Parliamentary Diplomacy of Taiwan in Comparative Perspective: Against Isolation and Under-representation 9781529211191

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PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY OF TAIWAN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

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PARL I AM E N TARY D I P LO M AC Y O F TAI WAN I N CO M PARAT I V E P E R S P ECT I V E AG AI N ST I S OL AT I ON AN D U N D E R- RE P RE S E N TAT I ON Z L ATKO Š A B I Č DAV I D W. F. HUA N G

PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY OF TAIWAN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE Against Isolation and Under-​representation Zlatko Šabič David W. F. Huang

First published in Great Britain in 2021 by Bristol University Press University of Bristol 1–​9 Old Park Hill Bristol BS2 8BB UK t: +44 (0)117 954 5940 e: bup-​[email protected] Details of international sales and distribution partners are available at bristoluniversitypress.co.uk © Bristol University Press 2021 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978-​1-​5292-​1118-​4 hardcover ISBN 978-​1-​5292-​1120-​7 ePub ISBN 978-​1-​5292-​1119-​1 ePdf The right of Zlatko Šabič and David W. F. Huang to be identified as authors of this work has been asserted by them in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved: no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of Bristol University Press. Every reasonable effort has been made to obtain permission to reproduce copyrighted material. If, however, anyone knows of an oversight, please contact the publisher. The statements and opinions contained within this publication are solely those of the authors and not of the University of Bristol or Bristol University Press. The University of Bristol and Bristol University Press disclaim responsibility for any injury to persons or property resulting from any material published in this publication. Bristol University Press works to counter discrimination on grounds of gender, race, disability, age and sexuality. Cover design: by blu inc. Front cover image: inawa – alamy.com Bristol University Press uses environmentally responsible print partners. Printed in the UK by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY

Contents List of Figures and Tables List of Abbreviations Preface

iv vi ix

1 Introduction 2 About Parliamentary Diplomacy 3 Unrecognized and Unrepresented States 4 Taiwan 5 Taiwan’s Parliamentary Diplomacy 6 Barriers Surrounding Taiwan’s Parliamentary Diplomacy 7 Conclusion

1 12 27 45 56 108 129

Notes References Index

142 162 195

iii

List of Figures and Tables Figures 2.1 4.1 4.2 4.3 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7

Parliamentary diplomacy –​an overview 26 Hits by inserting the word ‘Taiwan’ in general Google Search 46 Hits by inserting the word ‘Taiwan’ in Google Scholar 46 Hits by inserting the word ‘Taiwan’ as a title of the work in a 46 Web of Science Core Collection Geographical distribution of friendship groups created in the LY 65 Geographical distribution of friendship groups created in 68 countries outside Taiwan Proposals by the US Congress referring to Taiwan, 1989–​2020 73 Congressional support to Taiwan’s membership in 79 international organizations Congressional support to Taiwan’s membership in selected 80 international organizations Staff visits to Taiwan 90 Resolutions of the European Parliament regarding Taiwan, 100 1994–2020

Tables 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8

Friendship groups in the Legislative Yuan, 2016–​2020 Taiwan-​friendly groups abroad Proposals recorded by the US Congress on the topic of the ASL Congressional actions on the status of Taiwan in the WHO Taiwan Legislative Yuan delegations to the United States, 2000–​2018 Congressional delegations to Taiwan, 2010–​2020 MEPs’ questions by subject matter, 1999–​2020 Resolutions, reports and texts adopted by the European Parliament, by subject matter, 1999–​2020

iv

62 66 76 82 86 88 98 99

List of figures and tables

5.9 5.10 6.1 6.2

Discussions between MEP delegations and LY members by subject matter, 1993–​2015 Resolutions of the European Parliament regarding Taiwan’s participation in the WHO, 2002–​2018 Breakdown of interviewees by categories Parliamentary elections in Taiwan, 2008–​2020

v

101 104 109 119

List of Abbreviations ‘European Union’ and its abbreviation, the EU, will be used interchangeably. The same goes for the European Parliament (EP), the United States Congress (US Congress) and the Legislative Yuan (LY). ALDE APPGS AIT ASL new APPGS AOR APU APPU ARIA ARK BTAPPG CCP KMT CCNAA COSAC CPG DPP EEAS EP EU FRY FAPA GATT GDP UNGA HADR ICAO

Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe All-​Party Parliamentary Group on Somaliland American Institute in Taiwan Anti-​Secession Law APPG on Somaliland Assembly of the Republic Asian Parliamentarians’ Union Asia–​Pacific Parliamentarians’ Union Asia Reassurance Initiative Act Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo British–​Taiwanese All-​Party Parliamentary Group Chinese Communist Party Chinese National Party or Kuomintang Coordination Council for North American Affairs Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the EU Cross-​party parliamentary group Democratic Progressive Party European External Action Service European Parliament European Union Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Formosan Association for Public Affairs General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Gross domestic product General Assembly of the UN Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief International Civil Aviation Organization

vi

List of Abbreviations

ICJ IDU INGOs IPAs IPU IPAC Interpol KMT LY LI MEPs MOFA NKR NARNK NPC NGOs NATO NATO PA PLC PRSO OSCE PA PGA PAA PFP PACE POIGOs PAs PRC POLISARIO PMR ROC SADR SNC SEECP PA

International Court of Justice International Democrat Union International non-​governmental organizations International parliamentary associations Inter-Parliamentary Union Inter-​Parliamentary Alliance on China International Criminal Police Organization Kuomintang Chinese National Party Legislative Yuan Liberal International Members of the European Parliament Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan) Nagorno-Karabakh Republic National Assembly of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China Non-​governmental organizations North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO Parliamentary Assembly Palestinian Legislative Council Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Co-​operation in Europe Parliamentarians for Global Action People’s Assembly of Abkhazia People First Party Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Parliamentary organs of international governmental organizations Party alliances People’s Republic of China Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro (Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro) Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic Republic of China Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic Sahrawi National Council South East European Cooperation Process Parliamentary Assembly

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PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY OF TAIWAN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

SCPMR SICA TAIPEI TEA TECRO TFPD TPR TRA TTA TOAH TRNC UN UN GA MINURSO UNFICYP US Congress WHA WHO WTO

Supreme Council of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic Sistema de la Integracion Centroamericana (Central American Integration System) Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative Taiwan Enabling Act Taiwan Economic and Cultural Representative Office Task Force on Peace and Diplomacy Taiwan Policy Review Taiwan Relations Act Taiwan Travel Act Track One and a Half diplomacy Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus United Nations United Nations General Assembly United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara United Nations Peacekeeping force in Cyprus United States Congress World Health Assembly World Health Organization World Trade Organization

viii

Preface The story of this book begins in 2014. Zlatko discussed the situation in Taiwan with Dr Saša Istenič Kotar, a good colleague and the Director of the Center for Taiwan Studies at the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. Somehow, this discussion turned to the parliamentary dimension of Taiwan’s international relations. As Zlatko had been writing on parliamentary institutions and the parliamentary dimension of international relations in general, he went to search for what has already been written on this regarding Taiwan. Detailed preliminary research has confirmed that not much is available in the scholarly literature about what is or may be the contribution of Taiwanese and other parliamentarians to ease Taiwan’s international isolation. This has brought Taiwan to the centre of Zlatko’s research interest in the context of the fast-​g rowing literature on international parliamentary institutions and parliamentary diplomacy. The next step was to test whether Taiwan’s academics and practitioners share his enthusiasm. So, he prepared a research proposal and responded to a call for applications from Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Taiwan Fellowships, designed to stimulate research on Taiwan. His application was successful, and the first part of the research started in Taiwan in 2016. At the initial stage, the support and hospitality he received from the wonderful staff at the Center for Chinese Studies at the National Central Library (NCL) under the leadership of Director ​General Tseng Shu-​hsien, in particular Yi-​Syuan Wu, Arthur Ding from the Institute of International Relations at the National Chengchi University, Jana Rošker from the University of Ljubljana –​who was a guest researcher in Taipei at that time –​Zlatko’s next-​ booth neighbour at the NCL Wen-​Ti Sung from the Australian National University, and Mor Sobol from the Tamkang University and a volleyball teammate, were very important. For that, they will never be forgotten. It was in Taipei when Zlatko, following up Saša’s suggestions for who to get in touch with while in Taiwan, met David. A renowned academic with rich practical diplomatic experience, David showed a keen interest in Zlatko’s research, which has paved the way for their partnership for this book project. This phase included Zlatko’s second stay in Taiwan which began

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in 2017, this time with the support of a grant from the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy. All in all, the period between 2016 and 2020 was busy with reading and discussing the progress of research, and interviewing politicians and officials, present and former, as well as many other knowledgeable and experienced individuals who generously shared their thoughts on Taiwan’s politics and parliamentary diplomacy. The driving force behind this book is the gap in research on parliamentary diplomacy in the context of the situation in which Taiwan has been since the 1970s –​ostracized, unrecognized and unrepresented. Taiwan is not alone in that experience. Several states and entities have been facing a similar situation and sharing the same destiny. This is why this book first introduces a still-​ to-​be-​explored world of unrepresented entities, and it analyses how they use parliamentary diplomacy as a tool to communicate with the international community. The existing literature on parliamentary diplomacy focuses primarily on parliaments and parliamentarians of universally recognized states. From a scholarly perspective, understanding the scope, potential and practice of parliamentary diplomacy is incomplete without studying parliamentary diplomacy conducted by unrepresented entities that have their own parliaments and democratically elected legislators. So how do these parliamentarians communicate with their international counterparts? What are the conditions of such communication and even participation in international relations? And finally, what are the results of their engagement in parliamentary diplomacy? Only a handful of scholarly contributions exist that at least partially reflect on the parliamentary diplomacy of unrepresented entities, but they barely touch Taiwan, let alone study it comprehensively. This is somewhat surprising. Compared with other unrepresented entities, Taiwan has by any measure the largest capacity to engage in (parliamentary) international relations. Looking at its economic size, the size its the military, its gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, the number of hits on search engines and so on, Taiwan outperforms not only all the unrepresented and unrecognized states combined, but the majority of recognized and represented states as well. Furthermore, Taiwan is a democracy, with a fully functioning party system and regularly held parliamentary elections. Many universally recognized states are not democracies. This book offers a comparative perspective of parliamentary diplomacy in a very specific environment. It shows that parliamentary diplomacy in the world of unrecognized and unrepresented states works under a different logic than in the international community of mutually recognized, fully sovereign states. To discuss this point further, the book compares the state of affairs of the parliamentary diplomacy of several states that belong to the category of unrepresented political entities, whereby Taiwan is analysed in more detail,

x

Preface

with a focus on activities of its parliament, the Legislative Yuan (LY), in various parliamentary institutions: international parliamentary associations (IPAs), parliamentary organs of international organizations, party alliances and national parliaments. Relations between the Legislative Yuan and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Taiwan, and the impact of party politics on parliamentary diplomacy are but some of the other issues discussed in the book, to provide a better overview of the development of parliamentary diplomacy in Taiwan. Special attention has been paid to relations between the Legislative Yuan and the United States (US) Congress on one hand, and the European Parliament (EP) on the other. The reason for this lies in the fact that these two parliamentary institutions are among the most powerful democratically elected ones in the world. The US Congress has considerable constitutional powers and is the most important parliamentary ally of Taiwan. The EP is a co-​deciding organ of the European Union and the largest international parliamentary institution whose members are directly elected. It is also known to be supportive of Taiwan’s democracy. The book’s ambition is to contribute knowledge relevant for comparative political scientists and international relations scholars, as it provides insights into the specific experience of parliamentarians who feature more and more as international actors. Further, the book aims to contribute to the burgeoning literature on parliamentary diplomacy by extending research in this field to the world of unrecognized and unrepresented states. These ambitions are a result of the work and contribution of individuals whose help is greatly appreciated. We first wish to express our gratitude for the support of the Bristol University Press representatives, Stephen Wenham and Caroline Astley. We are indebted to Annie Rose and anonymous reviewers for their guidance in polishing the drafts. To Petra Roter for many helpful and constructive comments, as well as several reads of the manuscript. To many friends and colleagues in Taiwan and elsewhere who have offered useful insights and advice so many times –​we do not dare to mention them by their names as this would entail a risk of omitting some, and we do not want that. And last, but most certainly not least, to all of our interviewees, most of whom wished to stay anonymous. We respect their preference. We know that they will want to read this book, so this is our way to thank them publicly as well. There is, however, one group of colleagues that deserves a special mention. For assistance with the logistics and organization of interviews, access to primary sources and collecting data, we have very much depended on our young collaborators. The support group consisted of PhD students and graduates studying or with an interest in international relations. The fact that the entire research group speaks at least six world languages fluently besides Chinese, was a great asset for this

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study. This preface would not be complete without expressing our thanks and deep gratitude to this highly capable, expedient and simply wonderful international team, in alphabetical order, Alexandr Burdian, James Chang, Ya-​Hui Hsueh, Şenel Kim, Ana Klemen and Nina Pejič. James in particular has been a powerful member of the team, good-​spirited and always happy to help. Working with young, knowledgeable people has given the writing of this book a special dimension. More details about their contributions will be found in individual sections of the book where their research results have been included. Last but most certainly not least, we wish to acknowledge the partial financial support for this research that we have received from the Slovenian Research Agency (research core funding no. P5-0177). As this book goes to print, the contribution of international parliamentary diplomacy and institutions appears to be needed more than ever, and particularly in support of promoting and protecting democratic standards, rule of law and human rights across the world, including in unrecognized and unrepresented states whose populations, too, deserve normality. And they certainly deserve solutions other than the use of the military. Many other entities are on the sidelines of international relations and they deserve similar attention, so we expect that interest in this topic will continue to grow.

xii

1

Introduction In 1997, the WHO rejected Taiwan’s application for observer status. The issue was hotly debated among WHO member states. Arguments against accepting Taiwan were all of a dubious political nature based on a biased interpretation of Taiwan’s international status in relation to that of the People’s Republic of China. As a result, the 22 million people of Taiwan remain unrepresented at WHO, and unjustifiable political pressure has undermined the health objectives for which WHO was established. From a health professional’s perspective, Taiwan’s admission to WHO is not a political question, rather, it is a technical issue that encompasses all elements of public-​health practice worldwide. If international borders are not a barrier to the transmission of diseases … then they should not be made into barriers to the free movement of cures and international health cooperation. Exclusion from international bodies only enhances the risk of importation of newly emerging and deadly infectious diseases into the island. The HIV-​1 pandemic taught us that there are many more threatening infectious agents in the world. What would happen if a mutant and deadly influenza virus reaches Taiwan or starts out from it? Taiwan’s medical profession is handicapped to deal with such events since it has no official mechanism by which to approach WHO for assistance in an expedient manner. (Jiang, 1998) The excerpt of this letter to The Lancet, a renowned medical journal, has turned out to be prophetic, because only five years after its publication, Taiwan was among the three countries most affected by the SARS outbreak between 2002 and 2004 (McNeil Jr., 2003; WHO, 2003). The authorities in Taipei were convinced that assistance from the World Health Organization (WHO)1

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PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY OF TAIWAN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

would have helped Taiwan in dealing with the outbreak, but requests for help were in vain (Chien, 2003). The problem Taiwan has been facing stems from the fact that very few countries recognize it. Consequently, Taiwan is blocked from participating in international governmental institutions, some, such as the WHO, being of vital importance to Taiwan. Even though a real population lives in Taiwan, which deals with real problems and faces real challenges, they are considered and treated as second-​class citizens in the contemporary international community.2 States are considered as primary actors in international relations and are the original subjects of international law. However, they can enjoy the status of states with rights and obligations under international law only when they are universally recognized by other states. Non-​recognized entities do not want to be denied the possibility to be able to participate in discussion of international issues either; they affect them too. The precarious situation in which they find themselves due to their international isolation has been demonstrated yet again with the 2020 COVID-​19 pandemic: ‘Excluded from participation in international governance mechanisms, states with limited recognition are responding bravely, but alone, to COVID-​19. Marginalized at home, unrepresented peoples are struggling without the support others receive’ (UNPO, 2020a). Furthermore, in several cases, as it has been reported, the pandemic has even increased political pressure on these entities (UNPO, 2020b). Taiwan has learned all the essential lessons from the 2002–​2004 SARS epidemic and it has prepared itself well for the eventuality of another infectious disease outbreak. Its preparedness was indeed put to the test with the COVID-​19 pandemic in early 2020. At the time, Taiwan was recognized as by far the most successful industrialized country in defending against the pandemic. Taiwan’s successful management of the pandemic has caught media attention worldwide, which, in turn, has made the country better known to the public than ever before. More people are aware today than they were in the past that Taiwan has one of the biggest economies in the world, with a fully functioning government. Its 2019 freedom index is 93/​ 100, the same as Austria, a point behind Germany (94/​100), a point better than Spain (92/​100) and seven points ahead of the United States (86/​100).3 Yet, despite such extraordinary achievements, the doors of the WHO and many other international institutions remain closed for Taiwan. The point being made here is that the difficulties unrepresented and unrecognized entities face when they try to reach out to other states through inter-​governmental channels do not benefit anyone. Such patterns of non-​ cooperation inevitably lead to the loss of valuable knowledge and expertise from these entities that otherwise might be used to address global problems. They reduce the space for negotiation to end disputes and conflicts. Non-​state

2

Introduction

actors such as international non-​governmental organizations (INGOs) seek to alert governments of this big picture, and so they advocate for the rights of people living in those entities to speak for themselves, to have an ‘opportunity to participate on the national or international stage’ (UNPO, 2020c). INGOs are important for unrepresented and unrecognized entities. They can influence international agenda-​setting, make an impact on multilateral negotiations, generate or withhold public support, whereas states depend on them to implement inter-​governmentally agreed solutions (Simmons, 1998). Yet, for all the good they do in the world, INGOs cannot replace democratic legitimacy. They can represent an entity, but only if the latter wants them to do so. In democratic societies, a legitimate representative, to be considered as such, must be elected in free and fair democratic elections. Once elected these deputies do not necessarily serve their voters only nationally. They have an opportunity to advocate for their people in a new kind of international community that has developed in the past few decades: that of parliamentarians and parliamentary institutions (Cutler, 2001; Charnovitz, 2002; De Puig, 2004; Barbé and Herranz, 2005; Cofelice and Stavridis, 2017; Raube, Müftüler-Baç and Wouters, 2019). Indeed, parliamentarians may fill in the gap in communication between the two worlds, the one that is fully integrated with international institutions, and the one that is excluded from them. States may or may not be involved in these processes, largely depending on whether or not their parliaments are constitutionally an integral part of the country’s foreign policy, on how much they want to be part of the country’s foreign policy, or on how much they must take part in the country’s foreign policy. The early experience with international parliamentary relations has been accumulated in Europe (Götz, 2005). Nowadays, international relations cannot be imagined without the parliamentary dimension (VIPCO, 2020). This defies the positivist literature, which is sceptical about the importance of international parliamentary relations. Slaughter, for example, has considered parliamentary networks, as she called them, as essentially weak in terms of the impact they have on international relations (Slaughter, 2004: 122). We beg to differ. Rather than being a collection of snapshots, international relations consist of a myriad of perpetually developing processes, which ultimately bring about changes in the international community; it may be several years, decades, sometimes even centuries before these changes take shape. Crucially, processes in the international community develop between and are developed by international actors. For a long time, we have considered states as the only actors that can be involved in international relations. Nowadays, many other actors may be agents of change and can make an impact on international relations.

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Our focus in this book is on parliamentarians and parliamentary institutions as one group of such actors. Thinking about the parliamentary dimension of international relations, a question necessarily occurs –​can parliamentarians be an agent of change in international relations? The short answer is yes. For example, our perception of the importance of a peaceful settlement of disputes is very different today than it was, say, 150 years ago. It would be wrong to say that states were the only generator of the changing attitudes, from treating peaceful settlement of disputes as a nuisance to understanding it as one of the core international norms and hence as part and parcel of international law, as Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations (UN) demonstrates. Parliamentarians, who created the Inter-​Parliamentary Union (IPU) at the end of the 19th century, played an important role in the development of arbitration as the norm of peaceful settlement of disputes, even though the creation of the IPU and their members’ advocacy for international arbitration were back then received in the press ‘with derision and satire’ (Moore, 1909: 550). Parliamentary diplomacy, too, has become a topic waiting to attract the attention of scholars and practitioners dealing with International Relations and diplomatic studies until after the end of the Cold War, which structurally changed the international community and opened up many avenues for international cooperation at different levels and by different actors. Unfortunately, the literature limits itself by only studying the development of parliamentary diplomacy in the world of universally recognized, fully sovereign states. Very little research has been done on parliamentary diplomacy in the world of unrecognized and unrepresented states and other entities. This is a pity. Regardless of how it comes about, gathering knowledge about the structure, scope, practice and potential of parliamentary diplomacy of unrepresented and unrecognized entities is important if one is to aim for a comprehensive knowledge about parliamentary diplomacy in the contemporary international community, and for an understanding of its opportunities and limitations for entities with parliamentary representation that cannot fully enter international relations due to their ‘non-​status’. There is much to be learned here: for example, how parliamentarians from unrepresented and unrecognized entities participate in international (parliamentary) relations; what conditions such participation; and what the results are of their engagement in parliamentary diplomacy. Many different unrepresented and unrecognized entities are scattered worldwide,4 but this book focuses only on unrepresented and unrecognized states. Broadly, we define this category of states as those that claim statehood but have limited or no opportunities to be represented in international relations because they are not universally recognized. Some of them belong to the category of contested states; their statehood is rejected by an overwhelming majority of states that are already universally recognized (UN

4

Introduction

members). Others belong to the category of states with limited recognition, that is, those on which the international community is more or less divided on whether or not to recognize them. All these entities largely meet the criteria of statehood listed in the 1933 Montevideo Convention,5 but there are differences among them in terms of practical viability to function as states. The selection of unrecognized and unrepresented states in this book (in alphabetical order: Abkhazia, Artsakh/​Nagorno-Karabakh, Kosovo, Palestine, Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, Somaliland, South Ossetia, Taiwan, Transnistria and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) reflects this broad definition and categorization, but there are other differences among them, too. In terms of democratic freedoms, for example, the differences are noteworthy. According to Freedom House data, three of them limit the right of representation and political participation: Palestine (Gaza and the West Bank), South Ossetia and Transnistria. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, on the other hand, is considered a democracy (Freedom House, 2020). Further, it might seem odd that Somaliland and Palestine are in the same group because Somaliland has not been recognized by any state, whereas Palestine has been recognized by a large majority of member states of the United Nations. However, Palestine is not a universally recognized state, which makes it difficult for Palestine to enter international relations and it, too, faces many obstacles in its endeavours to be(come) a full member of the international community. The reasons for limited access to international relations are complex in Palestine, too, not only in Somaliland. More differences among the entities in this group can be found. Each unrepresented and unrecognized state has its very own history and problems to be addressed, but the lack of international representation affects them all. The isolation reduces the options to deal with serious problems that affect lives of their populations. Consequently, we have been asking ourselves, can this gap between recognized and unrecognized/​unrepresented states be filled in, at least partially, by parliamentarians? This has been our conceptual motivation for the present book. The practical one has been linked with international relations of Taiwan6 –​a democratic de facto state that is not recognized by more than 90 per cent of the UN members, and which has been effectively prevented from cooperation with inter-​governmental organizations, including functional organizations whose successful work depends on universal membership, as the case of Taiwan’s exclusion from participating in the WHO demonstrates. Our analysis of Taiwan’s parliamentary diplomacy is contextualized within the dialectical relationship between parliamentarians as actors (agents), acting as members of parliamentary institutions (the Legislative Yuan, national parliaments, international parliamentary associations, parliamentary organs of international governmental organizations and party alliances), and the environment in which they operate and which affects, by both

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enabling and limiting, their opportunities and the choices they make as agents of parliamentary diplomacy. Such an environment (the structure) is complex and a result of numerous processes over time. Accordingly, this environment is researched at three levels: individuals, states and at international level. Individually, parliamentarians must be motivated, skilful and encouraged to participate in Taiwan’s international relations. Internationally, parliamentarians act within the patterned arrangements in the international community, whereas their choices and opportunities are also determined, domestically, by the Taiwanese state and its political system. For us to be able to analyse parliamentary diplomacy comprehensively, it is useful to adhere to Marsh’s conceptualization of agents and structures as ontologically separate (Marsh, 2010: 219): • Structures provide the context within which agents act; these structures are both material and ideational. • Agents have preferences/​objectives, which they attempt to forward. • Agents interpret the context within which they act, a context which is both structural and strategic. • However, structures, both material and ideational, can have an effect on agents of which they are not necessarily conscious. • In acting, agents change the structures. • These structures then provide the context within which agents act in the next iteration. This allows us to analyse agents (parliamentarians) both as an independent and a dependent variable, that is, to examine their actions in a specific structural context and to analyse how they interpret and affect these structures and vice versa. Such a broad conceptual understanding of agents and structures is useful for this research for it allows us to bring into the analysis both domestic and international structures, material and non-​material. The Taiwanese experience with parliamentary diplomacy as a means to soften its international isolation has inspired this research. Namely, Taiwan’s legal, political and economic situation is one of a kind. Although regionally and globally unrepresented, Taiwan arguably functions as a de facto state much more than any other unrepresented and unrecognized state that has been touched upon in this book. Most of them endeavour to convince other states to recognize them. Taiwan is the only state that for decades has endeavoured not only to win new recognitions but also not to lose them. This effort alone, we thought, would have merited scholarly attention about the experience Taiwan has had with parliamentary diplomacy, as one of the means to pursue its foreign policy goals, such as keeping its ‘diplomatic allies’ as they are called by the Taiwanese government.7 Furthermore, the Taiwanese

6

Introduction

official foreign policy promotes parliamentary diplomacy. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Taiwan has a special Office of Parliamentary Affairs, devoted to the coordination of activities supporting inter-​parliamentary relations. We find this unusual because normally it is not up to ministries of foreign affairs (the executives) to take responsibility for the tasks that are under the purview of parliamentarians. In the world of unrepresented and unrecognized states such improvisations are necessary. There is plenty of scholarly expertise on Taiwanese politics, Taiwanese economics and cross-​strait relations, yet very little is known about alternative ways Taiwan uses to counter its international isolation. But few authors have taken note of the fact that Taiwan has been developing its parliamentary diplomacy since the early 1990s, and none of them has analysed this part of Taiwan’s foreign policy in a comprehensive, comparative way. The present study is meant to fill in this lacuna. Our research is decidedly interdisciplinary. For a long time, parliaments and parliamentarians have been studied as actors in the domestic sphere, hence within the field of political science. But globalization has changed the environment in which parliaments and parliamentarians operate; the domestic and international environments increasingly intersect. As will be seen in Chapter 2, it was hard to imagine just a few decades ago that today we would be talking about a kind of parliamentary diplomacy considered as an international activity in which parliamentarians (rather than states) would be involved. Nowadays, parliamentarians tend to change hats and become international actors, with national parliaments developing strings of international cooperation (Dri et al, 2013). These developments have put International Relations and diplomacy studies at the forefront as frameworks of researching these phenomena. The research design for this book aims to reflect on the emergence of parliamentary diplomacy as a relatively new phenomenon in studying International Relations. We look at it as a tool used by parliamentarians, and in certain circumstances by implication also by states, to broaden the scope of their international activities. Our analysis contributes to the knowledge about unrepresented and unrecognized entities which elect their representatives, but studying all of them would have been an effort that would have well exceeded the scope of this book. Hence our focus is on unrepresented and unrecognized states. The plan of the work ahead is as follows. Chapter 2 of the book introduces the concept of parliamentary diplomacy and how it applies to unrepresented and unrecognized states. We build on the existing knowledge about both phenomena. We use this knowledge for two purposes. First, we develop a working definition of parliamentary diplomacy. We argue against self-​imposed limits of applying the term parliamentary diplomacy, however defined, by limiting it to the world of internationally recognized

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states. We take a normative stand here, as we believe that to address issues of common concern, unrepresented and unrecognized states, too, should be allowed to participate in inter-​parliamentary relations and use parliamentary diplomacy to carry out their interests and policies, thereby also contributing to and participating in joint efforts to address transnational, global problems. Our definition of parliamentary diplomacy reflects this position. In Chapter 3, we discuss the concept of unrecognized and unrepresented states to understand the difficulties that these states encounter in their international relations. This will help us to put in to context the practical relevance of parliamentary diplomacy for them. Chapters 4 to 6 are devoted to Taiwan. In Chapter 4 we show that, although belonging to the group of unrepresented and unrecognized states, Taiwan has to be discussed separately. We agree that its basic problems and dilemmas are similar to those of other unrepresented and unrecognized states –​it wants the recognition of its existence and unimpeded access to international relations. Yet, its uniqueness is remarkable. Let us think about the emergence of the Republic of China (Taiwan) as a state; the peak of its presence in international relations from the end of World War Two until Resolution 2758 was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1972, which recognized the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the sole legitimate representative of China in the United Nations, and the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States (US) and the PRC in 1979, a final act that threw Taiwan into indefinite isolation. The problem for Taiwan is even bigger because the PRC, once at the sidelines of international relations, but now a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations and a global political, military and economic power, continues to see Taiwan as part of China; according to the One China principle, as it is called in Beijing, it intends to integrate it into its territory in practice as well. What is particularly relevant for our debate is the way Taiwan has used diplomacy in responding to its international isolation. Taiwan has developed not one, but several types of diplomacies. A short overview of them serves as the prelude to our central debate concerning the importance of parliamentary diplomacy as a means for Taiwan to survive in the international community. In Chapter 5, we first look at parliamentarians and parliamentary institutions as actors (agents). Following our definition of parliamentary diplomacy, we analyse the participation of Taiwanese parliamentarians in international relations and their contribution to the development of Taiwan’s parliamentary diplomacy, individually or as members of their parliament, the Legislative Yuan. Since international parliamentary relations have become increasingly complex with various parliamentary institutions participating, we have paid particular attention to the participation of

8

Introduction

Taiwanese parliamentarians with and within those institutions: national parliaments, international parliamentary associations, parliamentary organs of international governmental organizations, and party alliances. From the perspective of International Relations, we study how these institutions respond to the initiatives and/​or preferences of Taiwanese parliamentarians whose mission is to promote inter-​parliamentary cooperation and advocate Taiwan’s foreign policy interests. In this regard, two inter-​connected questions are discussed. Firstly, can the LY and/​or its members (parliamentarians) make an impact on decision-​making processes relevant for Taiwan in parliamentary institutions, or can they influence them to act on behalf of Taiwan? Secondly, how have these actions affected Taiwan’s position in the international community? Among parliamentary institutions that will be discussed in this book in the context of Taiwan’s development of parliamentary diplomacy, two of them will receive particular attention: the US Congress (also: Congress) and the European Parliament. The US Congress has a special meaning for Taiwan’s parliamentary diplomacy for at least two reasons. First, Congress is the most powerful parliament in the world, with widespread constitutional powers, including in the US foreign policy. Second, it has a strong historical relationship with Taiwan. It played a decisive role in the adoption of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) in 1979. The TRA continues to be the cornerstone of Taiwan’s security. From the perspective of the US Congress, Taiwan is very important because it is one of the few existing and viable democracies in the (south-)eastern part of Asia, and because symbolically it represents a model for the development of mainland China if the latter ever gets rid of its communist regime. The TRA does not imply that the US would respond automatically in a case where the PRC decides to launch an attack on Taiwan. However, the bipartisan Congress can ensure that Taiwan is high on the foreign policy agenda of the US. It has done so in the past and has certainly done so during the 2016–​2020 Trump administration. For this reason, it is of vital importance for the LY and its members to play an active role in sustaining good relations with Congress. The European Parliament is important for Taiwan because it is the largest international parliamentary institution in the world that is composed of directly elected parliamentarians. Indeed, the European Parliament’s traditional emphasis on democracy, freedom, human rights and good governance fits very well in its engagement with Taiwan, given that Taiwan stands out as a role model of genuine liberal democracy in East Asia. The European Parliament does not have an equal say with states on foreign policy issues. Furthermore, the European Union and its member states do not recognize Taiwan and adhere to the One China principle. Nevertheless, because the European Parliament is not obligated to follow the official policies of

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the European Union and its member states, it provides an important, albeit informal, channel for Taiwan to interact with parliamentarians and other actors in the European Union. The backgrounds of relations between Taiwan on one side and the European Parliament and the US Congress on the other side are different, as are their respective powers. However, as previously pointed out, both of them are very important for Taiwan and its parliamentarians, who seek alternative ways to advocate for Taiwan’s interests. The US Congress, the European Parliament and other parliamentary institutions that will be discussed here are a research topic worthy of careful examination, not only because empirical evidence in this field has not yet been systemically analysed, but also because its policy implications can enrich theoretical understanding of parliamentary diplomacy. It has already been mentioned that actors do not act in a vacuum. They participate in an environment (structure) that affects the independence of actors in the pursuit of their preferences. In this respect, in Chapter 6 we concentrate on two broad questions about the Taiwanese experience with parliamentary diplomacy. What motivates members of the LY to be active internationally? What determines the success or failure of their activities? Such inquiry is relevant for our research because we analyse determinants that affect the scope of the parliamentary dimension of Taiwan’s foreign policy mostly by talking directly to individuals who have experienced or observed the contribution that LY members provide to the development of parliamentary diplomacy from Taiwan’s perspective. Their reflections, often original and never shared before, are an invaluable input for us to understand the practical implications of Taiwanese parliamentary diplomacy for the implementation of Taiwan’s foreign policy. The trade-​off has been that we needed to agree with interviewees relevant for the analysis in this chapter that their thoughts shared with us would be off the record. As for methods, we have come to realize that, at this point, relying on quantitative analyses would not benefit our study. For example, in the case of the US Congress, its consistently bipartisan support for Taiwan-​related research does not allow for any specific conclusions regarding the presence of pro-​Taiwan or pro-​China positions, because the latter appear relatively infrequently in Congressional debates. Further, we have been able to conduct surveys with parliamentarians in the LY. Unfortunately, the number of responses we have received from them is rather limited, so the size of the sample is not representative enough. Therefore, we mostly rely on qualitative methods. Semi-​structured interviews, focus groups, and primary sources, such as constitutive documents, rules of procedure, official declarations and press releases from ministries, have been used. We have been privileged to interview members of the LY coming from the two biggest political parties,

10

Introduction

including some leading political figures. We have been able to discuss our topic with former legislators, officials in political parties’ headquarters, members of think tanks, scholars, researchers and staff working for members of the LY. We have also talked with high-​ranking officials in the LY and the Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), former cabinet members in Taiwan, senior officials from the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), members of the European Parliament and senior staff from the US Congress with direct knowledge and experience of working with members of the US Congress on Taiwan-​related issues. The organization and the conduct of interviews have depended on the research focus in individual parts of the book, so we provide more information about interviews in individual sections as appropriate. Although far from all-​encompassing, this study includes a variety of concrete examples, the recounting of personal experiences and the identification of good practices of parliamentary diplomacy, all of which have given us additional knowledge needed to address the role and potential of Taiwan’s parliamentary diplomacy.

11

2

About Parliamentary Diplomacy Diplomacy then and now Traditionally, diplomacy has been seen as an ‘application of intelligence and tact to conduct official relations between governments of independent states; or, more briefly still, the conduct of business between states by peaceful means’ (Satow et al, 1995: 3). ‘Together with the balance of power, which it both reflects and reinforces, diplomacy is the most important institution of our society of states’ (Berridge, 2015: 1). The roots of diplomacy can be traced as far back as the 15th century BC (Potemkin, 1947), but like any other human activity, the content of diplomacy changes over time. It is determined by the given situation at a certain point of history (Benko, 1997: 256). So, for example, in a 1945 article published in Foreign Affairs, André Géraud found the system of alliances as obsolete –​as a kind of ‘old’ diplomacy. For him, the collective security introduced by the League of Nations represented an entirely new context, in which multilateralism played a bigger role than in the past, hence the dawn of the ‘new’ diplomacy as he has called it (Géraud, 1945: 256). In the new global order, emerging after the end of the World War Two, the term diplomacy has been given new meanings and interpretations to reflect changes in the conduct of international politics. This is how we can explain the modern interpretation of the term conference diplomacy. Kaufmann defines it as a ‘part of the management of relations between governments and of relations between governments and inter-​governmental organizations that takes place in international conferences’ (Kaufmann, 1996: 7). Changes caused by globalization have demonstrated that classic, state-​to-​state diplomacy cannot always equally address all walks of international life. Non-​governmental organizations (NGOs) feature ever more prominently in international negotiations, for example in the field of environmental protection, which has led authors to introduce NGO diplomacy as a research field (Betsill and Corell, 2008).

12

About Parliamentary Diplomacy

Studies of diplomacy in which not just states but other actors may be involved are many. Human rights diplomacy, for example, is defined as the ‘utilization of diplomatic negotiation and persuasion for the specific purpose of promoting and protecting human rights’ (O’Flaherty et al, 2011: 1). Citizens’ diplomacy has been defined as a form of conflict resolution, whereby actors use ‘a network of relationships across enemy lines to build the earliest foundations of cooperation and communication where there is little or no constructive contact between enemies’1 (Gopin, 2009: xiv; Magu, 2018).2 Humanitarian diplomacy is about ‘activities carried out by humanitarian organizations to obtain the space from political and military authorities … for arranging the presence of international humanitarian organizations and personnel in a given country’ (Minear and Smith, 2007: 1). These activities include ‘negotiating access to civilian populations in need of assistance and protection, monitoring assistance programmes, promoting respect for international law and norms, supporting indigenous individuals and institutions, and engaging in advocacy at a variety of levels in support of humanitarian objectives’ (Minear and Smith, 2007: 1). Environmental diplomacy is considered as a part of ‘collective action required to address the next generation of global environmental threats’ (Susskind, 1994: viii). Science diplomacy is understood as a bridge-​builder when state diplomacy finds itself in a deadlock: ‘when political tensions between countries do not allow for traditional diplomacy to express itself, scientific relations can be used to maintain or restore links’ (Ruffini, 2017: 12). Haas refers to scientists as epistemic communities that help states ‘identify their interest, framing the issues for collective debate, proposing specific policies and identifying salient points for negotiation … control over knowledge and information is an important dimension of power’ (Haas, 1992: 2). Just how powerful knowledge and scientists can be has been demonstrated by the developments that led to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer in 1985 and to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer in 1987. Those treaties had been triggered by conclusions of two pairs of scientists, working independently in the 1970s, on the impact of chlorine (Stolarski and Cicerone) and chlorofluorocarbons (Rowland and Molina) on the ozone layer (Benedick, 1998: 12). Science diplomacy, in this particular case referred to as ozone diplomacy, has led to the most powerful and effective environmental regime ever designed by politicians. It was considered ‘unique in annals of international diplomacy’ (Benedick, 1998: 1), and possibly ‘a paradigm for a new form of global diplomacy’ (Benedick, 1998: 8). The catalogue of diplomacies includes other types, such as economic diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, public diplomacy, para​diplomacy, celebrities’ diplomacy, sports diplomacy, football diplomacy, city diplomacy, even

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Twitter as well as Facebook diplomacy (Stavridis and Jančić, 2017: 1; Van de Pluijm and Melissen, 2007; Sandre, 2013; Spry, 2018),3 and, finally, parliamentary diplomacy.

Parliamentary diplomacy defined Parliamentarians are unique actors in international relations because they can claim that their legitimacy is based on being democratically elected. Cooperation among them takes up various forms; motivations for cooperation are different, but the main problem from the perspective of our research is that inter-​parliamentary cooperation is limited to parliamentarians and parliamentary institutions in the community of ordinary, universally recognized states. For example, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) was inaugurated as part of the Council of Europe in 1949 to be the voice of the people against the war in Europe and to ensure the implementation of norms related to human rights and fundamental freedoms. Yet, the PACE allows inter-​parliamentary cooperation to take place with parliamentarians from Morocco, but not with deputies from the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), which claims that most of its territory has been occupied by Morocco. The difference between Morocco and the SADR is that the latter is not a universally recognized state. So, where does this leave the PACE? One answer to this question could be that based on the existing evidence PACE’s agency in the universal protection of human rights has become questionable. It raises the questions of the two worlds in which those living in unrecognized and unrepresented states do not have equal access to international institutions that serve universally recognized states. In this regard, it also undermines parliamentary diplomacy as a tool of parliamentarians from democratic states, ‘acting within their remit, to tackle major problems which transcend national borders … to launch initiatives designed to influence political decisions by the executive and pave the way for practical solutions’ (Squarcialupi, 2000: 4) (emphasis added). Most definitions of parliamentary diplomacy do not take into account the existence of the world of recognized and represented states on one side, and the world of unrecognized and unrepresented states on the other. Weiglas and de Boer, for example, define parliamentary diplomacy as ‘a full range of international activities undertaken by parliamentarians to increase mutual understanding between countries, to assist each other in improving the control of governments and the representation of a people and to increase the democratic legitimacy of inter-​governmental institutions’ (Weiglas and de Boer, 2007: 93–​94). This definition is widely adopted by scholars and practitioners.4 It is less fitting for our study because it assumes parliamentarians to be democratically elected independent actors of universally recognized

14

About Parliamentary Diplomacy

states, working together to exercise control over governments. In the world of unrecognized and unrepresented states, parliamentarians cannot be actively engaged in international (parliamentary) relations, yet that does not necessarily mean that their countries are undemocratic. The definition offered by Stavridis and Jančić is more inclusive. It defines parliamentary diplomacy as ‘individual or collective action by parliamentarians aimed at “catalyzing, facilitating and strengthening the existing constitutional functions of parliaments through dialogues between peers on countless open policy questions across continents and levels of governance” ’ (Stavridis and Jančić, 2017: 6). From the perspective of this book, the sticky part is the reference to ‘peers’. A member of the US Congress will consider a member of the LY as a peer because they share the experience of being elected in free elections. The same cannot be said of a member of the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China (NPC) who does not have that experience. Yet, a member of the NPC, unlike member of the LY, can fully participate in international parliamentary relations, because the NPC is a parliament of the universally recognized state (never mind how representative), and the Legislative Yuan is not. In the context of this book such bias is, by definition, unacceptable. In addition, parliamentary diplomacy in unrecognized and unrepresented states is considered differently than in ordinary states –​it is not limited to interactions between peers, and often governments determine the content of parliamentary diplomacy. For example, in Taiwan, parliamentary diplomacy is when the MOFA organizes and coordinates visits of foreign parliamentarians to Taiwan. These visits typically include meetings with governmental officials, sometimes even the president him/​herself; meeting with local parliamentarians is just one item on the schedule of the visitors. These differences have been taken into account in our definition. Due to their isolation, unrepresented and unrecognized states are not able to develop in the same way as other states. Limited access to international relations may result in, among other things, weak legislative bodies, unable to participate in international relations. In these circumstances, the government may need to take over the task of reaching out to parliaments and parliamentarians abroad. In the world of unrecognized and unrepresented states that, too, is parliamentary diplomacy. Hence, we have opted for a broader working definition of parliamentary diplomacy. It denotes activities of parliamentarians as well as other actors that engage with other parliamentarians at all levels of international cooperation. An actor in parliamentary diplomacy can thus be an individual (a democratically elected member of parliament), a national parliament or any type of international parliamentary institution (Šabič, 2008), as well as any individuals and institution from the executive branch, such as a president, a prime minister or a ministry responsible for foreign affairs. Their interactions

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PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY OF TAIWAN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

take many different shapes and forms. They can meet, regardless of their status (it does not matter whether these actors are from universally recognized or non-​recognized states), in order to identify mutual problems and seek solutions to them by using advocacy, persuasion, negotiations and so on.

Parliamentary diplomacy as a field of research The origins of parliamentary diplomacy can be found as far back as the beginning of the 20th century,5 but the actual term ‘parliamentary diplomacy’ seems to have been used for the first time in connection with the creation of the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN GA). The former US Secretary of State Dean Rusk is widely credited to have coined the term. He considered parliamentary diplomacy as a type of multilateral negotiation, which is more than an ad hoc multilateral conference. In the General Assembly of the UN (UNGA), representatives of member states abide by the rules of procedure and adopt decisions by a majority vote, like in a national parliament.6 Using the case of inter-​ethnic conflict in Cyprus, Rosenbaum underscored the importance of parliamentary diplomacy practised by the UNGA, ‘especially for hostile powers who would not otherwise meet except in the parliamentary-​style regional international organizations, where membership is based on at least partial shared interest’ (Rosenbaum, 1967: 226). However, doubts were raised by leading experts in the field of international law and international organizations about the accuracy of the term ‘parliamentary diplomacy’ used in the context of what were essentially inter-​governmental deliberations. Bayley noted that parliamentary diplomacy, as defined by Rusk, could not be properly understood in the context of contemporary national parliaments. ‘The United Nations can be most usefully compared not to the mature parliaments of the19th and 20th centuries but the rudimentary parliamentary system of mediaeval England. In that context, “parliamentary diplomacy” may seem less far-​fetched’ (Bailey, 1963: 309). Jessup equated parliamentary diplomacy with conference diplomacy (Jessup, 1956: 237). The latter seemed a more accurate description of the work of state representatives (‘delegates’) in inter-​governmental institutions in general, not only in the UNGA.7 Indeed, the usage of the term parliamentary diplomacy as conference diplomacy or UN diplomacy has gradually disappeared from the literature (Rittberger, 1983: 171; more recently, Brisibe, 2016). In the meantime, the growing presence of parliamentarians in international politics did not escape the attention of scholars (early examples include Matthews, 1962/​1986; Harned, 1965; Klebes, 1990; Ghebali, 1993; Cutler, 2001; De Puig, 2004; Sbârnâ, 2007; Šabič, 2008; Peters et al, 2010; Stavridis and Malamud, 2011). As the knowledge about the parliamentary

16

About Parliamentary Diplomacy

dimension of international relations became richer, the research agenda widened and, eventually, parliamentary diplomacy as diplomacy of parliamentarians rather than representatives of governments became part of that agenda (Götz, 2005: 264–​265). Stelios Stavridis, the most prolific scholar in the field of parliamentary diplomacy, argued almost 20 years ago that systematic academic research on parliamentary diplomacy was overdue. ‘What is interesting,’ he added, ‘is that parliamentarians or officials working in parliamentary institutions appear to be more aware of this new phenomenon than academics or other observers and analysts of world affairs’ (Stavridis, 2002). A lot has changed since then. The burgeoning literature on parliamentary diplomacy demonstrates the attention this field of research has attracted among scholars in less than two decades. It would take a considerable amount of space to do justice to all the valuable contributions, those by practitioners, and those of scholars, that touch upon this issue. Being fully aware of the fact that, due to the focus of this book, we will be omitting many prominent researchers of parliamentary diplomacy who would have deserved to be mentioned, we offer a tentative categorization of works of scholars and practitioners who discuss parliamentary diplomacy. We have organized the literature into three groups of authors: conservatives, moderates and idealists. The conservatives and moderates link parliamentary diplomacy to state diplomacy. The difference between them is how strong that link is. For conservatives, there is no doubt that parliamentary diplomacy is the government’s tool to represent and advocate an official foreign policy line. Konstantin Kosachev, a politician with rich experience as a deputy in the Russian Duma, argues that parliamentarians have responsibilities toward their state and the government. Those involved in parliamentary diplomacy can be independent in their actions only in so far as they understand ‘that the existence of parliamentary diplomacy can never be outside state’s pursuit of foreign policy aims and interests’ (Kosachev, 2004: 110), and that ‘all deputies represent the Russian state and their prime duty is to uphold its interests’ (Kosachev, 2004: 112). Ngara, reflecting on the experience of Nigeria, emphasized that the first task of politicians, involved in international parliamentary activities, should be the promotion and protection of the national interest (Ngara, 2016: 4–​5). A study that looks at the case of Zimbabwe departs from the understanding of parliamentary diplomacy as ‘alternative diplomatic channels which are critical to the management of a country’s bilateral and multilateral relations within a unitary system of government’ (Mudyanadzo and Nkomo, 2016: 1). It leaves no doubt about the role of parliamentary diplomacy, which must be in the service of national foreign policy. ‘Parliamentarians are expected to put their political affiliations behind, be a unified front and pursue the national interests of the country

17

PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY OF TAIWAN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

first and foremost before they could even think about their constituency’ (Mudyanadzo and Nkomo, 2016: 5). Moderates emphasize the importance of parliamentary diplomacy for a country’s foreign policy, but they do not advocate too close a connection between the two. They argue that parliamentary diplomacy assists traditional diplomacy with a degree of independence and the ability to monitor how a country’s foreign policy is implemented (Noulas, 2011). ‘If parliamentarians are seen as too close and indistinguishable from their governments then this can also be viewed as a weakness of [parliamentary diplomacy]’ (Fiott, 2011: 4). Michael Frendo, a Maltese politician who occupied top positions in both the government and parliament,8 departs from the position that parliamentary diplomacy in the framework of the PACE is a complementary tool to traditional diplomacy. The purpose of parliamentary diplomacy is to ‘achieve results that are hard to achieve through other conventional channels’ (Frendo, 2012: 3). He believes that it would be impossible to expect meaningful results from parliamentarians if they worked alone. ‘This value added is best achievable … when parliamentary diplomacy and traditional diplomacy of the Executive are well aligned, well connected and collaborate together’ (Frendo, 2012: 8). Geert Hamilton, Clerk of the Senate of the States General of the Netherlands, is of a similar opinion.9 Nitou and Sus, too, see ‘parliamentary diplomacy as a complementary tool to traditional diplomacy (driven by institutions holding executive power) which captures the broader political role of parliaments in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy’ (Nitou and Sus, 2017: 2). Nikos Kotzias, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece, has offered this understanding of the interplay between governmental and parliamentarian dimensions of parliamentary diplomacy. I also think that Parliaments can become agencies for expressing what we call national issues … But at the same time … it is important not to limit yourself to narrow issues that interest our country. In foreign policy, to develop and gain a role, it is of great importance to defend general principles, universal human values; to show solidarity with the needs of the everyday citizen who lives in the world, to bear in mind peoples who are fighting for basic rights or to satisfy basic needs. This means that, certainly, as the Foreign Minister, I will always be pleased if your Committees support our views on foreign policy, but I will be equally pleased if I learn from you … you are closer to society, you meet with other types of personalities and social agencies while exercising the duties of the Committees founded by Parliament, and, by extension, you have a lot to tell us. (Kotzias, 2016)

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About Parliamentary Diplomacy

Following idealists’ views on inter-​parliamentary relations, parliamentary diplomacy can be conducted also by parliamentarians who prefer the pursuit of shared norms and values rather than of particular interests of states. One way of doing so is ‘to address a “democratic deficit” on the international stage through parliamentary representation in international governance regimes’, for example, by creating a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly (Roche, 2003: 36; Kauppi, 2007). Another way would be the ‘parliamentarisation’ of the international community as proposed by the Cosmopolitan Democracy School: ‘the cosmopolitan model of democracy would seek the creation of regional parliaments … and the enhancement of the role of such bodies where they already exist … In the final analysis, the formation of an authoritative assembly of all democratic states and agencies –​a reformed General Assembly of the United Nations or a complement to it –​would be an objective’ (Held, 1995: 118). Some authors might be placed somewhere between idealists and moderates. Cutler looks at parliamentary diplomacy as ‘an important middle ground between the traditional level of interstate diplomacy and the new level of transnational cooperation amongst grassroots non-​governmental organizations’ (Cutler, 2006: 82–​3). Another concept is the so-​called Track One and a Half (TOAH) diplomacy. Originally, the term referred to governmental representatives involved in informal channels of interaction and communications with actors other than governments (Nan, 2003; Nan and Strimling, 2004). Surprisingly, case studies of TOAH diplomacy do not take into account the role of parliamentarians.10 It is true that other studies of unofficial diplomacy, which offer a different terminology, such as ‘Quasi Track One’ diplomacy, indicate the importance of parliamentarians in peaceful conflict resolution initiatives (Schiff, 2010: 100), but readers receive little knowledge beyond that. This has changed with the advent of the literature focusing on the TOAH parliamentary diplomacy. The latter has been defined as ‘the role played by high-​level political actors and national and state legislatures in the resolution of local disputes, conflicts, and insurgencies’ (Rafi, 2015: 72). The Parliamentarians for Global Action (PGA) is given as an example of a parliamentary institution that exercises the TOAH parliamentary diplomacy. According to its understanding, the PGA defines this type of diplomacy as ‘peacemaking efforts carried out neither by governments (Track I) nor by non-​governmental organizations (Track II), but by global-​minded parliamentarians (PGA, 2019: 5). In other words, the PGA, a parliamentary institution consisting of democratically elected parliamentarians, addresses global problems ‘which could not be solved by any one government or parliament’ (PGA, 2019: 3). It sees itself as ‘the intervening link between civil society and executive authority’ (PGA,

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PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY OF TAIWAN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

2019: 3). Indeed, the PGA can be credited for several diplomatic successes. Its members are considered to have played an important role in the process of building trust between the Soviet Union and the US during negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty (Spencer, 1995: 68). After the end of the Cold War, the PGA established a special Task Force on Peace and Diplomacy (TFPD), which was mandated to ‘send teams of its members out on peace-​making missions to resolve parliament-​based conflicts, especially in countries with emerging democracies’ (PGA, 2019: 1). According to Shazia Rafi, the former Secretary General of the PGA, the work of the TFPD on the ground gave substance to the term TOAH parliamentary diplomacy ‘as a functional, multi-​conflict peace-​making tool working across Africa and the Caribbean in coordination with the UN system’ (Rafi, 2015: 74; PGA, 2019: 7–​25).11 We see moderate views as a promising route towards the future development of parliamentary diplomacy. As Fiott has argued, having no connection with governments involves the risk of parliamentarians being ‘utopian in aims and methods’ (Fiott, 2011: 4), but parliamentarians should be the ones who decide when and how they will link themselves with governmental preferences. Our task as researchers is to analyse circumstances in which such decisions are made. The latter is an important part of our effort to analyse the Taiwanese parliamentary diplomacy as well.

Subjects, activities, effectiveness, forms and potential of parliamentary diplomacy At the beginning of the chapter, we introduced our understanding and definitions of the basic concepts and institutions that we will discuss in the present analysis. A parliamentarian is a member of an institution –​a parliament –​that assembles a ‘group of people who are elected to make a country’s laws and discuss important national affairs’.12 He or she can be active in international relations as an individual, or as a member of parliamentary institutions: national parliaments, international parliamentary associations, parliamentary organs of international governmental organizations (POIGOs) and party alliances (PAs). National parliaments interact with governments on issues related to foreign affairs. Depending on their constitutional role, they could influence foreign policy responses of the government on issues of international importance. POIGOs are defined as organs of international organizations, composed of parliamentarians (Lindeman, 1983: 228). IPAs are defined as parliamentary institutions in which (more or less) democratically elected parliamentarians promote or deepen cooperation in areas of common interest (Šabič, 2008: 266). Last but not least, PAs are defined as international networks in which members

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About Parliamentary Diplomacy

of political parties across the world with similar ideological orientations cooperate to facilitate international advocacy of their policy preferences. Concerning activities related to parliamentary diplomacy, an IPU report from 2005 introduces a catalogue of parliamentary involvement in international relations. The report lists several activities, which are grouped into 11 clusters, parliamentary diplomacy being one of them (IPU, 2005: 4).13 Some of the activities listed as parliamentary diplomacy are (IPU, 2005: 8): • • • •

promoting relations between countries in various fields; inter-​party dialogue; institutionalized and regular encountering between parliamentarians; participation in conflict resolution and confidence-​building measures.

Authors, particularly practitioners, echo the overview in the IPU’s report. Weiglas and de Boer see the activities of parliamentary diplomacy in terms of ‘promoting democracy and transparency’ (Weiglas and de Boer, 2007: 95–9​ 6). Hamilton believes that an enhancement, through personal contacts between members of parliament of different states, of mutual understanding and establishing ‘alternative channels beneficial for bilateral relations between countries’ is an important value of parliamentary diplomacy (Hamilton, 2012: 4). Parliamentarians can keep up the dialogue in situations where links between the two countries are interrupted14 or where a country has limited possibilities to participate in international relations.15 Establishing and facilitating an inter-​party and/​or inter-​parliamentary dialogue is another example of parliamentary diplomacy. Fiott has mentioned the transitioning of Portugal to a stable democracy after the revolution in 1974–​75 as an example. In this process, a concerted effort of political parties across Europe has played a considerable role (Fiott, 2011: 3). The list of activities that speak in favour of parliamentary presence in international relations can include capacity building as a tool for parliamentary diplomacy. The so-​called Rose–​Roth seminars organized by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA) were designed to prepare parliamentarians from former socialist countries for parliamentary democracy, as part of a larger project of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) enlargement (Flockhart, 2004). Other activities can be mentioned to give an overview of what is or may contribute to parliamentary diplomacy. Election monitoring is one of them (Stavridis and Jančić, 2017: 9). Norm entrepreneurship is another (Šabič, 2013). At global level, parliamentary diplomacy underpins policies that address transboundary problems such as Millennium Goals in the past and Sustainable Development Goals in the present. The tasks of what one may call global parliamentary diplomacy have been summarized by Jeffrey Sachs.

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In the rich countries, parliamentarians have to help increase international financial support for the poorest countries of the world. In the poorer countries, parliamentarians have a major role in ensuring that the domestic policy framework supports openness, transparency, democracy, human rights, and the commitment to the social challenges of health, education, agricultural productivity, and elimination of hunger. This is a partnership that must involve all countries of the world and therefore –​almost by definition –​all parliaments of the world. (IPU, 2002: 3) The literature identifies various forms of involvement in parliamentary diplomacy. All these forms are neatly presented by Fiott (2011: 2–​3). He mentions four levels of parliamentary diplomacy: intra-​state, inter-​state, intra-​regional and inter-​regional; to this list, one might also add the global level of parliamentary diplomacy, as explained in what follows. According to Fiott, ‘at the intra-​state level parliamentarians and political parties are formally and principally involved in scrutinizing the foreign policy of their national government, and in this way can have a direct bearing on the shape and extent of these policies’ (Fiott, 2011: 2).16 According to the IPU, intra-​state activities by parliamentarians also include the negotiation of mandates or consultative recommendations, consultations between committees and governments on important matters relating to foreign affairs, the inclusion of representatives of parliament in governmental delegations at ministerial or summit meetings and so on (IPU, 2005: 4–​5). Some parliaments have had committees focused exclusively on parliamentary diplomacy which empowers them to play a bigger role in national foreign policy planning and implementation, for example, in Italy (Baiocchi, 2005) (the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, better known as the Helsinki Commission, created by the US Congress in 1976, also belongs in this category17). There are several forms of inter-​state diplomacy in which individual parliamentarians, parliamentary delegations and political parties can participate. Regarding parliamentary delegations, the so-​called friendship groups are a typical example. Many parliaments have established such groups.18 Parliamentary delegations participate in shaping and implementing confidence-​building activities, meet with accredited ambassadors both abroad and in their home country and so on. At the individual level, parliamentarians may be involved in concrete projects, such as creating international parliamentary institutions, or organizing events (conferences, workshops) dedicated to discussing pressing issues.19 Political parties create alliances in which they meet and advocate their positions and solutions to international problems.20

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About Parliamentary Diplomacy

As for the intra-​regional level of parliamentary diplomacy, the European Parliament comes to mind (Fiott, 2011: 2). It has created a variety of links that bring parliamentarians from the region together (Raube, MüftülerBaç and Wouters, 2019). Concerning EU membership, the Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the EU (COSAC), created in 1989, is the oldest of them. The COSAC may ‘submit any contribution it deems appropriate for the attention of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission and to promote the exchange of information and best practice between national Parliaments and the European Parliament. … It may “organize inter-​parliamentary conferences on specific topics, in particular to debate matters of common foreign and security policy, including common security and defence policy” ’.21 The European Parliament has created committees with which it maintains contacts with non-​member states from Europe. Irrespective of their legal arrangements with the European Union (whether they are candidate countries, have an association agreement with the EU and so on), inter-​ parliamentary cooperation is included in the agreement.22 Another example of a parliamentary institution in Europe for intra-​regional parliamentary diplomacy would be the PACE. Similar institutions exist in other regions, too (Dri et al, 2013: Part II). The European Parliament can also be discussed in the context of the inter-​ regional level of parliamentary diplomacy. It has created a system of delegations, which connects it with parliamentary institutions such as the ACP–​EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly and the Euro–​Latin American Parliamentary Assembly.23 Outside the network of inter-​parliamentary cooperation created by the European Parliament (Stavridis and Irrera, 2015), other examples include the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Co-​operation in Europe (OSCE PA), which brings together parliamentarians from Europe, Asia and North America (Oliver, 1996) and the NATO PA (Lunn, 2005). Finally, many parliamentary activities in the international arena do not take place only at national, regional or inter-regional levels, but also globally. An example of an institution dealing with issues of global importance is the IPU, but several other IPAs also address topics of a global nature, such as protection of the environment24 and nuclear weapons.25 Effectiveness is a term that tends to be infamously used by the media to comment on parliamentarians travelling abroad alleging that they abuse official travels for personal use (Foxe, 2013). Usually, those media do not specify what is meant by ineffectiveness. We believe that the latter cannot be measured in quantitative terms, but we can observe the behaviour of an actor (for example, a parliamentary institution) and the changes it creates in its environment over a certain period. In this respect, we can talk about two interlinked types of effectiveness: an institutional and an environmental one.26

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Institutional effectiveness can be defined as the ability to accomplish specific tasks, aims or expectations concerning the implementation of a certain policy that an actor (for example, a state) sets for itself in a predetermined time frame. If these tasks are accomplished, say in five years, the given policy can be declared as effective. Environmental effectiveness means the ability of an actor to induce changes in a given political and/​or economic environment. The positive outcome of these activities is all but certain; many problems may need to be overcome along the way, and it can take years, or decades, before it can be declared that an actor has been effective. The aforementioned work of the IPU on promoting arbitration as a norm in relations between states can be considered as an example of environmental effectiveness. There are other examples, although they do not necessarily end up as success stories. Longin Pastusiak, an experienced parliamentarian from Poland, proposed, on behalf of the PGA, a cooperation between Armenia and Azerbaijan on water, an issue of high priority for both countries. The problem was that the two countries barely communicated with each other because of the frozen conflict in the area of Nagorno-Karabakh which is legally within the borders of Azerbaijan but was controlled by Armenia at that time. Yet, together with Georgia, they were part of the 2002–​2007 South Caucasus Project, financed by NATO and the OSCE (Campana et al, 2008). In 2003, parliamentarians from the two countries with the support of scientists signed a letter of understanding to stimulate cooperation on ‘monitoring of water resources, data processing and analysis, water quality and treatment using artificial and natural means, and the assessment of the environmental impact of degradation’ (PGA, 2003: 14–​15). Initiatives of this kind demonstrate the substance of environmental effectiveness in theory: domestically, because two countries could focus on economic development rather than violence; internationally, because such cooperation could help to reduce the threat of war between the two states.27 In this particular case, the expression of political will was deeply overshadowed by the conflict, which made the practical cooperation difficult, despite the engagement of other institutions and motivated individuals from both countries participating in the project. At the time of writing, any such cooperation became impossible because at the end of September 2020 the war broke out again between the two countries in which Azerbaijan sought to reclaim the territory lost to Armenia in 1994. The last item to discuss in this section is the potential of parliamentary diplomacy. Parliamentarians and parliamentary institutions may not be counted among the most influential actors in international relations, but that does not mean that they are powerless. Indeed, not all parliamentarians are elected by free and fair elections, and not all of them have the freedom to monitor their governments or co-​shape foreign policies –​but one may still need them in the processes of searching for solutions to international

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About Parliamentary Diplomacy

problems, in particular by bridging the gap between the recognized states and those that lack both recognition and representation. Parliamentary diplomacy cannot be exclusionary in nature and we cannot discriminate among parliaments and parliamentarians on where they come from –​each of them matters. Negotiating mutually acceptable solutions to problems is what diplomacy is all about. The right to participate in international parliamentary relations must be universal, regardless of status, legal or political, of parliamentarians and parliamentary institutions, if they wish to be part of the solution, not part of the problem.28 This analysis, summarized in Figure 2.1, does not in any way claim to be representative of views on defining and explaining parliamentary diplomacy, some of which we have presented in this chapter. The overview is nevertheless important for this study because it shows the ways we can discuss parliamentary diplomacy by looking at concrete examples, as scholars have already done so many times. It is intended to help make the case for parliamentary diplomacy as a field of research that cannot be sidelined from the scholarship dealing with International Relations. It shows that issues, which are of direct interest to voters, are global issues at the same time. Parliamentarians, national parliaments and other parliamentary institutions are and must be involved in the maintenance of peace and security in the international community, such as by promoting good relations between parliamentarians from states and other entities, recognized or unrecognized, conducting inter-​party dialogue, contributing to conflict resolution and so on. In this respect, let us recall that Figure 2.1 talks about the effectiveness and potential of parliamentary diplomacy as well. It is not an easy task to ‘measure’ either of them, and we know that it is important to demonstrate the ‘usefulness’ of parliamentarians and parliamentary institutions involved in international relations. In the context of the present study, we can make a case for them if we can show that parliamentary institutions and parliamentarians from universally recognized states can connect, in some form, with peers and parliaments from unrecognized and unrepresented states. We will continue this discussion after the next section, in which we gain better knowledge about unrecognized and unrepresented states.

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Figure 2.1: Parliamentary diplomacy –​an overview Parliamentary diplomacy

Subjects

Activities

Effectiveness

Forms

Parliamentarians

Facilitating good relations, co-operation

Intra-state

Institutional

National parliaments

Inter-party dialogue

Inter-state

Environmental

IPAs

Networking

Intra-regional

POIGOs

Conflict resolution, confidence-building

Inter-regional

PAs

Global

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Potential

3

Unrecognized and Unrepresented States The contemporary international community is unique in many ways. One of its characteristics is the abundance of sovereign states; currently, 193 of them are members of the UN. These states enjoy worldwide recognition, but nothing guarantees them such a status indefinitely. As Chinese international lawyer Chen Tiqiang wrote, ‘Whenever there is an outbreak of civil war, a change of government or a transfer of territory or other important changes, the question of recognition is immediately involved’ (Chen, 1951: 13). Of course, a newly independent state wants to be fully integrated into the international community. It wants to be able to communicate with other states and actors without interruptions. It wants to be considered not just as a subject of International Relations, but also as a legal person, with rights and obligations according to international law. However, the process of recognition of a new state, and its admittance to the international community, is not an easy one. In international law, two main theories address the nature of the recognition of states: constitutive and declaratory. The first one argues that only fully recognized states can engage in international communication, whereas the second one asserts that the act of recognition is of a declaratory nature; a state becomes a state when it fulfils conditions for statehood, not because of formal recognition (Türk, 2007: 90). The constitutive view on recognition is, according to Chen, Eurocentric. ‘The historical fact that international law originated among the States of Europe has made this notion of a “closed club” a constant feature in the theories of international law’ (Chen, 1951: 35). Entering such a club is not easy, but that does not mean that one should be oblivious to the fact that states which lack formal recognition and, consequently, face limited access to the international community, nevertheless do exist.

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The lack of international relations renders the enforcement of rights difficult, but not impossible; it suspends the enforcement of rights, but does not destroy them … Even in the absence of diplomatic relations, certain minimum rights can nevertheless be claimed and exercised by a State, for instance, the rights of independence and territorial integrity. To argue otherwise would be to maintain that an unrecognized State may be invaded and subjugated without violation of international law. (Chen, 1951: 33–​4) We agree with international lawyers who argue that the recognition of a state ‘is a political act, which is, in principle, independent of the existence of the new State as a subject of international law’ (Crawford, 2006: 22). At the same time, we should not ignore how politicized this process can be. The Montevideo Convention often serves as a reference point to probe the eligibility for statehood, but, as Vidmar points out, ‘the traditional statehood criteria are not a simple checklist that could objectively determine whether or not an entity is a State’ (Vidmar, 2012: 746). Where it becomes complicated is answering the question of, which factors decide the status of statehood and the acceptance of a country to the community of recognized states, usually symbolized by UN membership. This is the issue that concerns scholars in general, not only international lawyers; one has to address not only the factual existence of a state but also the justification of the existence of that state (Wheatley, 2016: 20). The international community is unable to develop a consistent approach on which states ‘deserve’ recognition and which do not; the act of recognition, again, remains primarily political, not legal. To address such inconsistencies, which have considerable consequences for the development of parliamentary diplomacy in unrecognized and unrepresented states, we have made an overview of their experience with (non-​)recognition. For operational reasons, we have classified them into two broad categories: contested states and states with limited recognition. The main difference between the two categories is that in the case of the former, the recognized states (UN members) are almost unanimous in an opinion that these states should not be recognized (Geldenhuys, 2009: 7) and in the case of the latter no such unanimity exists. Furthermore, we have divided these two broader categories of states into two sub-​groups: states that have been created as a result of secession, which tends to be viewed by the international community as particularly problematic, because it violates international law and, consequently, disrupts the international political stability; and states that have been established in the process of decolonization, during which they face various challenges that affect their statehood as well as their participation and representation in international relations.

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Contested states Created after secession Several states have declared independence within the internationally recognized borders of another state. The Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR, also called the Republic of Artsakh) has declared independence on the territory of Azerbaijan, to which it belonged from 1923 when the Soviet authorities established the autonomous oblast Nagorno-Karabakh as part of the territory of the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic. In 1988, the authorities in Nagorno-​Karabakh officially requested to be transferred to the sovereignty of Armenia. Azerbaijan refused, which led to clashes between the Azeris and the Armenians (RefWorld, 2004). By the end of 1991, Azerbaijan and Armenia declared independence. Soon after, in January 1992, Nagorno-Karabakh declared independence from Azerbaijan. That resulted in the outbreak of war with Azerbaijan in which Armenia was involved as well. The conflict resulted in massive fleeing, in opposite directions, of local populations on both sides of the border (HRW, 2004). The conflict was halted in 1994 when the truce was signed between Armenia and Azerbaijan. As previously mentioned, the conflict had remained frozen for 26 years (Klever, 2013; Ohanyan, 2019; de Waal, 2020) until hostilities escalated into an all-​out war in September 2020. The NKR is not recognized by any UN member, not even Armenia.1 Nevertheless, it has developed various connections to maintain its presence in the international community. Its parliamentary body, the National Assembly of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh (NARNK, also called the National Assembly of the Republic of Artsakh), pays particular attention to promoting inter-​parliamentary contacts. Informal friendship groups for the NARNK have been created in several countries such as Belgium, Canada and France. Several friendship groups have been established in the NARNK as well.2 Parliamentary diplomacy as a foreign policy tool receives attention from both the parliament and the government because it ‘provides a unique tool for overcoming the artificial barriers that keep the people of not recognized countries isolated from international politics’ (Ghavalyan, 2019). As for other parliamentary institutions, some contact has been recorded. In 2004, for example, Terry Davis visited the NARNK in the capacity of a rapporteur for the PACE on Nagorno-Karabakh.3 Recently, representatives of the NARNK met with Kristian Vigenin, the OSCE PA Special Representative on the South Caucasus.4 Apart from these and occasional contacts with parliamentarians abroad, there is not much evidence at hand of parliamentary diplomacy having been put to use for the pursuit of NKR’s interest.

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Another country that emphasizes the importance of parliamentary diplomacy as a way to broaden its external relations is Abkhazia. During the Soviet era, Abkhazia had the status of an autonomous republic in the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic. Already under the Perestroika in the second half of the 1980s, ‘the Abkhaz leadership strove for full control over the state institutions of Abkhazia and for a confederation with Georgia’ (Coppieters, 2004: 4). After the fall of the Soviet Union and the declaration of independence in April 1991, Georgia sought to assert control over the region by using force (1992–​1993), but it was not successful (Petersen, 2008). Moreover, in October 1999, the process of separation of Abkhazia from Georgia culminated in an Abkhaz referendum followed by the adoption of the Act of State Independence.5 The year 2008 –​the Russo–​Georgian war –​ was another important milestone for Abkhazia. After the successful military intervention in Georgia, the Russian Federation established diplomatic relations with Abkhazia (Kopeček et al, 2016: 94). Five other members of the UN (Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru, Vanuatu and Syria) currently recognize Abkhazia (see also Vermishyan, 2016: 72).6 To facilitate inter-​parliamentary cooperation, the People’s Assembly of Abkhazia (PAA) has created a committee on international and inter-​ parliamentary relations and relations with Abkhaz compatriots. 7 Yet, the scope of that cooperation seems limited. Besides maintaining inter-​ parliamentary relations with parliaments of UN member states that recognize Abkhazia (AW, 2012), Abkhazian parliamentarians meet only sporadically with parliamentarians from other countries (AW, 2009, 2014). The PAA is active in facilitating inter-​parliamentary relations with parliaments of other contested states, notably South Ossetia and Transnistria, as will be seen later in this study (Vermishyan, 2016: 73). Recently, the PAA has expanded its activity to Syria, at the time of writing the last UN member that has recognized Abkhazia (al-​Frieh and Said, 2017). Very few contacts exist between the PAA and other parliamentary institutions. To establish contact with the breakaway region, the OSCE PA created the Ad Hoc Committee on Abkhazia. During its first visit to Georgia in 2001, the Committee sought to get in touch with representatives from Abkhazia, but without success (OSCE, 2001; BBC, 2001). Abkhazia continued to refuse communication with the Committee (Cutler, 2006: 86). At the time of writing this study, we could not find any activities aimed at renewing contact between the OSCE PA and Abkhazian politicians. There are a lot of similarities between Abkhazia and South Ossetia, another breakaway region within Georgia. Both of them had a special status during the Soviet era (South Ossetia had the status of an autonomous oblast). In 1990, South Ossetia adopted a Declaration in which it asserted its sovereignty. The first Constitution was adopted in 1993 (Vermishyan, 2016: 79). In August

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Unrecognized and Unrepresented States

2008, incidents provoked by separatists in South Ossetia caused the outbreak of the Russo–​Georgian war (Sotiriou, 2019). Georgia intended to retake control over South Ossetia in a military campaign starting on 7 August 2008, which triggered the military response from the Russian Federation. The war was over within five days. Worse still, the Russian Federation recognized and established diplomatic relations with South Ossetia as well, and has assumed, even to a larger extent than in Abkhazia, a considerable political, military and economic influence in that country (Czachor, 2015: 153–​4). Besides the Russian Federation, the following UN member states have recognized South Ossetia: Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru and Syria. South Ossetia, too, strives to expand its presence in the international community, but its inter-​parliamentary contacts are limited. The Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia (PRSO) has established a Committee on foreign policy and inter-​parliamentary relations.8 The inter-​parliamentary cooperation in which it participates is largely focused on the Russian Federation (PRSO, 2018). Beyond that, it cooperates mostly with parliaments from contested states in the region (Vermishyan, 2016: 83).9 The Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR) is the last among the self-​proclaimed states that emerged from the fall of the former Soviet Union, which we will address in this section of the book. Transnistria became part of the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, created in 1924, which then was a part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. In 1944, the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic was established. The development of this new republic from 1945 until the end of the Soviet Union best explains the creation of the PMR. According to Vahl and Emerson: Soviet post-​war economic policy was to develop Western Moldova as an agricultural area, with industry, often military-​related, mainly located in Transnistria. Immigrants from other parts of the Soviet Union, mainly Russians … as well as Ukrainians and Belorussians, were brought in to work at the new plants. This entailed that the two sides of the Nistru river diverged in demographic and economic terms: a rural, Moldovan, agricultural region to the west, and a more urban, Slavic, and industrial area on the left bank. (Vahl and Emerson, 2004: 4) The Russian population was growing steadily in the region, yet that growth did not overwhelm the two other main ethnic groups, i.e. the Moldovans, which was the largest one, and the Ukrainians (Vahl and Emerson, 2004: 4–​ 5). The deciding factor was nationalism, which increased as the Soviet grip on Moldova started to weaken. The pro-​Moldovan party (the Moldovan Popular Front) was created in 1989. In March 1990, elections were held in Moldova. The ruling coalition was composed almost entirely of ethnic

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Moldovans. In the Moldovan Popular Front, which received the largest number of seats, the idea of unification between Romania and Moldova was frequently mentioned (Vahl and Emerson, 2004: 5). Such rapid changes were not well received in Transnistria. The local population there, in which the Russians and Ukrainians had a majority, did not see itself having much in common with Moldova (Vermishyan, 2016: 51). In such tense political circumstances, Moldova declared sovereignty on 26 June, with the PMR following less than three months later, on 2 September 1990. That led to the conflict between central authorities and separatists. The conflict has remained unresolved ever since (de Waal, 2016; Rogstad, 2018; de Waal, 2018: 35). As far as its international status is concerned, no UN member recognizes the PMR, not even the Russian Federation, which supports the PMR both economically and militarily (Rojanski, 2011; Minzarari, 2020). The PMR’s parliament is called the Supreme Council of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (SCPMR). Its inter-​parliamentary relations are mainly conducted in the circle consisting of the Russian Federation and the breakaway entities from the former Soviet Union. This cooperation takes place in the Inter-​Parliamentary Assembly of the Community for Democracy and the Rights of Peoples (PACDRP), established in 2006.10 Besides the Transnistrian parliament, the parliaments of South Ossetia and Abkhazia are also members. The headquarters of the PACDRP are in Moscow. Outside the Russian space, parliamentary activities of the SCPMR are reduced to relations with Moldovan authorities, but not without the Russian influence; in a case where the relations between the Republic of Moldova and PMR become tense, the SCPMR ‘may reach out to the deputies of the Russian Duma for assistance’.11 Beyond contact with Russian and Moldovan parliamentarians, inter-​parliamentary contact of the SCPMR is scarce, with some visits of individual parliamentarians and international parliamentary associations such as the PACE being reported only occasionally (SCPMR, 2006; 2008). The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus12 has emerged from the ethnic conflict between the Turkish and Greek populations on the island of Cyprus. The island was under British rule until 1960 when Cyprus was formed as an independent state. Soon after, tensions between the two ethnic groups heightened (Ker-​Lindsay, 2004). In response to the tensions, on 4 March 1964 the United Nations’ Security Council adopted Resolution 186, with which it established a peacekeeping force, called the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).13 The UNFICYP was responsible for maintaining a neutral zone (the so-​called green line) which divided the two communities, and ‘to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal condition’.14 The

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Unrecognized and Unrepresented States

most problematic issue for the Turkish community, living in the northern part of Cyprus, was the period between 1967 and 1974 (Kiralp, 2017). In that period, the idea of creating a union (enosis) between Greece and Cyprus was high on the agenda of the military junta in Greece, which in 1967 overthrew the democratically elected government and introduced the so-​called ‘Regime of the Colonels’. The junta lasted until 24 July 1974, following the failed attempt to accomplish the enosis. On 15 July of that year, a military coup d’état took place in Cyprus, which the junta plotted together with the Greeks of Cyprus. The goal of the coup was to be a unification of Cyprus with Greece. The coup was successful in the beginning but ended up in a disaster for the Greeks. Turkey responded by invading Cyprus five days later and again in August of the same year. ‘By the time of a final brokered ceasefire [16 August 1974], Turkish troops occupied 36 per cent of the island’ (Ker-​Lindsay, 2017: 433). The position of the ethnic Turks in Cyprus has also changed. ‘Previously, efforts focused on providing strong minority rights for the Turkish Cypriot community. However, the Turkish Cypriots now demanded executive powers over a territorial unit’ (Ker-​Lindsay, 2017: 433). The process of further partition of the island continued and, in 1983, the Turkish part of Cyprus declared independence as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) (Ker-​Lindsay, 2017: 439). The TRNC controls its territory and has functioning institutions, but the country has very limited access to the international arena. The TRNC is not recognized by any other state except Turkey. Members of the Assembly of the Republic (AOR) have established relations only with members of the Turkish Parliament. The friendship group between the two parliaments has been formally regulated since 1987,15 but the group was brought to life only in 2019.16 No other friendship groups have been formed, and according to a member of the AOR, very few inter-​parliamentary activities outside visits to and from Ankara take place.17 Regarding other parliamentary institutions, the European Parliament has been engaged with both civil society (Kyris, 2020: 349) and political parties in the TRNC. In 2006, a high-​level group was created to establish contact with elected representatives, among others (Kyris, 2012: 479). Members of the contact group frequently visited Northern Cyprus. These interactions had a positive impact because they offered to local politicians ‘access to the international environment, increased prestige and policy knowledge’ (Kyris, 2012: 479). Parliamentarians from the TRNC had access to the PACE as well, especially after the failure of the so-​called Annan Plan that sought to unify Cyprus. The Plan was put forward in a referendum in 2004. It was approved by the Turkish Cypriots but rejected by the Greek Cypriots. To ‘reward’ the support of the Turkish Cypriots for the Annan Plan (Hoffmeister, 2006), the PACE adopted a decision ‘to associate more closely elected representatives of the Turkish

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Cypriot community in the work of the Parliamentary Assembly and its committees’ (PACE, 2004b: Paragraph 6; TRNC, 2011).

Created in the process of decolonization In the past, several states that were later considered contested had suffered because the decolonization process went wrong. Africa is particularly sensitive in this regard. Because of the arbitrary division of Africa among colonial powers African states fear that major border changes could have catastrophic results for the stability of the continent. The sad stories of secession attempts such as the creation of the Republic of Biafra (1967–​1970) are telling in this regard.18 However, newly independent states may suffer also because of the legacy of former colonial masters and how they governed those colonies. Such is the case of Somalia, ‘Africa’s most spectacularly failed state (and society)’ (Picard, 2015: 180–​1). Somalia has been a complicated decolonization story.19 After the 1884–​ 85 conference in Berlin,20 it fell into the hands of European powers. They separated the Somali people into five territories: ‘Italian Somalia (today’s Somalia), British Somaliland (today’s Somaliland), French Somaliland (today’s Djibouti), and Somali enclaves in Ethiopia’s Ogaden region and Kenya’s North Eastern province’ (Hersi, 2018: 4). In 1886, Britain created a protectorate called British Somaliland (Richards, 2014: 76–​7); Italy became a neighbour of the British by establishing Italian Somalia (Møller, 2009: 8). Less than six decades later, after the two world wars and at the peak of the decolonization process, a new state was established. This was a two-​stage process. On 26 June 1960, Somaliland was free from British rule and declared independence, which was quickly recognized by 35 states; the list included the United Kingdom and the United States. After Somalia won independence from Italy on 1 July 1960, the two entities merged and became the Republic of Somalia (Keating, 2018). The future of that new state seemed uncertain from the beginning. Different governing practices of Italian and British masters have eventually become an insurmountable obstacle for the unification of the two territories (Richards, 2014: 80). In 1969, a coup d’état took place in Somalia. Siad Barre, the leader of the coup, became president, but he could not keep the integrity of the country. The civil war started in the 1980s, and Barre was removed from power in 1991. The government opposition group which was formed during the 1980s, the Somali National Movement, occupied former British Somaliland. It unilaterally declared that the Republic of Somalia no longer existed. The independence of former British Somaliland was proclaimed in May 1991 (Hersi, 2018: 6). Sporadic fighting lasted until the peace accord was reached in Hargeisa in February 1997. Since then, Somaliland has experienced relative

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Unrecognized and Unrepresented States

peace compared with the rest of Somalia, where warlords continued to fight (IRI, 2001: 10). In 2001, the government of Somaliland held a referendum in which the voters supported the region’s claim of independence. The turnout was more than 66 per cent of the estimated voting-​age population, with 97 per cent voting in favour of independence (IRI, 2001: 21–​2). Unlike Somalia, Somaliland holds regular elections and, in terms of political freedoms, scores much better than all of its neighbours.21 Some even call it ‘the strongest democracy in East Africa’ (Gerth-​Niculescu, 2019). The international community seems slow to acknowledge that. At the time of writing, no government has recognized Somaliland as an independent state. Several countries view Somaliland as an entity separate from Somalia. ‘Some, such as France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as the EU, sent a delegation to observe Somaliland’s 2017 presidential election’ (Felter, 2018). Yet, the lack of recognition keeps Somaliland isolated, which creates a plethora of difficulties for its government, both nationally and internationally (Gerth-​Niculescu, 2019). The House of Representatives of Somaliland’s parliament began to build infrastructure for the development of parliamentary diplomacy in 2007, by establishing a cross-​party parliamentary group (CPG) that was tasked with a range of activities. They include advocacy of the Somaliland case, fostering and exchanging dialogue with parliaments abroad and reaching out to the Somaliland diaspora (CPG, 2007). Scarce financial resources do not allow members of Somaliland’s House of Representatives to travel abroad very often and meet their peers in other countries. Instead, official representatives of Somaliland abroad are instructed to network with parliamentarians willing to assist in advocating Somaliland’s independence. At the level of inter-​parliamentary cooperation, the parliament of Somaliland has most contact with British colleagues; members of the CPG first visited London in 2008 (CPG, 2008). On the British side, the House of Commons created an All-​Party Parliamentary Group on Somaliland (APPGS) in 2006. When visiting, senior politicians from Somaliland have an opportunity to speak in the British Parliament. Up until 2012, the APPGS had been an important voice for Somaliland’s cause in the British Parliament, because all major parties were presented in that group (Labour, the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats). Since 2012, because of the EU and consequently British support to the integration of Somalia, the APPGS turned away from Somaliland. Symbolically, it changed its name to the APPG on Somaliland and Somalia. In 2016, responding to the pressure from constituents of Somaliland origin, a new pro-​Somaliland parliament group was formed in the British Parliament, called the APPG on Somaliland (new APPGS).22 The group is active (MENAFN, 2018). Their members recently visited Somaliland (Doughty, 2018) and called ‘on the

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UK Government to formally recognize Somaliland as an independent state’ (HC, 2019). Furthermore, the new APPGS has been credited for an interim partial recognition of Somaliland passports by the British Government –​a remarkable success given how isolated this country is.23 Somaliland enjoys little support from other corners of the world. Uganda has declared that it would support Somaliland’s bid to join the IPU (Ayieko, 2020). 24 Ugandan parliamentarians furthermore called for Uganda’s recognition of Somaliland as an independent state (Aiyeko, 2019). As far as other parliamentarian institutions are concerned, members of Somaliland’s parliament cooperate with the African European Parliamentarians Initiative.25 On the other hand, Somaliland caught international attention in 2020 by announcing an agreement with Taiwan on the mutual establishment of representative offices. Both Somalia and the PRC protested against such an agreement, claiming that Somaliland was part of Somalia and Taiwan was part of China. Yet, in light of the lack of international contacts, especially for Somaliland which is not recognized by any country, such a move should not be deemed as a complete surprise (Chung, 2020a).

States with limited recognition Created after secession This group of states has found itself in a peculiar situation. They have received some, partly even broad, recognition in the international community, yet not wide enough to be considered as fully ​fledged members because key states are yet to recognize them. Hence, they need to seek alternative ways to participate in international relations and advocate for their participation in international institutions. Take Kosovo, for example. It was part of socialist Yugoslavia, a state that started to disintegrate in 1990 and does not exist anymore. Kosovo became part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918. After 1945, it remained within the borders of the new Yugoslavia. Kosovo was under close Serbian control until 1966, ‘when secret police chief Aleksandar Ranković, a Serb and the key architect of repression in Kosovo, was removed from office by [president of Yugoslavia Josip Broz] Tito’ (Woehrel, 1999: 4). Subsequently, especially after the 1974 constitutional reforms, Kosovo received more autonomy, but after Tito’s death in 1980 that was soon to be changed. In 1987, the Serbian authorities, under the leadership of Slobodan Milošević, attempted to restore dominance in Kosovo. ‘In 1989, the Serbian parliament passed amendments to the Serbian Constitution sharply limiting Kosovo’s autonomy. The [Kosovar] parliament, under heavy pressure by Serbian security forces, did likewise. In 1990, Serbia approved further measures that eliminated Kosovo’s autonomy

36

Unrecognized and Unrepresented States

and abolished Kosovo’s parliament and government’ (Woehrel, 1999: 5). However, the break-up of Yugoslavia led to a significant weakening of the Serbian position. In 1999, the Serbian (then still called Yugoslav) authorities sought to strengthen the Serbian rule in Kosovo by sending the army to the region. NATO forces came to the rescue of the Kosovars and prevailed in a war that lasted less than three months (PBS, 1999). Nine years later, in 2008, Kosovo declared independence. By 2020, Kosovo had been recognized by about 100 UN member states, but it continues to face considerable difficulties in the conduct of its foreign policy. It is neither a member of the UN nor of most of the specialized agencies of the UN. It remains on the margins of the European institutional architecture; it is not a member of the Council of Europe. It does not participate in the OSCE. At the time of writing, several members of the EU (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain) still do not recognize Kosovo, mostly due to the fear that such a move might embolden parts of the population in their own countries to demand more autonomy or even declare independence. This has important ramifications for Kosovo’s efforts to develop relations with the EU and NATO. Still, by virtue of a relatively high number of countries that recognize it, opportunities to make use of parliamentary diplomacy to pursue its interests are much more diverse for Kosovo than those of countries in the post-​Soviet space or the TRNC. The priority for Kosovo is the advocacy for its independence. Parliamentary diplomacy is one of the tools Kosovo uses to reach this goal. Its parliamentarians visit and communicate with peers from countries that Kosovo’s government cannot reach in an official capacity (Osmani, 2012: 629–​ 30). Institutionally, two committees in the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo (ARK) are tasked with fostering inter-​parliamentary relations and conducting parliamentary diplomacy. The Committee on Foreign Affairs and Diaspora is expected to ‘build cooperation with state parliaments and promotes Assembly membership in regional and international parliamentary organizations’.26 The Committee on European Integration is expected inter alia to interact and promote Kosovo’s interests with parliamentarians from EU member states and countries participating in the Stabilization and Association Process.27 At the inter-​parliamentary level, the ARK is in touch with parliaments from other countries via friendship groups which were formed, for example, in Canada,28 Italy (Tota, 2017) and the United Kingdom (PMO, 2018). In the US Congress, Kosovo is included in the House Democracy Partnership Programme.29 As far as other parliamentary institutions are concerned, options for the ARK are limited. Chances for it to become a member of the IPU are non-​existent as long as Kosovo is not a universally recognized state.30 Some parliamentary institutions, such as the OSCE PA, have been of little use to parliamentarians from Kosovo.31 Still,

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some positive developments have taken place. In 2016, the PACE decided to enhance dialogue with the ARK (PACE, 2016). Alongside informal connections (RKMFOA, 2017), relations between the Assembly of Kosovo and the European Parliament were formalized in 2016, when the EU–​Kosovo Stabilization and Association Parliamentary Committee was established (EP, 2016). The European Parliament has been supportive of the recognition of Kosovo: ‘by treating Kosovo like any other state, the Parliament was creating certain diplomatic facts on the ground which strengthened its policy preference regarding Kosovo’s status’ (Redei, 2015: 279). The biggest diplomatic success for the ARK is its membership in the South East European Cooperation Process Parliamentary Assembly (SEECP PA).32 This has not been an easy process (De Vrieze, 2017), but the end of it has had multiple positive effects. First, it was an important step for Kosovo’s efforts to become actively engaged in international relations because the parliamentarians from Kosovo could formally meet with peers from the region. Second, it was important for the SEECP PA. The involvement of parliamentarians from Kosovo has made the SEECP PA a truly inclusive inter-​parliamentary platform for the South East European region. Third, the story of the ARK’s participation in the SEECP PA is important for scholars dealing with international parliamentary relations, because it demonstrates that international parliamentary activities can also have a positive impact in areas that are not immune to political instability. Specifically, as commented by De Vrieze, ‘this example shows that inter-​parliamentary initiatives have a limited but real effect in fostering regional co-​operation’ (De Vrieze, 2017: 188).

Created in the process of decolonization Western Sahara, a territory in north-west Africa, has had a tumultuous history of decolonization. This former Spanish colony is home to the native Sahrawi people. To end its presence in Western Sahara, Spain decided in 1974 to organize a referendum in the first half of 1975 so that the people living in the territory could exercise their right to self-​determination. But the plan was abandoned. From the 1950s, Morocco claimed that Western (then Spanish) Sahara should be brought within its borders. The UNGA urged Spain to postpone the referendum and asked the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1974 for an advisory opinion about the legal status of this area. On 16 October 1975, the ICJ ruled that some ‘legal ties of allegiance between the Sultan of Morocco and some of the tribes living in the territory of Western Sahara’ existed in the past, but that the ownership of the territory should be decided by self-​determination of people living there (ICJ, 1975, para. 162). The Moroccan King Hassan II interpreted the

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Unrecognized and Unrepresented States

ruling to be favourable to his country. Wasting no time, Morocco staged the infamous ‘Green March’ on 6 November of the same year in which 350,000 Moroccans entered Western Sahara to demonstrate the territorial claim. As it turned out later, this was a prelude to the Moroccan invasion of Western Sahara, which was not only of symbolic but also political and economic significance to Morocco (Weiner, 1979). The Sahrawi people mounted resistance under the leadership of the Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro –​Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-​Hamra and Río de Oro (POLISARIO), which was created in 1973 and has represented the Sahrawi people ever since. After the Spanish troops withdrew from Western Sahara on 26 February 1976,33 the Sahrawis proclaimed the establishment of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic –​SADR (Besenyő, 2009: 101). The new ​born country made a major diplomatic breakthrough in 1984 by becoming a member of the Organization of African Unity (now the African Union), which resulted in an immediate withdrawal of Morocco from the organization.34 The decision was adopted as discussions were going on among international lawyers about the merits of the SADR being considered a fully ​fledged state (Naldi, 1982; Pazzanita, 1985), but it also led to political negotiations about the future status of Western Sahara. On 29 April 1991, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 690 to set up a United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) whose task was to prepare conditions for ‘a referendum in which the people of Western Sahara would choose between independence and integration with Morocco’ (MINURSO, 2020). Scholars soon raised doubts about the fairness of a referendum.35 One can say that they have been proven right, 30 years on.36 The SADR is recognized by a number of states. Nevertheless, gaining universal recognition continues to be a formidable task for the SADR. Its recognition status has been changing since its establishment, as several countries have withdrawn the recognition.37 In addition to that, the SADR functions in unenviable conditions. The POLISARIO controls only 20 per cent of the territory it claims. Its government operates from Rabouni, an administrative centre of refugee camps, situated in neighbouring Algeria, ‘in one of the most inhospitable parts of the Sahara desert’ (ICG, 2007: 6).38 This impossible situation has psychological as well as practical consequences: ‘building permanent structures [in Algeria] can be perceived as an acceptance of permanent settlement in exile and resignation of the cause for independence’ (Dreven et al, 2016: 23). The harsh circumstances in which the SADR operates have a negative effect on its inter-​parliamentary cooperation. The SADR parliament –​ officially called the Sahrawi National Council (SNC) –​is somewhat specific in that it does not have proper political parties. Members of the SNC are

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elected, but they all represent POLISARIO. The Head of the Parliament is nominated by the president of the SADR. As one of our interviewees has said, political differences among voters and consequently their representatives in the SNC do exist, but this is not publicized because the entire country is run like a movement.39 Nevertheless, the SNC develops contacts with parliaments abroad. The parliaments with which the SNC has established cooperation in Africa are in Algeria, Nigeria, South Africa and Kenya.40 In the past, parliamentarians from countries that do not recognize the SADR have established groups dedicated to supporting the Sahrawis, as examples from Australia, Norway, the UK and the US demonstrate (The Northern Star, 2011; McCollum, 2013; Stortinget, 2014).41 As for other parliamentary institutions, the SNC’s record on relations with them can be evaluated as mixed. The SNC is a member of the Pan-​African Parliament but is not a member of the IPU. In Europe, the PACE has awarded the Moroccan parliament a ‘Partner for Democracy Status’42. We have already mentioned that no such status has, as yet, been awarded to the SNC (PACE, 2011b).43 In the European Parliament, the SADR and the SNC enjoy support from Intergroup Western Sahara, with over 70 Members of European Parliament (MEPs) signed up for it.44 Unfortunately, intergroups ‘are not Parliament bodies and therefore may not express Parliament’s opinion’ (EP, 2020b). Furthermore, the number of members of the intergroup does not correspond to the number of MEPs who are active in this group, which is about ten.45 Still, the group provides an opportunity for Sahrawi politicians to advocate their positions on the conflict in Western Sahara.46 Sadly, the advocacy does not meet success where it matters for the Sahrawis. For example, the European Parliament has voted for the ratification of the Fisheries Partnership Agreements between the EU and Morocco. The European Parliament has indeed declared that the support for the agreement ‘does not prejudice the outcome of the political process on the final status of Western Sahara and fully supports UN efforts to find a political solution which allows the self-​ determination of the people of Western Sahara’ (EP, 2019). However, the overwhelming vote in favour of the agreement47 was a major disappointment for the SADR, especially in light of the Court of Justice of the European Union’s ruling in 2016 that no trade agreement could include Western Sahara without the consent of the people living there (CJEU, 2016).48 Like the SADR, the State of Palestine struggles with effective control over its territory, although its situation is even more complex, for three reasons. First, the statehood had been provisionally granted to the people of Palestine already in 1919, within the mandate system of the League of Nations, in Article 22(4) of the League Covenant. Palestine was rated as Mandate A,that is it was at the stage of development where independence was to be realized soon. The institutional design for the then Palestine included a parliamentary

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Unrecognized and Unrepresented States

body as well. It was supposed to be called a Legislative Council (Shandra, 2018). Second, at the time of writing Palestine has been recognized by 138 members of the UN. Third, Palestine is well integrated into international institutions, better than most of the unrecognized and unrepresented states in our study. Most likely it would have already been a member of the UN had it not been for the US veto that blocks such a decision. Instead, Palestine received, from the General Assembly of the UN (UNGA) in 2012, the status of a ‘non-​member observer State’, which is nothing less than a global political act of recognition of Palestinian statehood. Currently, the only other non-​member observer state is the Holy See. In the past, 16 states were awarded such status.49 In September 2018, another step was undertaken to demonstrate the position of the majority of UN members that Palestine deserved to be a member of the UN. Namely, the Group of 77 (G77), comprising 134 UN member states, decided to elect Palestine as 2019 Chair of the Group. To carry out this role, the UN General Assembly approved a resolution that enabled Palestine additional privileges and rights for the duration of its chairmanship (UN N ​ ews, 2019). Furthermore, Palestine is a member of UNESCO, a UN specialized agency; of the Organization for Islamic Co-​operation; of the Arab League; and of the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol). Yet, because it is not a member of the United Nations it is not represented in most specialized agencies in the UN system, including, for example, the World Bank and the IMF. Thus, in spite of all the political support it receives, and many recognitions not withstanding, Palestine still belongs to the category of unrepresented and unrecognized states. Palestine’s parliamentary body, the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), is well embedded into inter-​parliamentary networks. Many national parliaments have established some form of relationship with the PLC, mostly by setting up friendship groups. Regarding IPAs, the PLC is a member of the IPU, which was made possible only after the adoption of statutory changes that allowed the recognition of the PLC as a full member, even though Palestine is not a universally recognized state (IPU, 2008). It is also a member of the Arab Parliament, and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean. As for POIGOs, the PLC has institutionalized connections with the European Parliament, which has a Standing Delegation for Relations with Palestine.50 In 2011, the PACE granted to the PLC a ‘Partner for Democracy’ status (PACE, 2011a). This made it possible for a six-​member delegation of Palestinian elected representatives to participate actively in the work of the PACE.51 So far, activities of the PLC have been beset with difficulties. The PLC was established as part of the Oslo Accords (Brown, 2000b). The first elections, in which Palestinians from the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and

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Gaza participated, took place in January 1996 (Abu-​Amr, 1997). The PLC suffered because of internal division, which boiled over in 2006, when Hamas, a radical wing in the Palestinian political landscape, won the second election by a landslide, defeating the then ruling Fatah party. The tensions escalated in 2007 when Hamas took control of Gaza. Palestine was effectively cut in to two parts –​the one dominated by Hamas, and the other by Fatah, which considers itself as a legitimate representative of the people living in the ‘State of Palestine’. The PLC has not met in a regular session ever since that conflict. The lack of a consolidated authority over the entire territory and the long-​term absence of democratic elections does not allow Palestine to fully use the wide inter-​parliamentary network that it has to advocate for Palestinian interests.52

Synthesis Parliamentary diplomacy may be used as a tool for unrecognized and unrepresented states to advocate for their statehood, but only if they can fulfil the basic preconditions for it to be developed: besides a functioning parliament, the ability to engage in international (parliamentary) relations. Numerous obstacles stand in the way, both at international and domestic level. From the domestic perspective, the major problem for some of these countries is the political system; they are not democracies. Basic human rights and political freedoms are not taken for granted, which, in turn, questions the legitimacy of parliamentarians that are or may be involved in international relations. South Ossetia and Transnistria count among the most problematic countries in this regard (Freedom House, 2020). The capability to run an effective government, control the territory and to sustain working institutions represents another problem, at least for some of these countries. For example, the SADR is in control of only one ​fifth of the territory it claims. Internationally, these countries face a range of issues that they need to deal with. The legality of their creation is the most frequently raised issue. Contested states that have separated from larger entities have more difficulties in participating in international relations. They receive little if any international support. They are seen primarily as a threat to the territorial integrity of another state and the stability of the region. This applies to Abkhazia and South Ossetia (both exist within the internationally recognized borders of Georgia), the Transnistrian Republic (Moldova), the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Cyprus) and Nagorno-​Karabakh (Azerbaijan). Another inhibiting factor for these states to break through international isolation is that they owe their existence to the engagement of the so-​called patron states, which provide security guarantees (Kopeček, 2019: 160). Abkhazia,

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South Ossetia, Transnistria and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus depend on support from the Russian Federation and Turkey, respectively. This is less the case with Nagorno-​Karabakh. Although political support for Nagorno-​Karabakh is given by Armenia, the Russian Federation plays an important role in keeping the status quo in the region. At the time of writing, Azerbaijan launched an offensive in the Nagorno-Karabakh region on a scale not seen since the early 1990s, and the international community is yet to see what the final outcome will be of that conflict. Not all the contested states should be considered separatist in a classical sense, even though no one recognizes them. The case of Somaliland, which has seceded from Somalia, is already a specific one. The decolonization of Somalia simply did not seem to work well. Somaliland broke away from Somalia, a fragile state composed of former colonies in Somalia, with rather different traditions of government. The ‘united’ Somalia had struggled since the proclamation of independence. It eventually disintegrated into a civil war. Also worth mentioning is that Somaliland had already experienced statehood, albeit briefly, in 1960. In the group of countries with limited recognition, we find those about which recognized states (UN members) are not in agreement that they should be fully integrated into the international community. For some, Kosovo may be considered a separatist state, yet its secession story was different. Many UN members agree that Kosovo has to be seen as the victim of political pressure from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) led by Slobodan Milošević. About 100 states agree that the exercise of the right to self-​ determination became legitimate and irreversible after the offensive of the FRY Army in Kosovo in 1999, which aimed at driving ethnic Kosovars away from their homes. The former colonies’ struggle for independence is also seen as more legitimate by the international community, however imperfect these processes might have been. Unfortunately, the statehood of Palestine has been the bone of contention since the time of the League of Nations. Some international lawyers claim that the statehood of Palestine was never disputable (Boyle, 1990: 301–​2), but the question remains of how to put the Palestinian statehood into practice so that Palestine would not exist only as a state de jure, but also de facto. At the time of writing, the ‘peace plan’ proposed by the US president Trump appeared to make the political situation and the international standing of Palestine even more difficult (Crowley and Halbfinger, 2020). The SADR is an example of ‘protracted decolonization’ (Ojeda-​García et al, 2017). The Sahrawi’s right to self-​determination was affirmed in the 1975 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, but that right is yet to be exercised. All these obstacles are the reasons why the above-​mentioned countries have more or less limited experience with inter-​parliamentary cooperation

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and parliamentary diplomacy. Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria, Nagorno-​Karabakh and Somaliland have the most limited access to the international community. Parliamentarians of South Ossetia, Transnistria and Abkhazia primarily cooperate with each other and with the Russian Federation. The Parliament of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has had limited communications with the European Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. At the inter-​parliamentary level, it cooperates only with the Turkish Parliament. Members of the Nagorno–​Karabakh Parliament have received visits by parliamentarians from several countries in Europe and across the Atlantic. Owing to historical circumstances, parliamentarians from Somaliland have friends among MPs in the British Parliament. Among the countries that have been recognized by a substantial number of UN member states, Palestine stands out, because it is the only one in the group that is a member of the IPU. However, its parliament has not been active for the last 15 years. The SADR has more, but still limited, experience with inter-​parliamentary cooperation. Kosovo’s parliament, on the other hand, has had diplomatic success with inter-​ parliamentary cooperation, as demonstrated by its becoming a member of the SEECP PA. Kosovo’s success is not an isolated one. Whether or not they have been successful, attempts such as the partial recognition of Somaliland passports and an attempt to stimulate cooperation between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the project of the monitoring of water resources could also be mentioned as examples of parliamentary diplomacy. The use of parliamentary diplomacy by the unrepresented and unrecognized states we have studied in this section reflects the reality of international isolation. Because of the many obstacles they need to deal with as a consequence of the isolation, members of the parliaments of these states have problems just in participating in international (parliamentary) relations, let alone conducting parliamentary diplomacy. As an unrecognized and unrepresented state, Taiwan is in the same position but, as will be seen in the coming chapters, it has many more options to ease its isolation and develop its own experience with parliamentary diplomacy.

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4

Taiwan The contextualization of Taiwan’s international relations The real size of a small island The number of states that recognize Taiwan is the first indicator of the extent to which this country is isolated from the rest of the world. At the time of writing, Taiwan was recognized by 14 UN member states plus the Holy See.1 This is not much higher than the number of UN members that recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and significantly less than Western Sahara, Kosovo and especially Palestine. Like other unrepresented and unrecognized states, Taiwan is not a member of the UN. It is not a member of any specialized agency within the UN system. It is, however, a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which recognizes it under the name Chinese Taipei, rather than its official name. But there is another side of Taiwan, which allows little room for comparison with other unrepresented and unrecognized states. Let us make a very practical case in point: Abkhazia and South Ossetia issue their own passports, but these are not ‘recognized in most of the world, and their citizens mostly have dual-​citizenship that grants them a valid passport from another country’ (Li, 2019). In contrast, at the time of writing carriers of the Taiwanese passport could travel visa-​free to 146 countries, which puts them in 33rd place, ahead of, for example, the Russian Federation and the PRC.2 Taiwan’s contribution to the international community is often high profile, as has been recently demonstrated by its handling of the COVID-​19 virus that has plagued the entire world, with Taiwan being the least affected among developed states.3 Indeed, in terms of relative development, Taiwan is considered one of the richest countries in the world. According to the 2019 data generated by the International Monetary Fund, Taiwan had the

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22nd largest economy and was in 17th place in the ranking of countries by GDP per capita.4 This explains all the attention that Taiwan attracts, which dwarfs that received by all other unrepresented and unrecognized states combined. Starting with a simple insertion of the keyword ‘Taiwan’ into the Google search engine (Figure 4.1) the difference already becomes obvious. We get a similar picture if we limit our research to non-​fiction literature via the Google Scholar engine (Figure 4.2). If we narrow down our (re)search even further, to the Web of Science Core database based on a title of an academic work (Figure 4.3), we see that the scientific attention on Taiwan is indeed many times bigger than on any other unrepresented and unrecognized state. Figure 4.1: Hits by inserting the word ‘Taiwan’ in general Google Search 1,200,000,000 1,000,000,000 800,000,000 600,000,000 400,000,000 200,000,000 Hits

Taiwan

Transnistria

S. Ossetia

Abkhazia

N-Karabakh Somaliland Western Sahara

Kosovo

Palestine

Figure 4.2: Hits by inserting the word ‘Taiwan’ in Google Scholar 5,000,000 4,500,000 4,000,000 3,500,000 3,000,000 2,500,000 2,000,000 1,500,000 1,000,000 500,000 Hits

Taiwan

Transnistria

S. Ossetia

Abkhazia

N-Karabakh

Somaliland Western Sahara

Kosovo

Palestine

Figure 4.3: Hits by inserting the word ‘Taiwan’ as a title of the work in a Web of Science Core Collection 45,000 40,000 35,000 30,000 25,000 20,000 15,000 10,000 5,000 Hits

Taiwan

Transnistria

S. Ossetia

Abkhazia

N-Karabakh

46

Somaliland Western Sahara

Kosovo

Palestine

Taiwan

These randomly picked indicators alone encourage us to insist that Taiwan’s importance in international relations and especially in international economic relations cannot be ignored, which means that scholarly attention to its isolation, the damage it causes, and how to deal with it is all the more relevant. We will see in the next section that Taiwan differs from the other unrepresented and unrecognized countries not only in terms of economic power but also in terms of history.

History Unlike other states we have studied here, Taiwan did not emerge from secession. It has not been part of the decolonization process either. Its history is intrinsically connected with the history of China, especially since 1911, when the so-​called Xinhai Revolution (10 October 1911–​12 February 1912) overthrew the Qing dynasty. The dynasty, which had ruled since 1644, did not respond well to the Industrial Revolution, which in the 19th century tilted the balance of power in favour of Europe. During that period, China was subjected to numerous invasions by foreigners. It was signing unequal treaties, losing wars and territories. Internally, structural problems led to the ‘rise of elite activism’ (Rankin et al, 2002: 54), and eventually to the revolution. After the revolution, which resulted in the creation of the Republic of China (1 January 1912), the country was supposed to become a modern democracy. Sun Yat-​sen, ‘the unquestioned leader of the great push to change China’ (Lary, 2007: 72), was inaugurated as the provisional president but, in March of the same year, he was replaced by the military strongman Yuan Shih-​k’ai. The first presidential elections were held in China in 1913 in the newly formed National Assembly. The elections confirmed Yuan, but the democracy was short-​lived. In the same year he ‘ended China’s experiment in parliamentary democracy by suppressing revolutionaries, disbanding parliament and provincial assemblies, and ending the thousands of local assemblies that had flourished in the first year of the republic’ (Rankin et al, 2002: 64). Meanwhile, World War One started in 1914. China continued to suffer from external threats which Yuan, who died of illness in June 1916, could not prevent. The military regime, the localization of power, warlordism and Japanese territorial gains in China following the 1919 Treaty of Versailles (Lary, 2007: 54–​5, 62–​3) were among the factors that kept China weak. To prevent it from complete fragmentation, Sun Yat-​sen brought the Chinese National Party or Kuomintang (KMT) to life in 1919, with one goal: to reunify China. With such an agenda, the KMT was seen as a threat to Western powers. Isolated as he and his party were, Sun Yat-​sen sought –​ and received –​support and training from the Soviet Communist Party.

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The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was formed in 1921 and was soon seen as a competitor to the KMT, which itself had been divided between the left-​and the right-​wingers.5 However, the two parties shared one goal, to end the fragmentation of power caused by warlords and to unify China. After Sun Yat-​sen died in 1925, Chiang Kai-​shek took over the KMT. He halted the fragmentation of China by successfully concluding the so-​called Northern Expedition launched to complete the unification (Wilbur, 2005). But for Chiang Kai-​shek, who represented the right w ​ ing in the KMT, the expedition did not end there. In 1927, he began to purge the party by getting rid of ‘key parts of the revolutionary movement, the Soviet advisors, the left-​ wing of the KMT, and the Communists’ (Lary, 2007: 98). The dominance of Chiang Kai-​shek did not last long. His government encountered many problems, which it failed to address successfully. The governing of China outside the cities and the growing influence of the CCP that filled the political vacuum in the province (Rankin et al, 2002), and the inability to fend off the Japanese, who occupied Manchuria and kept it until the end of World War Two were some of these problems that discredited the central government. Eventually, in 1949 the CCP overpowered Chiang Kai-​shek and his supporters, who retreated to Taiwan. The retreat was only meant to be temporary, simply for Chiang Kai-​shek’s army to ‘regroup and counterattack’ (Copper, 2013: 47). As time went by, the ‘temporary relocation’ of the government of the Republic of China was becoming permanent. The future of the Republic became uncertain. At the beginning of the 1950s the anti-​communist stance of the Republic of China, operating from Taiwan, earned it an alliance with the United States. According to Cohen and Tang, ‘prior to June 1950, the US decided not to provide further military aid to Chiang Kai-​shek’s government. … However, the outbreak of the Korean War made Taiwan strategically important to the US … Fearing the spread of communism in Asia, US policy-​makers now felt they had a vested interest in Taiwan’s future, and made a commitment to protecting Taiwan’ (Cohen and Teng, 1990: 161). In fact, ‘because of the Korean War and China’s role in it … Taiwan became a valued member of the Western bloc. With the polarization of the world into two camps and because the Republic of China continued to represent China in the United Nations and most other international organizations … Taipei was at the center stage in the East–​West struggle’ (Copper, 2013: 48). Gradually, the tide was turning against Chiang Kai-​shek. More and more countries accepted the reality that the government in Taipei was not in control of mainland China and it was unlikely that it would be ever again. Support for Beijing reached a culmination on 25 October 1971. On that day, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted Resolution 2758 in which it decided to ‘recognize the representatives of [the PRC’s

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government] as the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations, and to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-​shek from … the United Nations and … all the organizations related to it’.6 This turn of events coincided with US foreign policy disaster in Vietnam. American voters elected Richard Nixon in 1968 with the mandate ‘to get out of Vietnam with honor’ (Copper, 2013: 188), but he could not do so without the support of the PRC. A thaw in relations between the two countries followed, with Taiwan being the collateral damage.7 By 1970, the number of countries recognizing the PRC or Taiwan (the Republic of China) had already been 68:53 in the PRC’s favour. ‘Three years later, Beijing had more than twice as many: 85:39. In 1977, Beijing had 111 compared to Taipei’s 23’ (Copper, 2013: 189). The final blow was sent from Washington to Taiwan on 15 December 1978 when President Jimmy Carter declared that US diplomatic relations with Taiwan (the Republic of China) would be terminated, and diplomatic relations with the PRC would be established instead. The radical change of the political context for Taiwan, from being a permanent member of the Security Council of the UN to becoming isolated from the international community, did not mean a change of its foreign policy. The so-​called Three No’s Policy applied: as long as the communists continued to rule mainland China there would be no contact, no negotiations and no compromise (Copper, 2013: 189). For the PRC, on the other hand, the status of the island mattered much more than who currently governed it. Beijing argued that as Chiang Kai-​shek troops were defeated in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party was the sole successor of China, which could only be one, not two. Taiwan is part of the territory of China and, as such, Taiwan can never be a sovereign state. This view prevailed at the end of Nixon’s ‘7-​day historic visit to China’8 in February 1972. On 28 February of the same year, the two countries agreed to the so-​called Shanghai Communiqué, in which the US government declared, somewhat ambiguously, that it ‘acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China’.9 The US position in the communiqué is ambiguous in the sense that it acknowledged but did not accept Beijing’s position towards Taiwan.10 As explained in a report by the Congressional Research Service, the ‘US policy leaves the Taiwan question to be resolved by the people on both sides of the strait: a “peaceful resolution” with the assent of Taiwan’s people and without unilateral changes. In short, US policy focuses on the process of resolution of the Taiwan question, not any set outcome’ (Kan, 2014a: 32). This interpretation is not at all shared with the PRC, arguing that ‘it is not normal diplomatic practice to recognize a nation’s sovereignty over a territory and then agree to defend that territory from the aggression of the

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nation in question’ (Cohen and Teng, 1990: 172). Such ambiguity,11 which was formalized with the adoption in 1979 of the US and Taiwan Relations Act (TRA),12 worked to the benefit of Taiwan. Protected as it was from a potential attempt of the PRC to conquer the island by force, Chiang Kai-​shek and his successors could build up the military force (Lin et al, 2012) and carry out economic reforms (Kuo, 2019) that gradually brought Taiwan to among the most developed economies in East and Southeast Asia. Additionally, the process of democratization started to take shape in Taiwan in the 1980s, as the decades-​long authoritarian grip of the KMT over the country began to loosen (Gold, 1997; Tien, 1997). Opposition gathered around the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), founded in 1986. The first democratic elections were held in 1991 (for the National Assembly) and in 1992 (for the Legislative Yuan). In 2000, the presidential candidate of the DPP, Chen Shui-​bian, won the race, ‘which effectively ended fifty-​five years of rule by the KMT’ (Lim, 2014: 184). Besides, even though UN member states were revoking the recognition of the Republic of China, many of them have not erased the contacts with the government in Taipei altogether. The US has provided a blueprint on how these relations could be continued. Upon the establishment of diplomatic relations between the US and the PRC as of 1 January 1979,13 President Carter issued a memorandum with guidelines concerning future relations between Washington and Taipei. Those guidelines include the continuing representation of American interests, ‘as appropriate, by an unofficial instrumentality in corporate form. On January 16, 1979, an entity was incorporated under the laws of the District of Columbia to serve as this instrumentality. It was named The American Institute in Taiwan’ (TRA, 1979: 2). In practical terms, the Institute was to have a similar function as any diplomatic representation. Taiwan was treated in the same way as foreign countries, except that ‘members of the American Foreign Service formally resign when they serve in Taiwan, but then return as regular members of the diplomatic corps when they leave Taiwan’ (Krasner, 2011: xvi). Many other countries have opened similar institutes in Taiwan, and vice versa.

Contemporary Taiwan: two realities This brief overview of Taiwan’s history shows the remarkable difference between the island and other unrepresented and unrecognized states. First, the history of Taiwan’s statehood as the Republic of China is much longer than any of the other unrepresented and unrecognized states discussed before. The second difference concerns the legal status of Taiwan, which led some authors to describe Taiwan as an intermediate state.14 The position of the PRC

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is that Taiwan is part of China and should be returned under its sovereignty. However, Taiwan’s perspective is a different one. Taiwan has not seceded from the PRC. The government that used to rule mainland China retreated to Taiwan for political reasons, after the Communists prevailed. The PRC cannot claim that Taiwan violates the UN Charter, because neither has it used force against the territorial integrity of the PRC nor has it exercised the right to self-​determination. The third difference concerns Taiwan’s ability to function as a state. Taiwan is a de facto state, with a functioning government that controls its territory, and has an army to defend itself. Moreover, despite the threats Taiwan receives from the PRC, many states develop economic cooperation with it. Several national parliaments of these countries have followed suit by creating (informal) Taiwan friendship groups. Yet, Taiwan still faces two realities in its international relations from which it cannot escape: the reality of the One China principle and the reality of international isolation. Finding a sensible way out of this situation continues to be a work in progress. After the developments in 1979, Taiwan and the PRC had attempted to define the future relationship. In 1992, as a result of the KMT-​led negotiations, the so-​called ‘One China, respective interpretations’ or ‘1992 Consensus’ was proposed as the basis for future relations between Beijing and Taipei.15 Considered by an insider as ‘the first political compromise reached between Taiwan and mainland China in over 40 years’ (Su, 2009: 15) the 1992 Consensus has never been accepted by the DPP (Su, 2009: 14). Seven years later, in 1999, then president of Taiwan Lee Teng-​hui upset the PRC by beginning to interpret the relations between Taiwan and China as a ‘special state-​to-​state relationship’ (Su, 2009: Chapter 3). The so-​called Two States Theory that emerged from Taiwan was said to have destroyed ‘the foundation for the dialogue and consultations authorized by the two sides’ (Shiquan, 2001: 121). Since then, the relations between the PRC and Taiwan have been tense, especially if the DPP is in power. As demonstrated in the speech of the PRC’s president Xi Jinping, Beijing is determined to integrate Taiwan, if necessary by force (Xi, 2017: 50–​51; Buckley and Horton, 2019).16 Currently none of the mainstream political parties –​the KMT and the DPP –​sees the future of the Taiwanese being absorbed by the PRC, which leaves the PRC with no significant political ally on the island (Hille, 2020). With this state of affairs comes a huge bill to Taiwan from the PRC. The ‘anaconda’ approach Beijing uses aims at stripping Taiwan of its diplomatic allies, restricting access to international institutions and disrupting its trade. Isolated as it is from the international community Taiwan has to be innovative in its policies to address the threat from the mainland. Taiwanese diplomacy, in particular, has developed several new approaches and concepts to this end.

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Taiwan’s diplomacies Taiwan’s diplomatic experience has a lot to contribute to the literature on diplomacy. It is not our task to delve deeper into these practices, but a brief overview is necessary because it will help us to understand the status and importance of parliamentary diplomacy for Taiwan. We can break its diplomatic practices into two categories: hard and soft informal diplomacy. The era of hard informal diplomacy, designed in Taiwan to assert itself in an inter-​governmental spectrum of international relations, lasted from the early 1970s after Taiwan was ousted from the UN until the presidency of Chen Shui-​bian (2000–​2008). Hard informal diplomacy meant entering into fierce competition with the PRC over maintaining diplomatic relations with countries that still recognized Taiwan, mostly by offering lucrative financial deals to them. In this respect, Taiwan used several terms, such as ‘total diplomacy’, defined as the mobilization of ‘every kind of resource –​political, economic, scientific, technological, cultural and sporting –​to develop “substantial” links with states that had terminated diplomatic relations, in the hope of gaining political concessions’ (Hughes, 1997: 131). In the MOFA the term ‘collective diplomacy’ has been defined as ‘mobilizing the nation’s overall resources to forward foreign relations. It is aimed at elevating the nation’s international status while advancing the interests of the country and its people’ (MOFA, 1993). Another term that has been used to describe Taiwan’s response to its new position in the world is ‘pragmatic’ diplomacy, defined as ‘a functional complex of economic aid, trade and investment, arms purchases, and nongovernmental and informal diplomacy’ (Yang, 2006: 116). The aim of pragmatic diplomacy is seen as threefold: ‘the advancement of formal diplomatic ties; the establishment and promotion of substantive relations with non-​hostile nations; and active participation in international organizations and activities’ (Yang, 2006: 116). Some argued that ‘pragmatic diplomacy’ was ‘designed to attract diplomatic recognition even from countries that already recognized Beijing, thereby in effect implementing a Two China policy’ (Bing 2017: 135). Other terms that are used in the literature are ‘beacon-​fire’ or ‘torching diplomacy’, ‘confrontational diplomacy’ (Lee, 2019: 12; Huang, 2016: 466), ‘dollar diplomacy’ (Hughes, 1997: 131) and ‘chequebook diplomacy’ (Huang, 2016: 467). Terms such as ‘vacation diplomacy’ or ‘golf diplomacy’ –​a practice in which Taiwanese politicians at the highest level visit other countries on the pretence of private vacation (Leifer, 1994; Scobell, 2011: 33) –​are also used to portray Taiwan’s era of hard informal diplomacy. Also worth mentioning is the term ‘visit diplomacy’ launched by the Coordination Council for North American Affairs (CCNAA), now called the TECRO (Taiwan Economic and Cultural Representative Office). The CCNAA/​TECRO

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began to invite ‘Americans who are not current federal government officials but who may have a say in policy-​making … to visit Taiwan … The purpose of this visit diplomacy is not so much to influence these American visitors as it is to build access to them or their offices’ (Wang, 1990: 39).17 The term ‘visit diplomacy’ could also be used in another context, to describe travels of high-​profile Taiwanese politicians with the purpose of meeting politicians in the country they ‘visit’. Such was the visit of Cornell University in 1995 by then Taiwanese president Lee Teng-​hui. An alternative expression is ‘transit diplomacy’ ‘where the Taiwanese president is permitted to “transit” through the United States en route to another country and is allowed to engage in a set of carefully defined activities while on US soil’ (Wang, 2016: 577). The framework for transit diplomacy has been laid out in the 1994 Taiwan Policy Review, a document from the US administration about the future conduct of relations with Taiwan.18 Most of the recent Taiwanese presidents took advantage of this possibility: presidents Lee Teng-​hui, Chen Shui-​bian and Tsai Ing-​wen have all ‘travelled through’ the US.19 Some of the diplomatic activities Taiwan has undertaken have been controversial. This is particularly true for ‘chequebook diplomacy’. In some cases, this type of diplomacy has been successful, for example, in the case of Taiwan’s effort to remain in the Asian Development Bank, of which it was a founder after the PRC had demanded its exclusion from the organization (Lindemann, 2014: 72). On other occasions, Taiwan’s financial assistance turned out to be a risky investment. Taylor provides an example of a negative experience with ‘African elites who have held Taiwan to ransom in attempting to extract the maximum amount of aid and financial assistance’ (Taylor, 2002: 132). Such experiences led the Taiwanese to reconsider the utility of such an approach to win or retain allies (Copper, 2006: 66). Besides, Taiwan could not afford to beef up its foreign policy preferences with the kind of money the PRC could. The experience with Central America, in particular, has attracted the attention of scholars (Alexander, 2014). Adjustments to hard informal diplomacy had been sought already during the presidency of Ma Ying-​jeou (2008–​2016). During his term, Taiwan was engaged in what has been called ‘truce diplomacy’ and ‘flexible diplomacy’. Truce diplomacy (Huang, 2016: 468), also referred to as ‘viable diplomacy’ (Fukuda, 2019: 305; Huang, 2016: 467, 472), represented a conceptual framework for the new approach in Taiwan’s foreign policy. It was based on the 1992 Consensus and the Three No’s Policy.20 The rationale of this new concept was to end the competition between the PRC and Taiwan to ‘win over diplomatic partners with foreign aid’ (Glaser, 2013: 8),21 hoping that in this way the PRC might loosen its grip on Taiwan and its efforts to actively participate in international relations. To some extent, these expectations had materialized, for example, by the PRC’s approval for Taiwan to be

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invited as an observer to sessions of the World Health Assembly (WHA), the principal organ of the WHO. Things took a different turn with the change in the Taiwanese presidency in 2016. The new Taiwanese president, Tsai Ing-​wen, lived up to her electoral promise and took a position that Taiwan’s future should not be tied to the 1992 Consensus. As a result, Taiwan has not been invited to the WHA since 2017. Officially, the WHO says that future invitations depend on ‘cross-​strait understanding between China and Taiwan’ (Wu, 2017). This statement, which does not at all reflect the consensus in the WHO membership, symbolizes the limits of hard informal diplomacy and the need to explore alternative options. By avoiding ‘sovereignty issues’ (White, 2006: 216), soft informal diplomacy, which may also be called ‘multifaceted diplomacy’ according to Foreign Policy Guidelines of Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs,22 has been introduced. It is designed to advocate Taiwan as an indispensable member of the international community, able to add value to the magnitude of problems common to humanity. Taiwan has developed a system of public diplomacy that includes the promotion of culture (Rawnsley, 2014), sports diplomacy (Yen, 2017), environmental/​climate change diplomacy (Gao, 2018) and even image diplomacy (Chen, 2002: 269). ‘Humanitarian diplomacy’, or ‘disaster diplomacy’, has been introduced by the administration under Chen Shui-​ban (Guilloux, 2016).23 It was followed up by Ma Ying-​jeou’s presidency. Because of Taiwan’s ‘outstanding medical capabilities, active volunteer groups and a generous private sector’, Ma believed that his country could be an important player in emergency rescue and relief (Huang, 2016: 472). One example of such diplomacy is Taiwan’s participation in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) groups. ‘The Taiwan Red Cross Society worked directly with the Japanese Red Cross Society in the aftermath of the March 2011 Tsunami in Japan’ (Glaser, 2015: 28). Non-​governmental organizations play an important role in international ‘people-​to-​people’ diplomacy, aimed at promoting good relations among people from states in the region and beyond. According to Glaser, people in Japan seem to have remembered the assistance of Taiwanese NGOs after the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake that led to the aforementioned Tsunami. ‘91 per cent of Japanese respondents said the Japan–​Taiwan relationship was good or very good, compared to 76 per cent in 2009’ (Glaser, 2015: 30). Recently, the most promising field for Taiwan to enhance its presence in international relations through soft informal diplomacy has been health. Following the outbreak of the SARS epidemic in 2002, Taiwan entered into the ‘health diplomacy’ (Lindemann, 2014: 212)24 or ‘medical diplomacy’ (Ward, 2020). Nowadays, such diplomacy aims at proving the relevance of Taiwan’s experience for the global fight against the COVID-​19 pandemic. The main message Taiwan has sent to the world is that despite the isolation,

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‘Taiwan can help’ and is ‘willing and able to contribute to global public health during the crisis using its strength in manufacturing, medicine, and technology’ (Sung, 2020: 1; Aspinwall, 2020). Despite the global damage caused by the pandemic and the unquestionable expertise of Taiwan in dealing with it, it is not likely that Taiwan’s health diplomacy alone could lead to a breakthrough in terms of Taiwan’s visible participation in international relations, for example, by being allowed to cooperate with the WHO. As Herrington and Lee conclude, ‘the question of Taiwan’s sovereignty, and the fluctuating temperature of cross-​strait relations, needed to be addressed before health concerns could come to the fore’ (Herington and Lee, 2014: 12). Plenty of studies have addressed Taiwanese diplomacy, but some stones are still left unturned. This is particularly true for Taiwanese parliamentary diplomacy. Only a few authors have considered the topic in their work on Taiwan’s foreign affairs. For example, Chen Jie describes the foreign policy relevance of parliamentarians in Taiwan’s ‘total diplomacy’ (Chen, 2002: 223–​7), and Dennis Hickey refers to ‘inter-​parliamentary diplomacy’ as a new tool in Taiwan’s foreign policy (Hickey, 2007: 55). Comprehensive research of Taiwan’s experience with parliamentary diplomacy is still missing, so the rest of the book will be devoted to this topic.

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5

Taiwan’s Parliamentary Diplomacy Changes in the international community are barely visible tremors, but from time to time, they take the form of major earthquakes. In the last 50 years, Taiwan has experienced at least three of them. The first one occurred in the 1970s. The second one happened with the fall of the Berlin Wall. The 1970s led to the forced exit of Taiwan from the international arena. The Cold War ended with the collapse of a superpower. In the dawning of a new era, it was hoped that the great power rivalry would be replaced by global governance (Rosenau, 1992). That would benefit Taiwan because it favoured cooperation over confrontation. But the liberal international order and the spread of democracy are under threat. Multilateralism seems to be giving way to a new rebalancing of power as the PRC has replaced the Soviet Union in the race with the US for global domination. The third earthquake is coming; it represents the biggest challenge for Taiwan since 1949 because the PRC aims to be a superpower, determined to implement the One China principle. Taiwan has never accepted the role of a passive observer; it wanted to influence the course of those changes and survive earthquakes unbruised. During the Cold War, Taiwan was employing various types of diplomacies to limit the damage the PRC was inflicting on it by isolating it from the international community. In the 1990s Taiwan started to transform itself by introducing the democratic political system. The process could not have had better timing for Taiwan. The democratization on the island was taking place at the time when the PRC was strengthening its communist regime which also led to the crushing of protests on Tiananmen Square in 1989. In the space of just a few years, two politically completely different Chinas emerged from the Cold War. Democratization processes have not changed much for Taiwan internationally, for the PRC was preventing Taiwan’s access to the international community wherever it could. But thanks to democratization, Taiwanese authorities could employ democratically elected

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parliamentarians as new actors to defend and promote Taiwan’s interests. Indeed, the intensified interactions among parliamentarians worldwide which took place after the Cold War encouraged Taiwan to try to connect with the international community at the inter-​parliamentary level of international relations. President Lee Teng-​hui’s administration instructed the MOFA to set up a parliamentary liaison group in 1993 to assist parliamentarians in their international activities. In his 2000 presidential campaign, president Chen Shui-​bian called for the acceleration of this ‘novel approach to international relations’ which, in light of the declining number of states that kept diplomatic relations with Taiwan, was expected to become of significant relevance in the conduct of its foreign policy (Hickey, 2007: 55). Taiwan’s parliamentary diplomacy is set up and implemented in the institutional triangle in which the president, the MOFA and the Legislative Yuan are responsible for international relations of Taiwan. The president provides guidelines for Taiwan’s foreign policy orientation and works with the speaker of the Legislative Yuan. The MOFA has a department called the Office of Parliamentarian Affairs, which is composed of two sections, the Parliamentarian Liaison Section, and the Parliamentarian Service Section. In preparing activities for parliamentarians, they work with heads of committees in the parliament and leaders of friendship groups. In the Legislative Yuan, as in any other parliament, one of the main committees deals with foreign affairs. This is the responsibility of the Foreign and National Defense Committee. The Committee recognizes parliamentary diplomacy (in the Legislative Yuan the term ‘legislative diplomacy’ is also used) as an increasingly important part of its activities. “It is appropriate and reasonable that the Legislative Yuan, as the branch representing public opinion, should interact with international society, because the international public also supports this type of communication”.1 In this respect, the Committee “does not only represent the Legislative Yuan to participate in international parliamentary activities but also initiates various parliamentarian caucuses aiming at enhancing Taiwan’s relations with other countries”.2 So how do Taiwanese parliamentarians participate in international relations and what are the outcomes of such participation? The literature is relatively silent on this topic, although several questions beg answers. For example, what kind of experience do members of the Legislative Yuan have with parliamentary diplomacy? Can they contribute to Taiwan’s foreign policy? What are the factors that hinder or accelerate their work? How are they received by their colleagues abroad? What is the effect of their visiting and interacting with peers from other countries? Taiwan’s position cannot be properly explained solely by foreign policy preferences of individual countries (such as the PRC’s One China principle), even though they represent a major impediment for Taiwan’s ambition to

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participate in its international relations (Wang et al, 2011). Some argue that the situation might be different if the PRC would go through a process of democratization. In such circumstances –​were the PRC to become a democracy –​the discussion about parliamentary diplomacy might well be set aside and full attention would be given to the realization of the One China principle.3 Indeed, anything can happen in Taiwan–​PRC relations in the future. One could even imagine this to be an ideal scenario, which would likely receive a firm nod by Taiwan’s allies including the US, but for now, an evolution of the PRC into a democratic society does not seem to be a realistic prospect. Hence, the discussion about ways and means for Taiwan to limit the damage caused to it by the international isolation should continue.

Research plan It has been remarked that one of the positive effects of democratization in the 1990s for Taiwan was that ‘Taiwan’s own popularly elected parliamentarians became fully involved in international activities. This is the foundation for the concept of parliamentary diplomacy as it is used in Taiwan’ (Chen, 2002: 223). Although the literature on parliamentary diplomacy is rich with examples of good practices and evidence of its successful use, we learn less about the use of parliamentary diplomacy by states’ parliaments that have no regular access to official inter-​governmental and/​or inter-parliamentary cooperation, how it is carried out and which factors explain its success or failure. In the context of Taiwan, this kind of inquiry becomes even more relevant. Resorting to parliamentary diplomacy in its foreign policy is not a matter of choice but a matter of necessity for Taiwan. It is one of the few tools it has at its disposal to ease international isolation. Following Marsh (2010), we analyse the Legislative Yuan and its members as independent and dependent variables. The analysis will proceed in two steps. First, we ask ourselves the question of whether parliamentary institutions provide the potential for LY members to cooperate with them or participate in some form in their decision-​making processes. There are three possible answers to this question, which we will explore in the following. One, parliamentary institutions are irrelevant to LY members because participation and/​or cooperation with them is legally and/​or politically impossible. Two, parliamentary institutions are relevant to LY members; they offer some room for cooperation. Three, parliamentary institutions are relevant to LY members; they adopt decisions favourable to Taiwan with or without the participation of LY members. In the second step we confront our findings of the importance of parliamentary institutions for LY members with factors that determine the ability of LY members to cooperate with parliamentary institutions, perhaps

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even influence the course of their decision-​making –​in other words, we will explore what facilitates or inhibits their ability to conduct parliamentary diplomacy. The analysis will be done at three levels: individual, domestic (state) and international. For the individual level, we seek to explain what affects the participation of LY members in international (parliamentary) relations in general. One of the reasons, we argue, is motivation. There is no parliamentary diplomacy without motivated parliamentarians. Various other reasons can explain a parliamentarian’s interest in international relations, such as professional interests,4 interests in promoting business ties,5 as well as opposition to the government’s policies.6 A parliamentarian’s confidence in him or herself that is based on the ability to speak foreign languages and familiarity with issues discussed at the international level can also make a difference between a passive and an active Taiwanese parliamentarian participating in international relations of the Legislative Yuan. At the domestic level of analysis, we look at factors stemming from the type of government and the political system that can help us explain the level of success –​or lack thereof –​of LY members’ involvement with parliamentary institutions. In democracies, the primary responsibility of directly elected parliamentarians (or district legislators, as they are called in Taiwan) is to their constituents. They elect their representatives to deal with issues that concern the voters most and these are by definition local ones. Directly elected parliamentarians who wish to be active internationally face the challenge of how to balance the work for the benefit of constituents and engage in international (parliamentary) relations to contribute to Taiwan’s parliamentary diplomacy. Continuity is an important factor as well. In parliamentary democracies, reputation, based on knowledge and experience, grows with the length of time a parliamentarian is in office. Relations with the executive branch, too, affect the propensity of LY members to engage in international activities. The MOFA, a ministry responsible for the coordination of activities relating to parliamentary diplomacy on behalf of the Taiwanese government, navigates between the preferences of LY members and the government. Party politics and the ability to create consensus on foreign policy issues also matter. A mandate a parliamentarian receives to partake in international activities on issues that have bipartisan support is much stronger than on the ones supported by a single political party. No bipartisanship means weaker support for the implementation of Taiwan’s foreign policy, already struggling to receive international attention. At the international level, the role of LY members is explained by the nature of the contemporary international community, skilfully (ab)used by the PRC to its advantage. The adherence to the One China principle largely determines the scope of international parliamentary activities of Taiwan, because states that wish to have diplomatic relations with the PRC

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must agree to be bound by this policy. This makes it easier for the PRC to exercise pressure on Taiwan and limit its international relations at the inter-​ governmental, but also other, levels. Inter-​parliamentary cooperation, too, falls victim to the PRC’s interpretation of Taiwan as one of its provinces. Several international parliamentary associations cannot admit the Legislative Yuan as a new member because the PRC is already a member of these associations or because they require UN membership as a criterion for admission. Members of national parliaments, too, are under pressure from the PRC not to meet with their peers from of the LY as this might imply some kind of recognition of the Taiwanese statehood. We can establish once again that, indeed, Taiwan deals with complex challenges in its quest for international affirmation. Parliamentarians are not spared from these challenges; they encounter many obstacles in their effort to carry the burden of Taiwan’s parliamentary diplomacy. Some of these obstacles seem insurmountable, some not, as the analysis of relations between LY members and parliamentary institutions abroad will show.

Parliamentary institutions National parliaments Parliament-​to-​parliament Parliament-​to-​parliament relations can be an important part of Taiwan’s foreign policy. The Legislative Yuan may do something where the Taiwanese government cannot, for example, re-establish contact with parliaments from states that broke diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Almost 25 years after the end of diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1992, representatives of the Legislative Yuan responded to an official invitation from the National Assembly of South Korea in May 2016. The visit has been considered as ‘marking the first time Taiwan embarks on an official visit to the Northeast Asian nation at the official invitation of its congress since the two severed ties’ (Lee, 2016). Beijing regularly protests if any such meetings or pro-​Taiwan statements are made public by parliamentarians, anywhere in the world. The PRC embassy in Australia was ‘known for coming down hard on parliamentarians who appear to be at odds with Beijing’s policy on such sensitive matters as the status of Taiwan or Tibet and religious freedom’ (Davis, 2009). In February 2017, the PRC protested with Indian authorities over a visit of LY members in New Delhi.7 Most recently, in June 2020, the speaker of the Czech Republic’s Senate Miloš Vystrčil announced his visit to Taiwan, ‘despite warnings from China and a recommendation from his government that he not take the trip’ (AP, 2020).8 His justification for the trip, which he planned to be accompanied by a 90-​strong delegation (Ponikelska,

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2020), indicated the rejection of the accusation of ‘outside meddling’ because democratically elected parliamentarians from the Czech Republic decided to visit democratically elected parliamentarians from Taiwan.9 The visit of the Czech delegation (Shattuck, 2020) might become historical if other parliaments decide to follow suit, on the same normative ground.10 At the same time, such visits might further endanger the security of Taiwan, because the PRC sees them as the manifestation of Taiwan’s gradual move towards declaring independence. As unsubstantiated these suspicions might be, the threats are real. This, in turn, begs the question yet again of how far beyond the inter-​governmental level of international relations the One China principle may be extended to isolate and ultimately subdue Taiwan, and what the response should be of democratically elected parliaments in general, not just of the Legislative Yuan. Friendship groups Friendship groups are ‘groups of members of parliament who voluntarily organize themselves to promote parliamentary relations between their own Parliament and another country’s parliament’ (AALEP, 2016). Various reasons motivate parliamentarians to create a friendship group. Besides personal interest in the state (parliament) in question, they include exchanges of information, discussions about different world views, the promotion of ‘dialogue and contact between business people, government … [and] … exchange visits of members of both Parliaments and their assistants to build better links at a working level’ (AALEP, 2016). Friendship groups are mostly informal and have no direct bearing on policy-​and decision-​making processes, neither in the parliament nor in the government. Nevertheless, they are an important element of Taiwanese parliamentary diplomacy. ‘Strengthening these ties [with parliamentarians] is key to putting in place the building blocks for Taiwan’s expanded participation in the international community’ (MOFA, 2016). By the end of 2015, 48 friendship groups have been established in the Legislative Yuan (MOFA, 2016). By the end of 2018, the number grew by almost 50 per cent –​to 71 groups (Gao, 2018). It remains to be seen whether such an uptick in forming friendship groups will continue because LY members must renew friendship groups after the elections. At the time of concluding this part of the research, 15 friendship groups have already been established for the 2020–​24 LY. The breakdown of friendship groups according to the regions gives some indication of the geographic preferences of LY members. Table 5.1 shows that the interest in establishing friendship groups is directed to Southeast Asia and North America/​Western Europe. The gravitation towards Southeast Asia can be explained by the geographical proximity and Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy Initiative,11 whereas the gravitation towards North America and

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Western Europe can be explained by the traditional political support and economic cooperation between Taiwan and the two regions. These general findings are consistent with the view of a senior member of one of the main political parties in Taiwan, who divides the parliamentary interest in creating friendship groups into four geographic areas. The first is the US, where security and economy are the main factors that drive this relationship. The second is Southeast Asia; especially under the DPP’s reign, this region is paid particular attention for the reasons mentioned previously. Science and technology in general, health and environment in particular, but also a transfer of democratic norms are at the forefront of cooperation with this region. Third, partnership with the EU is important for Taiwan, primarily because of economic and scientific cooperation. Finally, Japan matters a lot to Taiwan in terms of economic cooperation and political support.12

Table 5.1: Friendship groups in the Legislative Yuan, 2016–​202013 1

Taiwan–​Australian and New Zealand Inter-Parliamentary Amity Association

2

Taiwan–​US Inter-​Parliamentary Amity Association

3

ROC–​Canada Parliamentary Friendship Association

4

Taiwan–​Russian Federation Parliamentary Amity Association

5

Taiwan–​Central and South American and Caribbean Countries Parliamentary Association

6

Parliamentary Cross-​Party Group on International Human Rights

7

Taiwan–​India Parliamentary Friendship Association

8

ROC–​South Korea Parliamentary Friendship Association

9

Taiwan and Austronesian Inter-​Parliamentary Amity Association

10

ROC (Taiwan)–​France Inter-​Parliamentary Amity Association

11

ROC (Taiwan)–​Italy Inter-​Parliamentary Amity Association

12

ROC–​Palau Inter-​Parliamentary Amity Association

13

ROC–​Turkey Inter-​Parliamentary Amity Association

14

ROC–​Poland Inter-​Parliamentary Amity Association

15

ROC–​Indonesia Inter-​Parliamentary Amity Association

16

ROC (Taiwan)–​Singapore Inter-​Parliamentary Amity Association

17

Taiwan–​UK Inter-​Parliamentary Exchange Association

18

Taiwan–​Vietnam Parliamentary Friendship Association

19

Taiwan–​Malaysia Inter-​Parliamentary Amity Association

20

Taiwan–​Japan Amity Association

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Table 5.1: Friendship groups in the Legislative Yuan 2016–​2020 (continued) 21

ROC Legislative Yuan and World Taiwan Chamber of Commerce Amity Association

22

Taiwan–​Europe Inter-​Parliamentary Amity Association

23

Taiwan–​United Kingdom Inter-​Parliamentary Amity Association

24

Taiwan–​Germany Inter-​Parliamentary Amity Association

25

Taiwan–​France Inter-​Parliamentary Amity Association

26

ROC(Taiwan)–​Israel Parliamentary Amity Group

27

Taiwan–​Korea Inter-​Parliamentary Friendship Association

28

Taiwan–​Republic of the Union of Myanmar Inter-​Parliamentary Friendship Association

29

Taiwan–​Cambodia Inter-​Parliamentary Friendship Association

30

Taiwan–​Indonesia Inter-​Parliamentary Friendship Association

31

Taiwan–​Slovenia Congressional Association

32

Taiwan–​Belgium Congressional Association

33

ROC (Taiwan)–​Spain Inter-​Parliamentary Amity Association

34

ROC (Taiwan)–​Portugal Inter-​Parliamentary Amity Association

35

ROC (Taiwan)–​Czech Inter-​Parliamentary Amity Association

36

ROC (Taiwan)–​Hungary Inter-​Parliamentary Amity Association

37

ROC (Taiwan)–​Slovakia Inter-​Parliamentary Amity Association

38

ROC (Taiwan)–​Netherlands Inter-​Parliamentary Amity Association

39

ROC (Taiwan)–​Switzerland Inter-​Parliamentary Amity Association

40

Republic of China–​New Zealand Inter-​Parliamentary Amity Association

41

Republic of China–​Scandinavian Countries (Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Iceland) Inter-​Parliamentary Amity Association

42

Taiwan–​Switzerland and Taiwan–​Austria Parliamentary Amity Association

43

Parliamentary Friendship Association for Taiwan and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations

44

Taiwan–​Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland Friendship Association

45

Taiwan–​African Countries Parliamentary Friendship Association (Eswatini, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, South Africa, São Tomé and Príncipe)

46

Inter-​Parliamentary Association on Digital Economy and Social Economy

47

Taiwan–​Mongolia Parliamentary Friendship Association

48

Taiwan Parliamentary Group for Tibet

49

Association on Rights for Eastern Taiwan, Remote Islands and Ethnic Groups (continued)

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PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY OF TAIWAN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Table 5.1: Friendship groups in the Legislative Yuan 2016–​2020 (continued) 50

Taiwan–​Italy Inter-​Parliamentary Amity Association

51

Taiwan–​South Africa Inter-​Parliamentary Amity Association

52

Taiwan–​New Southbound Policy Countries Parliamentary Amity Association

53

ROC–​Argentina, Brazil, and Chile Parliamentary Friendship Association

54

Taiwan–​Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) Parliamentary Friendship Association

55

Child Rights League of Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan

56

Taiwan–​Philippines Congressional Association

57

Legislative Yuan Association for Renewable Energy

58

Solidarity Association of the Taiwan and Solomon Islands Lawmakers

59

Legislative Yuan Association for Sustainable Development

60

Legislative Yuan Group on Reduction of Greenhouse Gases

61

Taiwan Congressional Hong Kong Caucus

62

ROC–​ASEAN Countries and India Parliamentary Association

63

Legislative Yuan Association on Facilitating International Medical and Public Health Exchange

64

Taiwan–​Israel Innovation Platform

65

UN Sustainable Development Goals Advisory Council of Parliament

66

Inter-​Parliamentary Friendship Association on Agriculture, Fishery and Animal Husbandry Industries

67

Legislative Yuan Association on Sustainable Travel

68

Taiwan Parliamentary Coalition for Blockchain Self-​Regulatory Organization

69

Legislative Yuan Association on Psychosocial Rehabilitation

70

Social Innovation Congress

71

Taiwan–​Middle East Countries Parliamentary Amity Association

In this respect, reading Figure 5.1 requires additional explanation. We have introduced East Asia as a separate region, but Japan, one of the most important of Taiwan’s allies is in this group. In the North American–​Western European Group the US is by far the most important partner for Taiwan. Also, members of the Legislative Yuan have established friendship groups for two (re)emerging powers, India and the Russian Federation. Several friendship groups in the Legislative Yuan have been established to cover

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Figure 5.1: Geographical distribution of friendship groups created in the LY14 Western Europe and North America 20 Africa

Southeast Asia and India

15 10 5

East Asia

Eastern Europe and Russia

0

Other Asia

South America Oceania

entire regions. Examples include friendship groups for the ASEAN, Africa, Latin America, Scandinavia, the Baltic region and the Middle East. Besides the ‘traditional’ creation of friendship groups focusing on states abroad and their national parliaments, LY members increasingly started to create sectoral groups, the purpose of which was to facilitate connections of LY members to promote Taiwan’s businesses and technical cooperation with advanced economies. Out of 71 friendship groups established in the 2016–​2020 term, no less than 12 of them belonged to this category, for instance, on blockchains, digital economy, sustainable development and greenhouse gas reduction.15 An example of such an initiative is the creation of the Taiwan Parliamentary Coalition for Blockchain Self-​Regulatory Organization, with an ambition to ‘attract blockchain investment and jobs to Taiwan’ (Spencer, 2018). It remains to be seen if the trend from the 2016–​2020 LY will continue into the next term. From the perspective of an effort to ease Taiwan’s isolation and limitations that LY members face in international relations, this avenue for inter-​parliamentary cooperation seems worthy of further exploration, because business-​motivated activities of Taiwanese parliamentarians might well be better received by their voters. On the other hand, our research has shown that the interest in friendship groups by the Legislative Yuan is not reflected in the map of pro-​Taiwan friendship groups in national parliaments around the world. As can be seen from Table 5.2, out of 193 countries, members of the United Nations, about one fifth –​40, including the EU (European Parliament) –​have created a friendship group for Taiwan.

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PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY OF TAIWAN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Table 5.2: Taiwan-​friendly groups abroad16 Country+EU

Parliamentary friendship group in a foreign parliament

Australia

Australia–​Taiwan Friendship Group

Austria

Austria–​Taiwan Friendship Group

Belgium

Cercle de Parlementaires–​Amis de Taiwan; Circle of Parliamentarian Friends of Taiwan/​Belgium–​Taiwan Friendship Group

Belize

Taiwan–​Belize Friendship Group/​Taiwan–​Belize Inter-​ Parliamentary Amity Association

Bulgaria

Bulgarian–​Taiwanese Parliamentary Group for Economic and Cultural Cooperation

Burkina Faso

Burkina Faso–​Taiwan Parliamentary Group of Friendship

Canada

Canada–​Taiwan Friendship Group

Colombia

Colombia–​Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Group

Czech Republic

Czech Republic–​Taiwan Parliamentary Platform

Denmark

Denmark–​Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Association

Estonia

Estonia–​Taiwan Friendship Group

Eswatini

Taiwan–​Swaziland Parliamentary Friendship Group

European Union

European Parliament Taiwan Friendship Group

France

France–​Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Group; Study Group with International Vocation on Taiwan; Senate-​Taiwan Exchange & Study Group

Germany

Berlin–​Taipei Parliamentary Circle of Friends; German–​Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Group

Greece

Taiwan–​Greece Friendship Association

Hungary

Hungary–​Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Association

India

India–​Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Forum; Taiwan–​India Parliamentary Friendship Association

Indonesia

Indonesia–​Taiwan Friendship Association

Ireland

Ireland–​Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Society

Israel

Taiwan Friendship Group of the Israeli Parliament

Italy

Italy–​Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Group

Japan

Taiwan–​Japan Parliamentary Friendship Group; Japan–​Taiwan Parliamentary Commission

Latvia

Group for the Support of Taiwan

Lithuania

Parliamentary Group for Relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan)

Nicaragua

ROC (Taiwan)–​Nicaragua Parliamentary Group of Friendship

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Taiwan’s Parliamentary Diplomacy

Table 5.2: Taiwan-​friendly groups abroad (continued) Country+EU

Parliamentary friendship group in a foreign parliament

Panama

Panama–​Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Group

Paraguay

Paraguayan Friendship Parliamentary Commission –​Republic of China (Taiwan) Comisión Parlamentaria de Amistad Paraguaya –​ República de China (Taiwán)//​ROC Friendship Committee

Poland

Polish–​Taiwan Parliamentary Group

Portugal

Taiwan–​Portugal Parliamentary Friendship Association

Republic of Korea Korea–​Taiwan Parliamentarian Friendship Association; ROK–​ Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Group Singapore

Taiwan–​Singapore Parliamentary Friendship Association; Taiwan–​ Singapore Inter-​Parliamentary Friendship Group

Slovakia

Slovak–​Taiwanese Parliamentary Friendship Group

Spain

Taiwan–​Spain Parliamentary Friendship Association

Suriname

Suriname–​Taiwan Friendship Foundation

Sweden

Swedish Taiwanese Parliamentary Association

Thailand

Thailand–​Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Group

UK

British–​Taiwanese All-​Party Parliamentary Group

USA

Congressional Taiwan Caucus//​Senate Taiwan Caucus

Venezuela

Venezuela–​Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Group

The regional distribution of Taiwan-​friendly groups that have been created in parliaments abroad only partly coincides with the regional distribution of friendship groups established in the Legislative Yuan, as Figure 5.2 suggests. Out of 40 parliaments that have created a friendship group with Taiwan, more than half of them are from Europe (19 plus the European Parliament). We could not verify many friendship groups that would be created in parliaments in Southeast Asia. This might be because of the good relations their countries have with the PRC, for example, by participating in the Belt and Road Initiative, by relying on the supply of arms and the like.17 Parliaments from Taiwan’s major allies have formed friendship groups for Taiwan. Besides the US Congress, which has a specific organization of partnership with countries/​parliaments abroad (in the case of Taiwan, the so-​called Taiwan Caucus), we find on the list parliaments from Japan, major European powers (France, Germany and the UK), as well as India. In East Asia, LY members tend to work closely with peers from Japan’s National Diet. The dynamics of this cooperation depend on

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PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY OF TAIWAN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

which party is in power, because the DPP is closer to Japan, whereas the KMT is more conciliatory to the PRC.18 With this caveat in mind, the cooperation between the two parliaments has become stronger ever since the democratization process started to unfold in Taiwan (Chong and Lam, 2004; Chen, 2006; Hoppens, 2018). It has had some noteworthy results. A good example is the reluctance of Prime Minister Obuchi to follow US president Clinton’s policy of the so-​called Three No’s.19 This was considered a major success for Taiwanese parliamentarians who ‘have lobbied their Japanese counterparts hard’ to accomplish this goal (Crowell and Mutsuko, 2000; see also Rawnsley, 2000: 83). The recent initiative from a cross-​party group in the National Diet, to create a trilateral security parliamentary forum consisting of American, Japanese and Taiwanese parliamentarians, also indicates the importance of inter-​parliamentary relations between the two parliaments (KN, 2019). Figure 5.2: Geographical distribution of friendship groups created in countries outside Taiwan Western Europe and North America and EP 15 Oceania

South America

10 5

Other Asia

Eastern Europe

0

Southeast Asia and India

East Asia Africa

Across the ocean, members of the Legislative Yuan have the strongest ties with British peers. The British–​Taiwanese All-​Party Parliamentary Group (hereafter: BTAPPG, or the Group)20 was established in 1976, although the history of the interest by British parliamentarians in Taiwan stretches back to the period after the events in 1949.21 Taiwan has often underscored the importance of the UK for Taiwan. For example, the UK ‘was the first country in Europe to grant visa-​free courtesies to travellers from Taiwan’ (Office of the President, 2017). The British support to Taiwan’s efforts to gain ‘meaningful’ participation in international organizations such as the

68

Taiwan’s Parliamentary Diplomacy

WHO and Interpol is also mentioned (Hansard, 2020a; Lim and Tai, 2020; UK Parliament, 2020).22 Taipei considers the support from the British Parliament important because it helps in raising ‘Taiwan’s international visibility and amplifying its voice on the international stage, ensuring that Taiwan is well placed to continue its promotion of freedom and democracy in the Asia–​Pacific region and beyond’ (Lin, 2017). Realistically, the British Parliament can do very little beyond giving Taiwan symbolic support demonstrated by the exchange of visits, submitting Taiwan-​related questions to the government and publicly declaring political support for Taiwan. In the British political system, the parliament faces, as some authors complain, ‘the pre-​democratic relic of the monarchical rule’, which gives the ‘Prime Minister, ministers and officials the power to make foreign policy without the approval, or even the knowledge, of Parliament’ (Weir, 2007: 7).23 This is in stark contrast with the powers of the parliament of Taiwan’s major ally, the US Congress. The US Congress The US Congress is one of the most influential parliaments in the world, not only because it is a representative body of a superpower, but also because of its role in US foreign policy.24 The Senate has the power to ratify treaties and to confirm foreign appointments. The jurisdiction of the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee ‘also includes foreign economic, military, technical and humanitarian assistance. It is also granted oversight powers in these areas’ (Dewhirst, 2007: 219). The Committee on International Relations in the House of Representatives is less powerful. However, the House has the ‘power of the purse’. This is the way for it to ‘influence the direction of the nation’s foreign affairs’ (Dewhirst, 2007: 277; Bennet Jr., 1978). Congress and its members have been involved in international parliamentary relations for more than a century. Several studies have dealt with these activities. Members of Congress have participated in the creation of the IPU (Davis, 1907b, 1907a). As it turned out, Congress had a major impact on world affairs after it had refused to ratify the Covenant of the League of Nations in 1919 (Ambrosius, 1987). After the war, the role of the US Congress in international parliamentary relations has become more visible (Olson, 1991). Congress has contributed to the creation of the NATO PA (Matthews, 1962/​1986; Hovey, 1966). Through the Helsinki Commission members of the US Congress play an advocacy role in the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE (Oliver, 1996). Such a role has been even more emphasized by the Rose–​Roth Seminars which are considered the flagship programme of the NATO PA.25 Congress is an active participant

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PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY OF TAIWAN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

in areas that used to be in the domain of the executive branch, such as the transatlantic regulatory cooperation (Ahearn and Morelli, 2009). The literature has also addressed the (wrong) impressions about the insularity of members of Congress by studying the role of endogenous and exogenous factors that determine their behaviour (Karns, 1977; Carter et al, 2004). Bilateral relations, including those with the PRC, also draw the attention of by scholars (Xie, 2009). More recently the Congress has become an object of study in the literature focusing on parliamentary diplomacy (Šabič, 2016). The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) which became law on 4 October 1979 is the foundation of the relationship between the US Congress and Taiwan, after the US recognized the PRC. Of course, the bond between the US Congress, Taiwan and even the LY26 is much older. To determine the mindset of members of Congress that is behind the building of, and actively sustaining, this bond, we must go back to history again. During World War Two, China played a considerable role in fighting against Japan, the axis power. Its importance was symbolically recognized by giving the Republic of China the honour to be the first to sign the UN Charter.27 As we know, less than four years later, it became clear that the Communists would prevail in mainland China and that Chiang Kai-​shek together with his supporters would retreat to Taiwan (FRUS, 1949: Document 2). At first, it seemed that the region would witness a war between the ousted government in Taiwan and the newly formed People’s Republic of China. As has already been mentioned, the original US position under the Truman administration was that Washington would not interfere were the conflict to occur. The ideological dimension of the Korean War and the determination of the PRC to spread its influence in East Asia changed the US position, which sided with the Republic of China. Realizing that the retaking of the mainland by Chiang Kai-​shek was not going to happen, Ike Eisenhower, the new president of the US, declared in the aftermath of the Korean War that ‘the United States was formally committed to defending Taiwan from armed attack’ (Tiezzi, 2015). On 2 December 1954, the Mutual Defense Treaty was signed in which the two countries pledged to help each other ‘separately and jointly by self-​help and mutual aid’, and ‘maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and communist subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability’.28 On 29 January 1955, the US Congress adopted a joint resolution, granting the president the power ‘to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting [Taiwan] against armed attack’ (FRUS, 1955–​57). ‘In case that wasn’t enough to deter the PRC’, wrote Tiezzi (2015), ‘Eisenhower’s secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, publicly revealed that Washington was considering the option of a nuclear strike against the Chinese mainland’. The US’s recognition of the PRC in 1979 resulted in the termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty. Hickey noted that this was ‘the first (and only)

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Taiwan’s Parliamentary Diplomacy

time that the US broke diplomatic relations with a friendly government and alliance partner’ (Hickey, 2015: 253). The Carter administration outlined future relations with Taiwan in the so-​called Taiwan Enabling Act (TEA) and sent it to Congress for consideration on 29 January 1979. The TEA received a cold reception in Congress. Members complained about the weakness of the Act regarding trade, legal, economic and security concerns about the new situation for Taiwan. John Glenn, a Democrat and a Senator from Ohio, criticized the administration’s proposal by emphasizing that normalization of relations with the PRC was important, but not at the expense of Taiwan’s security. He also complained about the way the Carter administration handled the cooperation with Congress on this issue. Unfortunately, the administration acted with such speed and secrecy that the Congress was not consulted. Let here be no doubt: informing some of us 2 hours before the public announcement cannot be considered consultation. This failure was particularly serious since the Congress had specifically directed the president in the International Security Act of 1978 to consult with Congress before making any move which could affect the Mutual Security Treaty.29 The criticism against the TEA and Carter’s ‘secret diplomacy’ (Xie, 2009: 81) was such that Congress revised and renamed the original document. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) was adopted with a considerable majority, first in the House on 28 March 1979 (339: 50), and then in the Senate on 29 March 1979 (85: 4). The president could not go against such overwhelming congressional support for the TRA, so it was signed into law on 4 October 1979.30 According to Hickey: The TRA represents one of those rare instances when the legislative branch took the lead in crafting US foreign policy. ... US officials contend that the TRA and the three US–​PRC Communiques31 (the 1972 Shanghai Communique, the 1979 Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations and the August 17 1982 Joint Communique on Arms Sales to Taiwan) form the foundation of America’s Taiwan policy. From time to time, US authorities also claim that President Ronald Reagan’s so-​called “Six Assurances” play a critical role in policy. … However, most US legal authorities agree that the TRA –​which carries the force of law –​trumps the three Communiques and other declarations of policy. (Hickey, 2015: 254)

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PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY OF TAIWAN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

One can hardly explain in a better way the importance of the US Congress for Taiwan, which goes way above simple inter-​parliamentary cooperation, particularly in light of the position of the PRC regarding the island, which has never changed: Taiwan shall not become independent and shall be unified with the PRC (Butterfield, 1978: 10). On the other side, the US Congress seems equally resolute to defend Taiwan against any policy undertaken by the PRC that would threaten the democratically expressed will of the Taiwanese people. The establishment of bipartisan caucuses in the House and the Senate underscored the importance the US Congress attaches to the island.32 The bipartisan support in Congress for Taiwan is so strong that it even discourages scholars from analysing the Congressional decision-​ making process on this topic.33 Nevertheless, the congressional role in supporting Taiwan remains a relevant case to study, because it offers an example of how a bipartisan Congress can influence the preferences of the administration. Overall, the congressional support for Taiwan is truly impressive. In the last 30 years (1989–​2020)34 the Congress has introduced or adopted no less than 416 proposals and initiatives (bills, resolutions, simple resolutions, joint resolutions and concurrent resolutions) in which it referred to Taiwan.35 Among the Taiwan-​related issues that have been debated in the US Congress, economic interests, ideology, security and membership in international organizations seem to be of foremost concern for the US Congress. As far as economic interests are concerned, Taiwan is an important trading partner for the US, but the level of support for Taiwan from Congress depends on who runs the government in Taipei. In principle, Congress is ready to lock horns with the administration whenever the latter seeks to balance congressional interests in protecting Taiwan against opportunities to trade with the PRC, one of the largest economies in the world. Congress is less eager to help only if Taiwan turns out to prefer better relations with the PRC and is ready to demonstrate this in practice, as was the case with KMT-​dominated Taiwan’s ‘failure to act’ on the congressional support and President Bush’s ‘2001 decision to approve a large weapons package for Taiwan’ (Dumbaugh, 2007: 23). Ideological concerns can be an important push factor for members of Congress to support Taiwan36. This was particularly evident during the presidency of Ma Ying-​jeou (KMT) between 2008 and 2016 because Ma was rather friendly to Beijing.37 Figure 5.3 shows less interest in Congress in Taiwan in precisely that period.38 However, the relative silence of Congress during the Ma administration period could also be attributed to the fact that the latter found ways to deal with the PRC. At the end of the day, some important foreign policy results have been accomplished during Ma’s presidency, such as the access to the WHA39

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Taiwan’s Parliamentary Diplomacy

and in particular the inclusion of Taiwan, with congressional support, in the US Visa Waiver Program.40 The congressional interest in Taiwan re-​ emerged at the end of the second Ma presidency. As the elections were approaching, it became apparent that Beijing was determined to radically change its relations with Taiwan if Ma and the KMT were not ‘rewarded’ by Taiwanese voters for the ‘benefits’ they delivered because of friendlier relations with the PRC. In the 2016 elections, no such reward was given since the Taiwanese voters preferred the PRC-​sceptic DPP to the PRC-​ conciliatory KMT. Figure 5.3: Proposals by the US Congress referring to Taiwan, 1989–​2020 30 25 20 15 10

0

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

5

On security, arguably the most important topic in relations between Taiwan and the US Congress, Figure 5.3 indicates that Congress becomes more active as soon as the situation in the Taiwan Strait worsens and the PRC adopts a more aggressive tone against Taiwan. The following major rifts can be highlighted: the 1996 missile crisis; the adoption of the Anti-​secession law in the PRC in 2005; and the deterioration of relations between the PRC and the US during almost the entire Trump presidency (2016–​2020). The March 1996 missile crisis was the first post-​Cold War incident that threatened to develop into nothing less than a full-​blown war between Taiwan and the PRC, with the US possibly getting involved. The reason for the escalation of tensions was the intention of Taiwan to hold the first-​ever direct presidential election. From Beijing’s perspective, this was seen as a clear signal that Taiwan, a democracy, wanted to take a different path of political development to the PRC, which continued its course as a communist state. In addition to that, Lee Teng-​hui, the then p​ residential candidate and a member of the KMT, was seen in Beijing as a rather problematic politician. At the beginning of his presidency, Lee did not question Taiwan as a part of China and he accepted unification as a future

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PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY OF TAIWAN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

option, under one condition, swiftly rejected by the PRC: ‘when objective conditions are ripe, based on the common will of the Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, we hope to be able to discuss the matter of national reunification’.41 The crisis had begaun to loom already in 1995. Emboldened by the US fiasco in Somalia, the PRC seemed convinced that the American administration would not choose Taiwan over dynamic trade with the PRC if the latter entered into war with Taiwan. In 1996, as the presidential elections were getting closer, the PRC chose to intimidate the Taiwanese by firing missiles to Taiwan shores and announcing military manoeuvres near the island. Congress pressed upon the administration to respond to challenges from Beijing. For example, the speaker of the House, Newt Gingrich, a Republican, called the missile tests an ‘act of terror’ (Copper, 2006: 11). Eventually, the US sent two aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Strait: ‘the pilots on the aircraft carriers were ready for war’ (Copper, 2006: 3). Some senators took a more precautionary position on the development of the situation in the Taiwan Strait, emphasizing the responsibility of Taiwan for the emerging political crisis. Senator Diane Feinstein, a Democrat, warned that ‘Taiwanese President Lee Teng-​hui’s visit in the United States, Taiwanese military exercises concurrent with that visit, and an ongoing campaign for a seat at the United Nations … called into question whether Taiwan is sincere in its statements that it opposes independence’, so she called for direct talks between the PRC and Taiwan.42 The majority of Congress, however, seemed ‘poised to do something if Clinton did not, thus exerting pressure on the White House to act with resolve to aid Taiwan’ (Copper, 2006: 11). Either way, Congress made itself heard and in the end, the status quo prevailed. Intimidation tactics by the PRC did the opposite to what Beijing had expected would happen in Taiwan. They galvanized support for Lee who ended up winning the elections by a landslide (Lim, 2003: 150). The PRC began to send assurances to Washington that it would not invade Taiwan as long as the latter would refrain from declaring independence (Tyler, 1996). Realistically, if this were the only reason why the PRC would invade Taiwan there is nothing to be afraid of because Taiwan is unlikely to declare independence. This did not seem to be an option then,43 nor does it seem to be an option today.44 But with its economic and military strength growing, the voices inside the PRC for finding a way to take Taiwan sooner rather than later, even by force if necessary, became louder. The clearest signal that the PRC did not intend to leave any space for Taiwan to consider any other policy but unification was made on 14 March 2005, when the so-​called Anti-​Secession Law45 (ASL) was adopted by the NPC. With Article 8 of the ASL, the PRC has legally obliged itself to intervene militarily should Taiwan attempt to ‘secede’ from the PRC.

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The ASL cannot be interpreted solely as a statement of the PRC that ‘it does not want war but has to insist on its likelihood’ (Ji, 2006: 253). The ASL has important domestic dimensions and international consequences. Domestically, the ASL is considered as a pragmatic response to hardliners who have been pushing for military action against Taiwan –​an idea that is as old as the PRC itself. It is also considered as a lesson learned from the US. The latter has created a legal basis with the TRA to defend Taiwan (Hu, 2011: 54). Now, Beijing has adopted its own ‘TRA’ to attack Taiwan (Tkacik, 2011: 44–​5; Copper, 2006: 216). Internationally, the ASL sent two messages to the world. First, that not intervening militarily in case Taiwan declared independence would be against the law in the PRC and would thus have immediate serious consequences for the PRC leadership if it did not respond at once. Second, the PRC has left very little room for manoeuvring politically if errors of judgement are made. Namely, any interpretation of the ‘evidence’ suggesting that Taiwan is going to secede is now solely in Beijing’s hands. With this legislation adopted, the prospects of war in the Taiwan Strait are not remote anymore. As declared by the then Prime Minister of the PRC Wen Jiabao, ‘the law contains potential triggers to war’, yet the PRC does not plan to start a war ‘as long as there is a ray of hope’ that Taiwan would not push for independence (Yardley, 2005). Again, only Beijing decides when that ‘ray of hope’ is extinguished; once it pulls the trigger there is no way back, which could result in anything, from a localized confrontation between the PRC and Taiwan to a regional conflict that might escalate into another world war. The enactment of Article 8 of the ASL has made the situation in the Taiwan Strait very complicated indeed. The US Congress has reacted to the ASL and has referred to the TRA in its response. Only a day after the ASL was adopted by the NPC, the House of Representatives adopted a resolution introduced by Henry Hyde Jr., a Republican. The resolution of 15 March 2005 emphasizes that the ASL ‘provides a legal justification for the use of force against Taiwan, altering the status quo in the region, and thus is of grave concern to the US’, which, according to the resolution, ‘should be pointed out in clear terms to the PRC’.46 The usage of the TRA’s term ‘grave concern’47 in the resolution and the level of support it has received (424:4) gives this decision significant political importance. Members of Congress spoke to demand that the US government officially express its opposition to the adoption of the ASL (see Table 5.3 for the list of tabled resolutions). The government explained its position in a hearing held by the House Committee on International Relations, namely that it communicated with the PRC on several occasions, bringing the message across about the issues related to the ASL (Schriver, 2005: 9–​11). It was clear that the US could do little to prevent the law from passing. As Congressman Tom Lantos, a Democrat, predicted, the passage

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PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY OF TAIWAN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

of the anti-​secession law was ‘a threatening move by Beijing which will undoubtedly heighten tensions across the Taiwan Strait’. Additionally, ‘it will decrease the chance that either side will be willing to resolve differences peacefully’.48 Table 5.3: Proposals recorded by the US Congress on the topic of the ASL Proposal

Date

Content

Action

H.Con. Res.76

17/02/2005 Expressing the sense of Congress that the United Introduced States should urge the People’s Republic of China not to enact into law the so-​called ‘anti-​ secession’ legislation with respect to Taiwan and should reaffirm its unwavering commitment to Taiwan, and for other purposes.

H.Con. Res.70

17/02/2005 Expressing the sense of Congress that the United Introduced States should strongly oppose China’s anti-​ secession legislation with respect to Taiwan.

H.Con. Res.98

15/03/2005 Expressing the grave concern of Congress Agreed to regarding the recent passage of the anti-​secession in House law by the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China.

S.Con. Res.21

17/03/2005 A concurrent resolution expressing the grave Introduced concern of Congress regarding the recent passage of the anti-​secession law by the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China.

S.Con. Res.24

20/03/2005 A concurrent resolution expressing the grave Introduced concern of Congress regarding the recent passage of the anti-​secession law by the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China.

H.Con. Res.219

17/07/2005 Expressing the sense of Congress regarding enhanced security for Taiwan.

S.Res.220

28/07/2005 A resolution to express the concern of the Senate Introduced regarding the passage of the anti-​secession law by the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan on an equal footing without preconditions.

Introduced

It has already been mentioned that between 2008 and 2016 the Congress was relatively quiet on the Taiwan issue. This was mostly because of the pro-​PRC government, but the US was also busy recovering from the global financial crisis and with getting out of costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some scholars began to question the continuous US commitment to Taiwan and favoured instead a stronger cooperation with the PRC (Tucker and Glaser,

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Taiwan’s Parliamentary Diplomacy

2011: 27). The Trump presidency (2016–​2020) has seen a complete reversal of this policy. The US Congress has ramped up the anti-​PRC and pro-​Taiwan rhetoric, and President Trump stands a good chance of being remembered in Taiwan ‘as the strongest US president in recent memory’ (Jennings, 2019). From the beginning of Trump’s presidency up until mid-​June 2020, Congress has introduced no less than 59 proposals relating to Taiwan. This is a dramatic uptick in comparison to Barack Obama’s second term as the president of the US (36), and only 14 initiatives shy of the total number tabled by the Congress in the entire Obama presidency (37 in the first term). At the time of writing, several congressional initiatives have made it to the final stage, among them the Taiwan Travel Act (TTA), which was signed into law in March 2018.49 The gist and the motive of the TTA are to abrogate from what Congress has called ‘self-​imposed restrictions’ regarding the ‘high-​level communication’ between the US and Taiwan.50 The specific reference to ‘restrictions’ is the pressure from the PRC on the US to stick to the ‘ “usual practice” that there would be no meetings between US officials and the Taiwanese president, vice president, officials, foreign ministers or defense ministers since the nations severed diplomatic ties in 1979’ (Lin, 2018). From now on, the Act stipulates, ‘officials at all levels of the United States Government, including Cabinet-​level national security officials, general officers and other executive branch officials’ shall be allowed to travel to Taiwan to ‘meet their Taiwanese counterparts’. The TECRO, on the other hand, is expected to ‘conduct business in the United States, including activities which involve participation by members of Congress, officials of Federal, State, or local governments of the United States, or any high-​level official of Taiwan’.51 The TTA represents very good news for members of the Legislative Yuan as well. In the context of the TTA, their official trips to the US will from now on be considered not only legitimate but also politically welcome. Congress sent a clear message to the PRC that it was determined to implement the TTA to facilitate inter-​parliamentary cooperation with Taiwan’s parliament. In September 2018, a public meeting took place in the US Congress between the speaker of the Legislative Yuan and the speaker of the House of Representatives. This was the ‘first such meeting since the US severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan in 1979’ (Tsao and Hsiao, 2018). The breaking up with the ‘tradition’ continued at the inter-​governmental level, too. The meeting between Taiwan’s national security chief and the White House national security adviser in 2019, then 2020 visits to Taiwan by the US health secretary, followed by the visit of the Undersecretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy and the Environment are recent examples (Lee and Blanchard, 2019; Kuo, 2020; Smith and Cai, 2020).52 The public lunch between the US Ambassador to the United Nations with the Head

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PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY OF TAIWAN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

of Taipei’s Economic and Cultural Office in New York, ‘the first meeting between a top Taiwan official and a United States ambassador to the United Nations’ (Lederer, 2020), is perhaps the most important signal of different kinds of relationships between Washington and Taipei. The adoption of the TTA was bound to receive a strong reaction from Beijing, which saw it as an act of infringement of its sovereignty. ‘Taiwan is a part of China, issues regarding Taiwan are completely internal affairs of China, the bill had interfered in the internal affairs of China and injured the environment for the development of relations between the two countries’ militaries’ (Xinhua, 2018). From the PRC’s perspective, the reason for the irritation is understandable. In the context of PRC–​US relations, acts such as the TRA or the TTA carry a substantial political weight because they reflect the bipartisan support in the US Congress. It would be difficult for any US president to ignore this.53 In response to the crisis in the Taiwan Strait, Congress continues to empower the US government to handle the Taiwan issue with the PRC. In December 2018, the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA) was signed into law.54 The purpose of the bill is to clarify US policy, diplomacy and security interests in the Indo–​Pacific region. The ARIA refers to Taiwan as well. From the perspective of the PRC, possibly the most problematic part of the act is Section 209, which allows the US to conduct ‘regular transfers of defense articles to Taiwan that are tailored to meet the existing and likely future threats from the People’s Republic of China’.55 Beijing repeated strong statements it had made in reaction to the TTA,56 but Congress did not stop there. It adopted another bill, the so-​called Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act, signed into law on 26 March 2020.57 The purpose of the TAIPEI is to assist Taiwan in a sustainable involvement in international relations, especially in light of the possibility that Taipei might lose most of the remaining allies to China in the near future. In this respect, the TAIPEI promotes the policy to consider ‘increasing its economic, security, and diplomatic engagement’ with countries willing to strengthen or elevate their relations with Taiwan, and reconsider its relations with countries that ‘take serious or significant actions to undermine the security or prosperity of Taiwan’.58 The TAIPEI further increased tensions between the US and the PRC, the latter promising a ‘resolute strike back’ if the US chose to implement it (Blanchard, 2020), but the US Congress’ political commitment to Taiwan continued. First, the Taiwan Assurance Act was passed, unanimously, in the House of Representatives and referred to the Senate on 7 May 2019. Most recently, on 23 July 2020, a bill was introduced to allow the US Congress to authorize the president of the US to intervene militarily in the case of an armed attack by the PRC on Taiwan.59 Indeed, in the 2016–​2020 Trump era, Taiwan has enjoyed the kind of unwavering bipartisan support by the US Congress it has never had before.

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Taiwan’s Parliamentary Diplomacy

Last, but not least, membership in international organizations has always been a top priority for Taiwan to be more engaged in international relations. With the support from the US Congress, Taiwan has enjoyed some success in its efforts to pursue this foreign policy goal, such as with the membership in the Asian Development Bank and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (Chang, 2010b, 133). The major obstacle, besides the fact that most inter-​governmental organizations only admit universally recognized states, is the PRC, which studiously prevents Taiwan’s access to multilateral institutions, mostly inter-​ governmental, but also non-​governmental ones.60 Given these obstacles, the lesser focus of the US Congress on promoting Taiwan’s membership in international organizations, as Figure 5.4 suggests, seemed understandable. Figure 5.4: Congressional support to Taiwan’s membership in international organizations 25 20 15 10 5 0 1989–1993 1994–1998 1999–2003 2004–2008 2009–2013 2014–2018 2019–2020

Figure 5.4 does not entirely reveal the congressional activity in this foreign policy area. In Figure 5.5 we have included all the proposed actions by the US Congress where the titles specifically referred to individual international organizations. The following are mentioned in these documents: 1) the UN (also addressing membership in international organizations in general); 2) the WHO and its main organ, the World Health Assembly (WHA); 3) the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), in connection with the membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO); 4) the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO); and 5) Interpol. The present list by no means exhausts all the mentions of the importance of Taiwan’s membership in international organizations in congressional proposals, but it is indicative enough to demonstrate the relevance of this topic for the US Congress. Three international organizations drew particular attention of Congress: the UN, the WHO/​WHA and the GATT/​WTO.

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PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY OF TAIWAN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Figure 5.5: Congressional support to Taiwan’s membership in selected international organizations 25 21

21

20

15 11 10 5

5

2 0 UN

WHO/WHA

GATT + WTO

ICAO

INTERPOL

The proposed so-​called ‘UN resolutions’ introduced in the Congress typically reflect the position that although Taiwan cannot be a member of the UN and its specialized agencies, it should still be allowed to participate in the work of these institutions.61 These proposed actions have not, as yet, received widespread support in the US Congress. The issue of Taiwan’s membership in the GATT/​WTO was a different story. Entering the WTO was considered vital for Taiwan. Being one of the ‘Asian tigers’ (besides Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea) because of its rapid economic growth that lasted up until the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the exclusion of Taiwan from the global trading system with the WTO at its centre would have been disastrous for the government in Taipei. Due to favourable circumstances, especially that Taiwan negotiated the WTO membership at the same time as the PRC and that the majority of WTO members favoured a separate entrance of Taiwan as a new member, the government in Taipei succeeded in this effort. Significant concessions it had to make on the road to membership62 have not changed the fact that ‘Taiwan and China both joined the organization as independent governments with equal membership status and full membership rights’ (Lindemann, 2014: 104). Congress was supportive of Taiwan. This is evidenced not only by the number of proposed actions with specific reference to the Taiwanese membership in the WTO shown in Figure 5.5 but also by the fact that the congressional position, to condition the entrance of the PRC in to the WTO by the subsequent entrance of Taiwan into this international organization, has gone successfully through the legislative procedure and has been formalized into law.63

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Taiwan’s Parliamentary Diplomacy

The WTO and the WHO have a lot in common for Taiwan. Just as the WTO is important for its participation in the global trade system, the WHO is vital for its participation in the global health system. It is ‘an indispensable source of information for countries’ health departments’ (Collins, 2020). As things stand now if Taiwan’s health authorities were to seek assistance or offer it they could do so only via the PRC. The SARS outbreak demonstrated the role the PRC plays in blocking Taiwan from the WHO (Winkler, 2012). This seems unreasonable. Such outbreaks, including the HIV/​AIDS one since 1981, and the outbreak of the COVID-​19 virus that turned into a pandemic in 2020, make global scientific cooperation an imperative. Taiwan has an advanced health system, which has proven itself during the 2020 pandemic. At the time of writing the total number of infections and deaths caused by COVID-​19 put Taiwan in 163rd place among the most infected countries: much less than any of the industrialized countries and almost 140 places below the PRC (29th place according to the official data).64 Notwithstanding these facts, the prospects for Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the WHO are dim. Unlike the WTO, which was created in 1995, the WHO was one of the first specialized agencies of the United Nations, created in 1948. Taiwan (the Republic of China) was one of the founders of the organization, but in 1972, it was replaced by the PRC. According to provisions in Chapter III of the Constitution of the WHO, only members of the United Nations or otherwise recognized states may become members of the WHO. Attempts of Taiwan to join the WHO in some capacity (Lindemann, 2014: 197) go as far back as 1997 when it sought an observer status in the WHA. It was unsuccessful because of Beijing’s position that Taiwan could only participate as part of the official delegation from the PRC, which Taipei refused (Lee, 1997; Chang, 2010b: 132).65 Between 2007 and 2008, under Chen Shui-​bian’s presidency and with the DPP in power, Taiwan made a bold move to request full membership in the WHO or at least the status of an observer in the WHA, both under the name of Taiwan. Such rather provocative efforts did not fare well with Taiwan’s allies (Herington and Lee, 2014: 4–​5; Wu, 2008), not even with the US.66 As already mentioned, Beijing did eventually give a nod to Taipei’s participation67 during the presidency of Ma Ying-​jeou. After Ma was succeeded in 2016 by Tsai Ing-​wen, whom the PRC does not accept because she refuses to adhere to the 1992 Consensus, things became bad for Taiwan again, for the Director General of the WHO does not invite Taiwan to WHA sessions anymore.68 Taiwan cannot even contemplate membership in the WHO as long as the PRC insists on the One China principle. For WHO officials, Taiwan simply does not exist in any other form than as a part of the PRC (Davidson, 2020), whereas Beijing makes sure to keep control of communication related to Taiwan that passes within the WHO.69

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PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY OF TAIWAN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Table 5.4: Congressional actions on the status of Taiwan in the WHO Year

Introduced

Agreed to/​Passed in House

1998

2

1

1999 2000

Agreed to/​Passed in Senate

Became law

1

1

1

2001 2002

2 1

2003 2004

1

2005

1

2017

1

1

1

1

1

2018

1

2019

1

2020

1

1

1

The US Congress was relatively silent during Ma’s presidency, when Taiwan was allowed to participate in the work of the WHO and attend meetings of the WHA.70 However, members of Congress have expressed their views many times before the 2008–​2016 period and after. Out of 21 actions that specifically refer to the status of Taiwan in the WHO (see Table 5.4), five of them have been bills signed into law. During the Clinton era, Congress wanted more determination from the White House in the support of Taiwan’s request for being associated with the WHO. In 1999, the Congress required from the administration ‘to fulfil the commitment made in the 1994 Taiwan Policy Review (TPR)71 to actively support Taiwan’s participation in international organizations’, and in 2001, it authorized the Secretary of State to ‘initiate a United States plan to endorse and obtain observer status for Taiwan’.72 Similar instructions were given to the Department of State in 2003 and 2004.73 After 2016 and until the time this study has been concluded, the congressional support of Taiwan’s participation in international organizations, in particular the WHO, was resumed.74 Unfortunately, these actions did not improve Taiwan’s prospects for formalizing its cooperation with the WHO in a meaningful way to contribute to international efforts to combat the COVID-​19 pandemic.75 As Tsai was elected for a second term in 2020 it is unlikely that Taiwan will gain access to the WHO anytime soon (Chen and Cohen, 2020). Worse still: it seems that the WHO has become a showcase for the PRC under

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the leadership of Xi to demonstrate its powers over Taiwan: restraining, pressuring and controlling it (Brown, 2020: 29). The main conclusion we suggest making about the preceding analysis is that it usually takes a lot of arm-​twisting between the US Congress and the president to adopt acts relating to Taiwan. From the perspective of the PRC, it is important that the vast majority of Congress’ bill proposals never make it through committees –​if the Congress had its way more often, the relations between the PRC and the US might have been even worse, according to Xie (2009: 50). Recent developments prove Xie correct. In the past three decades, Congress has been able to secure the president’s signature for 43 Taiwan-​related acts. Such bills are already a constant source of disputes between the US and the PRC. To keep up good trade relations with the PRC, the US government had been traditionally averse to any political moves by the Congress that would upset those relations. Apart from the inclusion of Taiwan into the Visa Waiver Program in 2012 (on congressional initiative), the US government has been steadfast in keeping that conservative line. The Congress under Trump’s presidency has changed all this. We have already mentioned that by the time of concluding this study, no less than two Taiwan Acts, aimed at strengthening US–​Taiwan relations (as kind of ‘upgrades’ of the TRA), and one regional Act that puts Taiwan firmly into the US vision of its role in the Indo–​Pacific region, have become law. In addition to that, the House passed the Taiwan Assurance Act, which reaffirms the US’s resolve to strengthen Taiwan’s defence and support for its participation in international organizations.76 This perfect storm has happened mostly due to souring US–​PRC relations. In response to the US’s trade war, the PRC has retaliated not only with countermeasures but also with more aggressive pressure on Taiwan, by continuing blocking its access to international organizations and with a military build-​up hinting that Taiwan might be taken by force. This has galvanized congressional support, with a much keener listener in the administration than in the past. “In contrast to previous administrations when the proposed legislation that was moving on Taiwan would receive a fairly robust pushback from the government to keep the US within the One China principle, there is no such pushback from the administration today, so you are getting the legislation that goes through the Congress unadulterated”.77 Whether this trend of support for Taiwan will continue with a new administration is impossible to predict. What seems certain is that Congress will keep up the bipartisan support for Taiwan. That, in turn, will obligate the US government. To keep Congress silent, especially under the circumstances when it is completely aligned with Trump on this issue, the PRC might re-​evaluate its policy of threatening Taiwan

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PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY OF TAIWAN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

with military action. “It is easy to imagine a scenario in which Taiwan would be governed as a one-​party state … so that the US would take a different approach [to the TRA]. But to walk away from a democratic state is impossible to imagine in the Congress: no Democrat or Republican would allow that”.78 In theory, having such an ally should encourage members of the Legislative Yuan to engage actively with members of Congress, not only on concrete political or economic issues but also to build on shared values such as democracy and human rights. In the following, we will evaluate how much the Legislative Yuan has capitalized on this fundamental cultural understanding among democratically elected parliamentarians. Our conclusions are based on the analysis of accomplishments of, opportunities for and constraints on LY members wishing to play an active role in the congressional policy-​and decision-​making processes, which has been done in two ways. First, we have looked at the external dimension of these activities, namely, how LY members have been able to navigate the US’s ‘rules of the game’ when it comes to their presence and visits to the US in the pursuit of goals relevant for Taiwan. Second, we have looked at the internal dimension of these activities, meaning whether and to what extent LY members could (indirectly) influence the US Congress not from Washington but from Taipei. The role of the Legislative Yuan in American politics seems to be determined, without any specific mention of it, by the TRA and the TPR. Members of the Legislative Yuan are considered by Beijing as official representatives of Taiwan. For a long time, the US government had treated them in the same way. LY members had limited access to the US government, which made them inferior to parliamentarians from recognized states. Eventually, Congress has adopted the TTA to remove any ambiguity concerning the status of its meetings in public with any official from Taiwan. The aforementioned get-​together between the then ​speaker of the House, Paul Ryan, a Republican, and the speaker of the Legislative Yuan, Su Jia-​chyuan, in 2018 was a demonstration that the US Congress would not hesitate in receiving visits from the LY in public anymore, not even at the highest level. It is worth recalling that considerations about improving the TRA to allow high-​level politicians, parliamentarians and other Taiwan representatives to travel to the US under much less restrictive conditions did not begin in 2018 when the TTA was signed into law. Members of Congress had tabled proposals in the past in which they required a better-​defined status and appropriate treatment for parliamentarians and other official visitors coming from Taiwan. For example, in 2000 both the House and the Senate adopted resolutions in the follow-​up to a transit stop by the former president of

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Taiwan’s Parliamentary Diplomacy

Taiwan Chen Shui-​bian, whom members of Congress could not meet, due to the pressure from Beijing and Washington. An angry Congress stated, ‘it is in the interest of the Congress and the executive branch … to communicate directly with elected and appointed officials of Taiwan, including its democratically elected president’. Accordingly, the administration was asked to revise the current restrictions concerning high-​level visits from Taiwan, with a view to reducing them.79 In resolutions introduced in 2006, the House and the Senate went a step further. They stated that ‘all restrictions on visits to the United States by high-​level elected and appointed officials of Taiwan, including the democratically-​elected president of Taiwan, should be lifted’.80 The TTA is, therefore, not to be viewed as an ad hoc decision, resulting from strained relations between the PRC and the US because of the trade war. It has been brewing in Congress for some time. So the message to LY members from Congress is not something new either; it has been the same for years: “When they come to Capitol Hill they are pushing an open door”.81 It is up to Legislative Yuan members to decide how much they would want to benefit from this rare privilege. So how do LY members use this privilege? The records from Washington show that they do travel to the US, albeit not frequently, as Table 5.5 shows. No data can provide an accurate picture of the frequency of parliamentary visits from Taiwan to the US. For example, two delegations that travelled to the US in 2017 and 2018, which we briefly mention further on, have not been included in the list. There are no data on the number of private visits, guest appearances in think tanks or some other occasions in which LY members might have participated. Those kinds of trips do not need to be publicly reported,82 although their nature could be political as well.83 Being mindful of these caveats, the data tend to be reflective of impressions we get from our interviewees familiar with the presence of Taiwanese politicians in Washington, namely that LY members are not often seen in Congress. The data available to us for the past 20 years even suggest that as the pressure from the PRC on Taiwan increases, the frequency of parliamentary visits to the US Congress decreases; parliamentary diplomacy appears to be giving way to classic inter-governmental diplomacy. In the period from 2000 up until 2010, there have been 25 visits in total. From 2010 onwards, only 12 groups visited the US Congress. Bare numbers do not tell us much about the substance of these visits. Some of them addressed issues of vital importance to Taiwan. For example, in 2011, LY members visited the US on behalf of the ROC (Taiwan)–​USA Inter-​Parliamentary Amity Association. The purpose of the visit, in which members from both major parties took part, was to lobby for arms sales, an extradition agreement between the US and Taiwan, and to support Taiwan’s participation in international organizations (Chen and Chen, 2011).

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PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY OF TAIWAN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Table 5.5: Taiwan Legislative Yuan delegations to the United States, 2000–​201884 Year

Visits

Delegates

C

C-​FA FG 1

S

2000

2

6

1

2001

1

3

1

2002

3

65

2003

4

25

2

1

1

2004

4

28

2

1

1

2005

2

12

1

1

2006

2

12

2007

2

20

2

2008

4

15

1

2009

1

4

1

2010

1

4

1

2011

2

5

1

2012

2

10

2

2013

2

12

1

2014

1

6

1

2015

1

6

1

2018

1

8

Total

35

241

2

14

Average

1

LY

KMT-​ PFP

1

1

1 1

1

DPP

1

1

1 1

1 2

9

14

4

3

2

1

Notes: C-​FA: LY Committee delegation –​foreign affairs; C: LY Committee delegation –​ other; FG: Friendship group delegation (Taiwan–​US Parliamentary Amity Association); S: Speaker of the Legislative Yuan; KMT–​PFP (People First Party), DPP: party delegation.

In 2013, another group visited Washington to discuss arms sales (CNA, 2013; DefenceTalk, 2013). In 2017, a group of LY representatives composed of members of both the KMT and the DPP visited Washington. When talking to members of Congress and other officials they addressed trade, arms sales and defence (Tsao and Chung, 2017; GlobalSecurity.org, 2018). Another visit in 2018 covered similar issues as well as opportunities presented by the TTA (Wang and Kao, 2018). Could these visits be considered part of Taiwan’s parliamentary diplomacy? Yes, with some qualifications. As one of our interviewees from the US Senate with rich experience in inter-​parliamentary relations has said, parliamentarians from Taiwan may not be on a par with parliamentarians

86

Taiwan’s Parliamentary Diplomacy

from recognized states, who have access to their colleagues and inter-​ parliamentary institutions all around the world,85 but Washington does not reproduce that inferiority, especially not since 2016 when the Trump administration took charge. Only a few parliaments in the world have the doors open to members of the Legislative Yuan as wide as the US Congress.86 The problem with those visits is that they are often seen in Washington as courtesy trips, with a modest substantial exchange of opinions and few, if any, follow-​ups.87 Members of Congress themselves do not have high expectations about these visits, and even some LY members share their views.88 Opportunities are there to be taken, we hear in Congress, so when travelling to the US, LY members should be proactive, prepared with extensive talking points to support their case. This does not seem to happen. This does not mean that LY members travelling to the US are unprepared or incompetent to talk about issues of vital importance to Taiwan. On the contrary, as emphasized by our interlocutors in Washington, delegations from Taiwan would typically have one or two knowledgeable parliamentarians in the group. From the perspective of the Congress, however, it would be important for Taiwan if the message were spread not just through one or two individuals but by the entire delegation, thus creating an impression that everyone present is competent in some way to discuss the issue on the table. As it is, if LY members travel to Washington and are not able to “close the sale because they do not know what to say, then there is a nice meeting, socially it’s nice, the relationships are nice, but that does not help us in moving the relationships in any significant way”.89 The lack of parliamentary presence in Washington is offset by the TECRO, which has its own congressional Liaison Division.90 TECRO officials call congressional offices, staff from key senators and others “every week, multiple times a week”.91 For their part, officials who worked in the TECRO or are familiar with the work of Taiwanese representative offices abroad have mixed feelings about parliamentarians and their visits abroad. They are sceptical about the potential of LY members to contribute to Taiwan’s foreign policy because they prefer discussing domestic issues that bring votes, such as the environment and agriculture.92 Be that as it may, the ball is not in Washington’s court; the work lies ahead for Taiwan’s politicians to find out if LY members can be better used as tools for carrying out Taiwan’s foreign policy goals, and how. This brings us to the internal dimension of LY members’ activities concerning the US (Congress). Given that members of the Legislative Yuan do not travel frequently to the US and do not contribute their share of advocacy for Taiwan’s foreign policy, we may wonder whether they can do this from home. We find that there are at least two avenues which parliamentarians can explore in reaching out to US members of Congress

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PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY OF TAIWAN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

and other institutions: visits of members of Congress and congressional staff to Taiwan, and communications between members of the Legislative Yuan and officials in the American Institute in Taiwan. The analysis of Congressional travels to Taiwan between 2010 and 2020 (see Table 5.6) show that, on average, 15 members of Congress travel to Taiwan per year. Only in one year –​2011 –​did the total number of parliamentarians fall below ten. Delegations that travel to Taiwan are bipartisan, although exceptions occur. For example, Democratic senators did not travel to Taiwan for four consecutive years. In the same period, 16 visits from Republican senators took place. Compared with their colleagues from the House of Representatives, senators are much less frequent visitors. All things considered, the regular annual visits to Taiwan from the US Congress are important for Taipei because they serve as evidence of an active Congressional interest in Taiwan.

Table 5.6: Congressional delegations to Taiwan, 2010–​202093 S/​D

S/​R

Total

HR/​D

HR/​R

Total

OVERALL TOTAL

2010

5

0

5

5

8

13

18

2011

0

0

0

4

5

9

9

2012

0

0

0

7

8

15

15

2013

1

3

4

6

13

19

23

2014

1

0

1

11

10

21

22

2015

0

1

1

8

8

16

17

2016

0

7

7

6

12

18

25

2017

0

2

2

4

6

10

12

2018

0

6

6

2

5

7

13

2019

2

2

4

4

3

7

11

2020

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

TOTAL

9

21

30

57

78

135

165

AVG

0.8

1.9

2.7

5.2

7

12.3

15

Note: S/​D: Senators from the Democratic Party; S/​R: Senators from the Republican Party; HR/​D: House representatives from the Democratic party; HR/​R: House representatives from the Republican party

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What about the substantive part of these visits? According to the information provided by MOFA officials, each visit is structured. It includes a set of specific expectations and talking points on issues important for Taiwan, tailored to the profile of the visitor: lobbying for support on certain policies, sharing information, exchanging good practices, proposing areas for future cooperation, and so on. Visits by members of the US Congress are seen as a good opportunity for LY members to interact with visitors, too. Leisure activities are part of the programme of a congressional visit, but they are not the central part of the visit.94 The problem with members of Congress travelling to Taiwan is similar to that of LY members travelling to the US. The distance is a factor not to be underestimated. Taipei is more than a 13-hour flight from San Francisco, home to a sizeable Taiwanese community, and more than 16 hours from Washington. Further, only a handful of members of Congress have either particular motivation to foster cooperation with Taiwan (business interests, for example), or have extensive knowledge and vision about Taiwan’s place in international relations.95 Most members of Congress that take part in such trips are not experts. “They travel to learn, but also as tourists. Their talking points are usually one sentence deep into a conversation. If you press them, why they were interested in a particular package of arms sales, how to unpack the nature of Taiwan relations with Latin America, with Asian–​Pacific states to get support from the US … they don’t really know”.96 According to accounts of staff accompanying members of Congress to visit Taiwan, they do not have high expectations about those visits. They anticipate more courtesy than substantive talks, which in the end is how these meetings seem to end. Indirectly, the bond between Congress and LY members is kept through another channel, the exchange programme based on the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961. The implementation of this programme may be termed staff diplomacy. With financial support from Taiwan, scores of staff from the US Congress visit the island. One indicator of staff visits is presented in Figure 5.6. These figures might be even bigger, as a staff member with wealthy experience working in the US Congress suggested. “In the past 25 years, between 60 and 100 staff visited Taiwan annually … you can hardly find an individual among staff in the Congress who has not been to Taiwan”.97 The rationale for inviting congressional staff in such numbers is clear: it is assumed that they are likely to share their (positive) impressions from the visits they have made with the lawmakers as well as fellow staffers in Washington. It is impossible to measure the actual effect that US staff visits to Taiwan have on, say, US Congress’ determination to defend Taiwan. Yet in these trying times, every Taiwan-​friendly voice in the US Congress is needed to keep the bipartisan support strong. This might explain the slight uptick of staff visits after 2017, when tensions between the PRC and Taiwan rose high again.

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Figure 5.6: Staff visits to Taiwan98 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 2019

2018

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

0

Many countries have their de facto embassies in Taiwan, including the US. Since Taiwan is estimated to conduct 50 per cent of its diplomatic activities with the US, 30 per cent with Japan and 20 per cent with the rest of the world,99 the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) plays an important role on the island. The Institute is said to be much bigger, compared with what it had been before Washington severed its diplomatic relations with Taipei.100 Exchanges between LY members and the staff in the AIT are frequent and they take place mostly at the senior level. For example, the Director of the AIT attended the inauguration of the US caucus in the Legislative Yuan for the 2020–​24 term. The event was introduced by Bi-​khim Hsiao, former head of the Taiwan–​US Inter-Parliamentary Amity Association and currently head of the TECRO (TNL, 2020). Another recent high-​profile visit to the AIT was that of Johnny Chiang, head of the KMT, that took place in June 2020 (Hsiao, 2020b). As one former diplomat in the AIT recalled when asked about interactions between the AIT and LY members, “there was a general awareness that the AIT had direct and frequent contact primarily with party leadership. It would be unusual that the AIT was approached by other parliamentarians because party discipline matters in Taiwan and, as a result, legislators probably felt no need to push a specific agenda parallel/​identical to what they trusted party leadership was already communicating to us”.101 On individual issues, for instance, cross-​strait relations, human rights, human trafficking, LGBT rights, the staff at the AIT would meet with legislators responsible or with interest in topics like these. The AIT had to adjust to the reality of the Taiwanese political landscape divided between pan-​blue (KMT) and pan-​green (DPP) groups. Hence, the AIT assigned one of its staff to communicate with each of the two groups.

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Although being far away from Washington, it seems that parliamentarians could still exercise indirect influence on US policy-​making regarding Taiwan. The international positioning of the DPP, the current party in power, is a good case in point. Namely, one US diplomat attributes the maturing of DPP’s foreign policy (for example, the downplaying of formal recognition and the reformulation of its position on independence) to a handful of legislators within president Tsai’s inner circle, with whom the AIT would also meet. For them, it was important to gain confidence from the US that Taiwan’s policies would not provoke tensions in the Taiwan Strait. The interviewee believes that these parliamentarians were largely successful in this undertaking, “insomuch as their messages did reach Washington policy-​makers, and added weight/​credence (as articulate, thoughtful, trusted contacts) to messaging from party headquarters/​leadership”.102 Such influence is indirect and could not be measured, but these parliamentarians undoubtedly “helped strengthen trust between DPP leadership and the US when the DPP was still in the opposition and helped smooth over what could have been US reservations about certain policies of the DPP-​led administration after it came to power”.103

International parliamentary associations IPAs offer plenty of opportunities to parliamentarians to network and cooperate on issues of regional and global importance (Kissling, 2011). Taiwanese parliamentarians were among the first from outside Europe to become active in these institutions. Together with their colleagues from Japan, the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand, LY members created in 1965 the Asian Parliamentarians’ Union (APU), which ten years later was renamed the Asia–​Pacific Parliamentarians’ Union (APPU) to better reflect the increased membership of parliamentarians from Pacific island states (Camilleri, 2003: 65). The LY remains member of this association but entering new IPAs after de​recognition has become difficult, which severely limits the room for LY members for active participation at this level of international parliamentary cooperation. For example, the Inter-​ Parliamentary Union (IPU) prides itself as an institution that ‘facilitates parliamentary diplomacy and empowers parliaments and parliamentarians to promote peace, democracy, and sustainable development around the world’.104 Yet, while the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China (NPC) is a member of the IPU, the Legislative Yuan is not. The reason for this lies in the Statutes of the IPU, which, according to Article 3, require that an applicant parliament must be ‘constituted in conformity with the laws of a sovereign State whose population it represents and on whose territory it functions’ (emphasis added). It is not widely known

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PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY OF TAIWAN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

that the issue of recognition and representation of China came up at the 1955 meeting of the IPU in Helsinki, when the applications of both the Legislative Yuan and the NPC to join the organization were considered. From the IPU perspective, one of the applicants was a parliament of a recognized state (Taiwan) that operated from an island, and the other one was a parliament of a state that effectively governed the mainland but was not universally recognized (the PRC). The IPU decided not to admit either of the two applicants for the time being (Dunham, 1955: 96). The situation has changed with the expulsion of Taiwan from the UN in 1972; the NPC joined the IPU in 1984 (Wang, 2017: 262–​3). The membership rules of the IPU and its aspiration to become a kind of ‘United Nations’ of all the parliaments are impossible to reconcile. The democratic criteria such as free and fair elections are not observed in all of the members in the IPU, and not all democratically elected parliamentarians are allowed to become members of the IPU. The rules –​international recognition of statehood –​do not allow Taiwan to join the organization. The IPU is not the only IPA with such restrictive rules for membership. The NPC, a member of the IPU, has built up a strong inter-​parliamentary network (Wang, 2017), but its members do not qualify for membership in the Parliamentarians for Global Action (PGA), one of the most influential IPAs in the world. The reason for that is the membership criteria of the PGA: ‘the members must be from a freely elected parliament, the election should be open to more than one party, or to those who have no party, and the Parliament must evidence an actual ability to engage in free debate and to question the Executive’ (PGA, 2019: 5). The Legislative Yuan meets these criteria but does not meet the most important one: the membership in the United Nations.105 The Asia Pacific Parliamentary Forum has a similar provision.106 The International Association of Parliamentarians for Peace uses the same approach: neither the NPC nor the Legislative Yuan participate in it,107 although one member of the Legislative Yuan attended its inaugural session in 2017 and participated in a panel.108 Other important IPAs that Taiwan does not have access to for the same procedural reasons (the lack of a recognized statehood) or because the PRC/​NPC is already a member include the Asian Forum of Parliamentarians on Population and Development and the International Medical Parliamentarians Organization. The World Trade Organization (WTO), of which Taiwan is a member, has its own parliamentary dimension, called Parliamentary Conference of the WTO (PC–​WTO), but this is not relevant for Taiwan. Since the PC–​WTO is jointly organized by the IPU and the European Parliament, only universally recognized states can be members.109 If they wish, LY members can attend, but only as private persons.110

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Taiwan’s Parliamentary Diplomacy

Recently two IPAs have been created in which Taiwanese parliamentarians do not participate, but their agenda is (in)directly supportive of Taiwan. One is the Inter-​Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC), created on 4 June 2020. It is an association of parliamentarians from democratic states joined together against undemocratic practices of the PRC. The statement of the IPAC says that ‘[it] has been created to promote a coordinated response between democratic states to the challenges posed by the present conduct and future ambitions of the People’s Republic of China. We believe that the natural home for this partnership is in the freely elected national legislatures of our peoples’. The IPAC pays attention to developments in Taiwan. Responding to the pressure from the PRC on the speaker of the Czech Senate Miloš Vystrčil because of his planned visit to Taiwan in August 2020, 68 parliamentarians signed a statement in his support (IPAC, 2020). The other such IPA is the Formosa Club, which was created on 16 October 2019, to ‘co-​ordinate and strengthen the many parliamentary friendship organizations that promote relations with Taiwan’ (Wilson, 2019). Parliamentarians from France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the European Parliament are members. These initiatives are no doubt important for Taiwan, but in this case, Taiwan’s participation in these two IPAs in some form, should it ever receive such an offer, would be risky. If membership in IPAs with strictly ‘anti-​PRC’ agendas were understood in Beijing as a step towards empowering Taiwan as an actor in its own right in international relations, this could well have negative political and security implications for Taiwan. Other inter-​parliamentary activities give more opportunities for LY members to participate and network with their colleagues. One such institution has been the Women Political Leaders Global Forum. The biggest branch of the forum is Women in Parliaments, which includes no less than 9,000 parliamentarians from around the world. At the Forum, which took place in Iceland between 28 and 30 November 2017, Taiwan was represented at the parliamentary level with a bipartisan delegation. 111 Furthermore, the Legislative Yuan enjoys observer status with the Forum of Speakers of the Legislative Bodies of Central American and Caribbean Basin.112 The participation of LY members in such IPAs contributes to the visibility of Taiwan in international parliamentary relations.

Party alliances LY members participate in international activities of sister political parties that form party alliances (PAs). Hickey refers to these activities as party-​ to-​party diplomacy (Hickey, 2007: 55). The DPP is a member of Liberal

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PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY OF TAIWAN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

International (LI), and the KMT is a member of the International Democrat Union (IDU). Both political parties joined the respective PAs in 1994. PAs can help them in ‘forging friendly relations with their foreign counterparts and joining in the international inter-​p arty organizations’ (Chen, 2002: 227).113 In principle, the two PAs are composed of democratically elected political parties. They do not allow deputies from the PRC under the current regime to participate. In an explanation of the role that strong inter-​party relations may have for Taiwanese political parties, Hickey argues that they ‘hope to be able to draw upon a reservoir of support should a need for assistance arise’ (Hickey, 2007: 56). The absence of the PRC plays an important role here because it increases the relevance of PAs for Taiwan’s parliamentary diplomacy. For example, according to one of our interviewees, PAs provide important input for the European Parliament to adopt decisions, friendly to Taiwan, and the PRC can do little to cut off this connection.114 PAs have certain limits in what they can or cannot do for Taiwan. For example, the 1992 Consensus is a thorny issue in Taiwan, but the DPP and the KMT are not eager to export their divisions and continue the discussion in PAs. On the other hand, both of them have used the respective PAs as platforms to promote Taiwan’s contribution to the global fight against the COVID-​19 pandemic and protest against the exclusion from the WHO. In a letter posted on the IDU’s web page, Johnny Chiang, the leader of the KMT, while mentioning differences between the DPP and the KMT about how the pandemic should be tackled he concluded that ‘Taiwan needs the WHO just as much as the WHO needs Taiwan in fighting coronavirus and future epidemics’ (Chiang, 2020). Concerning Taiwan’s efforts to associate with the WHO, the leadership of the LI issued a pledge that it would ‘mobilize our network and work across party lines to campaign for Taiwan’s place in the World Health Assembly’ (Liberal International, 2020). Furthermore, PAs have demonstrated that they are willing to side with Taiwan whenever the PRC ramps up the pressure on it and Taiwanese parties call for support. During the 1996 missile crisis, Taiwan’s Green Party ‘appealed to the European Federation of Green Parties for support. The Greens sympathized with Taiwan’s plight and sent a member of its executive committee to the island in a show of solidarity’ (Hickey, 2007: 56). Stephen Harper, former prime minister of Canada, now president of the IDU, visited Taiwan in October 2019, amidst increased tensions in the region. Although this visit was not well received by the PRC (Vanderklippe, 2019) it was important for Taiwan, especially in the present situation where the threat from the mainland is real and the majority of Taiwan’s population does not favour a speedy let alone forced unification with the PRC.

94

Taiwan’s Parliamentary Diplomacy

Parliamentary organs of international governmental organizations Parliamentary organs of international organizations (POIGOs) are institutions, first being created in Europe, that owe their birth to the devastating outcome of World War Two. The idea of having a regional parliament representing the will of Europeans began to materialize among the post-​war civil society which gathered at the Hague Congress of Europe on 10 May 1948. They agreed not only that the calamities of war should not ever be repeated, but that people should have a direct say on decisions about war and peace. The Congress, which was attended by more than 7,000 people, demanded, among others, the creation, ‘as a matter of real urgency, of a European Assembly (Lipgens and Loth, 1991: 345–​7). European governments were not averse to the idea, yet they were hesitant to endow such an assembly with decision-​making powers. Eventually, the negotiations led to the creation of the Consultative Assembly in the framework of the Council of Europe, which was inaugurated in 1949. The powers of the Assembly were meagre, which angered many participants in the Congress who demanded an assembly that would be directly elected and with decision-​making powers (Fischer, 1990: 68). Because the Council of Europe was a classic inter-​governmental organization it was not possible to expect that powers of the Consultative (now Parliamentary) Assembly of the Council of Europe would ever expand in any significant way. Not much later, in 1951, six countries began what turned out to be a far-​reaching European integration process, of which a directly elected European Parliament with co-​decision-​making powers has become one of the main outcomes. The European Parliament The evolution of the European Parliament has always attracted considerable interest from scholars (Hix, 2003).115 Many of them would agree that its creation has been one of the most important accomplishments in Europe since the end of World War Two. Its institutional progress, from being but a gathering of parliamentarians, with minor powers, in the 1950s, to becoming a legislative body of the European Union has been impressive (Høyland and Hix, 2013). The rich literature that focuses on the European Parliament includes, among others, conceptual discussions (Rittberger, 2003), analyses of its actorness (Stavridis and Irrera, 2015; Cofelice, 2016), the role it plays in international diplomacy (Fonck, 2019; Redei and Romanyshyn, 2019) and in EU foreign policy (Raube, 2012; Raube, Müftüler-Baç and Wouters, 2019), and so on. The growth of the EP with ever-​expanding powers has been possible because of the democratic environment in Europe, which so far has been friendly to the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms. In the realm of foreign policy, a subject traditionally dominated by EU member states, the European

95

PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY OF TAIWAN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Parliament’s influence is formally limited. However, the EP ‘has a strong ambition to control and oversee developments also within the CFSP, and might thus be expected to become increasingly engaged, active and influential in the implementation phase of EU policies’ (Riddervold and Rosén, 2016: 700). Furthermore, the EP has made itself heard internationally, on several occasions. For example, in 2006, the EP opened up a high-​profile investigation of alleged activities of the CIA in Europe to run detention facilities for interrogation of suspects in the ‘war against terror’ after the 9/​11 terrorist attacks on the US. The EP did not shy away from directly accusing the United States, which it held responsible for ‘multiple human rights violations, such as abduction, unlawful and arbitrary detention, torture, enforced disappearance and a breach of the non-​refoulement principle’ (Jančić, 2016: 905). The EP has been paying attention to these human rights violations for years. Such activites, according to Jančić, ‘exemplify the nascent trend of parliamentary bodies acting not only as legislatures but also as diplomatic agents reaching beyond the borders of their legal systems (Jančić, 2016: 906). In this context, the arguments such as that ‘the EP is powerful enough to make Beijing angry’ (Lan, 2004: 140) make a lot of sense. As long as member states of the EU remain democracies, the European Parliament will be an important actor both inside and outside the European Union. As such, it is and will be important for Taiwan. As regards economic relations, the interest in close cooperation between Taiwan and the EP/​EU is mutual. Taiwan is the 15th trade partner for the EU, and the EU is Taiwan’s fourth trade partner, after the PRC, the US and Japan. Concerning diplomatic relations, the EU and its members do not recognize Taiwan as an independent state and adhere to the One China principle. In practical terms, this means that the MOFA and its representative office in Brussels have limited access to the Commission and the ‘foreign ministry’ of the European Union, the European External Action Service (EEAS). In conceptual terms, the non-​recognition of Taiwan has consequences for the EU because, being considered a normative power it is expected to deal with ‘normative “black holes” which include threats to democracy in Taiwan, too, to keep up its image’ (Manners, 2006: 411). Nevertheless, the EU does not ignore the East Asian region in general and Taiwan in particular. For example, the EU is consistently critical of the PRC about the ‘deteriorating human rights situation’ (CoEU, 2020). It also underlines ‘its commitment to continuing to develop its relations with Taiwan and to supporting the shared values underpinning its system of governance’ (EUCom, 2019: 1). The European Parliament has a special meaning for democracy in Taiwan (Lan, 2004: 116). There is little that can be compared between the US Congress and the European Parliament, but they do have one thing in common. In both the US and the EU, the executive branches/​ bodies often seek to make a compromise with the PRC between their

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Taiwan’s Parliamentary Diplomacy

own democratic values and strategic, especially trade, interests. Both the US Congress and the European Parliament tend to resist such pragmatism. The most important difference between the Congress and the European Parliament is in the scope of formal powers. We know that unlike the US Congress, the European Parliament does not legislate on foreign policy. But we also know that the European Parliament’s position on international issues is not ignored. With particular reference to Taiwan, the European Parliament’s activism, as Lan has called it, has some unique characteristics: • The MEPs respond quite quickly to important political events that have happened in Taiwan or on both sides of the Strait (for example, the outbreak of SARS, and calls for participation of Taiwan in the WHO). • The EP’s action on Taiwan has been accelerated since the historic year 1996 (the first direct presidential elections in Taiwan). • In some of the ongoing disputes between Beijing and Taipei, the EP often sides with Taipei, especially in contrast to the Commission and the Council. • The Commission and the Council’s China–​Taiwan policy is further clarified through the written reply published in the Official Journal of the EU and the recorded oral reply. • Important resolutions, exclusive to Taiwan, are passed in urgent form, in order to avoid the omnipresent diplomatic blockade of Beijing. The MEPs who actively initiated pro-​Taiwan resolutions belong to different political parties. (Lan, 2004: 118) The European Parliament can respond to the situation in Taiwan in many ways (EP, 2020a). Resolutions that the EP adopts as well as written and oral questions seem particularly relevant, not only as a means to put the Commission and the Council under pressure, but also to indicate to the public the topics on which MEPs prefer to focus when discussing Taiwan. From 1999 to 2020, 138 questions relevant to Taiwan have been asked by the MEPs. Trade has been the most frequent theme since almost one ​third of all the questions have addressed this topic (42). The support for Taiwan’s participation in international organizations is the second most discussed topic in these questions (28). Finally, the MEPs monitor the development of Asia–​Pacific regional security, as the number of questions on cross-​strait relations, the South China sea and the Taiwan–​Philippines conflict suggest (see Table 5.7). The overview of the resolutions that the EP has adopted in the same period gives us a slightly different picture. Trade continues to be addressed very often, but other topics come more to the fore. According to the European Parliament’s official records, 57 resolutions, reports and texts concerning Taiwan have been adopted from 1994 to June 2020. 116

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PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY OF TAIWAN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Table 5.7: MEPs’ questions by subject ​matter, 1999–​2020 Topic

Frequency

COVID-​19

2

ICAO

1

South China sea

2

Organ trafficking

1

Natural disaster

2

Consumer safety

2

Taiwan–​Philippines conflicts

5

Elections

1

Fisheries

1

Human rights

3

Visas

9

WHO

18

International organizations

1

WTO

4

UN

5

Illicit trade

1

SARS

2

Crime

1

EU–​Taiwan relations

15

Trade

42

Sanitary and phytosanitary measures Cross-​strait relations

3 13

Cybersecurity

2

Licence

1

Fundamental freedoms

1

Cross-​strait relations were the most mentioned topic –​32 times. Participation in international organizations has been another major topic; 27 resolutions have addressed this problem. Trade is the third most discussed topic in these resolutions (see Table 5.8). Further examination of the text contents relevant to Taiwan shows that a great majority of them strike a positive tone about Taiwan’s position on cross-​strait relations, reaffir ming the support for Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations, and promoting bilateral trade and investment between the EU and Taiwan.

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Taiwan’s Parliamentary Diplomacy

Table 5.8: Resolutions, reports and texts adopted by the European Parliament, by subject matter, 1999–​2020 Topic

Mentioned in resolutions

Cross-​strait

32

International organizations

27

Human rights Trade

4 13

EU–Taiwan ​relations

6

Fisheries

1

While MEPs acknowledge that the EU adheres to the One China principle, they tend to push the Council and the Commission to do more for the strengthening of EU–​Taiwan relations. The only negative issue that the European Parliament raises with Taiwan through its resolutions is about the death penalty. The death penalty is inconsistent with European values, and the European Parliament has often emphasized that (EP, 2018). In this regard, the Taiwanese government still has work to do. As stated by the spokesperson of the EEAS, the declared moratorium in Taiwan on the implementation of the death penalty in 2016 had been short-​lived, since the next execution took place in 2018 (EEAS, 2018), and the most recent one in 2020 (EEAS, 2020). As Figure 5.7 –​which breaks down the adoption of resolutions per individual years –​shows, the number of resolutions has peaked in 1996, 2001, 2006, 2013, 2017 and, to some extent, by the time this study has been completed, 2020. We see some correlation between the reactions of the European Parliament and the events in Taiwan. The first peak (1996) can be easily connected with the missile crisis in the Taiwan Strait, which has received wide condemnation, also by the European Parliament, which mentioned the PRC’s aggressive behaviour four times. Similarly, between 2005 and 2006 when tensions rose high again due to the PRC’s assertive stance against Taiwan (for example, by the adoption of the ASL), we see an increased interest of the MEPs in Taiwan. Finally, the period between 2016 and 2020 has been marked by growing tensions between the US and the PRC, which have an impact on the security situation in Taiwan as well. The year 2019 was silent as far as Taiwan is concerned, which can be attributed to the fact that elections were held in the European Parliament. However, the adoption of the Hong Kong national security law in June 2020 which effectively scrapped the autonomy of Hong Kong and brought it under the control of the PRC has not remained without a response from the European Parliament. Importantly, Taiwan’s security concerns have been mentioned in these Hong Kong-​related resolutions.117

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PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY OF TAIWAN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Figure 5.7: Resolutions of the European Parliament regarding Taiwan, 1994–2020 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

0

Thus far we have learned that visits of parliamentarians from Taiwan and in particular to Taiwan are an important element of Taiwan’s parliamentary diplomacy. MEPs, too, are regular visitors. According to the Legislative Yuan’s database (LY, 2020), 67 delegations from the European Parliament have visited the Legislative Yuan from 1993 to 2015. Roughly a third (21) of MEP delegations have been led by the president or the vice president of the European Parliament’s Taiwan Friendship Group. Other delegations have been led by the president or vice ​president of the European Parliament’s standing committees. The attention that MEPs receive in Taipei gives us another view of how parliamentary diplomacy works in Taiwan. More than half of MEPs’ delegations (37) have been greeted by the speaker of the Legislative Yuan and a fifth of them by the deputy speaker of the Legislative Yuan. Occasionally, Taiwan’s president welcomes visitors from the European Parliament, too (Office of the President, 2019). In terms of the distribution of political groups to which MEPs belong, practically all the major parties are represented, namely the European People’s Party (EPP), the European Conservatives and Reformists Party, the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) and the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats. Arguably, Taiwan’s political image would suffer if it were but a ‘pet project’ of one or two political groups in the EP. The LY database includes topics that have been discussed during those visits and are summarized in Table 5.9. It can be seen from the table that key issues concerning Taiwan have remained the most topical in these discussions as well. According to the data available to us for the 1993–​2015 period, 44 out of 67 MEP delegations discussed Taiwan’s participation in international organizations with their LY counterparts. 31 delegations have discussed cross-​strait relations, whereas 16 delegations discussed Taiwan–​EU

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Taiwan’s Parliamentary Diplomacy

Table 5.9: Discussions between MEP delegations and LY members by subject matter, 1993–​2015 Topic

Frequency

Parliamentary diplomacy

24

Trade

16

Environment

2

Cross-​strait relations

31

Gender issues

4

International organizations

44

Visas

21

East Sea

2

Death penalty

4

EU–Taiwan relations

4

Taiwan–Poland relations

1

Senkaku Islands

1

Regional security

1

Democracy and human rights

6

US–​Taiwan–​PRC relations

1

Renewable energy

2

Global economy

2

Weapons embargo

15

Taiwan–​Spain relations

1

Elections

11

Legislative work

5

Taiwan–​Lithuania relations

2

Taiwan–​Slovakia relations

1

Technology

1

Cultural exchange

1

Politics and media

1

Natural disasters

2

Climate change

1

Taiwan–​Luxembourg relations

1

Taiwan’s constitution

3

First lady visa

1

Taiwanese politics

2

Taiwan–​Denmark relations

1

Indigenous politics

1

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PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY OF TAIWAN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

trade and economic cooperation. Among other topics that were discussed, the visa waiver in the Schengen area (22 times) and the EU’s lifting of the arms embargo against the PRC (15) have been most often on the agenda. Interestingly enough, returning visits of MEPs and LY members in the future have been rather frequently discussed (24 times), indicating an interest in follow-​ups, and exploring the potential of regularizing parliamentary diplomacy between the EU and Taiwan. Yet, when we talked with Taiwan-​ friendly MEPs about the potential of returning visits and the likelihood of follow-​ups, one of them has confirmed to us that those MEPs who have visited Taiwan several times tend to be more committed to supporting its interests in the European Parliament. At the same time, he said that he could not recall any specific follow-​up on any topic that could be considered as a result of closer cooperation between LY members and MEPs who visited Taiwan.118 Indeed, there is some reason to be sceptical as to whether LY members play a particularly important role in relations between Taiwan and the European Parliament. We have found out, for example, that LY members show considerably less interest in travelling to Brussels to meet MEPs; in fact, they hardly ever travel there. Moreover, in the 2016–​2020 Legislative Yuan there had been no friendship group formed in the LY that focused specifically on the European Parliament. A more generic friendship group called the Taiwan–​Europe Inter-​Parliamentary Amity Association was created instead. Members of this friendship group did pay a visit to the European Parliament in July 2019. This was the only visit of LY members we have recorded for the 2016–​2020 period. Besides, the visit was not focused only on the European Parliament. The International Criminal Court, for example, was also on the list (T-​Ned, 2019). These findings must come with a caveat: we cannot know if and how many LY members may have visited the EP privately. Nevertheless, judging by our discussions with other observers residing in Brussels for many years (such as journalists, covering Taiwan) our impression about the non-​ presence of LY members in Brussels seems pretty accurate. However, in the European Parliament, an informal Taiwan friendship group has been created. Its purpose is to promote and advocate for Taiwan’s interests in the European Parliament. In the language of the European Parliament, the Taiwan friendship group belongs to the category of intergroups, which are regulated by Rule 35 of the EP’s Rules of Procedure (EP, 2020c). Interests among MEPs to participate in intergroups or other unofficial groups vary. Some do not have any interest in participating at all, sometimes for a very particular reason.119 Others participate in so many of them that they “even forget to which group they belong”.120 Roughly 20 MEPs actively participate in the Taiwan friendship group.121 Its members see their role mainly in passing resolutions to support Taiwan. From Taiwan’s side, and given the limited role

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of LY members in this regard, the development of parliamentary diplomacy as a tool to promote Taiwan’s interests depends more on the executive branch in Taiwan (the MOFA) and its representative office in Brussels. Although it is primarily focused on the EU and its member states, the Taiwanese government invests in good relations with MEPs to make sure that Taiwan remains a topic on the EP’s agenda as well. As explained by a senior official of the MOFA, it can be very difficult for Taiwan’s representative office in Brussels to pursue Taiwan’s interest in the EP because its officials need to make sure that they do not ‘anger’ the Commission.122 However, Rule 35 allows the MEPs to hold ‘informal exchanges of views on specific issues … and [promote] contact between Members and civil society’ (EP, 2020c). As a result, most of the Taiwan-​related events in which such ‘informal exchanges’ have taken place were encouraged or facilitated by Taiwan’s representative office, to make sure that MEPs get together with Taiwanese experts and policymakers, through which MEPs could obtain essential information regarding Taiwan.123 Cross-​strait relations, the security environment of the Asia Pacific, the PRC’s One Belt One Road strategy, the US–​China trade war and Taiwan’s participation in the WHO and other international organizations have been among topics of such exchanges at forums and hearings organized in premises of the European Parliament. Besides security concerns, health and participation in the WHO are the most prominent issues for Taiwan. The European Parliament, too, has been aware for decades of the difficulties Taiwan has been facing concerning its membership in the WHO and its attempts to find a compromise solution to participate in the organization in a meaningful way. Such as, for example, the low-​profile strategy from 1997 to 2003, to gain observer status in the WHA. Or that, in 2002, Taiwan conceded to adopt the name ‘Health Entity’, which has no political implication, to apply for participation in WHO meetings, only to be rejected by the PRC on the grounds of the One China principle (Chang, 2010a). Let us recall that Taiwan’s request to be allowed to participate in the WHO was rejected just before the SARS outbreak, which so badly hit Taiwan. Even after SARS, nothing has changed for Taiwan, as evidenced by numerous rejections and obstacles erected by the PRC to prevent Taiwan from participation in the organization.124 The PRC’s political influence and pressure dissuade most WHO members from confronting the PRC. The European Parliament, however, has undertaken several actions in support of Taiwan as can be seen in Table 5.10. If we compare the contents of the resolutions introduced in Table 5.10 we find that the following ‘keywords’ appear most frequently: representation, participation and observer status. In addition to that, the EP has consistently been calling upon the Commission and EU member states to support Taiwan’s aspirations to associate with the WHO. The timing of the adoption

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Table 5.10: Resolutions of the European Parliament regarding Taiwan’s participation in the WHO, 2002–​2018125 Document number

Date

Topic

P5_​TA(2002)0130 14/03/2002

• spread of various infectious diseases • assistance and financial aid provided by Taiwan • b etter representeatation in international organizations in an appropriate and meaningful way • c alls on the Commission and the member states to support the application for observer status

P5_​TA(2003)0224 15/05/2003

• SARS • participation in an appropriate and meaningful way • observer status for Taiwan • c alls on the Commission and the member states to officially support Taiwan’s participation in the World Health Organization • b etter representation of Taiwan in international organizations

P6_​TA(2005)0297 07/07/2005

• b etter representation of Taiwan in international organizations • c all on the Commission and the member states to support Taiwan’s application for observer status in the World Health Organization

P6_​TA(2006)0228 18/05/2006

• Taiwan Centre for Disease Control (Taiwan CDC) •G  lobal Outbreak and Alert Response Network (GOARN) • HIV/​AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, SARS • direct access to and can attend all technical meetings • meaningful participation • c all on the Commission and the member states to support Taiwan’s application for observer status in the WHO • observer status •o  ne of the most important international hubs in the Western Pacific

P6_​TA(2006)0346 07/09/2006

• observer status •H  IV/​AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, SARS, avian influenza •o  ne of the most important international hubs in the Western Pacific • b etter represention in international fora and organizations •u  nfair exclusion of 23 million people from the international community

P7_​TA(2010)0060 10/03/2010

• Taiwan’s participation in the WHO

P8_​TA(2018)0343 12/09/2018

•m  eaningful participation in international organizations

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of these resolutions is important, too. The EP has adopted them almost always before the annual meeting of the WHA in May. In this way, the resolutions from the European Parliament supporting Taiwan’s participation in the WHO and the WHA provided timely moral support for Taiwan. Also, they served as an additional pressure on the PRC to (re)consider its policy of not allowing Taiwan to participate in the WHO.126 To this extent, therefore, parliamentary diplomacy provides an alternative channel for Taiwan to articulate its position in the EU. Another illustration of how such a channel works is pushing the information out by Taiwan’s representative office in Brussels that can be used by MEPs to ask oral and written questions in the EP. The details framed in MEPs’ questions would reflect how well informed a particular MEP is and what might have been the source of that information. Take, for example, the question concerning Taiwan’s exclusion from the WHO that was raised in the European Parliament on 20 May 2008, which reads as follows: 23 million Taiwanese are excluded from the international network for cooperation on health protection provided by the WHO. Furthermore, despite its very significant medical potential, Taiwan cannot support the activities of the WHO. 80% of cases of bird flu occurred in East Asia (China, Laos, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, and Cambodia). Only today, Taiwan sent medical teams to Burkina Faso, Sao Tome and Principe, the Marshall Islands, Guatemala, Kenya, and Haiti … China’s policy restricts the functioning of the WHO system, while also excluding the Taiwanese people form joining it. This is at odds not only with the interests of the international community but also with the provisions of the WHO Constitution, Article 1 of which states that the objective of WHO ‘shall be the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health. The EU has no reason to fulfil China’s aspirations under its policy to isolate Taiwan. Will the Council review EU policy in this area? Will the Council at least adopt a neutral position on Taiwan’s application for observer status at the World Health Assembly?’ (Szymański, 2008) On this question, a former official of the MOFA recalled that several sentences in it had been very similar to those in the 2008 MOFA internal non-​p aper on the WHO. 127 Moreover, the internal information of Taiwanese medical teams sent to various countries in Africa and Central America could only be revealed by the Taiwanese government. Therefore, our interviewee concludes, it is very likely that the information used in this MEP’s question came directly from the MOFA or the representative office in Brussels.

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In sum, Taiwan’s parliamentary diplomacy in connection to the European Parliament primarily involves the MOFA and its representative office abroad. The Brussels representative office connects with MEPs and supplies them with relevant information on issues concerning Taiwan. The role of the LY seems to be limited to receiving MEPs when they arrive in Taipei and attending meetings with them. It seems that the European Parliament is simply too far for Taiwanese parliamentarians. The question of whether there should be a more dynamic exchange between parliamentarians from both sides can only be answered in Taipei, although it certainly comes as a surprise that among many friendship groups created by LY members in the 2016–​2020 LY only one generic ‘Taiwan–​Europe’ friendship group was inaugurated. With that said, investing in strong relations between MEPs, the Taiwanese government and LY members can yield dividends. For example, Cecilia Malmström, former Commissioner for Home Affairs (2010–​2014) and then Commissioner for Trade (2014–​2019) was also an MEP (2006–​ 2009) and a member of the Taiwan friendship group in the European Parliament. She has been credited with playing an important role in securing the Schengen visa exemption for Taiwan128 (Commission, 2010). This particular case demonstrates that making and keeping up good contacts with parliamentarians from abroad might turn out to be useful for LY members if in the future former colleagues assume senior positions in running their states or international organizations. Parliamentary diplomacy can work much better if it originates from strong, lasting inter-​parliamentarian networks.

Synthesis The room for parliamentarians from the LY to engage in international (parliamentary) relations and contribute to parliamentary diplomacy of Taiwan depends on the type of parliamentary institution with which LY members seek to cooperate. The main obstacle for them is, of course, that Taiwan is not a universally recognized state, but as we emphasize throughout this study, the purpose of developing parliamentary diplomacy is to try to remove these obstacles and ease the isolation. In this respect, the overall impression about activities of LY members in parliamentary institutions, and how they contribute to the development of Taiwan’s parliamentary diplomacy, is a mixed one. Some evidence suggests that individual LY members can be active contributors to the accomplishment of goals relevant to Taiwan, but this happens only occasionally. In most cases, the LY and its members’ success in advocating for Taiwan’s interests depend on the agenda and focus of other parliamentary institutions. IPAs provide very little space for Taiwanese parliamentarians to actively participate in international relations. All the most important IPAs are closed to LY members

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because UN membership or global recognition of Taiwan is required. PAs provide more opportunities to LY members for active participation. They can be used as a global cross-​party platform for LY members to promote Taiwan’s foreign policy goals and generate support when tensions in the Taiwan Strait increase. From the perspective of a national parliament, LY members are rather active when it comes to the establishment of friendship groups, yet this does not reflect in parliaments around the world. Only about 40 of them have created some kind of Taiwan-​friendly group, compared with 71 created in the LY during the 2016–​2020 term. The dependence on the PRC such as in arms sales or benefits from the One Belt One Road programme may have played a role in the making of decisions in parliaments around the world for or against launching (informal) cooperation with Taiwanese parliamentarians. Last but not least, we find little evidence of LY members actively working with peers from abroad to accomplish goals that would benefit Taiwan. For example, the European Parliament has adopted many resolutions in support of Taiwan. The weight of its resolutions is, of course, not to be compared with that of the US Congress, but the EP is an international parliamentary institution that brings together the largest number of directly elected parliamentarians in the world and its voice in the international community is not ignored. Therefore, the support of the EP is valuable for Taiwan. Nevertheless, Taiwanese parliamentarians prefer visiting peers in the US Congress, and the LY sends its delegations there much more frequently. But even in Washington, the impression about those visits is one of the lost opportunities for LY members.

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6

Barriers Surrounding Taiwan’s Parliamentary Diplomacy This chapter discusses factors that have an impact on the capacity of members of the Legislative Yuan to act internationally and in this way contribute to parliamentary diplomacy of Taiwan. A great deal of the analysis in this section is based on 73 interviews conducted with 62 interviewees. For various reasons, mostly associated with the political sensitivity of the topic and related research, the position they occupied and/​or the (political) status they had at the time of conducting interviews, the interviewees agreed to talk to us if our discussion was off the record. We honour their trust in the following way. When we refer directly to an interviewee, we do so by providing general information about his or her position at the time of the interview. We also provide information about the place and date of the interview. All interviews have been done in the period 2016–​2020. The majority of them have been conducted in Taipei, others have taken place by using telecommunication applications or by email. We have opted for semi-​structured interviews to allow our respondents to reflect on the topic, and also broadly about challenges and opportunities for Taiwan’s parliamentary diplomacy. The interviewees have been informed about the background and the aim of the research. We have told them that the focus of our research is the period since the early 1990s when parliamentary diplomacy was introduced to Taiwan’s foreign policy. We have explained to them that we aimed to understand better the potential of parliamentarians to help Taiwan pursue its foreign policy. The maximum time devoted to an interview was between 30 minutes and 90 minutes, and the average time spent in an interview roughly 60 minutes. Our group of interviewees is diverse. We have met no less than 18 parliamentarians who were members of the Legislative Yuan at that time. Four of them were from the KMT, and 14 from the DPP. We have been fortunate to include several prominent KMT and DPP parliamentarians among our interviewees. On the executive branch side, we have interviewed

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eight officials. At the time of conducting those interviews, all of them were employees of the MOFA, some of whom were directly involved in coordinating parliamentary visits. From the administrative and research support side, we have interviewed seven individuals, including a high-​ranking official in the Legislative Yuan and a person with experience in coordinating activities in the parliament. We have also included in this group five assistants to members of the Legislative Yuan. Four of them were assistants to legislators from the DPP and one to a legislator from the KMT. Furthermore, we have spoken to 15 domestic experts. They combine expertise, first-​hand knowledge and experience as academics, former diplomats, members of governments and politicians, some of them serving in the past as LY members. Seven of them are closer to KMT positions and three to DPPs. We evaluate other experts in this group as politically neutral. Among those close to the KMT’s position, three interviewees are high profile political figures who also served in the Legislative Yuan. Their views benefit the research because all of them have provided a valuable reflection on the time when the KMT was dominating the Taiwanese political scene. Their insights complement the perspective we have been given by parliamentarians and others sympathizing with the DPP, the party that currently dominates in Taiwan. Interviewees from abroad include former parliamentarians who visited Taiwan as well as senior officials with first-​hand experience working with the Legislative Yuan (see Table 6.1). Table 6.1: Breakdown of interviewees by categories Legislators Legislators Executive Staff Staff Domestic Foreign Foreign –​ KMT –​ DPP (MOFA) (LY) (other) experts officials experts (legislators, staff) 4

14

8

7

3

15

6

5

Total interviewees: 62

So, what have we found out? At international level, there is no doubt that the PRC’s One China principle and the insistence on the 1992 Consensus are the biggest hurdles LY members face as they try to participate in international (parliamentary) relations. From the perspective of the PRC, the tightness of the grip on Taiwan depends on whether Taipei accepts that the unification with Taiwan is the only option acceptable for the PRC. Everything is negotiable, Beijing says, if Taipei takes the road to unification.

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On the other hand, as long as the government in Taipei does not accept that and is unwilling to talk to the PRC, Bejing says, everything is possible, even taking Taiwan by force.1 This ominous communication from Beijing, which has intensified at the time of writing this study, is just one of the many manifestations of the ‘China factor’. Take, for example, an official invitation from the Legislative Yuan or the government given to a prominent parliamentarian from overseas to visit Taiwan. In normal circumstances, this would have been a high-​profile visit. Instead, such invitations turn into complex projects with uncertain outcomes. The MOFA and the Legislative Yuan face considerable obstacles when they try to invite senior parliamentarians from countries abroad. Bar a few exceptions, these politicians are afraid that their countries might have difficulties with the PRC when they return home. The dilemma of whether or not to travel to Taiwan becomes even bigger if their party is in power because such visits might have tangible negative consequences for the business this country does with the PRC.2 A similar dilemma occurs if parliamentarians from Taiwan visit their peers abroad, except that in order not to “inconvenience our hosts”, LY members are willing to meet them in “secret places”.3 Such incidents, at times going to extremes, for example when a parliamentarian from Taiwan kindly asks a minister from a foreign country for permission to take a picture with him or her, are considered as humiliating by members of the Legislative Yuan.4 The influence of the PRC goes beyond inter-​governmental cooperation. IPAs would seem a possible forum for LY members to participate in international relations, but, as one of the interviewees said, “even on the inter-parliamentary level we face many obstacles”,5 such as that members of the APPU, the only IPA of which Taiwan is a member, prefer to channel funding to other IPAs in the region where the PRC is a member.6 In addition to that, as we know by now, Taiwan has no access to prominent IPAs such as the IPU and the PGA. Most of our interviewees believe that this has important ramifications for the mobility of LY members and their ability to network with peers from all over the world. Not everything is bad news for members of the Legislative Yuan, because some options for inter-​parliamentary cooperation remain open and/​or are (partly) outside the PRC’s control. For example, according to several interviewed parliamentarians, cooperation with parliamentarians from Japan and the US is very well organized. The same can be said for the cooperation between the Legislative Yuan and the British Parliament. The support of the European Parliament for Taiwan is becoming increasingly important. A new trend in creating friendship groups seems to be taking place. Parliamentarians create friendship groups focusing on businesses and scientific cooperation. In addition to that, LY members can network via PAs to which the PRC has no access.

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The network via friendship groups seems limited to some extent, given the lack of balance between the number of friendship groups LY members have created and the number of those created in foreign parliaments. In addition, by parliamentarians’ own admission, not all friendship groups are equally active, which represents a problem for Taiwan. As one of the LY members has said, the very act of creating a friendship group must be based not on the notion that it is important to establish a friendship group but on a plan –​what should such a group accomplish? It has been suggested that international activities of friendship groups should be strictly issue-​ oriented and only those parliamentarians with keen interest, willingness to produce results and knowledge about the topic should participate. Some members of the Legislative Yuan have been applying this theory in practice, as explained by one of our interviewees who is a member of the LY. When he would take his fellow parliamentarians on a foreign visit, he assumed that everyone in the group was highly motivated to meet and talk to his or her colleagues abroad. Hence, he insisted on a clear agenda, and “no sightseeing, no shopping, just work and staying focused”. That kind of approach, he said, made his friendship groups “less popular” among parliamentarians in the Legislative Yuan.7 This anecdote demonstrates the importance of personal motivation, which brings us to LY members as the units of analysis. Some of our interviewees complained that there is no systemic push in the Taiwanese political system that would encourage parliamentarians to be motivated to engage internationally. If there is a ‘system’, as illustrated by an interviewee, it is such that “you can’t blame them or hold them accountable for doing nothing”.8 In addition to that, parliamentarians in Taiwan are up against the public image of parliamentary diplomacy being a PR of individual parliamentarians or their parties, or that parliamentary diplomacy is (ab)used by parliamentarians as a means for travel and pleasure. The challenge for the LY is how to address these negativities and make use of parliamentarians willing to spend their time and effort to contribute to Taiwan’s presence in international relations. The challenge is considerable, for there is no parliamentary diplomacy without motivated parliamentarians. But being motivated is not enough. Every parliamentarian with interest in international (parliamentary) relations should have a good idea about where to contribute through inter-​parliamentary activities. Being so isolated, Taiwan would welcome good initiatives. One interviewee, a former member of the Legislative Yuan, has argued that trade relations should be at the centre of these initiatives. Diversification of the economy is as strategic and as vital a goal for Taiwan as security. Taiwan needs to become as independent as possible in running economic affairs, and using inter-​parliamentary channels may be a part of activities aiming towards that goal.9 Meetings with companies

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and fellow parliamentarians from other countries are important for an exchange of ideas and considering business opportunities for Taiwan. Given that Taiwan is not a widely recognized state and relations between Taiwan and governments around the world are restricted, parliamentarians might be able to open more doors than members of Taiwan’s representative offices (de facto embassies) can. In some countries, members of the cabinet may be elected parliamentarians at the same time, which is yet another stimulus for parliamentarians from Taiwan to travel abroad, seek contacts and put forward Taiwan’s business and other interests.10 One interviewee listed five characteristics an LY member should have to take part in Taiwan’s effort not to remain isolated from international relations and contribute to Taiwan’s parliamentary diplomacy. Besides his or her interest and motivation, the other four are communication skills, networking ability, willingness to do work beyond protocol obligations and innovativeness in finding ways and means to help Taiwan. In his view, such parliamentarians are hard to find in the Legislative Yuan.11 We would add expertise and competencies to this list. Almost all our interlocutors agree with this view. Not many parliamentarians speak English, the lingua franca of international communications today. Only a few parliamentarians have broader knowledge about international relations, and most of them have no interest in foreign policy at all.12 Some of these findings apply to Speakers of the Legislative Yuan, too. For example, Wang Jin-​pyng, the LY speaker from 1999 to 2​ 016, was known during his tenure as a cosmopolitan and conciliatory person able to communicate with both parties (Chan, 2013). He received hundreds of foreign delegations, yet his English was considered to be rather weak.13 According to one estimate for the ninth term of the Legislative Yuan (2016–​2020), only about three to five members of the LY from the DPP and only three to five of them from the KMT could be described as ‘internationalists’, that is, those who combine good education, interest in international relations and the ability to speak fluent English.14 For the rest of the LY membership, their priorities are ‘down-​to-​earth topics’ such as agriculture and trade, in short, whatever brings votes. This is not what an interest in foreign policy does.15 Some interviewees believe that ignoring foreign policy matters in this way is in contrast with international ambitions of Taiwan, and indeed, of LY members themselves. The case in point is the number of friendship groups: as we know, 71 have been created for the 2016–​2020 LY. It is difficult to expect that members of the Legislative Yuan participating in so many friendship groups could serve the group properly without the relevant knowledge and skills.16 Because of such ‘reality’, visits of Taiwanese parliamentarians risk ending up as stories about lost opportunities for Taiwan. One former parliamentarian has illustrated this by providing an example of when a parliamentary delegation from Taiwan

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went to visit the US to inquire about the purchase of weapons. The group was bipartisan, but in that delegation, half of them did not speak English or did not have enough knowledge on the subject.17 As we indicated earlier by introducing views from the US Congress about parliamentary visits from Taipei, such structuring of parliamentary visits does not benefit Taiwan. To put this into another perspective, said one expert, one should take into account that about 50 per cent of the entire inter-​parliamentary activity in Taiwan is focused on relations with the US.18 This alone is a good reason for visits to be paid to parliamentarians from strategically important countries, not by Taiwanese parliamentarians generally interested in (visiting) these countries, but by those currently sitting in the Legislative Yuan who have knowledge, expertise, experience and skills to be able to converse with their hosts on substantive issues fluently and competently. In inter-​parliamentary relations and parliamentary diplomacy, quality takes preference over quantity. Knowledge is an important asset for a parliament that wishes to expand its international presence, but some of our interviewees have warned that this fact must be put in to context, which concerns the way LY members are elected. Taiwan’s election system includes first-​past-​the-​post and proportional representation. This creates two types of parliamentarians, those directly elected (district) and those nominated (at-​large). District legislators feel less pressure about the need to speak foreign languages or to have a broader understanding of international relations. Their primary concerns are domestic issues and voters’ preferences –​their job is to win the next election. On the other hand, it is expected that more members of the Legislative Yuan from the party list (at-​large legislators) should be able to converse in foreign languages and to have a better understanding of international affairs. From the perspective of Taiwan’s parliamentary diplomacy, the most important advantage at-​large legislators have over district legislators is they do not need to serve constituents, so they can focus entirely on particular projects of importance to their political party. That being said, to choose the right ‘team’ of at-​large legislators is anything but an easy task (Hsieh, 2019) and not even a perfect representative of Taiwan abroad, a diplomat or a parliamentarian, can do much without strong domestic support. Political parties in Taiwan carry a big responsibility to find ways to agree on platforms that they could represent internationally. It would seem that it is not always easy to deal with this challenge. The current political system in Taiwan –​a democracy –​is, of course, far different from the dictatorship in the past. Free speech is the norm, and elections are immensely competitive. In such circumstances, finding an agreement between parties on issues of national concern is difficult. One way to describe the impact the democratization process has had on Taiwan’s foreign policy-​making is to call the era of democracy an era of lack of

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consensus; there is no consensus in Taiwan on the ‘1992 Consensus’. We have seen that on some occasions, such as the exclusion of Taiwan from the WHO, the main political parties in Taiwan speak to the world with one voice. Yet, the differences between the KMT and the DPP about the vision for the future of Taiwan should not be ignored. So how much do these differences affect the design, the content and the implementation of Taiwanese parliamentary diplomacy? Some argued that they do a lot of damage to Taiwan. The domestic discussion about whether Taiwan should lean more towards independence or more towards a kind of relationship if not unification with China does not only limit parliamentarians’ scope of activities in the international community, it also cripples the country from inside.19 Avoiding partisanship in the Taiwanese domestic arena20 is important for the MOFA as well. A Taiwanese expert on international politics, with experience working for the MOFA, has underlined that the support of two main parties for Taiwan’s foreign policy and diplomacy is the only way forward for Taipei. Otherwise, Taiwan risks being weakened in dealing with the One China principle promoted by the PRC. If differences between the parties on foreign policy issues are substantial, the hands of the MOFA are tied. Namely, the foreign ministry cannot push for only one agenda –​it has to find a compromise between the preferences of both parties. Doing otherwise would create confusion among international partners and would not help Taiwan.21 Our interviewees acknowledge that differences between the KMT and the DPP burden Taiwan and they list several reasons why this is so. Events such as the meeting between former president Ma and Xi Jinping in 2015 to endorse the 1992 Consensus (Ma, 2015), and the 2016 visit of the new leader of the KMT to Beijing after the party’s defeat in the 2016 elections (Chung, 2016), sowed the seeds of discontent on the other side of the aisle. The recent convention of the KMT has confirmed that the 1992 Consensus remains the bone of contention, for the KMT sticks by it (Hsiao, 2020a). Some of the interviewed DPP members seem concerned about the KMT’s ‘contribution’ to the disintegration of Taiwanese society from inside, to make it more vulnerable to the PRC propaganda. Others are unhappy with the practice of ‘double representation’, in the form of creating rival friendship groups in the Legislative Yuan.22 Those that belong to the KMT camp believe that the role the KMT plays in strained Taiwan–​PRC relations should have been better appreciated. Namely, some KMT members of the Legislative Yuan pursue a different kind of parliamentary diplomacy: they seek, often on their own initiative, to keep up some kind of communication with the PRC.23 The motivation for doing so is to make sure that strained relations between Beijing and Taipei have as few consequences as possible for other ways of cooperation between the island and the mainland; in particular,

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the door for doing business in Taiwan and the PRC must be kept open. In this respect, the argument goes, their efforts are useful for Taiwan.24 Unfortunately, said another interviewee, because of the lack of domestic support, the room for KMT members of the Legislative Yuan to play some kind of mediating role between the PRC and Taiwan is extremely narrow.25 The discord between the two parties on key (foreign) policy issues becomes particularly problematic if the two parties seek to influence politicians in the United States, Taiwan’s key ally. Taiwan has been dealing with this problem since the DPP became the KMT’s main competitor. The DPP wanted its voice to be heard in Washington, hoping that policy-​and lawmakers there would understand the role the DPP was to play in Taiwanese politics. The KMT, once valued in Washington as the pillar of anti-​Communism in East Asia, was becoming ever more PRC-​friendly and the DPP was there to fill the void. To advocate its positions, the DPP first relied on the Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA), a lobby group established in 1982 to promote democracy in Taiwan and to separate it from the PRC. The FAPA has proven not only to be a successful lobbyist for Taiwan in the US Congress,26 but also a diplomatic channel for the DPP to assure members of Congress that the DPP is a party that would keep the anti-​PRC position and bring Taiwan on to the path of democratization. The KMT countered such narratives and practices. For example, it would ‘invite US members of Congress and staff to visit Taiwan and inform them that the DPP and the opposition movement were fronts for communists’ (Lin, 2006: 153). In Washington, various tactics were employed by the KMT, including protests with members of Congress who supported resolutions that seemed to favour Taiwan’s interests –​but not in the way the KMT would have wanted them to do so. An example is a resolution introduced in September 1991 by Dennis Hertel, a Democrat in the US House of Representatives, which sought representation for Taiwan in the United Nations.27 The KMT lobbied against that resolution claiming that the Taiwanese government supported UN membership ‘in principle but only if Taiwan could take over the seat of the PRC in the UN Security Council with veto-​r ight’ (Lin, 2006: 153). As long as the KMT was in power, Taiwan had one of the most powerful lobbies in Washington (Sciolino, 1996). Things began to change after the DPP’s candidate Chen Shui-​bian won the presidential election in 2000. Following that historic win, the competition for the attention of the US administration and members of the US Congress intensified, and some kind of party diplomacy rather than parliamentary diplomacy ensued. The DPP, now the ruling party, did not trust the TECRO, which it considered KMT-​controlled. The KMT, on the other hand, was convinced that the new administration did not properly represent Taiwan’s interests (Dumbaugh,

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2006: 17–​18). Parliamentarians from the Legislative Yuan kept coming to Washington. Some of those delegations were not bipartisan, but in the light of fierce competition between the two parties both inside and outside Taiwan, this was not necessarily such a bad thing at that time.28 Keeping up a permanent presence in the US capital was high on the agenda of both parties. As long as it controlled Taiwan’s de facto embassy, the KMT did not see the need to have a special representative office. Four years after the defeat in 2000, a KMT–​PFP representative office was opened in Washington. It was closed down after the KMT returned to power in 2008 and resumed its activities from the TECRO (Chung, 2020), but it has not reopened after the DPP came back to power in 2016. The DPP, meanwhile, had its representatives in Washington from the 1990s, and it strengthened its presence further in 2013 by opening a new office. The DPP explained the motivation for establishing the new office by stating that it should ‘foster close relations with the US and explain the party’s policies and strategies toward China’ (Lowther, 2013). Some observers translate this statement as a reaction to the fact that the DPP failed to persuade the Obama administration ‘that it had a sound and well-​developed strategy for dealing with China. As a result, the US signaled its support for President Ma Ying-​jeou and in the opinion of some analysts helped in his victory’ (Lowther, 2013). The underestimation of the continuing need to keep up contacts in Washington by the KMT and the better understanding of a long-​term presence in Washington by the DPP has benefited the latter. Eventually, the KMT, too, concluded that it needed to work on strengthening ties with the American administration to ‘counter some of the electoral sway that the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) gained from its support in Washington’ (Chung, 2020b). The partisanship in the Taiwanese parliamentary presence and activity in the US might not go away anytime soon. Not so long ago the opposition party Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) established a rival US friendship group in the Legislative Yuan, called the Taiwan–​US Legislators Amity Association. Reflecting on this initiative, a DPP legislator demonstrated the lack of trust between parties by saying that ‘it is a good thing for Taiwan’s parliamentary diplomacy to be diversified rather than being monopolized by a specific political party, as Washington may only hear one side of voices within the country’ (Shih, 2012). This returns us to square one: to the question of whether partisan messages that reach Washington benefit or weaken Taiwan in its effort to maintain a coherent foreign policy, including the one concerning the PRC. An answer to this question is, again, particularly important for the TECRO, which, according to observers in Washington, continues to be a victim of the

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DPP–​KMT political culture. From the perspective of the US Congress this is considered unfortunate because the TECRO should be left free to follow its primary mission when it comes to parliamentary diplomacy, that is, to cater to all parliamentarians equally, regardless of the political party they come from.29 Curiously enough, the push factor that helps to bring the two parties somewhat together and to shape the foreign policy focus in the MOFA/​ TECRO comes from the mainland. The recent increase of tensions in the Taiwan Strait and threats from the PRC to take Taiwan by force after the re-​election of president Tsai in 2020 may well have a positive impact on the positioning of the KMT and the DPP in their competition for the attention of the US Congress. The current head of the KMT, Johnny Chiang, agreed that the KMT must be present in Washington, ‘to convey a clear stance on US–​Taiwan–​Beijing relations to Washington. It needs to emphasize that the KMT is pro-​America, that it is conciliatory to China instead of pro-​China’ (Chung, 2019). Such a statement does not signal that the KMT radically changes its position on the PRC, but it might be seen as a way forward to develop a political platform that would allow for a more bi​partisan presence of Taiwanese legislators in Washington and more commonly supported positions that the TECRO could then introduce in the US Congress or the administration.30 In fact, some of our interviewees already agree that as far as foreign policy is concerned, primarily relating to the situation in the Taiwan Strait, there is more cooperation between the DPP and the KMT than there used to be not so long ago. In their opinion, the current state of play between the two parties is as follows. Both parties know that declaring the independence of Taiwan at this point would be imprudent, to say the least.31 Neither party wants unification, at least not in the short term.32 Neither of them wants to worsen relations with the PRC. Such positions are shared with the voters, too.33 But the 1992 Consensus brokered by the KMT remains the bone of contention. The less chance there is an agreement on the validity of the 1992 Consensus, the less chance there is for cohesion between the two parties at international level. In this regard, members of the Legislative Yuan emphasize the importance of their speaker. He or she must be an internationalist by definition. As the official representative of the legislative branch in Taiwan, the speaker is expected to keep up the bipartisan support to international relations of the Legislative Yuan, for example, by ensuring that all political parties sitting in the parliament are appropriately represented in those international visits that the speaker undertakes on behalf of the Legislative Yuan. A senior official in the Legislative Yuan with good knowledge of the role of its speaker has explained that “as a matter of principle when we

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as parliamentarians go abroad we typically follow the bipartisan line. We hide our differences and try to represent Taiwanese interests, especially in terms of trying to ease our isolation”.34 The parliamentarians who we have interviewed confirm that past speakers Wang Jin-​pyng (the longest-​serving speaker in Taiwan’s history as a democracy) and Su Jia-​chyuan have followed that principle.35 The task might be even easier for future speakers, because the change of generations, especially in the KMT, one interviewee argues, may further reduce differences between the two parties on key foreign policy questions.36 If one adds the continuing pressure of the PRC on Taiwan and the response of the Taiwanese to it, these factors combined –​ the maturity of the political parties accepting that domestic differences ‘stop at the water’s edge’ and the ‘China factor’ –​might create an even stronger sense of the importance of bipartisan support to Taiwan’s foreign policy and parliamentary diplomacy. Political parties are crucial for the development of substantive and consistent parliamentary diplomacy, but they are also their weakest link because of traditionally unpredictable elections in Taiwan. We have looked at the results of the elections in Taiwan since 2008, after the number of members in the Legislative Yuan has been reduced to 113, following the constitutional amendments in 2005 (see Table 6.2). From the perspective of the presence of LY members in international (parliamentary) relations, these figures and trends are not encouraging. The volatile political scene and, consequently, the lower chance of re-​election of an incumbent member does not help Taiwan’s efforts to break international isolation with the help of its parliamentarians. The political experience and influence of a parliamentarian can only come with continuous service in parliament. The former speaker of the Legislative Yuan Wang Jin-​pyng earned his reputation among parliamentarians and in the MOFA as “an important foreign policy figure”.37 In his position as a speaker, he has served in the Legislative Yuan for more than two decades. Yet, he is the exception rather than the rule in how the Legislative Yuan is filled every four years. Parliamentarians in Taiwan are not very successful in their effort to stay longer in office. In the 2012 distribution of district seats (the KMT won those elections), 65 per cent of incumbent members were re-​elected, 60 per cent in 2016 (DPP) and 77 per cent in 2020 (DPP). This brings us to another domestic factor –​the role of constituencies. At the beginning of this chapter, we have already pointed out some obstacles LY members encounter if during their term they choose to be more focused on Taiwan’s international relations rather than on domestic affairs. When asked the question of what they thought they could contribute to Taiwan’s parliamentary diplomacy, the majority of directly elected LY members to whom we spoke have given the same answer to us: nothing, or very little.

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Table 6.2: Parliamentary elections in Taiwan, 2008–​202038 Summary of legislative elections –​total Re-​elected

Newly elected

2008

91

22

2012

64

49

2016

59

54

2020

68

45

Summary of legislative elections –​districts seats Re-​elected

Newly elected

2008

60

13

2012

48

25

2016

44

29

2020

56

17

Summary of legislative elections –​at-​large seats Re​appointed

Newly appointed

2008

26

 8

2012

11

23

2016

10

24

2020

 7

27

Several reasons have been offered as to why this is so. The most important ones are culture and tradition. As one member of the Legislative Yuan has explained, voters expect district legislators to be at their disposal all the time. Attending weddings and funerals is also on the list of expectations, and an incumbent may find it difficult to survive through the next elections if voters complain, “we have never seen you”.39 As one of the interviewees has illustrated, the chairperson of the Foreign and National Defense Committee might be just about the only one who could justify the time spent on foreign affairs. The rest, in his estimation, must devote 90 per cent of their time to the needs of constituents.40 Another member of the Legislative Yuan explained her encounter with the new reality after she won the elections in her district. As a politician who has been educated abroad, with excellent command of English, ample international experience and a rich network of colleagues worldwide, she had to dramatically reduce her foreign travel to take care of her constituents.41 Another parliamentarian explained that as much as he was aware that international parliamentary activity was important, his time for international travel was restricted as long as he was a district legislator.

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International relations and foreign policy are among his areas of interest, but he needed to focus instead on the preferences of his constituents who only have local concerns. Since he was a directly elected legislator, he said, he only managed one foreign trip per year.42 In most cases, the decision of district legislators to travel is the result of some form of cost–​benefit analysis. Because “foreigners do not vote”,43 parliamentarians must have a clear idea about the merits of planned travel abroad, and how it might affect constituents’ support to him or her in the next election.44 The decision is even tougher if foreign travel does not receive much coverage in the media, which is the case in Taiwan. The lack of interest in foreign affairs is, of course, not typical just to Taiwan, but Taiwan is not a typical country. Let us remember that Taiwan has very limited access to the world of recognized states. In its case, at the very least, efforts to reduce its isolation should not be ignored. Unfortunately, said one legislator, if, for example, US members of Congress come to visit Taiwan, they are likely to receive more media attention than those from the Legislative Yuan travelling overseas, even though, at least in theory, it should be the other way around. At the end of the day, LY members are the ones who are expected to do ‘something good’ for their country.45 Another problem for LY members is the way political parties in the LY manage memberships in standing committees. Several interviewees have emphasized that unlike in most other parliaments, LY members frequently change membership in those committees, which means that many of them cannot add experience and expertise in any particular area covered by those committees.46 A high-​ranking official in the Legislative Yuan has described the situation thus: ‘In principle, it would be good to have an expert parliamentarian in a certain committee. But if that committee is obscure –​and currently [at the time of conducting the interview] the National Defence and Foreign policy committee does not rank among the most important ones47 –​then the party would shift its [capable] person somewhere where he is needed more. In other words, there is no strategic thinking in the parliament as to how to choose an “appropriate” parliamentarian for specific tasks, but there are real obstacles that political parties face. We are aware of that, but nothing much can be done.’48 District legislators may still contribute to parliamentary diplomacy in a meaningful way. What is required is a vision and some strategic planning, said one of our interviewees. She proposes what might be called hybrid parliamentary diplomacy, one that intertwines local and governmental interests. As a district legislator, representing the DPP, she knows that

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constituents are her priority and that she must pay full attention to them if she wishes to maintain her seat in the next election. At the same time, she is a politician, expected to advocate for the interests of Taiwan. She believes that in the globalized world identifying policies that address local and national concerns at the same time is not impossible. She gave an example of tourism, a project in which a summer school would be established for young people from around the world. The school would focus on teaching mandarin and stimulating students to connect through joint projects, outdoor activities and so on. Her win–​win in this proposal is as follows. First, her political party benefits. This project contributes to its political programme, which is to diversify trade, especially in tourism, where dependence on the PRC is considerable. As a directly elected parliamentarian, she benefits because she communicates with peers and international actors. Her constituency benefits because the summer school brings business. Taiwan benefits because guests might develop an ‘emotional fondness’ for Taiwan and, in this way, start advocating for international support for the country. She is aware that this approach does not bring results overnight, that it is a long-​term investment with slow returns. But hybrid parliamentary diplomacy may be an answer to the district parliamentarians’ dilemma of how to cater to constituents and be internationally active at the same time.49 There are other international topics that connect a parliamentarian’s interest in international relations and local interests that can be offered. “For example, in the territorial disputes in the South China Sea or the East China Sea, Taiwan’s parliamentarians focus on interests of Taiwan’s fishermen in the disputed areas”.50 In addition to 73 directly elected parliamentarians, 34 candidates (called at-​large legislators) are selected according to proportional representation party votes. Regarding continuity the re-​selection of at-​large legislators to keep them focused on their respective portfolios is not a matter of course. After the 2020 election, only seven at-​large legislators have survived the 2016–​2020 term and have been re​appointed. The selection process of at-​large legislators puts a lot of pressure on political parties, and it may create divisions and discontent, but it also indicates ‘current ideologies guiding the major political parties currently represented in the Taiwanese legislature’ (Hioe, 2019). From the perspective of our research, we are primarily interested in the potential these parliamentarians have for contributing to Taiwan’s parliamentary diplomacy. Several at-​large legislators explained that they had more time to spend on international travel to promote topics of interest for Taiwan, and to connect with their peers abroad with similar portfolios.51 Other LY members argued that at-​large legislators do not represent anyone but the president, and as such, they are considered ‘junior’ to those directly elected. They do travel more, but they often do not have as much influence as directly elected parliamentarians; a junior member of the Legislative Yuan

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is less likely to introduce a policy proposal because he or she does not have proper standing in his or her party.52 An additional factor to be taken into consideration is that the two main political parties seem to have different views about the re​appointment of district legislators. In the DPP, there is an unwritten rule that a legislator-​at-​large can serve a maximum of two terms. This is one of the mechanisms of maintaining a balance of interests in the party. There is no such rule in the KMT. The former speaker of the Legislative Yuan, Wang Jin-​pyng, has been on KMT’s list for four terms.53 Another interviewee with good knowledge of selecting at-​large legislators has provided a frank opinion that gives a more sobering perspective on selecting at-​large legislators. She believes that the main selection criteria are the following: prospects of winning votes for the party, maintaining balance among factions in the party, attachment to corporate business and, last but not least, being in or out of favour of the party’s president. As she put it, “politics, rather than expertise plays a major role in determining the list of legislators-​at-​large … profession in domestic politics is important but second to votes and banknotes”.54 Therefore, a lot depends on the strategy of a given political party, its vision for where it wishes to move Taiwan and with which politicians, said one of our interlocutors, who agreed that ideally, one way to be more active in the international arena would be by a long-​term consecutive selection of at-​large legislators whose knowledge and expertise could help advance Taiwanese interests with foreign counterparts. In this regard, he concluded, the two major parties still have enough room to improve the selection process.55 These insights are important for our analysis of Taiwan’s parliamentary diplomacy. In theory, it would seem that opportunities to be active internationally for parliamentarians who come to the Legislative Yuan on party lists are much better, but in reality they face serious limitations: they seem to be considered second-​rate politicians because they do not have a constituency and are not directly accountable to the voters. Also, other criteria for their selection and the evaluation of their performance apply, such as how they can benefit the party in terms of gaining votes; whether they can contribute to Taiwan’s parliamentary diplomacy is less important. In this way, Taiwanese parties find themselves in a vicious circle: directly elected members of the Legislative Yuan do not have sufficient time to deal with international relations, and appointed parliamentarians lack domestic legitimacy to participate in international (parliamentary) relations. Let us add to this the high probability that many incumbents will not survive the next elections, as well as the large oscillations in the appointment of at-​large legislators as shown earlier. Local elections that take place two years after national elections, putting additional pressure on political parties to win voters’ support, is just another factor that forces parliamentarians

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to be more inward-​oriented.56 Oscillations in the selection of at-​large legislators also hint at the lack of awareness of how important it is to have knowledgeable parliamentarians in the Legislative Yuan. For example, one junior parliamentarian with professional experience who came to the Legislative Yuan in 2016 on the party list admitted that at the beginning she was not familiar with the inter-​parliamentary type of cooperation; however, during her mandate, she became more experienced and knowledgeable of international affairs. Therefore, she hoped that she might be selected for the next term (2020–​24), should her party be successful in the elections, to build upon her experience in inter-​parliamentary relations gained in the first four years.57 Her party was successful, yet she has remained a single-​term member of the Legislative Yuan as she was not selected. All these factors do not help to create a favourable environment for the development of parliamentary diplomacy in Taiwan. They do not stimulate the development of a type of politician who does not have to fear re-​election and can focus on areas of international relations relevant to Taiwan.58 As a result, a senior former diplomat and member of the cabinet has said he could not remember a single member of the Legislative Yuan who would be widely acknowledged for playing a particularly prominent role in pursuing Taiwan’s foreign policy goals. If most parliamentarians are not interested or do not find time to get involved in foreign policy then no results can be expected. The two main political parties must have a clear idea, he continued, what to do with parliamentary diplomacy. That currently does not seem to be the case. He contrasted the current situation with the KMT era. At that time, the party did not need to worry about support from the voters, so it could do the planning and think strategically. The moment one’s seat in the parliament is subject to competition, everything, including consistency and continuity (in foreign policy), becomes uncertain.59 Taiwan’s parliamentary diplomacy has a special character and is different from other democracies in yet another dimension: the role of the government. From Taiwan’s perspective, international parliamentary relations do not involve only inter-​parliamentary exchanges and communication initiated and organized by the Legislative Yuan, but also those (inter)parliamentary activities organized and carried out by the MOFA. Moreover, parliamentary diplomacy, which is normally in the domain of the legislative branch, has become one of the tools for the executive branch to implement Taiwan’s foreign policy interests. In other words, “parliamentary diplomacy in the language of the Legislative Yuan means a replacement for classic inter-​ governmental diplomacy”.60 The MOFA has been put in charge of coordinating parliamentary diplomacy since Lee Teng-​hui’s initiative was made public in 1993. In principle, the two branches should work well together because they share

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the same goal: to break through international isolation. Yet, this relationship is not always a harmonious one. Several issues concerning the cohabitation between the two institutions have been raised in our discussions with parliamentarians, diplomats (present and former) and other experts. The central one among them is the legacy of the KMT and dissatisfaction with MOFA’s alleged conservativism. Regarding the KMT legacy, the interviewees remind us that the diplomatic service had been controlled by the KMT for most of the time since Chiang Kai-​shek moved his government to Taiwan in 1949. The DPP is still a ‘newcomer’ in Taiwanese politics, and its presence in Taiwan’s foreign service is a work in progress. The MOFA is in a period of transition. The KMT is currently in retreat politically, but the diplomatic service cannot change overnight, even though politicians from the rival party, the DPP, are at the helm of the MOFA. Time is needed to build a pool of quality human resources able to represent modern Taiwan in the international arena, not just through the prism of interests of one party, but of Taiwan as a whole. For this ideal goal to be accomplished, all political parties must contribute. The DPP, as argued by our interlocutors, still needs to cover some ground before getting there. One of the interviewees said, of the current generation of DPP politicians, that “they are more nativist and less cosmopolitan than their KMT counterparts used to be”.61 The DPP is yet to develop international networks and skilled diplomats that would help its current government to represent Taiwan internationally, said another.62 The transition period in which the MOFA has found itself raises expectations and creates tensions at the same time, especially among parliamentarians from the DPP. Almost every LY member from this party whom we have interviewed has expressed disappointment with the MOFA. Some say that career diplomats have yet to accept parliamentarians as a constituent part of Taiwan’s parliamentary diplomacy. Parliamentarians can promote Taiwanese interests, and they see fewer obstacles in doing so than the MOFA –​they would certainly ‘dare’ more than ordinary diplomats could afford.63 One parliamentarian mentioned the organization of the visit of foreign parliamentarians as a case in point. In principle, those meetings have a template and substantive talks are part of them.64 But, others contend, the reality does not always match that template. Because it is responsible for the coordination of parliamentary diplomacy, the MOFA should pay more attention to substance, to inquire how individual visits benefit Taiwan and can therefore be considered as proof of active parliamentary diplomacy. Instead, visits organized by the MOFA, one interviewee said, are associated with receptions and banquets rather than substance. This is why she believed many Taiwanese parliamentarians invited to such events do not attend them.65 Another parliamentarian from the DPP explained that officials implementing the MOFA’s conservative approach were sometimes rather

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discouraging, for example, when they would instruct parliamentarians who visited countries abroad in an official capacity “not to take pictures of themselves showing where they travelled, not to give details from a visit on the web and the like”.66 Another LY member was given similar instructions ahead of her visit. She said that the main goal of the MOFA is to make sure “that the PRC is not offended”. In her opinion, the problem of the MOFA goes even deeper. Namely, she claimed that the influence of the KMT is visible in the training of diplomats and even “textbooks used there are pro-​KMT”.67 The lack of flexibility of the MOFA has been illustrated by another DPP who described MOFA–​organized travels abroad. According to her experience, “if the MOFA gives an initiative for visit, there is little a parliamentarian can do: everything is scheduled in advance”. She claims that visits organized in her capacity are better structured and with follow-​ups.68 Besides parliamentarians, other officials and experts who have talked to us have been critical about the MOFA’s role in coordinating parliamentary diplomacy. One sees limits in the MOFA’s ability to contribute to Taiwan’s parliamentary diplomacy because it is “still a very conservative institution, which finds it very difficult to adapt to political changes. It is perhaps even the most rigid of all ministries. The influence of the KMT is still very much part of it. It will not change very easily”.69 Other experts with deep knowledge of Taiwanese politics and society concurred. One of them has said that the conservative cadre still has a big influence in the MOFA. He argued that this needed not to be so because Taiwanese representative offices have plenty of possibilities at their disposal to facilitate inter-​parliamentary relations.70 Another interviewee said that the MOFA does too little for parliamentary diplomacy, although he saw the source of the problem more generally, not in the MOFA alone but Taiwanese society as a whole, for the latter is too internally oriented and not interested in international relations.71 Last but not least, one expert echoed criticism of those parliamentarians who complained that they had no influence on the agenda of parliamentary visits but, he added, that one should not ignore the fact that, in his opinion at least, parliamentary visits serve mostly for sightseeing anyway.72 Some of our interviewees, while critical of the MOFA’s handling of foreign parliamentary delegations visiting Taiwan, have reflected on suggestions for the ministry to improve the practising of parliamentary diplomacy. As has already been said, LY members face the harsh reality of isolation many times when visiting peers abroad. Their hosts do not dare to invite them officially to speak in their national parliaments. They meet in a cafeteria or some ‘secret places’ instead. On the other hand, when parliamentarians from abroad come to visit Taiwan, they receive a protocol that is appropriate for an official visit. The trouble is that many of them travel to Taiwan in order to break from the routine. They do not know much about the country.

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This problem needs to be addressed, one Taiwanese scholar has said; both visits of parliamentarians from abroad and those of LY members travelling overseas need to be better structured. Besides, he argued, Taiwan should prefer visits of smaller delegations, one or two members, and having concrete, informed talks with their guests, or hosts, with clear objectives.73 A senior official from the Legislative Yuan agrees. In his view, parliamentary trips are too loosely organized. There is some time spent on substantive talks, but a lot of time is spent on leisure, too. Only on some occasions does one see different strategies in place for the organization of parliamentary visits from abroad. The same advice applies to the organization of LY members’ trips abroad. The quality of these trips too often depends on the motivation of committee members74 or on the effort that individual parliamentarians make in preparing their delegations before and during the visit abroad.75 Officials in the MOFA and those with good knowledge of the work in the ministry see things differently. They argue that, above all, a lot depends on the interest and motivation of individual parliamentarians. No system can push a parliamentarian to work hard and prepare for a visit abroad.76 If a parliamentarian is proactive, the MOFA can connect personal motivation and institutional interest. As one parliamentarian with a focus on environmental protection has told us, his expertise helped him to cooperate closely with the ministry and its work on environmental issues.77 There should be more instances of such good practices, he said. In areas that are of particular importance for Taiwan such as health protection, the cooperation between the MOFA and members of the Legislative Yuan becomes crucial. In such instances, the motivation of parliamentarians for being involved in international relations to help the MOFA and contributing to Taiwan’s interest in participating in the WHO should not be a question of if but how. Parliamentarians who know they can count on support from professional networks from their previous jobs or positions should be particularly motivated to do so. As one parliamentarian described the ‘sectoral diplomacy’ in the field of health protection, Taiwanese parliamentarians with a medical background and government officials put their ideological differences aside (albeit not always successfully78) and work with their colleagues abroad, fellow physicians and others to contribute to the growing international awareness that Taiwan should cooperate with the WHO in some capacity.79 However, some of our interviewees warn that when viewed from the perspective of the executive, an effective participation of LY members in Taiwan’s parliamentary diplomacy has limits. They explain that working with parliamentarians is a sensitive issue, politically and strategically. Due to unpredictable elections and frequent changes in the Legislative Yuan, the MOFA is reluctant to rely on parliamentarians and give them a more important role in the conduct of parliamentary diplomacy. It is not always

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easy for the MOFA to develop some kind of cooperation, let alone share sensitive information, with the LY members coming and going from a parliament where holding on to two terms in office is already considered a success.80 As far as foreign travel is concerned, they say, one should not overlook that, when they are abroad, LY members are perceived as the official representatives of Taiwan, especially in the eyes of the PRC. This is the main reason why the MOFA insists that parliamentarians keep a low profile during a visit if they are to accomplish the objectives of the trip. The public receives only brief information about planned visits (the same approach is applied if a parliamentarian from abroad visits Taiwan). The often-​heard impression that these visits are mostly about leisure and no substance is wrong, according to officials from the MOFA responsible for the coordination of parliamentary visits. Substantive discussions are an essential part of these visits but details are not shared. Reporting about visits of Taiwanese parliamentarians when they go abroad is classified, because of the fear of pressure from the PRC. All parliamentarians whose visits abroad have been coordinated by the MOFA have debriefings with the Ministry when they return.81 When organizing parliamentary visits from abroad, the officials at the MOFA say, the ministry takes the potential of parliamentary diplomacy and its benefits for Taiwan very seriously. Not every foreign parliamentarian is invited to Taiwan. The MOFA and Taiwan’s heads of representative offices play a key role is in the process of selecting visiting parliamentarians.82 The selection is based on a thorough assessment of potential candidates: what their role is in the domestic politics of the country in question; whether they are friendly to Taiwan; and what their role might be in helping Taiwan in the future.83 Representative offices may receive suggestions from LY members as to who to invite, or they may consult with them on the individuals they are considering inviting, but the final decision about sponsorship of a proposed parliamentary visit from abroad rests with the MOFA. To summarize, the MOFA is not much different from ministries of foreign affairs around the world. Most of them are seen as conservative institutions, wary of quick changes. However, each ministry has its specifics, and this also applies to Taiwan. As we have said many times, the MOFA works in unenviable conditions, as Taiwan is cut off from the world of recognized states. Additionally, to understand the MOFA one needs to add another dimension: history. The role of the MOFA in the development of Taiwan’s parliamentary diplomacy cannot be studied without reflecting on the impact of the decades-​long exclusive presence of the KMT and its cadre in the ministry. Listening to LY members and officials, we have concluded that the dissatisfaction with the continuously strong presence of the ‘KMT spirit’ in the MOFA does exist. Yet, one should not disregard the positive

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side of KMT dominance. As the case of Taiwan’s presence in the US has shown, the representation of Taiwanese interests was more efficient before democratic changes in Taiwan. This is a challenge for the KMT and the DPP: how to make sure that their domestic differences do not translate into an incoherent foreign policy. Indeed, what matters for Taiwan is the future. Our findings from the interviews we have carried out suggest that the cooperation between the Legislative Yuan and the MOFA needs to be constructive. We believe that this will be the case in the future, for three reasons. First, because it will be a logical follow-​up in case Taiwan continues to lose diplomatic allies to the PRC. Second, because as far as foreign affairs are concerned, especially as regards the One China Policy, the gap in position between the DPP and the KMT is not as big as it used to be. And third, because Taiwan has no choice if it wants to play a meaningful role in the international arena; the gradual gaining of mutual trust and coordinated operation of the Legislative Yuan and the MOFA is a precondition for, and contributes to, an efficient implementation of Taiwan’s foreign policy.

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7

Conclusion The modern international community is made up of two categories of states: those that are universally recognized, and those that are not. Some of the non-​recognized states try (in vain) to convince more states to recognize them, others are unlikely ever to be recognized. We are reminded every now and then –​such as during the current COVID-​19 pandemic –​that isolation and limited representation in international relations may have serious negative consequences for these countries. This unfortunate division is reflected in the academic literature on parliamentary diplomacy. We learn from it that parliamentarians and parliamentary diplomacy can play an important role in international relations, but that these findings are limited to the world of recognized states. We know very little about how parliamentary diplomacy works when it includes parliaments and parliamentarians from unrecognized and unrepresented states. The book has sought to fill in this research gap. Some of the findings will not surprise anyone. The short overview of parliamentary diplomacy of unrepresented and unrecognized states has shown that in most of them its development is, at best, at a rudimentary level. The lack of universal recognition is undoubtedly the main obstacle, but other factors also restrict possibilities for parliaments and parliamentarians of unrepresented and unrecognized states to be active internationally. The majority of states we have studied are considered partially free in terms of political freedoms they ensure for their citizens, or not free at all. This, in turn, questions the legitimacy of their parliamentary representatives. Further, their isolation reduces diplomatic tools they can use to pursue their foreign policy goals. Participating in parliamentary diplomacy is particularly difficult for them because they have either insufficient contacts or rather limited financial means to send parliamentarians abroad to meet their peers from other states. The lack of funding causes the transfer of tasks originally assigned to parliamentarians on to their governments’ representative offices abroad.

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Such is the situation in the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) and Somaliland. One group of parliamentarians is particularly limited internationally, because of their dependence on the so-​called patron states. Governments and parliaments in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria depend on protection by the Russian Federation. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and its parliament depend on Turkey. The government and parliamentarians in Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) are in a particularly bad situation. They share the fate of Somaliland (not being recognized by any state) and they depend on the fragile peace in the region that followed the first Nagorno-Karabakh war which ended with a truce in 1994. At the time of writing, the situation in the region has rapidly deteriorated, because Azerbaijan launched the so-​called second Nagorno-Karabakh war in September 2020. As for other countries, Kosovo has been recognized by about 100 states. It already has concrete experience with the exercising of parliamentary diplomacy, but universal global recognition may well take more time –​not even all member states of the European Union recognize it. Palestine is an outlier in this group, but for the wrong reasons. It is a widely, albeit not universally, recognized state, with the best access to governments and parliamentary institutions among all the unrepresented and unrecognized states. Unfortunately, Palestine is yet to explore the potential of its inter-​parliamentary networks; the last election of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) took place in 2006. To some extent, parliaments from partly recognized states (Palestine, SADR and Kosovo) cooperate with parliamentary institutions: national parliaments (through friendship groups), IPAs (the PLC is a member of the IPU) and regional parliaments (the Sahrawi National Council is a member of the Pan-African Parliament; the PLC is a member of the Arab Parliament; and the parliamentarians from Kosovo are members of the South East European Cooperation Process Parliamentary Assembly). Occasionally they meet with representatives of POIGOs, notably the European Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Other parliaments on our list are not completely isolated from parliamentary institutions abroad, but their contact is much more limited. Taiwan’s parliament, the Legislative Yuan, has been chosen as a case to be studied separately. Taiwan stands out from all the other unrepresented and unrecognized states combined in terms of many indicators: the size of the economy, the strength of its military, history and a diplomatic tradition. Hence the question one can ask following the title of this book: can a country such as Taiwan at least to some extent address its isolation by developing, engaging in and relying on parliamentary diplomacy? The short answer is yes, but with some important qualifications.

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Parliamentary diplomacy of Taiwan is based on its rich experience with various types of diplomacies to protect its interests. It began to develop in the early 1990s, as Taiwan was transforming from an authoritarian state to a democracy. However, this has not been an ordinary development. Despite democratization, Taiwan’s position has not changed –​ it has remained an isolated state, in fact even more so because of the growing economic and military power of the PRC and its increasingly assertive tone against Taiwan in the context of the One China principle. This difficult situation explains why parliamentary diplomacy as understood in Taiwan is different from the mainstream thought present in the literature on parliamentary diplomacy. In Taiwan, the executive and the legislative branches work closely together, with the former most often taking the lead. The Taiwanese government has created an infrastructure –​the Office of Parliamentary Affairs –​to coordinate and support inter-​parliamentary activities. The government is the one that primarily invites parliamentarians from abroad to visit Taiwan, hoping that they would develop a positive attitude towards the country, and ‘spread the word’ about it in their home countries as well as internationally. In Taiwan’s conception of parliamentary diplomacy, domestic parlia­ mentarians play a lesser role. The fact that the government is such an important player in the conduct of parliamentary diplomacy, and that it is fully expected of LY members to represent Taiwan’s interests is, in the ordinary world, more often than not associated with non-​democratic regimes. What we have here, however, is yet more proof demonstrating that things work differently in the world of unrecognized and unrepresented states. Therefore, whenever we talk about the considerable role of Taiwanese government in parliamentary diplomacy we should keep in mind that Taiwan is a democracy and that its parliamentarians are elected according to all international standards on free and fair elections. Despite Taiwan being isolated from the rest of the world, free and fair democratic elections are the source of legitimacy for LY members to communicate with democratically elected parliamentarians around the world. When we introduced parliamentary diplomacy in Chapter 1, we posited that parliamentarians might fill in the gap in communication between recognized and unrecognized states. In the concrete case of Taiwan, we have found out that LY members are active and seek to contribute to easing Taiwan’s isolation. They are not always able to do so, however. Restricted access to prominent IPAs such as the IPU and the PGA prevents LY members from networking with parliamentarians across the globe; it affects their ability to forge inter-​parliamentary cooperation and does not allow them to participate and share good practices in inter-​parliamentary activities aiming to address regional and global problems.

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POIGOs offer more opportunities for Taiwan to employ parliamentary diplomacy. The Legislative Yuan has an observer status in the Central American Parliament, a parliamentary organ of the Central American Integration System (Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana –​SICA). The duration of this status might depend on how long members of the SICA (Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua) keep up their diplomatic relations with Taiwan. On the other hand, the European Union and its members do not recognize Taiwan, but the European Parliament (EP), a parliamentary organ of the EU, is seen from Taipei as an important ally. The EP is known as a supporter of democracies and democratic movements around the world, whether or not formally recognized by other states. It often adopts resolutions to raise public awareness of issues, and MEPs have demonstrated their support for Taiwan. Asking questions is one of the ways used by MEPs to make sure that Taiwan is brought to the attention of European policy m ​ akers. Support for Taiwan’s participation in key international organizations such as the WHO is often voiced in these questions. Almost all EP resolutions are supportive of Taiwan, but there is also some dissatisfaction with Taipei, especially concerning the death penalty, which Taiwan continues to practise. MEPs often visit Taiwan, which from Taipei’s perspective is seen as an important element of parliamentary diplomacy. On the other hand, we have found out that there has been very little contribution from the LY and its members to Taiwan–​EP relations. The LY has de facto limited itself to receiving delegations of MEPs travelling to Taiwan. Its members do not exchange visits with their colleagues in Brussels, and no EP–​Taiwan friendship group was created in the 2016–​2020 LY. Taiwan can count on support from the European Parliament on many issues, but, from the perspective of our research, it is also important to stress that our analysis could not trace much LY agency in the process of considering and eventually adopting Taiwan-​friendly resolutions. PAs are important for Taiwan because they admit only those political parties as members whose countries are democracies with free and fair elections. This is certainly true for Liberal International (LI), of which the DPP is a member, and the International Democrat Union (IDU) with the KMT as its member. The PRC is not a democratic state, so the NPC does not have access to these PAs. This gives a lot of political space to the DPP and the KMT to initiate decisions in support of Taiwan. Indeed, PAs have demonstrated on several occasions their readiness to support Taiwan in dire situations, such as during political threats to the island that come from the PRC, often reinforced by a demonstration of military power. The IDU and the LI are active in extending support to Taiwan on other issues of vital

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importance for the island as well, for example, to advocate for Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the WHO. Concerning the advocacy of interests and the implementation of goals relevant for Taiwan as a result of interactions with other national parliaments (parliament-​to-​parliament cooperation), the Legislative Yuan and its members can demonstrate some success stories. Official visits of LY delegations, headed by the speaker to South Korea and the US, could be considered as successful because the meetings took place at the level of speakers of parliament, between two states that formally do not recognize each other. The visit of the speaker of the Legislative Yuan to the British Parliament also belongs to this category. He met, among others, the Lord Speaker and the Deputy Speaker of the House of Commons. A visit to Taiwan in August 2020 of the Czech Senate delegation, composed of 90 members and headed by the Speaker of the Senate, had particular value for Taiwan because the delegation did not come from a major power. Such visits and contacts between Taiwanese parliamentarians and their colleagues abroad are very important for Taiwan’s parliamentary diplomacy, for two reasons. First, because they demonstrate that, in spite of formal adherence to the One China principle, states are not united in completely isolating Taiwan, and would welcome its better representation in the international arena. Second, because parliamentary visits like these put into practice the policy in international relations that has been the motivation of this book as well: to build a bridge and enhance communication between an isolated state and the world of recognized states to discuss problems of common concern as well as opportunities for further cooperation. In addition to visits of parliamentary delegations to parliaments in other states, another way to develop good relations between national parliaments is through the formation of friendship groups. The number of friendship groups established in the Legislative Yuan has been on the rise since 2012. The figures are less encouraging, however, if we look at the number of Taiwan-​friendly groups established in parliaments around the world. Unless Taiwan has established diplomatic relations with a country, those friendship groups are likely to be informal. In Portugal, the requirement to formally establish a friendship group is the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two respective countries. In France, the requirement is that a country for which a friendship group is to be formally created must be a member of the UN. Not surprisingly, given the historical background, in particular because of the adoption of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) in 1979, the Legislative Yuan has strongest relations with the US Congress. This relationship has been neatly summarized by a scholar at the Academia Sinica in the following way: the US Congress is responsible for the TRA, a security

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guarantee for Taiwan; Congress produces initiatives important for Taiwan; and Congress exercises international pressure to allow Taiwan to participate in international institutions, such as the World Health Assembly (WHA). In addition, the US Congress plays the role of a socializing agent. In the past, it exerted pressure on Taiwan during the dictatorship and supported the democratic movement. Nowadays, it assists Taiwan in protecting democracy, to keep up its credibility against the communist regime in the PRC.1 This assistance has been especially important for Taiwan during the Trump administration (2016–​2020). The US Congress takes the implementation of the TRA very seriously, even if that requires a confrontation with the US administration. If Congress feels that the president appears willing to renege on commitments to Taiwan to keep good relations with the PRC, and the government in Taiwan feels nervous about this, Congress will react. The more the PRC voices threats against Taiwan, the more proactive the US Congress is likely to be, as demonstrated with the series of pro-​Taiwan bills adopted in the period between 2018 and 2020. In the context of the strong constitutional position of the US Congress –​the Senate plays an important role in the foreign policy of the US –​the traditional bipartisanship on Taiwan issues in both the House and the Senate matters a great deal. Some suggest that members of the Legislative Yuan have played a role in congressional decision-making processes and even in the establishment of the congressional Taiwan Caucuses (Hickey, 2007: 55). In our research, an impact on congressional decision-making that would originate from the Legislative Yuan or individual members of the Legislative Yuan has only been proven partially, but not insignificantly. Namely, it appears that individual members of the Legislative Yuan can co-​create a political climate in which it is easier for Taiwan to pursue certain foreign policy preferences with the help of the US Congress and/​or the administration. The assistance of DPP parliamentarians in convincing Washington that Taiwan’s policies under the Tsai government would not provoke tensions in the Taiwan Strait is an example of a little known, yet a highly valuable, parliamentary contribution to the maintenance of stability in the Taiwan Strait. Such examples indicate that LY members should be more aware that the doors of the US Congress are always open to them, all the more so if these visits are well ​prepared in the sense that they are primarily substantial, rather than solely cordial. Indeed, frequent, well-​organized and well-​prepared meetings between LY members and members of the US Congress seem like an opportunity waiting to be used more efficiently. Unlike in the case of the EP, members of the Legislative Yuan do visit the US, but this fact needs to be put in context. Compared with the number of visits by a member or members of the US Congress to Taiwan, there have been fewer visits of LY members to

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the US Congress. For every LY member travelling to the US, two members of the US Congress travel to Taiwan. In principle, this would make sense because the US Congress is much bigger than the Legislative Yuan. However, given the disproportionate attention paid by Taiwan to sponsoring visits of congressional delegations, one might wonder if it were not useful to invest in visits of Taiwanese parliamentarians to the US, to advocate for Taiwan on the spot. At any rate, the concrete value of visits from Washington is difficult to establish and it may even be debatable, but it should not be dismissed –​ they are still important for Taiwan. These visits may seem mostly cordial, barely going beyond the exchange of views and expressing mutual support. For many members of the US Congress, visits to Taiwan seem like a good opportunity to ‘take a break’ from daily routine. But they also symbolize good relations between Taiwan and the US, as well as between the Legislative Yuan and the US Congress. Frequent congressional visits to Taiwan emphasize the consistency in the resolve of the US Congress to protect Taiwan, and many congressional actions, particularly during the Trump administration, are a demonstration of that resolve. Internationally, options for LY members to advocate for Taiwan are very limited. The PRC has developed a structure within the structure of the international community, in which Taiwan’s (and its representatives’, including parliamentarians’) access to international actors (states, international governmental organizations, even INGOs), its participation in dealing with practical international problems (non-​participation in the WHO is an example), and even its participation in international mechanisms designed for the maintenance of international peace and security (for instance, crime prevention, conflict resolution) are close to impossible. The PRC has developed a monitoring system through its embassies, which keep on reminding host countries not to develop relations with Taiwan. Furthermore, the PRC builds up its institutional influence by seeking to place as many of its representatives as possible into senior posts in international organizations and is rather successful in these efforts (Lynch and Graner, 2019; Drake, 2020). The PRC’s grip on Taiwan affects international activities of LY members as well. Namely, the interest of parliamentarians abroad to create Taiwan-​ friendly groups does not match the interest of LY members in organizing friendship groups in their parliament. At least in part, this is connected with the risk of damaging relations with the PRC that many states, including those in Southeast Asia, do not seem to be willing to take. Still, there are exceptions. Some friendship groups, for example, in Japan and the United Kingdom, are rather active. Nevertheless, that the PRC controls the international environment to neutralize, if not eliminate, Taiwan’s presence in international relations is a tough challenge.

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Beijing’s behaviour is not a historical precedent. The PRC simply does what a superpower does. It uses the opportunity to exercise its growing structural power in the way the US has been behaving since 1945. The difference is that, for the most part, the targets of the US are, or have been, recognized states, which, for example, could activate international organizations for help. Taiwan does not have that possibility, which requires extra efforts from Taipei in implementing its foreign policy goals by resorting to parliamentarians. This brings us to an important set of findings regarding the development of Taiwan’s parliamentary diplomacy. Besides difficulties LY members encounter as they seek to be engaged as actors in international (parliamentary) relations, several factors limit the LY members’ capacity to act internationally in the domestic environment as well. Paradoxically, Taiwan’s evolution from an authoritarian state towards democracy weakens Taiwan’s ability to implement its foreign policy. As in any other mature democracy which gives power to voters to elect their representatives, voters expect them to cater to their needs. This, in turn, means that the LY members who have been directly elected spend 90 per cent or more of their time dealing with local affairs. They have very little time available to be active internationally. The result of transitioning from authoritarianism to democracy is also the introduction of a multi-​party system, with two main political parties instead of one, the DPP and the KMT (the latter had dominated Taiwan before democratization). They compete on different political platforms domestically, sometimes they export their differences internationally. This ‘export’ goes primarily to the US, Taiwan’s strongest ally. As democracy was shaping up in Taiwan, and the DPP posed an increasing threat to the domination of the KMT, members of the US Congress and officials in the administration needed to listen to two different narratives of Taiwan’s foreign policy –​a striking difference in comparison with the KMT era, where the one-​party system did not allow for different versions of Taiwan’s positions. Different domestic views and interests are the lifeblood of democracies, but they may be somewhat detrimental when differences take place in a democratic country whose statehood is contested and its future existence is an uncertain one. The competition for domestic and international attention by both political parties is closely connected with tensions that occur in the processes of formulation and implementation of Taiwan’s foreign policy. Some attribute these tensions to differences between the DPP and the KMT about the 1992 Consensus, others complain about the inability of the MOFA to adapt to the post-​Cold War situation. The survival of Taiwan as a de facto state undoubtedly depends on consistency and credibility of its foreign policy and on its ability to communicate the contents of this policy internationally. A constructive relationship between parliamentarians and the MOFA is

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necessary for achieving such consistency. At the same time, certain realities must be taken into account, such as that, unlike parliamentarians, Taiwan’s governmental representatives (de facto ambassadors) reside in the countries where Taiwan has its representative offices. Because the fate of unrecognized and unrepresented states can change overnight (as the developments in the Nagorno-Karabakh region at the time of writing seem to be proving), it is vital that Taiwanese diplomats live in the most important capitals in the world and be in constant touch with all key institutions there, including the parliamentary ones. In the context of parliamentary diplomacy, we can identify certain similarities between Taiwan and other unrepresented and unrecognized states we have analysed in this book. Their inter-​parliamentary communications do not rely (solely) on parliamentarians but also on permanent representatives abroad. In the case of Somaliland and the SADR, people’s representatives barely travel abroad and meet parliamentarians from other countries –​they rely on governmental representatives. Parliamentarians from Kosovo are more independent actors, and they have proven the ability to forge inter-​ parliamentary links. Taiwanese parliamentarians have good opportunities to travel abroad, but they do not always use them. An excellent case in point is the European Parliament, which is a parliamentary institution of significant relevance for Taiwan, but parliamentary visits from the LY to meet MEPs in Brussels are quite rare. Of course, that does not mean the end of parliamentary diplomacy with regards to the EP. In this case, the MOFA and its representative office in Brussels do most of the work to facilitate communications with MEPs who support Taiwan. The Taiwanese government, like other governments of unrepresented and unrecognized states, prefers visits of foreign parliamentarians to Taiwan and not the other way around. The main reason for this seems to be that LY members stand little chance of being re-​elected, let alone serving several terms. In such circumstances, it is difficult to entrust them with important roles in parliamentary diplomacy and share with them sensitive information. The focus of Taiwan on receiving visits from foreign parliamentarians is unparalleled. The Legislative Yuan, for example, receives about 6,000 visits from 80 countries every year. The costs of visits are often paid for by Taiwan. Many of the visitors are parliamentarians.2 These visits are the essence of what Taiwan’s government understands as parliamentary diplomacy. Compared with these figures, foreign trips by members of the Legislative Yuan are a rare occurrence.3 The rationale behind this approach to parliamentary diplomacy is the hope that foreign parliamentarians might develop a sense of fondness for Taiwan and join advocacy for its better access to international

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(parliamentary) relations. The effectiveness of this approach is impossible to measure; even officials at the MOFA would admit that. If the main political parties in Taiwan are to play a greater role in parliamentary diplomacy and would want more parliamentarians from Taiwan to visit countries abroad rather than just receiving foreign parliamentarians who are more or less motivated to do something for Taiwan on a long-​term basis, they would need to think strategically about their representatives in parliament and their qualifications to be on par with MOFA officials. The opportunity for this lies in the selection of at-​large legislators. Thinking strategically means deciding that a certain parliamentarian should keep his or her seat earned by the party from proportional votes for a longer t​erm and that some of those parliamentarians should be specialized in foreign policy and international relations. The safety of his or her seat over the years can help that parliamentarian to develop expertise in international relations and to earn a reputation at home and abroad, including through more frequent visits and networking with peers from national parliaments and other parliamentary institutions. Our interlocutors from the Legislative Yuan have confirmed that the LY needs motivated, skilled parliamentarians, able to speak foreign languages, who would be encouraged to work long​ term in areas of particular interest to Taiwan. While not all parliamentarians would agree with this view, the rapid development of science and technology and increased diversity of actors who want to influence events in the international community calls for a new type of parliamentarians, not just in Taiwan. Parliamentary parochialism, with elected representatives focusing exclusively on domestic issues and the local interests of their constituents, may gradually become unsustainable. Knowledgeable, well-​networked and skilled parliamentarians should assume more responsibility if their party and their country are to survive domestically and internationally. We conclude with a note on the potential of LY members as contributors to Taiwan’s parliamentary diplomacy. Parliamentary diplomacy as we know it from the world of recognized states is inaccessible to Taiwan. Nevertheless, Taiwan’s parliamentarians manage to get involved in international (parliamentary) relations, directly or indirectly. They have organized a range of friendship groups aimed at forging links with national parliaments. They are active in PAs. The European Parliament and the US Congress have delivered strong support as Taiwan’s allies. They, particularly the US Congress, shoulder a lot of burden for the LY members’ efforts to advocate for Taiwan. This needs to be underscored because the support of the US Congress is of vital importance not just for the LY but for Taiwan as a whole. Taiwan is a democracy, but not a regular democracy –​it does not have access to the world of universally recognized states. This is why in Taiwan, parliamentary diplomacy is exercised by both the executive and

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the legislative branches. Both branches must work together, with a single purpose: how to ensure maximum continuity in the implementation of parliamentary diplomacy. The latter should not be just about visits of foreign parliamentarians to Taiwan, although this is how a casual observer of Taiwan’s international relations might see it, based on the data available to the public. It should be much more about domestic parliamentarians visiting other countries assisting their government in advocating for Taiwan. Following such a path is never going to be easy. We have indicated that the PRC factor is an objective problem, but Taiwanese parliamentarians also face many problems at home that do not allow them to be more active internationally. These are the challenges Taiwanese politicians need to address if they hope to develop a stronger parliamentary diplomacy and ensure more active participation of Taiwanese parliamentarians in international (parliamentary) relations. This study has shown that parliamentary diplomacy has the potential to contribute to filling in the gap that exists between the two worlds, the one of recognized and represented states and the one composed of unrecognized and unrepresented states and entities. The case of Taiwan, which faces a real challenge from the PRC, determined to see through the completion of the One China principle whereby the use of force to accomplish this goal is not excluded, has taught us a lot. For example, we have seen that parliamentary diplomacy as a foreign policy tool cannot address or solve problems on its own, but always in cooperation with (parliamentary) institutions at home and abroad. Even in Taiwan, which as a democracy in isolation has to organize and conduct its foreign policy in a different way to universally recognized democracies, parliamentary diplomacy cannot be conducted by the executive. The development of parliamentary diplomacy should also rely on input from LY members, especially those with expertise and experience in international relations. LY members complain that the Taiwanese media pay more attention to visiting parliamentarians from abroad than to Taiwanese parliamentarians travelling overseas. We reiterate that it should be the other way around and that the public image of the parliamentary dimension in Taiwan’s foreign policy is also incomplete. For example, the public should be more aware of the fact that LY members tend to be active in international relations and seek to interact with their peers in defiance of the structure within the structure of the international community imposed on them by the PRC, which considers LY members as government officials and studiously prevents them appearing in foreign countries in any official capacity. One should also keep emphasizing that when visiting abroad Taiwanese parliamentarians are often not allowed to meet their hosts, fellow parliamentarians, on the premises of national parliaments but in alternative places such as private

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clubs or cafeterias. This is not how a parliamentarian should be treated, but this is the reality of the One China principle; this is the price LY members often seem willing to pay to ease Taiwan’s isolation. LY members tend to travel abroad with the logistical support of the MOFA and its representative offices. This cooperation may not always be optimal, but one has to be fair: both LY members and MOFA diplomats complain about each other, but they also complement each other. In the case of the EP, most of the parliamentary diplomacy from Taiwan’s side is run through the diplomats in the Brussels representative office. The picture is different as regards the US Congress, which in comparison with the EP has a much more dynamic relationship with LY members. However, in Washington, too, the MOFA plays a crucial role. The TECRO is the main pillar of Taiwan’s parliamentary diplomacy concerning the US and the US Congress. This is where decisions and policies made in Taipei are implemented, though we have shown that LY members are not just bystanders in the development of parliamentary diplomacy in the context of US–​Taiwan relations. By making a brief reference to experience with Japanese and British peers we have indicated that the same seems to be true for LY members’ other inter-​ parliamentary contacts. However, these cases would deserve much more detailed research. Bi-​khim Hsiao, a former LY member from the DPP and the new head of the TECRO in Washington has offered a comparison between the role of parliamentarians and diplomats: ‘the greatest difference between serving as a legislator and as ambassador is that the pressures are immeasurably greater … successes and failures as a lawmaker were personal. But the task of handling [Taiwan’s] relationship with the US only permits success’ (TNL, 2020). The findings in this book suggest a slight disagreement with this statement. Success and failure are relative terms that differ by individual perception. Within limitations, partly driven by the grip of the PRC, partly by domestic factors, Taiwanese parliamentarians have responsibility that goes beyond a mere personal one. They are actors in international (parliamentary) relations who, albeit mostly indirectly, contribute to the development of Taiwan’s parliamentary diplomacy and in this way also to the reaching out of Taiwan to the world of recognized states and their parliaments. Other unrepresented and unrecognized states face additional challenges that affect the mobility of parliamentarians and the development of their parliamentary diplomacy. They may be too poor to participate in international relations, they may be heavily dependent on patron states or they cannot participate in international relations because their parliaments do not work. But even in such cases, the key message of this research remains the same. Parliamentary diplomacy as a field of research continues to develop, and the road to comprehensive knowledge in this area is a long one. There

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is still so much to learn. Hopefully, the accumulation of knowledge will extend beyond unrepresented and unrecognized states and to many other unrepresented entities and their elected representatives. They, too, should be able to use parliamentary diplomacy as a tool in their efforts to reach out to their colleagues beyond the walls of isolation. New practical experience will be collected in the future and, as this process is ongoing, the exploration of the potential of parliamentary diplomacy and how parliamentarians from two parts of the world build confidence in each other and contribute to the solution of problems of common concern is hopefully going to lead to some changes in the minds of policy ​makers. Looking at the particular case of Taiwan, the motivation to add more, or improve existing knowledge, is even bigger. Taiwan may be an unrepresented and unrecognized state, yet it is more democratic than many states that enjoy full recognition, membership in the United Nations and full access to international institutions. Taiwan has a long history. It has also gathered a lot of international experience in the field of parliamentary diplomacy. It deserves to be studied as a case that demonstrates how important it is to build bridges between the world of unrecognized and unrepresented states on one side and that of recognized and represented ones on the other, and how important the building of these bridges is to maintain international peace and stability and to solve transnational problems (including the ongoing pandemic) jointly. In such a context, let us imagine what seems the unthinkable: that the PRC seizes an opportunity to earn the much-​ needed respect and confidence of the world by finding an arrangement with Taiwan that would lead to a cohabitation that respects the will of the people in Taiwan and its way of life as a democracy.

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Notes Chapter 1 1

2

3 4 5

6

7

Note that in this book we use full names and acronyms interchangeably, depending on the context and paying attention to the clarity of the text. The question of what exactly constitutes an ‘international community’ can be the subject of academic debates (Ellis, 2009). In this book the definition offered by Georges Abi-​Saab will be followed. He uses the words ‘in the sense of community of states, but without ignoring the social forces, which make those states act or which transcend them sometimes by acting through alternative circuits of their own construction’ (Abi-​Saab, 1998: 249). In contrast, the PRC’s 2019 score is only 10/​100 (Freedom House, 2020). For a map see https://​unpo.org/​nations-​peoples [accessed 8 September 2020]. According to Article 1 of the Convention, the state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states. The official name of Taiwan is ‘The Republic of China’. Unless the usage of the official name is needed for the development of our arguments, we have decided to go with the name Taiwan, because the country is best known worldwide by it. Available from: https://​www.mofa.gov.tw/​en/​AlliesIndex.aspx?n=DF6F8F246049F8D 6&sms=76B7230ADF29736 [accessed 9 September 2020].

Chapter 2 1

2

An example is former research physicist Danaan Parry. During the Cold War he was bringing ‘numerous groups of Soviet citizens to the United States and American groups to the Soviet Union … “to melt the fear and prejudice that has often divided the people of these countries” ’ (Pace, 2007: 107). The literature that focuses on how private persons who prepare common ground for (stalled) official negotiations to resume often refers to Track Two diplomacy. Jones defines it as unofficial dialogues, typically between two antagonistic parties. Such dialogues can be facilitated by an impartial third party. This kind of diplomacy involves ‘individuals with some close connections to their respective official communities, focused on cooperative efforts to explore new ways to resolve differences over, or discuss new approaches to, policy-​relevant issues’ (Jones, 2015: 24). Joseph V. Montville, who is said to have first used this term, described Track Two diplomacy in a more simple way: as a process in which ‘citizens could take some action rather than simply being bystanders while the grown-​up governments acted like jerks’ (Homans, 2011).

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On football diplomacy, see contributions posted on the web page of the Center for Public Diplomacy at the University of Southern California. Available from: https://w ​ ww. uscpublicdiplomacy.org/​tags/​football-​diplomacy [accessed 17 June 2020]. For example, our experience with interviewing parliamentarians from Europe, the Americas and Asia, which goes as far back as 2005, shows that the ‘promotion of mutual understanding’ between parliamentarians and their respective countries is considered the essence and the core purpose of conducting inter-​parliamentary relations. Varlen refers to the April–​June 1916 trip of the Russian parliamentary delegation to England, France and Italy to strengthen relations between Russia and the other Entente powers (Varlen, 2019: 57). Rusk, D. 1955. ‘Parliamentary Diplomacy –​Debate vs. Negotiation’. World Affairs Interpreter Summer 26(2): 121–​122 (in Thompson, 1965: 396). In this regard, and referring to the League of Nations, Berridge used the term ‘open diplomacy’ beside ‘parliamentary diplomacy’ (Berridge, 2015: 169, 200). See also Kaufmann, whose definition of conference diplomacy is inspired by Rusk’s definition of parliamentary diplomacy (Kaufmann, 1996: Chapter 1). He admitted that when he was Foreign Minister, ‘parliamentary diplomacy at least initially looked like an intrusion into the exclusive area of diplomacy reserved to the State and to the national diplomatic corps led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. This, of course, was a simplistic view …’ (Frendo, 2012: 1). ‘Parliamentary diplomacy can supplement government diplomacy because members of parliament … are not bound by the positions taken by the government and can transcend their own government’s interests’ (Hamilton, 2012). See, for example, Heiling, who analyses the role of Martti Ahtisaari, the former president of Finland, in resolving the conflict between the Free Aceh Movement and the government of Indonesia (Heiling, 2008), and Mapendere, who mentions former US president Jimmy Carter and his Carter Center as an institution that practises Track One and a Half Diplomacy (Mapendere, 2000). For other examples of TOAH parliamentary diplomacy, see Goumenos (2018: 5–​69). Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English. Available from: https://​www.ldoceonline. com/​dictionary/​parliament [accessed 8 March 2020]. These are: parliamentary contribution to inter-governmental negotiations; monitoring government activities in international relations; following up on international agreements; information gathering on international issues and organizations; dissemination of information on international issues and organizations; citizens’ involvement in parliamentary decision-​making; activities of parliamentary diplomacy; coordination of relations with inter-​parliamentary organizations; strengthening links with the IPU; actions taken in support of global development programmes (such as Millennium Development Goals, underscored in this report); and examination of development programmes. This was the case with British and Argentinian parliamentarians who, according to a member of Switzerland’s Council of States, used the IPU to establish the first contact in the wake of the Falklands War (Stavridis and Pace, 2011: 76). Referring to the experience of his colleague who received criticism for visiting countries in the Middle East that had strained relations with the United Kingdom, a former member of the British House of Commons had this to say: ‘Sometimes, it is not appreciated that the only way of restoring diplomatic links with such countries is by using the contacts that may have been established by such MPs’ (Brown, 2000a: 3). During the outbreak of the Iraq war, Congressman Alcee Hastings was in regular touch with Secretaries of State Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice, and with Assistant Secretary

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17

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of State for Europe Daniel Fried, to discuss ways of reaching out to participating states of the Organization on Security and Co-​operation in Europe (OSCE). This was the time when the US government could not ‘cherry-​pick’ forums in which it could explain its foreign policy. Hastings’ importance increased when he became president of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in 2004 (and re-​elected in 2005). Information about the Helsinki Commission is available from: https://​www.csce.gov/​ [accessed 16 March 2020]. The US Congress is a case of a parliament with very few friendship groups. Part of the reason is the internal organization of the Congress, where parliamentarians gather in country or issue-​related groupings (caucuses) (House of Representatives, 2020). For example, the Global Organization of Parliamentarians Against Corruption (GOPAC) organizes annual conferences –​multi-​day events, which are composed of workshops and ‘meetings to assess progress and explore new topics of common concern’. Information available from: http://​gopacnetwork.org/​gopac-​conference/​ [accessed 16 March 2020]. Examples include Liberal International (https://​liberal-​international.org/​), Socialist International (https://​www.socialistinternational.org/​) and the International Democrat Union (https://​www.idu.org/​) [accessed 16 March 2020]. Rules of Procedure of the Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the European Union (2011/​C 229/​01), Article 2.1. Available from: https://​ ipexl.secure.europarl.europa.eu/I​ PEXL-W ​ EB/d​ ossier/​files/​download/​082dbcc564afa02 10164b2e954b4030b.do [accessed 16 March 2020]. See, for example, Articles 410 and 411 of the EU–​Georgia Association Agreement. Available from: https:// ​ e ur- ​ l ex.europa.eu/ ​ l egal-​ c ontent/​ e n/​ T XT/​ P DF/​ ? uri= CELEX:22014A0830(02) [accessed 17 March 2020]. ‘Types of Delegations’, available from: https://​www.europarl.europa.eu/​delegations/​en/​ about/​types-​of-​delegations; ‘ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly’, available from: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/acp/10_01/default_en.htm; and EuroLat, available from: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/eurolat/menu_en.htm [accessed 17 March 2020]. See also Müller (2019) and Delputte and Williams (2019). Globe International, available from: https://​globelegislators.org/​ [accessed 16 March 2020]. Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-​Proliferation and Disarmament. Available from: http://​ www.pnnd.org/​[accessed 16 March 2020]. The dichotomy is adapted from Kütting (2000). ‘The project has been a model of collaboration and cooperation in a region where such traits have at times been in short supply. Not only have valuable data been collected, but collegial professional relationships also have been established among the participants. In the long run, this latter aspect will likely prove to be the most important product’ (Campana et al, 2008: 153, emphasis added). See also NATO’s assessment of long-​term effects of such cooperation in Germany (2012: 156). This is demonstrated in De Vrieze’s analysis of the participation of Kosovo’s parliament in the South East European Dialogue in which he concludes that inter-​parliamentary initiatives have a limited but real effect in fostering regional cooperation, in particular if they go ahead with external pressures from other actors. In this particular case, the EU was such an actor (De Vrieze, 2017: 188).

Chapter 3 1

Armenia gives preference to international negotiations about the resolution of the conflict (RFE/​RL, 2013).

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For details, see: http://​ w ww.nkr.am/​ en/​ i nternational-​cooperation [accessed 22 March 2020] and http://​www.nankr.am/​en/​15 [accessed 14 April 2020]. The report (PACE, 2004a) was completed by David Atkinson in the same year, because Davis became Secretary ​General of the Council of Europe. The record of Davis’ visit in the archives of the NARNK is available from: http://​www.nankr.am/​en/​2884 [accessed 14 April 2020]. The meeting took place on 29 September 2017, but in Yerevan, rather than in Stepanakert, the capital of NKR. Details available from: http://​www.nankr.am/​en/​2322 [accessed on 14 April 2020]. The Act of State Independence of the Republic of Abkhazia is available from: https://​ unpo.org/​article/​705 [accessed 24 March 2020]. At this point one might indicate the difference between an act of international recognition, which is inherently a political one, and its practical relevance for the country’s economy. The difference could be a striking one, as an Abkhazian businessman commenting on the importance of Nauru in this regard has demonstrated: ‘They have fewer people than we do, and they are sinking into the sea’ (Higgins, 2016). Information available from: http://​www.parlamentra.org/​r us/​officials/​komitety.php [accessed 22 March 2020]. Information about bodies in the PRSO is available from http://​www.parliamentrso.org/​ node/​1 [accessed 23 March 2020]. The list of activities is available from: http://​www.parliamentrso.org/​taxonomy/​term/​ 11 [accessed 23 March 2020]. The founding document of the Assembly, which was established in Sukhumi, Abkhazia, is available from: https://​www.google.com/​url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web& cd=15&ved=2ahUKEwjg68qW49PoAhVupYsKHX0FDAo4ChAWMAR6BAgGEAI &url=http%3A%2F%2Fabkhazia-​pmr.org%2Ffiles%2Fdocuments%2FMPASogl.doc&u sg=AOvVaw2NKTIG9NDRk41HQaQIBax2 [accessed 17 March 2020]. This information is provided by Alexandr Burdian, a guest researcher (SNSPA Bucharest) at the University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences. Research assistance for the section on Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has been provided by Şenel Kim, University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences. Information available from: https://​unficyp.unmissions.org/​ [accessed 29 March 2020]. The text of the resolution is available from: https://​digitallibrary.un.org/​record/​112185 [accessed 29 March 2020]. The regulations are available from: http://​www.cm.gov.nc.tr/M ​ eclisYonetmelik [accessed 29 March 2020]. Information obtained by email on 18 March 2020 from a source who wishes to remain anonymous. Information obtained by email on 18 March 2020 from a source who wishes to remain anonymous. Since the creation of the Organization for African Unity in 1963, succeeded in 2002 by the African Union, ‘there have only been two widely recognized border changes in Africa: Eritrea’s split from Ethiopia in 1993 and South Sudan’s independence in 2011’ (Felter, 2018). Research assistance for the section on Somalia has been provided by Ana Klemen, University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences. The aim of the conference was to regulate colonization of Africa. The conference is infamously named the ‘Scramble for Africa’. Indeed, the colonization process in the 19th century lives up to such a name. As the invitation to read one book from that period portrays, ‘In 1870 barely one tenth of Africa was under European control. By 1914 only about one tenth –​Abyssinia (Ethiopia) and Liberia –​was not’ (Chamberlain, 2013).

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At the time of writing, Somaliland was considered by Freedom House as partially free; all of its neighbours are considered as not free (https://​freedomhouse.org/​countries/​ freedom-​world/​scores [accessed 4 April 2020]). Interview with Paul Whiteway, Director of Independent Diplomat’s London office, 22 April 2020 and 4 September 2020 (both online). See also Duale (2018). As stated in the press release of the Somaliland mission in the UK, ‘The Mission would like to thank the All-​Party Parliamentary Group on Somaliland and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office for their unwavering support in addressing this issue’ (SomalilandSun, 2018). Worth noting is that in 2012 the IPU readmitted Somalia as a member of the Inter-​ Parliamentary Union IPU 2013. In addition, a specialized Somali Institution for Parliamentary Studies focusing on parliamentary diplomacy was established in 2018. Available from: https://​ w ww.sips.org.so/​ p arliamentary-​ d iplomacy/​ [accessed 4 April 2020]. ‘Working with Parliaments’. Available from: https://​www.aepi-​international.org/​what-​ we-​do/​ [accessed 4 April 2020]. Information about the tasks of the Committee is available from: http://​www.assembly-​ kosova.org/​eng/​comittees/​committee/​?committee=23 [accessed 25 March 2020]. The tasks of the Committee are available from: http://​www.assembly-​kosova.org/​eng/​ comittees/​committee/​?committee=22 [accessed 25 March 2020]. https://​www.parl.ca/​diplomacy/​en/​friendship-​g roups [accessed 19 April 2020]. By its own description, ‘the mission of the House Democracy Partnership is to promote responsive, effective government and strengthen democratic institutions by assisting legislatures in emerging democracies. Central to our work is peer-​to-​peer cooperation to build technical expertise in partner legislatures that will enhance accountability, transparency, legislative independence, access to information, and government oversight.’ Available from: https://​hdp.house.gov/​about [accessed on 19 April 2020]. See the discussion in Chapter 5 (under the heading ‘International parliamentary associations’) on the Legislative Yuan’s membership in the IPU. The OSCE PA has created the Ad Hoc Committee on Kosovo, but no activities of the Committee have been recorded since the announcement of its visit to Pristina in 2002 (OSCE, 2002). Information about the Assembly available from: http://r​ spcsee.org/e​ n/p​ ages/r​ ead/s​ eecp-​ parliamentary-​assembly [accessed 25 March 2020]. Letter dated 26 February 1976 from the Representative of Spain to the Secretary ​General. Available from: https://​digitallibrary.un.org/​record/​551155 [accessed 29 March 2020]. Morocco returned to the African Union in 2017, in spite of the still unresolved dispute with the SADR. On that occasion, King Mohammed VI of Morocco stated: ‘When a body is sick, it is treated more effectively from the inside than from the outside’ (Kuwonu, 2016–​17). ‘Under the terms of the [1991] agreement, the Kingdom of Morocco was permitted to maintain total control of essential services in the territory. The Moroccan navy still patrols the coast, the Moroccan air force goes on providing all radio communications, meteorological services and air-​traffic control, and units of the Moroccan force continue to overfly beyond the sand wall into Polisario-​controlled sectors where blue-​bereted UN troops are’ (Smith de Cherif, 1991: 56). Given the focus of this book, which does not allow for a detailed study of the complex situation in Western Sahara, we suggest other studies that pay special attention to the disputed area, such as Ojeda-​García et al (2017).

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Available from: https://​www.usc.gal/​es/​institutos/​ceso/​RASD_​Reconocimientos.html [accessed 28 March 2020]. The parliament of SADR usually meets in Tifariti, which is within the West Saharan territories under the control of POLISARIO. The opinion was obtained via the exchange of emails with Simon Dreven, a researcher, expert on Western Sahara, 25 March 2020. Interview with Sidahmed Jouly, Sahrawi civil society activist, Skype, 22 April 2020. The House of Commons has created an All-​Parliamentary Group on Western Sahara. Information available from: https://​publications.parliament.uk/​pa/​cm/​cmallparty/​ 180131/​western-​sahara.htm [accessed 3 April 2020]. The purpose of this status, introduced by the PACE in 2011, is to facilitate contact with parliaments from regions neighbouring Europe (PACE, 2009). Earlier on, the PACE adopted a resolution in which it resolved to facilitate contact with the countries from the Maghreb region. The resolution mentions Western Sahara only once, in the context of it being the bone of contention between Morocco and Algeria (PACE, 2008: para 11). For the list, see: https://​www.europarl.europa.eu/​about-​parliament/​files/​organisation-​ and-​r ules/​organisation/​intergroups/​list-​of-​members-​western-​sahara.pdf [accessed 29 March 2020]. Interview with Matthew Porges, PhD student at University of St Andrews, Skype, 30 March 2020. He has carried out ethnographic fieldwork in Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania and Western Sahara since 2014. Prior to starting his PhD, he worked for the diplomatic advisory group, Independent Diplomat (ID). Although MEPs visit the SNC, Members of the Sahrawi parliament seldom visit back. Most communication between the SADR and the EP is done through the official representation (de facto embassy) which SADR has in Brussels (interview with Matthew Porges, Skype, 30 March 2020). As for the US, Washington is a penholder of the Western Sahara resolution and it supports the SADR. The US Congress helps, but POLISARIO does not have enough resources to carry out its foreign policy with the help of its deputies. In the case of the SADR, parliamentary diplomacy cannot be seen as isolated from other activities. Whether ambassadors or the civil society, all of them are part of SADR’s ‘parliamentary diplomacy’ (interview with Marlene Spoerri, 17 April 2020, via Zoom. She is a UN Representative at Independent Diplomat [ID], where she leads ID’s work on Western Sahara and women’s political participation). ‘The agreement was adopted with 415 votes in favour, 189 against and 49 abstentions, according to the consent procedure, whereby Parliament can either approve or reject the whole text’ (EP, 2019). Information and comments obtained also from the interview with Sidahmet Jouly, 22 April 2020. For example, Switzerland was a non-​member observer state for 56 years until it became a member in 2002. Information on the delegation is available from: https://​www.europarl.europa.eu/​ delegations/​en/​dpal/​home [accessed 7 April 2020]. According to Rule 60 of the PACE’s Rules of Procedure, delegations with the ‘Partner for Democracy’ status may sit at Assembly’s meeting, speak upon permission, participate in committees, submit proposals in drafting the agenda and amending draft decisions, and so on. Available from: http://​assembly.coe.int/​nw/​xml/​News/​FeaturesManager-​View-​ EN.asp?ID=996 [accessed 7 April 2020].

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A former MEP with knowledge of Palestine has given this comment on the current state of affairs in Palestine: ‘Palestine provides a poor example of parliamentary diplomacy. Abbas and others do not enjoy a reputation, parliament does not meet, only civil society movements are active, and young people are extremely critical of the current authorities’ (Interview 5, with former MEP, phone conversation, 21 July 2020).

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Belize, Eswatini, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, St Lucia, St Kitts and Nevis, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau and Tuvalu. The data are from Henley & Partners passport index. Available from: https://​www. henleypassportindex.com/​passport [accessed 28 July 2020]. At the time of writing, Taiwan’s successful fight against COVID-​19 was echoed by virtually every major media outlet in the world. Taiwan decided to screen all passengers arriving from Wuhan since 31 December, the day it learned of the emergence of then ​unknown virus in the city (Aspinwall, 2020). Both data are on the basis of purchasing power parity. The data are available from: http://​ statisticstimes.com/​economy/​projected-​world-​gdp-​capita-​ranking.php [accessed 29 April 2020]. Both the KMT and the CCP ‘were organized in the Leninist mould; they advanced new claims to legitimacy based on their differing mixes of nationalism and social justice. Each, however, soon denied the moral legitimacy of the other and sought to annihilate it’ (Rankin et al, 2002: 69). The resolution was based on Resolution 396 adopted on 2 December 1950. This resolution addresses the silence in the UN Charter about possible different claims by governments to represent a certain member. With this resolution, the Assembly, as the highest representative organ in the United Nations, has awarded itself the right to decide on the membership in the UN if ‘more than one authority claims to be the government entitled to represent a Member State in the United Nations’. One detail from this rapprochement process should not escape the reader. Namely, as noted by the Office of the Historian, ‘as part of this rapprochement, the two countries opened liaison offices in one another’s capitals in 1973, a time when Taiwan still had an Embassy in Washington. The liaison offices, which in many ways operated as de facto embassies, represented a significant concession by the People’s Republic of China, which opposed the acceptance of “two Chinas” because that implied both were legitimate governments’ (https://​history.state.gov/​milestones/​1977-​1980/​china-​policy [accessed 26 July 2020]; emphasis added). This concession might be interpreted as a kind of precedent for the ambiguous situation concerning the status of Taiwan’s representative offices in the world, which in reality are nothing less than de facto embassies of Taiwan. It also helps to explain strong reactions from Beijing on activities of Taiwan’s representative offices coordinated by the Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The quote is from ‘Nixon’s China’s Visit and “Sino-​US Joint Communiqué” ’, available from: https://w ​ ww.fmprc.gov.cn/​mfa_​eng/​ziliao_​665539/3​ 602_6​ 65543/3​ 604_6​ 65547/​ t18006.shtml [accessed 5 May 2020]. The quote is from the Office of the Historian, US Department of State, available from: https://​history.state.gov/​historicaldocuments/​frus1969-​76v17/​d203 [accessed 5 May 2020]. From the PRC side, the three conclusions are: i) there’s only one China in the world; ii) Taiwan is a part of China; iii) the People’s Republic of China is the only legal government

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that represents all Chinese citizens. According to Li, ‘the US has “recognized” the last conclusion, but only “acknowledged” the first two, which indicates that the US is aware of the existence of such claims but it does not establish any stance or approval. In the Chinese version of the communiqués, China took the liberty to translate both “recognize” and “acknowledge” into 承認 (recognize). The US, however, never endorsed the Chinese version’ (Li, 2019, emphasis added). As one author has put it: ‘Legally, the [Republic of China] is dead to the United States; in practice, it is very much alive’ (Rigger, 2019: 12). The Act was adopted by the US Congress on 13 March 1979. It became law on 10 April of the same year. On the same day, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China sent ‘an open letter to Taiwan compatriots’, emphasizing the inevitability of reunification among other things, because ‘Taiwan has been an inalienable part of China since the ancient times’ (NPCPRC, 2002: 22). As put by Hughes, ‘Taiwan has been left in a condition between the two possible statehoods: unification with the PRC on one hand, or an independent Taiwan on the other. So long as neither of these conditions can be achieved, Taiwan’s status might best be described as that of an “intermediate state” ’ (Hughes, 1997: 129). From the Taiwanese perspective, One China means ‘the Republic of China, established in 1912 and existing today, and its sovereignty extends throughout China … admittedly, Taiwan is part of China, but the mainland is also part of China’ (Su, 2009: 13). According to Su, the effort to reach the consensus was driven by different motivations, yet each of them is very important for both parties. Taipei wanted to have freer access to the international arena; Beijing wanted an assurance that the notion that Taiwan was part of China was recognized on the island as well and that, therefore, Taiwan would not seek independence. Such resolve has not originated with Xi. As reported by Huan, ‘Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang have repeatedly announced that Beijing is not willing to rule out the possibility of using force against Taibei if the latter continues to reject their proposals for reunification talks’ (Huan, 1985: 1067). See also the next chapter, in the section dealing with the role of the Legislative Yuan and its members in Taiwan’s communications with US lawmakers. Among other things, the document permits ‘Taiwan’s top leadership to transit US territory for their travel convenience, for periods of time normal for transits, but without undertaking any public activities. We will consider each case individually’ (DoS, 1994). For example, President Lee visited Cornell University in 1995. President Chen made a stopover in Alaska in 2007 and, in 2019, President Tsai ‘transited’ in New York and Denver. These are: no unification; no independence; and no use of force. ‘“Flexible Diplomacy” is to pursue rapprochement and truce with mainland China in international arena for national interest. That is, both sides should be committed to not wasting national resources in a vicious cycle to win over diplomatic allies from the other side, or conducting diplomatic activities that will hurt the feelings or interests of the other side’ (Ma, 2008). Foreign Policy Guidelines available from: https://​ w ww.mofa.gov.tw/​ e n/​ cp.aspx?n=B7411BDCD003C9EC [accessed 8 July 2020]. We are grateful to the anonymous reviewer for sharing this detail with us. Global health diplomacy has been defined as ‘the multi-​level negotiation processes that shape and manage the global policy environment for health’ (Herington and Lee, 2014: 3).

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Interview 3, with senior staff in the Legislative Yuan, Taipei, 19 December 2016. Interview 4, with a senior scholar at the National Chengchi University, Taipei, 11 November 2016. Interview 2, with a senior scholar at National Chengchi University, Taipei, 28 November 2016. Interview 56, with a member of the LY (DPP), Taipei, 1 November 2017. Interview 10, with a former member of the LY (KMT), Taipei, 14 October 2016. Several interviewees who were members of the Legislative Yuan mentioned that some parliamentarians actively promote the One China principle by making official visits to the PRC. Interview 40, with a member of the LY (DPP), 9 November 2017. See also Xinhua (2019). ‘We have always been resolutely opposed to any country with diplomatic relations with China having any form of official exchanges, or establishment of any official institutions, with Taiwan’ (Wen et al, 2017). As declared by the PRC’s embassy in Prague, ‘such action is significant interference into China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state … It significantly breaches basic norms of international relations and bilateral political commitments and it undermines political basis for future cooperation between China and the Czech Republic’ (Muller and Blanchard, 2020). According to the report, ‘Vystrcil said China’s pressure, including a warning from the Chinese Embassy against congratulating Taiwan’s pro-​independence president Tsai Ing-​ wen on her re-​election, contributed to his decision to travel to the island. “The People’s Republic of China believes it has a right to tell us what to do”, Vystrcil said’ (AP, 2020). The visit took place as planned (CNA, 2020). Alluding to Taiwan’s rich experience with various types of diplomacies, Shattuck (2020) labelled the visit as: ‘Czech-​book diplomacy’. Information about the initiative available from: https://​nspp.mofa.gov.tw/​nsppe/​[accessed 17 August 2020]. Interview 21, with a senior member of the DPP, Taipei, 17 October 2017. The table was compiled by Ya-Hui Hsueh, former Legislative Assistant, Legislative Yuan. Data prepared by Alexandr Burdian, SNSPA Bucharest, a guest researcher at the University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences. en234 See Table 5.1. To trace relations with Taiwan in parliaments abroad, we have perused the information available on web pages of all the parliaments in the world which are members of the UN. The database we have created for this table and other tables/figures dealing with friendship groups based on the approach explained previously may not correspond to the actual state of affairs. We do not exclude inaccuracies in this database (for example, if the web page of a certain parliament does not provide enough information about its international activities). In some cases, national parliaments do not encourage the creation of friendship groups. Nevertheless, we believe that this research – never done before, at least to our knowledge, and always open to improvements – is still a good approximation of the current ‘map’ of Taiwan-friendly friendship groups. Alexandr Burdian, SNSPA Bucharest, a guest researcher at the University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences, has contributed to this research. See, for instance, the example of Myanmar in Tourangbam and Amin (2019). Interview 21, with a senior member of the DPP, Taipei, 17 October 2017.

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No to Taiwan’s independence, no to One China, one-​Taiwan or a two-​China policy, and no to Taiwan’s membership in any international organization in which recognized statehood is a requirement. In Westminster, ‘All-​Party Parliamentary Groups (APPGs) are informal cross-​party groups that have no official status within Parliament’. Available from: https://​www.parliament. uk/​about/​mps-​and-​lords/​members/​apg/​ [accessed on 21 July 2020]. According to Martin Boyle (2020), ‘The British version of what is now the Taiwan lobby arose after 1950 among backbench Conservatives who opposed the UK’s diplomatic recognition of Beijing while trying to maintain relations in practice with the ROC’. The official position of the British government is that Taiwan should be allowed to participate in international institutions ‘where statehood is not a prerequisite and Taiwan can make a valuable contribution’ (Hansard, 2020b). Some time ago, one author even said of the BTAPPG that it ‘exists only to promote British (overwhelmingly business) interests in Taiwan’ (Rawnsley, 2000: 83). The scope of powers of the British Parliament is in stark contrast compared with that of the US Congress. In the British political system, the ‘Prime Minister, ministers and officials have the power to make foreign policy without the approval, or even the knowledge, of Parliament’ (Weir, 2007). An introduction to the programme is available from: https://​www.nato-​pa.int/​content/​ rose-​roth-​programme [accessed 21 August 2020]. The contact between the US Congress and the Legislative Yuan was established soon after World War Two, in 1947, when members of the Legislative Yuan visited the US Congress and President Truman to learn about ‘Congressional procedure’ (NYT, 1947). The KMT, the ruling party during the authoritarian regime in Taiwan, had been visiting institutions in Washington (Sciolino, 1996). One year later, in 1948, the first and so far the only parliamentary elections were held in mainland China. Dag Hammarskjöld Library, ‘Who was the first country to sign the UN Charter?’, available from: https://​ask.un.org/​faq/​14588 [accessed 16 July 2020]. Article II of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of China. The Treaty was ratified on 2 March 1955. Congressional Record –​Senate, 7 March, 1979, S 2122. Available from: https://​www. cia.gov/l​ ibrary/r​ eadingroom/​docs/​CIA-​RDP85-​00003R000100050011-0​ .pdf [accessed 17 July 2020]. Public Law 96–​8. The process of adopting the TRA is available from: https://​www. congress.gov/​bill/​96th-​congress/​house-​bill/​2479/​all-​actions?overview=closed#tabs [accessed 3 December 2020]. The text of the TRA is available from: https://​www.ait. org.tw/​our-​relationship/​policy-​history/​key-​u-​s-​foreign-​policy-​documents-​region/​ taiwan-​relations-​act/​ [accessed 30 July 2020]. The ‘three communiques’ and the ‘Six Assurances’ are (inter-​)governmental documents, meant to define relations between the US and the PRC after the latter received global recognition. This process, aiming at assuring stable relations between Washington and Beijing, has been based on the premise that Taiwan cannot be considered a separate state but a part of China. The text of the ‘Six Assurances’ is available from: http://​www. taiwandocuments.org/​assurances.htm. The text of the ‘three communiques’ is available from: http://​www.taiwandocuments.org/​doc_​com.htm [both accessed 30 July 2020]. The Congressional Taiwan Caucus (CTC) was established on 9 April 2002 (TC, 2002: 22–​ 3). The Senate Taiwan Caucus was established on 17 September 2003 (Rogin, 2011). For example, ‘Taiwan-​related measures typically pass with overwhelming majorities, and the absence of sufficient variance in voting behaviour across members makes it difficult

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to gain meaningful analytical leverage on the discrete role of individual factors driving such votes’ (Kastner and Grob, 2009: 58). Last document checked on 23 June 2020. These proposals have been collected in two phases. In the first phase, the Congressional activity related to Taiwan has been searched using the search engine available at the US Congress’s main web page (https://​www.congress.gov/​). In the second phase, we have refined our search by removing all the proposals that did not have a substantial reference to Taiwan. For example, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 does not mention Taiwan in its title, yet it includes a section on ‘Strengthening the defense partnership between the United States and Taiwan’. Thus, it has been included in the database. We are grateful to our research assistant James Chang of the Institute of European and American studies at the Academia Sinica for his contribution to this research by compiling the database. Senator Cory Gardner, a Republican, is alleged to have said, upon his first visit to Taiwan, ‘This is how China should be like’. Since then, he has been considered as one of the biggest advocates for Taiwan in the Congress. Interview 8, with a senior US diplomat, AIT, Taipei, 31 October 2018. Ma was acceptable for Beijing because he built his presidency on the 1992 Consensus. For example, in 2009, Dana Rohrabacher (R-​CA), ‘although a founder in 2002 of the Congressional Taiwan Caucus, resigned as co-​chair in 2009, lamenting Taiwan’s decision to cooperate with Beijing, rather than oppose the repressive regime’ (Tucker and Glaser, 2011: 28). Taiwan’s access to international organizations from the Congressional perspective will be discussed later in this chapter. The Ma administration relied heavily on the US Congress, hoping it would support Taiwan’s inclusion in the Visa Waiver Program (VWP). On 13 September 2011, a bill (S 1545) was introduced in the Senate to designate Taiwan as a visa waiver country. In December of the same year, the State Department announced a favourable consideration of this initiative. Less than a year later (1 November 2012), Taiwan was included into the VWP. Predictably, the decision did not please the PRC; since 2012, citizens from the PRC need a visa to come to the US and citizens from Taiwan do not. From Beijing’s perspective this admission of Taiwan into the VWP was an act of interference in the PRC’s internal affairs (Toh, 2017: 182–84). Quoted from Jacobs and Liu (2007: 381). Congressional Record, 21 March 1996, Senate, S 2629. Chen Shui-​bian (DPP) is the Taiwanese president who will be remembered as the first politician who ended the KMT dominance in Taiwanese politics. He is also known for his five No’s with regards to relations between Taiwan and the PRC: no declaration of independence; no change in the ‘national title’; no ‘state-​to-​state’ description in the Constitution; no referendum to change the status quo; and no abolition of the National Unification Council nor the Guidelines for National Unification (Ji, 2006: 246). According to a former member of the European Parliament knowledgeable of Taiwan, ‘independence’ is the one word that is never discussed at meetings with Taiwanese interlocutors, nor do they bring it up on such occasions (interview 5, phone conversation, 21 July 2020). The text is available from: http://​www.china-​embassy.org/​eng/​zt/​999999999/​t187406. htm [accessed 26 July 2020]. H.Con.Res.98 –​109th Congress (2005–​6), adopted on 16 March 2005.

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48 49 50

51 52

53

54 55

56

57 58

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Section 2/​b.4 of the TRA: ‘It is the policy of the United States … to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States’. Congressional Record –​House, 16 March 2005, H1529. Public Law 115–​135 115th Congress, 16 March, 2018. Section 2(6) of the ‘Act to encourage visits between the United States and Taiwan at all levels, and for other purposes’, Public Law 115–​135, 16 March 2018. Section 3b (1, 3). De facto official visits –​with officially determined destination, not on transit –​have taken place in the opposite direction. For example, ‘the Bush Administration granted a visa for Defense Minister Tang Yiau-​ming to visit the United States to attend an industry conference held by the US–​Taiwan Business Council between March 10–​12, 2002 making him the first ROC defense minister to come to the United States on a non-​transit purpose since 1979’ (Kan, 2014b: 6). One author argues that such acts should be treated as the ‘supreme law of the land’ under Article VI of the US Constitution (Ku, 2018). Public Law 115–​409, 115th Congress, 31 December, 2018. Section 209 of the ‘Act to develop a long-​term strategic vision and a comprehensive, multifaceted, and principled United States policy for the Indo-​Pacific region, and for other purposes’, Public Law 115–​409, 31 December 2018. For example, ‘“the Act has seriously violated the One China principle and stipulations in the three China-​US joint communiques, and bluntly interfered in China’s domestic affairs”… Just two days after US president Donald Trump signed the proposed Bill into law, his Chinese counterpart, Mr Xi Jinping, warned: China will not tolerate foreign meddling in the Taiwan issue and will resort to military force, if necessary’ (Wei, 2019). Public Law 116–​135, 116th Congress. Section 5(a) 2 and 3 of the ‘Act to express United States support for Taiwan’s diplomatic alliances around the world’, Public Law 116–​135, 26 March 2020. ‘To authorize the President to use military force for the purpose of securing and defending Taiwan against armed attack, and for other purposes’, H.R., 116th Congress, 2nd session, 23 July, 2020. Available from: https://​yoho.house.gov/​sites/​yoho.house.gov/​ files/​Taiwan%20Invasion%20Prevention%20Act.pdf [accessed 31 July 2020]. According to Li (2006: 5999), ‘between 1974 and 1978, China persuaded the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the International Civil Aviation organization (ICAO) to pass resolutions calling upon affiliated NGOs to sever all relations with individuals or groups linked to Taiwan’. See, for example, S. Res. 148, 103rd Congress, 2nd Session, 27 September, 1993. In H. Con. Resolution 390 (106th Congress, 2nd Session, 19 October, 2000), the US Congress addressed the administration’s role. The US Congress criticized it for inaction: ‘The United States should fulfil the commitment it made in the 1994 Taiwan Policy Review to more actively support Taiwan’s participation in appropriate international organizations’. For example, the name under which Taiwan is listed in the WTO is Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu (Chinese Taipei). In Taiwan’s Working Part Report, written after membership negotiations had been completed, all ‘sovereignty-​ related terminology’ had to be deleted (Lindemann, 2014: 102–​03). Taiwan became a member of the WTO on 1 January 2002.

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63 64

65

66

67

68

Public Law 106-​286, 106th Congress, 10 October 2000, Title VI, Section 601, 906–​07. Information retrieved from Worldometer: https://w ​ ww.worldometers.info/c​ oronavirus/​ #countries [accessed 2 August 2020]. An observer of the vote has reported that after the debate concerning the motion to grant Taiwan the observership status, the PRC ‘immediately manipulated the situation to have the roll call vote. It was obvious that China intended to identify any nation that supported Taiwan and institute the necessary measures against them afterwards’ (Lee, 1997). ‘Testifying before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations … US Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte reaffirmed Washington’s support for Taiwan’s participation in the WHA as an observer, although he reiterated that Washington does not advocate that Taiwan be allowed membership in international organizations in which statehood is a requirement’ (Lin and Low, 2008). Some authors provide useful insights about the scope of the observer status in the WHO/​ WHA (Lindemann, 2014: 188–​190). It seems that the PRC holds the veto power over any initiative to invite Taiwan to WHA meetings. Namely, it has become practice in the WHO that the Director General, with the consent of member states, can invite any institution or political entity which can contribute to the discussion about health issues to sessions of the WHA. With respect to Taiwan, according to the WHO principal legal officer Steve Solomon, there are ‘well-​established arrangements for Taiwan’s experts to work with the WHO’, both in the context of COVID-​19 and generally. As far as invitations are concerned, the WHO and its Director G ​ eneral, according to own interpretation, depend on the will of member states (WHO, 2020). Interesting yet important curiosity from the perspective of Taiwan: in three international organizations where Taiwan sees its strategic interest –​besides the WHO –​the PRC used to have or continues to have top officials who de facto implement(ed) Beijing’s policy against Taiwan (van der Wees, 2017). In the WHO, the current Director General succeeded Margaret Chan from Hong Kong in 2017. Meng Hongwei served as the president of Interpol from 2016 to 2018. He was the first Chinese person ever to have been put at the helm of this organization, but was recalled and sent to prison in the PRC on corruption charges. The head of the International Civil Aviation Organization is Fang Liu from the PRC, whose second mandate expires in 2021. Even if officials from the PRC do not occupy high positions in international organizations, not much changes for Taiwan. Gro Harlem Brundtland, former Director G ​ eneral of the WHO, was known for her tough stance against the PRC’s response during the SARS outbreak (Buranyi, 2020). Yet the former Taiwanese Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that when Taiwan was requesting assistance, ‘repeated letters from our Ministry of Health and medical experts to Gro Harlem Brundtland, director-​general of the WHO, went unanswered’ (Chien, 2003). The extent of the PRC’s control over Taiwan’s participation in the WHO is evidenced by the secret memorandum of understanding between the WHO and the PRC, and the regime for its implementation from 14 May 2005 and 12 July 2005, respectively. For example, every invitation to Taiwanese medical and public health experts for technical activities organized by the Secretariat has to be filtered by the PRC authorities. The text of the implementation regime is available from: https://​www.fapa.org/​who/​index. html [accessed 5 August 2020]. On the influence of the PRC on the Director G ​ eneral of the WHO, see also the testimony of Julian Ku at the ‘Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the US House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific: Reinforcing the US–​Taiwan Relationship’ 17 April 2016, p 4. The text of the testimony is available from: https://​www.congress.gov/​115/​meeting/​house/​108170/​ witnesses/​HHRG-​115-​FA05-​Wstate-​KuJ-​20180417.pdf

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76 77 78 79

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81 82

83 84 85

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88 89 90

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See the Statement of the People’s Republic of China in WHO International Health Regulations (WHO, 2005: 62–​63). The PRC signed additional memoranda with the WHO in 2011 in which the implementation of the IHR with respect to Taiwan was elaborated by Winkler (2012). For an overview of congressional actions concerning Taiwan’s status in the WHO, see also Chang, (2010b, 134–​9). The TPR is consistent with Clinton’s Three No’s policy (Chang, 2011: 15; Chang, 2010b: 133–​4). Public Law 106–​137, 106th Congress, 7 December, 1999; Public Law 107–​10, 107th Congress, 28 May, 2001. Public Law 108–​28, 108th Congress, 29 May, 2003; Public Law 108–​235, 108th Congress, 14 June, 2004. See H.R. 353, 116th Congress, 1st Session, 22 January, 2019; and S 249, 116th Congress, 2nd Session, 11 May, 2020. ‘Engel, McCaul, Risch, and Menendez Call on World Leaders to Support Taiwan’s Participation in WHO’, Press Release, House of Representatives, 8 May 2020. Available from: https://​foreignaffairs.house.gov/​press-​releases?ContentRecord_​id=C5920F7E-​ A4FF-​4022-​8EEB-​6250CD3224BA [accessed 3 August 2020]. H.R. 2002, 116th Congress, 1st Session, 8 May, 2019. Interview 46, with a senior official from the US Senate, online, 20 August 2020. Interview 46, with a senior official from the US Senate, online, 20 August 2020. H. Con. Res. 401, 106th Congress, 2nd Session, 14 September, 2000; S. Con. Res. 140, 106th Congress, 2nd Session, 28 September 2000. H. Con. Res. 381, 109th Congress, 2nd Session, 6 April 2006; S. Con. Res. 106, 109th Congress, 2nd Session, 27 June, 2006. Interview 46, with a senior official from the US Senate, online, 20 August 2020. Interview 25, with a senior administrator in the Legislative Yuan, email exchange, 19 December 2016. Interview 10, with a former member of the LY (KMT), Taipei, 14 October 2016. Source: Congressional Research Service (received by email, 16 September 2020). Interview 7, with a senior staff member, the US Congress, phone conversation, 17 December 2017. Interview 8, with a former diplomat at the American Institute in Taiwan, Taipei, 31 October 2018. Interview 7, with a senior staff member, the US Congress, phone conversation, 27 December 2017. Interview 12, with a legislator, senior member of the KMT, Taipei, 18 October 2016. Interview 46, with a senior official from the US Senate, online, 20 August 2020. The TECRO primarily organizes meetings with congressional office staff. An exact number of these meetings would be hard to determine but, as a former MOFA official at the TECRO confirmed, “we lobby all the time”. Interview 69, exchange of views with a former diplomat at the TECRO, 28 September 2020. Interview 46, with a senior official from the US Senate, online, 20 August 2020. Source: TECRO. The data, available only for the period 2010–​20, received by email on 21 September 2020. Interview 20, with a former Taiwanese diplomat, Taipei, 26 November 2016. Interview 62, with a member of the LY (DPP), Taipei, 29 October 2018.

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95

96 97

98

99 100 101 102 103 104 105

106

107 108

109

110

111 112 113

114

In the past, one such name was Benjamin Gilman, a Republican member of the House of Representatives (Xie, 2009: 49–​50). Senators Lisa Murkowski (D), Jim Inhofe (R) and Bob Menendez (D) are also considered to be knowledgeable about Taiwan. Interview 46, with a senior official from the US Senate, online, 20 August 2020. The data are based on the summary of the ‘Expenditure Reports Concerning Official Foreign Travel’, which are published periodically in the Congressional Record Concerning Official Foreign Travel. The caveat to consider is that, according to the Congressional Research Service, ‘these reports identify congressional visitors by committee or office and dates of travel. The reports in the Congressional Record do not identify ‘delegations’ or groups that may be traveling together. If members of a delegation work for different committees, the individuals are identified with their committees, not the group with which they are traveling’ (the data and the methodological remark received by email, 16 September 2020). At the time of writing, no travel of congressional staff to Taiwan has been recorded. No member of the US Congress has travelled to Taiwan either, in both cases due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The authors are grateful to Nina Pejič, a researcher at the University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences, for assistance in organizing the data. Interview 7, with a senior staff member, the US Congress, phone conversation, 27 December 2017. Interview 8, with a senior US diplomat at the AIT, Taipei, 31 October 2018. Interview 8, with a senior US diplomat at the AIT, Taipei, 31 October 2018. Interview 9, with a former diplomat at the AIT, email exchange, 4 August 2020. Interview 9, with a former diplomat at the AIT, email exchange, 4 August 2020. Interview 9, with a former diplomat at the AIT, email exchange, 4 August 2020. ‘Our Impact’, available from: https://​www.ipu.org/​our-​impact [accessed 24 July 2020]. ‘PGA Membership Eligibility Criteria’, available from: https://​www.pgaction.org/​ membership/​eligibility-​criteria.html [accessed 24 July 2020]. Article 6 of the New Rules of Procedure. Available from: http://​www.appf.org.pe/​ [accessed 24, July 2020]. Information available from: http://w ​ ww.upf.org/i​ app#j_t​ ab3 [accessed 16 August 2020]. Information available from: http://​www.upf.org/​conferences-​2/​364-​world-​summit/​ 7334-​world-​summit-​2017-​concludes-​with-​iapp-​and-​icus-​assemblies [accessed 16 August 2020]. Article 2.1 and 2.2 of the Rules of Procedure of the Parliamentary Conference on the WTO. Available from: http://​archive.ipu.org/​splz-​e/​trade04/​r ules.pdf [accessed 16 August 2020]. Article 2.3 of the Rules stipulates that its sessions ‘will also be open to other persons with a specific interest in international trade questions. These persons may follow the work of the Conference without intervening in its proceedings and will have no speaking rights. They will be issued a security badge bearing their name only. They will not receive an official invitation or be accredited to the event’. Interview 39, with a member of the LY (KMT), Taipei, 11 December 2017. https://​centrogilbertobosques.senado.gob.mx/​foprel [accessed 16 August 2020]. The MOFA may assist in these efforts. For example, representatives of the Taiwanese representative office in the UK went to conferences of the Liberal Democrat, Labour and Conservative Party conferences ‘to promote bilateral exchanges and interactions’ (TRO, 2019). Interview 21, with a senior member of the DPP, Taipei, 17 October 2017.

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120 121 122 123 124

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We recognize that the European Parliament is an organ of the European Union, which is an international organization sui generis. Nevertheless, we hold the opinion that the EU is ultimately an international organization that depends on the will of member states which, on the face of it, keep their sovereignty intact on sensitive issues such as foreign policy and defence. At its core, therefore, the EU is still an inter-​governmental organization. For this reason, we classify the EP as the POIGO. Our database has been created as follows. We have used the official website of the European Parliament (https://w ​ ww.europarl.europa.eu/​plenary/​en/​texts-​adopted.html) and searched for EP resolutions about Taiwan from 1994 to 2020. On the search option we used the keyword ‘Taiwan’. To include the resolution in our database, it had to refer to Taiwan directly and meaningfully rather than just mentioning it for other purposes. We are grateful to James Chang for his assistance in this part of research. For example, in the resolution adopted on 19 June on ‘The PRC national security law for Hong Kong and the need for the EU to defend Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy’, the European Parliament emphasized that ‘the PRC’s policy of abandoning the “One Country, Two Systems” approach has greatly alienated the people of Taiwan’. It expressed ‘its willingness to cooperate with international partners in order to help strengthening democracy in Taiwan’ (P9_​TA-​PROV(2020)0174). Interview 5, with a former MEP, phone conversation, 21 July 2020. One MEP believed that unofficial groupings limit the scope of action of MEPs, especially if they are members of unofficial groupings of ‘critical countries’. In his view, such MEPs are primary targets of secret services; in the case of Taiwan, for example, “members of Taiwan friendship groups are very likely on the list of the Chinese secret service”. Interview 71, with an MEP (EPP), 5 June 2018. Interview 70, with an assistant to the MEP, email exchange, 29 October 2016. Interview 69, with an MEP (ALDE), Brussels, 5 June 2018. Interview 72, with a senior official in the MOFA, Brussels, 4 June 2018. Interview 72, with a senior official in the MOFA, Brussels, 4 June 2018. For example, in 2006, Taiwan wished to join the WHO’s ‘Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network’ (GOARN) and ‘Global Influenza Program’ (GIP), but the WHO, due to the PRC objection, failed to accommodate Taiwan’s requests. Moreover, in November 2006, the host country (the PRC) refused to invite the Taiwanese health authority to ‘attend the WHO’s international fund raising convention for control of avian flu’ (Chang, 2010a: 452-​453). No WHO-​related resolution has been adopted by the EP in 2019. In 2020, two documents refer to Taiwan’s participation in international organization, but in a wider context. See, for example, ‘Annual report on the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy’, Doc. no. P9_​TA(2020)0008, para 61. We do not wish to say that the LY has played no role in promoting Taiwan’s position regarding the WHO with the European Parliament. The LY is not excluded from this effort, but its ‘influence’ is mostly symbolic, demonstrating the importance the LY attaches to the efforts of the MEPs in promoting Taiwan’s interests. For example, between 2002 and 2015, more than 20 delegations from the European Parliament visited Taiwan, and the speaker of the LY, Wang Jing-​pyng, the most experienced Taiwanese parliamentarian, was often there to meet the MEPs and thank them for their support on topical issues such as the participation of Taiwan in the WHO. Interview 73, with a former MOFA official, Taipei, January 2018. Interview 72, with a senior official in the MOFA, Brussels, 4 June 2018.

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Chapter 6 1

2

3

4 5

6

7 8 9 10 11

12 13

14 15 16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

Interview 36, with a former diplomat and former high-​ranking official in Taiwan’s government, Taipei, 8 January 2018; interview 53, with a former member of the LY (KMT) and a well-​known public figure, 2 November 2018. For example, following the announcement of a visit to Taiwan by the speaker of the Czech Senate in January 2020, the PRC sent a document to the Czech president suggesting that Czech companies operating in the PRC would suffer if the visit were to take place (Muller and Blanchard, 2020). Interview 41, with a high-​ranking official in the Legislative Yuan, Taipei, 21 November 2016; interview 45, with a member of the LY (DPP), Taipei, 1 December 2017. Interview 40, with a member of the LY (DPP), Taipei, 9 November 2017. Interview 41, with a high-​ranking official in the Legislative Yuan, Taipei, 21 November 2016. Interview 41, with a high-​ranking official in the Legislative Yuan, Taipei, 21 November 2016. Interview 10, with a former member of the LY (KMT), Taipei, 14 October 2016. Interview 16, with a former member of staff, Legislative Yuan, online, 12 January 2018. Interview 10, with a former member of the LY (KMT), Taipei, 14 October 2016. Interview 28, with an expert advising the KMT, Taipei, 22 November 2016. Interview 36, with a former diplomat in the MOFA and former high-​ranking official in the government, Taipei, 8 January 2018. Interview 20, with a former diplomat in the MOFA, Taipei, 26 November 2016. Interview 51, with an expert on Taiwanese politics, National Chengchi University, Taipei, 1 November 2018. Interview 22, with a member of the LY (DPP), Taipei, 11 October 2017. Interview 20, with a former diplomat, MOFA, Taipei, 26 November 2016. One member of the LY (DPP) remarked that in reality more parliamentarians speak foreign languages. They are “just a little ashamed” to speak because they believe the quality of their foreign language is not good enough. The interviewee shared a ‘recipe’ for how to get round this problem: alcohol. He explained that he had met an Italian parliamentarian who also did not speak English at all, “… and after a few glasses of wine, the English flowed between the two without any problems …” (Interview 59, Taipei, 30 October 2018). Interview 53, with a former member of the LY (KMT) and a well-​known public figure, Taipei, 2 November 2018. Interview 51, with an expert knowledgeable of domestic party politics, National Chengchi University, Taipei, 1 November 2018. Interview 41, with a high-​ranking official in the Legislative Yuan, Taipei, 21 November 2016. Interview 28, with an expert familiar with party politics in Taiwan, Taipei, 22 November 2016. Interview 33, with an expert on International Relations, Academia Sinica, Taipei, 12 October 2016. In the 2016–​2020 LY, for example, two friendship groups for France were created: the ROC (Taiwan) France Inter-​Parliamentary Amity Association and the Taiwan-​France Inter-​Parliamentary Amity Association. The first one was launched by an LY member from the KMT, and the second one by an LY member from the DPP. Interview 36, with a former diplomat and former high-​ranking official in Taiwan’s government, Taipei, 8 January 2018. Interview 65, with diplomats at the MOFA, Taipei, 13 November 2017.

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25 26

27 28

29 30

31 32

33

34

35

36 37

38

39 40 41 42 43

44

45 46

Interview 39, with an LY member (KMT), Taipei, 11 December 2017. ‘Until October 1995, Taiwanese Americans had to give “China” as their place of birth on their American passports. The FAPA’s Miami chapter-​president approached his Congressman who inserted a piece of legislation in the State Department Authorization Bill. This declared that Taiwanese Americans should be able to give Taiwan (not the ROC) as their place of birth. The bill was passed’ (Rawnsley, 2000: 139–​140). H. Con. Res. 210, 102nd Congress, 1st Session, 26 September, 1991. ‘Asked about the prospects of sending regular multi-​party legislative delegations to visit the US Congress instead of the more frequent one-​party delegations now being sent, one Taiwan official said that bipartisan coalitions had proven an embarrassing “disaster” for Taiwan because the participants ended up arguing in front of foreign parliamentarians’ (Dumbaugh, 2006: 25). Interview 46, with a senior official from the US Senate, online, 20 August 2020. One of our interviewees (interview 8, with a senior US diplomat, AIT, Taipei, 31 October 2018) is convinced that “KMT will evolve”. The new leadership may indeed be seen as a product of changing opinions of younger generations, many of them having studied abroad, who cherish democracy and do not consider the unification with the PRC as a short-​term goal. On the significance of socialization for the development of Taiwan, see Lynch (2002). Interview 48, with a scholar from National Taiwan University, Taipei, 31 October 2017. Some from the KMT camp disagree; two high-​profile interviewees we had a chance to talk to believe that unification is inevitable (interview 36, with a former diplomat and former high-​ranking official in Taiwan’s government, Taipei, 8 January 2018; interview 53, with a former member of the LY [KMT] and a well-​known public figure, 2 November 2018). For more details see the results of opinion polls carried out by the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, at: https://​esc.nccu.edu.tw/​course/​news.php?Sn=167# [accessed 30 August 2020]. Interview 41, with a high-​ranking official in the Legislative Yuan, Taipei, 21 November 2016. Interview 39, with an LY member (KMT), 11 December 2017; Interview 45, with an LY member (DPP), Taipei, 1 December 2017. Interview 21, with a senior party member, DPP Headquarters, Taipei, 17 October 2017. Interview 39, with an LY member (KMT), 11 December 2017; interview 51, with an expert on Taiwanese politics, National Chengchi University, Taipei, 1 November 2018. Data compiled by James Chang, Academia Sinica, Institute for American and European Studies. Interview 42, with an LY member (DPP), Taipei, 15 November 2017. Interview 11, with an LY member (DPP), Taipei, 19 October 2016. Interview 13, with an LY member (DPP), Taipei, 20 October 2016. Interview 22, with an LY member (DPP), Taipei, 11 October 2017. For example, a legislator who won the election in a district that has a nuclear power plant had no difficulty explaining why he went to France, inquiring “about good practices relevant to the maintenance of Taiwan’s nuclear power plant” (interview with three diplomats at the MOFA, Taipei, 13 November 2017). For example, an LY member (KMT), interviewed in Taipei, 18 October 2016 (interview 12). Interview 12, with an LY member (KMT), Taipei, 18 October 2016. Interview 23, with an expert on the political system of Taiwan, National Chengchi University, Taipei, 17 October 2017.

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47

48

49 50 51 52 53

54 55 56 57 58

59

60 61 62

63

64

65 66

67 68

A well-​known publicist focusing on Taiwan agrees. He adds that this is in stark contrast to Taiwan’s situation, which demands Taiwan and the Legislative Yuan be more involved in policy discussions about international politics, especially in East Asia (interview 47, Taipei, 27 December 2017). Interview 41, with a high-​ranking official in the Legislative Yuan, Taipei, 21 November 2016. According to a researcher focusing on internal politics of Taiwan, political parties in the LY “have been trying to maintain the continuity of membership in committees, but still about 50 per cent of the membership is being replaced”. This, of course, is a big handicap for the LY in terms of knowledge and familiarity with the topics (interview 50, with a researcher based in Taipei, Academia Sinica, 18 November 2016). Interview 13, with an LY member (DPP), Taipei, 20 October 2016. Interview 4, with a scholar from National Chengchi University, email, 11 November 2016. Interview 58, with an LY member (DPP), Taipei, 19 November 2017. Interview 12, with an LY member (KMT), Taipei, 18 October 2016. Interview 68, with a former legislator assistant with good knowledge of the Legislative Yuan, email exchange, 17 September 2020. Interview 67, email exchange, 7 September 2020. Interview 44, with a member of a major research institute, Taipei, 19 October 2017. Interview 56, with a member of the LY (DPP), 1 November 2017. Interview 58, with a member of the LY (DPP), 19 November 2017. As one former member of the LY –​who has held a senior position in an LY committee dealing with international relations –​commented on his non-​election after eight years in office, the fact that he had not been re-​elected meant that the parliament lost someone who had expertise and experience in international relations. He and his party try to influence policy-​making of the government via think tanks, and they try to ‘educate’ members of the party who currently occupy a seat in the LY. But he said, “this is a long process. You cannot build a good internationalist in one day”. (Interview 10, with a former LY member [KMT], 14 October 2016). Interview 36, with a former diplomat and former high-​ranking official in Taiwan’s government, Taipei, 8 January 2018. Interview 4, with a high-​ranking official in the Legislative Yuan, Taipei, 21 November 2016. Interview 46, with a senior official from the US Congress, online, 20 August 2020. Interview 53, with a former member of the LY (KMT) and a well-​known public figure, 2 November 2018. Interview 15, with an LY member (DPP), Taipei, 31 October 2016; interview 59, with an LY member (DPP), 30 October 2018. A typical visit, in and out of the country, consists of two parts. The first part includes exchange of views, good practices and initiatives concerning a concrete issue area. In the second part, the security of Taiwan is addressed (interview 58, with a member of the LY, Taipei, 19 November 2017). Interview 15, with an LY member (DPP), Taipei, 31 October 2016. Interview 40, with an LY member (DPP), Taipei, 9 November 2017. That said, one parliamentarian has noticed that the MOFA is changing this policy; according to her experience taking photos on trips seems no longer an issue for the ministry. She has mentioned trips to Malaysia, Germany, Poland and Slovakia in which such restrictions did not apply. Interview 62, with an LY member (DPP), Taipei, 29 October 2018. Interview 42, with an LY member (DPP), Taipei, 15 November 2017. Interview 64, with an LY member (DPP), 26 October 2018.

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70 71

72 73 74

75 76 77 78

79 80

81 82 83

Interview 19, with an officer in a think tank headquartered in Taiwan, Taipei, 24 October 2017. Interview 47, with a well-​known publicist focusing on Taiwan,Taipei, 27 December 2017. Interview 23, with an expert on Taiwanese politics, National Chengchi University, Taipei, 17 October 2017. Interview 28, with an advisor to the KMT, 22 November 2016. Interview 48, with a scholar from National Taiwan University, 31 October 2017. The difference is with the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Standing Committee. Their visits are usually structured in detail, very well organized, with little free time (interview 41, with a high-​ranking official in the Legislative Yuan, Taipei, 21 November 2016). See interview 10, with a former member of the LY (KMT), Taipei, 14 October 2016. Interview 65, with MOFA officials, Taipei, 13 November 2017. Interview 56, with an LY member (DPP), Taipei, 1 November 2017. One of the interviewees, a member of the LY from the KMT, regretted that after renewed exclusion of Taiwan from participating in the WHO/​WHA after Tsai’s election in 2016, the two parties could not develop a joint strategy to cooperate with an organization which is of vital interest to the whole of Taiwan, not just one of the political parties (interview 60, Taipei, 30 October 2018). Interview 15, with an LY member (DPP), Taipei, 31 October 2016. Interview 53, with a former member of the LY (KMT) and a well-​known public figure, Taipei, 2 November 2018. Interview 65, with diplomats at the MOFA, Taipei, 13 November 2017. Interview 26, with a diplomat from the MOFA, Taipei, 5 December 2016. For example, a former diplomat serving in one of the representative offices in Europe explained that his office selected a parliamentarian whom they projected as a rising star in his country, so they wanted to invite him to Taiwan as soon as possible to get an impression about the country (interview 20, with a former diplomat of the MOFA, Taipei, 26 November 2016).

Chapter 7 1 2

3

Interview 38, with a senior research fellow, Academia Sinica, Taipei, 10 November 2017. Internal Administration Committee, at: https://​ w ww.ly.gov.tw/​ E ngPages/​ L ist. aspx?nodeid=448 [accessed 21 July 2020]. In fact, the then speaker of the LY, Su Jia-​ chyuan, declared in 2018 ‘that in his two-​plus years as President of the Legislative Yuan, he has received 751 delegations comprising 8,808 members from 106 countries’ (MOFA, 2018). In 2018, according to Section 5, Chapter 3 in the Diplomacy Yearbook, the MOFA assisted trips abroad of 25 groups of members of the LY and members of Control Yuan. There were 17 groups in 2016, and 33 in 2017. Information was provided by Ya-​Hui Hsueh, former Legislative Assistant, Legislative Yuan.

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194

Index Page numbers in italics refer to figures and tables.

A Abi-​Saab, Georges  142n1 Abkhazia  5, 28, 130, 145n5, 145n6, 145n10 ACP–​EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly  23, 144n23 African European Parliamentarians Initiative  36 African Union  39, 145n18, 146n34 Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE)  100 All-​Party Parliamentary Group on Somaliland (APPGS)  35, 146n23 American Institute in Taiwan (AIT)  11, 50, 72, 88, 90, 155n86 Anti-​Secession Law (ASL)  73, 74, 76 APPG on Somaliland (new APPGS)  35, 36 Artsakh/​ Nagorno-​Karabakh  5, 29, 130 Asian Development Bank  53, 79 Asia Pacific Parliamentary Forum  92 Asia–​Pacific Parliamentarians’ Union (APPU)  91 Asian Parliamentarians’ Union (APU)  91 Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA) 78 Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo (ARK)  37 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)  64 avian influenza  104, 105, 157n124

Chinese Communist Party (CCP)  48, 49 Chinese National Party or Kuomintang (KMT)  47–​51, 68, 71, 73, 86, 90, 94, 108–​12, 114–​18, 122, 123–​7, 132, 136, 148n5, 150, 151 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe  see Helsinki Commission Committee on International Relations in the House of Representatives  69 Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the EU (COSAC)  23, 144n21 Congress  see United States Congress contested states  4, 27, 28–​30, 42, 43 see also states with limited recognition Coordination Council for North American Affairs (CCNAA)  52 coronavirus  see COVID-​19 Council of Europe  see Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe COVID-​19  2, 45, 54, 81, 82, 94, 98, 129, 148n3, 154n67, 156n97 crime  98, 135 cross-​strait relations  7, 55, 90, 97, 98, 100–​3

B Belt and Road Initiative  67 bird flu  see avian influenza British–​Taiwanese All-​Party Parliamentary Group (BTAPPG)  67, 68

E Euro–​Latin American Parliamentary Assembly  23 European Conservatives and Reformists Party  100 European External Action Service (EEAS)  96 European Parliament (EP)  9, 12, 33, 36, 38, 40–​4, 65–​7, 92, 95–​107, 110, 130, 132, 137, 138, 152n44, 157n115, 157n116, 157n117, 157n126

C Chen, Shui-​bian  50, 52, 53, 57, 81, 85, 115, 152n43 Chiang, Johnny  90, 94, 117 Chiang, Kai-​shek  48–​50, 70, 124

D death penalty (Taiwan)  99, 101, 132 de facto state  5, 6, 51, 136 decolonization  28, 34, 38, 43, 47

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PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY OF TAIWAN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

European People’s Party (EPP)  100 European Union (EU)  9, 10, 23, 40, 60, 95, 96, 130, 132, 144n21, 157n115 exile  39

Kuomintang Chinese National Party (KMT)  see Chinese National Party or Kuomintang (KMT) L Lantos, Tom  75 Lee, Teng-​hui  51, 53, 57, 73, 74, 123 Legislative Yuan (LY)  5, 8, 15, 50, 57–​68, 77, 84–​93, 100–​23, 126, 128–​38, 146n30, 149n17, 150n1, 150n6, 150n13, 151n26, 155n82, 158n19, 158n3–​8, 159n34, 160n47–​53, 161n74 Liberal International (LI)  56, 94, 132, 144n20

F Feinstein, Diane  74 financial crisis  76, 80 fisheries (Taiwan)  40, 98, 99 Foreign and National Defense Committee (Taiwan)  57, 119 Formosa Club  93 Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA)  115 Forum of Speakers of the Legislative Bodies of Central American and Caribbean Basin  93 friendship groups  22, 29, 33, 37, 41, 51, 57, 61–​8, 106–​7, 110–​12, 130–​8, 144n18, 150n16, 157n119, 158n22 Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro see Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-​Hamra and Rio de Oro

M Ma, Ying-​jeou  52, 54, 72, 81, 116 Malmström, Cecilia  106 Mutual Defense Treaty  70, 151n28 Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act  89

G General Assembly of the UN (UNGA)  8, 16, 19, 41, 48 Global Organization of Parliamentarians Against Corruption (GOPAC)  144n19 Green March  39 H Hague Congress  95 Helsinki Commission, the  22, 69, 144n17 Hsiao, Bi-​khim  90, 140 Hong Kong  64, 79, 80, 99, 154n67, 157n117 I Indo–​Pacific region  78, 83, 153n55 informal diplomacy  52–​5 International Association of Parliamentarians for Peace  92 International Democrat Union (IDU)  94, 132, 144n20 International Medical Parliamentarians Organization  92 International parliamentary associations (IPAs)  5, 9, 20, 32, 60, 91 Inter-​Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC)  93 Inter-​Parliamentary Assembly of the Community for Democracy and the Rights of Peoples  32 Inter-​Parliamentary Union (IPU)  4, 91, 146 K Kosovo  5, 36–​7, 43, 44, 45, 46, 130, 137, 144n28, 146n31

N National Assembly of the Republic of Nagorno-​Karabakh (NARNK)  29 National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China (NPC)  15, 76, 91, 149n13 NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA)  21, 23, 69 New Southbound Policy Initiative  61 O One China principle  8, 9, 50, 103, 109, 114, 128, 131, 133, 139, 140, 148n10, 149n15, 150n6, 151n19, 153n56 Organization for Islamic Co-​operation  41 P Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) 41–​2, 130 Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia (PRSO)  31, 145n8 Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean  41 Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Co-​operation in Europe (OSCE PA)  23, 29, 30, 37, 69, 144n16, 146n31 Parliamentarians for Global Action (PGA)  19, 92 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE)  14, 44, 95, 130, 147n32, 147n51 Parliamentary organs of international governmental organizations (POIGOs)  5, 9, 20, 26, 41, 95, 130, 132, 157n115

196

Index

parliamentary diplomacy  4–​11, 12–​25, 26, 35, 37, 40, 44, 52, 55–​60, 61, 70, 85, 86, 91, 94, 100–​6, 108, 111–​18, 120–​40, 143n6–​9, 146n24, 147n46, 148n52 Partner for Democracy Status  40, 41, 147n51 party alliances (PAs)  5, 9, 20, 93 People’s Assembly of Abkhazia (PAA)  30 People First Party (PFP)  86, 116 People’s Republic of China (PRC)  1, 8, 15, 36, 45–​53, 56–​61, 67, 70–​85, 90–​105, 110, 114–​20, 125–​32, 142n3, 148n7, 148n10, 149n13, 150n9, 155n69 Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-​Hamra and Rio de Oro (Frente Popular de Liberacion de Saguia el Hamra y Rio de Oro) (POLISARIO)  39, 40, 146n35, 147n38, n46 Q Qing dynasty  47 R Republic of China (ROC)  8, 47, 48, 49, 50, 70, 81, 85, 149n11, 149n15, 151n21, 159n26 Rose–​Roth seminars  21, 69, 151n25

Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI)  78 Taiwan Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO)  52, 77, 87, 90, 115–​17, 140, 155n90, 155n92 Taiwan Enabling Act (TEA)  71 Taiwan Inter-Parliamentary Amity Association  63–4, 66, 80 Taiwan Parliamentary Coalition for Blockchain Self-​Regulatory Organization  64, 65 Taiwan Policy Review (TPR)  82, 153n61 Taiwan–​PRC relations  58, 114 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA)  9, 50, 70, 71, 133 Taiwan Travel Act (TTA)  77–​8, 84, 85, 86 Three No’s Policy  49, 53 Track One and a Half diplomacy (TOAH)  19, 20, 143n10, 143n11 Track Two diplomacy  142n2 Tsai, Ing-​wen  53, 54, 81 Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)  5, 32, 33, 42–​4, 130, 145n12 U United States Congress (US Congress)  9–​11, 15, 22, 37, 67, 69, 70–​8, 79, 80–​8, 89, 96, 107, 113–​17, 133–​8, 140, 144n18, 147n46, 149n12, 151n24, n26, 152n35, n40, 153n61, 159n28 unrepresented states  4, 5, 8, 14, 15, 25, 27–​9, 41–​4, 129, 131, 137, 139, 141 US Senate, the  18, 69, 78, 82, 84, 85, 86, 134, 151n29, 152n40, 154n66, 155n76, 155n77, 155n81, 156n96, 159n29 Foreign Relations Committee  69

S Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR)  5, 14, 39, 40–​3, 130, 137, 146n34, 147n37, 147n46 Sahrawi National Council (SNC)  39–​40, 130, 147n46 SARS  1, 2, 54, 81, 97, 98, 103, 104, 154n67 Shanghai Communiqué  49, 71 Sistema de la Integracion Centroamericana (Central American Integration System) (SICA)  132 Somaliland  5, 34–​6, 43–​6, 130, 137, 146n21–​3 Somali National Movement  34 South China Sea  97, 98, 121 Southeast Asia  50, 61, 62, 63, 65, 67, 68, 135 South East European Cooperation Process Parliamentary Assembly (SEECP PA)  38, 44, 130 South Ossetia  5, 28, 42–​4, 45, 130 Six Assurances  71, 151n31 Sun, Yat-​sen  47, 48 Supreme Council of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (SCPMR)  32

V Visa Waiver Program  73, 83, 152n40

T Taiwan  Caucus  57, 64, 67, 72, 134, 151n32, 152n38 diplomacies  8, 13, 52, 56, 131, 150n10 Economic and Cultural Office, New York  78 Strait  49, 73–​8, 91, 97, 99, 107, 117, 134

W Wang, Jin-​pyng  112, 118, 122, 157n126 Wen, Jiabao  75 Western Sahara  38–​40, 45, 46, 146n36, 147n39–​46 Women in Parliaments  93 Women Political Leaders Global Forum  93 World Health Assembly (WHA)  54, 79, 94, 105, 134 World Health Organization (WHO)  1–​2, 5, 54, 69, 79, 80–​3, 94, 97, 98, 103–​5, 114, 126, 132–​5, 153n60, 154n67, 155n75, 155n69–​70, 157n124–​6, 161n78 World Trade Organization (WTO)  45, 79–​81, 92, 98, 153n62, 156n109 X Xi, Jinping  51, 83, 114, 149n16, 153n56

197

Thomas Gold, University of California, Berkeley

“This comprehensive and thorough study of the parliamentary dimension of Taiwan’s international relations shows the great potential of parliamentary diplomacy in today’s international system.” Wolfgang Wagner, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

Zlatko Šabič is Professor of International Relations at the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. David W. F. Huang is an Associate Research Fellow at the Academia Sinica, Taiwan.

Parliamentary diplomacy has provided a crucial, promising outlet in Taiwan’s challenging pursuit of its own interests in the international arena.

Z L AT KO Š A B IČ AN D DAV ID W. F. HUA N G

This book assesses both the potentials and the constraints of parliamentary diplomacy for Taiwan. Through a comparative perspective – and using evidence from the relations of the Legislative Yuan in Taiwan with the US Congress and the European Parliament – the authors investigate the implementation of parliamentary diplomacy in Taiwan and its impact on Taiwan’s foreign policy. In their analysis, the authors draw vital lessons that will have important implications for other entities which have similar challenges and aspirations.

PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY OF TAIWAN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

“This is a very smart book that draws our attention to alternative ways that unrecognized and unrepresented ‘entities’ can make use of democratically elected parliamentarians to engage with the world. A valuable contribution to the study and theory of international relations.”

ISBN 978-1-5292-1118-4

9 781529 211184

B R I S TO L

@BrisUniPress BristolUniversityPress bristoluniversitypress.co.uk

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PARL I AM E N TARY D I P LO M AC Y O F TAI WAN I N CO M PARAT I V E P E R SP ECT I V E AG AI N ST I S OL AT I ON AN D U N D E R- RE P RE S E N TAT I ON Z L A TKO Š A BI Č DA V I D W. F. HUA N G