Passion and Restraint: Poles and Poland in Western Diplomacy, 1914–1921 9780228012627

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pas s io n a n d res trai nt

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Passion and Restraint Poles and Poland in Western Diplomacy, 1914–1921

d e n i s c la r k

McGill-­Queen’s University Press Montreal & Kingston • London • Chicago

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©  McGill-Queen’s University Press 2022 ISBN 978-0-2280-1188-0 (cloth) ISBN 978-0-2280-1262-7 (eP DF ) ISBN 978-0-2280-1263-4 (eP UB) Legal deposit third quarter 2022 Bibliothèque nationale du Québec Printed in Canada on acid-free paper that is 100% ancient forest free (100% post-consumer recycled), processed chlorine free This book has been published with the help of a grant from the Canadian Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences, through the Awards to Scholarly Publications Program, using funds provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

We acknowledge the support of the Canada Council for the Arts. Nous remercions le Conseil des arts du Canada de son soutien.

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Title: Passion and restraint: Poles and Poland in western diplomacy, 1914–1921 / Denis Clark. Names: Clark, John Denis Havey, 1985– author. Description: Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: Canadiana (print) 20220206317 | Canadiana (ebook) 20220206406 | IS BN 9780228011880 (cloth) | I SB N 9780228012627 (ePDF) | IS BN 9780228012634 (eP UB) Subjects: L CS H: Polish question. | L CS H: Polish people—Europe, Central— History—20th century. | L CS H: Poland—Foreign relations—1918-1945. Classification: L CC DK4182 .C 53 2022 | DDC 327.438—dc23

This book was typeset by Marquis Interscript in 10.5 / 13 Sabon.

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Contents

Figures vii Acknowledgments ix Note on Place Names  xiii Introduction 3   1 An “Internal” Russian Problem, 1914–15  18   2 Sympathy for Suffering  40   3 Commitments and Plans, 1918  65   4 The Polish Territorial Settlement at Paris, 1919  89   5 Stabilizing Poland’s Domestic Affairs, 1919  122   6 Hoping for Compromise, 1919–21  150 Conclusion 182 Notes 193 Bibliography 251 Index 287

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Figures

1.1 Historical maps of Poland. Originally from Józef Lipkowski’s La question polonaise (1915), pa n Biblioteka Kórnicka.  20 1.2 David Lloyd George, c. 1915–20. Library of Congress.   26 1.3 Ignacy Paderewski in 1915. Library of Congress.   28 1.4 Roman Dmowski, c. 1919. Library of Congress.   29 3.1 Georges Clemenceau. Library of Congress.   67 3.2 Woodrow Wilson in 1918. Library of Congress.  70 4.1 Ethnographic map of Poland. pan Biblioteka Kórnicka.  90 6.1 Józef Piłsudski inspecting the troops, c. 1919. Library of Congress. 165

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Acknowledgments

The project that became this book started as a narrow study of British diplomacy towards Poland from 1917 to 1920. It has since evolved to include France and the United States, whose policies were interconnected, and to recognize and delineate the importance of emotions and attitudes as a factor in diplomatic decision-­making. These evolutions could not have happened without the insight and encouragement of many people, and it gives me great pleasure to recognize them. I have benefitted tremendously from the scholarship, wisdom, and support of Margaret MacMillan, who was my supervisor from the beginning of this project at Oxford and read multiple drafts of my work. Andrzej Nowak, Adam Kozuchowski, Dariusz Jeziorny, and Andrzej Kaminski read the whole manuscript as part of the 2019 Forgotten Histories workshop and made many insightful suggestions. My thanks also to the organizers of that excellent event, particularly Andrzej Kaminski and Oleksandr Avramchuk. The comments of the two anonymous reviewers helped to sharpen my argument. Vivian Reed and my mother, M.C. Havey, read chapters. This book is derived in part from an article published in the International History Review (2020). This research has continued to evolve over many years in part because I was fortunate during my doctorate to benefit from several people whose comments on the text have enriched it. Patricia Clavin, – Mark Cornwall, and Donatas Kup cˇ iunas read the entire thesis and offered valuable comments, as well as encouragement and advice in ensuing years. David Foglesong, Mikołaj Kunicki, Meighen McCrae, and David Priestland read chapters. It has been a pleasure to work with Richard Ratzlaff, my editor at McGill-Queen’s University Press,

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x Acknowledgments

whose encouragement, wisdom, and patience has guided me through the publication process. Kathleen Fraser led me through the last stages and answered my questions. Correy Baldwin did excellent work copy-­ editing the manuscript and Alyssa Favreau prepared the proofs. I have also been fortunate throughout to have had no end of people to urge me on and offer helpful advice. While I’ve learned much from the scholarship of Frank Costigliola, Norman Davies, Alan Sharp, Larry Wolff, and Piotr Wróbel, I also appreciated their counsel on numerous occasions. Discussions or correspondence with R.J.W. Evans, Tony Lentin, Lutz Oberdörfer, Anita Prażmowska, and David Robin Watson provided direction in the early days of my project. Postgraduate seminars with Robert Gildea, Ruth Harris, Rob Johnson, and Nick Stargardt gave me the tools I would later use to interpret attitudes and emotions in diplomatic sources. Miles Hewstone guided me through the literature on stereotypes. Antony Polonsky sent me draft chapters from The Jews in Poland and Russia. At the University of Calgary Simon Bayani, George Colpitts, Petra Dolata, Alexander Hill, Nancy Janovicek, Amie Kiddle, Mark Konnert, Kate McGillis, Bafumiki Mocheregwa, Lori Somner, Jewel Spangler, Tim Stapleton, and Sarah Stevenson gave me lots of encouragement and advice. Petra also hired me for a short but crucial postdoctoral research fellowship at the Calgary Institute for the Humanities. My students’ conviction about the enduring importance of international history helped to inspire me. Finally, I have enjoyed convivial conversations and corre– spondence over many years with Donatas Kup cˇ iunas, Whitney Lackenbauer, Sylvia Mullins, Sheila Tremlett, and Matt Vallières. I am grateful for the assistance of numerous librarians and archivists, but I owe particular thanks to Isabel Holowaty of the Bodleian Library, Carol Leadenham at the Hoover Institution Archives, and Nadine Hoffman and John Wright at the University of Calgary Library. Thank you to Olivia Gibson for permission to quote from the papers of her grandfather, Hugh Gibson, and to Sir Henry Rumbold, 11th Baronet, for permission to quote from the papers of his grandfather, Sir Horace Rumbold. The Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (sshrc) supported my doctoral research with a four-year fellowship. Grants from the Jagiellonian University’s Polish Research Centre in London, Jesus College, the Royal Historical Society, the University of Oxford Faculty of Medieval and Modern Languages’ Ilchester Fund, the Polish History Museum in Warsaw, and the University of Calgary Faculty of Arts helped to fund research travel.

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Acknowledgments

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A sshrc Awards to Scholarly Publications Program publication grant supported the publication of this book. I wish to acknowledge and affirm the traditional owners of the land on which I prepared this book. As a resident of Calgary, I worked within the traditional territories of the people of the Treaty 7 region in Southern Alberta and of the Métis Nation of Alberta, Region 3. I completed this book while living in Ottawa and Gatineau, on the traditional, unceded territories of the Algonquin Anishnaabe Nation. While a land acknowledgement is insufficient, I am grateful to have been on this land, and I pay respect to Indigenous people past and present. I alone am responsible for any errors in the text. I have the deepest gratitude to offer to my family, whose contributions range far beyond the text. My parents, Tim Clark and M.C. Havey, have always offered much-needed encouragement and support. My mother also read the introduction and made many sensible suggestions. Kate Clark, Denis Havey and Martha Burke, Graeme Clark and Jill Andersons, and particularly my in-laws Bart and Jean De Vries provided good cheer on many visits. Living for a year with Alison, John, Anna, Sarah, and Lydia Lise (and many visits before and after) helped to sustain us. My wife, Jenn De Vries, has lived through this entire project since the beginning and continues to give me much to be thankful for. I dedicate this book to her.

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Note on Place Names

Many cities in Central and Eastern Europe have different names in different languages. This reflects the different national groups that lived there and political entities that claimed or controlled them. Thus, in the period of this book, present-day Lviv, Ukraine, was variously called Lwów by Poles, Lvov by Russians, Lemberg by Austrians, and Lemberik by Yiddish speakers. Vilnius, Lithuania, was referred to as Wilno in Polish, Wilna in German, and Vilna in Russian, and Gdansk, Poland, was widely known as Danzig. For the sake of consistency with quoted material, this book uses the names that Allied and American officials employed, except in cases of well-recognized names like Warsaw or Kraków, or where usage varied, as with Vilnius. I will indicate alternate versions in brackets after the first mention of a place name. For the most part, the English-language terminology tends to reflect German naming conventions, but use of a particular linguistic version of a name does not imply support for a state’s claim to that place.

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pas s io n a n d res trai nt

For Jenn

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Introduction

“One of the things that troubles the peace of the world is the persecution of the Jews,” declared US President Woodrow Wilson to David Lloyd George, the British prime minister, and Georges Clemenceau, the French premier.1 It was 1 May 1919, six days before the draft text of the postwar peace treaty was presented to Germany. The world’s three most powerful men had been meeting together every day for weeks, intending to reorder the world after a disastrous war. Often, as in this case, no one else was present except for one or two interpreters. Today, as in many of these meetings, the leaders’ attention soon focused on the situation in Poland. “You know that [Jews] are especially badly treated in Poland,” said Wilson. The draft treaty, he concluded, “must demand guarantees for both national minorities and religious minorities.”2 Lloyd George agreed on the principle, but added, “There is obviously something to be said to justify the hostile feeling of the Poles against the Jews. M. Paderewski [the Polish prime minister] told me that, during the war, the Jews of Poland were by turns for the Germans, for the Russians, for the Austrians, and very little for Poland itself.”3 Yet the leaders agreed that this would change if Jews in Poland were given equal status under the law. The leaders were keen to show each other that they were well disposed towards Jews. “The Jews of the United States are good citizens,” Wilson said, and Clemenceau and Lloyd George agreed for their countries. According to the British notes, the conversation continued as follows: “Mr. Lloyd George said that in Poland he understood the Jews were really more efficient men of business than the Poles. M. Clemenceau said that in Poland a Pole who wanted to carry out any transaction – for example, to buy a

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horse – would send for a Jew.” “In England,” Wilson commented, “the Jews had been bad citizens before they were properly treated,” to which Lloyd George replied proudly, “Cromwell was the first person to recognise the importance of treating the Jews properly.”4 Satisfied, the leaders approved Wilson’s suggestion that a committee should study the matter and moved on to other issues. A Polish minorities treaty was included in the final version of the Treaty of Versailles, became the template for several other new or existing states, and is often considered the origin of modern minority rights in international law.5 The conversation is instructive, not only because of its importance in hindsight but also because of how the leaders talked about the peoples involved. Their reasoning relied particularly on stereotypes about “the Jews”: that “they” were “efficient men of business,” not always loyal, and a victimized people. The leaders’ attitudes about Poles were less prominent here, though no one contradicted Lloyd George’s statement about “the hostile feeling of the Poles against the Jews,” a concern that they frequently raised in other situations. The leaders often expressed their understandings about other peoples through comparisons, for instance that Jews were better at business than Poles. This included positive comparisons with their own countries, in which they agreed that Jews were “properly treated,” a shaky assertion on its own merits that nonetheless signifies their perception of superiority to Poland.6 In British, French, and American attempts to make policy regarding the rebirth of Poland between 1914 and 1921, this conversation was no aberration. Policy makers expressed their attitudes about Poles not only in private documents such as diaries and personal letters, but also in inter-allied meetings like this one, official memoranda, and other formal settings. They described Poles variously as emotional, nationalistic, solidly liberal, anti-Semitic, or pro-Entente. Their attitudes, along with other factors, informed many decisions and policy preferences. This book is a case study of how emotions and attitudes affect diplomats and diplomacy. The case I have chosen is particularly appropriate for such a study for several reasons: first, because of the rich material that survives from a variety of actors; second, because the Poles were seen as both European and less civilized. The Western empires therefore regarded them as both legitimate claimants to a state of their own and as legitimate objects of paternalistic care.7 Moreover, as I will show, the emotions and attitudes of those making decisions had a clear and demonstrable effect on their decisions. The

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purpose of this book is therefore to focus on an important factor that has been overlooked and to join those scholars who, in integrating emotions and culture into their analysis, are advancing a new agenda for international history.8 Two categories of attitudes – about national character and emotional restraint – were central, intertwined themes in British, French, and American diplomacy regarding the rebirth of Poland. The two categories functioned differently. Between 1914 and 1921, British, French, and American policy makers’ attitudes about the Polish national character evolved based on personal experiences, political conditions, and dominant understandings of national character. This happened sometimes because they had met more Poles and witnessed or read about the actions of the Polish state. While historians of the peace settlement have focused largely on the border settlement, my research finds that exposure to the Polish domestic political and social context often modified the peace­makers’ perception of the Polish national character or brought their apprehensions about other traits to the fore. At other times, a change in their government’s interests modified their perspective of Polish characteristics. Policy makers tended to phrase observations about Poles or any foreign group in terms of national characteristics perceived to be eternal.9 Yet their perceptions instead often reflected the immediate context. When US president Woodrow Wilson complained that “The Poles are too impetuous” in a September 1920 interview, his comments on Poland’s recent war with Russia came after years of meeting with Polish people and reading about their country.10 Moreover, his comments had a persuasive element: they justified his government’s lack of support for Poland in its battle with Russia. Wilson had not, however, always viewed the Poles this way; prior to 1920, Wilson’s public support and private enthusiasm for Poland’s independence had done much to inter­ nationalize that campaign. Amidst these changing attitudes, policy makers’ emphasis on the necessity for Polish restraint was a constant, emotionalized theme. What we see as emotions are, of course, only the visible manifestation of thoughts and impulses. Everyone expresses emotions a little differently, but crucially, norms around what emotions to express and how to express them differ among cultures and can even vary among professions.11 As a starting point, it is useful to think of “emotional communities,” or groups sharing norms and values about emotional expression.12 Diplomats and politicians, who formed one such

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community, were expected to act in a cool, restrained fashion – to be self-restrained – in most circumstances. Understanding this restraint means understanding one of the critical concepts of international policy and diplomatic self-comportment. Yet while restraint was and remains a critical aspect of diplomatic culture, international historians have hardly ever made it the focus of their analysis.13 This book aims to explore more precisely the importance and role of attitudes about emotional restraint. The function of attitudes about restraint went beyond self-­ comportment. While British, French, and American policy makers promoted self-restraint as a desirable personal characteristic for Poles, they also applied attitudes about self-restraint to their understanding of Polish state policy and decisions. When individual Poles or “the Poles” did what the great powers wanted, policy makers saw those actions as restrained and approved of them. When Poles or Poland transgressed these bounds, for instance by quarrelling among themselves or with neighbours when they were expected to put aside their desires and seek compromise, their actions were criticized. Western policy makers did not have a consistent definition or application of restraint, and they certainly did not always practice what they preached. Rather, the nature of the restraint they desired depended on the situation. While attitudes about national character and emotion occupied different trajectories over this period, the two concepts were frequently linked in the words of decision makers. The concept of restraint had strong gendered and racialized connotations, particularly in the colonial discourse of this era. Poles did not experience the worst of this, in comparison with non-European peoples whose political futures were decided in 1919 or during the imperial contest in the nineteenth century.14 Poland did, after all, become independent in 1918 with considerable Western support. Yet policy makers frequently hoped that Poles would restrain particular characteristics, such as anti-­ Semitism or nationalistic aspirations for independence, which were perceived to be part of their national character. The Polish experience does demonstrate that a liminal orientalism, which had influenced Western Europeans’ views of Eastern Europe since the eighteenth century, remained in the First World War era. Westerners’ emphasis on restraint implied a desire to control Polish actions and enforce a civilizational hierarchy, which helps to explain why representatives of the new Polish state took such umbrage at various Western attempts

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to restrict their freedom of action after 1918.15 Yet this does not imply that Poles were innocent of all charges. The record of Polish anti-­ Semitism and pogroms in this era, not to mention Polish attacks against Ukrainians and Lithuanians, among others, is also outlined in this book. The Western powers were eventually concerned both with liberating the Poles and with pogroms and state violence. Policy makers’ words could be deeply symbolic and heavily suggestive, but they also had consequences. The Western governments did not bring about the creation of Poland on their own or determine all of its eventual borders, but their attempts to do so left lingering grudges and made this a crucial period in Polish and international history. As Natasha Wheatley argues, “ground zero” for much of today’s international order can be traced to the experimentation with international governance that occurred in and on Central Europe immediately after the First World War.16 Poland was at the epicentre of this, and not only because the Polish settlement featured the germ of modern minority protections. Many different contradictions and complications of national self-­determination – the basis for modern statehood – were fully explored in the Polish settlement. Poland was also a major recipient of US food aid in 1919, and a subject of repeated debates about greater humanitarian intervention. Colossal figures like Woodrow Wilson and even young academic historians and diplomats became emotionally invested in the decision-­making, partly because they recognized that Poland’s failure could plunge the continent into war once again. The dénouement of Poland’s war with Russia in 1920 and the threat of war with Germany over Upper Silesia in 1921 seemed to immediately confirm the importance of the Polish settlement. In 1939, invasions of Poland by Germany and then Russia echoed many of the concerns voiced after 1918 about German or Russian irredentism and the fate of Jewish minorities, and plunged the world into an even more devastating war.17 Applying the cognitive processes that shape perception and mis­ perception as they relate to intercultural contact makes this book one of a few new international histories that draws on research in cognition and psychology. Studies of cognition, including those of processes that produce stereotypes and emotions, support the interpretation that attitudes about others can evolve based on new information.18 I use the term “attitudes” to describe the broadest set of views that policy makers held. Such attitudes can include stereotypes about specific Polish characteristics or emotional responses such as sympathy or disappointment,

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as well as emotionology, that is, attitudes about the expression of emotion. Policy makers’ attitudes also usually integrated understandings of the military, economic, or political situation – the rational factors that previous studies have elucidated. Attitudes were often quite vague when expressed, but even vagueness can help us to understand what decision makers thought about Poles or the rebirth of Poland. Education or culture can create a series of preconceived ideas that later affect policy, but attitudes can also develop on contact with other individuals or peoples.19 I do not intend to psychoanalyze or otherwise examine the cognitive states of historical individuals, especially since the written evidence likely portrays only part of a person’s thoughts. Yet the wealth of research on the social context of cognition offers some basic clarifications of how attitudes develop holistically and why they proved central to British, French, and American government thinking about policy questions.20 The consensus in cognitive studies is that our thoughts are integrated, not divided between reason and affect, as is often presumed in Western tradition. Advocates of “psychological construction” note that thinking is better understood as a series of mental states or schemas in which we group associated people, concepts, events, and other information.21 Stereotypes, in particular, are an important subgroup of the attitudes considered in this book. The word “stereotype” has a negative connotation and is often conflated with discrimination: the use of stereotypes or categories to judge others.22 Most historical works that examine stereotypes do so on this basis alone, without even a basic definition of the term.23 Psychologists understand stereotypes as essentially cognitive shortcuts. Stereotypes are generalizations about the characteristics of a group that we develop to make sense of the world, and they can be positive or negative.24 A stereotype reflects prior knowledge and experiences, but what is perceived in the present either confirms or adjusts pre-existing assumptions.25 This process was quite evident in British, French, and American policy-making from 1914 to 1921: vague conceptualizations of Poland or the Polish people gradually became more defined after increased contact. Stereotypes, and all of the attitudes studied in this book, are perceptions of people and groups. They may be based on a “kernel of truth” or perhaps a great deal of it, but in this book I do not focus on correcting such perceptions.26 While today stereotypes about national groups and other states are seen to be anachronistic (though they remain part of foreign policy

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anyway), a century ago many people, including British, French, and American policy makers, considered such views scientific.27 Many of the stereotypes that policy makers developed about Poles incorporated emotional content. Increasingly, scholars are highlighting evidence of emotional content in diverse situations, though much work remains to be done.28 Incorporating emotional content requires careful analysis, but this need not be different from international historians’ usual work of interpreting motivations and intentions.29 The reader must merely be open and attentive to the fact that historical actors might comment on their own emotions or someone else’s. This can happen in many ways; the assumption that policy makers are “bureaucratic ‘rationality machines’” is misguided.30 What we perceive as emotions are, like stereotypes, best understood as integrated within a cognitive whole.31 Emotions are not strictly separated from the reasoning parts of our brains, nor are they all-consuming impulses that overcome all other inclinations. Yet emotional content should emerge from primary sources and then be interpreted. Sufficient evidence must exist on which to base analysis, and the Polish case offers this. Relying on historical sources – in this case, entirely on written sources without video of the participants’ body language – does impose limitations. The source material is mediated, both in the sense that emotional expression itself is mediated and in that writers then interpret it.32 These mediations clarify that historians must look at primary sources through one or two lenses, and while we can interpret emotional expression as intentional, it is impossible to know if it is authentic.33 Yet focusing not only on content but also on these lenses can also be extremely valuable. As this book focuses primarily on internal deliberations and discussions, many of the archival sources used are those that record those deliberations: the official files of the British Foreign Office, French foreign ministry, and US Department of State. These archives contain meeting minutes, memoranda, letters, reports, and other items that illustrate the decision-­making process at a state or multilateral level. An examination of the private papers of many of those involved in decision-­making, including key Polish figures, supplements the analysis. Diaries and letters provide additional insight into the attitudes of these people and the factors that affected British, French, and American policy. The intent is not to magnify the importance of these people and governments – as mentioned above, the British, French, and American governments generally did not control events  – but to critically

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examine their perspectives. External sources such as newspaper articles have been considered insofar as they affected decision-­making or depicted events. Government archives and private papers do contain news articles upon which diplomats or interested people commented. This study does not, however, examine the contours of public opinion in thorough detail. An examination of the thousands of newspaper articles and other sources from the public sphere that mentioned Poles or the rebirth of Poland during this period would require a different focus, along the lines of Dariusz Jeziorny’s recent consideration of British perspectives on minorities in Poland in 1918 to 1919.34 As it is, the voluminous collections of state and private papers and memoirs about the diplomacy of Poland’s rebirth provide a substantial basis for understanding how the concept of restraint pervaded policy makers’ discussions of Poland and “the Poles.”

A d o p t in g A t ti tudes What was Poland and who were the Poles? Today, the state of Poland is overwhelmingly the nation-state of the Polish people, a legacy of the near-annihilation of Poland’s Jewish population in the Holocaust and of population transfers at the end of the Second World War.35 We must not, however, project this unity of national culture backwards through history. To paraphrase Leszek Kołakowski, it has not always been clear whether Poland was called Poland because Poles lived there, or whether Poles were called Poles because they lived in Poland.36 In the period of this book, an independent Poland was constructed on the battlefield and around the conference table. Nearly one-third of its population identified with another ethnicity in the 1921 census, while some Polish speakers were nationally indifferent.37 Moreover, the understanding of Polishness has long been contested. Was Poland “for your freedom and ours,” as nineteenth-century revolutionaries proclaimed, or was Polishness an exclusive identity based on ethnic markers like language and religion? Some Jews considered themselves Polish, for instance, because they spoke Polish and their families had lived in Poland for centuries. Yet an increasing number of Polish-speaking Catholics did not consider Jews to be part of the Polish nation, with terrible results. British, French, and American decision makers regularly referred to “Poland” in a general sense without thinking specifically about its  borders. Similarly, they spoke of “the Poles” without always

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interrogating whether people in “Poland” regarded themselves as Polish. Moreover, they often failed to specify which Poles they meant, whether leaders, émigré representatives, peace conference delegates, the population of a particular partition, or inhabitants of a city or region (who were often not all Polish). Sometimes this ambiguity was accidental, but in other cases the conflation of terms implied a judgment about all Poles rather than a specific subset such as the government. To understand these attitudes, we must understand the men (and they were all men) who held them. A few dozen British, French, and American policy makers spent considerable time debating government policy towards Poland’s independence and its potential borders from 1914 to 1921. Political scientists would call them a “policy network,” a concept that overlaps considerably with what D.C. Watt termed the “foreign-­policy-making elite.”38 The milieu of this group – and its significance for preconceived ideas about the Poles and Poland – is considered in more detail in the first chapter. They were politicians, diplomats, officials in the foreign ministry, or academics, business leaders, or other public figures who advised governments on foreign policy. Most policy makers within the national foreign policy elite shared a common background and outlook that broadly shaped their perspectives but did not predetermine their specific policy. For instance, some general attitudes about Eastern Europe, such as discriminatory vestiges of a liminal orientalism, were mixed with vague sympathy because Eastern Europeans faced various restrictions on the full expression of national culture. What united British, French, or American foreign policy makers was the pursuit of a policy in their state’s best interests, although they often disagreed internally about what that was. Their differences demonstrate that it is difficult at times to generalize for a “British” or an “American” policy.39 Only a few of these policy makers, moreover, exerted strong influence over the direction of policy. They receive considerable attention in this book, as do those who tried unsuccessfully to shape policy. In most cases, policy makers at the time adopted attitudes according to a relatively consistent pattern. They first engaged extensively with Polish matters in 1915 after the German army captured Warsaw and the Russian army suffered a disastrous retreat. Many, like Woodrow Wilson, sympathized with the suffering of “the stricken Polish people.”40 These sentiments helped to inspire a US-led relief effort, though it failed because the British believed that aid would undermine their blockade of German-held territory.41 Meanwhile, Polish émigré

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representatives like the prominent politician Roman Dmowski worked in London and Paris, where they assured policy makers that an “anti-German majority” existed among Poles and that most of their compatriots yearned for independence.42 This led Westerners to sympathize privately with the idea of Poland’s independence. Since Russia, the ally of Britain and France, contended that Polish affairs were its internal concern, the British and French governments prevailed upon Polish émigrés to restrain their enthusiasm for independence so as to not upset their ally.43 Chapter 2 outlines this tension between growing support in private and the public restraint necessary to sustain the Triple Entente. After Russia left the war in late 1917, the British, French, and American governments elevated the rebirth of Poland into a public war aim. The third chapter examines British, French, and American commitments to Polish independence and subsequent efforts to prepare for the existence of a postwar Poland in 1918. After a long period in which Polish aspirations were curbed, sympathy for Poland’s independence during the First World War eventually coincided with government policy when it became advantageous to give public support for Polish self-­determination, because the Central Powers controlled almost all of the Polish lands and because the new Bolshevik regime in Russia already supported national self-­determination. When the war ended in November 1918 and the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and German empires had collapsed, it was Poland’s forces that created the nucleus of an independent state on their own, albeit within a supportive framework provided by the Allied and American victory over Germany.44 Sympathy for Poland became a powerful motivating force, both in public and in private, that endured after the armistice. The victorious powers met in Paris in 1919 to prepare the peace, and a stable, independent Poland was seen to be crucial to the political settlement in Europe. As the Allied and American governments proclaimed to the German government in June 1919, Poland’s partition “was one of the greatest wrongs of which history has record, a crime the memory and the result of which has for long poisoned the political life of a large portion of the continent of Europe.”45 After a few months, however, many policy makers grew frustrated with Polish actions and the human qualities they associated with them. While the victorious powers had given themselves the right to determine Poland’s borders and other matters, they often disagreed about how this should be

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done. Moreover, from Paris they had little control over events on the ground. In many respects, neither did anyone else. From 1918 to 1921, Poland was at the centre of the violent, chaotic struggle that erupted in the wake of Russian, Austrian, and German imperial disintegration, a struggle that Jochen Böhler calls the “Central European Civil War.”46 The fourth chapter describes the debates over Poland’s borders in 1919, and the growing concern about controlling the newly independent state. When the peace­makers paid attention to Poland’s internal matters tended to be when they most often opined about Polish characteristics and the need to restrain them. After pogroms by Polish forces in contested areas, the peace­makers imposed a minorities treaty over the strenuous objections of Poland’s government. Yet the British and French governments had worked closely during the war with Dmowski, who was well known to be anti-Semitic.47 They had essentially overlooked his contempt for Jews in favour of his solid anti-German stance. Any tolerance for Polish anti-­Semitism evaporated as concern grew that Polish anti-­Semitism was out of control amid the chaotic situation. It did not help that the full extent of Poland’s precarious economic position had alarmed Western governments, or that Poland’s first parliament had developed a reputation for bitter infighting. Chapter 5 shows how greater involvement by the peace­makers in Poland’s internal affairs, particularly with regard to the fate of the Jewish minority but also with politics and the economy, affected how they viewed Poles and Poland. The final chapter turns to Poland’s war with Russia in 1920, when the Polish government’s perceived territorial ambitions outstripped all British and French attempts to restrain them. This led one French diplomat to tell his British counterpart that the new Poland acted like “our joint infant … who is so naughty and irregular in his habits.”48 British, French, and Italian forces then oversaw the 1921 plebiscite in Upper Silesia and tried to prevent war from breaking out between Poland and Germany. Many negative British comments about Poles, in particular by Lloyd George, coincided with a period from June 1919 through 1921 when the British government worked to assign the valuable territory of Upper Silesia to Germany rather than to Poland. While this may have reflected some personal animus after numerous disagreements, part of the context of his comments was that the French government supported Poland’s claim, and Lloyd George was trying to convince them to modify their position.

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Passion and Restraint

Throughout this period, the changing political and international contexts are crucial for understanding the attitudes that the policy makers expressed. Between 1914 and 1921, most foreign policy makers expressed both positive and negative views relating to policy – the rebirth of Poland – and those affected by it – the Polish people. Furthermore, policy makers sometimes spoke as though Polish characteristics were eternal, for instance by saying that Poles were quarrelsome or, as one British policy maker stated, that “all pure Poles really dislike Jews.”49 Such statements suggest that, at a working level, they accepted that “the Poles” comprised a nation, which was believed to exist from time immemorial and whose members were said to possess certain personality characteristics.50 Yet these attitudes were very much a product of their time. While many stereotypes about Poles, Poland, or Eastern Europeans existed from previous centuries, policy makers rarely indicated that these were their longstanding views. While Britain, France, and the United States usually first developed policies internally, they also discussed them together or at least were mindful of the others. It is therefore important to look at them together.51 Britain and France remained firmly allied during the period discussed in this book, despite many disagreements. When the United States entered the First World War on the Allied side in April 1917, it did so as an “Associated Power” to preserve its ideological independence. Yet within months, the United States military had joined the new Supreme Allied Command.52 Ferdinand Foch, the French Generalissimo who headed the new body, is said to have remarked that his position required him “not to give orders, but to make suggestions … one talks, one discusses, one persuades.”53 He could just as easily have been describing diplomatic relations, in which he was often involved. Although a transatlantic foreign policy network developed a little more slowly than the military one, the British, French, and American governments soon made many decisions together, especially at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.54 Even in 1915 at the start of internal policy discussions regarding Poland, Britain and France referred to each other’s policies. Sometimes this was because they wanted to cooperate, but at other times, one government’s position could sharpen affinities or differences for the members of the other two. As a French representative cynically reported to his superiors, “the British Prime Minister is trying to make the least favourable solution for Polish interests.”55 Italy, which joined the alliance with

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15

Britain and France in 1915, also developed a Polish policy and played an important role during the war with its support for Polish independence, especially relating to the development and deployment of propaganda in 1918. Italy’s policy is not a focus of this book, as the country had little influence over alliance policy and, at the peace conference, neither Italian leaders nor delegates showed significant interest in any of the aspects of the Polish territorial settlement.56 Building trust is an important and often overlooked part of diplomacy, and some historians have recently argued that the foreign-­ policy-making elite shared certain common ideas and approaches on a transnational level.57 Such basic affinities did not predispose British, French, and American decision makers to particular policies, but they did help them to work together, as did an intentional focus on a common intellectual heritage. Representatives of all three countries liked to identify themselves as belonging to liberal societies that upheld values like truth and justice. (They mentioned much less frequently that these societies were still quite unequal, or that civil liberties were notably lacking in their imperial possessions.) This was a way both of distinguishing themselves from the autocratic Central Powers during the war and of arguing in favour of any number of positions afterwards, including competing national claims in Eastern Europe. Some of their positions have become more familiar with the endurance of the North Atlantic alliance since 1949, but they had a similar purpose in the First World War era: to construct an imagined common ground. Many Enlightenment thinkers, whose ideas helped to shape Western liberal societies, had also denigrated Eastern Europe in order to construct a more advanced “West,” as Larry Wolff argues.58 When British, French, or American diplomats commented on Polish otherness to each other, their comments often echoed these older conceptions. Considering British, French, and American policy together allows for a clearer appreciation of the transnational flow of ideas that characterized the diplomacy of this period.

E m o t io n s , S t e r e otypes, and In t e r n at io n al Hi story Diplomacy is regularly represented as a chess game and its practitioners as master strategists. This image rests, however, on what Barbara Keys calls “the diplomat’s two minds”: the perception that policy makers do not allow their subjectivities – their background,

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home life, likes, and dislikes – to affect their professional work.59 Policy makers usually encourage this image about themselves. As Jules Cambon, a key architect of France’s foreign policy in the First World War era, wrote in his 1926 book on diplomacy: “What separates the diplomat from the crowd is that he seems foreign to his passions: he is held by a professional reserve.”60 Certain emotional norms, particularly calmness or restraint, were prized in early-twentieth-century diplomacy.61 (Policy makers also find it easy to depict themselves as rational after the fact and to call their opponents irrational and misguided.62) Most experienced diplomats, however, including Cambon, recognize that this is an impossible ideal, and that human connection is important in diplomacy.63 The commingling of attitudes about national character and restraint at the core of the diplomacy around Poland’s rebirth reflects the intersection between emotions and cultures in international politics. This intersection creates the conditions for misperceptions of emotions and of other cultures, which can in turn reflect power differentials and affect policy. International politics should be understood to be affected by culture and intercultural relations on a broad spectrum. As Poland’s rebirth was debated, diplomats, politicians, businesspeople, and transnational activists served as conduits of intercultural contact.64 Public attitudes influenced these interactions. Astute politicians and diplomats reflected prevailing public attitudes, but politicians especially also shaped those attitudes. Insofar as diplomatic interactions are inter­ cultural endeavours as well as political ones, contravening the emotional norms of a particular group of policy makers often invited comments, as Polish representatives repeatedly discovered. Emotional expression is at least partly culturally defined; different cultures have different emotional cues and norms.65 As Barbara Rosenwein writes, “If an emotional display seems ‘extreme,’ that is itself a perception from within a set of emotional norms that is socially determined.”66 Policy makers’ comments about unusual emotional displays can be historicized with reference both to the immediate personal, cultural, and diplomatic contexts and to broader ones, since emotional norms should be included among those frameworks which international historians have long studied as the “unspoken assumptions” of diplomacy.67 International historians, however, have mostly dismissed the relevance of emotions and stereotypes. Though the writers of many works of international history have enlivened the text by including the odd

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17

intemperate outburst or insulting comment about foreigners by a policy maker, these comments have rarely been accorded any analytical importance. For decades, most international historians wrote as though relative military, political, and economic power, or a confluence of those structural factors, were the sole and decisive explanatory forces.68 At the individual level, such scholarship relies on a “rational actor” model that assumes that decision makers filter out personal opinions at or before the moment of decision.69 Starting in the mid-1990s, the pioneering work of Frank Costigliola, a historian of United States foreign relations, reinterpreted the importance of gendered language and then of emotions.70 Now many US-based historians emphasize the influence of “culture,” while several historians of Britain have for decades stressed the importance of “personalities.”71 Yet while a new wave of histories focus on the expression of emotion in different circumstances, there remain very few works on restraint and the norms around it, particularly in the realm of diplomacy. My approach to attitudes about national character and emotions joins other recent works that seek to reshape the practice of international history.

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1 An “Internal” Russian Problem, 1914–15

In January 1863, an insurrection began across the Russian partition of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In Paris, Napoleon III considered sending troops to help. In London, the Times deplored the actions of the Russian government, and the issue was debated in Parliament.1 Would the British and French governments assist the insurgents? Both governments had intervened in 1859 to 1960 in favour of an independent Italy, and they had fought the Ottoman Empire thirty years previously to create an independent Greece.2 Britain and France had also just fought a war with Russia in the Crimean peninsula.3 Yet such hopes were not fulfilled. Britain enjoyed naval supremacy in Europe, and the French army was renowned for its successes under Napoleon I and Louis XIV, but both the British and French governments decided that challenging Russia over the fate of Poland was too difficult.4 A similar situation existed in the early twentieth century. The British, French, and American governments did not begin to engage with policies regarding Poland’s independence until autumn 1915, more than a year after the start of the First World War. Yet an examination of early contacts between the Poles and Western decision makers contextualizes later changes or continuities in the attitudes they expressed. This chapter begins with a brief overview of the situation in the Polish lands before 1914. Next, it looks at the men who made foreign policy in each country and outlines their mentalités regarding general questions such as national self-­ determination or emotion and self-restraint in diplomacy and specific ones like the rebirth of Poland. Policy makers had had little experience with Poles and the idea of an independent Poland, and the

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attitudes emanating from these experiences were often vague in comparison with those expressed later. Lastly, the chapter discusses the Triple Entente’s approach to Polish political questions in the first year of the war.

P o l a n d B e f o r e t h e Fi rs t World War A single “Poland” – let alone an independent one – did not exist in 1914. Rather, we can speak of at least three “Polands” in 1914, corresponding with the three partitions.5 When Poland–Lithuania was partitioned in 1772, 1793, and 1795, Russia had claimed the largest share of the territory, covering parts of modern-day Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine, and Belarus. It added to its possessions at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The term “Russian Poland” sometimes referred to the entire partition, but more often to the Russian province predominantly inhabited by Polish speakers, which was first called “Congress Poland” when Russia claimed it at the Congress of Vienna. Congress Poland was better governed than the rest of the Russian Empire, and Polish rights were more regularly respected than those of Russian subjects elsewhere.6 Foreign control was nonetheless intolerable to those Poles who remembered independence or later dreamed of it, and consequently Poles often led intrigues against the Russian Empire. Several Poles, including the brother of Józef Piłsudski, were involved in a plan to blow up the tsar’s carriage in 1887, in which Vladimir Lenin’s brother Alexander was also involved.7 The Russian partition, while largely agrarian, was nonetheless one of the most economically developed areas in the Russian Empire. By 1914, Russia’s industrialization had brought substantial growth to some cities, especially Łódż. Prussia, however, had retained the most prosperous and densely populated of the partitioned regions, comprising Posen (Poznan) and West Prussia.8 A sizeable Polish-speaking minority also lived in Upper Silesia, which Prussia seized from Austria in 1740. By 1914, Germany’s partition still had the strongest economy of the three, having built up substantial industry. The Austrian partition, the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria, or simply Galicia, was mostly agrarian and economically backward. The oil fields of East Galicia had, however, enjoyed a brief boom in the early twentieth century.9 The partitioning powers used a variety of repressive measures in their Polish provinces. They tried cultural assimilation by restricting language and religious rights and controlling education, and they

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1.1  Historical maps of Poland; originally from Józef Lipkowski’s La question polonaise (1915). The Polish delegation distributed this map at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference.

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successfully repressed uprisings, particularly those in the Russian partition in 1830 to 1831 and 1863 to 1865.10 Yet attempts at assimilation had eased by 1914, and in Galicia, Poles enjoyed wide political freedoms and were the primary administrators of the province. While there was not a single independent Poland, many subjects of the three partitions identified as Polish nationals.11 Concentrations of Polish speakers usually corresponded with the territories outlined above, but not exclusively: Upper Silesia in particular included a large Polish-speaking population but had passed from the Polish crown in 1335, while Danzig (Gdansk) was predominantly German speaking, even though the Polish crown had controlled it until 1793. Migrants from the partitions also identified as Polish nationals. M.B. Biskupski argues, for instance, that the substantial Polish American community should be considered a fourth major Polish partition.12 Polish political parties or clubs existed in the parliaments of all three partitioning empires.13 Yet there were many divisions among Polish nationalists and politicians, in particular on how to navigate the many competing identities in the partitions, like national (German, Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian, Lithuanian, and to some extent Zionist) or religious (Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, Jewish) ones. Two prominent conceptions contested how a Polish identity fit with these others.14 National Democracy, a right-wing movement with followers in each partition, espoused an exclusive form of Polishness based on cultural markers such as the Polish language and Catholicism. The Endecja, as the movement was called, argued that the mass ­propagation of this national idea was more important than the independence and reunification of Poland.15 Others posited an inclusive Polishness that equated a reborn Poland with freedom from oppression, though such idealistic notions tended to be advocated by Polishspeaking landed élites and their descendants like Piłsudski.16 These idealists also tended to favour insurrections against the partitioning powers. So too did socialists, including many Poles in Russia; Marx and Engels had suggested that toppling oppressive empires was an important step to creating a proletarian paradise.17

T h e F o r e ig n - p­ o l icy- m aki ng Eli te and Vi ew s o f P o l e s a n d P o l and before 1914 Only the general outlines of the Polish situation were understood in policy circles of Britain, France, and the United States. This gave Polish representatives considerable trouble during the First World War era,

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and many historians have seconded these accusations of ignorance.18 Policy makers, however, often must learn new files quickly when they are reassigned. Since this book argues that policy makers’ views about Poles and Poland evolved in part on greater exposure, it is helpful to focus on who those policy makers were. In an influential essay, D.C. Watt argued that an identifiable “foreign-­policy-making elite” existed in twentieth-century Britain, a concept that also applies well to France and the United States in the period of this study.19 Watt pinpointed four crucial groups that directed foreign policy. Politicians comprised the first group, meaning the prime minister (or president if extended to the United States and France), foreign minister, and the cabinet or at least a few interested ministers. Next came the diplomatic corps or ambassadors, consuls, and other officials abroad, as well as those in the foreign office in the capital. Watt labelled the third group “bureaucratic”; it included those interested civil servants in other departments such as the Treasury who sought to involve themselves in policy. The final major group was the military. After 1914, military leaders like Marshal Ferdinand Foch consulted on grand strategy, and military attachés provided information while on missions abroad. Watt also noted a few outsiders who regularly affected policy, such as the “serious” press or parliamentary and extraparliamentary groups that discussed foreign affairs. Individuals and groups representing trade or financial interests could also influence policy. The foreign-­policy-making elite was therefore a professional grouping rather than a social one, though many within this elite shared the same social origins, having been born into the social and economic elite.20 Some care had been taken in Britain and France, especially in the decade before 1914, to widen the pool of applicants and decrease the reliance on the aristocracy, but this had only been partly successful. This was both because an entrant to the diplomatic corps required certain means to support himself in the first months or years of application, and because those from outside the milieu of the aristocracy or the wealthy tended not to apply. As Zara Steiner further notes, “Scots, non-­ conformists, Jews, [and] black men were not welcome as colleagues” in the prewar Foreign Office, and a similar situation prevailed in France and the United States.21 In all three countries, women held no key official diplomatic roles, though wives or mistresses sometimes exerted influence informally and a number of women were typists or researchers. Women were also increasingly involved in some imperial and foreign affairs in their own right, though this involvement did not extend to Polish matters.22

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Most of the men of the foreign-­policy-making elite had received an excellent education by the standards of the day. In France, a large contingent had trained as lawyers. In Britain, most had gone to an elite public school, and the majority hired after 1908 had degrees from Oxford or Cambridge.23 In the United States, most had also travelled to Europe, where they made contacts and learned foreign languages. Notably, as mentioned in the introduction, the emotional communities in which these people were instructed emphasized that men (especially statesmen or diplomats) should never express emotion unless in particular circumstances – as righteous anger, for instance.24 General material about Poland’s history such as the partitions would have been part of school curricula, but from 1914 to 1921 policy makers made no specific references to information learned about Poland in school or university. At other times, they referred to old ideas in reference to recent events, and may have just learned about them. There were, for instance, no university chairs of Polish history in Britain, France, or the United States before 1914 (or for many years after that). University experts did contribute a great deal of information to peace planning efforts from 1917 to 1919, but this reflected individual expertise. The importance of education for shaping perspectives should not be discounted, but educational history had little effect on policy makers’ specific knowledge about Poland or the Polish people before 1914. As James Joll argued, in addition to examining the documentary record, historians must also consider the “unspoken assumptions” that shape decision-­making, those “instinctive reactions, traditions, and modes of behaviour … which are taken for granted.”25 The combination of social origins, education, and expertise meant that the makers of foreign policy shared some ideas in common that helped to shape their views on Poles and an independent Poland. First, they considered themselves an elite. Often those who did not share the aristocratic origins of many of their colleagues, like Eyre Crowe in the Foreign Office or Jules and Paul Cambon at the Quai d’Orsay, believed most strongly in the privileges of the foreign-­policy-making elite. Many in the diplomatic realm, moreover, regarded outsiders – even politicians – as interlopers who did not possess the expert knowledge necessary to steer the complicated waters of international diplomacy.26 This created difficulties during the First World War era. Three important politicians – Lloyd George, Wilson, and Clemenceau – had defined their careers in opposition to the establishment that most

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of this elite formed. Wilson, the elected champion of the Progressive movement in the United States, came to national prominence because he opposed the stranglehold of trusts and monopolies on American life. He then attempted to break this hold with a sweeping array of legislation in 1913–14.27 Clemenceau began politics as a radical and anti-imperialist, and had been a Dreyfusard. He thus defined himself squarely in opposition to conservative supporters of a restored monarchy or of the Catholic Church in France, many of whom worked in the French Foreign Office.28 Lloyd George’s beginnings as a Welsh nationalist provided him no great knowledge of Polish history or culture, but it did give him a reference point for understanding Poland’s context, in a way that reflects the experiences of other members of the foreign-­policy-making elite. Lloyd George had always been an outsider in British politics; not only because he was Welsh but also because he was a Nonconformist and had not attended Oxford or Cambridge. This nurtured in him a tendency of being, in his biographer John Grigg’s words, a “relentless fighter against the strong.”29 He also reserved a special hatred for the landed elite; the struggle against English landlords was a main focus of Welsh nationalism. During the war, Lloyd George often compared his Welsh heritage to the situation of small European nations, including Poland.30 As leader, he was flexible in his views; as Poles were also landlords over Ukrainians and others, he could see both sides of later territorial debates. Lloyd George, Wilson, and Clemenceau, like many outsiders, tended to think of other foreign policy makers, and especially the diplomatic corps, as ideologically conservative, which many of them were. Yet the ideas of the foreign-­policy-making elite were not so easily defined. They pursued policies in the self-interest of their respective countries, often perceiving that their country had a singular civilizing mission in the world and that their actions were consistent with it.31 But they did not always agree on the correct policy or even what the national interest was, for reasons that included political differences and personal rivalry. There were many differences between national foreign-­policy-making elites, but there were many connections and parallels between Britain, France, and the United States. A common European diplomatic culture existed, at least in outline, in the period preceding the First World War.32 Many American diplomats ascribed to these norms as well and socialized into them by travelling to Europe and learning languages.33

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1.2  David Lloyd George, c. 1915–20

A visible sign of these converging norms was that world political leaders had adopted the morning coat and top hat by the early twentieth century.34 Transnational organizations and a few statesmen attempted to encourage international cooperation in a variety of initiatives. These were global in scope, though most tended to be concentrated in Europe and the North Atlantic.35 Yet while state integration happened slowly, this belied much greater coordination that had already occurred in trade and finance and also because of immigration.36 Some broad commonalities existed in the realm of ideas, moreover, and these became important during the war. In particular, Britain, France, and the United States each had a tradition of representative government and liberalism.37 Of course, these governments applied these ideals unequally. They all had empires in which they subjugated foreigners, and they presumed that women should have no formal role in affairs. From the perspective of 1914, none of these factors had created closer collaboration, nor were they exclusive to these three countries. A similar basis existed for German friendship with both Britain and the United States, and only the war and its progress

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created a gulf.38 Yet noting the existence of such transnational connections helps to inform the comments that Western policy makers made about Poland and the Poles after 1914.

K n ow l e d g e o f t h e Poli s h Lands With a few exceptions, however, Poland and the Poles were left out of this developing transatlantic community. This is evident by studying the personal histories of those British, French, and American foreign policy makers who contributed to discussions about the rebirth of Poland. Though this elite were educated and well travelled, it seems that they knew little about Poland or the Poles from personal experience. Documented connections are few. Moreover, during the period on which this book focuses, few policy makers made specific reference to information they likely learned before the war. Rather, most of the policies and attitudes discussed in this book clearly emerged from contemporaneous events, meetings, or policy discussions. There were a few exceptions: Clemenceau had two close Polish friends as a young man and had visited Galicia.39 His sympathies for the Poles under oppression remained decades later. Writing in his newspaper, L’homme libre, in 1913, Clemenceau compared the “sad pages of [the Poles’] disturbing history” to the German occupation of Alsace-Lorraine.40 As the German occupation of Alsace-Lorraine was an emotive subject for France, this was a powerful comparison. Similarly, Winston Churchill, who as minister of war in 1919 to 1920 advocated for a strong Poland as a bulwark against Bolshevism, had travelled to Polish-majority Silesia in 1906, but as a guest of the German emperor. This hardly made him an expert on Poles or Poland.41 Of the experts who worked on policy regarding Poland’s rebirth, two had extensive prior knowledge about the region’s history. The first and most influential was Lewis Namier, who had been born and raised outside Lemberg (Ukrainian: Lviv; Polish: Lwów; Russian: Lvov), a Polish-majority city in Galicia.42 During the war, Namier worked with the British government’s propaganda agency at Wellington House and then the Political Intelligence Department (pid) in the Foreign Office. He became an influential advisor to the Paris Peace Conference, even though he was not part of the British delegation. The second expert on Polish affairs was Robert Lord, a young, Catholic Harvard professor who had written a book about the second partition of Poland. Lord, who served in the Polish section of the United States Inquiry

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1.3  Ignacy Paderewski in 1915

and as a delegate at the peace conference, sympathized with the Poles’ suffering in his book, and some of this came through in his duties.43 The members of the foreign-­policy-making elite would also have been aware of certain exceptional Poles, most notably Ignacy Paderewski. Born in Podolia in the Russian partition, Paderewski’s talents as a pianist took him on hugely popular tours across Europe and North America. The piano had recently become more affordable and was consequently a very popular instrument; Wilson’s three daughters, for instance, were avid pianists and persuaded Paderewski to play for them on his first visit to the White House.44 Even before the First World War broke out, Paderewski stopped composing to focus on the political struggle for Polish independence. He worked on his English and French and funded Polish nationalist activities, most notably a celebration of the 500th anniversary of the Polish crown’s victory over the Teutonic Knights at the Battle of Grunwald (Tannenberg) in 1410.45 Paderewski’s fame opened doors for him and also for his associates, most notably the nationalist politician Roman Dmowski. Paderewski

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1.4  Roman Dmowski, c. 1919

contributed 5,000 francs to Dmowski’s 1912 election campaign and later arranged meetings with important people like Lord Northcliffe, the British newspaper baron who owned the Times and the bestselling Daily Mail.46 Dmowski was, moreover, prominent in his own right. He had led the Polish nationalist underground in the late nineteenth century, transforming it into a mass movement as National Democracy.47 He was the most prominent Polish deputy in the Russian Duma from 1906 until he was defeated in the 1912 election.48 Dmowski blamed this defeat on the Jewish vote and organized a weeks-long boycott of Jewish businesses.49 Yet he had already made some enduring contacts outside Poland. As a representative in the Duma, Dmowski made a positive impression on Sir Arthur Nicolson, who was Britain’s ambassador to St Petersburg from 1906 to 1910 before becoming the permanent under-secretary in the Foreign Office. After Dmowski met with Nicolson in London in 1912, the latter told his colleagues that the Polish nationalist leader was “an exceedingly able and intelligent man.”50 Many other Poles were active in political and social circles of leading foreign policy makers.51 There is, however, no indication that these meetings inspired much further interest in the Polish question.

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In an examination of the British foreign-­policy-making elite’s views about Russia, Keith Neilson outlines a group of men who “possessed an expertise concerning Russia as a result of various circumstances: long residence, linguistic aptitude, specialized study, business dealings, and so on,” and helped to shape British official and public attitudes.52 No similar group of experts – or level of corporate knowledge – existed for Poland in British, French, or American foreign policy circles before 1914. This did not mean that no knowledge existed – Britain, France, and the United States had ambassadors to each of the partitioning powers and a consul in Warsaw – but that expert knowledge resided only at a low, less important level of the diplomatic corps and was not shared broadly. Yet after 1900, some general attitudes and policies of the foreign-­ policy-making elite and the broader public touched on Poland’s rebirth. “Public” here should be distinguished from “popular,” and implies the perspectives of those who engaged with questions of foreign policy without necessarily making decisions on it.53 In the specialist historiography of the diplomacy of Poland’s rebirth, previous examinations of British and American attitudes regarding the Poles in this period have tended to deplore the ignorance in those countries about Polish independence and the Polish people generally.54 This ignorance existed, but it should be understood with reference to the backgrounds of the elite as outlined above and of the place of the Poles and the Polish question in international politics before the First World War. It should not be assumed that the elites therefore had no views. Changing circumstances, especially the prospect of an independent Poland, meant that they were obliged to develop positions during the war. The world before the First World War had become increasingly interconnected.55 Relatively few of these connections, however, ran between Warsaw and Paris, London, or Washington. Partitioned Poland was the intersection point of the German, Austrian, and Russian borders, and tensions had risen between Russia and Austria in particular in the first years of the twentieth century.56 But those tensions focused on the situation in the Balkans, though Russia had massed troops on the border with Austrian Galicia in 1912.57 Both Russia and Austria began covert campaigns in 1913 in which they hinted that they would support an autonomous Poland in the hope of gaining support of Poles across the border.58 The French consul-­ general in Warsaw in particular kept watch on developments in the

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Polish partitions, but his primary concern – and presumably that of his government – was whether Austrian intrigues would weaken Russia in a potential war.59 The British, French, and American governments sought no involvement in the Polish question after 1900. British and French representatives to the partitioning powers occasionally made incidental references in internal reports to Polish opinion. In one July 1905 dispatch, the French consul-general in Warsaw made an evocative comment, writing, “As for the Poles, by their nature very welcoming and very kind to foreigners [and] who by tradition and memory have a very real sympathy for our country, they do not hide their grievances against the Republic, allied with the Russian empire.”60 Such dispatches appeared rarely, however, and had little impact: the attention of Western governments was elsewhere.61 In global context, Poles occupied a relatively privileged position as a White, European people, and some public support had existed for the rebirth of Poland, especially in mid-nineteenth-century Britain and France. Revolutionaries, whether socialists or the nationalist followers of Giuseppe Mazzini, usually included Polish independence among their demands for political change in Europe.62 Wider support among the British and French publics in particular had accompanied the Polish insurrection in 1863.63 Foreign policy did not usually concern public or popular opinion in any of the three countries, but there was growing interest in foreign news.64 An interesting anecdote comes from a 1912 meeting between Dmowski and Northcliffe. Northcliffe asked Dmowski about how many Poles were in the three partitions, and how many spoke Polish or felt Polish. “From these questions, I concluded that he knows very little,” Dmowski wrote to Paderewski, who had arranged the meeting. Reading between the lines, Northcliffe asked Dmowski to write for his papers, only to quickly reconsider when Dmowski lectured him about the Polish “fight against the Jews.”65 Though Dmowski may have missed a crucial opportunity to frame the Polish cause abroad, newspaper articles about conditions in the Polish lands – usually in the Russian or German partitions – appeared regularly before 1914. In general, the people of the Polish lands were treated sympathetically. In a December 1907 article, for instance, the liberal Manchester Guardian concluded that a successful Polish education program in Warsaw had been oppressed because “the Russian Government … requires little provocation to give its instincts of indiscriminate repression full play.66 The arrest of a British Russian citizen, Kate Małecka, in 1911 on charges of “conspiring against the

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Russian Government” likewise resulted in a furore about Russian illiberalism.67 Yet the fact that she was arrested in Warsaw and had a Polish-sounding last name received little notice. Several prewar articles, moreover, mentioned attempts to “Germanise” the Polish people and colonize their lands.68 The appearance of any article about the Polish lands – especially since the term “Poland” was regularly used – could constitute grounds for sympathy for the Polish people. This sympathy may have existed in Britain, considering that British newspapers published much less about other subject peoples such as the Czechs or the Slovaks.69 In contrast, Russian treatment of its Polish minority was rarely discussed in prewar France, where pro-­ Polish content was understood to threaten the Russian alliance.70 With the exception of 1905, however, when articles about the revolution in Poland and Russia regularly appeared prominently in British newspapers, most articles about Poles or the partitions in the serious press tended to be short and inconspicuously placed.71 Public attitudes about Polish character also revolved around immigration, in particular in France and the United States, where there were significant populations of immigrant Poles. Large-scale immigration should also be considered as a factor in prewar attitudes because of its potential to inspire sympathy regarding Polish suffering or undermine it. Some studies from the United States have also found that immigration creates stronger images of national groups than do “elite” sources such as school textbooks.72 Polish immigration to France contributed an important ingredient to the longstanding friendship between the two countries.73 At least 10,000 refugees fled to France after the Russian army defeated a Polish uprising in 1831. This was called the Great Emigration because the immigrants were widely regarded as representing the elite of Polish politics and society.74 Many Poles, including Frédéric Chopin and Adam Mickiewicz, made a substantial contribution to elite cultural life in Paris, especially from 1830 to 1848.75 Their influence on the French elite had mostly faded by 1914, though not entirely; Clemenceau’s experiences demonstrate lingering attachments to the Polish cause in radical circles. After 1900, however, incoming Polish migrant workers in the coal and agricultural industries in northwestern France were not well regarded by the French people.76 Two Polish citizens, General Casimir Pulaski and Tadeusz Kościuszko, had been heroes of the American War of Independence, but large-scale Polish immigration meant that by 1900, American attitudes about Poles had become less positive. Before about 1870,

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most immigrants to the United States had come from Northern or Western Europe and were Protestant. Of the twenty-six million immigrants who arrived in the United States between 1870 and 1920, however, many were Catholics from Southern and Eastern Europe, including approximately two million Poles.77 Polish immigrants formed large minorities and even majorities in many booming industrial cities in the Midwest, such as Milwaukee and Chicago. Jewish immigrants, many of whom came from Polish areas, also formed large communities in US cities.78 Many nativists in the United States worried that the new immigrants’ Catholicism would threaten established Protestant communities and that because of Poles’ strange customs, inability to speak English well, and perceived slow-wittedness, they would not integrate into society. Woodrow Wilson, for one, named them in his 1902 History of the American People as a “coarse crew,” and as one of several immigrant nationalities that possessed “neither skill nor energy nor any initiative of quick intelligence.”79 One point of note is that Polish Americans commonly formed local organizations, usually including fraternal religious societies, mutual aid societies, and sometimes Polish aid societies.80 This proliferation of societies provided the foundation for wartime attempts to organize and then influence American policy. By 1914, the existence of a Polish immigrant minority in the United States had not affected the government’s approach to foreign policy. Before 1914, few contacts existed between the British and Polish peoples that would have formed the foundation for British sympathy for independence.81 This was true for the foreign-­policy-making elite, who determined the British government’s wartime position on Poland’s rebirth. In 1911, between 33,000 and 40,000 Poles lived in Britain. Many were poor and lived in areas like East London. Among them were many Jews, Catholics, and socialists; none of these groups were well represented in the British foreign-­policy-making elite before 1914.82 A few exceptional Poles like Paderewski and Józef Retinger did travel in elite circles, as noted above. British representatives – and their French and American counterparts – were likely also influenced by Western philosophers like Rousseau and Voltaire, who considered Eastern Europe to be a liminal space “between civilisation and barbarism.”83 Such attitudes persisted in the twentieth century, perhaps reinforced by Social Darwinism, racial hierarchies, and ideologies of imperialism.84 Poles may have been sympathetic Europeans, but they were also a subject people, and like the partitioning powers, Britain,

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France, and the United States were engaged in colonizing projects. This liminal orientalism helps us understand the insignificance of the Polish question for the British, French, and American foreign-­policymaking elite when the First World War started in August 1914.

B r ita in , F r a n c e , a n d the Alli ance w it h T sa r is t R u s si a, 1914–15 For British and French policy makers, the Polish question was intricately tied to their relations with Russia. France and Britain deferred to Russia on the Polish question from the outbreak of war until the fall of the tsarist government in March 1917. During that period, the Western Allies publicly respected the tsarist government’s assertion that the Polish question was an internal matter. Privately, as the next chapter shows, they paid attention to Russia’s relations with its Polish subjects and worried when those relations soured. Yet Britain and France prioritized other matters.85 Both wanted Russia to stay in the war to take pressure off the Western Front. France, Britain, and Russia also reached an agreement in 1915 to partition the Ottoman Empire, while the French hoped for a Russian guarantee for their territorial claims on Alsace and Lorraine. Neither government was willing to risk a damaging confrontation with the Russian government over its plans for Poland.86 From the perspective of London and Paris, Russia’s relations with its Polish subjects during the war began auspiciously.87 Russian Poles had had reason to favour the Austrian government for its liberal policies in its Polish partition, so it surprised the French consul in Warsaw, Gaston Velten, that the people of Warsaw overwhelmingly supported the Russian war effort in the first few days of the war. In his first wartime dispatch on 11 August, Velten wrote, “You see this extraordinary display in the history of Poland, Russian regiments cheered in the streets of Warsaw by the Polish population, volunteers enlisting in considerable numbers in Russian forces, Polish demonstrations for the triumph of the Franco-Russian armies, and finally all the Polish press pronouncing unanimously against Germany.”88 This good feeling surprised many Poles also, including one Warsaw resident who wondered, “Is Kościuszko turning in his grave?”89 This good feeling was augmented on 14 August, when Nicholas Nikolaevich, the supreme commander of the Russian army and brother of the tsar, proclaimed that “under the sceptre of the Russian Emperor … Poland will come

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together, free in faith, in language, and in self-government.”90 The Russian government wanted to annex the German and Austrian partitions. Sergei Sazonov, Russia’s foreign minister, and others hoped that the proclamation would settle the Polish question so that Russia could count on the loyalty of its Polish subjects for the duration of the war.91 The promises were quickly put to use. When Russia invaded Galicia later in August, propaganda leaflets were distributed that called for freedom for oppressed Habsburg nationalities, including Poles.92 Velten reported that the Grand Duke’s declaration had made a “fortunate impression.” The people of Warsaw, he wrote, interpreted it to be a major concession towards self-government and were jubilant at what they perceived to be the end of Russian oppression.93 Several Polish newspapers hailed the news, and some proclaimed that “the hour approaches of the resurrection” of the Polish state.94 In London, Sir Edward Grey, the British foreign secretary, recognized that the Russian proclamation could be useful propaganda and ordered it to be cabled in full to American newspapers, where it was widely distributed and well received.95 The proclamation appeared, for example, on the front page of the New York Times alongside analysis of the situation in Russian Poland.96 Both the British and French governments recognized the importance of Polish issues in the neutral United States. Events soon complicated Sazonov’s plan to reunite the Polish partitions. Some in the Russian government did not want to give any more autonomy to Polish subjects, and this faction successfully halted the implementation of the decree.97 These difficulties soon paled against the effect on Polish civilians of the Central Powers’ victories against the Russian army.98 The German army won crushing victories at Tannenberg and Masurian Lakes, took Łódż and several towns, and destroyed Kalisz. Velten reported in early October that the people of Warsaw blamed the Russian army for not defending Polish lands with greater vigour and for the wave of refugees that descended on their city.99 Later that month, the situation worsened as German zeppelins approached Warsaw. Rumours spread that the German infantry was in Praga, on the outskirts of Warsaw, and some 260,000 fled the city.100 After the German army retreated, the tsarist government received some of the credit, though Warsaw’s citizens also recognized their own fortitude.101 Many Poles took pride in being on the side of France. Yet for the French government, the Polish question had to be subservient to its alliance with Russia.102 For most of the war, the French government

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felt the constraints of the alliance with Russia to a much greater extent than the British. Part of the reason for this was the union sacrée in France that made defence of the country, to which the Russian alliance was deemed essential, the overwhelming priority of French life during the war.103 The public consensus was also maintained by censorship that for much of the war prevented the type of discussion of war aims that might have changed official policy by challenging the Russian alliance.104 The French government generally believed that the alliance with Russia needed to be defended at all costs and France had no time to devote to unnecessary questions.105 For the most part, French diplomats supported the tsar’s plan to unite Poland by taking Posen and Upper Silesia because it would weaken Germany.106 Before 1917, the British government made no commitments to support new or larger nation-states in Central and Eastern Europe. In fact, the British government did not lay out a formal program of war aims at all until the beginning of 1917.107 Nonetheless, it was clear from the beginning of the war that the restoration of Belgium was the government’s primary war aim in Europe.108 In several speeches in 1914, Prime Minister H.H. Asquith made this into a general principle. He proclaimed that Britain fought to protect the rights of the “small states” of Europe, a phrase he occasionally swapped with “small nationalities.”109 He likely meant only the existing small states of Europe, which he once listed as “Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland, and Scandinavian countries, Greece and the Balkan States.”110 Asquith – and the British press – also emphasized the importance of preventing German hegemony over the continent. Belgium’s independence in particular was strategically important to Britain.111 It was convenient, however, that Britain could also portray itself as altruistic in helping small states against the aggression of large ones.112 Despite these mentions of small states, British policy makers had no particular interest in national self-­determination. Some senior British figures like Churchill had mentioned their support for national self-­determination in the past, especially in connection with the Balkan Wars of 1912 to 1913. Yet this support typically applied to frontier rectifications involving existing states so that national minorities could be reunited with their countries to prevent irredentist war. British leaders had no interest in making promises to support the creation of “new” states such as Poland.113 From the first days of the war, numerous émigrés nonetheless asked the British government to establish a

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policy on the self-­determination of nations. Émigré representatives of the Yugoslavs, Czechoslovaks, and Poles were most prominent in London, forging links with the Foreign Office and seeking positive press coverage. The Foreign Office received memoranda from and occasionally met with individual Poles after the outbreak of war, but neither the foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey, nor Nicolson, who directed the Foreign Office’s activities, dealt significantly with Polish issues before early 1916. Britain’s position that the Polish question was an internal affair for the Russian government was rarely discussed in Cabinet or Parliament for the duration of the war, and especially not before 1916. No government official was devoted solely to Polish affairs until 1918. Those who engaged most regularly with Polish representatives were Foreign Office clerks like Sir George Clerk and J.D. Gregory, both of whom later sympathized with Polish independence.114 Junior-level clerks like Gregory forwarded important information to their superiors and could offer opinions but had little influence on decisions. A few diplomats abroad also met with Polish representatives extensively. Sir Horace Rumbold, the British minister in Berne during the war, became known as Britain’s “best authority” on Poland because he dealt with Polish émigrés so frequently.115 Rumbold and other diplomats submitted reports – often composed by Polish groups – that provided information on morale, economic conditions, and sometimes military matters from behind the Central Powers’ lines, but at first these reports received little attention. Other émigré groups from Central and Eastern Europe, principally the Czechoslovaks and Yugoslavs, were carrying on similar campaigns, which may have helped Polish émigré representatives later. The Foreign Office, which dealt with most of these and made policy that affected their homelands, did not publicly support self-­determination for Czechoslovakia or Yugoslavia until near the end of the war. The flow of information reinforced the nationalities’ position, however, and also encouraged personal relationships. As a result, many British officials eventually sympathized with the subject nationalities, including the Poles.116 The subject nationalities’ campaigns were often mentioned together or reaped the benefits of one another’s successes. In the fall of 1914, for instance, reports of large-scale desertions from Czech regiments and Russian and Serbian victories against AustriaHungary were widely reported in the British press, and all Slavic

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nationalities benefitted from this positive attention.117 This was helpful to the Polish émigrés, but on the other hand these campaigns for self-­ determination did not impinge on the Anglo-Russian alliance. Moreover, Polish independence did not yet have an effective government lobby to capitalize on good publicity. Campaigns by other nationalities also provided a basis for negative comparisons. The Foreign Office initially developed a negative opinion of Polish representatives, who competed openly with each other for the government’s attention unlike the united Czechoslovak and Yugoslav émigrés. As Nicolson noted, “it is characteristic of Polish politics that several self-styled representatives of Polish feeling have all produced different schemes as to the future of Poland.”118 His specialist knowledge of Polish politics came from his time at the Russian imperial court in St Petersburg, hence the negative view. In 1915, the Polish representatives who dealt with British representatives in the United States were seen as uncommitted to the Allied cause, unlike the Czechoslovaks and Yugoslavs.119 The relative fortunes of different émigré groups are also revealing. The Yugoslavs’ lobbying, for instance, won the private sympathy of the Foreign Office, if not the support of the British government, by early 1915.120 Overall, the Foreign Office kept an open mind where it could. Regarding the eventual territorial settlement in Greater Hungary, for instance, even though officials criticized “Magyar chauvinism,” they recognized that concessions to oppressed minorities like the Romanians or Slovaks might be impossible if the Hungarian government was to be successfully convinced to sign a separate peace.121

A F a r away Land The Polish question was relatively insignificant in British, French, and American foreign policy before 1915. This chapter outlines policy makers’ early attitudes relating to the rebirth of Poland to contextualize their later views. Before the First World War, vestiges of a liminal orientalism that discriminated against people in Eastern Europe existed, as did vague sympathy for those people, including Poles, because they lived under oppressive regimes. Emotional norms around self-restraint were not connected specifically with Poland’s situation. Newspaper articles, especially in publications like the left-wing Manchester Guardian or Clemenceau’s L’homme libre, occasionally mentioned discrimination against German and Russian Poles. Yet the

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attention of the British, French, and American governments and their respective publics was usually focused elsewhere. Those governments monitored Polish opinion from Warsaw, but this was an unimportant diplomatic post. When fighting broke out in the Polish lands in August 1914, the British and French governments regarded Polish questions as internal matters for the Russian government. It took a significant reversal on the Eastern Front to change this view.

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2 Sympathy for Suffering

In May 1915, Germany and Austria-Hungary launched a major offensive against the Russian Empire. The German army entered Warsaw on 6 August, and by the end of the year the Central Powers held nearly all of the lands of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In the retreat, the Russian army briefly arrested or deported thousands of Polish subjects for supposed pro-Austrian sympathies and carried out a scorched-earth campaign that destroyed homes and properties.1 These events caused a humanitarian catastrophe and soon attracted attention in Britain, France, and the United States. The devastation caused to the Poles of Russia was reported to British and French diplomats. In a report that circulated through the British Foreign Office, a mining engineer in Moscow reported that “the refugees from Poland and Galicia were pouring in … by thousands, one of the saddest sights you can conceive.”2 Many Polish organizations, not only in Poland but also in Switzerland, France, Italy, and Britain, attempted to raise money for humanitarian relief. But these efforts soon centred in the United States because of its growing Polish lobby and the public’s involvement in humanitarian activities relating to the war. This in turn made Polish relief an international issue and helped to shape Western views of Poles and their desire for independence. The theme of restraint emerges clearly in Western policy-making efforts during this period. Both Polish relief and Polish self-­determination inspired sympathy and, from some, enthusiasm, yet the Russian alliance required British and French policy makers in particular to curtail public expression of these feelings. Moreover, because of the Russian alliance, Polish émigré representatives were expected to restrain their calls for independence and instead

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shape their nationalist desires to the Entente’s needs. Polish representatives who restrained their desire for independence most successfully, particularly Roman Dmowski, Erazm Piltz, and Ignacy Paderewski, maintained the closest relationships with policy-makers.

T h e P o l is h R e l ie f Campai gn The United States, which had the world’s biggest economy and vast reserves of manpower, was the most important neutral state. Both the Central Powers and the Entente attempted to win its favour through diplomacy and propaganda, but its citizens and its government became involved in the war from the beginning.3 The public followed events in Europe closely and argued about whether or not to enter the war, and companies and financiers supplied both sides (but mainly the Allies).4 A few citizens volunteered to fight, most notably Ernest Hemingway, but also 10,000 trained Polish Americans, whose services were offered – unsuccessfully – to the French government in the first weeks of the war.5 In addition, the people of the United States gave a great deal of money and attention to various humanitarian efforts.6 The most well-known relief effort was for the people of Belgium.7 Beginning in October 1914, the Commission for Relief in Belgium (crb) raised substantial funds for the Belgian people under the leader­ ship of Herbert Hoover, a wealthy engineer. Calls for aid to civilians in the Polish partitions had begun around the time of the c r b ’s founding. In October 1914, the Rockefeller Foundation sent Ernest Bicknell, an official with the American Red Cross, to investigate conditions in each of the Polish partitions. His report on civilian suffering led these organizations to join with Hoover and the c r b to advocate for a relief effort to Poland.8 Separately, several Polish American organizations were pursuing opportunities for relief. Polish Americans tended not to be involved in politics at any level and had no single, nationwide Polish organization, though there were a number of small, competing ones.9 Yet these Polish relief campaigns soon reached beyond the large Polish American community with the involvement of Paderewski, the famous pianist. From a base in neutral Switzerland, Paderewski had involved himself in advocating for Poland’s rights in the first weeks of the war. He arranged for some of his Polish colleagues to meet with French officials. When that did not work, he wrote directly to the French president, Raymond Poincaré, and the foreign minister, Théophile Delcassé,

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urging them to hold the Russian government to the promises it had made – but not yet fulfilled – to the Poles.10 Relief for Polish civilians soon consumed his time. The first year of war affected Russian Polish civilians greatly, with the loss of power supplies, food shortages, and mass unemployment compounded by Russian requisitions.11 In 1915, he led efforts to set up relief committees, first in Switzerland and then in Britain, where in late March he lunched with the chancellor of the exchequer, David Lloyd George, and others at the chancellor’s residence at 11 Downing Street. Paderewski made an excellent impression. “[Lloyd George] admires him greatly,” wrote Frances Stevenson, Lloyd George’s secretary and mistress. “He says [Paderewski] is passionately devoted to his country, Poland, and his great desire is to see a separate Poland, independent and free.”12 The poet Rudyard Kipling joined Paderewski’s relief committee, which symbolized the power of Paderewski’s network.13 After a short stay in London, Paderewski then moved to the United States, where he had toured extensively since the 1890s. Many of the disparate Polish groups in the United States soon put aside their differences as Paderewski’s campaign for Polish relief gained prominence.14 Paderewski’s involvement also brought the Polish relief campaign beyond the Polish community and helped to shape views of the Poles and Poland in Western minds. As mentioned previously, many Americans viewed Polish immigrants with distrust and likely would have agreed with Wilson’s assertion in 1902 that Poles were a “coarse crew.” Paderewski, in contrast, was viewed as more sophisticated, and he moved easily among the elite. This helped him to make important contacts quickly and to be taken seriously.15 In particular, he made an ally out of Colonel Edward Mandell House.16 House, who had made his fortune in Texas and befriended Wilson in 1912, lived in New York and did not have an official position until late 1915. Yet he was already Wilson’s most important foreign policy advisor and a conduit to the State Department, which Wilson distrusted.17 This was significant because Wilson set the direction for US foreign relations, and later in the war he made some important pronouncements regarding the independence of Poland. House and Paderewski first met on 12 November 1915, and Paderewski again made a good impression in person. “I had an idea that Paderewski was an egoist of the most violent and offensive type. He did not indicate a trace of such characteristics in his interview with me,” House confided in his diary.18 House then acted quickly,

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which indicated the effectiveness of Paderewski’s intervention. The next day, House raised the issue of Polish relief while meeting with the British ambassador. Britain had blockaded the Central Powers, so any relief would have to be negotiated with them; similarly, relief to German-occupied Belgium had to travel through the British blockade.19 House soon wrote to Wilson to ask whether the president thought it worthwhile for him to “think up some plan along the lines of the Belgian Relief Commission,” and two weeks later pursued the question with Wilson in person.20 He suggested that Russian Poles be included in a relief plan led by the mayor of Cleveland, Newton D. Baker.21 House and Paderewski met several more times before the end of the year, and House also facilitated Paderewski’s access to the president. Paderewski’s first meeting with Wilson likely took place in March 1916 on House’s introduction, and the two met several more times over the course of the war.22 Paderewski in turn expressed his gratitude, writing on 22 December, “Words cannot express what I feel for you. It has been the dream of my life to find a ‘providential man’ for my country.”23 House was greatly pleased that his efforts were so appreciated; it was “[o]ne of the most delightful letters I have received in a long time.”24 Though he occasionally found Paderewski’s emotional responses discomfiting, that passion also helped to convince him and Secretary of State Robert Lansing that Paderewski and the Russian Poles deserved government support.25 The relief campaign raised awareness of the plight of Russian Poles, both at the political and the popular level, not only because of Paderewski’s popularity but also because it played successfully to common humanitarian themes. These efforts were not as successful in terms of bringing food and money as were those in Belgium and northern France, but they were effective in inspiring sympathy, as exemplified in House’s behaviour. The campaign spread across the United States and dwelt on the Poles as innocent victims of the world conflict, which many Americans viewed as a pointless struggle. In most cases the term “the Poles” was used, and while it primarily would have referred to the people of Russian Poland, this distinction was often not made. The term could also have referred to other Polish civilians who had been affected by the war, like those in Galicia. Many representations focused particularly on the suffering of women and children, who were considered to be the most innocent and are often the focus of humanitarian campaigns. As one American relief worker reported, “The Poles make the general statement that there are no

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children under five years of age alive,” and such statements also appeared in the press.26 Likewise, Paderewski commented in his initial meeting with House that “there was scarcely a Polish child under eight years of age” due to the terrible conditions in Poland, a comment that House repeated to Wilson in his letter two days later.27 So while many Americans accepted the image of the innocent, suffering Poles, so too did their leaders, especially House. He soon took up the cause to relieve “the misfortunes of that unhappy people” and raised the issue with Wilson. On 17 December 1915, a Senate resolution calling for a Polish Relief Day wrote of “the appalling situation in Poland, where practically the entire population today is homeless, and where men, women, and children are perishing by the thousands for lack of shelter, clothing, and food.”28 In his response, Wilson responded using similarly emotive language: “I feel confident that the people of the United States during this holiday season will be moved to aid a people stricken by war, famine, and disease.”29 While the aid was primarily intended for the people of Russian Poland, neither statement distinguished between the suffering Poles of the Russian partition and the Poles of the German and Austrian partitions, who were mostly less affected by the privations of war but had still suffered. The theme of the suffering Poles was the emotive stereotype through which the Polish cause first became relevant for the conduct of the war. It often returned in later British, French, and American diplomacy regarding the rebirth of Poland.

B r ita in a n d P o l i sh Reli ef The chief obstacle to relief was the British blockade of the Central Powers.30 This meant dealing with the British government: in July 1916, France agreed that Britain would speak for them in all international matters relating to blockade and relief.31 The German government was more willing to allow the relief of Poland since, as in Belgium, relief lessened the possibility that the occupied population would rise up against them, and it would free up supplies that would otherwise have been used in the occupied territory. The British government, however, was concerned that any provisions sent to Poland could be requisitioned for the German army or used to strengthen Polish workers who would then contribute (or contribute more) to the Central Powers’ war effort. British officials had raised similar concerns about providing supplies to Belgium and occupied France, but eventually

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assented. To convince the British government to make the same concession for the Russian Poles, Frederic Walcott, a representative of the Rockefeller Foundation, met with key British politicians, including Asquith, Grey, Lloyd George, and Arthur Balfour. The latter two men would replace Asquith and Grey respectively by the end of the year.32 Walcott attempted without success to convince these and other politicians that relief of Russian Poland was in Britain’s interests. He claimed, for instance, that the relief of Poland would prevent 1.5 million Poles from replacing German workers, who could then be sent to the front lines. He quickly realized, however, that “from the English point of view nothing would be justified that would help to lengthen the war even for one week.” 33 Grey and others also sought to use the importance of home front morale and the fickle nature of public opinion to excuse the government from lifting the blockade. The public, British officials argued, opposed any changes in the blockade; the Foreign Office in particular was very unwilling to challenge this consensus.34 Walcott had also tried to shape public opinion by meeting with the press. Yet in an uncanny parallel of 1863, the British press sympathized with the Poles while journalists argued that the government should not intervene. While in London, Walcott met frequently with the editor of the Times, Geoffrey Robinson (later Geoffrey Dawson), who expressed his sympathy with the plight of civilians in Russian Poland and helped to introduce Walcott to important politicians like Lord Robert Cecil, the parliamentary under-secretary of state.35 In response to a request from Walcott that the Times take a strong stand in favour of relieving Russian Poland through the blockade, however, Robinson replied, “I am not prepared to make a stir in The Times about the Poles, for the simple reason (which I gave to you the other day) that I cannot support your plan on humanitarian grounds if the Government decide on military grounds that they cannot entertain it.”36 The result was that there was no movement in Britain to lift the blockade for Polish relief. Instead, the government attempted to blame the Central Powers for the plight of Polish civilians. This defence was partly intended to shape both public and government opinion in the United States, where the relief issue was a particular concern. In a private letter to House, Grey suggested that the relief of Poland could be permissible if Germany ceased its attacks on neutral shipping.37 Meanwhile, the British propaganda agency at Wellington House sent 13,500 pamphlets to targeted citizens in the US, and the British point

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of view was distributed in US press outlets.38 This represented an expanded version of earlier efforts. Since 1914, Wellington House had produced pamphlets in English and Polish, which were transmitted from Polish compatriots in London, ostensibly acting on their own initiative, to 600 influential Polish Americans as well as to Polish American organizations.39 The German government conducted similar campaigns. Similar campaigns were conducted among other Slavic groups in the United States to counteract the anti-Allied influence of Irish and German Americans in particular.40 The British government did not immediately reject American Polish relief plans but first asked for Russian opinions, which was merely an effort to delay the inevitable. As Walcott wrote despondently, Russia’s “destruction was deliberate, and they do not want to undo it now to make it any easier for the Germans.”41 An eventual British plan for the relief of Russian Poland made relief contingent on a massive and unfeasible civilian relief program in the Balkans.42 Though Walcott’s campaign failed, aid eventually began to flow to Russian Poles in March 1917, when Polish American organizations began sending money through Switzerland.43 Limited supplies began entering Russian Poland by the summer of 1917, with the Swiss government guaranteeing the shipments from the French government.44 The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee had also sent some aid and had opened an office in Warsaw.45 While the British government was unwilling to support the relief effort, it did not mean that citizens did not sympathize at all with the Poles’ situation. In Robinson’s letter to Walcott, he noted that the Times had carried several articles in recent weeks about the Poles’ plight.46 But instead of concluding that aid should be sent to Poland, British representatives emphasized the efforts of the occupying German government to take food out of Russian Poland to feed its own people.47 Both sides used civilian forced labour at various points in the war, but there was evident propaganda value in the British outrage. The Times alleged on 2 February 1916 that a censored Reichstag debate provided evidence that the German authorities were taking corn out of Poland to feed their people without replacing it with other foods, while the Morning Post published a telegram from Asquith that detailed similar allegations.48 Other newspapers also followed the theme. On 12 March the Daily News carried a story entitled “Robbing the Corpse of Poland” that alleged further German requisitions in Poland.49 The sympathetic attitude towards the Poles’ plight was

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perhaps best shown in a letter to the editor of the Morning Post from J.H. Harley, a Polish sympathizer who later wrote a history of Poland and edited the Polish Review, a pro-­Polish wartime publication. “Poland is a nation of many sorrows,” Harley wrote, “but if there is one conclusion that emerges clearly and strongly from all her history of the past, it is her undying hostility to the spirit of Prussianism.”50 This idea that Poles were suffering under a common enemy and were loyal to the Allies became an important ingredient in British sympathy towards them as the war progressed. Critically, this sympathy arose because of the situation in Russian Poland. Sympathy was often expressed for “Poland” or all “Poles,” rather than, for instance, saying that German and Austrian Poles were disloyal while the Poles of the Russian partition were pro-Allied. Sympathy for Poles also reflected the British context, because it illustrated the generally anti-German tone of public discourse and did not dwell on the negative effects of the blockade and the Russian retreat, which Walcott and Hoover believed to be the main cause of the Russian Poles’ misfortunes. The plight of the Russian Poles might also have recalled earlier efforts for the relief of Serbia that gained much positive attention in Britain.51 Such attitudes also served, however, to highlight the Poles’ political situation generally. By creating this awareness of and sympathy for the Poles’ plight, Paderewski, Walcott, and others laid the groundwork for a campaign for Polish independence.

T h e F o r e ig n O f f ic e a nd Poli s h Émi grés in L o n don Separately, representatives of Polish views had begun to make stronger connections with the Foreign Office when Roman Dmowski arrived in Britain from Russia in November 1915. This section examines these connections; although few specific attitudes resulted, a focus on the interactions of Dmowski and others helps us understand later developments. Unlike those who had had little influence with the Foreign Office, Dmowski had immediate credibility because he had been an influential politician in Russian Poland. It also helped that Nicolson, who knew Dmowski in Russia, gave him an introduction to the Foreign Office. Nicolson’s opinion carried weight, because as permanent under-secretary he was the highest authority in the Foreign Office after Grey. Dmowski now possessed status in the Foreign Office that no other Polish émigré had enjoyed previously.52

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Dmowski’s main reason for coming to London had been to internationalize the Polish question; in other words, to convince the Foreign Office or the British government to make a public statement challenging the Russian claim that Poland’s independence was an internal matter. His network of informants, especially Erazm Piltz of the Polish National Committee at Lausanne, also passed along information designed to sway Allied opinion. One early report, for instance, noted that the Central Powers were preparing to create a Polish army of up to 800,000 men from the newly conquered Russian partition.53 The Central Powers’ appeal reflected the reality of the war. After two years of fighting, manpower had grown short, and both sides therefore attempted to draw upon every possible source while trying to obstruct their opponents’ attempts to do the same. The Polish question was of particular concern for the Central Powers, who investigated plans for a Polish army for much of 1916.54 The Central Powers needed to maintain the loyalty of their new subjects, something which they often attempted by entreaties to the different nationalities  – Poles, Lithuanians, Jews, and others – whom they now controlled. These efforts met with varying degrees of success.55 A Polish army might come about, one British envoy reported, only because “the choice would probably be either to fight against Russia or to be shot.”56 The Foreign Office and the French foreign ministry also began to take seriously the prospect that the Allies should attempt to win over public opinion in occupied Russian Poland.57 Such awareness of the situation for civilians under German occupation helped to position the Polish people as oppressed by a common enemy. Beginning in January 1916, both the French ambassador, Maurice Paléologue, and the British ambassador, Sir George Buchanan, discussed the subject of Poland briefly with Sazonov. Crucially, these discussions were always in private. Neither the British nor French government ever rebuked the Russian government publicly for its treatment of the Polish people, because it was not a priority to dispute the matter.58 Yet their private campaign was unsuccessful. After a few conversations, Sazonov forbade the topic in meetings with Buchanan and Paléologue respectively.59 The tsarist government maintained this stance until it fell.60 Buchanan’s account of his conversation with Sazonov is nonetheless worth noting.61 He suggested that “Russia was prepared after the war to satisfy legitimate demands of Poles and promises of autonomy contained in Grand Duke’s manifesto,” which implied concessions towards Polish aspirations for statehood and

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assumed that the people of Russian Poland were nationally conscious Poles.62 Buchanan concluded in his report that Sazonov was “personally most well-disposed towards Poles.”63 In fact, in July 1916 Sazonov convinced the tsar to make an announcement granting autonomy to a reunited Poland, though the plan was later dropped.64 Yet both he and the British government were concerned about Polish sentiment, even if only out of a strategic desire to thwart the Central Powers. Sazonov had warned the British government “against listening to desultory talk” from Polish leaders who had been “agitating” in London, but the Foreign Office increased their contact with Dmowski and his associates despite such warnings.65 This is evidence of some sympathy but also that the Foreign Office doubted the likelihood that anything would come of the Russian government’s promises and judged it useful to remain in contact with Polish émigrés. Dmowski took a chance in March 1916 when he proposed an independent Poland with its own monarch and army. While the Foreign Office did not agree with his proposal, it was examined in close detail. Grey read Dmowski’s memorandum and instructed Nicolson to ask the advice of Count Alexander Benckendorff, the Russian ambassador.66 Dmowski’s memorandum went no further; on Benckendorff’s advice, the Foreign Office concluded that an independent Poland would “not be entertained for a moment by Russia.”67 Dmowski did not raise the idea of an independent Poland again for another year, and only then after the fall of the tsarist government. Yet his intervention further demonstrates that the Foreign Office had a basic sympathy for his ideas. Officials listened to and considered Dmowski’s message, even though the government did not yet change its policy. Dmowski benefitted most, and his personal connection to the Foreign Office increased as he eliminated potential rivals. Dmowski first used the National Democrats’ pro-Allied credentials to marginalize his most powerful rival for the British government’s attention, August Zaleski. Zaleski, who had studied at the London School of Economics before the war, had followed a similar path to that taken by the Czech émigré leader Tomáš Masaryk: he took a position at King’s College, London, spoke in public all over Britain, led the Polish Information Committee (pic), and published a work of Polish history. He also befriended R.W. Seton-Watson, a professor of history, and encouraged him to sit on the board of the p i c.68 Zaleski presented himself as tolerant and liberal and thereby an excellent representative of the Polish people, but upon Dmowski’s arrival, the National

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Democrat leader repeatedly mentioned Zaleski’s connections to the Central Powers.69 These were relatively minor, but crucially Zaleski was connected with Piłsudski, who at the time was fighting for the Central Powers.70 Dmowski did hold other advantages over Zaleski: as a major Polish politician, he could credibly claim that he spoke for his people, while Zaleski did not have an introduction to the Foreign Office. But by pointing out Zaleski’s connections to the Central Powers and the Council of State that governed during the occupation of Poland, Dmowski curtailed Zaleski’s influence. As Eric Drummond, Balfour’s secretary, indicated in a minute, “I think we ought to be very careful of accepting any impressions by M. Zaleski on the war. The Council of State is … a purely Austro-German institution.”71 Dmowski also successfully ostracized Lewis Namier, a Polish Jew working at Wellington House.72 That Dmowski was also able to overcome Namier’s opposition further illustrates the Foreign Office’s commitment to the Polish leader and his pro-Allied campaign. Namier later asserted that the anti-­Semitism of Dmowski’s National Democrats had convinced him, as an eighteen-year-old university student in Lemberg, to continue his studies in Switzerland and then in England at the London School of Economics.73 When war broke out, Namier volunteered for the British army, but after several months he was offered a position at Wellington House. He was the British government’s foremost expert on Polish matters, and he read and commented upon Foreign Office materials.74 When Dmowski arrived in Britain, Namier criticized the National Democratic leader in several memos, hoping that the Foreign Office would not seek Dmowski’s advice. Namier’s efforts proved unsuccessful, however. Dmowski obtained a copy of one of Namier’s memos and showed it to Nicolson, who warned Namier against including his personal opinion in further press summaries.75 Dmowski later accused Namier of treason for commenting on an internal Russian issue.76 This effectively ostracized Namier; the young official continued to comment on Polish items but his comments were rarely read.77 It did not help that Namier was at Wellington House, physically removed from the Foreign Office. He was well informed, but providing advice on foreign policy was not his responsibility. The incident shows the general feeling in the Foreign Office and the extent to which Dmowski had established himself because of his pro-Allied leanings and his connection with Nicolson. In Britain and France, more influential policy makers began discussing Poland’s independence. As the British and French governments

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began in mid-1916 to consider what a beneficial peace would look like, they raised the strategic benefits of weakening Germany by detaching its Polish provinces or by freeing the subject nationalities of Austria-Hungary.78 These did not present great awareness of Polish nationality at this stage, but the acknowledgement of the possibility of Polish independence was still notable, even if nothing came of it at this stage. Dmowski’s positioning of himself as pro-Allied, moreover, also applied to how Poles and an independent Poland were seen. Another action soon showed that there were important limits on how much the British foreign-­policy-making elite would support Poland’s independence. On 5 November 1916, the Central Powers issued the Two Emperors’ Declaration, in which they declared their intention to create an autonomous Poland. Zaleski and the p i c believed that this was the time to support Poland’s independence publicly, but his stance caused the pic’s advisory council of British citizens to resign in protest. Seton-Watson, who was one of the council members, wrote to Zaleski’s colleague Leon Litwinski, “I have the greatest possible sympathy with Poland … But there are limits to which I am not prepared to go … I have, with the best will in the world, utterly failed to convince myself that [Polish independence] has any serious prospect of realisation under present conditions in Europe.”79 “None of us,” he later added, “are prepared to lend ourselves to anti-Russian agitation.”80 When Zaleski promised not to pursue independence again, most of the committee resumed their positions. SetonWatson had supported an independent Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia since spring 1915, but Russia had no designs on their territory.81 The Two Emperors’ Declaration was poorly received in occupied Russian Poland and had major flaws.82 The declaration specified no territories for the kingdom, which was assumed, correctly, to comprise only those Polish territories taken from Russia. Moreover, no provision had been made for an elected government. (Plans for an elected Council of State were hastily drawn up later that month.) The declaration nonetheless motivated the Russian government to reconsider Sazonov’s failed scheme, which it made public on 15 November. This declaration did not sway Russian Poles either, but both Britain and France quickly praised it. They did so again when they replied jointly to Wilson’s peace note of 18 December 1916, saying that “[t]he intentions of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia regarding Poland have been clearly indicated in the proclamation which he has just addressed to his armies.”83 Yet the Allied note called for “the liberation of Italians,

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of Slavs, of Roumanians and of Czecho-Slovaks from foreign domination.”84 The implication was that any support for national self-­ determination could not extend to Poles or Poland because of the Russian alliance. In early March 1917, the French government agreed to Russia’s request for a free hand on their war aims in Poland; in return, the Russian government pledged full support for French claims to Alsace-Lorraine.85 The agreement was short lived, since soon after it had been concluded, the February Revolution broke out and the tsarist government collapsed. If Poland, Czechoslovakia, or Yugoslavia were to become states after the war, it would require a reconfiguration of the European order. The Russian February Revolution provided the strategic context, as will be discussed below, but even before this, there had been movements in Britain, France, and the United States that argued that any peace settlement must improve on the international political system, for example by building international institutions or promoting new norms like self-­determination. When these calls for change became more influential, this favoured Polish independence. In France, support for a peace without annexations and the League of Nations coalesced around the Comité pour la reprise des relations internationales, a left-wing organization that originated from the trade union movement.86 In Britain, influential outsiders like Seton-Watson and Henry Wickham Steed, the former editor of the Times, believed that the British government should practise the ideals it preached in public policy such as support for small states.87 The intellectuals whose ideas helped to drive these movements also communicated with like-minded associates abroad.88 They and others were able to build on renewed public support for national self-­determination beyond what had existed in the nineteenth century. Seton-Watson and Wickham Steed, who both had connections with the Czechoslovak and South Slav émigré lobbyists, became increasingly influential after they founded the New Europe in October 1916. Within several weeks, the weekly journal was selling 4,000 copies and had received praise from influential people as well as other publications like Punch and the Observer.89 Articles in the New Europe covered questions of war aims and occasionally featured articles on Poles or the Polish question. The journal’s general support for national self-­determination also focused attention on Central and Eastern Europe, building on the government’s wartime emphasis on the rights of small European nations and pre-existing general sympathies.90 Its

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anti-German slant also would have helped the Polish émigrés’ campaign. Anti-Germanism was widespread in wartime Britain. Several articles in the New Europe by Masaryk are noteworthy among those that carried this theme.91 Masaryk found favour with the New Europe group and the British foreign-­policy-making elite generally and took up a lectureship at King’s College, London.92 The success of other émigré campaigns did not directly affect British policy on the Polish question, but it suggested that a coherent Polish campaign might find sympathy from the British government. Wilson became the most influential figure among those proposing fundamental changes to international relations. He proposed a League of Nations, while even his political opponents proposed alternative methods to avoid another European conflagration.93 Then, in his “Peace without Victory” speech on 22 January 1917, Wilson declared that “statesmen everywhere are agreed that there should be a united, independent, and autonomous Poland.”94 The line was part of his larger call for a peace without annexations and government based on “the consent of the governed.” Though Wilson’s statement about Polish independence provided no guidance on how an independent Poland might be created, who should create it, and where its borders would be, the mention of Poland in a major foreign policy speech was a forward leap for the cause of Polish independence.95 Polish individuals and organizations worldwide responded positively, and this feeling was communicated to the British, French, and American governments.96 The relationship between House and Paderewski was important in inspiring Wilson’s statement, though it has been exaggerated in later accounts.97 Yet as a perceptive Foreign Office clerk later wrote, “it would appear that [Wilson] considers the Polish question to have a position of special importance.”98 This, at least, reflected Paderewski’s influence.99 The clerk further suggested that “the Polish question may be made an avenue of approach to closer relations.”100 By March 1917, developments in the war meant that the British government, at least, would entertain these ideas.

T h e F e b rua ry Revoluti on Wilson’s mention of an independent Poland became considerably more significant when the tsarist government fell in March 1917. In the turbulent weeks after the February Revolution, both the French and British governments tried to determine what was happening in

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Russia and how they should react. They worried that Russia might conclude a separate peace with the Central Powers and drop out of the war because of the explosion of anti-war sentiment there, or that the revolution would severely impair Russia’s fighting ability, which was already a concern.101 A separate peace would free up soldiers and supplies that the Central Powers could concentrate on the Western Front. These factors, however, did not lead the British or French governments to think about supporting Polish independence. Rather, Polish émigrés put the issue before each government. The initiative was largely Dmowski’s, as Piltz, in Lausanne, did not want to act.102 The ensuing discussion revolved around whether an appeal to Polish national feeling could achieve British and French strategic aims: to frustrate the Central Powers. Those policy makers, primarily on the British side, who argued in favour of such a declaration believed a declaration would be very important to Poles. This growing concern with appealing to Polish public opinion led policy makers to engage more deeply with what Poles wanted, in turn leading to more observations about the Polish national character, even if these were quite vague at this point. London had become a centre of the Polish independence campaign. The debate in 1917 displays a growing general support for Poles through Polish independence, but the Foreign Office showed the tension between their desire to publicize their support and the restraint required in a flexible foreign policy. In a memorandum to the Foreign Office on 21 March, six days after Nicholas II abdicated in Russia, Dmowski called for the British government to support Poland’s independence. “The opposition to the German schemes in Poland” was in danger of weakening, he noted. While there remained “irreconcilable enemies of Germany with the National Democrats at their head,” many Poles had opposed the Central Powers simply because they had been Russian subjects. The revolution in Russia, he noted, had released Russian Poles from their oaths of loyalty to the tsar: “the question of loyalty no longer exists, and the latter elements may radically change their position and become conciliated to the new state of things created by the Germans.”103 Meanwhile, National Democratic organizations in Petrograd made the same assertions to the French minister there.104 Dmowski further argued that if the Russian government were to assert its right to determine the future of a Polish state in the Duma, as was the initial position of Pavel Miliukov, the new Russian minister of foreign affairs, it “would provoke an outburst of indignation among

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all Poles without exception.” Dmowski implied that Poles were ­suspicious of Russian intentions and could not trust a Russian government, even a democratic one, to advocate the independence of Poland.105 As “all hopes of the anti-German majority were placed in the Western Powers,” Dmowski proposed the following solution: “A declaration by the Governments of the Allied Powers that Poland will be re-united and reconstituted as an independent State under conditions which will enable her to contribute with other nations to the maintenance of the European equilibrium.”106 This declaration, he concluded, would “impress” many Poles under Austrian or German control. In Paris, the Ministère des affaires étrangères received a similar letter that Piltz sent from Lausanne on 24 March. “The Polish question,” Piltz wrote, “can only be resolved by the creation of a Polish state,” and “a friendly intervention” with the Russian government could help to achieve this.107 Piltz’s letter was less forthright than Dmowski’s – the above quotes were buried midway through the fourpage memo – and he believed initially that the Russian government should act independently of any pressure. Yet both Dmowski and Piltz urged their readers to move quickly. The British files indicate that a debate broke out immediately over what to do, which revealed much about British policy and attitudes towards the rebirth of Poland at the time. Polish representatives had attempted for more than a year to use the threat of a Polish army under the Central Powers’ control to win sympathy from the British government, but as noted above, their efforts led only to private, and unsuccessful, entreaties to the Russian government.108 Balfour met with Dmowski on 21 March, then drafted a letter that night seeking Buchanan’s advice from Petrograd. Balfour noted that he had “said nothing to encourage” Dmowski’s idea, but that it “certainly merits consideration.”109 Buchanan replied three days later and urged that the British government “can hardly act except in agreement with [the] Russian Government” but should continue to propose the importance of winning the loyalty of the Polish people.110 On 26 March, Dmowski submitted another memorandum that placed the creation of an independent Poland within the larger British “aim of this war [which] was to reduce German power.”111 While the rest of the memorandum discussed the territories that a future Poland would need to remain politically and economically independent from Germany, the Foreign Office reacted only to Dmowski’s depiction of the threat of German power. The desire to crush “Prussian militarism”

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had been a central theme of the British government’s rationale for war since August 1914.112 Dmowski’s second memorandum incited an urgent debate in the Foreign Office that nearly culminated in a Britishled declaration of support for an independent Poland. Sir George Clerk minuted on 26 March, the same day on which Dmowski submitted his second memorandum, that if 700,000 Poles bolstered the Central Powers’ war effort, it would have a “disastrous effect.” “The only way to prevent it,” he argued, “is to give the Poles some assurance, in which they could really trust, that after the war they will be in fact an independent country. No Russian promise will carry this conviction … The Poles must be convinced that the Allies have made the Polish cause our own.”113 Charles Hardinge, who had replaced Nicolson as permanent under-secretary of state, responded that any action must be taken by the Russian government.114 Balfour, however, proposed a compromise in a telegram to Buchanan on 28 March. Using much the same wording as Clerk’s minute, Balfour argued that the Allies, including the Russian government, should make “some declaration about Polish freedom which would give reasonable satisfaction to the Poles.”115 Before waiting for Buchanan’s response, the Foreign Office also prepared a note to the French ambassador in London that the British would lead an initiative to persuade the Russian government to make a joint Allied declaration on a question that was “necessarily international,” despite Russian protestations that it was a domestic affair.116 This reflected a wholehearted acceptance of Dmowski’s depiction of the situation. The French government steadfastly refused to consider independent action, despite receiving the same information. Two French reports from Petrograd suggested that German efforts to recruit Polish soldiers remained a threat. One report from the head of the French military mission in Russia, which was copied to the president and prime minister, noted that there were as many as 1.3 million Polish men between eighteen and fifty who could join the Polish army. “The revolution and the fraying of the bonds with the tsar, alongside German proclamations, may change the situation,” the report said ominously in language that echoed Dmowski and Piltz.117 Yet the Russian alliance remained France’s most important consideration. In another dispatch, Gaston Velten reported that Poles were hoping that Russian armies would be “disorganized” and would never return to Poland.118 “The Poles are to be told that should Russia turn its attentions elsewhere, ‘Germanisation’ will be the Poles’ fate,” Pierre de Margerie replied.

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“When Russia is removed from European questions, Germany grows stronger,” he added.119 The letter was copied to major French embassies in Europe, signifying its importance. Furthermore, the French government did not respond to the concerns about German recruiting. To outsiders, French and British positions seemed in harmony. The British letter proposing a joint declaration was never sent, because on 29 March, the Russian provisional government declared its support for “the creation of an independent, Polish state comprised of all the lands in which the Polish people constitute the majority of the population.”120 The influence of Alexander Lednicki, a Polish deputy close to Miliukov, had helped to sway the government.121 “They go further than I had ventured to hope,” Buchanan wrote.122 His colleagues agreed, though Clerk in particular worried that the stipulation that gave power to the Duma to revise the scheme could “put Poland at the mercy of Russian politics.”123 With reports from Dmowski in London and Polish representatives in Petrograd and Berne that the declaration pleased the Polish people, the Foreign Office decided not to propose adjustments to the Russian government’s announced policy on the independence of Poland.124 The French government, which had not acted, praised the Russian declaration, which also received cautious support from French dailies.125 It helped that sources for both the British and French governments showed that the German high command had abandoned its plans for a Polish army after poor recruiting.126 While British and French policy remained unchanged in the end, a comparison of their actions helps to show how policy makers integrated policies and attitudes in their discussions and is worth further discussion. That the Foreign Office took Dmowski’s claims seriously highlights the British government’s increasing conviction that policy could win popular opinion in Russian Poland to the Allied cause.127 (As knowledge of the Polish national character and involvement in Polish politics increased in later years, this link would become stronger.) Velten alone held a similar view among French policy makers. Until the end of the war, the British government flirted with concessions to Polish self-­determination when they feared that the Russian Poles’ sympathies were moving towards the Central Powers. Otherwise, they did not act. This demonstrates that many in the Foreign Office, and Velten, presumed that the people of that province were nationally conscious Poles who desired national independence above all. Dmowski and his conservative allies in Switzerland, especially Piltz, had implied as much in earlier memos and would continue to do so in the coming

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months. Notably, the Foreign Office listened to Dmowski, and his proposals were considered quickly at the highest level.128 Very few discussions of Polish matters had yet taken place with such urgency in the British government. Positive reactions to the Polish message notably corresponded with face-to-face contact. In London, Dmowski’s memoranda had focused the debate after Clerk and Balfour met with Dmowski in person, and Clerk delivered Dmowski’s second memorandum. In Berne, Rumbold based his opinion on a meeting on short notice with Piltz and an unnamed colleague.129 Very few discussions of Polish matters had yet taken place with such urgency in the British government. Velten, in Moscow, was likely in contact with local Polish organizations, about whom he was well informed, but no one in Paris was willing to give them much attention. Strategic thinking – removed from attitudes and personal contact – clearly motivated the discussion for both the British and the French governments. As Balfour wrote, the Foreign Office feared that “pro-German propaganda may make serious progress [in Russian Poland] during the present Russian crisis if nothing is done to counteract it.”130 French officials had similar fears but were unwilling to act on them, because any action had to be considered within the context of the alliance with Russia. The French government, which had just committed to giving Russia a free hand in Poland, was unwilling to consider any internationalization and urged pro-Entente Poles to fall into line. The French position demonstrated an irrefutable fact of the Polish émigrés’ position: their access to decision makers was based on an imbalance of power; they could only say things that the decision makers found acceptable. On the British side, Dmowski had greater latitude at this time, and everyone agreed that the British government should at least urge Russia to make a proclamation. Several British officials appear to have personally considered that Polish independence was desirable for “the Poles” as well as for their own policy. This reflects their feelings on the subject and the degree to which those feelings informed their recommendations. Clerk, who urged a British declaration in favour of Polish independence, expressed this most regularly. Others believed that a declaration was at least worthwhile. When Miliukov asked Buchanan his personal opinion, the ambassador replied that “if it were possible to comprise in reunited Poland [the] greater part of Posen, independence would be best for all concerned.”131 Even Hardinge, who was the least enthusiastic, did write that despite the constraint of the Russian alliance, Polish

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independence was “desirable.”132 Moreover, while the government did not publicly support the independence of Poland at this stage, no one suggested that it was not worthwhile. Once Hardinge and Balfour had indicated a measure of preference for Poland’s independence, this would have created a climate in which it would have been unwise for their subordinates to oppose Polish independence. Such support should not be separated from the officials’ belief in the immediate strategic importance of such a move. Though the dissemination of any public statements is not discussed in the files, it was implicit that changes in policy should be communicated to the people of Russian Poland as well as to the United States. Such policy would have spread indirectly through speeches and newspapers articles rather than directly, by targeting certain groups.133 Dmowski and his National Democrat allies also claimed that they were passing on this information.134 The Foreign Office did realize the importance of foreign propaganda, as officials occasionally raised concerns that German propaganda might turn the people of Russian Poland against the Allies.135 Policy makers and propagandists operated separately in each government. In the Foreign Office, for instance, most Polish policy issues were dealt with by the War Department, usually by Clerk or officials under his supervision. Clerk also read memoranda from the News Department, which tracked issues in the foreign press and connected officials with foreign newspapers as necessary.136 The British propaganda agency at Wellington House cooperated with the Foreign Office but their operations were not wholly synchronized. Namier, the Polish expert at Wellington House, appears to have worked well with the News Department, but his influence with the War Department was limited because of Dmowski’s involvement.137

T h e U n it e d S tat e s E nters the War The discussion of Polish independence changed further when the United States entered the war against the Central Powers on 8 April 1917.138 The United States entered the war as an “Associated Power” to emphasize its detachment from the European alliance system. Despite this distinction, Britain and France took American policy into consideration when making their own policy to a greater extent than they had done prior to American entry. They needed American loans, supplies, and manpower.139 One of the major reasons why the United States entered the war was to reshape the international political

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system, which Wilson and many Americans believed had led to the war. This meant that the British and French governments increasingly needed to accommodate Wilson’s policy ideas, in particular his ideas for a postwar League of Nations and for territorial reorganization.140 Shortly after the United States entered the war, successive British and French missions visited Washington. Balfour led the British mission, which arrived on 22 April, intending to win Wilson and the American public to the British view and to coordinate policy.141 During the debate over Dmowski’s memoranda, Buchanan noted that a British declaration in favour of Polish independence “would be received with enthusiasm in America,” and Balfour raised the issue of Polish independence in one of his many meetings with House.142 Balfour and House agreed that Polish independence was desirable but not necessarily practical, and that it would be important for the new country to have access to the sea.143 This view reflected in part the nineteenth-century conviction that a state’s power depended considerably on its ability to trade and use the seas. The only acceptable location would be at Danzig, which once had been the bustling seaport of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Wilson and Balfour recognized that, as the city’s population was overwhelmingly German speaking, to grant Danzig to an independent Poland “would leave an Alsace and Lorraine to fester for further trouble, but they saw no alternatives.”144 No further decisions were taken regarding positions on Poland’s independence, but Balfour reportedly also shared one of Dmowski’s March memoranda with House.145 In public, the British government continued to respect its Russian ally’s position that the Polish question was an internal Russian matter. But the Balfour ­mission represents yet another situation in which British politicians and diplomats expressed their sympathy – albeit privately – for an independent Poland. For several months after the United States entered the war, the Allied and American governments made no further public statements on Poland’s independence. On the Eastern Front, the Central Powers reaped the rewards of intensified front propaganda and attempted to stimulate further unrest in the Russian hinterland by sending Lenin and other Bolsheviks on the famous sealed train to Petrograd in April 1917.146 The Russian army’s disastrous July offensive, meanwhile, damaged the provisional government’s reputation. During this period, Polish émigré representatives sent regular reports to Allied foreign ministries on conditions under the Central Powers’ occupation. These

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reports often dwelled on the Central Powers’ difficulty in occupation. They did not, however, inspire action, because the reports clearly indicated that the people of Russian Poland already opposed the Central Powers. After the February Revolution, the German high command had lost interest in its plans for a Polish army recruited from Congress Poland, as did many of the soldiers.147 Later Polish reports detailed that heavy-handed German punishments, an ineffective Polish civilian government, and the disastrous attempt to require an oath of loyalty from the Austrian-controlled Polish Legion aggravated Polish sentiment throughout the partitions.148 The debacle over the oath resulted in Piłsudski’s imprisonment, which proved unpopular enough that even the impotent civilian government resigned in protest. Allied and American inaction came during a period when the belligerent powers were considering various possibilities for a negotiated peace.149 Commitments on Polish independence could threaten any agreement. In particular, the French government had also been pursuing various secret peace initiatives, intending to draw AustriaHungary into a separate peace.150 As the Austrians hoped to wrest control of occupied Poland from the Germans, any French encouragement of Polish independence could jeopardize those talks.151 France did, however, become the principal supporter of a Polish army in the United States. From July 1917 it funded recruitment of more than 20,000 Polish Americans into a special unit and paid their salaries at levels comparable to the French army.152 The main political development in this period was the formation of the Polish National Committee (Komitet Narodowy Polski – knp). For months, the British and American governments had expressed irritation that different groups of Polish representatives regularly competed for attention.153 “Things would be so much easier,” Esme Howard, the British minister in Stockholm, wrote to Drummond, “if the various Polish parties would restrain their love of quarrelling among themselves.”154 Such reports undoubtedly contributed to the stereotype of the quarrelling Poles, which became increasingly prominent at the Paris Peace Conference and contrasted starkly with the organized Czechs. In June 1917, Wilson endorsed the formation of a single, recognized Polish group to deal with the Allies. The British and French foreign ministries agreed.155 When this became the kn p in August 1917, the group included representatives in Paris, London, Rome, Petrograd, Washington, and Lausanne. Though the organization claimed to represent all Polish opinion, most of its members had

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connections to Dmowski and the National Democrats.156 Paderewski argued for greater diversity in the k n p ’s membership, particularly the inclusion of at least one Jewish member to forestall accusations of anti-­Semitism.157 Other Poles continued to send information, but the establishment of the k n p essentially formalized and strengthened the existing arrangement whereby Dmowski, Paderewski, Piltz, and their associates were already the most trusted of all Polish sources. Count Ladislas Sobanski, the official kn p representative in London, even had the Foreign Office send his telegrams. This relationship, however, had no immediate effect on policy. The k np ’s primary purpose, as stated in its act of foundation, was to advocate for a concrete, public recognition not only that an independent Poland should exist, but that the Allied and American governments would commit to recreate it.158 Though the Foreign Office did not change its policy on the Polish question for the rest of 1917, officials occasionally indicated their sympathy with the Polish émigrés’ demands. Most had come to believe that an independent Poland was, Clerk minuted on 3 October, “desirable and just in itself.”159 Perhaps the strongest support at this stage, however, came from Howard and J.D. Gregory, who had recently been assigned to add the Polish file to his responsibilities. (Both were Catholics – Gregory was nicknamed “the Jesuit” for his religious convictions – and though this may have inspired their support, there is no specific evidence of this.160) After conversations with Polish émigrés in Stockholm, Howard argued on several occasions that the Allies needed to make a firmer declaration of support for Polish independence.161 Gregory became the chief advocate for the k np within the Foreign Office, partly as a result of his friendship with Sobanski. Hardinge wrote regarding British policy towards Poland that “[s]o long as it is a pious aspiration it does not much matter what is said.”162 By October 1917, however, the distinctions of wording that shaped diplomatic strategy had great importance, as the knp pursued an Allied and American commitment to create an independent Poland and the Foreign Office attempted to keep Britain’s diplomatic options open. This was clearly shown at a celebration in Russia of the centenary of the death of Polish revolutionary Tadeusz Kościuszko. Buchanan attended, and spoke after Russian Foreign Minister Mikhail Tereshchenko, whose speech included the declaration that “the creation of a Poland independent and indivisible constitutes one of the conditions of a solid and just peace.”163 Buchanan then articulated the British government’s agreement with these sentiments and went

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on to express its hope that a “free and independent” Poland would be created at the end of the war.164 The speech did not represent a full commitment to recreate Poland, but it did provide public recognition that Britain supported the Russian provisional government’s intention to bring about Polish independence. Nonetheless, Balfour believed that Tereshchenko had committed to more than the Allies could promise. Buchanan’s declaration of support was unplanned, not because it supported Polish independence but because the British government did not want to tie its hands in a future peace settlement. With this in mind, both Balfour and Lloyd George had deleted “indivisible” from an earlier draft of Buchanan’s speech, preferring “free and independent.”165 “Indivisible” reflected more than a “pious aspiration” that Poland should exist; it could also imply that a new Poland should be reconstituted from partitioned territory. Balfour seems to have realized this: on being informed that Tereshchenko meant “indivisible … in an ethnographic sense,” Balfour replied, “‘[i]ndivisible’ has no ethnographic sense and was a foolish word to use.”166 He believed that, because of their alliance, the foreign minister’s comments had nearly committed the British government to a definition of the borders of a future Poland. The government’s desire to avoid this commitment at this time outweighed any sympathy for Polish self-­determination. Though widespread sympathy for Poles as expressed through support for Poland’s independence existed in the British, French, and American governments by late 1917, they believed that the military situation did not permit an expression in favour of Polish independence.

G row in g S y mpathy The Central Powers had conquered Russia’s Polish territories in 1915, and for the rest of the war, the belligerent powers competed to win the favour of the conquered peoples. As the population of Russian Poland was increasingly perceived to comprise primarily nationally conscious Poles, both sides promised forms of autonomy or independence for Poland to win them over. Allied and American policy was cautious to preserve freedom of action, only making such promises as were perceived to be strategically necessary to prevent the spread of Central Powers influence among the people of Russian Poland and, more generally, to win the war. The British and French governments also respected the Russian government’s primacy in matters of Polish policy. The United States retained greater independence in its Polish policy because it stayed out of the war until April 1917 and was never allied with Russia.

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All three Western countries had considered positions on Polish affairs since 1915 because of the Polish relief campaign centred in the United States. Britain and France, moreover, worried about the Russian government’s dwindling prestige with its former Polish subjects and urged changes in policy to rectify this. Officials and politicians in all three countries developed general, positive attitudes about the Polish people and Polish independence in the course of these and later policy deliberations. As the Polish relief campaign raised awareness of the plight of civilians in Russian Poland, British, French, and American officials sympathized with such suffering. They believed that the Russian Poles were innocent of such a fate, regardless of whether they believed the ultimate cause was German requisitioning or a combination of the Russian scorched-earth campaign and the British blockade. In Britain, Dmowski convinced the Foreign Office that a Polish public opinion existed and that it yearned for independence. The Polish representatives’ supplicant approach and the friendships they developed are particularly important to note. Some of those ties frayed after 1918, and Western representatives became increasingly concerned about the restraint of Polish emotions and the immoderation of the Polish program. From 1915 to 1917, Dmowski and Paderewski presented themselves – and by extension the Poles they represented – as the idealized versions of a supplicant. They presented a compelling and respectful case, in part because they controlled their message well and tried not to disturb the main players by challenging the Anglo-French alliance with Russia. Zaleski’s falling-out with Seton-Watson shows the importance that British foreign-­policymaking elite placed on a moderate, even subservient policy from the subject nationalities. The French foreign ministry, which tried to quieten Polish representatives, adopted a similar approach. Interactions with the émigré representatives also affected Allied and American sympathy for independence and perceptions of the Polish people as quarrelsome, anti-Semitic, or the victims of a common enemy. Changes in attitudes can be traced in part to personal interactions, whether Paderewski’s good relations with House and Wilson, or Dmowski’s ties with British officials like Nicolson, Clerk, Gregory, or even Namier in a negative sense. Personal relationships and the development of attitudes about Poles and the rebirth of Poland were also an important feature of internal policy discussions, and would become more important still in late 1917.

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3 Commitments and Plans, 1918

The Allies’ fortunes in the war seemed bleak in late 1917 after a pyrrhic triumph at Passchendaele and a disastrous Italian defeat at Caporetto.1 Most worryingly, the Bolshevik party had taken over the Russian government in early November 1917 and immediately announced that Russia was leaving the war. Lenin declared the Bolsheviks’ support for national self-­determination and promised that the Bolsheviks would honour the rights of any of the Russian Empire’s nationalities to secede from the empire. This had particular relevance for the Polish question: on 28 March 1917, the Petrograd Soviet had proclaimed its support “for the recognition of national-political self-­ determination of peoples, and … that Poland has the right to complete independence in national and international affairs.”2 Such promises reflected communist ideology but were also good strategy. The Bolsheviks hoped to turn the Russian Empire’s many nationalities against the provisional government and the anti-Bolshevik White forces that wanted to preserve the Russian Empire. They also believed that the expected international dictatorship of the proletariat would render nationality unimportant, an assumption that had informed Marx and Engels’ support for Polish independence as well. The Central Powers, aware of the propaganda value of the Bolsheviks’ declaration, promoted versions of self-­determination for Finns, Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians.3 The period covered in this chapter, which spans from the October Revolution to the eve of the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, became a critical turning point in Western views of Poland as the groundwork for later disputes was laid. British, French, and American governments decided to favour Polish independence publicly, which reflected the

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strategic concerns of the moment. The attitudes that policy makers had already developed because of Polish lobbying meant that there was little debate over whether they desired Polish independence, merely the extent to which they could support it. As Western governments began to consider the postwar peace settlement, however, they considered new questions, such as the disposition of territories and the treatment of Poland’s Jewish minority, and faced a rapidly changing situation in the wake of imperial disintegration in Eastern Europe. Polish leaders adjusted to the new conditions too, and became less concerned with presenting a subservient face to the West as they saw the opportunity for independent action. As a result of these changing conditions, some British, French, and American policy makers, who at the beginning of 1918 had held positive but general views of Poles and Poland, began to urge restraint, compromise, and collaboration, in a light rebuke of Polish actions.

F ou rt e e n P o in t s a n d O t her Commi tments After a long period in which the Allied governments had restrained their wishes to support Poland’s independence, change came swiftly. Their announcements were made in bureaucratic and constrained language and had important limits, but they show how far Western governments were willing to go in support of a cause in which they believed. Keeping these vague promises structured Allied and American diplomacy in the coming years. The substance and context of these promises therefore deserve attention. The Bolshevik Revolution meant that these governments felt greater pressure to develop a set of transformational public war aims in competition with the Bolsheviks.4 Ending the war and, for some, replacing unequal societies with a workers’ paradise, as the Bolsheviks intended to do, appealed to war-weary publics no matter how difficult such ideas would be to achieve. The effect of months of Polish lobbying and networking meant that the campaign for Polish independence was well positioned for such a moment. Conditions began to change first in France, where Georges Clemenceau formed his second government on 16 November. Nicknamed “The Tiger” for his fierce nature, Clemenceau had distinguished himself during the war for speaking out against the government’s record. When his paper, L’homme libre [The Free Man] was banned for refusing to make changes demanded by the censor, he continued publishing his

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3.1  Georges Clemenceau

daily under the name L’homme enchaîné [The Chained Man].5 It was this combative character that led his political enemy, President Raymond Poincaré, to name him prime minister in November 1917, because Clemenceau intended to prosecute the war to the fullest extent. This included a new approach to foreign policy.6 As mentioned above, previous French governments had been very reluctant to endanger the alliance with Russia or peace initiatives with Austria by making any public statement about the Polish question. Clemenceau increasingly supported a strategy rooted in the idea that the small nationalities of Central and Eastern Europe, including the Poles, could provide an Eastern counterbalance against Germany and fight against the Bolsheviks.7 It helped that French anti-Bolshevism developed rapidly when the Bolsheviks announced that they would not repay the tsarist government’s debts, many of which were owed to France.8 Clemenceau had long sympathized with the cause of Polish independence. He had good Polish friends, had travelled to Galicia, and wrote sympathetically about Polish suffering in L’homme libre in 1913.9

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At a meeting of the Supreme War Council in early December, Stephen Pichon, the new French foreign minister, suggested a declaration in favour of Polish autonomy.10 Balfour, who had favoured such a declaration in internal discussions, proposed the wording for one. Lloyd George demurred, arguing: “It was impossible to contemplate keeping the war going for two years to set up a Polish state.” He added that he “had full sympathy with the Poles, but if you started new war aims in regard to them you would have to make them also in regard to the Jugo-Slavs and [Czechs].”11 Two days later, the Allies agreed to a modified version of Balfour’s statement: “The creation of a Poland, independent and indivisible, constitutes one of the conditions of a solid and just peace and of the regime of right in Europe. The proper development of an independent State requires unrestricted access to the sea.”12 They decided not to publish it, on Lloyd George’s advice. A few weeks later, the French government made its first declaration of support for Poland’s independence. On 27 December, Pichon informed the Chamber of Deputies of the government’s support for an “independent, indivisible [Poland], with all the guarantees of its free political, economic, and military development.”13 The statement resembled the one agreed a few weeks earlier, especially since the reference to political, economic, and military development had once been part of Balfour’s wording. Pichon did not delineate the borders of a future Poland that France would support, as the inclusion of Galicia would threaten any chance of a separate peace with Austria-Hungary. He did assert, however, that “we do not separate our cause from [Poland’s].”14 The suggestion that Polish independence was a war aim – that France would fight to attain it – was not made explicit, but the statement was still more than the French government had yet promised. The first major British government commitment came on 5 January 1918, when Lloyd George spoke to the Trades Union Conference at Caxton Hall in London.15 The choice of venue reflected the fact that the Bolsheviks’ calls for national self-­determination, open diplomacy, and a peace without indemnities or annexations had emboldened advocates of those principles in Britain, particularly the unions and the Labour Party.16 “I went as near peace as I could,” Lloyd George confided afterwards.17 Aside from the tactical considerations, however, the Caxton Hall speech also provided a reference point for later British policy. The speech, which outlined Britain’s war aims, declared that “an independent Poland, comprising all those genuinely Polish elements who desire to form a part of it, is an urgent necessity for the

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stability of Western Europe.”18 Before this point, British policy on the Polish question had almost exclusively been discussed by the Foreign Office, so the mere mention of the rebirth of Poland at the highest political level represented a significant alteration. All of Britain’s previous statements had respected the Russian government’s supremacy in the matter. Lloyd George’s Caxton Hall speech failed, however, to impress Polish émigré lobbyists. As a Cabinet paper noted, the speech did not require Britain to create a Polish state.19 Though Lloyd George called an independent Poland “a necessity,” he said nothing about who would carry out the task of giving Poland independence. The Central Powers still controlled the Polish lands, while Russia  – especially if the Bolsheviks were overthrown – could reasonably be expected to claim Russian Poland in the future.20 The language of Lloyd George’s speech, while suggesting that Poland’s independence was a war aim, reflected these realities and his arguments the previous month that the fighting could not be extended to ensure Poland’s independence. The limits of the government’s commitments were evident from distinctions in the wording of the commitment to Poland’s independence (“an urgent necessity”) in comparison to the restoration of Belgian territory (the “first requirement” of a just peace).21 Nonetheless, in February 1918, the Foreign Office used the speech’s text to advertise the Allies’ interest in the rebirth of Poland for distribution by Polish groups in Russia.22 The most important commitment came when Wilson delivered his “Fourteen Points” address to a joint session of Congress on 8 January 1918. “An independent Polish state should be erected,” Wilson said in his thirteenth point, “which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic ­independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.”23 As with Lloyd George’s speech, the thirteenth point was a major indication of American support for Polish independence but limited possible American involvement. Wilson’s speech did not outline how the new Polish state would be “erected” and contained the word “should” four times.24 This wording was not accidental: Wilson, like Lloyd George, set out several war aims but also chose his words carefully to reflect his priorities and the realities of the situation.25 While Poland “should” be independent, “Belgium … must be evacuated and restored,” Wilson declared, mirroring Lloyd George’s assertion that Belgian independence was the “first requirement” of a

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3.2  Woodrow Wilson in 1918

just peace.26 Yet although neither Wilson nor Lloyd George had much influence over the Polish question, the Foreign Office privately regarded Wilson’s thirteenth point as the joint Allied and American position, and the Fourteen Points formed the basis for the eventual peace negotiations.27 While Polish émigré representatives had reacted coolly to Lloyd George’s speech, Wilson’s was widely acclaimed. House was taken aback by Paderewski’s gratitude, which further informed impressions both of the maestro and the Poles he represented. Paderewski greeted House by saying, “I come to kneel at your feet. You are the noblest man I have ever had the honor to know. You stand by yourself, unapproachable by any means by which ordinary men are reached and influenced.”28 “He expresses himself in such an extravagant way that I always hesitate to repeat what he says, although I know he must say practically the same things to the President,” House wrote in his diary.29 Wilson always strove to keep his emotions in check and present a cool and detached front.30 In fact, male culture in the United States

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was steadily moving towards norms that favoured control of emotions in most circumstances.31 While House worried that Paderewski’s emotional displays contravened these norms, Wilson did not comment on them during the war. Rather, Paderewski’s outbursts were tolerated because they were widely believed to be an earnest expression of his deep love of the Polish people. His gratitude on 12 January, while expressed in “an extravagant way,” nonetheless accorded with the general expectation that Poles would appreciate Wilson’s declaration, which had been what Paderewski had long been saying. Reports indicated that Poles in the United States and overseas were pleased by the declaration, and Paderewski was the manifestation of this pleasure.32 Besides, House did not mind that Paderewski was so sentimental. As House wrote in 1917, “Paderewski is an emotional soul, and I am as tender in my treatment of him as I would be of a highly sensitive child.”33 These four statements – the secret one at the Supreme War Council and the three public ones later – reflected the tactical realities of the moment, as diplomatic policy was used to support the war effort. Support for Polish independence still had the potential to win Poles to the Allied cause and cause trouble for the Central Powers, who still occupied Polish territory and had Poles fighting in their ranks.34 Yet the decision to make specific reference to Poland or “Polish” territory reflected some longer-held attitudes that demonstrated the effectiveness of the Polish émigré campaign. British and American support for Poland’s independence – and the idea that this could sway Poles under occupation – carried with it an implicit assumption: that its audience was a core of nationally conscious Poles in all three partitions who desired an independent Polish nation-state. Neither politicians nor officials seriously considered the possibility that sectors of the public in Russian Poland (or the other partitions) were not nationally conscious, or that they were nationally conscious but did not consider themselves Polish, or that Polish independence was not a great priority to them. knp materials had emphasized the importance of national considerations, but this was something of a distortion of the situation. As Robert Blobaum argues in a recent book, residents of Warsaw worried much more often about the deterioration in material conditions under occupation than about the Germans’ insincere promises of national self-­determination.35 Jochen Böhler, moreover, notes that a majority of Poles were peasants, and, as late as 1920,

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most peasants were more concerned about local conditions than national self-­determination.36 Thus the tactics in these declarations still reflected the attitudes that policy makers developed in contact with Polish representatives.

P ro m is e s a n d P ropaganda Following the major policy announcements at the turn of 1918, for several months the Allied and American governments did not make additional declarations regarding the Polish question. This does not mean, however, that these governments were inactive; each government dealt in private with Polish émigré representatives and discussed Polish policy – including plans for a Polish army – internally and within the coalition. They also mentioned Poles or the rebirth of Poland on occasion in public statements. On 11 February, for instance, Wilson referred to his desire for a “united” state comprising “the indisputably Polish peoples who lie contiguous to each other,” which further clarified his ideas about how a potential Polish state would look.37 A joint Allied-American “condemnation” of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk included a protest that “Poland … is now threatened with a fourth dismemberment under cover of the usual deception.”38 The Treaty had been preceded by the “bread peace” between AustriaHungary and Ukraine, which infuriated Polish sentiment because Polish-claimed territory was assigned to Ukraine and dampened enthusiasm for a Polish kingdom under Austrian control.39 Meanwhile, k np reports continued to emphasize that the German occupiers were unpopular and treated the Poles heavy-handedly. They implied that Poles refused to cooperate with the occupation regime, all thanks to the work of the National Democrats.40 Such reports did not motivate the Allies to make additional commitments on Polish independence. They did, however, figure into Allied propaganda that confirmed the view that the Polish public sympathized with the Allies.41 Propaganda was used to shape opinion of Poles in different situations of the war, and its use increased considerably in 1918.42 The American Committee on Public Information (cpi), for instance, which oversaw the production and dissemination of American propaganda, prepared material to appeal to Polish Americans.43 The cpi’s efforts were mostly aimed at disseminating government information and promoting 100 per cent Americanism through events such as a Fourth of July celebration in which foreign-born groups, including Polish Americans,

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participated enthusiastically.44 Occasionally, the cpi produced domestic material to appeal to specific audiences. One of its weekly films for countrywide distribution included footage of Polish forces marching before French president Poincaré in June 1918.45 As the war intensified in spring 1918, the Allies and Americans also used front propaganda in an attempt to undermine the morale of Polish troops already fighting for the Central Powers. Perhaps two million Poles served in the imperial armies of the partitioning powers over the course of the war, with few reports of desertions or defections.46 In late March, the German army launched its final offensive on the Western Front. The following month, the French and British governments abandoned their pursuit of a separate peace with AustriaHungary after secret Franco-Austrian negotiations were revealed and both parties distanced themselves from further efforts.47 The front propaganda effort focused particularly on the Italian Front in 1918, where the Italian government sought increasingly to deploy the “nationalities weapon” in front propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whose contingents on the Italian front included many Czechs, South Slavs, and Poles. Materials emphasized the struggle of the Polish people against Austro-German oppression or religious themes.48 Such material was considered more effective than an emphasis on Allied and American political promises, though these could be found in propaganda. Yet this propaganda was generally ineffective in convincing Polish troops to desert from the Austro-Hungarian army.49 The Allies and the cpi also directed some propaganda at civilians in Central Powers territories, but the impetus to inspire nationalist revolutions has not been comprehensively examined. Polish Americans were, however, among several foreign-born groups that sent resolutions to their compatriots in German and Austrian territories in an attempt to inspire solidarity.50 In the summer of 1918, some hospital patients and soldiers on leave from the Austrian army brought back propaganda material they had received at the front, and some of this might have filtered back to Galicia.51 The most important efforts, however, likely came from existing networks like those the National Democrats had developed, which already carried influence with the populace. This helped to strengthen the relationship between the knp and Western governments on the basis that only the knp was pro-Allied. Meanwhile, the k np continued to seek a firmer commitment to a reborn Poland. In a letter to the Foreign Office on 15 March 1918, for instance, Sobanski underlined the phrase “will be set down as one

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of the conditions of the peace” to emphasize the point.52 The k n p also hoped that the proposed declaration would enshrine their desire for the new Poland to retain most of the lands of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as a non-negotiable element of any peace settlement. Dmowski concluded that the best chance to advance the knp’s cause would be to establish closer relations with the French government. The organization established headquarters in Paris, and Dmowski soon moved there from London. In May, the knp pushed to have the Polish army fight on the Western Front, hoping that its contribution would raise the status of Polish independence with the Allies.53 The French government became more supportive of the k n p ’s position that a new Poland should be established according to its larger, “historical” frontiers.54 France’s growing alignment with the Polish cause in early 1918 will be an important focus for the rest of this chapter and prefigured the split between the Allies over full support for Poland’s territorial claims at the Paris Peace Conference. The culmination of the k np ’s lobbying efforts came as the Allies’ fortunes were improving in mid-1918. The German offensive on the Western Front had stalled, American troops were beginning to arrive in larger numbers, and Czech and Russian White forces were battling the Bolsheviks. The Allied and American governments were paying a monthly subsidy to the k np from January 1918 and supporting the development of a Polish army.55 Beginning in late May, just before a major propaganda offensive on the Italian front, the Allied and American governments recognized the national aspirations of Poles, Czechs, and South Slavs in several statements. This included the following statement, published on 6 June, by the governments of Britain, France, and Italy: “The creation of a Poland, independent and indivisible, under such conditions as will ensure her free political and economic development, constitutes one of the conditions of a solid and just peace, and of the regime of right in Europe.”56 The declaration matched what British, French, Italian, and American representatives had agreed secretly at the Supreme War Council in December 1917. It was used immediately in propaganda at the Italian Front.57 The statement was nonetheless not as far-reaching as Polish representatives had requested. The Allied governments had not made Poland’s independence a war aim of primary importance, but one to be achieved as part of a “solid and just peace.” The joint declaration marked the Allies’ strongest demonstration of support for Polish independence and was intended to concur with Wilson’s thirteenth point. It was

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also more definite than Wilson’s and Lloyd George’s speeches in January 1918, because it suggested in stronger terms that an independent Polish state was an important war aim. The Allied and American governments made no further commitments and, significantly, did not consider the re-creation of Poland to be a non-negotiable war aim, which if it remained unresolved would motivate them to continue to fight. It did not help that the fate of Russian Poland was far from decided. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk between Bolshevik Russia and the Central Powers had recognized the latter’s victory in the east. The Czechs, who had been fighting for the Allies in Russia and in Italy, eventually received stronger promises, as the contributions of the Czechoslovak Legion had advanced the cause of Czechoslovak nationhood.58 On 29 June, the French government recognized the Czechoslovak National Council as postwar Czechoslovakia’s rightful government, and on 9 August the British government recognized the Czechoslovaks as an Allied people. When some Polish émigrés requested that the British government recognize the Polish government in Warsaw as the representatives of a legitimate state, Hardinge minuted, “We really have gone as far as we reasonably can in helping the Poles.”59 The Allied and American promises had been based on the simple consideration that many Poles were naturally inclined to favour them and would be encouraged by promises to re-create a Polish state. Beyond this, however, strategic considerations influenced policy as the Central Powers threatened the coalition along the Western and Italian fronts. As the British, French, and American governments began to plan for the postwar peace, however, their attitudes about Poles started to become more nuanced and to more clearly influence policy.

P l a n n in g f o r a New Poland The assumption in Allied and American promises that a Polish nation existed also had territorial implications. While Wilson had pledged to create a Polish state, the Allies had declared themselves in favour of an indivisible Poland. Though the Allies did not specifically promise access to the sea in their declaration on 6 June 1918, their statement recognized the importance of Poland’s “free political and economic development,” much as Pichon’s 27 December speech had done. These ideas were vague and did not always agree, yet each government began efforts to plan for the postwar territorial reality.60 These

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preparations, especially those of the American Inquiry, gathered many of the maps and statistics that the peace­makers used in 1919. Their conclusions influenced the settlement of some of the territorial questions that the peace conference debated. Moreover, many of the same people involved in planning for the postwar peace were chosen as experts on the Polish question. The United States Inquiry undertook the most extensive preparations.61 Convened in September 1917, the Inquiry comprised approximately 150 experts, among them prominent academics like the historians James Shotwell, Archibald Cary Coolidge, and Charles Homer Haskins, and other notables like Isaiah Bowman, who was the director of the American Geographical Society. By the end of the war, the Inquiry had produced nearly 2,000 reports and around 1,200 maps to serve as background material for the eventual peace conference. Robert Lord, an expert in Polish history at Harvard University, headed the small Polish section that produced several papers on potential borders for the new Poland and conditions in those territories. They also assisted with the preparation of papers that commented on neighbouring regions like the Baltic or East Galicia, or countries like Germany. The Inquiry’s recommendations for the territorial settlement, including five successive ones for Poland, proved less useful than the background information they compiled.62 Britain’s Political Intelligence Department (pid), which was established in February 1918 with William Tyrrell in administrative control, headed British government preparations. As with the Inquiry, the pid relied on experts from outside the Foreign Office, including historians such as Arnold Toynbee, E.H. Carr, R.W. Seton-Watson, James Headlam-Morley, and Lewis Namier.63 Though the role of the p i d experts was to examine and evaluate the foreign press rather than to consider a peace settlement, several p i d members played important roles in the Polish settlement. In addition to Tyrrell, who sat on the Polish Commission, Headlam-Morley and Namier were also p i d members who influenced the British position. Their roles will be explained further below in connection with the German and East Galician settlements respectively. Finally, the most significant of several French private and government initiatives to prepare for peace was the Comité d’études, a group of about twenty French academic experts who began meeting in February 1917. Their principal task was to define France’s aims on its northern and northeastern borders, but their members devoted twelve

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memos to Poland.64 Unlike the other governments, moreover, the French government did not need to leave anyone behind to attend a peace conference in Paris. The work of the Comité d’études, and especially its secretary, Emmanuel de Martonne, also included editing and correcting information for the French delegation.65 Georges Chabot, who joined the Comité in 1919, later recalled that one of his main tasks was to calculate the consequences of the pencil strokes “that the Four, Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Orlando, meeting in the afternoon … had striped across the map of Europe.”66 The work of the Comité d’études was part of the reason French delegates were always well prepared on the details of the Polish settlement.67 The knp’s connection to Western governments ideally situated it to shape these preparations according to its desires, but this was limited in practice. knp members had already shared some territorial ideas. Dmowski, for instance, had laid out fairly specific territorial demands in his memoranda of March 1917. Most notably, however, the knp used its connections with the British and French governments to raise the profile of the National Democrats in the hope that doing so would lead the Allies to accept the knp as the legitimate Polish government after the war ended. This had been their tactic for most of the war, and they shaped reports to show themselves favourably. For instance, near the end of May 1917, Stanisław Kozicki, one of Dmowski’s informants, submitted a report on a conference in Stockholm involving the Council of State and the Democratic Conference based in Petrograd.68 While Kozicki provided a balanced description of the Council of State, he also noted that the organization was collaborating with the Germans and the National Democrats were not. The National Democrats, Kozicki noted, were “the Party most hated by the Council of State and its friends.” They were so popular, he added, that they were really “an unofficial Polish government.”69 Later reports continued on this theme of the National Democrats’ popularity. In midApril 1918, k n p sources noted that the National Democrats won thirty-seven of fifty-two seats in elections to the new assembly.70 This prepared for the k n p ’s postwar argument that it was the natural postwar governing party of an independent Poland. knp propaganda convinced many officials, including J.D. Gregory, who had become good friends with Sobanski.71 As Gregory wrote in 1918, the knp’s “policy is entirely favourable to the Allied Cause and is constantly directed towards keeping the Poles from any compromise with the Central Powers.”72 These and other reports failed to mention more

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inconvenient facts, and the Allies, who were still receiving unsolicited information from non-k np sources, had inklings of this, though it did not always matter to them at the time.73 Socialist parties had boycotted the elections, so the National Democrats had only obtained this significant victory because of the absence of their strongest electoral rivals. Moreover, the National Democrats had been co-opted into a Central Powers–controlled government in which, as Namier noted, they had very little influence on most decisions.74 The National Democrats’ strongly Catholic, anti-Semitic program was popular in Poland, but not in Britain and the United States, where its anti-­Semitism concerned many. Awareness of National Democratic anti-­Semitism can particularly be traced to Dmowski’s years in London. Edvard Beneš, a fellow émigré petitioner and later president of Czechoslovakia, recalled that Dmowski often demonstrated his anti-­ Semitism “rather ostentatiously.”75 In one instance, at a dinner in Britain hosted by the writer G.K. Chesterton, Dmowski told fellow guests that “my religion came from Jesus Christ, who was murdered by the Jews.”76 Paderewski, who was in contact with Jewish figures, worried in 1917 that Dmowski’s appointment as president of the knp “will call forth [the] most ferocious campaign leading possibly to disaster.”77 Lucien Wolf, a prominent spokesperson for the Anglo-Jewish community, related “the profound anxiety which [the recognition of the knp] has caused throughout the Jewish Community.”78 The Foreign Office thanked Wolf for his information, but took no action at the time since the knp favoured the Allies.79 As these and other complaints trickled in, however, the knp began to acquire Dmowski’s reputation for anti-­ Semitism. In Britain, where Dmowski had been based, many people believed that Dmowski’s views showed that, as British official Eric Drummond wrote in 1917, “all pure Poles really dislike Jews.”80 Polish anti-­Semitism had been a common concern of Namier’s, who warned his colleagues about it repeatedly.81 Namier had, moreover, restored his influence as the Eastern Europe expert in the pid in 1918, while also cultivating more important contacts. In March 1917, Namier made contact with Philip Kerr, Lloyd George’s secretary, who thought him “a very intelligent fellow.”82 Despite Drummond’s misgivings, Namier soon began to write briefings for Kerr and the Cabinet.83 Seton-Watson, another key figure in the pid, also disliked Dmowski and the National Democrats, and was generally aloof from the Polish cause in London. On 13 September 1917, Seton-Watson warned the Foreign Office that the National Democrats, a party of “clericalism,”

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would remain influential in Poland “for many years to come … but the forces of progress lie elsewhere, and our alliance must be with the future and not the past.”84 Articles in the New Europe, moreover, often expressed uncomplimentary views about Poles or reflected on them poorly. On 7 June 1917, for instance, an article entitled “Poles, Czechs, and Jugoslavs” argued that Austrian Poles were obstructing progress for other oppressed nationalities in the Habsburg Empire because Poles and Austrians were cooperating to preserve their status in Galicia and the empire respectively.85 Later that month, a pair of articles by “A Polish socialist” expressed some criticism of the Allies’ foreign policy and thus were accompanied with the disclaimer – prevalent today but uncommon in the pages of the New Europe – that the views were those of the author and did not necessarily reflect those of the editors.86 The Poles’ poor reputation in the New Europe and among its influential creators foreshadowed the troubles that the Polish delegation would have at the Paris Peace Conference with similar perceptions that Poles were impractical, anti-Semitic, and interested primarily in their own welfare. Considering the New Europe’s influence and Seton-Watson’s connections, the journal may have influenced these perceptions.

C o n s o l idat io n a nd Coali ti ons a f t e r t h e A rmi sti ce No single idea about Poles, Poland, the knp, or the National Democrats had proven decisive when the war ended. A short outline of the armistice conditions helps to demonstrate the diplomatic context in which the new Poland took shape. The Allies and the United States signed an armistice with Austria-Hungary on 3 November 1918 and with Germany on 11 November. Neither armistice mentioned Poland specifically, but each provided conditions under which a Polish state could assert its sovereignty.87 Each armistice required the defeated power to evacuate its troops from territories occupied since the beginning of the war, which included Russian Poland. Yet the terms contained important differences. The armistice with Austria-Hungary required the empire’s troops to evacuate “all territories invaded … since the beginning of the war.”88 The Austrian government had controlled the southern part of occupied Russian Poland, including cities like Lublin and Kielce; these were now formally free.89 The terms also permitted the armies of the Allied and Associated Powers free

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movement across Austro-Hungarian territory and the option to occupy “strategic points” if necessary.90 The armistice with Germany, however, stipulated that German troops remain in territory seized from Russia until the Allies required them to leave.91 This was intended as a temporary situation. The stipulation reflected the belief that German forces, rather than such local authorities that existed, would be best able to provide order in parts of the German-occupied zone, which comprised the northern half of Russian Poland, parts of Ukraine, and the Baltic region. A separate article required the renunciation of Germany’s territorial gains in the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The armistice terms provided representatives of the Allies and United States access to the territories on Germany’s eastern frontier through Danzig or the Vistula River (a much more restrictive condition than the total freedom of movement provided in Austria-Hungary), but essentially German troops were expected to secure Russian Poland, Ukraine, and the Baltic region until the political situation solidified and the peace conference decided the fate of those territories.92 Internal discussions in 1918 indicated that the Allied and American governments intended that a Polish state would develop that included not only some of the territory that the Central Powers had occupied during the war but also German and Austrian territory within the pre-1914 boundaries of those countries. The consolidation of power for a new Polish government presented the first focal point for Western concerns about the future of the country. The events of November 1918 now have great significance – 11 November is a major holiday in today’s Poland – but most popular and historical recollections project unity into a time when it was not evident, especially to foreign observers.93 The Polish power struggle also contrasted poorly with other prospective governments, particularly the Czechoslovaks, who had formed a coalition quickly.94 The central figure was Józef Piłsudski, the revolutionary and wartime hero who the German government freed from the Magdeburg prison on 9 November.95 He arrived in Warsaw the following day and met with representatives from two existing power centres: the Regency Council, which had dismissed the partially elected Council of State but still assumed caretaker power over Congress Poland, and a self-proclaimed socialist republic centred on Lublin, led by Ignacy Daszynski. By 14 November, both the Regency Council and Daszynski’s republic had transferred their authority to Piłsudski. On 18 November, Piłsudski installed an ally, Jędrzej Moraczewski, as prime minister of his new

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government. Four days later, Piłsudski declared himself provisional head of state and “supreme authority” until a legislature could be elected. He took care, however, to maintain both publicly and privately that he did not intend to retain his provisional powers.96 On 17 November, Piłsudski submitted a declaration stating the independence and unification of Poland.97 At the time, he controlled few territories, and his political power was limited.98 The knp, meanwhile, provided an important base in Paris for the National Democrats’ bid for power, and they used their close relations with the French government to their advantage. Piltz and Dmowski, who had cultivated personal relationships with French decision makers and emphasized the historical friendship between France and Poland, successfully encouraged French policy makers to take several decisions in their favour. On 13 November, the French government recognized the knp as a de facto government in charge of foreign policy, the Polish army, and care of Polish civilians abroad.99 (Those functions “are in reality those of a Government of a recognized independent state,” Balfour later wrote the French ambassador.100) On Piltz’s request, Pichon then asked France’s allies that they do the same and admit the knp to the peace conference.101 The diplomat Philippe Berthelot additionally made a number of confidential assurances to Dmowski on 27 November, including that the French government would support faits accomplis on German territory.102 Most importantly, perhaps, the knp tried to keep the Polish army under their control.103 Haller’s Army, as it was called, after its commander, General Józef Haller, was the largest, best-organized, and best-equipped Polish force.104 As such, Piłsudski’s first communication with the French and American governments was to request the immediate return of the Polish army.105 But the French government consulted the knp before sending a reply, and the committee tartly informed Piłsudski that it had been given direction over the army.106 The knp considered using it to stage a coup.107 Members of the knp raised the possibility of leading or fomenting the overthrow of the new government in Warsaw, but this option was always rejected in place of caution, compromise, and coalition building.108 They decided on 16 November to send a mission under Stanisław Grabski to negotiate with Piłsudski.109 Yet the knp did not have British or American support in the power struggle. The Foreign Office, which had staunchly supported the k n p months before, believed that making closer links with the group would be “dangerous.”110 The Foreign Office had increasingly become aware that the

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k n p might have been a better wartime ally than a peacetime one, in part because of Dmowski’s anti-­Semitism and vindictiveness and in part because of growing concerns that it did not represent majority opinion after all. Recognition of the k n p, Balfour wrote the French ambassador, “might risk the definite alienation of general opinion in Poland, whose wishes have never yet reached the Allied Governments in any substantiated form.”111 Wilson, meanwhile, told his advisors that Poland should have “any government they damned pleased” and that the United States should not interfere in the process.112 In this case, this meant that the United States government did not act to support the knp, and Wilson believed that the French government was attempting to pre-empt “the consent of the governed” by supporting it. This meant that Poland had two competing governments, and the situation appeared worse to the major powers because they could not agree on which one was best. Britain and the United States encouraged compromise. “In present circumstances,” wrote Drummond, “a coalition [government] is a necessity, if Poland is to be adequately represented at the Peace Conference and if Poles really care about a united and independent Poland.”113 House, who met with Dmowski in Paris on 4 December, recalled in his diary, “I urged upon Dmowski moderation and a coalition government so they [Poland] might at least start with a fair prospect of harmony.”114 The k n p ’s plans for annexations from Germany and a close relationship with France sounded promising to the French government, but France valued its alliance more and did not push its allies very hard to change their stance. These requests for “moderation” and coalitions were encoded with emotional norms that became increasingly common in the postwar period.

F ig h t in g in E as t Gali ci a Meanwhile, Ukrainian and Polish forces began fighting over East Galicia even before the armistice was signed on the Western Front. The conflict continued for several months.115 Fighting broke out on 1 November in the city of Lemberg, where Ukrainian nationalist forces took control of the city and declared the creation of a West Ukrainian Peoples’ Republic. From Paris and London, the k n p protested the Ukrainian seizure and attempted to blame it on the machinations of the Central Powers. “The fact that the Archduke William, German candidate for the Ukrainian throne, commanded these troops and that

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the latter for the most part were composed of Austro-Germans clearly shows the object pursued and indicates who was to benefit,” the knp wrote to the Western governments.116 This rumour, which was inaccurate, had spread among the Poles of the city and reflected the misinformation that characterized the conflict and on which the Western powers had to base their decisions.117 When Pichon was presented with the knp’s protests on the occupation of Lemberg, Stanisławów, and Chełm, he wrote in reply: “do everything you need.”118 The American and British governments were slower to respond. In the Foreign Office, officials contested the Polish and Ukrainian versions more than a week later. On 13 November 1918, Count Sobanski, the k n p representative in London, wrote to the Foreign Office that the Ukrainian invasion of Lemberg “was begun by the Ukrainians together with the Austro-Germans with the avowed support of the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy.”119 Yet this proved unpersuasive after Namier wrote a long rebuttal citing Polish newspaper evidence that the Austrians were likely not involved and that Ukrainian troops had imprisoned the military commander and the governor of Galicia.120 The Foreign Office was increasingly skeptical about the Polish émigrés’ version of events. Even Clerk, who had been a confidant of Polish émigré representatives during the war, argued that Namier’s rebuttal was “pretty conclusive.”121 None of the three governments took action, however, and Polish forces re-entered the city on 22 November. West Ukrainian forces again attempted to take the city and maintained a siege for several months. Fighting also erupted over the region’s oil fields, which were the other prize for whoever controlled the region. Lemberg had a large Jewish minority, and most had remained neutral in the fighting between Polish and Ukrainian forces. Some did show favour to the occupying West Ukrainian force, while other inhabitants mobilized a Jewish militia for self-defence. When Polish forces took the city, Ukrainian troops departed, while the Jewish militia was quickly and peacefully disarmed. Amidst riotous celebrations of victory, some soldiers, likely including officers, entered the Jewish quarter and exacted “revenge” for two days.122 Dramatic news stories reached the West days later. “Wholesale Massacre of Jews in Poland,” a New York Times headline announced on 28 November. The report referred to “a wholesale massacre of men, women and children by the Polish population in Warsaw, and Western, Central, and Eastern Galicia,” adding, “The massacres and plundering have caused horrors exceeding the Russian pogroms or Turkish massacres

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of the Armenians. The Polish authorities are either passive or promote the massacres.”123 Two days later, the paper reported that 1,100 Jews had been killed in the Lemberg pogrom.124 Careful reconstruction by historians indicates that at least several dozen Jews were killed.125 The discrepancy in figures reflects the international reaction. Not only Zionists but also concerned citizens protested in the streets of major cities, and Jewish organizations wrote letters of protest to the British, French, and American governments. The British and American governments quickly sent official protests to Poland’s new government, and the British government urged France to do the same. Pichon wrote that Lord Derby, the new British ambassador in Paris, had proposed sending “a serious warning” advising that “without immediate cessation of pogroms, the future of Poland would suffer at the peace conference.”126 But Pichon responded as the French delegation would continue to respond throughout the conference: that Jews had collaborated with the Central Powers during the war and that they comprised “a large number” of the Bolshevik “agents” sent to Poland. Finally, he suggested that Poles were not to blame anyway; the likely culprits of the mass killing were the Russian, German, and Austrian prisoners who were pillaging Jews and Christians as they crossed the country. Pichon nevertheless agreed to the protest and to a planned Allied investigatory mission, but proposed his own text, which was weaker.127 The French government was generally uninterested in listening to tales of Polish wrongdoing, as any acknowledgement of this might endanger the large Polish state with which they hoped to form an Eastern alliance. The k n p did little to minimize its corrosive anti-­Semitism. The committee believed that “Jewish and radical elements” were its most dangerous opponents in Poland.128 In the wake of reports of pogroms in Lemberg, the k np meeting minutes referred rather to “the Jewish assaults on the Committee” and the “alleged pogroms,” which suggests strongly that the knp believed that this was a Jewish plot rather than an actual problem.129 On the same day, the kn p agreed that as few Jews as possible should be incorporated into their Polish army.130 In a meeting with the American Jewish leader Louis Marshall, among others, Dmowski made the fanciful assertion that either there had never been pogroms in Poland or that his supporters were against them.131 In fact, his party had been behind a 1912 boycott on Jewish businesses that the peace­makers regularly mentioned in 1918 and 1919. On behalf of the Polish delegation and in cooperation with

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Marshall and other American Jewish representatives, Paderewski prepared a proclamation that Jews would be equal partners in the new Polish nation.132 He later assured Wolf that boycotts of Jews would be made illegal in the new Poland.133 Dmowski’s meeting with Marshall, moreover, was intended to allay American Jewish suspicions about the National Democrats’ anti-­Semitism, even though it failed. Paderewski’s efforts seemed more well intentioned, although American concern about Polish anti-­Semitism preceded the Lemberg pogrom; the sympathetic State Department official James C. White had already suggested such a proclamation many days earlier.134 These defensive or half-hearted responses had consequences for Poland at the peace conference. The peace­makers did not believe that Paderewski was anti-Semitic, but this good opinion did not extend to his fellow Poles.

M is s io n s a n d N egoti ati ons, D e c e m b e r 1 9 1 8 – January 1919 The French and Polish responses to the pogroms were apparently sufficient to turn British and American attention away from the topic after the first week of December. Yet with political developments moving quickly, the belief in the West was that, as Hardinge wrote, “nobody seems to know much about Poland at present.”135 While telegraph communication linked Warsaw to Paris, after years of relying on messages passed through neutral countries, particularly Switzerland, it was now possible to have people on the ground in Poland. In December, Herbert Hoover sent Frederic Walcott to Eastern Europe, including Poland, while the American Red Cross prepared its own fact-finding mission.136 The knp and French representatives discussed the sending of a French military and diplomatic mission to strengthen ties between their two countries, and the British government assembled a fact-finding mission under Colonel H.H. Wade. Its activities in Posen are examined in the next chapter. The knp and the government in Warsaw also recognized the importance of face-to-face interaction if they were to form a coalition as the Allies wished. The k np sent Grabski to negotiate with Piłsudski and make contacts in Warsaw. Piłsudski agreed with the k n p that Poland should be an Allied country, but the two sides disagreed on Poland’s borders.137 While Dmowski wanted more territory from Germany, Piłsudski hoped to expand the Polish state much further east into modern-day Lithuania, Ukraine, and Belarus to protect

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against Russia. They also disagreed about the nature of Poland’s coalition government, and negotiations broke down. Grabski turned his attention to finding allies among Polish political parties. Next, Piłsudski sent a mission to Paris under Kazimierz Dłuski. Dłuski passed through Berne on 31 December, where he met with British representatives before proceeding to Paris. Pichon assured Dmowski, however, that the French government did not consider Dłuski’s delegation to be the official representation of Poland.138 The Quai d’Orsay directed Dłuski to the k n p, and the two sides began informal talks on 6 January.139 British, French, and American policy makers knew comparatively little about Piłsudski. They did know that he had fought with the Central Powers for a time during the war, as the kn p continually reminded them, and that he was now the head of a socialist government. The k np remained overwhelmingly the main source of information on Polish politics for Western governments, and the messages continued to be negative. While Piłsudski was interested in compromise with the knp, Dmowski told an American representative, “his party, the Socialists, is obdurate.”140 In Warsaw, Paderewski told Lieutenant R.C. Foster, an American in Warsaw, that the government was “inefficient and incompetent,” had wasted public funds on “socialistic propaganda,” and had no support outside the army and the small socialist constituency.141 Such messages had little effect on the British and Americans, but they did help to convince French officials that the knp remained a pro-Allied organization. Georges Degrand, a French diplomatic officer, had earlier told Dmowski in Pichon’s presence that the French government could not open relations with Piłsudski’s government, because he had fought with the Central Powers.142 Paderewski, meanwhile, had accompanied Wade’s mission to Poland to ensure “the uniting of all the parties,” and began his own negotiations with Piłsudski.143 The parallel negotiations continued to nearly the last moment: the date for the first plenary meeting of the peace conference was to be 18 January, though the leaders had already started meeting on the twelfth. In Paris, the k n p drew up a draft agreement on 14 January and prepared to discuss it with the Warsaw delegation.144 Before they could do so, however, a telegram arrived from Paderewski outlining his agreement with Piłsudski. The pianist was to become prime minister, Piłsudski would remain head of state, and the knp would organize the Polish negotiating effort in Paris in a modified form. Dmowski was to be Poland’s first plenipotentiary

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at the conference.145 Piłsudski’s correspondence with Dłuski, meanwhile, indicates that he thought that putting Paderewski in charge of the government would help him get aid from the United States.146 Elections went ahead as planned on 26 January – several parties split the vote – and Paderewski began the process of assembling his cabinet. The Western powers recognized the government in February.147 Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Wilson, whose views on Polish issues became most important in 1919, made little mention of the continuing negotiations between the KNP and Piłsudski in December and January. Some of their advisors, however, did take notice. The French government had provided telegraphic communications between Warsaw and both the k np and Dłuski’s delegation, and so were well aware of the state of affairs. “[Piłsudski] does not seem to be on good terms with the [Polish] National Committee,” reported Stephen Bonsal, an American reporter in Paris who was a confidant of Colonel House. “As a matter of fact, I should say he is on the worst possible terms with its members – in fact everybody is on bad terms with everyone else.”148 From London, Namier wrote to Headlam-Morley in Paris, “I am not at all astonished at Pilsudski’s understanding with Paderewski considering what the position must have been like for him after Pichon’s declaration that the Polish National Committee has been acknowledged as a regular Polish government by the Allies.”149 He continued to be disappointed that the knp had influence with Western governments. The same day, the Times had noted that “owing to the promise of a new government prices fell from their Alpine heights,” but Namier was not impressed.150 “This means,” he wrote, “that the public and trading community sincerely believe that no relief can be expected from the west until the Polish National Committee has been acknowledged in Poland. The campaign of lies and intrigues has achieved its aim.”151 He also worried that Piłsudski intended to subjugate Lithuanian and Ukrainian territories. These remarks were mild, and there were few of them. But the views of Bonsal and particularly Namier were influential. Bonsal was close to House, and Namier was close to Kerr, who had Lloyd George’s ear. In the coming months, these and other policy makers would again raise the issue of disunity between Polish factions. Just like earlier Western calls for unity and moderation, concerns about infighting provided a further, emotionalized warning to representatives in the new Poland.

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M a k in g P ro m is e s into Reali ty By the end of the First World War, the British, French, and American governments had promised the re-creation of a Polish state and begun planning for the endeavour. Such a situation had been unthinkable in 1914. British, French, and American foreign policy leader­ship had involved itself little in Polish affairs to this point, although the bureaucracy of each country devoted considerably more resources to considering Polish affairs than they had in the past. The main exceptions to this were House and Pichon, who regularly encountered k n p representatives, provided confidential advice, and forwarded their aims. British, French, and American policy makers still only had generalized ideas about Poles and Poland, in comparison to the views they and other policy makers expressed in the coming years. These ideas were mostly positive, but developments like the pogrom in Lemberg began to change this view, just as more people were paying attention to Poland. Britain, France, and the United States had not exerted any control over the Polish lands during the period of the war, and they had very little influence there. Nor, however, had the Polish émigré representatives with whom they dealt. As the end of the war brought independence for Poland and the possibility for immediate action, the British and American governments began to lose the appearance of control over the knp, which now sought their support only as needed and was less interested in asking their permission. Moreover, the Western powers had never controlled Piłsudski and others who were already based in Poland. Concerns about Polish quarrelling or anti-­ Semitism were well founded, but calls for restraint and moderation also reflected this loss of control. Britain, France, and the United States had also, however, committed to defining the borders of the new Poland at the Paris Peace Conference. The disconnect between events in Poland and decisions in the West, which began in the last weeks of 1918, increasingly shaped the relationship between Polish and Western representatives as the Paris Peace Conference considered the Polish settlement in 1919. While the positive feeling at the beginning of 1918 endured to some extent in 1919, the events of late 1918 foreshadowed later disagreements.

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4 The Polish Territorial Settlement at Paris, 1919

On 29 January 1919, Roman Dmowski formally presented some of the Polish delegation’s aims to the Supreme Council, the chief decision-­ making body of the conference.1 The day’s meeting had been convened to address the fate of duchy of Teschen (Polish: Cieszyn, Czech: Těšín), which the new governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia both claimed. Dmowski, who was not informed of the topic of discussion beforehand, tried to prepare for everything. In a five-hour presentation in both English and French, Dmowski addressed the situation in Poland before outlining his delegation’s claims not only to part of Teschen but also to Posen, Upper Silesia, West Prussia, and parts of East Prussia, Danzig, and East Galicia. His claims conflicted with Piłsudski’s – the new Polish chief of state wanted to establish Poland’s boundary further to the east – though Dmowski suggested that, as Ukraine and Lithuania were not yet able to govern themselves, they should be allied with Poland. He addressed himself primarily to Wilson, who nodded sympathetically at times and whose eyes opened wide when Dmowski showed a map of Prussian colonization. Clemenceau, who chaired the meeting, told Dmowski afterwards that his speech had been “excellent.”2 Yet Wilson’s advisor also caught him examining the murals in Pichon’s room during Dmowski’s long speech.3 Perhaps more worryingly, Lloyd George missed the first part of Dmowski’s address. When the prime minister arrived in the interval, he turned his back on the Polish delegate instead of greeting him.4 No other source describes this interaction, and if the gesture was intentional, perhaps meant as a rejection of Dmowski’s anti-­Semitism, it is surprising that Lloyd George did not tell anyone. He then listened impatiently to Dmowski’s territorial claims.5 The days’ events showed

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4.1  Ethnographic map of Poland. The Polish delegation distributed this map in 1919 to outline their territorial claims.

how the potential for misinterpretation helped to shape attitudes and policies at the Paris Peace Conference. This chapter is the first of two on the peace conference and will focus on territorial questions. Chapter 5 then considers those domestic questions in Poland about which the peace conference became concerned. Although a core of Poles did exist whose self-­determination could be recognized, the question was what to do on the periphery of the new country, where for historical reasons Poles were not always in the majority and where the new Poland was fighting with several of its neighbours. (This was the difficulty with applying national self-­ determination throughout the lands of the defeated empires.) The process of settling boundaries, either at the peace conference or as

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faits accomplis, reflected not only wartime attitudes but, increasingly, new ones about the Polish national character. The peace­makers’ discussions included an emotional subtext: just claims were reasonable, but overreaching claims and unprovoked aggression could be seen as signs that Poles and Poland lacked the necessary self-control for an independent state. The theme of restraint once again became central to British, French, and American attitudes and policies, including as Western policy makers also abandoned diplomatic self-restraint during the frenetic negotiations.

A T r a n s n at io n a l Contact Zone While the peace­makers in Paris – the victorious Allies and the United States – thought the Polish settlement was important, it was not their sole focus. The leaders who eventually made or confirmed the major decisions of the Polish settlement often did so based on scattered impressions, as their discussions rarely looked at Polish issues in detail. The structure and ideas of the peace conference should be outlined briefly here, because they helped to shape the context of the Polish territorial settlement in Paris. While the British, French, and Americans were united in their desire to fashion a lasting peace as an alliance, each delegation had a different opinion on how best to do so. Two main questions defined the strategic framework in which the peace­ makers approached the Polish territorial settlement: how to apply the principle of national self-­determination and how to fashion a settlement for the two great powers that bordered Poland – Germany and Russia.6 The peace­makers agreed that Poland should have self-­ determination, that Germany should be punished for the war, and that Russia should be dealt with fairly while civil war reigned between the Bolsheviks (“Reds”) and White forces.7 Yet this basic agreement masked chasms in how these aims could be achieved, and the powers’ disagreements often centred on the Polish settlement.8 The other two major allies, Italy and Japan, preferred to concentrate on their own interests. Italian experts participated in commission meetings that discussed Poland’s borders but rarely advocated any particular position. Italy’s leaders commented infrequently on the Polish settlement and did not affect it. Japanese delegates attended some discussions of Polish issues but rarely participated.9 The settlement was made more difficult because the peace­makers also had to reckon with shifting conditions on the ground. Jochen

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Böhler argues that as the German, Austrian, and Russian empires disintegrated, the region experienced a “Central European Civil War,” with Poland at the centre.10 It was distinct from the Russian Civil War to the east, although the two civil wars were connected. The Central European Civil War included “unrestrained violence and blurred boundaries between the protagonists” as states and warlords battled for control.11 These conditions meant that many Polish leaders felt that they had to move quickly, because time was not on their side and the conference was not moving fast enough.12 As a “Slavic” (presumably Polish) person told Emmanuel de Martonne, the hardworking French geographer, “The Poles would be crushed by the Germans on the West and the Bolsheviks on the East while the conference continues to study and deliberate regarding their fate.”13 Yet in Paris, the conflicts meant two things as the peace­makers became aware of them. First, with the Allied and American armies demobilizing quickly, the peace­ makers knew that their authority to stop the conflicts was limited.14 Second, because all of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe were engaging in skirmishes along their borders, there was bound to be comparison between them. Those comparisons often focused on national character. Wartime diplomacy had involved a new and changing situation, but it was largely done within existing power and bureaucratic structures. The Paris Peace Conference, which opened with its first official plenary session on 18 January, was an event unrivalled in world history. The peace­makers relied in part on existing organizations such as their foreign offices and the Supreme War Council (which became the Supreme Council) to determine the delegation’s policies. They also created ad hoc bodies in which the major delegations – Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States – could discuss specific questions and supplicant delegations like Poland’s participated when invited.15 The leader and foreign minister of each of the Big Five were the main participants at early meetings of the Supreme Council, giving the meetings the moniker the Council of Ten. Dozens of supplicant groups also travelled to Paris to state their case. Poland was permitted two delegates, but others like the Lithuanians, the Irish, or the young Hồ Chí Minh for Vietnam were denied access to the conference and had to plead their cases informally. Each of the British, French, and American governments brought hundreds of delegates, mostly drawn from politics, the diplomatic corps, military leader­ship, and academia. The delegates debated the

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peace settlement, and many then socialized together away from the meeting rooms. American geographer Isaiah Bowman noted in his diary for 13 January 1919 that he had dined with the family of Emmanuel de Martonne, who was now the secretary of the French Comité d’études.16 Three days later, Bowman reported that he and two other American experts dined with British experts; later Lloyd George, Balfour, and other “bigwigs” came over and “chatted” with them.17 Polish delegates attempted to persuade the Allied experts at social gatherings as well as in meeting rooms.18 The presence of so many representatives who mingled easily made Paris a transnational contact zone where ideas, including those about national character, could spread formally and informally through the delegations. The Council of Ten first discussed an issue relating to the Polish settlement in detail on 22 January, ten days after the first official meetings of the conference. (Shorter discussions on issues in which Poland was mentioned in brief or in passing had taken place since the first day.) That the leaders’ meetings flitted through diverse topics reflected not only the global nature of their aims, but also the conference’s lack of direction in the first several weeks as leaders put off important decisions for expert commissions. As the French diplomat Paul Cambon complained, “We agree verbally on everything, but nothing is concluded.”19 The discussion about Polish armies, for instance, had been tabled as the third item of the leaders’ first meeting on 12 January, but it was soon deferred.20 The related issue of arming Polish soldiers was raised and put off in the morning and afternoon meetings on 21 January.21 Poland was mentioned in discussions about representation for small powers on 12, 15, and 18 January, while on 16 January, Wilson also mentioned that any territorial settlement with Russia would affect Polish and Lithuanian claims.22 Many complained that the conference began slowly (Wilson, who arrived in Europe in mid-December, had wanted it to start a month earlier), but the Polish delegation was racing to catch up. The government in Warsaw was still coming together, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was being staffed.23 The delegation expanded in February and March as experts arrived from Poland, but Paderewski, Poland’s second plenipotentiary alongside Dmowski, did not arrive in Paris until early April. His substitute, Kazimierz Dłuski, only arrived in early February after committee assignments had been handed out and the Supreme Council had discussed Polish matters several times.24 Dłuski eventually played little role in the conference.

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Poland’s delegation only received its official instructions from Warsaw on 21 May, little more than a month before the Treaty of Versailles was signed.25 Initially, therefore, Poland’s delegation relied heavily on the k n p in Paris, and k np members held many of the delegation’s leader­ship positions. Dmowski was Poland’s first plenipotentiary and attended plenary sessions, presented Poland’s case to the Supreme Council, and sat on the League of Nations commission, which was the major commission in the conference’s first weeks as Wilson sought to draft the League covenant. Stanisław Kozicki, another knp member, was the delegation’s secretary-general, while the delegation initially operated out of the building at 2 bis, Avenue Kléber, where the knp’s offices were.26 (The k np itself continued to function in parallel until May 1919.) When more personnel finally began arriving from Warsaw, the building’s three floors quickly became cramped, and by early April the delegation had moved to the more expansive premises of the Hôtel des Champs-Elysées.27

T he In t e r- A l l ie d M is s ion and Ci vi l War in C e n t r a l E urope In the first several weeks of the peace conference, events on the ground quickly outpaced the ability of those in Paris to keep track of them. The situation in Poland, as across Central and Eastern Europe, was in flux. In November 1918, forces linked to Piłsudski had quickly disarmed occupying forces in a few cities like Warsaw, Łódż, Lublin, and Kraków.28 The withdrawal of German soldiers from the former Congress Poland was negotiated later, in Warsaw in December 1918, and was complete by February 1919.29 Yet the Polish government’s increasingly effective claim to authority in some areas should not obscure the fact that major problems lay ahead. Other important territories, including the vast borderland of the Kresy to the east or German territories to the west, did not immediately come under Warsaw’s control. Even in Warsaw, disorder reigned for weeks.30 The government in Warsaw needed to create a unified administration and regulatory and legal framework from the patchwork that remained from the partitions and the occupation administration. Despite the early establishment of a national government, the full implementation of essential local services continued into the mid1920s.31 Poland faced massive economic challenges, including widespread unemployment and the necessity of implementing land reform.

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Economic conditions helped to fuel some social unrest and inspired fears that the people might turn to Bolshevism. Social cohesion was also a problem, as Polish relations with minorities, especially Jews, proceeded poorly. Finally, elections in January 1919 splintered the Sejm, Poland’s lower house of parliament, into several rival parties who together needed to make a constitution. These domestic problems will be covered in greater detail in chapter 5, but they deserve mention here because they contributed to the attitudes that the peace­makers formed as they considered Poland’s territorial claims. The discussion of these claims at the peace conference – and various governments’ attempts to create faits accomplis in the meantime – will be the focus of the rest of this chapter. Four important conflicts continued around Poland’s periphery at the start of 1919. As across Eastern Europe, conditions in modern-day Lithuania and Belarus were fluid at the end of the war. While Piłsudski and many others were interested in incorporating the Kresy as a buffer against Russia, Dmowski’s National Democrats were less interested, as the Polish-speaking population was a minority confined to cities and towns. Yet all sides watched the situation with concern. German troops maintained their occupation according to the armistice conditions. They were ostensibly keeping the peace until order could be restored locally, although Polish sources reported looting.32 As German troops began to retreat, Bolshevik Russian forces moved into some territories. In Paris, the k np heard worsening stories about the situation. The territory was “in a state of terrible destruction” and the people “exhausted” after the German retreat and Bolshevik invasion of some areas, a local representative, Leon Łubienski, told them in mid-December.33 Grabski alleged that in Minsk and the surrounding area, the Germans were operating not only in cooperation with the Bolsheviks but also with the Lithuanian authorities.34 In response, the k n p privately discussed outlandish plans for intervention by the Great Powers. Perhaps, Łubienski mused, the Royal Navy could seize the Baltic ports.35 Dmowski floated the idea that the British and French could convince the Americans to bring in troops to establish a massive “cordon” from the Baltic to southern Ukraine and thus make it safe for provisions.36 On 1 January, Paderewski asked House officially. He omitted the seizure of Baltic ports but requested 50,000 American troops plus a division each from Britain and France. He painted the picture starkly: “Thousands of people have been murdered and there have been many cases of persons being buried alive. There is a danger

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of an immense population being exterminated.”37 The Bolsheviks took Vilnius on 5 January 1919, four days after German troops had withdrawn from the city. Paderewski’s request was forwarded through the Allied and American governments, but Britain and the United States did not support the scheme. The leaders did not discuss it specifically, though their decision on 15 January to negotiate with the Bolsheviks rather than fighting them or establishing a cordon sanitaire ruled out such action.38 The peace­makers attempted with some success to use what influence they had to prevent faits accomplis. After Paderewski asked for arms for Poland’s soldiers and the K N P requested the return of Haller’s Army to Poland, the Allied governments decided to send a mission comprising military and diplomatic representatives from each of the Big Four.39 “The real difficulty,” Lloyd George told the British Empire delegation, “was that the Poles were giving the appearance of an attempt to forestall the decisions of the Peace Conference by seizing territory whose rightful possession could fairly be said to be a disputed question. The Germans, for instance, had a case as to part of this territory. We could not allow the Poles to carry through such an attempt.”40 His suspicions clearly informed the mission’s instructions, which stated: “The Polish Government should be warned against adopting a policy of an aggressive character. Any appearance of attempting to prejudge the decisions of the Conference will have the worst possible effect.”41 Yet the mission’s members proved particularly accommodating to the Polish perspective. Lloyd George’s reference to German claims likely referred to the region of Greater Poland (Wielkopolska), which was still under German control. There had been clashes between local Germans and Poles in the city of Posen at the end of December 1919, when Paderewski stopped en route to Warsaw and gave a passionate speech about Polish independence.42 “German soldiers had stormed the offices of the Polish National Council and had torn down the Polish and Allied flags and stamped them into the gutter,” reported the American attaché in Copenhagen, citing a dispatch from Colonel Harry Wade, the British soldier who was leading a previous British mission to Warsaw.43 “At the time of writing the despatch, Colonel Wade stated that the hotel was being besieged by these German troops and defended by Polish soldiery … Bullets had entered Mr. Paderewski’s room.”44 In Paris, the knp urged the French government to solve the problem by amending the armistice with Germany, which was renewed every

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month. Creating a 160-kilometre neutral zone within the former borders of Germany would do nicely, Dmowski agreed with Foch and Pichon.45 When he addressed the Council of Ten on 29 January, he said that the fighting showed that Germany “was organising for war … she had not given up her plan for extending her Empire to the East.”46 Fighting broke out again in February, when in response to offenses committed by German troops, local Polish paramilitaries briefly took control of the city. In communication with the peace­makers, each side unsurprisingly blamed the other. Wojciech Korfanty, a former Reichstag deputy and local leader, told Allied representatives that the Polish population had “risen up” against “gangs” and the regular German army.47 In fact, the initial Polish uprising had reflected their superior organization, but local Germans had since begun forming Freikorps, or militia, and quickly became numerically superior. Meanwhile Matthias Erzberger, the head of the German armistice commission, complained to the Supreme Council that “the Poles … have everywhere assumed the offensive militarily.”48 The peace­m akers, still viewing the Germans as the enemy, believed the Polish point of view. The inter-Allied mission in Warsaw warned the peace conference that the unrest was in fact a German offensive or that there was a secret agreement between Germany and the Bolsheviks.49 When the Allies renewed the armistice convention with Germany on 17 February, a stipulation was added requiring both sides to cease “offensive operations.”50 The inter-Allied mission in Warsaw was sent to Posen to investigate further and negotiate a settlement. The mission worked closely with Polish representatives but had a mistrustful relationship with the Germans, whom they saw as the opposition. Esme Howard, one of the meeting members, reported that at the first meeting, “We of course only removed our hats to Germans but did not shake hands.”51 In contrast, Howard later attended a mass said by the Polish minister of finance in Posen, Father Adamski, before the mission met with Adamski and Korfanty to discuss terms.52 Polish and German negotiators agreed on a deal in mid-March, although paramilitaries on both sides continued to arm for months afterwards.53 Similar events in the duchy of Teschen had been the reason that the Supreme Council had asked to see Dmowski in January.54 In the last days of the war, Polish and Czech representatives in the duchy had agreed to divide the partition between the two nationalities.55 Yet tensions rose when both sides reconsidered their positions; Poles were

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in the majority in the whole duchy, but Czechs predominated in some parts, and the government of Czechoslovakia wanted the territory.56 Near the end of January 1919, Czech troops acting without orders from their government attacked Polish forces and forced them to retreat.57 The offensive was marked by a curious incident in which Allied officers, pretending to assume the authority of their governments, ordered Polish forces to retreat in order to restore order to the region.58 Polish troops rapidly telegraphed for Allied help, and the fighting stopped within a week. There had been perhaps 150 deaths, and the situation remained tense as paramilitaries on both sides fought a shadowy conflict for many months.59 The peace­makers attempted to solve the problems themselves in Paris and hoped that the inter-Allied mission would keep the peace in the meantime. On 11 February, the mission stopped briefly in Prague on its journey from Vienna, where Tomáš Masaryk assured them that the Czechoslovak government would remove its troops from Teschen as agreed.60 Yet nearly a month later, Howard recorded in his diary that the Czechs were “still not carrying out [the] Teschen agreement properly.”61 Back in Paris, the Allied commission on Teschen concluded that the two sides could not be reconciled. “[T]he mutual hatred is intense, never have I come across greater bitterness,” wrote Colonel Basil Coulson, the British representative on the commission.62 The French Ministry of Defence observed similar tensions.63 Both the Czechoslovak and Polish delegations rejected the commission’s recommendation to give the duchy autonomy. Despite repeated announcements by the Allies that they did not condone the activities of the Czech troops in Teschen, Allied representatives learned that Polish delegates and the Polish public believed that the Czech actions were part of an anti-Polish campaign to take the territory from Poland. General Joseph Barthélémy, one of the French representatives on the mission, reported that Polish newspapers were nearly asserting “that the Czechs had attacked on the order of Marshal Foch.” There were doubts about Paderewski, “the friend of President Wilson, who has done nothing for the Poles.”64 Barthélémy complained to the inter-Allied mission about the Czechs’ “tendency to seize by force territories which do not belong to them ethnographically, and the violence and the atrocities committed by their troops,” though he did point out that this was done without the sanction of the Czechoslovak government.65 General Rossi, the Italian delegate, seconded these sentiments, commenting on “the very bad moral

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leanings of the Czechs, their ignorance of the decisions of the Entente … and above all their tendency, which shows itself continually, to extend their borders by violence.”66 Lastly, at the start of 1919, Polish and Ukrainian forces continued to battle over Lemberg and the eastern half of Galicia. The Allied and American governments attempted to coerce Polish and West Ukrainian forces to sign a ceasefire, but they had little success. General Barthélémy, who led several members of the inter-Allied mission to Lemberg in February to negotiate with the combatants, worried that the situation was “nearly unsolvable.”67 Similar sentiments echoed from the mission’s other members, who tended to blame the West Ukrainians for the state of affairs and to depict Polish forces as the victims of Ukrainian oppression. This reflected not only the mission’s pre-existing sympathy with the Polish government’s perspective but also the fact that they received most of their information from Polish sources. Barthélémy told the mission that the Ukrainians had initially been working in league with the Austrians when they occupied Lemberg on 1 November 1918, much as Polish sources had told the Allied governments at the time. When Polish forces took the city back later in the month, Barthélémy told his colleagues, it was because the inhabitants of the city rose up against Ukrainian administration and retook the city “house by house.”68 The statement reflected a pro-­ Polish argument that the sentiments of the local populace favoured Poland, rather than the reality that Polish forces had retaken the city from outside. Barthélémy also criticized the Jews, who in his view “clearly” favoured the Ukrainians, because some had shot at Polish troops while others “shirked” from fighting in the war and profited from hoarding while the rest of the population starved.69 He thus repeated anti-Semitic disinformation that many local and national Polish leaders had spread since the pogroms.70 While the implications of tensions in East Galicia between Poles and Jews will be examined in greater detail in the following chapter, it is important to note that Barthélémy’s explanation, which the other members of the mission accepted, represents assent to a Polish government version of events and support for its position. After a few weeks in Poland, the members of the inter-Allied mission to Poland all came to favour Poland’s position. In part, this was because they were affected by what they saw. After Helena Paderewska, the wife of the prime minister, took Howard to a refugee camp on 17 February, he was clearly stricken, particularly by the children in

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the camp. In his diary, he wrote, “I never saw a more heart-breaking sight than those poor people all in destitution + completely ragged … Lord! It’s awful. A little food and no clothing in the country to give them.”71 As the next chapter indicates, the economic and humanitarian situation in Poland was dire. The mission members integrated such experiences into many judgments. Some were natural responses; for instance, the same day that Howard visited the refugee camp, he wrote privately to Lloyd George’s private secretary, Philip Kerr, imploring the British government to send assistance.72 Yet in many more cases, mission members tied the humanitarian situation to the territorial settlement or to political judgments. Lord, the US delegate, telegraphed from Warsaw: “I was strong for [granting Danzig to Poland] in Paris, but I am ten times stronger for it now, after coming here and seeing to what a state this country can be reduced.”73 French representatives particularly linked their experiences to geopolitical realities. When General Barthélémy was transferred to Turkey in late March, he told Paderewski that he had received “so warm, so enthusiastic, so affectionate” a welcome from the people of Poland and thanked him for his “delicate attention” and “affection.”74 Other mission members also mentioned being welcomed by effusive crowds, and their testimony indicates regular contact with Paderewski and other major Polish politicians.75 Barthélémy wrote, “You know, Mr. President [sic], how much I love Poland. You also know that if this love, born in the past of sentiment, is so deep, it is because it draws all its strength from my ardent patriotism which feels the absolute necessity of a great and strong Poland.”76 He desired that the new Poland would be a “true sister of France,” linked through military alliance.77 Barthélémy, as mentioned above, had been particularly critical of Czech and Ukrainian forces that fought against Poland. Whereas the British and American members attempted to use their emotional experiences to change the policy of their delegations in Paris, Barthélémy was on solid ground when integrating emotional attachment to Poland with policy recommendations. The French government clearly intended to help Poland’s government to obtain the most territory to form a strong state. Barthélémy’s colleague Joseph Noulens, the French diplomatic representative and the mission’s overall head, was, for instance, most often the one to advance or favour Poland’s territorial claims in meetings, including a demand that the renewal of the armistice with Germany in February contain a clause

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requiring the cessation of hostilities in Posen.78 Though Noulens did not incorporate emotional content, other French representatives would do so as the Franco-Polish alliance took shape in the next two years. In the first months after the armistice, the sentiment that John Horne and Alan Kramer call “wartime cultural mobilization” remained in the observations and judgments of Allied and American representatives.79 Most people in the allied countries and the United States had developed prejudices against Germans as a result of the war. Public opinion was for a harsh peace, the authors argue, because “peacemaking raised the meaning of the war and the reasons for which so many died.”80 The Polish government depicted itself as against not only Germany but other forces like the West Ukrainians and Bolsheviks, who were alleged to be in league with the Germans. As a result, Polish activities retained the broad support of Allied representatives in the first weeks of 1919. This was even though the first dealings with Polish questions took place in efforts to stop various conflicts. Yet the mission’s evident Polish sympathies limited its effectiveness with those in Paris who were already skeptical about the Polish delegation’s expansive territorial claims. As Headlam-Morley wrote to Namier, “I understand that the members of the mission to Warsaw have all become pure Poles.”81

T h e P o l is h C o mmi ssi on a n d t h e P o l is h - G e rman Border On 12 February, the Supreme Council created the Commission of Polish Affairs, which included a representative from each of the Big Five. This preceded a lull in high-level activity in Paris, as Wilson returned to the United States and Lloyd George soon left for London. Several days later, Clemenceau was injured in an assassination attempt. The commission’s remit was originally to handle the voluminous correspondence from the inter-Allied mission to Poland, but its focus soon expanded. On 26 February, the commission was told to examine Poland’s boundaries with Germany and submit its recommendations.82 Its efforts marked an influential stage in the discussion of the Polish settlement, although not a decisive one, and continued to show the integral part that attitudes about Poles and Poland played in the process. Though the commission considered historical, economic, strategic, and religious claims for territory, its first principle for determining

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the borders was nationality. The commission’s statement of principles decreed “that primary consideration be given to the line of ethnic separation in such a way as to secure the fairest possible settlement between the two peoples concerned.”83 Dmowski circulated amongst the commission delegates and pressed Poland’s claims. Since Germany had not been invited to the conference, its representatives could not counter him.84 “Germany had one face towards the West, where she had made peace, and the other face towards the East, where she was organizing for war,” Dmowski had proclaimed in his presentation to the Supreme Council on 29 January.85 He told the Polish Commission, meanwhile, that “the Poles do not harbour imperialistic and annexationist tendencies.”86 German representatives claimed, meanwhile, that the Polish population of Posen was at fault for the hostilities there and that Posen had a German majority.87 These claims failed to persuade the peace­makers. “It is clear that [the] Germans are only playing with us,” Howard wrote in his diary just before leaving the negotiations between the Germans and Poles.88 The issue of Danzig and the Polish Corridor was one of the major flashpoints of the conference and has received extensive historical attention.89 The next few paragraphs provide a brief overview of this complex debate, which contributed to the later development of attitudes. The Polish émigrés’ territorial claims during the First World War had always included access to the sea. They believed that this was the only way for the new state to be truly independent, and in 1918 the Allies and Americans had committed to ensuring that Poland had access to the sea. Allied and American policy makers understood that access to the sea was necessary to permit international trade links so that Poland’s economy could grow and trade could thrive. Danzig, which had once been the great port of the PolishLithuanian Commonwealth, was the most likely location. It sat at the mouth of the Vistula River, which made it the easiest place from which to ship goods upriver to the capital at Warsaw or to the many smaller cities and towns along the river like Kraków or Thorn (Torun), with its centuries-old university. In more recent years, a rail line also connected Danzig to Warsaw. The trouble was that the city’s population was overwhelmingly German. Dmowski told the peace conference that this problem could be overcome in the long term. He had suggested to the Council of Ten that the German census had concealed the ethnographic reality; while the statistics said that 3 per cent of Danzig was Polish, it was really

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closer to 40 per cent.90 He expanded on his reasons in meetings with the Polish Commission in early March. Though the region had experienced hard times in recent decades, Dmowski proclaimed that it would “acquire new vigour” as it became the conduit through which all Poland’s trade flowed.91 Germans of the region would accept Polish sovereignty “without regret” in this new age of prosperity.92 Besides, he added, German control of the city would allow an unfriendly government to close off Poland’s international trade at will. Dmowski also claimed some of the surrounding region to the east: the Nogat River, which was an eastern delta branch of the Vistula, and the former Hanseatic city of Elbing (Elbląg).93 The Polish Commission soon agreed that Danzig should be part of Poland.94 More of the commission’s attention focused on Poland’s claims in the area of West Prussia that linked central Poland with Danzig, which became known as the Polish Corridor.95 Poles were in the majority along much of the route, but there was a large German minority in the entire province, and many districts had German majorities. The winding course of the Vistula, which ignored ethnographic concentrations, complicated matters for the commission, which brainstormed numerous potential borders. Some cut off portions of the railway between Danzig and Warsaw, though Dmowski countered that if Germany obtained any part of the river or the railway, it would easily be able to cut off trade to the rest of Poland. The other difficulty was what lay on the east of the proposed Polish Corridor: the province of East Prussia, which was solidly German. The Polish delegation did not want East Prussia to remain part of Germany, preferring it to be made an independent republic. Dmowski told the commission that Königsberg (Russian: Kaliningrad, Polish: Królewiec), the East Prussian capital, was already becoming a secondary outlet for Polish trade, and the province might someday see the benefits of a customs union with Poland.96 The greater fear was of a German attack. Polish and French representatives worried that someday Germany could attack the Polish Corridor from both sides (as they did in 1939).97 The Polish Commission was willing to tolerate some minorities under Poland’s control, but the delegations of the Big Three differed on how many. French representatives, who frequently expressed concern that Poland be economically viable and the Polish border defensible against German attacks, did not worry much about German minorities. General Henri Le Rond reminded his colleagues of the importance of defensible frontiers: “the experience of the

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present war had proved that a water course or even a small canal constituted an excellent line of defence.”98 He applied this logic in several cases, and argued with a persistence that suggested his commitment to the line of argument. In general, the British and American delegates expressed greater concern than the French about leaving too many German minorities in Poland.99 Howard and Lord had negotiated an Anglo-American agreement several weeks earlier that outlined their joint position.100 Bowman, the American delegate, and Lieutenant-Colonel L.H. Kisch, the British delegate, also proposed that the administrative region of Allenstein (Olsztyn) should have a plebiscite over its future rather than be assigned to Poland, as Le Rond had suggested. Bowman doubted the Polish delegation’s claim that the region’s people were nationally conscious Poles.101 Le Rond protested briefly but eventually assented. In drafting the report, the commission demonstrated their continued sympathy for the Polish perspective and antipathy towards Germany. In one evocative passage, the report justified assigning the Germanmajority Schneidemühl region to Poland on the grounds that “the artificial colonisation plan of the German government has produced its most marked effects, so as almost to cut off the Polish Corridor to the Baltic from the solidly Polish areas to the south … the Commission considered it would be an act of simple justice to disregard the ethnic boundary and include the district in Poland.”102 Bowman suggested that this be inserted “in view of the tyrannical methods which had been exercised by the Germans over the Poles in the region,” and the rest of the commission agreed.103 Dmowski had also appealed to the commission’s sense of historical justice when he met with them three days previously.104 Yet when Baron Degrand, another French representative, attempted to insert language about Poland as a historical bulwark against the “Asiatic invader” and “Teuton aggressor,” French diplomat Jules Cambon rejected the notion at once.105 The commission’s report, accepting the Polish delegation’s nationality statistics, said that while more than two-thirds of Danzig’s population were German, it was necessary to grant Danzig to Poland.106 The Allies and the United States, the report continued, had publicly asserted that Poland would have access to the sea, and a Polish Corridor to Danzig better served the interests of those 25 million citizens of Poland whose livelihoods would depend on it than 1.6 million Germans in East Prussia who would be cut off from their country.107 The Polish

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Commission’s report thus did not accept all of the Polish delegation’s territorial claims against Germany, but it gave those claims priority. After two weeks’ work, the commission had proposed a border between Germany and the new Poland. Its ideas reflected that, at this point, the Allies and the United States remained generally favourable towards Poland and antagonistic towards Germany, the wartime enemy. The commission representatives modified some Polish claims, but generally considered the Polish perspective favourably. Military and economic considerations were discussed extensively, but personal connections were also important. The presence of Dmowski during crucial debates influenced the results considerably. So did the dedication of French representatives, who were well prepared to argue the details of Poland’s case. Le Rond was magnanimous in victory; after he won another debate over the border, he thanked Kisch and Bowman, whose “attitude had throughout been most conciliatory.” Kisch and Bowman thanked Le Rond in return.108 As was the case throughout the peace conference, the British, French, and American delegates prioritized good working relations even when they disagreed. Their disagreements soon became more numerous.

T h e L e a d e rs T a ke Control The Polish Commission and the inter-Allied mission to Poland had worked largely without oversight or interference from the leaders since Dmowski’s presentation on 29 January. But in mid-March, the leaders began to engage with the most controversial topics, including various aspects of the Polish settlement. Over the coming weeks, they debated the fate of the besieged city of Lemberg and the territorial settlement along the Polish-German border, particularly the proposed Polish Corridor and the fate of Danzig. As some of the solutions proposed were not those that the Polish delegation had advocated, the peace­makers increasingly considered whether the Polish public’s reaction to adverse territorial decisions made in Paris could be restrained or would be uncontrolled, leading in the latter case to anarchy or “Bolshevism.” Their conclusions helped to further shape their view of Polishness and were a crucial part of their decisions. On 11 March, Lloyd George and Foch led a long discussion about the disorganization of the Polish government and armed forces. They eventually agreed to send a French general, Paul Henrys, to Poland

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to organize Poland’s military.109 In the background was the turbulent situation in Lemberg. Ukrainian forces continued to besiege the city, and the fighting had intensified.110 The inter-Allied mission tried to negotiate an armistice at the front lines but failed, saying later that the Ukrainian negotiators had laughed at them.111 Ukrainian soldiers shot at their train as they left, wounding two Polish officers.112 Robert Lord, the American representative on the inter-Allied mission, travelled to Paris in mid-March to inform the Supreme Council that an armistice could only be negotiated between Polish and Ukrainian representatives in Paris, because another attempt to use the inter-Allied mission to broker a settlement would likely fail.113 The mission’s representatives and the Polish Commission – which were both generally sympathetic to the Polish perspective – also called for Haller’s Polish divisions to be sent as soon as possible.114 The issue reached the Supreme Council on 17 March. Foch proposed that several Romanian divisions would be sent to Lemberg, which British, French, and American experts had advocated.115 Foch declared that this would be “a resolute policy, affirming [the peace­m akers’] resolve to stop the progress of Bolshevism.”116 Lloyd George countered that “it would merely mean giving support to the perpetration of a great mischief … the setting up of a great army for the eventual invasion of Russia.”117 He also informed the Supreme Council that there was currently no shipping available to send Haller’s Army to the port at Danzig.118 The discussions are important because of what they reveal about the attitudes of the participants. The peace­makers’ discussions included considerable concern that the emotions of the Polish people and the fate of Poland’s government were closely tied to the resolution of territorial disputes in Poland’s favour. In Paris, the Polish Commission discussed the matter and then relayed their concerns to the Supreme Council on 12 March. Their letter noted that the situation at Lemberg had become “critical” and that “the Poles are in danger of being defeated by the Ukrainians unless they receive prompt assistance.” The commission then outlined disastrous consequences: “The loss of Lemberg would have a tremendous effect throughout Poland and would be interpreted as a defeat of the Entente. This would immediately strengthen the position of the Bolsheviki, at the same time encouraging all agents employed by Germany in organising plots against the Entente in Eastern Europe.”119 Some worried that, as Barthélémy said, “the fall of Lemberg would be the signal for the revolution.”120 Foch spoke for many when he told the Supreme

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Council, “Lemberg was about to fall, and if Lemberg fell the Polish Government would fall with it.”121 Bowman worried that if Lemberg fell, the Ukrainians “will massacre [the] whole population.”122 In fact, Polish troops lifted the siege on 18 March, and Haller’s Army began to ship out to Poland in April.123 Yet the debate is instructive, because it demonstrates attitudes at the beginning of this period of the leaders’ engagement and begins to establish a pattern of correlating “Polish” views with the territorial settlement. Polish political and military elites were certainly concerned about these territorial disputes, and the Western representatives took most of their cues about Polish opinion from them.124 Recent research, however, questions whether the populace was really so interested in the concerns of the central government or the National Democrats at a time when material and local concerns were particularly pressing.125 These themes are discussed further in the next chapter. Moreover, the peace­makers’ view of the Ukrainians was particularly negative. The Polish mission’s negative interactions with Ukrainian representatives during the armistice negotiations partly motivated this. In particular, Foch said that Lemberg was “infested by the Ukrainians,” a description which implies great disdain.126 He and others correlated the nationalist West Ukrainian forces with other Bolshevik Ukrainian forces, and Bolshevism was often described in terms of a virus or infestation. Yet Foch’s view certainly reflected geopolitical realities; Barthélemy, another influential French figure in this discussion, privately recognized that Poland “right now was in total sympathy with France.”127 The leaders’ engagement with the Polish territorial settlement intensified on 19 March, when Jules Cambon presented the Polish commission’s recommendations. This was immediately after the Council again discussed the conflict between Polish and Ukrainian forces in East Galicia. Lloyd George objected that the commission’s suggested frontiers left too many German minorities in Poland.128 “The Poles … had not a high reputation as administrators,” he added. “It was neither fair nor prudent … to hand over large populations to a Government they disliked.”129 The settlement, he warned, “would be the seed of future war.”130 Cambon defended the commission’s reasoning, saying that Poland’s economic security and its borders needed to be safe against German aggression. He added that, given a choice “between protecting German populations largely imported since the 18th Century, and protecting the Poles, he preferred the latter.”131 Clemenceau’s trusted advisor André Tardieu and Pichon agreed, while Wilson and even Balfour noted that Poland’s

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economic and military security needed to be safeguarded. Yet the latter two also noted Lloyd George’s objections about German minorities and convinced their colleagues that the commission should study slightly different borders between Poland and East Prussia.132 Privately, Wilson was annoyed that the entire episode had delayed discussion of the League covenant.133 The 19 March debate repeated many of the same points about German minority rights, Polish security and economic survival, and justice for historical wrongs that the Commission had discussed. In fact, when the Commission discussed the matter the following day, its members agreed that they did not need to change their recommendations, as they had already “fully considered” the matter.134 Kisch, the British representative, concurred in this, even though Lloyd George had alleged the previous day that the British delegates had only agreed “reluctantly” to the Commission’s report.135 Yet the Commission had not really mentioned Lloyd George’s concern about Polish administrative ability. He had made similar observations in the discussion of the armistice in East Galicia, and as the next chapter discusses, this stereotype of Polish characteristics became a persistent theme. As Lloyd George pushed for further discussion of the proposed Polish-German border, a series of rapid changes influenced the discussion. News of a communist revolution in Hungary jolted the conference on 22 March. Amid widespread consensus that the crowded Supreme Council meetings were getting nowhere, Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Italian premier Vittorio Orlando withdrew to a Council of Four to make decisions more efficiently.136 Moreover, reports of extreme deprivation in Germany had already spread through the British and American delegations.137 On 25 March, Lloyd George and his advisors returned from a weekend retreat at the chateau of Fontainebleau, outside Paris, and produced a memorandum that outlined urgent changes to the peace treaty. Lloyd George warned that a harsh peace could topple the German government and bring Bolshevik forces to power, as had just happened in Hungary. He also made his strongest declaration yet against the proposed Polish border settlement: “The proposal of the Polish Commission that we should place 2,100,000 Germans [under Polish rule] … must, in my judgment, lead sooner or later to a new war in the East of Europe.”138 Lloyd George’s view was that the Commission’s proposal would create another “Alsace-Lorraine,” where minority populations “would be the seed of future war.”139 His Fontainebleau Memorandum thus

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proposed that Poland should receive a corridor to Danzig that included only “the smallest number of Germans” but not the city itself, which would be autonomous.140 After Lloyd George’s return, the leaders took control of the PolishGerman border settlement from the experts and showed their growing emotional investment in this and other decisions in the way they engaged with each other.141 “The great topic is Poland – Poland at breakfast, lunch & dinner,” wrote Frances Stevenson, Lloyd George’s secretary, though German reparations and the Franco-German border were discussed more extensively in the meetings.142 The meetings of the Four, as they were known, were stormy affairs for more than two weeks after Lloyd George’s return.143 The French delegation rebutted Lloyd George’s arguments in a careful memorandum, and warned that Bolshevism could come to Poland if their national claims were denied.144 Wilson, who was already annoyed with the French for what he perceived as “constant obstruction,” complained that “the only real interest of France in Poland is in weakening Germany by giving Poland territory to which she has no right.”145 Clemenceau and Wilson argued fiercely on 28 March; privately, Clemenceau fumed about Wilson’s “intransigence” and “absolute opposition,” and found Lloyd George’s Fontainebleau Memorandum “astonishing.”146 Lloyd George was “very pleased” that he was winning over the American leader to his view on the Polish-German border.147 Yet a vigorous debate also broke out in the British delegation while the Danzig terms were being drafted. “Dantzig, Dantzig, Dantzig!” Howard wrote in his diary after another day of meetings.148 (He had returned to Paris in early April.) Howard, H.J. Paton, and F.B. Bourdillon argued repeatedly that the prime minister’s changes should not be implemented, because they would leave Poland at the mercy of Germany and Russia.149 Kerr and Headlam-Morley defended the prime minister’s view that, as Kerr wrote, “it was to Poland’s interest to incorporate as few people of other nationalities within itself as possible.”150 As Headlam-Morley added, “Germany will, in virtue of its much larger population, its older civilisation and its great resources, always be in a position of great advantage as against Poland.”151 As mentioned above, the delegates frequently predicted an emotional reaction of public opinion in Poland to a rejection of Poland’s claim. “I fear that unless Dantzig becomes Polish there will be such an explosion of feeling in Poland that it is difficult to predict the result,” Howard warned Lloyd George.152 Reports leaked to the press that

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Danzig was not to be given to Poland, causing Polish public opinion to become “excited,” Headlam-Morley wrote.153 Paton, who in most cases viewed Polish intentions skeptically, noted that Polish public opinion was united on the issue and predicted that “a wave of indignation and despair” could cause the Polish government to fall, which would threaten “the foundations of order in Eastern Europe.” He continued: “to outrage the strong sentiment of the Poles by a measure which will certainly not satisfy the Germans is to disregard altogether the real forces at work in the present situation.”154 Kerr, who collected all of these opinions, underlined this sentence. Meanwhile, Paderewski, who had just come to Paris from Warsaw, told Headlam-Morley that control of Teschen and of Danzig were “the two cardinal points of Polish feeling.” Making the latter a free city was inadvisable, as “Polish feeling was getting more difficult to control.”155 Paderewski further burnished his personal reputation with the peace­makers in this period, as the next chapter discusses, but he could not change the outcome. On 22 April it was finally agreed that Danzig would be a free city, as Lloyd George had proposed.156 As the peace­makers’ engagement with the Polish situation deepened through discussion of the Lemberg armistice and then the PolishGerman boundary, all became aware of the potentially explosive behaviour of the Polish public. They increasingly questioned whether the Polish public’s reaction to adverse territorial decisions made in Paris could be restrained or would be uncontrolled, leading in the latter case to anarchy or “Bolshevism.” The peace­makers had raised these concerns on previous occasions, particularly regarding the Teschen dispute, and Polish representatives had been warning of the threats to their country for months. Moreover, the emotional connotations of anarchic displays recently shown in Hungary and in the lurid stories emerging from the Russian Civil War would have been plain. Yet the fact that the peace­makers finally fully saw this danger did not mean that they also all agreed with the Polish delegation’s proposals. The debate became intense, not only for the leaders but also for the experts. Lloyd George’s plan received considerable criticism, particularly from his own delegation. The expected Polish revolution did not occur, but the attitudes shaped in this period remained. The peace­makers further developed their view that the Polish public was not fully committed to maintaining domestic order, as the next chapter discusses. They also continued to develop attitudes and policies about Poles simultaneously as they considered the East Galician settlement again.

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C o m pa r in g P e o p l e s i n Eas t Gali ci a While the Polish Commission and its various sub-commissions continued to work on the Polish territorial settlement, for the next several weeks the leaders’ attention focused on other topics. Reports of further pogroms in Polish-controlled areas, particularly at Pinsk in early April, raised urgent questions about the treatment of Jews in Poland. The resulting discussions are examined in the next chapter. Other weighty decisions also captured the attention of the conference. In particular, the Italian delegation left the conference for two weeks because Wilson, among others, refused its claim to the city of Fiume, where Italian speakers were the most numerous but the residents of the surrounding region spoke Croatian. A few people recognized the parallel with the situation in Danzig.157 On 7 May, the peace­makers presented the draft treaty to the German delegation, which then spent three weeks preparing a response. Meanwhile, Piłsudski continued to pursue his broad strategic objective of establishing a buffer region between central Poland and Russia. Polish forces had taken Pinsk, for instance, only two weeks before the pogrom. Vilnius, to the northeast, was a bigger prize. This was not only because a plurality of Polish speakers lived in the city but also because it had long been a centre of Polish culture. Piłsudski epitomized this; he had been born in the region into an old noble family. Howard observed that “[Piłsudski’s] patriotic love for his own country Lithuania was really touching.”158 In fact, Vilnius was a multi­ cultural, multilingual city typical of much of post-imperial Europe.159 Moreover, the majority of the population lived in the countryside, and while Vilnius province’s rural inhabitants might best be categorized as nationally indifferent, few spoke Polish, and Lithuanian nationalists regarded them as fertile ground for their proselytizing efforts.160 In fact, Dmowski had not claimed Vilnius province in his deposition to the Polish Commission, though he had suggested that the area around Könisgberg, which the Lithuanian delegation also claimed, could be joined to Poland.161 Yet on Piłsudski’s command, Polish forces captured the city on 19 April after two months of sporadic fighting with the Bolsheviks. In many respects, the national situation was quite similar to East Galicia, but the Polish invasion received little attention from the leaders at the peace conference.162 The new French representative in Warsaw, Eugène Pralon, wrote that a resolution by the Sejm in favour

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of Piłsudski’s action was “foolish” and “annexationist.”163 But other representatives were less concerned about Vilnius even though the Polish invasion pre-empted the peace conference’s deliberations, something which Poland had been warned against in other instances. The Supreme Council considered the matter and made “an appeal to the political sense” of both sides and urged them to cooperate.164 It did not pursue the issue. The peace­makers did not want to carve up the former Russian Empire out of concern that a future non-Bolshevik Russian government would likely want to reclaim many lost territories.165 Partly for this reason, Lithuania had no official status at the conference, and its unofficial representatives made few contacts. Four separate Lithuanian groups sent delegations to the peace conference, which immediately gave them a reputation for infighting.166 The peace­ makers were also often easily convinced that Lithuanians were pro-German, either because Germany had accepted an autonomous Lithuania in 1917 or because of supposed ethnic links.167 Polish representatives were much better established in comparison. Many Western decision makers were thus unworried by the Polish annexation. Howard, for instance, wrote in his diary: “Poles have taken Wilno … so Piłsudski’s dream is accomplished. Isn’t that sweet?”168 He, like several others, had previously advocated some sort of close Polish-Lithuanian cooperation.169 In sum, the combination of strategy, attitudes, and contingency that determined many of the peace conference’s discussions meant that Piłsudski’s seizure of Vilnius was largely ignored. The Vilnius question would, however, attract greater attention in 1920 and is treated further in chapter 6. While the Polish delegation was compared positively to the Lithuanians when Vilnius was taken, comparisons of Poles and Ukrainians were at the heart of how the leaders understood the simmering antagonisms in East Galicia when they returned to the agenda in late May 1919.170 This was partly because both sides made assertions about the other’s national character in broad terms: “Poles” and “Ukrainians.” When the peace­makers had discussed an armistice in East Galicia in previous months, Polish representatives had successfully framed a negative view of Ukrainians. Yet in this latest debate, the leaders joined the experts in considering the details of the territorial settlement in East Galicia rather than simply the armistice. The Ukrainian point of view became more prominent, both because Ukrainian representatives appeared in the Council of Four and because representatives in the British government advocated their point of view. The vigorous debate

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incorporated questions of civilizational hierarchy and self-­determination with concerns about Bolshevism. The Polish delegation had already presented thorough arguments for their control of East Galicia. The Polish delegation generally accepted that Ukrainian nationals comprised the majority in East Galicia – although their figures on the exact difference varied wildly – but argued that Poles were better suited to governing there. “Whatever wealth and culture exists in East Galicia is Polish,” Dmowski stated to the inter-Allied mission.171 Others were even blunter in their criticisms: one Polish representative told the British delegation that Ukrainians were “illiterate, drunkards, and awfully lazy, their land badly cultivated,” and that “Ukrainian self-rule is an absurdity so preposterous, that persons knowing Ukraine cannot seriously talk about it.”172 Dmowski assured the Polish Commission that Ukrainian national rights would be fully respected under Polish governance, but that since “91% of the Ruthenian population are small farmers or farm workers … there is no element of the country that can govern it.”173 Polish representatives always concluded that only a Polish government would be able to bring order to East Galicia. Dmowski made less reference to the oil fields in the eastern half of the province. These had been the fourth largest in the world in the years before the war, although output had collapsed since 1914.174 The eventual territorial settlement was implicit in the long-running armistice discussions, whether in the conference’s strict assertion that neither side pre-judge the conference or in both sides’ realization that a favourable armistice (or sending Haller’s Army) would help them to create or acknowledge facts on the ground that could later sway the settlement. The Polish delegation also regularly attempted to bolster its territorial claim by portraying Ukrainian forces as the aggressors in the ongoing conflict. This exemplifies a regular theme: Polish representatives repeatedly linked a group with which they contested territory with one of the Allies’ wartime enemies. When meeting with the inter-Allied mission in early February, Dmowski asserted that Ukrainian forces were selling petrol to the Hungarian army in return for arms and ammunition.175 When Dmowski later gave Poland’s full territorial claims to the Polish Commission, he argued that the Ukrainian national movement was merely “a weapon employed by the Germans against Poland.”176 Most frequent with regard to Ukrainians, however, were attempts to link them to Bolshevik Russia. Here, French representatives frequently

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repeated the Polish depiction of Ukrainians. This reflected the French government’s view that Poland should take the lead in defending East Galicia and should be given control of the territory as a result. General Barthélémy told the inter-Allied mission that West Ukrainian troops had been “contaminated by the Bolshevik virus.”177 In early March, French representatives again raised the fact that the West Ukrainian forces had been receiving arms from Hungarian sources.178 Even Clemenceau, who said little about East Galicia in any of the occasions when it came up in the Council of Four, maligned Ukrainian efforts to defend against the Bolshevik invasion, stating that “the Ukrainians were more than half Bolsheviks themselves.”179 In May, the Polish and Ukrainian delegations presented increasingly lurid accusations about the other. Many of these accusations contained some truth about the bitter fighting, but they were also phrased to hint at the national character of the other side. The Ukrainian delegation argued that Poles had been their historical oppressors under the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and then the Austrian Empire, and had intensified this oppression since November 1918. The delegation pleaded for the peace­makers to force Polish forces to stop, especially when Polish forces drove Ukrainian fighters back in May and June 1919. In an appearance before the Council of Four on 26 May, Ukrainian representatives reluctantly accepted the inter-Allied mission’s armistice plan even though it would leave many Ukrainians under Polish “subjugation.” A ceasefire, they argued, would save their people “from the Polish menace.”180 They portrayed themselves as the victims of Polish imperialism: “The Poles are destroying our country, our fertile fields, the Poles are killing our soldiers fighting in defence of our fatherland, the Poles are ruining our villages, killing our peasants for no other reason than their unwillingness to remain under the Polish yoke.”181 Polish forces had done this, they argued, after the Allied and American governments had fed and clothed them and given them military assistance.182 The Ukrainian delegates’ deposition intended to encourage the peace­makers to protect them by using images of helplessness, much as the Polish relief campaign had done during the First World War. As the peace­makers debated the East Galicia situation in late May and early June, Britain, France, and the United States took different positions. The Polish victories were “quite satisfactory news,” General Henrys reported privately to French President Poincaré.183 Clemenceau said little about East Galicia, but he did not share the enthusiasm of

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his armed forces. Wilson – who will be examined in greater detail in the next chapter – considered halting US food aid to convince the Polish army to stop its advance but also did not wish to topple Paderewski’s government. Lloyd George, who repeatedly questioned Polish actions and motives in contrast to the Ukrainian forces, considerably influenced the peace conference’s discussions, if not its eventual decisions. Two phrases particularly evoke the confluence of forces that shaped his position. As Lloyd George asserted in the Council of Four during a discussion of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict: the “Poles were using Bolshevism as a cloak for their Imperialistic aims.”184 In another meeting he is quoted as saying: “In the fight against the Ukraine, Poland is playing the role of a relatively strong state attacking a weaker country.”185 These comments reflected the depiction that the Ukrainian delegation had presented, but it also helped that Lloyd George’s advisors were telling him much the same thing, and that he saw parallels with his Welsh past. Lloyd George’s concern about “Polish imperialism” certainly reflected his growing concern that Poland should comprise only ethnographically Polish areas and his apprehension about the Polish army’s conduct in the east. It is important to note, however, that Namier had long claimed that Polish nationalists sought to dominate the region and incorporate territories containing non-­Polish majorities, and that early in 1919 he began to describe “Polish Imperialism” in particular.186 The phrase is important because it would have been an unfamiliar concept to those who, like the rest of the British delegation, knew little about the political and social history of the region. After all, before 1919, Poles had been looked upon sympathetically in Britain because of their experience under imperial oppression. While Namier was only in Paris for a few days in 1919, he corresponded regularly with Kerr, and with Headlam-Morley.187 Kerr was Lloyd George’s primary intermediary on foreign affairs, while HeadlamMorley, a historian working on drafting the German treaty, had considerable access to the prime minister during this period.188 The prime minister was known for relying on the views of those around him rather than reading memos, and it appears that Namier’s connection to Headlam-Morley and Kerr proved valuable.189 Lloyd George, as mentioned previously, had defined much of his political career by fighting against the strong. Since the Poles were the landlords in East Galicia, they offered another parallel with Lloyd George’s Welsh background – but it was not helpful for Poland’s

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claims that in this case Poles were equated with oppressive English landlords rather than the downtrodden Welsh. As Lloyd George perceived Poland as a coercive power, thanks to what he had observed of their international actions and what he had learned from his advisors, it is unsurprising that he repeatedly used such arguments to caution against Polish control of the region. On 12 June, one day after the peace­makers had agreed to hold a plebiscite in Upper Silesia, they decided to schedule one in East Galicia also.190 Yet within a week, the plebiscite for East Galicia had been abandoned. On 18 June, Balfour submitted a memo that became the basis for the peace conference’s interim settlement of the East Galicia question and represents the degree to which each side was successful in its attempts to sway the Allies.191 His assessment of the Ukrainian forces’ ability to control the territory was bleak: “The Ruthenian majority is backward, illiterate, and at present quite incapable of standing alone. The urban and educated classes are largely Polish, and when not Polish are Jewish. The whole country is utterly disorganised.”192 To prevent a Bolshevik invasion of Galicia, he advocated giving Poland temporary military control over the region with “complete Military freedom – as from a Military point of view they certainly ought to be.”193 But his proposal that Polish governance should be supervised by a League of Nations high commissioner, and that the League would decide when Poland should cede control of the territory, also reflects British and American concerns that the Polish government was claiming too much territory with little regard for the rights of the Ukrainians of East Galicia to self-­determination. The peace­makers eventually granted short-term military control over East Galicia to Poland in order to control “Bolshevik bands.”194 As the leaders rushed to finish outstanding issues before Wilson left for Washington, they deferred the question of League control but confirmed Balfour’s temporary solution. The eventual decision on East Galicia is considered in chapter 6.

U p p e r S il e s i a Lloyd George’s complaints about Polish conduct led right into the sudden debate on the future of Upper Silesia.195 The region’s characteristics made it difficult for the peace­makers to assign part or all of it to Poland or Germany. Upper Silesia was economically important for both countries, with a concentration of industry as well as plentiful

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supplies of coal and minerals. Some British industrialists had ties to the region.196 Dmowski exaggerated his population statistics to help his cause, first telling the Supreme Council that 90 per cent of the population was “strongly Polish,” but later suggesting to the Polish Commission that two-thirds spoke Polish.197 The territory had not belonged to the Polish crown since the fourteenth century (Lloyd George claimed that it “had not been Polish territory for 800 years”), but Dmowski noted that it had returned Polish deputies to the Reichstag for decades.198 In fact, the region’s mix of Polish and German speakers (including many who spoke both languages) and strong Catholicism across language lines meant that no easy definition of its national identity was possible.199 Yet the region’s complexities received little attention from the peace conference at first. The Polish Commission recommended that Upper Silesia should go to Poland, and Lloyd George did not mention it in the Fontainebleau Memorandum in late March. The German delegation’s reply to the peace terms on 29 May quickly focused British attention on Upper Silesia, which soon led to disagreement with France and the United States. When Lloyd George led three meetings of the British Empire delegation to examine the German reply and prepare revisions, the fate of Upper Silesia became the most significant point of agreement. In the first meeting, Lloyd George suggested that Upper Silesia had never seemed to be Polish and that the Poles had claimed other German areas. “If the facts alleged were accurate,” he warned, “then the Peace Treaty would be setting up something that would end in a great catastrophe in Europe. It must not be forgotten that, in some respects, the Poles were a difficult people to deal with. At the present moment, the Poles were, in defiance of the Peace Conference, fighting the Ukrainians, who, themselves, were fighting the Bolsheviks on another front.”200 When the delegation met again the next day, Lloyd George assented to a report that some territory in “Northern Silesia” should be given directly to Germany and a plebiscite should be held in the rest of the territory.201 The South African general Jan Smuts, who sometimes had Lloyd George’s ear, agreed: “Poland was an historic failure, and always would be a failure, and in this Treaty we were trying to reverse the verdict of history.” His colleagues assented to the plebiscite proposal. Billy Hughes, the Australian prime minister, added: “It was monstrous to put Germans under Polish rule unless there was some overwhelming reason for doing so.”202

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The discussion continued that afternoon. Balfour “agreed that Poland had behaved quite abominably and had mismanaged her affairs,” but also questioned whether “Germany was repentant.” “[W]hy should there be faith in Germany altering her course, and no hope … of Poland behaving as a reasonably civilized state?” he asked his colleagues.203 While the British delegation believed that a plebiscite in Upper Silesia would go far in mollifying German opinion, many other delegates still held wartime attitudes of the German people. Since Prussia had taken Silesia in war, Lloyd George noted, Germany’s retention of the territory was not a matter of “justice.”204 “The election results showed that the Poles were numerically very strong,” Hughes added. (He had called Germany “a nation of liars” earlier in the day.205) Lloyd George suggested that this would all be worked out in a plebiscite.206 The meetings of the British delegation show a shift in perception towards Poland and the Poles. The struggle in East Galicia and the pogroms that had been brought up previously in the leaders’ deliberations had poisoned British opinion. The German reply offered a means of expressing this in policy. Yet while disdain for Polish conduct was additional – and evidently powerful – justification for the British Empire delegation, the greatest concern was finding a solution that placated German opinion and prevented a future war. “All the information I receive from Germany … shows that the question of Silesia is the one that most concerns the Germans,” Lloyd George told the Council of Four on 2 June.207 He advocated a plebiscite, suggesting disingenuously that “his personal view was that Upper Silesia would vote for Poland.”208 Clemenceau voiced his displeasure immediately, and his rebuttal to Lloyd George illustrates the strategic reasoning behind France’s support of Poland’s claim to the region, as well as the understandings of national character with which this reasoning was imbued. “In England the view seemed to prevail that the easiest way to finish the war was by making concessions,” Clemenceau asserted. “In France the contrary view was held that it was best to act firmly.” He continued: “The French people, unfortunately, knew the Germans very intimately and they believed that the more concessions we made, the more the Germans would demand.”209 Regarding the Polish settlement, he asserted: “It was possible that some alterations might be made … [but] when we spoke of establishing Poland, it must be remembered that this was not done merely to redress one of the greatest wrongs in history. It was designed to create a barrier between Germany and Russia.”210 It was feared

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throughout the conference that the two countries might unite. Clemenceau concluded dramatically that “if Germany were to colonize Russia [i.e., through Poland], the war would be lost and not won.”211 The French position remained that a Poland with a greater population and more economic resources – especially rich Upper Silesia – would become the best counterweight to German power. Wilson, meanwhile, believed initially that there was no sense changing the terms and that Germany was being justly punished, and argued with Lloyd George for several days. One exchange is telling for the national comparisons. Lloyd George noted, “The Poles, like the Irish, were specially good at propaganda. The Allies were only hearing one side of the case.”212 As the Irish were trying to influence Wilson to push for independence and also beginning an independence uprising, the connection was uncomplimentary. Wilson replied, “the Germans were far more subtle propagandists than the Poles … As against the Germans he was pro Pole with all his heart.”213 Lloyd George countered, “for the moment there was no doubt that the Germans had a higher civilization than the Poles. As a matter of fact they rather despised the Poles. To force a race of that kind against their will under a race that they regarded as inferior was not to promote peace.”214 Lloyd George’s view eventually prevailed, and the plebiscite was set for 1921. Paderewski protested, but Lloyd George reprimanded him sharply. “Don’t forget,” the British Prime Minister told his Polish counterpart, “your liberty was paid for with the blood of other peoples.”215 Lloyd George was perhaps the only one satisfied with the proposal, even though it was ­supposed to be the epitome of national self-­determination. The peace­makers’ initial deliberations on Upper Silesia hinged largely on geopolitical considerations but also incorporated understandings of national character. In this case, however, British and French understanding of German national character was central; the leaders then interpreted how Poles stood in relation to Germans. Clemenceau’s view of Germany as aggressive, duplicitous, and always looking for more territory, a view that Wilson shared in this case, became one of his main arguments for assigning Upper Silesia to Poland. Robert Lansing, the forgotten US secretary of state, later wrote to Paderewski: “I am no believer in plebiscites and never was. There is too great an opportunity for colonization, false swearing and other frauds. Poland should have been given a definite boundary at the first. This is only one of the evils flowing from the false doctrine of ‘self-­determination.’”216

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D e f e n s iv e B o r ders and “ A l sac e - L o r r ai nes ” The British, French, and American governments weighed ethnographic, strategic, economic, and historical considerations as they examined the Polish settlement. Would the new Poland comprise all the territories that the Polish Crown controlled in 1772, before it was first partitioned? Was that the just solution because it righted a historical wrong regardless of the present ethnographic considerations, or should the new Poland only include those areas where Poles predominated? The Polish delegation contended that if the peace­makers really wanted Poland to be a strong, viable state, they should give to Poland the territories they sought as well as a free hand to handle minorities. The new country needed access to the sea, which had been promised in several instances, including in Wilson’s Fourteen Points, but also a strong railroad system, defensible frontiers, and a large population base, all of which would provide some measure of protection against future German attack. The peace­makers’ deliberations also took into account their own interests in the region. In general, the French government believed that lasting peace would be ensured if Germany remained weakened, which meant protecting the independence of the new states on Germany’s eastern borders. The French delegation also wanted to ensure that Bolshevism was contained in Russia, an objective that they believed could be in part achieved by a strong Poland. The British delegation, meanwhile, pursued a general policy in keeping with their long-time preference for a balance of power on the continent, but also preferred to avoid future “Alsace-Lorraines” in which territory granted to one country could fuel irredentism. The United States delegation attempted to follow the principle of self-­determination closely. Nonetheless, when considering the jumble of nationalities around Poland’s borders, American delegates were often convinced by their allies’ arguments. An examination of Polish territorial questions at the Paris Peace Conference also demonstrates the importance that the peace­makers gave to emotionalized comparisons between different nationalities. One of the Polish delegation’s main tactics at the Paris Peace Conference when contesting a territory with another state was to note the links between that state or national group and the Central Powers or the Bolsheviks. Their intention was to make Poland look better by comparison. The Polish delegation, for instance, successfully

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portrayed the Ukrainians of East Galicia as Bolsheviks but also attempted to connect them to Austria, Hungary, and Germany. The Polish delegation – and the French government, which supported most of Poland’s claims fully – also relied on negative perceptions of German aggression to forward claims on German territory. British and American delegates, meanwhile, often compared Poles to other peoples in the region or to other nationalities with which they were familiar. Lloyd George also frequently compared nationalities with his own people, the Welsh. The comparison was rarely favourable for Poland’s territorial claims; usually Lloyd George equated Poles with oppressive English landlords. For many among the British, French, and American delegations, their perceptions of Poland, the Poles, and the Polish government changed as a result of their postwar interactions, and this affected how they framed their economic and strategic considerations as well. For some like Howard or Barthélémy, further encounters with Poles, whether in Paris or on one of the several diplomatic or military missions to Poland in 1919, led them to argue strongly in favour of all of Poland’s claims. But increasingly for others, especially those at the Paris conference, a more negative view of the Polish national character took hold. One widely held view was that Poles were aggressive and imperialistic. Polish forces were involved in skirmishes along Poland’s borders, not just in the west with Germany and Czechoslovakia but also with Lithuanians, Russians, and Ukrainians. Polish forces were not always perceived as the guilty party in these conflicts, and similar quarrels were erupting across Central and Eastern Europe throughout 1919. These were important arguments, because if Poland’s actions were justified, then they could be seen as rational; if Poland was the guilty party, then such impulsive actions were not the sign of a mature state. The leaders, who had to adjudicate several quarrels between Poland and its neighbours while attempting to finish the treaty with Germany and establish the League of Nations, began to doubt Poland’s fitness to embody the modern ideal of a peaceful liberal state. These broader doubts about the new Poland began to be employed, in connection with other factors, to explain why Poland should not control a particular disputed territory. Notably, all shared the concern that decisions against Poland’s claims could lead to an unrestrained reaction from the Polish populace. As the next chapter discusses, these concerns about restraint also influenced debates about whether the Western powers should intervene in Polish domestic affairs.

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5 Stabilizing Poland’s Domestic Affairs, 1919

After spending two months in Europe, US President Woodrow Wilson returned to the United States from mid-February to early March 1919 to shore up support for the negotiations in Paris. As part of his efforts, on 28 February 1919 he spoke to the Democratic National Committee, to whom he gave a long defence of his recent work. In particular, he mentioned the peace­makers’ opinion about interfering in the Russian civil war. “We do not guarantee any state against what may happen inside itself, but we do guarantee against aggression from the outside, so that the family can be as lively as it pleases, and we know what generally happens to an interloper if you interfere in a family quarrel.” He added, “I read the Virginia Bill of Rights very literally but not very elegantly to mean that any people is entitled to any kind of government it damn pleases, and that it is none of our business to suggest or to influence the kind that it is going to have. Sometimes it will have a very riotous form of government, but that is none of our business.”1 Wilson’s comments conformed with his wartime advocacy of government with “the consent of the governed” in the new European order, and with various statements during the peace conference. They could also apply quite easily to his ideas about how the peace­makers should be approaching the governance of Poland. Yet in Poland as in Russia, some of the peace­makers’ actions – including ones that Wilson supported – contradicted their ideas about non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries. Wilson expressed the above sentiments in terms of family. For British, French, and American policy makers in 1919, if Poles were part of the family, then they were the children who had just reached the age of maturity – “our joint infant,” as a French diplomat told his British counterpart in 1920.2

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As Glenda Sluga in particular has argued for this period, the c­ oncepts of statehood and national self-­determination were gendered, and more broadly, status was gendered in a male-dominated world.3 Women had just won the vote at the national level in Britain and United States but were generally excluded from political affairs and business – in other words, both the nexuses of power and of adulthood or personhood. Poland occupied a liminal space in what Wilson and the other leaders understood as a spectrum. They believed that they needed to give Poland a great deal of guidance, partly on the basis of Polish actions and partly because of the context of the Western powers: after a long, costly war, the Western powers had hoped that they could construct a durable peace at Paris, which meant that, to a greater extent than ever before, the domestic affairs of small states became matters for comment, concern, and direct involvement. The Paris peace­makers were, at times, very interested in the details of Poland’s domestic affairs, because they worried about whether the country would thrive and what effect that would have on the European peace settlement. As with the territorial settlement, the peace­makers regularly warned that, if an issue in Poland’s domestic situation was not addressed, it would lead to regional instability, or German or Bolshevik hegemony. (Polish representatives frequently made the same suggestions, though in many cases these were ignored.) Poland’s government also faced the massive challenge of combining three political, economic, and social systems. It could not do this successfully in its first months and needed help, but the government resented the peace­makers’ interventions in internal matters. “The Polish Nation has not forgotten that the dismemberment of Poland [in 1795] was the consequence of the intervention of foreign powers in affairs concerning her religious minorities,” Paderewski wrote the peace conference in protest against the proposed minorities treaty, “and this painful memory makes Poland fear the external [interference] into internal matters of State more than anything.”4 But no matter how much Polish politicians disapproved, the victorious powers looked in on Poland’s domestic affairs and recommended adjustments when they felt it necessary. As previous chapters have shown, they also tended to think of Eastern Europeans as a little less civilized and therefore in need of guidance on political, economic, and social policy, including the treatment of minorities. In the first months after Poland’s declaration of independence at the end of the war, it was uncertain whether Polish leaders could

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assemble and maintain a stable coalition government. When it took two months for Polish factions to coalesce behind a single leader, the peace­makers grew impatient, and as the peace conference progressed, they regularly pointed out examples in which Poland’s leaders were disorganized or quarrelling with one another. These comments became linked to the mistakes of past Polish governments and increasingly challenged the earlier idea that Poland’s independence would rectify a historic injustice. Concern about Poland’s political situation also incorporated the peace­makers’ awareness of the country’s economic difficulties, which were reported in the Supreme Economic Council of the peace conference and by the American aid effort in the country. Allied and American opinion increasingly viewed Paderewski as the only man who could lead the fractious country, and took actions intended to shore up his leader­ship. Yet in the wake of attacks against Poland’s large Jewish minority, the Paris peace­makers did not trust even Paderewski to combat Polish anti-­Semitism, so they developed a minorities treaty to be imposed on Poland’s governments. As British, French, and American policy makers debated Poland’s future and intervened in its politics, they integrated what they understood to be Polish national characteristics and emotional tendencies into discussions of governance and economic well-being.

A vo id in g t h e M is ta k es of the Pas t: P ol i s h P o l it ic s a n d t h e 1919 S ettlement In the weeks after 11 November 1918, British, French, and American diplomats had worried whether Poland’s political elites could make the compromises necessary to form a stable government. Their concerns persisted through 1919. From the Western perspective, the unity government under Paderewski was barely managing to stay together. These concerns increasingly encouraged the attitude that Poles were more interested in quarrelling amongst themselves than meeting Poland’s many challenges. It did not help that the Polish delegation to the peace conference made little effort to disguise the divisions that still existed in their government. Dmowski raised the issue in his speech to the Council of Ten on 29 January: “The National Council [i.e., the knp] … felt that a Socialistic Government [Moraczewski’s] situated between two extreme Socialistic governments was necessary for the safety of Poland at the time, and it concentrated its efforts on arranging a compromise with the Socialists.”5 In effect, Dmowski was taking credit

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for the agreement, especially as he proceeded to blame Piłsudski for the protracted negotiations that produced Paderewski’s premiership. Dmowski also suggested that most of the Polish people had been “against” Piłsudski’s “Socialistic” government, which was “not given much to compromise.” Calling Piłsudski’s government “Socialistic” was another clear attempt to cast aspersions on them, though there is no evidence that the assembled delegates responded to Dmowski’s characterization.6 But they all knew about the divisions in Polish politics, and may have been more impressed had Dmowski feigned to show common cause with his long-time political opponent. It appears that Paderewski, at least, was aware of the fact that projecting a spirit of unity was important. His 21 January cable to the knp, which was in French for easy distribution, included a crucial line about ensuring unity.7 An earlier proclamation on Polish-Jewish relations likewise focused on unity between peoples as well as political factions.8 But the peace­makers talked much more about disunity in Poland, and this soon took on an aspect of national characterization. As the reporter Stephen Bonsal noted on 5 January 1919 while Polish politicians were haggling over a coalition government, “All apparently are exercising the liberum veto which brought low the Polish state in the olden days. As I sit and listen to the uproar, I recall an old German saying I heard so often in my student days. It is to the effect that wherever four Poles are gathered together, at least five opinions are held and loudly expressed.”9 Bonsal’s description outlined an old, generalized stereotype about Polish character that the participants began to apply to the specifics of Poland’s situation in 1919. This was especially the case since throughout the peace conference it was uncertain whether Poland’s government would last. Many agreed that Poles were passionate and quarrelsome and could not restrain themselves when it was necessary or practical to do so. This stereotype of national character was informed by the idea that it was necessary to put aside emotions and to make compromises in order to govern successfully. This way of thinking came to pervade many assessments of Poland’s internal politics and helps to explain why some in the British and American delegations in particular opposed Poland’s territorial claims. As this stereotype in particular was based on a particular understanding of past and present actions, each will be outlined below. Infighting among Poland’s leading politicians prompted many peace conference attendees to discuss one of the main explanations for the demise of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. This was the liberum

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veto that Bonsal noted, which was the right of any member of the Sejm to veto a course of action. The Sejm could only proceed with unanimous agreement. The Polish gentry or szlachta, the greatest of whom sat in the Sejm, were unwilling to give up the liberum veto, which they regarded as a traditional noble privilege to be defended against monarchical power.10 The veto also allowed foreign powers to meddle in the Polish system by buying votes, which Russia in particular did throughout the eighteenth century. It was also this history to which Paderewski referred when, in his argument against the minorities treaty, he said that “the intervention of foreign powers” had caused Poland’s dismemberment.11 The explanation was that in the face of advancing Austrian, Prussian, and Russian armies in 1772, the Sejm prevaricated for too long, leading Poland–Lithuania to lose its territories. As the 1911 edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica explained, “[I]f only the contending factions had been able to agree and unite” in the late eighteenth century, “the final catastrophe might, perhaps, even now, have been averted.”12 The division of the szlachta in the face of disaster increasingly informed a wider stereotype that Poles were quarrelsome by nature, to the point of ignoring impending disaster.13 The depiction of Polish quarrelling also reflected the liminally orientalist way in which Western and Russian writers viewed Eastern Europe, as was outlined previously. German and Russian historians had used the argument that Poles were naturally quarrelsome throughout the nineteenth century partly to legitimize their conquest of the Polish lands.14 (The British said the same about Indians to legitimize their presence in that crucial imperial territory.15) As late as the First World War, many Russians maintained that Poles were too quarrelsome to handle independence. “They [the Poles] are without political sense,” Sergei Sazonov, Russia’s liberal foreign minister, told Maurice Paléologue, the French ambassador, in 1915. “At all the decisive hours of their existence they have committed an irreparable mistake.”16 Infighting between Polish émigré groups during the war tended to reinforce this stereotype. As mentioned earlier, even pro-­Polish advocates in the Foreign Office observed such quarrelling and drew conclusions from it. As Gregory later recalled, “No one, not even the Poles themselves, will deny that they are prone to glaring faults: disunion, instability, and jealousy.” This tendency to quarrel seemed ubiquitous: “Every Pole I ever met, with two exceptions, stood immovably, inflexibly on his ‘rights’ and refused to budge.”17 During the war, the formation of the knp had followed complaints

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that Polish representatives could not get along. The argument that Polishness had a distinctive essence was an implicit recognition of Polish nationality, but identifying quarrelling with this essence was, unsurprisingly, negative in connotation. Such judgments about Polish emotionalism, moreover, were usually a factor in delegates’ attempts to limit one or another of the policies of Poland’s representatives. The focus on quarrelling was not, however, the only way in which the fall of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was interpreted at the Paris Peace Conference, which shows how all sides used references to the past and to national characteristics in their arguments. The peace­makers said quite clearly on many occasions that the partition of Poland was a historical crime carried out by three autocratic regimes. During the war, this characterization had become a central part of Allied and American public rhetoric and private sympathy in favour of Poland’s independence, and it was often applied when discussing the border between Poland and Germany. The partitions of Poland were “one of the greatest wrongs in history,” Clemenceau had asserted while trying to avoid a plebiscite in Upper Silesia.18 The Allied and American reply to the German delegation on 16 June, which all of the leaders approved, spoke of the partitions in almost identical terms.19 Even the final text of the Polish minorities treaty acknowledged “the independence of which [the Polish nation] had been unjustly deprived.”20 Poland’s restoration was, Wilson told a crowd in September 1919, “one of the most noble chapters in the history of the world.”21 These instances all served to defend Poland’s authority over former provinces of the German Empire. A critical distinction existed, however, between these declarations in favour of the existence of an independent Poland and support for every one of its territorial claims and domestic policies.22 Yet the experts, in discussions about the border with Germany, often stated that Poland deserved territory from Germany because of how poorly Poles had been treated during the partitions. If the Germans were in the majority in the Schneidemühl region, General Le Rond noted, this should not impede a Polish claim to the area, because it was merely “the result of pressure exercised on the Poles and of enforced colonization.”23 The Polish delegation also regularly appealed to the peace­ makers to redress past wrongs by Germany.24 When meeting with the sub-commission on Poland’s western and northern frontiers, Dmowski noted “the efforts made for more than a century by the Prussian government to colonize the Polish territories east of the Vistula … The

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plan failed in spite of the fact that the Germans employed every means, even the most reprehensible.”25 The commission then awarded generous borders to Poland, influenced partly by strategic arguments but nonetheless bolstered in their belief that they were doing the right thing. Such reasoning used emotion in a different way than those critiques of Polish emotionalism. Calling Poland’s rebirth a historic justice was intended to sway listeners, and undoubtedly it reflected how many people felt about the Polish settlement. But this appeal to emotion did not persuade others who sought to limit Poland’s territorial claims in contested areas, like Lloyd George and increasingly Wilson. Wilson often spoke about various elements of what he saw as Poland’s disorganization. This was sometimes when he spoke about the importance of supporting Poland with a lasting European settlement, as when he told a crowd in Boston in February 1919 that the country was “immature, inexperienced, as yet unorganized … with a circle of armies around her.”26 At other times, however, Wilson’s concerns about Polish organization coincided with his questions about Poland’s territorial claims, as when he told the Council of Four in the long debate on 19 March that “[t]he Allies were creating a new and weak state, weak not only because historically it had failed to govern itself, especially as religious differences were an element in the situation.”27 The Czechoslovak government in particular had shown that it was possible to organize a new country properly. Wilson told the Four that “Beneš [the Czechoslovakian representative, and future president of Czechoslovakia] had given a very intelligent and unbiased description of the Teschen question” for their 17 May meeting, but population figures for the contested duchy were unavailable because “Beneš had told [Wilson] it was impossible for the Poles to agree with the CzechoSlovaks, as they had been asked to do. The problem was that in Poland it was a party question and no party could afford to give way. This was not the case in Czecho-Slovakia.”28 The implication was that Poland’s government was less productive because Polish politicians were simply too emotionally invested and could not compromise with each other. Lloyd George, meanwhile, regularly pointed to disorganization in Poland as a reason to limit a particular objective of the Polish delegation. On 13 March, Lloyd George suggested that a French general be sent to Poland to organize the Polish armed forces. The Council agreed to send a French general, Paul Henrys, but the content of the conversation is striking. Lloyd George, referencing a memo sent by

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General Adrian Carton de Wiart from Poland, argued that military guidance was necessary because “[t]he Poles had no idea of organisation; they had no capacity to direct or govern. The Premier was a pianist; the President, an idealist without any practical ideas. The generals of the army were all acting independently; they had no notion of training the 500,000 troops they were raising or of co-ordinating the various units constituting the army.”29 He implied that there was something wrong with a country whose prime minister lacked the experience and likely the temperament to lead. Foch agreed that “the Poles really had no army organisation of any kind, except perhaps at Posen, where German methods were still being followed.” He continued, “In Galicia the Austrians were in command of the Polish forces, but (and that was typical of the Austrians) they were on bad terms with the civilian population and had only introduced disorder into the army. At Warsaw, there was no organisation of any kind.”30 Of the forty-six other people in the meeting, no one defended the abilities of the Polish government and army. While this does not mean that all shared these views of Polish capabilities, the leaders’ attitudes would have influenced or at least impressed the others in the room. Lloyd George made other remarks along these lines, as when he observed in the Council of Ten on 19 March that Poles “had not had a high reputation as administrators” and should not take territory from Germany that was not “indisputably Polish.”31 A draft of the Fontainebleau Memorandum, meanwhile, referred to the Poles as “a people which is predominantly Roman Catholic and which has shown a proverbial incapacity for self-government throughout its whole history.”32 Kerr scripted the memorandum based on Lloyd George’s conversations with his advisors, and while this sentence did not make the final version, it reflects the tenor of the discussion. Because the peace­makers mistrusted the ability of Poles to govern, based on emotionalized characteristics that the peace­makers saw as inherent to a Polish essence, they often advocated such measures to limit the Polish government’s sovereignty. In Paris, everyone agreed that the new state had major challenges to overcome and wanted Poland to become a stable state as quickly as possible. This meant that the peace­makers wanted Poland’s leader­ ship to make compromises across political divisions, make peace with neighbouring states without seizing territory that was not “indisputably Polish,” and demonstrate their commitment to look after minorities. When Poland’s leader­ship did not act as they were expected to

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do, the peace­makers tended to explain this as the result of Polish emotionalism and romantic idealism. As Sir Horace Rumbold told Charles Hardinge, “The Poles are also a very difficult people to deal with. They are very sensitive, and while they know quite well that they need foreign help and advice to enable them to put their administration on a sound footing, it is difficult to talk very straight to them, although I have done so once or twice to men I have known formally.”33 The charge that Poles tended to be impractical and emotional stayed with the Polish delegation through 1919, in part because that impracticality was linked to the Polish nature, which tended to mani­ fest itself in passionate disagreement rather than reserved pragmatism. The conclusion as the conference wore on was clear: Poland’s leader­ ship did not possess the emotional detachment to make difficult compromises and practical decisions to ensure the survival of their country. This realization wore away at Poland’s claims, for instance that Danzig would return to prosperity under Polish rule or that Jews would be respectfully treated. The British, French, and American governments did not directly install a government in Poland, but claims like Wilson’s that they were disinterested about who formed the government in Poland and how it functioned must be considered skeptically. Each country’s government observed the Polish political situation carefully, and British and American representatives in particular came to correlate political struggles in Poland with a tendency to be quarrelsome or impractical in the Polish nature. Many of the political struggles in postwar Poland were natural in a democratic society, and at no time did Poland come perilously close to a radical or Bolshevik takeover, as some delegates had suggested it would. Open quarrelling was a feature of politics in the early Second Republic, and it was not inevitable that the quarrelling would dangerously destabilize the country. Even experienced Polish legislators had only served in opposition and thus had little experience of governing, while the rivalry between the National Democrats and Piłsudski’s Polish Socialist Party had long been a defining feature of Polish political culture.34 These factors did not encourage the kinds of emotion-free compromises that the peace­ makers believed were necessary for Poland to face its challenges. Piłsudski’s decision to announce early elections was an admirable sign of a commitment to democracy, but democratic systems can often be riven by conflict, as the United States Senate demonstrated later in 1919 when it failed to ratify the Treaty of Versailles. Britain, France,

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and the United States, however, were global powers deciding the fate of a small, weak country, and they were less interested in comparative discussions about political systems than in ensuring that the postwar European order survived and their objectives were met. Polish history in particular was called upon to support or object to further actions or policies. Different explanations of the partition of Poland supported the arguments of those who argued for Polish territorial claims, and of those who argued against them.

E c o n o m ic S ta bi li ty and A m e r ic a n A id to Poland In The Economic Consequences of the Peace, John Maynard Keynes implied that the peace­makers had not paid enough attention to the economy when crafting the Treaty of Versailles, but Western attitudes about instability in Poland also incorporated understandings about the weakness of Poland’s economy and its potential as a source of general unrest. This section outlines Poland’s economic situation, as the attainment of economic self-sufficiency had emotional and gendered connotations. The First World War era witnessed the development of what Patricia Clavin calls “a wider definition of security” that included economic security.35 Yet how to obtain security through economic strength was debated. One conception, which had gained renewed attention since the late nineteenth century, held that economic security was a zero-sum game in which states and their allies competed against unfriendly countries for trade and resources. A competing argument, which was at the core of Keynes’ book, was that it was in the collective interest of the international community (and Britain in particular) to ensure the economic well-being of all countries.36 The Allied and US governments intervened frequently in Poland’s economy in 1919, chiefly through the American Relief Administration (ara). While Poland’s economic difficulties were largely structural and thus evidently not of the government’s making, the peace­makers understood that it was primarily the Polish government’s responsibility to deal with the problem. The primary economic base of Poland’s accumulated territories in 1919 was agriculture, except in the German partition, where extensive industry had developed.37 Many small farms operated on a subsistence basis, which meant that, particularly in Poland’s more rural eastern territory, there was little evidence of a market economy.38 Some aristocratic landowners also had large estates, though the Sejm

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passed land reform bills in 1919 and 1920 that divided the largest of these.39 Extensive oil deposits in East Galicia had been exploited before the war, though production dropped dramatically after 1911 as supply ran out.40 In addition to industrialized areas in the German partitions, there was some industry in the Russian partition, especially in Łódż, which was known as “Polish Manchester” for its rapid growth from a small settlement to a manufacturing centre. The legacy of the partitions made it difficult to integrate the regions of Poland into an effective national economy. Few rail links had connected the partitions in 1914, because the primary market for each partition had been the imperial centres, which were now closed to Polish goods.41 Moreover, railway lines in Poland’s new territory had varying gauges and rolling stock, and could not be easily integrated.42 Transportation problems thus made the distribution of food and necessary supplies more difficult. Yet these were compounded by the drastic toll that the war had taken on Polish lands. Many cities had been invaded and occupied, and much of the countryside had suffered from requisitioning and severe rationing.43 The government also needed to standardize the economy, from taxation regimes to banking regulations, between the different regions and partitions. Trade suffered because five currencies circulated in Polish territories in 1919. Fluctuations in the value of these currencies also resulted in inequities in exchange. The new Polish mark became the country’s standard currency only in 1921, when the use of other currencies apart from the German mark was outlawed.44 Adding to the confusion, private banks had operated according to quite different regulations under each partition, and in 1919 the Polish government had not yet chosen the amalgam of Russian and German regulations that it used in the interwar period.45 Hyperinflation was a further problem. In 1918, eight Polish marks were worth one US dollar. Inflation rose steadily even before a period of hyperinflation in 1923, when one mark was worth six million dollars, an increase of nearly 750,000 per cent since the end of the war.46 British, French, and American experts documented Poland’s economic challenges in detail, often sympathetically, while the leaders were generally aware that there were challenges.47 The first American relief workers to arrive in Poland quickly spread word about conditions that captured human suffering in emotive terms. This added urgency to the relief effort and recalled the language of suffering that had been used during the wartime Polish relief. In December 1918,

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Hoover sent Walcott to give his opinion of the conditions. Walcott called it a “catastrophe too vast for private relief.”48 Vernon Kellogg, a top deputy of Hoover’s, followed Walcott to Poland and its contested territories in January. “In certain cities the misery is terrible,” he reported. “In Vilna and Lemberg people are dying of starvation.”49 In the ensuing months, other aid workers and diplomats added their testimonials. The inter-Allied mission to Poland, which left Paris in early February 1919, stopped in Łódż before proceeding to Warsaw. This was the mission’s first opportunity to see the conditions in Poland, and its members were shocked. Howard wrote in his diary, “The whole population is apparently out of work, + starvation v[ery] bad. These poor people all cheered us as they left the station.”50 On 17 February, from Warsaw, Howard was taken on a tour of the city. He wrote in his diary that evening that “many have no home their villages having been destroyed.” As mentioned in the previous chapter, he found the sight “heart-breaking.”51 Reports on the ground were commonly brought before the Supreme Economic Council of the peace conference, which began meeting on 8 February 1919. Much of the information came from Polish representatives; a considerable proportion of the Polish delegation to the peace conference focused on economic and financial issues.52 When the delegation started having its reports printed as pamphlets, one of the first, from April 1919, was on the wartime damage to Poland.53 Nearly all of the information that the peace­makers received was dismal. Hoover reported on 21 March, for instance, that Poland had no liquid assets or exportable goods at all.54 In these circumstances, Poland’s situation was often compared with that of other countries in the region. Hoover expected that Czechoslovakia would be the second European country to recover from the pressures of widespread malnourishment, after only Belgium. He also hoped “for the early construction of the Roumanian and other administrations of this character,” but did not mention such hopes for Poland, whose needs were considered to be quantitatively similar to Romania’s but whose economic base was inadequate to meet them.55 These reports, and those of the first diplomats to Poland, also included advice on how the Allied and American governments should act. Most representatives on the ground in Poland suggested that the best way to ameliorate suffering would be with a massive food aid program, such as was simultaneously contemplated for most countries in Europe.56 In a report on 20 January 1919, Colonel William Grove,

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one of the administrators of the planned relief effort, wrote from Poland that “Bolshevism will surely result unless some action is taken” to aid the starving Poles.57 (The knp had said this to Western officials since the end of the war.) The French government also pressured the American government to begin an aid program in Poland, arguing that “it is of the greatest interest to revictual Poland, not only from considerations of humanity but … to combat Bolshevist propaganda.”58 From Warsaw, Howard wrote to Kerr and Lloyd George to make a strong plea for “immediate action,” warning that widespread starvation might cause the government to collapse.59 The economic situation was thus linked with the peace­makers’ fears about the Polish political system. Grove’s official report in July 1919 noted that food distribution proved difficult, especially beyond the cities, because the government was so weak and the people did not trust authority.60 But a greater concern was simply the common conception that hunger created Bolshevism, whereas a well-fed citizen was unlikely to revolt. The point of American aid to Europe, as Hoover wrote to Wilson in April 1919, was “to maintain stability by food.”61 It was widely believed that the Bolshevik Revolution was simply an extreme reaction to the privation faced under tsarist rule during the war. This assumption held that the Bolsheviks would be easily defeated, and underlay the Allied and American intervention in the Russian civil war, one purpose of which was to help the Russians throw off the Bolshevik yoke.62 Both Hoover and Wilson believed that a short influx of food aid would stimulate a desire for “self-help” among the recipient peoples.63 By early June 1919, Hoover believed that having had a short injection of humanitarian aid, Poland and other countries could be self-sufficient “in a few months.”64 The British and French governments also believed that food relief was critical, but they did not have the same resources. Private aid had already been flowing since March 1917; Polish American organizations had been sending money back to Poland through Switzerland, and their activities increased as soon as the war was over.65 In the weeks following the end of the war, the US Red Cross donated 20,000 undergarments and quilts, and a temporary share of food and medicine to the poorly equipped Polish army in Italy, who had been reassigned to an airplane hangar in Milan.66 The United States government began its aid effort in January 1919, first by permitting Polish American organizations and individuals to send money and remittances directly to relatives in Poland.67 But as Jan

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Smulski, a prominent Polish American banker in Chicago, wrote to Paderewski, what needed to be done in Poland was “beyond [the] power of associated or private effort. Governmental action must be secured.”68 The creation of the a r a on 24 February 1919 became the vehicle for this. Of the $100 million originally appropriated for the a r a’s operations, an estimated $63 million went to Poland. This entailed the shipment of hundreds of thousands of tons of grain, clothing, and medical supplies in 1919 to 1920.69 The relief effort focused on feeding children, as this was considered apolitical and did not constitute support for any territorial claims or political agendas.70 The aid effort fed more than one million children a day at its height, while those adults who went hungry could have food packages purchased for them by relatives in the US.71 The aid effort was limited in comparison to the deprivation faced by the Polish people, but it was nonetheless a massive program. In the fall of 1919, the Polish army requested more clothing from the United States. State Department counsellor Frank Polk believed that such an offer should come with a warning that the Polish government was “spending too much on their army,” but “If [the] army [is] not clothed,” he warned, “there is just another dangerous factor in an already highly charged situation. Frankly the chances of a revolution in Poland are very real.”72 From Warsaw, the young American diplomat Hugh Gibson echoed Polk’s warning when the plan dragged on with few results: “With advent of snow and intense cold, suffering has become acute … If we wish to avoid collapse of Poland we must make a great effort to equip these people to resist the sufferings of the next four or five months.”73 As discussed in the previous chapter, Polish representatives had also discussed the importance of certain territories, especially Danzig but also Teschen, East Galicia, and Upper Silesia, for Poland’s economic survival. These arguments resonated with many of the Paris peace­ makers. In April 1919, for instance, Hoover proposed to Wilson that a deal with the Bolsheviks that suspended Russian territorial expansion would give the new democracies in Eastern Europe a “breathing spell to build up some stability” and allow them time to prepare to grow crops in 1920.74 The knp had already requested Western assistance in securing Poland’s vast eastern border to make it possible to send provisions to Poland safely.75 All of Poland’s territorial claims were complex and contentious, and economic arguments were used alongside many others. Feeding children was more easily accomplished,

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and though it was seen as apolitical, if Poland was to survive, then immediate humanitarian aid would certainly help. So too, however, would political unity and good governance, which Poland would need to proceed on the road to economic sustainability.

K e e p in g P a d e r e w s ki i n Power Western concerns with the stability of the Polish government and the economic viability of the country resulted in repeated attempts to ensure that Paderewski remained prime minister. The peace conference acted on numerous occasions to prevent Paderewski’s government from disintegrating. The peace­makers seemed to like Paderewski personally, which dated in part to his wartime activities. His passionate sincerity in support of wartime Polish relief and Poland’s independence had endeared him to politicians and crowds alike. During the war, Paderewski’s flattery (and surely his fame) had won over House, who became the maestro’s best contact in the American government.76 Meanwhile, the British press baron Lord Northcliffe told Paderewski in early April 1919, “My newspapers will be glad to assist you in every way possible.”77 Paderewski’s membership in the k n p   – as well as some rumours about his political connections – had linked him to the National Democrats, but the British, French, and American governments tended to view him as being above party politics.78 It also helped that he communicated his dislike for the National Democrats’ intolerant policies and promoted a more inclusive Poland. At the knp’s founding in 1917, he had pushed for a more representative committee that included Jewish members.79 As the peace conference progressed, Paderewski earned a reputation as perhaps the only Pole whom the peace­makers believed they could trust. As Wilson stated in a meeting of the Council of Four, to no opposition, Paderewski had “played the game straight throughout,” and his government should be supported.80 The leaders also may have felt more comfortable with Paderewski because he was cosmopolitan. Yet his outbursts contravened common emotional norms for Britain, France, and the United States, each of which emphasized restraint, and also coincided with growing concern by these countries about the political and social situation in Poland. Paderewski’s government looked precarious from the start. On 22 January, the first day that the Supreme Council discussed a Polish matter in detail, Lloyd George told his colleagues that “he had no

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doubt of the honourable character of M. Paderewski. But the Poles were not all united, and M. Paderewski was unlikely to maintain complete control of the situation.”81 Arms that Paderewski had requested, he concluded, might not stay in trustworthy hands. The conservative Polish Peasant Party “Piast” won a plurality of seats in the elections of 26 January, while the National Democrats became the second-largest party. Several other parties had significant numbers of seats, but most parties attracted votes in only one of the former partitions.82 Paderewski’s cabinet included elements from across the political spectrum, but overall the Sejm was divided. Paderewski was in a difficult position when the Sejm deputies quickly came to believe that he had compromised too much on important questions like Danzig, Upper Silesia, and the minorities treaties.83 On several occasions, therefore, the peace­makers considered ways of modifying their decisions to help Paderewski’s government survive. In particular, the way in which the peace­makers talked about the Polish prime minister was significant. Their support reflected not only their admiration for the man, but also their fear of instability in the country’s political system and its people. Paderewski burnished his reputation with the peace­makers when he returned to Paris in early April to contest the decision over Danzig. Paderewski advocated for Poland to the Council of Four and the Commission of Polish Affairs, but he was particularly effective in private, where he met frequently with British, French, and American policy makers.84 His interlocutors reported that he used different emotional strategies successfully. Speaking to House and to Gibson, who was about to be named minister to Poland, the Polish prime minister “was moved to tears” when describing the work of American aid workers in Poland.85 Yet while his passionate displays were well known to the Americans, he also showed a serious side. At a dinner that Hoover hosted for Paderewski, Gibson reported that “all the men present were very deeply impressed by the fact that he is really a statesman as well as a musician, which seems to surprise all of them. He talked in a very dispassionate and restrained way about questions that got everybody excited these days.”86 Similarly, he impressed Stevenson when he lunched with her and Lloyd George. “More often one is disappointed when one meets great men who have been greatly praised, but this time the fulfillment was greater than the expectation. He is a really remarkable man.”87 Meanwhile, the French President Poincaré reported in his diary that Paderewski had met with him two

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days before. The Polish premier was more direct and took a position that would have pleased Poincaré: “Paderewski declares that Danzig is indispensable to Poland and complains about the ignorance of Lloyd George.”88 Yet Paderewski’s growing connection with the leaders did not create a correspondingly positive view of Poland. Rather, it seems to have burnished his image but not that of his country or people. Policy makers may, alternately, have seen only his emotionalism as representative of his Polishness. The peace­makers’ view of Paderewski affected, for instance, how they dealt with the intensified conflict in East Galicia in May 1919. Though the leaders did not agree on whether Polish or Ukrainian forces were to blame, all agreed that Paderewski had to remain in charge. Gibson reported on the situation in a telegram that Wilson presented to his colleagues in the Council of Four. In Gibson’s view, Paderewski was doing all he could to fulfil the Allies’ conditions, but he faced substantial opposition in the Sejm and from popular opinion to any measure to restrict the war operations in East Galicia.89 The Sejm had already rejected a motion by Paderewski to suspend military operations in East Galicia in accordance with the wishes of the peace conference, and Paderewski threatened to step down as a result.90 But Gibson warned that not only was Paderewski’s resignation a possibility, his departure would result in “the loss of the strong personal influence which he has wielded on behalf of our ideas.” With Paderewski’s departure, “Chauvinistic” factions would come into control of the government, though Gibson suspected that no one would be able to sustain a majority in the Sejm “in an orderly manner.”91 Gibson was painting the choice as one between Paderewski and disorder. From Paris, the peace­makers soon coalesced around the suggestion that they should support Paderewski’s position in the government – and thus his position against continuing the war in East Galicia – by tying it to food relief. The peace­makers were aware that their powers to influence events were waning as their troops demobilized. One could blame the small nations for defying the wishes of the conference, the British general Henry Wilson wrote, but “the root of evil is that the Paris writ does not run.”92 The provision of aid was where the peace conference did have influence. On 17 May, Lloyd George seconded Robert Cecil’s suggestion that aid only be sent if hostilities ceased, and Wilson noted that Paderewski had a letter from Hoover saying that aid was contingent on him remaining in charge.93 The peace­makers

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also considered halting the return of Polish troops to Poland, but they rejected this in favour of linking aid with an armistice, which they did in a formal letter to Piłsudski dated 19 May.94 “M. Paderewski ought to be supported,” Lloyd George said, “as he was a very honest and loyal man.” Wilson soon added, “it was important not to give even a superficial idea that M. Paderewski was not being supported.”95 The issue was raised again when the fighting continued. In a morning meeting on 21 May, Wilson again raised the idea of stopping food aid to Poland, but then argued against it in another meeting in the afternoon.96 He feared that “if strong action forced the downfall of the Paderewski Government, Poland would turn Bolshevist, as had happened in other cases. As far as he could judge the present temper of the Diet, Poland would become anarchical if any extreme measure should be adopted.” He continued, “Paderewski’s government is like a dike against disorder.”97 The peace conference therefore did not carry out its threat to suspend aid. The Poles and Ukrainians were called before the Council of Four on 26 May, and a week later, the two sides had signed an armistice. Yet the signs were clear that Wilson and Lloyd George, who spoke most often in the debate over East Galicia, trusted only Paderewski to prevent disorder from overtaking Poland and, in an emotionalized turn of phrase, to restrain the “temper” of Polish politics. They were also prepared to back up their trust by intervening in Polish politics with the most effective means at their disposal, food aid. In November 1919, with the Paderewski government in danger of collapse, Poland’s government asked for an emergency grain shipment of 100,000 tons. Its request was granted because, as Lansing wrote, “our Government should do all it can to strengthen Paderewski’s hands and it is quite possible that the fall of his Government may bring about a dangerous situation in Poland.”98 Paderewski soon used the shipment of aid from the United States to assert that he was running the country successfully.99 Similar sentiments came a few weeks later from Rumbold in Warsaw. When the peace conference was preparing to declare publicly in early December that Poland had been granted a twenty-five-year mandate over East Galicia, Rumbold urged his government to delay the announcement. Because the Polish people felt so strongly about control of East Galicia, Rumbold feared that Paderewski’s government would fall if he had to sign a treaty for a mandate and that the result would be a swing to the left and a shortlived, unstable government. “[I]t is not improbable,” he concluded,

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“that it would eventually become necessary to establish some sort of dictatorship.”100 Paderewski’s government had already endured weeks of votes of non-confidence.101 These, too, could be explained with reference to the innate qualities of the Polish people. In a long letter to the Ministère des affaires étrangères in Paris, which was copied to most of France’s European embassies, French representative Eugène Pralon bemoaned Paderewski’s decrease in support as the result of “the extraordinary inconstancy of Polish affections.”102 Paderewski’s government did not survive another week, and Leopold Skulski, an ally of Piłsudski’s, replaced Paderewski as prime minister. While the peace­makers were prepared to support Paderewski through 1919, the concerns of British and American representatives about the threats to Paderewski’s government reflected more general fears about the perceived volatility of the Polish people. Similar fears had shaped the Danzig settlement, as discussed in chapter 4. As Lloyd George remarked when the Council of Four debated its response to the ongoing fighting in East Galicia, “We are told that the Warsaw mob would overwhelm the Paderewski Government if we took strong steps [to force an armistice]. If that were so it showed pretty conclusively that the Poles were quite unfitted to govern themselves.”103 The divisions in Polish politics reflected longstanding fissures as a result of the partitions and the differences between right- and left-wing ideologies, but the peace­makers viewed such conflicts in predominantly negative terms because of their preoccupation with rebuilding Poland. Other governments had quickly established unified leader­ship, Czechoslovakia’s in particular under Masaryk, with Beneš as his loyal supporter, while Poland’s had not.104 The peace­makers were generally concerned that a weak government could collapse and allow a communist takeover, as had happened in Russia in 1917 and then in Hungary in March 1919. They surely also would not have wanted a dictator to stabilize matters, as Admiral Horthy in Hungary did later in 1919 or even like Piłsudski when he seized power in 1926, but fear of a communist takeover was mentioned much more frequently. The result was continued support for Paderewski through 1919.

P ol is h J e w s a n d t h e M i nori ti es Treaty The difficulties of drawing Poland’s borders, as mentioned in the previous chapters, meant that the peace­makers accepted that some communities of Germans, Russians, Ukrainians, Czechs, or Lithuanians in

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contested areas would need to be incorporated into the new Polish state. Yet regardless of Poland’s eventual borders, the country would doubtless include a substantial Jewish minority whose fate increasingly concerned the British and American delegations. In this area as in others, the peace­makers were fuzzy about how much they were interfering in Poland’s governance. “The recognition of ‘national rights’ of the Jews of Poland would have been completely inconsistent with the territorial sovereignty of the state, which is the basis of our whole political system,” wrote Headlam-Morley in the official history of the peace conference.105 Yet the Allied and Associated Powers imposed a separate treaty protecting minorities in Poland, despite Polish government protests. This section will consider how the debate over this treaty affected the peace­ makers’ opinions of Poland and the Polish people.106 In the tenth century, Jews had first settled in the lands that the Polish government claimed in 1919. The settlers endured there and thrived, making this one of the most stable Jewish communities in Europe.107 Jews comprised the majority in many towns in 1919, especially in Vilnius province and in East Galicia, where they were an important part of the commercial and professional classes.108 Some considered themselves to be Poles – even if Catholic Poles did not always agree – but most valued their separate identity.109 Modern anti-­Semitism replaced tolerance, such as it existed, in the late nineteenth century. The pogroms in the Russian Empire in 1881 to 1882 helped to precipitate a rise in anti-­Semitism and encouraged the movement of some Jews westward into Polish-dominated areas.110 At the end of the war, the National Democrats had considerable influence in the Sejm and a broad reach across the country in general. They were well-known to be anti-Semitic, not least because in 1912 Dmowski had ordered a boycott of all Jewish businesses after an unfavourable election result.111 Moreover, the National Democrats planned to assimilate all the peoples who came within Poland’s boundaries at the end of the war. That Jews were often viewed as collaborators with the occupying armies of the Central Powers only increased their fears of what would happen once the war ended.112 So too did perceptions among Poles that Jews in contested regions who declared themselves neutral in armed conflicts were actually antagonistic to the Polish state.113 As with worries about Poles’ tendency to quarrel, even during the war, the British and American governments worried about how a postwar Polish state would treat its Jewish minorities. Dmowski’s

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proximity to power worried Jewish groups, especially since he was initially the main Polish delegate at the peace conference while Paderewski established his government in the early months of 1919.114 The British and American governments appeared open to establishing guarantees of protection for Polish Jews. In November 1918, Louis Marshall, a lawyer and leader in the American Jewish community, urged Wilson to protect the Jews in Polish-controlled territory. Wilson made a public statement later that month that indicated that he would do this.115 Wilson planned to ensure that minorities would be protected under the League charter, but the British and French protested, and the statement was dropped in early February 1919.116 Jewish representatives thus worked with British and American officials behind the scenes to establish minority protections in another form. Reports of a pogrom at Pinsk again raised the issue in Paris of Polish anti-­Semitism. On 5 April 1919, Polish soldiers in Pinsk pulled nearly three dozen Jews from a gathering and executed them in the public square.117 The Polish army claimed it had captured Bolsheviks who were preparing to slaughter the army detachment, while Jewish representatives argued that the victims had been sharing the Passover meal.118 The international reaction to these events was strongest in the United States, where the country’s large and influential Jewish community seized on the attacks as a further reason not to trust Poland’s government. As with the Lemberg pogroms, the first newspaper reports had the highest casualty numbers, and this helped to shape public opinion. The American delegation was slow to act, but the sustained outcry after the Pinsk massacre forced a change in attitude. The culminating event was a huge protest in New York City on 21 May, with hundreds of thousands of people said to be in attendance. The event attracted considerable attention, and the main speakers were William Howard Taft, the former president, and Charles Evans Hughes, Wilson’s opponent in the previous presidential election. This public pressure led the British and American delegations in Paris to consider measures to ensure that future anti-Semitic acts in Poland could be prevented. The leaders first discussed specific minority protections for Poland on 1 May, as mentioned at the start of this book, and Lloyd George and Clemenceau approved Wilson’s proposed Committee on New States to examine laws to protect the minorities of Central and Eastern Europe. That the initiative came just after the Polish Commission’s proposals on Danzig had been reversed to Poland’s disadvantage was unfortunate for the Polish delegation,

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which regarded the potential safeguards as a further reverse, as it did not want international treaties dictating Poland’s internal affairs. Increasingly, Polish representatives believed that the conference had turned against them. The peace­makers’ initial discussions incorporated numerous positive and negative stereotypes about Jews, Poles, and their own peoples, on which they expanded in later meetings. While the eventual Polish minorities treaty did not distinguish between different national minorities, with the exception of two clauses that mentioned Jews specifically, the leaders’ discussion focused mostly on Poland’s Jewish minority and perceptions of Polish anti-­Semitism. Wilson worried that “one of the most dangerous elements of ferment arose from the treatment of the Jews” in Poland.119 He further suggested that many Jews had become Bolsheviks as a result of their historical mistreatment.120 At a plenary meeting on 31 May, he added, “[n]othing … is more likely to disturb the peace of the world” than mistreatment of minorities.121 The leaders compared the Polish situation to others, as they had done in the territorial disputes. Wilson often compared the Polish case with that of Romania to stiffen his colleagues’ resolve.122 When Romania had become an independent state in 1878, the Great Powers had attempted to constrain potential anti-­Semitism by imposing legal restrictions. These proved ineffective, however, and by 1919 Romania also had a reputation as an anti-Semitic state.123 Wilson explained to his colleagues: “in Roumania, by a quibble over the use of the word ‘citizen,’ the Jews had, in effect, been deprived of their rights … any sanction less formal than a Treaty would be read in such a way as to render it useless.”124 Wilson had earlier suggested that “the reason the Jews had caused trouble was because in those countries they were not really welcome citizens.”125 By improving these regulations they could avoid the mistakes of the past. Meanwhile, Lloyd George later suggested that “the proper thing was to do as the Germans were doing, and make an intelligent use of the brains of the Jews,” since “half the German Delegates were Jews,” according to his observations.126 The Committee on New States began its work by considering the situation in lands controlled or claimed by the Polish government. Its report recommended several safeguards to be inserted in a separate treaty between the Allied and Associated governments and Poland, which came to be known as the minorities treaty. While the French delegation remained skeptical that such stipulations were necessary, British and American representatives supported them fully. This

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support reflected several factors, but one of them was an increasing conviction that Poles were very anti-Semitic. It would be important for the Jews of Poland, Wilson noted, “to induce their friends in other countries, such as the United States of America, Great Britain or France” to intercede on their behalf in the League of Nations, because “[d]islike of the Jews in Poland would continue in spite of everything.”127 Lloyd George suggested that as “[t]he Jews, in particular, are very litigious,” and there would be “ceaseless incidents” if they could petition the League directly, but that the peace­makers should not expect that “the treaty will not make anti-­Semitism disappear from Poland overnight.”128 Their perceptions were likely strengthened by the Committee on New States, which cited in its second report “the strong anti-Semitic feeling in Poland which is not denied even by the Poles themselves.”129 One major influence on the British position was an Anglo-Jewish campaign for the rights of Jews in Central and Eastern Europe. Lucien Wolf, who also acted as an advisor for the Conjoint Foreign Committee (c f c ), which advocated for the rights of Jews outside of Britain, secured two clauses that safeguarded the cultural freedom of the Jewish community in Poland.130 These clauses did not recur in any of the other minorities treaties. Unlike American Jewish representatives and many Jews in Britain who favoured a Zionist “national home” in Palestine, Wolf and the cfc lobbied so that Jews could enjoy the same religious, educational, and cultural freedoms in Central and Eastern Europe as they did in Britain.131 Wolf considered his “assimilationist” views to require only a moderate commitment from the peace­makers in comparison to the Zionists’ demands. So did Headlam-Morley, who had Wolf’s assistance in preparing the Polish minorities treaty.132 On 20 May, the Council of Four approved the Committee on New States’ proposed minorities treaty for Poland. The Council of Four sent the proposed terms for the minorities treaty to Paderewski in Warsaw on 23 May, and Paderewski briefly registered Poland’s intentions to protect the rights of all its citizens in the 31 May plenary session.133 His intervention was mild compared with the strong retort by Romania’s Ion Bratianu, which earned a light rebuttal from Clemenceau and a strong one from Wilson.134 Yet the entire discussion further demonstrated what the peace­makers were not thinking about, which demonstrates that the leaders did not think of the Polish settlement solely in rational terms of, for instance, ethnography or sovereignty. While the leaders referenced the Poles’ right to comment on

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the proceedings, which relates to sovereignty, and the existence of minority communities, relating to ethnography, their discussion reads as an attempt to choose the correct course of action based on their understanding of the national characters of two peoples. The minorities treaty, in its discussion in the council and formulation by the experts, was almost entirely an Anglo-American affair. Clemenceau is recorded as saying very little during the discussion of a minorities treaty for Poland, and by the time the Committee on New States had presented its first draft text on 3 May, the French representative had not yet participated in its deliberations.135 French disinterest is worth comparing to the French government’s reaction to reports of pogroms in Lemberg in November 1918, when it sought to dilute any international response. Clemenceau’s near silence in the leaders’ discussion suggests that the French premier did not care to contest the treaty, despite the Polish government’s strong stance against the imposition of any protection for minorities. The inaction of any Polish representatives despite continuing Western concerns about the treatment of Jews is also notable. Pogroms had been occurring throughout Polish-held or claimed territory since November 1918, but the Polish peace conference delegation took no action, despite the uproar over the Lemberg pogroms and the ongoing collaboration between Jewish groups and the US and British delegations. The Polish delegation to the peace conference only established a committee on Jewish concerns on 31 March, after establishing nearly a dozen other committees in previous weeks, covering issues from reparations to each territorial claim.136 There was, moreover, a distinct lack of minority members in Poland’s delegation. Another problem was the clear link between the Polish delegation and the k n p ; the delegation worked out of the k n p ’s offices at first, and the k n p ’s leaders became many of the delegation’s leaders. Dmowski, who was the de facto leader of the delegation before Paderewski’s arrival, bears responsibility for these problems, and his presence concerned the peace­makers. Dmowski later wrote that once Paderewski arrived in Paris, several people suggested that because Lloyd George and Jewish representatives disliked him, he should reduce his role.137 The peace­makers’ decision on the minorities treaty ignored the Polish delegation’s frequent assertion that Poland was really an old state with a long history of tolerating minorities.138 The Polish delegation was furious at the text of the treaty, and on 15 June Paderewski sent a strong letter of protest to the Council of Four. He decried both

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the degree of autonomy granted to the Jews and the indignity of  Poland being “permanently placed under the control of the Powers.”139 Poland needed to be strong so that it could defend itself against future German and Russian aggression, he argued, but outside interference like the minorities treaty weakened it. The peace­makers did adjust some articles as a result of Paderewski’s letter, but Poland signed both the Treaty of Versailles and the minorities treaty as planned. On 28 June, Paderewski signed the Treaty of Versailles for Poland, thus finalizing Poland’s border with Germany. Later the same day, he signed a separate minorities treaty with the Allies and the United States. It was to serve as a template for minorities treaties covering the new states of Central and Eastern Europe and those like Romania and Greece that had gained significant new territories. In the process of preparing the treaty, Allied and American discussions had made particularly frequent reference to stereotypes of national character. Meanwhile, the public outcry in the United States about the situation in Poland led the State Department to ask Gibson to lead an investigation into the alleged pogroms. Gibson did so, but the situation worsened when the congressional committee examining the issue released his confidential reports to the public.140 Gibson wrote frankly and explained the various reasons why Poles and Jews were antagonistic towards each other, but his summaries were sometimes unsympathetic to the Jewish perspective.141 On 2 June, for instance, he wrote, “If a Jew is injured it is called a pogrom. If a Christian is mobbed it is called a food riot.”142 The government turned against Gibson and, after some debate, decided to send an impartial investigatory mission headed by Henry Morgenthau. Morgenthau, who was Jewish, had been the American ambassador to Turkey during the Armenian genocide. Whether the public believed him to be an appropriate representative of the American Jewish community was another matter. American leaders, many of whom perceived Jewish culture as quite alien, preferred that Morgenthau was strongly anti-Zionist and did not identify strongly as Jewish.143 For these same reasons, the majority of the pro-Zionist Jewish movement in Paris and the United States disliked him and immediately demanded that he resign. Morgenthau acquiesced, but Wilson and Hoover convinced him to change his mind. This frustrated the American Jewish representatives in Paris, who included Marshall and US Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis; they sent Felix Frankfurter, a fellow Zionist and later also a Supreme Court justice, to observe Morgenthau’s activities and conduct his own report.

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Morgenthau and his assistants, Homer Johnson and General Edgar Jadwin, visited dozens of cities and towns in Poland in the second half of 1919, collecting depositions in Yiddish and Polish. The Polish authorities expressed disdain for the panel but allowed it to do its work, though they frequently reminded the mission of the July 1919 race riots in the United States and suggested that perhaps the Polish government could mount an investigation into those.144 Morgenthau’s report, which he submitted in October 1919, did not exonerate the Polish people but recognized that initial news reports exaggerated the death count. He was careful not to call the events “pogroms,” noting that “the word is applied to everything from petty outrages to premeditated and carefully organized massacres.”145 Like Gibson, he also expounded on the underlying tensions between Poles and Jews in the country, even though the topic was outside his brief. These tensions were important, he noted, but “it would be … unfair to condemn the Polish nation as a whole for the violence committed by uncontrolled troops or local mobs.”146 Jadwin and Johnson, meanwhile, submitted a separate report the following month exonerating the Polish government. They blamed the fuss on German propagandists instead.147 Morgenthau won acclaim in the American press for his impartial viewpoint, including a ringing endorsement from Marshall.148 Critically, however, the controversy over the pogroms had already died down, and the report was met with muted interest. Yet in the United States, public perceptions of Polish anti-­Semitism remained.149

C o n c l u s io n : In t e g rati ng Forei gn a n d D o m e s t i c I s sues The influence that attitudes had on the peace­makers’ policies regarding Poland’s frontiers and domestic affairs in 1919 can be best illustrated by dividing opinion into two groups. The “large Poland” group advocated that Poland receive all or nearly all of its requested territorial claims, while the “small Poland” group advocated more limited acceptance of those claims. The “large Poland” group – chiefly the Polish and French delegations but also several American and British delegates like Lord and Howard – believed that a large Poland would secure long-term European peace primarily by offering an eastern counterbalance to German aggression in combination with Czechoslovakia and the continued involvement in the region of the victorious Great Powers. As such, Poland should be given the military means to defend

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itself, principally through defensible borders and a large population base. It should also have a sufficient base for economic security, beginning with aid but bolstered by the territory that would ensure its independence from Germany. This meant providing Poland with access to the sea at Danzig, including control of the Vistula and the entire Danzig-Mława-Warsaw railway, control of the rich coal mines and industry of Upper Silesia, and a larger population accruing from control of these and other contested areas. Endowed with economic and military strength and the potential to increase these, Poland would also be able to form an effective barrier against the spread of Bolshevism from Russia. A large Poland would contain a greater number of minorities, the argument went, but considering Poland’s history of tolerance and its leaders’ openness to Western values such as democracy, as evidenced in their opposition to Germany and to Russian Bolshevism, surely such minorities would be better treated in Poland than would Polish minorities in other countries. Finally, should the peace­makers approve Poland’s territorial claims, this would satisfy public opinion in Poland and ensure that the government would not fall, and thus that Poles would not embrace Bolshevism. This general program was based largely on a realist perspective on world affairs but also assumed the fundamental sympathy of the Polish government and people with Western ideals (and Western governments), not only in cooperation with France in particular, but also in respect for minorities and ideological opposition to the twin menaces of Prussian militarism and Russian Bolshevism. This perception that the Polish people were in sympathy with Western ideals had largely persisted from the wartime conception of the Polish people as victims of Germanic oppression and opponents of the Central Powers. So too had the idea that the populace felt strongly about territorial boundaries, sovereignty, and nationality. These perceptions also reflected to a great degree how Polish representatives like Dmowski presented the Polish state. Conversely, some in the British and American delegations resisted this argument for a large Poland. Lloyd George was the most visible member of this group, but his advisors Headlam-Morley, Kerr, and Namier fed him evidence. Wilson, meanwhile, argued forcefully for an independent Danzig and the imposition of the minorities treaty. The security of continental Europe, this group argued, was best served by a smaller Poland that contained only those lands that were “indisputably Polish,” to use the phrase from Wilson’s thirteenth point. A

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smaller Poland would leave fewer minorities in the country; the greatest concern was that, should German-majority populations in Upper Silesia, the Polish Corridor, or Danzig be included in Poland, this would create the conditions for future irredentist wars (another “Alsace-Lorraine,” as the peace­makers often said). It did not help that ethnographic statistics were disputed. A minority view at a conference at which economic views were often overlooked was that a smaller Poland would also provide a more secure basis for European economic reconstruction. If Germany possessed the industry and coal fields of Upper Silesia, it would be better able to make reparations payments and integrate into a re-established European economy. Germany, after all, had possessed one of the world’s strongest economies in 1914.150 Poland, in this conception, would be better off tackling the massive economic and administrative problems that resulted from partition and war. The country would later benefit from increased European trade; Poland did not need to have a defensible border because the League’s power would protect it.151 Some in the British delegation also hoped that a larger Germany would balance French power on the continent. Poland’s claims on territory contested by Lithuanian and Ukrainian governments, moreover, would bring yet more minorities under Polish control, yet Polish wars with Ukrainian forces in East Galicia seeded doubts about how the Polish government would treat minorities. So, too, did pogroms in those territories, as well as concerns about Polish anti-­Semitism, prompting the imposition of the minorities treaty. Finally, the peace­makers were not certain whether a restored “White” Russia would claim some of the territories on Poland’s northern and eastern borders that had been part of the Russian Empire. Limiting Poland’s claims in those areas would, it was believed, forestall possible Russian irredentism. The “small Poland” group did worry about the impact of such proposals on Polish popular opinion. They, too, regarded Polish opinion as rather volatile in general and attempted to focus Polish leaders on easing sources of political quarrelling rather than fighting with their neighbours. Yet the influence of this group over Poland’s leaders, especially Piłsudski, lessened in 1920 as the Russo-Polish War reached its crisis point.

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6 Hoping for Compromise, 1919–21

In early May 1919, Kurjer Warszawski, a newspaper that favoured the National Democrats, published an article that particularly attracted Lewis Namier’s attention. He was continuing his attempt to demonstrate Poland’s imperialistic tendencies to his colleagues, and sent the article to Philip Kerr as evidence that these were deep-rooted. In the article, the Kurjer Warszawski’s correspondent sought to reassure Poles that despite the obstacles facing the Polish delegation in Paris over the peace settlement, there was still reason for optimism: Polish forces had made gains both in Lithuania and East Galicia. “One should not assume,” the correspondent noted, “that here alone in Paris works the diplomatic machine which has a monopoly for carving Europe.”1 The peace­makers’ control over events on the ground was often minimal, despite threats to withdraw food aid or otherwise penalize the offending party because of perceived aggression. As the British, French, and American governments attempted to settle Poland’s borders from 1919 to 1921, their lack of control over events on the ground became most evident during the intense period of the Russo-Polish War in 1920. The central focus of this chapter is on British and French attitudes and policies regarding the Polish government and its conduct of the war. United States government policy will also be considered, but the American government had little involvement. The war was an existential struggle for the Polish state but was not the only territory that the Polish government contested in 1920 to 1921. This chapter will also outline the settlement of the PolishLithuanian border and the Upper Silesian plebiscite. In many respects, British and French attitudes about Poles and Poland reached their culmination during these years, while French

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representatives also frequently expressed concern about impulsive Polish actions, particularly the invasion of Kyiv in April 1920. (The French also defended Poles and Poland against similar concerns raised by the British, particularly in 1921 when they defended Polish actions against Germans before and after the plebiscite.) The irritations between the Western powers and Poland during this period centred on certain emotionalized concepts. Principally, and as at the 1919 peace conference, Britain and France wanted Poland to make compromises, particularly with Russia but also Germany or Lithuania. This would bring about regional order and peace, and the Western powers could then focus on myriad other problems. In the imaginings of British and French (and sometimes American) policy makers, order, peace, and compromise required a denial of those emotions that lead to conflict, such as aggression, pride, or nationalism. In other words, they demanded restraint. These demands were paternalistic (itself an emotionalized concept) and showed how Western policy makers responded to events by analyzing them according to their foreign policy and cultural contexts.

A f t e r t h e T r e at y of Versai lles The Paris Peace Conference had provided an exceptional stage for world politics in the first six months of 1919. The peace conference continued to function until January 1920, but its work took place on a smaller scale after the Treaty of Versailles was signed. Wilson departed for Washington on 29 June 1919 and never returned to Europe, while Lloyd George left most of the negotiating to a series of deputies. Clemenceau remained to lead the French delegation, and some of the experts stayed, but their ranks thinned as each state returned to the business of government after the extraordinary experience of the peace conference. British and French leaders continued to meet in person in 1920, but only in short conferences. The new normal shaped the context of British, French, and American decision-­making regarding Poland. In the first months of 1919, the British, French, and American governments established official representation in the country at the rank of minister: Rumbold for Britain, Pralon and then André de Panafieu for France, and Gibson for the United States.2 These representatives were even-handed observers but generally supported the Polish government’s perspective in their dispatches, noting that Poland was an ally and by its ideological affiliations

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was preferable to an external enemy, in this case the Bolsheviks. Western representatives had the chance to deal with Piłsudski and Paderewski personally and, eventually, with the Polish foreign ministry, which had developed from scratch in November 1918.3 Its representatives lacked formal experience, though many had been involved in the knp or other émigré organizations during the First World War. By the time Stanisław Patek replaced Paderewski as foreign minister in December 1919, Poland had established diplomatic posts in London, Paris, and Washington. Following the establishment of diplomatic relations and representation, British, French, and American firms and individuals began to seek opportunities to invest in Poland. French firms concentrated in coal and also rushed into the oil deposits in East Galicia, which in 1920 already comprised one-quarter of oil imports into France.4 More foreign investment in Poland came from France than any other country in the interwar period.5 British and American firms did not invest heavily in Poland in the period of this study. Meanwhile, the French government loaned Poland one billion German marks in 1920 to facilitate the government’s purchase of German-owned enterprises in Posen. The agreement also, however, allowed for considerable French involvement in the purchases, including a clause specifying that French or Franco-Polish corporations could repurchase these enterprises, presumably the profitable ones.6 Poland was one part of wider French and British involvement in the region. The French government attempted with mixed results to develop a “Little Entente” of states, while British commercial and financial interests established connections particularly in Prague and Budapest in 1920 to 1921.7 The United States government did encourage private American investment in Poland as a corollary to its massive aid program there, but this proceeded slowly until after Piłsudski’s coup in 1926 and his subsequent economic liberalization reforms.8 American firms had done little business in the region before the First World War.9 As the Great Powers debated the Treaty of Versailles in their respective legislatures, many of the arguments about the rebirth of Poland that had predominated during the war and the peace conference were aired in public. The debate was most contentious in the United States.10 Though opposition centred on the American commitment to the League and to European security, many Americans believed that the treaty had been too harsh on Germany, while Republicans chafed at Wilson’s unwillingness to consult them. Upon Wilson’s return to

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the United States in July 1919, he began working to ensure the ratification of the treaty. After several weeks in Washington, he embarked on a cross-country speaking tour. On many occasions, especially in the Midwestern states, where there were many Polish immigrants, he touted the virtues of the Polish settlement. As he proclaimed in a rally in Indianapolis on 4 September, “I have no doubt that in this audience there are many men who come from the ancient stock of Poland, for example, men in whose blood there is the warmth of old affections connected with that betrayed and ruined country, men whose memories run back to insufferable wrongs endured by those living in that country. And I call them to witness that Poland never could have won unity and independence by herself. Those gentlemen sitting at Paris presented Poland with a unity she could not have won and an independence which she cannot defend unless the world guarantees it to her. There is one of the most noble chapters in the history of the world.”11 The British and French governments similarly defended the rebirth of Poland as one of the hallmarks of the peace, though not always with such emotive language as Wilson used. In Britain, Lord Robert Cecil told the House of Commons that “an independent Poland” was one of the territorial matters “on which none of us has any doubt.”12 In France, André Tardieu included the rebirth of Poland first in a list of the beneficial results of the treaty.13 On 25 September 1919, however, “unbearable” headaches after a speech in Pueblo, Colorado, led Wilson to cut his trip short. Six days later, back in Washington, he suffered a stroke that paralyzed his left side.14 He was incapacitated for the rest of the year and never able to fully resume his work as president. In his absence, the Senate voted not to ratify the Treaty of Versailles.15 As Jan Smulski, a Polish American banker and community leader from Chicago, wrote in a 5 January 1920 letter, “There is a feeling that as Americans, we have somehow become so wrapped in our affairs, it is of little moment as to what may happen to the Polish nation.”16 American disinterest could bring problems, since the US government had provided so much aid to Poland, and a weaker League might be an ineffective guarantor of Poland’s borders. (Yet the same disinterest had also meant that Morgenthau’s report into anti-­Semitism received little attention from the American public.) Many of those further disputes continued to be aired in public as part of the debate about the treaty. Keynes’ The Economic Consequences of the Peace, which was published in December 1919,

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exemplifies this. Keynes, who had served as an economic expert in the British delegation before leaving in disgust in early June 1919, argued that the peace settlement did not have a sound basis for returning the European economy to prosperity.17 The book became instantly popular, particularly in Germany and in the English-speaking world. It sold 100,000 copies in six months and was translated into twelve languages.18 In the United States, an opponent of the Treaty of Versailles read from Keynes’ book during the Senate debate over ratifying the treaty.19 Keynes wrote little about Poland, focusing mostly on the FrancoGerman settlement and German reparations, but what he did write was dismissive of the new country and its prospects. “Poland is an economic impossibility with no industry but Jew-baiting,” he asserted, illustrating the connection between Poland’s economic difficulties and perceptions of anti-­Semitism.20 Moreover, Keynes argued that Poland’s territorial ambitions were too great and resulted from France’s desire to control the continent. He deplored the potential loss of Upper Silesia (the plebiscite was still being prepared), which he believed would gravely injure the German economy. “Whereas the Silesian mines are essential to the economic life of Germany, Poland does not need them,” Keynes claimed. “Even without any supply from Upper Silesia and Czecho-Slovakia, Poland could probably meet her requirements by the fuller exploitation of her own coalfields which are not yet scientifically developed.”21 The international debate over the treaty is important because many of the diplomatic problems that had characterized Poland’s first several months of independence remained, though there was less attention to them. The United States, Britain, and Poland carried out investigations of pogroms and anti-­Semitism across Poland. In Paris and at the new League of Nations in Geneva in 1920, lawyers debated the implementation of the Free City of Danzig, while Poland and Czechoslovakia continued to quarrel over the fate of the duchy of Teschen. While German troops officially evacuated their former territories after the Treaty of Versailles went into force on 10 January 1920, Polish authorities shared their fears of another invasion, either officially or by German paramilitaries such as the Freikorps, which had been operating in the Baltic states. The situation in Upper Silesia surged in importance as Polish and German interests clashed in anticipation of the 1921 plebiscite. The war with Russia, which is the principal subject of this chapter, became the government’s overriding

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concern for much of the year. The war with Lithuania was seen as a corollary to this. Finally, the situation in East Galicia, which the leaders had deferred in June 1919, attracted the peace conference’s attention again in the autumn.

E as t G a li ci a Policy makers again connected the East Galicia settlement to concerns about Polish nationalism and the volatility of the Polish people. The context had changed considerably. As one American bemoaned, “the staff of experts is now so small that every one is just struggling and consequently no one has either the heart or the time to really dig into any one subject with the old time enthusiasm.”22 Yet the fault lines remained the same. French delegates argued that Poland should be granted outright control of East Galicia, while British delegates said that it should be autonomous. The British government believed that Poland’s best defence against the Bolsheviks would be an alliance with Anton Denikin, who led an anti-Bolshevik army. Piłsudski agreed with reluctance, but he carried out the British wishes slowly and in the meantime developed contacts with Symon Petliura, leader of a Ukrainian nationalist army. Concern for the fate of the Ukrainians in East Galicia remained central to British policy. Namier, for instance, sent Kerr two articles from 10 July 1919 that reported the beginning of “Polonising” efforts in the region. The Polish government, Namier argued, wanted to settle the land in East Galicia to secure its “Polish character” and to encourage instruction in Polish in the region.23 Lloyd George in particular may have been sensitive about national assimilation, as Welsh had been forbidden in school when he was a child and he had been beaten for using it.24 Kerr wrote to Lord Curzon, at the Foreign Office, on 9 November: “The Prime Minister considers that under no circumstances should Eastern Galicia be annexed to Poland. Its population is two-thirds Ruthenian and it is inevitable that the question of its relations to the Ukraine will some day become acute … Poland which has suffered so cruelly from oppression and from disregard of its national feelings and traditions and which has now won self-­determination practically entirely through the sacrifices of others, now appears bent on denying to another race the rights it has so long demanded for itself.”25 Lloyd George and those around him had become increasingly convinced that the Polish government would not treat minorities fairly.

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Eventually, however, Lloyd George accepted that Polish control over the region was the only option for the interim. He proposed that Poland receive a ten-year mandate, after which time the region’s electorate could determine its future.26 At the peace conference, however, the American, French, and Italian delegations were prepared to give East Galicia to Poland. The members of the Polish Commission – except for the British delegate – agreed that a twenty-five-year mandate would be an acceptable compromise, since it would allow time for generational renewal. The American delegate, still concerned that national rights be respected, supported the idea “as long as this system should give satisfactory results,” with the League being granted the power to intervene if necessary.27 The matter of the length of the mandate was referred to the Council of Heads of Delegations, where Eyre Crowe, the British representative, accepted the idea of a twentyfive-year mandate on 11 November 1919.28 The announcement of the provisional border between Poland and Russia was delayed for weeks. The border, which was intended as a minimum line for Poland, included only indisputably Polish areas. It was based on the Polish commission’s recommendations from mid-April and also corresponded closely with the frontiers of Russia after the third partition of Poland in 1795.29 Rumbold feared the public’s reaction to the peace conference’s decision. He urged Lord Curzon, who was now the foreign secretary, to put off the official announcement “for a few months” out of concern that the news could destabilize Poland. Paderewski had requested this from both Rumbold and Gibson.30 Rumbold argued that publication of the Supreme Council’s decision could “dishearten a portion of the Polish army” and threaten its successful record of fighting the Bolsheviks.31 “Poland has always looked upon Lemberg as the third capital of the country,” Rumbold noted, but because Ukrainians were in the majority and the territory would have universal suffrage, the Polish people believed that they would lose their “third capital” in twenty-five years’ time. He also worried that the news could topple Paderewski’s government.32 The French representative, Pralon, was more sanguine. Though certainly Paderewski’s position was difficult, he wrote, eventually the Polish premier would need to accept the responsibility of relaying the news to the country.33 Paderewski’s requests for additional time were unsuccessful, however, and came too late anyway because the information leaked out on the same day. As one Polish newspaper wrote in the aftermath of the decision, “[t]his in reality decides for us the loss of East Galicia.”34 Paderewski’s government fell within a week.

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In Poland, blame focused on the British government, whose opposition to Polish control of East Galicia had been well publicized.35 The British government in return attempted to mollify the people of Poland, in the process showing how they perceived the Polish people. Rumbold noted that he had attempted to explain “all the arguments” for Britain’s position, but also noted to Curzon that “discounting the tendency of this nation to exaggerate and to get excited,” the people of Poland felt “very strongly” that their country should control East Galicia, especially Lemberg.36 This nonetheless reflected the longstanding stereotype that Poles were passionate by nature, as well as concerns that Polish public opinion was volatile. Michał Sokolnicki, the counsellor of the Polish delegation in London, offered a somewhat different view when he told Headlam-Morley that “the matter was one of those things on which a nation feels intensely.”37 While Rumbold attributed the sensitivity and passion to Polishness, Sokolnicki implied that any group of people would feel disappointed by a similar decision. Rumbold then asked Lloyd George to give the Poles “a pat on the back” to demonstrate Britain’s friendship.38 Despite Rumbold’s concerns about the emotions of the Polish people, it was hoped that building trust between British and Polish leaders would help the situation. Kerr replied that such action was unnecessary and that, regardless of Polish opinion, Lloyd George was “not in the least anti-Polish.”39 As in Danzig and Upper Silesia, Lloyd George feared that if Poland controlled too many minorities, it would create the conditions for future unrest.40 A month later, Kerr further expanded on Lloyd George’s opinions, telling Rumbold that Lloyd George was the only “real friend” that Poland had among world leaders, since he had a “true appreciation” of the long-term dangers of irredentism by Poland’s neighbours.41 Kerr argued that this explained why the prime minister had fought Poland’s “absurd” territorial claims against Germany and Ukraine.42 As it happened, on 22 December the mandate was made indefinite, but bad feeling remained.43

T h e M il ita ry S it uati on i n the R u s s o - P o l is h B orderlands The conference’s 8 December 1919 decision effectively finished with the Polish territorial settlement. The Russo-Polish border was critical for Poland and for Europe, yet discussion of it in Paris, at least at the highest levels, had almost always resulted in prevarication. In Paris, the Polish delegation sought to benefit from the absence of a

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Russian delegation and gain territory at the negotiating table, but the peace­makers had been quite cautious about dividing the territories of the former Russian Empire. “In the discussions everything inevitably leads up to Russia,” Headlam-Morley wrote in his diary. “Then there is a discursive discussion; it is agreed that the point at issue cannot be determined until the general policy towards Russia has been settled; having agreed on this, instead of settling it, they pass on to some other subject.”44 The peace­makers suspected that they needed to prepare for Russia’s eventual resurgence, and thus they should not give away territory that contained an ethnic Russian majority. The committee on Poland’s eastern frontiers noted this in its first meeting as a general principle for guiding its deliberations, while also observing the Allies’ vague pledge to ensure that Russia remained inviolate.45 The Polish minorities treaty recognized that “the Polish State … now in fact exercises sovereignty over those portions of the former Russian Empire which are inhabited by a majority of Poles,” but added no specifications.46 Meanwhile, fighting between Polish and Russian forces had begun during the peace conference and continued for long afterwards. This did not especially concern the peace­makers in Paris, in marked contrast with Poland’s other border skirmishes.47 The Bolsheviks made threatening moves towards the Polish heartland in early 1919 when they took Kyiv and Vilnius, while Poland’s occupation of Eastern Galicia and the seizure of Vilnius in April 1919 set the stage for a future confrontation. For most of 1919, however, both sides were occupied with other problems. The Red Army consolidated the Bolsheviks’ hold on power with successful military campaigns against a variety of enemy groups, including ineffective Allied intervention. Poland’s government, meanwhile, focused on rebuilding and on skirmishes with its other neighbours (though Polish forces continued to advance through the marchlands to the east).48 By the end of 1919, the Bolsheviks had confounded expectations that they would not survive, by defeating most of their enemies. While the British and especially the French governments feared the spread of Bolshevism, they also had reason to advocate peace between Russia and Poland, and to be frustrated when the Polish government did not see it the same way. The British government began to consider reintegrating Russia into the international system to reopen trade. Lloyd George hoped that access to Russian grain would lessen food shortages and lower the high grain prices that resulted from Europe’s dependence on

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the American market.49 In January 1920 the British government ended its blockade of Russia, and in May it began trade talks with Bolshevik representatives in London.50 This generally meant that Poland’s concerns became subordinate to Russia’s, at least for Lloyd George. In autumn 1919, Curzon and especially Winston Churchill had advocated that Britain support Poland militarily. Curzon hoped that Russia – Britain’s longtime rival in South Asia – could be permanently weakened, and Churchill wanted Poland to continue fighting against Bolshevism.51 Lloyd George, however, was not interested in such adventures, and neither were most British politicians, nor the British people. The French government was less interested in accommodating the Bolsheviks. It still hoped, as it had since the Bolshevik Revolution, that it would be able to recoup Russian debts and that French companies could trade in Russia again.52 Yet France was increasingly isolated in this stance when Britain and Italy began to consider opening trade relations. Alexandre Millerand, the new French president, reluctantly agreed to a joint statement in London on 23 February 1920 that the Allied governments would no longer support anti-Bolshevik groups and would encourage trade with Russia.53 The American government, meanwhile, did not recognize the Bolsheviks as the government of Russia until 1933 and instead continued food aid to Russia until 1923 in the hopes of inspiring a popular revolt. The British and French governments had other concerns in 1920 that meant that they preferred a settlement of the Russo-Polish War to contributing supplies or troops to Poland. Britain needed troops to deal with unrest in Ireland, India, Egypt, and Iraq, and so did not contribute divisions to the plebiscite commission in Upper Silesia as planned.54 The British government’s finances were stretched from the war, and there was little appetite for another European conflict as most troops had demobilized.55 Maintaining the security of Poland remained more important for the French government because of its developing system of alliances, but it too had difficulties at home. The French treasury was exhausted from a long and punishing war that had devastated France’s industry in the northeast. Industrial unrest led to a general strike in much of May 1920 and increased concerns of a Bolshevik uprising for a time.56 Other major international crises also required attention. Negotiations with the German government over reparations were ongoing, for instance, while the armies of Kemal Atatürk undermined attempts to finalize the territorial settlement in Anatolia.57

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Furthermore, significant differences remained between British and French aims in Central and Eastern Europe. Following the Versailles treaty, the French government continued to develop its links with the several small states, including Poland, that occupied the territory roughly between Germany and Russia. France wished to use those states to replace Russia as its eastern balance on German power, and increasingly as a cordon sanitaire separating Bolshevik Russia from Germany and the rest of Europe. As a result, the French government sought alliances with those individual countries, concluding one with Poland in 1921.58 France also sought to federate those states in a sort of economic or political union, though these efforts were not always successful and inspired separate negotiations for a “Little Entente” between the governments of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania.59 As mentioned in previous chapters, the French viewed Haller’s Army as a vehicle for strengthening Poland. When the army began arriving in Poland in April 1919, it joined a motley force that was continuing to come together from widely disparate circumstances.60 The socialist government of Lublin and the Regency Council gave Piłsudski control of their respective armed forces on 11 to 12 November 1918, which was a combined force in the tens of thousands.61 Other experienced soldiers joined later; Polish units formed during the First World War slowly returned from the Balkans, Murmansk, and Siberia, while individual soldiers crossed Russian lines into Poland.62 The government also introduced conscription in March 1919, while regional authorities in Kraków had drafted citizens three months earlier. The peace­makers in Paris, however, received widely different understandings of the Polish government’s manpower. In February 1919, the inter-Allied mission estimated that the Polish government controlled about 105,000 troops.63 The previous month, however, Paderewski had asked for enough munitions for an army of 600,000 to 800,000.64 In the disorganization that prevailed, it was hard to say for certain.65 What was less evident, at least to Western leaders if not to the military representatives that they sent to Warsaw, was that pro-National Democrat and pro-Piłsudski soldiers formed rival camps. This rivalry had already led to fighting within Polish units in 1917 and 1918, and would emerge again in the summer of 1920.66 Western representatives were aware of these tensions, which are important to note in the context of complaints about Polish disorganization. These forces, moreover, had inconsistent training and insufficient supplies, and required central organization. While Haller’s Army and

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those soldiers who had previously served in German units were well equipped and well trained, those from the Russian and to some extent the Austrian imperial armies were inferior.67 While the Polish government spent much of its budget on defence, it was still not able to remedy these problems at once. In Paris, Foch mentioned these problems frequently. Poland “had no bases, no outlets, no communications, no supplies, no army,” he told the Supreme Council on 22 January.68 The partitioning powers had been careful not to establish armaments factories in their Polish territories, so the new state did not possess domestic armaments manufacturing before 1920.69 Lack of armaments plagued the Polish army until the end of the war with Russia. Other basic necessities were also in short supply; in February 1919 the inter-Allied mission gave alarming reports of Polish soldiers without proper clothing for winter weather.70 Foch, Howard, and others such as Churchill argued that the aid that Britain and France were sending was insufficient.71 With few arms and little material supplied by their Western allies, therefore, the Polish army relied mostly on old equipment in the war with the Bolsheviks.72 As mentioned in the previous chapter, both Lloyd George and Foch criticized the Polish army’s organization and, implicitly, Polish administrative ability. As a result, the peace conference sent General Paul Henrys to Poland with hundreds of officers, including a young Charles de Gaulle. This was initially to train the Polish army, but the French military mission became the crux of extensive Franco-Polish military cooperation that preceded the formal military convention of March 1921.73 They also became a vehicle for further criticism. The mission opened an officers’ school, which was soon a success, and reviewed Polish troops and installations, which were usually found wanting.74 De Gaulle criticized the “chaotic operation” of the Polish army, which operated “without any method,” while army officials complained continuously that Polish officers were uninterested in their help.75 The mission also reported to its superiors not only on military matters but also on Polish diplomacy and public opinion. It became an important conduit for communication with the Polish government and military, in particular in 1920 as the Polish minister of war, General Kazimierz Sosnkowski, asked repeatedly for more arms and munitions for the fight against Russia. Henrys forwarded these requests with approval. He emphasized his support for Poland’s position in several dispatches, often referring to Poland’s historical links with and present sympathy for France.76 This examination of the military situation

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illustrates the various roles that emotions played in the diplomacy of Poland’s rebirth. Poland was often blamed for disorganization and chaos, regardless of the government’s capacity to address those issues immediately, and this blame carried connotations of unrestrained emotion when the reality was more complicated. Henrys’ personal role also, however, demonstrated the strengthening bond between the French and Polish militaries.

T h e R u s s o - P o l is h War i n 1920 At the beginning of 1920, British, French, and American diplomatic representatives in Poland were not as positive as Henrys. Economic conditions – the consistent concern of the Americans – remained dismal. As Gibson noted in a long report, the Polish people were poor and dispirited. With a food shortage expected in two months, Allied support shaky at best, and inflation rampant, “civil war” or defeat loomed. “It may be too late,” Gibson concluded, “to put them on their feet with enough energy to withstand a determined Bolshevist [attack] either from within or without.”77 The new Skulski government had parliamentary support but little experience, Pralon reported to the French government.78 The “intransigent” National Democrats had taken down Paderewski and were squabbling internally, he noted in another dispatch. “Public opinion,” he added, “is more and more won over by the idea that General Piłsudski is Poland’s only statesman.”79 Officials who sympathized with Poland’s plight believed that its people would meet their challenges. “Many Poles are discouraged in the face of the immensity of the task to be accomplished,” reported a demobilized French soldier who had just returned from Warsaw. “Many French, rapidly disillusioned, proclaim the collapse of Poland. I do not believe that there is cause to despair.”80 “This is an overview from an excellent observer, certainly impartial,” wrote one official, who recommended that his superiors begin reading from the optimistic passage. It was distributed widely among French foreign policy makers.81 While French reports continued to indicate that Polish forces were keeping the Bolsheviks at bay and even advancing, peace negotiations between Poland and Russia started less successfully. The Bolsheviks and the Polish government had been talking privately since autumn 1919.82 Meanwhile, both the British and French governments hoped to delineate the Russo-Polish border definitively, viewing the 8 December line as provisional. The British government continued its

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attempt to ensure that Poland did not seek territories beyond the 8 December line. On 26 January 1920, Lloyd George met with Patek in London and demanded that Poland make peace with Bolshevik Russia. Peace was in Poland’s interest, Lloyd George argued, since Poland was the Bolsheviks’ only remaining opponent.83 (Lloyd George was not considering General Wrangel, whose forces continued to battle the Bolsheviks throughout 1920.) Moreover, Lloyd George insisted that the Polish government needed to make a genuine effort to come to “fair terms” with the Bolsheviks. This meant ceding those territorial gains that were “far beyond the racial boundary.” Should the Polish government refuse to do so, Lloyd George asserted that British public opinion would not support a war with the Bolsheviks on Poland’s behalf.84 This remained the British government’s position throughout 1920. When Lloyd George later discussed the meeting with the cabinet, however, it was concluded that “we have neither the men, the money, nor the credit” to fight the Bolsheviks, “and public opinion is altogether opposed,” but the government would “continue our policy of giving material support to enable the Border states to defend themselves if attacked by the Bolsheviks.”85 On 28 January 1920, Polish-Soviet negotiations entered the realm of public diplomacy when the Bolsheviks extended a peace offer.86 The Bolsheviks had won respect in some corners of international public opinion for publishing the secret treaties and the proceedings of their peace negotiations with Germany, and again attempted to use public opinion to their advantage in negotiations with the Polish government. The British government expected that Lloyd George’s stance would convince the Polish government to make peace with the Bolsheviks, though Rumbold wrote privately that the Bolsheviks’ offer was motivated by “something rotten in [the Bolshevik] state, unless, of course, they are laying a trap for the Poles.”87 Patek and the Polish government wanted to negotiate, but Piłsudski, who controlled foreign policy, remained suspicious.88 The Polish government’s early experiences of negotiating had taught it that the Bolsheviks were “devoid of any honour or scruples” and might break an agreement if it suited them, Rumbold wrote.89 The government also feared that if the Bolsheviks were overthrown, the regime that replaced them might not honour any prior agreements.90 The Bolsheviks rejected the Polish government’s counteroffer as too severe and, since they considered the exchange a public relations victory, felt no need to continue to negotiate.91 The Polish government, however, had little experience

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with public diplomacy and handled the exchange awkwardly. Its apparent unwillingness to negotiate contributed to the perception that it still retained expansionist aims. The Polish government’s lack of concern about international opinion regarding its policies may have passed with little comment had subsequent events not continued to establish a perception of Polish imperialism. In April 1920, with the Bolsheviks preparing to strike on Poland’s northern frontier, Piłsudski led a surprise offensive towards Kyiv. He intended to stop eight miles west the city, but the Red Army withdrew on 6 May and he decided to press the advantage. The stunning victory cheered the Polish people and was intended to be a strategic masterstroke that would allow Piłsudski to focus on the assault from the north with his eastern flank secure.92 He also intended to station some of his troops there to support the creation of a Ukrainian People’s Republic alongside the troops of its leader, Petliura.93 Instead, the seizure of Kyiv was a major miscalculation that underestimated the importance of public opinion in Russia and the rest of the world. Lenin and Leon Trotsky used the Polish offensive to rally their people, claiming that the Polish army had provocatively seized historically Russian territory. With renewed support from the flagging populace, the Red Army counterattacked fiercely on 26 May, and by 5 June it had forced the Polish army to retreat from Kyiv. Allied and American leaders condemned the seizure of Kyiv. To them, this was another example of the Polish government’s inability to restrain its hunger for territory. This attitude persisted for the rest of 1920. Poland was “a danger to Europe,” Lloyd George said privately.94 American intervention, meanwhile, was already unlikely. Since the Senate rejected the Treaty of Versailles on 19 November 1919, the United States government had retreated rapidly from European politics. American diplomats and politicians had already come to view the Polish government as imperialistic, and the invasion of Kyiv seemed to confirm this view. As Wilson stated in a 27 September 1920 interview, “The Poles are too impetuous. My natural sympathy is all with the Poles but by invading Russian territory, the Poles give Lenine [sic] and Trotsky their greatest possible strength.”95 The British and American governments still believed that the best settlement of the Russo-Polish frontier would be the “ethnographic” line established on 8 December 1919. The French government’s response came later, but it, too, criticized Piłsudski’s advance. France had previously supported Poland’s claims to territories beyond the 8 December line, but

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6.1  Józef Piłsudski inspecting the troops, c. 1919

never as far as Kyiv.96 Millerand told Panafieu to tell the Polish government to restrain itself. “We desire a strong Poland,” Millerand wrote. “That is why we caution it against all adventurous policy that … makes its existence precarious.”97 Criticisms of Poland’s actions in the war with Russia in 1920 increasingly focused on Piłsudski, conflating his policies with the actions of the Polish state and the characteristics of the Polish people. Historians have often asserted that the British and American governments always mistrusted Piłsudski, largely as a result of the k n p ’s propaganda campaign during the First World War.98 Yet Piłsudski’s image with Western governments had been partly rehabilitated at the Paris Peace Conference. The peace­makers were impressed with Piłsudski’s popularity, an impression repeated throughout the RussoPolish War. Piłsudski began his career in the 1890s as a socialist revolutionary who fought against tsarist Russia, though he had moderated his methods by the time he came to power.99 His revolutionary past and his heroic refusal to take the Central Powers’ oath of loyalty in 1917 meant that he had, in effect, struggled against each of the partitioning powers, which contributed to his broad popularity with the Polish public and earned respect in the West.100 Both the Foreign Office and the Quai d’Orsay commented favourably when Piłsudski

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refused the oath and noted the “violent outbursts at Warsaw and throughout the country” after the German authorities arrested him.101 Dmowski had informed the Supreme Council in January 1919 that the majority of people throughout the new country were “against” Piłsudski’s new government, but Western diplomats and politicians often commented on the chief of state’s popularity.102 Piłsudski’s image also improved because he captivated many of the Western diplomats who met him. Howard’s first impression was that Piłsudski had “an extremely interesting and fascinating personality.”103 Rumbold, who had a more critical eye about Polish matters than Howard, believed Piłsudski to be “the biggest man in this part of Europe.”104 Even Namier, though he later criticized Piłsudski’s imperialistic policies, commented admiringly on “his absolutely magnificent energy and daring.”105 Namier, like many Poles, had idolized Piłsudski the dashing revolutionary as a boy.106 Nevertheless, there were also concerns about the popular hero. Lloyd George had called Piłsudski “an idealist without any practical ideas.”107 These criticisms and others returned when the Russo-Polish War turned in the Bolsheviks’ favour. Throughout 1920, Lloyd George suggested repeatedly that British popular opinion would not support a war against Russia on behalf of Poland. This concern was borne out when in May 1920, London dockworkers refused to load munitions onto the S S Jolly George on suspicion that the munitions were bound for Poland. The workers’ stand created a political storm, and on 17 May the government house leader, Andrew Bonar Law, was forced to admit publicly that the British government was supplying the Polish war effort.108 It was a major embarrassment for the government, since on 6 May Bonar Law had said precisely the opposite.109 It also boosted the “Hands Off Russia” campaign, which sought to convince British leaders to cease any intervention in Russia.110 Similar campaigns resulted in supplies for the Polish army being embargoed in a Belgian port and on rail through Czechoslovakia. Some workers’ representatives in Britain called for a day of industrial action in support of the campaign, and in August 1920 numerous local “Councils of Action” were formed to ensure that the government did not intervene in the Russo-Polish conflict. These calls met with a lukewarm response, and such support as existed was probably motivated by ideological sympathy for the Bolsheviks and an unwillingness to be sent off to another European war.111 The workers showed little antipathy towards Poles or Poland specifically, though evidently they did not believe the Polish cause

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worthy of sacrifice. As such, they provided an additional reason for Lloyd George’s caution about a more active intervention in the Russo-Polish conflict. Days before the Bolsheviks recaptured Kyiv, Lloyd George predicted a general Polish defeat. “It would do them good,” he told Baron George Riddell, a newspaper proprietor and close confidant, “as they have become swollen-headed.”112 Kerr then told Rumbold that the prime minister believed that “the Poles have put themselves in the wrong … by plunging madly into conquest and adventure in non-­ Polish areas instead of trying to make peace.”113 Rumbold duly relayed the message to the Polish government. He also attempted to explain that Poland’s position was “comparable with that of a man inhabiting a house in which some dangerous snake or person with a very infectious disease occupies a room next to his.”114 His words had little effect, however, as Kerr wrote a fortnight later saying that Lloyd George believed the Polish government to be “short sighted” and would only consider an “ethnographic” Poland, not “the sort of peace terms which the Poles themselves contemplate.”115 Lloyd George’s actions at this point show that he was firmly convinced that the lands east of the 8 December line were not ethnographically Polish, that the Polish government would not abandon its imperialistic claims on those territories unless forced to do so by outside powers or defeat, and that the Polish government’s policy had invited the war with Russia. This represents a continuation of both Lloyd George’s attitude and position at the Paris Peace Conference. Furthermore, Lloyd George and Kerr echoed their longstanding view by depicting “the Poles” as driven by their desires rather than restraining themselves for the long-term benefit of making peace. The French government may not have been too critical of Piłsudski’s invasion of Kyiv, but the latest ministerial crisis in the Polish Sejm inspired harsh criticism of Polish politicians for infighting in the face of danger. On 10 June, Skulski’s cabinet resigned, and it took two weeks until a new governing coalition formed under Władysław Grabski, who had previously been finance minister. The crisis has happened at a particularly “unfavourable” time, Panafieu wrote in a letter to Paris that was widely distributed throughout the foreign ministry. The war against Russia was now going poorly, and it seemed likely that Germany would win control of all of the plebiscite areas contested with Poland. “It would seem that knowledge of the gravity of the moment would dictate to Poland’s representatives in the Diet …

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to understand the necessity of national union to support a coalition government,” he wrote. “On the contrary, the dangers of the present hour seem to strengthen the natural tendency not to depart from an intransigent attitude.”116 Panafieu’s criticism resembled comments that British and American policy makers in Paris had previously made. It also demonstrates the difference between the French, who were critical of Poles but had usually supported the government’s position, and the British, who were critical of Poles and usually tried to limit the Polish government’s actions. When the new government formed, Panafieu was hardly more complimentary. He described Grabski as someone “on whose shoulders weighs such a heavy burden and who possesses real merit has clearly proven [that] he does not possess nearly any of the qualities necessary for a Head of Government.” Yet, Panafieu argued, Grabski was “infinitely superior to his entourage. Prince Sapieha [the new foreign minister], indeed, would doubtless surprise even his best friends if he brought from London the elements of a policy capable of triumphing over the multiple external difficulties that face Poland.”117 Panafieu predicted that the ministry would only be “provisional,” given the constant battles between Polish political parties about which he had complained extensively.118 He was correct; Grabski’s ministry lasted only a month. Wincenty Witos, the leader of the Peasant Party, became Poland’s fourth prime minister, with the socialist Daszynski as his deputy prime minister. It is difficult to know for certain whether Millerand read Panafieu’s dispatches, though they were sent to him as minister of foreign affairs and to his office as premier. But the wide distribution afforded to Panafieu’s dispatches suggests that the Quai d’Orsay viewed them as the government’s view. Millerand, meanwhile, would soon repeat the general themes of Panafieu’s assertions in conference with Lloyd George. Panafieu’s attitudes about Polish aggression and quarrelling, which Lloyd George and others in the British delegation had raised for more than a year, increasingly pervaded Allied policy generally. They, too, imply criticism that the Poles were entertaining their emotional impulses and could not make the pragmatic compromises necessary to stabilize their political situation. Meanwhile, the Bolsheviks advanced rapidly against the increasingly disorganized Polish forces, and by early July they were within striking distance of Warsaw. The Allies observed Poland’s retreat but waited to see if the Polish government would request their aid.119 It eventually did so at the Spa Conference on 9 to 10 July, at which the new

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National Democrat prime minister, Grabski, signed an agreement that essentially conceded to British demands.120 At Lloyd George’s urging, the Polish army was to withdraw to the “ethnographic” frontier established at the Paris Peace Conference on 8 December 1919. In some places, this meant a retreat of 150 to 200 kilometres.121 Polish forces would respect armistice lines surrounded by a buffer zone and attend peace negotiations in London. Grabski also agreed to attend a general peace conference in London to which Soviet Russia was also invited. The Polish government had wanted to control its negotiations with the Bolsheviks and had in the past dismissed these and similar terms as unworkable. On the same day, a separate note to Georgy Chicherin, the Soviet commissar for foreign affairs, outlined a variant of the 8 December line that also put Lemberg and much of East Galicia outside Poland, even though this region had never been Russian territory.122 The note was under Curzon’s name (though Kerr likely wrote it), and the border it proposed is now known as the Curzon Line.123 In Warsaw, Patek told Rumbold that the terms amounted to “capitulation.”124 In return for these concessions, the Allies pledged to send much-needed military assistance if the Bolsheviks proved unwilling to negotiate. The general peace conference had been Lloyd George’s idea, which he pursued for the next several weeks.125 The Polish government quickly requested an armistice, as they had promised at Spa, but the Bolsheviks delayed, hoping that victory on the battlefield would make the question irrelevant. Chicherin’s eventual reply to Lloyd George contained conditions so unpalatable that Lloyd George threatened to renew the blockade of Russia.126 Eventually the Polish government and the Bolsheviks agreed to hold separate peace talks in Minsk in mid-August. Though the United States government was not a signatory of the Spa agreement, it nonetheless supported the Curzon Line because it represented the ethnographic limits of Poland. Official and public opinion in Washington had turned against Poland following the seizure of Kyiv, and this was reflected in policy.127 In a note that was printed in the press, Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby told the Italian government on 10 August that the United States hoped “that the territorial integrity and true boundaries of Russia shall be respected. These boundaries shall properly include the whole of the former Russian Empire, with the exception of Finland proper, and ethnic Poland.”128 This support for an ethnographic Poland was consistent with the thirteenth point and Wilson’s position throughout the Paris Peace

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Conference. Unlike Britain and France, the United States provided no assurances of military assistance should Warsaw fall. As Colby wrote to the US ambassador in London, “We do not see what other aid can be given,” considering what had already been loaned to Poland.129 American food aid continued despite the oncoming Bolshevik army, partly because American relief workers were willing to risk their safety. Should the Bolsheviks take over ethnic Poland, Hoover instructed the relief workers, “it would be [a] fine thing if some of our men would remain with [the] Poles and continue to carry on Childfeeding [sic].” “I don’t know of any service they could perform,” he continued, “that would be finer and more wonderful character.”130 The relief workers even negotiated their continued presence with the Bolsheviks, who favoured the idea.131 These actions signified that while the conditions had changed considerably since the end of the First World War, the general contours of American policy had remained the same: the American government and private organizations supported Poland internally by stabilizing material conditions there, but disapproved of Polish external policy that involved going beyond the new state’s ethnographic frontiers. Later in July, the British and French governments sent a joint mission to persuade the Polish government to complete an armistice with the Bolsheviks. With the Bolsheviks seemingly uninterested in negotiations, however, the Allies again considered providing additional military assistance. The British contingent, led by Lord D’Abernon, General Percy de B. Radcliffe, and Sir Maurice Hankey, attempted to assess the readiness of Polish forces to face the expected Bolshevik assault on Warsaw.132 Hankey, who had worked closely with Lloyd George, returned to London after six days in Poland. His report to Parliament implied that Poland had little chance of defeating the Red Army. “The Polish Government are sincerely anxious to have peace,” he wrote, but the army was “demoralised” and “widely scattered” after their long retreat. The French military mission came to similar conclusions: “It seems,” concluded a French commandant, “that the success of the Bolsheviks is in large part [due] to the Poles’ absolute lack of resistance.”133 Hankey also worried that because the Poles “as a nation … are unaccustomed to look facts in the face,” delusions of grandeur could lead them to propose unacceptable peace conditions.134 The public, Panafieu observed critically, appeared “optimistic and carefree, which is the characteristic of Slavic spirits.” They were, he added, “cradling illusory hopes, no doubt in order to not worry too much

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about the realities that are making them suddenly descend from the heights of a megalomaniacal ambition.”135 These conclusions matched earlier British and French observations that Poles were unable or unwilling to restrain their impulses and do what the Western powers believed was in their best interest. If the Polish government could not achieve a peace agreement with the Bolsheviks, it seemed likely to the British and French that the Polish army would be defeated. In addition to problems of morale, the army was also short on munitions, as German dockworkers had held up a shipment in Danzig, and there was trouble in Posen, where Dmowski was drumming up local autonomist sentiment in an apparent attempt to topple Piłsudski, with troops refusing to engage with protesters.136 In such a dismal situation, Hankey concluded that the defence of Poland was not worth the lives of British troops.137 It is possible that Lloyd George knew that Hankey would argue against intervention or indeed had instructed him to do so.138 Hankey was also prejudiced; he had told Lloyd George before the trip that he had “both dislike and contempt for the Poles,” and he was “doubtful if they are worth saving.”139 Regardless, his report signifies that the British government remained uninterested in further involvement in the Russo-Polish War. In the face of looming Polish defeat, Lloyd George, Millerand, and a few of their advisors met at Lympne, in Kent, for emergency discussions on 8 to 9 August. “There appeared to be little prospect of saving the situation,” Lloyd George began in the first meeting. “It was impossible to defend Warsaw, and there was the danger that the Bolsheviks might reach the German frontier.”140 Both leaders agreed that something needed to be done. As Millerand argued, “the defence of Poland was in reality the defence of the peace of Europe, and – as Mr. Lloyd George had said – it was essential to prevent the loss of the fruits of victory as enunciated in the Treaty of Versailles.”141 A Red Army victory might provide Bolshevik leaders with a “bridge” to the rest of Europe and especially the connection with Germany that had concerned the peace­makers in 1919. Millerand also worried that the German government might take the opportunity to seize territory in Western Poland and thus undermine the peace settlement. Meanwhile, the governments of many smaller states had declared neutrality in the conflict. Czechoslovakia, for instance, was unwilling to permit troops and munitions to travel to Poland through its territory for fear that this would cause internal crisis because of communist agitation.142

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Millerand and Lloyd George concluded that their governments had few means to aid a Polish victory. They quickly agreed that additional munitions should be sent to the Polish army, but further measures would be more difficult to implement. In particular, it was impossible to send troops, as public opinion would not support it.143 Should the Red Army continue to advance without attempting to negotiate further, the British navy could reimpose the blockade of Russia with French assistance, and the British government discontinue its trade negotiations with Bolshevik representatives in London. Though the Bolsheviks were “quite untrustworthy,” the leaders hoped that these measures would induce them to negotiate. As Lloyd George put it, “[t]he only way in which one could get the respect of a highwayman was by holding a pistol at his head.”144 The conditions that Allied leaders placed on their assistance to Poland demonstrate the extent to which their attitudes affected how they framed the situation. As Foch asserted, British and French intervention was necessary “not on account of any love … for the Poles … but it was because it was essential to constitute a buffer State in order to combat Bolshevism and to prevent a union of Germany and Russia.”145 Churchill had made the same point in the London press just before the summit at Lympne.146 The eventual product of the meetings, a joint declaration to the Polish government, stated that Poland should try to conclude an armistice at the forthcoming Russo-Polish conference at Minsk. Should the Polish government reject terms that threatened Poland’s “legitimate independence,” the Allies would supply assistance, but on conditions: that the Polish government declare its intention to fight to the end, appoint a separate commander-in-chief, and “accept and act upon” military advice from the Allies.147 These conditions reflected the Allies’ specific concerns about Piłsudski. Reports indicated that Piłsudski had been ignoring advice from French officers, including General Maxime Weygand, the head of the mission.148 “Piłsudski’s attitude was one of treachery,” Millerand declared, and the leaders worried that he might make peace with the Bolsheviks, even promise to “Sovietise” Poland, to stay in power.149 The Allied leaders wanted to replace him, but since they assumed he was too popular to be directly removed, they suggested that he choose between his functions as chief of state and commander-in-chief.150 Other criticisms of the war were made in general terms that likely also included Piłsudski but provided for broader censure, at least of the government’s attitude. “Practically all the present trouble had been

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brought on Poland by the Poles’ own actions,” Lloyd George declared, an opinion which Curzon later echoed to Rumbold.151 Finally, criticisms were also made about the attitude of the Polish army and citizenry. “The trouble was,” Millerand asserted, “that the Poles could not be trusted … [and] were putting up no resistance at all.”152 He had earlier claimed that “it was hardly possible to deal seriously … [not only] with the Polish Government, but with the Poles themselves.”153 In Warsaw, Weygand’s attempts to provide leader­ship were only partly successful.154 On 6 August, he presented a defence plan to Piłsudski that involved falling back and abandoning the Vistula. Piłsudski rejected it and adopted his own offensive plan instead. But within days Piłsudski was busy in the field and neglecting the responsibilities of overall command. The command was thus offered twice to Weygand, on 10 and 13 August, perhaps as a result of the Allies’ note, though he refused it on both occasions. Plans for a Minsk peace conference, an Allied intervention, or Weygand’s control of the Polish forces soon became unimportant. On 16 August, Piłsudski ordered the counterattack group with which he had been ensconced to move against the Russian troops. The manoeuvre caught the Russians off guard; the Polish cavalry encircled the Bolshevik forces and scattered them. For the next several weeks, the revitalized Polish army continued to force the Russian retreat. The Polish victory at the Battle of Warsaw stunned British and French observers, who had been expecting defeat. Piłsudski, whose prestige had fallen precipitously during the crisis, now enjoyed vast popularity in Poland.155 While Western observers were relieved that the Bolshevik danger had passed, it soon became clear that, as Kerr wrote to Lloyd George, “both the Poles and the Russians will follow their own lines and will not accept the direction of the Allies.”156 The increasing ­consensus in Britain, France, and the United States that the Polish government retained aggressive and imperialistic aims had led those countries to attempt to restrain it. As Poland avoided defeat, its government could continue to disregard Western opinion and determine the border with Russia without outside interference. The proposed Minsk negotiations were abandoned, and Russian and Polish negotiators reconvened at Riga on 19 September. Both sides now wanted a settlement. The Bolsheviks needed peace so that they could appease the Russian people, who were restless from years of civil war. The Polish government still hoped to attain the borders it had claimed at the Paris Peace Conference, but sought to moderate its demands somewhat because it knew that Western opinion would

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oppose a draconian peace.157 The Bolsheviks, however, knew that the Polish army had the advantage on the battlefield and Piłsudski might be more comfortable pressing the advantage than negotiating. The Polish army continued its advance during the talks, and the Red Army offered little resistance.158 Polish political parties had even stopped the public airing of their grievances, Panafieu reported in surprise to his superiors.159 He expected partisan quarrelling to resume soon, which it did once Poland and Russia signed an armistice at Riga on 10 October. For the next few months, the two sides haggled over the details of their agreement. The Polish government wanted the return of prisoners of war and Polish treasures, as well as a share of imperial Russia’s gold.160 The difficulties were sorted by early 1921, and on 18 March the Bolsheviks and the Polish government signed the Treaty of Riga, which confirmed Poland’s vast border with Russia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The treaty confirmed the Polish government’s control of most of Poland’s historical territories, but it also meant that minorities comprised one-third of the country’s population in the interwar period.161 The Allies protested and only approved Poland’s borders with Russia and Lithuania on 15 March 1923, but their influence over the process had been minimal. Following a major victory against the Bolsheviks at the Battle of Niemen River, Polish General Lucjan Żeligowski staged a mutiny in Vilnius on 9 October 1920 and claimed the city and surrounding region for Poland. This was even though Sapieha had repeatedly guaranteed that Poland did not intend to seize Vilnius – a guarantee that was ignored after the victory over Russia. The Polish minister in Berlin told his French counterpart that Polish public opinion would never stand for giving up the city again.162 The annexation was further evidence that Poland took little consideration of Western governments at this point. Connecting the seizure of Vilnius to the Italian seizure of Fiume several months earlier, Panafieu suggested that the government “does not seem to be overly concerned about the solution à la D’Annunzio [the Italian ultranationalist].”163 The Polish and Bolshevik delegations agreed in principle to the terms of their treaty the day after the seizure of Vilnius, with the Russians agreeing on 12 October not to interfere in the Lithuanian-Polish dispute.164 While Panafieu doubted whether the Polish action was diploma­ tically wise, the French military mission was more supportive. Throughout 1920, its members had sent a series of reports to the government in Paris that alleged cooperation between the Lithuanian

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government and the Bolsheviks. This followed the Polish government’s allegations that the movement of Bolshevik troops into Lithuania signified an entente between the Bolsheviks and the Lithuanians against Poland. General Henrys, who was usually sympathetic to the Polish viewpoint, suggested that the likelihood was that there was some informal or even formal coordination between the two sides.165 In December 1920, the mission’s new head, General Henri Niessel, reported that a reliable source had told them that the Lithuanian government had seriously considered a Bolshevik offer to assist in the expulsion of Polish forces from Vilnius. Niessel, who was less favourable to Polish views than Henrys, was uninterested. “Polish and Lithuanian national pretensions are equally exaggerated,” he concluded, “and it is extremely desirable to bring about a direct entente between Kovno and Warsaw.”166 The dispute over Vilnius continued in the League of Nations until the powers finally accepted Polish control in 1924.

T h e P l e b is c it e in Upper S i les i a After the Treaty of Riga, a few issues remained to resolve Poland’s borders, the most important of which was the Upper Silesian plebiscite, which was set for 20 March 1921.167 There had been periodic unrest in the province since the plebiscite had been announced, partly because each side worried that the other would gain unfair influence. The German administration had remained in place after the armistice, and German troops and police were required to keep the area secure. The state commissioner treated Poles harshly, however, which raised accusations that the Germans were looting and trying to expel Poles from the territory. (The Germans accused Poles of the same.)168 The resulting “overexcitement” sparked the first of three uprisings in the region by Polish paramilitaries in August 1919. The uprising was suppressed violently, but nonetheless German administrative power in the province began to wane. First, Polish-national candidates swept local elections in November 1919, and the following February, the Inter-Allied Plebiscite Commission under French General Henri Le Rond sacked the top levels of German administrators and replaced them with commission members. The Allied presence was bolstered by fourteen battalions: ten from France and four from Italy. The removal of German influence and the Allies’ strength increasingly became an issue of concern for the Germans of Upper Silesia.

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In August 1920, a German mob lynched a Polish activist in the street, sparking a second uprising from the Polish population. French troops protested little as the Poles took over the region, but British soldiers and officials shared the German view that the entire episode showed a lack of respect for law and order.169 Intense campaigning by both sides accompanied the uprisings. The Polish Plebiscite Commission, established in February 1920 as the Allies arrived, employed more than 2,000 people to campaign for the region’s incorporation into Poland, though the French feared that its German counterpart was more effective. The leader of the Polish Plebiscite Commission, Wojciech Korfanty, was a popular National Democrat and had led the unofficial Polish government in Posen in 1919. According to an assessment passed on to the French, Korfanty had been in favour of the Entente “since the Marne” but was an “arriviste who turns to the right or left depending on opportunity” and thus not completely trustworthy.170 (One of those opportunities had been in August 1920, when Dmowski and Korfanty had been behind a National Democrat plot to use Poznanian support to topple Piłsudski and take power.171) Korfanty’s larger-than-life persona made him popular among Poles, but German propagandists portrayed him as a sort of warlord, which undoubtedly fed into their wider message that Poles were not law-­ abiding and could not be trusted.172 The possibility for further unrest was apparent to Allied officials in the days before the plebiscite. The preceding week had been a busy one for Poland. The Sejm passed the new constitution on 17 March, and the government signed the Treaty of Riga with Russia the following day. Meanwhile, 20,000 nonresident voters had been arriving every day for a week before the plebiscite, carrying the potential for violence.173 In Upper Silesia, Germans and Poles accused each other of attacks to the plebiscite commission.174 Le Rond, the president of the commission, thought one German dossier of accusations was “make-believe,” while in Paris, Philippe Berthelot bemoaned the ceaseless accusations from German officials. But the French, who worried that German propaganda and intrigues would have an effect, also hoped that “nervous” Polish leaders in Warsaw would remain “calm” and avoid intrigues that would threaten their chances.175 This was necessary, because many intrigues were reported.176 There were rumours that the German government was contriving a Lithuanian invasion of Vilnius just before the plebiscite, or that German irregulars or Polish forces would flood the region after the results were

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announced.177 In one incident, about eighty Polish troops crossed the border into Upper Silesia and attacked a police station, injuring two.178 The French received accusations that fake editions of Polish news­ papers were appearing in the cities and that German newspapers had falsely claimed that the Polish government had closed the stock exchange out of fear that the currency would collapse.179 Yet having toured the region extensively, the leaders of the Allied delegations concluded that everything was as calm as possible.180 The concerns of all sides did not come to pass on the day of the vote. “The vote was pursued in all of Upper Silesia in the most perfect calm and order,” Le Rond informed his government.181 Eighty-eight per cent of registered voters participated, and 188,000 of 191,000 registered outvoters did. The German government in Berlin instructed the plebiscite representative, Prince Hatzfeldt, to complain to Le Rond about “Polish terror” that had prevented émigrés from voting, and newspapers in Germany and Upper Silesia carried similar complaints.182 But Hatzfeldt knew the true situation, Le Rond wrote: “There were no incidents.”183 In the entire province, 704,900, or 59.6 per cent, voted for Germany and 477,200, or 40.4 per cent, for Poland.184 A line from the northeast to the southwest divided German majorities above it from Polish majorities below, but the results did not divide the territory cleanly. There was a confusing mix of allegiance in the all-important industrial basin, with German majorities in some southern cities like Kattowitz (Katowice) and a Polish majority in the countryside.185 As James Bjork has shown, the plebiscite should not be interpreted as a choice between eternal nationalisms. Upper Silesians who had supported Polish parties in parliament, for instance, also voted to remain in Germany. There was additionally a small but significant campaign of Catholics and autonomists who rejected the plebiscite’s binary choice or were nationally indifferent.186 The Allied governments did not take this population into account, but they did consider the geopolitical implications of partition, including the national character of each side that could potentially control the industrial basin. Over the next few weeks, the Allies considered their goals before the three-member plebiscite commission met to interpret the results in the last week of April. Each government’s eventual position was determined as much by government preference as the results on the ground. The French view was consistent: the territory must be divided in accordance with the treaty, and the partition line they supported

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would give the southern industrial basin to Poland in its entirety.187 The question was not only one of Poland’s fate, the French ambassador told Count Sforza, the Italian foreign minister, but “one of the most important elements of French policy.”188 The Polish government, which wanted the same result, was told to follow France’s lead and meanwhile not say or do anything to upset the outcome.189 The French had often adopted a similar approach towards Polish concerns since the Russian alliance in the First World War. They may have been Poland’s strongest supporters, but they still demanded restraint. The British held a contrary view. Eyre Crowe, the permanent under-secretary in the Foreign Office, told the French ambassador that it would be best for Germany to receive the entire territory. Germany would run the industrial areas much more effectively than if they were under “Polish anarchy,” Crowe said.190 German newspapers and the German government were also for controlling all of Upper Silesia, and the British observed hints that Germany would fulfill its reparations obligations entirely, as well as provide sufficient coal to Poland.191 But this was contrary to the terms of the plebiscite, which were that the territory was to be apportioned by regional majorities, not overall vote. The British recognized this and were prepared to concede to partition, though on terms that ensured that Germany still kept most of the region’s industry and coal.192 The French were aghast that their wartime allies were already thoroughly sympathetic towards Germany. Le Rond tried to explain this by suggesting that the British saw the Upper Silesian conflict as analogous to their own conflict in Ireland, which was still raging.193 Lloyd George had, in fact, often compared Upper Silesia and Ireland during the Paris Peace Conference.194 The Italians, who were the swing vote on the commission, gave contrary indications to their allies about what they would decide to do. Sforza had promised that General Marinis, the Italian delegate, would support the French position (though he later told the French representative that he had said no such thing).195 Italy also received guarantees from both Poland and Germany that they would get coal from Upper Silesia.196 In the end, General Marinis suggested a compromise: Germany would receive the western part of Upper Silesia and Poland the east, in conformity with the results of the plebiscite. It was partition, but on less favourable terms for Poland than the French and Polish government had supported. Germany would get most of the industrial areas except for the regions of Rybnik and

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Pless, which had voted for Poland. Le Rond’s response demonstrated that in this situation, an important consideration remained that Poland was a friendly country and Germany remained an enemy. The plebiscite line, he wrote bitterly, would leave military factories in Germany that had supported the German war effort greatly during 1916, which was a year of great French losses at the battle of Verdun.197 Under pressure from Lloyd George to come to a conclusion, the commission members prepared their reports overnight. Without time to reconcile their differences, they submitted both plans together as the commission report, which was rushed by courier to London so that it could be discussed at the meeting of the Supreme Council. Before the Supreme Council had had time to discuss the issue, a Polish newspaper in Upper Silesia circulated rumours that very little of the industrial basin would go to Poland. First, Polish miners walked out, and soon a general strike – and a general insurrection – had broken out. Korfanty resigned immediately and declared that he would lead the uprising. The French and the British viewed the events differently. While French sources referred, in an emotionalized turn of phrase, to “the extreme overexcitement of the Polish masses,” the British saw more sinister motives. “It is clear that we have to do with a concerted Polish plan to seize Upper Silesia by force,” Colonel Percival, the British representative on the plebiscite commission, informed his superiors.198 Le Rond, among others, had predicted unrest following the decision, but it still worried the Allies. “There is reason to believe that this movement will only degenerate rapidly,” Marinis wrote to the heads of government.199 British and French officials told every Polish official they could find that the unrest must stop, especially after Italian soldiers from the plebiscite commission were killed in the fighting.200 Piłsudski closed the border (although the British reported that Polish troops and supplies were nonetheless crossing), which restored calm for a few weeks. Yet pitched battles between Poles and Germans resumed shortly thereafter, and about 2,000 soldiers and another 2,000 civilians died, while thousands more fled before the Allies eventually established peace late in the summer of 1921.201 The eventual decision, which was referred to the League of Nations, attempted to compromise between the French and British positions. Poland received most of the industrial triangle and Germany approximately 70 per cent of the territory.202 The German and Polish governments accepted the border in a treaty in 1922, but the experience of the plebiscite soured relations throughout the interwar period.

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Though about 100,000 Germans migrated from Polish to German Silesia in the decade after the plebiscite, most inhabitants remained.203 When the German army swept into Poland in September 1939, the occupation regime referred to Upper Silesia as one of the forgotten territories that should always have been part of the German Reich.

D id F a m il ia r it y B r e ed Contempt? British, French, and American policies regarding the settlement of the Russo-Polish border reflected significant continuity from the Paris Peace Conference. British and American policy at the conference was to draw the border at the “ethnographic frontier” so that eastern Poland only included majority-Polish territories. The French government and the Polish delegation advocated a more favourable border, even if it meant including significant minorities within Poland. Of the three governments considered in this book, French support for Poland’s expansionist aims continued to be strongest in 1920. Lloyd George and his foreign policy circle continued to see imperialism in Polish actions, as the Polish government mishandled the politics of their armistice negotiations with the Bolsheviks and Piłsudski led the ill-­ advised seizure of Kyiv in April 1920. Lloyd George also worried that if Poland’s government contravened the principle of self-­determination in the east, it would invite irredentism, and then concluded after the Kyiv invasion and the Red Army’s subsequent advance that his concern had been justified. As the war turned against Poland, Millerand joined Lloyd George in expressing increased concern about the aims of the Polish government and people. Britain and France resolved to assist the Polish war effort with advisors and munitions, but could not make a stronger contribution by, for example, sending troops. The United States also expressed concern about the direction of the Polish government’s policies, but aside from the semi-­autonomous aid effort, American representatives enjoyed little influence in 1920. The Polish army’s victory at the Battle of the Vistula, the seizure of Vilnius, and the Polish government’s relative independence in treaty negotiations with the Bolsheviks illustrated the Allies’ lack of power to affect Polish affairs. The Allies had greater influence over the settlement of the Upper Silesian plebiscite, but the process demonstrated the AngloFrench divide regarding the Polish settlement that had dominated the Paris peace conference. Despite the settlement of these last major questions, Poland’s borders continued to be contested throughout the postwar period.

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While Western policies reflected continuity, British and French policy makers increasingly believed that the Poles were unable to make the emotional sacrifices necessary to preserve the existence of their new state. Policy makers deplored what they perceived as infighting in Polish politics and the undoubtedly precarious state of the government. French military advisors criticized the pride of Polish soldiers unwilling or too slow to submit to French methods. Both Britain and France opposed the seizure of Kyiv and a Polish policy that they found too “adventurous.” The British criticized Polish actions repeatedly in Upper Silesia on the grounds of being beyond the bounds of expected behaviour. While these observations about a lack of restraint from the Poles all reflected British and French desires for a more subservient ally, they also reflected the fact that actions with which the Western powers disagreed were seen as unrestrained.

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Conclusion I am puttering around in a small academic way, doing a great deal of ranting and spouting in public, trying to enlighten the people who insist on believing that all the nations of Eastern Europe are very much on a level with Red Indians, but that nevertheless it would be so much better if they would all unite and form one big union “like the United States”; also that Poland is a small country inhabited mainly by Jews, who are horribly oppressed by the small Polish minority who happened to get there in some way; and that this small country is also inflamed with incessant militaristic ambitions, and that the chief topic of discussion is whether we shall march to Moscow or Berlin next week. Robert Lord to Hugh Gibson, 14 January 19221

Lord was writing about American public opinion, but he might as well have been talking about the British, French, and American policy makers who had tackled the question of Polish independence since the outbreak of war in 1914. Many of the British, French, and American policy makers who had worked on the problem, sometimes with Lord, had developed poor opinions about the Poles and the new Poland. Others, like Lord and Gibson, remained partial to the Polish viewpoint, and both sides attempted to “enlighten” the other whenever a political question came up. Despite their differences, the two sides maintained some common ground. Lord’s use of a derogatory term for Indigenous peoples of North America, and his implication that Poles were a better people, reflects a view that the other policy makers shared: that while Poland may not have been equal to the great powers they represented, it was worthy of statehood.2 Civilizational criticisms directed at Poles and Poland were a fractional portion of what non-White groups experienced in the same period. Second, it reflects a view that it was wrong for any group to be “inflamed by incessant military

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ambitions,” even though there was disagreement about whether this phrase should apply to Poland. Rather, statecraft was only acceptable when it was conducted in a cool and detached manner. The return of the independent state of Poland and the delineation of its borders from 1919 to 1921 had lasting consequences for the people of Poland and for Europe generally. During the interwar period, Poland’s borders defined the space in which the country’s government attempted, among other things, to create a Polish nation-state from the diverse population.3 In 1939, Britain and France entered the Second World War after Germany invaded across the 1919 border with Poland. The German invasion, the Russian one less than three weeks later, and the ensuing war resulted in the deaths of millions of Polish citizens, most notably almost all of Poland’s prewar population of three million Jews.4 After the war, Poland’s borders were changed and its population homogenized by expulsions, which resulted in further deaths. If redrawing borders was the defining feature of the Polish settlement in 1919, the defining feature of the post-1945 landscape was how many people were moved to achieve it.5 In comparison with the horrors of the Second World War, the events of the First World War era seem almost trivial, though as Robert Blobaum argues, the impact of the 1914 to 1918 war on civilians, in Warsaw at least, has been underestimated.6 The role of British, French, and American policy makers on events in Poland was quite limited. They had not been solely responsible for the rebirth of Poland, the delineation of its borders, or its subsequent tensions with its neighbours. Yet their efforts were integral to the process. Numerous factors influenced discussions of policy during the First World War, the Paris Peace Conference, and the Russo-Polish War, such as the balance of power, the influence of non-state actors like the k n p, and public opinion on the diplomacy of Poland’s rebirth. These were not, however, the only factors to affect policy: a further factor was the emotionalized attitudes of the British, French, and American foreign-­policy-making elite about the rebirth of Poland and the Polish people.

T h e D e v e l o p m e n t of Atti tudes Between 1914 and 1921, British, French, and American representatives developed various attitudes in the course of making policy about the rebirth of Poland. Their attitudes about Poles and the rebirth of Poland developed in a relatively consistent pattern. Members of the British,

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French, and American foreign-­policy-making elite generally knew little about Poles or Poland before 1914, but they learned more as they engaged with the diplomacy of Poland’s rebirth. The pace of events – the international strategy required for the First World War and then the all-reaching remit of the Paris Peace Conference – required the British, French, and American foreign-­policy-making elites to encounter Polish representatives on an increasingly regular basis. After an initial period of engagement, attitudes gradually developed in response to events and experiences. Social psychologists note that sometimes experiences can modify or reinforce pre-existing understandings about a person or group.7 This observation has been asserted in many historical studies of intercultural contact.8 The case of Poland contrasts with the assertion that the peace­makers in Paris solely relied on old prejudices when they made the territorial settlement because they did not know enough about the world.9 From 1914 to 1921, Allied and American diplomats and politicians met frequently with Polish representatives, first regarding Poland’s independence and then its territorial claims. They developed attitudes based on the claims that Polish representatives made for independence or territory, and on how those claims related to their perception of the national or general interest. Another influence was their attitudes about self-­determination generally, which evolved during this period in response to events and the lobbying campaigns of other nationalities. The attitudes and stereotypes that they held about Poles or the rebirth of Poland developed primarily in response to the actions of Polish representatives with whom they had contact, either in person or as they appeared on the world stage. Some Polish representatives befriended Allied and American policy makers, like Paderewski with House and Piltz with Pichon. In contrast, some, like Namier, were repelled by Dmowski’s anti-­Semitism. Others held a middle ground. Such contacts during and after the First World War helped to define the attitudes that diplomats and politicians expressed on the rebirth of Poland, rather than the vague knowledge that these elites possessed about Poland and Poles prior to 1914. Throughout this period, an analysis of the policies and attitudes of British, French, and American policy makers shows the centrality of restraint in their discussions. Self-restraint was both an ideal for the comportment of diplomats and elite men generally in these countries, and a feature of the control of these groups over domestic and foreign populations. Rather than attempting to apply a particular definition

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of restraint, this study shows that restraint (or self-restraint) was applied differently in different situations. When the Polish relief brought Polish affairs to international attention in 1915, an enthusiastic Paderewski and the policy makers he met had to contend with the harsh realities of the British blockade, which eventually caused the campaign to dwindle. The Polish émigré campaign for independence during the war occurred within the constraints of the Anglo-French alliance with Russia, and Dmowski and the knp shaped their advocacy to fit neatly with Western priorities. After the war ended and the situation in Poland became understandably chaotic in the resulting power vacuum, British, American, and French policy makers quarrelled about whether the Polish government, too, was chaotic and acting in a justified manner and whether its people were akin to an unrestrained mob. Some worried about the spectre of Bolshevism and the scourge of anti-­Semitism in particular, while others like Esme Howard and many French diplomats noted the provocations that assailed the Polish government and their moderate and reasoned responses. This debate featured rather unrestrained words and conduct from Western policy makers as well, and continued through the RussoPolish War and the plebiscite in Upper Silesia. Though British, French, and American policy makers often expressed their attitudes about Poles and the rebirth of Poland, this does not imply that a single attitude predominated. Moreover, we cannot speak of one “Poland” or a unified group of “the Poles” in this period, though policy makers often did. During the First World War, the term “Poland” usually referred to Russian Poland, but this was often not specified, while Poles could be the inhabitants of any of the three partitions, or émigré Poles, especially those in the United States, or those particular émigrés who lobbied foreign governments. After  1918, the peace­makers often referred to the Polish government, its delegation in Paris, or the people of Poland as “the Poles” without specifying whom they meant. Yet whatever they meant, Allied and American policy makers ascribed many qualities to “the Poles”: Poles were passionate, romantic, idealistic, anti-Semitic, proud, vain, pitiable, quarrelsome, imperialistic, oppressed, devious, and loyal, or some combination of those qualities. These stereotypes reflect the personality characteristics of an individual applied on a national level. They were reinforced both by participants’ particular understandings of Poland’s actions in European history and by their interactions with Polish representatives. The participants rarely observed either that these

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stereotypes often conflicted with each other or that their own perceived nature of Poles could be used to support any number of positions on Poland’s boundaries. Foch and Lloyd George agreed that Poland’s policy was “divergent and eccentric,” but Foch wanted to send more troops and Lloyd George did not want to send any. The existence of many and conflicting stereotypes about Polish characteristics shows Western policy makers’ propensity to characterize the emotional expression of other peoples and why they became preoccupied with restraining those characteristics that were undesirable. Despite this ambiguity, the way British, French, and American policy makers, as a group, mainly understood the rebirth of Poland was through two general, conflicting attitudes comprising multiple stereotypes about Poles. The first overall view was that Poles shared Western values: they were liberal, democratic, and strongly opposed to the Central Powers, whose governments tended to be depicted as being opposed to these principles. Moreover, the Poles had endured horrible treatment at the hands of wartime enemies Germany and Austria-Hungary, during both the partitions and the recent wartime occupation. Because of the British and French alliance with the Russian Empire and then uncertain relations with its successors, Polish suffering under Russian imperialism was not mentioned with similar frequency. Nonetheless, it was primarily attention to Russian Poland and its inhabitants that provoked these attitudes about the rebirth of Poland during the war. British, French, and American policy makers eventually developed widespread sympathy for Polish independence, which became perceived as part of the “rule of right,” including self-­ determination, that ought to be established after the war.10 While the British, French, and American foreign policy elites expressed this attitude regularly from 1916 to 1921, changed conditions after the end of the war led some representatives, especially Lloyd George, to express more negative attitudes about “the Poles” and the new Poland. The war had ended, and Poland did not always live up to its promise. The country was beset by internal divisions, in particular because of the political division between National Democrats and Piłsudskiite leftists, and the legacy of the partitions. These divisions, combined with the ravages of war, meant among other things that the economy was in tatters. Yet Poland skirmished or warred with most of its neighbours in 1919 to 1920, in conflicts that often spilled over into pogroms against Jews, as at Lemberg and Pinsk. As Allied and American representatives observed how “the Poles”

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interacted with each other and, after November 1918, with their neighbours, they increasingly viewed Poles as quarrelsome, anti-­ Semitic, aggressive, and unreliable. By late 1920, most policy makers had come to share this view. Their arguments contested the earlier, more positive view, which some policy makers still held. This conflict between views existed even for French policy makers, who both acted to strengthen their country’s ties with Poland and criticized Polish actions. In all cases, the attitudes that Western policy makers expressed reflected the cultural and political contexts from which they came. “The Poles” were hardly the only people about whom the Allies and Americans developed attitudes. British, French, and American elites were much more familiar with Germans and Russians, for example, but still used stereotypes to describe those national groups. Lack of knowledge was only part of the reason why stereotypes were central to Allied and American attitudes. “Germans,” for instance, were regularly suspected of engaging in duplicitous activity and of being militarist and imperialist by nature. Stereotypes also informed the way policy makers understood other national groups in Central and Eastern Europe. Often Polish representatives helped to shape these stereotypes in order to forward their territorial claims, as much as others, such as Czechoslovak representatives, were shaping stereotypes of them. The peace­makers in Paris tended to regard Ukrainian and Lithuanian representatives with suspicion, for instance, because some of their compatriots had cooperated with the Central Powers or the Bolsheviks. Polish representatives made sure to mention both points. The peace­makers also saw these national groups as generally uncivilized and wondered if they had reached the level of national development required to take on the task of self-government. Finally, at times, Allied and American policy makers expressed attitudes that lumped together the nations of Central and Eastern Europe. Western European observers had long viewed the peoples to the east as less civilized, and remnants of this undoubtedly affected Allied and American attitudes. For policy makers, emotional restraint was a sign of civility, and commenting on the emotions of others reinforced this hierarchy. A common view at the Paris Peace Conference emphasized the venality of the peoples of the region. As Lloyd George put it, “everyone there was agreed to grab all they could.”11 Yet during the First World War, Polish émigré representatives also benefitted from the positive unofficial discourse about other Slavic groups like Serbs and Czechs.12 In sum, generalizations regarding nationality or perceived

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racial type were a common way in which diplomats and politicians understood the world in the early twentieth century, and they integrated such attitudes into a wide variety of policy discussions. Existing attitudes about “the Poles” and the rebirth of Poland did not determine a clear direction for British, French, and American policy. Rather, individual policy makers defined certain stereotypes to support a particular course of action. In official policy discussions, policy makers considered many factors to make the best decision and often expressed attitudes along the way. The wartime discussion in the Foreign Office regarding support for an independent Poland, for instance, involved a combination of officials’ sympathy for an independent Poland with an awareness of how a public declaration would affect relations with Russia, public opinion in Russian Poland and the United States, and the military strength of the Central Powers. Dmowski’s first memorandum in March 1917 had listed several thematic arguments in favour of British government support for an independent Poland that embraced both realpolitik and moral duty. Policy makers expressed attitudes more frequently or prominently in some policy discussions and less in others. Allied and American policy makers empathized with Poles during the First World War, but that empathy had little effect on when those governments decided it was strategically suitable to declare their support for Polish Relief or independence. Yet other situations are impossible to describe without reference to attitudes. In discussions about the Russo-Polish War, British, French, and American policy makers increasingly expressed frustration with Poland’s invasion of Kyiv, which they believed was aggressive and unwise. Policy makers then discussed restricting assistance, based, in part, of this frustration. Meanwhile, the perception in the United States that Poles were anti-Semitic and had been perpetrating pogroms was a strong motivator in establishing the Polish minorities treaty. As the diplomacy of Poland’s rebirth grew in importance, policy discussions were increasingly not confined to national foreign offices. Advocates of each point of view often built on or responded to the positions of external representatives who argued for a particular position. Each government’s position should not, therefore, be depicted as monolithic, as each included differing currents of opinion. Some representatives like Howard disagreed with their government’s approach to Polish territorial questions and instead advocated a position similar to that taken by another government. The large

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number of comments about Poland and the Poles, moreover, has much to do with this close coordination between the British, French, and American governments, but also reflects extensive disagreements about what to do. Throughout the entire period of this study, Britain and France remained committed to their alliance. Meanwhile, both countries tried to use their Polish policy to win the favour of Woodrow Wilson and the US government from at least 1915. When the US entered the war in April 1917, the three governments deepened their partnership through an ever-closer consultation process. This culminated in Wilson and a huge entourage travelling to Paris for the peace conference, which remains the longest overseas absence for a US president in history. The result of this commitment to close cooperation was that the three governments were trying to win each other over without fracturing the alliance over Polish matters. This was even true when policy differences deepened between Britain and France after 1918. References to Polish characteristics were often an attempt to make a connection with broader conceptions of human behaviour, and often morality, and thus bridge the policy gap between two governments. Whether the policy makers believed what they were saying is secondary for this study. These comments were clearly intentional and should be taken seriously. For instance, when US and Polish representatives championed the relief of Poland in 1915 and 1916, they talked frequently about the Poles’ historic suffering and of the treatment of children. They appealed to what were assumed to be universal conceptions of right and wrong in their attempt to convince the British government to let aid to Poland pass through the blockade of the Central Powers. Lloyd George likewise appealed to broader conceptions of proper behaviour when he repeatedly denounced Polish aggression in Upper Silesia. This was an attempt to win support for his policy by arguing that the Poles were an unstable people whose rule-breaking conduct had forfeited their right to control the valuable territory. He could not, of course, say directly that France should abandon its support of Polish claims to Upper Silesia because the British economy would be better served if Germany were to control coal and steel production in the province, at least not without demonstrating a complete lack of interest in the alliance. Polish affairs became internationalized to an extensive degree, because they became a matter that connected to the core political interests of these three North Atlantic powers. This internationalization had been the initial goal of Polish émigrés like

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Dmowski, though the results of this internationalization in later years tended to go against their wishes. Policy makers also referred to Polish qualities in discussions within national foreign offices, for instance when Namier deplored Polish characteristics as expressing a long-standing regional “imperialism” in an attempt to convince his colleagues that Poland’s territorial aims would subjugate minorities. Other foreign representatives, particularly from Poland but also Ukraine and Germany, also linked Polish characteristics to supposed universal norms. None of these rhetorical efforts were successful entirely on their own. Yet they speak to the expectation – or at least the hope – that a common set of cultural assumptions existed on a transnational basis and that appealing to these norms might be a means of bridging a policy gap. This transnational shared space, it is important to note, included liminally orientalist views that used cultural norms to rationalize an international political and economic hierarchy. The restraint of emotion represented a particularly powerful shared norm. Evidence from the diplomacy of Poland’s rebirth, however, suggests that this transnational sphere was also a central feature of the coalition of North Atlantic powers. Despite extensive consultation and discussion, it was possible for a few individuals to shape state or alliance policy, and their views became more influential. Though this book considers the policies and attitudes of the British, French, and American governments, it does not imply that each country’s government played an equal role in deciding collaborative policy on the rebirth of Poland. The allies Britain and France influenced policy in different ways. Both governments respected the Russian government’s right to decide the Polish question as an internal matter, but after the Bolshevik Revolution, the French government began to support Polish independence and territorial claims, especially through its support for the Polish army. The French government’s organization and preparation was particularly evident in the peace conference committees, in which the French and Polish desire for a large Poland generally influenced the recommendations of those committees. The British government’s support for Poland’s independence during the war, meanwhile, contrasts with its later efforts to limit Poland’s territorial claims. Though only some of these efforts proved successful – Poland did eventually receive East Galicia but was not granted Danzig and had to submit to a plebiscite in Upper Silesia – they irritated Polish opinion. Yet the government’s position concealed the division within the foreign-­policy-making elite and instead reflected

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Conclusion

191

the preponderant influence of Lloyd George and certain advisors like Kerr and Headlam-Morley, both of whom relied upon Namier’s advice. The United States, first as a neutral power and then as an “associated” one, was the first of the three powers considered here to advocate for Polish rights at an international level, first with the Polish relief campaign and then in Wilson’s “Peace without Victory” speech of 22 January 1917. Wilson’s international popularity and the financial position of the United States also helped to give the language of national self-­determination such importance in 1918 and 1919, though there were proponents of such ideas in all belligerent countries. Yet aside from Wilson’s insistence on a Polish minorities treaty and the independence of Danzig, the United States government rarely played the decisive role in the Polish territorial settlement. Finally, the influence that all three countries exerted over the situation on the ground in Poland was often minimal. The partitioning empires held political control of Poland until the armistice in 1918. While the peace conference did set Poland’s borders with Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Romania in 1919 to 1921, from 1918 to 1921 Polish forces attempted with some success to establish faits accomplis before the British, French, and American governments could decide an issue. Polish soldiers and diplomats established Poland’s borders with Russia, Lithuania, and Latvia, and the League of Nations set the boundary in Upper Silesia after Britain and France could not compromise. The rebirth of Poland remains a significant event for both international and Polish history, and this book contributes to the understanding of both fields while proposing avenues for further research. Conceptualizing attitudes, stereotypes, and emotions as analytical tools exemplifies the new course that this book charts. Evidence from cognitive psychology and archival records demonstrates that attitudes should be studied as an integral part of decision-­making. An approach that utilizes scholarship in the study of cognition can be applied broadly to histories of policy-making. Further awareness of how humans think is important for historians, not to psychoanalyze historical personalities but to offer a better understanding of what can be concluded from sources. Secondly, this book has implications both for dominant themes in Polish historiography and for contemporary Polish self-understanding. It concurs with those historians who have recently argued that while a nationalist narrative of Poland and Polish history served a purpose when that narrative was threatened during the partitions or the

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Communist period, it is important to put the experiences of Poland and Poles in historical, regional, or global context rather than merely proclaiming the exceptional sufferings of the Polish people.13 Such an approach also makes Polish history more accessible to historians who do not specialize in the region, so that they can better situate the Polish experience in its European and world context.14 This new perspective also rather undermines nationalist mythology in contemporary Poland. The date 11 November, for instance, has assumed critical importance in contemporary Poland, as what M.B. Biskupski calls a “national holiday of Polish sacrifice and heroism.”15 While part of the focus of Independence Day stresses Polish agency in the rebirth of Poland, it coincides with the “martyrological understanding of Polish history” which often stresses how the Polish people have suffered, including when they have been disregarded in international affairs.16 But some have taken this too far.17 In recent years, 11 November celebrations have become the focus of menacing and often violent manifestations. To the extent that perceptions of Western disrespect contribute to the nationalist’s siege mentality and worldview, the Yalta agreement between Churchill, Stalin, and Roosevelt that sealed Poland’s fate as a Soviet satellite after 1945 is most prominent. Yet perceived Allied and American intransigence to Polish demands after the First World War has inspired the passion of historians and is directly connected to memories of independence. This book replaces allegations of indifference, bias, and many other sins with a fuller understanding of the wide range of attitudes that became integrated in British, French, and American policy towards Poland and the Poles.

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Notes

A b b r e v iat i ons aan ac n p apip b ed cab c a d cpa ddf fo

Archiwum Akt Nowych Records of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace Archiwum Polityczne Ignacego Paderewskiego British Empire Delegation Cabinet Papers, The uk National Archives, Kew Centre des archives diplomatiques de La Courneuve Commission on Polish Affairs Documents diplomatiques français Records created or inherited by the Foreign Office, The National Archives, Kew f ru s Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States frus: ppc Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919. The Paris Peace Conference n ac p National Archives at College Park, College Park, m d pp knp Protokoł: posiedzenia Komitetu Narodowego Polskiego (k np meeting minutes) pww The Papers of Woodrow Wilson swc Supreme War Council wn fs Sub-Commission on Polish Affairs for the study of the Western and Northern Frontiers

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Notes to pages 3–7

In t ro du c t i on  1 Mantoux, Council of Four, 1:439.  2 Ibid.   3 Ibid., 1:440.  4 frus: ppc , 5:394.   5 On the minorities treaties, see Fink, Rights of Others; Kaufman, This Troublesome Question, is invaluable on the Polish treaty. Numerous other works are cited in chapter 5.   6 See, for instance, Black, Anglo-Jewry.   7 On the intellectual development of liminal orientalism in the Enlightenment, see Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe.   8 Recent examples include Varley, “Ambassador Brawls”; Goedde, “Power, Culture.” See also the discussion below.   9 This tendency is outlined in further detail below. See also the full discussion in Vasilev, “Methodological Nationalism.” This tendency also commonly occurs in secondary literature; see Brubaker and Cooper, “Beyond ‘Identity,’” 28. Brubaker and Cooper criticize such “unreflectingly groupist language.” 10 pww , 66:154. 11 For an introduction, see Reddy, Navigation of Feeling, and the discussion below. 12 Rosenwein, Emotional Communities, 24. 13 An important and rare exception is Cowan, “Who’s Afraid.” 14 The impact of tropes of Western cultural hegemony in international politics is shown in many works, notably in Sluga, Nation, Psychology for the European settlement; Manela, Wilsonian Moment for the treatment of imperial populations; and Pedersen, Guardians, 17–44, in the creation of the mandates system. The classic, indispensable work on how Western global power popularized narratives of Eastern cultural inferiority is Said, Orientalism. 15 Cowan reaches a parallel conclusion in the case of minority petitions from the Macedonian region to the League of Nations, finding that Western expectations that diplomacy ought to be restrained and civil served to police and penalize those petitions and enforced a hierarchy of civilization. These expectations proved frustrating to the smaller states, who felt that a civilizational hierarchy was being imposed upon them. Cowan, “Who’s Afraid.” 16 Wheatley, “Central Europe,” 902. 17 For a thorough examination of Poland’s relations with the Western powers from a Polish viewpoint, see Karski, Great Powers and Poland; also

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Notes to pages 7–9 195

Cienciala and Komarnicki, From Versailles to Locarno for the period up to 1925. On the favourable British view towards German revisionism in the interwar period, see especially Lentin, Lloyd George and the Lost Peace. German influence on these views is well established, for instance in Marks, “Mistakes and Myths”; Schuker, “Keynes and Reparations, Part 1”; Schuker, “Keynes and Reparations, Part 2.” Zara Steiner’s magisterial international histories of interwar Europe, in which Poland receives considerable attention, offer a wider view: Steiner, Lights That Failed; Steiner, Triumph of the Dark. 18 The “contact hypothesis,” that contact with a subject will change one’s views, has been the subject of extensive research, experimental and otherwise, by psychologists since the 1960s. For opposing views, see Amir, “Contact Hypothesis”; Hamburger, “Contact Hypothesis Reconsidered”; for an overview of the debate, see Schneider, Psychology of Stereotyping, 405–30. 19 Mangold, “Oriental Slowness?,” 257–8. Some recent work on intercultural contact is outlined in Adam, “New Ways.” Works on intercultural contact and transfer that have informed this research because of their decentred analysis on interactions include Thornton, Cultural History of the Atlantic World; K. Lowe, “‘Representing’ Africa”; K. Wilson, “Thinking Back”; Bayly, Birth of the Modern World; Osterhammel, Transformation of the World; McDonnell, Masters of Empire. 20 Research on “situated cognition,” or cognition that considers the interplay between mind and context, is a rapidly developing “movement.” See E. Smith and Collins, “Situated Cognition.” 21 Barrett and Russell, “Introduction to Psychological Construction”; see also Schneider, Psychology of Stereotyping, 120–71, on schemas. 22 Schneider, Psychology of Stereotyping, 29. 23 For example, Sluga, Nation, Psychology; Wandycz, “Western Images and Stereotypes”; Łaptos, “Le rôle des stéréotypes.” Important recent examinations of “perceptions,” a vague term conflated with attitudes, do not interrogate even that term or mention social cognition or stereotypes; for example, Jacobs, Imagining the Middle East; Barclay and Glaser-Schmidt, “Introduction.” 24 Schneider, Psychology of Stereotyping, 24. 25 E. Smith and Collins, “Situated Cognition,” 130–1; Schneider, Psychology of Stereotyping, 120. 26 On the “kernel of truth” hypothesis, see Schneider, Psychology of Stereotyping, 17. 27 Sluga, Nation, Psychology, especially 8–36.

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Notes to pages 9–11

28 Goedde, “Power, Culture,” 602. For recent works that integrate emotions, see especially the thematic issue of the International History Review 40, no. 3 (2018); also Costigliola, “I React Intensely to Everything”; “Pamela Churchill”; Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances. Studies of enforced civility in early modern Europe offer some interesting parallels; for example, Thomas, In Pursuit of Civility; Ranum, “Courtesy, Absolutism” is older and flawed but remains relevant. 29 T. Hall, Emotional Diplomacy, vii. Two good introductions to interpreting emotions for international historians are Costigliola, “Reading for Emotion”; Gienow-Hecht, “Emotions in American History.” Methodological issues for historians are discussed in Eustace et al., “ahr Conversation.” 30 Billaud and Cowan, “Bureaucratisation of Utopia,” 6. 31 Reddy, Navigation of Feeling, 40–1; Costigliola, “Reading for Emotion,” 358–9, 371n13. 32 Reddy, Navigation of Feeling, 63–111, outlines important perspectives on language as a “speech act.” Different views on the representativeness of language are expressed in Wierzbicka, “Language and Metalanguage”; Katz, “Love, Loss, and Hope.” 33 Costigliola, “Reading for Emotion,” 364. 34 Jeziorny, Londyn wobec ochrony. Other relevant studies of newspapers include Hanak, Great Britain and Austria-Hungary; Miquel, Paix de Versailles; Śladkowski, Opinia publiczna. 35 On the effect of the Second World War on Poland’s population, see the overview in Snyder, Bloodlands, 313–37; also Davies, God’s Playground 2:419–25. 36 Kołakowski, “War amongst the Lemurs.” 37 On the results of the 1921 census, see Horak, Poland and Her National Minorities, 81. Evidence of national indifference in the 1921 plebiscite in Upper Silesia is demonstrated particularly clearly in Bjork, Neither German nor Pole. See also Brubaker and Cooper, “Beyond ‘Identity,’” which argues that nationality is an identification rather than an essential characteristic; Zahra, “Imagined Noncommunities” notes the applicability of the concept to histories of Central and Eastern Europe. 38 For an introduction to policy networks, see Rhodes, “Policy Network Analysis.” Scholarship on policy networks tends to be focused on analysis of the present and recent past, but Lemercier, “Formal Network Methods,” outlines their importance for historians. Jacobs, Imagining the Middle East, offers a clear examination of US networks of subject experts. Watt, Personalities and Policies, 1–15, outlines the contours of the “foreign-­ policy-making élite.” Further discussion appears in chapter 1.

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Notes to pages 11–14 197

39 Many works in the specialist historiography clearly show the differing views in national foreign offices, most recently Nowak, Pierwsza zdrada Zachodu, for Britain; Biskupski, United States and the Rebirth, for the United States. 40 “Appeals for the Poles,” New York Times, 21 December 1915. 41 Biskupski, United States and the Rebirth, 123–58. 42 See, for example, Roman Dmowski memo, 21 March 1917, fo 371/3000/62097; Erazm Piltz to Denys Cochin, 1 July 1917, c a d: Guerre, 1914–1918, vol. 724, and further discussion in chapter 2. 43 See Mankoff, “Future of Poland.” 44 Polish state-building is narrated in many works. See especially the narrative in Böhler, Civil War, which assesses most new work and provides a convincing reinterpretation. 45 frus : ppc , 6:945. 46 Böhler, Civil War, 59–66 especially. 47 For example, Mantoux, Council of Four, 1:473. 48 H.A.L. Fisher to Lloyd George, 21 November 1920, Parliamentary Archives, Lloyd George Papers, lg / f/ 16/7. 49 Eric Drummond to Philip Kerr, 6 April 1917, National Library of Scotland, Lothian Papers, g d40/17/872/3. 50 On Western views of the nation in the First World War era, see especially Sluga, Nation, Psychology. On the construction of nations and nationalism, see Hobsbawm and Ranger, Invention of Tradition; Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, which highlights the role of education; and Anderson, Imagined Communities, which focuses on print culture. Anderson’s arguments about Eastern Europe draw substantially from Seton-Watson, Nations and States. 51 Few detailed studies of the diplomacy of Poland’s rebirth have done so. This is true of the large majority of specialist studies, including nearly all of those in Polish. Some notable exceptions include Lundgreen-Nielsen, Polish Problem; Mankoff, “Future of Poland”; Komarnicki, Rebirth; Wandycz, “The Polish Question.” Biskupski, United States and the Rebirth, uses many international archives to study US policy. Przewłocki, Stosunek mocarstw zachodnioeuropejskich discusses Britain and France but uses only Polish archives. Bierzanek, Panstwo polskie uses some printed Western documents but not archival sources. General studies more often include Britain, France, and the United States together, for example, MacMillan, Paris 1919; Sharp, Versailles Settlement. 52 A thorough new exposition of military integration in 1917 to 1918 is McCrae, Coalition Strategy.

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Notes to pages 14–16

53 Quoted in Morgan-Owen, “Re-Fighting the First World War,” 1023. 54 International relations scholars have recently focused greater attention on the possibilities of social network analysis for international relations. For an introduction, see Maoz, Network of Nations; Hafner-Burton, Kahler, and Montgomery, “Network Analysis for International Relations.” Transnational links in the Western alliance are a major theme in Sluga, Nation, Psychology. 55 Montille telegram, 15 April 1921, cad: Z-Europe, vol. 159. 56 Italian-Polish relations in this period have generally received little attention. 57 On trust, see Keys, “Diplomat’s Two Minds,” 19–20. Costigliola, Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances, a pioneering work that integrates emotion, uses considerable archival research to demonstrate how politicians build and use trust in diplomacy. On a European foreign-­policy-making élite culture, see MacMillan, War That Ended Peace, especially 228–65; Mösslang and Riotte, “Introduction,” 11–14. 58 Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe. Wolff’s study draws heavily from concepts outlined in Said, Orientalism. Said’s work also informs this book. Several works on the Balkans elucidate similar attitudes, which Milica Bakič-Hayden refers to as “nesting orientalisms.” Bakič-Hayden, “Nesting Orientalisms”; Todorova, Imagining the Balkans; Michail, British and the Balkans. 59 Keys, “Diplomat’s Two Minds,” 2. 60 Cambon, Le Diplomate, 10. 61 Keys, “Diplomat’s Two Minds,” 8–10. Studies of British and American ­cultural norms note that emotional restraint – under most conditions – became prized for men beginning in the late nineteenth century. See Dixon, Weeping Britannia; Stearns, American Cool. On emotionology, or the analysis of emotional norms, see Stearns and Stearns, “Emotionology.” T. Hall, Emotional Diplomacy, offers three modern case studies of the intentional expression of official emotion, which is another example of controlling emotions in diplomacy. 62 Keys, “Diplomat’s Two Minds,” 3, 10. 63 Ibid., 9, 11–20. 64 On transational actors in international relations, see Mösslang and Riotte, “Introduction,” 18–19; Clavin, “Defining Transnationalism,” 422. See also Keys, “Nonstate Actors.” 65 Reddy, Navigation of Feeling, 41. 66 Rosenwein, Emotional Communities, 15. 67 Joll, 1914: The Unspoken Assumptions.

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Notes to pages 17–19 199

68 Finney, “What Is International History?,” 15. Economic determinism is a notable feature of Marxist works, particularly those written under Communist rule; see Wandycz, “Historiography.” One example from the specialist historiography is Kukułka, Francja a Polska. 69 Dean, “Personal and Political,” 763. Other historians go further to argue that decision makers did not consider personal views; for example, Brands, “Unpremeditated Lansing”; Bridge, From Sadowa to Sarajevo, 384. 70 Some important examples include Costigliola, “Nuclear Family”; Costigliola, “I Had Come as a Friend”; Costigliola, Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances; Costigliola, “I React Intensely to Everything.” 71 “Culture” includes a vast range of topics. US-based work is best introduced in Zeiler, “Diplomatic History Bandwagon.” Costigliola and Hogan, Explaining the History, an introductory text for international history, includes considerable reference to “culture,” variously understood. For a British view, see Finney, “Diplomatic Temptation.” Neilson, “My Beloved Russians,” 521–23, cogently summarizes historians’ interest in “personalities”; the foundational work is Watt, Personalities and Policies.

c h a p t e r o ne   1 Pasieka, “British Press,” 16–20; Latawski, “Great Britain,” 21.   2 On these interventions, see Bridge and Bullen, Great Powers, 49–56, 134–45.   3 On the Crimean War in international relations, see ibid., 114–25; Kennedy, Rise and Fall, 170–7.   4 Latawski, “Great Britain,” 21–22. See also Schroeder, “Balance of Power,” which argues, from the perspective of earlier in the century, that it was in the interests of Britain and Russia not to interfere in each other’s affairs.   5 On the history of the Polish partitions, see Davies, God’s Playground, 2:60–120; Wandycz, Lands of Partitioned Poland; Prażmowska, History of Poland, 130–58. A welcome corrective to Polish narratives is Snyder, Reconstruction of Nations, which outlines Polish, Ukrainian, Lithuanian, and Belarusian histories.   6 On Russian treatment of non-Russian minorities, see Weeks, “Tsarist Nationalities Policy”; Thaden, Russia’s Western Borderlands.  7 Figes, People’s Tragedy, 144–5; Kukiel, “Lelewel, Mickiewicz”; Blackwell, “Russian Decembrist Views.”   8 On Prussia’s role in the partitions, see C. Clark, Iron Kingdom, 230–39.   9 On Galicia, see Wolff, Idea of Galicia; on its economy, see especially Frank, Oil Empire.

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Notes to pages 22–3

10 On uprisings, see especially Leslie, Revolution of November 1830; on repression of Polish nationality, in addition to the works in notes 5 and 6, see also C. Clark, Iron Kingdom, 568–75; Lamberti, State, Society, and the School. 11 On Polish nationalism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see Porter, When Nationalism Began to Hate. Brock, “Polish Nationalism,” is foundational but outdated; Davies, God’s Playground, 2:3–59, provides a useful outline. 12 Biskupski, United States and the Rebirth, 6. 13 See especially Chmielewski, Polish Question. Jędruch, Constitutions, Elections, Legislatures, 249–62, provides a brief overview of all three partitions. 14 These two conceptions were the predominant ones across the partitions and are most important for the purposes of this book, but other important ideas of Polishness existed, such as that of the Galician peasantry; see Stauter-Halsted, Nation in the Village. 15 On National Democracy, see especially Porter, When Nationalism Began to Hate. 16 Perceptions of elitism in this Polish project led Ukrainian and Lithuanian nationalists to turn away from it after 1863; see Snyder, Reconstruction of Nations, 31–33, 134. 17 Figes, People’s Tragedy, 141; see Marx and Engels, Communist Manifesto, 43. 18 Among contemporaries’ accusations of Western ignorance, perhaps the most influential are Dmowski’s memoirs: Dmowski, Polityka Polska, 2:133, 147–9. Other accusations are mentioned in later chapters. Historians’ criticism of “ignorant” policy makers or general “ignorance” include Borejsza, “De Sedan à Versailles,” 97, about the French; Latawski, “Great Britain,” 4; and Nowak-Kiełbikowa, Polska-Wielka Brytania, 413, about the British; Wandycz, “Western Images and Stereotypes,” 9, about Westerners; Nowak, Pierwsza zdrada Zachodu, 121, about US Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby, and 353 about Lloyd George; LundgreenNielsen, “Aspects,” 101n37, about US geographer Isaiah Bowman. 19 Watt, Personalities and Policies, 1–15. 20 Most works that examine the British foreign-­policy-making elite do so in the context of Watt’s characterization; see Steiner, Foreign Office; also Steiner, “Elitism and Foreign Policy,” a reconsideration of some of her ­earlier views and a defence of others; Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar, 3–50; Otte, Foreign Office Mind. On France, P. Jackson, Beyond the Balance, explicitly grounds his analysis of French security policy in

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Notes to pages 23–6 201

Watt’s concept; Hayne, French Foreign Office, does not, but remains ­valuable for understanding French foreign policy makers. The “foreignpolicy-making élite” has not been used to describe United States policy makers, though it would provide focus to those works that consider their views closely, for example Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind; Jacobs, Imagining the Middle East. 21 Steiner, “Elitism and Foreign Policy,” 30; she does note that Lord Rothschild, a Jew, was “received … [by] the highest policy circles” (34). 22 On foreign policy, see Sluga, Nation, Psychology, 106–31; in the empire, including by representing the British Raj, see Bush, Edwardian Ladies; MacMillan, Women of the Raj. 23 Steiner, Foreign Office, 20. 24 On emotional norms, see Dixon, Weeping Britannia; Stearns, American Cool; Forth, Dreyfus Affair, 30–1. 25 Joll, 1914: The Unspoken Assumptions, 6–7. Joll’s call for further study of unspoken assumptions remains influential in recent work, for example Otte, Foreign Office Mind; MacMillan, War That Ended Peace, especially 228–352. This discussion also draws inspiration from the wealth of works produced on the formation of collective identities, for example Fentress and Wickham, Social Memory; Portelli, Death of Luigi Trastulli; as well as studies of mentalités in the longue durée by Annales school historians, such as Bloch, Royal Touch; Ladurie, Montaillou; and works by those cultural historians influenced by the Annales school, for example, Darnton, Great Cat Massacre; Zemon Davis, Return of Martin Guerre. 26 For example, Steiner and Dockrill, “Foreign Office,” 67–8; Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 6–7; P. Jackson, Beyond the Balance, 28. 27 Link, Wilson and the Progressive Era, 10. See also Cooper, Wilson, 120–81. 28 On Clemenceau, see D.R. Watson, Clemenceau; Duroselle, Clemenceau. 29 Grigg, Young Lloyd George, 54. 30 Hanak, Great Britain and Austria-Hungary, 58. 31 Keys, “Diplomat’s Two Minds”; P. Jackson, Beyond the Balance, 22; Steiner, “Elitism and Foreign Policy,” 31; Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 6–7; Manela, Wilsonian Moment, 28–29. 32 Mösslang and Riotte, “Introduction,” 11–14. MacMillan, War That Ended Peace, 228–65 outlines this culture in some detail. 33 Schulzinger, Diplomatic Mind, 6. See, for example, Hugh Gibson: Swerczek, “Hugh Gibson,” 9–10. 34 Bayly, Birth of the Modern World, 13–14. 35 On internationalisms, see especially Gorman, International Cooperation, an admirable synthesis of recent scholarship, including on major

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Notes to pages 26–9

non-Western (particularly Chinese and Indian), Black, and Indigenous ­perspectives. Sluga, Internationalism, 11–44, focuses on Western internationalisms. 36 See especially Hobsbawm, Age of Empire. London had become the world financial hub as well as the centre of the world’s biggest empire; see Darwin, Empire Project, 4–6. Belich, Replenishing the Earth, notes the extensive integration of finance, trade, and populations (through immigration) between Britain and the United States and includes the latter in his definition of the “Anglo-World.” 37 On ideologies and the emphasis on progress, see the optimistic account of European politics in Mazower, Governing the World, 35–115. Bayly, Birth of the Modern World, 284–324, offers a global, multicentric critical narrative. 38 See Scully, British Images of Germany; Barclay and Glaser-Schmidt, Transatlantic Images and Perceptions. The French view of Germany was more antagonistic. See, for example, Chrastil, Organizing for War. 39 Duroselle, Clemenceau, 814. 40 Georges Clemenceau, “La ‘Question d’Alsace-Lorraine,’” L’homme libre, 3 June 1913. 41 Nowak, Pierwsza zdrada Zachodu, 327. 42 On Namier, see Rose, Lewis Namier and Zionism; Ng, Nationalism and Political Liberty; and Namier, Lewis Namier, a sympathetic biography by his wife. See also chapters 2, 4, and 5. 43 Lord, Second Partition of Poland. 44 My thanks to Erez Manela for sharing this anecdote. 45 Landau, Paderewski, 102; Zamoyski, Paderewski, 138–39. 46 apip , 38–9, 42–3. 47 See especially Porter, When Nationalism Began to Hate. 48 On Polish participation in the Russian Duma, see especially Chmielewski, Polish Question. 49 Jeziorny, Londyn wobec ochrony, 11. Paderewski’s association with and support for Dmowski, a virulent anti-Semite, earned the pianist the displeasure of his Jewish friends and associates, including the famous Polish-Jewish sculptor Alfred Nossig; apip , 1:44–6. See also Zamoyski, Paderewski, 143–4. 50 Gooch and Hancock, British Documents 9: 225–6. On Nicolson’s tenure and views, see Neilson, “My Beloved Russians.” 51 Another example is the well-connected Józef Retinger, whose father-in-law was the famous reformer E.D. Morel. He met informally with influential British leaders before and during the war; Biskupski, “Spy, Patriot, or

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Notes to pages 30–1 203

Internationalist?,” 31–6. In 1914, Retinger also enlisted the assistance of the famous Polish-British author Joseph Conrad (born Józef Konrad Korzeniowski); Biskupski, “Conrad and the International Politics.” 52 Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar, 4. 53 From Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar, 4. The “serious press” played an important role in reflecting and shaping public debate. On its role in Britain and limitations for the study of public opinion, see Watt, Personalities and Policies, 10–13, which also names the “serious” dailies and weeklies; for France, see Miquel, Paix de Versailles, 12–22. In the United States, popular opinion had greater influence over certain major questions of foreign policy; Preston, Sword of the Spirit, 8–9. 54 On Poland as a “terra incognita” for the British before 1914, see Latawski, “Great Britain,” 13–62. Biskupski’s work on Wilson’s early views of Poles is also instructive; see Biskupski, “United States and Rebirth,” 345–51; complemented by Biskupski, United States and the Rebirth, 181–5. 55 See especially Bayly, Birth of the Modern World. 56 Lieven, Towards the Flame, 57–8. A multitude of excellent works examine European politics immediately preceding the First World War. Some recent books include MacMillan, War That Ended Peace, 353–592; C. Clark, Sleepwalkers. 57 On the foreign policies of the partitioning powers before 1914, see, in addition to the above, Bridge, From Sadowa to Sarajevo; Kennedy, Anglo-German Antagonism. On the Polish question in Russian policy, see Mankoff, “Russia and the Polish Question”; Bobroff, “Devolution in Wartime.” 58 Bobroff, “Devolution in Wartime,” 510; Mankoff, “Russia and the Polish Question,” 743. Russia and Austria made similar promises to Ukrainian nationalists. Like Poles, Ukrainians lived on both sides of the border. See Frank, Oil Empire, 180–1. 59 For example, ddf , 1871–1914, 3e série, 8:547. Concerns about whether Russian Poles would be loyal to Russia in an eventual war were raised, albeit tangentially, in several diplomatic dispatches from Warsaw and St Petersburg beginning around 1909; see also ddf , 1871–1914, 2e série, vols. 12–14 in particular. 60 ddf , 1871–1914, 2e série, 7:278. 61 On French policy, see Keiger, France and the World; Girault, Emprunts russes. On British policy, see Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar; Lowe and Dockrill, Mirage of Power, vol. 1; Steiner, Foreign Office. Recent works on American policy that assert that the United States was not as isolationist as previous historians have argued include Herring, From Colony to

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Notes to pages 31–2

Superpower; Mead, Special Providence. Frank, “Petroleum War of 1910” provides a well-conceptualized example of American involvement in the Galician oil fields. 62 Mazower, Governing the World, 50–1. 63 Pasieka, “British Press,” 17; Halecki, “Anglo-Polish Relations,” 659; Kennedy, Anglo-German Antagonism, 10. 64 Hanak, Great Britain and Austria-Hungary, 9. 65 apip , 1:42–3. Dmowski does not mention the incident in his memoirs. 66 “Russia in Poland: A Heavy Blow to National Development,” Manchester Guardian, 30 December 1907. See also, for example, “The Policy and Condition of Russia,” Economist, 28 September 1912, which mentions the Polish minority in a scathing article about Russia. For British prewar perceptions of Russia, see Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar, 52–103. For articles in the American press, see, for example, “50,000 Poles parade, denouncing the Czar,” New York Times, 6 May 1906. On US perceptions of Russia before 1914, see Foglesong, American Mission, 1–9. 67 h c Deb 11 July 1911 vol 28 c177. Her case was mentioned several times in Parliament in July 1911; the proceedings were printed in the Times. One hundred eleven m ps signed a petition for her release in August. See also Steiner and Neilson, Britain and the Origins. When she was convicted in May 1912, the popular daily the Telegraph also ran numerous stories until her release in early June. My thanks to Sam Coggeshall for directing me to this incident. 68 On colonization attempts, see “Prussia’s Scheme for the Germanising of Poland,” Manchester Guardian, 13 May 1903; “German Policy in Poland,” Manchester Guardian, 2 December 1912; Viator (alias for R.W. Seton-Watson), “The Polish Danger,” Times, 3 January 1901. On the general situation for Poles in Germany, see “Editorial,” Manchester Guardian, 5 September 1902. 69 Hanak, Great Britain and Austria-Hungary, 6–10. 70 Borejsza, “De Sedan à Versailles,” 96–7; see also Tomaszewski, “Tsarist Manipulation.” 71 Based on search results for “Poland,” “Pologne,” and “Polonais” from 1900 to 1914 in full-text databases of the Times, the Manchester Guardian, Le Temps, and the New York Times. The subject is worthy of further study, as there is little information in the secondary literature, but this is beyond the scope of this book. 72 Barclay and Glaser-Schmidt, “Introduction,” 12–13. 73 Among many works on Franco-Polish relations, see Ponty, Les Polonais en France; Michel, “France et Pologne”; Masłowski, “La culture française et la culture polonaise”; Łaptos, “Le rôle des stéréotypes.”

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Notes to pages 32–4 205

74 There are varying estimates of how many Poles emigrated after 1831. The highest figure, 25,000, is offered in the detailed study of Włoszczewski, L’établissement des Polonais, 41; the lower figure, 10,000, is more widely accepted. See Lequin, Histoire des étrangers, 315–25. 75 Ponty, Les Polonais en France, 47–53. 76 Włoszczewski, L’établissement des Polonais, 271. 77 For a discussion of various Polish immigration figures, see Pula, Polish Americans, 19. 78 Benton-Cohen, “Other Immigrants,” 33. 79 W. Wilson, History of the American People, 5:212–13. Wilson’s political opponents in the 1912 presidential election publicized the statement, and he quickly disavowed it; Cooper, Wilson, 151. 80 The best source on the proliferation of prewar Polish organizations in the United States is Galush, For More than Bread, 50–65; see also Pula, Polish Americans, 20–7. 81 For a general overview of those contacts that existed, see Latawski, “Great Britain,” 13–62; on literature, see McLean, Other East. 82 On the composition of the Polish immigrant community in Britain, see Davies, “Poles in Great Britain,” 63–6. A few hundred Poles fled to Britain after the 1830 to 1831 insurrection; Zubrzycki, “Polish Emigration,” 650. 83 Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe, 13. 84 Orzoff, Battle for the Castle, 10. On racial hierarchies, see C. Hall, Civilising Subjects, 17. 85 Poland is scarcely mentioned in studies of British priorities before 1917. See Rothwell, British War Aims, 18–58; French, British Strategy and War Aims; and on relations with Russia in particular, see Neilson, Strategy and Supply. The fate of Poland was more important to the French people than to the British during this period but was nonetheless a low priority for the government. On France’s general aims to 1917 (specific aims were not outlined before then), see Stevenson, French War Aims, 9–60; and P. Jackson, Beyond the Balance, 79–132; on France’s Polish policy, see Castelbajac, “La question polonaise,” 42–61; on nationalities policy, see Hovi, Cordon Sanitaire, 30–61. 86 This point is best developed in Mankoff, “Future of Poland”. On the relative importance of Eastern Europe in British policy during this period, see Calder, New Europe, 12–107; on press interest, see Hanak, Great Britain and Austria-Hungary, 36–202. For France, see P. Jackson, Beyond the Balance, 98–9; Stevenson, French War Aims, 26–32. 87 On the tsarist government’s wartime relations with its Polish subjects, see Mankoff, “Russia and the Polish Question,” 144–384; Blobaum, Minor Apocalypse; Bobroff, “Devolution in Wartime.”

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Notes to pages 34–6

88 Velten to Théophile Delcassé, 11 August 1914, c a d: Guerre 1914–1918: Pologne, vol. 713. 89 Quoted in Blobaum, Minor Apocalypse, 27. Kościuszko led a major Polish rebellion against Russia in the 1790s. 90 Quoted in Latawski, Reconstruction of Poland, 196. 91 Bobroff, “Devolution in Wartime,” 512. 92 Abrash, “War Aims toward Austria-Hungary,” 80. 93 Velten to Delcassé, 25 August 1914, Guerre: Pologne, vol. 713. 94 Ibid. 95 Calder, New Europe, 23; Biskupski, United States and the Rebirth, 80. 96 Adolf Hansen, “Russia Promises Poland Autonomy,” New York Times, 16 August 1914. 97 Dallin, “Future of Poland,” 13–14; Mankoff, “Russia and the Polish Question,” 12–13. 98 For the military operations on the Eastern Front, see especially Stone, Eastern Front; A. Watson, Ring of Steel; Herwig, Germany and AustriaHungary; Wildman, End of the Russian Imperial Army. 99 Velten to Delcassé, 5 October 1914, Guerre: Pologne, vol. 713. 100 Described in Blobaum, Minor Apocalypse, 30–5. 101 Velten to Paléologue, 5 November 1914, Guerre: Pologne, vol. 713. Residents of Warsaw largely cooperated with tsarist authorities up to the Russian retreat in 1915; see Blobaum, Minor Apocalypse, 44–57. 102 On Polish Francophilia, see Velten to Paléologue, 5 November 1914, Guerre: Pologne, vol. 713. 103 This encompassed not only government but also civil society, as shown in Chrastil, Organizing for War. 104 Miquel, Paix de Versailles, 21. 105 Stevenson, French War Aims, 21. 106 Ibid., 26–7, 32; Mankoff, “Future of Poland,” 755. 107 On British aims during this period, see Rothwell, British War Aims, 18–58; Stevenson, International Politics, 107–12. 108 Rothwell, British War Aims, 18. 109 For example, on 25 September and 9 November 1914; see Times, 26 September 1914, 10 November 1914; see also Calder, New Europe, 14–15. 110 Times, 26 September 1914. 111 See, for example, “Summary (House of Commons)” and “Editorial: Hands off Belgium,” Daily Telegraph, 4 August 1914. 112 Strachan, First World War, 1126; Hanak, Great Britain and AustriaHungary, 57–61. 113 Calder, New Europe, 15–16.

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Notes to pages 37–41 207

114 A Foreign Office clerk was roughly equivalent to a policy advisor, rather than a stenographer, as the term’s contemporary meaning implies. The importance of clerks in the Foreign Office’s bureaucratic system is outlined in Steiner, Foreign Office, 79–82. On the difference in function between Foreign Office clerks and the diplomatic service, see Steiner, “Elitism and Foreign Policy,” 24. 115 Lancelot Oliphant minute, 4 January 1917, fo 371/3000/7684. 116 Calder, New Europe, 10. 117 Hanak, Great Britain and Austria-Hungary, 45–6. 118 Quoted in Calder, New Europe, 25. 119 Ibid., 60, 73–4. 120 Ibid., 33, 46. 121 Cornwall, “Great Britain and Hungary,” 109, 113–14.

c h a p t e r two   1 Dallin, “Future of Poland,” 26. For an overview of the Polish civilian experience during the First World War, see especially Sukiennicki, East Central Europe; Davies, God’s Playground, vol. 2. Blobaum, Minor Apocalypse, provides a rich narrative of wartime life in Warsaw. Lehnstaedt, “La Première Guerre mondiale en Pologne,” introduces the historiography in English, French, Polish, and German. See also the works on the occupation noted below.   2 Letter by E.T. McCarthy, 5 December 1915, fo 371/2746/9699. On Polish refugees in Russia, see Gatrell, A Whole Empire Walking, 154–7.  3 Calder, New Europe, 60–1; this was especially true in the discussion of war aims in late 1916 and early 1917: Stevenson, International Politics, 134–7.   4 On public interest, see P. O’Brien, “American Press”; on the religious perspective, see Preston, Sword of the Spirit, 240–6; on economic involvement, see Brandes, Warhogs, 129–38; Strachan, First World War, 941–92.   5 Jusserand telegram, 24 August 1914, ca d, Série Guerre (1914–1918), vol. 713, f. 8.   6 Several recent works highlight American relief efforts during the First World War. In particular, see the works listed in Irwin, Making the World Safe; and Little, “An Explosion of New Endeavours.” Among older works, see Surface and Bland, American Food.   7 On relief efforts in comparative perspective, see especially Biskupski, “Strategy, Politics, and Suffering.” On the Armenian and Syrian relief efforts, see Patrick, “Wilson, the Ottomans, and World War,” 890–1.

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Notes to pages 41–4

 8 Biskupski, United States and the Rebirth, 124–7.  9 Galush, For More than Bread, 62. 10 apip , 1:60–2. 11 See especially Blobaum, Minor Apocalypse, 26–57, which describes Warsaw’s experience in detail. 12 Taylor, Frances Stevenson, 38. 13 apip , 1:67. 14 On Polish American groups and international relief efforts, see Biskupski, United States and the Rebirth, 41–97, 123–58. 15 Landau, Paderewski, 104, 109. 16 On Paderewski’s influence with House and Wilson, see Biskupski, United States and the Rebirth, 131–6, 201–8. For a broader view, see also Wolff, Woodrow Wilson, 56–114, which analyzes Wilson’s friendships with Paderewski and other Eastern European statesmen. The allegations in Gerson, Wilson and Rebirth, that Paderewski’s influence was somehow manipulative and immoral have been discredited. 17 House was particularly close to Wilson at this time, which was shortly after the death of Wilson’s first wife. See Cooper, Wilson, 192–4. There are many works on House. A recent biography is Neu, House. House’s early foreign policy work for Wilson is re-evaluated in Ferns, “Loyal Advisor?” See also chapter 4. 18 House diary entry, 12 November 1915, House Papers, Series II: Diaries [hereafter House Diary]. 19 On the diplomacy of Belgian relief, see den Hertog, “Relief in Belgium”; Biskupski, “Strategy, Politics, and Suffering,” 33–7. 20 House to Wilson, 14 November 1915, Sterling Memorial Library, House Papers, Box 120; House Diary, 28 November 1915. 21 House Diary, 3 December 1915. Baker soon became Wilson’s Secretary of War. 22 There is little documentation on the first meeting, which was likely on 7 March 1916 but may not have been until later that summer. See the detailed discussion in Biskupski, United States and the Rebirth, 202. 23 Paderewski to House, 22 December 1915, House Papers, Box 84a. 24 House Diary, 22 December 1915. 25 Gerson, Wilson and Rebirth, 76–9. 26 Frederick Walcott, quoted in Biskupski, United States and the Rebirth, 127–8. Regarding the press, see, for example, “Poland’s Children Dead,” New York Times, 23 January 1916. 27 House Diary, 12 November 1915; House to Wilson, 14 November 1915, House papers, Box 120.

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Notes to pages 44–8 209

28 Printed in “Appeals for the Poles,” New York Times, 21 December 1915. 29 Ibid. 30 On Polish relief in Anglo-American diplomacy, see Biskupski, United States and the Rebirth, 142–55. 31 Biskupski, “Strategy, Politics, and Suffering,” 43n51. 32 Walcott to Jerome D. Greene, 8 March 1916, Sterling Memorial Library, Frederick C. Walcott Papers, Box 3. 33 Walcott to Greene, 8 March 1916, Walcott Papers, Box 3. 34 Hoover to House, 23 February 1916, House Papers, Box 61. 35 Geoffrey Robinson to Walcott, 5 March 1916, Walcott Papers, Box 3. 36 Robinson to Walcott, 12 March 1916, Walcott Papers, Box 3; underlining in original. 37 House to Wilson, 13 January 1916, House Papers, Box 120. 38 Butler to Gowers, 11 October 1916, fo 395/41/203802. 39 Calder, New Europe, 57. 40 See ibid., 49–74. In a few cases the Foreign Office or Wellington House also published refutations to criticisms by Polish Americans; for example, Namier reply to Młynarski pamphlet, 21 July 1916, fo 395/41/146226. 41 Walcott to Greene, 14 March 1916, Walcott Papers, Box 3. 42 Biskupski, “Strategy, Politics, and Suffering,” 50–1. 43 Breckinridge Long to Pleasant Stovall, 21 November 1918, nac p, r g 59, 860c.48/186. 44 Denys Cochin to French embassy in Berne, 1 August 1917, Guerre, vol. 725, f. 1. 45 Wróbel, “Foreshadowing the Holocaust,” 188. 46 For example, “The Starvation of Poland,” Times, 7 February 1916; “A Hard Problem,” Times, 23 February 1916; “Through German Eyes: Poland under the Germans: The Food Exports,” Times, 24 February 1916. 47 Walcott to Greene, 8 March 1916, Walcott Papers, Box 3; Hoover to House, 23 February 1916, House Papers, Box 61. 48 “Through German Eyes: Poland under the Germans: The Food Exports,” Times, 24 February 1916; “Food for Poland: Appeal to the British Government: Mr Asquith’s Conditions,” Morning Post, 7 February 1916. 49 “Robbing the Corpse of Poland,” Daily News, 11 March 1916. 50 J.H. Harley, “Poland and Germany,” Morning Post, 21 January 1916; see also Harley and Mickiewicz, Poland Past and Present. 51 Hanak, Great Britain and Austria-Hungary, 64–74. 52 Calder, New Europe, 88. 53 “L’avenir de la Pologne Prussienne,” n.d. [January 1916], fo 371/ 2746/19318.

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Notes to pages 48–50

54 Hoffman, War of Lost Opportunities, 154. 55 On the German occupation of Central and Eastern Europe, see Liulevicius, War Land on the Eastern Front. Focusing on the Ober Ost military governate, which was separate from the Polish-governed entity, Liulevicius argues that German occupation of Eastern Europe in the First World War foreshadowed events in the Second. R. Nelson, “Utopias of Open Space” makes a similar argument based on occupied Poland; J. Kauffman, Elusive Alliance argues that the German occupation regime in Poland offered ­considerable governing autonomy to Poles and that comparisons to the Second World War are overdrawn. Blobaum, Minor Apocalypse rebuts this, arguing that material conditions in Warsaw deteriorated further under German occupation, whatever the occupiers’ intentions. 56 E. Grant Duff to Grey, 27 January 1916, fo 371/2746/19318. 57 Stevenson, French War Aims, 32. 58 Polish issues figure regularly in Paléologue’s papers and memoirs but hardly at all in Buchanan’s memoirs. Buchanan, Mission to Russia; Paléologue, Ambassador’s Memoirs. 59 Buchanan to Foreign Office, 5 March 1916, fo 371/2747/42936; Buchanan telegram, 26 April 1916, fo 371/2747/79517. 60 For example, in Pokrovsky to Buchanan, 8 January 1917, f o 371/3000/16233. 61 Sazonov claimed never to have discussed the issue with Buchanan. Sazonov, Fateful Years, 311. 62 Buchanan to Foreign Office, 5 March 1916, fo 371/2747/42936. 63 Ibid. 64 Bobroff, “Devolution in Wartime,” 521–6. 65 Buchanan to Foreign Office, 5 March 1916, fo 371/2747/42936. 66 Grey minute, 22 March 1916, fo 371/2747/53414. 67 Hugh O’Beirne minute, 22 March 1916, fo 371/2747/53414. 68 Davies, “Poles in Great Britain,” 69. 69 Wandycz, “August Zaleski,” 413; Calder, New Europe, 84. 70 Zaleski’s travails are further elucidated elsewhere, for example, Wandycz, “August Zaleski,” 412–13; Calder, New Europe, 89–90; Davies, “Poles in Great Britain,” 69–70. 71 Drummond minute, 4 August 1917, fo 371/3001/147721. 72 On Dmowski’s struggle with Namier, see Latawski, “Dmowski-Namier Feud”; Calder, New Europe, 88–93. 73 Rose, Lewis Namier and Zionism, 3. 74 Calder, New Europe, 56. 75 Ibid., 89.

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Notes to pages 50–3 211

76 Ibid., 93. 77 Until 1918, most of Namier’s minutes in the Foreign Office records appear to have been written last as no one has initialled at a later date. 78 Paget and Tyrrell memorandum, 7 August 1916, c a b 24/2/32; Goldstein, Winning the Peace, 13, 16; P. Jackson, Beyond the Balance, 105–6, 111; Soutou, L’Or et le sang, 163–4. 79 Quoted in Seton-Watson and Seton-Watson, Making of a New Europe, 188. 80 Quoted in ibid., 189. 81 Calder, New Europe, 80; on Russian policy, see Abrash, “War Aims toward Austria-Hungary.” 82 Mankoff, “Future of Poland,” 305–6; J. Kauffman, Elusive Alliance, 78–89; Sukiennicki, East Central Europe, 267–71. 83 frus , 1917: Supplement 1, The World War, 8. 84 Ibid. On the peace note and the Allied reply, see Stevenson, International Politics, 137–8. 85 Mankoff, “Russia and the Polish Question,” 379–81; P. Jackson, Beyond the Balance, 147. 86 Stevenson, French War Aims, 19. 87 On other such support in the press, see Hanak, Great Britain and AustriaHungary, especially 50–3. 88 Sluga, Nation, Psychology, 20, 22; Irish, University at War. 89 Seton-Watson and Seton-Watson, Making of a New Europe, 195. 90 Hanak, Great Britain and Austria-Hungary, 50–3, 57–61. 91 C. Clark, Iron Kingdom, 670–1. Masaryk published articles on the literature of “Pangermanism” in several issues beginning in the fall of 1916. This followed Tomáš Masaryk, “Pangermanism and the Eastern Question,” New Europe 1, no. 1 (18 October 1916): 2–19. 92 Hanak, Great Britain and Austria-Hungary, 103–4. 93 Considerable scholarship has analyzed Wilson’s intended program for international relations. See in particular Ambrosius, Wilsonian Statecraft; Gardner, Safe for Democracy; Knock, To End All Wars; and most recently Throntveit, Power without Victory. On rival conceptions of the League in US politics, see Wertheim, “League That Wasn’t,” 802–21. The limitations of Wilson’s seemingly general promises have also received extensive attention. See in particular Manela, Wilsonian Moment. 94 frus , 1917: Supplement 1, The World War, 27. 95 A thorough examination of Wilson’s mention of Poland, along with useful historiography, can be found in Biskupski, United States and the Rebirth, 233–53. A briefer analysis of the speech’s applicability to Poland and limitations is in D. Clark, “Apogee of Nationalism,” 69–70.

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Notes to pages 53–5

96 Reports to the French government are in Guerre, vol. 720, ff. 161, 168–79. For the British government, see fo 371/3000/28868, Rumbold to Foreign Office, 5 February 1917. For the United States, see the thorough survey in Biskupski, United States and the Rebirth, 253–8. 97 Gerson suggests that Paderewski promised to deliver the Polish vote if Wilson endorsed independence; Gerson, Wilson and Rebirth, 55–66. Paderewski also later exaggerated his involvement. As Biskupski notes, however, Wilson did not campaign on the issue. Wilson had also advocated Polish relief and vetoed language tests for new immigrants. (Congress overrode his veto.) This likely won him the support of most Polish Americans, many of whom were inclined to vote Democrat anyways. Biskupski, United States and the Rebirth, 203–4, 239–47; and a local view in Praszałowicz, “Milvaukee Ethnic Press,” 295. 98 Geoffrey Butler minute, 22 March 1917, f o 395/76/63597. 99 Also argued in Biskupski, United States and the Rebirth, 246. 100 Ibid. 101 D. Woodward, Trial by Friendship, 69; Carley, Revolution and Intervention, 6–7. For an introduction to the events of the February Revolution, see especially Figes, People’s Tragedy, 307–405. David Stevenson argues that the outbreak of the revolution ushered in “the most sustained attempts to end the war by compromise”; see his narrative in Stevenson, International Politics, 139–77. The Central Powers began a considerable propaganda campaign to convince Russia and Russians to stop fighting; see Cornwall, Undermining, 43–62. 102 See Dmowski, Polityka Polska, 1:349–50, for Dmowski’s account of his actions in his memoirs. Piltz’s actions were not at all coordinated with his colleagues in Lausanne, Marian Seyda and Jan Rozwadowski, who wanted to approach the Western powers first; see Florkowska-Frančić, Lozanną, Fryburgiem i Vevey, 315–16. Dmowski had also urged Piltz to approach the French government immediately; see Dmowski, Polityka Polska, 1:350. 103 Dmowski memo, 21 March 1917, fo 371/3000/62097. 104 Velten to Ministère des affaires étrangères, 24 March 1917, Guerre, vol. 722. 105 Dmowski, Polityka Polska, 1:349. 106 Dmowski memo, 21 March 1917, fo 371/3000/62097. 107 Piltz to Ministère des Affaires étrangères, 24 March, Guerre: Pologne, vol. 722. Two other petitions reached the Ministère des Affaires étrangères making similar demands; see Le Comité de la Pologne to Ministère des Affaires étrangères, 26 March 1917; both in Guerre: Pologne, vol. 722. Piltz had first written to Prince Lvov, the first prime minister of Russia, to

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Notes to pages 55–7 213

seek concessions; see Erazm Piltz to Prince Lvoff, 22 March 1917, Guerre, vol. 722, forwarded to the Ministère des Affaires étrangèreson 25 March. (The Foreign Office received this 28 March: see fo 371/3000/65655.) 108 See, for example, E. Grant Duff to Grey, 19 February 1916, f o 371/2746/38674. 109 Balfour to Buchanan, 22 March 1917, fo 371/3000/62097. Balfour composed a handwritten draft on 21 March, but the telegraph was transmitted the next day. 110 Buchanan telegram, 25 March 1917, fo 371/3000/63340. 111 Dmowski memo, 26 March 1917, fo 371/3000/63741. 112 Stevenson, International Politics, 108; Rothwell, British War Aims, 18. 113 Clerk minute, 26 March 1917, fo 371/3000/63340. 114 Hardinge minute, n.d. [26 March 1917], fo 371/3000/63340. 115 Balfour to Buchanan, 28 March 1917, fo 371/3000/63340. 116 Draft telegram to Paul Cambon (French ambassador to Great Britain), n.d. [28 March 1917], fo 371/3000/63340. 117 Chef Mission Militaire to Ministère de la Guerre et Général Cdt en Chef, 26 March 1917, Guerre: Pologne, vol. 722. See also similar reports in Velton to Ministère des Affaires étrangères, 24 March 1917, Guerre: Pologne, vol. 722. 118 Velten memo, 22 March 1917, Guerre: Pologne, vol. 722. 119 Minister of Foreign Affairs to Velten, 23 March 1917, Guerre: Pologne, vol. 722. 120 Browder and Kerensky, Russian Provisional Government, 1:322. The ­proclamation later provided the basis for the peace­makers’ provisional acceptance in the Treaty of Versailles of the reborn Poland’s sovereignty in “those portions of the former Russian Empire which are inhabited by a majority of Poles.” See frus : ppc , 13:792. 121 Komarnicki, Rebirth, 155–7. Paleologue suggested the influence of “extreme parties”; Paleologue telegram, 29 March 1917, Guerre: Pologne, vol. 722. 122 Buchanan telegram, 29 March 1917, fo 371/3000/66640. 123 Clerk minute, 30 March 1917, fo 371/3000/66367. 124 Buchanan telegram, 30 March 1917, and Clerk minute, 31 March 1917, both in f o 371/3000/67338; Rumbold telegram, 4 April 1917, fo 371/3000/70714. 125 “Les événements de Russie: La révolution libère la Pologne,” Le Temps, 1 April 1917; see also Śladkowski, Opinia publiczna, 168. 126 Gen. Morier to Minister of War, 29 March 1917, Guerre: Pologne, vol. 722. See also Communiqué from Agence Polonaise Centrale, 20 March 1917,

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Notes to pages 57–60

fo 371/3000/73033; Rumbold to Foreign Office, 3 April 1917, fo 371/ 3000/74756. See also J. Kauffman, Elusive Alliance, 98–9. 127 For example, Clerk minute, 26 March 1917, and Balfour to Buchanan, 28 March 1917, both in fo 371/3000/63340. 128 The discussion did not reach the Cabinet. See War Cabinet Conclusions for 21–30 March 1917, cab 23/2/18-27. 129 Balfour to Buchanan, 22 March 1917, fo 371/3000/62097; Clerk minute, 26 March 1917, fo 371/3000/63340; Rumbold to Foreign Office, 28 March 1917, fo 371/3000/66364. 130 Balfour to Buchanan, 28 March 1917, fo 371/3000/63340. 131 Buchanan telegram, 25 March 1917, fo 371/3000/63340. 132 Hardinge minute, n.d. [26 March 1917], fo 371/3000/63340. 133 On “direct” and “indirect” propaganda, see Cornwall, Undermining, 3–4. See below for more on dissemination of propaganda. 134 Dmowski memo, 21 March 1917, fo 371/3000/62097; Dmowski memo, 26 March 1917, fo 371/3000/63741. 135 For example, extract from Parliamentary Debates, 20 August 1917, f o 371/3001/165785. 136 For example, Lord Robert Cecil interview with New York Tribune, 21 March 1916, fo 395/41/54313. 137 For example, News Dept to Namier, 27 March 1917, fo 395/76/65520. 138 Among a wealth of works on American neutrality and entry into the war, see Knock, To End All Wars; Doenecke, Nothing Less than War. On the electoral politics of neutrality, see Link, Wilson and the Progressive Era, 241–5. Many international relations theorists debate whether American entry was brought on by “offshore balancing”; see Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics; a thorough response is G. Jackson, “Offshore Balancing Thesis Reconsidered.” 139 On American materiel and loans after April 1917, see Brandes, Warhogs, 138; on manpower, see D. Woodward, Trial by Friendship, 44–52. 140 Stevenson, International Politics, 171–2. 141 Kennedy, Realities behind Diplomacy, 163; on Anglo-American diplomacy in 1917 to 1918, see D. Woodward, Trial by Friendship; also Fowler, British-American Relations. 142 Buchanan telegram, 25 March 1917, fo 371/3000/63340. 143 Seymour, Intimate Papers, 3:43. 144 Ibid. 145 Lundgreen-Nielsen, Polish Problem, 33. This file or any mention of it was not found in the House papers.

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Notes to pages 60–3 215

146 On the Central Powers’ propaganda efforts on the Eastern Front in 1917, see Cornwall, Undermining, 43–62. 147 J. Kauffman, Elusive Alliance, 98–101. For a recent, thorough synthesis of Austro-German political perspectives on Poland, see Vermeiren, German Identity, 223–69. 148 Rumbold to Foreign Office, 28 May 1917, fo 371/3000/107523; Rumbold to Balfour, 29 June 1917, fo 371/3001/132545; Translation of Council of State proclamation, 3 August 1917, fo 371/3001/154240. 149 See Stevenson, International Politics, 139–69. 150 Hovi, Cordon Sanitaire, 60–1. 151 Howard to Foreign Office, 18 September 1917, fo 371/3001/181803; Townley to Foreign Office, 13 November 1917, fo 371/3002/216998; on Allied pursuit of a separate peace with Austria, see Stevenson, International Politics, 139–48. 152 Ruskoski, “Polish Army in France,” 42. 153 On contacts before Dmowski’s arrival, see Calder, New Europe, 19–21, 83–5; Davies, “Poles in Great Britain,” 66–7. 154 Howard to Drummond, 20 September 1917, Cumbria Record Office, Esme Howard Papers, dhw 4/Personal/19. 155 Spring-Rice to Foreign Office, 14 June 1917, fo 371/3001/119346. 156 Horodyski to Paderewski, 21 August 1917, fo 371/3001/164526. 157 apip , 1:162. 158 See Buchanan’s letters to the Foreign Office, 15 September 1917, fo 371/3001/180634, and 19 September 1917, fo 371/3001/183579. 159 Clerk minute, 3 October 1917, fo 371/3001/189230. See also his comment that the Polish cause was “just”: Clerk minute, 4 August 1917, f o 371/3001/147721. 160 Gregory, Edge of Diplomacy, 171. McKercher, “Catholicism” argues that Howard’s Catholicism never affected his work. 161 See the following despatches from Howard: 26 October 1917, fo 371/ 3002/211205; 29 October, fo 371/3002/207473; 12 November, f o 371/3002/216593; 16 November, fo 371/3002/219884; and 6 December, fo 371/3002/234811. 162 Hardinge minute, n.d. [c. 3 October 1917], fo 371/3001/189230. 163 Tereshchenko speech, 15 October 1917, fo 371/3002/211160. 164 Buchanan speech, 15 October 1917, fo 371/3002/211160. 165 Balfour to Buchanan, 13 October 1917, fo 371/3001/198716. 166 Buchanan to Foreign Office, 24 October 1917, and Balfour minute, n.d. [c. 27 October 1917], fo 371/3002/205880.

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Notes to pages 65–9

c h a p t e r t hree  1 Rothwell, British War Aims, 143–4; on Passchendaele, see Prior and Wilson, Passchendaele; on Caporetto, see Thompson, White War, 294–327.   2 Browder and Kerensky, Russian Provisional Government, 1:321.   3 On self-­determination discourse at Brest-Litovsk, see Chernev, Twilight of Empire.   4 On Bolshevik diplomacy to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, see also Debo, Revolution and Survival, 3–169; on its effect on the belligerent powers, see Mayer, Political Origins, 245–312; Stevenson, International Politics, 183–205.  5 Duroselle, Clemenceau, 587.   6 D.R. Watson, Clemenceau, 272.   7 On the early development of this strategy, see Hovi, Cordon Sanitaire, 62–87; P. Jackson, Beyond the Balance, 168–72. Castelbajac, “La question polonaise,” 86–7, focuses on the articulation of this strategy in Pierre de Margerie’s “long memorandum” of 26 November 1917.  8 Carley, Revolution and Intervention, 89–90.   9 See chapter 1. 10 sw c minutes, 1 December 1917, cab 28/3. 11 sw c minutes, 1 December 1917, cab 28/3. This became British policy for several weeks, though officials did not always agree with it; see Hardinge to Howard, 7 December 1917, Howard Papers, dhw 5/Official and semi-official correspondence/5; Gregory memo, n.d. [14 December 1917], f o 371/3002/236695. 12 sw c minutes, 3 December 1917, cab 28/3. 13 Filasiewicz, Actes, 309. 14 Ibid., 309. 15 On the speech and its importance, see especially Mayer, Political Origins, 313–28; Rothwell, British War Aims, 145–53; Fry, And Fortune Fled, 149–53. 16 Rothwell, British War Aims, 146–7. 17 McEwen, Riddell Diaries, 212. 18 Lloyd George, War Memoirs, 1514. 19 Latawski, “Great Britain,” 218; Fry, And Fortune Fled, 152. 20 Grigg, Lloyd George, 427. 21 Lloyd George, War Memoirs, 1513. 22 Hardinge and Cecil minutes, n.d. [7–8 January 1918], fo 371/3277/3379; telegram to Petrograd, 10 January 1918, f o 371/3277/3379.

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Notes to pages 69–72 217

23 frus , 1918: Supplement 1: The World War, 1:16. The Fourteen Points speech has been extensively analyzed; see in particular Cooper, Wilson, 420–4; Knock, To End All Wars, 142–7; Gardner, Safe for Democracy, 159–63. On the thirteenth point, see especially the extensive analysis in Biskupski, United States and the Rebirth, 328–36. 24 This is also pointed out in Biskupski, United States and the Rebirth, 330–1; Wandycz, United States and Poland, 119–20. 25 Wilson and House, for instance, debated the use of “must” and “should” in the Fourteen Points; see House Diary, 9 January 1918. 26 frus , 1918: Supplement 1, 1:15; Lloyd George, War Memoirs, 1513. 27 Balfour memorandum, 11 March 1918, fo 371/3277/46350. See also chapter 4. 28 House Diary, 12 January 1918. 29 Ibid. 30 Cooper, Wilson, 255, 271. 31 Stearns, “Girls, Boys, and Emotions,” 45–7, notes that, in the late nineteenth century, boys were taught to control and mask their fear and ­channel anger through appropriate means, like boxing. Stearns dates a shift in American culture towards emotional “coolness” to the 1920s; see Stearns, American Cool. 32 Biskupski, United States and the Rebirth, 333. 33 House Diary, 14 May 1917. 34 Cornwall, Undermining, 214–15. 35 Blobaum, Minor Apocalypse. 36 Böhler, Civil War, 130–6. 37 Biskupski, United States and the Rebirth, 331; frus , 1918: Supplement 1: The World War, 1:111. 38 Minutes of the Allied diplomatic conference, 15 March 1918, c a b 28/3; joint declaration by the Allied Governments, 16 March 1918, c a b 28/3. Polish representatives had requested that the Allied and American governments protest Brest-Litovsk, but the conference did not mention this request. Sobanski to Gregory, 15 March 1918, fo 371/3278/49693. 39 Townley to Foreign Office, 14 February 1918, fo 371/3277/29008; J. Kauffman, Elusive Alliance, 199. 40 Townley to Foreign Office, 14 February 1918, fo 371/3277/29008; Rumbold to Foreign Office, 15 April 1918, fo 371/3278/69730. 41 Cornwall, Undermining, 215–16. 42 There are few mentions of the content of propaganda directed at Polish groups aside from Cornwall, Undermining. Propaganda towards Polish nationals is not mentioned in such key works as Sanders and

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218

Notes to pages 72–6

Taylor, British Propaganda; Messinger, British Propaganda; or Steed, Through Thirty Years, vol. 2. Mock and Larson, Words, 257–8, 261, briefly discusses US propaganda directed towards the nationalities of the Central Powers but does not mention Poles specifically. US propaganda helped to make Wilson very popular worldwide. See especially Manela, Wilsonian Moment; Rossini, Wilson in Italy. 43 Creel, Report, 87. 44 Ibid., 81–3. 45 Hapak, “Film,” 27. 46 A. Watson, “Fighting for Another Fatherland,” 1138n6; Böhler, Civil War, 45. 47 Stevenson, International Politics, 216–21. 48 Cornwall, Undermining, 215–16, 358–60, 436–7. 49 Ibid., 214–16. Less information is available about any Allied and American propaganda directed at civilians in Russian Poland or the other partitions. 50 Mock and Larson, Words, 257. 51 Cornwall, Undermining, 267. 52 Sobanski to Gregory, 15 March 1918, fo 371/3278/49693. 53 See Stephen Pichon to French Ministry of War, 4 May 1918, fo 371/3277/146278. 54 “Le Comité national polonais et M. Clemenceau,” Le Temps, 8 September 1918. 55 Gregory minute, 18 February 1918, fo 371/3277/30343. 56 “Resolution No. 4: Czech and Polish Question,” 3 June 1918 [published 6 June], c a b 28/4. On 29 May, the United States government declared “that the nationalistic aspirations of the Czecho-Slovaks and Jugo-Slavs for freedom have the earnest sympathy of this Government;” frus , 1918: Supplement 1, The World War, 809. The Allied governments associated themselves with this statement in the resolution cited above. On US relations with Austria-Hungary and its nationalities, see Phelps, U.S.Habsburg Relations, 219–73; Mamatey, East Central Europe. 57 Cornwall, Undermining, 214–15. 58 On the Czech Legion’s importance, see Unterberger, Rise of Czechoslovakia; Perman, Shaping; Hanak, “France, Britain, Italy.” 59 Hardinge minute, n.d. [30 June 1918], fo 371/3278/108501. 60 Prott, “Tying up Loose Ends,” 729. 61 On the Inquiry, see especially Gelfand, Inquiry; also N. Smith, American Empire, 113–38. 62 On the Inquiry and Poland’s rebirth, see Biskupski, United States and the Rebirth, 393–417. This updates Biskupski, “Re-Creating Central Europe.”

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Notes to pages 76–9 219

63 On British preparations, see Goldstein, Winning the Peace, 9–89; Sharp, “Some Relevant Historians”; Steiner and Dockrill, “Foreign Office,” 55–60. 64 Lowczyk, Fabrique de la paix, 30–1. 65 Ibid., 116–23. 66 Chabot, “La géographie appliquée,” 102. 67 Lowczyk, Fabrique de la paix, 91–126, argues that the Comité had some influence, mainly because a core figure, Emmanuel de Martonne, became influential in foreign policy circles. 68 Report on Stockholm Conference by Stanisław Kozicki, n.d. [c. 29 May 1917], fo 371/3001/108369. 69 Ibid. 70 Rumbold to Foreign Office, 19 April 1918, fo 371/3278/69989; Gregory minute, 22 April 1918, fo 371/3278/69989. 71 Gregory, Edge of Diplomacy, 171. 72 Gregory minute, 21 April 1918, fo 371/3277/70004. 73 Rumbold to Balfour, 7 June 1918, fo 371/3278/105041. 74 See Namier to Tyrrell, 3 September 1918, fo 371/3277/146278. 75 Beneš, War Memoirs, 313. 76 Quoted in MacMillan, Paris 1919, 211. 77 apip , 1:162. The telegram, which was sent from Paderewski in California to Jan Horodyski in London, was sent via the Foreign Office – yet the Foreign Office copy is missing this crucial line; Paderewski to Horodyski, 28 August 1917, fo 371/3001/169054. 78 Wolf to Balfour, 31 October 1917, fo 371/3002/209275. 79 Oliphant to Wolf, 9 November 1917, fo 371/3002/209275. 80 Drummond to Kerr, 6 April 1917, Lothian Papers, gd4 0 /17/872/3. 81 For example, Namier to Tyrrell, 3 September 1918, fo 371/3277/146278. Namier had fallen afoul of a group of anti-Semitic Dmowski supporters at university in Lemberg, which informed his views; Namier, Lewis Namier, 61. 82 Kerr to Drummond, g d40/17/872/1, 5 April 1917. 83 Drummond to Kerr, 6 April 1917, Lothian Papers, gd4 0 /17/872/3; Memorandum on Poland by L.B. Namier, 2 April 1917, gd4 0 /17/872/2; Calder, New Europe, 154–5. 84 Quoted in Seton-Watson and Seton-Watson, Making of a New Europe, 231. 85 Panther, “Poles, Czechs, and Jugoslavs,” New Europe 3, no. 34 (7 June 1917): 227–9. Authors often published under a pseudonym. 86 See “A Polish Socialist,” “The Rise of Democracy in Poland,” New Europe 3, no. 36 (21 June 1917): 267–77; “A Polish Socialist,” “Polish Democracy and the War,” New Europe 3, no. 37 (28 June 1917): 332–42.

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Notes to pages 79–81

87 On the armistice negotiations, see Stevenson, International Politics, 221– 33; Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy, 53–116; H. Nelson, Land and Power, 53–87; Schwabe, Wilson, Germany, and Peacemaking, 30–117. On their relevance for Polish claims, see Komarnicki, Rebirth, 223–36. Further ­discussion of historiography and the events leading to the end of the war is in Mick, “1918: Endgame.” 88 frus , 1918: Supplement 1: The World War, 1:433. (Article III). 89 On the formal end of Austria-Hungary, see Mamatey, “Legalizing the Collapse.” 90 frus , 1918: Supplement 1: The World War, 1:434. (Article IV). 91 Ibid., 1:496. (Article XII). 92 Ibid., 1:466 (Article XVI). The article specified that “The Allies shall have free access to the territories evacuated by the Germans on their eastern frontier, either through Danzig, or by the Vistula, in order to convey supplies to the populations of those territories and for the purpose of maintaining order” (496). 93 Claims of Polish political and popular unity are found in, among others, Biskupski, Independence Day, 25, 31; Jędruch, Constitutions, Elections, Legislatures, 269–70; Ajnenkiel, “Establishment of Government,” 140–1; Kadlubowski, “Experts and Poland’s Frontiers,” 99; Komarnicki, Rebirth, 247–48. To paraphrase Tara Zahra, this reflects a tendency to project national unity when indifference or other motivations were equally present; Zahra, “Imagined Noncommunities,” 96–7. Some recent works credibly challenge this historical consensus, especially Böhler, Civil War, which argues that the National Democrats in particular sought an opportunity to supplant Piłsudski through 1920. 94 The peace­makers found the Czechoslovak government’s claims to be broadly representative of the population to be credible, even though the leading Czechs poorly represented German and Slovak opinion in the new country. See MacMillan, Paris 1919, 229; Cude, “Slovak Question.” 95 For a narrative of Piłsudski’s actions, see Biskupski, Independence Day, 22–34; for the wider context, see Ajnenkiel, “Establishment of Government”; on the establishment of armed forces, see Böhler, Civil War, 51–8. 96 Kessler, Diaries, 17; Komarnicki, Rebirth, 248. 97 Latawski, Reconstruction of Poland, 199–200. 98 Böhler, Civil War, 52. 99 p p k np, 13 November 1918, aan 39/8. 100 Balfour to Paul Cambon, 30 November 1918, fo 371/3277/189331. 101 p p k np, 13 November 1918, aan 39/8.

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Notes to pages 81–4 221

102 p p k np, 28 November 1918, aan 39/8. 103 p p k np, 24, 28 November 1918, aan 39/8. 104 p p k np, 17 November 1918, aan 39/8. 105 Piłsudski to Foch (2 telegrams), 18 November 1918, reprinted in Handbook “A”: A Collection of Recent Political Information October 14th to November 27th, Library of Congress, Woodrow Wilson Papers: Series 5B; 25 October–14 December 1918. 106 Projet de réponse au Général Piłsudski, 22 November 1918, a a n 39/8. 107 p p k np, 13, 22 November 1918, aan 39/8; Böhler, Civil War, 142. 108 p p k np, 22, 23 November, 11 December 1918, a a n 39/8. 109 p p k np, 16 November 1918, aan 39/8. 110 Clerk minute, 19 November 1918, fo 371/3277/189331. 111 Balfour to Cambon, 30 November 1918, fo 371/3277/189331. 112 Bowman’s notes, quoted in Lundgreen-Nielsen, “Aspects,” 98. 113 Drummond minute, 27 November 1918, fo 371/3279/193949. 114 House Diary, 4 December 1918. 115 On the fighting in East Galicia, see Eley, “Remapping the Nation”; Mick, Lemberg, Lwów, Lviv, 137–208. 116 frus: ppc , 2:412; see also Sobanski note, 13 November 1918, fo 371/3279/190852. 117 Mick, Lemberg, Lwów, Lviv, 146. 118 p p k np, 13 November 1918, AAN 39/8. 119 Sobanski note, 13 November 1918, fo 371/3279/190852. 120 Namier memo, 21 November 1918, fo 371/3279/191049. 121 Clerk minute, 23 November 1918, fo 371/3279/191049. 122 This incident is described in considerable detail in many historical works. See particularly Kaufman, This Troublesome Question, 81–93; Mick, Lemberg, Lwów, Lviv, 158–62. 123 Julian Grande, “Wholesale Massacre of Jews in Poland,” New York Times, 28 November 1918. 124 “1,100 Jews Murdered in Lemberg Pogroms,” New York Times, 30 November 1918. 125 The number of Jewish deaths is usually given as seventy-two or seventythree; for example, Mick, Lemberg, Lwów, Lviv, 159. Kaufman, This Troublesome Question, 93, argues that only fifty-two deaths were part of the pogrom. 126 Pichon to Jusserand, 3 December 1918, c a d, Z -Europe: Pologne, vol. 60. 127 Ibid.; Fink, Rights of Others, 119. 128 p p k np, 16 November 1918, aan 39/8. 129 p p k np, 30 November 1918, aan 39/8.

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Notes to pages 84–9

130 p p k np, 30 November 1918, aan 39/8. 131 p p k np, 28 November 1918, aan 39/8; Kaufman, This Troublesome Question, 48–9. 132 Paderewski’s proclamation (draft), 27 November 1918, a a n 39/8. 133 Levene, “Nationalism and Its Alternatives,” 524. 134 apip : 1:538. 135 Hardinge minute, n.d. (c. 21 November 1918), fo 371/3277/191322. 136 Walcott to Hoover, 23 December 1918, n a r a , r g 59, 860c.48/179; p p  k np, 2 8 December 1918, aan 39/ 8. 137 Stanisław Grabski to kn p, 16 December 1918, a a n 39/9. 138 p p k np, 4 January 1919, aan 39/9. 139 p p k np, 6 January 1919, aan 39/9. 140 frus: ppc , 2:427. 141 Ibid., 12:365–7. 142 p p k np, 5 December 1918, aan 39/8. 143 frus : ppc , 12:365. 144 p p k np, 14 January 1919 (afternoon), aa n 3 9 /9. 145 Paderewski to Dmowski, 14 January 1919, a a n 39/9. 146 Wędrowski, Stany Zjednoczone, 103. 147 frus , 1919, 2:741.  148 Bonsal, Suitors and Suppliants, 118. 149 Namier to Headlam-Morley, 18 January 1919, Headlam-Morley papers, h d l m 688/2/Namier. 150 “M. Paderewski Takes Office,” Times [London, England], 18 January 1919. 151 Namier to Headlam-Morley, 18 January 1919, Headlam-Morley papers, h d l m 688/2/Namier.

c h a p t e r f o ur   1 The French notes are the most detailed: “Première séance du 29 janvier 1919,” a a n 39/9. The English account, which differs slightly, is in frus: ppc , 3 :773–82. Dmowski’s narrative draws on the French minutes but adds his own recollections: Dmowski, Polityka Polska, 2:127–30.  2 Dmowski, Polityka Polska, 130.   3 Lundgreen-Nielsen, “Aspects,” 112n21.  4 Dmowski, Polityka Polska, 2:129. No other source describes this interaction, and if the gesture was intentional, perhaps meant as a rejection of Dmowski’s anti-­Semitism, it is surprising that Lloyd George did not tell anyone.

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Notes to pages 89–91 223

 5 MacMillan, Paris 1919, 214.   6 The historiography of national self-­determination at the Paris Peace Conference and in the postwar world is vast. The best work is Sluga, Nation, Psychology, which argues that the popularization of psychology and ideas of the national self affected the settlement. Weitz, “Vienna to the Paris System,” argues that the norm of state legitimacy based on the rights of populations, national groups in particular, rather than kingdoms or empires, exploded in prominence at the Paris Peace Conference. D. Clark, “Poland in the ‘Paris System,’” evaluates these two works with reference to the Polish settlement. Other works that focus on Poland are noted below. The peace­makers did not extend the principle beyond Europe. On imperial populations, see Manela, Wilsonian Moment; Wiel, Irish Factor, 353–95. On the establishment of a mandate system for German and Ottoman territories outside Europe, see Pedersen, Guardians, 17–44.   On the negotiations for the territorial settlement in Central and Eastern Europe, see especially MacMillan, Paris 1919, 109–42, 207–72; Sharp, Versailles Settlement, 130–58. Maier, “Consigning,” argues that the ­territorial settlement was evidence of a commitment to territoriality in international politics that dates to the 1860s.   7 Of the surveys of the peace conference, the most extensive treatment of Russian issues is in Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy, 284–346, 410–87, 813–26; MacMillan, Paris 1919, 63–82, offers an overview of a confusing situation.   8 The policies of the British, French, and American delegations have been treated extensively. On French policy at the peace conference, see in particular Stevenson, French War Aims, 133–97; D.R. Watson, Clemenceau, 331–79; Trachtenberg, Reparation in World Politics, 29–154; and P. Jackson, Beyond the Balance, 197–31. On domestic politics, see Miquel, Paix de Versailles; Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy, 647–72. On French plans in Poland, see Hovi, Cordon Sanitaire; Wandycz, France; Davion, Mon voisin, cet ennemi.   For British policy at the peace conference, see Dockrill and Goold, Peace without Promise; Dockrill and Fisher, Paris Peace Conference 1919; Goldstein, Winning the Peace, 229–78; for an overview, see MacMillan, Paris 1919, 36–49; on policy towards Germany, see especially H. Nelson, Land and Power; on domestic politics, see Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy, 133–66, 604–46; on Britain and the Polish settlement, see especially D. Clark, “Moderation and Stability”; Bryant, “Britain and the Polish Settlement”; Nowak-Kiełbikowa, Polska-Wielka Brytania, 61–166; Piszczkowski, Anglia a Polska, 71–121.

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Notes to pages 91–3

  On the United States at the peace conference, see Walworth, Wilson and His Peacemakers; Floto, Colonel House in Paris; for an overview, see MacMillan, Paris 1919, 3–16; on policy towards Germany, see Schwabe, Wilson, Germany, and Peacemaking; on domestic politics, see Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy, 119–32. Adam Tooze sees the first rise of a world order centred on US “moral authority backed by military power and economic supremacy” beginning in 1916; Tooze, Deluge, 8. See also works on Wilson and his policies cited in chapters 2 and 3. On the US and the Polish settlement, see Lundgreen-Nielsen, “Aspects”; Lundgreen-Nielsen, “Wilson and Poland”; Wędrowski, Stany Zjednoczone, 98–164; Schwabe, Wilson, Germany, and Peacemaking, 254–67. Wolff, Woodrow Wilson, 115–227, convincingly integrates Wilson’s “mental mapping” and “fantasies.” Additionally, two works that consider American policy in detailed analyses of Allied and Associated Power policy are Lundgreen-Nielsen, Polish Problem; Kadlubowski, “Experts and Poland’s Frontiers.”   9 See also Kadlubowski, “Experts and Poland’s Frontiers,” 123. 10 While long a subject of Polish interest, these conflicts have received considerable historical attention recently in English. See Böhler, Civil War; Böhler, Borodziej, and Puttkamer, Legacies of Violence; Gerwarth and Horne, War in Peace. A pair of earlier works complement this historiography: Roshwald, Ethnic Nationalism, 156–217; Eley, “Remapping the Nation.” 11 Böhler, Civil War, 61. 12 Protokoł posiedzenia wdziału politycznego Polskiej delegacji kongresowej, 31 March 1919, aan 40/4. 13 Maj. Douglas Johnson to House, 30 January 1919, Folder 2/763, Box 206, House papers. 14 Henry Wilson, quoted in MacMillan, Paris 1919, 30. 15 On the organization of the conference, see Temperley, History of the Peace Conference, 1:236–77; Marks, “Behind the Scenes.” Many useful memoirs portray the conference vividly, especially Nicolson, Peacemaking, 1919; Bonsal, Suitors and Suppliants; Headlam-Morley, Bryant, and Cienciala, Memoir. 16 Entry for 13 January 1919, Milton S. Eisenhower Library, Johns Hopkins University, MS 58: Isaiah Bowman Papers, Box 13.2, “Diaries,” [hereafter Bowman Diary]. 17 Bowman Diary, 16 January 1919. 18 Entry for 11 April 1919, Howard Papers, dhw 1/5, Howard Diary [hereafter Howard Diary]; MacMillan, Paris 1919, 134. 19 Cambon, Correspondance, 309. 20 frus: ppc , 3:471, 497.

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Notes to pages 93–6 225

21 Ibid., 3:642, 654, 662, 669. 22 Ibid., 3:487, 503, 584, 593; frus: ppc , 3:172. 23 Sibora, “Polish Foreign Ministry.” 24 Delegacja Polska Sekreteriat Generalna, “Raport 3: Organizacja pracy Delegacji Polskiej na Kongres Pokoju w Paryżu,” 9 February 1919, a a n, Collection 40: Delegacja Polska na Konferensowę Pokojową w Paryżu, folder 1. 25 Regulamin Polskiej Delegacji, 21 May 1919, a a n 40/2. 26 Delegacja Polska Sekreteriat Generalna, “Raport nr. I: Organizacja pracy Delegacji Polskiej na Kongres Pokoju w Paryżu,” n.d. [~26 January 1919], aan 40/1. 27 Delegacja Polska Sekreteriat Generalna, “Raport nr. 3: Organizacja pracy Delegacji Polskiej na Kongres Pokoju w Paryżu,” 9 February 1919, a a n 40/1; Delegacja Polska Sekretariat Generalna, “Raport No. 6: Organizacja pracy Delegacji Polskiej na Kongres Pokoju w Paryżu,” 5 April 1919, aan 40/1. 28 Biskupski, Independence Day, 28–9; Böhler, Civil War, 41; Ajnenkiel, “Establishment of Government,” 134. 29 Böhler, Civil War, 52. 30 A rich description from the chief German negotiator is Kessler, Diaries, 15–34. 31 Sibora, “Polish Foreign Ministry,” 170–4. 32 p p k np, 22 December 1918, aan 39/8. 33 Ibid. 34 Stanisław Grabski to kn p, 16 December 1918, a a n 39/9. 35 p p k np, 12 December 1918, aan 39/8. 36 p p k np, 22, 28 December 1918, aan 39/8; 4 January 1919, a a n 39/9. 37 Paderewski to House, 1 January 1919, House Papers, box 84a, folder 2936. 38 frus: ppc , 3:590–3. 39 On the mission’s activities, see Lundgreen-Nielsen, Polish Problem, 180–93. Sierpowski, “Działalność Misji Międzysojuszniczej,” is the only work that focuses on the mission. It provides a useful overview but is not based on archival sources. 40 British Empire Delegation minutes, 23 January 1919, fo 374/22. 41 “Instructions for the Delegates of the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy, Composing the Mission to Poland,” 1 February 1919, ac np, 181.213/7. 42 On the uprising, see Böhler, Civil War, 97–104. 43 The Wade mission’s activities are discussed thoroughly in Jeziorny, “Misja Harry’ego Wade’a.”

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Notes to pages 96–9

44 frus : ppc , 2:423–4. 45 p p k np, 4 January 1919, aan 39/9. 46 frus : ppc , 3:775. 47 Inter-Allied mission to Poland, procès-verbal, 13 February 1919, ac np, 181.21301/3; Commission on Polish Affairs, minutes, 24 February 1919, ac np, 181.213201/2. 48 frus : ppc , 4:39. 49 Inter-Allied mission telegram to Paris Peace Conference, 14 February 1919, ac np, 181.21301/6; 50 frus: ppc , 4:24. 51 Howard Diary, 5 March 1919. 52 Howard Diary, 9 March 1919. 53 Négotiations de Posen: Projet d›accord, 27 March 1919, ac np, 181.21301/51. 54 On the diplomacy of the Teschen dispute, see especially Perman, Shaping, 97–120, 228–57, 266–75; Davion, Mon voisin, cet ennemi, 37–176; Lundgreen-Nielsen, Polish Problem, 247–51, 273–6; and Wandycz, France, 75–103. 55 Accord between the Czech and Polish Councils, 5 November 1918, ac np, 181.213301/21. 56 For population statistics, see Eberhardt, Między Rosją a Niemcami, 82, 117. 57 Compte-rendu du Gén. Barthélémy, 12 February 1919, acnp, 181.21301/5. The report identifies the troops as “Czech,” not “Czechoslovak.” Böhler, Civil War, 115–21, provides a useful summary of the fighting. 58 “Proclamation par les troupes tchèques à leur entrée en Silésie,” 25 January 1919, acn p, 181.21301/5. 59 Böhler, Civil War, 117–19. 60 Telegram to Peace Conference, 13 February 1919, ac np, 181.21301/3. 61 Howard Diary, 3 March 1919. 62 Coulson telegram, 22 March 1919, fo 608/58/5458. 63 Davion, Mon voisin, cet ennemi, 23. 64 Inter-Allied mission to Poland, procès-verbal, 14 February 1919, ac np, 181.21301/5. 65 Ibid. 66 Quoted in letter from Lt Lamarque to Gen. Barthélémy, 13 February 1919, ac n p, 181.21301/5. 67 Inter-Allied mission to Poland, Procès-verbal, 15 February 1919, ac np, 181.21301/7. 68 Ibid.

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Notes to pages 99–103 227

69 Ibid. 70 On the response of politicians in Poland to the pogrom, see Mick, Lemberg, Lwów, Lviv, 162–72. 71 Howard Diary, 17 February 1919. Howard’s perspective is analyzed ­further in D. Clark, “Moderation and Stability.” 72 Howard to Kerr, 17 February 1919, Lothian Papers, gd4 0 /17/879/1. 73 Lord to Bowman, 9 March 1919, acn p, 181.21302/70. The Danzig debate is discussed further below. 74 apip , 2:67. 75 Howard reported meeting flag-waving crowds in Warsaw, Lemberg, and Posen; Howard Diary, 12, 24 February, 9 March 1919. In the spring, the US minister Hugh Gibson reported similar encounters; see Reed, American in Warsaw, 44–82. 76 apip , 2:66. 77 Ibid., 2:66–7. 78 Inter-Allied mission to Poland, Procès-verbal, 13 February 1919, ac np, 181.21301/4. 79 On wartime cultural mobilization at the peace conference, see Horne and Kramer, German Atrocities, 329–37. 80 Horne and Kramer, German Atrocities, 355. 81 Hunczak, “Namier and Eastern Galicia,” 202. 82 frus: ppc , 3:1007; frus: ppc, 4:141. The most thorough examinations of the workings of the commissions are Lundgreen-Nielsen, Polish Problem; Kadlubowski, “Experts and Poland’s Frontiers.” 83 Report No. 1 of the Commission on Polish Affairs, 12 March 1919, ac np, 181.213202/1. 84 Kadlubowski, “Experts and Poland’s Frontiers,” 130. 85 “Première séance du 29 janvier 1919,” a a n 39/9. 86 wnf s minutes, 6 March 1919, acn p, 181.2132201/3. 87 H. Nelson, Land and Power, 176. 88 Howard Diary, 18 March 1919. 89 See in particular Lundgreen-Nielsen, Polish Problem, 269–73; Cienciala, “Battle of Danzig”; Oberdörfer, “Danzig Question”; H. Nelson, Land and Power, 145–97; Schwabe, Wilson, Germany, and Peacemaking, 234–66. 90 frus: ppc , 3:780. 91 c pa minutes, 6 March 1919, acn p, 181.2132201/4. 92 wnf s minutes, 6 March 1919, acn p, 181.2132201/3. 93 Ibid. 94 Ibid. 95 In addition to the above, see also Moorhouse, “Polish Corridor.”

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Notes to pages 103–7

96 wnf s minutes, 6 March 1919, acn p, 181.2132201/3. 97 Ibid.; c pa minutes, 6 March 1919, acn p, 181.2132201/4. 98 wnf s minutes, 4 March 1919, acn p, 181.2132201/2. 99 Headlam-Morley to Howard, 4 March 1919, Headlam-Morley Papers, h d l m 688/1. 100 The Howard-Lord agreement is discussed extensively in H. Nelson, Land and Power, 147–50. 101 wnf s minutes, 6 March 1919, acn p, 181.2132201/3. 102 c pa report no. 1, 12 March 1919, acn p, 181.213202/1. 103 c pa minutes, 9 March 1919, 181.213201/6 104 wnf s minutes, 6 March 1919, acn p, 181.2132201/3; also Dmowski note, 6 March 1919, acn p, 181.213201/4. 105 Bowman Diary, 9 March 1919. 106 c pa report no. 1, 12 March 1919, acn p, 181.213202/1. 107 Ibid. 108 c pa minutes, 7 March 1919, acn p, 181.213201/5. 109 frus: ppc , 4:316. Their discussion is examined further in the next chapter. 110 Mick, Lemberg, Lwów, Lviv, 175. 111 c pa minutes, 13 March 1919, acn p, 181.213201/8. 112 Howard Diary, 4 March 1919; Carton de Wiart, Happy Odyssey, 100. 113 Commission on Polish Affairs to Supreme Council, 18 March 1919, ac np, 181.213201/1. 114 c pa to Supreme Council, 14 March 1919, ac np 181.213201/8. The inter-Allied mission had been advocating this for a month; see telegram to peace conference, 14 February 1919, acnp, 181.21301/6. The debate over the transport of the Polish divisions is considered in detail in LundgreenNielsen, Polish Problem, 125–61. 115 frus : ppc , 4:379–80; cpa to Supreme Council, 14 March 1919, ac np 181.213201/8; cpa meeting minutes, 12–13 March 1919, ac np, 181.213201/7-8. 116 frus: ppc , 4:380. 117 Ibid. 118 frus: ppc , 4:383. 119 J. Cambon (cpa) to Supreme Council, 12 March 1919, ac np, 181.213201/7. 120 Poincaré, Au service, 11:270. Wilson expressed similar fears: pww , 56:127, as did the American Lieutenant Foster: cpa minutes, 13 March 1919, acn p, 181.213201/8. 121 frus: ppc , 4:381. Lord made similar remarks: cpa minutes, 18 March 1919, acn p, 181.213201/12.

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Notes to pages 107–9 229

122 Bowman Diary, 15 March 1919. 123 Mick, Lemberg, Lwów, Lviv, 177. 124 Howard Diary, 8 March 1919. 125 Böhler, Civil War, 6. 126 frus: ppc , 4:379. 127 Poincaré, Au service, 11:270. 128 frus: ppc , 4:414–15. 129 Ibid., 4:415. 130 Ibid., 4:417. 131 Ibid., 4:416. 132 Ibid., 4:418–19. 133 pww , 56:127–8. 134 c pa minutes, 20 March 1919, acn p, 181.213201/13. 135 frus: ppc , 4:417. In fact, Kisch also drafted the letter to the Supreme Council in which the Commission explained its decision: cpa to Council of Ten, 20 March 1919, acn p, 181.213202/2. 136 Many contemporaries describe the conference’s slow progress. See, for example, pww , 56:128; P. Cambon, Correspondance, 309; Mordacq, Témoin, 164–5; see also Sharp, Versailles Settlement, 130. On the workings of the Council of Four, see MacMillan, Paris 1919, 273–8; Elcock, Portrait of a Decision. 137 Headlam-Morley to Kerr, 5 March 1919, Headlam-Morley Papers, 688/2/Kerr; pww , 56:127. 138 “Some considerations of the Peace Conference…,” 25 March 1919, Fonds Clemenceau, g r 6n 80, Traité de Paix folder. 139 Ibid.; Taylor, Frances Stevenson, 176. See also Kerr to the Times, 28 March 1919, Lothian Papers, g d40/17/1241. 140 “Outline of Peace Terms,” 25 March 1919, Fonds Clemenceau, gr 6 n8 0 , Traité de Paix folder. 141 The leaders’ conceptions of Polishness and the Polish settlement are explained in further detail in D. Clark, “Poland in the ‘Paris System.’” 142 Taylor, Frances Stevenson, 176. 143 Bowman Diary, 29 March, 1 April 1919; Mordacq, Témoin, 184, 195, 220; Taylor, Frances Stevenson, 176–7. 144 “Observations generales sur la note de M. Lloyd George,” 28 March 1919, Lothian Papers, g d 40/17/61. 145 pww , 56:128; 57:69. On Wilson’s views on the Danzig problem, see Lundgreen-Nielsen, “Aspects”; Biskupski, “Free City of Danzig.” 146 Mordacq, Témoin, 186, 195. 147 Taylor, Frances Stevenson, 176–7.

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230

Notes to pages 109–12

148 Howard Diary, 11 April 1919, Howard Papers, dhw 1/5. 149 See in particular Howard to Kerr, 17 April 1919, Lothian Papers, gd 4 0 /17/888/1; Memorandum on Danzig by F.B. Bourdillon, n.d. [16–17 April 1919], Lothian Papers, g d4 0 /17/888/2; Paton, “Danzig as a Free City,” 17 April 1919, Lothian Papers, gd4 0 /17/888/3. 150 Kerr to Drummond, 4 April 1919, Lothian Papers, gd4 0 /17/884. 151 “Notes on the Report of the Polish Commission,” 1 April 1919, Lothian Papers, gd 40/17/882; see also Note on Paper 7593: “Future of Danzig” by Polish Commission, 19 April 1919, Headlam-Morley Papers, hdlm 0727/19/Danzig. 152 Howard to Lloyd George, 10 April 1919, Lloyd George Papers, F/57/6/1. 153 Headlam-Morley to Kerr, 12 April 1919, Lothian Papers, gd4 0 /17/886/1. 154 Paton, “Danzig as a Free City,” 17 April 1919, Lothian Papers, gd 4 0 /17/888/3; see also Paton to Drummond, 19 April 1919, Lothian Papers, g d40/17/890/2. 155 Headlam-Morley, “Memorandum of Interview, 17 April 1919,” Lothian Papers, gd40/17/889. 156 frus: ppc , 5:118. 157 Drummond to Kerr, 18 April 1919, Lothian Papers, gd4 0 /17/990/1; frus: ppc , 5:86. The Italians returned in early May as the treaty was being finalized. 158 Howard Diary, 30 March 1919. Gibson made a similar observation; see Reed, American in Warsaw, 57. 159 Polish was the language of the cultured élite; while most of the churches were Roman Catholic, most of Vilnius city’s schools were in the Russian language, and the city had a sizeable Jewish minority. Snyder, Reconstruction of Nations, 52, 306n2. A thorough study of national statistics in Vilnius (city and province) is Eberhardt, Między Rosją a Niemcami, 34–5, 42–3, though the author’s conclusions do not consider the possibility of national indifference or fluidity, and accept controversial census results at face value. 160 On the Lithuanian nationalists’ viewpoint, see Kupčiūnas, “Devil’s Paradise,” 28–45. 161 Dmowski note, 6 March 1919, acn p, 181.213201/4. 162 Less has been written about the peace­makers’ perspectives on the PolishLithuanian dispute than about Poland’s other contested territories. The best international history is Kupčiūnas, “Devil’s Paradise,” which is based on extensive research in numerous archives and several languages. The British perspective is considered extensively in Bryant, “Britain and the Polish Settlement,” 437–513. 163 Pralon telegram, 17 May 1919, Z-Europe: Pologne, vol. 69.

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Notes to pages 112–15 231

164 Dutasta to Dmowski and Voldemaras, 2 May 1919, Z-Europe: Pologne, vol. 69. 165 Kupčiūnas, “Devil’s Paradise,” 56–7. 166 Alston, Piip, Meierovics and Voldemaras, 62–3. 167 Rumbold to Acton, 29 December 1919, Rumbold Papers, dep. 26; Alston, Piip, Meierovics and Voldemaras, 64; Roshwald, Ethnic Nationalism, 120–2. 168 Howard Diary, 23 April 1919. 169 Howard to Lloyd George, 10 April 1919, Lloyd George Papers, F/57/6/1; Opinion of the British Peace Delegation respecting Special Delegates for Poland, 27 January 1919, acn p, 181.213/7; Inter-Allied Mission to Poland minutes, 5 February 1919, acn p, 181.21301/2; Hancock, Smuts Papers, 4:26–7. 170 On the peace­makers and the East Galicia settlement, see especially Lundgreen-Nielsen, Polish Problem, 217–25, 385–99; Hunczak, “Namier and Eastern Galicia”; Elcock, “Russo-Polish Frontier”; Bryant, “Britain and the Polish Settlement,” 355–436. 171 Inter-Allied mission to Poland meeting minutes, 5 February 1919, ac np, 181.21301/2. 172 Martynski report, 27 April 1919, aan , 2: Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych w Warszawie, 322/0/5068a. 173 Dmowski, “Note sur les frontières occidentales de l’État polonais,” 6 March 1919, acn p, 181.213201/4. 174 Frank, Oil Empire, 4, 174. 175 Inter-Allied mission to Poland meeting minutes, 5 February 1919, ac np, 181.21301/2. Dmowski’s rhetorical strategy is worth noting; the accusation may or may not be true. 176 Dmowski, “Note sur les frontières occidentales de l’État polonais,” 6 March 1919, acn p, 181.213201/4. 177 Inter-Allied Mission to Poland, procès-verbal, 14 February 1919, ac np, 181.21301/5. 178 c pa minutes, 7 March 1919, acn p, 181.213201/5; cpa minutes, 12 March 1919, acn p, 181.213201/7. 179 frus: ppc , 6:676. 180 Ibid., 6 :58. 181 Ibid. 182 Ibid., 6:57. 183 Poincaré, Au service, 11:458. 184 frus: ppc , 5:781. 185 Mantoux, Council of Four, 2:86.

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232

Notes to pages 115–17

186 Namier to Headlam-Morley, 18 January 1919, Headlam-Morley papers, h d l m 688/2/Namier. Namier had also used the phrase in letters to Kerr beginning in 1917: Namier, remarks on “The Problems of Central and Eastern Europe,” n.d. [April 1917], Lothian papers, gd4 0 /17/874. 187 Neither Kerr nor Headlam-Morley always concurred with Namier’s deep mistrust of “Polish Imperialism,” and both chided Namier for his unrelenting criticism of the Poles: Headlam-Morley, Bryant, and Cienciala, Memoir, 175; Kerr to Namier, 17 July 1919, Lothian Papers, gd 4 0 /17/216. 188 Turner, “Lord Lothian and His World,” 7. Billington, Lothian looks closely at Kerr’s foreign policy work. 189 Steiner and Dockrill, “Foreign Office.” 190 Hankey’s notes, in frus: ppc , 6:352, have Lloyd George proposing the plebiscite, while Mantoux, Council of Four, 2:420, has Wilson proposing the plebiscite and Lloyd George agreeing. 191 See Balfour memo, 18 June 1919, Balfour papers, Add. 49750, ff. 221–6. 192 Ibid. 193 Ibid. 194 frus: ppc , 6:677. 195 On the Upper Silesian issue at the peace conference, see LundgreenNielsen, Polish Problem, 367–71. The short section stops in June 1919 but is balanced. Britain’s role in the settlement has been much studied and is particularly controversial. Leśniewski, “Britain and Upper Silesia,” 29–65, contains many inaccuracies and is relentlessly defensive of all Polish claims; Komarnicki, Rebirth, 341–6, provides a muted version of the same defensiveness. Bryant, “Britain and the Polish Settlement,” 257–313, defends the British point of view. 196 “Poland,” October 1918, Lloyd George Papers, lg/f/2 0 1 /1 /1; “Value of Territories to be Ceded by Germany,” 20 March 1919, Lothian Papers, gd 4 0 /17/71. 197 frus: ppc , 3:778; Dmowski, “Note sur les frontières occidentales de l’État polonais,” 6 March 1919, acn p, 181.213201/4. 198 frus: ppc , 6:148; Dmowski, “Note sur les frontières occidentales de l’État polonais,” 6 March 1919, acn p, 181.213201/4. Prussian control of the region was first confirmed in the 1742 Treaties of Breslau and Berlin; the two states fought two further conflicts over it, including as part of the Seven Years’ War (1756–63). See C. Clark, Iron Kingdom, 190–210. 199 This point is well-developed in Bjork, Neither German nor Pole. 200 b e d meeting 32 minutes, 30 May 1919, fo 374/22. 201 b e d meeting 33 minutes, 1 June 1919, fo 374/22.

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Notes to pages 117–26 233

202 Ibid. 203 b e d meeting 34 minutes, 1 June 1919, fo 374/22. 204 Ibid. 205 b e d meeting 33 minutes, 1 June 1919, fo 374/22. 206 b e d meeting 34 minutes, 1 June 1919, fo 374/22. 207 Mantoux, Council of Four, 2:282. 208 frus: ppc , 6: 140. It is not clear what Lloyd George’s position was at this point. Smuts wrote Lloyd George on 2 June to argue that Upper Silesia should be assigned to Germany, a position that Lloyd George later advocated. Yet at this time, the prime minister responded, “Am I to understand that it is your proposal to depart from the principle of nationality and leave great numbers of downtrodden Poles under Prussian rule? That is the only way in which the eastern boundaries of Germany could be thoroughly revised.” Hancock, Smuts Papers, 4:218. 209 frus: ppc , 6:142. 210 Ibid., 6 :142–3. 211 Ibid., 6:143. 212 Ibid., 6:303. 213 Ibid. 214 Ibid., 6:304. 215 Lloyd George, quoted in MacMillan, Paris 1919, 220. 216 apip , 2:655.

c h a p t e r fi ve  1 pww , 55:319.   2 H.A.L. Fisher to Lloyd George, 21 November 1920, Lloyd George Papers, l g/f /16/7.  3 Sluga, Nation, Psychology, 124–30.  4 frus: ppc , 6:535.   5 Ibid., 3:775–6. Komarnicki, Rebirth, 247–8, argues that Dmowski had been admitting that Moraczewski’s government was “necessary” but does not include or analyze the evident bitterness in the Polish delegate’s speech.  6 frus: ppc , 3:775–6.   7 Paderewski to kn p, 21 January 1919, aan 39/1845.  8 Załącznik I do protokołu kn p nr. 160 [Paderewski’s draft proclamation on Jewish matters], n.d. [c. 27 November 1918], a a n 39/8.  9 Bonsal, Suitors and Suppliants, 118. 10 Prażmowska, History of Poland, 123–4.

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234

Notes to pages 126–9

11 frus: ppc , 6:535. 12 Kropotkin and Bealby, “Poland,” 917. The szlachta finally relented in 1791 and agreed to a new constitution under King Stanisław August, but this did not please Russia, Prussia, and Austria, who initiated a further partition in 1793. In 1794 Tadeusz Kościuszko, a hero of the American Revolutionary War, led a widespread uprising; in subduing it, Austria, Prussia, and Russia partitioned the remaining territory of PolandLithuania. The constitutional weakness of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth remains one of the major explanations of its demise; for example, Lukowski, Disorderly Liberty. 13 Paléologue telegram, 19 January 1915, Guerre: Pologne, vol. 713. 14 Komarnicki, Rebirth, 31. 15 Darwin, Empire Project, 201–2. 16 Paléologue telegram, 19 January 1915, Guerre: Pologne, vol. 713. 17 Gregory, Edge of Diplomacy, 174–6. 18 frus: ppc , 6:143. 19 Ibid., 6:945. 20 Ibid., 13:792. 21 pww , 63:24–5. Such arguments were an integral part of the defense of the Treaty of Versailles after 1919; for example, Tardieu, Truth about the Treaty, 424. 22 Also noted in Biskupski, “Free City of Danzig,” 82. 23 wnf s minutes, 4 March 1919, acn p, 181.2132201/2. 24 For example, in Dmowski’s presentation to the Supreme Council on 29 January; frus: ppc , 3:774–6. 25 wnf s minutes, 6 March 1919, acn p, 181.2132201/3. 26 pww , 55:243. 27 frus: ppc , 4: 418. Wilson’s evolving attitude on Poland’s territorial claims is best demonstrated in Lundgreen-Nielsen, “Aspects.” This modifies Lundgreen-Nielsen, “Wilson and Poland,” as he was given permission to use the Isaiah Bowman papers in 1988. Lundgreen-Nielsen argues that Wilson’s ideas about the Polish settlement changed between 17 and 27 March as Lloyd George attempted to modify the boundaries suggested by the Polish Commission; Lundgreen-Nielsen, “Aspects,” 103–4. 28 frus: ppc , 5:677–8. 29 Ibid., 4:316; Lundgreen-Nielsen, Polish Problem, 508n2, 509n8. 30 frus: ppc , 4:316. 31 Ibid., 4:415. 32 Draft of “Some considerations for the Peace Conference,” Lothian Papers, gd 40/ 17/ 61, f. 92.

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Notes to pages 130–3 235

33 Rumbold to Hardinge, 16 November 1919, Rumbold Papers, dep. 26. 34 Jędruch, Constitutions, Elections, Legislatures, 273. 35 Clavin, “Austrian Hunger Crisis,” 265–6. 36 This debate continued through the interwar period. The leading perspective became Keynes, Economic Consequences; competing historical views are outlined in Trachtenberg, Reparation in World Politics; P. Jackson, Beyond the Balance, 247–62; Clavin, Securing the World Economy. Poland’s importance in American conceptions of “stabilization” is best seen in Pease, Poland, the United States, and Stabilization. On American “stabilization” to Europe, see Tooze, Deluge; Costigliola, Awkward Dominion. 37 On industrialization in the partitioned lands of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, see Davies, God’s Playground, 2:120–30. 38 Roszkowski, “Reconstruction of the Government,” 144. 39 Jędruch, Constitutions, Elections, Legislatures, 378–9. 40 Frank, Oil Empire, 174. 41 Dziewanowski, Joseph Piłsudski, 64. 42 Roszkowski, “Reconstruction of the Government,” 144–8. 43 For a recent, clear outline of the war’s toll, see Blobaum, Minor Apocalypse. 44 Roszkowski, “Reconstruction of the Government,” 150–1. 45 On banking, see Landau and Morawski, “Polish Banking in the Inter-War Period,” 358–62. 46 Roszkowski, “Reconstruction of the Government,” 152. 47 Little historical attention has been paid to Western relief of Poland in 1919 and 1920. Two short works provide overviews of American-led relief program from the government perspective and are chiefly based on research in the ARA archives at the Hoover Institution: Adams, “Hoover and the Relief Effort”; and the editor’s introduction in Lerski, Herbert Hoover and Poland. A narrative of one private initiative is Szymczak, “An Act of Devotion.” These works provide reasonable overviews of the administration of relief, though the studies by Adams and Lerski in particular nearly amount to hagiographies of Hoover for saving Poland. The above works do not, however, analyze the importance of the relief effort for the Polish settlement or for the peace­makers’ perspectives of Poland, and no works among the specialist historiography attempt to elaborate on this. 48 Walcott to Hoover, 23 December 1918, nac p, r g 5 9 , 860c.48/179. 49 Bane, Documents of the ara , 18:3. 50 Howard Diary, 10 February 1919; see also a similar comment about Łódż by Lord Robert Cecil: hc Deb, 16 April 1919, vol 114 c 2966.

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Notes to pages 133–5

51 Howard Diary, 17 February 1919. 52 Delegacja Polska Sekreteriat Generalna, “Przedstawiciele w Komisjach,” 5 April 1919, aan 40/1. 53 Polish Delegation to the Peace Conference, “Approximate Estimation of the War Damages Caused to Poland,” (Paris, April 1919), a a n 40/93. 54 frus: ppc , 10:94. 55 Ibid., 10:95. 56 Historians’ recent interest in humanitarianism and humanitarian aid during the Great War has also included a number of works on postwar relief efforts, for example, Irwin, Making the World Safe, chapter 5; Clavin, “Austrian Hunger Crisis”; Cox, “Hunger Games.” 57 Bane, Documents of the ARA , 18:118. 58 Gen. Tasker Bliss telegram, 8 January 1919, nac p, r g 59, 860c.48/189. 59 Howard to Kerr, 14 February 1919, Lothian Papers, gd4 0 /17/879/1; Howard to Kerr, 22 February 1919, Lothian Papers, gd4 0 /17/879/2. 60 Bane, Documents of the ara , 18:3–4. 61 F. O’Brien, Two Peacemakers in Paris, 101. Wilson repeated this often to close associates, for example, his secretary Joseph Tumulty, pww , 53:709, and his doctor Cary Grayson, pww , 56:127. 62 Foglesong, America’s Secret War, 162. 63 frus: ppc , 10:94. Hoover had similar hopes for the American relief of Russia from 1921–23. Patenaude, Big Show in Bololand, 42–3. 64 F. O’Brien, Two Peacemakers in Paris, 158. Scholarship on international development recognizes, as Hoover did not, that short-term humanitarian aid is insufficient without broader, long-term supports. See Allen and Thomas, Poverty and Development, especially Ben Crow, “Famine and hunger,” 51–74. 65 Breckinridge Long to Pleasant Stovall, 21 November 1918, nac p, r g 5 9 , 860c.48/186. 66 p p k np, 2 8, 6 December 1918, aan 39/8. 67 William Phillips to Jan Smulski, 20 January 1919, nac p, r g 59, 860c.48/185. 68 apip , 2:8. 69 Hoover, An American Epic, 358. 70 Adams, “Hoover and the Relief Effort,” 5. 71 Lerski, Herbert Hoover and Poland, xi; Adams, “Hoover and the Relief Effort,” 5. 72 Frank Polk to Lansing, 8 October 1919, nac p, r g 59, 860c.48/271. 73 Gibson to Phillips, 5 November 1919, n ac p, r g 59, 860c.48/278. 74 F. O’Brien, Two Peacemakers in Paris, 132.

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Notes to pages 135–9 237

75 Paderewski to House, 1 January 1919, House Papers, 84a/2936. 76 See, for example, Paderewski to House, 22 December 1915, House Papers, 84a/2935, and House’s pleasure in it: House Diary, 22 December 1915. In 1919, Paderewski promised to build a statue of House in Poland, which pleased House greatly; House Diary, 2 February 1919; Paderewski to House, 25 January 1919, House Papers, 84a/2936; House Diary, 6 April 1919. 77 apip , 2:84. 78 Lundgreen-Nielsen, Polish Problem, 115. 79 Paderewski to Horodyski, 28 August 1917, fo 371/3001/169054. 80 frus: ppc , 5:677; see also Lundgreen-Nielsen, “Wilson and Poland,” 115–16. 81 frus: ppc , 3:674. 82 Sibora, “Polish Foreign Ministry,” 164; Jędruch, Constitutions, Elections, Legislatures, 270–1, 289. 83 Prażmowska, Ignacy Paderewski, 100–1. 84 Howard Diary, 10 April 1919; Jules Cambon note, 12 April 1919, s h d 6N80/Traité de Paix. 85 Reed, American in Warsaw, 41. House reports the meeting but not Paderewski’s reaction; House Diary, 12 April 1919. Paderewski saw House privately at least three times in April; see House Diary, 6, 12, 14 April 1919. Yet while Paderewski flattered House extensively, House and Wilson had grown apart over the past month and House no longer enjoyed the president’s confidence. Floto, Colonel House in Paris, 99–214, provides the most extensive analysis of the split. 86 Reed, American in Warsaw, 43. 87 Taylor, Frances Stevenson, 179. 88 Poincaré, Au service, 11:328. 89 frus: ppc , 5:713; Gibson had warned against this possibility a few weeks earlier: Gibson to House, 29 April 1919, House Papers, 49/1544. 90 frus: ppc , 5:676. 91 Ibid., 5:714. 92 Callwell, Henry Wilson Diaries, 197. Italics in original. 93 frus: ppc , 5:676. 94 Ibid., 5:782. 95 Ibid., 5:677. 96 Ibid., 5:755. 97 Ibid., 5:780; Mantoux, Council of Four, 2:150. 98 Lansing to Tumulty, 7 November 1919, r g 59, nac p, 860c.48/276. 99 “Autour de la crise polonaise,” 7 December 1919, c a d, Z-Europe: Pologne, vol. 49.

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Notes to pages 140–3

100 Rumbold to Curzon, 4 December 1919, Rumbold Papers, dep. 47. His warning presaged the establishment of Piłsudski’s dictatorship in 1926. 101 Prażmowska, Ignacy Paderewski, 105–6. 102 Pralon to the minister, 4 December 1919, Z-Europe: Pologne, vol. 49. 103 frus: ppc , 5:781. 104 MacMillan, Paris 1919, 231. 105 Temperley, History of the Peace Conference, 5:137. 106 Much has been written on the development of the Polish minorities treaty. The best sources to consult are Kaufman, This Troublesome Question; and Lundgreen-Nielsen, Polish Problem, 302–7, 341–8, 371–85; see also Fink, Rights of Others, 133–265 for the general picture. Two works examine American public and government perspectives: Różanski, Stany Zjednoczone wobec kwestii żydowskiej; Pease, “Troublesome Question.” Both are partial to the Polish viewpoint. Black, “Lucien Wolf and Poland”; and Levene, “Britain, a British Jew, and Jewish Relations,” write favourably on the lobbying of Lucien Wolf. On Jewish issues in Europe and Palestine at the peace conference, see MacMillan, Paris 1919, 410–24; Levene, “Nationalism and Its Alternatives.” 107 On the history of Polish-Jewish relations, see Polonsky, Jews in Poland and Russia. The region included the “Pale of Settlement” to which Jews were limited in late tsarist Russia. 108 Wróbel, “Foreshadowing the Holocaust,” 170–2. 109 Mick, “War and Conflicting Memories,” 257n1. 110 See Polonsky, Jews in Poland and Russia, vol. 2; Porter, When Nationalism Began to Hate. 111 Black, “Lucien Wolf and Poland,” 10. 112 On the Jewish experience during the war, see especially the overview in Wróbel, “Foreshadowing the Holocaust,” 177–96. 113 Mick, “War and Conflicting Memories,” 259–60. 114 Levene, War, Jews, and the New Europe, 226; Pease, “Troublesome Question,” 78. 115 Kaufman, This Troublesome Question, 244–6. 116 Ibid., 247–8. 117 Lewandowski, “History and Myth,” 55. 118 See Kimens to Balfour, 8 April 1919, and Fronczak deposition, 9 April 1919, in fo 608/66/7150. 119 frus: ppc , 5:680. 120 Ibid.; Mantoux, Council of Four, 2:90. 121 frus: ppc , 3:406. 122 For example, frus: ppc , 5:393.

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Notes to pages 143–51 239

123 Mazower, “Minorities and the League,” 52. 124 frus: ppc , 5:679. 125 Ibid., 5:394. 126 Ibid., 5:680. 127 Ibid., 5:680–1. 128 Mantoux, Council of Four, 2:91. 129 Second report of the Committee on New States, 13 May 1919, Service historique de la Défense, Fonds Clemenceau, 6N80, Traité de Paix folder. 130 Levene, War, Jews, and the New Europe, 15–17. 131 Black, “Squaring a Minorities Triangle,” 29. 132 frus: ppc , 5:678. 133 Ibid., 3:401. 134 Ibid., 3:395–400, 406–8. 135 Ibid., 5:440. 136 Protokoł posiedzenia wdziału politycznego Polskiej delegacji kongresowej, 31 March 1919, aan 40/4. 137 Dmowski, Polityka Polska, 2:154. 138 For example, in Paderewski to the Supreme Council; see Mantoux, Council of Four, 2:489. 139 Mantoux, Council of Four, 2:489. 140 Pease, “Troublesome Question,” 67–8. 141 Many of these are reprinted in full or as extensive excerpts in Reed, American in Warsaw, 77–115. 142 frus , 1919, 2:758. 143 Pease, “Troublesome Question,” 70. 144 Ibid., 72. 145 frus , 1919, 2:776. 146 Ibid., 2:781. 147 Pease, “Troublesome Question,” 75. 148 Ibid., 75–6. 149 Lord to Gibson, 14 January 1922, Hoover Institution, Hugh Gibson Papers, Box 51. 150 Kennedy, Rise and Fall, 199–202. 151 pww , 55:317.

c h a p t e r si x   1 “What about the Eastern Frontiers?” 5 May 1919, Lothian Papers, gd 4 0 /17/897/3.   2 See Gilbert, Sir Horace Rumbold; Wandycz, “French Diplomats in Poland”; Swerczek, “Hugh Gibson.”

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Notes to pages 152–5

3 On the formation of the Polish Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych (msz, Ministry of Foreign Affairs), see Sibora, “Polish Foreign Ministry.” There is no satisfactory study in English or French on the first years of the msz; even the most thorough studies of Polish foreign policy in this period do not examine it: for example, Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations; Borzęcki, Soviet-Polish Peace; Cienciala and Komarnicki, From Versailles to Locarno; nor do surveys: for example, Dębicki, Foreign Policy of Poland; Karski, Great Powers and Poland. 4 Laforest, “Investissements français en Pologne,” 109. 5 Frank, Oil Empire, 21; Laforest, “Investissements français en Pologne,” 107. 6 ddf , 1:31–5. 7 Ádám, Little Entente and Europe, 47–109, on the formation of the Little Entente; on Britain, see Lojkó, Meddling; Bátonyi, Britain and Central Europe. 8 Costigliola, “American Foreign Policy in the ‘Nut Cracker,’” 94. 9 One major involvement, a foray by Standard Oil in the Galician oil fields, ended in 1912 because of a combination of Austro-Hungarian economic nationalism and the antitrust lawsuit against Standard Oil in the United States. See Frank, “Petroleum War of 1910,” 37–8. 10 On Wilson’s defence of the treaty, see Cooper, Wilson, 506–34. 11 pww , 63:24–5. 12 h c Deb, 21 July 1919, vol. 118, c984. 13 France. Assemblée nationale, Journal officiel, 4098. 14 Cooper, Wilson, 530–3. 15 On Wilson’s time in office after the stroke, see ibid., 535–78. 16 Smulski to Glass, 5 January 1920, n acp, r g 59, 860c.48/299. 17 On Keynes’ history and his time at the peace conference, see Schuker, “Keynes and Reparations, Part 1,” 453–65; Lentin, “Keynes and the ‘Bamboozlement,’” 726–9. Keynes’ economic argument has been very influential, though specialists note that the content is contestable and notably Anglo-centric. See especially several works by the late Sally Marks, most recently Marks, “Mistakes and Myths.” 18 On the effect of Keynes’ book, see Marks, “Mistakes and Myths”; Trachtenberg, Reparation in World Politics, 108–10. 19 Cooper, Wilson, 556. 20 Keynes, Economic Consequences, 273. 21 Ibid., 79n2. 22 R. Foster to Gibson, 24 August 1919, Gibson Papers, Box 23.

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Notes to pages 155–8 241

23 Translation of article in Kurjer Lwowski, 10 July 1919, Lothian Papers, gd40/17/905/1; “The Polish Diet,” 10 July 1919, Lothian Papers, g d40/17/905/2. 24 Grigg, Young Lloyd George, 20, 32. 25 Kerr to Curzon, 9 October 1919, Lothian Papers, gd4 0 /17/908. 26 Ibid. 27 frus: ppc , 9:116. 28 Ibid., 9:100. 29 Ibid., 9:446–7; Karski, Great Powers and Poland, 43; Nowak, Pierwsza zdrada Zachodu, 155. 30 Pralon telegram, 8 December 1919, Z-Europe: Pologne, vol. 49. 31 dbfp , 1st ser., 3:903. 32 Rumbold to Curzon, 4 December 1919, Rumbold Papers, dep. 47. 33 Pralon telegram, 8 December 1919, Z-Europe: Pologne, vol. 49. 34 Translation of article in Naprzod, 5 December 1919, Lothian Papers, g d40/17/909/1. 35 dbfp 1st ser., 3:902. 36 Ibid.; Rumbold to Curzon, 16 December 1919, Rumbold Papers, dep. 47. 37 Headlam-Morley to Kerr, 19 December 1919, Headlam-Morley Papers, h d l m 688/2/Kerr. 38 Rumbold to Kerr, 6 December 1919, Rumbold Papers, dep. 26. 39 Kerr to Rumbold, 15 December 1919, Rumbold Papers, dep. 26. 40 Ibid. 41 Kerr to Rumbold, 30 January 1920, Rumbold Papers, dep. 26. 42 Ibid. 43 Nowak, Pierwsza zdrada Zachodu, 157. 44 Headlam-Morley, Bryant, and Cienciala, Memoir, 7–8. 45 Sub-Commission for the Study of the Eastern Frontiers of Poland, Minutes, 22 March 1919, acn p, 181.2132101/1. 46 frus : PPC , 13:792. 47 The most thorough study of the diplomacy of the war with reference to the Western powers is Nowak, Pierwsza zdrada Zachodu, which looks at British policy based on considerable archival research. Other extensive works do not use key archives, including Komarnicki, Rebirth, 397–748, which looks at all sides; Wandycz, France, 118–80; Wandycz, “General Weygand”; Wandycz, United States and Poland, 143–57. All of these works are quite critical of Western policy, in particular British. Three works by Norman Davies are also insightful: Davies, “Lloyd George and Poland”; “Poles in Great Britain”; “Britain and Polish Jews.” Davies,

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242

Notes to pages 158–60

White Eagle, Red Star, also refers frequently to British policy. Elcock, “Russo-Polish Frontier,” provides a general overview. 48 The principal work on the war in English remains Davies, White Eagle, Red Star; see also Zamoyski, Marchlands. Two works of diplomatic history also examine the war in significant detail: Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations; Borzęcki, Soviet-Polish Peace. A view from a British observer is D’Abernon, Eighteenth Battle. It is based on D’Abernon’s diaries, which he edited for publication. 49 Kerr to A.W.A. Leeper, 19 January 1920, Lothian Papers, gd4 0 /17/214. On Lloyd George’s reasoning, see also Nowak, Pierwsza zdrada Zachodu, 342–6. 50 On the Anglo-Soviet negotiations, see especially Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations, especially 3:3–59, 135–314, on the Russo-Polish War. On how the negotiations impacted Poland, see especially Nowak, Pierwsza zdrada Zachodu, 115–43. 51 Nowak, Pierwsza zdrada Zachodu, 328–43; Davies, “Lloyd George and Poland,” 136–7. The geopolitical theorist Halford Mackinder, whose “Heartland” thesis impressed Curzon and who visited with Piłsudski, also proposed British support for a regional federation, with Poland as the “pivot,” but Cabinet rejected his conclusions on 29 January 1920; Pelizza, “Mackinder and Eastern Europe,” 185. 52 Hovi, Alliance de Revers, 35–7; Carley, Revolution and Intervention, 89–90. 53 Hovi, Alliance de Revers, 36. 54 Leśniewski, “Britain and Upper Silesia,” 160; Pedersen, “Getting Out of Iraq,” 978. 55 Nowak, Pierwsza zdrada Zachodu, 338–40. 56 Millerand downplayed such concerns at the time, successfully broke the strike, and dissipated the threat of revolution in France. See dbfp , 1st ser., 8:279; Hovi, Alliance de Revers, 39. 57 On the settlement between Turkey and Greece, see MacMillan, Paris 1919, 427–55. 58 The classic work on France’s alliance policy is Wandycz, France, 27–185; see also Hovi, Alliance de Revers; Davion, Mon voisin, cet ennemi, 37–126; P. Jackson, Beyond the Balance, 364–70. Ádám, Little Entente and Europe, 47–109, revises some of Wandycz’s conclusions on the effect of France’s policy, albeit with little reference to Poland. 59 Ádám, Little Entente and Europe, 90–3. 60 On the Polish army’s formation and composition, see Böhler, Civil War, 38–45, 51–8; Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 41–6; Zamoyski, Marchlands, 16–35; Biskupski, “Military Elite,” 53–5, 57–69.

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Notes to pages 160–3 243

61 Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 41; Biskupski, Independence Day, 24. 62 Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 41–2. 63 Inter-Allied Mission to Poland, procès-verbal, 14 February 1919, ac np, 181.21301/5. 64 frus : ppc , 3:673. 65 Böhler suggests that the armed forces numbered about 500,000 in mid1919; Böhler, Civil War, 54. 66 Ibid., 56–7. 67 frus: ppc , 4:315; Böhler, Civil War, 55. 68 frus: ppc , 3:674. 69 Sibora, “Polish Foreign Ministry,” 169. 70 Inter-Allied mission to Poland, procès-verbal, 14 February 1919, ac np, 181.21301/5. 71 Howard Diary, 5 and 8 March 1919; Nowak, Pierwsza zdrada Zachodu, 311–54; Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 84–5, 92. 72 Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 45. 73 On Franco-Polish military relations, see Schramm, Francuskie misje, 13–133; Le Goyet, France-Pologne. 74 Henrys report, 26 November 1919, s hd gr 6 n/212. 75 Quoted in Gelton, “Le capitaine de Gaulle,” 124. 76 For example, Henrys reports, 15 February and 28 July 1920, Fonds Clemenceau, g r 6n / 212. 77 Gibson to Lansing, 24 January 1920, n a r a , r g 59, 860c.48/311. 78 Pralon to Clemenceau, 22 December 1919, Z-Europe: Pologne, vol. 49. 79 Ibid. 80 “Renseignements sur la situation de la Pologne,” 9 December 1919, Z-Europe: Pologne, vol. 49. 81 See Bordereau d’envoi á M. Laroche, 29 December 1919, Z-Europe: Pologne, vol. 49. 82 On these discussions, see Borzęcki, Soviet-Polish Peace, 21, 36–48; Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 136–45. 83 Telegram to Rumbold, 27 January 1920, c a b 23/20/7. 84 Ibid. 85 Conclusions, 29 January 1920, cab 23/20/7. 86 On the negotiations, see Borzęcki, Soviet-Polish Peace, which makes excellent use of both Polish and Russian archival sources. Other works, for example, Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, use Polish archival sources effectively but were written without access to Soviet Russian archives. 87 Rumbold to Hardinge, 1 February 1920, Rumbold Papers, dep. 26.

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244

Notes to pages 163–7

88 Rumbold to Curzon, 14 April 1920, Rumbold Papers, dep. 26; Borzęcki, Soviet-Polish Peace, 53. 89 Rumbold to Curzon, 2 February 1920, Rumbold Papers, dep. 47. 90 Ibid. 91 Borzęcki, Soviet-Polish Peace, 56–7. 92 Ibid., 65. 93 Nowak, Pierwsza zdrada Zachodu, 136–9; Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 103–5. 94 McEwen, Riddell Diaries, 313. 95 pww , 66:154. 96 Some historians have argued that France participated in plans for the April offensive, in particular Le Goyet, France-Pologne, 26; Carley, “Politics of Anti-Bolshevism.” Yet the evidence is inconclusive. Panafieu reported on the agreement with Petliura and its reception in the Sejm, but made no mention of a planned invasion; Panafieu to Millerand, 24 April 1920, Z-Europe: Pologne, vol. 70. 97 Millerand to Panafieu, 14 May 1920, Z-Europe, Pologne, vol. 71. 98 For example, Costigliola, “American Foreign Policy in the ‘Nut Cracker,’” 94, in which it is incorrectly asserted that in January 1919 the US government asked the Polish chief of state to resign. 99 On Piłsudski, see Dziewanowski, Joseph Piłsudski; Jędrzejewicz, Piłsudski. 100 Telegram on Piłsudski’s arrest, 1 August 1917, Guerre: Pologne, vol. 725. 101 For example, Howard to Foreign Office, 27 July 1917, f o 371/3001/149032. 102 Howard to Kerr, 17 February 1919, Lothian Papers, gd4 0 /17/879/1; dbfp , 1st ser., 8:713. 103 Howard Diary, 13 February 1919. 104 Rumbold to Kerr, 29 December 1919, Rumbold Papers, dep. 26. 105 Namier memo, n.d. [October 1918], fo 371/3279/178931. 106 Ng, Nationalism and Political Liberty, 100. 107 frus: ppc , 4:316. 108 “House of Commons,” Times, 18 May 1920. 109 Hansard, h c Deb, 6 May 1920, vol. 128, c2221. 110 See Macfarlane, “Hands Off Russia”; Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 177–81; White, Britain and the Bolshevik Revolution, 41–51. 111 White, Britain and the Bolshevik Revolution, 49. 112 McEwen, Riddell Diaries, 313. 113 Kerr to Rumbold, 10 June 1920, Lothian Papers, gd4 0 /17/915/1. 114 Rumbold to Kerr, 18 June 1920, Lothian Papers, gd4 0 /17/915/2. 115 Kerr to Rumbold, 4 July 1920, Lothian Papers, gd4 0 /17/915/3.

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Notes to pages 168–71 245

116 Panafieu to Millerand, 15 June 1920, Z-Europe: Pologne, vol. 49. 117 Panafieu to Millerand, 30 June 1920, Z-Europe: Pologne, vol. 49. 118 Ibid. 119 Ibid. 120 “Engagement signé par W. Grabski,” 10 July 1920, Z-Europe, Pologne, vol. 71. 121 Nowak, Pierwsza zdrada Zachodu, 157. 122 This was originally considered an oversight resulting from “clerical error”; see Sworakowski, “Error Regarding Eastern Galicia.” Norman Davies suggests that the ethnographic maps of Poland that Lewis Namier had prepared while at the Foreign Office, one of which is in David Lloyd George’s files and corresponds to the Curzon Line, could have been the origin of the line; Davies, “Lloyd George and Poland,” 145. Yet Howard, who unlike Namier was certainly pro-­Polish, proposed a border very similar to the Curzon Line that left Lemberg outside of Poland. Howard had proposed this only as a minimum, incontestable border for the Poles and also offered his own more expansive suggestion for Poland’s frontiers. Both were traced on a map used by the Polish Commission, and Howard’s ideas could conceivably also have been used to develop the Curzon Line. See “Pologne,” February–April 1919, The National Archives, Kew, mpk (Maps and plans from records of the Foreign Office) 1/326. 123 Nowak, Pierwsza zdrada Zachodu, 153. 124 Rumbold to Kerr, 15 July 1920, Lothian Papers, gd4 0 /17/915/4. 125 McEwen, Riddell Diaries, 319. 126 Borzęcki, Soviet-Polish Peace, 94. On the Russian government’s deliberations, see Nowak, Pierwsza zdrada Zachodu, 159–74. 127 Biskupski, “A Very Special Ally?,” 344. 128 frus , 1920, 3:468. 129 Ibid., 3:387. 130 Hoover telegram, 14 July 1920, Hoover Institution Archives, American Relief Administration: European Operations Records, Box 707, Folder 5. 131 Childfund telegram, 9 August 1920, and Rickard telegram, 11 August 1920, both in ara: European Operations Records, Box 707, Folder 5. 132 Roskill, Hankey, 2:181. 133 Commandant Doudeuil, “Compte-rendu: Voyage à Revel…,” 23 July 1920, Fonds Clemenceau, g r 6n /212. 134 dbfp , 1st ser., 11:429–30. 135 Panafieu to Millerand, 26 July 1920, Z-Europe: Pologne, vol. 49. 136 Henrys to War Minister and Marshal of France, 28 July 1918 [1920] Fonds Clemenceau, g r 6n /212; Jusserand telegram, 13 August 1920,

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246

Notes to pages 171–3

Z-Europe: Pologne, vol. 49; Délégué de la Mission Militaire Française en Pologne à Poznan, “Fiche de renseignements. Situation économique et politique en Poznanie,” 10 August 1920, Z-Europe: Pologne, vol. 49. 137 dbfp , 1st ser., 11:433–4. 138 Davies, “Lloyd George and Poland,” 146. 139 Quoted in Roskill, Hankey, 2:181. 140 dbfp , 1st ser., 8:709. 141 Ibid., 8:736. 142 Ibid., 11:455. 143 Ibid., 8:710, 752. 144 Ibid., 8:712, 714. 145 Ibid., 8:724. 146 Ibid., 8:742n7. 147 Ibid., 8:754. 148 Ibid., 8:713. 149 Ibid., 8:734; 11:453. 150 Ibid., 8:713, 724. 151 Ibid., 8:733; 11:453. 152 Ibid., 8:713. 153 Ibid., 8:711. 154 Fierce debates about the authorship of Poland’s victory continue. Most Polish nationalist historians argue that Piłsudski’s offensive won the victory (Piłsudski took the credit in his memoirs). Wandycz, “General Weygand”; Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 220; Komarnicki, Rebirth, 699–700; see also Borzęcki, Soviet-Polish Peace, 95–6; Piłsudski, L’année 1920. See also Fiddick, “Miracle of the Vistula.” A competing narrative argues that Piłsudski’s actions were increasingly erratic in the days before the battle, and the counsel of the Anglo-French mission, especially General Weygand, ensured Poland’s victory: Le Goyet, France-Pologne, 69; Bryant, “D’Abernon and the Battle of Warsaw,” argues that the mission provided much-needed organization and structure to the Polish army, which had been in disarray. Biskupski argues that Paderewski and the National Democrats are the source of the “Weygand myth” as well as stories that they told because they wished to discredit Piłsudski, while Davies implies that French premier Millerand sought to associate Weygand’s victory with his own leader­ship as the presidential election approached: Biskupski, “Paderewski, Polish Politics”; Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 223–4. Many of the arguments are spelled out effectively in an edited volume resulting from a colloquium on the subject that included Davies and Le Goyet: Gervais, Guerre polono-soviétique, 11–48.

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Notes to pages 173–6 247

155 Panafieu to Millerand, 21 September 1920, Z-Europe: Pologne, vol. 50. 156 Kerr to Lloyd George, 2 September 1920, Lothian Papers, gd 4 0 /17/1280; see also Panafieu to Leygues, 11 October 1920, Z-Europe: Pologne, vol. 50. 157 Borzęcki, Soviet-Polish Peace, 108–9. 158 Debo, Survival and Consolidation, 28. 159 Panafieu to Leygues, 8 October 1920, Z-Europe: Pologne, vol. 50. 160 Borzęcki, Soviet-Polish Peace, 177–8. 161 Horak, Poland and Her National Minorities, 81. 162 Charles-Laurent telegram, 16 October 1920, Z-Europe: Pologne, vol. 50. 163 Panafieu to Leygues, 11 October 1920, Z-Europe: Pologne, vol. 50. 164 Debo, Survival and Consolidation, 282. 165 Henrys report, 20 September 1920, Fonds Clemenceau, gr 6 n/2 1 2 . 166 Niessel report, 10 December 1920, Fonds Clemenceau, gr 6 n/2 1 2 . 167 The most thorough examinations of Allied policy focus on Britain. See Leśniewski, “Britain and Upper Silesia,” which is critical of British policy; Gajda, Postscript to Victory offers a narrative overview of British policy with little analysis of motivations, but is more neutral on Britain’s role than Leśniewski’s account. On French policy, see Wandycz, France, 225– 37. Other examinations of the international history of the Upper Silesian plebiscite include Von Riekhoff, German-Polish Relations, 39–51; Cienciala and Komarnicki, From Versailles to Locarno, 41–90. For local perspectives, including ambivalence about the binary choice between nationalities, see the nuanced treatment in Bjork, Neither German nor Pole, 210–66. 168 Henrys to Minister of War (Clemenceau), 23 July 1919, shd, État-major de l’armée, g r 7n / 2988. 169 Leśniewski, “Britain and Upper Silesia,” 162. 170 Count Morawski, “Les hommes en vue. Korfanty, Dmowski et les autres,” n.d. [c. 15 December 1920], Fonds Clemenceau, gr 6 n/212. 171 Panafieu to Millerand, 9 September 1919, Z-Europe: Pologne, vol. 49. 172 “Picnic Atmosphere in Upper Silesia,” New York Times, 21 March 1921; Bjork, Neither German nor Pole, 219. 173 Le Rond telegram, 16 March 1921, Z-Europe: Pologne, vol. 157. 174 For example, Le Rond telegram, 16 March 1921, Deutsche Friedensdelegation to Briand, 13 March, von Mutius to Briand, 17 March, and von Mutius to Count de Peretti della Rocca, 20 March, all in Z-Europe: Pologne, vol. 157; Col Percival telegram, 10 March 1921, fo 371/5891/5166; Baron von Richthofen report, n.d., [March 1921] f o 371/5891/5365.

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248

Notes to pages 176–9

175 Le Rond telegram, 16 March 1921 and Berthelot to Panafieu, 19 March, Z-Europe: Pologne, vol. 157. 176 Minute, 16 March 1921, fo 371/5891/5447. 177 Panafieu telegram, 15 March 1921, Z-Europe: Pologne, vol. 157. 178 Le Rond telegram, 18 March 1921, Z-Europe: Pologne, vol. 157. 179 Le Rond telegram, 19 March 1921, Z-Europe: Pologne, vol. 157. 180 Le Rond to Conference of Ambassadors, 18 March 1921, Z-Europe: Pologne, vol. 157. 181 Le Rond telegram, 22 March 1921, Z-Europe: Pologne, vol. 158; see also Col Percival telegram, 21 March 1921, fo 371/5891/5891. 182 Le Rond telegram, 22 March 1921; Charles-Laurent telegram, 22 March; Terver to Briand, 29 March; all in Z-Europe: Pologne, vol. 158. 183 Le Rond telegram, 22 March 1921, Z-Europe: Pologne, vol. 158. 184 Le Rond telegram, 31 March 1921, Z-Europe: Pologne, vol. 158. 185 Le Rond telegram, 21 March 1921, Z-Europe: Pologne, vol. 158. 186 Bjork, Neither German nor Pole. 187 Gen. Le Rond, “Note sur l’attribution de la Haute-Silésie,” 9 April 1921, Z-Europe: Pologne, vol. 159; Berthelot to Barrere, 11 April 1921, Z-Europe: Pologne, vol. 159. 188 Barrere telegram, 7 April 1921, Z-Europe: Pologne, vol. 159. 189 Le Rond telegram, 19 April 1921, Z-Europe: Pologne, vol. 160. 190 Saint-Aulaire telegram, 7 April 1921, Z-Europe: Pologne, vol. 159. 191 Saint-Quentin telegram, 16 March 1921; Charles-Laurent telegram, 22 March 1921; Terver to Briand, 29 March 1921; all in Z-Europe: Pologne, vol. 158. 192 Waterlow minute, 24 March 1921, fo 371/5891/5894. 193 Le Rond telegram, 22 Aprch 1921, Z-Europe: Pologne, vol. 160. 194 For example, frus: ppc , 6:314. 195 Barrère telegram, 14 April 1921, Z-Europe: Pologne, vol. 159; CharlesRoux telegram, 27 April 1921, Z-Europe: Pologne, vol. 160. 196 “Note pour le Directeur: visite de Rome du 18 avril 1921,” 19 April 1921; Charles-Roux telegram, 29 April 1921; both in Z-Europe: Pologne, vol. 160. 197 Le Rond telegram, 30 April 1921, Z-Europe: Pologne, vol. 160. 198 Niessel report, 4 May 1921, Fonds Clemenceau, gr 6 n/2 1 2 ; Col Percival telegram, 3 May 1921, fo 371/5896/c9060. 199 Henri Ponsot telegram (forwarding de Marinis), 3 May 1921, Z-Europe: Pologne, vol. 161. 200 Briand telegram, 4 May 1921, Z-Europe: Pologne, vol. 161; Niessel report, 4 May 1921, Fonds Clemenceau, gr 6 n/2 1 2 ; Max Muller

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Notes to pages 179–92 249

t­ elegram, 5 May 1921, fo 371/ 5897/ c9 2 2 4 ; Panafieu telegram, 5 May 1921, Z-Europe: Pologne, vol. 161. 201 Bjork, Neither German nor Pole, 255–6. 202 MacMillan, Paris 1919, 221. 203 Bjork, Neither German nor Pole, 260–4.

c o n c l u s io n   1 Hugh Gibson Papers, Box 51; Correspondence, Folder: Lord, Robert H., 1920–1922.   2 For an introduction to the derogatory naming of Indigenous peoples in North American culture, see King, Inconvenient Indian.  3 Borzęcki, Soviet-Polish Peace, xiii. The process of bordering and the “unmixing” of peoples also happened administratively, through citizen denunciations and the decisions of border guards, as Keely Stauter-Halsted points out; Stauter-Halsted, “Violence by Other Means.”   4 Figure from Judt, PostWar, 804.   5 Ibid., 27; on population displacement, see the summary in Snyder, Reconstruction of Nations, 179–201.  6 Blobaum, Minor Apocalypse.   7 Amir, “Contact Hypothesis”; Schneider, Psychology of Stereotyping, 430.   8 See Mösslang and Riotte, “Introduction,” 18–19.   9 See Sluga, Nation, Psychology, especially 1–2. 10 Paget and Tyrrell memorandum, 7 August 1916, c a b 24/2/32. 11 frus: ppc , 5:678. 12 Hanak, Great Britain and Austria-Hungary, 45–6. 13 See especially Porter, Poland in the Modern World; Prażmowska, History of Poland, viii. 14 One prominent example that incorporates “Eastern” and “Western” perspectives in a European narrative is Judt, PostWar. 15 Biskupski, Independence Day, 163. 16 Ibid., 3. 17 See also the comments in Böhler, Civil War, 196–7.

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Index

Allies, 11, 61, 65; attitudes about Germans, 97, 101, 104–5, 121; imbalance of power with Poland, 131, 180, 183; and Polish independence, 56–7, 60, 63, 65–75, 87; and Polish public, 110, 140; propaganda, 73–4; relations with Bolsheviks, 97, 158–9; relations with Russia, 34; and Russian revolutions, 53–4, 65–6; Russo-Polish War, 171–3; transnational connections, 14–15, 188–9; on Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, 72, 75, 80, 217n38; war aims, 34, 36, 51–2, 66, 69, 75. See also France; Great Britain; Italy; Japan; Paris Peace Conference; Supreme War Council; United States Alsace-Lorraine, 27, 34, 54, 149; as metaphor for Polish settlement, 60, 108–9, 120–1 American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, 46 American Red Cross, 41, 85, 134 American Relief Administration (a r a ), 131, 135, 170,

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Asquith, Herbert Henry, 36, 45, 46 attitudes, 4–9, 16, 64, 90; about Eastern Europe, 11, 14–15, 123, 125, 187; about Jews, 3–4, 143–4; about restraint, 5, 184; about Ukrainians, 113–16 attitudes about Poles and Poland, 11–15; 27, 183–92; compared to Czechoslovaks, 98–9, 128, 140; compared to Germans, 109, 117–18, 144; compared to Irish, 119; compared to non-White peoples, 182; compared to Ukrainians, 116; European/ Western, 4, 104, 148; helpless, 153; historical failure, 117, 124, 128–9; historical sympathy with France, 31, 100; historical victims, 11–12, 27, 72, 104, 107, 153; immature, 13, 122–3, 128; partition as historic injustice, 127–8, 153; pro-Allied, 12, 48, 55, 101, 152, 179; public unstable, 138–40; sympathy for suffering, 12, 44, 47, 64, 132–3. See also stereotypes of Poles and Poland

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288 Index

Austria-Hungary, 12, 61, 73, 79–80; and Polish autonomy, 30, 72; Polish-Ukrainian relations in, 114   Baker, Newton D., 43, 208n21 Balfour, Arthur, 45, 93; discusses statements on Poland’s independence, 55–60, 63, 68; and kn p, 81–2; on Polish settlement, 107–8, 116, 118 Barthélémy, General Joseph, 98–100, 106, 107, 114, 121 Belgium, 36, 69, 133; Polish supplies embargoed, 166; relief efforts in, 41, 43–4 Benckendorff, Count Alexander, 49 Beneš, Edvard, 78, 128, 140 Berthelot, Philippe, 81, 176 Bicknell, Ernest, 41 Biskupski, M.B., 22, 192 Bolsheviks, 65–6, 95–6, 117. See also Russia; Russo-Polish War; Treaty of Brest-Litovsk Bolshevism, 107 Bonar Law, Andrew, 166 Bonsal, Stephen, 87, 125–6 Bourdillon, F.B., 109 Bowman, Isaiah, 76, 93, 104–5, 107 Brandeis, Louis, 146 Bratianu, Ion, 144 Buchanan, Sir George, 48–9, 55–63, 210n58   Cambon, Jules, 16, 24, 104, 107 Cambon, Paul, 24, 93 Carr, E.H., 76 Carton de Wiart, General Adrian, 129

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Cecil, Lord Robert, 45, 138, 153 Central Powers, 41, 48, 65, 75; Eastern Front, 35, 40, 61, 78, 210n55; Polish army, 48, 55–7, 61; and Russian revolutions, 54, 65, 212n101; Two Emperors’ Declaration, 51. See also AustriaHungary; Germany Chabot, Georges, 77 Chesterton, G.K., 78 Chicherin, Georgy, 169 Churchill, Winston, 27, 36, 192; on Russo-Polish War, 159, 161, 172 Clemenceau: Georges, 25, 66–7, 101, 108–9, 151; and Dmowski, 89; on East Galicia, 114–15; on Jews in Poland, 3–4; knowledge of Poland before 1914, 27, 32, 67; minorities treaty, 142, 144–5; Upper Silesia, 118–19, 127 Clerk, Sir George, 37, 56–9, 62, 83 cognition, 7–8, 191, 195n20 Colby, Bainbridge, 169–70 Comité d’études, 76–7, 93 Comité pour la reprise des relations internationales, 52 Commission for Relief in Belgium (c r b ), 41, 43 Committee on Public Information (c pi), 72–3 Congress of Vienna, 19 Conjoint Foreign Committee (c fc ), 144 Coolidge, Archibald Cary, 76 Costigliola, Frank, 17 Coulson, Colonel Basil, 98 Council of State (Poland), 50, 51, 77, 80 Crowe, Eyre, 24, 156, 178 Curzon, George, 155–7, 159, 173

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Index

Curzon Line, 169, 245n122 Czechoslovakia, 133, 171, 229n94. See also Paris Peace Conference; Teschen Czechoslovaks, 32, 37–8, 52, 73–5, 218n56   D’Abernon, Edgar Vincent Viscount, 170 Daily News [London], 46 Danzig (Gdansk), xv, 22, 60, 171. See also Paris Peace Conference Daszynski, Ignacy, 80, 168 Dawson, Geoffrey. See Robinson, Geoffrey Degrand, Georges, 86, 104 Delcassé, Théophile, 41–2 Denikin, Anton, 155 Department of State (US), 42, 146 Derby, Lord (Edward Stanley), 84 diplomacy, 26, 190; and emotions, 4–5, 15–16; personal contact valuable in, 58, 64, 137, 144, 184; restraint in, 16, 183–4, 194n15; trust in, 15 Dłuski, Kazimierz, 86–7, 93 Dmowski, Roman, 28–9, 111, 127, 176; anti-Semitism, 13, 29, 31, 78; East Galicia, 113; effect of anti-Semitism, 82, 84, 141–2, 145; and Foreign Office, 47–50, 54–8, 64; and French delegation, 97; on Germany, 12, 54, 85, 97; and House, 82; and kn p, 74, 81; and Marshall, 84; and Namier, 50, 59, 184; and Nicolson, 29, 47; and Northcliffe, 29, 31; and Paderewski, 29; at peace conference, 86, 89–90, 94, 102–5, 145– 6; and Piłsudski, 86, 89, 124–5,

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289

166, 171; restraint of, 41, 64; territorial demands, 77, 89, 95; on Ukrainians, 113; Upper Silesia, 117; and Zaleski, 49–50; Drummond, Eric, 50, 61, 78, 82   East Galicia, 19, 83, 141; oil fields, 19, 83, 113, 152, 240n9; plebi­ scite, 116; Polish-Ukrainian conflict, 82–4, 99, 106–7, 111–14, 138–9. See also Paris Peace Conference Elbing (Elbląg), 103 emotions, 5–6, 9, 16; connotation of aggression, 91, 121, 122, 151, 182–3; connotation of ­compromise, 125, 130, 151; connotation of disorder, 110; overlooked by historians, 4, 9, 16–17; trust, 15. See also moderation; restraint Endecja. See National Democracy Erzberger, Matthias, 97 Estonia, 65   Finland, 65, 169 First World War, 65, 73, 212n101; armistices, 79–80, 97, 220n92; Eastern Front, 34–5, 40, 60, 75 Foch, Ferdinand, 14, 23, 97, 98, 186; and Haller’s Army, 105–6; and Lemberg, 106–7; on Polish army, 105–6, 129, 161; RussoPolish War, 172; on Ukrainians, 107; urges aid to Poland, 161 Fontainebleau Memorandum, 108– 9, 117, 129 Foreign Office, 23, 37–8, 59, 207n114; and Dmowski, 47–50, 54–6, 58, 64; and k np, 62, 78,

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290 Index

81–2, 83; and Polish émigrés, 37, 47–51, 54–8, 62; propaganda, 59, 69, 209n40; restraint in, 54; and Russia, 49, 57. See also foreign-policy-making elite foreign-policy-making elite, 11, 23–30, 200–1n20 Foster, Lieutenant R.C., 86 France, 15, 26, 36, 77, 159; anti-Bolshevism, 67, 114, 120, 134, 159; and Germany, 63, 120; and national self-determination, 52; relations with Britain, 57, 171; relations with Czechoslovakia, relations with United States, 51, 59; separate peace, 61, 67, 68, 73; 75; support for Russia in Poland, 35–6, 51–2, 56–7, 67, 82; war aims, 34, 36; Yugoslav independence, 52. See also Allies; foreignpolicy-making elite; Ministère des affaires étrangères; Paris Peace Conference; Supreme War Council France, relations with Poles and Poland, 101, 151, 161, 171; advising restraint, 165, 176, 178; alliance with Poland, 160; desired Polish loyalty to tsarist Russia, 56–8, 64; East Galicia, 107, 113–16, 155; historical relations with Poland, 18, 31–4, 100, 203n79, 205n74; investment in Poland, 152; kn p, 81, 86; military mission to Poland, 161–2, 174–5; minorities treaty, 145; Piłsudski, 86; Poland in French strategy, 67, 118–20, 147–8, 152, 160, 180; Polish army in US, 61;

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Polish Corridor, 103–4; Polish independence, 12, 56, 67–8, 147; Polish relief, 44, 46; Polish settlement, 74, 109, 147, 164, 190; reaction to pogroms, 84, 145; Russo-Polish War, 167, 170–1, 244n96; Teschen, 98; Upper Silesia, 118, 175–9 Frankfurter, Felix, 146   Galicia, 19–22. See also East Galicia Gaulle, Charles de, 161 Gdansk. See Danzig (Gdansk) Germany, 27, 44, 46, 108, 149; armistice, 79, 97, 100, 220n92; invasion of Poland (1939), 7, 103, 180, 183; occupation of Russian territory, 47, 72, 80, 94, 210n55; and Polish independence, 71; and Polish relief, 44; Prussian partition of Poland, 19, 89, 127–8. See also Central Powers; Paris Peace Conference; Upper Silesia Gibson, Hugh, 135, 138, 151, 162, 182; and Paderewski, 137–8; and pogroms, 146–7 Grabski, Stanisław, 81, 85–6, 95 Grabski, Władysław, 167–9 Great Britain, 15, 26, 37, 52–3, 159; attitudes towards Russia, 31–2, 47; blockade, 43; and Bolsheviks, 69, 172; British Empire delegation, 96, 117, 118; propaganda in US, 45–6; relations with France, 57, 171, 189; relations with Germany, 27, 47, 53, 63, 118; relations with Russia, 30, 60, 69, 158–9;

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relations with United States, 46, 51, 59; separate peace, 73; use of Poland for US relations, 35, 37, 45, 53, 56, 60, 68, war aims, 36–7. See also Allies; Foreign Office; foreign-policy-making elite; Paris Peace Conference; Supreme War Council Great Britain, relations with Poles and Poland, 82, 151; historical, 18, 31–2, 34, 37, 205n82; Lemberg pogrom, 84; Poland in British strategy, 109, 120, 148, 152, 180–1, 190; Polish anti-Semitism, 78; Russo-Polish War, 162–3, 166–71; sympathy for Poles, 47, 62–3; Upper Silesia, 154, 159, 178, 189; urging coalition in Poland, 82 Gregory, J.D., 37, 62, 64, 77, 126 Grey, Sir Edward, 35, 37, 45, 47, 49 Grove, Colonel William, 133–4   Haller, General Józef, 81 Haller’s Army, 81, 96, 106–7, 113, 160–1; in Italy, 134 Hankey, Sir Maurice, 170–1 Hardinge, Charles, 56, 58–9, 62, 75, 85 Harley, J.H., 47 Haskins, Charles Homer, 76 Hatzfeldt, Prince Hermann von, 177 Headlam-Morley, James, 76, 87, 101, 110, 144; influence, 115, 191; minorities treaty, 141; and Namier, 115; and Polish-German settlement, 109; support for Polish claims, 148

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291

Henrys, General Paul, 105–6, 114, 128, 161–2, 175 Hồ Chí Minh, 92 Holocaust, 10 Hoover, Herbert, 41, 135, 146; and Paderewski, 137, 138; and Polish relief, 41, 47, 85, 133–4, 170 House, Colonel Edward Mandell, 42, 60, 208n17; and Dmowski, 82; and Paderewski at Paris, 184, 237n76, 237n85; and Paderewski in wartime, 42–4, 53, 70–1, 88, 137 Howard, Esme, 62, 97, 215n160; Howard-Lord agreement, 104; inter-Allied mission, 97–100, 102, 133–4, 227n75; and Piłsudski, 111–12, 166; on Polish Corridor, 109; on quarrelsome Poles, 61; role in Curzon Line, 245n122; support for Poland, 62, 121, 147, 161, 185 Hughes, Billy, 117, 118 Hughes, Charles Evans, 142 Hungary, 37, 80, 140; and British diplomacy, 38; revolution, 108, 110   Ireland, 92, 119, 159, 178 Irish, 46, 119 Italy, 51, 65, 111, 159, 230n157; Fiume question, 111, 174; and Poland’s rebirth and borders, 14–15, 91, 156; propaganda, 73–4; Upper Silesia plebiscite, 13, 175, 178–9. See also Allies; Paris Peace Conference   Jadwin, General Edgar, 147 Japan, 91, 92

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Jews, 48, 84, 143; and Polish identity, 10, 141; treatment by Poles, 3–4, 99, 141, 146–7; in Western countries, 3–4. See also stereotypes   Kattowitz (Katowice), 177 Kellogg, Vernon, 133 Kerr, Philip, 78, 87, 173; Curzon Line, 169; Fontainebleau Memorandum, 109–10, 129; and Namier, 78, 115, 232n187; speaking for Lloyd George, 155, 157, 167 Keynes, John Maynard, 131, 153– 4, 194–5n17, 235n36, 240n17 Kielce, 79 King’s College, London, 49, 53 Kisch, Lieutenant-Colonel L.H., 104, 105, 108, 229n135 Kołakowski, Leszek, 10 Komitet Narodowy Polski (kn p), 61–2, 77–8, 126–7, 136; anti-Semitism, 62, 78, 84–5, 136; and Foreign Office, 62, 81–2; and France, 85, 96; and Namier, 87; at peace conference, 86, 94; plans for Allied intervention, 95, 135; and Polish army, 74, 81, 96; Polish government, 77, 81, 85–6; propaganda distribution, 73; reports, 71–2, 77–8, 86; territorial demands, 73–4, 77, 82; warnings of Bolshevism, 134 Königsberg (Kaliningrad, Królewiec), 103 Korfanty, Wojciech, 97, 176, 179 Kościuszko, Tadeusz, 32, 62 Kozicki, Stanisław, 77, 94 Kraków, 94, 102, 160 Kyiv, 158, 164–5, 167

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Lansing, Robert, 43, 119, 139 Latvia, 65, 174, 191 Le Rond, General Henri, 103–5, 127, 175–9 League of Nations, 52, 149, 153; and Polish territorial settlement, 154; and Upper Silesia, 179; Vilnius conflict, 175 Lednicki, Alexander, 57 Lemberg (Lviv, Lwów), xv, 50, 133; conflict in, 82–3, 99, 105–7; Curzon Line, 169, 245n122; pogrom, 83–5, 88, 145, 186; and Polish public, 110, 156–7. See also Paris Peace Conference Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich, 19, 60, 65, 164 liminal orientalism, 6, 11, 34, 38, 123, 190; orientalism, 194n7, 198n58 Lithuania, 95, 150, 155, 174–6, 200n16; and Central Powers, 48, 65, 80; at peace conference, 92–3, 111–12. See also PolishLithuanian Commonwealth; Vilnius Little Entente, 152, 160 Litwinski, Leon, 51 Lloyd George, David, 24–6, 115, 155; attitudes about Eastern Europe, 187; Caxton Hall speech, 68; and Czechs, 68; and Germany, 143; and Jews, 3–4, 143–4; and Kerr, 87; met with Walcott, 45; at peace conference, 93, 108, 151, 191; role of ­advisors, 115; and Russia, 158; Welsh heritage, 25, 115, 155; and Wilson, 109, 119; and Yugoslavs, 68

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Lloyd George, David: attitudes about Poles and Poland, 13, 138, 148; anti-Semitic, 3–4, 144; comparing Poles and Germans, 119, 144; difficult, 117; disorganized, 105, 107, 128; Dmowski, 89–90, 145; East Galicia, 25, 115–16, 155, 157; imperialistic, 115–16, 157, 167, 180; on the oppression of weaker peoples, 155; Paderewski, 42, 119, 137–9; Polish Corridor, 107–10, 233n208; Polish faits accomplis, 96; Polish independence, 25, 63, 68–9; poor administrators, 107, 128; Russo-Polish War, 167, 169, 171; self-destructive, 172–3; unstable, 140; Upper Silesia, 117–19, 178, 179 Łódż, 19, 35, 94, 132, 133 London School of Economics, 49, 50 Lord, Robert, 27–8, 76, 106, 147, 182; Howard-Lord agreement, 104; on inter-Allied mission, 100 Łubienski, Leon, 95 Lublin, 79, 80, 94, 160 Lviv. See Lemberg Lwów. See Lemberg   Mackinder, Halford, 242n51 Małecka, Kate, 31–2, 204n67 Manchester Guardian, 31, 38 Marinis, General Alberto de, 178–9 Marshall, Louis, 84–5, 142, 146–7 Martonne, Emmanuel de, 77, 92, 93, 219n67 Masaryk, Tomáš, 49, 53, 98, 140, 211n91 Miliukov, Pavel, 54, 57, 58

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293

Millerand, Alexandre, 159, 165, 168, 171–3, 242n56 Ministère des affaires étrangères, 9, 23, 25, 48; and Poland, 55, 168 moderation, 82, 87 Moraczewski, Jędrzej, 80, 124 Morgenthau, Henry, 146–7, 153 Morning Post, 46–7   Namier, Lewis, 27, 76, 83; and Dmowski, 50, 59, 184, 219n81; and Foreign Office, 59, 211n77; influence, 78, 87, 115, 191, 232n187, 245n122; and k np, 78; on Piłsudski, 166; on reborn Poland, 87, 115, 148, 150, 155 Napoleon III, 18 National Democracy, 22, 29 National Democrats, 77, 137, 150, 160; in 1919 elections, 137; anti-Semitism, 78, 141–2, 219n81; as émigré representatives, 54, 57, 59 national self-determination, 7, 12, 18, 72, 191, 223n6; gendered, 123; at peace conference, 90–1, 102; Upper Silesia plebiscite, 119, 196n37; Western support for, 52 networks, 11, 14, 196n38, 198n54 New Europe, 52–3, 79 New York Times, 35, 83–4 Nicholas II, 54 Nicolson, Sir Arthur, 37, 38, 49, 56; and Dmowski, 29, 47, 50, 64 Niessel, General Henri, 175 Nikolaevich: Grand Duke Nicholas, 34–5 Northcliffe, Viscount (Alfred Harmsworth), 29, 31, 136

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Noulens, Joseph, 100–1   Orlando, Vittorio, 77, 108   Paderewska, Helena, 99–100 Paderewski, Ignacy, 28, 138; and American views of Poles, 42; and anti-Semitism, 3, 78, 85; asks for military aid, 95–6; Danzig, 102–10; and Dmowski, 28–9, 78, 202n49; emotionality, 42–3, 64, 70–1, 137–8; and House at Paris, 184, 237n76, 237n85; and House in wartime, 42–4, 53, 70–1, 88, 137; and inter-Allied mission, 100; in kn p, 85, 136; and Lloyd George, 42, 137–9; and Piłsudski, 86–7; Polish plenipotentiary, 93, 137; Polish relief, 41–4, 47; popularity in Poland, 98, 125; Posen, 96, 102; prime minister, 86–7, 124, 136–40, 152, 156; protests minorities treaty, 123, 145–6; reputation with peacemakers, 110, 124, 136–40, 156; Teschen, 110; Upper Silesia, 119; Wade Mission, 86; and Wilson, 43, 53, 208n16, 208n22, 212n97 Paléologue, Maurice, 48, 126, 210n58 Panafieu, André de, 151, 165, 170–1; on Polish politicians, 167–8, 174 Paris Peace Conference, 3, 89–94, 111, 151; and Bolsheviks, 96; Commission of Polish Affairs, 101–8, 111, 117, 128; Committee on New States, 142– 5; Council of Four, 108, 144;

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Danzig, 102–5, 108–10, 130, 148–9; East Galicia, 105, 111– 16, 138–9, 155–7; East Prussia, 89, 103–4, 108; emotional subtext of territorial claims, 91; and European economy, 131; fears of Bolshevism, 106, 108–9, 115, 134, 148; Franco-German border, 109; Germany, 91, 97, 102, 111, 117; Howard-Lord agreement, 104; inter-Allied mission to Poland, 96–101, 106–7, 133, 227n75; national self-­ determination, 102, 119, 156; Polish Corridor, 103–5, 107–10, 148–9; Polish minorities treaty, 3–4, 141–6, 148, 158; Posen, 89, 102; reparations, 109, 149, 159; Russia, 91, 112, 149, 157–8; Supreme Council, 92–3, 97, 101, 106, 108; Supreme Economic Council, 124, 133; Teschen, 89, 97–9, 110, 128; Upper Silesia, 116–19, 127, 148–9; Vilnius, 111–12; West Prussia, 19, 89, 103 Patek, Stanisław, 152, 163, 169 Paton, H.J., 109, 110 Peasant Party “Piast,” 137, 168 Percival, Colonel, 179 Petliura, Symon, 155, 164 Petrograd (St Petersburg), 29, 54–7, 60–1, 65 Pichon, Stephen, 68, 84, 97; and k np, 81, 86–8; and Lemberg, 83, 84; and Piltz, 184; and Polish independence, 75; PolishGerman settlement, 107 Piłsudski, Józef, 61, 130, 165–6; Allied view of, 85–6, 165, 172;

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coalition government, 85–7; and Dmowski, 89, 124–5; geo­ political strategy, 85–6, 89, 95, 111; and Haller’s Army, 81; and Lithuania, 85, 87, 111–12; popularity in Poland, 162, 166, 173; and Russia, 85, 163; takes power, 80–1, 94, 160; and Ukraine, 85, 87. See also Russo-Polish War Piltz, Erazm, 41, 48, 62, 81; and February Revolution, 54; and Pichon, 184; proposes independent Poland, 55, 57–8 Poincaré, Raymond, 41, 67, 73, 114, 137–8 Poland, 10–11, 123; access to the sea, 102; in armistice terms, 79; army, 93, 135, 160–2, 243n65; Austrian partition, 19; census (1921), 10, 196n37; Central European Civil War, 13, 92, 95–100; constitution, 176; economy, 94, 131–3, 152, 162; elections (1919), 87, 137; foreign ministry, 93, 152; formation of government, 85–7, 94–5, 107, 123; German (Prussian) partition, 19, 32, 127; government stability, 124, 130, 134, 137; historical sympathy with France, 31; independence, 6–7, 12, 80–2, 123; integration after independence, 132; Jews in, 95, 141, 146– 7, 183; and new international order, 7; peace conference delegation, 92–4, 133, 145; pogroms, 7, 83–4, 111, 142, 186; politics, 124–5, 130, 136–40, 167–8, 186; public opinion, 98, 140, 150, 174; relations with Britain, 157;

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295

relations with Czechoslovakia, 98; relations with France, 101; relations with Germany, 92; relations with Lithuania, 174; ­relations with Russia, 92; war’s effects on civilians, 18, 19, 32, 42, 47, 132. See also Paris Peace Conference; Polish relief; Russian Poland; Russo-Polish War; Upper Silesia Poles, 10–11, 72–3, 79; attitudes towards Russia, 35; depiction of Ukrainians, 83, 113–14, 120; effect of Allied propaganda on, 73; in global context, 30–1; identity, 10, 22, 141, 200n14; national consciousness, 14, 49, 57, 63, 71; refugees, 40. See also attitudes about Poles and Poland; Komitet Narodowy Polski (k np); stereotypes of Poles and Poland Polish Americans, 22, 33; and Fourteen Points, 70; in Polish army, 61; and Polish relief, 41–2, 46, 134–5; in propaganda, 72–3 Polish Information Committee (pic ), 49, 51 Polish Legion, 61 Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, 18, 60, 74, 102; partitions, 19, 123, 125, 127, 234n12; Ukrainians in, 114 Polish Plebiscite Commission, 176 Polish relief, 40–7, 64; postwar, 133–6, 138–40, 169–70 Polish Review, 47 Political Intelligence Department (pid), 27, 76, 78 Polk, Frank, 135

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Posen (Poznan), 19, 58, 152, 176; autonomist revolt in, 171; ­fighting in, 96, 97, 101–2; negotiations in, 97, 101–2; in tsarist plans for united Poland, 36. See also Paris Peace Conference Pralon, Eugène, 111–12, 140, 151, 156, 162 Prussia. See Germany psychological construction, 8 Pulaski, General Casimir, 32   Regency Council, 80, 160 restraint, 5–8, 38; in compromise, 151; and control, 6, 88; in diplomacy, 5–6, 15–17, 54, 181, 194n15; and moderation, 88; norms, 6, 136, 198n61, 217n31; and Polish independence campaign, 41; and Polish relief, 40; similar to civility, 196n28 Retinger, Józef, 33, 202–3n51 Robinson, Geoffrey, 45 Rockefeller Foundation, 41, 45 Romania, 38, 106, 133, 143–4, 146 Rossi, General, 98 Rumbold, Sir Horace, 37, 151; and decisions on Poland’s borders, 139–40, 156–7; on Piłsudski, 166; on Polish independence, 58; on Russo-Polish negotiations, 163, 167; views of Poles, 130, 157 Russia, 12, 52, 60, 141; invasion of Poland (1939), 7, 183; Kyiv’s importance to, 164; at peace conference, 91, 93, 96, 157–8; promises to Poles, 30, 34–5, 48–9, 51, 57; revolutions, 52–4, 65, 212n101. See also First World War; Treaty of Brest-Litovsk

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Russian Civil War, 74, 91, 110, 158, 163; Allied intervention, 134 Russian Poland, 18–22, 32, 126, 132; in armistice terms, 42, 46, 79; in First World War, 40, 42. See also Warsaw Russo-Polish War, 7, 13, 158, 162–74, 246n154   Sapieha, Prince Eustachy, 168, 174 Sazonov, Sergei, 35, 48–9, 51, 126, 210n61 Schneidemühl, 104, 127 Sejm, 95, 131–2, 141, 167, 176; Paderewski in, 137–8; in PolandLithuania, 126; and seizure of Vilnius, 111–12 Serbia, 47 Seton-Watson, R.W., 49, 51, 52, 64; and Dmowski, 78–9; in pid, 76 Sforza, Count Carlo, 178 Shotwell, James, 76 Skulski, Leopold, 140, 162, 167 Slovaks, 32, 38 Smulski, Jan, 135, 153 Smuts, General Jan, 117 Sobanski, Count Ladislas, 62, 73–4, 77, 83 socialists, 22, 31 Sokolnicki, Michał, 157 Sosnkowski, General Kazimierz, 161 Spa Conference, 168–9 stereotypes, 6–9, 16, 186, 195n18; of Jews, 3–4, 143 stereotypes of Poles and Poland, 9, 27, 185–90; anti-Semitic, 3–4, 78, 85, 143–4, 146, 154; care about territorial settlement, 109–10, 139–40, 156–7; carefree, 170; difficult, 117, 130;

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disorganized, 105, 107, 108, 124, 128, 161–2; disunited, 38, 136– 7; emotional, 5, 179; expansionist, 13, 96, 112, 164, 167; have poor judgment, 126, 170, 172–3; imperialistic, 50, 80, 115–16, 121, 170–1; intransigent, 87, 110, 168, 181; oppressive, 155; poor administrators, 107–8, 128–9, 178; quarrelsome, 61, 124, 125–7, 140, 168; strong national feeling, 54, 57, 63, 70–2; untrustworthy, 140, 173; volatile, 110, 128–30, 140, 159 Stevenson, Frances, 42, 109, 137 Supreme War Council (swc), 14, 68, 71, 74, 92–4 Switzerland, 36, 40, 41–2; conduit for Polish information, 85; and Polish relief, 46, 134   Taft, William Howard, 142 Tardieu, André, 107, 153 Tereshchenko, Mikhail, 62–3 Teschen (Polish: Cieszyn, Czech: Těšín), 89, 97–9, 110, 128, 154. See also Paris Peace Conference Thorn (Torun), 102 Times (London), 18, 29, 45–6 Toynbee, Arnold, 76 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, 72, 75, 80 Treaty of Riga, 173–4, 175–6 Trotsky, Leon, 164 Tyrrell, William, 76   Ukraine, 19, 72, 80, 85, 113. See also East Galicia; West Ukrainian Peoples’ Republic Ukrainians, 107, 112–14 United States, 14–15, 26, 59, 147, 224n8; enters war, 59; the

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297

Inquiry, 27, 76; neutrality, 41; relations with Germany, 27; relations with Russia, 159; restraint in male culture, 71; and self-­ determination, 120; treaty ratification debate, 152–4; war aims, 59–60, 69. See also Allies; American Relief Administration; foreign-policy-making elite; Paris Peace Conference; Supreme War Council; Wilson, Woodrow United States, relations with Poles and Poland, 151, 170; investment in Poland, 152; and k np, 82; Morgenthau mission, 146–7, 153; Polish independence, 12; Polish relief, 7, 134–6, 138–40, 170; and Polish settlement, 120, 180, 191; prewar attitudes, 31, 32–3, 42; reaction to pogroms, 83–4, 142; and Russo-Polish War, 169; urges Polish coalition, 82 Upper Silesia, 19, 22, 36, 116–17, 232n198; plebiscite, 13, 119, 167, 175–80. See also Paris Peace Conference   Velten, Gaston, 34–5, 56–8 Vilnius, 133, 141, 176, 230n159; Bolshevik seizure of, 96, 158; seized by Poland (1919), 111; Żeligowski mutiny, 174 Vistula River, 80, 102, 103, 148   Wade, Colonel H.H., 85, 86, 96 Walcott, Frederic, 45–7, 85, 133 Warsaw, xv, 85; German occupation of, 11, 40, 210n55; at outbreak of war, 34–5, 206n101; Russo-Polish War, 170, 173

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Watt, D.C., 11, 23 Wellington House, 27, 45–6, 50, 59 West Ukrainian People’s Republic, 82, 83, 99, 107, 114 Weygand, General Maxime, 172–3 White, James C., 85 Wickham Steed, Henry, 52 Wilson, General Henry, 138 Wilson, Woodrow, 24–5, 42, 70, 122; Fourteen Points, 69–70, 170; and France, 109; League of Nations, 53, 60, 94, 108; and Lloyd George, 119; at peace conference, 93, 108; peace note, 51; “Peace without Victory” speech, 53, 191; in Treaty fight, 152–3 Wilson, Woodrow, attitudes about Poles and Poland, 53; Danzig, 60, 148; Dmowski, 89; East Galicia, 115; knp, 82; Morgenthau mission, 146; Paderewski, 43, 53, 136, 139; Poles anti-Semitic 3–4,

32904_Clark_E3.indd 298

142–4; Poles immature, 128; Poles impetuous, 5; Poles unable to govern, 128; Polish-German settlement, 107; Polish government, 82; Polish relief, 44, 134, 139, 141; prewar attitudes, 33, 205n79; Russo-Polish War, 164; support for Polish independence, 5, 53, 69–70, 72, 127; sympathy for suffering, 11; Upper Silesia, 119 Witos, Wincenty, 168 Wolf, Lucien, 78, 85, 144; and knp, 78 Wolff, Larry, 15   Yugoslavs, 37–8, 51–2, 160, 218n56   Zaleski, August, 49–50, 51, 64 Żeligowski, General Lucjan, 174 Zionists, 22, 84, 144, 146

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