Past and Present Migration Challenges: What European and American History Can Teach Us (Palgrave Studies in Economic History) 3031394305, 9783031394300

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Edited by Francesca Fauri · Debora Mantovani

Past and Present Migration Challenges What European and American History Can

Teach Us

Past and Present Migration Challenges

Francesca Fauri · Debora Mantovani Editors

Past and Present Migration Challenges What European and American History Can Teach Us

Editors Francesca Fauri Department of Economics University of Bologna Bologna, Italy

Debora Mantovani Department of Political and Social Science University of Bologna Bologna, Italy

ISBN 978-3-031-39430-0 ISBN 978-3-031-39431-7 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39431-7 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Paper in this product is recyclable.

The European Commission support for the production of this publication does not constitute an endorsement of the contents which reflects the views only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.

Contents

1

Past and Present Migration: A Multi-Disciplinary Approach Francesca Fauri and Debora Mantovani

1

Part I Italians in Latin America 2

Atlantic Reflections: Italian Spirits and Business Communities in the Americas Giulio Mellinato and Valerio Varini

3

Italians in Southern Brasil: Tradition and Innovation Vania Beatriz Merlotti Herédia

4

Business and Transmission of “Knowledge”: Italian Migration to Brasil Donatella Strangio and Mario Noviello

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6

Science, Techniques, Ideas: Italian Emigration in the Construction of Modern Argentina Paolo Galassi The Mafia in the Italian Ethnic Press in Argentina Maria Soledad Balsas

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107 137

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CONTENTS

Part II Past and Present Migration Challenges 163

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Italian Remittances in Great Migration Years Francesca Fauri

8

Living Arrangements of European Second-Generation Immigrants in the United States at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century Roberto Impicciatore, Rosella Rettaroli, Alessandra Samoggia, and Francesco Scalone

195

Policy Incoherence? The UK–Rwanda Asylum Partnership Arrangement Mark McQuinn

219

Dreaming Europe: Migrant Flows from Moldova to the EU Since the End of the USSR Paolo Tedeschi

247

9

10

11

Solidarity Driven by Utilitarianism: How Hungarian Migration Policy Transformed and Exploited Virtues of Solidarity Judith Tóth and Anikó Bernát

271

Part III Old Challenges in A “New” Country of Destination: The Italian Case 12

13

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The Role of Local Socio-Economic Integration in Italian Asylum Adjudications Alice Lacchei, Cristina Dallara, and Debora Mantovani

299

Past Migration and Current Challenges to Citizenship and Integration: The Chilean Migration in Italy Maria Grazia Galantino and Francesca Messineo

349

Italian Citizenship and New Generations: The Cases of Italians Without Citizenship and CoNNGI Veronica Pastorino

385

Index

413

List of Contributors

Maria Soledad Balsas Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas, Buenos Aires, Argentina Anikó Bernát TÁRKI Social Research Institute, Budapest, Hungary Cristina Dallara Department of Political and Social Science, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy Francesca Fauri Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy Maria Grazia Galantino Department of Social Sciences and Economics, Sapienza University of Rome, Rome, Italy Paolo Galassi Universidad Nacional del Sur (UNS), Bahía Blanca, Argentina Vania Beatriz Merlotti Herédia University of Caxias do Sul, Caxias do Sul, Brazil Roberto Impicciatore Department of Statistical Sciences, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy Alice Lacchei Department of Political and Social Science, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy Debora Mantovani Department of Political and Social Science, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy ix

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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Mark McQuinn SOAS, University of London, London, UK Giulio Mellinato Department of Economics, Management and Statistics, University of Milan-Bicocca, Milan, Italy Francesca Messineo Department of Social Sciences and Economics, Sapienza University of Rome, Rome, Italy Mario Noviello Logistics Manager at Hyva International, Carpi, Italy Veronica Pastorino Department of Political and Social Science, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy Rosella Rettaroli Department of Statistical Sciences, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy Alessandra Samoggia Department of Statistical Sciences, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy Francesco Scalone Department of Statistical Sciences, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy Donatella Strangio Department of Methods and Models for Economics, Territory and Finance, Sapienza University of Rome, Rome, Italy Paolo Tedeschi Department of Economics, Management and Statistics, University of Milano-Bicocca, Milan, Italy Judith Tóth University of Szeged, Szeged, Hungary Valerio Varini Department of Economics, Management and Statistics, University of Milan-Bicocca, Milan, Italy

List of Figures

Fig. 3.1

Fig. 7.1

Fig. 7.2

Fig. 7.3

Fig. 7.4

Fig. 7.5

Map of the Caxias Colony, municipality of Caxias do Sul. Drawn on the original General plan of Colonia Caxias by João Spadari Adami, 1962 (Source Projecto Victur. URB-AL program. Collection: Municipal Historical Archive of Caxias do Sul) Italian migrants’ destinations 1885–1913 (percentage values) (Source Ministero di Agricoltura, Industria e Commercio [1915]) Long-term trend of emigrants’ remittances according to ISTAT and Balletta (Source Istat [1957]; Balletta [1976]) Remittances channelled via the Banco di Napoli (thousand lire) (Source ASBN, Banco di Napoli, Direzione Generale, Relazione sul servizio di raccolta, tutela impiego e trasmissione nel Regno dei risparmi degli emigrati italiani, various issues) Bank of Naples remittances per country of origin. Years 1902–1920 (percentage values) (Source ASBN, Banco di Napoli, Direzione Generale, Relazione, various issues) Emigrants deposits at the postal savings banks (thousand of lire) (Source ASBN, Banco di Napoli, Direzione Generale, Relazione, various issues)

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164

170

176

177

180

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LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 7.6

Fig. 8.1

Fig. 8.2

Fig. 8.3

Fig. 8.4

Fig. 8.5

Fig. 8.6

Fig. 8.7

Fig. 8.8

Fig. 12.1

Fig. 12.2 Fig. 12.3

Deposits and loans of the BCV 1893–1914 in thousand lire (Source Own elaboration from Archivio Storico Intesa Sanpaolo, patrimonio archivistico Banco Ambrosiano Veneto, Banca Cattolica del Veneto, Funzioni amministrative centrali, Contabilità generale, Bilanci d’esercizio [ASBV hereinafter]) Men’s median age of leaving home by nativity and race. US, 1880–1990 (Source Gutmann et al. (2002), Table B.12) Women’s median age of leaving home by nativity and race. US, 1880–1990 (Source Gutmann et al. (2002), Table B.12) Men’s living arrangements by country of origin. Weighted data. Individuals aged 16–29. US censuses (1910, 1920, 1030) (Source IPUMS) Women’s living arrangements by country of origin. Weighted data. Individuals aged 16–29. US censuses (1910, 1920, 1030) (Source IPUMS) Percentage of men living with parents by age and country of origin. Weighted data. Individuals aged 16–29. US censuses (1910, 1920, 1030) (Source IPUMS) Percentage of women living with parents by age and country of origin. Weighted data. Individuals aged 16–29. US censuses (1910, 1920, 1030) (Source IPUMS) Living arrangements by gender and country of origin among not employed individuals aged 16–29 (Source IPUMS) Living arrangements by gender and country of origin among employed individuals aged 16–29. US Censuses (1910, 1920, 1930) (Source IPUMS) Asylum adjudications by outcome at the appeal stage in those European countries where humanitarian status is granted. Year 2021 (percentage values) (Source Authors’ own elaboration—Eurostat dataset) The Italian international protection procedure (Source Authors’ own elaboration) Humanitarian protection granted at first instance from 1998 to 2018 (absolute values and percentages on total positive decisions) (Source Authors’ own elaboration—Ministry of the Interior)

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304 306

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LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 12.4

Fig. 12.5

Fig. 13.1

Fig. 13.2

Predicted probabilities (with 95% confidence intervals) of gaining humanitarian protection by country of origin (Source Authors’ own elaboration on final decisions adopted by an Italian civil court-1st January–31st December 2020) Predicted probabilities (with 95% confidence intervals) of gaining humanitarian protection by integration dimensions (Source Authors’ own elaboration on final decisions adopted by an Italian civil court-1st January–31st December 2020) Chilean emigrants by period of time and place of destination (Italy vs. World) (percentage values) (Source authors’ elaboration on INE data [2017]) Age distribution of non-EU and Chilean citizens in Italy. Year 2021 (percentage values) (Source authors’ elaboration on ISTAT data [2021])

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List of Tables

Table 2.1 Table 2.2

Table 2.3 Table 3.1 Table 6.1

Table 7.1 Table 7.2 Table 7.3 Table 7.4

Table 8.1 Table 8.2

Stock exports to the Americas (1937–1940). Values in current US Dollars Company’s profitability according to the auditor’s reports and estimated operational results. Years 1946–1971. Values in current Italian lire Distillerie Stock: indices of the balance sheet data, 1961–1971 (1961 = 100, unless otherwise indicated) Commercial and industrial establishments. Caxias colony 1892 Corpus distribution for L’Italia del Popolo, La Nuova Patria and Il Mattino d’Italia. Years 1932–1935 (absolute values) Estimates of Italian remittances (millions of current lire) 1876–191 The Banco di Napoli (BdN) foreign correspondents in 1906 Distribution of Bank of Naples remittances per receiving regions (thousand lire) Regional emigration to the most important destination countries 1904–1913 (total and percentage incidence of outgoing flows) Percentages of home leavers at 18 years of age by cohort and gender. Sweden Percentages of home leavers at 18 years of age by cohort, gender and geographical area. Italy

36

43 46 68

142 166 172 178

179 200 200

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 8.3

Table 8.4

Table 9.1 Table 11.1 Table 11.2 Table 11.3 Table 11.4

Table 11.5

Table 12.1

Table 12.2 Table 12.3 Table 12.4 Table 12.5

Table 12.6 Table 12.7 Table 12.8

The age range in which 50% of young people left their parental home and the length of the process by gender. England and Wales, 1881 Sample description (unweighted cases). Individuals aged 16–29 at the interview by origin, gender and 1910, 1920, and 1930 US Censuses (1% samples) References to human rights and environmental issues in UK government policy documents Applicants and persons granted international protection in Hungary. Years 2013–2022 (absolute values) Irregular migrants in Hungary. Years 2013–2022 (absolute values) Have you helped refugees in Ukraine in any of the following ways? Year 2022 (row percentages) Who would be responsible for the care of refugees arriving in Hungary in the following areas? Years 2015 and 2022 (row percentages per year) Who should be responsible for the care of refugees and immigrants recognised in Hungary in the following areas? Years 2015 and 2022 (row percentages per year) Asylum applications, TCRIPs’ decisions, asylum rejections at first instance and asylum appeals in civil courts. Italy—years 2014–2021 Asylum decisions at the appeal stage in Italy. Years 2016–2021 Main reforms of the Italian national protection and explicit reference to integration dimensions Descriptive statistics (percentages or mean values and standard deviation in brackets) Factors explicitly mentioned by judges in their positive decisions to grant humanitarian protection (percentage values) Asylum seekers’ migratory experience dimensions by country of origin (mean values and percentages) Asylum seekers’ integration dimensions by country of origin (percentage values) Results of binomial logistic regression models (log odds)—reference category in brackets (N = 525)

200

207 223 277 281 287

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307 308 311 321

324 326 327 329

CHAPTER 1

Past and Present Migration: A Multi-Disciplinary Approach Francesca Fauri and Debora Mantovani

The book comprises multi-disciplinary contributions from both continents dealing with the economic, political and sociological impact of migration. It aims to shed light on the complex nature of migratory movements and use the past as a way to better understand current challenges. The goal of the book and the core of the research effort is to address a variety of migration issues involving Europe and the Americas in order to offer new insights and expand our comprehension of the multiple challenges associated with migration both in the countries of origin and those of destination. Also, the complexity of the migration phenomenon requires taking into consideration several dimensions especially if one wants to explore if, and to what extent, past

F. Fauri (B) Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy e-mail: [email protected] D. Mantovani Department of Political and Social Science, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. Fauri and D. Mantovani (eds.), Past and Present Migration Challenges, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39431-7_1

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migration issues and challenges are still in play in immigration countries today. We want to raise questions and provide answers that might refute conventional wisdom. This cross-cultural multi-disciplinary book can be extremely fertile for stimulating intellectual confrontation on the migration phenomenon among the international community of scholars in Europe and North and South America. The idea is also to identify and share best practices in order to encourage significant strategic and quality improvement in European immigration policies. The book is divided into three parts. The first one—Italians in Latin America—investigates the socio-economic integration process experienced by Italian emigrants in Latin America at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century and in particular the much-praised transfer of knowledge and culture but also the unwelcome transfer of immoral behaviours and ideas. In Chapter 2, “Atlantic Reflections: Italian Spirits and Business Communities in the Americas”, Giulio Mellinato and Valerio Varini present a rich archive-based reconstruction of the landing in Argentina and other foreign markets of two Italian business groups in the spirits’ sector: the Martini & Rossi (vermouth) and the Stock company (cognacstyle liqueur). The first case concerns the pioneering role of Martini & Rossi (M&R), one of the first Italian companies to embark upon the conquest of overseas markets and establish a branch and a production site in Argentina. Interesting aspects of the M&R expansion abroad have been the simultaneous migration of family members and experts to better organise foreign production. The Italian team of the Argentinian branch devoted its efforts to improving the local production of vermouth in Argentina, thanks to the expertise acquired in Piedmontese vineyards and to intensifing the networking activity in order to expand commercial relations. The exploration of foreign markets started much later for Stock, however, it expanded over Europe and attained its first success on the North American market before the outbreak of World War II. During the years 1946–1948 explorative missions were sent to Central and South America and the company’s general agency was set up in Argentina. However, while Stock was able to consolidate its presence in the USA, the initiatives in Central and South America showed growing difficulties over the years. The two authors assess that the migration of some family members, as the Argentine case shows, was the founding factor of the success achieved by M&S, while Stock penetration into the principal foreign markets was increasingly disengaged from the presence of family

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members and in the end unable to adapt to the fast-changing economic environment of the 1960s and 1970s. Thus, by abandoning direct participation in the construction of a network of human relationships abroad, the Stock group completely subordinated itself to the dynamics of the market, temporarily increasing its foreign revenues, but losing its identity. However, the two companies remain a remarkable example of how much of “made in Italy” is the result of a long process of historical sedimentation and capacity to conquer foreign markets through human capital migration. In Chapter 3, “Italians in Southern Brasil: Tradition and Innovation”, Vania Beatriz Merlotti Herédia reconstructs the case of Italian migration in Southern Brasil. Italians settled in the official colonies organised by the imperial government where the production of foodstuffs and agricultural products led to the development of craft activities aimed at supplying the colonisation of the region. The artisan and manufacturing tradition of Italian settlers contributed to the development of new factories, expert workers and the rise of large urban centres. Italians specialised in the production of wine and food products but also in the milling and textile sector and in metallurgy. In particular, the metallurgical industry emerged as an economic milestone, as the case of Alexandre de Antoni indicates. He was a forerunner, manufacturing the first threshing machines in Rio Grande do Sul, machines that were used to process rice, wheat, barley, oats and cereals in general. As many other examples in the chapter show, the transfer of knowledge carried out by Italian emigrants took place in different areas of production, which allows the author to state that some typical artisanal specialities of some regions in Brasil: “migrated along with their protagonists”. Thus, Italians did not only populate Southern Brasil and its agricultural colonies, but contributed to its industrial development as well. Chapter 4, “Business and Transmission of Knowledge: Italian Migration to Brasil”, by Donatella Strangio and Mario Noviello, is also devoted to Brasil and it reinforces the idea of the utmost importance of knowledge transmission on the part of Italian emigrants in Brasil. The authors tell us the stories of Italian immigrant entrepreneurs who were key actors in the modernisation process of the country. Among the most interesting personalities, there were: Francesco Matarazzo, who began by producing lard and later created many factories within the nation, establishing an industrial empire; Abramo Eberle, founder of the largest metallurgical industry of the nation; and Pietro Morganti, also known as

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“the king of sugar”. According to Strangio and Noviello, these immigrant entrepreneurs not only played a vital role in the economic and industrial development of Brasil, but also contributed to the evolution of society— greatly influencing Brasilian culture in terms of values, language, cuisine, religion and ethics—and the building of long-term bonds between the two nations. In Chapter 5, “Science, Techniques, Ideas: Italian Emigration in the Construction of Modern Argentina”, Paolo Galassi analyses the early influx of Italian scientists in the process of consolidation and subsequent modernisation of Argentina between the second half of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth century. Italian technicalscientific immigration was a phenomenon partly propitiated by the “civilising” aspirations that were deemed functional to the construction of modern Argentina. Inserted in a debate on human capital and the transmission of knowledge, this contribution envisages the early arrival of Italian scientists and thinkers in Argentina as evidence that the movement of people was inevitably accompanied by the movement of ideas. In the Argentinian case, the transformation produced by massive immigration combined with the transition from a traditional colonial-type society into an urban industrial society, resulted in one of the main factors of development. This meant that immigrants were not simply assimilated into the pre-existing Argentine society and culture, but they were vectors of a real transformation of society, as in the case of the arrival of Italian professors and scientists who had a clear impact on the development of the university, undoubtedly stimulated by this intellectual immigration. However, not all the knowledge imported from Italy had a modernising role. Galassi underlines how, for instance, the influential theories of Cesare Lombroso and his disciples served to foment migratory policies from Europe and discriminate against natives and mestizos, describing them as barbarians suffering from atavism or degeneration. These theoretical developments found fertile ground in the emergence of fascism in Italy, and the appearance, in Argentina, of nationalist currents with fascist attitudes and forma mentis. Over the first great migration decades, many Italian immigrants brought along knowledge and scientific progress in Argentina, as many examples underline, but unfortunately, during the interwar era, Italy also exported pseudoscientific nonsense which was gaining considerable attention in both continents. Similarly, in Chapter 6, “The Mafia in the Italian Ethnic Press in Argentina”, Maria Soledad Balsas underlines another problematic heritage

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of Italian migration. If the transfer of capital, people and knowledge is still often weighed in predominantly positive terms when we talk about Italian migration, the migration of criminals and its long-term consequences should also be considered. Balsas analyses the position of three Italian newspapers with opposing political orientations (L’Italia del Popolo, La Nuova Patria and Il Mattino d’Italia) on a mafia crime that took place in 1932. Abel Ayerza was kidnapped and killed (even if his family paid ransom money) by Giovanni Galiffi’s clan, a Ravenusa-born mafioso that had emigrated to Argentina in 1910. The results of the author’s scrutiny of 30 articles published on the crime show that neither the importance allotted to Ayerza’s case nor the information delivered in the ethnic press was homogeneous. The way in which the Italian newspapers in Argentina positioned themselves with respect to Ayerza’s case was not exclusively based on an abstract common origin. Rather, it proved to be highly dependent on the political orientation of the newspaper itself. In the end, if the author’s empiric evidence suggests that the Italian ethnic press in Argentina failed to configure a coherent and articulated antimafia discourse to counterbalance the Argentine’s press xenophobia, on the other hand, the ethnic newspapers’ omissions may have contributed to the idealised image of Italian immigrants in Argentina in exclusively positive terms. In the first part of the book, the different chapters underline how Italian mass migration to Latin America brought along successful business stories, the development of important industrial sectors in many different fields (from wine/food production to metallurgical/textile/engineering companies) and the influx of engineering and science professors/experts who played a key role in the transfer of knowledge process. However, Italian migration also carried with it the setbacks of fascist pseudoscientific doctrines and the criminal style of the Italian “mafiosi”, feeding the mounting xenophobia in the Argentinian press, for instance. The case of Argentina is tantamount in its change from a country deeply believing in the possible contribution of European immigrants (in terms of elite immigration of educated people) to its economic and social development, to an increasing phobia about the consequences of the early nineteenth-century inflow of low-skilled and illiterate people, which the Argentinian press progressively saw as a threat. What the past can teach us in this context, besides keeping an open mind and an open door to foreign inputs, ideas and people, it’s the need for constant attention to the key role played by the media (today covering a much larger range of instruments) both

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in their deliberate omissions, partial coverage and economic biases—for instance in evaluating the cost but not the opportunities when talking about immigrant flows. The second part of the volume, Past and Present Migration Challenges, analyses different economic and social issues interlinked with the movement of people across countries and continents, yesterday and today. The driving theme of the section relates to the economic and social effects of past and present migration on the countries of departure and destination. In Chapter 7, Francesca Fauri evaluates the effects of remittances on the Italian economy in great migration years. Using Bank of Naples data which provides reliable, though limited, information about remittances’ geographical paths, the author underlines how between 1902 and 1920 the large majority of Italian migrants’ savings originated from the USA, while Sicily, Calabria and Campania were the most important receiving regions (reflecting not so much the absolute number of people leaving those regions, but rather the fact that most people from the South moved to the USA). The chapter then evaluates the micro and macroeconomic effects of remittances on the Italian economy. Certainly, remittances had positive macroeconomic effects on the balance of payments, but they also performed encouraging microeconomic impacts on receiving areas, especially where they were able to increase and improve Italian families’ consumption and living standards, incentivise school attendance and support new leavers. In general, however, remittances rarely enhanced the economic well-being and development path of an area of departure. Nonetheless, when dynamic provincial banks receiving large shares of the emigrants’ savings took a leading role in financing new ventures and local entrepreneurs, they ensured the productive use of remittances for the benefit of the whole area’s economic development. In Chapter 8, Roberto Impicciatore, Rosella Rettaroli, Alessandra Samoggia and Francesco Scalone explore the potential effects of migration on children of immigrants living arrangements. Resorting to the US census microdata of the years 1910, 1920 and 1930, the authors focus on the six numerically most significant European groups residing in the USA at the beginning of the twentieth century (Germans, Irish, Italians, Poles, Swedes and Britons) in order to test if second generations—born and raised in the country of destination with both parents born in another country—adopted the same model of family formation as white native Americans or if, on the contrary, preserved patterns of transition to adulthood typical of their parent’s country of origin. In line with

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past studies, results suggest that second-generation Europeans tend to stay longer with their parents and thus delay family formation compared to the US white population. In other words, past migrations in the USA teach us that children of immigrants tend to reproduce the prevailing models of transition to adulthood typical of their parent’s countries of origin, and this attitude is especially due to cultural reasons. However, authors also observe that the delay in the exit from the parental home and family formation is particularly visible among men. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that reproduction of family formation may also be related to second-generation men’s disadvantaged position in the labour market, low-income levels and possible discrimination in access to housing. In Chapter 9, “Policy Incoherence? The UK-Rwanda Asylum Partnership Arrangement”, Mark McQuinn addresses a recent and controversial issue with a great impact on the media, the 2022 UK–Rwanda socio-economic development partnership (the Migration and Economic Development Partnership or MEDP). Besides evident issues of legality, practicality, morality and cost, McQuinn analyses the document within the concept of Policy Coherence for Development (PCD), which is a central policy plank of the UK government. The MEDP shows a lack of policy coherence on the part of the UK government, it does not prioritise human rights and is environmentally destructive, contrary to the British green development objectives. This partnership will affect asylum seekers in unjust ways and evidently diminish the human rights of migrants claiming asylum in the UK. Last but not least, the MEDP lacks synergies with Britain’s existing aid policies and programmes in Rwanda. As the author clarifies, this recent development follows a path already started in 2021 with the downgrading of UK overseas development assistance and its independent office, the Department for International Development, which was merged with the Foreign Office. MEDP has been the most recent outcome of this policy, a programme which lacks humanity, coherence and feasible solutions in its approach to the migration challenge. Paolo Tedeschi’s Chapter 10 addresses a recent migratory issue albeit along a more traditional path: the economic (low salaries, poverty, few job opportunities) and political (weak institutions, corruption, poor services) push factors that drastically increased migration flows from Moldova to the European Union. With the end of the USSR and the related independence of the former Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova (becoming the present Republic of Moldova and losing Transnistria at the same time)

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a rushing outward flood of people started and increased so much that by 2003 a quarter of the Moldovan population worked abroad. One of the immediate and most noticeable consequences of the Moldovan diaspora was the significant rise in remittances with some well-known consequences from a historical point of view: an improvement in the quality of life at home and a subsequent further rise in migration. As to the destination of the migratory flows, Tedeschi underlines the important role of Romania (where geographical, cultural and language ties played an essential part) among the EU countries (without forgetting the still attractive role of the Russian Federation and Ukraine). In this case, migration does seem a long-term solution to the country’s problems. Since no relevant improvement in the living conditions of the people in Moldova has been attained so far, migration is not going to lose its appeal. The author concludes that the present national economy’s dependence on emigrants’ remittances could negatively expose the country to world economic trends and threaten Moldova’s future. Chapter 11, “Solidarity Driven by Utilitarianism: How Hungarian Migration Policy Transformed and Exploited Virtues of Solidarity”, written by Judit Tóth and Anikó Bernát, closes this second part of the book. The focus of this chapter is the notion of “solidarity” and its transformation under the effects of the recent Ukrainian refugee crises. Thanks to the empirical findings collected via semi-structured interviews with volunteers and non-governmental organisations’ (NGOs) leaders, as well as participant observation conducted in the month after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, the authors underline the important solidarity role played by the population in supporting refugees either in structured forms (NGOs) or spontaneously in public spaces. Refugees’ assistance at the border, provision of food, accommodation, health aid and financial support are some examples of actual charitable and institutionalised solidarity provided by NGOs and volunteers. Evidence reveals that, although the number and activities promoted to help Syrian refugees in the 2015 crisis were already unprecedented, the role of volunteers and NGOs, the diversity of their tasks and the heterogeneity of their activities multiplied in every sense during the refugee crisis that occurred after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in 2022. Empirical evidence also suggests that forms of solidarity are put into play by local populations where refugees are present, even if the Hungarian government aims to minimise humanitarian criticism and concerns about those in need of international protection. Nonetheless, voluntary and institutionalised

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solidarity promoted by volunteers and NGOs is often considered a temporary alternative to the institutional assistance activities for which the state remains the main actor. Therefore, it is not by coincidence that shortly after the outbreak of the humanitarian emergency, the civil solidarity force weakens and loses visibility. In this second part of the book, past and present migration challenges are analysed from different perspectives and countries of departure and destination. The economic sphere here plays a major role. Despite different time periods, the economic push factors play a fundamental role both in the case of Italy during the mass migration period and over the last 30 years in the case of Moldova. Yesterday and today, remittances do improve the standard of living of families at home and increase migration along more interesting migration routes and chains. However, a stable process of development can only be endogenous, in the Italian case its catching-up process was well underway during its great migration years, while in the case of Moldova the attempts made so far to set the country on a virtuous cycle of growth have not proved very successful, making emigration the most important industry of the country (as it was said in the case of Calabria more than a hundred years ago). Chapter 8 on second-generation immigrants in the USA and their propensity to live with their parents longer than native children seems again to point not only at cultural but also economic motives, in particular, if second-generation Europeans are males, who are more likely to suffer from limited access to well-paid jobs and housing. The UK– Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership reveals how economic reasons still play a crucial role today in determining the fate of many migrants not only at the national but also at the international level. It is mainly economic reasons that have pushed the British government to downsising its development assistance programme, cancel DIFID and sign the above-mentioned agreement with Rwanda. However, sadly, reducing economic assistance and sending refugees to Rwanda will not lessen migration flows and their deep-rooted causes. It’s only a palliative, unilateral and short-term solution. Nonetheless, economic reasons are not always the main explanation for migration outcomes. The Hungarian case well exemplifies the implementation of tightened anti-refugee and antimigration policies in order to preserve ethno-nationalist homogeneity. Immigrants are welcomed to the extent that they are able to meet the

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need of national solidarity utilitarianism, which means they are considered by the government as useful, tolerated exceptions to the anti-migrant rhetoric. The third final part of the book, titled Old Challenges in A “New” Country of Destination: The Italian Case, explores one of the greatest dares posed by immigration: the complex and multifaceted issue of immigrants’ socio-economic and cultural integration into the country of destination. And this topic is analysed focusing on a specific European country of recent immigration: Italy. In Chapter 12, “The Role of Local Socio-Economic Integration in Italian Asylum Adjudications”, Alice Lacchei, Cristina Dallara and Debora Mantovani pursue the double aim of describing the peculiar nature of the Italian system for asylum governance, on the one hand, and explaining the role played by asylum seekers’ level of socio-economic integration in obtaining humanitarian protection at the appeal stage, on the other. The first part of the chapter is dedicated to reconstructing the structure of international protection for refugees and asylum seekers, and to examining the specificities of the Italian asylum adjudication system. Indeed, although global norms rule asylum determination at the international level, each State also preserves discretion in defining localised practices aimed at implementing such international dispositions. Focusing on the Italian case, the authors explore this “regime complexity” by examining the so-called “humanitarian protection”: a distinctive national form of protection recognised within the asylum procedure, which has been granted in a massive way by Italian judges since 2018. One of the major specific traits of this local form of protection is the importance given to asylum seekers’ socio-economic integration into the receiving society to obtain humanitarian protection. Resorting to a mixed-method approach combining quantitative analyses of 584 final sentences adopted in 2020 at the appeal stage by an Italian civil court with both 100 observations of hearings held in the same court and 6 interviews with judges involved in the same trials, findings reveal that dimensions of asylum seeker’s socio-economic integration are actually distinctive traits considered by Italian judges when granting this national form of protection. Nonetheless, some differences according to the country of origin are observable: not only are integration dimensions relevant to gain humanitarian, but also episodes of violence experienced in the country of origin or transit by some national groups (Bangladeshis, Pakistanis, Ivorians and Senegalese) contribute to increasing the likelihood of obtaining national

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protection. Lastly, qualitative findings emphasise judges’ awareness of the complexity embedded in the notion of “integration”. This complexity is usually taken into account by gauging asylum seekers’ linguistic fluency, social integration and professional insertion in the labour market, as well as exploring their attitudes to (re)form a family in the country of destination. However, interviews reveal that work is often the pivotal integration-related dimension considered by judges in their final decision. In Chapter 13, “Past Migration and Current Challenges to Citizenship and Integration: The Chilean Migration in Italy”, Maria Grazia Galantino and Francesca Messineo offer the reader an exceptional overview of immigrants’ integration in the receiving society by comparing past and present migrations. Considering the case study of Chileans in Italy, the authors investigate the process of integration of this national group, whose specific trait is given by the fact that the first inflows date back to the early 1970s. At that time Italy was still an emigration country lacking experience and legislation on immigration, and Chileans arrived as refugees escaping violence perpetrated by Augusto Pinochet after the 1973 military coup. Despite Italy’s legislative vacuum, Chilean exiles were offered accommodation, health care and social assistance and obtained permanent permits of stay and some advantages for accessing the labour market. In the Seventies, an important role in favouring Chilean refugees’ integration was played not only by the major political parties (Catholic-Democratic, Socialist and Communist) and international organisations but also by civil society organisations, and this support encouraged Chileans’ active political, social and civic participation. Although forced exile terminated at the end of the Eighties, many ex-refugees decided to stay in Italy and since then new Chilean emigrants have privileged Italy as their country of destination. Resorting to historical literature, secondary data analyses and conducting interviews with Chileans, the authors explain Chileans’ preference for Italy stressing the importance of the strong network of relationships developed by previous migrants with Italian local communities, as well as the support given by Italian social and political organisations. Chilean immigrants in Italy, though numerically a minority, are an example of successful integration in the country of destination. In comparison with other national groups, Chileans possess a higher level of education, are more likely to participate in the labour market, enjoy good socio-economic inclusion and take part in third sector, civil and political organisations. This unusual level of integration is partly due to the peculiar strong network of political and civic solidarity which was put

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into play in order to host Chilean refugees at the beginning of the Seventies escaping violence and repression. The Chilean case study exemplifies how a special network of solidarity—which was built for refugees in a period exempted from migration issues—has survived the end of forced migration and still applies to more recent economic migrants from Chile as well. The examination of the socio-economic and political inclusion of Chileans in the past offers noteworthy insights for understanding the level of integration of Chileans today. In the last Chapter 14, “Italian Citizenship and New Generations: The Cases of Italians Without Citizenship and CoNNGI ”, Veronica Pastorino analyses the complex relationship between nationality and citizenship. Her starting point relies on the sociological literature which explores, on the one hand, the nation-state’s birth and the following process of identity construction and, on the other hand, the notion of citizenship, which formally defines and rules people’s inclusion in the political, civic and social life. Traditionally, immigrants are considered a threat to the cultural and ethnic homogeneity characterising people who live in the same territory delimited by the nation-state’s boundaries. Additionally, immigrants can also be formally excluded from participation in socio-political life inhibiting their access to citizenship. It is not by coincidence that immigrants are used to undergoing episodes of “double exclusion”. They may: (i) develop a sense of belonging to the country of destination where they live, but not being recognised as part of the society by natives; (ii) be officially precluded from taking part in some socio-economic and political activities due to legislation reluctant to grant citizenship, especially if it is based on ius sanguinis principle (as the Italian case). Analysing two Italian collective actors—Italians Without Citizenship and National Coordination of New Italian Generations (CoNNGI)—Pastorino explores the double exclusion experienced by new generations with a migratory background (i.e. second- and third-generation immigrants) and investigates the narratives promoted by the two groups in claiming Italian citizenship for new generations, as well as the relationship between citizenship and identity construction. Her empirical findings—based on semi-structured interviews with members of both collective actors—reveal that, although citizenship is undoubtedly a crucial issue for both organisations, two narratives are detectable. The first one, characterising Italians Without Citizenship’s claims, reinforces the idea of a strong relationship between citizenship and nationality: new generations are, in practice, already Italians due to their internalisation of Italian values, norms and culture.

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The second narrative—especially promoted by CoNNGI —separates the concept of citizenship from that of nationality emphasising new generations’ actual participation in the Italian social community regardless of their cultural and ethnic features. In the concluding part of this book, Italy becomes the privileged context for analysing how old challenges posed by immigration are being addressed in a country traditionally unrelated to this phenomenon. Indeed, Italy has recently shifted from a country of emigration to one of immigration. Starting at the beginning of the Eighties, this transition has produced significant changes in the country’s social, cultural and economic structures and has posed major new challenges to the so-called “ethnic homogeneity”. In particular, the common thread connecting the three chapters collected in this section is the composite concept of immigrants’ socio-economic and cultural integration and particular attention is given to some different types of immigrants. Indeed, according to some features—such as legal status, aim behind migration and other personal characteristics (i.e. age, social class, level of education, country of origin)—immigrants can be classified into different categories. For asylum seekers, who enter a new country with neither proper documentation nor authorisation, experiencing and proving forms of integration into Italian society may be crucial in order to obtain the recognition of the legal status of refugee. Empirical findings uncover that, at the appeal stage, Italian judges are more likely to grant asylum seekers the peculiar national form of humanitarian protection especially if the latter can demonstrate to be employed in the labour market and be able to actively interact with other people in the language spoken by natives. Additionally, though to a lesser extent, other forms of social and professional integration— such as participation in local community organisations and attendance of vocational courses—are also positively associated with higher chances to get humanitarian protection. A community which was able to become an integral part of the Italian social fabric was offered by Chilean exiles in search of refuge in Italy at the beginning of the Seventies. Indeed, many exiles established new lives in this country, raised their families and contributed to the local economy and culture. Although immigration was an unknown phenomenon in Italy at that time and, unlike today, Chilean refugees were welcomed and supported by the political class and civil society, many current Chilean emigrants still mainly choose Italy as their country of destination taking advantage of the strong ties developed with the local community by previous Chilean forced migrants.

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Today, Italy hosts about 16,000 Chileans—including first-, second- and third-generation immigrants, binational citizens and undocumented individuals—and this community is well integrated, in exemplary fashion, into the labour market, in social promotion associations and political organisations. This positive outcome of integration in the receiving society is not so common, not even for immigrants’ descendants. Although secondgeneration immigrants are less likely to experience language barriers and cultural differences than their first-migrant parents, there are formal hindrances able to inhibit their actual process of integration into the local society. One of the most relevant formal barriers to immigrant integration is the lack of access to citizenship. The Italian nationality law, based on the right of blood, hampers chances of naturalisation not only for first immigrants but also for their children, born and raised in Italy. Failure to hold Italian citizenship is often a synonym for exclusion since it means no access to some rights and benefits that Italians have. Furthermore, Italian citizenship can also be a source of identity, a formal qualification fostering the sense of belonging to the Italian community, although Italianness is not a mere formal issue. In order to give voice to their social and political marginality, new generations with a migratory background are promoting and becoming activists of collective associations mainly operating through their online website, blog and forum, as well as local groups in several Italian cities. Italians Without Citizenship and National Coordination of New Italian Generations are two examples of collective actors whose aim is to upgrade citizenship to a key issue in the political agenda, encourage a change in the citizenship law in order to favour the actual integration of new generations into the society and stimulate the debate on the topic of Italian identity.

PART I

Italians in Latin America

CHAPTER 2

Atlantic Reflections: Italian Spirits and Business Communities in the Americas Giulio Mellinato and Valerio Varini

The End of Long Journeys Italian immigration in Latin America has been amply documented by historians. In order to provide a better understanding of how the formation of community channels affected its extent, a short demographic summary will precede the analysis of the role played by companies as promotors of the characteristics of the workforce travelling towards the new frontiers. During the years when the exodus was at its height, between 1880 and 1922, over two million Italians emigrated, with the peak between 1895 and the outbreak of World War I. In Argentina, Italians made up the largest proportion of new arrivals (46%), followed at some distance by the Spanish (32%).

G. Mellinato · V. Varini (B) Department of Economics, Management and Statistics, University of Milan-Bicocca, Milan, Italy e-mail: [email protected] G. Mellinato e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. Fauri and D. Mantovani (eds.), Past and Present Migration Challenges, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39431-7_2

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In addition to the demographic figures, some economic parameters serve to outline the growth taking place in Argentina, also revealing its attractiveness. The country’s gross national product (GNP) grew during the 1880s at an annual rate of 12%. While direct investments were relatively contained, the local press reveals the lively presence of Italian producers of consumer goods, who were attracted by favourable marketing opportunities to settle overseas, marking a distinctive operativity in the newly formed Italian communities in Argentina’s urban centres.1 In rapid sequence, Fernet Branca pioneered Made in Italy in December 1876 and established itself on a legal basis by registering its own trademark, followed by other renowned producers, such as Cinzano and Florio (Diccionario Biográfico Italo-Argentino, 1976). In the early years of the twentieth century, this expansion continued in the textile sector with “merchant prince”, Enrico dell’Acqua, a charismatic figure in Italian business emigration beyond the national borders (Einaudi, 1900). An emblematic role at the cutting edge of technology was played by Pirelli (Lavista, 2015), whose business activity was marked from 1892 by the presence of permanent representatives on Argentinian soil. Finally, mention must also be made of the work carried out by the principal Italian banking institutions in promoting both trade and the establishment of Italian companies throughout Latin America (Piluso, 1996). In this context, the two cases studied deserve attention and allow us to shed light on some aspects that are otherwise overshadowed by the sheer numbers involved in the migration flows. Moreover, two different periods will be considered, highlighting how the changes in the context have profoundly influenced the managerial attitudes, and therefore also the quality of relations with the Italian emigrant communities.

1 An overview of the companies established by Italian immigrants is contained in the reports drawn up by the Italian Chamber of Commerce of Buenos Aires in 1898, 1906 and 1911; for a detailed analysis of these reports, see Scarzanella (1983).

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Martini & Rossi: A Frontier Community The first case concerns Martini & Rossi (M&R), a company that played a pioneering role in different ways. It was one of the first Italian businesses to embark upon the overseas markets and to establish both the company2 itself and its products in lands that were still largely unpopulated. The historical archives of M&R3 have preserved almost the entire body of documents produced by the Argentinian branch of the company up until 1905. The types of documentation can be grouped into three macro-areas: the documents entering the company, mostly concerned with commercial and accounting reports; the documents leaving the company (business correspondence) and the accounting books (Libri Giornale, Mastri). Alongside these documents, there are also the official papers produced and received from the parent company, such as particular copy letters dedicated to the correspondence with the Argentinian branch. The letters entering the company are grouped in batches dedicated to Buenos Aires, or else under the initial of the surname of the correspondent (e.g. B for Barberis). This correspondence makes it possible to understand the many diverse aspects of distant places such as Turin and Buenos Aires, where the company’s need for expansion met with the exploration of a new economic frontier, and also—more relevantly to our purpose—with the formation of a cohesive company community, and on a wider scale, with the formation of the Argentinian society. Thus, attention has been concentrated on archive sources that can reveal the crucial years when the company was established in Argentina, so that the first stage of research has focused on the documentation concerning the period 1877–1888, which will be followed by the exploration of a further period (1895–1897), added only in order to monitor eventual changes in comparison with the critical years of the company establishment.

2 Given the wealth of historiography concerning immigration in Argentine, the following references represent a summary: Devoto (2003, 2007), Bertagna (2020). 3 First of all, I must thank the archivists of Martini & Rossi, Anna Scudellari and Lorenzo Manetta, without whose help and passionate interest I would never have been able to explore this history. I am indebted to them for identifying the sources and selecting the documents used.

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The ample correspondence between the parent company and the Argentinian branch, especially in 1888, notes with a diarist’s attention to detail the variety of the relations between the two opposite sides of the ocean. Economic questions and human relations alternate in a composition where the project for the future draws on the roots of the company’s origins.4 Pessione—or perhaps rather Turin—and Buenos Aires are the reflection of two worlds engaged in a process of reciprocal and profound change. This is the spatial and temporal context within which we will proceed chronologically to examine some particularly important hypsographical issues. In order to provide a clear and brief explanation, the origins of the company’s establishment in Argentina will be investigated first, with some indications about the reasons for such a complex venture. This involves studying the nascent markets, with punctual reference to the wine market,5 and this will be followed by a much more important and fascinating investigation of the origins of human settlement in a land still unexplored. In addition, attention will focus not only on the men and women involved but also on the flow of goods, as these were essential components in the establishment of a material culture which sought to replicate its place of origin at the same time as it adapted to its new area of settlement along the course of the Río de la Plata. For the sake of simplicity, the available documentation will be used firstly to investigate the company’s arrival in Argentina, as the starting point for the establishment of the networks of men and goods that occurred within the time frame indicated above.

The Origins of the Argentinian Settlement Here is a concise account of the origins of M&R. The company began in Turin with the constitution of a “national distillery of wine spirit in the French Manner” (Ortalda, 2005). Fluctuating fortunes led to its refoundation in 1863 under the name of Martini, Sola e C.ia, with the help of expert distiller Luigi Rossi. In 1864 the production site was moved to 4 For the complex dynamics of migration, such as the interplay of social life and contacts, see Arru et al. (2008). 5 For an analytical summary of the Argentinian market for Italian wine, see Vaquero Pineiro (2019).

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Pessione on the Turin–Asti–Genoa railway line near the Monferrato hills, and the company adopted the name “Martini & Rossi” (M&R) in 1879. Just a few years later, the company set its sights on promising markets across the ocean. Exploration of this new territory required experts whose trustworthiness was unquestionable. The people entrusted with the hazardous undertaking had well-defined characteristics: they were closely related to the owners. Andrea Barberis was responsible for the Argentina venture, and he encapsulated both of the characteristics required. Not only was he the nephew of Luigi Rossi’s wife, and thus a member of the wider family circle, but he had also been a salesman for M&R in Italy since 1876. After travelling and gaining ample experience in Italy, Barberis was sent to Argentina in 1883 to assess the opportunities for establishing M&R directly in the new market. In the first letter, dated December 1883, Andrea Barberis writes at length about the business opportunities, highlighting the question of a direct presence. Buenos Aires is extremely attractive because of the “immense turnover [which] bodes well for the opening of the branch”, and “the straight roads of Buenos Aires are similar to those of Turin”. Barberis focuses on the “Italian wine market, empty bottles, import rights for vermouth, sugar, spirit, raw materials, cases, lithographs for the production of labels and signs, the required workforce (2 workmen and 1 salesman), premises”.6 In the next letter (24 December 1883), Barberis presents formal “proposals for the construction of the Martini & Rossi plant in Buenos Aires”, with appropriate technical controls related to the production site, consisting of “accommodation, warehouses, a workshop, packaging, a rainwater cistern etc.”,7 for the production of vermouth using the extract supplied by the parent company. The company was rapidly established as the parent company gave its approval with the brief instruction to “continue”,8 and so the first seeds of a community were sown.9 Barberis’ predictions were so successful that in January 1885 “Signor Tagliazucchi arrived after a journey of 61 days in order to help his friend

6 AsM&R, Copialettera, no. 142, Letter 18 December 1883. 7 AsM&R, Copialettera, no. 142, Letter 24 December 1883. 8 AsM&R, Copialettera, no. 142, Letter 23 January 1884. 9 Consumption, followed by the production of vermouth in Argentina, expanded rapidly

with fierce competition between the major Italian brands.

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Andreino Barberis”.10 The Buenos Aires branch “is beautiful, the large and spacious premises have nothing to envy those of Pessione”. The transformation of the branch is significant. Its commercial nature, open to all the kinds of goods required by the local market, as will be seen more clearly below, was enhanced with the addition of a production facility to make vermouth in loco, according to the parent company’s established methods. Proof of its success is seen in the local press, which published acknowledgements obtained in the Argentinian editions of promotional events, such as Trade Fairs that awarded the usual kind of medals to exhibitors.11 The relations between the two units are significant. When the parent company asked for punctual information about the “organizational structure of the office staff, workers, the duties of each one, and their salaries”, it highlighted the twofold nature of the relationship founded on the bond of trust with “Sig. Barberis”12 and also on adherence to the directives from the head office in Italy. This confirmed the two cornerstones of the relationship: trust and the management hierarchy. The results confirmed expectations to the extent that “The work obtained so far has been incessant and gratifying” as demonstrated by sales of a vast range of articles that included vermouth alongside generic “Wines and Spirits, together with 100 barrels of Spirit”.13 Having witnessed the positive response of the local market, the company strategy now aimed to establish its own distinctive brand, and it consequently stopped being known as just a business selling food products, among which alcoholic beverages predominated. This decision implied the construction of the brand alongside a careful expansion of the company’s presence in Argentina. However, the preference now given to brands instead of generic products did not just mean limiting the range of goods 10 AsM&R, Copialettera, no. 142, Letter 6 January 1885. 11 The Buenos Aires branch of Martini & Rossi was awarded the gold medal at the

National Trade Fair at Mendoza in 1885 (AsM&R, Copialettera, no. 142, Letter 13 April 1885). 12 The parent company’s words are extremely significant in terms of the relations with the Argentinian branch: “we would like to reach an understanding with Signor Barberis on the way to manage this House, as far as relatively possible, a little according to our criterion” (AsM&R, Copialettera, f. 131, Copy letter, 1 February 1888). 13 AsM&R, Cartas y Facturas M&R Torino 1888, n. 22; continual references to the flow of commodities, to which we will return below (AsM&R, Copialettere particolari, Filiale Martini & Rossi Buenos Aires from 12 April 1887 to 6 February 1890, f. 1319).

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traded, but rather the profitable exploitation of the company’s own structures via the stipulation of exclusive agreements with other companies that were interested in establishing their own products, which were duly “branded” and complemented M&R’s own products.14 Rapidly fluctuating circumstances suggested caution when it came to investing in new property,15 while the Pole Star of the company’s own core business became the principal criteria for management decisions.16 In a short time, the Argentina branch developed a well-defined organisation that was based on a clear distinction of the company functions carried out by the company’s trusted men from headquarters, with Barberis in the role of “director”, supported by brothers Umberto and Ernesto Tagliazucchi in charge of sales and production, respectively. Each function was carried out by staff qualified to perform defined and distinct duties, such as retail or wholesale activities, each with two employees for each, and individual “heads” managing the personnel of the plant. The total workforce of 46 employees included a community of both male and female “workers”, whose origins will be explored below.17 The composition of the workforce required a unifying culture on which to draw and the “memory … [of] the famous banquets in Pessione” served to create the habitual “family reunions”, intended to “reward them

14 “With regard to the request of M&R to Ingham and Florio to become their exclusive agents in Argentina, they state that the outcome was unsuccessful; it seems, however, that Signor Giacone Pietro of Marsala has accepted to act as representative” (AsM&R, fondo Martini & Rossi Argentina, Serie Cartas y Facturas—henceforth AsM&R, Cartas Y Facturas—4 July 1888). 15 “With Signor Barberis we have decided to forego any idea of new buildings on the land belonging to the plant that we possess there. In this country, where from one moment to the next the price of gold may be equal and increase to 50%, it is always better to have money available than to invest it in property” (AsM&R, Cartas Y Facturas, 9 March 1888). 16 “In any case, the trade in ordinary wines is neither our business nor your business and will consequently be abandoned” (AsM&R, Cartas Y Facturas, March 1888). 17 Andrea Barberis, director (with accommodation provided); Umberto Tagliazucchi, vice-director (with accommodation in the farm); Erasmo Tagliazucchi, manager (with accommodation in the factory); 1 retail seller (paid on commission); 1 salesman to wholesaler (paid on commission); 1 head of male workers; 1 head of female workers; machinist-stoker; blacksmith; 1 gardener; 1 vintner machine operator; 1 one distillery worker; 14 male workers; 18 female workers; 1 maid; 1 caretaker (AsM&R, Copialettere Martini e Rossi Torino from 3 February 1888 to 27 November 1892, ff. 41–48, March 1888).

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for their hard work, since business was going well”. Ceremonies were celebrated, but they were always business occasions, since along with the guests who were invited “the party served excellently as promotion, and what is most satisfying is that on the same day we sold to various clients of the sector, among other products: 250 cases Verm., 100 cases Verm. Chinato and 50 Fernet”.18 If sales did not create excessive problems, it was a different situation for the supply of raw materials that were not yet entirely produced in Argentina but partly imported, because these suffered the effects of adverse weather on harvests and of the long journey from Italy to Argentina.19 The reasons for establishing a new site at Catilinas, apart from those connected with speculation in a period when property prices in Buenos Ayres were booming, were based on the profitable advantages of having a location near the railway line that connected the capital city to the country’s other major cities, and this decision also proved decisive for the parent company.20 The reference to the property market also deserves a brief mention: “bricks will become gold in time”. This vision was based on the demand from “immigration”, which made it extremely profitable to invest in “land and houses”, so that Tagliacuzzi foretold: “after two years you are sure that the price has doubled”.21 Their analytical correspondence shows the links between the units even more clearly. Having reiterated the purpose, namely the growth of company production and trade in its economic unity, the constituting factors were also widely reiterated. 18 AsM&R, Copialettere Martini e Rossi Torino from 3 February 1888 to 27 October

1892, ff. 49–54, 3 April 1888. 19 “Here the grape harvest is so bad that there has been perhaps none worse in living memory; the weather is very cold and even today we were obliged to wear coats in the morning and evening” (AsM&R, Cartas Y Facturas, 8 August 1888). 20 “Consumption of our articles is greatest in the north-western provinces, where everything arrives via the railway line from Buenos Aires to Rosario, and with a stretch of this same line on our site, we will achieve economies of wagons, fewer breakages and leaks, supervision of goods at the station, more rapid and direct dispatches […] many of the advantages you have in Pessione and more” (AsM&R, Copialettere Martini e Rossi Torino from 3 February 1888 to 27 October 1892, ff. 101–115, 10 August 1888). 21 AsM&R, Copialettere Martini & Rossi Torino 3 February 1888 to 27 October 1892, ff. 30–23, 14 March 1888.

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The Argentinian managers, Barberis and Tagliazucchi, not only listed the supposed advantages of moving to Catalinas, but also appealed to the “esteem and trust given to us, will not make us [take] actions that are less than reasonable and prudent. We need this esteem and trust now more than ever, because we think it would be a mistake not to take advantage of this beneficial combination of a new country, called on to advance for the very natural reason that the population increases continually due to great immigration”.22 Although the parent company was fearful about the size of the investment, it agreed to the proposal and placed its trust in its representatives: since you are on site, without refusing [your proposal] we strongly advise you to take extreme care to consider what you are doing if you actually decide to establish [that] kind of branch, do it in a [very restrained] way, avoiding as much [expense]as possible […]. Trusting your common sense and - your good agreement, and – your interest […] in doing well, we have sent you a telegram with the word “proceed”.23

Ultimately, the bond of trust set the seal on the institutional relations between the units of M&R. This meant that the establishment of the new production plant was authorised due to the positive behaviour of the market, in addition to an “office in the centre of Buenos Aires with a goods warehouse” to function both as the commercial headquarters and the deposit for the capital, whose consumption was estimated to be equal to that of “the consumption of the city … [of] Turin”. In summing up the advantages of the new site, the promotors not only saw their managerial independence confirmed, but they also suggested repeating the choices of the parent company. Catalinas was on the railway line connecting the capital with Rosario, and its urbanisation and development of its infrastructures would provide advantages in supplying the “north-western provinces” where “consumption of our articles was the highest”.24

22 AsM&R, Copialettere Martini e Rossi Torino 3 February 1888 to 27 October 1892, ff. 101–115, 10 August 1888. 23 AsM&R, Copialettere Martini e Rossi Torino 3 February 1888 to 27 October 1892, ff. 116–120, 12 September 1888. 24 AsM&R. Copialettere Martini e Rossi Torino 3 February 1888 to 27 October 1892, ff. 101–115, 10 August 1888.

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The move to Catilinas proved profitable because the site in Calle Santa Fe was sold for a high price and the other profits made it possible to repay the investment very quickly.25 Some years later, in 1895, there was another move from Catalinas to Calle General Lavalle in the centre of Buenos Aires, for reasons that are unclear, although it may have been prompted by the serious economic crisis that Argentina suffered in the early 1890s (Devoto, 2007). A specific note concerns the taxes on alcoholic beverages, which increased drastically following the crisis in public finance. This dealt M&R a bad blow that required all the company’s available liquidity, and triggered “an indescribable crisis in our business”.26 The restrictive fiscal policy and the collapse of the wine market were signs of the profound economic crisis that struck Argentina in 1890, and which also had important repercussions on migration flows. As the flow of migrants from Italy slowed to a trickle, Argentina was replaced by the rapid growth of the “United States, which from that date became the main destination for Italian emigration” (Fauri, 2015, 142). This short period of time, ended by the economic crisis and the reduction in migration flows—at least incoming—marks the formation of the Italian community on which our attention will now focus.

The Development Network: The People Having traced the framework of the company, the focus will now move onto the people themselves who migrated, starting with those employed by the Argentina branch of M&R. As mentioned, the head of the Argentinian branch was Andrea Barberis, son of Francesco whose sister Marianna was married to a shareholder, Luigi Rossi, thus making Barberis a direct member of the family that shared ownership of the company. He appears in the company registers from 1876 as a commercial agent with the task of following the Italian market.27 His skills qualified him to assess the potential of the Latin

25 AsM&R, Cartas Y Facturas, 11 March 1889. 26 “The new law […] would cost us having to immediately pay the sum of L.180,000,

unexpectedly” (AsM&R, Cartas Y Facturas, 3 September 1888). 27 Details of Barberis’ life and career are contained in AsM&R, Libro Mastro A1 from 1877, ff. 38 and 98.

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American market. After a long ocean voyage, Barberis arrived in Uruguay on 3 December 1883 before travelling to his destination in Buenos Aires. When the official paperwork had been completed, his first collaborator arrived directly from the parent company. Umberto Tagliazucchi joined him on 6 January 1885. The first working nucleus of the Martini community had now been formed and it acquired another member with Barberis’ wife, the daughter of a well-known Buenos Aires businessman. Ocean crossings were interlaced with family ceremonies, such as weddings and honeymoon trips, and other relatives entered the network of relationships; for example, Andrea Barberis’ brother Ettore was given the task of registering marriages in both Italy and Argentina.28 After a few years, as mentioned already, the company organisation saw Umberto Tagliazucchi as vice-director, and his brother Erasmo as head of the production, thus providing further proof of the importance of family ties. Adding to this cohesion, personnel who had matured their professional expertise in Italy arrived in Argentina with the clear intention of settling there permanently, as shown by the presence of their closest family members.29 Two constituent features are noticeable from the outset: family and professional expertise become the distinguishing characteristics of the “Martini” migrants, whose cohesion was based on two unifying elements. The first one was “moral progress”, and the second one, but no less important, was the “cash” from “profit-sharing”, meaning the dividends distributed from capital invested in the Argentine “branch” of which the two managers received a small share.30 28 “Dearest Umberto, I’m using the free space to ask you to have the City Council of Buenos Ayres draw up the marriage certificate of my brother and then to have it validated by the Italian General Consul resident in Buenos Ayres. Send me this document promptly so that Andrea’s marriage can be registered at the State Registry Office in Turin, otherwise his marriage would not be valid in Italy” (AsM&R, Cartas Y Facturas, Letter from Andrea Barberis [from Turin] to Umberto Tagliazucchi [Buenos Aires] dated 10 February 1888). 29 “And of the family of our office-worker o Baldassare Varese” (MsM&R, Copialettere Martini e Rossi Torino from 3 February 1888 to 27 October 1892, ff. 72–73, 19 May 1888). 30 “Our man Barberis has already at this time travelled several leagues on the sea to reach his workplace. He will take to our man Tagliazucchi a dividend contract whose conditions were accepted by Signor Barberis, and which are identical for Signor Tagliazucchi, except for the dividend proportion. Sig. Tagliazucchi will see that we have considered him favourably and we hope that he will be pleased. Now it remains for

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It is significant in the relations between the units that the Argentina branch was completely autonomous in choosing its own “employees”, but that these were always selected from within the Piedmontese community.31 This connection was strengthened with the work of trusted collaborators from Pessione who alternated between the different sites and kept close ties with their original family.32 As proof of its trust, the parent company went no further than suggesting that Tagliazucchi and Barberi’s disagreements over branch management might be resolved in a friendly manner, without directly intervening in the decisions of the company’s managers across the ocean. On the production side, M&R went ahead with its process of putting down roots in Argentina by improving the production of vermouth in loco, thanks to expertise acquired in Piedmontese vineyards. The true common denominator of the entire group—advertising—was the strategic responsibility of the parent company, making the labels that it supplied directly.33 Widening the range of relations beyond the company community, the correspondence with Argentina reveals the ramified relations within the Italian community present in Buenos Aires. The “recommendations” sent by the branch reveal a selection of migrants performed by the company and allow a more informed understanding of the numerous immigrant communities. Within the limited range of cases marked, there is a definite prevalence of certain characteristics. Firstly, there is only one “recommendation” for an unemployed person, while the others indicate the professions of those recommended.

you both, Barberis and Tagliazucchi, in your own interest, to prove to us that our interests are well supported and we hope for you that you may have fabulous dividends […] We wish you the greatest harmony in your management of your affairs, inspired by the same feeling for the common good, tolerating each other’s character, doing everything, even the smallest, in mutual agreement, sharing your ideas calmly, and that you will obtain peace of mind and thus earn a great deal of money” (AsM&R, Cartas Y Facturas, 3 May 1888). 31 Teofilo Rossi: “and then we leave it entirely to the Director of that branch of ours to choose his staff” (AsM&R, Cartas Y Facturas, 13 August 1889). Concerning the presence of Piedmontese natives in Argentina: G. Libert (2014). 32 “Poor Domenico M. left a wife and four children on 20 February in Pessione” (AsM&R, Cartas Y Facturas, 28 February 1890). 33 AsM&R, Cartas Y Facturas, 11 September 1890.

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Between February and July 1888, a total of twelve people were recommended with just one recorded as “unemployed”, while the other eleven had a clearly defined profession: four were manual workers (coffeegrinder, jeweller, gunsmith, carpenter), while the others were more distinctly “professionals” (insurer, accountant, doctor, lawyer, trader). It is also interesting to observe how the recommendations of staff changed in the months leading up to the serious economic crisis of 1890. Between December 1889 and the following year, eight recommendations were recorded. While this is a similar number to the previous period, it is interesting to note some differences. Among the eight recommendations, there are no more references to manual jobs, and the common factor is that they all have administrative expertise. Closer analysis reveals the presence of three candidates with different experiences in warehouse management, in a railway station and in banking activities. In other words, they were destined for positions in sites already in operation, which presumably needed qualified staff for their various company structures.34 Moreover, two candidates are quite revealing: one was an office worker “with a good educational background, and knowledge of foreign languages” and destined, at least this was the intention, to operate in “one of the many strong trading houses”.35 The second one was a female (the first woman ever mentioned), a widow who presumably needed an income, a “teacher of foreign languages”,36 destined for work in one of the many trading companies operating in the capital. Then comes the category of “friends” with diverse qualifications. These range from the manager of a “pipe shop” whose talents would be appreciated in “any trading house”,37 to the son of a parliamentarian and former minister, interested in “meeting the principal members of the Italian Colony”.38 The recommendations of enterprising economic agents 34 Natale R. “commesso di magazzino, or presso qualche rivenditore di liquori o caffetteria” (22 November 1888); office-worker at the Banca Nazionale (13 August 1889); Enrico P. “station master at Chieri” “where he might demonstrate his intelligence and active nature to greatest advantage” (2 December 1889): lettere in AsM&R, Cartas Y Facturas. 35 AsM&R, Cartas Y Facturas, 29 December 1889. 36 AsM&R, Cartas Y Facturas, 29 January 1890. 37 AsM&R, Cartas Y Facturas, 9 April 1889. 38 AsM&R, Cartas Y Facturas, 13 February 1890.

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were also significant for strengthening the community relations among the Italian migrants. There were repeated references to representatives and agents of Italian companies intending to operate in Argentina,39 and some of them were defined as “the most talented” and were intended for important jobs in public relations management.40 The practice of “recommendation” continued over the years, becoming increasingly sharply focused on the promotion of those migrants who intended to create economic activities consolidating the Italian community’s network of relations, which were mostly concerned with economic matters.41 As evidence of this development, recommendations mainly concerned the free professions, such as lawyers, whose expertise was useful in dealing with the voluminous body of laws regulating economic activities.42 This shift in professions confirms the consolidation of production structures that required managerial expertise imported from the mother country in the early decades of the twentieth century.43 With this in mind, the reported observations are even more useful. Regarding immigrants with no trade, Barberis writes to Turin, saying that those “with few skills… have difficulty finding bread”,44 whereas “industrial” expertise is more appreciated. Exemplifying this is the case of “signor [Mestrallet] Giuseppe” who moved to Argentina “in order to set up a factory” producing “Velocipedes and Sewing Machines, whose products are greatly esteemed in Italy and do not fear competition from

39 Stefano R. “representative of the Raffineria Ligure company” (AsM&R, Cartas Y Facturas, 11 September 1890). 40 “Guglielmo […] is a very cultivated young man, having attended all the courses of the Royal University” (AsM&R, Cartas Y Facturas, 19 April 1890). 41 Recommendation for Giudo M. who moves to Argentina to establish a representative house (AsM&R, Cartas Y Facturas, 30 January 1895); Corrado C.: vendita vino toscano (AsM&R, Cartas Y Facturas, 2 April 1895). 42 Lawyer Giacomo C. (AsM&R, Cartas Y Facturas, 30 March 1897), or: Giuseppe C. “a cultivated person who has already held distinguished positions in banking houses in our country” (AsM&R, Cartas Y Facturas, 16 May 1896). 43 “With the gradual reduction in individual companies … the old industrialists, who personally run their plants, are accompanied by the new figure of the manager” (Scarzanella, 1983). 44 AsM&R, Copialettere Martini e Rossi Torino from 3 February 1888 to 27 October 1892, ff. 89–92, 20 July 1888.

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the great foreign factories”.45 This appreciation extended as far as the granting of small loans,46 which suggest the intensity of relations between immigrants, and also the advantages of belonging to a nascent community. There were also opportunities in terms of intelligence, such as the case of immigrants who went missing or died and could be traced via information that arrived from M&R’s trade network.47 The references to fragmented and informal credit further reinforce the importance of “ethnic solidarity” in preparing for the advent of a credit system consisting of solid financial institutions (Scarzanella, 1983, 35). Ultimately, although within the limits of the cases analysed, the 1890 crisis had a profound effect on Italian migration to Argentina, but the process of professional enhancement involving the Italian community continued, so that for the period 1895–1897 there are records of recommendations that accentuate professional characteristics, ranging from manual trades to management expertise.48

The Development Network: The Goods In addition to migrants, the trade flow also involved goods. It is extremely significant to understand how all the commodities were involved in transferring and reproducing the material life of the new Italian community. It seems appropriate that 1,115 kg of items belonging to Barberis and his wife are recorded as accompanying their “honeymoon” journey towards the new settlement, including a gas cooker (320 kg) and a sewing machine (52 kg). This meant further consolidation of the profitable opportunities for Italian manufacturers to export their products to fellow citizens living abroad. In general, the trade network favoured by the intensification of shipping and telegraph provided opportunities for profitable exploitation in broadening the entire range of products “Made in Italy”. 45 AsM&R, Copialettere particolari, Filiale Martini & Rossi Buenos Aires from 12 April 1887 to 6 February 1890, f. 145, 6 March 1888. 46 AsM&R, Cartas Y Facturas, 12 July 1888. 47 AsM&R, Cartas Y Facturas, 6 July 1888. 48 For the sake of brevity, during the period January 1895–March 1897 only “mer-

chants” are indicated, mostly trading in food products, lawyers and the administrators of “banking houses”, with no reference to manual arts and qualifications/trades (AsM&R, Cartas Y Facturas, from January 1895 to March 1897).

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The M&R company itself moved outside the sphere of alcoholic beverages and proposed itself as the exclusive dealer for the “products” of the Lugo Hemp Manufacturing Company (Società di Lavorazione Canapa di Lugo), and rudimental market research was performed to assess the receptivity of products renowned in Italy and imported for the Argentinian market.49 This choice demonstrates the intention to expand the range of commodities Made in Italy so as to include new brands that evoke images of Italy.50 The networking activity of the Argentinian branch was extremely important in creating commercial relations. It operated as an intermediary promoting contacts between Italian companies and possible Argentinian customers, especially in its favourite sector, the “wine trade”.51 The service was not limited just to making recommendations, but also extended to the sale of wines imported from producers in Piedmont,52 and from neighbouring French producers of speciality products that were not yet established brands; for example, Tafia Martinique was purchased in Bordeaux and sold in Argentina. The vast array of commodities imported from the mother country also extended to “diverse art objects” that were not the result of direct trade by the company, but carried out by the branch staff on behalf of other family members. This shows how the connections between the units of the M&R group became a kind of platform for intensifying multiple trade channels.53

49 Invoice of Latour Neveu & C. Bordeaux, 22 January 1889; “There is a request for information between Buenos Aires and Meletti of Ascoli, presumably the producer of Meletti aniseed liqueur” (AsM&R, Cartas Y Facturas, 4 July 1888; www.meletti.it). 50 Ditta Tassoni di Salò (AsM&R, Cartas Y Facturas, 22 September 1888). 51 For example, the parent company asks the branch to gather information for the

Viterbo company of Turin regarding the Brunelli Gatti wine traders of Buenos Aires (AsM&R, Cartas Y Facturas, 5 June 1889). 52 For example, the sale of renowned Barbera and Nebbiolo wines by Bosso of Mombercelli (AsM&R, Cartas Y Facturas, 11 March 1889). The voluminous commercial correspondence contains many references to trade with wine producers, mostly in Piedmont, but also others. 53 AsM&R, Cartas Y Facturas, 11 March 1889.

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While food products remained the principal sphere of activity, the range broadened increasingly until it included “creative confectionery” to accompany “fig salami from Melini”.54 No less important was the expansion of economic contacts with the entire region. Olive oil from Liguria offered a further opportunity for trade, with the involvement of local producers in the sale of their products in Argentina.55 It should be noted that trade extended to products that the parent company purchased in Italy and sold directly in Argentina, using the branch only for customs procedures; the twofold intention was to establish M&R firmly in Argentina and to carry out a profitable trade in single agricultural products, mainly foodstuffs,56 from all the European regions where M&R operated. In this trade network, the triangulation of transactions between M&R branches offered a profitable opportunity to enhance the single products and to optimise the customs regulations regarding international trade. This is exemplified by the triangulations between the parent company and the two branches in Spain and Argentina. Barrels of white wine57 were sent from the first (Spain) to the second (Argentina), while the extracts for the vermouth came from Italy and were accompanied by large quantities of Marsala.58 The articulated organisational structure of M&R made it possible to exploit sales opportunities with quite complex trade flows. Railway lines and seaports enabled connections with distant markets. Goods arriving from France, or via the Suez Canal from Egypt,59 were shipped from Brindisi to Buenos Aires, covered by insurance policies stipulated in Geneva. This maze of contacts demonstrates the potential of the company’s extensive organisation that was already in operation at the end of the nineteenth century.60 54 AsM&R, Cartas Y Facturas, 26 March 1889. 55 AsM&R, Cartas Y Facturas, 11 September 1890. 56 Wine shipped from Bari to Buenos Aires (AsM&R, Cartas Y Facturas, 10 April

1895). 57 Letter from Flaminio Mezzalana of the Barcelona branch to Giovanni Tamagnone in Buenos Aires (AsM&R, Cartas Y Facturas, 3 February 1896). 58 AsM&R, Cartas Y Facturas, 20 August 1896. 59 AsM&R, Martini in Egitto. 1864–1873, March 2022. 60 For example, an insurance policy stipulated on 20 April 1895 with “La Fenice

Austrica” of Vienna to cover goods arriving from France by railway for shipping from Brindisi aboard a British-registered steamship (AsM&R, Cartas Y Facturas, 20 April 1895).

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The network also served for the recovery of credit from debtors who had moved to Argentina,61 while an even more important service was that it provided information for Italian companies that were “friends” with information “about the solidity, [and] morality” of companies operating in Buenos Aires. The network was also useful in spreading information about the activities of expert financial fraudsters intending to take advantage of Italo-Argentinian companies.

The Stock Case In 1884, in Trieste (at that time inside the Habsburg Empire), Lionello Stock founded a distillery. The new business developed swiftly during the first years, however still remaining a medium-size firm for some decades. The specialisation was a Cognac-style liqueur, obtained by distilling wines from Dalmatia and refined in oak barrels. To distinguish his products from the competition, the founder obtained the recognition of the health properties of his liqueur from the Imperial pharmaceutical service, thus managing to name his first product “Stock Cognac Medicinal”. Thanks to that recognition, before the Great War the Stock liqueur was also able to establish itself among the female public, and it was even exported to some Arab countries, such as Egypt and Palestine. After 1919 and the final peace settlements, Lionello Stock tried to revitalise the “comfort zone” where his business flourished before the war, establishing new branches of his business almost in all the successor states of the Habsburg Empire. In so doing, he was able to maintain the Stock’s market positionality, notwithstanding the political turmoil and the protectionist turn taken by some Central European countries. Anyhow, during the Twenties, it appeared clear that the former Habsburg spaces were too economically feeble and scarcely dynamic to sustain further the development of the Stock spirit firm. The business survived without major problems also the transition from the relatively rich Central European markets to the poorer Italian economic space. When the effects of the 1929 crisis arrived, it became easy to understand that the old structure was unsuitable for the new circumstances, and the company was profoundly reformed, separating the domestic Italian

61 AsM&R, Cartas Y Facturas, 21 March 1889. Many letters contain the same type of information.

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activities from those dedicated to international markets. In 1932, a separate branch of the original business was founded, the “Distillerie Stock S.A.”, whose production was mainly intended for export, especially to Central Europe and inside the Mediterranean area, together with the management of the affiliates operating abroad. More than an organisational change, it was a mutation for the corporate philosophy: from the accentuated centralism that saw Lionello Stock as the final person responsible for almost every aspect of the business, the “Distillerie” moved on to a necessarily decentralised structure, where every single unit operating outside Europe would be fundamentally autonomous, at least in the short run, leaving to the Trieste headquarters the final word only about the more strategic aspects. However, the execution of this reorganisation plan closely followed the “familistic” approach that Lionello had given to the company, even during the phase of its expansion in Central Europe. Continuing a tradition that had already begun with his brothers-in-law, Lionello Stock welcomed the opportunity to test new possibilities, entrusting the four nephews already active abroad with the task of exploring the markets where they resided, with the prospect of enlarging the export spaces for the entire company. The United Kingdom and the USA were the first two markets where expansion was attempted. Alberto Casali, a nephew, was in London, where he married a British national, and the namesake Lionello Stock, another nephew, resided in the USA where he married an American citizen.62 During the second half of the Thirties, two other nephews joined in the USA the young Lionello, the twin brothers Bruno and Mario Morpurgo. The latter three chose New York as a starting point, selling the company’s products especially within the colonies of Italian emigrants. In the USA things went better than in the United Kingdom, and the success in the US market led to the launch of new initiatives also in South America, which however did not bring equally positive results at that time. As World War II began, the United Kingdom and South America proved to market too difficult to immediately accept the Stock liqueurs, while the USA welcomed especially the Stock products with more “Italian” characteristics, such as Vermouth and Marsala, immediately 62 Trieste State Archive [from now on AST], Stock, b. 401 (old catalog) “Distillerie Stock – azienda Jugoslava – Causa contro Zvecevo”.

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demonstrating the need to leave in the background the Central European origins, and to build a new identity for the Stock brand abroad. But this season, marked by promising beginnings and some setbacks, lasted very little (Table 2.1). During the late Fascist years, and especially after the introduction of the racial laws in Italy (1938) the Stock family dispersed abroad, surviving the persecution and World War II, but also gaining new insights about more advanced markets and practices. Moreover, it was the occasion for strengthening the existing business relations and forging new ones. Shortly before the war, Nora Stock left Europe with her family for Brazil, where afterwards they were joined by Vittorio Morpurgo (the founder’s stepchild) and his family. Other members of the very extended Stock family (Lionello had nine siblings) dispersed in other countries (Stock Weinberg, 1988). In the meantime, the management not touched by the Fascist racial laws (all outside the Stock family, and non-Jewish) remained in Trieste. They had to confront multiple crises. They replaced several family members Lionello had appointed in key positions inside the Table 2.1 Stock exports to the Americas (1937–1940). Values in current US Dollars

North America Vermouth Fernet Cognac Spirits Crema Marsala Grappa Total South America Vermouth Spirits Cognac Rhum Fernet Crema Marsala Total

1937

1938

1939

1940 (I semester)

37,729

38,078

3,083 1,165 804

458 707 754

42,781

39,997

18,085 3,345 864 584 1,980 286 25,144

7,137 18,370 320 155 62 710 26,754

1,578 995 265 158 135 139 3,270

915 34 55

402 14

504

23 1,027

61 622 47 1085

61 626

Source AST, Stock, b. 119 (old catalog), f. Distillerie. Statistiche esportazioni. America Nord e Sud (1937–1940)

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management, and since 1938 they tried to resist the German attempt to seize the various branches of the company in central Europe, starting with the Austrian subsidiary after Anschluss and subsequently in the territories gradually occupied. However, they were able to keep the business going, safeguarding especially the production lines and the company’s financial assets, paving the way for a quick recovery when the war ended.63 When the time came for reconstruction, these experiences proved to be extremely important. After the World War II, the company’s material and financial recovery followed a very peculiar path, having to face multiple issues at the same time: the physical reconstruction of the buildings, damaged by the wartime bombings, the loss of the now-across-theIron-curtain subsidiaries, the repositioning of the brand, and even the establishment of a new equilibrium inside the Stock family itself, after the sudden death of the founder in 1948. So, the company governance was forced to pass through a season of extremely fast changes, without a clear vision for the succession (García-Álvarez & López-Sintas, 2006), abandoning a more than six decades old very centralised managerial tradition. Stock spirits businesses confronted this dynamic scenario leaning on a quite articulated organisational structure, derived both from business choices and family constraints (Hougaz, 2015). The founder’s seat as President was briefly taken by his brother Gino, who died in 1950, and later by his other stepchild Giorgio Morpurgo, who died in 1956. Finally, Mario Morpurgo (the son of one of Lionello’s sisters) was recalled from New York, and he remained President for more than four decades, until the business was sold, and the family ceded the company’s ownership. Soon after his arrival in Trieste, Mario Morpurgo adopted a new strategy, drawing a dividing line between the European activities and those outside the continent. Since 1958, the former “Italian” branch, Stock SpA focused on the countries that were about to form the first European Economic Community, effectively extending the organisation and structures of the Italian part of the family business within the new free market spaces, while the “Distillerie” and the truly international structure expanded and restructured outside Europe.64

63 AST, Stock, b. 154 (old catalog), Distillerie Stock SA, Bilancio 1938. 64 AST, Stock, b. 259 (old catalog), Stock SpA, Bilancio 1958.

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All in all, the organisational structure designed in order to survive the difficulties of the 1930s proved to be very effective in taking advantage of the opportunities of the 1950s, at the same time preserving the delicate equilibrium inside the intricate web of family ties and preserving the business’ profitability. After the Second World War, the company “Distillerie Stock” opened new branches in the USA, Israel, Australia and New Zealand, and subsequently in Germany and Latin America. Actually, at the international level, the “Distillerie Stock” Company was entrusted with multiple objectives: expanding the outlet markets, renewing contacts in Europe and the Mediterranean area, but also creating completely new structures in countries where some members of the family had taken refuge during the war. When the existence of favourable market opportunities was recognised, the family network activated, starting a process of exploration of the real market conditions. Every time, the first step was the search for connections with local businesspeople already active in the spirits market, as shopkeepers, wholesalers and representatives, privileging the ones of Italian origin. Subsequently, if the family members believed they had found promising areas for the Stock products consumption, the central headquarter in Trieste authorised, and in some cases financed, the opening of subsidiaries, which in the best cases became autonomous companies, able to do business on their own. Somehow, the very strict interconnection between the family structure and the companies’ management accelerated the entire process. The family representative who had already acquired some experience inside the new market received at first an assignment as a plenipotentiary commercial representative, with the task of trying to gain buyers for the Stock products. If the first phase proved positive, then the second step was to find a local partner, finally establishing local company branches and possibly plants for an autonomous Stock production, as happened in Israel, Australia and New York. Immediately after the war, the search for new markets went along with the re-establishment of the connections already activated in the second half of the 1930s. During the years 1946–1948 explorative missions were sent in Central and South America, with positive results in Mexico and especially in Argentina, where a company’s general agency was set up. Since the first results were positive, with a positive outlook for future

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developments,65 Argentina was chosen as a sort of sub-subsidiary for the entire Latin America, depending on the well-established North American subsidiary, active in New York. The favourable development of the new American network rapidly assumed paramount importance, since the affiliated companies active in the part of Europe which remained under Soviet influence gradually fell outside the parent company’s control, until one after the other they were nationalised, without compensation. For the “Distillerie Stock”, which until then had seen its reference market in the former Habsburg spaces, it was a blow more serious than the wartime destructions, because it threatened to nullify the company’s very reason for existence, which was created precisely to manage those markets, leaving Italy to the “Stock SpA” Company. Therefore, seeking compensation elsewhere became vital both for the business and for those ramifications of the family that had been assigned ownership stakes in the Stock business’s international assets. Back at the beginning of the 1930s, dividing the property was for Lionello a way to specialise and improve the quality of the managerial resources available. On the other hand, it was also a tool, aimed to foster the different branches of the family to find an agreement in the overall management of the family’s industrial heritage which, despite the functional subdivision, required numerous synergies between its two halves. After his death, and facing the serious problems that arose by the end of the 1940s, that structure proved to be effective in generating new resources (especially human capital, chosen among people belonging to the second generation) to which to entrust the task of finding new territories where to re-establish the business, and new organisational schemes to rely on. In fact, within the “Distillerie Stock”, a new strategic managerial approach emerged during the 1950s. The main aim was the strengthening of the company inside the dollar area, first of all, the Americas, but also Australia and other non-European markets. Towards the remaining European continental markets, the company proved to be much less dynamic, and in this case the commercial attitude was substantially linked to the maintenance of the acquired positions, with a sort of rentier disposition. 65 At that time, in Argentina wine and wine-related markets were already developed (Stein, 2014).

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From the financial point of view, the company began to reap more and more abundant fruits from the foreign subsidiaries, especially in the form of dividends. The item “Dividends and Interests” inside the balance sheets suddenly jumped from one to four million lire in 1950, and then rapidly grew to 13 million in 1951, 41 in 1957 and 51 in 1961. Proportionally, the resources that flowed from the subsidiaries’ network represented 13% of net profits in 1946, 57% in 1950, 99% in 1957 and 58% in 1961. It was mainly thanks to the resources coming from abroad that the expansion of production during the 1950s was financed, triggering the virtuous circuit that would have led to an increase in sales abroad, an improvement in economies of scale, the consequent repositioning inside the foreign markets (thanks to relatively lower prices compared to the French competitors) and therefore the definitive launch of the Stock brand overseas. The years when the Presidency passed from Giorgio (the founder’s stepchild) to Mario Murpurgo (a nephew) were of the utmost importance also for the development of a much more dynamic approach to business management. Between 1954 and 1956 the value of the company assets increased by 89%, total income by 118% and net profit by over 500%. During the second half of the 1950s, the company came close to the full utilisation of its production capacities (so much so that production increased very little in the following years), managing to place almost all of its production on the new markets acquired after the war. In practice, after the three brief post-war presidencies, whose main purpose was substantially the “Distillerie”’s material reconstruction along the tradition and according to pre-war models,66 Mario Morpurgo began not only to imagine wider horizons, but also a transformation of the Stock’s products nature, also transferring the image of Stock spirits to new markets as a refined consumption for the wealthy, but within the reach of a wider audience, so as to become a widespread habit even among the middle class. From a geographical point of view, the 1950s were a mixture of ups and downs. Argentina remained a very promising market, were it not for the considerable institutional difficulties, starting from a protectionist turn at the beginning of the decade to continuing with growing concerns 66 For example, still in the 1950s the company purchased raw Slavonian oak directly, to transform it into barrels within its own shops, thus directly controlling even this apparently marginal aspect in the management of raw materials. AST, Stock, folder 120.

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related to political stability (Belini & Korol, 2020). However, at least, the agency in Argentina acted as a reference centre for other initiatives. In partnership with a former employee who had moved to Venezuela, directly from Trieste the “Distillerie” contributed to the foundation of the “Distribudora Venezolana de los productos Stock”, described as performing a “calm but continuous” work.67 Gradually, and every time in close connection with the local Italian communities, the Stock business found new distributors in Central America, gaining access to one country after the other. Rapidly, the USA became the most important foreign market, moving across the Atlantic the gravitational centre of the company’s interests. The early optimistic approach was overshadowed by a series of political steps, which first made it more difficult, and progressively almost prohibitive, to export products in Latin America. Argentina was considered a closed market by the second half of the 1950s, and gradually a wave of protectionist import barriers erected in almost all the countries endangered the export possibilities, where the company had already expanded its distribution network.68 Where the customs duties were not prohibitive, monetary instability made managing the business difficult, mainly due to the distance and the difficulty of efficiently planning sales campaigns (and prices) in advance. Despite everything, the American prospects continued to be considered positively, so much so that in 1958, on the one hand, the experience in Venezuela ended, but a new concessionaire was opened in Mexico, the “Stock de Mexico”, again following the local partnership scheme, which however was carefully supervised by the central headquarters in Trieste. As had also happened in Europe in the 1930s, the American experiences during the 1950s also reflected an interweaving of economic interests and family structure. Mario Morpurgo’s arrival to the presidency in 1956 was certainly a recognition of the good work done in New York, but also a precise commitment by the rest of the shareholders (all close relatives) towards an expansion inside the dollar area. A similar commitment was confirmed by the fact that in 1959 Mario’s twin brother Bruno Morpurgo Morel (he changed name during the war) was co-opted into

67 AST, Stock, f. 155 (old catalog), Distillerie Stock SA, Bilancio 1951. 68 See all the Company’s Balance Sheets series: AST, Stock, ff. 155–159 (old catalog).

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the board of directors, while remaining in New York and rarely participating in Board meetings and Shareholders’ Assemblies in Trieste. He was a shareholder of the “Distillerie” since 1946, inheriting his father’s shares, and in 1959, to make room for him inside the Council, the number of Councillors was exceptionally raised, clearly crediting the New York office with a status almost equal to a Trieste department. Around the consolidated presence in the USA revolved a small constellation of initiatives in Central and South America, all evaluated very positively at the outset, but with growing difficulties over the years. Argentina was the first experiment, when Venezuela, Mexico, Chile and Brazil followed in time.69 Each experience basically repeated the same evolution. After a first evaluation of the situation, and the creation of an initial network of local retailers and importers of Italian origin, the New York agency took the initiative, with Trieste giving its assent, offering products and resources and then evaluating the results, until inevitably registering the lack of the minimum necessary conditions and ratifying the closure of the experience within a few years. Surprisingly, during this season, despite the rapid turnover of individual initiatives, the American markets proved to be a good business after all, absorbing a good amount of export production and familiarising local consumers with Stock products. It is not easy to follow this evolution of corporate relationships, but it seems to understand that despite the relatively short life of the individual initiatives, the rapid opening up of other opportunities kept the flow of products and their sales high, in such a way that allowed the New York subsidiary to function more autonomously, as a Stock redistribution centre for some small countries in Central and South America. By shortening the communication lines, it became easier to control the markets and keep export flows active (Table 2.2). Looking at the company accounts from a longer-term perspective, 1954 was the turning point: a large increase in exports, especially to the USA, but we don’t know if those products were actually sold inside the USA or were re-exported towards other parts of the Americas, as seems very likely. The whole structure had started to function at full speed, triggering a positive circuit: higher sales, higher revenues, a decrease in financial exposure and an increase in the value of foreign branches (with a revaluation of their shares) and their profitability, with an increase in 69 The economic environment was favourable at that time (Müller & Sandoval-Arzaga, 2021).

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Table 2.2 Company’s profitability according to the auditor’s reports and estimated operational results. Years 1946–1971. Values in current Italian lire

1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971

Total assets

Total liabilities

Total income

Net income

Operating result as a % of the total assets

39,559,039 78,789,261 135,588,319 295,593,243 320,041,503 328,510,381 354,135,420 371,264,032 446,404,877 545,004,106 845,021,883 1,021,492,582 1,069,133,896 1,008,973,056 1,273,848,573 1,554,353,352 1,699,567,665 1,733,453,447 2,311,350,417 2,721,669,852 2,916,060,684 3,057,029,477 2,555,424,656 2,578,619,630 2,933,201,457 3,285,559,649

36,985,339 76,764,618 13,187,1362 292,182,638 312,787,767 322,325,732 353,056,133 363,493,324 437,752,236 525,106,461 792,624,304 979,251,968 1,025,640,805 960,367,639 1,187,677,465 1,467,070,731 1,626,873,920 1,681,193,977 2,215,344,512 2,589,239,635 2,767,432,134 2,899,687,775 2,374,287,424 2,387,753,498 2,725,188,179 3,083,464,180

12,686,907 17,541,552 28,337,926 30,705,956 44,325,080 46,835,394 43,142,457 50,235,561 56,855,531 90,018,116 123,962,665 126,841,219 152,181,613 152,883,571 210,646,177 241,308,941 – 276,328,737 298,600,453 414,729,707 422,943,467 468,700,683 503,242,399 561,604,377 607,044,146 640,478,878

2,573,700 2,024,644 3,716,957 3,410,605 7,253,736 6,184,649 1,079,287 7,770,708 8,652,641 19,897,645 52,397,579 42,240,614 43,493,091 48,605,417 86,171,108 87,026,320 72,693,745 52,259,470 96,005,905 132,430,217 148,628,550 157,341,702 181,137,232 190,866,132 208,013,278 202,095,469

6.51 2.57 2.74 1.15 2.27 1.88 0.30 2.09 1.94 3.65 6.20 4.14 4.07 4.82 6.76 5.62 4.28 3.01 4.15 4.87 5.1 5.15 7.09 7.40 7.09 6.15

Source AST, Stock, ff. 155–158, “Distillerie Stock” Balance sheets, various years

dividends transferred to the mother company in Trieste. The departure from the Central European “comfort zone”, and the reinvention of the brand as a champion of the Italian tradition had not only put the company back on track but had projected it towards new growth horizons at quite unexpected speed.

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Towards Mass Production The 1960s were certainly a golden moment for the “Distillerie Stock”. Production doubled between 1962 and 1966 and doubled again between 1966 and 1971. The share capital increased in the same years from 200 to 625 million Italian lire, and when the share capital stabilised on that level (from 1965 onwards) reserves increased steadily, from 170 million lire in 1965 to 710 million in 1971, while dividends were liberally distributed to shareholders initially equal to 9% (from 1964 to 1967) and later for 10% of the share capital. During this truly exceptional season, both the profitability of the Trieste activities and the profits coming from the foreign affiliates were high, especially after an agreement with an important local distributor had made Stock products a commodity available everywhere in the USA, and not only in New York or where the Italian national communities were present. The agreement with Schenley Industries Co. allowed “Distillerie Stock” to distribute its products in 87 countries in 1967, exceeding one hundred in the early 1970s. During the same years, besides the ongoing business with Schenley, “Distillerie” did not entirely renounce to develop an independent presence in Latin America, setting up a subsidiary in Brazil by the end of the 1960s, which would later expand into Chile. The Brazilian endeavour was considered so promising that it deserved special treatment: a member of the family was sent directly to follow the deal closely, chosen from among the young people already active in New York. The newly nominated manager was Fred Leon Segal, grandson of the younger among Lionello’s sisters, the first from a new generation and also the first who was experienced outside the headquarters in Trieste. The Brazilian-Chilean business took root well, and quickly became autonomous, contributing to a definitive change of nature for the entire Stock structure. In 1971, President Mario Morpurgo’s twin brother, Bruno Morel, was appointed Vice President of the “Distillerie” in Trieste, while remaining physically in New York. So, “Distillerie Stock” became something like a two headquartered company. These changes reflected the enterprise’s excellent performance during the 1960s, but they also froze it into patterns that would prove dangerous in the 1970s. Operating in the consumer discretionary sector, the Stock group was particularly exposed to foreign currency instabilities, especially since Stock

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never produced a consolidated balance sheet, or an effective managing coordination, for having centralised and verifiable control of the entire governance structure. The company’s internal relations were kept alive and functioning more thanks to the family ties among managers, even when the matter was the development of the company’s foreign offshoots. Blindly following a tradition that was to prove increasingly ineffective, management’s behaviours and governance strategic choices were made within family dynamics, while the company administrative structure took care of the short-term matters, such as the manufacturing processes and the distribution of the products, together with central accounting and the redistribution of financial resources and profits. In practice, the elaboration of the strategies and their implementation took place at a level different and from that of their application, with a subordinated (and almost ineffective) role reserved to the one in which the results achieved were materially evaluated, and any short-term corrective actions adopted. The flows of information were frequently only at a personal and informal level, being the top management more sensible to the family matters than to the manufacturing routines (Morpurgo, 2000). Over the long run, the Stock system had proved resilient in getting the company to survive the world wars and the loss of entire areas of business. But when the reference scenario changed too quickly, the Stock system was not effective, and errors turned first into a reduction of market shares, and subsequently into actual losses. The shift in the strategy was closely connected with a deep change in the approach practices adopted to enter a new market. Before the very profitable deal with Schenley, Stock representatives essentially became part of the local community of Italian immigrants, and from within those communities they began to expand the circuit of buyers and consumers of Stock products. It happened in Latin America, but also in other very important circumstances for the company, such as Australia and New Zealand (Morpurgo, 2000). By abandoning the gradual construction of its market spaces and the personalisation of human relationships, the Stock group completely subordinated itself to the dynamics of the market, increasing its revenues while losing its identity. At the company level, profits remained the most dynamic factor, particularly the net profits, which in fact turned into dividends for the shareholders, in remuneration for the Board of Directors and in reserves, used systematically for increasing the company’s share capital (Table 2.3).

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Table 2.3 Distillerie Stock: indices of the balance sheet data, 1961–1971 (1961 = 100, unless otherwise indicated) 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 Inventory products and raw materials Reserves (total) Share capital Taxes Gross profits Administration expenses Total income Gross industrial profit Net income Overall activities Total liabilities Coupons and dividends Payables to banks Securities and equity investments

100

127

152

205

242

250

234

273

287

390

493

100

23

36

37

77

109

147

189

239

260

321

100 – 100 100

295 – 112 132

300 100 118 157

300 87 129 142

313 150 153 186

313 173 187 154

313 278 198 157

313 265 241 181

313 322 241 194

313 321 266 228

313 286 278 278

100 –

0 100

115 106

124 116

172 137

175 167

194 177

209 215

233 215

252 238

265 249

100 100

84 109

60 112

110 149

152 175

171 188

181 197

208 164

219 166

239 189

232 211

100

111

115

151

176

189

198

162

163

186

210

100

100

100

105

92

93

92

85

98

114

126

100

49

119

116

121

123

77

106

52

98

111

100

100

99

99

75

79

74

74

83

90

96

Source Balance Sheets, various years. Original data are in current Italian lire

These positive results can be explained in part by a radical change in the family connection with the company. Since 1964, when Bruno Morpurgo Morel signed in New York the agreement with the Schenley Imports Company, the main aim was to reach a significant increase in exports, relying on one of the major sales organisations in the USA. Moreover, the agreement would extend to all the other countries where Schenley was active, so creating a new, centralised and efficient network for the distribution of the Stock products in Central and Southern America. The Stock-Schenley agreement took on the form of a real alliance, since Schenley was allowed to become a shareholder of the “Distillerie Stock”, which for the first and only time opened the shareholding to someone

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outside the restricted and privileged circle of the family members who owned the company.70 In the short run, as the business results easily demonstrate, the alliance was very beneficial, but the company lost the possibility to have direct knowledge of the markets where its products were sold, and even the Italian aura so carefully constructed during the years gradually vanished, since Schenley actually distributed several different brands, using an approach to business totally devoid of national references, apart from those remained written over the bottle labels, in Italy as in every market where the Stock group was active.

The Final Chapter For the new managerial organisation, the moment of truth came in August 1971, with the sudden and unanticipated devaluation of the US dollar. The top management feared “unfavourable repercussions which today have become extremely serious in the sales sector, as well as in the economic one”.71 For governing their businesses, the enlarged Stock family has created a complex interweaving of parallel and interdependent lines of governance (Koeberle-Schmid, 2008). There were many “horizontal” exchanges of information and personnel between the different companies, but the only real connection was at the top, in the person of the President and his closest collaborators, often relatives, since the long era when the founder was the deus ex machina for everything. As property passed from one generation to the other, the increasingly diluted ability to match the evolution of the business with the stability within the family made the corporate vision and mission less and less unitary. Top management increasingly confided in routines and in a business-as-usual approach, losing the ability to evolve keeping pace with increasingly rapid changes in the context (Colli, 2003). The main interest was family control, then the company as such. At the end, only the brand remained, when it was sold, at the beginning of the Nineties.

70 AST, Stock, b. 158 (old catalog), minutes of several shareholders’ meetings held in 1964. 71 AST, Stock, f. 159, Distillerie Stock SA, Bilancio 1972.

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Starting in 1972, two trends began to take shape within the company’s ownership: an “extractive” one (Carney & Dieleman, 2023), focused on the short term, and a “strategic” one with a broader and longer-term vision. The first won, which led to a progressive reduction in investments, and a retrenchment inside the most important markets, in an attempt to keep the company’s profitability at the highest possible levels. Along this way, the 1970s were marked by the slow erosion of corporate assets, along with managerial sclerotisation, with very little projection towards the future and a weak perception of the dangers and threats of the present. Across the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, some attempts were made to reverse the decline, but in the end the family definitively closed the door to the last effort to revive the business with a fresh capital injection. The “extractive” fraction prevailed, and Fred Leon Segal was summoned in Trieste from South America (Morpurgo, 2000). The Segal’s new course envisaged a reduction of assets, liquidation of part of the peripheral activities, renunciation of some businesses that would have required investments and a return to assets thanks to these liquidations. In simple words, the downsizing of the core business to the lowest level of guaranteed profitability. More and more business lines were put on sale until the entire company was sold to a German multinational in 1995. During its “golden decade”, the Stock’s business geographical expansion paved the way for the first examples of consumerism in many markets. Alcoholic beverages played a crucial role, as vehicles of the new forms of sociability but also as symbols of the new status reached by the consumers. Sometimes, the aura surrounding the drink was more important than the product and its material consumption. As some firms did, Stock understood the double nature of the spirits consumption, and very precociously (and also very effectively) was able to present to the customers both levels of alcoholic drinking at once: a product with distinctive organoleptic characteristics (smell, taste, persistence, etc.) but also the idea of doing something more than drinking alcohol: to be part of a lifestyle, a tradition, a way of living. During its happiest moments, Stock was part of this movement, mixing in a very creative way its non-Italian origins, the Italian tradition and the ability of some members of the family to embed themselves inside very different and quite peculiar social environments, as the one created by the Italian communities abroad.

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The Stock success is remarkable because it may be an example of how a half-breed tradition was able to create and structure entirely new markets for selling their industrial and mass-produced version of traditional products. From the business point of view, in the spirits case, it was essentially a process of commodification of the renovated social selfperception developed by the newly enriched urban lower middle-class people.

Conclusions Step by step, these two cases show two aspects of building Italian business abroad: the Italian way to build up a mass market for alcoholic beverages, and the Italian footprint over the spirits’ global market. The first observation concerns precisely the companies studied. Their distinctive business approaches in the Americas offer further insights into the institutional architecture with which a latecomer country like Italy promoted distinctive rooting styles of its businesses during the age of early globalisation for M&R, and when globalisation was fully developed for Stock. M&R stood out for the precociousness with which it decided to set up its own production branch, after having quickly assessed the opportunities on the local market. Thus, a multinational company was born at the same time as the main European experiences (Colpan & CuervoCazurra, 2020; Da Silva Lopes, 2007; Jones, 2013). The choice arose from the desire to take advantage of market opportunities that went beyond internal limits, but not in a temporal sequence of gradual evolution, then again in the search for the optimal dimensions allowing it to establish itself as a distinct brand of alcoholic beverages. A strategic aim that required a widespread presence in the crucial points of consumption, to be achieved through dedicated human settlements. The migrations of some “family members”, as the Argentine case shows, was the founding factor of the success achieved (Scarzanella, 1983). The Martini community outlines a sort of regulation of emigration based on bonds of belonging, which extend to different degrees: from the corporate community to the ethnic community of Buenos Aires. These ties are innervated in systematic professional relationships and through the thread of “recommendations” they come to unite the ends of the migratory journey. The case helps to understand how the apparently anonymous migratory movements were instead influenced by the

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consolidation of ties aimed at replicating cultures, personal and social relationships inspired by the starting heritage. Quite differently, the Stock case illustrates the way how the company took advantage of already existing and functioning networks, for eminently commercial purposes. The integration of Stock officials within the local communities was functional to the sale of the products, and they remained active as long as the market conditions were profitable, but not beyond. Moreover, during the 1950s and the 1960s transcontinental mobility was easy, and the overseas experiences became an opportunity to build a solid operational background for the new managers, destined to climb the positions of responsibility inside the company, as well as their leadership functions within the family. When new, more effective and more profitable marketing techniques were adopted, the final direct ties between the company and the local Italian communities were dropped, transforming Stock liqueurs from messengers of Italianità to ordinary consumer goods. The results of our research can outline two examples of business activities inside the international markets through a poorly hierarchical structure, coordinated mainly by the internal relationships of the owner’s family. These two companies were effective in their attempt to project themselves at a global level, for such time maintaining their family business nature, surviving even in periods of strong protectionist closure, but in the Stock case collapsing when the family constraints were too strong to enable an adaptation to the fast-changing economic environment they lived in. Notwithstanding, the two companies remain a remarkable example of how much Made in Italy is the result of a long, and sometimes not linear, process of historical sedimentation. Both brands still survive today, albeit in different forms. They are still very well-known globally, even if their stories prove that the unifying function of the different Italian communities they had performed during their best moments has varied greatly over time.

References Arru, A., Caglioti, D. L., & Ramella, F. (Eds.). (2008). Donne e uomini migranti. Storie e geografie tra breve e lunga distanza. Donzelli. Belini, C., & Korol, J. C. (2020). Historia económica de la Argentina en los siglos XX y XXI . Siglo Veintiuno Editores. Bertagna F. (2020). Italiani in Argentina, ieri e oggi. Pellegrini.

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Carney, M., & Dieleman, M. (2023). Business Families: Promising Future Research Directions. In M. Carney & M. Dieleman (Eds.), De Gruyter Handbook of Business Families (pp. 563–576). De Gruyter. Colli, A. (2003). The History of Family Business, 1850–2000. Cambridge University Press. Colpan, A. M., & Cuervo-Cazurra, A. (2020). Business Groups. In T. Da Silva Lopes, C. Lubinski, & H. J. S. Tworek (Eds.), Companion to the Makers of Global Business (pp. 234–248). Routledge. Da Silva Lopes, T. (2007). Global Brands. The Evolution of Multinationals in Alcoholic Beverages. Cambridge University Press. Devoto, F. J. (2003). A History of Spanish and Italian Migration to the South Atlantic Regions of the Americas. In S. L. Baily & E. J. Miguez (Eds.), Mass Migration to Modern Latin America (pp. 29–51). Scholarly Resources. Devoto, F. J. (2007). Storia degli italiani in Argentina. Donzelli. Diccionario Biográfico Italo-Argentino. (1976). Associación Dante Alighieri. Einaudi, L. (1900). Un principe mercante. Studio sulla espansione coloniale italiana. Fratelli Bocca. Fauri, F. (2015). Storia economica delle migrazioni italiane. Il Mulino. García-Álvarez, E., & López-Sintas, J. (2006). Founder–Successor’s Transition: A Model of Coherent Value Transmission Paths. In P. Z. Poutziouris, K. X. Smyrnios, & S. B. Klein (Eds.), Handbook of Research on Family Business (pp. 237–250). Edward Elgar. Hougaz, L. (2015). Entrepreneurs in Family Business Dynasties. Stories of ItalianAustralian Family Businesses Over 100 Years. Springer. Jones, G. (2013). Entrepreneurship and Multinationals: Global Business and Making of the Modern World. Edward Elgar. Koeberle-Schmid, A. (2008). Family Business Governance. Aufsichtsgremium und Familienrepräsentanz. Fachverlage. Lavista, F. (2015). Market and Operational Knowledge in Expanding from One Emerging Country to Another: Pirelli in Argentina, 1900–1945. Management & Organizational History, 10(2), 136–152. Libert, G. (2014). Torinesi nella Pampa. L’emigrazione dal Piemonte e dalla provincia di Torino in Argentina. Atene del Canavese. Morpurgo, F. (2000). My Life in the Italian Brandy Business: Stock ’84. Career, Loves, Travels All Over the World. Parnaso. Müller, C. G., & Sandoval-Arzaga, F. (2021). Family Business Heterogeneity in Latin America: A Historical Perspective. Palgrave Macmillan. Ortalda, M. (2005). La storia di un marchio nelle carte d’archivio. In N. Orengo (Ed.), Mondo Martini. Viaggio nell’unicità di uno stile (pp. 19–24). Sorì. Piluso, G. (1996). Le banche miste italiane in Sud America: Strategie, mercati e organizzazioni (1903–1933). Archivi e Imprese, 13, 7–54.

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Scarzanella, E. (1983). Italiani d’Argentina. Storie di contadini, industriali e missionari italiani in Argentina 1850–1912. Marsilio. Stein, S. (2014). Essence and Identity. Transformations in Argentine Wine, 1880– 2010. In G. K. Pierce & Á. Toxqui (Eds.), Alcohol in Latin America. A Social and Cultural History (pp. 210–241). University of Arizona Press. Stock Weinberg, L. (1988). L’anello—The Ring. B&M Fachin. Vaquero Pineiro, M. (2019). The Italian Wine in Argentina (1861–1914): Market, State Intervention and Wineries. Storia Economica, XXII (2), 329– 358.

CHAPTER 3

Italians in Southern Brasil: Tradition and Innovation Vania Beatriz Merlotti Herédia

Introduction Italian emigration to Brasil played a key role in the country’s economic development. In 1808, the arrival of the royal family to Brasil changed the economic organisation of the country and, after independence from Portugal, there was a rapid development and the search for political emancipation. After independence, the policy of the imperial government aimed to occupy parts of the territory with immigrant labour in order to defend its borders and develop centres that could regionally supply the population. Brasil had a structure based on latifundia, monoculture and slavery and the Empire’s policy of migration and colonisation was to promote the occupation of the territory with white, semi-specialised labour that could bring an improvement in the living conditions of the population. After the Land Law of 1850, which modified access to land, the emigration movement grew to the benefit of the country, since there

V. B. M. Herédia (B) University of Caxias do Sul, Caxias do Sul, Brazil e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. Fauri and D. Mantovani (eds.), Past and Present Migration Challenges, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39431-7_3

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was the possibility of the emigrant to become a landowner. Access to the land structure, based on donations, was replaced by the purchase criterion. This Law, which changed the property regime, took place at the same time as the enactment of another Law, the Free Womb Law, which strengthened the abolitionist movement and heralded the modification of the work regime. Colonisation was a form of occupation of territory. The concept of colony means “a more or less vast area of virgin land that is destined for colonisation” (Sabbatini, 1975, XXXIII). The division of lots, made by the government that sold the land and defined the criteria, established the rules of occupation of the colonial lots. The design of each colony provided a layout which was followed when the lots were divided. The Colony was divided “into leagues and each league had a number of colonial plots. The extension of lots in the Italian colony could not exceed 25 hectares of land. The lot had the shape of an elongated rectangle, measuring 200 to 250 meters width and 1,000 to 1,250 meters long” (Manfroi, 1975, 115). The lots should have access to water and when this was not possible, the price of the lot was cheaper. The colonial lot was “the basic unit of land division and the lots were numbered inside each line. The line was the organic unit of the settlement” (Manfroi, 1975, 115) and was also called “dash”. It was a way of classifying the land and locating lots. Each line had a path or road, which on the left and the right were, respectively, arranged two series of lots in parallel vertical succession. “The lines or dashes then constituted the colonial settlement system in relation to the territory and represented also an internal communication system in rural areas” (Sabbatini, 1975, XXXV). The formation of the Italian colonisation zone in Southern Brasil “was linked to the Land Law, since it established the criteria for structuring agricultural colonies, as well as the legitimation of existing sesmarias ”1 (Herédia, 2017, 38). The government of the Province of Rio Grande do Sul, interested in occupying part of its territory in the South, granted land to emigrants who wished to settle in that territory. It was a way to encourage targeted immigration. The concession of 36 square leagues of land in the Province of Rio Grande do Sul in 1848 was regulated 1 Sesmaria is a system of division of public lands, inherited by the Portuguese government. It was a plot of land distributed by the king of Portugal with the aim of occupying the land. Those who received the land had the responsibility of cultivating it.

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by the legislation established from 1850 onwards, between “São João de Montenegro, São Sebastião do Caí, Taquara do Mundo Novo and São Francisco de Paula de Cima da Serra” (Herédia, 2017, 40). With the Land Law of 1850, the provincial government established criteria for the purchase of colonial lots, which ranged from price, conditions of sale, size and measurement of lots and forbade slave labour in colonial lots. In 1870, requests for more land to continue the colonisation project were granted when the first provincial colonials were created and, from 1875, a significant number of Italian emigrants from Northern Italy settled in this region. The first four colonies were: Conde d’Eu, Princesa Isabel, Fundos de Nova Palmira (Caxias ) and Silveira Martins. Thus, the objective of the study is to analyse the initial forms of the land occupation process of emigrants in the economic formation of the Italian Cultural Region of the State of Rio Grande do Sul. In the middle of the nineteenth century, the imperial government had an interest to occupy the South of Brasil with free, white labour in order to build up agricultural nuclei and defend the territory. Agricultural colonies founded after 1870 in the Northeast of the State had a fast economic development. The long road taken by the immigrants shows that they knew how to take advantage of the opportunities they were given by the Brasilian society. Forest clearing, extractive activity as a means of subsistence, subsistence farming, the development of agricultural trade and colonial trade were actions triggered by immigrants that allowed the organisation of agricultural colonies. The study takes as reference the Caxias colony, one of the four official Italian colonies, located in the Northeast of the State of Rio Grande do Sul, promoted by the imperial government in the nineteenth century. The prosperity of the colony led to it being called the “Pearl of the Colonies” for the economic results it demonstrated, marked by the immigrant’s ability to work. The implemented colonial system, based on small property and family work, was used for the development of colonial centres with the aim of occupying the land, stimulating polyculture, whitening the race and making use of specialised labour. The Caxias colony, initially called Campo dos Bugres because it was an ancient area of indigenous occupation, was located in vacant lands in the Province of Rio Grande do Sul and later would be the economic centre of the Italian communities, located between the communities of origin and the Campos de Cima da Serra, the path where drovers took their cattle for resale in the centre of the country.

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Italian emigration in Brasil had a visible impact on Brasilian society as emigrants found favourable conditions and carried in their luggage work habits that made a difference in the occupation of the territory. Studies of Italian emigration in Southern Brasil allow us to elaborate premises about the economic evolution of the Italian colonisation zone. These studies show that the Italian colonisation zone had rapid economic development due to the colonisation and immigration Policies installed by the imperial government in the nineteenth century. Premises were used to guide the study in questioning how the transformation of Brasilian society occurred after the arrival of Italian emigrants in vacant lands of the Brasilian State and the objective criteria of this process. The premises were: (i) according to the colonisation policy of the Brasilian government, preference for emigrants who had experience as peasants; (ii) many of the immigrants had experiences in the areas of origin and in temporary emigration, they carried different knowledge that made the difference in the production of equipment, tools, instruments and utensils in the rural community that they settled; (iii) the craft activities developed in the Italian colony and the demand of the occupation of the territory promoted the specialisation of agricultural production. The origin of the emigrants and the connection with local productions established relationships with specific knowledge transfers. The specialised and semispecialised workforce was a way of transferring know-how that marked the economic activities in this region. The diversity of these activities was one of the embryos of the industry in the region. Thus, the present study2 is divided into two parts: the first deals with the context of Italian emigration and immigration in the South of Brasil and the second with the transfer of specialised knowledge (tradition and innovation) of these emigrants in the economic formation of the colonial centres in the South from Brasil.

Context of Italian Emigration in Southern Brasil The Brasilian colonisation policy effectively began with the arrival of the Portuguese royal family to Brasil in 1808, when the colonisation process took on an innovative character, as the proposal was to renovate 2 This research used the Book of Registration of Industries and Professions of Caxias colony (1892–1945) located in the João Spadari Adami Public Archive. The bibliographical research made use of the official documents of the colony.

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existing structures with European labour. The colonisation proposal also intended to create economic, political and social conditions, based on a new mentality that would allow the country to overcome all the obstacles arising from its initial formation, sustained by the tripod: latifundia, monoculture and slavery. The colonisation and immigration policies had a series of objectives. Among them: the replacement of slave labour by free labour, wage labour due to the expansion of the abolitionist movement and the implementation of free labour in order to develop cities, stimulate trade and encourage the creation of infrastructure services with a view to promoting economic development. The founding of agricultural centres was an important objective for supplying the internal market that was formed as the country grew. For some provinces, the State provided for the inclusion of immigrant labour, which served the interests of the imperial government in developing an agricultural colonisation that would found agricultural centres, characterised by polyculture. It was the case of the Province of São Pedro do Rio Grande do Sul that received German immigrants from 1824 and, from 1875, Italian immigrants. The experience of colonisation by the Germans in Rio Grande do Sul encouraged the provincial government to invest in the colonisation project. However, the experience of the Germans was different from the Italians. The first occupied fertile areas, close to rivers and with an extension of land that allowed intensive agriculture. The Italians were inserted in the mountain region, where the size of the lots was smaller, and not all the land was suitable for plantations. However, for Italian emigrants, the possibility of becoming small landowners was a socioeconomic condition that they did not have where they came from and they saw in it an opportunity for social ascension. Italian emigrants played different roles, based on the location in which they were inserted. Those who remained in São Paulo at first had the role of replacing slave labour on the coffee farms and in Rio Grande do Sul they were the founders of the colonial nuclei. The colonisation in Rio Grande do Sul was founded under the regime of small property. In 1824, the Germans received colonial lots of 77 hectares. In 1848, the colonial lots were reduced to 48 hectares to guarantee agriculture. In 1875, the lots were changed to 25 hectares (Roche, 1969). The Charter of Colonisation of the Province of São Pedro do Rio Grande do Sul (Porto, 1934) established the fundamental principles of

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colonisation and defined that colonisation would be done through the sale of land. Emigrants could cultivate the land but could not have help from slaves. The action of Italian emigrants was decisive for the economic growth of the region of Italian colonisation in Southern Brasil. Many declared themselves farmers since the colonisation and immigration policies favoured emigrants who founded colonial agricultural centres with the aim of developing polyculture and supplying emigrants with products necessary for their subsistence. However, the trajectory of these emigrants made it possible to prove that they brought with them a series of diversified artisanal technical skills, recorded by the various professions later declared in the Tax Book of each colony. There were many emigrants who settled in Rio Grande do Sul between 1882 and 1914, according to Cenni (2003, 175), 66,901 Italians entered the State. This author states that this number represents almost half of the immigration contingent of Rio Grande do Sul. The emigrants who settled in the colonies became small landowners and, consequently, small producers who, through family labour, occupied the territory that had been delegated to them and transformed it into a prosperous zone, synonymous with the concentration of work and wealth. Family work was a characteristic of this region since the Italian family was large and needed to work to support the group. The number of children was between 6 and 12, in addition to relatives who lived on the same lot. Despite the initial agriculture being marked by subsistence farm, without traces of permanent crop, it was developed from the indigenous type. The agricultural system adopted in this region was land rotation, initially predominating the culture of corn and capoeira.3 This planting system, called “improved land rotation4 ” was the most used after deforestation, even if it caused soil erosion (Valverde, 1950, 271). To facilitate the occupation of land, the government created a General Department of Public Lands and a Special Inspectorate of Land and Colonisation, responsible for the installation of emigrants in colonial lots. “This Inspectorate was represented by the colony Board, which was 3 Capoeira is a vegetation consisting of grass and shrubs that grows after the original vegetation has been cut down. It is a term used by the Tupi Indians, which designates bush that grew in the place of cut vegetation. 4 “Improved land rotation” is a crop rotation system that can optimise agriculture, increasing productivity and soil quality.

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subordinated to the President of the Province” (Herédia, 2017, 58). The agricultural colonies were divided into square leagues, lines and dashes, according to the maps defined by the government. Over time, dashes were replaced by numbered lines and leagues by sections (Fig. 3.1). The financing system of the immigration company was public, which meant that the imperial government was interested in the colonisation and immigration process being successful. Access to land, selling on credit, seeking out immigrants and encouraging them to come were signs of advantages and benefits that were offered to the first immigrants. It is worth mentioning that the Italian colonial zone had its own characteristics, which shows that Italian immigrants were initially dedicated to extractive activities, subsistence agriculture and agriculture of necessary crops such as corn, wheat, grapes, rye and beans, where the economic surplus became a commercial product, in addition to workshops and small businesses that served the rural and urban areas. The work of subsidised colonisation lasted until 1914 when the government of the state of Rio Grande do Sul announced that it would no longer subsidise colonisation and immigration. This announcement closed a cycle of investments made in land occupation, financed by the State government until World War I.

Knowledge Transfer: The Experience of the Caxias Colony in Rio Grande do Sul The Caxias colony became the seat of Italian colonisation in Rio Grande do Sul. In less than ten years of its creation, it became a district of São Sebastião do Caí, emancipating itself from the colonial system and, in 1890, it became an autonomous municipality, with its own life, and then called Caxias do Sul. This colony was initially inhabited by emigrants from Northern Italy, mainly from “Veneto, Lombardy, Trentino Alto Adige (Tyrol) and Friuli-Venezia Giulia” (Frosi & Mioranza, 1975, 15). The immigrants produced in their colonial lot agricultural products that they needed for the subsistence of their family and also a surplus that they produced for the exchange. The pioneers used the colonial lots with the following function: “a) temporary crops: corn, wheat, beans, potatoes, cassava; b) permanent culture: grape; c) paddock for service animals cattle, horses, donkeys; d) capoeira area for rotation” (Azevedo, 1975, 266). The diversification of production through polyculture developed

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Fig. 3.1 Map of the Caxias Colony, municipality of Caxias do Sul. Drawn on the original General plan of Colonia Caxias by João Spadari Adami, 1962 (Source Projecto Victur. URB-AL program. Collection: Municipal Historical Archive of Caxias do Sul)

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a system of improvement of primary activities and allowed a system of exchanges that offered a certain profitability. From raising pigs, the immigrants produced lard, salami and meat for meals; poultry and cattle promoted leather, butter, milk and cheese and consequently moved the colonial economy from a rudimentary and precarious way to a specialised system of products that was needed by all. In planting, they devoted to some of the most frequent crops, and land use was done by seasons: summer crops and winter crops. The vintages were different from what happened in the country where they came from. Some crops initially stood out, such as the planting of corn, beans, wheat, barley and temperate fruits. Corn was one of the initial crops, of great importance for the family’s livelihood as it provided the flour for the production of bread and polenta.5 The corn was planted twice a year and was also used to feed the animals. The construction of mills became a necessary activity for the production of flour. The mills were meeting places for immigrants, driven by the need to transform grain into food. The transformation of the grain, by millstones, was a technique widely used because it produced the flour quickly. The work on the land by the immigrants generated the need to create utensils and tools that could help them in the occupation of the territory. Deforestation meant having equipment available that could facilitate extractive, planting and harvesting activities. They began, therefore, to produce tools that facilitated domestic production and the development of colonial agriculture. Utensils such as axes, knives, saws, hoes, shovels and buckets were produced as needed. Craft production gave impetus to manufacturing production, and this supplied the regional market. Many sawmills were created and transformed the trees into processed wood and its transport. Pine and other woods were used for the construction of houses, bridges, buildings, furniture and in the infrastructure of the colony. The use of wood by deforestation made sawmills and wood cooperatives grow. Collective life generated the need to produce new equipment and machines that could increase production. Mills, sawmills, pastry houses, blacksmith shops, tinsmith shops, saddleries and small factories were created to meet these demands. Several economic activities were born from the activities developed in the colonial plots. 5 Polenta is a typical Italian food, produced from corn flour, it was consumed by Italian emigrant families as the main dish at the table.

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The artisanal vocation of the Italian immigrant is evident in the emergence of small workshops that gave rise to factories, which stimulated specialised work. Wine production has become a profitable activity for small landowners and has been the main export product for several decades. Food production and foundry development also stood out in the initial occupation process. The clearing of the forest was carried out by the emigrants with the aim of using the colonial lot for the benefit of each family. They needed to cut down the trees to build the house and prepare the land for planting. The tools used were the axe, the saw and the buildings were handcrafted, rustic, made with wood from the lot itself. Over time, they transformed this activity into a business and sawmills occupied an important economic space in the region. The first economic cycle in the colonial zone is that of extractive activity, with the use of wood in various economic activities increasing the demand for sawmills and making it an essential segment. The record of sawmills in the Caxias colony between 1894 and 1909 “reveals an increase from 28 to 50 sawmills. Practically all of them were located in the interior of the Colony” (Cancian, 2016, 18). Normally, sawmills were located on the banks of water courses, which facilitated transport that was done by trucks. In addition to sawmills, a highly valued activity in the Italian colonies was milling. The transformation of grain into flour facilitated food and supported families. Milling activities were significant. In 1892, the colony recorded the operation of “52 mills”, distributed throughout its territory (Herédia, 2017, 78). A highlight in this milling sector is the work of Aristides Germani, who learned the trade of triticulturist in the Province of Cremona, where he had left. He worked in several mills and, in 1891, he bought a waterfall where he built a mill. The availability of water allowed him to create the first electric mill in the region, where he became known for the industrialisation of wheat in the region. He taught farmers how to plant wheat, which was previously a crop of Azorean origin, and Aristides Germani invested in planting techniques and fighting against diseases, which made him known in the agricultural industry. He encouraged producers from other regions such as Guaporé, Erechim and Passo Fundo to plant wheat and observe the techniques necessary for the quality of the product. Winemaking was one of the main economic activities recorded in the Italian colonisation zone in Rio Grande do Sul. The organisation of the viticulture system involved “planting, production and commercialization

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of the elements that constituted the system, from the cultivation of vines, wine production, processing and commercialization” (Cavagnolli, 1989, 30). When the first Italian emigrants arrived in the region, they brought bacelos that did not give the expected results. After several attempts, they replaced it with Isabel and Concord grapes, which were cultivated by the Germans. According to Gobbato (2000, 403) “between the two varieties, Isabel was the most widespread, although not comparable in quality to the European ones, allowing the production of large unit quantities of grapes and providing a wine boom in the region”. Less than a decade after the Italians arrived in Caxias colony, wine had become one of the main products of the local economy. In rural properties, wine production was carried out by the family. “In domestic canteens, grapes were handled empirically without technical aid, based on rudimentary processes” (Cavagnolli, 1989, 48). The canteen was part of the small farmer’s house since it was located in the lower part of the house. This activity began as a domestic industry, developed in the canteens where the preparation process was done manually. For planting, they used the “pergolatto” system that vertically and horizontally supported the branches and trunks of the plant. Divisions of pine or wood from other trees helped to hold the branches of the plant. “Vine planting was carried out on cultivated land or immediately after deforestation, between the tips of the burned trunks and normally using stakes” (Gobbato, 2000, 201). There were several types of canteens, the most frequent being those located in the producer’s house where conditions were not always favourable. However, they represented a large number of winegrowers. The merchants’ canteen had the function of storing wine and was used as a warehouse. Gobbato (1942) classifies canteens into five types and the differences that he, as a winemaker, presents help to understand the transition from domestic canteens to canteens that invested in the wine industrialisation process. The canteen types are those for: domestic use, storage, the production of wines in barrels, production in bottles and the mixed ones. This diversification shows that the interests of those who owned the canteen were different and when the cooperative movement was born, many adhered to it because they felt protected by the way their product was sold. Italian immigrants produced wine for domestic consumption and later began to produce for the regional and national markets. In 1896, the

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government supported this initiative and imported bacelos from Uruguay, with the aim of qualifying the product. Two years later, they organised an Experimental Agronomy Station in Porto Alegre with the aim of, in addition to qualifying the product, transforming this initiative into a centre for technicians to specialise in vine cultivation and wine production (Pesavento, 1983). The planting of grapes in quantity favoured the production of wine. The formation of cooperatives strengthened this economic activity, either by defending the interests of small producers or by conquering markets through the competition and the monopoly exercised in their commercialisation. However, the wine cooperative movement was affected by the economic crisis that plunged Brasil due to World War I. The modernisation process took place slowly with the foundation of wineries. The large canteens took on greater proportions due to the investments made in modern machinery that led to a high degree of technification. It can be enumerated a series of examples of the wine industry that started with small canteens and gradually turned into manufacturing companies, showing the subordination of peasant labour to capital. To defend the cooperative system, in which rural producers united in defence of their product, the federal government hired an Italian lawyer, Giuseppe D’Steffano Paternó, who had experience in cooperatives in Italy. This cooperative movement also represented a transfer of knowledge promoted from one society to another in search of the defence of some values that a part of the emigrants defended. Paternó tried to implement in the area of Italian colonisation the cooperative model adopted in Trento, Italy. “This model consisted of founding a federation of cooperatives, rural credit banks, with the aim of organising an agricultural bank” (Cavagnolli, 1989, 69). The cooperative movement expanded for three years and its decline took place in the context of the First World War. The difficulties that the movement faced stemmed from the financial situation of the cooperatives and the difficulties they faced in marketing their products. The cooperative movement faced some resistance from large traders who did not adhere to the model. Wine culture became the embryo of important industries that were nationally recognised for the quality of their products. Among them, “Sociedade Vinícola Rio Grandense Ltda., Sociedade Brasileira de Vinhos Ltda. Luiz Antunes & Co., Luiz Michielon, Eduardo Mosele & Co., those from Caxias, Lorenço H. Monaco & Co. Ltda., from Bento Gonçalves, and Armando Peterlongo, from Garibaldi” (De Sá, 1946, 106). The wine

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industry was for many years the main industrial activity in the entire colonial zone. With the emergence of wine cooperatives, wine production was able to face the regional market and solidify the national market. Despite the difficulties faced by the distribution, circulation and transport of the product and its commercialisation, in a generalised way, to the centre of the country due to the falsification of the product, wine has always occupied a prominent position in the economy of Caxias. The Caxias colony, seat of Italian colonisation in Rio Grande do Sul, had economic conditions that reflected its growth potential. In addition to agriculture with an economic surplus, there was the development of a series of craft activities that demonstrated the mastery of various trades and the presence of migrant labour, such as blacksmiths, leatherworkers, tinsmiths, watchmakers, carpenters, barbers, shoemakers. The production of bricks in potteries is an activity that stood out in this colony, mainly for housing, which involved the construction of buildings and infrastructure materials. It appears that many economic activities were concentrated in the centre of the village, which became a place of exchange. The small commercial houses, the “kiosches”, located in the central square, helped immigrants who lived in the rural area to supply what they needed and sell the surplus they produced. This way, they had a place where they could sell their products and receive, in addition to a monetary value, products they needed for subsistence. The trade took place in the village and immigrants brought an economic surplus to local merchants. This practice stimulated trade and the development of the colony. The transfer of knowledge of immigrants occurred in several directions. Some who were carpenters and blacksmiths dedicated themselves to the production of machines that, due to their speciality, interested wheat and grape growers in the region and later in the country. Tinkers collaborated a lot for the initial activities in the colony, which ranged from instruments for transport, utensils and tools used in planting. As an example of the production of machines for agriculture, it can be highlighted the experience of Alexandre de Antoni, an immigrant from the Province of Vicenza who visualised the growth of wheat and grape plantations, and projected the need for machines that would improve these productions. He was a forerunner, manufacturing the first threshing machines in Rio Grande do Sul, machines that were used to process rice, wheat, barley,

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oats and cereals in general. Examples like this show specificities of artisanal work, different from the work of the farmer who worked the land, but did not produce the tools for this purpose. The origin of metallurgy is also connected with the transfer of knowledge from some Italian emigrants. Two workshops stand out as precursors: that of Amadeo Rossi and that of Abramo Eberle. The first began with the production of stills, riding gear and agricultural instruments by Amadeo Rossi (Adami, 1970). The Belunese Amadeo Rossi had a body shop as a trade and when he arrived in Brasil he decided to open a workshop in the urban area of Caxias colony. He also repaired machines in the rural area where he sold his products. Abramo Eberle’s bodywork opened up a new cycle for metallurgy as he produced domestic utensils and tools for the colony (such as lamps, pots, boilers and mugs). In Italy, Abramo Eberle’s father, José Eberle, emigrated from Monte Magré, worked as a barber, but when the whole family emigrated, he worked as a farmer. He brought in his luggage a series of instruments that helped life in the colony, among them stills that he later produced in his workshop along with boilers and sulphate machines (Franco, 1943). The workshop, initially managed by his mother, Gigia Bandera, was located in the centre of the village and quickly became a big business. The production of metal items made the business grow since the production of domestic utensils favoured the lives of immigrants who needed utensils for housework. The production of lamps, chimarrão 6 pumps, tableware, knives, cups and mugs, among many others, was a demonstration of the vision that Abramo Eberle had of the needs of the colony and the diversification of products. The production of riding articles was a successful investment, since in the initial phase of the colony the animals most used for transportation were horses and mules, which meant that the immigrant colonists needed these articles (saws, harnesses, saddles, bridles, spurs, stirrups, rings and buckles). With the growth of metallurgy and the expansion of production, in 1904, Abramo’s body shop merged with Gasparetto’s goldsmith shop, which gave rise to Abramo Eberle e Co. In addition to riding products, Eberle dedicated to the production of religious articles, since the Italian colonisation zone was marked by the 6 Chimarrão, or mate, is a characteristic drink of the Southern Cone culture, a legacy of indigenous culture, produced by infusing the yerba mate plant ground in hot water at approximately 70 degrees Celsius, in a gourd with a pump.

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strong presence of Catholicism, characteristic of this emigration flow, and the devotion kept them united and integrated into rural and urban areas. These devotional practices occurred in places built by themselves and for that they needed sacred articles that were manufactured by the metallurgical workshop. Among these, chalices, crucifixes, candlesticks, lamps, candelabra and tabernacles. Still, this metallurgist produced items for the army such as swords, rapiers and fencing sabers. This small illustration shows how emigration brought a strong handicraft baggage and provoked substantial changes in the colonies that were founded and inhabited by these emigrants. Eberle, Rossi and Gazola were names of expression in the history of metallurgy in Caxias do Sul and reflect the example of work, savings, enterprise and mastery of the craft. The transfer of knowledge in the textile sector was significant. The experience that gave rise to this sector was born of a group that emigrated at the end of the nineteenth century to the Italian colonisation zone. This fact stems from the decision to emigrate a group of workers from Lanificio Rossi in the city of Schio, Province of Vicenza, “after suffering the consequences of a strike” (Herédia, 2019, 78). The emigration of these Italian workers proves the premise of knowledge transfer from workers in the textile sector. The experience of these workers in the wool industry came from the region’s long history of spinning and weaving tradition. After a strike in Lanificio Rossi, the workers chose transoceanic emigration as a solution to unemployment. When they settled in the Caxias colony, they founded a textile cooperative, called Società Tevere e Novità, formed by 28 Italian partners, which was dedicated to the production of woolen cloths. The use of the craft, known to them, contributed to the expansion of economic activity. The cooperative started with manual looms and later mechanical looms and used the knowledge acquired in the former homeland to develop this production (Herédia, 1992). It can also be highlighted that Dalla Santa & Co. was the first industry to produce essential machinery for the wine and food industries. The main artisanal and industrial activities were directed towards food, beverage, wood and metallurgy industries. There was a record of craft activities, such as tailoring, shoemaking, woodworking and saddlery. Table 3.1 shows the commercial and industrial establishments registered in Caxias in 1892, at the time the colony became a municipality. The fact that the settlers manufactured the products necessary for agricultural production, expanded the market initially created throughout

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Table 3.1 Commercial and industrial establishments. Caxias colony 1892 Establishment

Absolute values

Establishment

Absolute values

Sawmills Steam sawmills Steam mills Hydraulic mills Tanneries Breweries Liqueurs Gazoza Hats Wickerwork Insecticide powder Soap

10 3 2 50 7 7 3 1 3 1 1 2

Blacksmiths Tinsmiths Woodworking Shoe stores Tailors Cooperage Saddlery Bakeries Looms Stills Trading houses

14 5 8 25 12 1 2 2 26 3 Various

Source Pellanda (1950, 57)

the colonial zone. Hoes, pickaxes, harnesses, saws and riding gear (Lazzarotto, 1981) reflect the type of craftsmanship aimed at agricultural production. Little by little, these activities took on new forms as they expanded production for the regional market, improving at the manufacturing level. Handicrafts had developed in order to improve the production needed to meet the Colony’s needs. This is restricted as the Colony’s economy became part of the market economy. The Colony developed a wide trade in the region through the sale, not only of its productive surplus, but of a commercial agriculture that allowed the colonists an increase in the capacity of external acquisition, in the form of monetary means. It is observed that, as the local market grew, there was an increase in establishments dedicated to the processing of agricultural raw materials, such as grapes, wine, lard, oats and beans. It can be said that the agroindustry expanded vertically, either through production or through consumption. However, there was a tendency to canalise the colonial economy towards just one product, despite the polyculture system being maintained. The transfer of knowledge does not only occur in economic activities. Also in social and cultural activities of an associative nature, Italian immigrants found institutions in the new society similar to those they knew in their country of origin. An example of this assertion is the “mutual

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help societies” that were founded in Rio Grande do Sul, with the arrival of Italian immigrants. The aim was “to promote protection among them, collaborate in cases of need, illness and death, and cultivate the feeling of Italianness, as an ideological nucleus, an expression of nativist patriotism” (Azevedo, 1975, 223). Religion played a fundamental role in the integration of Italian emigrants. The devotional practices that they had in their societies of origin were transferred to the places where they were inserted and religion was an element of cultural identity among them. Many Catholics carried their patron saints to the place where they settled. These communities did not always have priests who could hold services and consequently were forced to adapt to the conditions of the new reality (Manfroi, 1975). It is observed as a transfer of knowledge that is maintained by the adaptation they made in relation to the conditions they had. The rites of passage were maintained, but it was not always the priest who practised them. In some rural communities, the emigrant who had the prayer books and the availability to participate in the practices led these events. Funeral rites, collective prayers and organisation of chapel groups were carried out by the residents themselves (Merlotti, 1979).

Conclusions The population of the colonial zone grew considerably and the industries in that zone accompanied this pace of growth. The growth of certain industrial sectors can be attributed to the availability of qualified labour, entrepreneurial capacity and the concentration of related activities. These activities, including the raw material for the industrial product, favoured the growth of various sectors such as grape-wine, wood-furniture, textilesclothing, etc., since this integration between industrial genres and primary activities characterised some of the sectors of local industry, which accompanied the evolution of this society. The Caxias colony absorbed favourable conditions for economic development and transformed itself from a simple colonial nucleus into one of the industrial zones of the State of Rio Grande do Sul. The elements that favoured the emergence of various industrial sectors were the conditions offered by the Brasilian government in the occupation of land, the regime of small property, the role of colonial agriculture, the commerce and the commercial houses and essentially the availability of abundant and semi-specialised workforce.

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Therefore, in the insertion of Italian emigrants in the official colonies organised by the imperial government, the production of products necessary for the subsistence economy led to the development of craft activities aimed at supplying the colonisation region. This production became specialised and these activities began to be produced no longer as a domestic industry, but as manufacturing processes that gave rise to a large industry. The artisanal and manufacturing tradition of the settlers contributed, therefore, to the specialisation of labour in the new factories. Some economic activities performed basically urban functions and others typically rural, and Caxias do Sul became the largest urban, commercial and industrial centre in the region. Despite not being the biggest grape grower, wine has always occupied a prominent position in the economy of Caxias do Sul. The wine industry was for many years the main industrial activity in the entire colonial zone. With the emergence of wine cooperatives, wine production was able to face the regional market and solidify the national market, even with the difficulties faced by the distribution, circulation, transport and commercialisation of the product. This activity began as a domestic industry, developed in canteens where the preparation process was done manually. The formation of cooperatives strengthened this economic activity either by defending the interests of the small producer or by conquering markets through competition and the monopoly exercised in its commercialisation. The large canteens assumed greater proportions due to investments made in modern machinery that led to a high degree of technology. The industrialisation process was born early as a result of the consumption demands of the region’s population. Sawmills, corn and wheat mills, the food industry, weaving and metallurgy were highlights of this area of Italian colonisation where emigrants made history through the strength of their Italian identity. The metallurgical industry stands out, which began with bodywork workshops and, in less than thirty years of the initial colonisation process, emerged as an economic milestone for the municipality and the region. Some mechanical industries that knew how to take advantage of the needs of the market and manufacture the necessary products for the development of the future municipality were quoted as examples. In the textile sector, the experience of emigrants reflected the transfer of knowledge from one place to another where knowledge was maintained and later innovated as a form of economic production. The milling activity had an excellent repercussions in the regional market, being one of the

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transformation and agricultural processing industries of national recognition. Wheat cultivation, established by the Azoreans in Rio Grande do Sul, was reactivated with the arrival of Italian immigrants. As for the food industry and the extractive manufacturing industry, both played a prominent role in the State’s economic production. Yet, the extraction of wood was one of the first activities of the immigrants. The extractive industry has always had a great demand that was met by the abundance of available raw materials. The transfer of knowledge took place in different spheres in the colonial centres of Italian emigrants: in the organisation of collective life, in economic activities and in the reproduction of some cultural habits that become social practices in the new society. The study points out that there was transmission of knowledge by Italian emigrants and their descendants in economics, politics, education and religion. The study recognises that many emigrants used their experiences to promote practices they knew in the places where they were inserted. The fact that several of them had a craft in the place of departure helped to ensure that the transmission took place in different areas of production, which allows us to state that some artisanal specialities typical of some regions also migrated along with their protagonists.

References Adami, J. S. (1970). História de Caxias do Sul, 1864–1970. São Miguel. Azevedo, T. (1975). Italianos e Gaúchos. Os anos pioneiros da colonização italiana no Rio Grande do Sul. A Nação, Instituto Estadual do Livro. Cancian, P. R. M. (2016). Araucária: raízes da industrialização. Educs. Cavagnolli, A. (1989). Os parceiros do vinho: a vitivinicultura em Caxias do Sul (1911–1936). Universidade Federal do Paraná. Cenni, F. (2003). Italianos no Brasil. Andiamo in Merica (3rd ed.). Editora da Universidade de São Paulo. De Sá, M. (1946). Breve exposição sobre a situação industrial do Rio Grande do Sul. Revista Província de São Pedro, 6, 98–111. Franco, Á. (1943). Abramo já tocou...: uma epopeia de um imigrante. Ramos Franco. Frosi, V., & Mioranza, C. (1975). Imigração Italiana no Nordeste do Rio Grande do Sul. Educs/Editora Movimento. Gobbato, C. (1942). Manual do Vitivinicultor brasileiro. Globo. Gobbato, C. (2000). Il colono ed il suo contributo nello sviluppo dell’industria rio-grandense. In Cinquantenario dela colonizzazione italiana nel Rio Grande

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do Sul (1875–1925) (Vol. I). La cooperazione degli italiani al progresso civile ed econômico. Herédia, V. B. M. (1992). Considerazioni sull’industrializzazione nell’area di colonizzazzione italiana di Rio Grande do Sul. Dimensione dello sviluppo. Trimestrale di Scienze Sociali, 3–4(IX), 161–183. Herédia, V. B. M. (2017). Processo de industrialização da zona colonial italiana (2nd ed.). Educs. Herédia, V. B. M. (2019). Emigrazione, lavoro e cultura operaia: la storia degli operai italiani nel Sud del Brasile. I veneti in Brasile e la storia dell’emigrazione. Vicenza: Cierre Edizioni. Venetica Rivista degli instituti per la storia della resistenza di Belluno, Padova, Treviso, Venezia, Verona e Vicenza, XXXIII (57(2)), 75–90. Lazzarotto, V. (1981). Pobres construtores de Riqueza. Educs. Manfroi, O. (1975). A colonização italiana no Rio Grande do Sul. Implicações econômicas, políticas e culturais. Grafosul/Instituto Estadual do Livro. Merlotti, V. B. P. (1979). O mito do padre entre descendentes italianos. EST/ Educs. Pellanda, E. (1950). Aspectos gerais da colonização italiana no Rio Grande do Sul. In Álbum comemorativo do 75º aniversário da colonização italiana no Rio Grande do Sul (pp. 34–64). Globo. Pesavento, S. J. (1983). RS: Agropecuária colonial & Industrialização. Mercado Aberto. Porto, A. (1934). O trabalho alemão no Rio Grande do Sul. Estabelecimento Gráfico Santa Terezinha. Roche, J. (1969). A colonização alemã e o Rio Grande do Sul (Vol. I). Editora Globo. Sabbatini, M. (1975). La regione di colonizzazione italiana in Rio Grande do Sul. Gli insediamenti nelle aree rurali. Cultura Cooperativa Editrice. Valverde, O. (1950). Excursão à região colonial italiana antiga do Rio Grande do Sul. In Álbum comemorativo do 75º aniversário da colonização italiana no Rio Grande do Sul (pp. 266–278). Globo.

CHAPTER 4

Business and Transmission of “Knowledge”: Italian Migration to Brasil Donatella Strangio and Mario Noviello

Introduction The desire and the ability to innovate starts with people who share their own path and then, through knowledge, become a bridge to create new relationships. The company can be considered as a complex of interdependencies between goods and people who work by exchanging knowledge and production with the outside world pursuing the same goal, namely the production of value, and among this “knowledge”. As stated by Adriano Olivetti, creator of the Olivetti company, whose activity has crossed national borders and occupies an important place as an example among the various Italian companies that have transferred their knowledge, the company cannot only be profit creation but must take on

D. Strangio (B) Department of Methods and Models for Economics, Territory and Finance, Sapienza University of Rome, Rome, Italy e-mail: [email protected] M. Noviello Logistics Manager at Hyva International, Carpi, Italy © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. Fauri and D. Mantovani (eds.), Past and Present Migration Challenges, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39431-7_4

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different roles and distribute not only wealth but also culture, services, knowledge. This paper aims to focus on the transmission of knowledge that Italian emigration has brought to Latin America: Brasil will constitute the non-European countries on which the analysis of Italian businesses and migration will be concentrated, trying to understand what kind of “knowing” has taken root and what it produced. The stories of some important Italian entrepreneurs who emigrated to Brasil will be presented, highlighting the innovations that their businesses have brought and what is still left of their work today.

The Importance of Knowledge Knowledge has always pervaded the life of men. The philosophers, a word that derives from the Greek filoV , “friend”, and sofia, “to know”, are therefore those who “love to know”. From ancient times they almost never agreed even on what it meant to know, so to clarify these concepts they introduced ever more subtle distinctions, raising new problems and leaving them as an inheritance to subsequent philosophers. Aristotle and Plato argued that knowing the why of things means explaining them, that is, knowing the causes that produced them. In the Hellenistic age, the Stoics, the Epicureans and the Skeptics tried to outline the figure of the sage: for the Stoics, for example, the sage is the person who has all possible knowledge, to the point that, by their own admission, a true wise man has practically never existed. Again for Aristotle, experience arises from memory, because it is produced by countless memories of the same thing and their progressive sedimentation while it is experience that generates technique or know-how. We do not want to trivialize the inspiring heritage that philosophy has handed down to us over time, we just want to highlight how learning and knowledge are essential and irreplaceable values. In the context of companies, they represent the ability to produce better services and products and the ability of workers to learn and share information in order to better face change and solve problems, as was done by most of the Italian migrants who arrived in Argentina. The desire and the ability to innovate starts with people sharing their knowledge, which becomes a bridge to create new relationships. The enterprise can be considered as a complex of interdependencies between goods and people who work by exchanging knowledge and production with the

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outside world pursuing the same goal, which is not just the maximization of profit but of know-how as well. So what is the use of knowledge? It serves to transform our way of being in the world: it is the ability to disclose the infinitely intricate yet clear space of the reasons that lurk in our lives. Knowledge is therefore utility itself. There is nothing that cannot be used. It also serves to generally establish what is useful and what is not, as well as to what extent an alleged knowledge is truly reliable or relevant. The usefulness of knowledge is unlimited, and history helps keep its long-term development alive. History is not the “science of the past” but rather one of the human sciences: this is an important legacy that Marc Bloch left us in his work The Historian’s Craft. There are tools, machines and states and nations, but behind all this there are people: Bloc conveys a variety of reflections and suggestions, but the ultimate meaning lies in answering the question posed at the beginning of the text when a child naively turns to his father, a professional historian, asking him “Tell me, Daddy. What is the use of history?”. History allows us not to repeat the same mistakes, in the very words of Bloch himself: “Misunderstanding of the present is the inevitable consequence of ignorance of the past”.1

The Dawn of Industrialisation In the first thirty years of the twentieth century, despite the relative economic backwardness of Italy and the initial dependence on foreign operating models, the major Italian mixed banks created an extensive multinational banking network. In particular, the first foreign markets in which the Italian mixed banks moved, as Piluso (1994) states, were the South American ones in Argentina and Brasil, where the Italian banks were able to conquer considerable shares, both because the communities of Italian emigrants represented a clientele with whom to establish privileged relationships and both because the commercial flows increased and the direct investments of Italian industrial companies acquired greater consistency. In addition to absorbing substantial migratory and commercial flows, Brasil and Argentina had seen the formation of a true ethnically connoted credit “subsystem” (Piluso, 1994, 5).

1 The book was written in 1944 while Bloch was in a prisoner of war camp and before he was executed. It was published posthumously in 1949 (Bloch, 1953).

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Italian immigrants have been a large and dynamic source of entrepreneurship in Argentina and in Brasil and this, combined with the active demand for Italian goods and brands, created both an ethnic market. Thanks to the complementarities between their savoir-faire and the needs of the host economy—in particular of machinery and equipment—Italian companies’ subsidiaries have played a very important role in the history of Argentina but also of Brasil industrialization; in particular, they were among brasiliane manufacturing firms to increase exports and invest in innovation. The industrialization process of Brasil was slow and belated compared to one of the other most significant sovereign states of the historical period under consideration. During its colonial era, the country had been marked mainly by the cultivation of tropical commodities. Such a characteristic continued throughout the nineteenth century, where the primary sector represented 80% of the nation’s economy. After its independence, occurred in 1822, the local administrations of the numerous provinces preferred to focus on international trade rather than on the internal market, by allocating their products exclusively for exportation (Prado, 1979). Since Brasil was still underpopulated and, thus, had a limited domestic demand, this strategy allowed the federal governments to profit considerably more from the export duties, which also helped them to sustain the enormous public expenses related to the promotion of immigration overseas. The vast territory and the lack of major competitors for the procurement of tropical commodities made the nation specialize in the production of the main native raw materials, which constituted a competitive advantage risen from its favorable geographical location. Each region, depending on the historical period, climate, and entry of labor force, specialized primarily in just a certain good. For instance, the northern provinces, throughout the nineteenth century, produced mostly natural rubber (Prado, 1979). The India rubber, also known with its original Quechuan name as caucho comes from a tree native to the American tropics, called seringueira,2 whose use dates back to pre-colonial times. In fact, the Indigenous peoples used it to make shoes and tunics. Following the most fundamental chemical discoveries, the product began to be employed also in the industrial sector.

2 Seringueira is the Portuguese denomination of the Amazonian rubber tree. Its scientific name is hevea brasiliensis.

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Thanks to the studies of Joseph Priestley, starting from 1770, it began to be used to erase pencil marks. In 1823, Charles Macintosh invented a method for making waterproof garments by using natural rubber. Finally, in 1842, the engineer Thomas Hancock noticed the flexibility of rubber and its resistance to high temperatures, and used it for the production of wheels. Brasil, owning a large part of the Amazon rainforest and, thus, being the world’s largest country with rubber tree reserves, became the leading exporter of this commodity. The country started to export it in 1828 with just thirty-one tons. As the demand grew, also the exports increased, reaching the highest level of the century in 1880 with seven thousand tons (Prado, 1979). The peak, however, occurred only in 1912 with forty-two thousand tons. Unfortunately, soon after, the exports began to decline steadily. The reason for such reduction is attributable to the fact that, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the Pará rubber tree seeds were introduced in Asia and planted there, making Brasil lose its leadership as the main exporter. Some major Asian countries, thanks to their close relations with Europe for their historical bonds risen from their colonization, sold the commodity at a lower price, to the detriment of Brasil. This loss is still perceptible nowadays, given that almost all the Mainland Southeastern nations are ahead of the South American country in the number of goods exported and in the value gained from their sale (Dean, 1997). Naturally, the Brasilian government in the past tried to remedy this by purchasing more land containing the Amazon rainforest, with the aim of increasing the rubber supply.3 In 1902, Brasil bought an area of 200,000 km2 , corresponding with the present-day state of Acre, in exchange of two million pounds sterling paid to Bolivia, which used to control such territory (Furtado, 1959). After Pará, this region became the second-largest producer of rubber. Unlike the former, Acre was an enclave, considerably distant from both the urban centers and the main ports of Brasil. Precisely for this reason, natural rubber favored the development of many small ports and towns along the rivers that crossed the nation and flowed into the Atlantic Ocean. Although this did not favor the creation of a real national industry, it still helped Brasil for the improvement of fluvial 3 In this period under consideration, the principles of economics were completely ignored in Brasil. It was, indeed, common to think that it was necessary to have more land in order to make higher profits, without taking into account the importance of technology and innovation.

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transport, which became the best alternative to railways, harder to build and more expensive considering the enormity of the nation. A similar observation to the history and importance of rubber can be made with cocoa, too. It is also a tree native to Brasil, whose use dates back to the pre-Columbian era. Its cultivation continued during and after the colonial period, especially in the northeastern provinces. The leading state of this commodity was Bahia, which in the nineteenth century produced 90% of the national total, and whose sales represented 20% of the state’s revenues. Since the 1600s, the North-Eastern area welcomed the largest flow of slaves who, after the independence of Brasil but also after the abolition of slavery, continued to live there and work at the cocoa plantations and their labor was vital for the cultivation of sugar as well. Undeniably, sugar was one of the most significant and historical products of Brasil, which increased the proceeds of the Portuguese colonists first and, subsequently, those of the landowners of the newly independent nation. Nonetheless, with the entry of other countries into the international market, its importance declined with the passing of time. Suffice it to say that between 1891 and 1900 Brasil exported 133,000 tons of sugar, which decreased considerably between 1931 and 1940 with only 40,000 tons (Furtado, 1959; Prado, 1979). This huge decline was due to the Great Depression. In fact, following this economic crisis, in 1933, within the framework of the World Monetary and Economic Conference of London, export quotas were applied to certain goods, including sugar. Under this agreement, Brasil could not have a market share of sugar higher than 1.6% (Prado, 1979). Obviously, this caused catastrophic damage to the Brasilian economy and, in particular, to the treasuries of the northeastern states, previously already impoverished by the advent of the “coffee fever”.4 Despite being mentioned at the end of the list of tropical commodities that Brasil specialized in, coffee has always been the most important one. Although not native to Brasil, its bush was able to adapt quickly to the vast lands of the nation’s southeastern regions,

4 The term “coffee fever” was named after the gold rush, also known as gold fever. Similar to gold, this expression defines the race in the purchase of land for the cultivation of this commodity, which guaranteed great profits to the investors. As has been already mentioned, this period began in the nineteenth century and ended only in the first half of the twentieth century, playing a long and vital role in the history of Brasil.

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which had a perfect climate for its growth. The landowners, considering the greatness of Brasil’s territory, preferred to invest their earnings in expanding more their fazendas rather than in the innovation of the production processes and machinery. Precisely for this reason, higher numbers of slaves were continuously in demand. With the end of slavery, the labor began to be carried out by European immigrants, poorly paid and easily submissive due to their previous precarious living conditions. The ease with which the demand for labor and for land was met in Brasil was among the main causes of the belated industrial development of the country, which only arose with the crisis of the coffee sector. Such setback began in the twentieth century, following commercial speculations based on the fazendeiros’ continuous optimistic expectations, a major climatic change, and the fear of labor shortages caused by the Prinetti act, which threatened the entry of Italian workers, whose number had always been the highest. The first sign of the crisis in this sector occurred between 1901 and 1905, where five million bags of coffee were unsold, causing the subsequent fall in price below the cost of production. In order to avoid further unsold stocks, the Brasilian government decided to introduce a tax on the establishment of new plantations, with the aim of decreasing the supply of coffee and, thus, to restore the higher selling price. It must be noted that Brasil was part of an oligopoly on the international sale of coffee and, therefore, it had enormous control over the price. Nonetheless, only with a limited supply of coffee, it could impose considerably higher prices, which would favor the revenues of both local governments and fazendeiros. As Celso Furtado (1959) noted, this peculiarity created a vicious circle since these gigantic profits, instead of being invested in other sectors or in the industrialization of the nation, acted like capital reversals within the same sector, causing a continuous increase of the coffee supply and consequently reducing its price. On the one hand, if the supply of coffee was marked by incessant rebounds, on the other, its demand was inelastic in relation to the price. In fact, it depended mostly on the demographic growth of the consuming countries. In this way, in the long run, the supply of coffee always exceeded its demand, generating a reduction in prices to the detriment of Brasil. When the Brasilian government became aware of this principle, it realized that blocking the formation of new plantations was not enough.

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Therefore, it was decided to purchase the surpluses of coffee intended for export. Needless to say, as the oversupplies increased, the local governments were forced to borrow capital from external lenders, such as the Rothschilds.5 The exclusive focus on the coffee sector damaged Brasil’s economy during this period. First, this policy only favored the fazendas, not making Brasil differentiate, hence avoiding the development of the secondary sector. Successively, with the Great Depression occurring in 1929, Brasil’s finances were hit gravely. In addition to reducing the international demand for coffee, this crisis made it difficult for Brasil to be able to obtain loans from external lenders to purchase the fazendeiros’ surpluses. Starting in the 1930s, all these factors led President Getúlio Vargas to initiate the industrialization of Brasil, placing an active and fundamental role of this process in the hands of the central government. Vargas was a populist politician who came from the state of Rio Grande do Sul. As a result of the recession of 1929, thanks to his impetuous and energetic speeches, he was able to get enough votes from the middle class to ascend to the presidency (Prado, 1979). His main opponents were the oligarchists of the “coffee with milk” politics, i.e., the elite of the states of São Paulo and Minas Gerais. This term was due to the fact that these two states were characterized by the production of coffee and dairies. The sale of such commodities made these territories so wealthy and powerful that they had always owed the majority of seats in the Brasilian parliament, giving them the possibility to make laws that aimed to follow their interests at the expense of the other states and social classes. In addition to the support of the working class, Vargas prevailed successfully through a dictatorship that began in 1930 and ended in 1945. During this period, the president faced many challenges. The first was to remedy the harmful effects of the economic crisis. Furthermore, he had to integrate the Brasilian territory and develop an internal market. It must be highlighted again that each Brasilian region specialised in only one raw material, intended exclusively for international trade. This

5 The Rothschilds were an important Jewish banking family that, starting in the nineteenth century, played a central role in world finance. In the case of Brasil, they offered a loan to the nation during the process of its independence from Portugal. Subsequently, loans continued to be given for the expenses related to the crises of the rubber and coffee sectors.

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created a sort of division among the federal states, which hardly cooperated and which used to meet their demands through importation. These purchases, due to the duties and exchange rates, were very expensive and created economic hardships for the Brasilian population, already in difficulty financially. In order to help the Brasilians, Vargas’ first step was to establish a minimum wage. At that time, the minimum wage had fourteen different values depending on the regional economy, whose variation between the lowest and the highest salary was 2.7 times. For instance, while a poor state like Acre could set a minimum wage of one thousand réis, a virtuous area, like that of São Paulo, could reach two thousand seventy hundred réis. In this way, it was guaranteed adequate purchasing power to the population, with the goal of creating a consumer market. Subsequently, the president founded the first public enterprises, whose task was to guarantee the basic industries. Among the most fundamental ones, it should be mentioned, first of all, the National Oil Advisor, known in Brasil with the acronym of CNP, which had the purpose of discovering oil and natural gas fields. From this company, he then set up Petrobras, a company with a legal monopoly on crude oil, and Eletrobras, whose purpose was the energy supply. In 1941, the National Siderurgy Company was established, representing the greatest South American metallurgy corporation of the time. In 1942, instead, the Sweet River Valley Company, nowadays better known with the name of Vale, was founded for the procurement of iron, copper, nickel, and cobalt. In the same year, also the National Motor Vehicle Company was instituted. Finally, during his second term, which took place shortly after the end of the Second World War and, therefore, also after his dictatorship, Vargas formed the National Bank for Economic and Social Development, associated with the Ministry of Development and Industry of Brasil to further boost the nation’s economy. In addition to founding public enterprises, the president also encouraged private individuals to start businesses for consumer goods. Most of the factories developed in the South-East thanks to a number of advantages related to the historical focus of the coffee sector. In fact, in those territories there were the best infrastructures of the country. Suffice it to say that in other areas they were not even present. Moreover, the concentration of capital and labor was there, as a result of the oligopoly that Brasil had over coffee in previous decades. The success of Vargas’ economic policy was also favored by the world conflict, which decreased imports, incited the growth of the national industry that did not have

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many competitors during that period and, subsequently, also increased the number of exports for finished products. These factors, later, also enhanced direct foreign investment to Brasil, which grew considerably since foreign corporations, in order to avoid tariff barriers, established some branch plants in the country. It must be pointed out that, besides industrialization, Vargas initiated the process of “Brasilianisation”, too. He developed a nationalistic ideology that was imposed in all the regions of Brasil, especially in the rural areas where the colonos never fully integrated. As previously stated, this detail was vital to prevent Italians from marginalizing themselves from the rest of the country, creating, as a result of Fascism, a sort of Italianisation of the territories in which they lived. The industrial and economic growth of Brasil also continued in the decades following the Vargas mandate, and eventually fell considerably in the 1980s. Starting from this timeframe, Brasil experienced a period of deindustrialization, caused by the dereliction of the economic development policies, combined with bad choices regarding the exchange rates and the management of public debt. The industrialization of Brazil, which began in the 1930s, was favored by the previous interest in the coffee sector. Despite this focus did not differentiate the nation, it was nevertheless essential to quickly stimulate the response of private entrepreneurs of the coffee producing states. These territories were, indeed, characterized by the intensity of capital and labor, as well as by sufficient infrastructures, such as roads, railways, and ports, still not present in many other areas of the country. Therefore, it can be affirmed that coffee played a decisive role in all the historical moments of Brasil. At the beginning of its independence, it was essential for the construction of the first farms, towns, and roads, as well as for the inflows of more inhabitants. As the fazendeiros made profits from its exportation, such capital was used to promote immigration overseas, hence improving infrastructures and further developing those lands. Precisely for this reason, many economists and historians consider coffee the seed for the spawn of Brasil’s industrialization. According to their theory, there was a direct relationship between the export growth of the primary sector and industrialization. The American author Warren Dean, in his paper about the industrialization of São Paulo (1971), noted that the needed infrastructure for the later industrial development arose from the coffee sector, responsible for the basis of the modernization of the state. Indeed, the first railways were built thanks to the coffee expansion to link the ports of the state to

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the inland fazendas. Such railways, besides transporting goods, also were essential to making workers move where they were needed. The remuneration of these workers began to increase the demand for finished goods, which later led to the establishment of manufacturers within the nation. Some noteworthy scholars who specialized in the history of Brasil, such as Furtado (1959) and Prado (1979), affirm that, together with coffee, the entry of immigrants was equally crucial for the development of the nation’s industry. The expatriates were either colonos or farmers. The former can be considered the very first entrepreneurs, whose products were sold in urban centers near their colonies, making them responsible for their territories’ development. The latter, instead, were the fazendeiros’ employees, whose wages were spent on the items they needed. Some of them, once earned a sufficient amount of capital, started their own businesses, which were mostly farms whose perishables were sold for the domestic market. Other immigrants ventured into the cities, continuing to work as subordinates or, in some cases, setting up manufacturing factories or stores. In the most famous books on the economic formation of Brasil, all the authors agree that the main actors for the industrialization of the nation were the Italians (Bevilacqua et al. (2009); Fauri (2015); Sori (1979). According to some documents from the early twentieth century, in 1904, in the city of Ribeirão Preto there were six factories, all belonging to families with Italian surnames (Lanza, 2013). In addition to the numerous small family businesses, there were also some striking cases. It must be mentioned the Matarazzo corporation, well known in Brasil with the tile “the industry of the industries” since, in order to produce their aimed products, this Italian family had to start other basic businesses first. Furthermore, another significant example was the Martinelli Brothers group, which built the first skyscraper of South America, named after them. Although these are the oldest and most known cases, the Italian immigrants, who continued to emigrate during and after the era of Vargas, kept opening basic industries needed for the industrialization and development of Brasil. Despite the long period of economic decline that began in the 1980s, even in contemporary times, there are many Italian corporations, such as Telecom Italia and Enel, which, in view of greater profits and thanks to the historical and cultural ties that the two nations still have, have decided to invest directly in Brasil, as well as to open their own branches there.

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The Major Cases of Italian Immigrant Entrepreneurs in Brasil: Francesco Matarazzo’s IRFM Corporation The state of São Paulo, between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, was characterized by the exclusive production of coffee. Brasil was an exporter of agri-food commodities, whose high revenues made it possible for landowners to accumulate capital. These funds were subsequently used to initiate the country’s industrial process. In fact, until the early 1930s, Brasil had not yet developed any industry, thus having to import all finished goods. Nonetheless, at the end of the nineteenth century, the Minister of Finance Ruy Barbosa created some secondary legislations with the aim of using the landowners’ resources to start some businesses. Simultaneously, he also reduced customs duties since machinery had to arrive from abroad to start producing. In this way, the first factories began to appear, although of little importance and in small amounts. At the same time, however, a modest number of new immigrants also started setting up their own enterprises. Among them, there were some exceptional cases, such as the one of Francesco Matarazzo, defined as the father of the Brasilian national industry. Matarazzo was born in 1854 in Castellabate, a small town not far from Naples, in southern Italy. He was the son of Costabile, a landowner, and Mariangela Jovane, daughter of a wealthy family of Salerno (Couto, 2004; Dean, 1971; Rodrigues & Vilela, 2013; Vichnewski, 2004). Unlike most of the people of his area, who were in a condition of extreme poverty, Francesco came from a household whose income allowed him to attend high school82 and thus to be educated. After the sudden death of his father, Matarazzo had to interrupt his studies to take care of the family business. In this period, he married Filomena Sansivieri, with whom he had two children, Giuseppe and Andrea. Unfortunately, after a series of financial issues, Francesco, under the advice of a friend of his, decided to leave his homeland and start a new business in Brasil. He was only twentyseven years old when, together with his family, in 1881, emigrated to South America. With him, he also brought twenty tons of lard, with the aim of selling them in Brasil to obtain sufficient capital to set up his own company. However, while the sailors unloaded these barrels from the ship to the port of Rio de Janeiro, they fell into the water, causing Francesco to lose all his investment. Worried about his future, he used the

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last remaining savings to move with his family to Sorocaba, in the state of Sao Paulo, where his fellow countrymen worked, and who welcomed them. Thanks to the help of his friends, he was able to find a job that allowed him to accumulate a sufficient amount of money to start his own production of lard. This product, vital for the nutrition of Brasilians, was not produced in any area of the nation, but imported at very high prices. Matarazzo, with his entrepreneurial skills, was far-sighted and saw an economic advantage in the production of this commodity. For this reason, he started buying some pigs from local farmers. Although they were reluctant to sell them to him, probably because he was a foreigner, thanks to the expertise acquired from his previous employment in Italy, he was able to negotiate in the best possible way. In 1882 he opened his first store, where he sold the lard he produced through a traditional and old-fashioned method, still practised in southern Italy. A few years later, Francesco was able to found a real lard factory in Sorocaba, that was later followed by two other factories in the neighboring colonies of Capão Bonito and Apiaí. These two communities were not connected to Sorocaba by road or rail. Therefore, the transport of lard and meat took place through the flock of the animals of local farmers, which, once reached the city, from there they were transported by rail to São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. According to some sources of that time (Vichnewski, 2004, 47), the Capão Bonito factory was the largest, occupying an area of twenty-five thousand square meters, of which four thousand were intended for the factory itself and for the livestock shelters. There were about three large boilers which could hold up to two thousand liters of fat. The fat, once boiled, was then stored in cans of various sizes and stocked in the warehouses. Pork was also processed and salted in the same factory. In this period, about forty-five workers were employed, who produced two thousand kilos of lard per day. Following the increase in demand, a few years later, Francesco decided to expand his company by establishing another plant in Porto Alegre, in the southern state of Rio Grande do Sul. In 1890, his two brothers, Giuseppe and Luigi Matarazzo, also arrived in Brasil. Together with them, he then founded the company Matarazzo & Brothers. This company, in addition to the previously established factories, also included a general store in the renowned commercial 25 de Março Street, in the city of São Paulo. While he and his wife were working in the shop of the capital, his brothers were put in charge of the four

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factories. It is important to note that in the new store, besides his own products, Francesco also sold imported consumer goods, such as rice from China and flour from the United States. This diversification strategy was implemented to counter the impacts of market fluctuations which already caused slight reductions in the demand and price of the lard. Meanwhile, Minister Ruy Barbosa was incentivizing the constitution of joint-stock companies.6 Precisely for this reason, in 1891, Francesco dissolved the Matarazzo & Brothers in order to found the Matarazzo Corporation S/ A. The company included the shares of forty-three shareholders, and its mission was to produce, refine, and sell lard, as well as buy and sell bacon, smoked meat, and other products from Rio Grande do Sul and São Paulo. In the same year, the assets of this corporation were sold with the goal of capitalizing his brothers. Because of this procedure, the shareholders withdrew from the company, and the Italian immigrant established the Francesco Matarazzo & Company Ltda.7 In 1898, following the outbreak of the Spanish-American war between the United States and Spain over the Cuban question, the importation of flour from North America was stopped. As happened with the lard, Matarazzo saw in this event an opportunity for his business. In fact, just like the former, flour, in a city full of immigrants like São Paulo, was an essential product. Bread and pasta were essential elements of the diet of the entire population, driving such market in a constant and wide expansion. Considering that Brasil had a huge territory and an equally significant domestic demand, Matarazzo decided to grow wheat in Brasil and produce flour within the same nation. Undeniably, since both the farming and the establishment of a factory took time, at the beginning this commodity was imported from Argentina, making Francesco’s store the nation’s only flour supplier. In the meantime, thanks to the friendship he had with some bankers, in 1900 Matarazzo obtained a loan from London and Brasilian Bank, with the aim of building the first gristmill of Brasil: the notorious Moinho 6 The joint-stock companies, also known as anonymous companies, are approximately the present-day equivalent to the public limited companies of the United Kingdom and the public companies of the United States. At the time of their creation, shareholders were anonymous, and dividends were therefore paid to whoever held the certificate. Given that this type of corporation caused money laundering, tax evasion and other issues, nowadays they work in a different way in the countries which still adopt this classification. 7 Ltda stands for private limited company, where the shareholders benefit from limited liability.

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Matarazzo. According to some documents dating back to the beginning of the twentieth century: “The mill was built and assembled according to the design of the Henry Simon Ltd. By the specialist engineers Rey and Prist. The main building, made up of four floors, contains all the washing, cleaning and grinding machinery. With a such modern grinding system, the gristmill produces daily three thousand and five hundred bags of flour, i.e., about forty-four thousand kilos, and more than two thousand bags of bran. The motor power is composed of two electric motors of three hundred horsepower, and the workforce comprises two hundred fifty labourers” (Vichnewski, 2004, 50). As the demand grew, it was necessary to expand the gristmill, favoring the hiring of new workers, mostly Italian immigrants, as well as the importation of higher quantities of wheat. Matarazzo’s ambition did not end with the mill. In the same year of the foundation of the mill, together with other Italian entrepreneurs, he founded the Italian Commercial Bank of São Paulo, whose mission was to back financially Italian immigrants in the constitution of their business, and to facilitate the transfer of money from Brasil to Italy. From this bank, other credit institutions were then established, all of which Francesco owned most of the shares. In 1902, he founded the Matarazzo Metallurgy, with the aim of manufacturing the cans for the packaging of his products, but also for the fabrication of machinery and the tools necessary for their maintenance. Two years later, he also established a textile factory named after his daughter, Mariangela. This new plant was designed in England, where the main pieces of machinery were also bought. The factory dealt with the spinning and weaving of cotton. In 1910, dyeing and stamping were added, too. Cotton entered the factory in its natural form, and was then put into the ginning machines. It was then transported in engines that mixed it until it became uniform, and then prepared it on the reels for spinning. About twenty thousand meters of cotton were produced per day, thanks to the labor of six hundred workers and a motor power that comprised nine electric motors of four hundred fifty horsepower.8 In all these factories 86 Horsepower used to be a unit of measurement for power. One electric horsepower is equal to exactly 746 watts located within the same area. After some time, following the cultivation 8 Horsepower used to be a unit of measurement for power. One electric horsepower is equal to exactly 746 watts.

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of rice in Brasil, a facility for its treatment was also built. In order to avoid wasting the seeds left over from cleaning process, Matarazzo also established an oil and soap factory, called Sol Levante. About sixty workers worked in this new facility, which produced eight thousand liters of oil per day, whose residue was destined for the production of soap, which reached five thousand liters per day. As reported by Matarazzo himself, “one thing leads to another”, and this summarizes his business strategy. In fact, from the sale of flour, he passed to its production, which then led to the manufacturing of the tools used for the factory and to the textile fabrication for the bags used for its packaging. The main reason for this strategy was due to the fact that there were no other major industries in Brasil that could meet the demand of Matarazzo’s factories. With very high customs duties, it was always worthwhile for him to produce everything he needed for the production and sale of his finished products. In the contemporary times, which are marked by the presence of many industries, this strategy is sometimes implemented by large corporations that want to control the entire market and own shares in different other companies. Logically, this is often not allowed by the national laws because the reason behind such practice is not the necessity that the entrepreneur has, but rather the greed that the shareholders of the corporation have. In 1911, Francesco Matarazzo united all of his factories into a single anonymous company, named Reunited Industries Factories Matarazzo,9 also known with the acronym IRFM. 80% of the shares of this company belonged to him, followed by those of his brother Andrea, corresponding to approximately 19%, and the remaining to various other shareholders. This group comprised: the lard factory of Capão Bonito; the Matarazzo’s mill for the production of flour and bran; Mariangela’s textile factory; the rice mills of São Paulo and Iguape; the Sol Levante oil and soap factory; the Matarazzo starch factory; the Matarazzo sugar refinery; Belenzinho weaving factory; and some warehouses and wharves in the most important ports of the country. In this way, Francesco produced all he needed. The great success of his works is also due to his investment in raw materials, which were until then imported. In fact, such materials were necessary for production processes and, without involving other suppliers, he closed all the stages of the production line within his corporation. Over time,

9 Literal translation of “Indústrias Reunidas Fábricas Matarazzo”.

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his company continued to expand without limits. In 1921, he started to buy other factories, especially those formerly belonging to the Pamplona Industries, which produced soap, candles, and greases. Subsequently, the group established: a tannery factory (1922); a rayon factory (1924); a paper, cardboard, and cellulose factory (1930); the Matarazzo Ceramics (1935); an oil refinery (1938); and a chemical factory specialized in the production of aluminium sulphate, caustic soda, acetylene, calcium carbide, and sulfuric acid (1939).

Giuseppe Martinelli’s Shipping and Construction Companies Francesco Matarazzo’s corporation is one of the most important industrial cases of the business history of South America. In fact, as a destitute person, through his foresight and entrepreneurial skills, he managed to build a commercial empire. Nonetheless, he was not the only one to mark the history of Brasil. While he was growing his business, another future giant of entrepreneurship arrived in the state of São Paulo: Giuseppe Martinelli. He came from Tuscany, and was born in Lucca in 1870. Similarly to Matarazzo, he came from a wealthy family. His parents had a construction company and were involved in the public procurement. In his case, too, as a result of financial difficulties, he found himself unable to work in Italy and to pursue the studies in architecture that he had always desired. Precisely for this reason, together with other fellow villagers, in 1893, Martinelli emigrated to Brasil at the age of twenty-three. He had no initial investment with him, but only a great desire to redeem himself. Once he landed in the port of Santos, he headed to the state capital, where he worked in a small Italian store as a butcher. During this period, he saw the birth and development of Matarazzo’s copious factories and, passing in front of his construction sites every day, he felt the need to do something majestic, too. After all, even Francesco started from nothing and eventually made his fortune. Precisely for this reason, before the end of the nineteenth century, he moved to Santos and worked for the Fiaccadori Brothers corporation,10 a group that dealt with customs operations. Upon his brother’s arrival from Italy, Giuseppe

10 It must be mentioned that they were the first adherents of the Brasil’s Italian Chamber of Commerce.

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decided to found the Martinelli Brothers with him. Thanks to his previous job, he realized that there was a lot of potential of business growth in the shipping industry. Therefore, he dealt with the importation of food commodities from Mediterranean countries and of Carrara marble from Italy. At the same time, he also carried out coffee and cereal exportations to the ports of Naples and Genoa. Their business was so profitable that with those gains they bought shares in the foreign joint-venture commercial banks of Brasil. This hazardous investment allowed them to obtain an exceptional fortune. Unfortunately, when running a family business, domestic disputes are also added to the entrepreneurial risks. Analogously to Francesco Matarazzo’s story, after a long series of conflicts with his brother, Martinelli decided to leave the previously founded firm to start his own business. In 1911, he established the Martinelli anonymous company. With the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, his enterprise was the only one to guarantee a constant flow of imports and exports between Brasil and Europe. With ever higher profits, Giuseppe decided to set up another shipping company, which this time had its own fleet. Therefore, in 1917, Lloyd Nacional was founded. This joint-stock company had a registered capital of eight thousand réis, divided into approximately eight thousand shares. The headquarters were no longer located in the port of Santos, but in the capital of Brasil, Rio de Janeiro. The first ship owned was the Campeiro, with a total tonnage of four thousand tons. One year later, he acquired the Alice, of six thousand tons; Belém, of four thousand two hundred tons; Campinas and Vittoria, both of two thousand eight hundred tons; Neuquém, of two thousand two hundred tons; and finally Rio Amazonas, of two thousand tons (Campello, 2007). The number grew steadily over the years, reaching twenty-two ships in 1922. The main route was from Rio de Janeiro to Santos, Marseille, and Genoa on the outward. On the inward journey, the ships also stopped in the ports of Barcelona, Málaga, and Gibraltar. Needless to say, there were also some minor routes whose vessels landed within the Brasilian territory. Although at the beginning Martinelli worked in the field of shipping, later he also took care of the transport of people. After a few years after the end of the world conflict, however, other navigation companies began to appear in Brasil and Europe, affecting negatively his business. As he was no longer competitive, he preferred selling all his shares to Henrique Lage, his main competitor, for a value of twenty thousand réis. Once

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out of the maritime industry, and with a millionaire fortune, Martinelli realized it was time to achieve his childhood dream of following his parents’ footsteps. So it was that in 1924 he founded a 66-construction company. Since he was a young adult, Giuseppe saw with admiration the work of Count Matarazzo who, in addition to creating an industrial empire, also built one of the largest mansions in São Paulo, symbol of his wealth and social status.11 For this reason, he wanted to mark his presence and success in the same city, too. Since he came from an area of Italy characterized by the numerosity of tall medieval towers, which reflected the prominence of the owner families, he decided to build a colossal construction in his adoptive nation. From the perspective of the modern era, such a structure was represented by a skyscraper: the Martinelli Building. Having never completed university studies in architecture, Martinelli’s skyscraper was designed by the Hungarian architect Vilmos Fillinger. The initial project planned the presence of twelve floors, and a total height of about fifty hundred meters. This novelty generated scepticism on the part of the citizens, since there were no buildings with more than five floors. Nonetheless, the construction began in 1924, on São Bento Street, in the heart of the state capital. The structure was made of reinforced concrete, imported from Sweden and Norway by Martinelli himself. The exterior was inspired by the notorious deluxe hotels of North America. The architecture belonged to the classical school, with a division into three parts: base, central body, and crown. The base was made of red granite. The body, instead, was painted pink, and shattering glass with rock crystals was added to the varnish with the goal of making the facade sparkle at night. Lastly, the crown was painted white. As for the interiors, luxurious materials and objects were used. The doors were made of Riga pine wood, the stairs of Carrara marble, the glass and mirrors were Belgian, the sanitary wares were British and, finally, the elevators and telephones were Swiss. Martinelli bought everything that was considered the best of that time. Furthermore, on the main floors he covered the walls

11 The mansion was located in Paulista Avenue. It was built according to the principles

of the neoclassical style, and occupied an area of four thousand four hundred square meters. Despite the opposition of Francesco’s descendants, it was demolished in 1996 in order to build a shopping center. This event was criticized by many illustrious personalities, since a landmark and symbol of the industrial history of the country had been canceled forever.

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with marble, a symbol of the wealth he possessed. All this required a ten-year commitment from more than six hundred workers and ninety artisans, mostly Italian immigrants. It is important to point out that the initial design was constantly changed over time. In fact, Martinelli wanted to add more and more floors and, at the end of the construction, the building counted thirty floors and a height of about one hundred meters. This created two problems. The first was of legal nature, since local laws did not allow the erection of skyscrapers due to political choices, subsequently resolved. The second was of financial nature. The cost was exorbitant and, with the impossibility of paying off his debts, Martinelli sold a large part of the building to the Italian government.12 It must be highlighted that with Brasil’s entrance into World War II, the structure was then occupied by the Brasilian government, which still owns it today. As has been said previously, people were not used to such huge facilities. Indeed, the size of the skyscraper made people afraid to live in it, since they thought it could collapse at any moment. In order to deny this, Giuseppe and his family moved into the building in 1929, before the construction work was completed. The first tenant was Arturo Patrizi, who also opened a dance school there. Subsequently, other famous people rented their apartments there. Eventually, Martinelli left the building after the Brasilian government took possession of it in 1943. Then, he decided to move to Rio de Janeiro, where he built other tall buildings which all counted about twenty floors. There, he died in 1946. Two years before his death, in São Paulo, the building of the national bank, nowadays known as Farol Santander, was finished, becoming the highest skyscraper in Brasil and South America. This caused the loss of that title to Martinelli’s work. Unfortunately, starting in the 1950s, the building entered a phase of deterioration, with many crimes occurring there and with occupation by the homeless. Only in 1975, the municipality decided to renovate it, recognizing its exemplary symbolic and historical value. Indeed, even today many public bodies and banks have their headquarters there. In addition, it has also become a tourist attraction, where people can admire the enormity of São Paulo from its roof terrace. The Martinelli Building is not only a legacy of one of Brasil’s most influential entrepreneurs, but 12 It was sold exactly to the National Credit Institute for the Italian Work Abroad, a governmental institution that collected the savings of Italian immigrants for the financing and development of Italian firms located abroad.

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it was also a source of inspiration for the subsequent generations. In fact, with the same intention of Giuseppe, the Italian Circle, which is the association of Italian immigrants who lived in São Paulo, decided to build the highest facility in the state capital of their time, that was the 1960s. Although today this record has been lost, the Itália Building still represents the second tallest skyscraper in São Paulo. Undeniably, without Martinelli’s ambitions, there would be no material legacy of the Italian immigrants, whose hard work was crucial for the progress of their new homeland.

Abramo Eberle’s Metallurgical Enterprise Francesco Matarazzo and Giuseppe Martinelli represent entrepreneurial cases of magnificent success among the Italian immigrants of Brasil. The former came from a small village in Campania, a region of southern Italy. The latter, instead, came from a medieval town of Tuscany, in the centre of the peninsula. Both belonged to wealthy families and emigrated by their own choice, paying for their own transoceanic ticket and taking care personally of their first occupation and dwelling. Nonetheless, this form of immigration was not the norm. In fact, it was much more common for Italians to be seduced by migration agents to expatriate to Brasil through the payment of their transfer and the certainty of receiving a work contract once they arrived in their promised land. Among the millions of Italians who moved to South America in this way, the Eberle family must be mentioned. They came from Northern Italy, and headed to a colony founded by Venetians in the state of Rio Grande do Sul (Tessari, 2013; Tisott, 2011). They constitute the third case of great entrepreneurial success that has marked the economic history of Brasil, leaving behind a legacy that still exists today. Abramo Eberle was born on 2nd April 1880. He was the second-born of Giuseppe Eberle and Luigia Zanrosso, two farmers who came from Monte Magrè, a small village in the municipality of Schio in Veneto. Due to the hopeless socio-economic situation of Italy at the end of the nineteenth century, Giuseppe decided that his household had to expatriate. Together with other fellow countrymen, he entrusted some migration agents who made them leave from the port of Genoa in 1884. Their harsh journey lasted several days, and eventually arrived in the state of Rio Grande do Sul, where they were headed to the Italian colony of Campos dos Bugres, later known with the name of Caxias do Sul.

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The immigrants generally prepared for their expatriation as best as they could, usually bringing with them tools that they considered vital to start working in those new lands. Indeed, Giuseppe brought with him some devices that were necessary for the production of grappa,13 a good not yet produced or imported into that territory. Once he had reached a sufficient amount of money, in 1886 he bought a smithy, which previously belonged to Francesco Rossi. The price of this purchase was worth about six hundred réis, and the contract also provided for the original owner to teach the buyer the crafts. Because of his health problems, Giuseppe preferred to buy a plot of land and devote himself to agriculture, leaving the forge to his wife Luigia, who was also helped by her children. Luigia, thus, began to produce tinplate, buckets, alembics,14 and other minor tools. As Sunday was the day when all the colonos met in the main church to celebrate the Mass together, Luigia went to the town square to sell her products (Tessari, 2013; Tisott, 2011). Precisely for this reason, in the colony she took the nickname of “Gigia Bandera”, which in the Talian dialect means “Luigia the blacksmith”. Although the business was going well, Giuseppe decided to focus only on agriculture, asking his family to join him in his other property, and thus selling the smithy. Contrary to this idea, his son Abramo, who helped his mother during the weekends in the workshop, proposed to buy it for six hundred réis. Surprised by the boldness of his son, who was only sixteen, the father accepted the offer. After buying his father’s forge, Abramo invited two friends of his, Rombaldi and Boff, to be partners and employees in the small factory. The first product they made was a metal lamp, designed to illuminate the nights in the colony that still did not have electricity. In addition to the workshop and small store, he opened a glasswork. Although he had his own business, Abramo continued to help his family. In fact, in his frequent trips to the city of Porto Alegre, where he went to buy raw materials for his factory, he also sold his family’s agricultural products. There, he entered into a commercial network that favored the growth of both his business and the one of his father. At the beginning of the new century, he married Elisa Venzon, who was also an immigrant 13 A type of Italian strong alcohol beverage made from grapes. 14 As reported in the Merriam-Webster dictionary, the alembic is a kind of still that

has been used since ancient times for the production of distilled beverages. It consists of a gourd-shaped container and a cap with a long beak for conveying the products to a receiver.

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from Veneto. This marriage was important for the further development of the firm. It must be noted that, during that period, marriage represented the union of two sources of capital and workforce. In fact, while his wife’s family provided the supply of raw materials, Elisa was in charge of managing the forge. At the same time, Abramo could easily travel to the other states in Brasil to sell his and his family’s products. Especially in the southeastern region, where there was a large number of Italians working at the coffee plantations, he was able to sell such commodities with ease. In this way, the business growth of the small factory was rapid. In 1904, Abramo decided to invest his capital in the establishment of a new enterprise, independent from the smithy, together with his childhood friend Luigi Gasparetto. They founded a proper metallurgical factory, named Goldsmith and Blacksmith Abramo Eberle & Company. Their strategy was product differentiation by producing pieces of jewelry, copper utensils, and riding articles, such as stirrups, spurs, and harnesses, all of which were in great demand. The company had a large number of employees, too. Among them, there were many apprentices. These young workers, who were between the ages of eight and thirteen, worked with extremely low wages in exchange of professional experience. For them, working in a factory was an important opportunity to learn a new profession, which would have guaranteed them to have a potential job in the urban centers, since many of them came from farming families who were starting to abandon the countryside to go to more prosperous and urbanized areas. Thanks to this contract, the paternalistic system of the company can already be observed. Paternalism made workers feel like an integral part of a large family, as they considered their employer as a close friend or even as a father. In fact, throughout Abramo’s life, no worker went on strike or joined trade unions. This vast number of employees was due to the fact that, in the early twentieth century, the labor of workers was mainly artisanal. Only in the 1920s, the first automated machines began to be introduced into the factory, together with the installation of electric motors, necessary for the operation of the devices. In fact, during this period, Abramo sold the tools of the old smithy to devote himself exclusively to the previously founded independent company. It should be noted that Eberle went through Matarazzo’s same struggle. In Brasil, indeed, there were still no basic industries where to buy the indispensable machinery. For this reason, he had to import it and, in order to find the

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best buyer but also to learn the most modern techniques, he began a long series of journeys. The first ones occurred during the period of World War I in Argentina and Uruguay, countries bordering the gaucho state,15 with the aim of purchasing raw materials, unavailable in Brasil. As Franco (1943) noted, the Great War was an opportunity for the growth of many South American enterprises since the European competition dropped dramatically, boosting the development of national industries. Other business trips took place in the early 1920s to North America and Europe. Among these, it must be mentioned that of New York, where Abramo also took his wife for medical examinations, given that she suffered from constant palpitations and no Brasilian doctor was able to cure her. At the same time, he seized the moment to visit some American factories to learn about their new technologies and techniques. Later, he returned to Italy, where he was looking for a technical school where his children could study. Under the advice of some industrialists, he decided to go to Germany, where he enrolled his eldest son in an academy of Mittweida, in Saxony, and where he also learned more about mechanics and electronics. Once back in Brasil, together with other investors, he founded the anonymous company Eberle, Mosele & Co., an extension of the previous group. Thanks to the new capital, more forges were bought, and he opened other hardware, kitchenware, and glass stores. In 1925, the firm changed its name again, being now known as Great Metallurgical Factory Abramo Eberle & Company. Additional productions were introduced, such as those of sacred items, intended for the newly built churches, but also of small iron weapons. A second spur for the development of the enterprise occurred during the Second World War. With the impossibility of importing electric motors, Abramo realized that it was time to produce his own. The result of this was successful, meeting even the demand of a large slice of both the domestic and international market. During the 1940s, the company experienced an exponential growth in revenues. Furthermore, with Brasil’s

15 The term gaucho is used to define a cowboy of the South American pampas, fertile lowlands that comprise Rio Grande do Sul, Uruguay, and a vast area of Argentina. In Brasil, this expression is also used to describe the state or even the citizens of Rio Grande do Sul.

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entry into the world war in 1942, the factory started to produce armaments for the Brasilian Expeditionary Force.16 Abramo Eberle died in 1945, and the management of the firm passed to his son, José Abramo, commonly known as Beppin. He had previously studied and worked for years in Europe, learning the new technologies and operations fundamental for his family business. Precisely for this reason, he realized that it was time to import new pieces of machinery to meet the ever-increasing demand, which was favored by the end of the world conflict. Not having enough capital, he decided to invest everything he had in the purchase of typical Italian food products produced in Caxias do Sul and to be sold in other areas of Brasil. In this way, he managed to have enough money to buy the most modern industrial machines. In the meantime, he also built new industrial facilities, the first in brick and concrete of the city, since beforehand everything was in wood, an abundant material of that territory. Similarly to his father, Beppin died young in 1953. Therefore, the company management passed to the third Eberle generation, represented by Claudio, Beppin’s firstborn. In this new administration, the company went through two distinct moments. The first was characterized by a rapid growth, favored by the urbanization process that led many farmers to move to Caxias do Sul, which had then become a city. The second, instead, occurred during the 1960s, when Claudio decided to transform the structure of the enterprise, by listing its shares on the São Paulo Stock Exchange. In this way, penetration of foreign direct investments into the corporate capital began. In 1974, the company also started producing buttons, metal rings, rivets, and buckles, all intended for the textile industry.

Other Significant Entrepreneurs Matarazzo, Martinelli, and Eberle were the three most important businessmen in the history of Brasil in terms of turnover and in the marks left in their new nation. Francesco succeeded in building a real industrial empire, characterized by the massive presence of a large number of factories in different sectors. Furthermore, he was the first entrepreneur to guarantee benefits to his employees. Martinelli’s entrepreneurial life

16 It was a branch of the Brasilian Army which consisted of about twenty-six thousand soldiers. It mainly fought in the Battle of the Atlantic and in Italy.

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can be divided into two moments. The former was dedicated to navigation, where he founded a firm with his own name with the mission of importing and exporting finished goods, as well as a company which had its own fleet that counted twenty-two ships. The second, instead, was marked by the construction industry, which allowed him to build the first skyscraper in all South America. Finally, Eberle, through his family business, managed to constantly grow his enterprise that began from a small smithy and later became a metallurgical company, now merged into a large multinational corporation. He, too, played a fundamental role in terms of employee satisfaction and in the development of the city in which he was based. They came respectively from southern, central, and northern Italy, and emigrated to two of the most important states for Italian immigrants: São Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul. Undeniably, they were not the only ones to achieve extraordinary results. Before mentioning other cases of lesser size yet still significant in the history of Brasilian entrepreneurship, it is necessary to emphasize once again how the Italians were vital for the economic expansion of their adoptive nation. According to some research of the Italian Chamber of Commerce located in São Paulo, before the end of the 1920s, there were about one thousand Italian companies in that region (Trento, 1989, 143); a remarkable number, considering that the industrialization process had not yet started in the historical period under consideration. Most of those businesses were textile, followed then by those for building materials, metallurgical and, lastly, agricultural. In addition to entrepreneurs, there were also many Italian retailers, who sold the products of their compatriots to a working class that was always growing in number and wealth. São Paulo was the polestar of the great Italian immigration and entrepreneurship. Precisely for this reason, it is necessary to start mentioning some prominent entrepreneurs of this state. One of high caliber was Rodolfo Crespi. He was born in 1874 in Lombardy. After working in the family laundry during his youth, in 1893 he moved with his friend to Brasil. In 1897, together with his fatherin-law Pietro Regoli, he founded Regoli, Crespi & Company, a cotton mill located in the capital state.17 When Pietro died, he remained the sole owner of the company, which was then renamed only after him. Under his administration, the business expanded both geographically and financially.

17 Historical Archive “Cavalieri del lavoro”, Cartella 2 Nella Busta LVII.

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Thanks to the accumulation of capital, he built a 250-square-meter English-style factory in the Italian Mooca district. Due to the absence of laws in defense of workers, Crespi took advantage of this legislative vacuum to be able to increase the working hours of his employees without paying them overtime. This was one of the main causes that led to a series of strikes which began in 1917.18 The result of this rebellion ended with the negotiations in favor of the laborers who had a wage increase of 20%, together with the right to join trade unions. In addition to being a textile entrepreneur, Crespi also founded the Italian Bank of São Paulo, now incorporated into ABN AMRO, a Dutch bank.19 Similarly to Eberle and Matarazzo, he was a sponsor, too, especially for the construction of the Dante Alighieri Italian school,20 the Brasilian fascist newspaper “Il Piccolo”, and the “Clube Atlético Juventus” football team.21 Furthermore, Crespi ran the presidency of the Italian Circle of São Paulo from 1928 to 1930. Another significant Lombard entrepreneur was Egidio Pinotti Gamba. He was born in 1872 and arrived in Brasil with his family at the tender age of ten. At the beginning of the twentieth century, he built several textile factories in the popular Italian neighborhood of Mooca. Later, in the same area, he opened a soap, oil, and glycerin industrial unit. In 1917, he also set up a sugar refinery. The various companies were merged in 1934 into the Great Mills Minetti Gamba corporation, which in the 1960s ceased its activity. Even today, the facilities that Crespi and Pinotti Gamba built can be visited in the state capital, representing a material heritage of the dawn of Brasil’s industrial revolution.22 18 In 1917 a national strike took place in the states of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Rio Grande do Sul. Most of the adherents were low-wage workers, mainly women and young people. The reason for such revolt was attributable to the poorly paid salaries that did not allow laborers the purchase of food, whose prices increased speedily due to the beginning of the First World War. 19 Historical Archive “Cavalieri del lavoro”, Cartella 2 Nella Busta LVII. 20 The school was founded for the children of immigrants. Being a bilingual institution,

students could learn both the local language and standard Italian, not yet known among the popular classes. Still today it is open and operational, and offers to new pupils the possibility of attaining the Italian high school diploma. 21 This football team must not be confused with Juventus Football Club, an Italian team located in Turin. 22 The buildings are located in the Mooca district, in the eastern area of the city of São Paulo, exactly in the Borges de Figueiredo Street.

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Moving toward Central Italy, another crucial entrepreneur was Pietro Morganti. He came from Tuscany and arrived in Brasil in 1890. As a young man, he worked in his brother’s coffee factory in São Paulo until he decided to open his own sugar refining plant. During the period of the crisis in the coffee sector, he managed to establish himself as the leading exponent of the sugar industry, taking the nickname of “King of Sugar” (Schiavon, 2022). Since he was a nationalist, in his firm only Italians worked. During the outbreak of World War II, he even financially supported the families of the employees who decided to return to Italy to join the army. However, he was not the only one working in the sugar industry. The brothers Nicola and Giuseppe Puglisi Carbone, originally from the city of Catania in Sicily, moved to Brasil at the end of the nineteenth century with the intention of selling the local products of their family. In 1910 they decided to found the Union of Refiners group, a company that brought together many small refiners from São Paulo in order to guarantee large quantities of excellent quality sugar. Two years later, the Coffee Union was added. In 1928, the group was sold and, during the twentieth century, it passed into the hands of various entrepreneurs until it was merged into the NovAmérica corporation, which nowadays offers the “União” sweets line, reminiscent of the initial firm (Schiavon, 2021). Another relevant businessman from southern Italy was Alessandro Siciliano. He was born in 1860 in Calabria and arrived in Brasil six years later, in one of the first Italian immigrants’ ships. He was one of the founders of the Mechanical and Importer Company, a pioneer in the manufacture of agricultural machinery, in the production of steel, and in the exportation of meat. He was also a member of the executive of the French Italian Bank, and president of the Italian Chamber of Commerce of São Paulo and of the Umberto I hospital.23 He was also the creator of the Conference of Taubaté of 1906, a treaty signed by the Brasilian coffeeexporting states that set the minimum price that the federal government had to pay for unsold surpluses of coffee. This agreement subsequently triggered the crisis in the coffee sector. Up until now, only entrepreneurs

23 Umberto I hospital was built in 1904 thanks to the donations of the Matarazzo family. After many years of activity, in 1993, following the bankruptcy, it closed definitively. Although the construction represents a cultural heritage of the city of São Paulo, the building was abandoned and left to deteriorate. It is currently undergoing renovation and recovery.

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who operated within São Paulo have been mentioned, but undeniably other major Italian businessmen also worked in other states, such as Geremia Lunardelli. He was born in 1885 in Veneto. At the age of two, he emigrated with his family in a rural area of the state of São Paulo to found a colony (Cenni, 2002). Starting in 1915, he had begun to buy various vast coffee plantations. When the crisis of the coffee industry occurred, he took advantage of the reduction in the cost of land to expand his fazendas in other federal states. In this way, he reached possession of eighteen million coffee brushes, which made him obtain the nickname of “King of Coffee”. Besides him, additional Italian businessmen also operated in the other federal states. In the state of Rio Grande do Sul, Feliciano Valduga, and Giuseppe Franceschini, both from Trentino, must be mentioned (Cappellin & Giuliani, 2011). Valduga opened an important forge in the city of Bento Gonçalves, while Franceschini opened the first fabric and textile company of that time. In the same city, the Salton family also played a predominant role. They emigrated from Veneto in 1878 and later opened a winery, called Paolo Salton & Brothers.24 Today this company has become the leader in the production and sale of spumante, considered the best type of sparkling wine of Brasil. Another eminent winery of those lands was the Aurora Cooperative. It was founded in 1931 with the intention of uniting about sixteen grapeproducing families.25 It was the first of the present numerous gaucho cooperatives, and today it is also the largest, counting the association of more than one thousand and one hundred families. In the same historical period, also the Todeschini, coming from Veneto, marked their presence. They opened the first factory of musical instruments of the area, goods were then exported throughout the Americas. Nowadays the firm has turned into a manufacturer of home furnishings. A little further north, i.e., in the state of Santa Catarina, Perdigão e Sadia companies must be highlighted. The former was founded in 1934 by the Ponzoni and Brandalise families. At the beginning, the small enterprise dealt with food trade. During the 1930s, a slaughterhouse was also opened. The business expanded rapidly soon after. In 1958, it was the first company to install a quality control body. At the same time, the management decided to

24 https://www.salton.com.br/a-salton/a-nossa-historia. 25 https://www.vinicolaaurora.com.br/historia.

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differentiate their products by adding poultry. All these goods were then exported all over the world. The latter, instead, was founded by Attilio Fontana in 1944. He started with a pork slaughtering and processing business, intended to meet the ever-growing domestic demand. In recent times, the two companies merged, becoming industry leaders in South America. All the entrepreneurs who have been described so far had in common the arrival in Brasil during the period of the Italian diaspora. However, even in the following years, a limited but substantial number of Italians continued to reach this country. Some of them became important businessmen as well. Therefore, Carlo Bauducco and Pietro Sportelli must be mentioned.26 Carlo emigrated to Brasil in 1948 and opened a small pastry shop in São Paulo. In this store, he mainly produced panettone, following his family recipe. He was the first to import this sweet to Brasil, which had great and rapid success. Later, he opened three factories, whose products were destined to reach all territories of the nation. In this way, his panettone, the Italian symbol of Christmas, acquired the same value in Brasil, too. Nowadays his company also deals with the production of other sweets, such as prepackaged biscuits and brioches. Pietro Sportelli, who came from Apulia, instead, emigrated in 1960. Together with his wife, in 1974 he founded Hammer Auto parts Manufactures Ltda., later known with the name AETHRA. They began with the production of small spare parts for cars for the domestic market until becoming one of the largest companies in South America in this industry. Today the company also deals with the supply of engineering services and tools.

Conclusions Modern Brasil is not a monocentric country (Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Bahia) but a polycentric one, still in progress, to whose construction both the traditional components of colonial origin and those derived from emigration have contributed and contribute (Corti & Sanfilippo, 2009). The number of Italians who immigrated to Brasil from 1880 to 1930 is noteworthy (Franzina 1979, 1992). About one and a half million Italian immigrants decided to relocate to the South American country in this period of time, representing the second most widespread nationality after

26 https://www.casabauducco.com.br/institucional/nossa-historia.

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the Portuguese one. Their presence was massive particularly in certain areas of Brasil. In fact, in the first decades, immigrants were directed to the southern macro-region with the purpose of founding towns. Here, especially in the state of Rio Grande do Sul and in the southern regions of Santa Catarina, entire territories were inhabited exclusively by Italians. Later, however, the new immigrants were sent to work in the fazendas located in the southeastern macro-region. In this case, the state of São Paulo received the largest number of Italians. With an overall amount of Italians so large and limited exclusively in those areas, it is undeniable that their culture influenced those territories which, being the most powerful and richest places of the nation, later have shaped the Brasilian culture in the broad sense. The three fundamental values of Italian immigrants were their family spirit, fervent religiosity, and strong sense of belonging to the community that was first linked to their own colonies and subsequently to the circles of Italians. Between the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, the world was characterized by many large migration flows, of which the Italian one was of great importance. Wherever they went, Italians distinguished themselves for their hard work, love for their family, and entrepreneurial spirit. In the specific case of Brasil, they brought many benefits to the nation. Here, they were welcomed in large numbers through a strategy developed by the various governments of the states of the Brasilian Republic. They often had their journey subsidized, and their destination had already been decided before they even left their homeland. Many Italians went to the southern macro-region where they founded several towns, creating small yet significant communities. Among those, Serra Gaucha must be mentioned since it is an entire area made up of many small villages established by Italian settlers, which even today still stand out for its Italian identity. Another considerable number of Italians, on the other hand, went to the southeastern macro-region, where they worked at the fazendas. Some of them managed to become owners of coffee plantations, whereas others succeeded in accumulating enough capital to start their own businesses. Among the many immigrant entrepreneurs, the most important was Francesco Matarazzo. He began by producing lard and later created many factories within the nation, establishing an industrial empire. Thanks to the vertical integration that characterized his corporation and his paternalistic spirit, he managed to become one of the greatest entrepreneurs in South America, as well as the richest Italian of his time.

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Giuseppe Martinelli also played a fundamental role in Brasil’s business history. From being a simple employee, he accumulated wealth thanks to his investments in the shipping sector which, during the period of World War II, was very profitable. Subsequently, his ambition to leave a material legacy to Brasil was achieved by building the first skyscraper in South America, which can still be visited today and is named after him. In addition to them, there are: Abramo Eberle, founder of the largest metallurgical industry of the nation, still in operation even if it is under the management of other shareholders; Rodolfo Crespi, who was both a predominant industrialist in São Paulo and a philanthropist, whose funded buildings still exist; Pietro Morganti, defined as the king of sugar; the Salton family, who introduced the Venetian cooperative model in the winemaking industry; and many other outstanding immigrants. Therefore, the immigrants of the past have been vital for the economic and industrial development of Brasil. Without their entrepreneurship, desire to improve, and foresight, this process would have happened much later. In addition to the economy, they have also contributed to society, greatly influencing Brasilian culture in terms of values, language, cuisine, religion, and ethics. Italian immigrants were among the most important nationalities for Brasil and their contribution is still valued and remembered today. Although in recent decades the reverse phenomenon has been taking place, especially with the arrival of the oriundi, many entrepreneurs and many Italian companies continue to invest and do business in Brasil, thanks to the advantages arising from the cultural bond of these two nations.

References Bevilacqua, P., De Clementi, A., & Franzina, E. (2009). Storia dell’emigrazione italiana, 1, Partenze. Donzelli. Bloch, M. (1953). The Historian’s Craft. Alfred A. Knopf. Campello, C. A. (2007). Henrique Lage e a Companhia Nacional de Navegação Costeira. Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro. Cappellin, P., & Giuliani G. M. (2011). Entre a memória e o mercado: famílias e empresas de origem italiana no Brasil. In Anais do XXVI Simpósio Nacional de História. Associação Nacional de História. Cenni, F. (2002). Italianos no Brasil. “Andiamo i ‘Merica…” (3rd ed.). Editoria da Universidade de São Paulo. Corti, P., & Sanfilippo, M. (Eds.). (2009). Migrazioni. In Storia d’Italia. Annali 24. Einaudi.

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Couto, R. C. (2004). Matarazzo. Planeta do Brasil. Dean, W. (1971). The Industrialization of São Paulo 1880–1945. Cambridge University Press. Dean, W. (1997). Brazil and the Struggle for Rubber: A Study in Environmental History. Cambridge University Press. Fauri, F. (2015). Storia economica delle migrazioni italiane. Il Mulino. Franco, A. (1943). Abramo já tocou… ou a epopéia de um imigrante. São Paulo. Franzina, E. (1992). L’immaginario degli emigranti. Miti e raffigurazioni dell’esperienza italiana all’estero tra due secoli. Pagus. Franzina, E. (1979). Merica! Merica! Emigrazione e colonizzazione nelle lettere dei contadini veneti in America Latina (1876–1902). Feltrinelli. Furtado, C. (1959). Formação econômica do Brasil. Companhia das Letras. Lanza, A. L. (2013). Immigration and Economic Development: Brazil and Argentina (1870–1930). Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 4(11), 116–123. Piluso, G. (1994). Le banche miste italiane in Sud America: Strategie mercati e organizzazioni (1906–1933). Impresa e Società, Liuc Papers 7. Serie Storia, 2, 1–33. Prado, C. J. (1979). História Econômica do Brasil. Brasiliense. Rodrigues, M. L., & Vilela, R. (2013). Família Matarazzo: Primeiro caso relevante de sucessão de um grupo familiar no Brasil. FGV—Grupo de Estudos de Empresas Familiares. Governança Global. Schiavon, R. (2022). Pedro Morganti: italiano se tornou gigante do setor sucroalcooleiro. https://italianismo.com.br/pedro-morganti-italiano-setornou-gigante-do-setor-sucroalcooleiro/. 13 February 2022. Schiavon, R. (2021). Irmãos Carbone: vieram vender vinho e criaram o Açúcar União. https://italianismo.com.br/irmaos-carbone-vieram-vender-vinho-e-cri aram-o-acucar-uniao/. 4 July 2021. Sori, E. (1979). L’emigrazione italiana dall’Unità alla seconda guerra mondiale. Il Mulino. Tessari, A. B. (2013). Imagens do labor: memória e esquecimento nas fotografias do trabalho da antiga metalúrgica Abramo Eberle (1896–1940) (pp. 28–50). Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul. Tisott, R. V. (2011). A família Eberle e o início do desenvolvimento industrial de Caxias do Sul. In Anais do XXVI Simpósio Nacional de História. Associação Nacional de História. Trento, A. (1989). Do outro lado do Atlântico: um século de imigração italiana no Brasil. Nobel. Vichnewski, H. T. (2004). As indústrias Matarazzo no interior paulista: arquitetura fabril e patrimônio industrial. Universidade Estadual de Campinas.

CHAPTER 5

Science, Techniques, Ideas: Italian Emigration in the Construction of Modern Argentina Paolo Galassi

Introduction The early influx of Italian scientists to the Rio de La Plata region is part of the process of consolidation and subsequent modernisation of the Argentine nation-state that we can observe between the second half of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth century. By placing science, technology and teaching at the service of the construction of the modern state, a new dynamic inaugurated an academic exchange destined to favour the development of international relations between Italy and Argentina, laying the foundations for a broad and lasting cultural, social and economic integration, part of which can still be observed today. Italian technical-scientific immigration was a phenomenon partly propitiated by the “civilising” aspirations that were inherent in Argentina’s National Organisation (roughly between 1852

P. Galassi (B) Universidad Nacional del Sur (UNS), Bahía Blanca, Argentina e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. Fauri and D. Mantovani (eds.), Past and Present Migration Challenges, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39431-7_5

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and 1880) and functional to the construction of modern Argentina, an economic and cultural model of Westernisation pursued by the so-called Generation of the 1980s political elite. It was a dynamic endowed with a specificity of its own, which claims a certain autonomy within the broader study of the migratory dynamics between Italy and Argentina, and whose importance lies in the fact that it constituted a decisive impulse for the affirmation of Argentine scientific culture at the end of the nineteenth century. This process initiated a scientific-intellectual interchange between a European periphery and an American periphery that was beginning to connect itself to the world economy: an eidetic dialogue destined to continue during the first decades of the twentieth century, which would accompany the economic and commercial relations between these two realities. Inserted in a debate on human capital and the transmission of knowledge, this text intends to reconsider the early arrival of Italian scientists and thinkers in the Argentinean context as evidence of how the movement of goods and people that is common in any migratory process is inevitably accompanied by a movement of ideas and to highlight the material and symbolic legacy that can still be observed today in the Rio de la Plata landscape.

Italians in Argentina: An Old Classic In the collection of essays, Why Read the Classics (1991), the Italian writer Italo Calvino formulates one of those definitions that prove useful in cases like this, when we have to think about subjects that are anything but new, about which so much has been written (and so much will be probably written in the future): “a classic is a book that never stops saying what it has to say”. The idea that leads to this synthesis is more or less one that follows: while certain readings from our youth have the merit of providing us with models, tools of analysis, terms of comparison and scales of value, the “re-reading” of the same text at a mature age treasures these pre-acquired and pre-assimilated tools, often present in our cultural baggage at an unconscious level, allowing us to grasp allegories, metaphors and abstractions existing at a deeper level. From this perspective, the re-reading of a “classic” can be compared to a re-discovery: a story that can be read and re-read perpetually, yet each time exquisitely different. A classic does not necessarily teach us something new: and of such a classic theme as the Italian immigration in Argentina we could

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say we know (or at least we have heard) everything by now. Dates, numbers, statistics, stories and micro-stories. Nevertheless, the message and the meaning we can find between the lines of this enormous novel can change, because although the story is always the same, what changes is the era in which we read it. Our point of observation and evaluation. For a start, we are well aware that the 1853 Constitution of the Argentine Republic made immigration its most immediate aim,1 granting the foreign newcomers all the civil rights of Argentine citizens, and thus favouring European- and especially Italian-immigration, which continued to grow steadily between 1883 and 1914.2 On the other hand, it is curious to note that in 1902, during the presidency of Julio Argentino Roca, Law 4.144—better known as the Law of Residence—allowed the deportation of those foreigners considered “undesirable”, among whom were primarily trade union militants. A symptom of the high social conflict, normally associated with the socialist and anarchist currents that arrived with the European migratory flows (Oved, 1976; Suriano, 2001; Zaragoza, 1996), and in clear conflict with the policies of what Botana (1977) defines “the conservative order”: a key period in Argentine history, roughly between 1880 and 1916, characterised by extreme prosperity, in which political and economic power overlapped and converged in the hands of a narrow social nucleus known as oligarchy. Maybe still more intriguing could be the fact that this bill was presented in 1899 by Senator Miguel Cané, one of the main exponents

1 Article 14: “All the inhabitants of the Nation enjoy the following rights in accordance with the laws regulating their exercise, namely: the right to work and to engage in any lawful activity; the right to navigate and trade; to present petitions to the authorities; to enter, remain, transit and leave Argentine territory; to make their ideas public through the press without prior censorship; to use and dispose of their property; to associate for charitable purposes; to worship freely; to teach and learn”. Article 20: “Foreigners enjoy in the territory of the Nation all the civil rights of a citizen; they may conduct their own business, trade and profession, own real estate, acquire the same and dispose of it; navigate along rivers and coasts; freely profess worship; make a will and marry within the law. They are not required to take citizenship, nor to pay extraordinary forcible contributions. They shall obtain nationality after two years of continuous residence in the country, but the authority may shorten this period in favour of those who request it, claiming and proving that they have rendered services to the Republic”. 2 The progression of the flow of Italian emigrants to Argentina went from 284,000 in the period between 1884 and 1893 to 393,000 in the period between 1894 and 1903, increasing to 810,000 between 1894 and World War I (Fauri, 2015).

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of the literary and political elite known as the Generation of’80.3 Born in 1851 in Montevideo, Uruguay, where his family had emigrated due to his father’s opposition to the authoritarian government of Juan Manuel de Rosas (1835–1852), Cané had grown up on the benches of the renowned Colegio Nacional of Buenos Aires: among his teachers, we find the Italian engineer Emilio Rosetti,4 arrived from the little village of Forlimpopoli, who had landed in Buenos Aires with his colleagues and fellow adventurers Pellegrino Strobel and Bernardino Speluzzi (Torri, 2010), whom Cané recalled in his student memoirs Juvenilia (1934).5 During the 50 years that separate the first Argentine Constitution of 1853 and the Law of Residency of 1902, we therefore observe a radical and diametric change in the way the migration issue is addressed: from fomenting European immigration according to Alberdi’s lemma “to govern means to populate” (2008), to observe the effects of a demographic growth that was disproportionate, especially at the urban level, in its ratio of foreigners to criollos.6 A disproportion not without psychological consequences in the middle and upper middle class of which Miguel Cané embodied the thoughts and anxieties.7 3 In his speech Miguel Cané pointed out that “the profound social upheavals that have Europe as their theatre, have highlighted the state of absolute defencelessness of the Argentine state, and this because the Constituent Assembly of 1853 could not have foreseen that among the men of goodwill called to cultivate the land would come the enemies of any social order, who had come to commit savage crimes in the name of a chaotic idea” (Oved, 1976). 4 On Rosetti’s travels and experiences in Argentina, see the texts by Arrighetti (2017) and Torri (2010). 5 “I went into all the old familiar corners, and as I passed under the vaults of the cloister, my memories rose up, obedient to a sympathetic evocation. Here, I said to myself, the good Cosson, so affectionate, so just, read to us the elegies of Gilbert, with sincere enthusiasm, or recited to us the Théraméne’s roll without looking at the book; here was where Professor Rosetti, delighted with my exposition, predicted to me that I would be a distinguished engineer if I persevered in mathematics, for which I was born”. 6 Looking at the censuses of 1887, 1895 and 1904, more than half of Buenos Aires’ population continued to be made up of foreigners. According to Zaragoza (1996), thanks to European immigration Buenos Aires experienced spectacular growth, going from 200,000 inhabitants in 1869 to over 300,000 in 1878, over half a million in 1890 and one million in 1905. 7 In his constant concern to keep Europe as an example of civilisation, with regard to the integration of foreigners observed in Paris, in one of his memoirs and impressions Miguel Cané comments (not without a note of admiration): “The foreigner is admitted, the doors of the temple of science are opened to him, but only as much as is necessary

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If in 1854 the Legislature of Buenos Aires had authorised the government to constitute the Philanthropic Association of Immigration, a commission of individuals of different nationalities, financed with funds from the province of Buenos Aires, in charge of providing assistance and protection to immigrants and administering the Hotel de Inmigrantes located near the port,8 in August 1869, by decree of President Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, the Central Commission of Immigration (under the Ministry of Agriculture) absorbed the Association, inherited its functions (for example, the sanitary inspection of ships and the respect for the rights of those who were to populate the inland agricultural colonies by contract) and incorporated businessmen, landowners and agents located in Europe with the task of capturing the flow of migrants towards Argentina. A systematisation then formalised in 1876 with the Immigration and Colonisation Law promoted by President Nicolas Avellaneda (1874–1880), aimed at establishing a new Immigration Department— this time dependent on the Ministry of the Interior—in charge of managing all the procedures of the migratory process, from the information and solicitation of workers in the European countries to the journey and accommodation in Argentina (Fauri, 2015). A step that, according to Fernández (2018), constitutes one of the legislative pillars of the Argentine modernisation process, with which for the first time the State takes an active and dynamic position to increase and select European emigration, adding to the instruments already used (such as the designation of agents in Europe, the housing and free transport of immigrants, information on job opportunities and the concession or purchase of land), the possibility for the State to use its own funds to finance transatlantic transport and distribute subsidies among passenger transport companies.

to make him a propagandist of French glory. Not for opening his arms to him, to say to him: this is your land, this is the homeland of all men of good will who inhabit the globe, come to me, study, make a career for yourselves, live among us and prosper” (Cané, 1934, 79–81). 8 Apart from philanthropic issues, according to Fernández, the presence among the members of the Association of some of the most detached rural landlords and entrepreneurs of the time (such as Olivera, Gowland, Pereyra, Martínez de Hoz, Armstrong or Casares) can be explained by the interest in introducing a labour force more accustomed to new modes of production into the country.

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On the Circulation of Ideas Between Europe and the Americas: From the “Young Italy” to the “Joven Argentina” In speaking about the transmission of knowledge (and therefore the circulation of ideas) between Italy and Argentina, it is inevitable to refer to the importance of political emigration during the Risorgimento.9 Indeed, the Italian political emigration towards the Rio de la Plata region in the preunification period represents an important dynamic, not only because it was able to identify in the Republican/Mazzinian exile the transoceanic vector of a new national identity,10 but also due to the dialogue that this peculiar inflow put in place with the political elites of Rio de la Plata in a crucial moment of their history. Relations were reflected by the next processes of the national organisation, by the creation and consolidation of a symbolic universe and institutional and infrastructural networks. The latter were in charge of receiving and fostering the integration of the enormous amounts of Italian emigrants who arrived in the era of the so-called “immigratory flood” (Romero, 2004). If we shift our attention to the European historical and political context, we can note that during the first half of the nineteenth century, in much of the Old World, from Spain to Russia, passing through Italy and Germany, the expansion of Napoleon’s armies and the triumph of absolutism sanctioned in 1815 by the Congress of Vienna generated resistance and opposition movements of a patriotic, liberal and

9 The Argentine researcher Tarragó (2011) reminds us in her study on Ligurian navigators and traders in the Plata and Parana rivers, the relationship between the Italian regions of Piedmont and Liguria and the region of Rio de la Plata became more complex in the first half of the nineteenth century, in parallel with the intensification of the violent and contradictory process of Italian unification, inevitably linked to the Savoy dynasty and its role as a balancing space for European tensions gravitating around the north of the peninsula. 10 In the macro subject of Italian immigration to the Plata region, the figure of the exile as an active subject deserves a separate reflection, and the category of exile as a fundamental element in the process of building a transcontinental national identity, thanks to the proselytising work of revolutionaries, volunteers and intellectuals installed on the Atlantic side, promoters of a national sentiment fuelled by the development of collective identities, in turn fuelled by the formulation of patriotic discourses, and capable of propitiating the creation of political options decisive for the birth of modern nationstates (Bonvini, 2018a, 2018b).

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nationalist nature,11 which to a large extent coincided with Romanticism: perhaps, the first truly universal current of Western thought, both in terms of its geographical dimension and its ability to affect the most diverse fields of knowledge, developed in Germany in the twilight of the eighteenth century and then spread rapidly towards France and England (Tarcus, 2016). With a particular epicentre in France, the European absolutist wave thus proposed for half a century the historical dialectic that combines romanticism and revolution, fuelled by the dichotomies revolution/counterrevolution, progress/regression, modernity/barbarism, reflected by a series of social, political and religious doctrines, and by a series of literary productions that through various channels arrive and spread as far as Rio de La Plata. In our case, the formation of a Mazzinian community in Latin America is the product of a politically motivated immigration scheme that between 1821 and 1835 initially headed towards Rio de Janeiro, and then organically structured itself in Montevideo. Latin America then began to represent a fundamental area for the reception of Italian patriotism (Devoto, 2002b), as demonstrated by the meeting between the emissaries of Mazzini’s “Young Italy” and the Argentine Generation of ’37, composed of personalities such as Miguel Toribio Cané, Juan María Gutiérrez, Juan Bautista Alberdi, Vicente Fidel López y Esteban Echeverria (Groussac, 1897; Ingenieros, 1915; Marani, 1985; Treves, 1973). A group of thinkers initially gathered in Buenos Aires, which out of total dissent with the regime of Juan Manuel de Rosas reconstituted itself as a clandestine political movement in Montevideo under the name of “Joven Argentina”, reproducing the associative practices, cultural canons and theoretical models of its Italian counterpart: a true American extension of Mazzini’s revolutionary organisations (Abramson, 1993, 125). More generally, as Marani (1985) points out in her work on the diffusion of Mazzini’s ideology in Rio de la Plata, both in terms of political strategy and propaganda method, the project of Young Italy helped

11 In addition to representing the culmination of a cultural and political process that began at the end of the eighteenth century, the Risorgimento can be considered as the Italian response to the call of European romantic nationalisms, in opposition to the conservative forces of the ancient regime: not only a political/territorial impulse, but a political/spiritual process that led to the identification of the Italian nation as the community of reference on which to base the claims and projects for the construction of an Italian nation-state (Salvatorelli, 1963).

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formalise the definition of an alternative Argentine nationalism, in opposition to the despotism and authoritarianism of Juan Manuel de Rosas, profoundly influencing the movement of 1837 and provoking a sort of transatlantic hybridisation with the republicanism of Rio de la Plata, later reflected in the Constitution of 1853 itself. According to Marani (1985), in fact, what the Argentine intellectuals of ’37 did was to adapt Mazzini’s ideology to the Argentine context, and then carry forward the democratic revolution, revitalise the opposition and the political debate and prepare the ground for the formation of a republican and representative government, feeding the current with symbols and canons proper of Mazzini’s imagination. In Montevideo, therefore, the Italian and Argentine exiles converge into a kind of diaspora nationalism that generates intense theoretical work, marked by hybridisation with other variants of Atlantic republicanism, since in Young Argentina both native nationalist aspirations and the cosmopolitan tendencies of European organisations intersect. In Montevideo, the Italian exiles produce a kind of cultural transfer (Bonvini, 2018a) towards exiled groups of different nationalities, undertaking a remarkable transcendence at an intellectual and political level. Such intellectual dialogue between the proscribed members of Young Italy and the Argentinians of the Generation of ’37 can thus be considered as an experience of cultural transnationalism that produces a fundamental impact throughout the republican movement, creating long-lasting links between Italy and Argentina. From the Generation of ’37 emerge the voices of Domingo Faustino Sarmiento and Juan Bautista Alberdi, the characters around whom the debate on how to populate and organise the Argentine state revolves, and how to introduce the country into the current of modernity by responding to two crucial problems: how to generate and spread civilised habits, and secondly, how to build and exercise power over these lands. In the vision of Alberdi, one of the main architects of the Constitution of 1853, the Argentine territory is depopulated, uninhabited and occupied

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by unspeakable and savage beings.12 Totally mistrustful of the endogenous capacity to create civilised conditions, Alberdi adopts in his texts the audacious theory of the “migratory transplant”, defined by the philosopher Oscar Terán as “vertiginous, insofar as it aims to modify the very fabric of society, the product of a romantic who not only seeks customs in other countries, but goes out to look for inhabitants abroad, concentrating in those Anglo-Saxon Europeans where the free spirit of modernity would be most developed” (Alberdi, 2008, 94–95). A modernity increasingly traversed by individualism as a distinctive trait, by the idea of an independent, autonomous human being, endowed with his own and inalienable powers and rights and launched towards self-realisation, in line with that “Republic of Interest” which, evading Montesquieu and Macchiavelli’s traditional classification of forms of government (monarchy republic, despotism), reverses the republican consignment of putting the general good before the individual interest, advocating instead in a selfish manner the satisfaction of the individual’s private interest, to eventually contribute to public happiness at a later date. It was at this time, according to Abramson (1993), that the influences of the distinct currents of European utopian socialism (mainly French) gave way to Anglo-Saxon political thought, to social Darwinism, constituted by the conjugation of the works of John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer, marking the passage of a large part of Argentinean intellectuals from utopian universalist projection to a biological and materialist rationality, not exempt from visions that today we would call racist, which do nothing but fortify and justify white supremacy, immigration policies as a weapon to populate and colonise, and the extermination of original peoples. Together with the affirmation of civil society as a strategic field for the resolution of a nation’s problems, in his writings, Alberdi thus

12 “What name shall you give, what name is worthy of a country composed of two hundred thousand leagues of territory and a population of eight hundred thousand inhabitants? A desert. What name shall you give to the Constitution of that country? The Constitution of a desert. Well, that country is the Argentine Republic; and whatever its Constitution may be, it will be nothing else for many years to come but the Constitution of a desert. But what is the Constitution that best suits the desert? That which serves to make it disappear; that which serves to make the desert cease to be a desert in the shortest possible time, and become a populated country (…) The Constitutions of depopulated countries can have no other serious and rational purpose, for now and for many years, than to give the solitary and abandoned territory the population it needs, as a fundamental instrument of its development and progress” (Alberdi, 2008, 207).

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seems to hope that the immigrants’ attitude to work would be capable of spreading a new ethos, a new matrix from which a new social subject, not present in the original native fabric, can be configured, and that pushes towards the need for the importation (and transplantation) of this ethos (Terán, 2008).13

Argentina and the Dilemma of Modernity In order to evaluate the importance of Italian immigration in the Argentine modernisation process, it is essential to make some preliminary remarks regarding the construction and consolidation of the national State that anticipates the modernisation age. This means considering a stage in which the action of a State that advances on the territory is materialised both from a structural and symbolic point of view. A territory that on the one hand is constituted as the basis of a productive system, linked to a model of material modernisation associated with new forms of economic exploitation. A territory that at the same time becomes the main theatre of the civilisation/barbarism dichotomy: a conflict destined to reach its most dramatic expression with actions of exclusion and state repression,14 despite the values legitimised by liberal ideology (and conveyed first and foremost by the Constitution of 1853), such as order, progress and the future. If we look at Argentine national history, in fact, the much-pursued Westernisation that characterises the decades following the fall of Juan Manuel de Rosas (1852), manifests itself not only in the cultural sphere (although this is perhaps the most evident), but also and above all in the economic and institutional space. While cultural Westernisation proceeds—for example, through the chronic idealisation of

13 “How will the life-giving spirit of European civilisation come to our soil in the future? As it has come in all ages: Europe will bring us its new spirit, its habits of industry, its practices of civilisation, in the immigrations it sends us. Every European who comes to our shores brings us more civilisations in his habits, which he then communicates to our inhabitants, than many books of philosophy […]. Do we want to plant and acclimatise in America the English liberty, the French culture, the industriousness of man from Europe and the United States? Let us bring living pieces of them in the customs of its inhabitants and establish them here” (Alberdi, 2008, 100). 14 Probably its most brutal expression will be the military campaign of extermination and genocide of the original peoples of the Pampean and Patagonian regions, sadly known as the Conquest of the Desert (1878–1885).

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English liberalism and it is carried out through the adoption of philosophical currents, social theories and fashions—economic Westernisation needs that Argentina “knows how to give guarantees to the system into which it proposes to enter” (Jitrik, 1982, 22). Regarding Argentine historiography, it now becomes crucial to consider the foundational moment of the Modern National State: that very year of 1880, which acquires historical significance as the end of a period that ideally began with the Battle of Caseros (1852). A period that finally provides concrete solutions to old conflicts (whose roots go back as far as the May Revolution of 1810), such as the non-existent economic organisation, the lack of agreements on the political structure and territorial integration still far from being complete. Deep-rooted and complex problems which in turn redefine themselves according to the perennial dispute between Buenos Aires (in constant search for a greater and closer relationship with Europe) and the country’s hinterland, generating fractures and dichotomies destined to endure and persist throughout the twentieth century (such as the still present opposition between urbanism and ruralism or between Westernisation and nationalism). Dynamics that cross and characterise all the structures (human, social, political, economic, cultural, literary, ideological) of the national scenario (Jitrik, 1982). Thus, if considered as the culmination of a ten-year process and not as an accidental date, or as the result of a series of simple circumstances, the phenomenon of 1880 has the capacity and strength to condense and channel all these different tendencies towards a homogeneous project, a common goal, a sort of great organisational period through which to achieve a definitive national physiognomy, not arbitrary and not subject to chance and episodic triumphs, but guided by a particular form of rationality identified with liberalism, the political-economic expression of the philosophy that underpins it, the Spencerian positivism (Jitrik, 1982). Supported by a generation of multifaceted intellectuals (such as the above-mentioned Miguel Cané) and based on a liberalism imbued with positivism that links its goals to the horizon of progress. This impulse is identified with the actions and thoughts of an entire generation (the so-called “Generation of the ’80s”) and is associated with material growth derived from the economic areas of primary extraction and linked to a production model that combines agriculture and sheep and cattle breeding, aiming primarily at the export of the meat-cereal binomial. All this, while the breach between the State and Church is becoming more

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and more evident, with the approval of a series of secular laws aimed at moving the control of the civilian population and education under the jurisdiction of the State. In this juncture, therefore, Argentina begins to connect in a solid manner with the international market, following the centre/periphery interconnection scheme, according to which the peripheries are constituted as producers and exporters of raw materials and the centres as exporters of manufactured goods and capital. In this sense, the importation of foreign capital is fundamental to carry out the great railway, port and service and infrastructure works necessary to consolidate the socalled agro-exporting model (Gallo & Cortés Conde, 1984). A model that completes the conformation of a productive space that maintains Buenos Aires as its traditional centre, and whose borders expand towards the south of the province of the same name, the Litoral region (Misiones, Corrientes, Entre Rios), the province of La Pampa and the south of the province of Cordoba. This is how the Pampa macro-region was structured, which was supposed to absorb, at least in theory, the enormous amount of labour from Europe. As Cortés Conde and Gallo (1973) warn us, this process is often simplified and summarised in a rather schematic way, but in reality turns out to be long and complex, anything but orderly and homogeneous. It is in this perspective that we encounter the “desert” and “internal borders” issues. The desert to be colonised runs from the south of the province of Mendoza to the Atlantic coast, isolating Patagonia and part of the pampas in the north, south of which extends the phantom desert, understood as the absence of populations, i.e. white settlements15 ; the other desert is located in the northeast of the country and excludes the regions occupied by the original peoples of the Chaco, who will manage to maintain a certain autonomy until the dawn of the new

15 In his studies on the military, scientific and religious campaigns in southern Argentina during the second half of the nineteenth century, the Italian-Argentinean historian Blengino (2005, 27) points out: “the term desert does not indicate an uninhabited space, devoid of life, but the territories of the pampas and Patagonia occupied by the Indians. The frontier advancing over the pampas contributes not only to the physical disappearance of the Indians occupying these territories, but to transforming nature, to conditioning and selecting the primitive fauna. Political, military and religious observers, and especially men of science […] describe these men and this nature with full awareness that what they are perceiving is about to disappear. The present, compressed between past and future, is translated into the opposition between prehistory and modernity”.

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century (Quijada Mauriño, 1999). It is in this context that the concept of “Pampa Gringa” refers to the enormous expanses of land for cultivation granted by the provincial governments through regulations and private agreements stipulated directly with the settlers, who in many cases were represented by foreign companies. Populating the border becomes a convenient resource for the State, which in this way succeeds in obtaining unprecedented stability in critical areas, and at the same time introduces an element of modernisation and economic diversification in them such as agricultural colonies (Djenderedjian, 2008; Kaerger, 2004). A further step towards the re-articulation between rural and urban interests, that the political elites of the post-Rosas stage attempt to formulate in search of new paths of economic integration (Oszlak, 1985). Between agricultural colonies and unproductive or disorganised latifundia, however, Argentina’s rural structure proves incapable of absorbing the enormous amount of foreigners that during the 1880s disembark at the port of Buenos Aires, the main reason for the dizzying demographic increase mentioned above, with all the consequences and complications that can be observed on a social, political and, not least, health level. In a certain sense, Buenos Aires becomes a privileged sample of the expected, unforeseen and often contradictory effects of the organisational plan of 1880 (unimpeachable in its intentions and values, inevitably complex in its implementation), a theatre capable of showing the most characteristic social conflicts in an often crude and dramatic way (but no less fascinating for spectators like us). A heterogeneity that we find implicit in the very concept of immigration, which in this case corresponds to an extremely varied, rich and discontinuous phenomenon, combining the movements of different subjects and social actors such as workers, academics, intellectuals, scientists, entrepreneurs, but also trade union activists and political militants who often bring with them the anarchist spark and socialist theoretical formulations concerning the conflict between capital and labour power.

Scientific Migrations Between Politics and Academic Knowledge So far we have referred to the Argentine Constitution of 1853, which, inspired by Juan Bautista Alberdi’s Bases (1852) and influenced by the US federal model of 1787 (Saguir, 2007), encloses a representative, republican and federal system of government, backed by a solid executive

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power, guaranteeing provincial autonomies, the distribution of national entrances, free navigation of rivers and above all, individual rights. The restrictive and arbitrary practices of the previous regime are thus replaced by civil, personal and property rights and freedoms, affirming the principle of equality before the law for all inhabitants and establishing guarantees related to people’s security. From this point of view, the freedom of expression and association guaranteed by the constitutional text favoured the growth of a dense associative movement throughout the region, the product of a renewed political activity within Buenos Aires’ social fabric, frequently linked to the entry of republican Italian exiles so far rooted in Montevideo, to which are now added those coming directly from our peninsula. These were the premises for the foundation of the first Italian mutual aid associations in Buenos Aires, including Mazzini’s Unione e Benevolenza (1858) and the even older Società Italiana di Beneficienza (1853), from which will arise, in the space of almost 20 years, the Italian Hospital of Buenos Aires (1872)—the third one built by a foreign community in the capital after the British (1844) and the French (1845)—whose first two Presidents Achille Maveroff and Paolo Marengo would both be members of the board of directors of the Banco de Italia y Rio de la Plata.16 The year the Italian Hospital opened—1872—is no coincidence. In 1871 a violent epidemic of yellow fever had killed more than 13,000 people, once again highlighting the structural and sanitary deficiencies of an overpopulated city, especially by European immigrants living crammed into the southern neighbourhoods of Barracas and La Boca, in precarious hygienic conditions, with no sewage system and an insufficient water supply (Scenna, 1974). In Buenos Aires epidemics are nothing new. This is the era of the “Impure city” described by Daniel Armus (2007): the scene of tensions between the imagined city and the one still in the process of expansion, untidy and poorly industrialised, incapable of containing and managing continuous demographic growth, plagued by a chronic lack of housing and infrastructure. The much-dreamed-of America can therefore also be misery, disease, crime and social strife. The

16 Just a detail, but enough to recall the leading role played by the Italian economic and entrepreneurial elite of Buenos Aires in completing the work. It was then thanks to loans from the two main Italian banking institutions in Buenos Aires, the Banco Italiano del Rio de la Plata and the Nuevo Banco Italiano, that in 1889 they were able to purchase the Almagro land where the institution still stands today.

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development project outlined by Alberdi and Sarmiento, the creation of a modern country through economic and cultural openness towards Europe, begins to provoke a critical discussion that, as anticipated, becomes constant from 1880 onwards, and where the main accused is naturally immigration, to which subversive ideologies and the loss of traditional cultural values are traced, overwhelmed by the rampant materialism of uncouth, uncultured, greedy and arrogant immigrants (Scarzanella, 2003). In line with the spirit of the time, 1872 also saw the foundation of the prestigious and still existing Argentine Scientific Society,17 founded with the purpose of promoting the study of mathematical, physical and natural sciences and their applications, studying publications, inventions and scientific advances, especially those that could have a practical application in the country, bringing together engineers and scientists both locally and from abroad, students of exact sciences and other people whose scientific education could serve these purposes (Babini, 1963). It is no coincidence, therefore, that the first president of the SCA was the Italian engineer Emilio Rosetti (who arrived from the little town of Forlimpopoli, in the Emilia Romagna region), followed in 1873 by the engineer Luis A. Huergo,18 the first of the so-called “12 apostles” (the country’s first generation of engineers), who graduated at the newborn Faculty of Exact, Physical and Natural Sciences of the University of Buenos Aires. Huergo’s theses, indeed, focused on issues related to 17 At the time of the Colony, there was no Argentinean Science, and if, by chance, activities of this nature had appeared, they would have been the result of the action of religious orders, a legacy undoubtedly of the evangelising process and the scientific and teaching activity that they themselves exercised in the Middle Ages. […]. Reading through the archives of the SCA (Sociedad Cientifica Argentina), it is evident how its founders sought, through their studies, works and initiatives, “to foment the country’s nascent industry, to unveil the secret of its lands and climates with each class of exploration and study trips, to make it a place of intellectuality and animating spirit for men of study, professionals and students. Foment knowledge of the country abroad through collaboration in congresses, scientific competitions, symposia (…) dictate lectures and organise a public library that would contribute a large number of selected works to spread knowledge and culture” (Pous Peña, 1969, 115). 18 An emblematic figure of Argentine engineering, despite being considered one of the

reference points for railway development and having directed the construction of the port of Riachuelo in 1876, Luis Huergo ultimately intervened in the most diverse sectors: river navigation, construction of bridges and docks, installation of industries, flooding, mining and quarrying, and oil fields. 6 June, the day of his graduation, is today considered National Engineering Day.

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communication routes (first of all the railway network) and to the sanitary situation of Buenos Aires, reflecting the typical anxieties and urgencies of the moment (Cristal, 2020).19 These engineers considered the fathers of Argentine infrastructural development during the modernisation stage in question, had begun their studies in 1865 thanks to Juan Maria Gutierrez, one of the members of that Joven Argentina founded in Montevideo on the model of Young Italy, a famous exponent of the Generation of ’37 like Sarmiento and Alberdi, who in one of his writings called him “one of the first statesmen of South America” (1998, 43).20 It was Gutierrez who summoned from Italy the Roman mathematician Bernardino Speluzzi, professor of Algebra at the University of Pavia, put in charge of essential courses in Pure Mathematics, Mechanics, Physics, Analytical Geometry, Algebra and even a course in Experimental Physics at the Faculty of Humanidades at the UBA; with him, we find the Milanese naturalist Pellegrino Strobel, professor at the University of Parma, a pioneer in the teaching of Geology in Argentina, later replaced by the young Genoese prof. Giovanni Ramorino from Genoa, a doctor in Natural Sciences at the University of Turin, who taught Mineralogy in Buenos Aires and became assistant to Florentino Ameghino, who was born in Liguria and emigrated to Argentina at an early age, a Darwinian palaeontologist, zoologist and anthropologist, author of an intriguing theory, called monogenistautoctonist, and based on the discovery of fossils in Patagonia, concerning the “autochthonous” origin of the American man. 19 In alphabetical order: Valentín Balbín, Santiago Brian, Adolfo Büttner, Jorge Coquet, Luis A. Huergo, Francisco Lavalle, Carlos Olivera, Matías Sánchez, Luis Silveyra, Miguel Sorondo, Zacarías Tapia, Guillermo Villanueva y Guillermo White. Guillermo White, president of the SCA between 1877 and 1878, was responsible for the construction of a large part of the national railway network, which grew from 722 km of roads in 1870 to over 20,000 km, directing during the 1890s the construction of the railway line from Bahia Blanca to Neuquen, a strategic work to assert the State’s domination and control over the Patagonian regions following the Conquest of the Desert. The port of the city of Bahia Blanca (Ingeniero White) is named after him by decree of President Julio Argentino Roca. 20 “Science can only be revolutionary, that is to say, it can only demolish the work of error in order to build a new one in its place, because that is what progress, the inevitable destiny of mankind, consists in, and science is the minister of that progress. Like the latter, then, it is irresistible and, like the sea, invasive; except that the finger of God does not wish to stop it, saying, Thou shalt not pass this way. When it conquers and persuades one truth, a million other truths of all kinds spring up as its consequence and enlarge its domain” (J. M. Gutiérrez “Escritos Históricos y Literarios”, in Palcos, Alberto (Dir.), Grandes Escritores Argentinos, Buenos Aires, Jackson, 1953, vol. 22, 205).

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The third professor summoned by Juan Maria Gutierrez to organise the courses of the newly founded Faculty of Exact, Physical and Natural Sciences at the UBA was also the youngest of the three (26 years old), Emilio Rosetti, who in Buenos Aires participated and intervened in a wide range of academic, scientific and associative circles. On 16 October 1865, the Department of Public Education appointed him Professor of Mathematics at the prestigious Colegio Nacional de Buenos Aires (of which he then designed the entrance arch), where he founded a physics cabinet destined to be taken as a future model for similar laboratories set up in schools in Corrientes, Santiago del Estero, San Luis and Jujuy. In 1866 Rosetti was appointed honorary member of the Union and Benevolence, the first Italian mutual aid association in South America, he was also appointed at the Board of Education to start its educational activities; he carried out ballistic consultancy for the Department of War and the Navy, he became an honorary member of the Paleontological Society (founded in 1866 by the German palaeontologist and zoologist Hermann Burmeister, director of the Museum of Natural Sciences), he collaborated with the Building Commission of the Confraternity Nuestra Signora de la Misericordia for the construction of the still existing “Church of the Italians”, completed in 1870; he became a member of the Italian Society of General San Martín, where he designed the municipal palace and the Jesus Amoroso church; together with his colleagues Pompeo Moneta and the brothers Nicola and Giuseppe Canale, he worked on hydraulic engineering consultancy on behalf of the Ministry of Buenos Aires, to solve the critical issue of the “saladeros” (basic industries that produced salted meat) and designed the water and sewer network. He then held various roles on the board of directors at the nascent Italian Hospital, briefly replaced Vice-Commissioner Allan at the Patent Office at the Ministry of the Interior, was among the members of the Circolo Italiano in Buenos Aires, a meeting place for the local entrepreneurial elite and was one of the founders of the Argentine Geographical Institute (1879), which together with the Argentine Geographical Society (1888) formed the basis of the current Argentine Society of Geographical Studies. He designed the monument dedicated to the statesman Dalmacio Velez Sarsfield, author of the Argentine Civil Code, located at the Recoleta cemetery, and took part in the committee for the construction of the monument to Giuseppe Mazzini, inaugurated in 1878 in Piazza Roma.

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In Rosetti’s diaries (Torri, 2010) we find the reconstruction of the journey/adventure made with Strobel and Speluzzi in 1865, an expedition that started in Buenos Aires and reached the Andes, whose main aim was to draw up a feasibility study for a possible trans-Andean railway that would unite Chile and Argentina through the Planchón Pass.21 The railway in Argentina thus became the emblem of modernity, unquestionably linked to England in terms of the capital invested, and yet constantly a subject of studies and interventions by local engineers. Among the best-known examples are Guido Jacobacci (1864–1922) from Modena, appointed director of the Patagonian Railways in 1908, who was entrusted with the construction of the lines between San Antonio Oeste–Lake Nahuel Huapi, Comodoro Rivadavia–Lake Buenos Aires and Puerto Deseado–Lake Nahuel Huapi; Giovanni Pelleschi (1845–1922) graduated from the University of Bologna and was active in the construction of the railway lines in the provinces of Chaco, Cordoba, Santiago del Estero and Tucumán; Cesare Cipolletti (1843–1908), who settled in Mendoza in 1889 to design irrigation works using water from the Mendoza and Tunuyan rivers, and later devoted himself to the study of the basins of the Lima, Neuquén and Negro rivers to enable the irrigation of the Upper Rio Negro Valley region, which thanks to the works he initiated became one of the country’s key fruit-producing regions; Clemente Onelli, a botanist and geographer (among his many specialisations), to whom we owe various water engineering works in the Patagonian regions, works that together with those of Cesare Cipolletti proved fundamental for the spread of fruit tree and vine cultivation, and for the consequent technological development of the Argentine wine industry.22

21 The genre of travel diaries compiled by Italians across the boundless distances of Argentina is a genre that stretches from Alberto Maria De Agostini, famous for his cartographies of Patagonia, to figures such as the Neapolitan Pedro de Angelis (1784– 1859), considered one of the first (and most controversial) historians and chroniclers of the Rosismo period. 22 With their names, the localities of Ingeniero Jacobacci, Cipolletti and Clemente Onelli, all three in the Patagonian region of Rio Negro, pay tribute to the three Italian engineers and their works.

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The Influence (and Drifts) of Italian Positivism in Argentina From what it has said so far, there are therefore sufficient tools to summarise the Argentine National Organisation period (and the modernisation process that accompanied it) as a sort of project based on the “Sarmian” pillars of the railway, army and education, where science, placed in the foreground, combines Darwinism and Spencerian positivism in the function of a universal law of progress, which pushes to install an evolutionist mentality in the ruling classes of the time (Vallejo & Miranda, 2010). Considering the great interest that was generated in Argentina (and more generally in Latin America) in this period for Darwin,23 it is now worth recalling the figure of Paolo Mantegazza (physician, anthropologist, hygienist), one of Darwin’s first popularisers both in Italy and Argentina (where he settled between 1854 and 1858), founder of the experimental pathology laboratory at the University of Pavia, where he trained together with Cesare Lombroso (Berzero & Garbarino, 2010).24 Mantegazza is the link between Darwinism and Italian positivism in Argentina. Scarzanella (2003) affirms that in a country undergoing a rapid and continuous transformation like Argentina at the end of the nineteenth/early twentieth century, a candidate to become a modern nation thanks also to the consolidation of central power and the massive import of capital and labour from abroad, among the European, and especially “Latin” versions of positivism, the Italian version prevails, because it is easier to follow, and it’s produced in a context that is culturally and socially similar to that which can be encountered overseas. If it’s true that one of the enigmas that science is called upon to solve in Argentina (and especially in the metropolis of Buenos Aires) is that of the country’s new and changing social configuration, the problems of post-unification Italy had produced a scientific knowledge in which socialism and positivism were intertwined, elaborating theories to solve the problems of the “inner colonies” (the archaic south and the dangerous cities), which now lend themselves to the overseas colony. While it is true that in Argentina 23 Darwin’s voyage to Argentina, on board the ship Beagle, commanded by the young captain Robert Fitzroy (1805–1865), lasted approximately five years, from 27 December 1831 to 19 October 1836 (Palma, 2009). 24 The arrival of the three lecturers Rosetti, Strobel and Speluzzi came about thanks to Paolo Mantegazza and his recommendation to Juan Maria Gutierrez.

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second-generation emigrants have often reached prominent positions in politics, journalism and the university, promoting interchange and cultural dialogue with the peninsula, in public squares, factories, prisons and hospitals, Italian and Argentine scientists and politicians are confronted with a humanity that is in some ways very similar. It was at this time that Cesare Lombroso’s criminal anthropology, and his studies derived from the psychiatric, penal and eugenic fields, provided Argentinean intellectuals with a vast arsenal of ideas and proposals. Lombroso, in fact, began in the last decade of the nineteenth century a collaboration with the newspapers La Nación and La Tribuna (in Uruguay); in 1898 the Mexican anarchist Pietro Gori began publishing in Buenos Aires the journal Criminologia Moderna, replaced around 1902 by the publication Archivos de Criminologia, Medicina Legal y Psiquiatria, directed by one of the most brilliant Argentinean criminologists and psychiatrists, Jose Ingenieros, born in Palermo (Sicily) in 1877 as Giuseppe Ingegneri. Between the journeys and conferences of the main Italian jurists, criminologists, doctors and demographers—such as Gina Lombroso and Enrico Ferri—we thus witness the enormous paradox according to which the theoretical tools used in the anti-migration campaigns derive precisely from the incoming positivist culture, which is why the accusation against the two main foreign components of the Argentinean society—Italians and Spaniards—end up being based on a new science rightly created in Italy at the end of the century, Criminal Anthropology. Those same theories of Cesare Lombroso and his disciples, which served to foment migratory policies from Europe and discriminate against natives and mestizos, defining them as barbarians suffering from atavism or degeneration, contain postulates that can now be used towards newcomers (Sansone, 2013).25

25 From this perspective, the arrival and rooting of the so-called Lombroso Galaxy in Argentina would function as a kind of catalyst between the turn-of-the-century reception of eugenics implicit in Darwinist thought and the subsequent involvement of intellectual elites with the bio-typological theories enunciated by the Italian fascist endocrinologist Nicola Pende (“godfather” of the Argentine Association of Biotypology, Eugenics and Social Medicine, founded in 1932), promoting the monopolisation of the eugenic field by ideas close to the Italian authoritarianism of the period between the two World Wars, and the consolidation of bio-typology as a scientific ideology that extends until the beginning of the post-World War II period, affecting the different public policies conceived during a broader time span that goes almost to the most recent history (Vallejo & Miranda, 2010).

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Among the drifts of the mentioned Italian Positivist School in Argentina, Vallejo (2010) proposes the affirmation of a “eugenic-bio typological” line, simultaneous and functional to the consolidation of Benito Mussolini’s fascist regime (1922–1938). According to Vallejo, the starting point for the diffusion of this “Italian biotypology” on the Rome– Buenos Aires axis coincides with Fascism’s rise to power, and with that desire to capitalise on the use of normative knowledge that at the end of the nineteenth century pushed to project the horizons of medicine and law to vast fields of the social sphere: a cultural policy based on the idea of exercising individualised and totalising control, detecting physical and/ or moral anomalies and crowned with the inauguration, in 1926, of the Bio Typological Institute of Genoa, later transferred to Rome (Vallejo, 2010). A project for the study of growth, bio typology and the psychology of the individual and the race, illustrated in 1923 in the journal Difesa Sociale, the popular organ of the Italian Institute of Hygiene and Social Forecasting founded and directed by Ettore Levi, which appeared in 1922 together with La Biotipologia Umana, a means of promoting the Italian version of eugenics, later systematised by the regime’s physician and endocrinologist Nicola Pende (Galera, 2005). In line with the fascist regime’s imperialist vocation, and its desire to integrate realities that under the supposed cultural authority of Rome and Romanity could converge into a common membership of the Latin race, Argentina and Brasil were soon identified as potential outposts for the fascist regime’s expansionist aims at the American continent (Finchelstein, 2010). Predictably, Argentina is then referred to as the first non-European country of almost exclusively Caucasian race and Latin predominance, characteristics that make Buenos Aires the Rome of America (Vallejo, 2010): the centre of a region massively occupied by Italian emigrants who now needed to be “fascistised”, primarily through the installation of media akin to the regime such as the newspaper Il Mattino d’Italia and Terra d’Oltremare, the magazine of the Italian business world in Argentina, published between 1925 and 1944 (Scarzanella, 2007). In this regard, as Scarzanella points out (2007), the ideas of the Risorgimento that had inspired the first long-lived Italian mutual aid associations in Buenos Aires, often referable to a dichotomy of the republican vs monarchical type, represented an obstacle to the penetration of fascist ideology in the Italian community of Argentina. Not without paradoxes, referring to the “shared heroes” Giuseppe Garibaldi and Giuseppe Mazzini, the

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Risorgimento and a whole series of elements derived from nineteenthcentury ideas on national identity, thus became a necessity for fascist propaganda in order to gain credibility overseas (Goebel, 2014): it is no coincidence that both the fascist regime in Italy and the anti-fascists (at home and abroad) claimed themselves as the legitimate heirs of the national heroes Garibaldi and Mazzini, and both factions celebrated the twenty of September, the date of the taking of Rome by the Kingdom of Italy in 1870. On the other hand, as already mentioned, Argentina’s convulsive sociopolitical landscape near the turn of the century had propitiated the adoption of various Italian-based scientific formulations aimed at forms of social control and racial hierarchisation: the idea of “social defence”, for example, was one of the pillars of the law of the same name sanctioned in 1910 by the physician and deputy Lucas Ayarragasaray, with the aim of consolidating the repressive measures already established by the aforementioned 1902 Law of Residence, expanding the faculties of the Executive Power to expel emigrants considered dangerous and socially undesirable (primarily anarchists). From this point of view, in the first two decades of the twentieth century the idea of social defence, with all its affinities with the Italian eugenics current, began to manifest itself in various fields of Argentine science: if in 1919 the government contracted the Lombrosian psychiatrist Lanfranco Ciampi to organise an institute for abnormal and retarded children in the city of Rosario (Allevi, 2017), in 1922, after visiting in person the nipiological institutes founded by Ernesto Cacace in Capua (1905) and Naples (1915), Victor Delfino, director of the journal La Semana Medica, the main organ of the Argentine medical corporation, founded the Argentine Society of Nipiology (1922). In a context in which Argentina proved to be an extremely fertile pole receptive to integration and cultural interchange with Italy, the conjunction between the crisis of liberalism and representative democracies and the economic crisis accentuated the nature of the bond between the fascist regime and the lands overseas. In 1930, following the first military coup in Argentina’s history, Leopoldo Lugones, one of the intellectual architects of the new political order governed by General José Felix Uriburu, recommended taking advantage of the state of political/economic crisis to redesign the selection mechanisms to be applied when the immigration process from Europe would be rekindled: “national bastardy exists and the heterogeneity of the immigrant elements is disadvantageous” he would say. “We can and must, therefore, adopt preferences, not only with

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regard to the economic capacity, health and marital status of the immigrant, but also his ethnic character”. In this sense, the selection criterion had to be clear from the beginning: “We are the Latin race, and it suits us to be so (…) since we form part of the Roman Empire” (Lugones, 1949, 442–443). On that occasion, almost at the same time as the dereliction of the democratic government of Hipólito Yrigoyen (1930), the Institute of Italic Culture in Buenos Aires (ICI) organised a reception for Nicola Pende, who as a senator in the XXVIII legislature of the Kingdom of Italy (1929–1934) would become the promoter of an intense scientific and cultural interchange between Italy and Argentina, reflected for example in the foundation of the Argentine Association of Biotypology, Eugenics and Social Medicine (AABEMS). It is in this context, therefore, that the academic interchanges between Rome and Buenos Aires become functional to a cultural diplomacy that merges the values of Latinity with those of fascism (Vallejo, 2010),26 at the same time in which, during the 1930s, racism and antisemitism contribute to forging a particular—though not exclusive—bond between Argentina and Italy (Finchelstein, 2010).

Conclusions This article has attempted to focus on the early insertion of Italian scientists and thinkers in the premises of the Argentinean modernisation process, highlighting how in this context science and teaching were placed “at the service” of the construction of the modern state, laying the foundations of an academic interchange capable of promoting the development of international relations that accompanied the political, social and cultural integration between these countries. A dynamic promoted by the “civilising” aspirations of the stage of the so-called National Organisation, which for its specificity and peculiarity claims a certain autonomy in the study of migratory dynamics. Its importance, we argue, lies precisely in the fact that it constituted a decisive and fundamental impulse for the development of Argentine scientific culture at the end of the nineteenth

26 Among the noteworthy projects we include the First International Congress of Latin Culture, strongly desired by Nicola Pende and scheduled for 12 October 1936, at which the AABEMS founded an Athenaeum (1934) to promote the study of all expressions of Italian culture, science, arts and philosophy. The Congress project was to be abandoned due to the opposition produced in the diplomatic field by the Ethiopian Campaign.

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century, and in inaugurating a scientific-cultural interchange between a European periphery in the process of consolidation and an American periphery that was beginning to integrate itself into the world economy, and which would continue until the first decades of the twentieth century. The idea that this historical phenomenon suggests to us is therefore to propose the possibility of reconsidering and re-signifying the history and development of international relations between Italy and Argentina starting from the study of the first scientific migrations. Among the perspectives offered by this kind of approach, we can include several strategic points, such as: to re-explore the transcendence of the “flow of knowledge”—that we could define as “transatlantic”— between Italy and Argentina, in a crucial historical-political context for the formation of both countries; to reconstruct the relations between Italian and Argentinean scientists and thinkers, the passage of Italian scientists and engineers on Argentinean soil and their role in the development process of certain territories and in the reorganisation of certain productive spaces; to recover the Italian roots of Argentinean positivism and their influence in the fields of criminology, eugenics and social medicine at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century; to investigate the Italian influence in the development of Argentinean scientific sociability, recovering potential unpublished archives and diaries of Italian expeditions to Argentina. As regards the transmission of knowledge (and therefore the circulation of ideas) between Italy and Argentina, the Italian political emigration during the Risorgimento period played a crucial role; not only is it possible to identify in the Republican exile the transoceanic vector of a new national identity, but it also represented a fundamental dialogue with the Rio de la Plata’s political elites at a crucial moment in their history. Such relations are reflected both in the subsequent processes of national organisation, and in the creation and consolidation of that symbolic universe and those institutional and infrastructural networks in charge of receiving and promoting the integration of the huge numbers of Italian emigrants who landed in the so-called “immigrant flood” era (Romero, 2004). To consider the importance of Italian immigration in the Argentine modernisation process, we needed then to make some preliminary remarks concerning the construction and consolidation of the nation-state, which anticipates the modernisation stage. That is, a stage in which the State begins materialising in the territory both in structural and symbolic terms; a conjuncture condensed by the dichotomy civilisation vs

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barbarism, where the pursued Westernisation manifests itself primarily in the economic and institutional sphere, through the chronic idealisation of the English theorists of liberalism. A dynamic that we remarked on is that the rural structure of Argentina proves incapable of absorbing the enormous quantity of foreigners that amassed in the port of Buenos Aires during the decade of the 1880s, with all the consequences and complications that can be observed on a social, political and, not least, health level. In this complex turn of the century, around the first centenary of independence (1910), we can observe the meeting between Darwinism and Italian positivism, a paradigm produced in a context both culturally and socially similar to that which can be encountered overseas. The consequences are paradoxical: those same theories of Cesare Lombroso and his disciples, which served to foment migratory policies from Europe and discriminate against natives and mestizos, describing them as barbarians suffering from atavism or degeneration, contain postulates that can now be used towards newcomers. A paradox reinforced by what we have considered the “drifts” of the Italian positivist school in Argentina. Developments that mainly concern the cultural and scientific interchange between Rome and Buenos Aires between the end of the 1920s and the decade of the 1930s, at the same time as the rise of fascism in Italy, and the appearance, in Argentina, of nationalist currents with a “fascist attitude, philosophy and forma mentis” (Finchelstein, 2010, 133),27 of which the Argentine Patriotic League (LPA) probably represents the progenitor.28 Referring to the broader spectrum of the History of Ideas in Argentina (Terán, 2008), it is interesting to note a parallel between the early ideological/political Italian emigration that took place in the pre-unification period and the intellectual anti-fascist immigration started during the 1930s, accentuated after the racial laws of 1938 (Leiva, 1983). If on the one hand, as we described before, the republican/Mazzinian exiles, 27 For a comparative study of the fascist phenomenon, authoritarianism and Latin American nationalisms in the period between the two world wars, see Paine (1980). 28 For a reflection on the relationship between Italian fascism and Argentine politics,

intellectual world and society in the 1930s, see Bertagna’s recent article (2020). For an in-depth look at the migration phenomenon in the post-Fascist era and the legal or clandestine forms of “escape” of the fascist political and business establishment from Italy to Argentina, see Bertagna’s La patria di riserva (2006). For an overview of nationalism and fascism in Argentina, see Devoto’s text (2002a).

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landed first in Rio de Janeiro and then in Montevideo and Buenos Aires, gave an important contribution to the cultural and political debate in the region, helping to formalise a new definition of Argentine nationalism, influencing the movement of 1837 and provoking a sort of transatlantic hybridisation with the republicanism of Rio de la Plata (later reflected in the Constitution of 1853 itself), the arrival of academics, scientists, researchers and publishers fleeing the fascist regime, such as Rodolfo Mondolfo (Treves, 1978), Eugenia Sacerdote de Lustig (Rozemberg, 1993) or Cesare Civita (Scarzanella, 2013), had fundamental consequences in the post-World War II Argentine cultural, university and scientific field. As a link with the most current debates, due to his influence in the field of the study of migratory dynamics—and especially, the study of the impact that massive immigration has produced on Argentine culture and society—it is now worth mentioning Gino Germani, considered the father of modern Argentine Sociology, after whom one of the country’s most important research institutes (IIGG) is named today. Indeed, at the centre of his studies on Argentine modernisation in the twentieth century we find foreign immigration: the integration of European migrants as a key device of a hybrid society, characterised by a level of complexity and integration deeper, for example, than the one observed in the United States (Germani, 2004).29 The transformation produced by massive immigration thus combined with the transit from a traditional colonial-type society to an urban industrial society, becoming one of the main factors of development. Not meaning the simple assimilation of immigrants to the pre-existing Argentine society and culture, but implying a real transformation, and determining the appearance of new 29 As an exile from Mussolini’s fascist regime, Gino Germani paid particular attention to the advent of Peronism, often reductively christened by Western opponents and observers as a kind of South American fascism (not least by virtue of Juan Domingo Peron’s military trajectory and his documented presence in the Europe of totalitarianism in the late 1930s). Nevertheless, an acute observer like Germani was intrigued above all by the apparent paradox of a workers’ movement unconditionally supporting a military-style government led by a leader of a different extraction from that of the masses supporting it. According to Germani, Argentina’s rapid process of industrialisation in the 1930s had generated an equally rapid movement of migrants who, moving from rural areas to the city, were abandoning a traditional society to integrate into a “modern” one, in which they arrived without any trade union or political experience and therefore experienced the feeling of having lost their sphere of reference, belonging and representation, therefore remaining in a state of ‘availability’, ready to be appropriated by the pseudo-representation offered by a charismatic leader like Perón” (Terán, 2008, 273).

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cultural forms and a new social structure (Germani, 1974). A conceptual binomial “native/traditional society” and “European immigrant/modern society” that would constitute the starting point for future analyses of the Argentine social and economic development process in the twentieth century.

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CHAPTER 6

The Mafia in the Italian Ethnic Press in Argentina Maria Soledad Balsas

Introduction If we want to understand why mafia groups have survived this long, we must look at their representations, a territory that is still largely unknown and unexplored. In fact, the main findings of a content analysis of news coverage on mafias in the Italian press between 2000 and 2009 pointed out that the mafia event was generally associated with the urban environment through criminal actors—almost exclusively male ones—oriented by individual interests, belonging to the middle-high class (D’Amato, 2013). In this context, not only legality but also sociocultural concerns were a great deal underestimated in favour of the portrayal of the mafioso as a charismatic leader. In tune with this trend, minor attention to the victims was also observed. The label “mafia” was applied to the Sicilian version of organised crime and to any territorial expression alike; as a matter of fact, camorra and’ndrangheta were not explicitly named. As a result, the mafia

M. S. Balsas (B) Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas, Buenos Aires, Argentina e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. Fauri and D. Mantovani (eds.), Past and Present Migration Challenges, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39431-7_6

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showed up as an indefinite, indeterminate and elusive issue related mainly to Italy. Interestingly enough, international events only represented 13% of the total analysed corpus. Inspired by these results, especially by the little attention drawn to international mafia events, in a previous work I focused on the news coverage of the Italian mafia in the digital version of Clarín, the leading newspaper in Argentina, between 1997 and 2020 (Balsas, 2021). Based on 219 selected articles, I also registered a widespread male-oriented mafia imaginary led by Sicilian cosa nostra. Rather than related to political-institutional dynamics, the privileged identified framing in news items was that of violence. Then, it is noteworthy that an incipient, limited, and circumstantial recognition of Italian mafia presence in the South American country was noted, too. To a certain extent, this very finding put into relative tension the underlying denialist interpretation that ruled the local context for decades. Generally speaking, Italian migrations in Argentina have traditionally been evaluated in terms of their economic, demographic, and even cultural contribution to local society. Thus, the transfer of capital, of people, and of knowledge is still nowadays often weighed in predominantly positive terms. This turned out to be especially true since the defeat of the political and trade union culture that migrants frequently brought with them took place. In this milieu, the most critical aspects concerning the Italian presence in Argentina—such as the mafias—have historically remained neglected. On this ground, producing scientific knowledge on Italian mafias in Argentina represents a pretty challenging endeavour, due to a certain lack of research work on the topic, as well as reliable information sources. If “the social construction of organised crime has been influenced (and distorted) by fictionalised Hollywood portrayals, sensationalised media reporting, self-serving politicians and enforcement agencies, and questionable academic research, all of which has resulted in simplistic, stereotypical, xenophobic, over-exaggerated, and panic-inducing accounts of its causes, scope, attributes, and impact” (Schneider, 2022, vi), then we need to reflect on how, where and with what consequences meanings are elaborated (Silverstone, 2004). Despite the pitfalls that they entail, [T]he news media has been disparaged for its superficial, simplistic, saturated, and sensationalised coverage of organised crime, not to mention a proclivity for ethnic and racial stereotyping. Lyman and Potter […] accuse

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journalistic accounts of providing “very little substantive knowledge or analysis of organised crime” because they fail to cover “the complexity of organised crime and paint a simplistic picture of an entity that is at odds with the elegant complexities of the real illicit market and the organizational dynamics of real organised groups”. Critics charge that news media coverage tends to be sensational in that it focuses overwhelmingly on notorious, exotic, exciting, or violent individuals and events. To this end, “news coverage of organised crime is usually treated by the media more as entertainment for popular consumption than as serious news” […]. The news media has also been chastised for relying too heavily on information provided by police and other government agencies and for reporting on this information uncritically. As a result, the social reality of organised crime created by journalistic accounts “closely reflects the state’s view of organised crime.” (Schenider, 2022, x)

it could be argued that the discourses that the press put into social circulation remain a feasible way of accessing an area of study (Hobsbawm, 1983) in which fieldwork is difficult and often dangerous and quantitative data banks are biased (Della Porta, 2012). In order to overcome the knowledge gap existing in Argentina, I find it helpful to provide an exploratory comparative analysis of the positioning of the Italian ethnic press about the most famous mafia crime in the country up to the present. Thus, I considered the following media outlets: the socialist-oriented L’Italia del Popolo, the liberal La Nuova Patria, and the fascist Il Mattino d’Italia.

Background Abel Ayerza was a young Medicine student at the prestigious University of Buenos Aires in Argentina. He belonged to a local elite family: his mother was of German origins while his father was a Spanish doctor with straight bonds with the Argentine ruling class. Abel Ayerza junior was kidnapped in the countryside while on holiday with his friends in October 1932. But his dead body was not discovered until February 1933, even though his family paid ransom money. The money was requested by Giovanni Galiffi’s clan, a Ravenusa-born mafioso that had emigrated to Argentina in 1910. In the host society, he devoted himself to several legal (barber, shopkeeper, restaurant owner) as well as illegal (kidnapping, extortion, adulteration of horse races, electoral fraud, political intimidation) activities (Delgado, 2011). In turn, Galiffi and his soldiers received favours

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in terms of Argentine citizenship and reduced punishment for crimes committed making evident that organised crime is not about individuals and groups breaking the law but rather about actors and institutions that emerge, evolve, and disappear under certain historical conditions (Volkov, 2014). Although Galiffi was deported to Italy in 1935, his wife and his only daughter stayed in Argentina. He died in Milan in 1943 (Aguirre, 2008, 2010). The Ayerza’s homicide caused the fierce opposition of rightwing nationalists who not only expressed their public rejection of what they considered an undesirable immigration flow but they also pushed for the (re)introduction of the death penalty in Argentina (Balsas, 2022a). According to alien conspiracy theorists, the roots of organised crime can be found in norms and values antithetical to those of the hosting society and are imported via the cultural transmission of specific immigrant groups. This theory is part of a broader narrative in which organised crime is defined as a problem of “outsiders”, while the involvement of “insiders” and the ways societies create and promote organised crime opportunities themselves are neglected (Kleemans, 2014). The development of the Ayerza’s case found itself under the pressure of intense journalistic coverage in the local press in which two different symbolic regimes were recognisable (Caimari, 2007). Even if they were all Italian immigrants in Argentina, the portrayal of the ideological author of the crime, Giovanni Galiffi, differed from that of the material murderers. Not surprisingly, the Argentine press forged Galiffi’s social image in terms of his migratory trajectory from his native Sicily to becoming a successful self-made man in the host society. No matter the differences between the US-based and the local gangsters, this storytelling was evidently inspired by the iconic public image of Alphonse Gabriel Capone. Indeed, the Argentine press had experienced a structural lack of expertise to define the symbolic terms of mafia acts from their very appearance in the late nineteenth century onwards (Caimari, 2007, 2012). For that reason, it proved to be highly dependent on foreign cinema, literature (Balsas, 2022b), and journalism alike. By opposition, the image of Ayerza’s kidnappers in the Argentine press is devoid of any imaginable positive trait. In tune with strain and culture conflict and ethnic succession theories (Schneider, 2022), the murderers were represented as poor, low-educated, and newly arrived immigrants. The kidnapping unfolded itself as a great national melodrama in which the suffering of the victim’s mother was of key importance in order to create an emotional tension.

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Unlike the Argentine press, hitherto the ways in which Ayerza’s case was exposed by the Italian ethnic press in Argentina raised no scientific or academic interest at all. This fact comes as no surprise considering that, despite the strategic role of the press in Italian language in Argentina, not only in quantitative but also in qualitative terms, generally speaking, ethnic journalistic sources would have not received due attention neither in Italy (Bertagna, 2009; Sergi, 2015) nor abroad (Dore, 1985; Melella, 2016; Sforza, 2019), let alone in the field of mafia studies (Johansson & Battiston, 2020; Smeriglio, 2022). Whereas other countries within the Anglophone world, in which a considerable body of knowledge on Italian organised crime is available, the lack of public awareness on mafia-related topics in Argentina is still, arguably, striking. Under these circumstances, there is no doubt about how useful the press published in the Italian language could potentially prove to be in terms of fresh evidence to gain new, deeper insights on the evolution of mafia phenomena at the local level.

Methodological Notes As previously stated, the aim of this research effort is to present a comparative case study in which text production grammars—quantitative as well as qualitative features are considered—entail a particular concern. However, for methodological purposes, it is mandatory to make evident that—unfortunately—some important temporary gaps1 were registered within the collection kept at the National Library in Argentina. The collection is made of a wide variety of ethnic journalistic sources, including an Italian language series. Despite these limitations, the available sources enabled to approach the study of the selected case, at least in an exploratory fashion (Table 6.1). On the basis of the above-mentioned archival shortcomings, findings could not be at all claimed to be representative. Instead, they may result in useful inputs for further research initiatives on the same topic. Then, given that the origin of human beliefs must be traced less in individual psychology than in the systems that circulate at the social symbolic level (Pérez Mauco, 2017), on one hand, and that newsworthiness is 1 In the Il Mattino d’Italia’s series, the entire 1932 issues and the first half of 1933 ones were missing. For La Nuova Patria issues from October to December 1932 were neither available, as well as those of January, November and December 1933.

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Table 6.1 Corpus distribution for L’Italia del Popolo, La Nuova Patria and Il Mattino d’Italia. Years 1932–1935 (absolute values)

1932 1933 1934 1935 Total

L’Italia del Popolo

La Nuova Patria

Il Mattino d’Italia

Total

6 16 1 1 24

2 1 – – 3

– 3 – – 3

7 21 1 1 30

Source author’s own elaboration

not a universal value but rather a culturally grounded and political one, on the other, the analysis of framing is highly relevant here. It alludes to the ways of thinking about the definition of public issues, choosing to highlight certain aspects instead of others, as well as their demanded response from the audience. Defined as the set of culturally shared cognitive principles that operate symbolically in the meaningful structuring of the social world, framing analysis seeks to explain the interpretation of a given news item in relation to audiences’ previous cognitive schemes (Aruguete, 2017). Last, but not least, including cultural frameworks helps to avoid simplistic generalisations (Calzado & Lio, 2021). Also meaningful are in this context the gatekeeping and the newsmaking functions performed by news media outlets (Martini, 2017). The fragmentation of information pieces, the segmentation of topics, and the selection of the agenda on the whole reveal the adopted social and political commitments about what it could be said (Martini & Luchessi, 2004) and what it could be not (Angenot, 2010). From this point of view, it is equally relevant to attend both to the modalities of saying and to what cannot/is not wanted to be said at all. And, even, to attend to what it is in fact said without consciously meaning it (Arfuch, 2002). The very notion of agenda cutting, which refers to issues that attract low levels of attention due to the unfair or no media coverage they receive, as a result of space restrictions, internal and/or external pressures, or the journalist’s own prejudices, is of clue importance. According to Aruguete (2017), the omission, the non-coverage, or the intentional submissive or penalised treatment suffered by certain facts, objects, or people in the press have undeniable cognitive, cumulative effects over time, with direct

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consequences over the knowledge systems that the audiences structure in the long run.

The Mafia on the Verge of Class and National Identity First published in 1917, L’Italia del Popolo was born as a socialist newspaper. Directed by Comunardo Braccialarghe, it appeared daily in Italian, albeit some ads and certain pieces of information may be found in Spanish, too. During its life cycle, the publication varied from four to twelve pages in which international events, with special regard to the situation in Italy, news on Argentina’s political, cultural, and social life, including Italian associations in loco, sports (box, horseracing, football), entertainment (cinema, theatre, literature) were treated. Unemployment, trade-unions’ news, and accidents at work also deserved a great deal of the available space. Together with the frequent topics, the fact that a considerable amount of the included ads referred to massive consumption items2 and workwear made evident that the newspaper was addressed to a target reader that belonged to the working class. However, the number of images—photographs, paintings, drawings—was quite limited. Noteworthy, after 1926 L’Italia del Popolo was the only Italian anti-fascist newspaper in the world (Bertagna, 2009). During the considered time slot, L’Italia del Popolo was directed by Enrico Pierini. It used to present frequent allusions to the kidnappings, to the attacks, and to the extortions of the mafia in Argentina even long before the Ayerza’s case. They were included in the Fatti e fattacci section, which was generally placed on the second page. Seldom did the news in this section include images. Their development was short and their headings were usually fixed: sempre la mafia, arresto di un maffioso, i fasti della mafia. The mafia was mainly depicted as a urban criminal act, which happened mostly in the Metropolitan Area of Buenos Aires. It is important to take into account that mafia crimes before the Ayerza’s kidnapping were said to be carried out not only by Italian people but also by Argentinians. According to the newspaper’s vision, rather than an ethnically based criminal organisation, the mafia expressed a male lifestyle

2 For example: Quilmes, Coca Cola, Harrods, Gath y Chaves, Fernet Pini, Argentine Metal Works, Nuevo Banco Italiano, Pirelli, Compañía Italo-Argentina de Electricidad.

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on the margins of a dangerous, vicious, and criminal urbanity signed by poverty (Scarzanella, 2002). To start with, the Ayerza’s case broke with a certain predictability of the mafia crime. It occurred in a rural setting; it involved both men and women of Italian origin3 : Digrado’s wife was in charge of carrying Ayerza’s letters. She delivered them in Rosario to Salvatore Rinaldi’s mother-in-law, who sent them to their destination. The same woman communicated the news that Rinaldi and Gerardi let her know. It was she who did not communicate the delivery of the 120,000 pesos. So when Digrado’s wife returned to Corral de Bustos from Rosario she said that everything was fine but that the money had not yet been delivered […]. The authorities decreed the prison of Vincenzo Di Grado, his wife Paolina Dazaz (sic), their sons Paolo and Carlo, Vincenzo’s brother, Paolo di Grado; Pietro, Emilio and Pasquale Gianni, Alcira Medina Dalara (sic) and Mattia Montenegro. The latter two were arrested as they prepared to leave the quinta in sulky.

(L’Italia del Popolo, 24th February 1933) and the victim was no longer an anonymous citizen. Just the day after the kidnapping the newspaper published: In the village of Marcos Juarez [sic] the son of Minister Hueyo and Mr. Ayerza have been kidnapped. Hueyo was released, not so his friend. Another spectacular kidnapping, even more cinematographic than that of the doctor Favelukes, took place the other night in the small town of Marcos Juarez [sic] in the province of Cordoba [sic]. The victims were the lords Santiago Hueyo, sons of the Minister of Finance and Abele Ayerza rich landowner. How the kidnapping occurred. Yesterday at 2.15 am, Minister Dr. Hueyo showed up at the Central Police Department to report the kidnapping of his 23-year-old son Santiago, who was in the “estancia” of his friend Abele Ayerza located near Marcos Juarez. He said that the night before, his son had gone out with Ayerza, the student Alberto Malaver and the butler of the second by car to a cinema in Marcos Juarez [sic]. On their return, they found along the road leading to the “estancia” a parked car with its lights off. A stranger who was next to the vehicle asks them what was the way that led to the village; the suspicious butler pulled out a gun, but when […] the car blocking the road had to stop […] five armed individuals […] surrounded Ayerza’s car and ordered 3 Original quotations are in Italian and translated in English by the author.

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the passengers to get out. The one who acted as the group leader turned to Ayerza and asked him if he was Abele (sic) Ayerza. Having received an affirmative answer, he told him to stand aside and turning to Mr. Hueyo, he asked him the same question, to which the interlocutor replied that he was Santiago Hueyo. Knowing that he was the son of a minister, he told him to stand aside. After that, they tied and gagged the butler and Mr. Malaver, abandoning them next to Ayerza’s car after having left the vehicle with its tyres punctured. Then, they blindfolded the young Ayerza and Hueyo, loaded them into their car, assuring them that they should fear nothing, and at full speed they disappeared. The vehicle had already disappeared, a quarter of an hour ago, when Mr. Malaver and the butler managed to free themselves from the gags after useless efforts. They immediately returned to Marcos Juarez [sic] and reported what had happened to the police of that town, also informing the Minister of Finance by telephone of the kidnapping. As soon as Colonel García got to know of the spectacular kidnapping, he sent a telegraphic circular to all the police forces in the province of Cordoba [sic] and to his colleague the chief of police of the capital city. Immediately the police chief of Cordoba [sic] mobilized all his forces, arresting in Marcos Juarez [sic] a 40 years old individual of Italian nationality named Vincenzo Caselli, who is supposedly linked to the daring kidnappers alleged to be mafiosi. (L’Italia del Popolo, 25th October 1932)

The fact that the article was embedded in the upper part of the second page and that it included two photographs of the victims showed the importance acknowledged to the kidnapping. The tight follow-up of the case during the first week also suggested great interest. This commitment could also be appreciated through the long period along which the case’s coverage extended itself. All in all, 24 references have been identified from October 1932 to April 1935. After that, news related to mafia, in general, tended to disappear. This enduring coverage would be triggered by commercial as well as political reasons that must be properly placed in the context of the struggle between fascists and anti-fascists: [D]uring the search carried out by the Rosario police in the house in Virasoro street, many copies of Italian newspapers and magazines were found. There were also recent issues of the “Domenica del Corriere”, the “Illustrazione Italiana”, the “Gazzetta dello Sport”, etc. Among the local newspapers, many copies of “Il Mattino d’Italia”, the fascist organ, make a fine show. The ferocious criminals who murdered Abele [sic] Ayerza were assiduous readers of the paid sheet. The proof is very significant. It proves

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once again that all criminals are fascists. (L’Italia del Popolo, 15th May 1933)

In reference to commercial values, a sensational way of conceiving the news—marked by the privilege of the emotion to achieve a certain impact—would be in tune with the intention of increasing sales based on a case of proven interest for the public. But unlike some religion-oriented strategies deployed in the Argentine press, here Ayerza’s mother’s pain was not overexposed: [I]t is reassured that yesterday Ayerza’s mother received a letter from her son explaining the situation in which he finds himself; (L’Italia del Popolo, 26th October 1932) [I]t is therefore easy to imagine how the mother and other family members received the sad news. [...] Shortly after, the mother was also informed; (L’Italia del Popolo, 23rd February 1932) [D]on’t kill me, don’t kill me… Do it for my mother… My family will pay the ransom… Don’t kill me, please. …” (L’Italia del Popolo, 24th February 1932)

As a rule, the victim’s family was (re)presented as a cohesive group led by his brothers: Ettore Ayerza, the brother of the kidnapped, left the Rosario Police Department by car, (L’Italia del Popolo, 28th October 1932); [t]he brother of the kidnapped, Hernan Ayerza, communicated to the newspapers that on October 29 last year, after receiving a letter from Abel, he handed over the sum of 120,000 to the alleged kidnappers; (L’Italia del Popolo, 4th February 1933); A brother of the extinct leaves. Yesterday evening Ivan Ayerza, brother of the deceased, left for Corral de Bustos accompanied by Federico Elortondo. Ivan has the mission to recognize the remains of the extinct. (L’Italia del Popolo, 23rd February 1933)

Interestingly enough, the image of the sorrowful mother as an epitome of a suffering Argentine Republic4 was used only the day after the murder

4 “We stand alongside Argentine public opinion which is expressing its indignation and horror right now. Let us make the pain of the mother and of the Republic our own” (L’Italia del Popolo, 23rd February 1933).

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was confirmed, for evident self-identification purposes with Argentine readership in the midst of a xenophobic wave. The employment of capital letters in headings to catch the reader’s attention; the use of adjectives evidently chosen to produce an emotional response from the audience; the intertextual relationship with cinema— “Another spectacular kidnapping, even more cinematographic than that of the doctor”, (L’Italia del Popolo, 25th October 1932); and a visible stress on phenotypic traits of murderers in Lombrosian fashion worked in the above-mentioned emotional sense, too. According to strain and culture conflict theory, people at the bottom of the economic ladder may resort to crime to succeed if their sense of frustration is acute enough and their drive to succeed is sufficiently strong and channels of vertical mobility are closed or narrowed in a society that places a high premium on economic affluence and social advancement. [Giovanni Vinti] says that he took part in the kidnapping because he was driven by poverty, but that he never killed anyone […]. [Romeo Capuani] As times were bad and no money was being earned, I accepted the “job” they offered me. I took part in the kidnapping but I know nothing of the disgrace that happened to Mr. Ayerza... I only did the work of the kidnapping. Times were bad! I had been unemployed for a long time. (L’Italia del Popolo, 15th May 1933)

In addition, ethnic succession theorists refer to “minority groups struggling for a place in their adopted country” (Schneider, 2022, 108). But these theoretical schemes revealed unsatisfactory as soon as Giovanni Galiffi’s involvement with the crime, who was also an Italian immigrant, had to be explained. In other words, why did some Italian people resort to crime while others who may encounter similar opportunities, face the same temptations, share demographic characteristics, and come from the same environment—did not? According to ethnic succession theory, the clue may be found in the elapsed time since the first arrival at the destination. “As time passes and as legitimate and socially acceptable avenues of mobility open up to these ethnocultural groups and immigrant populations, the strain subsides, they integrate more fully into mainstream society, and they rely less and less on crime for upward mobility” (Schneider, 2022, 108). By comparison, no visual text nor reference to Galiffi’s phenotypic characteristics was identified. Although he was also presented in quite

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negative terms, it could be argued that the emotional impact was lower; no intertextual relationship neither with cinema nor with Al Capone was recognisable: The crimes of the Mafia. The arrest of Giovanni Galiffi. Coming from Montevideo, Giovanni Galiffi arrived yesterday, suspected as “the head of the terrorist gangs frequently called “mafia” whose crimes were the culmination of the horrendous assassination of Abele [sic] Ayerza. Invited by police chief Viancarlos, Califfi [sic] arrived from Montevideo and was driven to the police department under strictly segregated detention. Califfi [sic], known as “Don Ciccio Grande”, the man who has remained up to now in the shadow. “Don Ciccio Chico” would be the Algerian Ali Ben Amar, fugitive so far. (L’Italia del Popolo, 27th February 1933) Galiffi arrested. Yesterday, in this capital city, at the request of the police of Rosario, the infamous Giovanni Galiffi, considered an accomplice of Ayerza’s murderers until last month, was arrested. Accompanied by a civil servant on the night train, Galiffi was then brought back to Rosario. (L’Italia del Popolo, 7th June 1933) G. Galiffi in provisional release. Our correspondent from Rosario informs us that the ill-famed Giovanni Galiffi, supposed head of the mafia, has been released on bail of 30,000 pesos, deposited in the courts. (L’Italia del Popolo, 30th July 1933) Citizenship card cancelled. The federal judge of Santa Fe yesterday annulled the citizenship card held by Giovanni Galiffi, an Italian, considering that it had been granted on the basis of fake pieces of information. (L’Italia del Popolo, 12th February 1933)

The Galiffi’s portrayal made evident the drawbacks that ethnic succession theory in particular presents as it fails to explain the reasons why wealthy and well-established Italian mafiosi in Argentina continued to get involved in mafia crimes even long after their setting in the new context. Whereas the Argentine press, some critical views that tended to defend Italian people living in Argentina were registered here: Nowadays it is enough to be Sicilian to be taken for a mafia man; (L’Italia del Popolo, 26th October 1932) [A] compatriot died under strange circumstances at the Police Department. He had been arrested during the investigations into Ayerza’s kidnapping. [He] was the compatriot Carmelo Vinti, Italian citizen, aged 48, resident in Rosario. He maintained, police said, relations with elements

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of the slums. […] We do not know if Carmelo Vinti was guilty or innocent. Given the way in which he gave himself up to the police, one would have to believe in the innocence of the deceased man. […] One gets the impression, as the reader sees, of being in front of the tragic result of one of the “skillful interrogations”. For this reason the justice ought to make a severe investigation to know if Vinti was really guilty. […]; (L’Italia del Popolo, 16th February 1933) The death of compatriot Carmelo Vinti. The evidence of the autopsy. The doctors who performed the autopsy on the compatriot Carmelo Vinti’s body who died in the police department under the circumstances reported by L’Italia del Popolo, and yesterday raised their report to the investigating judge. According to this report, the dead body presents various ecchymoses in different parts of it, signs of violent pressure in the chest, break of various ribs and cartilages, internal lesions in different organs, as well as a head wound. The doctors also declared that Vinti had a heart illness. The necropsy report therefore confirms that violence was used against Carmelo Vinti. Death may have been caused by cardiac syncope, but the attack in turn was caused by the acts of violence exerted on the prisoner. The medical report is therefore in full contrast with what the police agents said and we therefore want to believe that the judge will punish the guilty whoever they are; (L’Italia del Popolo, 19th February 1933) On Vinti’s face there are visible signs of the punches he received from the policemen at the time of his arrest. (L’Italia del Popolo, 15th May 1933)

But the observed ethnic defence was not straightforward nor monolithic: “Juan [sic] Vinti who is still a fugitive is a cruel, violent and unscrupulous individual of any kind” (L’Italia del Popolo, 24th February 1933); “Giovanni Vinti speaks in Castilian with a clearly ‘cocolichesque’ intonation and occasionally mixes Sicilian and Italian words” (L’Italia del Popolo, 15th May 1933). Compared to other ethnic newspapers, the discursive strategies deployed here did not necessarily imply that the National identity of suspected criminals was hidden: “The Italian prisoners are: Manuel Tuttolomondo; Vincenzo Casselli, barber shop; Mario Vittorio, Vittorio Pittori, Angelo Struzi, Antonio Tedolfi, Luigi avarello, Angelo Avarello and Luisa Tenerini. Tuttolomondo is considered by the police as an old mafioso” (L’Italia del Popolo, 26th October 1932). Rather than in ethnic values, the previously noted defence was grounded in class and ideological terms with few exceptions:

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Ruggierini’s house [where the three offenders were arrested] is luxuriously owned and located in an almost aristocratic district […]. The house in via Virasoro 2026 which was a refuge for the mafia has an excellent appearance: there are not only all the comforts of a bourgeois house, but also luxury. All the rooms were well furnished. In the dining room there is a radio that costs at least a thousand pieces. In the garden there are plants of some value. They also had a large cage with many fine birds. They had portable phones. In a kind of vestibule there is a table with many newspapers and magazines. Among the newspapers we note Il Mattino d’Italia and among the magazines La Domenica del Corriere; (L’Italia del Popolo, 15th May 1933) But when the police and certain Argentine press discovered a gang of maffiosi in every corner of the Republic, when Calabrians and Sicilians were accused of having kidnapped Favelukes and Ayerza, and threatening letters attributed to the mafia appeared every day, in a word when a certain confusion of episodes and circumstances was not favourable to the Italians, neither the Ambassador nor the Regent of the Embassy said a single word to put things in order, they did not take steps to mitigate certain languages and for the police to keep a somewhat more thoughtful demeanour so as not to offend a large community, perhaps the one that most and most disinterestedly contributed to the progress of the country. Thus neither the Ambassador nor the Regent of the Embassy intervened with the faculties granted them by the diplomatic rules, to obtain that justice did not delay the investigation of the facts attributed to the mafia, and to give the greatest possible publication to the results of these investigations, given that they came to clarify many situations, and to break the black atmosphere that had artificially been forming especially around the Calabrians and Sicilians, that is to say around the emigrants who have given the greatest contribution of work to this country. Why this absence of the Italian diplomatic authorities? Because fascism was not able to affirm, through its interest the imperialist spirit, because fascism enters the field with lance in hand and remains only when there is some rich person to defend, some scoundrel who can flaunt the membership card Party of the underworld, which gives money and support to it, which can show a cross or a commendation; then, yes, Italian honour is at stake; but when it comes to workers, people who sweat and suffer to make their living, who do not renounce their dignity, who do not bend their backs, the fascist authorities remain hermetically locked up in their residences, and do not understand that the honour of Italians is only the one created by the great mass of emigrants, all the anonymous elements who have

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given the effort of their muscles and their intelligence without any exceptional pretension, contenting themselves with living miserably. (L’Italia del Popolo, 30th December 1932)

To conclude, in the undertaken editorial line an idealised image of Italians residing in Argentina was also at work: The Italians who work hard here and are creators of progress, the Italians who build cities, build railways and roads across the desert and open the fertile furrow of the “pampa” cannot be responsible if some of their compatriots have made themselves unworthy of their nationality, which in the end is a very small thing, but of the human consortium. [...]. Not Italians, therefore, but only criminals. Their nationality is neither an aggravating nor a mitigating factor. Italians can have absolutely nothing in common with these disgusting beings. This is why Italians ask for the punishment to be severe, very severe. (L’Italia del Popolo, 23rd February 1933)

This resulted in an ambivalent positioning that pivoted from the shy reaction to ethnic offence to the open exposure of mafiosi.

A Denialist View La Nuova Patria was founded by Basilio Cittadini in the late nineteenth century (Melella, 2016). Within a wider liberal-oriented political strategy, the publication assumed the monolithic defence of the Italian community abroad as if it were a homogeneous group (Dore, 1985; Sforza, 2019). Hence, it addressed a model reader on whom a common National origin was projected through the almost exclusive use of the Italian language. As the largest Italian newspaper printed outside Italy, and the third in terms of quantitative importance in the Argentine context (Sergi, 2012), it used to resort to controversy as an effective method to guarantee a high and sustained readership (Bertagna, 2020). After an interruption, due to the boycott exercised by the fascist government through the creation of the competing Il Mattino d’Italia, the newspaper managed to survive: it was renamed and it reappeared some months before the Ayerza’s kidnapping. Given that the fascist ideals promoted the exclusive relationship of (e)migrants with the homeland, among the evolving goals of the new edition was the increasing incorporation of Italian people into Argentine political life. In 1933, the newspaper was directed by Giuseppe Chiummiento (Balsas, 2022a).

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The editor unfolded as an authorised speaker in terms of his National origin in order to explain facts and characters related to mafia groups in Argentina to local society. In fact, he performed a “pedagogical mandate” to counterbalance the perceived lack of expertise of local journalism to deal with mafia issues. Besides, the newspaper developed an ironic and controversial style to answer/oppose to Argentine press, by denying the link between Ayerza’s kidnapping and Italianness, on one hand, and by denouncing local police ineffectiveness, on the other: The Ayerza case. The mystery over the case of the young Abel Ayerza continues, despite the very active investigations that the kidnappers are carrying out to track down the police. At the last minute we know that the amateur policeman Franz C. Cotti has offered to participate in the research, as a profound connoisseur of the subject and a close friend of the great-grandfather of the Mafia’s inventor and importer. (La Nuova Patria, 22nd February 1933)

The fact that no images were included in the analysed articles revealed a way of conceiving the readership in a rational way rather than in an emotional one. Standing at the evidence gathered, the development of Ayerza’s case was not covered in depth. Despite the limited space allotted on the whole to the case, the fact that the most important, either in quantitative or qualitative terms, reference was an editorial note located at the right end at the top of the front page, which included the term “mafia” in the heading, proved that the newspaper was not completely strange to the debates on mafia that were taking place in Argentine society. Moreover, the editorial note represented a further chance to attack the declared political opponent: the fascism. We defend the mafia. Yes sirs, we defend it and we brag about it. And we defend it, both when it comes to the mafia with one f, and when it is written with two, perhaps with the aim of… strengthening it and making it more fearless. And by defending the mafia we are sure that we are not only doing a work of courage, but also of justice. To start with, let’s say that 95 per cent of those who are angry with the mafia do not even know what it means. So let’s first give the explanation: Mafia, from the Arabic mahias, means braggart, “guappo”, “compadrito”. We affirm, after this definition, that the mafia in this sense has existed, exists and will always exist, all over the world. It could be objected that the word mafia is Sicilian jargon and

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that only in Sicily there are those who declare themselves “mafioso”. It is true. There are only in Sicily those who declare themselves mafia and show it off, but there are in all regions of the world types of braggarts who call themselves in a thousand different ways, despite being equal in temperament, moral sense and action. That is, they are personalities who love outlawed situations, they prefer to take justice into their own hands, to impose themselves with their brutal force and their lack of scruples, always following their impulses, which are sometimes even generous. There are even mafiosi who, after having lived against the laws, make use of them to transform them into instruments of uncontrolled power, of legalized arrogance. The Sicilian mafia ignores the use of chloroform and there is a mafia that can be Sicilian as well as Argentine or Spanish, which is certainly not made up of fishermen or farmers. There is also a mafia interested in creating the legend of the Sicilian mafia, which is very convenient, almost as much as good soul Di Giovanni and his gang. The Sicilian mafia?... But the Sicilian mafia had already almost disappeared for some time; the prefect Mori could state that, the Sicilian mafia was by now a “tale”, like the Neapolitan Camorra and the Calabrian brigandage. Mafiosi, camorristi and brigands exist all over the world, and they often occupy public offices and lead banks and edit newspapers. The mafiosi, the camorristi and the brigands are found in the large health resorts, in the well-known international hotels, in the luxury classes of the large steamers, in the magnificent automobiles, in the famous "clubs" and in the splendid social gatherings. In the suburbs of Buenos Aires, on the other hand, and in Cordoba (sic) or Santa Fe countryside, there are honest workers or, at most, hopeless people who steal out of hunger: there are those perennially kidnapped by poverty, the real mafia reserved by fate for our very sad times, and not kidnappers. The mafia? But if the mafia is made up of those poor souls who were recently arrested for the kidnapping of doctor Faveluques [sic] and the young Ayerza, we pride ourselves on declaring defenders of the mafia, and we are even willing to pass for mafiosi. (La Nuova Patria, 22nd November 1932)

The ambiguous image of mafioso underlying here combined positive as well as negative aspects. This ambivalence was not new; it may be traced back to the etymology of the word mafia (Anello, 2013; Cacopardi, 2021). In clear contrast with ethnic succession theory, the idea of mafia conveyed here pointed out a widespread upper-class expression rather than an ethnocultural one. To this end, a sharp division between

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a military mafia that acts “out of necessity” and other more sophisticated one, associated with political, economic, and cultural leadership, not necessarily of Italian origin, was advanced. Notwithstanding, Giovanni Galiffi was depicted as a successful businessman and a respectful father/husband: Giovanni Galiffi’s situation. Montevideo, 18—Giovanni Galiffi “ranch owner” or “sportman” well known in Argentina and Uruguay, is confidently awaiting the response of the Supreme Court of Justice on the decree of the Executive Power which expels him from the National territory, as an undesirable person. An unquestioned Italian citizen, who has lived in America for many years, where with his work he has managed to create an independent position for himself, there is no specific evidence or positive elements against him that indicate that he belongs to that Arab Phoenix called the “Maffia”. On the other hand, he absolutely lacks the physical traits and mental habit of the maffioso: very nice person, dressed with refinement, almost elegant, good talker, man of society, cordial, affable, anyone who speaks to him once could see in him the gentleman, even before the bourgeois who got rich with work. And the fact that he is a gentleman, as demonstrated again recently by the banquet offered to him by the Jockey Club, which succeeded in a fine demonstration of esteem, even if some envious and jealous member then echoed the absurd rumors that ran through Argentina regarding his activities, rumors of which the Montevideo police later used to decree his expulsion. Giovanni Galiffi is also a good husband and an excellent father: when he talks about his wife residing on the other shore and his Argentina-born children, it is good to note—he is moved to tears. He recalls the sacrifices, the shortcomings, the heroic efforts of will during the first years in America, when with his wife he devoted himself sixteen hours a day to washing bottles; and he draws the consequence that a man so devoted to work has, at least, the right to demand proof when accusations tending to harm his reputation are launched against him. For this reason, for the honor of his name which is that of his children, Giovanni Galiffi works with commitment that will undoubtedly earn his reward, to undo the chatting and rumors about him. “If it were only me—he told us more than once—I would know how to desert a life full of bitterness rather than joy with a manly gesture; but I owe my children the fierce, desperate defence of my name and my past.” Giovanni Galiffi is assisted by two talented lawyers from the Montevideo court, animated by the certainty that the Supreme Court will be able to do justice to their patronage, guilty of nothing and victim only of gossip. Micromega.” (La Nuova Patria, date not available)

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Interestingly enough, each bond with the local mafia was denied on the basis of his physical traits and his class belonging, among other characteristics.

The Official Response Due to the impossibility of converting the main ethnic newspapers published in Argentina into the Italian language, the fascist regime started its own editorial project called Il Mattino d’Italia. First directed by Mario Appelius, the paper had 20 pages with plenty of images; it also counted upon a professional staff. During Michele Intaglietta’s direction, the fascist orientation was deepened: not only were the “advantages” of the fascist regime but also its leader’s image highlighted. Except for a few ads, the newspaper was completely written in the Italian language. Considerable attention was drawn to the situation in Italy, the cinema, the sports, and the Italian associative life in the South American region in its pages. Unlike what it might be expected, it is interesting to note that the very existence of the mafia in Argentina was not openly denied in it. Nor the Italian community’s interests were blindly defended. Instead, different subtle strategies were enacted. For instance: The fear of maffia. The audience that packed a Rosario movie theatre the other night, where a sensational film was being shown that reproduced the episodes of the kidnapping and murder of Abel Ayerza, was surely attracted by the somewhat morbid desire to know the details of the mafia’s life that the program of the show promised to reveal, as a subject of indisputable interest. That this interest was real and intense was demonstrated by the fact that the theatre room was full and that there was no shortage of well-known people in the best circles and the local police authorities themselves. The latter had also taken part in the preparation of the film and more than one of those present were both an actor and a spectator. This further increased the interest of the public and the success of the show, due to the opportunity and to different opinions on good taste that may exist. However, the show was possibly staged for educational purposes and if one part of the audience was drawn to that aforementioned morbid curiosity, others may have been able to portray its teachings and warnings. It all comes down to choosing and keeping a convenient vantage point. The film titled “Asesinos” made about the tragic facts of the kidnapping and murder of the unfortunate Ayerza and about the preliminary stages,

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was projected in a theatre in Rosario, with great intervention of authorities and public. By the way, since the process against the alleged perpetrators of the crime has not yet been closed, the show may also seem, at least, inopportune. But “¡allá ellos!”. The terrifying and pitiful scenes of the story were reproduced on the screen […] and the excitement of those present increased with the progress of the action, when suddenly, in the dark room covered with shivers of emotion, a loud explosion was heard like of a shot from a firearm. It was a moment; frightened people rushed towards the doors trying to save themselves from the supposed danger. Screams, moans, swear words. The scene of tumult passed from the screen to the audience where the crowd was seized with an indescribable panic. It was with great difficulty that the authorities present were able to make themselves understood in that pandemonium and prevent further disorders from occurring. There were already several wounded in the melee; many women suffered seizures or passed out. And all because a photographer, wanting to reproduce a view of the packed public, had ignited the magnesium, causing a detonation perhaps a little louder than usual. Those present, who were already prone to violent sensations, abandoned themselves to the fright that the sudden outbreak caused them. The mob scenes, certainly reproduced with exaggerated evidence of detail, had predisposed the public to fear reprisals and violence. In fact, then and there, it was believed that the maffiosi had intervened in the show to exercise an act of revenge… The maffiosi, if there were any, had every interest in staying calm. And nothing would have happened if the audience who loves sensational scenes on stage had a little serenity, spirit, but rather a little courage. That, if there is not, it cannot be given. As Don Abundio, who really had very little courage, said. (Il Mattino d’Italia, 27th October 1933)

Through an explicit taunt tone, the boundaries between mafia issues and sensational storytelling were set. The audience, as an epitome of Argentine society, including local authorities, was presented as a fearful, ignorant, and coward one. Another deployed strategy consisted in hiding mafiosi’s National identity. Arguably, the fact that their names were generally omitted or even translated into Spanish could be found a bit odd in the context of a newspaper almost entirely published in Italian language: [t]he trial for the assassination of Ayerza. The convicts Juan (sic) Vinti, José (sic) Frenda and Romeo (sic) Capuani left yesterday from Rosario, duly guarded by police officers and headed for Villa Maria. They will be placed at the disposal of Judge Dr. Setiem, who is entrusted with the trial for the

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kidnapping and murder of Mr. Abel Ayerza. The commission is carrying weapons and money seized from the prisoners. (Il Mattino d’Italia, no date available)

This editorial policy would be in line with the official non-approval during the entire fascist period of stories featuring criminals of Italian nationality (Buonanno, 2012). Thirdly, although the viewpoint of Galiffi’s defence was clearly assumed: [D]ecrees against the mafia man of Rosario. The Criminal Appeal Chamber of Córdoba has rejected the appeal against the preventive prison decree presented by the defence of the criminals Vinti, Capuano and Frenta for the kidnapping and murder of Mr. Abel Ayerza. The Santa Fe judge Doctor Oviedo Bustos withdrew the card of Argentine citizenship granted to Juan [sic] Galiffi, don Ciccio Grande, stating that it was obtained through a false witness. The defence declares the decree unconstitutional. (Il Mattino d’Italia, 12th March 1933)

It did not seem that it was for the sake of ethnic solidarity. Rather, it appeared to be rooted in class belonging. While Vinti, Capuano, and Frenta were called criminals, the use of “don” in Galiffi’s case implied a higher range. Then, the withdrawal of his citizenship card was not explicitly connected to Ayerza’s kidnapping but to administrative faults.

Conclusions From the previous analysis, it could be concluded that neither the importance allotted to Ayerza’s case nor the news reporting it in the ethnic press published in Argentina during the first half of the 30 s were homogeneous. For instance, in some cases commercial values were more evident than in others. Overall, the way in which the Italian ethnic press in Argentina positioned itself towards Ayerza’s case was not exclusively grounded on an imagined common origin. Rather, it proved to be highly dependent on the political orientation assumed by the editor. In this sense, class belonging was also meaningful in terms of information treatment. Although the very existence of mafia in Argentina was acknowledged, to different extents, the body of evidence gathered suggests that the

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Italian ethnic press in Argentina failed to configure a coherent and articulated anti-mafia discourse to counterbalance either the assumed Argentine’s press enduring lack of expertise in the subject or even the ruling xenophobia in Argentine society. By action or omission, ethnic newspapers seemed to have contributed a great deal to set the basis for the idealised image of Italian immigrants in Argentina in exclusively positive terms. This idea must be further assessed on light of new evidence in future research efforts.

References Aguirre, O. (2008). El secuestro que conmovió a la Argentina. Todo Es Historia, 494, 54–64. Aguirre, O. (2010). Historias de la mafia en la Argentina. Norma. Angenot, M. (2010). El discurso social. Los límites de lo pensable y lo decible. Siglo XXI. Anello F. (2013). La mafia nella fiction. D’amato M. (ed.), La mafia allo specchio (pp. 228–258). Angeli. Arfuch, L. (2002). El espacio autobiográfico. Dilemas de la subjetividad contemporánea. Fondo de Cultura Económica. Aruguete, N. (2017). ¿Paraguas común o teorías independientes? El debate entre la agenda setting, el priming y el framing. In S. Martini & M. Pereyra (Ed.), La noticia hoy. Tensiones entre la política, el mercado y la tecnología(pp. 93– 106). Imago Mundi. Balsas, M. S. (2021). “El país que no miramos”. Las mafias italianas según “Clarín” (1997–2020). Estudios sobre el Mensaje Periodístico, 27 (4): 1035– 1042. Balsas, M. S. (2022a). Secreto a voces. Mafias italianas y prensa en la Argentina. Autopublished. Balsas, M. S. (2022b). La mafia, entre identidad y otredad en Arlt y Sciascia. Aportes para una literatura comparada. Cuadernos del Hipogrifo. Revista De Literatura Hispanoamericana y Comparada, 18, 18–37. Bertagna, F. (2009). La stampa italiana in Argentina. Donzelli. Bertagna, F. (2020). Italiani in Argentina, ieri e oggi. Cosenza: Pellegrini. Buonanno, M. (2012). Italian Tv Drama & Beyond. Stories from the Soil, Stories from the Sea. Intellect. Cacopardi, I. (2021). Il crimine raccontato tra decostruzione e mitizzazione. In M. Bertone & C. Masoni C. (Ed.) Mafie transmediali. Forme e generi del nuovo racconto criminale (pp. 37–52). Rubbettino.

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Caimari, L. (2007). Sucesos de cinematográfico aspectos. Secuestro y espectáculo en el Buenos Aires de los 30. La ley de los profanos. Delito, justicia y cultura en Buenos Aires (1870–1940). FCE-UDESA. Caimari, L. (2012). Lenguajes del delito. Mientras la ciudad duerme. Pistoleros, policías y periodistas en Buenos Aires 1920–1945. Siglo XXI. Calzado, M., & Lio, V. (2021). El policial del día. Rutinas productivas en los noticieros porteños. In S. Calzado & S. Morales (Eds.), Atravesar las pantallas. Noticia policial, producción informativa y experiencias de la inseguridad (pp. 67–100). Teseo. D’Amato, M. (2013). La mafia allo specchio. Franco Angeli. Della, Porta D. (2012). Foreword: Political Science and Transnational Organized Crime: What is the Connection?. In F. Allum & S. Gilmour S. (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Transnational Organized Crime (pp. xiii–xiv). Routledge. Delgado, E. J. (2011). Ágata Galiffi, la flor de la mafia en San Juan. Todo Es Historia, 532, 52–55. Dore, G. (1985). Un Periódico Italiano En Buenos Aires (1911–1913). In F. Devoto & G. Rosoli (Eds.), La inmigración italiana en la Argentina (pp. 127–140). Biblos. Hobsbawm, E. (1983). Rebeldes primitivos. Estudio sobre las formas arcaicas de los movimientos sociales en los siglos XIX y XX . Ariel. Johansson, C., & Battiston, S. (2020). News Reporting of Italian Organised Crime in Australia: Examining Il Globo’s Editorial Commentary. In C. Dewhirst & R. Scully (Eds.), The Transnational Voices of Australia’s Migrant and Minority Press (pp. 189–208). Palgrave Macmillan. Kleemans, E. R. (2014). Theoretical perspectives on organized crime. In L. Paoli (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Organized Crime (pp. 32–52). Oxford University Press. Martini, S., & Luchessi, L. (2004). Los que hacen la noticia. Periodismo, información y poder. Biblos. Martini, S. (2017). Últimas noticias. Construyendo actualidad en el siglo XXI. In S. Martini & M. Pereyra (Eds.), La noticia hoy. Tensiones entre la política, el mercado y la tecnología (pp. 1–28). Imago Mundi. Melella, C. (2016). Migrantes de países andinos en la Argentina. Prensa gráfica, redes virtuales y construcción identitaria. Biblos. Pérez, Mauco M. (2017). ¿Clarín miente? Ideología y discurso “Del editor al lector”: canon del periodismo gerencial. Ciccus. Ravveduto, M. (2019). Lo spettacolo della mafia. Edizioni Gruppo Abele. Scarzanella, E. (2002). Ni gringos ni indios. Inmigración, criminalidad y racismo en la Argentina 1890–1940. Universidad Nacional de Quilmes. Schneider, S. (2022). Canadian Organised Crime. Canadian Scholars.

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Sforza, N. (2019). Italianos en la Argentina del Centenario según La Patria degli Italiani. In M. S. Balsas (Ed.) Italia en la Argentina. Desafíos actuales en la investigación social (pp. 49–58). IDES. Sergi, P. (2012). Patria di carta. Storia di un quotidiano coloniale e del giornalismo Italiano in Argentina. Pellegrini. Sergi, P. (2015). L’immagine dei calabresi in Argentina tra discriminazione e difesa identitaria. Palinsesti, 3, 155–178. Silverstone, R. (2004). ¿Por qué estudiar los medios?. Amorrortu. Smeriglio, G. P. (2022). ¿Adónde se habrá metido Mafiopoli? Las mafias italianas según La Gente d’Italia. Comparative Cultural Studies, 15, 59–69. Volkov, V. (2014). The Russian Mafia: Rise and Extinction. In L. Paoli (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Organized Crime (pp. 159–176). Oxford University Press.

PART II

Past and Present Migration Challenges

CHAPTER 7

Italian Remittances in Great Migration Years Francesca Fauri

Introduction From just over 100,000 persons leaving in 1876, a total of 872,596 Italian people emigrated abroad on the eve of World War I. Between 1876 and 1913 11.4 million Italian citizens left their country. In 1911 Italians living abroad corresponded to about 1/6 of the population on the peninsula (Choate, 2007). Between 1883 and 1913 Italian migrants’ destinations were, in order of importance, Europe, the United States and Latin America. Figure 7.1 shows the changing incidence of these three areas: it is quite clear that as Latin America (primarily Argentina and Brazil) lost ground, the United States replaced it as the favoured destination while the relevance of the European labour market remained quite stable. Emigrants’ remittances derived from that part of migrants’ income that was not consumed locally, but rather sent home (Jannaccone, 1927). The

Thanks to Valerio Vanelli for the help with data processing. F. Fauri (B) Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. Fauri and D. Mantovani (eds.), Past and Present Migration Challenges, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39431-7_7

163

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F. FAURI

1884 1885 1886 1887 1889 1891 1893 1895 1896 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 0%

10%

20%

30% Europe

40% Usa

50%

60% South America

70%

80%

90%

100%

Others

Fig. 7.1 Italian migrants’ destinations 1885–1913 (percentage values) (Source Ministero di Agricoltura, Industria e Commercio [1915])

volume of these savings, though influenced by global economic trends, grew over time as migratory flows mushroomed and migrants’ earnings and ability to save improved. That said, it is still almost impossible to correctly estimate the amount of savings Italian migrants sent back during the mass migration period. With the best available data, this chapter attempts to estimate the changing volume of remittances throughout the great migration era and establish where such remittances came from and to which Italian regions they were mainly directed. In order to avoid recurrent frauds and recurring complaints among migrants, the Italian government assigned the collection and transfer of remittances to the Banco di Napoli (BdN), as we shall see. Finally, the macro and microeconomic effects of remittances on the Italian economy will be analysed.

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An Estimate of Italian Remittances The growth of Italian remittances was sudden and significant, according to the Bank of Italy: “Starting from the second half of the 1890s, the importation of the capital factor was replaced at a rapidly increasing rate by the exportation of the labour factor, a circumstance which ensured for a certain number of years a growing inflow of income and money remittances from abroad. Before 1895 the contribution of remittances to the Italian balance of payments had been almost insignificant, but in the following twenty years it reached a considerable amount”, as remittances covered, on average, 24% of balance of payment (BOP) inflows over the last four years before World War I (De Mattia, 1990, 160). Emigrants’ remittances in this case played an important role because they compensated Italy’s persistent trade deficit; in general, this “fantastic rain of gold” helped reduce the incidence of financial disturbances throughout the great migration era (Esteves & Khoudour-Castéras, 2009). The evolution of these flows was never constant, but it was influenced “by the numbers and characteristics of migratory flows, by earnings and the ability to save, and by global economic trends and variations in the exchange rate between foreign currencies and the Italian lira” (Balletta, 1978, 94). When in the early 1890s the number of expatriates in the United States declined due to a crisis of overproduction and a drop in railway construction, remittances also decreased by 6% per cent on previous years (Balletta, 1976). Similarly, the US downturn of 1908 brought about a strong increase in unemployment that negatively affected remittances to Europe: between 1907 and 1909, remittances dropped by 11% to Italy (and 25% to Sweden, 26% to Norway and 30% to Finland) (Esteves & Khoudour-Castéras, 2011). Clearly, remittances were also generally related to the economic activity in immigration countries as emigrants reacted to the conditions in the foreign labour market and often came back during economic downturns. In spite of temporary downfalls, the amount of remittances closely followed emigration flows and reached a huge figure: according to Istat data 10 billion lire were sent to Italy between 1900 and 1914, exceeding the Italian government’s direct annual tax revenues for the entire period (which amounted to 8 billion lire—Table 7.1). One of the questions that spontaneously arises is how immigrants could save this much. As various studies of the time recall, Italian workers abroad, also compared to emigrant workers from other countries, were

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Table 7.1 Estimates of Italian remittances (millions of current lire) 1876–191 ISTAT 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914

103 105 109 107 121 125 137 143 141 138 147 171 183 181 203 257 251 221 194 216 246 265 300 356 394 596 594 567 526 811 880 774 671 660 805 846 886 917 627

% of BOP (Istat)

7.1

6.7

13.3

18.7

15.8

23.1

23.5

20.5*

Balletta 108 111 115 113 127 132 144 151 148 145 155 180 193 191 214 286 279 246 216 240 273 294 333 396 439 663 664 634 589 906 981 863 749 736 899 945 1,042 1,024 703

% of BOP (Balletta) 7.04 8.84 8.51 7.95 8.52 8.49 9.30 9.42 9.87 10.54 10.63 11.90 13.50 12.84 14.81 19.10 17.63 15.72 13.51 14.58 16.90 16.65 17.24 17.81 20.07 27.06 25.94 24.45 22.04 28.60 28.08 25.20 23.41 22.11 23.85 24.16 24.94 23.61 19.94

Tax revenues

527 531 530 533 533 540 542 506 483 498 518 536 555 576 617

(continued)

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Table 7.1 (continued) ISTAT Total 1900–1913

% of BOP (Istat)

14,974 10,554

Balletta 16,627 11,837

% of BOP (Balletta)

Tax revenues

8,025

* 1915

Source Istat (1957); Balletta (1976)

simply the most frugal. “In America for example some years ago it was calculated that on average Italian workers spent 31 per cent of their income as opposed to workers from other countries who spent on average 46 per cent” (Sabbadini, 1935, 4). Clearly one could only spend so little—and save so much—by adopting a standard of living that was unimaginable for native citizens, finding for example low-cost living situations, such as sharing a rented residence or boarding (which Italians called “bordo”) with other immigrant families. In this way, according to the Dillingham Immigration Commission’s estimates, people could save up to 80% of their salary: “95 per cent of Italian workers save 25 to 30 dollars per month. Therefore, in eight months of work they can save over 200 dollars per capita” (US Immigration Commission, 1911, vol. 37, 277; Speare, 1908). Historians have come up with other explanations of Italian emigrants’ spirit of sacrifice: the young leaver should always be seen as an agent of a fixed-term mission for profit, agreed on previously with one’s own family: “These projects excluded any form whatsoever of integration in the host society: the only goal was to save the greatest amount in the shortest possible time, often at the cost of a brutal job and a drastic regime of under-consumption which made them indecipherable and extraneous to other ethnic groups” (De Clementi, 1994, 90). Thus, the sacrifices made to save so much were great, not only in terms of a life of hardship and privation abroad, but also because they had to accept selfexclusion from the host society. Emigrants remained an extraneous entity that in most cases returned home after a few years and, if things had gone well, with the hoped-for savings. Many crossed the ocean just once if this was enough to solve the most urgent family budget problems, but others, if necessary, made the crossing numerous times. After returning and using one’s savings, people sometimes decided to leave again and began the virtuous cycle of movement that characterized many migrants’

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lives. These “circular migrants” have been also defined target earners: they would leave with a clear idea of how much they wanted to earn, and this idea influenced both their destination and how much time they would spend there. For example, it is commonly known that southern Europeans who emigrated and then returned, stayed in the United States for an average of five years (Brettel, 1986, 533). These young target earners had already decided to return before leaving, with a savings goal that had been agreed upon by shared family planning strategies. And once back home they were often ready to leave again. The seasonality of Italian emigration is proved by the high percentage of returnees on emigrants, which according to official statistics reached a peak of 76.4% in the case of the United States between 1902 and 1913 (Fauri, 2015; Gould, 1980). Archdeacon (1983) calculated that the rate of people leaving the United States to go back to their own country was much higher in the Italian ethnic group than in any other ethnic group (1,137,100 Italians emigrated from the United States between 1908 and 1924 out of the 3,820,986 Italian immigrants arrived in the period 1899– 1924). That means that a large part of them was made of temporary migrants who did not show interest in integrating into the American society, acquiring citizenship and learning the English language (Vecoli, 2005).1 It is extremely complex to correctly estimate remittances. The official data is a de facto estimate based on the volume of visible remittances (international postal, consular, or bank money orders). Money orders were of course only part of the savings sent home, for various reasons: money orders were complicated and not very common because it was necessary to know the host country’s language in order to speak with post office employees. One could also use consular money orders or a well-reputed bank’s cheques, but often they (consulates and good banks) were both too far from one’s residence. And here is where invisible remittances come into play. A significant share of savings was entrusted to private bankers (see below) or consigned to friends and relatives who were going home and brought the money back with them. Indeed, often when emigrants decided to go home, they would exchange large sums into Italian bills and bring them on the return journey (sometimes for 1 However, War World I effect on increasing returns should be considered, a real watershed that forced many Italians to decide whether they still felt Italian enough to go back and fight for their country (Pretelli, 2011).

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safety sewn into the garments they were wearing). For amounts of less than 25 lire emigrants exchanged the local money into lire and put the 5–10–25 lire bills in an envelope that they would send to Italy as a registered or insured letter. Attempts to gather data and information on these flows of incoming bills, in Stringher’s words “were never fruitful enough” (Stringher, 1912, 14–15); in any case, he estimated these savings which entered outside banking institutions at 90 million lire a year (Stringher was the general di director of the Bank of Italy). In Table 7.1 two estimates are combined. Istat’s estimates on remittances, starting with Italy’s unification, are especially interesting in that they have been reworked by the same institute on the basis of various studies and statistical sources. Istat used three types of data to construct the final estimate on remittances: the first set of data was taken from the amount of deposits and reimbursements made by citizens at postal banks (from 1890), from international money orders (from 1861) and from the amount of consular money orders (from 1868 to 1908). Istat has thus integrated this data with the official data published in the United States. The second set of data was taken from statistics on remittances handled by the Banco di Napoli (see below) while the third was taken from private studies offering “more or less reliable evaluations of emigrants’ remittances” (Borgatta, 1933). The figures in column 1 (Table 7.1) were thus calculated by ISTAT in this complicated way. Balletta (1976) then, on the basis of Istat’s estimates, developed a broader overall estimate, adding “unilateral transfers” (the balance of payments item which refers to small amounts of savings coming from permanent migrants) to remittances and in fact the resulting figure is slightly higher than Istat’s. Still excluded from these calculations are the savings of Italian emigrants abroad sent to Italy via unofficial channels, so-called invisible remittances.2 The evolution of these flows was uneven, but before World War I remittances reached their peak in 1912 when, according to Balletta’s data, for the first time a little more than 1 billion lire was sent back to Italy (Fig. 7.2).

2 Luigi Mittone attempted the difficult accounting of invisible remittances (for the years 1902–1913) using the estimates of Stringher and Coletti and other variables such as Italian private consumption, the number of Italians abroad, the American national income—given that the trend of the US economy could influence the economic possibilities of migrant workers ( Mittone, 1984). See also Biagioli & Picozza, 2003.

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1,200

1,000

800

600

400

200

1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914

0

ISTAT

Balletta

Fig. 7.2 Long-term trend of emigrants’ remittances according to ISTAT and Balletta (Source Istat [1957]; Balletta [1976])

The Role of the Banco di Napoli As said in the beginning, in order to avoid recurrent frauds, in 1901 the Italian government entrusted the Banco di Napoli with the supervision of the remittances’ transfer. At the time, migrants often relied on private bankers to deal with the transfer of their savings home (Cuneo, 1940). Much has been written about the role of these bankers especially in the United States, where the image emerges of the Italian middleman, who had already lived in the United States for several years, was rather well-educated and well-integrated into both the Italian and the American community. These bankers did not limit themselves to depositing savings in Italy through their contacts with a banker who resided near the emigrants’ hometown (the banker in Italy arranged for the money to reach the person it was destined for). They also “recruited labour from newly arrived emigrants according to bosses’ requests (through contacts with American entrepreneurs), from whom they received a commission for each unit of labour provided”. They also arranged for food and lodging, gave advances for travel expenses for getting to the workplace and made ample claims on future wages. Alongside these rich bankers with multiple tasks and contacts, there were also more modest bankers,

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often small shopkeepers of various types who had installed a massive safe in their stores. They managed then to “obtain from some American company the book of money orders necessary to receive deposits and send remittances, the receipt book for overseas tickets necessary to contact emigrants’ relatives at home… and they even arranged for these relatives to immigrate as well, purchasing tickets and dealing with disembarking procedures” (Soldaini, 1969, 139–40; De Rosa, 1980, 112). Sometimes emigrants were cheated by these bankers, who took advantage of the trust placed in them, extracting exorbitant commissions for mediating and running off with all the savings in the worst cases. A parliamentary inquiry on Calabria revealed the following: “Every once in a while, a banker fled with the money that was given to him out of naiveté, money stolen from poor people… this happens because we send one hundred thousand illiterates to America every year… They are the inevitable prey of the compatriot banker, the only person in America who understands them and whom they understand” (Taruffi et al., 1908, 752– 755). To better protect the savings of Italian citizens abroad and ensure that money was safely transferred to Italy, the government proposed to Parliament to grant the privilege of collection to a public financial institution, the Banco di Napoli, which was authorized in 1901 to carry out the services of collection, protection and transmission of Italian emigrants’ savings to Italy—through specifically provided money orders or vaglia. The vaglia was divided into three parts: matrix, receipt and payment title. The sum to be paid in Italy was indicated on all three parts of the money order, the receipt and title were given to the emigrant. The first to be kept as a receipt and the second to be sent to the recipient in Italy. The emigrant thus had a title that from the first moment gave him certainty of payment of the deposited sum. Money orders were payable at the branches of the Banco di Napoli, Bank of Italy, Banco di Sicilia and at the post offices (Archivio Storico del Banco di Napoli—ASBN, 11 23). The Banco di Napoli decided not to set up direct branches abroad due to the high costs they would entail but reached agreements with the largest local credit institutions in areas of strong emigration, which collected emigrants’ savings both directly and via their own agents. As shown in Table 7.2, the Bank of Naples signed agreements with a significant number of foreign authorized correspondents, “making the transmission of savings more popular and easier” (ASBN, 11 21). In the two main destination countries, a different organization was set up. In the case of the US direct agreements were concluded by the

The Banco di Napoli (BdN) foreign correspondents in 1906

VENEZUELA

CANADA BRASILE

USA (Stati del Nord)

New York Brooklyn N.Y Pittsburgh Pa Braddock Pa Providence R.I Buffalo N.Y Boston Mass Cincinnati Oh San Francisco Cal Montreal Rio de Janeiro San Paulo Santos Pernambuco Caracas

Cesare Conti Anthony Sessa Union Savings Bank of Pittsburgh Union National Bank of Braddock Mariano Vervena G. Banchetti & C A. Alvino & F Union Savings Bank & Trust. C Banca Italo Americana Sovereign Bank of Canada Carlo Pareto & C Jodo Briccola & C Jodo Briccola & C Miguel Isabella J. Baccardo & C

Corrispondenti autorizzati alla emissione dei vaglia del BdN

Banco di Napoli Direzione Generale Servizio di raccolta, tutale, impiego e trasmissione del risparmio degli emigrati italiani

Table 7.2

172 F. FAURI

Melbourne e Sidney

Banco de Italia y Rio de la Plata con succursali a Rosario, La Plata, Bahia Blanca, Paranà, Concordia, Gualeguay, Gualeguaychù, Uruguay, Victoria e Curuzù-Cuatià Credit Lyonnais con agenzie ad Algeri, Bone, Constantine, Philippeville e Oran Cooperativa italiana di credito Tunisi Comptoir National d’Escompte Comptoir National d’Escompte con agenzie in Diego Suarez, Manjuga, Mananjary, Tamatave, Tananarive e Tullear Comptoir National d’Escompte

Note The table is reproduced as the original archive document Source ASBN, 11 23, Napoli 10th August 1906

AUSTRALIA

Algeria

AFRICA

Tunisia Marocco-Tangeri Madagascar

Buenos Aires

ARGENTINA

Corrispondenti autorizzati alla emissione dei vaglia del BdN

Banco di Napoli Direzione Generale Servizio di raccolta, tutale, impiego e trasmissione del risparmio degli emigrati italiani

7 ITALIAN REMITTANCES IN GREAT MIGRATION YEARS

173

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F. FAURI

Bank of Naples and 9 different American banks which covered the large urban immigration centres densely populated by Italians and extended from New York to Pennsylvania, Ohio and California (Table 7.2). In this latter state, we find in San Francisco the Banca Italo Americana founded in 1904 by the son of an Italian immigrant, Amedeo Giannini, who unlike most Italian bankers, was destined to a long-term success story. The Banca based its strength on granting loans without collateral guarantees to small entrepreneurs and a clientele of various ethnicities and humble social extraction. After the great 1906 San Francisco earthquake (and fire), Giannini extended its branches to other cities and bought various banks outside California and as far away as New York. He finally changed the name to Bank of America and continued with his generous credit policy. He managed to survive the difficult years of the depression and continued to baffle the American banking system with his loans to middle-class account holders based more on trust than on real guarantees, for purchasing cars, houses and farms (Bonadio, 1994; Dana, 1947). He also offered financial help to Fiat after World War II, in a very delicate moment, when Vittorio Valletta (the general manager) was upon a temporary expulsion for alleged war-time collaboration, Giannini went to meet him in Tourin. Valletta remembers him as follows: “The meeting with Giannini was especially gratifying; he was possibly the only person who had something serious to say and thanked me, whereas the newspapers were publishing a lot of rubbish”. Giannini offered Fiat a loan of $600,000 with the possibility of more in the future, which was “immediately accepted” (Fauri, 2012, 46–47). In the case of Argentina, the correspondent was the Banco de Italia y Rio de la Plata (BIRP founded in1871) which was able to collect Italian remittances from a vast geographical area thanks to its branches scattered all over the country. The Banco was the first credit institution of Italian origin in Argentina and the “first bank to handle all credit, loan, deposit and savings operations, taking a special interest in Italian trade and industry and in the transfer of Italian emigrants’ funds back to the homeland” (Quintela, 2005). The five founding partners were all Italian or of Italian origin (José Piaggio, Marcos Demarchi, Antonio Devoto, Nicolas Schiaffino and Luis Vitale) as were the underwriting banks of the 13,471 shares (Banca di Genova, Banca Lombarda di Sconto e Depositi and Banco Italico). Even the bank’s employees had to speak

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Italian.3 In 1902 the BIRP became the exclusive partner of the Banco di Napoli thus effectively monopolizing the remittances’ business, but also reducing transaction costs, increasing the fluidity of the system and playing an important positive countercyclical function on savings in the leading regions of departure (De Rosa, 2000). From 1879 to 1923 the Banco issued one million dollars’ worth of money orders and checks. However, the 1901 law was a partial success since the Banco di Napoli ended up handling only a share of Italy’s remittances: from 7 to 14% of the total between 1910 and 1913. Nevertheless, it was the only institution which elaborated periodical and detailed studies on the origin and destination of migrants’ savings, which will be analysed in the next paragraph.

The Countries of Origin and the Regions of Destination of Remittances The only detailed estimates on the origin countries of remittances during the great migration era are supplied by the Banco di Napoli. These are partial data since they refer solely to money orders handled by the Bank of Naples, which initially supervised just a small fraction of total remittances, but as time went by its intermediatory role became increasingly important, especially after the end of World War I when it oversaw the transfer of almost 1 billion lire in 1920 (Fig. 7.3). The BdN data also provide an interesting panorama on the major countries of origin: on average between 1902 and 1920 65.8% of remittances came from the United States, 12.2% from France and about 4% each from Germany, Canada, Brasil and Argentina.4 Italian emigrants in the United States definitely provided the highest amounts of savings to 3 The Banco de Italia became involved in a wide variety of businesses: from purchasing and cultivating farmland in the pampa, to building many public facilities (such as hospitals, schools, railways and engineering waterworks), to providing financial assistance to Argentinian and Italian companies such as: Empresas Eléctricas de Bahia Blanca; Cia Italo Argentina de Electricidad and Corporaciòn Sud Americana de Teléfonos or Comanda General de Fòsforos, Pirelli Platensa S.A. and Fiat Argentina (Centro de Estudios Migratorios Latinoamericanos, 1972, 259). 4 In the case of Brasil, for example, as emerges from the reports of the consul in San Paolo cav. Monaco, the Italians lived isolated, did not trust “the shopkeeper where they buy food” and preferred to exchange money locally into gold or pounds, store it and then take it home when repatriating (Banco di Napoli, 1905, 757).

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1E+09 900000000 800000000 700000000 600000000 500000000 400000000 300000000 200000000 100000000 0

Fig. 7.3 Remittances channelled via the Banco di Napoli (thousand lire) (Source ASBN, Banco di Napoli, Direzione Generale, Relazione sul servizio di raccolta, tutela impiego e trasmissione nel Regno dei risparmi degli emigrati italiani, various issues)

their relatives in Italy, more than 2/3 of the earnings sent home through the Bank of Naples came from the United States between 1901 and 1920 (Fig. 7.4). The Banco di Napoli data also provide us with the distribution of remittances among Italian regions. By the end of the First World War, Sicily, Calabria and Campania were the most important receiving regions and accounted for more than 44% of total savings sent back to Italy between 1905 and 1918 (Table 7.3). Table 7.3 also indicates that the distribution of BdN remittances does not correlate to the emigration flows from the Northern regions. This simply reflects the fact that remittances came mainly from the United States, the principal destination of Italian immigrants from the South as shown in Table 7.4. Thus, even though between 1904 and 1913 Veneto was the most important region of departure, people from this region emigrated mainly to Europe, and only 5.8% went to the United States, while 73% and 80%

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Fig. 7.4 Bank of Naples remittances per country of origin. Years 1902– 1920 (percentage values) (Source ASBN, Banco di Napoli, Direzione Generale, Relazione, various issues)

of migrants from Sicily and Campania, respectively, moved to the United States and sent back a greater share of the savings managed by the Banco di Napoli.

Macroeconomic Effects of Remittances on the Italian Economy One of the most notable and important macroeconomic effects of remittances was to stabilize the balance of payments: “the rain of gold” coming from abroad covered “nearly one half of the cost of goods that we import for our own convenience” (Coletti, 1912, 247). Given the nearly constant deficit due to imports exceeding exports, emigrants’ remittances contributed to offset a significant part of that deficit in the years of the migration boom (Jannaccone, 1927). A second macroeconomic effect relates to the fact that many families used a part of the money sent from

1905– 1906

1,729 1,526 572 524 965 544 479 194 251 292 255 73 14,852

1,618 1,620 576 644 1,074 631 491 77 246 331 305 55 17,111

1,335 985 394 145 715 522 391 351 183 209 225 56 11,257

1,851 1,435 1,519 941

1908– 1909

1,260 986 697 481 554 518 384 521 175 243 218 63 11,835

1,667 1,605 1,480 984

1909– 1910

1,432 1,109 934 549 443 487 480 789 151 307 278 164 12,374

1,733 1,229 1,563 726

1910– 1911

1,303 792 872 461 346 438 445 511 125 254 255 173 10,027

999 904 1,447 702

1911– 1912

Source ASBN, Banco di Napoli, Direzione Generale, Relazione, various issues

2,558 1,782 1,508 1,602

1907– 1908

2,985 2,530 1,747 2,182

1906– 1907

1,089 788 929 525 443 531 493 166 202 200 230 213 12,551

1,929 1,661 1,841 1,311

1912– 1913

1,216 923 1,304 1,250 847 868 614 228 860 192 272 341 25,912

4,623 4,553 3,190 4,631

1913– 1914

1,475 1,025 1,372 819 894 908 453 407 213 347 269 89 17,538

2,563 2,191 2,469 2,042

1914– 1915

1,903 1,142 1,833 1,691 1,300 1,409 556 602 365 423 351 168 26,590

4,960 3,314 3,668 2,903

1915– 1916

Distribution of Bank of Naples remittances per receiving regions (thousand lire)

Sicily 1,364 Campania 1,895 Calabria 1,307 Abruzzi 1,398 and Molise Piedmont 1,133 Lombardy 1,062 Veneto 359 Apulia 363 Marche 696 Basilicata 572 Toscana 313 Sardinia 10 Lazio 90 Liguria 299 Emilia 188 Umbria 36 Total 11,085

Regions

Table 7.3

1,698 818 1,604 1,964 1,251 1,406 467 466 520 366 359 173 28,106

5,370 3,665 4,104 3,876

1916– 1917

1,602 824 606 2,046 1,142 1,543 469 231 497 397 391 88 27,209

5,545 3,881 4,128 3,820

1917– 1918

18,793 13,600 12,052 11,462 10,668 10,376 6,034 4,553 3,878 3860 3,596 1,693 226,446

38,147 30,645 29,971 27,117

Total

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999,736 913,730 669,009 624,695 616,789 468,317 468,066 357,528 352,494 264,605 258,611 149,525 141,110 124,757 79,538 75,336 6,563,846

Veneto Sicily Campania Lombardy Piedmont Abruzzo Calabria Emilia-R Toscana Apulia Marche Lazio Basilicata Umbria Liguria Sardinia Total

Source Fauri (2015, 115)

No. of emigrants

Regions 15.6 0.3 0.3 46.1 20.9 1.4 0.4 27.0 12.3 0.9 6.3 3.7 0.1 19.2 4.7 2.1 11.9

Switzerland (%) 33.1 0.1 0.4 11.8 3.5 6.6 0.1 19.5 12.8 2.0 14.1 4.3 0.1 21.4 2.0 1.3 10

Germany (%) 3.0 16.7 6.0 11.4 20.8 10.1 22.8 5.2 4.7 12.6 32.8 3.4 22.2 3.1 29.9 22.9 12.3

Argentina (%) 3.0 2.4 4.7 2.5 2.3 5.0 9.9 2.1 4.7 5.3 2.1 1.9 9.9 1.8 3.3 0.8 3.8

Brasil (%)

5.8 72.7 79.5 9.1 17.4 65.7 59.4 16.9 24.3 63.5 23.7 79.2 60.1 20.9 29.6 14.5 40.3

USA (%)

Table 7.4 Regional emigration to the most important destination countries 1904–1913 (total and percentage incidence of outgoing flows)

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abroad to purchase treasury bonds. The reabsorption of Italian revenue “which before was located in such high proportions abroad” was indeed possible also thanks to the remittances of those migrants who preferred this type of investment. Thus indirectly, remittances also contributed to the success of Italian monetary policy, which managed to achieve a significant appreciation of the lira and a reduction of government debt servicing by lightening the burden of interest payments (from 5% to 3.5% by 1906) (Jannaccone, 1927; Vöchting, 1955; Zamagni, 2003). Thirdly, remittances channelled through the postal savings banks (set up at post offices—Pavan, 1999) enabled a huge flow of savings to flow into the Cassa Depositi e Presiti—CDP, a public financial institution which began collecting savings deposited at the postal savings banks right from their institution (1875). The CDP issued loans to local administrations all over Italy for public projects. Italian post offices did widen their network in rural areas so that migrant families could have better access to their financial services. The number of account holders increased along with deposits which grew from 323 million lire in 1890 to 2,108 million in 1913 (+553% in 23 years). In this same period, emigrants’ deposits at the postal savings banks also increased from 87 thousand to more than 100 million lire (Fig. 7.5). 120,000 100,000 80,000 60,000 40,000 20,000

1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914

0

Fig. 7.5 Emigrants deposits at the postal savings banks (thousand of lire) (Source ASBN, Banco di Napoli, Direzione Generale, Relazione, various issues)

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Yet these new deposits at postal banks cannot be automatically connected to an increase in local wealth or to an area’s financial development. Since it was the Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (CDP) which gathered all the savings deposited at the postal savings banks, we need to ascertain how this capital was invested. A large part of it was used by the CDP to buy public debt securities, and the rest was loaned to local administrations. Starting in 1900 there was a clear delineation between types of financing granted to the country’s three macro areas: local administrations in the Po River valley requested and received financing for public works associated with urban transformation, those in central Italy (which received most of the financing) used the loans to renegotiate their debts and in southern Italy local administrations used CDP money to pay back the Municipalities’ debts. In the two latter cases, the CDP’s function was to reduce indebtment instead of promoting investment as happened in the case of Norther regions (Conte, 2001). Thus, the role of remittances in stimulating local financial development by increasing deposits at post offices and ttherefore the CDP’s financial intervention possibilities, cannot be generalized to the whole country and should be carefully studied on a case-by-case basis.5 Regarding the increase in deposits at the post offices in Calabria and Abruzzo, for example, the effect of American gold was acknowledged at the time by all the postal banks in all the surveyed areas. In the province of Teramo, for instance, information was obtained from each post office in order to calculate that in 1906, of all deposits received, approximately 41% came from remittances. In Cosenza postal bank books boasted credit of “no less than 25% of the total sum of deposits, about 4,500,000 lire, which undoubtedly came from the United States” as the 1911 parliamentary enquiry highlighted (Faina, 1911, 255). However, as said, in these cases the money was mostly used to smooth budget problems, increasing public loans to settle outstanding debts.

The Microeconomic Effects of Remittances When, finally, remittances were withdrawn from the receiving financial institutions, they were used for different purposes by migrant families and had different microeconomic effects. Remittances were used to buy 5 As Sori (2002) recalls, the Municipalities located in the South also showed a limited ability to access these funds.

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houses (or remodel them) and land, but also to pay off families’ debts and taxes, increase expenditure to slightly improve the level of consumption of primary goods, food and clothing, increase school attendance and allow other family members to leave. According to Faina’s parliamentary inquiry on southern Italy, once remittances arrived in the hands of the family they were used “first of all to pay off the debts contracted when the migrant family member left and those incurred before leaving” (Faina, 1911). According to De Clementi (1994, 98): “The impulse that pushed peasants from the South to cross the ocean was the irreversible growth of accumulated debt, contracted with the government as well as with private parties which demanded exorbitant interest rates. The first remittances were used for this purpose”.6 It was also clear to politicians at the time that direct taxation in Italy strongly depended on remittances: “The emigrants are the ones who pay direct taxes and increase the national wealth… this great human movement is even more than a good thing, it is a necessary one” (Nitti, 1958, 412). Once the debts were paid off, a good percentage of the savings accumulated abroad was then used to buy a piece of land or a house or to remodel the family dwelling: terraces, balconies and even “pretentious crenelated towers” were added on to homes (Tonizzi, 1999, 40). Thus, these investments were mainly conservative, tending to defend the existing order of rural families and their cultural environment. The goal was to make enough money and buy land once back home (Bodnar et al., 1982). Many scholars and economists of the time cultivated the hope that remittances would enable the formation of a class of small capitalists and peasant land owners, but overall the land ownership patterns that were formed were small, fragmented parcels, almost never selfsufficient (Franciosa, 1932; Serpieri, 1947). Peasants’ ownership of tiny parcels of land grew strongly, mainly at the expense of small and mediumsized bourgeois ownership, but still without giving rise to that multitude of self-sufficient enterprises that had been hoped for. This was because the emigrants pursued a strategy of buying land that preferred small parcels, first and foremost to facilitate an equitable hereditary transfer. This type of succession was very widespread in southern Italy, where parents would leave their children miniscule and scattered plots of land, sometimes even 6 “As a matter of fact, the 4,000 lire that an average American stay could be worth was just enough to put together a disastrous family budget. Debts, recent and past, and parental subsistence made them disappear almost entirely” (De Clementi, 1994, 98–99).

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an hour’s walk away from each other. This was probably done out of principles of fairness and impartiality, but certainly not for economic efficiency (De Clementi, 1994). So even in areas with high emigration rates, the entire society remained bound to subsistence farming and a precarious economy (Cerase, 1971). In most cases, southern Italy “dissipated” the potential of remittances in houses, land that was expensive but not productive, or to repay old debts (Arru et al., 2008). These were never good business deals: houses and land were often bought “for much more than the cost of the appraisal” and people often went against their own personal gain, since these purchases could not ensure enough income to prosper. These were “perfectly hedonistic actions”, which certainly gratified and satisfied one’s self-respect (“people suddenly ascended to a higher class than the original one”) but they were economically inefficient (Mittone, 1984, 156–160; Coletti, 1912, 202). De Rosa estimates that at the beginning of the 1900s about 300 million lire was sent back to the families of emigrants from Calabria, an enormous figure that caused emigration to be considered “the most important industry in Calabria” (De Rosa, 2011, XIV). Nevertheless, this flow of money and the increase in property prices did not lay the foundation for a renewal of agriculture in the South. It did help those who remained to survive better but, on the other hand, did nothing but perpetuate the existing underdevelopment (Taruffi et al., 1908). In the end, very often the “Americans” did not manage to support themselves with their meagre acquired property and ended up leaving for America again. In other cases, some of those who had returned from the United States to stay bought a house and land but could no longer adjust to the old customs and after some time sold everything to return to America with the family (Guarino, 2008; Rossi, 1908). Finally, remittances had two further important effects on the population: they increased and improved Italian families’ consumption and incentivized school attendance thanks to improved well-being and greater awareness of the importance of education (Faina, 1911). In the first case, the migration experience improved emigrants’ living habits and nutrition. Certainly, there was a forced change in the usual diet, but in the United States as in Argentina and on the famous Brasilian fazendas witnesses affirmed that in terms of diet, workers’ conditions were better than in their country of origin (Canella, 1903; Commissariato generale dell’emigrazione, 1926; Relazione della Commissione Italiana, 1912). In Argentina and the United States where food was “good and low-priced”

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the protein-rich diet seemed to have even changed immigrant children’s physiognomy “stunted parents, majestic, athletic children” (Bevilacqua, 1981, 520–545). Remittances also enhanced the living standards and enriched the diets of the families who had stayed home “as documented by the growing consumption of meat, the spread of wheat bread and the separation of human and animal coexistence in the same dwelling” (Cerase, 1975, 120). Savings sent home by emigrants thus led to an overall improvement in the peasant diet, revolutionized the traditional vegetarian diet based on bread and legumes (and not much else), introduced the use of meat and fish, widened the consumption of non-primary goods (fabric, clothing) and improved housing conditions. In the second case, the importance of raising literate children was clear for those who left as well as those who stayed home: savings sent from abroad enabled greater affluence and therefore facilitated the education of minors. Sometimes this even provided the stimulus for building new schools, as a result of what Luigi Rossi recalls as a “blessed ransom”: “when I was general commissioner for emigration in a Sicilian town, local authorities were forced to build elementary schools because the emigrants had imposed a form of ransom: either you build schools for our children or we will not send any more money back to Italy” (Rossi, 1920, 93– 94). Last but not least, it should not be forgotten that the remittances’ formalities needed to cash and use them, forced many peasant families and wives who had stayed home to become familiar with banking, financial and notary services. A study on the emigrants’ wives in Sutera (Sicily) shows how they were able to progressively replace their husbands in all family duties, including the deposit of remittances at the bank and the payment of taxes. In many cases, these women also began attending night school and making sure their children went to school (Reeder, 2003).

Do Remittances Foster Economic Development? From what we said so far this is a rhetorical question and the answer is no, remittances do not seem to have fostered local development except for a few exceptions. In some cases, domestic micro-entrepreneurships were generated by savings earned abroad. Some emigrants, once they had returned home, invested their savings in an artisan’s workshop or a small retail shop or even in usury, and this applied to all geographic areas of Italy. Certainly, some areas were more dynamic than others. In Friuli the news quickly spread of very profitable uses for remittances

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given that “earnings scraped together are used in many cases differently than in southern Italy: they are employed to transform a simple worker into a small entrepreneur. So, with their savings and entrepreneurship some emigrants end up making a moderate fortune. But this is possible because of the type of work people from Friuli do abroad” (Coletti, 1912, 244).7 In general, however, remittances were not able to change the local development path. An interesting field of study relates to the possible relationship between remittances, local bank deposits increase and credit expansion to new business ventures. In sum, the relation between remittances and dynamic provincial banks interested in local development. At first, local financial institutions managed to attract a large share of this new and growing clientele composed of migrants’ families, offering attractive interest rates (Commissariato generale dell’emigrazione, 1926). Successively, some of these enterprising credit institutions used the fresh credit for financing investment projects and/or broadening their loan offers (at lower interest rates) as demonstrated by two interesting case studies. The first one refers to the case of Agnone, a municipality in Molise, where emigrants’ remittances and the savings of those who had returned flowed in great quantities into two cooperative banks towards the end of the 1800s, the Banca Operaia and the Sannitica bank. With the accumulated wealth of emigrants’ hard work, deposits grew while one way the capital was used to support important entrepreneurial initiatives such as the Hydroelectric Company of Verrino: this company began operating at the beginning of 1904 and stimulated the opening of electric mills and pasta manufacturing plants as well as electric sawmills and spinning mills, also providing Agnone with an electricity plant for city lighting. Due to the two credit institutions’ unusual dynamism the AgnonePescolanciano railway company was also financed, along with a myriad of small entrepreneurial, social and cultural initiatives (Ferrandino, 2011). The impact of remittances on the economy and local banks was also studied in the province of Lucca. Here again, financial flows sent by emigrants fuelled society and improved the standard of living. In this

7 Emigrants from Friuli often gave rise to a seasonal migratory movement, mostly directed towards neighbouring European countries (Austria and Germany), and most importantly, these migrants were specialized workers in professions sought abroad: such as kiln operators, masons, stonemasons, woodcutters and building contractors, who used their savings to set up small companies once back home (Ermacora, 2005).

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case, the flows were significant enough to finance the restructuring of the regional banking and financial network, which entered into a phase of remarkable vitality (Douki, 2001). The most manifest sign of this was the rapid development at the end of the century of local banking infrastructure which made a huge effort to attract and collect what appeared to be manna from heaven. When in the 1880s emigrants suddenly began to demand that new branches be opened at the local savings banks in order to carry out their operations, the response was swift. New branches were opened in areas of heavy emigration where new savings were there to be captured (Fanfani et al., 1987). In the case of the Cassa di Risparmio of Lucca, deposits grew so rapidly that the bank could afford to offer several advantages to its clients: numerous and nearby branches, a handy savings book formula which allowed holders to delegate others to carry out operations and the provision of a 4.25% return rate on deposits. Post office savings banks offered fewer advantages and emigrants knew it well: interest-bearing deposits were limited to 2000 lire, interest rates fixed by the Ministry of Finance were lower (they decreased from 3% to 2.7% after 1900) and savings books were personal so that the holder had to be present to carry out operations (De Cecco & Toniolo, 2001; Douki, 2001). The interesting part of Caroline Douki’s explanation is that a significant part of remittances remained in the local banking system and was then often reinvested locally to develop the area around Lucca. In this town emigrants’ savings were used for “modernising” development and were rapidly reinvested in the local economy, due to a sense of responsibility on the part of the financial institutions whose economic choices were focused on their local area. The author surmises that historically, this commitment to the local economy is one of the greatest differences between the northern and southern provinces. In the South the social and economic élite that controlled the local banking network was not interested in investing in local business and largely preferred safe financial markets, those guaranteed by the state, thus diverting emigrants’ money towards other circuits for the benefit of extra-regional economic and financial interests (Douki, 2001; Pasquali, 1922). I have developed a third case study which refers to the Banca Cattolica Vicentina (BCV). After World War I, Vicenza was the most industrialised city in the Veneto region, with the highest number of industrial workers in the textile and mechanical sectors (Consiglio provinciale dell’economia di Vicenza, 1930). But Vicenza also showed the highest migration

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propensity in a region which historically underwent the largest haemorrhages of population. Between 1876 and 1913, 3.1 million emigrants left from Veneto, followed by Piedmont with 1.45 million, Campania with 1.41, Sicily with 1.28 and Lombardy with 1.25 million. Veneto was also the region that between 1876 and 1905 showed the highest ratio of emigrants to the resident population. At the beginning of the new century, 32.5 per 1,000 citizens from Veneto left their home to seek a better fortune abroad. And Vicenza was the major province of departure with 17.478 people leaving still in 1912. This case study is based on archival sources of the Banca Cattolica Vicentina (the Board of Directors minutes and the bank’s balance sheets from 1892 to 1914). As it clearly comes out from Fig. 7.6, deposits and loans followed a similar path. The minutes of the bank meetings testify two interesting features: the increasing importance of the emigrants’ remittances in the expansion of the bank’s deposits and the willingness to increase the interest rate granted on emigrants’ savings, which was raised from 3 to 4% in 1906. 10000000 9000000 8000000 7000000 6000000

Loans Deposits

5000000 4000000 3000000 2000000 1000000 0

Fig. 7.6 Deposits and loans of the BCV 1893–1914 in thousand lire (Source Own elaboration from Archivio Storico Intesa Sanpaolo, patrimonio archivistico Banco Ambrosiano Veneto, Banca Cattolica del Veneto, Funzioni amministrative centrali, Contabilità generale, Bilanci d’esercizio [ASBV hereinafter])

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In this latter case, the minutes of the Board of Directors certify that an agreement was signed that year between the Bank and the Emigrants’ Union of Vicenza, whereby expatriate deposits were given the same status as small savings and granted a 4% interest rate (ASBV, 1894–1915; Chiapponi & Guizzi, 2007). Bank deposits soared thereafter (Fig. 7.6). “Our bank records an increase in deposits of 800 thousand lire from 1st January to 30th April 1909, and therefore in just four months”; deposits grew so much and so fast also in successive months that the Board decided to increase the company’s share capital urging all member to buy the new shares—many members bought 250 each (ASBV, 1909–1910). In that very same year, the Banca Cattolica Vicentina started negotiating with the Banco di Napoli based in Venice for the possibility to nominate correspondents of the Banco a few more BCV subsidiaries: besides Vicenza, also Arzignano, Breganze, Cologna Veneta, Lonigo, Noventa Vicentina, Schio, Thiene and Marostica. From 1909 to 1910 emigrants’ remittances could thus be directly collected or deposited in as many as nine branches of the Banca Cattolica capillary presence scattered all over the surrounding territory. What also emerges from the Board of Directors’ minutes is a growing attention of the BCV to investing the rising bank deposits in local development through various interventions. First of all, the contribution was provided for the institution of a construction company of local railway lines “for ethical reasons in the first place”. The bank had in fact opened an overdraft account of more than one million lire for the Vicenza– Noventa–Marostica railway project; on 2 April 1907, another credit line was raised to 250 thousand lire for the Vicentine tramway company (at a 5.25% interest rate). In this latter case, the President of the Banca Cattolica thoroughly supported the operation also comforted “by the strong credit exposure of the Banca Popolare which deeply believes in the good outcome of the deal” that certainly made the operation much less risky (ASBV, 1906–1910). In the second place, special credit lines for farmers to buy agricultural machinery were created. In this case, the interest in farming and agricultural entrepreneurship reached its apex in 1907 when the BCV incorporated the Agricultural Union of Vicenza (Unione agricola Vicentina): “in order to give greater development to agricultural trade in the interest of farmers, something that for many reasons and especially due to its limited potential, the Union cannot guarantee anymore” (ASBV, 1906–1910). Having incorporated the Agricultural Union, the

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bank also entered the institutional world linked to agricultural representation and the connected responsibilities at the national level in the “appointment of the three councillors at the Superior Labour Council of the Ministry of Agricultural, Industry and Commerce”. Lastly the BCV, as it emerges from the Board of Directors minutes, gave its consent to recurrent loans to the silk industry and to the purchase of local industries’ assets to sustain provincial industrial development. An example is the loan of 300 thousand lire to the social spinning mill in Arzignano (5 June 1909). Also, in almost every Board meeting, new “funding for the silk campaign” was approved and in 1907 the BCV bought the Santo Stefano mill authorizing significant investments for new machinery in order “to renovate it and bring the mill back into operation”. As to the support of local industries, just to give another example, in 1908 the bank authorized the purchase of 25 bonds issued by a local cotton mill and 10 bonds issued by the Lanificio Rossi (one of the most important woollen mills in Italy located in the province of Vicenza—Schio). In conclusion, we can say that where local banks took a leading role in promoting common development, they ensured the productive use of remittances for the benefit of the area’s economic progress.

Conclusions From 1876 to 1914 the increasingly massive outflow of Italian emigrants remitted from 14,9 to 16,9 billion lire covering from 1/5 to 1/4 of Italy’s balance of payments deficit during the great migration era. Bank of Naples data, which provide reliable though limited information about remittances’ geographical paths, suggest that between 1902 and 1920 the large majority of Italian migrants’ savings (65.8%) originated from the United States, and Sicily, Calabria and Campania were the most important receiving regions (reflecting not so much the absolute number of people leaving those regions, but rather the fact that most people from the South left for the United States). This chapter then evaluated the micro- and macroeconomic effects of remittances on the Italian economy. Certainly, remittances had positive macroeconomic effects, but also performed encouraging microeconomic impacts on receiving areas, where they were able to increase and improve Italian families’ consumption and living standards, incentivize school attendance and encourage new leavers to move abroad.

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The role of remittances in stimulating local financial development has also been studied in consideration of the fact that many emigrant families increasingly moved their savings back to Italy via the Banco di Napoli, which allowed them to collect their “vaglia”, or money orders, in Italy at the local post office, which also offered them the possibility to deposit their earnings. Then the Cassa Depositi e Presititi gathered all the savings deposited at postal savings banks and used them for loans to local administrations or to buy public debt securities. However, only the Municipalities in the North and around the Po River valley requested and received financing for public works associated with urban transformation, while the Municipalities in central and southern Italy used them to renegotiate or pay back their debts. So we might say that part of the remittance inflows which reached the Italian territory through the Banco di Napoli and was produced by the hard work of Southern migrants in the United States ended up benefiting local administrations in Northern Italy. Finally, as to the question of whether remittances foster local development, in general, the answer is no: they may have helped improve emigrants’ families’ overall living and educational standards, but rarely enhanced the economic well-being and development path of an area of departure. However, as underlined in the final part of the chapter, when dynamic provincial banks took a leading role in financing new ventures and local entrepreneurs, they ensured the productive use of remittances for the benefit of the whole area’s economic development.

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Franciosa, L. (1932). Inchiesta sulla piccola proprietà coltivatrice formatasi nel dopoguerra. Istituto Nazionale di Economia Agraria. Gould, J. D. (1980). European Inter-Continental Emigration. The Road Home: Return Migration from the USA. The Journal of European Economic History, 9(1), 41–112. Guarino, N. (2008). Ritornare. Percorsi migratori di uomini e donne (Avellino, 1875–1914). In A. Arru, D. L. Caglioti, & F. Ramella (Eds.), Donne e uomini migranti: Storie e geografie tra breve e lunga distanza (pp. 18–43). Donzelli. Istat. (1957). Indagine statistica sullo sviluppo del reddito nazionale dell’Italia dal 1851 al 1956. In Istat, Annali di statistica 8–9, Istat. Jannaccone, P. (1927). La bilancia del dare e avere internazionale con particolare riguardo all’Italia, Treves. Ministero di Agricoltura, Industria e Commercio. (1915). Statistica della emigrazione italiana all’estero 1876–1914. Ministero di Agricoltura, Industria e Commercio. Mittone, L. (1984). Le rimesse degli emigrati sino al 1914. Affari Sociali Internazionali, 4(4), 125–160. Nitti, F. S. (1958). Scritti sulla questione meridionale Vol. I. Saggi sulla storia del Mezzogiorno, emigrazione e lavoro. Laterza. Pasquali, A. (1922) L’emigrazione e i suoi rapporti con l’agricoltura. n.a. Pavan, P. (1999). Le Casse di Risparmio Postali in Italia dalle origini alla Prima Guerra Mondiale. Storia Economica, 1, 85–112. Pretelli, M. (2011). L’emigrazione italiana negli Stati Uniti. Il Mulino. Quintela, R. L. (2005). El año 1985. La caída del Banco de Italia y Rio de la Plata. In Quintela R.L. (Ed.), Crisis bancarias y corrupción. Dunken, Reeder, L. (2003). Widows in White: Migration and the Transformation of Rural Italian Women, Sicily, 1880–1920. University of Toronto Press. Relazione della Commissione italiana. (1912). Emigrazione agricola al Brasile. Berti. Rossi, A. (1908). Vantaggi e danni dell’emigrazione nel Mezzogiorno d’Italia. Note di un viaggio fatto in Basilicata e in Calabria dal R. Commissario dell’emigrazione Adolfo Rossi. Bollettino dell’emigrazione, 13(10), 3–110. Rossi, L. (1920). Camera dei deputati, Discussioni 30 giugno 1920. In Ciuffolotti Z. and M. Degl’Innocenti (1978). L’emigrazione nella storia d’Italia 1868–1976. Vallecchi, 93. Sabbadini, A. (1935). Il risparmio degli italiani all’estero. Rivista Delle Casse Di Risparmio, XXIII (1), 1–10. Serpieri, A. (1947). La struttura sociale dell’agricoltura italiana. Inea. Soldaini, V. (1969). La raccolta delle rimesse degli emigrati italiani e l’opera del banco di Napoli: 1902–1913. Revue Internationale D’histoire De La Banque, 2, 137–188.

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CHAPTER 8

Living Arrangements of European Second-Generation Immigrants in the United States at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century Roberto Impicciatore, Rosella Rettaroli, Alessandra Samoggia, and Francesco Scalone

R. Impicciatore (B) · R. Rettaroli · A. Samoggia · F. Scalone Department of Statistical Sciences, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy e-mail: [email protected] R. Rettaroli e-mail: [email protected] A. Samoggia e-mail: [email protected] F. Scalone e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. Fauri and D. Mantovani (eds.), Past and Present Migration Challenges, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39431-7_8

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Introduction The dominant norms of mainstream society usually shape the living arrangements of children of immigrants. However, literature has underlined the role of long-term cultural factors acquired in the country of origin and transmitted by immigrant parents to their children. Following this perspective, even though children of immigrants were born and raised in the country of arrival, they would mirror behaviours that are typical of the country of origin. Thus, comparing the patterns experienced by children of immigrants from different countries and contexts and those with native parents can shed light on the role of specific cultural factors transmitted from parents to their children. In this paper, we test whether the norms that drive young people towards the transition to autonomy or the formation of their own family are still rooted in what has been assimilated and preserved by the countries of origin and eventually linked to the strength of family ties. We seek to understand if and how the historical trajectory of living arrangements differ among ethnic groups and whether second-generation immigrants in the United States still follow the prevailing models of transition to adulthood typical of their parents’ countries of origin. The US case is particularly relevant in this perspective. Between the end of the nineteenth century and the introduction of rigid migration laws by quotas in the 1920s, more than 30 million individuals crossed the borders coming from different areas of Europe (Dribe et al., 2018) where different models of family formation, the timing of leaving the parental home and co-residence patterns had prevailed. Until the 1870s, immigrants came mainly from the North-western European countries while later there was a massive arrival of Southern and Eastern Europeans. As the demographic transition began affecting these regions in the second half of the nineteenth century, growth rates of the resident populations of the Iberian Peninsula, Italy, Greece, the Ottoman regions of the Middle East in the Mediterranean region and regions of the Russian empire and Poland in Eastern Europe began to outpace the capacity of their new and growing older cities to absorb this population (Klein, 2012). Considering the second-generation immigrants born in the United States between 1870 and 1970, Perlmann (2005) estimated that about a third were Southern, Central or Eastern Europeans. In contrast, the rest had North-western or Canadian parents. As immigration from Southern, Central or Eastern Europe was mainly concentrated between 1900 and

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1914, most of the second-generation immigrants of this group were born in the United States between the last decades of the nineteenth century and the first ones of the twentieth one. An earlier study based on the 1910 census (Miller et al., 1994) analysed the compliance of immigrants in the United States with the norms of the model guiding the formation of the Western European-type family by constructing a measure of co-residence mother–child. In general, European-derived groups considerably resemble the native white population in terms of the typicalities of the family structures, recalling not only similar economic opportunities but also a typical Western European background in a context of dynamic modernisation. Literature has markedly underlined geographical differences in European family formation (Hajnal, 1965; Laslett, 1977; Le Play, 1871). Within this perspective, a pivotal role in defining the timing of family formation and the exit from the parental home may be played by family ties. According to Reher (1998), the prolonged stay of children in their family of origin and the caring work of children towards their parents in all the phases of life are the two characteristics of the “strong” family. In contrast, in Central and Northern Europe, the Reformation contributed to the spread of “weak” ties. As a result, the parent’s country of origin may substantially affect the exit timing from the parental home, being traditionally more rapid in the continental European countries and delayed in Eastern and, in particular, in Mediterranean areas. These different ways of adulthood transition make us recall the persistence of some anthropological structures and practices concerning the formation of the family and the type of residence at marriage among immigrants’ country of origin (Laslett, 1983; Micheli, 2000; Reher, 1998). Less is known about leaving household customs in Eastern Europe in the past, even though more recent literature shows a significant variability about the transition to adulthood models (Szołtysek, 2012) and a relatively mixed situation between the other two blocks.

Transition to Adulthood: Geographical Heterogeneity in Europe Several studies tried to compose the patchwork of the various territorial patterns for the transition to adulthood in Western Europe, and less frequently in Eastern Europe (Hajnal, 1983; Laslett, 1983, 1994).

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Focusing on the European organisation of the family and the diffusion of complex households, Le Play (1871) distinguished between a neolocal model, prevailing in the Central-western region and a patrilocal (or stem) model, predominant in the Mediterranean area (and partially in Eastern Europe). Hajnal’s seminal work (1965) pointed out a specific geographical distribution of the marriage patterns differentiating between Eastern and Mediterranean Europe and the North-western continental area, ideally divided by a straight line from Trieste to St. Petersburg. In the Western area, families are mainly neolocal and nuclear, with a late mean age at marriage and a significant proportion of never married. Most of those who do not marry leave their parents’ homes anyway. In the Eastern area, marriage is early and universal, and the new couple may continue to stay with their parents for a long time, or even co-reside with relatives as a permanent solution. Moreover, households often have vertically and horizontally extended structures. Although these two categorisations might be too simplistic, other analyses confirmed a strong link between timing in family formation and geographical area. Research has shown that in the Central and Northwestern regions of Europe, a significant percentage of young males and females left their parents’ household long before marriage, spending a prolonged period of their lives usually working as urban or rural servants (life-cycle servants) to gather sufficient resources to build a family of their own (Laslett, 1977, 1983; Mitterauer, 1990; Wall, 1978). Mitterauer and Sieder (1982, 41) measured that in the pre-industrial North-West, 75% of boys and 50% of girls left their families to live and work in other families such as domestic servants or apprentices. This trend is not typical of Southern Europe, where the proportion of young people involved as life-cycle servants was smaller and consisted mainly of males who usually re-entered the family of origin at the end of the work experience (Reher, 1997; Viazzo, 2003). Therefore, domestic service was uncommon, and when it did occur, it was mainly a short and temporary experience. Overall, young people in Spain and Italy were likelier to stay with their parents until marriage than their peers in England and Scandinavia (Reher, 1997). According to Reher (1998), the prolonged stay of children in their family of origin and the caring work of children towards their parents in all the phases of life are the two characteristics of the “strong” family. The underlying idea in this approach is that the strength of ties is mainly based on moral obligations aimed at regulating the relations between subsequent generations and transmitted

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from parents to their children, generation after generation, i.e., intergenerational transmission of deep-rooted traits. Hammel (1990, 455) has suggested: “Culture may explain why communities or persons living under apparently identical economic conditions but differing in language or tradition, often behave very differently demographically”. Following this point of view, other authors underlined that kinship ties in Mediterranean countries, such as Italy, are more critical and diffused than bonds with neighbours and friends (Di Giulio & Rosina, 2007; Micheli, 2000). This last aspect is a peculiarity of a familistic society in which parents try to give their children the best opportunities in terms of social mobility (as far as children’s success means parents’ success), and every behaviour that could represent a risk in this sense is discouraged (Dalla Zuanna, 2001). In order to compare the various ways in which young Europeans experienced leaving the parental home, Cavalli and Galland (1996) distinguished three broad geographical patterns in the transition to adulthood in contemporary Europe, which are partially rooted in the past: (i) a Mediterranean pattern, characterised by a prolonged stay with parents and synchronisation between exit and marriage; (ii) a French and Northern European model, where a period lived as a single usually precedes the establishment of one’s own family; (iii) a British pattern with an early transition to work but slower and more protracted family formation (Kerckhoff, 1990). In any case, an inevitable variability emerged within each macroarea (Holdsworth, 1998; Sklar, 1974). Various evidence in the literature confirms that in North-western Europe, during industrialisation, young people tended to leave the parental roof by 15–20 years of age in various situations. Demographic, economic and cultural factors influence how autonomy is achieved and, therefore, family formation and co-residence patterns (Wall, 1995). Tables 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3 show some examples of Sweden, Italy, England and Wales. For instance, 24% of men born in Sweden in 1920 still live with their parents at 18 years of age (Table 8.1) whereas the same percentage for Italian men is between 27.5% and 29.3% according to the subnational area (Table 8.2). However, the opposite can be observed among women with a delayed exit among Swedish women compared to the Italian ones. This is typically due to the higher occurrence of life-cycle services among men in Sweden and the greater simultaneity between exit and marriage in Italy with women entering marriage at usually younger ages than men. In this regard, it is also interesting to note that among those born in the second

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Table 8.1 Percentages of home leavers at 18 years of age by cohort and gender. Sweden

Cohorts

Men

Women

1829–1866 1900 1910 1920 1949 1959 1964

16.9 21.0 22.0 24.0 20.4 20.4 20.2

17.4 32.0 27.0 31.0 19.3 18.6 18.9

Source Dribe (2000); Dribe and Stanfors (2005)

Table 8.2 Percentages of home leavers at 18 years of age by cohort, gender and geographical area. Italy

Cohorts North-West 1919–23 1924–28 1929–33 North-East 1919–23 1924–28 1929–33 South and Islands 1919–23 1924–28 1929–33

Men

Women

28.8 27.6 27.6

25.1 24.4 24.6

29.3 29.4 28.7

24.3 24.4 24.2

27.5 26.6 27.0

24.8 23.6 23.8

Source Barbagli, Castiglioni and Dalla Zuanna (2003)

Table 8.3 The age range in which 50% of young people left their parental home and the length of the process by gender. England and Wales, 1881 Men

Women

Area

Interval age

Length

Interval age

Length

North and West (family farms) South-East High (industrial areas and cities)

(14.0; 25.0) (16.5; 25.5) (19.0; 27.0)

11.0 9.0 8.0

(14.0; 24.0)

10.0

(16.0; 25.0)

10.0

Source Day (2018)

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half of the twentieth century in Sweden, the age at exit decreased substantially, in particularly, among women, indicating a marked change in the way people acquire housing autonomy. Finally, Table 8.3, which relates to 1881, highlights the early exit from parental home in England and Wales mainly for work-related reasons, particularly where farm services predominated. Indeed, in the rural north and west, the absence of nonservice occupation drove the children of poorer families to quickly leave the parental home from the age of 16, the earliest age at which it is culturally permissible for children to leave (Day, 2018).

Leaving Parental Home and Family Formation Across European Countries The age of exit from parental home declined between the 1920s and 1970s. After that, the trend inverted in many regions (Liefbroer & de Jong Gierveld, 1994; Billari et al., 2001). However, along with this general trend, crucial differences emerged across countries. To provide further insight into different European contexts, we look specifically at the pathways to adulthood in European countries, from where the main migration flows to the United States originated. At the beginning of the twentieth century, England was characterised by a relatively early exit from the parental home, especially for males, whose first exit occurred on average between the ages of 14 and 16, with significant variability by geographical area (Goose, 2006; Kussmaul, 2008). Day (2018) finds that heterogeneity in age at leaving home tends to increase in the Northern and Western areas, where the average age is lower than elsewhere in England. In these areas, characterised by family farms, boys leave the parental home between 14 and 25. Conversely, in industrial districts and cities, the male age at exit varies between 19 and 27. The Irish patterns show some similarities with the English setting. Research emphasises that one of the peculiar aspects of early twentiethcentury rural life in Ireland was the combination of late age at marriage, the prevalence of stem families, and the life-cycle service. As effectively summarised by Foley and Guinnane (1999), Ireland was known for three widespread demographic behaviours among young people: a solid propensity to migrate, low proneness to marriage and a tendency to form large families once married. However, as an agricultural servant for boys and domestic service for girls, the life-cycle service was a crucial stage in

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the transition to adulthood for many young Irish people (Breen, 1984). Guinnane (1992) estimates Ireland an average age at exit between 13.4 and 26.1 years for males and 11.1 and 24.3 for girls depending on their household economic activity (agricultural or other), social group and region. Servants were mostly unmarried, and permanent celibacy was widespread. The time gap between leaving the family and marriage remained wide, with the average age at first marriage of around 30 years for men and 26 for women. Sweden belongs to the Northern European model of transition to adulthood (Lundh, 1997), characterised by late marriage and neolocal residence, high levels of celibacy and life-cycle service systems. The exit from the family of origin can historically be seen as one of the family strategies to cope with short-term economic and demographic stresses (Dribe, 2000, 2004). Dribe (2000), in his study of family exit in rural Scania in the nineteenth century, finds that about 50% of the children of smallholders and labourers leave their families between the ages of 16 and 19. The average age at leaving home in the first part of the twentieth century is 21 for girls and 23 for men. Looking, however, at cohorts born during the first decade, a portion ranging from 13 to 15% are already out of the household at age 16 to achieve economic independence or to help the family. Social history points out that numerous areas of Germany and Austria share low levels of nuptiality during the nineteenth century (Gavalas & Tscheulin, 2016; Knodel, 1986). In Germany, the census of 1880 reveals that more than 16% of men and women aged 45–49 had never married in Southern regions. Several other insights suggest that the process of family formation and prevailing residence lies in an intermediate situation characterised by high ages at marriage, substantial proportions of stem families, usually formed by no more than two generations and the widespread presence of servants in households (Szołtysek et al., 2010). Italy, as a country in the Mediterranean pattern, typically shows a delayed transition to adulthood and family formation but with a high level of internal complexity and heterogeneity. Unlike in Northern Europe, where neolocal residence at marriage prevails, the age at marriage is relatively low. In contrast, in the areas where the extended patriarchal family dominates, the age at marriage is higher for both males and females (Viazzo, 2003). Research on life-cycle service also underlines extreme territorial differences. In the South, rural or domestic service is often a long-term job,

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especially for men (Da Molin, 1990). In the Central and Northern regions (Doveri, 1993) and Sardinia, the life-cycle service is more widespread than in other regions. However, it retains a different meaning compared to the Northern European countries. In contrast, it is less widespread among women because of the shared concept of honour and the solid social control over them. In the Central areas with sharecropping, especially for boys, service starts at 11–12 years of age. They usually spend 7–8 years as “apprentices” and return home several years before their potential marriage. Leaving the family, in most cases, takes place through marriage. Male cohorts born in the first three decades of the twentieth century leave home at about 29 in theNorth-West, 30 in the North-East and Centre and 27 in the South. For women, the median values are about 25 in the Centre-North and 23 in the South (Barbagli et al., 2003). Greater uncertainty emerges in the transition to adulthood experienced in Eastern Europe. However, recent literature allows us to consider this large region as an area of “cultural transition” regarding the patterns of marriage, residence and leaving the parental home, linking the West to the more distant East. Baltic countries and some parts of Poland fit better with the West and the Central family and co-residence patterns. Other countries such as Romania, Bulgaria, Bosnia, Serbia and, more generally, the whole Balkan area show proximities with the Eastern patterns (Szołtysek, 2008). For example, relatively late ages at marriage surveyed in Poland seem to be linked to the spouses’ neolocal residence and the spread of the life-cycle service (Szołtysek, 2012). Gruber and Szołtysek (2012) also underlined the apparent differences along the West–East axis of Poland’s historical territories. Ehmer (2009) suggested both the predominance of nuclear families throughout the Western part of the territories and the existence of different and more complex family forms in the more peripheral areas in the East of the country. In the West, marriage is late for men and, for a substantial proportion of women, it does not occur before 24 (Sklar, 1974). Going into service is more common in Western regions, and life-cycle service constitutes an economic opportunity for a significant number of young Poles in the West, with a proportion of servants in the population of over 13%.

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Leaving the Parental Home and Family Formation in the United States at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century The patterns and reasons for leaving the parental home of young Americans in the nineteenth century show significant results by gender and region of residence. Based on a sample of families surveyed at both the 1850 and 1860 censuses, Steckel (1996) estimated that the mean age at the exit was higher for males (26.6 years vs. 22.0 for women) and for those living in the North-Eastern States (28.3 and 23.1 respectively for men and women). Lower ages emerged for those living in the Southern States (26.1 for men and 22.1 for women) and the so-called “border States” (24.9 and 20.1 years of age). In the twentieth century, the age of leaving the parental home decreased over time and behaviours became more homogeneous, as witnessed by the progressive reduction in the range of ages at which young people reach independent living (Goldscheider & Goldscheider, 1999). However, as shown by Gutmann and colleagues (2002), this decline only started after 1940 for men and 1950 for women, whereas, from 1880 to World War II, the age at exit increased (Figs. 8.1 and 8.2). Nevertheless, despite a significant reduction in differences during the 1950s, ethnic groups failed to converge. Native people show a higher age at exit compared to foreigners and black people; both men and 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 1880

1900

White Foreign

1910

1920

1940

White Native born

1950

1960

Black Foreign

1970

1980

1990

Black Native born

Fig. 8.1 Men’s median age of leaving home by nativity and race. US, 1880– 1990 (Source Gutmann et al. (2002), Table B.12)

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23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 1880

1900

1910

1920

1940

1950

1960

1970

White Foreign

White Native born

Black Foreign

Black Native born

1980

1990

Fig. 8.2 Women’s median age of leaving home by nativity and race. US, 1880– 1990 (Source Gutmann et al. (2002), Table B.12)

women continue to systematically postpone leaving home. Gutmann and colleagues (2002) also show that young people living on farms left their families of origin later in life. Stevens (1990) confirms that the most substantial changes occurred after the conclusion of World War II when life course transitions shifted towards greater conformity of sequences. The reduction in heterogeneity can also be linked to the near disappearance of agricultural farmers and the progressive adaptation to the American way of life of European immigrants and their descendants. Following the existing literature, four main factors in determining the timing of leaving the parental home can be identified. The first one is the age at marriage, as most young people, at least until the 1960s, left the parental home mainly for marriage. Indeed, gender differences in age at marriage explain the early exit for women (Gutmann et al., 2002; Hamilton, 1936). The second factor is the economic condition. Young people anticipate the exit if their family cannot offer financial support or if there are more opportunities outside the family (Guinnane, 1997). For instance, young farmers may remain in the household while waiting to inherit the farm (Florey & Guest, 1988). In other cases, the presence or absence of opportunities for them to contribute to the family budget justifies the decision to stay or to leave (Arcury, 1990).

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Education constitutes the third element of influence. From the 1940s, mass access to colleges decreased the average age at which young, not economically independent people left their families. Higher college attendance is undoubtedly due to the significant increase in high school graduates during the first half of the century and to changes in laws facilitating access to superior education. Finally, the evolution of survival, specifically, parents’ living status , also influenced the evolution of exit age. The growth in age at the exit in the early twentieth century may be related – at least partially – to improved parental survival.

Data and Method Empirical analyses are based on the IPUMS (Integrated Public Use Microdata Samples) developed by the Minnesota Population Centre at the University of Minnesota. US census microdata is collected, preserved, and harmonised. IPUMS project also provides easy access to data with enhanced documentation. We focused on 1910, 1920, and 1930 US IPUMS samples (1% of the original census) which are particularly valuable to consider children of immigrants born in the United States between the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century. Our outcome of interest is the living arrangement at the time of the interview, including the following mutually exclusive categories: living with parents, with the spouse, with parents and spouse, with other relatives, or alone. Given the cross-sectional feature of this information, we limited our attention to individuals aged 16–29 at the interview. Furthermore, we selected individuals born in the United States with both parents born in the country of origin. In other words, we excluded those who arrived in the United States after birth and those born in the United States but with mixed parents (one born in the United States and one born abroad), as well as non-white native ethnic groups. In this way, we can directly compare the second-generation immigrants with the native US white population, i.e., people with both parents born in the US. We considered children of immigrants coming from the six most important European sending countries in the United States in the period 1910– 1930, namely Germany, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Sweden, and the UK. The resulting numbers of cases are reported in Table 8.4.

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Table 8.4 Sample description (unweighted cases). Individuals aged 16–29 at the interview by origin, gender and 1910, 1920, and 1930 US Censuses (1% samples) Origin

US White Germany Ireland Italy Poland Sweden UK Total

Gender

Year of observation

Total

Men

Women

1910

1920

1930

209,042 11,168 5,339 5,566 4,114 3,147 2,781 241,157

215,086 11,848 5,819 5,586 4,283 3,101 3,012 248,735

122,746 11,295 4,537 909 135 2,013 2,442 144,077

135,838 7,385 3,834 2,602 2,593 2,413 1,980 156,645

165,544 4,336 2,787 7,641 5,669 1,822 1,371 189,170

424,128 23,016 11,158 11,152 8,397 6,248 5,793 489,892

Source IPUMS USA

The wider second-generation group originates from Germany (23,016 cases), followed by Ireland (11,158) and Italy (11,152). The distribution of cases across different censuses reflects the migration dynamics in the US. Migrant flows originating from Central and Northern Europe decreased during the first three decades of the twentieth century and were progressively substituted by migrants from Southern and Eastern Europe. As a result, children of immigrants coming from Germany, Ireland, the UK and, to a lesser extent, Sweden reduced in number passing from the 1910 to 1930 census. In contrast, the opposite occurred for second generations with Italian and Polish origins.

Findings Figures 8.3 and 8.4 contain the distribution of living arrangements for men and women aged 16–29. Overall, the second generation tends to stay more often with their parents compared with US native-born white counterpart. However, crucial differences emerge according to the country of origin. The exit from parental homes tends to be delayed among children of Italians and Polish immigrant parents. This result is confirmed for both men and women, even though, as a general rule, women tend to leave the parental home and form a family earlier than men. The UK and Germany show behaviours more closely related to those experienced

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by US white than other European children of immigrants. In contrast, children of immigrants from Sweden and Ireland stay in the middle. Consequently, US white and second-generation immigrants from the UK and Germany show the highest proportion of men living in a couple (29%, 28% and 25%), followed by those from Sweden and Ireland (17% and 16%). In contrast, the second generations from Italy (14%) and Poland (15%) register the lowest values. Among women, percentages are generally higher, confirming an earlier family formation. However, differences across countries show peculiar traits. On the one hand, a higher percentage of women in couple are observed for US white (44%) and children of immigrants from the UK (38%) and Germany (41%). On the other hand, unlike men, women originating from Italy and Poland (respectively 32% and 29%) show proportions that are in line with, or higher than, those observed for groups from Sweden and Ireland (29% and 23%). In other words, Italian and, to a lesser extent, Polish immigrants’ daughters tend to postpone the exit from the parental home, in line with men of the same origin. However, once they leave, they enter marriage much more rapidly than the other groups avoiding other living arrangements. Indeed, this result should be read in conjunction with the 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 US White

UK

Germany

Parents and spouse

Parents

Sweden Spouse

Ireland Other relatives

Poland

Italy

Alone

Fig. 8.3 Men’s living arrangements by country of origin. Weighted data. Individuals aged 16–29. US censuses (1910, 1920, 1030) (Source IPUMS)

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1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 US White

UK

Germany

Parents and spouse

Parents

Sweden Spouse

Ireland Other relatives

Poland

Italy

Alone

Fig. 8.4 Women’s living arrangements by country of origin. Weighted data. Individuals aged 16–29. US censuses (1910, 1920, 1030) (Source IPUMS)

very low propensity of children of Italians and Polish to live alone, i.e., without a spouse and relatives. On the contrary, the second generations from Sweden and Ireland experience this living arrangement more often. The percentage of people living with other relatives is relatively stable, around 4% for all the groups except for the children of Irish parents showing around 7% for men and 8% for women. The proportion of those living alone is particularly low in Italy (4% for men and 1% for women) and Poland (4% for both men and women). In contrast, it is higher in other countries, especially among men. Despite being married, the proportion of those who live with parents is rather low and tends to be higher for women (around 2% for men and 3% for women) with a relatively slight variation across groups. The share of unmarried people living with other relatives is also somewhat stable, although higher than average values emerge for sons and daughters of the Irish. Focusing on the percentage of those living with parents according to age groups (Figs. 8.5 and 8.6), differences across origins tend to persist (or increase further) over different ages with few exceptions, such as the catching up of Italian women who show one of the highest proportion

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of those still living with parents at 16–19 years and one of the lowest at 25–29 years. Among men, the percentage of children of immigrants from Italy, Poland and Ireland living with their parents exceeds 70% at 20–24 years old and around 47% for 25–29. The behaviour of US whites is quite different, with only 56% living with their parents at 20–24 years of age and 27% at 25–29. The other groups are in intermediate positions. For women, the share of those living with their parents falls sharply over age, demonstrating a more rapid process of forming a new family unit. However, differences according to origin remain. What emerges, in particular, is the high propensity of the daughters of Irish immigrants to live with their parents (66% at 20– 24 years and 44% at 25–29 years), followed by the daughters of parents born in Sweden and all the other second-generation groups with percentages still higher than those of US whites (41% at 20–24 years and 23% at 25–29). Employment status plays a crucial role in defining living arrangements. Figures 8.7 and 8.8display respectively the living arrangements of individuals aged 16–29 working o(r actively seeking work) and those not working at the interview. The results show a very clear gender difference. While among men, not being in the labour market strongly hinders the 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 US White

UK

Sweden 16-19

Germany 20-24

Ireland

Poland

Italy

25-29

Fig. 8.5 Percentage of men living with parents by age and country of origin. Weighted data. Individuals aged 16–29. US censuses (1910, 1920, 1030) (Source IPUMS)

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100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 US White

UK

Sweden 16-19

Germany 20-24

Ireland

Poland

Italy

25-29

Fig. 8.6 Percentage of women living with parents by age and country of origin. Weighted data. Individuals aged 16–29. US censuses (1910, 1920, 1030) (Source IPUMS)

formation of a new household, conversely, not working women are more frequently married. However, even considering this aspect, differences according to origin persist. Among men, Italian and Polish second generations live more often with their parents than other groups, especially US whites. This is confirmed when they are out of the labour market, with percentages higher than 96%, and when working. A similar result can be observed among working women. If, on the other hand, they are outside the labour market, women daughters of Italians and Poles are characterised by a high propensity to live with their spouse.

Conclusions Overall, the analyses highlight two main points. The first concerns the greater propensity of children of immigrants to live longer with their parents, especially among men. This result suggests a specific impact of the migration/integration experience at the family level on the integration process in the American context. The delay in the exit from the parental home and family formation, particularly visible among men, could be related to their possible disadvantaged position in the labour market. Immigrant descendants may have encountered structural obstacles in

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Fig. 8.7 Living arrangements by gender and country of origin among not employed individuals aged 16–29 (Source IPUMS)

Fig. 8.8 Living arrangements by gender and country of origin among employed individuals aged 16–29.US Censuses (1910, 1920, 1930) (Source IPUMS)

transitioning to adulthood, despite having acquired widespread norms and preferences in the host country. In this perspective, labour market characteristics, low-income levels and socioeconomic background determine the economic resources available to young adults. Furthermore, constraints related to the housing market, particularly possible discrimination in access to housing, may also have played a role. Indeed, immigrants

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in the United States at the end of the nineteenth century arrived poor, with low professional skills. They settled in neighbourhoods characterised by high levels of poverty and cultural distinctiveness, and they were mainly involved in industry, construction and mining (Pearlman, 2005). However, crucial differences emerge between different countries. These results lead to the second key point given by the potential effect of cultural maintenance among children of European migrants. This is in line with previous research. Regarding more recent immigrant flows, Giuliano (2007) highlights the striking correlation between the fraction of Southern European second generations who live with their parents in the United States and the corresponding fractions in the countries of origin. In Australia, Khoo and colleagues (2002), using the census data of 1996, show that young people of Italian and Greek parents leave home later, rarely go to live alone and have fewer children than their peers with Australian origins, as well as those with parents born in other European countries like Germany and the UK. Also, in the European context, Impicciatore (2015) highlighted how the children of Italian and Spanish immigrants in France during the twentieth century tended to mirror the behaviour observed in their countries of departure. Although the results shown here constitute only a descriptive analysis, comparing children of immigrants and the native population provides interesting insights into the role of contextual and cultural factors. Despite being born and raised in the same institutional context, the second generations constitute a social group of extreme interest. They are the bearers of norms and values capable of modifying individual behaviour and the timing and modalities of family formation. The availability of census data in the past offered by the IPUMS project represents an opportunity to examine these aspects in depth, also from a historical perspective.

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CHAPTER 9

Policy Incoherence? The UK–Rwanda Asylum Partnership Arrangement Mark McQuinn

Introduction The UK and Rwanda agreed to a Migration and Economic Development Partnership (MEDP) in April 2022. Administered by the Home Office, the collaboration includes a five-year asylum partnership arrangement (APA), which allows the British government to send people to Rwanda who would otherwise claim asylum in the UK. The arrangement has drawn critiques, highlighting issues of legality, practicality, morality and cost. While these are all substantial lines of criticism, this chapter examines a different aspect of the APA. It provides an analysis of how the APA is situated within the concept of Policy Coherence for Development (PCD), which is a central UK government strategy. Based on an examination of Britain’s development partnerships with Rwanda from the 1960s to the present and a discourse analysis of current policy documents, this research finds that the APA continues a pattern of a lack of policy coherence on the part of the UK government in three major respects. First, evidence

M. McQuinn (B) SOAS, University of London, London, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. Fauri and D. Mantovani (eds.), Past and Present Migration Challenges, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39431-7_9

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has been produced by a number of critics to show that the APA denigrates the human rights of migrants to the UK. The government has failed to engage transparently and rigorously with the arguments and evidence outlined by these critics. This contradicts the government’s stated position in its policy documents that respect and support for human rights is a high priority. Second, key aspects of the APA have negative effects on the environment, which belies the claims made in the same policy documents that fostering green development is a primary UK government concern. Third, the UK’s Home Office has not attempted to integrate the APA with existing development programmes in Rwanda, which are overseen by various government departments. The APA is not, therefore, based on a “whole of government” approach, which is stated as being a core element of policy-making by the UK administration. The chapter is divided into five main sections. First, the main elements of PCD are outlined in the context of the importance attached by the UK government to human rights and environmental issues in two of its core policy documents. Second, a brief overview of the political economy of Rwanda is provided to contextualise the subsequent examination of Britain’s aid to and wider development partnerships with, the country. The methodology is then set out, followed by the case study section, centred on an analysis of the APA. The major points arising from the case study discussion are summarised in the conclusion.

Policy Coherence for Development In 2018, in the wake of concerted criticisms of its aid programmes (McQuinn, 2019), senior politicians in the UK called for ODA to be aligned more closely with the country’s foreign policy and commercial interests. To further this aim, the Department for International Development (DFID) was merged with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) on 2nd September 2020, creating the Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO). The department is overseen by the Foreign Secretary, who has the power “to make decisions on aid spending in line with the UK’s priorities overseas” (UKG, 2022c). In the wake of the merger, the UK has moved to provide more of its aid bilaterally with a planned reduction of multilateral assistance from 50.9% of the total in 2020 to 25% by 2025. Overall, the UK’s ODA strategy has been repurposed since 2020 to centre on securitisation of the country’s borders and blending of

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aid programmes with commercial investments by domestic enterprises. This has led to a number of aid programmes losing focus and funding. An example from Rwanda will be discussed in the case study section. Compared to 2020, total UK aid decreased by 21% in real terms in 2021 to $15.8 million. This represents a decline in the ratio of ODA to Gross National Income (GNI) from 0.7% to 0.5%. Despite these reductions, the UK is the fourth largest bilateral Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)-Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donor in terms of the total amount of finance expended and the eighth biggest in relation to aid as a percentage of GNI.1 A further reason for the repurposing of aid by the UK government is its attempt to achieve policy coherence for development (PCD). The concept of PCD originated during the 1990s from the realisation that aid strategies and programmes of OECD-DAC donors were not always well integrated with their wider socio-economic policies (Cambridge Policy Consultants, 2020). PCD is based on ensuring that different policyforming groups in states that provide aid coordinate effectively, so that “the interactions among various policies in the economic, social, environmental, legal and political domains support countries on their pathway towards inclusive sustainable growth” (OECD, 2015, 2). PCD objectives were introduced in EU fundamental law in 1992 with the Treaty of Maastricht and reinforced in the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 (European Commission, 2019). The need for aid providers to demonstrate policy coherence has risen with the adoption of the 2030 Agenda, centred on achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Bond, 2019). The OECD-DAC donor’s concentration on achieving the SDGs by 2030 has led to the development of Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development (PCSD). Closely related to PCD in a number of ways, PCSD “is an approach and policy tool for integrating the economic, social, environmental and governance dimensions of sustainable development at all stages of domestic and international policy-making” (Morales & Linberg, 2017, 1). For OECDDAC donors, fostering PCSD is vital because the “sustainability of the democratic model of governance will depend on governments’ capacity to effectively address […] climate change” (OECD, 2021, 8). The high level of attention paid by the UK government to support for human rights 1 The DAC currently has 31 members. https://www.oecd.org/dac/development-assist ance-committee/.

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(as part of a democratic model of governance) and environmental protection is reflected in the amount of space devoted to these issues in core documents setting out its policy prescriptions. In 2021, the government published the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy.2 The review’s intention is to outline the government’s “overarching national security and international policy objectives, with priority actions” (UKG, 2021, 12). The review also states that the government will take a “more integrated approach [which] supports faster decision-making, more effective policymaking and more coherent implementation by bringing together defence, diplomacy, development, intelligence and security […] in pursuit of crossgovernment, national objectives” (UKG, 2021, 19). One year later, the FCDO outlined the UK Government’s Strategy for International Development. The aim of the strategy is to “drive coherence across the whole of the UK Government” and to “enhance cross-departmental coordination” (FCDO, 2022, 30). In the Integrated Review, it is claimed that the UK’s “first goal” is to “support open societies and defend human rights, as a force for good in the world” (UKG, 2021, 44). Additionally, the UK has a “commitment to universal human rights, the rule of law, free speech and fairness and equality” (UKG, 2021, 14). In the 111-page document, (human) rights are referred to 29 times (Table 9.1). In the Strategy for International Development , it is claimed that the UK government “will uphold International Humanitarian, Human Rights and Refugee Law and meet our international obligations to protect refugees and people seeking asylum” (FCDO, 2022, 16). The UK government also proclaims itself to be a “world leader in climate action” in the Integrated Review (UKG, 2021, 9). It further states that “tackling climate change and biodiversity loss [is] its number one international priority” (UKG, 2021, 4). The term “environment” is referenced 61 times in the document (Table 9.1). In the Strategy for International Development , climate change and biodiversity are identified again “as the UK’s number one international priority” (FCDO, 2022,

2 In March 2023, the UK government published the Integrated Review Refresh 2023: What Has Changed Since 2021? No analysis of the content of this document is provided, as it is a short update on the more detailed 2021 publication.

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Table 9.1 References to human rights and environmental issues in UK government policy documents Document

No. of pages

No. of refs to No. of refs to (human) environment rights

No. of refs to green

No. of refs to sustainable

UK Government (2021) FCDO (2022)

111

29

61

31

21

30

3

5

17

13

Note The vast majority of references in the documents to the terms selected for discourse analysis, though not all, are directly relevant to the UK’s policies on human rights and environmental issues Source Author’s own elaboration

4).3 The term “green”, in reference to the UK’s development policies and programmes, is used 17 times in the 30-page publication (Table 9.1). It is recognised in the same document that by 2030, climate change and biodiversity issues may have caused millions of people to be living in poverty. It is also acknowledged that the least-developed countries are most vulnerable to climate change. As Rwanda is categorised by the OECD as one of the Least Developed Countries (OECD, 2023),4 this has clear implications for the nub of the UK’s development programmes in the country. It is evident from the discourse analysis of these policy documents that respect for human rights and the need to protect the environment are high priorities for the UK government, rhetorically. If, therefore, policy coherence is taken as seriously by the UK government as it claims, the APA, as a major bilateral partnership, should contain substantive engagement with these two issues. Furthermore, the APA should have congruity with the UK’s existing development programmes in Rwanda, as part of its ‘whole of government’ approach. Before the case study section, a brief

3 The government’s revised development strategy, outlined in 2022, is based on increasing the use of British expertise in concentrating on climate change, along with delivering investment, gender equality and humanitarian assistance. 4 The OECD uses the definition of Least Developed Countries provided by the UNDESA: “countries that have low levels of income and face severe structural impediments to sustainable development”: https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/leastdeveloped-country-category.html.

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overview is provided of some aspects of the political economy of Rwanda to contextualise the analysis of the APA.5

The Political Economy of Rwanda A landlocked republic, Rwanda has 13.2 million inhabitants (Republic of Rwanda, 2022) and is the most densely populated country on the mainland of Africa (UNDESA, 2022). According to the 2022 National Census, 72.1% of the population is rural and 53.4% of those in employment are engaged in agriculture, forestry or fishing (Republic of Rwanda, 2022). Much research on Rwanda takes the post-genocide period (from 1994 onwards) as a starting point (Bergamaschi et al., 2014; Grayson & Hitchcott, 2019; McDoom, 2022). However, Chemouni (2020) points out that 1994 does not represent an unequivocal break between periods of political economy and shows that there are continuities between the formations of the pre- and post-genocide states. A number of analysts (Beloff, 2017; Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 2012; Rutazibwa, 2014) show that a significant amount of research on Rwanda tends to be polarised. Harrison (2017) describes this as a “two Rwandas” scenario, where some analysts spotlight the repressive nature of the ruling party, the Rwandan Popular Front (RPF), while others adopt a “renaissance narrative”, centring on the impressive levels of economic growth in the country since 1994 and the achievement of political stability. Reductionist positions are sometimes taken, where research is analysed primarily as being for or against the policies and practices of the RPF government and President Kagame. Beloff (2021) highlights the problematic nature of taking such a stance. Drawing on interviews with officials responsible for crafting and enacting foreign policy, he indicates that the Rwandan government is not the homogeneous actor it is often portrayed to be in the literature. Rwandan government officials have diverse views concerning three core themes of feelings of abandonment by the international community; agaciro; and the government’s responsibility to ensure domestic human security. Agaciro is conceptualised by Mwambari (2021) as a multifaceted Rwandan concept, encompassing dignity, self-respect and self-worth.

5 Lack of space precludes detailed engagement with the large research output on Rwanda’s development trajectories.

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Rwanda’s successful government-led policies in a number of socioeconomic spheres since the mid-1990s have led to the country being examined through the lens of the developmental state (Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 2012; Gaudreault & Bodolica, 2022; Mann & Berry, 2016; Musewe, 2023; Poulton, 2020). An issue with adopting this lens is that providing an analytically rigorous and uncontested definition of the developmental state is difficult (Bresser-Pereira, 2019).6 The World Bank (2022) praises Rwanda for achieving “political stability” in the post-genocide period. It also lauds the per capita GDP growth rate in the country, which averaged 5% in the decade to 2019.7 With the majority of the employed population being engaged in agriculture, fluctuating increases in output from the second half of the 1990s to the first part of the 2000s were problematic (Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 2014). However, since the phase of reforms beginning in 2007, focusing on chain integration and “upgrading”, agricultural output has increased substantially. From 2007 to 2011, the “total production of maize, wheat and cassava tripled” (Harrison, 2017, 360). While output in the agricultural sector has risen, the government has put an emphasis on the need for a structural transformation of the economy, concentrating on training for—and creating high-value jobs in—industries of the future and services (Republic of Rwanda, 2020). The contribution of the industrial sector to total GDP increased from 16% in 2009 to 19% in 2019 (ibid.). Turning to social aspects of development, life expectancy at birth has risen from 51 years in 2002 to 69.6 years in 2022 (Republic of Rwanda, 2022). Rwanda has also progressed in some areas of gender equality (UNDP Rwanda, 2018). For example, at the national parliamentary level, 61.3% of the Chamber of Deputies were women in 2021, compared to 17.1% in 1990 (National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda, 2022). Moreover, Rwanda is one of only six countries globally where more than 50% of people holding ministerial positions are women. However, Umuhoza (2023) argues that Rwanda’s political system would benefit from a greater

6 Moreover, some analyses adopting a developmental state framework in examining Rwanda, do not engage substantively with points raised by critics who argue that the concept has fundamental flaws (Chang, 2009; Chibber, 2005). 7 The deleterious effects of the Covid-19 pandemic led to a fall in GDP of 3.4% in 2020. The Covid-19 pandemic also led to increases in poverty in the country (World Bank, 2022).

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degree of inclusivity since “most women in Parliament owe allegiance to the RPF, rather than the constituencies that elected them”. Moving to less positive analyses of development directions in Rwanda, the autocratic nature of the RPF has been highlighted by a number of researchers. Reyntjens (2011, 2015), for example, argues that the RPF manages information aggressively, allowing it to monopolise narratives concerning government policies and actions. The party addresses internal dissent and external criticisms of its policies combatively by presenting itself as the victim of genocide and capitalising on the guilt feelings of the international community. In short, the ruling party maintains a “repressive peace” (Samset, 2011, 279) and is capable of persecuting political opponents (Bergamaschi et al., 2014). A number of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) provide critical narratives on Rwanda. Freedom House (2023) argues that the RPF has “suppressed political dissent through pervasive surveillance, intimidation, torture, and renditions or suspected assassinations of exiled dissidents”. The International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) categorises Rwanda as a country where violations of the rights of workers occur regularly. A study by Transparency International (2020) finds a culture of fear among the Rwandan media, which has generated a high level of self-censorship. Human Rights Watch argues in its 2022 report on Rwanda that the “space for political opposition, civil society, and media remained closed” (Human Rights Watch, 2022). For Reporters Without Borders (2022), “the Rwandan media landscape is one of the poorest in Africa. TV channels are controlled by the government or by owners who are members of the ruling party [… and] there is no longer a single national newspaper”. Given the UK government’s claim that respect and support for human rights are central to its policies, the issues raised in these critiques of Rwandan government policies merit thorough examination by officials in the context of developing the APA. The methodology for the research is outlined briefly in the following section, leading to the case study analysis, in which these critiques are discussed in more detail.

Methodology The research utilises primary data, in the form of an examination of official government documents on Rwanda contained in the UK’s National Archives in London. The documents cover discussions on migration,

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aid, trade and humanitarian issues from the 1960s onwards among UK government officials, military personnel, staff at CSOs and business people. The research further draws on an analysis of grey literature in the form of publications by the UK government, supranational organisations and CSOs on policy coherence, aid and the APA. Finally, use is made of existing published data on aid flows to Rwanda and other secondary sources.8

Case Study: The APA The signing of the MEDP, containing within it, the APA, marked a significant point in the UK’s treatment of asylum seekers. According to the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the APA, the UK government aims to “create a mechanism for the relocation of asylum seekers whose claims are not being considered by the UK, to Rwanda, which will process their claims and settle or remove […] individuals after their claim is decided, in accordance with Rwanda domestic law, the Refugee Convention, current international standards, including in accordance with international human rights law” (UKG, 2022b, 6–7). The authorities in Rwanda will assess people on a case-by-case basis for permission to stay or return to their country of origin. The people assessed as part of the scheme will not be eligible to return to the UK. The MOU also states that “Rwanda will ensure that at all times it will treat each Relocated Individual, and process their claim for asylum, in accordance with the Refugee Convention, Rwandan immigration laws and international and Rwandan standards, including under international and Rwandan human rights law, and including, but not limited to ensuring their protection from inhuman and degrading treatment and refoulement” (UKG, 2022b, 9). The APA is closely linked to the UK’s Illegal Migration Bill (2023), sponsored by the Home Office, which aims to “prevent and deter unlawful migration, and in particular migration by unsafe and illegal

8 The Rwandan position on the APA is not analysed in this research. Nevertheless,

complexities involved in conducting research on Rwanda should be acknowledged. There has been substantive discussion concerning research on Rwanda by outsiders (Beloff, 2017; Chemouni, 2020; Fisher, 2015; Rutazibwa, 2014). Rutazibwa (2014) outlines the need to pluralise those who configure theories and the conceptualisation of issues and debates about Rwanda and highlights the value of engaging people at the local level.

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routes, by requiring the removal from the UK of certain persons who enter or arrive […] in breach of immigration control” (UKG, 2023a, 1). The Bill, which was passed by the UK Parliament in July 2023, allows migrants entering the UK by such routes to be denied the right to claim asylum, detained and removed from the country. The Bill centres on the removal of the legal rights of migrants, which it is asserted, are a motivating factor in their decision to embark on journeys to the UK. The number of asylum seekers initially earmarked for processing of claims in Rwanda is two hundred, with plans to increase. No limit has been placed on the numbers of people who could become part of this scheme. Without providing corroborating evidential support, the UK Home Secretary, who carries the ultimate responsibility for the scheme on the British side, asserts that Rwanda has the capacity to host large numbers of asylum seekers.9 As part of the arrangement, the UK has provided £120 million in funding to the Rwandan government and will also pay for the processing and integration costs for relocated people. Government officials claim that contributions made to the Rwandan Government will be similar to the amount currently being spent on processing asylum claims in the UK (Pursglove, 2022). The APA has been categorised variously as an example of offshoring, outsourcing or externalising migration management. In the face of criticism of the arrangement, the British Prime Minister argues that it is an effective approach to migration that will be copied by other European destination countries (The Times, 2023). In fact, this approach to migration has been taken already, in different forms, by a number of destination countries, including Israel, Canada, Australia and the US. In these four cases, analysts show that an effective and equitable solution to migration flows was not forthcoming (Bar-Tuvia, 2018; Ellis et al., 2021; Fitzgerald, 2021; Prasad, 2021). Moreover, Denmark passed an amendment to its Aliens Act in 2021 allowing asylum seekers to be transferred to a nonEU country for the processing of their claims and for possible settlement (Tan, 2022). Denmark has also engaged in talks with Rwanda about the formulation of a scheme similar to the APA for asylum seekers. The externalisation of migration approach taken by a number of destination countries has also led to the emergence of a “migration industry” 9 In April 2023, the UK Home Secretary stated that “Rwanda has the capacity to resettle many thousands of people, and can quickly stand up accommodation once flights begin” (The Guardian, 2023).

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composed of different actors, which together form a “complex migration governance structure” (Pacciardi & Berndtsson, 2022, 4010). Morris (2023) shows in detail the complex ways in which this industry operates in the case of the “Pacific Solution”, where migrants attempting to reach Australia have been taken to Nauru for processing and detention. Through the APA, the UK government is, thus, pursuing an approach to migration which has a number of failed precedents and taps into an opaque multifaceted global network of institutions and individuals. The UK Home Office selected a group of asylum seekers to be sent to Rwanda under the terms of the APA, following the signing of the MOU. However, legal challenges were formulated in response to the government’s actions. In December 2022, judges at the UK’s High Court found the government’s policy to be lawful but rescinded the Home Office’s decision to deport the people selected for transfer to Rwanda. In June 2023, the UK Court of Appeal reversed the ruling that the government’s migration policy was lawful, thus, halting the stated aim of the Home Secretary “to operationalise our arrangement shortly” (The Guardian, 2023). The government subsequently appealed to the UK Supreme Court against the ruling, adding further time and expense to what has already become a lengthy and costly process.10 There have been criticisms of the APA from a variety of perspectives. Three lines of critique are discussed below. First, the argument that the APA involves the denigration of the human rights of migrants. Second, the view that the APA entails practices which degrade the environment. Third, the claim that the APA is not integrated with existing bilateral development programmes in Rwanda and does not draw on lessons from the past or the views of a variety of development experts with current knowledge of issues from their work in the field.

Human Rights and the APA Critics contend that the human rights of migrants are denied in a number of ways by the terms of the APA (Beirens & Davidoff-Gore, 2022; British Red Cross, 2023; Equality & Human Rights Commission, 2023). It is argued that the APA is incompatible with obligations outlined in the 1951 Refugee Convention, to which the UK is a signatory (Terry, 2022).

10 The outcome of the appeal was unknown at the time of publication.

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Article 33 of the Convention, guarantees that asylum seekers will not be returned to a country where their lives or freedom would be threatened. The UK government counters that Rwanda will provide a safe environment for migrants, including accommodation, education and job opportunities (UKG, 2022a). As Rwanda is a “safe third country”, the government claims it is not in breach of Article 33. However, the UK Court of Appeal ruled in June 2023 that Rwanda could not be categorised as a “safe third country” and that deporting asylum seekers there risked placing the UK in breach of its legal obligations to protect human rights. By a majority decision, the Court of Appeal considered that Rwanda could not be considered a “safe third country” given that its system for deciding asylum claims was “inadequate”. A source of concern was the fact that all asylum applications by Afghans, Yemenis and Syrians had been rejected by the Rwandan authorities. The majority of judges making the ruling were also disquieted about the Home Secretary’s “uncritical acceptance” of assurances from the Rwandan government that it would make changes to address deficiencies in its asylum processes. Despite such assurances, the judges noted that changes had not been made. Consequently, sending asylum seekers to Rwanda would breach human rights protections under UK law. The Lord Chief Justice of the UK (2023) stated in his summary of the ruling that “unless and until the deficiencies in its asylum processes are corrected, removal of asylum seekers to Rwanda will be unlawful”. Although the UK government contested the ruling of the Court of Appeal, its undertaking of due diligence to ensure Rwanda is a “safe third country” can be questioned. The Home Secretary admits to being unaware that a number of refugees were killed at a protest in Rwanda in 2018 (Kalamo & Alfred, 2018). Furthermore, the UK government’s International Ambassador for Human Rights expressed regret in 2021 about the Rwandan government’s failure to support a recommendation to undertake investigations into claims of human rights violations, including deaths in custody and torture (FCDO and French, 2021). The expression of regret has not been referred to by the UK government in any of its pronouncements and publications relating to the APA. Additionally, the Home Office provided a review of “general human rights” in Rwanda in 2022 (Home Office, 2022). In this overview, criticisms of human rights processes in Rwanda from a number of CSOs are cited. However, in formulating the APA, the UK government has not engaged meaningfully with any of these criticisms. Since the UK government’s stated “first

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goal” in its Integrated Review (UKG, 2021) is to support open societies and defend human rights, its failure to address these criticisms robustly is questionable, given their seriousness. Moreover, the government has not engaged in a thoroughgoing way with health as a human right in constructing the APA. The 1946 constitution of the World Health Organisation states that the “enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic or social condition”. Acknowledging health as a human right recognises a “legal obligation on states to ensure access to timely, acceptable, and affordable health care”. Analyses in The Lancet (2022) and the British Medical Journal (2023) outline ways in which transferring asylum seekers to other countries have negative consequences for their health. Migrants often have complex healthcare needs, such as post-traumatic stress disorder and depression. Furthermore, many migrants need urgent care for untreated communicable diseases and poorly controlled chronic conditions. The explanation of how such health care needs will be met in Rwanda for asylum seekers could “hardly be more vague” (The Lancet, 2022). The failure to outline in any depth how the health care needs of asylum seekers will be addressed in Rwanda casts further doubt on the claim of the UK government in policy documents (UKG, 2021) that it regards support for open societies and the defence of human rights as being of paramount importance.

Environmental Issues and the APA The APA contributes to global warming and an increase in the carbon footprint, as it involves using long-haul flights to transport asylum seekers from the UK to Rwanda. This aspect of the arrangement casts doubt on the UK government’s claims in its policy documents (FCDO, 2022; UKG, 2021) that environmental issues are central to its vision. The government states that “tackling climate change and biodiversity loss will be the UK’s international priority through COP26 and beyond” (UKG, 2021, 89). It further declares that the UK will “strengthen adaptation to the effects of climate change that cannot be prevented or reversed, supporting the most vulnerable worldwide in particular” (UKG, 2021, 90). Concerning Rwanda, DFID (before it was merged with the FCO) was well aware of the country’s fragile environmental position. In a

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2014 report, DFID stated that “strong reliance on rain-fed agriculture makes [… Rwanda] highly vulnerable to climate change threatening food security, health, export earnings and causing damage to infrastructure” (DFID, 2014, 5). There is, therefore, a good case for the UK to support programmes protecting the environment in Rwanda. One such programme was in existence. The UK Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (UKDBEIS)11 funded a programme named Resilience+: Integrating Equity into Climate-Resilient Development (RICARDO). The main objective of the programme was “to critically evaluate the existing theoretical and practical approaches that are relevant for increasing the resilience to climate shocks of women and persons with disabilities in rural Rwanda” (UKDBEIS, n.d). The rationale for the programme was that climate impacts negatively affect women and people with disabilities disproportionally and it is, thus, vital to build their resilience to climate shocks. Little information about the progress of the programme is available on UK government websites. Nevertheless, the objectives are congruent with the claim of the UK government that its development policies and programmes prioritise environmental protection. At the same time, however, the UK Home Office is planning to fly asylum seekers regularly to Rwanda. A direct flight from London to Kigali is 6,590 kilometres. One CSO (Ecotree, n.d) calculates that travelling this distance on a plane with 20 passengers emits 16,150 kg of carbon dioxide, which would take 567 trees to absorb. In 2018, aviation accounted for 2.4% of all anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide including land use change. The total contribution to global warming of flying is likely to be considerably larger because of contrail cirrus and nitrous oxides (Lee et al., 2021). In addition, “commercial traffic has increased nearly four times faster than fuel efficiency improvement, and passenger aircraft CO2 emissions increased 33% between 2013 and 2019” (Graver et al., 2021, 23). As Gossling and Dolnicar (2023, 8) conclude, flying contributes significantly to climate change, “yet represents a service that is used by only a small share of humanity, often in highly carbon-intense forms”.

11 The UKDBEIS was split in 2023 to form the Department for Business and Trade (DBT), the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ) and the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT). The RICARDO programme remains listed on the government’s website as run by UKDBEIS.

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Moreover, as outlined in the section on the Political Economy of Rwanda, statistics from UNDESA (2022) show that Rwanda is the most densely populated country on mainland Africa. An analysis by Imasiku and Ntagwirumugara (2020) reveals that there is likely to be insufficient access to clean drinking water, energy and food to meet the demographic needs in Rwanda by 2050 due to the anticipated land scarcity. Their study outlines different ways in which land stress in Rwanda is endangering energy, water and food security, which is compromising efforts to bring about ecological sustainable development. Additionally, the President of the Rwandan Green Democratic Party, Frank Habineza, argues that APA is unacceptable because of the country’s high population density, which is already causing competition and conflict over land resources (Terry, 2022). One part of the UK government is, thus, prepared to cause considerable environmental damage by flying asylum seekers over one and a half thousand miles to Rwanda, while at the same time, another department has been using public funds to increase the resilience to climate shocks of women and people with disabilities in the same country. This demonstrates a lack of policy coherence on the part of the UK government and belies its claims to be at the forefront internationally of climate action policies and programmes. No overt analysis has been undertaken by the UK government of how increasing the carbon footprint through the use of long-haul flights and adding to an already high population density by sending asylum seekers to Rwanda is likely to affect the fragile energy–water–food–land nexus in the country. In addition to these issues, the UK government does not include the views of development experts working in Rwanda in its analyses of the APA. There are a number of staff working on UK-funded development programmes in Rwanda, who could provide valuable information about human rights and environmental issues in the country. The UK government claims to have twenty five “active projects” in Rwanda and the FCDO (2022, 27), in its Strategy for International Development , states that it will “give authority to our … development experts”. However, the government produces no insights or evidence from people working on these programmes in its assessment of whether Rwanda is a “safe third country” or how environmental issues can be addressed effectively. This again reveals a lack of policy coherence across government departments. There is a clear case for consulting with development experts already working on the ground in Rwanda about key issues concerning human

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rights and the environment. These individuals have knowledge and lived experience of Rwanda, which would be helpful in assessing these issues. Overall, the UK government has been unwilling to engage in a thoroughgoing way with human rights issues concerning the APA or the environmental consequences of putting it into practice. Moreover, there has been a lack of clarity and focus on the part of the UK in forming development partnerships with Rwanda, dating back to the independence of the country, as the overview in the following section shows.

Policy Coherence and the APA UK development programmes in Rwanda lacked clarity and sound organisation before the 1990s, when the concept of policy coherence rose to prominence. A major element of UK assistance in the period immediately following Rwanda’s achievement of independence in 1962 was the provision of scholarships for students to study at Makerere University in Uganda. The usefulness of this programme was questioned for some time by government officials administering the scheme (Brown, 1967; Nelson, 1966). After considerable debate, British officials at the Foreign Office decided to continue because “if we were to tell the ODM [Overseas Development Ministry] the scheme was useless it would be embarrassing as we have consistently told them the scheme was essential and of real benefit for Ruanda” [sic] (Yarnold, 1967). The incoherent and frustrating nature of UK assistance during this period is captured in a memorandum in 1966, in which it is stated that the attitude of the ODM towards aid projects for Rwanda has “always been marked by lack of enthusiasm and dilatoriness” (Brown, 1966, 1). The muddled nature of British assistance to Rwanda continued during the 1970s and 1980s. During this period, the British considered a wide variety of options but concentrated aid on sending English language teachers to the country. They also debated using aid to finance the training of Rwandan teachers in Britain since this would “do something to correct the present predominance of French culture and thinking” (Hennessy, 1973, 21). Attempts by British diplomats in Rwanda to establish a clear aid strategy were rebuffed by government officials in London. It was made clear in diplomatic correspondence from London to British officials lobbying for aid to Rwanda that the government preferred ad hoc arrangements (Lynch, 1974; Stewart, 1973).

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During the 1990s, much of the aid Rwanda received was devoted to humanitarian assistance and rebuilding the country in the wake of the genocide. Rwanda’s dependency on foreign aid as a source of capital for government operations by the end of 1994 was around 94.9%. The British Contingent (BRITCON) of the United Nations Force in Rwanda (UNAMIR) ran a Field Ambulance, which covered a number of villages, where medical aid was provided. Medical staff also undertook nutritional and epidemiological studies. A military medical unit provided aid from a base camp in Kitabi, running a field surgical team in Kigemi and a treatment facility at Kibeho. The unit sent teams on a daily basis to provide assistance in displaced persons camps in Gikongoro Prefecture (Khan, 1994). Coordination between BRITCON and NGOs was a strength of the UK’s assistance in this period (Hawley, 1997). As its administrative capacity grew from the late 1990s, the Rwandan government began to formulate a clear perspective of what it required from external aid. The UK became a significant “new donor” in this period, giving more financial assistance to Rwanda than “old donors”, notably Belgium and France. However, the UK continued to find it difficult to formulate and execute a clear aid policy as the 2000s progressed. As Whitfield (2010), points out, recipient agency matters to aid outcomes. The clarity of the vision of the recipient government is salient. Rwanda provides an example from the 2000s of a recipient which developed a vision for external aid and acted on it even when donors were not in agreement with proposed directions. Hayman (2007) provides support for Whitfield’s position in outlining the way the Rwandan government has increasingly taken ownership of external aid from the second half of the 1990s. To enhance this process, the government framed its aid policy in an official document in 2006 (Republic of Rwanda, 2006). The government took further steps to control ODA in 2011, when it published a policy document, outlining what are—and are not—acceptable aid procedures (Republic of Rwanda, 2011). The effectiveness of aid management was solidified by the use of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN) in an overarching supervisory capacity. The MINECOFIN is responsible for the coordination and mobilisation of external assistance, while ensuring it is aligned to government priorities. All documentation with respect to external financing needs to go through the MINECOFIN for scrutiny (Republic of Rwanda, 2006). The MINECOFIN’s (2017, 7–8) “Guiding

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Principles of the National Investment Policy” include the need for aid alignment with national priorities and value for money. On top of referring donors to its own aid strategy documents, Brown (2018) shows how the Rwandan government makes use of the principles set out in DAC documents to persuade donors to concur with its proposals for assistance. The Rwandan government uses, in particular, the DAC donor principle of “increasing alignment of aid with partner countries’ priorities, systems and procedures and helping to strengthen their capacities” (OECD, 2015, 1) in promoting its aid agenda. Given the lucid vision for aid developed by the RPF, the UK has been forced to negotiate and compromise over its aid programmes in the country. Beswick (2011, 1926) argues that the “basis for strong relations between the UK and Rwanda […] reflects the significant achievements of the RPF-led government in development and security”. However, in 2012, the UK government suspended aid, citing the support of the Rwandan government for the M23 movement in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as the reason. The UK unfroze half the aid within months, despite criticisms from CSOs, such as Human Rights Watch and Christian Aid, which argued that in formulating development programmes the UK government needed to recognise that addressing “democratic space, human rights and strengthening civil society in Rwanda is key to long term stability, development and accountable governance” (UK Parliament, 2012). Since the aid was unfrozen, the UK has remained a major bilateral donor to Rwanda. It was the second largest bilateral provider of aid to Rwanda for the financial year 2019 to 2020, providing 64.9 million dollars in assistance to the country. Critics continue to argue that the UK government’s aid programme in Rwanda does not address governance issues, such as empowering CSOs, or respect for human rights. In 2021, in response to concerns around these issues raised by the UK parliament’s International Development Committee, the then-Foreign Secretary, sent a letter to its Chair, stating (without providing particular examples from Rwanda) that aid interventions are designed to “strengthen governance systems that are inclusive of wider civil society […] and support human rights compliance” (Raab, 2021). Rwanda has, therefore, developed a coherent vision, since the mid1990s, for use of external aid. However, the country remains more dependent than a number of senior government officials would like it to be on aid flows (Beloff, 2021). Net ODA received as a percentage of

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central government expense was 74.2% in 2020 and the figure has not been under 70.0% between 2014 and 2020. The UK has become one of the largest bilateral aid donors to Rwanda. However, since 1962, its aid policies and practices have not been coherent and driven by focused partnership-based strategies. Instead, the way the UK’s assistance has been provided bears out the perspective of Desrosiers and Swedlund (2018) that donors in Rwanda operate according to a complex set of motives, many of which are idiosyncratic. The rise of the PCD agenda during the 1990s has not led to the UK’s ODA to Rwanda becoming well integrated with its wider socio-economic policies and programmes in the country. Nevertheless, the situation regarding aid provision is dynamic. Some order has been established over the institutional architecture of aid, through the oversight of the MINECOFIN and the creation of formal policy documents by the Rwandan government, driven by its priorities for assistance (Republic of Rwanda, 2006, 2011). Concerning aid for education, Knutsson and Lindberg (2019) show how control has been established in the sector and procedures created, which are determined by a narrow group of government and civil society actors, centring on technical aspects of delivery. In general, however, the UK–Rwanda aid relationship has been from the 1960s—and remains—a reflection of what Swedlund (2017) terms a diplomatic-development “dance” involving agency on the part of donors and recipients. The form of the relationship also affirms the argument of Yanguas (2018) that foreign aid is invariably messy and its principles and goals are subject to short-term political, economic and strategic perspectives. Given these findings, it is unsurprising that synergies between the APA and the UK’s pre-existing partnerships with Rwanda are weak. The lack of any tangible input to the APA from the FCDO illustrates the decline in status attached by the UK government to its ODA since 2020. The Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI, 2023, iii) states that “the UK government’s reputation as a thought leader and reliable global actor on democracy and human rights has declined in recent years […]. Since 2020, following aid budget reductions, the lack of a clear strategic framework and the disruption caused by the DFID/FCO merger, the UK is no longer considered a reliable partner”. The FCDO performed notably worse in the 2022 Aid Transparency Index compared with DFID’s performance in 2020. Its performance was downgraded to

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the “good” category, dropping out of the “very good” band for the first time since classifications were introduced in 2013 (Publish What You Find, 2022). Annual Reviews of some of the UK government’s aid programmes in Rwanda also highlight a decline in performance. For example, the FCDO is running a TradeMark East Africa (TMEA) programme which “aims to deepen trade facilitation reforms in Rwanda, to open opportunities for trade, growth and poverty reduction” (FCDO, 2021). In the 2020/ 2021 Annual Review of the programme it is stated that “TMEA […] has been affected by budget cuts and subsequent […] reorganisation” (FCDO, 2021). Additionally, “TMEA remains unable to evidence much progress towards intermediate outcomes or outcomes” (FCDO, 2021). The rating for the programme overall was downgraded from A to B in the Annual Review.

Conclusions This research finds that the UK government’s APA with Rwanda, which is at the heart of the MEDP, is deeply problematic in various ways. First, a number of analysts have produced evidence-based arguments from different positions indicating that the terms of the APA breach the human rights of migrants claiming asylum in the UK. In response, the UK government has not engaged assiduously with the arguments presented by these critics. This is a substantial issue, given the UK government’s repeatedly stated position in key policy documents that respect and support for human rights is one of its highest priorities. Second, the APA involves long-distance air travel, which has significant adverse consequences for the environment. It also adds to numbers of people living in Rwanda, which is the most densely populated country on the African mainland. These points cast doubt on the UK government’s claim that fostering sustainable green development is a central element of all its policies and programmes. Third, the APA continues a pattern of incoherence concerning the UK’s bilateral relations with Rwanda, dating back to the early 1960s. It lacks congruence with other programmes the UK has funded in Rwanda. The adverse environmental outcomes of the migration policy jar, in particular, with the objectives of the RICARDO programme. Taken together, these lines of criticism beg the question of how far policy coherence has any meaning for the UK government beyond being a fashionable term to include in core strategy documents. The way the migration policy has

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been developed also points to the downgrading of ODA by the British government, following the merger of DFID and the FCO in 2021. The FCDO’s (2022, 6) Strategy for International Development highlights a commitment to taking a “whole of government approach to international development”. However, in the case of the APA, there is scant evidence of such an approach. The migration policy may be seen as a partnership formulated and driven narrowly, on the British side, by the Home Office, without evident input from the FCDO, other UK government departments or development experts currently engaged in the field in Rwanda. Overall, the three main strands of this research show that the APA between the UK and Rwanda, draws on unsuccessful precedents and fails to provide a viable or just way of addressing the needs of people seeking asylum in the UK.

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CHAPTER 10

Dreaming Europe: Migrant Flows from Moldova to the EU Since the End of the USSR Paolo Tedeschi

Introduction The aim of this paper is to analyse the main characteristics of the migration flows departing from Moldova to the European Union (hereafter EU) countries during the 1990s and the first 15 years of the new Millennium: using and comparing statistical data published by the Republic of Moldova and some relevant international organisations (as Eurostat, World Bank, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, International Monetary Fund, International Labour Office and International Organisation for Migration), it is, in fact, possible to show what has happened since the end of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (hereafter USSR) and the related independence of the former Soviet Socialist Republic (hereafter SSR) of Moldova (which immediately lost the region

P. Tedeschi (B) Department of Economics, Management and Statistics, University of Milano-Bicocca, Milan, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. Fauri and D. Mantovani (eds.), Past and Present Migration Challenges, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39431-7_10

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of Transnistria, whose inhabitants were in large majority native Russian speakers) (Haynes, 2020, 133–180; Ticu, 2016).1 This paper, in particular, illustrates the origin of migrants (rural or urban areas) and the level of education as well as the reasons pushing them to leave their native country. The main reasons for emigrating are similar to those recorded in all countries where migratory flows are intensive: no (or very few) job opportunities and very limited socio-economic growth prospects for young people; low salaries and poverty and, consequently, no financial resources available for decent life conditions and food provision; no real access to facilities and public services, in particular, for people living in rural areas where many services are not available; weak institutions and the consequent formation of economic oligarchies that strongly limit medium and small entrepreneurs’ activities; the inefficient legal system, widespread corruption and lack of protection from abuse had the obvious effect of driving away foreign investment and enticing young people to look for work elsewhere. Besides, as it happened in other countries having significant outward migration flows, Moldovan migrants left their families in their native country and sent remittances home (at least until the family eventually reunited in the host countries). So, this chapter also indicates the social and economic impact of the money arriving from abroad and it underlines, in particular, how the improvement of the quality of life of the families receiving foreign remittances obviously pushed young people to

1 Transnistria is the region situated on the East side of the Dnestr (Nistro) river that claimed its independence after the birth of the Republic of Moldova. Transnistria was the most industrialised part of the Moldovan SSR during the Soviet era and most of its inhabitants were Russian native speakers with a relevant minority of Ukrainians. Since 1992, Transnistria is de facto independent from Moldova even if it is not officially recognised by the international community. The conflict between Moldova and Transnistria (from March to July 1992) destroyed a relevant part of the national wealth existing in the former Moldovan SSR. As the local factories strongly decreased their production and job places, Transnistria’s economy started to depend on the Russian Federation’s financial aid. Data published by the Moldovan government continue to include figures and information concerning people living in Transnistria: however, it is not possible to verify the actual accuracy of these data and this explains the use of other data provided by international organisations mentioned in the introduction.

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think that emigration (normally permanent and rarely temporary) represented a winning choice for all, i.e. emigrants, their families and the national economy too.2 Furthermore, this contribution shows the great dimension of the migratory flows (a quarter of Moldovans between 15 and 64 worked abroad in 2003) and the main destinations (with particular attention to the EU countries). In this regard Germany and Romania represented the preferred destinations: in Germany, job opportunities, real wages and the welfare system were, in fact, better than in other EU countries, also for low-skilled people; Romania offered relevant advantages and, in particular, the same language, the cultural and territorial proximity and, moreover, the right to acquire the Romanian citizenship. Besides, after Romania entered the EU (January 2007), the first EU “Common Visa Application Centre” was set up in Moldova, progressively facilitating access to all EU countries and related benefits (in particular, the EU welfare system). However, the paper also underlines that Germany, Romania and the other EU countries were not actually the ones that, according to official data, attracted the biggest share of Moldovan migrants. In the first years after the fall of the USSR (that is during the 1990s) a relevant part of migrants leaving Moldova chose in fact the Russian Federation and Ukraine (in particular, Russian native speakers), the USA (in particular, high-qualified people or those who had the possibility of being hosted by relatives) and Israel (normally Jewish who took advantage of “the law of return”). The preference for the new countries originating from the former Soviet Socialist Republics (hereafter SSRs) and offering low wages in comparison with other countries, depended on pre-existing migratory

2 There exists an extensive bibliography on the migratory flows originating in Eastern Europe from the end of the USSR and its socio-economic model. Considering books and articles particularly concerning the former SSRs; see, among others: Alam et al. (2005), Tishkov et al. (2005), Pribytkova and Gromovs (2007), Favell (2008), Leonˇcikas and Žikas (2009), Voinescu et al. (2008), Careja and Emmenegger (2012), Engbersen et al. (2013), Filipec et al. (2018), and Berlinschi and Harutyunyan (2019). For this purpose, this paper does not analyse the small migration flows directed to Moldova and arriving in particular by Ukraine, Russian Federation and Arab countries: in 2004, there were in Moldova more than 180,250 legal migrants coming from 90 different countries (please note that for other sources they were only a few thousand). For an analysis of the migration flows towards Moldova in the new Millennium also see Bara et al. (2013) (policies and data about Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine).

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flows as well as on the possibility of using the Russian language that all Moldovan people had learnt during their schooling. Only in the new Millennium did migratory flows begin to modify their destinations: in particular, there was a growth of young people preferring the EU countries and Ukraine instead of the Russian Federation where, during the analysed period, civil rights progressively decreased and also job opportunities suffered an important even if temporary reduction (except in the case of Transnistria). This change was related to the progressive loosening of cultural relations with the Russian-speaking world by the younger generation: the latter, in fact, had to choose between the wealth and freedom of the EU countries and the Russian Federation, where the increase of the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was accompanied by the loss of freedom of thought and, more in general, the reduction of civil rights. However, official data underestimated the real migratory flows towards the EU countries and, in particular, towards Romania, the country speaking the same language as most of Moldovan citizens. In this regard, the paper illustrates that emigration to Romania was (and continues to be) much higher than it appeared in official data: taking advantage of the possibility of frequent returns to Moldova, many people became in fact “border workers” although they were real migrants living in Romania.3

3 About Moldovan migration flows and their social and economic effect in Moldova during the analysed period, see, among others, Malinovska et al. (2007), Mosneaga (2007a, 2007b, 2009, 2012a, 2015, 2017), Pantiru et al. (2007), Pribytkova (2007), Görlich and Trebesch (2008), Voinescu et al. (2008, 6–15), Leonˇcikas and Žikas (2009), Stemmer (2011), Cirlig and Mosneaga (2012), Ganta (2012), Vremis et al. (2012), de Zwager and Sintov (2014), Buciuceanu-Vrabie and Gagauz (2017), International Labour Office (2017), and Tabac and Gagauz (2020). See also references indicated in the notes 6 and 8. Please note that these references represent the main sources for all data and information concerning Moldovan migration flows illustrated in this paper. Finally, the migrants’ narratives about their experiences in the EU countries emerging by the mentioned references were supplemented by reports of interviews with parents and relatives made by Moldovan students (coming from Moldova or children of Moldovan parents living in the EU countries) attending the Master in International Economics of the University of Milano-Bicocca.

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The Moldovan Migration Flows During the 1990s After the definitive fall of the USSR at the end of 1991 there were two relevant migratory flows concerning the Moldovan population (4,335,000 inhabitants according to the last USSR census of 1989). The first one was directed towards the former SSRs belonging to the USSR, that is the Russian Federation and Ukraine and it concerned Moldovan native speakers (they represented almost 70% of the total population including Transnistria) as well as all other minorities, in particular, the Russian one (representing almost 10% of the total population) and the Ukrainian one (representing more than 11% of the total population). Until the 1998 Russian economic crisis, the Russian Federation represented the final destination for many Moldovan migrants. For this reason, it is important to note that since December 1991 the Republic of Moldova joined the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the free trade zone including most of the former SSRs of the USSR (only the three Baltic Republics did not join) and this situation facilitated the emigration of Moldovans towards the Russian towns and factories, taking advantage of the low cost of travel and accommodation (Brzezinski & Sullivan, 1996; Karnaukhova et al., 2018; Kubicek, 2009; Sakwa & Webber, 1999).4 The second flow concerned Moldovan native speakers only and was directed towards the EU countries, particularly, Germany (where high real wages and a very good welfare system attracted skilled and non-skilled workers) and Romania (where it was possible to obtain a well-paid job, in comparison to those existing in Moldova, remaining relatively close to the native villages or towns). Other relevant migrant flows were directed towards the USA and Israel. In the first case, people normally had high professional skills and they were requested by universities or high-tech companies (hosting their families too), but there were also migrants with a low or medium qualification who simply had the possibility of being hosted by relatives and thus 4 The CIS was born almost immediately afterwards the end of the USSR (i.e. 21st December 1991) and allowed both to maintain the economic relations existing during the Soviet era and to guarantee the economic survival of the former SSRs: 10 former SSRs gave their full adhesion while Ukraine and Turkmenistan decided to be simply associated. Please note that in the new Millennium, after the Russian great economic crisis of 1998, the relevance of the CIS strongly decreased and Georgia and Ukraine left it (in 2006 and 2014 respectively).

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find a job and a new accommodation. In the second case, migrants were normally represented by Jewish people taking advantage of “the law of return” (promulgated in Israel in 1950) allowing all persons of Hebrew descent to acquire Israeli citizenship and the related right to live in Israel (Sheveliov, 2014).5 People leaving for the CIS countries were normally less skilled than people emigrating towards the USA, Israel and the EU countries: this depended on the numerous job opportunities that the CIS labour market offered to people who knew Russian and also on the low travel cost. This also meant that a great part of labour migration to the CIS countries arrived from poor rural areas and was mostly caused by the need to survive, while migration towards the EU countries (as well as to the USA and Israel) came from urban areas and was normally generated by the aim to improve skilled people earnings. So, people working in the former SSRs sent a bigger share of their salaries home: their families in fact needed that money to survive, while the people working outside the CIS also sent home money to improve the quality of life of their families, but it was not essential for living. In general, Low qualified migrants had great difficulties concerning the language used in the foreign labour markets and this evidently explains why the perfect solution for them was represented by the Russian (and former SSRs) and Romanian job markets. On the contrary people having a secondary school graduation or more were also able to attend vocational training courses in their country of destination: this in particular involved migrants working in the healthcare or in jobs requiring high technological knowledge. Besides, it is important to note that some people emigrated without permission and fed illegal trafficking or were exploited in underpaid activities or in prostitution: unscrupulous people in fact took advantage of the dream of Moldovans who had no professional qualifications or had beauty as their only actual talent. Some were promised passage to better living conditions, but they were instead enrolled in the crossborder smuggling of wood, wool, cigarettes, toys, metal goods, nails and carpets: these illegal activities granted new earnings, but not the quality

5 Note that Jewish migrants arriving since the early 1990s from the former SSRs were so numerous that the rules had to be changed. It exists an extensive bibliography about the “law of return” and the need to adapt it because of the great migratory flows of the 1990s and early new Millennium. See, among others, Richmond (1993), Altschul (2002), and Gavison (2011).

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of life these “almost” migrants desired. For others the new life conditions as migrants were more severe and dramatic: many children and young women were in fact involved in the trafficking of human beings and they were often victims of sexual abuse by European and Asian people who literally bought their bodies.6 The final result of these migratory flows from Moldova was shown in the first census of the new Millennium (2004) when the Moldovan inhabitants only counted 3,383,000 (excluding those living in Transnistria amounting to almost 555,000): Moldova had experienced a demographic decrease of more than 9% in 15 years and a parallel rise in the rate of elderly population. Migrants left mainly from the countryside where, during the last years of the USSR, more than 60% of the Moldovan inhabitants lived. Their quality of life was very low, they had no public services as water supply, sewerage and central heating. Even if public services were available in the principal Moldovan towns, there existed other reasons pushing young people to leave their native country such as low salaries and a strong reduction of job opportunities following the fall of the socialist economic system, de facto pushing many people to leave Moldova. Besides, the presence of weak public institutions favoured the formation of economic oligarchies that strongly limited medium and small entrepreneurs’ activities and even the possibility to build new ones using migrants’ remittances to their families in Moldova. Furthermore, the existence of an inefficient legal system, and the related emergence of corruption and lack of protection from abuse, further reduced the perspectives of socio-economic growth for more qualified young people. The related loss of this human 6 About Moldovan citizens’ irregular transits towards the EU countries (and the related risks for the migrants’ life and public health and safety) see, besides the references indicates in notes 3 and 9, Mosneaga (2013, 2014). Regarding Moldovan children and women who were victims of the trafficking of human beings (normally through Belarus and Ukraine) also see Reiko (2006), UNICEF (2006), Pop (2007), Kontula and Saaristo (2009), and Bara et al. (2013). For a more general analysis of this problem concerning all people migrating from the Eastern European countries but also people belonging to other migratory flows (i.e. those arriving from Africa, Asia and Latin America), see, among others, Ollus et al. (2013), Piotrowicz et al. (2017), Forin and Healy (2018), and Dalla and Sabella (2020). About EU institutions (in particular, the European Council) and the Council of Europe’s policies and their actual actions against human trafficking, see Piotrowicz (2017) and Duki´c and Andrejic (2022). https://www.consil ium.europa.eu/en/eu-against-human-trafficking/; https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/ eu-against-human-trafficking/; https://www.coe.int/en/web/anti-human-trafficking.

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capital moving abroad reduced the number of potential entrepreneurs and reduced job opportunities creating a vicious circle of increasing migration flows departing from Moldova. Remittances from abroad improved the quality of life at home but also spread the idea that emigration guaranteed advantages for all. This evidently increased the appeal of leaving among young people and those who had a family to support favouring the growth of migratory flows departing from Moldova. However, before the 2008 financial crisis, there also existed some negative outcomes of mass migration: Moldovan families left behind underlined the emotional stress suffered by partners and kids because of the long separation (40%) and the lack of parental care of the mothers who found a job abroad (25%). Teachers declared that migrants’ children needed more care than others.

The Progressive Changes of the Moldovan Migrants’ Destinations in the New Millennium For the Moldovan people, the last years of the nineteenth century were characterised by the negative effects of the 1998 Russian economic crisis: Moldova’s industrial output fell by 25%, agricultural output by 20% and exports decreased by almost 50% between 1998 and 1999. Over this period also the Moldovan GDP showed a dramatic reduction: it was in fact only 34% compared to the Soviet era (1989); similarly, the industrial output was only 32% and the agricultural output 50%. This forced the Moldovan government to modify the main destination of its exports (until then the CIS countries’ markets) and to strongly increase the relations with the EU markets with the aim of recovering, as soon as possible, lost wealth and the citizens’ consensus.7 In 2003, the EU countries became in fact the first economic partner of Moldova overcoming both the Russian Federation and Ukraine. However, this did not change the number of jobless people and the economic condition of the majority of the population who had become poorer than in the Soviet era. In 1999, nearly 80% of the Moldovan inhabitants lived below the poverty threshold, and, even if the trend

7 Please note that figures concerning the effects of 1998 Russian crisis change depending on the source. Besides the references indicated in the notes 3 and 8, see: Radziwiłł et al. (1999) and World Bank (2002).

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started to change thereafter and the number of families living in poverty strongly diminished, this situation reduced the government’s support. Henceforth, the new Millennium began with a relevant political change: the communist party obtained the majority of votes and elected 71 out of 101 members of Parliament. This considerable victory, due to the bad reception by public opinion of the new liberal policies introduced during the second half of the 1990s (in particular, the privatisation of public enterprises producing goods or services on the verge of bankruptcy after the Russian crisis), allowed the new government to launch the “Revival of the Economic Rebirth of the Country” attributing a key economic role to the State. Given the existing corruption, the effects of the new policies were negative: even if the number of poor Moldovan citizens declined (representing 25% of the total population by 2004), the migration flows increased. In 2003, statistical data indicated that 25% of Moldovans worked abroad and this obviously implied that the national economy largely depended on migrants’ remittances. Official data in fact showed that about 40% of the households in Moldova depended on remittances which approximately covered 27% of Moldova’s GDP—the highest rate among Eastern European countries previously belonging to the USSR economic system. Besides, as far as the incidence of remittances on income Moldova represented the second country in the world and thus one of the most exposed to exogenous financial and economic crises.8 The growth of migration flows also depended on the new government policies: in the elections of 2005 the communist party won again but it obtained a slight majority. It then decided to improve the relations with the EU countries favouring emigration towards Western Europe (including Norway and Switzerland). As far as its commercial relations 8 Please note that figures about Moldovan migrants’ remittances change, albeit slightly, depending on the sources used: in any case, in the first decade of the new millennium Moldova was the European country where migrants’ remittances were most important for the national GDP. About the relevance of Moldovan remittances and suggestions concerning their use in favour of Moldovan social and economic development. See, besides the references indicated in the note 3, Ghencea and Gudumac (2004), Cuc et al. (2005), Lucke et al. (2007), Rios Avila and Schlarb (2008), Hristev et al. (2009), Lücke et al. (2009), World Bank (2011), Stratan and Chistruga (2012), and Prohnitchi and Lupusor (2013). For a general analysis concerning the migrants’ money in all Eastern European countries also see Leon-Ledesma and Piracha (2004) Mansoor and Quillin (2006) and Gomez Lacalle (2008). In 2008, among the countries’ main recipients of remittances, only Tajikistan and Tonga had more relevant remittances in percentege on GDP than Moldova (Sing 2012, 351).

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were concerned, Moldova imported raw materials from the CIS countries and manufacturing products and new technologies from the EU, while it exported agricultural products (in particular, after the ban on the export of Moldovan wine to the Russian market), textiles, clothing and, officially, workforce to the EU. In October 2006, Moldova and Romania signed an agreement allowing Moldovan citizens a new travel regime based on a visa scheme favouring their entry into Romania. In April 2007, an EU “Common Visa Application Centre” (the first one created in EU history of visa policy) was opened in Moldova: this centre facilitated the issuance of new visas for Moldovan citizens with the obvious effect of increasing migration flows towards the EU countries. Romania’s admission to the EU (in January 2007) definitively transformed this country into the preferred destination for migrants leaving Moldova. Logistic, economic, and legal factors explain the preference for the Romanian job market. For Moldovan people it was in fact easy to regularly and frequently return home, young Moldovans could study in Romania and had the possibility to earn a degree (and the related professional skills) which was recognised by most Western countries (including Switzerland and Norway). This clearly explains why, in 2010, 90% of Moldovan students attending foreign high schools and universities lived in Romania. There was also a great increase in Moldovan people applying for Romanian citizenship: during 2007, about 800,000 Moldovans started the application for citizenship. They were sure to obtain it because of “Law No. 21/1991 on Romanian citizenship”: since Moldova had belonged to Romania until the Second World War, the law allowed Moldovans (and their descendants up to the third generation) who had lived in “Romanian Moldova” until 1940 to reclaim their Romanian citizenship, thus becoming EU citizens. Considering the whole population of Moldova (around 3.2 million people) the figure on citizenship applications clearly shows how important the European dream was for Moldovans, i.e. becoming EU citizens and enjoying the related benefits in terms of welfare and freedom of circulation. The “European dream” was also strengthened by the existing political problems with Transnistria (in particular, after the definitive failure of the project to create a federation between the two countries divided by the Dnistro River) and the declining economic role of the CIS. Besides, the increasing limits to personal freedom passed in the Russian Federation progressively reduced the interest in the Russian job

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market in favour of the EU countries and Ukraine, where civil rights were protected, and real wages were higher. The young generation represented a relevant share of Moldovan migrants: in the first decade of the new Millennium 40% of them were less than 30 years old (they were children when the USSR disappeared) and 70% were less than 40 years old (they were young adults under the USSR and they had breathed the “air of freedom” that blew in Eastern Europe during the early 1990s). The freedom existing in the EU countries attracted them more than the job opportunities offered by the Russian Federation, suffering from a curtailment of freedom of thought under President Putin. While old Moldovans who had experienced the Soviet regime could accept less freedom in exchange for labour, the young generation was afraid of losing the rights it normally enjoined in Moldova and which were guaranteed in all EU countries. Furthermore, young Moldovan citizens grew up in a context where the Russian language progressively lost its importance compared to English and Romanian. By the television (first) and internet (then), they in fact watched images of the rich Western Europe having more appeal than those arriving from the Russian Federation. Finally, migrants’ descriptions of their life in the EU were overall positive and had an impact on young people. This obviously did not mean that there were no problems concerning the integration of Moldovan migrants into the EU countries, but difficulties were considered far outweighed by the overall benefits of the new life abroad. In this regard, we should underline that very few migrants living abroad stated that they wanted to go back to Moldova in the future (after retirement) and more than 60% of the interviewed return migrants declared that they intended to leave Moldova in the next six months. These opinions and, more in general, migrants’ narratives about their experiences were obviously very important in a context where people having the intention to find a job abroad trusted relatives or the advice of friends in the first place: in the early 2010s, even if it existed 20 Moldovan private employment agencies playing providing brokerage and intermediary services (recruitment, selection, and professional training), most of potential migrants in fact had information on job opportunities and accommodation by their social networks (Kring, 2007; Moraru & Mosneaga, 2010; Mosneaga, 2012b). When Moldovan migrants in the EU countries detailed the benefits of living in a democracy, they influenced all their relatives and the young people, in particular, favouring the progressive growth of Moldovans’

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good disposition towards the EU job market as well as for pro-European parties in case of political elections (Barsbai et al., 2017). It is important to note that the sum of the two abovementioned events (that is, the increase in applications for Romanian citizenship as well as the growth of Moldovans working in Romania and officially continuing to live in Moldova) created a “statistical paradox” concerning data about Moldovan migration flows: in 2010, two former SSRs were, in fact, the official preferred destinations for Moldovan migrants. Ukraine attracted 47% of Moldovan migrants (also thanks to the new 2007 protocol signed between Moldova and Ukraine simplifying the admission of border area residents). The Russian Federation received the same percentage of migrants as Ukraine: this figure was probably “doped” by the number of Transnistria Russian native speakers who moved to Russia. However, a few Moldovan migrants still chose the Russian Federation because of its job opportunities also for unskilled people, no visa barriers to entry, low migration costs and still alive socio-cultural proximity, the same allowing to find a job in Ukraine, and to lesser extent, in Belarus Italy became the third preferred destination (it attracted more than 11% of Moldovan emigrants) followed by the Czech Republic and Germany (they attracted less than 5% each).9 Data do not consider the real dimension of the migratory flow to Romania, yet Romania influenced the positive feelings of Moldovan citizens towards the EU countries and also favoured pro-Europe parties. Consequently, in the 2007 local elections, the Communist Party only reached 35%. Faced with this strong reduction of popular consensus the Communist party not only tried to improve its attitude towards the EU institutions and, more in general towards the Western world (for example, in January 2007 the Republic of Moldova started a non-visa regime for the people arriving from the EU countries, USA, Canada, Switzerland, Norway, Iceland and Japan), but it also organised the public apparatus in order to succeed in better orienting future electoral flows. Members of opposition parties considered that the real government’s aim was to increase control on the outcome of elections and, when in April 2009 (thus, during the 2008 world financial crisis) results confirmed the victory of the Communist party with almost 9 Please note that other data indicates that the USA remained very interesting for Moldovan migrants, resulting the third preferred destination (instead of Italy) and having more than double of the migrants towards Germany (that attracted less Moldovans than France and Iberian countries).

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50% of the votes, protests and riots exploded everywhere in the country. It was in fact evident that State control had exceeded legal limits during the counting of votes, in particular, in the poorest areas. The recount of votes reduced the consensus for the Communist party to 44.5% and this new electoral result allowed all other parties to create a “pro-European alliance” hindering the creation of a new stable government and de facto forcing it to convene new elections in November 2009 (Birch, 2011; Independent Journalism Center, 2009; International Election Observation Mission, 2009; Organization for Security & Co-operation in Europe, 2009). The new election round allowed pro-European parties to obtain the majority in the new Parliament. New economic policies started to create favourable economic conditions for private investments coming from abroad (in particular, from the EU countries) and hence reduced both the migration flows of qualified young people and the national economic dependence on migrants’ remittances. Moldovan mass migration was evidently threatening Moldova’s future: thus, if the Moldovan public authorities wanted to actually develop the national economy, they necessarily had to decrease both the “brain drain” and the dependence of the national economy on migrants’ economic support. Before the 2008 financial crisis, migrants’ remittances represented more than one-third of Moldovan GDP. The following decrease to more than a quarter only depended on two main factors: the general reduction of job opportunities in the foreign labour markets provoked by the 2008 financial crisis and the increase of Moldovan migrants in Romania (whose remittances escaped official data). This meant that the reduction of the relevance of migrants’ remittances was only apparent and that the Moldovan economy remained greatly exposed to the negative effects of an international crisis (International Organization for Migration, 2009). Besides, the depreciation of the Moldovan currency led to a surge in remittance flows (Akkonliu, 2012, 286). Furthermore, the economic situation in Moldova worsened: the world financial and economic crisis progressively reduced both job opportunities abroad and foreign investments in Moldova, the public authorities had to face the evident decay of physical infrastructures such as roads, sanitation, and gas supply, as well as the lower availability of health care workers and in general of workers with high professional skills. Public services and education in fact suffered from the reduction of the number of engineers

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and teachers and a very difficult situation was experienced by local hospitals. Clearly, engineers (and in general people having high technological skills) as well as teachers could find a job in border countries and receive higher wages than in Moldova. At the same time, all healthcare workers did not want to remain in their native communities because there were few earning opportunities and the young generation had earned a proper degree to work in the EU countries. The new government began a slow process aimed at removing the reasons pushing the people to leave, such as the renovation of public institutions and public investment goals. New laws promoted capital increases and controls on banks, insurances, and other financial activities: they in fact had to support small- and medium-size enterprises producing high-quality goods (in particular, in new sectors such as automation and information and communication technologies) or operating in logistics (in particular, to improve the existing market relations between the EU countries, Ukraine and the Russian Federation). Moldovan small and medium enterprises employed 30% of the local workforce in 2004 and their development was essential to improve the national GDP. They obviously needed less financing than industries having great plants and equipment: in any case, these latter were very few because of the restructuration after the end of the Soviet era and the crisis of the end of the Nineteenth century (and, moreover, most of industries were in Transnistria, thus they were not controlled by Moldovan government). Besides, new investments were dedicated to the renovation of the educational system to further improve the quality and professional skills of the new Moldovan generations. Financial aid was specifically addressed to the countryside to improve both rural productivity (especially for cereals and wine) and the peasants’ quality of life. Since still almost 60% of the population lived in the countryside, these benefits represented a real investment in increasing real earnings, reducing migration flows and, obviously, in expanding electoral consensus. New policies also favoured the development of local tourism, in particular, by a new innovative “hôtellerie” based on thermal baths and/or visits of ancient castles. Furthermore, new rules were introduced to increase controls on the local legal system (including the external evaluation of judges) in order to eliminate existing corruption and thus create an appealing business environment for foreign investors. The aim was to attract investments not only thanks to low labour costs (if compared to those existing in the EU

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countries) but also thanks to a workforce with good professional skills and the presence of an efficient public administration. However, in the end, most investments and quality of life improvements only concerned the main Moldovan cities such as Chisinau and Balti: thus, most of the people living in small towns and rural areas did not experience a significant increase in real wages. Therefore, the Moldovan population continued to shrink even at a faster rate (almost 12% from 2004 to 2014): the new census (2014) indicated that Moldovans were less than 3,000,000 while in Transnistria they went down to 475,000. Compared to 1989 it meant a demographic loss of almost 20%. In the particular case of the Jewish people, the migration flow involved most of 65,800 living in Moldova in 1989 and reduced them at less than 1,600 in 2014. All 1,250 Jewish inhabitants living in Transnistria emigrated. This “mass emigration” led to a further real (and feared) decrease in young human capital who fled abroad leaving behind old people and children. Besides, family reunifications in the hosting countries contributed to a further reduce Moldovan inhabitants, causing a rapid ageing of the country’s population: between 1989 and 2014 people aged 60 and older grew from 15.3 to 17.4% while people aged 14 or younger decreased from 29.6 to 18.2%. At the same time, when mothers and/or fathers emigrated for long periods, a negative impact on family stability and cohesion was observed. Furthermore, in a context where many children were not brought up by their parents, but often raised by grandparents or relatives, the cases of children left without parental care increased favouring teenagers’ bad behaviours as well as people trafficking in human beings. Finally, the migration of high-qualified people also had a negative impact both on the average quality of public institutions and on the attention to civic issues, especially in poor outskirts and rural areas: the lack of professional skills, in fact, influenced the average quality of civil servants (increasing cases of cronyism, corruption and concussion) and the level of civic activism among poor and not educated people (favouring the “conspiracy of silence” in the face of bullying, extortion and violence) (Cheianu-Andrei et al., 2011; Cojocari & Cupcea, 2018; Schwartz, 2007). Many migrants also financed the Moldovan Social Investment Fund which aimed at building local productive activities and improving services in favour of poor communities (Bezhanian & Ionascu, 2002). Still, remittances provided financial support for community, church, sport clubs and other associations obviously improving the quality of life of

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Moldovans: however, this positive effect was considered inferior to the abovementioned negative outputs. In the early 2010s, the migratory flows were on the rise because of new European Commission rules favouring the circulation of Moldovans in the EU countries (together with the granting of new funding to build infrastructure and modernise enterprises) (European Commission, 2012, 2013; European Parliament, 2015, 118–126) and because of increased remittances from abroad. Families normally spent migrants’ money for: food and clothes (43.1%), public services (18.2), domestic goods (excluding electronic goods) (17.2), home renovation works (15.3), education (12.8), treatment (12.5), payment of debts (11.7), payment of debts for the trip abroad (10.4), agricultural works (10.5). Only 8.5% of remittances were saved and only 1.8% was placed in bank deposits: poor people had no confidence in the banking system (which was also considered too much expensive) while remittances were rarely used to start a new business. The persisting lack of funding for the Moldovan small and medium enterprises did not allow to create new job opportunities and, de facto, invited young people to emigrate, preferably towards neighbouring countries such as Romania. The social and economic importance of migrants’ remittances grew with time even though it was underestimated by official data: more than one-third of migrants’ money was in fact sent home in “unofficial” ways and it was impossible to register them (especially remittances coming for the nearby Romania which were brought back in person). Migrants gave money to trusted persons as train and bus conductors or put their savings in packages including food and clothes: besides, in more than one-sixth of cases, migrants brought the money with them when they went back home for holidays. The “official” migrants’ remittances were instead sent home using money transfer agencies (40%) and banks (22%) while few people used the post office (5%, but there also existed another 3% who used it for sending packages). Finally, comparing the period before the new Millennium and the following years there were no relevant changes concerning migrants’ age and gender: almost 65% of Moldovan migrants were less than 39 years old, while people from 20 to 29 years represented more than 23%. Moldovan migrants continued to leave for big cities: 75% in fact went to 10 towns in various countries (i.e. Moscow, Rome, Sankt-Petersburg, Istanbul, Odessa, Lisbon, Milan, Padua, Paris and Tyumen). Moscow represented the preferred destination during the 1990s and the early new

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Millennium and it thus remained the town hosting the greatest number of Moldovan migrants: however, all EU cities increased their appeal and Rome became the second preferred destination overcoming SanktPetersburg. The Russian Federation also officially remained the country where most Moldovan migrants lived (60%) and also the official preferred destination (70%): it was followed by Italy (20%) and Portugal (5%) and, considering the small but growing percentage of migrants living in Spain, Greece and France (besides Germany and Romania, always underestimated), it was evident that the EU countries were much more attractive than in the previous years. Besides, migration flows continued to involve both men and women, not only jobless ones but also people who previously worked in Moldovan enterprises or farms. Women preferred to emigrate towards Italy, Greece and Turkey and they usually worked in services, wholesale and retail trade, catering, housekeeping and agriculture (in particular, in Greece): they easily found jobs as maids and caregivers for old people (in particular, in Italy, sometimes they used to be nurses in Moldovan hospitals whose degree was not recognised in the EU). Men preferred to emigrate towards the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Spain and Portugal and they were mainly employed in construction (more than 50%, but this share went up to 60% in the Russian Federation) in industry as blue-collars, in transport and in agriculture: moreover, when they had high professional skills, they found a job as white-collars or freelance professionals. There also existed some differences between the Moldovan emigration towards the Russian Federation and the EU countries in so far as the average stay abroad is concerned. People working in the Russian job market remained there for about seven months on average: they were often temporary migrants. People working in the EU job market stayed in the hosting country for more than a year on average and many of them came back home only for holidays (in particular, for Christmas and Easter). Moldovan migrants who had no intention to return to their native town/village (i.e. they wanted to remain where they worked) were more numerous among those emigrating to the EU countries than those working and living in the Russian Federation: more than 75% of migrants in Russia returned to Moldova, while among migrants in Italy this ratio dropped to 10%. Finally, during the new millennium, the gender division progressively changed. Female migration grew up from a quarter to a third of the total number of migrants and then it strongly increased surpassing the

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male migratory flow to the EU by 2010 (when the ratio women/men in the working-age population became 1.2). There were few exceptions: in Spain, in January 2010, there were 17,137 Moldovan migrants and 51.20 per cent were male (Roig & Recaño Valverde, 2012, 267).

Conclusions Since the end of the USSR the desire to improve the quality of their lives has led a significant part of the Moldovan population (in particular, the young and more qualified people) to leave their native country. During the 1990s, Moldovan migrants moved all over the world but they preferred the former SSRs (especially, Ukraine and the Russian Federation), while in the new millennium, the destination towards the EU countries became increasingly important: in particular, finding work in Romania meant that migrants could still be close to their families back in Moldova and see them frequently. This also created problems related to the significance of data on migration flows, as many migrants in Romania became “cross-border workers” (even if they did commute daily) and they were classified as temporary migrants. Regarding the reasons and objectives of migrants, they were not different from those observed in the analysis of the migratory flows that involved, after the end of the USSR, the inhabitants of the Eastern European countries and, in particular, of the other former SSRs. Concerning the social and economic effects of the great migration flows departing from Moldova, it is important to underline that in the new Millennium, because of the lack of policies attracting foreign investments and improving local real wages for skilled people, the relevant improvement in the living conditions of Moldovans was granted by the continuous flow of emigrants’ remittances, which however implies a strong exposure to world economic trends with the risk of threatening Moldova’s future. Public authorities tried to modify this situation but, before the arrival of the Covid-pandemic, they did not obtain significant results and were not able to reduce migratory flows.

References Alam, A., Murthi, M., Yemtsov, R., Murrugarra, E., Dudwick, N., Hamilton, E., & Tiongson, E. (2005). Growth, Poverty, and Inequality: Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. World Bank.

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Mosneaga, V. (2007a). The Role of Labor Migration in Social and Economic Stabilization of Moldova. In D. Katsy (Ed.), International Relations: From Local Changes to Global Shifts (pp. 70–94). Sankt-Petersburg University Press. Mosneaga, V. (2007b). The Labor Migration of Moldovan Population: Trends and Effects (Socius Working Papers, 3). Mosneaga, V. (2009). Moldovan Population in the Context of Current Migration Processes. In D. Matveev, G. Selari, ¸ E. Bobkova, & B. Cseke (Eds.), MoldovaTransdniestria: Working Together for a Prosperous Future (pp. 156–172). Cu drag Publishing House. Mosneaga, V. (2012a). Republic of Moldova Immigration: Volume and Policy. Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration-East, Explanatory Note 12/111. Mosneaga, V. (2012b). Moldovan Labour Migrants in the European Union: Problems of Integration. Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration-East, Research Report 12/41. Mosneaga, V. (2013). Illegal Moldovan Migration to the European Union. Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration-East, Explanatory Note 13/85. Mosneaga, V. (2014). Irregular Transit Migration of Moldovan Citizens to the European Union Countries. In F. Duvell, I. Molodikova, & M. Collyer (Eds.), Transit Migration in Europe (pp. 185–207). Amsterdam University Press. Mosneaga, V. (2015). Migrant Support Measures from an Employment and Skills Perspective (MISMES). Republic of Moldova. European Training Foundation. Mosneaga, V. (2017). Mapping the Moldova Diaspora in Germany. United Kingdom, Israel, Italy, Portugal and Russia. International Organisation for Migrants. Ollus, N., Jokinen, A., & Joutsen, M. (Eds.). (2013). Exploitation of Migrant Workers in Finland, Sweden, Estonia and Lithuania: Uncovering the Links Between Recruitment, Irregular Employment Practices and Labour Trafficking. HEUNI. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. (2009). Republic of Moldova: Parliamentary Elections, OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Pantiru, M. C., Black, R., & Sabates-Wheeler, R. (2007). Migration and Poverty Reduction in Moldova (Working Paper). University of Sussex, Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty. Piotrowicz, R. (2017). The European Legal Regime on Trafficking in Human Beings. In R. Piotrowicz, C. Rijken, & B. H. Uhl (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Human Trafficking (pp. 41–51). Routledge. Piotrowicz, R., Rijken, C., & Uhl, B. H. (Eds.). (2017). Routledge Handbook of Human Trafficking. Routledge.

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Pop, A. (2007). Moldova-Romania: Managing Migration and Combating Trafficking in Human Beings at the EU Eastern Border. International Organisation for Migrants. Pribytkova, I. (2007). Regular and Irregular Migration in Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, 2004–2006. In I. Pribytkova & J. Gromovs (Eds.), Migration Trends 2004–2006 Söderköping Process Countries (pp. 3–34). European Commission, International Organisation for Migrants. Pribytkova, I., & Gromovs, J. (2007). Migration Trends 2004–2006 Söderköping Process Countries. European Commission, International Organisation for Migrants. Prohnitchi, V., & Lupusor, A. (2013). Options for Harnessing Remittances and Migrant Savings for Development of Republic of Moldova. United Nations Development Programme. Radziwiłł, A., Scerbatchi, O., & Zaman, C. (1999). Financial Crisis in MoldovaCauses and Consequences. Center for Social and Economic Research. Reiko, M. (2006). The EU’s Response to the Human Trafficking Situation in Moldova. Uppsala University, Department of Eurasian Studies. Richmond, N. C. (1993). Israel’s Law of Return: Analysis of Its Evolution and Present Application. Dickinson Journal of International Law, 12(1), 95–133. Rios Avila, F., & Schlarb, E. (2008). Bank Accounts and Savings: The Impact of Remittances of Migrations: A Case Study of Moldova. Kiel Advance Studies Working Paper 448. Roig, M., & Recaño Valverde, J. (2012). The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Migration to and Remittance Flows from Spain. In I. Sirkeci, Cohen, J. H. & D. Ratha (Eds.), Migration and Remittances during the Global Financial Crisis and Beyond (pp. 255–265). World Bank. Sakwa, R., & Webber, M. (1999). The Commonwealth of Independent States, 1991–1998: Stagnation and Survival. Europe-Asia Studies, 51(3), 379–415. Schwartz, R. (2007). Exploring the Link Between Moldovan Communities Abroad (MCA) and Moldova. International Organization for Migrants. Sheveliov, D. (2014). The Jewish Revival in Moldova (A Survey of Jewish Life in Moldova in the 1990–2000s). The Journal of Ethnology and Culturology, 15, 58–66. Sing, R. J. (2012). Determinants of Remittances in Sub-Saharian Africa, In I. Sirkeci, Cohen, J. H. & D. Ratha (Eds.), Migration and Remittances during the Global Financial Crisis and Beyond (pp. 349–357). World Bank. Stemmer, A. (2011). The Republic of Moldova and Migration: Migration and Its Risks and Opportunities for the European Union. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung International Reports. Stratan, A., & Chistruga, M. (2012). Economic Consequences of Remittances: Case of Moldova. Procedia Economics and Finance, 3, 1191–1195.

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Tabac, T., & Gagauz, O. (2020). Migration from Moldova: Trajectories and Implications for the Country of Origin. In M. Denisenko, S. Strozza, & M. Light (Eds.), Migration from the Newly Independent States: Societies and Political Orders in Transition (pp. 143–168). Springer. Ticu, O. (2016). Borders and Nation-Building in Post-Soviet Space: A Glance from the Republic of Moldova. In I. Liikanen, J. W. Scott, & T. Sotkasiira (Eds.), The EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood: Migration, Borders and Regional Stability (pp. 50–64). Routledge. Tishkov, V., Zayinchkovskaya, Z., & Vitkovskaya, G. (2005). Migration in the Countries of the Former Soviet Union. Global Commission in International Migration. UNICEF. (2006). The Situation of Children Without Parental Care as a Result of Migration: Study Report. UNICEF. Voinescu, S., Neac¸su, G., Moraru, A., Mosneaga, V., Vladicescu, N., Shapovalova, N., & Chumak, V. (2008). Migration Trends and Policies in the Black Sea Region: Cases of Moldova, Romania and Ukraine. Institute for Public Policy, Institute for Development and Social Initiatives “Viitorul”, International Centre for Policy Studies. Vremis, M., Craievschi-Toart˘a, V., Burdenlii, E., Herm, A., & Poulain, M. (2012). Extended Migration Profile of the Republic of Moldova. International Organisation for Migrants. World Bank. (2002). Transition—The First Ten Years: Analysis and Lessons for Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. World Bank. World Bank. (2011). Moldova After the Global Crisis: Promoting Competitiveness and Shared Growth. World Bank.

CHAPTER 11

Solidarity Driven by Utilitarianism: How Hungarian Migration Policy Transformed and Exploited Virtues of Solidarity Judith Tóth and Anikó Bernát

Introduction The strength of social solidarity can indicate how a society learns from its own history of failures and achievements. Hungary is not a good student of history in this regard. The mass influx of refugees and migrants occurred four times since 1989 (Hungarian refugees from Romania, Balkan war refugees, Syrian refugees, and refugees from Ukraine), but the state and public services were almost equally unprepared to receive and register those in need and to deal with those seeking international protection. Although the political context of the four waves differed

J. Tóth (B) University of Szeged, Szeged, Hungary e-mail: [email protected] A. Bernát TÁRKI Social Research Institute, Budapest, Hungary e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. Fauri and D. Mantovani (eds.), Past and Present Migration Challenges, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39431-7_11

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widely, certain common elements of refugee policy that can be considered durable (ethnicist, short-term, policing, non-investment in socioeconomic integration, lack of social dialogue, incoherent regulation) have been established over the past decades. One of these is the utilitarian solidarity developed as an invention in Hungarian foreign policy, which is part of migration policy measures. The utility of international migrants is manifold (demographic, labour supply, ethnic identity reinforcement, spectacular fulfilment of international legal obligations, attracting investment, increasing corruption revenues, expanding churches’ support for government, rules and rhetoric increasing pro-government voters) and often masks security and anti-migration practices. In this context, we are focusing on two revealing cases and our research would like to show how the management of the mass inflow of refugees into Hungary in 2015–2016 and in 2022 has transformed solidarity, in particular with regard to the system of border controls and fencing introduced between 2015 and 2021. In contrast, spontaneous solidarity by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and volunteers to help refugees appeared to counteract state-level reluctance, but this counter-movement faded as the officially announced—admission of a few utility-based thirdcountry-national (TCN) migrant groups (bond buyers, selected ethnic groups, persecuted Christians, academics and students from developing countries) became more blatant. However, this solidarity movement involving a few thousand people cannot compensate for the exclusion of hundreds of thousands of potential asylum seekers, refugees and people ready for integration. Exclusion from protection and support has been facilitated by the government’s anti-migrant hate campaign, the complete overhaul of border and asylum legislation since 2015, and the shifting of the burden of refugee care and procedures to neighbouring (partly non-EU) countries. The research is partly focusing on the 2015–2016 migrant crisis, and partly on the Ukrainian refugee crisis in 2022 as they share many similarities. The empirical research is based on the analysis of a series of legal regulatory scandals and a mixed method (quantitative and qualitative) social research aimed at understanding the different manifestations of solidarity in the context of the refugee crises since 2015 with a focus on the various refugee help organisations (charities, NGOs, grassroots) and the state. In this context, both refugee crises are embedded into a rather hostile social climate, as the attitudes of Hungarian society towards

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migrants (as emerges from a European comparison based on the European Social Survey—ESS) show that Hungary stands out by far both in terms of rejection and negative perception of migrants or refugees from poorer countries. In sum, Hungarians mostly reject migrants and perceive them negatively out of all ESS countries. Furthermore, looking at data before and after 2015, Hungary also made the largest negative shift for both indices in the overall European field between 2014/2015 and 2016/2017 (Messing & Ságvári, 2019). The social attitudes related to the Ukrainian refugee crisis in 2022 have been explored via a representative sample survey that also seeks the attitudes of the Hungarian society complemented with questions on whose responsibility would be helping the refugees (both in 2015 and 2022). The activity of civil organisations has been explored by applying ethnographic and qualitative methods, including participatory observation (as a volunteer in grassroots and official charities) and semi-structured interviews with volunteers and NGO leaders. The refugee crisis of 2015 is particularly illuminating, as the ambivalence of solidarity towards Ukrainian refugees has not disappeared with the institutionalisation of temporary protection in Europe. Most refugees are still spending a short time in Hungary, as most of the conditions for getting by in Hungary are lacking, especially for those who fled Ukraine but are not ethnic Hungarians. Thus Hungary has become a source of secondary migratory movements once again.

(Dis)continuity in Regulation In Europe, the Hungarian state has taken a highly extreme anti-refugee and anti-migration stance in relation to the 2015 refugee wave. Behind the government’s massive propaganda campaign, real legal and policy measures have been taken, including a complete physical and legal closure of the Southern border, a not inconsistent anti-refugee legislative dumping and a complete dismantling of refugee care and integration services, which signalled the emergence of a comprehensive (but in fact permissive towards numerous favoured migrant groups) anti-migration policy. One of the reasons for this is the rejection of refugees from the Middle East, Africa and other non-EU (third) countries on cultural and religious grounds, irrespective of the international legal standards, also accepted by Hungary, that refugee status should be granted on the grounds of the reasons for flight (e.g. escaping war or torture). With

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the outbreak of the war against Ukraine, the anti-refugee legal system reached the point where it was no longer even possible to apply for asylum in Hungary, but only outside the country’s borders, at the Hungarian embassy in the “nearest safe country”. The situation of refugees and foreigners was legally transformed in 2015–2016, with many benefits being cut, access to asylum made more difficult, and applicants detained in transit zones, all of which were met with criticism at home and abroad (Tóth, 2022a). A spectacularly tightened policy since 2011, which was less welcoming to refugees and from 2015 explicitly anti-refugee, was radically changed by the wave of refugees from Ukraine, notwithstanding the institutionalisation of European solidarity, which quickly introduced European temporary protection. In Hungary, the most welcome group of Ukrainian refugees is composed of Transcarpathian Hungarians, who are also partly Hungarian nationals (with dual citizenship), but in addition to them, the country has also started to adopt a refugee-friendly policy towards Ukrainians and nationals of other countries legally residing in Ukraine, and as part of this, a previously existing but never applied temporary protection instrument inside the asylum regime. However, the recognition of the legal basis for their asylum and the provision of basic services can be traced back to the activation of the EU Council Directive 2001/ 55/EC on temporary protection on 4th March 2022, which thus introduced common European minimum standards. Hungary provides more than the Directive on some issues and less on others, thus preserving the contradictions in the asylum field (Tóth, 2022b).1 Governmental and largely public perceptions of Ukrainian refugees are also radically different from those of the 2015 refugee wave, shifting from massive rejection to acceptance, tolerance and empathy. The reason for this positive turnaround is that the refugees of the 2022 wave are seen as citizens of a neighbouring state or in many cases the Transcarpathian Hungarians are (dual) citizens of Hungary, culturally similar and fleeing war, who are thus “entitled” to protection. The Constitution (2011) envisions a unifying Hungarian nation composed of those living either in diaspora, in adjacent states as a minority or in the motherland. On an ethnic basis, assuming intergenerational 1 Although Hungary does not grant temporary protection to foreign students studying in Ukraine, only transit, it provides more than the minimum for health care for beneficiaries of temporary protection.

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continuity, the law facilitates naturalisation, entry and residence in the country, and the exercise of the right to vote for those belonging to the nation (those whose ancestors of any degree were or are Hungarian citizens and can speak Hungarian).2 The predominance of solidarity as loyalty is reminiscent of the pre-Enlightenment period, thus reinforcing the dichotomy between an ethno-nationalist, tribal, imagined national belonging (in-group) (Majtényi, 2014) and the excluded others—visible immigrants and non-nationals (out-group).3 This is contrary to humanist tradition, universal human values and dignity. Utilitarian solidarity does not reinforce national unity but rather social polarisation (Marsovszky, 2012) and only makes somewhat visible those “others” who are not classified as Christian Hungarians, but are somehow considered by the government as useful, tolerated exceptions to its anti-migrant rhetoric. The main recipients of utilitarian solidarity are in particular: – third-country national workers, whose simplified entry, loan through placement agencies and their employment4 serves to fill labour shortages (70–75 thousand persons annually) (ITM, 2021); – Hungarians from across the border who have obtained permanent residence permits and Hungarian citizenship through preferential naturalisation, meaning that there are about 1.2 million of new Hungarians (although perhaps 10% of them live in Hungary and have a residence here) (KSH, 2016), and that such a huge number of new voters in the general elections together with a significant proportion of government party sympathisers have been fabricated by ethnic solidarity; – some 20,000 third-country nationals and their family members who acquired settlement bonds5 invested into the country; 2 See the Preambulum, Article D) and G), Article XXIII (3)–(4) in the Constitution/ Fundamental Law (published on 11th April 2011). 3 With the Seventh Amendment to the Fundamental Law, in 2018, the augmented Article XIV came into force, which prohibits the resettlement (relocation) of foreign populations, and makes asylum almost inaccessible to foreigners if they do not come directly from the country of persecution. 4 Government Decree no. 445, 28th November 2013, Government Decree no. 407, 8th July 2021 allows for 13 non-EEA nationals to be employed without visa and labour authorisation in defined economic sectors/professions facing labour force shortages. 5 Act II of 2007 on the entry and residence of third-country nationals, as amended by Act CCXX of 2012, Act CVIII of 2014 and Act XL of 2018: this program allowed

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– undergraduates and doctoral students recruited from developing countries are an excellent demonstration of international aid besides short-term migration, as the state provides them with scholarships and visas to study in Hungary (at least 50,000 young people took advantage of this program between 2015 and 2022 and then returned home) (Oktatási Hivatal, 2021); – the country has been completely silent in admitting Venezuelan and Coptic refugees, reinforcing national-Christian identity, who have not been included in the refugee statistics.6 From 2022, the vast majority of Ukrainian refugees (especially those who do not belong to the Transvcarpathian Hungarian minority) seeking temporary protection are in transit for only a short period of time, with a small share of them staying in Hungary (around 50–80,000) due to lack of adequate assistance, although the government regularly reports numbers in the admitted millions, showing a shouldering of the international refugee burden.7 Governmental efforts to demonstrate solidarity are communicated in state media to reflect the prevention-avoidance objective of migration. For example, in Lebanon, the Hungarian state is supporting the renovation of churches in a country where about a fifth of the population is now made up of Syrian refugees and their care is a heavy burden for the host Lebanese community. The Hungarian government has so far funded the renovation of 33 Christian churches in the Middle East country to the value of $1.8 million, and in the third phase of the reconstruction the purchase of a certain amount of EUR bonds to obtain a permanent residence permit and thus free movement in the EU for third-country national buyers and their family members, which was repaid by the state after 5 years, with interest; it was suspended by parliament due to severe critics (https://helpers.hu/services/immigration/investment-pro gram/). 6 Parliamentary Resolution no. 36, 19th December 2016, Governmental Resolution no. 1513, 22nd September 2016, no. 1532, 25th October 2018 on the support of persecuted Christians; online media article (Panyi, 2015). 7 According to the information provided by the government, from the beginning of the Russian invasion until the end of 2022, more than 1.2 million Ukrainian citizens fled to Hungary, of which 33,228 were granted temporary protection status (while the refugees with Hungarian citizenship are not entitled to temporary protection), as the vast majority of refugees are mainly destined for Germany, the Czech Republic and Poland. Still, Hungary has received e300 million in financial support from the European Union to assist the refugee situation. Source: Migration Research Institute, 5th January 2023.

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program, another 30 churches will be renovated with $2 million. Moreover, in the interest of migration prevention, the government has also supported a number of projects in Syria to the amount of approximately $27 million (reconstruction of hundreds of buildings, including schools, running hospitals, agricultural development and financing the studies of thousands of university students). The Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade summarised it briefly: “We are brave enough to say that migration is a bad and dangerous phenomenon […] that migration should not be encouraged but stopped […]. Migration is a loss for the countries of origin and a destabilising factor and a danger for the countries of transit and destination” (index.hu, 2023). The risk must therefore be reduced by all means. In parallel, the figures in Table 11.1 indicate that the number of asylum seekers has fallen dramatically after 2015 and is now running out because they cannot enter the country (but can submit their asylum application in the “nearest safe country’s” embassy). If we compare the proportion of people granted international protection to all applicants over two decades, the recognition rate is 1.35%, so the reason for tightening the rules for refugees in Hungary cannot be to Table 11.1 Applicants and persons granted international protection in Hungary. Years 2013–2022 (absolute values) Year

Applicants

Recognised international protectiona

Refused applicants for temporary protection

Terminated procedure (without decision on substance)

Pending cases

2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022b

18,900 42,777 177,135 29,432 3,397 671 500 117 40 4

360 503 512 432 1,291 367 60 130 41 4

4,185 4,553 2,917 4,675 2,880 595 650 346 19 n.d.

11,339 23,406 152,260 49,479 2,049 160 50 47 28 n.d.

1,886 15,685 36,694 3,413 678 124 234 n.d. n.d. n.d.

n.d. = no data a Refugees, subsidiary protection, tolerated migrant b Data updated at 1st May 2022 Source National Directorate General for Alien Policing- Statistics (2013–2022)

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reduce over-generosity. The liquidation of the asylum system is also indicated by the abolition in 2019 of the independent Asylum Office, which had been operating since 1989, and its tasks were merged into the competencies of the National Directorate General of Alien Policing, composed of professional police officers, from 2020 (KSH, 2022). Nation-state isolation, national sovereignty and security measures are stronger than European solidarity in the field of asylum. Thus, in the common asylum area of the European Union, Hungary’s primary aim is to implement national utilitarianism: only those deemed useful in political marketing are admitted, the others are spread out to the surrounding countries by fencing, push-back of potential protection seekers and minimalist compliance with human rights conventions (Tóth, 2019). EU standards, support for developing countries, participation in humanitarian operations are applied with strong formalism. Due to the legal and physical obstacles to the crossing of borders by refugees and forced migrants, the number of smuggling and facilitation of illegal stay offences has increased to an average of 550 cases per year between 2012 and 2022. At the same time, non-EU nationals (third-country nationals) apprehended and escorted at the border fence gates (to Serbia and Croatia) could be potential asylum seekers, as 85% of them were Syrians, Afghans, Somali and Iraqis in 2021 (National Headquarters of the Hungarian Police, 2022). Information from ECRE or UNHCR can also provide evidence of this exclusion effect (Strik, 2020). The state level of anti-immigration policy and stance is embedded into the notion of “mass immigration crisis”, which was introduced by the 2015 amendment of Act LXXX of 2007 on asylum and which gave the right for further authority actions on a constitutionally contestable legal basis (Mészáros, 2019). After its proclamation in September 2015, the crisis situation was extended to the whole country and has been maintained until 7th March 2023,8 even though the conditions laid down in the law (number of asylum seekers per day/month or existence of a serious threat) were not met. The extended police authorisation includes the right to close roads and public areas, restrict the operation of public institutions, enter private houses for control, surveillance and security of premises, on the basis of a specific written order; on the other hand, the

8 Government Decree no. 41, and its length has been renewed ten times (until the manuscript is completed).

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military is entitled to use weapons to guard the state border and to avert conflict situations that directly threaten the order of the state border.9 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has also condemned the Hungarian government’s decision to extend the decree authorising the police to automatically and immediately remove from the country those who are apprehended for irregular border crossing and staying in the country. As a result of this decision, Hungary can deny entry to the territory and access to the asylum procedure to all those people who may be in need of international protection, but in practice it does not apply to refugees from Ukraine. The Hungarian authorities forcibly removed more than 71,000 people from the country between March 2016 and March 2021 (UNHCR, 2021). Table 11.2 shows how rich this deterrence toolkit has become over the last ten years. This includes the Dublin procedure, based on the Dublin Regulation,10 which designates which Member State is responsible for examining an asylum application, in order to reduce irregular secondary movements, multiple applications and the additional asylum burden on some destination countries through collaboration between authorities. Over nine years, Hungary has transferred around 650 applicants to another Member State for asylum examination, while the potential transfer back to Hungary is minimal because several international fora have found that asylum seekers are subjected to a legal regime that violates human dignity, the prohibition of torture and the right to an effective remedy by starvation, unlawful detention and obstruction of access to a fair trial. By making entry and procedures more difficult, Hungary indirectly contributes to the gains of those engaged in human trafficking,11 while helping thousands of refugees to stay in their country of destination, as they are not sent back to Hungary. It is also an indication that the Hungarian borders are porous, with many migrants entering or leaving

9 Act CXLII of 2015 provided also these entitlements. 10 Regulation (EU) no. 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of

26th June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person. 11 Human trafficking in Hungary brings in HUF 5-8 billion a year for the big players. They are rarely caught, the border crossers found in their cars are escorted back to the other side of the fence, and the drivers face 2–5 years in prison.

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the country without a trace, and fewer and fewer people being transferred back. The lack of reception conditions in Hungary also encourages those in need of protection to continue their journey, making Hungary a source country for secondary migration. All this is linked to the fact that Hungarian legislators and authorities often respect only the letter of human rights-procedural law requirements, not their values, as evidenced by the infringement-violation procedures (Nagy, 2019). In 2022, around 330,000 irregular border crossings were detected at the EU’s external border, according to preliminary calculations of Frontex. This is the highest number since 2016. The Western Balkan route accounted for nearly half of the total. Syrians, Afghans and Tunisians together accounted for 47% of the detected migrants in 2022. The number of Syrians roughly doubled to 94,000. Together with record numbers of refugees arriving in the European Union, these events demonstrate the need for a strong and effective European Border and Coast Guard, with Frontex as a strong supporter of Member States to “securitisation” (Frontex, 2022). Due to the many inconsistencies in the legislation and its implementation, it is not at all clear how Ukrainian refugees staying in Hungary, whether temporarily or for a longer period, will get through their stay and possibly build a new life in Hungary. Without legal support and the complete absence of any refugee care and integration policy support, how can refugees meet their basic needs and those of their families in terms of housing, food, work, education, health care, transport and the administration of their legal residence and in most cases without financial support, language skills and local knowledge? There are many actors involved: the state, local authorities, the civil sector across a very broad spectrum (large aid organisations, small and medium-sized NGOs, new grassroots NGOs and many unregistered organisations) and individual helpers. Refugee assistance activities in the months after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine were investigated through interviews and participant observation at the major Budapest train stations, and then at the central refugee reception centre (the BOK Sports Hall in Budapest), the Migration Aid refugee shelter (a grassroots turned to registered NGO and offered one of the few “official” refugee shelters in Budapest exclusively from private donations), and other refugee care sites, as well as through social and online media monitoring of these organisations and groups during the first months of the refugee crisis (February–June 2022).

Illegal border crossing stopped

Migrants apprehended and escorted through a fence gate (push-back)

1,962 2,603 3,274 1,057 824 976 1,172 1,532 n.d.

13,990 11,557 12,526 14,055 15,050 14,289 37,938 35,569 9,432 (January–May)

1,234 676 357 390 310 n.d.

4,643

15,950

6,837

2,814

217 53 28 31 n.d. n.d.

204

0

89

32

Applicants transferred under Dublin procedure (from HU)

129 65 1 1 n.d n.d

0

0

827

850

Applicants transferred under Dublin procedure (to HU)

n.d. = no data Source Data-compilation from statistics of EUROSTAT, HQ of the Hungarian Police, Central Statistical Office and National Directorate General for Alien Policing

1,352

Expulsion Detention, stay in designated place

11,101

Migrants Refused entry intercepted/ apprehended and processed

2013 11,144 Illegal crossing of the external Schengen borders 2014 6,282 Illegal crossing of the external Schengen borders 2015 61,457 Illegal crossing of the external Schengen borders 2016 12,526 8,420 (July–December) 539 (July– December) 2017 10,950 9,076 1,416 2018 1,691 4,286 485 2019 3,070 13,170 943 2020 14,250 29,643 2,078 2021 47,323 72,787 1,973 2022 109,351 162,108 1,125

Year

Table 11.2 Irregular migrants in Hungary. Years 2013–2022 (absolute values)

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Although the state and local authorities cover certain services (e.g. certain types of transport, temporary accommodation, low levels of assistance for a limited number of people, health care, education), the availability, extent or quality of these services is generally insufficient. For example, temporary housing and three meals a day in public (mass) accommodation are provided and coordinated by the Ministry of Interior National Directorate General for Disaster Management or in other sub-optimal longer-term environments (e.g. in places far from job opportunities, schools, health facilities, with modest transport facilities, or in dormitories without private bathrooms or kitchens and similar temporary accommodations), which cannot be helped by the monthly allowance of 22,800 Hungarian forints (about 50 euros). Similarly, it is questionable how refugees can actually access the education or health care that is supposed to be available, which is severely limited by language and often spatial barriers. Consequently, there are plenty of areas where care or assistance is not available at a sufficient level or at all. By way of comparison, during the openly opposed refugee crisis in 2015, the state provided hardly any assistance (other than transport facilities and even then inadequate refugee camps), but during the refugee crisis in Ukraine, its involvement has increased. Only a few Municipalities—mainly the city of Szeged, led by the opposition—can be singled out for its effective and committed helpfulness during the 2015 refugee wave. In the case of refugees from Ukraine, municipalities all over the country were involved in a much broader range of activities, e.g. providing or organising temporary accommodation, meals and food aid. The state outsourced some of the unfulfilled tasks to large aid organisations in return for financial support, and to a lesser extent to other NGOs or businesses. The large aid organisations (typically members of the state-coordinated Charity Council)—similarly to the state and presumably not independently of it—have been much more active and effective in the Ukrainian refugee crisis than in 2015, when they also provided state support, but only to a rather symbolic extent (Bernát, 2016). In the Ukrainian refugee crisis, large aid agencies are covering tasks ranging from housing, assistance, education and individual mentoring at a single border crossing and across the country on a short-term in a coordinated manner. However, the activities and effectiveness of aid agencies are often difficult to see and even more difficult to quantify or to understand due to the multi-factorial and complex nature of aid and its context. While State aid is supported by public funding and the infrastructure, organisational

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structure and expertise already in place to carry out its tasks, aid agencies have had difficulties in responding rapidly in terms of physical and human infrastructure, which has made it difficult for them to provide adequate care in all areas initially, and which will continue to affect their operations in the longer term. The diverse NGO sectors—i.e. NGOs of different sizes and backgrounds with a longer (several decades long) history and practices, and newer, often unregistered grassroots organisations or informal groups, or completely independent individual volunteer helpers—have been intensively involved in the care of refugees from the first days after the outbreak of the Ukrainian war. In addition, international organisations (such as UNHCR, UNICEF or IOM) have been supporting both state and municipal refugee care and the activities of aid agencies and small NGOs in both material and technical matters, both at the border and in other areas of the country where refugees settled. The portfolio of activities and the way in which NGOs provided assistance is indescribably diverse and typically overlapping: in the first weeks of the refugee crisis, civilians (independent NGOs, grassroots and individuals, including foreigners) providing assistance at the border and in the surrounding settlements, and mainly at the Budapest railway stations and airport, tried to provide immediate temporary assistance in the areas of food provision, accommodation, transport and continuing travel. On the other hand, they were also trying to solve more complex problems ranging from health care issues to cases outside the standard legal and residence rules, long-term accommodation and financial issues. For example, immediate accommodation started with spontaneous individuals who simply accompanied people arriving by train home, soon coordinated by volunteers from a small NGO, supplemented by free rooms offered by hotels and a refugee hostel run and supported by NGO and private donors. While those who could not find such accommodations (typically Roma refugees) were taken by the Director General for Disaster Management to public shelters available anywhere in the country. All this was made possible by an unprecedented level of in-kind and financial donations and voluntary works, initially mainly from private individuals, but later on increasingly from companies. It should be noted that the empathy and support for refugees in Ukraine do not usually extend to Roma, who often experience prejudice and discriminatory treatment (in terms of food distribution, accommodation, refugee services and the management of their affairs), regardless

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of whether they are Hungarian (and have Hungarian citizenship) or not. They are the ones who, as newly arrived refugees, are the least likely to get better accommodation and care, and they are usually the ones who are left at the end of the line: after a humiliating (segregated) procedure, they are put on buses by Director General for Disaster Management to the refugee care centre, they are given a place in a rural mass shelters and three meals a day, but the path to a more normal, non-transitional life is often not an issue. Due to the spontaneous and then increasingly organised but still inadequate functioning of the Budapest railway station, the state set up a refugee care centre in the BOK Sports Hall in Budapest, which is still in operation after more than 1 year, although refugee flows have fallen to a fraction of their previous levels and hardly any refugee arrives to this centre anymore. In this reception centre there is a diverse portfolio of services available: – primary registration by the state (but no other immigration or asylum services are provided); – registration and transport to rural temporary accommodation provided by the Ministry of Interior National Directorate for Disaster Management (for those who have no other option); – purchasing of officially free-of-charge (but practically not free) train tickets for those who travel onward within the country and in Europe. Meanwhile, while the large aid organisations, supported by the state central budget, were distributing simple cold meals, the NGOs, not supported by the state at all, were accommodating refugees in their own refugee shelters for nearly 300 people, or coordinating individual offers of accommodation from ordinary people, also not supported, or hotels offering their unused rooms with little compensation from the central budget. Other NGOs (e.g. an organisation that provides pets with chips essential for onward travel or volunteers who play with children while waiting in the reception centre), market companies (mobile phone companies, employment agencies, money changers) and a few other services operate there with a mix of government-paid and volunteer interpreters or other staff members and volunteers.

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Volunteers also played a key role during the 2015 refugee wave, when there were hardly any official NGOs to provide meaningful assistance to the typically transient population, who stayed in the country for a few days at most and were much smaller in number and complexity than in the Ukraine refugee crisis. Meanwhile, the state and the large aid agencies essentially shied away from their task over most of the refugee crisis and only got involved minimally for a short period of time by the end of the crisis. Then, grassroots groups, which organised themselves and their activity through Facebook – such as Migration Aid, Help the Refugees or Migszol Szeged—without any central support, and even in strong opposition to it, carried out the obviously state-aid task only through voluntary work and donations. The number and diversity of volunteers were already unprecedented in 2015, but during the refugee crisis of 2022, the number and role of volunteers, their tasks and their heterogeneity multiplied in every sense. It can no longer be said that volunteers can be described by well-defined socio-political groups (such as typically oppositional or apolitical, educated, higher status, mostly female), as those helping in the Ukraine refugee crisis can be described as completely heterogeneous along gender, age, education, occupation, activity, residence, political, religious and cultural characteristics. The weeks after the outbreak of the war were characterised by an almost overflowing, rarely seen, abundance of charity, donations and volunteers, but this diminished significantly over time as the previously unimaginable number of refugees caused continuing supply difficulties for all actors, including the state, large and small NGOs, grassroots and individual helpers. At that time, individual public and civil society organisations were still struggling to find the optimal ways and volumes of assistance. Their working arrangements and the tasks they had to perform were constantly evolving, just as the initially isolated activities of very different actors, and sometimes their conflicts and rivalries with each other, showed signs of cooperation in certain areas over time. As time went on, donations and volunteering declined in line with the number of new arrivals, but for those who stayed longer, the state and (some) aid agencies continued to offer no meaningful and sustained assistance, leaving it to the (large-scale) provision of NGOs without any public support and to an opposition and extra-parliamentary party of its own. How disproportionately large the task and responsibility of the civil sector was compared to the inadequate state and its aid organisations’ intervention in the refugee crisis is hard to tell and impossible to measure.

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What is more informative, however, is that by April 2022, just over a month after the outbreak of the war, 30% of the adult Hungarian population claimed to have helped refugees in some way in a single month. This average, however, varies enormously from those who volunteered 50+ hours a week, to those who regularly donated large sums of money or in-kind donations, to those who gave a one-off donation of small value. Food donations (18%), other material donations (17%) and cash donations (15%) were the most common, while only a fraction (1–3%) helped refugees with accommodation, transport, interpretation, volunteer or paid work in the first two months after the war. A larger proportion of assistance was directed towards refugees whom the helper did not know from a previous experience, which is an important issue because the Transcarpathian Hungarian refugees could rely on their existing network based on their family and previous work contacts. Data show that help from the population was received to a greater extent by those who did not have this kind of embeddedness (Table 11.3). However, it is another question as to who society thinks should be responsible for helping refugees, whether they are newly arrived or already recognised and settled refugees and migrants. In the context of the refugee crisis in Ukraine, the majority clearly expects the state or local authorities to help, whatever the area of care. For newly arrived, the most common areas are health (87%), transport (79%) and medium and long-term accommodation (73%), but not far behind are basic needs (food, clothing-63%), short-term accommodation and general information (60%). In contrast, surprisingly, large church and aid organisations— with significant public funding and other secure resources, and more developed infrastructure—are less likely to be expected to assist refugees (3–13%, depending on the area) than NGOs, which are necessarily less economically well-off, more unstable and typically much less capable (7– 22%). Moreover, the responsibility of individual volunteers would not be expected by Hungarians to be much lower (2–9%) than in the case of large aid organisations, where economic and organisational superiority is clear (Table 11.4). A very similar pattern is also evident in the opinions of the Hungarian population on the issue of long-term care. The majority of respondents affirm that the state or local authorities should be primarily responsible for the long-term care of recognised refugees or settled immigrants, most notably in the areas of education (86%), teaching Hungarian (79%) and providing training to help people find work (74%), and two-thirds of the

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Table 11.3 Have you helped refugees in Ukraine in any of the following ways? Year 2022 (row percentages) How to help

With a cash donation (including if you bought a train ticket for onward travel, for example) Food (and hygiene products) donation Other material donations (clothes, blankets, pram) With accommodation By transport (passenger or freight) Voluntary (unpaid) work Paid work With interpretation Other ways

Did not help

Did help Relative, friend, acquaintance

Stranger

Both helped by

84.6

3.7

11.1

0.6

81.6

4.5

12.9

1.0

83.1

5.3

11.2

0.4

97.5 98.3

1.9 0.7

0.6 0.9

0.0 0.1

97.4

1.2

1.2

0.2

99.3 97.6 98.9

0.4 0.8 0.2

0.2 1.5 0.8

0.1 0.1 0.1

Note The question originally read: “Have you personally helped any of the following people fleeing Ukraine during the current crisis or war in any of the following ways?” Source TÁRKI survey on a national representative sample. N = 1.000. April 2022. own calculation

respondents (66%) also think that housing and general assistance should be provided. In comparison, only a fraction of the population (4–8%) expect these services to be provided by the churches and large aid organisations, which could have a role in providing refugee care alongside the state (or instead of the state in return for a state subsidy). While many aid organisations do this during and independently of refugee flows, the public opinion does not confirm that it should be their job., Many people think that NGOs should be responsible for providing costly and longterm support for the integration of refugees and migrants, though with a much weaker financial base, which is uncomparable with the resources and capacities of the large NGOs and charity organisations (Table 11.5). The change in public attitudes towards refugees and migrants, which have become more permissive, is reflected in the much more harsh

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Table 11.4 Who would be responsible for the care of refugees arriving in Hungary in the following areas? Years 2015 and 2022 (row percentages per year) Method of supply

Provision of general information (e.g. signposting) Basic needs (food, clothing) Provision of transport facilities Provision of health services Short-term (a few days) accommodation Medium and long-term accommodation

State, local government

NGOs

Church and large charity organisations

Individual volunteers

No one

2015

2022

2015 2022 2015

2022

2015

2022

2015 2022

66

60

13

22

7

7

6

9

8

1

56

63

13

18

16

13

3

5

11

1

67

79

6

10

6

6

3

3

18

2

68

87

7

7

8

3

3

2

13

1

–

60

–

21

–

13

–

5

–

1

–

73

–

13

–

9

–

2

–

3

Note The question reads exactly as follows: “The care of refugees arriving in Hungary is provided in different areas. Please tell us which of the following actors, in your opinion, is most responsible for providing the following assistance to people arriving in Hungary?” Questions on the provision of accommodation were only asked in 2022 Source TÁRKI survey on a national representative sample, N = 1000, October 2015 (Bernát et al., 2015) and April 2022, own calculation

and hostile climate in 2015, when between roughly one-sixth and onetenth (8–17%) of respondents felt that no one should help newly arrived refugees (Table 11.4), and between one quarter and one third (24–32%) of those who had already settled felt that no one should help them (Table 11.4)—this means that they should sort out their situation themselves. This attitude has essentially disappeared in the case of refugees from Ukraine (1–3%): Hungarian society no longer thinks that a person fleeing a war conflict (from a poorer country) should have to cope with

11

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Table 11.5 Who should be responsible for the care of refugees and immigrants recognised in Hungary in the following areas? Years 2015 and 2022 (row percentages per year) Method of supply

Ensuring participation in education Teaching the Hungarian language Providing training to help you get into work Assistance in finding a suitable apartment General job search assistance

State, local government

Civil organisations

Church and aid organisations

Individual volunteers

For anyone

2015

2022

2015

2022

2015

2022

2015

2022

2015 2022

53

86

12

6

7

4

3

2

24

2

47

79

12

8

7

6

5

4

24

3

44

74

9

15

7

4

4

3

27

3

35

66

12

18

10

8

5

4

32

3

38

66

12

20

7

6

5

5

31

3

Note The question reads exactly as follows: “The care of refugees and immigrants recognised in Hungary is also provided in different areas. Please tell me which of the following, in your opinion, is most responsible for providing the following assistance to people arriving in Hungary?” Source TÁRKI survey on a national representative sample, N = 1000, October 2015 (Bernát et al., 2015) and April 2022, own calculation

all challenges of setting up a new life in a new country without sufficient resources, either in the short or long term. The same difference in attitudes emerged for many volunteers based on interviews and participant observation: there are volunteers who did not feel their own cause of the 2015 refugee crisis with refugees arriving from the Middle East, whereas they see helping the current plight of refugees in Ukraine as their own cause.

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Direct Contact with and Impact on Specific Groups in the Host Society Zooming on some specific social groups of the host society can provide a more in-depth understanding of how the majority population’s attitude towards refugees is formulated in a hostile, anti-immigration political and social climate. These case studies reflect on the 2015 refugee crisis. Public attitudes have been influenced by the sight of the exhausted refugees, especially families with children, but also by the hostile and securityoriented government communication. This has increased ambivalence in local communities, border settlements and police officers working at the border. A questionnaire survey of police officers serving in the Southern border area in 2015 revealed as follows (Éberhardt, 2021): the performance of duties in 2015 caused mental effects that are still actively present in the lives of police officers despite the passage of time, the culture of action, objectivity, humanity and sense of fear of police officers who acted against foreigners is related to the prior and limited knowledge of the psychosocial and cultural characteristics of travellers who crossed the state border unlawfully. The police officers, who were constantly dealing with irregular migration in their area of responsibility, performed differently from new police officers from other departments and other branches of service. The arrival of refugees was sudden, the police were not prepared for it and lacked infrastructure, health and social equipment and support (e.g. laundry of police equipment, clothes, catering, accommodation, adequate protection against infections, screening, psychological training, interpretation), therefore complex and continuous preparation should be organised by introducing and applying a proactive border management methodology/protocol. Including the detention of foreigners who did not enter the state border on a regular basis, the police performed their tasks in a reactive manner, and it was critical to ensure supply and logistical conditions adapted to the production period, the applicable law enforcement protocol and the changing number of foreigners and police officers, which had to be corrected. The police communication developed good practices that were able to increase efficiency when regulation became effective. There are also some lessons learned from the interviews (2020–2021) with the population of Szeged and the surrounding villages in the border area. Accordingly, the out-migration of inhabitants increased in the peripheral areas because of a decreased sense of security, while feeling that refugees needed help. This was a kind of emotional roller coaster,

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similar to the police officers serving there, i.e. it revealed some sources of conflict that had the greatest impact on the psychosocial state of local residents and their daily living conditions. At first, the lack of regulation caused direct and indirect damage to farmers and residents in the border area, but also to businesses and service providers (e.g. refugees’ crossing the arable lands and gardens). The lack of care was mostly criticised by NGOs, often targeting the police officers in charge, but this did not exclude the cooperation to ensure that everyone on the ground complied with police orders. The sense of fear was reduced, compliance and cooperation improved as more knowledge was gained about the circumstances of the refugees. Border area residents and police alike felt abandoned as central authorities neglected their demands for stronger security in the midst of a growing illegal migration burden since 2014. The coordination between local and regional state and law enforcement agencies was missing (for example, the Local and County Emergency Committees’ competencies were too limited), so the management of migration was slow and inadequate, and could only be counterbalanced by local innovation or overwork. Therefore, the police, as well as the local population, took measures to increase security (e.g. installation of cameras, strong locks or alarming instruments). The result was that the securitisation process endorsed by the government is now widely accepted not only by local and medium-level authorities (who are powerless in the management due to over-centralisation) but also by citizens. The Szeged Studies were researching the perception of refugees in the area of the city of Szeged (Mátó, 2019), which is the main entry point of Middle-East and African refugees arriving in Hungary on the main Balkan migration routes from Serbia and thus a very much likely area to encounter locals. While in 2015 and 2017 half of the respondents in Szeged were at least somewhat disturbed by the arrival of refugees in Hungary, in 2016 half of the respondents were explicitly disturbed by the arrival of refugees. About half of the respondents were of the opinion that only those who were persecuted in their home country should be admitted. It is worth noting that while in 2015 only 8% of respondents said that no refugees should be admitted, in 2017 the share of those who would reject any refugees increased to 29%. A reverse proportionality can be seen in the case of the answer to full acceptance of any refugees, from 14% in 2015 to 2% in 2017. Overall, at both extremes, there is an increase in total isolation and a decline to accept asylum seekers.

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Related to this, during the initial phase of irregular migration (1990– 2012) the Hungarian population was characterised by compassion and helpful behaviour. The interviews conducted in the Szeged Studies also proved that before September 2015, before the peak of the crisis, until the emergence of national and international media, the local governments and NGOs of border settlements practically abandoned their settlements in the face of the increasing migratory pressure and the subsequent difficulties, despite their previous presence in several forums. During this period, respondents felt that the care of migrants was self-sustaining through the cooperation of the population and local authorities. However, little had been done in terms of organised transfers. In fact, the activities of smugglers with irregular migrants were already visible to the local population during the Kosovo migration wave (Rácz, 2018).

Conclusions The grassroots solidarity of the population in support of refugees, expressed through NGOs or spontaneously in public spaces, became visible and tangible relatively quickly in Hungary in the wake of the five major refugee waves between 1989 and 2023. However, the supportive, voluntary and institutionalised solidarity that has developed from individual and NGO actions quickly died out, because most of the population saw the organisation of institutional assistance as a state task, which people are willing to replace only temporarily because of their faster reaction time and their emotional resilience. This upward and then downward curve of activity flattens even more quickly if government policy and rhetoric are hostile to refugees, but such governmental attitudes do not in themselves hinder social solidarity in the form of concrete assistance. Although the government, through the control of the state media and a publicly funded hate campaign, aims to minimise humanitarian criticism and concerns about those in need of international protection from 2014, in the areas affected by the presence of refugees, the solidarity of local populations (e.g. by the residents of the city of Szeged in 2015–2017), supported by data, has surfaced, not independently of the individual experiences of vulnerability and fragility of refugees. But by the end of 2015 or early 2023, the civil solidarity force was largely dead or operating almost invisibly, rather than on the visible front in both the cases of Middle-East and Ukrainian refugee crises.

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By 2016, the border fence was built, refugees were locked up in the transit zone, those caught at the fence were deported back to Serbia, assistance and illegal entry were criminalised, asylum became unavailable in 2019, and temporary protection for war refugees was introduced in 2022. So the state wants to demonstrate that it can once again entirely control migration, the discourse on it and the solidarity that gives protection and security to a selected few lucky ones. And this nationalised asylum, mass media and solidarity send out the message: no civil spontaneity and social solidarity, we will let you know when you are needed again!

References Bernát, A. (2016). Hosts in Hostility: The New Forms of Solidarity and the Role of Volunteer and Civilian Organizations in the Migration Crisis in Hungary. In B. Simonovits & A. Bernát (Eds.), The Social Aspects of the 2015 Migration Crisis in Hungary (pp. 72–100). TARKI Social Research Institute. Bernát, A., Sik, E., Simonovits, B., & Szeitl, B. (2015). Attitudes towards refugees, asylum seekers and migrants. TARKI Social Research Institute. http://www.tarki.hu/hu/news/2015/kitekint/20151203_refugee.pdf Éberhardt, G. (2021). The Needed Public Development Impacts of Overload Migration (PhD dissertation). Budapest: National University of Public Service. Fontex. (2022, January 13). EU’s External Borders in 2022: Number of Irregular Border Crossings Highest Since 2016. https://frontex.europa.eu/media-cen tre/news/news-release/eu-s-external-borders-in-2022-number-of-irregularborder-crossings-highest-since-2016-YsAZ29. Index.hu. (2023). Millions of Dollars to Help Renovate Churches in Lebanon (Dollármilliókkal segítjük libanoni templomok felújítását). Report on a Diplomacy Trip by Péter Szijjártó, Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade on 12th January. https://index.hu/belfold/2023/01/12/szijjarto-lib anon-kereszteny-templom-felujitas/. ITM. (2021). The Main Characteristics of Employment of Foreign Nationals in Hungary in 2019 and 2020. Summary of the Activities of Temporary Employment Agencies in 2020–2021. Budapest: Ministry of Innovation and Technology, Department of Analysis and Wage Policy. KSH. (2016). Új magyar állampolgárok. Változások az egyszer˝ usített honosítási eljárás bevezetése után (New Hungarian Citizens: Changes after the Introduction of the Simplified Naturalisation Procedure). Budapest: Central Statistical Office.

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KSH. (2022). Data Sheet no. 22.1.1.26: Number of Asylum Seekers and Beneficiaries of International Protection Arriving in Hungary. Budapest: Central Statistical Office. Majtényi, B. (2014). Alaptörvény a nemzet akaratából (Fundamental law of the will of the nation). Állam-és Jogtudomány, 1, 77–96. Marsovszky, M. (2012, December 27). „Nemzetek Európája”: Az etnoszocialitsa nemzetkoncepció és annak demokratikus alternatívája (“Europe of Nations”: The Ethnosocialist Concept of the Nation and Its Democratic Alternative). Népszabadság Online. Mészáros, G. (2019). A “militáns demokrácia” esete a tömeges bevándorlás okozta válsághelyzettel (The Case of “Militant Democracy” in a Crisis Situation Caused by Mass Immigration). Állam-és Jogtudomány, 4, 43–55. Mátó, M. (2019). The Perception of Refugees among the Population of Szeged at the Peak of the European Migration Crisis (BA Thesis). University of Szeged, Sociology Department. Messing, V., & Ságvári, B. (2019). Still Divided but More Open: Mapping European Attitudes Towards Migration Before and After the Migration Crisis. Budapest Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Regional project “Flight, Migration, Integration in Europe”. Budapest: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Nagy, B. (2019). Hungary in Front of Her Judges: Asylum-Related Cases of Hungary in European Courts. In P. Minderhoud, S. Mantu & K. Zwaan (Eds.), Caught In Between Borders: Citizens, Migrants and Humans: Liber Amicorum in Honour of Prof dr. Elspeth Guild (pp. 251–260). Wolf Legal Publishers. National Headquarters of the Hungarian Police. (2022). General Situation Report on Border Management. I–XI. Budapest. Oktatási Hivatal. (2021). Stipendium Hungaricum jelentkez˝ oi és hallgatói adatok (Stipendium Hungaricum Applicant and Student Data), Department of Education: https://tka.hu/palyazatok/7619/statisztikak. Panyi, S. (2015, September 11). Rejtélyes a befogadott kopt családok ügye (The mystery of the case of the adopted Coptic families). Index. Rácz, A. (2018). On the Mass Irregular Migration Crisis and Beyond: Compassion, Rejection, Solidarity. Rend˝orségi Tanulmányok, 3, 49–70. Strik, T. (2020). Mechanisms to Prevent Push-Backs. In S. Carrera & M. Stefan (Eds.), Fundamental Rights Challenged in Border Controls and Expulsion of Irregular Immigrants in the European Union. Complaint Mechanisms and Access to Justice (pp. 234–258). Routledge. Tóth, J. (2019). From the Minimum of Human Rights to the Maximum of National Defence. Transformation of the Asylum Law in Hungary. In B. Majtényi & G. Tamburelli (Eds.), Human Rights of Asylum Seekers in Italy and Hungary: Influence of International and EU Law on Domestic Actions (pp. 129–146). Eleven International Publishing.

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Tóth, J. (2022a). On the Edge on an Epoch, or a Farewell to Asylum Law and Procedure. In É. Ged˝ o & É. Szénási (Eds.), Populism and Migration (pp. 175–193). L’Harmattan. Tóth J. (2022b). Difficulties in Accessing Healthcare and People in Need of International Protection in Hungary. In A. Kováts & B. Soltész (Eds.), A Place to Call Home: Social Integration of Refugees in Hungary (pp. 256–287). Menedék-Hungarian Association for Migrants. UNHCR. (2021, March 10). Az UNHCR-t aggasztják Magyarországnak a menedékjoghoz való hozzáférést érint˝o legutóbbi lépései. https://www.unhcr. org/hu/12377-az-unhcr-t-aggasztjak-magyarorszagnak-a-menedekjoghozvalo-hozzaferest-erinto-legutobbi-lepesei.html.

PART III

Old Challenges in A “New” Country of Destination: The Italian Case

CHAPTER 12

The Role of Local Socio-Economic Integration in Italian Asylum Adjudications Alice Lacchei, Cristina Dallara, and Debora Mantovani

Introduction The right to international protection for migrants is based on a complex and multi-layered system of international norms and standards, originating in the aftermath of World War I and ratified with the 1951 Geneva Convention. These global norms and standards were then gradually transposed at European, national, and sub-national levels, becoming normative and concrete ways of managing refugee governance. Consequently, one of the crucial contemporary challenges in the functioning of international protection is the tension between provisions set in global norms and their

A. Lacchei · C. Dallara · D. Mantovani (B) Department of Political and Social Science, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy e-mail: [email protected] A. Lacchei e-mail: [email protected] C. Dallara e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. Fauri and D. Mantovani (eds.), Past and Present Migration Challenges, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39431-7_12

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peculiar local application, which is one of the main expressions of the “regime complexity” characterising asylum (Brumat et al., 2021). The chapter focuses on this aspect by describing the peculiar nature of the Italian system for asylum governance and shedding light on a specific tool of national protection: humanitarian protection. More precisely, it analyses how this tool is interpreted and concretely applied by state authorities, namely civil courts, to guarantee asylum seekers’ rights. Among other criteria, Italian authorities responsible for analysing asylum claims can grant humanitarian protection on the basis of the asylum seekers’ level of integration in the country. Thus, the chapter investigates if, and to what extent, asylum seekers’ level of integration is a criterion that leads judges to grant humanitarian protection at the appeal stage. Moreover, the chapter examines how Italian judges use and interpret the broader concept of integration as a legal tool. Indeed, the analysis of the complex relationship between integration and asylum adjudication can offer an angle to “rethink integration” and allows to elaborate new perspectives on the adaptation and settlement of migrants (GrzymalaKazlowska & Phillimore, 2018; Phillimore, 2021). In particular, it is important to reflect on the concept of socio-economic integration as conceived and shaped by the national state authorities responsible for deciding the status of asylum seekers. Applying a mixed-method approach, 584 final decisions adopted from 1st January to 31st December 2020 by an Italian civil court and granting humanitarian protection are examined. Information on asylum seekers’ socio-demographic characteristics, migratory experience and integration dimensions included in each decision were organised in a database. Analyses aim to test if, and to what extent, judges take into account the asylum seekers’ level of integration in their final decisions to grant humanitarian protection at the appeal stage. Furthermore, in order to better comprehend judges’ attitudes towards integration, this chapter integrates the quantitative analysis with a qualitative approach, conducting 6 semistructured interviews and shadowing 6 judges responsible for processing asylum claims, as well as observing 100 hearings in the same court whose final decisions were analysed.

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International Protection: Global Norms and Their National Transposition The contemporary protection regime is the result of a historical and doctrinal evolution starting after World War I and culminating in the signing of the 1951 Geneva Convention. More precisely, the International Committee of the Red Cross stimulated the development of the international protection system set up by the League of Nations, which followed widespread atrocities against civilians during the Great War. The Council of the League of Nations first favoured refugee protection by establishing the office of the High Commissioner of Refugees in 1921 (Jaeger, 2001). Especially after the creation of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) office in 1950, international norms and standards were designed to shape, influence and impact states and other national and international actors in governing asylum-seeking and forced migration (Brumat et al., 2021). The 1951 Geneva Convention modified and extended the notion of refugee itself, including refugees protected by previous arrangements, protocols and conventions and establishing a universal definition. According to the Geneva Convention, a refugee is someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country” (1951 Geneva Convention: Article 1A (2)). States which have signed the Convention are obliged to protect refugees and this obligation is founded on the core principle of asylum law: “non-refoulement”. According to this principle, a state cannot send people back to a place where they could be persecuted (1951 Geneva Convention: Article 33). The UNHCR Executive Committee (1977, 14) argues that the principle of non-refoulement acts “irrespective of whether or not they have been formally recognized as refugees”. For this reason, non-refoulement applies to both refugees and asylum seekers. Today, the principle of non-refoulement goes beyond the Geneva Convention and also applies to people at risk of torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, or threatened in their life, physical integrity or liberty (Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, 2003).

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In Europe, the existing system of international norms and standards was also integrated with regional instruments, such as the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Then, the EU legislation on asylum also incorporated this wider interpretation of non-refoulement by introducing other forms of protection complementary to the status of refugee. Since the 1990s, a common policy on asylum, including a Common European Asylum System, has been recognised as a constituent part of the EU mission establishing an area of freedom, security and justice open to those who, forced by circumstances, legitimately seek protection in the UE. The 1999 European Council in Tampere agreed to work towards establishing a Common European Asylum System (CEAS), based on the full and comprehensive application of the 1951 Geneva Convention. The Tampere conclusions also suggested that rules regarding refugee status should be integrated with measures on subsidiary forms of protection, offering an appropriate status to any person in need of protection. The CEAS became the policy framework covering all aspects of the asylum process. In a nutshell, the CEAS aims to guarantee common standards for treating all asylum seekers and applications. Specifically, the CEAS relies on two Regulations1 and three Directives: (i) the Asylum Procedure Directive, which aims at regulating the conditions for fair, fast and quality asylum decisions; (ii) the Qualification Directive, which sets the criteria for granting international protection; and (iii) the Reception Condition Directive, which guarantees common standards for reception conditions. The Asylum Procedure Directive and the Qualification Directive regulate the asylum adjudication process, which consists of the evaluation of the asylum application by the competent first-instance authorities and, in case of rejection, by the appeal court.2 Indeed, when asylum seekers receive a negative decision at first instance, they have the right to

1 The Dublin Regulation, which indicates the state responsible for examining the application and clarifies the rules governing the relations between states; and the EURODAC Regulation, which assists the Member State responsible under the Dublin Regulation in establishing an EU database of fingerprints of asylum applicants. 2 To give an idea of the relevance of the appeal phase, it is sufficient to recall that, in 2021, around 65,100 asylum seekers in the EU received positive final decisions based on an appeal or review.

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appeal through administrative or judicial institutions that can guarantee an effective remedy (Asylum Procedure Directive: Article 46). In particular, the 2004 Qualification Directive sets out criteria for obtaining international protection, which may consist of the refugee status, as defined by the 1951 Geneva Convention, or the subsidiary protection status, which was designed to guarantee the principle of non-refoulement more comprehensively. More precisely, the subsidiary protection status is granted to those asylum seekers who fled because of serious harm, defined as: (i) death penalty or execution; or (ii) torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in their country of origin; or (iii) serious and individual threat by reason of indiscriminate violence during international or internal armed conflict (Asylum Qualification Directive: Article 15). In addition, to establish common grounds for granting and withdrawing international protection, the Qualification Directive also regulates who can be excluded from protection. Moreover, it improves the international protection beneficiaries’ access to rights and integration measures. Most importantly, the Directive allows EU countries to set more favourable standards than those contained in its provisions. As an example, each Member State can decide to adopt additional national forms of protection for humanitarian reasons, complementary to international protection (that is, refugee status and subsidiary protection status). In fact, according to the Directive, each state could issue a residence permit “for humanitarian, charitable or otherwise reasons” at any time (Directive 2008/115/EC: Article 3). The empirical evidence stresses that Member States often resort to national forms of protection, especially at the appeal stage. In 2021, at first instance, positive asylum decisions for humanitarian reasons were 28,050 over 202,035 (13.9%) and, at the appeal stage, they were 26,535 over 72,400 (36.6%). However, there are some dissimilarities among EU countries, since only some grant humanitarian status to asylum seekers. Among them, Italy—along with Ireland, Austria and Germany—is characterised by a larger use of humanitarian protection, especially at the appeal stage (Fig. 12.1). As said, the CEAS framework is mainly based on European Directives and therefore leaves wide discretion to Member States on implementation models, especially for asylum adjudication. This characteristic is particularly true at the appeal stage, where each Member State adopts

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100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Austria

Finland Refugee status

Germany

Iceland

Ireland

Subsidiary protection status

Italy

Netherlands

Humanitarian status

Spain

Sweden

Rejections

Fig. 12.1 Asylum adjudications by outcome at the appeal stage in those European countries where humanitarian status is granted. Year 2021 (percentage values) (Source Authors’ own elaboration—Eurostat dataset)

different organisational choices on asylum adjudication procedures, especially regarding responsible bodies, involved actors and procedural aspects (Gill et al., 2022). Moreover, Member States opt for different models governing the reception of asylum seekers waiting for a decision, also granting them different rights and facilitations. As an example, only in certain countries, such as Italy, can asylum seekers work while waiting for their decision. Some other jurisdictions, instead, tend to restrict the possibility to work, effectively making it illegal before and unless their application is accepted. In such a system, one of the major current challenges in the functioning of asylum system consists in the tension between the provisions set in global norms and their application in each peculiar local context. On the one hand, differences in the local reception of international standards signal the widespread diffusion of principles embedded in such international norms; on the other hand, the persistence of localised practices leaves questions on the repercussions of significant variation in and among governance systems for asylum seeker and refugee migration.

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In the recent literature on refugee and migration governance (Betts & Collier, 2017; Geddes, 2021), the tension between global norms and localised practices is considered an expression of the so-called “regime complexity” (Brumat et al., 2021, 831). Despite its international roots, the asylum determination regime is shaped at the national level, where also human rights law has to be applied. In this process, states—and more precisely different political and administrative institutions—maintain their own discretion in defining the national implementation structures. For this reason, asylum law well represents the complex relationship between international human rights obligations and national politics and policy aims (Lawrence & Ruffer, 2015). As Hamlin (2014) shows, by looking at the asylum determination regime at the domestic level, it is possible to understand the causes and mechanisms of divergences in the application of international human rights law among states. This chapter aims to contribute to this debate on tension between global norms and localised practices by focusing on the Italian case and more precisely on humanitarian protection, which is a specific national tool introduced to better guarantee the right to asylum and to transpose international human rights law at the national level.

Asylum Adjudication in Italy According to Italian law, when migrants ask for asylum at the national border, or at immigration offices, or at local police stations, they become asylum seekers and have the right to stay in the country until the request is fully processed. As regards the adjudication process, which consists of assessing the asylum claim, the Territorial Commissions for the Recognition of International Protection (TCRIPs) are the first competent authorities. TCRIPs are administrative bodies of the Ministry of the Interior and are located throughout the national territory. Officers interview asylum seekers about the reasons they fled their country of origin, consider the related documents and finally decide on the application. More precisely, the asylum application can have two outcomes: (i) rejection: no protection is granted; (ii) acceptance: TCRIPs grant a form of protection. Acceptance may result either in international forms of protection—refugee status or subsidiary protection status —or in a national form of protection formerly referred to as humanitarian protection and then, after the 2018 reform, as special protection (Fig. 12.2).

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Fig. 12.2 The Italian international protection procedure (Source Authors’ own elaboration)

Although Italy has been dealing with asylum applications since the 1950s, the actual number of applicants remained extremely low until the early 1980s. Between 1980 and 1989, Italy received 31,405 asylum applications, especially from Poland, but the course changed in the early 1990s when more than 50,000 people coming from Albania and former Yugoslavia asked for asylum. Then, at the end of the 1990s, asylum applications continued to increase, following the outbreak of the Kosovo war and other conflicts in non-European countries, such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia (Petrovic, 2020). Between 2002 and 2013 the number of asylum seekers remained almost constant, not exceeding 20,000 units, except from 2008 to 2011

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when they were more than 30,000. Between 2014 and 2016, almost 500,000 migrants arrived on the Italian coasts, mainly from Nigeria, Gambia and Senegal, and others entered the country from the Balkan route, especially Pakistanis (Petrovic, 2020). The increase in arrivals coincided with an increase in first-instance asylum applications, which doubled from 63,456 to 123,600 between 2014 and 2016, reaching 130,119 in 2017 (Table 12.1). After 2018, applications began to decrease, even if they remained numerous. People asking for asylum since 2015 mainly came from Nigeria, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Senegal, and Gambia and most of them were men. As an example, out of 130,119 asylum seekers who applied in 2017, 84% were men and only 16% were women (Ministry of the Interior, 2020). This increase in asylum applications resulted in a growing workload for the institutions responsible for examining them not only at first instance via TCRIPs, but also at the appeal stage. In 2014, only 3,674 appeals were lodged in Italian civil courts, whereas more than 60,000 were submitted in 2019, and only in 2020 they began to decrease due to the Covid-19 pandemic (Table 12.1). In response, the Italian government proposed a reform of asylum procedures in 2017, creating 26 specialised sections within Italian civil courts specifically dealing with migration issues, including asylum appeals. Although the reform aimed to improve the efficiency of the appeal system there are still long delays because of the high backlog in Italian courts— asylum seekers usually wait from one to five years depending on local courts (Dallara et al., 2022). Table 12.1 Asylum applications, TCRIPs’ decisions, asylum rejections at first instance and asylum appeals in civil courts. Italy—years 2014–2021 Year

Asylum applications

TCRIP’s decisions

TCRIPs’ rejections

Asylum appeals

2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

63,456 83,970 123,600 130,119 53,596 43,783 26,963 53,609

36,270 71,117 91,102 81,527 95,576 95,060 42,604 51,931

13,122 37,400 51,170 42,700 56,002 61,588 18,758 30,108

3,674 13,965 47,078 41,818 48,799 60,196 17,384 16,120

Source Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Justice

(36%) (53%) (56%) (52%) (59%) (65%) (58%) (58%)

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Concerning appeal decisions, there is not much available data on recognition rates. According to EU data, from 2016 to 2021, the propensity of Italian civil courts to grant a form of protection has varied significantly. In 2020, only 9,690 appeal judgments were positive (40.7% of total decisions), whereas 11,840 applications were accepted in 2021 (63.0%). Additionally, the type of protection predominantly granted on appeal is “humanitarian protection”. Excluding decisions taken in 2016 and 2017, judges have mostly granted this national form of protection since 2018 (Table 12.2). Differently from decisions at first instance, there is no official data on asylum adjudication on appeal according to applicants’ country of origin and sex. However, information on asylum seekers whose applications have been rejected at first instance can offer some hints. As an example, on 95,576 decisions made by TCRIPs in 2018, 59% of them were rejected and among certain national groups—especially those coming from Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal and Tunisia—rejections were more than 70% (Ministry of the Interior, 2020). Thus, it is possible to hypothesise that these nationalities are strongly present at the appeal stage. Moreover, rejections have always been higher for male asylum seekers: looking at 2018 data concerning first-instance claims, of 82,232 decisions on males, 62% were rejected, compared to 35% of 13,344 decisions on women (Ministry of the Interior, 2020). Thus, also because of the limited number of female asylum seekers, it is possible to expect a gender disparity in favour of men at the appeal stage. Table 12.2 Asylum decisions at the appeal stage in Italy. Years 2016–2021 Year

2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

Total decisions

Positive decisions

9,770 12,590 42,970 35,500 23,810 18,780

4,770 3,335 17,215 12,635 9,690 11,840

Type of protection on positive decisions (%) Refugee status

Subsidiary protection

Humanitarian protection

8.1 11.5 4.8 7.1 6.3 6.3

49.6 73.5 25.4 30.4 28.8 17.1

42.3 15.0 69.9 62.5 64.9 76.6

Source Authors’ own elaboration—Eurostat database

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The Humanitarian Protection In 1998, Italian immigration law introduced a national form of protection—called “humanitarian protection”—granted to migrants who could not be expelled from Italy due to “serious reasons, in particular of a humanitarian nature or resulting from constitutional or international obligations of the Italian State” (article 5, co. 6, law no. 286/1998). Humanitarian protection provides for a two-year renewable residence permit, which allows access to the labour market and to other social rights. Italy has chosen to include the recognition of humanitarian protection within the asylum procedure. Indeed, asylum adjudicators can grant this national form of protection in addition to international protection. Over time, the number of humanitarian protections granted at first instance has considerably grown both in absolute value—rising from only 26 cases in 1998 to 20,014 in 2018—and in relative terms as a proportion of total positive decisions—1.8% in 1998 against 63.7% in 2018. In 2012, as a consequence of the so-called “Arab Spring”, the percentage of humanitarian protections on total positive decisions rose again (70.3%), also because the Italian government decided to grant humanitarian protection to many people coming from Tunisia, which was experiencing a period of social and political instability. Finally, from 2015 to 2018—when Italy faced the highest number of asylum applications— more than half of the positive decisions at first instance were taken for humanitarian protection reasons (Fig. 12.3). Humanitarian protection seems a useful legal tool to adapt the system to changes in forced migration flows and respond to the challenges that followed. This use of the norm is possible mainly because of its abstractness and vagueness, which offers high discretion to both decision-makers and implementers (Dallara & Lacchei, 2021). In order to understand the circumstances under which humanitarian protection has been granted in recent years, it is necessary to look at governmental soft-law instruments combined with the jurisprudence developed by Italian courts. For this purpose, a 2015 soft-law document provides crucial information, trying to clarify the content of humanitarian protection by listing five circumstances under which it should be released: (i) exposure to torture or inhuman and degrading treatment, when there are no grounds to grant refugee or subsidiary protection status, for example in case of exclusion from international protection; (ii) serious psycho-physical conditions or

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100.0 20,000 90.0 18,000 80.0 16,000 70.0 14,000 60.0

12,000

50.0

10,000

40.0

8,000 6,000

30.0

4,000

20.0

2,000

10.0

0 2018

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

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0.0

Fig. 12.3 Humanitarian protection granted at first instance from 1998 to 2018 (absolute values and percentages on total positive decisions) (Source Authors’ own elaboration—Ministry of the Interior)

serious diseases that cannot be adequately treated in the country of origin; (iii) temporary impossibility of repatriation due to insecurity in the origin country/area, when the situation does not meet the level of indiscriminate violence required by EU legislation and jurisprudence to grant the subsidiary protection status; (iv) serious natural disasters or other serious local factors that prevent a return in dignity and security; (v) protection of private and family life in accordance with Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) (Asylum National Commission, 2015). According to Italian case law, the applicant’s socio-economic integration is crucial in deciding on humanitarian protection when there is the

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need to guarantee respect for their private and family life. The judge must assess the existence of stable and significant ties in Italy and grant humanitarian protection if there is a disproportionate difference between the applicant’s personal situation in the country of origin and their current level of integration in Italy (Acierno, 2018). Over the last years, humanitarian protection has been at the centre of the political debate, especially with the rise of anti-immigrant parties, which have questioned the high rate of humanitarian protection and criticised the expansive interpretation of the norm, favoured by its vagueness. In 2018, this debate led to the abrogation of humanitarian protection and its replacement with a series of residence permits, including the so-called “special protection” (law no. 132/2018). Like humanitarian protection, special protection could be granted to asylum seekers in addition to international protection. However, although special protection maintains a few aspects of the previous form, it excludes all references to Article 8 ECHR (Table 12.3). The main aim of the reform—promoted by Matteo Salvini, leader of Lega (a right-wing populist political party) and Minister of the Interior—was to reduce acceptance rates by restricting the application of the only form of protection that is strictly national (Zorzella, 2021). Not by chance, in 2019 special protections represented only 1% of 95,060 TCRPIs’ decisions, compared to 21% of humanitarian protections among 95,576 decisions taken in 2018. In 2020, only two years later, the new “yellow–red” government— supported by the anti-establishment Five Star Movement and the centreleft Democratic Party—modified this legal tool again, extending its Table 12.3 Main reforms of the Italian national protection and explicit reference to integration dimensions Law

Protection

Integration dimension

286/ 1998 132/ 2018 130/ 2020

Humanitarian Protection Special Protection Special Protection

Evaluation of integration level in Italy vs. situation in the country of origin No

Source Authors’ own elaboration

Duration of stay in the national territory Social integration Family ties in Italy vs. family, cultural or social ties in the country of origin

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scope. Despite limited differences, legislative decree no. 130/2020 reintroduced the content of humanitarian protection. Although it maintains the name “special protection”, the evaluation of the asylum seeker’s integration returns crucial in asylum adjudication. Indeed, the 2020 special protection protects asylum seekers from violations of Article 8 ECHR considering the duration of the stay, the existence of family ties and the actual social integration in Italy, as well as the presence of family, cultural or social ties in the country of origin.

Socio-economic Integration and Access to Asylum Following the suggestions of recent studies on migrant and refugee integration to “rethink integration” (Grzymala-Kazlowska & Phillimore, 2018; Phillimore, 2021), it could be useful to analyse connections between integration and asylum adjudication. Two strands of literature can support this reflection: studies on asylum adjudication (Gill & Good, 2019; Neumayer, 2005); and those on asylum seeker socio-economic integration (Federico & Baglioni, 2021; Feinstein et al., 2022). With reference to asylum adjudication, some scholars demonstrate how asylum seeker’s characteristics impact on recognition rates. As an example, recent studies stress the importance of the applicant’s sex in asylum adjudication, showing that female asylum seekers are generally evaluated more favourably than males (Ecker et al., 2020). Another research—including 14 EU countries, Norway and Switzerland—demonstrates that the asylum seeker’s country of origin clearly affects recognition rates in international protection claims (Neumayer, 2005). More precisely, the regime type, the extent of human rights violations, interstate violent conflicts and events of genocide and politicide influence the final decision for both refugee status and subsidiary protection status. In addition, statuses and rates of recognition are lower for asylum seekers from poorer countries, probably because it is harder to convince the decision authorities that their claim of persecution is genuine and that they are not merely economic migrants. As regards the studies on refugee and asylum seeker socio-economic integration, scholars agree that integration is a multidimensional process, taking place across a series of intertwined domains, and the complex semantic extension of this concept is operationalised resorting to a set of indicators. Spencer and Charsley (2016) note that even if integration

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domains are sometimes categorised differently by scholars, these mainly are: (i) structural (participation in the labour and housing market, education and training); (ii) social (social interactions, relationships, marriage); (iii) cultural (values, attitudes, behaviour and lifestyle); (iv) civic and political (participation in community life and the democratic process); and (v) identity-related (that is, the process through which individuals develop a somewhat shared identity and sense of belonging to the place where they live) (Entzinger, 2000; Heckmann & Schnapper, 2003; Spencer, 2011). A similar classification is also proposed by Ager and Strang (2008), who list four dimensions: (i) “markers and means”, such as employment, housing, education and health; (ii) “social connections”, such as social links and ties; (iii) “facilitators”, in particular, knowledge of the hosting country’s language and culture; (iv) “foundation”, that is rights to recognition and access to citizenship. As for “facilitators”, it is well known that holding second-language skills can substantially accelerate integration. Not only are immigrants proficient in the host country’s language more likely to enter the labour market (Chiswick, 1991; Dustmann, 1994; Dustmann & van Soest, 2002), but they are also more likely to establish social interactions with natives (Kristjansdottir & Dis Skaptadottir, 2018). In a nutshell, successful integration in one area facilitates integration in others. As for the “markers and means” dimension, employment is one of the aspects mainly analysed by the literature on migration governance. A recent collective contribution—specifically focused on migrants, refugees and asylum seekers’ integration into European labour markets—centres on legal barriers and catalysts for integration (Federico & Baglioni, 2021). Entering the country as a worker is difficult and obtaining the right to work having entered for other reasons might also be very challenging. Each country adopts different legislation on the right to work for asylum seekers. These differences in regulating access to the labour market for asylum seekers are crucial since work is considered one of the most relevant domains of integration (Ager & Strang, 2008). In Italy, asylum seekers are allowed to work after 60 days from their application, but if they need to receive accommodation facilities, their annual income should not exceed approximately 6,000 euros. This forces people to make hard choices, often pushing them to resort to the black or grey labour market. The rigidity of their legal status is a second barrier blocking the full benefits of the right to work. In fact, each legal status is subject to several

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conditions, which need to be fulfilled in order to obtain a specific set of rights (Federico & Pannia, 2019). While waiting for the decision, asylum seekers can also access social rights such as health services, social assistance, education and housing. As regards housing, in Italy asylum seekers have access to the System of Accommodation and Integration (SAI), which is managed by municipalities and provides support by promoting individual programmes to enable them to regain independence in employment, housing, social interactions as well as school integration for minors. However, due to insufficient capacity in the SAI, many asylum seekers are in Emergency Reception Centres (CAS)—coordinated by prefectures (the local branches of the Ministry of the Interior)—which are structured without a clear regulatory framework and with fewer standards to respect (Campesi, 2018). Although guarantees exist on paper, there are many obstacles making the integration path for asylum seekers challenging (Biondi dal Monte, 2020) and hindering full access to basic social rights for this category of migrants, such as decent housing and health services (Mendola & Busetta, 2018) as well as access to work (Schenner et al., 2019). Regarding “social connections”, opportunities to interact with the native population are positively associated with migrants’ social integration (Wren, 2007). Resorting to the concept of “social capital” (Putnam, 2000; Putnam et al., 1993), Ager and Strang (2004) claim that “bridging” social capital—which describes connections between different social groups—is more likely to promote asylum seekers’ integration into the host society than “bonding” social capital—which refers to deep social ties within social groups. Bridging social capital implies that integration is a two-way process involving mutual adjustments by both asylum seekers and the host community (Atfield et al., 2007). Empirical evidence has stressed that people entitled to asylum are more disadvantaged in their networking abilities than economic migrants (Bergeron & Potter, 2006), and barriers to their social integration are usually isolation (living in asylum homes), fear, poor language proficiency, discrimination and absence of local initiatives (Cheung & Phillimore, 2013; Feinstein et al., 2022). Voluntary and community organisations (third sector organisations) have been identified as catalysts of asylum seekers’ social integration since they facilitate their participation in activities which boost language acquisition, enable them to achieve economic independence, meet people

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and form networks. Despite this wide debate on socio-economic integration dimensions, only sporadically have scholars investigated integration and asylum adjudication in connection. Some have argued that the length of time for asylum decisions could negatively impact on refugees’ economic integration since longer waits have an adverse effect on achieving stable legal statuses and accessing employment (Hainmueller et al., 2016; Kosyakova & Brenzel, 2020). Waiting can have an ambivalent effect: on the one hand, it is a mechanism of control, which blocks or slows asylum seekers; on the other hand, it can be a source of benefit. Thus, asylum seekers can experience the waiting time for the decision either as an “empty interlude” (Rotter, 2016), or as a “meaningful experience” (Bissell, 2007) that they can use strategically (Andersson, 2014; Khosravi, 2014). In this context, Vianelli et al. (2022) explore the role of integration-related considerations in shaping judges’ decision-making on applicants’ status in asylum appeals and find that migrants’ waiting time for a decision may turn into a period of probation. This may be true in contexts where asylum determination procedures are strongly delayed, and therefore years are required to process applications. For this reason, it is extremely important to understand how asylum judges apply integration-related considerations in their final decisions.

Data, Variables, Methods The Italian asylum governance is a privileged context to investigate the underexplored relationship between integration and asylum adjudication. The national form of protection granted for “humanitarian” reasons encourages Italian judges to develop their decisions also by taking into account integration-related dimensions. To this end, a mixed-methods approach was applied to investigate if, and to what extent, asylum seekers’ level of integration guides judges in granting humanitarian protection and if there are significant differences between countries of origin. The analysis focuses on decisions taken at the appeal stage for humanitarian protection since, at this court level: (i) this form of protection numerically prevails on the other types (refugee status and subsidiary protection status); (ii) judges explicitly take in consideration integration dimensions. Regarding the quantitative approach, the data used in this study concerns asylum appeals processed by an Italian civil court from 1st

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January to 31st December 2020. Although these decisions were filed in courts in 2020—when reforms promoted in 2018 and 2020 were already in play, and special protection replaced humanitarian protection— judges still applied rules in force before the 2018 reform. This mismatch between formal regulation and actual implementation of norms is due to delays of more than two years affecting Italian civil courts in examining applications. These asylum appeals refer to applications lodged before the 2018 reform. As a consequence, judges continued to grant humanitarian protection until the end of 2020. The final decisions examined here involve 584 asylum applications rejected at first instance.3 Thanks to the analysis of each decision, the potential relationship between the asylum seeker’s level of integration and the outcome of their request was explored by organising the following information in variables included in a dataset. Judge’s final decision: this is the outcome of the appeal decision and represents the dependent variable, with a value of 0 if the application was rejected and 1 if humanitarian protection was granted. Level of integration: this concept is broad and was operationalized by distinguishing the following dimensions: – job experience: three different categories were applied. The asylum seeker: (i) was working at the time of the hearing; (ii) had worked in the past, but not at the time of the hearing; (iii) has never worked—a proxy of the dimension “markers and means”; – linguistic integration: whether the asylum seeker attended an L2 Italian course—a proxy of the dimension “facilitators”; – social integration: whether the asylum seeker took part in voluntary associations and/or other third sector organisations—a proxy of the dimension “foundation”; – professional integration: whether the asylum seeker participated in professional training courses or unpaid internships—a proxy of the dimension “markers and means”; – family ties : three different family conditions were applied. The asylum seeker: (i) lived in Italy with their family (in couple with or without children); (ii) lived alone since their family stayed in the

3 86 asylum seekers waiting for the appeal sentence were excluded from the analysis since they did not show up at the hearing.

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country of origin; (iii) had no family either in Italy or elsewhere—a proxy of the dimension “social ties”. From judgements analysis, the following additional information on asylum seekers was extrapolated and organised in the dataset: – socio-demographic characteristics: sex, country of origin; – migratory experience: age at the departure from the country of origin, age at the arrival in Italy, age at the first instance judgement, age at the appeal decision, days elapsed between their arrival in Italy and the first decision, days elapsed between their arrival in Italy and the appeal decision, days elapsed between the first and the appeal decision, whether the applicant was hosted in a reception centre. Due to the dichotomous feature of the dependent variable (final decision), a set of incremental binomial logistic regression models was developed. According to the data and in line with the literature on asylum adjudication and asylum seeker’s socio-economic integration, the following hypotheses were tested: Hypothesis 1 (H1 ): asylum seekers coming from countries at higher risk of human rights violations are more likely to be granted humanitarian protection. Regarding the integration dimensions, the literature has stressed that being employed in the labour market and having good proficiency in the host country’s native language are the most relevant—and strongly intertwined—integration domains. Therefore, according to these theses: Hypothesis 2 (H2 ): asylum seekers employed in the labour market are more likely to be granted humanitarian protection. Hypothesis 3 (H3 ): asylum seekers with good proficiency in Italian are more likely to be granted humanitarian protection. Finally, since other integration dimensions may contribute to a positive integration of the asylum seeker in the host country, the following hypothesis was formulated: Hypothesis 4 (H4 ): any additional form of integration (social, professional and family ties) increases asylum seekers’ odds of being granted humanitarian protection.

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One of the major limits of logistic regression is that parameters (log odds) cannot be interpreted in a straightforward manner and do not allow us to compare models across samples (Jann, 2014; Mood, 2010; Williams, 2012). To overcome these limits and to explain more effectively the role of integration in gaining humanitarian protection, predictive margins were estimated for the final regression model, which can be directly interpreted as probabilities.4 Furthermore, for a more complete understanding of the potential and actual role played by integration dimensions in the Italian asylum adjudication, a qualitative approach was also applied and focused on appeal hearings held by all judges employed in the same civil court. More precisely, from September to December 2020, participant observation of 100 hearings was conducted and in 74 of them the asylum seeker was present in the courtroom.5 Most asylum seekers were men (only 5 women) and came from Senegal (22), Nigeria (20), Pakistan (11), Bangladesh (8) and Ghana (7). During the hearings field notes on judges’ attitudes in questioning asylum seekers’ level of integration in the local society were collected. In particular, integration-related considerations made during hearings by judges, lawyers and asylum seekers—such as references to work, housing conditions, family, social and educational activities, and language—were taken into account. Moreover, documents certifying the asylum seekers’ integration paths and exhibited during the hearings—such as work contracts, certificates attesting participation in vocational courses, social activities such as volunteering, Italian language courses and exams—were examined. The observation was integrated with shadowing, a qualitative technique consisting in following a person during all of their daily activities, effectively as a shadow (Czarniawska, 2007). Six out of seven judges6 of this civil court were followed during their job activities, asking for clarifications and opinions before and after the hearings and during breaks or informal moments. The judges were four women and two males: two of 4 Predictive margins were estimated with all other covariates fixed at their means. 5 In the other 26 hearings, the lawyer was present without the asylum seeker. In those

occasions, when lawyers declared they were not able to contact the asylum seeker, the judge usually decided to conclude the appeal procedure and decide on the case (mostly negatively). If the asylum seeker’s absence was due to personal reasons (work, health problems, etc.), the judge postponed the hearing. 6 One judge did not consent to participate in the research.

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them had less than one year of experience, while the others had a longer experience. However, the findings suggest that the personal characteristics of judges do not seem to be relevant for their evaluation of humanitarian protection and integration-related considerations. The same judges were then interviewed through semi-structured interviews. Interviews—lasting between 40 and 90 minutes—were recorded and transcribed verbatim. Among others, the following topics were investigated: (i) how judges conceive humanitarian protection and its role in asylum adjudication; (ii) if and how they take into account integration-related criteria in granting humanitarian protection; (iii) if they also consider other elements as relevant for humanitarian protection and in which terms.

Limits and Caveats Although the mixed-methods approach here has the great advantage of explaining and understanding the relationship between asylum seekers’ integration and granting of humanitarian protection, there are some limits and caveats. The analyses focus on just one civil court, which is also well known for being rather indulgent in granting forms of protection. This limit has some consequences in terms of result interpretation, since information on the criteria used to grant humanitarian protection and the integration dimensions considered by judges only refer to patterns of interpretation used in this specific organisational context. Previous studies on the criteria applied by judges in asylum adjudication (Dallara & Lacchei, 2021) show that each local civil court adopts very different patterns of interpretation (for example in relation to how to evaluate the risk level of the country of origin). These patterns really depend on the local organisational routines and choices, made by the court president or agreed collectively (Brodkin, 2021). For this reason, it is not possible, at this stage, to generalise our results as they are not necessarily representative of the Italian context. Further research enlarging the number of civil courts could shed light on the variance of the interpretative criteria between courts or whether some criteria prevail nationally. As for quantitative analysis of appeal decisions, this limit is counterbalanced by a significant accuracy in data collection. Indeed, it is extremely difficult to extrapolate exhaustive and reliable data from judicial decisions,

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since each civil court has a high level of discretion regarding the selection of what information to include in the judgement and how to record it. Judgements are not standardised and, in some cases, do not contain the needed information. Decisions taken by the selected civil court have the advantage of being complete. At the same time, although the selected decisions were detailed and full of information, the data did not allow us to trace the asylum seekers’ integration path over the years. No information is usually available either on when asylum seekers were involved in an integration activity (L2 language course, training course or internship, participation in associations) during their stay in Italy or on how long they have been engaged in these activities. Consequently, the quantitative analysis could not correctly assess the role of waiting time in asylum adjudication and, more precisely, in the evaluation of asylum seekers’ integration. Qualitative techniques were combined to overcome these limits, though partially. Finally, information on reception centres was included in the analysis, although data does not include details on the type of structure in which asylum seekers reside. Reception centres—especially if they belong to the “Protection System for Asylum Seekers and Refugees” (SPRAR) instead of the Emergency Reception Centres (CAS)—promote asylum seekers’ participation in language courses and traineeships, and plan individual projects of integration (Campomori & Ambrosini, 2020). As a consequence, this variable may be considered just a partial proxy of asylum seekers’ integration into the host country.

Descriptive Results Descriptive statistics on the main variables included in the final judgements are displayed in Table 12.4. The great majority of appellants (84.1%) obtained humanitarian protection, whereas only 15.9% of all applications were rejected. This overturning rate of first-instance asylum decisions is particularly high— especially if compared with the national average overturning rate (about 38%)—and may suggest a particularly indulgent attitude by judges employed in this civil court. Concerning the appellants’ socio-demographic characteristics, there is very little variability according to sex, since almost all asylum seekers are males (97.8%). This disproportion is not surprising considering that two

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Table 12.4 Descriptive statistics (percentages or mean values and standard deviation in brackets)

judge’s final decision Humanitarian protection Rejection socio-demographic characteristics Sex Male Female Country of origin Africa Nigeria Gambia Senegal Ivory Coast Guinea Ghana Other African countries Asia Bangladesh Pakistan Other Asian countries East Europe migratory experience Age at the departure (mean and SD) Age at the arrival in Italy (mean and SD) Age at the first instance (mean and SD) Age at appeal decision (mean and SD) Days from arrival to first decision (mean and SD) Days from first to appeal decision (mean and SD) Days from arrival to appeal decision (mean and SD) Host in a reception centre Yes No

% or mean (SD)

N

84.1 15.9

491 93

97.8 2.2

571 13

81.0 37.4 18.2 17.1 8.0 6.3 5,7 7.3 18.7 53.2 40.4 6.4 0.3

473 177 86 81 38 30 27 34 109 58 44 7 2

23.9 (6.16) 24.9 (6.09) 26.7 (6.31) 29.0 (6.29) 611.9 (406.29) 845.9 (199.88) 1443.6 (432.35)

469

68.3 31.7

371 172

498 566 568 393 577 396

(continued)

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Table 12.4 (continued)

integration dimensions Linguistic integration Yes No Social integration Yes No Professional integration Yes No Job experience Currently at work At work in the past Never worked Family integration No family (either in Italy or in the country of origin) Family in the country of origin Family in Italy (couple alone or with children)

% or mean (SD)

N

67.8 32.2

397 189

33.7 66.3

195 384

32.0 68.0

185 394

59.4 22.8 17.8

344 132 103

68.3 26.7 5.0

396 155 29

Note Total number of observations may vary according to the different variables due to missing values Source Authors’ own elaboration on final decisions adopted by an Italian civil court (1st January–31st December 2020)

factors are contextually in play: (i) most migrants applying for protection at first instance are males; (ii) male asylum applications are more likely to be rejected at first instance, therefore their propensity to appeal is higher (Ministry of the Interior, 2020). Because of this imbalance, the sex dimension will not be considered in the multivariate analyses. Most asylum seekers hail from an African country (81.0%), whereas only 18.7% come from an Asian country and a negligible number is from an Eastern European country (0.3%). A more detailed analysis of asylum seekers’ country of origin reveals that, within the African continent, migrants from Nigeria, Gambia and Senegal prevail (respectively 37.4%, 18.2% and 17.1%), whereas most Asian asylum seekers come from two countries only: Bangladesh (53.2%) and Pakistan (40.4%). This second socio-demographic characteristic of applicants at the appeal stage is also

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consistent with the outcome of decisions at first instance: national groups that were more rejected at first instance are more likely to appeal. Regarding the migratory experience, on average, asylum seekers at the appeal stage leave their country at the age of 23.9, arrive in Italy at 24.9, get their first rejection at 26.7 and, finally, obtain the last decision at 29.0. As for the time spent waiting for the decision, appellants to the Italian court here examined wait, on average, 1 year, 8 months and 12 days for the first decision and 2 years and 4 months extra for the appeal decision: in total, they spend almost 4 years in Italy from their first arrival to the final decision at the appeal stage. In other words, asylum seekers who appeal spend a considerable period of time in Italy before getting the final decision. Furthermore, almost seven out of ten (68.3%) appellants reside in a reception centre. As already mentioned, and although data does not include information on which type of reception centre asylum seekers reside in, living or not in such a hosting structure might be an accurate proxy to estimate their integration into the host society. Concerning an in-depth analysis of integration dimensions, the data reveals that the most frequent activities attended by appellants (67.8%) are L2 Italian courses, whereas only one out of three asylum seekers took part in third-sector associations (33.7%) or participated in professional training courses or unpaid internships (32.0%). Another crucial dimension of integration is the asylum seekers’ employment status. Indeed, work is a decisive integration domain (Ager & Strang, 2008). According to the data, most asylum seekers waiting for the appeal judgement (59.4%) had a job at the time of the hearing; 22.8% were not working at the time of the hearing but did in the past, and only 17.8% of them never worked. Finally, a very small proportion of appellants (5.0%) are rooted with their family in Italy—meaning that only a few might benefit from the family integration dimension—whereas 26.7% of them have their family in the country of origin. In any case, most appellants (68.3%) are alone since their family is neither in Italy nor in the country of origin.

Final Decisions and Integration Dimensions According to the legislative decree no. 286/1998 and the 2015 softlaw document, on paper judges can grant humanitarian protection under specific circumstances related not only to asylum seekers’ safety but

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also to their integration into the receiving society. Indeed, the right to respect private and family life is explicitly prescribed by the law and other regulations. An in-depth analysis of motivations stated by judges in their judgements granting humanitarian protection at the appeal stage reveals that the integration dimension approach is not only preached but also practised. Almost all positive decisions (96.5%) openly refer to asylum seekers’ integration into the local society and seven out of ten (70.3%) mention uprooting reasons, which means that asylum seekers are uprooted from their country of origin due to insecurity, poverty and/or environmental circumstances and, in Italy, have reconstructed their private and family life through an integration process. Additionally, the data shows that the integration dimension is more relevant regardless of the asylum seekers’ country of origin. Nonetheless, for some national groups, origins are also relevant: this is the case for Pakistanis and Bangladeshis for whom violence in the country of origin is an extra motivation taken into account for granting humanitarian protection. The same consideration can be extended to forced migrants from the Ivory Coast and Senegal, for whom violence in the country of transit is an additional reason to grant humanitarian protection (Table 12.5). Table 12.5 Factors explicitly mentioned by judges in their positive decisions to grant humanitarian protection (percentage values)

Nigeria Gambia Senegal Ivory Coast Guinea Ghana Bangladesh Pakistan Other countries Total

Violence in the origin country

Violence in Health the country of transit

Age

Uprooting

Integration

40.9 22.9 34.3 32.4 34.5 18.5 64.3 47.5 34.3

29.9 14.3 32.9 50.0 27.6 25.9 25.0 10.0 14.3

7.9 7.1 8.2 11.8 6.9 – 3.6 5.0 11.4

13.4 47.1 24.7 26.5 62.1 33.3 16.1 15.0 22.9

67.7 80.0 68.5 91.2 79.3 88.9 57.1 47.5 68.6

94.5 95.7 97.3 97.1 93.1 100.0 100.0 95.0 100.0

37.9

25.9

7.1

25.9

70.3

96.5

Source Authors’ own elaboration on final decisions adopted by an Italian civil court (1st January–31st December 2020)

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As proof that migrants’ country of origin may be a crucial factor in analysing their level of integration in the receiving society (Burnett & Peel, 2001; Ruokolainen & Widén, 2020) and, consequently, their chances of getting humanitarian protection, it is useful to analyse the country of origin and the migratory experience dimensions jointly (Table 12.6). The data reveals that appellants from Guinea and Gambia— who are more likely to obtain humanitarian protection for young agerelated reasons—are also the same who left their country of origin at a younger age (respectively 20.1 and 20.5). This aspect is far from trivial. Indeed, even if age is not considered a specific ground for international protection, young people are considered to be particularly vulnerable and, thus, this can favour the recognition of humanitarian protection. On the contrary, Pakistanis are noticeably older at departure (27.9) and they remain the oldest national group at the time of the appeal (33.0). Additionally, Pakistanis—along with Bangladeshis—are the appellants who have to wait longer before getting the judge’s final decision, with an average of respectively 4 years and 3 months and 4 years and 5 months.7 Waiting time may be crucial for appellants, especially if they can turn such an “empty interlude” into a “meaningful experience” (Vianelli et al., 2022). In fact, some rejected asylum seekers at first instance take advantage of their extra waiting time by engaging in activities which promote their integration into the host society. This might be particularly true in Italy, since Italian law allows asylum seekers to work after 60 days from the submission of the asylum application, differently from other EU countries. The data seems to be consistent with the view that Italian legislation favours inclusion in the labour market. Indeed, the great majority of appellants belonging to the most numerous national groups show a certain degree of labour integration: only a few have never worked since their arrival in Italy. In any case, there are some significant differences across national groups: Pakistanis and Bangladeshis stand out as the most work-integrated groups since about 8 out of 10 were working at the time of the hearing. This detail may be crucial since being engaged in the

7 A careful reading of the data shows the existence of some inconsistencies between,

on the one hand, age at arrival in Italy and age at the appeal stage and, on the other hand, days passed between the first arrival and the final decision. For example, according to age, Pakistanis get the final decision after 5 years from their arrival in Italy, whereas if one considers days between arrival and final decision, they have to wait “only” 4 years and 3 months. These discrepancies are due to missing data variability across variables.

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Table 12.6 Asylum seekers’ migratory experience dimensions by country of origin (mean values and percentages)

Nigeria Gambia Senegal Ivory Coast Guinea Ghana Bangladesh Pakistan Other countries

Age at Age Age at Age at Day 1st Day Day deparat 1st 2nd instance 1st/2nd 2nd ture arrival instance instance instance instance Mean values

In reception centre %

24.7 20.5 23.0 24.4

25.1 21.8 24.7 26.5

26.9 23.3 26.6 27.6

29.3 25.6 28.9 30.0

563.0 559.5 594.7 536.1

839.2 780.5 838.0 806.3

1,390.7 1,342.5 1,432.9 1,353.4

71.3 85.2 68.5 63.9

20.1 22.0 23.8 27.9 25.6

21.9 22.7 25.3 28.8 26.1

23.0 24.3 27.5 30.5 28.2

25.3 26.7 29.7 33.0 30.5

518.5 594.1 786.4 678.7 766.7

860.4 900.3 864.3 885.3 859.6

1,399.8 1,495.4 1,626.4 1,558.0 1,608.7

90.0 87.0 50.0 35.9 68.3

Source Authors’ own elaboration on final decisions adopted by an Italian civil court (1st January–31st December 2020)

labour market can speed up the process of integration into the host society and, therefore, increase asylum seekers’ chances of obtaining protection. However, it seems that work experience is the primary integration dimension for Pakistanis and Bangladeshis because they have, in comparative terms, the lowest level of linguistic, social and professional integration (Table 12.7). In other words, for these two Asian groups, attendance at an L2 Italian course does not significantly increase their chance of being integrated into the labour market. This result must not be misunderstood: language acquisition remains crucial for labour integration. The weakness of the relationship between language and inclusion in the labour market observed in this case may be because rejected asylum seekers have spent more than 4 years in Italy since their first arrival and have had several other opportunities to learn Italian aside from attending a language course. In other words, not attending an L2 Italian course does not necessarily mean not being fluent in Italian—and the variable “linguistic integration” may underestimate their actual language skills—but attending an L2 Italian course is undoubtedly an indicator of integration.

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Table 12.7 Asylum seekers’ integration dimensions by country of origin (percentage values) Nigeria Gambia Senegal Ivory Guinea Ghana Bangladesh Pakistan Others Coast Employment Currently 43.2 at work Worked in 30.1 the past Never 26.7 worked Family Italy 9.6 Origin 21.5 country No family 68.9 Italian L2 66.3 courses Social 37.1 integration Professional 28.6 courses

51.2

67.1

60.5

60.0

66.7

86.2

79.5

65.8

24.4

17.7

26.3

23.3

33.3

8.6

18.2

12.2

24.4

15.2

13.2

16.7

–

5.2

2.3

22.0

1.2 12.9

1.3 33.7

13.1 26.3

– 23.3

7.4 11.1

– 50.0

– 38.6

7.3 31.7

85.9 83.7

65.0 77.5

60.6 81.6

76.7 86.7

81.5 85.2

50.0 36.2

61.4 36.4

61.0 56.1

46.5

35.0

44.7

46.7

55.6

8.6

9.1

17.1

38.4

36.3

44.7

56.7

55.6

10.3

6.8

36.6

Source Authors’ own elaboration on final decisions adopted by an Italian civil court (1st January–31st December 2020)

Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are also noteworthy for their lowest propensity to be engaged in activities promoted by local actors (social integration)—such as voluntary associations and other third sector organisations—and to participate in professional training courses or unpaid internships (professional integration): only 9% of Asian appellants took part in these activities. Finally, although Pakistanis and Bangladeshis have no family in Italy, respectively, 38.6% and 50.0% of them have a family in the country of origin. On the contrary, Gambians are the most isolated: more than eight out of ten have no family either in Italy or in their country of origin, which means that only a few may benefit from the family integration dimension.

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Regression Results A set of incremental logistic regression models were developed in order to better explore if, and to what extent, integration dimensions may be relevant in determining the judge’s final decision, and if there are significant differences according to the country of origin. The dependent variable is the judge’s final decision, which assumes the value 0 if the judge’s sentence is “rejection” and 1 in case of “humanitarian protection”, whereas the five dimensions of integration (job experience, linguistic integration, social integration, professional integration and family ties) are the main explanatory variables. The covariates included in all models are: – asylum seeker’s age (at the appeal hearing): interval variable, which was mean-centred. Among the four age-related variables available in the dataset, “age at appeal” is the only one included in all models since it contains the lowest number of missing cases. Furthermore, this selection was needed to avoid multicollinearity problems due to the high correlation between these dimensions; – country of origin: due to the low number of people hailing from some countries, a residual category “other country” was created, which contains cases from countries with less than 50 observations; – residence in a reception centre: the variable assumes a value of 0 if asylum seekers do not live in a reception centre and 1 if they do. As a robustness check, different models including, respectively, days elapsed between the arrival in Italy to the first judgement, days elapsed between the first and the second sentence, and days elapsed between the arrival in Italy to the final decision were run (results available upon request).8 The results reflect those reported in Table 12.8 and parameters for these variables are systematically statistically non-significant. This outcome may not so much be due to the irrelevance of the waiting time for integration, but rather because there is a very limited variability among asylum seekers in time spent waiting for the sentence. For parsimony, models do not include any of these variables. The results of all logistic regression models are shown in Table 12.8.

8 Models were run considering one variable at a time due to multicollinearity.

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Table 12.8 Results of binomial logistic regression models (log odds)—reference category in brackets (N = 525) Model 1 β Age at appeal Country of origin (Nigeria) Bangladesh Pakistan Ivory Coast Gambia Guinea Senegal Other countries Reception centre (No) Job experience (Never) Currently at work Worked in the past only Italian L2 course (No) Social integration (No) Professional integration (No) Family ties (None) In the origin country In Italy Constant Pseudo R 2

Model 2 S.E

β

Model 3 S.E

β

S.E

−0.07*** 0.020 −0.07**

0.024 −0.07**

0.030

+2.56*** +2.03*** +1.42* +0.31 +2.02 +1.42*** +1.86* +1.13***

+1.78* +1.08 +1.31* +0.18 +1.70* +1.24*** +1.84** +1.73***

0.803 0.645 0.640 0.416 1.069 0.511 0.618 0.337

+2.91*** +1.97** +1.03 −0.02 +1.71 +1.25* +2.17** +1.02**

0.846 0.704 0.722 0.472 1.151 0.584 0.710 0.386

+3.11*** +1.15***

0.397 +3.61*** 0.340 +1.35*** +0.89* +1.35*** +1.84***

0.459 0.394 0.376 0.403 0.502

+0.17 0.133

0.760 0.593 0.581 0.368 1.040 0.447 0.519 0.273

−0.29 0.388 +1.61* 0.772 0.249 −1.61*** 0.381 −2.77*** 0.961 0.309 0.428

Significance levels: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 Source Authors’ own elaboration on final decisions adopted by an Italian civil court (1st January–31st December 2020)

Model 1 only includes asylum seekers’ migratory experience dimensions: age at the appeal sentence, country of origin and being hosted in a reception centre. As expected, asylum seekers’ age may be relevant in determining the outcome of their application: all other things being equal, a one-unit increase in asylum seekers’ age at the appeal stage decreases judges’ relative propensity to grant humanitarian protection by 6.8%. Furthermore, the country of origin also plays a crucial role. In comparison with appellants from Nigeria, ceteris paribus, judges display a significantly stronger propensity to grant humanitarian protection to forced migrants from Bangladesh, Pakistan, Ivory Coast and Senegal—i.e. precisely those countries for which judges observe a high risk of violence.

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Finally, being hosted in a reception centre is another crucial dimension: the odds of obtaining humanitarian protection for asylum seekers who reside in a reception centre over those who do not is 3.11. In other words, ceteris paribus, the odds of obtaining humanitarian protection are 211% higher for applicants residing in a reception centre. This outcome does not necessarily mean that judges consider reception centres positively on their own: residing in a reception centre instead of elsewhere is not an actual discriminating factor. Rather, reception centres may play the role of “integration accelerator”. Although judgements do not contain information to explore in detail activities promoted by reception centres, it could be hypothesised that asylum seekers who reside there are more likely to be informed about activities promoted by associations and third sector organisations and to get involved. Furthermore, residing in a reception centre means being able to access to free meals, a clean bed, a hot shower, a change of clothes and medical care. In a nutshell, asylum seekers in reception centres do not have to invest resources to meet their basic needs and may devote more time to integration activities. Model 2 includes the most important additional dimension of integration: asylum seekers’ job experience. In the transition from Model 1 to Model 2, one major point of consideration is the remarkable increase in its predictive power (Pseudo R 2 ). In Model 1, 13.3% of the total variability in obtaining humanitarian protection is explained by the covariates related to asylum seekers’ migratory experience, whereas in Model 2— which adds the job integration dimension only—the same value is equal to 30.9%. In Model 3, where all integration dimensions are considered (attendance of an L2 Italian course, social integration, professional integration and family ties), Pseudo R 2 (0.43) further increases, albeit to a lesser extent. On the whole, all other things being equal, Model 3 reveals that each integration dimension increases the judge’s propensity to grant humanitarian protection. Interpreting logistic regression parameters has some complications. Parameters (log odds) cannot be interpreted straightforwardly and do not allow us to compare models across samples (Jann, 2014; Mood, 2010; Williams, 2012). To overcome these limits and more effectively explain if the country of origin, on the one hand, and integration dimensions, on the other, are important to gain humanitarian protection, predictive margins for the final regression model—which can be directly interpreted

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as probabilities—were estimated.9 The results of these estimations are shown in Figs. 12.4 and 12.5 and convey the implications of the model more clearly. As already mentioned, the empirical evidence has pointed out that the country of origin affects recognition rates at first instance. Our purpose is to explore if such differences also persist at the appeal stage. Figure 12.4 shows predictive margins estimated according to the appellant’s country of origin and setting the values of other independent variables at the mean. Results are consistent with the hypothesis (H1 ), which states that asylum seekers hailing from countries at higher risk of human rights violations are more likely to be granted humanitarian protection. More precisely, results stress that “average” Bangladeshis and Pakistanis have, respectively, a 99.3% and 98.2% chance of gaining humanitarian

Fig. 12.4 Predicted probabilities (with 95% confidence intervals) of gaining humanitarian protection by country of origin (Source Authors’ own elaboration on final decisions adopted by an Italian civil court-1st January–31st December 2020)

9 Predictive margins were estimated with all other covariates fixed at their means.

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Fig. 12.5 Predicted probabilities (with 95% confidence intervals) of gaining humanitarian protection by integration dimensions (Source Authors’ own elaboration on final decisions adopted by an Italian civil court-1st January–31st December 2020)

protection at the appeal stage, whereas otherwise-comparable Nigerians and Gambians have an 88.5% and 88.3% chance, and these differences are statistically significant. Nigerians also have a lower chance of getting humanitarian protection compared to other asylum seekers hailing from the same continent: Senegalese (96.4%) and Guineans (97.7%). Concerning integration dimensions, Fig. 12.5 shows that integration dimensions are considered a lot when granting humanitarian protection. In particular, there are huge differences in employment status. An average asylum seeker at work at the time of the hearing has a 98.5% chance of obtaining humanitarian protection, whereas those who only worked in the past or never did have, respectively, a chance of 87.6% and 64.8%: all these differences are statistically significant. In other words, these results are consistent with hypothesis 2 (H2 ): being employed or not is a key proxy of integration into the receiving society and this variable may be

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a powerful predictor of the judge’s decision. Nonetheless, it should be noted that asylum seekers’ employment does not equal adequate working conditions. Indeed, sociological literature stresses the fact that, if access to the labour market is a sort of conditio sine qua non to gain humanitarian protection, asylum seekers might be willing to accept any working condition to increase their chances of success. As for linguistic integration, no statistically significant differences between those who took an L2 course and those who did not are detectable. Therefore, our data is inconsistent with hypothesis 3 (H3 ), which expected a positive relationship between good proficiency in Italian and chances to gain humanitarian protection. Nonetheless, this result does not necessarily mean that judges do not consider language skills important; on the contrary, it suggests that attending a course is not so key to gaining humanitarian protection, probably because appellants have been waiting for a second decision for 3–4 years, they might have learnt Italian in other ways during this period of time. Finally, the two dimensions of social and professional integration were statistically significant. Indeed, an average appellant who participated in third-sector associations had a 98.0% chance to gain protection against a 92.8% chance for those who did not, whereas appellants engaged in professional training courses or unpaid internships had a 98.6% chance (against 91.8%). As for the family ties dimension, living in Italy with a partner (with or without children) also increases the chance to obtain protection: there is a 99.0% chance versus 94.0% for those with family in the country of origin, whereas there is no statistically significant difference between appellants with no family and those with family in the country of origin. Therefore, the results confirm hypothesis 4 (H4 ): any additional form of integration is relevant for asylum seekers in order to increase their chances of obtaining humanitarian protection.

Qualitative Results According to data from interviews, observation and shadowing, humanitarian protection has a crucial role in Italian asylum adjudication at the appeal stage. Judges argue that humanitarian protection allows to fully implement the right of asylum granted by the Italian Constitution, which has a broader scope compared to international protection as defined at

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the EU level. Moreover, according to some judges, humanitarian protection remedies to some constraints proper of the EU legal framework on asylum. [Humanitarian protection allows] to overcome the fictitious distinction between economic and forced migrations, which characterises the EU legislation, even though it is not really appropriate. Indeed, this distinction pictures the world as “black or white”, but migration is a complex phenomenon related to demography and humanity and, as legal practitioners, we know that it is not “black or white” at all, but there are actually many shades of grey. Thus, national instruments, such as humanitarian protection, that leaves room to asylum decision-makers for interpretation, are extremely useful. (Interview 5)

In a nutshell, judges consider humanitarian protection extremely useful to navigate the “regime complexity” characterising asylum (Brumat et al., 2021) since it helps to overcome certain limitations of implementing supranational norms in local contexts. Regarding the criteria for granting humanitarian protection, judges claim to pay a lot of attention to integration dimensions when deciding and stress the complexity of this concept. I always dedicate one part of the asylum seekers’ interview to their integration path in Italy. In particular, I ask them where they live, what they do every day, whether they have learnt Italian by attending some courses, and whether they are studying or attending a vocational course. In short, we try to understand their degree of integration. This assessment is very important for granting humanitarian protection because according to Article 8 ECHR, if a person is well integrated, we should guarantee their private life right and, thus, it would be inhuman to reject the application and return them to their country of origin. (Interview 3)

This quotation well exemplifies the multifaceted feature of integration: judges consider asylum seekers’ engagement in activities positively, since it can promote their socio-economic and linguistic integration and increase chances of granting humanitarian protection. Although not explicitly mentioned by judges, family ties seem an additional key integration dimension contributing to the final decision. Family ties are usually investigated from two different perspectives. On the one hand, judges often ask asylum seekers if they are alone or have built their

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family in Italy. This latter condition, though extremely rare, may improve asylum seekers’ chances of obtaining humanitarian protection, since it is an evident indicator of integration in the receiving society. Judges also investigate whether asylum seekers maintain ties with family members who remained in their country of origin. Indeed, uprooting makes asylum seekers socially vulnerable and therefore might increase their chances of obtaining humanitarian protection. Not only do judges assess asylum seekers’ integration by balancing different dimensions, but they also consider some integration factors more important than others. In particular, work seems to be the most relevant indicator of integration. Indeed, all interviewed judges pay a lot of attention to asylum seekers’ employment status. I check all the documents in detail, especially those I consider decisive for assessing the asylum seekers’ occupational situation. Thus, I check work contracts and paychecks since the job is extremely important for granting humanitarian protection. (Interview 5)

If asylum seekers can prove they have a working contract at the moment of the hearing, their chance of getting humanitarian protection improves, especially in the case of permanent work contracts. During a hearing of a Senegalese asylum seeker, after asking for clarifications about the reasons for expatriating, the judge moved on to inquire about the integration path focusing on employment: [The judge] asks what has the asylum seeker done in Italy until now and the latter replies that he has always worked and, in particular, now he is working in a restaurant with a permanent contract. The lawyer steps in and specifies that work contracts are attached to the case file, as well as the asylum seeker’s CV [which is defined as “impressive”]. The judge does not ask further questions […]. When the hearing is over the judge comments that he clearly will be granted humanitarian protection since the asylum seeker is perfectly integrated in Italy. (Hearing 3)

Apart from some exceptions, most asylum seekers are more likely to have temporary or seasonal labour contracts and to be employed in 3D (dirty, dangerous and demanding) jobs, which are characterised by poor salaries and unfavourable working conditions. Although these forms of employment are only the tip of the much bigger and more severe phenomenon of asylum seeker exploitation in the Italian labour

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market (Chiaromonte & Federico, 2021), judges consider being engaged in these working activities positively, since having a job (any kind of job) implies contributing to one’s livelihood and reaching socio-economic independence. Living in a reception centre often increases asylum seekers’ opportunities to be employed, though frequently in poor conditions. Indeed, asylum seekers who live in a reception centre can benefit from free accommodation and do not have to worry about having to pay rent or go shopping and, therefore, can accept any low-paid job. However, if the reception centre is a sort of “shelter” for asylum seekers—which may increase their chances of getting a job—not residing in a reception centre does not necessarily mean being less integrated, and judges seem to be aware of this. In this case, judges question asylum seekers about their motivations for leaving the centre, as they want to know if they live elsewhere for work-related reasons. As an example, one judge—before a hearing of a Nigerian asylum seeker—while consulting his files, stated: During the hearing, I need to remember to ask why he is outside the reception centre. In fact, this aspect can be significant since it may indicate a lack of integration if it occurred for disciplinary reasons. But perhaps he gave up the reception system simply because he found work elsewhere, let’s see…. (Shadowing Judge 1)

Indeed, it can also be the case that asylum seekers find a job and need to leave the reception centre since the workplace is far from it. Additionally, a job can also provide asylum seekers with the chance to achieve economic independence and rent a house. The following dialogue between a judge and a Senegalese asylum seeker exemplifies the ambivalent role played by the reception centre as an indicator of potential integration (Hearing 35): J: A: J: A: J:

Do you live in a reception centre? No, in a house. I pay the rent together with some friends. Very good. Why? Is it because you work? Yes, I found a job in another city, and I earn enough money. Good.

Residing in a reception centre—especially if it belongs to the System of Accommodation and Integration—may also offer asylum seekers extra

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opportunities to attend L2 courses and participate in vocational training courses or voluntary and community organisations. It is not by coincidence that, when asylum seekers live or have lived in a reception centre, judges ask them what kind of activities they have conducted there. Indeed, judges believe reception centres can play a crucial role in the asylum seekers’ integration path, although they are aware that this varies considerably among local contexts. In this region, in certain reception centres, [asylum seekers’] integration is easier since they can attend professional courses and then enter the job market thanks to cooperatives’ connections (Interview 5).

To sum up, empirical evidence suggests that living in a reception centre can have a positive effect on receiving humanitarian protection, because asylum seekers have access to some activities which judges evaluate positively and, in some cases, can also facilitate access to the job market. In addition to work, judges positively consider attendance of educational and professional courses, which, as mentioned, reception centres usually provide. During hearings, judges almost always ask for certificates attesting participation in these activities, since educational courses can be considered a proxy for asylum seekers’ intention to improve their qualifications and therefore, increase their opportunities to enter the labour market, whereas vocational courses are aimed at improving their professional skills. This was the case observed during the hearing of an asylum seeker from Ghana: The judge directly asks whether the asylum seeker attended some vocational or educational course. The asylum seeker replies that he passed his middle-school examination and also attended many professional courses, such as classes in pruning, computer, first-aid and safety training in workplaces. The judge asks the lawyer to send the attesting documents to the court since they could be relevant in order to understand the asylum seeker’s integration path. (Hearing 9)

Last but not least, language is another crucial integration dimension which judges consider in their evaluation process, and asylum seekers seem to be aware of its importance. Indeed, while observing hearings, asylum seekers almost always provide judges with both certificates attesting they attended L2 Italian classes and documentation certifying

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they passed the final exam. However, these certificates often do not match the asylum seeker’s actual language level: grades achieved in the exam may either exceed or underestimate their actual skills in understanding and speaking Italian. For instance, during a hearing, a Ghanese asylum seeker was speaking in broken Italian and the judge looked at the language exam certificates and ironically commented that he should have spoken Italian better, due to the high grades obtained on paper (Hearing 10). Conscious of the limited reliability of linguistic certifications, judges have other tools at their disposal to probe asylum seekers’ actual language knowledge: for example, switching the interaction to Italian, especially when asking questions on their integration path in Italy. Although asylum seekers are unable to express themselves in Italian during the first part of the hearing, when they explain the reasons for expatriation, I try to switch to Italian when I move on to the second part of the hearing, which is about their integration path in Italy. I notice that asylum seekers often answer these questions directly in Italian. (Interview 4)

As evident from this quotation and observation, it is extremely frequent that asylum seekers reply directly in Italian to judges’ questions on their integration path since almost all are familiar with everyday life terms at a basic level. However, asylum seekers often find it difficult to handle more complex discussions in Italian. In this regard, the literature shows that asylum seekers’ psychological distress and vulnerability may discourage achieving proficiency in the host language (Salvo & de Williams, 2017), as do lower levels of education in one’s country of origin and past traumatic experiences (UNHCR, 2001). Finally, it is important to stress that in many cases asylum seekers also face challenges in gaining proficiency in Italian because their native language is considerably different in both grammar and vocabulary. People from Bangladesh do not speak Italian at all, maybe because their native language is extremely different, and they find Italian very difficult. However, they almost always work to sustain their family in their country of origin, even if in very precarious conditions. (Shadowing Judge 3)

On the basis of this quotation, speaking broken Italian is not deemed a sufficient condition for denying humanitarian protection as long as this deficiency is compensated by labour integration. Asylum seekers observed

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in court often obtained humanitarian protection even though they were not fluent in Italian at all. Looking at judges’ integration-related considerations, the time dimension seems quite relevant. Although the quantitative analyses excluded time due to inconsistent variations among observations, this feature is not negligible. According to interviews and hearing observation, long delays in asylum adjudication can positively affect judges’ decisions. Indeed, judges do not exclude that things might have changed during the years that asylum seekers spent waiting for the appeal hearing, and a sort of positive association between time spent in Italy and the level of integration is observable. The moment of the hearing [at the appeal stage] is extremely important, especially to assess the criteria for granting humanitarian protection, because asylum seekers can provide new elements and documents attesting their integration path in Italy. Since they last were heard by the Territorial Commissions about three years before and lodged their appeal about two years before, their situation has often changed at the moment of the hearing. (Interview 3)

It is not uncommon that most asylum seekers provide additional evidence of their integration during the appeal hearing, such as a transition from unemployment to employment status, improvement in Italian language skills, participation in volunteering associations and attendance of internships or professional courses. In a nutshell, evidence collected through observation is consistent with other empirical findings in the literature: although waiting time may have a negative impact on asylum seekers, who experience a long and uncertain limbo (Hainmueller et al., 2016), it also allows them to spend more time in activities and establish ties in the destination country (Rotter, 2016), especially ifintegrationrelated considerations matter in asylum adjudication, such as in Italy. Finally, integration is not the only dimension considered by judges. In evaluating the criteria for granting humanitarian protection, one judge stresses the need to add to the integration path in Italy the conditions of vulnerability experienced by the asylum seeker in the country of origin. These conditions may be related to personal characteristics—such as young age or health problems—or to instability or insecurity in the country of origin (Interview 1). Additionally, some national groups may suffer from some of these dimensions of vulnerability more frequently.

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This is the case for Bangladeshis, for whom going back to their country of origin may put their lives at risk. After a hearing with a person coming from Bangladesh who had experienced violence from usurers, the same judge commented: Although what he told me is not enough for granting the subsidiary protection status for inhuman and degrading treatments, we should consider granting humanitarian protection, not only for reasons of integration but also and mainly for his extreme vulnerability. Integration is not the only dimension to consider for granting humanitarian protection, and possible threats in the country of origin should also be evaluated, as provided by the right for asylum ruled by the Italian Constitution. (Shadowing Judge 5)

Other judges argue that they grant humanitarian protection to asylum seekers from Bangladesh for the same reason, confirming that the asylum seeker’s country of origin plays a role. In Bangladesh, many people live in poverty, so they are usually economic migrants. However, some of them fled from an extremely vulnerable situation since they are victims of violence from usurers with whom they incurred debts. This needs to be considered as a reason to grant humanitarian protection. (Interview 7)

Attention to dimensions of vulnerability is not valid only for Bangladeshis, but also for other (sub-)national groups, such as those who come from the Casamance region in Senegal. Before a hearing, referring to an asylum seeker hailing from this African region, one judge argued that there were very low chances to grant subsidiary protection status due to significant improvements in Casamance. However, humanitarian protection could be granted instead, because the asylum seeker’s return to Casamance would have put him in a difficult situation considering his young age and the absence of any family ties (Shadowing Judge 1). Thus, judges’ decision-making on humanitarian protection is an extremely complex process, consisting in an evaluation of intertwining factors. Among them, both the asylum seekers’ personal vulnerability (often linked to the characteristics of the country of origin) and their integration path play a crucial role.

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Conclusions Asylum adjudication is characterised by several sources of complexity. The first regards obstacles and difficulties in implementing international and EU norms in local contexts (Noll, 2005). Although international forms of protection—refugee status and subsidiary protection status—are defined by the 1951 Geneva Convention and ruled by common European directives, each EU country has margins of manoeuvre in implementing the asylum determination system with different organisational models and legal tools. Among these tools, each Member State can adopt national forms of protection in addition to international protection, such as the humanitarian protection in force in Italy from 1998 to 2018. Not by coincidence, scholars in migration studies refer to the notion of “regime complexity” to describe the intrinsically challenging nature of the set of rules governing international protection (Brumat et al., 2021). The second source of complexity stems from the fact that international protection standards ruled at the EU level as well as national ones prescribe a set of abstract criteria (credibility, persecution, vulnerability, risk in the country of origin, family ties) which have to be concretely evaluated and applied to specific cases. Decision-makers interpret them also depending on local contexts. This is the case for the criteria to grant humanitarian protection, and in particular the asylum seekers’ socioeconomic integration in the receiving country, which is considered in the evaluation. The humanitarian protection that Italian judges grant to asylum seekers well exemplifies the importance of studying local contexts and their peculiarities to better grasp the “regime complexity”. From a quantitative perspective, the phenomenon is relevant on its own. Since 2016, an increasing number of decisions taken by Italian judges at the appeal stage granted asylum seekers humanitarian protection instead of any other international form of protection. Thus, from an analytical perspective, humanitarian protection in Italy can be considered a tool to overcome some limits of the EU legislation on asylum and to ensure the right to international protection more broadly. The chapter relies on a mixed-methods approach including the quantitative analysis of humanitarian protection appeal judgements released in 2020 by an Italian civil court and the qualitative investigation of judges’

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opinions and attitudes towards this national form of protection. Empirical findings reveal that the additional criterion of integration is an actual distinctive dimension considered when granting this form of national protection. Although traditional factors—such as violence experienced in the country of origin and other vulnerabilities (young age and health problems)—play a crucial role, judges do not consider them grounds for granting humanitarian protection as frequently as integration-related dimensions. In other words, integration is a hallmark of humanitarian protection. However, it is important to bear in mind that some national groups are more likely to experience some forms of vulnerability—especially Bangladeshis and Pakistanis, who suffer more from violence in their country of origin—and this element increases—all other things being equal—asylum seekers’ chances of gaining humanitarian protection. Furthermore, if quantitative findings show that judges explicitly mention “integration” in almost all their positive judgements, qualitative results reveal that judges are also aware of the complexity embedded in the macro concept of “integration”. Indeed, observing hearings and interviews reveal that judges explore asylum seekers’ integration by simultaneously investigating several dimensions, which—according to Ager and Strang (2008)—fall into the following domains: (i) markers and means (employment in the labour market, attendance of educational and professional courses); (ii) facilitators (language knowledge); (iii) social connections (participation in voluntary associations and/or third sector organisations). Although judges consider all these dimensions when examining asylum claims, work seems the most important in their integration-related considerations. Regression results reveal that employment is a powerful predictor of obtaining humanitarian protection and qualitative findings emphasise that this dimension may also prevail on linguistic integration. However, asylum seekers often have low wages and are subject to different forms of exploitation, which judges anyway consider positively. The importance of the work dimension in obtaining a form of protection can indirectly push asylum seekers to accept unfavourable working conditions “reserved” for them in the Italian labour market, as confirmed by studies and research on this topic (Federico & Baglioni, 2021). This analysis of the complex relationship between asylum adjudication and integration opens new avenues for research. Future studies should enlarge the sample of civil courts to investigate if, and how, judges

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use different interpretations of integration dimensions when deciding on asylum adjudication. Moreover, further research should elaborate on the role that asylum reception centres play in this process. In this respect, it could be extremely useful to explore if local reception centres affect the opportunities for asylum seekers to become active members of the receiving context. Preliminary results in this study suggest that reception centres may increase asylum seekers’ chances of gaining humanitarian protection. Due to the peculiarities of the Italian reception system, it would be extremely important to check if asylum seekers’ level of integration varies according to the reception centres in which they are hosted: Emergency Reception Centres (CAS) or structures of the System of Accommodation and Integration (SAI). Exploring the role of reception centres in improving asylum seekers’ level of integration would significantly contribute to the debate on this system’s limitations. In addition to reception centres, future research should expand on the role played by other actors, especially lawyers. Indeed, asylum seekers are required to prove their integration path by providing relevant documents in the courtroom. In doing so, they strongly depend on lawyers, who are responsible for submitting papers and records to the judge and can therefore be crucial in determining the result of the asylum appeal. Finally, this chapter offers an alternative view on the nature of the waiting time, whose relevance for asylum adjudication had previously been underestimated. On average, asylum seekers rejected at first instance are used to waiting years before obtaining a final decision. The literature mainly conceives the waiting time as a negative experience that “contains, delays and suspends” asylum seekers’ life (Hainmueller et al., 2016; Vianelli et al., 2022). On the contrary, only few contributions consider the waiting time as a potential resource if asylum seekers invest it in activities that improve their professional and language skills, as well as their participation in the host country’s labour market and civil society (Rotter, 2016). This research contributes to this debate by showing that waiting time can also be an opportunity for those asylum seekers who are able to take advantage of it, given the importance of integration-related considerations in asylum adjudication. However, how asylum seekers spend their waiting time does not only depend on their will to get engaged in such activities, since it could be also influenced by many external factors. For example, opportunities to access the labour market vary considerably

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among different geographical areas of the country and chances to improve professional and language skills may be influenced by the specific reception centre where the asylum seeker resides (Federico & Baglioni, 2021). In order to better understand the role of the waiting time, it would be necessary to enrich the analysis by considering the asylum seekers’ whole integration experience, starting from their arrival in Italy up to the moments of the first and second hearing.

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Feinstein, S., Poleacovschi, C., Drake, R., & Winters, L. A. (2022). States and Refugee Integration: A Comparative Analysis of France, Germany, and Switzerland. Journal of International Migration and Integration, 23(3), 2167–2194. Geddes, A. (2021). Governing Migration beyond the State: Europe, North America, South America and Southeast Asia in a Global Context. Oxford University Press. Gill, N., & Good, A. (2019). Asylum Determination in Europe. Springer. Gill, N., Hoellerer, N., Allsopp, J., Burridge, A., Fisher, D., Griffiths, M., & Vianelli, L. (2022). Rethinking Commonality in Refugee Status Determination in Europe: Legal Geographies of Asylum Appeals. Political Geography, 98, 102686. Grzymala-Kazlowska, A., & Phillimore, J. (2018). Introduction: Rethinking Integration: New Perspectives on Adaptation and Settlement in the Era of Super-Diversity. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 44(2), 179–196. Hainmueller, J., Hangartner, D., & Lawrence, D. (2016). When Lives Are Put on Hold: Lengthy Asylum Processes Decrease Employment among Refugees. Science Advances, 2(8), e1600432. Hamlin, R. (2014). Let Me Be a Refugee: Administrative Justice and the Politics of Asylum in the United States. Oxford University Press. Heckmann, F., & Schnapper, D. (2003). The Integration of Immigrants in European Societies: National Differences and Trends of Convergence. Lucies & Lucius. Jaeger, G. (2001). On the History of the International Protection of Refugees. International Review of the Red Cross, 83(843), 727–738. Jann, B. (2014). Plotting Regression Coefficients and Other Estimates. The Stata Journal: Promoting Communications on Statistics and Stata, 4, 708–737. Khosravi, S. (2014). Waiting. In B. Anderson & M. Keith (Eds.), Migration: A COMPAS Anthology (pp. 66–77). COMPAS. Kosyakova, Y., & Brenzel, H. (2020). The Role of Length of Asylum Procedure and Legal Status in the Labour Market Integration of Refugees in Germany. SozW Soziale Welt, 71(1–2), 123–159. Kristjansdottir, E., & Dis Skaptadottir, U. (2018). “I’ll Always Be a Refugee.” The Lived Experiences of Palestinian Refugee Women of Moving to a Small Society in Iceland. Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies, 17 (3), 389– 404. Lauterpacht, E., & Bethlehem, D. (2003). The Scope and the Content of the Principle of Non-Refoulement: Opinion. In E. Feller, V. Türk, & F. Nicholson (Eds.), Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection (pp. 87–177). Cambridge University Press.

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Lawrence, B. N., & Ruffer, G. B. (2015). Adjudicating Refugee and Asylum Status: The Role of Witness, Expertise, and Testimony. Cambridge University Press. Mendola, D., & Busetta, A. (2018). Health and Living Conditions of Refugees and Asylum-Seekers: A Survey of Informal Settlements in Italy. Refugee Survey Quarterly, 37 (4), 477–505. Ministry of the Interior (2020). Quaderno statistico dal 1990 al 2020. Available online at: http://www.libertaciviliimmigrazione.dlci.interno.gov.it/sites/ default/files/allegati/quaderno_statistico_per_gli_anni_1990_2020.pdf Mood, C. (2010). Logistic Regression: Why We Cannot Do What We Think We Can Do, and What We Can Do About It. European Sociological Review, 26(1), 67–82. Neumayer, E. (2005). Bogus Refugees? The Determinants of Asylum Migration to Western Europe. International Studies Quarterly, 49(3), 389–409. Noll, G. (2005). Proof, Evidentiary Assessment and Credibility in Asylum Procedures. Martinus Nijhoff Publisher. Petrovic, N. (2020). Storia del diritto di asilo in Italia, 1945–2020: le istituzioni, la legislazione, gli aspetti socio-politici. FrancoAngeli. Phillimore, J. (2021). Refugee-Integration-Opportunity Structures: Shifting the Focus from Refugees to Context. Journal of Refugee Studies, 34(2), 1946– 1966. Putnam, R. D., Leonardi, R., & Nanetti, R. Y. (1993). Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton University Press. Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. Simon and Schuster. Rotter, R. (2016). Waiting in the Asylum Determination Process: Just an Empty Interlude? Time and Society, 25(1), 80–101. Ruokolainen, H., & Widén, G. (2020). Conceptualising Misinformation in the Context of Asylum Seekers. Information Processing & Management, 57 (3), 1–14. Salvo, T., & de Williams, A. C. (2017). “If I Speak English, What Am I? I Am Full Man, Me”: Emotional Impact and Barriers for Refugees and Asylum Seekers Learning English. Transcultural Psychiatry, 54(5–6), 733–755. Schenner, J. K., Cavanna, P., & Ollus, N. (2019). Asylum-Seekers and the “Hyper-Precarity Trap” in Austria, Finland and Italy. Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research, 25(1), 81–99. Spencer, S. (2011). The Migration Debate. The Policy Press. Spencer, S., & Charsley, K. (2016). Conceptualising Integration: A Framework for Empirical Research, Taking Marriage Migration as A Case Study. Comparative Migration Studies, 4(18), 1–19. UNHCR. (2001). Chapter 2.6: Fostering Independent Communication: Language Training Programs for Adult Resettled Refugees. In UNHCR

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CHAPTER 13

Past Migration and Current Challenges to Citizenship and Integration: The Chilean Migration in Italy Maria Grazia Galantino and Francesca Messineo

Introduction The public and scholarly debate on migration often tends to emphasise the newness of today’s migratory patterns and only a few contributions offer a comparison between past and present immigrants in Europe.1 In line with Bertossi et al. (2021), we claim that research about old migrations can help us to identify parallel processes and developments that connect past trajectories to the present. Undeniably, today’s immigration and integration take place in a context which has considerably changed 1 Among the few exceptions, see Lucassen et al. (2006) and the special issue of Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies edited by Bertossi et al. (2021).

M. G. Galantino (B) · F. Messineo Department of Social Sciences and Economics, Sapienza University of Rome, Rome, Italy e-mail: [email protected] F. Messineo e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. Fauri and D. Mantovani (eds.), Past and Present Migration Challenges, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39431-7_13

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in the last decades, particularly in more recent immigration countries like Italy. Drawing on Lucassen et al. (2006), we can point out three main distinctive features of this new context: (i) the role of the state in controlling flows and intervening in integration processes; (ii) the different characteristics of new immigrants, particularly regarding culture and “race”; (iii) the intensification of transnationalism. To begin, we will discuss these features in order to understand to what extent they are convincingly new and if there are any continuities with the past. We will then present a case study which examines the process of access and integration of one of the first extra-European groups migrating to Italy: the Chileans. We organise the case study’s discussion by focusing on the above-mentioned features, which had a very significant role in shaping the integration path of Chileans in Italy: the role of the state and other political and social institutions; the characteristics of these immigrants and their participation in the public sphere; the role of transnational networks and communities. In the final section, we argue that, in spite of its peculiarities, the Chilean case can offer insights not only for studying more recently arrived immigrants, but also for understanding integration processes and identifying levers that might contribute to migrants’ inclusion. At a more general level, this case study is meant to contribute to the ongoing debate about migration and integration acknowledging the added value of past experiences for the present.

Migration and Integration Between Novelty and Continuity From a long-term perspective, the power of the state to control immigration and shape integration processes has increased over time, particularly in Europe. After the Second World War, as a consequence of the extension of welfare states’ functions implicitly and explicitly based on the distinction between “citizens” and “aliens”; in the last quarter of the twentieth century, as a direct effect of the development of immigration and integration policies (Lucassen et al., 2006). Both have strengthened the role of the state in regulating who is admitted to the country and who holds citizenship rights. More generally, citizenship is both a key institution for the inclusion or the exclusion of subjects in modern societies (Joppke, 2010) and a multidimensional concept in which institutional, socio-political and identitarian features coexist and are inextricably related (Isin & Turner, 2002; Mindus, 2014). From a legal and institutional

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perspective, citizenship is a formal status by virtue of which individuals are granted a set of substantive rights and are subject to certain obligations. At this level, while remaining the main regulatory power, the state faces multiple challenges to the “national” citizenship model, in the direction of dual, multiple or supranational forms of citizenship (Bauböck, 2010; Bosniak, 2001; Kivisto & Faist, 2007; Sassen, 2002; Soysal, 1994), or more simply towards a de-nationalisation of citizenship (Sassen, 2008; Wihtol de Wenden, 1992). The expansion of the institution of dual citizenship over the past decades (Brøndsted Sejersen, 2008) is an exemplary indicator of the reshuffling that immigration causes in terms of the clear-cut correspondence between territory, population and citizenship. As Joppke notes: “dual citizenship breaks with the segmental logic of the classic nation-state, according to which an individual can belong to only one state at a time” (Joppke, 2003, 441). Further challenges stem from social practices of citizenship. From a socio-anthropological point of view, citizenship has to be understood as the ways in which common values are elaborated in everyday life and practices, determining an individual’s access to specific resources (Giddens, 1984; Turner, 1993). From this perspective, citizenship has an important relational dimension, which focuses on the ways in which social relations and representations of the self are constructed by means of the interaction among institutions, collective and individual actors (Bloemraad & Sheares, 2017). Immigrants and their children express composite and changing loyalties, often revealing a misalignment between national belonging and cultural identity. To underline that the ethnos no longer coincides entirely with the demos (Benhabib, 2008), Joppke (2007) uses the concept of civic citizenship, which highlights the importance of the subject’s presence on the national territory and his/her adherence to the civic principles and values of the political community, in opposition to the concept of ethnic citizenship based on the belonging to a “community of identity”. Today, an international trend towards citizenship policies’ liberalisation can be observed and processes of citizenship from below are redefining the actual content of citizenship (Ambrosini, 2016). Moreover, governance at the local level (i.e. city authorities) is increasingly important in civic integration implementation (Caponio & Borkert, 2010) and in defining who enjoys the rights that ensure substantive citizenship. Nevertheless, legal recognition of civic citizenship by state institutions proves to be difficult in many countries—as it is in Italy—and, according to some,

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the rise of nativism and xenophobia signals a return to an ethnic notion of citizenship (Aime, 2020; Bertossi, 2016). Other non-state actors, like parties, churches, unions, third-sector or voluntary organisations, NGOs, social movements, informal groups and individual citizens have also been important in past experiences of settlement and integration, and are still important today (Zincone, 2006). In the past, in Italy, these activities were deeply rooted in catholic and left-wing subcultures, whereas today the non-profit sector is a substantial institutional and professional partner in the delivery of social and care services (Ranci, 2015). Since the provision of reception and integration services is nationally planned, but its effective implementation largely relies on the local level, the role of non-state actors, as well as the quality of their services, appears quite diverse and fragmented (Caponio, 2006, 2008). As a result, migrants’ access to social rights is highly dependent on municipal or regional institutions, local political agendas and economic resources, and third-sector organisations (Barberis, 2010). The activism of local civil society organisations is fundamental for the integration of migrants in Italy, not only because they provide fundamental services, but also because they carry out advocacy campaigns and offer protection from discrimination (Ambrosini, 2014). Similarly, migrant “ethnic” organisations represent important nodes of the networks connecting migrants, institutional actors, and local voluntary or third-sector actors (Caselli, 2010). A further factor of newness is, according to many, the diverse phenotypical and cultural characteristics of recent immigrants. More than national origins and ethnicity, race—or skin colour—and religion emerge as the primary markers of the “new” otherness. At the beginning of the twenty-first century—and particularly in correspondence to the socalled “refugee crisis” and the terrorist attacks in European cities in 2015 and 2016—the link between migration and Islamic terrorism became so embedded in political and media discourses that they looked like one and the same problem (Galantino, 2022). Paraphrasing Melossi (2003, 376), we can say that the otherness of the stranger and the otherness of the terrorist are collapsed in the social portrayal of the “Islamic terrorist immigrant”. Following the lead of Samuel Huntington (1993), politicians and commentators of different sorts often portray the new Muslim presence in Europe against the backdrop of an age-old “clash of civilisations” between the West and the Islamic world, feeding a long-standing Western

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discourse of Orientalism and fear of Islam (Said, 1978). The understanding of migration as a security threat for Europe has thus further reinforced an image of a racialised other which is constructed mainly on religious bases, carrying with it the implication that immigrants with a Muslim background are “non-integrable” in Western democratic societies (Kumar, 2010; Morin, 2016; Mythen et al., 2009; Powell, 2011; Poynting, 2004). This vision reflects both a misperception of factual immigration data and a normative assumption regarding diversity. In the case of Italy, the claim that we are confronting an “Islamic invasion of Europe” is not supported by any empirical evidence. Despite an increase in the number of arrivals from Muslim-majority countries (Egypt, Tunisia, Bangladesh, Syria and Afghanistan) in the last few years, most foreign citizens registered as permanent residents or holders of residency permits are nationals of Eastern European and Balkan countries. ISMU (2022) estimates that the number of Christians of different affiliations, albeit in slight decrease, was twice that of Muslims in 2022. The often-implicit assumption beneath the novelty of today’s immigrants is that intra-European migrants, and especially internal migrants, were culturally and physically much more similar to the population of the host societies, thus easier to integrate. This claim ignores that race, and even colour, is a highly elastic concept and subject to changes in social constructions of difference. In her book about past and present immigrants in New York, Foner (2000) shows that a hundred years ago Jewish and Italian immigrants were seen as racially different from and inferior to people with origins in Northern Europe and they were believed to have distinct biological features, mental abilities and innate character traits. In the Fifties and Sixties, Italians moving to more industrialised European countries were also subject to racialisation processes and they maintained a racial stigma for a very long time during the integration process. Even internal migrants, moving from the poorer South to the richer North of the country, did not escape discrimination based on alleged cultural and personality attributes. The same attitudes were encountered by newcomers of the past in other countries, like the Turks in Germany or the beurs (second-generation Algerian migrants) in France, for reasons which are not strictly related to actual phenotypical or cultural differences. Transnationalism scholarship has also examined the changing features of integration. Early contributions considered migrants’ cross-border connections and persistent relations with their societies of origin to

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be a novelty, due to changes in transport, communication technology, and attitudes of receiving societies (Glick Schiller et al., 1992). More recently, studies acknowledge the presence of transnational practices in the past and emphasise the added value of the concept of transnationalism in illuminating links between contemporary migration processes and their historical precedents (Foner, 2007; Morawska, 1999; Portes, 2001; Smith, 2003; Waldinger & Fitzgerald, 2004). One of the most debated arguments for discontinuity with the past is the idea that the advent of de-territorialised and post-national social systems (among others, see Glick Schiller & Fouron, 1999) and the rise of an international human right regime would diminish the gap between nationals and foreigners (Spiro, 2010), thus restricting the power of the state and the scope of assimilation. As we have already argued, if the responsibility of defining citizenship lies with domestic institutions, the path towards a new international regime should be hardly taken for granted. Moreover, immigration policies regulating migrants’ mobility and social rights contribute to processes of civic stratification (Jasso, 2011; Morris, 2002) and internal differentiation between diverse categories of non-citizens (Zetter, 2007). Underemployment, discrimination and xenophobia in the country of residence can easily lead to isolation and identity frictions, which, conversely, can incentivise transnational practices and facilitate the development of a “reactive identity” in opposition to a social context which is perceived as exclusionary (Waldinger, 2017). In sum, symbolic and socio-economic discrimination, as well as the degree and the scope of the civil and socio-cultural rights migrants can enjoy in the society of residence are crucial for integration (Itzigsohn & GiorguliSaucedo, 2005; Snel et al., 2006), but they are largely the outcomes of policies which remain nationally defined and culturally embedded. The notion of transnationalism as opposed to assimilation has also been the object of many criticisms. Morawska (2003, 133) claims that the transnational involvement of migrants and their assimilation are concurrent processes producing “varieties of transnationalism-withassimilation combinations”. According to Kivisto (2001, 551), transnationalism should be considered as a “subset of assimilation”: resistance to the dominant culture and the maintenance of strong group identities can be viewed as one of the various outcomes of the assimilation process, alongside acculturation and incorporation. Because identification with the host culture grows over time, the persistence of transnationalism over time and for future generations cannot be assumed ex-antes

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(Kivisto, 2001). Although transnational practices and relationships tend to become more residual in subsequent generations’ experiences, scholars also emphasise the long-term implications of transnational socialisation on personal and family life and on broad processes of cultural reproduction (Vertovec, 2009) as well as the potential benefits individuals can derive from transnational competences and relationships (Erdal, 2020). These perspectives maintain that transnational practices do not necessarily hinder integration, but they can also facilitate upward mobility in the host society. Using the concept of “segmented assimilation” to account for different trajectories of adaptation, Portes and Zhou (1993) observe that children of migrant populations with more in-group resources are less likely to sever ethnic ties. Therefore, taking advantage of the material and immaterial resources that the group offers can become a “rational” strategy for countering the downward assimilation pathway rather than serve as a barrier to integration (Portes, 2003; Portes & Rumbaut, 2001). More recent research also suggests that migrants’ transnationalism cannot be interpreted as a set of marginal activities, characterising the experiences of less skilled and recently arrived migrants only (Chaudhary & Moss, 2019; Waters, 2011), but it is often associated with a solid economic and legal status of migrants and their descendants in the host society. Moreover, participation in ethnic organisations and political groups oriented towards the country of origin offers a sort of training for engagement in the host country’s public sphere (Miller, 2011; Waldinger, 2014) and it can help to strengthen social relations with the local civil society (Jacobs & Tillie, 2004; Pilati & Herman, 2020).

The Case Study: Chileans and Their Children in Italy The Chileans were among the first extra-European immigrants to arrive in Italy, forcibly driven out of their country by Augusto Pinochet’s military golpe against the socialist government of Salvador Allende on 11th September 1973. While they may be considered as “new” immigrants in an international periodisation (studies on the United States, for instance, draw the line in the post-war period), they are relatively “old” in the European and especially in the Italian context. Until the end of the Seventies, Italy was an emigration country and migrants were mainly internal ones, moving from the poorer South to the North of the country or from rural to industrial areas. Major changes in Italian immigration occurred

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in the Nineties when foreign citizens living in the country outnumbered Italians moving abroad and specific legislation and policies were adopted to regulate entry and stay (Pugliese, 2006). Studying the experience of past immigrants and the factors that may have facilitated (or hindered) their social inclusion is thus useful not only to emphasise both novelty and continuity with present experiences but also to identify levers that might contribute to migrants’ inclusion. Empirical material for the case study was collected from different sources: historical accounts and literature; data collected by the Italian National Statistics Office (ISTAT) in the survey about non-EU citizens (ISTAT, 2021); data collected by the Chilean National Statistical Agency (INE) in a 2016 survey on the Chilean population living abroad (INE, 2017); in-depth interviews to representatives of Chilean political and civic organisations based in Italy; semi-structured interviews to Chilean citizens during the 2022 presidential elections in Chile, carried out at the Chilean Consulates in Rome and Milan.2

The Permissive Role of the State: Unprecedented Actions in a Loose Legal Framework The Chileans’ migration to Italy took place in a unique political context marked by widespread public attention and an active reaction from national and international institutions. Furthermore, it occurred in the legislative vacuum of Italian migration legislation and policy prior to the Nineties. These two factors, combined with the low number of foreign citizens living in the country at the time, established the conditions for state institutions to assume a relatively permissive posture towards incoming Chileans and to take some unprecedented actions to facilitate their entry and inclusion. The Italian embassy in Santiago de Chile was an important institutional actor. Soon after the golpe, several Latin-American and European embassies gave shelter to political opponents trying to escape the violence of the repression and, ultimately, to obtain a safe-conduct to leave the country. The Italian embassy became a well-known asylum site, with individuals jumping over the wall of the building at night. In this difficult 2 Most data were collected for the Ph.D. project of Francesca Messineo at the Doctoral School of Social Sciences and Economics, Department of Social Sciences and Economics, Sapienza University of Rome.

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situation, it proved to be essentially the autonomous actions taken by the young diplomats Piero De Masi, Tomaso de Vergottini and Roberto Toscano in the face of the Italian government’s absenteeism, which, while not impeding the diplomats’ efforts, initially demonstrated minimal cooperation.3 The interruption of official diplomatic relations between Italy and Chile, following the Italian refusal to recognise the military junta as the legitimate government of Chile,4 though, made it particularly difficult to ask for the release of safe-conduct permits for those sheltered in the embassy. The situation came to a turning point in November 1973, when the military junta accepted to recognise the asylum seekers as “diplomatic refugee”, a category not codified in international laws but largely used in Latin America. Notably, the Italian one was the only one that continued accommodating refugees until the beginning of 1975, when the issuance of safe-conducts was discontinued. Indeed, the active role played by the Italian diplomatic institutions was a major cause of conflict between the two countries,5 preventing the normalisation of diplomatic relations. Overall, it has been estimated that between two and three thousand people were hosted in the Italian embassy and then expatriated to Italy between 1973 and 1975 (Rebolledo González, 2010). Despite the strong commitment of the diplomatic institutions, the Italian government initially refused to accept Chilean refugees, fearing they might fuel revolutionary ideologies at home. The legal basis for this position was a clause added to the Geneva Convention on asylum signed in 1954, which introduced a “geographical constraint” granting the status of political refugees only to European citizens (Fonzo, 2019). Thanks to the pressure exerted by a large span of civil society and political organisations sympathetic to the Chilean cause, as well as by international organisations such as the UNHCR, the Italian State eventually accepted to host Chilean refugees at the end of October 1973. Despite the initial reluctance, Chilean exiles, who arrived by means of diplomatic channels, were provided with accommodation, health care and some social assistance by the Amministrazione per le Attivit`a Assistenziali Italiane e 3 As Toscano reports about decisions made at that time: “[De Masi] sent to Rome telegraphic dispatches that began: ‘unless specified otherwise’. Obviously, the ministry never specified otherwise” (2013 in Fonzo, 2019, 189). 4 A position held by Italy, Cuba and the Soviet Union only. 5 The conflict reached its peak in 1974, when the Chilean government threatened to

expel de Vergottini, who did not hold a regular permit for staying in the country.

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Internazionali (Aai), in cooperation with the International Red Cross. Soon after, they were also granted permanent permits of stay and some advantages for entering the labour market.6 This made the Chileans a highly privileged group, compared with the other refugees’ populations present in the Italian territory at that time, who could not rely on similar reception services and rights. A woman who arrived by means of diplomatic channels describes her experience as follows: My two older brothers and my father escaped through the Italian embassy, they are part of the group of people that flew from the dictatorship by jumping the wall of the Italian embassy in Santiago. My mother, my younger brother and I worked for the reunification of the family in Italy. I did plenty of research, I visited many offices… In the end, the IOM, an international organisation for migration by the UN, helped us leave Chile. They made the planes available and provided us, and many other Chileans, with flight tickets. Our exile started in this way, and it was very painful. It was like our lives were borrowed… The house was borrowed, the food was borrowed, and it wasn’t really ours. It was a very hard condition for us to accept. (Interview with an anonymous former-exile Chilean activist online, November 2021)

Nonetheless, these provisions introduced a distinction between refugees and “economic migrants”: only those who arrived by means of diplomatic channels had privileged access to services, whereas all the Chileans who arrived in Italy through other means were not entitled to the refugee status and the related rights. This different treatment did not consider that there are: situations in which it is difficult to clearly establish the boundary between political exiles – those whose life is in danger – and exiles for politicaleconomic reasons, whose life is not in danger but, due to their political choices, cannot work or study in their own country. This is a typical dimension of exile in the extreme South of Latin America, where the persecution of leftists by military dictatorships has been so pervasive as to make it

6 According to a Circular issued in 1963, the Offices of Labour had to first check if there were Italian workers and, only if none were available, could they hire foreign people. An expectation was introduced for Chilean refugees in March 1974. The Italian Ministry of Labour communicated to the provincial Offices of Labour that they should be employed regardless of the availability of Italian workers (Fonzo, 2019).

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impossible for them to stay in the country. (Rebolledo González, 2010, 115)

In sum, the Italian State undertook unprecedented initiatives to help the Chilean refugees. Despite initial hesitations and thanks to the pressure exerted by other actors—such as the diplomats stationed in Chile, left-wing political parties and civil society organisations, and supranational actors—the role of national institutions in the reception and integration of the Chilean was fundamental. In these regards, Fonzo (2019) maintains that the Chileans’ experience contributed also to opening the debate about the abolition of the “geographical constraint” in Italy, which became effective in 1990, with the ratification of the so-called Legge Martelli (law no. 39/1990), the first law attempting to regulate the presence and the access of migrants. As declared by the cultural attaché of the Chilean Embassy in Rome,7 approximately 14,000 Chileans lived in Italy during the Seventies. With the lifting of the restrictions on return in the Eighties and the end of forced exile in 1988,8 many former refugees living in Italy returned to Chile, but many others chose to stay. The path to integration of the latter ones was strongly influenced by rules for citizenship acquisition in both countries. Chilean citizenship law is largely based on ius soli. Before 2005, when an important Constitutional reform on nationality was ratified, children of a Chilean parent born abroad were required to return and live in Chile for at least one year in order to become citizens, and the acquisition of a second citizenship was not allowed. The same law also established the loss of nationality for those who had committed crimes against the dignity and interests of the State.9 Therefore, many exiles and the great majority of their born-abroad children did not hold Chilean citizenship, a condition which made easier—and more desirable—access to the Italian one.

7 Interview with the cultural attaché of the embassy of Chile in Rome (October 2021). 8 This move was an attempt to give legitimacy to the oncoming referendum—envisaged

by the 1980 Constitution—in which citizens were asked if they wanted to give Pinochet another eight-year mandate. The victory of the “no” (56%) led to free elections and a soft transition to democracy, characterised by strong institutional continuity (Stabili, 2008). 9 Citizenship was restored to those who had lost it between 1973 and 1988 in 2001, in accordance with the international standards set by the American Convention on Human Rights.

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In Italy, before 1992, a foreign citizen was allowed to apply for citizenship after five years of residence, and a foreign citizen born in the country was automatically given the status upon reaching the age of majority. Law no. 91/1992 made naturalisation requirements stricter: naturalisation was allowed after ten years of residence, and the requirement of “regular and uninterrupted residence” on the national territory was added for foreign citizens born or grown up in the country. The new law also allowed dual citizenship, but this right was granted mainly to Italian nationals acquiring a second citizenship or to descendants of Italian ancestors, whereas legally resident non-citizens were still asked to renunciate to their native citizenship. In sum, the Chileans—as any other foreign population—could access Italian citizenship thanks to marriage and residence. The recognition of dual nationality in both countries’ legislations determined a significant increase in binational citizens, although official statistics do not allow us to estimate the exact size of this population. Nonetheless, the Chileans too, like most immigrants, are affected by Italy’s failure to recognise ius soli rights. In this respect, we report an interviewee’s commentary about the intersection of Italian and Chilean legislation: Not long ago… if I had a son, this son would not have had Chilean citizenship right away, because obtaining citizenship [by ius sanguinis ] was much more difficult. Instead, now the situation has changed. If I had a son, I could register him as soon as he was born, and he would be Chilean. For me that is the bare least because, for example, [before] if I had taken him to Chile, he would be a nobody, not a citizen. Finally, those are the child’s rights... Italy too has issues on these respects, they refuse to grant citizenship to children born to foreign parents. But then this child… where is he from? I mean, it’s the child’s right to belong somewhere, if he’s not Italian and he was born here, where is he from? (Anonymous semistructured interview conducted at the polling stations - Milan, November 2021)

The Proactive Role of Social and Political Institutions Social and political institutions have been crucial to the inclusion of the Chilean population in Italy, with political parties playing a particularly important role. Even before the exiles arrived in 1973, there was a powerful connection between the Italian and Chilean political

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organisations. The two countries had very comparable party structures (Nocera, 2008; Zaldívar, 2010), characterised by the presence of a strong Catholic-Democratic party that positioned itself as an alternative to both conservative authoritarian and marxist revolutionary parties.10 After the presidential victory of Salvador Allende and the Unidad Popular (UP) coalition in 1970, transatlantic relations between the Socialist and the Communist parties became paramount and Chile became an incubator for political internationalism, hosting activists and intellectuals from all around the world. These exchanges helped creating important transnational networks, which grew exponentially after the golpe. Emblematic in this respect is the figure of Lelio Basso, a socialist member of the Italian Constituent Assembly (1946), who was very active in Chile during the Allende’s government (Mulas, 2010) and undertook a key role in the advocacy campaigns against crimes committed by the Chilean and the other Latin-American dictatorships, coordinating the work of the second Russell Tribunal11 (Monina, 2021). The thick transatlantic relations between political forces, together with the strength of left-wing social movements, importantly contributed to shaping feelings of political affinity between Italy and Chile. Therefore, the echo of the images showing Augusto Pinochet attacking and occupying the presidential palace La Moneda was thunderous in Italy, leading to a coral condemnation by the Italian Parliament.12 These dramatic events provided an opportunity for Italian politicians to reflect on the past, redefine alliances and—not least—assess the risks posed by the presence of subversive far-right groups in Italy too (Stabili & Guarnieri, 2004). Notably, these events were pivotal for the “historical compromise” proposed by the Italian Communist Party and for the emergence of the so-called “Euro-communism”. Overall, the failure of the Chilean socialist experiment changed Italian politics, but the political cultures of host nations transformed the exiles’ ideologies as well (Shain, 2005). The experiences in the host countries, particularly in Europe, were crucial for the so-called “renovation” of the Chilean Socialist Party (Wrigth, 10 The alliance between the Catholic-Democrats reached its pick in the Sixties, during the presidency of Frei Montalva (1964–1970) in Chile (Nocera, 2014). 11 It was a private People’s Tribunal like the one organised in 1966 by Sartre in order to investigate the military intervention in Vietnam by the United States. 12 The only parliamentary group that refused to condemn the golpe was the far-right party Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI).

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2014), whose members grew to understand the unsustainable nature of an uncompromising and revolutionary political stance,13 thus forming an alliance with the Catholic-Democrats, who later became the coalition that guided the transition to democracy (Concertación por la Democracia) and governed Chile for the next two decades. Italy was key for the resistance and the strategical organisation of the Chilean diaspora and exiled government in many ways. Outstandingly, Rome was selected to host the coordination centre—active in more than 80 countries in the world—Chile-Democrático, whose objective was to create a unitarian coalition against Pinochet and to rise international solidarity. In the Seventies, all the three main Italian political parties performed acts of solidarity with the Chilean resistance, financially supporting both Chile-Democrático and the grassroots association ItaliaCile 14 (Christiaens et al., 2014). Similarly, the extra-parliamentary left founded its own—although less influential—solidarity committee called Comitato di Sostegno alla Resistenza del Popolo Cileno. Ideological support combines with practical help for migration and integration, as reported in this interview: I arrived in Milan in 1979 with a scholarship... it was [provided to me by] the Enrico Mattei School in San Donato Milanese, and it was for attending a master… but let’s say that I had this scholarship although they knew that I didn’t have any [qualification], I was not an engineer... It was a declaration of solidarity towards the Chilean comrades. I am not part of the exile, but I was part of the whole group that was outside. (Anonymous semi-structured interview conducted at the polling stations Milan, November 2021)

In the Eighties, when mass solidarity with Chile began to wane in Italy and elsewhere, NGOs, supranational organisations and political parties continued to collaborate with Chilean actors they deemed appropriate to work towards the establishment of a liberal democratic order. At the 13 Interview with Javier Ossandon (Rome, December 2021). 14 The DC found itself in an uncomfortable position: it wanted to minimise the respon-

sibility of the Christian Democrats, but it was also forced to recognise the responsibilities of its Chilean counterpart, who had refused to negotiate with the UP government and initially made benevolent statements towards the new regime. This problematic stance ended in 1975, when the Chilean DC adopted a united condemnation of the Pinochet government.

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same time, ties between Catholic-Democrats on both sides of the Atlantic resurfaced (Quirico & Lomellini, 2014), with frequent meetings between representatives of the Italian government and the Catholic-Democrat Chilean opposition (Nocera, 2008). With the restoration of a democratic regime in Chile in 1989, Italian institutions initially affirmed the importance to keep alive the historical relations and friendship with the Latin-American country, but this privileged institutional connection faded quickly after an initial enthusiasm. Nowadays, very little of it remains, and relations between the two countries are primarily framed within the EU cooperation’s strategies. Another significant area of collaboration between the host society’s institutions and Chilean exiles is human rights defence. According to Eckel (2014), the Chilean cause importantly contributed to the dissemination of the human rights’ regime at the international level: the exiles established several independent human rights NGOs; Amnesty International based its first campaign against torture on the work carried out in Chile; the United Nations created an ad-hoc commission to investigate about the desaparecidos. These transnational human rights networks are still relevant today. For example, the arrest of Pinochet in London (1998– 2000) established an important precedent for the legal concept of heads of State’s responsibility for crimes against humanity. Moreover, in Italy has been conducted the so-called “Condor Trial”, one of the most important trials against Latin-American dictatorships’ human rights crimes (Lessa, 2022), whose aim has been the reconstruction of the entire Plan Condor’s strategy.15 The trial, which concluded on 8th July 2021, has been based on the Italian origin of some of the victims. In this occasion, several Italian unions and political parties chose to bring suit as civil parties by virtue of the formal political ties with their South American counterparts, and of the presence within their organisations of Latin-American exiled activists.16 Apart from political parties and international organisations, in the Seventies, many opinion leaders and civil society organisations expressed

15 The Condor Operation was an intelligence operation implemented by the military governments of many South American states, whose objective was the cooperation for the elimination of political opponents. 16 Interview with the lawyer Arturo Salerni, prosecuting attorney within the frame of the Condor Process (Rome, March 2022).

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solidarity and felt sympathetic with the so-called “Chilean path to socialism”.17 The Chilean exiles themselves played a catalyst role in the development of solidarity movements and demonstrations. They “had arrived in exile with little more than memories of their political project in their bags and these memories were among the first belongings to be laid open” (Simalchik, 2006, 97). Hence, they made themselves visible— and politically recognisable—within the Italian society by replicating the content and the form of their political, cultural and artistic practices (Rolle Cruz, 2010), establishing committees in many Italian cities, and carrying out intense work of sensibilisation and dialogue with the local public opinion. The high level of exchange and reciprocal commitment resulted in the emergence of a shared imaginary that conflated the militant identities of the exiles and of the Italian leftist activists. Summarising, the Chileans have been able to develop steady political relations both in their residence countries and at the supranational level, being the most politicised and organised among the exiles fleeing Latin-American dictatorships (Wrigth, 2014). However, it is difficult to tell whether this was the cause or the result of the international attention they received (Christiaens et al., 2014). In Italy, the international resonance of the Chilean cause opened important participation spaces for foreign activists, allowing them to actively participate in the Italian sociocultural and political life during and after the Seventies. The engagement of civil society groups, political parties and other social institutions, who proactively worked for the inclusion of the Chilean exiles impacted the migratory experience of the group, with consequences that are still visible today. As an interviewee remembers: We, the political exiles… when we arrived here, we had the same symptom of those who escaped from Auschwitz... the syndrome of the survivor. I mean, you feel guilty because you’re alive... not all of them, but a lot of the comrades who stayed in Chile went through torture and killing and a lot of other bad things… So, you feel guilty, and you must continue […] In addition, we were all political activists... Here each one of us kept in contact with its own party, all the [Chilean] parties were organised here, and the militants continued working for Chile. […] Italy was a great 17 Harbour workers in Trieste and Genova refusing to unload ships coming from Chile in order to boycott the regime or the rally organised in Piazza Duomo in Milan on New Year Eve in 1975 are only two examples of these spontaneous expressions of solidarity with Chile.

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breeding ground, let’s say. There was not a leftist government at all, there were no laws that favoured immigration, there was no right to asylum in Italy. We didn’t have any documents... […] But people helped us, the people, the social organisations, the civil society, as it is called now, was very, very active. There was a different cultural background in Italy in the Seventies... So, the Italians also encouraged us, they invited us to organise events about Chile, every day throughout Italy, they invited us. So, each one of us found his or her own place... those who were militants of the Communist Party joined the communists, the others joined the socialists, we joined the ACLI... who are left-wing Christians as well as the Manifesto group, the trade unionists joined the unions… because that was our life in Chile... so it didn’t change. (Interview with Lucy Graciela Rojas Reischel (Messineo & Marzullo, 2021) - online, February 2021)

Exiles developed horizontal ties with the Italian people as a result of these political relationships. This process was certainly motivated by a desire to gain visibility and raise awareness of their cause, but it grew to impact the lives of the exiles at various levels: they received support from the local population for finding housing, entering the labour market and participating in local cultural life. In line with the literature, we can say that they started to claim rights by means of performative action (Isin & Nielsen, 2008). Through these actions, migrants envisage new forms of democratic participation and affirm themselves as part of the national community of the place they inhabit, establishing meaningful relations with the social body and the institutions of the state (Ambrosini, 2016; Anderson, 2010). According to Stabili, this civic and performative conception of citizenship has been very important in shaping the forms of participation of the Chilean exiles within Italian society: The experience of the Chilean exile in Italy seems to have revived an old notion of citizenship, built on the individual active participation to the political life of the community that receive him. According to this view, the concept of citizenship is understood as a horizontal bind, which does not constrain each citizen to the sovereign of the state, but rather binds all the citizens together. (Stabili, 2013, 383–384)

Sharing a political project allowed the Chileans to act and to be recognised as citizens, regardless of their status. They were considered as “people in need” but, at the same time, as political and social actors with

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their own agency. Notably, they did not experience processes of categorisation based on religious or ethnic traits, and their “otherness” rather assumed a positive connotation. The popularity of Chilean music and literature in Italy was also a resource to acquire recognition. So much so that a former exile18 living in Milan reports that the Chileans and other political refugees from South America always joined local demonstrations all wearing a poncho. Overall, these cultural and political practices contributed to giving visibility to the Chilean cause, captured the interest of the local population and increased feelings of empathy and proximity.

The Chileans in Italy: Characteristics and Trends During Pinochet regime (1973–1989), around one million individuals flew from Chile (Shayne, 2009), a tenth of the national population at that time, and, in 1989, when democracy in Chile was restored, 60,000 Chilean residents lived in the European Community member states (Rebolledo González, 2010). According to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) data, the outflows from Chile underwent a sharp increase in the 1970s and decreased steadily in the following decades (Solimano & Tokman, 2006). Migration for political reasons reached its peak in the decade 1971–1980, while family and economic reasons were majoritarian in the decade 1981–1990, and educational purposes significantly increased from 1991 onward. Differently from the total Chilean emigration trend registered by the Chilean Statistic Agency (INE, 2017), migration to Italy significantly increased after democracy was restored: in fact, 75% of the Chileans currently living in Italy arrived after 1989 and, among them, 30% arrived after 2005 (Fig. 13.1). The relatively higher numbers of Chilean migrants to Italy can be partially explained by the support of Italian social and political organisations and the strong network of relationships within the ethnic group and with Italian local communities, but also by the low degree of regulation which made easier for fellow comrades and family members to enter and stay in the country. Previous research shows that Chilean emigration to specific countries has increased considerably in recent decades, particularly for educational and family reasons (Solimano & Tokman, 2006). These flows 18 Informal conversations between Lucy Graciela Rojas Reischel and Francesca Messineo.

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50% 47.0% 45%

40% 34.6%

35%

30%

27.8%

25%

20%

17.9%

18.8%

17.4%

16.2% 15% 11.5% 10%

5%

4.4% 2.9% 0.4%

1.2%

0% Before 1961

1961-1970

1971-1980 World

1981-1990

1991-2000

2001-2016

Italy

Fig. 13.1 Chilean emigrants by period of time and place of destination (Italy vs. World) (percentage values) (Source authors’ elaboration on INE data [2017])

concern mainly educated youth, who leave Chile because of a relative exclusion in the—highly precarious—domestic labour market, or because they want to gain experiences abroad in order to achieve upward mobility at home (Depolo & Henríquez, 2006). Moreover, the high university education costs in Chile contribute to an increase in the number of migrants to countries with affordable public universities like Argentina (Jensen & Perret, 2011). INE survey (2017) seems to confirm this increasing trend also in the case of Italy. “To satisfy one’s own aspirations” is in fact the reason for migrating declared by 36% of respondents. From the 1990s the proportion of Chileans migrating for educational reasons was always higher in Italy than in other countries of the world. Looking at Italian official sources, the permits of stay for educational reasons issued to Chilean citizens are 7% of the total, while they constitute only 1.5% of the permits for non-EU citizens as a whole (ISTAT, 2021). Qualitative observations and interviews reinforce this interpretation as well. As an interviewee in her thirties reports:

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In 2011, one of the major reasons for the protests [in Chile] was the restructuring of the entire scholarship system... Not exactly grants... but facilitated access to educational loans. They changed the quintiles, and I moved from the last to the fourth, so they took away my aids. Obviously, not just to me... to many people. And this was one of the reasons I dropped out of my studies in Chile; I had to spend too much... Approximately 400 euros per month. [...] They took away my desire to study, and I was thrown for a loop... I didn’t know what to study, where to study, and nothing motivated me anymore. At one point, I said that enough was enough, so I decided to move abroad, and since I needed to study, I chose to do it abroad. Finally, education is the reason why I moved here. (Interview with a feminist Chilean activist living in Italy - online, February 2021)

A second relevant reason for migrating is related to the family. According to the INE survey (2017), migration for family reasons— understood in a broader sense than family reunification—has a greater weight in Italy than in the rest of the world: in the 1990s it was the cause of migration to Italy in 45% of cases, while in the world it stopped at 36% and, since 2001, it accounts for 35% in Italy and for 26% in the world. This suggests that return migration to the land of one’s ancestors, and origin search aimed at Italian citizenship acquisition, may also play a role. As shown by Blanchard’s (2020) research, the holding of Italian citizenship may be the fulcrum of individual migratory project, while for others migration is explicitly aimed at obtaining Italian citizenship by ancestry. The historical Italian migration to Chile—certainly residual if compared to the flows to other Latin-American countries—reached its peak in 1949 (14,098 individuals), while in 1987 there were only 4,710 Italian citizens in Chile (Stabili, 2001). Yet, according to the AIRE census,19 they reached 58,299 individuals in 2017. This is partly due to the country’s increased attractiveness, determined by both economic growth and democratisation. However, a key role must be accorded to the liberalisation of citizenship policies in both countries, which allowed many Chileans with Italian origins to recover the nationality of their ancestors (Pedroza & Palop-García, 2017; Tintori, 2009). According to ISTAT, Chilean nationals living in Italy were 3,238 in 2020 (ISTAT, 2021). This number is considerably lower than the 19 http://ucs.interno.gov.it/files/allegatipag/1263/int_00041_anagrafe_degli_italiani_ residenti_all_estero_-aire-_2018.pdf.

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one provided by INE (2017), which estimates the presence of approximately 16,000 Chileans in Italy (11,000 immigrants from Chile and 5,000 belonging to second or third generations), placing Italy among the five European countries with a higher number of presences. Such a great difference between official sources depends on the different nature of data: ISTAT data come from a census which only includes legally residing individuals with Chilean citizenship, whereas INE estimations include also binational citizens, individuals irregularly residing in the country and Italian citizens with Chilean origins.20 According to ISTAT (2021), Chileans are mainly located in the Northern regions, and there is a relevant feminisation of this population21 (58%). Their age distribution differs significantly from the one recorded for non-EU citizens in Italy as a whole (Fig. 13.2). These differences are more visible for the extreme age groups: minors are 22% of non-EU citizens but only 8% among Chileans, while share of elders among the Chilean population is higher than that of non-EU populations (+5% for those between 45 and 59 and +12% for those ageing 60 and older). Even if more balanced, the age distribution resulting from INE data (2017) also portrays an ageing population more in line with Italian nationals. Mixed marriages represent a solid indicator for assessing the degree of assimilation of a foreign population in the context of residence (Colombo & La Fauci, 2017). On the one side, about 75% of the respondents to the INE survey (2017) declared to have a partner of non-Chilean nationality, who is Italian in 84% of the cases. Consequently, only 24% of those born outside Chile have both parents of Chilean nationality, while the remaining 76% are children of mixed couples. In the same line, ISTAT data on citizenship aquisition show that 26% of the Chileans acquired Italian citizenship by means of marriage in 2019, in comparison to 13% among non-EU citizens (ISTAT, 2021). As no microdata are provided by ISTAT due to the small size of this sub-population, it is rather difficult to account for the socio-economic characteristics of Chilean nationals. The INE survey (2017) provides 20 Furthermore, it cannot be excluded that some individuals with a second European citizenship—for example Chilean and Spanish—are registered in Italy with their European nationality. In fact, of the 998 respondents from Italy to the INE survey, 51.8% hold the Chilean citizenship only, while 48.2% hold also, or only, another citizenship, Italian in 91% of the cases (INE, 2017). 21 Less then the average (62%) of Latin-American immigrant population.

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60 and over

10%

22%

55-59

5%

9%

50-54 45-49

9%

9%

40-44

10%

10%

35-39

11%

11%

30-34

10%

10%

25-29

8%

8%

18-24

8%

6%

0-17 -25%

7%

8%

22%

8% -20%

-15%

-10%

-5% Chileans

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

Non-Ue

Fig. 13.2 Age distribution of non-EU and Chilean citizens in Italy. Year 2021 (percentage values) (Source authors’ elaboration on ISTAT data [2021])

some estimations: 43% of the respondents have a qualification equal or superior to a university degree, 45% have a high school diploma and only 12% have a qualification equal or inferior to a secondary school diploma.22 Occupation indicators show that 62% of the respondents are part of the workforce: 53% are in employment and 9% are in search of employment. Chileans are mainly employees (70%), but 23% are entrepreneurs or selfemployed, and 8% work within their households. Moreover, 24% of the employees work in the public administration, the schooling sector and the social-health field. Besides high participation in the labour market, Chilean citizens in Italy show rather important rates (43%) in another indicator of integration: participation in civil society organisations (INE, 2017). They are active in artistic-cultural organisations (14%), voluntary associations (10%), sports (9%), religious or “ethnic” organisations (8%) and political organisations (7%). The highest participation rate emerges among

22 As these data include all respondents older than 14 years, it is possible that many have not completed their studies yet.

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the very young (54%) and the elderly (51%), while for intermediate age groups participation fluctuates between 38% and 42%. In this regard, the gender difference is relevant: 51% of men and 36% of women belong to these organisations. It is also relevant that almost all respondents (92%) declare to have experienced facilities in their integration path in Italy while a smaller percentage report difficulties (67%). Only 7% reported experiences of discrimination.23 Nevertheless, it is worth noting that something might have changed over time as the youngest reported experiences of discrimination more frequently than the oldest. Overall, the Chileans in Italy constitute an ageing population, well-educated and well-integrated in both the labour market and the social milieu.

Transnationalism as a Driver for Integration In the case of Chilean migrants and their children, transnational networks facilitated rather than hindered integration. As previously discussed, transnational relations at the political and cultural levels fostered perceptions of affinity between the two societies, resulting in a bi-directional and reciprocal process of adaptation (Alba, 2008; Alba & Nee, 2003): the Chileans adapted and contributed to the cultural and social development of Italy, and Italian local civic and political organisations incorporated the specificity of this foreign population within their own structures and practices (Sznajder & Roniger, 2009). The openness of the Italian society and institutions, as well as the active involvement of the Chilean exiles in the local public sphere, enabled them to gain access to socio-cultural and civil rights more easily than other migrant groups. Overall, the exiles’ transnational practices fuelled inclusive attitudes among Italians and increased the group’s social capital, fortifying its position in the host country, thus its opportunities for social inclusion. Perceptions of political proximity were important in this process, but representations of cultural, religious and ethnic similarity also played a significant role. As highlighted in the literature, transnational political activism can lead to active engagement in the host society’s political or civic sphere (Miller, 2011; Waldinger, 2014) and to the gradual abandonment of “diasporic practices” (Kivisto, 2001; Waldinger, 2017). However, in our case study, we observe both a growing involvement in Italian politics and civil society 23 According to an ISTAT survey in 2013, 29% of non-Italian residents reported to have experienced discriminations (ISTAT, 2014).

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activities and the persistence of a diasporic political project (Bauböck & Faist, 2010). The Chilean exiles can be defined as a “diasporic community”, whose typical traits are the existence of a distinctive political project, a performative political identity (Brubaker, 2005, 2017), a high degree of internal solidarity, and the continuous de-territorialised relationship with the origin state (Dufoix, 2011). Notably, the exiles’ political goals have always been inspired by cosmopolitan ideals such as freedom, social justice and equality, causing them to become involved in societal and political issues in the host societies and at the international level, rather than just focusing on the native country. Yet, the restoration of democracy in Chile clearly marked a turning point in the diaspora’s political practices. In the Nineties, most exiles’ organisations were disbanded, and new associations took on the task of preserving both the praxis of political militancy and the social relations created during the dictatorship (Perret, 2012). Furthermore, many individuals stopped thinking about their lives in the host countries as temporary projects and began to see themselves not solely as political refugees but as subjects of rights in both countries. This is disclosed by the activists themselves: most of the associations that are part of the European Network [Red Europea de Chilenos por los Derechos Cívicos y Políticos ], forty and something, are associations that continue to function from the time of exile. Even if they have been renewed over time, they are primarily formed by political exiles, those who did the political work in Europe and the direct solidarity with the Chilean social movements during the dictatorship. Obviously, this has been handed down from generation to generation let’s say... Before these associations were made up of dozens of people, but today each association is about ten people [...] Now however, in addition to showing solidarity with certain causes in Chile, we also want our emigrant rights to be recognised. (Interview with the President of the Red Europea de Chilenos por los Derechos Cívicos y Políticos - online, November 2021)

The politicised Chilean migrants still aim at exerting an influence on the origin country’s politics, particularly regarding the emigrants’ inclusion in the Chilean polity,24 and the respect of human rights in Chile. But, at the same time, they also extended their public engagement in 24 The right to vote from abroad (recognised in 2016 for referendum and presidential elections only) continues to be a key claim of Chilean expats. In more general terms,

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the host society to new issues, such as the diffusion of Chilean culture, the maintenance of their national identity and the social inclusion of all immigrants. The networks built in the past by the first generation continue to represent a social capital that allows new generations of immigrants to engage in political action at many territorial scales (Messineo, 2022). Beyond political activism though, the high degree of civic integration of those who arrived in the Seventies does not appear to have a similarly relevant impact on the experience of subsequent generations, nor to be an advantage for the newcomers. The latter often complain25 about the lack of co-ethnic civil society activities targeted at facilitating their integration in Italy. Solidarity and the provision of services to fellow migrants are characteristics frequently associated with immigrant organisations, and they represent a means of sharing and distributing social resources and capabilities gathered over time. Chilean activism though is primarily expressed in ideological and cultural terms, and does not materialise in solidaristic activities for the community or for assistance to the recently arrived. Hence for “non-politicised” Chilean newcomers it is often hard to connect with—and sometimes simply meet—fellow nationals because they are a small population quite dispersed in the country and not living in ethnic-based communities. Among our young interviewees, for instance, many of those engaged in the transnational social movement in support of the 2019 mass demonstrations in Chile, claim not to have known any Chileans prior to these mobilisations but they treasure this opportunity to build ties. In the words of one of them: For example, I didn’t know any Chileans in Genoa... I only knew one girl, and I assumed there were none more... but due to the protest we got together... and I found that there are more Chileans, and they are leftist and nice and cool... Of course, it’s a political issue... But it was also an opportunity to meet like-minded people. After all, there is a whole emotional component to the committee... that has to do with the desire to

a process of policy diffusion led to the ratification of dual citizenship laws and to the recognition of emigrants’ political rights in South America (Escobar, 2007). 25 Anonymous interviews at the polling stations (Rome and Milan, November and December 2021) and qualitative observations of several Facebook pages of the Chilean community in Italy.

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meet other Chileans, this goes beyond the political goals. (Interview with a Chilean activist living in Italy - online, January 2022)

Second generations do not seem to be involved in political networks either. Their disconnection can be ascribed to a high level of assimilation, which is a result of their parents’ successful integration and of the high number of binational citizens within the group. Together with the absence of racialisation processes, access to Italian citizenship strengthens the sense of belonging and identification with the society of residence (Riniolo, 2020), whereas the connection with the origin country takes the form of a symbolic attachment, which finds little expression in the public sphere.

Conclusions The experience of Chilean migrants, among the “first comers” in Italian immigration history, is characterised by peculiarities and dynamics that can help us deepen our understanding of migration and integration. As discussed in the chapter, these immigrants’ path to integration has been relatively successful and today first- and second-generation Chileans enjoy a good level of educational, economic and social inclusion, especially when compared to groups of other national origins. Some of the reasons for this success can be found in the specific circumstances that led to the Chilean diaspora in the world, which prompt worldwide public attention and strong empathy towards people forced to flee their country because of repression. A strong network of solidarity helped first-generation migrants in settling and participating in the local cultural and political life. Moreover, despite—or thanks to—a loose legal framework on asylum and migration in Italy, political institutions mobilised to ensure them the right to enter and stay in the country. However, after the end of the dictatorship, Chileans continued to migrate to Italy and certainly not all of them qualify as “political refugees”. Nevertheless, the openness and solidarity experienced by the exiles in the past have had a great influence on the inclusion of individuals with a Chilean background in present Italy. How, then, is this experience relevant to highlight current changes in migration and integration? And what does this imply for current policy? Answering these questions thoroughly is an ambitious undertaking that cannot be accomplished here. But we can bring attention to a few points that are related to the discussion in the first section of the chapter.

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First, there is the question of the role of the state. There is no doubt that, in Europe as elsewhere, the issue of immigration regulation has become one of the most pressing concerns of governments at the national and supranational levels. The most striking policy developments towards this goal are in the direction of securitisation and include tighter border controls, increased visa requirements, carrier sanctions, accelerated return procedures, employer sanctions, labour enforcement, detention and expulsion of unwanted immigrants, and changing benefits eligibility. The implementation of these measures has also been possible thanks to more advanced technologies. If technology facilitates migration processes and transnationalism, we cannot ignore that it is also a tool that acts in the opposite direction, facilitating mechanisms of control and expulsion. Furthermore, it has been observed that states use citizenship as a policy response to manage diversity in contemporary society (Zapata-Barrero, 2009). In the 1990s, the academic debate focused on an international policy-shift towards de-nationalisation of citizenship and the acceptance of multiple citizenship, in response to increased people’s mobility and multiple national affiliations (Bauböck, 2010). However, this trend has recently reversed, with several European countries emphasising the need to strengthen the citizenship/nationality link and even re-nationalise citizenship, by subjecting it to restrictive cultural requirements such as language and civic tests. This is certainly the case in Italy, where the longstanding debate on the enlargement of citizenship rights, even in forms increasingly more tempered, has not resulted in any concrete legislative change. This “unwelcoming” attitude of the states is both a cause and an effect of an opinion climate that is increasingly less tolerant towards “aliens”. Particularly in Italy, nationalistic and populist parties have instrumentally used migration to scapegoat the “other” for threatening Italian cultural identity, along with social welfare, security and economic stability. This narrative, coupled with the failure of EU member states to find a shared solution to how migration flows can be effectively managed, exacerbates a debate over the legitimacy of migrants to enter and stay and fuels people’s fears in front of what is perceived as an “uncontrollable invasion”. Today, people arriving in Europe and other countries of the global North encounter a different regulatory and institutional setting, as well as a different opinion climate, than Chileans did when they arrived in Italy in the 1970s. However, the anti-immigrant public debate often ignores good practices and networks of solidarity among today’s civil society,

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which stem primarily from Italy’s long heritage of catholic and left-wing volunteerism (Ambrosini, 2018). During the so-called “migrations crisis”, the spontaneous and bottom-up mobilisation of ordinary citizens all over Europe has shed light on the persistence of active publics that engage in reception and integration practices individually, through informal groups or third-sector organisations. More recently, the number of deaths at sea has also sparked public outrage in Italy, particularly in local communities that directly witness people arriving from the sea. More attention from political actors and the media to solidarity initiatives and practices may pave the way for positive changes in public attitudes towards migrants. Our case study also demonstrates the relevance of civic participation in favouring processes of integration. If we look at the practices of both “former” exiles and new generations of activists, participation in Italian politics and civil society coexists with the persistence of a diasporic political project (Bauböck & Faist, 2010). In-group solidarity and identity can thus be driving forces for engaging in larger projects aimed at promoting human rights, social justice and equality in the country of residence. These are projects that do not focus exclusively on the ethnic community but are cosmopolitan and inclusive, enjoying “the challenges and the richness involved in being positioned transnationally” (Beck & Lau, 2005: 555). Individuals with Chilean background—like many second-generation young people in Italy—do not usually prefer homophilic friendship networks but develop relationships in the social environment in which they live, which is no longer referable to models of interaction between foreigners and natives or between members of national or ethnic groups but rather multicultural and promiscuous (Farruggia & Galantino, 2020; Mantovani, 2015). Groups mobilised for the reform of the Italian citizenship law and, more broadly, for redefining the social understanding of what it means to be Italian represent a clear example of promiscuous networks (Zinn, 2011). The family’s role in political socialisation of youth with a migratory background has also been pointed out by recent research carried out in Italy (Ortensi & Riniolo, 2020). Therefore, not only does the long stay of Chileans in Italy favour processes of cultural hybridisation, but the past, and the cultural background of the exiles, offers younger people a baggage of practices and participatory habitus that favours their engagement in the political and social life of the country. At the time of writing, it is the 50th anniversary of the Pinochet coup and the initiatives promoted in Chile and all over the world provide an

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opportunity to reinforce the memory of that tragic 11 September and consolidate the collective memory of the Chilean diaspora. Collective memory, however, as the “sum of social representations regarding the past, which every group produces, institutionalises, preserves and transmits through interaction among its members” (Jedlowski, 2001, 375) carries with it the risk of mythologising historical experiences thus reinforcing the sense of difference between the past and the present. As well illustrated by Nancy Foner (Lucassen & Foner, 2002), it can contribute to the construction of a mythical past, a process of “invention of immigration” which mobilises historical repertoires to glorify some people and episodes of the past and actively forget others. An imaginary of folk heroes, who were harshly persecuted but worked hard and strove to become assimilated in Italy can have exclusionary functions in that it may foster a view of an incommensurable difference between “old” (good) and “new” (bad) migrants. “Against an image of these mythical heroes and heroines, it is difficult, indeed virtually impossible, for contemporary immigrants to measure up” (Bertossi, 2021, 4167). As we have attempted to show, however, the history of Chileans in Italy, and more generally the inclusion of migrant communities in the past can offer interesting insights for rethinking the present.

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CHAPTER 14

Italian Citizenship and New Generations: The Cases of Italians Without Citizenship and CoNNGI Veronica Pastorino

Introduction This chapter analyses the narratives employed by two Italian collective actors composed of young people with a migratory background while claiming their right to citizenship: the umbrella organisation “National Coordination of New Italian Generations” (Coordinamento Nazionale Nuove Generazioni Italiane, CoNNGI) and the social movement “Italians Without Citizenship” (Italiani senza Cittadinanza). By tracing the discursive dynamics of the re-bordering of their identitybuilding processes, I show how the activists of CoNNGI and Italians Without Citizenship expand and reframe the nation-state’s ideological borders, challenging the link between citizenship and nationality. This work, therefore, aims to contribute to the debate on the possibility of a

V. Pastorino (B) Department of Political and Social Science, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. Fauri and D. Mantovani (eds.), Past and Present Migration Challenges, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39431-7_14

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post-national future in Europe by introducing bottom-up examples from the field. More specifically, the chapter brings the example of a particular category of actors, those named as “second- and third- generation migrants”,1 that challenges the nation-state’s conceptual basis. In the first two sections, I will develop the chapter’s theoretical framework. First, I will introduce in the Italian academic debate the concept of “post-migratory society” as an analytical tool able to capture today’s social controversies. Then, the chapter will progress highlighting how fixing borders legitimises exclusion, which is performed through structural and ideological violence (Balibar, 2004). In the modern political landscape, the principle of citizenship regulates exclusion by marking, ideologically and legally, the distinction between citizens and foreigners in the access to a state’s territory and sovereignty (Brubaker, 1992). Even if the statebuilding process developed independently from nation-building (Linz & Stepan, 1996), the merging of the two elements in the nation-state has been an increasingly distinctive feature of the modern era (Wimmer, 2002). Not only does the nation-state presuppose the monopoly of the use of violence and the standardisation of political governance, but also and above all it develops and maintains cultural and ethnic homogenisation within its borders (O’Dowd, 2012, 160). In countries like Italy, this combination is strengthened by basing citizenship law on the principle of ius sanguinis (right of blood). The legislation based on the ius sanguinis hence inevitably excludes from the citizens’ community certain social actors who are juridically and ideologically considered by this law as “foreigners”, even though they were born on the national territory and consider themselves Italians. This double barrier produced through and by the nation-state can be analytically described with the concept of “double exclusion”. In fact, the combination of the state’s legal regulation and the national ideology leads not only to the formal legal misrecognition of a part of the population that cannot participate in political decisions despite having been born or raised in the national territory, but

1 In this chapter I will only use the term “second- and third- generation migrants” in quotation marks since the two groups described here reject this terminology, because it refers to a reality of migration which most of these actors do not consider fully representative of their role in the Italian community, underlining that they do not perceive themselves as “guests” but as an integral part of society (Pastorino, 2022). For this reason, in this chapter I will use the same terminology the actors use, hence “new generations with a migratory background”, “people with a migratory background”, “new Italians”.

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also to the informal misrecognition of those who, even if formally citizens, do not correspond to the (physical, cultural, religious) characteristics of the imagined (Anderson, 2006) Italian national community (Andall, 2002) and that hence are structurally discriminated (Balibar, 2004). As already illustrated elsewhere (Pastorino, 2022), in Italy the intensive media campaign identifying the migrant—or anyone perceived as such due to their name, dress code, or physical characteristics—as dangerous for the physical and cultural integrity of the national state and its people was one of the main reasons triggering the reaction of the subjects targeted by this denigrating political campaign. As also shown in Milan (2022), starting from 2005, some among the “secondand third-generation migrants” started national associative and political mobilisations moved not only by the desire to reclaim control on the discourse about them but also to stimulate the social and political recognition of alternative narratives. Although recently different movements with common goals have been established in Italy—signalling the resonance acquired by these issues, especially in the last decade—this chapter focuses on two specific social movement organisations: the movement Italians Without Citizenship and the umbrella association National Coordination of New Italian Generations (CoNNGI), whose development processes I will illustrate in the third section. The last sections of the chapter will analyse the narratives promoted by the two groups to identify the main positioning of the actors on the principle of citizenship and hence trace their identity construction dynamics as well as their conception of the Italian nation-state. The results presented are based on an inductive thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2013) of the data collected throughout the years 2020–2022, composed of the written and visual material that both networks shared on their official social media pages as well as semi-structured interviews with both group’s spokespersons. As described further on, by analysing interviews and public statements of CoNNGI and Italians Without Citizenship, I will deduce two main narratives emerging from the actors’ claims. The first narrative aims to expand the conception of Italian nationality including people with a migratory background that share the same cultural and linguistic features as supposedly “native” Italians. In this case, however, the actors reinforce the principle of binding citizenship with nationality, the link that triggered the same dynamics of exclusion that they fight. The second narrative instead focuses on the need to separate the concept of citizenship and nationality, putting forward a concept of citizenship that should

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include new generations with a migratory background not on the basis of their cultural/ethnic features but of their participation in and membership of the Italian social community. Consequently, there is the question of whether this latter inclination is part of a general shift away from a logic of national belonging. Finally, I will analyse the claims of Italians Without Citizenship and CoNNGI through the framework of the (re-)bordering processes linking the two group’s identity construction and the reformulation of national borders. The concept of bordering (Wesley Scott, 2012)—understood as a process that creates (and recreates) a bargaining space subject to continuous mutations of meaning—focuses on the performative creation of physical and symbolic boundaries. The Post-Migratory Society As stated by many authors in migration studies, the constant increase of immigration in Western Europe since the post-war era has inevitably accelerated cultural diversification in social communities (Alba & Waters, 2011). In fact, the exponential mobility in the last century facilitated the temporary and permanent movement of people around the globe, bringing academic focus on the phenomenon since the Seventies (Wimmer, 2002). While early studies mainly focused on migrants’ coping and integration strategies, the significance of ethnic ties, and the formation of transnational communities (Wimmer, 2002), in the new century scholars have started considering migration not as a phenomenon that only concerns a certain social category, but as a central analytical tool for the whole sociological discourse, framing contemporary European societies as postmigrantische Gesellschaften (post-migratory societies). As illustrated by Gaonkar and colleagues (2021), the concept of “postmigration” was first developed in the UK academic context during the Nineties to grasp how people with a migratory background negotiate their identity, de facto questioning the concept of national identity and stable ethnicities. However, only during the mid-2000s, post-migration started to gain more prominence politically and academically, especially in German-speaking countries, thanks to its re-elaboration by the theatre scene in Berlin as a tool for people with a migratory background to

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reclaim control of their labels in society.2 The term post-migration started to influence the academic and political debate on migration, putting forward an approach that considers migration not as a compartmentalised phenomenon but as a feature of modern societies. As illustrated in Espahangizi (2021), the definition of post-migratory societies has taken different meanings in academia: from the more rigid formulations of postmigratory societies as communities structured by experiences of migration (Yildiz & Hill, 2015) to the more flexible ones emphasising the multifaceted political and cultural transformation leading different social and political actors to realise, individually and collectively, that immigration is changing society (Espahangizi, 2021; Foroutan, 2016). This last use of the concept is also useful to analyse Italian contemporary social conflicts on processes of identity and belonging construction.3 Here I intend the concept of post-migration as an analytical principle flexible and informative enough to comprehend and describe current societal transformations through a non-hierarchical vocabulary. Considering that until now the term “post-migration” has never been used in this way by Italian scholars, this work aims to contribute to using the concept as a performative tool of contemporary social analysis in the Italian academic discourse. According to Soysal (1994, 2012), the post-war era was characterised by an increasing importance of individual rights, which started to challenge the conception of citizenship as based on collective homogeneity. Therefore, in a context where constructing itineraries of belonging is detaching from nationality, also the very principle of citizenship, which determines the inclusion or exclusion from a territory and/or community, inevitably started to be challenged at both social and academic levels. Also within citizenship studies, this change of perspective resulted in what has been defined as the “critical citizenship approach” (Isin & Nyers, 2014), which focuses on the contradictions between people’s citizenship demands and the development of new sovereign spaces (Nì Mhurchù, 2014). 2 This process of re-appropriation of their social labels by discriminated groups as a form of resistance resembles the case of Italian and German new generations with a migratory background (Pastorino, 2022). 3 Every identity construction is mainly based on identifying what is assumed as “other”, i.e. not belonging to the group (Remotti, 2010). Practices of “bordering” are hence strictly connected to those of “othering”.

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As I will show in the next sections, these demands can be analysed also through post-state and/or post-national perspectives.

The Nation-State Citizenship and the Double Exclusion In this section, the concept of “double exclusion” is discussed stressing its usefulness to analytically grasp the complexity of the exclusion processes experienced by certain actors with a migratory background in Italy. This concept can help to understand the nuanced—and sometimes even contradictory—narratives of belonging proposed by CoNNGI and Italians Without Citizenship activists. Before illustrating the implications of double exclusion more in detail, it is important to clarify the construct of nation-state referred to by this concept. First of all, it should be noted that the processes of state formation are not universal but historically contingent. Most importantly, nationstate legitimisation is based not only on territorial sovereignty (Jones & Jessop, 2010) but also on its ability to create imagined communities of people that are considered to share the same symbolic background (Finlayson, 2012). While the first assertion results directly from the historical and ideological construct of the state, the second is more linked to the concept of nationhood: in both cases, bordering practices4 are central in determining who and what should be considered a nationstate “outsider” or “insider”. I prefer to use the term bordering (Wesley Scott, 2012) instead of border(s) since it emphasises the performative character of the construction of borders in general, and nation-state borders specifically. In fact, even if the main purpose of identifying the nation-state’s borders is to justify its sovereignty on an identifiable social and territorial unit legally and ideologically, the physical and/or symbolical definition of these borders is never stable but the precarious result of a constant and often contradictory re-signification of socio-spatial processes. Moreover, the concept of bordering can grasp the relationship between the dynamics of identity construction and spatial constitution, highlighting how the former inevitably implies positioning through spatial 4 I will use the term “practice(s)” throughout the text to refer to an “organized constellation of action” (Schatzki, 2002, 71). Practice is hence intended as encompassing the two dimensions of organisation and activity, the latter including both discursive and non-discursive performances.

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differentiations (Wille et al., 2015). Often, as in the case of the social movements analysed here, the spatial dynamics of (re-)bordering included in policies of territorial sovereignty give meaning to claims of identity processes, making the border at the same time the pretext, the means, and the purpose of conflict and of the work of re-signification. The spatial constructions produced (and reproduced) in everyday life become physically and symbolically part of the geographies to which the subjects refer (Wille & Hesse, 2015). The main way of demarcating a physical and symbolic inside and outside is citizenship law, which influences (and is influenced by) the ideology of the imagined community of national belonging. Since the eighteenth century, citizenship has been one of the main criteria in constructing social belonging (Appadurai & Holston, 1996). Specifically, Balibar (2004) highlights that the concept of (universal) citizenship has led to a potential overlap between being “citizens” and “human beings”, implying a process of institutionalised dehumanisation of those who do not belong to the first category. The consequences of this overlap concern not only the category of people who are not officially part of any citizenship community but also of those who move between national borders and even those who remain within the same state borders where they were born but are still considered foreigners. This last category includes, for instance, children of migrants who were born in a nation-state where citizenship law is regulated mainly by ius sanguinis , as in the case of the two Italian examples of this chapter. According to the ius sanguinis , citizenship is obtained through kinship, namely if one or both parents are already citizens of the state, differently from other principles, like the ius soli, where citizenship is determined by the place of birth (Gallissot et al., 2001). The ius sanguinis hence reveals the profound connection between citizenship and a state conceived in connection to a national and ethnic group with precise cultural characteristics (Wimmer, 2002). Therefore, the nation-state cannot be reducible to its occupation of physical space but encompasses and reproduces historical social practices through which it occupies ideological spaces shaping the social actors’ everyday “lived space”5 (Lefebvre, 1991). This permeation—also given that, in the last century, the state (particularly the nation-state) has 5 According to Lefebvre (1991), the lived space, also referred to as representational space, consists in the actual experience of the social actors, which can never be purely material nor purely abstract but a combination of the two (Zhang, 2006).

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become the most common form of territorialisation of political power— may lead to regard it as an ahistorical entity, without considering not only that other political forms existed (chiefdoms, empires, feudalism) but also that new ones are emerging and/or can be imagined (EU, post-sovereign authority, world state) (Jones & Jessop, 2010). This assumption introduces the central idea of the theoretical framework, namely to consider the processes of state and nation formation as connected yet separated realities. According to Linz and Stepan (1996), the state formation processes—which started in Europe after the fifteenth century—did not require any strong sentiment of identification with the state from its population: on the contrary, the ruling elite itself stressed the artificiality of the process. On the other hand, the concept of nationhood—understood as a collective identity-building process— appeared later in history and, in some cases, detached from a state territory. Analysing Central European political and cultural geography, Brubaker (1992) stresses that the understanding of nationhood developed differently between contemporary nation-states. Different connotations of the European states’ nationhood consolidated throughout the nineteenth century and they are also reflected in their current citizenship laws. Nevertheless, in the twentieth century, there was a general increase in nationalist discourses revolving around a strictly ethnocultural conception of nationhood. According to Wimmer (2002), nationalist exclusion based on ethnic features is not just a by-product of the modern nationstate formation: modernity itself is based on these principles. Therefore, the author stresses how even the differentiation between Staatnation and Kulturnation stressed by Brubaker (1992) does not eliminate the distinction between “us” and “them” implied in the state boundaries-making processes. Territorial demarcation hence plays an important role in nationalist discourse formation: this separation, as previously illustrated, is also ideologically constructed, not only physically. Therefore, determining borders legitimises exclusion, and this is performed not only through the structural and legal violence of state institutions preventing those who are not part of the citizenship community from entering the territory (Balibar, 2004), but also through the symbolic mis-acknowledgement of any person considered not to belong to the national “identity group” (Anderson, 2006; Hayward & Ó Dochartaigh, 2013). The problematic nature of this combination inevitably leads to the “double exclusion”.

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Even if these two forms of exclusions often overlap, I still find it analytically important to distinguish exclusion based on the formal and legal features of those who do not have citizenship from exclusion based on the ideological not-recognition of who, regardless of their citizenship status, is (physically, culturally, linguistically) identified as not belonging to the imagined national community. As previously mentioned, double exclusion particularly affects one specific section of the social population: the “second- and third- generation migrants”. Although the latter consider themselves part of the community of the country where they were born and/or raised, they are (i) not always formally recognised as citizens, especially in countries with ius sanguinis , or (ii) even if they are, are ideologically not seen so due to their linguistic, physical, and cultural features. These two forms of exclusion are well described by this episode experienced by one of CoNNGI’s activist. When I attended my final school exam [...] the commission chair of the section asked me where I came from and I replied “From San Lazzaro [a neighbourhood in Bologna]” and she asked me “So are you Italian?” and I said “Yes”. But she didn’t believe it [the interviewee is not white], so she asked me again “So do you have Italian citizenship?” and I said “I don’t know, what is citizenship?”, because I didn’t know it at the time, I was 18/19 years old... and so she told me “But what colour is the passport?”. “It’s green, like the Pakistani one…” and then she replied “Then you are Pakistani, you are not Italian”. There I realised that I was not what I thought I was, namely Italian, because I lacked a bureaucratic requirement. (CoNNGI’s activist, 23th April 2021)

In this case, it can be seen how discrimination played along two binaries: on the one hand, the interviewee was asked about their national belonging because of their name and physical features. On the other hand, the interviewee was also identified as non-Italian through the logic that they were not formally Italian citizens. The double exclusion hence influences discrimination processes where actors with a migratory background are excluded not only from exercising active and passive political rights in what they consider their country and accessing certain public sector job opportunities, but also from symbolically being part of the national community they live in. In the next sections, I will further illustrate the implications of this double exclusion in the construction of the main narratives of CoNNGI and Italians Without Citizenship.

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Italians Without Citizenship and National Coordination of New Italian Generations (CoNNGI) Starting from 2005 with the formation of the G2 network (Rete Seconde Generazioni),6 in Italy some of the so-called “second- and third- generation migrants” started to associate and mobilise politically not only driven by the desire to reclaim their bodies, perceived as exploited for political purposes which they did not share, but also determined to ensure that their voices led to the social and political recognition of alternative narratives (Andall, 2010). Recently, numerous groups7 with similar claims have been established in Italy, signalling the resonance acquired by these issues in the last decade. However, this chapter focuses on the two collective actors, among the firsts organised on a national level since the beginning in Italy, composed exclusively of people with a migratory background who have initiated a structured discourse on the need for self-determination through the terms “new generations” and “new generations with a migratory background”: the Italians Without Citizenship movement and the umbrella association National Coordination New Italian Generations (CoNNGI). As previously illustrated, given the diverse meaning and application that the concept of citizenship assumes, as well as the importance of its ideological and practical implications, it is not surprising that citizenship has increasingly become the product, arena, and source of contentious politics (Van der Heijden, 2014). Like for the cases presented here, instances of social conflict are particularly useful to understand contradictory social dynamics and their power relations: often social movements highlight these antagonisms, making conflictual dynamics more visible by translating them into collective action (Nicholls, 2009). The first collective actor analysed here is the movement Italians Without Citizenship, established in Italy in 2016 with the aim to reform law no. 91/1992 regulating the acquisition of Italian citizenship, as it is

6 The G2 Network (www.secondegenerazioni.it) helped to connect different “secondand third-generation migrants” organisations and individuals and to initiate discussions on issues of identity and self-representation (Andall, 2010). 7 An example is given by the Futuro è ora movement (www.facebook.com/futuro eora/), established in September 2020, or by the movement Dalla parte giusta della storia, established in 2021 (www.dallapartegiustadellastoria.it).

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perceived to discriminate against people who are not formally recognised as Italians, although they feel so having been born or educated in Italy. As underlined by a current local counsellor and active supporter of the movement: Italians Without Citizenship was born from the bottom-up. It is a nonpartisan movement: it has intentionally decided not to support any of the parties on the territory [...]. Only in one sense, this movement is political: it promotes social and cultural change. (Italians Without Citizenship’s activist, 13th April 2018)

The movement was born from the social networks promoted by various activists with migratory backgrounds: There are people from all over Italy among the founders and they [...] connected mainly through Facebook [...]. Then a brain-storming was organised on the issue of the group’s name... a name that wanted to detach itself from the concept of “second to someone” [of second generation migrants] and from the concept of immigration. (Italians Without Citizenship’s spokesperson, 18th March 2021)

After years of adjustments, the bill reforming the current Italian citizenship law was approved by the Chamber of Deputies in October 2015 but it never came to be examined by the Senate. Between the end of 2016 and the beginning of 2017, Italians Without Citizenship organised demonstrations in various Italian cities, as well as formally getting in touch with members of the Parliament and sending open letters to the President of the Republic (Ricciardi, 2017) to push for the approval of the other chamber of the Italian Parliament. The media attention that the movement (Polchi, 2017) and the legislative reform proposal (which promoted the acquisition of citizenship through the principles of both ius culturae and ius soli temperato 8 ) gained, rapidly generated a significant political debate that polarised public opinion on the issue (Della Porta et al., 2022). Even though the law no. 92/1992 was not changed either 8 The proposed law of the temperate ius soli provides for the acquisition of citizenship by those born in Italy from at least one parent who has legally lived in the country for at least five years, while the ius culturae is defined as the principle of law by which underage foreigners acquire the citizenship of the country in which they were born and live, provided they completed educational cycles lasting a certain number of years.

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on that occasion or afterwards, Italians Without Citizenship continues to organise awareness campaigns on this issue through public events, to sensitive public opinion through their official Facebook and Instagram pages, and to send open letters to the ministers in office or the heads of government. The second collective actor is the National Coordination of New Italian Generations (CoNNGI) that was established since its origin in a much closer relationship with political institutions. Although CoNNGI was presented as a social promotion association only in October 2017, the group was formed at the end of 2014 after a public call promoted by the General Directorate for Immigration and Integration Policy, part of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies called “Direct line with the second-generation migrants” (Filo diretto con le seconde generazioni). More than thirty associations in Italy responded to this call, whose aim was to map the so-called “second generation migrants” organisations on the territory and establish a dialogue between the institutions and the new generations with a migratory background. A period of co-planning started and, at the end, a web-community was created and a first manifesto was drafted (Pastorino, 2022). In 2016 a group of twenty associations that took part in this initiative decided to continue in this direction by creating a national network of associations composed of “new Italian generations” with a renewed manifesto. On 13th October 2017, the CoNNGI board finally decided to make CoNNGI a third-sector organisation and, more precisely, a social promotion association. Even though CoNNGI has highly diversified aims, one of its main goals is to give visibility to the new generations with a migratory background at a local, national, and even international level. More specifically, most of CoNNGI’s decisions and collective actions are shaped by its activists’ need to be recognised by other members of society as “new generations” and/or “citizens” rather than “immigrants” or “outsiders”. CoNNGI aims to have the dual function of providing the elements for an (imagined) group homogeneity, both to its members and to external actors, and to start processes of group belonging— among internal members—and recognition—for outsiders. This double work is carried out both nationally, through the leading group’s advocacy and lobbying activities, and locally, through activities promoted by the network’s various member organisations.

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I think that CoNNGI is a platform to enhance the diversity-management skills of new citizens, therefore of young people with a migratory background. And in this task, CoNNGI has two objectives: first, it represents politically and institutionally [...] our everyday issues and difficulties through the member associations [...]. Secondly, the more social goal is to let the new generations come in contact with role models or older people who may have faced and overcome difficult identity issues during their development [...]. So, the social objective is to reach the territories in a capillary way through programmatic planning in supporting children with a migratory background in their growth. (CoNNGI’s activist, 23rd April 2021)

Many of the strategies implemented by CoNNGI also deal with managing the new generations’ voice in the public space: like in the case of Italians Without Citizenship, this is accomplished through public events, social media such as Facebook, and their official web page. CoNNGI also pursues its goals through the activities of the network’s member associations, participation in meetings, dialogue with national and local political institutions, circulation of political documents, and the organisation of an annual national congress. As illustrated in their 2022 manifesto, the issue of political representation and citizenship is among the main points brought forward by CoNNGI, and is identified not only as the possibility for actors to express their will and decisions on a territory that they perceive as their own, but also as a recognition of their Italianness. Our idea of nation starts from regarding citizenship as active and supportive, representing the set of rights and duties of the individuals who are part of the community, who must be considered citizens in all respects regardless of their origins. (CoNNGI’s activist, 23rd April 2021)

Before concluding this section, it is necessary to address in more detail the differences between the two contentious political realities addressed here. The first difference between CoNNGI and Italians Without Citizenship is the centrality given to the issue of citizenship as well as the aim of the network itself, as already mentioned while describing the two cases. In fact, while Italians Without Citizenship’s main goal is to change the Italian citizenship law to include people with a migratory background born and/or raised in the country, CoNNGI’s aim is broader and is not limited to legally recognising the new generations with a migratory

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background as Italians. Secondly, CoNNGI and Italians Without Citizenship are different in their structure: while the latter is a social movement created by different activists and independent from political institutions, CoNNGI is a registered umbrella organisation that originated directly from an initiative promoted by the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies. Therefore, while Italians Without Citizenship can be defined as a social movement, CoNNGI can be labelled as a social movement organisation (SMO). The definition of SMO given by McCarty and Zald (1973, 1218) is that of a “complex, formal organisation which identifies its preferences with a social movement or a counter-movement and attempts to implement those goals” (Walker & Martin, 2019, 167). This definition encompasses the experience of CoNNGI even if one cannot identify a formal social movement whose goals CoNNGI lobbies for. In fact, even if CoNNGI has had a strong relationship with national political institutions since its inception and this has always been crucial in inspiring some of the decisions taken by the leading group, it would be inaccurate not to consider the network of which CoNNGI activists were part of before the establishment of CoNNGI itself. This network, in part created through the activists’ participation in G2 network, hence influenced (and influences) the umbrella organisation’s activities and external alliances by prioritising or deprioritising the issues that were carried out by other groups on the territory. The fight of Italian activists with a migratory background to reform Italian citizenship law and recognise people with a migratory background as Italian is a complex, structurally acephalous network composed of different individuals and collective actors, the majority of which would not see themselves as a unique entity. Nevertheless, the different actors of this network are in constant dialogue with each other—at times explicitly, at times implicitly, sometimes in a conflictual way and sometimes harmoniously—and they influence each other at different levels. Therefore, this network can be considered a heterogeneous contentious political entity with common goals (Milan, 2022). Thus, in the case of CoNNGI, I would use the definition “institutional SMO” to capture the network’s more formalise character, its proximity with political institutions, and its connection to a social movement and/or to an external contentious political network that links the organisation to a broader social movement. It is now important to consider the structural and thematic differences between Italians Without Citizenship and CoNNGI, and therefore the strategies they use to advance their claims. In the next section, I will

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analyse in more detail the narratives that the two collective actors employ on the issue of citizenship.

The Claims of Italians Without Citizenship and CoNNGI: Similarities and Differences This section presents the results of the thematic analysis of the claims concerning the concept of (Italian) citizenship and belonging promoted by Italians Without Citizenship and CoNNGI. The first part of the section describes the similarities and differences between the main definitions of citizenship extrapolated from the collected data, while the second part illustrates the different and conflictual narratives not only between the two collective actors but even within the same group, as well as their political and conceptual implications. Before proceeding, it is analytically relevant to highlight three points while reading the analysis outcome. First, the meaning-making processes of Italians Without Citizenship’s and CoNNGI’s activists are not only founded on individual perceptions deriving from personal experience and cultural backgrounds, but also on both groups’ internal strategic decisions and external influences by political institutions and other collective and individual actors (Snow et al., 2019) of the Italian network of activists with migratory background described in the previous section. Therefore, it is not surprising that the meanings that actors give to citizenship are multiple and sometimes even contradicting, and that the concept’s boundaries are blurred as well as both context- and time-dependent. Second, the processes of defining the concept of citizenship by Italians Without Citizenship and CoNNGI are not totally unstable but become denser and more repetitive on certain themes, enabling us to identify some common threads that help to understand the complex scenario surrounding the two collective actors. Third, the re-signification practices of Italians Without Citizenship and CoNNGI refer not only to a symbolic space but also to a concrete one. Space is here understood, according to the Lefebvrian conception, not only as an always-negotiated social construction but also as an active producer of sociality and its categories (Lefebvre, 1991). A key role in both collective actors’ claims is played by accessing the city’s physical and symbolic space, interpreted as a public space (Mitchell, 2003) where a subject can exercise their decision-making power but also be recognised through their own self-definition.

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As already described in the previous section, both Italians Without Citizenship and CoNNGI extensively use social media for their communication. More specifically, both use Facebook as a platform to make their claims and activities visible to the public. Therefore, here I use both collective actors’ Facebook posts for a comparative thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2013) from the date of the page’s creation (October 2016 for CoNNGI and October 2017 for Italians Without Citizenship) to October 2022. Furthermore, the analysis includes several semi-structured interviews with both groups’ spokespersons. In both cases, references to citizenship can be grouped into two main (related) categories, one concerning what citizenship should be, symbolically and concretely, and one concerning what the Italian citizenship law is today (again, symbolically and concretely). Regarding the first category, both Italians Without Citizenship and CoNNGI highlight two main points: the definition of citizenship as a tool for both recognition and democracy. One should understand the actors’ focus on these two features in relation to their main critique of the current Italian citizenship law: it excludes people with a migratory background who consider themselves Italians. The necessity of legal recognition of new generations with migratory backgrounds as part of the Italian citizenship community is relevant for the actors at two levels: (i) symbolically, a formal acknowledgment would solve the often mentioned dichotomy experienced by the actors making them feel Italians without being it formally; (ii) concretely, it would tackle their exclusion from exercising their democratic rights in the country where they live and consider theirs. This democratic aspect, often declined as freedom of speaking and participating in the public realm, is central to understanding the double exclusion these actors experience, since they already consider themselves as Italian citizens regardless of their formal recognition, and in this way it emphasises the seriousness of their formal and symbolic exclusion from democratic rights they consider theirs. Therefore, regarding the second category, the groups frame the current Italian citizenship law almost always negatively, criticising it and pointing to the aspects that should be modified. As mentioned, Italians Without Citizenship and CoNNGI address as a major point of critique the exclusion from the citizens’ community of the new generations with a migratory background. Even though this group is defined in multiple ways, it is possible to extrapolate a definition valid for both collective actors, who understand new generations as a (constantly increasing) group of people who are born

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and/or raised in Italy and who attend Italian school9 and participate in social activities locally. Moreover, the two collective actors often stress how damaging the lack of formal recognition is for both the new generations and the entire Italian community. For the new generations, the actors denounce that their future is spoiled because they are prevented from taking up jobs in the public sector and/or being free to travel abroad. Moreover, people with a migratory background cannot benefit from state incentives reserved for Italian citizens, hence lowering their current and future welfare standards. For the general Italian community, both groups stress the damaging nature of a law that is not up-to-date with contemporary society and that loses potential workers in whom it has invested through education. Despite these points of convergence, the claims of Italians Without Citizenship and CoNNGI differ in their description of the actors and in their definition of citizenship and belonging. More generally, Italians Without Citizenship tends to stress the damages and distress experienced by the new generations with a migratory background, while CoNNGI often highlights also the new generations’ multi-cultural and linguistic skills, hence emphasising their economic value, activism, and civil commitment to the territory: all this highlights their importance for civil cohesion. This contrast can be attributed to CoNNGI’s proximity to state institutions, while Italians Without Citizenship—external to the political realm—aims at condemning and making their demands as loud as possible instead of compromising to start a formal dialogue with institutions. This divergence is less evident in the first year of CoNNGI’s Facebook activity, due to the close relations between the activists of the two networks, especially in the first phase of their establishment. Furthermore, there is a slight difference in how the two groups frame the concept of citizenship. On the one hand, Italians Without Citizenship tends to frame the people with migratory background’s membership of the Italian community through their knowledge of the Italian cultural and linguistic background as well as through their upbringing and education in Italy. On the other hand, CoNNGI highlights more starkly the new generations’ belongings to the citizens’ community by framing citizenship also as participation, highlighting that people with a migratory 9 According to both CoNNGI and Italians Without Citizenship, school plays a significant role in shaping the common understanding of a diversified Italian civil community.

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background are already citizens because they are present in the country’s territory and everyday life, regardless of whether they are formally recognised as such. In this sense, CoNNGI prefers to frame the new generations as “active citizens” instead of “activist citizenship” (Isin, 2009) in order to show their proximity to the rest of the social community instead of their detachment. In her analysis on the mobilisation for citizenship rights of Italian youth migrant descendants, Milan (2022) also refers to this concept by emphasising that the new generations define the category of citizenship starting from the concreteness of everyday practices of participation. Finally, and most importantly for this analysis, CoNNGI’s claims stress more often the need for a cultural change that goes beyond the legal acquisition of citizenship and includes the full recognition of people with a migratory background as Italians.

The Narratives of Italians Without Citizenship and CoNNGI This section illustrates the two main narratives emerging from the analysis of the claims of Italians Without Citizenship and CoNNGI. It is important to highlight that both narratives were identified in the two groups, even though with different frequencies and emphasis. The first narrative, present especially (but not exclusively) in Italians Without Citizenship’s claims, connects the right to citizenship to the fact that the new generations with a migratory background have the same linguistic and cultural characteristics of the imagined Italian national community. Often, this narrative focuses on the school’s role in shaping common values and knowledge or on living together in a specific local or regional Italian territory. We are talking about 825,000 boys and girls who go to Italian schools and speak the Venetian, Roman or Neapolitan dialect. Italian politics cannot speak of “wrong moments for right laws”, the #ReformationOfCitizenshipLaw is a priority for this country (Italian Without Citizenship’s Facebook post, 29th September 2017). I grew up here, I go to school here. I should be Italian but for Italy I’m not […]. [The new generations with migratory background] are not just a constantly growing part of Italy’s future but already its present, and

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they are settling, dreaming and living in Italian cities. (Italian Without Citizenship’s Facebook post, 27th July 2022)

One can also find this narrative in claims made by CoNNGI, as exemplified by the following quote found in their 2022 Manifesto of the New Italian Generations: The new Italian generations do not experience the same linguistic and cultural barriers as their parents. Indeed, they express themselves in the dialect of their Italian-native peers, they master their cultural codes, they live the entire socialisation process in Italy. Precisely for this reason their scholastic success, their inclusion in the labour market, the possibilities they find to express their identity and their participation in civic life become very sensitive indicators of their real opportunities for social and economic integration, as well as their possibility of success. (CoNNGI’s Manifesto delle Nuove Generazioni Italiane)

Italians Without Citizenship and CoNNGI stress how belonging to the national community is not about one’s skin colour or parents’ origins but consists in sharing the same values and cultural knowledge. However, while the aim is expanding the features that the Italian national community may have—and hence ideologically including black people in the Italian community, for instance—this narrative does not break the link between the concept of citizenship and nationality. In fact, in this case, the elements that characterise “Italians” are not identified in being white or Christian anymore but in sharing other cultural features such as having common values or language. Therefore, the social actors using this first narrative reproduce the same discursive dynamic that is at the basis of the logic that excluded them from being considered Italians in the first place. As Davis and Libertun De Duren (2011) underline, it is important to ask whether the protagonists direct their struggles towards the creation of new institutions that better represent their identity or towards new ways of inclusion within existing institutional contexts. Although members of Italians Without Citizenship and CoNNGI try to reformulate and expand the boundaries of nationality, for example stressing that Italian nationality can include being black and professing a religion other than Christian, they do not discern the concept of nation (i.e. sharing of the same cultural features) from the principle of citizenship. However, it is possible to identify a second emerging narrative, especially among the claims of

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CoNNGI. This second discursive frame involves the recognition of citizenship as necessary for people living in the country to be able to engage in democratic participation and affirmation. So, on the one hand, we are aware that recognition starts from our internal journey and therefore we call ourselves Italians [...]. However, on the other hand, [formal citizenship] is important because it is the basis of democracy […] there is no full democracy if I cannot fully express myself, even at the legal level, even at the juridical level. (Italians Without Citizenship’s spokesperson, 18th March 2021)

This logic sometimes leads to disconnecting the concepts of citizenship and nationality. This divergence is explicitly mentioned during one of the internal meetings of CoNNGI for the renewal of the 2022 manifesto by one of the invited activists and a clarification is offered by the following quotations: What is nationality? What is citizenship? If we continue to think of citizenship as belonging to an “autochthonous” reality, we will never make it because we should become white, celebrate Christmas [...] but Italian citizenship has long been disconnected from the concept of cultural belonging because that is nationality [...]. Citizenship today is a tool that is necessary for a person who lives permanently in a specific territory to exercise all civil rights. This is the new citizenship, and it is no longer linked to the nation. (ConGGI’s activist, 31st March 2021) First of all, we are in that period, let’s say that it is overcoming the idea of a nation-state. Clearly, it [nation state] is a model that was useful in the human journey to define a new step. Today we are over […]. Today someone often says: “I am a citizen of the world”. Now this definition is also good, but in my opinion we still have to get to be citizens of the world. We are certainly citizens projected towards an openness to the world, yes. Precisely due to the fact that the idea of nation-state to which citizenship was connected today finds many more examples that undermine that type of idea [...] because the movements give life to new generations, in some way they mix what belongings are, overlap them and therefore create, as it were, new profiles of citizenship, new cultural profiles. So, a set of elements that in some ways undermine even the image [...] the collective imagination [of Italianness] which we have been accustomed to for years. (CoNNGI’s spokesperson, 30th April 2021)

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What unites the two narratives just outlined is the demand to access (ideological and physical) spaces perceived as their own and considering discourses that exclude them as anti-democratic and unjust, which can be read as a re-signification of the droit à la ville as a fundamental democratic right to be present.

Post-National (Re-)Bordering In this section, I further explore the second narrative detected in the two collective actors’ claims and outlined in the last section in its ideological premises. As previously illustrated, one of the narratives, especially promoted by some of the actors in CoNNGI, defends the rights of the new generations with a migratory background to be part of the Italian community’s ideological and physical spaces by deeming their presence and activity in the Italian territory a sufficient condition to be part of the Italian community. In this way, this narrative does not merely enlarge the concept of nationhood in its ideological bordering to include Italians with different cultural and physical characteristics, but it takes a step forward, totally detaching it from the concept of belonging to the state. Therefore, also regarding the above-mentioned differentiated development of the concepts of state and nation, it could be useful to separate the two principles analytically and conceptually, especially in their declination as post-state and post-national concepts. Post-state is understood here as a process that weakens the state’s centrality in favour of local and/or supranational entities. Post-national is conceived as the progressive detachment from the concept of nationality based on the principle of “one state, one people, one culture” homogeneity (Kotek, 1999, 227). As already stressed, territorial sovereignty is the founding principle of the nation state, and a common language, blood, or ethnos are only secondary elements. In recent decades, however, territorial sovereignty has been challenged by decentralising pressures towards both urban and/or regional bodies and transnational entities, and globalisation has led more and more people to experience trans-local spaces (Appadurai, 2003). These processes are linked to the downsizing of national state sovereignty that began at the end of the 1970s in Western Europe, seeing a transition from a closed national economy—in which the centralising dynamics of state sovereignty extended to the whole national state— to a progressive opening up to foreign investment which enhanced the centrality of urban and regional economies linked to supranational

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capital circuits (Brenner, 2011). This process has therefore led to the national state’s economic and administrative fragmentation. According to Appadurai (2003), the principle of jurisdiction and control over civil society is progressively separating from that of national loyalty, jeopardising the relationship between state and nation. On the contrary, authors such as Wilson and Donnan (2012) argue that, formally, the nation-state has emerged successfully from globalisation and post-colonial processes, despite their challenges to it, and still continues to regulate the life of those who come in relation to it on a practical and symbolic level. Wimmer (2002) also doubts that it is possible to detach the principles of citizenship and democracy from that of nationality. Nevertheless, the fact that today the nation-state is the most common form of territorialisation of political power should not be confused with the fact that, historically, it has not always been so. In fact, not only is the nation-state a relatively new form in human history, but it also has already changed its features in the recent past and there are different social, economic, and political elements that suggest that it could change in the future, especially concerning the construction of the concept of nationality, as this research shows. Moreover, post-national citizenship does not imply the absence of territorialisation nor the decline of the state, but only that the source of legitimacy of rights is becoming more complex and is moving away from nationhood’s monopoly of belonging processes. As also highlighted by Staeheli (2010), the concepts of post-national citizenship, transnational citizenship, cosmopolitan citizenship, and global citizenship—regardless of the different ways of thinking about citizenship they imply and sometimes implement—are all not necessarily alternative to state citizenship but develop in active relation to it. Getting back to the initial discussion, it is now clearer that the increasing importance of individual rights in the post-war era also influenced the concept of citizenship through both expanding claim-making and mobilisation practices and the de-territorialization of persons’ rights, no longer linking them to a national community but rather to universal personhood (Soysal, 1994). Finally, Isin and Nielsen (2013) emphasise that it is no longer sufficient to refer to state belonging to understand the new reformulations of citizenship, it is also necessary to focus on how citizens self-affirm as such through “acts of citizenship”. Therefore, I consider it analytically essential to separate the two notions of state and nation in order to correctly and flexibly interpret the social phenomena belonging to the postmigrantische Gesellschaft, such as those presented in this chapter.

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Conclusions The research on which this work is based originates from the analysis of the social condition highlighted by the concept of “double exclusion”, which describes the experience of an increasing part of Italian society composed of people with a migratory background who consider themselves Italians but are not juridically and/or ideologically recognised as such. As illustrated, the principle of double exclusion includes, on the one hand, the exclusion enshrined in law: in Italy, the current citizenship law is based on the ius sanguinis , hence not recognising the children of migrants as Italians, even though they were born and/or raised in the country. On the other hand, the concept refers to a second type of exclusion that concerns new generations’ misrecognition as Italian people who have different physical and/or cultural features from those attributed to the Italian imagined national community. This problematic combination inevitably leads to the structural exclusion of the new generations with a migratory background who, even if they consider themselves part of the civic community where they were born or raised, are not formally recognised as citizens or, even if they are, they are not symbolically recognised as Italian due to their cultural or somatic features. Consequently, these social actors are excluded not only from exercising active and passive democratic rights in what they consider their country, but also from the ideological space of the “Italian” community. Starting from 2005, some among the “second- and third- generation migrants” started national associative and political mobilisations moved not only by the desire to reclaim control on the discourse about them but also to promote alternative narratives concerning a new understanding of citizenship. This chapter focused on two collective actors engaged in claiming the right to citizenship for Italian new generations with a migratory background: Italians Without Citizenship and CoNNGI. As illustrated, the main differences between the two collective actors are: (i) the centrality given to the issue of citizenship since the change of the Italian citizenship law is the central goal for Italians Without Citizenship while CoNNGI’s aim is broader and is not limited to legally recognising the new generations with migratory background as Italians; (ii) the structural organisation since Italians Without Citizenship is a social movement created by different activists and independent from political institutions while CoNNGI is a registered umbrella organisation that originated from an initiative promoted by the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies; (iii)

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Italians Without Citizenship can be defined as a social movement while CoNNGI can be labelled as “institutional SMO” given its proximity with the political institutions. The analysis of Italians Without Citizenship’s and CoNNGI’s interviews and public statements emphasize how the references to citizenship can be grouped into two main (related) categories, one concerning what citizenship should be and one concerning what the Italian citizenship law is today. In the first category, citizenship is defined as a tool for both recognition and democracy. This last point is central to understanding the double exclusion these actors experience, since they already consider themselves as Italian citizens regardless of their formal recognition, and they hence emphasise the seriousness of their formal and symbolic exclusion from democratic rights they consider theirs. In the second category, citizenship is defined as damaging for both the new generations and the entire Italian community. For the first, the damages concern the impossibility from taking up jobs in the public sector by the actors without citizenship and/or being free to travel abroad. Moreover, they cannot benefit from state incentives reserved for Italian citizens, hence lowering their current and future welfare standards. For the general Italian community, the damages concern the economic as well as ideological loss of potential workers and skilled people in whom it has invested through education. Moreover, the analysis has emphasised two main narratives that Italians Without Citizenship and CoNNGI use. The first narrative expands the concept of citizenship through a vision of nationality that includes those who consider themselves Italians due to sharing the same cultural background as supposedly “autochthonous” Italians. In this case, the two collective actors reinforce the same citizenship-nationality binomial that triggered the same dynamics of exclusion that they fight. The second narrative instead focuses on the need to separate citizenship from nationality, putting forward a vision of citizenship based on the actor’s participation in the public sphere. Building from this last narrative, the final section illustrates this argument’s ideological implications in the context of the general process of detachment of the concept of state belonging from the principle of nationhood. Consequently, to correctly frame the positionalities of the social actors in the two analysed networks, I separated the concepts of state and nationhood, also referring to the concepts of the post-state and post-national.

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The purpose of this work is not to speculate on possible post-national scenarios in Europe but rather to reflect on how the connection between nationhood and citizenship, although still highly performative in Italy, is not inevitable. On the contrary, this bond is challenged by the rebordering dynamics such as those implemented by the bottom-up entities of Italians Without Citizenship and CoNNGI. By emphasising the procedural dynamics of border creation, the examples of these two collective actors allow us to reflect on the categories of the nation-state and belonging as intrinsically subject to continuous change and re-signification. This theoretical framework is especially valid to understand the complexity and contradictions of a contemporary society increasingly characterised by multiple definitions of belonging processes. Therefore, the academic gaze on the post-migratory society should identify concepts that are flexible enough to capture the conflict and contradictions of post-migratory processes of belonging and informative enough to allow us to understand these phenomena.

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Index

A ABN AMRO, (a Dutch bank), 99 Adaptation, 355, 371 Agaciro, 224 Age at marriage, 198, 201, 202, 205 Aid, 220, 221, 227, 234–238. See also Official Development Assistance (ODA) Alien conspiracy, 140 Alphonse Gabriel Capone, 140 Andrea, Matarazzo, 88 Appeal, 300, 302, 303, 307, 308, 315–319, 322–325, 328, 329, 331–333, 339, 341, 343 Appellants, 320, 323, 325, 327, 329, 331, 333 Apulia, 102 Argentina, 74–76, 86, 96, 107–114, 117–119, 122, 124–132 Aristotle, 74 Artisanal technical skills, 58 Arturo Patrizi, 92 Asia, 77 Assimilation, 354, 355, 369, 374

Asylum, 356, 357, 365, 374 Asylum adjudication, 300, 302–305, 308, 312, 315, 317–320, 333, 339, 341–343 Asylum Partnership Arrangement (APA), 219, 220, 223, 224, 226–231, 233, 234, 237–239 Asylum seeker(s), 227–233, 300–308, 311–320, 322–326, 328–344 Atlantic Ocean, 77 Aurora Cooperative, 101 Austria, 202 Ayerza, Abel, 139–141, 143–148, 150–153, 155–157 B Banca Cattolica Vicentina (BCV), 186–189 Banco di Napoli/Bank of Naples, 164, 169–171, 174–177, 180, 188–190 Barbosa, Ruy (Minister of Finance), 84, 86 Barcelona, 90

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 F. Fauri and D. Mantovani (eds.), Past and Present Migration Challenges, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39431-7

413

414

INDEX

Bauducco, Carlo, 102 Belarus, 249, 253 Bento Gonçalves (city), 101 Bolivia, 77 Bordering, 388–390, 405 Brand, 22, 32, 36, 37, 40, 43, 47, 49, 50 Brandalise families, 101 Brazil, 82 Brother, 23, 27, 35, 37, 41, 44 C Calabria, 100 Canada, 258 Capão Bonito (factory), 85, 88 Castellabate, (a small town not far from Naples, in southern Italy), 84 Catania, 100 Caxias do Sul, 93, 97 Census, 197, 202, 204, 206, 207, 213 Children of immigrants, 196, 206–208, 210, 211, 213 Chile, 356–369, 372, 373, 376 Chilean migrants, 366, 371, 372, 374 Chilean migration, 349 Chile-Democrático, 362 China, 86 Circular migrants, 168 CIS countries, 252, 254, 256 Citizenship, 350–352, 354, 359, 360, 365, 368, 369, 374–376, 385–387, 389–395, 397–404, 406–409 Civic participation, 376 Civil organisations, 273 Civil rights, 371 Civil sector, 280, 285 Civil society, 226, 236, 237, 285, 352, 355, 357, 359, 363–365, 370, 371, 373, 375, 376

Civil solidarity, 292 Clarín, 138 Climate change, 221–223, 231, 232 Community, 17, 19, 21, 23, 26–28, 30, 31, 45, 49 Company, 19–29, 32–35, 37–50 Competition, 21, 30, 34 Condor Trials, 363 Contribution of remittances, 165 Coordinamento Nazionale Nuove Generazioni Italiane (CoNNGI), 385, 387, 388, 390, 393, 394, 396–405, 407–409 Country of origin, 196, 197, 206, 207 Crespi, Rodolfo, 98, 104 Cultural factors, 196, 199, 213 Cultural hybridisation, 376 Cultural maintenance, 213 Czech Republic, 258 D Dante Alighieri Italian school, 99 Deep-rooted traits, 199 de Janeiro, Rio, 84, 85, 90, 92, 99, 102 Denialist, 138 Department for International Development (DFID), 220, 231, 232, 237, 239 Deposits, 169, 171, 180, 181, 185–188 Development Assistance Committee (DAC), 221, 236 Diaspora, 362, 372, 374, 377 Diplomatic refugees, 357 Discrimination, 352–354, 371 Distribution of remittances, 176 do Sul, Rio Grande, 80, 85, 86, 93, 96, 98, 99, 101, 103 Double exclusion, 386, 390, 392, 393, 400, 407, 408

INDEX

Dual citizenship, 351, 360, 373 E Eberle, Abramo, 93, 97, 104 Eberle, Claudio, 97 Eberle family, 93 Eberle, Giuseppe, 93 Eberle, José Abramo (son), 97 Eberle, Mosele & Co., 96 Economic condition, 199, 205 Economic formation, 55, 56 Education, 206 Emigration, 111, 112, 130, 131 Employee, 23, 28, 41 Enel, 83 England, 87 Environment(al), 220–223, 229–234, 238 Epicureans, 74 Ethnic press, 139, 141, 157, 158 Ethnic succession, 140, 147, 148, 153 Europe, 77, 90, 96, 97, 196–199, 202, 203, 207 European Union (EU), 247, 249–260, 262–264 Eurostat, 247 Exclusion, 350, 367 Exit from the parental home, 197, 201, 208, 211 Externalisation (of migration), 228 F Familistic society, 199 Family, 21, 23, 26–28, 32, 36–39, 41, 44–50 Family formation, 196–199, 202, 208, 211, 213 Family ties, 312, 316, 317, 328, 330, 333, 334, 340, 341 Female, 23, 29, 34 Fiaccadori Brothers corporation, 89

415

First World War, 90, 99 Fontana, Attilio, 102 Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), 220, 222, 230, 231, 233, 237–239 Framing, 138, 142 France, 263 Franceschini, Giuseppe, 101 Franco (generale), 96

G Genoa, 90, 93 Gerais, Minas, 80 Germany, 96, 202, 206–208, 213, 249, 251, 258, 263 Giovanni Galiffi, 139, 140, 147, 148, 154 Goldsmith and Blacksmith Abramo Eberle & Company, 95 Great Depression, 78, 80 Great Metallurgical Factory Abramo Eberle & Company, 96 Great Mills Minetti Gamba corporation, 99 Greece, 263 Green (development), 220, 238 Group, 28, 32, 44, 45, 47

H Hammer Auto parts Manufactures Ltda., later known with the name AETHRA, 102 Hancock, Thomas (engineer), 77 Henrique Lage, 90 Henry Simon Ltd., 87 Humanitarian protection, 300, 303, 305, 308–312, 315–320, 323–325, 328–335, 337–343

416

INDEX

Human rights, 220–223, 226, 227, 229–231, 233, 234, 236–238, 354, 363, 372, 376 Human trafficking, 253 Hungary, 271–280, 291, 292

I Iceland, 258 Ideas, 108, 109, 112, 126–128, 130 Identity, 351, 354, 372, 373, 375, 376 Il Mattino d’Italia, 139, 141, 145, 151, 155–157 Immigrant descendants, 211 Immigration, 17, 19, 24, 25 Inclusion, 350, 356, 360, 364, 371–374, 377 In-group solidarity, 376 Integrated Public Use Microdata Samples (IPUMS), 206–213 Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, 222 Integration, 300, 303, 311–320, 323–328, 330, 332–340, 342–344, 349–355, 359, 362, 370, 371, 373, 374, 376 Inter-generational transmission, 199 International Labour Office (ILO), 247, 250 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 247 International Organisation for Migration (IOM), 247 International protection, 299, 301–303, 309, 311, 312, 325, 333, 341 Ireland, 201, 202, 206–210 Israel, 249, 251, 252 Istanbul, 262 Italia-Chile, 362

Italian Commercial Bank of São Paulo, 87 Italian emigration, 53, 56 Italian migrations, 138 Italian remittances, 165, 174 Italians Without Citizenship, 385, 387, 388, 390, 393–404, 407–409 Italy, 75, 84, 85, 87, 89–91, 93, 96–98, 100, 196, 198, 199, 202, 206–210, 258, 263, 350–353, 355–371, 373–377 Ius sanguinis , 386, 391, 393, 407

J Japan, 258 Jewish, 80, 249, 252, 353 Jovane, Mariangela, (daughter of a wealthy family of Salerno), 84

K Kinship ties, 199

L Labour market, 309, 313, 317, 325, 326, 333, 336, 337, 342, 343 Land Law of 1850, 53, 55 La Nuova Patria, 139, 141, 151–154 Latin America, 74 Life-cycle service, 199, 201–203 Linguistic integration, 316, 326, 328, 333, 334, 342 Liqueur, 32, 34 Lisbon, 262 L’Italia del Popolo, 139, 143–151 Living alone, 209 Living arrangements, 196, 207–210 Living with parents, 206, 209–211 Local development, 184, 185, 188, 190

INDEX

Lombardy, 98 Lombroso, 125, 126 London and Brazilian Bank, 86 Lucca, 89 Luigi Gasparetto, 95 Lunardelli, Geremia, 101 M Macintosh, Charles (invented a method for making waterproof garments by using natural rubber), 77 Macroeconomic effects, 177, 189 Mafia, 137–141, 143–145, 148, 150, 152–157 Málaga, Gibraltar, 90 Manager, 23, 29, 44 Market, 20–22, 24–27, 32, 34, 35, 37–41, 45, 47, 49, 50 Marseille, 90 Martinelli Brothers group, 83 Martinelli, Giuseppe, 89–93, 97, 104 Matarazzo & Brothers (companhy), 85 Matarazzo & Company Ltda, 86 Matarazzo Corporation S/A., 86 Matarazzo Costabile, (a landowner), 84 Matarazzo, Francesco, 84, 88–90, 93, 103 Matarazzo, Giuseppe (son and brother), 85 Matarazzo, Luigi (Brother), 85 Matarazzo, Mariangela (daughter), 87 Mediterranean pattern, 199, 202 Microeconomic effects, 164, 181 Migrant, 26–28, 30, 31, 220, 228–231, 238 Migrant flows, 251 Migrants’ destinations, 163 Migrants’ remittances, 253, 255, 259, 262, 264

417

Migration, 226–229, 238, 239, 272, 276, 277, 280, 290–293, 350, 352–354, 356, 358, 362, 366, 368, 374, 375 Migration and Economic Development Partnership (MEDP), 219, 227, 238 Migration policy, 272 Milan, 262 Mobility, 354, 355, 367, 375 Modernisation, 107, 111, 116, 119, 122, 125, 129, 130, 132 Moldovan migrants, 248, 249, 251, 255, 257–259, 262–264 Moldovan Pro-European parties, 258 Moldova (Republic of), 247, 248, 251 Moldova (SSR), 247 Moldovan Communist Party, 258 Monte Magrè, 93 Morganti, Pietro, 100, 104 Moscow, 262 N Naples, 84, 90 Nationality, 385, 387, 389, 403–406, 408 National Motor Vehicle Company, 81 Nation-state, 385–387, 390–392, 404, 406, 409 Native population, 213 Naturalisation, 360 Network, 27, 30, 31, 33, 34, 38–42, 46 New generations, 386, 388, 389, 394, 396, 397, 400–402, 404, 405, 407, 408 News coverage, 137–139 Non-governmental organisations (NGO), 272, 273, 280, 282–287, 291, 292 North America, 86, 91, 96 Northern Italy, 93, 98

418

INDEX

Norway, 91, 255, 256, 258 Nuclear families, 203 O Odessa, 262 Official Development Assistance (ODA), 220, 221, 235–237, 239. See also Aid Offshoring (migration), 228 Olivetti, Adriano, (creator of the Olivetti company), 73 Organisation, 23, 27, 33, 37, 47 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 221, 223, 236 Organised crime, 137–141 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 247 Otherness, 352, 366 Outsourcing (migration), 228 P Padua, 262 Paolo Salton & Brothers, 101 Parents’ living status , 206 Paris, 262 Past migration, 349 Perdigão and Sadia companies, 101 Pinotti Gamba, Egidio, 99 Plato, 74 Poland, 196, 203, 206–210 Policy Coherence for Development (PCD), 219–221, 237 Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development (PCSD), 221 Political institutions, 360, 374 Political organisations, 357, 361, 366, 370, 371 Political refugees, 357, 366, 372, 374 Ponzoni families, 101

Porto Alegre, 85, 94 Portugal, 263 Positivism, 117, 125, 130, 131 Post-migratory society, 386, 388, 409 Professional integration, 316, 326–328, 330, 333 Proximity, 366, 371 Public sphere, 350, 355, 371, 374 Puglisi Carbone, Giuseppe, 100 Puglisi Carbone, Nicola, 100 R Racialisation, 353, 374 Reception centre, 317, 320, 323, 328–330, 336, 337, 343, 344 Refugees, 271–274, 276–280, 282–293, 299, 301–305, 309, 312, 313, 315, 341 Regoli, Crespi & Company, 98 Regoli, Pietro, 98 Ribeirão Preto, 83 Rio Amazonas, 90 Romania, 249–251, 256, 258, 259, 262–264 Rome, 262, 263 Rossi, Francesco, 94 Rothschilds, Jewish banking family, 80 Russian Federation, 248–251, 254, 256–258, 260, 263, 264 Rwanda, 219–221, 223–238 S Salton (family), 101, 104 Sankt-Petersburg, 262, 263 Sansivieri, Filomena, 84 Santa Catarina (state), 101, 103 Santos, 89, 90 Saxony, 96 Second-generation immigrants, 196, 197, 206, 208 Second generations, 374

INDEX

Second World War (World War II), 81, 92, 96, 100, 104 Securitisation, 375 Serra Gaucha, 103 Siciliano, Alessandro, 100 Sicily, 100 Skeptics, 74 Social institutions, 350, 364 Social integration, 312, 314, 316, 327, 328, 330 Socio-economic integration, 300, 310, 312, 315, 317, 341 Solidarity, 271–276, 278, 292, 293, 362, 364, 372–376 Sorocaba, (in the state of São Paulo), 85 South America, 83, 84, 89, 92, 93, 98, 102–104 Spain, 263 Special protection, 305, 311, 312, 316 Spirit, 20–22, 34 Sportelli, Pietro, 102 Stoics, 74 Strain and culture conflict, 140, 147 Strategy for International Development, 222, 233, 239 Strong family, 197, 198 Sustainable, 221, 223, 233, 238 Sweden, 91, 199, 201, 202, 206–210 Sweet River Valley Company, 81 Switzerland, 255, 256, 258 T Target earners, 168 Telecom Italia, 83 The colonisation and immigration policy, 56–58 The state of São Paulo, 80–82, 84–86, 88, 89, 91–93, 97–104 Third sector associations, 314, 316, 327, 330, 342

419

Transition to adulthood, 196, 197, 199, 202, 203 Transnationalism, 350, 353–355, 371, 375 Transnational networks, 350, 361, 371 Transnistria, 248, 250, 251, 253, 256, 258, 261 Trentino, 101 Trust, 22, 25, 28 Turkey, 263 Tuscany, 89, 93, 100 20th century, 201–204, 206, 207, 213 Tyumen, 262 U UK, 206–208, 213 UK government, 219–223, 226, 227, 229–234, 236–239 Ukraine, 249–251, 253, 254, 257, 258, 260, 263, 264 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), 247, 249, 251, 253, 255, 257, 264 United States (US), 86, 196, 197, 201, 206–208, 210, 211, 213 Uruguay, 96 USA, 249, 251, 252, 258 Utilitarian solidarity, 272, 275 V Vaglia, 171, 190 Valduga, Feliciano, 101 Vargas, Getúlio (President), 80–83 Veneto, 93, 95, 101 Venzon, Elisa, 94, 95 Vermouth, 21, 22, 28, 33, 35 Vilmos Fillinger (Hungarian architect), 91 Volunteers, 272, 273, 283–286, 289

420

INDEX

Vulnerability, 338–342 W Waiting time, 315, 320, 325, 328, 339, 343, 344 Weak ties, 197

Western Europe, 255 Wine, 20, 21, 26, 32, 33, 39 World Bank, 247, 254, 255 Z Zanrosso Luigia, 93