Paper Families: Identity, Immigration Administration, and Chinese Exclusion 9780822388319

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Paper Families

politics, history, and culture A series from the International Institute at the University of Michigan Series Editors George Steinmetz and Julia Adams Series Editorial Advisory Board Fernando Coronil, Mamadou Diouf, Michael Dutton, Geo√ Eley, Fatma Müge Göcek, Nancy Rose Hunt, Andreas Kalyvas, Webb Keane, David Laitin, Lydia Liu, Julie Skurski, Margaret Somers, Ann Laura Stoler, Katherine Verdery, Elizabeth Wingrove Sponsored by the International Institute at the University of Michigan and published by Duke University Press, this series is centered around cultural and historical studies of power, politics, and the state—a field that cuts across the disciplines of history, sociology, anthropology, political science, and cultural studies. The focus on the relationship between state and culture refers both to a methodological approach—the study of politics and the state using culturalist methods—and to a substantive approach that treats signifying practices as an essential dimension of politics. The dialectic of politics, culture, and history figures prominently in all the books selected for the series.

Paper Families Identity, Immigration Administration, and Chinese Exclusion

Estelle T. Lau

duke university press Durham and London 2006

∫ 2006 Duke University Press All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper $ Designed by Amy Ruth Buchanan Typeset in Quadraat by Keystone Typesetting, Inc. Library of Congress Cataloging-inPublication Data appear on the last printed page of this book.

This book is dedicated to all of those I consider my family— immediate or extended, through blood, marriage, law, choice, or happenstance.

You know who you are and why we are a family.

Contents ———————————— Acknowledgments ix Introduction: Identity and Exclusion 1 1. Legislating Exclusion 12 2. Challenges to Exclusion 23 3. Entry Despite Exclusion 33 4. Guardians of the Gate 67 5. Legacies 114 Notes 165 Bibliography 179 Index 207

Acknowledgments ———————————— I believed that writing the acknowledgments to this book would be easy. After all, I fully realized that without the support of many people and institutions, this book would have stalled out long ago. The problem, I finally recognized, was not because I had nobody to thank, but that, in fact, I have benefited from so much generosity that these acknowledgments would become epic in length. In an e√ort to keep these pages shorter than the book itself, I apologize in advance to those who scan this generalized thank-you with the deserved anticipation of seeing their name. I hope, instead, I have demonstrated my gratitude in other ways. This book developed from my Ph.D. dissertation for the University of Chicago, and those noted in that manuscript deserve reiterated thanks here. Certain institutions, nevertheless, must be mentioned again—the National Science Foundation, members of suny at Bu√alo, School of Law, and the sta√ at the National Archives in San Bruno were indispensable. Susan Silbey, Lawrence Friedman, and Schlegel! through their continued friendship have provided me with an ‘‘imagined’’ academic home since I left teaching. In addition, many new friends and colleagues have helped the manuscript in its transition to its present form: my editors at Duke University Press— Raphael Allen, Mark Mastromarino, and Courtney Berger—and my ‘‘anonymous readers,’’ including Frank Wu, went well beyond my expectations to repeatedly provide useful insights that allowed me to turn the manuscript into a more cohesive whole. Eagle-eye Phil Lumish for his unfailing dedication to punctuation, David Chao of dcm who gave me ‘‘shoptime,’’ and graphic assistance by Scott Peterson and Nancy Aaron must also be noted. Finally, I must thank three members of my family: my mother, who taught me to wander and wonder the world, Scott, who beyond all the words and

theories has shown me what family is, and Laura, who has always been more than a sister to me—cheerleader, best friend, devil’s advocate, medic, psychiatrist, and coach.

x

acknowledgments

Introduction ———————————— Identity and Exclusion

I

n the nineteenth century, immigrants to the United States faced the hardship of leaving their familiar homes and all that was known to try to settle into a foreign country, facing an uncertain culture, landscape, and language. Prior to the advent of airplanes, worldwide communications, and globalized economies, immigrants had to contend with an almost unimaginable disorientation, which led one writer to comment that ‘‘little is more extraordinary than the decision to migrate.’’∞ Chinese immigrants faced the additional burdens imposed by U.S. immigration policies and practices. Unlike other immigrant groups who chose to make the crossing to the United States, the Chinese were the first immigrant group that the U.S government actively sought to keep out of the country. In addition to the arduous journey and the problems faced once landed in the United States, the Chinese had to endure additional weeks and, many times, months of detention in quarters as uncomfortable and crowded as the holds of the ships from which they had just disembarked, undergoing exacting and repeated questioning by hostile immigration o≈cers and humiliating medical examinations. This book shows how this often neglected point of interaction—immigration entry—provides a site around which a regularized pattern of action developed that defined and created the groups involved. As with the journey leading to the shores of the United States and the subsequent life that immigrants built once they landed, once the United States began to regulate immigration at its borders, the point of entry itself should be regarded as significant in establishing elements of immigrant identity, as well as elements of U.S. government bureaucracy. While every interaction of each Chinese immigrant with immigration o≈cials appeared to be a discrete and (possibly random) act, in actuality they were coordinated, forming, sustaining, and changing larger networks and structures. The immigration service developed

record-keeping, interrogation, and identification practices, thereby creating an overarching administrative structure and basic attitude toward immigrants in general. For the Chinese, their responses—in particular, the creation of fictive kin and the needed family histories, landscapes, and use of stereotypes— created a web of interdependence and sponsored mobility that required and created both trust and closure from those who could not be trusted, thereby fostering an insular community of Chinese that, at once, disturbed basic family structures but created new ones. Thus, the Chinese community and the immigration service were shaped in relation to each other through acts of resistance that were, on the one hand, ‘‘opportunistic and individualist,’’ but ‘‘neither random nor idiosyncratic.’’≤ Put more broadly, this book sets out to describe a particular example of the reciprocal relations between the power of the state and the power of civil society: ‘‘The power of the state as an actor and institution cannot be analyzed in isolation from an understanding of the nature of the cleavages that rend society or the ties that bind it together. At the same time, the evolution of opposition to the state within civil society is shaped by the way in which the state defines its project and by the contradictions and conflicts that emerge inside the state apparatus itself.’’≥ The orientation of this book, therefore, is toward a ‘‘cultural centering of social analysis.’’ The emphasis lies on the interplay between structural constraint and situational contingency, where structure gives ‘‘form and shape to social life insofar as it exists in and through the activities of human agents.’’∂ Thus, the immigration service itself is shaped and reshaped through its interaction with the subjects of its own administration. Or, more simply: immigration policy is formed through practice. This understanding of the development of the immigration service accords with a small amount of recent scholarship, both in Asian American studies and state development. Many historians have begun to highlight how Chinese attempts to resist discriminatory legislation (including immigration regulation) are central to the development of a number of aspects of U.S. law. For example, Charles and Laurene McClain chronicle Chinese contributions to the development of U.S. law.∑ During the early part of the exclusion period, the Chinese aggressively challenged discriminatory local, state, and federal legislation which grew out of the exclusion laws. Focusing on the use of the court system, the McClains contend that through litigation, the Chinese not only defended their own positions, but pushed U.S. law to develop. Indeed, much scholarship concerning the Chinese and the legal system has focused on the struggle the Chinese led against discrimination within the court system.∏ A smaller group of researchers has started to call attention to the value of 2

introduction

this perspective within the field of immigration itself. Erika Lee and Lucy Salyer have called for research focusing on the relationship of immigration policy to immigrants.π But while rich studies on the development of Chinese American communities and other aspects of Chinese immigration policy have been published, little attention has been paid to how Chinese immigrants themselves played a part in the development of U.S. immigration policy and practice.∫ By paying attention to everyday practices we are able to unpack the development of technological procedures and apparatuses, ways of operating, or techniques and operations through which the government learned to identify, classify, analyze, and process immigrants. Such an approach suggests that the ‘‘opaque power’’ upon which the legal doctrine rests creates and sustains administrative discretion.Ω Additionally, emphasis on practices highlights the fact that the challenges of Chinese immigrants contributed to the development of American immigration control. Because the analysis focuses on the daily interactions of immigration enforcement, it places in the forefront of analysis the activities of individual actors—the Chinese immigrants and immigration o≈cials. Jonathan Simon has described this perspective as the ‘‘history of means.’’∞≠ He writes that the focus on ‘‘how power is exercised’’ privileges the study of the genealogy of means, which represents the story of people or classes or groups. He reflects that this type of history has been neglected because ‘‘too often we are embarrassed by means,’’ and he points out the importance of privileging these stories: ‘‘Yet the means have repeatedly outlived their original ends and gone on to shape new ones. It is through means that institutions bite into real people, not through their ends or objectives. Means require their own history, and their own kind of history.’’∞∞ In analyzing the development of the Immigration and Naturalization Service in relation to the Chinese, this book seeks to look closely at those practices and techniques. It also provides an opportunity to examine the unintended e√ects of these practices, both for the immigration service and the Chinese. One of the benefits of focusing on this narrow segment of interaction, then, is that it provides a unique window through which immigrant and administrative identity were created and manipulated. It suggests the fluid and responsive nature of individual, family, community, and administrative bureaucracy that can otherwise appear deceptively static and monolithic over time. It also reminds us that the creation of structure and identity are intimately informed. And, it admonishes that the consequences of action are often unintended and develop through seemingly disparate and discrete acts. A surprising consequence of creating a category of illegal immigrants and then vigorously enforcing their entry was the creation itself of the illegal introduction

3

immigrant. This may, at first, appear tautological; of course, the creation of a category should define that category. But, this book closely examines the complex process of immigration regulation which created and defined particular elements of the Chinese by setting up rules and techniques that, once made explicit, were open to capture and negotiation by the Chinese themselves. The very mechanisms of policing Chinese immigration o√ered the means through which Chinese were able to thwart their regulation, entering the United States by subverting and manipulating the regulatory system and organizational structure.∞≤ This is not to say simply that the ins created Chinese identity and community within the United States. The Chinese themselves were active agents and participants in that construction. It was through the relationship created within the interaction between the Chinese and the ins that the manner and organization of Chinese family and community were constructed. Similarly, as the Chinese struggled against their exclusion and immigration regulators responded to those tactics, the administration itself was defined and negotiated. The postures and procedures that the ins implemented in response to the particular situation with which they were confronted came to define the manner and policy of immigration regulation in general. Not only were the creation and negotiation of administrative and personal identities consequences of immigration processing, but the negotiation and definition of what constitutes truth became a consequence of the administration of the Chinese. Through the struggle over immigration processing, the Chinese and immigration regulators contested and negotiated which stories and histories were to be privileged. They determined which physical markers or social factors would be given weight. And, in time, they fixed the fluid and messy lived reality of the Chinese into intractable and immutable facts. It is important to note that this study is not meant to be a comprehensive history of the ins or an exhaustive foray into Chinese immigrant culture during the Exclusion period. Rather the analytic scheme seeks to reveal how the continual interactive and responsive dialogue between the immigration service and Chinese immigrants helped create an arena in which the surveillance powers of the state and the identity of one immigrant group were mutually constructed. This book focuses on the period from 1882 to 1943, when almost all classes of Chinese were barred by federal law from entering the United States. Prior to 1882, the United States did not regulate the flow of people into its territories. Immigration selection was determined simply by those who wanted to enter and could cross open borders. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, therefore, 4

introduction

marked the beginning of the first restrictive immigration policy in the United States aimed at a particular nationality. Although the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and subsequent legislation extending its e√ects (collectively known as the Chinese Exclusion Acts) attempted to set a complete bar against Chinese immigration to the United States, these policies were not seamless. Certain Chinese—notably merchants, students, and travelers—who Americans did not consider a threat to U.S. labor, continued to enter. Additionally, even the Chinese Exclusion Acts could not set aside generally accepted principles concerning the immigration of U.S. citizens, which included persons born on U.S. soil and their o√spring. Thus, Chinese exclusion legislation sought to bar the general population of Chinese while recognizing that some Chinese fell into accepted exceptions. Concomitant with the formulation of U.S. exclusion policy, immigration administrators formulated an independent agency dedicated to the policing and enforcement of these new restrictive laws. Although the Immigration Bureau was given a general mandate to exclude Chinese, agents developed their gate-keeping tasks and practices through trial and error in constant negotiation and struggle with the objects of their administration. As one immigration administrator said, ‘‘While the Chinese Exclusion laws are on the statute books, the Executive o≈cers must adopt such means as are necessary to secure an e√ective enforcement of them.’’∞≥ In the face of exclusion, the Chinese attempted to gain entry by a number of methods although only one—the creation of ‘‘paper sons’’—addressed both the initial di≈culties of physical entry and the problems of continued residence. This technique stemmed from a loophole in the law that granted children of U.S. citizens, regardless of place of birth, eligibility for U.S. citizenship, and thus, immigration. Taking advantage of this, U.S. citizens of Chinese descent created fictive or ‘‘paper’’ children whose kinship status could be used by individuals who otherwise would be denied entry. Over time, a complex system developed in which individuals seeking to enter the United States could attain—by purchase or otherwise—slots made available by the false registration of children entitled to derivative citizenship. It is estimated that nearly 25 percent of Chinese in the United States in 1950 had illegally entered using this subterfuge. In response, the immigration administration developed two seemingly contradictory strategies. First, inspectors began to exercise heightened discretion in their handling of immigration processing. Second, they developed an increasingly bureaucratic structure to implement a highly detailed interrogation procedure. The twin strategies of discretion and bureaucratization introduction

5

worked in tandem to convert the personal histories of the Chinese into immigration histories and data, thereby permitting their processing. In particular, the Immigration Bureau learned to use procedural consistency, developed identification practices, and created an administrative structure to process Chinese claims for entry. Immigration inspectors could not verify the responses given by the Chinese, given their limited understanding of the language, customs, and life in China. Nor, given common perceptions of Chinese as ‘‘all looking alike,’’ could they easily distinguish between individuals. At the same time, the Chinese—the vast majority of whom were legally not entitled to enter—had a strong motivation to use any means to argue that they fit within the few exceptions to exclusion and, in particular, to argue that they were U.S. citizens or children of U.S. citizens. Immigration inspectors therefore were faced with the di≈culty of setting out a system in which truth had to be determined by procedure. The Chinese have the dubious distinction of being the first immigrant group against which restrictive legislation was passed, but Congress did not waste much time before it began to promulgate restrictive legislation against other groups. Following the 1907 restrictions preventing Japanese and Koreans working on Hawaiian plantations from migrating to the mainland, by 1917, virtually all Asians were barred from entry to the United States. The Immigration Act of 1917 created an ‘‘Asiatic Barred Zone’’ that excluded immigrants from India, Burma, Siam, Afghanistan, Arabia, the Malay Islands, and Polynesia. It also raised the general bar by requiring a literacy test for all immigrants. By 1924, quotas had been established for Europeans as well. Historians have noted how the principles of exclusion and deportation were first established with the Chinese and then applied to other aliens, as they too were labeled undesirable.∞∂ Thus, ‘‘the summary administrative procedures sanctioned by the Supreme Court in the Chinese exclusion cases became the norm in the administration of the general immigration laws.’’ Nevertheless, because Chinese exclusion was more severe and more extensive than U.S. restrictions against any other group, its administration initially developed separately from that directed at other immigrant groups. As the United States broadened the range of immigrants deemed unwanted, the lessons learned policing Chinese immigration soon became the norm. Just as the administration developed in relation to its interaction with the Chinese, so too, the Chinese community was a√ected by its interaction with the Immigration Bureau. In reaction to the detailed questioning, identification techniques, and administrative processing, the Chinese, and, in particular, paper sons, resorted to memorizing their purported family histories. Elaborate 6

introduction

crib sheets that included extensive family trees, village and household maps, and tips for answering questions were sold along with the paper title. The Chinese played o√ common stereotypes, obfuscated Chinese customs, and relied on the indeterminacy of language to further confuse immigration inspectors. Adoption of these techniques was not without long-term consequences for the Chinese—they were forced to change their names, adopt fictitious family histories, and maintain these deceptions over time until these fictions themselves became inescapable elements of the stories the Chinese told about themselves. These manipulations not only changed the ways Chinese spoke and understood themselves, but it changed the ways in which they interacted as a community and with the greater population. The need for the paper slot to roughly match the individual seeking to enter created a market that extended beyond immediate kinship. And the need to learn and create a plausible family in the eyes of immigration inspectors required a substantial level of coordination within the Chinese community in the United States and China. As the network of paper kin developed and was maintained over time, the Chinese became mutually interdependent, liable, and obligated to each other. The tactics and ruses oftentimes self-consciously adopted by both the Chinese and the immigration o≈cers came to form inescapable elements of their identities and culture which have persisted to this day. The practices—elaborate interrogation methods, identification techniques, and Chinese manipulations of these procedures—came to constitute both the bureaucratic culture of the ins and its policies and immigrant understandings of state, law, community, and individual identities. This book therefore underscores the fact that the administration of Chinese immigration into the United States was not simply a struggle over physical entry, but was also a struggle over the appropriation of symbols, a struggle over how the past and present were to be understood and labeled. Put another way, it was not just a struggle over who would be admitted, but a struggle to create personal and collective history, to set the manner in which the details of individual and family stories would be told and understood. It was a struggle to define and identify what was considered truthful or fraudulent. The production of regulation defined, as well, the role of the regulatory agents and the objects of regulation.

Research Strategies and Methods Because this book provides a form of historical ethnography of the immigration administration of the Chinese at one specific port of entry, a systematic analysis of the development of the individual immigration files was central to introduction

7

unraveling the dialogue between the Chinese immigrant and the immigration service. Legislative materials can, at best, reveal the motivations and purpose behind the passage of immigration laws. Reliance on these sorts of public government documents cannot reveal the dialectical and interactive mechanisms that are at the heart of the narrative. Likewise, internal administrative circulars, memos, and notes can expose the underlying concerns of immigration administrators, but they are necessarily partial and cannot capture the interaction with or the perspective of the immigrants themselves. Individual immigration files, however, can stand in as surrogate informants.∞∑ They served a policing and surveillance function, and they recorded the whereabouts of every Chinese immigrant. Moreover, immigration o≈cers independently created their administrative files and records, writing notes during the course of their daily work. Finally, the individual case files included information pro√ered by the immigrants themselves, as well as transcripts of interviews and court proceedings. The files, therefore, provide a range of information: they show how the processing developed, they provide information concerning the composition of the Chinese immigrant population, and they provide information on how a central element of Chinese identity was created. This is not to say that the immigration case files themselves are not administrative documents, accumulated and set down by o≈cials as a textual record of their decision-making process. While the files served a policing and surveillance function and may be relied upon to a certain degree for their veracity, both the Chinese and the immigration o≈cers had strong incentives to record a particularized version of the events in accordance with their goals. Indeed, since the avoidance of immigration regulation formed the basis of the Chinese attitude toward immigration processing, one must view all statements made as possibly duplicitous. Similarly, the need for immigration o≈cers to justify their decisions and to build a record of their e≈ciency must color the statements they make within these files. Nevertheless, the transcripts and ‘‘hidden transcripts’’ within these files can o√er a unique perspective on a salient identity-forming moment for both the Chinese and the immigration regulators. To tease out this information, a random selection of San Francisco Chinese immigrant files was examined chronologically. A random selection of twenty files was taken at ten-year intervals by archival storage box. The San Francisco files were organized in what archivists call the ‘‘slash dash’’ system. Each immigrant was identified first according to ship (and later flight) number and approximate year of arrival. Following a slash, the immigrant’s berth and 8

introduction

passage number are separated by a dash. Thus, someone arriving on steamer 886 arriving in 1906 in berth 1 and bed 1 would receive the number 8866/1–1. Files from 1885–1915 at the national archives in San Bruno, Calif., have been organized and placed in folders. These documents are in standard archival boxes. Documents from 1915 onward, however, remain in their original boxes, which are over twice the size of the archival storage boxes. All files within a given box from 1885 to 1915 form part of the database. From 1920 onward, a random selection of the files was made within the original boxes, thereby maintaining sample size across years. Because of limited access, I coordinated selection of the materials with the archivists. Within this selection, I eliminated certain files (for example a number of files were empty). For each file that was eliminated, I selected a replacement file using the same system described above until twenty files were collected for each period. In addition to the selection of files under this scheme, I also selected from three to five files randomly from within the selection years to get a sense of changes that might have occurred within the ten-year period comprising my formal sample. In addition to these files, I also made a random selection of twenty deportation files. While the mechanisms for enforcement of the law once an immigrant had entered the United States are beyond the scope of this book, I wanted to get an impression of the types of concerns and sorts of people that became targets for deportation. Finally, a small number of files and other documents were presented to me by one of the archivists as items he had found interesting while working with the materials. These items provided mostly administrative information and they were not used for the general analysis. Overall, approximately 190 files were sampled from the 1885–1943 period. Once the selection was made, the files were examined for their form and content. This required that the files be analyzed in a two-step fashion. First, I concentrated on understanding how the structure of examination developed over time by looking at the types of forms, questionnaires, and investigative techniques. I conducted this codification by hand. I read the files in chronological order and began a codification scheme, noting the introduction of new techniques or forms and then backtracked through the files to see if they appeared in earlier years. Although my initial hypothesis was that the examination scheme would become more elaborate, I wanted to read the files in chronological order to track the entry or discontinuance of techniques. I divided the administrative processes into three large groupings—(1) physical markers and indicators; (2) entry examinations; and (3) outside investigation, including coordination with other immigration records or o≈ces. In an addiintroduction

9

tional category I called ‘‘unusual’’ I noted any items that did not fit into one of these groups or simply struck me as unusual. With these large headings in mind, I went through all of the files and noted basic information concerning each case: name, sex, age, claim for entry, number of entries, amount of time to disposition, number of witnesses, representation, level of inquiry reached, reasons for determination, and number of pages in the file. Next, I read the files focusing on each administrative grouping, such as medical or physical evidence, noting the types of evidence gathered, the weight given to each technique within the file. The files were then re-read focusing on the examination process, and then again for outside evidence. I tried to take into account not only the commentary of the inspectors in their decisions and correspondence, but the notations and markings in the margins. Each file was read a minimum of three times during this process. Second, a content analysis of the documents, particularly the transcripts of the inquiries, suggested ways in which the creation of paper families and other immigration devices developed and became more elaborate over time. I began the process with the most recent files, as they were the lengthiest and most detailed. From these, I gleaned certain themes or questions that were reoccurring. I placed these questions into larger groupings—U.S. versus Chinese life; personal history; family history; daily tasks; and household, village, and county information. Within these groupings I then re-read the files looking for specific indicators that immigration inspectors focused on. For example, what was each immigrant asked to describe in terms of the household geography, or village geography? Which events—personal or family—formed part of the inquiry? Once the most complex files were categorized, I returned to the earliest ones and worked chronologically forward, noting which sorts of questions were asked and looking for items that did not appear on the overall list, adding categories and then returning to earlier files to check that they had not surfaced earlier. Again, each file was read a minimum of three times during this analysis. My strategy of thematic analysis involved attention to both theoretically and empirically emergent themes. I initially proposed a set of predefined themes, which I drew from the traditional literature. In addition, I searched for themes and ideas within the transcripts themselves. As Glaser and Strauss point out, the generation of theoretical ideas and categories cannot be limited by coding and analyzing only pre-determined categories.∞∏ Therefore, this analysis was guided recursively by both deductive and inductive reasoning, by theoretical concepts and empirical observation. Nevertheless, because little research has been conducted on the development of immigration processing, I mostly 10

introduction

focused on the files themselves to generate categories and themes. This was facilitated by the often explicit commentary by ins administrators about why they were conducting the inquiry in a specific manner. Next, I placed these inquiries in their institutional and social-history context and I considered external variables. Supplemental data, including internal memoranda, congressional records, and historical sources, served as key independent and dependent variables. This book describes an interactive process through which both the immigration administration and the Chinese immigrant population were constituted. However, as the literature on immigration administration has found, the importance of independent bureaucratic interests in the formulation of policy cannot be ignored. Policy changes within the ins explain and are explained by variation in the content of the transcripts. While external organizational interests may have an important impact on the functioning of the administration, these interests are also informed, at least in part, by administrative interaction with the subjects of their control. The analysis is obviously considerably less mechanistic than other types of analysis. For example, a syntactical content analysis, where pre-identified and textually emergent words are counted, would be much more straightforward. Words are discrete, visible, and identifiable units amenable to observation, quantification, and measurement. The identification of themes, is, however, more dependent upon the researcher’s close reading and interpretation of the text. The identification of recurrent or analytically significant themes, therefore, cannot be wholly separated from the investigator’s reading of each transcript. It is hoped that by allowing the analysis to recursively develop, this thematic investigation remains grounded in the data and literature as well.

introduction

11

Chapter 1 ———————————— Legislating Exclusion

M

uch has been written about the impact of immigration law on the Chinese community in the United States. For example, Bill Hing’s analysis of the demographic impact of U.S. immigration law describes how the Chinese and, more generally, all Asian American communities, were ‘‘made and remade’’ by immigration policies.∞ Hing argues that by shaping the demographic composition of these immigrant communities, immigration policies also shaped in a fundamental manner three important aspects of immigrants’ experience—educational performance, political participation, and self-identity. Likewise, legislative mandates form the structure within which administrative agencies and agents carry out their daily tasks.

The Chinese Exclusion Laws Following thirty years of open immigration from China, during which time nearly three hundred thousand Chinese entered the United States, the 1882 Exclusion Act was passed as a temporary means of curtailing Chinese immigration. This is not to say that this or other exclusion laws were written out of whole cloth. Rather, the Exclusion Act stemmed from local attempts to curb the influx of Chinese into the Western states. Prior to the passage of the federal exclusion laws, individual states had unsuccessfully attempted to discourage residency and to limit entry either into the United States or into each separate state.≤ California residents were the most persistent. Soon after the first Chinese arrivals, the legislature passed a tax exclusively on Chinese gold miners.≥ Chinese complained about the law, but records indicate that over 75 percent of the state’s revenues could be attributed to the Foreign Miner’s Tax. Taxes on fishing and then a general monthly head tax quickly followed, passed against any Chinese who was not already paying the Foreign Miner’s

Tax.∂ Not only did Californians hope to make Chinese labor unprofitable for the Chinese, but they hoped that by permitting increased violence against the Chinese, they would be encouraged to move elsewhere. In People v. Hall, the California judiciary denied Chinese the right to testify in court, which meant injuries against Chinese could not be prosecuted.∑ This ruling meant that almost all acts of violence against Chinese could not be prosecuted since Chinese testimony was now inadmissible in court. Passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1870, however, and the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment made explicit discrimination di≈cult, but California legislators continued to pass facially neutral, though discriminatory, legislation. The so-called QueueCutting Ordinance mandated the trimming of all prisoners’ hair. This was a state-sanctioned form of harassment of Chinese men, by forcing the cutting o√ of their queues, ostensibly for public health reasons. A Cubic Air Ordinance required five hundred cubic feet of air per renter and sought to close Chinatown boarding houses; and a series of laws attempted to drive the Chinese out of the laundry business, where the majority of laborers had found employment after being driven out of the mines and fisheries.∏ The federal courts, however, held many of these laws to be unconstitutional.π Alongside legislation aimed at making life di≈cult for Chinese, Californians passed exclusionary laws from 1855 to 1879 and approved a constitution that prohibited the immigration of Chinese laborers, ordered their removal to outside of certain cities or within city limits to specified areas, and deprived Chinese of employment on any state, county, municipal or other public works. These attempts to explicitly regulate immigration were struck down again by federal courts as violations of the federal government’s power to regulate foreign commerce.∫ Having failed at a local level to curb Chinese immigration, proponents turned their attention to the development of federal remedies.Ω From being a relatively minor regional concern of little interest to most Americans, Chinese immigration took on national importance as its utility to solidify and galvanize voters emerged. The six years prior to enactment of the exclusion laws saw increasing debate and interest in the ‘‘Chinese Question’’ as politicians recognized its usefulness in breaking the deadlock between political parties that had paralyzed national politics after the Civil War. At first, the battle pitted Western anti-Chinese interests against a strong range of champions for the Chinese that included railway barons, manufacturers who hoped to keep customers in China happy and willing to purchase U.S. goods, missionaries, and individuals concerned with issues of fairness. In time, however, the need to carry Western voters and the votes of laborers across the United States won legislating exclusion

13

Chronology of Major Chinese Exclusion and General Immigration and Naturalization Administration and Law Events 1864

Congress passes first law assigning control of immigration to a federal agency, The Immigration O≈ce, in the Department of State.

1868

Burlingame Treaty between United States and China.

1880

Amendment to Burlingame Treaty permits the United States to limit, though not prohibit, entry of Chinese laborers.

1882

First Chinese Exclusion Act passed, barring entry of Chinese laborers. Congress passes first general immigration law placing central administration of immigration under the Secretary of the Treasury, who, in turn, delegates responsibility for Chinese exclusion to the Bureau of Customs and its collectors at ports of entry.

1884

Second Chinese Exclusion Act extends prohibitions of 1882 act.

1888

Third Chinese Exclusion Act passed, prohibiting entry of all Chinese except select persons. Readmission of Chinese laborers limited; citizenship denied to all Chinese residents.

1891

Legislation expands federal control of immigration under a Superintendent of Immigration within the Department of the Treasury.

1892

Geary Act extends Chinese exclusion for ten years. Requires registration and certificates of residence.

1895

O≈ce of the Superintendent creates the Bureau of Immigration. Chinese Division enforces Chinese exclusion.

1900

Chinese immigration committed to the Commissioner General of Immigration.

1903

Bureau of Immigration transferred to the newly created Department of Commerce and Labor. Chinese immigration consolidated with administration of general immigration.

1904 1906

Chinese exclusion extended permanently. Immigration and naturalization functions are brought together to form Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, in the Department of the Treasury.

1913

Bureau of Immigration and Bureau of Naturalization separated and transferred to the newly created Department of Labor.

1921

Immigration Act of 1921 prescribes immigration quotas.

1924

Immigration Act of 1924. Border Patrol created.

1933

Bureau of Immigration consolidated by executive order as the Immigration and Naturalization Service within the Department of Labor.

1940

ins transferred to the Department of Justice. Nationality Act passed to increase naturalization functions of ins.

1943

Formal repeal of Chinese Exclusion Acts, quota of 105 Chinese permitted to enter the United States.

1950

Internal Security Act makes the investigation of subversive activities

1952

Immigration and Nationality Act passed.

central to ins. 1955

Chinese Confession Program implemented by the Department of Justice and ins to curb illegal Chinese immigration by calling on Chinese residents to confess illegal entry.

1965

Immigration and Nationality Act repeals national origins quota system and establishes preference categories for alien admissions.

1970 1978

Chinese Confession Program formally ends. Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy established by Congress.

1980

Refugee Act enacted.

1986

Immigration Reform and Control Act provides for a range of civil and criminal sanctions for immigration-related misconduct, beginning a new era of tightening immigration regulation.

1996

Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act implements sweeping substantive and procedural changes.

2003

Homeland Security Act establishes the Homeland Security Department, eliminating the ins along with twenty-two other agencies.

out and pushed politicians across the country to reposition themselves in favor of and to vote in support exclusion. Politicians eager to create a platform which would garner the support of laborers across the United States created and reinforced the distinction between Americans and immigrants—and, in particular, Chinese immigrants—in order to sever class-based commonalities that labor leaders initially felt between workers regardless of nationality. The Chinese Question became inextricably tied to reframed labor issues, drawing attention to the entry of all immigrant laborers as a threat rather than contract laborers who were instrumental as a threat and perceived threat during labor negotiations. Within this political backdrop, in 1880, the United States gained a concession from China in an amendment to the Burlingame Treaty of 1868 that permitted the United States to limit, though not absolutely prohibit, the immigration of Chinese laborers whenever American o≈cials deemed that legislating exclusion

15

such immigration ‘‘a√ects or threatens to a√ect the interests of that country, or to endanger the good order of said country.’’∞≠ Drawing from the powers granted under this amendment, Congress began to curtail Chinese immigration to the United States in a series of acts in 1882, 1884, and 1888, jointly known as the Chinese Exclusion Laws.∞∞ During the next twenty years, the substance and application of the 1882 Exclusion Act broadened until, in 1904, the United States extended Chinese exclusion indefinitely. The series of laws passed between 1882 and 1904 facially excluded only Chinese laborers, thus allowing members of certain ‘‘exempted classes’’—merchants, students, diplomats, and travelers—entry to the United States. In practice, however, the implementation of these laws made it equally di≈cult for non-laborers to enter, thereby serving as a general bar to any Chinese immigration during that period. Indeed, beginning with the 1882 Act, Congress established ‘‘a presumption that any Chinese seeking to enter the United States were ‘coolies’ and that those who were in the United States were there illegally.’’∞≤ The 1882 Act (‘‘An Act to execute certain treaty stipulations relating to Chinese’’) suspended the immigration of all Chinese laborers for ten years and provided for the deportation of anyone entering illegally but did not apply to Chinese laborers already in the United States.∞≥ In order to allow Chinese laborers previously residing in the United States to come and go freely, the 1882 Act set up an identification system. Before resident Chinese could leave, the collector of customs issued a so-called return certificate that included ‘‘all facts necessary for the identification of each such Chinese laborer.’’∞∂ The 1888 Act, known as the Scott Act, was perhaps the most controversial and prohibitive of the exclusion laws until the 1904 permanent bar to Chinese entry.∞∑ It prohibited the entry of all Chinese persons except ‘‘teachers, students, merchants, and travelers of pleasure.’’ Under the Scott Act, a Chinese laborer would not be readmitted to the United States unless he had property worth $1,000 or family in the country. Over twenty thousand Chinese laborers, following the provisions earlier set out which allowed for their return to the United States with proof of a valid return certificate, were denied entry even if they had left family or businesses in the United States when they left for China. The Scott Act reclassified all Chinese regardless of nationality as Chinese, and therefore subject to the exclusion provisions. Anyone of Chinese descent, whether citizens of Canada, Great Britain, or any other locale, were deemed to be Chinese. Finally, it forbade the granting of citizenship to any Chinese resident aliens. Two further legislative enactments solidified and extended the restrictions imposed on Chinese immigration. First, the Geary Act of 1892 extended the 16

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exclusion of Chinese laborers for ten more years. The Act also denied bail for any Chinese in habeas corpus cases. Finally, it required that Chinese residents register with immigration o≈cials and obtain certificates of residence and permitted arrests without warrants, imprisonment, or deportation of those found without a certificate.∞∏ Second, the Act of April 27, 1904 indefinitely extended the Chinese Exclusion Laws.∞π The 1904 Act was the last step the United States took to simply ignore the treaties that had, until that point, at least nominally limited the scope of exclusion. Just as Chinese men were generally barred under the Chinese Exclusion Acts, so too Chinese women were excluded from entry. Legal scholars have noted two ways in which Chinese women were barred from entry. First, although the Exclusion Acts did not address Chinese women explicitly, federal court cases following the enactment of each act set precedents that treated them along with Chinese men. Thus, where the 1882 Act barred Chinese laborers, their wives became ineligible for entry. Since women gained derivative immigration status through Chinese men, wives of merchants were accorded the most preferential treatment. Oddly enough, Chinese wives of U.S. citizens encountered di≈culty gaining entry since it was the labor status of the male, not his citizenship, through which immigration status was derived.∞∫ Second, Chinese women were also barred from entry in their own right through legislation which pre-dated Chinese exclusion and, as many historians have noted, was more prohibitive to Chinese women than laws set out by the Exclusion Act rulings. Following unsuccessful attempts in California to close down brothels and limit the entry of Chinese prostitutes, Congress passed the 1875 Page Law barring entry to ‘‘Mongolian’’ contract laborers, convicts, and prostitutes.∞Ω The Page Law did not curb the entry of Chinese men, with nearly fifty thousand entering the United States from 1880 to 1882, but it almost completely stopped the entry of women; fewer than 220 entered during that period, and their numbers dwindled thereafter through the period of exclusion due to fears of subjecting wives and young girls to the di≈culties of detention and interrogation. It was not until December 13, 1943 that the Chinese Exclusion Acts were formally repealed and a quota of 105 Chinese per year was allowed.≤≠ The 1943 legislation also permitted Chinese aliens to apply for naturalization. Though the Repeal Act, as it came to be known, brought Chinese immigration in line with quotas set for all nations, as it was based on a percentage of the number of each country’s nationals resident in the United States, it actually sought to perpetuate the e√ects of Chinese exclusion, though in a facially neutral manner. It did so in at least three ways: First, the percentage (one-sixth of one legislating exclusion

17

percent) was calculated using the Census from 1920. This was done explicitly to minimize the number of ‘‘less desirable’’ immigrants and maintain racial lines with the more restrictive atmosphere of 1920. Following forty years of exclusion and with the di≈culties of enlarging the population through local growth due to the imbalance of men to women, Chinese residency in the United States reached its lowest point in 1920. Second, Chinese continued to be the only group counted as a racial category rather than as a nationality. For example, an Italian living in France would be considered French. In contrast, a person of Chinese heritage immigrating from Peru, China, or Indonesia would still fall under the Chinese quota. This meant that only 75 percent of the 105 quota slots were allocated to Chinese from China, while the rest were reserved for Chinese from other nations. Implementation of this rule meant that the full quota was never actually used, despite oversubscription. Finally, the Repeal Act was careful not to upset the inequitable rules that continued to prevent the entry of wives and minor children of U.S. citizens of Chinese descent. Legislators only debated but did not end disallowing family members from entering as non-quota immigrants.≤∞ During the next twenty years, legislation allowed additional, limited entry to brides and wives of Chinese Americans who had served in the U.S. armed forces during World War II and refugees who sought political asylum after the Communist government took power in 1949. On October 3, 1965, Congress abolished the national origins immigration quota system and renewed open Chinese immigration.≤≤

Administrative Legislation Legislation concerning the administration of Chinese immigration reflected the peculiar role of Chinese immigration regulation as first a distinct administrative problem that then served as a model for U.S. immigration processing. The legislative history manifests the fragmented and incoherent position that first characterized immigration control. Over time, successive moves of the administration mirrored changes in the perceived goals and related departments that would govern the application of immigration policy. Because U.S. ports were concerned primarily with customs, and only marginally with the safety and comfort of passengers, beginning with the 1882 Act, Congress gave the secretary of the treasury responsibility for enforcing the Chinese exclusion laws. The secretary, in turn, delegated enforcement powers to the Bureau of Customs collectors at the various U.S. ports of entry.≤≥ Parallel to the development of the Chinese Bureau was the development of the 18

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general administration for all other immigrant groups and the slow expansion of exclusionary policies toward other immigrant groups. Almost simultaneous to the 1882 Exclusion Act, a head tax was placed on all immigrants entering by ship, and local authorities were required to refuse entry to certain groups—namely, convicts, lunatics, idiots, or ‘‘any person unable to take care of himself or herself without becoming a public charge.’’≤∂ This same law gave the secretary of the treasury supervisory control over general (non-Chinese) immigration, again processed through local state boards. The delegation to local authority reflected the perception that immigration was best handled in a local, rather than a federal, venue, despite federal oversight of immigration. This continued until 1891, when Congress established the O≈ce of the Superintendent of Immigration within the Treasury Department. which began to run federally controlled receiving stations such as Ellis Island. Finally, in 1895, the O≈ce of the Superintendent created the Bureau of Immigration, with the head of the Bureau given the title Commissioner General of Immigration. However, the belief that Chinese immigration was a peculiar problem continued to hold sway, so that it was not until the Act of February 14, 1903, that the administration of the Chinese exclusion laws and administration of general immigration were consolidated. This move reflected the desire of enforcement agents to apply to the Chinese the harsher standard toward judicial review that had been imposed on the general immigrant population. Similar to the slow development of an overarching and coherent national immigration policy was a confusion concerning the relationship of naturalization issues to immigration. Scholars have recently noted the close connection between the development of U.S. immigration policies and the belief in the right to naturalize based on underlying racial conceptions of certain immigrant groups being ‘‘fit’’ or ‘‘unfit’’ citizens for civic participation. However, the seemingly contradictory self-image of the United States as a land of immigrants that no longer wished to welcome new immigrants could not be reconciled easily by the American psyche at the turn of the twentieth century. Indeed, it was not until 1906 that naturalization was assigned to the same administration and the two functions were joined, and the Bureau of Immigration’s name was changed to the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization. The ultimate consensus concerning the proper venue for and scope of authority related to immigration and naturalization, however, remains unresolved as the United States envisions and re-envisions the priorities and structure of federal agencies. First, in 1913, the bureau was again transferred, this time to the Department of Labor, where it was again split into the Bureau of legislating exclusion

19

Immigration and Bureau of Naturalization. This shift in departmental authority appears to reflect the change in perception that the regulation of the flow of people across U.S. borders had a greater impact on labor and business than on the flow of goods into the country. In 1933, still within the Department of Labor, the bureaus were again consolidated by executive order to form the Immigration and Naturalization Service. It was not until 1940, with rising concern over criminal and subversive activities, that the combined service was transferred into the Department of Justice, where it resided until 2003 and the creation of the Homeland Security Department, which absorbed the ins along with twenty-two other agencies including the Secret Service, Coast Guard, and Customs O≈ce.

Statistics of Chinese Immigration Until passage of the first Exclusion Law in 1882, Chinese had been drawn increasingly to the United States, much like many other immigrant groups, in the hope of attaining economic security for their families. The Chinese population in the United States had grown 4,509 percent from 1850 to 1860 and continued to grow by a rate of 81 percent and 67 percent in the subsequent two decades, respectively.≤∑ Although many Chinese were lured to the West Coast hoping to find gold, others came to work as fishermen, farmers, or merchants and settled in regions as diverse as the Mississippi Delta, the plantations of Hawaii, the mining communities of Montana and Wyoming, and the logging and fishing communities around Seattle. Close to 370,000 Chinese entered the United States in the forty years preceding exclusion; the Census of 1880 shows that 105,465 Chinese resided in the United States, with three-quarters of this number living in California. With fewer than eight hundred Chinese accounted for within U.S. borders before 1860, 100 percent of these Chinese were foreign-born. During the early years of immigration, the Chinese followed a common pattern whereby the male population grossly outnumbered the female population.≤∏ However, unlike other immigrant groups, this imbalance worsened and continued for nearly 100 years, due to the imposition of immigration laws which denied Chinese women entry to the United States coupled with antimiscegenation laws which prohibited the marriage or intercourse of Chinese with ‘‘whites.’’ The combination of these laws drastically reduced the possibility of renewal of the Chinese population within U.S. borders. Studies, therefore, have shown a significant delay in the development of a second generation Chinese population in the United States. 20

chapter one

Spurred by fears of contagion and moral outrage, legislation aimed specifically at Chinese women suspected of prostitution further limited the grounds for Chinese female entry. The number of Chinese women within the United States was limited by natural immigration patterns exacerbated by immigration restrictions. Studies have shown that the ratio of unmarried adult Chinese males to adult Chinese females remained extremely skewed: In 1900 the ratio was forty-eight to one, in 1910 it was thirty-nine to one, and in 1920 it had improved to just seventeen to one. The problem appears even more acute when one examines age disparity. Because a high percentage of Chinese females were born in the United States, most were much younger than the male population; where the gender ratio appeared to be improving, the age disparity continued to make marriage unlikely. Thus, on average, from 1882 to 1920, less than 10 percent of the Chinese male population had wives in the United States. Anti-miscegenation statutes were a legacy of Southern slave laws, but by no means restricted only to the South. Of the twenty-eight states that continued to prohibit intermarriage or illicit intercourse between races after the Civil War, seven prohibited these relations between whites and Asians in some form. California was the first state to pass an anti-miscegenation law, in 1880, that included ‘‘Mongolians’’ along with blacks and mulattos. By 1910, Arizona, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Utah had joined California in this ban. These seven states accounted for nearly 68 percent of the Asian population at the time. As the remaining population of Asians migrated to other states, seven more—Wyoming, South Dakota, Georgia, Idaho, Maryland, Nebraska, and Virginia—also added anti-miscegenation laws including Asians. By 1950, these laws a√ected 64 percent of the Asian population in the United States.≤π Because of the delay in building a second generation, the Chinese relied on immigrant arrivals to maintain their population. During the exclusion period the percentage of foreign-born Chinese accounted for, at a minimum, half the population of Chinese in the United States. Likewise, landing statistics show that the number of arrivals roughly approximated the local population. The Chinese desire to return to China further accentuated this tendency. Like other groups, the majority of Chinese wanted to return to their home country following years of labor and the accumulation of capital.≤∫ Indeed, return rates for Chinese have been estimated at nearly 50 percent at the time of the passage of the Exclusion Acts. Any change in immigration policy could, therefore, seriously a√ect the size and composition of the Chinese population in the United States. legislating exclusion

21

In fact, the Exclusion Acts did have a serious impact on the Chinese population in the United States. Eight years after the passage of the first Exclusion Act, the Chinese population remained static, with a growth rate of only 1.9 percent during that decade, compared to the 81 percent and 67 percent of positive growth the preceding decades. During the following decades, until exclusion was repealed, the Chinese population in the United States steadily declined on average about 15 percent per decade, with a concomitant 10 percent decline per decade in the percentage of foreign-born Chinese. Thus, where 105,456 Chinese resided in the United States in 1880 and a similar number in 1890, subsequent decades counted 89,863 in 1900, 71,531 in 1910, and 61,639 in 1920.≤Ω When the Exclusion Acts were repealed in 1943, census records showed that nearly seventy-eight thousand Chinese resided in the United States, of whom o≈cial records indicate nearly 50 percent were foreign born, with uno≈cial estimates as high as 80 percent.≥≠ Nevertheless, despite the continued presence of Chinese in the United States regardless of legal restriction, the exclusion laws did reverse and slow Chinese entry into the United States. Since the opening of immigration from China in 1965, the entry of Chinese has increased dramatically. The number of Chinese in the United States has nearly doubled every decade. The 1990 Census showed over 1,600,000 Chinese in the United States, of whom nearly two-thirds were foreign born. Current rates of entry remain equally high, with China ranked among the top ten countries of emigration to the United States. It is ironic that while the focus of this book is on Chinese immigration and its unique salience to the development of U.S. immigration policies, within the overall U.S. immigration flow the Chinese never amounted to any significant number. Even at its height before 1882, Chinese immigration accounted for only 4.3 percent of the entries into the United States, with less than 3 percent settling east of Colorado. Set against the backdrop of the close to twenty-five million non-Chinese immigrants (compared to approximately 150,000 Chinese) who entered the United States during the exclusion period, Chinese immigration could be (and often has been) considered insignificant. Nevertheless, it is precisely because the Chinese were targeted as the first illegal immigrants and because they were so reliant on the continued inflow of immigrants because of gender imbalance and anti-miscegenation laws, that they provide such a stark case study of the e√ects of immigration practices.

22

chapter one

Chapter 2 ———————————— Challenges to Exclusion

I

n spite of sixty years of exclusionary legislation and the development of the immigration service to implement these laws, the Chinese continued to enter the United States. Studies of illegal Chinese immigration have shown that over one-quarter of the Chinese population in the United States in 1950 had entered under false pretenses as derivative citizens.∞ While it is possible to contend that the U.S. government was simply inept at policing its borders, the reasons for the continued presence of the Chinese in the United States are more complex. Indeed, the basis for continued entry derived from the very rules that defined their exclusion and the specific contours of the enforcement of these rules. Chinese challenged exclusionary immigration legislation by taking diplomatic, political, and judicial action. Moreover, they sought allies and harnessed public attention to the plight of Chinese immigrants in a relentless campaign to thwart regulation. These tactics were able, at least in the short term, to curb the more extreme provisions of the exclusion laws. Over time, as restrictive tendencies gained more popularity in the United States against all immigrants, Chinese attempts to directly challenge immigration legislation proved insu≈cient.

Diplomatic and Public Pressure Throughout the period of exclusion, the Chinese protested legislation they found to be unjust and poorly administered. Their calls for relief from the provisions of the Exclusion Acts included complaints to government entities, as well as more public forms of protest including civil disobedience and commercial boycotts. Historians have remarked that the Chinese were willing to exploit all avenues and to leverage support from local as well as international

spheres. Nevertheless, the relatively inconsequential numbers of Chinese in the United States and their isolation, coupled with the inconsistent and tardy intervention of the Chinese government, made these e√orts ine√ectual. U.S. government correspondence files are replete with petitions and complaints from Chinese individuals and business entities, filed through diplomatic channels and privately.≤ Complaints also can be found from nonChinese Americans, such as educational institutions and business associates with a common interest in maintaining Chinese immigration. For example, a small though significant group of non-Chinese supporters drew attention to the situation. Mary Roberts Coolidge’s 1909 Chinese Immigration, which examined anti-Chinese sentiment in the United States focusing in particular on the activities of the immigration regulators, caused much anxiety and defensiveness for immigration regulators.≥ Immigration o≈cials analyzed her complaints, scrutinized her sources, and generally attempted to discredit her account of Chinese immigration processing. Beyond the complaints lodged with the government, continual public pressure forced U.S. government entities to take complaints more seriously. The public nature of exclusion drew, in part, from the interrelatedness of the exclusion laws with business interests and, to a lesser degree, the diplomatic relationship of the United States and China. Although the United States attempted to push exclusion to the limit permitted by treaty, until 1905, legislators were cautious not to interfere with immigrants in the ‘‘exempt’’ classes— diplomats, students, and merchants—and, overall, an attempt was made to apply the laws in a manner so as not to antagonize these classes. When the United States finally enacted exclusionary immigration legislation independent of any treaty in 1904, however, it triggered the so-called Chinese Boycott of 1905, led by business interests organized by the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce, but quickly spreading to major cities throughout China and gaining much popular support.∂ The impact of the boycott was to draw public attention in the United States to the workings of the Chinese immigration administration. Interestingly, the position of most Chinese participants in the boycott was not to demand the end of exclusion, but just the removal of the more stringent provisions enacted by the new legislation.∑ This position flowed from the class-based perspective of many Chinese elites, who in actuality shared the exclusionist view that distinguished between laborers and Chinese of the upper classes—students and merchants. During the next two years intense pressure from the administration forced some changes within the Bureau of Immigration to appease the Chinese, although, in general, the 1904 legislation remained in force. The 1905 boycott was not wholly 24

chapter two

successful in altering the position of the United States vis-à-vis Chinese immigration and its regulation, but it did capture the attention of the government and the public in a way that other forms of protest had not. The Chinese attempted economic sanctions in other areas as well, though they proved much less successful than in the international arena posed by immigration context. For example, in 1892, they rallied under the guidance of the Six Companies to contest the requirement for Chinese registration under the Geary Act. The Six Companies was the popular name for the Consolidated Chinese Benevolent Association, founded in San Francisco in 1862 to unify Chinese interests and present a united front when dealing with non-Chinese. Until then, mutual aid societies were primarily based on membership from ‘‘native place.’’ Thus, anyone born within the same geographic region in China could turn to their ‘‘Native Place Huiguan’’ for support. As native place often roughly translated into kinship relationships, these groups were also known as ‘‘family associations.’’ Infighting and exploitation of the groups by merchant classes led to the formation of the Six Companies to mediate the often conflicting interests of the six main organizations. However, continued merchant exploitation of laborers and disparities in power within the Six Companies soon led to the development of surname associations, which could provide more personalized services, and, finally, the ‘‘tongs’’—sworn brotherhood associations—whose emphasis on loyalty and egalitarian treatment set them apart from the huiguans and surname associations, which were obliged to permit entry because of birthright rather than because of sworn a≈liation. These groups formed the underlying structure of the Chinese community in the United States, helped immigrants bridge between China and the United States, and served to organize and coordinate e√orts such as the boycott. Within the Chinese community, with the backing of the Six Companies, nearly 99 percent of the people refused to register.∏ However, the boycott failed to gain popular sympathy outside the Chinese community. Even before the passage of the Exclusion Acts, in 1867, thousands of Chinese working for the transcontinental railroad went on strike for better wages and working conditions. All Chinese workers received thirty dollars without board per month regardless of the job performed; European and white American laborers received thirty dollars plus board (worth seventy-five cents daily) for unskilled labor and up to five dollars per day for skilled labor. Chinese laborers worked longer hours and were allocated the more dangerous and di≈cult jobs. Challenging the disparity, two thousand Chinese went on strike, asking for forty dollars per month, ten hours of work per day for outdoor labor and eight hours a day for tunnel work, the right to leave the railroad at challenges to exclusion

25

any time, and the end of the use of corporal punishment. Although historians have noted the centrality of Chinese labor and skill to the building of the railroads, the strike lasted only one week because the railroad company cut o√ food supplies to the laborers.π The inadequacy of the railroad strike as a means of defeating discriminatory practices was not quickly forgotten. Minor gains made by Chinese through events such as the international boycott of 1905 and boycotts within the United States could thwart increasingly negative public opinion in the United States and block more stringent legislation, but they were doomed to failure in large part because of the inaction of the central Chinese government, whose e√orts have been characterized as ‘‘too little, too late.’’∫ Thus, for example, balancing conflicting interests, the Chinese government stunningly decided to help quash the Chinese Boycott of 1905 by issuing a series of decrees that forbade anti-American activities. The seemingly odd position taken by the central Chinese government against its own people by 1905 highlights what had been the underlying ambivalence of China’s Qing Dynasty rulers. Since its founding in 1644, the Qing initially opposed emigration for political reasons, believing that supporters of the usurped Ming dynasty could flee the country and rally forces. Over time, as the Qing consolidated their power, they became indi√erent toward emigration and the travails of overseas Chinese. China had a very decentralized power structure, which made the Qing even more reluctant to enter into diplomatic negotiations. Historically, local provincial o≈cials had been given the duty to handle matters with foreign states, though they were not empowered to act on behalf of China as a sovereign state. Over time, the Qing agreed to create a Tsungli Yamen (Chinese Foreign O≈ce) that had, again, no diplomatic authority. It was not until 1901 that this group was dissolved and a foreign ministry empowered. Thus, while lesser government o≈cials in China were concerned with foreign a√airs in general and the United States in particular, they lacked authority to act. Not until the passage of the Burlingame Treaty did China begin to take an interest in foreign a√airs related to its immigrants abroad. Even then, this treaty was negotiated by the American Anson Burlingame on behalf of China, which refused to discuss its migration policy or send any agents to the United States to ensure the welfare of its citizens there or elsewhere.Ω Overall, another ten years would go by after the passage of the Burlingame Treaty before China would accredit diplomatic representatives to the United States, many of whom initially spoke no English and had no training in international law. By the time well-trained and sophisticated diplomats were finally sent to the United States toward the end of the nineteenth century, their persistent e√orts to petition 26

chapter two

and negotiate were easily set aside because of China’s diminished stature in the international arena. The situation was further exacerbated by the complexity and dangers within China and the relatively low importance of the Chinese situation in the United States to China throughout the period in which the United States tightened its exclusionary practices. For the Qing, fighting o√ Great Britain and other imperialistic powers within its own territorial boundaries and contending with domestic governance issues while warding o√ Japanese encroachment, there were more salient and serious matters than the problems of a few of its overseas citizens whom the Qing were already predisposed to ignore. During the exclusion period, the central government in China had to deal with the encroaching European concessions leading to the humiliation of the Boxer Rebellion, the Japanese invasion, and civil war. Neither the clamor of some of its businessmen nor the loss of international prestige due to U.S. treatment of its citizens nor the increasingly racist overtones of U.S. public opinion could make the matter appear urgent. Chinese problems in the United States, a country considered if not an ally, at least not an enemy, would gain some sympathy, though not the full attention of China’s nascent diplomatic e√orts. A quick review of Japanese immigration to and community development in the United States at the turn of the century highlights the salience of China’s stature in international a√airs and its indi√erence to its emigrants to the treatment of Chinese immigration in the United States. Prior to the passage of the first Exclusion Act, only a trickle of Japanese immigrated to the United States, totaling less than two thousand by 1890. Following Chinese exclusion, however, Japanese began to immigrate in larger numbers; by 1900, eighty-five thousand lived in the United States, and by the following decade the number had nearly doubled. However, with the growing fear of immigration in general by the turn of the century, concern over Japanese immigration mounted as well. In contrast to China, Japan was motivated to achieve equal standing with other world powers and perceived that equal treatment of its emigrant citizens would reflect on its prestige. In recognition of its growing strength in the international arena, as evidenced by its participation with Western powers in the suppression of the Chinese during the Boxer Rebellion, its signing of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and its defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, Japan sought and negotiated the Gentleman’s Agreement in 1908, which limited, but did not bar, the entry of laborers and permitted the entry of their wives and children. The Gentleman’s Agreement remained in e√ect until the Quota Act of 1924, placing Japanese outside the purview of the 1917 Asiatic Bar Zone. In contrast to the diminishing Chinese population in the United States challenges to exclusion

27

following the Exclusion Acts, the Japanese community grew rapidly, as single Japanese men sent to Japan for ‘‘picture brides’’ and began to raise families of U.S. citizens.

Judicial Review While their attempts to use political and public forms of persuasion were inadequate to thwart discriminatory treatment, including exclusion, legal historians have long noted the tenacity and skill of the Chinese in pursuing litigation as a means of challenging what they perceived as discriminatory laws.∞≠ Likewise, the Chinese challenged the Exclusion Laws and their application through litigation in the courts.∞∞ Although in the long run these challenges proved fruitless, they nevertheless provided, in the short term, one means of avoiding exclusion, and they served as stop-gap measures to slow enforcement. As noted earlier, though restrained by the 1880 Burlingame Treaty, the first Exclusion Act of 1882, sought to curtail Chinese immigration into and the perceived threat of Chinese as labor in the United States. During the early exclusion period, each city’s customs o≈cials processed immigration matters. Until 1913 and the consolidation of the Chinese cases with all other immigration cases, the Chinese Bureau was one of twenty-two divisions under the collector’s control. During the early years, the sta√ never exceeded seven, with one collector, four inspectors, one interpreter, and one clerk. The fragmented organizational structure and division of responsibilities among several federal o≈ces led to uncoordinated administration of the laws, with each o≈ce exercising a significant degree of discretion under the supervision of its controller.∞≤ Until consolidation of the Chinese Bureau, five collectors set the tone in the San Francisco o≈ce, each bringing to his sta√ a particular perspective and style of administration that influenced and modified the enforcement of exclusion.∞≥ In the heat of anti-Chinese sentiment and frustration over unsuccessful state-level restrictions, passage of the first federal laws imposing immigration restrictions allowed the San Francisco collector to take an absolutist position toward the enforcement of the Exclusion Laws. In response to his tough stance, Chinese began to appeal adverse admissions rulings to the federal judiciary, a forum that proved to be a useful and advantageous venue. Immigrants would file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking to establish their right to enter the United States. From 1882 to 1890, a total of 7,080 petitions challenged the collector’s decisions in San Francisco.

28

chapter two

Indeed, so many writs were heard that other judicial business could not be conducted, and the local press dubbed the process ‘‘the habeas corpus mill.’’∞∂ Not only did the Chinese file, but they were inordinately successful in pressing their claims in court during this period. Between 85 percent and 90 percent of the collector’s denials were overturned.∞∑ So successful was this tactic that during this period the courts made enforcement of Chinese exclusion impossible. The success of the Chinese can be attributed to their willingness to mobilize as a community and to hire top-notch attorneys, as well as to the fact that the courts felt bound by institutional rules and procedures that required the application of general standards to review each case on an individual basis. Strong Chinese business interests and the thought of a reasonably secure and repeatable practice were su≈cient incentive for some of the best legal minds on the West Coast to work for the Chinese on their immigration matters, despite any latent prejudices. Chinese business elites and local guilds paid well and had established relationships with law firms outside the immigration realm, which led those firms to also go into immigration defense work. Eager to maintain their commercial relationships with these well-paying clients, law firms consented to help out on immigration issues for defendants linked to these interests. The lure of a lucrative Chinese clientele pushed other attorneys, specialists in immigration matters, to also work for the Chinese. The unique nature of Chinese immigration matters—they were the first and only illegal immigrants—meant that experienced attorneys could come only from the U.S. Attorney’s O≈ce or from the Immigration Bureau itself. Records indicate that many traded sides, drawn by the ability to earn from seventy-five to one hundred dollars per representation. In the end, a highly sophisticated and specialized group of six to eight attorneys cornered the Chinese immigrant market. Although the types of evidence allowed in the hearings worked to the advantage of the collector, court cases were often decided in favor of the petitioner; results hinged on the consistency of the testimony, and in the absence of direct conflicting testimony, the petitioner often met the evidentiary standard.∞∏ While the same type of examination was used by the collector and his sta√, the results of these two procedures were frequently at odds. The Collector’s O≈ce claimed this was because litigants had coaching and time to perfect their fraudulent stories. While this may explain some of the success in court, di√erences in evidentiary standard may account for much more. The courts required that there be ‘‘uncontradicted testimony,’’ while the Collector’s O≈ce required that the collector be ‘‘fully satisfied’’ and that the ‘‘evi-

challenges to exclusion

29

dence presented is reliable and justifies such admission.’’ Thus the collector could exclude a petitioner merely because he thought the story was fraudulent. Moreover, the Collector’s O≈ce required other evidence for admission, including the testimony of two white witnesses to prove an applicant’s birth in the United States. Finally, the secretary of the treasury explicitly forbade Chinese the right to counsel until after the collector had examined and decided to exclude the applicant. Despite the benefits to the Chinese of appealing to the judiciary on an individual basis, reliance on the courts permitted the establishment of judicial precedent that ran contrary to Chinese interests. Ultimately, judicial precedent established the right of the federal government to exclude, deport, and process immigrants under a cloak of discretion. First, in 1889, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act and its amendment in 1888.∞π In 1892 it upheld the constitutionality of the 1892 Geary Act and the broad powers it conferred to require registration and permit the deportation of Chinese citizens despite contrary treaty stipulations.∞∫ Overall, the general exclusionary policy became established through judicial precedent, so that by 1892 there was consensus about the acceptability of the exclusion of Chinese. Moreover, new appointments brought the judiciary closer to the restrictionist position held by the immigration regulators. Finally, the appointment of Timothy Phelps, a more cautious and less zealous collector, as customs o≈cer in San Francisco ushered in a less combative relationship between the judiciary and local administration, which further facilitated enforcement of the Chinese Exclusion Laws. Thus the district courts became a more hostile forum to Chinese immigrant claims for entry. In 1891, Congress curtailed all immigrants’ access to the federal courts by making the decisions of the newly created federal immigration o≈ce final.∞Ω In 1892, the U.S. Supreme Court sanctioned the power of Congress to forbid judicial review, declaring, ‘‘It is not within the province of the judiciary to order that foreigners . . . shall be permitted to enter.’’≤≠ However, the laws did not bar Chinese from appeals to the judiciary because of an ironic consequence of the administrative structure instituted by the Immigration Act of 1891. The 1891 Act specifically omitted Chinese from its reach and established in e√ect a dual system of administration—one for the Chinese and one for all other immigrants groups. The collector of customs in various ports remained responsible for enforcing the laws regulating Chinese immigration, while the new Superintendent of Immigration administered the laws governing all other immigrants. Consequently, while non-Chinese immigrants were barred from judicial review, the Chinese could continue to press their claims 30

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in court. This dual system remained in e√ect until 1903, when the Chinese were brought under the aegis of the Bureau of Immigration and subject to the general immigration laws. This is not to say that nothing was done to curtail Chinese use of the courts and to limit their success. Even during the early period, the Chinese were subject to procedures designed to decrease their chance of success in the courtroom. According to Salyer, Chinese were brought before the U.S. attorney without defense counsel, and their statements, made before they were released on bail, could later be used in court. For example, ‘‘the Chinese person was immediately brought before the U.S. attorney for an examination without his attorney. A statement was taken from the petitioner who was then released on bail. At trial the U.S. attorney could introduce and use this statement in court.’’≤∞ A well-known member of the bench, Judge Ho√man appears to have been cognizant of the illegality of this procedure, but felt it was necessary to the ‘‘successful carrying out of the Restriction Act.’’≤≤ Further anomalies existed in the system. Following the enactment of the Exclusion Acts, the caseload of judges was overwhelmed by the number of petitions filed. From 1882 to 1890, one court alone heard over seven thousand Chinese habeas corpus cases.≤≥ In 1888, to allow them to attend to other business, the judges referred the Chinese cases to a U.S. commissioner, who would try each case de novo, that is, the commissioner would come to his own decision about the petitioner’s right to land, independent of the collector’s ruling.≤∂ The commissioner took testimony, made findings of fact, and could recommend that the court admit or remand the petitioner for deportation.≤∑ Immigration administrators complained that the de novo review usurped the administration’s jurisdiction over exclusion, while the courts argued that their power of review was not incompatible with immigration authority over exclusion. In addition to e√orts to curtail the e√ectiveness of judicial review, proponents of exclusion did not lose time in seeking to extend to the Chinese the restrictions on judicial review imposed upon other immigrants. They turned to Congress to obtain legislation similar to the 1891 Act and attached a rider to the 1894 appropriations bill that achieved this purpose. The new law provided that, ‘‘in every case where an alien is excluded from admission into the U.S. under any law or treaty now existing or hereafter made, the decision of the appropriate immigration or customs o≈cer, if adverse to the admission of such alien, shall be final, unless reversed on appeal to the Secretary of the Treasury.’’≤∏ Following passage of this rider, the district court was e√ectively stripped of authority to review the Chinese cases.≤π However, the following challenges to exclusion

31

year, one group of claimants was held to be entitled to judicial review by the district court: Chinese claiming to be born in the United States, and, therefore, U.S. citizens could continue to seek relief in court.≤∫ During the following four years, the number of petitions to the court claiming U.S. citizenship began anew. The government immediately began to challenge this loophole, but in 1898, the Supreme Court held that the rights of Chinese born in the United States were not subject to the exclusion laws.≤Ω In Wong Kim Ark, the court held that the common law right of U.S. citizens and the plain language of the Fourteenth Amendment could not be ignored or set aside to achieve exclusion. Since these claims were made by persons who alleged U.S. citizenship and not by aliens, their rights could not be set aside. With this ruling, the door was reopened to the judiciary for the Chinese. The battle over forum continued for another seven years. From 1898 to 1905, administrative o≈cials tried several strategies to minimize the judiciary’s influence in the enforcement of the Chinese exclusion laws.≥≠ Attempts were made to make the evidentiary standard more stringent, though these proved unsuccessful. Finally, a more successful route to exclude Chinese entailed shifting Chinese immigration regulation to the Bureau of Immigration. As noted previously, the Chinese Bureau had been part of the Bureau of Customs. However, in 1903 it was subsumed within the Bureau of Immigration, headed by the Commissioner-General of Immigration in Washington, D.C., and subject to the review of the Secretary of Commerce and Labor.≥∞ Immigration o≈cials demanded that the Chinese exhaust available administrative channels despite the fact that the legislation permitted appeal to the courts or to the Secretary of the Treasury. Additionally, the bureau required that each petition failing to demonstrate an appeal to the Secretary of Commerce and Labor be dismissed. Taking advantage of the separation between judicial and administrative jurisdiction established in 1891 for non-Chinese immigrants, exclusionists were now able to place Chinese immigration under the same rubric since, in fact, they were now being administered by the same agency. Finally, the Supreme Court e√ectively and definitively foreclosed judicial review with its ruling in United States v. Ju Toy.≥≤ The court held in this case that a claim to citizenship did not permit the judiciary to investigate the right of a petitioner to enter the United States without a showing of unlawful or arbitrary action on the part of the administration. There has been much criticism of the ruling in Ju Toy because of how it blurred the distinction between the rights granted to aliens and to U.S. citizens. Nevertheless, the ruling remains as legal and binding precedent to this day. 32

chapter two

Chapter 3 ———————————— Entry Despite Exclusion

C

oncurrent with their pursuit of legal means to hinder the enforcement of the Chinese exclusionary legislation, the Chinese attempted extralegal means of entry by a number of methods. As legal means of entry were curtailed, the Chinese focused on these illegal means. Where direct, legal, and public avenues for entry proved fruitless, over time, covert, extralegal, and surreptitious means became much more e√ective. Two methods were common. The first, and more dangerous, entailed illegally crossing the Canadian or Mexican borders. Halifax and Tucson were relatively easy points of entry. In 1901, the House Committee on Immigration indicated that twenty thousand Chinese were smuggled into the United States each year. As late as 1932–33, 4,953 Chinese were caught illegally crossing the border into Arizona. The U.S. government sought to curb smuggling across the northern and southern borders by limiting the number of ports of entry and patrolling the borders. In contrast to today, the U.S.-Mexican border at the turn of the century initially was closed not because of fear of Mexican or other Hispanic immigrants, who were free to cross, but to keep out the Chinese.∞ Another method was to land in New York City, Boston, or other Eastern ports from Cuba, falsely claiming to be merchants or giving a Canadian destination. With a two-hundred-dollar bond, such travelers could disembark and roam about the city for twenty days. Reports show that many Chinese stayed permanently. These methods provided entry, but often only at great physical risk, and they did not provide any security once a person had entered. Fear of detection was a critical concern, especially with the requirement that Chinese carry identity cards and otherwise register their activities. Moreover, with the tightening of the U.S. borders, both Canada and Mexico worried about illegal Chinese immigration into their own countries. For example, Canada placed a

head tax on all incoming Chinese that had, by 1905, greatly reduced the number of illegal immigrants.≤ Additionally, the U.S. government entered into an arrangement with the Canadian Pacific Railroad for limiting the transportation and housing of would-be immigrants along the Canadian border to four points of entry.≥ And, by 1923, both countries had passed their own exclusion laws, which created a double barrier for smugglers. As a result, the Chinese developed more sophisticated entry schemes, which attempted to minimize risk during entry and to address concerns for longterm residency within the United States. Despite the best attempts of legislators to seal o√ most possible means of entry, throughout the Exclusion Period loopholes remained in the law. One loophole in U.S. naturalization law that was not abrogated by the provisions of the exclusion laws, called by some ‘‘paper partners,’’ developed in response to a provision in the exclusion acts which allowed for the entry of Chinese who were merchants. This requirement could be met by proof that one held a stake of at least one thousand dollars in an ongoing merchant business. Merchants sold the title of shareholder to aspiring immigrants, called ‘‘paper partners,’’ who paid a lesser sum to be placed on the company records. Discrepancies between shareholder lists and other company records filed for labor purposes indicate that Chinese engaged in this scheme with some frequency. Immigration o≈cials also worried about the potential for fraud, and extensive files were kept of all ongoing Chinese businesses.∂ Entry as a paper partner carried with it significant benefits. Merchants could bring their wives and families. Due to the need to continually register all business activities with the U.S. government, however, the continued success of paper partners in the United States is unknown. While these immigrants purchased the status of partner for entry purposes, thereby creating a mechanism which would avoid the hazards of being smuggled into the United States, merchant records did not continue to list these sham partners on their records over long periods. Over the long term, the continued safety and residency of immigrants entering as paper partners was not certain. While the Immigration Service did little to deport people who changed occupations, once a person lost his merchant title, he would be prohibited from returning to the United States should he choose to return to China for a visit. Likewise, once he had lost his merchant status, he would be prohibited from bringing in a wife. The number of loopholes that the Chinese were willing to exploit opened opportunities for fraud by regulatory agents as well. From the beginning of the exclusion period, the demand for Chinese immigrants to prove their en34

chapter three

titlement to enter by the procurement of the proper papers—certificates of residency, merchant certificates, etc.—opened the possibility for the sale of these documents. The sale of false documents was diligently pursued, even after the dismantling of the Exclusion Acts, as new avenues for document fraud became available to the Chinese. An elaborate scheme was uncovered: The Passport Division of the Department of State thereupon began issuing United States passports to persons of the Chinese race based upon their sworn passport application and such supporting evidence as they were able to muster. Generally speaking, this evidence is found to have fallen into four categories: i.e. contemporaneously issued birth certificates; delayed birth registration based upon orders of the Superior Court, City and County of San Francisco; delayed birth registration based upon a≈davits; and a≈davits of birth appended directly to the passport application. During the war years and subsequently, an unbelievably large number of fraudulent documents of each of these four types began to be circulated among the Chinese. A contemporaneous false birth certificate racket or ring came into existence in San Francisco furnishing beautifully authenticated and aged birth certificates showing birth in various small towns in Nevada, particularly Montello. The care with which they were prepared is shown by the fact that the doctors whose names appear on these certificates were actually in Nevada practicing approximately during the time they were alleged to have attended the birth. Signatures from several di√erent doctors have been discovered and each determined to have been forged. The signature of the County recorder was likewise a reasonable forged facsimile of that of a recorder who was actually doing business in Nevada. A seal similar to that used in the State of Nevada was appended to each of these certificates. . . . This Service is presently investigating sixty similar cases in which we already have positive evidence of fraud of this type. We are also pushing to the utmost our investigation looking toward the apprehension of persons who are the ‘higher ups’ in this ring, but largely because of the fact that aliens who are prosecuted on these violations would rather go to jail than act as informers against the persons from whom they secured their certificates, we have as yet been unable to secure su≈cient evidence to ask for indictments. . . . Contemporaneously issued birth certificates covering births which actually occurred where the person so born subsequently died are similarly being used as a basis for passport application. . . . The Immigration and Natural-

entry despite exclusion

35

ization Service is presently investigating many cases in which orders establishing fact of birth were secured in the City or County of San Francisco.∑

While often such rackets did not involve government o≈cials, many times the procurement of documents did, and much e√ort was spent policing the regulators themselves.∏ For example, Special Agent O. L. Spaulding pointed out in his 1885 report that there was rampant fraud related to the issuance or sale of return certificates. The conspiracy included not only Chinese, but also customs o≈cials. Spaulding noted that customs o≈cials had two opportunities to profit from the system—they could either issue certificates upon departure or permit the entry of those without certificates upon landing.π In 1899, investigations of fraud in the San Francisco o≈ce led to the replacement of B. E. Meredith, the Chinese Bureau Chief Inspector, with Frank Flesh.∫ Special agent investigations revealed that inspector Carleton G. Richards worked with Meredith to help ‘‘whenever it was necessary to admit a dumb Chinaman.’’Ω The opportunities for fraud by regulators was so great that special investigators urged, ‘‘this Port should be under secret surveillane [sic] at all times.’’∞≠ During short periods, then, fraudulent documentation may have provided entry for some Chinese, though the dogged pursuit of internal fraud by immigration regulators limited the possibility for Chinese to find long-lasting mechanisms for fraud based on collusion with immigration processors.

Paper Sons and Fictive Kin One technique for overcoming the di≈culties of physical entry, the problems of continued residence in the United States, and the entry of further family members was the creation of ‘‘paper sons.’’ This technique stemmed from another loophole in the law that held that children of U.S. citizens, regardless of birthplace, were eligible for citizenship and, thus, immigration. Taking advantage of this loophole, U.S. citizens of Chinese descent would create fictive or ‘‘paper’’ children whose kinship status could then be used by others who would be otherwise ineligible. The Chinese called this process ‘‘purchasing paper.’’ For example, during visits to China, an American citizen of Chinese descent who was eligible for re-entry to the country would report the birth of a child (often more than one child), usually male, when there had been no such birth. This created a ‘‘slot’’ that could be sold to someone who had no immediate relatives in the United States to sponsor entry to the United States. Or a U.S. citizen might report the birth of a child who subsequently 36

chapter three

died before immigrating, thus opening a position which, again, could be sold or used by a more distant family member. This loophole could be implemented by any U.S. citizen. Indeed, throughout U.S. history, many immigrant groups have resorted to this practice to gain entry into the United States.∞∞ However, because Chinese exclusion was the first exclusion of any racial group and lasted for the longest period, use of the loophole by Chinese immigrants was more extensive than that of other groups. After the 1906 San Francisco earthquake razed Chinatown and set o√ fires that destroyed all Chinese public records, the subterfuge grew even more popular, as many Chinese claimed to have been born in the United States and the government found itself without the means to disprove these claims. As one Chinese noted recently, ‘‘many Chinese felt that the earthquake was sent to help us because it happened in the city where almost all Chinese lived and all records of Chinese were kept. It really could not have been better.’’∞≤ The earthquake, therefore, enlarged not only the number of potential U.S. citizens but also the number of possible new immigrants through claims made by paper sons. By the 1920s generations of paper relatives within one family were not uncommon. The confession found in the admission file of Hom Wing Shick exemplifies the practice.∞≥ The confession of Chin Lung Hong in 1966 reveals that Mr. Chin entered as the paper son of Mr. Hom in 1930. After his entry, Mr. Chin brought in a paper son as well, using the identity of his deceased son. His confession further reveals that his paternal paper grand-uncle Hom Ng Fook brought six people into the United States as his children, three of whom confessed and three of whom were under investigation by the ins. Mr. Hom did not know if his paper father was a paper son or whether his paper grand-uncle was really related to his paper grandfather. Interestingly, Mr. Chin stated that his real father had been a merchant in the United States, though he had since returned to Hong Kong. Furthermore, Mr. Chin revealed that his two brothers also were living in the United States, though they continued to be citizens of China. Another example of multiple generations of paper kin can be found in the file of Chan Chang Yuen.∞∂ Chan’s son Chan Kim Yuke confessed in 1963 that he illegally entered as the son of Chan Yuen Chang. In actuality, his alleged father was his mother’s cousin. In addition, Chan Kim Yuke told the investigators: My paper father’s true name was WONG NGING. I believe that when the papers were fixed up for him to come to the United States whoever was

entry despite exclusion

37

fixing his papers got my father’s family name mixed up with his wife’s name, so that the paper father came here as a Chan and his wife came as a Wong and actually it should be reversed. At the time of my entry, I claimed for my paper mother, WONG SHEE, and a paper brother named CHAN HIM OONG. His true name was WONG KIM OONG, a fellow villager of my paper father. He came to the United States with me and immediately went to Los Angeles and I have not seen or heard from him since. . . . The last one I recall was a paper brother in the name CHAN KIM EP and I don’t know if any one ever came to the United States in that name. I knew that my paper mother came to the United States two or three years after I did because I appeared as a witness for her. I did not keep in touch with the paper family at all.∞∑

Making Faces: Changing Basic Family Structures and Personal History For the ‘‘paper son’’ subterfuge to work, a number of elements of each immigrant’s identity had to be changed and maintained over time. The need to maintain a coherent family history over time despite the infusion of paper relatives can be seen in the use of Mr. Hom’s file as evidence for the entry of each subsequent (real or otherwise) family member. Following Mr. Hom’s entry in 1930, his file was requested eight times for the entry of his wife, his (later confessed) paper son, and various nephews (both paper and real). Mr. Chin’s alleged father’s file was requested and copied as part of his own entry procedure in 1915, when he failed to impress the examining o≈cer with his claim as a native-born citizen, and was admitted only upon appeal.∞∏ However, the examining o≈cer’s reasoning remains unclear. A note at the bottom of his interview states: ‘‘The examining o≈cer is not favorably impressed with the manner in which the witness has testified, and, further, is impressed that he is not in truth a native-born Chinese person: He does not speak or understand the English language, and has testified in a manner which indicates coaching.’’ The burden of proof rested with the applicant as is evidenced by the delay in admitting Mr. Chin because his attorneys could not secure the transcript of Mr. Chin’s father’s testimony during his discharge into the United States in 1903, despite the fact that the needed evidence appears to have been lost by the U.S. government. From the letter sent by Mr. Chin’s attorneys to the commissioner of immigration, it appears that his father’s docket was missing and that the attorneys had to secure the transcript piecemeal from other sources and then procure certification of these parts 38

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from the assistant secretary of the treasury.∞π The immigration inspector from the Law Division set out the applicable standard: Attention is called to the letter of the attorneys . . . the evidence submitted is intended to establish the existence of the commissioner’s record by parole evidence, the original record having disappeared. A claim of citizenship as res judicata, based upon a commissioner’s decision, must be proved by introducing in evidence the complete original record or a certified copy thereof. The evidence submitted does not satisfy the above requirements.∞∫

Despite their e√orts and further proof that his father had since left and reentered the United States, and a favorable report from the immigration inspector analyzing evidence, the commissioner of immigration remained unimpressed and denied Mr. Chin’s entry for failure to provide evidence of the nativity of his father. It is apparent, then, that certain elements needed to be coordinated. First, immigrants changed their names to take into account the new family name and personal name that the family had already registered with the Immigration Service. The year of birth often had to be changed to coincide with preexisting histories. These new facts would be memorialized on identity cards and any further government documents, requiring the immigrant to adopt—at least for o≈cial purposes—these new elements. Although it would appear easiest to change the identity of the immigrant to suit the paper family’s history, at times the Chinese altered family histories to sustain new fictions. Two techniques to evade exclusion are evident in the 1920s admissions files. First, discrepancies between previous admissions show that Chinese immigrants attempted to change the number of children in order to gain more slots. For example, Fong Yee Sun claimed to have two brothers when he arrived at Angel Island in 1922.∞Ω However, the Immigration Service review of his alleged father’s previous entry records showed that his father had claimed only one son—which the inspector concluded must be Fong Yee Sun, given the dates of his father’s previous trips and the applicant’s birth date. When it became apparent that this discrepancy was considered fatal by the Immigration Service, the applicant and his father recanted their previous testimonies and said the two newly alleged brothers were, in fact, distant relatives who were being raised by Fong Yee Sun’s mother following the death of their parents. Moreover, the applicant testified that he had been told by his alleged father to claim two brothers so that they might also immigrate in the future. Despite the immigration inspector’s conclusion that Fong Yee Sun could, in fact, be the real son previously claimed by his alleged father entry despite exclusion

39

given the dates previously discussed, and despite the fact that the Immigration Service did not appear to question the veracity of the alleged father’s testimony that he did, in fact, have one son, Fong Yee Sun was excluded. Second, the Chinese attempted to use the names and entry records of deceased or otherwise missing natives. The case of Lew Han Bock in 1922 illustrates the lengths to which Chinese immigrants attempted to enter illegally using a ‘‘missing parent.’’ Lew Han Bock applied for admission as the son of a native U.S. citizen, Lew Wah Lim.≤≠ His alleged godfather, Leu Duck, and an identifying witness, Lew Kim Yuen, claimed that the applicant’s alleged father had died in 1919 in Alaska when working at a fish cannery and had been buried at sea. They could provide no corroborating evidence to establish his death. Leu Duck, the alleged godfather, claimed to have met the applicant earlier at a ceremony in China, where he became the godfather to the applicant at the behest of the deceased father. Lew Kim Yuen, the witness, claimed to have met the applicant by chance at a market in China, and after various conversations found out that he was a friend of the child’s deceased father. Lew Kim Yuen then acknowledged that he had been holding money left by the father when the latter left for Alaska. Upon his return to the United States, Lew Kim Yuen sent this money to the boy and then made arrangements to bring the boy to the United States. Immigration inspectors found the story strange—the coincidental meeting in the market and the fact that the godfather paid nothing for the boy to come to the United States, and they did not complete any of the paperwork. Their suspicions solidified when they looked into the alleged father’s entry records. Inspectors had failed to ask the alleged father at any of his entries whether he had any family, and he did not claim any. Nevertheless, immigration inspectors realized that there were serious problems with the applicant’s birth date and his alleged father’s visits to China: It will be noted that the applicant claims birth January 19, 1900 or nine months prior to the time the alleged father departed from this port that year. It is also claimed by the applicant that his second brother Lew Han Tung, is twenty-two years of age, born December 25, 1900, or two months after the alleged father’s departure from this port in that year. The record evidence proves beyond the question of a doubt that Lew Wah Lim could not be the father of the applicant or his alleged brother, Lew Han Tung.≤∞

Accordingly, the inspector concluded, This is one of the clearest cut attempts for the illegal landing of a Chinese laborer that has come to my attention in some time; although the alleged

40

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father has resided in the United States the majority of his lifetime, our records do not disclose that he has ever attempted to secure the admission of any members of his family; and, in fact, his record does not indicate that he has ever claimed one, it has remained for some of his friends to use his papers to secure the landing of an alleged son after his claimed death.

At the most basic level, then, we find that Chinese immigrants manipulated the names and ages of immigrants and family members to accommodate their entry ruses. They also changed the number of family members and took advantage of missing information to create kin where none existed.

All Chinese Look Alike: Relying on Stereotypes and Common Perceptions Given the small percentage of Chinese in America and their isolation in closed pockets made all the more remote due to linguistic barriers, immigration o≈cers generally were ignorant about the Chinese either as individuals or as a people. One public opinion specialist commented, ‘‘Have never seen a cross section on this [knowledge of Chinese]. Would assume in most a vast ignorance. Of those with some knowledge, would expect causal contacts in restaurants, laundries, movies. Very little else.’’≤≤ Even those who had some contact with Chinese thought they were ‘‘inscrutable’’ and distant. A congressman noted, ‘‘Remember one fellow, bright and courteous, but uncommunicative. Didn’t know what he thought. He spoke good English, had no di≈culty communicating, but he didn’t communicate much. The Chinese o≈cials here in Washington are pretty unfathomable. I have never met a Chinaman that I felt I could know, always a barrier.’’≤≥ Likewise, another remarked, ‘‘I have always felt the Chinese di≈cult, never felt that I really understood them. Maybe it is a stereotype I’ve had since childhood of the Chinese as a mysterious people. I couldn’t have gotten it at home, where we almost made a fetish of tolerance of other people. Maybe it was the Fu-Manchu stories. Has the idea of ‘inscrutable’ attached to it. The fact is I did have the experience of dealing with Chinese and never knowing what they had in mind.’’≤∂ In place of ignorance, certain stereotypes of the Chinese endured since their arrival. Legislators and the judiciary helped to inscribe these images of the Chinese, as the California Supreme Court noted as early as 1854: [The Chinese are] a distinct people, living in our community, recognizing no laws of this State except through necessity, bringing with them their prejudices and national feuds, in which they indulge in open violation of entry despite exclusion

41

law; whose mendacity is proverbial; a race of people who nature has marked as inferior, and who are incapable of progress or intellectual development beyond a certain point, as their history has shown; di√ering in language, opinions, color and physical conformation; between whom and ourselves nature has placed an impassable di√erence.≤∑

Or, as the U.S. Supreme Court in 1889 commented, The di√erence of race added greatly to the di≈culties of the situation. . . . They remained strangers in the land, residing apart by themselves, and adhering to the customs and usages of their own country. It seemed impossible for them to assimilate with our people or to make any change in their habits or modes of living. As they grew in number each year the people of the coast saw . . . great danger that . . . our country would be overrun by them unless prompt action was taken to restrict immigration.≤∏

While these stereotypes were more often imposed upon the Chinese and worked to their disadvantage, Chinese immigrants and their attorneys were willing to take advantage of the general ignorance of the population and play o√ stereotypes and di√erences in Chinese customs to gain admission. For example, Wong Gat’s attorney filed a Petition for Rehearing listing reasons why Wong Gat deserved a rehearing and attempting to explain why there were discrepancies in the previous testimony that warranted his exclusion.≤π As summarized in the petition, Wong Gat’s exclusion was premised on a problem with his birth date: If either of the birth dates given by the alleged father and the [previously landed] brother is conceded then the applicant is beyond the maximum age limit provided by law, . . . Again if the birth date given by his mother to him before he left China and supported in this statement by the report of the Medical Examiner of Aliens, who places the applicant’s age at one year either way of eighteen years, . . . then the alleged father’s claim to the paternity of this boy has not been established for the reason that the alleged father, according to his own statement and the records of this o≈ce, was not in China for at least two years prior to the birth date given by the applicant, making the paternity to child an impossibility.≤∫

However, the applicant’s attorney argued that there were at least two reasons why the inspector had reached a mistaken conclusion. First, the alleged father gave his son’s birth date according to the Chinese calendar, not the American date. Thus, his birth in the ‘‘twelfth month, first day’’ did not refer to Decem42

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ber 1 but to December 22 or 23. Second, the fact that the son gave a birth date completely di√erent than that given by his father (or brother, whose date also was slightly di√erent than that given by the father) could easily be explained by two Chinese practices: ‘‘(1) It is well-known that Chinese do not carry the year of their birth in their mind, and very frequently when asked the year of their birth you will see them clumsily counting back the years and try to locate the correct year.’’≤Ω In addition, ‘‘(2) It would be wrong to place too much importance upon the statement by this applicant that his mother told him he was born in the 28th year of Kwong Sui. Chinese women are illiterate and do not keep records of births, and it is very probable that she was mistaken in her recollection or in her mathematical calculation in counting back to get the year of his birth.’’≥≠ For the Immigration Service to reverse its previous finding of exclusion, it would have to accept both reasons; it would have to find that his birth date was given by his father according to the Chinese calendar, and that there was an ‘‘innocent’’ reason why the applicant had gotten his own birthday wrong. Interestingly enough, the Department of Labor did just that. It reversed the commissioner’s finding and admitted Wong Gat. The di≈culty in reconciling the information given by immigrants may simply have been a result of working with immigrants coming from societies with unknown social norms. For example, Chew Hong, who sought entry as a son of a native, was asked, Q.

Are you giving all dates according to Chinese old reckoning?

A.

I don’t know.

Q.

Why don’t you know?

A.

I don’t know whether they are old calendar or new calendar dates because in the village the people generally use the old calendar and in the city the people generally use the new calendar.≥∞

Thus, immigration o≈cers needed to contend not only with the use of a di√erent calendar (the lunar calendar) but with local customs pertaining to usage which could vary by region or village. Because some immigrants ‘‘played dumb,’’ as Chew Hong did in this instant, immigration o≈cers were unable to penetrate Chinese customs or gain any information which could then be verified by further testimony. Similarly, it is easy to see how the Chinese could thwart immigration processing by making more complicated problems than the immigration regulators already had. For example, inspectors had di≈culty with the Chinese language, its dialects, and the Chinese system for naming. Coupled with entry despite exclusion

43

notions of fairness imposed by regulators and especially the courts, Chinese immigrants were thought to take advantage of the general confusion and of the courts’ notion of fairness. One interpreter recounted, I remember one case. One came on a birth certificate and landed. Another person came and claimed that he was born in this country but that his birth certificate had been stolen. He was denied admission, but Washington sustained his appeal on the grounds that he might be the true one. The first one that came may have really stolen his paper. Then a third one came claiming the same thing, that the first two were false. So it was brought up to the District Court and he was also landed. The court proceeded on the standpoint that no matter how many were fraudulent, one person was true, and it had not been proven that this third person was not true. So there was a certain amount of fairness in all this.≥≤

Social scientists have long understood that language creates a dominant structure that requires compliance. However, at the same time it creates a sequestered site where autonomous discourse may also flourish.≥≥ Problems in keeping track of individual Chinese immigrants can be seen in the transliteration of Chinese names and the inadequacy of attempts to take into account Chinese tonal nuances. Multiple names slowed down the tracking and surveillance capabilities of the state, and the similarity of names achieved the same e√ect. The file of Louie Fong demonstrates this problem. Louie Fong sought to leave the United States and petitioned for a return certificate certifying his birth in the United States before he departed.≥∂ The bureau investigating his claim was certain of his nativity because of various a≈davits he submitted. However, they were unable to grant his petition because they could not locate his original entry file. Four possible matches were made under four possible spellings of his name. But an investigation of these files revealed that many had already been used by other Chinese claiming the identity of Louie Fong. Immigration inspectors were confounded in their attempts to find the correct file that correlated with his previous admission because of multiple spellings of his name. In addition, claims had been made by a number of other individuals to the same name and files, confusing matters more. It is likely that at least some of the Louie Fongs who tried to use the admission file that this Mr. Fong claimed were simply trying to take advantage of the similarity of names, poor record keeping, and the regulators’ inability to index individuals. Finally, regulators had di≈culty ascertaining which person—or body— actually belonged to each immigration record or document presented. Al44

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ready, there was an underlying racial bias which made it possible for the mostly white regulators to view all Chinese as ‘‘looking alike.’’ Images of crowded tenement dwellings and a sea of Chinamen waiting to enter the United States, which anti-Chinese enthusiasts had supplied to newspapers since before the exclusion acts, fueled a persistent image of the Chinese as an indistinguishable horde. Coupled with their renowned industry and ability to work long hours, Chinese were often described as toiling ‘‘ants’’— anonymous, interchangeable laborers. The stereotypes of the Chinese focused on general characteristics that easily distinguished them from whites. Newspapers described any Chinese immigrant as ‘‘almond-eyed,’’ ‘‘spindle legged,’’ ‘‘yellow-skinned,’’ ‘‘pigtailed,’’ and ‘‘bald-pated.’’ Individual attributes mattered little. ‘‘Nicknamed ‘John Chinaman’ or simply ‘John,’ these common epitaphs, like ‘Sambo’ for black men or ‘Bridget’ for Irish women, stereotyped male Chinese immigrants as anonymous, undi√erentiated mass.’’≥∑ Unlike the images of Bridget and Sambo, whose appearance on the cultural landscape, while ridiculed, was familiar, the almond eyes, ubiquitous queues, and strange soft clothing and bowler hats preferred by John Chinaman lent him an alien air. Fantastical stories of the dietary habits and customs of the Chinese embellished the imaginations of a population. For example, a popular children’s rhyme survived through the 1950s, when the character played by Judy Garland in the musical Meet Me in St. Louis sang the tune in the original book. It captures the full image of the ubiquitous Chinaman with his strange speech, funny appearance, labor habits, and loathsome diet: Chinkie, Chinkie Chinaman, Sitting on the fence; Trying to make a dollar Out of fifteen cents. Chink, Chink, Chinaman Eats dead rats; Eats them up Like gingersnaps.

Barraged with these types of depictions of the Chinese as indescribably foreign or unassimilable, the local population shrank from contact, thereby perpetuating the stereotypes. In deliberately confusing regulators by fraudulently assuming the names and ages of paper slots for entry and changing birth dates, Chinese may have

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enhanced the perception that they were an indistinguishable yellow horde. The Chinese did make an e√ort to find slots which matched as closely as possible. But often, they entered with identification that made them a year or two older or younger. And in certain instances, Chinese attempted to enter using slots that were three or even five years o√ in age.≥∏ So long as immigration o≈cers could be convinced, applicants were willing to stretch reality as far as plausible; thus in the 1940s when blood samples were required to establish paternity, two brothers attempted to enter pretending to be father and son.≥π Moreover, although many entered using the slots of family relations, often the assumed identities matched only by being from the same region. Assuming the identities of children of people not biologically related meant assuming and persuading, in some instances, immigration o≈cers that everyone looked similar enough to pass as anyone’s o√spring. This ruse, therefore, reinforced and sustained the belief that Chinese physical characteristics were not unique or identifiable. Regulators and the local population were confused not only because of the persistent stereotypes attributed to the Chinese, but because the Chinese consciously sought to deceive. The Chinese not only lied about their age and identity, but they also withheld information in order to deflect detection. The discrepancy in testimony described by this o≈cer reflects the attempt by the mother in this case not to o√er any information concerning the exact birth date and the common practice of making birth dates match with other information, The alleged mother has never been accredited in any of her testimony with giving the year or month of this applicant’s birth. She testified however in Sacramento in January 1922 that her first husband died about July or August 1901. The [1901] applicant states in his present testimony that he was born on March 18, 1901. And he might be credited on this point with being a posthumous child, but in the departure a≈davit supposed to be of this present applicant, his birth date is shown to be January 28, 1902, so there is a di√erence in these birth dates of about ten months.≥∫

In another case, the following summary by the chairman of a board of special inquiry in 1924 reflects the almost comical extent to which Chinese tried to thwart regulators’ identification procedures: It is noticeable in this and the previous case that the alleged mother has feigned blindness. Yet when this applicant was brought before her she readily identified him as her son, and when confronted with the fact that she

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similarly identified another Chinese boy in 1922 as her son also, and who is now known to have been admitted fraudulently on her testimony, she stated that she could not see very well, that she was laboring under the influence of an opiate administered to her by some person unknown, and she now admits she testified falsely in that case, and that she was advised to so testify by a Chinese man by the name of Jung, whom she states was the real father of Ah Jew Mooey in January of 1922. I am of the opinion in this connection that this woman is not physically a√licted to the extent of at least correctly identifying photographs of people personally presented; and that she has been using this claimed disability to evade the real issue. As an illustration that this woman is not as blind as she claims to be, she was shown two photographs recently taken, one in 1921, the other in 1923, . . . respectively, of a son, Hooey Juey [Youey], and one who has been living with her, yet she failed to identify either photograph, still maintaining she was blind. Yet when shown a photograph of her alleged daughter, Mary Mooey, . . . she readily identified that photograph as her daughter. When asked why she could not recognize one photograph and then recognize another, both being her children, she states she could see pretty well out of one eye.≥Ω

As described later, identification of the correct person was a problem of which immigration o≈cers were well aware. By enhancing the opaqueness of Chinese customs, manipulating the linguistic di≈culties, and playing o√ the inability of non-Chinese to tell them apart, Chinese took advantage of common stereotypes and enhanced these to gain entry to the United States. By doing so, they underlined the basic belief that Chinese were strange, ‘‘foreign,’’ and ‘‘inscrutable.’’

Getting the Story Straight: Maps, Personal Narratives, and Family Histories Because a redundant and detailed interrogation process became the centerpiece of immigration processing, Chinese crafted and maintained their personal stories and family narratives carefully. One o≈cer remarked, ‘‘We usually examined the applicant first. If there was any chance of misunderstanding we would call back the applicant and alleged father or brothers and try to reconcile them if possible. I found it an impossibility to get the applicant to change his testimony. He had learned that and by God, he was going to stick by that testimony right or wrong. Major discrepancies would be cause for deportation.’’∂≠ The stories contained an astonishing level of detail con-

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cerning family, friends and neighbors, the family home, the surrounding environment, and events which the inspectors felt were relevant to the applicant’s history. Applicants had to recall the ages (sometimes even the birth dates), occupations, and physical appearance of all family members—uncles, aunts, cousins, grandparents, and spouses of any of these members. The type of foot—bound or natural—was asked for each woman in the family. Applicants were asked the last time they had seen each person and where they were now and what they were doing. One immigration o≈cer proudly recalled the exactness of his interrogations: I was a lot more thorough than most inspectors. I gave them a pretty good examination, and that involved a lot of di√erent angles. We started by getting the data on the applicant himself: his name, age, any other names, and physical description. Then we would ask him to describe his family: his father—his boyhood name, marriage name, and any other names he might have had, his age, and so forth. Then we would go down the line: how many brothers and sisters described in detail—names, age, sex, and so forth. Then we would have to go into the older generations: paternal grand-parents; then how many uncles and aunts and they had to be described. Then the village: the district, how many houses it was composed of, how arranged, how many houses in each row, which way the village faced, what was the head and tail of the village. Then the next door neighbors. Then describe the house: how many rooms and describe them. What markets they went to. Find out about the father’s trip: when he came home, how long was he home, did he go to any special places, and describe the trip from his village to Hong Kong. In describing the home we had to get the details of the main things in it and how the family slept, what bedroom each occupied. Sometimes it would take three or four hours to examine each one.∂∞

Applicants had to describe the family village with excruciating detail. The number of houses, the layout of the city, the exact location of the family house, ancestral hall, place of occupation, school, and any other building that came out during the interview was required. For example, in the interviews for Chan Gut Fook, inspectors asked each witness the following questions: How large was the village? How many rows of houses are there in the village? Where in the village is [the applicant’s] house located?

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How many houses in the village did [the applicant’s family] own? Where is the head of the village? Which way does the village face? Where is the house located? How many houses are there in the first row counting from the east? How many in the third row? Are there any vacant spaces between any of the houses in the village in the various rows? In which rows are there vacant spaces? Between which houses? How many vacant spaces in the first row? How many vacant spaces in your row? How many lots were vacant in the fourth row?

Once answers were obtained for all of the questions, the witnesses were questioned about every discrepancy. Thus, Gut Fook’s father was asked: Q.

Why does Gut Fook say there are in each of the five rows nine houses and that they touch each other with no vacant spaces between any of the houses in village?

A.

Maybe some lots are only partly built on, and he counts them as fully built up.

Q.

Even that don’t agree with your statement?

A.

The first row has nine houses.

Q.

That doesn’t agree with your former statement, does it?

A.

Because some are not fully built on I thought it wouldn’t be necessary to count them.

Q.

You have already stated that the fifth lot in your row was vacant, there is no building on that at all, according to your statement, and you also stated that there was no building in the first lot in the first row.

A.

There is a little built in the fifth lot in my row.

Q.

What about the first lot, first row, which you state was vacant?

A.

The first row has nine houses, which are only partly built; the first row has some vacant lots which are not built on.∂≤

Following a series of questions concerning the applicant’s schooling and more descriptions about various buildings in the village, the interviewer returned to the description of the houses in the village and asked the father:

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Q.

Won’t you tell me once more how many vacant spaces there are in the

A.

Nine houses in the third row; two of the lots are only half built up.

Q.

How many buildings in the first row, east side?

A.

First row has eight houses, the fourth house is only half built.

Q.

There are only eight buildings altogether?

A.

Yes, the ninth lot is vacant.

third row?

Q.

How many houses are there in the fourth row?

A.

I didn’t pass that way, but I think nine houses.

Q.

How many in the fifth row?

A.

I don’t know whether it is all built up or not.

Q.

Don’t you think you ought to know, as you just returned from China

A.

I know there are nine houses, but I don’t know whether they are all

after a visit of two years? built up or not.∂≥

The inspector concluded that the ‘‘witness answered all questions promptly, but when he found that his answers conflicted with those made by the applicant, he changed his own to agree with the statements made by the applicant.’’∂∂ The applicant and his witnesses were also asked where the family drew its water for domestic use, whether there were other sources of water, and where the nearest market was located. Inspectors also asked the names and occupations of the applicants’ neighbors and details concerning their lives. Although knowledge of exacting details repeated consistently was key to entry, sometimes having too much knowledge of details could also get an applicant into trouble with the immigration inspectors. Woo Wint’s (Wong’s) application for admission as a son of a native was denied, in part because the inspectors were suspicious of the amount of knowledge the alleged father had concerning his native village.∂∑ Indeed, the inspectors note that there were no discrepancies in the testimony to warrant exclusion. Rather, they were suspicious of the applicant’s alleged status as a son of a native because ‘‘the alleged father’s knowledge of his home village is somewhat over-intimate considering the length of his absence therefrom.’’∂∏ The suspicious testimony did not arise in the instant matter, but in the entry exam of Woo Wint’s alleged brother a year earlier. Though Woo Wint’s brother was admitted, the inspector in that case noted he was suspicious of the amount of detail in the father’s 50

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testimony regarding his home town. This evidence was used in the instant matter to exclude Woo Wint. Nevertheless, applicants were aware that, overall, factual agreement among witnesses was essential to their entry. To facilitate, coaching papers were used to coordinate ‘‘histories.’’ As Won Hung Quen, an immigration applicant, described in the coaching letter to his uncle intercepted by immigration officers, ‘‘in my testimony given to the Immigration devils there was not the least variance from the coaching paper you let me have some time ago. I hope you will also answer those Immigration devils according to the same coaching paper; with our testimony agreeing, my landing may be possible.’’∂π The letter describes the answers that the applicant gave during his interviews and instructs his ‘‘uncle’’ to answer accordingly. The letter begins, Dear Uncle, Today the Immigration people came down to take my testimony; they asked me what people I knew who were in the employ of May Lung & Co; I said Wong Toy, Wong Hung and Wong Si Kee, and that my father was bookkeeper; they also asked whether Won Hung and Wong Toy lived upstairs or in the store; I said in the store. They asked, ‘‘Is Si Kee married?’’ I said, ‘‘Si Kee was married in China where his family is now, they have never been in the United States.’’ They also asked who taught me Chinese when I was young. I said, ‘‘In the May Lung Store Uncle Si Kee taught me Chinese at night, and he sent me to the Congregation school to learn English; never engaged any teacher to teach me Chinese.’’

The letter continues to describe questions and responses concerning the death of Wong Hun Quen’s mother, visiting his father’s grave, and other details about acquaintances and the length of their friendship. It concludes with a postscript: ‘‘P.S. The Immigration devils also asked, ‘How long was your father sick before he died?’ I said, ‘Two months.’ When asked be sure to say two months. Father’s home number was 637. Should they ask you whether or not my father has any brothers be sure to say no, and if any sisters say one younger sister.’’ Thus, in response to the detailed questioning of immigration o≈cials, paper sons resorted to memorizing the purported family histories of their paper families. In addition to the verbal testimony, immigrants had to identify family members’ photographs and to draw pictures of houses, villages, and the surrounding countryside. Elaborate crib sheets that included village and household maps, family trees, and tips for answering questions were sold along with the paper title. entry despite exclusion

51

For example, the maps on pages 55–57 were discovered by immigration inspectors. They depict and describe an applicant’s purported home, village, and the surrounding area. Notations on the maps include tips for answering other personal questions and specific facts that should be emphasized. Thus, Jung Hon’s family home map admonishes the user to ‘‘be sure to say that the house has three skylights.’’ The locations of family grave sites, the size and appearance of homes in the village, and placement of trees, rivers, roads and fields, are carefully depicted on the village maps. In addition, given the detail required by the immigration service, charts listing the inhabitants of entire villages were also exchanged. Thus, the service translated the following spreadsheet, which describes the inhabitants of each house in one paper son’s alleged village. From the descriptions included, one can deduce the types of questions that immigrants anticipated. The diagram shows the names of the occupants of each home, the ‘‘type of foot’’ of the women, and ages of all children. The diagram carefully depicts vacant lots, as well as the location of schools and boardinghouses. Immigration o≈cers suspected that immigrants attempted to simplify their family stories for immigration purposes to make memorization easier. Similarly, they suspected that immigrants collectively created out of whole cloth villages and surrounding areas for immigration purposes. As o≈cers pushed immigrants for more details, the narratives grew more complicated. The amount of information became so overwhelming that would-be immigrants calculated their departure dates by the amount of time they thought they would need to memorize the material. Thus, for example, one crib sheet confiscated during a drug raid of a Chinese business was over fifty typed pages.∂∫ Gin Hon, to whom the information was addressed, was advised to ‘‘give answer only to the question asked; do not say more than the question requires.’’ The letter also suggested that ‘‘if an inspector or interpreter talks loudly to show anger, do not be afraid, but be composed and answer the question in easy manner according to the demand of the occasion.’’ Written in question and answer style, the letter goes on to detail information concerning every area of questioning. For example, the following excerpt provides information concerning the ancestral hall that Gin Hon had to remember: Q:

What is the YEE CHONG ANCESTRAL HALL built of and how many sections has it?

A:

It is built of bricks in two sections, between which is the open court paved with bricks; in the middle on the right side is located the kitchen

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which has a double stationary stove built of bricks, about 3 ft. high, 4 ft. wide, 6 or 7 ft. long; there is nothing on the left side or aisle of the ancestral hall. On the 4th day of the 1st month each year the kitchen is used to boil the pork. In the front section there is a large wooden door and also a screen door, both opening inward, located in the center. In the front section there is a room on either side of the foot; in each room there is an ‘‘L’’ shaped loft, no railing. The ladder is moveable and has cylindrical rungs. The door to each of these rooms (referring to the rooms in the front section) faces the aisle,—near the door there is a window made of green tiles, about 3 ft. high, 2 ft. wide, no door to close it. Above the loft there is also a window, about 3 ft. high, 3 feet wide, no door to close it. There is a granite threshold at the front entrance; the door jambs are built of granite, and there is a large granite slab over the door with five raised characters ‘‘YEE CHONG WONG GOONG SOO’’ painted in green. About 3 jungs from the front entrance there are two granite stone pillars used to support the roof. In front of the entrance there is an enclosed space about 1 jung deep and as wide as the ancestral hall, the walls built of brick; there is a gateway on the left side wall and one on the right side wall. The gate tower is about 7 or 8 ft. high and 5 ft. wide, the walls are more than 1 jung high. In the rear section there are four stone pillars used to support the roof. There is a large shrine shelf made of wood painted in gold, containing 400 or 500 ancestral tablets with gold letters on green ground. There are two large, long tables, each more than 1 jung long, 4 or 5 ft. wide, movable. One of these tables is used for worship of the ancestors; the other is used by the director, who is my teacher GING HING, to give account for receipts and expenditures. There are two long benches, more than 1 jung long and over 1 ft. wide. Outside the wall at each corner there is a pair of granite slabs standing upright, about 5 or 6 ft. from the wall, and 5 or 6 ft. from the wall are rice fields. Dirt road to YEE CHONG ANCESTRAL HALL, no bridge or ferry to cross. On the left side of the ancestral hall are 10 odd toilet houses, built of dirt or adobes, belong to AI LEUNG VILLAGE. There are trees on the right and back of the ancestral hall, and the YOUNG NGEE HANG VILLAGE lantern house is about 5 or 6 jungs away. I remember when I was a small boy I saw two wooden flag poles there, but I cannot remember when they were blown away by wind storms afterwards. Roughly the description of the ancestral hall is like the above, but you must talk it over carefully with uncle GAY YEN’s son KAY JEYNG entry despite exclusion

53

first; if you find anything not noted there you should at once agree with him as to the additions. In regard to NGIN WO VILLAGE, YOUNG NGEE HANG VILLAGE, the houses, toilets, fish ponds, wells, altars, fuel houses, school house, lantern house, bamboos, trees, rice fields, ditches, highways, back hill and villages near NGIN WO VILLAGE, you must carefully notice them and remember them so that when the inspector asks about them, you three—father and sons—will agree thereby making it easy for you to land.

The same amount of detail was supplied concerning the family home, each family member, their friends, teachers, and other villagers. Information concerning Gin Hon’s new personal history was also included—he was told how he used to comb his hair, whom he sat next to in school, what his favorite dishes were, and how much money he made a day at the business for which his mother had provided the capital. It is easy to see how the system became so arcane that even bona fide United States citizens had to study these newly created ‘‘family trees,’’ for if their answers failed to convince the immigration o≈cers or if they failed to jibe with those given by their paper relatives, they, too, were vulnerable to deportation. The irony was not lost on the regulators themselves: It was so tedious, such minute detail, that you were bound to trip. Let me give you a humorous situation. I think it was a case of a triple-header. A mother of two kids came in at the same time and a question by the inspector was: ‘‘Is there a dog in the house.’’ If you live in a house, you know whether there’s a dog or not, especially if the dog is your pet. So the mother said ‘‘Yes we have a dog.’’ And another son, ‘‘Yes, we have a dog.’’ And the third son, ‘‘No, no dog.’’ So they call the mother again, and the son, and they both said ‘‘Yes, yes we had a dog.’’ And the other son was called in again, ‘‘Did you say that you have a dog in the house?’’ ‘‘Oh, we had a dog, but we ate that dog before we left! No dog!’’ Well, this was true. By the time he left the house there was no dog. So otherwise it would be a very serious discrepancy, if you lived in the same household and two said there’s a dog and the other one said no.∂Ω

Nevertheless, when applicants were caught with coaching papers, immigration inspectors took them as proof of the fraudulent nature of the entry. For example, the letter from applicant Wong Hung Quen described above was intercepted by immigration o≈cers. The manner in which the letter is written 54

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1. Drawings provided detailed descriptions of homes, including occupants of rooms and locations of fixtures such as windows and skylights. In addition, they o√ered tips for answering questions. On the left side of the drawing the author has written, ‘‘If anything is asked you don’t know, say you have forgotten it.’’ Courtesy of the National Archives and Record Administration, Pacific Region (San Francisco).

2. Larger drawings described entire villages, setting out distances and locations of fields, rivers, and other towns nearby. The author of the map notes that the village name has been changed to Dai Pong Tow ‘‘so as to be easily remembered.’’ Courtesy of the National Archives and Record Administration, Pacific Region (San Francisco).

3–4. Chinese crib sheets were meticulously translated by immigration interpreters. These show generic drawings of a village and the type of information that would be required by immigration inspectors. Courtesy of the National Archives and Record Administration, Pacific Region (San Francisco).

translation of diagram of supposed 76-house village, intended to coach applicant as to occupants of each home. Yung Chung’s wife, Dare Shee, bound footed. Son Yee Tsung, 18 years old, not married

Ah Ngar, 30, no wife or children.

Shun Yow, no wife or children.

Hawk Jeung’s wife, Wong Shee, bound footed.

Vacant lot

Jang Shew Shun’s house.

Mee Jung’s wife, Ong Shee, natural footed. Son, Yee Jing, 20 yrs old, not married

Tew Wah’s wife, Wong Shee, natural footed.

Wong Jeung’s wife, Ong Shee, bound footed.

Man Wah’s wife, Jee Shee natural footed. Son, Yew Ting Tsam 10 years old

Loy Woon’s wife, Wong Shee, bound-footed, son, Chew Git.

Gock Jung’s wife, Mah Shee, bound footed. Son, Yee Hung In.

Low Wah, married, no children.

Girls’ house.

Chung Jung’s wife, Wong Shee, bound footed. Daughter, Ah Kum 10.

Empty lot

Po Jung’s wife, Dare Shee, bound footed, 35.

Quon Jung’s wife, Hom Shee, natural footed. Son, Ah Yow, 10 years old.

Ming Jung, not married. No children.

Yuey Jung’s wife, Jee Shee natural footed.

Chau Jung’s wife, Mah Shee, natural footed, one daughter, Ah Yew, 10.

Chee Eew’s wife, Wong Shee, bound footed, Daughter, Yew Chaw Som, 10.

Mah Jeung, no wife or children.

Lan Jung’s wife, Wong Shee, bound footed.

Law Quock Gum’s wife, Gwan Shee, natural-footed.

Soon Jung’s wife, Tong Shee, bound footed. Son, Yew Jew, 10.

Ong Bew, no wife or children.

Kay Yue, no wife or children.

Empty lot.

Pun Jung, no wife or children.

Ho Jung’s wife, Mah Shee, natural footed. Son, Yee Low, 10, daughter 10 years old.

Bon Jeung, no wife, son Yee Yuk, 10.

Vacant lot.

Vacant lot.

Vacant lot.

Gan Jung’s wife, Jeung Shee, natural footed. Son, Yee Jick.

Vacant lot.

Low Ah Shung, no wife or children.

Woo Jugn, no wife or children.

Jee Jung, not married, no children.

5. Since immigrants were required to know every house and all occupants living in each home, crib sheets, such as this one, became ubiquitous, even for genuine families. The information required was much too detailed for the average person to recall upon demand. Courtesy of the National Archives and Record Administration, Pacific Region (San Francisco).

Gar Jeung’s wife, Jee Shee, bound footed. No children.

Tsow Jeung’s wife, Hom Shee, bound footed. Girl Ah Lun, 10.

Tsun Jung’s wife, Wong Shee, bound-footed. Son, Yee Bing, 10.

Yip Jung’s wife, Wong Shee, natural footed. Daughter’s name Mee Lem. Son’s name Yee Yew.

Yow Wah’s wife, Fung Shee, natural footed, no children.

Hong Wah’s wife, Jee Shee, natural footed. No children.

Hom Tsung, Tiet’s wife, Jee Shee. Son, Ah Mon, 10; son, Ah Jee, 10.

Shung Jeung’s wife, Wong Shee, natural footed. Son, Yee Mun Yin, 10.

Yee Jung’s wife, Wong Shee, natural footed. No children.

Kung Jung’s wife, Tong Shee, natural footed, one son, Ah Tim.

Tung Wah’s wife, Jee Shee, natural footed. One son, Ah Yeung 10.

Hong Jung’s wife, Ong Shee, bound feet. Daughter, Ow Sow, 10.

School

Yee Jeung’s wife, Wong Shee, bound footed. Daughter, Ah Po, 10 years old.

Yuk Jung’s wife, Hom Shee, bound footed. Son, Yee Lum, 10 years old.

Shee Jung’s wife, Jee Shee, natural footed. Daughter (unreadable text)

Yun Wo’s wife, Wong Shee.

Gawk Jung’s wife, Jee Shee, bound footed. Son, Yee Fun, 10 years old.

Wong Yook’s wife, Wong Shee, bound footed.

Shun Hong’s wife, Fung Shee, natural footed, no children.

Yut Lum, 30, no wife or children.

Low Ah Toy, no wife or children.

Wong Po, no children or wife.

Wong Nai, not married yet.

Kin Jung’s wife, Ong Shee, bound footed. Son, Yee Ting Gwong, 10.

Vacant log.

Gow Tsai, not married, but has mother.

Yee Jung, married, had no children.

Shun Jung’s wife, Wong Shee, bound feet. Son, Yee Kwing Hoy 10.

Low Jung’s wife, Wong Shee, bound footed.

Vacant lot.

Lew Gwock Wah married no children.

Chew On’s wife, Wong Shee, natural footed.

Woon Jung’s wife, Mah Shee, natural footed. Son, Yee Yick Yew, 23.

Yin Jung’s wife, Ong Shee, natural footed.

Wong Shung, not married, no children.

does not on its face show that the information was made up. However, the use of the coaching letter provided su≈cient proof for immigration o≈cers to exclude the applicant. The case of Toy Fon is a further example. Toy Fon spoke a considerable amount of English and was familiar with San Francisco. While the Bureau of Immigration notes that ‘‘it is possible, of course, that he was born in the U.S.,’’ the interception of a coaching letter to his alleged parents and certain inconsistencies in their testimony led the bureau to be suspicious as to the alleged parent-child relationship as well as regarding whether the alleged parents were actually man and wife.∑≠ The extent to which the inspectors realized the di≈culties inherent in the inspection process can be seen in the following example concerning the use of coaching papers. In contrast to the belief made manifest in other files that the existence of coaching was prima facie evidence and sure proof of fraud, one inspector, commenting on the discrepancies in an applicant’s testimonies, reflected a more ambiguous position: The alien did, however, give testimony to agree with some of the testimony he gave when he was originally admitted to this country, but in order to do so it is possible that he studied coaching matter that was used when he first came here. Whether this is true or not I do not know, but it seems to have been the custom for many years for all applicants, both bona fide and fraudulent sons of merchants and natives applying for admission, to have perspective questions and answers prepared to assist their examination.∑∞

Constancy had become an indicator of truthfulness, but it could serve as only a rough approximation. The Chinese attempted to work within the parameters set out by regulators. Real and fictive families resorted to learning details that would commonly have been forgotten to meet the stringent entry requirements. As the Chinese manipulated the process by learning the facts sought by immigration processors, immigration o≈cers required ever more detail, escalating the requirements. The sum of this spiral was to fix, over time, the stories that Chinese had to remember about themselves and their ‘‘kin’’ with immigration regulators.

Perpetuating Immigration: Family and Business Networks Given the hardships involved in attempting entry into the United States, uncertain outcome due to the ever-increasing levels of surveillance, and the preparation needed before attempting to circumnavigate the entry process meant that the journey to the United States could not be undertaken without 60

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significant reliance on networks of support both within and between the United States and China (not to mention any intervening locales along the journey). What appear to be individuals making isolated decisions to enter the United States must be viewed rather as the outcome of complex networks of information and financial support and as part of long-term family strategies and commercial development and interests. A quick review of the steps involved in gaining entry highlights the interdependence and communal nature of the immigration process. Through every step in this process the ability to call upon networks of support—in the form of information, material goods, or other intangible help—had to be in place, or the obstacles would be too di≈cult to overcome, both for legitimate and illegitimate immigrants. Before making the decision to travel three thousand miles on a vessel that took, on average, thirty-five days to reach its destination, individuals must have heard of opportunities in the United States that would make emigration desirable. Recently, historians have posited that migration from the southern seaports of China developed from a long-standing tradition of supplying contract labor throughout Southeast Asia and the rise of Hong Kong in particular as a center for labor migration.∑≤ Traditional ‘‘push’’ theories accounted for southern Chinese migration to the United States by arguing that Chinese were pushed to emigrate because of poverty, famine, or natural disasters. However, recent work by historians has shown that, in fact, the Chinese who emigrated to the United States were overall better educated and belonged to the lowermiddle or upper-lower classes. They were motivated to improve their financial situation and were willing to take the risks associated with emigration.∑≥ Thus, a more reasonable explanation for the concentration of immigration from the Pearl Delta region and through Hong Kong, rather than through northern ports such as Shanghai or Tianjin, which held treaty concessions, was that it was linked to the established coolie trade with the British through those areas, rather than poverty or social disruption. Despite the fact that northern ports such as Shanghai or Tianjin held the treaty concessions, migration routes developed in the South. This disparity can be explained by the ability of southern coolie traders to turn their skills at attracting contract labor for other regions to exploit new market opportunities in the United States. The term ‘‘shanghaied,’’ commonly used during the period, referred not to Chinese attempts to kidnap foreigners but to the Chinese victims of coolie traders who made a business of grabbing men from the streets of Shanghai or villages for export as laborers across the British empire and elsewhere. These trading companies proved their ingenuity and resilience by entering new markets, dominating first the trade to Southeast Asia, then to localities as dispaentry despite exclusion

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rate as the United States, Africa, and Peru. A well-known use of contract Chinese labor even developed during World War I in France. Approximately two hundred thousand Chinese worked there for the British and French in non-combatant capacities, building railways, dockyards, and roads, or working in fields, mines, and factories. Almost every one returned to China, having amassed nearly fifty-one million francs in savings.∑∂ A member of the Wing family recounts how their ancestors came to California and settled in Hanford: One evening our Great-Grandfather went out for a walk in Canton. We’re not certain of the date, but it was sometime before the 1870’s. His name was Gong Ting Shu and he was already married with at least one son. The Ching guards started chasing him, as he was a Ming loyalist and anti-Ching. He ran across the city to escape the guards, but couldn’t get away. Finally, desperate, he leapt into the Pearl River. Luckily for him, or maybe not so luckily, he ended up rolling into a small boat that was there. The next thing he knew he woke up and he was in the middle of the ocean. What happened was that he had fallen into a boat that was looking to hijack Chinese as laborers. Maybe they had hit him over head when he landed in the boat, but all he remembered was that he had jumped into the river to get away from the people chasing him and the next thing he knew he was on a large ship headed for the United States. Anyway, he never got back to China. Instead he ended up here in California. We don’t know what he did when he first got here, but after he landed in San Francisco, he worked on the fruit ranches as a cook and we know that by 1883 he had established our first restaurant in Hanford. Can you imagine, you tell your wife you’re going out for a short walk, and the next thing you know you end up in a place 3000 miles away and never make it home again your entire life? Luckily, though, he sent for one of his sons and over time he came into the U.S. too. Unfortunately he never saw his wife again. That’s how we ended up as the Wing family. As you know Wing isn’t a real Chinese name—let alone our real family name. Our Grandfather came under merchants paper that our Great-Grandfather purchased for him. He was supposed to be Chow Gong Wing, but the immigration people got that name wrong when he landed and he ended up as Mr. Wing rather than Mr. Chow and we ended up the Wing family.∑∑

The profits to be had by dragging unsuspecting Chinese across the ocean presented an opportunity not to be passed up, and shipping lines worked to develop the new and lucrative business of transporting willing passengers to 62

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America. Not to be left out, in 1866, the Pacific Mail Steamship Company and Occidental and Oriental Steamship Company were the first U.S. companies to enter the business and to compete with British and Japanese shipping companies. Indeed, these lines were a central impetus to establishing regular immigration patterns by establishing regular travel on a bimonthly basis between Hong Kong and the United States and encouraged the Chinese to emigrate, spreading stories of the wealth to be gained. For example, one handbill distributed by an American shipping company declared, Chinamen have become richer than mandarins there. Pay first year, $300, but afterwards make more than double. One can do as he likes in that country. Nobody better nor get more pay than does he. Nice rice, vegetables, and wheat, all very cheap. Three years there will make poor workmen very rich, and he can come home at any time. On the ships that go there passengers will find nice rooms and very fine food. They can play all sorts of games and have no work. Everything nice to make man happy. It is a nice country. Better than this. No sickness there and no danger of death. Come! Go at once. You cannot a√ord to wait. Don’t heed the wife’s counsel or the threats of enemies. Be chinamen, but go.∑∏

Moreover, the direct interest in the continual flow of Chinese outside China’s borders was key to the formation of stable routes of circulation that would facilitate continual, rather than sporadic, translocation. Making the steamships reasonably comfortable and o√ering travel at regular intervals, the companies encouraged a regulated flow of Chinese from the mainland. These businesses would further encourage would-be migrants to consider the possibility of going abroad by bringing home overseas Chinese who spoke about the opportunities they had abroad. Returning immigrants would boast about their successes and spend what appeared to be vast quantities of money earned abroad, while their fellow villagers toiled. Overseas Chinese worked in the clothing or restaurant industries. While the reality of these jobs entailed backbreaking work as laundrymen or as cooks and dishwashers, the myth of ownership of elegant retail clothing stores and restaurants was encouraged by the half-truths and sometimes bald-faced lies told. As interest in going to the United States grew, networks developed to provide the infrastructure for emigration. For example, a robust market lent money to immigrants to pay for their passage and a few months living expenses. Before the passage of the Exclusion Acts, over thirty thousand immigrants had entered the United States to mine for gold or work on the railroad, most using the credit-ticket system. The system developed through coordinaentry despite exclusion

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tion among transportation providers, their agents or ticket brokers in China, employers in the United States, and institutions such as family associations or companies. Basically, a would-be immigrant would sign a contract with his family or village or family association putting up collateral assets as a bond for a certain amount of cash to cover the cost of transportation and a stipend for expenses for a few months. The shipping company would then sell these contracts to employers or others in the United States, who would then collect the loan from the individual over time. Even following the passage of the Exclusion Acts these networks persisted and other businesses developed. Central to the needs of would-be immigrants was the development of networks of information. Current information concerning shifting administrative practices, new mechanisms of interrogation, and the biases of administrators flowed through personal, business, and political channels to be funneled toward people anxious about gaining entry. Contrary to the perception of Chinese immigrants as lone sojourners, they were in constant communication and association with each other and with ever-widening circles of accomplices.∑π Chinese family, clan, village, and business associations, which stretched across the Pacific and to which each person was entitled membership based on surname or kin a≈liation, are known to have been strong and durable. Secret societies (tongs), gangs, and political parties added a further level of interconnectivity and an alternative source of support. The resilience of these groups was based on their adaptability while retaining the fundamental core of mutual aid and association for which they were formed in China. Stretching back to the sixteenth century, these groups were transplanted to the United States, where they helped immigrants through opportunities for finance or credit and, as they began to specialize in particular industries, the formation of economic networks. Mr. Low described the help he and his father received through their local kinship association ( gam saan jong): Father couldn’t make a living in China and our relatives looked down at him, so he went to Hong Kong and worked at a gam saan jong. Later he was smuggled aboard a ship and came to the United States. He changed to treaty merchant status and returned to China when I was about 18. He reported two sons, and since I was too old to use these slots, there were given to two others. Later when I was 25 and married, my father bought a citizen’s son’s paper for me to come to the U.S. It cost him $2,000, with $500 down. If I was unable to land, the $500 would have been forfeited to the seller. The paper was for someone in a neighboring village, so I visited it to familiarize

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myself with the place. I stayed at a gam saan jong owned by Sze Yup people for a month waiting for a favorable decision from the U.S. The firm helped me with the paper work and booking passage, I finally took the Japanese ship Siberia.∑∫

Every detail of the immigration process was commodified and sold—for cash or credit. Extended family and other clansmen were necessarily involved in the sale of family slots and family histories and in the supply of witnesses. Family photographs could be purchased and recent photos taken. Doctors provided medical examinations to prove general health or provide proof of one’s age, or family resemblance. Expediters helped immigrants with paperwork and then moved these papers through the proper channels. U.S. o≈cials were certain that government o≈cials were accomplices in providing the proper approvals and collaborating documentation. Western shipping companies, local banks, and companies specializing in the movement of goods and people sold tickets and provided lodging, food, clothing, and ready cash for the journey. Brokers made introductions to experienced immigration lawyers for a fee, while attorneys in the United States vied for Chinese business. Underlying and supporting these commercial networks were family and village relationships that encouraged, fostered, and reinforced the movement of Chinese into the United States. Family members encouraged others to emigrate to send much-needed funds back to China or provide a stepping stone for other family members. As Mr. Low noted in the preceding reflection on his father’s decision to emigrate, his father appeared to be equally motivated by his inability to make a living in China and by the taunts he received from his relatives. Or, as Mrs. Chan commented, I was forced to come to America. I had never seen my husband before. My mother matched me in marriage so that I could bring the family over later. I had a passport to come when I was 16, but I didn’t come until I was 23, when the Japanese attacked. Most of us then came as daughters of citizens or wives of businessmen. Other wives weren’t allowed to come. I came as the granddaughter of a citizen. The papers had been purchased for me.∑Ω

Moreover, families and villages helped sponsor immigration. Although commercial entities were willing to share in the risk by demanding only a quarter of the entry fee before travel, the amount required—five hundred dollars in the case of Mr. Low—was not a paltry sum. The purchase of papers alone could cost from one hundred to fifteen hundred dollars. Regardless of assistance from the local family association for meals and lodging, families still had to

entry despite exclusion

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contribute cash. Mr. Tom explained how the payment of fees evolved over time but still required a significant investment on the part of the immigrant: My father was here in the late 1890’s. After he died in an accident, my uncle bought a merchant’s son’s papers for me to come to America. All the papers then were false and cost $100 per year of age. I was actually 17, but the paper said 19. After I got here, I found out that when an elder wishes to bring a younger relative over from China, he must go make contact at such places as Hip Sing Chong and buy papers for the closest age. He pays a deposit and the balance after the immigrant has landed. If he can’t land, you just lose the passage cost and get the deposit back. If court fees are needed to land the immigrant, the seller of papers must foot it. At that time, there were few court battles. Later when the immigration laws became stricter, the applicant and seller shared the court costs fifty-fifty and the paper was paid for regardless of the results. If you’re deported, it’s your own bad luck.∏≠

Once established in the United States, relocated family members formed a new community that could help arriving immigrants meet their basic material needs as well as provide a familiar culture and ambiance. The salience of Chinatowns to immigrant Chinese around the world has been well documented. The peculiarity and insularity of Chinatowns in the United States have made them tourist attractions since their founding. While ethnic enclaves were established by Italians (Little Italy), Greeks (Greek Town), or Japanese (Little Tokyo or J-Town) and served as transition points for many firstgeneration immigrants, Chinatown came to be seen as a ‘‘city within a city.’’ Easily recognizable from the outside because of the dress, language, and customs of its inhabitants, San Francisco’s legally prescribed Chinatown offered immigrants a reproduction of the world they had left behind. ‘‘An invisible moat seemed to cut the Chinese o√ from the mainstream of American life just beyond the borders. From birth to death, a Chinese found his needs met within the enclave of an area ten blocks square. He lived a way of life as his parent remembered it back in the villages of Kwangtung Province.’’∏∞ The constant flow of Chinese between the two countries provided a continual chain of communication and support that drew from kin and village ties. Preexisting familial, clan, and mercantile institutions were harnessed together into a transnational network. At the same time, new institutions and businesses developed and fed into the existing networks across the Pacific to create an intricate and seamless web of information and supplies.

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Chapter 4 ———————————— Guardians of the Gate

T

he Janus face of the ins—hyper-bureaucratization and hyperdiscretion—was an interactive e√ect of the e√ort to regulate Chinese exclusion and the persistent resistance of the Chinese to regulation. This dual construction was viewed as necessary, given what was perceived as a peculiar resiliency of the Chinese to resist immigration processing. Once created, this dual approach permitted the conversion of Chinese immigrant identities into regulatory knowledge and data, thereby facilitating processing. At least two factors provided impetuses for immigration inspectors to develop a harsh inquiry system based on a combination of administrative discretion and lengthy interrogation that soon typified immigration processing. First, o≈cers had genuine di≈culty verifying information o√ered by the immigrants. Second, they generally believed that immigrants were attempting to enter by fraudulent means. Inspectors had some basic information regarding China. For example, inspectors relied on their basic understanding of Chinese dialects to reach decisions. Thus, in the case of Chin Shee and Fong Gie Wong, who claimed entry as the wife and son of a domiciled merchant, the inspector made an unfavorable recommendation based, at least in part, on Chin Shee’s ability to speak two dialects of Chinese.∞ Interpreter Ben Yim, the first interpreter used in the examination of applicant Chin Shee, stated that this applicant speaks both See Yup and Heung Shan dialect, having been able to speak in either equally well. This interpreter’s original dialect is Heung Shan and accordingly he would be able to catch at once any trace of that dialect in one’s speech. This applicant claims to have been born in Hoy Ping district (where See Yup is spoken) and to have been married to the Sun Ning district (where See Yup is also spoken). This

applicant states that she speaks Heung Shan but claims that she is unable to speak the latter dialect on account of her association at the station here with Heung Shan people, and that this is the only time she has associated with persons speaking that dialect. This explanation does not seem reasonable because it is not likely that she could acquire a Heung Shan accent in so short a time. Inspector Jack Chin was the next interpreter used. He is a See Yup man and stated that the applicant speaks that dialect and that he did not notice any trace of Heung Shan dialect in her speech but that he thinks she has a short tongue or something like that.≤

The inspector assumed that a person should only be able to speak one dialect and appears to have based his analysis on that assumption. However, the facts, even as described by him, did not prove that the applicant fraudulently claimed nativity from the Hoy Ping district. Rather, the evidence suggests she was able to speak two dialects without a trace of a foreign accent. While the inspector’s logic might be simply attributed to a desire to exclude these applicants, it may also reflect the poor application of a tested method of discovering fraud—namely that applicants should speak only the dialect from their region. Likewise, immigration o≈cers’ reliance on a superficial understanding of regional dialects underlay R. I. Davis’s request that the examining o≈cer inquire into the dialect spoken by Leung Ton: Although the home of this family is claimed to be in the Sun Ning District and at a considerable distance from Hoy Ping District border, the Applicant has been stated to use the See Yip Hoy Ping dialect rather than the See Yip Sun Nung dialect, which he claims to be natural and in which he stated he would testify. If it can be brought out that the dialect principally used in the village and in the household from which he claims to come is the See Yip Sun Nung, while in actual fact the Applicant uses the See Yip Hoy Pin exclusively, this feature would reflect very seriously against his claim to relationship. This then is an essential matter, to be definitely determined.≥

Inspectors believed that Chinese dialects were distinct and regionalized— sometimes even from village to village—so that any deviation could indicate fraud. The salience of this belief as a fundamental understanding of the Chinese can be found in many comments, as one interpreter recollected, ‘‘The interpreter didn’t count in the ruling. We just interpreted what the man said or what was asked. But we did render an opinion as to that person’s dialect. Because if I said the son spoke in the Chingshan dialect and another interpreter said the father spoke in the Toishan dialect, immediately the inspector 68

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would smell a rat.’’∂ Nevertheless, knowledge of exact distances, regional variations in dialects, and other facets of life in China remained elusive to immigration o≈cers. Further, although an e√ort was made to understand basic social and religious practices among the Chinese, and crude indicators were developed to test the veracity of responses, immigration o≈cers often expressed frustration as they found that they were unable to confirm most of the information given. As the commissioner-general commented in his 1901 Annual Report, In the case of an alleged minor son of a domiciled merchant the facts alleged to sustain such a claim must all have existed in China, to wit, the marriage of the parents and the birth of the son, as well as the date of birth, and therefore proved by Chinese testimony exclusively. The Government has no means of refuting a prima facie case thus established and must admit an applicant upon such evidence, unless it can find, in minor variations if the testimony of the di√erent Chinese witnesses, grounds for discrediting it altogether. The simple statement of the case is su≈cient to show with what comparative ease the law may be defied by the entrance of Chinamen without limit practically, who can be made to pass muster as minors.∑

Independent evidence and documents to corroborate or disprove claims rarely existed; the evidence was often confined to the testimony o√ered by the applicant and his witnesses. The situation was well understood, as this o≈cer noted: ‘‘It was a question of testing them on family history. I couldn’t see how it could have been handled any other way in the absence of documentary evidence. When a person came in from a little village, who would know them? There was just one way of finding out if the family belonged together as it was claimed and that was by testing their relationship knowledge.’’∏ Not only were facts concerning the Chinese hard to verify, but lack of investigative ability, limited resources, and poor record keeping contributed further to the dilemma. The perception that information concerning the Chinese was hard to verify was further exacerbated by the fact that immigration o≈cers also held a general suspicion that all Chinese were untrustworthy and that all cases were fraudulent. An immigration o≈cer reflected, ‘‘I one time asked one of our interpreters what percentage of cases were fraudulent. I asked if 90 percent were. He said probably. I was aware from the beginning.’’π Likewise, as the writer of the ‘‘Synopsis of Evidence’’ in the case of Toy Loon, stated, ‘‘The details presented fall quite naturally into the stereotyped form of so-called ‘native’ cases. The appellant is the ‘only son of his parents’; the usual two Chinese clansmen appear as witnesses; his parents are dead and have been guardians of the gate

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dead for a number of years; and in other ways the story is arranged to permit of agreement by avoiding too many details.’’∫ Inspectors often held Chinese immigrants to a higher standard simply because they were Chinese. In the letter recommending the exclusion of Wong Shew Ping, the inspector commented, ‘‘I . . . certainly do not feel justified in declaring a Chinese an American citizen under such a showing.’’Ω In the case of Toy Shear Kong the investigating inspector wrote, ‘‘It is apparent that the applicant has furnished all the testimony within his power, and I do not feel satisfied from the evidence o√ered that applicant has established even to a reasonable certainty his native birth. The evidence is of such a character as any Chinese person might easily procure, and does not carry conviction.’’∞≠ O≈cers often justified their conclusion to exclude by placing the instant case into a larger pattern of suspected fraud that simultaneously drew from and reinforced the belief that most cases were fraudulent. For example, in the case of Mar Kim Dock, the inspector noted, ‘‘I am satisfied that this is one of the cases where the parties interested have looked up the death records first and made their story fit, taking advantage of the lapse of time since the death to prevent us from securing definite information.’’∞∞ The belief that the Chinese were systematically lying and undermining the exclusion laws already was prevalent in 1883, only one year after passage of the first act. The San Francisco Alta California disparaged the enforcement of exclusion legislation and renamed the 1882 Exclusion Act, ‘‘The Chinese Evasion Act,’’ an ‘‘Act to perfect the art of lying among the Chinese and their white auxiliaries.’’∞≤ In 1909, Mary Coolidge noted, ‘‘in the average mind, the traditional Chinaman— a left-handed, cunning, industrious, and inhuman creature—is still the typical Chinaman.’’∞≥ The popular image of the ‘‘heathen Chinee’’ varied in the particular characteristics over time, but the basic qualities—industriousness, cunning, and lack of morality—were already well in place by the time the first Exclusion Act was passed and remained consistent thereafter.∞∂ This image served to bolster claims of fraudulent entry and justified the need for ever more stringent methods to control entry in the face of such a crafty opponent. These stereotypical views coincided with the agent’s professional experiences to support the notion of a di≈cult population to regulate and, therefore, justified both discretion and simultaneous invention of more controlling mechanisms. As the immigration o≈cer in one case noted, ‘‘the Bureau does not stand alone in considering Chinese testimony o√ered, under circumstances like this, incredible. Congress itself realized this peculiarity of the race and required in the cases of domiciled merchants that witnesses other than Chinese should testify.’’∞∑ 70

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Frustrated with their inability to verify information due to poor record keeping, inspectors accused the applicants of relying on records or testimony of persons that were no longer accessible. Inspector Kennah’s conclusion of fraud in the case of Mar Kim Dock, discussed above, was based on his inability to verify any information concerning Mar Kim Dock’s parents despite detailed investigation. He stated: I called at the undertakers, N. Gray & Co., to see if I could ascertain anything regarding the Chinese woman described in the death record in this case, purporting to be that of the applicant’s mother. I found their firm had buried Looie Sing [the applicant’s mother] by direction of Miss Culbertson of the Presbyterian Chinese Mission; and nothing appeared on their records to show who was the husband, if any, or who were her relatives. I then visited the Presbyterian Mission, and their books showed no record of Looie Sing in any way. Miss Culbertson is now deceased, and there is no one in the Mission now who has any recollection of Looie Sing or can tell why she was buried by direction of Miss Culbertson. 919 Stockton Street, where Looie Sing died, is a lodging house in which numerous Chinese families reside. We were unable, however, to secure any information at that place regarding Looie Sing.∞∏

The inability of the inspector to verify information, rather than a failure of the applicant to provide a plausible factual history or the adducing of contrary evidence, led to the conclusion of fraud in this case. It is worth noting that inspectors later found a coaching letter that appeared to bolster their decision. Confronted with a group intent on concealing the truth as well as di≈culties in teasing out objective facts, immigration o≈cers developed two separate techniques to process immigrant claims. While o≈cers would continue to probe for the veracity of answers, they would also find shortcuts based on personal experience and individual expertise. Additionally, they would rely on the consistency of responses to determine truthfulness. The coherence and uniformity of an immigrant’s answers would serve as a substitute for honesty.

Unbridled Administrative Discretion If there is one recurring theme in discussions of immigration processing, it is the overwhelming amount of discretion left to immigration o≈cers. This discretion and the inevitable accompanying abuses were unusually resistant to procedural reform.∞π Moreover, a rich tradition of litigation concerning immigration practices has enabled and, ironically, authorized rather than conguardians of the gate

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strained the ins’s discretionary power.∞∫ My review of the immigration case files provides additional evidence of the tenacity of the extraordinary discretion in the ins. The discretion is ironic because it was regularly challenged in court, but, more importantly, the discretion simultaneously paralleled and enabled the increasing and systematic bureaucratization of the agency and its handling of routine immigration applications. Throughout the Exclusion Period, immigration processing was veiled in a cloak of administrative discretion. Early immigration case files from 1885 to 1898 are brief; many are just two or three pages, and the majority are fewer than ten pages. Their size makes it virtually impossible to determine why an individual was admitted or excluded. Often, customs o≈cials did not explain their reasoning. By the 1920s, a few legal protections had been a√orded to immigrants such as the right to have counsel at the hearings (though counsel could not intervene or represent the applicant), but immigrants still received scant protection from the exercise of unchecked administrative discretion. For example, the complaint filed by McGee and Sapire in the case of Jeong Guon Jung alleged that the applicant was illegally deported while his attorneys were perfecting his appeal.∞Ω The immigration service agreed that the applicant was, in fact, inadvertently deported on a ship two weeks earlier than anticipated, but they did not make any attempt to return him to the United States to complete his appeal. Rather, the commissioner said the mistake was caused by understa≈ng and an unusual last-minute scheduling of a ship to China. That the cases are replete with instances where o≈cers appear to exercise their authority capriciously does not seem surprising. What is surprising, though, is that they appear themselves to be aware that the inspection process was limited in its ability to ascertain the truth and that reliance on idiosyncratic judgment and intention—understood as o≈cers’ ability—was crucial. As an interpreter noted, decisions often hinged on an inspector’s position concerning the Chinese: ‘‘Some inspectors were fair-minded and impartial, and I would say, good. Then there were some who were very technical and who were very prejudiced, who had no love for the Chinese.’’≤≠ Given the detail required of the Chinese, even with extensive preparation and coaching, they knew that much depended on the assigned inspector: ‘‘Before a son or daughter comes, the father must prepare coaching information to send them, which includes the family tree descriptions of the village, living quarters, etc. But it can be very tricky especially when they don’t ask the essentials, but instead ask questions as: Is there a clock? Who is in the family photos? So if they want to trip you, they can.’’≤∞ The immigration service personnel formally and informally acknowledged their power in deciding each case and their centrality in weighing 72

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the evidence. For example, the inspector in the case of Jew Shee Ngee, who sought entry as a merchant’s son, wrote a lengthy report and summary of his findings explaining why the subject should be deported: Central to his recommendation to deport Jew Shee Ngee was his determination that despite a significant amount of agreement between witnesses, he still did not believe the applicant to be truthful. He stated, It is of course conceded that there are a number of matters on which the principals in this case, from the very nature of the story, are in absolute or substantial agreement, but they are not of an intimate, personal or household nature. Even were they such, the very nature of the case and the circumstances under which it arises creates to my mind the necessity of strictness and for not giving too much weight to agreements, especially on ordinary simple matters easily learned or remembered, when our experience has shown that more or less coaching occurs in good as well as in bad cases and on points of an almost endless variety. The usual resort of attempting to develop discrepancies between witnesses or between di√erent versions of the same facts by the same witnesses is one, therefore, which cannot from the very nature of the story presented, hardly be applied to the case as a decisive test of the claimed relationship. The only other test is then the impression the witnesses make personally upon the examining o≈cer and the impression the testimony, as a whole, may make upon the examining o≈cer directly and upon reviewing o≈cers less directly through the record. The impression made upon the examining o≈cer by the case is that it is a fraudulent one, the story is so unnatural as to be preposterous, leaving the testimony, in my opinion, unworthy of belief.≤≤

Although the inspector argued that the facts in the case were unusual, a review of the claims made show that they were similar to those in many other files. The applicant claimed to be a merchant’s son. He claimed never to have met his father because he was conceived during his father’s brief stay in Macao with the family. Because, as the inspector noted, ‘‘father and son have never spent one day in the same village or town,’’ it was di≈cult to use the consistency of their answers as a test. Rather, the inspector in Jew Shee Ngee’s case explicitly noted the role his personal judgment played in the determination of truthfulness. In other situations, however, the amount of discretion and intuition applied by each o≈cer can merely be implied by the tortured reasoning used. For example, the law o≈cer in the case of Fong Hon stated in his ‘‘Memorandum for the Commissioner in re FONG HON, applicant as Merchant’s son’’: guardians of the gate

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The examining inspector in this case makes an unfavorable recommendation on the relationship. The mercantile status of the alleged father of the applicant is satisfactorily established in the record. The alleged father, Fong Huey, was last in China in 1909 and on his return to this country secured the admission of Fong Why as his oldest son, Fong Why now appearing as a witness for the applicant. The examining inspector reports that the applicant and his alleged father and brother fail to agree as to the location of their house in the home village in China. This discrepancy, however, depends on the circumstance that the location is described by the row and the number of the house in the row, and it appears from the testimony that the houses in the village do not conform to any symmetrical arrangement. This was brought out in the 1909 testimony. It appears to me that the di≈culty arises not because the applicant and the others are unfamiliar with the village but because [of ] their inability to describe the location by house and row. The worst feature of the case is the following: It is stated by all that the father has two brothers in the home village. In 1909, Fong Huey and Fong Why testified that one of these brothers had six sons and a daughter and that the other brother had two sons. These children were then described by name and ages. Now the story has changed. All agree that the first brother has two sons and the other one son. When called upon for an explanation the alleged father and brother stated that they did not testify as the 1909 record shows. It is remarkable that both the alleged father and Fong Why should agree in 1909 and now give testimony in disagreement with their former testimony but in precise agreement with the statement now made by the applicant. This indicates that some understanding has been made beforehand as to this testimony and points to the possibility that the whole testimony has been coached. It is something of a favorable circumstance that the alleged father mentions a son bearing the name of the applicant twelve years ago. It will be noted also that the 1909 testimony covered many matters concerning the home village and surroundings and the present testimony covers these matters satisfactorily except in the particulars above referenced. It will be noted that in 1909 mention was made of a servant girl. The alleged father testifies that this girl died in 1909 or 1910 while the applicant states that there was a servant girl in the house but she is not there now. It would seem that if the case was built upon coached testimony that the flaws would appear in such matters as the existence of this servant or other 74

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equally unimportant matters rather than as to the children of the father’s brothers. The unfavorable feature of the case is important particularly as it tends to discredit the whole testimony, but, not withstanding, I am of the opinion that the favorable features point to the existence of the claimed relationship. From my review of the evidence, it is my opinion that a favorable finding is the proper one and accordingly I have to recommend that the applicant be admitted.≤≥

Following the law o≈cer’s reasoning, the immigration commissioner admitted Fong Hon despite the earlier recommendation by the inspector to exclude him. As evidenced in the preceding memo, how the o≈cer chose to interpret the failure to provide consistent testimony across entry hearings and provide consistent testimony between witnesses at a given entry was crucial to the applicant’s admission. Moreover, the ability (and desire) of the o≈cer to find an explanation as to why the description of the family village would not conform also lay within his discretion. The self-conscious manner in which the law o≈cer discussed his rationale and his conclusion reflects a clearer understanding of the centrality of his discretion to the decision-making process than would be expected. The di≈culty in ascertaining the correctness of the outcome and the reliance on the discretion of the examining administrators is further reflected in the reversal of previous findings. For example, Yeung Bing Ying entered the United States as the fourteen-year-old son of a merchant in 1921 following extensive interviews and research by the immigration service into his father’s status.≤∂ Approximately five years later, he was deported after a hearing when he sought a return certificate and the immigration o≈cers found that he was not the son of his alleged father and that his alleged father was not a merchant. A review of the admission file reveals that the immigration service received the proper documentation and conducted the customary interrogation and analysis of the findings. A≈davits from two white witnesses and two Chinese witnesses testified to the father’s status. In addition, the manager of the store where his father was a≈liated testified and provided the partnership list to the immigration service. Yeung Bing Ying’s father was examined extensively over the course of two days concerning the store as well as the village and his family in China. The inspector found that the father’s mercantile status was ‘‘satisfactorily established’’ and that the discrepancies in testimony were not ‘‘material,’’ and he advised admission. Despite the apparent thoroughness of the investigation, interrogation, and analysis at his entry, authorities found

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five years later that Yeung Bing Ying had fraudulently entered. This contrary conclusion was reached after Yeung testified in support of his return certificate and failed to provide responses consistent with his earlier testimony at his entry. Moreover, the inspector found that Yeung’s alleged father was not a merchant at the time of Yeung’s entry. Finally, the inspector noted that it appeared that there was a pattern of attempted fraud in the family and that a prior landed brother was not really a family member since he had entered with the father but had no contact with the family since his entry. Yeung and his father attempted to bring in a third brother in 1923, who was excluded after being unable to prove his relationship to his alleged family. Note how the immigration service used the exclusions of other family members to justify the exclusion in this case, bootstrapping on the earlier decisions. Whether the decision to deport Yeung rectified a previous mistake or created a new one cannot be deduced from the file. Moreover, because the amount of interrogation, investigation, and analysis were commensurate from Yeung’s first entry to his later deportation, it appears that the inspectors simply di√ered in their conclusions based on similar information. Yeung’s situation illustrates the broad discretion a√orded each o≈cer, as each preceding decision could be revisited by subsequent o≈cers. In contrast to legal proceedings, which a√ord the protection of res judicata so that parties are not forced to relitigate issues already decided during earlier legal proceedings, immigration proceedings are based on the premise that all prior proceedings may be reopened. Indeed, not only may each prior entry be re-examined, but every encounter with the immigration administration o√ers an opportunity to discover or create new information and new discrepancies with earlier entries, thereby justifying the reversal of previous decisions. In this way, each interaction that a Chinese immigrant had with the immigration service became part of a larger system of regulation. At one level, every encounter with the immigration service was placed within the larger context of one’s immigration history. Thus, Chinese immigrants had to construct their personal histories from one entry to another in a consistent fashion that a√orded no room for faulty memory, the recollection of new facts, or the desire to simply change one’s mind. The lived experience of one’s life became intractable and fixed, so that immigration history had the capacity to overshadow the fluidity and variability of personal history. At another level, the immigration service was able to convert the lived experiences of Chinese immigrants from personal histories into regulatory data to serve administrative needs. Not only were personal histories subsumed within a recorded immigration history, but these stories were converted into immigration data points—facts open to scrutiny, categorization, and analysis. The 76

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minutiae of one’s daily life not only became intractable, it became separable from the immigrant himself. The conversion of the personal to the abstract by the immigration service permitted the comparison of these newly disembodied facts to a generalized understanding of the Chinese that did not need to take into account individual circumstances or idiosyncrasies. However, that immigration o≈cers were endowed with a great amount of discretion did not always work against the Chinese immigrants. The files reveal a number of situations where the immigration service erred to an immigrant’s benefit. Lung Choy benefited from such an error when he was admitted in 1922.≤∑ At his entry, Lung Choy was detained for a Board of Special Inquiry because of discrepancies between his testimony and the testimony pro√ered by his father, Lung You. The board rejected his appeal and noted that, ‘‘It is a peculiar feature that all parties interested in any way in the cases of the [prior landed] alleged son or the present applicant, excepting the alleged father, belong to the Lam family and the alleged father seems to have no friends of his own in the Lung Family.’’ Despite the reasonableness of this logic as a basis for doubting the veracity of Lung Choy’s claim for admission, the board upheld his appeal and Lung Choy entered after three months of detention. In 1971, however, Lam Sing Kwong, also known as Lung Kow, confessed to having fraudulently entered the United States. Within his confession, found in his immigration file, Lam stated that his alleged paper father, Lung You, was, in reality, his true father, who had immigrated under a fictitious name. Although some of his alleged immigrant siblings were his real siblings, Lung Choy was not. Rather, Lung Choy was a fellow villager who, along with another paper brother, immigrated to the United States.

Truth Through Repetition and Routinization At the same time that the immigration files reveal an unusual reliance on administrative discretion in the handling of Chinese immigrants, they also reveal a tendency toward increased bureaucratization and the development of highly detailed interrogation procedures, investigative techniques, and systems for the administration of cumbersome entry procedures. Just as administrative discretion permitted unfettered decision making by immigration o≈cials and provided shortcuts where Chinese claims for entry could not be processed based on adherence to objective substantive reasons, the development of the arcane system of interrogation and the accompanying bureaucracy permitted the processing of the Chinese based on procedural justifications, thereby o√ering an alternative method to eschew thorny problems associated guardians of the gate

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with ascertaining truth or veracity. Faced with the need for generally applicable standards, the di≈culty of understanding the social and religious practices of the Chinese, and the inability to develop indicators to confirm the veracity of information, immigration o≈cers changed the interrogation procedure so they could use consistency as an indicator of truthfulness. In other words, where verification of the substantive information was impossible, the repetition of detailed questions and comparison of answers served instead to filter true from false. Inspectors tried to apply rules with some consistency across cases. For example, Lau On was initially denied re-entry to the United States. He claimed that his mother had departed from the Port of Portland during a period when there was no record keeping there. The examining inspector noted that there were many discrepancies in the testimony but felt that they were ‘‘immaterial.’’ Rather, the ‘‘main ground for denial [is] that while the departure of the alleged father is established by our records, that of the alleged mother via Portland at a time records of departure were not kept there, can not of course be verified.’’ The commissioner’s o≈ce overturned the denial, stating, ‘‘Personally I agree with the examining inspector that [the departure of the mother through Portland] raises grave doubts in the case, but the Department has held . . . that so long as we could not disprove a claim of this kind it must be accepted in favor of the applicant.’’≤∏ As in this instance, immigration o≈cers attempted to apply generalized rules even in situations where the outcome ran contrary to their personal assessment. Faced, then, with immigrants that were perceived as particularly cunning opponents and a general inability to test the veracity of information pro√ered, immigration o≈cers learned that adherence to procedural norms could o√er an alternative means of adjudicating entry. While o≈cers would continue to probe for the veracity of answers, they would, as well, rely on the consistency of responses to determine truthfulness. The coherence and uniformity of an immigrant’s answers would serve as a substitute indicator for honesty. To implement this alternative test based on consistency of responses, immigration o≈cers soon developed, through trial and error, an inquiry system that would check for constancy over time. Questioning became redundant, seeking to illicit any response from immigrants rather than the ‘‘correct’’ answer. They learned to ask particularly detailed questions repeatedly to test whether they would get the same answer over time, not only from the same immigrant but from witnesses. Thus, one inspector explicitly noted that ‘‘it was most important to get any answer from the witness so that it could be compared to other answers given.’’≤π Taking this one step further, inspectors learned that 78

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they could also cross-check information across entry files, thereby creating another level at which they could test the uniformity of responses. Exclusion interrogation and analysis therefore increasingly required the detailing of minute information and the painstakingly close readings of interviews and files to cross-reference the information gathered. Foucault has described this basic mechanism of modern state-building, premised on the generalized creation of surveillance powers. He notes, ‘‘People learned how to establish dossiers, systems of marking and classifying, the integrated accountancy of individual records. Certain procedures had of course already been utilised in the economy and taxation. But the permanent surveillance of a group of pupils or patients was a di√erent matter. And, at a certain moment in time, these methods began to become generalised.’’ The centrality of these practices to the modern state are so great that ‘‘should any part of the universal gaze slacken, the collapse of the State itself would be imminent.’’≤∫ The exacting detail and di≈culty of the entry examination was cause for much complaint by the Chinese. It was also recognized by third parties as unusually harsh. For example, when the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce and the Merchants Exchange were asked to provide an impartial assessment of the ‘‘matter of the admission of Chinese at the Port of San Francisco,’’ they agreed with the Chinese that the interrogation process was exceedingly di≈cult to pass: We found the examinations to be unreasonable, and to answer the questions correctly was an impossibility, and seeing that the applicants have to prove their own case (in criminal cases the prisoner is considered innocent until he is proven guilty—here he is considered guilty until he proves himself entitled to land)—their own evidence if taken literally and compared with the witnesses, would be su≈cient to exclude every man, woman and child from landing. For instance, the eight or ten year old son of a merchant is asked his grandmother’s maiden name on both father’s and mother’s side, the names of people living a block or two distant, their children’s names, age, sex, etc. Then the father, who has not been at home for years is asked to corroborate his son’s statement, which is simply impossible.≤Ω

Nevertheless, given the exigencies of the ‘‘Chinese situation,’’ the interrogation and lengthy inquiries continued as a practice. Indeed, the relationship of Chinese immigration flow to the ability for derivative citizens to gain entry to the United States was explicitly recognized by the Immigration Service as a reason to maintain their practices. For example, the inspector in the case of Yee Han commented that Yee Han, like most other Chinese, could make no guardians of the gate

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other claim for entry but citizenship. Thus, the immigration o≈cer recognized ironically that what was perceived as the Chinese cultural need to ‘‘leave progeny to worship at their graves,’’ which required a return to China to ‘‘secure a wife’’ and have children, provided both the need for illegal entry as well as the mechanism to enter illegally.≥≠ Immigration files became larger as investigations and interrogations became lengthier. Over time, the content of the stories that the immigration service required immigrants to remember became more elaborate. The files reveal the changes in the contours of the fictions that the Chinese were forced to create and re-create as the questioning became more detailed and more probing. A reading of the transcripts reveals that from 1885 to 1915 there is a noticeable shift in the sort of questioning being done. Before 1915, the questions concerned life in the United States at a very general level. Immigrants were required to identify persons who were familiar with them and provide information concerning these peoples’ occupations and addresses. They were asked to describe the places where they had lived and to identify their neighbors. However, after 1915, questioning became more detailed and focused more closely on life in China and on Chinese customs, whether in China or in the United States. Respondents were required to draw detailed maps of households, villages, and outlying areas, identify distant family members, and recall exact dates of marriages, births, and deaths. Moreover, they were expected to be able to describe family and religious rituals—the placement of altars, types of o√erings, and names of participants. The increasing detail and the systematization and routinization of questions can be seen as underlying goals of immigration regulators seeking to elicit responses from immigrants not only for truth, but for the consistency and uniformity of their responses. Moreover, inspectors consciously understood the need for interrogations to be consistent so that witnesses and applicants would provide testimony that could be compared. R. I. Davis, requesting the cooperation of an immigration inspector in South Dakota, sent an outline of the questions he wanted asked. While he acknowledged the need for flexibility in questioning, he explained that he sought the testimony to ‘‘parallel the hearing of the Applicant and another alleged brother at th[e San Francisco] Station.’’≥∞ When Chinese immigrants first became singled out for exclusion, customs o≈cers had only a rudimentary system in place. Most files from 1885 to 1894 are less than five pages. They include a photograph of the passenger and a landing document stating the date of arrival, the passenger’s name, his or her occupation, and the type of ‘‘certificate or paper’’ under which the person 80

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sought entry. A blank space on the form was used by customs o≈cials to write their decision concerning entry and any appeals. The customs o≈cers performed little investigation into passengers’ right to land. Instead, they mostly reviewed the partnership books of mercantile establishments. Passengers provided a≈davits as evidence to the collector of customs, and if they were laborers, they submitted a return certificate. Collectors barely analyzed this evidence. In the typical case from 1885, o≈cials made no real attempt to reconcile answers. Questions were asked just once. Almost all seven files of landed passengers concerned children of merchants. Only two passengers were over the age of eleven: Lew See entered with her two children as the wife of a merchant,≥≤ and Ah Foo entered as a merchant.≥≥ The collector of customs liberally granted entry to those who could prove a familial relationship to a person with mercantile status. Thus, Voo Choi, the sister of Voo Fook, who was the wife of a merchant, was permitted to enter upon proof of Voo Fook’s husband’s status as a merchant.≥∂ The 1895 file of seventeen-year-old Tom Moi reflects the continued brevity of inquiries ten years into the enforcement of exclusion.≥∑ The entire file consists of ten letter-size pages of the double-spaced transcribed record. The general nature of the questions asked and the failure of the Immigration Bureau to analyze the responses are also typical of the period. Tom Moi claimed to have been born in the United States, but had been living in China with her grandmother since she was three. At her entry hearing, both of her parents and two friends of the family served as her witnesses. Only one of the four witnesses—a family friend—correctly identified her. Tom Moi herself admitted that she couldn’t recognize her witnesses. She claimed to have letters from her parents but asserted that she had left them in China. The inspectors solicited personal details only from her mother, who had to describe the place where Tom Moi had been born. Customs o≈cials signed her landing documents without commentary, despite what appeared to be a lack of corroborating evidence. The sample from 1895 includes men and women claiming entry for a number of reasons—because they were natives, merchants, or wives of merchants. At entry, about six of the twenty cases were rejected, and the subjects were deported. In two cases the final disposition is unclear. Customs o≈cials landed seven passengers within this sample without any discussion, while the rest had some notations. As with Tom Moi’s case, the files reflect the rudimentary development of the immigration processing system. The files are inconsistent in the type of evidence taken and the analysis of the evidence. guardians of the gate

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Some files have clear statements of reasoning, while at other times they are confusing and it is di≈cult to even ascertain to whom they pertain and who was conducting the investigation. Often there is no explanation as to how the final decision to deport the passenger was reached. Compare the cases of Wong Sui Hong and Jew Ah Tai, who were both excluded. Wong Sui Hong’s file contains handwritten notes taken during the investigation of her admissions case, the a≈davits of four witnesses, and a typed transcript of the interview of Wong Sui Hong.≥∏ At the bottom of the transcript the inspector, Mr. Harrison, wrote: This case appears to be a fraud for the following reasons. When the girl registered, [and left the United States] . . . she took no papers. [The o≈cer] took a description of her and none of the marks described can be found on the girl in the st’n [station]. The certificate has erasures on it and the photo appears to have been recently pasted on. I think the certificate was given to the girl after her arrival here as no ticket no. appears thereon. If she has had it when she started the steamship people would have marked a number on it—This for the Collector’s information.≥π

Attached to the file is a letter from the deputy collector and two supporting a≈davits. In the letter, the deputy states further reasons for exclusion, namely that the two witnesses who had signed Wong Sui Hong’s return certificate when she departed one year earlier now testified that the girl seeking admission to the United States was not the person for whom they had signed the certificate—that she neither looked like the girl who left a year earlier nor could she speak English, while Wong Sui Hong could speak some. Finally, the file contains a notation that the girl seeking admission as Wong Sui Hong ultimately confessed to being a fraud and was deported. In comparison, the case of Jew Ah Tai, who arrived on November 29, 1895, and was excluded for no stated reason, exemplifies the range of record keeping. The file shows a lack of articulated procedures and decision-making guidelines during this period, as the reasons for Jew Ah Tai’s exclusion are undisclosed in his file. Jew Ah Tai’s file contains a photograph of an unidentified woman, a summary of the passenger’s interview, the transcripts of three interviews, and a laborer’s certificate issued to the passenger on which it is noted that it was canceled. The passenger jacket contains a notation stating, ‘‘if an appeal is taken in this case, notify Collector as we have evidence su≈cient to send him back.’’ Underneath this statement is the notation, ‘‘returned to China, per Stm, ‘Coptic’ Jany 28- ‘96, Lynch.’’ The one-paragraph summary of the passenger interview identifies the pas82

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senger as Jew Ah Tie (note the changed spelling), male, and sixteen years of age. It states that the passenger was born ‘‘at 730 Sacramento Street, over the firm of Quong Wah Ching & Co.’’ In addition it states that his father is a merchant and his mother lives with his father. His sister, Jen Ah Fung, is fifteen and lives with his parents. Finally, it states that he left for China on the S.S. Tokio on August 13, 1893. As part of the same investigation, an unidentified person interviewed two witnesses. The interview of Mr. Brown centered on his knowledge of Jew Ah Ock, the passenger’s alleged father. Mr. Brown contended that he knew Jew Ah Ock, doing business with him in Oakland, but that he knew nothing about ‘‘Jew Ack’s family.’’ At the bottom of his interview there is a handwritten notation stating, ‘‘For the Collector’s information— will say that above witness is known to Mr. Lynch to be a man in whose statements . . . little faith could be placed.’’ In addition, the manager of the store where the passenger’s father was supposed to have had a share was interviewed. The manager claimed that Jew Ah Ock was ‘‘his brother’’ and that they jointly held their partnership interest in the store in the manager’s name. He was asked various questions about his brother’s family—where they lived, the last time he saw them, and whether he had seen the children. The file of Jew Ah Tai exemplifies the brevity of the investigation characteristic of many files, despite the amount of time that the passenger was held (in this case nearly two months). In addition, as noted earlier, it highlights the lack of reasoning for the collector’s decision, only hinting at ‘‘evidence’’ in the collector’s possession that is dispositive. It appears that the thoroughness of the investigation and analysis depended on who was assigned to the case rather than by any fixed standards. Another file, that of Lew Fook reflects the amount of discretion a√orded to the investigator.≥∫ Lew Fook claimed to be a native of Los Angeles and provided four a≈davits—three of them from white people—in support of his entry. Nevertheless, the investigator recommended denial because ‘‘among the oldest Chinese residents not one remembered the death of the wife of Lew Fong Ark (the applicant’s alleged father)—and I have asked, at least, twenty— and only two know the likeness of the boy and those two are the only ones who knew his father. They do not remember his wife’s death nor know where [the father] is at the present time.’’ The investigator went on to note that they should have remembered the deaths of the mother and boy if they had performed the ceremony at her death. After speaking with the white witnesses, the investigator concluded that he did not trust them as they positively recognized and identified the applicant’s photograph as a person whom they were well acquainted with and who had been a ‘‘purchaser of exchange and kept an guardians of the gate

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account at the bank,’’ which he did not think likely since the applicant is ‘‘only twenty.’’ Finally, he stated that he did not bother to speak to the last witness, as ‘‘I should not take stock in his evidence if I had it.’’ Lew Fook was deported without comment. The lack of procedure and the failure to articulate the collector’s reasoning is even more evident in cases where the passenger was landed. Indeed, a review of those files reveals that passengers were landed even where there was inconsistent testimony and a failure to require any positive evidence or to analyze the evidence provided. The file of Lee You Sung, who arrived on November 29, 1895, and was landed on January 14, 1896, demonstrates these characteristics of the 1895 files.≥Ω The passenger jacket contains no notations except that Lee You Sung was transferred to the Shed for holding on December 10, 1895 and that he was landed on January 14, 1896. Four interviews were conducted, and a comparison of the information reveals highly inconsistent testimony. For example, Lee You Sung testified that he had returned to China with his father, who continued to reside in China, while his mother had died in San Francisco. In contrast, the customhouse broker, C. E. Heise, testified that the ‘‘old man went away and died and the boy was sent to China to be educated with his mother I think.’’ Moreover, Heise admitted that he could not identify Lee You Sung, though he believed that this was the same boy who had left, because one of his customers had told him that the boy was coming back and ‘‘I have every reason to believe him.’’ Handwritten on the back of the typed interview is a supplemental statement in which Heise corrected his previous interview and noted that he believed that the father was still alive and in China. In addition to the interviews, a note from William Madden, a local attorney, is attached to the file. In the note, Mr. Madden provided no evidence to support Lee You Sung’s landing, but merely stated, ‘‘I sincerely trust you will see fit to land this Chinaman. I am firmly convinced from my personal investigation of the facts of this case that the applicant is under the law entitled to land.’’ The case of Hoo Sing is a further example.∂≠ In the file there is a memo from W. Boyce, Chinese inspector, noting that the statements of Hoo Sue and Hoo Lung Suey, taken on behalf of this applicant, do not correspond. Indeed, one states that Hoo Sing was an only child, while the other states that he had an older brother named Hoo Wai. Despite this discrepancy and lack of further evidence concerning this matter, Hoo Sing was landed without further comment. Finally, the case file of Lee Wah Yew is even more sparse.∂∞ Although the case was finally decided on writ of habeas corpus, and Lee Wah Yew was landed, there is no commentary at all in the file as to why the applicant was 84

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deferred, denied admission, and then landed upon appeal. The file consists of the transcript of Lee Wah Yew’s interview, at the bottom of which is typed ‘‘Defer.’’ In addition, there is a copy of the motion for habeas corpus and a copy of the judge’s order to land the applicant. This is not to say that all admissions were summarily granted without explanation. As with the applicants who were excluded, the files are inconsistent. For example, the file of Hoo Foo contains a thorough investigation and further highlights the limits of the procedures available to customs o≈cials at the time.∂≤ Hoo Foo sought entry as a native. His uncle, a merchant in Placerville, vouched for his entry and promised support. The investigator suspected Hoo Foo of fraud because he had no papers and deferred his entry. Not having any investigators in Placerville, the investigator wrote to the postmaster of Placerville, forwarding the file and requesting that the postmaster conduct an investigation concerning Hoo Foo. The postmaster responded with a summary of over a dozen interviews he had conducted and the a≈davits of witnesses—both white and Chinese—who attested to the character of the uncle and to whether Hoo Foo had been born in Placerville. Upon receipt of the letter, Hoo Foo was photographed, registered, and released. Not only were immigration procedures unclear during this period, but Chinese were still not barred from seeking judicial review which, as noted earlier, permitted yet another standard to be applied. The ‘‘habeas corpus mill’’ permitted the entry of many more Chinese because the courts and the Collections House maintained di√erent standards.∂≥ For example, Yep Kim Tom was admitted after filing a motion for habeas corpus. The district court ruled that he should land because a comparison of photos and an investigation did not reveal any ‘‘contrary evidence.’’∂∂ The government appears to have recognized the apparent chaos of standards and policies. By 1905, codification of the regulations pertaining to Chinese exclusion described the proper procedure for the examination, hearing, and appeal. According to Rule 6, The examination . . . should be separate and apart from the public, in the presence of Government o≈cials and such witness or witnesses only as the examining o≈cer shall designate, and if, upon the conclusion thereof, the Chinese applicant for admission is adjudged to be inadmissible, he should be advised of his right of appeal and his counsel should be permitted after duly filing notice of appeal, to examine, but not make copies of, the evidence upon which the exclusion decision is based.∂∑

And, according to Rule 7, guardians of the gate

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The burden of proof in all cases rests upon Chinese persons claming the right of admission to or residence within, the United States, to establish such right a≈rmatively and satisfactorily to the appropriate government o≈cers and in no case in which the law prescribes the nature of the evidence to establish such right shall of the evidence be accepted in lieu thereof, and in every doubtful case the benefit of the doubt shall be given by administrative o≈cers to the United States government.∂∏

A random selection of cases from 1905 shows that the most common ground for entry was the nativity of the applicants, who were all male. In most cases the immigration o≈cers agreed that the applicant had spent time in the United States, and entry hinged on evidence that he had, in fact, been born, and therefore resided, in the United States. Inspectors used the ability of the applicant to speak English as one indicator of nativity. Failure to speak English was held as evidence that the applicant had not really lived in the United States. On the other hand, the ability to speak English did not prove nativity. It was a necessary, though not su≈cient, point of evidence; the ability to speak English did not prove birth in the United States, but only that the applicant had spent time in the United States. Thus, Ng Pon was deported although ‘‘the applicant speaks fair English, also writes it and understands it, and undoubtedly has been in the United States for some time.’’∂π Applicants also were required to account for the details of their birth in the United States and to provide evidence as to where their parents were. The inspectors routinely held that ‘‘in order to establish even in a prima facie manner his native birth, a Chinese must produce positive evidence of his having had parents in the United States.’’∂∫ Where an applicant did not produce his parents as witnesses, he had to account for their death by providing a death certificate or ‘‘bone book’’ or the present location of his parents. Inspectors also demanded that applicants provide names of people who knew them or their parents and family in the United States. Failure to produce any names was looked upon with suspicion. These ‘‘friends’’ were required to come forward as witnesses and to have some intimate knowledge of the applicant. Support from witnesses, particularly white witnesses, sped the process along, despite failure to provide other evidence in support of the applicant. In the case of Yee Kim, letters from the postmaster, an immigration o≈cer, and three other white witnesses supporting his re-entry facilitated his return.∂Ω He was landed within two days of arrival despite the fact that none of the letters of support really addressed any of the factual issues required in other cases to prove his birth in the United States. As one letter supporting his re-entry 86

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written at the time of his exit stated, ‘‘There is not one of the witnesses whose names are on his papers who know that Yee Kim was born in the United States. . . . I believe that they said Yee Kim was born in San Francisco and would respectfully recommend that he be allowed to land upon his return.’’∑≠ Inspectors’ questions centered around births, deaths, and descriptions of family members. Applicants were invariably asked if they had been taught in English or Chinese and where they had received schooling. Locations of businesses and descriptions of the layout of certain buildings were often requested. In one case, over half the questions pertained to this one issue (approximately ten of the twenty-two pages of single-spaced testimony), and grounds for detention revolved around the description of a ladder and staircase in the building where the applicant’s family lived and had a store.∑∞ The applicant and his witnesses were repeatedly questioned about the means through which one could enter the third floor of the building and repeatedly asked to describe the layout of each floor in the building. The referee stated, ‘‘If he lived there from the time he was born until he was twenty years of age, he ought to know [the layout of the second floor]; he ought to know every mouse hole in that store.’’∑≤ In the end, the applicant and his witnesses agreed that the third floor served both to store goods and as a living space, but they disagreed on the layout and the number of windows in the third floor of the building. According to the interpreter, ‘‘Here is the third floor of this man’s drawing, and here is the third floor story of the other man’s. He makes the room to be just a small corner, while the other man makes it to have four windows. According to this drawing there is only a wall, the fact is there is no window at all to the room, but there is window right close to the room, which would throw light in.’’∑≥ The case was remanded based on this inconsistent testimony. As it turned out, the applicant was landed when he produced six other witnesses, who testified to other issues about the applicant but did not address the layout of the building. Compared to the summary decisions in prior years, the inquiry had become more elaborate by 1905, and inspectors submitted investigative reports in which a comparison was made of testimony, which was still brief without much detail asked. In addition, immigrants were often denied entry petition for habeas corpus with some frequency. The file of Gee Tie Dig is typical: it consists of eight legal-size pages with the single-spaced transcript of the hearings, along with four letters to the collector of customs concerning the inspectors’ findings, summarizing the testimony and their conclusions. Gee Tie Dig sought admission as a native, and he presented two a≈davits. The inspectors contended in their letters that they found the a≈davits to be lackguardians of the gate

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ing in facts and details, thereby making it necessary to ‘‘conduct the investigation of the case with great care.’’ The letters go on to lay out a number of inconsistencies in the statements pro√ered at the entry hearing: Gee incorrectly stated that his uncle had three children, while his uncle testified he had only two; Gee contended that he met with another witness in China on numerous occasions, while the witness asserted that they met only once. The inspectors thought it highly unlikely that a native of the United States would leave his homeland and not seek to return for eleven years. Finally, they attached a coaching letter found on Gee when he was searched on the boat, and a translation of the letter. The inspectors concluded, ‘‘Were it not for this coaching it is unquestionably true that the discrepancies between the statements of the applicants and the witnesses would have been far more important than those I have noted.’’ Gee filed a motion for habeas corpus following the inspectors’ denial. He withdrew the appeal, however, a few days later and was deported on the next ship to China. Chinese immigration was processed by the customs house collector’s office during this period. ‘‘Chinese passengers,’’ as they were called, were issued certificates of identification upon arrival, which were stamped with the date of arrival and name of the vessel. Customs o≈cials wrote notations on this jacket, although the use of stamps ordering the landing of the passenger and certifying that the passenger had been landed were also used. The notations on the jackets were working notes and are di≈cult to decipher. For example, on the jacket of Mar Sear Lock’s certificate are the following notations: ‘‘Born at 727 Clay Street,’’ ‘‘29 in 95,’’ ‘‘Denied by coll March 23rd 95,’’ ‘‘SEND FOR LYNCH,’’ ‘‘Photo in Court records does not compare favorably Lynch,’’ ‘‘Regtd O.K. Lynch.’’ Investigator Lynch’s notes, which make up the bulk of the file, show that an investigation revealed that the location where Mar Sear Lock was said to have been born and resided did not house any Chinese. It appears that Mar Sear Lock filed a motion for habeas corpus, though the outcome of the appeal, and consequently this application for admission, are not noted in the file. By 1915, the Chinese Bureau had been consolidated with the Immigration Service under the Department of Commerce and Labor and had implemented forms with set questions that each immigrant had to answer. The forms asked for a general physical description, a history of registration or other admission to the United States, and a list of all papers supporting the applicant’s ‘‘right to be and remain in the United States.’’ The Immigration Service carried out investigations on the applicants, cross-checking information given for immigration purposes with other records kept by the government. For example, 88

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one admittee claimed entry as a merchant and provided two witnesses from the store. The inspector not only questioned both witnesses as to what job the admittee performed and the amount of money he had invested in the shop, but also compared the partnership lists on file at the Department of Commerce and Labor and inspected the shop itself to make certain that it was a ‘‘mercantile establishment, with no apparent prohibitive features.’’∑∂ All members of the sample taken from 1915–24 were male. The majority sought entry through derivative claims—either as sons of merchants (eight) or as sons of natives (nine). While they ranged in age from fourteen to forty-two, thirteen were between the ages of fifteen to twenty. Thirteen applicants appealed their denials, of whom four withdrew their appeals after filing and were deported. Overall, sixteen of the twenty applicants were denied entry. The majority of denials were based on inconsistent testimony during the current entry, though, in five cases, files from other family members were compared as part of the investigation. The applicant and his witnesses were required to remember an astonishing level of detail concerning their family, friends and neighbors, the family home, surrounding environment, and events which the inspectors felt were relevant to the applicant’s history. Applicants had to recall personal information for every extended family member. They were asked the last time they had seen each person, where they were now, and what they were doing. The applicant and his witnesses also were asked where the family drew its water for domestic use, whether there were other sources of water, and where the nearest market was located. The names and occupations of the applicants’ neighbors and details concerning their lives were also asked. In addition, medical and physical evidence was central to the decision in at least four cases. Inspectors spoke explicitly about the resemblance between family members—most notably between the father and the applicant, though also between the applicant and his brother, in certain cases. Questions concerning the applicant’s age were key to denial in two cases. By the 1920s, not only were the various forms completely developed, but coordination between immigration o≈ces and the exchange of information were readily apparent through the requests and exchanges of files. Interviews were lengthy, with questions repeated sometimes three or four times throughout an interview, and witnesses were often called back to give more testimony or to respond to questions previously answered. The 1925 files included an ‘‘Inspector’s Abstract of Record and Report’’ for those entering as ‘‘son of American Native or Minor Son of Exempt Chinese.’’ The form summarizes the types of indicators used. Identifying information included the ‘‘record name’’ guardians of the gate

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of the applicant, aliases, passenger number, vessel name, date of arrival, and destination. The father’s name and aliases and the nativity of the father were required, as well as personal information about the father, including: Is the Father’s American nativity established? Is exempt status of father established? Is essential trip verified? How many children and sexes? When did father first enter U.S.? How many trips made to China since? When did he return from last trip? Did he mention applicant at time of last return and other trips? Is there prior-landed brother? When landed? Did he mention applicant at that time? Where is mother? How many wives has father?

In addition, inspectors assessed the physical appearance of the applicant and his alleged family: Is there resemblance between alleged father and applicant? Is there resemblance between applicant and prior-landed brother? Is there resemblance between prior-landed brother and father?

Information about other witnesses was also required: Is other prior-landed brother now with father and what is his occupation? Name of supporting witness? When (was this supporting witness) last in China? What was the demeanor of all the witnesses during examination? Are any of them substantially discredited before this o≈ce?

Finally, the inspector was asked to make a recommendation and provide justifications for his decision using the following formula: Does testimony disclose any discrepancy on essential points of case? Do you believe relationship as alleged exists? If not, is your adverse opinion based upon the discrepancies in testimony? If your opinion is adverse to relationship claims made, would it be otherwise if you disregarded the discrepancies in testimony? Special features of case?

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Inspectors did not uniformly use this form. Although this form was found in the file of Wong Loy, it was not found in the majority of cases sampled.∑∑ All applicants reviewed from the files from the 1920s were male and claimed derivative entry as sons of natives (eleven) or sons of merchants (nine). Six applicants who claimed entry as sons of merchants were admitted, while only four who claimed entry as sons of natives were permitted to stay. Strangely, there were three sets of twins in this sample. The age of applicants ranged from ten to twenty-six, though most were between eighteen and twenty-one. The principal reason for denial was inconsistencies in the interrogations. Nevertheless, there is little consistency in the files regarding the value of the information. Some inconsistencies were explained. For example, in the entry of Fong How, investigation in Vacaville revealed inconsistencies between the father’s testimony and that of the applicants.∑∏ In any event, the immigration o≈cer admitted Fong How. In the case of Chew Wing, whose father’s file could not be found to prove his father’s claim of U.S. citizenship, the immigration o≈cer chose to ignore the omission.∑π Although files from the previous period showed inconsistent use of the ‘‘required’’ forms and questions developed, by the final period of Chinese exclusion, from 1935 to 1943, the files reveal the complexity of the immigration bureaucracy that had been developed in the intervening years including the routinization of detailed questioning, the drawing of maps, and the retrieval of files from other o≈ces and entries. Thus, answers used in one family member’s entry would quickly be cross-checked against the current information. Indeed, in at least two cases the verification of information in other files was central to the admission decision. And, in the case of Toy Doon Toi, information was taken that could be used to exclude other family members in the future.∑∫ Finally, a self-conscious concern for correcting discrepancies from past entries can be seen. Immigration o≈cers still admitted Lum Som, but they corrected his status from merchant to laborer.∑Ω While the files appear more uniform and the investigation and interrogation more consistent, there was still room for issues idiosyncratic to the particular immigrant to be introduced and taken into account. This balance was key to maintaining the system as the range of applicants broadened. Five of the applicants in this sample were women; two of them sought entry for temporary visits, one as a student and the other as a traveler. All were admitted. Of the male applicants, the majority still sought entry through their derivative relationship—nine as sons of natives and two as sons of merchants. The ages of the immigrants ranged from nine to fifty-two, though the greatest number were teenagers (eight). In three cases, the applicants had entered the guardians of the gate

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United States at least once before this entry. Overall, fifteen were permitted to enter, five following appeal (with two denials upon appeal). In recognition of the particular circumstances of individual immigrants, nine-year-old Hom Lee Min was admitted after his mother committed suicide in detention, despite the fact that investigations and interrogations were pending.∏≠ Similarly, immigration inspectors took under consideration Gee Ngue Sing’s petition to be released on bond because she was su√ering complications due to her pregnancy, was soon to give birth, and was unable to care for her ten-year-old daughter, who was also detained.∏∞ Nonetheless, the o≈cers did not forget that their primary duty was to enforce exclusion, and interrogations were clearly conducted to trip up the applicants, as is evidenced by both the manner in which questions were asked and the types of questions asked. Inspectors interspersed questions on unrelated topics within the interrogation, as if to catch applicants unawares. For example, during the special hearing for Soo Hoo Tung Lam who sought admission in 1935 as the son of a native, the inspector during the B.S.I. hearing asked, Q.

Have you ever been in NGON WOO VILLAGE?

A.

Yes.

Q.

How far is it from your native village?

A.

About 1 li.

Q.

When were you last in the NGON WOO VILLAGE?

A.

In the first part of this year.

Q.

Why did you go there then?

A.

I went there for a visit sometimes.

Q.

Did your parents ever adopt a child?

A.

No.

Q.

What schooling have you had?

A.

A little over three years.

Q.

What schools or school have you attended?

A.

I have attended only the FOOT GOK SCHOOL near CHUCK HOM MARKET.∏≤

Not only did inspectors ask questions randomly, jumping from topic to topic, but they would ask seemingly rhetorical questions to create an atmosphere of

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fear. For example, Soo Hoo Tung Lam was asked, following a series of questions regarding the birth dates of his brothers, Q.

Did you make a special e√ort to memorize those dates?

A.

No

And then, Q.

Are you really older than the age you claim to be?

A.

No.

Finally, certain questions appeared to be especially arcane. Returning to Soo Hoo Tung Lam’s interview, the inspector asked, Q.

I didn’t ask you how the smoke escaped from the stove in your house, when covering the description of your dwelling in China. Will you state now how the smoke escapes from the stoves?

A.

Through the doorways.

The interrogation process became more elaborate and complete to allow inquiry between immigration o≈ces and between entries for the individual and their family members. Thus, in Louie Wah’s entry in 1939, with inspectors following procedures in use after 1910, the inspectors requested twelve other files for comparison. The transcript of the entry interrogation for this applicant is thirty-three single-spaced typed pages and includes photographs of various alleged family members. Both Louie Wah and the Immigration Bureau relied on medical testing and expert opinions concerning his age. The questions asked of Louie Wah and his witnesses further reflect changes in immigration processing. The questioning in Louie Wah’s file was detailed and focused more closely on life in China and Chinese customs in China or in the United States. For example, Louie Wah and all of his witnesses were asked questions concerning the school he attended: ‘‘What schooling had this applicant had?’’ ‘‘In what kind of building was the school held?’’ ‘‘Where is the school located?’’ ‘‘What space and row was the building in?’’ ‘‘Where was the school in relation to the social hall?’’ Similarly detailed and probing questions were asked concerning other family members, childhood illnesses, religious practices, and the family village in China. After nine months of detention, Louie Wah was deported. Addressing the reasons for this decision, the inspectors placed on record three typed single-spaced pages outlining inconsistencies in the testimony and discussing at length the medical evidence. Overall, then, the immigration processing system had matured to allow both for rou-

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tinized and consistent questioning, and the use of discretion and personalized questioning, always with the goal of exclusion.

Any One of a Thousand Chinamen The determination of the truthfulness of immigrant claims and, thus, the interrogation process served as the centerpiece of the admissions process, but o≈cials used alternative methods to exclude Chinese and were faced with other pressing concerns. Medical examinations, therefore, became another arena in which entry was contested and determined. On the one hand, use of ‘‘science’’ permitted immigration o≈cials to dispatch, without much contestation, a fair number of Chinese. On the other, a fundamental issue that remained throughout, regardless of the development of the interrogation system, was the need to connect the correct physical body or person to the documents or testimony gathered. While the interrogation process could facilitate a determination of truthfulness, it could not determine conclusively whether the immigrant was really the person who should be making these claims or had made these claims in the past. The bodies of Chinese immigrants, then, became another site where immigrant claims for entry were contested and negotiated. From the inception of restrictivist legislation, qualitative categories also permitted the exclusion of would-be immigrants (paupers, prostitutes, etc.) even within generally admissible categories. Promulgated for the protection of the local population, these categories included a range of medical criteria for which persons su√ering from a ‘‘loathsome or dangerous contagious disease’’ could be excluded. With the expansion of the list of diseases and physical ailments, immigration processing was in some ways also medicalized. Chinese immigrants were inspected for infectious and parasitic diseases considered prevalent in Asia, including trachoma, hookworm, bubonic and pneumonic plague, threadworm, and liverfluke. They were checked for sexually transmitted diseases, tuberculosis, and chronic physical ailments such as hernias, varicose veins, and mental disorders. Howard Markel and Alexandra Stern have noted that the di√erential application of medical examinations and rates of rejection of those su√ering from trachoma, an infectious eye disease, reflect a facially neutral, racially based means of exclusion. Although trachoma was typically associated with Eastern and Southern European immigrants during the first decade of the twentieth century, at least one-third of all Chinese debarred from entry into the United States were also

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certified with this diagnosis. Even more telling, however, is the fact that of the approximately sixty thousand Chinese who passed through Angel Island during this period, close to ten thousand were deported. This rate, roughly 17 percent, is at least five times as great as the 1 to 3 percent noted at Ellis Island. Moreover, although the Chinese were never more than 1 percent of the nation’s immigrant population during these years, [1891 to 1928], they made up more than 4 percent of the number of immigrants deported each year.∏≥

All Chinese immigrants at Angel Island were subjected to the more uncomfortable examinations that only steerage passengers from other groups had to undergo. Medical inspectors were also less conscientious about taking sanitary precautions or sterilizing medical equipment when dealing with Chinese than with other immigrant groups. While immigrants who were rejected or detained on the basis of medical categories had little room for contestation, the Chinese also fought for their entry in this arena by contesting physical identification. Inspectors struggled to develop an accurate system to physically identify individual Chinese. As the collector of customs described the process, ‘‘When a Chinese makes application at the Registration o≈ce for a certificate, his height is measured, his scars and marks, if any, noted, and his general features described but notwithstanding these precautions there is by reason of the great similarity of Chinese, in color of skin, eyes, hair and style of their features great di≈culty experienced in identifying them, and every means of identification which can be procured, are therefore required to prevent fraud and substitution.’’∏∂ Within a short time, regulators acutely felt the need to find a sure method of identification: ‘‘Frauds had become so constant and extensive in connection with the landing of Chinese laborers in this country, especially by substituting for laborers who had been registered in this country, and after departing on a visit to their native land had either died or determined to remain permanently abroad, other Chinese of similar appearance who had never been in the United States.’’∏∑ Indeed, with the requirement of each document by immigration inspectors— return certificate, merchant certificate, U.S. passport—the opportunity for fraud was created, rather than thwarted. To give meaning to the variety of documents required, regulators experimented with available technologies to help identify individual Chinese. Four methods were considered: (1) the use of fingerprints; (2) the taking of photographs; (3) the Bertillon system of identification; and (4) the notation of the physical description of each immigrant. Although the implementation of an identification policy nationwide required the approval of administrators in

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Washington, D.C., the process through which techniques were tested relied on the trial and error of local regulators and the suggestions gleaned from their experiences. Because there were always certain classes of Chinese immigrants who were entitled to enter and, consequently, who were not to be harassed by o≈cials at their time of entry, it was a logistical challenge to devise a system in which those entitled to enter could be swiftly and accurately identified while barring entry to all others. To facilitate this process, o≈cials issued return certificates to each Chinese leaving the United States that would allow him or her to re-enter. Each certificate identified the holder by name, age, height, and a description of ‘‘physical marks and peculiarities.’’ O≈cials began to track the identity of immigrants by taking short physical descriptions based on their visual assessment in order to determine whether an immigrant was a former resident or a member of the exempt class and thus entitled to enter the United States. The problem, according to a 1997 study, as Burris, Cole, and Lui describe in their article ‘‘ ‘Better than a Photograph’: Thumb Print Identification and the Enforcement of the Chinese Exclusion Acts,’’ was that, ‘‘with the brief physical descriptions of the holder of the certificate, o≈cials could not guarantee that possession of the certificates could not somehow be transferred. The problem remained how to link the certificate permanently to the individual body. Without such a guarantee, the entire system could be circumvented through thievery and fraud.’’∏∏ They describe how customs o≈cials became increasingly frustrated with the system, which provided them with only one short line to write a description, and no guidelines on the criteria for significant marks or peculiarities. And while o≈cials in one location might agree to focus on certain traits, regulators had to process certificates issued nationwide. Burris, Cole, and Lui quote one o≈cial complaining that, ‘‘the descriptions of the Chinese are very vague, and it is almost impossible for this o≈ce to tell with any degree of certainty whether the Chinese who hold the certificates are the persons described therein. Mole on left wrist . . . [is a] rather indefinite means of identification.’’∏π While customs o≈cials found their task increasingly di≈cult to perform, the public clamored for better enforcement and lamented the poverty of technologies available. The San Francisco Daily Report commented, The general description of the Chinese is something as follows: Name, Ah Gow; 5 feet 2 ∞⁄≤ inches; complexion, brown; hair, black; distinguishing marks, slightly pock-marked; mole on left side of chin. Any one of a thou-

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sand Chinamen will answer this description. If the mole is absent, it is explained that it was removed in China by a process which left no scar. The ordinary certificate description would perhaps debar one man in ten thousand, but it would describe the other nine thousand and nine hundred and ninety-nine. . . . Photographs o√ered no better methods of identification. Of the ordinary Chinese in American eyes, the portrait of one will pass with little question for that of another. Some more marked characteristic is needed for identification.∏∫

Because physical descriptions and photographs relied on the visual assessment of regulators, these systems seemed prone to manipulation and fraud by both the Chinese and regulators themselves, who profited from the sale of certificates.∏Ω Regulators therefore began to consider the implementation of more ‘‘scientific’’ methods to improve identification practices for enforcement. Two systems were of particular interest—the Bertillon system and fingerprinting. The Bertillon system was developed in the 1880s in France by Alphonse Bertillon as a system of criminal identification. The system is based on twelve anthropomorphic measures including head length and breadth, eye color, ear length and breadth, and torso length. When combined, these measurements can yield a million possible combinations, which can further be increased by adding more measurements. By 1883, the French state began using the Bertillon system, which was widely applied in institutional settings where measurements could be coded on cards and copied for use in other settings. In the United States, its adaptation to the Chinese situation called for the use of three instruments: (1) A large pair of straight calipers, for taking forearm and foot measurements, being a similar instrument to that used in all shoe stores for measuring the feet of customers; (2) a small pair of straight calipers, similar to the above, used for measuring fingers and ears; and (3) a pair of curved calipers, used for taking the measurements (diameter) of the head. The height of laborers, measured for purposes of identification, is taken by means of an ordinary mural board, with a sliding pointer, similar to the device now used by medical examiners in life insurance o≈ces. A stool of fixed height on which the subject sits against the mural board while his trunk measure is indicated by drawing the sliding pointer down close to the top of his head; a stand on which the subject rests his arm while the forearm measure is taken with the large calipers, and a stool of proper size, on which he rests his foot while it is being measures with large calipers.π≠ guardians of the gate

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Chinese complained about the application of the Bertillon system stating, ‘‘our people have been insulted, detained, imprisoned and outraged by third degree inquisitorial methods and barbarous doctor’s examinations.’’π∞ At the same time, others were independently studying an alternative identification system based on thumb prints. Interestingly, the use of thumb prints as an administrative tool dated back to China as far back as the Chou or Han dynasties. The idea was picked up most notably by two Britons, William Herschel, a colonial administrator in Bengal, and Henry Faulds, a physician in Japan, both of whom were faced with situations similar to that of immigration regulators—namely how to distinguish and identify individuals who appeared indistinguishable upon visual inspection. San Francisco Detective Henry N. Morse introduced fingerprinting as a possible immigration regulatory technology during the early 1880s. Although the commissioner of customs, H. B. James, dismissed the suggestion, other regulators recognized its potential. Thus in 1885, Franklin Lawton, the superintendent of the San Francisco Mint, suggested that thumb prints be photographed. Lawton went so far as to recruit a San Francisco landscape photographer to develop a fingerprinting technique, and newspaper articles began to appear with claims such as, ‘‘the thumb marks of Mong Shing, a Chinese laundryman, are more easily recognizable than his face.’’π≤ Concurrently, Special Agent Spaulding was sent to San Francisco to investigate charges of fraudulent use of certificates. He suggested that there be more space on the blank forms for noting physical descriptions and that further experiments with thumb marks be undertaken. Despite the apparent interest in thumbprinting by local administrators, the technique was never adopted. Burris, Cole, and Lui speculate that 1888 legislation barring the entry of all laborers regardless of prior residency rendered the identification issue moot for immigration purposes.π≥ Nevertheless, concern over physical identification persisted, and their inability to settle on a single technique led administrators to shift among several. The Commissioner-General determined in his 1902 annual report, In closing this report I desire to express my conviction of the importance to an e≈cient administration of the laws, particularly those in relation to the exclusion of Chinese, of adopting the best available method of securing such a physical record of every alien found to be admissible to the United State as will enable administrative o≈cers to identify such alien should he seek access thereto after rejection. Such record, it is believed can be secured by the adoption of what is known as the ‘‘Bertillon system’’ of identification,

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and I accordingly urge that appropriate steps be taken to secure the use of that system at the earliest practicable date.π∂

But, without further commentary, in 1906, regulators returned to the ‘‘former system of identifying by means of photographs and taking a note of the height and general personal description of Chinese laborers.’’π∑ While the consistent identification over time of individuals was a central concern, regulators also struggled to determine basic characteristics of the immigrants. First, because Chinese were the only group excluded, determining who would be considered Chinese was a basic question that regulators had to answer. The files reveal that o≈cers were equipped with the latest methods for determining race based on contemporary physical anthropological classification schemes. During the period of Chinese exclusion, race was commonly understood to be based on physical di√erences, of which color was but one self-evident marker. Physical anthropologists sought to treat race as a biological concept that could be ascertained through the development of scientific classifications. Simultaneously, race was also seen as cultural, and racial groups could be identified based on common language, customs, and experience. Overlaying these concepts was a hierarchical understanding of race based on Darwinian notions of ‘‘survival of the fittest’’ and, at the turn of the century, on eugenics, with its concepts of ‘‘inferior’’ and ‘‘superior’’ races. Turning these concepts into practice, index cards marked ‘‘Chinese’’ provided brief descriptions that helped inspectors make determinations among Polynesians, Hawaiians, and Mongolians. For example, while a Polynesian’s nose was ‘‘well shaped and arched’’ and he had a ‘‘yellowish brown, smooth body,’’ a Hawaiian’s nose was ‘‘somewhat flattened’’ and his skin was ‘‘dark brown.’’ Those of Mongolian descent were ‘‘practically universal brachycephaly, while Caucasians were mesaticephaly.’’π∏ As discussed above, the correct assessment of an immigrant’s age was often key to the entry decision. Age often determined whether paternity was possible, since the age of the immigrant had to match with the dates of the alleged father’s visit to China. The determination of age was sometimes key to whether a particular immigrant could fit the history being pro√ered. Files contained elaborate discussions of an immigrant’s facial or body hair, teeth, or genitalia, with medical experts o√ering opinions. X-rays were used extensively to facilitate a determination based on bone growth and fusion. Finally, these techniques were supplemented by the analysis of the immigrant’s demeanor and appearance. In other words, where science could not provide an objective means for determining physical identity, common sense

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and personal judgment, as in the case of the verification of information, enabled a shortcut for making and justifying quick determinations. The discretion of immigration o≈cers, therefore, continued to play a central role in the assessment of the bodies of Chinese immigrants despite the often explicit preoccupation with science. Many cases hinged on the o≈cial’s judgment as to familial resemblance; as an interpreter noted, ‘‘Of course, the inspector would also make a judgment as to family resemblance, and those went into the record. This was very important because the appeal was often based on the fact that there was a close relationship.’’ππ For example, Louie Way sought entry as the son of Loui Len An, a U.S. citizen.π∫ His entry was denied, and his attorney appealed his deportation in 1915, arguing that as Louie Way was not represented by counsel until his appeal, minor discrepancies in testimony could not be resolved earlier. Moreover, Louie’s attorney argued that a request for a physical comparison had not been made at his entry. The memorandum of March 31, 1915, was o√ered as proof: The applicant and his alleged father were this day brought before the Commissioner, Assistant Commissioner and Inspector Wilkinson for a comparison as to physical likeness. IT WAS THE OPINION OF INSPECTOR WILKINSON that the general contour of the face and head is quite similar, su≈cient in my mind to indicate relationship. IT WAS THE OPINION OF THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER that considerable likeness existed between the two persons, such as would suggest a close relationship. THE COMMISSIONER sees a very strong likeness in the general features of the applicant and his alleged father, an exact duplication of the right ears of the two; also a great deal of similarity in the left ears.

Despite the general similarity found by the immigration o≈cers and specific details supplied by the commissioner, the appeal was denied without comment. The reliance on the casual impression as to familial resemblance could be made through other kinship ties. In the 1936 case of Chew Hong, who sought entry as the son of the deceased U.S. citizen Chew Jee, a comparison was made by the immigration hearing board members to his alleged brother, Chew Ngan.πΩ None of the board members found that ‘‘there was any resemblance between them which in [their] opinion tends to indicate that they are related.’’∫≠ Although the files are replete with instances of in-person comparisons, where family members were not available for a ‘‘live’’ comparison, immigra100

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tion o≈cers often relied on a comparison of family photos. In the case of tenyear-old Quan Gean Fong, immigration board members noted in their case summary, The statements of all persons testifying are in good general agreement. The only discrepancy of any importance concerns the birth dates given by the alleged father for his four alleged children in 1932, which all conflict with the dates he now gives. He o√ered no explanation for the discrepancy in the dates given by him other than faulty memory. However, he appears to be a person of rather sluggish mentality and I believe that the discrepancy in dates is not due to an attempt at fraud. A group photograph of the family was submitted and is attached as Exhibit A. This photo indicates a good resemblance between the alleged father and son, as well as between the alleged mother and applicant.∫∞

As in the case of Quon Gean Fong, immigration o≈cers also o√ered general impressions of the credibility of the applicants and their families. Many of these impressions were based on cultural stereotypes that relied both on beliefs about the Chinese and on a general understanding of class. Inspectors used indicators such as ‘‘type of foot’’ or dress and demeanor to arrive at personal judgments concerning Chinese immigrants. Women from the upper classes often had bound feet, thus a presumption developed that a woman with unbound feet was likely to be from the laboring class. Similarly, inspectors borrowed stereotypes gleaned from their common experience within the United States and applied these perceptions to the Chinese. Thus, an immigrant with darker skin, a ‘‘thicker neck,’’ and muscular body was ‘‘obviously’’ a laborer rather than a merchant’s son. Likewise, one’s clothing or hairstyle might reveal to another inspector clues that could determine the outcome of an applicant’s claims for entry. The rough clothing of a laborer could be easily distinguished from the robes worn by persons of the educated classes. In the end, many decisions were made by immigration o≈cials by balancing contradictory general impressions and scientific evidence. Jew Shee Ngee’s entry is a good example of the range of ‘‘physical’’ impressions that had to be balanced. Jew Shee Ngee was admitted on appeal based on a memorandum concerning facial resemblance.∫≤ In the case of Jew Shee Ngee, alleged son of a merchant, ex ss Mongolia, March 16, 1915. The applicant and his alleged father were this day brought before the Commissioner for a comparison as to physical resemblance, Attorney Stidger guardians of the gate

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being present. The Commissioner noted a facial resemblance in the general features of the two persons, especially as to the shape of the forehead and the ears, the likeness being of such a character as to indicate some relationship.

Despite the physical similarity, the inspector in law stated in his earlier report that he believed the claim to be unsupported: The usual resort of attempting to develop discrepancies between witnesses or between di√erent versions of the same facts by the same witnesses is one, therefore, which cannot from the very nature of the story presented, hardly be applied to the case as a decisive test of the claimed relationship. The only other test is then the impression the witnesses make personally upon the examining o≈cer and the impression the testimony as a whole, may make upon the examining o≈cer directly and upon the reviewing o≈cers less directly through the record. The impression made upon the examining o≈cer by the case is that it is a fraudulent one, the story is so un-natural as to be preposterous, leaving the testimony, unworthy of belief.

In addition, reports within the file showed that, While this applicant is claimed to be 15 years and 10 months of age, American reckoning, the medical examiner of aliens, after a physical examination of the applicant, has expressed . . . a written opinion that the applicant is approximately 18 years of age, our reckoning. This alone must be considered distinctly unfavorable, when not overcome—as it is not in this case—by other favorable evidence. It is noted . . . that there is not the slightest resemblance between this applicant and his alleged father, their physical characteristics being entirely di√erent.

Similar to the more formal discussion found in the contemporaneous racial prerequisite cases for the determination of citizenship, and mirroring the common perceptions of race described earlier, the case files show that inspectors relied on an ungainly combination of science and common knowledge that reflected the trends in social and scientific thought of the time.∫≥ Thus, immigration o≈cers experimented with objective measurements and indicators, but often relied on personal opinion where science could not provide clear answers.

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Pulling It All Together: Administrative Coordination As immigration regulators experimented with more sophisticated methods for the interrogation and analysis of Chinese entries, a bureaucracy that could sustain its administration concurrently developed. Social scientists have long noted that the manner in which work is organized and carried out o√ers opportunities and restraints that determine how the task becomes understood and defined, thereby determining the work itself.∫∂ The regulation of immigrants has always been considered one of the most di≈cult administrative tasks, and within this context, the administration of the Chinese exclusion laws was highly problematic. As regulators summarized, In the first annual report submitted by the Commissioner-General of Immigration after the enforcement of the Chinese-exclusion laws was vested in that o≈cial by the Act of June 1900, it was stated that ‘‘an experience of but one year has been su≈cient to convince the Bureau that probably no system of legislation enacted thus far by Congress has more numerous or serious obstacles to surmount in order to become reasonably e√ective of its purpose’’ than the laws embodying the exclusion policy of the Government. There has been no reason to change that opinion; in fact, each year’s experience has but added new reasons for holding the view then expressed.∫∑

Regulators in 1903 believed that this problem stemmed from three sources: (1) there was a ‘‘divided responsibility due to the disconnected o≈cial agencies through which the laws were administered’’; (2) there were individuals who ‘‘never believed in the exclusion policy’’ and ‘‘are never willing to assist, and are often ready and glad to oppose the enforcement of the law’’; and (3) the laws relate to ‘‘a people who, according to all recognized authorities, are deficient in a sense of the moral obligation of an oath, and who in their political views hold caste in higher esteem than law, and are ‘clannish’ to the highest degree.’’∫∏ Because there was little that administrators felt they could do about the Chinese or anti-exclusionists themselves, they worked to eliminate, to the extent possible, the di≈culties caused by the internal structure of the immigration administration. It is apparent even from the brief discussion of the legislation of immigration administration that there was a significant lag before the Immigration Service and Chinese immigration were consolidated under one agency. For a twenty-year period, immigration and Chinese matters were handled by a series of separate government entities, and it was not until 1924 that the current structure was finally established. As noted above, immigration administrators

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themselves perceived the fragmented structure as troublesome. Prior to legislation in 1900, the enforcement of the treaty and statutory provisions related to Chinese exclusion was vested in the O≈ce of the Secretary of the Treasury.∫π The structure at that time provided for highly decentralized control over the administration of these laws: Most of the duties of enforcing the laws devolved upon collectors and deputy collectors of customs located at the various ports of this country. At first the division of customs of the o≈ce of the Secretary of the Treasury was invested with general supervisory powers; but at a later date, . . . this general supervisory power was transferred by the Secretary of the Treasury to the division of his o≈ce known as the division of special agents, the supervising special agent being constituted the chief administrative o≈cer, under the Secretary of Treasury. By this arrangement, the various details of administering the laws remained in the hands of the collectors of customs and it was only in a very general way that the division of special agents exercised its supervisory powers.∫∫

The decentralized structure of Chinese immigration regulation provided an arena in which individual action could determine the success of enforcement. For example, in 1901, the Chinese Bureau in San Francisco consisted of fewer than a couple dozen individuals. The susceptibility of enforcement to individual manipulation, given this divided authority, is evidenced by the sustained interest of enforcement o≈cers in tracking down fraud within the bureau. Concern about fraud by enforcement o≈cers appeared to be second only to concern about fraud committed by the Chinese.∫Ω The consolidation of Chinese exclusion matters under the Bureau of Immigration, first under the Treasury Department in 1903 and then under the Department of Commerce and Labor in 1905, marked the first opportunity to implement a coherent set of rules. It ‘‘became possible to issue definite and detailed instructions intended to meet every possible contingency, and to lay down, as far as possible, an exact rule of procedure for the chief administrative o≈cers throughout the country and their subordinates and for the o≈cers charged with the enforcement of the law at ports of entry.’’Ω≠ Indeed, thereafter, on an annual basis the department issued a pamphlet entitled ‘‘Laws, Treaty and Regulations Relating to the Exclusion of Chinese,’’ in which regularly numbered rules organized and codified the results of administrative and judicial ruling relating to Chinese exclusion.Ω∞ Even as the administration grew more coherent, administrators continued to struggle with the legacy of the administration’s decentralized and fragmented beginnings. Hampered by 104

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the gaps and inconsistencies left from prior years, yet more and more reliant on a system based on procedural verity proven through consistency, the Immigration Service, throughout the enforcement of the Exclusion Acts struggled to develop an infrastructure to sustain the exigencies of their interrogation and investigative techniques. Immigration processing—as with all legal-rational systems—increasingly relied on textualization and the inscription of records to define, order, and systematize. Immigration o≈cials sought not only to learn, assess, and understand the information that the Chinese pro√ered, but worked to standardize and routinize the manner in which such information was taken down and stored. The development of immigration bureaucracy as a record generating, maintaining, and retrieval system necessarily paralleled its e√orts as police and gatekeeper. But the service’s bureaucratic fragmentation and confusion made such coordination di≈cult, at the same time as it made the development of a standardized inscription process imperative to the processing of Chinese immigrants. Likewise, it also a√orded the Chinese yet another opportunity to thwart their processing. Consequently, the development of the record-keeping capacity of the immigration service proved to be another site of contestation between the Chinese and immigration o≈cers. Record keeping—the process of textualization through inscription—is integral to the law. As a way of giving shape to and organizing lived experience, ‘‘it locates us in a particular place. It marks that location, holds it, making it resistant to the erosion of time, change and memory.’’Ω≤ Ewick and Silbey further note that textualization reifies legal relationships, confers authority on legal decision making through the creation of a system of precedents, and defines the grounds of participation within trials. More generally, textualization plays a significant role in organizing social interactions, given the greater authority of text over spoken words. ‘‘The greater authority of the written words derives from the fact that texts, as opposed to spoken words, can be preserved, retrieved, inspected, and interrogated. In this way, texts convert momentary utterances and events into permanent, timeless artifacts.’’Ω≥ Once recorded, text—as a reified form of legality—is seen as unbiased, reliable, and undeniable. As we have seen, the primary method of distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate claims by the Chinese was to carefully compare recorded statements taken during the interrogation process and to ferret out inconsistent statements. Utterances made by immigrants and their witnesses, therefore, needed to be recorded and be capable of being retrieved to validate or discredit their claims. The record—its creation and maintenance over time—was as guardians of the gate

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important as the processing of exclusion itself. It is not surprising, then, that immigration o≈cers recognized the centrality of record keeping to the administration of Chinese exclusion laws and immigration policy in general. Inspectors explicitly understood the need for interrogations and file maintenance to be consistent so that witnesses and applicants o√ered testimony that could be compared, not only within a given o≈ce, but across stations. Although Chinese immigrants during this period generally came from one region in China, they spoke a number of dialects, including the Sze Yup and Sam Yup dialects of Cantonese. One of the basic problems with Chinese administration was that the administrators, by and large, had little or no ability to speak Chinese, much less the numerous dialects. Thus, the need to translate all documents and conversations contributed greatly to the amount of time needed to process each applicant. Furthermore, because there were few non-Chinese Americans who spoke Chinese, the immigration service was forced to hire Chinese-Americans to serve as interpreters. Despite some interpreters’ claims to the contrary, the influence of interpreters on the process can be seen in the role that the interpreter took during the entry of Lim Yen. During a habeas corpus proceeding in court, the translator did more than simply provide translation; he also o√ered explanations or interpretations for certain answers. The transcript reveals a significant amount of questioning concerning the order in which Lim Yen saw two visitors in China. The U.S. attorney and the referee repeatedly asked him for the dates and whom he saw first. Finally, the interpreter cleared up the confusion. He stated, ‘‘he has been telling me ‘before’ when he really meant ‘after’ the other fellow.’’ Or, earlier in the hearing, they questioned Lim Yen about the location where he saw someone. At first he responded, ‘‘at home.’’ But later he contended that he saw the person walking down the street about four or five houses down from his house. As the referee began to probe this discrepancy, the interpreter intervened and noted ‘‘It would be ‘at home,’ inside or outside; did not mean in the house; it may be at home in both places, when he said ‘at home.’ ’’ The interpreter’s discussion of the testimony was central, therefore, in clearing up the discrepancies. In addition, the interpreter at times told the attorneys which questions to ask. For example, the attorney asked, ‘‘Do you know where they got water in that village, that they used?’’ and the interpreter stated, ‘‘Ask him where they get water.’’ Other times, the interpreter was given free rein to ask the relevant questions. Thus, at one point the court was questioning a witness about the distance of a village from Lim Yen’s home. After asking a series of questions, the interpreter suggested, ‘‘Ask him whether the [village] runs into [Lim Yen’s 106

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village] or not.’’ And the attorney responded, ‘‘Ask him that. Anything to get to the facts.’’ Whereupon the interpreter himself responded, ‘‘He has to go through the country three miles to get from one place to another.’’ Finally, during the discussion of the case prior to making a decision, the interpreter o√ered his own analysis of the dialect used by Lim Yen and his assessment of the veracity of his claim: There are two or three things as to dialects. The boy in speaking speaks a mixture of Cantonese and See Yup dialect. His dialect is not of his own home,—a mixture of both. And then further again, I am thoroughly acquainted with the topography of the town, which is three lees away. In examining one witness I made a drawing and I located the town, and recalling the boy, I asked the boy the name of his town. He pronounced it in a di√erent way,—one syllable in a di√erent way from what I ever heard before; and I asked him what was across, he said, ‘‘Chung Show,’’ and I know it is so; and I asked him what was the other way, and he said, ‘‘Sun Chung,’’ and I know that to be. So that, all these things about his dialect corroborates his testimony that he was away at Canton, and down there on occasional visits, and did not live . . . there altogether.

Note how the interpreter independently calls the various witnesses to testify and draw maps. Interpreters not only had the ability to explain the testimony o√ered by immigrants, they were the only people who could judge the tone or quality of responses. But because of the perceived collusion between interpreters and the applicants due to racial solidarity or bribery, interrogations became even more drawn out, as a new interpreter would be used for each interview in a given entry. Di≈culties stemming from the translation itself were also hard to overcome. For example, the problem of handling Chinese cases because of confusion in spelling Chinese names was a continual problem for administrators. Inspectors who read and wrote no Chinese could note only the approximate spelling of the name based on how they heard the name pronounced. Thus, Chinese names were inconsistently spelled, even within the same case. In the most simple cases, an applicant was listed with multiple aliases—so that Lan On who departed the United States in 1908 as a native born in San Francisco, was also known as Lau On or Lew On.Ω∂ Moreover, o≈cials did not understand the arrangement of Chinese names and used family names in place of personal names and vice versa. For example, my American name is written Estelle Lau. However, my name when pronounced in Chinese would be written and its transliteration into English would be ‘‘Liu Lee Tsui’’ (or alternatively, deguardians of the gate

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pending on the phonetic system employed ‘‘Lew Li Cui’’ or any combination of the spellings of these names—for example Liu Li Tsui or Lew Lee Cui). Liu/ Lau/Lew is my family name; Lee/Li is my middle or generational name; and Tsui/Cui is my personal name—which has no relation whatsoever to my personal American name, Estelle. Confusion on the part of o≈cials might have them translate my name as Ms. Tsui or Ms. Lee, rather than Ms. Liu. Following English arrangements for names, I would thus be called Ms. Liu Tsui or Ms. Liu Lee and my last name would be mistaken for a first name. As one can see, even where no attempt is made to try to make the situation confusing, misunderstandings and misspellings can take place. The problem would only worsen where multiple dialects were used. In addition, some applicants not only had multiple spellings of a single name, but they also had multiple names, such as a family name and marriage name. As early as 1905 a bureau circular was sent to the Immigration Service inspectors attempting to set a uniform practice for the spelling of Chinese names relying on phonetics.Ω∑ As late as 1909, however, the problem had not diminished, and local stations were criticized for using multiple spellings within a single file for a given immigrant.Ω∏ The failure to adopt a uniform system was not the fault of local stations, nor was the push for a uniform practice only a concern of the central o≈ce; San Francisco interpreters and inspectors took personal initiatives to propose solutions. For example, Interpreter David Jones, of the U.S. Attorney’s O≈ce in the Northern District of California, suggested one spelling system. Contesting the usefulness of Jones’s system, Inspector and Interpreter John Endicott Gardner, of the San Francisco Immigration Service, o√ered a di√erent system, based on writing the Chinese character and then using a standardized system to translate the characters. This system had already been implemented within his o≈ce. Gardner pointed out that ‘‘this rule has been adopted to a considerable extent at this port already. At least ninety percent of the Chinese in this country can write their names, if they cannot write anything more, and no matter how their names may be pronounced in Chinese or spelled in English they remain always the same, and I have found the signature to be the best and at times the ultimate means of determining the identity of any Chinaman in question.’’Ωπ He went on to explain the problem and his solution: If a Chinese applicant for admission or a Chinese witness testifying on behalf of anyone should give as his surname [Chinese character here]. Let him write the character, and no matter in what dialect this word may be pronounced or however it may be spelled in English it remains unchanged

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and certain. I have seen this surname spelled Hom, Ham, Haam, Tom, Tam, Taam, and Tahm, and no wonder, since this surname is pronounced differently according to the di√erent dialects, and the English speaking person can only spell it as he hears it, spelling it according to the usual values of the letters of the English alphabet. The writing of the Chinese will obviate all such di≈culties.Ω∫

The problem of spelling a Chinese name using English was further exacerbated by the number of names each Chinese immigrant had. ‘‘There is no feature of this work that is more confusing that that of determining the identity of Chinese. Nearly all Chinese have at least two names, and each of these names is subject to great variety of pronunciation according to the numerous dialects spoken in China, which pronunciations are of course rendered phonetically into English, producing extensive ways of spelling in English letters the same name.’’ΩΩ Finally, Chinese names were even more di≈cult to ascertain because inspectors failed to understand Chinese customs related to naming. For example, a brief review of records reveals that o≈cials often took forms of address or marital status such as ‘‘Ah’’ or ‘‘Shee’’ as actual names and listed individuals as such. Indeed, almost all women entering the United States as wives were given the first name ‘‘Shee,’’ although in Chinese this ‘‘name’’ only connotes the woman’s marriage status. Just as immigration o≈cers encountered di≈culties in creating the record due to language problems, the maintenance and retrieval of information was also hampered by structural limitations. Coordination was di≈cult due to the fragmentation of the immigration bureaucracy and because each port developed its own system for indexing and filing. As noted earlier, at first, authority was conferred upon customs o≈cials at each port without general supervision. Quickly, however, immigration regulators discovered the need to develop a generalized system for record maintenance and retrieval that would permit the more e≈cient use of the records they were painstakingly gathering. Archival research even today is complicated by the inability of archivists and historians to decipher the filing system used in the various ports. Keys to only three immigration stations’ indexing systems have been determined. Even in situations where record keeping was coordinated, the early period of fragmentation has hampered later use of the records. Sometimes, immigrants had not been asked the same questions, so validation was impossible. Other times, records could simply not be found or had already been used by previous entrants—as was the case of Louie Fong. The fact that the Chinese took advantage of inconsistencies in immigration bookkeeping made record retrieval all

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the more di≈cult. The Chinese not only defied their regulation by manipulating the substance of their interrogations, but they attempted to take advantage of defects in immigration record keeping as well. For example, as noted previously, inspectors believed that Chinese took advantage of the incomplete Portland departure records to allege departures through that port that could not be verified.∞≠≠ Inspectors believed that the Chinese purposefully and falsely claimed departure from Portland because everyone claimed they exited before the date that records were kept. As the interrogation system became more elaborate and the time needed to review cases lengthened, the detention and warehousing of the Chinese became a central issue. The Immigration Service therefore also developed the capacity to serve as jailers, maintaining detention centers that could isolate immigrants for fairly long periods of time. Two concerns that proved incompatible in practice provided the underlying pressures for the changes in location for detention facilities of Chinese immigrants. First, immigration o≈cials were concerned about the opportunities for Chinese to conspire to defraud immigration inspectors. Thus, one set of pressures concerned the need to isolate Chinese detainees. On the other hand, maintaining facilities that adequately housed the Chinese in a sanitary fashion pushed o≈cials to reconsider the benefits of strict isolation. Chinese passengers were at first held on board their arriving vessels pending examination. As investigations became lengthier, however, the steamship companies complained that this unreasonably delayed the release of their vessels for outbound voyages. In deference to these complaints, the shipping companies then obtained permission to house detainees in a shed on the dock, thus permitting vessels to return to use more quickly. Until 1910, Chinese arriving in San Francisco were detained in a two-story shed at the Pacific Mail Steamship Company wharf. All parties agreed that the shed was an unsanitary and cramped facility. Both the Chinese and the immigration inspectors complained about its cramped quarters, the filth, and, during the summer, stifling heat.∞≠∞ Even the steamship companies that maintained the shed admitted that conditions ‘‘are not what they should be’’∞≠≤ and a special immigration inspector touring the facilities wrote to the CommissionerGeneral of Immigration that the shed was ‘‘a veritable fire-trap, and also unsanitary.’’∞≠≥ The situation was made all the more unpleasant by the need to keep detainees restricted to the loft—a second-floor bunk area—to limit contact with the greater population and lower the chances for subterfuge. As a consequence, detainees were permitted to leave the loft for only one hour each day—for lunch—at which time they would ‘‘crowd the stairs.’’ Chinese bitterly 110

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complained about these circumstances. In particular, the manner in which women and those from the higher classes were treated was cause for consternation. And, although immigration o≈cials continued to justify the conditions because of the need to isolate the Chinese, they too agreed that the situation was intolerable. Responding to demands for greater, more hygienic and more isolated space, the immigration service began to construct a detention center on Angel Island—a small island a mile o√ the northern coast of San Francisco Bay. The concern for the treatment of higher class Chinese during detainment reflects the class bias that su√used even the Chinese perspective on immigration enforcement. Where poor treatment of those entering as laborers was considered problematic, Chinese o≈cials were much more preoccupied that those of the exempt classes—merchants, students, and diplomats—would not su√er the same indignities. Soon after detainees were moved to this new space, it became clear the two issues had not been resolved. Quarters remained unsanitary and dismal, and the isolation of the island made it di≈cult for witnesses and others to testify. When the occasional ‘‘white,’’ Japanese, or other Asian detainees were brought to the center pending investigation, the Chinese were isolated from them. Furthermore, Chinese men and women were separated, with children under the age of twelve permitted to stay with their mothers. These families were not reunited until they had all been admitted into the United States. At any given time, thirty to fifty women and about six times as many men were housed at Angel Island. All detainees lived in large, communal rooms furnished with bunk beds. The sleeping quarters were fenced in to deter escape or the entry of visitors, who were not permitted prior to a detainee’s hearing. Although the island itself provided isolation from the public, detainees were nevertheless confined to their dormitories. Women were at times permitted to go on supervised walks, and both men and women had access to small, separate recreational areas. Because immigration o≈cials feared coaching and other subterfuges, the only visitors permitted were members of religious organizations who taught English, helped detainees compose letters, showed movies, and otherwise tried to alleviate the pall of detention. Life was dull and monotonous for detainees. One detainee recollected, There was not much for us to do on the Island. In the morning, we got up and washed our faces. Afterwards, we had breakfast. After we ate, we napped or washed our own clothes. At lunch time, we had some congee in a large serving bowl with some cookies. Then at night we had rice with a main dish. You picked at some of it, I picked at some of it, and that was that. We

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ate in a huge dining hall. After the women ate, the men ate. As the women passed, the men teased us, whistling, saying this-and-that; they were so naughty. They allowed us to go outside to the yard or even out to the dock, where there were grass and trees, tall and fan-like. The women were allowed to stick our hands and feet into the water to fish out seaweed. Otherwise the day would have been hard to pass.∞≠∂

Within a few days, detainees on Angel Island filed the first complaints of mistreatment, which focused mainly on the quality of the food, especially during the early years. The situation became so heated that, in 1919, a riot broke out, and federal troops had to be brought in to restore order. Tenacious in their claims for relief, Chinese soon began to petition the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Society (‘‘Six Companies’’), the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, and the Chinese Consul General. In 1922 the Chinese men formed a ‘‘self-governing association’’ called the Zizhihui to provide support and order. The group provided orientation programs, aided with the filing of complaints, and negotiated with authorities. Interestingly, one detainee later noted that the organization’s fees, two or three dollars, were used to help smuggle coaching information: The organization helped this way: When someone made a mistake during the interrogation, coaching information was sneaked into Angel Island from San Francisco by Chinese kitchen helpers. The information was hidden in a newspaper and tossed to a particular o≈cer assigned to receive the newspaper. If the guard should try to seize the message, we were all prepared to fight him. Returning upstairs the message was given to the addressee , who in turn paid five dollars to the o≈cer who had picked up the newspaper.∞≠∑

Recently, historians have gone to Angel Island and collected the poetry that was left on the walls by detainees, publishing it in tribute. A sample of these poems captures the desperation and depression that detainment engendered among the Chinese. For example, America has power, but not justice. In prison, we are victimized as if we were guilty Given no opportunity to explain, it was really brutal. I bow my head in reflection but there is nothing I can do.∞≠∏

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Imprisoned in the wooden building day after day, My freedom withheld; how can I bear to talk about it? I look to see who is happy but they only sit quietly. I am anxious and depressed and cannot fall asleep. The days are long and the bottle constantly empty; my sad mood, even so, is not dispelled. Nights are long and the pillow cold; who can pity my loneliness? After experiencing such loneliness and sorrow, Why not just return home and lean to plow the fields?∞≠π

Despite obvious concerns about the facilities and unwarranted isolation forced upon immigrants at Angel Island, the Immigration Service used the facility until 1940, when its administration buildings burned down. Following that, detainees were held in San Francisco at various locations until the 1950s, when consular o≈cials in the sending countries took up primary responsibility for admissions determinations, and the detention of the Chinese diminished.

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Chapter 5 ———————————— Legacies

With several years’ experience in attempting to enforce this supreme law of the land, our faith in e√ective legislation upon this subject is much impaired. Laws deemed apparently faultless have proven but legislative makeshifts. They do not meet the evil, but rather aggravate it by o√ering opportunities for their evasion through perjury, chicanery, and frauds. The entire customs service of the country, the Federal judiciary, and those appointed specially to enforce these laws, all admit that the Chinese Exclusion Act is a pretence and fraud in that it assumes to be legislation in pursuance of treaty stipulations, when in fact it is in violation of them, it pretends to correct the evil complained of by o√ering opportunities for its evasion through the crafty practices, fraudulent devices, and bold perjury of the criminal Chinese; that it has opened a door to the perjurer, who is too ready to swear himself within the pale of our laws, and thus whole legions of these people are flocking to the United States who are not entitled to come. —Scharf, ‘‘The Farce of the Chinese Exclusion Laws,’’ 97

— — — — — — — — — — — —

T

he constant and subterranean struggle waged by Chinese immigrants against regulators proved to be the most e√ective means to evade and resist exclusion from the United States. Where overt action—boycotts, civil unrest, petitions, and lobbying—was ine√ective in curbing restrictionist legislation and its application, self-help in the form of ‘‘crafty practices,’’ ‘‘fraudulent devices,’’ and ‘‘bold perjury’’ could make, in the long run, an utter shambles of those same policies. Immigration control is an arena in which the state exerts its power and mastery and the immigrant seems to be the most vulnerable. Nevertheless,

despite appearances, it has proved over time to be a site where immigrants have managed to resist regulation, carve out exceptions, and gain entry. The picture I have described, is an example of the pushing and pulling on a micro level that is inherent within power relations. As James Scott found in his study of peasant forms of resistance, contrary to appearances, there are no clear victories for either side, for as each battle is won, plans to overcome the loss are already in the making. Thus, ‘‘relations of domination are at the same time relations of resistance.’’∞ The dialectical relationship between domination and resistance is obvious. The practice of domination creates opportunities for resistance—it creates the resistance itself. The more subtle or complex the domination, the more likely it is going to create a corresponding resistance of equal subtlety or complexity. The form of resistance, in turn, reacts back in the form of domination, engendering further opportunity and response. This dialectic is clearly visible in the context of immigration regulation during the Chinese Exclusion Period between immigration administrators and Chinese immigrants. On a general level, as soon as regulators deemed Chinese excludable, the Chinese began to search for any means to avoid this exclusion. With the closing of each legal loophole, the Chinese challenged its closure, then sought other avenues for entry. The more stringent exclusion became, the more the Chinese found increasingly subtle means to evade immigration regulation. On a more detailed level, the Chinese and immigration o≈cers manipulated each interrogation procedure and identification technique for their purposes. Through this micro interaction, both the individual and the state are changed. The development of paper families and the concomitant elaboration of family histories and landscapes are the most vivid examples of this dialectic.

Identity Legacies Despite the sometimes self-conscious use of techniques, these same ruses and devices became part of the identity of both the individual and the state. It appears that Chinese immigrants experienced their interaction with the Immigration Service as a performance or a form of manipulation. While appearing to conform, they were actively manipulating the role ascribed to them for their personal advantage. They o√ered lengthy personal histories replete with data demanded by regulators and provided both white and Chinese witnesses, photographs, court records, return certificates, and medical evidence, using the language of the immigration administration. All the while, immigrants and their specialized attorneys manipulated these procedures and requirelegacies

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ments to achieve the desired result. They fine-tuned their performance into one of concealment and manipulation. These ruses, however, were not without consequences for the Chinese, for they, in turn, became part of Chinese culture and identity within the United States. Chinese were forced to change their names, family histories, and personal identities to conform to immigration entry information. Moreover, they often ended up living their entire lives in conformity to these changes. Families were separated or joined depending on the needs of the immigration stories they told. The fictions they created for immigration purposes became part of the lived reality of Chinese life in the United States. Despite the repeal of the exclusion laws in 1943 and the ultimate obsolescence of the quota system, the legacy of the paper families lasted long after their actual implementation or usefulness. The fictions created and elaborated required continued maintenance over time and generations. These fictions— the masks or faces that the Chinese put on for immigration purposes—thus came to constitute a central element of Chinese American identity and became an inescapable element of Chinese American culture. The long-term e√ects of the creation of paper families can only be speculated at here. However, more recent events have indicated that there can be no doubt that the Chinese and their community have been altered because of their responses to immigration processing and the creation of fictive kin in particular. From 1955 to 1970, the Immigration and Naturalization Service implemented a program known as the ‘‘Chinese Confession Program’’ to resolve organized Chinese immigrant resistance to exclusion in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. ‘‘In exchange for information of ‘illegal entry’ by individuals and their disclosure of the true identities and status of all members of that individual’s ‘paper family,’ the program o√ered administrative adjustment of status. The bargain at the core of confession was legalized status for those already settled in America in exchange for closing o√ future immigration.’’ By calling upon the Chinese to reveal their ‘‘true identities,’’ the program complicated an already tangled situation. Three reasons for the development of the Confession Program have been suggested. First, it could be seen as simply another tactic of the ins to tackle the problem of illegal Chinese immigration.≤ Second, the program existed during the period when the race-based immigration policies codified under the National Origins Act of 1924 were under attack. In that sense, the program served as a mechanism toward the normalization of Chinese immigration. By closing o√ future illegal immigration by explicitly investigating the network of fictive kinship ties, Chinese immigration in general could be opened. It seems clear that the ins 116

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continued to be concerned over illegal Chinese immigration and the avenues for continued fraud that had been established during earlier periods. As derivative citizens, Chinese could perpetuate their illegal entry to the United States based on fraudulent claims which had been unresolved during the entry of previously claimed U.S. citizens. With the movement toward at least a facially race-neutral general immigration policy that did not impose racial quotas, there would be no means of curtailing the flow of Chinese immigrants to the United States. Finally, it cannot be ignored that the Confession Program developed during the heyday of McCarthyism and the cold war in the United States. Spurred by fears of communist sympathizers within the Chinese American community, the United States government may have been seeking to ferret out leftists while it attempted to clear up immigration anomalies. Under the program, Chinese residents who gained entry into the United States by fraudulent means were encouraged to come forward and confess their guilt. The government also attempted to force confession by sending investigators into Chinatowns during the Chinese New Year festivals of February 1966, subpoenaing family and district association records, and empanelling a grand jury to weigh testimony on fraud.≥ To confess, the person provided the names of all the members of real and fictive families, current addresses, and any knowledge of other illegal immigrants. The ins compared these lists to immigration records to test the veracity of the confessor’s statements, which would, in turn, trigger an inquiry into the activities of every person named. The ins cross-referenced copies of the confessor’s statements to all related files, opening investigations into these related files and the files of their families. If the authorities were convinced that the confessor had not engaged in subversive activities, the confessor was given legal status as an immigrant, granted immunity from deportation, and allowed to reapply for naturalization. It should be noted that the Confession Program exemplifies, once again, the amount of discretion left to the Immigration Service in matters concerning naturalization and admission. The Immigration Service could determine the consequences of a confession since the program did not provide amnesty for those who came forward. Rather, the Immigration Service could determine whether the individual would become eligible for normalization of status. Many residents reacted with fear and apprehension. Others looked upon the program as a way to gain lost identities and to clear the record. Real and paper families were forced to reconcile, since one confession necessarily required that all family members confess. Disagreement as to the true motivation underlying the government program caused fighting within Chinatowns, legacies

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and many family association buildings and their records were burned. Ultimately, the decision to confess would result in some family members changing their last names from their paper names to their real names, while others would continue to use their paper names. As one person explained, ‘‘My dad, he wanted to die a Wong, not a Young, so we all confessed. But for me, I had gone to school, gotten degrees, had children and made a name for myself in this community. I decided to keep my paper name.’’∂ Although the Chinese who chose to change their names regained their lost identities, they had to relinquish other elements of their lives which had been established under their paper names. For example, Mr. Young, who changed his name back to Wong, asked that his tombstone be marked to show that he had served in the U.S. Army during World War II. However, because army records reflected that no Mr. Wong had served, his grave could not be marked. Despite e√orts by his family to rectify his records, the army continued to refuse acknowledgment of his service. His son commented, ‘‘It’s good that he was dead when we found out. He would not have understood, since he thought that his records had been cleared up. Actually, he simply gave up one part of his history for another.’’ The success of the Confession Program was heralded by the Immigration Service. For example, John Hayakawa Torok notes that the Service’s 1958 annual bulletin reported the following inflammatory case: Success in overcoming the Chinese fraud problem continued during the year. In one instance, known as the Sai Kay Village fraud, approximately 225 members of the Huey clan of the village of Sai Kay, China were exposed as having entered the United States under false identities and various clan names. They claimed to be descendants of 12 progenitors whose United States nativity was established in habeas corpus proceedings in San Francisco between 1889 and 1910. Confession obtained from the foregoing individuals prevented more than 150 other from obtaining entry documents abroad.∑

From 1957 to 1965, 11,336 people confessed as paper sons or daughters.∏ As a result, 19,124 people’s undocumented status was revealed. In addition, 5,800 slots were closed from future use. While the impact of the Confession Program on curtailing illegal Chinese immigration has not been established, it does reveal, however, the extent of Chinese illegal immigration to the United States and could be seen as a ‘‘formal recognition . . . by the ins of the failure of ins enforcement of the Chinese exclusion policy. [Concomitantly] the measure of that failure also marks the scope of resistance by Chinese immigrants to exclusionary immigration policy in the twentieth century.’’π 118

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Recently, economic incentives have caused the Chinese themselves to become suspicious of claimed identities. Many properties and businesses in Chinatowns are owned by family associations whose members share the same last name. As members fight over control of these increasingly wealthy organizations, membership has become more restrictive. No longer will an association take someone’s word that they belong. Now, organizations require that applications for membership be sponsored by at least two members of the association who will vouch for the authenticity of the applicant’s lineage. Thus, the creation of immigration fictions over one hundred years ago still has a widespread and lasting impact on Chinese identity and community. Finally, as younger Chinese Americans gain pride in their heritage, some have sought to reclaim their families’ lost histories by recovering family names not used since the nineteenth century. The Asian American Movement began in the late 1960s, when a significant number of Asians were enrolled in college and the antiwar movement was at its height. Essentially a middle-class reform movement, participants sought to bring together Chinese Americans, Filipino Americans, Korean Americans, Japanese Americans, and other kinds of Asian Americans with the idea that these divergent and isolated groups shared a common history and experience and a unity, as well, with Americans. William Wei has noted that the movement has remained largely invisible for four reasons: (1) Asians account for less than one percent of the overall population; (2) there is widespread ignorance of the exploitation and oppression of Asians in American history, especially in comparison to the emphasis placed on that of African Americans; (3) the movement’s national leadership has not gained national attention; and (4) the relative success of Asians within the United States has made them into ‘‘model minorities.’’∫ Wei notes that the invisibility of the movement is not only apparent in the non–Asian American community but within the Asian community as well. He contends that most of the seminal scholarship on Asian American history fails to acknowledge the salience of the movement, although certain aspects of the political activism do receive some attention.Ω Nevertheless, the movement was successful, first in gaining space within some academic institutions, especially on the West Coast, and in raising the ethnic consciousness and self-awareness of students. Asian American programs have fostered continuous and thoughtful scholarship related to Asian Americans in general and to specific ethnic groups. For example, social psychologists in San Francisco are beginning to study the conflicting emotions that American Chinese have concerning their identities, the odd mix of shame and pride, anger and joy, that the retrieval of family histories brings.∞≠ The legacies

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programs also have provided second- and third-generation Asian Americans with a place where they can explore their history and heritage. As one interviewee ruefully remarked, ‘‘I grew up Chinese, my kids, they like to go to class now and study what it is to be Chinese. It’s funny. They come home and tell me ‘what it was really like.’ ’’∞∞

Lim Moe The first U.S. government record of Lim Moe’s family is the habeas corpus petition filed by his father, Lim Yen, in 1902 upon his father’s re-entry to the United States.∞≤ From the court record it appears that Lim Yen alleged he was born in the United States in 1880 and moved to China with his parents and sister when he was about one year old. Lim Yen’s father died shortly after his return to China, and he lived with his mother and sister until he moved to Canton in 1900, where he worked as a barber, returning to his village twice a year on vacation. It appears that Lim Yen had an older brother, Lim Wing Yuk, who was also born in the United States and who did not move to China with the family. Lim Yen’s entry was initially denied by the Chinese Bureau because of discrepancies in the testimony regarding the number of times he had seen his brother during the latter’s visit to China and the number of times he had seen two other people from the United States during their visits to China. During the hearing, Lim Yen, his brother, and two witnesses testified about his birth in the United States and the visits to China that caused the discrepancies in the earlier proceedings. After analyzing the testimony, the court ruled in favor of Lim Yen and found him to be a U.S. citizen because of his birth in the United States. Lim Moe entered the United States for the first time on the USS Siberia in 1908 based on a claim of citizenship as the son of a U.S. citizen.∞≥ At the time of Lim Moe’s entry, he claimed to have three brothers—Lim Wing Yuk, Lim Wing Wah, and Lim Wing Foo—and one uncle, Lim Wah. He was landed without further inquiry, the investigator noting, ‘‘I have taken the statements of the applicant, alleged father, and one other Chinese witness, no discrepancies appearing. The nativity and essential trip of the alleged father is established by Court record which he produces, No. 12812 U.S.D.C.N.D. of C.’’ One year later, Lim Wah, Lim Moe’s alleged uncle, entered the United States, again without inquiry. Beginning in 1912, Lim Moe received permission to depart the United States five times. The first four times he entered and departed alone. The fifth 120

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time Lim Moe entered, he was accompanied by his wife and one of his sons. Lim Moe claimed to have married during one of his trips to China, and during his various entries into the United States he claimed, over the following years, to have had five sons: Lim Mun Sung, Lim Ying, Lim Ming Pon, Lim Mun Sing, and Lim Mun Sen. Three of these alleged sons—Lim Mun Sung, Lim Ming Pon, and Lim Ying—later also entered the United States as derivative citizens. Lim Moe ultimately returned to China in 1945 or 1946, and his whereabouts following his departure are unknown.

Discovering Lim Moe’s True Family History ≤ Lim Moe’s entry file contains two cross-referenced ins Reports of Investigation from the Chinese Confession Program. The first is the 1968 confession of his paper niece, Lim Soon Oy, the alleged daughter of Lim Moe’s brother Lim Wing Yuk. The second is the 1961 confession of one of Lim Moe’s alleged sons, Lim Ming Pon. These two reports, cross-referenced into Lim Moe’s file, provide a first inroad into the real and fictive kinships that Lim Moe and his family developed over time. They also reveal the complex relationships and outcomes that the creation of these ties generated within one ‘‘family.’’ Lim Soon Oy’s Confession ≤ The ins Report of Investigation of Lim Soon Oy copied into Lim Moe’s file provides a first glimpse into Lim Moe’s fictive and real families. It also reveals the interconnections among di√erent families where kinship ties were created for immigration purposes. To begin with, Lim Soon Oy’s 1968 confession was initiated during the interview of her husband, Sun Quong Wing (true name Joe Hai Fuey), in 1967. In that confession, Sun Quong Wing first admitted to having entered as a paper son. Lim Soon Oy’s husband purchased paper for her entry after his first wife died. The ‘‘bought papers’’ for Lim Soon Oy made her the paper daughter of a Chinese merchant, Lim Wing Yuk, and, at least for o≈cial purposes, part of the Lim family. Already, then, we can see the interplay between fictive families and the continued need to create further fictive ties to provide o≈cial support for real family relations. Joe Hai Fuey entered as Sun Quong Wing, the son of a merchant. Thus, he entered under a fictive tie. However, because as a son of a merchant he could not himself, under U.S. immigration law, bring in a wife, he had to again purchase paper from another family so he could bring in Lim Soon Oy. Because of Sun Quong Wing’s confession, an investigation of his wife was initiated, resulting in the creation of this report in 1968. The file also reveals information about Lim Moe’s family even though Lim Soon Oy appears to have had little or no contact with her immigration family legacies

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6. The family tree depicts the fictional family that generations of immigrants using Lim family paper slots described to immigration inspectors. More than half the relations were fictitious, created expressly for the purpose of selling slots. Courtesy of the National Archives and Record Administration, Pacific Region (San Francisco).

after entry. Lim Soon Oy contended that she knew nothing about her immigration family or their whereabouts. For example, she responded to the question ‘‘How many immigration brothers and sisters have you claimed?’’ I have two younger immigration brothers. The names of the brothers that I claimed were LIM Yue Ming and LIM See Ming. They are not related to me in any manner. I do not know whether or not they are the true sons of my immigration father. When I entered the United States, I testified from coaching papers concerning their dates of birth and their place of birth. As I recall, I said that they were born in the same fictitious village that I claimed. I have not seen my immigration brothers for more than ten years and have no idea as to where they live or where they are employed. I know absolutely nothing about them. Also, I do not know their true names.∞∂

Likewise, she was unable to provide information concerning her three immigration uncles, her immigration father (though she ‘‘heard over ten years ago that he had returned to China’’), or her immigration mother. It is unknown if Lim Soon Oy’s ignorance was feigned or real. Because the program traced each individual within a family network, thereby coercing further confessions and more investigations into others, if she acknowledged continued ties to her paper family, she would be obligated to give the ins information concerning their whereabouts, leading to investigations into their status and the status of their families. The decision to confess may not have been shared by other family members, so it may simply have been more e≈cacious to deny any ties to these paper family members. Suspiciously, the only family member that she had any certain knowledge of was her immigration father, who was no longer in the United States and therefore outside the scope of government inquiry and control. Indeed, given the repeated need for individuals to testify at entry hearings for other family members, it seems unlikely that there was no contact between Lim Soon Oy and her paper family. Nevertheless, her confession provides a glimpse into the network of fictive ties that bound the Lim family. Moreover, Lim Soon Oy’s purchase of paper suggests that the Lim family may have sold paper to others, bringing into question the veracity of other alleged family ties.

Lim Ming Pon’s Confession ≤ What Lim Soon Oy’s confession suggests about the Lim family is confirmed in the confession of Lim Ming Pon. Lim Ming Pon revealed to the immigration investigators the extent of the use of fictive family membership within the Lim family, exposing generations of paper relations within one family. The confession further revealed the consequences of these legacies

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tactics. Lim Ming Pon’s entry in 1949 was built upon a series of lies to the Immigration Service. Despite the fact that at the time of entry, Lim Ming Pon was held for secondary review and investigation by a board of special inquiry, none of the following fictions were revealed during the ensuing investigation. First, Lim Ming Pon entered the United States as the citizen son of Lim Moe. In actuality, at the time of entry, Lim Ming Pon’s biological father lived in the United States. However, because his father was the son of a merchant, he could not bring his own children into the country. Thus, he paid two thousand dollars to purchase paper for Lim Ming Pon. Second, at the time of entry, Lim Ming Pon claimed four paper brothers and three paper uncles. During his confession, Lim Ming Pon indicated that two of his paper brothers had entered the United States, but he believed that the other two brothers he had alleged were, in actuality, ‘‘unused slots.’’ He confessed, however, that it was likely that none of his paper brothers were real sons of Lim Moe because he had heard that, in fact, Lim Moe may never have married or had children. Finally, Lim Ming Pon claimed at the time of his entry to be single and without children. In reality, he was married in China and had two daughters. A close reading of the confession reveals the consequences of the creation of the fictive ties to the Lim family and their family history. As with Lim Soon Oy, Lim Ming Pon’s use of the Lim family name was, at least allegedly, purely nominative. Although Lim Ming Pon entered as a member of the Lim family, he claimed his ties to the Lim family remained minimal. During his confession, Lim Ming Pon stated that ‘‘he didn’t know anything at all about the three alleged brothers of his paper father . . . because he had never seen them or heard about them, and he had just been told by Lim Moe to say that he had those uncles.’’ And, although Lim Ming Pon seems to have kept in contact with his paper father—he knew that his paper father had returned to China in 1945 or 1946—‘‘he did not know where he was now or even if he was alive.’’ Once again, Lim Ming Poon, like Lim Soon Oy earlier, appears only to have had knowledge of the whereabouts of the family member who had left the United States. The veracity of his claims to ignorance also must be assessed in light of the consequences that any information may have had on any other member still within the United States. The fictive personal history created during his entry record had consequences for Lim Ming Pon’s real family. Because he had declared himself to be single upon his entry, conforming to the information Lim Moe had previously given the Immigration Bureau, Lim Ming Pon faced the problem of securing entry for his wife. Thus, on a subsequent trip to China, he took his wife to Hong Kong and remarried her to attain a valid marriage certificate. He then 124

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brought her to the United States in 1958. While it may seem that his entry subterfuge might have caused only some short-term di≈culties—keeping Lim Min Pon and his wife separated for a period of time and requiring the second marriage ceremony—there were other, more lasting consequences from his purchased family history. Lim Ming Pon admitted at his confession that not only was he married at the time of his initial entry, but he already had one daughter, Lim Mee Hung. In 1959, Lim Min Pon sought her entry, which was denied on the basis that the relationship had not been established. Specifically, ‘‘the basis of denial of the petition on behalf of Lim Mee Hung at that time was the discrepancies in SUBJECT’s statements and Service files which indicated that SUBJECT was single in 1949 and in 1955 that he was married but had no children and yet in 1959 he submitted a visa petition on behalf of a child who he claimed was born in 1948.’’ At the time of his confession, Lim Mee Hung continued to reside in Hong Kong with her paternal grandmother. Thus, the internal logic of the o≈cial histories subsumed and made relationships which fell outside those created stories ‘‘unreal.’’ Lim Min Pon’s real family history did not conform to the o≈cial history that Lim Min Pon had constructed for immigration purposes. The Immigration Administration, therefore, denied his real daughter’s entry, forcing Lim Min Pon and his real family to live their lives in conformity with the fiction. Fiction, once o≈cially documented, could overcome fact, turning fact into fiction. As a further twist, although Lim Ming Pon was required to purchase paper because his real father (Wong Yeh) was not a U.S. citizen at the time of Lim Ming Pon’s entry, in 1956, Lim Ming Pon’s father acquired U.S. citizenship. Thus, in 1961, Lim Ming Pon, while admitting to his fraudulent U.S. citizenship as part of the Lim family, alleged U.S. citizenship derived from his real father. Finally, the continued spiral of these ties can be seen in the concluding comments attached to Lim Ming Pon’s confession state: Salt Lake City should open investigations regarding SUBJECT’s wife MAH BACK LING and SUBJECT’s daughter LIM (WONG) FAY KAM, as it appears that they entered the United States illegally as the wife and daughter respectively of a United States citizen when in fact the person who claimed to be a United States citizen was not a United States citizen. In connection with these investigations, it is suggested that SUBJECT’s real father, WONG YEH, be asked to appear to testify and to present proof of his naturalization as United States citizen. It is also suggested that the disposition of SUBJECT’s case be held in abeyance until the deportation cases against all the family have been completed.

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It is suggested that Los Angeles open an investigation regarding SUBJECT’s No. 2 paper brother, LIM YING, who, according to SUBJECT, could not be the son of claimed father, LIM MOE, because LIM MOE didn’t have any children. All the known addresses and contacts for LIM YING are set forth in the body of this report. If LIM YING is located and questioned, it is suggested that an attempt be made to learn of the whereabouts of LIM MING SUNG and the No. 1 paper brother, and also the whereabouts of the alleged uncles LIM WING FOOK, LIM WING WAH, and LIM WING FOO, in order that appropriate action may be instituted in their cases.

Following these comments a notation was added that the recommendations were approved and would be carried out. Although the individual family members constructed their lives and claimed to ignore, to the extent possible, the fictive family ties and relationships created on paper for immigration purposes, these ties continued to have consequences for all involved. Using each person’s file and the information given during entry interrogations, the ins forced continued compliance with fictive personal histories and then used the information to track each family member so long as they remained in the United States.

Lim Nguey Ming’s File ≤ Lim Ngeuy Ming’s immigration file contains a copy of Lim Soon Oy’s confession.∞∑ His name is underlined on the distribution list for her confession as her ‘‘immigration brother.’’ Lim Nguey Ming was born May 31, 1926, in Ngow Lo How village, China. He arrived at San Francisco May 5, 1937, on the SS President Coolidge and applied for admission as a ‘‘son of son of native.’’ He was excluded by a board of special inquiry on June 14, 1937. He appealed his case June 17, 1937, and his appeal was sustained on September 4, 1937. He was admitted as a ‘‘son of son of native’’ that same day. His citizenship was acquired from his alleged grandfather, Lim Yen, a native-born citizen of the United States. The need to remember facts from previous testimonies is evident in the case file. Lim Wing Yuk appeared as a witness during his alleged son’s entry June 9, 1937. The board of special inquiry began its examination by taking Lim Wing Yuk’s statement. Following some questions regarding his family— questions concerning his wife and daughter—the board questioned Lim Wing Yuk about his parents. Immediately, the board pointed out discrepancies in Lim Wing Yuk’s current testimony and testimony from previous examinations: Q.

Are your parents living?

A.

No, both died long ago. 126

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Q. A.

What are their names? LIM YEN was my father, or LIM SEUNG: He died in Sacramento, Calif., 8 or 9 years ago; his bones have been shipped back to China—That was about 1929. Mother was YEE SHEE—She died in GAR HING VILLAGE, CHINA, before I returned to China the first time. She is now buried in the REPUBLIC CEMETERY a few li from GAR HING VILLAGE.

Q.

Was your father ever married more than once?

A.

No.

Q.

What kind of feet had your mother?

A.

Natural.

Q.

What makes you say that your mother’s name is YEE SHEE?

A.

I thought her name was YEE SHEE—that is all.

Q.

How do you account for the fact that this woman’s name has been variously given as CHING, CHIN, and CHUNG and now you claim she is a YEE?

A.

Possibly I have forgotten my mother’s name because she died so long ago and when I was a small boy I just called her ‘‘mother.’’

Q.

You were about 13 when you first came to this country, were you not?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Do you think a boy 13 would ever forget his mother’s name?

A.

I forgot it.

As the examination continued, further discrepancies were discovered. Specifically, facts concerning Lim Wing Yuk’s siblings became confused. Q.

Please describe your two brothers.

A.

LIM WING WAH About 45 or 46 years old. I don’t know where he is now, but formerly he was in DETROIT MICH. He and I have become unfriendly, due to money matters. He has not written to me for 10 years, although I have written to him several times. LIM WING FOO, about 40, He is in the U.S. but I don’t know where. He and I also have become unfriendly on account of money matters. . . .

Q.

You are positive are you that you have never had more than the two brothers you have named; that is LIM WING WAH and LIM WING FOO: is that right?

A.

That is right.

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Q.

Whom does this photo represent (indicating photo of Lim WAH).

A.

My Brother Lim WAH.

Q.

Whom does this photo represent (indicating photo of Lim FOO)

A.

LIM FOO my brother.

Q.

Are you positive there are the only two brothers you have ever had, living or dead, blood or adopted?

A.

Yes I am positive.

Q.

Whom does this photo represent (Indicating photo of Lim Moe)

A.

I don’t know—Oh yes, this is Lim MOE—I heard my father once say that he was my fourth brother, but I have never seen him.

Q.

According to the story told by LIM MOE, himself, which has been corroborated by your alleged father, LIM MOE, is not your fourth brother at all; have you any comment.

A.

In that case I don’t know because I never saw that man myself.

NOTE: When this man was shown the photo of LIM MOE he manifested the greatest perturbation for a Chinese, clasping his hand to his forehead and changing color and facial expression. Q.

When you were an applicant for admission and were being question on board the steamship ‘‘Korea’’ in 1908 you told about having three brothers; no sisters, and further, stated that one of them was in the U.S. at that time. The record further shows that LIM MOE was admitted to the U.S. a few days prior to your own arrival at this port. Have you any comment?

A.

(long hesitation) I cannot remember what happened in 1908.

Q.

You mean to say you cannot remember how many brothers you had in

A.

I really have three brothers, but I can remember only the two I have

1908? trouble with. Q.

As a matter of fact, weren’t these brothers of yours just brothers for

A.

No

Q.

If LIM MOE is your blood brother, you should be able to say just where

A.

I don’t remember where he came in the other order of birth; I just

immigration purposes only?

he comes in your family—that is, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, or 4th.

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remember that LIM WING WAH is the oldest. I AM THE SECOND and since I cannot remember who is number 3, I suppose that LIM MOE must be. NOTE: According to the testimony previously given in this case, LIM WING YUK is the oldest; then comes LIM MOE, then Lim WING WAH and then LIM WING FOO fourth. Q.

The old testimony goes on to show that LIM MOE claimed the same father and mother that you claimed; claimed to have lived in the same village and house in which you lived and that his age was very close to yours. Have you any further comment?

A.

From what you said now I can remember that LIM MOE is my blood brother; that he is my next younger brother.

Q.

Who is the oldest boy in your family?

A.

LIM WING WAH.

Q.

Sure of that, are you?

A.

I cannot remember their ages. Either LIM WING WAH or LIM MOE is the oldest.

Q.

Is not seniority in a Chinese family always a point strongly recognized,

A.

Yes

even down to the seniority of twins?

Q.

If I should tell you that your record shows you were listed as the oldest; what would you have to say in the matter?

A.

I cannot say anything because I have forgotten all about these things.

Q.

Isn’t your memory as good as that of an average Chinese?

A.

Yes, I suppose so.

Lim Wing Yuk’s testimony continues, following this line of questioning, and it is not until the end of the examination that any questions are asked regarding his alleged son Lim Nguey Ming and his entry into the United States. Following the examination of all the witnesses for Lim Nguey Ming’s entry, the chairman of the board noted, ‘‘The testimony in this case seriously a√ects the citizenship of the alleged father. In order that opportunity may be given to present additional testimony on this point, if desired, I move to defer action in the premises.’’ On June 14, 1937, following the representation by Lim Nguey Ming’s counsel that there was no further evidence to be submitted to establish the citizenlegacies

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ship of Lim Nguey Ming’s father, the board issued its ruling denying Lim Nguey Ming entry: Citizenship of alleged father: By far the most important adverse feature in this case is the citizenship of Lim Wing Yuk, alleged father. This man was originally admitted to this country as a son of one Lim Yen, who, in turn, was declared a native by the Collector of Customs at San Francisco in 1902. Four Chinese have since secured admission to the U.S. as sons of Lim Yen: Lim Wing Yuk, alleged father in the present case; Lim Moe one year younger than Lim Wing Yuk; Lim Wing Wah, 2 years younger than Lim Moe; Lim Wing Forr, two years younger than Lim Wing Wah. On pages 17 and 18 of the present record it will be seen that applicant agrees with his alleged father’s testimony (as originally given) that Lim Wing Yuk has two brothers only. After the alleged father had been questioned repeatedly and had made reiterated statements that he never had but two brothers, he was shown the picture of Lim Moe and made the statement his father had told him about such a brother, although, he (the witness Lim Wing Yuk) had never seen him. Later he changed his original statement to say that he meant that he had never seen Lim Moe in this country. Our files show that Lim Moe originally arrived here and was admitted as of the status claimed a few weeks prior to the arrival of Lim Wing Yuk himself. Inasmuch as Lim Wing Yuk arrived at the age of thirteen (Chinese) at which time Lim Moe was 12, the statements of Lim Wing Yuk regarding his utter lack of knowledge of his brother speak for themselves. Attention is invited to the fact that Lim Wing Yuk has changed his statement a number of times regarding the order of birth of himself and brothers and seems to have forgotten that he is supposedly the oldest boy in the family. It is hardly necessary to stress the fact that probably no other people in the world rank children according to birth more than do the Chinese, especially with reference to the first-born male.∞∏

The reasoning and subsequent denial of entry by the inspectors demonstrates the need over time for immigrants to remember the previous testimony. Not only was Lim Nguey Ming denied entry because of these discrepancies, but Lim Wing Yuk’s citizenship became precarious as well. The denial also reflected the ins’s growing ability to collect this information and use it during later entries. Not only did the ins rely on the questioning from previous entries, but it relied on its record-keeping and record-retrieval systems so that the information could be made available. Strangely enough, following an appeal to the Department of Labor, on September 4, 1937, Lim Nguey Ming was admitted without comment. 130

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Discussion and Consequences The analysis of Lim Moe’s family provides a case study of the development of a network of fictive kinships and the long-term e√ects of these fictions on the lives of immigrant families. It also exemplifies how the Immigration Service developed the administrative capacity to track families. Relying on the first court finding in Lim Yen’s writ of habeas corpus that established him as a U.S. citizen, the Lim ‘‘family’’ was able to secure the entry of numerous Chinese immigrants, many of whom did not have the legal right to enter. The Lims, through their ingenuity, were able to thwart attempts to exclude them from the United States. By taking advantage of the court system, by creating fictive kinship ties that permitted them to fall within categories that were not excluded, and by perpetuating these ties over time, the Lims engaged in legal and extralegal maneuvers to outwit the immigration service. Such entry, however, was not without consequences. As each ‘‘family member’’ entered the United States, their stories had to conform to those previously told to the immigration regulators. The vulnerability of every family member upon entry to the United States was evidenced by Lim Nguey Ming’s experience. Not only was he scrutinized, but his father Lim Wing Yuck’s entry became the subject of interrogation. Real histories became subsumed or mixed within the new family story. Generations of fictive kinship ties had to be purchased to maintain lived relationships that existed in real life but did not conform to the immigration requirements. Thus, both Lim Soon Oy and her husband had to purchase paper because he was not entitled to bring in his wife. And, not only did this immigration scam change the stories they told, but it changed how the ‘‘Lims’’ lived. Lim Min Pon and his wife were forced to have a second marriage and were unable to bring in their daughter because she could not logically exist. As the Lim family suggests, the consequences to Chinese immigrants can be viewed from at least three perspectives. First, the ruses and manipulations had consequences to the immigrants and their families. Second, they changed the way the Chinese community in the United States interacted as a group and with non-Chinese. Finally, the persistence of these consequences has meant that, even to this day, the e√ects of Chinese circumvention of the exclusion laws are still evolving. Overall, the Chinese changed themselves and their community in fundamental ways that may never have been intended nor foreseen.

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Chinese Individual and Family Identities Although the exact number of paper immigrants cannot be known, Chinese historians and the Chinese community in general believe that eighty percent of Chinese families between 1882 and 1965 brought in paper sons or daughters. At a dinner in Chinatown, I found that at a table of ten Chinese, I was the only person whose family had not immigrated to the United States using a paper name, because my parents immigrated in the mid-1950s, when the immigration laws had been relaxed. However, even if the percentage of paper families is exaggerated, the impact of this subterfuge on Chinese identity and the Chinese American community is still significant. Just the fact that many members of the Chinese community believe that such a high percentage of families purchased paper highlights the significance of this fiction to Chinese American history and the ways in which Chinese Americans have come to view themselves. The creation of paper families, however, has impacted not only how Chinese perceive their history in the United States but it has also directly impacted their history, structuring Chinese family, economic, and social relations by forcing the Chinese to accept a fiction at the heart of their community. At a most basic level, admittees had to change their names. Although immediate family members might refer to them under their real name, fear of detection meant that only trusted family relations or friends would know about the deceit. Concomitantly, families were forced to incorporate these fictive members into their families. As families grew, both through the inclusion of more fictive kin and through marriage and the birth of children, real names would become hopelessly lost and entangled. Often, it became easier to simply use one’s paper name, relegating one’s true names along with ties to real family in China to the past. Sometimes, the Chinese did not divulge the illegality of their entry even to their own family. For example, Jane Chan Wong entered the United States in 1936 as the daughter of her ‘‘true’’ father, who was a merchant.∞π However, in 1964 she told the ins that she ‘‘did not become aware her true father had entered the United States illegally until he made a confession statement to this Service during December of 1963.’’∞∫ Admittees not only assumed these new names and families and maintained these kinship ties over time, they also incorporated these fictions into their true family histories. There are no records that indicate that immigration o≈cials investigated sui sponte the legitimacy of families once they were admitted to the United States. However, as noted above, because testimony by family members was key to immigration interrogation methods, families 132

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often continued to perpetuate these stories. Once a paper son was admitted, he would often have to testify on behalf of other children, both real and fictive, who immigrated later. Likewise, paper family members would have to testify should the paper son decide to bring in a son himself. Immigration o≈cials looked upon failure to produce relevant family members with suspicion, which could itself trigger an investigation of the entire family, possibly leading to deportation. As files were cross-referenced and testimonies compared with testimony o√ered at each subsequent entry, families were forced to incorporate and sustain the fictions told at previous entry hearings. At each inquiry hearing, more and more details of family life became ‘‘fixed’’ as responses were recorded to create an o≈cial family history. Subsequent testimony, both within an individual inquiry hearing and across families, had to match that given previously. The fictions, therefore, became an inescapable element of the stories that the Chinese told about themselves. The fate of Chan Gut Fook shows how the stories o√ered by the applicants had to remain the same over time, and how failure to retain consistency over multiple entries could result in exclusion.∞Ω The inspector in the Law Section recommended the exclusion of Chan Gut Fook because the alleged brother and father of the applicant left for China and subsequently returned and were examined by the Immigration Service. ‘‘Under such circumstances it would seem that applicant should experience no di≈culty in establishing an honest claim. On the other hand said conditions will permit of giving full weight to any discrepancies on essential points which may appear in the case.’’≤≠ Likewise, Loey Kee was excluded because he claimed entry as a son of a native, but his file noted that he had entered previously as a merchant.≤∞ His attorney argued on appeal that it was not likely that Loey Kee was properly entered as a merchant, since at his last entry he was only twenty years old and no a≈davits supporting his merchant status were pro√ered. The attorney argued that the witnesses at Loey Kee’s earlier entry, including two white witnesses, had o√ered statements concerning his birth in Sacramento. Nevertheless, the inspectors were skeptical about the failure of the file to reflect his nativity, so they excluded him.

Chinese Community It seems likely that the implementation of this subterfuge not only changed the ways in which the Chinese spoke about and understood themselves but also changed the ways in which they interacted as a community and with the legacies

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greater population. A national survey in 2001 showed that many non-Asian Americans found Chinese Americans to be ‘‘hard to get close to or make friends with.’’≤≤ Moreover, this same survey found that one out of five Americans believed that Chinese Americans were ‘‘clannish’’ and ‘‘not likely to participate in their community.’’ While ‘‘hardworking’’ and ‘‘industrious,’’ Chinese Americans were perceived as ‘‘stand-o≈sh’’ and ‘‘non-participatory.’’ The same survey discovered that a clear majority of Chinese Americans were disturbed that they were seen as foreigners or as ‘‘permanent aliens’’ by non– Asian Americans. Overall, the survey showed that, despite long and significant contributions to U.S. society, Chinese Americans were viewed as isolated from the general U.S. community. Interestingly enough, despite Chinese American dismay over their characterization by the rest of Americans, this depiction of the Chinese has been pervasive during the past one hundred years, if not longer.≤≥ Two seminal studies of the Chinese community took as their starting point the problem of the Chinese as ‘‘outsiders’’ within U.S. society. Rose Hum Lee, author of the classic 1960 study, The Chinese in the United States of America, depicts life within the Chinese community. She believes that such information is useful to facilitate the eventual integration of the Chinese into the greater U.S. society. She herself describes her principal reason for writing her book: ‘‘The primary one is the understanding of how the process of acculturation, assimilation and integration operates when persons with distinguishable physical characteristics, bearing a di√erent culture, come into contact with people of European origin.’’≤∂ Seen as a model of ‘‘Chinese acculturation’’ in U.S. academic society, Lee was interested in helping other Chinese, ‘‘the marginal and the insecure, who waver between the Chinese and the American ways of life, finding neither of them wholly adequate’’ to ‘‘comprehend the nature, composition and problems of their group.’’≤∑ Stanford Lyman, on the other hand, in Chinese Americans (1974) explicitly rejected Lee’s perspective and set out to explain why Chinese were so resistant to assimilation. Lyman described the cultural, political, and social traditions that the Chinese transplanted from their villages. Where Lee’s study rejoices in the ability of the Chinese to assimilate into white, American society, much as she had, Lyman’s work looks closely at the barriers to assimilation, both those created by the Chinese themselves and by the larger American society through legal and physical separation in the form of discriminatory legislation and the creation of Chinatowns. Thus, the best-developed social theories concerning the Chinese focus on the social isolation experienced by Chinese both historically and in the present.≤∏ Similarly, historians have long noted the exclusion 134

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of Chinese from American political, social, and economic life.≤π One possible explanation for this characterization of the Chinese may be, in fact, ironically, that the intense desire of Chinese to come to the United States created the circumstances which led to their perceived and real isolation that has lasted to this day. It is not hard to see why Chinese remained isolated. Chinese built networks of support and information and were tied to each other through the retelling of fictive family narratives. By relying and building on stereotypes, they confirmed the belief that their world was impenetrable so as to outwit immigration o≈cers. Key to immigrants’ ability to resist regulation were the strong community ties and networks that extended back to villages in China.≤∫ The richness of organizational ties within Chinatowns, ranging from mutual aid societies to kinship or native place associations and secret brotherhoods, has long been established as a distinctive feature of the Chinese among ethnic communities in the United States.≤Ω While fear of detection and deportation cannot explain by itself Chinese isolation and the unique development of Chinatowns as organizations providing social and economic services, it seems likely that such concerns led the Chinese to be wary of interacting with the greater population, especially with government agencies, and to develop alternative support networks. Close community ties also could have negative consequences. Three of the twenty deportation files examined resulted from anonymous tips to the Immigration Service. Although the tipsters’ identities and motivations remained undisclosed in the documents, it can be imagined that disclosure would be a powerful weapon or threat. One case, where the identities of the tipsters were known, underscores the complex issues and emotions that were raised within the Chinese community through the practice of creating paper families. In one such case, the existence of a twelve-year-old girl in Hawaii who was admitted illegally when she was two was brought to the attention of the Immigration Service by her paper siblings upon the death of their mother. Her predicament became a cause célèbre as some of her siblings a≈rmed in open court that she was a true sister, while others denied her status. The case illuminated the predicament of many who had purchased papers—she did not know who her real family was, she had immigrated without knowing that her actions were illegal, and now she had been abandoned by members of the only family she knew. Notwithstanding, others felt that the illegality of her status could not be erased by her ignorance or youth. Ultimately, friends set up a trust fund for her education, and she was granted residency in the United States as a student, even though she was stripped of her naturalization papers. legacies

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Her file abruptly ends during World War II. A letter from a U.S. Army general asking for her to be allowed to work for them because of a shortage of typists, and a letter from her school noting that she had failed to register as a full-time student, thus violating her immigration status, reflect the problems she faced because of her background as a paper daughter. Similarly, the exclusion of Gee Hen Dick in 1936 by the Board of Special Inquiry exemplifies the vulnerability of individuals to the actions of others within the community.≥≠ Gee Hen Dick and his brother first encountered the Immigration Administration when they applied for admission as sons of a native. The service in 1928 conducted the usual lengthy interrogation, in which both applicants, as well as Gee Hen Dick’s father and a previously admitted brother, Gee Hen Jin, appeared as witnesses in support of their entry. According to the board chairman, ‘‘It would appear that the alleged father and alleged brother have repudiated their former statements regarding the size of their home village in order to agree with the size of the village as given by the two applicants, but the record of the present cases convincingly shows that false testimony was given on this point in 1922 or that the testimony in the present case is false. In either case the reliability of the present testimony as credible evidence is open to serious questioning.’’≥∞ He went on: In 1922 the alleged father had one 1 son, GEE HEN JIN admitted to the U.S. At that time it was claimed that GEE HEN JIN had lived from infancy in the NGIN HING village, Sun Ning District, which is the same village named as the place of birth and residence of the 2 applicants in the present case. At that time a description of the NGN HING village was given by the alleged father and the then applicant, and this description was in exact agreement; the description of the village as given at that time was a 12 house village in addition to a schoolhouse, the dwelling houses being located in 3 rows of 4 houses each; the village was then said to have had 2 entrance gates—1 at the head and at the tail, and both of the principals made a definite statement that the alleged father owned but 1 house in the village. In the present case GEE HEN JIN the alleged [prior landed] brother repudiates his former statement regarding the size of his home village when he left there to come to the U.S. for the first time; he claims that his village had 26 houses at that time and states that the entrance gates which formally existed have been taken away, and that his father now owns and has owned continuously since 1914 2 houses in that village. The alleged father now claims to have made a visit to his home village in 1922, a few months after he testified in the case of GEE HEN JIN that the village consisted of 12 houses; during the present

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examination he first stated that when he arrived in that village in 1922 there were 11 or 12 houses there, and when again questioned testified as to the correctness of that statement; but when he was told that GEE HEN JIN had testified that there were 26 houses in that village when GEE HEN JIN left there to come to the U.S., the alleged father immediately repudiated his former distinct statements in that respect and claimed that he had never made such statement; the alleged father now states that he has owned 2 houses in that village continuously since 1914, thus contradicting his former statement in 1922 that he owned but 1 house in that village, and also contradicts the former statement that there were 2 entrance gates to the village by saying that there never were any entrance gates. The size of the village in question is now given as 32 dwellings houses and 1 school, and all the principals are in agreement as to the present size of the village. While all of the principals testified that there had been some houses built in the NGIN HING village since 1922, the present testimony of each of them is to the e√ect that the village was larger in 1922 than the testimony then given showed it to be.≥≤

Gee Hen Dick appealed and he was subsequently admitted. Gee Hen Dick left the United States in 1933. Prior to his return, the Immigration Service received copies of crib sheets that were purported to have been used for his 1928 entry. Inspector Z. B. Jackson stated in his memo to the file, Coaching papers connected with [Gee Hen Dick’s] family are on file in the O≈ce of the Inspector in Charge of the Oriental Division and should be given consideration in connection with the subsequent appearance of any of the above-named persons before this Service. The coaching materials referred to [were] used by GEE HEN DICK, GEE HEN FOR and GEE BING YOUNG in e√ecting the admission of the former two in March 1929.

Based on this evidence, the service denied Gee Hen Dick re-entry, a decision he appealed on September 15, 1936. While the matter was pending appeal before the Department of Labor, the department directed the Board of Special Inquiry to reopen the case to consider further evidence that had been gathered at Ellis Island during the entry of three unrelated immigrants who claimed to be from the same village and who called as a witness for their entry a villager they alleged to be their father, Gee Wing Duck. The Chairman summarized the ‘‘situation’’:

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The witnesses in the New York case, three in number, are in accord that this applicant [Gee Hen Dick] is in truth one GEE SUEY FOON, only son of GEE YOU NGIM, owner of the sixth house, third row from the head in NGIN HING village, claimed home in China of all these parties, that GEE YOU SHUCK (marriage name of our applicant’s alleged father), who actually is as alleged in our case the owner of the third house in the fourth row in the same village, fraudulently e√ected the admission as his sons of this applicant GEE HING JIN and GEE HING SIM. They state further that GEE HEN FOR is in fact the true son of GEE YOU CHUCK or GEE BING YOUNG, and the only son of that man now alive although he had some daughters. They agree further that GEE HING JIN is in truth their fellow villager, GEE YEN DEP, who lives in the third house of the sixth row in their village, and that GEE HING SIM, real name unknown, is the son of GEE LIP CHOOEY, a Chinese resident of New York, whose home in China is elsewhere than NGIN HING VILLAGE. These three New York witnesses readily identified photographs of the applicant, his alleged father, GEE HING JIN and GEE HEN FOR, whose real name is said to be GEE NGIT DIN. The applicant categorically denies the truth of all these assertions concerning him and the family of his alleged father and claims to have no knowledge of any New York witnesses except the applicant there, whom he tentatively identifies as GEE TON of his village. . . . The applicant is admittedly unable to furnish any proof that these allegations in the New York case are not true. In our consideration of this matter we have kept in mind the fact [that] the excluding action of the New York Board was based, apparently, on the fact that our applicant’s representations as to the real identity of the New York applicant and of the occupants of the house in the home village in which GEE WING DUCK claims his family has always lived are not in conformity to the representations on those same features made by the parties in the New York case.≥≥

The chairman went on to describe why he found the testimony of the New York witnesses and, in particular the evidence of Gee Wing Duck, to be more credible than that of the applicant: It will be noted that GEE WING DUCK testifies that this GEE YOU NIGM, the applicant’s real father, who is now in San Francisco or in this vicinity, is the source of his information regarding our applicant’s predicament, and that this information came to him (GEE WING DUCK) in this wise: Applicant’s real father set about to assist the applicant in his present di≈culties and one of the means he attempted was to obtain the aid of applicant’s 138

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‘‘paper’’ brother GEE HING SIM in New York, feeling that because of this ‘‘Immigration’’ relationship this alleged brother was duty bound to come to the applicant’s aid. The alleged brother took up the matter with his father, GEE LIP CHOOEY, and the latter solicited the aid and advice of GEE WING DUCK, as being a sort of head of the GEE family in New York as well as a fellow villager of the applicant. Unless it can be shown that GEE WING DUCK was prepared for this line of examination, and most thoroughly prepared, prior to this appearance before the Board of Special Inquiry on November 6, 1936, we believe that no reasonable person could reach any conclusion other than that his statements in the above convention were true statements of the facts. If they were not, we are at a loss to understand just how this GEE WING DUCK learned of our applicant’s predicament, and it certainly is beyond reason to believe that GEE WING DUCK could have fabricated such a complex and detailed account without very careful prearrangement.≥∂

It is apparent from this case just how vulnerable the family histories were to exposure. Although at one point during the discussion of the numerous inconsistencies in the testimony the inspectors asked Gee Hen Dick, ‘‘Do you know of any enemies you have?’’ thereby suggesting a possible (and exonerating) reason for the discrepancies, the circumstances through which the damaging information was revealed to the Immigration Service do not really suggest any malice or intention to harm Gee Hen Dick.≥∑ Rather, the stories told by the two unrelated ‘‘families’’ from the same village were simply inconsistent. When confronted with the inconsistency and the threat of deportation, both parties attempted to protect their own and thwart exclusion. The development of paper families led to systematic changes in the organizational and community dynamic of the Chinese. Recent immigration research has started to highlight these cross-border ties within immigrant communities and their significance to the form and duration of the immigrant experience. For example, Peggy Levitt has studied the types of links immigrants maintain with their countries of origin and the impact of these links on the relationship between the immigrant and his new host society. Migration begins in and spreads through social networks. A social network is a set of interpersonal ties connecting migrant, return migrants, and nonmigrants in the sending and receiving countries through kinship, friendship, and attachment to a shared place of origin. Once a network is in place, it becomes more likely that additional migration to that region will occur. The risks and costs of movement for subsequent migrants are lower legacies

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because there is a group of ‘‘experienced experts’’ already in the receiving country, who greet newcomers and serve as their guides. Because these well-established migrants help new arrivals find jobs and housing, they also increase migration’s economic rewards.≥∏

The use of fictive kinship ties during the Chinese Exclusion Period cannot be seen as a fragmented marketplace of individual acts. Rather, the process took place within a network of sponsored mobility. The stakes involved—the price of purchasing a steamer ticket and, often, a fee for the use of a slot, as well as the lengthy journey and hardships associated with entry—led would-be immigrants to plan these entry attempts carefully. Moreover, because of the demands placed by the policing of the Immigration Service, purchase of kinship ties could not be random. Applicants had to share the same dialect as their purported families and had to match fairly closely in age and appearance to the identity they were assuming. Thus, individuals could not use any slot, but had to search for and select slots that could plausibly match. Widespread networking within extended families and communities was required. Additionally, because the fictions had to be remembered and retold upon subsequent entries, a web of interdependence and mutual obligation was created. Families had to incorporate new members and had to be relied upon to appear and to testify in accordance with the predetermined story. Concomitantly, a web of mutual liability was formed, as the possibility for exposure bound both the paper son and his purported family. Thus, systems of interaction were developed that required organization and coordination, lasting over long periods of time and encompassing Chinese communities in the United States and China.

Institutional Legacies Despite the intricate subterfuges the Chinese used and their long-lasting effects, the Chinese were never entirely successful in their ploys. The Immigration Service was never wholly convinced by the Chinese ‘‘performance’’ during the entry process. It is not surprising that immigration regulators did not trust the Chinese—they were not paranoid, but just saw what was going on. Regulators noted that Chinese families had too many sons and not enough daughters. Indeed, even a quick perusal of the records reveals that families comprised almost all sons. For example, out of the eleven applicants who alleged having siblings in the 1930s entries, only two claimed to have sisters. Seven of the immigrants claimed at least three brothers (one claimed seven and an140

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other four). Under U.S. immigration law, all these men were entitled to enter as sons of natives. Similarly, applicants during this period claimed only to have uncles. As one regulator skeptically calculated, Consider, taking the present year as an average, that possibly 10,000 to 12,000 Chinese claiming citizenship by birth in this country have come to our ports in the last twelve years; consider as well that virtually they are all males and all born in the Pacific States; allow also for some mortality and such a number of absentees as will keep the stream flowing hereafter at about the rate mentioned—1,000 per annum; and bear in mind that these claimants are practically all at least 20 years of age, or born some time prior to 1884, what married female population of the Pacific States should there have been twenty years ago? There were in those states in 1900, according to the census, 1,746, and of married and widowed in the entire continental portion of the Unites States, but 2,316. Chinese females were never numerous in the United States, but were fewer in the earlier days of Chinese immigration than they are now. If all of the children born of Chinese couples were sons, all returned to China, and all survived to return to this country, it is making a draft on its credulity that is hard to honor when this country is asked to believe that among its other staple products it was for years prior to, say 1884, having Chinese male citizens born to it at the rate of 1,000 per annum.≥π

Just as the Chinese were a√ected by the ruses they employed, the practices and techniques employed by immigration o≈cers came to form the fundamental basis for immigration regulation. With each tactic the Chinese deployed, inspectors responded by implementing another investigative or interrogation technique.

Yee Han Yee Han left the United States on February 11,1903, for China.≥∫ Before leaving, he obtained an a≈davit witnessed by a notary public in which he claimed he was a citizen of the United States and had been born in San Francisco. Following a two-year trip, on May 22, 1905, he returned to the Port of San Francisco, where he submitted his 1903 a≈davit and that of two family acquaintances in support of his re-entry. Like the vast majority of Chinese who were not immediately admitted from the steamer, Yee Han was sent to the detention shed at the Pacific Mail Dock. On June 7, Yee Han was first interviewed. One week later, the Chinese inspector assigned to the case determined who would be legacies

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called as witnesses for his entry and notified them to appear on June 21, 1905, for questioning before a lone Chinese inspector who would be assisted by a stenographer. Although Yee Han was represented by counsel, he was not permitted to consult with his attorney during this process. Interviews were conducted in Yee Han’s native dialect, using a di√erent interpreter for each interview. The interviews were brief and probed for information that could verify Yee Han’s claim to birth in the United States.≥Ω Witnesses were asked similar questions regarding themselves (age, address, occupation, etc.), their relationship with Yee Han’s parents, and their knowledge of Yee Han’s birth and life in the United States. The witnesses and Yee Han all alleged that he was born in San Francisco in 1886 as the only child of his parents. Following the failure of his father’s business, his parents returned to China when Yee Han was eight or nine years old. No one was able to recall the name of the steamer or the precise date or port of departure, though each alleged that Yee Han’s parents left at some point during the middle of the year. Witnesses did not know (and Yee Han himself was not asked) with whom Yee Han lived after his parents’ departure. Everyone interviewed, however, believed that he began to work as a laundryman and then as a cook in a Chinese store. Yee Han spoke and understood almost no English. Yee Han’s inability to speak English was typical of the vast majority of Chinese immigrants whose work and social life resided firmly within the Chinese community and o√ered few opportunities to interact with the larger English-speaking population. Chinese, and especially those whose work involved menial labor and had only passing contact with non-Chinese, often spoke little or no English despite having resided in the United States for extended periods. ‘‘For the Chinese laundryman, to be able to speak English is something extra rather than necessary. It is not that he does not want to learn. He has, in fact, no time, no chance, and no facility for learning. He has not the incentive to learn English. . . . ‘In this sort of menial labor,’ one [laundryman] says, ‘I can get along speaking only ‘yes’ and ‘no.’ ’’∂≠ After reviewing the interviews, on June 29, 1905, the inspector excluded Yee Han based on a determination that his birth in the United States had not been satisfactorily established. Following appeal by Yee Han’s counsel to the acting secretary of commerce and labor, the case was returned on July 24,1905 for further investigation centering on the circumstances of his parents’ departure to China. On July 31 the file was returned to the San Francisco o≈ce for reinvestigation and report and, following the inspector’s submission of more information on August 11 on August 24, the appeal was dismissed. Two days later, Yee Han was deported. 142

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The manner in which he was detained, interrogated, and deported typifies the procedures employed by immigration o≈cers. Given the limited resources, delay between inspections and further delay in the analysis of the case were not uncommon. Indeed, responding to the commissioner’s impatient request to know what caused the lag in the reinvestigation, the inspector explained: This case was handed to me on July 31st, just about closing time. August 1st was spent entirely on this case; I worked all day long on it. As is known, the Department requested that the records of this o≈ce for many months prior to and subsequent to a certain date be examined in the e√ort to prove or disprove the claim as to the departure of certain Chinese persons for China. At this task I have worked whenever I could get a spare moment from the pressing current cases. The registration books covering the period in question (1886) contain hundreds of names, and as the claim was made in this case that the persons in question might have returned to China under different names, much more work was necessitated by reason of the fact that descriptions had to be examined as well as the names. On August 1st I also heard the witnesses whose a≈davits had filed on appeal and spent a considerable time not only in hearing them, but in securing their attendance at this o≈ce. On Wednesday August 2d, I left at 8:30 in the morning to board the S.S. Siberia, which had just arrived, and from that date (the second) to August 8th my time was practically all occupied in turning out the native cases assigned to me on the steamer. I was repeatedly instructed that all cases had to be turned in with the reports one way or the other within five days after the steamer docked, and in order to do this I assure you I had little time to spend in the long and slow examination of the records. Had I had my own way about it I should have taken at least four days steady work upon this case alone, to secure all of the data asked for by the department and to answer all of the erroneous statements made by the attorney in his brief on appeal. Time was also spent in this case examining the records at the customhouse, also records at the City Hall, both of which consumed considerable time. I beg to state that in view of the fact that I did manage to finish all my cases within the time limit, despite many delays by the Chinese appearing at this o≈ce to testify, I was a bit proud to be able to report on the case of Yee Han as soon as I did. I also desire to state that in my search of the records and in all of my work upon this case I received absolutely no assistance from any o≈cer of this department.∂∞

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O≈cials outside the local station saw as problematic the common exclusion of applicants because of the inability to a≈rmatively discredit their factual statements. For example, a series of letters written during Yee Han’s appeal exemplified the positions of local and federal immigration o≈cials regarding the standard for exclusion. Defending the procedures used by the San Francisco bureau, the commissioner-general wrote to the acting secretary describing why employees believed exclusion was warranted: The Bureau feels thoroughly convinced upon careful review of this record and in light of the extensive experience with cases of a similar character in the past that the agreement of the witnesses concerning the material facts has been brought about by pre-arrangement and coaching. San Francisco has been for a number of years the Mecca of Chinese who have gained unlawful entry to this country through smuggling operation: this is because of the fact that it is practically impossible to apprehend and arrest them in the extensive and densely populated portion of that city known as ‘‘Chinatown’’. The very interests at stake in a case like this must cause administrative o≈cers to handle it carefully. The applicant is not in possession of any evidence which would enable him to enter the United States on any other plea than that of birth here. This man is no exception to the general rule that a Chinaman living in this country and unmarried, will take any risk whatever to visit his native country and secure a wife, it being part, in fact that most important part, of their religious belief that they must leave progeny to worship at their graves. The methods of examining witnesses at the port cannot be varied to any considerable extent, and every variation which has been adopted has immediately been thoroughly mastered by the Chinese and persons interested in their cases. The Bureau does not stand alone in considering Chinese testimony offered under circumstances like this, incredible. Congress itself realized this peculiarity of the race and required in the cases of domiciled merchants that witnesses other than Chinese should testify. Moreover, the courts have again and again rejected Chinese testimony—not, it is true, specifically because it was Chinese, but upon the broader ground that it was incredible.

Removed from daily interaction with the Chinese, those in Washington, D.C., were sometimes skeptical of determinations by local authorities, which appeared arbitrary. Thus, in this case, unconvinced of the propriety of the decision, Acting Secretary of the Department of Commerce and Labor James Garfield responded to the commissioner of immigration in the Port of San

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Francisco with concern about the failure to a≈rmatively disprove certain information alleged by Yee Han. He wrote: ‘‘The department returns the appeal record of the alleged native, Yee Han . . . as it is not satisfied to render an excluding decision on such appeal on the ground, principally, that the a≈rmative statements of the applicant and his witnesses to the e√ect that his parents left your port on or about a certain date for their native country, are disproved merely by the negative condition that the departure records fail to show their embarkation.’’∂≤ A postscript to the letter from the acting commissionergeneral of immigration, who forwarded the letter to the San Francisco Bureau, added, The Acting Secretary, when signing this letter, stated to me that he desired it made plain to you that he wishes a complete statement with regard to the existence, non-existence, reliability, unreliability, and condition in general of the records of departure at the time claimed in this case. He noted particularly your comment at the bottom of page 22, to the e√ect that it is impossible, from the data given, to search your records to verify or disprove the departure of applicant’s parents.∂≥

The response by the investigator responsible for this case then described the ‘‘meticulous fashion’’ in which departure records had been kept by the Port of San Francisco. In addition, the inspector pointed out that the registration books identified departing Chinese using ‘‘place of birth, the age, occupation, last place of residence, and in former days [before the use of photographs] the description of the departing Chinese person.’’ Thus, he said, The Chinese sometimes have as many as half a dozen names, and this is the reason why your o≈cers are so particular in procuring any name under which the Chinese person in question is ever known to have gone, and in very few instances, and in fact such instances are almost exceptional, are the relatives and intimate friends of a Chinese person ignorant of all the names of the man about whom they are testifying. If one of the witnesses does not know the man’s individual name, chances are pretty good that another witness will know such name, and after interviewing two, three, four people in a case, all the names under which the man goes will most likely be brought to light. [Applicant’s] counsel does not appear to take into account that while a man might change his name to hide his identity, he cannot change his physical description, and in the year 1886, in which the alleged father of the applicant in this case is supposed to have departed for China, the descrip-

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tions of the persons departing were taken and recorded, and today form a part of such record.∂∂

Now convinced of the bureau’s procedure and reasoning in this case, the acting secretary dismissed the appeal, and Yee Han was deported. A further examination of Yee Han’s case reveals the no-win situation that applicants were placed in. Another reason for Yee Han’s exclusion was described by the inspector: Applicant’s counsel takes exception to my having made special mention of the fact that applicant did not attend the Midwinter Fair held in the City in 1894. Although not in the service at that time, I personally recall the Fair, and especially the extraordinary interest manifested in it by the Chinese of San Francisco. Those who are familiar with Chinese know of their great fondness for fairs, circuses, etc., and at the Midwinter Fair they literally flocked in hundreds and thousands to the fair grounds. It is therefore a very unusual circumstance if a bona fide native born, or one who was in the City during the year 1894 did not attend the fair.∂∑

Nevertheless, further on in his memo, the inspector noted that Yee Han’s answers fell into a larger pattern: Knowing nothing of the conditions about which he attempts to describe, [applicant’s] counsel considers my statement that the applicant was probably coached by others in the Shed as ‘‘highly problematic.’’ During recent stress of work at this port when many natives were held in the Shed pending appeal, re-examination, etc., it was an amusing fact that nearly every one of the new so-called natives, who were placed in the Shed with these men before examination, when they came to be interrogated by the inspector, told nearly the same story, gave the same stereotyped answers, and mentioned almost invariably a few stock fires, the Midwinter Fair, quarantine of Chinatown, etc. . . .∂∏

On the one hand, Yee Han was ‘‘unusual’’ and aroused the inspectors’ suspicions because he failed to attend the Midwinter Fair and could not o√er any description of the event. On the other hand, the inspector was suspicious because Yee Han o√ered what the inspector considered ‘‘stereotyped answers’’ to other questions, suggesting he had been coached. No matter what Yee Han answered, inspectors were suspicious. Either the failure to remember or the ability to remember was used against the applicant according to the inspector’s inclination and personal judgment. 146

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This is not to say there was no attempt by the bureau to find a sure and uniform means of assessing the veracity of statements. However, given the limited ability to verify information, both because of time pressures to form quick judgments and because of substantive issues, inspectors relied on the consistency of responses within and across interviews. They asked similar and detailed questions of the applicants and their witnesses in order to ferret out inconsistencies and, thus, it was hoped, fraud. Inspectors marked the margins of the typed transcripts to indicate sections relating to one issue, then compared the answers given on each topic across witnesses, summarizing their findings in a memorandum to the Chinese Inspector in Charge of the Port of San Francisco in which they made their recommendation and laid out their reasoning. The letters consisted of short summaries of the testimony, an analysis of the inspector’s conclusions, and a summary of any further investigation by the inspector. In all cases, the recommendation of the inspector was a≈rmed by the Inspector in Charge of the Port. Although in certain circumstances, as in the case of Yee Han, the commissioner sought further evidence from the inspector, rarely were the initial findings overruled. Thus, in the sample of twenty cases from 1905, only in one case did the commissioner overturn the inspector’s findings. Local inspectors, acting as fact finders, privileged their findings to those made at the appellate level by the Department of Commerce and Labor. As the acting commissioner general of San Francisco in Yee Han’s case argued to the acting secretary, I respectfully submit, therefore, that the Department, removed as it is from the immediate scene of action, with no opportunity to form any personal impression regarding witnesses while under examination, should not reverse an excluding decision of this character, rendered by the Commissioner of Immigration and his o≈cers (the particular inspector who handled this case being one of the most e≈cient in his employ), who are on the scene, have examined the witnesses, and are unanimously of the opinion that said witnesses are testifying falsely.∂π

Analysis and Discussion The story of Yee Han’s detention, interrogation, and subsequent exclusion from the United States as set out in his administrative file exemplifies the tasks and techniques immigration regulators developed and employed as they attempted to administer the Chinese exclusion laws. First, immigration regu-

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lators attempted to gather and analyze personal information from petitioners and their witnesses—thus they sought from Yee Han information about common events such as the Midwinter Fair as well as personal information unique to Yee Han and his family. Second, they employed various identification techniques, including what the inspector in Yee Han’s case described as detailed physical descriptions of Chinese entering and leaving the United States. Finally, they sought to coordinate, systematize, and routinize the administrative process. Although Yee Han’s and his witnesses’ interviews were relatively brief, they were all asked similar questions. Additionally, the inspector sought to verify the information o√ered using older entry and exit records, demonstrating the use of record keeping and retrieval within the administration. This case also shows the recurring issues and tensions for Chinese immigration regulation that were central to the development of the tasks and techniques developed by the administration. As the internal memoranda found in Yee Han’s file reveal, immigration o≈cers were worried about setting and following generally applicable standards for verifying immigrant responses and about the caseload and amount of work required to properly process each immigrant, and they were mindful of the discretion with which they handled matters. Despite concerns for procedural fairness, however, it is also clear that inspectors processed immigrants in the belief that all Chinese were attempting to enter by fraud. Regulatory agencies attempt to systematize information as a way to process the objects of regulation, thereby defining the objects through their processing. But, through this process of defining, they organize and fashion themselves the administrative apparatus. The regulators themselves become defined as they sought to define the objects of their regulation through the control of the form and substance of regulatory knowledge. Because this mutual construction is dialectical, both administrative and personal identities are necessarily processes; they are not static. Thus, there are rarely, if ever, clear victories; rather, as regulators deployed each strategy to control, understand, and process immigrants, the Chinese launched counter-strategies, triggering a further response from the regulators. The dialogue therefore was not fixed but was constantly changing and open to change. Consequently, immigration administration can also be seen as constantly evolving and adapting to the material circumstances of the micro-interaction with immigrants. If the study of the Chinese and immigration o≈cers shows one thing, it is that the study of micro-interactions matters. A comparison to modern immigration administration would require an in-depth analysis well beyond the

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scope of this volume. Moreover, the relative simplicity of the immigration situation during the period of Chinese Exclusion, when only one group was considered illegal and therefore subject to exclusion, has long passed. Immigrant groups and their entry strategies and points of entry are diverse and complex today. Current U.S. immigration administration encompasses three organizations within the Department of Homeland Security, as well as o≈ces in the departments of Labor, State, Justice, and Health and Human Service and leveraging the resources of a range of non-state and third-party actors including airlines and private security companies. Nonetheless, there are certain institutional legacies from the earlier period that have become central to immigration administration.

Practice Legacies ≤ Even taking into account the relative paucity of research on the development of the Immigration Service with respect to Chinese immigration during the exclusion period, it is widely accepted that the foundations of immigration policy and practice developed directly from the experiences of regulators with the Chinese.∂∫ This finding supports what students of administrative agencies have recognized: policies are often determined not by rules or legislation but by the activities of what Michael Lipsky calls ‘‘street-level bureaucrats.’’ Lipsky contends that public service employees are generally considered low-level, but, ‘‘when taken together, the individual decisions of these workers become, or add to, agency policy.’’∂Ω Policy is made by these street-level bureaucrats in two related respects: (1) they exercise wide discretion in decisions and (2) when taken in concert, their individual actions add up to agency behavior. Because most people encounter the government not through letters to congressmen or by attendance at school board meetings, but through their teachers or the policeman on the street corner, these encounters make up the bulk of interaction with government regulators. That the customs o≈cial stationed at the dock determined immigration policy when the immigration service began in 1885 can easily be imagined, as the system was designed as a decentralized bureaucracy with large amounts of autonomy and discretion left to local authorities. Even when regulation was centralized, the details and daily practice of administration continued to take place in the local o≈ces on a daily basis between immigrants and the inspectors and interpreters assigned to their cases. The general mandate to exclude Chinese laborers took shape and meaning through the administrative process as experienced by the regulators within the San Francisco o≈ce—the clearing-

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house for the largest number of Chinese immigrants. The immigration administration developed its capacity to serve as gatekeepers. In doing so they learned to become policemen, judges, record keepers, and jailers. The vast majority of Chinese immigrants’ encounters with immigration policy is similarly with immigration regulators rather than in negotiation with legislators or high-level government functionaries. On a daily basis, each individual o≈cer made countless decisions about the immigrants with whom they interacted. O≈cers manifested their discretion in their ability to determine the nature, amount, and quality of investigation and interrogation each one received. They decided who would be admitted and whose behavior and responses should be overlooked or reassessed. Modern-day films such as Green Card continue to reflect the antics that would-be immigrants to the United States engage in to thwart exclusion and the wide discretion a√orded investigators. The premise of Green Card is the desire of a Frenchman to enter and stay in the United States. To achieve this, he decides to marry—for immigration purposes—a U.S. citizen. The two lead characters coach each other on the answers to possible questioning. In one scene, the Frenchman rifles through the contents of his alleged wife’s bathroom, attempting to learn and memorize the types of soap and cosmetics she uses. In another, the two carefully construct a photo album that records the places they went on vacation together, coming to agreement about what they did and saw on these fictive vacations. They invent anecdotes concerning their alleged in-laws. The experience they have with ins o≈cials, while very different than that experienced by the Chinese, is nevertheless fraught with anxiety because they do not know what the o≈cers will do or ask. They experience relief when they are able to ‘‘pass’’ the questioning concerning their alleged love a√air and marriage. Clearly, this modern-day vignette shows a striking commonality with the underlying characteristics of immigration processing—the discretion a√orded to the immigration o≈cers and the detailed questioning of the two in order to find consistent answers—as well as the presumption of fraudulent entry that immigration o≈cers at the turn of the century first laid out. Likewise, they show that the process remains virtually the same today as it was during the era of Chinese exclusion.∑≠ Calvin Trillin provides a humorous glimpse into the daily activities of the Houston district immigration o≈ce that underscores the techniques that attorneys employ to navigate the obscure routine of immigration processors.∑∞ Although the Houston o≈ce is considered one of the more ‘‘e≈cient’’ o≈ces in the service, Trillin notes that ‘‘about the kindest remark that is ever made concerning the e≈ciency level of the Immigration and Naturalization Service 150

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is that the agency has been chronically underfinanced and overworked, and that is a remark usually made by an I.N.S. o≈cial.’’∑≤ He writes: ‘‘When people who deal regularly with the I.N.S. try to illustrate the depths of its ine≈ciency and obduracy, they often find themselves at a loss for American institutions to compare it with, and turn to foreign examples—the South Vietnamese Army, maybe, or the Bolivian Foreign Service.’’∑≥ Trillin describes the ‘‘skills’’ valuable in a successful immigration practice—namely the ability to buttonhole examiners and related understanding of the layout of the district o≈ce: Simply finding out, through the device of a shrewdly timed buttonholing, which examiner is handling which sort of visa applications is valuable in the immigration practice. So is knowing how to find him. When Immigration announced, a couple of years ago, that it was moving into its present building . . . a few immigration lawyers immediately went over to check the place out. They studied the layout of the main public room–a large room that looks a bit like a recently modernized bus station—and poked around the area that was to be restricted to those called in for their appointments with immigration examiners. They studied the possibility of access through side doors and emergency exits. Patrick Murphy [a Fulbright & Jaworski immigration attorney] . . . still carries among the papers in his briefcase a blueprint of the Houston District O≈ce of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. ‘‘A blueprint of the building is the key to the practice of immigration law,’’ he told [Trillin] that rainy Wednesday. ‘‘I beg to di√er,’’ a colleague said. ‘‘The key to the practice of immigration law is knowing that an immigration examiner who wants to go to the bathroom has to pass through the waiting room to get there.’’∑∂

Immigration attorneys e√ectively handle their cases by understanding the overburdened caseloads that immigration examiners balance. Trillin writes ‘‘One reason that lawyers are so eager to grab an immigration examiner as he walks through the waiting room is that they are often trying to juggle matters in a way that makes something good happen before something bad happens. Immigration lawyers are people who have an interest in seeing that some folders are on the top of the pile and some folders are on the bottom of the pile.’’∑∑ The attorneys’ understanding of the volume of cases being processed and their strategy of positioning files at the top or at the bottom of the pile, as well as their on-the-fly interventions while regulators move through the o≈ce, are reminiscent of the Chinese who sought to make their cases fit the criteria required by inspectors. The concept of a favorable outcome is closely linked to manipulation of the system. The attorneys in Houston, like the Chinese, work legacies

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within the system set out by regulators, and although little can be done to change the regulations, their actions can slowly whittle away the restrictions. Trillin explains how the Houston attorneys define winning a case: Immigration lawyers win time. Given calendar delays and court appeals and bureaucratic lethargy, a suspension-of-deportation action might take years. The immigration judges in Houston have almost never granted asylum to a Salvadoran, so, strictly speaking, lawyers have almost never won a Salvadoran-asylum case. On the other hand, there is a backlog of eight thousand asylum cases to be heard in Houston, there are only two immigration judges to hear them and there are three levels of appeal—so, speaking not very strictly, lawyers have won a lot of time in Salvadoran-asylum cases. In time, as immigration lawyers say, ‘‘something good could happen.’’ The client might marry a citizen—giving him permanent-resident status unless Immigration decides that the marriage is a sham. The client might find a job that makes possible permanent residence through labor certification. Congress might pass the Simpson-Mazzoli bill, which would legalize the presence of any alien who can demonstrate that he has lived in this country since before some specified date. The I.N.S. might lose the file. Meanwhile the client is in the United States, and that is what he wanted in the first place.∑∏

One could imagine a Chinese immigrant or his or her attorney echoing what a Houston attorney said: ‘‘What I do is take a bunch of diverse facts and put them into the statutory system.’’∑π Recent research on the organizational aspects of ins decision making supports the veracity of the fictional account set out in Green Card and the anecdotal description of Trillin. Janet Gilboy examines how immigration inspectors pass judgment on who should be admitted into the United States. She notes that immigration o≈cers, standing at airports and other ports of entry, deploy commonly shared categories which are developed and shaped by these o≈cers as they implement on a daily basis broader agency concerns.∑∫ Gilboy finds, as this study of Chinese immigration o≈cers has found, that the managerial and coping strategies of the individual immigration o≈cers led to the invention of categories and techniques to carry out the task of deciding who does and does not get in. ins o≈cers were given broad agency parameters and pushed to work quickly. To accomplish their tasks, they resorted to the use of stereotypes and other mechanisms—including the use of certain questions and physical markers—to come to quick decisions without, in their opinion, jeopardizing accuracy. Statisticians have remarked that variations in enforcement across federal 152

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districts also suggest that discretion at the regional level, despite one hundred years of centralized enforcement, still continues to play a major role in immigration administration. A certain amount of variation must be assumed. That the five federal districts along the Southwest border have the highest referral rate for prosecutions seems reasonable. But Oregon (Portland), Washington East (Spokane), Georgia North (Atlanta), and Utah (Salt Lake City) are also among the top fifteen regions referring immigrants for prosecution. A closer look at four of the top five districts also shows a marked variation in the median sentences, with the lowest in Texas West (San Antonio) at six months, and the highest, Arizona (Phoenix), at twenty-four months. California South (San Diego) and Texas South (Houston) fell in-between, with thirteen months and eighteen months, respectively. With strict sentencing guidelines and a 98 percent prosecution rate for referred cases, the variation cannot be accounted for by judicial discretion. Rather, variation in the investigation and enforcement of types of criminal activity within each region may account for the disparities. Individual discretion and decentralized decision making continue to be the hallmarks of immigration processing even as the regulatory apparatus has developed.

Policy Legacies ≤ When taken in concert, the individual decisions and actions of immigration o≈cers add up to the Immigration Bureau’s institutional behavior, which in turn constitutes, at least in part, the institutional culture and policy formation of the Immigration Bureau. Specifically, as immigration o≈cers interacted with the Chinese, they came to see their role as gatekeepers in a distinct manner. Not only did they receive information and process immigrants, but they became the decision makers, and, in doing so, detectives, investigators, and police. It now seems hard to imagine immigration inspectors as other than enforcement o≈cers, but their role underwent a dramatic shift after passage of the first Exclusion Act in 1882. The predominance of the perception of immigration o≈cers as quasi-police has not been without detractors, even within the ranks of immigration regulators. Indeed, the current tripartite division of immigration responsibilities at least nominally reflects the struggle over the goals to be achieved. The ins is now divided into three groups: the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services. While budget and sta≈ng of these groups will continue to demarcate the focus of U.S. immigration regulation, at least nominally, twothirds of those responsible for the entry and assimilation of immigrants will focus on border security and enforcement. This current posture of immigralegacies

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tion regulators is, however, a far cry from their stance prior to the promulgation of the Chinese as illegal. Entwined with the notion of ‘‘homeland security’’ the centrality of ‘‘enforcement’’ over ‘‘service’’ is assumed. Before 1882, the United States maintained an open-door policy. Immigration rules and regulations were designed to ensure the health and safety of passengers during the sea crossing. O≈cials patrolled and inspected incoming vessels not to catch illegal immigrants (since there were none), but to ensure that ships were maintained with adequate care. The passage of the first exclusion law necessarily changed the role of customs o≈cials , and an adversarial, rather than cooperative, relationship was created. But the extent and form of the hostility of regulators toward Chinese immigrants (and then, by extension, toward all immigrants) could not be determined a priori from exclusion. A similar relationship could have developed in a host of other regulatory arenas—from the postal service to welfare. Nevertheless, these government agencies have service, not enforcement, as their principal image and purpose. The adversarial relationship the immigration service has adopted became an accepted position because Chinese exclusion was hard to administer and because the Chinese did not acquiesce. Instead, they engaged in increasingly sophisticated ruses which required that regulators respond by implementing more sophisticated regulatory techniques, adoption of which simply created the opportunity for more subterfuge. At least two common positions seem to have derived from this positioning. First, rather than perceive that the Chinese immigrants’ behavior was created by and responsive to the process of regulation, regulators attributed the behavior to the Chinese themselves.∑Ω This feat of logic was self-serving. The manipulations the Chinese engaged in came to be seen as characteristic of them as a race; the Chinese were seen as dishonest, and innately inferior, justifying their continued exclusion. James Scott notes a similar response in his study of peasant resistance and o√ers some discussion of the same mechanism within the gender context as well. ‘‘The logic of the argument is marvelously perverse. . . . Adaptations to inequalities in power are depicted as natural characteristics of the subordinate group, a move that has, in turn, the great advantage of underlining the innate inferiority of its members when it comes to logic, truth, honesty, and reason and thereby justifying their continued domination by their betters’’∏≠ Over time, then, as more groups were categorized as excludable like the Chinese, immigration o≈cials could easily broaden the parties against which a hostile stance could and should be taken. The United States identified the Chinese as the first illegal aliens, but quickly

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saw other groups as also undesirable. As early as 1907, the government began to look closely at what was called a ‘‘massive emigration’’ from southern and eastern Europe and from Asian countries other than China, and it began controlling the entry of immigrants from the lower classes by requiring literacy tests and limiting outright the number of immigrants from certain countries. That position culminated in the Immigration Acts of 1921 and 1924, when the United States implemented a quota system based on Census figures which sought to attain an acceptable mixture of nationalities that met certain education and income levels. As one historian aptly said, the U.S. immigration policy went from being an ‘‘open door’’ to a ‘‘Dutch door,’’ where the lower door was firmly shut.∏∞ Some analysts have argued that the 1965 recodification of immigration laws represented a movement away from discriminatory immigration policies and a reopening of the door to the United States for immigrants from all countries. However, many others have noted that while the laws no longer are an overt attempt at racial balancing, immigration policy, nevertheless, continues to embody ideals of exclusion. Current immigration legislation codifies the presumption that all immigrants seeking to enter the United States do so under a veil of suspicion and may commit fraud. The burden of proof rests firmly on the immigrant to a≈rmatively prove that he or she falls within an accepted category for admission.∏≤ All aliens admitted to the United States must fall within two categories: (1) those seeking entry for a limited period of time and for a limited purpose (‘‘non-immigrants’’) and (2) those wishing to become permanent residents of the United States (‘‘immigrants’’).∏≥ Because entry standards for immigrants are much sti√er than for nonimmigrants, the Immigration and Nationality Act first presumes that any alien desiring to enter the United States is an immigrant who must o√er proof of eligibility under an immigration category or demonstrate that he or she is a nonimmigrant. At every level the bar is set with the presumption to exclude rather than to admit. Not only must the immigrant generally demonstrate qualification for an immigrant visa under one of the categories of admission, but it is presumed that the visa will be subject to numerical limitation unless the immigrant can establish entitlement to another classification.∏∂ Second, as noted earlier, in the context of class conflict, economic depression, and rising unemployment during the mid-nineteenth century, the identification of the Chinese immigrant as the problem and the subsequent exclusion of the Chinese as the solution to a host of thorny domestic issues o√ered a blueprint and justification for future uses of exclusion. In other words,

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the usefulness of anti-immigration rhetoric during di≈cult economic and social periods was learned and legitimized through Chinese exclusion. As Gyory put it, The Chinese Exclusion Act neither caused nor made inevitable later restrictions on immigration, but it certainly lent them legitimacy. It made future bans and quota systems easier to justify and easier to accept. By the early twentieth century, when many of the Act’s original sponsors had long since passed away, Chinese exclusion remained firmly embedded in the nation’s laws. . . . The Exclusion Act legitimized racism, and racism legitimized further exclusion. . . . After permanent renewal in the early 1900s, exclusion no longer appeared an aberration of traditional American policy; it became American policy, it became American tradition and had repercussions for generations to come. . . . In enacting the ‘‘anti-Chinese bill’’ in 1882, politicians not only closed the gate on an entire group of people but it also set the standard for how America would both frame the immigration debate in the years that followed and come to accept far greater and greater restrictions on foreigners seeking refuge and freedom in the United States. More than a century after its passage, the Chinese Exclusion act still haunts the nation’s treatment of immigrants and immigration.∏∑

Nativist and anti-immigrant impulses reached a post–World War II zenith during the early 1990s and are on the upswing again. To explain this trend, one scholar has noted that anti-immigrant sentiment has a cyclical character, peaking when three factors are evident: ‘‘(1) economic uncertainty and job insecurity among the nation’s population, (2) social, ethnic and cultural disparities between new arrivals and the native majority, and (3) a large and sustained immigration inflow.’’∏∏ Nevertheless, belying the complex underlying economic and social circumstances which in actuality are the causes of social unease, politicians and the media could now draw from the imagery that lends legitimacy to Chinese exclusion and use these embedded feelings and ideas to galvanize and create cohesion. Much like how the perceived number and threat of Chinese immigration was instrumental in pushing for harsher laws and more enforcement, recent public sentiment has been fueled by the perceived threat of illegal immigrants and tainted popular beliefs about all immigrants. As a result of biased media coverage, many Americans do not understand the character of contemporary immigration. Respondents to a 1993 poll vastly overestimated the percentage of immigrants who enter the United States illegally. Almost two-thirds believed that most immigrants enter 156

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illegally, although o≈cial estimates put the proportion at just under onequarter of the total.∏π Making the jump from illegal immigrants to all immigrants, Americans now, like Americans during the period of Exclusion, are suspicious of them all. The concerns being voiced today are also strangely similar: Americans believe that new immigrants are driving out ‘‘real’’ Americans from cities and taking away jobs from U.S. workers, despite studies that have shown that lowwage workers actually create more jobs and that U.S. corporate and government policies are central to pulling lower-wage workers into the country. Polls have shown that Americans believe that new immigrants sap public resources rather than contribute to the public good, cause crime rates to escalate, and, most recently, pose a threat as terrorists. These ideas follow racial lines as well. Because most immigrants come from Latin America or Asia, and because there are immediate concerns over Muslims, Americans focus on racial and cultural di√erences and find these di√erences threatening. Once again, the imagery of the faceless, strange-looking, sneaky, and decidedly ‘‘foreign’’ hordes have resurfaced and galvanized politicians. As public worries over immigrant crime, and now terrorism, have spiked and more stringent laws have been enacted, a significant number of enforcement agents have been allocated to handle the perception of unrestrained illegal immigration into the United States. At the end of World War II, with new record keeping (including the fingerprinting and registration of every resident alien), the operation of interment camps and detention facilities, increased patrol of borders and coastline, and administration of imported farm workers, the Immigration Service grew from four thousand to eight thousand employees. The administration remained roughly that size until the late 1970s, when immigration once again began being seen as an issue of national security. During the past two decades, the Immigration Service has been the fastest growing bureaucracy in the federal government, with over seventeen thousand employees in the early 1990s and just under thirty-two thousand in 2001. Before the ins was absorbed by the Border and Transportation Security Branch of the Department of Homeland Security, the employees were classified as follows: In fy 2001, the ins had 31,971 full-time employees. Three out of four of these employees (24,233) were classified as enforcement personnel, with 9,651 employees allocated to the Border Patrol. 4,691 immigration inspectors are mostly assigned to the country’s ports of entry, checking travel documents and searching for contraband. The agency’s 3,909 detention

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enforcement o≈cers operate detention centers. 1,974 criminal investigators are responsible for developing criminal cases against illegal immigrants, smugglers, providers of fraudulent documents and other violators. Finally, the agency’s enforcement sta√ consisted of 4,008 general enforcement and support personnel.∏∫

Not surprisingly, as the number of immigration enforcement agents has grown, so have the number of arrests and prosecutions. Expulsions of illegal aliens quadrupled from 1993 to 2001 (from 42,471 to 176,746). Referrals for prosecution doubled in the same time frame (from 8,840 to 17,933), and median sentences jumped from two to seventeen months from 1992 to 2001. These numbers are even more impressive when it is taken into account that ins prosecutions saw the only increase in the 1990s compared to other major investigative arms of the Justice Department, including the Internal Revenue Service; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; and the Drug Enforcement Administration.∏Ω The huge number of regulators, and the even more startling expulsion, prosecution, and sentencing rates, continue to justify and reinforce the salience of the immigration problem. Just as the enforcement of Chinese exclusion helped create the Chinese illegal alien as an issue demanding strict attention, so too has the enforcement of far-reaching immigration restrictions created the new American immigrant as an illegal trespasser. This is not to say that U.S. immigration policy has not reflected divergent viewpoints or that exclusion has been the only goal. Beneath the rhetoric, there has always been concern over the fairness of restriction policies. The Immigration Reform Control Actπ≠ (irca) in 1986 was heralded as the most restrictive immigration law passed since the 1924 Act, and it was followed by further federal limitations, notably the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Actπ∞ (iirira) in 1996, and local initiatives such as Proposition 187 in California, which restricted immigrants’ access to medical services and education. However, Roger Daniels has shown how, despite the heralded passage of federal and local legislation to ‘‘regain control over our borders,’’ the restrictivist tendencies of this legislation were largely mitigated, either through loopholes (irca) or through further legislation or judicial rulings that simply reversed the most restrictivist sections (Proposition 187).π≤ Simultaneously, while measures such as irca were touted as closing immigration, Daniels notes that, in fact, it relaxed entry requirements for nonimmigrants through an experimental visa waiver program. Moreover, it expanded legal immigration by permitting the ‘‘authorized legalization’’ of 158

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unlawful aliens who had resided in the United States since 1982, opening a new class of immigrants classified as seasonal agricultural workers and allocating five thousand preference visas for aliens born in countries that had been adversely a√ected by the 1965 Act.π≥ Even more recently, following the heightened public outcry over immigration and immigrants post-9/11, President Bush proposed a ‘‘new’’ temporary workers program. Under the program, the U.S government would grant limited and temporary legal status to as many as 12 million temporary workers for agricultural farm labor within the United States. Undocumented workers currently in the country would be allowed to apply for this status, which would expire after three years. Criticism of the program as creating a legal framework for maintaining a tier of second-class and super-exploited labor in America has been swift. Nevertheless, Bush’s proposal during the start of serious election-year campaigning, reflects an underlying ambivalence toward a wholehearted acceptance of a closed door policy. The Chinese remain a focus of attention, despite the fact that they rank twenty-first among ethnic groups entering illegally.π∂ Estimates suggest that approximately fifty thousand Chinese enter illegally every year. Interest in illegal Chinese immigration remains high because of the perceived threat posed by the enormous population of China, and also because of the nature of their illegal entry. Chinese illegal immigration is riskier and requires a more substantial network than that from Mexico and Latin America, given the distance involved. Ko-Lin Chin notes in his recent study of Chinese smuggling that this is unique due to the ways in which the Chinese enter the United States illegally and because organized crime has grown in tandem with illegal Chinese immigration. Air travel is still the predominant form of transportation used by the Chinese to illegally enter the United States. But spectacular events such as the grounding of the Golden Venture o√ New York City in 1993 with a cargo of over 260 Chinese, many of whom drowned when they attempted to swim to shore, remind Americans of the risks Chinese are willing to endure. The public was horrified at the sophistication of the smugglers and the conditions endured by their human cargo. Ko Lin Chin has written that the average cost per person to be smuggled into the United States from China is thirty thousand dollars, a very lucrative business. Estimates suggest Chinese smuggling rings make between 1 billion and 3.2 billion dollars per year. Not only do smugglers earn money for bringing individuals into the United States, they earn o√ the labor these individuals are forced to perform once they have landed. Since most Chinese cannot a√ord more than 20 percent of the required fee, most are legacies

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brought in with a guarantor—either a family member or a business owner. Once landed, they work in restaurants or in the garment industry to pay o√ their debt. American sensibilities are disturbed by Chinese illegal immigration not only because of the smuggling of humans as cargo but the forced labor they are required to fulfill in honor of their debt. I must note that I too shared the horror of Chinese illegal immigration and the sweatshops they engender. Surprisingly, it was one of my students during a seminar who forced me to look at the smuggling of the Chinese from another perspective. During a class discussion, one student presented a paper where he forcefully argued that the Asian community should work to close down sweatshops in local Chinatowns, and I made a few comments agreeing with his paper. After class, a young woman came to my o≈ce and spoke quite emotionally to me, pointing out that I had a distorted view on illegal immigration and the businesses they fostered. She related to me that her family had illegally entered the United States and recounted to me what seemed like a fantastical story about how her family was pushed out of a small plane somewhere in the Florida swamplands and then had to make their way laboriously up the coast to Chinatown where they had promised to work o√ the balance of their fee. She pointed out to me that her family wanted to come to the United States so badly that they were willing to take that risk. And they so much wanted to be in the United States that they were willing to work—all of them—in the sweatshops for many years. She ended her story by asking me, ‘‘Who are you, an American citizen, to say what people should be allowed to endure for the opportunity to come to the U.S.? Look at me now, I am graduating from law school this year! For my family, it was all worth it.’’

General Implications for Immigration Research Underlying structures and circumstances have informed the development and responses of both the immigration regulatory system and the immigrants themselves. This book o√ers a close case study of early immigration processing focusing on one particular immigrant group in one city, the most heavily tra≈cked port for Chinese immigrants. I have suggested some broad implications for current immigration processes and some long-term consequences for other immigrant groups. More than five hundred million people cross U.S. borders on an annual basis, with a net gain of approximately seven hundred thousand immigrants each year. Researchers have noted a shift in the demographics of these immigrants to include larger numbers of Asians and Latin 160

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American immigrants from developing nations and to recognize that, while concentrated mainly in six states, they are a visible presence in every region. Based on this study of the first and only group of illegal immigrants, we can suggest a few directions for further thought regarding immigration, race, politics, state-building, and state bureaucracies. At least three points should be noted. First, this book points to the need for more cross-disciplinary work in areas such as race, politics, and state-formation. There is a rich and growing body of literature exploring the complexity and variety of the immigrant experience that looks beyond the traditional European immigrant populations who were the focus of earlier studies. With few exceptions, work focusing on the intersection of race and state-formation has not taken into account the complexity of ideas of racial formation that immigrant research has revealed. This is hard to understand; immigration processing and the administrative apparatus created to sustain it are uniquely positioned at the interface of what is considered internal and external to a given polity. This book has shown how they define who is excluded and included. As Anthony Marx notes, Citizenship is a key institutional mechanism for establishing boundaries of inclusion or exclusion in the nation-state. It selectively allocates distinct civil, political, and economic rights, reinforcing a sense of commonality and loyalty among those included. But by specifying to whom citizenship applies, states also define those outside the community of citizens, who then live within the state as objects of domination. . . . The process of defining the nation with rules of citizenship is of obvious relevance for how racial categories are established and reinforced.π∑

Nevertheless, even Marx’s account of state-formation, which focuses on the hardening of black-white divisions, does not take into account the role of immigration.π∏ Two recent works exemplify the movement in scholarship to break down the traditional barriers between research on immigration, race, and statebuilding to create a more synthetic approach. Matthew Frye Jacobson’s book, Barbarian Virtues,ππ and Mae Ngai’s Impossible Subjectsπ∫ are two excellent contributions that look at the relationship of race and citizenship, seeking to understand how American political life was influenced by and influenced immigration. The focus of these two works are di√erent; Ngai examines U.S. immigration policy and practice from 1924–65, while Jacobson focuses on the development of U.S. expansionist policies from 1876 to World War I. What both authors share, however, is an attention to the interwoven relationships legacies

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among American political life (whether it be bureaucratic development for Ngai or foreign policy for Jacobson), immigration, and race. The result of this attention is to set out very rich historical narratives of the ways in which immigration policies derived from notions of national sovereignty and, set within a global context of state-building, produced new categories of racial di√erence. Second, this book suggests that another factor should be considered in addition to ‘‘push’’ and ‘‘pull’’ factors to account for immigration and the contours of immigrant populations. The focus has been on what forced or encouraged emigration and immigration (and subsequent acculturation); such a focus defines the types of people who choose to migrate. As this book has shown, immigrants themselves must manage their attempts to enter a new country. While the book has focused primarily on the bureaucratic obstacles that immigrants must navigate, it demonstrates that immigration bureaucracy (along with political and economic factors) intervenes and filters, permitting some would-be immigrants to be successful while others are not. Immigration policy as a lived experience, well beyond the letter of the law, also influences who becomes immigrants. Indeed, this book refutes the common perception that immigrants tend to be from the bottom of the barrel. The ingenuity, network of relationships, and intelligence required to enter into the United States demonstrate that immigrants, especially illegal immigrants, may have more skills than are commonly attributed to them. In addition, because this book focuses closely on illegal immigration, it suggests that attention should be paid to the long-term costs to immigrants for illegally entering the polity. The book explores some of the possible costs and benefits to the Chinese due to implementation of the paper family scheme. For those interested in issues of assimilation and acculturation, the e√ects cannot be ignored. Additionally, for those interested in long-term studies of immigrant communities, it is ironic that those most willing to leave behind kin and culture, for any period of time, may be those most bound to that society once entering a new country depending upon the means employed to enter. The consequences of the method of entry into the new country to immigrants must be factored into discussions on immigrant composition and culture. Finally, a third point is highlighted—research on the implications of government legislation must take into account the administrative structures and agencies they create. While the notion of ‘‘bringing the state back in’’ is not a new concept, many legal scholars overlook this notion when studying legislative debates and legal doctrine. There is no doubt that legislation is one of the 162

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ways in which the state exercises its power, but its consequences are not so clearly foreseen by review of text alone. This perspective fails to capture the increasing density of relationships that center on the apparatus of the state as the state seeks to gain more control while at the same time pushing responsibilities and liabilities for regulation to local, private, and international actors all of whom have their own agendas and constraints.πΩ This book has sought to understand the ‘‘messiness’’ of the state by looking closely at the interactions of individual state actors and their clientele, the Chinese immigrants. It shows how the concatenation of local action in the form of street-level bureaucrats wielding discretion opens avenues for unforeseen consequences and divergent application of what might appear on the outside to be centralized authority. In summary, this study of Chinese immigration to the United States during the Exclusion Period connects the development of increasingly complex immigration procedures and policies and the Chinese attempts to resist their exclusion. As such, it demonstrates the relevance of individual actions within the broader landscape of policy development, showing how the very personal trials and tribulations of the Chinese, when taken together, became policy and practice. Looked at inversely, the book shows how the letter of the law becomes a lived experience, with personal and community consequences that are unexpected.

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Notes ———————————— Introduction 1 Kennedy, A Nation of Immigrants, 5–6. 2 Ewick and Silbey, The Common Place of Law, 187. 3 Stepan in Evans et al., Bringing the State Back In, 340. 4 Giddens in Held and Thompson, Social Theory of Modern Societies, 256. See also Agger, Cultural Studies as Critical Theory; Alexander, Action and Its Environments; Silbey, ‘‘Making a Place for the Cultural Analysis of Law.’’ 5 McClain in Sucheng Chan, Entry Denied. 6 See Fritz, ‘‘A Nineteenth-Century ‘Habeas Corpus Mill’ ’’; Janisch, ‘‘The Chinese, the Courts, and the Constitution’’; McClain, ‘‘The Chinese Struggle for Civil Rights in Nineteenth-Century America’’; McClain, In Search for Equality; Wunder, ‘‘The Chinese and the Courts in the Pacific Northwest.’’ 7 Lee, At America’s Gate; Salyer, Laws Harsh as Tigers. 8 This failure to address the subjects of administrative control pervades much writing on regulatory enforcement, despite recognition of their centrality to administrative development. For example, despite Hutter’s stated recognition of the centrality of interaction between regulatory agents and the subjects of regulation, her study nonetheless treats environmental o√enders as passive or static inputs rather than as fluid and reactive, employing strategies and tactics in response to o≈cers’ initiatives to gain compliance. Hutter, The Reasonable Arm of the Law?, 14–15. 9 De Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life. 10 Simon, Poor Discipline, 9. 11 Ibid., 10. 12 A recent article by Zuckerman, The Categorical Imperative, suggests a similar mechanism regarding the valuation of companies. Studying the manner in which specialists value companies for investment purposes, he notes that companies’ need to fit into identifiable industries in accordance with the criteria of valuation specialists results in a lower valuation for hybrid companies. Thus, the organization of valuation ends up

determining, in a real sense, the value. See also Ewick and Silbey, The Common Place of Law; and Kagan, ‘‘Regulatory Enforcement.’’ 13 Letter, H. Edsell, Jan. 22, 1911, Subject Correspondence Files (reel 24). nara, New York. 14 Salyer, Laws Harsh as Tigers, 136. 15 I had initially thought to gain much of the information for this project through interviews. However, after interviews were conducted with members of three families, I found that family members who had any experience related to the creation of paper kin were reluctant to speak about their knowledge or could not remember any details. Younger family members were often eager to talk about their family history but could only repeat vague stories they had heard. A few interviewees said it would be hard to get anyone to talk about illegal immigration, given current attitudes towards aliens and Mexican ‘‘illegals.’’ Although interviews with individuals I met while doing archival research proved more fruitful, overall I interviewed members from only ten families. Because of these di≈culties and a belief that legislative materials could provide only a partial view of this interaction, I ended up relying more on the immigration files. 16 Glaser and Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory, chap. 1.

Chapter 1 Legislating Exclusion 1 Hing, Making and Remaking Asia America. 2 Researchers have extensively examined the emergence of the anti-Chinese movement at the state level, and particularly in California. See Klebaner 1958 for discussion of the history of state and federal jurisdiction over immigration. See also Coolidge, Chinese Immigration; Sandmeyer, The Anti-Chinese Movement in California; and Saxton, The Indispensable Enemy. 3 Statutes of California (1852), 84. 4 Statutes of California (1862), 462. 5 4 California Reports 399 (1854). 6 See Sandmeyer, The Anti-Chinese Movement in California, 51–65, for a discussion of anti-Chinese legislation. See also Tung, The Chinese in America, 1820–1973, for a chronology and texts of state and federal legislation against the Chinese. 7 See Ho ah Kow v. Nunan 5 U.S. Ct. Reports 552 (1879), finding the queue ordinance to violate the Fourteenth Amendment; In re Quong Woo, 7 U.S. Ct. Reports 526 (1882); and Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. Reports 356 (1886), holding laundry ordinances to be invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment. 8 Janisch, ‘‘The Chinese, the Courts, and the Constitution,’’ 370–93; Kim, Asian Americans and the Supreme Court, 79. 9 For particularly thoughtful histories, see Hune, Politics of Exclusion, and Gyory, Closing the Gate. 10 Treaty between the United States and China Concerning Immigration, November 17, 1880, art I, 22 Stat.826, art II. 11 Act of May 6, 1882, 22 Stat. 58; Act of 5 July 1884, 23 Stat. 115; Act of September 13 1888, 25 Stat. 476; Act of Oct. 1, 1888, 25 Stat. 504.

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12 Zolberg, Citizenship and Exclusion, 305. 13 Act 6, 1882, 22 Stat. 58. 14 Ibid., sec. 4. 15 Act of September 13, 1888, 25 Stat. 476. 16 27 Stat. 25. 17 33 Stat. 428. 18 Two Supreme Court cases decided on the same day held that under the 1924 Act, alien wives of U.S. citizens were ineligible for citizenship or entry into the United States, while wives and children of Chinese merchants could enter the country as non-quota immigrants. Chang Chan et al. v. Nagle, 69 L. ed. 642 (1925); Charles Sum Shee et al. v. Nagle, 69 L. ed. 640 (1925). 19 Chapter 141. An act supplementary to the acts in relation to immigration. 43rd Congress. Session II. chap.141. March 3, 1875. 20 57 Stat. 600–1. 21 Sung, Mountain of Gold, 78–79. 22 79 Stat. 911. 23 For a general discussion of the legislation concerning the development of the ins, see Smith and Herring 1924, 19–28. 24 22 Stat. 214 25 Zeng as cited in Cassel, The Chinese in America, 436. 26 Chan, Entry Denied, 94. 27 Karthikeyan and Chin, ‘‘Preserving Racial Identity,’’ 1–39. 28 Liu, ‘‘The Social Origins of Early Chinese Immigrants,’’ 31. 29 Zeng as cited in Cassel, The Chinese in America, 436. 30 Sung, Mountain of Gold, 95.

Chapter 2 Challenges to Exclusion 1 The figure is limited to those who themselves entered illegally and does not include further immigration or acquisition of U.S. citizenship through marriage or birth in the United States of persons related to those who illegally entered. 2 See generally, Subject Correspondence Files, nara, New York, in particular reels 21 and 24, which contain correspondence from the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and from Chinese residents within the United States complaining about treatment of immigrants. 3 Subject Correspondence Files, reel 17, nara, New York. 4 See letter from Hang Shen-hsiu and more than a thousand others, representing Chinese merchants of every province, to the Hon W. W. Rockhill, American Minister, praying for action in the matter of the Immigration Treaty. October 1, 1905, Subject Correspondence Files, reel 13. 5 K. Scott Wong, ‘‘Cultural Defenders and Brokers,’’ 3–40, notes the tendency among the Chinese elite to sound very much like anti-Chinese Americans. 6 Salyer, Laws Harsh as Tigers, 163–64.

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7 Chan, Entry Denied, 81–82. 8 Tsai, China and the Overseas Chinese in the United States, 1868–1911, 143. 9 Ibid., 24. 10 See Sandmeyer, ‘‘California Anti-Chinese Legislation and the Federal Courts’’; Kim 1992; McClain, ‘‘The Chinese Struggle for Civil Rights in Nineteenth-Century America.’’ 11 See Fritz, ‘‘A Nineteenth-Century ‘Habeas Corpus Mill’ ’’; Salyer, ‘‘Captives of Law’’; and Salyer, Laws Harsh as Tigers. 12 See Salyer, Laws Harsh as Tigers, 39–41. 13 Terms of service: Collector of Customs, John Hager, 1885–88. With the formation of the Chinese Bureau, collectors were responsible only for the enforcement of Chinese exclusion. Timothy Phelps, 1888–92; John Wise, 1892–98; John Jackson, 1898– 1900; Frederick Stratton, 1900–1912. 14 Fritz, ‘‘A Nineteenth-Century ‘Habeas Corpus Mill.’ ’’ 15 Ibid. 16 See Salyer, Laws Harsh as Tigers, for a detailed discussion. 17 Chae Chen Ping v. U.S., 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 18 Fong Yue Ting v. U.S., 149 U.S. 698 (1893). 19 Act of March 3, 1891. 26 Stat. 551. 20 Nishimura Eicku v. U.S. 142 U.S. 651 (1892). 21 Salyer, Laws Harsh as Tigers, 103. 22 Ibid. 23 Fritz, ‘‘A Nineteenth-Century ‘Habeas Corpus Mill,’ ’’ 348. 24 Act of Sept. 13, 1888. 25 Stat. 476. 25 In 1888, Ward MacAllister Jr. was appointed commissioner in the district court and Stephen Chase Houghton in the circuit court. E. H. Heacock succeeded Houghton as U.S. commissioner and refereed the Chinese habeas cases from 1892 to 1910. 26 Act of Aug. 18, 1894. 29 Stat. 390. 27 See, In re Lem Moon Sing, 158 U.S. 538 (1895). 28 In re Tom Yum, 64 F. 485 (1894). 29 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898). 30 Salyer, Laws Harsh as Tigers. 31 Act February 14, 1903, sec 7. 32 Stat. 825. 32 198 U.S. 253 (1905).

Chapter 3 Entry Despite Exclusion 1 See Perkins, Border Patrol. Up to two ports of entry along the southern border may have opened by 1892. In 1893, only one U.S. immigrant inspector, Leonidas B. Giles, was present on the U.S.-Mexican border to enforce alien contract labor laws. In 1899, four U.S. immigrant inspectors worked along the Mexican border at Nogales, Arizona; El Paso and Laredo, Texas; and Piedras Negras, Mexico. The border district was not formally organized, nor were there any written procedures adapted to southern border

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ports. The Immigration Act of February 14, 1903, essentially restated the 1891 provisions concerning borders, but also enacted rules covering entry and inspection. Following 1903, o≈cers began recording entries and inspecting aliens—other than Mexicans who crossed freely—on the Mexican border. Thus while the Immigration Service was present on the southern border since 1892, the earliest Mexican border arrival records were not created until a decade later. Immigration o≈cers on the border concentrated primarily on enforcement of the Chinese exclusion laws. With increased attention to the southern border came increased sta√ at more border ports. At El Paso, the force expanded to four inspectors, a Spanish interpreter, and a few clerical personnel. The entire force at or near the Mexican border expanded to twentythree. Following passage of the Immigration Act of 1907, the Immigration Bureau reorganized into the Mexican Border District, containing Arizona, New Mexico, and most of Texas. Additionally a new Inspector-at-Large began to investigate conditions, notably enforcing infectious disease exclusions against Syrians, Greeks, Japanese, and, of course, Chinese. It was not until the passage of the 1924 Act that the border patrol ceased being primarily concerned with Chinese immigration and turned to e√ectuate exclusion of all nationalities subject to the quotas. 2 Facts Concerning Chinese Immigration, 1906, 12. 3 Ibid., 97. 4 See, generally, Records of the Bureau of Customs. nara, San Francisco, California. 5 Letter from I. F. Nixon, File No. 1300–67656, 5–6. nara, San Francisco, California. 6 Problems of fraud and corruption have not abated, even in recent years: Over the years the agency has su√ered from corruption problems, management failures, and political embarrassments. Year after year, dozens of ins employees have been arrested for taking bribes and related crimes. In 1991, Attorney General Dick Thornburgh became so concerned about the state of the agency that he removed a number of senior managers. More recently, independent audits determined that a flawed citizenship process had resulted in thousands of immigrants being naturalized without proper criminal background checks. Congressional critics led by Representative Lamar Smith, Republican of Texas, asserted the problem had developed partly because of a desire of the Democratic administration to put new voters on the rolls before the 1996 presidential campaign (‘‘Regional Patterns in ins Enforcement’’ at http://trac.syr.edu/index.html). 7 Report from Special Agent O. L. Spaulding to D. Manning, Secretary of the Treasury, November 2, 1885, in Senate Executive Document Vol. 7, No 103. Subject Correspondence Files, reel 79, nara, New York. 8 See, generally, 1899 Special Agent reports and letters to Hon. Walter S. Chance, Supervising Special Agent, regarding San Francisco and charges of illegal activities. Subject Correspondence Files, reel 20, nara, New York.

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9 San Francisco, Cal’a March 10, 1899 Report on Inspector C. G. Richards, General Correspondence Files, reel 20, nara, New York. 10 Synopsis. Western trip and conditions. Submitted May 9, 1899, General Correspondence Files, reel 20, nara, New York. 11 Fritz, ‘‘A Nineteenth Century ‘Habeas Corpus Mill.’ ’’ 12 L. Y. interview, on file with the author. (L. Y. requested anonymity before granting interview.) 13 File 20660/7–8. nara, San Francisco, California. 14 File 22908/2–7. nara, San Francisco, California. 15 Ibid., 3–4. 16 File 20660/7–8, Note Feb. 23, 1915. nara, San Francisco, California. 17 Ibid. Correspondence Nov. 28, 1914; Nov. 18, 1914, Stigder and Kennah to the Commissioner of Immigration. nara, San Francisco, California. 18 Ibid. 19 File 20667/18–9. nara, San Francisco, California. 20 File 20667/18–23. nara, San Francisco, California. 21 Ibid., Report 3. 22 Wu, Chink! A Documentary History of Anti-Chinese Prejudice in America, 143. The interviews in this collection were conducted in the 1950s, when immigration of Chinese had already eased. The ignorance decades before, when even fewer Chinese lived in the United States or spoke English, can only be imagined. 23 Ibid., 142–43. 24 Ibid., 143. 25 People v. Hall, 4 Cal 399, 404 (1854). 26 Chae Chan Ping v. U.S., 130 U.S. 581, 595 (1889). 27 File 20667/15–13. nara, San Francisco, California. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 File 36330/5–22, 7/14/36, 24. nara, San Francisco, California. 32 Lai, et al., Island, 114. 33 See Robin Cohen, ‘‘Resistance and Hidden Forms of Consciousness Among African Workers,’’ Review of African Political Economy 19 (1980): 8–22, cited in Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, 32. 34 File 9470/89. nara, San Francisco, California. 35 Gyory, Closing the Gate, 18. 36 See, for example, File No. 1300–67656, where the applicant assumed the identity of someone four years younger. nara, San Francisco, California. 37 File 1300–126266 (1952). nara, San Francisco, California. 38 File 23586/5–2, 15, text added by o≈cer in handwritten notation. nara, San Francisco, California. 39 Letter from Chairman, File 23586/52, 14. nara, San Francisco, California. 40 Interview with an immigration inspector, in Lai, et al., Island, 113–14.

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41 Ibid. 42 Ibid., 6. 43 Ibid., 8. 44 Ibid., 10. 45 File 14270/8–10. nara, San Francisco, California. 46 Ibid, report, May 3, 1915. nara, San Francisco, California. 47 File No. 10039/48, coaching letter. nara, San Francisco, California. (This letter is most likely a translation from Chinese, but original is not in file.) 48 File 30962/11–6. nara, San Francisco, California. 49 Lai, et al., Island, 114–15. 50 File 10039–2, Comments on evidence. nara, San Francisco, California. 51 File 20667/15–26. nara, San Francisco, California. 52 McKeown, Chinese Migrant Networks and Cultural Change, 61–100. 53 Liu, ‘‘The Social Origins of Early Chinese Immigrants.’’ 54 McKeown, Chinese Migrant Networks and Cultural Change, chap. 8. 55 Interview Wing family, July 2000 (on file with author). 56 Pan, Sons of the Yellow Emperor, 54. 57 McKeown, Chinese Migrant Networks and Cultural Change, 1–25. 58 Lai, et al., Island, 45–46. 59 Ibid., 44. 60 Ibid., 45. 61 Sung, Mountain of Gold, 134.

Chapter 4 Guardians of the Gate 1 Files 20667/5–4 and 5–5. nara, San Francisco, California. 2 Ibid., letter, Jan. 17, 1922. 3 File 31613/5–29, Examination of Leung Ton. nara, San Francisco, California. 4 Lai, et al., Island, 114. 5 U. S. Congress. House. Facts Concerning the Enforcement of the Chinese Exclusion Laws. Commissioner-General’s Annual Report, 47. 6 Lai, et al., Island, 112–13. 7 Ibid., 110. 8 File 10039/9, Synopsis, March 28, 1905. nara, San Francisco, California. 9 File 10039/47. nara, San Francisco, California. 10 File 10039/41, Letter March 17, 1905. nara, San Francisco, California. 11 File 10039/6, Letter Feb. 20, 1905, 2. nara, San Francisco, California. 12 Alta California, Dec. 18, 1883, cited in Fritz, ‘‘A Nineteenth-Century ‘Habeas Corpus Mill,’ ’’ 360. 13 Coolidge, Chinese Immigration, 3. 14 Gardner, ‘‘The Image of the Chinese in the United States, 1885–1915’’; Takaki, Iron Cages. 15 File 1055/22. nara, San Francisco, California.

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16 File 10039/6, Letter, Feb. 20, 1905, 1–2. nara, San Francisco, California. 17 Schuck, ‘‘The Transformation of Immigration Law.’’ For criticism and the historical development of immigration administration in general see, Note, ‘‘Developments in the Law’’; Crewdson, The Tarnished Door; Le May, From Open Door to Dutch Door. 18 Salyer, Laws Harsh as Tigers. 19 File 20687/5–4. nara, San Francisco, California. 20 Lai, et al., Island, 114. 21 Ibid., 45. 22 File 14202/4–10. Report, March 26, 1915, 2. nara, San Francisco, California. 23 File 20667/15–18, Memo, Dec. 27, 1921. nara, San Francisco, California. 24 File 20667/15–26. nara, San Francisco, California. 25 File 20660/7–1. nara, San Francisco, California. 26 File 1300–4118, Letter from Commissioner, Jan. 7, 1909. nara, San Francisco, California. 27 File 14298/4–22. nara, San Francisco, California. 28 Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 71–72. 29 Joint Report of Committee on Foreign A√airs of the Chamber of Commerce of San Francisco and of the Committee on Trade and Commerce of the Merchants Exchange. Subject Correspondence File, reel 24. nara, New York. 30 File 10055/22. nara, San Francisco, California. 31 File 31613/5–29, Letter to Commissioner, June 8, 1932. nara, San Francisco, California. 32 File Nov. 28, 1885/2584. nara, San Francisco, California. 33 File Dec.19, 1885/119. nara, San Francisco, California. 34 File Nov. 28, 1885, 324/329. nara, San Francisco, California. 35 Peru Nov. 2, 1895, No. 105. nara, San Francisco, California. 36 File 9496/72. nara, San Francisco, California. 37 Ibid., Dec. 7, 1895, B. J. Harrison. nara, San Francisco, California. 38 File 9493/122. nara, San Francisco, California. 39 File 9496/78. nara, San Francisco, California. 40 File 9493/66. nara, San Francisco, California. 41 File 9485/35. nara, San Francisco, California. 42 File 9493/72. nara, San Francisco, California. 43 Fritz, ‘‘A Nineteenth-Century ‘Habeas Corpus Mill.’ ’’ 44 File 9483/20. nara, San Francisco, California. 45 U.S. Department of Commerce and Labor, Immigration Laws and Regulations (1905), Rule 6. 46 Ibid., Rule 7. 47 File 10058/410. nara, San Francisco, California. 48 File 10059/18, Letter, July 12, 1905, 2. nara, San Francisco, California. 49 File 10039/41. nara, San Francisco, California. 50 Ibid., Letter, Sept. 23, 1904. nara, San Francisco, California. 51 File 10039/35. nara, San Francisco, California.

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52 Ibid., 22. 53 Ibid., 23. 54 File 200660/7–10. nara, San Francisco, California. 55 File 20649/3–2. nara, San Francisco, California. 56 File 20667/15–18. nara, San Francisco, California. 57 File 20601/6–1. nara, San Francisco, California. 58 File 35332/10–12. nara, San Francisco, California. 59 File 35332/10–11. nara, San Francisco, California. 60 File 41369/11–30. nara, San Francisco, California. 61 File 36330/6–6. nara, San Francisco, California. 62 File 41354/1–1. nara, San Francisco, California. 63 Markel and Stern, ‘‘Which Face? Whose Nation?’’ in Foner, et al., eds., Immigration Research for a New Century, 102. 64 Letter, Collector of Customs, July 23, 1885. Subject Correspondence Files, reel 22, nara, New York. 65 U.S. Congress. House. Facts Concerning the Enforcement of the Chinese Exclusion Laws, 31. 66 Burris, et al. ‘‘Better Than a Photograph,’’ 10. 67 Ibid., 11. 68 Daily Report, quoted in ibid., 9–10. 69 Burris, et al., ‘‘Better Than a Photograph,’’ 12–15. 70 U.S. Congress. House. Facts Concerning the Enforcement of the Chinese Exclusion Laws, 32. 71 Letter, H. Edsell, Jan. 22, 1911, Subject Correspondence File, reel 24. nara, New York. 72 ‘‘Thumbs Down! The Latest Plan for Outwitting the Chinese. Thumb-Marks for Identification. An Old Idea Revived in Good Practical Shape. Facsimiles of Thumb Marks. Some Curious But Hitherto Little Known Facts. Every Man’s Thumbs Di√erent From Every Other Man’s—The Lines Which Serve to Invariably Identify a Person— Opinion of Prominent Persons on the Advantages of the Method.’’ San Francisco Daily Report, Sept. 19, 1885. 73 Burris, et al., ‘‘Better Than a Photograph,’’ 25. 74 U.S. Congress. House. Facts Concerning the Enforcement of the Chinese Exclusion Laws. Annual Report, Commissioner-General of Immigration, 31. 75 U.S. Congress, Facts Related to Enforcement, 1906, 32. 76 This signified the distance measured ‘‘from the smooth prominence of the forehead—just between the eyebrows—called the Glabella to the Occiput—to the back part of the head or skull.’’ Apparently the Mongolian skull was believed to be longer than the Caucasian. Burris, et al., ‘‘Better Than a Photograph,’’ 26. 77 Lai, et al., Island, 114. 78 File 14144/14–3. nara, San Francisco, California. 79 File 36330/5–22. nara, San Francisco, California. 80 Ibid., 32.

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81 File 35332/10–26, 20–21. nara, San Francisco, California. 82 File 14202/4–10. nara, San Francisco, California. 83 See Haney-Lopez, ‘‘The Social Construction of Race,’’ for a discussion of the prerequisite cases. He notes that three reasons were articulated by the court when determining race—social anthropological theories, scientific studies, and common knowledge. 84 See, for example, Bittner, ‘‘The Police on Skid Row’’; Gilboy, ‘‘Regulatory and Administrative Agency Behavior’’; Kagan, ‘‘Regulatory Enforcement’’; Emerson, ‘‘Case Processing and Interorganizational Knowledge’’; Emerson and Paley, ‘‘Organizational Horizons and Complaint Filing’’; Hawkins, ‘‘Creating Cases in a Regulatory Agency’’; Lynxwiler, et al., ‘‘The Organization and Impact of Inspector Discretion in a Regulatory Bureaucracy’’; Waegel, ‘‘Case Routinization in Investigative Police Work.’’ 85 U.S. Congress, Compilation of Facts Concerning Enforcement, 1903, 7. 86 Ibid., 5–6. 87 Act of June 6, 1900, 31 Stat., 588–611. 88 U.S. Congress, Compilation of Facts Concerning Enforcement, 1903, 5. 89 See, for example, Subject Correspondence Files, reel 20, nara, New York, containing Special Agent reports and analysis of fraud in the San Francisco o≈ce. 90 U.S. Congress. House. Facts Concerning the Enforcement of the Chinese Exclusion Laws, 1 23. 91 See, for example, U.S. Department of Commerce and Labor, Treaties, Laws and Regulations relating to the exclusion of Chinese, June 1903; Treaties, Laws and Regulations relating to the exclusion of Chinese, second edition, Dec 1903; Treaties, Laws and Regulations relating to the exclusion of Chinese, May 1905; Treaties, Laws and Regulations governing the admission of Chinese; regulations approved February 5, 1906, in U.S. Department of Commerce and Labor, Treaty, Laws and Regulations governing the admission of Chinese, 1903–07. 92 Ewick and Silbey, The Common Place of Law, 99. 93 Ibid., 100. 94 File 1300–4118. nara, San Francisco, California. 95 Bureau Circular No. 12, Feb. 16, 1905, Subject Correspondence File, reel 12, nara, San Francisco, California. 96 Subject Correspondence File, reel 12, nara, New York. 97 Letter from Inspector Gardner, Jan. 11, 1905, Subject Correspondence File, reel 12, nara, New York. 98 Ibid. 99 Letter from Commissioner-General, Nov. 11, 1909, Subject Correspondence File, reel 12. 100 See, e.g., File 1300–4118, Jan. 5, 1906, 26–27. 101 See, e.g., ‘‘Pacific Mail Dock: Loud Complaints Among Chinese,’’ The Hong Kong Telegraph, Oct. 2, 1909. 102 Ibid. 103 Letter Oct. 15, 1909, Subject Correspondence File, reel 12, nara, New York.

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104 105 106 107

Lai, et al., Island, 72. Ibid., 75. Ibid., 58. Ibid., 68.

Chapter 5 Legacies 1 Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, 45. 2 The Annual Reports of the Immigration Service support the contention that the agency continued to interest itself specifically with the Chinese, ‘‘one of the oldest frauds confronting the Service.’’ ins Annual Report 1959, 383. 3 Ngai, Legacies of Exclusion, 34–36. 4 L. Y. interview on file with author. Aug. 1999. 5 Annual report of the ins, 1959, at 392. 6 Ibid., citing Mae M. Ngai, ‘‘Legacies of Exclusion: Illegal Chinese Immigration During the Cold War Years’’ (unpublished paper, Columbia Dept. of History, 1996). 7 Ibid. at 8. 8 Wei, The Asian American Movement. 9 Although outside the scope of the book, one could suggest that another reason why the Asian American movement has not garnered much pubic attention even within Asian communities is because it sought to create a coalition among various groups and an over-arching identity. I work with companies seeking to do business in what is called ‘‘Greater China,’’ but I find that even within my own networks that the concept of a ‘‘Greater China’’ is fraught with internal fissures, even among Chinese. I am routinely asked by Taiwanese Chinese how I ‘‘manage’’ to work with ‘‘Mainland Chinese’’ or Singaporean Chinese, much as I am asked by the others whether I really ‘‘enjoy working with the Taiwanese’’ (or Hong Kong Chinese, Singaporean Chinese). Even within the United States, among my Chinese American friends and colleagues I am often asked the same question. Linguistic and cultural di√erences which from outside appear opaque are salient from within. The response I give—that my mother is from China via Taiwan and my father from Singapore—is generally accepted as the reason why I find it easy to move among the various groups. If the Chinese American community is fractured in its identity, how much further from one’s sense of identity would be a community that included, for example, Japanese or Vietnamese? 10 Interview with K. C. Sept. 1999 (on file with author). 11 Fong interview 1999 (on file with author). 12 Lim Moe’s file was randomly selected using the general system described in the introduction. After a preliminary reading of Lim Moe’s file, which revealed an extensive network of fictive kinship ties, I noted the file numbers of all immediate family members (I did not request files of spouses and in-laws). From these, I was able to gather three more files, which o√ered more information. The technique could be continuously applied, following case file numbers found in each subsequent file in an outwardly spiral-

notes to chapter five

175

ing network. In addition, collecting information from spouses’ and in-laws’ files would further widen the network. Habeas No. 12812 in File 39891/9–7, nara, San Francisco, California. 13 File 39891/9–7, nara, San Francisco, California. 14 Ibid., Q and A Statement of Lim Soon Oy, A17 974 415. 15 File 39891/9–7. nara, San Francisco, California. 16 File 39891/9–7, 38–39. nara, San Francisco, California. 17 File 36330/6–6. nara, San Francisco, California. 18 Ibid., 1. 19 File 14298/4–22. nara, San Francisco, California. 20 Ibid., 3 June 1915 memo to commissioner. 21 File 14144/15–17. nara, San Francisco, California. 22 Committee of 100, American Attitudes Toward Chinese Americans and Asian Americans. 23 Indeed, sociological interest in the Chinese began with a concern for issues of acculturation, assimilation, and integration. Chinese were seen as deviant in their resistance toward assimilation into mainstream society. Chang, ‘‘An Accommodation Program for Second-Generation Chinese’’; Louis, ‘‘Problems of Second Generation Chinese’’; Smith, ‘‘The Second-Generation Oriental-American.’’ 24 Lee, The Chinese in the United States of America, 3. 25 Ibid. 26 See, for example, Siu, The Chinese Laundryman (1988), a thoughtful work elaborating the perspective of the Chinese immigrant laundryman as a ‘‘sojourner’’ who came to the United States and remained isolated from the general population. 27 Nee and Nee, Longtime Californ’; Siu, The Chinese Laundryman. 28 Salyer, Laws Harsh as Tigers. 29 Nee and Nee, Longtime Californ’. 30 File 26464/3–27, 5–8. nara, San Francisco, California. 31 File 26464/3–27, 1/16/28, 48. nara, San Francisco, California. 32 Ibid., 47–48. 33 Ibid., 2/11/37, 5–6. 34 Ibid., 2/13/37, 6–7. 35 Ibid., 2/11/37, 2. 36 Levitt, ‘‘Migrants Participate across Borders: Towards an Understanding of Forms and Consequences’’ in Foner, et al., eds., Immigration Research for a New Century, 460. 37 Annual Report of the Commission-General ending June 30, 1904, 146–47 in U.S. Department of Commerce and Labor. Annual Report of the Commission-General of Immigration (1903–11). 38 File 10055–22. nara, San Francisco, California. 39 Even where the immigrant could speak some English, interviews were often conducted in Chinese. 40 Siu, The Chinese Laundryman, 138.

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41 File 10055–22, Letter from Chinese Inspector 8–11–05. nara, San Francisco, California. 42 Ibid., letter July 24, 1905, emphasis in original. 43 Ibid. 44 File 10055/22, Letter Aug. 10, 1905. nara, San Francisco, California. 45 Ibid., 5. 46 Ibid., 7. 47 Ibid., 2. 48 Gyory, Closing the Gate; Salyer, Laws Harsh as Tigers; Schuck, ‘‘The Transformation of Immigration Law.’’ 49 Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy, 3. 50 The film concludes with the lead characters falling in love and getting married ‘‘for real.’’ The ruses and tactics they engaged in to thwart immigration processing take on a life of their own, changing, as with the Chinese, people who, at first, were simply acting a part. 51 Trillin, ‘‘Making Adjustments,’’ 50. I thank Frank Wu for bringing this article to my attention. There are few writers who have captured the flavor of an immigration o≈ce with such humor and insight. 52 Ibid., 51. 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid., 51–52. 55 Ibid., 56–57. 56 Ibid., 56. 57 Ibid., 68. 58 Gilboy, ‘‘Deciding Who Gets In.’’ 59 Gyory sets his study as an example of ‘‘top-down’’ politics and policy making that would seem to contradict my underlying claim that policy is created from the bottom up. I believe, however, Gyory’s nuanced discussion of the passage of exclusion provides a backdrop within which the interaction between the immigrant and regulator can be understood. As the Chinese continued to defy exclusion on a daily basis, regulators felt vindicated in their assessment of the Chinese as cunning, untrustworthy, and dishonest, an assessment that only confirmed the underlying rationale for exclusion. 60 Scott, 1990, 36. 61 LeMay, From Open Door to Dutch Door. 62 Immigration and Nationality Act, Section 101(a)(15). 63 Ibid. 64 Immigration and Nationality Act, Section 203(f ). 8 U.S.C. 1153. 65 Gyory, Closing the Gate, 258–59. 66 Muller, ‘‘Nativism in the Mid-1990’s.’’ 67 Feagin, ‘‘Old Poison in New Bottles,’’ 31. 68 Transactional Records Access Clearing House at http://trac.syr.edu/tracins/ aboutLaw/index.html.

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69 As the federal bench has not expanded in proportion to the growth of ins prosecutions, one may suspect that the same ‘‘mill’’ that overran the Northern District of California may be currently underway. 70 Pub. L. 99–603. 71 Pub. L. 104–208, 110 Stat. 3009. 72 Daniels, Guarding the Golden Door, chap. 11, ‘‘Controlling Our Borders: Struggles over Immigration Policy.’’ 73 Ibid., 227–231. 74 Chin, Smuggled Chinese, 6. 75 Marx, Making Race and Nation, 5. 76 Other equally compelling accounts of U.S. state-formation such as Richard Bensel’s Yankee Leviathan focus solely on the North–South dynamic and competition for control over the U.S. political economy. Bensel 1990. 77 Jacobson 2001. 78 Ngai, Impossible Subjects. 79 Lahav, ‘‘Rise of Nonstate Actors in Migration Regulation in the United States and Europe: Changing the Gatekeepers or Bringing Back the State?’’ in Foner, et al., eds., Immigration Research for a New Century, 234.

178

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Bibliography ———————————— Unpublished Materials Committee of 100. American Attitudes toward Chinese Americans and Asian Americans. Prepared by Yankelovich Partners, April 2001.

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National Archives and Record Administration, San Francisco Branch, San Francisco, California (nara, San Francisco) Chinese Exclusion Cases, Records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, rg 85. (Random selection of individual case files from 1885–1945 at 10-year intervals. Twenty files per year were selected and complete copies made.) Records of the Bureau of Customs. rg 36 Port of San Francisco. Correspondence from the Collector to Other Federal Agencies and the General Public 1895–1915 (review and selection of files). Records of the Bureau of Customs. rg 36 Port of San Francisco. General Correspondence from the O≈ce of the Collector of Customs, 1869–1931. Records of the Bureau of Customs, rg 36 Port of San Francisco. General Correspondence to the O≈ce of the Collector, 1894–1931. Records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Chinese Arrival Files. Records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Densmore Investigation Files (1917).

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Index ———————————— administration of exclusion, 1–2, 20, 67– 113, 162–63; age factors in, 99, 102; certificates of identification and, 88; Chinese Confession Program, 15, 116– 31, 175–76n12; Chinese stereotypes in, 44–46, 95–102, 170n22, 173n76; chronology of Chinese Exclusion Laws, 14–15; coordination and systematization of, 77–94, 103–13, 141– 60; current practices in, 149; detention facilities, 110–13; expulsions and deportations, 135–40, 158; fraudulent activities in, 34–36, 169n6; history of means in, 3–4, 165n12; ignorance of Chinese customs in, 41–47, 109; institutional legacies of, 149–60; knowledge of China in, 67–71, 76–77; language problems in, 43–44, 67–68, 86, 106–9, 176n39; maintenance and retrieval of records in, 109–10; medical exclusions in, 94–95; o≈cial forms of, 89–91; physical identification in, 2, 4, 44–46, 95–102, 170n22, 173n76; record keeping in, 105–6, 109–10; relationship between policies and immigrants and, 3–4, 67, 76–77, 115, 148–49, 165n8, 177n59; separation of Chinese from others in, 30–31; shifts of jurisdiction of, 19–20, 31–32, 88– 89, 103–5, 149, 157–58. See also discre-

tion, administrative; interrogation procedures; legislation of exclusion age factors, 99, 102 agricultural workers, 159 Angel Island, 95, 111–13 Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 27 anti-immigration movements, 156–59 appearance stereotypes, 44–46, 95–102, 170n22, 173n76 Arab immigrant exclusion, 6 Asian American Movement, 119–20, 175n9 Asian immigrant exclusion, 6, 27, 111, 155 Asiatic Barred Zone, 6, 27 Barbarian Virtues (Jacobson), 161–62 Bertillon system of identification, 95–99 border crossing, 33, 168–69n1 border patrols, 14, 33 Boxer Rebellion, 27 Boyce, W., 84 bureaucracy of regulation. See administration of exclusion; discretion, administrative; interrogation procedures Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, 158 Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration, 153

Bureau of Customs, 18, 32 Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, 153 Bureau of Immigration, 19–20, 31, 32 Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 153 Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, 19–20 Bureau of Naturalization, 19–20 Burlingame, Anson, 26 Burlingame Treaty of 1868, 15–16, 26– 27, 28 Burris, A., 96, 98 Bush, George W., 159 business associations, 64–66, 112, 119, 135 California: anti-Chinese movement, 166n2; anti-miscegenation laws in, 21; demographics of Chinese immigration in, 20–21; exclusion laws in, 12– 13; fishing and mining taxes in, 12– 13; Proposition 187 in, 158 Canadian border crossings, 33–34, 168– 69n1 Canadian Pacific Railroad, 34 categories of immigrants, 3–4 certificates of identification, 88 challenges to exclusion laws, 2, 23–32, 114–15; boycotts, 24–26, 167n4; complaints to U.S. government, 24; economic sanctions, 25; litigation, 28– 32; public pressure, 24–25. See also illegal entry methods Chan, Mrs., 65–66 Chan Chang Yuen, 37–38 Chan Gut Fook, 48–50 Chan Kim Yuke, 37–38 Chin, Ko-Lin, 159 China: Boxer Rebellion in, 27; business associations in, 64–66; class-based perceptions of exclusion in, 24; crossborder ties of fictional families in,

208

139–40; diplomatic challenges of exclusion laws by, 23–28; emigration networks in, 63–66; kidnapping of laborers in, 62–63; labor migration in, 61–63; outside intervention and invasions of, 27–28; prohibition of anti-American activities in, 26–27 Chinatowns, 66, 117, 134–35 Chinese Americans (Lyman), 134 Chinese Boycott of 1905, 24–26, 167n4 Chinese Bureau, 18–19, 28–29, 32, 36, 88–89, 104, 168n13 Chinese community. See community interdependence/insularity Chinese Confession Program, 15, 116– 31, 175–76n12 Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Society, 25, 112 Chinese Exclusion Laws, 12–18, 22; Burlingame Treaty of 1868, 15–16; Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, 4–5, 12– 16, 28–30, 70; Chinese Exclusion Act of 1884, 14, 16; Chinese Exclusion Act of 1888, 14, 16, 30; Chinese Exclusion Act of 1904, 17; chronology of events, 14–15; denials of access to courts by, 17, 30–31; extensions of, 16–17; Geary Act of 1892, 14, 16–17, 25, 30; legacies of, 153–60; loopholes in, 5–7, 16; Page Law of 1875, 17; repeals in 1943 of, 15, 17–18, 22, 116; for U.S. citizens, 32; women’s exclusion by, 17, 20–21, 167n18. See also challenges to exclusion laws; legal immigration Chinese Immigration (Coolidge), 24 Chinese in the United States of America, The (Lee), 134 Chinese names, 107–9 Chin Lung Hong, 37, 38–39 Chin Shee, 67–68 citizenship, 32; as claim for illegal entry, 79–80, 86, 120–21, 126; of fictional

index

families, 2, 5–7, 36–38; o≈cial forms for, 89–91; racial aspects of, 161–62 Civil Rights Act of 1870, 13 clan associations. See family associations class-based issues: detention facilities, 111; exempt classes, 5, 16, 24, 34, 81, 89 Cole, S., 96, 98 Commissioner General of Immigration, 19, 103 community interdependence/insularity, 2, 7, 133–40, 162; business associations and, 64–66, 112, 119, 135; characterization as foreigners/outsiders and, 134–35, 176nn23, 26; Chinatowns and, 66, 117, 134–35; commodification of documents and assistance and, 65–66; emigration networks in China and, 63–66; perpetuation of paper family ties and, 60–66, 131–33; support of litigation and appeals and, 29, 112; tipsters and threats of deportation and, 135–40 confessions, 15, 116–30, 175–76n12 Consolidated Chinese Benevolent Association, 25 Coolidge, Mary Roberts, 24, 70 corruption, 34–36, 169n6. See also administration of exclusion; illegal entry methods crib sheets, maps, and charts, 51–60 criminal societies, 25, 64 cross-border ties of immigrants, 139–40 Cubic Air Ordinance, 13 Custom House Collector’s O≈ce, 88 Daniels, Roger, 158–59 dates and calendars, 42–43 Davis, R. I., 68, 80 demographics, 20–22; anti-miscegenation laws and, 21; of cross-border smuggled Chinese immigrants, 33; gender

index

imbalance and, 20–21; overestimates of illegal immigration rates, 156–57; rates of entry since 1965, 22; rates of entry under false pretenses, 23, 167n1; rates of illegal entry of Chinese, 159; rates of return to China, 21; rates prior to exclusionary laws, 20–21, 22 detention facilities, 110–13 development of immigration policies, 3– 4, 165n12. See also administration of exclusion dialectic of domination and resistance, 3–4, 67, 76–77, 115, 148–49, 165n8, 177n59 dialects of Chinese, 67–69 diplomatic challenges to exclusion laws, 23–28 discretion, administrative, 5–6, 28–29, 67, 71–77, 83–84, 100; assumptions of Chinese dishonesty and, 69–71; in Chinese Confession Program, 15, 117; in current ins practice, 149–53; legal protections of immigrants and, 17, 30–31, 72, 76 diseases, 92, 94–95 Drug Enforcement Administration, 158 Ellis Island, 19 entry methods, 33–66 ethnicity. See racial aspects of immigration European immigrant exclusion, 6, 155 evasion of exclusion laws. See illegal entry methods Ewick, P., 105 extralegal immigration. See illegal entry methods family associations, 25, 64–66, 118–19, 135 Faulds, Henry, 98 Federal Bureau of Investigation (fbi), 158

209

fictional families, 2, 5–7, 12, 36–41, 77, 132–33; Chinese Confession Program, 15, 116–31, 175–76n12; creation of new identities and, 38–41, 115–20, 170n36; crib sheets and, 51–52; crossborder ties of, 139–40; fabrication of family histories and, 47–60; history of means of, 3–4; Lim Moe’s family, 120–30; long-term impact of, 116–30, 132–33, 162; lost family names and histories and, 119–20, 132–33; preponderance of male relatives in, 140– 41; tipsters and threats of deportation and, 135–40 fingerprinting, 98 Fong, Louie, 44 Fong Gie Wong, 67–68 Fong Hon, 73–75 Fong Yee Sun, 39–40 forced labor, 159–60 Foreign Miner’s Tax, 12–13 Foucault, Michel, 79 fraudulent entry methods. See illegal entry methods Gardner, John E., 108 Garfield, James, 144–45 Garland, Judy, 45 Geary Act of 1892, 14, 16–17, 25, 30 Gee Hen Dick, 136–40 Gee Tie Dig, 87–88 gender imbalance. See women Gentleman’s Agreement of 1908, 27 Gilboy, Janet, 152 Gin Hon, 52–54 Glaser, B., 10 Golden Venture (cargo ship), 159 Green Card (film), 150, 177n50 Gyory, Andrew, 156, 177n59 Heacock, E. H., 168n25 head-taxes, 19, 34 health of applicants, 92, 94–95

210

Heise, C. E., 84 Herschel, William, 98 Hing, B., 12 history of means, 3–4, 165n12 Homeland Security Act, 15 Hom Nh Fook, 37, 38–39 Hom Wing Shick, 37, 38–39 Hoo Foo, 85 Hoo Sing, 84 Houghton, Stephen Chase, 168n25 house drawings, 55 human smuggling, 159–60 Hutter, B., 165n8 identification practices, 2, 4, 95–96, 173n76 identity formation. See fictional families illegal entry methods, 3–7, 16; border crossings and, 33–34, 168–69n1; claims of citizenship and, 79–80, 86, 89–91, 120–21, 126; commodification of documents and assistance and, 65– 66; creation of new identities and, 38– 41, 170n36; crib sheets, maps, and charts and, 51–60; fabricated personal information and, 47–60; fraudulent passports and birth certificates and, 34–36, 169n6; language problems and, 43–44; loopholes in record keeping and, 109–10; ‘‘paper partner’’ merchants and, 34; reliance on stereotypes and ignorance of Chinese customs and, 41–47, 170n22; smuggling and, 159–60; through ports of entry, 33–34, 168–69n1. See also dialectic of domination and resistance; fictional families Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (iirira), 15, 158 Immigration Acts (1891), 30–31; (1903), 168–69n1; (1917), 6; (1921), 14; (1924), 14, 158, 168–69n1

index

Immigration and Naturalization Service (ins), 15, 20, 175n2; adversarial enforcement role of, 154–58; Chinese Confession Program, 15, 116–30, 175– 76n12; current structure and focus of, 153–54; fictional and anecdotal portrayals of, 150–52, 177nn50, 51; growth of, 157–58; policy legacies of Chinese exclusion of, 153–60; practice legacies of Chinese exclusion of, 149–53. See also administration of exclusion immigration families. See fictional families immigration law, 29, 151–52 immigration policies. See administration of exclusion Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (irca), 15, 158–59 Impossible Subjects (Ngai), 161–62 Inspector’s Abstract of Record and Report form, 89–91 interdependence/insularity of Chinese community. See community interdependence/insularity Internal Revenue Service (irs), 158 interpreters, 57, 106–9 interrogation procedures, 2, 5–6, 47–60, 67–71; assumptions of Chinese dishonesty in, 69–71; building and village descriptions and, 48–54, 87; coordination and systematization of, 77–94, 141–60; detailed family histories and, 47–48, 69–73; determination of dialect in, 67–69; health and welfare of applicant and, 92; interpreters and, 57, 106–9; legal protections during, 17, 30–31, 72, 76; o≈cial forms in, 89–91; rules of consistency in, 78, 80, 133, 144–45; search for discrepancies in testimonies by, 73; suspicious testimonies and, 50–51, 60; use of redundancy

index

and cross-checking in, 78–80; use of unrelated questions in, 92–94; witnesses in, 86–87. See also discretion, administrative Jackson, Z. B., 137 Jacobson, Matthew Frye, 161–62 James, H. B., 98 Japanese immigration and exclusion, 6, 27–28, 111 Jew Ah Tai, 82–83 Jew Shee Ngee, 73, 101–2 Jones, David, 108 judicial review. See litigation of exclusion Ju Toy, United States v., 32 Keenah, Inspector, 70–71 kidnapping of laborers, 62–63 kin associations. See family associations Korean immigrant exclusion, 6 labor issues: exclusion of immigrants and, 15–16; railroad worker strikes, 25–26 labor migration, 61–63 language issues, 43–44; Chinese names, 107–9; dialects, 67–69, 106, 107; English language skills, 86, 142, 176n39; phonetic spellings, 108–9; translations and interpreters, 57, 106–9 Lawton, Frank, 98 Lee, Erika, 3 Lee, Rose Hum, 134 Lee Wah Yew, 84–85 Lee You Sung, 84 legacies of Chinese exclusion, 149–60; exclusion as solution to domestic problems, 155–59; expulsions and deportations, 158; policy legacies, 153–60; practice legacies, 149–53; prison sentences, 153, 158; prosecution rates, 153, 158, 178n69

211

legal immigration: of Chinese women, 34, 81, 167n18; of exempt classes, 5, 16, 24, 34, 81, 89, 111; prior to exclusion laws, 20–21, 22, 63–64; since 1965, 22, 155, 159. See also illegal entry methods legal protections of immigrants, 17, 30– 31, 72, 76 legislation of exclusion, 2–3, 12–22; border patrols and, 14, 33; Burlingame Treaty of 1868, 15–16; chronology of events, 14–15; confession programs, 15, 116–31, 175–76n12; denials of civil rights by, 13, 17, 30–31, 72, 76; head taxes, 19, 34; Homeland Security Act, 15; Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 15; Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 15; investigation of subversive activities and, 15; laborer exclusions, 15–16; literacy tests, 6; loopholes in, 5–7, 16; Nationality Act, 15; of other groups, 6; quotas, 6, 14, 15, 17–18, 27, 116–17; Refugee Act of 1980, 15; separation of Chinese from other immigrants through, 30–31; state laws, 12–13; women’s exclusion, 17, 20–21, 167n18. See also administration of exclusion; Chinese Exclusion Laws Leu Duck, 40–41 Levitt, Peggy, 139–40 Lew Fook, 83–84 Lew Han Bock, 40–41 Lew Kim Yuen, 40–41 Lew Wah Lim, 40–41 Lim Ming Pon, 121, 123–26, 131 Lim Moe, 120–31, 175–76n12 Lim Nguey Ming, 122, 126–31 Lim Soon Oy, 121–23, 131 Lim Yen, 106–7, 126–27, 131 Lipsky, Michael, 149 literacy tests, 6, 155 litigation of exclusion: appeals of, 28–

212

32; de novo reviews of, 31, 168n25; judicial precedent in, 30; procedural anomalies in, 31; prosecution rates of, 153, 158; Supreme Court decisions, 30; of U.S. citizens, 32; use of racial stereotypes in, 42–43 Liu, M. T. Y., 96, 98 loopholes. See illegal entry methods Louie Wah, 93 Louie Way, 100 Low, Mr., 64–65 Lung Choy, 77 Lyman, Stanford, 134 MacAllister, Ward, Jr., 168n25 Madden, William, 84 Markel, Howard, 94–95 Mar Sear Lock, 88 Marx, Anthony, 161 McClain, Charles and Laurene, 2 means, 3–4, 165n12 medical exclusions, 92, 94–95 Meet Me in St. Louis, 45 merchant status, 5, 16, 24, 34, 81, 89, 111 Meredith, B. E., 36 Mexican border crossings, 33–34, 168– 69n1 mobility of Chinese community, 2 Morse, Henry N., 98 motivators for immigration, 162 mutual aid societies, 25, 135. See also business associations names, 107–9 Nationality Act of 1940, 15 National Origins Act of 1924, 116–17 nativist and anti-immigrant movements, 156–59 Ngai, Mae, 161–62 Nishimura Eicku v. United States, 32 Occidental and Oriental Steamship Company, 63

index

O≈ce of the Superintendent of Immigration, 19 open immigration period, 12 Pacific Mail Steamship Company, 63, 110 Page Law of 1875, 17 paper families. See fictional families ‘‘paper partner’’ merchants, 34 passport fraud, 34–36 People v. Hall, 13 personal histories. See fictional families Phelps, Timothy, 30 physical anthropology, 99, 173n76 physical identification as Chinese, 4, 44– 46, 95–102, 170n22, 173n76 policies. See administration of exclusion ports of entry, 33–34, 168–69n1 prison sentences, 153, 158 prostitution, 17, 20, 94 purchasing paper. See fictional families ‘‘push’’ theories of labor migration, 61– 63 Qing Dynasty, 26. See also China Quan Gean Fong, 101 Queue-Cutting Ordinance, 13 Quota Act of 1924, 27 quotas, 6, 14–18, 27, 116–17 racial aspects of immigration, 17–18, 161–62; anti-miscegenation laws and, 21; legacies of Chinese Exclusion Laws and, 156–58; medical exclusions and, 94–95; model minorities and, 119; National Origins Act of 1924 and, 116– 17; physical identification as Chinese and, 2, 4, 44–46, 95–102, 170n22, 173n76; stereotypes of dishonesty and, 69–71, 154–55, 177n59; use of stereotypes to gain entrance and, 41– 47, 170n22 record-keeping practices, 2 Refugee Act of 1980, 15

index

regulation of exclusion. See administration of exclusion; legislation of exclusion relationship between policies and immigrants. See dialectic of domination and resistance research methods, 7–11, 166n15; analysis of files, 9–10; external (contextual) variables, 11; selection of files, 8–9; thematic analysis, 10–11 resistance of exclusion laws. See challenges to exclusion laws; illegal entry methods Richards, C. G., 36 Russo-Japanese War of 1905, 27 Salyer, Lucy, 3, 31 San Francisco, 37, 66. See also California Scott, James, 115, 154 Scott Act, 14, 16 seasonal agricultural workers, 159 secret societies, 25, 64 September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, 159 Shanghai Chamber of Commerce, 24, 167n4 ‘‘shanghaied’’ labor, 61–63 Sibley, S., 105 Simon, Jonathan, 3 Simpson-Mazzoli bill, 152 Six Companies, 25, 112 smuggling of Chinese immigrants, 159–60 Spaulding, Special Agent, 98 statistics. See demographics Stern, Alexandra, 94–95 stories, 3–4, 165n12 Strauss, A., 10 surname associations, 25. See also family associations sweatshops, 159–60 taxes: on fishing and mining, 12–13; immigrants head-taxes, 19, 34

213

temporary workers program, 159 terrorism, 157–58 thumb prints, 98 time frame of exclusion, 4–5 Tom Moi, 81 tongs, 25, 64 Torok, John Hayakawa, 118 Toy Fon, 60 trachoma, 94–95 transcontinental railroad, 25–26 translations, 57, 106–9 Trillin, Calvin, 150–52, 177n51

village associations. See family associations village maps, 56–57 visa waiver programs, 158–59

United States, Nishimura Eicku v., 30 United States Department of Commerce and Labor, 19–20, 32, 88–89, 104–5 United States Department of Homeland Security, 15, 149, 157–58 United States Department of Justice, 158 United States Department of the Treasury, 18–19, 104 United States Supreme Court, 30, 32 United States v. Ju Toy, 32 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 32

214

Wei, William, 119 Wing family story, 62 women, 140–41; in detention facilities, 111–12; impact of fictional families on, 124–25; legal exclusion of, 17, 20– 21, 167n18; prostitution of, 17, 21; as wives of merchants, 34, 81 Wong Gat, 42–43 Wong Hung Quen, 51, 54, 60 Wong Kim Ark, United States v., 32 Wong Nging, 37–38 Wong Sui Hong, 82 Woo Wint (Wong), 50–51 Yee Han, 141–47 Yee Kim, 86–87 Yeung Bing Ying, 75–76 Zizhihui association, 112 Zuckerman, E., 165n12

index

Estelle Lau is an independent scholar. She earned a Ph.D. in sociology from the University of Chicago and a law degree from Harvard University. She is currently working on a pictorial history of Chinese immigrants in the United States.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Lau, Estelle T. Paper families : identity, immigration administration, and Chinese exclusion / Estelle T. Lau. p. cm. — (Politics, history, and culture) Includes bibliographical references and index. isbn-13: 978-0-8223-3735-5 (cloth : alk. paper) isbn-10: 0-8223-3735-5 (cloth : alk. paper) isbn-13: 978-0-8223-3747-8 (pbk. : alk. paper) isbn-10: 0-8223-3747-9 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Chinese Americans—Race identity. 2. Chinese Americans—Legal status, laws, etc.—History. 3. Immigrants—United States—History. 4. China— Emigration and immigration—History. 5. United States—Emigration and immigration—Government policy—History. 6. Emigration and immigration law— United States—History. 7. United States—Race relations—Political aspects. I. Title. II. Series. e184.c5l38 2007 323.1195%107309034—dc22 2006016846