Patchworks of Purpose: The Development of Provincial Social Assistance Regimes in Canada 9780773567047

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Patchworks of Purpose The Development of Provincial Social Assistance Regimes in Canada

In Patchworks of Purpose Gerard Boychuk asserts that Canada does not have one social assistance system but rather ten variants that reflect the particular policy goals of each province. He argues that provincial assistance regimes have followed significantly distinct paths in their historical development even though they have been funded under the same federal cost-sharing arrangements. To examine patterns of social assistance provision specific to particular provinces, Boychuk develops a five-fold typology consisting of "residual," "market/family enforcement," "market performance," "conservative," and "redistributive" models. He uses this typology to compare development of assistance provision in the provinces, provincial responses to federal initiatives, and unique trajectories of assistance regimes. He concludes by surveying some of the broader implications of his findings for issues such as the development of national standards and the impact of globalization on social assistance provision in Canada. Patchworks of Purpose is an important book for students of social assistance and social policy as well as for scholars interested in Canadian public policy, Canadian federalism, and Canadian politics in general. GERARD WILLIAM BOYCHUK is an Izaak Walton Killam Memorial Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Alberta and a research associate with the Research Unit for Public Policy Studies, University of Calgary.

COLLECTION ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE CANADIENNE CANADIAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION SERIES Peter Aucoin, Vincent Lemieux Co-editors / Co-directeurs

}. E. Hodgetts Editor Emeritus / Directeur emerite En publiant cette collection, 1'Institut d'administration publique du Canada cherche a promouvoir la recherche sur des problemes contemporains touchant 1'administration publique, la gestion du secteur public, ou les politiques publiques au Canada. II cherche aussi a favoriser une meilleure comprehension de ces questions chez les praticiens, les universitaires, et le grand public. This series is sponsored by the Institute of Public Administration of Canada as part of its commitment to encourage research on contemporary issues in Canadian public administration, public sector management, and public policy. It also seeks to foster wider knowledge and understanding among practitioners, academics, and the general public. The Biography of an Institution: The Civil Service Commission of Canada, 1908-1967 J. E. Hodgetts, William McCloskey, Reginald Whitaker, V. Seymour Wilson An edition in French has been published under the title Histoire d'une institution: La Commission de la Fonction publique du Canada, 1908-1967 by Les Presses de 1'Universitc Laval Old Age Pensions and Policy-Making in Canada Kenneth Bryden Provincial Governments as Employers: A Survey of Public Personnel Administration in Canada's Provinces J. E. Hodgetts and O. P. Dwivedi Transport hi Transition: The Reorganization in the Federal Transport Portfolio John W. Langford Initiative and Response: The Adaptation of Canadian Federalism to Regional Economic Development Anthony G. S. Careless Canada's Salesman to the World: The Department of Trade and Commerce, 1892-1939 O. Mary Hill

Conflict over the Columbia: The Canadian Background to an Historic Treaty Neil A. Swainson L'Economiste et la chose publique Jean-Luc Miguè (Published by Les Presses de 1'Universitè du Quebec) Federalism, Bureaucracy, and Public Policy: The Politics of Highway Transport Regulation Richard J. Schultz Federal-Provincial Collaboration: The Canada-New Brunswick General Development Agreement DonaldJ. Savoie Judicial Administration in Canada Perry S. Millar and Carl Baar The Language of the Skies: The Bilingual Air Traffic Control Conflict in Canada Sandford F. Borins An edition in French is distributed under the title Lefrançais dans les airs: le conjlit du bilinguisme dans le contrôle de la circulation aérienne au Canada by Les Presses de 1'Université du Québec L'Analyse des politiques gouvernementales: trois monographies Michel Bellavance, Roland Parenteau et Maurice Patry (Published by Les Presses de 1'Universite Laval) Canadian Social Welfare Policy: Federal and Provincial Dimensions Edited by Jacqueline S. Ismael Maturing in Hard Times: Canada's Department of Finance through the Great Depression Robert B. Bryce Pour comprendre 1'appareil judiciaire québécois Monique Giard et Marcel Proulx (Published by Les Presses de 1'Université du Québec) Histoire de Padministration publique quebecoise 1867-1970 James Iain Gow (Published by Les Presses de 1'Universite de Montreal) Health Insurance and Canadian Public Policy: The Seven Decisions That Created the Canadian Health Insurance System and Their Outcomes Malcolm G. Taylor

Canada and Immigration: Public Policy and Public Concern Second Edition Freda Hawkins Canada's Department of External Affairs: The Early Years, 1909-1946 John Hilliker An edition in French has been published under the title Le ministere des Affaires exterieures du Canada: Les années deformation, 1909-1946 by Les Presses de 1'Universite Laval Getting It Right: Regional Development in Canada R. Harley McGee Corporate Autonomy and Institutional Control: The Crown Corporation as a Problem in Organization Design Douglas F. Stevens Shifting Sands: Government-Group Relationships in the Health Care Sector Joan Price Boase Canada's Department of External Affairs: Coming of Age, 1946-1968 John Hilliker and Donald Barry

An edition in French has been published under the title Le ministère des Affaires extérieures du Canada: L'essor, 1946—1968 by Les Presses de 1'Universite Laval The Institutionalized Cabinet: Governing the Western Provinces Christopher Dunn The Dominion Bureau of Statistics A History of Canada's Central Statistical Office and Its Antecedents, 1841-1972 David A. Worton An edition in French has been published under the title Le Bureau federal de la statistique: Les origines et1''evolution du bureau central de la statistique au Canada, 1841-1972 Patchworks of Purpose The Development of Provincial Social Assistance Regimes in Canada Gerard William Boychuk

Patchworks of Purpose The Development of Provincial Social Assistance Regimes in Canada GERARD WILLIAM BOYCHUK

McGill-Queen's University Press Montreal & Kingston • London • Buffalo

© McGill-Queen's University Press 1998 ISBN 0-7735-1699-9 Legal deposit first quarter 1998 Bibliothèque nationale du Quebec Printed in Canada on acid-free paper This book has been published with the help of a grant from the Humanities and Social Sciences Federation of Canada, using funds provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. McGill-Queen's University Press acknowledges the support of the Canada Council for the Arts for its publishing program.

Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data Boychuk, Gerard William, 1967— Patchworks of purpose: the development of provincial social assistance regimes in Canada Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7735-1699-9 1. Public welfare — Canada - Provinces. I. Title. HV105.B69 1998 361.6'o97i c97-901043-8

This book was typeset by Typo Litho Composition Inc. in 10/12 Baskerville.

ToM.N.,J.S., and RN.

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Contents

Tables and Figures Preface

ix

xi

Acknowledgments Introduction

xv

xvii

1 The Significance of Difference

3

2 The History of Provincial Assistance Regimes to 1950

24

3 Federal Initiatives and the Development of Provincial Social Assistance, 1950-92 41 4 The Unique Trajectories of Assistance Regimes since 1950 58 5 So What? The Political Implications of Distinct Provincial Regimes 97 Appendix: Comparative Data on Provincial Assistance Regimes 117 Notes

125

Bibliography Index

155

143

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Tables and Figures

TABLES

1 Regime typology and characteristics

16

2 Assistance regime type and program design 3 Mothers' allowances in the provinces

22

28

4 Continuity and disjunction in provincial assistance regime development 59 A 1 Per capita spending on social assistance, by province A 2 Provincial assistance rates by category, 1965—91

120

FIGURES 1 Range of provincial social assistance expenditures, 1945-92 51 2 Dispersion in provincial social assistance expenditures, 1 945-92 51 3 Range of provincial social assistance expenditures, 1961-92 53 4 Range of provincial assistance rates by category, 1966-95 55 5 Range of provincial assistance rates by category, 1950-95

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118

x Tables and Figures A 1 Annual welfare income by category, 1995

122

A 2 Welfare income relative to average income, by category, 1995 122 A3 Welfare income relative to average income, by category, 1995 123 A4 Welfare income relative to the poverty line, by category, 1995 123 A5 Welfare income relative to the poverty line, by category, 1995 124 A6 Provincial taxback rates, by category, 1995

124

Preface

At the outset of this project, my interest in social assistance was only incidental. It flowed out of an overarching interest in fiscal federalism and the federal ability to use cost-sharing to skew provincial spending priorities. As the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP) was the last major conditional cost-sharing program, it provided the natural focus for a consideration of these issues. I originally intended to look at the provincial welfare effort (measured as both overall spending on assistance and provincial benefit rates) and ask whether these factors were affected in an appreciable way by federal cost-sharing. It was only when I became embroiled in the issue of the comparability of data across provinces that I began to realize how widely different provincial social assistance systems actually were. As I considered this apparently technical problem, I became convinced that I could see certain patterns in the qualitative differences between provinces that made the design of quantitative measurements of welfare effort so difficult. I began to consider the possibility that provincial assistance systems might be aimed towards qualitatively different ends. I still expected to find significant convergence between provinces in both quantitative and qualitative measures of welfare effort in the period after the inception of CAP. When I found this argument difficult to sustain, I began extending my analysis backwards in time to previous federal initiatives in the field, expecting to find significant convergence in an earlier period. My expectations remained unfulfilled. So the study evolved into one concerned with qualitative indicators of different types of welfare effort, rather than one focused solely on quantitative

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Preface

indicators of what were assumed to be similarly directed welfare efforts. I became concerned with the evolution of these systems over a long period of time rather than the short period originally intended. Finally, I was able to document unique provincial patterns of continuity and discontinuity, rather than the substantial convergence that I originally expected. Over the course of this study I have put together a wide range of materials on provincial social assistance in Canada that, to my knowledge, has not been compiled elsewhere. Nothing currently provides an adequate qualitative comparison of provincial social assistance policy in the contemporary period, much less across time. I hope that this work provides the basis for further comparisons, case studies, and explanation of these differences. I also hope that further work is done to establish comparable data among provinces for both the historical and contemporary periods. If I had my preference, there would be meaningful data (much of the existing data is not meaningful) for each province dating back as far as each province had any type of state assistance program. Unfortunately, this data does not exist. So I have presented data where it has been available in a form and level of completeness that seems to make it useful. I have categorized particular systems on the basis of this data and on a less rigorous comparison of the more idiosyncratic characteristics. I am well aware that each regime, to varying degrees, has elements or traces of all five models of assistance provision that I outline. Typologies are always, to some extent, arbitrary and distorting. Reality does not fit easily into typologies, but without typologies we would have great difficulty comprehending reality in all its complexity. I invoke the standard disclaimer that broad comparisons risk doing violence to the nuance and detail of particular cases. Readers are invited to question my classification of particular provinces at particular points in time. I stand to be corrected, but I doubt that reclassification of any particular regime would pose a serious challenge to my primary argument that provincial assistance regimes are and have been directed to fundamentally different ends as regards the market and family. Since this study rejects the assumption that assistance systems are necessarily directed to similar ends, such as relieving destitution and reducing dependency, it differs significantly from much of the existing work on social assistance in Canada. However, I do not claim that my approach is better than others, just that it is different. Understandings of policy are enhanced by a plurality of perspectives. In this area, there is not much analysis outside the mainstream interpretation that all regimes are focused on similar ends and all are failing to varying

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Preface

extents and in different ways, though for largely the same reasons. Adopting the standard assumption that social assistance is directed to relieve destitution and reduce dependency and examining the extent to which various provincial policies appear appropriate to these ends would have produced a technical - rather than critical - evaluation of policy. One can speculate that this evaluation would probably have developed into a critique of incremental policy-making and a consideration of which characteristics of provincial bureaucracies make them more or less able to approach policy more comprehensively. Developing such a critique would not be trivial; however, this is well-tilled soil, and the returns to such efforts are of decreasing marginal value. As do virtually all government reports, most social policy groups and institutes in Canada start from the assumption that the aim of social assistance policy is to relieve destitution and reduce dependency. My approach challenges this interpretation and provides an alternative perspective. The critical assumptions that underpin this approach lead to empirical findings of considerable political significance. This study illustrates that social assistance policy decisions should be treated as political choices rather than simply technical matters or foregone conclusions determined by outside constraints. This is not to say that constraints do not exist, but my perspective forces us to consider which constraints we are willing to accept and which we are determined to challenge. Choice is central to the continuing vitality of democratic politics. If we deny the existence of such choices, as a society, we abdicate our collective political responsibilities. Providing for those in our society who are unable to provide for themselves is an issue of considerable contemporary political importance. Current debates about social assistance and the welfare state more broadly are really debates about the fundamental principles that underlie our form of social organization. Perhaps most importantly, the provision of assistance is a matter that affects a great number of people in a very direct and profound way. The full realization of this radically changed my perception of the issue. Over the course of completing this work, I was not only forced to shift 180 degrees in my methodology and anticipated conclusions, but I was also forced to make a similar shift in the personal reasons sustaining my pursuit of this line of inquiry.

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Acknowledgments

I would especially like to thank Dr Peter Leslie for his commendable performance as supervisor of the doctoral dissertation from which much of this work is drawn. I would like to thank Keith Banting and Alain Noel who both generously provided comments on this work as it progressed through various stages. Others who I would like to thank for their comments on earlier versions and pieces of this work include Abby Bakan, Keith Brownsey, Phil Goldman, Rod Haddow, Jacqueline Ismael, Jonathan Rose, and Stephen Tomblin. Bob Burge and Fred Cutler were both extremely helpful in the technical and troubleshooting department. Shannon (Sam) Sampert provided invaluable assistance in compiling the index. In dedicating my doctoral dissertation, I noted that a mere dedication was not sufficient to cover the debt of thanks that remained outstanding so, again, I would like to acknowledge my thanks to Nadine Busmann. I would also like to thank my family and friends, especially my parents, for their unfailing moral support, which has, on occasion, also been manifest in somewhat more tangible forms. Despite the distance between us, their support has never gone unnoted. Finally, I would like to thank Debora Van Nijnatten for her support of this and all of my work. Sharing our intellectual journey together has been one of the true joys of my academic endeavours. However, above all, I would like to thank her - not just as an unfailing reader and constructive critic - but also as a long-standing close friend and now partner.

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Introduction

Historically, provincial social assistance policies in Canada have been directed to significantly different ends. Their distinct origins marked fundamental differences in how the provincial states acted to reinforce or undermine the market, on the one hand, and the traditional family, on the other. Over the course of their subsequent evolution, individual provincial assistance regimes have followed unique trajectories of development, and important differences among them persist. In contrast to this interpretation, some widespread assumptions in contemporary social policy debates understate the policy differences between political units. The goals of social assistance policy are often assumed, perhaps now more than ever, to be self-evident and, as a corollary, similar across political systems. In both the political and academic realms, the provision of social assistance is treated largely as a technical problem of finding the most efficient means to widely agreed-upon ends, such as the relief of destitution and the reduction of dependency. A related current in contemporary debates focuses on external restrictions on social policy, such as fiscal pressures and constraints imposed by globalization and technological change. These factors ostensibly dictate particular policy responses. Based on a type of economic determinism, it is argued that various political units must adopt similar social policies in response to these forces.1 Policies that deviate from these dictates appear as vain attempts to forestall the inevitable. Such arguments serve a highly political and ideological function: they deny that there is a range of policy options and obscure the fact that, within this range, the choice of policy orientation is ultimately political.

xviii Introduction

These currents of thought echo broader debates about the welfare state and indicate, more generally, that the welfare state is increasingly under stress. More and more, social policy appears constrained by changing global economic conditions and the fiscal crisis that plagues all Western industrialized governments. Their ability to pursue social goals through the welfare state is increasingly perceived as limited. Although often viewed as one of the major accomplishments of the postwar period, the welfare state is under sharpened ideological attack. Its critics argue that the welfare state exacerbates many of the problems it was designed to remedy. For example, the welfare state is charged with rigidifying inequalities in the social structure by helping to create a culture of poverty and long-term trends of cyclical poverty. Critics often also point to negative effects on economic performance. The relationship between the welfare state and market efficiency is assumed to be zero-sum - higher levels of one necessitating lower levels of the other. The drive for global competitiveness will thus increasingly require major restructuring and retrenchment - if not abandonment of the welfare state. A focus on external pressures generates expectations that welfare states will converge upon a reduced level of welfare. The external constraints imposed by changing economic conditions will be felt most powerfully where welfare states are most generous. Fiscal pressure will be most onerous where the welfare state presents the largest burden relative to fiscal capacity. Ideological backlash will be most significant where the welfare state is most visible and, likely, where it is most generous. These are powerful arguments for convergence. Alternatively, certain types of welfare state may prove to be more resilient and resistant to change than others, and uniform external pressures may well lead them to diverge. In this view, welfare states are not only shaped by their societal context but also contribute to shaping it. Both the economic structure and the existing configuration of political preferences are affected by the welfare state. Thus, welfare states may be significantly self-reinforcing and firmly embedded in their social contexts. In this conception, pressures on the welfare state will have the strongest effects where the welfare state is most weakly developed, and vice versa.2 Due to institutional persistence, social structures such as the welfare state may develop along considerably different paths from those ostensibly dictated by external forces. These larger debates about the welfare state are germane to the issue of social assistance - cash and in-kind benefits provided to those deemed to be without the means for an adequate level of subsistence. Although it is only one component of the larger welfare state, lastresort social assistance plays a particularly crucial role in determining

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Introduction

the character of a welfare state through providing, in the final instance, for those who fail in the market or do not receive adequate support within the family. Certainly, the welfare state includes a wide variety of policy areas such as income maintenance, labour market policies, education, and housing, among others. However, social assistance is the income maintenance program of last resort in all welfare states: "policies for the needy [constitute] ... the focal point of a social welfare system."3 If social assistance marks the boundaries of the institutional nexus of the state, market, and family, one might expect that, as pressures mount, the contours and nature of these boundaries will become increasingly similar across political units. Any attempt to examine social assistance in Canada is immediately confronted by the existence of the federal system. The nature of the interaction between the state - through the assistance system - and th market and family is primarily determined by the characteristics of assistance as it is actually provided to recipients: assistance in Canada is provided by provincial (and, in some cases, municipal) government and it is at this level that analysis of the interaction between the assistance system and the market and family must take place. However, provincial policy is made within the federal context. The Unemployment Assistance Act (1956), the Canada Assistance Plan (1966), the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982), and now (1995) the replacement of the Canada Assistance Plan with block funding for social assistance under the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST) are all extraprovincial policy initiatives that have affected provincial policy-making in the field of social assistance. With the exception of the most recent initiative, it has been argued that these changes to the federal context have increasingly led to similar provincial social assistance regimes. However, the extent to which the federal system has contributed to such convergence remains to be adequately examined. Thus, a consideration of the development of social assistance in Canada raises several important questions: To what extent has the history, the political values, or the configuration of political power specific to each province resulted in distinct provincial regimes? Is the range of social assistance policy alternatives becoming increasingly restricted by market and structural forces, pushing policy inexorably in a particular direction and are provinces therefore increasingly forced to adopt a particular model of social assistance provision, making political differences between provinces less significant? Or, conversely, do these external forces play out differently in various provinces because of significant differences in the way the state, market, and family interact in individual provinces? Does it appear that significant latitude remains for policy variation between provinces?

xx

Introduction

In this book I compare provincial social assistance regimes over the course of their historical development. I do not presuppose that social assistance regimes are necessarily directed to lessening poverty or ameliorating the conditions of the disadvantaged: whether these regimes are aimed towards reinforcing or undermining other social institutions is an open question. Thus, without prejudging the question I am open to the possibility that distinct provincial policy orientations do exist. I also adopt the critical assumption that the state has the potential, through social assistance, to have significant impacts on the market and family. The book begins by identifying particular ways in which social assistance may reinforce or undermine other social institutions. I have developed a typology of assistance regimes that represents answers to the following hypothetical question: if a social assistance system was designed to reinforce the market or traditional family, or, alternatively, to undermine the market distribution of well-being or an existing status hierarchy, what would it look like? In providing answers to this question, this approach outlines the range - what Titmuss refers to as the "ends of the value spectrum" - of alternative aims of social assistance policy.4 The development of this typology demonstrates how the various components of an assistance regime contribute to forming a coherent whole having a distinct impact on other social institutions - emphasizing the political rather than technical nature of these components. Empirically, this book examines which of the ideal types individual provincial assistance regimes appear to conform with most closely. It considers whether there are significant differences between provincial regimes and whether these differences have persisted over time. In so doing, my aim is to "help us see some order in all the disorder and confusion of facts, systems, and choices" evident in the ten provincial systems over the course of their development.5 I conclude from a comparative historical examination (which considers not only differences between provinces but the general trajectory of development of the social assistance complex in Canada) that provincial assistance regimes have followed significantly distinct paths of development. Canada has not one assistance system but ten distinct provincial variants, each reflecting a particular way in which the state reinforces or undermines the market and family. These conclusions challenge the assumption that the goals of social policy are self-evident and similar across political units, as well as the argument that social policy is moving inexorably in a particular direction. First, this study shows that choices about even the most basic nuts and bolts of assistance provision are deeply political and have significant implications for other social structures such as the market and

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Introduction

traditional family. Second, the significant differences between provincial social assistance systems demonstrate that a consensus about the ends of social assistance policy has not existed historically and has not yet emerged. Third, the analysis reveals that provincial assistance policy has not been evolving inexorably in a particular direction: a range of policy alternatives in the field of social assistance continues to exist. Commentators who emphasize the role of external pressures in enforcing particular policy choices on provincial assistance regimes underestimate the extent to which assistance regimes are embedded in distinct provincial contexts. Important political and economic differences between provinces may be linked to distinct modes of social assistance provision - shaping and, in turn, being shaped by, provincial assistance regimes. This mutual reinforcement may contribute to interprovincial differences that are more robust than is often recognized. Chapter i establishes the conceptual basis for a consideration of similarities and differences between assistance systems and thus for a comparative historical examination of the development of provincial social assistance regimes. I begin by using the differences between the three major variants of the English poor laws as powerful examples of the considerable significance of different modes of assistance provision for other social institutions. I then construct a typology of assistance regimes that outlines in a general sense the possible ways in which these regimes may reinforce or undermine the market and family. After refining this typology for specific application to provincial social assistance regimes in Canada, I proceed to examine six major aspects of social assistance program design and to demonstrate how similarities and differences in these elements of assistance provision condition the way in which social assistance regimes interact with other social institutions. In chapter 2 I embark on an empirical investigation of the differences between provincial assistance regimes, first examining the common claim that social assistance in Canada developed out of the English poor laws. The chapter compares modes of assistance provision in Canada in the formative years of modern social assistance, and I argue that the historical origins of provincial assistance regimes, like the different versions of the English poor laws, were significantly distinct. Historically, the relief complex in Canada was more uniquely Canadian and the individual regimes comprising this complex were much more distinctly provincial than references likening Canadian practice to the English poor laws often suggest. The interprovincial differences, like differences between the poor laws, could be expected to have significantly divergent impacts on the development of the economic and social structures of the various provinces.

xxii Introduction

Chapter 3 examines the development of provincial assistance systems during the period from 1950 to 1992 in light of the growing activism of the federal government in this area. Using quantitative indicators of provincial welfare effort, I assess the extent to which federal initiatives contributed to reducing variation among provinces; I establish that federal initiatives in this area did not result in substantial convergence and that significant variation continues to exist between contemporary provincial assistance regimes. My conclusion is that distinctiveness among provinces has not resulted primarily from varying levels of provincial fiscal and administrative ability to provide assistance but represents more fundamental differences about the ends of social assistance policy - a point more fully developed in the following chapter. In chapter 4 I turn to examine the qualitative aspects of provincial social assistance provision in the postwar period. I demonstrate that provincial assistance regimes have differed qualitatively in certain consistent ways over long periods and significant differences between them still exist. Despite episodic shifts in the orientations of particular provincial systems, these regimes have had and continue to have distinct trajectories of development. These distinct trajectories and the continuing diversity suggest that the differences are deeply rooted. Chapter 5 concludes by surveying some of the broader implications of the research. Here I consider the immediate policy significance of persistent provincial differences for national uniformity versus provincial variability in the Canadian federal system. More broadly, I reexamine the arguments that external pressures are forcing provincial policymakers to adopt similar approaches to social assistance. I suggest, considering the distinct historical trajectories of provincial assistance regimes, that these arguments understate the importance of the various social, political, economic, and historical contexts in shaping social assistance policy within individual provinces. My conclusion is that there are no self-evidently superior solutions to the questions raised by the issue of social assistance and no compelling reason to believe that regimes need develop in any one direction. Economic imperatives do not unambiguously point to any particular policy option. Solutions depend on how the problem is defined. The direction of future social assistance policy in the provinces is not foreordained. The question of the model that assistance systems should adopt remains in essence a political one.

Patchworks of Purpose

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1 The Significance of Difference The development of the welfare state is a topic which ... conceals questions of utmost importance under matters that may at first seem merely technical and abstruse ... actuarial risk, waiting time, point-indexing and cost-of-living differentials rarely seem the stuff of dramatic narrative. In fact, approached from the right angle, the nuts and bolts of social policy testify to the heated struggles of classes and interests. The battles behind the welfare state lay bare the structure and conflicts of modern society. Peter Baldwin1

The central question for a study of provincial social assistance regimes and the range of policy alternatives that they represent is, what constitutes significant similarity or difference? Differences are significant if systems vary in some coherent manner and if the state (through the assistance system) reinforces or undermines other major social institutions, such as the market and family, with some consistency over time. The relationship among these institutions constitutes the central issue in the contemporary debate over the role and future of the welfare state. There are strongly developed intellectual antecedents on which to base an examination of such relationships: Polanyi's detailed consideration of the relationship between the assistance system and the market in the historical context of the British poor laws and the more broadly comparative typologies of welfare states constructed by both Titmuss and Esping-Andersen.2 Drawing on these antecedents, I will develop, later in this chapter, a five-fold typology for application to provincial assistance regimes in Canada. But first, I must consider the implications of such an approach, since the question whether assistance systems reinforce or undermine other major social institutions in different ways incorporates several crucial assumptions and prescribes a particular methodology. To examine how social assistance interacts with other social institutions is to emphasize institutional coherence. The focus is on how the assistance system as a coherent whole acts - or does not act - to push back the boundaries of the market, for example, or to buttress the patriarchal family structure. Behind this approach lies, in essence, an

4

Patchworks of Purpose

important assumption about state capacity: it is assumed that the state could act in these ways if so directed.3 For example, after observing an assistance system that fails to reduce dependency, one may, on the assumption that the system really is intended to alleviate poverty, conclude that it is incoherent and incapable of contributing to these aims. There is considerable distance between this conclusion and the conclusion that the system is simply not directed towards alleviating poverty. Related to this, the focus on the effects of the state on other social institutions precludes assuming that societal characteristics are determined prior to the political process or outside the interaction of state and society. For example, the structure of the economy is not assumed to exist prior to the political process but is part of this process and, most importantly, conditioned by it. In considering assistance policy, factors such as the level of demand for the welfare state (for example, the incidence of poverty) are not assumed to be determined by general economic conditions or other ostensibly external factors. Rather, analysis is directed towards examining the extent to which these factors are conditioned by policies that contribute to or undermine welfare state dependence or cyclical poverty. Analysis of policy from this perspective considers not only how it is shaped by political preferences but also how political preferences may be shaped by it. Different forms of the welfare state with their distinct effects condition the very circumstances that structure their own future development.4 Welfare states, for example, can make dependence on the state more or less socially acceptable or define certain categories of individuals as deserving and others as undeserving. The "most striking message" of the social democratic model of the welfare state is that the potential for particular patterns of political mobilization is not merely an exogenous function of the economic and social context but that "the mobilizers themselves have a capacity for moulding these structural conditions and how they are perceived."5 This type of reasoning is also found in feminist analyses of the welfare state. In bringing together large numbers of primarily female state dependents, the welfare state may foster solidarity among them and, in so doing, increase their political power.6 In addition, the welfare state may create "the basis for cross-class alliances among women" including middleclass women who dominate the welfare state infrastructure and those dependent upon it.7 Alternatively, the welfare state may be structured such that it does neither of these things. To allow for the possibility that social assistance systems vary significantly in their effects on other social institutions, the interaction of social assistance regimes with other institutions must be treated as "open and contingent"8 - the interaction is essentially an empirical question

5 The Significance of Difference - rather than as fixed or functionally determined. In contrast, structural-functionalists focus on the contribution of state structures to the broader maintenance of the sociopolitical system. Because they focus on the broadly defined functions that must be performed in any political-economic system of a specific type (for example, modernized, industrialized, capitalist, patriarchal), structural-functionalists emphasize similarities rather than differences between state structures. Approaching the relationship between social assistance regimes and other institutions as open and contingent rather than as functionally determined has two important implications. First, in this non-instrumental approach one must not assume that policy is necessarily directed solely or even primarily towards its self-evident aims: "the end to be achieved [may lie] outside the commonsensical domain of the policy instrument itself."9 Poverty policy is not simply assumed to be directed towards the relief of poverty.10 There are compelling arguments that welfare policies may be directed to a wide variety of ends. J l Consequently, the contention that the reinforcement of dependence demonstrates that a particular welfare state is failing to achieve its primary purpose of alleviating inequality is no more convincing a priori than the assertion that reinforcing particular patterns of inequality - not undermining them - is the primary goal. The second implication, a corollary of the non-instrumental approach, is that the ends of policy may differ across political units, as may the relationship between assistance regimes and other social institutions. Whether these relationships are significantly different becomes an empirical question. These assumptions lead to a focus on the political rather than the technical aspects of policy. Piven and Cloward present a strong criticism of the assumption in the welfare research establishment that the ends of poverty policy are obvious (the reduction of poverty) and of the concomitant focus of policy debate on technical problems of administrative design and program delivery: By agreeing that this is the main question, the researchers in effect underline the critics' definition that the assault on the welfare state emanates from essentially consensual and benign motives. Everyone is presumably exploring together which social policy options work best to reduce poverty. If political questions emerge at all, they tend to remain within the narrow and relatively neutral sphere of bureaucratic implementation. Meanwhile, no one, at least no one in the welfare state research establishment, investigates the political interests of different groups and classes in the welfare state, and the political strategies through which those interests are or are not advanced. On these questions, the main body of research is silent.12

6 Patchworks of Purpose Such a criticism may be levelled against much of the research on social assistance in Canada. The assumptions outlined above have very immediate methodological implications suggesting an approach contrary to the broad range of cross-national empirical studies that use aggregate spending as a measure of welfare effort in various countries.13 These studies typically designate welfare spending as the dependent variable and search for correlations between this indicator of welfare effort and a host of independent variables. The primary assumption is that welfare expenditures in all countries under examination are necessarily directed to a similar end - for example, lessening poverty and inequality. Welfare expenditures in the various political systems are considered comparable because the relationship between the welfare state and other social institutions is implicitly assumed to be similar across these political units. The possibility of qualitative differences between welfare states is ruled out by definition. In a strong critique of such approaches, Esping-Andersen argues that "a focus on spending may be irrelevant or, at best, misleading. Expenditures are epiphenomenal to the theoretical substance of welfare state ... By scoring welfare states on spending we assume that all spending counts equally."14 Aggregate approaches understate the important fact that, within a similar level of per capita spending, expenditures may be distributed relatively evenly among all recipients or, conversely, they may be very generous for some categories of recipients and nonexistent for others; expenditures may accentuate personal autonomy or, alternatively, foster strong state paternalism; expenditures may encourage or discourage labour market participation; and they may or may not rely heavily on intrusive verification and control mechanisms. Changes in these aspects of state provision of well-being may fundamentally transform state interaction with other social institutions. In arguing that these qualitative aspects are overlooked by a focus on aggregate expenditures, Esping-Andersen notes that "a remarkable attribute of the entire literature is its lack of much genuine interest in the welfare state as such ... the welfare state itself has generally received scant conceptual attention. If welfare states differ, how do they differ?" 15 In this study I examine the actual impacts state policy appears likely to have on other social institutions. Because my approach is noninstrumental and because I accept that the ends of policy may not be what common sense suggests, I focus on the "internal logic" of policy, rather than accepting claims by policymakers about what policy is intended to do or accepting the apparent aims of policy.l6 In a sense, actions (actual policy as implemented) are assumed to speak louder

7 The Significance of Difference

than words (the policy pronouncements of particular political actors). How the assistance system actually meshes with other social institutions is the central focus of this analysis. The importance of the qualitative aspects of assistance provision in shaping its interaction with other social institutions is powerfully expounded by Polanyi in his examination of the English poor laws.17 In Polanyi's interpretation of the development of the modern world, state care for the indigent has been crucial in the development of capitalism. Last-resort provision for the poor (the precursor to modern social assistance), according to Polanyi, marked the battleground for the last struggle in England between the premodern state and the emerging market. After a brief period of resistance, the state, through poor relief, began to contribute actively to the development of the market. According to this interpretation, assistance policy was not, either before or after this fundamental shift, merely the manifestation of altruistic concern for the poor. Rather, the various approaches to assistance provision represented distinct ways in which the state could either undermine or reinforce the market and had powerful consequences in shaping the dominant mode of economic relations. In keeping with this interpretation, Piven and Cloward argue that "even in the sixteenth century, it was apparent that a good deal was at stake in the organization of relief arrangements, that relief was not merely a modest system of redistribution, but that the extent of relief and the methods by which it was distributed affected power relations between classes."l8 Polanyi's detailed effort to distinguish between the various forms of poor relief focuses on the significance of (and significant differences in) the relationship between forms of assistance and capitalism. Whether poor relief reinforced or undermined the market is, for Polanyi, a matter for empirical investigation. This assumption constitutes a compelling counterpoint to assertions, found in current debates, that the welfare state is inherently inimical to the operation of the market economy. Polanyi did not view the market as existing naturally or spontaneously in the absence of other institutions displacing it or limiting its operation; rather, he viewed the market itself as a state-supported institutional structure.19 Although policymakers (such as the Justices of Berkshire who implemented the Speenhamland system) did not appreciate the significance of the policy choices they faced, 20 these were fundamentally matters of political choice. The primary principle underlying the poor laws was the compulsory provision of assistance to the indigent by a level of government that was assigned this obligation through statute. 21 Beyond this, it is difficult to identify themes that are common to all three major periods of poor law administration - the Elizabethan Poor Law (1590-1794), the

8 Patchworks of Purpose Speenhamland system (1795-1834), and the New Poor Law (1834 and later.) Each of these three versions of poor law represents a different relationship between the state, market, and family. Under an original feature of the Elizabethan Poor Law, the state actively stratified recipients into the deserving and undeserving poor. While providing relatively generous relief for deserving recipients, the state enforced strong negative sanctions against the undeserving, including requiring them to work in return for assistance. During the eighteenth century, assistance became even more starkly differentiated with the advent of workhouses for employable recipients, which were distinct from the assistance provided to the deserving poor largely through outdoor relief.22 The Elizabethan Poor Law was "a system of stratification and legitimate - one might almost say planned - inequalities [that] was sustained by laws and administrative orders."23 In 1795, the Speenhamland system was adopted, by which "subsidies in aid of wages should be granted in accordance with a scale dependent upon the price of bread, so that a minimum income should be assured to the poor irrespective of their earnings."24 This measure was directly contrary to the original intent of the Elizabethan Poor Law, under which "the poor were forced to work at whatever wages they could get and only those who could obtain no work were entitled to relief; relief in aid of wages-was neither intended nor given. Under the Speenhamland Law a man was relieved even if he was in employment, as long as his wages amounted to less than the family income granted to him by the scale."25 That an individual could receive aid while employed was the fundamental distinction between the Elizabethan law (as well as the New Poor Law) and the Speenhamland system. With lack of employment no longer a condition of eligibility, Polanyi argues that this unconditional right of relief caused a decline in employees' perceptions of obligation to their employers. Productivity dropped because wages were guaranteed at a level that exceeded the normal market wages so that "no labourer had any material interest in satisfying his employer, his income being the same whatever wages he earned; this was different only in the case of standard wages, i.e., the wages actually paid, exceeding the scale, an occurrence which was not the rule in the countryside, since the employer could obtain labour at almost any wage; however little he paid, the subsidy from the rates brought the workers' income up to scale."26 In those industries and localities where assistance income exceeded wages, according to Polanyi, wage labour would effectively be eliminated. Contrary to the Elizabethan Poor Law, the Speenhamland system undermined the stratification of state dependents into the deserving

9

The Significance of Difference

and undeserving: "The laboriously established distinction between workhouse and poorhouse became meaningless, the various categories of paupers and able-bodied unemployed now tended to fuse into one indiscriminate mass of dependent poverty. The opposite of a process of differentiation set in."27 The Speenhamland system also undermined the dualism in well-being that existed between state dependents and those primarily dependent upon the market. This system did not distinguish between the employed and unemployed and, regarding the independent labourer and the pauper, Polanyi argues that "the difference between the two strata had become nonexistent under Speenhamland."28 Of the three poor law regimes, the Speenhamland system came closest to ensuring social rights. It "offered, in effect, a guaranteed minimum wage and family allowances, combined with the right to work or maintenance. That guarantee, even by modern standards, is a substantial body of social rights, going far beyond what one might regard as the proper province of the Poor Law."29 Marshall argues that "in this brief episode of our history we see the Poor Law as the aggressive champion of the social rights of citizenship."30 In contrast, the New Poor Law marked a radical shift: "we find the attacker driven back far behind his original position. By the Act of 1834 the Poor Law renounced all claim to trespass on the territory of the wage system or to interfere with the forces of the free market."31 Rather than offering assistance to the working poor as the Speenhamland system had, the New Poor Law "offered relief only to those who, through age or sickness, were incapable of continuing the battle, and those other weaklings who gave up the struggle, admitted defeat, and cried for mercy."32 In addition to substantial differences from the Speenhamland system, the New Poor Law also explicitly entailed three principles that were contrary to the Elizabethan Poor Law: uniform treatment of different categories of recipients, the abolition of outdoor relief, and "less-eligibility."33 Less-eligibility, the principle that no one should be better off on assistance than working at the lowest market wage, was assured by the workhouse test.34 Recipients were forced to enter the workhouse in order to receive assistance and "unwillingness to enter the workhouse was taken as presumptive evidence that an applicant's claim to need help was fraudulent."35 Being strongly infused with a sharp state/nonstate dualism and offering very low standards of subsistence for state dependents, the New Poor Law did not differentiate between the deserving and the undeserving poor. Consequently, "many of the most needy poor ... were left to their fate as outdoor relief was withdrawn, and among those who suffered most bitterly were the 'deserving poor' who were too proud to enter the workhouse which had

10 Patchworks of Purpose

become an abode of shame. Never perhaps in all modern history has a more ruthless act of social reform been perpetrated; it crushed multitudes of lives while merely pretending to provide a criterion of genuine destitution in the workhouse test."36 Determining eligibility for assistance by the willingness of the applicant (able or disabled, deserving or undeserving) to face the prospect of institutionalization not only strictly limited the extent to which relief constituted an alternative to participation in the market or family but also minimized the intrusiveness of the system through making determinations of the cause of need unnecessary. Thus, it limited the role of the moral judgment of officials in determining the conditions under which assistance was to be provided. Although the New Poor Law did not undermine wage labour (as did the Speenhamland system) or stratify the poor into the deserving and undeserving (as did the Elizabethan Poor Law), neither was it passive. It was "fundamentally different" from laisser-faire ideology in its acceptance of positive state action "to drive men to work or into the workhouse"37 and its active enforcement of a stark dualism between state dependents and those whose well-being was provided through the market or family. While Polanyi, in emphasizing the importance of differences in relief provision, limited himself to the historically specific case of the English poor laws, Titmuss began to develop a categorization of the welfare state of more universal applicability. Based on the assertion that social policy does not necessarily "operate in practice to further ends of progressive redistribution, equality and social altruism," Titmuss' typology is intended to encapsulate "the major differences - the ends of the value spectrum - in the views held about the means and ends of social policy."38 In striving to perceive the coherence in different welfare states, it is designed "to help us see some order in all the disorder and confusion of facts, systems and choices concerning certain areas of our economic and social life."39 In so doing, the models of his typology "represent different criteria for making choices."^0 Titmuss began to develop a three-fold typology of welfare states consisting of the residual, industrial achievement-performance, and institutional-redistributive models.41 The residual model is based on the premise that only when provision of well-being through the market or the family breaks down "should social welfare institutions come into play and then only temporarily."42 In this model, the welfare state is strictly limited and supplementary. In contrast, Titmuss' industrial-performance ("handmaiden") model represents a broader role for the state in supporting the market: "This [model] incorporates a significant role for social welfare institutions as adjuncts of the economy. It

11 The Significance of Difference

holds that social needs should be met on the basis of merit, work performance, and productivity. It is derived from various economic and psychological theories concerned with incentives, effort and reward, and the formation of class and group loyalties. It has been described as the 'Handmaiden Model.' "43 In keeping with Polanyi's interpretation of the variants of poor laws, this model denies that the market and welfare state are necessarily contradictory. Finally, Titmuss' institutional-redistributive model "sees social welfare as a major integrated institution in society, providing universalist services outside the market on the principle of need."44 In this model, unlike the residual model, the role of the state is considerable, although it is not directed towards supporting the market as in the industrial-performance model. Acknowledging Polanyi's contribution as an inspiration, EspingAndersen makes a conscious effort to build on the type of qualitative examination of welfare states undertaken by both Polanyi and Titmuss.45 He develops a typology that categorizes welfare states on two theoretical axes: (i) the extent to which they provide workers with an alternative means of well-being outside the cash-nexus of the market, so that "distribution is detached from the market mechanism";46 and (2) the extent to which the welfare state serves to stratify society and contributes to structuring inequality according to a given pattern. EspingAndersen's typology is intended to emphasize the effects of the welfare state on both the development of variants of capitalism and different patterns of social stratification. Esping-Andersen highlights the ways in which the welfare state interacts with society, fosters particular class loyalties, and makes some political coalitions more viable than others. With these intentions, Esping-Andersen presents a three-fold typology of welfare state regimes - liberal, corporatist, and social democratic. The ideal-type liberal welfare state provides a social minimum in order to ensure social stability and the smooth operation of the market. However, it does not impinge upon market outcomes as they naturally develop within this minimalist framework. As well as being premised on the notion of the limited state, the liberal model emphasizes individual freedom and responsibility. Thus, to the extent that a social minimum is provided, it is furnished in a way that minimizes the infringement of individual autonomy. The liberal model is premised on a strong reliance on public assistance targeted to those in need rather than broader, more universalistic programs. The ideal-type corporatist welfare state, rather than allowing wellbeing to be distributed almost exclusively through the market as does the liberal state, attempts to distribute well-being according to an existing status hierarchy. The active enforcement of status differentials is its

12

Patchworks of Purpose

primary raison d'etre: "rights therefore were attached to class and status."47 As a result, "the state's emphasis on upholding status differences means that its redistributive effects are negligible."48 As a corollary, corporatist regimes rely more heavily on programs gearing benefits to employment history, such as social insurance, than on public assistance. The ideal-type social democratic welfare state endeavours to erode the market distribution of well-being and existing social stratification by allowing all citizens to make basic decisions about their role in the market and family free of the constraints of material need or state compulsion. Thus, the social democratic assistance regime aims to foster social solidarity, as opposed to reinforcing the hierarchical stratification of society. Because of this solidaristic orientation, social democratic regimes rely heavily on universalistic benefits rather than public assistance targeted solely to those in need. To clarify Esping-Andersen's concept of stratification, which encompasses both differentiation between particular categories of welfare state dependents as well as between welfare state dependents and nondependents, one may use the concept of stigmatization. While a welfare state may encourage participation in the market and family in a negative sense through providing only a very low level of benefits, it may also do so in an active way through stigmatization - actively fostering a dualism between state dependents and those who do not rely on the state. By making dependence on assistance unattractive, the state makes reliance on other institutions (market and family) attractive in comparison. With the addition of the concept of stigmatization, the concept of stratification can be limited to state actions that contribute to a hierarchy of status among welfare state dependents. Thus, stratification addresses the extent to which various categories of recipients are made dependent on or are freed from the market and (patriarchal) family. Polanyi, Titmuss, and Esping-Andersen all understand that the welfare state has profound implications for the family.49 However, all three authors - like many others who analyse the welfare state - have tended to fall into the more general trap of focusing on the relationship between the state and market, while not paying adequate attention to the relationship between these institutions and the family. Incorporating the family into analysis of the welfare state is crucial, however, because the welfare state contains "moral choices of profound importance" regarding the "great classical question of the appropriate relationship of government, markets, and families."50 Moreover, the boundaries between these three spheres are "decisive for the welfare of women and for their social power."51 The relationship between the welfare state and the family is not only of theoretical interest: it has also become increasingly central to con-

13 The Significance of Difference

temporary debates in the United States and Canada on the impacts and appropriate role of social policy. One of the politically most serious charges levelled against social policy in the United States is that it is eroding the traditional family structure and thus contributing to the persistence of dependence on state-provided welfare.52 Nevertheless, research has not focused sufficiently on programs most central to the interaction between the state and gendered/familial social cleavages: the prevailing framework of writing on the welfare state ... has concentrated on transnational comparisons and the evolution of national policies and programs ... However, this focus on universal programs and contributory social insurance schemes at the national level has obscured the extent to which needs-based programs most directly targeted towards the poor have been developed and administered by provinces and local governments ... as recent feminist writing on social policy has pointed out, the welfare state itself is a gendered, twotiered construct in which "rights-based" social insurance programs, both in design and administration, typically serve a male wage-labour force. In contrast, discretionary "needs-based" social assistance, along with its more intrusive tradition of casework intervention, responds to the particular vulnerabilities and moral expectations surrounding women's dependence within the family. Understanding the gendered response to poverty in our past, then, requires a redirection of our attention to policy developments at subnational levels of government where needs-based programs predominate.53

The analysis applied to the relationship between assistance and the market may be explicitly extended to a consideration of the effects of the welfare state on the family. If an alternative means of well-being is not provided outside the market, labour market participation is virtually inevitable, regardless of the conditions of work. Similarly, for some range of dependents, if an alternative source of well-being is not provided outside the family, participation in the family is virtually inevitable, regardless of the conditions. On the other hand, if the welfare state provides support for individuals regardless of their family situations, this support tends to weaken dependence on the family: it contributes to making participation in the market and the family a matter of choice. In contrast, the welfare state may reinforce dependence on the family in a negative sense - simply through not providing assistance that offers a viable alternative to participation in the family. Alternatively, the welfare state may actively reinforce dependence on the family through the stigmatization of recipients. Finally, the welfare state may also stratify assistance provision (by identifying certain recipients as deserving and others as undeserving) in order to reinforce the performance of traditional family roles.

14 Patchworks of Purpose AN ASSISTANCE REGIME TYPOLOGY

Polanyi, in his examination of last-resort relief under the poor laws, outlines significant differences between modes of relief provision and their effects on the operation of the market. However, his characterization of the various poor laws is historically specific, and he makes no attempt to develop a typology of broader applicability. Both Titmuss and Esping-Andersen develop typologies of the broader welfare state rather than simply the last-resort assistance component. These typologies are also of broader applicability to welfare states in general, rather than being historically specific. The typology I develop here marries the spirit of the work of Titmuss and Esping-Andersen in its attempt to be of broad applicability with the subject matter examined by Polanyi last-resort assistance for the indigent. Although this typology draws on the insights of both EspingAndersen and Titmuss, it is also significantly different from their typologies. In the typology developed here, differences between assistance regimes are seen as similar in nature, if not magnitude, to differences between the broader welfare state regimes. The various principles that these authors identify as characterizing distinct welfare state regimes are also used as conceptual compass points in outlining distinctiveness among assistance regimes. Certainly, this approach does not fit with Esping-Andersen's classification of all welfare state regimes that rely heavily on public assistance as liberal. Considering their widely varying effects on the operation of the market as outlined so compellingly by Polanyi, it hardly seems useful to characterize the Elizabethan Poor Law, the Speenhamland system, and the New Poor Law as similarly liberal. In the contemporary context, empirical research shows convincingly that there are significant differences between regimes that rely equally heavily on public assistance: "Though all countries in the English-speaking world exhibit extensive assistance regimes, they differ substantially in other respects."54 Assistance regimes may be compared on the extent to which they weaken the dependence of labour on the market, weaken the dependence of the individual on the family, stratify state dependants into a hierarchical ordering, and stigmatize recipients through contributing to a dualism between state dependents and those not dependent upon the state. Constructing a typology on this conceptual basis draws attention to the range of potential directions in which assistance regimes may develop - the menu of alternatives presented to would-be reformers. Residual regimes reinforce dependance on the market and family simply by providing state assistance at such low levels that market or family participation is relatively attractive by comparison. These

15 The Significance of Difference

regimes do not stigmatize or stratify; they are simply predicated on principles of less eligibility. Market/family enforcement regimes reinforce the market and family through sanctions against all state dependants. These sanctions overtly penalize failure to obtain adequate support within these institutions so that dependence upon the state appears less desirable than market or family participation. For example, the poor law practice of incarcerating the indigent certainly marked a considerably higher level of state intervention than simply providing only very limited levels of outdoor relief to the poor. Rather than allowing absolute need to enforce labour market and family participation as in the latter case, the former approach used the fear of imprisonment to actively reinforce the market and family. Although this model harshly penalizes, individuals leaving the market or family, it may actually erect barriers to state dependents entering or reentering the labour market or establishing normal familial relations. This model explicitly recognizes, contrary to many contemporary claims, that a system that fosters long-term cyclical dependence among a particular group of recipients does not, as a logical corollary, necessarily undermine the market or family. Market-performance regimes provide benefits in a manner designed to encourage labour market participation. Recipients participating in the market or preparing to participate receive more generous benefits than nonparticipants. Alternatively, recipients unwilling to participate or prepare to participate in the market may be treated like recipients in either the residual or market/family enforcement models. Conservative regimes are differentially generous for various categories of recipients, with the primary aim of contributing to a nonmarket status hierarchy among state dependents. This hierarchy may be based, for example, on social status, race, or gender. Conservative welfare states - patriarchal regimes, for example - reinforce the existing pattern of gender and family relations by actively distributing well-being according to a particular gendered familial-status hierarchy. Conservative regimes may provide generous assistance to deserving recipients, relieving them of reliance on the market or family, while providing mean and stigmatizing assistance to undeserving recipients, following the pattern of the residual or market/family enforcement models. Redistributive regimes substantially weaken dependence on the market and family. They do so equally for all recipients and, as a corollary, they are neither stigmatizing nor stratifying. These regimes make participation in the market or family a matter of individual choice, free of the compulsion of material need or state coercion. The characteristics of the assistance regimes are summarized in table 1.

16

Patchworks of Purpose

Table 1 Regime typology and characteristics

Weakens family dependence

Stigmatizing (dualism between dependents and non-dependents)

Stratifying (differential treatment among dependenvts)

Regime type

State role

Weakens market dependence

Residual

Negative

No

No

No

No

Market/ family enforcement

Positive

No

No

Actively stigmatizing for all recipients

No

Market performance

Positive

No

May discourage family participation in favour of market participation

No

Differential benefits to recipients participating in employment or employment preparation

Conservative

Positive

Differential for deserving and undeserving recipients

Differential for deserving and undeserving recipients May discourage market participation in favour of family participation

Differentially stigmatizing for deserving and undeserving recipients

Differential benefits to recipients according to non-market status hierarchy

Redistributive

Positive

Yes -for all Yes - for all recipients recipients

No

No

T H E C O M P O N E N T S OF P R O V I N C I A L ASSISTANCE REGIMES

Assistance policy, even the design of the most basic nuts and bolts of the assistance system, is a Rubik cube of complex trade-offs. Weighing the various values at stake in these trade-offs requires subjective judgments, and the design of even the most basic components of an assistance system involves not only technical but fundamentally political issues. Major aspects of program design - eligibility restrictions, benefit levels, asset exemption levels, taxback rates, employability enhancement programs, and verification/enforcement mechanisms - are

17 The Significance of Difference significant in conditioning how the social assistance system may interact with other major social institutions. Asset exemptions, the assets (generally liquid) that an applicant may possess and still be eligible for assistance, raise the question of the appropriate balance between targeting benefits to those most in need and ensuring that asset exemptions are not so low that recipients find it difficult to reenter the labour market or normal family life (for example, they might be required to dispose of home, vehicle, or tools in order to be eligible for assistance). Benefit levels raise the question of the appropriate balance between providing adequate support to help reestablish independence and ensuring that benefits are not high enough to unduly discourage participation in the labour market. Verification and enforcement mechanisms raise the problem of the appropriate balance between ensuring that the system is well-policed and limiting the erosion of self-respect among recipients. Stringent verification and enforcement mechanisms may further contribute to persistent negative stereotypes of recipients among the broader public, which may, in turn, foster dependence. Taxback rates are the rates at which benefits are reduced for employment earnings. Overall taxback rates are determined by a combination of earnings exemptions - the amounts that applicants may earn without reducing their assistance benefits - and taxback rates assessed against nonexempt earnings above this level. Policymakers must identify the adequate trade-off between limiting the number of people on assistance and ensuring that there are incentives to work. Lower overall taxback rates provide a greater incentive for recipients to seek employment but, concomitantly, define a wider range of individuals as eligible for assistance. Policymakers may view low taxback rates as encouraging the move to full-time employment, or, by ameliorating the conditions of assistance recipients, as increasing the time spent on benefits and subsidizing low-wage employment. In designing employment and training programs and requirements, policymakers must consider whether these programs should be punitive and discourage nonrecipients from entering the assistance system and, if so, how they can avoid creating impediments to labour market entry (for example, avoid work requirements that displace job search in the private labour market). If employment and training initiatives are aimed primarily at encouraging employment, they should give recipients some real chance of leaving assistance but should not be so attractive that they draw people into the assistance system who otherwise would not apply. A related issue is how the employability of recipients is defined that is, who should be allowed or expected to work. Provincial differences in the reported percentage of employable recipients are striking

18 Patchworks of Purpose and vary from 28 percent in Newfoundland to 76 percent in New Brunswick.55 Such stark differences are not simply the result of different characteristics of the various provincial caseloads; rather, they are in part the result of divergent definitions of employability. These differences mark fundamental political differences in the range of persons who are recognized by the state as having the legitimate right to be exempt from dependence upon the market or family. Employability per se does not constitute an objective basis for classifying recipients. Although it is often treated as a technical matter, it is impossible to separate the issue of employability from considerations of who is or is not deserving. For example, the Ontario Social Assistance Review Committee report (Transitions) argues, regarding the categorization scheme in Ontario, that "the definitions themselves imply that disabled recipients have no expectation of remunerative employment."56 However, mental or physical ailments, in the absence of multiple deprivations, obviously do not render an individual unemployable. To categorize mentally and physically handicapped recipients as unemployable is, in effect, to state that although the disability is not the primary cause for reliance on social assistance, the system will judge the disabled individuals less harshly because they are deserving recipients. Similarly, to classify single parents as employable or unemployable is to reveal the model of the optimal family arrangement implicit in the provincial assistance system. The various components of social assistance provision outlined above may be fit together in different ways to constitute the five distinct assistance regimes outlined in the last section. The underlying principle of the residual assistance system is to provide some minimal social protection, but not to detract from the operation of the market. Of specific importance is the principle of less eligibility - no one receiving assistance should be better off on assistance than working at the lowest market wage. Thus, the residual assistance regime does not significantly weaken reliance on the market or stratify recipients beyond accepting a state/market dualism, and it thus provides for a "relative equality of poverty among state welfare recipients."57 In order to maximize individual autonomy, this regime exercises control over recipients only in the negative sense that assistance rates (which are below the minimum wage) force recipients into the labour market or into the patriarchal family. Beyond this, benefits are provided so that recipients may dispose of them as they see fit, and assistance is not contingent on certain patterns of behaviour. Thus, the ideal-type residual assistance regime offers universal eligibility for persons in need, who are defined as those whose level of well-being is lower than the lowestpaid wage earner.

19 The Significance of Difference Residual assistance regimes provide standardized benefit levels that are in all cases lower than the minimum wage. Conditions specifying the level of well-being at which individuals are considered to be in need are applied at an equally restrictive level across all categories of potential recipients. The lower the allowable level of asset exemptions, the more closely the system conforms to the residual model. In accordance with the principle of less eligibility, taxback rates are designed such that no combination of employment income and assistance benefits can exceed minimum market wage, and thus, these regimes may incorporate high taxback rates. Employment incentives are provided only by maintaining assistance rates below the minimum market wage, and employability enhancement and labour market adjustment are left solely to the market. Categorical eligibility restrictions, which grant or deny eligibility on the basis of the cause of need rather than on the existence of need, are not incorporated in the residual model, since they would be redundant - levels of need are defined so low that any applicant who meets the requirements is assumed to be deserving. Because recipients are not categorized and asset exemption levels and taxback rates are undifferentiated, and because there are few restrictions on the behaviour of recipients, there are fewer regulations to enforce and much less information requiring verification than in more active regimes. The market/family enforcement regime aims primarily to reinforce the market and family by providing assistance in a way that is sufficiently distasteful to strongly discourage individuals already participating in the market or family from risking the need to rely on state assistance. Thus, this regime disciplines labour market and family participants through providing a visible example of the treatment accorded those who fail to receive adequate support either in the family or market. These regimes have many of the same essential attributes as residual regimes, such as ensuring that everyone who can participate in the market or can depend on the family will not turn to the state. Although these regimes are similar in this sense to the residual model, the primary disincentives to receiving assistance are not the low levels of benefits and restrictive eligibility conditions of residual regimes but the high levels of deliberate and active stigmatization applied against all recipients. Market/family enforcement systems may incorporate stigmatizing verification and enforcement measures. The state may, for example, be extremely active and intrusive in fraud investigation (contrary to the residual model) yet reinforce the market by levelling sanctions against state dependents. As well, the system may enforce nonvoluntary employment and training programs in order to discourage individuals

2O Patchworks of Purpose from turning to assistance. Thus, the level of benefits and asset exemptions may be higher in the market/family enforcement system than in the residual model, on the principle that only those who are truly in need would willingly subject themselves to the stigmatization accompanying receipt of assistance. Market-performance regimes seek primarily to actively encourage labour market participation, or preparation for such participation, by those dependent upon assistance. The hallmark of this type of regime is to provide employment and training programs with significant participation incentives and low taxback rates. Employment incentives may be enhanced by providing supplementary benefits to working recipients, as well as allowing extensions of in-kind benefits to recipients leaving assistance for employment. This approach implies eligibility requirements (such as asset exemptions) of a higher level than residual assistance regimes, so that eligibility for assistance is not limited only to those least able to succeed in the market. If differential benefits are provided, they are higher for market and training participants. In the extreme, assistance may be denied to recipients refusing to participate or to prepare to participate in the labour market, or it may be provided at the low levels or in the stigmatizing manner of the two preceding models. The conservative assistance regime seeks primarily to reinforce an existing nonmarket status hierarchy. Unlike the residual model it is not bound by the strictures of less eligibility, and unlike the market/ family enforcement and market performance models, it may weaken the dependence of labour on the market to the extent of actively discouraging some categories of recipients from market participation. The conservative assistance regime is not bound to acknowledge any a priori equality among assistance recipients. Recipients may be accorded differential treatment on any basis deemed suitable by the state, in keeping with its central purpose of stratifying recipients according to a defined status hierarchy: for example, based on social status, race, or gender. Entire categories of potential recipients may be ineligible for assistance, even though their level of need may be similar to or greater than other categories. Benefit levels, asset exemptions, and taxback rates may vary between deserving and undeserving recipients. Benefits may be higher than the minimum market wage for some categories of recipients, while lower than the minimum market wage for others. In addition, taxback rates may be so high (usually due to the complete reduction of in-kind benefits at some specified income level) that the assistance system actually provides a positive inducement for certain categories of recipients not to participate in the labour market. For example, a patriarchal assis-

21

The Significance of Difference

tance regime may discourage women from entering the labour force, in order to reinforce their position as care-givers in the home. This goal is the counterpart to the goal of the market-performance regime, albeit applied in a different direction: recipients receive special benefits for performing traditional family roles, not for participating in the market. For example, the original intent of Aid to Dependent Children (ADC; now AFDC, or Aid to Families with Dependent Children) in the United States was "to keep mothers out of the paid labour force."58 A conservative assistance regime may offer beneficial employment enhancement and training programs only to deserving recipients or, alternatively, force only undeserving recipients to participate in employment or preparation programs that are seen by recipients as undesirable. Because of stringent regulations and complex categorization, intrusive verification and enforcement mechanisms may be the indirect but necessary result of highly stratifying assistance regimes. However, these mechanisms may also deliberately stigmatize certain categories of undeserving recipients. The redistributive regime seeks primarily to foster social solidarity by eroding the unequal market distribution of well-being and existing social stratification. As a result of this orientation, the redistributive assistance regime does not categorize recipients by employability or ascriptive characteristics, does not provide them with differential treatment, and does not deliberately stigmatize them. A last-resort assistance system may be categorized as redistributive relative to other last-resort assistance systems to the extent that it provides universal eligibility for those in need without discrimination in the treatment accorded to various categories of recipients and provided it can "offer benefits of such a standard that they provide recipients with a genuine option to that of working."59 Redistributive regimes set eligibility requirements relatively loosely, thus defining a wide proportion of the population as in need, and assistance is available to everyone deemed to be in need. Benefits and asset exemptions must be high enough that assistance provides a realistic alternative to participation in the market or family. The redistributive regime allows the parent to decide whether to provide care at home or to participate in the market, and to do so free of compulsion from the state or from absolute material need. Wages may be fully taxed back dollar for dollar, leaving the individual financially indifferent (employment is neither rewarded nor penalized) about accepting employment at wage rates below the level of assistance benefits. From the redistributive viewpoint this situation, which is often referred to as the "poverty trap," simply undermines the dependence of labour on wage levels be-

Table 2 Assistance regime type and program design Regime type

Eligibility

Benefits

Asset exemptions

Taxback rates

Employment/training

Verification/control

Residual

No categorical restrictions Restricted definition of need

Low - standardized

Low - standardized

High - standardized

No

Low — standardized

Market/ family enforcement

No categorical restrictions Restricted definition of need

Standardized

Low - standardized

High - standardized

May enforce work requirements and/ or training

High - standardized

Market performance

No categorical restrictions May include generous definition of need

If differential, higher for market and training participants

Medium - may be differential (must not be so low as to impede market entrance)

May vary Low (if differential, Employment and lower for employtraining programs able recipients) with significant participation incentives

Conservative

Categorical restric- Differential (depen- Differential (depentions dent upon status of dent upon status of Differential (gener- recipient) recipient) ous definition of need for deserving recipients; restricted definition for undeserving recipients)

Differential (used to create status distinction or discourage market entrance)

Differential Differential (may (higher for undeenforce work serving recipients) requirements for undeserving recipients or provide beneficial training and employment for deserving recipients

Redistributive

No categorical restrictions Generous definition of need

High - standardized (must not be so low as to impede market entrance)

High - standardized (actual market wage must provide incentives for market entrance)

May enhance employability of recipients but strictly voluntary

High - standardized

Low - standardized

23 The Significance of Difference

low a particular level. Programs aiding labour market participation may be provided but, where offered, are furnished on a strictly voluntary basis and to all recipients. Like residual regimes, redistributive systems have very limited categorical eligibility requirements, low levels of categorization within assistance programs, simple and undifferentiated asset and earnings exemption levels, and few restrictions on the behaviour of recipients. Thus, enforcement and verification mechanisms are considerably less intrusive than in other types of regimes. Table 2 summarises the design of the five assistance regimes. CONCLUSION

The typology outlined above highlights the various ways in which social assistance may reinforce or undermine the operation of the market and the traditional family. Using this typology, subsequent chapters will examine provincial assistance regimes as they have developed throughout this century, in order to determine whether these regimes represented qualitative differences in how the state strengthened or weakened the market and family, whether these regimes are converging or remain distinct, and whether and how the range of alternative policy directions open to provincial policymakers appears increasingly constrained. The next chapter turns to the first of these questions.

2 The History of Provincial Assistance Regimes to 1950 The history of the poor law and public assistance is ... still important to an understanding of social policy today.1 Analysts of states and social policies must, in short, become unequivocally historicalin their orientation.2

References to the English poor laws, which are the touchstone of the literature on the historical development of the welfare state in Canada, often obscure significant differences between the historical precursors of modern provincial social assistance regimes. The references range from those implying a vague association between assistance provision in Canada and the poor laws or identifying particular Canadian practices as falling under the rubric of the poor law tradition to much stronger statements, such as the claim that "the treatment of the poor in English Canada has its roots in the Elizabethan Poor Laws of 1601" or that "social assistance in Canada very closely resembled that prevalent in the days of the Elizabethan Poor Law."3 The three major variants of English poor law each acted in a distinct manner to weaken or reinforce the market and family. The distinct historical modes of provincial assistance in the formative years of the Canadian social assistance complex (prior to significant federal involvement in this field in the 19505), like the different versions of the English poor laws, marked considerable differences in the relationship between the state, market, and family. When the provincial states accepted responsibility for assisting the indigent, they did so in various ways, ranging from a residual to a redistributive approach. Intuitively, one might expect to explain differences in the historical forms of provincial assistance provision as a function of differences in the models dominant during the various periods when assistance systems were first established. One might reasonably expect that provincial regimes developing in the seventeenth and

25 The History of Provincial Assistance

eighteenth centuries while the Elizabethan Poor Law was in force would share some of the essential characteristics of that model. Concomitantly, regimes developing after the Poor Law Reform of the 18308 might be expected to share some of the characteristics of the New Poor Law model. However, even a cursory examination reveals provincial systems of roughly the same historical periods espousing considerably different models of assistance provision that varied widely, as well, from the model dominant in the imperial centre. Rather than adopting an approach similar to the Elizabethan Poor Law, regimes that developed in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century (in New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Ontario, and Newfoundland) were significantly different both from one another and from the dominant English model. Assistance systems that were to develop considerably later, as a group (in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, British Columbia, and Prince Edward Island), also espoused various models of assistance provision that differed from the contemporary English poor law. Assistance in Quebec, Saskatchewan, and Prince Edward Island took a residual approach in which state responsibility was extremely limited. Assistance in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick more closely approximated the market/family enforcement model, incorporating the uniform application of both less-eligibility and the workhouse test to all recipients, which were integral elements of the New Poor Law of 1834. In these provinces, the state accepted responsibility for providing assistance to the poor - but only to those desperate enough to endure the stigmatization of the workhouse. Assistance regimes in Ontario, Manitoba, Alberta, and British Columbia approximated the stratifying, conservative Old Poor Law of 1601, which designated certain categories of recipients as deserving and others as undeserving. In these provinces, the state accepted responsibility for deserving recipients. In Manitoba, the provincial state accepted no responsibility for undeserving recipients. In Alberta, the state did accept responsibility for undeserving recipients, but only to a minimal extent. In Ontario and British Columbia, the state accepted responsibility for undeserving recipients, but only if they were willing to endure the stigmatization of the workhouse or work tests. Assistance in Newfoundland was neither stratifying nor actively stigmatizing: particular categories of recipients were not designated as deserving or undeserving and residence in the poorhouse or "working out" relief was not required. In this sense, Newfoundland's system resembled the redistributive model implicit in the Speenhamland system, since the state accepted responsibility for providing everyone in need with some minimal level of well-being.

26 Patchworks of Purpose Considering this pattern, the assistance regimes adopted by individual provinces appear to hinge more clearly on their specific economic and social contexts than on the period in which social assistance systems were initially constructed. Historically, the relief complex in Canada was much more uniquely Canadian and the individual regimes were much more distinctly provincial than references likening Canadian practice to the English poor laws often suggest. THE RESIDUAL REGIMES

The historical forms of assistance provision in Quebec, Saskatchewan, and Prince Edward Island are the closest to the residual approach. In all three cases, the state tried to avoid responsibility, in any significant way, for the care of the indigent. In so doing, the state reinforced other mechanisms for the distribution of well-being, including the market and family, simply through providing no viable alternative to reliance on these institutions. Quebec

Judging the role of the Quebec state in the provision of assistance is difficult due to the unique relationship between the state and the Church in this field. Historically, the provincial state's role was supplementary to assistance provided by the Catholic Church.4 The state went to considerable lengths until at least 1940 to deny any responsibility for care of the indigent. The ultimate aim was to reinforce what Minville has referred to as the "cult of the family," which was so central to Quebec society.5 Before the early twentieth century, assistance in Quebec was predicated on the notion that assistance was a private - not public - matter. According to the teachings of the Catholic Church, primary responsibility for maintaining the indigent fell, in the first instance, to the family and, in the second instance, to parish authorities.6 These principles led logically to a very limited role for the state. A formal recognition of the role of the Church is evident as far back as 1688, in the stipulation by the French state that the cure in New France had power over the distribution of assistance.7 The Municipal Code of 1871 and subsequent amendments had granted municipalities the discretionary authority to provide assistance or establish houses of refuge - probably to accommodate localities where anglophones and Protestants predominated. Most municipal assistance was still channelled through the Church. According to Strong, writing in 1930, "in respect to the treatment of poverty,

27

The History of Provincial Assistance

private rather than public initiative continues to be almost universally favoured and, in spite of powers granted by the Municipal Code, practically no poor relief is directly under public administrative control."8 The Public Charities Act of 1921 extended the principle of public financial responsibility;9 however, the actual provision of assistance was still left to private charity, which would then decide how funds (twothirds of which were public) would be disbursed. Minville noted that the Act "does not provide for the establishment of welfare work by the state. It tends only to assist financially the institutions, private or municipal, which are looking after the poor."10 Before the province implemented an allowance for needy mothers in 1940 (see table 3, which lists all the provinces), "no government agency - provincial or municipal - was empowered ... to pay direct financial assistance at home under the Public Charities Act." 11 Grauer notes that as of 1939 "aid [was] confined almost exclusively to institutional care, with the result that outdoor relief to persons in their own homes [had] been, and ... still [was] left to private charity."12 Although the state appeared to play only a limited role in providing assistance, the Boucher Report argued in 1963 that its role was in fact significant. According to the report, from 1921 to 1960 the public and private sectors fashioned an acceptable mode de vivre whereby the state financed assistance, which was then distributed by private agencies. This arrangement allowed the "myth" of the supplementary role of the state to continue unchallenged long after the state had come to play a leading financial role in providing assistance at home. 13 Thus, Cassidy referred in 1945 to the Public Assistance Act as "an ingenious device for preserving the values of church and other private charitable effort in an age when it can no longer carry heavy financial burdens without public support."14 To the extent that the Quebec assistance regime is seen as a partnership between the state and Church in which the state's financial resources were transferred to the Church to provide at-home relief for deserving recipients and institutional relief for nondeserving recipients, it appears as a more strongly conservative regime designed to reinforce a particular status hierarchy identified by the Church. In part, the validity of this characterization depends on whether the Church might appropriately be seen as an integral part of the state. In part, it depends on more immediate empirical questions, such as the extent to which the Church provided outdoor relief based on status differentials. The relationship between the state and the Church in the providing assistance is clear in the formal recognition that "wherever religious communities of the Roman Catholic faith are concerned, the rights of the bishops over such communities cannot be prejudiced by

28 Patchworks of Purpose Table 3 Mothers' allowances in the provinces

Date" Amount*

NF

PEI

NS

NB

QC

ON

MB

1949

1949

1930

1943

1940

1920 $35

n/a

n/a

$15

n/a

$25

SK

AB

BC

1916

1917

1919

1920

f

$10

$45

$42

$33

Source: Marsh, Report on Social Security for Canada. a Year in which allowances were first paid. b Maximum amount payable to a one-child family, 1942. c Plus winter fuel allowance.

any supervisory power of the state."15 The Church used this power to reinforce traditional notions of the importance of the family. However, the role of the state per se remained limited, and the Public Charities Act is strong testament to the lengths to which the state would go to avoid assuming direct responsibility for the care of the indigent. Saskatchewan

The assistance system in Saskatchewan resembled the residual model: the state accepted only very limited responsibility for care of the indigent and, in so doing, reinforced, in a negative way, reliance on either the market or the family. Saskatchewan never adopted indoor relief for the indigent, whether applied to all recipients or limited to employable recipients.16 Thus, it does not fit the market/ family enforcement model. Since categorical programs were particularly meagre, the Saskatchewan system also was not highly stratifying and did not reinforce a particular status hierarchy. Finally, a tradition of widespread assistance, as existed in Newfoundland, was not evident. Throughout the first half of this century, assistance in Saskatchewan was the responsibility of the municipalities.17 Municipal relief was often meagre or nonexistent; Cassidy notes "the problem of municipal denial of relief to the needy."18 For example, as late as the Second World War "communities cut out relief for their residents altogether or reduced it to very little."19 Mothers' allowances were adopted in Saskatchewan in 1917, but levels of assistance were extremely low. For example, in the early 19408, maximum payment to a one-child family was $ 10.00, compared to $42.50 in British Columbia and $45.00 in Alberta (see table 3, above). 20 Marsh argues that "Saskatchewan's system [was] really a

29 The History of Provincial Assistance

children's allowance, not a mothers' allowance at all, for no payment [was] made on behalf of the parent." 21 Thus, the Saskatchewan mothers' allowance was "evidently only partial support" 22 and was intended only to complement municipal assistance. Municipalities could supplement these allowances with additional municipal relief. 23 However, they did not generally do so; additional assistance could simply be denied. Mothers' allowances in Saskatchewan certainly did not raise the status of recipients relative to other state dependents, unlike mothers' allowances in some other provinces, nor could such a low level of assistance actively displace wage labour by these recipients or reinforce the performance of traditional family roles. This system reinforced the market and traditional family simply by providing no viable alternative to labour market participation or dependence on the family. Prince Edward Island

Unlike other provinces, Prince Edward Island had no significant categorical programs (for example, mothers' allowance) before ig5O. 24 Only then did the province formally recognize a responsibility to provide some minimal level of assistance to the indigent. Poor relief appears to have been quite strictly limited before 1950: "there [was] little organized provision for public assistance."25 Elected provincial officials distributed the assistance that was available with absolute discretion: "special grants were provided to individuals through the provincial cabinet where circumstances appeared to so warrant."26 Unlike the market/family enforcement regimes, the province provided no indoor relief. And in contrast to the conservative regimes, because it provided discretionary relief to all categories of recipient, assistance was neither categorically granted or denied: "As far as unemployment relief [was] concerned, the Province [made] provision for grants to incorporated towns under certain conditions and otherwise, distribute [d] relief from the office of the Deputy Provincial Treasurer in small monthly cash payments, each by approval of the Treasury Board."27 Cassidy argues that "the simplicity of the Prince Edward System [was] commendable"28 - but its simplicity was, perhaps, not particularly surprising considering the size and population of the island. Although residual in the sense that the province did not formally recognize an obligation to assist the indigent, the method adopted may have served to distribute patronage in a clientelistic party system. This somewhat complicates the categorization of the Prince Edward Island assistance system.

30 Patchworks of Purpose THE MARKET/FAMILY

ENFORCEMENT

REGIMES

Assistance in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick closely mirrored the New Poor Law. These regimes combined a strong insistence on the primacy of the market and family with what Titmuss recognized as the acceptance of positive state action "to drive men to work or into the workhouse"29 and, concomitantly, drive women into the patriarchal family. They were based on the premise of uniform treatment for all categories of recipients, as well as the principle of less eligibility. They relied on undifferentiated indoor relief for all recipients, which was highly stigmatizing and contributed to a stark dualism in well-being between individuals dependent on the state and individuals dependent on the market or family. These regimes also actively reinforced the market and family by providing that even persons who were not state dependants but were deemed likely to become state dependants could be forced into labour. In keeping with this orientation, they adopted categorical home relief programs later than other provinces, and eligibility for these programs was generally more restrictive than in other provinces. Thus, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick lagged behind other provinces in adopting more conservative measures of assistance provision. By providing assistance in the poorhouse the state did acknowledge responsibility for care of the poor; however, indoor relief appeared most clearly geared to reinforcing the market and family by providing a visible reminder to participants in those institutions of the fate that awaited them should they require state assistance or even appear likely to require assistance. Not only was indoor relief stigmatizing, it actually posed significant dangers to the health of the unfortunate residents (especially through infectious diseases). Work even at sub-subsistence wage levels or life even within a dysfunctional family were probably more attractive alternatives. New Brunswick

A formal poor law modelled on the Elizabethan Poor Law was adopted in New Brunswick in 1786, although the practice of assistance provision was much more in keeping with the principles of the New Poor Law. Nothing in the New Poor Law of 1834 was formally instituted, but elements of the New Brunswick system were strongly consistent with this model, including an emphasis on indoor relief for all categories of recipients. This tradition of assistance provision, established early on, continued into the middle of the twentieth century. The Canadian Welfare Council

31 The History of Provincial Assistance

noted in 1949 that the New Brunswick Poor Law "assumes that the Municipal Home is the usual means through which support is given and that outdoor relief is only provided until arrangements can be made in an institution."30 According to the council, "the development of assistance to people in their own homes has been discouraged by the nature of the Poor Law ... outdoor relief is provided to a lesser degree in New Brunswick than in most provinces in Canada."31 Based on numerous interviews conducted with local officials in the late 19408, the council concluded that "relief given to persons in their own homes in the rural areas was practically negligible."32 In Saint John in the early 19405, outdoor aid was not available to any recipient if there was accommodation in the municipal almshouse.33 Institutions providing care for the indigent did not separate inmates according to the cause of their dependency. Indigent mothers and families, the disabled, and the mentally handicapped, among others, were all housed within the confines of the general workhouse (otherwise known as the municipal home), which "was still very much in evidence as late as i94g."34 A considerable tradition of forced work was also related to the provision of assistance in New Brunswick municipalities. Until 1900, by virtue of the 1786 legislation, certain parishes "annually offered paupers for sale by public auction."35 Even persons not dependent on charitable support could be legally bound into forced labour and, if likely to become chargeable on the parish, could be forced to labour "for any person who may employ him."36 In addition, nonresidents likely to become chargeable on the parish could be forcibly returned to their home parish. It is perhaps not surprising, considering the institutionalized antipathy towards outdoor relief, that mothers' allowances were adopted only in 1943 (see table 3, above). Thus, not until this time were any state dependents free of the stigmatization and degradation associated with the mixed poorhouse. Even under mothers' allowances, assistance was "not sufficient in amount to provide a minimum standard of health and decency."37 In stark contrast with other provinces such as Ontario and Manitoba, mothers were expected to subsidize assistance with market earnings.38 In addition, even categorical relief continued to be stigmatizing and intrusive: "all applicants are visited in their homes and, if the allowance is granted, the administration plans for a reinvestigation every three months."39 This practice contrasts sharply with the absence of intrusive verification techniques in certain other provinces such as Newfoundland. Overall, the assistance system in New Brunswick was "much weaker than those of most provinces ... Gaps and inadequacies in welfare service [were] striking, including very limited public assistance measures."40

32

Patchworks of Purpose

Nova Scotia

As in New Brunswick, relief in Nova Scotia was predicated historically on the principle of undifferentiated indoor relief. The poor law adopted in 1763, which was based on the Elizabethan legislation, incorporated an optional "work house test" and municipalities (although obliged to assist the needy) were empowered to make entrance into the workhouse a condition of assistance.41 In keeping with the principles of the New Poor Law, the general application of the workhouse test became standard practice and remained in effect into the middle of the twentieth century: "The general reliance upon institutional care rather than home relief [was] indicated by the fact that in 1942 the City of Halifax granted no home relief, offering only care in the City Home or nothing at all."42 Nova Scotia put more stress on indoor relief "than any other province."43 Furthermore, as in New Brunswick, relief in Nova Scotia did not differentiate between various categories of recipients and "in the county homes there [was] indiscriminate mixture of various types of needy persons - the aged and the widows ineligible for pensions, the physically handicapped, the chronic invalids, the shiftless adults of low mentality, and even the 'harmless insane.'" 44 Considering this, it is not surprising that "over time, conditions in the workhouses became appalling."45 Among other things, tuberculosis and other infectious diseases posed a significant threat to the health of inmates. The province first acknowledged responsibility for assistance in the modern era with the passage of mothers' allowance legislation in 1930 (see table 3, above).46 This legislation shifted assistance in Nova Scotia towards a more categorical orientation. However, eligibility requirements for categorical assistance remained stringent: When welfare in the form of financial rather than institutional assistance first appeared, it was limited to the "deserving poor." Of course, it was only those in positions of authority who were able to decide who was and who was not deserving. At first only widows - apparently the most deserving of poor women were given financial assistance. It was not until much later that deserted wives and wives of disabled husbands and prisoners were assisted. Last of all, and not surprisingly, unmarried mothers and their illegitimate children did not begin to receive welfare until the 197os.47 Persons not eligible for these strictly limited categorical programs remained reliant on the municipal poorhouse.

33

The History of Provincial Assistance

THE CONSERVATIVE REGIMES

The hallmark of the assistance regimes in Ontario, Manitoba, Alberta, and British Columbia in their historical forms was the strong differentiation between assistance provided to the deserving and the undeserving poor. These conservative regimes readily accepted responsibility for the care of deserving recipients - unlike residual systems, which essentially attempted to deny responsibility for all categories of indigents. They also adopted categorical allowances for the deserving poor very early, in comparison with other provinces. In contrast to the relatively ready acceptance of state responsibility for deserving recipients, responsibility for undeserving recipients was accepted only grudgingly. In stark contrast to the uniform application of the workhouse test in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, these provinces either provided no indoor relief or applied it only to undeserving recipients, while deserving recipients were offered home relief. Ontario and British Columbia actively stigmatized undeserving recipients, while Manitoba and Alberta adopted a more residual approach to them. Ontario

Relief provision as it existed in Ontario in the early twentieth century had been essentially shaped during the 18308, when present-day southern Ontario was known as Upper Canada. However, when English civil law was established in the colony of Upper Canada in 1792 it explicitly excluded the English poor law.48 Although the basis of the Ontario assistance system was laid in Upper Canada at the same time as the New Poor Law was being instituted in England, the assistance system in Upper Canada rejected the nonstratifying approach of the New Poor Law. Despite the explicit, formal rejection of the Elizabethan Poor Law in Upper Canada in 1792, the province stratified assistance recipients and provided outdoor relief for deserving applicants — in contrast to Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, which developed assistance in roughly the same period. Deserving and undeserving recipients were "closely differentiated" and "Upper Canadian practice ... excluded able-bodied persons from receiving relief except under strict conditions; with institutionalized work tests among the most noteworthy."49 In keeping with this conservative mode of differentiating between the deserving and undeserving poor, Irving notes that "the moral character of the needy, too, began to be a factor in the 18305 in qualifying people for relief."50

34

Patchworks of Purpose

Providing outdoor relief for the deserving poor and indoor relief for the undeserving poor was central to the Ontario system. After it became mandatory for municipalities to establish workhouses in the i86os, the workhouse remained a central element of assistance in Ontario, even though the mandatory aspect was soon repealed. In 1903, the establishment of what were now called county houses of refuge again became compulsory.51 As a result, "Ontario developed a comprehensive network of county poorhouses" that were even more common than in Nova Scotia or New Brunswick.52 Municipalities were empowered to commit indigents (that is, the poor who were not yet state dependants) to these houses.53 However, this did not entail a mandatory workhouse test, since the provision of outdoor relief was left to the discretion of the municipality, and "there [was] no rule ... that municipal aid must be given only to inmates of the institution; that is, there [was] no 'workhouse test' in Ontario, and in fact a great deal of outdoor relief [was] given by municipalities, especially in the city."54 By 1874, "the granting of municipal [outdoor] relief was remarkably widespread and involved a considerable expenditure."55 Care of able-bodied recipients in the workhouse gradually evolved into a system of compulsory work requirements: "The workhouse test became a work test, with able-bodied recipients required to saw cordwood or break rocks as a condition for receiving help."56 For example, in Toronto undeserving recipients were required, upon application for relief, to break up a 65o-pound crate of rocks. In the mid-19305 it was still standard for assistance to able-bodied employables to be contingent on a work test, and a provincial requirement of "compulsory labour for the dole" was instituted.57 In keeping with the strong tradition of differentiation, mothers' allowances, adopted in 1920 (see table 3, above), established categorical outdoor relief for mothers and required municipal involvement.58 The government stressed that the applicant was not applying for charity. Recipients were "to be regarded as ... employee [s] of the Ontario Government, receiving remuneration for service rendered in the proper care of [their] children."59 Noting the difference between this approach and general poor relief, Kierstead argues that this approach was "necessary because of the demoralizing results which have attended local poor relief."60 Mother's allowances undermined the market in the sense that care-giving in the home was recognized as a legitimate alternative to labour market participation. However, the Ontario program certainly did not undermine the expectation that mothers would perform traditional family duties. Attendant with the supposed status of government employee was a strong measure of intrusion into the management of the family. The Ontario Mothers'

35 The History of Provincial Assistance

Allowance Commission explicitly asserted that "the mother is regarded as an applicant for employment as a guardian of future citizens of the state, and if she does not measure up to the state's standards for such guardians other arrangements must be sought."61 This rather ominous warning undoubtedly implied that the children of mothers who did not "measure up" would become wards of the state. Thus, Struthers argues that "the state ... explicitly took the place of the absent husband. Financial support and the right to retain care of one's children were given only in exchange for strict fidelity to specific moral norms and expectations concerning the proper external behaviour and innate qualities of a 'good mother' and housekeeper. Women received help not as independent citizens in their own right, but as paid caregivers for the state."6a Further developing this argument, Little argues that "these women were supposed to donate all their time and attention to their children and to never show another interest in a man as long as they received the Mothers' Allowances cheque. Just as their husband had financially supported them in return for sexual monogamy, the state struck the same bargain."63 Despite mandatory outdoor relief for deserving recipients, there was "no legal obligation upon the local authorities to provide work or maintenance for the able-bodied poor and their families."64 Provisions for assistance varied widely across municipalities. One of the more interesting variations was to be found in East Windsor, where municipal public relief was under the control of departmental managers of the Ford Motor Company. A review of assistance provision at the time noted that "the office itself was 'the most orderly I have visited' as a 'police officer was in attendance at all times.'" 65 To the extent that standardization of the widely varying municipal practices evolved, it was in the form of ceilings on assistance paid to undeserving recipients.66 Consistent with the historical tradition of differential assistance, when the federal government cut its cost-sharing for unemployment relief in 1941, the provincial government continued to share costs with the municipalities for unemployable but not for employable recipients: "Provincial government orders-in-council in the summer of 1940 simply cut off funding for employable single men and married men on relief under the age of forty-five with up to two dependents."67 Thus, "for the next fifteen years the Ontario Unemployment Relief Act offered provincial assistance only to those who were not employable and made no payments to those who were simply unable to find employment ... unemployed employables were once again cast on the mercy of municipalities."68 The general practice among local authorities was to deny assistance to this category of undeserving recipients.69

36 Patchworks of Purpose British Columbia

British Columbia also has a conservative historical legacy of social assistance provision. Assistance was at first a matter for local government and, to the extent they existed, private charities. However, in 1920 British Columbia adopted the Mothers' Pension Act, which removed assistance for single-mother families from local administration.70 British Columbia was "the most 'liberal' in its allocations" of mothers' allowances.71 They could be granted to any mother needing assistance to maintain a normal home, whereas in all other provinces allowances were limited to specific categories of mothers. 72 In addition to drawing eligibility requirements widely, the British Columbia scale was among the most generous of the original programs (see table 3, above).73 As in Ontario, while deserving recipients received relatively generous and unconditional home relief, undeserving recipients remained the responsibility of the municipalities. By the early 19308, the province established relief work camps for the able-bodied single unemployed, akin to the work requirements of Ontario: "From 1935 on, it was usual throughout British Columbia to require the able-bodied unemployed to 'work out relief,' on sewer, park or road construction ... until they had paid off their public assistance allowance."74 This workfor-relief mirrors the requirement of the Elizabethan poor law for ablebodied recipients to work out assistance: the relief camps of British Columbia are analogous to Elizabethan workhouses. The Social Assistance Act of 1945 changed assistance provision in British Columbia significantly by expanding eligibility to all families in need: "Families without means were no longer dependent on relief handouts from municipal governments or private charities."75 However, a segment of the poor (generally able-bodied) who still did not qualify under these early provincial programs was forced to continue to rely on municipal relief, which "was provided on an ad hoc basis, frequently through kind (meal chits or the soup line) rather than cash and was usually accompanied by stringent residency requirements."75 Manitoba Although the sanctions enforced against undeserving recipients in Manitoba were clearly not as harsh as in British Columbia and Ontario, the Manitoba assistance system was nevertheless highly stratifying. Undeserving recipients received assistance strictly at the discretion of individual municipalities.77 In contrast, the province assumed responsibility for deserving recipients very early on, in comparison to other provinces. Mothers' allowances in Manitoba, in addition to being the first

37 The History of Provincial Assistance

such program initiated, in 1916, were also the most generous of the provincial allowances (see table 3, above).78 Manitoba was also the only province to rely on a "budget system," rather than a standardized means-tested formula, which provided "a better chance of meeting the real needs of the family.'"79 Mothers' allowances in Manitoba were clearly intended to supplant wage labour: "the province pays the mother to stay at home and train her children because it regards her function in the home of greater social importance than her economic earnings."80 Program design "discourages outside work on the part of the mother, since it takes away from the duties and functions of the home, and to this extent weakens her influence on the home and defeats the object of the allowance."81 As in Ontario, while the system relieved mothers of the possibility of being forced into the labour market by abject poverty, it was intended to reinforce traditional family roles. Like Ontario, Manitoba adopted the philosophy that recipients of mother's allowances were not recipients of charity but were employees of the state. This philosophy included paternalistic intrusions into the care of the household: "Manitoba ... appointed a 'visiting housekeeper' to instruct mothers, arguing that 'when the contract of employment between the mother and the Province is signed and the mother in receipt of her salary ... the Province should satisfy itself that the services rendered for the salary are accomplishing what was intended." 82 Thus, Manitoba based the stratification of recipients primarily on the consideration that female sole-support parents were deserving because of their role in the household; the patriarchal role of the family bread-winner, who was absent for whatever reason, was simply being transferred to the state. alberta

In Alberta, as in Manitoba, assistance provision for undeserving recipients was not as harsh as in either British Columbia or Ontario, but there was a significant difference in the treatment of undeserving and deserving recipients. Although Alberta had no provisions for indoor relief and workhouses were never adopted,83 Whitton argued forcefully in 1947 that "the whole concept of relief and assistance in the Province [was] unjustifiably harsh."84 According to Whitton, "the relief of general distress [was] left solely to the municipalities ... There [was] a consequent uneven patchwork of assistance for the ablebodied in need, for the borderline and aged cases not under old age payments, for the family or individual in distress and serious consequent growth of suffering in the absence of adequacy of municipal

38 Patchworks of Purpose

welfare provisions."85 Municipal benefit levels varied considerably and "complaints [were] common that relief [had] frequently been inadequate."86 Ironically, considering that the province required municipalities to provide assistance,87 the role of the province was to serve as a check against municipal provision becoming too generous. Cassidy noted that "The [Alberta] bureau [had] emphasized the upper limits of relief to be granted by the local authorities and [had] been vigorous in its efforts to reduce the relief rolls. But apparently it [had] been much less concerned with guaranteeing adequacy of relief, and it [had] done but little to assist local officials in doing a more constructive job. Essentially its supervision [had] been limited to financial matters, and in this respect it seems to have been very strict."88 As with other stratifying assistance regimes, mothers' allowances were adopted early in Alberta (in 1919, see table 3, above). They were quite generous, especially in comparison with assistance for undeserving recipients.89 With the advent of this categorical program, differential provision of assistance became a formal hallmark of the Alberta system. THE REDISTRIBUTIVE

REGIME!

NEWFOUNDLAND

The assistance regime in Newfoundland was neither stratifying (assistance was not categorically granted or denied to different groups of recipients) nor highly stigmatizing in comparison to provinces where residence in the poorhouse was required (Nova Scotia, New Brunswick) or work requirements were enforced (Ontario, British Columbia). To the extent Newfoundland provided some minimal level of assistance to all recipients in need, including able-bodied recipients in seasonal employment, assistance in the province bore some resemblance to the Speenhamland system. In the early twentieth century the colonial government of Newfoundland provided considerable relief to what a 1930 Royal Commission called the "permanent poor" (widows, orphans, and the aged), the "casual poor" (temporarily incapacitated and seasonally unemployed), and the "able-bodied poor."90 The wide range of recipients is perhaps not surprising considering the long-standing tradition of significant state involvement in this area. By the mid-nineteenth century, Newfoundland had already established a strong tradition of state assistance for the seasonally unemployed, especially for those employed in the fisheries. "[I]n StJohn's the whole operative class of resident fishermen habitually found themselves idle and destitute for

39 The History of Provincial Assistance seven months out of twelve, a situation which gave the colony a larger proportion of poor than in other British colonies."91 A Newfoundland royal commission argued in 1933 that "we cannot indeed emphasize too strongly that recurring visitations of pauperism necessitating large payments for relief have always been a feature of the Island's economic history and must continue to be so, while the fishery is conducted on its present basis and remains the mainstay of the country."92 Widespread assistance for the seasonally unemployed continued in the twentieth century.93 At certain times (for example, during the winter of 1932-33) up to a quarter of the population was receiving outdoor relief. Despite the low levels of relief in individual cases, it was widespread and, to a significant degree, helped guarantee a minimum level of annual income. In this sense, assistance provision in Newfoundland in this period bears a considerable resemblance to the Speenhamland system. Assistance allowed independent commodity producers to remain in the fisheries rather than be forced to sell their fishing equipment and rely completely on wage labour. Newfoundland also provided significant amounts of outdoor relief to able-bodied recipients who were not in regular seasonal employment. (Indoor relief, even for these recipients, was never significant in Newfoundland.) 94 Although the total amounts of outdoor relief provided to the able-bodied varied considerably from municipality to municipality, as of 1930 it represented over one-third of funds disbursed to all recipients.95 In fact, assistance for able-bodied recipients as a proportion of overall spending was probably higher in this period than it is at present. Though assistance was provided to single-mother families, unlike the practice in many other provinces, it was not provided through a categorical program. The strong tradition of state assistance is evident in the complete absence of voluntary agencies providing assistance - in sharp contrast to Quebec, for example, where, for the most part, private charity delivered assistance.96 In spite of its significant role, the state did not provide assistance in an intrusive or highly stigmatizing manner. For example, verification methods were extremely relaxed. Applications, in certain circumstances, could even be made by mail and no home visits were conducted.97 State assistance was as a widespread and accepted fact of life: "Social welfare services of a kind have always been a part of the Government's efforts to relieve seasonal destitution, the 'relieving officer' in the old order being a familiar kindly figure in these communities."98 Although undoubtedly a romanticized view of the perceptions of the relieving officer in Newfoundland, this image would have found little resonance outside of Newfoundland. Certainly, such an image would be foreign in provinces such as Nova Scotia and

40 Patchworks of Purpose New Brunswick, where the relieving officer could have the indigent auctioned into forced labour, forcibly removed from the municipality, or cast into the poorhouse. CONCLUSION

Assistance under the English poor laws was in some cases highly stratifying or highly stigmatizing and in some cases neither; assistance in the provinces also ranged widely in this regard. The significant variation reveals fundamental differences in the extent to which the state accepted responsibility for the care of the indigent and, in so doing, buttressed or weakened the market and the family. Significant differences between provinces may not appear surprising considering that assistance provision received legal recognition in New France as early as 1688, developed in the colonies (Upper Canada, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland) between the mid-eighteenth and midnineteenth centuries, and was established in the remaining provinces essentially in the early twentieth century (Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, British Columbia, and Prince Edward Island). Nevertheless, differences between provinces do not appear significantly related to the time at which assistance regimes were initially established; they did not simply institutionalize variations in the approach to assistance dominant at the time. Rather, a more powerful explanation of the rich provincial diversity is likely to be found in the specific historical contexts (social, economic, cultural) of the various provinces. Differences between the variants of English poor laws had tremendous consequences for the economic structure and the development of modern society. Although the impacts may not be as dramatic as in the case of the English poor laws, it is reasonable to expect that similar variations in provincial assistance regimes would have had significant effects on the economic and social structure of the provinces. Consequently, these differences warrant much greater scholarly attention than they have received thus far. The next chapter examines these differences as they developed in the face of increasing federal activism in this policy field.

3 Federal Initiatives and the Development of Provincial Social Assistance, 1950-92

Social assistance is a critical element of the welfare state; yet while much of the larger welfare state edifice in Canada has been constructed at the federal or national level, this crucial component has been and remains primarily a provincial concern. Because the provinces adopted widely varying approaches, the welfare state in Canada by the middle of the twentieth century looked more like a patchwork of ten distinct provincial variants than a national system. Conditional, matching cost-sharing under the Unemployment Assistance Act (UAA, 1956) and Canada Assistance Plan (CAP, 1966) represented the federal answer - albeit a weak one - both to the substantive question of what kind of welfare state was most desirable as well as to the question whether the social assistance complex should be fashioned as a national system or a set of provincial systems. Certainly, these initiatives represent a move in the direction of a national model and away from the earlier, solely provincial involvement. They are also more consistent with a national model than current federal policy. The Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982, is another federal initiative that might be expected to contribute to the development of uniformity in provincial social assistance provision. However, when provincial assistance provision is assessed empirically using two quantitative indicators - overall expenditures on social assistance and benefit rates - there is slight evidence of convergence in the postwar period. Expectations of convergence resulting from federal cost-sharing are based on crucial assumptions about the causes of provincial variations and their pliability, as well as assumptions about the

42

Patchworks of Purpose

weight of federal initiatives in shaping provincial policy preferences. Differences among provinces are assumed, it appears, to exist autonomously of the societal context. Whatever the specific causes of policy variation, differences are presumed not to be substantially rooted in provincial societal differences. Concomitantly, in the face of pressures towards uniformity resulting from cost-sharing, provincial policy differences are considered likely to dissolve, since the forces underlying these differences are assumed to be relatively insubstantial in comparison to the fiscal leverage of the federal government. An alternative view is that provincial differences are deeply rooted in the economic, social, and cultural contexts of the various provinces: historically, assistance regimes have been shaped by and, in turn, have helped to shape distinct provincial contexts. Consequently, provincial variations are much more robust and substantial and less amenable to change through federal policy instruments such as cost-sharing under the UAA and CAP, which could not therefore effect substantial convergence between provincial regimes. Seen in this light, the debate about the effects of cost-sharing is not simply an arcane technical question of fiscal federalism - it is rooted in a much more fundamental debate about the forces shaping and constraining policy and the relationship between state and society. FEDERAL

POLICY DEVELOPMENTS

The postwar period, which was marked by optimism about the ability of governments to solve social problems, saw the development of the national aspect of the Canadian welfare state.l The optimism was evident in the Beveridge report, which was intended to guide postwar development of the English welfare state and which was mirrored in Canadian social policy in the Marsh report and the proposals of Harry Cassidy.2 In the immediate postwar period, the federal government put forward a "grand design" for a "charter of social security for the whole of Canada" in the White Paper on Employment and Income and the Green Book on Reconstruction.^ It was committed "to the development of a comprehensive nation-wide social security system,"1^ whose four cornerstones were family allowances, contributory unemployment insurance (ui) and unemployment assistance for those not eligible for ui, a universal old-age security plan and a cost-shared pension plan based on need, and, finally, a national health insurance plan.5 The federal government put this plan in place incrementally over the course of the 19505 and 19605. The Canada Assistance Plan (1966) appears as one of the last elements in a range of social security legislation, including the Unemployment Insurance Act (1940),

43 Federal Initiatives

Family Allowances Act (1944), Old Age Security Act (1951), Blind Persons Act (1951), Disabled Persons Act (1954), Unemployment Assistance Act (1956), Hospital Insurance Act (1957), Canada Pension Plan Act (1965), and Medical Services Act (1968). It has been argued that "the Canada Assistance Plan symbolized ... an end to the major reforms of the 19505 and igGos. The grand design of 1945 had been put in place - not always tidily, not always peacefully, but it was there."6 Social assistance was never a central element in the federal government's national social security strategy, which was based on the assumption (as was the Beveridge Report) that with a commitment to full employment, contributory insurance plans to guard against disruptions in employment earnings, and universal family benefits, social assistance would be only a residual component of the overall social security scheme. Probably as a result of this assumption, proponents of a national social security system did not challenge provincial responsibility over social assistance. At the same time, the assumptions underlying the policy initiatives that were undertaken in the field appeared to be much in keeping with those guiding the larger process of constructing a national social security program. Policymakers assumed that some national uniformity in the social security system was desireable. They believed in the efficacy of government and assumed the federal government could use innovative policy instruments such as cost-sharing to achieve their ends. Their efforts to foster a modicum of national uniformity in social assistance were embodied in the cost-sharing initiatives culminating in CAP. Undoubtedly, there are good reasons to expect that this extension of federal cost-sharing would have led to increasing homogeneity in provincial assistance programs. Federal transfers could be expected to be "a critical factor in equalizing the capacity of provinces to provide public services, including social assistance."7 Cost-sharing, it has been argued, can "break the bond between the strength and wealth of a provincial economy and its access to public revenue ... Once the link has been broken, then the poorer provinces are able to provide a level of spending comparable with the other provinces and, indeed, to respond to the greater burdens posed for welfare services and the like arising from the original poverty."8 However, cost-sharing may have contradictory effects. On the one hand, cost-sharing is said to equalize the fiscal capacity of provinces so that they might be expected to provide more similar levels of services. On the other hand, cost-sharing may allow provinces that are already willing and able to commit funds to a particular program or service to offer those services at an even higher level relative to other provinces. Thus, there is no a priori reason to expect that cost-sharing would lead

44 Patchworks of Purpose

quantitative measures of provincial social assistance provision such as overall spending or benefit levels to converge. The actual effects of cost-sharing in fostering convergence remain to be examined. Unemployment Assistance, 1956

The federal government played an extremely limited role in the provision of social assistance up until the Great Depression, which demonstrated that the provinces simply did not have the financial wherewithal to provide adequate assistance for the significant number of individuals in need. Thus, despite having no jurisdictional authority in the area of social assistance, the federal government, under pressure, extended relief grants to provincial governments under varying formulae in the period from 1930 to 1940, although it did not itself accept any direct administrative responsibility in this area.9 The federal government in this period was increasingly under pressure to take responsibility for unemployment insurance, and in 1935 it passed legislation introducing a contributory unemployment insurance plan, which was subsequently ruled ultra vires.10 In response to mounting pressure, a constitutional amendment was passed in 1940 that vested exclusive jurisdiction for unemployment insurance at the federal level.11 Jurisdiction over last resort assistance for those who did not qualify for unemployment insurance entitlements was left to the provincial governments. Until the mid-1950s, the federal role in the field of noncontributory assistance remained quite limited.12 In 1956, the federal government passed the Unemployment Assistance Act (UAA), which extended matching federal cost-sharing for aid to unemployed employable persons who were in need but did not qualify for ui entitlements: "This program was a significant development, since the new category eligible for federal aid was much broader than the three previous categories: the blind, the aged and the disabled. Provinces were able to develop more fully their general assistance programs according to their varying needs, although certain conditions still prevented the provinces and municipalities from using federal funds for the development of a comprehensive assistance program."13 The UAA required that assistance should be provided on the basis of a needs-test.14 Benefit rates and eligibility were left to the discretion of the provinces.15 Amendments to the act in 1958 extended cost-sharing to assistance for certain categories of unemployable recipients and "thus extended federal funding of unemployment assistance into support for a modest measure of general public assistance."16

45 Federal Initiatives Some commentators argue that the UAA resulted in a clear pattern of "substantial convergence in the spending patterns of Canadian provinces".17 In addition, the UAA is said to have resulted in significant convergence in the qualitative aspects of assistance provision: "Prior to the introduction of the Unemployment Assistance Act in 1956, relief provisions varied enormously across the country ... But since the establishment of federal conditional grants, especially the 1956 Unemployment Assistance Act, provinces across the country have adopted much more similar social assistance programs. Provinces in which there had been no general social assistance programs began such services; more provinces imposed common standards with respect to benefits and administration on their municipalities; and some provinces even began to assume direct responsibility for the operation of social assistance, relieving municipalities of their welfare role either in whole or in part." 18 On a less sanguine view, this federal initiative simply reinforces existing models of provincial assistance provision. Johnson argues that it "amounted in essence to little more than a plan for the federal financing of provincial social assistance for the employable unemployed" which "contained little in the way of policy innovation."19 In comparison to other possibilities for reform, the UAA appeared to some observers to reject a significant federal role in establishing national standards or some measure of uniformity: "Gone was the suggestion that unemployment assistance was ... a proper part of the federal responsibility for the unemployed. Gone - or absent - was any suggestion that the federal government should prescribe the key characteristics that would be required of provincial social assistance plans if they were to qualify for federal support."20 The Canada Assistance Plan, 1966 Instituted in 1966 as a major matching conditional cost-sharing program, the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP) consolidated a variety of assistance programs under one umbrella program. 21 Existing cost-sharing programs for categorical assistance, including Old Age Assistance, Blind Persons Allowances, Disabled Persons Allowances, and Unemployment Assistance, were replaced by this noncategorical program. Under CAP, the federal government would continue to match the funds expended by the provinces under these categorical programs dollar for dollar. In addition, cost-sharing under CAP would include assistance to needy mothers and widows covered under provincial categorical programs that were not previously cost-shared. Cost-sharing under CAP was also extended to a variety of welfare services including

46

Patchworks of Purpose

"homes for special care, children's institutions, child welfare, welfare services, and health care."22 CAP was intended to provide a basis for co-ordinating public assistance programs in Canada; federal sharing for the First time in mothers' allowance programs; federal support for the strengthening of administration and welfare services related to social assistance programs; emphasis on developing, improving and extending services designed to lessen the amount of dependency; federal aid for buttressing child and youth welfare services; federal sharing of health care costs for social assistance recipients; no federal ceilings on benefits under this new program and full sharing of payments made on the basis of need to improve the level of benefits now being paid to the aged, the blind and the disabled.23 Clearly, the federal government recognized what has been referred to as the "incremental and residual nature of CAP." 24 In introducing CAP, the Minister of National Health and Welfare, Allan J. MacEachen, noted that "while these additional [federal] funds are largely directed to programs now being provincially financed, and may be thought of as savings to the provinces, it is the hope of the government that the provinces will use these funds to make improvements in the assistance and welfare service programs."25 The federal government viewed flexibility in the cost-sharing arrangements as an end in itself.26 Legally, the provinces remained fully responsible for administration and program delivery. CAP was intended to have — and did have — little effect on the administration of provincial assistance programs, which, it was assumed, would continue to be based on existing provincial categories. Benefit rate structures would also be left to provincial discretion. While categorical cost-sharing programs had fixed limits on the level of benefits that would be cost-shared, CAP uncapped these programs by removing such limits. Federal conditions were included in the CAP legislation, although they were not very rigorous. For most of the agreements under the act, there were five conditions: (i) assistance must be provided to anyone "in need"; (2) there must be no provincial residency requirement; (3) an appeal procedure must exist; (4) the province must "maintain accounts" regarding funds disbursed; and (5) the province must make available all provincial legislation and regulations concerning the plan.27 The three substantive conditions did have significant implications for provincial assistance program design. There has been considerable debate about the implications of the stipulation that assistance must be provided to anyone "in need." Need is defined by the province. There is a wide range of grounds on which assistance may be denied to recipients who might otherwise be considered

47 Federal Initiatives to be in need.28 Thus, the stipulation suggests that in any given province one individual cannot be provided assistance on the basis of being in need while assistance is denied to another individual in similar circumstances. This condition limits discretion and requires that a set definition of what constitutes being in need must be applied impartially to all applications for assistance. Certainly, this was not standard practice across the provinces. For example, contrary to this condition, until 1972 assistance in Prince Edward Island was provided at the discretion of political officials, without any formal written guidelines. While control over disbursement of assistance was transferred to bureaucratic officials in 1972, written guidelines were not established until 1974. Nor was a set definition of need applied to individual cases in those provinces that relied on relief provided by municipalities. CAP prohibited the provinces from requiring a period of residence in the province as a condition of eligibility for assistance, which was significant in that such requirements were standard practice.29 This provision, which had been introduced with the UAA, was simply extended to all assistance covered under CAP.3° Requiring a formal appeal procedure also limited discretion, since an appeal procedure implies that a set of standard regulations must be applied impartially to particular cases, with written records of the process. This requirement differed considerably from practice in certain provinces (such as Prince Edward Island, which had no written guidelines) and many municipalities in the two-tier systems. Before the inception of CAP, only three provinces had appeal procedures.31 In keeping with this general thrust, an important aspect of CAP in relation to previous categorical programs was that administrative costs were to be covered.32 This provision could be expected to professionalize assistance provision and increase reliance on trained social workers, which in turn, might lead, indirectly, to convergence between provinces, based on shared professional norms. This professionalized model was inextricably linked with the principle of providing assistance on the basis of a fixed test of need, rather than on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis. It has been argued that CAP did in fact lead to convergence in provincial social assistance in terms of overall spending, 33 benefit levels,34 and standards of assistance provision.35 Simeon and Miller note, regarding overall social assistance spending, that "the dispersion index has dropped sharply over the period [1957-74], varying erratically at first, then dropping steadily after the introduction of the Canada Assistance Plan in ig66."36 From this, they conclude that "federal aid, then, appears to be a critical force underlying the observed convergence."37

48

Patchworks of Purpose

However, the converse effects of cost-sharing in exacerbating provincial diversity are illustrated by the cap on CAP. CAP remained relatively unchanged from its inception until the early 1990$. The 1990 federal budget announced that the funds transferred to the three richest provinces - Alberta, British Columbia, and Ontario - would be limited to a 5 percent annual increase for the following two fiscal years.38 This change quite fundamentally altered the open-ended, matching costsharing nature of CAP. British Columbia launched court action against the capping of CAP and was joined by Alberta, Ontario, and Manitoba.39 The British Columbia Court of Appeals ruled against the unilateral federal capping; however, this ruling was appealed to the Supreme Court by the federal government in mid-1990.4° Although the case was still before the courts, the federal government extended the caps in the 1991 budget speech for an additional three years.41 In August 1991, the court rendered a decision allowing for the selective capping of CAP. The cap on CAP may be explained by the fact that Ontario had the highest rate of growth in CAP transfers in the mid- to late 19808 and expensive plans for reform. The federal move simply indicated the federal government's refusal to pay for Ontario's proposed reforms.42 Undoubtedly, this is; a compelling explanation for the specific timing of the cap on CAP. This example demonstrates how matching costsharing can contribute to divergence in provincial assistance provision. Had CAP not been capped, it seems likely that Ontario's already generous provincial program would have become even more generous, relative to other provinces. The Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1^82,

The Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982 could be expected, prima facie, to have a significant impact on social assistance in the provinces. Many aspects of social assistance delivery in the various provinces were apparently in violation of the Charter: discrimination among categories of recipients on the basis of sex and age appeared to violate equality rights of section 15, and some verification and enforcement practices appeared to violate legal rights.43 At the time of writing, Charter-based litigation challenging provincial assistance procedures yields little help in understanding the potential impact of the Charter on social assistance provision. There has as yet been no Charter-based litigation regarding social assistance at the Supreme Court level, although there has been some at lower levels. Thus, existing case precedents are thin. The outcomes of lower court litigation are also difficult to judge, as they are somewhat contradictory

49 Federal Initiatives

and often not in keeping with the approach adopted by the Supreme Court in interpreting the Charter in other policy fields.44 Even if the impact of Charter-based litigation on social assistance were clear, the overall impact of the Charter would still be very difficult to measure. Some individual provinces have responded to the Charter by making significant changes in assistance provision or by not adopting particular reforms in anticipation of Charter-based challenges. Several provinces have changed assistance regulations in anticipation of Charter challenges in such areas as differential benefits based on age and gender and "man-in-the-house" rules. Thus, while it is undoubtedly likely that "provincial social assistance programs are ... feeling the weight of the Charter,"45 measurement of this effect is difficult. If these measurement problems could be overcome, it would still be unclear whether convergence between provincial assistance regimes resulting from the Charter is likely. A range of approaches to assistance provision would probably be more difficult to implement in light of the Charter and the possibility of Charter-based litigation. For example, programs that rely on high levels of compulsion, such as workfare, and enforcement mechanisms that rely heavily on the coercive powers of the state appear particularly vulnerable to the limiting effects of the Charter and may be subject to challenges under rights to life, liberty, and security of the person of section y.46 The legal particulars of this issue have not been conclusively settled. The significance of the Charter for social assistance will also depend, in many respects, on whether differential treatment of recipients and nonrecipients can be properly characterized as prohibited discrimination under section 15(i). 4 7 Regarding programs that exclude particular categories of individuals from benefits, there are at least two lines of reasoning about the potential effects of the Charter. First, from a strict reading of equality rights under section 15, it may become more difficult to implement or sustain highly conservative assistance regimes that treat various groups of recipients differently. However, as assistance regimes move away from this conservative model, it is unclear which direction they may take. It seems plausible that the Charter may dichotomize assistance regimes into two camps - residual and redistributive regimes. In the face of Charter-based litigation, provinces are presented with at least two possible remedies to the perceived Charter infraction resulting from benefits being extended only to particular groups. The first is to extend benefits to all categories of actual or potential recipients - a move towards a redistributive model. The second is to eliminate benefits for all categories of recipients - a move towards the residual model. A much different perception of the potential effects of the Charter arises out of a different reading of section 15. In contrast to the strict

50 Patchworks of Purpose

reading of equality rights, which may lead to less categorical programs, a different reading may presage more highly categorical programs: "from a more contextual perspective on equality which emphasizes the differential effects of legal rules and policies, section 15 may also be a basis for challenging policies and programs that treat people the same, and lead to disadvantage by failing to recognize the special or differential needs of vulnerable groups or individuals."48 Thus, not only categorical but also noncategorical programs and benefits may be challenged on the basis of equality rights under section 15. This brief examination of the potential impacts of the Charter on social assistance reveals that the Charter and its interpretation by the courts is much too complex to point unambiguously towards likely trends of convergence or divergence among provinces. ASSESSING

CONVERGENCE AND

DIVERGENCE IN PROVINCIAL

SOCIAL

ASSISTANCE

Although all the caveats outlined above regarding the limitations of quantitative indicators of social assistance effort must be kept in mind, indicators such as gross provincial expenditures on social assistance or provincial benefit rates do seem to reveal a pattern of slight convergence in the postwar period, although considerable variation remains and the overall pattern is complex. Moreover, various indicators reveal different pictures about the level of convergence that has occurred — indeed, whether convergence has actually occurred at all. Thus, these data do not provide compelling evidence for the claim that convergence was causally linked to federal initiatives in this area. The range of aggregate provincial gross expenditures per capita on social assistance (the expenditures of the highest-spending province as a multiple of the expenditures of the lowest-spending province) was roughly the same in the early igSos as it was in the Iate-ig4os (figure i) ,49 The patterns of convergence and divergence evident in this measure over this period are extremely irregular. The dispersion in social assistance expenditures (standard deviation in expenditures as a percentage of the mean) more clearly reveals a pattern of significant convergence (figure 2). The average level of dispersion in the last fifteen years of the series is slightly over half the average level in the first fifteen years of the postwar period. However, the development of this pattern of convergence is also very irregular. What appears most striking in these indices is the cyclical nature of convergent and divergent trends. Sharp periods of divergence are followed by relatively more protracted periods of convergence. Thus, it is

Figure i. Range of provincial social assistance expenditures, 1945-92 ($ per capita) Sources: For list of sources see the appendix and the note to tableA i.

Figure 2. Dispersion in provincial social assistance expenditures, 1945-92 ($ per capita) Sources: For list of sources see the appendix and the note to table A i.

52

Patchworks of Purpose

extremely important to view specific periods within the broader temporal context. For example, convergence is evident in the eight years following the advent of the federal unemployment assistance initiative in 1956. However, a significant pattern of divergence precedes this, and by 1963 variation has simply returned to its immediate postwar level. This return to preexisting levels of variation does not clearly suggest that the federal initiative had a significant effect on convergence. Similarly, an examination of these indices in the years immediately following the initiation of CAP may lead to the conclusion that costsharing contributed to significant convergence in overall spending among provinces. However, when the levels of variation in the years before the advent of CAP are compared with those after CAP'S inception, it appears that the introduction of CAP itself contributed to significant divergence between provinces and that the subsequent convergence was, in part, a return to lower levels of variation that existed prior to CAP. The pattern of convergence after the introduction of CAP described by Simeon and Miller as a strong continuous downward trend in the variation between provinces50 - was followed by considerable divergence in the period immediately after the one they examine. One might argue that variation in per capita expenditures by province simply captures differences in provincial fiscal capacity or ability to spend on social assistance, rather than in provincial propensity to engage in such spending. Alternatively, one might argue, in turn, that differences in provincial propensity to spend on social assistance simply reflect differences in each province's overall propensity to spend. Finally, one might argue that variation in per capita expenditures simply captures provincial differences in the demand for social assistance spending rather than differences in their willingness to respond to such demands.51 To permit a brief assessment of these arguments, figure 3 compares the ranges of provincial social assistance spending per capita, assistance spending as a percentage of total (consolidated provincial and municipal) expenditure, assistance spending as a percentage of provincial gross domestic product, and per capita assistance spending for each percentage point of unemployment.52 In each case, if variations in per capita spending simply reflected variations in one of these other factors, the range in per capita spending would be greater than the range in the measures incorporating these additional factors. However, figure 3 reveals the opposite case. In examining expenditures from the supply side, provincial differences in per capita expenditure cannot be explained away as merely reflecting differences in overall provincial propensity to spend or differences in provincial wealth.53 Variation in per capita expenditure closely matches variation in assistance spending measured as a

53 h

Federal Initiatives

Figure 3. Range of provincial social assistance expenditures, 1961-92 (various measures) Sources: Unemployment rates used for calculating figure 3 are from the following. 1946-66: Statistics Canada, Historical Statistics of Canada, 2nd ed. (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, 1983), Series 0491-7; unemployment rates, by region, annual averages, 1946-75. 1966-76: Statistics Canada, Canadian Economic Observer: Historical Statistical Supplement 1988/89 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1989, 107, table 12.4, Unemployment Rates by province). 1976-92: CANSIM, Matrix 2075, Unemployment Rate 15 yrs. and Over, by province and total. See also the list of sources in table A i.

proportion of total expenditures. Thus, differences in actual spending per capita are the result of differences in provincial propensity to spend on social assistance rather than differences in their overall propensity to spend. Furthermore, differences in spending between provinces are greater a/ter variations in fiscal ability, measured by variations in gross domestic product, have been taken into account. To the extent that provincial social assistance expenditures have been similar, they have been so despite differences in gross domestic product. Nor does it appear that provincial differences in per capita expenditure can be explained away as merely reflecting differences in demands on the social assistance system (using unemployment rates as a proxy for demand.) 54 Variation between provinces in their per capita spending for each percentage point of unemployment is much greater than differences in unadjusted per capita spending. Thus, differences in actual spending per capita reflect differences in provincial responses to demands generated by unemployment, rather than differences in overall levels of unemployment. Differences in spending between provinces are greater after variations in unemployment rates have been taken into account.

54 Patchworks of Purpose Provincial benefit levels provide another quantitative measure of assistance provision. Although comparisons are often made of provincial assistance rates as well as ratios of assistance to average income and minimum wage, it is difficult to interpret such comparisons, and the conclusions drawn from them must be cautious. It is important to note various caveats.55 First, the conventional bases of comparison are representative types of social assistance cases. However, specifying the characteristics of the hypothetical recipient units for comparison is arbitrary and will, to a significant degree, prejudice the outcome of any comparison. This selection of representative recipient types is both necessary and arbitrary "because the caseload data is not detailed enough to allow the definition of average recipients."56 Second, there are considerable differences between the value of benefits as generally reported and as actually provided, due to discretionary payments, special-purpose transfers, benefits in the form of services and other in-kind transfers, and payments that cover the actual cost incurred by the recipient for certain items (for example, shelter). Moreover, basic rates may be reduced in individual cases, for various reasons. Thus, "in order to assess social assistance benefits one would ideally examine the actual amounts paid to recipients in each province. Such data, however, are not available."57 The National Council of Welfare notes that "we have no idea of the actual average amount of benefits received by recipients in various categories. No information is readily available on a province-by-province basis of changes in welfare rates over the years."58 Finally, the comparisons of assistance rates that do exist adopt a wide range of assumptions (for example, fifty-one separate assumptions in the case of National Council of Welfare comparisons) in order to maximize the comparability of assistance rates or, in other words, to maximize the similarity between assistance rates. Thus, such comparisons understate differences between provincial assistance rate schedules. That is, the differences that exist between provincial rates in these comparisons are residual differences after rates have been made to appear as similar as possible. Rates in particular cases or as actually provided may in fact differ more substantially. In addition to these practical difficulties in comparing benefits levels across provinces, there are also serious conceptual difficulties with comparing ratios of assistance to legislated minimum wages - a standard practice in the Canadian literature on social assistance. The difficulties are clearly illustrated by the example of an assistance regime in which x is the minimum wage and Y represents assistance benefits levels where x is always greater than Y. Suppose there is an otherwise

55 Federal Initiatives

Figure 4. Range of provincial assistance rates by category, 1966—95 Sources: For list of sources see the appendix and the source note to table A2.

identical system in another province except that in this province minimum wages are 2X and assistance benefit levels are SY. It is not convincing to argue that benefits in these two systems are somehow equivalent. Noting these caveats, differences between provincial benefit rates may be examined to see if rates have been converging over the CAP period. The Department of National Health and Welfare's Evaluation of the Canada Assistance Plan, completed in 1991, argues that considerable convergence in social assistance benefits had taken place in the wake of the inception of CAP: "Rates became more similar across the country over the time period 1965/66 to 1976/77 ... social assistance incomes were more tightly clustered around the average value in 1976/77 than they were in 1965/66."59 Indeed, they were (figure 4). However, when the comparison is extended to 1991, provincial social assistance rates over the CAP period do not demonstrate significant and continued convergence.60 Rather, the pattern appears cyclical.61 Differences between provincial benefit rates for single employables by the mid-igSos were as significant as they were at the inception of CAP. By the early 19905, differences in provincial assistance rates for couples with two children were also as significant as differences at the inception of CAP. Though they had not reached the levels of the mid-1960s, differences in provincial rates for single parents increased significantly in the i g8os.

56

Patchworks of Purpose

Figure 5. Range of provincial assistance rates by category, 1950-95 Sources: For list of sources see note 62.

During the period from the inception of CAP to the present, the strongest pattern of convergence in provincial assistance rates occurs in the decade following the inception of CAP. However, in the absence of explicitly comparable interprovincial data for periods before this date, it is unclear whether this convergence began only with the inception of CAP or whether it followed a broader trend of convergence that was already evident before then. A methodologically dubious way to examine convergence before the inception of CAP is to create a composite set of indices of variation from otherwise noncomparable tables of provincial assistance rates. If the strict limits of such an endeavour are recognized, such indices may be used to see whether it is even remotely plausible that convergence after the inception of CAP was simply part of a larger trend and not a direct result of CAP. The range of rates of the highest-benefit provinces compared to the lowest-benefit provinces suggests that assistance rates have converged somewhat in the postwar period, although the pattern is complex (see figure 5).6a In the early postwar period they diverged until 1960. Since 1960 there has been a relatively steady trend of convergence. However, rates converged at a lower rate in the half-decade immediately following CAP than in the years preceding CAP. 6 3 According to these data, convergence over the entire postwar period was slight. The highest-benefit province payed roughly twice the lowest-benefit province's rates for a single parent with one child in 1950 and about 1.8 times the lowest-benefit province's rate in 1991.

57 Federal Initiatives

The highest-benefit province paid roughly 2.5 times the lowest-benefit province's rates for a couple with two children in 1950 and about 2.2 times the lowest-benefit province's rate in 1991. These results raise questions about the extent of convergence in the postwar period, as well as doubts about claims that federal initiatives fostered significant convergence. CONCLUSIONS

Not only is the logical case for a linkage between federal initiatives and convergence a weak one, broad quantitative indicators provide little empirical evidence of such a link. The range of provincial expenditures per capita on social assistance in the postwar period remains almost as significant in the contemporary period as in the immediate postwar period. A more significant pattern of convergence is found in dispersion among provinces. However, this pattern is not clearly related to federal initiatives in this area, and considerable variation between provinces remains. Although differences in benefit rates between provinces have waxed and waned in the twenty-five years since CAP'S inception (1966-91), no clear and marked pattern of convergence is apparent. Due to the paucity of comparable interprovincial data, it is difficult to make generalizations about convergence over the course of the entire postwar period. However, a cursory and, admittedly, methodologically weak examination of rates in this period suggests an erratic pattern of slight convergence unconnected to federal initiatives in this area. Given the development of fiscal equalization and other federal transfers to provincial governments, the fact that federal involvement did not lead to a clear pattern of convergence in this policy area demonstrates that differences between provincial social assistance regimes are more fundamental than different fiscal capacities to provide assistance at similar levels. This is not surprising considering the divergent historical roots of provincial assistance regimes. In the next chapter I turn to consider the development of qualitative differences between provincial assistance regimes, as I examine further the issue of provincial distinctiveness.

4 The Unique Trajectories of Assistance Regimes since 1950 While it may be self-flattering to see our own times as a culmination, a historical perspective on social policy yields no beginnings or ends, only middles. H. Heclo1

Significant qualitative differences between provincial assistance regimes have existed from the initial federal involvement in this field in the 19505 to today. These differences are no less significant than the differences that existed between the historical antecedents of contemporary provincial regimes. There has been no obvious harmonization around a particular model of social assistance provision. Throughout the period beginning in the 19505, provincial assistance regimes developed along distinct trajectories and demonstrated particular orientations that differed from one another over considerable periods of time. When shifts did occur in the long-term tendencies of provincial assistance regimes, they were episodic and did not follow an unambiguous pattern of either convergence or divergence. Although provincial assistance regimes have differed from each other in consistent ways over time and although they continue to be quite distinct, they are not static or unchanging. Rather, despite their distinct trajectories of development, the provincial regimes have also followed similar broad patterns of development that characterize the welfare state in Western industrialized society more generally. In this chapter I begin by outlining the significant differences that exist today between contemporary provincial assistance regimes and then proceed to examine the distinct trajectories of development of the individual provinces, including both continuity and change in their orientations. In so doing, I consider the impact of federal initiatives on the qualitative aspects of provincial assistance provision as an example of how uniform extra-provincial forces, which all provinces

59 Assistance Regimes since 1950 Table 4 Continuity and disjunction in provincial assistance regime development

1930

1950

1970

1990

Ontario

Conservative

Conservative

Conservative

Conservative

Manitoba

Conservative

Conservative

Conservative

Conservative

Nova Scotia

Market/family enforcement

Conservative

Conservative

Conservative

Newfoundland

Redistributive

Conservative

Conservative

Conservative

Saskatchewan

Residual

Residual

Residual

Market/family enforcement

Quebec

Residual

Residual

Redistributive

Market enforcement/ Performance

Alberta

Conservative

Conservative

Conservative

Market/ family enforcement

British Columbia Conservative

Conservative

Conservative

Market performance

New Brunswick

Market/family enforcement

Market/family enforcement

Market/family enforcement

Market performance

Prince Edward Island

Residual

Residual

Residual

Redistributive

face, seem not to have significantly eroded provincial differences. Finally, I outline the general contours of development of provincial assistance regimes as a group over this period. CONTEMPORARY PROVINCIAL ASSISTANCE REGIMES CIRCA

1QQ2

Provincial assistance regimes continue to be significantly distinct into the 19905, but the categorization of individual regimes varies over time.2 Table 4 demonstrates that some regimes have shown considerable continuity over the course of their historical development, while others have experienced significant shifts in orientation. In the contemporary period, although elements of each model are evident in all provincial regimes and some regimes fit a particular category more or less easily than others, four broad groups of provincial assistance regimes may be identified: regimes most closely approximating the conservative model (Ontario, Manitoba, Nova Scotia,

6o Patchworks of Purpose Newfoundland); regimes most closely approximating the market-performance model (New Brunswick and British Columbia); regimes most closely approximating the market/family enforcement model (Saskatchewan and Alberta); Quebec, which combines elements of the market-performance and market/family enforcement models; and Prince Edward Island, which comes the closest of all the provinces to approximating a redistributive regime. Conservative assistance regimes, as we saw in chapter i, are characterized by the strong categorization of recipients and the aim of relieving deserving recipients of reliance on the market or family. In keeping with this conservative bent, which is not primarily concerned with reinforcing the market, these regimes define a relatively wide group of recipients as unemployable or, in effect, legitimately absent from the labour market. For example, in all three two-tiered systems (Ontario, Manitoba, and Nova Scotia), sole-support parents are generally eligible as unemployable provincial recipients. Sole-support parents in Newfoundland are also not considered available for work.3 In contrast to the assistance provided to deserving recipients, assistance provided to undeserving recipients is particularly harsh, in order to discourage other undeserving individuals from leaving the market or family in favour of assistance. Of all the provinces, the two-tier systems in Ontario, Manitoba, and Nova Scotia are most obviously predicated on providing different treatment to various categories of recipients.4 Upon entering the system, recipients are categorized either as eligible or ineligible for provincial assistance. Provincial programs are primarily for individuals considered unemployable and "the common characteristic of all cases is the absence of a formal work expectation."5 Persons not meeting categorical provincial requirements are left to the vagaries of municipal assistance provision, which may include, for example, public applications for assistance, denial of benefits during particular seasons, and highly targeted fraud investigations. Employables (including those with dependants) who meet the conditions of need may nevertheless be denied assistance on various grounds. There may be no liquid asset exemptions (which is the general practice in Manitoba and Nova Scotia),6 and earnings exemptions may also be denied. As a result, recipients are significantly worse off if categorized as employable. Providing incentives for labour-market participation is subordinate to reinforcing the status hierarchy of deserving and undeserving recipients. For example, taxback rates are lower and employment incentives more generous for unemployable than for employable recipients. In addition, to the extent that these provinces promote labour market participation, provincial initiatives are, by definition, limited, as they

61 Assistance Regimes since 1950 tend to apply to unemployable provincial recipients rather than to employable municipal recipients. Like the provinces examined above, New Brunswick and British Columbia incorporate a measure of stratification in their assistance systems; however, in contrast to the conservative regimes, they incorporate elements of the market-performance model and actively promote labour-market participation through positive employment and incentive programs. Both provinces offer lower taxback rates to employable than to unemployable recipients and use these measures primarily to induce labour market participation rather than to differentiate between deserving and undeserving recipients. While the more conservative regimes dissuade undeserving recipients from entering the assistance system through particularly harsh treatment of employable recipients in comparison to unemployable recipients, there are clearly circumstances in New Brunswick and British Columbia in which recipients may find themselves better off being classified as employable than as unemployable. In contrast, it is extremely unlikely that any recipient in Nova Scotia or Ontario would ever willingly be classified as employable rather than unemployable. These market-performance regimes also define employability broadly, and the state recognizes a much more limited range of recipients as legitimately free of reliance on the market or family than in conservative assistance regimes. For example, all single parents in New Brunswick are classified as employable and, in British Columbia, single parents are classified as employable after the child has reached the age of six months. Both in terms of being less stratifying and in defining a narrower range of recipients as unemployable, these regimes are more market-oriented than the conservative regimes. Saskatchewan, Alberta, and Quebec all stratify recipients to some extent, but the primary emphasis is enforcing the market and family by actively stigmatizing recipients, thereby making assistance relatively unattractive for all recipients. In addition, these provinces incorporate stringent provisions aimed specifically at employable recipients; however, they also define a very broad range of recipients as employable. Thus, it is only a very narrow range of recipients who are not subject to the rigorous treatment accorded to employable recipients. As a result, participation in the labour market or family becomes an attractive alternative in comparison to dependence on assistance. The assistance system in Quebec combines elements of both the market-performance and market/family enforcement models. It incorporates all the positive inducements to labour-market participation offered by New Brunswick and British Columbia, but it combines these

62

Patchworks of Purpose

elements with certain punitive measures, such as its strident approach to fraud investigation. The emphasis on labour-market participation links this combination of approaches. The assistance regime in Prince Edward Island is the closest one to the redistributive model. Assistance in Prince Edward Island is relatively nonstigmatizing and nonstratifying and, of all the provinces, comes closest to a level that provides a viable alternative to participation in the labour market or family. D E V E L O P M E N T IN THE

PROVINCES,

1950-1990 In particular cases, contemporary provincial assistance regimes quite strongly resemble their historical forebears. In other cases, there have been shifts of varying magnitude over the course of their historical development. The following sections examine these patterns of continuity and change within individual provinces and emphasizes the distinct provincial trajectories. Three assistance regimes (Ontario, Manitoba, and Prince Edward Island) display highly continuous patterns of development from the early part of this century to the present day. Nova Scotia and Newfoundland shifted in orientation in the 19308 and 19505, respectively, but have since shown considerable continuity. The Quebec regime in the late 19505 broke quite sharply from historical tradition, and another significant shift took place in the mid-igSos. The remaining regimes (Alberta, Saskatchewan, New Brunswick, and British Columbia) all demonstrate continuity in development until more recent periods, but in the 19708 and 19808 shifted orientation to varying degrees. (For a summary, see table 4, above.) Conservative Regimes

Ontario. The social assistance system in Ontario demonstrates a high level of continuity, based on its well-established historical tradition of highly differentiated assistance provision. Much in keeping with the pattern in the early part of this century in Ontario, deserving recipients continue to receive more generous provincial assistance than do undeserving recipients, who are subject to the vagaries of municipal provision. To the extent that federal initiatives had any impact on the development of assistance, they reinforced the categorical nature of the Ontario system. The federal Unemployment Assistance Act of 1956 prompted the government of Ontario to adopt legislative changes in order to take advantage of federal cost-sharing. However, the actual effects on

63 Assistance Regimes since 1950 assistance provision were slight: "Despite these federal inducements, the general level of social assistance spending on the able-bodied unemployed did not rise. This failure reflected the residual legacy of 'less eligibility' and the desire to keep income support to this group at as low a level as possible.'"7 As Struthers notes, "Despite the infusion of cost-shared federal dollars after 1958, life for those struggling to get by on general welfare did not markedly improve."8 However, the federal legislation did contribute to ending mandatory work requirements, which, following the tradition of enforced work for employable recipients in Ontario, were still widespread until ig6o.9 In contrast, the extension of cost-sharing to categorical programs for deserving recipients under CAP had a significant impact: "CAP caused the single largest rewriting of Ontario's social assistance laws in its history, and some [formerly categorical] recipients saw their allowances raised by more than 50%."10 This change exacerbated differences in the level of assistance provided to deserving in comparison to undeserving recipients, and the combined effect of these two federal cost-sharing programs was to reinforce the highly stratifying orientation of Ontario's assistance system. Thus, at least regarding social assistance in Ontario, Struthers is fundamentally correct in arguing that the "Canada Assistance Plan ultimately failed to alter, in any fundamental way, longstanding approaches to the needs of the poor."11 Since CAP, in keeping with the tradition of differentiated assistance provision, provincial and municipal assistance have increasingly diverged: "the benefit structures have grown farther apart over the years. At present differences are found in a number of areas, including benefit levels, asset limitations, taxback rates, earnings averaging periods, treatment of non-earned income, and limitations on work hours." 12 Concomitantly, municipal assistance has increasingly become a program solely for single employables as eligibility for provincial assistance has gradually been liberalized and extended to include "permanently unemployable persons (1973), separated mothers (1979), and single fathers and disabled wives (1982).'" 3 Provincial recipients continue to receive standardized assistance, while municipal recipients face widely varying standards. For example, eligibility requirements vary from municipality to municipality. Even in contemporary periods, in certain communities, employable recipients can be automatically cut off assistance in the spring, based on the expectation of increased employment opportunities. Interestingly, the Social Assistance Review Committee (SARC) found that "the most rigid expectations are often imposed in those parts of the province where the economy is weakest and employment opportunities most limited."14 As well, asset exemptions may be denied altogether for employable recipients.

64 Patchworks of Purpose Even where standardized treatment of recipients across municipalities is mandated by provincial regulation, it is at less generous levels than the assistance accorded to provincial recipients. The provincially legislated maximum basic assistance levels for the municipalities are 80 to 85 percent of the benefits for similar categories of provincial recipients.15 Taxback rates for both the provincial and municipal levels are also outlined in legislation, with basic earnings exemptions being higher for provincial beneficiaries, even though they are less likely to be employable than municipal recipients. Municipal recipients may also be prohibited from working full-time and receiving benefits, regardless of their level of need. As a conservative regime, the assistance system in Ontario defined a relatively broad range of recipients as exempt from reliance on the market. Not classifying sole support mothers as employable, due to their child-rearing responsibilities, was an integral part of the patriarchal orientation of the Ontario system.16 It was not until 1981 that sole-support mothers could be classified as employable.17 Even in the late 19808, full-time work by single mothers in receipt of provincial benefits continued to be actively discouraged.l8 For example, until the rule was rescinded in 1989, single parents who worked more than 120 hours per month for more than three months became automatically ineligible for provincial benefits, even if still in need according to provincial budgeting standards. This rule discouraged part-time work undertaken with the aim of gaining full-time employment. Another example of the patriarchal orientation of the Ontario system was the persistence of the "man-in-the-house" rule, which "rendered recipients ineligible for benefits as soon as an adult of the opposite sex moved in."19 It was estimated that 60 percent of all welfare fraud in Ontario was a result of violations of this rule, and investigations specifically geared to abuses of this rule were routinely conducted.20 This provision, as an attempt to specify certain recipients as deserving and others as undeserving, produced barriers to assistance recipients reentering normal familial relations. The picture of assistance in Ontario that emerges continues to be highly categorical, intrusive, discretionary, complex, and stratifying. The SARC report refers to the complexity of the Ontario system as "legendary" - "a morass of categories and rates that confounds all but the most expert."21 Regarding the highly stratifying nature of the system, the report notes: "recipients are ... stigmatized through a benefit structure based on categories that first labels them, then implicitly places them in a hierarchy of deservedness."22 The SARC report argues that enforcing this hierarchy has become the primary aim of the assistance system in Ontario: "rather than meeting its first obligation - to

65 Assistance Regimes since 1950

cover the needs of recipients - the social assistance system has been sidetracked into fulfilling perceived social and moral objectives by determining benefits according to category."23 This pattern is not significantly different from the historical roots of the Ontario assistance system established in the early nineteenth century. Manitoba. Assistance in Manitoba historically drew stark distinctions between deserving and undeserving recipients. In contrast to categorical provincial programs for deserving recipients, which were adopted early and were quite generous, assistance for undeserving recipients was a discretionary municipal or private responsibility. It was not until 1972 that municipalities were obliged by provincial legislation to "pass by-laws regarding the granting and regulation of assistance," and all aspects of program design and delivery were still left to the municipalities.24 In addition, the Manitoba system was highly paternalistic, with a significant emphasis on reinforcing the place of the mother as the primary care-giver in the home. These characteristics are still evident in the contemporary assistance system in Manitoba. Municipal recipients continue to be subject to practices that vary widely and may be marked by high levels of discretion, intrusiveness, and stigmatization. In stark contrast to municipal assistance, even as of 1983, the Manitoba assistance system ensured the right for deserving single mothers to full support until the child reached the age of majority.25 The Manitoba system provided assistance based on the reason for need, including, among other things, disability, single parenthood, unemployment, and age.26 The system also incorporated more explicitly moral considerations. For example, not until 1970 was provincial assistance provided to unmarried mothers with one child despite their level of need. Again, despite their level of need, until 1985 solesupport male parents (unless disabled) could not qualify for provincial benefits.27 Until 1990 separated or deserted single parents initially had to apply for municipal assistance before receiving provincial benefits, rather than being automatically eligible, as other categories of provincial recipients were.28 In keeping with the conservative tradition, all these individuals were forced to rely on municipal provision that not only varied widely from municipality to municipality but tended to be much harsher than provincial assistance. Municipalities in Manitoba continue to have complete discretion over assistance rates, eligibility requirements, and administrative practices. Large discrepancies in these aspects continue to exist between jurisdictions, although overall "there is much evidence of punitiveness."29 While rates vary considerably among municipalities, the general pattern is that municipal rates are lower than provincial rates. For

66 Patchworks of Purpose example, the 1989 benefit rate for a single-parent family with two children was $2340 a year in the village of Powerview, while the comparable provincial rate was $io,332.3° For employable recipients, the Manitoba system appears most clearly geared towards dissuading potential applicants from leaving the labour market or family in favour of assistance, rather than encouraging recipients to enter the labour market. For example, asset exemptions are strict, and employables may be "required even to liquidate the resources, for example, work tools, with which they can earn their livelihood."31 In some municipalities, past employment history may be cause for automatic ineligibility: "in many Manitoban municipalities, applicants who refuse or terminate employment without just cause are automatically found ineligible."32 Municipalities may also place strict time limits on assistance for employable recipients. Even in the contemporary period, "in some municipalities recipients have been required to work for their assistance."33 Indeed, as in Ontario, regarding certain provisions applying to employable recipients such as workfare and job search requirements, "some of the most repressive measures are often found where unemployment rates are highest and negative personal characteristics of applicants least likely to be relevant."34 Until very recently, municipal assistance could be treated as a debt for which cash repayment was demanded. It was a generally accepted procedure for municipalities to register liens against the financial resources (actual or potential) of the recipient. This practice was not discontinued until ig86.35 It is hard to imagine how recipients could break the cycle of poverty under this type of assistance provision. In addition, municipal recipients may also be subject to the stigmatization of vouchers: "Many municipalities use vouchers for all recipients as a matter of course."36 In addition, certain municipalities require public review of applications at municipal council meetings.37 It is difficult to imagine a more stigmatizing application procedure. Especially in small communities, such practices can hardly be expected to contribute to the recipients' chances for employment or marriage. The Manitoba system does not appear to strongly encourage the independence of deserving recipients. It is not surprising, considering the treatment of provincial recipients as unemployable, that the 1983 Manitoba report criticizes the government for not providing appropriate services: "many recipients who need and want employment preparation services find that they are not available."38 In addition, certain restrictions regarding the disbursement of benefits discourage the development of independence and basic decision-making skills. For example, "the social assistance system in Manitoba is very intrusive about how benefits are spent by recipients. Budgets are constructed which

67 Assistance Regimes since 1950 specify the expenditure category to which each dollar is to go. Not infrequently, recipients are required to provide receipts in order to demonstrate their compliance with these specifications."39 Under these regulations, for example, "obtaining a telephone without permission is often interpreted as a violation of the rule that benefits must be used only for the basic needs for which they were intended."40 This enforced dependence on the assistance system for even the most basic decisions reinforces assumptions about the inability of recipients to care for themselves. At the same time, certain aspects of assistance provision suggest that the system does not deliberately attempt to stigmatize deserving recipients. For long-term recipients, continuing eligibility requirements may simply entail a computerized self-declaration eligibility review.41 This is a far cry from the mandatory annual home visit required in some other provinces. Manitoba is ostensibly moving towards lessening the severity of its categorical approach, and it announced in 1992 that municipal benefit rates and eligibility requirements would be standardized. However, provincial benefit minimums have thus far been too low to constitute an effective floor, and significant municipal differences still exist.42 There also continue to be significant differences in earnings and asset exemptions between provincial and municipal recipients (who, in general, are not allowed asset exemptions). 43 Federal cost-sharing initiatives do not appear to have shaken the foundations of the conservative tradition of assistance provision in the province. Thus, Manitoba continues to maintain the categorical orientation that has marked assistance provision in that province since the early part of this century. Nova Scotia. Through much of its history, Nova Scotia's assistance regime exhibited the characteristics of a market/family enforcement system. Before 1930, assistance in Nova Scotia was limited to noncategorical indoor assistance for all recipients. However, with the introduction of categorical assistance programs in 1930, the Nova Scotia assistance system began to move towards the conservative model. As categorical programs developed, programs for undeserving recipients remained wholly the responsibility of the municipalities. The two subsystems increasingly diverged, and the system as a whole became more stratifying, one of the hallmarks of a conservative regime. Categorical recipients were provided with outdoor provincial benefits, while other recipients faced the prospect of the municipal poorhouse. This high level of stratification, which characterised the assistance regime after 1930, marks a considerable break from the period before 1930, and strong elements of this categorical approach

68 Patchworks of Purpose

remain evident today. Deserving recipients continue to receive relatively standardized provincial provision, while undeserving recipients are subject to a variety of bizarre, idiosyncratic, and antiquated municipal rules - in addition to considerably lower benefit rates. In 1958, following passage of the UAA, Nova Scotia, after two centuries, rescinded the Poor Law and instituted the Social Assistance Act.44 It was not until this time that entering the poorhouse no longer constituted an eligibility test for undeserving recipients.45 This marked a significant change in assistance provision in Nova Scotia. Although treatment of municipal recipients was not nearly as harsh as incarceration in the poorhouse, assistance (under the Social Assistance Act) provided to deserving recipients by the province and undeserving recipients by the municipalities continued to be significantly differentiated. In response to CAP, the Social Assistance Act of 1958 was amended in 1966 and again in 1968 to extend the range of expenditures for which the province would reimburse municipalities and increase the percentage of expenditures borne by the provincial government.46 However, the new legislation was still based exclusively on categorical eligibility, and recipients not eligible for provincial assistance remained reliant on the municipalities. As with other conservative regimes, the system in Nova Scotia has always had a significantly patriarchal and moralistic element. For example, it was not until the 19708 that provincial assistance could be paid to an unmarried mother. Ironically, until 1976, a mother who could not adequately provide for her children (despite being ineligible for provincial assistance) could be declared neglectful and her children made wards of the state. Surprisingly, "a foster parent receives five times as much from the government for a foster child's food, clothing, and miscellaneous expenses as a mother on welfare receives for her own child."47 It was not until the mid-igSos that single fathers became eligible for provincial benefits. Before this change, "Nova Scotia [remained] the only province which excluded single fathers from long-term social assistance."48 Assistance continues to be divided between the province and the municipalities, and the municipalities still determine their own eligibility requirements and benefit rates. Differences in eligibility requirements between municipalities remain significant: "a family in one community may be eligible for assistance while a family in identical circumstances in another community may not."49 Eligibility rules in certain municipalities may not even be formally adopted, and "some municipalities ... have only the sketchiest of policies."50 In at least twenty-four municipalities (of the total of sixty-nine), employable applicants are considered ineligible if they are single or have no dependents.51

69 Assistance Regimes since 1950 Consistent with the broader tradition of categorizing recipients, significant stratification also takes place between recipients at the municipal level: "Employable unemployed applicants' eligibility for municipal social assistance is ranked on the basis of marital/family status, without regard for their actual need. 'Heads of households' (married or common-law with dependents) are considered most 'eligible,' those who are married or common-law without dependents are less eligible, and single people are least eligible. If you are single and transient your chances for receiving municipal assistance is [sic] minimal."52 Municipal idiosyncrasies that surprisingly still exist include cutting assistance rates for employables during particular fruit seasons; not providing assistance to able-bodied employables with families in the summer; and relying solely on food vouchers.53 Benefits for employable recipients may also be denied on the basis of failure to meet municipal job search requirements, which may be extremely stringent (for example, in certain municipalities recipients must provide evidence of a job search with three job contacts per day). Assistance workers can "require an unreasonable number of job searches, and ... cut off assistance when recipients do not or cannot comply."54 Benefit schedules also differ very significantly from municipality to municipality: "Variation in General Assistance Allowances for a single employable recipient is enormous, from a low of $278 in Guysborough County to a possible high of $631 in Springhill in iggo."55 Depending on the municipality, provincial rates vary from ten to sixty percent higher than maximum municipal rates.56 While the treatment of indigents is not nearly as severe as in earlier periods, the principles underlying assistance provision today are quite similar to the principles behind assistance as it developed in Nova Scotia in the period after 1930. It appears that only the means - not the ends - differ. Newfoundland. Around 1950, Newfoundland's social assistance regime moved from a redistributive orientation towards a more conservative model. Historically, a considerable amount of relief for able-bodied recipients was provided by the Newfoundland colonial government, especially to those employed in the fisheries. Relief helped guarantee a minimum level of annual income for workers dependent upon this highly seasonal industry, and it allowed fishermen to maintain their status as independent commodity producers, rather than be forced to become completely dependent on wage labour. However, after Newfoundland joined Confederation, the Newfoundland assistance system developed from a nonstratifying redistributive regime into a more highly stratifying, conservative regime.

70 Patchworks of Purpose With Newfoundland's entrance into Confederation in 1949 and the extension of federal unemployment insurance, social assistance played a severely diminished role as an income stabilizer, and it developed a considerably different complexion. Assistance shifted from a form of income support extended to a wide range of recipients to a more highly targeted, highly stigmatizing, and marginal program. There remained little justification for unemployed employables to rely on provincial social assistance as opposed to federal unemployment insurance. Newfoundland adopted categorical assistance programs, presumably on the logic that the needy who did not fall into these categories would be able to receive unemployment insurance benefits. As a result, the assistance system after 1949 became more highly stratifying as it developed into one in which the primary clientele was unemployable and which was unforgiving for employable recipients. Because the primary clientele was unemployable, there was little emphasis on encouraging the employment of recipients. After 1949 all recipients in Newfoundland received provincial benefits, although some received categorical benefits while others received general assistance. Under these arrangements, short-term recipients (primarily employables) were provided with lower rates than other recipients, were not allowed earnings exemptions, and were paid through vouchers rather than cash.57 As of 1967, apparently in response to CAP, general assistance was provided to the unemployed as well as long-term recipients (single mothers and the disabled) under the Social Assistance Act.58 However, significant differences in assistance provided to employable and unemployable recipients continued, and employable applicants faced significantly more stringent scrutiny than unemployable recipients.59 Thus, in Newfoundland the social assistance system became relatively marginalized: "households with any appreciable amount of earnings ... rely very little on social assistance ... it is an income support program for those without earnings and not an income supplementation program for those with low earnings."60 Unemployment insurance payments are more significant and assistance payments less significant than in other provinces.61 Since the mid-1970s, the government of Newfoundland also has had a deliberate policy of using make-work projects to make employable social assistance recipients eligible for unemployment insurance. Considering this in combination with the reduced stringency of unemployment insurance requirements in Newfoundland in comparison with other regions, it is not surprising that the assistance caseload is made up primarily of unemployables: "Social Assistance recipients are the non-employed: people who cannot, or do not, get the ... paid employment ... required for ui."62 Thus, it is perhaps not surprising

71 Assistance Regimes since 1950

regarding social assistance that "officials have been more disposed to help applicants with families to support than to help the single, ablebodied unemployed."63 For those otherwise eligible for unemployment insurance, the stigma attached to the status of assistance recipient was and is considerable. This is not surprising considering that employable assistance recipients must have failed not only to secure adequate earnings in the private market but also in the ui/make-work system. Reports on social assistance in Newfoundland have noted that many persons estimated to be living below the social assistance level could qualify for assistance if they chose to apply.64 The current system in Newfoundland is not as stratifying as the other conservative regimes, and undeserving recipients are not denied assistance outright, as may happen in particular instances in Ontario or Nova Scotia. However, Newfoundland continues to categorize recipients as eligible for short-term assistance or eligible for long-term assistance (largely disabled recipients) and on this basis provides different asset exemptions, taxback rates, and benefit levels.65 Perhaps as a result of the significant component of unemployable assistance recipients, efforts to encourage labour market entry have been equivocal at best. In addition, taxback rates vary across categories in a manner that extends the strongest work incentives to those least able to work. In these respects, assistance provision in Newfoundland incorporates a hierarchy of deservedness that overshadows concerns with shifting recipients from assistance to employment. Having developed along a particular historical trajectory, Newfoundland's assistance regime experienced radical institutional changes that launched it on a significantly different path of development. Within a span of thirty odd years, the role of social assistance in Newfoundland was transformed from one of supporting a relatively large proportion of the population on a quite regular basis to one so associated with stigma that even some of the neediest citizens refuse to accept benefits. Market/Family Enforcement Regimes Saskatchewan. Historically, social assistance in Saskatchewan was predicated on the principles of uniform provision and less eligibility. Saskatchewan did not adopt highly stigmatizing measures such as institutional care for the indigent and, as categorical programs were particularly meagre, neither was the system highly stratifying. Thus, relative to other provinces, the assistance system in Saskatchewan approximated the residual model. While very meagre provincial assistance was provided to single mothers, employables relied solely on the municipalities until the province

72 Patchworks of Purpose began providing assistance to needy families under the Social Aid Act of 1959.66 This change, which coincided with the federal cost-sharing initiative, reasserted the nonstratifying nature of the Saskatchewan system by extending provincial benefits to those in need (with dependents) who were not eligible on a categorical basis. In comparison to the case of Ontario, the federal initiative led Saskatchewan to move somewhat away from its categorical orientation. The Saskatchewan system maintained its tradition of noncategorical assistance provision for another twenty years. In the 19805, the system began to develop a stronger element of stratification. Treatment of employable recipients is now somewhat harsher than treatment of unemployable recipients. Increasingly active stigmatization of all recipients also became more prevalent in the 19808. Saskatchewan currently applies to all recipients elements of active stigmatization that do not appear in any other Canadian provincial assistance system. With this blanket stigmatization it apparently intends to ensure that no recipient who has the option of relying on employment or the family would willingly choose to remain on assistance. In this sense, the current approach resembles the historical approach in Saskatchewan, under which assistance was an unattractive alternative for all recipients. Referring to the two major rounds of reform in 1984 and 1987, the National Council of Welfare notes that "the main objective of reform was the movement of employable recipients off the welfare rolls."67 The most obvious aim of these reforms was to provide stronger disincentives for leaving the market or family in favour of assistance, rather than to provide positive aids for recipients to reenter the market. Before the 1984 reforms, benefits were paid according to a schedule that did not take into account the cause of need: "The standardized benefit schedule was designed to offer equity in the distribution of social assistance funds. Recent changes (1984) have resulted in a tiered system of benefits based on the cause of need, a break from almost twenty years of tradition."68 The reforms initiated in 1984 were most obviously targeted at single employables - cutting benefits by as much as 41 percent for this group.69 While other categories of recipients were affected by this round of cuts, none were singled out for the treatment accorded to single employables. This change "result[ed] in a hierarchy of deserving versus non-deserving recipients,"70 and Saskatchewan now incorporates a significant element of stratification based ostensibly on employability. The new categorization scheme divides recipients into three groups: fully employable, partially employable, and unemployable.71 However, the definition of employability is drawn widely. For example, only

73 Assistance Regimes since 1950 single parents with a newborn child under three months are categorized as unemployable. Treatment of employable recipients is particularly harsh. Households headed by a "fully employable person" receive two-thirds to three-quarters of standard benefits for the first three months of assistance.72 Taxback rates are also considerably lower for disabled than for employable recipients. In 1987, rules regarding earnings exemptions were tightened and taxback rates generally were increased, although rates for recipients classified as disabled were lowered.73 These changes included a move to disallowing any earnings exemptions for the first three months of assistance, including the first three months after reapplication for those who have temporarily left the assistance caseload.74 Thus, recipients who leave assistance to enter the labour market risk having to endure reduced benefits levels and being denied earnings exemptions for a period should they need to reapply for assistance. Rather than providing incentives for assistance recipients to enter the labour market, these provisions are most clearly aimed at ensuring that labour market participants are not enticed to enter the social assistance system. In addition to these requirements, failure to comply with workfare provisions may lead to the denial of benefits to persons otherwise defined as eligible and in need, and "although participation in work or training activities is voluntary, single employables can have their benefits reduced if they refuse to participate in these activities."75 As a result of the 1984 reforms, "People receiving social assistance were categorized as fully employable or unemployable. Benefits were cut for those deemed capable of work, and in order to continue receiving benefits they were required to participate in training or job schemes. In other words, workfare was introduced."76 Failure to comply with workfare provisions could lead to the denial of benefits: "[Recipients] have been denied or cut off financial assistance for refusing or being unable to participate in workfare schemes ... Furthermore, once cut off, clients in Saskatchewan are being denied the right to reestablish their eligibility."77 The Saskatchewan system combines stringent work and job search requirements with measures that reduce employment incentives (denying earnings exemptions pending a waiting period and providing higher taxback rates for employable than for unemployable recipients.) Although these elements may appear quite contradictory, in combination they have a significantly punitive effect: recipients are required to look for work even though upon finding employment they may face completely confiscatory taxback rates. The Saskatchewan system also incorporates a significant element of stigmatization that discourages dependence on assistance by making it an unattractive alternative for all categories of recipients. Eligibility

74 Patchworks of Purpose requirements in Saskatchewan are stringent: "the provincial government ... is resorting to the most stringent and punitive tests of eligibility it can devise."78 Severe anti-fraud measures have "created a stringent and punitive environment."79 In 1983, home visits, which were not a regular part of the intake process, were "rarely undertaken."80 However, as part of the reform package home visits at the time of application, as well as on an annual basis, are now mandatory for all applicants.81 Saskatchewan has also adopted the most stringent overpayment recovery regulations of all provinces. In addition, it issues rental cheques that are jointly payable to the recipient and the landlord. Recipients are also required to pick their monthly cheque up in person or risk being cut off assistance and having their files frozen so that eligibility is difficult to reestablish.82 This blanket stigmatization of recipients appears intended to ensure that no one with the option of employment or dependence on the family would willingly choose to depend on social assistance. Saskatchewan incorporates strong elements of the market/family enforcement model. No other provincial system stigmatizes all recipients so clearly in order to make labour market and family participation more attractive than assistance. The system is geared to ensuring that market and family participants do not opt for assistance even to the extent that it discourages recipients in a variety of ways from establishing their independence. This marks a change from Saskatchewan's historically residual approach, although it is in keeping with the broader tradition of reinforcing reliance on the market and family. Alberta. Historically, the assistance system in Alberta was moderately stratifying and, in general, modestly conservative. Provincial assistance for deserving recipients (such as the categorical program for single mothers) was quite generous relative to other provinces, while assistance for indigents who did not qualify under categorical programs remained the responsibility of the municipalities. The punitive treatment of municipal recipients that existed in British Columbia and Ontario was not a feature of social assistance in Alberta. In the late 19705 and beyond, Alberta's assistance regime began to shift away from the earlier conservative tradition towards one more clearly predicated on the enforcement of the market and family. In 1961, the government introduced a new social assistance program based on need rather than categorical eligibility.83 In 1970, in keeping with the principles of CAP, the Social Development Act provided for the integration of provincial and municipal programs into one "based on meeting need, rather than focusing on the circumstances which created the financial need (i.e., disability, single parent, etc.)."84 However,

75 Assistance Regimes since 1950 the new Act makes a distinction between an "employable" and an "unemployable" person and the services that may be made to each. Provision is also made for financial incentives in connection with the Employment Opportunities Program. Assistance continues to be based on need rather than means, and municipalities have been relieved of the burden of those persons classed as unemployable and those who are capable of benefiting from rehabilitative services. The tendency is for all assistance programs to merge into one social allowance program. Municipalities are only responsible for those persons who are legally their residents and who do not qualify for a social allowance.85

During the 19708 the provincial government gradually took over the remaining municipal responsibilities for the delivery of assistance to employable persons.86 Despite these changes, municipalities, which set their own benefit rates, remained responsible for providing assistance to employable persons in need, and not until the mid-1970s did the province assume full responsibility for assistance.87 This change roughly corresponded with the beginning of the shift in Alberta away from the conservative model. In contrast to the historically conservative orientation of assistance in Alberta, the contemporary system is more in keeping with the market/ family enforcement model. It now incorporates stringent enforcement of work requirements and defines employability widely so that the work requirements apply to a broad range of recipients. Thus, assistance to recipients defined as unemployable is much less significant. These changes began in the late 19708 and the most recent developments in Alberta appear to follow this pattern closely.88 As with many other provinces, there was no initial work expectation for single mothers: "In 1971, there was an acceptance of single mothers staying at home to care for their children, with support from Social Allowance if necessary."89 However, by the late 19705 "Alberta introduced the most specific definition of single mothers who are considered employable and therefore subject to work requirements."90 The conditions for exemption from employment requirements were relatively strict in comparison with other provinces.91 Whereas in 1971 virtually all single parents were considered unavailable for employment, by 1990, under the Social Allowance Program, 57 percent of single parents were considered available for employment.92 Regarding work requirements, the mechanisms of compulsion were harsh: "The consequence of failing to comply with work requirements can be the suspension or termination of eligibility for assistance."93 The Alberta system continues to incorporate stringent enforcement of work requirements: "Penalties, in the form of restriction of benefits, will be considered for failure to seek selfsufficiency by finding employment over a reasonable period of time.

76 Patchworks of Purpose These will range from restriction of some benefits to removal of benefits."94 The definition of employability for single parents (they are employable once the youngest child is two) demonstrates the broad range of recipients to which these work requirements apply. In the igSos, Alberta implemented yet even more stringent work requirements for single mothers.95 Outside of these requirements, little had been done until recently to provide positive aids to employment: "The focus is almost exclusively one of providing financial benefits, with no time available to help clients increase their employability."96 Despite the lack of voluntary programs for recipients who wanted to increase their employability, Alberta experimented with mandatory workfare in the early i g8os. One experiment, the Community Self-Help Project, "required that welfare recipients contribute several hours a day to helping senior citizens and handicapped people with their outside activities. The regulation stipulates that recipients must be involved in the project for continued eligibility for welfare."97 In addition to enforced employment search requirements, the Alberta assistance system now incorporates some positive employmentenhancement programs. Benefit packages are "provided to clients who are working or attending school, to cover the additional costs associated with regular participation in the workforce or training programs, including extra costs resulting from an increased need for transportation, day care, etc."98 As well as applying employment requirements to an increasingly broad range of recipients, Alberta has further eroded its conservative tradition of assistance provision by moving increasingly away from categorical provision. It is now standardizing benefit packages, asset exemptions, and taxback rates for all categories of recipients.99 Further, in another change from past practice, assistance benefits are now provided in such a manner as to maximize individual autonomy: "Clients ... have ... responsibility for budgeting and financial planning, and will have the freedom to use their standard benefit package as they see fit, based on their personal or family priorities."100 The broad definition of employability, in combination with Alberta's increasingly noncategorical orientation and emphasis on enforcing employment requirements, demonstrates the market-enforcing nature of the Alberta assistance system, which is quite different from its more conservative historical orientation. Market-Performance Regimes

British Columbia. Historically, categorical assistance in British Columbia was relatively generous in comparison with other provinces and eligibil-

77 Assistance Regimes since 1950

ity was drawn quite widely. While generous outdoor relief was provided for deserving recipients, able-bodied recipients were generally required to work for relief - often within the confines of work camps. British Columbia maintained this conservative orientation until the igSos when it adopted a more positive, incentive-driven approach to encouraging labour market participation and shifted somewhat towards the market-performance model. From around 1920, in contrast to residual and market/family enforcement regimes, the range of deserving recipients defined as legitimately exempt from relying on the market or family and thus eligible for provincial assistance was relatively broad. It was extended further under the 1945 Social Assistance Act, which, along with the Mother's Pension Act and the Mothers' Allowance Act, "were indeed social assistance measures conditionally granted according to predetermined needs or means criteria. Yet the new 1945 act did reflect the cumulative progress already made in the establishment of social welfare as a public, provincial responsibility. Families without means were no longer dependent on relief handouts from municipal governments or private charities."101 Interestingly, this extension of provincial benefits to needy families headed by unemployed recipients predated the federal extension of cost-sharing for such cases by more than a decade. However, in keeping with the conservative tradition, there remained a segment of poor who did not qualify under any of these early provincial programs. These recipients were forced to continue to rely on municipal relief. This conservative orientation continued to be evident throughout the 19608 and 19708, when "women, particularly those with children, were not expected to join the paid labour force."102 In keeping with the conservative state's willingness to regulate individual behaviour, stringent restrictions were aimed at female recipients, including strict enforcement of the man-in-the-house rule. Because of stringent and intrusive rules, assistance officials "increasingly became investigators of behaviour rather than of financial needs and resources."103 In contrast to deserving recipients, undeserving recipients faced relatively coercive employment requirements. In keeping with the historical legacy of the workcamps, the British Columbia assistance system placed considerable emphasis on workfare: "The reemergence of workfare programs in BC in the 19705 fits ... with the province's history of welfare policy. In the 19605, workfare was implicit in ... seasonal work projects, primarily for male recipients ... Seasonal work projects were a mandatory rather than voluntary approach. Picking berries in the Fraser Valley or fruit in the Okanagan, firefighting and tree planting were typical jobs that employables receiving assistance had to accept in some areas during some seasons or be cut off

78 Patchworks of Purpose

welfare."104 The first formal provincial workfare program in British Columbia, under which the government attempted to find jobs for the "hardcore unemployables," was implemented in 1969.105 Another example of the coercive treatment of employable recipients in this period was the "controversial and since rescinded policy [that] identified certain geographical areas of the province as unsuitable for employable recipients."106 In no other province in the contemporary period have such intrusive provisions been applied against a particular category of recipients. In the mid-igyos, the province assumed responsibility for all remaining municipal assistance programs.107 Concurrent with this shift to full provincial responsibility and in keeping with the emphasis of the British Columbia system on the employment of employable recipients, British Columbia adopted a program whose "chief features were ... special attention to fraud and welfare abuse ... and aggressive measures to find work for the employables on social assistance."108 As part of this initiative, a job-finding team and a fraud investigation unit were created. In the igSos, British Columbia implemented even more stringent work requirements.109 While it has made various nominal changes, British Columbia has continued a significant focus on employment enhancement programs. In keeping with established historical tradition, employment enhancement programs in the mid-19808 required that employable recipients "must report for work or lose benefits." 110 British Columbia still categorizes recipients. Assistance is separated into two different programs, one for elderly and disabled recipients and one of temporary assistance for all other persons not eligible under categorical programs, including employable and unemployable persons, single-parent families, and transients. Beneficiaries of the residual program of temporary assistance are further categorized as unemployable or employable, with the latter being subject to reduced benefit levels and asset exemptions. 111 The system still places a strong emphasis on the employment of employable recipients, although it has shifted from relying on negative sanctions against these recipients to more positive measures of encouraging employment (hence the classification of British Columbia as a market-performance regime rather than a market-enforcement regime). To the extent that there was a change in the emphasis of the British Columbia assistance system in the early 19805, it was in the direction of defining an increasingly broad range of recipients as employable: "the provincial government announced major policy changes which have had the effect of broadening the definition of 'unemployed employables.' At the same time, the new policies contained strict eligibility requirements for persons receiving social assistance. The net result has

79 Assistance Regimes since 1950

been a considerable limiting of eligibility for assured social assistance as distinct from temporary relief."112 It was not until 1980 that single parents were considered employable unless they had a child less than six months old or two children under twelve. Included in these changes was the stipulation that families headed by a person deemed employable would have their benefits reduced.113 This change marked a quite drastic shift from a policy that deliberately offered no encouragement to single mothers to enter the labour market to one of the strictest policies in the country for deeming single parents as employable. In 1986, the definition of unemployable single parent was further restricted.114 Callahan argues that the rapid changes in employment programs (four separate programs between 1976 and 1989) have allowed the province to impose new regulations regarding eligibility: "With the introduction of each 'new' workfare program has come a substantial change in ... regulations which consistently defines a larger and larger circle of recipients as employable. In each case the effect of these regulations has been to reduce benefits and decrease recipients' security. These regulations remain on the books while the names and ground rules of workfare programs constantly change. It sometimes appears as if workfare programs have served as a cloak for new ministers to introduce increasingly restrictive eligibility regulations."115 In the mid-ig8os, taxback rates were redesigned to provide more positive incentives for assistance recipients to accept employment. Encouraging employment among recipients continues to be a major theme in the provision of social assistance. Increasingly, British Columbia is moving away from more coercive measures of enforcing work and job search requirements in favour of positive inducements to labour market participation, including the following: provision of "wage subsidies for employers who hire income assistance recipients";116 enhanced earnings exemption that may be extended "where the client can demonstrate that he or she is making progress toward becoming selfsupporting";117 provision of transportation allowances (for single parents and handicapped) and coverage of day-care surcharges for one year for single parents who become fully employed; and the extension of in-kind health benefits after a recipient leaves assistance for employment. Employment enhancement and incentive programs are targeted primarily towards employable recipients and, thus, recipients may be better off if classified as employable and may, indeed, request reclassification. This is sharply distinct from other provinces, such as Nova Scotia and Ontario, where there are no circumstances under which a recipient would prefer to be categorized as employable. In summary, while the British Columbia system has not undergone as fundamental a shift in orientation as has occurred in other prov-

80 Patchworks of Purpose inces, it has been changing in at least two significant ways. Over the course of the late igSos, the range of recipients defined as employable has been broadened, suggesting an increasing concern with the market and decreasing concern with the provision of generous assistance for deserving recipients. Second, the shift to positive aids for employment of recipients also signals an increasing concern with the market and less concern with the conservative aim of stratifying recipients according to a hierarchy of deservedness. New Brunswick. Historically, assistance in New Brunswick was predicated on reinforcing the market and family by providing assistance of a mean and stigmatizing nature emphasizing indoor relief for all recipients. Assistance was much more limited and categorical programs were adopted much later in comparison with most other provinces. Except for mothers' allowances, adopted in 1943, assistance remained the responsibility of the municipalities. Under the general municipal approach to assistance provision, indigence meant the forfeiture of virtually all rights for those who were unable or appeared likely to become unable to provide for themselves. There is considerable continuity in the underlying model of assistance provision in the New Brunswick system from this period until roughly the mid-igSos. In apparent response to the Unemployment Assistance Act of 1956, New Brunswick passed the Social Assistance Act in 1960, which was the first time that the province financially assisted municipalities with the cost of assistance and began to set minimum standards for assistance. This action ended the tenure of the poor law in New Brunswick. With outdoor relief now being provided to those previously ineligible for categorical assistance, New Brunswick returned in some significant senses to the principle of uniform treatment of recipients. By 1967, in response to CAP, the province assumed full responsibility for the provision of social assistance.118 Even so, the assistance that was actually provided remained relatively unchanged from the earlier market/family enforcement model. In keeping with New Brunswick's noncategorical tradition, assistance remained undifferentiated. The White Paper on Social Development of 1970 notes "the general acceptance of uniformity in allocating welfare assistance" under which benefits were not adjusted according to employability: "Under the present system, a 5o-year-old disabled person unable to work receives the same amount of assistance as a young, able-bodied man who claims that he cannot find a job." 11Q While not stratifying, assistance in New Brunswick continued to be stigmatizing. In keeping with the historical emphasis on the principle

81 Assistance Regimes since 1950

of less eligibility, eligibility requirements were so strict as to require "a person to sell a house or a fisherman to sell his boat before he is eligible for assistance."120 The obvious aim was to discourage recipients from applying for assistance at all, rather than ensuring that recipients would have the means to reestablish independence. In conformity with this approach, work by assistance recipients was clearly discouraged: earnings exemptions were low (for example, $20 per month in 1970) and, after earnings exceeded the maximum allowable, the entire amount of earnings would be fully taxed back so that "a welfare recipient earning $35 per month has less to support his family than he would if he was earning $20 per month." 121 Contemporary assistance rates in New Brunswick for all categories of recipients remain low in comparison with rates in other provinces. Into the 19805, assistance also continued to be highly stigmatizing for all recipients. For example, in 1983, New Brunswick initiated a reassessment project in which assistance recipients were hired to conduct home visits on all other recipients in order to reassess their eligibility status. The implications of this tactic for assistance recipient solidarity could hardly have been imperceptible to policymakers. Presumably, recipients would have no idea when the next review might take place and which of their fellow recipients might play the role of fraud investigator. This type of nontargeted reassessment is in keeping with the tradition of treating all assistance recipients according to an equally stigmatizing standard. Stigmatizing procedures that continued to exist in the 19805 allowed, for example, assistance officials to contact "banks, insurance companies and any other relevant source that might validate the information provided."122 In addition, assistance recipients "may be required to have their landlord complete and sign a form that is clearly marked 'Department of Income Assistance' ... making it impossible to conceal the fact of being on financial assistance from the landlord."123 Although not nearly as harsh as the historical practice of institutionalizing all recipients, these practices are consistent with the underlying principles of assistance provision developed under the poor law. Recent developments in New Brunswick represent a shift from this tradition. In the mid-1980s, assistance provision in New Brunswick has taken on a more highly categorical complexion as assistance recipients are categorized according to the cause of need and employability, although the latter category remains broadly defined. Before the 1980s, differential rates did not exist for the various categories of recipients. However, as of 1983, the province began to differentiate benefit rates according to employability, as well as age. The New Brunswick system now categorizes recipients using several

82 Patchworks of Purpose criteria: disabilities, presence of dependents, age, length of time on assistance, and employment potential (high, medium, or low). On these criteria, recipients are assigned to one of three subprograms: a program for long-term recipients, including the blind and disabled; for persons who have upgrading, training, or placement potential; and for recipients assessed as having high employment potential. 124 Different grades of benefits are granted to the different categories, with the highest benefits going to long-term recipients, followed by upgrading or training recipients, and finally highly employable recipients. In stark contrast to historical practice, the contemporary New Brunswick system emphasizes positive incentives for removing recipients from assistance and incorporates programs that actively facilitate labour force participation, including several positive employment initiatives. Recipients categorized as having high employment potential are granted generous supplementary earnings exemptions and, in contrast to some other provinces, taxback rates decrease with earning potential. In addition to reducing taxback rates - especially for clients with high employment potential - in the late igSos the province launched initiatives to enhance employability through "providing specialized training, academic upgrading, job-search workshops and supporting benefits (i.e., assistance with child care or transportation)." 125 In doing so, it has used a broad definition of employability. For example, sole-support parents in New Brunswick are defined as employable.126 This focus on employability is in accordance with the New Brunswick tradition of providing assistance that does not favour deserving recipients at the expense of discouraging labour market participation, demonstrates an overarching concern with the market, and accepts positive state action in reinforcing it. However, it is clearly a change from the earlier market/family enforcement focus, which emphasized negative inducements against initially entering the assistance system. In comparison with other provinces - and its own historical antecedents - the New Brunswick system is no longer nearly as intrusive or stigmatizing. For example, in 1987 mandatory home visits were discontinued.127 This is an interesting development, especially at a time when monitoring techniques in many other provinces were becoming more intrusive. Regarding the rules concerning living arrangements and spousal obligations, the New Brunswick Action Committee for the Status of Women argues that "New Brunswick is at the forefront of progressive financial assistance legislation."128 This reinforces New Brunswick's image as an assistance regime that is no longer primarily concerned with the stigmatization of recipients.

83 Assistance Regimes since 1950 The Mixed Model: Quebec

Historically the role of the state in Quebec was limited to providing financial resources to private charities (primarily the Catholic Church). The assistance regime in Quebec primarily reinforced the family by strictly limiting the extent to which assistance could replace dependence on the family. This basic approach to assistance continued in Quebec until the province entered into a cost-sharing agreement with the federal government in 1959 for the provision of assistance to the unemployed, who were previously ineligible for categorical assistance.129 This change produced large increases in expenditures for unemployment assistance, which had previously been a municipal responsibility.130 Under the Public Charities Act, municipalities had been free to establish their own definitions of indigence and municipal residency, eligibility requirements, and benefit scales, without any provincial guidance. Under this act, considerable differences existed between municipalities.131 In contrast to the case in other provinces, such as Ontario, where the extension of federal cost-sharing did not result in more generous treatment of employable recipients, in Quebec the effects of costsharing were significant: "The municipalities which had been ... very thrifty in granting assistance to the needy when they had to defray part of the cost became much more accommodating overnight ... many indigent did not in the past receive the assistance they were entitled to, because in many municipalities there was a tendency to a negative and retrograde approach to the problem of relieving hardship. It is not surprising that the pendulum swung to the opposite side to some extent after municipal participation was discontinued."132 The benefit rate schedule established by the new regulations did not differentiate between recipients on the basis of employability or duration of assistance. The rates copied the rates of permanent allowances, and an adult living alone would receive the same on assistance as a recipient of an old age, disability or blindness allowance.133 The Boucher Report lamented the fact that the assistance system as it existed after 1960 did not adequately take into account the causes of indigence, the moral standing of the recipient, or other factors that the commissioners felt were essential to determining need, including age, sex, and marital status. Because assistance was noncategorical and aid was provided in cash rather than in kind, "the role of the municipalities appear[ed] to be limited to the recognition of eligibility of applicants to assistance and to the distribution of financial aid."134

84 Patchworks of Purpose

This reform was significant in establishing the right to assistance for groups formerly ineligible for categorical programs. Lesemann argues that it constituted "an affirmation of social rights (right to assistance, regardless of the reason for need)." 135 And it greatly expanded eligibility for assistance: "Formerly, the chronically unemployed, the victims of automation, poor farmers, always more numerous [than categorical recipients], remained anonymous; unemployment assistance henceforth enabled them to make their presence felt in society."136 Expanded eligibility, in turn, undermined the transition of rural Quebecois to dependence upon wage labour: Since a very large number of farmers lived on farms called "marginal," unemployment assistance found among them a "clientele" ready to accept financial assistance ... the regularity of which guaranteed the security the farm could not give them. They came to think of farm life not in terms of productivity of the land, but inasmuch as it affected their eligibility for assistance. Since the essential condition for this eligibility consisted in the impossibility of living on the farm, they reduced their livestock and even left their land fallow. Others lost interest in farming because the meagre earnings from their work were smaller than any possible amount of assistance. Still others who could have leased or sold their farm to a neighbour and moved elsewhere failed to do so because life on a nonprofit-earning farm was considered as a condition which assured them of a small but at least regular income from the State ... In short, financial assistance to farmers proved an obstacle to consolidation of the farm; it hindered the desire for progress and renewal in many; it decided others to dig in on farms unsuitable for cultivation and it limited the number of farm hands. In a word, it crystallized the latent dependence of a large segment of an underprivileged social class. The application of a long-term farm policy thus met, because of financial assistance, a resistance based on the artificial security offered by immediate relief.^?

Thus, this change had a significant effect on the economic and social structure of Quebec society. The noncategorical orientation of the Quebec system was reaffirmed in 1969 when, in response to CAP, social assistance programs were consolidated under the Social Aid Act, which "embodies the principle of the same poverty threshold for every person or household, regardless of the cause of need: whether able to work or not, everyone was entitled to the same financial assistance from the government, if he had no other income."138 This act, which superseded all nominally categorical programs, made assistance completely and explicitly noncategorical.139 The Quebec assistance system under the Social Aid Act put little emphasis on employment. The Quebec White Paper noted the considerable

85 Assistance Regimes since 1950

taxback provisions of the program: "The social aid program has the highest marginal reduction rate, nearly 100% of every additional dollar of employment income."140 The program was also criticized for not making employability enhancement mandatory: "the social aid system does not make clear demands that would facilitate the reintegration of the recipient in the labour force, and there s/he remains on welfare without any obligation to take steps to get off it."141 The noncategorical approach to assistance provision remained clearly evident until the mid-igSos: "a characteristic of the Quebec system is to accord as high a level of benefit to those able to work as to those who are not, in contrast with most other systems in the world."142 The Social Aid Act represented a significant break from the residual approach to assistance that predominated in Quebec only a decade earlier and, in this sense, indicated the vast changes taking place during the Quiet Revolution. The extension of federal cost-sharing coincided quite closely with the emergence of the powerful forces unleashed by the fracturing of traditional Quebec society, though it is difficult to gauge the relative weight of each in reshaping the social assistance system. Yet, as a result of these and other forces, the Quebec assistance system developed from one approximating a residual model into a much broader, noncategorical system: Quebec developed, in the igGos and 19708, an approach to social assistance that was more ambitious, more universal, and better integrated than the approach defined in the Canada Assistance Plan framework. This approach often came up against the constraints posed by CAP regulations, which did not easily accommodate the financing of aid, outside of that provided to the most poor, such as daycare or services to persons with handicaps.143

The approach evident under the Social Aid Act prevailed until the igSos, when the Quebec assistance system significantly increased its focus on employment. The current system, as it developed, included a categorical element that was clearly distinct from the noncategorical orientation of the Quebec system over the past quarter century. The government introduced a broad scope of positive inducements, as well as negative sanctions, to encourage labour market participation by the wide range of recipients defined as employable. The resulting system is a hybrid of the market/family enforcement and market-performance models. The overall emphasis has been on labour market participation: "For ten years, no province in Canada has been more innovative than Quebec in making the transition from a social assistance system based strictly on income maintenance to a system fostering the integration of recipients into the labour market."144 Notably, while these

86 Patchworks of Purpose

changes were taking place, the Quebec government announced a significant overall funding reduction for social assistance. The shift in orientation was marked in part by the introduction of Bill 30, which "establishes the old distinction between those people who are capable of working and those who are incapable of doing so; it establishes economic functions as well as social discrimination through that distinction when it determines such criteria [of employability]."145 Johnson crisply sums up the aims of the 1986 reforms as the government of Quebec's "intention to transform social assistance into two distinct programs, a program for unemployables and a program for employables."146 The aim was "to separate those able to work from those unable to do so and push the former into the labour market."147 As a result of the reforms, the assistance regime in Quebec now incorporates several stratifying components, such as higher benefits for unemployable recipients. Benefits also vary for employable recipients: recipients participating in employment enhancement receive the highest benefits; recipients available though not currently participating receive less; and unavailable and nonparticipating recipients receive the least. Benefits for employable recipients also depend on employment performance and may be reduced through successive penalties for households that "include an adult who refuses or abandons suitable employment without valid cause or who loses such employment through his or her own fault."148 This provision implies a broad range of state involvement in determining whether employment is suitable, whether reasons for leaving employment are valid, and where fault lies when employment is terminated. In keeping with the trend towards greater differentiation, Quebec, which by 1980 was the only province that fully indexed benefits, introduced differential indexing of benefits in 1989, when benefits for employable recipients were no longer indexed, although unemployable recipients continued to be guaranteed indexed benefits.149 Full indexation before 1989 is of considerable significance: at least in theory, growth in assistance rates could have outstripped growth in minimum wages rates. However, it is crucial to note that the categorical nature of the current regime is quite strictly limited by the fact that the pool of recipients defined as employable in Quebec is very broad and the stringent requirements for employable recipients applies across this wide range of recipients. With the reforms of the mid-igSos, the assistance system in Quebec began widening its definition of employability: "In 1971, 63.6% were classified as unable to work; by 1987, 73.5% were deemed able to work."150 This trend continued in the 19905 and "increasingly, some of the disabled and single parents with older children are being

87 Assistance Regimes since 1950 reclassified as employable."151 In keeping with the general trend of regimes based on the market/family enforcement and market-performance models, "the definition of employable in Quebec is considerably broader than in most other provinces."152 As an example of this broad definition of employability and the emphasis on market participation in Quebec, sole-support parents are defined as employable and are provided with higher benefits if they simply declare a willingness to leave the home for training or employment. This definition clearly emphasizes the fact that the Quebec system places less value on providing at-home care for a child than on engaging in employment or employability enhancement. The broad range of recipients defined as employable are expected to enhance employability through vocational or general educational training, volunteering to work at community services, or by entering subsidized employment in the private sector. Recipients face punitive measures in the form of reduced benefits if they do not avail themselves of these programs.153 Muszynski notes that "recent welfare reform in Quebec has focused on getting people off welfare by coercive and punitive means."154 For example, in early 1986 the Quebec government announced its intention to significantly increase fraud investigation through a special unit of 150 welfare police.155 By 1987, of all the provinces, Quebec had made "the most extensive use of the home visit to verify recipients' living arrangements."'56 Quebec assistance investigators performed random unannounced home visits to which all recipients could be subjected.157 In 1993 it was announced that investigations would ostensibly be shifted from this broad systematic orientation to a more highly targeted orientation. However, "the categories were so vast and so numerous that almost no one was excluded. Thus, one cannot truly speak of targeting."158 It is not surprising in a system that requires so much information (about, for example, the value of recipients' private property or the income of their parents) that verification measures are necessarily intrusive, although the effectiveness of the type of fraud investigation employed in Quebec is open to question. Gow, Noel, and Villeneuve note that "in fact, studies on the subject show ... that a more rigorous administration of files in the welfare office proves more effective than home visits."159 Despite the fact that "such a review cannot justify home visits, even in purely administrative terms ... their operation nevertheless has been maintained, and even reinforced, from one year to the next."l6° These findings suggest that such investigations have existed for reasons beyond curbing fraud - for example, to deter those not yet in receipt of assistance benefits.

88 Patchworks of Purpose

Although several aspects of assistance provision are consistent with the perception that the Quebec system is punitive, the contemporary system in Quebec has not adopted many of the market/family enforcement measures that existed in such provinces as British Columbia in the early 19708 and Saskatchewan in the igSos.161 Quebec has, in fact, combined its negative sanctions enforcing labour market participation with all the positive features of the market-performance model. For example, lower taxback rates are available to employable recipients. l6a Quebec is also the only province to have a significant low-income wage supplementation program - a feature strongly in keeping with the market-performance model. Quebec's APPORT (Aide aux parents pour les revenus du travail), or, in English, PWA (Parental Wage Assistance), program of 1988 is a more recent version of SUPRET (Supplement au revenu de travail), introduced in 1979 in order to "supplement the employment income of families and increase the incentives to return to work."163 APPORT/PWA "provides incentives for ... recipients of unemployment insurance or social assistance with dependent children to join or rejoin the work force. PWA offers a nontaxable, asset-tested supplement to employment income, reimbursement of a portion of eligible child-care expenses, where applicable, and special help with high housing costs."'64 The plan, "although primarily targeted at the working and non-welfare poor, is also open to some employed social assistance recipients."165 In fact, about 40 percent of recipient families in 1993 also received social assistance.166 The major difference between APPORT and its predecessor SUPRET is that APPORT considers "the income supplement granted as an adjustment to income in the current year. Of course, this requires adjustments to the supplement and a certain ingenuity in calculating monthly benefits, but it allows the program to offer support at the time when it is needed."167 This difference in short-term calculations of wage-benefit differentials is likely crucial in encouraging recipients to enter the labour market. Both Manitoba and Saskatchewan have income supplementation schemes for low-income families (the Child Related Income Support Programme in Manitoba and the Family Income Plan in Saskatchewan), although the benefits under these programs are not significant in comparison with benefits under the Quebec program. In 1993 maximum benefits for a single parent with one child ranged from $5,800 in Quebec to $1260 in Saskatchewan and $360 in Manitoba.l68 In comparison with the programs of Saskatchewan and Manitoba, APPORT was the "most effective in reducing the work-welfare income differential ... this is why Quebec was the only province in which a parent receiving welfare was not financially disadvantaged by taking full-time employment at the minimum wage."169 The most serious problem with the program has

89 Assistance Regimes since 1950

been low "take-up": "its effectiveness is seriously limited by the fact that it reaches only a small percentage of its intended population."170 However, the number of recipient families has increased from 23,000 in 1992 to 33,000 in 1995-96.1?1 Not all so-called employment programs in Quebec operate primarily to encourage market participation by employable recipients. One example is AGIR (Activite de Groupe pour 1'Integration par la Recherche d'emploi): "Obligatory under the threat of penalties, participation takes place over a period of seven weeks and includes five group meetings of a total duration of twelve hours, as well as individual meetings. This program of activity is intended to inform participants, help them to identify their objectives and employment possibilities, and prepare them to conduct an effective job search."172 In light of its low success rate in reintegrating recipients into the labour market, Bouchard, Labrie, and Noel argue that "AGIR functions more as a measure of control, conformity, and dissuasion than as a measure that encourages entry into the labour market."173 It appears that individual employment programs in Quebec have followed both the market-performance model and the market/family enforcement model. To add yet another dimension to the multifaceted Quebec system, some recent initiatives have reintroduced elements of older historical traditions of assistance provision in Quebec. One example is the enforcement of familial financial obligations by denying benefits to otherwise eligible adult recipients who the assistance system deems should be dependent on their families. For employable recipients between the ages of 18 and 30, independence from the family must be established (through meeting specific requirements) or the applicant is assumed to be dependent and assistance is automatically reduced or denied. Depending on whether there are additional siblings on assistance or in postsecondary education, "if the family income is more than $21,000 per year, the young person is not considered eligible for social aid."174 This provision is consistent with the historical emphasis in Quebec on the primacy of the family. In contrast to its noncategorical and relatively straightforward orientation of the early 19805, by 1992, "one point was clear: the new Quebec system is complex, perhaps the most complex of any provincial or territorial welfare system."175 This complexity is hardly consistent with the approach to assistance provision in Quebec throughout the 19608 and 19705 or with the residual approach as it existed before the Quiet Revolution. Because it is so complex, it is difficult to categorize the current system, but it is clear that the system is now primarily based on an emphasis on labour market participation - an emphasis in keeping with both the market-performance and market/family enforcement models.

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The Redistributive Regime: Prince Edward Island Over the course of its development, the assistance system in Prince Edward Island has tended to be noncategorical and nonstigmatizing. Historically, poor relief was generally provided directly through the provincial cabinet where circumstances warranted and was not explicitly categorical or highly stigmatizing as in other provinces that required residence in the workhouse or compliance with a work test. Assistance in Prince Edward Island remains relatively nonstratifying and nonstigmatizing, although it is no longer provided on a discretionary basis. Prince Edward Island has shifted from a residual regime in a direction more in keeping with the redistributive model. Categorical programs were originally only very weakly developed in Prince Edward Island in comparison with other provinces. Assistance in Prince Edward Island was provided on a largely noncategorical basis until about 1950, at which time categorical programs similar to those in other provinces developed.176 However, the tendency towards noncategorical provision was reasserted in the wake of CAP when municipal and provincial programs were combined under a single provincial program reflecting a noncategorical approach. Assistance provision was "redesigned to provide assistance based on financial need rather than the cause of that need. This meant the elimination of higher basic benefits for some persons than others. Every applicant [was] now given a 'needs test' ... and granted assistance according to the resulting budget deficit. [Benefit rates varied] only according to size of family and ages of children, whether the breadwinner [was] disabled or merely unemployed."'77 Assistance continued to be provided under the direct supervision of elected officials assisted by the Director of Welfare Assistance and the Deputy Minister. Elected officials maintained direct supervision over the disbursement of funds until the early 19708, when authority was delegated to the Director of Welfare Assistance and regulations became increasingly codified.'78 Provincial assistance continues to be noncategorical and "benefits [and taxback rates] are based solely on need, not on employability or length of time on welfare." '79 In addition, assistance is provided not only to persons in need but also "to any person who is not in need but likely to become a person in need if the goods or services are not provided."'80 Benefits in Prince Edward Island have tended to be more generous than in other provinces. Even during the late igSos, while benefit levels were being significantly reduced in other provinces, they were enriched along with other aspects of assistance provision in Prince Edward Island.'8' In keeping with the principles underlying assistance provision in Prince Edward Island, job search requirements for employable recipi-

91 Assistance Regimes since 1950 ents were relatively lax. As of 1980, clients were expected to demonstrate three job contacts each month. This is surprising in comparison with other jurisdictions, which required as many as three job contacts per day.182 It is difficult to overstate the significant difference between the assumptions underpinning assistance policy in Prince Edward Island and the assumptions in other provinces: "The policy is that applicants are to be presumed unemployable. Destitution itself should be sufficient evidence of severe unemployment problems; hence technical employability should not effect eligibility. Operating on the assumption that the vast majority of recipients will actively seek any work which is available, and for which they are capable, there is little point in imposing harsh work tests."183 Considering these assumptions, it is not surprising that assistance provision in Prince Edward Island was not highly stratifying or stigmatizing and that there has been no evidence of the stringent verification techniques, such as mandatory home visits, that are found in other provinces. The Prince Edward Island system is not aimed at enforcing either market or family participation. In contrast to regimes requiring single mothers to attempt to secure employment or patriarchal regimes reinforcing the place of single mothers in the home, the province allowed the choice about her role in the market and family to fall to the single parent: "single parents with children under school age are given the option of remaining at home with their children or of being assisted ... to pursue employment."184 This was contrary to the practice in other provinces: "unlike a few other provinces, welfare assistance policy on Prince Edward Island does not clearly identify a preference for working or stay-at-home mothers, thus allowing both options."185 Thus, assistance in Prince Edward Island bears strong ties to its nonstratifying and nonstigmatizing historical roots. At the same time, the movement toward providing assistance as a right rather than as a matter of discretion has fundamentally altered the nature of the province's assistance system. FEDERAL EFFECTS TRAJECTORIES

ON

PROVINCIAL

OF DEVELOPMENT

Federal initiatives did not result in significant convergence in the qualitative aspects of provincial assistance provision. Provinces reacted differently to cost-sharing. In some cases, the impacts were significant, while in others they were negligible. Federal cost-sharing shifted the orientation of some provincial assistance systems in one direction, while shifting others in different directions. In some provinces, the extension of federal cost-sharing reinforced the existing orientation of the assistance system and, in so doing, also

92 Patchworks of Purpose reinforced provincial distinctiveness. In Ontario, the overall effect of federal cost-sharing was to strengthen the conservative orientation of the system. In contrast, in Saskatchewan the extension of federal costsharing reinforced the noncategorical approach to assistance provision. Conversely, in other provinces the extension of federal cost-sharing contributed to the major reorientation of the assistance system. For example, in Quebec federal cost-sharing initiatives appeared to interact with potent provincial political forces to cause a radical break from the historical approach to assistance. In Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, federal cost-sharing did result in the modernization of social assistance legislation and administration.186 However, the overall effects on the principles underlying assistance provision in these two provinces were much less significant than in Quebec. In yet other cases, the extension of federal cost-sharing had little effect on assistance provision. For example, in Prince Edward Island, significant change did not take place until well after federal cost-sharing was extended. The provision of assistance remained essentially discretionary until the mid-ig7os, with the decision to grant assistance in particular cases falling to elected officials. In Manitoba, Alberta, and British Columbia it is difficult to discern any significant effects resulting from the extension of federal cost-sharing. Thus, the impact of federal cost-sharing was multifaceted and complex and did not result in a clear pattern of convergence. Although both the Unemployment Assistance Act (UAA) and Canada Assistance Plan (CAP) were only tentative steps in the direction of establishing national uniformity in social assistance provision, even judged by their own policy objectives, their performance was relatively dismal. It is reasonable to wonder why the effects of the UAA and CAP in fostering convergence were so negligible. In the case of CAP, the three substantive conditions were that assistance should be provided to anyone "in need," that there should be no provincial residency requirement, and that an appeal procedure should exist - yet CAP did not even achieve success in enforcing these minimal standards. The federal requirement of a needs-test appears to have been designed not to identify assistance that provinces were obliged to provide but to identify the boundaries of shareable costs and, specifically, those that the federal government would not share. For example, the needs-test requirement rendered provincial income supplementation schemes ineligible for cost-sharing if they were income-tested rather than needs-tested. Even the implication of the needs-test requirement that individuals in similar situations should be treated in a similar manner has not been met in those provinces in which eligibility requirements or the definition of being in need continue to differ from municipality to municipality.

93 Assistance Regimes since 1950 CAP explicitly prohibited provincial residency requirements. However, in certain provinces, assistance continued to be denied to applicants without a place of residence.l8? While not an explicit violation of the ban on provincial residency requirements, such provisions certainly discouraged assistance recipients from moving interprovincially. This practice persisted in certain provinces into the 19905 in apparent violation of the ostensible requirement that assistance should be provided to anyone in need. Moreover, despite the provision that provinces must establish appeal procedures, they were not in place in some provinces for some considerable time after CAP came into effect, although all provinces now do have them.' 88 Despite considerable concern in the social policy community with the mechanics of fiscal transfers, the failure of the federal government to impose meaningful national standards in social assistance is not merely a technical issue about how transfers have been designed. The political context and levels of public support for social assistance are crucial. Context is crucial in explaining the effects of cost-sharing on provincial social assistance. In contrast to CAP, fiscal penalties that could be levied against provinces under the Canada Health Act were effective in maintaining national standards because of the political popularity of health care and medical insurance. Social assistance does not enjoy similar political support. In the case of governments ideologically opposed to generous provision of social assistance, CAP would provide little protection. To governments or voters who see social assistance expenditures as a waste of tax dollars, regardless of the amount of federal funding foregone, every provincial dollar saved is a dollar saved. To threaten a government ideologically opposed to social assistance with reducing funds available for social assistance is a rather empty threat. Those arguing that CAP would provide meaningful protection against social assistance cuts in Ralph Klein's Alberta or Mike Harris's Ontario are likely whistling past the graveyard. Fiscal leverage is simply an extremely poor substitute for jurisdiction in this area. GENERAL TRENDS IN D E V E L O P M E N T

While provincial assistance regimes have developed along distinct trajectories, all also share similar broad patterns of development. Judging the relative significance of similarities and differences between provinces is a very difficult problem that hinges on subjective judgement. The time frame chosen to compare policy will condition the extent to which similarities or differences are emphasized. Although this study focuses primarily on the distinctiveness of regimes, the relatively

94 Patchworks of Purpose broad time frame enhances the perception of long-term similarities between regimes over the course of their development. For example, if one were to focus on the 19205, one would see categorical mothers' allowances in half the provinces, but they would be conspicuously absent in the others, with no evidence of convergence between the two groups. A longer time frame softens this picture of distinctiveness, since all provinces eventually adopted categorical mothers' allowances. Another example is the assumption of responsibility for relief. While municipal responsibility was the rule (with a few exceptions) historically, in the contemporary period provincial responsibility is the rule (with a few exceptions). A final example is provided by residency requirements. Residency requirements were the norm historically among provincial assistance regimes. However, in the early 19605, several provinces abolished residency requirements. After CAP, explicit provincial residency requirements were no longer part of the social assistance landscape in Canada. Neither convergence nor divergence is evident in these processes. However, the early stages of these processes convey an image of divergence as some provinces adopt innovations, while others do not. Conversely, the later stages convey an image of convergence as most provinces adopt the reforms already in place in other provinces. A broader time frame in each of these cases reveals the entire process as one of change with neither convergence nor divergence dominating. Thus, it is necessary to examine time periods of sufficient length in determining patterns of convergence and divergence. Before categorical mothers' allowances first appeared, there were several clusters of assistance regimes: regimes in which indoor relief was the only assistance available (New Brunswick, Nova Scotia); regimes in which deserving recipients could receive outdoor relief while undeserving recipients were relegated to the county houses (Ontario); regimes in which outdoor assistance was provided by the province on a discretionary basis (Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island); and regimes in which assistance remained a private or municipal responsibility (Quebec, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, British Columbia). Thus, the Canadian assistance complex had an overall residual orientation, with stratification and active stigmatization of recipients being limited to particular provinces. During the thirty-five-year period from 1916 to 1950, all ten provinces adopted categorical mothers' allowances. Although this development took place over a long period and categorical provision was of varying significance in individual provinces, the overall orientation of the Canadian assistance system shifted in a decidedly more categorical, and hence conservative, direction.

95 Assistance Regimes since 1950

After 1950, provincial assistance gradually became more generous and was provided to a broader segment of the population. With increasingly generous provision for recipients previously categorized as undeserving, assistance in Canada became less noticeably categorical, although some provinces retained their highly conservative orientations. In the late 19708 and early 19808, assistance provision generally appeared to be under stress; however, the overall direction in which this will drive assistance is somewhat unclear. Some provinces have moved towards more active encouragement of employment (British Columbia, New Brunswick, Quebec); some have moved in the direction of making assistance less attractive for all recipients (Alberta, Saskatchewan, Quebec); some have increased the generosity of assistance programs (Prince Edward Island and, until the Harris government, Ontario); while others (Manitoba and Nova Scotia) have remained relatively static. There does appear to be a slight trend towards increasingly stratifying recipients on the basis of their level of employability. Ontario, Manitoba, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland have retained their traditional highly stratifying orientation. In the 19808, three provinces that did not have a tradition of categorical provision began to adopt categorical approaches (New Brunswick, Saskatchewan, and, to a lesser extent, Quebec). However, Alberta, which historically had a strong tradition of stratification of recipients, has been moving away from that tradition since the 19708. There are also some very clear trends in the historical development of the mechanisms of assistance delivery. There has been a general movement towards providing outdoor rather than indoor relief (or relief in work camps.) There has also been a general shift away from vouchers and in-kind benefits, which were once prevalent in some provinces. Nevertheless, certain differences in the relationship between the state, market, and family that underlie assistance provision remain. For example, conservative regimes today may represent much the same relationship between the state, market, and family as in the past, although they now deny assistance to undeserving recipients rather than incarcerate them. However, there are also some substantive trends evident in the principles underlying social assistance provision. There seems to be an increasing concern with the effects of assistance on the economy rather than with the moral implications of assistance. Categorical provision and stratification of recipients have increasingly been based explicitly on employability rather than other ascriptive qualities or explicitly moral considerations. Patriarchal modes of assistance provision intended to reinforce the traditional view that the mother's place was in

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the home have given way to an increasingly marked trend towards expecting single mothers to enter the labour market. In addition, there has been a general movement away from some of the more explicitly patriarchal regulations such as the man-in-the-house rule. Within these broad patterns of historical development, differences between the provinces are significant. For example, all provincial assistance regimes passed through a phase in which particular categories of recipients (for example, deserving mothers) received more generous benefits than individuals who were not eligible for categorical benefits. While all assistance regimes were stratifying in this sense, they differed considerably in the extent to which assistance differentiated among recipients, that is, in the generosity of categorical benefits in contrast to the treatment of noncategorical recipients. In some provinces this categorical complexion lasted the entire century; in others, about fifteen years. CONCLUSION

Provincial assistance regimes have differed significantly in relatively fixed and consistent ways over quite long periods of time, although their distinct trajectories of development are in some cases marked by certain episodic shifts in orientation. Thus, there are three distinct patterns within the overall development of provincial assistance regimes in the postwar period. First, these regimes do not appear to be significantly less distinct at the end of this period than at the beginning. Second, the regimes have followed distinct trajectories of development in the sense that, despite episodic changes, one can identify particular provincial orientations that persisted over considerable periods of time. Third, despite these distinct trajectories, provincial assistance regimes have all also followed a similar broad path of development. The next chapter considers the significance of this overall pattern of historical development.

5 So What? The Political Implications of Distinct Provincial Assistance Regimes Decisions in the development of social policy must be seen as choices. These are made, of course, in a context of economic, cultural and ideological constraints, but nevertheless they are choices, indeed to some extent choices about which of those constraints to accept and which to challenge ... Social policies do not merely emerge in the form they do because of a particular family system or economic system; they must be seen as the result of choices in favour of those systems. These choices then reinforce those systems, and the ideologies that sustain them. Hill and Bramely1

The distinct historical origins of provincial social assistance regimes mark fundamental differences in how the state acted to reinforce or undermine the market, on the one hand, and the family, on the other. Provincial regimes have displayed relatively coherent and persistent differences over considerable periods, though this development has been marked by certain episodic shifts in orientation in particular regimes. The overall pattern has not been unambiguously one of either convergence or divergence; rather, provincial assistance regimes have followed unique trajectories of development and continue to remain distinct. Within the bounds of broader patterns of development characterizing the welfare state in Canada and in Western industrialized society more generally, Canada has had and continues to have not one regime but an amalgam of ten provincial variants. What is the significance of these findings? First, they have immediate significance for the current policy debate about whether social assistance reform should move towards some measure of national uniformity or, alternatively, encourage further provincial diversity. Even if one could provide a strong philosophical rationale for implementing national standards in social assistance provision, this is simply not a realistic political strategy. Second, these conclusions raise doubts about the extent to which external factors - such as fiscal constraints or constraints imposed by changing world conditions, including globalization and changing technology - are limiting the range of viable

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policy alternatives and forcing policymakers across political units to adopt similar solutions to policy problems. Third, these conclusions imply, when considering the distinct historical trajectories of development of provincial regimes in light of these homogenizing forces, that differences between regimes are significantly robust. These differences may be an integral part of provincial differences in public preferences regarding assistance policy as well as differences in provincial economic structure. Distinct provincial regimes are not only responses to differences in public preferences or economic structure, however. These regimes themselves contribute to and reinforce such differences. Thus, the question of how to provide assistance is not simply an issue of whether a particular model of assistance provision fits with a preexisting configuration of public preferences or economic structure. Rather, it encompasses normative questions about whether policy should accept a particular set of public preferences or particular economic structure and whether assistance should reinforce these social structures or attempt to change them. NATIONAL STANDARDS: FLOOR OR CEILING The most immediate implications of these findings are for the reform of the Canadian social assistance complex. There are mounting pressures in Canada, as elsewhere, for social policy reform. Reform in Canada, however, is confronted by the fact that such policy is embroiled in the intergovernmental entanglement of Canadian federalism. The provincial differences outlined in this study highlight the fact that there is no consensus among provinces about the appropriate ends of assistance policy. Thus, the issue of assistance policy reform raises the question of what kind of welfare state is most desirable. In so doing, this issue also raises the question of whether there should be a relatively uniform national system or a more disparate set of provincial systems and whether the federal government should be attempting to reduce or encourage provincial diversity in such a critical component of the Canadian welfare state. The replacement of CAP with block-funding for social assistance under the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST) in 1996 demonstrated that current federal policy is moving more explicitly towards accepting diversity in provincial program design and delivery - if not actually encouraging provincial variation. Unlike CAP, under the CHST there will not even be federal pretensions of ensuring any minimum standards of uniformity in provincial assistance provision, except for a restriction against provincial residency requirements. Critics claim that

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Political Implications

this change poses a threat to the national uniformity and standards in social assistance that have existed under CAP. Such criticisms are often based on erroneous assumptions about the existing level of national uniformity and the role of federal policy in fostering it. A glaring example is the myth created in the national print media that meaningful national standards in the provincial provision of social assistance have existed in Canada and have been enforced by the federal government through CAP. For example, the Globe and Mail reports that "Ottawa set strict conditions for sharing the cost of social programs with the provinces under CAP" that included "providing assistance to anyone in need" in accordance with standards specifying "interprovincial portability of benefits, and minimum levels of welfare payments."2 CAP conditions are argued to have prohibited provinces from denying welfare to those deemed employable or from implementing workfare schemes.3 CAP is also attributed with helping to "consolidate a patchwork of welfare programs" and "build a national infrastructure of welfare and social services" based on a standardized philosophy of assistance provision.4 Regarding CAP'S passing, it was noted, wistfully, that CAP "defined us, morally, as a national community."5 In keeping with this myth, national antipoverty groups have argued to the United Nations that the changes in federal policy from CAP to the CHST abrogated the "rights of the poor" in Canada.6 In reality, CAP guaranteed very little in the way of a right to a minimum level of assistance. The uniformity that had existed among provincial social assistance systems under CAP was also minimal. Cost-sharing under CAP and its attendant conditions did not contribute significantly to diminishing interprovincial distinctiveness.7 Regardless of the success or failure of earlier policies, any assessment of the current federal policy of more explicit acceptance of provincial variation is linked to much larger debates about the type of country Canada is and will be. These debates implicate all the broader issues of federalism and raise all the traditional issues of federal versus provincial jurisdiction:8 democratic implications (devolving decisionmaking responsibility to the level of government closest to the people, as well as ensuring the integrity of the lines of accountability between different orders of government and the people), equity concerns (ensuring that disadvantaged citizens in different parts of the country can expect reasonably similar levels of social protection), efficiency concerns (containing spill-overs and preventing provincial exportation of social assistance caseloads to other provinces), and broader concerns about national unity. Appeals for national uniformity are often not distinguished from pleas for a minimum level of social protection - implicitly at a level

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higher than currently furnished by provinces providing assistance at the lowest levels. The assumptions of this type of reasoning are generally that, for a variety of reasons (such as ideological differences or the effects of interprovincial spillovers), provinces will not voluntarily adopt the favoured model of assistance provision. One strain of this reasoning is simply that the federal government is generally more progressive than provincial governments. However, as Muszynski notes, Simply reinforcing the role of the federal government will do little in the face of powerful social and economic forces favouring a society that conforms to market logic rather than the logic of equality, caring, and solidarity ... the redistribution of federal powers ... will do little to stem the tide of welfare state erosion unless there is a significant restructuring of political and economic visions and priorities ... It is not clear that decentralization in itself would substantially undermine the Canadian welfare state. At this point, the provinces are no less progressive than Ottawa in their social policy visions.9 Other examples of arguments that aim to promote a higher social minima through national standards focus on the issue of spillovers and reason that provinces will attempt to off-load their social assistance burdens onto other provinces through various means, including residency requirements and low levels of assistance. The overall result of this process of provincial levelling will be a safety net of a very low level. However, Blank and Hanratty's investigation of poverty policy in Canada and the United States, which demonstrates that social assistance policy in Canada is both more generous and more decentralized, launches a serious empirical challenge to this line of reasoning.10 Regarding the welfare state more broadly, from a cross-national comparative perspective, "the evidence for a process of social dumping remains limited."'' Arguments about the likelihood of interprovincial social dumping are based on important assumptions about the high mobility of assistance recipients. However, these assumptions are often accepted as axiomatic or are supported only by anecdotal evidence rather than rigorous cohort analysis that traces the movements of assistance recipients across provinces over time. Recent data suggest that the mobility of assistance recipients is often overstated.12 Most simply, assistance recipients are probably the least likely segment of the population to have the financial means to move interprovincially and establish a new residence while facing a certain (perhaps lengthy) interruption of benefits. Second, arguments positing high mobility overlook the critical importance of family and neighbourhood relations and the fact that recipients who move will lose these

101 Political Implications social relations and have little chance of recreating them. This social reasoning is certainly as important, if not more important, than the abstract comparison of assistance generosity. Third, the intricacies of the various components of assistance systems (especially eligibility requirements) may discourage recipients from moving and attempting to reestablish eligibility in another jurisdiction. There are no guarantees that recipients eligible in one jurisdiction will be eligible in another. Due to various factors, including special benefits and discretionary benefits, recipients may also find it difficult to compare benefit rates across jurisdictions. The level of knowledge often attributed to recipients stretches credulity. Finally, recipients who do relocate probably base their decision on the relative employment opportunities in the various provinces, rather than on the relative generosity of the various assistance regimes. However, despite the dubious nature of assumptions about high mobility among recipients, governments still use them to justify restrictive policies. The case for national uniformity is also often made on the basis of national unity concerns and the expected effects of a patchwork of provincial safety nets in eroding a sense of national community. The arguments are generally based on assumptions about the ability of provincial governments (especially in advantaged provinces) to create and foster distinct provincial political cultures and attachments to the provincial (as opposed to the national) state. The obverse argument is based on considerations of interregional equity. National citizenship implies a right to reasonably comparable levels of social protection regardless of an individual's province of residence. National standards are assumed to encourage perceptions of national citizenship — especially in disadvantaged provinces. An argument in favour of national standards that appeals more directly to economic concerns rather than nationalist sentiments is based on the reasoning that different provincial assistance policies fragment the internal common market and the labour market, in particular. Where assistance provision varies across provinces, recipients may be unwilling to give up the security of assistance in their home province in order to seek employment in another province. The mobility of surplus labour across the national labour market would be facilitated by a uniform national assistance system, especially if people could move to another province without interrupting their benefits. Thus, the question of whether social assistance should be provided through a nationally uniform system or a set of provincial systems encompasses important questions of economic efficiency. Arguments favouring national uniformity are confronted by a range of arguments favouring provincial variability. For example, the most

1O2

Patchworks of Purpose

democratic government is often argued to take place at as close a level to the people as is feasible. Imposing standards ultimately governing the appropriate ends of assistance policy upon a provincial community infringes upon this aspect of democratic governance. This line of reasoning underpins, for example, Quebec nationalist criticisms of costsharing that see programs such as CAP as "an indication of federal intrusion in a field of provincial jurisdiction."13 This aspect of democratic governance is integrally related to the question of whether there are significant provincial differences in public perceptions about poverty and the appropriate means of alleviating it. If such differences do not exist, there appears to be little democratic justification for significant provincial policy differences. A further argument based on a concern with democratic governance is made from within the framework of the current assignment of jurisdictional responsibilities. It is argued that cost-sharing and other forms of imposing standards of national uniformity in an area of exclusive provincial jurisdiction increase the difficulty of determining which level of government is responsible for particular policy decisions - thereby blurring the lines of democratic accountability. Another argument favouring provincial variability is that provincial governments are more adept than the central government at determining what form of assistance provision is most beneficial for their particular provincial economies. The central government may simply be insufficiently responsive to varying economic conditions in the provinces. This argument rejects the assumption that the relationship between assistance provision and market performance is fixed (for example, that higher levels of one necessitate lower levels of the other). Rather, this approach stresses that this relationship is open and contingent and that various forms of assistance provision may be differentially beneficial or detrimental to market performance, depending on the economic context. According to this logic, there is no model of social assistance provision that is uniformly appropriate to the different provincial economic contexts that make up the Canadian economy. Finally, provincial variability allows provinces the necessary flexibility to experiment in the field of social assistance provision. Policy initiatives that are successful may then be adopted by other jurisdictions. This approach may encourage innovation and adaptation. While there are strong arguments on both sides, the debate about national uniformity versus provincial variability cannot be authoritatively resolved. There is no objective standard for weighing various concerns about democracy, efficiency, or national unity when they come into conflict.

103 Political Implications

However, if one accepts that significant differences will exist between provincial social assistance systems in the absence of federal initiatives and that the philosophical bases for adopting some standard of national uniformity outweigh arguments for provincial variability, the practical policy question of how to foster such uniformity still remains. Critics of the current federal move to block funding appear to be advocating - often by default - that some form of conditional matching cost-sharing should continue. Another possibility is attaching national standards to block-funding. However, it seems likely that meaningful national standards constituting even a minimal level of national uniformity in this field would be extremely difficult to achieve through fiscal means alone. Designing some minimal standards of national uniformity is a much more difficult challenge than is often recognized. The complex interaction of the individual components of provincial assistance provision demonstrates the difficulty of specifying national standards in adequate detail to ensure that they could not be easily circumvented by recalcitrant provinces. For example, specifying minimum benefit levels for everyone deemed to be in need does not mean much if provinces determine the definition of need. There are significant ways in which the federal spending power simply cannot replace direct jurisdiction.14 Furthermore, it simply does not seem plausible that the federal government would be able to enforce national uniformity at a higher level than currently exists without increasing its fiscal commitment. For better or for worse, it is unlikely that the federal government will do so in the foreseeable future. Thus, the debate is bounded by Ottawa's fiscal position and ranges between attempting to ensure that the very minimal national uniformity now in place continues to exist or, possibly, accepting the complete abnegation of a federal role in this policy area. While significant provincial variations in social assistance outline a menu of possible directions for reform, it is not clear that any of these alternatives command more public or elite support than others. There is thus no national consensus about the most desirable type of assistance system upon which to base national standards. In addition, the realpolitik of federal-provincial relations provides ample reason to suspect that any substantial policy moves in the direction of national uniformity are highly unlikely. The political strategy of promoting social welfare and a strong social safety net through calls for national standards is simply not realistic. Nor is this strategy without its costs. Welfare reformers who call for national standards as a means of ensuring minimum standards should beware. Recent experience in the United States demonstrates that federal legislators are willing to use conditions attached to fiscal transfers

104 Patchworks of Purpose

to enforce maximum national standards. In 1992, Bill Clinton's presidential campaign included a pledge to "end welfare as we know it." The essence of the proposal was to use the federally imposed costsharing conditions of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program to enforce a two-year time limit on recipients to reestablish independence. However, before the Clinton proposals could command sufficient bipartisan Congressional support, the 1994 Congressional elections significantly changed the political landscape. After vetoing one Republican welfare reform bill early in 1996, Clinton agreed in August 1996 to sign another version of the bill that transfers AFDC cost-sharing to a block grant, reduces federal spending by $55 billion over six years, and also "[i]mposes a five-year lifetime limit on welfare benefits. States could ... set shorter time limits. [The bill requires] recipients to begin working two years after receiving welfare, and mandates that half of all single-parent families work 30 hours a week by 2002." 15 The American experience clearly demonstrates that federally imposed national standards may be used to contract rather than expand welfare entitlements. For the first time, echoes of this approach can now be heard in the Canadian context.16 While generally used in Canada by proponents of minimum national standards, the language and logic of national standards could easily be appropriated by those arguing for maximum standards - a policy purpose to which fiscal instruments may be much better suited. National standards could well come to represent a ceiling rather than a floor in the provision of social assistance in Canada. PROVINCIAL SOCIAL ASSISTANCE

AND

CONVERGENCE

Federal intervention in the field of social assistance is just one example in which uniform changes in circumstances external to the provinces did not result in significant convergence. Despite the universal nature of external forces such as globalization, the fiscal crisis, the generalized ideological backlash against the welfare state, and federal involvement in this field, significant differences continue to exist among contemporary provincial assistance regimes and noticeable reorientations in a uniform direction have not yet emerged. This challenges arguments that suggest external pressures will force provincial policies to develop in a particular direction. At the cross-national level, the evidence uncovered thus far does not suggest a pattern of convergence in social assistance provision but rather a continuing pattern of distinctiveness and rich diversity.

105 Political Implications

Mirroring his broader conclusions about the American and Canadian welfare states in the 19805 and iggos, Banting's examination of social assistance in both countries leads him to conclude that "clearly divergence, not convergence, was the dominant trend."17 Blank and Hanratty examine the effects of the increasing divergence between low-income transfer generosity in Canada and the United States over the early igSos.18 Elsewhere, they provide a detailed inventory of the differences in social assistance in Canada and the United States and develop the theme that small differences persisted in the mid-ig8os, albeit small differences that matter.19 In the same volume, Card and Freeman outline the developing pattern of divergence in spending on needs-based transfers in the igSos in the two countries.20 These findings are consistent with more broadly comparative examinations of social assistance. In an unprecedented study of social assistance, Eardley and his collaborators outline the wide range of diversity in social assistance provision across the twenty-four OECD countries. They identify various groupings of social assistance regimes and illustrate the differences between them, and they identify one significant point of convergence: "All types of welfare regime exhibited a rising share of expenditure on means-tested schemes in the igSos - a notable convergence of otherwise disparate national patterns."21 However, based on the impressive empirical data amassed, they conclude that "overall the pattern of response to common economic pressures is complex."22 Studies of social assistance both in North America as well as across the OECD are consistent with the conclusions drawn here. While patterns of development in the provision of social assistance are complex, the overall picture has not been unambiguously one of either convergence or divergence. Social assistance regimes in different provinces as well as different countries in North America and the OECD have followed unique trajectories and continue to remain distinct. The explanations for these empirical patterns provide at least three compelling counterarguments to the logic underpinning arguments portending convergence around a particular assistance model. First, while changing global economic conditions and fiscal constraints do shift the relative costs (or opportunity costs, in terms of economic performance) of providing social assistance, these changes can be expected to have different effects in the various provinces, since they do not share similar preferences for providing social assistance relative to other services they may provide. For example, federal initiatives represented a uniform shift in the cost to provinces of providing assistance but did not result in substantial convergence. This demonstrates that differences between provinces are more substantial than

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simple differences in their ability to afford social assistance at a given level. One might expect that changes in other external constraints would have similarly ambiguous effects in enforcing a uniform direction in policy development. Pierson, examining convergence arguments from the cross-national comparative perspective, notes: Even if a high social wage were associated with poor economic performance, the assumption that downward adjustments in social policy would necessarily follow is unjustified ... countries have maintained widely different levels of economic performance for very long periods of time, without marked pressures towards convergence. In a world where particular arrangements have been institutionalized and where local actors have adopted strategies that succeed in local terms, there is no automatic or necessary movement toward any particular definition of efficiency - market dictated or otherwise.^

Pierson concludes that "social policy outcomes cannot be derived directly from economic trends."24 A second problem arises when the argument for convergence assumes that technical solutions to the policy problems posed by social assistance are obvious. There are, in fact, no self-evidently superior solutions and no compelling reasons to believe that regimes will develop inexorably in the direction of one particular solution. Economic imperatives do not unambiguously point in any specific policy direction and conclusions about the best approach cannot be reached scientifically. Solutions depend on how the problem is defined, and the question of which model assistance systems should adopt remains in essence a political one. In fact, the range of alternatives may be broader now than in the past. With the advent of new systems of production, "a pattern could emerge in which the uniformity of economies on a national and international scale breaks down, to be replaced by a system in which different politico-economic arrangements are successful in different areas."25 The third difficulty arises when commentators argue that convergence began only in the very recent past.26 One may wonder why conditions are sufficient now to drive convergence more strongly than in the first three-quarters of this century. The first question raised by the current focus on globalization is whether the mobility of capital and increasing provincial reliance on international markets has increased at a drastically faster annual rate in the last ten or twenty years than over the course of the entire century. A similar process of provincial economic integration, in which capital became nationally more mobile and markets became more national, has also been taking place over the course of this century. Nevertheless, distinct provincial regimes

107 Political Implications

have persisted. Second, it is unclear why globalization should have a greater homogenizing effect than industrialization, modernization, urbanization, and provincial economic integration. These processes have been taking place in Canada throughout the twentieth century, but distinct provincial assistance regimes have continued to exist. Predictions of convergence upon particular models of social policy resulting from globalization or other contemporary social processes risk falling into the self-flattery Heclo warns against of seeing our own times as a culmination of rather than another stage in a continuing process.27 That substantial diversity existed among provinces historically and continues to exist today, despite the factors auguring for convergence, suggests that distinctive provincial systems are more robust and better able to withstand pressures towards convergence than is often assumed. Differences between provincial assistance regimes are firmly embedded in distinct historical, social, economic, and political contexts of individual provinces, as is indicated by the infrequency of major shifts in orientation in these regimes. The established relationships between the state, market, and family in a particular province are much more significant in predicting the future direction of development than more ephemeral factors. For example, the orientations of provincial assistance regimes do not readily shift with the prevailing partisan winds. Provincial assistance regimes are not impervious to change, but they may be considerably more resistant than is often recognized. Pierson reaches similar conclusions after examining the development of the broader welfare state in Britain, the United States, Germany, and Sweden: "Economic, political, and social pressures have fostered an image of welfare states under siege. Yet if one turns from abstract discussion of social transformation to an examination of actual policy, it becomes difficult to sustain the proposition that these strains have generated fundamental shifts."28 Broadening his argument regarding these four countries, Pierson notes that "in most other countries the evidence of continuity is even more apparent." 29 The various directions of the shifts in the orientation of particular regimes and the disparate time periods in which they have taken place suggest that where external forces have had significant impacts on provincial social assistance, it has been through their interaction with distinct provincial political contexts. In examining provincial social assistance, as with the welfare state in cross-national perspective, "the pressures of a shifting global economy, which have long been at the centre of discussion of the contemporary welfare state, continue to deserve major (if more nuanced) attention. What needs more consideration is what happens when these considerable pressures collide with

108 Patchworks of Purpose ... deeply institutionalized public policies."30 Explanations of the orientations of provincial regimes and shifts therein need to focus on the interaction between broad general forces (such as modernization, industrialization, and globalization) and the components of the specific provincial contexts, including provincial public preferences and the provincial economic structure. ASSISTANCE PROVISION, PUBLIC PREFERENCES, AND ECONOMIC

STRUCTURE

Provincial assistance regimes are firmly rooted in their provincial contexts because they are self-reinforcing: while they are shaped by their contexts, they also contribute to shaping them. There are at least two ways in which assistance regimes might reasonably be expected to be self-reinforcing: as a result of the views about poverty and its causes that particular forms of assistance provision instil in the broader public and as a result of the behaviour that various approaches to assistance provision encourage in recipients and the way this behaviour interrelates with the provincial economic structure. There are many ways in which assistance provision may have significant effects on the beliefs of the broader public about the causes of poverty and the appropriate methods of alleviating it. For example, high levels of fraud will undermine public support for the system. However, the level of fraud in a particular system is significantly determined by methods of assistance provision.31 Complex and intrusive rules will lead to a considerably higher incidence of fraud in any system, but the policy response to high levels of fraud is often to make assistance regulations more complex and intrusive - further exacerbating the problem. This cycle may reinforce stereotypes of assistance recipients as dishonest, and poverty may increasingly be seen as related to individual moral failure. Other aspects of assistance provision may also reinforce particular stereotypes of recipients. For example, mandatory work requirements reinforce stereotypes of recipients as lazy and the perception that indigence results from the personal failure of the recipient. An emphasis on work incentives may contribute to a perception that employment is, indeed, available, although recipients are unwilling to accept it - thus, undermining the legitimacy of entitlements.32 In a related way, an emphasis on training programs may contribute to public perceptions that poverty results from inadequate job-market preparation by individual recipients. Categorizing recipients can also be expected to foster deeply ingrained shared understandings among the public about which of the various categories of recipients are deserving and, concomitantly, about their ability to contribute meaningfully to society.

109 Political Implications

There is also a much more indirect, yet perhaps more important, way in which assistance systems may shape public perceptions. The dominant public view of social assistance policy is that its fundamental goal is to relieve destitution and reduce dependency. Certainly, these aims have been conveyed by all governments of all partisan stripes. Yet, as I argued earlier, particular forms of assistance provision seem designed to encourage dependence. Since the public perceives that assistance is intended to reduce dependency even though some assistance regimes reinforce dependency, there may be a significant overall ideological effect. The first and most obvious effect is the propagation of the view that recipients remain dependent despite aid from the state to establish independence. In this view, it becomes much easier to blame recipients for their dependence. This perpetuates the perception that poverty exists prior to and independently of state intervention. Such conclusions lead to significantly different prescriptions regarding the appropriate policy responses, in comparison with views based on the assumption that assistance systems are shaped by - but also contribute to shaping - their social, economic, and political contexts. Perhaps more importantly, because the general assumption is that assistance is designed to reduce dependence, persistent dependence may create strong public perceptions that the state is incapable of achieving its policy aims, even though the state is actually demonstrating that it is very capable of reinforcing dependence. Such views and their underlying assumptions about the aims of assistance policy are the basis of some of the most strident arguments in favour of retrenchment. 33 Regardless of how compelling one finds the logic of the arguments presented above, it may be the case empirically that public opinion regarding the causes of poverty and appropriate means of alleviating it does not differ significantly across provinces, despite the different systems of assistance. Alternatively, public opinion may be converging, despite the continuing distinctiveness of provincial assistance regimes. Either case would demonstrate the weakness of provincial policy in shaping public preferences. Concomitantly, assistance provision would be identified as an area in which policy is highly autonomous of public perceptions. Many analysts argue that there are significant regional variations in public perceptions about politics and policy.34 While some analysts focus on political orientations more broadly, Schwartz argues that significant differences in opinion regarding social assistance are indeed related to region.35 Focusing on a more recent period, Blake and Simeon examine provincial public policy preferences, including those regarding social policy, using two separate measures of distinctiveness.36 One measure,

110 Patchworks of Purpose

the "difference index" for social policy, did not change at all in the period under examination - there was no convergence in public opinion among regions in the postwar period to ig75.37 According to the second indicator, regional differences in approval of social policy declined only slightly in the postwar period.38 These results are somewhat difficult to apply to the issues probed here. Because it dichotomized attitudes towards social policy into either "expand, support" or "restrict, curtail," the survey probably understates provincial distinctiveness through obscuring differences between various ideological positions that support either expansion or retrenchment of social policy but have fundamentally different views of the role to be played by the welfare state. Secondly, because the data are broken down by region rather than province, it is difficult to examine the proposition that public preferences differ by provinces within regions, and this also probably understates considerably the significance of provincial distinctiveness. Even with the most generous reading of these data, evidence regarding the convergence of public preferences among regions regarding social policy is mixed, and convergence in the postwar period has been slight at best. This lends tentative support to the hypothesis that distinctiveness in social assistance provision is interlinked with differences in public policy preferences. An adequate, let alone conclusive, examination of the development of provincial distributions of public opinion regarding social assistance remains to be undertaken. The existence or absence of provincial differences in public perceptions is obviously central to the question of whether assistance regimes can shape this aspect of the societal context in which they develop. This question is, in turn, related to the question of how robust the provincial differences are and of the relative weight offerees required to narrow or widen these differences. Cross-national evidence suggests that the debates surrounding assistance provision in various countries differ considerably and that the differences are related to the mode of assistance provision.39 Striking examples of such differences are provided by the debates regarding social assistance fraud and abuse in various national contexts. For example, Dutch officials have argued that it was difficult, in their particular social and political context, "to seriously raise the issue of fraud."40 This stands in stark contrast to the United States, where "there has been considerable public discussion of fraud since the igGos" and "it is likely that the fraud issue will be raised during political campaigns in most jurisdictions."41 While it is perhaps unlikely that distinct provincial assistance regimes would result in such striking differences, significant differences in public attitudes and the tone of public debate are likely.

111 Political Implications

Distinct provincial policies might also be considered in light of differences in provincial economic structure. Contemporary debates concerning social policy in Canada focus increasingly on the relationship between social policy and the economy. Courchene has argued recently that although social policy in Canada in the past was designed "independently of the underlying economic environment," changing conditions are forcing the reintegration of social policy and the economic structure.42 The argument is that structural changes (that is, globalization, technological changes) present social policy with new challenges; however, social policy remains bound by an institutionalized sclerosis and no longer fits the requirements of a healthy economy. One may ask whether social policy does indeed appear to have been made independently of the economic environment or, conversely, whether there has been a strong historical linkage between the two. In support of this latter argument, Myles makes the claim that "particular welfare state regimes (systems of distribution) have generally been implemented as particular responses to specific historical problems associated with production."43 Differences in provincial assistance provision historically may have been and may continue to be embedded in differences in provincial economic structure. Assistance provision may be shaped by and may in turn contribute to shaping the economic structure by conditioning how recipients interface with the market. There are several ways in which the specifics of program design have significant effects on the behaviour of recipients. The most familiar examples are assistance regimes in which the combination of benefit levels and taxback rates discourage recipients from pursuing employment. There are also many more subtle ways in which assistance shapes the behaviour of recipients. Conservative assistance regimes, which provide substantially better treatment for particular categories, encourage recipients to declare and consider themselves as belonging to those favoured groups. For example, in many systems there is an advantage for recipients to be classified as unemployable or disabled and, thus, an incentive structure encouraging recipients to think of themselves as such. Assistance regimes that are highly intrusive in determining the consumption patterns of recipients encourage recipients to see individual life choices as determined by the system and not as matters of personal responsibility. As a result, these recipients may become illprepared to enter the market, where norms of individual choice prevail. A related argument is that assistance often punishes the exercise of skills that are rewarded in the market and discourages innovation and adaptation.

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Patchworks of Purpose

The cumulative macro effect may be that assistance systems help to maintain a pool of floating surplus labour that can accommodate rapid changes in the demand for labour. Conversely, assistance may help to maintain a stagnant pool of labour that is incapable, at least in the short run, of effective labour market participation. The assistance system also serves as the nexus between the market and family and can contribute to regulating the flow of labour between these two spheres. One example is the Aid to Dependent Children program (the precursor to AFDC) in the United States, which actively contributed to stemming the flow of labour from the traditional family into the labour market.44 In addition, assistance systems historically have played a crucial role in furthering or stemming the transition from independent commodity production, such as farming or fishing, to labour that completely depends on wage relations.45 By shaping the mix of labour in a particular province (household labour, wage labour, or independent commodity production), the nature of surplus labour reserves (floating or stagnant), and the tightness of the labour market, assistance systems have undoubtedly had significant impacts on the overall development of the various provincial economic structures. Assistance may also subsidize or favour, through its impacts on the labour supply, certain types of production relative to others, depending on their labour intensity and the required level of skill. For example, depending on how assistance is actually provided, high assistance benefit rates may bid up labour costs in low-wage industries and shift production away from these industries. Inflated wage rates resulting from high benefit levels may also shift the optimal mix of factors of production within these industries away from labour in favour of technology, capital equipment, and other non-labour factors of production. Alternatively, assistance that supplements low wages may favour low-wage unskilled industries relative to high-wage, high-skill industries and reliance on low-wage labour as a factor of production relative to technology and capital equipment. Similarly, by affecting the supply of labour, assistance may shift the mix of production in an economy between industries relying on a stable, fully employed workforce and those relying on a high level of floating reserve labour (for example, seasonal industries or those exposed to large market fluctuations). In these instances, high levels of assistance provided in a particular manner may benefit unstable industries more than stable industries. Similarly, the extent to which assistance systems subsidize independent commodity production or, alternatively, help to transform independent commodity producers into wage labourers depends on the stability of the sector in which independent commodity production takes place and on how serious

113 Political Implications

disruptions in cash income are to the independent producers. The openness of particular industries (for example, the percentage of domestic production undertaken for export) may increase the need of capital for access to a pool of job-ready surplus labour, decrease the ability of labour to command wages through market relations (relative to the social wage), or increase the need to subsidize independent commodity production if such production is to remain economically viable. The redistributive model can be used to illustrate how assistance may have a significant effect on the economic structure. First, although comparisons of short-term wages and benefit levels probably misrepresent the factors that come into play when individuals choose between work and assistance, it is generally argued that the high levels of assistance associated with the redistributive model will undermine labour supply. However, in the long run this result may in turn affect the nature of labour demand. Employers may be forced to provide more stable employment, better training opportunities, and better overall career paths in order to attract labour. Second, high levels of state-provided welfare may improve competitiveness through shifting the mix of the factors of production away from low-wage labour.46 For example, the Netherlands combines the highest level of productivity in the European Union (second only to the United States in the OECD) and "remains relatively successful economically" while "having what is generally regarded as one of the most generous and comprehensive social security systems," including an assistance system strongly in keeping with the redistributive model.47 Eardley et al. note the argument that "in the Dutch case the welfare state is a major contributor to the high level of productivity, first by allowing non-productive workers to withdraw from the productive sphere with a reasonable level of financial support, and secondly, by successfully motivating employers to look for productivity gains through investment, restructuring, and cost reduction. Thus it is argued that the welfare state provides similar pressures to those arising from industrial competition."48 This argument may be particularly important in countries such as Canada, which cannot hope to have a comparative advantage on the basis of low-wage labour. Third, the redistributive regime has implications for government policies regarding unemployment. The standard argument regarding the relationship between unemployment and assistance is that in societies where there is a commitment to full employment, social assistance can play only a relatively marginal role. Conversely, guaranteeing high levels of social protection through assistance increases the costs to government of pursuing high unemployment strategies. Thus, political battles

114 Patchworks of Purpose over the levels of protection provided through social assistance may have significant consequences for the broader employment and macroeconomic policies of government. High levels of social protection provide incentives for governments to pursue high levels of employment. This relationship is clearly demonstrated by the Scandinavian welfare states, which rely on high levels of employment to remain sustainable. The propositions just discussed deny that the relationship between assistance and market performance is fixed. Instead, they stress that various forms of assistance provision may either undermine or bolster different types of economic structure. Thus they completely reject the fundamental premise that social policy has been designed "independently of the underlying economic environment."49 Rather, the argument presented here is that there is no underlying economic structure that exists independently of and prior to politics and state intervention. Policy is shaped by the economic context but also contributes to shaping it. Thus, the question of how to provide assistance is not simply a question of whether a particular model of assistance provision fits with a preexisting economic structure. It is a normative question about whether policy should accept a particular economic structure and whether assistance (or broader social policies) should reinforce that system or attempt to change it. The outstanding empirical question in the Canadian context is whether initial differences in provincial assistance provision were related to historical differences in the economic structures of the various provinces. A second question is whether differences in provincial assistance provision are related to differences in the patterns of economic development in the various provinces over time. Empirical research might examine whether provincial economic structures have remained significantly different over time such that it appears reasonable to posit causal linkages between these differences and continuing differences in provincial assistance regimes. CONCLUSIONS

The observations of this study suggest that politics matter, the specific historical context and particular constellation of political forces in individual provinces will strongly determine provincial reactions to uniform pressures such as globalization and fiscal constraints. This study draws a picture of considerable institutional inertia and emphasizes that assistance regimes, as they develop along their unique trajectories, are resistant to change. Yet politics matter in the sense that policy is shaped by and shapes long-term, persistent political forces. Assistance systems, or welfare states more generally, are like oil tankers: it takes an

115 Political Implications

incredible amount of time, space, and energy to change their direction.50 These systems cannot, like zodiacs, be made to dart quickly in any direction. Yet human agency can significantly affect the direction taken by each kind of craft. This is also the case for social assistance regimes. Social assistance regimes may indeed converge on particular models of provision. However, this result is not inevitable. Should they converge, that result would not demonstrate that they had to converge. Future policy directions are not foreordained. The determinism that tends to underpin current arguments predicting convergence around particular models of social policy serves a highly political and ideological function. It is often the basis for assertions that policymakers in contemporary circumstances do not effectively have a significant range of options. To argume that policy is being driven inexorably in a particular direction is to deny the existence of a range of policy choices and obscure the fact that, within this range, the policy directions ultimately adopted are the results of fundamentally political decisions. Establishing the significance of this range of policy latitude or the importance of any particular set of policy differences is a matter of interpretation always open to the charge that the differences identified are not as significant as broad similarities. In judging the significance of differences between assistance regimes and various policy options, Heclo provides an important benchmark: "The only ultimately satisfying answer I know to the infuriating and invaluable question 'so what?' is that such matters affect people's lives."51 Differences in provincial social assistance regimes have significantly distinct effects on the lives of the people who rely on them. More speculatively, they have significant effects on the broader general public, whose perceptions about the causes of poverty are shaped by them. To illustrate the significance of differences between regimes, observers of provincial social assistance might think about whether they would be indifferent as to the province and historical period in which they would receive assistance, if they needed it. For millions of Canadians, the question is not academic.

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APPENDIX

Comparative Data on Provincial Social Assistance Regimes

The following tables and figures more fully outline the distinct provincial assistance regimes that were discussed in detail in chapters 3 and 4. Table A i presents per capita spending on social assistance, by province, in constant 1986 dollars. This is the raw expenditure data from which figures 1 , 2 , and 3 are drawn. Table A 2 presents provincial assistance rates, by category, from 1965 to 1991 in constant 1988 dollars. This is the raw benefit data from which figure 4 is drawn. Figure AI presents estimated annual welfare income, by category, for 1993. This estimated income is then presented as a percentage of average income (figures A2, A3) and as a percentage of the poverty line (figures A4, A5). Finally, figure A6 presents the percentage taxback rate (on $400 earnings), by category and province, for 1993.

Table A1 Per capita spending on social assistance and services, by province (constant 1986 dollars) NF

1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989

-

167 152 127 77 79 84 86 94 111 147 152 149 156 166 173 174

177 211 257 289 251 254 304 294 265 297 303 327 328 356 340 350 346 363 372 369 391 407 418 419 441

PE

NS

NB

QC

ON

MB

SK

AB

BC

43 58 75 92 94 82 67 23 25

86 94 108 113 116 106 83 44 44 43 46 47 52 62 64 70 73 80 87 93 93 104 114 114 116 127 180 187 228 242 263 280 310 382 385 364 366 369 392 388 388 415 440 462 490

78 88 96 97 109 99 75 44 47 48 51 52 58 65 65

57 63 62 65 65 63 56 49 51 61 69 71 86 93 98 127 143 147 147 156 185 183 217 234 228 241 345 338 341 375 412 468 483 313 529 572 565 600 569 683 670 565 536 533 539

67 73 80 85 85 82 63 38 39 41 45 47 53 61 64 68 74 76 80 84 100 102 101 116 115 130 200 203 210 207 253 286 312 243 311 331 326 342 361 362 371 389 416 452 470

61 81 83 88 92 86 65 36 39 41 43 47 55 63 66 81 91 99 91 103 107 118 96 139 133 184 234 247 234 148 209 222 270 372 228 236 245 272 292 297 316 334 360 350 353

94 109 108 105 108 104 72 46 46 49 61 68

71 81 87 92 93 90 65 43 48 57 59 56 63 72 88 88 97 112 117 127 136 162 169 155 168 182 210 235 220 225 268 291 306 378 272 277 305 347 378 406 394 420 432 474 489

110 124 138 150 145 131 110

27 34 36 44 58 64 73 82 99 106 123 186 274 252 155 123 148 250 262 285 388 372 339 356 290 372 396 403 426 412 407 337 307 323 320 320

72 80 88 92 99 97 96 108 138 121 153 217 232 251 315 375 369 381 511 363 396 394 462 456 470 499 518 511 522 507

77 77 80 89 94 114 119 121 126 146 118 114 112 142 194 226 264 324 367 360 366 286 368 368 329 397 406 359 388 392 361 448 481

71 72 87 86 94 92 102 109 130 146 137 141 139 155 158 136 164 181 217 242 262 336 432 458 418 404 378 375 380 361 436 461 438 433 386 365 357 353

CDA

70 79 84 88 91 86 69 46 48 53 59 61 69 78 83 96 106 110 113 119 136 141 148 163 162 180 249 254 266 287 327 353 370 371 376 396 426 460 489 493 459 438 440 459 470

Table A1 Per capita spending on social assistance and services, by province (constant 1986 dollars)

1990 1991 1992

485 493 510

367 421 420

520 533 548

530 534 627

554 588 622

560 662 696

384 403 438

466 436 471

477 504 538

360 399 459

511 565 603

Sources: Per capita and constant dollar calculations are by the author. For gross current dollar expenditures from 1945 to 1963 the sources are Financial Statistics of Provincial Governments, Expenditures and Revenues (Actual), 1945-63 and Financial Statistics of Local Governments, Expenditures and Revenues (Actual), 1945-63. For gross current dollar expenditures from 1964 to 1988: Health and Welfare Canada, Social Security Statistics: Canada and Provinces 1963-64 to 1987-88 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1989). Gross expenditures by province are presented there in table A34- For gross current dollar expenditures from 1989 to 1992: Human Resources Development Canada, Social Security Statistics: Canada and Provinces 1968-69 to 1992-93 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1994). Gross expenditures on welfare by province were calculated by combining Canada Assistance Plan expenditures, total federal-provincial cost-shared program expenditures (table 360), provincial welfare program expenditures, payments for programs not cost-shared with the federal government (table 522), and net municipal welfare expenditures (Table 911). These calculations reproduce the aggregate expenditure figures presented in table A34 of the earlier editions of this publication that are not included in this edition. Population data used for calculations from CANSIM, Matrix 0599, Series 31 236-48, population of Canada, by province. Consumer price index data used for calculations are from CANSIM, Matrix 7440, series pyooooo, Consumer Price Index (all items).

Table A2 Provincial assistance rates by category, 1965-91 (in constant 1988 dollars) 1966/67

1976/77

1986/87

1990

5410 6688 9787

10674 12994

3674 10406 13006

4656 11702 13986

4975 6748 12164

6599 10200 15281

6936 11090 15618

10592

9898

10970

5888 9201 14653

5355 9240 13775

5880 13878

3144 9184 11414

2489 9706 11681

2868 8954 10350

6055 9007 12503

2495 9509 13744

6540 9994 16529

8159 11156

9498 14790

11674 17243

14558 19926

3817 7273 10281

3676 7004 9902

5118 9159 12778

5610 10306 14784

7224 13850 19218

8996 12144

8762 11679

8308 12369

10695 14473

9638 15066

1965/66 NEWFOUNDLAND

Single employable Single, 1 child Couple, 2 children

5106 6179 8630

PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND

Single employable Single, 1 child Couple, 2 children NOVA SCOTIA (p)

Single employable Single, 1 child Couple, 2 children

9090

NOVA SCOTIA (M)

Single employable Single, 1 child Couple, 2 children NEW BRUNSWICK

Single employable Single, 1 child Couple, 2 children

1106 3881 4800

1967 4340 5693

QUEBEC

Single employable Single, 1 child Couple, 2 children ONTARIO (P) Single employable Single, 1 child Couple, 2 children ONTARIO (M) Single employable Single, 1 child Couple, 2 children MANITOBA (P)

Single employable Single, 1 child Couple, 2 children

Table A 2 Provincial assistance rates by category, 1965-91 (in constant 1988 dollars) MANITOBA ( M )

Single employable Single, 1 child Couple, 2 children

3197 5553 9283

5812 10086 16401

5481 9465 15231

5640 9794 16110

4660 6160 11029

5763 8588 13624

4925 10953 16164

4860 11498 14910

6829 9603 14964

6152 10933 16569

4092 10826 15705

4408 8735 12861

4974 10129 13943

5616 11222 14418

SASKATCHEWAN

Single employable Single, 1 child Couple, 2 children

4591 6005 10340

ALBERTA

Single employable Single, 1 child Couple, 2 children BRITICH C O L U M B I A

Single employable Single, 1 child Couple, 2 children

3847 6733 9779

3705 6484 9419

Source: Canada. Department of National Health and Welfare, Evaluation of the Canada Assistance Plan, 111-52. Note: p = provincial; M = municipal.

Figure A i . Annual welfare income, by category, 1995 Source: National Council of Welfare, Welfare Incomes /95>5-

Figure A2. Welfare income relative to average income by category, 1995 Sowce: National Council of Welfare, Welfare Incomes f$9$-

Figure A3. Welfare income relative to average income by category, 1995 Source: National Council ofWelfare, Welfare Incomes iqyy. Note: Data not available for single, i child in Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island.

Figure A4- Welfare income relative to the poverty line, by category, 1995 Source: National Council ofWelfare, Wdfare Incomes 1995-

Figure A5. Welfare income relative to the poverty line, by category, 1995 Source: National Council of Welfare, Welfare Incomes 1995.

Figure A6. Provincial taxback rates by category, 1993 Source: National Council of Welfare, Welfare Incomes 1993. Note: Taxback rate for New Brunswick single employable and family employable is o%.

Notes

INTRODUCTION

1 See, for example, Courchene, Social Policy, esp. chap. 2. Courchene himself refers to the "economic determinism" of his argument. 2 See Esping-Andersen, "Three Political Economies," esp. 31. See also Weir et al., Politics of Social Policy, esp. 4, 16. 3 Ismael, Canadian Social Welfare Policy, xv. 4 Titmuss, Social Policy, 27. 5 The quotation is from ibid., 30. CHAPTER ONE

1 Baldwin, Politics of Social Solidarity, i. 2 See Polanyi, The Great Transformation', Titmuss, Social Policy; EspingAndersen, "Three Political Economies"; and Esping-Andersen, Welfare Capitalism, esp. chap, i. 3 Taylor-Gooby points out that many critiques of the welfare state are founded on such assumptions. See Taylor-Gooby, Social Change, Social Welfare, 51. 4 Esping-Andersen, "Three Political Economies," 36. 5 Shalev, "The Social Democratic Model," 321. 6 Fox Piven, "Women and the State," 18. 7 Ibid. 8 This usage borrows from the phrasing of Alford and Friedland in describing what they term political (as opposed to functional) approaches. See Alford and Friedland, Powers of Theory.

126 Notes to pages 5-9 9 Pal, "Missed Opportunities," 7. 10 Esping-Andersen notes that it has generally but erroneously been taken for granted that the welfare state creates a more egalitarian society. EspingAndersen, "Three Political Economies," 22. See also Titmuss, Social Policy, 26-7. On the widespread currency of the assumption in the comparative literature that this is the primary aim of the welfare state, see Hill and Bramely, Analysing Social Policy, 38. 1 1 See, for example, Rimlinger on the motives underlying social policy in Bismark's Germany. Rimlinger, Welfare Policy and Industrialization. Regarding Bonapartist approaches to social policy-making, see Baldwin, Social Solidarity, 39-41. 12 Fox Piven and Cloward, "The Contemporary Relief Debate," 90. 13 Classic examples include Wilensky, The Welfare State and Cameron, "Expansion of the Public Economy." Recent examples include Hicks, Swank, and Ambuhl, "Welfare Expansion Revisited"; Swank and Hicks, "State Welfare Spending"; Schmidt, "The Welfare State"; and Wilensky et al., Comparative Social Policy, esp. chap. i. 14 Esping-Andersen, "Three Political Economies," 19. 15 Ibid., 18. 16 Pal, "Missed Opportunities," 8. 17 Polanyi, The Great Transformation. 1 8 Fox Piven and Cloward, "The Historical Sources of the Contemporary Relief Debate," 11. ig Polanyi, The Great Transformation, 37— 8. 20 Maclver, forword to Polanyi, The Great Transformation, ix. 2 i Although the provision of assistance by the local level of government is commonly identified as the quintessential aspect of poor law administration, the Elizabethan Poor Law was originally administered from 1590 to 1640 on a national basis by the Crown through justices of the peace. Polanyi, The Great Transformation, 95. This initial period of the Elizabethan Poor Law has been described as a "premature attempt at a nationalised poor law" under a "centralised administrative hierarchy" that was abandoned with the outbreak of civil war. Webb and Webb, English Poor Law History, 66, 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29

398-9-

Polanyi, The Great Transformation, 95. Marshall, The Right to Welfare, 32. Polanyi, The Great Transformation, 78. Ibid., 79. Ibid. Ibid., 95. Ibid., 101. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, 23.

127 Notes to pages 9-21 30 31 32 33

34

35 36 37 38 39 40 41

42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49

50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59

Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. See Fraser, The New Poor Law, 17. For an interpretation of the intentions and principles underlying the Poor Law Reform of 1834 contrasting with that of Polanyi, see Webb and Webb, English Poor Law History. This term has been widely used in debates regarding social assistance since its general introduction around the time of the New Poor Law. It was neither in use at the time of the earlier poor laws nor applicabk to them. Ontario Social Assistance Review Committee, Transitions, 71. Polanyi, The Great Transformation, 82. Titmuss, Social Policy, 35. Ibid., 27, 32. Ibid., 30. Ibid., italics mine. Ibid. Although these models are widely referred to in the literature, they were drawn only from Titmuss's lecture notes after his tragic death and remain considerably underdeveloped. Ibid., 30. Ibid., 31. Ibid. Esping-Andersen, Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, 3, 20. Esping-Andersen, "Three Political Economies," 21. Ibid., 25. Ibid. For example, on the effects of the Speenhamland system on the family, see Polanyi, The Great Transformation, 79. On the more general relationship between the welfare state and family, see Titmuss, Social Policy, esp. 32; and Esping-Andersen, "Three Political Economies," esp. 25-6. Fox Piven and Cloward, "The Contemporary Relief Debate," 100. Hernes, State and Woman Power, 17. For a strong statement of this argument, see Murray, Losing Ground. Struthers, The Limits of Affluence, 3-4. On this point, see Eardley et al., Social Assistance in OECD Countries: Synthesis Report, esp. 170. This range excludes the two-tier systems. Canada, Health and Welfare, Income Security Programs, 1991. Ontario, Social Assistance Review Committee, Transitions, 150. Esping-Andersen, "Three Political Economies," 25. Pateman, "The Patriarchal Welfare State," 194. See also Dale and Foster, Feminists and State Welfare, 60. Esping-Andersen, "Three Political Economies," 22.

128 Notes to pages 24-31 CHAPTER TWO

1 Titmuss, Commitment to Welfare, 190. 2 Skocpol and Amenta, "States and Social Policies," 152. 3 Ontario, Social Assistance Review Committee, Transitions, 70; Canada, National Council of Welfare, Welfare in Canada, 2. See also Quebec, Health and Social Welfare, 13. 4 Guest, Social Security in Canada, 9-12; Bryden, Old-Age Pensions, 22. See also Minville, Labour Legislation and Quebec, Report of the Study Committee on Public Assistance, generally referred to as the Boucher Report. 5 Minville, Labour Legislation, 47. 6 Quebec, Public Assistance, 27. 7 Blyth, The Canadian Social Inheritance, 8. For an examination of the development of poor relief in Quebec in this period see Reid, "The First PoorRelief System." 8 Strong, Public Welfare Administration, 141. 9 Ibid. 10 Minville, Labour Legislation, 55. 11 Ibid., 33. 12 Grauer, Public Assistance, 83. 13 Quebec, Public Assistance, 100. 14 Cassidy, Public Health and Welfare, 375; italics mine. 15 Strong, Public Welfare Administration, 145; see also Cassidy, Public Health and Welfare, 367. 16 Bryden, Old Age Pensions, 35. 17 Cassidy, Public Health and Welfare, 303. 18 Ibid., 309. 19 Ibid. 20 Marsh, Social Security for Canada, 218. 21 Ibid. 22 Kierstead, "Mothers'Allowances," 178. 23 Cassidy, Public Health and Welfare, 309. 24 Mothers' allowances were adopted only in 1949. See table 3, this chapter. 25 Cassidy, Public Health and Welfare, 436. 26 Prince Edward Island, Welfare Assistance Review Committee, Dignity, Security and Opportunity, 6. 27 Grauer, Public Assistance and Social Insurance, 84. 28 Cassidy, Public Health and Welfare, 437. 29 Titmuss, Social Policy, 35. 30 Canadian Welfare Council, Public Welfare Services, 61. 31 Ibid., 63, 65. 32 Ibid., 65.

129 Notes to pages 31-5 33 Cassidy, Public Health and Welfare, 395. Total expenditure on outdoor relief in Stjohn amounted to $11,208.56 in 1947. Canadian Welfare Council, Public Welfare Services, 63. 34 Whalen, "Social Welfare in New Brunswick," 60. 35 Ibid., 56. See also Greenhaus, "Paupers and the Poorhouse." 36 Ibid., 55; Canadian Welfare Council, Public Welfare Services, 63. 37 Ibid., 52-3. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid., 48. 40 Cassidy, Public Health and Welfare, 401. 41 Strong, Public Welfare Administration, 149. 42 Cassidy, Public Health and Welfare, 412. 43 Ibid., 425. 44 Ibid., 412. 45 Nova Scotia, Cost-Sharing of Municipal Assistance, viii. 46 Fitzner, Social Welfare in Nova Scotia, 51. 47 Blouin, Women and Children Last, 2. 48 Manzer, Public Policies, 53. 49 Irving, From No Poor Law, 5. 50 Ibid. 51 Strong, Public Welfare Administration, 121; see also Cassidy, Unemployment and Relief, 77. 52 Bryden, Old-Age Pensions, 35. 53 Strong, Public Welfare Administration, 127. 54 Ibid. 55 Splane, Social Welfare in Ontario, 109; see also Ontario, Social Assistance Review Committee, Transitions, 71. 56 Ibid., 72. 57 Struthers, "How Much is Enough?" 55, 60. The Toronto House of Industry existed into the mid-19308. 58 Strong, Public Welfare Administration, 120. 59 Kierstead, "Mothers Allowances," 176. 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid., 177. 62 Struthers, The Limits of Affluence, 20. 63 Struthers, quoting Little, in Limits of Affluence, 43. 64 Cassidy, Unemployment and Relief, 78. 65 Struthers, "How Much is Enough," 47. 66 Ibid., 48-52. 67 Ibid., 73. 68 Irving, From No Poor Law, 24. 69 Cassidy, Public Health and Welfare, 347.

130 Notes to pages 36-43 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98

Clague et al., Reforming Human Services, 8-9. Strong-Boag, "Wages for Housework," 27. Kierstead, "Mothers' Allowances," 178. Manzer, Public Policies, 56; Strong-Boag, "Wages for Housework," 27. Irving, "The Development of a Provincial Welfare State," 168. Clague, Reforming Human Services, 13. Ibid., 11. Manitoba, Task Force on Social Assistance, Report, 5; see also Lawson, "Public Welfare in Manitoba." Grauer, Public Assistance, 43; Strong-Boag, "Wages for Housework," 27. Grauer, Public Assistance, 43. Kierstead, "Mothers' Allowances," 177. Ibid. Strong-Boag, "Wages for Housework," 28. Bryden, Old Age Pensions, 35. Whitton, Welfare in Alberta, x. Ibid. Cassidy, Public Health and Welfare, 294. Whitton, Welfare in Alberta, 27. Cassidy, Public Health and Welfare, 296. Strong-Boag, "Wages for Housework," 27. Newfoundland, Royal Commission, Report, esp. 162. Fingard, "Relief of the Unemployed." Newfoundland, Royal Commission, Report, 50. Ibid., 48. Newfoundland, Royal Commission, Report, 207-8. Ibid., see appendices. Leigh, "Social Welfare Services," 14. Newfoundland, Royal Commission, Report, 184. Leigh, "Social Welfare Services," 11. CHAPTER THREE

1 Much of the following section draws on Johnson, "Social Policy in Canada," 29-70. 2 For a good review of these proposals, see Guest, The Emergence of Social Security, 109-26. 3 Ibid., 32; italics mine. 4 Splane, "Social Policy-Making," 211; italics mine. 5 Ibid., 32-5. 6 Johnson, "Social Policy in Canada," 50. It is important to note Johnson's misgivings about the loose conditions of CAP. See Johnson, 49-50, 52. For

131 Notes to pages 43-6 a considerably more critical view of this period see Guest, The Emergence of Social Security, esp. chap. 9. In contrast to Johnson's depiction of a "grand design," Guest argues that the social security system as it developed in this period "lacks any notion of integration or comprehensiveness" or "unity of design." See Guest, 143-4. 7 Banting, The Welfare State, 93. 8 Simeon with Miller, "Regional Variations," 275. 9 Manzer, Public Policies and Political Development, 56. 10 Ross, The Working Poor, 29. For an excellent account of the development of the federal unemployment insurance program, see Struthers, No Fault of Their Own. See also Moscovitch, "The Canada Assistance Plan" and Guest, The Emergence of Social Security, 88-95, 106-8. 11 Ross, The Working Poor, 29. 12 The Old Age Assistance Act, 1927 and the Blind Persons Act, 1937 extended federal cost-sharing to provinces for assistance provided to these categories of recipients. These acts were renewed in 1951 with more generous terms. In addition, the federal government initiated cost-sharing for means-tested assistance to the permanently disabled through the Disabled Persons Act, 1954. Manzer, Public Policies, 62. 13 Ross, The Working Poor, 31. 14 Guest, The Emergence of Social Security, 146. In contrast, other categorical programs were means-tested. 15 Manzer, Public Policies, 62. 16 Ibid. 17 Banting, The Welfare State, 94. 18 Ibid. 19 Johnson, "Social Policy in Canada," 37. 20 Ibid., 37. 21 For an overview of the plan, see Canada, Canada Assistance Plan; and Fiscal Federalism in Canada. For an overview of the process and debates leading up to CAP, see Haddow. For a critical view of CAP from a Quebec nationalist perspective, see Vaillancourt, "Les Origines du Regime de 1'assistance publique du Canada"; "Un bilan quebecois: la dimension constitutionelle"; "Un bilan quebecois: La dimension sociale"; and "Le Regime d'assistance publique du Canada." 22 Moscovitch, "The Canada Assistance Plan," 288. 23 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1966, 6407. This was the address of the Minister of National Health and Welfare introducing the Canada Assistance Plan. 24 Hepworth et al., "Insiders Looking Back," 39. 25 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1966, 6409; italics mine. 26 Tom Kent, interview with the author, November 1993.

132 Notes to pages 46-52 27 See Canada Assistance Plan Act 1966, Part I, s.6 ( 2 ) . 28 To provide one concrete example: in certain provinces, recipients could be denied assistance on the basis that they "were fired from a job." Moscovitch, "The Canada Assistance Plan," 285. 29 See Banting, The Welfare State, 95-6. 30 Moscovitch, "The Canada Assistance Plan," 274. 31 See Guest, The Emergence of Social Security , 158. 32 The following is drawn from Tom Kent, interview with the author, November 1993. 33 Simeon with Miller, "Regional Variations," 259. 34 Canada, National Health and Welfare, Canada Assistance Plan, 39. 35 Banting, The Welfare State, 115. 36 Simeon with Miller, "Regional Variations," 259. 37 Ibid., 276. 38 Watts and Brown, The State of the Federation, 263. See also Canadian Council on Social Development, Canada's Social Programs, 27. 39 Bird, "Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements," 124. See also 249. 40 Ibid. 41 Canada, National Council of Welfare, No Time for Cuts, 20. The savings resulting from the five years of capping were estimated to be $2.1 billion. 42 Courchene, "Restructuring Economic and Social Policy," 19. 43 For a general discussion of these issues see Pal, "Federalism." 44 For a good discussion, see Howse, "Another Rights Revolution," 113, 133-4. 45 Banting, The Welfare State, 204.

46 47 48 49

Howse, "Another Rights Revolution," 106, 141-4. Ibid., 107, 118-22. Ibid., 107. A full outline of the sources and methodology used to calculate these indices is presented in the note to table Ai in the appendix to this volume. 50 Simeon with Miller, "Regional Variations," 258-9. 51 For example, Fortin and Seguin find, regarding assistance in Quebec, that changes in the social assistance caseload closely match changes in the unemployment rate. See Fortin et Seguin, Pour un regime equitable, 23. Thus, here I will adopt unemployment rates as a proxy indicator - although admittedly a far from perfect one - of the demand side of the social assistance equation. 52 For the sources of the per capita expenditure data, see the note to table Ai in the appendix to this volume. Additional data used to calculate spending as a percent of gross domestic product is drawn from Statistics Canada, Canadian Economic Observer: Historical Statistical Supplement, 1988/89, table 12.1, 104 for 1961 to 1988 and Statistics Canada, Canadian Economic Observer, February 1995, table 39, 58 for 1989 to 1992. Consolidated provincial and municipal expenditure data is drawn from Statistics Canada, Public

133 Notes to pages 52-9

53 54 55

56 57 58 59

60

61

62

63

Finance Historical Data, 7965/66-7991/92, table H8, 136-61 for 1966-87 and CANSIM Matrix 2817, series 0465279, 0465320, 0465361, 0465402, 0465443, 0465484, 0465525, 0465566, 0465607, and 0465648 for 1988 to 1992. Consolidated provincial and municipal expenditure data by province was not available for the period prior to 1966. An examination of dispersion expressed in terms of the standard deviation as a percentage of mean reveals a very similar picture. Again, an examination of dispersion expressed in terms of the standard deviation as a percentage of mean reveals a very similar picture. All the problems outlined below are exacerbated by the fact that in Nova Scotia, Ontario, and Manitoba general rates and special purpose transfers continue to differ from municipality to municipality. Canada, National Health and Welfare, Canada Assistance Plan, 3-35. Ibid. Canada, National Council of Welfare, Welfare in Canada, 117. Canada, National Health and Welfare, Canada Assistance Plan, 3-39. It is important to note that some of the early data in this set is incomplete. For example, figures for 1965-66 are available only for six of the provinces (or six of the thirteen municipal/provincial systems). However, it is not the case that the addition of provinces in later years accounts for patterns of convergence/divergence in assistance rates. These rate comparisons are drawn from Canada, National Health and Welfare, Canada Assistance Plan and National Council of Welfare, Welfare Incomes 7993 and Welfare Incomes, 7995. The data in the Department of National Health and Welfare's Evaluation of the Canada Assistance Plan were explicitly designed for comparability with the National Council of Welfare's Welfare Incomes series. An examination of dispersion in assistance rates measured as the standard deviation in provincial rates as a percentage of the mean reveals an almost identical picture. This composite series is constructed using data from various sources. For 1950-60, see Vaillancourt, "Income Distribution," 40. For 1965-86/7 see Canada, National Health and Welfare, Canada Assistance Plan. For 199195, see National Council of Welfare, Welfare Incomes 7991-5. An examination of dispersion in assistance rates measured as the standard deviation as a percentage of mean reveals a very similar picture. CHAPTER FOUR

1 Heclo, Modern Social Politics, 19. 2 This overview attempts to use the most recent sources available at the time of writing (1995). The examination of the provinces below depicts them as they existed in approximately the 1990-92 period.

134 Notes to pages 60-6 3 See Canada, National Health and Welfare, Inventory, 1991; Ross, Report; National Council of Welfare, Welfare Incomes, 1992; and National Council of Welfare, Welfare Reform. 4 Newfoundland is not as explicitly categorical as these other three regimes, although it does incorporate strong elements of categorization. 5 Canada, National Health and Welfare, Inventory 7990, 89. This quote is in specific reference to Ontario. 6 Ibid., 65, 103. 7 Ontario, Social Assistance Review Committee, Transitions, 75; italics mine. Under the legislation of 1958, municipalities continued to have discretion over the level of assistance benefits. 8 Struthers, The Limits of Affluence, 191. 9 Ibid., 183-8. 10 Ibid., 76. 11 Ibid., 231. 12 Ontario Social Assistance Review Committee, Transitions, 135. 13 Ibid., 394. 14 Ibid., 227. 15 Canada, National Health and Welfare, Inventory 7990, 93. 16 Haddad, Sexism and Social Welfare, i. 17 Ibid., 4. 18 Canada, National Health and Welfare, Canada Assistance Plan, 6. 19 Ontario, Social Assistance Review Committee, Transitions, 20. 20 Canada, National Council of Welfare, Welfare in Canada, 89. In the face of a Charter challenge in 1987, this rule was rescinded. Canada, National Health and Welfare, Inventory 1988. Under the Conservative government, this rule has since been reinstated. 21 Ontario, Social Assistance Review Committee, Transitions, 14. 22 Ibid., 132. 23 Ibid., 129-30. 24 Manitoba, Task Force on Social Assistance, Report 1983, 5. Municipal assistance began to be cost-shared by province under the auspices of the Social Assistance Act, 1949. 25 Ibid., 72. 26 Ibid., 40, 47. 27 Canada, National Health and Welfare, Inventory 1987, 23. 28 Canada, National Health and Welfare, Canada Assistance Plan, 5. 29 Ibid., 44. 30 Manitoba, Report (1989), 15; Canada, National Council of Welfare, Welfare in Canada, 6; and Canada, National Council of Welfare, Welfare Incomes 1992, 29. 31 Manitoba, Task Force on Social Assistance, Report 1983, 41. 32 Ibid., 55.

135 Notes to pages 66-72 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58

Ibid., 44. Ibid., 30. Ibid., 41. Ibid., 62. Manitoba, Report (1989), 5. Ibid., 56. Ibid., 60. Ibid., 62. Canada, National Council of Welfare, Welfare in Canada, 87. Canada, National Council of Welfare, Welfare Reform, 29; Welfare Incomes, 10; Welfare Incomes 1992, 29. Canada, National Health and Welfare, Inventory 1990, 103. Nova Scotia, Report of the Task Force, ix. Fitzner, Development of Social Welfare, 56. Nova Scotia, Report of the Task Force, ix. Blouin, Women and Children Last, 4. Canada, National Council of Welfare, Welfare in Canada, 20. Nova Scotia, Report of the Task Force, 5. Blouin, "Below the Bottom Line," 123. Ibid., 116. Ibid. The following information is drawn from Blouin, "Below the Bottom Line," 112-31. Ibid., 123. Ibid., 126. It is important to note that these are maximum amounts. Ibid., 115. Canada, National Health and Welfare, Canada Assistance Plan Annual Report 1970, 23. Canada, National Health and Welfare, Canada Assistance Plan Annual Report

1967, 19. 59 In the mid-ig8os, the National Council of Welfare reported that "Newfoundland investigates the circumstances of employable individuals four times a year." Canada, National Council of Welfare, Welfare in Canada, 87. 60 Ross, Income Security System, 83. 61 Ibid., 21, 35. 62 Newfoundland, Building on Our Strengths, 281. 63 Ibid., 281. 64 Ross, "Report on the Income Security System," 72; Newfoundland, Building on Our Strengths, 281. 65 Canada, National Health and Welfare, Inventory 1990, 56. 66 Canadian Tax Foundation, Provincial-Municipal Finances 1965, 132. 67 Canada, National Council of Welfare, Welfare Incomes 1992, 32. 68 Church-Staudt, "The Revolving Door," i.

136 Notes to pages 72-8 69 70 71 72 73 74 75

Jeffrey and Shadrack, Living without Power, 4. Church-Staudt, "The Revolving Door," 1 1 . Ibid., appendix 3. Canada, National Health and Welfare, Inventory 1990, 109. Canada, National Health and Welfare, Inventory 1988, 5. Riches and Manning, Welfare Reform, 29. Canada, National Health and Welfare, Canada Assistance Plan, 3-3. See also Riches, "Welfare Reform in Saskatchewan," 42; and Riches and Manning, Welfare Reform and the Canada Assistance Plan, 27. 76 Riches, "Welfare Reform in Saskatchewan," 40. 77 Ibid., 42. 78 Riches and Manning, Welfare Reform and the Canada Assistance Plan, 19. 79 Ibid., 5. 80 Adams, A Productive Welfare System, xviii, 212. 81 Riches and Manning, Welfare Reform and the Canada Assistance Plan, 29. 82 Canada, National Health and Welfare, Inventory icjcji, 5. 83 Bella, "Social Welfare and Social Credit," 87. 84 Alberta, One Step at a Time, 6. 85 Canadian Tax Foundation, Provincial-Municipal Finance 1971, 202. 86 Alberta, One Step at a Time, 6. 87 See Canadian Tax Foundation, Provincial Municipal Finances, 1973, 209 and Bella, "Social Welfare and Social Credit," 87, 95. 88 See, for example, Alberta, Caring and Responsibility. 89 Alberta, One Step at a Time, 7. 90 Evans and Mclntyre, "The Single Mother," 107. 91 Canada, National Council of Welfare, Welfare in Canada, 19. 92 Alberta, One Step at a Time, 9. 93 Evans and Mclntyre, "The Single Mother," 107. 94 Alberta, One Step at a Time, 23. 95 Evans and Mclntyre, "The Single Mother," 118. 96 Alberta, One Step at a Time, 12. 97 However, the project was not expanded and was eventually converted from a compulsory to a voluntary program. Cetnar and Haddad, Recent Changes in Welfare Policy, 11-12. 98 Alberta, One Step at a Time, 23. 99 Canada, National Health and Welfare, Inventory 1990, 115. 100 Alberta, One Step at a Time, 18. 101 Clague, Reforming Human Services, 13. 102 Callahan et al., "Workfare in British Columbia," 16. 103 Ibid. 104 Ibid. 105 Clague, Reforming Human Services, 24. 106 Callahan, "Workfare in British Columbia," 17.

137 Notes to pages 78-85 107 Clague, Reforming Human Services, 188. 108 Ibid., 186. 109 Evans and Mclntyre, "The Single Mother," 118. no Callahan, "Workfare in British Columbia," 18. in Canada, National Health and Welfare, Inventory 1990, 125. 112 Clague, Reforming Human Services, 229. 113 Callahan, "Workfare in British Columbia," 17; Canada, National Council of Welfare, Welfare in Canada, 19. 114 Callahan, "Workfare in British Columbia," 18. The definition was restricted to parents with one child under six months or two children under six years. However, as of 1991, "[s]ingle parents are no longer categorized as 'employable' when their children reach six months." Canada, National Health and Welfare, Canada Assistance Plan: Annual Report 1991—92, 16. 115 Callahan, "Workfare in British Columbia," 18. 116 Ibid. 117 Canada, National Health and Welfare, Inventory 7990, 126. 118 New Brunswick, White Paper 1970, 16. 119 Ibid. 120 Ibid. 121 Ibid. 122 Canada, National Council of Welfare, Welfare in Canada, 87. 123 New Brunswick, Advisory Council on the Status of Women, Women and Financial Assistance, 30. 124 Canada, National Health and Welfare, Inventory 7990, 74. 125 Canada, National Health and Welfare, Canada Assistance Plan: Annual Report 1989-90, 14. 126 Canada, National Council of Welfare, Welfare Reform, 13. 127 Levesque, Income Assistance in New Brunswick, 26. 128 New Brunswick, Advisory Council on the Status of Women, Women and Financial Assistance, 30. 129 Quebec, Report on Public Assistance, 55. 130 Ibid., 49. 131 Ibid., 170. 132 Ibid., 58. 133 Ibid., 171. 134 Ibid., 158. 135 Lesemann, "Social Welfare Policy in Quebec," 356. 136 Quebec, Report of the Commission on Health and Social Welfare, 3:147. 137 Quebec, Report on Public Assistance, 99. This passage is quoted approvingly in Castonguay-Nepveu, 3:148. 138 Quebec, White Paper, 22. 139 Canadian Tax Foundation, Provincial-Municipal Finances 1971, 194. 140 Quebec, White Paper, 138. See also Courchene, Social Policy, 85.

138 Notes to pages 85-9 141 Shragge, "Welfare Reform: Quebec Style," 13. 142 Quebec, White Paper, 178. There were, however, benefit differentials for employable and unemployable recipients under thirty years of age. 143 Bouchard, Labrie, and Noel, Chacun sapart, 10; my translation. 144 Ibid., 75; my translation. 145 Leseman, "Social Expenditure in Quebec," 41. 146 Johnson, "Quebec Social Assistance," 67. 147 Shragge, "Welfare Reform," 14. 148 Ibid., 81. 149 Canada, National Health and Welfare, Inventory 1990, 4. The exception was that benefits for single persons under 30 were no longer indexed after 1974. Quebec, White Paper, 124. 150 Ibid., 13; italics mine. 151 Canada, National Health and Welfare, Canada Assistance Plan, 3-19. 152 Canada, National Council of Welfare, Welfare Incomes, 16. 153 Shragge, "Welfare Reform," 15. 154 Muszynski, "Social Policy and Canadian Federalism," 310. 155 Johnson, "Quebec Social Assistance," 66. 156 Canada, National Council of Welfare, Welfare in Canada, 89. 157 For a very good examination of this topic see Gow, Noel, and Villeneuve, Choc des valeursfand Gow, Noel, and Villeneuve, "Les Controles a 1'aide sociale." 158 Gow, Noel, and Villeneuve, "Les controles a 1'aide sociale," 48; my translation. 159 Ibid., 47; my translation. 160 Ibid., 32; my translation. 161 These points were convincingly drawn to my attention by Alain Noel, and I would like to record my thanks to him. 162 Canada, National Health and Welfare, Inventory 1990, 79. 163 Fortin et Seguin, Pour un regime equitable, 86; my translation. 164 Ibid. For a concise overview of the program and how it fits with the Quebec taxation system, see Courchene, Social Canada in the Millennium, 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173

247-9Evans, "Linking Welfare to Jobs," go. Grady, "Income Security Reform," 75. Bouchard, Labrie, and Noel, Chacun sa part, 121; my translation. Eardley et. al., Social Assistance in OECD Countries: Country Reports, 92. Evans, "Linking Welfare to Jobs," 90. Grady, "Income Security Reform," 75. Fortin et Seguin, Pour un regime equitable, 16. Bouchard, Labrie, and Noel, Chacun sapart, 94; my translation. Ibid; my translation.

139 Notes to pages 89-104 174 Shragge, "Welfare Reform: Quebec Style," 133. 175 Canada, National Council of Welfare, Welfare Incomes 1992, 15. 176 Prince Edward Island, Dignity, Security, Opportunity, 6. 177 Ibid., 31. 178 Prince Edward Island, Report, 3. 179 Canada, National Council of Welfare, Welfare Incomes 1992, 10. 180 Canada, National Health and Welfare, Inventory 1990, 60. 181 Canada, National Council of Welfare, Welfare Reform, 10. 182 Prince Edward Island, Report, 27. 183 "Welfare Assistance in Prince Edward Island," 50; italics mine. 184 Canada, National Council of Welfare, Welfare in Canada, 19. 185 Prince Edward Island, Dignity, Security, Opportunity, 65. 186 Moscovitch, "The Canada Assistance Plan," 271. 187 Ibid., 285-6. 188 See Guest, Social Security in Canada, 158. See also Canadian Council on Social Development, Appeal Procedures. CHAPTER FIVE

1 Hill and Bramely, Analysing Social Policy, 125. 2 Globe and Mail, 7 February 1996, A i; Globe and Mail, 15 June 1995, A11; Globe and Mail, 23 September 1995, A2. 3 Globe and Mail, 28 February 1995, A 25. 4 Globe and Mail, i February 1995, A2; Globe and Mail, 20 June 1995, A i 5 _ 5 Globe and Mail, i February 1995, A2. 6 Edward Greenspon, "Ottawa Quietly Repealing Health Act, Expert Alleges," Globe and Mail, 3 May 1995, A47 Muszynski also makes this argument. See Muszynski, "Social Policy," 302. 8 For a good review of these issues, see Smiley, The Federal Condition, esp. chap. i. 9 Muszynski, "Social Policy," 308. 10 Blank and Hanratty, "Responding to Need." 11 Pierson,"The New Politics," 148. 12 Statistics recently gathered by the British Columbia Social Services Ministry finds no support whatsoever for the claim that differences in assistance rates result in the interprovincial movement of assistance recipients. See "Welfare Cuts Unlikely to Cause Exodus," Globe and Mail, 28 July 1995, A313 Vaillancourt, "Le Regime d'assistance publique," 20; my translation. 14 Duperre, "Federal-Provincial Arrangements," 20. 15 Fraser, "Clinton Bends on Welfare Cuts" Globe and Mail, i August 1996, A i; and "Clinton Ends Welfare as Americans Know It" Globe and Mail, 3 August 1996, A i.

140 Notes to pages 104-9 16 "Why the Rise in BC Welfare Cases?" Globe and Mail, 18 September 1995, A 12. This editorial suggests that the BC welfare caseload is high because of the number of single men receiving assistance and that this situation could be rectified through recourse to national standards limiting eligibility of these recipients. 17 Banting, "Economic Integration and Social Policy," 36. 18 Hanratty and Blank, "Down and Out in North America." 19 Blank and Hanratty, "Responding to Need." 20 Card and Freeman, Small Differences That Matter, 16. 21 Eardley et al., Social Assistance in OECD Countries: Synthesis Report, 3. 22 Ibid., 13. 23 Pierson, "The New Politics," 149; italics mine. 24 Ibid., 150. 25 Taylor-Gooby, Social Change, Social Welfare, 65. 26 For example, Courchene's argument regarding "an underlying 'determinism' that will push social policy inexorably in particular directions" refers to the economic conditions of the "mid-igSos and beyond." Courchene, Social Policy in the 199os, 19. 27 Heclo, Modern Social Politics, 19. 28 Pierson, "The New Politics," 173. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid., 176. 31 For example, it has been argued that the government of Quebec deliberately intensified fraud investigation in order to erode public support for social assistance. See Shragge, "Welfare Reform," 13; and Johnson, "Restraint and Quebec Social Assistance." 32 This argument is made, for example, by Evans and Mclntyre, "The Single Mother," 119. 33 See for example, Murray, Losing Ground; andjencks, Rethinking Social Policy. 34 Wilson, "The Canadian Political Cultures"; Gregg and Whittington, "Regional Variations"; Ornstein, Stevenson, and Williams, "Regions, Class and Political Culture"; Simeon and Elkins, "Regional Political Cultures"; Schwartz, Public Opinion and Canadian Identity. More recent works highlighting the distinctiveness of regional political cultures include Clement and Myles, Relations of Ruling, esp. 226-7; and, as regards the distinctiveness of Quebec political culture, Baer, Grabb, and Johnston, "National Character, Regional Culture." 35 Specifically, Schwartz notes that "those resident in the Maritimes and Quebec were somewhat less favourable to social-welfare measures than were others." Schwartz, Public Opinion and Canadian Identity, 101. A much more recent - albeit static - glimpse of such differences regarding social assistance policy may be found in Angus Reid Group, Social Security Reform. 36 Blake and Simeon, "Regional Preferences."

141 Notes to pages 110-15 37 Ibid., 88. The "difference index" indicates "what proportion of a given group would have to change its opinion in order to produce a distribution of opinion identical to that in the group to which it is being compared." This indicator considers all possible responses to the various questions (that is, agree, disagree, don't know) and thus incorporates a measure both of support and opposition to a particular item. Ibid.,83. 38 Ibid., 92. This indicator measures the average regional deviation in the most frequent response (for example, support or opposition to an item) from the national average. 39 Eardley et al., Social Assistance in OK CD Countries: Synthesis Report, esp. 165. 40 Eardley et al., Social Assistance in OECD Countries: Country Reports, 285. 41 Ibid., 437. 42 Courchene, Social Policy in the 19905, 11. 43 Myles, "Decline or Impasse?" 84. 44 Pateman, "The Patriarchal Welfare State," 194. 45 See Piven and Cloward, Regulating the Poor, 16. See also Webb and Webb, English Poor Law. 46 Block, "Political Economy of the Welfare State." 47 Eardley et al., Social Assistance in OECD Countries: Country Reports, 268. 48 Ibid., 269. 49 Courchene, Social Policy in the 79905, 11. 50 This oil tanker analogy is drawn from Cairns, "The Embedded State." 51 Heclo, Modern Social Politics, 5.

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Index

accountability, democratic, 102 ADC (Aid to Dependent Children), 21, 112 AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children), 21, 104, 112 aged, assistance for, 9, 32, 37,38,43,44,45,46, 65, 78, 83. See also Old Age Assistance, Old Age Security, pensions Alberta: Community SelfHelp Project, 76; contemporary assistance, 59, 60, 61, 62, 74-6, 92, 94, 95; Employment Opportunities Program, 75; historical development of assistance, 25, 33, 378, 40, 48; Social Allowance Program, 75; Social Development Act, 74 appeal procedures, 46, 47, 92>93 asset exemption levels, 19, 20, 21, 22, 60, 63, 65, 66, 67, 71, 76, 78; defined, 17

Banting, Keith, 105 benefit levels, 17, 20, 21, 22, 63, 65-6, 67, 68, 70, 71, 74, 76, 80, 81, 83, 85, 86, 88, go, 99, 100, 101, 103, 111-13; denial of benefits, 60, 6g, 73, 75-6; differentiation between categories, 66, 70,72,81,82,83,86, 88; dispersion in, 41, 44, 45, 47, 5°, 54-7;indexing of, 86; provincial comparisons for mothers' allowances, 28, 367; rate limits, 46; reduction of benefits, 72, 73, 75-6, 79, 86-7 Beveridge Report, 42-3 Blake, Donald, 109 Blank, Rebecca, 100, 105 blind, assistance for, 43, 44, 45,46, 182, 183 Blind Persons Act, 43 Blind Persons Allowances, 45 Bouchard, C., 89 Boucher Report, 27, 83 Bramely, Glen, 97 Britain, contemporary wel-

fare state in, 107. See also poor laws British Columbia: contemporary assistance, 59, 60, 61,62,74, 76-80,88, 92, 94, 95; historical development of assistance, 33, 36>37, 3 8 '4 8 -7 6 -7; Mothers' Pension Act, 36, 77; Social Assistance Act, 36, 77 budgets, for assistance recipients, 64, 66-7, 76, 90 Callahan, Marilyn, 79 Canada Assistance Plan (1966), xix, 41, 42, 43, 45-8, 50, 55, 56, 63, 68, 70, 74, 80, 84, 85, 90, 92, 98, 99, 102; cap on CAP, 48; federal conditions, 46, 92, 93, 94 Canada Health Act, 93 Canada Health and Social Transfer, xix, 98, 99 Canada Pension Plan Act, 43 Canadian Welfare Council, 30-1 Card, David, 105

156 Index

71.73.74.78,79.80, Cassidy, Harry, 27, 28, 29, 82,83,85,86,90, 111 38,42 disabled, assistance for, 9, categorical programs, 25, 10, 18,31,32,43-6 28,29,30,31,32,33, Disabled Persons Act, 43 34, 38, 39, 45, 50, Go, Disabled Persons Allow63, 64, 65, 67, 68, 70, ance, 45 71, 72, 74, 76, 78, 80, 81-2, 83-6, 89,90,94-6, discretion, in assistance provision, 36, 44, 46—7, 64, 108 6 Catholic Church, role in as5. 9°' 9 1 - 92, 94,101 sistance, 26-8, 83 charities, role in assistance Eardley, Tony, 105, 113 provision, 27, 28, 31, 36, earnings exemptions, 17, 60, 64, 73, 79, 81, 82, 39, 77, 83. See also Catho92, 93. See also taxback lic Church, role in assisrates tance Charter of Rights and Free- economic structure, and assistance, 97,98,105-7, doms, xix, 41, 48—50 108-14 Clinton, Bill, 104 eligibility restrictions, 20, Cloward, Richard, 5, 7 21, 22, 30, 32, 36, 63, conservative regimes: con65, 66, 68, 69, 73-4, 79, temporary, 59-60, 61, 81, 84, i o i; categorical 62-71,74, 75, 76, 77, eligibility, 19, 23, 67 80,92,94,95, 111; hisemployability, definition of, torical, 25, 27, 29, 30, 17-8, 60, 61, 72-3, 75, 33-8, 49; model, 15, 16, 76, 78-9, 80-2, 85, 86-7, 20-1, 22 convergence of assistance 91 regimes: assistance provi- employable recipients: classification of, 60, 64, 69, sion, 45, 47, 58, 91-3, 97, 104-8; benefits, 50, 75' 79, 82, 86, 111; reported percentages, 1754-7. 94; spending, 45, 8,86 47- 5°-4- 57, 94 cost-sharing, 35, 43, 62, 63, employment, incentives for, 67,72,77,83,85,91-3, 61, 73, 77, 79, 88, 108; subsidies, 60, 61, 79, 87; 99, 102, 103, 104. See also training programs, 17, Canada Assistance Plan, Unemployment Assis19, 20, 21, 22, 73, 76, tance Plan 80,82,87, 88, lo8, 113See also labour market, county houses of refuge, minimum wage 94. See also poorhouse, equalization of fiscal capacworkhouse Courchene, Thomas, 111 ity, 43, 57 Esping-Andersen, Gosta, 3, 6, 11, 12, 14; corporatist daycare, 76, 79, 82, 85 model, 11-12; liberal deserving and undeserving model, 11; social demopoor, 4, 8-9, 19, 20,25, cratic model, 12 27. 32, 33-5. 36~7. 6°. 61, 62-5, 67, 68, 72, 74, European Union, 113 expenditures on social as77, 80, 82, 94-6, 100 sistance, 41, 44, 50-4, disability and social assis57.68 tance, 18, 44, 63, 65, 70,

family, and social assistance, 3, 12-13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 21, 23, 24, 26, 28, 29,30,31,34-5, 36-7, 60-1, 64, 65, 72, 74, 77, 80, 83, 89, 91, 95,97, 100, 107, 112 family allowances, 42, 43 federal initiatives, and convergence, xix, xxii, 41—4, 50-7,91-3,94 feminist analysis, of the welfare state, 4. See also family, gender, paternalism, patriarchal regimes fiscal capacity, 52, 57, 103 fiscal crisis, 104 forced labour, 15, 30, 31, 40 forcible removal, of indigents, 31, 40 Fox Piven, Frances, 5, 7 fraud investigation, 19, 60, 62,64,74,78,81,87, 108, 110. See also verification and enforcement Freeman, Richard, 105 full employment, 43 gender, and social assistance, 15, 20, 49, 77, 83 Germany, welfare state in, 107 globalization, 97, 104, 105, 106-7, lll> 114 Gow, Ian, 87 Grauer, A.E., 27 Great Depression, 44 Green Book on Reconstruction, 42 Halifax, 32 Hanratty, Maria, i oo, 105 Harris, Mike, 93, 95 Health and Welfare Canada, 55 health insurance, 42 Heclo, Hugh, 58, 107, 115 Hill, Michael, 97 home visits, 31, 37, 39, 67, 74, 81, 82, 87, 91 Hospital Insurance Act, 43

157

Index

ideological backlash, against assistance, 93, 104 incentives, for employment, 61, 73, 77, 79, 88, 108 independent commodity production, 112, 113 indoor relief, 15, 28, 29, 3°. 32, 33-4- 3°. 37, 39. 67, 80, 94, 95; institutional care, 71 in-kind benefits, 20, 36, 54, 95 Johnson, A.F., 86 Johnson, A.W., 45 jurisdiction, over social assistance, 24, 26, 35, 38, 41-2, 44, 102 Kierstead, W.C., 34 Klein, Ralph, 93 labour, floating surplus, 112, 113; stagnant, 112 labour market, and social assistance, 15, 17, 19, 20, 23, 29, 34, 37, 60, 61, 71, 72-4, 77, 79, 82, 85, 86-9,9,, i , 1 O 1 ,

1J

1 12,,

3

Lesemann, Frederick, 84 less-eligibility, 9, 18, 19, 20, 25,3 0 Levesque, R. liens, 66 Little, Margaret, 35 man-in-the-house rule, 49, 64, 77, 96 Manitoba: Child Related Income Support Programme, 88; contemporary assistance, 59, 60, 62,65-7,88,92,94,95; historical assistance, 31, 33.3 6 -7

market/family enforcement: contemporary regimes, 60, 61, 67, 71-6, 77, 80, 82, 85, 87-9; his-

torical regimes, 25, 28, 29, 30—2; model, 15, 16, 19, 20, 22 market performance: contemporary regimes, 60, 61,76-82,85,87-9, 100; model, 15, 16, 20-2 Marsh, Leonard, 42 means test, 37, 105 Medical Services Act, 43 minimum wage, and assistance, 9, 18, 19, 26, 545, 86, 88 Minville, Esdras, 26, 27 mobility, of assistance recipients, 100-1 moral judgments, in assistance provision, 12, 345,65,68,77,83,95, 107 mothers' allowances, 28-9, 3L32, 34-5. 36-37-8, 45-6, 80, 94 municipalities, and social assistance: contemporary role, 60, 62, 63-4, 65-6,67-9,71,74,75, 77, 78, 80, 83, 90, 92, 94; historical role, 26—7, 28, 29,31,32,34-5,367, 38-9, 44, 45, 47, 94 Muszynski, L., 87, 100 Myles.John, 111 national social security system, 42-3, 101, 104 national uniformity/standards, 43, 45, 92, 93, 97, 98-104; philosophical rationale for, 97, 107 National Council of Welfare, 54, 72 need, definition of, 46, 103 needs test, 47, go, 92 Netherlands, assistance in, no, 113 New Brunswick: Action Committee for the Status of Women, 82; contemporary assistance, 59, 60, 61, 62, 80-2, 92, 94,95; historical assistance, 30— 1,32. 33.34. 38. 4°J So-

cial Assistance Act, 80; White Paper, 80 Newfoundland: contemporary assistance, 59, 60, 62, 69-71, 94, 95; historical assistance, 28, 31, 38-40; Royal Commission on Health and Public Charities, 38; Social Assistance Act, 70 Noel, Alain, 87, 89 non-instrumental approach to public policy,

5-7

Nova Scotia: contemporary assistance, 59, 60, 61, 62, 6 7-9, 7i. 79. 92,94, 95; historical assistance, 30, 32,33, 34. 38> 39;Social Assistance Act, 68 OECD, 105, 113 off-loading, 100 Old Age Assistance, 45. See also aged, assistance for Old Age Security, 42, 43. See also aged, assistance for Ontario: contemporary assistance, 59, 60,61, 62-5, 71,72,74,79,83,92,94, 95; historical assistance, 3i.33-5.3 6 .37.38,4 8 ; Mothers' Allowance Commission, 35; Social Assistance Review Committee, 17, 63, 64; Unemployment Relief Act, 35 outdoor relief, 8, 9, 15, 27, 3L33. 34. 35. 39.67, 77, 80, 94, 95 paternalism, 65 patriarchal family, 3, 15, 18, 21, 30; regimes, 15, 20-1,64,68,91,95,96; roles, 29, 37 paupers, sale by public auction, 31 pensions, 42. See also Canada Pension Plan Act, Old Age Assistance, Old Age Security

158

Index

Pierson, Paul, 106, 107 Polanyi, Karl, 3, 7-10, 11, 12, 14 poorhouse, 9, 25, 30, 31, 32, 34, 38, 40, 67, 68. See also county house of refuge, workhouse poor laws, 3, 7-10, 14, 15, 24, 25, 33, 40, 68, 80, 81; Elizabethan, 7-10, 24, 25, 30, 32, 36; New Poor Law, 7-10, 25, 30, 32, 33; Speenhamland, 7-10, 25,38,39 poverty: cycle, 66; levels of, 4; trap, 21 Prince Edward Island: contemporary assistance, 59, 60, 62, 90-1, 92, 94, 95; historical assistance, 25, 29, 40, 47 professionalization, of assistance provision, 47 public perceptions, of social assistance, 108, 109, 115; provincial differences in, 102,109-10, 115 Quebec: AGIR, 88, 89; APPORT/PWA, 88; Bill 30, 86; contemporary assistance, 59, 60, 61, 62,83-90,91,92,94, 95; historical assistance, 25, 26-8, 40; Public Charities Act, 83; Social Aid Act, 84, 85; SURPRET, 88; White Paper, 84 race, and social assistance, 15, 20 redistributive model, 15, 16, 21—3, 113; regimes, 25,38-40,49,60,62, 69, 90-1 residency requirements, 36,46,47,83,92,93, 94, 98, 100 residual model, 14, 16, 1819, 20, 22, 23; regimes,

25. 26-9, 33. 49. 7 L 74. 77.78,85,89,90,94 Riches, Graham, 73, 136nn76-7 rights, and assistance, 99 Stjohn, 31 St John's, 38 Saskatchewan: contemporary assistance, 59, 60, 61, 62, 71-4, 88, 92, 94, 95; Family Income Plan, 88; historical assistance, 25, 28-9, 40; Social Aid Act, 72 Scandinavia, the welfare state in, 114 Schwartz, Mildred, 109 Simeon, Richard, 47, 50, 109 single fathers, 63, 65, 66, 68. See also single parents, sole-support parents single mothers, 31, 32, 34— 5, 36, 39, 63, 64, 65-6, 68,70,71,74-6,79,91, 96. See also single parents, sole-support parents single parents, 18, 28, 55, 56,61,64,65, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78, 79, 86, 88, 91,1 04. See also single fathers, single mothers, sole-support parents social assistance, definition of, xviii social insurance, 1 2 social rights, 9, 84 sole-support parents, 37, 60, 64, 65, 82, 87. See also single fathers, single mothers, single parents spill-overs, 99, i oo state capacity, 4, 1 09 status hierarchy, 60, 64 stigmatization, 13, 14—16, 19, 20, 25, 30, 31, 38, 39,40,61, 64,65,66, 67, 70-1, 72-4, 80-1, 82, 90, 91, 94; defined, 12

stratification, 8, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 18, 21, 25, 28, 36, 38, 40, 61, 64, 67, 69, 70-1, 72, 74, 80, 86, 91,94-6 Strong, Margaret, 26 Struthers, James, 35 Supreme Court of Canada, 48,49 Sweden, welfare state in, 107 take-up rates, 89 taxback rates, 17, 19, 20, 60, 61, 63, 64, 71, 73, 76,79,81,82, 85,88, go, 111. See also earning exemptions Titmuss, Richard, 3, 10-11, 12, 14, 30; industrial-performance model, 10-11; institutional model, 11; residual model, 10 Toronto, 34 training programs. See employment, training programs two-tier assistance systems, 60, 72 unemployment assistance, 42,43,50,83,84, 113-4 Unemployment Assistance Act (1956), xix, 41, 42, 44-5, 47, 62, 68, 80, 92 unemployment insurance, 42,44,70,71 Unemployment Insurance Act, 4, 44 unemployment relief, 35 United States, 13, 21, 100, 103-4, 1O5> 1 1O> 112> 1*3 universal benefits, 12, 85 verification and enforcement mechanisms, 17, 19,21, 23,31,39,48, 49, 87, 91. See also fraud investigation, home visits vouchers, 66, 69, 70, 95

159 Index White Paper on Employment and Income, 42 Whitton, Charlotte, 37 Windsor, municipal relief, 35 work: expectations, 6g, 778; requirements, 60, 63,

75. ?6, 77. 78, 104, 108; restrictions on, 63,64, 81; search requirements, 66, 69. 73. 76. 78. 79. 9°-! work camps, 36, 77, 95 workfare, 49, 66, 73, 76, 77-8, 79, 99

workhouse, 8-g, 25, 31, 32, 34, 37, 90 workhouse test, g, 10, 25, 32,33.34 work test 25, 33, 34, 38, go, 91