Paradoxes of Modernity: Culture and Conduct in the Theory of Max Weber 0804724555

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Paradoxes of Modernity Culture and Conduct in the Theory of Max Weber

Paradoxes of Modernity Culture and Conduct in the Theory of Max Weber Wolfgang Schluchter TRANSLATED BY

Neil Solo1non

Stanford University Press Stanford, California « >> r 99 6

Stanford University Press Stanford, California © 1996 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University Printed in the United States of America CIP data are at the end of the book Stanford University Press publications are distributed exclusively by Stanford University Press within the United States, Canada, Mexico, and Central America; they are distributed exclusively by Cambridge University Press throughout the rest of the world.

Preface

This book is an attempt to spell out Max Weber's lasting contribution to a philosophical and sociological understanding of the Western trajectory and its consequences. All chapters were originally written in German; Neil Solomon provided the translations. I am very, grateful to him for his unceasing effort to render the original as accurately as possible in English. However; I decided to free myself from my own German and revise the English, even to rewrite longer passages, especially in Chapter 2. Therefore, the texts published here differ considerably in length from the German originals and partly also in content. I appreciate the help Guenther Roth gave me with this revision, as well as the suggestions made by ,Guy Oakes. A stay at the Center for Advanced Study in Berlin provided the time needed to finish the project. Thanks are due Grant Barnes, now Director Emeritus of Stanford University Press, who offered his good services. I would also like to thank Jan Spauschus Johnson at Stanford University Press and Ken Plax for excellent work in preparing the manuscript for typesetting. Now responsibility rests with me, and any mistakes are mine. Quotations from Weber's texts are based on the extant Englishlanguage editions cited in the Notes and Bibliography but have been substantially modified. In case readers might want to consult the original, a reference to the German-language edition is also included.

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Contents Introduction

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Truth, Power, and Ethics: Max Weber's Political-Philosophical Profile

1

Activity and Renunciation: Max Weber on Science and Politics as Vocations

2

Conviction and Responsibility: Max Weber on Ethics

II

Religion, Economy, and Politics:

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Max Weber's Historical-Sociological Profile 3

Hindrances to Modernity: Max Weber on Islam

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4

The Emergence of Modernity: Max Weber on Western Christianity

179

Epilogue: Action, Order, and Culture

245

Notes Bibliography Index

255 349 367

Table and Figures

Table I. Comparison of Early Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and Ascetic Protestantism Figure I. Conceptual Scheme of Values Figure 2. ·Types of Control of Action Figure 3· Typology of Ethics of Conviction and Responsibility Typology of Ethics Figure 4· Weber's Basic Conceptual Apparatus Figure 5· Figure 6. Weber's Typology of Action Orientation Figure 7· Weber's Architecture of Basic Sociological Terms Figure 8. Weber's Typology of Coordination of Action

I68 67 84 96 IOO · 242 249 250 25I

Paradoxes of Modernity Culture and Conduct in the Theory of Max Weber

Introduction

In a letter to Hannah Arendt of October 4, 1964, Karl Jaspers mentions a conversation he .once had with Heinrich Rickert, his colleague and competitor in philosophy at Heidelberg University during the days of the Weimar Republic. It revolved around Max Weber and what it means to be a philosopher today. Jaspers quotes Rickert as having said, "That you turn Max Weber into a philosophy is your indisputable right. That you call him a philosopher is nonsense." 1 Indeed, Weber never claimed to be a philosopher in any technical sense of the term. Although he was well acquainted with the philosophical discourse of the time and to an extent also took part in it, he refrained from crossing this boundary professionally, unlike his friend Georg Simmel. Weber regarded economics and sociology as his domain, not philosophy. Although Rickert was right, he missed Jaspers's crucial point. When Jaspers, immediately after Weber's death and subsequently/ called Weber a philosopher, he identified him not as a member of an academic discipline but as a person who, like Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, advocated intellectual honesty and, unlike them, also lived up to its demands. To Jaspers, Weber was the embodiment of an idealized modern man who resolutely exposes himself to intellectual risks and lives through existential tensions passionately without accepting final resolutions. He saw Weber moved not so much by Nietzsche's dead God as by the God of the Old Testament, whom he experienced as both good and evil. According to Jaspers, Weber was dedicated to science and politics, but with the awareness that even living for them could never be ulti-

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mately fulfilling. This tension explains why, Jaspers concludes, Weber posed the question of meaning in the modern world radically, that is, philosophically.3 We need not accept Jaspers's philosophical Weber. Jaspers's contention that there is a philosophical dimension to Weber's work, however, is sound. In the first two chapters of this book I make an attempt to spell out at least some facets of this dimension. My focal points are value theory and ethics, both conceived as integral parts of Weber's theory of history and weltanschauung. Weber not only struggled with the problem of meaning in the modern world; he was also driven by the question of how this world came about. Step-by-step he broadened and deepened his comparative and developmental perspectives. In the last two chapters I try to formulate what I regard as Weber's theory and history of the Western trajectory. Like Max Weber's Vision of History, which I wrote with Guenther Roth, 4 this book is about matters left unfinished by Weber. In fact, it returns to issues partly dealt with in that book, especially the problem of ethics. I hope the solution I can now offer proves to be superior to the position I took almost fifteen years ago. This remark also holds for the reconstruction of Weber's view of the course of Western history that is offered in this book, which has its prelude in two other English-language books of mine, The Rise of Western Rationalism, 5 and Rationalism, Religion, and Domination. 6 Here I complement these studies and expand on the ideas expressed in them. As is well known, Weber intended to extend his studies on the economic ethics of the major religions beyond those published in the Archiv fiir Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik (Archive for social science and social policy) from 1915 to 1920. These new studies would have included an investigation of Islam. In Chapter 3 I attempt to capture his intentions on the basis of the scattered remarks that we find in his writings. Although the picture that emerges from these passages may be sketchy and biased, perhaps we should remember that they were part of an encompassing and multifarious project, and not an effort to demonstrate the existence of a homo islamicus or the superiority of the West to the East. Such ill-considered enterprises were neither the purpose nor the result of Weber's comparative and developmental endeavors. Rather, they aimed at a better understanding of alternative modes of conduct caused by constellations of cultural traditions, by institutional arrangements, and by the material as well as the ideal

Introduction

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interests of the social strata that were the cultural carriers of these traditions. The remarks on Islam should be read in this light. Chapter 3 supplements similar efforts already undertaken in Rationalism, Religion, and Domination, where studies on Confucianism and Taoism, Hinduism and Buddhism, ancient Judaism and early Christianity are assembled. Weber wanted to conclude his studies of the major- religions with an account of the distinctive features and developmental tendencies of Western Christianity. To trace the outline of this unwritten study has been a challenge to any interpreter of Weber's work. In Chapter 4 I try to meet it. I also attempt to put The Protestant Ethic (Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus) in proper context, something that has still not been achieved in most of the secondary literature/ Chapter 3 emphasizes the comparative perspective, Chapter 4 the developmental. Read together, they should convey a relatively coherent picture of the Western trajectory from a Weberian point of view.

P A R T

Truth, Power, and Ethics Max Weber's Political-Philosophical Profile

CHAPTER

Activity and Renunciation Max Weber on Science and Politics as Vocations

Allem Leben, allem Tun, aller Kunst mu:B das Handwerk vorausgehen, welches nur in der Beschrankung erworben wird. Eines recht wissen und ausi.iben gibt hohere Bildung als Halbheit im Hundertfaltigen. -Goethe, Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre (Wilhelm Meister's Journeyman Years) Wie an dem Tag, der dich der Welt verliehen, Die Sonne stand zum GruBe der Planeten, Bist also bald und fort und fort gediehen Nach dem Gesetz, wonach du angetreten. So muBt Du sein, dir kannst du nicht entfliehen, So sagten schon Sibyllen, so Propheten; Und keine Zeit und keine Macht zersti.ickelt Gepragte Form, die lebend sich entwickelt. -Goethe, "Urworte-Orphisch" ("Primal Words-Orphic")

The Character of Weber's Two Lectures ((Science as a Vocation" and ((Politics as a Vocation" The two speeches "Science as a Vocation" ("Wissenschaft als Beruf") and "Politics as a Vocation" ("Politik als Beruf") are key

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texts in understanding the position Weber took on central questions of modern culture. Some scholars consider them to.be foundational efforts at a rational declaration of faith that even today remain pathbreaking. In fact, Weber responds more directly here than elsewhere in a fundamental way to the intellectual and political situation of his time and to its questions of meaning. This directness is the intrinsic connection between the two speeches. There was, however, an extrinsic one as well. Both were given in a similar framework and addressed a similar audience. This similarity is the reason why they should be read together. 1 Contrary to the editions of these addresses prepared by Marianne Weber and Johannes Winckelmann, "Science as a Vocation" should not be incorporated into Weber's writings on the methodology of science (Wissenschaftslehre), nor should "Politics as a Vocation" be included in his writings on politics. Both addresses differ in character from Weber's scholarly treatises or his academic lectures, and from his political articles or election speeches. They pursue a different goal. They are "philosophical" texts, intended to lead the listeners (and later, the readers) to recognize facts and to encourage self-reflection, to win them over for responsible efforts on behalf of a realistic cause. In Weber's view, the future both of the German nation and of modern Western culture depended on the readiness of individuals to engage in such labors of self-renunciation. as part of the dialectic of dedication and detachment. These two futures were interrelated: apprehension about the state of the nation was the starting point for apprehension about the state of modern culture. 2 Max Weber was, as Karl Jaspers put it, a "national German." 3 Nevertheless, Weber fought against those representatives of the German spirit who contrasted it as something "of its own, selfgrown and superior" to the progressive, democratic individualism ofWestern Europe and America. 4 As a national German, he was cosmopolitan in outlook. Nonetheless, he waged battle against those representatives of a moralistic, international pacifism who denied the necessity of a German power state (nationaler Machtstaat) and the "responsibility in the face of history" it involves. 5 Even at the end of the First World War, as imperial Germany collapsed-due to the politics of emotion and vanity practiced by its feudal-conservative and bourgeois forces 6 -he hoped, in a paraphrase of an expression of Heinrick von Treitschke's, for Germany's third age of youth. 7 If one was going to take advantage of this opportunity, political action had to take up again a line of de-

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velopment that had begun with the events of r8o6-7 and I84849· This action presupposed that politically, the bourgeoisie finally stood on its own two feet and combined its powers with those of the labor movement on behalf of a politics pursuing realistic causes. 8 It further presupposed that academic youth actively participated in this historical alliance. To do this, youth would need to cast off its illusions that one can replace rational, scientifically determined knowledge with "direct experience" (Erlebnis) and that a politics of conviction that calmly ignores the realities not only of Germany but also of life in general is more authentic than a rational, power-oriented politics of responsibility. Both speeches were addressed to the German academic and democratic youth; 9 they were and are speeches about political and human self-determination under the conditions of modern Western culture. To make the audience (and later, the reader) aware of intellectual and political conditions, of "the state of the world in general," 10 it was thus not ·sufficient to diagnose the fate that only Germany faced.U A world-historical perspective was demanded. Weber had obtained it by means of a cultural science that employed a comparative and developmental orientation. It encompassed the value-related but "nonevaluative" (werturteilsfreie) investigation of the distinct nature of each of the world's major civilizations (Kulturkreise). Only against this backdrop were the · distinct character of modern Western civilization and its accompanying problems of life, as well as the problems of Germany's life, put in proper perspective. Therefore, the lectures represented a summation of Weber's most important scientific findings and of his most important political convictions. What led to these two addresses? Even though they go together, they do not form a single·entity. Not only do they treat different topics, they also were conceived at different times. The addresses were given over a year apart: "Science as a Vocation" was delivered on November 7, I9I7, and "Politics as a Vocation" on January 28, I9I9. 12 In the time between them, imperial Germany had suffered its final military defeat, and the November Revolution had occurred,. Moreover, a host of developments in Weber's life and work took place between these two dates: his return to those manuscripts abandoned at the beginning of the war, on the economy and other societal orders and forces; 13 his revision and expansion of the compar~tive studies of the economic ethics of the world religions, the publication of which had meanwhile progressed up to ancient

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Judaism; his continued interventions into foreign, and increasingly, domestic policy; and finally, his participation in the election campaign for the national assembly 14 and in the choice of candidates for it, in which he failed to get himself nominated. Let us therefore take a closer look at the genesis of the two speeches. The broader context of the addresses primarily encompasses the developmentof Weber's work from the time he left military service on September 30, I 9 I 5.15 The narrower context involves above all his ties to the Bavarian Free Students Association (Bayerischen Landesverband der freien Studentenschaft) in Munich, which planned and carried out the lecture series "Intellectual Labor as a Vocation." 16

The Broader Context of the Lectures: Weber's Emergence as a Political Orator and His Return to University Teaching Before the outbreak of the First World War, Weber worked very intensively on his articles for the Outline (GrundrifJ der Sozialokonomik).17 Even though he participated not only in the schol. arly but also in the organizational side of periodicals such as the Archiv fiir Sozialwissenschaft und Soziaipolitik, and of organizations such as the Association for Social Policy and the German Sociological Association, after his breakdowns in I898-99, his real field of activity was his writing desk. Even after regaining his admittedly precarious ability to work, Weber continued to try to keep his distance from public speaking and teaching activities. 18 He had developed strong psychological inhibitions regarding public obligations of this kind. 19 With the onset of the First World War he left his desk, and with it, a series of well-advanced, but as yet incomplete, manuscripts. During the following year, he performed the time-consuming and monotonous activities of a military member of the Heidelberg Auxiliary Hospital Commission (Reservelazarettkommission Heidelberg). 20 After departing from this "service for the fatherland" he began to publish his essays on the economic ethics of world religions, the revision and expansion of which occupied him from the winter of I 9 I 5- I 6 onward. At the same time, he intervened in the foreign-policy debate, especially on the war goals, with his first political articles. 21 After leaving the military hospital administration, he initially hoped to be active politically. This

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hope was one of his reasons for going to Berlin in the middle of November I9I5. However, although he kept his chances alive by staying there (with some interruptions) until the middle of I9I6, little came of it. He parti'cipated in organizations of a more "private" nature, such as Friedrich Naumann's working committee on Central Europe and a committee of the Association for Social Policy; but aside from sporadic and informal contacts with highlevel government officials, he never had the chance to influence the political decision-making process in a way satisfactory to him. 22 As a result, Weber made use of his time to work in the library on "Chinese and Indian matters." 23 One result of this intensive scholarly activity was soon forthcoming. In I 9 I 6- I 7, he published the study on Hinduism in three parts in the Archiv fiir Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik as the continuation of his study of Confucianism and on the basis of the abandoned manuscripts from I9I4. 24 After reinvestigating the "Chinese and Indian matters," he immersed himself for a ·second time in "matters Jewish" in the autumn of I9I6. He dealt with the Old Testament, primarily analyzing "the Prophets, Psalms, and the Book of Job." 25 In particular, the pre-exilic prophets of doom-independent of both political authorities and the people, and oriented toward foreign affairsmade a great impression on him now. Were there not certain similarities between the international situation of ancient Israel and· that of imperial Germany? And in view of this situation, did Weber not feel himself increasingly pushed into the role of the preexilic prophets of doom? In the impressive series on ancient Judaism, the first sequel of which appeared in I 9 I 7, he described these prophets, the first political demagogues in world history, in a historical treatment with contemporary relevance. 26 Thus, he appeared to move between the present and the most distant pasts. But those Chinese, Indian, and Jewish "matters" were not just the past; they were, in a manner of speaking, also alternative to the present. 27 The year I9I6 not only brought the revision and expansion of important scholarly texts and the first results of policy-oriented political journalism, it also witnessed the conquest of the public platform. Admittedly, Weber still avoided the lecture hall, for which, as he later once wrote, he was not born. 28 In his first political address since his illness, the Nuremberg speech of August I, I9I6, to the German National Committee for an Honorable Peace (Deutscher National-AusschuB fiir einen ehrenvollen Frieden), he

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Rodinson raises the question of why the Islamic world, in contrast to the West, did not give rise to a capitalist economic formation, and thus to a conditiqn in which not just the majority of enterprises produce on the basis of free labor and for the sake of profit, but. in which the economic system is dominated by the capitalist sector, which in turn dominates all other sectors of society. He thus poses Weber's question, even if he does so in Marxian terms. Indeed, on this point he sees-and this is certainly correct-no opposition between Weber and Marx. 229 The differences first arise in their respective responses to the same question, for here Weber makes recourse, in contrast to a properly understood Marx, to ideas as factors obstructing or favoring development. He thus gives what in Rodinson's view is an ultimately "ideological" explanation, and this in two senses of the word. On the one hand, Rodinson claims that ideology, in the case of Islam and Koranic and post-Koranic "ideology," has a decisive influence upon economic development. On the other hand, this explanatory approach is itself an ideology. It is an ideology of the higher rationality of the West, especially of an activist and antimagical religious ethic that is missing in Islam. Although Weber also emphasizes the importance of state and law, here too, the same Western bias prevails. 230 Rodinson goes on to say that if, however, one examines the thesis of the low level of rationality of non-Western cultures, and thus also of Islamic culture, which follows from the claim of the "specific rationality of the European'~ 231 (and if one. does this scientifically and, so to speak, positivistically),232 one quickly sees that this thesis cannot be upheld, neither in terms of method nor in terms of substance. In terms of method it rests on a circular argument, and substantively, it rests on an underestimation of the level of rationality of Islamic "ide· ology" and Islamic institutions. The thesis is circular inasmuch as it offers examples of the higher rationality of the West that originate from an epoch that comes after that age "in which Occidental Europe very decisively placed itself on the path of modern capitalism." The asserted rational characteristic, however, can "just as well be owed to the economic development on the capitalist path, or they could have arisen in the interplay with this development and together with it have arisen from a common cause." 233 Conversely, the thesis is substantively false because Islam in no way represents an antiactivist and magic-bound "ideology." Just the opposite is the case: If one compares the Koran, for example, with the Old and New Testaments, one can even speak of the higher rationality of the

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