Parallelization: A Theory of Cultural, Economic and Political Complexity 3031516354, 9783031516351

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SpringerBriefs in Psychology Psychology and Cultural Developmental Science Björn Boman

Parallelization A Theory of Cultural, Economic and Political Complexity

SpringerBriefs in Psychology

SpringerBriefs in Psychology and Cultural Developmental Science

SpringerBriefs present concise summaries of cutting-edge research and practical applications across a wide spectrum of fields. Featuring compact volumes of 55 to 125 pages, the series covers a range of content from professional to academic. Typical topics might include: • A timely report of state-of-the-art analytical techniques • A bridge between new research results as published in journal articles and a contextual literature review • A snapshot of a hot or emerging topic • An in-depth case study or clinical example • A presentation of core concepts that readers must understand to make independent contributions SpringerBriefs in Psychology showcase emerging theory, empirical research, and practical application in a wide variety of topics in psychology and related fields. Briefs are characterized by fast, global electronic dissemination, standard publishing contracts, standardized manuscript preparation and formatting guidelines, and expedited production schedules. Series Editors Giuseppina Marsico, University of Salerno; Centre for Cultural Psychology, Aalborg University Salerno, Salerno, Italy Jaan Valsiner, Centre for Cultural Psychology Aalborg University Aalborg, Denmark SpringerBriefs in Psychology and Cultural Developmental Science is an extension and topical completion to IPBS: Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science Journal (Springer, chief editor: Jaan Vasiner) expanding some relevant topics in the form of single (or multiple) authored book. The series will have a clearly defined international and interdisciplinary focus hosting works on the interconnection between Cultural Psychology and other Developmental Sciences (biology, sociology, anthropology, etc). The Series aims at integrating knowledge from many fields in a synthesis of general science of Cultural Psychology as a new science of the human being. The series will include books that offer a perspective on the current state of developmental science, addressing contemporary enactments and reflecting on theoretical and empirical directions and providing, also, constructive insights into future pathways. Featuring compact volumes of 100 to 115 pages, each Brief in the series is meant to provide a clear, visible, and multi-sided recognition of the theoretical efforts of scholars around the world. Both solicited and unsolicited proposals are considered for publication in this series. All proposals will be subject to peer review by external referees.

Björn Boman

Parallelization A Theory of Cultural, Economic and Political Complexity

Björn Boman Department of Education Stockholm University Stockholm, Sweden

ISSN 2192-8363     ISSN 2192-8371 (electronic) SpringerBriefs in Psychology ISSN 2626-6741     ISSN 2626-675X (electronic) SpringerBriefs in Psychology and Cultural Developmental Science ISBN 978-3-031-51635-1    ISBN 978-3-031-51636-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-51636-8 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Paper in this product is recyclable.

Series Editors’ Preface

 arallelization: Hopping on the Fourth Leg Across P the Whole World This little book is interesting as it takes a concept—parallelization—from the domain of global political relationships within and between countries to the level of abstracted theory that should cover the whole of social sciences. The reader can be intrigued by that transposition—which is likely to trigger new thoughts. This is very much needed in both psychology and political sciences as the usual contrasts between personal and political standpoints are given as if these were solid. The parallelization coverage in this book transcends that by taking a developmental orientation. What is parallelization? The author sets it up as the “fourth leg” in the general theory of globalization. The other three—represented in Pieterse’s (2015) globalization theory—are homogenization, hybridization, and polarization. Is this “fourth leg” needed? The author of this book passionately claims it is. Indeed, four-legged creatures are more lovable than any three-legged ones if those were to exist in nature—so let us accept the author’s claim. In a nutshell, parallelization applies to co-presence of oppositely directed processes in politics, society, and the human mind. Such parallel patterns occur in a complex world where a singular pattern seldom occurs or constitutes a dominant trajectory (Boman 2021, pp, 355–358). Parallelization leads to unity of opposites— many related events and processes are taking place at the same time. Such social realities give rise to paradoxes in terms of classical logic where A and non-A cannot co-exist. In complex systems, they do co-exist—and here Boman’s parallelization “fourth leg” as added to Pieterse’s system fits. His ambitions are notable—his range of presented phenomena cultural development, globalization, secularization, migration, cognitive ability, the economic effects of climate change, and political conflicts is impressive, even if the reader might feel the need for further depth of analyses in each case.

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Series Editors’ Preface

The parallelization perspective gains further support from already well-­ established sociological and social psychological perspectives. Georg Simmel’s (1904) analysis of conflict involving the opposite processes of war-making and peace-making going on in parallel is a historical predecessor to the idea. Furthermore, the originator of the Social Representation Theory Serge Moscovici had a notable insight into the ways in which societies function: Our society is an institution which inhibits what it stimulates. It both tempers and excites aggressive, epistemic, and sexual tendencies, increases or reduces the chances of satisfying them according to class distinctions, and invents prohibitions together with the means of transgressing them. Its sole purpose, to date, is self-preservation, and it opposes change by means of laws and regulations. It functions on the basic assumption that it is unique, has nothing to learn, and cannot be improved. Hence its unambiguous dismissal of all that is foreign to it. Even its presumed artificiality, which might be considered a shortcoming, is taken, on the contrary, for a further sign of superiority, since it is an attribute of mankind. (Moscovici, 1976, p. 149, added emphasis)

This idea—inventing prohibitions together with ways to transcend these very same prohibitions—is needed for further development of the parallelization perspective outlined here. Currently it is absent—mostly because the focus on border processes that unite oppositely oriented directions of the soul and of society have been out of focus in the social sciences. How can the theory be further advanced? The border relations between the parallel processes need to be elaborated. More specifically, an in-depth understanding of the processes of meaning-making about “I-Other-World” in the context of border phenomenon is needed. As pointed out by Kullasepp and Marsico (2021) in another volume of this SpringerBriefs, there are many ways of thinking about borders. However, the basic understanding of borders is that they are markers of difference. Yet, borders can be zones or spaces of interaction, such as the entry/exit point between two countries (Kullasepp, 2021). Further elaboration of the notion of Border into the notion of Social Membrane (Marsico, 2023) illuminates the complexity of the semiosis in-between which is what the author of this volume aimed at. The “space in between” is neither a cuttable and divisible presence into discrete things, nor a mere “nothing” that could be cut off our conceptualization; on the contrary, it allows the negotiation phenomenon and semiotic processes that are the pre-condition for the parallelization to exist. One of the possible kinds of relations between parallel opposed processes is dialectics. Interestingly the author explicitly rejects the centrality of dialectics in the relations of the parallel processes. Instead, the general notion of interdependence is used. Unfortunately—as is the case with many other uses of that term in the social sciences—the elaboration of the idea in concrete examples is not given. If we consider dialectics to be one of the possible elaborations, then the parallelization component to globalization theory could lead to new forms of society. Yet history is filled with claims about building “new societies” that have ended up with usually grotesque versions of the old—thus promising a dialectical turn to parallelization might indeed be too revolutionary a theoretical step.

Series Editors’ Preface

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In sum, the present book could persuade the reader about the need for theoretical modelling of complex societal processes. It points to the arena that is generally is overlooked—relations between oppositely directed processes in complex social systems. Salerno, Italy Chapel Hill, NC, USA November, 2023

Giuseppina Marsico Jaan Valsiner

References Boman, B. (2021). Parallelization: The fourth leg of cultural globalization theory. IPBS: Integrative Psychological & Behavioral Science, 55, 354–370. Kullasepp, K., & Marsico, G. (Eds.). (2021).  Identity at the borders and between the borders. Springer. Marsico, G. (2023). Cultural psychology of bordering process. In J. Valsiner, & M. Tamm (Eds.), Breakthroughs in cultural psychology. Tallin University Press. Moscovici, S. (1976). Social influence and social change. Academic Press. Pieterse, J.  N. (2015).  Globalization and culture: Global Mélange. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Simmel, G. (1904). The sociology of conflict III. American Journal of Socology, 9, 799–811.

Preface

In late autumn of 2019, I was still a fresh PhD candidate. Nevertheless, I had a lot of things going on with research ideas and endeavors both within and outside the frames of education which is my main academic field. Education as a discipline can be fruitful to have as a point of departure as it overlaps other disciplines such as psychology, sociology, history, and cultural studies. Earlier I had also obtained a master’s degree in the social sciences of religions as well as studied the Korean language and Russian history in parallel with full-time work as a secondary level teacher. I convey this for those who do not necessarily understand why I have conducted research in so many areas. Some of it might be a consequence of boldness or foolishness but most of it does, in fact, follow an educational trajectory. In one PhD course, I remember that we dealt with theories pertinent for education and philosophy (or specifically, the philosophy of education). During that time, I felt that I wanted to contribute to the social sciences in the broader sense. Is it possible that a new theory might be of relevance? Can I come up with something partly novel and interesting? Typically, new theories do not come out of nowhere. They are partly built on existing scholarly works, sometimes not adding much more than a new word for quite similar theoretical and conceptual underpinnings. In my case, parallelization theory was partly built on Jan Nederveen Pieterse’s summary of cultural globalization theory. Moreover, it added elements from cognitive ability research, and in that regard, I owe both James Flynn and Richard Lynn for their earlier efforts. Regarding the economics of climate change, I owe much to William Nordhaus and Bjorn Lomborg. Of course, I also build my arguments on many other scholars, books and articles in, for example, Korean studies, migration studies, political science, education, psychology, and sociology. This creation of this book is both directly and indirectly a consequence of Jaan Valsiner’s editorial assistance in the journal Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science and in the Springer Brief book series on Psychology and Cultural Development. The original article “Parallelization: The fourth leg of cultural globalization theory” was published in early January in 2021  in Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science. A little more than two years later, I submitted a book proposal to write an entire work on this theory. As editors for the Springer ix

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Brief series in question, Jaan Valsiner and Giuseppina Marisco, as well as the involved Springer team, then made this book possible by accepting the proposal. Hence, I pay my sincerest gratitude to these individuals and anyone else who has contributed to the formation of the current work. A special thank you goes to the readers and reviewers, who provided important feedback on earlier versions of the current chapters. Lastly, I also want to thank supporting family members, co-­ workers, and friends. Stockholm, Sweden

Björn Boman

Contents

1

Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   1 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    3

2

Parallelization Theory ������������������������������������������������������������������������������   5 Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    5 Theoretical Underpinnings������������������������������������������������������������������������    6 Some Notes on the Methods and Methodology����������������������������������������    9 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   10

3

Climate Change and Economic Development as Both Destruction and Resilience ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  13 The Basic Premises of Climate Change����������������������������������������������������   13 Economic Growth as a Double-Edged Sword ������������������������������������������   14 Emissions Data������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   19 Conclusion ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   20 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   21

4

 Secularization and the Resurgence of Religions ������������������������������������  23 Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   23 The Parallelization of Secularization and Re-enchantment in Various Contexts������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   25 Argentina����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   26 Kazakhstan������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   26 Malaysia����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   27 Poland��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   29 Sweden������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   29 Conclusion ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   31 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   31

5

 Migration as Both Integration and Segregation�������������������������������������  33 Integration and Segregation ����������������������������������������������������������������������   33 Sweden������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   34 Partial Success Stories of Integration in Sweden��������������������������������������   35 xi

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United States����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   36 Conclusion ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   40 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   40 6

 Cognitive Ability as Both the Flynn Effect and Dysgenics ��������������������  43 Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   43 Why Intelligence Matters��������������������������������������������������������������������������   44 Genotypic and Phenotypic Intelligence: The Parallelization Paradox������   45 The Bidirectional Patterns Which Underlie the Parallelization in Cognitive Ability������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   47 Conclusion ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   49 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   49

7

 Instances of Parallelization in the Russia-­Ukraine War������������������������  53 Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   53 The Backdrop of the Ukraine War ������������������������������������������������������������   54 Current Trends and Developments in the Ukraine War ����������������������������   56 Conclusion ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   58 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   58

8

Culture and Politics in Georgia: Parallel Acceptance/Rejection of the West and Russia������������������������������������������������������������������������������  61 Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   61 Georgia’s Modern History ������������������������������������������������������������������������   62 Methodological Remarks ��������������������������������������������������������������������������   63 Westernization/Russification in Contemporary Georgia����������������������������   64 Conclusion ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   68 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   68

9

 South Korea as Representing the Coexistence of Homogenization, Hybridization, and Polarization ��������������������������������������������������������������  71 South Korea’s Modern History������������������������������������������������������������������   71 Homogenization: The American Influence������������������������������������������������   72 Hybridization: The Korean Wave��������������������������������������������������������������   74 Polarization: The Threat from North Korea and Potentially China and Russia��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   76 Conclusion ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   78 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   78

10 Conclusion��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  81 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   82 Inde x��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 83

Chapter 1

Introduction

Many fascinating and useful works deal with some of the big questions and concepts such as the culture (e.g., Jahoda, 2012), the relationship between culture and psychology (e.g., Marsico, 2011; Valsiner, 2000, 2014), and the nexus between culture and self as regards migration (e.g., Gamsakhurdia, 2018, 2019, 2020; Tartarovsky, 2010). Furthermore, several social scientists are interested in how culture interacts with politics and economic development in an era continuously characterized by globalization and transnationality (e.g., Bhabha, 1994 Hannerz, 1992; Pieterse, 2015). Moreover, others have fruitfully dealt with the economics of climate change (e.g. Nordhaus, 2015), complex and nuanced outlooks of secularization (e.g., Riesebrodt, 2010, 2014), and yet others on the intricate relationships between the rise and fall of cognitive ability around the world (e.g., Flynn, 2012). Unfortunately, these different fields are often both disparate and disconnected from each other. Continuous scholarly effort is bound to build, more or less, on earlier works in various fields. The abovementioned fields and topics are increasingly interdisciplinary and as such include substantial ingredients from both the social and behavioral sciences, with overlaps to both the natural sciences and humanities. On the other hand, the author’s attempt is to bring these topics, and some more, into an overarching theoretical concept that can explain the complex, parallel, and interdependent patterns often found within the frames of cultural development, globalization, secularization, migration, cognitive ability, economic effects of climate change, and political conflicts. To give an example: Can a country become Russified and Russophobic at the same time? One may ask the Ukrainians. Can a country become Russified and Westernized simultaneously? Ask the Georgians. Can a country become more and less religious at the same time (at least if one considers several groups within a single political entity)? Ask the Malaysians, Poles, and Swedes to name some of them. Can economic development be partly responsible for climate change but also safeguard against cataclysms and future climate impacts such as increased © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 B. Boman, Parallelization, SpringerBriefs in Psychology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-51636-8_1

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1 Introduction

flooding? Yes, it seems to be the case, if one asks many who may have thought about it. Can cognitive ability rise even if the fractions of society with higher socioeconomic status decrease? The answer is, thus far, mostly yes. These are but some of the questions that parallelization theory may provide an answer to. Parallelization theory (Boman, 2021), in a nutshell, concerns the parallel patterns that often occur in a complex world where a singular pattern seldom occurs or constitutes a dominant trajectory. It does partly belong to the family of cultural globalization theories (Pieterse, 2015; Popova, 2023) while also transcending it. One of the differences is that academics, students, and scientists are often taught to argue for a predominant pattern, albeit with some nuances and counterarguments. Secularization or the resurgence of religions? Genetic decline or environmental improvement. Integration or segregation. Parallelization theory adds the conjunction “and,” as it pertains to be an inclusive theory of parallel social, biological, cultural, political, psychological, and environmental complexity. Furthermore, the theory, as it is fleshed out in the current work, aims to explain some of the above questions in a more satisfying way than has previously been done, or at least provide some alternative perspectives on them. Moreover, it aims to go beyond the original article (Boman, 2021). For example, a limitation of the previous contribution is that it partly lacks a foundation for an empirical application. Any valuable theory must be both novel and useful (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2013; Castells, 2009). Hence, by bringing forward a richer theoretical foundation as well as additional empirical exemplifications, the theory’s utility is augmented. While the original descriptions of the conceptual underpinning of parallelization theory were sufficiently explained, the next chapter aims at a more comprehensive account of its main constituents. In addition, I also provide examples of how the theory could be used methodologically. I suggest that parallelization theory may be applied with both quantitative, qualitative, and mixed methods. The work is organized as follows: Chap. 2 deals with parallelization theory, as well as some methodological issues. Chapter 3 treats the relations between anthropogenic climate change and economic development. Chapter 4 focuses on the parallel patterns of secularization and the resurgence of religions with examples from Argentina, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Poland, and Sweden. Chapter 5 concerns the complex relations between migration, integration, and segregation. Chapter 6 examines the nexus between the rise and fall of cognitive ability around the world, known as the Flynn effect and anti-Flynn effect, and its relations with genetic and environmental processes. Chapter 7 highlights the Russia-Ukraine war. Chapter 8 focuses on contemporary culture and politics in Georgia (i.e., Westernization and Russification), whereas Chap. 9 analyzes the current state of South Korea from the parallel patterns of homogenization, hybridization, and polarization. The book ends with a conclusive chapter.

References

3

References Alvesson, M., & Sandberg, J. (2013). Constructing research questions: Doing interesting research. Sage. Bhabha, H. (1994). The location of culture. Routledge. Boman, B. (2021). Parallelization: The fourth leg of cultural globalization theory. Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 55(2), 354–370. Castells, M. (2009). The Rise of the network society. Wiley-Blackwell. Flynn, J. (2012). Are we getting smarter? Cambridge University Press. Gamsakhurdia, V. L. (2018). Adaptation in a dialogical perspective – From acculturation to proculturation. Culture & Psychology, 24(4), 545–559. Gamsakhurdia, V. L. (2019). Proculturation: Self-reconstruction by making “fusion cocktails” of alien and familiar meanings. Culture & Psychology, 25(2), 161–177. Gamsakhurdia, V. L. (2020). Semiotic construction of the self in multicultural societies: A theory of proculturation. Taylor & Francis. Hannerz, U. (1992). Cultural complexity. Columbia University Press. Jahoda, G. (2012). Critical reflections on some recent definitions of “culture”. Culture & Psychology, 18(3), 289–303. Marsico, G. (2011). The “non-cuttable” space in between: Context, boundaries and their natural fluidity. Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 45(2), 185–193. Nordhaus, W. (2015). Climate Casino. Risk, uncertainty, and economics for a warming world. Yale University Press. Pieterse, J.  N. (2015). Globalization and culture: Global Mélange. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Popova, B. (2023). The University as a socio-material assemblage: Promotional videos – Codes, territories, and globalization (Ph.D. dissertation). Lancaster University. Riesebrodt, M. (2010). The promise of salvation. A theory of religion. University of Chicago Press. Riesebrodt, M. (2014). Religion in the modern world: Between secularization and resurgence. European University Institute, Italy: Max Weber lecture series, no. 2014/01. Tartarovsky, E. (2010). Found in transition: An acculturation narrative of immigration from the former Soviet Union to Israel. Culture & Psychology, 16(3), 365–381. Valsiner, J. (2000). Culture and human development: An introduction. Sage. Valsiner, J. (2014). An invitation to cultural psychology. Sage Publications.

Chapter 2

Parallelization Theory

Introduction The scientific and scholarly communities have long taken an interest in many of the big ideas such as what constitutes a “culture,” “civilization,” and how these giant conceptual boxes do or do not relate to other important spheres such as economics and politics. Somewhat more recently, the literature on globalization expanded to gargantuan proportions (e.g., see Beck, 2000, for an overview). Overall, while many of the earlier scholarly efforts have contributed greatly to these intricate issues, recent scholarship emphasizes more complex, nuanced, and multifaceted theories and patterns. Instead of one big meta-theory for civilization and culture, such as those presented by Giambattista Vico or Oswald Spengler (e.g., see Ferguson, 2011), current theories are more historically situated and limited in their descriptive and explanatory scope. For example, instead of recurrent civilizational and economic cycles, one may speak of cyclical elements within cultures, countries, and the global economic system. Rather recent popular scientific works such as Ferguson (2011) and Pinker (2011) underline the West-centered, curvilinear progress of civilizations but also that the future remains uncertain. Hence, the predominantly linear models are still plagued by cycles, drawbacks, and emerging black clouds in the sky (e.g., the Russian invasion of Ukraine). The Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset (1969) cherished the liberal-democratic progress of the nineteenth century, but he also warned about the rise of plebeian democracy and totalitarian movements in the early twentieth century. It seems that few scholars can allow themselves to be completely sanguine about future civilizational prospects, despite palpable progress in the humanitarian and material realms. Valsiner (2000, 2014) underscores the multidirectional possibilities and directions in terms of culture and psychology. Human psychology is always affected by culture, and culture is always affected by human psychology. Bronfenbrenner (1994) accentuates the different human “ecosystems” and dimensions that affect © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 B. Boman, Parallelization, SpringerBriefs in Psychology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-51636-8_2

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human developments, such as micro-systems (e.g., individuals and families), meso-­ systems (e.g., neighborhoods and schools), and macro-systems (e.g., broader cultural, political, and economic structures). Thus, human life is intricately linked to both biological, social, cultural, and structural components. In a globalized world, some of these structures are of a super-national or transnational kind (Beck, 2000; Castells, 2009; Hannerz, 1992). Even discourse analysts accentuate that a physical reality affects us (e.g., Laclau & Mouffe, 2001), thus adding an element that transcends intersubjective interactions and interpretations. For example, a tsunami that hits Southeast Asia is indeed a real phenomenon but how humans thereafter interpret and elaborate discourses based on this event may differ quite dramatically from one person or group to another. For some it is just bad luck, while for others it may be a sign of an emerging climate catastrophe. Yet others may interpret it as an instantiation of God’s wrath (e.g., Christians and Muslims). Some Buddhists may see it as the result of bad aggregated karma that have accumulated over time. Therefore, there are usually as many discourses as there are individuals or groups, although one may simplify reality by creating discursive typologies (e.g., a Christian discourse, a scientific discourse, a Buddhist discourse). While it is impossible to cover all the important works on culture, globalization and similar topics, it may be useful to have Jan Nederveen Pieterse interdisciplinary works on cultural globalization as a starting point. Pieterse (1995) identified three major trajectories with regard to the broader relations between culture and globalization. But first, what is meant by culture and globalization? According to Merriam-­ Webster, culture means “the customary beliefs, social forms, and material traits of a racial, religious, or social group”, as well as “the characteristic features of everyday existence”. The same source defines the word global as something that is relating to the entire world. Cultural globalization, in a basic sense, is thus concerned about the emergence of human interaction on a global scale that affects people’s customs and everyday life within relatively distinct countries and cultures. Transportation and communication have played pivotal roles for this development (Pieterse, 2015; Rodrik, 2011). Jahoda (2012) offers a well-crafted overview of the various meanings of culture. There are, accordingly, many different descriptions and definitions of the meaning of the global and globalization. However, for the sake of simplicity I will put aside further analytical definitions and hereafter focus on the three core concepts of Pieterse’s typology.

Theoretical Underpinnings One component of cultural globalization is homogenization (Pieterse, 1995), which implies a West-centered (sometimes equated with Westernization or even, specifically, Americanization) diffusion of culture that affects many parts of the world. For example, a recent instance is the presence of McDonald’s in the occupied city of Mariupol in Ukraine. This symbolizes the partial Americanization of Ukrainian culture. Indeed, even Russia used to have McDonald’s on some parts of its territory

Theoretical Underpinnings

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prior the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Very few major cities do not have at least one McDonald’s (Gentile, 2022; Ritzer, 1993). While McDonald’s is a profitable multinational company and thus related to the economic sphere of globalization it is also linked to the customs of everyday life such as food consumption and dietary habits. Sports, fashion, television, and music are also related to a West-centered form of cultural globalization, namely homogenization (Pieterse, 1995). McDonald’s, in Ritzer’s analysis (1993), is also a metaphor for more general structural developments that guide contemporary societies in many ways. Hence, the more for instance a country’s population conforms to American/ Western customs, the higher the rate of homogenization is. This could be analyzed by for example case studies, ethnographic methods, or quantitative analyses. For example, the number of Western companies or stores per capita signifies the rate or intensity of homogenization. Another example could be the percentage of English loan words that have been absorbed by non-English countries, whether these are Estonia, Russia, or South Korea. However, local examples could focus on more limited and specific phenomena. For example, mainstream South Korean pop music, K-pop, is often understood as a form of hybrid culture (i.e., an example of cultural hybridization, see Chap. 9), particularly a blend of Korean and Western elements. But some may argue that it is also linked to homogenization. The more English words that are used in K-pop, the higher the degree of homogenization. A K-pop song which is fully sung in English is almost indistinguishable from an American song. The same goes for Swedish artists such as Zara Larsson, or earlier, Roxette, Ace of Base, and the Cardigans (Boman, 2021b). The second leg of Pieterse’s tripartite theory is hybridization (Pieterse, 1995). Briefly put, hybridization means the merging of cultural elements, whether they are Western or not. Pieterse (2015) asserts that the first waves of globalization, or world culture, started rather early such as the late fifteenth century onward. Hence, there are many pre-modern examples of cultural mixing, such as in relation to languages and cultures. These were early waves of small-scale globalization of cultures and ideas. In earlier linguistics scholars used the term creolization for the blend of different languages, typically English combined with some indigenous language, and in religious studies one may use the term syncretism for the mix of various religious elements (Pieterse, 2015). Surzhyk is a mixed sociolect of Ukrainian and Russian (Bilaniuk, 2004). In Latin America, it was quite common to blend Catholicism with folk religion. Some religious historians may even argue that Christianity is, at its core, a hybrid between Judaism and Greek culture. Boman (2021a) also highlights that ethnic or population mixing is a form of cultural hybridization in the broader sense and often goes hand in hand with religious and linguistic hybridization (Cavalli-Sforza, 2000). Hybridization may not only be studied as older facts or processes but as contemporary and continuous phenomena. For example, as I write this, in Sweden there is an ongoing cultural hybridization when people with a migration background, who have not or may even never become “fully assimilated”, mix for example suburban sociolects with regular Swedish, as well as the majority laws and customs with Islamic beliefs (Boman, 2021a). An individual’s mode of thinking is always affected by the old and new cultural ingredients (Gamksakhurdia, 2018).

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Hence, hybridization is also associated with psychological processes of both an intra-subjective and intersubjective kind. The third leg of Pieterse’s theory on cultural globalization is polarization. Polarization is a quite multifaceted concept and may be tied to, for example, the media’s role in political division (Prior, 2013) as well as segregation and ethnic conflict (e.g., Klasnja & Notva, 2016). Pieterse focuses mostly on the broader wars and conflicts with a reference to Samuel Huntington’s (1993) seminal article. Huntington’s (1996) clash of civilizations theory, which depicts rather bounded macro-cultures and a world mostly characterized by real or latent conflicts, has been criticized multiple times as it partly lacks empirical support (e.g., Ferguson, 2011; Pieterse, 2015). Nonetheless, it has turned out to be quite correct with regard to, for example, Ukraine (Boman, 2021a). What may be regarded at first merely as small-­ scale and latent ethnolinguistic and political polarization turned out to be a full-­ scale physical confrontation in 2014 onward (Boman, 2021a). Polarization may also have a mere discursive element in relation, for example, to the media and democratic politics (e.g., Mouffe, 2013). But what is exactly global about polarization? And do we really need to consider the global dimension of political and/or ethno-­ cultural conflicts? Obviously, an answer to such a query requires a context-­dependent approach. It depends. However, in a world characterized by global processes and relations, it is quite often the case that external factors, which hinge upon global tools such as communication, trade, and transportation, if not pure geopolitics, play a key role in such serious events. Migration is of course another factor, often associated with economic prospects and previous conflicts (Alesina et et  al., 2003; Ferguson, 2011; Rodrik, 2011). For example, the war in Ukraine is mostly a local and regional conflict between two neighboring countries with substantial ethno-­ cultural and historical ties (Boman, 2023). However, Western countries, most notably the United States, have also played a central role both prior to and during the unfolding of this conflict (Götz & Staun, 2022; Tsygankov, 2015). What Pieterse’s tripartite account lacks, however, is a comprehensive illustration and explanation of various cultural, economic, political, and psychological phenomena that occur in parallel. For example, Pieterse (2015) argues for the predominance of hybridization in the past and present. But that is not entirely convincing. The same locality, whether we consider South Korea, Sweden, Ukraine, or the United States, might be characterized by all of these processes simultaneously. South Korea is still officially at war with its northern neighbor which will be further elaborated in Chap. 9. There are also many examples of homogenization and hybridization in South Korea that transcend the Korean wave in current times. Indeed, there are countries which are affected by cultural, economic, and political globalization but in complete lack of polarization, at least beyond mere discursive examples. Micro-states such as Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, and San Marino seem to be prime examples of peaceful and prosperous locations in the liberal West. A visitor can enjoy casinos, hiking, skiing, food, and shopping and does not have to consider the possibility of danger, at least such that are linked with crime and conflicts (World Factbook, 2023).

Some Notes on the Methods and Methodology

9

Another limitation of earlier scholarly efforts, such as Pieterse’s works (e.g., 1994, 1995, and 2015) but also other accounts, is that they fail to conceptualize other important global and local phenomena such as the economic impact of climate change, as well as the impact of economic development on climate change. Hence, there is a link between parallelization and the works of Bjorn Lomborg (e.g., Lomborg, 2020) that will be examined in Chap. 3. Moreover, one may underscore the parallel patterns of “dysgenic fertility” and the Flynn effect (i.e., the secular increase of IQ scores in many countries of the world throughout the large swaths of the twentieth century and in some cases beyond), and the parallel patterns of secularization and the resurgence of religiosity. The complex and interdependent processes of migration, socioeconomic integration, and ethnic segregation also deserve a more satisfying conceptualization and theoretical explanation. Hence, parallelization offers a complex theory of cultural, economic, political, and psychological complexity at the local and global levels of analysis. It focuses on the co-­occurrence of several and sometimes seemingly contradictory processes (Boman, 2021a).

Some Notes on the Methods and Methodology The original parallelization article (Boman, 2021a) was mostly a theoretical paper which reviewed some of the theoretical and empirical evidence for the conceptual and topical dimensions of pertinence for the overall argument. However, it is hard to imagine an empirical application to the economics of climate change, cognitive ability trends, or even secularization without any quantitative features. On the contrary, it is also hard to envision any theoretical reasoning without interpretation and deduction. Overall, I consider it a matter of scholarly preference, topic of concern, as well as context as regards the use of qualitative methods (e.g., interviews, ethnography, textual analysis, and narrative literature reviews), quantitative methods (e.g., statistical analysis), or mixed methods. In addition, I consider case studies to be particularly useful (e.g., Flyvbjerg, 2011), which may or may not consist of quantitative or qualitative methods to support the interpretation of the data. Any useful theory must have substantial support in an empirical reality, and any empirical reality may be interpreted from a set of theoretical assumptions or underpinnings. However, sometimes it is a bit more manageable to examine particular countries or localities. In this book, I scrutinize certain aspects of countries such as Georgia, South Korea, Sweden, Ukraine, and the United States. Yet, other parts of the current work have no such clear-cut examples, but instead it deals with the topic on a broader, sometimes global scale. The aim of parallelization theory has been to include both global and local levels of analysis (Boman, 2021a). The preparation of the current work consists of a review of the latest publications on the topics which are the focal point: cognitive ability, secularization, economics of climate change, the Russia-Ukraine war, culture and politics in Georgia, South Korea’s cultural and political orientation, and migration studies. In this regard, I have used, for example, backward and forward referencing on a number of key

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works, as well as searches in Google Scholar. Because this is not a systematic literature review, I will not convey search strings, inclusion criteria, and similar features. Nevertheless, the author has included works which have been published in 2021–2023 (i.e., after the publication of Boman, 2021a, which was published in January 2021) but also earlier works of significance have been included, too, in order to have a more comprehensive representation of the literature in question. Moreover, the author has examined official statistical sources of many of the topics of concern such as aggregated carbon dioxide emissions, migration estimates, death tolls in Ukraine, and so forth. Ultimately, there are always limitations regarding the inclusion of pertinent sources, but the author intends to cover at least a bulk of the crucial references.

References Alesina, A., Devleeschauwer, A., Easterly, W., Kurlat, S., & Wacziarg, R. (2003). Fractionalization. Journal of Economic Growth, 8(2), 155–194. Beck, U. (2000). What is globalization? Polity. Bilaniuk, L. (2004). A typology of Surzhyk: Mixed Ukrainian–Russian language. International Journal of Bilingualism, 8(4), 409–425. Boman, B. (2021a). Parallelization: The fourth leg of cultural globalization theory. Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 55(2), 354–370. Boman, B. (2021b). Why has Sweden risen in the IFPI league tables but been surpassed by South Korea? A comparative case study. Social Sciences and Humanities Open, 4(1), 100204. Boman, B. (2023). The co-existence of nationalism, westernization, russification and Russophobia: Facets of parallelization in the Russian invasion of Ukraine. International Politics, 60, 1–17. Bronfenbrenner, U. (1994). Ecological models of human development. In International encyclopedia of education, vol. 3, 2nd edn. Oxford: Elsevier. Reprinted in: M. Gauvain, & M. Cole (Eds.), Reading on the development of children, 2nd edn. (1993, pp. 37–43). Freeman. Castells, M. (2009). The rise of the network society. Wiley-Blackwell. Cavalli-Sforza, L. L. (2000). Genes, peoples and languages. Penguin. Ferguson, N. (2011). Civilization. Penguin. Flyvbjerg, B. (2011). Case study. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), The sage handbook for qualitative research (pp. 301–316). Sage. Gamsakhurdia, V. L. (2018). Adaptation in a dialogical perspective – From acculturation to proculturation. Culture & Psychology, 24(4), 545–559. Gentile, M. (2022). Pax McDonaldica before the storm: From geopolitical fault-line to urbicide in Mariupol, Ukraine. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 48, 665. Götz, E., & Staun, J. (2022). Why Russia attacked Ukraine: Strategic culture and radicalized narratives. Contemporary Security Policy, 43(3), 482–497. Hannerz, U. (1992). Cultural complexity. Columbia University Press. Huntington, S. (1993). Clash of civilizations? Huntington, S. (1996). The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. Simon & Schuster. Jahoda, G. (2012). Critical reflections on some recent definitions of “culture”. Culture & Psychology, 18(3), 289–303. Klasnja, M., & Novta, N. (2016). Segregation, polarization, and ethnic conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 60(5), 927–955. Laclau, E., & Mouffe, C. (2001). Hegemony and socialist strategy. Verso.

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Lomborg, B. (2020). Welfare in the 21st century: Increasing development, reducing inequality, the impact of climate change, and the cost of climate policies. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 156. Merriam-Webster. https://www.merriam-­webster.com/dictionary/culture Mouffe, C. (2013). Agonistics. Verso. Ortega y Gasset, J. (1969). La rebelión de las masas. W. W. Norton & Co. Pieterse, J. N. (1994). Globalisation as hybridisation. International Sociology, 9(2), 161–184. Pieterse, J. N. (1995). Globalisation and culture: Three paradigms. Economic and Political Weekly, 31(23), 1389–1393. Pieterse, J.  N. (2015). Globalization and culture: Global Mélange. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Pinker, S. (2011). The better angels of our nature. Penguin. Prior, M. (2013). Media and political polarization. Annual Reviews of Political Science, 16, 101–127. Ritzer, G. (1993). The McDonaldisation of society. Thousand Oaks. Rodrik, D. (2011). The globalization paradox. Oxford University Press. Tsygankov, A.  P. (2015). Vladimir Putin’s last stand: The sources of Russia’s Ukraine policy. Soviet Affairs, 31(4), 279–303. Valsiner, J. (2000). Culture and human development: An introduction. Sage. Valsiner, J. (2014). An invitation to cultural psychology. Sage Publication. World Factbook. (2023). https://www.cia.gov/the-­world-­factbook/.

Chapter 3

Climate Change and Economic Development as Both Destruction and Resilience

The Basic Premises of Climate Change Climate change is often equated with global warming (Nordhaus, 2015), and for the sake of simplicity, I will use it here as synonymous with global warming. In reality, climate change is more complex and dynamic and also includes the effects of warming such as predicted future hurricane intensity, higher sea levels, and ocean acidification. According to the most prevailing theoretical and empirical explanation, climate change is predominantly driven by greenhouse gas emissions. The postindustrial period, 1900 up and until 2100, is often used to calculate the changes from a baseline level to a foreseeable future level of global warming (predominantly caused by anthropogenic effects). As greenhouse gases are released and stay in the atmosphere for a very long time, global temperatures are expected to increase over time. Only mitigation of greenhouse gases, via carbon pricing and other measures, as well as supplemental strategies (e.g., carbon capturing and adaption), could reduce warming and avoid large future problems in terms of the world’s economic and ecological systems. Climate change in the preindustrial past has typically been driven by large solar cycles and the amount of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere has differed over time and space. Nevertheless, the recent emissions, as a result of economic productivity, are regarded as an anthropogenic (i.e., human) effect (Nordhaus, 2015). What makes the picture more complicated is, for instance, various feedback effects (which could have either cooling or warming effects) such as those that result from water vapor, clouds, surface albedo changes, and Planck feedback. Increased amounts of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere likely cause higher temperatures. A higher temperature then allows the atmosphere to hold more water vapor, and since water vapor is a strong greenhouse gas, the increased amount of water vapor in the atmosphere causes the temperature to rise even more. The feedback effect from water vapor is therefore said to be positive. Without clouds, the © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 B. Boman, Parallelization, SpringerBriefs in Psychology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-51636-8_3

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average temperature on Earth would be significantly higher than today, but not all clouds have a net cooling effect as different kinds of clouds have different effects on the temperature. On average, clouds that are located at higher altitudes have a warming effect, while their lower counterparts typically have a cooling effect. The Earth’s surface albedo explains how much solar radiation the Earth re-reflects to space. Presently, it is around 0.3, which implies that the Earth reflects approximately 30% of the inward solar radiation. The portion of the solar radiation which is reflected does not contribute to warming, however. A warm object radiates more than a cold object, or in the case of the Earth, a warm planet radiates more to space than a colder counterpart. As our planet becomes warmer, it radiates more energy to space, which in turn makes the globe colder and in parallel decreases the rate of warming. Thus, the Planck feedback constitutes a powerful negative feedback that cools the planet (Lewis, 2023). Moreover, various tipping points make future predictions of the costs of climate change difficult to assess with wide margins of error (Cai & Lontzek, 2019; Wunderling et  al., 2023). Tipping points constitute nonlinear changes that may accelerate the damages of climate change (Nordhaus, 2015). Hence, climate models which account for probable costs under different assumptions may or may not include effects from tipping points.

Economic Growth as a Double-Edged Sword The Nobel laureate in Economics, William Nordhaus, is well known for his work on the nexus between economics and climate science, in particular the Dynamic Integrated Climate-Economic (DICE) model. Nordhaus (2015) describes how climate change, specifically global warming, is a real problem which is primarily caused by economic growth via greenhouse gas emissions (e.g., carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, water vapor, as well as aerosols such as ammonia and black carbon). A large part of all economic production and infrastructure development is based on fossil fuels such as coal. First of all, if future warming is higher than expected (e.g., 4–5 degrees Celsius compared to 2–3) it could lead to a loss of biodiversity, ocean acidification, high costs to adapt (estimates typically vary 1–5% of the global GDP, based on realistic assumptions), rising sea levels, and many other net negative side effects. On the other hand, this is a very complex problem that requires a delicate balancing act. It is necessary to drastically reduce emissions of greenhouse gases (i.e., mitigation) but not to the extent that the economy is not growing at all. An expanding world economy is tantamount to the adaption and resilience of future climate change effects. In fact, Nordhaus is not particularly worried about many of the manageable sectors of the world economy and local markets such as healthcare and agriculture (Nordhaus, 2015). These are largely technology based, and as the economy grows in many developing countries and regions, the farmers can adapt to new circumstances. As Lomborg (2020) underscores, many of the more fatalistic scenarios of current and future climate

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change are based on false assumptions that people will just sit idly and not adapt, that the world economy will not grow, and so on. However, the business-as-usual (BUA) scenario is not an ideal one. In this scenario, governments and people in general will not do anything to tackle global warming. The world economy will grow substantially but at very high future costs, both market based and nonmarket based, which are associated with the effects of “unrestrained” warming. An example of economic loss is the cost associated with rising sea levels and more intense hurricanes and wildfires, while the extinction of many species is an example of a nonmarket loss. The optimal solution, according to Nordhaus (2015) and Lomborg (2020), is a combination of substantial mitigation (through carbon-based taxes), research and development, as well as adaption and a few other supplemental approaches to tackle future effects of climate change (e.g., Fakraee et al., 2023). A larger and low-carbon intense future world economy can afford to deal with future costs relatively well, at least if global warming is limited to about 3 degrees Celsius (Nordhaus, 2015). As Nordhaus (2015), Piontek et al. (2021), and many others underline, the quantification of economic and social climate change effects is complicated. Different research methodologies and models lead to quite disparate estimates (Cai & Lontzek, 2019; Nordhaus, 2018a, b; Nordhaus & Moffat, 2017; Piontek et  al., 2021). A problem may be, for example, too simplified aggregates that do not distinguish between various sectors and subsectors of national markets. However, many of the best model teams could still implement different models with different but real assumptions. The year 2100 is typically set as a temporal goal post, which in turn introduces a higher degree of uncertainties compared to shorter timeframes, but as these processes are gradual, it is also possible to consider intermediate effects in the middle of the twenty-first century. For example, currently, it is interesting to see how much warming occurs until, for instance, 2060. In a nutshell, Fig. 3.1 illustrates how a researcher may account for both conventional production factors (e.g., human capital and natural capital), economic production, climate change, and social and ecological consequences of a warming planet. The ecological components constitute a Green-DICE model (e.g., Bastien-­ Olvera & Moore, 2021). Figure 3.2, on the other hand, illustrates a tripartite interrelated parallelization flow pattern between economic growth (or production followed by output), climate change, and resilience. The double-headed arrows indicate that there is typically a bidirectional relationship between these components, as, for example, climate change also affects economic production. More and more companies in the world want to become “green” and “sustainable.” Furthermore, economic production and output must focus more on new energy systems (e.g., solar and wind) and low-carbon emissions. In that regard, one may say that climate change is “mediated” by human capital factors because it is a human discovery that causes changes in production mode rather than the climate per se on setting such changes. One may also add political and governmental decisions, both in Fig. 3.1 and in Fig. 3.2. For the sake of simplicity, however, Fig. 3.2 focuses on the three major elements. The resilience box is quite multifaceted once one starts to examine its underlying content and ideas. As Gallopín (2006) stresses, the meanings

Economic production

Climate

Fig. 3.1  Green-DICE diagram, partly based on Bastien-Olvera and Moore (2021)

Natural capital

Human capital

Manufactured capital

Ecosystem services

Economic output

Social welfare

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Economic Growth as a Double-Edged Sword

Economic growth

Climate change

Resilience

Fig. 3.2  Parallelization framing of the climate change-economic growth nexus

of central concepts such as resilience and vulnerability may differ between disciplines. In Chap. 5, which focuses on migration, vulnerability is not defined as the same phenomenon as when one pays attention to climate change (e.g., Gilodi et al., 2022). Consequently, academic or psychological resilience is not the same as social systems or nations being resilient. To the same degree, the cross-disciplinary meanings may overlap, as human beings are affected psychologically by climate change (Tam et  al. 2023), and war migrants and future climate migrants face adversity (Boman, 2023). Until the big economic and ecological effects emerge, discourses on climate change are sometimes more important than the effects themselves (Boman, 2021; Nordhaus, 2015). Furthermore, as they are part of colloquial language, these may introduce further ambiguity and subjectivity. Nevertheless, in this regard, I define resilience as a system-level capability to handle and adapt to climate change, first and foremost a higher average temperature and its current and future side effects. System-level vulnerability implies that larger units such as societies are vulnerable to climate change, regarding both its ecological, economic, and social consequences. Governments in specific nations, informed by, for example, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports, in conjunction with corporations and firms, must handle the situation that occurs. On the micro and meso level, individuals, families, and communities must also deal with various consequences such as higher energy costs or the need for installing an air condition system in the home (Masselot et al., 2023), as well as consumption of electric vehicles, which have emerged to at least partly replace the petroleum-fueled vehicles (Nordhaus, 2015). The emergence of resilience and adaption, akin to sound climate science, does not constitute atomistic phenomena that come out of nowhere. Indeed, these are created in a dynamic interplay between an ecological reality, a world of nations, and human activities in the economic, political, and scientific realms. Usually, governments or other actors sponsor research which may lead to the discovery of, for example, new energy systems that are fruitful to implement in a world which must cut carbon emissions. If these are possible to scale up (e.g., improved nuclear power

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and wind energy systems), they can have quite dramatic consequences for the world’s future climate, especially if that electricity can also be used for electric cars, trucks, and ships (Nordhaus, 2015). But not only scientific and engineering discoveries are funded. The basic infrastructure of our societies such as roads, bridges, houses, alarm systems, tracking devices, and communication systems—all necessary for the adaption to and resilience of likely climate change effects—are only possible to exist because of a certain degree of economic development among nations. That is also why these components, systems, and mechanisms are more common and widespread in countries such as Japan and the United States compared to the Philippines or Guatemala (Boman, 2021; Lomborg, 2020). As the Philippines, Guatemala, and other countries with comparatively much lower GDP per capita levels experience economic growth, as well as cooperate with other states, they can more effortlessly tackle both natural disasters and probable side effects of future warming (Lomborg, 2020; Nordhaus, 2015). If, for example, the economy of the Philippines grows by 4% annually, and there has been a reduction of victims from tropical storms and tsunamis at the same time, one may conclude that its level of resilience has increased. It is exactly what must happen in this and many other nations throughout the world. The local conditions matter greatly regarding the implementation of, for example, adaption to rising sea levels (Blankesport et  al., 2023) and increased cyclone intensity (Wenzhong Huang et al., 2023). But what if economic development is both necessary and hurtful? What is the optimal balance? According to Nordhaus (2015) and Lomborg (2020), it is reasonable to set the goal post to approximately 3 Celsius degrees of warming (from the baseline year 1900 until 2100). Even that goal is complicated to accomplish as many big emitters such as China, India, and the United States (Zhang, 2011; UNEP, 2022) are very different in terms of ideology and GDP per capita levels. It is easy to imagine that the average Chinese and Indian citizens are still more concerned about economic and health prospects than global warming, at least in the short term, compared to their American or Western counterparts. Still, it is important to focus on the big emitters. These are also possible to create some positive externalities such as research and development that the rest of the world can, depending on a country’s developmental stage, benefit from (Lomborg, 2020; Nordhaus, 2015). Another positive sign is that earlier resilience and adaption, which were consequences of natural disasters, show that societies have so far been able to drastically reduce the number of victims from cataclysms by roughly 99%. Furthermore, wealthier countries are also keener on setting up national parks and nature reserves than their poorer counterparts (Lomborg, 2020). Hence, there are intricate relationships between economic growth, climate change, and resilience that must be considered.

Emissions Data

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Emissions Data Thus far, the overarching patterns of the parallelization of economic growth, climate change, and resilience have been established. Next, it is pertinent to examine current and future trends. The United Nations Emissions Gap report (UNEP, 2022) is an important source of credible data on recent emissions and trends in the near future. The document summarizes a number of key findings of which one is that countries are doing too little to tackle greenhouse gas emissions responsible for climate change (UNEP, 2022). However, based on Nordhaus’s (2015) cost-benefit analysis, which aims for an optimal balance between mitigation and economic growth, the trends seem aligned with a realistic global warming trajectory at about 3 degrees Celsius (again, from the baseline year 1900 to 2100). Indeed, 2.8 degrees which UNEP (2022) points at is well above the ambitious 1.5- and 2-degrees goals but still not alarmingly high figures. Moreover, according to several scenarios posed by IPCC’s working groups, there is roughly a 66% chance that temperatures will be below 1.8 degrees. Furthermore, the report underlines that gradual implementation is no longer possible; only the implementation of broad and full-scale strategies is regarded as a feasible way forward. Nordhaus (2015) accentuates the difficulties of coordinating national and local markets with regard to political decision-making, carbon tax systems, and so on. However, the UNEP (2022) report still provides examples on how to more effectively and fruitfully implement changes. Politically, binding protocols such as the Kyoto Protocol (implemented in 2005), the Copenhagen Accord (2009), and the Paris Agreement (2015) are important steps to concrete actions. Essentially, the aim is to reach the goal of less than 2 degrees of warming relative to preindustrial levels. These accords underscore the importance of national actions and accountability under the aegis of an international framework. However, it does not stipulate how this should be done. There are a host of factors that contribute to the slow progress of ambitious plans to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. One is the geopolitical factor as the top ten emitters are the major countries in terms of population size and total GDP.  Table  3.1 summarizes the size of emissions and major emitters. Table 3.1  Total GHG emissions and major emitters

Countries China USA India EU27 Indonesia Russia Brazil International transport Rest

Emissions (GtCo2) 15 6 3.5 3.3 2 2.7 1.5 1 X

Notes: Source: UNEP (2022). The numbers are rounded off

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Another reason is that per capita emissions are still the highest in the Western world, except for Russia (UNEP, 2022). National and global accountability must consider both total and average emissions in a realistic way. As Nordhaus (2015) emphasizes, any sophisticated cost-benefit analysis must account for the well-being of future generations. However, because current investments in, for example, constructive climate policies, technology, and adaption are also to the benefit of future generations, it is not wise to limit economic development too much to the benefit of costly climate policies. It hurts both current and future generations. Indeed, many countries commit to relatively vague policies such as mitigation targets being part of long-term strategies. This could lead to so-called free-riding, meaning that some parties (i.e., usually countries) benefit from the decisions of others while not contributing on their behalf. Nordhaus (2015) suggests that a moderate carbon tax and penalties that are in accord with these in a global “climate club” could be a solution. Hence, states that do not follow their own nationally determined contributions (NDC) must face relatively severe “punishments” in an economic sense, partly similar to the sanctions against Russia in the aftermath of the Ukraine war (see Chap. 7). Of course, economic penalties and partial political isolation can only do so much. Hence, UNEP (2022) also stresses the removal of carbon subsidies, electrified transportations, implementation of zero-emission technologies, and many more investment strategies. Compared to Lomborg (2020), UNEP (2022) focuses less on adaption and resilience. Nordhaus (2015) underlines that mitigation is the most important factor in this regard. However, Lomborg (2020) argues that many of the solutions are also economic in nature. As I wrote in my article from 2021: “Economic growth is, at least at some point in history, like an armed robber who shoots a victim and then pays the hospital bill, in particular for the wealthy.” (Boman, 2021). Hence, economic development constitutes both the problem and the solution.

Conclusion Climate change is a real problem, predominantly caused by greenhouse gas emissions set off via economic production. The exact temperature and damage effects from greenhouse gas emissions are an intricate issue due to climate feedback factors such as clouds and albedo effects (Lewis, 2023). On the other hand, economic development via GDP growth is also a solution to many of the current and future problems which are associated with natural disasters and the effects of global warming. Reasonable estimates, derived from deterministic model assumptions, indicate that approximately 1–5% of the future global GDP must be allocated to tackle climate change effects such as rising sea levels, intensified hurricanes and wildfires, as well as climate refugees and related migratory processes. Some nonmarket effects (e.g., loss of biodiversity) cannot be assessed in purely economic terms but may be considered (Nordhaus, 2015). Other models, which focus on climate tipping points, show much higher cost estimates for future damages (Cai & Lontzek, 2019). The

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parallelization of climate change caused by economic growth and the resilience against climate change, likewise caused by economic growth, may be further highlighted and analyzed.

References Bastien-Olvera, B.A., & Moore, F.C (2021). Use and non-use value of nature and the social cost of carbon. Nature Sustainability, 4, 101–108. Blankespoor, B., Dasgupta, S., Wheeler, D., Jeuken, A., van Ginkel, K., Hill, K., & Hirschfeld, D. (2023). Linking sea-level research with local planning and adaption needs. Nature Climate Change, 13, 760–763. Boman, B. (2021). Parallelization: The fourth leg of cultural globalization theory. Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 55, 354–370. Boman, B. (2023). Vulnerable women: Negotiations among migrant women in the aftermath of the Ukraine war. Human Arenas, 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1007/s42087-­023-­00347-­5 Cai, Y., & Lontzek, T.  S. (2019). The social cost of carbon with economic and climate risks. Journal of Political Economy, 127(6), 2684–2734. Fakraee, M., Planavsky, N. J., & Reinhard, C. T. (2023). Ocean alkalinity enhancement through restoration of blue carbon ecosystems. Nature Sustainability, 6, 1087. Gallopín, G. C. (2006). Linkages between vulnerability, resilience, and adaptive capacity. Global Environmental Change, 16(3), 293–303. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2006.02.004 Gilodi, A., Albert, I., & Nienaber, B. (2022). Vulnerability in the context of migration: A critical overview and a new conceptual model. Human Arenas. https://doi.org/10.1007/ s42087-­022-­00288-­5 Lewis, N. (2023). Objectively combining climate sensitivity evidence. Climate Dynamics, 60, 3139–3165. Lomborg, B. (2020). Welfare in the 21st century: Increasing development, reducing inequality, the impact of climate change, and the cost of climate policies. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 156, 119981. Masselot, P., et al. (2023). Excess mortality attributed to heat and cold: a health impact assessment study in 854 cities in Europe. The Lancet Planetary Health, 7(4), e271. Nordhaus, W. (2015). Climate Casino. Risk, uncertainty, and economics for a warming world. Yale University Press. Nordhaus, W. (2018a). Evolution of modeling of the economics of global warming: Changes in the dice model, 1992–2017. Climate Change, 148(4), 623–640. Nordhaus, W. (2018b). Projections and uncertainties about climate change in an era of minimal climate policies. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 10(3), 333–360. Nordhaus, W., & Moffat, A. (2017). A survey of global impacts of climate change: Replication, survey methods, and a statistical analysis. National Bureau of Economic Research. Piontek, F., et al. (2021). Integrated perspective on translating biophysical to economic impacts of climate change. Nature Climate Change, 11, 563–572. Tam, K.-P., Chan, H.-W., & Clayton, S. (2023). Climate change anxiety in China, India, Japan, and the United States. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 87, 101991. UNEP. (2022). Emissions gap report. https://www.unep.org/resources/emissions-gap-report2022?gclid=EAIaIQobChMIha7vipT__gIVW-­n mCh0LRAVxEAAYASAAEgJa4fD_ BwE. Accessed May 2022. Wenzhong Huang, M.  P. H., et  al. (2023). Global short-term mortality risk and burden associated with tropical cyclones from 1980 to 2019: A multi-country time-series study. The Lancet Planetary Health, 7(8), e694.

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Wunderling, N., Winkelmann, R., Rockström, J., Loriani, S., Armstrong McKay, D. I., Ritchie, P. D. L., Sakchewski, B., & Donges, J. F. (2023). Global warming overshoots increase risks of climate tipping cascades in a network model. Nature Climate Change, 13, 75–82. Zhang, Z. (2011). Assessing China’s carbon intensity pledge for 2020: Stringency and credibility issues and their implications. Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, 13(3), 219–235.

Chapter 4

Secularization and the Resurgence of Religions

Introduction According to Casanova (2007), secularization theory has three core features, namely the decline of religious belief, the separation of religious and nonreligious spheres, and the privatization of religious commitments. Casanova (2007) considers the second component to be the most well-established fact, at least in large swaths of the West. The two other components are open for debate and probably quite context dependent. Be that as it may, to understand to which extent “full-scale” secularization occurs in, for example, Asian, Western, and Latin American societies, one must examine each dimension and provide empirical data as support for the argument. As these aspects may interact, it is also occasionally important to highlight the nexus between them. Secularization theory has long roots in the sociology of religions, including not least Max Weber’s works as well as those of Emile Durkheim (e.g., Hughey, 1979). Weber did not typically use the word “secular” or “secularization,” instead he emphasized other and partly related concepts such as disenchantment and rationalization. Weber (1963) describes premodern religiosity as typically interlinked with magical thinking and practices. Today, one can find such elements in some religious forms such as animism and shamanism in Central Asia and East Asia (Baker, 2008; Edelbay, 2012; Riesebrodt, 2010). Hence, even in modern and largely Westernized nations such as South Korea, one may identify examples of “magical” and “primitive” religious thinking (Baker, 2008). Weber (1963) notes that the sacred and worldly dimensions have clashed in many historical contexts. At least there is an obvious tension between them. Nevertheless, a longer and curvilinear process of rationalization has taken place throughout the last two millennia or so. With curvilinear I mean, for example, that seemingly rational and irrational forces have coexisted in many contexts, and there is no completely linear process of rationalization of societies, even in the West. Some earlier societies © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 B. Boman, Parallelization, SpringerBriefs in Psychology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-51636-8_4

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were also more materially advanced than others, even when inter-temporal comparisons are being made within the same regions and localities. As the esoteric radical-­ right writer Julius Evola notes in his major work Revolt Against the Modern World (1995), the Romans mixed what he regarded as a true esoteric tradition of spirituality and initiation with pure superstition. Both Rome and Athens combined a highly sophisticated intellectual culture of architecture and philosophy with beliefs in various deities. These societies contained some of the earliest expressions of societal rationality. Yet, these very never fully rational in their constitution. Indeed, today’s modern era is more rational and secularized compared to those of Athens and Rome. In between, the world has witnessed the emergence and growth of Abrahamic monotheism and Christian Protestantism (which bore a seed of capitalism and disenchantment), followed by New Age and atheism in the twentieth century onward. Today, the world religions, which indeed Christendom and Islam are part of, coexist with secularization (Riesebrodt, 2010). India and several Buddhist societies have absorbed democracy and capitalism, typically derived from the West but mixed with local religio-cultural elements, but also a high degree of religiosity. As Hughey (1979) underscores, Weber did not regard secularization as a mystical or teleological impetus. Secularization is neither cyclical nor evolutionary in its constitution. Secularization processes are always embedded in concrete historical contexts, and it is likely that many societies will remain more or less religiously oriented. A proper reading of Weber (e.g., Weber, 1963) indicates that secularization is never a full-­ scale process that undermines all religiosity. Moreover, the long rationalization process that indeed has occurred does also rest on the assumption that religiosity itself bears a component of rationality as most religions strive to make sense of the cosmos and, for example, human suffering (Hughey, 1979; Riesebrodt, 2010; Taylor, 2007). On the other hand, the rationalization process also hinges upon the fact that many human societies have become increasingly affected by scientific rationality, empiricism, and inner-worldly values (Norris & Inglehart, 2011; Weber, 1963). The last premise is crucial for the understanding of secularization in today’s world. Even if one paints with a broad brush and argues for a global trend of increased secularization over time and space (although with many exceptions), each national or local context must be understood within the confines of their limited circumstances. Trends in Japan cannot be used to predict trajectories in Russia or Ghana. Hence, case studies are important as they can provide patterns of both secularization and its opposite, the resurgence of religions. If researchers conduct many such well-crafted case studies, it is possible to assess the degree to which secularization occurs as a general trend or not. Thus, this chapter proceeds with several exemplifications. These are not to be regarded as fully developed case studies. In some cases, they are rather built on existing case studies. However, with a set of geographically diverse examples from various national contexts, it is possible to make a more compelling argument. Albeit religiosity and secularization are not the main foci there, Chap. 7 examines the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Chap. 8 on contemporary Georgia, and Chap. 9 on South Korea. Thus, to some extent, these chapters provide additional examples of parallel patterns of secularization and re-enchantment.

The Parallelization of Secularization and Re-enchantment in Various Contexts

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 he Parallelization of Secularization and Re-enchantment T in Various Contexts As an opposite force to secularization, one may use terms such as the re-­sacralization, resurgence of religions, or re-enchantment (opposed to Weber’s disenchantment). Tentatively, I define these terms as synonymously referring to the same underlying phenomenon, the fact that several societies are still religiously oriented in the age of secularization, modernization, Westernization, and globalization (Boman, 2021). If Americanization meant not just homogenization (see Chaps. 2 and 9) but also secularization, one may expect many societies in the West to become highly irreligious over time. This could be understood by, for instance, trends of religious participation or belief in various national contexts. However, the United States itself is largely religiously oriented (Riesebrodt, 2014). Nonetheless, when appropriate statistical models are applied in research on religious competition theory, it seems to be the case that this assertion is not correct (Voas & Chaves, 2016). Other examples include Poland, as well as countries previously or currently influenced by Western values such as India, Iran, and South Korea (Riesebrodt, 2010, 2014). Riesebrodt (2010, 2014) was one of the religious scholars who emphasized the parallel patterns of secularization and re-enchantment. For example, he writes as follows: Thus we can note trends toward both disenchantment and (re)enchantment of the world. Disenchantment and re-enchantment are obviously not alternatives but, rather, simultaneous, even mutually determining processes. For many people, scientific thinking and religious thinking operate on different levels, which are not essentially in competition with each other. (Riesebrodt, 2010, p. 178)

A scholar interested in these intricate relationships must therefore study why these two major processes occur simultaneously in many contexts. I will argue that the debate must shift from secularization or re-enchantment to both. Needless to say, there might be research initiatives that focus more on secularization specifically, just as there is research which focuses on re-enchantment in particular. After all, some research builds on complicated statistical models or very specific contextual patterns that do not allow for further complexity. Nevertheless, it is possible that local patterns are characterized by both secularization and re-enchantment and should be examined appropriately and accurately. I will argue that there are three main reasons why religious/secular parallelization occurs in many national and local contexts. One is Westernization and, sometimes in tandem, secularism (i.e., the separation of the state from the religious institutions). The second one is ethnic and religious diversity that either has already been established since a long time (e.g., Kazakhstan and Malaysia) or has occurred more recently as a consequence of migration (e.g., Sweden). The third main reason is polarization, typically between Western and Islamic values but also between Western and Orthodox counterparts (see Chaps. 7 and 8). Nevertheless, there might be countries that are not characterized by such processes and instead introduce other factors such as political preferences. To a degree, secularization is almost always related to political factors (Norris & Inglehart, 2011).

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4  Secularization and the Resurgence of Religions

Argentina According to World Factbook, 62.9% of Argentina’s population consists of Catholics and 15.3% of Protestants (mostly “Evangelical”). The rest of the population comprises mostly smaller Christian sects and congregations, Muslims, and non-­ confessional groups. According to Mallimaci et al. (2015), Catholicism, the main religious tradition in Argentina, is in decline. The authors also stress that a complete separation between church and state has not yet occurred. Hence, Argentina does not fulfill all three of Casanova’s secularization aspects (2007; see also 1994, 2019). Evidence provided by Mallimac et al. (2015) does only point to a decline in religious belief. Some of the new religious movements might be exemplifications of re-enchantment, but overall Argentina is a country signified by a slow and partial secularization process with regard to religious beliefs and participation. However, only 4.9% of the population are nonbelievers, and in total, only 9% are nonbelievers or indifferent (Mallimaci et al., 2015). This is substantially lower than in neighboring Uruguay (23.2%), as well as South Korea (46%, Baker, 2008) and many Western countries (Riesebrodt, 2010). As much as 84.5% of university-educated category believe in God. On the other hand, active participation in religious organizations is low, 5.7% among Catholics (Mallimaci et al., 2015). This lends some support to the presence of the privatization component of secularization theory as it is defined by Casanova (2007). Lastly, one may notice that according to Stolz (2020), educational achievement is negatively associated with religiosity. This is somewhat consistent with the findings of Mallimaci et al. (2015). Argentina has relatively low levels of educational achievement as it is measured in Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), which might be a consequence of slow economic development and income inequality (Boman, 2023). Hence, one may expect that secularization intensifies if Argentina improves its economic growth and academic achievement levels. It is not credible to say that palpable re-enchantment is taking place in contemporary Argentina. Therefore, Argentina is not the best case in point for secular/religious parallelization patterns. However, more case studies may provide a more nuanced and comprehensive depiction of the religious map in the country.

Kazakhstan Like in many other post-Soviet nations, the sacred and secular have been at odds or had a complicated coexistence in independent Kazakhstan. Furthermore, due to a large degree of ethnic heterogeneity—currently, about 70% are ethnic Kazakhs and as such typically Muslims, while approximately 18% are ethnic Russians who usually are Orthodox Christians—a diverse ethno-cultural and religious map has emerged naturally in this country (World Factbook, 2020). The Soviet Union had a secular, if not anti-religious stance, but there were also several compromises. To

Malaysia

27

some degree, different national and ethnic groups were allowed to maintain their cultural identity as long as it was not at odds with the official ideology (Spehr & Kassenova, 2012). As Malik (2019) accentuates, Kazakhstan promotes a parallel path of a revival of the pre-Soviet Muslim identity and a secular statehood. Thus, Kazakhstan could simultaneously cherish the Kazakh language (which is a form of Turkic language) and Islamic identity and crack down on religious extremists (Yemelianova, 2014). Kazakhstan is an interesting case in point because it has chosen a deliberate path toward re-enchantment (i.e., a “return” to the pre-Soviet historical-cultural legacy) within a broader secular framework that promotes the idea of interreligious tolerance and nonreligious institutions that transcends the Soviet legacy. As such it is different from both Russia, whose major ethnic group has a strong basis in the Orthodox Church (while still allowing Muslims and Buddhists), and, for example, Malaysia that has two parallel systems for two groups: one Islamic system for the Muslims and one secular for the rest. Turkey and Azerbaijan could be seen as counterparts to Kazakhstan, as they share both linguistic, religious, and historical ties. However, the ethno-genetic ancestry of most Kazakhs is linked with the Mongol tribes of Genghis Khan and his descendants (Dulik et al., 2011). Kazakhstan has also developed a natural form of cultural and political hybridization. It represents both the Kazakh (language and ethnicity), the Islamic, the Russian (language, ethnicity, Orthodox belief system, and Soviet legacy), and the Western (secularism, consumerism, and English as an emerging “third language” among the university educated). They might be seen as the three pillars of contemporary Kazakh society, although there are of course additional cultural ingredients, ethnic minorities, and regional variations (Danabayev & Park, 2020; Edelbay, 2012; Yergaliyeva, 2018). One of the most interesting dynamics with regard to Kazakhstan, and which may provide room for some degree of polarization, is related to post-Soviet Islam within an overarching secular system. Moreover, Islamic beliefs are not necessarily monolithic within a particular national context. For example, both Sufism and Salafism have emerged as two dominant branches within Islam in Kazakhstan (Yemelianova, 2014). Overall, Kazakhstan supports the argument of religious/secular parallelization.

Malaysia A good starting point when one examines a particular country is to look at the broader contours of the demographic map. Malays constitute about 62.5% of the country’s population and are usually Muslims, Chinese comprise about 20.6% and are typically Buddhists, and Indians comprise about 6% and are usually Hindus. There is also a sizeable Christian community of about 9.2%, for example, among the Chinese minority (World Factbook, 2020). But there is something more striking about Malaysia than the fact that it looks a bit like a reversed version of neighboring

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city-state Singapore, where instead the Chinese make up the largest demographic group (Boman, 2020). Malaysia has implemented two parallel systems: one Islamic, mostly for the dominant Bumiputera (i.e., Malay) ethnic group, and one secular, for the rest of the population. The Federal Constitution of Malaysia states that Islam is the religion of the Malaysian federation. However, the constitutional document seems rather ambiguous as to whether the Malaysian state is religious (Islamic) or secular. Different interpreters have come to somewhat different conclusions in that respect (Fernando, 2006). But what is interesting about the constitution, whose legal extension is based on British common law (i.e., a colonial residue), is that many legal matters that concern, for example, marriage, divorce, infidelity, nonpays of religious tithes and taxes, and so forth, are taken care of by Sharia courts for the Muslim population. There is no Buddhist, Christian, or Hindu counterparts, so these groups do only follow the common law in Malaysia (Peletz, 2002). This, in tandem with increased piety and orthopraxy, and Islamization of parts of the penal system (e.g., execution for apostasy), is an indication of Islamic re-enchantment in Malaysia (Tong & Turner, 2008). An interesting case in point for the opposite and parallel patterns, secularization, is the Westernized club and alcohol culture in Malaysia. Data show that urban areas such as Malaysia’s capital Kuala Lumpur is less religious and has a higher percentage of Chinese inhabitants relative to the average demographic structure. In addition, prior to Covid-19, the city had a vibrant club culture that is essentially the same as in other Asian countries like Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand. The secular nightlife attracts many tourists. Although there are import tariffs on Western alcoholic beverages, there are also cheaper local options (Mutalip et al., 2014). Many other global hubs such as Dubai have introduced a similar parallel system for non-­ Muslims and tourists who can easily get inebriated at bars, clubs, and restaurants. Another important dimension of Malaysia’s socio-demographic map and religious/secular dynamics is the presence of Salafi-Jihadists groups with a terrorist potential. The most dominant Islamist network with terrorist potential is the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which was likely responsible for the infamous Bali bombings in 2002 and 2005. The organization is mostly rooted in Indonesia and Malaysia but does also have members in the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. After a series of arrests and violent crackdowns, JI has lost most of its terrorist potential and instead moved to the social and political spheres of society. Instead, Islamic State (IS)-affiliated groups have been more present in the region (Nasir, 2019). Currently, it seems that neither JI nor IS are able to attract new members with terrorist potential. There are no realistic goals of groups such as JI to fully incorporate an Islamic caliphate. And there is perhaps really no need for it, as Malay Muslims already have a privileged position in contemporary Malaysia. There are affirmative action policies in place that protect Malays, who typically are Muslims (World Factbook, 2020). All in all, Malaysia is another prime example of a parallelization of secularization and re-enchantment (Boman, 2021; Tong & Turner, 2008). It is due to a secular statehood (although somewhat ambiguous), ethnic diversity, and tolerance for

Sweden

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Western and secular culture among minorities and tourists, as well as a partial Islamization that has taken place in recent decades.

Poland Poland has approximately 38 million inhabitants among whom 97% are Poles and 85% Roman Catholic (World Factbook, 2020). Riesebrodt (2014) highlights Poland as an example of a re-enchantment that goes against secularization theory. Since 1989, the Catholic Church has had a strong presence in contemporary Poland. However, contrary to Riesebrodt’s account, younger Poles are somewhat less serious about religious beliefs and practices compared to their older counterparts. This could be seen as a general cohort effect (Requena & Stanek, 2013), although it also related to an epoch effect, in this case, the dissolution of the atheist Communist system and the re-enchantment that followed (Voas & Chaves, 2016). On the other hand, the ruling party in today’s Poland, Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość), has focused on a social conservative policy which includes, among other things, strong ties between the Polish Catholic Church and the Polish state. It is possible that this may slow down the decline of religious beliefs and practices in Poland (Zuk & Zuk, 2019). Overall, both re-enchantment and secularization (e.g., decreased religious beliefs) are ongoing processes in contemporary Poland. Historical and political factors and cohort effects explain some of these processes rather than migration and ethnic diversity.

Sweden According to both research (e.g., Nordin, 2017) and the World Values Survey (2023), Sweden is characterized by far-reaching secularization. Formerly a Protestant country, the Swedish church and state were officially separated in 2000, and religious belief and participation have been in decline for many decades. Only about 57.6% belong to the Swedish Evangelic-Protestant Church (World Factbook, 2020), and among these, many are but nominal adherents to the Christian faith. Radical writers such as the author August Strindberg heckled the Christian Eucharist sacrament already in 1884 in the collection of short stories, Giftas (1884) (Boman & Öjesjö, 2023). From the 1990s onward, Sweden has had a significant presence of Satanic or quasi-Satanic metal music as well as the ecce homo debate, when Christ was ridiculed and depicted as homosexual in a Swedish art exhibition (e.g., see Igrutinovic & van den Berg, 2020). Although Christianity has not completely lost its traditional, cultural, or intergenerational importance in contemporary Sweden, native Swedes constitute one of the most secular groups in the world (Boman, 2021; Kasselstrand, 2015; Nordin, 2017). However, due to large influxes

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of migrants from the Middle East and other regions, Christianity and Islam have found their places in a post-secular society. Especially Islam plays a pivotal role in many of the public debates on blasphemy, interreligious tolerance, and hate crimes (Boman & Ali, 2023). Hence, what one may identify in today’s Sweden is a parallelization of secularization and re-enchantment. The re-enchantment does not represent a religious reawakening among some parts of the native majority population, although there could be individual exceptions but is a direct consequence of migration. To different extents, these processes also intersect with the global increase of Jihadism and Islamism. For instance, a sizeable number of Salafi-Jihadists were recruited or self-recruited in Sweden and joined IS in Iraq and Syria (Nilsson & Frees Esholt, 2022). Nevertheless, the broader and more moderate Muslim group is a direct consequence of regional migration patterns (Sanandaji, 2020). Parallelization theory (Boman, 2021) focuses on the identification of distinguishable but interdependent processes. Because the secular groups interact with the religious groups, these can hardly be kept completely separated. Such interdependence occurs not just in some everyday contexts such as in the supermarket, labor and educational settings, and public transport but concerns beliefs, customs, and laws. The Quran burnings in 2022 and 2023, which occurred in a number of Swedish cities (Boman & Ali, 2023), constitutes a potential area of polarization. So far, however, many secular groups have remained quiet on this matter. They do not protest against Muslims and for freedom of expression in accordance with the laws that were introduced in the 1970s. Essentially, blasphemy is no longer considered a crime in Sweden, and freedom of expression includes the ability to heckle and criticize religions as long it does not include a verbal or physical attack on the adherents, which would constitute a hate crime. The logic behind the legal allowance of the incineration of holy books (e.g., the Bible and the Quran) is that the object is different from an individual. The individuals might be very upset about particular book burnings that concern them and their personal beliefs, but that is completely different from attacks on other people. Because the book burnings may have an effect on public order and international relations, the government and police force may try to find ways to curtail protests that involve incineration of the Quran. However, as the judicial system is supposed to be independent in a democratic state, it is not always easy to find such a pragmatic circumvention. The legislation might have to change, and this may take several years (Boman & Ali, 2023). There is of course more to be said about the nexus between secularization and re-enchantment in today’s Sweden. For example, self-centered religiosity and/or spirituality such as yoga and veganism might be linked with another form of interdependence between the secular and substitutes for the majority religions (Boman, 2021). Nonetheless, the combination of secularism and economic development has paved the way for far-reaching secularization among the native population, while ethnic heterogeneity as a consequence of migration from majority Muslim countries has led to re-enchantment on the Swedish soil.

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Conclusion It is possible for secularization and religious re-enchantment to coexist, sometimes within the same localities or national contexts. That is because countries often are too complex for a singular pattern to be predominant or prevailing (Boman, 2021). Countries such as Kazakhstan, Malaysia, and Sweden are examples of a parallelization of secularization and a strong Islamic presence. In Kazakhstan and Malaysia, Muslims were already located in the country and could more effortlessly have a strong societal position after the Soviet Union (Kazakhstan) and colonial rule ended (Malaysia). In the Swedish context, the separation between church and state and a long process of modernization and economic growth have paved the way for secularization, whereas Muslim migration influxes have led to a relatively strong presence of the growing Muslim minority. The situations in Catholic nations such as Argentina and Poland seem different. There, Islam is not a strong societal force at all. Instead, secular tendencies coexist with a slow religious decline. As the belief and practice of Catholicism are slowly declining in these two countries, they are not the most striking examples of parallelization of secularization and re-enchantment. Nonetheless, they share some of the features with other countries (e.g., Sweden). More case studies and exemplifications are required to disentangle patterns that point to parallelization, secularization, or re-enchantment.

References Baker, D. (2008). Korean spirituality. Hawaii University Press. Boman, B. (2020). What makes Estonia and Singapore so good? Globalisation, Societies and Education, 18(2), 181–193. Boman, B. (2021). Parallelization: The fourth leg of cultural globalization theory. Integrative Psychological Science, 55, 355–370. Boman, B. (2023). Is the SES and academic achievement relationship mediated by cognitive ability? Evidence from PISA 2018 using data for 77 countries. Frontiers in Psychology, 16. https:// doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1045568 Boman, B., & Ali, M. (2023). To burn or not to burn: Polarized online discourses on Quran burnings in Sweden. Working paper. Boman, B., & Öjesjö, L. (2023). Nils von Dardel: Dandy persona and multifaceted painter. Social Sciences & Humanities Open. Casanova, J. (1994). Public religions in the modern world. University of Chicago Press. Casanova, J. (2007). Re-thinking secularization: A global comparative perspective. Religion, globalization and culture (pp. 101–120). Brill. Casanova, J. (2019). Global religious and secular dynamics: The modern system of classification. Religion and Politics, 1(1), 1–74. Danabayev, K., & Park, J. (2020). Q-pop as a phenomenon to enhance new nationalism in post-­ soviet Kazakhstan. Asia Review, 9(2), 85–129. Dulik, M.C., Osipova, L.P., & Schurr, (2011). Y-Chromosome Variation in Altaian Kazakhs Reveals a Common Paternal Gene Pool for Kazakhs and the Influence of Mongolian Expansions. PLOS One.

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Edelbay, S. (2012). Traditional Kazakh culture and Islam. International Journal of Business and Social Science, 3(11). Evola, J. (1995). Revolt against the modern world. Inner Traditions. Fernando, J. M. (2006). The position of Islam in the constitution of Malaysia. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 37(2), 249–266. Hughey, M. (1979). The idea of secularization in the works of max Weber: A theoretical outline. Qualitative Sociology, 2, 85–111. Igrutinovic, D., & van den Berg, M. (2020). Ecce homo in Sweden and Serbia: State, church, and blasphemy. In Public discourses about and religion in Europe and beyond (pp. 261–283). Kasselstrand, I. (2015). Nonbelievers in the church: A study of cultural religion in Sweden. Sociology of Religion, 76(3), 275–294. Malik, B.A. (2019). Islam in Post-Soviet Kazakhstan: Experiencing Public Revival of Islam through Institutionalisation. Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 13(3), 351–369. Mallimaci, A., Esquivel, J. C., & Giménez Béliveau, V. (2015). What do Argentine people believe in? Religion and social structure in Argentina. Social Compass, 62(2), 255–277. Mutalip, M.  H. B.  A., Kamarudin, R.  B., Manickam, M., Abd Hamid, H.  A. B., & Saari, R.  B. (2014). Alcohol consumption and risky drinking patterns in Malaysia: Findings from NHMS 2011. Alcohol & Alcoholism, 49(5), 593. Nasir, A. A. (2019). Women in terrorism. Terrorist Trends and Analyses, 11(2), 35–49. Nilsson, M., & Frees Esholt, H. (2022). After the caliphate: Changing mobilization in the Swedish Salafi-jihadist environment following the fall of ISIS. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism., 1. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2022.2104682 Nordin, M. (2017). Secularization, religious plurality and position: Local inter-religious cooperation in contemporary Sweden. Social Compass, 64(3), 388. Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2011). Sacred & secular. Cambridge University Press. Peletz, M. (2002). Islamic modern: Religious courts and cultural politics in Malaysia. Princeton University Press. Requena, M., & Stanek, M. (2013). Secularization in Poland and Spain after the democratic transition: A cohort analysis. International Sociology, 28(1), 84. Riesebrodt, M. (2010). The promise of salvation. A theory of religion. University of Chicago Press. Riesebrodt, M. (2014). Religion in the modern world: Between secularization and resurgence. European University Institute: Max Weber Lecture Series. Sanandaji, T. (2020). Mass challenge. The socioecoomic impact of migration to a Scandinaian welfare state. Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-­3-­030-­46808-­8 Spehr, S., & Kassenova, N. (2012). Kazakhstan: Constructing identity in a post-soviet society. Asian Ethnicity, 13(2), 1–17. Stolz, J. (2020). Secularization theories in the twenty-first century: Ideas, evidence, and problems. Social Compass, 67(2), 282–308. Taylor, C. (2007). A secular age. The Belknap Press. Tong, J. K.-C., & Turner, B. S. (2008). Women, piety and practice: A study of women and religious practice. Contemporary Islam, 2(1), 41–59. Voas, D., & Chaves, M. (2016). Is the United States a counterexample to the secularization thesis? American Journal of Sociology, 121(5), 1517–1556. Weber, M. (1963). The sociology of religion. Beacon Press. World Factbook. (2020). https://www.cia.gov/the-­world-­factbook/countries/ Yemelianova, G.  M. (2014). Islam, national identity and politics in contemporary Kazakhstan. Asian Ethnicity, 15(3), 286–301. Yergaliyeva, A. (2018). Kazakhstan language reform. A Worldwide Student Journal of Politics, 1(1), 22–44. Zuk, P., & Zuk, P. (2019). Dangerous liaisons between the Catholic Church and state: The religious and political alliance of the nationalist right with the conservative Church in Poland. Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe, 27(2–3), 191–212.

Chapter 5

Migration as Both Integration and Segregation

Integration and Segregation Concepts such as integration is segregation are almost exclusively related to current or earlier migration patterns (Lee & Zhou, 2015). When a society is experiencing migration, there will be both higher ethnic heterogeneity and an increased risk of social disparities (Boman, 2022a). Moreover, when there are substantial sociocultural differences between groups within a society (e.g., the majority group and minority groups), adaptation to some degree is required (Berry, 1997; Boman, 2020, 2022a). Hence, migrants must adapt to the host society and whether the receiving country is willing to do the same differs between contexts. Other potential obstacles include precarious conditions for migrant workers (Campbell & Price, 2016) and more or less unfavorable attitudes toward migrants (e.g., Cochran et al., 2017). It is not particularly far-fetched to consider integration and segregation, as sociocultural and socioeconomic consequences of migration (e.g., Qing, 2020; Ruist, 2015), to be both parallel and interdependent processes. Clearly, Sweden is experiencing palpable problems with migration and organized crime, in part as a direct consequence of migration and segregation, as well as failed socioeconomic and sociocultural integration (Sanandaji, 2020). However, as earlier data and some evidence presented in this chapter show, this cannot be understood as a complete failure as many individuals and groups with a migration background are well integrated into the majority society (Boman, 2021; Lee & Zhou, 2015). Moreover, it is clearly the case that migration, integration, and segregation are parallel and interdependent processes. At the same time, they are not always mutually exclusive, as for instance Musterd (2003) underlined with empirical examples from the Netherlands. The same might be shown with examples from two localities: Sweden and the United States. These are important cases because they are vastly different in population size but similar regarding the share and intensity of migration. Indeed, other examples are also of pertinence, but for the sake of the broader argument, two case studies seem sufficient. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 B. Boman, Parallelization, SpringerBriefs in Psychology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-51636-8_5

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5  Migration as Both Integration and Segregation

Sweden There are a variety of sociodemographic and socioeconomic indicators that could be used to examine integration and segregation: academic achievement, crime rates, income, and welfare are but some of them (e.g., Borgegard et al., 1998; Sanandaji, 2020). In this regard, individual-level data from the education through follow-up database (e.g., Boman, 2022c), Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) 2018 (e.g., Boman & Wiberg, 2023), and aggregated municipality data (e.g., Boman, 2022b, c), as well as crime rates (Brå, 2021) will be used to measure the intensity of integration and segregation. Parallelization theory will be used to explain and contextualize the empirical results. Whether one looks at individual-level data or aggregated data from schools and municipalities, there is a negative correlation between migration background and school results in today’s Sweden (e.g., Boman, 2022a, b, c, d; Boman & Wiberg, 2023). This pattern occurs because “native Swedes” outperform their non-native counterparts. When using quantitative methods such as multiple regression analysis, this relationship could in part be a consequence of so-called omitted variable bias (i.e., important variables are left out from the models, which affects the reliability of the results). Indeed, when cognitive ability and achievement-related noncognitive variables are included in multivariate models, the relationships between migration background and school results become substantially weaker. This implies that students with a migration background perform well as long as they have relatively high cognitive and noncognitive skills. Moreover, socio-economic status (SES) is typically a stronger predictor than migration background in the Swedish context (Boman, 2022a, b, c). Overall, the negative relations between migration background and school results and other integration indicators are clear and robust. Municipalities with a higher percentage of non-natives have lower academic achievement, lower income, and higher rates of welfare recipients (Boman, 2022a, b). For this chapter, the author reanalyzed municipality data from Sweden in SPSS 29 and found that there was a high negative correlation (r = −0.755 in 2013 and − 0.824 in 2018) between average income and percentage of non-natives. The relations were robust when the authored included other explanatory variables in a regression model (e.g., geographical position, percentage of certified teachers, perceived teacher competence, and classroom climate): the percentage of non-natives was the strongest predictor (β = −0.402) of average municipality income in Sweden in 2018, followed by geographical position. These patterns expand also to crime rates (BRÅ, 2021; Sanandaji, 2020). Some social theories such as critical race theory (Lee & Zhou, 2015) may suggest that it is the racist social structures such as the majority population, police officers, judges, teachers, and so on that lead to disparities in crime rates. However, such explanations seem far-fetched and unlikely in the Swedish context if not beyond. Migrants from Afghanistan typically look similar to East Asians, yet the latter group is virtually not overrepresented in the crime suspect statistics (compared to native Swedes as a reference group) while Afghans are, as 16.34% of this group are crime suspects. It does not make sense to claim that the police force (which also is increasingly heterogenous in terms of gender and ethnicity) systemically goes after Afghans but

Partial Success Stories of Integration in Sweden

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not, for example, Chinese exchange students, even if these groups may have different socio-spatial behaviors. Moreover, white European national groups such as Poles and Russians are also overrepresented in the crime statistics (around 8–9% are crime suspects with native Swedes as the reference group, BRÅ, pp. 130–136), typically on par with most other immigrant groups. Hence, according to critical race theory, racist police officers in Sweden suddenly become truly color blind when East Europeans commit crime. They go after Afghans but not East Asians. Indeed, a much better explanation is to be found in the socio-demographic qualities and quantities of migrants that typically come to Sweden. According to the Swedish Migration Agency (2020), large fractions of migrants originate from countries such as Afghanistan, Eritrea, Iraq, Somalia, and Syria. All of these countries have one thing in common: they have a low level of aggregated human capital (e.g., academic achievement and health, see Lim et al., 2018). Moreover, factors such as number of migrants, sociocultural preferences, age, and sex interact (BRÅ, 2021), and with young and male-dominated migration flows from developing countries to Sweden (Sanandaji, 2020), a substantial overrepresentation of migrants in crime statistics and poor school results is to be expected. Indeed, all countries may manifest everyday racism (Malmqvist, 2015) and labor market discrimination (Carlsson & Rooth, 2007) to some extent, but according to the World Values Survey (2023), Sweden is one of the least racist countries in the world and increasingly so. A large percentage of migrants from developing countries do also feel at home in Sweden, which indicates that the country in question puts effort into accommodating migrants through the welfare systems and general hospitality and perhaps the fact that there are sizeable diasporas in the country that welcome fellow co-ethnics matter. However, as the influx of low-skilled migrants continues to be relatively high in Sweden (e.g., Swedish Migration Agency, 2020), residential segregation appears to be a continuous problem that hinders socioeconomic and sociocultural integration. This has wide implications for social outcomes such as academic performance (Boman, 2022a, b) and hence labor market integration (Holmlund et al., 2019).

Partial Success Stories of Integration in Sweden The abovementioned research and statistics paint a rather bleak picture of the nexus between integration, migration, and segregation in today’s Sweden. Overall, integration has failed, and residential segregation and other effects are manifest. These problems are also very likely to persist in the coming decades. However, there is considerable nuance as data also shows that successful, or at least partially successful integration, has taken place. Thus, the next section explores some positive trends in order to paint a fuzzier and more nuanced picture. One example of relative success is the long-term integration of migrant groups from Bosnia, Chile, and Iran (Boman, 2021). These partial success stories may not be as distinctive as that of “model minorities” such as Asian Americans in the United States (Lee & Zhou, 2015). However, the PISA data show (e.g., Boman & Wiberg,

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5  Migration as Both Integration and Segregation

2023) that second-generation migrant students outperform their first-generation counterparts, although they still perform at lower levels than native students. Similarly, native Estonians whose mother tongue is Estonian outperform students with a Russian background (Boman, 2020). Indeed, if integration was not occurring at all, the gap between first- and second-generation students would not decrease but remain static. But as expected from earlier research (e.g., Rooth & Saarela, 2007), linguistic, educational, socioeconomic, and sociocultural integration may close some of the gaps between natives and non-natives. Other studies still show a lack of substantial gap closing between native Swedes and immigrant groups (e.g., Behtoui & Olsson, 2014), even Nordic neighbors such as second-generation Finns (Weber & Vogiazides, 2023), as regards labor market participation and levels of income. Hence, overall, the intergenerational mobility does not look particularly positive, although there are some trends that evoke a sense of mild optimism. What is seen in Sweden is a parallelization of integration and segregation. Because integration is difficult and suboptimal, the socioeconomic segregation increases in conjunction with the number of newly arrived migrants. To some degree, this also extends to the second-generation migrants who are not on par with the native Swedish majority group. However, migration also pushes the number of people who are integrated, more or less, although this may not be the case in percentage terms.

United States The United States is an important case to examine because it is by and large a country built by migrants from Europe and to a lesser extent other regions. Moreover, it has for long been characterized by ethnic polarization and racism (e.g., Schwartz et al., 2022) while also still having a substantial influx of migrants from different parts of the world such as Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America. According to data from the Migration Policy Institute (2023), the percentage of migrants from Europe has decreased since the 1960s, while the percentage of Asians and Africans has increased throughout the last two decades. The share of migrants from the Americas (e.g., Mexico, Guatemala, and Honduras) has increased until recently, when it has slightly decreased, but it is still the largest regional migrant group. State-level aggregated data for the 50 states that comprise the American federation can provide a crude but relevant overview of some of the relationships which are pertinent for the understanding of current ethnic and socioeconomic integration and segregation. Four variables are of particular significance in this respect: average income, ethnic heterogeneity, crime rates, and population size (e.g., Alesina et al., 1999, 2003). Annual income (i.e., per capita income in the last 12 months) provides a key socioeconomic indicator, in conjunction with crime rates. Average income does also serve as a dependent variable in multivariate analysis, as it constitutes a key indicator of human well-being within countries as well as globally (Lomborg, 2020), although crime rates could be regarded as a crucial alternate outcome

United States

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variable. The level of ethnic heterogeneity, in relation to income and crime rates, is an indication of to which extent ethnically diverse states fare better or worse than ethnically more homogenous states. The level of ethnic homogeneity is defined as the aggregated percentage of non-Hispanic white groups in each state (e.g., Alesina et  al., 2003; Boman, 2020). Lastly, population size is used as a control variable because smaller polities often have more homogenous populations and hence similar socio-political preferences (Alesina et  al., 1999; Alesina & Spolaore, 2003). Most of the data are taken from the US Census Bureau (https://www.census.gov/ quickfacts/fact/table/CA/BZA210221). However, crime rate statistics is taken from World Population Review (2023), specifically the number of crimes per 100,000 index. In the current analysis, the measurement year includes current data from, usually, 2021 (Table 5.1), and is as such of a “contemporary” and cross-­sectional kind. The results from the first regression analysis (Table 5.2) suggest that when average income constitutes the dependent variable, the model has a very poor fit (adjusted R2 = 0.026). However, (higher) average level state income is negatively associated with ethnic homogeneity, and therefore more ethnically diverse states (e.g., California) have higher average income. In line with earlier research from Pesta et  al. (2010) and Pesta (2022), the author included updated converted IQ scores (from standardized achievement test results as well the Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies, PIAAC) from Pesta (2022) to potentially increase the statistical power of the model. This second model had a much better model fit (adjusted R2 = 0.322), as ethnic homogeneity and IQ explained a substantial portion of the income variance. When crime rates constitute the dependent variable (Table 5.3), then the model fit is substantially better with only the first three predictors (adjusted R2 = 0.300), although the aggregated analysis leads to huge standard errors of the unstandardized beta coefficients. In this model, both ethnic homogeneity (EH) and income are statistically significant. The negative relationship between EH and crime rates, as well as population size (which is, however, not statistically significant), is expected from theory in economics (e.g., Alesina et al., 1999, 2003; Alesina & Spolaore, 2003). Moreover, IQ was not statistically significantly related to crime rates in a robustness check and did not add to the statistical power of the model. As with all cross-sectional regression models, which may also suffer from a degree of omitted variable bias, it is difficult to interpret the results, especially in terms of causality. Moreover, the aggregation of data makes it difficult to tease out various group effects. Nevertheless, there are some indications of a complex, parallel situation in the current United States when it comes to migration, integration, and segregation. Large, migration-intense, and ethnically diverse states such as California, Florida, New  York, and Texas are characterized by high aggregated affluence as wealthier people are drawn to large cities such as Dallas, Los Angeles, Miami, New  York, and San Francisco but also higher crime rates, on average. Obliviously, the interpretation of these findings may lead to the ecological fallacy, where aggregated data are used to infer individual patterns (e.g., Piandosi et  al., 1988). It may be a fallacy to infer that the average ethnic minority individual in California or New York is particularly affluent, especially when it comes to newly

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Table 5.1  Descriptive statistics for the US states State Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennesse

Income 63,380 39,230 25,680 28,815 41,276 42,807 47,869 38,917 35,216 34,516 39,045 31,596 39,571 32,537 34,817 34,968 30,634 30,340 36,171 45,915 48,617 34,768 41,204 26,807 33,770 34,423 35,189 34,621 43,877 46,691 29,624 43,208 34,209 37,343 34,526 30,976 37,816 37,725 39,603 32,823 33,468 32,908

Ethnic homogeneity 46,2 58,8 52,9 71 34,7 67 78,4 68 52,3 59 25,2 80,7 76,1 84 83,7 74,3 83,2 62,5 92,2 57,3 79,4 78,8 82,6 56 82,5 85,3 76,9 45,7 88,8 70,7 35,7 54,2 61,5 83 77,3 63,4 73,5 74,5 69,9 63,5 80,7 72,9

Crime 4727 5359 4940 5899 4720 6091 3312 4355 3922 4415 5077 2466 3545 3924 3700 4823 3818 6408 2421 3619 2415 3200 4527 4494 5605 4711 4527 4314 2344 2512 6462 3185 4872 4577 4009 5870 5610 3678 2722 5973 4415 5658

Population 5 0,73 7,2 3,02 39,24 5,81 3,6 1 21,78 10,8 1,44 1,9 12,67 6,8 3,19 2,95 4,5 4,62 1,37 6,16 6,95 10 5,7 2,95 6,16 1,1 1,96 3,14 1,38 9,26 2,11 19,84 10,55 0,78 11,78 3,99 4,24 12,96 1,09 5,19 0,89 6,97 (continued)

United States

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Table 5.1 (continued) State Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington Washington D.C. West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming

Income 34,255 33,378 37,903 43,267 43,817 63,973 28,761 36,754 36,288

Ethnic homogeneity 39,8 76,7 91,9 59,8 65,1 36,7 91,2 80,1 83,1

Crime 4937 5190 2607 3121 5759 7996 3155 3295 3455

Population 29,53 3,33 0,64 8,64 7,74 0,71 1,78 5,89 0,57

Table 5.2  Regression results Variable Constant Ethnic homogeneity Crime rates Population size

B 4753 −0.002 −0.001 −1.588

Std. error 0.102 0.001 0.002 0.000

β −0.334 −0.074 −0.251

Sig.