), p. 128; also Phanphen and Atcharaphan (1984) (T), p. 241; Archaimbault (1980), pp. 114-119.

41 Khamphon (1936) (T), p. 65. 42 Brugiere (1831), p. 137. 43 This wap recorded as the night of the sixth to seventh of the waxing moon of the second lunar month. Khamphon (1936) (T), p. 115. This contradicts neither Thiphakorawong (1961) (T), pp. 90-91, nor Charubut (1982) (T), who substantiates that Chao Anou "was born in the year Miing Khai (pi kun nopphasok) chulasakarat 1129, Ph.S. 2310, and died in the year Kat Pao (pi salu ekkasok).

44 Moor (1837), p. 199. 45 Neale's account draws on information from Robert Hunter, a British arms merchant residing in Bangkok and an insider to Thai power circles. Neale (1852), pp. 48-52.

24

Paths to Conflagration their hands, afford a melancholy exhibition of their ferocity. The situation is thus described by Mr. Tomlin, who was residing as a missionary at Bangkok when they were brought in: "The king of Laos and his family, when taken prisoners, were brought here in chains and exposed to public view for a fortnight in a great large iron cage. The news of their arrival caused great joy; the Phrah Klang and other high personages were long busied in devising the best mode of torturing and putting them to death. Close by are the various instruments of torture in terrific array. A large iron boiler for heating oil, to be poured on the body of the king after being cut and mangled with knives! On the right of the cage a large gallows is erected, having a chain suspended from the top beam, with a large hook at the end of it. The king, after being tortured, will be hung upon this hook. In the front there is a long row of triangular gibbets, formed by three poles joined at the top, and extended at the bottom. A spear rises up, from the joining of the poles a foot or more above them. The king' s two principal wives are to be fixed on these as upon a seat. On the right of the cage is a wooden mortar and pestle to pound the king's children in. (Nine of his sons and grandsons were in the iron cage; most of them grown up, but two were mere children.) Such are the means these unsophisticated children of nature employ to maintain their superiority over one another-such the engines of power despotism employs to secure its prerogatives-and such the worse than fiendish cruelty of man towards his fellow-man, when left to the unsoftened dictates of his own depraved heart! Shortly afterwards, the old Lao king expired, and thus escaped the hands of his tormentors. He is said to have gradually pined away, and died broken-hearted. His corpse was removed to the place of execution, decapitated, and hung on a gibbet by the river side, a little below the city, exposed to the gaze of everyone passing by, but left a prey to the birds. 46 His son afterwards escaped, but on being pursued, put an end to his existence. On the fate of the others we have not heard. 47

46 Such an excruciating passing shook the nerves of the population who left vacant the place

where the execution took place. Even as late as the 1850s, Neale reported that "your boatmen shudder as you pass this place." Neale (1852), p. 52. Since then, in this very location, King Rama V's Queen Saowapa Pongsri has established the Ratchini School. Chao Anou became a benevolent spirit in at least one part of Laos. The people of Ban Nala in Mi.iang Sayabouly have recalled that just before his death, Chao Anou told his bodyguards who were of LanNa heritage that whenever they encountered difficulty, particularly during a time of drought, they and their descendants could summon his spirit by offering a one hundred-legged tray of rattan. Until 1975, every time that someone offered a one hundredlegged tray of rattan, rain fell. From an interview with Thit Nan Sutham, sixty years old, by Professor Akiko Iijima from Tokyo University, on Jan. 4, 1997 at Ban Nala, Sayabouly province, Laos. Chao Anou's recommendation may have been the origin of the auspicious rites consecrated to him in Vientiane twice a year, in June at the beginning of the rocket festival and in December for the festival of the great stupa, That Luang. Both celebrations had been performed before the ruins of Wat Kang, which is now the location of the Lan Sang hotel. Then it was the residence of the patriarch of the kingdom of Vientiane. This celebration, requesting well-being for the country, ended when France granted formal independence to Laos in the early 1950s. The elderly of Vientiane attribute plagues which descended upon the rulers of the old regime to the abandonment of this rite dedicated to Chao Anou. Pa Chanthapone, interview, Vientiane, Jan. 13, 1997. 47 Gutzlaff (1834), p. 27.

The Fabric of History

25

After a lengthy meeting with high-ranking Lao Vientiane officials imprisoned in Bangkok, K. F. A. Gutzlaff situated the origin of this merciless intercourse in these terms: The Southern districts [i.e., the name generally given to the Lao kingdoms of Vientiane and Champassak] carry on a very brisk trade with Siam, whither the natives come in long narrow boats, covered with grass; importing the products of their own country, such as ivory, gold, tiger skins, aromatics, etc.; and exporting European and Indian manufactures, and some articles of Siamese industry. This trade gave rise, in 1827, to a war with the Siamese, who used every stratagem to oppress the subjects of one of the Laos tributary chiefs, Chow-vin-chan [i.e. the Prince of Vientiane]. This prince, who was formerly so high in favour with the late king of Siam [Rama II, or Phrachao Lretla Naphalai, who was Rama III's father] as to be received, at his late visit, in a gilded boat, and to be carried in a gilded sedan chair, found the exorbitant exactions of the Siamese governor of the frontier injurious to the trade of his subjects and to his own revenues. He applied, repeatedly, to the court at Bangkok for redress; and being unsuccessful, he then addressed the governor himself: but no attention was paid to his grievances. He finally had recourse to arms, to punish the governor, without any intention of waging war with the king-an event for which he was wholly unprepared. His rising, however, transfused so general a panic among the Siamese, that they very soon marched en masse against him, and met with immediate success. From that moment the country became the scene of bloodshed and devastation .... The number of captives, generally country people, was very great. They were brought down the Meinam [Menam Chaophraya] on rafts; and were so short of provisions that the major part died from starvation; the remainder were distributed among the nobles as slaves and were treated more inhumanly [sic] than the most inveterate enemies; while many of the fair sex were placed in the harems of the king and his nobles .... The country was laid waste; the peasants, to the number of one hundred thousand have been dispersed over different parts of Siam; and the whole territory has been brought, notwithstanding the remonstrances of the court of Hue, under the immediate control of the Siamese, who are anxious to have it peopled by other tribes.48 Years later, other European observers would record the chilling impressions that struck them when they visited what remained of Vientiane, and they would measure the holocaust with epic comparisons. Forty years after the events, the Mission for the Exploration of the Mekong led by Commandant Doudart de Lagree stopped over in Vientiane. The Mission described the area where Vientiane once stood as "Vientiane ruins" on their maps of the area. April 3 and 4, 1867, were devoted to interviewing the few surviving inhabitants about the historical traditions of the vanished kingdom.49 In an article published in 1869 in the Revue des deux mondes (Paris) on "Vienchan and the Siamese conquest," Louis de Came, representative of the French Foreign Office, wrote: "The Laotians were exterminated or deported in mass, and 48 Gutzlaff (1834), pp. 67-68. 49 Garnier (1870-1871), p. 394.

26

Paths to Conflagration

their capital razed, as Jerusalem was by the Roman armies."5° Nearly one hundred years later, the British historian D. G. E. Hall echoed him: "The Siamese made a complete holocaust of Vientiane."5 1 And recently, Arthur Dommen has written, "The Siamese, who by now were embarked on a policy of vigorous presence in the Lao territories, reacted to this impudent and imprudent challenge by sacking Viang Chang [Vientiane] as the Romans had destroyed Carthage after the Second Punic War." 52 3. VIETNAM'S LINKS TO CHAO ANOU AND THAI PERCEPTIONS OF THAT ASSOCIATION

Not only Europeans observed and recorded the fall of Chao Anou. Vietnamese reports of the event were also collected, for Vietnam, close neighbor to both Siam and Laos, had been involved in a number of the diplomatic maneuvers leading up to the conflict and figured as Anou's last hope after the defeat. Following the collapse of the kingdom of Vientiane, Anou wandered several months in the forests of central Laos and finally decided to seek asylum in Vietnam. Aware that granting asylum to the defeated Lao king would surely spark reactions from Siam, the Vietnamese Emperor Minh Mang immediately directed a scholar, Ngo Cao Lang, to make a compilation of all documents related to this affair. Traveling to the front lines at Quy Hop, on the fringes of Lao territory, Ngo Cao Lang amassed a dense administrative report, entitled the "Chronicle of our imperial court's behavior toward the affairs of the country of Ten Thousand Elephants."53 This unique compilation gathered all the sources available at the Vietnamese court, ranging from spy reports from Lao territory occupied by Thai armies, to the details of the one-man-show performed by Bodin when he received Vietnamese emissaries in Vientiane, to the successive letters forwarded by Anou to Minh Mang. The whole report gives a picture of the elaborate, shifting political stance of the emperor, Minh Mang, himself. The court of Hue displayed surprising care in handling this affair. Minh Mang certainly realized the full value and potential significance of the file concerning Anou. As a matter of fact, he was very uneasy about it, probably because it exposed certain actions performed by the Vietnamese court. J. H. Moor, in his "Notes on Siam taken in 1833," wrote that "The Prince Vun Chow [Anou] and family made their escape into Cochinchina; but instead of meeting with a friendly reception, they were seized by the king of that country and delivered prisoners to the Siamese."54 More than thirty years later, the members of the French Commission for the Exploration of the Mekong-Louis de Carne and Francis Gamier among them-echoed Moor's 50 Came (1869), p. 496. 51 Hall (1976), p. 451. 52 Dommen (1986), p. 22. 53 Ngo Cao Lang (1977) (V). On the historical importance of this document, see Cadiere and Pelliot (1909), p. 645; Pheuiphanh (1986) (L), p. 4. Do Quang emphasizes that, "With a serious working method, the author minutely recorded every date, every fact relating to every personality, and shed light on many points." Do Quang (1981), pp. 90-91. 54 Moor (1837), p. 199.

The Fabric of History

27

assessment. 55 It is thus truly ironic that the French colonialists succeeded in arguing that they were coming to extend their protectorate to Laos in the name of Vietnam. We encounter a more telling, and perhaps more accurate, reflection of the relationship between Vietnam and Laos in the words of Emperor Thieu Tri (r. 18411847), Minh Mang's successor, who, receiving an official report from his mandarin relating to Laos, scribbled on it, "Laos, What? Where?"56 Though Chao Anou received little assistance from the Vietnamese emperor, his final stumbling flight into that country has subsequently provided Thai historians with the drop of evidence they require to portray Chao Anou as a rather feeble dependent or puppet of Minh Mang's. The prolific Thai historian, M. L. Manich Jumsai, unhesitatingly identified the conflict of 1827 as the pivotal catalyst for later events in the region and noted Anou's association with Vietnam. The suppression of Vientiane has been one of the bitterest episodes of Thai history. Anou's rebellion is understood as one of the most daring and ruthless that was suppressed in Thai history. However, Lao history perceives Anou's rebellion as a war of independence. Anou became a war hero who staked everything for his country and was considered one of the bravest men in Lao history. It is beyond doubt that he was a brave warrior. He proved himself a daring soldier when he served under the king of Bangkok and drove out the Burmese and recaptured Chiengsen from the enemy! Even among the Thai, he was honored as such. The consequence of this war [between Laos and Siam] was far reaching, because it provided the Vietnamese with an opportunity to lay claim to Laos. Anou had gone to ask the emperor of Vietnam for assistance by discussing terms of submission and promising the secession of the eastern provinces and the usual tribute of silver and gold trees every three years. As a result, Siang Khuang was occupied by a Vietnamese garrison and the Vietnamese moved in at several points in Kammuon and Huapan. Later, when France ruled Vietnam, this served as a pretext for the French to take control over the whole of Laos. 57 This representation of Chao Anou as the failed rebel who submitted himself to Vietnam, and in that act sacrificed large portions of Laos to Hue, has influenced many subsequent histories. For instance, during the Cold War era Chao Anou was portrayed by Thai historians as a "villain" puppet whose strings were pulled by the Vietnamese. A Thai scholar tried to substantiate this in an article with the suggestive title, "Behind the Scenes of the Revolt of Vientiane's Chao Anou." 5 8 This interpretation has even been popularized in a novel entitled Dokfa champassak 55 With the same opinion and nearly the same words, Came speaks of "a secret accord passed [by the Vietnamese court] with Bangkok." Came (1869), p. 497. Three other sources referred to the "treaty of 1828" between Bangkok and Hue on this. issue. Gamier (1870), pp. 53-54; Gosselin (1900), p. 80; Grossin (1933), pp. 20, 38. 56 Woodside (1971), p. 236. 57 Manich (1967), pp. 218-19. 58 Thanom (1982) (T), pp. 75-92. This article has been reprinted under another title, Thanom (1984) (T). More generally, see Thanom (1980) (T), pp. 230-243.

28

Paths to Conflagration

(Celestial Flower of Champassak),59 authored by Luang Vichitr Vadakam. Luang Vichitr Vadakam was the noted ideologue of the Pan-Thai movement during World War II and the eminence grise of two military dictators, Marshal Phibulsongkhram (1938-1944, 1948-1957) and Marshal SaritThanarat (1958-1963), during whose rule the "Thai-Lao alliance" became, in fact, a "Thai-Laotian integration." 60 Ironically, a Luang Prabang historian, Khamman Vongkotrattana, has substantiated that Marshal Sarit Thanarat, for whom Luang Vichitr Vadakam worked, was Chao Anou' s greatgrandson. Thai official institutions, such as the celebrated Fine Arts Department of which Luang Vichitr Vadakam was Director-General from 1932, have efficiently planted and propagated the idea that Chao Anou allied himself with Vietnam in the conflict of 1827. This theme was implied in the 1926 preface written by Prince Damrong Rajanubhab to Chotmaihet riiang prap khabot wiangchan (Documents on the Suppression of the Vientiane Revolt) 61 ; fixed from 1932 on in the documents relating to the Siam-Vietnam war in Cambodia during Rama III's reign; and renewed in the fifty-sixth part of the Prachum phongsawadan (Compendium of Historical Documents).62 Since then, this version of history has been widely disseminated in school and university textbooks in Thailand as well as in Laos.63 The Thai government and its officials have initiated and supported efforts to interpret Anou as a traitorous figure in areas populated by Lao. In Khorat, in 1934, officials erected a statue dedicated to Khun Ying Mo, a woman credited with having led the insurrection of her town against Chao Anou. Yet available documents prove that this "heroine" was a fiction, a plain town woman dressed up in exaggerations by inventive subjects eager to please Siam. Readers can discover this hoax by paging through the Chotmaihet miiang nakhon ratchasima (Collected Documents Related to Khorat), edited by the Fine Arts Department. This compendium consists of detailed reports written by Khorat authorities, including Khun Ying Mo's husband, on the evening of the battle. Khorat authorities forwarded these reports to the Bangkok court, hoping to win royal favor for their contribution to the struggle against the Lao and to prove Khorat's loyalty to Siam, about which Bangkok was deeply suspicious.6 4 Nationalistic Thai thinkers have reclaimed this old woman, who was 59 Vichitr (1966) (T). The views of Luang Vichitr Vadakarn have since then exercised a predominant influence over Bangkok's political culture. See Kobkua (1978). 60 Zacher and Milne (1964), p. 267. 6l Chotmaihet ruang prap khabot wiangchan (1926) (T), pp. 6-7. Prince Damrong Rajanubhab, as Minister of Interior, was responsible for the ban on the use of the word "Lao" in the designation of the Lao areas and Lan Na territory and for the interdiction on playing the khene (bamboo-reeds), the music instrument par excellence of the Lao people. Theerachai (1984) (T), pp. 1-2; Sathian (1866) (T), pp. 160-162; Sunai (1985) (T), pp. 25-26. 62 Krom Silpakorn (1964) (T), "Introduction," Prachum phongsawadan, ed. Kao Na, vol. 6 (Bangkok), p. E. Also, Krom Silpakorn (1965) (T), "Foreword," Prachum phongsawadan, ed. Kao Na, vol. 4 (Bangkok), p. 18. 63 Borihan (1965) (T) 285ff.; Nakhon (1983) (T), p. 195. 64 Ruam riiang miiang nakhon ratchasima (1968) (T), p. 36. See the copy of these documents in Dhawaj (1980) (T), pp. 158-66. The originals are preserved in the Thai National Library (Manuscripts Division) with the following call numbers: Document Rama III (7) 1188/20; Document Rama Til (8) 1188/20; Document Rama III (14) 1188/20. The local chronicles, Phongsawadan muang yasothon (1969) (T), p. 77; Chantha (1969) (T), pp. 211-212; Khamphon (1936) (T), the Phun viang chronicles, the oral tradition, and the first writings about the history of the region of the Khorat Plateau [see Teem (1970) (T), p. 364]

The Fabric of History

29

fifty-five years old when the event occurred, by rebaptizing her with a more potent, masculine name: Thao Suranari (literally, Sir+alcohol+women). They have also taken great pains to find proof of her "heroism," but so far have not found any convincing evidence. 65 Thirty years later, in 1964, as Cold War conflicts spread into regions surrounding Thailand, writings patronized by the Thai Fine Arts Department presented Chao Anou as a traitor, allied to a power [Vietnam] that figured as a competitor of or antagonist to the Thais. Local notables, seeking to stimulate interest in the impoverished condition of the Northeast provinces among officials in the Thai central government, initiated the celebration of "historic" figures who had resisted the "invader Anou." For example, Chaiyaphum province commemorated the "faithful hero to Bangkok, Chao Pho Phraya Lre." However, Thai archival documents undeniably prove that Chao Pho Phraya Lre came down from his mountainous preserve to Anou's camp in Khorat in order to pledge his loyalty to Anou. Chao Pho Phraya Lre headed to Vientiane when the Thai armies began to roll across the Khorat Plateau. 66 Is he not therefore a Lao hero instead? In any case, the dramatic, changeable circumstances like those that prevailed in 1827 made consistent loyalty a challenge. 67 The search in 1964 for local, legendary heroes famed for their loyalty to Bangkok coincided with the engagement of the first contingents of Thai mercenaries in Laos at that time. Though the Thai government ostensibly sent the troops to confront the Vietnamese, the troops actually sought to combat the Pathet Lao movement.68 Books on Lao history written during these central decades of the twentieth century reshaped and diminished the figure of Chao Anou in an attempt to bring Lao history in line with the Thai version.6 9 It also served to satisfy those who considered themselves "elder-brothers" in the Thai-Lao world of kith and kin. The most striking case is exemplified by Prince Phetsarat, one of the leading Lao nationalists in the struggle against the French in 1945-1946. In his memoirs, he decried the foreign invasions of Laos yet simultaneously avoided mentioning those invasions perpetrated by Siam, even though they were "most disastrous for Laos."70 Similarly, an illustrated booklet edited by the Ministry of Information of the Kingdom of Laos, titled Phramahakasat ong samkhan khong lao (Important Lao Kings), make no mention of a famous act by any woman during the battles between the Lao and the Thai. See also Saipin (1996) (T). 65 In 1986, during a seminar in Bangkok focusing on Thai-Lao relations, a Thai researcher announced that a Vice-Minister of Education of Thailand was opposed to any extension of the cult rendered to Khun Ying Mo. Note the intervention of Sanguan Rotbun in this sense when he makes reference to the opposition expressed by this Thai Vice-Minister, proceedings of Sammana Samphanthamaitri Thai-Lao (1986) (T). 66 Chotmaihet riiang prap khabot wiangchan (1926) (T), pp. 25, 27. 67 "When the pan is white hot, it is the sesame seeds that burn," says a Lao maxim on the pitiful lot of the ruled. 68 Burgess (1974-1975), pp. 62-72; Anderson and Mendiones (1985), p. 31 and note 12. 69 The lengthy book titled "Historic Heroes and Statesmen," and sponsored by all the rulers in the Kingdom of Laos, managed to remain silent about Chao Anou. See Kitti (1970) (L). Equally, when Ukham dedicated his book to the spirit of the Lao heroes, he failed to cite Chao Anou. Ukham (1966) (T). These lacunae reflect a particular political climate among the Vientiane elite of this period, well rendered by Burchett (1957), pp. 315-17. 70 Saveng (1971), p. 329.

30

Paths to Conflagration

succumbed to the demands of the day. It mixed well-known fact and flagrant fantasy when it asserted that "Chao Anou wanted to liberate the country from foreign domination nominally by Thai and Vietnamese." 71 By making this statement, the booklet strove to generate an anti-Vietnamese racism that had not previously existed per se in Lao history?2 It grafted this superficial anti-Vietnamese sentiment onto a historically developed and traditional suspicion of the Thai. 73 The booklet had a circulation of one hundred thousand issues, an enormous figure by Lao standards. The revision of history has continued. Since the establishment of the Lao People's Democratic Republic in 1975, the idea that Chao Anou was manipulated by the Vietnamese has been revived?4 It will be difficult to extirpate this bias from history books and popular, regional impressions. 4. MISTAKEN INTERPRETATIONS OF RELATIONS BETWEEN LAOS AND FRANCE

Historians eager to denigrate the status of Chao Anou as a Lao hero need not always compromise the reputation of the defeated king by describing him as a puppet of the Vietnamese; they can also suggest that Lao loyalty was misguided or manipulated by a foreign power. Both of these interpretations imply that the Lao lack independent judgement and will. For instance, we note that some Thai scholars-willingly or not-tried to trivialize and distort Chao Anou's legacy by maintaining that "the French, each time they want to mobilize the Lao against the Thai, had merely to resort to an invocation of the events of 1826-1829." 75 However, the Lao attachment to Chao Anou has nothing to do with a French or a colonialist machination. In fact, the Lao have very mixed feelings toward the French, particularly because the French failed to secure Lao territories and even sacrificed the domains ruled by Luang Prabang's king to the Thai?6 The French also scrapped Lao territories in the south when they gave Stung Treng to the Cambodians, and Darlac and Kontum to the Vietnamese.77 Ellen Hammer has criticized what she describes as 71 Ministere de !'Information et du Tourisme (1970) (L). Lao sorcerer-apprentices were not aware of the feeling toward Chao Anou nurtured by their counterparts from the other side of the Annamitic range, which otherwise should have surprised them. In the pre-1975 Republic of South Vietnam, the Lao king was simply portrayed by Saigon scholars as "the revolutionary leader" of the Lao. Hoang Van Hoe and Nguyen Quang To, Minh Menh Chinh Yeu (1974) (V), vol. 6, p. 122, fn. 1. 72 Gurney (1950), p. 85. 73 "The Lao are very sensitive to domination by the Thai." Halpern (1964), p. 24. 74 See Thanom, already quoted; Punsri (1986) (T), pp. 110-117; Nakhon (1983) (T), p. 84. 75 Teem (1987) (T), p. 167; Sulak (1980), p. 167: "Something which Laos lacks very much are the young intellectuals who identify themselves with Laos. If, in the past, a young man had intellect or ability he was brainwashed by the French. The French cunningly indoctrinated the Laotians to hate the Thais, and they even used the Emerald Buddha as a means to this end. They used Prince Anou as a lure." Charubut asserts that Chao Anou was manipulated by the French. Charubut (1978) (T), 76 Raquez (1902). 77 Stung Treng had been considered Lao territory until the French arrival. See Miche (1852). Regarding the French cession to Cambodia, see Khamchan (1971) (L). Darlac was attached to Vietnam by French colonization in 1904 and Kontum in 1905. For more about this arbitrary French territorial scheme, see Gay (1988).

The Fabric of History

31

the tendency of the French Government to consider Laos as simply composed of principalities over which Vietnam and Siam had fought for centuries. French officials at the time apparently did not realize that the king of Luang Prabang was (after the words of Paul Le Boulanger) 'the chief of a real state, the legitimate descendant of a long line of kings.'78 As the first French Resident in Vientiane, Armand Tournier, wrote in 1900, "French Laos consists of only a third of the area known under the name of the Lao principalities and it is the least rich and the least peopled of these territories."79 The Australian expert on Laos, Martin Stuart-Fox, acutely stressed that "French intervention thus had the effect of saving Laos from extinction at the hands of its more powerful neighbours, and of permanently reducing it to the status of a dependent and minor power."80 Anti-French feelings are shared by the Lao elite and the Lao population. When millenarian movements burst forth in the early 1900s in Laos and in Thailand's northeast, they were directed "against the French and against the Siamese."81 Mistakenly equating Auguste Pavie with the acts of French colonial oppression and neglect of Laos during a time when, in fact, Auguste Pavie had been completely sidetracked by coteries in Paris,82 the Lao populace in Luang Prabang and Vientiane destroyed the statue of him and threw it in the Mekong.83 Significantly, the first guerrilla group created by the Secretary General of the Lao Communist Party for the Lao People's Army during the struggle against the French was the "Ratsavong unit," named after Chao Anou's son and hero of the 1827-1828 conflict.84 Lao from a broad range of factions expressed their grave dissatisfaction with French treatment of Laos after World War II. 85 Even the Lao most committed to the French, such as King Sisavangvong and Crown Prince Savang Vatthana, wanted the French to demand the return of northeast Thailand to Laos. 86 Despite so many years of disappointment with the French, Laos's own histories have been influenced by a requisite allegiance to this imperial nation, most often evidenced in our texts by sly attacks against the British. Some Lao writers curiously remade the brutal Chaophraya Bodinthondecha (Bodin) into a British mercenary, in this way accommodating the French-British rivalries of the nineteenth century.8 7 78 Hammer (1954), p. 13. 79 Toumier (1900), p. 1; Reinach (1911), p. 52. 80 Stuart-Fox (1986), p. 435. 81 Archives des Missions Etrangeres, Paris. For a pan-Lao interpretation, with which we disagree, see Archaimbault (1980), pp. 114-118. 82 Bernard (1933). 83 Gunn (1988), p. 145. 84 On the "Koong ratsavong," see Sisana and Vongsay (1970) (L), pp. 21-25. 85 Grievances were expressed by members of the Lao lssara, such as the Francophile, Nhouy Abhay, about the inability of the French to protect Laos against Thai encroachment. 86 Mayoury and Pheuiphanh (1990), p. 12. 87 Khamchan (1971) (L), p. 17; Prasit (1974) (L), p. 34. Leclere (1914) reports, however, that while "some authors said that Bodin was a Frenchman," Bodin is a Thai. See Akin (1969), p. 221; Damrong (1975) (T), pp. 20-39; Charubut (1959) (T).

32

Paths to Conflagration

Certain contemporary scholars have even hypothesized that Chao Anou was heading to Bangkok in 1827 to struggle against the British capitalists.88 In 1984, when a border war occurred between Thailand and Laos, the Lao immediately called on the memory and name of Anou. A book, entitled "Draw Chao Anou's Sword," was edited for the political mobilization of Lao youth. 89 On March 22, 1985, when Laos celebrated the thirtieth anniversary of the foundation of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party, Thailand ostentatiously revived the ceremony dedicated to Khun Ying Mo, the reputed (fictitious) rebel leader of Khorat. This ceremony was held in Khorat, on the west bank of the Mekong, in the presence of Thai Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanon. In 1988, after Thai air and ground operational forces had pounded the Lao militia for one hundred bloody days, a Siam rath reporter asked former Thai Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj (a distant descendant of Chao Anou) if Thailand should take back Sayaburi province. He responded: Two hundred years have passed and we should cross over and burn Vientiane once more. There is no need to declare war-just go across and burn it; when it's done come back. I don't think friendly relations can happen between the Thai and Lao. The Thai side must remain strong. If we want our countries to relate like elder and younger brothers, the elder brother must be strong and make the younger Lao brother fear him. There is no use being too compliant. If you go to war, do it properly, break them completely. Don't fight and allow the Lao win like this.90 It may be that no one has learned or forgotten anything, but neither have they forgiven anything. As an exorcising operation, when Prime-Minister Chatichai Choonhavan visited Laos shortly after he came to power, he pledged to initiate a special relationship between the Thai and Lao peoples. He endlessly repeated, "Let bygones be bygones." Despite the long, entangled and sometimes antagonistic histories of Thailand and Laos, the diplomatic politicians of today attempted to renew positive ties. Chatichai Choonhavan's Lao counterpart, Kaysone Phomvihane, responded in the poetry of which his people are so fond: "Mountains may collapse and rivers may run dry, but may the Lao-Thai friendship last forever."

88 See reference in Stuart-Fox (1986), p. 10. See, however, Mayoury and Pheuiphanh (1989), p. 66, note 74. 89 That gao chao anou (1984) (L). 90 Interview, Siam rath, Bangkok, February 23, 1988.

THE HEGEMONIC CRISIS OF THE "CITY OF ANGELS" 1

5. THE CONQUEROR T AKSIN

Although twentieth-century Thai writers claim that the Mekong basin was part of the Thai kingdom much earlier than the late eighteenth century, even Siam's King Mongkut (r. 1851-68) observed that during the Ayudhyan period (1350-1767) the Lao states "were fully independent" and the Thai kings "honored the Lao (kings) as equal to themselves."2 Auguste Pavie essentially agrees with Mongkut when he describes the relationship between the Lao and the Thai in the eighteenth century: Isn't it striking to see that, in their chronicles, the Lao people bow before the prestige of the Chinese, of the Annamese and of the Burmese, and that they constantly place themselves toward the Siamese in the situation of superiority or of equality.3 This equal relationship between the two kingdoms was probably strongest and most balanced in the sixteenth century. Facing Burmese attacks, the Siamese king had to ask for help from his Lao counterpart three times, most notably at Phitsanulok and Saraburi.4 In another instance of alliance, the Lao king, Setthathirat (r. 15501571), asked for and obtained a Thai princess to be his queen. The two monarchs struck a friendship treaty when they met at Dansai in 1560, and a stupa was founded in 1563 to memorialize this honeymoon period. The stupa, called Si Song Hak, 1 The

"City of Angels" here refers to Bangkok.

2 Breazeale (1975), p. 4; an identical view can be found in Anuchit (1932) (T), p. 168. For the

Peking court, cf. lmbault-Huart (1878), p. 136; Siam and Laos were treated on the same footing in Peking, a favor to which the ruler of Chiang Mai aspired when he dispatched an embassy to China in 1731. China rejected his request. 3 Pavie writes this passage at the conclusion of his study on the Lao manuscripts saved from the Chinese bandits who took part in the Ho invasion in Luang Prabang. Pavie (1911), vol. 6, p. 42.

4 Ukham (1958) (L), pp. 48 ff.

34

Paths to Conflagration

represented the amity between the two kingdoms of Si Sattanakkhanahut (Laos) and Si Ayudhya (Siam).s Despite evidence that the Lao kingdom for many years wielded influence and power equal to the Thai, Thai historians tend to portray the Lao kingdom as a weak dependent of Siam. Pierre-Bernard Lafont comments on a representative book by Bunchuai Sisawat that handily absorbs Laos into Thailand: In reading the chapter on the French implantation in Laos, the reader gets the impression that the Lao territory was an integral part of Siam. As a matter of fact, even if after the defeat of the Lao army in 1826 [actually 1827] and the capture of Chao Anou, the kingdom of Vientiane did become a Siamese province, still the kingdoms of Luang Prabang and Champassak, although vassals of Siam, continued to be acknowledged de jure, as independent kingdoms. However, the Siamese generals and kha luang (high commissioners) behaved as masters in these two kingdoms. According to this aspect of a de facto annexation, which rapidly transformed into de jure annexation, as was the case in several kingdoms and principalities in the north of Thailand, the author interprets the results of the French intervention as an amputation of Siamese territory. 6 This interpretative approach has received the official Thai stamp of approval on several occasions, particularly in 1946 when Thai representatives asked France to give Laos to Thailand as if it were Thai territory. The Franco-Siamese Commission of Conciliation of Washington, chaired by a former US Assistant Secretary of State and composed of two other neutral members from Britain and Peru, unanimously rejected such claims? Historians have settled on the year 1778 as the genesis of troubles in Thai-Lao relations. A new phase in bilateral relations characterized by antagonism began then. The threefold partition of Laos in 1707 had tom apart its political and social fabric, causing internal weakness and lack of control over its own territories even before Siam began to pressure Lao rulers. This phase resulted in the subjugation and extermination of the feebler protagonist, the Lao. Ayudhya, the old Siamese capital, fell in 1767 to the Burmese. Fleeing Ayudhya's collapse, Taksin, then governor of the province of Tak, founded a new capital at Thonburi. Its population was only five percent of that of Ayudhya. 8 The former ruling class was decimated in the defeat, opening the way for a new group to take up the reins of power. "The law of revolutions is that they are inclined always to fortify 5 For more information regarding this stone inscription, see Sila (1957) (L), pp. 156-157; see also Dhawaj (1987) (T), pp. 434-440, and Manich (1967), pp. 156-157. 6 Lafont (1962), pp. 582-583. Manuel Sarkisyanz (University of Heidelberg) in his review of a book authored by a former Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs, Direk Jayanama, states "He also left unmentioned the fact that the territories Thailand claimed 'from France' were historically part of (and after the war returned to) Cambodia and Laos. The unwary reader may be left with the impression that this development accepted by historians as an encroachment by Thailand's empire builders on Cambodian and Laotian territory was rather an encroachment by French imperialist on Thai territory." Sarkisyanz (1971), pp. 257-258. 7 Commission de Conciliation Franco-Siamoise (1947); Mayoury and Pheuiphanh (1994) (L). 8 Malinee (1985), p. 79.

The Hegemonic Crisis of the "City of Angels"

35

their power through the renovation of its personnel and of its spirit." 9 The subsequent enthronement of Taksin validated the consequences of the revolution. The spirit of post-1767 Siam is embodied by this Thai statesman, Taksin. David K. Wyatt has aptly described the psychology of this homo novo. Something more innovative, however, may have been at work in the expansion of Taksin's empire to encompass regions never previously ruled by Ayudhya .... Taksin, to begin with, was a usurper, claiming no blood ties with his Ayudhyan predecessors or with neighboring Thai dynasties. Similarly, he need not necessarily have felt himself bound by any historic accommodations which his predecessors may have reached with neighboring kingdoms. More immediately, throughout his reign Taksin faced the necessity of waging warfare against a Burman monarchy much more aggressive than any antagonist the Siamese had ever met. ... To break this encirclement, Taksin had to work to expel the Burmans and their allies from these regions, and narrow the zone in which subsequent campaigns would be fought. At the same time, Taksin stood to gain the additional resources and manpower that these conquests could bring him. It is noteworthy, however, that Taksin consistently went further along these lines than King Naresuan (r. 1590-1605) had done under similar circumstances two centuries earlier.1o Furthermore, Taksin seems to have been ideologically compelled to act as he did, as Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian has explained: A ruler after 1767 had always to augment his store of merit and bun-barami [augustness] by being successful in his various undertakings. Frequent failures tended to be interpreted as signs of the diminishing merit and worthiness of the royal position. This pressure would naturally be stronger when the ruler was a usurper or a newcomer to the throne, as in the case of Taksin or Rama I, or the one whose royal right encountered constant challenges, as in the case of Rama III. Consequently, the Thonburi-Bangkok rulers appeared more conscious of achieving what was expected of the institution both in theory and practice than their Ayudyhan predecessors .... The Thonburi-Bangkok era was marked by the expansionist campaigns conducted by the self-declared dhamma-raja and cakravartin.l 1 Kings of this era took more seriously their role as "World Conqueror" (cakravartin) than as "Guardian of the Law" (dhamma-raja). For this reason, Thai kings of this period adored Napoleon; his portrait adorned royal temples. 12 Circumscribed by traditional conceptions of kingship and ignorant of the new situation with all the dangers that it portended, neighboring kings were content haughtily to despise the new Thai ruler, whom they charged with being "a son of 9 Jouvenel (1945), pp. 351, 324-325. 10 Wyatt (1982), p. 13. 11 Kobkua (1987), p. 99. 12 Pallegoix (1844), pp. 141-143; Burney Papers, vol. 5, part 1, p. 8; Crawfurd (1830), pp. 194, 211.

36

Paths to Conflagration

Chinese and a usurper." 13 A proud Cambodian chronicler at the time dismissed the personal pedigree of Taksin and completely failed to take into account the fact that the region's old, dynastic, Indianized international order, with its stable sacred frontiers, had passed away.1 4 Taksin's conception of "borders" was much closer to the Chinese conception, which defined borders as constantly moving and essentially elastic. Everywhere and always, it was by the sword and the gun that this strongman succeeded, first by reestablishing the unity and independence of Siam, and then by imposing Siamese law and order upon the Malay, Cambodian, and Lao states. His commander-in-chief, the Chaophraya Chakri, succeeded in working out a modus vivendi in 1776 with his Burmese counterpart, Asewunki; as a result, the Burmese evacuated most of Siam. The international environment at the time was particularly favorable to his undertakings. Interactions between Peking and Taksin were particularly significant. In his efforts to realize the "Celestial empire in Southeast Asia," 15 the vision that the new Thai rulers more or less sketched as their goal, Taksin was aided not only by his Thai compatriots, but also by Chinese and Sino-Thai allies, such as the Chakri.16 Taksin was half-Chinese; his father had been born in the Kwangtung region. When Taksin asked for assistance from the Emperor of China, he was rewarded with modest success in the form of sulfur and cannons. 17 China entered the conflict between the Thai and Burmese by bringing pressure to bear on the Burmese. In fact, during this period the Lao received an invitation from China to cooperate against the Burmese. 18 Taksin even coveted marriage with a princess of the "Son of the Sky." 19 He encouraged the immigration of Chinese into his territories; these immigrants received such privileged treatment that the Thai called them Chin Luang (Royal Chinese). 2 0 As it turned out, however, their situation was unenviable. These migrants suffered and sacrificed to create wealth that contributed to the fortunes of the ruling elite, while simultaneously their apparent privileges earned them popular antipathy that would otherwise have been directed against the elite.21 During his stay in Bangkok in 1821, John Crawfurd took notice of them: The Chinese whose numbers are at present so great, are scattered over every part of the country .... At Bangkok, the capital, it is supposed they are equally numerous with the native population. In the end of the seventeenth century I find their numbers nowhere rated at above four or five thousand. About thirty years ago there sat upon the throne of Siam a king of half Chinese race, and it was through the extraordinary encouragement which he 13 Cf. Chandler (1973), p. 99. On Taksin, see Thompson (1961), p. 28. See also Chroniques royales khmer (1974), p. 69, where the writer declares: "We are of a very noble dynasty, it is not proper for us to submit to Cao Tak, a Chinese Hai Hun, and thus to dishonor ourselves." 14 Lafont (1989); Thongchai (1988). 15 Chandler (1973), p. 67. 16 Wenk (1968), pp. 1-2. 17 Fistie (1967), p. 52. 18 Brailey (1968), p. 19. 19 Narinthonthewi (1963) (T), p. 11; Tuan (1985) (T), p. 81. 20 Malinee (1985), p. 81. 21 See the analysis in Nithi (1988) (T), pp. 37-38.

The Hegemonic Crisis of the "City of Angels"

37

gave to his countrymen that they were induced to resort to the country and settle it in such numbers. This extraordinary accession of Chinese population constitutes almost the only great and material change which has taken place in the state of the kingdom during many centuries. 22 This demographic transformation fueled the productive power that resuscitated the Siamese economy and enabled Siam to participate energetically in the early stages of developing capitalism. The process created a voracious demand for valuable natural resources available in the hinterlands. Political expansionism thus resulted directly from the rejuvenation of the economy after the sacking of Ayudhya. To the east, in Vietnam, the Tay Son insurrection put to flight that country's royalists. This Vietnamese civil war, as well as a Chinese invasion of northern Vietnam, swept away the last impediment to Siam's hegemonic expansion over the whole of the Mekong River basin. 23 Siam's aggressive expansion generated fierce tensions and misunderstandings that continue to haunt Laos and Thailand to this day. In their relations, internal as well as interstate, "violence is a poison to the political constituency; this poison once introduced, diffuses and leads to convulsions. It must never begin."24 6. THE END OF THE FRATERNAL PACT IN 1778-1779

After eliminating his rivals and striking a deal with the Burmese, Taksin strove to constitute the "Thonburi tributary network." 25 The first tributary mission recorded by Thai chroniclers originated from the small Lao principality of Lomsak, which offered one elephant and five horses. 26 Not all provinces were so quick to offer tribute. To overcome the resistance of other states, Taksin resorted to coercion. In Cambodia, a country traditionally vulnerable to Thai incursions, the Thai advance forced the Cambodian king to take refuge in Vietnam. Taksin, however, circumvented the Cambodian king's bid for protection, and proposed to the Vietnamese court that Cambodia be divided between Siam and Vietnam.27 The Thonburi king was more fortunate when he applied the new policy to Lao states in the Mekong basin. Previously both large and small Lao states had only entered into tributary relationships with Ayudhya when they were advantageous to the Lao. The larger states were powerful enough to enjoy a "more or less equal" relationship except during rare occasions when they required military protection from Ayudhya. Small Lao states often paid tribute to Ayudhya, but they could "let it lapse" when it was no longer advantageous because the larger Lao states would protect them. With the rise of Thonburi, however, their freedom became circumscribed. The larger Lao states became "fragmented and much weaker" and therefore unable to protect either the small Lao principalities or themselves from 22 Crawfurd Papers, pp. 103-104. 23 Le Than Khoi (1955), p. 337; Woodside (1971), p. 248. 24 Jouvenel (1963), p. 28. 25 Gesick (1976), p. 87. 26 Gesick (1976), pp. 87-88. The relentless progress of the Thai armies after the reconquest of Khorat appears to have precipitated Lomsak's move. Gesick (1976), p. 88. 27 Gesick (1976), pp. 88-89.

38

Paths to Conflagration

Siam's determined efforts to "bring these states into its tributary orbit." Within a few years, "Ayudhya's two major Lao rivals had been brought firmly under Siamese domination. " 28 While close ally to the Burmese since the 1769 alliance, Vientiane was the first of the Lao capitals to initiate intercourse with Taksin in order to acknowledge the new regional situation as well as to gain access to the sea for Lao international trade. Its king, Siribunyasan, sent Taksin a letter dated January 1, 1771. To underline the perfect parallelism and equality of rank between the two courts, the chief of the Lao ministers also forwarded a missive to his counterpart. 29 These first dealings between the two capitals focused on the problem of Phra Voraphita, a Vientiane rebel dignitary.30 Vientiane's forces had been unable to conquer Phra Voraphita, who was entrenched in Nang Bua Lam Phu despite two years of a siege laid by Vientiane. The Lao elite requested help from Taksin, and with the assistance of Thai troops from Khorat, Vientiane forces finally succeeded in dislodging Phra Voraphita from his sanctuary. In a letter to Taksin, Siribunyasan expressed his gratitude for Siam's help in containing this "rebellion" by Phra Voraphita. It appears that Taksin's assistance convinced the king of Vientiane that the new Thai dynasty was friendly and not threatening, for in this letter, Siribunyasan requested that Thai troops remain stationed in Vientiane, since there were signs that Luang Prabang would soon direct its armies against the capital. 31 The governor of Khorat who commanded the Thai troops agreed to this proposition from Vientiane, in part because he also had to carry out Taksin's order to capture members of the former Siamese royal family hiding in Laos. 32 Taksin responded cordially in a letter to Siribunyasan dated May 1, 1771. Alluding to the prestigious lineage of his counterpart, Taksin proposed a matrimonial union to strengthen the mutual alliance suggested by Siribunyasan. Taksin's chief minister noted in his letter to his Lao counterpart that Taksin had easily overcome all his opponents in Siam and his power was at its apogee. The Thai dignitary proposed to the Lao ministers that Siribunyasan's daughter be given as a chief queen to his king. King Chulalongkorn, who published these letters, hypothesized that Taksin expected to receive neither the Lao princess in marriage nor the three hundred horses he wished to purchase from the Lao. Chulalongkorn "suggested that Taksin's apparent willingness to deal with the Lao king as an equal was merely a ruse to pacify Vientiane until Thonburi became strong enough to subdue it militarily."33 Vientiane did not reply to the Siamese counter-proposal. Their silence may have been because the Lao princess categorically refused to become involved with Taksin even 28 Gesick (1976), p. 90. 29 This correspondence between Vientiane and Thonburi is annexed to the memoirs of Princess Narinthonthewi (1963) (T) by the learned king of Siam, Chulalongkom, who devoted a thorough comment to it. See also Sila (1957) (L), pp. 165-219. This intercourse is scrutinized precisely by Wyatt (1963), pp. 15-19; and, studied with finesse by Gesick (1976), pp. 90-102. See also Kobkua (1987). 30 Ironically, after Taksin sent troops to help Vientiane against the rebel Phra Voraphita, Taksin later espoused the rebel's cause as a pretext for invading Laos. 31 Sila (1957) (L), p. 167. 32 Gesick (1976), p. 92. 33 Cf. Narinthonthewi (1963) (T), p. 84.

The Hegemonic Crisis of the "City of Angels"

39

for imperative political reasons.3 4 (The Thonburi marriage-makers had also been snubbed by the Cambodians and the Malays.) 35 In addition, the Siamese court's political representation of the arrangement did not please the Lao because "the relations are seen as being quasi-tributary in nature, in which the king of Vientiane appears as a man imploring the Siamese king."36 In the meantime, Luang Prabang attacked Vientiane, which apparently turned to the Burmese for help. 37 Taksin assailed Cambodia and compelled the southern Lao kingdom of Champassak to accept Siamese suzerainty. Then Taksin launched two campaigns to secure Chiang Mai, which he subdued by the end of 1774.38 As his expansion gathered momentum in the heart of Lan Na territories, consisting of Chiang Mai, Lamphun, and Lampang, Taksin had a letter delivered to the Vientiane king in January 1774. He emphasized that henceforth no one, not even the Burmese king, would be capable of hindering him. Taksin warned Siribunyasan to stop aiding the Burmese and to cease hiding Siamese subjects in Laos. Lorraine Gesick illuminates the diplomatic imbroglio of this period: Vientiane's response, sent in March 1775, disclaimed all the Siamese charges. They pointed out that they had evaded carrying out Burmese orders to attack Siam, secretly communicating these orders to the Siamese, and had only cooperated with the Burmese at all because they were holding as hostages King Sribunyasan's son, grandchildren and some high officials. They also defended themselves against the charge of preventing Siamese subjects from returning to their homes, asserting that they had given all possible cooperation to Chaophraya Nakhon Ratchasima. In tum, they asked that any Lao people from Vientiane's territories who had fled Siam be returned home, and asked that Siam also, as a mark of friendship, aid Vientiane to recover those princes and ministers still held hostage by the Burmese. To reinforce Vientiane's protestations of friendship, King Sribunyasan had the Supreme Patriarch of the Buddhist Order in Vientiane send an accompanying letter to his counterpart in Thonburi. 39 These letters reached their addressees when Siam gained victory over the Burmese, further boosting Taksin's ambitions. Gesick continues: They [the Siamese] demanded that King Siribunyasan present tribute and be invested as a tributary ruler by Siam. They also requested military aid and warned Vientiane that it would not be wise for them to reconsider and again throw in their lot with the Burmese.40 34 Traduction de l'histoire de Vien-chantha, p. 14. 35 For the case of Cambodia, see Chroniques royales khmer (1974), p. 69; for the Malay case, cf. Phongsawadan miiang songkla, quoted in Gesick (1976), p. 94, note 57. 36 Gesick (1976), p. 94. 37 Gesick (1976), p. 94, note 59. 38 Gesick (1976), p. 95. 39 Gesick (1976), pp. 98-99. 40 Gesick (1976), p. 99.

40

Paths to Conflagration

Taksin further pressured Vientiane by having his Supreme Patriarch communicate to the Supreme Patriarch of Vientiane the idea that King Taksin, more than any other king before him, fulfilled the ideal of the righteous monarch. The Supreme Patriarch of Vientiane was strongly urged to advise his king to remain steadfast in his friendship with the king of Siam. On July 31, 1775, three weeks after they received Taksin's ultimatum, Vientiane replied. The ruling elite tried "desperately to convince the Thai of their good intentions while also attempting to avoid falling completely under Siamese domination."4 1 The Lao, informed by the Khorat governor that the Siamese armies single-handedly defeated the Burmese, refuted Taksin's claim that he required Lao military assistance. Nevertheless, as proof of his friendship, the Lao king offered in marriage one of his daughters to the king of Siam and asked the Siamese to make all the necessary arrangements to escort her to Thonburi. Vientiane proposed also to send five-hundred ox-carts of rice and requested buffalo to convey the rice to Thonburi. In return, the Lao king asked the Siamese to bring two thousand guns with them when they came to escort the Lao princess. David Wyatt acutely interprets this episode: Evidently, the king of Vientiane had accepted the fact of Siamese power, but his response to Taksin's request indicates that he wished to keep their relations on an equal basis. While he must have felt constrained to accept some of Siam's demands in view of the disparity in their military power, he attempted to gain some status in his own right by marrying his daughter to Taksin and he also required that Siam make some efforts on his behal£. 42 Taksin abruptly replied to the Lao that if they were sincere in their desire to fight against the Burmese, he would send them four to five thousand guns and instructors. Taksin declined the offer to escort the princess, under the pretext that he urgently needed all of his military men. He dismissed the Lao allegation that the Burmese had already submitted to Siam. He also refused to dispatch buffaloes to cart the offered rice and warned Vientiane against taking sides with the Burmese. With this letter, the correspondence broke off. Taksin's tone in the final letter makes it safe to assume that the rupture was complete.43 Gesick has argued that this correspondence clearly demonstrated the "escalating expansionism" of the Thonburi kingdom. Initially, Thonburi was not sufficiently certain of its power and so was willing to maintain "friendly and, at least superficially, equal" relations with Vientiane. As Thonburi's power grew, its demands became more insistent, and letters to Vientiane claimed Taksin was cakravartin (world conquerer). Soon after the correspondence broke off, the Siamese conquered Vientiane "outright," an action "foreshadowed in the last letters." King Chulalongkorn of Siam would later claim that the Siamese had envisioned conquest from the beginning; at minimum, by 1778, the Siamese desired and imagined conquest possible.44 Taksin's strategic thinking about the threats to his power lends support to Chulalongkorn's comparatively grim assessment. From the beginning, Thonburi 41 Gesick (1976), p. 100.

42 Wyatt (1963), p. 18. 43 For the same opinion, Gesick (1976), p. 103; for a dissenting opinion, see Wyatt (1963), p. 18. 44 Gesick (1976), pp. 101-102.

The Hegemonic Crisis

of the "City of Angels"

41

compared the Lao to Siam's worst enemy, the Burmese. The Royal Khmer Chronicles report that when Taksin founded the new capital at Thonburi, he thought aloud in front of his court: Krun Sri Ayudya [Krung Sri Ayudhya], the place where the court had been established in Krun Kau [Siam's previous capital], was too near Laos and Burma, that its geomantic emplacement was not very good, and that was why the Burmese could come to assail it so many times. 45 From early on, then, Taksin had clear ideas about who his enemies were and contemplated how to meet and repel their threats. His stance was strengthened by an implacable ideologico-religious logic, as Gesick reminds us: Since the "Dhamma" of a kingdom was inextricably bound up with the merit of its king, Taksin perhaps felt that only by being personally the possessor of vast stores of merit could he restore that morality ... Since the possession of tributaries was one of the most visible indications that a king possessed great merit, the tendency to expansionism which this idea built into the system was ever more enhanced in Thonburi's case. The youth and the capability of Taksin's generals, combined with their own desire to vindicate the Ayudhyan ideal, added further impetus to Thonburi's expansionistic drive. 46 The logic is defensible only on its own terms. Why should Taksin, his generals, and successors feel themselves entitled to claim great merit and tributaries at the expense of, for example, the Lao king or the Cambodian king, who were also self-styled dhamma-raja? Whatever the case, certainly Taksin was himself seduced by an absolute power that frightened his peers. After compelling the Thai clergy to pray to him for more than two years, Taksin pretended that he could fly in the air and that he was the omniscient Buddha incamate.47 Absolute monarchs who focus exclusively on the ends of political action and use naked force to gain those ends can be perceived as victims of a potent, seductive delusion. Is not Taksin perhaps a political animal led astray by his experiences and convictions, which designated violence as the exclusive means and goal of politics? It is not surprising that violence finally spilled over into Taksin's relations with the Lao. Taksin had previously had pretexts for attacking Vientiane, but they had arisen at times when he was preoccupied with Burma. At this point, however, there was a lull in the West, and several pretexts upon which to base an invasion of Vientiane, including perhaps the accusation of Thao Kham that the Lao were in league with the Burmese, as well the murder of a vassal, Wo. 48 45 Chroniques royales khmer (1974), p. 68. 46 Gesick (1976), pp. 103-104. 47 Krom Silpakorn, Prachum phongsawadan (T), vol. 9, pt. 39, p. 488. 48 Wyatt (1963), p. 20.

42

Paths to Conflagration

However, it took two trips for the Thai armies to break the Lao resistance and take over the Lao capital. Then, as the Royal Khmer Chronicles reported: the order was given to confiscate all precious objects, all weapons, guns and flints, and the population. Afterward, the Luang Prabang troops received orders to attack the territory of Than [called Su-ngi by the Vietnamese] and the territory of Moi. These two territories belonged to the Lao Songdam and were located along the Vietnamese border. ... The Songdam peoples received the king's order to settle in the proximity of Phetchaburi. The Lao from Vientiane, as well as other Lao taken in the areas east of the Mekong River, had to go to live in Saraburi, in Ratchaburi, in the towns situated along the Western frontier [of Siam], and in Chanthaburi. 49 Only the survivors of these attacks went to live in the designated areas. However, fully two-thirds died during their journey to Siam.50 The Lao chronicles call this ordeal the silk Thai (Thai war). 51

7. BANGKOK'S POLICY OF DIVISIVENESS LEADS TO DANGEROUS TENSION: KHORAT PROVES IRREDENTIST

After the aggression of 1778-1779 and at the prompting of the Bangkok establishment, a new elite seized power in villages and towns on the Khorat Plateau and more generally in the Mekong basin. 52 This counter-elite, opposed to Vientiane, was recruited especially from among the offspring of Phra Vorapita, the rebel dignitary whose resistance had prompted King Siribunyasan to invite Siamese forces into his territory. 53 The yokkrabat54 of Khorat was directly responsible for this silent and merciless conquest. In the first stage, forces allied with Bangkok took or recaptured localities situated near Khorat. In the second stage, Bangkok's allies infiltrated other Lao centers and scattered their populations. This technique for conquest, which relied on successive destabilization, was incredibly efficient. Chaiyaphum, located mid-way between Bangkok and Vientiane, is a typical case. "The population was formed primarily from the descendants of Krung Sisattanakkhanahut (Vientiane), the province of Lrei or the district of Phu Viang, and even from Khorat." 55 During the reign of Chao Anou, the people of Vientiane established villages in this ancient Khmer site, and by 1819, the villages numbered eleven. Thao Lee, the pioneer of this enterprise, gathered one cubit of white cloth per person to present to Anou as a sign of allegiance, and in return, the Vientiane king ennobled him with the title of Khun Phakdichumphon. Three years later, Thao Lee, 49 Chroniques royales khmer (1974), p. 84. See also Thiphakorawong (1978), pp. 26-27. 50 Krom Silpakom, Prachum phongsawadan (T), vol. 9, pt. 39, p. 489. 51 Phongsawadan yo miiang wiangchan (1969) (T), p. 141. 52 Pansa (1978) (T), pp. 42-60; Dhawaj (1980) (T), p. 14. 53 Breazeale (1975), pp. 78-79. 54 The exclusive position of yokkrabat was defined in the Arthasastra, the celebrated Indianized political science treatise, as slightly less powerful and esteemed than a governor. 55 Teem (1970) (T), p. 24.

The Hegemonic Crisis of the "City of Angels"

43

certainly influenced by the yokkrabat of Khorat, refused to pay tribute to Anou. To explain his change of heart, he declared that Anou himself was nothing more than a vassal of the Bangkok court. This same, bitter stratagem was also provocatively directed against Anou and Chao Yo, Anou's son, by the yokkrabat of Khorat.56 Thao Lre then signaled his allegiance to Bangkok by bringing the white cloth to Khorat; the yokkrabat of Khorat exulted when Thao Lre inflicted this insult on the yokkrabat's mortal enemy, Chao Anou.5 7 Rama III then awarded his new ally with a title higher than that bestowed on him by Anou, and Thao Lre thereafter bore the rank of Phraya Phakdichumphon.58 Thao Lre's conversion was a success for Bangkok, which had encountered frequent failures in its attempt to exert influence over principalities such as Nakhon Phanom, Mahachai-Kongkeo, and Khamkeut. These three principalities remained intractably faithful to Vientiane from 1790 on. 59 But other regions proved more receptive to Siam's blandishments. After 1815, Hemmarat (now Khemmarat) and Yasothon, formerly the establishment of descendants of the royal house of Lan Sang, chose to rely on Bangkok and received, as a reward, the spoils taken from the Champassak domains. 6 Champassak was sacrificed to profit Khorat,61 which gobbled territory, piece by piece, as the silkworm consumes mulberry leaves. The same process that devastated Champassak was used to divide, conquer, and ultimately destroy Suwannaphum, where a succession dispute that began in 17931794 left the region vulnerable to incursions. Before its virtual disintegration, the political significance of Suwannaphum was equal to that of Vientiane or Champassak, for after 1778 its leaders had been invested with equivalent ceremonial status by Siam. 62 But the Bangkok elite was determined to co-opt Suwannaphum. The governor of Roi-Et adopted a devious stratagem in 1793-1794. He invited a village leader, Thao Somphanit, to be received in audience by the king of Siam, Rama I, who promptly elevated the status of Thao Somphanit's village, Ban Keng Sam Hong, to equal that of Miiang Kalasin. 63 Gradual implementation of this method resulted in the shrinkage of Suwannaphum, which lost territory one piece at a time. These pieces became independent centers governed by individuals who had received favors and advancement from Siam. Already, Miiang Ubon had been created out of one part of Suwannaphum. Later, an official from Suwannaphum left the principality to create Chonnabot. After he settled there as leader, he asked to be dependent on Khorat.64 In 1798, the Khorat authorities laid the foundation of Khon Kren, also at the expense of Suwannaphum's territorial integrity. In 1800, the establishment of

°

56 Dhawaj (1980) (T), p. 75. 57 On the antagonistic relations between the would-be governor of Khorat in 1824 and the royal dynasty of Vientiane, see Dhawaj (1980) (T), pp. 67-83; Dhawaj (1982) (T), pp. 28-29; and Gutzlaff (1834), p. 76. Confirmation by Vietnamese archival sources can be found in Nguyen Le Thi (1977) (V), p. 134. 58 Trem (1970) (T), p. 25. 59 Trem (1970) (T), pp. 255, 275, 323. 60 Trem (1970) (T), p. 129. 61 Archaimbault (1961), pp. 560-567. 62 Pansa (1978) (T), pp. 44, 46. 63 Prayun (1972) (T), p. 22. 64 Archaimbault (1961), pp. 560-567.

44

Paths to Conflagration

Phutthaisong further reduced Suwannaphum, so that afterwards it was just a fraction of its former size. In 1815, the governor of Khorat delivered the final stroke when he had the leader of Suwannaphum accused by his own wife of maladministration and had him sent to Bangkok. His life was terminated in Saraburi.65 In this way, Suwannaphum (formerly Miiang Thong), a principality that once equaled Vientiane and Champassak in status, was dismantled and its population redistributed.66 Divide, parcel out and oppose-this policy was applied with great success to Champassak and Suwannaphum. Ironically, in 1827, the new centers concocted by Siam out of the spoils carved from Suwannaphum would form a bloc that allied with Chao Anou. One of Anou's best military commanders, Phagna Narin, was born in the town of Chonnabot. Similarly, Yasothon resisted the Bangkok armies led by the Thai general, Chaophraya Bodinthondecha (Bodin). And Suwannaphum, a territory cut up by Khorat, became the only stronghold opposing Anou. Siam did not meet with universal success in its efforts to fragment and control the Lao principalities, and in certain instances its attempts were stymied and even opposed, because the many administrative changes and manipulations that took place during this period generated unexpected results. In Kalasin, a town founded under Rama I by an opponent to the Vientiane dynasty, a debate raged among its elite concerning its relationship with Bangkok at the beginning of the reign of Rama III. Members of the elite argued over whether to accept or refuse direct administration by Bangkok, signified by the order to tattoo the population in this regionP The debate, highly political and eminently disruptive, eventually spread throughout the Khorat Plateau. 68 In the particular case of Kalasin, its Ratsavong protested the policy by proclaiming himself tributary of the kingdom of Vientiane and by bringing his partisans to found a new settlement called Ban Sieng Sum, later named Sakon Nakhon. After the Lao insurrection was crushed, these dissidents from Kalasin were transported to the province of Chonburi in the Gulf of Siam. 69 Also, certain migrant movements stirred up by the activities of Siam reinforced rather than fragmented Lao unity by revitalizing the economy and increasing the prosperity of Vientiane, the Lao political center. For instance, the Gnoo, led by Thao Moo, a Burmese subject, settled in the region, creating Saysouthi Outamburi in 1808; 65 Amorawongwichit (1963) (T), pp. 216, 217, 220, 221, 227. Thinking about the coups initiated

against the Lao by Rama II, King Chulalongkom lauds his ancestor in these terms: " ... the fame of his Majesty's happy rule spread far and wide, so that Lao and Burmese left their own countries to live in Siam." See Bock (1884), p. 378. The predominant opinion seems to have been that Anou and Rama II were close friends. To a certain extent, such a notion is not incongruous, for in the field of politics as in the animal kingdom, members feed on one another. The Lao literary masterwork Sieo savat maintains that "When the tide rises, the fish eat the ants; when the tide recedes, the ants eat the fish." 66 We should note in passing that the dates of 1793-1794 are crucial, for it was during this period that the second depopulation of the kingdom of Vientiane took place. The Vientiane population was transferred in waves to the west bank of the Mekong. According to the few extant sources, one part of the population must have settled at Ban Na Khi-Khwai, later known as Miiang Lomsak. Others must have inhabited Miiang Mahasarakham, which received four waves of refugees originating from Vientiane: in 1778-1779, 1793-1794, 1845, and 1865. Prayun (1972) (T), p. 15. 67 Theerachai (1984) (T), pp. 44 ff.

68 Theerachai (1984) (T), pp. 76-87. 69 Trem (1970) (T), pp. 251-252.

The Hegemonic Crisis of the "City of Angels"

45

this town was later known as Outhenh.7° The Phuthai, who numbered ten thousand, came from Miiang Na Noi: 01 Nu 71 and asked Chao Anou if they could settle in the kingdom of Vientiane. Anou allowed them to inhabit Vang Viang and then offered a woman from the palace of Vientiane in marriage to the chief of the Phuthai. He even sent a monk from the Vientiane clergy to spread Buddhism among the new settlers.72 These factors worked against Bangkok's attempts to dominate Lao areas and precipitated a reaction by the new monarch of Siam, Rama III, who perceived that Bangkok's traditional "divide and rule" policy vis-a-vis Lao territories was being thwarted. 73 The king initiated efforts to regain control. "The new dynasty [in Bangkok] reorganized the kingdom and sought to establish its influence over all the groups of the Thai race. In 1827, the peril became imminent." 74 Danger threatened both the Lao and the Thai, for tensions between the two powers had been growing. Bangkok's efforts to maintain its influence by compelling local elites in Mekong River basin areas to declare their ultimate allegiance to Bangkok or Vientiane fueled tensions. Rama III's decree to tattoo all able-bodied men in the Lao territories was a desperate measure fated to provoke an armed confrontation, the result of which would be a sharp, neat, genocidal military victory over the Lao. This victory would put an end to their prolonged skirmishes in the shadows. 8. SLAVE RAIDS IN LAO AREAS Siam's fragmentation and absorption of Lao principalities was accompanied by ongoing slave raids against the Lao population, for Siam was sparsely populated and, as it moved into the nineteenth century, found itself in increasingly greater need of labor. The increase in the supply of slave labor that began in 1778-1779, when Siam was recovering from the devastation of the Burmese invasion, helped fuel the primitive accumulation of capital. This, in tum, contributed to a departure from petty production and stimulated Siam's economic takeoff during the reigns of Rama II and Rama III, a development that ultimately facilitated Siam's integration into the world capitalist system. Bangkok had for many years relied on the impressment of its citizenry to complete court projects. John Crawfurd, the British envoy to the court of Bangkok, reported in 1821: Prayun (1972) (T), p. 44; Dhawaj (1987) (T). Miiang Na Noi: Oi Nu means the land-of-tiny-ricefields-with-short-sugarcane-plants. It refers to Miiang Theng or Dien Bien Phu. 72 Sanre (1978) (T), pp. 162-163. A local history of Sieng Soy, an inhabitant of Se·Song Soy, (a branch of the Se Bang Hieng river), in South Laos, relates that Sieng Soy had gone to struggle against rebels at Miiang Thtmg and, thanks to his muskets with two firing bullets, he was able to defeat the Phuthai rebels. Chao Anou had ennobled him as Chao Phanoid with a residence at Miiang Phoong (now Miiang Sieng Hom), on the bank of Se Song Soy. Chao Phanoid was son-in-law of the governor of Miiang Phin. Thus, according to this oral tradition, one wonders if the migration of the Phuthai was voluntary. Interview of Khampheng Kettavong. Vientiane, April15, 1987. 73 Pansa (1978) (T). 74 Lajonquiere (1901), p. 99. 70

71

46

Paths to Conflagration All the male population of Siam are by law considered the slaves or servants of the State, and compelled to give it their gratuitous labour in whatever form it may be exacted from the year of twenty-one upwards ... The system by which the population is organized and arranged for the purpose of rendering the forced services of the people available, forms the most important object of Siamese administration ... 75

He continued: An extraordinary advance in latter times in the price of slaves would seem to imply an important change in the frame of the society. About fifty ticals was in former periods the price of a good slave, but at present the average is about three times this amount. This implies an increased demand for labor, which has no doubt been the result of that freedom from internal disorder and anarchy, and the augmentation of commerce and industry, which have now prevailed for forty years, since the final expulsion of the Burmans.76 It appears that there was work to be done in Siam, but not enough people to do it.

Contemporaries recorded that in the early nineteenth century Siam had a declining population. Archbishop Bruguiere wrote from Bangkok: Siam is a very fertile country, but poorly populated and badly cultivated; there are ten times fewer inhabitants than in France for an equal expanse of territory. If one is to judge the population by the number of persons born in ten years, compared to the persons dead in the same period, a comparison I carried out in one of our Christian parishes, it seems that the population diminishes by one-ninth every year; thus in less than one century, Siam would just become a desert ... 77 Other European visitors noted that cholera morbus, which in 1820 killed one-fifth of Bangkok's population, and the ruthless use of manpower both had contributed to the population decline.78 Siam also experienced a tremendous demand for labor as a result of the unprecedented increase in international trade provoked by the creation of a free port at Singapore. In 1824, among Asian nations, only China conducted more trade than Siam at this port?9 New cultivation technology applied to sugarcane in the 1810s made the Bangkok oligarchy a fortune until the 1860s, after which Java dominated the sugar trade and reaped the profits. 80 New sugar cultivation methods introduced in Siam between 1810 and 1860 were highly labor-intensive, and sugar workers were often procured through duress.8 1 Rama III gave orders to send "the Chinese, the Lao Papers, p. 122. 76 Crawfurd Papers, pp. 138-139. 77 Brugiere (1831), p. 69. 78 Crawfurd Papers, pp. 138-139; Burney Papers, vol. 2, part 4, pp. 52, 133, 226. 79 Cady (1964), p. 332; Fistie (1967), p. 52. 75 Crawfurd

80 Hubbard (1977), p. 30. 81 Nithi (1988) (T), p. 40.

The Hegemonic Crisis of the "City of Angels"

47

and the Khmers" as laborers to help develop supplies of this new monoculture export. 82 For instance, after the fall of Anou, Phagna Ba-Inh, a high-ranking Lao official in the Vientiane kingdom was forced to work with his family in Lopburi sugar plantations owned by Vice King Bowon. 83 The princely family of Siang Khuang was sent, after the Lao defeat, to cultivate rice in ChachCEngsao.84 The first official slave draft operated by Bangkok in peacetime against the Lao occurred in 1791, only nine years after the foundation of Bangkok, although an earlier harvest of Lao slaves had occurred in 1778-1779 (that particular incursion dramatically boosted the total number of Lao slaves). 85 The yokkrabat of Khorat at the time, a man known for his treachery against the Lao and for Bangkok, handled the traffic in humans. As the only high-levellocal official in Khorat directly appointed by and responsible to Bangkok, the yokkrabat found himself strategically placed as the "eyes and ears" of the Crown. In return for his service, the yokkrabat of Khorat would eventually be promoted by Rama III to the position of governor of Khorat. In 1791, a millenarian movement among the Lao Theung people broke out in opposition to Siamese oppression.86 The offspring of Phra Vorapita, mercenaries hired for the maintenance of the Thai order, were dispatched by Bangkok to repress the rebel Sieng Kreo and his followers, who had occupied Champassak. Bangkok also ordered the yokkrabat of Khorat to carry out the same mission, but he preferred to delegate this dangerous assignment to Phra Prathumsorarat of Huai Chaeramae (Ubon) and to Thao Fai Na of Ban Singtha (Yasothon). After the extermination of the Sieng Kreo movement, the yokkrabat of Khorat allied himself with two other local leaders in the service of Bangkok. Together they moved into the hinterland adjoining Champassak where they: ... apprehended members of the Jarai, Rhade, and Kasseng ethnic groups and others who lived on the eastern bank of the Mekong. They [the pro-Thai leaders] caught and enslaved great numbers of these people, a condition that would continue indefinitely for them and their offspring. In this way, according to the chronicle, began the custom of catching and enslaving kha peoples. 87 The tribal Lao Theung are commonly referred to by the derogatory name kha, which means slave, savage, or under-man in both Thai and Lao. 88 This rush by Siam and its proteges to enslave the kha-the Lao ethnic minorities-continued over a long 82 Nithi (1988) (T), pp. 41-42. 83 Phagna Ba-Inh died in the harsh conditions of the sugarcane plantations. Chotmaihet nakhon

ratchasima (1985) (T), p. 268. The coerced Lao work force had been used for digging canals and other infrastructures needed for the Siamese economic take-off. See Chotmaihet yo muang vientiane, Wat Ho Phra Kceo (Vientiane) (L); Theerachai (1984) (T); Sagnan Dongdeng (1988) (L); Sujit (1986) (T), pp. 42-44. 84 Snit and Breazeale (1988), p. 33; Naree (1985); for descriptions of the Lao settled at Prachinburi, s~e Thompson (1866); Mouhot (1863), p. 316. 85 Amorawongwichit (1963) (T), pp. 214-215. 86 "Histoire," Institut de Recherches en Sciences Sociales (1987) (L), pp. 252-256. 87 Chatthip (1984), p. 114; see also Amorawongwichit (1963) (T), pp. 214-215. 88 The derogatory word, kha, referred toAustroasiatic (like the Kasseng and the Katang) and Austronesian (such as the Jarai and the Rhade) tribal groups inhabiting the mountainous regions of Vietnamese and southern Lao hinterlands.

48

Paths to Conflagration

period. In 1819 another millenarian movement took place in Champassak, this time led by a man named Sakietgong and opposed by Chao Anou himself, for Anou had received orders from Bangkok to help suppress the rebellion. This movement swept rapidly through southern Laos, threatening Bangkok's domination of the area. The king of Champassak was no help in quelling the rebel movement; he preferred to place himself securely on the west bank of the Mekong rather than offer resistance to the crowd of Sakietgong fanatics. Bangkok ordered Anou and the yokkrabat of Khorat to regain control of the area, inhabited by the Lao Theung. The yokkrabat of Khorat perceived that the unrest among the kha could profit him directly, and he manipulated this movement in an effort to extend his grasp over Champassak first and over the whole east bank of the Mekong later. 89 If he had succeeded, his power would have encompassed the territory of the Vientiane kingdom. 90 As in 1791, the yokkrabat of Khorat chose to let the new regional gendarme of Bangkok, Chao Anou, advance into action. The yokkrabat may have believed that giving Anou the opportunity to crack down on the movement would also give Anou extra rope with which to hang himself. Thus, Chao Anou's forces advanced without assistance against eight thousand partisans of Sakietgong, who claimed they were invulnerable to bullets. 91 Guessing the yokkrabat's hidden strategy, Anou swiftly executed his own design and thwarted the hopes of this representative of Bangkok. Anou sent his son, Chao Yo, with forces to subdue Sakietgong, and the results for Chao Yo's own forces were dismal. Driven by the need to move quickly, Chao Yo won the nickname of khi noon or "worm excrement" during the expedition, for he required his men to paddle day and night without rest from Vientiane to Champassak. Their hands swelled and putrefied without their realizing it.92 However, Chao Yo did succeed in obtaining his goal: Sakietgong was taken prisoner. Accompanied by the yokkrabat of Khorat, Anou brought Sakietgong, along with the overthrown Champassak leader, to ask for justice in trade relations from Bangkok. His plea was in vain.93 Anou saw the denial of his request, as well as the utter silence maintained on the topic by the Bangkok establishment, as an official endorsement by the Siamese elite of the yokkrabat 's plan to extend his power across the Mekong. The sorrow and the resentment felt by Anou must have been exacerbated by the impertinent yokkrabat who preached, "We both are subjects of the king of Siam: you must not think yourself better placed than me."9 4 Even ritual honors and the elevation of Anou's son, Chao Yo, who became king of Champassak, could not now placate Chao Anou, whose distrust for Bangkok and Khorat was growing more profound. 95 Under the pretext of installing a defense post against Vietnam, the yokkrabat of Khorat established his base of operations at Miiang Khong to capture the ethnic Lao 89 On this point, see Dhawaj (1980) (T), p. 17 and note 4; Wuthichai (1982) (T), pp. 45-52;

Chatthip (1984), p. 115; Pansa (1978) (T), p. 83. 90 Dhawaj (1982) (T), p. 71; Dhawaj (1980) (T), pp. 28-29. 91 They believed that bullets would transform into frangipan flowers. 92 Khamphon (1936) (T), p. 36. 93 Dhawaj (1982) (T), pp. 71-77; Gutzlaff (1834), p. 76. 94 Dhawaj (1980) (T), p. 75. 9 5 The delicate court compromises leading to the assignment of Chao Yo as ruler of Champassak are discussed at greater length in a later chapter.

The Hegemonic Crisis of the "City of Angels"

49

Theung.96 With the Sakietgong uprising defeated, he was now perfectly free to chase and capture "savage" slaves within the Lao Theung areas. All those who were not captured perished by the sword. The Siamese reduced the minority peoples, who in those areas had once numbered some three hundred thousand, to only a few thousand in a terrible massacre. The people's legends still recall the rice fields running with blood, streams choked and valleys piled high with corpses. 97 The yokkrabat dared to require the new king of Champassak, Chao Yo, to capture slaves for him, a request which Anou's son categorically refused to meet. 98 His refusal exacerbated the antagonism between the Lao and the yokkrabat, who used every opportunity to damage the reputation of the Lao, especially the Vientiane royalty, in front of the Bangkok court and King Rama III. In 1827, the decisive war against the Lao and the systematic displacement of population from the east bank of the Mekong that followed it furnished Bangkok with abundant manpower. In 1866, after the fall of the kingdom of Vientiane, Louis de Came still observed "great rafts [bearing] herds of slaves" floating down the Mekong River and bands of slaves trudging along the dusty trai1. 99 The traffic in slaves permanently depressed the Lao economy and the losse!? worsened with the passage of time. Its consequences were catastrophic and virtually irreparable for many generations. The perennial under-development of Laos and the physical appearance of the Lao population were the most visible results of the slave trade.100 Jean Renaud observed that: Since a long time previous [the Lao's] best elements had been killed or reduced to slavery, this explains the puny aspect of the indigenes observed by our first explorers. This dark past (invasions, enslavement, massive transfers of population . . . ) explains also the somewhat surprising distribution of this population: they had fled the best soil that was most accessible where raids were fatal to seek refuge in the high valleys, the forest, where they felt more secure. They had regressed as well from the cultivating stage to the stage of the gathering economy.101 96 Dhawaj (1980) (T), p. 34. 97 Chatthip (1984), p. 115. 98 Dhawaj (1980) (T), pp. 29, 30. From 1791 on, slave hunting passions rose to a fever pitch. An emulator of the yokkrabat of Khorat braved sacrilege when he set out on a raid to kidnap slaves consecrated to That Phanom, the religious metropole of central Laos, and to abduct the Phuthai of central Laos who were direct subjects of the king of Vientiane. 99 Came (1869), p. 470; Harmand (1879-1880), pp. 6, 16, 28, 305-306. 100 The massive deportation in the wake of 1827 resulted in a five-fold disparity between the population of Laos and Thailand's northeast (Isan). The estimated magnitude of this displacement ranges from one hundred thousand people, a figure given by contemporary sources (Gutzlaff, 1834, p. 78) and generally accepted by present-day historians (Chalong, 1986 [T], p. 149), to more than three hundred thousand, a tally found in the Chiang Mai Chronicles. Lao chronicles drafted during the early period of French colonization appear, in this context, to be fictitious when they refer to five thousand families. 101 Renaud (1930), p. 139. It seems that the Lao economy was already partially monetized in the seventeenth century, see Wilson (1987), p. 173, note 10.

50

Paths to Conflagration

Exactions, extortions, pillaging, and the widespread theft of men and resources: the dark scene calls to mind contemporary accusations the Third World directs against the industrialized countries, accusations which the academician Bertrand Poirot-Delpech confronts in a column entitled "On your knees, men" (A genoux les

hommes): Fernand Braudel had already said it: "Europe becomes incomprehensible without its slaves and its subject economies." No, the exquisite is not a commodity that falls from the sky, neither is liberty. It took four centuries of overseas genocide, thirty years of a workforce imported, dozens of millions of migrants. Who will reckon the price of human rights in conquests and in confiscations? Who will ever know if his ideology has not resulted in, or been designed to insure, the maintenance of underdevelopment elsewhere? The culture called "free" deliberately ignores the exploitation which has permitted its birth and which provides for its survivai.102 It suffices to substitute "Siam" for "Europe" to find mutatis mutandis the basis of the

Lao-Thai problem. 9. THE CAPTURE OF LAO INTERNATIONAL TRADE

In the years preceding the holocaust of 1827, as Siam's encroachments gained momentum, not only were Lao land and people progressively swallowed up by Bangkok and its proxies, but Lao trade was as well. The war of 1827 was the culmination of a prolonged commercial struggle that Bangkok and Khorat authorities, eager to monopolize Laotian goods and trade, had waged against Anou and the Lao since 1814. 103 D. G. E. Hall remarked: In that year (1812) Rama II intervened in Cambodia in support of a rebel brother of the king, Ang Chan, who fled to Saigon. A strong Vietnamese force reinstated him in the following year, and the Siamese prudently retired with their candidate . . . But the Bangkok government took the opportunity to regain control. It compensated itself by sending an army in 1814 to Khorat which proceeded to occupy all the territory between the frontier of the province of Prohm-Tep and the Dangrek mountains. In addition, they occupied the provinces of Mlou-Prey and Tonle-Repou, which were too far distant from Udong to be effectively under the control of the central government. There was no opposition, and the Siamese army proceeded to cross the Mekong and occupy Strung Treng. By this operation, Siam gained possession of a thick slice of territory in the north of Cambodia and drove a 102 Poirot-Delpech (1980). 103 Dhawaj (1980) (T), p. 82; Dhawaj (1982) (T), pp. 27-28. Paul Schweisguth laconically mentions the "campaign against the Lao [centered in Khorat]; seizure of Strung Treng." Schweisguth (1944).

The Hegemonic Crisis of the "City of Angels"

51

wedge between that kingdom and the kingdom of Vientiane, which a few years later it was to absorb.104 Before Siam asserted control over regional trade between Cambodia and Vientiane, Chao Anou had attempted to maintain a grip, symbolically as well as economically, over this crucial area. As a symbolic gesture in 1806, Chao Anou initiated work with leaders of the central Lao principalities to revive the past glory of the That Phanom stupa, located in this hotly contested border region that was the center of many vital trade routes. With this action, Anou renewed a political tradition established long before by former Lao kings whose efforts unified the country and added to its prosperity. Historian D. G. E. Hall affirmed: Tradition credits King Phothisarath with raising the great reliquary of That Phanom to a central position in the religious life of the Mekong region south of Vientiane, and his bestowal of land and slave endowments to that shrine in 1539 reflects his power and interests in the region. Centered on Nakhon Phanom and That Phanom were trade routes directed eastward across the mountain chain to the coast of central Vietnam and southward to the new capital of a reviving Cambodian kingdom at Phnom Penh.1os By 1806, when Chao Anou commenced work on the That Phanom stupa, the rebel Tay Son movement in Vietnam had been definitively crushed by Gia Long, reestablishing order in that country, so that Vietnam once again became a promising trade partner. Anou sought a way to salvage the Lao trade that had traditionally crossed Cambodia and Vietnam. This explains why Anou returned to That Phanom in 1807, 1812 and in 1813. But in 1814 Bangkok blocked the Mekong because it considered the river a threat to its commercial and political interests. At the same time, Bangkok instituted a customs barrier 106 on the land route between Laos and Cambodia through Khukhan, itself "a rich province," 107 in order to break down the travel patterns followed by the caravan trade, thus cutting an artery vital to Lao prosperity. Siam had not always been able to impede Lao trade. In 1647, Jeremie Van Vliet recorded that to persuade the Lao to trade in Siam, where they had long been victimized by unfair trading practices, the Thai king had to send ambassadors to Vientiane with a promise that he would end such practices.108 But over a period of two centuries, the balance of power between the two countries had changed completely. In 1814, the Thai deliberately rechanneled the flow of trade toward the Khorat emporium and then to Bangkok, a stopping point for Singapore and China. Commenting on Article 5 of the treaty signed by Henry Burney on June 20, 1826 between the British and Siam, Burney stressed that "Their [Siamese leaders'] object is 104 Hall (1976), pp. 465-466; Gamier (1870-71), p. 51. On the importance of Tonle-Repou for the tri-border trade between Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam, see Doudard de Lagree's letters of 27 October, 18 December 1866, and 1 April1867, in Julien (1886), pp. 210 ff. 105 Hall (1976), p. 85. 106 Dhawaj (1980) (T), p. 82; Dhawaj (1982) (T), pp. 27-28. 107 Courtet (1890), figure and pp. 43-45. 108 Van Vliet (1647), p. 202.

52

Paths to Conflagration

to make Bangkok an entrepot for the commerce of the country." 109 This goal was largely achieved. In 1867, the older commercial route was diverted by a bottleneck installed in the extreme south of Laos which proved to be hermetic, for all trade relations ceased here below the [Mekong] river and all exchanges were directed toward Ban Kok through Khorat_110 This shift had fatal consequences for Laos, which had earlier profited from thriving trade relationships with its near and distant neighbors. Phonphisai was once celebrated for silk weaving. In the past "the best [silk was] exported to Siam, Toncquin, Quinam and Camboje"111 from Phonphisai, but by the 1860s this trade had completely collapsed. Pavie noted a similar decline in the south as the result of Siam's new administration of trade in the region: The first act of the invaders has been to close all communication with the [Vietnamese] coast. They have installed everywhere customs posts which confiscate merchandise at Kham-Lo ... Even at Lakhone, trade is almost entirely in the hands of the Chinese coming from Bangkok ... These Chinese are endorsed by the Siamese functionaries who strive to divert to their capital the products of the region which were sent in the past to Annam.1 12 Even the most active supporters of Bangkok in the 1827 conflict, such as the population of Mukdahan, became disgruntled with this situation. The peoples of Ban Mouk [Mukdahan] miss the time when the Se Bang-Hien [river] was a commercial artery linking Laos to the [Vietnamese] coast. Today Siamese posts have cut this artery to the detriment of the region. Kemmarat and its vicinity are admirably placed to benefit from this outlet.113 It is not difficult to find observers who attest to the flourishing trade activity in Laos before the interventions of Siam in the nineteenth century. As early as the 1500s, Father Gaspar de Cruz (1510-1570) saw the Lao coming down the Mekong to trade at Lovek (Cambodia). Most notable among the goods they had to sell was the famous musk the Portuguese and Spanish wanted to purchase. Gold was also exported from Laos; Joao de Barros (1496-1570) noticed that gold sold in Ayudhya came from Laos.l 14 Engelbert Kaempfer described the rich products of Laos in 1690: It produces Rice of the best kind in abundance, and furnishes Cambodia with the best Benzoin and Gumm Lace, though both these commodities grow also in that Country. It likewise yields the most valuable Musk, some Gold, and some precious Stones, chiefly Rubies, besides Pearls, which the Siamites call 109 Burney Papers, vol. 2, part 5, p. 169. 110 Gamier (1870-71), p. 82. 111 Gamier (1870-71), p. 83. 112 Pavie (1902), vol. 9, pp. 87,282. 113 Pavie (1902), vol. 9, p. 290. 114 Lach (1968), pp. 526, 566, 570; Mayoury and Pheuiphanh (1989).

The Hegemonic Crisis of the "City of Angels"

53

Muk, which is the more to be admired, since I could not hear that there was any Salt Sea in the country.J15 Friar Domingo Fernandes Navarette, a Spanish Dominican clergyman who lived in the Philippines for a decade in the rnid-1600s, wrote: Above [Camboxa] is the large kingdom of the Laos, a country abounding in Musk, Civit, Frankinsense, Benjamin and Storax, which Commodities they carry to Manila, and thence they are sent into New Spain. The country swarms with people.J16 Until the mid-nineteenth century, international trade in Southeast Asia placed a high value on these Lao products, and the profits derived from them were fantastic. In a letter of December 12, 1685, Verret estimated the profit from trade with Laos at two hundred percent, while it was one hundred percent with Macao and China, seventy to eighty percent with Tonkin, and sixty percent with Timor and Bomeo. 117 But the benefits and rich natural resources enjoyed by the Lao caused some difficulties with neighboring countries, particularly with Siam, which wanted to capture these trading opportunities for itsel£. 118 For instance, in 1633 the Thai king's commercial agents treated the Lao so poorly that they subsequently refused to trade in Ayudhya. In November 1641, Van Wuysthoff, representative of the Dutch East Indies Company, reported on his meeting with the twenty-three-year-old Lao king, Suryavongsa, in these terms: We [Dutch East Indies Company] seek to put all the spokes in the wheel of the peoples of Siam who strive to monopolize the commerce and to comer all the gold and all the resources. The [Lao] king is an active partisan of the freedom of trade, and is irritated that the Siamese are raising obstacles. "It is strange"-he often said-"that in Siam they want to hinder what is permitted in the whole world." The merchants from Louwen [Laos], Van Wuysthoff continued: ... complained bitterly to us of all the vexations they have endured in Siam. They have been forced to stand with their carts in special houses filled with spies; in this way they could sell only to some grand privileged persons. These latter purchase all the beautiful stuff at a cheap price to sell at a high 11 5 Kaempfer (1729), pp. 22-23. For an identical view, see San Antonio (1604), vol. 78. 1;

Hamilton (1727), p. 204; Modern Part of an Universal History From the Earliest Account of Time (1759), vol. 8, pp. 153-154; Aynes (1816); Hamilton (1821), p. 78; Malte-Brun (1841), vol. 3, p. 365; Jancigny (1850), pp. 234, 242, 245, 405; Cortembert and Rosny (1862), pp. 1, 8, 26, 36, 188 and 272; Septans (1887), pp. 50, 74; Maybon (1913), p. 414; Groslier (1958), p. 162; Dore (1980b), p. 21. For an opposite view, see Osborne (1975), p. 87. 116 Quoted in Mayoury and Pheuiphanh (1989), p. 9. 117 Krom Silpakom, Prachum phongsawadan, vol. 10, pt. 41, pp. 213-225. 118 Gutzlaff (1849), pp. 40-41.

54

Paths to Conflagration price, and give, in exchange, at a very high price, the cloth asked for by the Louwen. 119

Two hundred years later, these same complaints were repeated almost verbatim by Anou, who used them to explain why he finally had to take action against the governor of Khorat. This action constituted the catalyst of the 1827 conflict, and was recalled in the Phiin viang and by K. F. A. Gutzlaff. 12 0 As the organizer of this prolonged act of blackmail against the Lao, the governor of Khorat earned the confidence of Rama II and gained promotion when Rama III acceded to the throne.121 After the fall of the Vientiane kingdom, he conscripted all the adults from Khemmarat, Suwannaphum, Yasothon, Roi-Et, Mukdahan, and Khon Keen to hunt for ivory and cardamom, which were then stored at Khorat.1 22 His endeavors allowed him to imitate the lavish lifestyle of the Bangkok aristocrats. 123 Bangkok's wealth became tied to Khorat trade: Bodin was closely tied to the ambitious ruling family of Nakhon Ratchasima (Khorat), the Thai outpost situated at the western juncture of the Lao and Khmer states. During the second quarter of the nineteenth century, this family came to dominate Lao and Khmer affairs from the lower limits of Luang Prabang down into the Great Lake basin. . . . Bodin had been personally involved in the interior trade from the Lao and Khmer states that had helped enrich the elite of Bangkok before mid-century.124 But of course it was not only the governor of Khorat who profited from the Lao losses. Just three years before Chao Anou's revolt, Siam instituted radical measures to save its own economy by plundering the economy of Laos. Siam's foreign policy and the domestic price of rice were undeniably linked. In 1824, when King Rama II died in Bangkok, the state coffers were empty, triggering a rise in the price of rice.125 At this time, just three years before the Thai invasion of Laos in 1827, the price of one ox-cart (1,391 kg.) of paddy rose to a high of twelve tamliing, matching the price in the years preceding the fall of Ayudhya (1767). 126 To avert economic and political catastrophe, Rama III had to take drastic measures, including the extension of direct administration over areas where Thai authorities had never before interfered. He accomplished this by tattooing on the wrist the entire population in these areas, extending the fiscal system, transforming the agricultural tax from "in kind" to 119 Gamier (1871), p. 271. 120 Dhawaj (1980) (T), pp. 75 ff.; Crawfurd Papers, pp. 65, 75; Gutzlaff (1834), p. 76; Gamier (1870-71), pp. 54 and 388; see also Dhawaj (1982) (T), pp. 21-22. 121 See Nguyen Le Thi (1977) (V), p. 134. 122 Ngo Cao Lang (1977) (V), p. 60. 123 Natthawut (1974) (T), p. 37. 124 Snit and Breazeale (1988), p. 59. Gutzlaff, a contemporary, held a similar view, "(Bodin) endeavoured to enrich himself with immense spoils." Gutzlaff (1834), p. 76. More generally, see Wilson (1987), p. 4. 125 Theerachai (1984) (T), pp. 80-81. 126 Chotmaihet Hon (1965) (T), pp. 92-104, 108-110. It is also significant that before the invasion of Cambodia by Siam, the price of rice was eight tamlilng and after the invasion it was seven tamliing.

The Hegemonic Crisis of the "City of Angels"

55

payments in money, and multiplying tax rights leased to the Chinese.1 27 These measures allowed the Thai to brace the infernal machine against the Lao for the war of 1827. For "war, probably the principal occupation of the state, served both to maintain and develop the resources of the state and to contribute to the reproduction of both the slave population and the political system."128

10. THE LOSS OF THE EMERALD BUDDHA AND THE WAT HO PHRA KlEO BUILDING POLICY Siam's ongoing efforts to dominate Laos, beginning with Taksin's accession to power, were marked by a number of accomplishments, including the capture of Lao as slaves and the control of the region's flourishing trade routes. It would not seem that the loss of a statue could be as significant to the Lao as these other losses, yet the capture of the Emerald Buddha surely roused Chao Anou and his followers, spurring them on to resist Siam in 1827. In fact, the loss of this Buddha continues to rankle the Laos to this day. The statue has served as a focal point for all conflict between Bangkok and the Lao since the image was seized and brought, along with many other Lao sacred statues and texts, from Vientiane to Bangkok in 1779. 129 The religious dimension of Bangkok's hegemony has been crucial in shaping its attitude toward the Lao. In addition to his monopoly over the possession of white elephants, a symbol of the universal monarchy's manifest destiny, Taksin, the king of Siam, also secured possession of the Emerald Buddha. Siam had recently recovered from its upheaval of 1767 and Taksin needed regalia. This Buddha, referred to as the Phra Kreo, is the supreme symbol of politico-religious legitimacy in this part of Southeast Asia. Probably of Chiangmai workmanship, the Phra Kreo was valued by travelers in the early nineteenth century at approximately one million francs or the price of two hundred kilograms of gold.130 It is symptomatic that Rama I, Taksin's successor, inaugurated his new capital, Bangkok, with the 1782 construction of a pagoda consecrated to the Phra Kreo. Lunet de Lajonquiere echoed Lao assertions that Lao prisoner-craftsmen brought from Vientiane in 1779 constructed the temple. 131 This pagoda remains an awesome place; over a century ago, it both impressed and dismayed one visitor, John Crawfurd: 127 Chai (1987) (T), pp. 63-64; Therrachai (1984) (T), pp. 60 ff.; Hong (1984), Chapter 4; Breazeale (1975), p. 90. 128 Turton (1980), p. 279. 129 Subhadradis (1982) (T). Sanguan (1983) (T), pp. 183 ff. The sacred texts were conveyed to Thonburi for the preparation of the Buddhist council. See Wenk (1968), p. 40. 130 The Phra Ka!o is not made of emerald but more likely of jasper. Crawfurd pictured it as a "deity, of a green-colored stone, and about eighteen inches high. This, our conductors assured us, was made of emerald; but the material had not the least appearance of being highly polished, but was dull and opaque. It was not within reach of examination, but it is not improbable that it was a light-colored malachite imported from China." See Crawfurd (1834), p. 153. According to one individual, the Phra Ka!O measured forty-five em. wide and seventyfive em high; and the statue would have been carved five hundred years after the death of Buddha. Jacqueline De Fels (1976). For a study of the Chiang Mai origins of the statue basedon a study conducted by Dr. Piriya Krairoek, historian at Thammasat University in Bangkok, see Chamvit (1987) (T), p. 175. For estimates of its value, see Came (1869), p. 491. 131 Lunet de Lajonquiere (1901), pp. 118, 111; Archaimbault (1961), p. 567. Thompson states also "They [Lao prisoners of the 1779 war] have constructed the palace for the king."

56

Paths to Conflagration

I ought, however, to observe that the first appearance of a Siamese temple made a forcible impression upon us. It was impossible to see the extent of the

buildings, and the laboriousness and costliness of the workmanship and materials, without feeling that we were amongst a numerous people, who had made considerable advances in civilization, and who were ruled by a despotic government and a superstitious priesthood.132 The Phra Kreo became the chief obsession of the Lao in the nineteenth century. 133 The psychic, physical, and political acts of dispossession initiated by Siam against the Lao failed to stifle the renaissance and force of religion in Laos. Paradoxically, the thefts actually helped legitimize and focus political power in Laos. When the Emerald Buddha, resident of Lan Sang for three hundred years, was spirited away, it provoked an awareness of the necessity for national recovery among the Lao. The loss of this prestigious and legendary medium, the Phra Kreo, catalyzed the Lao people to mobilize politically. Political mobilization drew its strength from a simple metaphorical parallel: the Phra Kreo, like Lao independence, was captive in Bangkok. 134 Chao Anou, who appreciated its full significance, saw to it that the Phra Kreo was "returned" to the Lao by ordering the creation of handsome substitutes and many new pagodas. Anou restored and raised the foundation of Vientiane's Wat Ho Phra Kreo, which invaders had razed in 1779.135 To remind the Lao of their Emerald Buddha's power and to focus and magnify the political energy of this symbol, Anou ordered the carving of a new emerald Buddha, Phra Nak Savatsadi Hiian Kreo, which was housed in the new pagoda. 136 The structure built to house the new Buddha rose elegantly and eerily over two stories of terraces. From its original inception in the sixteenth century, this pagoda had been the sacral place for the political and religious life of the country. For instance, in 1779, Anou's sister, Princess Khieo Khom, took refuge in Wat Ho Phra Kreo when the defense of Vientiane collapsed before the Thai armies. 137 Fifty years later, in 1828, when he returned from exile in Vietnam, Anou came to spend his nights under the roof of this pagoda.I38 Lunet de Lajonquiere described its beauty: Thompson (1866). See also de Came (1869), p. 491; Thompson (1961), p. 748. Fran~ois Joyaux explained that in 1779 when Rama I brought the Emerald Buddha from Vientiane, "this originated to him a considerable prestige among the Siamese clergy." Joyaux (1967), p. 95. This is not accidental as Kobkua has demonstrated. Kobkua (1987), p. 99. 132 Crawfurd (1834), p. 153. 133 It is significant that on the 1820s "Map of Siam, Camboja and Laos" drawn by James Low, the words "Wat Phra Kreo" are substituted for the common name of the Lao capital. See also, Thao lao kham in a translation by Archaimbault (1980), pp. 127, 128, 150, 151, 155, 173; Dhawaj (1980) (T), p. 30; Dhawaj (1979) (T), p. 287. 134 Somsy (1984) (L); Pramuanwichaphun (1937) (T), p. 43. 135 Parmentier (1954), p. 112; Archaimbault (1980), p. 159. 136 Subhadradis Diskul (1982) (T), p. 33. 137 Traduction de l'histoire de Vien-chantha, p. 14. 138 Phongsawadan milang phuan (1969) (L), p. 18; Pramuanwichaphun (1937) (T), p. 40.

The Hegemonic Crisis of the "City of Angels"

57

. . . the gracious silhouette of the superimposed roofs, that are easy to reconstitute by thought, the elegance and the boldness of the colonnades, the lines simple and harmonious of the principal body, the spacing of the terraces make this monument a remarkable edifice ... It is likely to be the best expression of the architectural art in the capital of the Lan Sang kingdom.139 This may have been the most impressive and inspiring pagoda Anou constructed, but it was certainly not the only one. Recalling the Buddhist allegory of Savatti, in which the Buddha infinitely multiplied his image to confuse unbelievers, Chao Anou and the Lao expanded the construction of pagodas devoted to the Phra Kreo throughout their territories. As in Vientiane, the various Wat Ho Phra Kreo in the Lao metropoles sheltered great political meetings in which new high officials were installed or housed ceremonies for the oath-taking of officials. These temples also served as the center for the celebrations on festive days. A Wat Phra Kreo was founded by Anou at Srichiangmai, across the river from Vientiane. 140 His ally, Chao Noi:, Prince of Siang Khuang, also constructed a Wat Phra Kreo in his capital, decorated like the one in Vientiane. 141 Chao Yo, Anou's son and the monarch of Champassak, erected a Wat Ho Phra Kreo in his new capital_142 In their songs, children predicted that in the near future, "Ubon will come also to construct a Wat Ho Phra Kreo." 143 Ubon was the metropole of the descendants of Phra Vorapita. The construction of these pagodas consecrated to the Emerald Buddha functioned as challenges launched by the Lao against Bangkok's domination, particularly when Anou succeeded in reviving faith and fervor in his country. Anou's effort to return the sacred Buddha to the Lao also indicates that he was summoning his resources and gathering his inspiration and strength in preparation for the supreme, ultimate confrontation with Bangkok. The political consolidation of Lao identity and the restoration of Buddhist ideology were interwoven. Anou had begun these twin tasks early in his reign as vice king of Vientiane, and it is clear that he recognized the ways in which political allegiance and religious allegiance could reinforce one another. To consecrate the new capitals referred to as Miiang Hua Miiang (called Hua Pho or "capital father") and Miiang Siang Kho (called Hua Mre or "capital mother"), Chao Anou built pagodas and stupas in the towns of the Hua Phan Ha Thang Hok (now Sam Niia).144 139 Lunet De Lajonquiere (1901), p. 109; Came (1869), p. 488. 140 Dhawaj (1987) (T). 141 Archaimbault (1967), pp. 578 and 620, ascertains that Chao Noi in 1822, "erected a palace like the one jn Wieng Chan [... ] and raised fortifications on the edge of the town of S'ieng Khwang of ten km.length." About half a century later, James McCarthy depicted it similarly. "Chieng Kwang stands at an elevation 3770 feet above mean sea-level, on the hill called Pu Kio. At its best, within the memory of the oldest inhabitants, it was but a collection of wooden houses. Across the Nam Nia, along a spur overlooking the plain, were still the remains, almost perfect, of extensive earthworks, constructed at the time when Chao Anu was captured and taken to Bangkok." James McCarthy (1900), p. 15. 142 Archaimbault (1961), p. 566. 143 Chaleun (1978) (L), vol. 3, p. 22. 144 Communication of Paul Macey, Commissaire at Miiang Sone, issued in the Bulletin de /'Ecole Franfaise d'Extreme Orient (1901), pp. 408-409.

58

Paths to Conflagration

At this time, the ruler of Siang Khuang, formerly the center of Buddhism in Laos, sent his Buddhist patriarch to Vientiane to study. In return, Vientiane sent the abbot of Wat Pa (the forest pagoda) to teach Buddhism at Siang Khuang. The year 1798 was a watershed in the religious history of this principality, for "during this year, monks and novices abandoned the red robe" and Burmese rituai1 45; their adoption of the yellow robes of Theravada Buddhism signaled their willingness to act in cooperation with Vientiane. Anou used a similar method to seal his new alliance with the migrant Phuthai-he sent them a monk from Vientiane. 146 These religious commitments and exchanges were all part of a greater plan to unite the Lao and their allies. Buddhist councils have met to reconstitute the Buddhist scriptures, the Tripitaka or the Triple Gems, three times in Lao history. The first, under the king who first united Laos, Fa Ngum, was in 1359; the second under Phothisarath, was in 1523; and the third, under Chao Anou, took place in 1813. Chao Anou constructed a ho tai (pavilion to shelter the Tripitaka) near his pagoda, Wat Sisaket, 147 to house a complete set of the Tripitaka identical to the one owned by the king of Luang Prabang. 148 In the cosmological and political order, the reign of Anou seemed to have achieved its essential fullness and harmony. This third Buddhist council was convened after the completion of Wat Ho Phra Kreo at Srichiangmai and the bridge linking the two shores of the Mekong River in front of Vientiane. Begun in 1810, these two highly significant construction projects had been finished in 1812 and consecrated by a festival lasting seven days and seven nights.149 An even longer celebration, lasting fifteen days and nights, marked the restoration of Wat Ho Phra Kreo and the construction of the ho tai in Vientiane in 1816. 150 The revival of pomp, the new surge in Lao confidence in themselves and in their destiny, and the mobilization of hearts and souls all were motivated by the same goal: to realize the unity of Laos and to recover their independence lost in 1779.151 Pilgrims, monks, and the devout flocked to Vientiane. The national stupa, That Luang, which was supposed to shelter the Buddha's hair, attracted its share of popular fervor. Chao Anou embellished the That Luang of Vientiane and added a cloister. The Thammahaysok kiosk also dates from this period. A big festival was held to celebrate the completion of this architectural work.l52 In the seventeenth 145 Archaimbault (1967), p. 576; Phongsawadan miiang phuan (1969) (L), p. 12. The red dress of the monks characterized Mahayana Buddhism, while the yellow one indicated Theravada Buddhism. 146 Sanre (1978) (T), p. 163. 147 Royaume du Laos (1956) (L), pp. 4-5. 148 Royaume du Laos (1956) (L), p. 6. 149 Chotmaihet yo miiang vientiane, Wat Ho Phra Kreo; also Riiang sang wat ho phra ka:o Srichiangmai (1969) (T), pp. 162-172; Dhawaj (1987) (T). 150 Chotmaihet yo miiang vientiane, Wat Ho Phra Kreo. 151 For an identical view, see Sila (1974) (L), pp. 12-13; Kham (1974) (L), p. 5. 152 Groslier, an Indochina art expert, described That Luang. "The stupa rises from an enclosed platform, and bears on its summit an elegant finial supported on lotus petals, which is a last echo of the architecture of Sukhothai. A cloister forms the external wall. The unity of the composition, the very felicitous replicas of the main building which frame the base of the stupa and grow larger towards the outside, and the clear cut design of the finial, make an assured success of this building which is more interesting perhaps than the composite and inharmonious erections at Ayuthya." Groslier (1962), p. 223.

The Hegemonic Crisis

of the "City of Angels"

59

century, the Dutch merchant Van Wuysthoff estimated the gold covering the stupa to weigh about one thousand pounds.153 The religious success of Laos coupled with the persistent rumor that Laos was "the holy land where all prodigies are accomplished and where the religious teaching originated" 154 contributed to Rama III's exasperation with the Lao. The Siamese king wanted his country to be the unique repository of the Buddhist faith in this part of Asia. 155 Moreover, Rama III had strongly encouraged the reform movement of Buddhism in Siam, apparently driven by his determination to engineer "a strengthening of royal Buddhism to the prejudice of popular Buddhism."156 Rama III and Anou repeatedly set themselves in opposition to one another. In religious matters, Rama III attempted to hold a monopoly over the faith and the guardianship of sacred, Buddhist books.15 7 Was not Bangkok "the city of angels, sublime city, the most precious gem of Indra?" 158 But the Lao Sangha [monkhood] maintained its independence of Thai control, an accomplishment which did not please Thai rulers.159 A specialist on Lao-Thai history rightly emphasizes: Thai kings were praised as cakravartin-world conquerors-an image which was still popular in the middle of the nineteenth century. Proclamations sent to the outer towns referred to the divine lineage of the Thai ruler. . . . One 153 Came (1869), p. 493. 154 Gamier (1870-71), p. 54. In the seventeenth century, Van Wuystoff related: "These idolizers make people believe that God is coming from the sky to the Louwen (Laos) ... ; what they glory in very much, and why they say that God blesses them over the inhabitants of Siam and Cambodia, [is because God gave them] temples of incomparable magnificence and many men who are saints and savants. They add that the priests of Siam and Cambodia have always studied in Louwen for ten to twelve years." Cited in Gamier (1871), pp. 277-278. Marini expounds at length on this topic and asserts that the monks "of Siam go to Laos as to a university." Marini (1663), p. 268. British linguist Dr.}. Leyden wrote in the time of Chao Anou that, "It is from this [Lao] nation that both Siamese and Barman [Burmese] allege they derive their religion, laws, and institutions. It is in the country of Lao that all the celebrated founders of the religion of Buddha are represented to have their most remarkable vestiges." Leyden (1808), p. 151. Low states "It has been noted by several writers on Siam [Kaempfer and Loubere] that the Siamese, equally with the Burmans, yield to Lao the honour of having been once a chief repository of their religion and laws, ... that it was the first Indo-Chinese country in which these laws were promulgated, and the Buddhist religion flourished ... " Low (1828), p. 16. The editor of the Siam Repository, Samuel J. Smith, recognized in 1869: "From Siam, as a standpoint, the Laos rank high in interest. Probably the Siamese should regard Laos as their mother country." Samuel J. Smith, Siam Repository (1869), p. 141. However, there was some religious contention between the Thai and the Lao since Taksin's reign. See Reynolds (1976), p. 210. 155 Vella (1957), p. 107. 156 Ling (1979), p. 54. 15 7 Lemire asserts that "The king of Siam, in 1827, took humbrage at the power of Vientiane, waged war against its king Anouc, and defeated him ... " (1894), p. 7. Renaud (1930), pp. 102-103. See also Chandler (1973), pp. 93, 111; Kobkua (1987), p. 101. Kobkua envisions the Bangkok-Vientiane relations in this way: "The seriousness with which the king (Rama III) performed his dharmaraja obligations and likewise his harsh treatment of Chao Anu and the Vientiane revolt brought home the message that Bangkok was not prepared to sustain a loss of her tributaries, particularly a Buddhist one, which could directly damage the moral position of the king." Kobkua (1988), p. 56. 158 On the noble name of Bangkok, see Wenk (1968), p. 19. 159 Breazeale (1975), p. 38.

60

Paths to Conflagration doubts that the image of the king as a divine ruler penetrated to the Lao states, where [a king's] right to rule was founded instead upon moral authority according to the principles of the dharma. 160

11. THE FINAL SOLUTION OF 1827-1828

But Anou's fervent efforts to reunite Laos and repel Siam were doomed to fail. Fifty years after Taksin conquered Laos, the Thai marched into Vientiane once more. This time the Lao capital was razed to the ground, "allowing only grass, water and the savage beasts"16l to remain. This genocide of an entire people remained a veritable nightmare for its few survivors; after Jules Harmand interviewed them in 1880, he called it, "Ia grande guerre." 16 2 Generally, Chaophraya Bodinthondecha's name is associated with the brutality. The subdued peoples dared call him only by the simple title chao khun (chao is a princely rank granted to tributary rulers by Bangkok). 163 Some Thai writers have justified the sack of Vientiane by citing the need to preempt a Vietnamese threat. 164 However, the Siamese decided to raze Vientiane to the ground before they began the 1827 campaign and at a time when there had been no visible Vietnamese interference in areas sensitive to the Thai. 165 After 1778-1779, not even a shadow of a Vietnamese threat to Siam's hegemonic domination over Laos remained. 166 After Siam captured Vientiane, the Thai commanders believed themselves safe from Vietnamese intrusion and exhibited a rather smug attitude 160 Breazeale (1975), p. 39. 161 Thiphakorawong (1961) (T), p. 75. 162 Harmand (1880), pp. 880, 302. 163 Bouillevaux (1874), p. 170. Came gives the following explanation: "The word Chao-Koun designated a high-ranking grade in the military hierarchy; but the terror felt by the Laotians has made of it a name of a person, and, when Chao-Koun is referred to without epithet, they (the Lao) evoked, trembling, the remembrance of their executioner [... ] I have had the opportunity to see at Oudon, in front of the former palace of Norodom, the glaring statue of this slaughterer of peoples. By an insolent decree of the Siamese to which the French have recently put to an end, the Cambodians humbly pay tribute to it [the statue] when passing by ... "Came (1872), p. 189. See also, Gamier (1870-71), p. 388; and Lemire (1894), p. 8. Snit and Breazeale who write: "Bodin had managed the policies towards Vietnam, and in the Lao and Khmer states, from the very start of hostilities. His successor possessed neither the ( ... ) experience that Bodin had gained during his expeditions to the Mekong in 1827 and in 1828, during his campaigns of the 1830s in Cambodia, and from his subsequent schemes for forced migration throughout the central Mekong basin. Bodin was the great social engineer of his day-perhaps the greatest ever in this part of the world. For a half century after his death, the very mention of his name struck a chord of terror in the hearts of the people whose lives were disrupted by his two decades of administration in the Mekong valley. The miseries of his era of war on the left bank were handed down from generation to generation in the traditional mo lam folk music." Snit and Breazeale (1988). See Bodin's portrait by his contemporaries in Schweisguth (1951) p. 264; Gutzlaff (1834), pp. 69, 76-77; Moor (1837), p. 199. On his career, see Akin (1969), p. 202. 164 This was a common tactic in Southeast Asian warfare. See Burney Papers, vol. 2, part 6, pp. 287-288. More generally, Kraisri (1985), pp. 260-263; Moor (1837), p. 201. And also, Fistie (1967), p. 30; Newbold (1839), vol. 2, pp. 1-21. 165 Chotmaihet rilang prap khabot wiangchan (1926) (T), p. 50. l66Jt suffices to refer to Rama ill's writings or those of King Chulalongkom (1965) (T).

The Hegemonic Crisis of the "City of Angels"

61

toward Vietnam. Siamese leaders anticipated that Anou would organize resistance at Miiang Mahachai-Kongkreo, flee to Chinese territory adjacent to Vietnam, or take refuge in Vietnam itself. In the event that Anou fled to Vietnam, Siam's military leaders had informed their armies to stop their pursuit at the Vietnamese frontier, not violate it at any cost, to inform Hue of Anou's presence, and to wait for orders from Bangkok. 167 In fact, the Bangkok establishment considered Anou's "revolt" to have caused the spill-over of Thai disgruntlement against the Lao. Rama III's chronicler denounced two Lao revolts against "the authority of Bangkok." 168 The Thai generalissimo computed three.l69 The exact number mattered little to those in command in Bangkok. As the British officer James Low observed in 1827: ... the ambition and restless jealousy of the Siamese have induced them successively within the last few years to attack and destroy the whole of these countries ... They sacked Weung Chan (or Lauchang) where a great slaughter of its inhabitants took place ... The Siamese do not seem ambitious of retaining conquests on the North East frontier; and to prevent annoyance from that quarter, have converted the subdued countries of South Laos into a desert. 170 Some years later, Francis Gamier wrote: To prevent forever all new attempts at rebellion, the population [of Vientiane] was dispersed, and then the country was repopulated with Lao chosen from the right bank of the Mekong, particularly from Sisuwannaphum.171 All the members of towns on the east bank were displaced to the west bank of the Mekong, including the population of Siang Khan, located on the route between Vientiane and Luang Prabang; residents of Siang Khan had sided with Anou in 1827.1 72 The Siamese forced this move because after 1827 they feared the Lao population in principal towns would use the river as a barrier between the Siamese and the Lao. 173 In fact, this relocation affected all the towns between Siang Khan and the southernmost part of Laos. Geographer Elisee Reclus noted that towns "were 167 Ruam ruang muang nakhon ratchasima (1968) (T), p. 45. 168 Thiphakorawong (1961) (T), p. 75. 169 Kulab (1971) (T), p. 313. 170 Low (1839), pp. 248-249. 171 Gamier (1870-71), p. 390. See Halpern (1964), p. 9. See Renard on "The role of the Karens in Thai society," in Wilson (1980), p. 21. For a map that diagrams the depopulation of the left bank of the Mekong and the forced resettlement on the right bank, see Breazeale (1975), charts 4, 5, and 6. According to Lemire, "during the time of Chao Anou, before the depopulation, this region had twenty times more people than today [1894]." Lemire (1894), p. 7. And according to Gosselin, seventy thousand people were sent to Siam from the region of Cammon alone. Gosselin (1900), p. 95. In contrast, during this time only six thousand people left the province of Samboc located below the Li Phi falls. See Miche (1852), p.178. 172 Aymonier (1885), pp. 115-116. 173 Garnier (1870-71), p. 396.

62

Paths to Conflagration

reconstructed on the bank most accessible to the Bangkok armies." 174 Thai historian Trem Wiphakphotchanakit, writing in the 1970s, agreed. 175 The relocation policy can be linked to other kinds of violence perpetrated by Siam. The ashes generated by Siam's destructive policy were scattered far and wide. 174 Reclus (1883), p. 890.

175 Trem (1970) (T), pp. 311, 339. Fistie (1967), p. 33. Keyes states that "The Siamese-Lao war of 1827 was a major watershed in the settlement of the Khorat Plateau, including the central Chi River Valley. Following the war, the Siamese court pursued the policies of encouraging (with force if necessary) Lao living east of the Mekong to migrate and resettle on the Khorat Plateau. Both policies were designed to prevent serious challenges to Siamese authority being mounted by peoples living in the inaccessible areas lying to the northeast." Keyes, (1976), p. 48.

THE REALIGNMENT OF THE LAO AS THEIR POWER DISINTEGRATES

12. FOREFATHERS' GALLERY

Although the leaders of most Southeast Asian countries in the sixteenth century acknowledged the sovereignty of the Burmese king, Bayinnaung, one monarch resisted: the Lao king, Setthathirat of Vientiane. He became known as "the chieftain who never knelt before the king of kings. " 1 Three successive Burmese invasions did not curb his combativeness. Chao Anou acknowledged the legacy of Setthathirat when in 1824 he added Setthathirat's name to his own title. Similarly, some of Anou's generals bore the war names of their illustrious predecessors who had joined battle during Setthathirat's reign. 2 Anou even modeled his battle strategy at Khao San in 1827 after one conducted by Setthathirat at Daen Somphu in 1569.3 Even in the most desperate situation, Setthathirat displayed confidence in himself and in his people. And he was not the only Lao hero who fought to maintain Lao independence before the advent of Chao Anou. Fa Ngum (r. 1353-1373) also figures significantly as a well-known Lao hero. Less familiar, although equally significant in Lao political history, is The:Enkham (r. 1479-1486). In 1483, as the Vietnamese forced the Lao to abandon the capital and retreat to the Thai border, Threnkham rallied the Lao to chase the invaders out of his domain. These Lao rulers placed a high value on Lao independence, as Father Giovanni Filippo de Marini noted in 1663. He wrote: But the prerogative he [the Lao king] prizes most highly is that of being in a position to enjoy independence and to recognize no superior, a privilege not 1 Hall (1976), p. 270; Thien (1908), pp. 71-82. 2 Anou probably ranked as Setthathirat IV. His brother Nanthasen had also taken Setthathirat as a reign name, which made him Setthathirat III. However, Phongsawadan miiang phuan identifies Inthavong as Setthathirat ill. See Phongsawadan miiang phuan (1969) (L), p. 13. Anou's great-grandfather, Phra Sai (r. 1689-1730) (spuriously called Sai Ong Ve by late-nineteenthcentury chroniclers) was likely the first to have added the name, Setthathirat, to his regnal name. Setthathirat's military officers had names like Phagna Mii Lek (Prince of the Iron Hand) and Phagna Mii Fai (Prince of the Fire Hand). Phongsawadan miiang luang prabang (1963) (T), p. 236. Such names were resuscitated by Anou and one can find among Anou's officers a Phagna Mii Lek who earned fame at the Sompoi battle. 3 Phongsawadan miiang luang prabang (1963) (T), pp. 326, 327.

64 Paths to Conflagration

even enjoyed by the great King of Siam and Tunquing nor several others who are far richer and more powerful than he ... 4 Chao Anou expressed in his poetic San liip bo sun (Indestructible Message) the same characteristic passion for independence. 5 Anou was motivated by a resolute drive for independence manifested in a political strategy transmitted to him by his father, Siribunyasan, the last monarch of an independent Laos and a shrewd tactician in diplomacy. 6 Siribunyasan, ousted from power by the Thai army in 1779, was rumored to have died at the age of forty-eight in the jungle near the Lao-Vietnamese border? It was in this same jungle that his son, Anou, would take refuge fifty years later. Immediately following the defeat of his father, Anou's elder brother, Nanthasen, continued the struggle for independence. Nanthasen was the commander-in-chief of the Lao forces from 1778-1779. Traditional stories extol his military virtues, explaining how he rode his war elephant in a counterattack against Taksin's furious Thai armies. The rage felt by Taksin's generals was fueled by their failure to capture the capital a year earlier from the Lao.8 Those generals ultimately won the field and 4 Marini (1663), p. 169. Wuysthoff shared the same view of the Lao. See Gamier (1871), pp. 274-275. Wuysthoff preceded De Leria in Vientiane. See also Gutzlaff (1849), pp. 33-42. See also the narrative of Marini (1663), p. 159. Marini relied on the personal account of Father de Leria, an Italian Jesuit, who journeyed to Laos and stayed in Vientiane from 1642 to 1647,

during the reign of King Suryavongsa, a monarch of the golden age in Lan Sang. 5 Chao Anou's confidence is elaborated in San liip bosun (L), p. 23. On this literary work, see Charubut (1977), pp. 136 ff.; Sila (1954) (L), pp. 51-54; Sila (1960), p. 272; Soulang (1974) (L), pp. 120-150; Khampheng (1968) (L), pp. 287-288. 6 Gesick (1976), pp. 97-104. 7 It is generally accepted that after the withdrawal of the Thai armies, Siribunyasan returned to his capital. Informed of this, Taksin nominated Nanthasen to rule Vientiane. But, according to one scholar, after Taksin nominated Nanthasen, Siribunyasan was authorized to rule in Vientiane until his death one year later. See Anuchit (1932) (T), p. 172. Vickery corroborates that "After the Thai invasion, King Siribunyasan returned to reign in Vientiane until his death a year later. Then Prince Nandasen was sent back from Bangkok to succeed him. This explains the Lao-Thai alliance." Vickery (1990), p. 12. For another perspective, see Traduction de l'histoire de Vien-chan, p. 15. 8 Renaud (1930), p. 102. The Lao capital "then rose high as an apparition behind its red ramparts. The gigantic doors of its walls allowed the passage of elephants, the canopy of which never touched the stones of their vaults, ornamented with ritual lotuses." According to Narinthonthewi: "The first month of the year of Dog, Chaofa Kasatsiik returned to attack Miiang Sisattanakkhanahut. The siege continued until the end of the year without success. Chaofa Kasatsiik could storm the town [Vientiane] only on Monday of the tenth month, the third day of the waxing moon. The Chao Miiang [Siribunyasan] escaped. We seized Phra Kreo and Phra Bang." Narinthonthewi (1963) (T), pp. 7, 9. A chronicle gives its version of the Lao defeat: "Phagna Miiang Chanh, mandarin of Chantha Bouli, colluded with the enemy. At midnight, he had boats sent to allow the Siamese troops to cross [the Mekong River]. Phagna Volapita [Voraphita] felt he was lost, and left the capital." Traduction de l'Histoire de Vien-chan, p. 14. However, this version is debatable. The Thai had an armed fleet which, for the first time in the history of this part of Southeast Asia, sailed up the Mekong from Cambodia. It is plausible that Phagna Miiang Chanh had the gates of the capital opened to the Thai armies, who seemed unable to assault the town with enough firepower. This is the opinion of Maha Kikeo Oudom (Interview, Vientiane June 10, 1986). Another scholar argues that it was the formation of a sand bank in front of Vientiane that facilitated the landing of the Thai armies when they arrived to capture Vientiane, which had no defense on the western side of the town aside from two cannon placed at each end of the town, one at the mouth of Hoong Passak and

The Realignment of the Lao

65

took Nanthasen to Bangkok as a prisoner with his brothers and sisters. There he found favor with the Siamese king, who sent Nanthasen back to Vientiane in 1781 to rule it as a vassal state of Siam. The situation facing Nanthasen after his return to Vientiane was unprecedented. He attempted to guard his country's interests while coping with the heavy burden of post-1778-79 pressures and complexities. 9 To critical observers, his accommodation with the Thai looked like a compromise. At last, in 1792, after a decade of rule, Nanthasen himself realized that despite a Lao lobby in Bangkok represented by Mom Venh, his policy of accommodation had been a failure and his country was suffering under Siamese domination.IO Nanthasen's interactions with the Thai monarchs had never been simple; distrust and opportunism prevailed on both sides. Rama I had accumulated numerous grievances against the Thai king, the most important of which stemmed from Nanthasen's attempts to take advantage of the bloody power struggle between Taksin and Rama I in Thonburi between 1781-1782, when Rama I had not yet ascended the throne, but was still Taksin's commander-in-chief. Undoubtedly Rama I recognized in Nanthasen a forceful ruler and fearsome warrior, and, thus, a potentially dangerous opponent, for Nanthasen had shown himself capable of subduing other Lao principalities and bringing them under his own jurisdiction. This Lao king reconstituted Lao unity by securing Vientiane's control over Nakhon Phanom and Siang Khuang. In 1792, while he fought against the Vietnamese Tay Son rebels as a mercenary of Bangkok, Nanthasen found the opportunity to subdue Luang Prabang and Sam Niia, thus repairing one of the divisions that had long plagued feudal Laos. "Ever a feeble state, Luang Prabang appears to have become a dependency of Vientiane in fact, if not officially, since this period.'' 11 All the areas subdued by Nanthasen's forces between 1781 and 1792 had the other at the end of Hoong Khou Viang. Before that, the Thai armies had already captured such vital points as Nong Khai, Miiang Khuk, Phan Phao. Parmentier (1954), p. 89; Cf. Fels (1976), pp. 458-460. 9 For an elaboration on Nanthasen's actions after 1779, see Pansa (1978) (T), pp. 26-27. 10 Mom Venh was a Lao prisoner who had become the mistress of King Rama I (whose queen had chosen to leave the palace and reside with her mother), exerted excessive influence over him. Pansa (1978) (T), pp. 33,40-41. On this total reversal of Nanthasen's politics toward Bangkok, see Pansa (1978) (T), p. 38 ff. Pansa dated the revision of the Lao policy to 1792. In fact, from 1791, Nanthasen had witnessed Siamese expansionism extend to Luang Prabang. Other signs reveal his endangered position. For instance, to attack Tavoy, on the Burmese frontier, Rama I no longer chose to rely on the Lao king to mobilize Lao contingents to aid the Thai, but preferred to entrust a Bangkok officer with this task, as reported by Thiphakorawong: "Phraya Kraikosa was to go to Laos and conscript an army there while Phraya Kalahomratchasena was ordered to proceed to Cambodia, where he was to levy troops." Thiphakorawong (1978), p. 192. In the past, the Thai had always encountered problems with the Cambodians, particularly in this field; however, the fact that Rama I had to proceed with the Lao as he did with the Cambodians suggests the deterioration of Bangkok's power in Laos. 11 Breazeale (1975), p. 7. Confirmation can be found in the document Traduction de l'histoire de Vien-chan, p. 18. This is substantiated by the Vientiane chronicle which recognized that "The territory of Vien-Chan-Tha-Bouli [Vientiane] abutting in the South the Li Phi, the North to the mouth of the river Nam Mi, and from the river Nam Mi, going up the river to Pha-Khan-Dai, was given to the government of Luang Prabang which had to protect it." Traduction de l'histoire de Vien-chan, p. 18. For an identical view, Le Boulanger (1931), p. 129.

66 Paths to Conflagration

previously paid tribute to the Tay Son.l 2 Surely when Nanthasen exerted himself to draw these areas inside his own circle of influence and away from the Tay Son, he must have camouflaged his actions as the efforts of a loyal Siamese vassal attempting to enlarge the number of political units dependent on Bangkok. 13 Siam itself did not wish to enter into direct conflict with the Tay Son, who during this period controlled most of Vietnam and had received the investiture of the Chinese government.l4 For Siam to achieve their apparently contradictory goals, it therefore required a proxy, such as Nanthasen. When the Tay Son sent an embassy to Bangkok to protest vehemently against Nanthasen's activities, Bangkok easily disavowed him; yet when the Tay Son threatened to destroy Nanthasen, Bangkok rushed to rescue him. 15 In the end, Bangkok arranged for the overthrow of Nanthasen because Thai elites judged him to be out of their control. Impeded by the disparate nature of the Lao "kingdom" and by Bangkok's forceful opposition to his attempts at organizing the Lao country, Nanthasen was unable to achieve his dream of reuniting Laos and regaining its independence. His "organizing" methods had not been gentle; they alienated Luang Prabang and exacerbated the irredenta of other areas, particularly Siang Khuang. 16 Luang Prabang swallowed its aversion for Vientiane until the arrival of the French, but the last lines of its chronicles still dwell on this episode of political rape. 17 Bangkok's policy toward the Lao and particularly Nanthasen was eminently sophisticated. It aimed to isolate Nanthasen internationally as well as in Lao politics, but it also used Nanthasen to spearhead its policy of pacification in the hinterland of Southeast Asia. In his military expeditions against Luang Prabang and Sam Niia, Nanthasen was accompanied by Siamese contingents dispatched from Bangkok.18 12 In a letter of June 2, 1794, received in Bangkok on November 24, 1794, the Prince of Siang

Khuang acknowledged that he had been invaded by Nanthasen because he had paid tribute to the Tay Son. This ruler of Siang Khuang also informed Rama I that Luang Prabang had paid tribute to these same Vietnamese rulers. See Gesick (1976), pp. 132-133; Bouillevaux (1874), p. 394. The Royal Chronicles of Bangkok were surely bending the truth when they accused Nanthasen of having deceived the Bangkok court by trying to hide the collusion between Luang Prabang and the "Burmese." In these chronicles, the term "Burmese" was often used by Bangkok as a code name to refer to any enemy of Siam, including those enemies Siam preferred not to name: the Tay Son. 13 Cf. Gesick (1976), p. 133, note 82. 14 Gesick (1976), p. 141. 15 Gesick (1976), pp. 131-132. However, Nanthasen's relations with the Tay Son were of an evolving nature. See the following section. 16 Gesick (1976), p. 133. In 1794, the prince of Siang Khuang asked to pay tribute to Bangkok through Luang Prabang and no longer through the intermediary of Vientiane. 17 Phongsawadan miiang luang prabang (1969) (L), p. 42. 18 Narinthonthewi (1963) (T), pp. 226-227. In his comment, King Chulalongkom asserted that

he sent Bangkok's troops at the request of Nanthasen, who had been assailed by the Tay Son. Relying on archival documents extant at the Thai National Library, Snit and Breazeale described the Thai as latecomers to the conflict involving the Phuan: "Patterns of modem Phuan history were already clearly set by the end of the eighteenth century. Bangkok was founded during this period; and the new Thai dynasty was attempting to bring the entire Lao country under its domination. Annam likewise had a strong new dynasty which, during the first generation, was well disposed to the Thai court. During the final years of the eighteenth century, serious conflicts arose in the Phuan state among competing candidates for the succession with various Phuan factions seeking support from outside. A Vietnamese force intervened on behalf of one candidate, while the Vientiane prince was supporting another. The

The Realignment of the Lao

67

Bangkok used this tactic extensively, not only with Nanthasen but also with other vassals who later were redirected against each other. For instance, the Prince of Nan, vassal of Siam in 1788, was strongly encouraged by the Siamese court to conduct raids as far away as Siang Khuang. 19 Siam spurred on this fratricidal war among the Lao, which resulted in the Laocization of a war in a country already moribund from endemic violence. Bangkok clearly sought to aggravate the Lao homelands' quarrels, "these harsh struggles between relatives for their immediate interests, these rivalries of tiny power against tiny power." 20 The politico-strategic interests of Siam were served by this devastating situation. In 1827, the vice king of Siam, Bowon, talked to the Thai general, Bodin, when both were encamped on the riverbank opposite Vientiane: "Under previous reigns, we did not have to sustain a war against Vientiane, for Luang Prabang was angry with Vientiane, which consequently could not consider rebelling [against the kingdom of Siam]." 21 Leaders in Bangkok ordered Nanthasen to arrest Luang Prabang's King Anuruttharat (r. 1792-1817). Later, however, these same leaders released King Anuruttharat and restored him to power on June 2, 1794. The Royal Chronicle of Bangkok leaves this sudden reversal of the king's fortunes unexplained. 22 As a final measure, Nanthasen plotted with Prince Borommaracha of Nakhon Phanom to break away from the Siamese. Nanthasen's plan was exposed and a Bangkok expeditionary army, led by Luang Thep Borirak, apprehended him. 2 3 Thai first became involved in the Phuan state in the 1790s when a Thai army acting for the Lao princes raided the plateau region, and carried Phuan prisoners back to Bangkok." Snit and Breazeale (1988), pp. 8-9. 19 Davis (1984), p. 32. The populations of Nan and the Lao of Lan Sang were very close, for in Luang Prabang King Photthisarat (r. 1520-1549) had been ordained by a monk trained in Nan. This monk became his spiritual master. 20 Deydier (1954), p. 825. 21 Kulab (1971) (T), p. 313. 22 Thiphakorawong relates: "The King [Rama I] ordered King Romkhao [of Luang Prabang] confined in prison. Some time later, however, the king graciously pardoned King Romkhao and allowed him to take his followers with him and return to rule Luang Prabang," Thiphakorawong (1978), p. 176. Were the Chinese diplomatically involved in this release, as some have written? Gesick notes that: "Prachum Phongsawadan, Part II, p. 214, says this person [a vassal of Luang Prabang] asked the ruler of Hsenwi to plead Anuruttha's [Anuruttharat's) case with the Chinese emperor. What seems more likely from the facts of the case as given in this chronicle is that the ruler of Hsenwi, with the possible connivance of local Chinese officials in Yunnan, arranged for a fake embassy to be sent." Gesick (1976), p. 131, note 75, and pp. 139-140. However the version given by Luang Prabang officials as recorded by the Court of Hue's chronicler seems to present a puzzle, which may explain the embarrassing silence of the Royal Chronicle of Bangkok in this regard. They say that a power struggle arose in Luang Prabang between Anuruttharat (called No-sa by Hue) and his nephew Manthathurat (called Ong-manh:) "When Trieu-phong died, his son, Ong-manh ... , was but three years of age. Availing himself of the occasion, No-sa promptly seized the throne, but the forces of Vantuong [Vientiane] ... thereupon invaded Nam-chuong [Luang Prabang] and captured No-sa, Ong-manh, and Ong-manh's mother, carrying them off to the Kingdom of Vientiane. No-sa was subsequently released, but the detention of Ong-manh and his mother continued. In the year of Tan-hoi (1791 AD), the Til.y-son rebels attacked the Kingdom of Vientiane. Ong-manh and his mother seized the opportunity to escape from the Kingdom of Vientiane and returned to Nam-Chuong, where they were reunited with No-sa." Kimura (1971), p. 157. 23 On the arrest of Nanthasen, see TNL Document Rama III. 1213/43. Memorandum on the history of Lomsak from 1767 to 1836. For a similar view, see Institut de Recherches en Sciences Sociales (1988) (L), pp. 250-251. And also, Chantha (1969) (T), pp. 207-208.

68 Paths to Conflagration

Imprisoned for a second time in Bangkok, Nanthasen was saved from immediate execution through the intervention of the Thai vice king, Surasi, who later donned Buddhist monastic robes and pleaded, in vain, for long-term amnesty for Nanthasen and his followers.24 Nanthasen's co-conspirator, Prince Borommaracha, died under suspicious circumstances. Nanthasen himself wasted away and died in a Bangkok prison. Decades later, Anou would find himself in the same situation. He, however, would choose to escape torture by committing suicide.25 One of Anou's brothers, Inthavong, the Lao king nominated by Bangkok to succeed the ousted Nanthasen, used discretion when he dealt with the Thai. Inthavong's daughter, Nang Thongsuk, had been taken as a hostage to Bangkok, where she became a consort of King Rama I. 26 Although these family alliances did not accomplish Inthavong's goals, he remained passive and never risked armed rebellion. Inthavong's successor, Anou, began his reign in the same spirit. After acting as the vice king to Inthavong for nearly a decade, Anou succeeded his brother in 1804 and became the third Lao king to be appointed by Rama I, the man who had been the Thai commander-in-chief in 1778-1779. Anou, who was thirty-seven when he took charge of Vientiane, would have a long reign throughout which he tried to achieve the independence for which his brothers and predecessors had struggled. 13. IN THE MACHINE ROOM OF A GRAND DESIGN

John Crawfurd, the early nineteenth-century British traveler, frequently repeated that "Lan-Chang [Vientiane] was always considered the capital of Lao." His reiteration of the statement suggests that Chao Anou certainly must have given him the impression that Lao was a relatively united country when the two met in Bangkok in 1822.27 In fact, however, Lao was only a patchwork of provinces, 24 Thiphakorawong

(1978), pp. 208, 213. 25 On Anou's suicide by poison, see Malpuech (1920), p. 6; Thao Lao Kham (1973) (L), pp. 47, 48, 65; McCarthy (1900), p. 38; Phongsawadan milang vientiane (Fonds Ouparat) quoted in Archaimbault (1967), p. 580, note 1. Picanon writes: "He was turned over with his three sons to the Thai commander; arriving in Bangkok, they poisoned themselves, preferring death to enslavement." Picanon (1901), p. 176. Aymonier specifies that these included Ratsabut Chao Yo, Anou's son and king of Champassak, and Chao Anou himself. This poison was mixed in the boiled rice prepared on his order by his wife Nang Khamphong who shared his fate. Aymonier (1885), pp. 46, 88. 26 Pansa (1978) (T), p. 40; Pramuanwichaphun (1937) (T), p. 79. This Lao princess, married to Rama I in 1795, gave birth in 1797 to a daughter who was giv~n the title Chaofa Khunthonthipphayawadi by Rama I (1797-1838); she was particularly dear to her father and had forty-two descendants. Khunthonthipphayawadi became the second queen of Rama II and gave him four children. Joyaux (1967), pp. 133-134. 27 Crawfurd (1834) p. 446. It is noticeable that at this time one referred to the Lao country as "Lao" and not "Laos," and to the inhabitants as "Lao" or in plural as "Laos" and not "Laotian" or "Laotians." Bonifacy wrote in an introduction to the 1931 edition of a book by Father Borri: "Lao, in singular, the genuine name of the country, becomes Lai in plural, as in Italian. This name in plural has been translated in French by Laos, and thus, one has pronounced the's,' as it usually has been done for foreign words. The country called now Laos, is said Lao in Annamese; the first Italian missionaries, such Father Borri, Father De Rhodes (the inventor of Qu'oc Nu, he wrote his first narratives in 1653, in Italian) put this name of Lao into a plural form, and made it Lai. When these narratives were translated in French, one translator wrote Laos, in plural, and as it was a foreign name, it was pronounced Laosse. We have conserved

The Realignment of the Lao

69

autonomous territories, kingdoms, and principalities with double or triple tributary relations. Only through shrewd political practice did Anou and his collaborators succeed, despite Bangkok's tireless resistance, in uniting this heterogeneous conglomerate into a sort of Lao confederation that gravitated around the Vientiane center. 28 Anou moved ahead in this effort despite the fact that the experiences of his elder brother, Nanthasen, demonstrated to him how forcefully Bangkok reacted against those who attempted to reunify Laos. King Anuruttharat of Luang Prabang abdicated in 1817 to allow his son Manthathurat (r. 1817-1836) to succeed him and then died two years later at the age of eighty-two years. It was at this point that Chao Anou decided to initiate a diplomatic effort to heal the rift between the two kingdoms, for like his brother Nanthasen, whose aggressions had alienated Luang Prabang, Chao Anou hoped to forge an alliance between the two principalities. "There are no reasonable politics without the capacity of forgetfulness." 29 Anou's embassy arrived solemnly in Luang Prabang in 1820 with magnificent gifts for Manthathurat. One year later, Anou dispatched a second embassy to the Luang Prabang king. These dates are crucial. At this time, the international situation on the western frontier of Siam was increasingly tenuous and even threatening. According to both Adoniram Judson, an American missionary who resided for years in Burma, and Antony Rowland, the Burmese translator for the Government of Bengal, the king of Ava was preparing to renew hostilities against Siam. This Burmese king had heard a rumor that Siam's king had died and that confusion prevailed at the capital regarding the succession to the throne because the Siamese king had left no descendants. The Burmese king commenced negotiations with foreign powers to seek their aid, contracted offensive alliances against the Siamese, and began its attack. 30 In his own country, Anou's prestige was at its height and the kingdom of Champassak had just been given to his son, Chao Yo, by Siam. Anou took advantage of these developments to rally Luang Prabang, the other important domain in the pre-1707 Lan Sang kingdom, to his cause. Luang Prabang responded by agreeing to undertake the sacred cause by symbolically raising the That Sithammahaysok stupa this orthography and this pronunciation, and more, we have made the Lai or the Laos, the Laotians." Borri (1931), pp. 397-398. In another book, Bonifacy writes: "Annamese and Chinese books often refered to these Lao who inhabited a part of southern China, the northwest of Tunkin, and who have let their name to Laos ... Tradition tells they were destroyed by the Tay who married their women. These men were certainly the aborigines." Bonifacy (1919), pp. 82-83. Aubaret, in his translation of the Vietnamese annals, states: "The country of Laos, called also Ai:-Lao, was in the past in communication with China (around 220 AD). It abutted Yunnan province and was bounded on the south by the Annam empire; to the North-West, are mountains inhabited by savages. This country contained different tribes and the principal ones are: A!-Lao, Lac-Hoan, Van-Tuong, Xi-Da, Muc-Da, Han-Vien, Chan-man, Khong-xuong, Maixuong-tinh and Ba-tac. The origin of these different peoples is Lao-sen (mountains of Laos); it is for this reason that one calls this country in the general way the country of the Laos." Aubaret (1863), p. 51; see also, Sisana (1987) (L). 28 Yule (1855), p. 106; Came (1872), pp. 100-101; Aymonier recorded that "These Laos of Central Mekong areas acknowledge the moral authority of the most powerful of all their chieftains as a national king, who is that of Vieng-Chan." Aymonier (1901), p. 145; Chalong (1986) (T), p. 8. 29 Aron (1962), p. 47. 30 See further in Saxena (1952), pp. 575-577.

70 Paths to Conflagration

five cubits higher. 31 The king of Luang Prabang, who had suffered from Nanthasen' s aggressions and had even been imprisoned in Vientiane,32 meant to signal through these deeds that he was willing to tum over a new leaf, forget his resentments, and move forward. Anou's reconciliation with Luang Prabang seemed to be going as planned. To reciprocate Luang Prabang's conciliatory gesture, Anou raised That Sithammahaysok atop Vientiane's holiest stupa, the That Luang.33 But finally, news from Bangkok revealed that the situation in that capital was less chaotic than originally believed and that Bangkok remained a formidable foe. In 1821, Siam demonstrated its strength by invading Kedah and forcing its king to take refuge in Penang, an English dependency. Responding to these developments, Anou decreased his pressure on the Luang Prabang king. It was clear he would have to continue his waiting game. Anou's careful approach toward Luang Prabang throughout these years deserves close examination if we are to understand the reactions of Luang Prabang's king to his advances. Paul Le Boulanger described the situation beginning in 1820 in these terms: Three years after his enthronement, King Manthathurat received two envoys from Vientiane, Meun Heua Kham and Phalasay, who proposed to him a secret treaty of friendship. King Anou, who bore the Siamese tutelage impatiently, proposed that he forget past quarrels and that they unite their forces against the suzerain from the West, whose power was expanding in a threatening way. Manthathurat accepted the two gilded pirogues brought to him by the two ambassadors in the name of their master, but, a little frightened, he refused to commit himself. The next year, Anou renewed his proposal without success by forwarding an elephant whose height was seven cubits sealed with a war packsaddle to his neighbor [the King of Luang Prabang] by Nakphumin [Anou's diplomat].34 Paul Le Boulanger's words convey the traditional historical understanding of this Lao-Lao episode. In fact, Anou did dispatch a letter to Manthathurat proposing that the latter join his efforts, as Le Boulanger describes, but his correspondence included an additional promise that Luang Prabang chroniclers failed to mention. Anou proposed that once the country was liberated, he would retire to a temple, as Fa Ngum had done four hundred years earlier, after he united the Vientiane kingdom with Luang Prabang. All Lao areas would be placed under King Manthathurat's control after Anou's retirement. 35 It is difficult to forecast what 31 Chotmaihet yo muang vientiane (L), Luang Prabang Royal Palace. 32 Kimura (1971), p. 157. 33 According to Maha Kikeo Oudom (interview, Vientiane 22 April 1988), Chao Anou constructed this stupa in 1808, the year of the beginning of the restoration of the most famous stupa in the area of the Mekong basin. He would also take care of other monuments, including That Phanom, That Sikhot, and That Si Songhak. The crowning of this policy instituting a full program of architectural resurrection, a policy that was essentially political but also religious, would materialize in 1818 with the construction of W at Sisaket and the launching of the bridge across the Mekong. 34 Le Boulanger (1931), pp. 129-130. Confirmation in Phetsarath (1916), p. xi. Phongsawadan muang luang prabang (1969) (L), p. 38. 35 Interview with Maha Kikeo Oudom, Professor of History at the Lycee of Vientiane until 1975, in Vientiane on Saturday, November 17, 1979. Aged fifty-eight at the time of the

The Realignment of the Lao

71

would really have happened if 1827 had brought success instead of defeat. It would be easy to criticize Anou's generosity or to see him as pursuing "the biggest ambition," which "has not any appearance of being ambition." 36 But perhaps Anou would have fulfilled his pledge in a manner consistent with what an ethnologist has characterized as "the fundamental values of Lao culture [which] are founded on generosity, a sense of honor and the recognition of good deeds."37 An intra-Lao dynamics had emerged. Anou broke with a century-long tradition (established with the tripartition of Laos in 1707) when he approached Luang Prabang in league with his own band of diplomats, of whom Nakphumin was the chief, in lieu of the usual rowdies. Characteristically, Manthathurat was receptive to Anou's initiative, for he was a man open to novelty.38 According to the Luang Prabang chronicles, "Manthathurat died on his parade bed on Tuesday of the first day of the waxing moon of the eighth month in the evening of the year 1198" (AD 1836). The chronicles continue, "He ruled his kingdom wisely, raised and cared for religious buildings, and never thought to mistreat foreign nations."39 Another copy of this chronicle emphasized: Under the reign of King Manthathurat, no invader has come to tramp across the soil of Luang Prabang; its population knows great happiness and can indulge in pious activities aiming at creating merits for the salvation of their souls in the future life.40 This paragraph describes the ideal for excellence for a Lao king, but reality taints this perfect portrait. Manthathurat's serene satisfaction could not effectively obliterate challenging problems encountered by a country caught between two warring powers. Some copies of the Luang Prabang chronicles maintain total silence on this period of history,41 possibly reflecting the attitudes of the ruling class of Luang interview, Maha Kikeo Oudom held a position at the Lao National Library. Under the former regime of the Kingdom of Laos, he had gathered, edited, and published palm-leaf manuscripts in the national library. In 1988, Maha Kikeo Oudom was nominated to the position of Director of the National Museums. In April 1987, we visited Luang Prabang to investigate the intercourse between Vientiane and Luang Prabang during Anou's reign. In Luang Prabang, the Superior of Wat Mai told us that a letter from Anou existed there but the key to the library which housed the letter was in the possession of a monk who had gone to northern Laos for many months. This letter is mentioned in the inventory conducted by Finot (1965). The content of Anou's letter to Manthathurat, king of Luang Prabang, is confirmed in Sila (1957) (L), p. 285; Khamman (1973) (L), pp. 65, 95. Khamman, a member and historian of the royal family of Luang Prabang, specified that Anou requested military assistance from Manthathurat. 36 Suares (1948), p. 7. 37 Dore (1980), p. 46. 38 Manthathurat had his pagoda W at That Luang ornamented with medallions inspired by European styles. Among objects found when the That Luang collapsed at the beginning of the twentieth century were champagne glasses and other goods of European origin. The That Luang of Luang Prabang was constructed by Manthathurat in memory of his queen. 39 Traduction de l'histoire de Vien-chan, p. 17. 40 Phongsawadan muang luang prabang (1969) (L), p. 38. 4l Phongsawadan muang luang prabang (1964) (T), pp. 2533-2598. The origin of the drafting of such chronicles is traced by Wilson (1976), p. 176: "local chronicles, several of which were compiled in the nineteenth century, among them chronicles of Chiang Mai, Lamphun and Lampang, Nan, the Northeast. ... The number of chronicles compiled in the 1890's, usually at the request of King Chulalongkorn, suggests that the Thai government was either anxious to

72 Paths to Conflagration

Prabang, especially those members who might have sympathized with Anou. Other copies, drafted at Bangkok's request, bluster with verbal intemperance. 42 After Anou's defeat, Manthathurat had to justify himself before the victor, Siam, by asserting his "good deeds" toward Bangkok, which did not really amount to much: a heap of the subaltern's Machiavellian ploys and ordinary day-to-day political actions displayed as concerted attempts to "circumvent" Anou. Bangkok's envoy camped in Luang Prabang and undertook a political purge within Manthathurat's own palace. The Luang Prabang Vice King Un Kceo and a number of other dignitaries were taken to Bangkok as prisoners and died in jail. Unfortunately, Phraya Phichai, Bangkok's commissioner during the political upheaval in this sleepy capital, died in Luang Prabang.43 A number of Luang Prabang inhabitants were subsequently deported to Siam: 675 to Ayudhya, seventy-six to Ban Aranyik, 560 to Mi.iang Phrom, and thirtynine to Bangkok. 44 The Luang Prabang chronicles quote Manthathurat as saying, "If I side with one and he doesn't succeed, the other will wage war in my kingdom. Thus, I will not take sides with anybody, and will appear favorably toward both countries.'' 45 Francis Gamier, who watched Luang Prabang teetering between alliances, remarked on the king's "exasperating preoccupation with equilibrium."46 The reality was perhaps more subtle and certain signals more telling than the young French navy officer could comprehend. By placing the Vientiane kingdom (Siam's vassal) and Siam (the suzerain of Luang Prabang) on an equal footing, Manthathurat's attitude reflects sympathy for the Lao and Anou. Manthathurat's conduct substantiates that sympathy. By accepting the rules for intra-Lao politics as newly defined by Anou, Manthathurat accomplished much for his career and personal safety. In 1824, Rama II's funeral ceremonies provided him with an opportunity to become a monk at Wat Phra Kceo in Bangkok to pay homage to the late king, as well to express his loyalty to the new Thai monarch. It is said that he stayed in the Thai pagoda for three years and only reluctantly returned to rule again in Luang Prabang at the insistence of Rama Ill. According to the Luang Prabang chronicle, Rama III not only "authorized" Manthathurat to govern but also rewarded him with the highest regal insignia. 47 But it seems that Rama III could never get Manthathurat to disclose information about Anou's maneuvers against the Thai king. While Manthathurat relied upon the yellow saffron robe to protect him from harm dealt out by the new strong man in Bangkok, Anou chose to be more direct: he preserve something of the past or that it was not especially knowledgeable about local administration or local history. Instead of turning to its own records, it may have been easier for the government to ask an interested person to compile a chronicle. In this respect it is noteworthy that no chronicles exist for the towns in the Chaophraya valley apart from those dealing with the fortunes of Ayudhya when it was the capital. All of the local chronicles are concerned with the autonomous townships of the south, the northeast, and the Lao, Khmer, and Malay satellite states." 42 See Phongsawadan miiang luang prabang (1963) (T), pp. 315-369; Saveng (1980). 43 Phongsawadan yo miiang wiangchan(1969) (T), p. 147. 44 Theerachai (1984) (T), pp. 114-115. 45 Le Boulanger (1931), p. 130. 46 Perrin (1937), p. 36. 47 Phongsawadan miiang luang prabang (1963) (T), p. 350.

The Realignment of the Lao

73

attended the funeral of Rama II in 1824 with a large entourage including all his highranking officers.48 As he passed through Lao towns on his way to the funeral, Anou asked the people to train men and to hoard paddy in preparation for the future. The Lao princes of LanNa preferred to stay home from the funeral, 49 as did Ong Chan,50 who was accused of lese-majeste by Rama III for this action. The political game had become deadly serious for these rulers: the brutal, systematic deaths of the rulers of LanNa following Rama III's accession to power in Bangkok were suspicious. 51 These princes had consistently allied themselves with Anou during the war between Bangkok and Burma. 52 Three years later, after Anou had lost everything and was wandering about in search of refuge in the limestone desert of central Laos, Manthathurat sent his son Sukkhaseum (r. 1838-1850) to Rama III on June 11, 1827 to inform him of Anou's previous approaches toward Luang Prabang. Sukkhaseum reported to the Bangkok court a diplomatic version of earlier communications between Manthathurat and Vientiane, despite the fact that divulging this information might compromise his loyal image. Manthathurat's political subtlety lay in the delicate timing of this embassy, which historians too quickly identify as an act of betrayal by Manthathurat of his formal ally, Anou. Through his messenger, Manthathurat did protest his loyalty to Anou's conqueror and presented the traditional "flowers of gold and silver."53 But these marks of subservience were as much required as they were tardy and should not be interpreted as genuine proof of any dramatic change of heart by the Luang Prabang king in Bangkok's favor. Manthathurat had repeatedly shown signs of sympathy for Anou. His aid to Anou's enemies was only grudgingly given: the Thai Commander-in-Chief, Vice King Bowon, was infuriated by the total absence of cooperation from Luang Prabang when he demanded help in crushing Anou's armies. What's more, Manthathurat kept Anou's letter, written in 1821, at the Wat Mai pagoda, the royal pagoda of Luang Prabang. This act signifies the fact that Manthathurat indeed considered Anou' s endeavors sacred. 54 48 This is a remark from the Royal Chronicle of the Third Reign of Bangkok which by contrast

fails to mention the retinues of other leaders that came to Bangkok for this occasion. Thiphakorawong (1961) (T), p. 26. On Anou's orders to train men and to hoard paddy, see for instance, Kennedy (1970), p. 332, note 23. 49 See the explanation offered by Brailey (1968), p. 52-53, and Notton (1932) vol. 3, p. 253. 50 Gesick (1976), pp. 152-153. 51 Notton (1932) vol. 3, p. 253. 52 See for instance, Notton (1932) vol. 3, p. 235. 53 TNL Document Rama III (35) 1189/10 kai. The date has been completely obliterated, but a note records that Manthathurat's letter was received in Bangkok on June 22, 1827. It was brought by Sukkhaseum and Chao Somphu, accompanied by an escort of ninety-one persons. All the political subtlety and the diplomatic art of Manthathurat and his peers rested on crucial timing. This entire episode substantiated generally the Lao capacity for survival, as described by Thion: "It is from the angle of traditional politics, with its exchanges, its subtle equilibrium, its symbols of religion and of power, [that] one must seek the main lines of the future of the Laotians, a game where they excel." Thion (1989), p. 42. 54 The abbot of the pagoda Wat Mai helped the explorer Henri Mouhot, and later would be the chief of the pro-French party, principally anti-Thai, with the venue of Auguste Pavie to Luang Prabang.

74 Paths to Conflagration

Manthathurat must have passed many disturbed evenings in his palace during 1826-1827, exploring alternatives and options. His head turned, ritually, in the direction of the small lake, Nong Sa Ket, located at the foot of the sacred Phusi hill with its 328 steps to the mountain-top temple. Contrary to what his chroniclers may have recorded in the "official journal"-the chronicle intended for consumption by the Luang Prabang population and for future generations-the subtle Manthathurat was aware of the cruel reality of the aphorism, "Life, an eternal victory-Pyrrhic."55 In his campaign to resist Thai domination and reunify Laos, Anou's efforts to gain the allegiance of the northern king of Luang Prabang were matched by his efforts in the south. He traveled south to visit Prince Pharamaracha of Lakhon (now Nakhon Phanom) and Prince Chanthasuryavongsa of Mukdahan, urging them to undertake pilgrimages with him to That Phanom in 1806, 1807, 1812, and 1813. They acceded to his request. The repeated visitations by these Lao rulers to the religious metropole of the central Mekong basin, at the heart of the whole Northeast, symbolized the renewal of Lao unity and recalled the Nanthasen-Borommaracha alliance of the 1790s.56 As an act of pious merit-making, Prince Chanthasuryavongsa of Mukdahan, Prince Pharamaracha of Nakhon Phanom, and Anou from Vientiane had a paved path nearly five hundred meters long, flanked by two Nang Thewada, constructed from the landing on the Mekong River shore to the That Phanom stupa.57 During Anou's heyday, this stupa was a magnificent and powerful center.58 Anou consecrated more than thirty-three hundred peasants for its care, and the territories assigned to support the needs of its monks extended south to Phu That. 59 55 Suares (1948), p. 485. 56 It also publicly signified Anou's determination to exorcise the legends of vengeful Sikhotabong, who had cursed the Lao and prophesied their doom. For the exegesis of this fable of Sikhotabong, see Archaimbault (1980). Meanwhile Low, relying on indigenous sources, considered "Phraya Khottabong" to have lived in the year AD 638. Low (1851), pp. 510-511. Having the Prince of Lakhon with him constituted Anou's attempt to inoculate himself against the storied malevolence of Sikhotabong, who is said to have ruled Lakhon, the capital of the Land Chen-la empire, in AD 638. The marriage of Anou to Princess Nang Sone of Lakhon was also meant to deflect the old curses, as it sealed the reconciliation between the manna of Sikhotabong and the Lao of Vientiane. On the marriage, see Dhawaj (1980) (T), p. 48. See also Archaimbault (1980), pp. 62-63. Lao rulers have for generations maintained a superstitious fear of such legends; King Sisavangvong (who reigned as king of Luang Prabang from 1906 to 1947 and of reunited Laos from 1947 to 1959) forbade the import from Thailand of books containing the imprecations of Sikhotabong against Vientiane. 57 After its construction, the path became known as "Khwa Taphan." That Phanom Chronicle (1976), p. 48. 5S By the beginning of the twentieth century, the stupa had fallen into disrepair. The chronicler of That Phanom recalled: "In the year 2444 (1901), the year of the Ox, the Fffth King [Chulalongkorn] of the Chakri Dynasty ruled at Krung Rattanakosin (Bangkok). The That Phanom shrine had become a dilapidated ruin .... No one dared to climb or even step upon anything because of the fear that a person doing so could be punished [by the deities]. The villagers firmly believed this, so they brought flowers, candles and incense to worship without daring to touch anything in the compound, even the large attractive sanctuary built by Chao Anou, of which it was said that anyone entering it would turn completely yellow like gold. As a result, this building was practically dilapidated by this time [1901]." That Phanom Chronicle (1976), p. 70. 59 Pavie (1902), vol. 9, p. 71.

The Realignment of the Lao

75

In 1808, the two princes of the central Mekong River basin and Anou increased the height of the shrine's spire.60 Politically, Anou relived the experience of his predecessors, Setthathirat and Suryavongsa, in his pilgrimage south to speak with the prince of Nakhon Phanom. His predecessors had been tempted to shift their capital to this town as a part of a more general movement of the region's peoples to the south, toward the seashore. These were religious peregrinations, but also, for Anou, acts displaying his political faith in his ability to resuscitate Lao identity and unity. For Anou, strategies for satisfying sacred duties and for pursuing political power were indissolubly bound together, not contradictory.61 Anou himself was not particularly superstitious; if he had been, he might have surrendered his ambitious plan to reunify the Lao because portents at the time were certainly not auspicious. In 1826, the supreme patriarch of the Lao clergy begged him to renounce his undertaking since premonitory signs clearly condemned it. Anou did not listen to him. The bad omens began in 1812, the year of the construction of a bridge linking Vientiane to Srichiangmai (Chiang Mai) on the opposite bank of the Mekong River. An earthquake occurred which frightened the Vientiane population. In 1814, the pagoda drums were said to have resounded loudly when no one was near, and that same year, a deadly storm ravaged the capital. In 1826, on the eve of the conflict with Bangkok, earthquakes created large abysses-six cubits long and eight cubits deep-under the floor of the royal palace (Ho Kham) and in front of Wat Ho Phra K~o; then a hurricane broke the spire of Wat Ho Phra K~o and of the Ho Phra Bang altar, which in its fall damaged the head and the foot of the Phra Bang, the 53.4 kilogram, solid gold standing Buddha. Three houses inhabited by Anou's consorts and four hundred Vientiane homes were destroyed. 62 These natural 60 They increased it to forty-three meters. That Phanom Chronicle (1976), p. 68. 61 More generally on this theme, Balandier (1969), pp. 137, 161. 62 TNL Document Rama Ill (19) 1189 I 4, and also Document Rama Ill (64) 1189 I 11 khwai. As a

matter of fact, the Royal Chronicle of the Third Reign, written by Thiphakorawong, and most written histories related to this topic, emphasize the significance of these natural cataclysms in order to suggest that Anou was damned by cosmic doom. However, Chaophraya Thiphakorawong maintains silence on identical natural disasters and bad omens that struck Bangkok at the same time. For instance, in the Siamese capital in 1824, the astrologers of Rama III recorded in their diary: "Thursday, the second day of the waning moon of the fifth month, at three hours pm, cyclone on earth and on sea. The spire of the royal palace dropped in the palace ... Friday, the seventh day of the waning moon of the seventh month, the white elephant offered by Nan is dead. Sunday, the ninth day of the waxing moon of the seventh month, the white elephant offered by Chiang Mai is dead." For the year 1825, the Siamese king's astrologers registered: "Thursday, the fourth day of the waxing moon of the tenth month, in the morning, showing of two suns which pursued each other until mid-day, then circles amounted three or four around the sun. The eleventh day of the waning moon, apparition in the afternoon of two suns which run after each other until the day falls .... Manifestation of comets .... Tidal waves which lift boats to a height exceeding the spire of the highest stupas." The King's astrologers took notice again of the appearance of two suns over Bangkok in the year 1827. Cf. Chotmaihet Hon (1965) (T), pp. 105-106. It seems that in the 1820s, the sky and the earth were in turmoil in Southeast Asia. Luang Prabang's chronicler related in 1825, "the appearance of a comet, turning its tail in the Eastern direction. Earthquake of an unprecedented gravity. The most steep heights of Pha Een, Pha Theung, Pha Sieng Kha, Pha Ho, Pha Hong, Pha Nam Ta Nang Oi have nearly disappeared." Chotmaihet yo miiang vientiane (L), Luang Prabang Royal Palace. In Nan reports of the bad omens also abounded. "Early in the next year [1824], the Mong River suddenly dried up at midday. The water started to flow again in the afternoon.... [In 1825] there had been a frightful hurricane which came from the

76 Paths to Conflagration

calamities reminded Anou's subjects of identical phenomena reported to have taken place between 1778-1779, when the kingdom of Vientiane was first subdued by Siam. Anou answered with supreme calm-"My Buddhist merits will protect me"and busied himself with repairs. He had the roofs of the pagodas repaired, the statue restored, the abysses filled up with soil, and the floor of his palace repaired. But it appears that the gestures of propitiation Anou and his peers made at That Phanom were aimed more to impress concerned people than to conciliate vengeful phantoms. Meanwhile, necessary precautions were carefully observed to avoid offending convention. The That Phanom pagoda was located south of the Nam Kading River, which had been the limit of the Vientiane kingdom since the tripartition of Laos in 1707. One can read on the stele erected by Prince of Mukdahan in 1806, In the year of the Tiger, Chaophraya Chanthasuryavongsa of Mukdahan, his

consort, all of his retainers and nobles, with devout faith in the religion, have invited the ruler of Vientiane to come and persevere [with us] in this opportunity with the blessing of the patriarch and his pupils, to erect these sema boundaries, the handiwork of arahants. May our hearts be strengthened toward Nibbana by this task. 63 But Anou's pious and glorious constructions would not survive. Maha Kham Champakreomani, a historian during the former regime of the Kingdom of Laos, reflects on the changes that eventually overwhelmed the That Phanom stupa: When the right bank of the Mekong became a integral part of the kingdom of Siam in 1893 according to the Franco-Siamese treaty, Phra That Phanom became Siamese. The Siamese authorities transformed it in 1939, for they feigned to despise the masterwork of Lao master artisans, particularly those of King Anou. They completely took off the summit of the reliquary to substitute a new one, as one can see today, and enhanced it by an additional fourteen meters to a total of fifty-seven meters. 64 west. It blew down many trees and houses. The image of Wat Chae Haeng was bent towards the Southeast." Nan Chronicle (1966), p. 68. On September 2, 1824, the explorer De Bougainville leaving Singapore for Cavite, had to face an earthquake, then a typhoon which damaged one of his two frigates, the Esperance. Guillon (1917), p. 292. 63 That Phanom Chronicle (1976), p. 48. 64 Kham (1974) (L), p. 25. In 1944, Luang Vichitr Vadakam pontificated to monks, some of whom were ethnic Laos, that "we must bum all the Lao manuscripts for by this way the Lao would have no roots [phiia bo hai mi siia sat lao), we must erase even the name of Lao for the Lao indeed to be Thais." The monks were attending a conference for Pali testing at Wat Mahathat in Bangkok. Maha Vankham Souryadet, interview in Vientiane, June 24, 1987. This drastic purging policy was similarly carried out in LanNa. See Diller (1992), p. 226, note 1. William J. Gedney pondered the disappearance of significant Lao artifacts and the perseverance of Lao resentment: "For one thing, I often wonder as I travel from one provincial capital to another in the Northeast whether a residue of resentment may still remain from the past. As old-timers in Thailand well remember, a good many of the elected representatives of these northeastern provinces in past decades have been arrested and imprisoned and finally have met a violent death. When I visit the shrine at That Phanom, mentioned in some of the papers, I recall the account of Luang Vichitr Vadakam, the former Director General of the Fine Arts Department, in which he tells of visiting this shrine and of having the thick crust of gold and gems on the tower, the product of many generations during which pious merit-makers climbed the tower during the annual festival and fixed ornaments there, removed to Bangkok

The Realignment of the Lao

77

Late in the twentieth century, That Phanom experienced the ultimate trial, described by Derek Davies: Early in August 1975, after several days of a tropical downpour, the fiftythree meter high tower [chedi] collapsed, crushing nearby walls and buildings. The symbolism was ominous indeed, for in that year the communist Pathet Lao had established control over Laos, heralding the collapse of the monarchy. The Lao royal capital of Luang Prabang had originally been one of the five kingdoms-Culani-whose ruler was said to have helped build the original chedi. Today the chedi has been completely restored yet again. One of the many factors spurring King Bhumiphol on in his efforts to improve his people's lot is his determination that the monarchy in Thailand will not suffer the fate of the kings who once ruled across the waters of the Mekong. 65 It appears that although That Phanom has not been preserved in the physical shape Anou gave to it, it has conserved its meaning, for in 1989 Thai Premier Chatichai Chunhavan invited Lao Premier Kaysone Phomvihane to worship there at its annual Buddhist festival. Taming spirits and leading people both posed challenges Chao Anou believed he could meet, and indeed he showed extraordinary talents as a political player and a resourceful diplomat in the years immediately preceding 1827. The Champassak episode involving Anou further illuminates this leader's abilities. The 1707 division of Laos gave rise to the Champassak kingdom. Subdued by Taksin's armies in 1777, the kingdom was subsequently required to provide conscripts to the invading Thai armies that assaulted Vientiane a year later. In 1791, Bangkok replaced the king of Champassak with a descendant of the rebel against Vientiane, Phra Voraphita. To strengthen his hand, this descendant nominated his relative to rule the newly created Ubon. Their methods make their policies very clear, and for this reason it is astounding to discover that Anou somehow managed to supplant the faithful appointees of the Bangkok court and maneuver his own son, Chao Yo, onto the throne of Champassak. It was a masterfully strategic achievement. Anou's twentieth-century detractor, Luang Vichitr Vadakam, could not conceal his exasperation at Anou's good fortune: "Chao Anou succeeded in fooling the kings of Bangkok as he cheated the kings of Hue."66 It is interesting to trace Anou's success story in Champassak. As a prisoner of war under Taksin in 1779, a hostage, and then a mercenary soldier under Rama I, Anou had to fight the Burmese and the Vietnamese Tay Son for Bangkok's benefit. for safekeeping, though so far as I know no one in Bangkok now knows where these are kept. How much past episodes like these affect present-day attitudes, I don't believe anyone knows." Gedney (1966), p. 379. According to the testimony of the inhabitants of the northeast of Thailand, the finial of the That Phanom is made of gold and weighs fifty-four kg. The scandal caused by this theft of the That Phanom finial was so enormous that the Thai government had to replace Luang Vichitr Vadakam by Luang Pin Muthukan. 65 Special issue on Thailand's King Bhumiphol Adulyadej. Far Eastern Economic Review, 1312,4 (January 23, 1986): 21. 66 Vichitr (1966) (T), pp. 103, 358.

78 Paths to Conflagration

He succeeded where the Siamese officers had failed.6 7 Rama I, however, could not ignore such prowess. He supported Anou, nominating him first as vice king, and then as king. Anou also became a close friend of the Siamese King Rama II, and even dug a pleasure pond for the inspiration of this poet-king who wrote to ask him to come to Bangkok with his theatrical troupe. 68 As a sign of Rama Il's favor, Anou was received in Bangkok in a gilded boat and carried in a gilded sedan chair. 69 Anou was not thrilled, and must have paused to think of vanity or the futility of court favor. Some high-ranking Thai officials did not hesitate to remind him that he was no more than "Chao Vientiane," the prince of Vientiane. The court would entertain him as long as it served Thai interests and promoted Bangkok's chief ambition: the annexation of the Lao country in its entirety.7° Though he might ride in a gilded boat, Anou was, like all his relatives, effectively a prisoner of war?1 Sakietgong's insurrection blew through Champassak like a flash fire, attracting passionate adherents among the ethnic Lao Theung, but posing no broader threat; still, Bangkok appeared to be alarmed and ordered Vientiane and Khorat to suppress it. 72 After Sakietgong and his followers had been crushed, Anou realized that Khorat had tried to maneuver the insurrection and subsequent military response in a manner that would open a path for Siamese expansion into the Mekong River basin under the sponsorship of the yokkrabat of Khorat. This high-ranking official had become the darling of the Bangkok king, and was now elevated to a position that placed him virtually out of reach of the law. Contemplating the situation, Anou requested that Rama II give Champassak to his son Chao Yo to prevent the further degradation of the Lao rulers' political status in the Bangkok court and to thwart the governor of Khorat's 7 3 plan to use Champassak as a way to legitimize his claim to be the regent of the whole Lao country.7 4 Thus Anou played double or nothing, apparently realizing that "in politics, it is always advantageous to be in the offensive position." 75 It was necessary for him to show off his prestige and assets and to highlight Chao Yo's competence in order to check the power of the Khorat yokkrabat's lobby at the court of Bangkok. Anou exploited the known political weakness of the yokkrabat of Khorat who happily indulged in "kin miiang" (eating). Khorat's yokkrabat collected all territories he could afford, but could not maintain order over his domain in the backyard of the Siamese empire, and knowing this, Anou must have promised to maintain order and made convincing references to his own record in battle, which proved that he would be able to keep his word. To avoid alarming Bangkok, Anou was shrewd enough to suggest that Champassak not be reunited with Vientiane, but be placed under a separate administration, with Chao Yo as ruler. Still, he could not be certain of the 67 Thiphakorawong (1978), pp. 270,271. Damrong (1977) (T), p. 688. 68 TNL Document Rama III. 1181/11 (17 December 1819). Sila (1957) (L), p. 241. 69 Gutzlaff (1834), p. 76. 70 Bangkok has always found it in its national interest to annex the whole of Laos. See, for instance, Pansa (1978) (T), pp. 87-88. 71 For example, Rama I's sister screamed when she was informed that Anou, a "prisoner of war," had revolted and seized .Khorat. See Narinthonthewi (1963) (T), p. 36. 72 Damrong (1957) (T), p. 66. 73 Dhawaj (1980) (T), pp. 28, 29. Dhawaj (1982) (T), p. 71. 74 Pansa (1978) (T), pp. 81-85. 75 Freund (1965), p. 438.

The Realignment of the Lao

79

outcome of his gamble; the well-connected Khorat yokkrabat was favored since he was general Bodin's client and had ingratiated himself with Rama 11?6 Anou at least temporarily out-maneuvered his mortal adversary by politicking among the various coteries at the Bangkok court. Most importantly, he succeeded in securing the approval of Prince Chetsadabodin, who was strategically placed as prime minister.77 The "Yo solution" prevailed at the Bangkok court as a compromise of last resort. The volatile situation in Cambodia shaped the decision taken. An expanding millenarian movement constrained Ong Chan, in Cambodia, to appeal to the Vietnamese to intervene?8 As the future Rama IV later put it, "Thailand thought it suitable to enlarge itself [into Cambodia] because it had the greater power." 79 The Bangkok court clearly misunderstood the balance of power and Bangkok ultimately lost its arm-wrestling match with the Vietnamese in this area. In 1818, suspicious that Bangkok was preparing an incursion into Vietnam to take revenge for their previous failure, the court of Hue readied battle stations in Saigon.80 On the other border, Bangkok was confronted by the Burmese, who advanced their armies to the border.8 1 This tense international environment convinced Bangkok to maintain stability in the Champassak hinterland, for the contagion threatened to spread to other parts of the Khorat Plateau. In this period, the Prince of Siang Khuang was also facing popular uprisings among the Lao Theung in his principality.82 At Vang Vieng, the Phuthai behaved similarly.83 It was Anou's men who appeared capable of stifling incipient rebellions, for they had managed to suppress the Sakietgong movement in Champassak, the outbreaks in Siang Khuang, and those in Vang Vieng. Bangkok badly needed gendarmes to enforce the interests and the security of Bangkok at the periphery of the Siamese empire, and Anou had all the credentials for this kind of job. In addition, Bangkok's men had failed since 1791 to stabilize the situation in Champassak. Bangkok urgently wanted to install a strong power in the border area where Siam, Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia met. In a certain sense, the Champassak affair was an unbelievable windfall for Anou. The Lao chroniclers, who did not take the international situation into account, reported that Anou was the one who nominated Chao Yo as king of Champassak and then came down on his own initiative to Champassak to construct a new 76 On the total confidence placed by the Siamese king Rama II in the ruler of Khorat, see Pansa (1978) (T), pp. 83-84. 77 Did Anou offer one of his daughters as a concubine to Chetsadabodin in this context? Lao and Vietnamese sources agree that there was such a matrimonial alliance, but have not explained its date and context. See Traduction de l'histoire de Vien-chan, p. 18. Ngo Cao Lang (1977) (V), p. 98, referred to a letter from Bodin to Chao Ratsavong on this issue when Anou took refuge in Vietnam. Rama III's biography is less certain than the official historiography about the "support" Chetsadabodin offered to Anou to assure that the Champassak throne would be secured for Anou's son, Chao Yo. The biographer says that "it is rumored" that Chetsadabodin supported Anou. See Anuchit (1932) (T), pp. 174-175. 78 Chandler situates events in 1820 while Leclere, cited by Chandler, gives the date of 1818. Chandler (1973), pp. 104-106. 79 Chandler (1973), p. 96, who cites Wilson (1971), p. 983. 80 Gutzlaff (1834), p. 80. 8l Saxena (1952), pp. 575-577. 82 Phongsawadan muang phuan(1969) (L), p. 14. 83 Sanre (1978) (T), pp. 162-163.

80 Paths to Conflagration

capitaL84 Possibly Anou wanted to muster Lao public opinion and convince his people that a resurrection of Laos was in the offing and that the country was on its way to reunification, soon to be free from foreign interference and released from submission to external powers. Given the nature of the political situation, Lao unity could only be temporary. Relative to the events of 1707, the year of the tripartition of Laos, Anou's gamble was a leap forward toward reunification, but was risky nonetheless. The first stanza of the San liip bosun depicted the situation allegorically, "The garuda goes hither and thither in the sky, opening the entire length of his beak, preparing to tum heaven and earth upside-down to attack the nagas." 85 For the Lao-who considered themselves nagas-of this epoch, the garuda, the mythical king of the feathered tribe and royal emblem under Rama II, represented the Thai. In mythology, the garuda's war against the nagas was perpetual. 14. THE SYMBOLISM OFWAT SISAKET'S CANDLE-BEARER

Monks, who form "a kind of intellectual elite of the population," 86 constituted one-eighth of the Lao population. 87 The ability to maintain this sizable, dependent religious order suggests the affluence of the populace while also demonstrating the influence and significance of the clergy, which provided the cement for society. Anou certainly understood that religion could be and had been used as a device for the legitimization of power. It appears that Siam understood the power of monks as well. In 1827, monks were among the Lao prisoners taken on the battlefield.88 84 See Chotmaihet vientiane, Wat Ho Phra Kreo; Phongsawadan yo miiang wiangchan (1969) (T), pp. 136-145. Neither Chao Anou nor his son Chao Yo tolerated the domination of Siam over the hinterland. On the contrary, they took countermeasures. They established a new capital on the right bank of the Mekong and materialized the scheme of land colonization. French authorities collected, a century after the events, testimony of the local population in these terms: "Many hundred years ago [the conception about time in the local mind is vague], many parents of the King of Vientiane came, in order to propagate the religion, to found a Miiang on the left bank of the Sekong River. They named it Miiang Laman and undertook the conversion of the Khas ... They succeeded fully and in a short time, numerous Laotian families came down from Vientiane to settle at Laman. But discord soon grew among them. Those disgruntled crossed the Sekong in order to establish a new Miiang at Bane Phone." Gay (1987), vol. 2, p. 489. 85 San liip bo sun (1967) (L), p. 1. Garuda is the generic name for a mythological eagle with a human body. Naga means mythical serpent. See discussion following in section 14, "The Symbolism of Wat Sisaket's Candle-Bearer." 86 Delineau (1893), p. 266. 87 Reclus (1883), p. 816. Van Wuysthoff, a Dutch traveler of the seventeenth century, wrote: "There is approximately one pagoda for every seven or eight houses; generally, one can see two or three nearby each other. It is unlikely that a family has fewer than one of its members committed in the clergy, and this pagan body is as numerous as the soldiers of the emperor of Germany." See Gamier (1871), p. 277. 88 Chotmaihet riiang prap khabot wiangchan (1926) (T), p. 4. The Siamese had frequent recourse to monks' magic power during the war of 1827. For example, they used four monks at the battle of Sompoi. Kulab (1971) (T), p. 262; Narinthonthewi (1963) (T), p. 37. To convince the Lao viceking, Tissa, to surrender, the Siamese dispatched monks to him. See Ngo Cao Lang (1977) (V), p.67.

The Realignment of the Lao

81

"Some words must be covert for some and comprehensible for others," murmurs a verse of the San liip bo sun. The more Anou devoted himself to the construction of pagodas, particularly on the right bank of the Mekong River from whence Siam wanted to expel him,89 the more smoothly he advanced toward his aim. His preparation went unnoticed until 1827, when Rama I's sister, Princess Narinthonthewi, shrieked with fright: The third month, twelfth day of the waning moon, the year of the Dog, be informed that Krung Si Sattanakkhanahut [Anou] offended the good name of the King [Rama III], for he wanted to undertake a new territorial division, depleting [Siam]. [The Prince of] Vientiane, although still a war prisoner [since 1779], should not dare to head for Miiang Nakhon Ratchasima [Khorat] to tread it under his feet nor should he have the gall to transport families on a large scale from Saraburi and Miiang Kao [Ayudhya].90 The indignant Princess Narinthonthewi had not demonstrated such qualms when she recorded the invasion of Vientiane by her two brothers, Chakri and Surasi, in 1778-1779. 91 "That which men find most divisive is that which each of them holds sacred." 92 What was "sacred" for Princess Narinthonthewi was the grandeur of Siam, and especially the security of its 1779 possessions. Anou considered "sacred" both his refusal to accept the fait accompli of 1779 and his determination to recover Lao independence. He did not think this an impossible mission, since he and his father Siribunyasan had been pursued by the same man, the Chakri who became Rama I. In 1827, Anou and his followers approached the Khorat Plateau as if they had been always there. They moved without haste, but with the self-confidence of proprietors convinced of their right to possessions which had belonged to them from time immemorial. When he was forced ultimately to evacuate the Khorat Plateau, Anou left swaying on the back of his elephant at a speed of three kilometers per hour, with "a red-bordered hat on his head," an eyewitness recalled. 93 The political mobilization for a break-away insurrection had begun as early as 1805 and persisted, with its peak years in 1810, 1820, and 1821.94 The height of Lao achievement perhaps came with the construction of Wat Sisaket, a temple of enormous political and cultural significance.95 The pagoda bears the noble Pali name 89 Dhawaj (1980) (T), p. 14; Pansa (1978) (T), pp. 47 ff. 90 Narinthonthewi (1963) (T), p. 36. 91 Narinthonthewi (1963) (T), pp. 7, 9. 92 Aron (1961), p. 342.

93 Chotmaihet ruang prap khabot wiangchan (1926) (T), p. 60. 94 1805 was the year of Anou's overture toward Hue, and in 1810 the bridge across the Mekong River was constructed and Wat Ho Phra Kreo was erected on the bank opposite Vientiane. 1820 and 1821 were years of rapprochement with Luang Prabang. 95 "In particular, Chao Anou reconstructed Wat Sisaket, for it became the place serving the most secret political intention of Chao Anou. Each year Chao Anou came to receive the oaths of allegiance pledged by the Lao governors of Vientiane and Champassak. This provided a favorable occasion to tighten the unity of views and souls in preparation for the insurrection to recover independence." Institut de Recherches en Sciences Sociales (1987) (L), p. 277. The temple's noble name is Wat Sren, which seems to draw from the Buddha statue weighing one sren that Nanthasen brought from Chiang Sren and had installed. The common name of the pagoda, Sisaket, is said to come from sisa, meaning head, and ket, the finial of the Buddha

82 Paths to Conflagration of Wat Sattasahassa Vihararama, which means the monastery of "ten thousand felicities." Its first brick was laid on March 4, 1818 and the pagoda was inaugurated in 1824.96 This pagoda constitutes a supreme masterwork among "admirable Laotian pagodas which are genuine artistic jewels."9 7 The feast given to honor it lasted nine days and nights, two more days than had been devoted to Wat Ho Phra Kreo. Processions around Wat Sisaket and around the royal palace took place for three days and nights. All the data relating to this event is carved on a black marble stele, which "bore on one of its faces an inscription of fifty-one lines." 98 Professor Etienne Aymonier at the School of Oriental Languages in Paris wrote that "Its admirably fine, neat and sustained script made it one of the more beautiful specimens of Laotian epigraphy." 99 This script actually constitutes a sample of Chao Anou's writing style: Anou reformed the Lao script, giving it its current form. 100 Once inside Wat Sisaket, celebrants and visitors gazed on a magnificent creation placed there by Chao Anou: a fascinating, complex candelabra, bathed in light from candles lit by devotees and monks. This dazzling, branched candlestick in all its splendor brightened the main Buddha statue of the sanctuary, which was flanked on each side by two bronze Buddha statues that were exactly as tall as Chao Anou. Anou devoted himself to conducting his people along the challenging path shown by Indra. The sacred and the temporal were interwoven unequivocally in this image, and the Wat Sisaket candelabra delivered a potent message to those who understood the symbolic meanings of its sculptural elements. Louis de Came reported on this work of art in 1869, "I have admired among others a small masterpiece of carved wood .... It mixes gold and the daylight to produce the best effect." 101 Francis Garnier had a picture drawn and published in the Revue Tour Du Monde, the Time magazine of the 1850s.l 02 Anou, and indeed all Lao, would certainly recognize the significance of the terms that Henri Marchal used to depict this famous candle-holder, whose silhouette was enlivened by two dragons' statue in front of the pagoda towards which the king turns his head when he sleeps (towards the east). However, Ratnam offers a more convincing interpretation when she writes: "Wat Sisaket (Sri Saketa, Saketa is the old name of Ayudhya the capital of Sri Rama)." Ratnam (1982), p. 78. The Lao were fond of the Ramayana they had "indigenized," and in the reign of Anou there was a splendid building devoted for the play of this piece. 96 Lunet de Lajonquiere (1901), p. 107. 97 Marchal (1949), p. 100. According to A. H. Franck, "Vientiane had one hundred and twenty magnificent temples." Franck (1926), p. 348. Delineau, passing by Vientiane, counted forty-two while Raquez gave sixty-two. See Delineau (1893), p. 266. Also Raquez (1902), p. 457. 98 Lunet de Lajonquiere (1901), p. 110. 99 Aymonier was informed of the existence of another stone inscription with this same "neat and well-drawn script," some miles below the chief town of Siang Khan province and located at 17°54' latitude north, on a hill of the left bank called Phu Houe Pha Len. It is naturally carved in a deep cave where there are a great number of statues of Buddha and a stele. Aymonier (1901), p. 147. 100 Sila (1973) (L), pp. 18 ff. For the needs of the colonial exposition held in Paris in 1932, the king of Laos, Sisavangvong, studiously stamped out the scripts from Wat Sisaket's stele in order to fabricate the first punches for the national printing office to publish the first books in Lao. Hospitalier used these punches to edit his Element de grammaire Lao (1937). Testimony of Pierre-Marie Gagneux, Paris, November 2, 1988. 101 Carne (1869), p. 262. 102 Garnier (1870-1871), p. 391.

The Realignment of the Lao

83

heads that supported it on each side. 103 Henri Marchal characterized the dragons as "bad-tempered," but remarked that the "splendid" nagas seemed to surround a door of light. Nagas are the symbol of Laos and source of its name, Si Sattanakhanahut, meaning the land of nagas. The nagas' heads, with their jaggedly tom crests, and the nagas' backs, bristling with flames, signified Lao resistance. In this carved image, the nagas, after reluctantly supporting Siamese domination, hold up their heads in a gesture of defiance.104 The central decorative motif of the candelabra is a group of fifteen vertical rods with a set of seven half-rods surmounted with a half-prasat on each side. The motif represents the seven principal Lao polities enumerated by Archbishop Pallegoix: "Muang-Lom or Loum, Muang-Vieng Tian, Muang-Louang Pho-Bang, MuangPhouenne, Muang-Phle, Muang-Nan, Muang-Meung Maie."105 Only the central stem is complete, however, for it represents the strength and the invincibility of the Lao country when united.106 Henri Marchal, a specialist in Lao art, noted the presence of "an emblem of the god Indra riding on the back of his elephant Airavata" at Wat Sisaket.107 Another critic, Henri Parmentier was surprised by this image, which he considered "abnormal enough here." 108 But this special presence communicated Anou's message that the war was an inescapable means for attaining the Lao objectives of unity and independence; this explains the presence of Indra, the god of thunder and war. Significantly, Chao Anou and his followers swore by Indra.109 For ritualistic reasons, the pagodas in the Lao capital all face east and their flanks are aligned with Mekong River. The only exception is here, at Wat Sisaket, which lies perpendicular to the Mekong River; its axis of forty degrees southwest turns it toward the Khorat Plateau, and its view includes Saraburi and Bangkok. The architectural precision is astonishing. Anou's contemporaries, aware of the geomantic setting of this royal pagoda, understood the intended message. "At this splendid new temple of Sisaket, he [Anou] held a grand assembly of all his feudatories twice a year to pay him homage."llO Representatives who took part in this assemblage would stand with their backs turned to Bangkok. After 1827, the court of Bangkok required that this practice cease: all the Lao were required to pay homage to Bangkok, with their faces turned in Bangkok's direction. French colonization renewed Anou's gesture. After the French protectorate ended, the Lao kingdom neglected to reinstitute Anou's proud gesture and instead staged its oath103 Marchand (1948), plate 36; Raquez (1902), p. 461; Parmentier (1954), p. 263. 104 Lao oral tradition holds allegorically that Laos had been defeated in 1778-1779 when the Siamese wise man, Si Thananchai, succeeded in plugging the tunnel to the nagas' underground refuge. Chan (T), p. 13; Lam Phiin Wiang Pen Phasa Thai (T), ninth verse. 105 Pallegoix (1836), pp. 40-41. Confirmed by Father Langlois, former missionary in Tonkin. Cf. Langlois (1831), p. 65. The number of seven Lao states is enigmatic. In the seventeenth century, Marini wrote that the Lao kingdom was embodied by seven provinces and each of them was ruled by a vice-king. Marini (1663), p. 265. The story, Thao Lao Kham, reminds us that the Kingdom of Vientiane owned seven vassal states. See Archaimbault (1980), p. 148. 106 Sila (1954) (L), p. 51. 107 Marchal (1964), pp. 14-15. 108 Parmentier (1954), p. 263. 109 Archaimbault (1980), pp. 120, 125, 126, 146, 152, 159, 173. 110 Hall (1976), p. 449.

84 Paths to Conflagration

taking ceremonies in a less contentious temple, Wat Ong Tii, a tradition which lasted until1975. 111 15. ACCUMULATION OF CAPITAL IN THE LAND OF COURTING POETRY

In an earlier chapter, we examined the ways in which Siam blocked and rerouted trade that had traditionally circulated between Laos and its neighbors, in particular Vietnam and Cambodia. These maneuvers inevitably frustrated Chao Anou, who found himself in need of revenue as he began serious efforts to muster his resources for an armed revolt. He exerted himself to circumvent Bangkok's attempted blockades by directing Lao traders to explore new routes, for example to the north, into China, by introducing intensive rice production, and by imposing increased taxes on Lao principalities now controlled by Vientiane. The second policy, in particular, was fated to stir up discontent in the region, for unlike the Bangkok elite, the Lao rulers had traditionally neglected to demand contributions from the populace to sustain glorious royal households. "The conditions of the life of a Laotian are very simple, for he is the simple man par excellence, with minimal needs and satisfied with little," wrote Henri Marchand. 11 2 And according to another observer, even the "nobles are of simple habits, not rich and poorly educated."113 At the apogee of the Lan Sang kingdom in the seventeenth century, foreign envoys who were granted an audience by the Lao king found themselves seated on mats, as was the king himself. Laos had always been known as a country of poetry, not glitter: "Laos, this beautiful country, is where love and joy are king."ll 4 In daily life, courting poetry continues to play a large role in Laos, which has gained the reputation among foreigners as the "kingdom of flirting." The country's royal families never instituted a taxation network sufficiently demanding to generate great wealth or to bring immense properties under their control. "The revenues of the kingdom consisted in gum lac, benjamin, and gold. In areas where gold exists, tax was set at a rate of one hoy for each one hundred men domiciled in this area. This tax for the whole kingdom amounted to about two picul [approximately 122 kg. of gold] per year."115 During French colonial rule, the situation changed little. Collectively these various members of the royal family [in Luang Prabang] own no more than a few hundred hectares of irrigated rice land. A similar situation applied to the surviving aristocrats elsewhere around Champassak. The surplus they received was consumed unproductively in maintaining the pomp and ceremony and lifestyle of a traditional aristocracy, which in many ways it remained. It is perhaps worth emphasizing, however, that commensurate with the small surplus generated, differences in standards of 111 Dare (1980), p. 89. 112 Marchand (1948), p. 68. 113 Gamier (1871), pp. 267-268. 114 Marchand (1948), pp. 72-73; Gamier (1870), p. 64. Fran~ois (1937), pp. 72-73. These observations confirmed those of earlier European travelers in the seventeenth century such Marini or Van Wusthoff. On courtship rituals in Laos, see Compton (1979). 115 Gamier (1871), p. 277.

The Realignment of the Lao

85

living between the elite and commoners were not great, unlike in Bangkok, although all the trappings of rank and social status were strongly enforced. Yet the important point is that the surplus was neither generated by commercial development, nor plowed back for commercial expansion.116 In other words, the Lao feudal class never possessed an assembly of slaves or captives to extract surplus profits from farming or trade,117 so the country was unable to negotiate the transition "from property rights in man to property rights in land . . . [or] the accumulation of large areas of paddy land in the hands of aristocrats and state-based officials."118 Anou tried to break this impasse. Confronted with the blockade organized by the Siamese in southern Laos, he looked toward the north for a commercial outlet. For the year 1811, the annals kept at the Wat Ho Phra Kreo, the Chotmaihet yo vientiane, noted an unprecedented event in Laos: "[On] the· ninth day of the waxing moon of the tenth month ... Chao Anou dispatched officials to trade in the Miiang Lii (Yunnan, China) and to buy horses and elephants." Perhaps at this time, Lao Vientiane officials were sent for training in trade skills. As traders, they could establish profitable commercial links with China. C. K. Gutzlaff wrote: Some Laos, who were sent by their chief, a few years ago, with a Chinese mandarin from the frontiers of China, appeared a superior class of people, though speaking the same language as other tribes. They were greatly improved through their association with the Chinese, to whose emperor they are accustomed to send regular tribute by the hands of an ambassador.1 19 Despite difficulties traversing the wide mountainous range that stood between Laos and China, intercourse between Vientiane and China was regular, as John Crawfurd noted in 1823: The territories, indeed, border upon each other, but these adjacent regions are the remote and thinly inhabited parts of both territories. These are the kingdom of Lao on the one side, and the Chinese province of Yunnan on the other. Here some traffic is carried on between them, and a considerable number of the Chinese of Yunnan have settled at Lantchang [Lan Sang], the capital of Lao, and other towns of the country.120 116 Evans (1987), p. 6. 117 Parmentier (1954). 118 Quoted in Evans (1987), p. 5. The quotation is from David Feeny, The Political Economy of Productivity: Thai Agricultural Development, 1880-1975 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1982), chap. 6. 119 Gutzlaff (1834), p. 79. l20 Crawfurd Papers, p. 148; Orleans (1896), p. 420; Sylvestre (1899), pp. 53, 101; Groslier (1958), p. 125; Franck (1926), p. 350. Crawfurd counted eight thousand Chinese in Laos, three thousand Chinese in Fai-Fo, Vietnam, and five thousand in Saigon. Crawfurd (1834), pp. 447, 470. Malloch gives the figure of two thousand Chinese in the kingdom of Vientiane, 450 in the kingdom of Champassak, 450 in Luang Prabang, and nine hundred in Chiang Mai. Burney Papers, vol. 3, part 2, p. 385.

86 Paths to Conflagration

The Chinese in Laos, called Nung-seh, numbered eight thousand according to John Crawfurd, who seems to have received this information from Anou himself. In his journal, John Crawfurd noted: "goods are transported with difficulty by small horses. The imports from China in this quarter I am told consist of coarse Chinese woolens, some English broadcloths, pins, needles, and other descriptions of hardware, with some gold, copper, and lead." 121 Did Anou's commercial initiatives obstruct Siamese interests and exacerbate the conflict in the 1820s? James Low, who claimed to have obtained his information from the Lao and the Bangkok Siamese, reported: "About thirty years ago, AD 1817, the Siamese court, being perhaps irritated at the intrigues of the Chinese with its neighbors, laid waste with an army ... a great part of South Laos." 122 The Bangkok court already suspected the Chinese, even those in Bangkok, of colluding with the British to prepare a British attack on Bangkok. 123 They may also have suspected that the Chinese would provide support to rebellious Siamese vassal states. There were some disgruntled Chinese and Thai in Siam who were exasperated by the way the Thai aristocracy handled trade, and who had shown a preference for contacting the British directly, as John Crawfurd reported. Like these Chinese traders, Anou had also found commercial dealings with the Thai aristocracy unprofitable and frustrating. The convergence of Chinese and Lao economic interests gave rise to common interests in politics. Certainly Anou hoped to forge an alliance with the Chinese. In 1827, Anou took special care to keep himself in the good graces of the Chinese in Saraburi and Khorat. For instance, he dispatched four hundred elephants to convey the fortune of a Chinese, Chek Chai, from Saraburi to Vientiane. He hoped his service would guarantee Chinese support for his war effort, which he believed would last at least three years. Anou lodged these Chinese in the residential quarter of Suan Luang (now the campus of the Vientiane Lycee) adjoining the royal palace.l 24 It is impossible to know the extent of the alliance between Anou and individual Chinese in Siam and China. In any case, both Bangkok and Vientiane had Chinese minorities whose capable trading skills ensured that politics and trade were intertwined. Clearly, Anou valued their talents and hoped for their friendship. Since trade moves easily across political frontiers and ignores ideological boundaries, Laos also engaged in intercourse with Burma as a substitute for the traditional outlet to the south. "Rubies," C. K. Gutzlaff related, ... and emeralds are collected, and are sent both to Bangkok and to Ava, but in great quantities to Ava, from whence they have .found their way to Hindostan.... Many of these Laos visit the fair at Rangoon, though forty days distant, with the productions of their country. They export lac, varnish, groundnuts, lead, gold and silver in ingots. Iron is found in large quantities. 121 Crawfurd (1834), p. 407; Burney Papers, vol. 2, 4, p. 83. For the situation before Anou, see Gutzlaff (1848), p. 39. For the context in the 1860s, see Mouhot (1863), p. 347. 122 James Low, who wrote this passage in 1847, referred to the 1827 invasion of Vientiane, which the British called "South Laos" at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Low (1851), p. 511. 123 Breazeale (1986), p. 211. 124 Dhawaj (1980) (T), p. 44; Ngo Cao Lang (1977) (V), p. 37. Some of these Chinese residents tried to emigrate to Vietnam when Anou took refuge there.

The Realignment of the Lao

87

The Lao have lately opened an intercourse with Martaban, and will probably, on finding security of person and property, come to the market in greater numbers for the manufactures of Europe.125 Was this trade authorized or was it carried on despite the injunction from the Bangkok court? The commercial intercourse between the Lao and Burmese was an established trade recorded in the Siang Khuang chronicles, 126 and the Burmese government was well aware of the activity and its economic potential. The Burmese envoy negotiating in Saigon in 1824 noted in his diary on July 9: "I observed that the King of Ava had many settlements towards the northern part of the Kambojan river [Mekong], by the channels of which a great trade might be carried on between the two nations [Burma and Vietnam]; while, if a road were cut through Lenjen [Lan Sang] to Tonquin, an intercourse might be established in that quarter."12 7 In short, we can suppose that Bangkok vigilantly observed Anou's attempts to extend his kingdom's trading networks and to foster communications with his neighbors in all directions but south. In addition to increasing revenues and strengthening alliances through trade, Anou also tried to extract revenues from his own country. It appears that Anou imported the plantation system from Siam, where it was rapidly expanding because it generated high profits for the Bangkok elite. Within an eighteen kilometer wall circling Vientiane, Anou established the na luang, or the royal paddy field. The Thai occupying armies in 1827 were surprised to find Vientiane so well endowed with rice. 128 The rice fields of these na luang were still discernible decades later to Delineau and Lunet de Lajonquiere, who passed through Vientiane in 1888 and 1901 respectively. They located the old fields near a virtually empty section of the city: "The part of the town situated between the That Luang road and the Huei is nearly deserted and seems to have never been as completely inhabited as the western part: one can still find traces of old rice fields which certainly had not been created after the seizure and the destruction of the town. "129 The long period of peace during Anou's reign stimulated production and prosperity, according to oral tradition, despite the efforts of Siam to cut off trade in the south. 130 Many new towns were created such as Miiang Kao, Miiang Heuang, Miiang May, Miiang Soum, and Miiang Bo in Borikan (formerly Ban Na-Hen).131 A. Raquez wrote about the area's prosperity in 1902: 125 For the commercial intercourse between Nan and Burma, see Gutzlaff (1848), pp. 38, 46; Chiranan (1989).

126 Phongsawadan miiang phuan (1969) (L). 127 Peam (1964), p. 161, 154. 128 Pansa (1978) (T), pp. 80-81. The rice grown in Vientiane gained an excellent reputation ever since the first Europeans traveled to Laos. Father Marini wrote "Rice is incomparable and has a such particular odor and savor . . . this rice is so excellent that I don't think it may possible to find it in other part of the East." Marini (1663), p. 155. Kaempfer wrote: "This country produces abundantly the best kind of rice." Kaempfer (1729), p. 23. 129 Delineau (1915), p. 449. 130 Traduction de l'histoire de Vien-chan, p. 19. 131 Interview of Pho Tou (113 years old) in Vientiane on August 2, 1986; Taupin (1888), p. 55.

88 Paths to Conflagration

This Vientiane province [actual name in the newly established French administrative chart] with its four Miiang of Vientiane, Turakhom, Pachum, and Borikhan is one of the richest of Laos. The Nam Ton [river] and the Sam Meun Miiang Tuong [Sam Miin Miiang Fuang] provide beautiful limestone. Near Vientiane, there are iron minerals, but no one indigenous to exploit it. Salt mines existed at Tat Luang, Ban Keun and Houei Sien, and gold in Nam Sang, Nam Born, at Keng Pha, at Keng Chau, and in the Nam Nghiep. Precious stones in the Tasseng of Thine Hou. There were formerly silver mines. Older persons have conserved the memory of the smelting of this ore, near the Tat Luang. Money is even fabricated at Vientiane. 132 The inhabitants of Sakon Nakhon (now in Thailand) to this day recall how Anou extracted silver from the mines in the area. Another sign indicating the tremendous effort and commercial activity initiated and encouraged by Chao Anou was the efficient system organized for exporting valued natural resources. In a report on April3, 1823, John Crawfurd noted: Benjamin is produced chiefly in the kingdom of Lao and has of late years been exported in considerable quantities. This is a commodity which has commonly been supposed to be peculiar to the Islands of Sumatra and Borneo.... Stick lac of the finest quality anywhere to be found forms a very valuable product. It is chiefly obtained from Lao and the northern parts of the country. Of this production not less than 18,000 piculs are annually sent to China. 133 This substantial export trade was the consequence of an energetic bureaucratic reorganization in the Lao kingdom.1 34 However, enlarging and empowering the bureaucracy had consequences. Understanding that he would require revenues to underwrite his plans, Anou saw to it that the tax system for the kingdom was systematized and extended. The old tax system, which traced its origins to the seventeenth century, had instituted a collective tax applied to villages mining gold at the rate of one hoy [125.5 grams] per one hundred inhabitants_135 Anou reworked and revived the system, organizing mu ban suai and mu ban lek dilan [villages that render taxes in kind]. Following the reorganization, villages in the western part of the country, such as Phan Phao, Nang Bua Lam Phu, Sompoi, and Pho, had to pay an annual poll tax of three to twelve baht in silver.l36 On the eastern side, Vientiane's control was less direct, but Anou still managed to exact tribute. For instance, the Siang Khuang annals recorded that directly after his enthronement, Anou "sent an embassy to bring a letter to Chao Noi: and acknowledged the kingdom of Phuan with Chao No'i as king. But, [Anou's] ambassadors immediately transformed [themselves into] officials to take a census of 132 Raquez (1902), pp. 466-467. 133 Crawfurd Papers, pp. 112-113. 134 On the organizational scheme of the kingdom of Vientiane, see Charubut (1981) (T), pp. 1-

5.

135 Archaimbault quotes Dutch travelers in the seventeenth century, (1967), p. 609. 136 Theerachai

(1984) (T), p. 59; Phongsawadan milang phuan (1969) (L), p. 14.

The Realignment of the Lao

89

Miiang Phuan's population and to consecrate the superior of Wat Si Phon as the patriarch of the Siang Khuang clergy." 137 Vientiane had attempted to organize a census of the Phuan kingdom in the past, but had met with resistance for political and fiscal reasons. In 1799, Inthavong had sent his vice king, Anou himself, with an army to capture the Phuan king, Chao Somphou, and to bring him to Vientiane. One year later, Inthavong tried to directly administer Siang Khuang; he sent a commissioner, whose name was Samonti, to take charge of the area and to make a census. 138 But the Vietnamese court of Hue intervened. Vientiane was subsequently persuaded to release Chao Somphou, who later died in his homeland, Siang Khuang. Chao Anou was more successful than his predecessor at dismantling the royal government of Siang Khuang. He dethroned twelve-year-old Chao Noi, the legitimate heir, and nominated a commoner, Chao Noi:'s uncle, to replace him. Chao Noi's uncle had formerly been governor of Miiang Kassy, located mid-way between Vientiane, Luang Prabang, and Siang Khuang. This substitution of a governor for a king aimed at reducing the status of Siang Khuang from a kingdom to a simple province of Vientiane.139 However, Anou's machinations were met with some resistance. Chao Noi:'s partisans helped him take refuge at Ky Son, in Vietnam, where he requested assistance and intervention from the court of Hue. At Hue's suggestion, Anou gave up his attempt to enthrone the legitimate heir's uncle and nominated Chao Noi: as the ruler of Siang Khuang, but then Anou promptly neutralized this legitimate ruler's power by appointing as vice king his own favorite candidate, the governor of Miiang Kassy. 140 Anou then dismembered the kingdom of Siang Khuang, where his appointee carried out his plans. After the fall of Anou, Chao Noi:'s sons would claim that "Siang Khuang had more than one thousand able men and a population of about six thousand. Its satellite towns were Siang Kham, Kat, and Khang, each with about two hundred to three hundred able men. Sui, Mok, and Siang Di were under Vientiane's jurisdiction also. Siang Khuang and its satellites were taxed at four hundred baht yearly-plus beeswax, rhinoceros hom, and ivory in no fixed amounts."141 Chao No'i of Siang Khuang, who had received one of Anou's distant female relatives to be his queen as a gift from Anou, 142 was as interested as Anou in rationalizing and facilitating tax collection. Echoing the general feeling of the population, the Siang Khuang chronicler recorded that: 137 Phongsawadan milang phuan (1969) (L), p. 13. 138 Snit and Breazeale (1988), p. 9. 139 Snit and Breazeale (1988). 140 Snit and Breazeale (1988). 141 TNL Document Rama ill, 1208/28, Memorandum on the State affairs of Phuan, recorded in 1835-1837. 142 When the princely family of Siang Khuang was imprisoned after 1829 by the court of Hue, Chao Kham and her daughters were spared because the Vietnamese considered them members of Chao Anou's family. See TNL Document Rama III, 1214/75. Later, they were brought to Thailand with other Phuan to be settled in the territory of Chachrengsao, at Tha San." At San landing, Prince Noi's consort Princess Kham (a member of Prince Anuwong's family) and their three daughters, helped to stabilize the new Phuan and Lao communities and to attract more Phuan and Vientiane Lao migrants. By that time, Phuan villages began to spring up around San landing.... " Snit and Breazeale (1988), p. 33.

90 Paths to Conflagration

Chao No'i came to the throne at the age of fourteen years. He was an authoritarian king who imposed heavy taxes. He had a treasury, elephants, horses, and an arms depot. He had a vast palace constructed that resembled that of Vientiane. He had five hundred pages trained for military careers. The population was numerous, the country was prosperous; Miiang Phuan was placed under the suzerainty of Xieng [Siang] Khuang.143 Thus, throughout the Lao principalities, a number of leaders appear to have been simultaneously inspired to extend their trade and taxation networks in the years prior to 1827. In Champassak, Anou's son, Chao Yo, became the new king. He earned a reputation similar to his father's, for he too was an energetic and ambitious man, interested in reviving the regal rights that his predecessors had allowed to fall into disuse. The outcome was essentially the same as in Siang Khuang, and the chronicle written after the fall of Anou and Yo is particularly hostile to them. Charles Archaimbault's account in the Champassak chronicles claims that opposition to Chao Yo represented the vox populi, and he hailed it as the south's "historical conscience" expressing its opposition to Vientiane, not just to Chao Yo's fiscal policies. "Yo was a wicked man. Each dignitary who did not execute rapidly the task assigned to him was chastised for his troubles," 144 asserts the Champassak chronicler, who also criticizes Chao Yo for organizing a census in Champassak and its satellite towns. Following the census, each married man liable for armed service had to pay a tax in silk, wood pigeon, and rice weighing one s'ang, five tamliing (1,500 kilograms). Anou, Ratsavong, Chao No'i, and Chao Yo were truly the technocrats of Lao power. Motivated by the broad interests of their country, they neglected to consider the human factor. For this reason, the legacy of chronicles and historical judgments trailing them is dark and critical in many places.145 143 Archaimbault (1961), pp. 619, 577. 144 Archaimbault (1961),

p. 566. Struck by their aggressive administrative expansion and taxation policies, Theerachai Boonmathum emphasizes the counterproductive effect of Anou's and his men's aggressive administrative efforts on the outcome of the 1827 conflict. Theerachai (1984) (T), p. 59. 14 5

THE ALLIANCE AND THE NATURE OF THINGS

16. BALANCING REGIONAL POWERS: NANTHASEN LOOKS TO VIETNAM

Following the defeat of Vientiane by Siam in 1779, the Lao principality became a vassal state and its rulers found themselves bound by the will of Bangkok. It is not surprising that they looked to their neighbors, hoping to find allies who could help them break free from vassalage; of these neighbors, one of the strongest, and, at last, the most disappointing, was Vietnam. Through much of this period, the Nguyen rulers of Vietnam-Nguyen Anh, who was later called Gia Long, and his successor, Minh Mang-were themselves challenged by a civil war with the rebel Tay Son, and Siam repeatedly called on the Lao kings to assist the Nguyen in their attempts to suppress the rebellion. Yet when those same kings, particularly Nanthasen and Chao Anou, sent their emissaries to Vietnam asking for favors in return, the emissaries usually returned empty handed, for Vietnam's Confucian rulers were unwilling to arouse the anger of Bangkok. Approximately three decades before Chao Anou confronted problems and opportunities represented by the potential alliance with Vietnam, his predecessor and elder brother, Nanthasen, the first Lao king appointed by Siam, puzzled over the same questions. Nanthasen found vassalage burdensome and considered using Vietnam as a counterweight to Siam's power in his region. In 1787, Bangkok had required Nanthasen to send his brother and vice king, Inthavong, to join Lao military forces together with the Thai armies under Rama I in a siege against a Burmese town. The very next year, Nanthasen dispatched a mission to congratulate the Vietnamese leader, Nguyen Anh, later Gia Long, for recapturing Gia Dinh from the Tay Son rebels. 1 Does this gesture suggest that Nanthasen hoped Gia Long would balance out Siam's political power in the region? 2 Or perhaps this was simply an exchange of good will traded between men similarly bound by subservience to Bangkok? 1 About

the events of 1787 and 1788, see Thiphakorawong (1978), p. 145; Nguyen Le Thi (1977)

(V), p. 130.

2 This is the dominant interpretation. "The real pattern the Burmese, Siamese, Laotians and Cambodians observed was to send gift-laden envoys to Vietnam whenever they needed a Vietnamese military counterweight to one of the other Southeast Asian courts. This pattern was more suggestive of continental European diplomacy in the age of 'the balance of power' than it was of the Chinese diplomatic system." See, Woodside (1971), p. 239.

92

Paths to Conflagration

Nanthasen's approach was not an unusual one; rather it renewed a wellestablished tradition of relations between Laos and Vietnam. The Luang Prabang chronicle, drafted at the request of Bangkok, asserts, "During this period [around 1680] Miiang Vietnam had consistent and good-neighborly relations with Miiang Vientiane [and] Miiang Luang Prabang."3 The chronicler reported that cordial relations between the Laotian principalities and Vietnam had then ceased: In the year Chulasakarat 1195 [a.d. 1833], Chaophraya Bodintharadecha [Bodin], commander-in-chief of the Bangkok armies, went to combat the Yuan [derogatory term referring to the Vietnamese] at Miiang Phnom Penh, and it is from this date that Miiang Yuan [Vietnam] and Miiang Luang Prabang saw their friendship and their relations end. 4 Eruptions throughout the region complicated the attempts of the more powerful kingdoms to form stable alliances. Siam called on the soldiers of its vassals to fight the Tay Son; forces mustered by Bangkok were also engaged in Cambodia and in Burma, a situation discussed at greater length below. Campaigns of this sort often led to enmity, as in the case described above, when the Thai general Bodin ordered soldiers of Luang Prabang to fight in Phnom Penh. Yet these campaigns also provided opportunities for cooperation between countries like Laos and Vietnam, and such temporary partnerships were sometimes viewed as threats by Siam. It appears that enforced involvement in the Vietnamese civil war led directly to the downfall of Nanthasen. While the king of Siam, Rama I, did not hesitate to intervene in Laos, he was reluctant to become involved directly in Vietnamese affairs, which he must have perceived as a dangerous quagmire or, at very least, a contest whose outcome was unpredictable. In 1786, when the ousted king of Vietnam, Nguyen Anh (Gia Long), fled his refuge in Bangkok, the Tay Son proposed to kidnap him and return him. Responding to this offer, Rama I "said that such an action would be totally unbecoming to one who had been [Nguyen] Anh's benefactor. He stated further that he did not want to become involved in the Vietnamese conflict because it was an internal matter among Vietnamese, and it would only make matters worse for an outsider who did not understand the Vietnamese situation to intervene."S But Rama I was very happy to order Lao mercenaries into Vietnam to harry the Tay Son. In the year preceding the arrest of Nanthasen, a Tay Son embassy visited Bangkok to propose friendly intercourse with Rama I, Gia Long's ally,6 and to air their grievances against Nanthasen, who was accused of invading Vietnamese areas. 7 The primary motivation behind the Tay Son denunciation of the Lao ruler stemmed from the rebels' ambition to undermine Gia Long's strength, for Nanthasen had helped Gia Long's military campaign by establishing a second military front. They also wanted to send a signal of their good faith to Rama I to secure Bangkok's confidence or at least its neutrality relative to the two Vietnamese factions. The Tay 3 Phongsawadan miiang luang prabang (1963) (T), p. 334. 4 Phongsawadan miiang luang prabang (1963) (T), p. 353. 5 Chantha (1969) (T), p. 208. 6 Gesick (1976), pp. 131-132; Thiphakorawong (1978), p. 202. It is curious that the Quy Hop documents mentioned in Tran Van Quy (1988) are mute on this issue. 7 Gesick (1976), pp. 130-133.

The Alliance and the Nature if Things

93

Son needed a respite following the death in 1792 of their outstanding chief, Nguyen Van Hue, alias Quang Trung. Relations between Nanthasen and the Tay Son had been ragged. In the early 1790s, the Tay Son armies were apparently defeated in Laos when they cut through Laos to attack Gia Long from the rear. Old Indochina hands, including Father Pierre Jacques Lemonnier de Labissachere and Father L. Labousse, reported this news. 8 It is possible that Nanthasen was trying to play the two Vietnamese warring factions off each other because they had become too demanding of him. The Quy Hop documents reveal that he willingly connived with the Tay Son on occasion. 9 But 8 In a letter from Cochinchina dated June 16, 1792, Father L. Labousse asserted that: "They [the Tay Son armies] numbered about thirty thousand and came through Laos, which they have scoured as a victor, as in Cambodia .... Therefore, they became master of most of Cochinchina they subdued the whole kingdom of Tonquin, and they probably subdued Laos too where they just pillaged." Labousse quoted in Cadiere (1912), p. 26. Labissachere gives another version of this passage about the Tay Son traversing Laos. The details he includes make his account more reliable than the one above. Labissachere writes that the Tay Son chief, Nguyen Van Hue, had armies numbering from six to ten thousand soldiers, under the command of Tran Quang Dieu. They crossed Laos to take Gia Long by surprise and also to ask the Vientiane king why he refused to pay tribute to the Tay Son. But Tran Quang Dieu was defeated and "his army perished nearly entirely while it passed through Laos." Labissachere (1812), p. 51. Thai sources substantiate Labissachere's version. They record that Nanthasen sent the trophies to Rama I. Thiphakorawong (1978), pp. 169-170, 183-184. The Luang Prabang chronicles as recorded by court of Hue officials in the 1830s, affirm this point when they say: "In the year of Tan-hoi (1791 AD), the Tay Son rebels attacked the Kingdom of Vientiane. Onmanh (Mangthathurat) and his mother seized the opportunity to escape from the Kingdom of Vientiane and return to Nam-chuong [Luang Prabang]." See Kimura (1971), p. 157. However, Father Bouillevaux specified that: "Quang Trung [a Tay Son chief], after seizing Tonking, seems to have made an expedition to Laos in 1791. Vien-Chan, ravaged by the Burmese in 1772, and by the Siamese in 1777, had just recovered from its ruins, when it was again attacked. The Laotian king pha-Poutichao was killed by the Tonkinese. The defeated seem, however, to have been reconciled with their eastern neighbors; the Annamese came to help the king of Vien-Chan, who could extend his authority on the left bank of the river as far as Khemmarat, and subdue all the country till Attapeu. Laos seems to have enjoyed some tranquillity. Bassac was re-established and Ubon was founded." Bouillevaux (1874), p. 394. 9 Tran Van Quy reports the following letter of October 1792 from "Chau Chiem, youngest brother of the king of Vientiane" addressed to "Do doc Dinh Nhat" (royal delegate of the Tay Son and governor of the province of Nghe-An). The "Chau Chiem" referred to in the letter by the Tay Son official is none other than Anou himself, since in his letter he says he is one of the three brothers, including the king of Vientiane, and he is the youngest. As a matter of fact, Siribunyasan had only three sons: Nanthasen, Inthavong, and Anou. At the time of intercourse with the Tay Son, Anou was twenty-five years old. It is possible that "Chiem" was a nickname he picked up when taken prisoner in Bangkok, where he might have been called by his Siamese peers "Chim," the cadet. This would be rendered "Chiem" in Vietnamese Nom. "Chau" is a Lao word for prince. It seems that the Thai never knew of Anou's link with the Tay Son. The proposed repatriation of the Lao forced to settle in Siam was a politically sensitive issue under the reign of Nanthasen and Anou, and was a major cause of the 1827 conflict. The body of the letter follows here: "The last time, I commanded Phia-Chan-the-pha, Phia Man kha-thi to escort Phoc-na-khi to report to your excellency that the kingdom of Vientiane has been invaded by the Siamese. "The king, secluded in the capital, was embarrassed and denied all initiative and action. He told me to take command of the affairs of the kingdom [resisting the Siamese] in the mountainous region of Phac-bat ... Your Excellency has dispatched eight soldiers from the post of Quy Hop to bring us a written ordinance with four dragon robes, four turbans, two skirts, and four gift boxes. We three brothers and Xam-pha-mat agree with all the content of your letter. We are very happy with it. And I have been charged to come and pay homage to

94

Paths to Confiagration

Nanthasen was also in a position that would have allowed him to demand assistance from Gia Long, since he had helped Gia Long many times. He would have expected not simply that the favor be repaid, but also that he would receive a contribution in "the well understood interests" shared by the two parties. In any case, his ambiguous position between Vietnamese factions eventually affected his relations with Bangkok. your excellency. But actually, I am in charge of the affairs of the kingdom. If I come in person to pay homage to your excellency in Vietnam, Siam will certainly know of it. And the Siamese undoubtedly will behead our parents, our women and our children, and will massacre our compatriots. "Thus, for instance, we dare not use the costumes with dragon insignia and the turbans you have bestowed on us for fear of being killed by the Siamese. "For the same reason, the correspondence your excellency addressed to us, if unveiled by the Siamese, will create problems [for us]. "Concerning your detachment camping at Tran Ninh, we beg you to withdraw it. For if you stay there, the Siamese will force the king of Vientiane to launch a battle, and that would be disloyal to the court of Vietnam. To keep faith, I have given orders to my delegates to take an oath with your excellency in my personal name. "As a big-brother country, may Vietnam demonstrate its fraternal affection for us as in the past and come to our aid for the repatriation of our parents, brothers, wives and children detained in Siam. "We beg the great army of Vietnam to come and defeat the Siamese. If it should arrive by the direction of Chau Ba-Dong, it is I, present at Phac-bat, who will go to meet it. If it comes by the direction of Lac Hoan through ... , it will be received and escorted by the chief of Lac Hoan and Xam-pha-mat. In the direction of Miiang ... Ba-Dong, the escort is confided to Thoc ... Bon who will organize passage through the Mekong. "The movement from Tran Ninh toward Vientiane is, for mercy's sake, to be postponed, since the king of the Kingdom of Vientiane is still there. Should he be pushed by the Siamese to attack you, it would be dishonest to Vietnam. "The promptest arrival of the great army is very desirable. The twelfth lunar month is the most favorable time. "By written ordinance, you should inform me about the date and directions of the great army's arrival so I can make preparations to receive it. "Lao and Siamese can be easily confounded in battle. I ask you to promulgate signals particularly distinct to avoid any trouble ... " The royal delegate of the Tay Son answered with a letter to Chao Chiem and the village chiefs of the kingdom of Vientiane, on December 22, 1792: "Today I charge the commander of Quy Hop, Lang Nhat Hau, to lead thirty pioneers to gather intelligence in the field about the Siamese situation to create a plan of attack. Afterward the great rear-guard will follow them. "Our resolution is to annihilate the foreign invaders so that the countries of your kingdom can become tranquil, as formerly. "Once these pioneers have arrived at their destination, take care to feed them correctly. Therefore, [you should] prepare provisions and money for the great army. "And then, you will send men to cooperate with Lang Nhat Hau to prepare a path of attack by this way by the back [probably in the direction of Siang Khuang-Vientiane] "Let's deploy all of your efforts for this challenging campaign, for your native lands to rekindle their fire, and for your hamlets and villages to recover the prosperity of the time of your ancestors. I have faith and confidence in you." Tran Van Quy (1988), pp. 11-12. It is indisputable that Nanthasen asked for Siamese military assistance. See Gesick (1976), p. 132. Was Nanthasen panicking before an unexpected move by the Tay Son or putting them under pressure by asking for Siamese intervention to chase the Tay Son out of Siang Khuang? It is a cruel irony if Nanthasen was the one arrested by such a Siamese party.

The Alliance and the Nature of Things

95

Because of the hostitility characterizing the Vietnamese imbroglio, Bangkok had to act swiftly to contain any elements that would endanger its tenuous relationship with Gia Long. The favor Nanthasen felt owed to him by Gia Long may have been repaid with a Vietnamese betrayal. In 1794 "someone accused King [Chao] Nanthasen of Lanchang at Vientiane and Phra Borommaracha, the governor of Nakhon Phanom, of secretly planning a revolt" against Bangkok.l° For this, Nanthasen was arrested along with any plans he might have had for Lao independence. The official Thai version maintains that Rama I wanted to act fairly toward his Lao vassal, so he invited Nanthasen to Bangkok to give him an opportunity to prove his innocence. 11 The short chronicle of Vientiane incongruously asserts that "Nanthasen was fleeing to Bangkok," as if to take refuge there. 12 A document from Mukdahan more accurately assessed the situation when it noted that "In the year Chulasakarat 1156, the Thai put Chao Nanthasen in iron chains."13 The Nakhon Phanom chronicler relates that Rama I "sent an expeditionary corps to seize Chao Vientiane and Phra Borommaracha to bring them down to Krungthep in the year Chulasakarat 1156, the year of the Tiger." 14 Lomsak rulers added that this raid was conducted by a Siamese army headed by Luang Thep Borirak. 15 Nanthasen was ousted around April1795, and his brother Inthavong was not invested until July 23.16 Documents vary on the hypothesis that Nanthasen had been planning an insurrection against Bangkok. The annals of the court of Hue, drafted during the period of total confrontation between Siam and Vietnam in the 1830s, mention that: "The arrest of Nanthasen has been carried out by mere gossips," suggesting that Bangkok acted on false information. 17 A Lao chronicle, however, validates the theory that Nanthasen had indeed been preparing a revolt against Siam: "After a reign of fourteen years, Phra Borommaracha wanted to join the Chao of Vientiane [Nanthasen] in insurrection. In the year Chulasakarat 1155, the year of the Bull (AD 1793), Chao Nan[thasen] of Vientiane sent a mission to Chaofa Yuan [the Vietnamese emperor] to ask for military assistance." 18 Many historians have identified the king of Luang Prabang as the unnamed "someone" who, according to the royal chronicle of Bangkok, arraigned his 10 Thiphakorawong (1978), p. 207. 11 Thiphakorawong (1978), pp. 207-208. 12 Chotmaihet yo miiang vientiane (L), Wat Ho Phra Kreo. See also Phongsawadan yo miiang wiangchan (1969) (T), p. 143. By asserting that "they take refuge in Bangkok," the chroniclers attempted to save face for their rulers and camouflage a politically painful fact. The question should be raised, since the same phenomenon occurred in the case of the king of Luang Prabang. Le Boulanger wrote: "Anourout had time to flee and to take refuge in Siam," an action that seems unlikely if, indeed, the king was a prisoner on Siamese orders and in Vientiane' Le Boulanger (1931), p. 129. 13Bok sakkarat khwam khluan wai khong Ian chang (T); Phongsawadan yo miiang wiangchan (1969) (T),

p. 134.

14 Chantha (1969) (T), p. 208.

15TNL Document Rama III.1213/43. Memorandum on the history of Lomsak from 1767 to 1836. 16 Gesick (1976), p. 133. Vickery (1973), pp. 352-353. 17 See Nguyen Le Thi (1977) (V), p. 134. 18 Chantha (1969) (T), p. 208. An excerpt of a letter of the Vientiane ruler addressed to the Tay

Son confirms it. See note 9, above

96

Paths to Conflagration

Vientiane counterpart and rival. Historians make this link based on the fact that the king of Luang Prabang was thought to be in Bangkok at this time.l 9 However, two considerations clear the Luang Prabang ruler. First, it seems that Nanthasen was not imprisoned in Bangkok, as the Thai chronicles say, but in Vientiane. Furthermore, he had been released from Vientiane by this date. 20 Second, the Luang Prabang chronicles never mention that the king of Luang Prabang had informed Bangkok of a possible revolt by Nanthasen even though the chroniclers wrote in a manner favorable to Bangkok and expressed resentment against Nanthasen. They might have been expected at least to report, if not applaud, actions taken to imprison him. These clues reveal that the Nanthasen case was shaped less by local events than by international interpretations and implications. But it should be noted that an embassy from Gia Long arrived in Bangkok immediately after the Tay Son embassy's departure in 1794. The Nakhon Phanom chronicle suggests the embassy brought "the letter by which Chaofa Yuan, the Vietnamese emperor, informed Krungthep Maha Nakhon [Bangkok] of the request [Nanthasen to the Vietnamese]."2 1 Gia Long's first priority was to forestall any rapprochement between the Tay Son and Rama I, if possible by presenting evidence of his arch-rival's bad intentions. Gia Long had used this method-exposure of a rival's secret plots-to demonstrate his greater loyalty to Bangkok at least once before; in 1789, the Prince of Pattani had asked Gia Long to help him against Bangkok, and Gia Long simply had the letter conveyed to Rama I. Soon thereafter the Pattani prince was apprehended. 22 In this case, Gia Long presented to Rama I only the letter addressed to him by Nanthasen, not the letters that the Lao rulers had sent to the Tay Son. If Gia Long had possessed and delivered all the letters, it is likely that all Nanthasen's brothers would have also been imprisoned, particularly Anou, who acted as the principal middleman in communications with the Tay Son. Evidence, in the final analysis, suggests that Nanthasen's enigmatic betrayer, referred to as "someone" in the royal chronicle of Bangkok, was most likely a Vietnamese. 17. BANGKOK-HUE RELATIONS CHALLENGED AT BURMA'S BIDDING

Despite commonplace historical assertions to the contrary, there was an entente in force between the Vietnamese and Siamese courts during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The Vietnamese king, Nguyen Anh, took refuge in 19 Trem specifies that the king of Luang Prabang, at this time in Bangkok, had denounced

Nanthasen and Borommaracha for having plotted an alliance with the Vietnamese. For this to have been the case, the Luang Prabang king needed to have had a very reliable intelligence network in the country to discover such a plot. Trem (1987) (T), pp. 84-85. In fact, the king of Luang Prabang did maintain a serviceable spy network, but since he was imprisoned in Vientiane and not in Bangkok, the original basis for guessing that he was the one who betrayed Nanthasen and Borommaracha evaporates. 20 Kimura (1971), p. 157. 21 Chantha (1969) (T), p. 208. 22 Pansa (1978) (T), p. 33, note 3; Gesick (1976), p. 142, note 110; Chulachakrabongse (1967), p. 106. The politic maneuver used here by Gia Long was a common practice in the region; the Burmese king used a similar ploy with LanNa's Kawila, who was denounced by Burma to Rama I. See Wenk (1968), pp. 91-94, 102, note 385.

The Alliance and the Nature of Things

97

Bangkok during the Tay Son rebellion. There he received assistance from forty-four French officers and Rama I, who sent Siamese, Lao, Khmer, and Chinese contingents against the Tay Son forces to help Nguyen Anh regain the throne. Enthroned as emperor, Nguyen Anh took the regnal name of Gia Long in 1802. Six times before 1801, he sent the traditional "gold and silver flowers" to Rama I to express his gratitude; these offerings indicate that he recognized the tutelage of Bangkok.23 Soon after the defeat of the Tay Son, however, the Siamese invasion of Cambodia threatened good relations between Siam and Vietnam. In 1811, the Cambodian king, Ong Chan, fled to Saigon. Disputes over the proper policy toward Cambodia tested the balance of power between two equally new dynasties, the Chakri in Siam and the Nguyen in Vietnam. Ultimately Siam, weakened during its long war with Burma, bowed to the demands of Vietnam. Fortunately, a peaceful resolution of the Cambodia problem seemed to have strengthened relations between the two countries. On May 9, 1822, the British envoy to the court of Bangkok, John Crawfurd, watched for the arrival of Vietnamese ambassadors sent to Siam by Gia Long's successor, Minh Mang. The Siamese Court received this mission with much respect and attention. Great preparations were made all the way from the Paknam to the capital, for the accommodation and reception accorded to these visitors were in all respects as magnificent as the Court can contrive. The ambassadors were feasted on the way, serenaded with Siamese music, and amused with gymnastic and theatrical exhibitions wherever they rested. . . . The intercourse was considered of so friendly and familiar a nature .... 24 Years later, the Thai king, Rama V (r. 1868-1910), looked back on the alliance between the two equally strong and rapacious royal houses and describe it as cordial: "Even if problems arose over Cambodia that required the two countries to negotiate, the amity and relations of cordiality remained without suspicion."25 Even so, Gia Long had expressed his concern about the consequences of a potential vacancy on the Bangkok throne, and there were many times (particularly in 1804 and 1805) when he pressed Rama I to nominate a heir. Finally, in 1808, the Bangkok ruler did nominate Rama II, the favorite of the court of Hue.26 But this amity between erstwhile allies did not prevent a conflict when they both pursued their interests in international relations. In 1806, Bangkok sent an embassy to Hue by land through Vientiane. This was a first. Those in Bangkok who initiated this diplomatic mission were interested in having their messengers reconnoiter the Vietnamese terrain according to the Thai court chronicler.27 Also, according to Rama V, the pro-Bangkok forces in Laos needed some encouragement, and this display was meant to hearten them.28 23 Thiphakorawong (1978), pp. 151, 169, 199, 221,222,238. 24 Crawfurd (1834), pp. 223-224. 25 Narinthonthewi (1963) (T), p. 237. 26 Joyaux (1967), pp. 102-103. 27 Thiphakorawong (1978), p. 284. 28 Narinthonthewi (1963) (T), p. 231.

98

Paths to Conflagration

At this point, the diplomatic intrusion of an outside power, Burma, illuminated the strength of the accord binding Bangkok and Hue. The policies and decisions made among Bangkok, Vietnam, and Laos evolved within an atmosphere influenced by Burmese activities. Burma intruded upon the Hue-Bangkok alliance whenever possible and attempted to force Siam back into its earlier, more limited boundaries. Burma urged countries in the region to join it in an alliance against Siam. To this end, in 1823 a Burmese embassy visited Saigon, where it was confined for eight months and prohibited from visiting the capital, Hue. The Vietnamese emperor, Minh Mang, rejected the proposal brought by the embassy, but not because he felt grateful to Siam. In fact, he spoke of Bangkok's past military assistance to his father disapprovingly before his ministers in their closed-door meetings: Siam has sent officers who were bad people. Everywhere they passed, they pillaged. Our people have lost confidence, and the Siamese comfort troops have finished battling our enemies [Tay Son]. These [Siamese] troops have been promptly defeated and, since then, brothers of the former king of Siam are apprehensive about the power of the enemy [Tay Son] and have never dared to discuss sending comfort. ... Finally, after achieving the union of the whole territory, my father [Gia Long] seized the whole Viet kingdom without having recourse to any aid, neither to a single bow nor an arrow provided by Siam. 29 The apparent resentment between the two former allies, Siam and Vietnam, was undoubtedly caused by the friction and frustration they encountered as they collaborated through the difficult conditions of war. But a workable foreign policy must reflect a country's interests, not just the sentiments, however justifiable, of its ruler. In this particular case, the sentiment of national pride was corrected by Minh Mang's sharp sense of reality. However, [Minh Mang continued,] my father has not forgotten that Siam has demonstrated well that Siam is our neighbor. I follow the ancient rule. I do not listen to other voices and, by my own initiative, do not break our relations with Siam. If one day Siam launches some accusation against us, this will bring war to our frontiers. If Siam is justified in declaring war, Siam will be victorious with the help of the Heavens. For us, we will get what we deserve. In my view, we have no reason to denounce our alliance with Siam, provoking the enemy and exhausting our troops. The Burmese proposal is unacceptable. 30 Though in this report Minh Mang's reasoning appears decisive, it actually betrays a more complacent approach to this issue than the previous rulers of Vietnam had adopted. There is evidence to suggest that Minh Mang's predecessor, Gia Long, seriously considered allying with Burma against Siam, and that the idea maintained a certain force in Hue even after Gia Long's death. Burma was included on a list of Vietnamese vassal countries issued by Gia Long in 1815,31 so its 29 Karpeles (1949), p. 40; Peam (1964), p. 154. 30 Karpeles (1949), p. 44. 31 Woodside (1971), pp. 237, 239.

The Alliance and the Nature of Things

99

acquiescence to Vietnamese policies might be assumed. In fact, in 1813 a northern Vietnamese grand mandarin suggested that Gia Long arrange an alliance with Burma against Siam in order to strengthen Hue's precarious hegemony in Cambodia.32 Such an alliance was thus under consideration at that time. During the 1820s, LeVan Duyet, governor-general of Saigon, sent a mission to India to acquire British guns; a storm caused the mission to land on the Burmese shore, where its members were taken prisoner. The prisoners affirmed that Gia Long had wished to initiate an alliance with Burma and that only his death in 1820 had put an end to the idea. The involuntary emissaries dared even to assert that the united efforts of the Vietnamese and the Burmese could easily overcome Siam, whose territory, once conquered, would provide an easy communication route between them. At last, they affirmed that the Grand Council in Hue was still considering such an alliance.33 Convinced that this might prove to be strategic information, the Burmese king dispatched George Gibson with forty-five followers to Hue. The party left Ava on July 21, 1822 and reached Saigon only on June 8, 1823 after a Siamese junk sunk their boat. The report from LeVan Duyet described Minh Mangas undecided, though influential people pressed him to enter the alliance with Burma. "When the question ultimately came before the Grand Council, the Mandarin in charge of foreign affairs was opposed to the Burmese alliance, asserting that it would alarm the Siamese. The king of Cochinchina, at the insistence of the Governor-General of Saigon [Le Van Duyet] and the French gentlemen [who helped Gia Long against the Tay Son] at the Court, was originally inclined in favour of Ava."34 To end the debate, Minh Mang was driven to boast that, "He could conquer the Siamese in an instant if he so desired."35 This claim was more fully justified than one might think, for at the time Vietnam had a population of thirty-three million, while Siam had only five million.36 Yet Minh Mang remained unwilling to provoke a conflict with Siam, and at last, in this meeting, the Vietnamese emperor had to invoke Confucian ideology to persuade his opponents to maintain cordial relations with Siam. "Being his respectful successor, in mounting this powerful throne I follow the ancient rule."3 7 This was an appeal toLe Van Duyet, Gia Long's old companion in arms. John Crawfurd, "the most sharp-minded" 38 observer of Southeast Asia of his time, stressed the balance-of-power issue. He considered what could happen "If these two nations (Cochin-China and Siam) should quarrel altho' neither be suited to maintain dominion over the other."3 9 Despite their differences in population, the rough parity in strength between Siam and Vietnam prompted Alexander Woodside, modem scholar and student of the Minh Mang reign, to conclude that "Minh Mang rejected the [Burmese] request because war with Siam at that time might have 32 Woodside (1971), p. 239. 33 Saxena (1952), p. 576; Karpeles (1949), p. 43. 34 Saxena (1952), pp. 578-579; Karpeles (1949), p. 44, note 37, refers to Nguyen Huu Tan and Nguyen Van Hung as forceful advocates of an alliance with Burma. 35 Saxena (1952), p. 579. 36 Figures quoted from Siebord and Burcher, by Sylvestre (1889), p. 106. 37 Karpeles (1949), pp. 40-41. 38 Chesnaux (1966), p. 30. And also, Wilson (1976), p. 178. 39 Saxena (1952), p. 579.

100

Paths to Conflagration

jeopardized Vietnam's hegemony in Cambodia, won under Gia Long." 4 0 This essentially conservative rationale remained influential in Saigon four years later when Anou asked for military intervention from Minh Mang. The emperor refused to provide it. But a hawkish, anti-Siamese party continued to lobby at the court of Hue in favor of aggression. Le Van Duyet, who represented the hawks, boasted before the Burmese embassy that he was "well acquainted with members of the Siamese forces, their discipline, and the Siamese mode of conduct in war." 41 Rama III fully appreciated the politics and power of this illiterate eunuch who had become the vice king of Vietnam, but still lived as a poor peasant. The ruler of Bangkok waited for Le Van Duyet's death in 1832 before he was willing to launch a massive attack on Saigon. 42 Evidence suggests that Le Van Duyet's thinking coincided with the analysis outlined by John Crawfurd: " ... an ambitious Cochin-Chinese Prince would find no difficulty in seizing the Siamese portion of Kamboja, making formidable inroads into the Siamese territory, and specially destroying or sacking the capital [Bangkok] which would, defenseless as it is, fall an easy prey to any sudden incursion." 43 This was nearly the same wording as LeVan Duyet's proposal to Minh Mang, which urged him to take advantage of the opportunity to attack when Anou was entangled with Siam in 1827. Hue dispatched an embassy to Bangkok to inform it of the Burmese embassy's proposal and to give Rama II a copy of the Burmese letter to Hue. In 1824, the two courts noisily celebrated Burma's failure and their reciprocal affection.44 Vigilant about each tiny shift in international events, Anou seized the opportunity to learn a lesson from the Vietnamese decision and position. He took the Burmese failure to heart as if it were his own, since "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." 45 Judging it hopeless to continue to court Hue, Anou ceased sending tributary missions to Minh Mang in 1821. Minh Mang had demonstrated to Anou Hue's unreliability as a potential ally to Laos.46 18. LIMITED COOPERATION BETWEEN VIETNAM AND LAOS UNDER BANGKOK'S EYE

For the year 1799, the Chotmaihet yo mii.ang vientiane47 contained an unusual reference to a Vietnamese name: Thoai. The complete name of this diplomat was 40 Woodside (1971), p. 239; for a micro-analysis of the Burmese embassy's failure, see Peam (1964), pp. 153-154. 41 Saxena (1952), p. 578.

42 Chandler (1983), p. 122: "The Thai made tentative military probes into western Cambodia in

1830-1831, but Rama III saw no chance of success until (LeVan) Duyet's death in 1832." 43 Dispatch of Crawfurd on April 22, 1824, in Burney Papers, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 4. Father Labissachere (1812), who was a political analyst for the French Foreign Affairs Ministry,

expressed an identical view.

44 Saxena (1952), p. 579. 45 See the luminous variation on this topic in Freund (1965), pp. 478 ff. 46 Ta Quang Phat and Buu Cam (1966) (V), vol. 2, pp. 101, 151, 197. According to Wyatt, the last embassy Anou dispatched to Hue dated from the year 1817. Wyatt (1963), p. 28.

47 The Wat Ho Phra Kreo, copy.

The Alliance and the Nature of Things 101 Nguyen Van Thoai. Thoai had accompanied Gia Long since 1777, even following him into exile in Bangkok in 1784. He became the Vietnamese specialist on Lao, Khmer, and Siamese affairs, and was later ennobled as marquis Thoai Ngoc Hao. 48 Thoai and the Lao appear to have been acquainted during their period of exile in Bangkok. Bangkok sent Thoai to Vientiane, an event duly recorded by the chronicler, to assist in carrying out an order to mount a combined Lao-Vietnamese operation against the rebel Tay Son; the order was given at the request of Nguyen Anh, the deposed leader.49 It was not the first time the Lao had been forced to help Nguyen Anh. In 1793, for instance, Rama I had given Nguyen Anh permission to march his armies through Laos, whose people were thus required to feed them. 50 The Vietnamese annals substantiate this brief reference in the Lao chronicles. [In the year 1798, Nguyen Van Thoai] assured the commandant of the navy that he would accompany Nguyen Van Nhan to Siam. Thus he received the Siamese king's authorization to return to his country by the northern land route. Arriving at his destination, he reported to Nguyen Anh who raised him to the rank of army commandant. "In military affairs," Nguyen Anh said to him, "one uses tricks. You should go to the country of Ten Thousand Elephants [Lao kingdom of Vientiane] and noisily proclaim that the armies of Siam have joined those of Vietnam to attack [the Tay Son] in Nghe-An by the road from the north. When our enemies get wind of it, they will be frightened and not even have time to make an appeal for reinforcements. In this way, the citadel of Qui-Nhon will be isolated, besieged and reduced to mercy in one day .... " During his trip, [Nguyen Van Thoai] used the services of a Khmer guide. From Tam Pong to Ubon, a territory dependent on the country of Ten Thousand Elephants, he received cooperation from local authorities. [In 1799], Nguyen Van Thoai reached the citadel of Vientiane. The king of the country of Ten Thousand Elephants, Chieu An [Inthavong], warmly welcomed him and put his army at his service. Nguyen Van Thoai then sent his subordinate, LeVan Xuan, to report to King Nguyen Anh. Two other of his subordinates, Nguyen Hoai Chau and Nguyen Van Uan, were ordered to convince the rulers of Tran-Ninh [Siang Khuang], Thanh [Hoa], and NgheAn. They successfully accomplished their mission. In 1800, Nguyen Van Thoai left the country of Ten Thousand Elephants to report to Nguyen Anh and to consult with him about future military operations. He was promoted to the high-command of the western army and received the order of the sovereign to insure the joining of his army with that of the country of Ten Thousand Elephants in order to conquer Nghe-An. The Tay Son chief, Nguyen Dhanh Lac, and his deputy, Nguyen Van Tri, were defeated and routed. Nguyen Anh congratulated Nguyen Van Thoai, who left the country 48 This high-ranking Nguyen official died in 1829. In 1943, the Vietnamese emperor Bao Dai still gave him posthumous titles. More generally aboug Nguyen Van Thoai, see Vietnam Khao-Co Tap San (1960) (V), pp. 105-122. References in Lao chronicles to Nguyen Van Thoai can be found in Phongsawadan yo miiang wiangchan (1969) (T), p. 143. 49 Thiphakorawong (1978), p. 226. 50 Thiphakorawong (1978), p. 199.

102

Paths to Conflagration of Ten Thousand Elephants to come without authorization to reside at Gia Dinh. He was thus demoted. 51

The joint Lao-Vietnamese operation required three years of preparation for its political and military phases before it was successfully carried out. In 1801, Inthavong sent war plunder to Hue; in return, Gia Long sent him a diploma of congratulations, four victory flags, two guns, and one hundred kilograms of ammunition. 52 A Vietnamese embassy sent to announce Gia Long's self-appointment to the imperial throne traveled via Vientiane in order to convey the announcement to Bangkok. Siam preferred to ignore this itinerary, for even though it was an order from Bangkok that had initiated the cooperative efforts of Laos and Vietnam by sending Nguyen Van Thoai to Vientiane, Bangkok was certainly suspicious of the Lao-Vietnamese rapprochement, the success of which had been demonstrated by the nature of their joint operation. At one point, Bangkok delayed the authorization for Lao troops to cooperate with Nguyen Anh, arguing that the rainy season prevented an attack on Nghe-An.53 In terms of protocol, Inthavong was treated by the court of Hue as a quoc-vuong, equal in status to Rama I. 54 Whatever the motive behind such imperial ceremony,55 it remains a fact that the Lao king was treated better by the court of Hue than by the Bangkok court, which gave him only the title "Chao." However, at this point, Bangkok had no time to react to Inthavong's flirtation with Gia Long because the Burmese were again threatening to invade Siam. In 1802, Bangkok required Inthavong to muster a Lao contingent to help Siam repel Burma. Inthavong acceded to the request, yet at the same time he managed to send a congratulatory mission to Gia Long when that leader ascended the throne. On this occasion, Gia Long officially granted the administration of Siang Khuang to Inthavong,56 though in fact Vientiane had already secured, by violence, the direct administration of this area by 1790. The motives and logic directing Hue's decision to grant Inthavong this authority were certainly numerous and complementary. Hue's reasoning took into account: the relative insignificance of Siang Khuang,5 7 the desire to reward a reliable ally, 58 and Gia Long's lack of interest in installing a Vietnamese administration over foreign territory, even in Cambodia, where Gia Long preferred indirect administration. 59 He 51 Dai-Nam Chinh Liet-truyen So Tap (1960) (V), v. 27, pp. 107-109. 52 Nguyen Le Thi (1977) (V), p. 131. On the preparation of this Lao-Vietnamese operation, see also Chroniques royales khmer (1974), p. 126. 53 Thiphakorawong (1978), pp. 226-227. 54 Ta Quang Phat and Buu Cam (1965-66) (V), vol.. 2, p. 271. 55 See Woodside (1971), chapter 5. 56 Nguyen Le Thi (1977) (V), p. 131. 57 "Neither outside power saw any strategic military significance in the plateau region . . . and the real value of the Phuan State, from the Lao and Vietnamese viewpoints, rested in the prestige of receiving tribute, however nominal, from a vassal prince." Snit and Breazeale (1988), p. 8. Relying on the Minh Mang chronicles, Briere, Resident Superieur in Annam, wrote on June 15, 1893: "King Minh Mang, speaking about this question of the frontier provinces had customarily said that his father considered Tran-Ninh a territory of little importance and that for this reason he gave it to the prince of Van-Tuong [Vientiane]." Briere, "Expose des droits historiques del' Annam sur le Laos central." Archives d'Outre-mer, Paris, p. 15. 58 Briere, "Expose des droits historiques del' Annam sur le Laos central," p. 13. 59 Woodside (1971), pp. 240, 248.

The Alliance and the Nature of Things 103 was more concerned with strategic and economic considerations than with political ones.60 Generally, the court of Hue maintained a surprising degree of ignorance regarding their neighbor, Laos, and even Siam. 61 To draft an historic summary on Luang Prabang, the court of Hue simply recopied a Chinese text from the T'ang dynasty that was thirteen hundred years old.62 Gia Long's attentions toward the Lao were meant to obtain their participation in the struggle against the Tay Son, and once Vietnam had won that conflict, Gia Long turned from his allies and concentrated on the internal situation in his country. His son, Minh Mang, was preoccupied with such designs, too. The delicate, diplomatic balancing acts required of various Lao rulers after 1779 are reflected in a letter addressed by the prince of Siang Khuang to the court of Bangkok. The letter, dated June 2, 1794 and received in Bangkok on November 24, implored Bangkok to accept his tribute and to understand that he also had to pay tribute to the Vietnamese in order to maintain peace in Siang Khuang. 63 Similarly, Chao Anou found it necessary to negotiate carefully relations with Vietnam and Siam, for attentions paid to one could be interpreted as slights or even threats by the other. In 1804 when Anou ascended the throne following Inthavong's death, he was called immediately to assist the Siamese armies in battle against the Burmese in LanNa. He trekked to the "Golden Triangle," where he successfully recaptured Chiang Sen, or Siang A'i Lao,64 from entrenched Burmese troops. He also waged war in Keng Tung, Chiang Hung, and the Lii principalities in Sip Song Panna, and still found time to dispatch a mission to Hue. This mission was sent to repay a visit by an earlier Vietnamese mission to Vientiane, at which time the Vietnamese representatives had arrived to attend the funeral ceremonies of Inthavong and to compliment Anou.65 Recording this event, the Thai chronicles accused Anou of betraying the confidence of Rama I, who had authorized him to deal with the Vietnamese only for developing trade. 66 Anou, however, was doing only what his immediate predecessors-Nanthasen and Inthavong-had done. Paul Le Boulanger has given a translated version of the message relayed by Anou's embassy to Gia Long in these words: The eleventh month of the fourth year of the reign [of Gia Long], Chao Anou, prince of Vientiane, sends [to Hue] an embassy conveying tribute composed of two elephants, two rhinoceros horns, eight hundred pounds of cinnamon peel, and a letter the gist of which is: "The State of Vientiane is a long-time vassal of Vietnam and has paid a triennial tribute; the Tay Son revolt forced it to submit to the Siamese who mistreat people. Today, seeing the glory and the power of Emperor Gia Long, the prince of Vientiane asks to serve Vietnam again and to pay tribute as in the past." The embassy was 60 Chandler (1973), p. 108. 61 Woodside (1971), pp. 258-259. 62 Woodside (1971), p. 236. 63 Gesick (1976), p. 133. 64 Siang A'i Lao was the city of Lao ancestors of the Tai. Phlainoi (1984) (T), p. 51. Freeman states: "A later raid, this time by the Siamese, destroyed Chiang Rai, and the old Laos capital, Chiang Saen." Freeman (1910), p. 99. 65 Nguyen Le Thi (1977) (V}. 66 Kulab (1971) (T), vol. 1, pp. 314, 416; Thiphakorawong (1961) (T).

104

Paths to Conflagration received in solemn audience by Gia Long who asked at length about the administration of the country, and it was dismissed after one month of stay [in Hue] with magnificent gifts. The ambassadors brought back to the prince of Vientiane a letter from Gia Long conceived in these terms: "Your predecessor Chao In [Inthavong] was my vassal; my policy toward you is imprinted with smoothness and benevolence; be faithful to your obligations and show yourself human towards your people; and you will respond in this way to my expectations."67

In measured phrases like these, Anou denounced the Tay Son for having rebelled against Gia Long, while testing the Vietnamese disposition toward the Siamese. Apart from the advice to manage the country effectively, which the Vietnamese generously gave to any Asian court including that of Bangkok, Gia Long reminded Anou of his duties as a vassal. In the Confucian universe of Gia Long and Minh Mang, a vassal did not have the right to criticize his suzerain, even a Siamese suzerain; this rule of conduct would have been particularly in force during this situation since Rama I was "the adopted father" and "protector" of Gia Long. 68 Therefore, the message from the Vietnamese court showed that it would refuse to act in accord with or assist any challenges to the established order, for such challenges had been prohibited by heaven. Anou tried to suggest that this international order was just an established disorder, contestable because detestable. The Vietnamese emperor reconsidered Anou's position during the crisis of 1827-1829, but essentially reached the same conclusion again at that later date. At that time, the new emperor, Minh Mang, signaled his decision to support Siam's authority over its vassal, Laos, by calling himself the "mother" of the king of the country of Ten Thousand Elephants and by calling the Siamese King Rama III the "father." Like a child, Anou was requested by Minh Mang to ask for Rama III's pardon. In this way, Minh Mang acknowledged the right of Rama III to punish Anou, whom he judged to have committed the crime of "lese-pouvoir," having dealt a blow to the existing powers. David Chandler's assessment of the Vietnamese ruler's logic, developed for Chandler's study of Cambodia, also clarifies Vietnam's messages to Laos: Some of this language was merely a mask for realpolitik, but these images are nonetheless suggestive. The language of diplomatic correspondence, like the language in everyday use in Southeast Asia, was in its pronouns hierarchical and family-oriented, and relationships between states were often described by images of child-rearing .... From a Cambodian point of view, however, what mattered about the Thai and the Vietnamese tributary systems and attitudes toward Cambodia was not that they were different and made different sorts of demands, but that they were condescending, overlapping, and expensive.69 67 Le Boulanger (1931), p. 102. Gia Long's reception of the Lao was unambiguous in terms of

his understanding of Vientiane's relationship with Hue: "Vientiane envoys, bringing tribute gifts, were received in audience at the Hall of Supreme Harmony in Hue as early as 1805. They were escorted to and from the capital by elephant guards, elephants being the symbols of military pomp everywhere in mainland Southeast Asia. But they performed the 'five obeisances' (ngu bai) while they were presenting their gifts." Woodside (1971), p. 240. 68 Pansa (1978) (T), p. 32; Gesick (1976), p. 124. Thanom (1980) (T), p. 73. 69 Chandler (1983), pp. 114-115.

The Alliance and the Nature of Things 105

Even under these terms, Nak Ong Chan of Cambodia (r. 1790, 1797-1835) had sought and obtained a Vietnamese commitment for military assistance and investiture from Gia Long?0 Nak Ong Chan, under the supervision of a pro-Thai regent, had received authorization from Bangkok before proceeding with his request to the Vietnamese. Anou, however, obtained nothing from Hue, which continued to follow the policy: "To keep the confidence of Bangkok, do not alarm Bangkok."71 This phrase encapsulates Hue's foreign policy in this part of Southeast Asia. Despite its circumspection, however, Hue never could appease insatiable Bangkok, and the rulers of Vietnam remained supremely, decisively insensible to the costs this policy exacted from Anou and the Lao. 19. CHAO ANOU'S DIPLOMATIC FIASCO IN VIETNAM

Historian Walter F. Vella claimed that by 1824, Anou was "in close touch with the Annamese and was relying on their support if he should require it."72 By contrast, other sources indicate that the intercourse between Anou and the Vietnamese had deteriorated by the mid-1820s. Anou's last embassy to the court of Hue visited in 1821.73 Anou quickly assimilated the lessons of the Nanthasen affair and applied them to his dealings with Gia Long. David K. Wyatt correctly maintains that during his reign Anou had sent only four embassies to the court of Hue: in 1804 [actually 1805], 1811-1812, 1814, and 1817.74 All were embassies to Gia Long. For unknown reasons, Anou ignored Minh Mang, Gia Long's successor, who had to remind him many times of his tributary obligations. Finally, Anou sent a "good will" embassy to congratulate Minh Mang in 1821, a year after his coronation. Following this, the two parties were quiet until 1826, after which all the movement of embassies flowed from Hue to Vientiane to placate a recalcitrant Anou. In 1826, Minh Mang received news, probably through the Chinese trade network, that Anou was preparing an insurrection against Bangkok. 75 The 70 Woodside gives the account: "The Cambodian ruler Nak Ong Chan ... dominated by Siam and faced with the task of suppressing the three ambitious pro-Siamese brothers in his own family who threatened to destroy him, requested Vietnamese investiture in 1807. He received a gilded seal from Gia Long, similar to the one Gia Long received from China. He was also promised Vietnamese protection against Siam. In return, he undertook to send tribute (elephants, elephant tusks, rhinoceros horns, waxes, medicines, and sapanwood) to Hue every four years." Woodside (1971), p. 240. 71 Saxena (1952), p. 578; Karpeles (1949), p. 43. 72 Vella (1957), p. 80. 73 Ta Quang Phat and Buu Cam (1965-1966) (V), vol. 2, pp. 101, 151, and 197. However, relying on the Genuine Chronicles of the Three First Reigns of Imperial Vietnam, Nguyen Le Thi says: "Fifth year [of the reign of the Emperor Minh Mang], envoy of a Lao embassy from Vientiane." This corresponds to the year 1824. It seems that it is an error of transcription. Nguyen Le Thi (1977) (V), p. 134. 74 Wyatt (1963), p. 28; Le Thanh Khoi (1955), p. 336. 75 The Chinese trade network constituted a vast web of information, principally consisting of news that could affect it. For instance, in 1833, "Chinese merchants in Cholon informed their compatriots in Bangkok of these events [LeVan Khoi's revolt]; when the news reached Rama III, he decided to intervene." See Chandler (1973), p. 112.

106

Paths to Conflagration

Vietnamese emperor immediately dispatched an embassy, composed of four noblemen and a suite of thirty persons, to Anou. It arrived in Vientiane in November 1826, when a series of natural cataclysms afflicted the Lao capital and hindered mobilization efforts. Minh Mang's envoys informed Anou that the Vietnamese emperor prohibited him from instigating trouble with Siam and enjoined him to continue paying tribute to the king of Siam. Minh Mang wanted peace in the region because he had enough troubles at horne. Cholera had stricken Vietnam, killing the emperor's mother in the process.76 Minh Mang repeatedly stressed his orders, so his position on Anou's undertaking was well known in Bangkok. After the fall of Vientiane, Minh Mang's envoys did not contradict Bodin when he described the Vietnamese response to Anou's earlier approach, before the conflict had commenced: Nha Phac Di [Phraya Phrornphakdi, governor of Khorat] had plotted with the seven towns [of the Khorat Plateau] to attack Vientiane. Chao Vientiane [Anou] had sent Cho Phi E Muong Tran [Chao Phagna Miiang Chan, the Prime Minister of the kingdom of Vientiane], Lac Hoan [i.e. Prince of Lakhon], Phi E Muong Trai [Phagna Miiang Tay, an official of Vientiane], and Muong Thuoc [governor of this town located in the present province of Mahachai] to ask for rnj.litary assistance from the dynasty [of Hue]. But His Majesty the King [Minh Mang] opposes this plan and has commanded Long Vu Doanh and Do Thong Che to send eleven soldiers to gather information on the situation. His Majesty has not yet received reports from them, but has emphasized to these soldiers that if Chao Vientiane has acted treacherously [toward Bangkok], they have the right to arrest him and to tum him over to the Siamese armies. 77 The young chief of the French Commission d'Exploration du Mekong, Doudart de Lagree, wrote in a report on July 31, 1866 that: In 1827, some tendencies to revolt manifested themselves in Vientiane and in the neighbouring tribes, and another Siamese expedition invaded the country and accomplished a bloody repression. In this last circumstance, it is noticeable that the Siamese, despite the advantages of their position, undertook their invasion only after clinching a preliminary accord with the court of Hue. 78 Minh Mang's reasons for siding with Bangkok are intriguing. He and Rarna III had less in common than Gia Long and Rarna I. Though both Minh Mang and Rarna III were illegitimate children who unexpectedly ascended the throne, they shared few other traits or experiences in common. However, objective, pragmatic reasons are impervious. At this time, despite its large population, Vietnam was the "sick 76 TNL Document Rama III (19)1189/4. Phraya Phetphichai to Phraya Sisahathep, April 17, 1827. Minh Mang's mother indeed died at this time, for a ceremony was celebrated in her honor by Father Gagelin who reported it. Gagelin (1830), p. 365. 77 Ngo Cao Lang (1977) (V), pp. 97-98. 78 Report from Sakron, January 31, 1866, addressed by Commandant Doudard de Lagree to the Governor and Commandant in Chief De La Grandiere, and to the Minister of Colonies. This report bears the title: "Question de cession des provinces d' Angkor et de Battambang." Archives d'Outre-Mer, Paris.

The Alliance and the Nature of Things 107 man" of Southeast Asia, and Minh Mang was well aware that Britain's victory in Burma had had a "profound effect on Siamese political thinking" 79 that would certainly affect the established situation. Nothing would be quite the same now that Bangkok was freed of the long-standing Burmese threat. Anou's endeavors further destabilized an already shaky regional power structure. Minh Mang probably feared that Anou might succeed in demolishing the perilously fragile scaffolding that characterized regional relations.80 Minh Mang saw that the status quo was threatened and feared instability-"his State-bareer must in no way collapse."81 Since the fall of Ayudhya it had become routine that each time a new king was enthroned in Bangkok, the contest for control over Cambodia would recommence. Minh Mang anticipated that Rama III would demand a greater piece of Cambodia, which Siam considered part of its own backyard. The possibility that Laos might emerge as an additional source of contention, upsetting the relationship between Siam and Vietnam must have troubled him. Already in 1822, while a rumor spread that a new king would soon succeed in Bangkok, Minh Mang noted that "Cambodia is in the midst of powerful neighbors, and the fear of being invaded is great."82 In the end, Cambodia, not Laos, remained the chief priority for the Vietnamese, who tried unsuccessfully to retake Battambang and Angkor.83 On the domestic front, Minh Mang's empire had been shaken since 1821 by incessant revolts led by Pham Ba Van, revolts which the authorities had not been able to suppress. 84 Then a new rebellion broke out in 1826 when Nguyen Han, a companion-in-arms of the late Tay Son emperor, Quang Trung, returned from China where he had been living in exile since 1802. In an attempt to quiet some of the rebellions, the state declared that the practice of Christianity by Vietnamese was prohibited. Approximately eighteen thousand Vietnamese Christians asked their protector, Marshal LeVan Duyet, to intervene and ask clemency from Minh Mang, but their pleas were in vain. The emperor faced many trials that decade. Ideological and religious wars, as well as famine, cholera, and floods, swept over Vietnam year after year. Three out of every ten men conscripted evaded service, despite the powerful bureaucracy. 85 Minh Mang's embassy left Vientiane at the end of November 1826, maintaining their demand for the preservation of peace throughout their stay. However, "Anou did not listen to Emperor Minh Mang and put his armies on war footing,"86 testified a Thai who was subsequently arrested on the 1827 battlefield and beheaded for supporting the Lao cause. Minh Mang's denial of assistance to Anou undermined Lao political efforts. Pham Nguyen Long, Director of the Hanoi-based Institute of 79 Vella (1957), p. 117. 80 Sylvestre reports that in 1826, the Cambodian Minister of Marine, Monteros, was beheaded in Phnom Penh for having shown his sympathy for the court of Hue and having accepted a Vietnamese military escort. Sylvestre (1889), p. 109. 81 Quoted in Chandler (1973), p. 108. 82 Chandler (1973), p. 211. 83 Chandler (1973), pp. 101-102; Chandler (1975), pp. 16-24. 84 See Shiraishi (1984), pp. 345-400. 8S Interview (Vientiane, Wednesday October 22, 1986) with Tran Xuan Cao, Professor at the Faculty of History, Hanoi University. 86 TNL Document Rama III (19) 1189/4. Phraya Phetphichai to Phraya Sisahathep, April17, 1827.

108

Paths to Conflagration

Research on Southeast Asia, devoted a lengthy paper to the 1827 conflict and concluded, At least one last cause [of the defeat of the Lao and of Anou] resided in the recalcitrant attitude of the Nguyen dynasty in its refusal to assist the [Lao] struggle against the Siamese armies. Worse still, Minh Mang had ordered Anou to capitulate before Siam. This provoked doubts in the minds of the soldiers supporting Chao Anou, weakened the morale of the [Lao] population and, at the same time, reinforced the combativeness of the Siamese troops, thereby assisting the aggressive war against Vientiane.S7 Pham Nguyen Long wrote his paper in 1972 and echoed the 1958 analysis made by Bui Quang Tung, a Saigon researcher who focused on the same topic. Bui Quang Tung wrote: "At no time did he [Minh Mang] want to support [Anou and the Lao] overtly, particularly in the military field, for he did not want to risk an open war with Siam."ss Neither openly nor covertly did Minh Mang desire to give a hand to Anou and the Lao, who wanted to break with tradition. Anou, Ratsavong, and their followers were extraordinary men, willing to stand up against a great host of opponents: against their Siamese suzerain, who was preparing to entrap them; against the Vietnamese emperor's condescending advice; and against natural calamities, which frightened even the most rational of men, including the supreme patriarch of the Buddhist clergy and Phra Hua Khru, responsible for the royal pagoda. Both of these Lao religious men implored Anou and Ratsavong to give up their insurrection, which they believed bad omens had doomed. 89 But Anou refused to heed even voices of thunder telling him to surrender before he had begun to fight. 8? Pham Nguyen Long (1972) (V), p. 15. For an identical view, see Pansa (1978) (T), pp. 93-96; Archaimbault (1967), pp. 582-620, 654; Woodside (1971), pp. 248-249; Nguyen Le Thi (1977) (V),

p. 11. They agree with testimonies of Gamier (1870-71), pp. 53-54, and Came (1869), p. 497. 88 Bui Quang Tung (1962), p. 404. 89 TNL Document Rama III (64) 1189/11. khwai, Testimony of Thao Lao (received in Bangkok on May 15, 1827); Document Rama III (19) 1189/4. Phraya Phetphichai to Phraya Sisahathep, April17, 1827.

THE WORLD SUPERPOWER: BRITAIN'S INDOCHINA STRATEGY

20. SIAM AND GREAT BRITAIN COLLIDE

"Those men will be seized and made grass-cutters for the king of Ava's elephants," 1 Rama III exclaimed when informed that ten thousand British expeditionary troops had debarked on Burmese soil at Rangoon in May 1824. In the end, Sir Archibald Campbell required forty thousand soldiers before he could defeat the Burmese. The British suffered fifteen thousand casualties in the struggle. 2 Initially, Rama III and his contemporaries could not fathom that Britain would overcome Burma. Their perspective may have been shaped by an incident that occurred in 1808, when a British fleet of ten warships attempted to make a show of force to Hanoi on its way to occupy Macao, but had its retreat cut off by Vietnamese junks, which burnt six or seven British warships. The remaining warships sailed with another part of the fleet to invade Macao, where they were dislodged by a Chinese army coming from Canton. Bangkok followed these events closely and concluded that this foreign power was a kind of "paper tiger." In Siamese geostrategic thinking, which mirrored that of most other Southeast Asian countries, Burma figured as the second most powerful empire, just after China. Both were "secular regulators of all the States of the far East." 3 Siam assumed its place in the hierarchy behind Burma and China, as John Crawfurd took pains to explain when writing from Bangkok on July 12, 1822: In the commencement of our political connexion with the Siamese Government, a firm tone and vigorous conduct will be indispensably requisite. The Siamese are surrounded by weak neighbours whom they have subjugated, and to whom they dictate without resistance. This and their great ignorance of all foreign nations has rendered them, although essentially weak and pusillanimous, vain and arrogant to such an extreme as to fancy themselves nothing less than the very first nation on the globe. 4 vol. 2, pt. 4, p. 46. 2 Hall (1976), p. 599. 3 Mouhot (1863), p. 248. 4 Crawfurd Papers, p. 44. 1 Burney Papers,

110

Paths to Conflagration

British representatives used a variety of epithets, including "barbarians" and "savages," to describe Siamese, Vietnamese and Burmese. The gap between Siamese and British perceptions of their own importance created difficulties for John Crawfurd, the diplomat sent by the British government to Bangkok to negotiate with the Siamese court. His mission was doomed to failure, however, not because of mere discrepencies in perception, but because its proposals threatened the interests of some of the most powerful figures at court, as Virginia Thompson has pointed out: "In reality, the treaty proposed by Crawfurd undermined the vested interests of the Chinese and Indian Muslims at court and also the faction headed by Nangklao [the future Rama III] and the Raja of Ligor."S The treaty's proposal to dismantle the royal monopolies amounted to nothing less than an assault on the power structure of the Siamese kingdom. George Finlayson, surgeon for the Crawfurd mission, may have exaggerated when he said that the Siamese king was the sole merchant in the kingdom, 6 but even if Finlayson's remarks were overstated, others arrived at similar conclusions. Archbishop Bruguiere's assessment, recorded in a 1829 letter, differs little from Finlayson's: However fertile the kingdom of Siam is, the inhabitants are not richer; all money and commerce is in the hands of the king, the princes, the mandarins and the Chinese.... The king, the princes have their vessels, their stores, their merchandise.7 Having a monopoly on the country's resources, the Thai king was in a good position to set treaty terms with Crawfurd. "What we chiefly want from you are firearms."S These were the only words of substance addressed by Rama II to John Crawfurd when they met. The Phra Khlang (Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade) also emphasized Siam's martial needs. He asked Crawfurd, "If a treaty were made ... would Siamese vessels be permitted to purchase firearms and ammunitions freely at British ports?" 9 The chief goal, for Siam, was to obtain guns in exchange for a treaty on trade. However, Britain refused to sell arms to Siam, partially because it was occupied at the time with providing arms to the Burmese military machine. The Siamese were puzzled by Britain's refusal, because the Portuguese and the Americans provided them with plenty of arms. In an effort to exploit the rivalry between the "farang" -the Western nations-the Phra Khlang said in falseconfidence to John Crawfurd: "These people [the Americans] bring us what we are most anxious to receive, plenty of firearms and cash, and take away large cargoes of sugar, and other produce of the country." 10 The manipulation of Western powers was a well-honed political strategy practiced by Siam. This time it succeeded. The British envoy reported to his superior: The Americans bring to Bangkok no other cargo than muskets, gun powder, brimstone, and Spanish dollars which are extremely acceptable to the 5 Thompson (1961), p. 149; Hong Lysa (1984), p. 60. 6 Finlayson (1826), p. 15. 7 Brugiere (1831), p. 98. 8 Crawfurd (1834), p. 147.

9 Crawfurd (1834), p. 243; Thompson (1961), p. 31. 10 Burney Papers, vol.

2, pt. 4, p. 95.

The World Superpower: Britain's Indochina Strategy

111

Siamese .... In the year 1818, a Captain Hale visited Bangkok with an American vessel and engaged to return with a cargo of muskets, an engagement which he fulfilled, and which obtained for him the Siamese title of Luang, and some offer it is said, to the American Government to establish a factory in Bangkok. Several Americans incited by the success of Captain Hale's speculation afterwards visited Bangkok. II Siam's policy bred grievances and frustrations on both sides. John Crawfurd was accused of meddling in Thai internal affairs while some Siamese assaulted the crew of an English vessel on October 19, 1822 at the residence of Prince Chetsadabodin (the future Rama III). The Phra Khlang informed the bruised and bleeding crew that they had "now seen what a Siamese Tomasha was." The Taloon (an officer connected with shipping) also sent a message to Captain Smith "that he understood the English thought the Siamese were afraid of them but he hoped we were now convinced they were not." 12 21. MEETING OF CHAO ANOU AND CRAWFURD IN BANGKOK

Against this background of mercantile, diplomatic, and political tension, a meeting between John Crawfurd and Chao Anou took place. John Crawfurd, under the heading "Visit of a Lao Chief," wrote in his diary: In the afternoon [May 19, 1822] I had a visit from a native chief; a circumstance which did not often take place, for our proximity to the PhraKhlang's house, and the fear of exciting the jealousy of the Government, prevented many persons from calling upon us who were otherwise well disposed to do so. The manners of this individual, who was a native of Laos, were singular. When he entered the room, I begged him to be seated; but before complying, he made three obeisances towards the palace, then three toward the residence of the Phra-Khlang, and three more to the company before him. His conversation was frank and intelligent, and he appeared well-informed respecting his own country, which forms so interesting and so considerable, but to Europeans so little known, a portion of the present Siamese Empire.13 The visitor was indisputably Chao Anou.14 A number of common problems brought together the Lao and the British, which provided Anou with an opportunity to tip the regional balance of power in his favor. He especially could not ignore this overture because having Britain as an ally and trading partner would assist him in his struggle against Bangkok, which he had begun as early as 1792. This explains why the "chief" of a country which formed "a considerable part" of Siam came

Burney Papers, vol. 2, pt. 4, p. 95. 12 Crawfurd Papers, p. 258. 11

13 Crawfurd (1834), p. 240. 14It was indeed Chao Anou. Lao and Thai historians agree on this point; see Youn (1971) (L), p. 20; Pansa (1978) (T), p. 80; Damrong (1957) (T), pp. 165-166. All the facts pertaining to this issue are related in John Crawfurd's journal, as will be documented below.

112

Paths to Conflagration

without escort-as a plotter-to the door of a representative of a country that had not had previous contact with Laos. From the notes in John Crawfurd's journal one can discern a clear portrait of Anou as affable, at ease, courteous, and respectful of tradition. This diplomatic poker game certainly represented a huge psychological challenge for Anou and his advisers. Their endeavor was unprecedented. Laos was an isolated country, and its foreign relations had historically been confined to intercourse with neighboring countries and to infrequent contact with other foreign powers. For example, in 1642-1643, Lao elites met with a Dutch embassy led by Gerrit Van Wusthoff when he came to Vientiane. Also, in 1637, a Lao embassy led by Kuan Monthip traveled to Batavia on the boat of Captain Abel Tasman. However, during the 1600s Siam's international diplomacy had extended much further. It exchanged embassies or engaged in trade with Sweden, France, and Persia. Laos' isolation helps explain the widening gap between the inward-looking Lao and the outward-looking Thai, evidenced in the dwindling power of the Lao feudal lords. They were scattered throughout the region as local, impotent potentates, vulnerable to aggression from external sources. Anou and John Crawfurd enjoyed an unconstrained, spontaneous conversation. Anou began by explaining that "Lanchang, the capital of Laos, takes its name from the number of elephants which are used by its inhabitants .... A native of that town informed me that they were used for a great many domestic purposes, 'even', he added, 'for carrying women and fire-wood."' 15 Possession of elephants signified a kind of power in Laos at that time. Military power depended on access to war elephants, key vehicles in indigenous warfare. By speaking in this way, Anou suggested to his interlocutor characteristics of the political process underway in Laos, which made Vientiane the hub of Lao political power. Anou's May 1822 visit with John Crawfurd occurred eight days after Rama II had received the embassy sent by the new Vietnamese emperor, Minh Mang, and several months before the departure of the British mission from Bangkok (on July 15). The British mission of 1822 would leave in its wake a tense atmosphere as a result of its diplomatic failure and the consequent, looming threat of armed conflict. Braving the political cordon sanitaire surrounding the British mission, 16 Anou had tried to draw John Crawfurd's attention to his country, hoping to extract Laos from its diplomatic ghetto. During their meeting, he presented the British representative with vague figures about the natural resources of Laos, international trade in the region, and Chinese residents in the country. However, his exploratory overture toward John Crawfurd was so modest and circumspect that it failed to convince the British ambassador that he ought to recognize and treat Laos as an important regional entity. Crawfurd's report reveals something of the impressions he received from Anou: "The elephant is found in every part of the Siamese territories, including Crawfurd (1834), pp. 429-430. In regards to the quantity of elephants in Laos, geographer Reclus writes: "They [the Lao) are devoted preferably to trade and each village owns many elephants for transportation, as many as fifty or even one hundred." Reclus (1883), p. 816. 16 One of the Phra Khlang's brothers asserted: "The English were a dangerous people to have any connexion with, for they were not only the most intelligent, but the most ambitious of the European nations who frequented the East. ... Those people are clever and active, and the country would not be long in their possession before they made it such that you might sleep in the streets and rice-fields." Crawfurd (1834), p. 217. 15

The World Superpower: Britain's Indochina Strategy

113

the Malayan and Kambojan tributaries, and Laos."1 7 This statement politely places Laos at the end of the list, but also carefully distinguishes between Laos and the more humble "tributaries," a construction that suggests Crawfurd is repeating here a sentence he heard from Anou. 18 It should be noted that by 1822, Anou was already presenting his country as a non-tributary of Siam; in fact, he had spoken of his country as independent of Siam in communications with Gia Long in 1805 and with Manthathurat many years before he met with Crawfurd. To realize his goals, Anou had adopted a three-pronged strategy from the model of the San liip bo sun: he aimed to reunite Laos, to strengthen the Lao population by repatriating those who had been forced to settle in Siam, and to forge alliances with Vietnam, China, and Britain. This strategy had potential, because since 1778 half of Siam's five million people had come from Laos.l 9 The population of Chao Anou's kingdom numbered 150,000, a number that would double if Luang Prabang and Lan Na sided with Vientiane. 20 Anou reasoned that the British could compensate for the gap in military strength between Laos and Siam by sending an armed British ship to Siam's coast to preoccupy Bangkok. While the British kept Siam busy on the coast, Anou could direct the repatriation of the Lao from Siam on the other front. 21 In short, Anou envisioned the unthinkable: a Lao-British alliance. As he gathered information, Anou assessed combinations, always aware of the obstacles and the potentialities in every situation. It became clear that Anou could expect little from the British after he learned the outcome of their negotiations with 17 Crawfurd (1834), pp. 423, 429, 422, 435, 446. 18 Anou wrote about Laos, using similar language, in a letter to Rama III on January 15, 1827. 19 Crawfurd (1834), p. 448. According to Crawfurd, Siam at this time (1822) owned 101 Lao towns. Crawfurd (1834), p. 447. Relying on Berghaus, Jancigny estimated that Siam covered 13,330 German square miles, while Siam proper covered only 6,380. Siamese Laos measured 4,910, the Siamese portion of "Kambodge" was limited to 930, and the Malay tributary states to 1,110 German square miles. Jancigny (1850), p. 243. Another source estimated that 150,000 people populated the whole kingdom of Vientiane, not including two thousand Chinese. This source estimated the kingdom of Champassak's population at 7,500 complemented by 450 Chinese; for the kingdom of Luang Prabang, it gives 14,500 with another 450 Chinese. Burney Papers, vol. 3, pt. 2, p. 385. Delineau ascertained that Vientiane, before its fall in 1827, had ten thousand inhabitants (certainly for the capital alone). Delineau (1915), p. 449. Pansa claims that the Lao, under the reign of Chao Anou, owned 165 towns including seventy-nine contiguous to Vietnam and eighty-six others located on the two banks of the Mekong. Pansa (1978) (T), p. 30. Were these 165 towns, which were simply villages, the same as those claimed by Bangkok? 20 Burney Papers, vol. 3, pt. 2, p. 354. According to the data contained in the Malloch document, Chiang Mai was peopled at this time (the 1820s) by 75,000 Siamese [sic] and nine hundred Chinese; Lamphun by 37,000 Siamese and nine hundred Chinese. See Burney Papers, vol. 3, pt. 2, p. 385. The prince of Chiang Mai was styled the "Lord of Fifty-Seven Towns." McLeod estimated the population of the whole of "Western Laos" (including Nan, Phrae, and Luang Prabang) at 175,000 persons. For McLeod, see Brailey (1968), p. 25. 21 Anou was not alone in his speculations, for foreigners had also considered what forces might be necessary to defeat Siam. Low writes that, "Two regiments, at the utmost, with the usual detachment of artillery, and supported by a few gun-boats, might in the Straits defy the whole Siamese nation. But Siam, unless indeed they allied with the Malays, a very improbable case, is too vulnerable by sea to the British, and by land to the Burmans, Laos, Cochinchinese, and Cambojans, to admit of her detaching a large army so far southward. Two British frigates and a steamer, with complements of troops, would be sufficient perhaps, not only to carry the boasted 'Seats of the Gods,' but to destroy all their ports, and to suspend or annihilate their trade." Low (1839), p. 107.

114

Paths to Conflagration

the Sultan of Kedah. Kedah's political position was a central topic on John Crawfurd's agenda when Crawfurd negotiated with the Siamese. Siamese armies had ousted the Kedah ruler on November 18, 1821. The sultan took refuge in Penang on the November 23, where he requested assistance from the British. Chao Anou, who carefully followed regional political developments, certainly inquired about the Kedah affair in his meeting with John Crawfurd. He received the same answer from the British envoy as the Phra Khlang had received: I noted that Queda [Kedah] was a poor and inconsiderable country, and could not bear the frequent exactions imposed by the Governor of Ligor, who was in the practice of making many demands which could not be authorized by his sovereign, the King of Siam, and that by these means, he constantly harassed the people and Prince of Queda, who had no means of redress. I added that the Rajah of Queda, though dutifully obedient to his liege, the King of Siam, could not but consider the Governor of Ligor as his personal enemy.22 This statement, examined closely, reveals that the situation in Kedah was identical to the situation in Laos. To trace the resemblance, one must simply substitute Anou for the ruler of Kedah, and the governor of Ligor [Nakhon Si Thammarat] for the governor of Khorat. A contemporary, C. K. Gutzlaff, depicted Anou's case with phrases that echo reports of the situation in Kedah: ... the Siamese who used every stratagem to oppress the subjects of one of the Laos tributary chiefs, Chow-vin-chan [Chao Anou]. This prince ... found the exorbitant exactions of the Siamese governor on the frontier injurious to the trade of his subjects and to his own revenues. He applied, repeatedly, to the court at Bangkok for redress: and being unsuccessful, he then addressed the governor himself: but no attention was paid to his grievances. He finally had recourse to arms, to punish the governor.23 The cause was identical, though the chain of events differed, perhaps because the court of Bangkok drew lessons from its experiences in Kedah-particularly the diplomatic aftermath-and then applied them to Laos. In any case, it is possible that Anou felt some empathy for his Kedah peer, especially since scholars then believed the inhabitants of Laos and of Kedah shared racial similarities. 24 If Anou had 22 Crawfurd Papers, p. 27. This affair was well-known in the region. Acting as a middle-man for the Burmese king, the vice-king of Tavoy wrote in a letter to impress the king of Kedah, "It is known that the Rajah of Kedah was formerly in friendly relations with Siam; but that the Siamese have now oppressed your Highness, and dispersed your Highness' family, thereby occasioning the greatest distress to the whole country. This is the usual habit of the Siamese to have no compassion, but to oppress all without regard either to mercy or justice." Quoted in Saxena (1952), p. 575. 23 Gutzlaff (1834), p. 76. For an identical view from the indigenous oral history, see Chan (T), p. 13, and Lam phiin wiang pen phasa thai (T), especially the ninth verse. Kedah's and Vientiane's identical predicaments are not fortuitous because the governors of Nakhon Si Thammarat and of Khorat are both sons of King Taksin and their mothers are sisters. Fels (1976), pp. 375-379,

384.

24 Low asserts that: "It is true that the original inhabitants of Kedah were of the Thai, or Siamese race. . . Siam was then but an infant state sent forth from the nursery of Laos; and

The World Superpower: Britain's Indochina Strategy

115

succeeded in clinching a deal with the British, Laos might have met with a fate more like that of Kedah's.25 22. CLEAVAGES AT THE BANGKOK COURT

Members of the Siamese elite were confounded26 by Anou's dealing with the British, whom they considered a new and redoubtable enemy. 27 Chao Anou's visit exacerbated divisions already existing within the Thai elite because it highlighted the fact that a vassal might choose to be either pro- or anti-British. It is significant that during his visit to John Crawfurd's residence, Anou paid homage to Rama II and the Phra Khlang, but not to the strongman of those days, Prince Chetsadabodin (Rama III). The Prince was vociferously anti-English at that time, while Mongkut, his potential successor, was more amenable to the newcomers and ultimately led the pro-British faction at the court. After succeeding Rama II, however, Prince Chetsadabodin moved closer to Mongkut's position on this issue. Still others remained overtly hostile to the British, including the Vice King Bowon, whom the British called by his title, Wang Na. Henry Burney reported in November 1825: We found the Court of Siam divided into two parties, and headed respectively by the King [Rama III] and Wangna. The king's party is intelligent, moderate, and truly well disposed to cultivate friendly relations with the British Government. His Majesty was declared to be favorable to our wishes with respect to Quedah [Kedah], but the Wangna's party is characterized by the conceit and ignorance natural to the Siamese, and His Highness ... was most decidedly opposed to the restoration of the Malay Chief of Quedah ... [and he] on one occasion ... proposed to the Ministers to hang up the [British] Envoy for presuming to vex the Court with representations concerning Quedah . . . . The Wangna is an important personage in the Siamese Government. ... He is at the head of its military establishment . . . and receives one third of the whole revenues of the kingdom. 28 After the fall of Burma to the British, Siam's council of ministers debated whether they should resist the European victors, who had proven that they wielded powers much more impressive than one would have expected from a "paper tiger." Rama III (formerly Prince Chetsadabodin) leaned towards compromise, while Wang Na other small parties of the Laos may have branched off in different directions, founding colonies where they settled ... we may suppose it to have been either the territory of the Laos, or some other one where that people had established themselves." Low (1839), pp. 97-98. 25 For instance, Burney Papers, vol. 2, pt. 6, p. 287. 26 See the criticism leveled by Prince Damrong more than one hundred years later. Damrong (1957) (T), pp. 165-166. 27 Finlayson (1826), p. 14. 28 Burney Papers, vol. 2, pt. 4, pp. 42-43.

116

Paths to Conflagration

Bowon, an accomplished yet stubborn military man, said, "Siam has numerous people to defend the Country, including many Chinese."29 This Rama III-Bowon dispute seems to have carried over to the Lao case, but in a tenuous way. The Wang Na had some complaints against the Lao, particularly concerning Chao Ratsavong, Chao-Anou's son, while Rama III seemed more flexible in disputes regarding Laos. In 1826-27, the Lao in Bangkok appear to have believed that Rama III would agree to a general repatriation of the displaced Lao peoples back to their homeland. 30 But this never happened; instead of reunification, the Lao met with a crushing defeat. In 1829, after the Siamese captured Anou and his relatives, Archbishop Bruguiere wrote that, "the King is disposed to pardon them. But his Prime-Minister, who remembers what he has suffered in this unfortunate war, is opposed."3 1 This "Prime-Minister" was Wang Na Bowon himself, who was "so angry at Vientiane that he had not deigned to set foot in the capital"32 and preferred to camp on the shore opposite the defeated town. Though the records clearly demonstrate Bowon's disposition toward the Lao, they leave room for interpretation of the king's stance. Some contemporaries contradict the portrait of Rama III as an accommodating ruler who was forced into stern action by his vengeful subordinate. For example, F. A. Neale reported that Robert Hunter, the British arms-trader in Bangkok who intervened in early 1829 with Rama III to end tortures inflicted on Anou, who was encaged in Bangkok, said "the flint-hearted monarch had a revengeful and insatiable temper, so that the petition proved of no avail." 33 The different assessments of Rama III and his peculiar behavior in this incident demonstrate the Siamese king's ability to adapt himself to various events and individuals. The Siamese population felt some sympathy for the Lao, and Rama III probably tried to channel and harness this stream of public opinion, particularly after people expressed horror at the fate reserved for Anou and his family.3 4 Rama III was a keen political strategist obsessed with manipulating public opinion. In a manifestation of his strategic abilities, he arranged to pass rumors among the British that he was no longer the same the Prince Chetsadabodin whom John Crawfurd had already characterized as anti-British, but rather was a "liberal"35 and "informed" 36 king, meaning that he had was now respectful of the power and resources of the British Government, displayed the proper demeanor toward British representatives, and appeared to appreciate British interests. His performance was so well-orchestrated that Henry Burney identified him as the chief of the pro-British faction at the Bangkok court. 29 Burney Papers, vol. 2, pt. 5, p. 12. But the anti-British stance of Wangna Bowon should not be characterized as dogmatic, for when the Burmese proposed an alliance with Siam, Bowon informed the British of it. See Burney Papers, vol. 3, pt. 1, p. 101. 30 It is not clear if this belief was founded on rumor or a concrete signal from the ruler in Bangkok. TNL Document Rama III (20) 1189/4. Testimony of Khanaya, probably on June 10, 1827.

31 Brugiere 1830), p. 217. 32 Thiphakorawong (1961) (T), p. 60. 33 Neale (1852), p. 51; Moor (1837), p. 199. 34 Neale (1852), pp. 51-52. 35 Burney Papers, vol. 1, pt. 1, pp. 48,51-52. 36 Burney Papers, vol. 2, pt. 4, pp. 112-113.

The World Superpower: Britain's Indochina Strategy

117

However, this purportedly reformed king had throughout his life engaged in activities and expressed attitudes that raised significant questions about his declared trust in Britain. He initiated the construction of tall barricades to surround the Kanchanaburi walls and dedicated it with an inscription reading, "Because Muang Kanchanaburi was the route taken by the English, Burmese and Mons, King Rama III ordered the palisades erected so that it might be one of the capital's impregnable diamond-hard military outposts."3 7 Moreover, on his deathbed Rama III prognosticated, "There will be no more wars with Vietnam and Burma. We will have them only with the West. Take care and do not lose any opportunities to them. Anything that they propose should be held up to close scrutiny before accepting it: do not blindly trust them." 38 His changeable behavior seems puzzling, but may merely reflect the flexibility of a skilled statesman who averted threats to his country while maintaining its grandeur. Ultimately, his thinking differed little from that of Mongkut, who began as an Anglophile and convinced partisan of Westernization, but after ascending the throne found it necessary to play the French against the British. In a letter written in 1867 to his ambassador in Paris, Mongkut avowed that "Both the French and the British probably think of us as animals for them to gnaw on and carve out; they deceive us into expending our energy as if we were oxen or buffalo."39 The problem was not deciding whether to be "oxen or buffalo," but rather how to be "oxen or buffalo" who might exert some control over the yokes on their own necks. 23. THE SIAMESE ARMS RACE

Siam's power was disproportionately weak compared to that of Britain, which would gain free rein over mainland Southeast Asia through their treaty with the Dutch in 1824. Still, the British government, with its forces now established in Burma, raised questions about the strength of this new neighbor, Siam, and were reluctant to take measures that would increase that strength. Concerns of this sort were dismissed by John Crawfurd, who wrote on July 12, 1822, expressing his opinion that Siam, as a neighbor, posed little risk to Britain's new territories: Should the Siamese nation become our neighbors, I may safely venture to assert from what I have seen of it that its power is just as little dangerous as that of the Malays. Sharing a border may even result in some advantages for us, which we could not derive from the poverty of the Malays .... The Siamese, by being brought into closer relations with us, will become better acquainted with our character and power-will be rendered more dependent upon our friendship and good offices, and by being finally brought to appreciate our forbearance and moderation, will learn to place a more implicit confidence in us than their jealousy and ignorance will at present admit of. Such a state of things will improve and tend to lay open, the 37 Renard, "The role of the Karens in Thai society," in Wilson (1980), p. 20.

38 Thiphakorawong (1961) (T), vol. 2, p. 188. [Translated from Wyatt (1969).] 39 Comment and annotations of Chadin and Thadeus Flood in Thiphakorawong (1965), vol. 4, p. 230.

118

Paths to Conflagration commercial resources which their fertile and extensive territory is undoubtedly capable of affording.40

Reassured by such a message from its own ambassador, Britain reversed its decision to forbid arms sales to Siam and authorized the country to purchase firearms from British dealers. In a letter dated September 9, 1823, John Crawfurd informed the Phra Khlang of Britain's new decision in these words: It gives me pleasure to inform your Excellency that there exists now no

objection to the merchants of England supplying the Siamese Government with firearms. The cargo of Mr. Gillies' ship indeed consists almost wholly of this article, a circumstance which I trust will be considered a convincing proof of esteem and confidence.41

Trading fever seized the British arms merchants. On August 15, 1824, the English brig Shannon sailed from Singapore for Siam carrying, along with its own substantial value and miscellaneous cargo, "four thousand muskets and a considerable quantity of ammunition." 42 In the same week, John Crawfurd informed the Phra Khlang that the British had already conquered Rangoon and added, "I again beg to know how the English and Siamese can best assist each other in conducting the war against the Burmans." 43 Meanwhile, the vessel which bore this letter conveyed to Bangkok a cargo of cannon, muskets, and ammunition. The letter also introduced the British arms trader, Robert Hunter, to the Phra Khlang. Hunter gave a gift of one thousand muskets to Rama III; the Siamese king subsequently had the wood of the barrels painted red, and these muskets became known in Siam as pun rang d~ng [red muskets]. To conduct the arms trade, Robert Hunter remained in residence in Bangkok and in 1831 was honored by the Siamese government as "Luang Awutwiset" (Marquis of Extraordinary Arms).44 In a letter from Singapore on August 28, 1824, John Morgan, another British arms trader, stated that he was sending "warlike stores," including ten thousand muskets, along with a gift of five hundred muskets to Rama II, 150 muskets for Chetsadabodin, and one hundred for the Phra Khlang. 45 He also gave Rama II twenty pieces of artillery for the Fort of Paknam, artillery that the Siamese used to reinforce that coastal stronghold against a potential attack by the British themselves. John Morgan avowed that he was able to conduct a great amount of business with the Siamese government and to build a prosperous, important, and flourishing business. The British representative, John Crawfurd, also presented a gift of one thousand muskets to the Siamese court.46

°

Crawfurd Papers, pp. 43-44. Commercial intercourse between Siam and Singapore soon recorded a great leap forward. Crawfurd Papers, p. 196. 41 Crawfurd Papers, pp. 188-189. 42 Crawfurd Papers, p. 199. 43 Crawfurd Papers, p. 200. 44 Vella (1957), p. 126; Thiphakorawong (1961) (T), p. 279; Moore (1915); Hong Lysa(1981), pp. 112-115. 45 Crawfurd Papers, pp. 204, 206. 46 Crawfurd Papers, p. 216. 4

The World Superpower: Britain's Indochina Strategy

119

The prodigious pace of this delivery of small armaments and ammunition to the Siamese soon saturated the country. By 1838, Robert Hunter's reply to Rama III's inquiry about his business gives evidence that the market had been flooded with an oversupply of small arms. Hunter informed the king "that he had made a great deal of money at first but very little in recent times." 47 According to Burney, "Ordnance for Pun Yai [cannon] [are] in great demand, and old cannon bring a price far beyond their value. Muskets, pun khap sila, are now less in demand than they were two or three years ago." 48 A shift in interest away from small arms and toward the cannon was reported by the Bangkok court to Henry Burney, as he wrote in a letter dated December 22, 1825: I enquired how many guns, and what size did the king require. The Minister gravely replied one thousand, some of brass, some of iron, some of six cubits length and some of four and two cubits, and calculated to carry balls of a size which he indicated by holding out his hand in the form of either twenty-four pound shot or six pound guns. These would be considered by the king as the greatest proof of our good will and friendship. 49 Along with this supply of modem weapons, the British provided some technical assistance, particularly for the "Christian troops" formed by descendants of Portuguese assigned to the "artillery and the engineer corps" in Siam. 50 The Westerners were not impressed by the manner in which Siam's troops adopted firearms. John Crawfurd wrote from Calcutta on April 3, 1823, "they have learned nothing from Europeans except a rude acquaintance with firearms."5 1 However, the ambassador may have underestimated the influence of the British and the alertness of the Siamese, for the Siamese were able to learn a number of lessons about conducting an aggressive war with artillery from the neighboring Burmese troops that had been defeated by the British, and from the British themselves. All these modem arms, some of which had been used at the battle of Waterloo against Napoleon, provided unsurpassed firepower to Siam, firepower first used in 1827 against the Lao.52 "Their corpses pile up to form an embankment,"5 3 Bodin reminisced in his memoirs as he recalled the stacks of Lao dead. Thanks to British, American, and Portuguese arms, Bodin rose to fame in the battles of that year. A dispatch from the general-staff in 1827, signed by Phraya Chasa:>nyakon, stated that: "ammunition is almost exclusively distributed to the forward forces of Phraya Ratchasuphawadi [Bodin] and to the forces of Chaophraya Khorat." 54 Another 47 Thompson (1961), pp. 31-32. 48 Burney Papers, vol. 2, p. 53. 49 Burney Papers, vol. 1, pt. 1, p. 60. 50 Brugiere (1831), p. 200. 51 Craufurd Papers, p. 126. 52 Hong Lysa(1984), p. 62; Moore (1915), p. 233; Moor (1837), p. 204. 53 Kulab (1971) (T), p. 257. 54 TNL Document Rama III (27) 1189/10, vol. 2, khun; Chotmaihet riiang prap khabot wiangchan (1926) (T), pp. 7, 9, 10. Bruguiere (1831), p. 200. Kulab (1971) (T), pp. 266-267, 273. About the intervention of mercenaries on the battlefield, see the testimony of Robert Hunter in Neale (1852), pp. 48-51. A dispatch from the Siamese general staff at Vientiane recorded a document in English sent there by Bangkok, and its presence is unexplainable unless it was sent for some

120

Paths to Conflagration

Siamese military man, Chaophraya Mahayotha, who had been sent to study British headquarters' operations in Burma, became the commander of the Bangkok armies which subsequently attacked the Lao at Nong Bua Lam Phu, Thong Sompoi, and KhaoSan. 24. LANNA'S ADVANCES TOWARD THE BRITISH

Chao Anou's meeting with John Crawfurd set a precedent for the rulers of Lan Na, who later attempted to establish independent intercourse with the British. The rulers of LanNa had attempted resistance and experienced defeat years before; they had suffered the same fate as their Lan Sang compatriots when the Siamese overran their territories in 1778, and the LanNa ruler, the famous Kawila, had his ear cut off by Taksin because he protested the ill treatment of Chiang Mai's population by the invading Siamese officers (Chiang Mai was the capital city of Lan Na).SS Under Rama I, the rulers of LanNa and Lan Sang had also frequently cooperated in their struggle against their other aggressive neighbors, the Burmese. Their readiness to fight did not go unrecorded. A vigilant observer in his time, James Low, stressed in a political report, Her [Siam's] neighbors to the North, the Laos of Cheung Mai and Lanchang, are ever ready to assert independence. It is impossible that the court of Bangkok should be blind to the nature of their political position. 56 English reports provide some clues to the source of LanNa's quest for freedom. It appears that Chiang Mai's rulers were quick to appreciate the British force that challenged Burma and eager to establish contact, even though they had received no authorization from Bangkok. Their earliest overtures puzzled the Westerners, however. The first Lao letter arrived at Moulmein in March 1825, soon after its occupation by British forces early in the First Anglo-Burmese war, and six months before the arrival in Bangkok of the British emissary, Henry Burney. It purported to be from the Chief of Zimmay Shans, lordly styling himself "ruler of fifty-seven provinces and possessor of the richest throne in the East" . . . requesting to be informed of his [the British General's] "circumstances" to which a friendly but non-committal answer was returned. Who exactly sent this letter is not clear, for two of the three Lao Jaomeuangs [rulers] died in that year. Yet, it seems unlikely that it could have been sent on Siamese orders at so early a stage in the war with the Burmese, and "the richest throne in the East" would not have been a title the Englishman who was there with the Bowon armies, engaged against the Lao; see, TNL Document Rama III (86) 1189/11, ching, Chasenyakone-Phraya Sisahathep, June 25, 1827. 55 Notton (1932), vol. 3, p. 207. 56 Burney Papers, vol. 5, pt. 1, p. 89.

The World Superpower: Britain's Indochina Strategy

121

Siamese could approve emanating from one of their tributaries. The next letter arrived at Moulrnein in 1828.57 At the time, Kanarit Sriyawong, son of Phrachao Kawila, ruled Chiang Mai under the name of Phrachao Kawilorot. The first letter sent to the British carne from him. According to Nigel J. Brailey, the second one came from Bunmar, who ... had, together with his subordinates, to decide whether he wished to establish fuller contact [with the British] while, judging from his subsequent fear of Bangkok, keeping that court largely ignorant of his proceedings. In the event, Bunrnar displayed considerable initiative and independence, as he had with China, by deciding in favor [of contact] .... Bunrnar himself, who received Richardson on his 1834 and 1835 visits as a personal friend, appears to have had no real fear of British empire builders, and probably saw [British-occupied] Moulmein as another Mon Pegu; a more useful and sympathetic potential counterweight to Bangkok than Ava could ever be. 58 The conduct of the rulers of LanNa provides clues about the kind of relationship Anou tried to have with the British. Intrigued by these initiatives from the vassal rulers, the British attempted to meet with Anou, as well as with the rulers of Lan Na. When Henry Burney saw that Rama III was granting an audience to Lan Na rulers, he insisted on being presented to them, but Bangkok apparently perceived these overtures as a threat to its national security and so prevented the meeting. Did Anou and his compatriots, the rulers of LanNa, plot with the British? One cannot find information to clear up this mystery. 25. DESTABILIZATION SCENARIOS OF SIAM

At the express demand of Prince Chetsadabodin, John Crawfurd promised he would avoid meeting with anyone outside Chetsadabodin' s faction and reported in his journal that he had kept this promise: I attempted to appease him in hopes that I might visit the Princes and Chiefs opposed to his own party at the Court, but I learned that he would be happier if I declined to do so. To prevent giving umbrage and to avoid throwing obstacles of any sort in the way of the mission, I accordingly declined visiting any one unconnected with the party to which he belonged, and I may add that he was pleased to make this discretion and forbearance on my part the subject of personal compliment upon several occasions. 59 Yet Crawfurd seems to have edited this version of his report to camouflage some of his activities, because although Anou certainly had not received any commitment from the British, the Lao had at least visited him. High-ranking Siamese officials who 57 British Museum, Richardson Journal, p. 3; quoted in Brailey (1968), p. 62. 58 59

Brailey (1968), pp. 63-64. Crawfurd Papers, pp. 85-86.

122

Paths to Conflagration

were opposed to Chetsadabodin had also approached Crawfurd, and it appears that Siam's foreign affairs minister was aware of it. In a letter on February 10, 1823, from the Phra Khlang to the Governor General of India, Crawfurd's superior, the Siamese government accused the British envoy of having taken "council to do many other things to give offence."60 The accusation is vague, but it reveals Siam's incessant worries. Crawfurd noted in his journal, on May 6, 1822, Every day brought to light some new occurrence calculated to display the ceaseless jealousy and suspicious character of the Siamese government. A government so arbitrary and unjust can place no reasonable reliance upon its own subjects and seems to be in perpetual dread that they are to be excited to insurrection or rebellion by the example of strangers. This is unquestionably the true explanation of the hectic alarm and distrust which it entertains of all foreigners. 61 Though paternalistic, Crawfurd's observations accurately depicted the dizzying power struggles in Bangkok. After all, Rama I had come to power as a result of a bloody putsch and was himse.lf nearly overthrown by the vice king. His successor, Rama II beheaded 117 nobles thirty-six hours after his accession to the throne. 62 However, economic and militaristic aspirations motivated the British to engage with a seemingly unstable Siam. The British tried to persuade the Bangkok government to allow free trade in Siam and to cooperate formally with them in the war against the Burmese. Both objectives stemmed from Britain's general regional policy, but Siam was not easily won over. At this time, the British focused on collecting operational intelligence and establishing an intelligence network in Southeast Asia directed from Singapore, the "Malta of the East," which, as the missionary J. Tomlin stated, "more than any other place in the East opens a wide door of communication, not only with China, but with the numerous colonies of Chinese in the kingdoms of Cochinchina, Camboja, Siam."63 Even while living in Singapore, Crawfurd maintained close relations with Cambodia's king, his ministers, and his surgeon-adviser, Cajitanus Lister, an Englishman who had settled in Cambodia in 1801.64 J. Tomlin depicted him [Lister] as an "Englishman residing with the Rajah who has the chief management of his government, being high in authority with the king and over the mint or treasury."65 Perhaps the British factor explains some events in Cambodia which would be otherwise undecipherable, for its king was as anti-Siamese as Anou himself. Crawfurd found the Siamese leaders, in contrast to the Cambodian leaders, "very ill-informed." 66 Crawfurd carefully chose which Siamese leaders to approach, hoping to make them amenable and receptive toward British interests. Phra Phiphat Kosa was one such target selected as a promising court ally and channel of 60 Crawfurd Papers, p. 269. 61 Crawfurd (1834), p. 216. 62 Mouhot (1863), p. 247; Crawfurd (1834), p. 405. 63 Tomlin (1832), p. 17. 64 Crawfurd (1834), pp. 275-276, 466; Nepote (1984), pp. 90, 98.

65 Tomlin (1832), pp. 6-7; See also the testimony in Lettre sur le cambodge par un cambodgien (1872), p. 55.

66 Crawfurd (1834), p. 208.

The World Superpower: Britain's Indochina Strategy

123

communication. An instruction to Crawfurd on June 27, 1823, advised him: "you should endeavour to maintain correspondence and communication with that Court, more especially with the Deputy Minister Pra Pipat Cosa, who seems to have been personally friendly and well disposed towards the Mission."67 Phra Phiphat Kosa led the Bangkok court faction that wanted to set up free trade with the British. On October 5, 1824, Crawfurd instructed M. Gillies to "take occasion upon all opportunities that may offer to assure the Siamese of our friendship, and that they have nothing to apprehend but what is advantageous from the result of the present contest [in Burma]."68 Regional factors hampered the success of these endeavors. Britain's envoy to Bangkok, Henry Burney, stated sternly in a report on September 2, 1825, that, "As long as the Burmese war continues, I do not foresee the probability of our being able to bring this court to any positive arrangements respecting trade and mutual boundaries." 69 The attempts by "land-hungry" Siamese elites to hedge their bets by preparing to negotiate with whichever party won the struggle illustrates their doubts concerning British prospects in Burma. In 1826, "Chao Phya Maha Yotha [Chaophraya Mahayotha] ... was sent to take possession of Martaban, but with two sets of dispatches, to be ceded according as he might find the English or the Burmese the victorious party." 70 The double game made Henry Burney laugh, since it was played by a supposed ally of the British. British officials repeatedly accused the Siamese of "aggrandizement." They even disputed the issue with Thai commanders-including Phraya Chumphol or Chaophraya Mahayotha-who had been sent officially to assist them. 71 After some failed attempts to share Burmese territory with Siam, the British decided to guide Siamese territorial expansionism toward the east, in compensation?2 The British were not exactly a trustworthy ally to Siam either. They actively took stock of Siam's military capabilities and economic resources in order to contrive an advantageous alliance with Siam. The British even devised contingency plans to strain Siam's government and civil order by manipulating the weaknesses and antagonisms inherent in Siamese society. Crawfurd reported on Siam's armed forces on July 12, 1822, This barbarous and unorganized force, independent of the perpetual fear of the Government of insurrection, is utterly incapable of offensive operations 67 Finlayson (1826), p. 15; Crawfurd Papers, p. 176. 68 Crawfurd Papers, p. 208. 69 Burney Papers, vol. 1, pt. 1, p. 62. 70 Burney Papers, vol. 2, pt. 4, p. 46. 71 Burney Papers, vol. 2, pt. 4, p. 46; vol. 1, pt. 1, p. 2; vol. 2, pt. 4, p. 47; vol. 1, pt. I, p. 62; vol. 2, pt. 5, p. 15. 72 Low, the negotiator who paved the way for the Burney treaty and who was in constant communication with high-ranking Siamese officials, did not miss the opportunity to suggest that the Thai look east for new territories to annex. His report in the year 1826 provided a faithful echo: "Siam may not then perhaps find it convenient to extend herself west [into Burma], but the Malacca Peninsula lies before her, an easy prey ... Siam will likely also tum her attention to Camboja and Laos, which cannot be supposed capable of resisting her long." Siam was worth paying attention to in the opinion of the British: "It is reasonable to conclude that Siam will in time rise to the first rank amongst Indochinese states ... and is a conquering people." See Burney Papers, vol. 2, pt. 4, p. 9.

124

Paths to Conflagration against the smallest regular force. The Kingdom at the same time in its most vital part is the most defenceless that can be imagined. By far the most valuable branch of the revenue of the kingdom and the principal perquisites of the Officers of the Government arise out of the foreign trade which is conducted in the river Me-nam. A single gun-brig, by blockading the river, would put a total stop to the whole of this trade, and two of them would destroy the capital, without possibility of resistance from this vain but weak people; for the Me-nam is accessible to vessels of this description at all seasons, the navigation is obstructed by no danger, and perhaps for fear of domestic treason, there is not a cannon mounted to defend the capital or the approach to it. 73

With this option in mind, on April 27, 1826, Henry Burney reported, "The Mission had to make its selection, to place our relations with the Siamese either on a conciliatory and friendly or an unsettled and hollow footing .... Nothing could have been easier to the late Mission than to have brought on a war with the Government of Siam." 74 This general situation, exacerbated by the fall of Burma, created genuine dread in Bangkok, which had come to recognize the extent of Britain's power. The Burney Papers contain a short, vivid report of Rama III's politic assessment of the British: "I think it right to continue in friendship with the English, by doing which I shall remain a king and maintain possession of my country. If I act otherwise, I shall lose my throne, be driven into the forest and become food for tigers." 75 Guided by this sort of pragmatism, Rama III maintained his reputation among British diplomats as "a person of much intelligence and energy."76 The trade treaty proposed by the British was finally and reluctantly signed in Bangkok. Contemporaries, such as Anou, called it pointedly "the British treaty." The exchange of ratification documents would come in 1827 in Trang, not in Bangkok, however. Acceptance of the treaty, a timely tactical move, was made necessary in part by dilemmas that had arisen and confronted the ruling Thai in Laos and Cambodia. 26. DID GREAT BRITAIN HOLD A "LAO CARD''?

In the middle of the nineteenth century, Charles Gutzlaff, the first European to compile all European books on Laos, wrote a monograph about the country in which he surveyed its lengthy, recorded history and predicted its future: The British penetrated the country from Pegu before 1587, and members of the company's factories from time to time visited these regions, until war and rebellion among the Laos prevented their progress. For more than two centuries all enterprise towards this distant land ceased, until the victories of the English in Birmah ... The age of seclusion being now past, it is by no 73 Crawfurd Papers, pp. 46, 126, 151. 74 Burney Papers, vol. 2, pt. 4, pp. 43-44. 75 Burney Papers, vol. 2, pt. 5, p. 12. 76 Crawfurd Papers, p. 212.

The World Superpower: Britain's Indochina Strategy

125

means probable that the Laos will be able to keep themselves much longer from intercourse with civilised nations?7 The invisibility of Laos relative to the West intrigued Gutzlaff. His Country of the

Free Laos begins with this phrase:

None of the nations of Asia has attracted so little attention as this numerous race, though they themselves have a written national history which commences a few years subsequent to our era. Gutzlaff's other study, Frontiers of China Toward Birmah, provided practical information about Laos and its changing relationships with its powerful neighbors. The south-west of Yunnan received its civilisation simultaneously with the remaining northern Laos states. Amongst the aborigines there existed a certain community of interests which kept their northern enemies long at bay. Mention is made of their early kings, of battles fought, and of conquests obtained, a few traces of which may be found in the Lao legends. The dominion of their kings during the great troubles in China, until the Tang princes reduced the empire to order, comprised at one time the greater part of Yunnan, and enabled their ruler to carry his arms into Tonkin?8 Research sometimes breaks ground for a military, commercial, or religious quest. Men like Gutzlaff were the first Europeans to visit Laos, and they prepared the way for their successors: traders, diplomats, and soldiers. The British proved especially interested in the region. They even financed the exploration made by (Frenchman) Henri Mouhot to Luang Prabang, and it was the British who rapidly gathered a mass of reliable information on this area. The British saw in Laos many potential benefits. It could serve as a passage from China to India. Laos also might be a production-center for valuable natural resources, resources that John Crawfurd discovered originated in the region. Benjamin is produced chiefly in the kingdom of Lao and has of late years been exported in considerable quantities. This is a commodity which has commonly been grown only on the Islands of Sumatra and Borneo .... Stick lac of the finest quality which is anywhere to be found forms a very valuable product. It is chiefly obtained from Laos and the northern parts of the country [Siam]. Of this production not less than 18,000 piculs are annually sent to China. 79 Samples of these products had been taken for analysis to London's laboratories. 80 The British also noted that "Almost all the most valuable exports of Siam, benjamin, cotton, teak, copper, peltry, stick lac, lead, etc .... are the products of Laos."81 77 Gutzlaff (1849), p. 40. 78 Gutzlaff (1849), pp. 42-48. 79 Crawfurd Papers, pp. 112-113. 80 Burney Papers, vol. 2, pt. 4, p. 105. 81 Burney Papers, vol. 2, pt. 4, p. 83.

126

Paths to Conflagration

Certainly, Anou and other Lao rulers preferred to trade directly with the British rather than through Siamese monopolies which forced them to sell at their controlled prices. Likewise, the British were eager to gain direct access to Laos, as evidenced by the many communications sent to British envoys in Bangkok that stressed the importance of initiating direct trade. But Laos was not only valuable to Britain as a potential source of trade goods. Crawfurd noted and reported on its geostrategic significance inside the region. The country of Lao ... appears to be divided between the Siamese, the Chinese, and the Burmans. It is composed of petty states, tributary to those three powers. Four of the petty states are under the domination of Siam; namely, Changmai [Chiang Mai], Lan-chang [Lan Sang or Vientiane], Pasak [Champassak], and Luang-phra-bang. Their chiefs are hereditary princes .... Lan-chang, always considered the capital of Lao, is situated at about 15°45' North latitude, on the great river of Kamboja [the Mekong], which is here as broad and as large as the Menam at Bangkok. It was described to me as being as populous as this last place; of which I have great doubt, because it has comparatively little foreign trade, is not much resorted to by Chinese, and is not the seat of a Court. ... The Siamese reckon, in all their portion of Lao, one hundred and one towns, large and small.82 During an audience with Rama III, the British envoy paid close attention to the Lao representatives present, as Henry Burney relates: "There were several Chinese and Cochin Chinese and we noticed particularly some Laos officers who were richly dressed and much resembled, in the opinion of Captain Macfarquhar, the Gurkha chiefs."83 Burney encountered them again in the following circumstances and was able to glean some fragments of information: Yesterday the 21st [September 1825], I met at the Prah Klang's by appointment the Lao Chiefs who are now here, but I could not collect much information from them. They said that before their departure from their own homes about two months ago, they had heard that the "Lao Burmahs" to the north of Ava, who they told me are extremely numerous and use the same dress and language as themselves, are coming down in great force in support of the Burmese. They had heard nothing of the Chinese detachment, but they said that there is a race in Northern Laos who dress in the same manner as the Chinese, wearing the hair only differently. They declared that any attack upon Ava from Cheung-Mai would be full of the greatest difficulty, as the frontiers on each side are an extensive mountainous waste, through many parts of which no cattle-drawn carriage can pass. Four of these Chiefs were styled the Prince of Chiang-Ton, Pya of Phray, Pya of Cheung-Mai, and Pya of Joo-um. They mentioned the names of many places which are unknown to European geographers. Although the Prah Klang hesitated when I requested to be allowed to pay these Chiefs a visit, I am still not without hopes of being able to see more of them later. They dress much like natives of upper 82 Crawfurd (1834), pp. 446-447. 83 Burney Papers, vol. 1, pt. 1, p. 46.

The World Superpower: Britain's Indochina Strategy

127

Hindustan, and they speak a language, I am informed, differing little from the Siamese. 84 This game of hide-and-seek between the British emissary and the Lao and Lan Na chiefs continued until January 4, 1826, when Burney met with Siamese officials, Phya Phi Phut and Phra Wiset, to discuss the assistance the Siamese might give to the British. Burney received assurances from Siamese officials that ... it had always been a custom for them to send every year an army to the Burmese frontier. I quickly was led to understand that the fact that Siam had sent an army, now that the country belonged to the English, meant we were to be considered by this Court in the same light as the Burmese had been ... I expressed a wish to see the Lao Chiefs before they quit Bangkok. Pya Phiput stated that there would be no time for me to see them as they were to depart the following morning. On further pressing the matter, I was told that I should see the Chiefs that same evening at the audience of the Chou Pya Chakri. On the evening of this day I paid my first visit to Chou Pya Chakri, who is generally considered the first Minister of Siam ... I then enquired whether the Minister would allow me to have another interview with the Lao Chiefs before their departure. He pointed [them] out to me in one part of the Hall of audience, saying that they as well as all the country to the North of Bangkok, are under his special superintendence, and that they had come that night to take leave, having been ordered by the king to depart to Laos early on the following morning. I strove to have them detained that I might pay them a visit on the next day, but the more anxiety I betrayed to see them, the more I aroused the jealousy and suspicions of the Siamese. I was requested to put then such questions as I desired to the Chiefs, but I observed that I had no political questions to put them, but such only as related to the natural history, religion and customs of Laos, with which Europeans are imperfectly acquainted. I have since learned that the people of Laos being a recent conquest, the Siamese are as distrustful of them as of us, and that the Minister apprehended that I desired to gather from these Chiefs information respecting the different routes from the Burmese dominions to Cheung Mai. 85 Clearly, Siam feared that through their interviews with the Laos, the British might learn the invasion routes through Chiang Mai. In order to divert Henry Burney's attention, the Phra Khlang asserted that: "the road from Cheung Mai to the capital of Ava is impracticable for a large army." Burney replied that roads existed between Martaban and Ummerapoora: The Phra Khlang simply denied it, but his denial failed to mislead his guests. Relying on information collected by Fitch in 1587, the British concluded that the trip from Pegu to Chiang Mai took twenty-five days through "many fruitful and pleasant countries," and John Crawfurd's map notes a twenty days' route from Martaban to Chiang Mai. But although the British failed in their attempts to interview the Lao and Lan Na chiefs in any depth, their attempts to make contact with the Lao and the LanNa 84 Burney Papers, vol. 1, pt. 1, p. 59. 85 Burney Papers, vol. 1, pt. 1, pp. 80, 83-84.

128

Paths to Conflagration

rulers won them a diplomatic plum. Wary of these persistent new foreigners, the Siamese now perceived and identified the Lao and the British as equal military threats. This recognition gave the British additional leverage in their dealings with Siam. It may also have inadvertently fueled Bangkok's distrust of its more familiar foes, the Lao; in the past, the Lao had been victimized dreadfully when Taksin measured them in company with the Burmese and judged Laos and Burma to be equally enemies of Siam.86 Throughout the subsequent half a century, although conquered, humiliated, and disparaged, the Lao were still perceived by the Bangkok court as one of its worst enemies. Siamese leaders in Bangkok had not tempered their animosity toward the Lao, and in their turn, the Lao persisted in their search for freedom and independence. The "Laos of Che-ung Mai [LanNa] and Lan Chang, are ever ready to assert independence" 87 reported James Low one year before the outbreak of the conflict of 1827. Obviously, the Lao had not accepted the pax siamica. The representatives of all four countries-Siam, Lan Na, Laos, and Britainunderstood that no political situation or compact could be trusted as permanent. Instability was endemic in Siam itself. "In less than forty years, three different dynasties have succeeded in Siam," noted Archbishop Bruguiere.88 Coincidentally, Rama III bore the reign name "Phaendin Plai" (meaning "the last reign," as opposed to Rama I, whose reign was termed the "beginning" reign, and Rama II, who ruled in the "middle" reign). These indications and a recent history of instability exacerbated the Siamese court's uneasiness regarding enemies. Parallel to the reunification movement taking place in central Laos and among the Lao on the eastern shore of the Mekong, particularly among the principalities of Vientiane, Luang Prabang, Champassak, and Siang Khuang, another unifying dynamic was developing that caught the attention of Henry Yule. He ascertained: . . . farther down the Mekhong is Chandapooree, called by the Shans Moungtchian or Wintchian [Vientiane] ... This state was also tributary both to Siam and to Cochin China. About thirty years ago the Tsaubwa of Wintchian [Chao Anou] was inclined to throw off his allegiance to both countries, and proposed to the Zimme [Lan Na] states to enter into a confederacy. The Siamese attacked him [Chao Anou] with a large force, and utterly destroyed the town [Vientiane].89 Even before the conflict described above, James Low predicted that "It is very probable that the Siamese will lose all their influence over the Lao provinces, and if these join together, they will be able to annoy the Siamese very much."90 British assessments of the rebellious potential of Laos and LanNa caused them to perceive 86 Chroniques royales khmer, p. 68. 87 Burney Papers, vol. 1, pt. 5, p. 89. 88 Brugiere (1831), p. 190. This general feeling in Siam about the fragility of its own power is described by Wyatt: "From 1610 to the fall of Ayudhya in 1767 virtually every succession to the throne was contested ... " Wyatt (1985), p. 258. A contemporary, Malloch, states: "It is considered rude in Siam for any one to enquire after the King's health; indeed it is criminal, and the person who dares to do so, subjects himself to severe punishment." Malloch (1852), p. 19. In addition, an old prophecy predicted that a foreign king would come to rule Siam. Thompson (1961), p. 32. 89 Yule (1855), p. 106, 307. 90 Burney Papers, vol. 3, pt. 1, p. 99.

The World Superpower: Britain's Indochina Strategy

129

the Lao and the Lan Na areas as levers that might be used against Siam in the event the Siamese rulers failed to commit themselves to the British side. The British designed multi-directional threats against Siam, linking the Vietnamese to the Burmese, and the Lao as well as the Lan Na people to the Malays. 9J In 1827, the British would decide whether to employ this mechanism they had devised against Siam or to allow Siam's many neighbors to remain mere strategic threats. 27. A DIPLOMATIC BREAKTHROUGH COMES TO NAUGHT

After Chao Anou met with British envoy John Crawfurd in Bangkok, he had to decide where his political and strategic interests lay. The San liip bo sun, the fascinating Lao literary masterpiece attributed to Anou, emphasized that "I would like to gather all my related communities to assist me. This includes the Ho [Chinese], the Kaleung, and the Keo [Vietnamese]." 92 The San liip bosun reads, With a deeply troubled heart, I am like a tangled stem of lotus leaf and how can I bond an elephant with it? Such a strong fire bums inside me that the waters of the five rivers would not be able to put it out. My heart's desire cannot be fulfilled because Mahanathi in Panjab is too far away.93 In this poem, the main British force and superpower ("Mahanathi") is pictured from an Asian perspective as distant; centered in India (in "Panjab") at the time, this force was located too far away to provide strategic assistance to the Lao. Meanwhile, the newly established English outpost on the Malay peninsula had not made any commitment to ally with Anou. In his comments on these verses, Somsy S. Desa focused on a related passage from the San liip bo sun, which declares, "I want to round up all the fighting men to protect the country." Somsy S. Desa interpreted it in these terms: "This means to build a strong army to fight for the liberation of the country until victory. For we cannot depend on foreigners." 94 Though there were many more forceful options open to them, the British merely settled back and watched the events that ultimately crushed Anou and his Lao followers.95 Following the holocaust, a few foreigners returned to the region to study 91 Burney Papers, vol. 5, pt. 1, p. 89. 9 2 San /Up bo sun (L), p. 17. The Kaleungs should be the descendants of the Lao Theung, derogatively called Khas, according to Chamberlain (1986), p. 86. See also Pavie (1902), vol. 4, pp. 69, 133-135, 157, 210. Pavie met with this tribe whose homeland is situated on the upper

Tchepone, at the doorstep of the Vietnamese province of Quang Tri. According to Pavie, this tribe of Kha Leung (Pavie's spelling) "has no state for the Siamese domination and needs very little encouragement to be ready to defend their independence with arms at hand." Pavie (1902), p. 210. In a 1902 atlas by Malleterre and Legendre, the Keus Leungs were portrayed as inhabiting an area spanning from Sakon Nakhon to That Phanom and Mukdahan on the west shore of the Mekong, while on the east shore, their habitat encompassed theSe Tchepon river, and the towns of Phin-Tchepone and to the Ai Lao pass. Malleterre and Legendre (1902), p. 37. For more on the San liip bo sun, see Sila (1954) (L), pp. 51-54; Sila (1960) (L), p. 272; Khampheng (1968) (L), pp. 287-288; and Soulang (1974) (L), pp. 120-150. 93 San liip bosun (L), pp. 3-4. 94 Somsy (1984) (L), p. 33. 95 Burney Papers, vol. 2, pt. 1, pp. 99-101; vol. 3, pt. 1, p. 111.

130

Paths to Conflagration

the pieces and people who remained. The missionary Charles Gutzlaff maintained an interest in the Lao, and in 1834, he and Archbishop Pallegoix both began separately to collect information for a Lao dictionary. This project was among the first signs of the Franco-British rivalry that would unfold in the region over the nineteenth century. Some British contemporaries bitterly resented Siam for having waged war against the Lao and Kedah. J. H. Moor wrote in 1833, The Siamese deserve a heavy punishment for their barbarity to Chow Vun Chan [Chao Vientiane, the common name given to Anou] and the poor Malays, whose "ghosts walk unrevenged" amongst them. 96 Many years later, the British in Singapore had not altered their opinion that Siam's hold over its tributary states was weak enough that a concerted act of resistance, possibly assisted by a foreign power, could break it. Some Englishmen attempted to forge new alliances to check Siam. The indefatigable James Low, who wanted to assist the Prince of Ligor [Nakhon Si Thammarat] in his struggle to gain that country's independence, mused, "Were the Chinese in Siam to confederate with the Cochinchinese and the Ligorian, Siam would most probably be subdued." 97 Still other British presented an opposing perspective. One asserted Britain's national interest in the region. "At any rate the barbarity of the Siamese nation was no reason why the British should have gone to war with it, unless that barbarity had been exerted against the settlement of Penang or against the general tranquillity of India." 98 The ambiguity of Britain's position in Lao-Siamese affairs continued to play a consequential role in their relations. 96 Moor (1837), p. 200.

97 Low (1839), p. 72. 98 Burney Papers, vol. 5, pt. 1, p. 7.

MANY PROVOCATIONS AND ANOU' S RESPONSE

28. WILY ENEMIES, SECRET SCHEMES

Rama III of Siam attempted to expand his power over other kingdoms and principalities of mainland Southeast Asia in the 1820s. Historian John Cady has argued that "the need to avoid a break with the rising Anglo-Indian Empire was especially urgent in view of developing Siamese problems on the Laotian and Cambodian frontiers." 1 It is accurate to portray the Siamese king as a man facing a host of challenges during this decade, but one must remember that these frontier "problems" were largely of Bangkok's own making, since they consisted primarily of Rama III's attempt to annex Laos. The Siamese king had prepared to face all the disturbances that such an undertaking might provoke. After his accession to the throne, he personally selected one of two newly nominated, high-ranking officials to take responsibility for tattooing all the king's subjects, literally marking the extent of this king's rule. 2 Rama III decreed that tattooing be extended to the population in most of the Lao possessions; their inhabitants were considered to be under the jurisdiction of Siam, not of the Lao kingdoms and principalities that were tributaries of Siam. This policy represented a shift in Lao-Siamese relations, and its success required a number of conditions that Rama III secured with his usual diplomatic dexterity. While in the process of reaching out to engulf Laos, Rama III was careful to avoid disturbing his fragile hold on the throne. For this reason, he chose not to reshuffle the old guard leaders with whom he had previously worked when he was minister of foreign affairs and trade, and later, prime minister for his father, King Rama 11.3 The Kosathibodi, the foreign and finance minister, was the only new member in the 1 Cady (1964), p. 335; Vella stresses, "Soon after achieving this settlement with the British regarding the Malay Peninsula, the Siamese became involved in difficulties that arose within the vassal states, difficulties that continued to engross Bangkok for over a decade." Vella (1957), p. 66. 2 Vella (1957). 3 His advancement to Prime Minister occurred after 1822, when Prince Phithakmontri, his maternal uncle and a supporter of Mongkut, died.

132

Paths to Conflagration

cabinet. 4 Even Bowon, the vice king, had been the minister of war under Rama II. The only youngster was Mongkut, future king, but he was an outsider to the power struggle. 5 In the international arena, the region's traditional diplomatic configuration was shaken dramatically with the forceful entry of Britain, a new contender for power. This irruption of the British as a world superpower convinced the court of Bangkok that it must solve its pending problem with the Lao in order to insure that it could focus its full attention on the British challenge. Britain's unexpected and rapid victory over the Burmese put the Siamese on the spot. This was not the first time Siam had experienced simultaneous tensions with powers on different borders. Fifty years earlier, Taksin reached an accommodation with his former enemy, Avesunki, the Burmese generalissimo, and just one year after the agreement had been reached, the Thai leaders, temporarily freed of concern about Burma, redirected their armies toward the Lao. In 1826, the Bangkok court perceived the British as the new Burmese and so, recalling diplomatic actions that had proven successful in the past, Siam entered into a treaty with the British that guaranteed mutual non-aggression.6 One year later, as had happened in the 1770s, the Siamese armies spread out into Laos. History appeared to be repeating itself. Siam's perception of threats in the region required that it settle problems with the Lao and the Cambodians first, and thus secure "law and order" in its own backyard. Only after the nearby threats had been neutralized did Bangkok officials begin to maneuver against an enemy of unprecedented power. Testing out their newfound and tenuous relations, Siam and Britain both engaged in military posturing. When Rama II died in 1825 and his successor's government recalled to Bangkok the Siamese troops habitually stationed at the Burmese border, foreign observers speculated about the meaning of the action. "I believe there was some disturbance apprehended, the present king being by many considered an usurper, and consequently not very popular," a British agent in Bangkok informed John Crawfurd on September 2, 1825. 7 For their part, Siamese officials tried to dispel British anxieties concerning the unusual presence of three army divisions in Bangkok by explaining that they were necessary for Rama II's funeral ceremony. This ceremony, however, had been completed on April 29, 1825, and no longer required a large military presence. Resolved to confront the amassed forces with a show of his own, the new British governor of Penang, John Fullerton, displayed his warships before the Siamese navy at Trang. This intimidating tactic seems to have succeeded; on July 31, the Siamese governor of Nakhon Si Thammarat signed an agreement with Britain, accepting its mediation in the Siam-Selangor 4 Brailey (1968), p. 84. Cady (1964), p. 334. For details on these grand serviteurs of King Rama III, see Akin (1969), p. 303; Vella (1957), pp. 3-13; Burney Papers, vol. 1, pt. I, pp. 52ff., particularly p. 80. 5 Thai historians have dismissed Chao Anou by claiming that he used the following words to entice Lao dignitaries to wage war against Bangkok: "The new political and military personnel in Siam are merely youngsters." Thiphakorawong (1961) (T), p. 39. Such gullibility is apocryphal. Acquainted with the intricacies of power and intimate with the power holders in Bangkok, Anou would never have uttered such nonsense to influence senior Lao officials, who were also well-acquainted with their peers in Bangkok. 6 The first article of the Burney treaty is dear on this issue. See Moor (1837), p. 218. 7 Burney Papers, vol. 1, pt. I, p. 2.

Many Provocations and Anou's Response

133

conflict. It was this agreement that paved the way for Henry Burney to come to Bangkok in November to negotiate the non-aggression treaty. But the Siamese did not rely solely on treaties to repel the perceived British threat. Since John Crawfurd's visit, the Siamese had prepared for battle with the British, whose forces they expected to arrive by sea. "The king lately has ordered that all the forts and two hundred war boats should be repaired, and this was effectuated at my departure from Siam,''8 wrote Henry Burney's predecessor. Siam's leaders took other defensive measures to deny the British access to the Menam River in the event of war. The Phra Khlang asserted to a British correspondent unconvincingly that these measures were directed against the Malays.9 However, the British were not really concerned by Thai preparations near the Menam River, since they knew of an alternative route and were confident their boats could break through any barriers erected. "They [the Siamese] have been endeavoring to construct chain works to throw across the river, but they are more likely to betray their ignorance than to place serious obstacles in the way of vessels navigating it," Captain James Low commented. 10 Made confident by their defensive work on the sea coast, the Siamese court placed its permanent armies at Tha Riia and Prachinburi, both locations that provided the Thai armies with indirect access to the Lao territories, but were of no use in repelling any British threat; in fact, Bangkok left its Burmese border defenseless. 11 Situated behind four rivers, Tha Rii.a was particularly suitable as a base for what Henry Burney called "the aggrandizement politics" of Siam.12 Troops at Tha Rii.a and Prachinburi could also control access to the Khorat Plateau. For these strategic reasons, the posts served as the general headquarters for Siamese armies commanders as they prepared their attack against the Lao in 1827, and they served as rear bases for the Bangkok armies that entered the Khorat Plateau on their march to Vientiane. In addition to the armies at Tha Riia and Prachinburi, a third Siamese army spread to three Siamese towns that were strategically located near Vientiane: Phitsanulok, Sukhothai, and Tak. 13 Clearly, Bangkok planned to descend on the Lao. The reign of Rama III had been the most bellicose and aggressive of the entire Bangkok dynasty. In its twenty-eight years of power, the regime encountered at least eleven revolts and multiple foreign wars.l 4 In a prophetic report, dated August 15, 1826, James Low wrote, 8 Burney Papers, vol. 2, pt. 5, p. 14. 9 Burney Papers, vol. 1, pt. 1, p. 4. lO Burney Papers, vol. 1, pt. 1, p. 30; vol. 2, p. 4, p. 8. 11 During the occupation of Khorat by Anou, Rama III ordered the towns bordering Burma, particularly Kanchanaburi, to mobilize all adults and to post them at the frontier with one absolute interdiction: they must not stir up any problems with the Burmese. See Kulab (1971) (T), p. 224. 12 Burney Papers, vol. 2, pt. 4, p. 53. 13 A dispatch from the general staff of the armies of Bangkok, dated April 17, 1827, states that forces from Tak (now Raheng) had already joined the army Bodin called "the great army of the north." In fact, their merger had occurred at least two months earlier (at the latest February 17, 1827), well before the Lao army had reached Khorat. To be ready for battle by this date, the "great army of the north" had to have reached its barracks in northern Siam, near the border of the tributary principality of LanNa, by the end of 1826. See TNL Document Rama III (19), 1189/4. 14 Thompson (1961), p. 297.

134

Paths to Conflagration

Siam is an inspiring race, yet wanting adequate means to realize highly ambitious projects. An increase of these means seems to be an inevitable consequence of the present [British] war with Ava ... Siam will likely also turn her attention to Camboja and Laos, which cannot be supposed capable of resisting her [for] long ... From a military point of view, I should say that the Siamese mode of fighting, if I may allowed to use the expression, is defensive while it is most actively offensive. 15 Siam would insist that it had helped its ally, Britain, gain territorial conquests in Burma, and that therefore Siam must be allowed to expand into Laos and Cambodia to keep pace with Britain. This expansion was encouraged by the British, who preferred that Siam, their reluctant and cumbersome ally, co-signer of the treaty with the defeated Burmese, be kept busy far away from Britain's new possessions in Burma and the Malay Peninsula. Siam did not require much encouragement in this direction, for it had an old score to settle with Laos. The opportunistic, uneasy alliance between Siam and Britain was only one factor complicating the political scenario that Anou would be required to interpret correctly if he hoped to succeed in winning Lao independence. Other forces were also engaged in overt and covert machinations, including the governor of Khorat, who ruled over the territory that lay between Siam and Laos, and Prince Mongkut, the rightful heir to the throne of Rama II, whose own secret ambition to overthrow the usurper, Rama III, apparently prompted him to engage in a series of wily dealings that ultimately worked against Anou. The governor of Khorat may have been most successful at confusing and entrapping Chao Anou. For example, long before the Lao armies left Vientiane to march on Khorat, a high-ranking Siamese official spread the rumor that Lao in Lan Na, Luang Prabang, Vientiane, and Champassak had begun a general uprising. This official started the rumor to provoke a preemptive strike by Siamese troops and thus lead to the fall of Vientiane. The governor of Khorat not only took advantage of rumors such as these, but did his best to agitate the population and provoke a Thai response with rumors and evidence that he himself broadcast. During the hostilities of 1827, the Bangkok armies intercepted a counterfeit letter forged by the governor of Khorat, who had disguised the letter so that it appeared to be correspondence from King Rama III. The letter ordered Siamese forces to march against the Lao. One passage of this letter commands: ... the Lao in the North, the East and the South, as well as Phraya Krai [governor of Khukhan] were in revolt, so we order Phraya Sangkha to take command of the armies of Miiang Pa Dong [Khmer towns under Siamese jurisdiction] to attack the Lao and Phraya Krai. Chaophraya Khorat and Phraya Rarnkharnhreng are waiting for the royal armies. The governors of Sisaket and Surin must be placed under the authority of Phraya Sangkha.16 15 Burney Papers, vol. 2, pt. 4, p. 10. 16 TNL Document Rama III (14) 1188/20. The Bangkok armies would seize all his letters, those of his collaborators, as well as those of his enemies, the Lao. TNL Document Rama III (14) 1188/20.

Many Provocations and Anou's Response

135

The governor of Khorat was impatient with Bangkok's "wait and see" attitude toward the Lao because he feared a Lao decision to stay put and watch the Siamese offensive gathering momentum in Tha Ri.ia, Prachinburi, and Sukhothai. At the same time, he broadcast the rumor far and wide that the Siamese armies were approaching. In this way, he helped set the stage for the cataclysmic events of 1827. The Machiavellian actions of the governor of Khorat are breathtaking. He simultaneously informed Bangkok of the Lao revolt, although it had not yet taken place, and of the readiness of Phraya Sangkha to help Rama III crush the Lao. 17 The governor of Khorat told Bangkok that he had received a letter from Phraya Sangkha informing him that "the prince of Vientiane and the prince of Champassak are in rebellion against His Majesty our King, and have brought down their armies to bum towns and village ... When Chaophraya Khorat arrives with his armies, Phraya Sangkha, Phraya Wisetphakdi, and Phraya Surin will make an alliance with him."18 One should note that the dependable Phraya Sangkha had been nominated to his military post through a fake letter written by none other than the governor of Khorat himself. Having stirred the waters effectively, the governor of Khorat then emptied his territory of its operational troops and took them to Khukhan, using the pretext that he had to settle the dispute raging there. By subsequently declaring Khorat an "open town," defenseless against attack, he tempted Anou to enter the fortress.1 9 The Lao had so many grievances against Khorat that they rushed in when they heard the town was defenseless. In this way, the governor of Khorat helped orchestrate the timing of Chao Anou's movements; Anou brought his armies over the Khorat Plateau, only to be trapped. 20 In the meantime, the governor of Khorat fled and took refuge under the protective umbrella of the Bangkok army based in Prachinburi. 21 Recently, the descendants of the governor of Khorat have tried to rehabilitate the reputation of their ancestor by displacing the responsibility for the events onto a former high official of the Vientiane kingdom, Phagna Akkharat, the man who opened the gates of Khorat to Anou. 22 The governor's descendants have tried to define this small action as the key betrayal that led to the fall of Khorat. Phagna Akkharat was not alone, however. All the elders present in Khorat came to meet Anou as he advanced to the kingdom's fortress, and neither Rama III nor Mongkut ever pardoned them. 23 A historian of Rama III's reign reported that the Siamese king never forgave the governor of Khorat for having "surrendered" this stronghold, which was Bangkok's only bastion in the area official documents call "Hua miiang lao fai tawan ok"(the Lao towns in the East). 24 A curious version of these events appears in the Vietnamese annals, which report that at the very beginning of the conflict, the 17 Ruam riiang miiang nakhon ratchasima (1968) (T), p. 39. 18 Ruam riiang miiang nakhon ratchasima (1968) (T), p. 39. 19 The fortress had been constructed by French engineers in the style of Vauban. 20 Thiphakorawong (1961) (T), p. 39. · 21 TNL Document Rama III (10) 1188/20, Despatch of Chaophraya Phra Khlang, AprilS, 1827; Document Rama III (14) 1188/20, Memorandum of April6, 1827; see also Ruam riiang miiang nakhon ratchasima (1968) (T), p. 36. 22 Phagna Akkharat had been a prisoner in 1779 and was authorized to settle at Miiang Pak, now Pak Thong Chai, a half day's walk from Khorat. See Ruam riiang miiang nakhon ratchasima (1968) (T), p. 60. 23 Ruam riiang miiang nakhon ratchasima (1968) (T), p. 60. See Dhawaj (1980) (T), pp. 89-90. 24 Thiphakorawong (1961) (T); Prathip (1982) (T), pp. 55-56.

136

Paths to Conflagration

governor of Khorat sided with the Lao and only afterward reversed his allegiances. 25 Probably the Vietnamese confused the governor of Khorat with other officials, such as Phraya Yokkrabat or even Phraya Plat, who at first sided with Anou and afterward turned against him. Consequently, the crisis of 1827 triggered a political struggle in which the governor of Khorat maintained a very high profile. However, the outcome did not benefit him or the Lao, but led to suppression of all internal dissent by Siam. It also unified Bangkok's ruling class, which had been riddled by succession disputes. The upheavals of 1827 forced this class into consensus with King Rama III, an action that ultimately helped legitimize the newly established Bangkok dynasty.26 The 1827 crisis occurred in a political context further complicated by the frustrated ambition of a high-ranking Bangkok royal, Prince Mongkut, who had been denied the throne by Chetsadabodin's accession in 1824. A Thai academic from Bangkok adamantly believed that Mongkut used the imminent Lao uprising to create confusion and regain power. 27 The Lao action caused Rama III to lose face and may have ultimately cost him the throne. In any event, Rama III's power and prestige suffered during the conflict, for it gained him a reputation as an oppressive king and undercut his authority. In the process, it ruined the image he had painstakingly attempted to establish at the beginning of his reign as an "open-minded, liberal" king, who would reign without initiating a blood bath of the kind his immediate predecessors had ordered. Prince Mongkut whispered to the missionary Tomlin that the holocaust committed against the Lao irremediably tarnished Rama III's reign.28Jt is certainly possible that Mongkut himself helped spread such rumors whenever the opportunity presented itself. 29 On March 12, 1827, Nai In, Nai Nak, and Nai Bun presented themselves as "Lao of Khorat" to Anou's armies encamped at Khorat. These three special envoys-or spies-had a long conversation with Anou, during which Anou gave them his version of events. His report was shaped to please his invisible audience-an audience of Prince Mongkut' s secret allies inside the Bangkok ruling class who might sympathize with acts of resistance potentially troubling to Rama III-in the hopes of exploiting existing factional differences. The three "Lao of Khorat" circulated freely among the Lao forces, where they noticed the Lao's lack of material and human 25 Nguyon Le Thi 1977) (V), p. 59. 26 Rama III's aunt protested against Anou, and the hustling poetess Khun Phum, a wellknown opponent of Rama III, could not resist helping her rail against Anou. Narinthonthewi (1963) (T), p. 36; Schweisguth (1951), p. 266. Some foreigners resident in Bangkok took sides according to their business interests, such as Robert Hunter with Rama III. Neale (1852), pp. 48-52. The Royal Chronicle of the Third Reign obligingly praised Rama III as "Chosen by God." Thiphakorawong (1961) (T). 27 Interview in Bangkok, Thailand, September 13, 1985. The Thai academic asked to remain anonymous, since he believes the issue remains sensitive. He affirms he is in possession of the documents necessary to support his assertion. 28 Tomlin (1832), p. 57. 29 In fact, although he ostentatiously retreated from the world by donning the saffron robe of a monk, Mongkut's preoccupations were desperately worldly: he was on a quest for power. Cowan (1967). He assisted, for example, at the famous council at which Rama III and Bowon argued over whether or not Siam should sign the Burney treaty. Burney Papers, vol. 3, pt. 5, p.

12.

Many Provocations and Anou's Response

137

resources.30 The "Lao of Khorat" were servants of Prince Itsaranurak, who had pressured Mongkut to challenge Rama III openly in order to reclaim the power that was rightfully his.3 1 Relying on the testimony of Prince Damrong Rajanubhab, historian Hong Lysa writes, Mongkut ... at first did not completely acquiesce to the nomination of Rama III as king. He consulted his closest relatives on the wisdom of staking his claim to the throne then. An uncle, Krommamiin Chinorot, and a halfbrother, Krommamiin Dechadison, counseled that the timing then was not right. His maternal uncle, Prince ltsaranurak, who was the brother of Prince Phithakmontri, however, encouraged him to do so. Mongkut followed the political assessment of the former. 32 It is difficult to know when Mongkut decided against challenging the accession of Rama III, and difficult to know exactly what surreptitious means he used to weaken or discredit the king after that. Internecine struggles among the Bangkok elite were not unusual, and the aristocrats involved certainly understood that a foreign crisis might be used as a provocation to achieve internal goals. Indeed, Prince Mongkut appears to have entertained the idea that he might benefit from a Lao uprising and a British invasion, for prior to 1827 he occasionally posed as a Lao sympathizer and an English sympathizer. John Crawfurd, who had negotiated in Bangkok in 1822, reported a meeting with two Siamese mandarins who informed him of their desire to put Siam under British influence; in order to attain this aim, they said, they planned to raise twenty-thousand men.33 The potential allies who unveiled themselves to Crawfurd were none other than Mongkut and his brother Chudamani, legitimate sons of Rama II and leaders of the anti-Rama III clique.34 These two men also had links with Laos. Mongkut himself married a Lao princess who was Anou's niece, and Chudamani (known by the title "Phra Pin Klao") had 120 spouses, of whom half were Lao and half were Siamese.35 In fact, Chudamani was a fan of things Lao. He constructed a Lao-style pavilion in the Ban Sittha district, learned to play the Lao reed mouth-organ known as khene, and performed Lao comedy-singing. "It was said that if one did not actually see his royal person, one would have thought the singer were a real Lao."36 30 TNL Document Rama III (9) 1188/20, Testimony of Nai In, Nai Nak, and Nai Bun, March 31,1827.

31 TNL Document Rama III (105)/34. It is significant that the death of Prince ltsaranurak in 1830 is recorded in a Thai National Library file titled "The Vientiane revolt," and not under a separate entry 32 Hong Lysa (1984), p. 23. Contemporaries found relations between Rama III and Mongkut extremely bitter; the reason Mongkut took the robe is different than the assessment of presentday Thai historiography. Jancigny, for example, argued that Mongkut became a monk in order to avoid bowing before Rama III, whom he considered a usurper. Jancigny (1850), p. 420. 33 Burney Papers, vol. 2, pt. 5, p. 14. This figure did match the number of soldiers Anou was able to muster when the Lao armies spread over the Khorat Plateau. 34 Gutzlaff (1834), pp. 66-67. 35 Bastian (1866), p. 552. 36 Thiphakorawong (1965) (T), p. 355; Krom Silpakom, Prachum phongsawadan (T), vol. 9, pt. 26, pp. 156-57; Ruschenberger (1970), pp. 37-39.

138

Paths to Conflagration

There is no firm evidence to prove that these two disinherited princes sincerely favored either the British or the Lao cause, but fragmented reports of their actions suggest that they were engaged in a number of courtly schemes, some of which may have been contradictory. The personal preferences and power struggles among the Bangkok elite helped shape the destiny of the kingdom of Vientiane and of the Lao during this epoch. In March of 1827, immediately after Lao armies seized Khorat, two fires ravaged Bangkok and devoured a number of Siamese war boats; those same fires ignited rumors that the British were about to invade Bangkok by sea. Looking back, historians can only wonder if certain members of court were busily feeding those rumors, for the disaster forced Bowon, who was camping with his armies at Tha Riia, to return to the capital. 29. BREAKING SPIRITS, CRUSHING BODIES

The Vietnamese emperor, Minh Mang, wrote the following report to Rama III: Chao Anou of Vientiane has launched hostilities against Siam for the following reason: when he came to Bangkok to pay homage to the king [Rama III], several Thai mandarins seized this opportunity to insult him by their acts and words. The king's older brothers of different mothers, still young, pJ.otted to humiliate and oppress Chao Anou under various pretexts, solely because he is Lao. From his perspective, as the descendent of a long lineage of a reigning dynasty, Chao Anou could not bear these offenses coming from very young princes and could bear even less the affronts and indignities from the grand Thai mandarins. Returning to Vientiane, he soon mobilized his army to launch a war to avenge him of all the ills with which the Thai had relentlessly overwhelmed him. But Chao Anou was cheated, for he was duped by the Lao mandarins who were in cahoots with the Thai ... 37 Despite its restrained language, this letter from the court of Hue emphasized the unbearable character of the situation Bangkok created for Anou. Minh Mang's letter mentions that Anou was victimized simply because he was Lao, and other contemporaries, such Edmund Roberts, the American special envoy, used the same words. 3S The Reverend Karl F. Gutzlaff was so convinced that Anou had been driven to war by Siam's provoking actions that he claimed Anou was "without any intention of waging war with the king [of Siam]-an event for which he was totally unprepared."39 Edmund Roberts, highly in favor at the court of Bangkok, also reported on the offenses Siam engineered to outrage Anou: "It seems, in 1827, the Siamese government oppressed the subjects of one of the Lao tributary princes, Chow-Vin-Chan [Chao Vientiane], to such a degree that he was obliged to take up arms in defense of his rights, against the neighbouring Siamese government, this was the point to which the Siamese government wished to force him, for the purpose of 37 Kulap (1971) (T), vol. 2, p. 750. 38 Roberts (1837), p. 282. 39 Gutzlaff (1834), p. 76; for the same view, Garnier (1870-71), p. 388.

Many Provocations and Anou's Response

139

taking into possession his territory." 40 The contemporary chronicles of these events, generally originating from the Khorat Plateau, lamented Chao Anou's fate.41 While it is clear that Siam's aggressions played a decisive role in provoking Anou to active rebellion, it would be difficult to agree with Gutzlaff that Anou entertained little thought of resistance before this time. We have seen that Anou showed an interest in constructing pagodas throughout the Lao territories to signify his connection to the population in these areas and in coaxing allies to his side at least a decade before 1825. Linked in spirit to his rebel brother Nanthasen, he was not a man to swallow insults and aggressions happily. (One of these insults, the impressment of Anou's son to lead a crew of Lao laborers in felling and transporting heavy sugar palm trees, is described in greater detail below.) During the visit to Bangkok described in the letter, Anou registered dissatisfaction with his treatment by curtailing his acts of obeisance traditionally due to the king of Siam. Before taking leave for Vientiane, Anou paid parting homage to Rama III, but refrained from performing other traditional (compulsory) courtesy visits. As the poet puts it, "One must not lower one's eyes before those one despise." 42 A number of writers have interpreted Chao Anou's acts of resistance as foolhardy gestures of a monarch pursuing a personal point of honor to recover what in Lao language is called "piap." 43 For example, Martin John Philip Barber has written, If retaining one's appropriate status in traditional rural society involved

stability and gradual progress, status levels in the cities were likely to be far more volatile. The fluctuations of fortune to which the Lao kings were subjected inevitably called into question their ability to maintain the image of supreme status. An attack on the king's piap could not be allowed to go unchallenged ... A classic example of when concern for piap caused a king to embark on the most foolhardy exploit was Chao Anou's attack on Bangkok in 1827. Chao Anou felt he had been insulted during a visit to the court of Rama III, and could think of no way to re-establish his piap other than to launch the biggest possible army against Siam. 44 40 Roberts (1837), p. 282. Roberts, the American envoy, described his reception by members of

the Court of Siam in this way: "No embassy from a foreign country ever had so favorable and honorable a reception as ours, marked at the same time with the most extraordinary despatch ever known." Roberts, pp. 83-84. 41 See Chan (T); Lam phiin wiang pen phasa thai. See an identical report from American envoy Roberts (1837), p. 156, and a recent analysis by Prathip (1982) (T), pp. 38-39. Lao high-ranking officials taken prisoner after the war and held in a guarded residence at Wat Sam Pliim (Bangkok), testified to Gutzlaff that "In their conversation, they cherish the hope that they shall be sent back to their native country, relying on the compassion of His Siamese Majesty, who forgives even when no offense has been given." (Emphasis added.) Gutzlaff, (1834), p. 78. 42 Suares (1948), p. 38. 43 Piap means honor, face, prestige, social status. 44 Barber (1979), p. 297.

140

Paths to Conflagration

Other recent historians have portrayed Anou as both aggressive and foolish. Eiland and Dammen, for example, envisioned him as the man who "launch[ed] a quixotic [attack] of his o~m," 45 and embarked on "a foolhardy enterprise."46 Though his own status and honor were undoubtedly important to Anou because they contributed directly to his power as a leader, his acts of resistance cannot be attributed simply to personal irritability and pride. He reacted as a representative of the Lao to insults and ill-treatment that had accumulated against his people as a result of regional power struggles and prejudices encouraged among members of Bangkok's ruling class. As contemporaries noted, the Siamese ruling class assumed Siam stood on the top of a hierarchy of nations. They actively indulged in "Bangkok chauvinism" 47 that targeted Siam's own neighbors, such as the Lao, for ridicule. Apparently, anti-Lao passions reached their zenith with the accession of Rama III to the throne; even the Thai patriarch of the Buddhist monkhood, Prince Chinorot, was solicited to promulgate descriptions of the Lao as the "enemy" in reports of historic episodes. 48 The discourse used to indict Anou in the 1820s, a discourse that continues to the present time, condemns the Lao leader for daring to stand up to Bangkok. The governor of Ayudhya, in his report to Rama III on the presence of the Lao king at Khorat in 1827, called Anou and his followers "rubbish." 49 The Siamese minister of foreign affairs, in a letter to his counterpart at the court of Hue, upped the stakes when he called them "blackguards."50 Fifteen years after his death, Anou was called a "rascal" by a Thai commander. 51 Such invective was not reserved for Anou alone, but directed at the Lao people as weU.52 The term "Lao" remains one which carries "rustic" or "provincial" connotations. Nonetheless, a stubborn pride prompts descendants of Chao Anou's countrymen to continue identifying themselves with their ancestors, though such identification has been discouraged by a number of interested parties and authorities. In the 1820s, the inhabitants of both sides of the Mekong called themselves "Lau Che-ung Mai, Lau Che-ung In, . . . Lamp'hoon, Sup'han, Lau Lo-ung of We-ung Chan ... " according to James Low. Even at the end of the nineteenth century, many Lao descendants were willing to claim the name "Lao," as noted by James McCarthy and Warington Smyth, even though the term "Lao" was forbidden in Siamese official documents and :in the designation of territories that were formerly part of Lao kingdoms. 53 At a:tl times, however, the struggle to maintain a Lao identity since 1827 45 Eiland (1983), p. 50.

46 Dommen (1986), p. 27. 47 Kochapun (1980), p. 21; Crawfurd Papers, p. 44. 48 See Schweisguth (1951). 49 Ruam riiang miiang nakhon ratchasima (1968) (T), p. 35. 50 Ruam riiang miiang nakhon ratchasima (1968) (T), p. 44. 5l Chotmaihet kieokap khamen lae yuan nai ratchakan thi sam (T), pp. 60-61. 52 See Chan (T); Thao lao kham. Phiin chao ratsavong (1973) (L); Phunphit (1983) (T), pp. 18-19; Mayoury (1987) (L); Prani (1982) (T), pp. 185-86. Even Mongkut, ascending the throne, branded the Lao as "inhabitants of the forest," in other words, savage. See Thiphakorawong (1965), p. 5. 53 McCarthy (1900), pp. 129, 155; Smyth (1898), vol. 1, p. 194. In fact, in some areas, the inhabitants still called themselves "Lao" or even "Bao Lao Vientiane." See Taupin (1888), p. 63; Lt. Chevalier, "Etude au sujet de la rive droite du Mekong," to Resident Superieur au Laos, August 14, 1903 in RSL-FIO, Archives nationales, Aix-en-Provence, France. King Chulalongkom, in 1888, also noted the different Lao perspective. "[We] must try to please

Many Provocations and Anou's Response

141

has been opposed by Thai domination and a strong current of misconceptions about the Lao people. But the struggle between the Lao and the Thai, a struggle that culminated in the events of 1827 and continues to influence the peoples of both countries to this day, was not solely instigated by courtly snubs and name-calling. Over the years, Bangkok had also aggressed against the Lao by forcing them to labor on lifethreatening construction projects. For example, in 1813, Siamese leaders ordered some Lao to build a dam at Ang Thong, at the highest section of the Bang Kceo canal, in order to redirect the Menam Chaophraya River. The Lao were forced to perform this gigantic task under the supervision of Phraya Aphaiphuthon. 54 Just after John Crawfurd departed from Bangkok, the Thai mustered Vientiane Lao to erect defensive structures at the mouth of the Menam Chaophraya designed to prevent an attack by the British fleet. These strategic works were supervised by Prince Chetsadabodin. In a report on September 2, 1825, Henry Burney said that this fortress thereafter was commonly referred to as the "Lao fortress." 55 Such endeavors were outrageously costly in terms of manpower and human lives. Contemporaries confirm the toll. Henry Burney wrote on December 2, 1826, ... it is well known that the service which the King of Siam demands from a portion of the males is most destructive to human life. This service is not limited to four or six months ... but according to the caprice of the Sovereign and his ministers, and the exigency of any public works. We were assured that the construction of the building in which the remains of the late King were burnt and which had occupied the workmen upwards of twelve months, had cost several hundreds of lives, and that no less than five hundred men had died last year in the labor of transporting to Bangkok from the interior an enormous tree intended for a large boat for the present King.56 Conscripted Lao laborers, truly drudges, had to provide their own food and equipment. Their fate was worse than miserable. 57 But conscription of the subjects of the kingdom of Vientiane was an integral part of a system that John Crawfurd described on April 3, 1823: "The system by which the population is organized and arranged for the purpose of exacting forced services from the people available, forms them [Luang Prabang], by explaining that Thai and Lao belong to the same soil. ... France is merely another who looks down on the Lao race as savages. Whatever the French do to please the rulers of Luang Prabang is merely bait on a hook ... although the Lao habitually regard Lao as We and Thai as They, in cases when only two peoples are considered, such as when comparing the Thai and French, they may regard Thai as We and the French as They." Jiraporn Stapanawatana, "The 1893 Crisis," Sri Nakarinwirot University (Prasanmit, 1980), pp. 411-412, quoted by Thongchai (1987), p. 162. Other observers perceived the Lao as separate from the Thai as well. In the mid-nineteenth century, a Cambodian still spoke of the "Laos-Iantao, Laos-Khong, Laos-ubong" in these territories. See Low (1851), p. 504; Lettre sur le Cambodge par un cambodgien (1872), p. 57. 54 Hubbard (1977), p. 33; Terwiel (1983), p. 108. 55 Burney Papers, vol. 1, pt. 1, p. 31; see Terwiel's discussion (1989) of where the forced laborers came from. 56 Burney Papers, vol. 2, pt. 4, p. 52. 57 Burney Papers, vol. 2, pt. 4, p. 226.

142

Paths to Conflagration

the most important object of Siamese administration."58 Crawfurd raised this issue again in a dispatch dated June 27,1823: The forced services, although not in proportion productive to the State, are of all others the heaviest tax upon the people. The most mischievous ingenuity, indeed, could hardly devise a scheme more destructive of industrious habits and adverse to public prosperity than a system which devotes, as this virtually does, a one-third portion of the manhood of almost all its subjects to the arbitrary, prodigal and capricious will of the servants of the Government. 59 In May 1825, when Anou came down for Rama II's funeral ceremony, his entourage was requisitioned by Rama III to provide laborers to fell sugar palm trees: a filthy, difficult job. Then these Lao laborers were ordered to drag the trees by hand from Suphanburi to Samut Prakan. The leader commanded to direct this forced labor crew in 1826 was none other than the crown prince of the kingdom of Vientiane, Anou's son Chao Ratsavong. 60 No other tributary states were required to perform such labor. On the contrary, the king of Luang Prabang's sons were integrated into the pages' unit in Bangkok's royal palace. The rulers of Chiang Mai had their ranks raised and were even authorized by the newly enthroned Thai king, Rama III, to repatriate some of their compatriots who had been forced to settle in Siam after the 1770s. Lao oral tradition asserts that the martyrs who hauled sugar palm trees one hundred and twenty kilometers left a deep furrow that is still visible today. The conscripted Lao laborers then had to drive these logs, linked together by iron hoops, into the sea bed. The Siamese intended the log fence to prevent an invasion through the mouth of the Menam Chaophraya by the British warships. The torture to which the Lao were subjected and the harassment in 1826 of the Lao prince, Chao Ratsavong, helped ignite the conflagration of 1827. This prince had come from Vientiane to present tribute from his country; he had not expected to be kept as a virtual slave. 61 His supervisor in 1826 would be none other than Bowon himself, called Phra Banthun by the Lao, a title which means "the official who receives petitions in the first instance." 62 The clash between Ratsavong and Bowon was recounted in the Vientiane chronicles as follows: Chao Rats.avong went to pay a visit to Phra Nangklao [Rama III]. During the meeting, Phra Banthun came and asked the visitor to provide him with sisuk bamboo so that he could use it for the works obstructing the mouth of the Menam, works that prevented vessels from entering the channel. Phra Banthun commanded him to dock bamboo at the landing pier of the port which was located near the palace. Chao Ratsavong and [Lao] inhabitants 58 Crawfurd Papers, p. 122. 59 Crawfurd Papers, p. 127. 60 Traduction de l'histoire de Vien-chan, pp. 18-19. 61

This story from the Lao chronicles was indirectly confirmed by intelligence gathered by D. E. Malloch, which was routed to him from Bangkok on November 4, 1826. Burney Papers, vol. 2, pt. 4, p. 226. 62 Traduction de l'histoire de Vien-chan, pp. 18-19. See also Burney Papers, vol. 2, pt. 4, p. 11.

Many Provocations and Anou's Response

143

could requisition five thousand trunks of bamboo that he assembled in rafts and floated down the river with such log driving that it could not be stopped at the place required [by Phra Banthun]. The stream pushed it far away. The bamboo raft could be moored only at the shore of Wat Cheng. Chao Ratsavong came to inform Phra Banthun of the regrettable incident; Phra Banthun was wildly furious to the point of insulting his messenger, who came away very displeased. Fighting might have ensued between them had the king of Siam not intervened. To prevent renewed disputes, His Majesty ordered Chao Ratsavong to return to Vientiane.63 A second version of this feud circulated in a different copy of the Vientiane chronicle, quoted often by French authors. 64 This story relates that the "Ratsavong of Vientiane had to lead the forces recruited for Siam to Bangkok; he was exposed to the mockeries of the Siamese who deemed his workforce laughable. Stung by the laughter, Ratsavong testily rebutted them. The Siamese then decided to attack Vientiane."65 Lao oral tradition elaborates on it by romanticizing the incident: Chao Ratsavong and his followers had completed their work well before the deadline. The Siamese therefore taunted them with jeers such as, "look at the Lao with the white eyes [cowardly] who think they have done well by achieving their task before us." Choking with indignation, Ratsavong even refused the meal prepared for him by his sister who was in Rama III's harem. In his hurry to reach Vientiane, he slipped on the embankment of the Khlong Sam Seep canal, which ever since has been called Ban Phalat Lorn [village of the slide].66 A British version, told by an engineer named McCarthy who was well acquainted with Prince Damrong Rajanubhab, placed even more blame on Bangkok. This writer collected facts in the 1880s and rendered them as follows:

The story relates that when Chao Anou was governor of Wiang Chan in about 1823, his son was called to Bangkok and to supervise the men summoned to assist in digging a canal to connect Tachin to Bangkok. It would appear that the official in charge of the undertaking, after kicking the young man, added a flogging, and when the youth returned home, his father, indignant at the insult, rebelled.67 63 Traduction de l'histoire de Vien-chan, p. 19. 64 Malpuech (1920), pp. 5-6; Marchand (1948), p. 142; Archaimbault (1967), p. 580. 65 Charuwan (T), p. 3. 66 Interview of Lung Suk (sixty-nine years old), Vientiane, November 10, 1986. 67 McCarthy (1900), p. 37. In an 1888 article, McCarthy situated the events around 1825, not 1823, as quoted above. Relying on this source, Hubbard wrote, "King Phra Nang Klao, or Rama III, ascended to the throne on his father's death in 1824. Well aware of the value to the state of inland shipping and trade, Rama III ordered several new canals dug and had old canals and river beds dredged and widened. According to one source, this ambitious program led to one of the major rebellions of his reign, the Laotian revolt of 1826-1827." Hubbard (1977), p. 34. After quoting McCarthy, Hubbard speculated about the canal Chao Ratsavong could have worked on: "No available reference suggests what canal project may have been in

144

Paths to Conflagration

The ultimate version placed the event in the context that Henry Burney, quoted earlier, particularly noted. This version was narrated by Phra Chao Ratsavong Theu Charatsphonpatithane: When Ratsavong had to pull down a tree of a special kind required for the cremation of Krom Somdet Phra Srisulalai [Rama III's mother], a grave incident occurred. Following the incident, Ratsavong returned precipitously to Vientiane. At the time of his departure, Ratsavong, standing on the back of his elephant, harangued in Lao [language] the peasants who were there, saying: "In Miiang Thai, we have no rice to eat nor fish bones to nibble. By going back to Miiang Lan Sang we will have perfumed rice and delicious fish." Arriving back in Vientiane, he pressed Chao Anou, "I do not want to be a slave to the Thai any more. Radical measures must be taken to put an end to this situation. What do you think about it, father?" 68 Lao chroniclers add to Ratsavong's address when they quote him saying, "Even if the Thai are very intelligent, they say the Lao are idiots. Thus I want now to let these Thai know what one of these idiots can do. I abhor these Thai who tyrannize us."69 Confronting the general terror felt by the whole religious, military, and political establishment of the Lao Vientiane kingdom in response to the suggestion that they fight back the Thai when the capital had just experienced a natural cataclysm, Anou exclaimed to his subjects, "If you want to stay here [in Vientiane], do it! Both my son and I will go to face the Thai." 70 Emerging from all these stories and facts is a single outline: forced labor, ostracism, and exhaustion. Even some Thai historians are shocked when they look back at the treatment inflicted on the Lao of Vientiane. Toem Wiphakphotchanakit argues that the repeated forced labor was a catalyst for "the uprising to recover independence" by the Lao in 1827: Chao Anouwong certainly suffered the pangs endured by the Lao who had been forced to dig canals that edified the capital, Krungthep Phra Maha Nakhon, under the reign of Rama I, and to plant in the ocean a stupa at Samut Prakan under the following reign?l This gigantic stupa is called "Phra Samut Chedi" and its construction was credited to Rama III in these terms: "Worthy of mention among his contributions is the construction of a chedi [stupa] on an island at the entrance of the Chaophraya River. The chedi symbolizes Thailand as a Buddhist country."72 progress in 1825, but the above story would indicate maintenance on the Mahachai Canal." On Lao forced labor and canals in Bangkok, see Sujit (1987) (T) and Sagnan (1988) (L). 68 Phlainoi (1984) (T), p. 246; Chotmaihet nakhon ratchasima (1985) (T), p. 260. 69 A quotation from the account Thao lao kham. Phiin chao ratsavong. See also the translation in Archaimbault (1980), p. 132. 70 Chotmaihet ratchakan thi sam (1987) (T), v. 3, p. 113. 71 Teem (1970) (T), vol. 1, p. 356. 72 Surat (1984) (T). The quote is from the Thailand Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1979), p. 2.

Many Provocations and Anou's Response

145

30. ANNEXATION OF THE LAO MUANG THROUGH TATTOOING

With Rama II gone, Prince Chetsadabodin (who soon became Rama III) decided on a measure that had serious consequences and provoked a chain of reactions in the international politics of the Southeast Asian peninsula. He insisted on tattooing his subjects for political purposes, "an event which has few parallels in even the most tyrannical political systems in human history." 73 The tattooing was accomplished by a stiletto, red with fire, that branded a Siamese census number and the name of a person's town on the wrist of every inhabitant from every town that the Short Chronicles of Vientiane had designated as "Miiang Lao." 74 For the first time, Bangkok departed from traditional policies that limited the range of a Thai census to areas considered within Siam proper, that is within the Menam Chaophraya basin. The towns thus dragged under Siam's jurisdiction by the tattooing procedure were still called "Hua miiang lao fai tawan ok" in the official documents of Rama III's reign. 75 These "Lao towns in the East" spanned the areas where inhabitants spoke Lao. Chao Anou called them "Hua miiang lao" and referred to their residents as "Banda lao thang puang," excluding those of Khorat.76 When gathering intelligence on the balance of power between the Lao and the Siamese in 1826-1827, Luang Prabang's King Manthathurat sent scouting parties to the towns bordering Siam proper, such as Phimai (near Samrit), Paklai, and Nan. He referred to them as Lao towns. 77 For contemporaries, there was no doubt that the areas where the Siamese tattooing agents intervened did not belong to Siam but were located in Lao country. Lao historical annals substantiate the traditional inclusion of such towns and territories as Lao. Though they lived in an agrarian culture which favored oral tradition, the Lao were fond of recording territorial demarcations. Their most ancient annals invariably included a document called "Kong din," literally "territorial wheel," that enumerated the natural border markers surrounding their territory?B Lao chroniclers located the limits of the kingdom under Chao Anou as follows: " ... on the Mekong River bank, in the west, they reach Dou Song Ton-On Song Khouai and continue to Sam Moo, frontier of Khon Lat [Khorat]."79 The Siamese outpost at 73 Trocki (1980), p. 68; Terwiel states, "It [the tattooing] has bearing upon the system of administration as well as the class structure and class friction." Terwiel (1979), p. 157. 74 Chotmaihet yo miiang wiangchan (1969) (T), p. 136. Along with this drastic measure, Rama Ill ordered a follow up edition of the Treatise on the Art of War. Wales wrote, "In 1825, at the beginning of the reign of Rama Ill, it was decided to produce a new edition of the Treatise of the Art of War, owing to the confusion and neglect that had overtaken this branch of learning since Bangkok had become the capital." Wales (1952), p. 122.1t would also be under this reign that the inhabitants of the Northeast areas had to learn the Bangkok standard language in the textbook "ko ka" or "prathom ko ka." Paitoon (1988), pp. 89-90. 75 Theerachai (1984) (T), pp. 1, 106. 76 Ruam riiang miiang nakhon ratchasima (1968) (T), pp. 27-28. 77 Chotmaihet riiang prap khabot wiangchan (1926) (T), pp. 64-65. 78 Lafont (1988); Saveng (1980); Bang lao. Bang chum (L). 79 Traduction de l'histoire de Vien-chan, p. 18. This border mark ("Three trees of Mai Dou and the three burrows of the groundhog"), located at the watershed line of the mountain Phu Khouaioon, was already the demarcation between A yudhya and Lan Sang. This natural marker was still visible in the reign of King Rama VII. The monk Chao Khun Ubali, accused by some of fostering a Pan-Lao movement, had had a twin Buddha erected at this place as a reminder that the traditional Thai-Lao border was here. The twin seated Buddha is called

146

Paths to Conflagration

Khorat constituted an anomaly in an otherwise Lao area; in the past, the demarcation line dividing Siam and Laos ran along the mountainous chain of Dong Phraya Fai called "the chain of Laos" by Western authors of the nineteenth century.80 The political map of this time was clear, not only to the governments of the two countries, but also to the common person. For instance, at the end of 1827, when the Vietnamese embassy was preparing to meet the chief of the Siamese occupation forces in Vientiane, the Vietnamese diplomat reported to his emperor: ... a Siamese soldier came to deliver papers and a pass to HoVan Chat [the Vietnamese head of the delegation] as well as a bit of glutinous rice. HoVan Chat took the occasion to question the Lao soldiers assigned by the Siamese to protect Ho Van Chat. These soldiers answered him that almost all of those who were at the Siamese camps at Lac Hoan [Lakhon or Nakhon Phanom] originated from the twelve towns of the country of Ten Thousand Elephants [the kingdom of Vientiane] including: Miiang Hoi At [Roi-Et], Con Lai [Kalasin], Miiang Van Van Pha Kham, Miiang Pha Cai, Obon [Ubon], Khamma-Lai [Khemmarat], Con Kien [Khon Kren], Miiang Dong, Miiang Nam, Miiang Man Giang-Cat, Miiang Muc-Da-han [Mukdahan]. The recruits from those towns are sent to different places under the command of Siamese chiefs. 81 During the same period, the Phra Khlang of Siam addressed a letter to his counterpart in Hue in which he made the same identifications as those soldiers "debriefed" by HoVan Chat. The Phra Khlang wrote that when heading to Khorat, Anou had seized "khropkhrua hua milang lao" [families of the Lao towns], and had "encircled Miiang Nakhon Ratchasima and forced the inhabitants to leave their homes." The Phra Khlang dated the beginning of Anou's revolt from the moment he entered Khorat, not before; before then, Anou was still in Lao areas. The Phra Khlang identified the provenance of numerous armies converging on Vientiane to crush Anou as "troops from the Thai towns in the north, the west, the east and the Lao towns of the black bellies" [Hua milang thai fai niia, fai tawan tok, tawan ok lcr hua miiang lao phung dam]. He was right, since all these attacking armies were from the traditional Siamese areas in the Central Menam Chaophraya basin, excepting the people of LanNa or "the black bellies." 82 The conflagration of 1827 thus reveals a Thai-Lao opposition rooted in territorial realities and indicates that the forced symbolic and political appropriation of Lao areas, engineered by Rama III, led to a collision between the Lao and Thai worlds. An official document taken from Bangkok in January 1827 by a British arms trader, D. E. Malloch, demonstrates the ultimate step in the process of "Siamization." According to the document, Laos was "Phra Ngam." (Interview with Maha Vangkham Suryadet, age sixty-three years, Vientiane, June 24, 1987.) 80 Gutzlaff (1834), p. 76; Moor (1837), p. 193; Taberd (1838); Folliot (1889), p. 22; more generally, Gagneux (1976) and Stemstein (1985). Until the 1850s, Le Grand de la Liraye still referred to the "Chain of Laos." See Sylvestre (1889), pp. 15, 40; Cortembert and De Rosny (1862), p. 8; Roberts (1857),p. 310. 81 Ngo Cao Lang (1977) (V), p. 80. 82 Ruam riiang miiang nakhon ratchasima (1968) (T), p. 41; Chotmaihet riiang prap khabot wiangchan (1926) (T), p. 52.

Many Provocations and Anou's Response

147

no longer peopled by Lao, but by Siamese and Chinese: in this way, the official records obliterated the Lao people. Names of Provinces, Cities, Towns, Villages

Siamese

Chinese

Miiang Wiang Chan Miiang Pasuk [Champassak] Miiang Luang Prabang Miiang Chiang Mai

150,000 7,500

2,000 450

14,500 75,000

450 900

Laos

CochinChinese

Cambojeans, etc.

Source: "Names of Provinces, Principalities, Cities, Towns and Villages of Siam, with the population of each consisting of Siamese, Chinese, Peguers, Cambojeans, Tavoyans, Cochin Chinese, Laos, Malays, Moors and Christians taken from the Public Records ... " Burney Papers, vol. 3, pt. 2, p. 357. It is interesting that this document acknowledged the existence of Cambodians. One of their towns, "Miiang Battabong" [Battambang] was said to be peopled by 150 Siamese, 1,500 Chinese, and nine thousand Cambodians; similarly, the Malay town, "Miiang Calatan," was credited with 2,500 Siamese and five thousand Malays. Yet, Bangkok refused to acknowledge the discrete existence of Lao inhabitants. In short, the Bangkok court's attitude toward the Lao was specific and deliberate. Years later, a Thai researcher revealed the continued success of the early nineteenth-century policy to deny the existence of Lao people when the researcher wrote: "Laos is indeed an expression purely geographic which corresponds to no ethnographic reality." 83 Siam's extensive tattooing campaign, mounted throughout traditionally Lao territories, had an economic aim: to introduce the Thai fiscal administration into Lao areas. Tribute and tax payments were calculated on the basis of the adult male population registered by tattooing. Payment was made in gold, silver, or cardamoms; as mentioned above, the bankrupt Siamese state also required forced labor from the Lao.84 The general pauperization of the Lao, particularly of the local nobles, resulted directly from this move. The order that men in Lao territory be tattooed constituted a turning point in the history of Lao-Thai relations, for it reduced the status of Lao principalities and kingdoms to the level of Siamese provinces. Thus, a high-ranking official of Khorat would refer to the "province of Vientiane,"85 while his superior, the governor of Khorat, would boast to Chao Anou: "Between you and me there exists no difference, for both of us are equally subjects of the king of Siam." 86 83 Subamonkala (1940) (T), p.l2. 84 Burney Papers, vol. 3, pt. 2, p. 257; Malloch (1852), p. 72. 85 Theerachai (1984) (T), pp. 80-81, 87. 86 Theerachai (1984) (T), pp. 76-87. Siam's policy of transforming tributary states into adopted provinces has been noted. According to one source, it was "in the Siamese interest, for example, to erode the autonomy and, where possible, the territory of the prathetsarat [tributary state]. One way in which such erosion proceeded was by blurring the distinction between the status of provincial and tributary miiang .... "Wilson (1970), p. 126.

148

Paths to Conflagration

Rama III's policy of incorporation had the unintended consequence of making Vientiane the rallying point of all opponents to Bangkok's policy. Even the former foes of Vientiane, such as the ruling elite of Kalasin, declared allegiance to Chao Anou. 87 Distant Khmer-speaking areas, such as Khukhan, also turned to Vientiane.88 As it turned out, the tattooing process required by Bangkok had alienated a number of subjects in the tributary states and split the population into two distinct camps: those who agreed with Bangkok and those who strongly disagreed. The latter were automatically classified as rebels, which meant they were associated with Chao Anou and the Lao. The inhabitants of the Mekong River basin had to face this risk in a situation where the rules were set by Bangkok. The tributary rulers who felt their autonomy was being threatened were faced with an unpleasant choice. If they behaved as faithful tributaries, conforming to behavior as it was defined by the Thai, they tacitly acquiesced to the erosion of their own position. If they refused to perform the duties assigned to them by their Thai suzerain or showed reluctance, they ran the risk of endangering their security by bringing their loyalty into question. 89 While the rulers and ruled in the Khorat Plateau struggled in this treacherous political maelstrom, the Bangkok armies encamped at Tha Riia cast a cannon with the inscription "Prap wiangchan" [Repress Vientiane]. 31. INCREASING THE STAKES: THE LAO DEMAND THE RETURN OF THEIR TREASURES

The Thai royal chronicle of the third reign records a war council that Anou held on his return from Bangkok, where Anou made demands on the Thai leader. Historians dispute the number and substance of these demands, but it is indisputable that the Thai keeping historical records at that time omitted facts that would harm the dynasty in Bangkok. 9 0 In particular, they downplayed Anou's request that Bangkok return the Phra Kreo (the Emerald Buddha) to the Lao. Thai historiography tends to discredit the Lao monarch by recording only Anou's seemingly frivolous demands, such as his request for Princess Duangkham and a troop of female actresses, but in fact this request for the restitution of the Emerald Buddha constituted Anou's essential demand: all others were linked to it.91 The Emerald 87 Dhawaj (1980) (T), p. 75. riiang prap khabot wiangchan (1926) (T), p. 8. 89 Gesick (1976), p. 150. 90 Borihan (1965) (T), p. 288, has argued that there were only two demands and that the Kingdom of Laos' history text [i.e., Sila's 1957 classic in Lao] added a third: the repatriation of the Lao of Saraburi. As documents in the Thai archives demonstrate, the Lao have not rewritten history. See TNL Document Rama III (5) 1187; Pansa (1978) (T), p. 89, note 3. Chaophraya Thiphakorawong mentions a similar third request for the return of the Lao of Saraburi. 91 Princess Duangkham and Kieokhom were the same person. See Pansa (1978) (T), p. 89, note 3. However, Lao historians argue they were not the same. They assert that Duangkham is the daughter of Chao Khimenh, Anou's seventh son, and of Nang Thonkeo, vice-king Tissa's daughter. Institute de recherches en sciences sociales (1987) (L), vol. 2, p. 286, fn. 1. Whatever 88 Chotmaihet

Many Provocations and Anou 's Response

149

Buddha was seized from the Lao in 1779, when Siam initiated aggressive actions against that country. The Lao continued to feel the sting of those insulting actions up to 1827. Only after Rama III rebuffed his demands did Anou begin his rebellion,92 as Thai historiography maintains. But let us first examine the demands that many historians have dismissed as frivolous. The abduction of the Lao princess whom Anou sought to recover was intimately connected with the loss of the Emerald Buddha. She had been abducted by the Thai in 1779, and her name was not Duangkham, as Chaophraya Thiphakorawong asserted, but Khieokhom (Siamized as Khiawkhom-thaajsuan), and she was Anou's sister, the femme fatale of 1778. Famed for her beauty, she rebuffed Taksin, who once had coveted her.93 In 1779, when the Thai armies stormed Vientiane, she took refuge in Wat Ho Phra Kreo, but was ultimately removed from there and brought to Bangkok with the Emerald Buddha. Though destined for Taksin, she was raped by Chakri, Taksin's commander-in-chief and the future Thai king, on the way to Thonburi. When Taksin learned this, he exiled her and her one hundred maids to Saraburi, along with the Lao families forced to leave Vientiane. 94 Repatriated in 1827 after a raid conducted by Ratsavong on Saraburi, Khieokhom was later recaptured by the Siamese armies at Pak Ngum after the fall of Vientiane.95 The fate of Khieokhom still roused the anger of the Lao during this epoch, since her carnal rape and victimization symbolized the political rape inflicted on their country by Siamese armies. Another demand entailed the return of a troop of actresses, who must have been members of the theatrical group that Rama II asked Anou to bring to perform in Bangkok. But the Siamese king, a womanizer with a thousand-member harem, demanded that the visiting actresses remain in his harem. 96 Thai archives document Chao Anou's request for the return of other exiles as well, as they report that Anou asked Rama III to allow the repatriation of the Saraburi Lao, a group that had been forcibly exiled in 1779. As victims of Thai forced labor policies, the Saraburi Lao would collectively function as a powerful symbol that hampered relations between the Lao and Bangkok for many years after 1779.97 In 1792, Nanthasen had dared to request their repatriation, but he failed to gain his the parentage of this princess, the request for the return of a family member by a vassal king of Siam was not unusual; the Cambodian king, Ong Chan, was also dismissed by the Court of Bangkok when he dared to present a similar request in 1807. Thiphakorawong (1978) (T), vol. 1, pp. 296-297. 92 Thiphakorawong (1961) (T), pp. 25-26. 93 Traduction de l'histoire de Vien-chan, p. 13; Raquez (1902), p. 105; Nan Chronicle (1966), p. 45. 9 4 Traduction de l'histoire de Vien-chan, p. 14; Interview of Maha Kikeo Oudom, Vientiane, September 15, 1986. Princess Khieokhom had kept close relations with Rama I; see Thiphakorawong (1965), vol. 2, p. 471. The Lao chroniclers romanticized her by making Khieokhom Rama I's "queen of the right." See Traduction de l'histoire de Vien-chan, p. 20. 95 TNL Document Rama III (87) 1189/11 ching. 96 Mouhot (1863). After the death of Rama II, his successor freed the entire harem population. Burney Papers, vol. 2, pt. 1, p. 40. At that time, Anou certainly must have demanded that the Lao members be returned to Vientiane. 97 Pansa (1978) (T), p. 38. Thai archival documents agree with Vietnamese ones on this issue. See Iran Van Quy (1988), p. 12. The Lao forced to settle in Siam were not happy with their situation. For contemporary Thai poems evoking the sorrow in Lao communities in Bangkok, see Kunlasap (1981) (T), pp. 75-77.

150

Paths to Conflagration

objective.98 More than twenty years later, it appeared that Rama III might perhaps be willing to discuss the issue of the Saraburi Lao, for he had agreed to the repatriation of the Lan Na rulers' kinsmen who had been forced to settle in Siam under the same circumstances.99 Three different sources suggest that the Lao were actually allowed to return home. The first is testimony given by a Lao to the Siamese armies when they captured him on approximately June 10, 1827: My name is Khananya. I am seventy years old. My wife is the grandchild of the late Phraya Thotchomphu. We live in Saraburi. [On April 30, 1827], I came to Bangkok to purchase some goods ... I encountered some Lao who informed me that the king [of Siam] had agreed to authorize [the king of] Vientiane to repatriate the families [the inhabitants] of the four villages [of Saraburi] and that Chao Ratsavong of Vientiane had come down to fetch them. I hastened to return home, but the Lao army had already taken away everybody in my village, while the houses and the granaries were intact. [On May 2, 1827] I quickly pursued them.IOO The second source is a letter from Anou to the Vietnamese emperor, Minh Mang, written when he was hunting for refuge after the fall of Vientiane to the Siamese armies. Some years before, the Siamese king invaded Lakhon [Nakhon Phanom] which is a dependency of Lan Sang, and he deported its population. Later, the king of Lan Sang had an audience with the Siamese king who gave him the authorization to repatriate them. The people of Lan Sang returned with Anou to Vientiane after he attended the ceremony of the cremation of the king's mother in Bangkok_IOl The oral tradition that persists to this day in northeast Thailand, particularly among the Phu Thai population forced to settle on the Khorat Plateau after 1827, confirms Anou's version in which the deported Lao willingly returned with him to Vientiane. Their ancestors recounted that Chao Anou came down to Bangkok to pay homage to the burial of Rama II; once the ceremonies were over, Chao Anou returned to Vientiane. The Thai, of Lao Vientiane ethnicity, feared that with the demise of Rama II troubles would engulf Siam, since Rama III had such enemies as Chaofa Mongkut; this population therefore came back to their homeland with Anou. But on the Thai side, there was misunderstanding.102 With each demand, Chao Anou sought to reclaim for the Lao "treasures"-his sister, a troop of female performers, a population of exiles-that had been stolen from his country by the Thai in 1778-79. But the stolen treasure that he was most 98 Pansa (1978) (T), pp. 26, 38. 99 Brailey (1968). 100 TNL Document Rama III (20) 1189 I 4, testimony of Khananya, June 10, 1827. 101 Ngo Cao Lang (1977) (V), p. 2. 102 Sanre (1978) (T), p. 166.

Many Provocations and Anou's Response

151

determined to regain because it almost literally embodied the heart of Laos, was the Emerald Buddha. 103 From 1550, this statue had been the palladium of Laos, and its loss in 1779 robbed the country of its soul and identity. At the time the Thai stole it, the people felt that "seizing a precious Buddha, a palladium of the kingdom, is like stealing its power from this territory." 104 Thereafter, the Lao were obsessed over this loss_IOS Even as early as Nanthasen's rule, the Lao had requested that the guardian image be returned to Vientiane, but Nanthasen, like Anou years later, encountered adamant refusal. 106 Prince Damrong Rajanubhab would maintain that Chao Anou presented this array of demands in order to demonstrate his influence at the court of Bangkok.107 This assessment fits the ideological slant of Thai historiography, which portrays Chao Anou as a man blinded by ambition. Again, however, one must note that the two most important requests-for the return of the Emerald Buddha and the repatriation of the Saraburi Lao-had already been tendered by Chao Anou's predecessor, Nanthasen, thirty-five years earlier. Thus, these issues cannot be dismissed as preoccupations of a cocky Chao Anou, but must be acknowledged as concerns shared by the Lao nation. Even after Anou's fall, other Lao rulers and their peoples returned again to these issues, particularly to the loss of the Emerald Buddha. 108 Moreover, it makes no sense to claim that Chao Anou made his requests in order to demonstrate his influence in Bangkok. By this time, Anou's political capital with the court of Bangkok was almost nonexistent. The nadir of Lao fortune had already been reached, and it is likely Anou understood his requests would be denied and planned to use this new manifestation of an old insult to provoke and 10 3 A number of sources insist that Anou sought the return of the Emerald Buddha to Vientiane. Pramuanwichaphun reveals "Phrachao Anuruttharat then decided to launch a war of national liberation and brought his armies to struggle at Bangkok and in the case of success to invite the Phra Kreo Morakot to return to Vientiane," Pramuanwichaphun (1937) (T), p. 43; Sila and Maha Nuan Uthensakda also wrote, "Phrachao Anou has brought his armies to combat Siam to recover the nation and invite Phra Kreo to return to Lan Sang Vientiane." See Sila and Maha Nuan Uthensakda (1969) (L), p. 28. Others support the argument that Chao Anou presented only one request to Rama III: the return of the Emerald Buddha to Vientiane. See Khamman (1973) (L), p. 64; Youn Oonphon (1971) (L), p. 7. 104 Archaimbault (1967), p. 557. 105 Dhawaj (1979) (T), p. 287. 106 Pansa (1978) (T), pp. 26, 38. 107 Darnrong, in his forward to Chotmaihet ruang prap khabot wiangchan (1926) (T), p. 6. 108 See the speech of Admiral Decoux, Governor-General of Indochina, and the speech of Prince Phetsarath, representative of King Sisavangvong, at the inauguration of the restoration of the Wat Ho Phra Kreo on March 18, 1942. Martin (1985), p. 99. After the Second World War, King Sisavangvong asked for the return of the Phra Kreo to Laos; see Direk (1978), p. 210, and Oun (1975), p. 57. Sarkisyanz comments, "The reader [of the book of Direk Jayanama] is led to believe that after the war, France demanded the Emerald Buddha from Thailand, rather than the fact that this had been the Laotian guardian Buddha of Vientiane which France was demanding to be returned to Laos." Sarkisyanz (1971), pp. 257-258. In the beginning of the 1980s, when as the result of an astral phenomenon in the night, the whole of Vientiane town was immersed in a light brighter than the full moon beam, the inhabitants of Vientiane spontaneously headed to the That Luang, thinking that the Phra Kreo was coming back to Laos! A persistent rumor about this statue in reported in White: "It's been said the Emerald Buddha enthroned in Bangkok is merely a copy, that the true Emerald Buddha is hidden away here in Vat Phu [Laos]." White (1987), p. 784. The rumor can be traced to Grossin, who reports that the true statue is hidden in the woods in the province of Phrre. Grossin (1933), p. 18.

152

Paths to Conflagration

mobilize the energies of the Lao people. "The refusal of so unreasonable a request was a foregone conclusion; it was made merely for the sake of obtaining a useful pretext for the highly dangerous step of renouncing his allegiance to his overlord," argued historian D. G. E. Hall.l09 Anou's demands were part of a focused plan to obtain the independencesymbolized by the return of the Saraburi Lao and the Phra K