Palestine in Turmoil: The Struggle for Sovereignty, 1933-1939 (Vol. II) 9781618113184

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Palestine in Turmoil The Struggle for Sovereignty, 1933-1939

Palestine in Turmoil The Struggle for Sovereignty, 1933-1939 Volume II: Retreat from the Mandate, 1937-1939

Monty Noam Penkower

N e w Yo r k 2 0 1 4

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data: A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN 978-1-61811-317-7 (hardback) ISBN 978-1-61811-368-9 (paperback) ISBN 978-1-61811-318-4 (electronic) ©Touro College Press, 2014 Published by Touro College Press and Academic Studies Press. Typeset, printed and distributed by Academic Studies Press. Cover design by Adell Medovoy On the cover: The Jewish Agency delegation at the St. James Conference on Palestine, London, 1939. Photograph courtesy of the Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem. Touro College Press Michael A. Shmidman and Simcha Fishbane, Editors 43 West 23rd Street New York, NY 10010, USA www.touro.edu/touropress Academic Studies Press 28 Montfern Avenue Brighton, MA 02135, USA [email protected] www.academicstudiespress.com

To the Cherished Memory of Abraham Goodman (1901 – 1971) Leah Stampfer Goodman Baruchi (1914 – 1998) Ari Kraut (1972 – 2000) and Larry Roth (1940 – 2011)

Table of Contents

Volume I: Prelude to Revolt, 1933-1936 Preface

7

1. The Gathering Storms

13

2. Racing against Time

86

3. Test Cases for Zionism

154

4. Enveloping Shadows

221

5. The Arab Revolt Begins

285

Volume II: Retreat from the Mandate, 1937-1939 6. The Peel Commission

355

7. The Retreat from Partition

411

8. The Woodhead Commission

475

9. Partition Abandoned

543

10. From the St. James Conference to the White Paper

612

Conclusion

680

Bibliography

694

Index

720

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6. The Peel Commission

At the opening session of the Palestine Royal Commission on November 12, 1936, at Government House in Jerusalem, Earl Peel immediately emphasized his colleagues’ shared conviction to “apply minds fresh and impartial to the problems before us.” For that reason, while having spent considerable time since their appointment by His Majesty the King that past August in studying numerous mandatory government reports, the members heard no evidence before leaving London and devoted only one meeting to discussions of procedure and other points of detail. Public and private sessions would be held, he announced; the entirely independent body intended to interpret its terms of reference in “a broad and comprehensive manner.” Alluding to the Arab Higher Committee, he observed that it would be “most unfortunate” if “one large section of the country’s population, through its leaders,” persisted in the declaration that it would take no part in the commission’s work. “It would be deplorable indeed,” Peel ended, “if strife and fear and dissension were to be the portion of this Holy Land, which sent forth in the past a message of peace and goodwill to all the world.”1 The following day, High Commissioner Arthur Wauchope reported to his superior that he had already had some “very agreeable” talks with the group, and liked them all. Peel was well aware of the difficulties besetting Palestine, the letter went on, but maintained a pleasant wit. When informed that Wauchope had served on a commission in Australia, the former Secretary of State for India talked of the damage done to trees there by rabbits. “I trusted he had brought none with him to this much-troubled but rabbit-less land,” Wauchope responded. “Only one,” the ailing 70-year-old statesman had rejoined, “which I shall produce out of my hat when the time comes.” At the same time, with the Arab Higher Committee having told Ibn Saud that “the Jews are now one-third of our population we cannot bear one more,” the High Commissioner closed his report to Ormsby-Gore on a cautionary note: “Lord Peel must produce a very intelligent rabbit from his hat, if — 355 —

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we are to avoid serious disturbances next year.”2 The royal appointees’ broad experience in imperial and colonial affairs offered some hope in pointing to an equitable solution. To Peel’s right as they began public sessions in a small chamber of the former ballroom of Jerusalem’s Palace Hotel on Mamillah Road sat ViceChairman Sir Horace G. M. Rumbold, previously a British ambassador in many countries and an outspoken critic of Nazi Germany. Sir Robert Laurie L. Hammond, with a distinguished colonial career behind him including Governor of the state of Assam in India, usually took the chair to Peel’s left. Sir William Morris Carter had presided over the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa. Sir Harold Morris, not long ago chairman of the Coal Wages Board, bore the title of a King’s Counsel and was thus able to practice in the Supreme Courts of Great Britain. Lastly, the dour and hollow-cheeked Professor Reginald Coupland of Oxford University was one of England’s leading authorities on the history of the Colonial Empire. To a visitor entering the main hall of their luxuriously furnished offices, the remaining set of rooms assigned to the group reflected calm and a dignified air of seclusion, exuding a “rarefied atmosphere” in which Palestine’s destiny would be studiously considered.3 With “a crushing sense of responsibility,” Chaim Weizmann opened the Jewish Agency’s case on the morning of November 25 in public session. Speaking for more than two hours to a rapt audience, the WZO president defined the Jewish problem as one of homelessness: the Jewish people is “a disembodied ghost of a race, without a body, and therefore it inspires suspicion, and suspicion breeds hatred.” “Have we the right to live?” he queried. There were six million Jews living East of the Rhine “for whom the world is divided into places where they cannot live and places in which they cannot enter.” The steadfastness that had preserved Jewry throughout the ages and through a career “which is almost one long chain of human suffering,” the 62-year-old Zionist avatar asserted, “is primarily due to some physical or pathological attachment to Palestine.” Jews had come to create “a National Home for the Jewish people” in the Promised Land. The Balfour Declaration, a “solemn” and “well-considered” act rooted in British tradition, meant “a Jewish state.” The Arabs had gained enormously out of the Great War of 1914-1918— the Hejaz, Iraq, Egypt, Syria and Transjordan, but the Jews only had “this small land to work in.” Yet, Weizmann concluded, “we are happy and proud that this upbuilding has been accompanied by a minimum — 356 —

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of suffering, by a minimum of servitude and by considerable benefits to the country at large.” He had not given up hope that the tradition of cooperation in the Middle Ages between Jews and Arabs might yet prevail.4 Weizmann’s feelings of relief and happiness, buoyed by his receipt of many congratulatory messages soon afterwards, shifted markedly the following day. During a grueling 3-hour session in camera, Peel asked him if HMG and the Zionists could take upon themselves the responsibility of bringing thousands of Jews into Palestine without being able to give them “proper protection.” Weizmann’s reply, that the Jews who were “protected” in Poland would prefer to live unprotected in Palestine, brought tears to Hammond’s eyes. Rumbold, however, wondered when the Jewish National Home would be finished. Hearing the witness answer “Never, England is never finished,” Peel remarked that he would be called upon to give evidence again. “The Commission has made up its mind; we shall have to make concessions,” a very depressed Weizmann told his wife Vera on returning to their Jerusalem flat. Imperial interests were Britain’s first concern; London could not afford to quarrel with the Arabs; an impasse had been reached. Uncertain of peace in Europe in the next few years, the British would have to go slowly “and leave the remote future to look after itself.” Above all, Weizmann feared that the commission would recommend freezing Jewish immigration into Palestine at a figure not exceeding the annual Arab birth rate, thereby consigning the Jews to a permanent minority status.5 He and colleagues who soon proceeded to critique British policy in detail did not waver on Zionist aspirations, at times their testimony even sounding a note of implicit threat. Weizmann, most moderate and Anglophile of the yishuv leadership, averred that “it is almost impossible to avoid destructive tendencies amongst the younger generation” of Jewry unless they were given some hope that one day a refuge would be provided to them where they could stand straight and “look with open eyes at the world.” When Shertok claimed that the mandatory, by underestimating Palestine’s economic absorptive capacity, had in effect encouraged illegal immigration, Peel reminded him that the Jewish Agency had to cooperate with HMG in order to prevent such activity. Shertok retorted that while the Agency opposed illicit entry, “it would be humanly quite inconceivable for a Jew to give information against his fellow-Jew” in this regard. Peel abruptly ended the session, insisting — 357 —

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that “it is the duty of every good citizen to assist the Government in carrying out the law.”6 By early December, Ben-Gurion confided in his closest Labor allies a personal belief that the Zionist enterprise stood before “a mortal political blow.” The commission would not overlook the danger of a Palestinian civil war which might spread to adjacent countries, leading to drastic cuts in Jewish immigration and perhaps harsh restrictions in the purchase of land. The pro-Zionist Ormsby-Gore was completely under Wauchope’s influence, the local administration itself “weak, fearful, and not firm in its spirit.” Given the threat of impending world war and the uncertainty of Britain’s ability to defend us, Ben-Gurion postulated, the Zionists had to strengthen their capability both against large attack and consequently to gain a receptive ear in HGM’s military circles. Attaining this objective demanded ships; establishing settlements to seize control of the country’s strategic hilltops; developing industrial self-sufficiency; and providing military training to the yishuv’s agricultural spearhead. Considerable financial means had to be obtained to achieve this end.7 On his own, Weizmann tried to persuade the High Commissioner that the hostilities which reigned within and between the nearby Muslim countries made an Arab Federation impracticable in the near future. If England nevertheless would be thereby compelled to “throw over the Jews,” the Zionist chief cautioned, the 400,000 Jews of Palestine would never submit. He and the entire Agency would resign, the yishuv’s revolt joined by millions of Jews in America and elsewhere “to gain their just rights and the promises made to them.” Wauchope remarked, in turn, that the Royal Commission and HMG would try to decide on the course that justice to Arabs and Jews demanded. After a pause, Weizmann declared that he would be prepared for some cut in Jewish immigration, but quickly added that the Arabs—”now all were extremists”—would refuse even 3,000 a year. Two alternatives existed, in his opinion: Either HMG would meet Arab refusal of all Jewish immigration by admitting some 300,000 Jews in the next two or three years, or condemn the Jews to a permanent minority, which would be “much more dangerous” for England. Weizmann then departed Jerusalem for his home in Rehovot, reportedly saying “I got nothing out of Sir Arthur.” Wauchope’s report to the Colonial Office concluded with this evaluation: “Should England falter in what he, not we, consider to be English duties in this cause, he will show a bitterness towards England exceeding in intensity the — 358 —

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feelings that now animate the Mufti, who likewise fears his people may suffer intolerable wrongs.”8 Both the British and the Jewish Agency were well aware of Palestinian Arab implacability. Ibn Saud’s continued effort, much appreciated by the Foreign Office, failed to sway the Arab Higher Committee to abandon its boycott of the commission. Nashashibi confessed in a telephone call with an associate that he wanted the National Defense Party to appear before the hearings, but feared for his life at the Mufti’s hand. Abdullah, whom Shertok had praised for his moderation when the two met a month earlier in the King David Hotel, rejected the Committee’s request that he not receive a possible commission visit to the royal palace in Amman. In a private letter on December 18 to Wauchope, Abd al-Hadi insisted that the country “cannot absorb one additional Jewish immigrant.” The Arabs feared that the Jews would become the majority in Palestine within the coming few years, he noted, and wanted the same guarantees that were enjoyed by their brethren in other Arab countries. The High Commissioner forwarded this letter to Peel for his consideration.9 Two days later, Peel sent Ormsby-Gore a long personal letter with some general impressions to date. He had not realized how “deepseated” was the Arab fear of Jewish domination; the wide gap dividing the two peoples was “really disturbing,” with no sign of fusion between them. The Jews regarded Palestine as a refuge for the threatened Jews of Europe, and were “determined by means legal or illegal to pour into Palestine as many of them as possible.” No one made any attempt to bring about reconciliation between Arab and Jew, who are brought up in separate schools, see nothing of each other, and are taught by persons who do nothing to create good feeling. The Jewish Agency is very nearly a separate government itself, while the Arab Higher Committee’s “word is law.” The administration was unpopular with both sides; the police much doubted whether the Arab policemen could be relied upon in case of another rising. The Jews think that they will be able to protect themselves against the Arabs if they get their quotas into the country, but “meanwhile there is a desperate race between Arab fertility and Jewish immigration.” Peel found it difficult to describe the unpleasant atmosphere of suspicion and secrecy that prevailed all about. Most people seemed to expect another Arab uprising, and even government officials could not give evidence in public, saying that if they were to speak frankly their — 359 —

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usefulness as Palestine officials would be gone. The commission would, however, do its best to examine the grievances under the mandate. The Jewish witnesses largely complained that HMG should spend far more money on developing ports and settling Jews on the land in order to increase the economic absorption of the country, “but it is, of course, racial issues that are dominant.” With one or two small exceptions, Peel observed, no one seemed able to put forward any helpful suggestions, unless the Arab proposal to banish the Jews or stop immigration, prevent land sales, and immediately establish a Legislative Assembly could be seen as constructive. Rumbold, who had seen the letter, considered it “a very temperate statement of the situation.”10 Wauchope also thought that the present period of quiet was “an interlude.” Despite the War Office’s anxiety to reduce the British garrison in Palestine as soon as possible, he urged Ormsby-Gore to understand that an “unnatural degree of political tension, hostility to Government and acute inter-racial animosity” existed. Another outbreak of rebellion would occur if the commission and HMG did not meet Arab demands, in which case General Dill would suppress it “if need be by severe measures such as will prevent any further rising for some years to come.” It would be most unwise to arm any additional Arabs, and the prospect of any mixed Arab-Jewish force was highly doubtful. For the close defense of Jewish settlements, a current auxiliary Jewish police force would come up to 3,000, with a possible enrollment of another 3,000 Jews if the need arose. The Inspector-General of Police agreed that Arab police freshly raised now would be “quite unreliable.” For the present and until the impending crisis had passed, Wauchope thought that the mandatory must rely upon British troops to supplement the police in maintaining or restoring public security. When the crisis had been met and overcome, and more stable conditions restored, then HMG could decide what permanent security forces were best adapted to the needs of the country.11 The Chief Secretary for Palestine agreed with this analysis, but went much further. Testifying in camera three weeks earlier, Hall asserted that the Arabs had real grudges, and that a reorientation of British policy was needed. He proposed the creation of an Arab Agency parallel to the Jewish Agency, and that Jewish immigration be limited to 5 percent of the population in the coming years. Jews, he told the commissioners, would have to seek other countries for refuge. Since HMG’s immedi— 360 —

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ate goal was to bring peace to Palestine, the Jews “will have to wait patiently” to immigrate until the authorities found ways to reconcile Jew and Arab. Martial Law had not been instituted because the mandatory feared the results, and concern for disorders still existed. The authority of the Mufti should be limited, but Haj Amin’s popularity ruled out his dismissal. Appearing as a radical, he was moderate in negotiations with the government, while the Jews bothered the entire administration over every argument that they had. Nothing should be done to impair the rights of Jews in other countries, Hall added, pointing out that after the Palestinian Arab “disturbances,” the condition of Jews living in Arab countries had worsened.12 The Jewish Agency knew of Hall’s stance, but a sudden development towards the end of Weizmann’s closed testimony on December 23 caught the Zionist leader unawares. He proposed then that HMG accept the principle of “parity between Jews and Arabs as political entities,” which Prime Minister MacDonald had agreed to five years ago. Even if the Jews attained a majority, Weizmann preferred the phrase “Jewish National Home” (to be called “Eretz Yisrael”), because “Jewish state” implied the Jews dominating the Arabs: “If there is to be a Jewish state it will only be when we are worthy of it, and it may take hundreds of years.” Weizmann foresaw the British staying in Palestine for at least the next half century, and wished to continue with the unlimited immigration of Jews subject to the absorptive capacity. The session eventually veered to Hammond’s idea of cantonization, a policy which the Agency had rejected one month earlier in favor of the formula “not to rule or to be ruled by others.” Then, unexpectedly, Coupland suggested instead “two big areas, developing the possibilities of self-government.” Weizmann refused to consider the idea, particularly as all these proposals did not carry “any weight” with the Arabs. Peel pressed on, but Weizmann would say no more than “if there were a definite suggestion before me, I would try my level best to consider it.” And if the suggestion was meant to satisfy the Arabs, he saw no signs of such a possibility at present: “For the time being they are intractable, intransigent and irreconcilable.”13 Two weeks later, the Palestinian Arab leadership reversed its stance towards the Royal Commission. On January 6, 1937, Abd al-Hadi reported to the Arab Higher Committee executive on behalf of its delegation’s trip to Iraq and Saudi Arabia in search of support. An overture to the German minister to Baghdad, arguing that in five years continued — 361 —

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Jewish immigration would create a Jewish majority, and therefore an anti-German state, met with refusal to intervene on the grounds that while the Third Reich understood the Arabs’ plight, it also desired good relations with Britain. The far more receptive Iraqi government and King Ghazi had stressed that further boycott would permit HMG not to carry out the Arab demands. Welcoming the emissaries warmly, Ibn Saud had expressed his certainty that London would endorse the Committee’s just case and take account of the neighboring Arab countries. These views, like Ghazi, he conveyed in a letter to the Committee. After much deliberation, the executive agreed to testify “in compliance with the Arab rulers’ request,” and released the two royal communications to the press. Haj Amin and associates also resolved to delay their projected conference in Mecca until after the commission published its report, that meeting to serve as a valuable means to protest should the conclusions harm the Committee’s cause.14 Ben-Gurion took a different tack from Weizmann when he appeared the next day before the commission. In open session, he proclaimed that “the Bible is our mandate” and that “our right is as old as the Jewish people. It was only the recognition of this right which was expressed in the Balfour Declaration and the mandate.” Palestine was the one country the Jews, “as a nation, as a race,” could regard as their historic homeland, and no other nation regarded this country as their only homeland. Without displacing or dominating the existing inhabitants, Zionists sought to make the Jewish people masters of their own destiny as any other free independent people. The movement ultimately wished the Jewish National Home to be a unit of the British Commonwealth; places holy to the whole civilized world should be placed under some form of international control. A free Jewish nation in Palestine would greatly benefit their Arab neighbors, he concluded, and from the recognition of this fact “will come a lasting peace and lasting cooperation between the two peoples.”15 Ben-Gurion followed this up with closed testimony shortly thereafter, but not before Peel disclosed some of his own hesitations in a private talk with the Agency Executive chairman. While seeing no difference between the terms “national home” and “state,” Peel feared that Jews worldwide would suffer as a result of the Jewish National Home’s establishment. The time might come when Jews everywhere would be told to leave for their new home. Palestine was small, it would take the — 362 —

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commission much time to prepare its report, and two opposing cultures with different languages existed there. Switzerland and Canada had different spoken languages as well, but they did not experience the antagonism that reigned in this country. Two cultural levels prevailed now, Ben-Gurion replied, but should the yishuv grow, these differences would weaken. Peel then interjected: And even if 1 million Jews settled Palestine, what would it mean for the Jewish nation of 17 million? In the part of the country west of the Jordan River alone, Ben-Gurion answered, he thought that room existed for 4 million Jews. Still, Peel shot back, the great part of the Jewish people would remain outside the country.16 In camera, Ben-Gurion focused on the Arab-Jewish conflict, possibilities of an accord, and the causes for the “disturbances.” Only last week, he confided, the newly elected Syrian President, Jamal Bey Mardam, had expressed optimism to two Agency representatives about a Jewish-Arab peace, while the Iraqi government did not accept Abd al-Hadi’s view about the dangers of Zionism. An active minority of Arabs in Palestine opposed the Jewish national movement, but economic cooperation existed between the Jewish and Arab villages. With modern methods of industry, at least four million Jews could be brought into Palestine during the next 30 or 40 years alongside an Arab population of two million. Political parity, a solution that he had first suggested to Arab spokesmen in 1934, was feasible. With HMG’s endorsement, the Arabs must be convinced that Jews had come to stay as “a historical necessity,” just as the yishuv had to take into account the millions of Arabs surrounding Palestine. Increased immigration and an improvement in the position of the fellahin would lead to no more trouble in the country. Intensifying the fertility of the land meant resettlement and irrigation, Ben-Gurion ended, particularly for almost half of the country called the Negev that had not been cultivated and was still considered uncultivable.17 At the commission’s final session with Weizmann on January 8, Coupland offered a revolutionary alternative far clearer than his proposal of December 23. In case Arab-Jewish harmony proved unrealizable in the course of the next five years, the commission’s most influential member suggested a period of partition on a federal basis, to be followed by “effective partition.” He explained: “To terminate the mandate by agreement, and split Palestine into two halves, the plain being an independent Jewish state—as independent as Belgium, in treaty relations — 363 —

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with Great Britain, whatever arrangements you like with us, and the rest of Palestine, plus Transjordan, an independent Arab state, as independent as Arabia.” “With a British entente,” Hammond cut in. Weizmann replied: “Yes, I appreciate that. Permit me not to give a definite answer now…. Of course, it is cutting the child in two.” Coupland retorted: “Yes, that has already been done once; but an impregnable base for possible conquest in the Middle East.” Weizmann, with no colleague present, gave a non-committal answer: “I appreciate the spirit in which the suggestion has been put to me, and perhaps I may be given an opportunity of coming back to it.”18 The prospect of statehood actually elated Weizmann, who revealed his inner feelings to an aide that same afternoon. After walking on Mt. Scopus for a while with Yehezkel Saharov (later Sahar), Hagana guards all about, he exclaimed: “I foresee the destruction of European Jewry, and therefore the proposal is so important. No matter how big it will be—we shall be our own masters. We could save a lot of them.” Highly excited, he stated very clearly: “There would be a war, from which Jews would not escape with their lives. Until this war breaks out, we could bring in as many Jews as we can. This would improve our situation here as well.” Saharov described the scene years later: “His voice would be suddenly choked by emotion and his eyes filled with tears. All his love for his people, all his love for England, rushed to the surface. His life’s labor, everything he had toiled for, was now within his reach: The Jewish State was at hand.”19 By then, the Royal Commission had made an extensive tour of the country, especially impressed with the settlements which had taken in immigrants from Germany and Poland. John Martin of the Colonial Office, then serving as the commission’s secretary, recalled that Rumbold recognized an elderly man living in a small, rough hut who had been a very prominent musician in Germany. “This is a terrible change for you,” said the vice-chairman. The old colonist responded, to Rumbold’s surprise: “It is a change, from Hell to Heaven.” Juxtaposing this vignette with an inevitable class of landless Arabs, Hammond concluded that therein lay the tragedy of Palestine: “two good, just causes that were quite irreconcilable.” Commission members also had the pleasure, along with 3,000 others, of attending the historic concert in which Arturo Toscanini conducted the premiere of the Palestine Philharmonic Orchestra, featuring the great violinist Bronislaw Hubermann, its — 364 —

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founder, most of whose members were European refugees. Nor could Peel not be struck by Weizmann’s reply, during the commission’s visit to the Daniel Sieff Institute at Rehovot, when asked what he was working on at his laboratory: “I am creating absorptive capacity.”20 The commission sought out Abdullah’s views as well, visiting him on January 9 in Amman. Assuming that the Palestine problem were resolved, Peel began, would His Royal Highness accept a number of Jews in Transjordan? Yes, Abdullah replied, provided that they did not demand any special political rights and on condition that the native residents and the mandatory approved. As for Palestine, a provisional government should be created to implement the mandate under British supervision, as occurred in Syria, Iraq, and now Transjordan. The Jews should not exceed 35 percent of the country’s population, Abdullah posited. The entire Arab world had religious, economic, and national ties to Palestine, and “not one Arab would agree that Palestine become Jewish.” HMG was obligated with promises to the Arabs before the Balfour Declaration and the League of Nations, the Emir continued, and had pledged to his father (Sharif Hussein) that it would not make peace with Turkey and Germany before the freedom of the Arabs was complete. Having controlled Transjordan during the recent “disturbances” in Palestine out of a close friendship with the British Empire, he uttered “only words of truth without petition or fear” for his visitors’ sake. Wishing them luck, Abdullah ended to shared laughter: “The end of my difficulties depends upon your ultimate report.”21 Haj Amin left little doubt as to the Committee’s stand when testifying publicly, all the while in his trademark dulcet tones, on January 12. Seated together with Committee colleagues around a horseshoe table, the Mufti insisted that HMG had pledged Palestine to the Arabs. The Jews had increased their number in Palestine about eight times since the Balfour Declaration, and now owned fifteen times the area of what they had possessed in 1917 of the country’s best and most fertile land. Their ultimate aim, he asserted, was the reconstruction of the Temple of King Solomon on the ruins of the Haram esh Sharif, the El Aqsa Mosque, and the Holy Dome of the Rock, “which is held in the highest esteem and veneration in the Muslim World.” The Jews wished to acquire the natural resources of the country, as well as to deface and trespass on the sanctity of the Holy Places. Arab grievances would intensify and Palestine made “the permanent scene of disorders” unless the — 365 —

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“experiment” of the Jewish National Home was abandoned, Jewish immigration and the sale of Arab land to Jews immediately and completely stopped, and the mandate replaced by a treaty between HMG and “a national and independent government … which will guarantee justice, progress, and prosperity for all.” Palestine “is already fully populated,” and the Arab-Muslim world “will never abandon this country at any time or under any circumstances.” What of the current Jewish population? the commission queried. They would live, Haj Amin replied, “as they have always lived in Arab countries, with complete freedom and liberty as natives in the country.” The government to be set up under the treaty would at its discretion decide what to do with the Jews already in Palestine. Rumbold pressed on: “Does His Eminence think that this country can assimilate and digest the 400,000 Jews now in the country?” Haj Amin: “No.” Peel: “Some of them will have to be removed by a process kindly or painful as the case may be?” Haj Amin: “We must leave all this to the future.” This exchange, Martin would recall, shocked the commission, which then heard the witness declare that the Arabs of Palestine would be happier if they reverted to Turkish rule. Peel pounced: “If you could not have complete independence you would rather the British Government handed over the mandate to Turkey?” Haj Amin: “We believe that we can attain complete independence.” Peel: “He does not like to answer my question?” [sic] Haj Amin: “Because in my opinion every mandate is temporary and provisional and the Arab peoples are determined to attain independence.”22 Abd al-Hadi adopted at least as militant a tone as Haj Amin. The Istiqlal Party leader believed that the country could not absorb “one additional immigrant,” and the Jews should never become a majority at all. In Germany, he argued, 70 million cultured and civilized Germans with all the necessary means of government “could not bear 600,000 Jews”; — 366 —

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Palestine’s Arabs, whose national rights are affected, were in “an even worse position” than the Jews in Germany. They would prefer death to seeing themselves denied the full independence already granted to their brethren in Syria and Iraq, refuse to sit at any table with Zionist Jews, and do “everything possible” in their power to “crush down” Zionism, because “Zionism and Arabism can never be united together.” Noting that the speaker stated he did not want to drive the Jews out of Palestine, but at the same time said that they are too many, Peel asked, “I want to know how he would reduce them?” Abd al-Hadi replied, “That is not a question which can be decided here.”23 The remaining Palestinian Arab witnesses, Muslim and Christian, sounded this tocsin as well. To Husseini, for example, the Jews were “an alien race,” importing “communistic principles and ideas … most repugnant to the religion, custom and ethical principles of this country.” For Committee secretary Fuad Saba, Arabs viewed the mandate as intended “to a large extent for their economic annihilation” in order to create a larger and larger Jewish community. In Izzat Darwazeh’s opinion, the Jews “discontinued to have any connection with this land” about two thousand years ago. The Arabs’ “major premise and policy,” declared school headmaster Khalil Totah of Ramallah, is their feeling that “they must belong to the Arab Federation and the Arab world.” Monsignor Hajjar refused to grant the Jews any national existence whatsoever. He warned that the Jews’ domination of Palestine once they reached a majority would run counter to the Koran, which said of this religious entity: “They have been stricken with misery until the day of Resurrection.” From the Christian point of view, the Melkite Archbishop of Galilee added, while Judaism looked to this country as the Land of Promise, “we are the new Israelites, we are the new people of God.”24 Coupland pursued his own course, arranging to meet with Weizmann on January 16 for a private talk at 2 p.m. in Nahalal. The moshav (agricultural cooperative) in the western Jezre’el Valley, founded in 1921 by pioneers of the Second Aliya and laid out in concentric circles, set aside a small room in the Girls’ Agricultural School where the two would meet. Soon after the pair made their way through the muddy paths to their secret rendezvous on that drab, rainy Sabbath, Weizmann defined the conditions necessary for the Jewish National Home to flourish. He doubted that HMG, in its current strategic situation, could guarantee the yishuv’s healthy development. Coupland agreed and, after toying — 367 —

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with a number of alternatives, said: “There needs to be an operation; no honest doctor will recommend aspirins and a hot-water bottle.” Advancing the idea of partition on his own initiative, Coupland began discussing details of the project. Weizmann understood that the area of the Jewish State would not be very great, and that it would embrace those parts of the country where the Zionists had done most of their work. While there did not seem to be much possibility for further expansion, Weizmann’s unpublished reminiscences later recorded, he thought that the new commonwealth could bring over something like 1 to 1.5 million Jews within 10-15 years. The Negev did not come into the discussion, Weizmann failing to realize its importance and skeptical about its possibilities. If deciding on partition, Coupland went on, the commission might propose continuing the Jewish State’s southern boundary almost to Gaza, but then the Jews would have to forego part of the coastal part of Western Galilee. Weizmann took it upon himself to respond that his colleagues would certainly prefer the whole north. There was still the “great fundamental question” of partition itself, he observed. Although enjoined by the Oxford professor to keep this suggestion a secret, he warned Coupland that “sealing his lips” was impossible; some of the Agency Executive had to be told. Feeling strongly, Coupland recalled the meeting some years later, that partition seemed to him “the only solution,” one “compatible with justice and logic—the lesser injustice,” Coupland left for Jerusalem as dusk fell. Weizmann turned to some farmers standing nearby, and exclaimed: “Hevra [Comrades], today we laid the basis for the Jewish State!” He then invited the few Nahalal settlers who had known of the scheduled meeting to enter the room. His face was pale and tired, but his eyes “shone with a special glow,” evidently weighed down with a critical matter. The memoir of veteran Ya’akov Uri continued: Should agreement be given to the establishment of a Jewish state in part of Eretz Yisrael?, Weizmann asked. This would mean surrendering large and important parts, including the biblical Shekhem, Hevron, and maybe even Jerusalem, with perhaps a special, neutral corridor between Jaffa and Jerusalem. On the other hand, an independent area would enable us to bring tortured, hounded Jews from all the corners of the earth to safety. Conceding that the choice was “difficult and bitter,” he asked for their opinion. A 4-1 vote in favor buoyed his spirits, and he set off for Haifa that same — 368 —

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evening to inform his mother of the good news.25 Coupland did not know what his colleagues thought of partition, since they spent their time hearing witnesses and touring the country. They never met to discuss the heart of the matter, he informed Weizmann in Nahalal. In private conversation, Peel told Ben-Gurion that the problems of Palestine seemed “very complicated and very difficult,” and it would require considerable time to digest all the material assembled. At one public hearing, Rumbold exclaimed that the “injection of an alien race into the body politic of this native race has complicated the situation very much,” leading the Agency’s outraged Dov Hos to counter that the Jews were “children returning to their country.” The Palestine administration had drawn up tentative plans for separate cantons, while more far-reaching plans of Sir Strafford Cripps and of Archer Cust had suggested dividing Palestine into two solid, independent state blocs in which there would still be an Arab majority in the Jewish half. To complicate matters, the mandate had already been interpreted many times. The members of the commission, however, did not consider themselves bound by any of the former interpretations. Having heard evidence from 137 witnesses, the Royal Commission decided that the time had come to leave for home. Additional testimony in London awaited, to be followed by the arduous task of decision and preparing a report. The last word lay, in fact, with the commission and with His Majesty’s Government.26

On January 19, Weizmann dispatched a very long letter to Peel, replying to the many questions asked of him in secret session. He first reviewed the history of British pledges to Jews and Arabs, the unique status of the Jewish people—unlike the Arab rulers—in the Palestine Mandate, and the fact that the root of the trouble lay not in increased Jewish immigration but in the Arab aspiration to exclusive rule over Eretz Yisrael. The mandate recognized the Jews’ “National Home” in Palestine; the ongoing persecution of Jews made the realization of this objective ever more essential. Any plan for cantonization, which curtailed Jewish immigration and settlement in Arab units, was particularly unacceptable after the lopping off in 1922 of 77 percent of the original mandate in order to create Transjordan. The mandate could not be terminated, Weizmann declared, until the League had satisfied itself that the Jewish — 369 —

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National Home “has developed to such a stage that its further free growth is assured by its own strength,” or that sufficient safeguards were provided as to effectively guarantee its growth “unhampered by any political limitations.” Any halting of Jewish immigration and preventing full development would only encourage the Arabs in the belief “that disturbances bring their rewards” and, he finished, ran counter to the intentions of the mandate.27 Completely in the dark as to the Royal Commission’s deliberations, the Foreign Office concluded au contraire that HMG had to adopt a new direction, one taken from a broader perspective. Its ambassador in Iraq had recently reported that, in the view of that country’s prime minister, the solution of Palestine’s Arabs was more important “than any other question of the day.” Asked about the possibility of cultivable land in Transjordan for Palestinian Arab farmers, British Resident Cox advised that “there are no suitable areas for systematic settlement.” Soon thereafter, George Rendel, the Eastern Department’s highly influential head who highlighted the anti-Zionist antagonism of Ibn Saud, admitted that “the utmost sympathy” was due the tragic position of the Jews. “But this is a world problem of the same type as that of the pressure of the surplus populations of Japan and Italy, or of the redistribution of raw materials and the opening up of markets,” he opined. Opposing Weizmann’s plea for continued Jewish immigration, Rendel advised that it was “neither practical nor just to regard the Palestine problem simply as an escape from a major world problem of these proportions.”28 On January 20, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden sent Ormsby-Gore a private summary of Whitehall’s position based largely on Rendel’s views, beginning with the premise that no hope existed for reconciliation between Arab and Jew. Reviewing Weizmann’s last talks with Wauchope the previous month, the memorandum argued that in view of Britain’s “conflicting promises” to the two peoples, the government had to seek a policy that offered “some tolerable harmony.” Palestine could not be regarded as furnishing a means of “escape” from current antisemitism, nor could Weizmann’s solution be endorsed, in which Jews would form between 80 to even 100 percent of the population. Rather, a fixed numerical ratio of Jews to Arabs (just put forward by Palestine’s first High Commissioner, Herbert Samuel) or a geographic “patch-work quilt” appeared as the two available alternatives. A clear and consistent policy, “based on principles and not merely on expediency,” should be adopted — 370 —

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soon after the commission’s report. Moderates, as well as Ibn Saud and other Arab rulers, would accept this provided that HMG gave the Arabs “something approaching a square deal.”29 Preferring to wait until the commission’s preliminary report reached the cabinet, Ormsby-Gore quickly expressed the hope that Eden would not circulate the memorandum to the cabinet yet. The Zionists had never made any claim for becoming an overwhelming majority of Palestine’s population, he observed, nor had even Jabotinsky. Admittedly, Palestine could not solve “a major Jewish problem of such proportions as that problem now assumes” in Europe. Yet the Colonial Office and HMG’s representatives at the League of Nations had postulated that the two obligations in the Balfour Declaration were not irreconcilable, and that Western Palestine was excluded from the area of independent Arab rule. Further, the WZO had never demanded a Jewish state, and in any event, “there is no question of establishing a Jewish State in Palestine.” The Palestine government had prepared a devastating criticism as regards the fixed Arab-Jewish ratio concept. In addressing Parliament on June 16, 1936, Eden was reminded, the Colonial Secretary had stated that both the fears of Arabs and Jews were “baseless,” and that the British government desired to find a solution to their “fundamental dual obligation.” “It is my confident belief,” Ormsby-Gore closed, “that we can dissipate those fears, and do justice to both parties, and it is my intention, when the solution is found, to apply that solution with firmness and consistency.”30 Rendel sharply challenged the Colonial Secretary’s response, penning a lengthy minute to his Whitehall colleagues on February 2. With the Jews “much more progressive and prolific” than the Arabs, he began, it stood to reason that the former must outnumber the latter. Yet, apart from this, most Zionist propaganda made no sense unless it was assumed that the Jewish population in Palestine could increase “practically indefinitely” and so solve the problem of the “new diaspora” of Central Europe’s Jews by creating a Jewish state. Weizmann himself had explained to Prime Minister MacDonald that “however large” (Rendel’s emphasis) the Jews’ majority might be, they would never exercise power to the detriment of their Arab neighbors. It would be “merely ostrichlike” not to face the fact that the majority of the Zionists, who always refused to accept any crystallization of present figures, ultimately sought Jewish sovereignty. To continue the line that two obligations of — 371 —

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the Balfour Declaration could be carried out simultaneously and fully, Rendel cautioned, “can only lead to disaster.” His memorandum, when fully ready, would be brought to the cabinet ministers for their consideration once the Royal Commission’s report saw the light of day.31 For his part, Weizmann moved swiftly to gain support for partition upon returning to London. He agreed with Blanche Dugdale, Lord Balfour’s niece, that “the Jews would be fools not to accept it, even [if] it were the size of a table-cloth.” The Jews would accept partition in principle, he told Orsmby-Gore in February, but he could not offer any decided opinion before being told “a good deal more about its details.” If a satisfactory plan could be worked out, Weizmann confided to Dugdale, he would agree to a stoppage of immigration for a year at the most, but insisted on the inclusion in the Jewish area of the entire Jezre’el Valley and Pinhas Rutenberg’s electric power station at Naharayim past the Jordan River, and on internal defense resting in the yishuv’s hands. He asked Amery, Rappard, and French Prime Minister Léon Blum, all backers of the proposal, to lobby for partition’s acceptance. Amery met with Ormsby-Gore on February 16 and found him “very sympathetic to the general idea of the scheme you enunciated,” although uncertain whether the commission “would have the courage to come down flat-footed in favour of so bold a scheme” in their report. “The more I think of the situation,” Weizmann replied to Amery, “the stronger grows my belief that there is no other way out of the deadlock which has been created.”32 Having eagerly embraced partition as the cornerstone for a new Zionist policy, Ben-Gurion spent a month studying maps and census figures, and then summoned Mapai’s Central Committee on February 5 to present his own scheme. Given his fear that the Royal Commission would propose a reduction of immigration and land sales, he urged the “two-state plan” as a “positive, radical solution.” A fully independent Jewish state would include the entire coastal plain from the southern border of the Acre area to the northern border of the Gaza area; the towns of Tiberias, Safed and Haifa; half the Negev; and the eastern border near to the hills of Judea and Samaria. Jerusalem (with local Arab-Jewish administration), Bethlehem, and Nazareth should be internationalized and placed under British rule. Three million Jews could be brought in this commonwealth, which would include 213,000 Arabs. An Arab corridor from Jaffa, Lod, and Ramleh should connect to the Arab State, to be joined to Transjordan as one entity. Acre and Gaza — 372 —

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would be autonomous areas for the time being. The entire plan would be doomed, however, if it came from the Agency, which ought to insist that the mandate be safeguarded until “something better” was given in exchange. Blum and Roosevelt could play a significant role in obtaining HMG’s approval, he added. Shertok, less enthusiastic about endorsing partition, agreed that the Agency should make certain it appeared that the plan was being “forced” upon it by England.33 Ben-Gurion immediately sent Kaplan to bring Brandeis and other American Zionists up-to-date about the commission, and especially partition. After listening quietly for almost an hour, the U.S. Supreme Court Justice opposed the proposal. HMG sought to weaken the yishuv, he explained, “taking from us the rights which are ours under the mandate.” The country is too small; Transjordan had already been “stolen” from us. Zionists should “wait and work,” and not bind themselves; the present British government was not permanent. We will be able to solve the problem with another 500,000 Jews in Palestine, Brandeis averred. The yishuv could endure reduced immigration and even restricted land purchase if given the opportunity for full administration. “We may now do no more than protest,” he ended, “but we must remain undiscouraged.” One week later, Wise and others in Brandeis’s circle submitted to Peel (with a copy to Ormsby-Gore) a lengthy memorandum on American interest in the administration of the mandate, noting also that American Jews had contributed at least $81 million dollars to the yishuv’s development “in the furtherance of the common ideal.” “A deep feeling has been aroused,” it concluded, that some Palestine administration officials were not carrying out the mandate’s principles; “that the duties of the trusteeship are not being properly and fully performed; and that the obligations undertaken to America by Great Britain are being in part, at least, disregarded.”34 The Commission also heard from Jabotinsky, who delivered an impassioned appeal in public session on February 11 on behalf of the New Zionist Organization. Unequivocally, he called for a Jewish state on both sides of the Jordan River as mentioned in the original mandate, capable of holding between 8 to18 million Jews and 2 million Arabs. “There is no question of ousting the Arabs.” Facing “an elemental calamity” where “many millions” (the speaker’s emphasis) required salvation because the Jewish people were everywhere a minority, the Jews could not “concede” anything. The Arabs would prefer Palestine to be “the Arab State — 373 —

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No. 4, No. 5, or No. 6,” Jabotinsky quite understood, “but when the Arab claim is confronted with our Jewish demand to be saved, it is like the claims of appetite versus the claims of starvation.” Every prominent British statesman understood the Balfour Declaration and mandate to mean a Jewish state, yet the administration continued to frustrate its realization, including the tepid response to last year’s Arab revolt. The Jewish Agency, discriminating against Betar youth and other political groups, should be reconstituted to represent the whole of Zionist Jewry. The Agency and the Colonial Office both had no blueprint for carrying out the Zionist program. “Cantonization is a dream and parity is a lie.” Arabs would come to terms with the Jewish State’s creation, Jabotinsky believed, compromise and peace to follow.35 Haj Amin entertained other ideas, departing with Darwaza for the Hejaz in quest of Ibn Saud’s assistance. The trip greatly angered Abdullah, who had earlier told Rutenberg that Wauchope’s “incomprehensible support” of the Mufti’s “tremendous power” would have to be replaced with the creation of “a local independent Arab authority” under the Transjordanian ruler, who would implement the Palestine Mandate. Abdullah urged the British to have Haj Amin, then working with some political agitators to “get rid of him” and other moderates, removed from office at once. He also warned the Saudi monarch that Haj Amin was a “fanatical nationalist” who, in concert with others, wished to control Palestine and the neighboring countries through “unrealistic solutions.” Ibn Saud replied that the Mufti had sought his continued efforts on behalf of the Palestinian Arabs, and that he promised to do everything “within the realm of possibility” vis-à-vis the British government. Indeed, Ibn Saud sent the Foreign Office a memorandum on February 18, stating that if the Jews attained a majority the Arabs would be driven out of this Holy Land. “Who knows what the future may bring?”—especially as HMG’s enemies were very active in all the Arab countries. He therefore requested a general amnesty for the various past crimes of Arab prisoners, a stop to Jewish immigration, land sale legislation to protect small owners, and the setting up of “a future government in conjunction with the people there.”36 The pressure from Arab States hardened Whitehall further against Zionist aspirations. Lacy Baggallay of the Eastern Department ventured that even Ibn Saud “would probably cease to exert any moderating influence” if a solution emerged that did not satisfy Arab opinion outside of — 374 —

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Palestine. He considered that Wauchope’s suggestion for more Jewish self-defense armed units offered no advantage at the cost of creating a situation where the use of British forces in Iraq, Egypt, and possibly Arabia might be called for. Under-Secretary Vansittart remarked to Weizmann that “all the Middle East was in ferment, and with complications abroad, anything could happen.” For that very reason, he noted to colleagues, “we should set our faces most resolutely against the recruitment of Jews for use against Arabs. This would be a vast mistake.” Under the circumstances, Rendel prepared for a swing the next month through the Middle Eastern capitals, having an admitted preference for the primitive character of Arabia in contrast to his distaste for the “brash modern look” that the Jewish colonists were giving to Palestine.37 Weizmann pushed on, strengthened by the High Commissioner’s confidential report to him on March 2 that Peel’s group would put forward partition. Wauchope had just confessed to Ormsby-Gore that his own efforts at conciliation had failed, and that HMG “must have a new policy.” He now offered no dissent to Weizmann’s claim for a territory that would permit the annual entry of 50,000 or 60,000 Jews. Nor did he raise serious objections while meeting with Weizmann and Shertok when the pair demanded the whole coastal plain from Ras el Nakurah near Lebanon to the Egyptian border and Eilat, the Galilee minus Acre, the Huleh and the Jezre’el Valley, and the northern half of the Jordan Valley. His response offered balm just when Weizmann received word that Ben-Gurion’s speech to the Mapai Central Committee described Weizmann as “the most dangerous man in Zionism” because of his irresoluteness in negotiation. Encouraging, too, was a report that Peel had said the only evidence that impressed the commission was Weizmann’s. In a letter to Dugdale on March 9, an excited Amery even raised the question of a name—perhaps “Judea”? She thought this premature, but after the Zionist Office in London had a full discussion of the possible boundaries, Dugdale recorded in a diary the belief that “in 20 years we shall see all Palestine as a Jewish State.”38 For the sake of parliamentary approval of the commission’s future plan, Peel wished to ascertain the views of Lloyd George and Churchill, among the primary statesmen involved in the issuance of the Balfour Declaration. Weizmann prepared notes for the former Prime Minister’s testimony at his request, including the suggestion that if the mandate were to be abandoned—”a counsel of despair”—in favor of Palestine’s — 375 —

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partition, the territory should be sufficient to permit the immigration of 50,000 Jews a year for the next 25 years. To the commission, Lloyd George would declare that at the time of the Declaration he had contemplated that if the Jews attained “a definite majority of the inhabitants, then Palestine would become a Jewish Commonwealth.” The mandatory had failed to protect the Jews’ life and property, and had “vacillated and hesitated” in its attitude towards immigration. In Lloyd George’s view, the country could absorb an additional 2 million Jews while also accommodating the natural increase of the Arab population, and if the Jews were permitted to drain and irrigate more of the waste lands, Jew and Arab alike would benefit.39 In closed session before the commission on March 12, Churchill spoke of HMG’s certain intention that the Jews “might in the course of time become an overwhelmingly Jewish State.” The former Colonial Secretary, who had presided over Transjordan’s excision from the Palestine Mandate in 1922, went much further, however, speaking of “the good faith of England to the Jews” and the fact that “we are bound by honour, and I think upon its merits, to push this thing as far as we can.” To Rumbold’s question about “harsh injustice” to the Arabs by “the invasion of a foreign race,” he retorted that the Jews had made the desert blossom; the Arabs had come in after the Jews, and the “great hordes of Islam” had “smashed” Palestine up. Churchill insisted that the backwardness of Palestine lay not in Turkish rule, as Rumbold claimed, but in the fact that “where the Arab goes it is often desert.” “It was for the good of the world,” he told Peel, “that the place should be cultivated, and it will never be cultivated by the Arabs.” When Rumbold asked at what point he would consider the Jewish National Home to be established and HMG’s undertaking fulfilled, Churchill replied: “When it is quite clear the Jewish preponderance in Palestine was very marked, decisive, and when we were satisfied that we had no further duties to discharge to the Arab population, the Arab minority.”40 Warning signs surfaced, however, for the Zionists who supported partition. The London Times, often a reflection of government policy, began featuring letters to the editor that trumpeted alternative outlets for the persecuted Jews of Germany, Poland, and elsewhere in order to relieve the danger to the Empire from more probable Arab outbreaks in Palestine. Wedgwood, a fierce critic of the mandatory in his appearance before the commission, opposed what he termed “the Solomon — 376 —

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baby scheme” as a betrayal of the Jews; a policy of “scuttle” that would lower British prestige still further in the region; and an impossibility for Christian Arabs to be placed under Muslim domination in light of the bloody fate of the Assyrians in Iraq. Amery responded that “the proposal is so far advanced that there is now no turning back.” Yet Coupland confidentially told Namier that the Jews had to be “generous” in the matter of partition’s borders. He was certain that, in their hearts, the Jews would not sacrifice anything of substance when accepting his plan, and that the commission would accept his draft report with one voice. Coupland’s remarks about the borders “are very worrisome,” wrote Shertok on March 23.41 In Palestine, a marked recrudescence of Arab murders, arson, and banditry was evident alongside an equally marked breakdown in mandatory control. The saying went round, wrote Bentwich to McDonald, that “there is a British High Commissioner for Palestine, but an Arab Higher Committee.” In the last seven weeks alone, 12 Jews, 10 Arabs, and 2 others had been murdered, aside from the throwing of 23 bombs and other acts of terrorism. Hall tried to comfort Ben-Gurion by saying that killings like this occurred every day in Chicago! Ben-Gurion was asking for the imposition by the British of Martial Law at least in the North of Palestine, which was a particularly volatile area in light of Arab killings. Martial Law had not yet been enacted anywhere in the country. Several death sentences of Arabs had been commuted to lesser punishments, and only “a tiny fraction” of criminals punished. Unbeknownst to the Agency, the Colonial and Foreign Secretaries also backed the Palestine administration’s view not to arrest the Mufti in light of the Arab Higher Committee’s public request (finally issued in the name of the Arab kings) to keep the “peace,” Ormsby-Gore adding that he foresaw “no likelihood or really serious disturbance in Palestine” pending publication of the commission’s report and the cabinet’s decisions upon it.42 In fact, as the Agency Arab Department’s Eliyahu Epstein informed Ben-Gurion, the Mufti’s actions while making the religious pilgrimage to Mecca belied the Committee’s proclamation. The Iranian consul in Jerusalem reported to Epstein that during that trip Haj Amin had met with an organization of “deprived” Iraqis and Syrians bearing the Pan-Arab ideal and had also sought support for the good of Palestine’s Arabs. An impending world war, exhorted the Mufti to his audiences, would bring salvation to the Arab nation provided that it united around — 377 —

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the figure of Ibn Saud. He dismissed the two remaining sons of Sharif Hussein: Abdullah was “a traitor” and Ghazi “a child.” Darwaza told Ibn Saud, who saw Abdullah as a rival, that Abdullah wished to annex the Arab sections of Palestine. The Mufti and an Istiqlal leader also advised Ibn Saud that if he did not head a Pan-Arab movement, others would do so. Iran opposed Pan Arabism and an Arab Federation, the consul added. Epstein linked this significant news with a conversation heard since between Haj Amin and Abd al-Hadi about the activities of three individuals who pursued efforts for the Pan-Arabist cause.43 Shertok tried his best to convince two members of the Foreign Office that Britain’s romantic perception of a great, unified Arab nation, a heritage of World War I that T. E. Lawrence famously championed, did not suit new developments in the Middle East. The Syrian government now needed a long period of rest and peace in order to build up prosperity, and understood that a thriving Palestinian economy was in their best interest. Lebanon, a predominantly Christian state, was uninterested in, and even opposed to, Pan-Arab ideals. The present Iraqi government was more strictly “Iraqi,” also realizing that Pan-Arabism was bound to alienate the large Kurdish population and that it must choose between a Shiah and a Sunni religious orientation. (Shertok could have added that none of the Arab States supported the Syrians when the League of Nations recently gave autonomy to the sanjak of Alexandretta.) Accordingly, he concluded, HMG could “go further in the direction of establishing the Jews in Palestine, without at the same time incurring the opposition of the surrounding Arab countries, than had previously been thought possible.” He made no mention of Ibn Saud’s attitude, Baggalay noted. Shertok’s diary read: They made no response except to compliment him on the clarity of his lecture. “These boys have education!”44 Warburg’s opposition posed another concern for Weizmann and other partition advocates. This influential American philanthropist, a member of the Agency’s Council, claimed that Ben-Gurion and Shertok (“the two propagandists in Jerusalem”) did not consult other Agency members. Shertok’s refusing to take “active steps” in connection with “illegitimate immigration,” he wrote to Weizmann, was “badly done” and, no doubt, made the commission members “distrustful.” The full Executive never considered the so-called Smilansky-Rutenberg proposals last year for Arab-Jewish understanding. In his opinion, a small state, in which Jews “would lie on top of one another” and “we would have a — 378 —

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cantonal ghetto,” would undo all that the Zionists had built up in the last two decades. Warburg threatened the breakup of the Agency itself because non-Zionists were not accorded the 50-50 percent representation in the Executive as stipulated in the constitution of the expanded Jewish Agency, which the late James Marshall and he had negotiated with the WZO in 1929 on behalf of the non-Zionists. Having enlisted their help eight years earlier in order to assist the yishuv’s practical work of reconstruction, Weizmann tried to calm the distraught Warburg in a meeting with the London Executive towards the end of March. No agreement had been reached by the time Warburg returned to New York.45 Leading Zionist voices soon rose to attack partition as well, with Weizmann often a major target. “Chaim’s position gets increasingly difficult—it is known in Jewry that he is very keen about the Scheme,” observed Dugdale in her diary on April 7. Ussishkin, leader of the antiUganda faction in 1903, asserted that Jews prayed for “the ingathering of the exiles” and for Jerusalem without compromise, not for a truncated state. For Tabenkin, Weizmann’s belief in using personal diplomacy to achieve a state at that time, particularly when the currently unprepared yishuv would one day be capable of achieving a large commonwealth, was “a type of false messianism.” Meirov and Katznelson thought that the eventual area would be strategically impossible to hold. Even BenGurion, whose partition plan would enable a far greater immigration than that championed by Weizmann, cautioned that the WZO should stand by Britain’s obligation to fulfill the mandate rather than embrace partition openly. New Judea editor Jacob Hodess charged that any division of Palestine meant a further violation of the country’s historical boundaries; would likely increase enmity between Arabs and Jews; not be able to absorb a constant, large stream of Jewish immigrants; and be “hopeless” with Jerusalem (“the centre of Jewish thought and Jewish religion”) and Haifa excluded. The London Jewish Chronicle denounced partition as “an evil and intolerable thing,” which no decent Zionist could support.46 The “great danger,” Weizmann fully realized, was the large number of Arabs who would inevitably be included in the boundaries of the Jewish State. The only way out, he told colleagues at 77 Great Russell St. headquarters on April 14, would be to arrange some kind of transfer scheme to reduce this number. Ben-Gurion believed that the large commonwealth he envisaged could negotiate such a movement with — 379 —

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Iraq, which had room for 20 million inhabitants and now held only 3-4 millions, and also with Syria. (In a letter to the London Times seven months earlier, an Oxford University don had proposed such a voluntary migration to Iraq, to be financed largely at Jewish expense.) If this failed, the Zionists could “thrust” 3 million Jews into their 12 million dunams of land, the figure ten times that of the yishuv’s present area. Shertok, however, warned the General Zionist Council that any population transfer in the next decade was unrealistic, and so the Arabs would have to remain in the Jewish State and revolt together with their kin outside its borders. Fully in agreement with this analysis, Katznelson emphasized to Weizmann that the only way to overcome the situation was by “an immediate, large aliya.” If the British government thought seriously about fulfilling partition and preventing its failure, HMG had to expand Jewish immigration without delay. From now on, Katznelson concluded, the movement had to worry what to do if partition was not possible and the commission lacked a positive plan to implement the mandate “as written and in its spirit.”47 Shertok’s private talk with Abd al-Hadi on the evening of April 23 confirmed the crux of the difficulty. To the suggestion that Jew and Arab should join forces to prevent partition, the Istiqlal leader answered that he also opposed partition, and the Arabs would fight it to the bitter end. The Jews should remain one-third of the population; the Arabs had to determine Palestine’s fate. To the Arabs, the issue was a question of national honor. “We shall fight!” Abd al-Hadi exclaimed, even if the Arabs might lose this war. He did not accept political parity as a guarantee because the Zionists aspired, as Jabotinsky correctly said, to make the Jewish point of view predominant. Nor did he accept Shertok’s proposal that a Jewish state would back an Arab Federation, for the Zionist could not give such a federation to him while Abd al-Hadi could not realize it at this time. “It lies hidden in the future,” and even if created one day, we were interested in an Arab Palestine joining that federation. He enjoyed the very best personal relations with Shertok and bore no hatred for the Jews, who were engaged in their “national enterprise.” The British were mainly responsible for the current situation, ruling the country by means of the Jews, and the Arabs would continue to fight them. Viewing this as “barren statesmanship,” Shertok ended their four-hour dialogue by commenting that Abd al-Hadi was “leading his people to destruction.” His host, in turn, expressed his readiness to meet with the Zionists if — 380 —

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they saw any need to do so.48 Rendel remained another staunch opponent, urging that the Palestine problem be solved in a way “which would placate the Arabs.” Ibn Saud had just told the explorer H. St. John Philby that in case of war, HMG would have to keep a large force in Palestine to repress any possible Arab rioting, and that if things went on like this “a massacre of Jews by Arabs was inevitable.” Having returned that same month from his trip to the region, Rendel presented his conclusions in a memorandum to the Colonial Office on April 12 for transmission to the Peel Commission. If Palestine’s Arabs became “a powerless minority,” he noted, Ibn Saud might turn in desperation to the Italians for help and guidance concerning “the new revolt which will inevitably break out.” The same was true for Iraq, and it would then be difficult to see how Transjordan could continue to cooperate with the British government. High Commissioner Sir Miles Lampson in Cairo agreed completely regarding Egypt. The cumulative effect might be serious in view of Imperial security, impact on the Muslims in India, and affect British naval strategy in an area of HMG’s sources of oil supplies. Going still further, Rendel argued that the Arabs had to be given some guarantee that they would not become a minority in a Jewish state, “as must happen if our present policy is continued.”49 Furious, Ormsby-Gore thought it “wholly improper for a civil servant” of another department to take the liberty of stating that Colonial Office policy would transform Palestine’s Arabs into a minority. He confined his sentiments to a handwritten minute: “I realize that Mr. Rendel is a sincere pro-Arab and anti-Jew, and a critic of His Majesty’s policy of carrying out the mandate of the League of Nations, but that he has the right to submit to a Royal Commission his erroneous opinion of that policy is a right I cannot admit.” He would take this up personally with Eden. Rendel consented to tone down the memorandum and remove his private views, but he insisted to his Colonial Office counterpart, Harold F. Downie, that foreign Arab and Muslim opinion should be taken into account as seriously as was Jewish opinion outside of Palestine. “I am neither pro-Arab [n]or pro-Jewish,” he claimed, “and I should like to see the Palestine problem dealt with purely on its merits. But if we are going to look beyond the pure merits of this case we ought to see both sides.”50 As the month drew to a close, both the mandatory government and the Colonial Office breathed an air of anxious uncertainty. Resigned — 381 —

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to accept partition if decreed by the commission, Hall told Shertok shortly before being succeeded by William Battershill that he remained “completely in the dark” about that body’s intentions. Unable to recommend some division line acceptable to Arab and Jew, Wauchope warned Ormsby-Gore that pretending now that the two peoples could be “left to settle their own inter-racial quarrels” would only increase HMG’s liabilities later: “The self-evident danger of a very large Arab minority, perhaps equal to half of the Jewish population in the proposed Jewish state, is not diminished by being ignored, it is increased.” Two leaders of the ultra-Orthodox Agudas Israel movement, preferring to wait for the Jewish Messiah rather than accept a Zionist state even in the whole of Palestine, suggested to Parkinson that they bring about a meeting in London between the Jews and Abdullah with a view to reaching some solution of the Palestine difficulties. The Colonial Office Permanent Under-Secretary gave them a quite definite “No,” sure that Jews and Arabs could not be gotten together at the moment round the table and that “no useful result” would emerge even if they convened. He concluded: “Clearly the right thing to do was to wait and see what came out of the report of the Royal Commission.”51 Convinced that the commission’s report would be “terrible” if it meant cantonization or partition, and possibly the ending of economic absorptive capacity as the norm of Jewish immigration, Wise tried through the U.S. State Department to hear in advance what the character of that document would be. Assistant Secretary R. Walton Moore had offered “in a spirit of friendliness” to see the British Ambassador, Sir Ronald Lindsay, and informally solicit the facts. A few days later, however, Moore wrote Wise doubting that he would have this opportunity soon and believing, “upon reflection,” that any such talk would yield no worthwhile result. Greatly concerned lest the American Zionist leadership would “get all sort of hurried messages from Weizmann and possibly Ben Gurion telling us what to do, and then it may be too late,” he asked advice of the likeminded Frankfurter. Should Wise see Roosevelt? He wanted to arouse the President, stirring him to reach Conservative Party leader Neville Chamberlain (soon to succeed Prime Minister Baldwin) directly through the American ambassador in London. Getting Brandeis’s approval, Wise wrote to Roosevelt for an appointment, seeking his judgment in light of the fact that “the situation in Palestine looks very grave and dismal.” This was quickly granted, and on April 27 Wise sat down in the White — 382 —

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House with the man whom he regularly lauded as “the Chief.”52 Two months earlier, Roosevelt had sent a message to Wise on the occasion of a National Conference for Palestine. It read: The American people, ever zealous in the cause of human freedom, have watched with sympathetic interest the effort of the Jews to renew in Palestine the ties of their ancient homeland and to reestablish Jewish culture in the place where for centuries it flourished and whence it was carried to the far corners of the world. This year marks the 20th anniversary of the Balfour Declaration, the keystone of contemporary reconstruction activities in the Jewish homeland. These two decades have witnessed a remarkable exemplification of the vitality and vision of the Jewish pioneers in Palestine. It should be a source of pride to Jewish citizens of the United States that they, too, have a share in this great work of revival and restoration. The greeting, which led the conference to record “its boundless affection” for FDR, had understandably heartened the participants.53 Much had happened since, however, and a greatly concerned Wise needed more from the American president at this critical juncture. Given the fact that London might adopt the commission’s report without even providing Parliament a chance to discuss it, Wise urged now that Roosevelt find out from Chamberlain some knowledge of the content so that FDR could give his views on it. Recalling Chamberlain’s remark in September 1936 that the doors to Palestine remained open because of the president’s intervention, and in view of the “very grave” plight of Polish Jewry, Wise reminded Roosevelt that President Wilson had helped to make possible the British mandate over Palestine. The U.S. had certain treaty rights, and above all, “the English need you—our Government—in every sense in the light of European possibilities.” Roosevelt nodded, and simply added “You bet.” “You ought to make it clear,” Wise observed parenthetically, that you and certainly the British do not want “another Irish question in America on their hands; and they will have it because the 4.5 million Jews will use their heads and not merely shillelaghs to hurt the British.” The largest Jewry in the world, — 383 —

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that of the United States, would consider any “gross injustice” on HMG’s part regarding Palestine as justifying the “bitterest of ill-will” on the part of the Jews. Would you also write a note to Secretary of State Hull, he asked, saying that “Wise speaks for all our friends,” including Brandeis {whom FDR, smilingly, called “Isaiah”), Frankfurter, Mack, and others “who really count in this great cause”? By the end of a half hour, “the Chief” had assented to these requests. Wise was concerned about the most important part of their conversation. Knowing that Roosevelt had gotten the idea from some source that Palestine had “reached the point of Jewish saturation,” he read to FDR the assessment of Ruppin, the foremost expert on the yishuv’s colonization and settlement, that 100,000 Jewish families could be settled on Palestine’s land. That meant room for “millions,” the president responded, his face lighting up. Roosevelt approvingly confided recent information from the American ambassador to Moscow that Russia and Turkey were coming to an agreement, intending to “passify [sic] things in Palestine” and to give the Arab countries “a sort of semi-independent sovereignty within the general frame.” This would mean the two governments standing against Italy in the Near East, Roosevelt added delightedly, as well as “a united Arab people and that whole country—Syria and the rest of it—making peace with and reaching an understanding with the Jews.” Agreeing with Wise’s interjection that a great, loyal Jewish population in Palestine would mean much to HMG, Roosevelt remarked significantly: “The Jews could make Palestine the eastern stronghold of the Mediterranean—be the Gibraltar of the Eastern Mediterranean to the British.” Wise shared this “most satisfactory talk” with Brandeis and Frankfurter, who responded that while FDR had “his heart and will in the refugee problem,” the “decorous de-energizers in the State Department seem gradually to attenuate his endeavors.”54 In his capacity as chairman of the United Palestine Appeal, Wise next wrote to Weizmann, urging that the forthcoming World Zionist Congress be held in the United States. This was “absolutely necessary,” he observed, because the Royal Commission and the British Government would have the last word, and “America means everything” to the ruling powers. “Some people in Washington” (Wise’s emphasis) clearly realized that Britain needed the Americans, and “the Gentleman in Washington” understood perfectly when Wise spoke to him last Tuesday about “our fighting” if the commission issued a bad report. — 384 —

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We want our country to impact upon the political capitals of the world and especially London, he continued, and wish to help take the Zionist movement out of Eastern Europe and make it “a World Movement.” American Jews constituted nearly a third of world Jewry and was the richest Jewish population in the world; a Zionist Congress here would awaken the country’s Jews to the aims of Zionism and “to what it may be made to mean for the resurrection of the life of the Jewish people as a collectivity.” Do not come to agreement with me, Wise concluded, “when it is too late to act.”55 Weizmann certainly was aware of what Wise’s letter referred to as “political values” and “all the imponderables,” but the WZO Actions Committee had already decided upon Switzerland for the Congress’s venue. Most significantly, he could not depart London to fly across the Atlantic that summer. Coupland, who had drafted the major part of the report, had told him in a long talk three days earlier that the commission report would be unanimous and presented to HMG in June. The proposed frontiers were “fairly satisfactory to Chaim,” recorded Dugdale after receiving a telephone call from Weizmann, including all the north—the most important after the Jezre’el Valley. The Jews, Coupland confided, would be given complete independence. Weizmann replied that “he would go as far as he could, but would not break the Jewish Agency.” Dugdale’s entry for April 27 ended: “But I think he may have to. He may have to be Michael Collins. Great events lie ahead. The Jews in the plains—so it must be before Armageddon.”56

On May 1, Hull reported to Roosevelt that Ambassador Robert W. Bingham had seen Eden, “in accordance with your desire.” Four years earlier, Brandeis had administered the oath of office to Bingham, and then delivered a moving discourse on the Zionist movement and Palestine to his long-time friend, with the repeated refrain, “the age-old cry of the Jews, ‘Next year in Zion.’” As instructed by Hull, Bingham informed the Foreign Secretary that important American Jewish groups were “perturbed” over rumors that the commission’s report would recommend that Jewish immigration cease entirely or that some system of cantonization be established. In this connection, he also mentioned “the hardship already worked upon the Jews by the repressive measures — 385 —

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of various countries in Europe,” and that the Jews, by reason of their experience at the hands of certain European governments, naturally looked to the world’s democracies to accord them “fair and equitable treatment.” (Eden was also told by Hull, as the Foreign Office reported, that Washington “fully understood our great responsibilities in view of the number of Muslims within the British Empire.”) Eden replied to Bingham, in turn, that while he could not make any definite statement without discussing the report, his friend had had “constantly in mind” HMG’s obligations under the mandate, the international Jewish situation, and also the Arab and Muslim situation. He felt that at that time he could go no further than this statement.57 On his own, Hull agreed that State should formulate a policy if and when HMG proposed to alter the current mandate over Palestine. Ever desirous of keeping the nation “free of foreign wars and foreign entanglements,” as FDR had put it in a public address seven months earlier, the department did not intervene or make any representations when Germany dissolved at that same moment all the B’nai B’rith lodges in the Third Reich. Hull and Moore also suggested that while the president receive from the ZBT Jewish fraternity the Gottheil Medal for Distinguished Service to the Cause of Judaism, it should be done “without ceremony as quietly as possible.” The Palestine question could not be avoided, however, given the statement in the American-British Palestine Mandate Convention of 1924 that any change required the U.S. government’s assent. The department’s Legal Adviser, F.X. Ward, had concluded the previous January that such modifications would not strictly affect strictly American interests in Palestine. Yet, pointed out chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs Wallace Murray, who already in 1929 had advised his colleagues to refrain “from injecting ourselves in the Palestine mess,” it seemed almost certain that “a vigorous effort” would be made by certain Jewish groups in the country to induce Washington to withhold its assent to any alterations in the mandate. Antonius, who had asserted to the Royal Commission that “no compromise is possible” regarding the Arabs’ determination to attain their national independence, had just conveyed to him British fears about such Jewish pressure. Murray therefore proposed on May 3 to prepare a study about this phase of the question for use in case the need arose. Hull gave his quick approval.58 The continued blackout about the commission’s report, joined — 386 —

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to HMG’s unwillingness to engage in further consultations until its completion, placed the Zionists in what Ben-Gurion dubbed “a vicious circle.” Unable to launch an open fight against the recommendations, he realized that they had to develop informal contacts in London with the aid of Frankfurter and Melchett. Also worrisome, Weizmann had not brought up the Negev in the last talk with Coupland, while his focus on an annual Jewish immigration of 50-60 thousand had nothing to do with partition and could not determine the area of the Jewish State. Confronted with the “two evils” of partition or limited entry quotas and reserved Arab areas, Ben-Gurion feared that the opponents who objected to partition in principle apparently forgot that the exile of Jewry “had already lasted two thousand years!” Zionism could not afford going back from “a national movement with the possibility of political salvation” to “amateur vassalage” and sectarianism that would end in failure. The latter choice would not draw youth, the masses, or funding. Our relations with the Arabs, Ben-Gurion concluded, would only worsen, unless Jews surrendered and reconciled themselves to “an Eretz Yisrael exile in an Arab state.” In the few weeks remaining before the report’s release, read his diary, Zionists had to focus all their strength in London on enlarging the partitioned area offered to them.59 The Agency’s Arab Department provided further concern with a report from reliable intelligence on Wauchope’s most recent talk with the Arab Higher Committee. The High Commissioner had asked a delegation led by Haj Amin to calm new Arab disturbances in Haifa and wait patiently “under the victory to come.” He hinted that they would benefit by sending a delegation to London prior to the report’s release in order to defend Arab interests. In response to Abd al-Hadi’s anxiety that the Jews would become the majority and dominate a proposed Legislative Council, he pledged that this would never occur. Nor did he plan to issue immigration certificates for the next season, Wauchope informed them, as long as the report was not published. The Committee subsequently split on the question of the Council, Nashashibi strongly arguing that rejection of that scheme would leave the Arabs with nothing and lead to a new revolt. Ultimately, letters were sent off to friends in London, seeking their advice.60 As if to corroborate Wauchope’s promise to the Committee, the Agency received word from Hall on May 10 concerning its appeal for a labor schedule of immigrants for the next six months. Whereas the — 387 —

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Agency had requested 10,550 certificates, it received 620 for four months, the time shortened in order to “give freedom” to HMG to decide on future policy in this respect after the commission’s report was delivered. “Purely relevant economic considerations,” Hall wrote, were the criteria used as always. Expressing the Agency’s sense of “humiliation,” Shertok soon informed Wauchope that the Executive was seriously considering not distributing this schedule. The High Commissioner countered that the Colonial Office had informed him one week earlier that “considerable” cuts must be effected in the administration’s proposed expenditures because economic prospects in Palestine were anything but bright. Indeed, there had been a suggestion not to give the Zionists any schedule at all. Taking this public step, Shertok replied, would shatter economic confidence and confirm the feeling of most Jews that the schedule was a political measure, showing an attitude of HMG that “augured no good for the progress of the Jewish National Home.” We would have to publicize our decision, he observed. “The High Commissioner looked strained,” reported Shertok to his colleagues, “but made no reply.”61 Placing a trans-Atlantic call to Wise, Ben-Gurion urged that Frankfurter be sent to London at once as the only man who could help the movement at that juncture. Melchett, then on vacation in the States, should return home as soon as possible. “We fear very bad things,” BenGurion remarked, something worse than partition. Asked for clarification, he added a guess: “Inhibit immigration in such a way so that the Jews in Palestine shall always remain a minority.” The Zionist Congress could not be far from Jerusalem, where “grave troubles” might occur in August, nor could Agency Executive members be absent from London at that time. Wise reported the conversation at once to Brandeis, who wrote to Frankfurter that Britain behaved “shamefully” in granting a total of only 770 labor certificates. “Fear seems to have obliterated conscience and paralyzed judgment,” opined the Justice, who concluded thus: “Nothing can be said in extenuation except that the other ‘great nations’ would probably have done worse.”62 Frankfurter could not possibly leave his Harvard Law School commitments before mid-June, however, while Wise harbored great doubts about Melchett. “He is not as anti-partition as we are,” wrote Wise to Brandeis. The “bug” had gotten hold of Weizmann and the Zionist Laborites, with even Melchett telling him “If we get a state we can ex— 388 —

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pand later.” Preferring a reduced immigration for a time rather than “any so-called small state with rigidly prescribed boundaries,” Wise had reminded Melchett what happened after removing Transjordan from the mandate. “We will get it back yet,” responded the Englishman. Hopefully, Wise added to Brandeis, you could “smash the partition idea out of his head” before Melchett’s intended visit with Roosevelt for a chat on Palestine. In fact, Melchett had warned Warburg that a very large proportion of Poland’s 3.3 million Jews faced the alternative of either starving or migrating to Palestine, a reality true in a lesser degree for the Jews of Rumania and Austria. “It is a world problem of gigantic proportions,” he asserted, “for which Palestine and Transjordan alone provide a solution.”63 By then, Shertok had concluded that no chance existed at present of arriving at any “fruitful contact” with Palestinian Arab circles. Nashashibi no longer had the courage to defy the Mufti. Abd al-Hadi, whose implacability had been made clear in his last talk with the Agency’s political department director, encouraged a strike of Arab shops in Haifa and Acre in order “to stoke the fires.” (In celebration of Mohammed’s birthday, Nazi flags and pictures of Hitler and Mussolini would soon be displayed by many Arab shops in the Old City, with Arab children shouting “Death to the High Commissioner!” and “Death to the Jews!”) Haj Amin strongly opposed a renewal of violence, preferring to hold off until the commission’s report would be made public. Arab sources revealed to Agency Arabist Aharon Cohen that Wauchope promised a Committee delegation of Haj Amin, Nashashibi, and Darwazeh to free 80 Arab prisoners from the Acre prison, and that he would consider others. Again, the Mufti had succeeded in disclosing the administration’s weakness, while extorting from the mandatory authorities yet another concession designed to weaken his more extremist rivals and to strengthen his own stature with supporters.64 Agency officials tried to find some modus vivendi with Abdullah, then in London for the coronation of George VI. In a meeting on May 15 with David HaCohen and Hos, the Transjordanian monarch remarked that Palestine itself could not become either a Jewish or Arab state. Some mutual agreement could be reached whereby the Jews could help his poor country expand, but he regrettably saw no chance of exploring this further until England’s decision on the projected commission report had been made. The private talk angered Rutenberg, certain that it — 389 —

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jeopardized his proposal for a financial scheme that would settle Jews and Arabs in Transjordan on a large scale. Ben-Gurion insisted that the Agency had to explore the relevant political aspects with Abdullah before the commission ended its deliberations, but Rutenberg was not mollified. He told Parkinson and Downie about his negotiations with the Emir, facts that greatly interested Ormsby-Gore. The Colonial Secretary suggested that Rutenberg inform the commission, so that it avoid any recommendations that might conflict with the possible realization of Rutenberg’s project. On May 18, Rutenberg gave Martin a copy of his July 1936 correspondence with the Emir, telling the commission secretary that both Jews and Arabs would oppose dividing Palestine. Such a division would be both impractical and nigh impossible to effect, he added, due to “the present absence of prestige and authority” on the part of the mandatory administration.65 The Agency also sought contact with Ibn Saud, based on BenGurion’s private meeting in Beirut on April 13 with Fuad Hamzah. After hearing Ben-Gurion’s appeal for a large Jewish state alongside an Arab Federation, the Saudi king’s director of foreign affairs had indicated that he would discuss the matter with Ibn Saud at once, as well as recommend that Prince Saud and his confidant Yusuf Yassin meet with Agency representatives in London. Epstein, who had arranged the interview in Beirut for Ben-Gurion, failed to accomplish this next step, however, when accompanying Ben-Zvi to the British capital for the coronation festivities. Saud was furious that Hamzah had met even informally with Ben-Gurion, Epstein’s Beirut contact later reported, while Ibn Saud and Prince Feisal rejected the possibility of any meeting with Jewish organizations and Zionists. Yassin, who took this opportunity to slander Hamza’s position in Riyadh court circles, received royal instructions not to conduct any political talks with private individuals once reaching London.66 Ben-Gurion tried another route when he arrived in London, contacting two Englishmen who were close to Ibn Saud. Both spoke Arabic, but they were markedly different. H. St. John Philby was of average height, bearded, deeply tanned, and a chain smoker; Captain Harold Courtney Armstrong was tall, pale, and a drinker of tea. Philby, after serving HMG’s Arab Information Office in Cairo during World War I and later the British representative in Amman, had traveled many areas of the unexplored Middle East and represented different British — 390 —

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firms in Saudi Arabia. Now a Wahhabi Muslim who hated the British Empire, he completely identified with Arab interests. Armstrong, on the other hand, the author of biographies of Kemal Ataturk and Ibn Saud, spoke like a British imperialist. He was frankly not concerned either about the Arabs or the Jews. Both men invited Ben-Gurion to their respective Athaneum and Royal Automobile Clubs, the meetings to immediately follow one another on the afternoon of May 18.67 As soon as the commission’s report was published, Philby asserted to Ben-Gurion during their two and a half-hour lunch meeting, the Arab “rebellion” would begin again. In his view, Ibn Saud, who considered that the Jews coming to Palestine was talm (an injustice), had ended the seven-month-old Arab disturbances the previous November. Only if the untrustworthy English were completely removed could the Jews and Arabs come to an agreement. The Saudi king alone could unite the Arabs under a federation, with a united Palestine and Transjordan to be placed under his rule. The Jews could then immigrate in great numbers to Palestine and elsewhere in the region, and be an asset to the Arab world. “This is our land, this was our land, and this will be our land,” the Jewish Agency Executive chairman countered. While he approved of a federation—Zionists had thought first of all of Eretz Yisrael, Transjordan and Iraq; they wished to be concentrated in Palestine. The Jews, Ben-Gurion remarked, would make a treaty with England. He did not think that British consent was out of the question if a common Jewish-Arab understanding could be reached.68 Ben-Gurion then met with Armstrong, who confessed that HMG was “in a mess.” That is why I came to you, the Zionist replied, assuming that the situation would be eased for the British if an Arab-Jewish agreement could be reached. Ibn Saud was a wise, cautious, and honest man, Armstrong declared. He would do nothing against England, and his intervention to halt the disturbances in Palestine had been done with the British government’s consent. Armstrong, much as Philby, was prepared to sound out Ibn Saud’s emissaries in London as to whether a meeting with the king would be worthwhile. The “whole structure” in Saudi Arabia might disintegrate after Ibn Saud’s death, since peace did not reign between his sons, and not one of them was capable of continuing his work. The desert monarch would act independently, Armstrong asserted, not influenced by the Mufti’s personal attempt to incite him against HMG.69 — 391 —

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On May 26, Philby met Ben-Gurion again for luncheon at the Athaneum, informing him of Yassin’s suggestion that if the two arrived at some conclusion, they should write directly to Ibn Saud. Accordingly, using the club’s stationery, Philby prepared a handwritten draft agreement for Ben-Gurion’s signature. Since HMG’s two sets of “incompatible” promises to the Jews and Arabs had resulted in Palestine’s reduction to a British Colony peopled by “two equally dissatisfied races,” only a freely negotiated agreement between these two peoples could provide a permanent solution of the problem. With both opposed to any partition and wanting a single, independent Palestine-Transjordan state, immigration would be determined by a mixed commission, such as a League of Nations president, two Jews, two Arabs, and a representative of the Arab states. The “Greater Palestine” might be placed under the sole protection of Ibn Saud, he being the most likely power able to enforce the guarantee, with the form of that government decided by a plebiscite of its citizens. No country, other than the various states of the peninsula, would be allowed any kind of preferential treatment in the Greater Palestine.70 Ben-Gurion’s draft that afternoon at the club read very differently. A Jewish-Arab pact approved by Great Britain and guaranteed by the League of Nations, it began, shall replace the mandate. The pact would provide for the re-integration of Transjordan into Palestine. Jews would be given free access to the whole of Palestine, with a view to establishing the Jewish National Home there. The Agency, in accordance with the principle of economic absorptive capacity, would regulate Jewish immigration. Joint boards of Jews and Arabs would direct Palestine’s development. Parity as between Jews and Arabs, irrespective of their numbers, would determine all internal matters dealing with Palestine’s complete self-government. The country would be affiliated with an Arab Confederation, provided that that new body recognized and guaranteed the rights of the Jewish National Home as laid down by the League. Lastly, any dispute that arose between Jews and Arabs in regard to the rights of the Jewish National Home would be submitted to the League for its arbitration.71 Ben-Gurion responded to Philby’s lengthy draft four days later with his own detailed observations. That draft, while giving full satisfaction to the Arabs, completely ignored the rights and claims of the Jewish people, especially that of free entry to their “historic homeland” and — 392 —

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the reestablishment of their National Home. They did not intend to displace Palestine’s Arabs from that country, but only the Agency, subject to mandatory supervision, could regulate Jewish immigration based on absorptive capacity. Economic cooperation and complete political parity as between Arab and Jew would gradually give rise to the “consciousness of a common citizenship.” Ben-Gurion also took issue with Philby’s statement that the mandate, which expressly recognized the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine, went against British promises to the Arabs during World War I. The Zionist enterprise’s current population and achievements, he added, could hardly be what Philby termed “a dream.” The League of Nations, since there was now no better instrument of organized world opinion, would have to be included as a guarantor. Finally, a Jewish-Arab agreement could only be possible with HMG’s consent and approval, which was hardly imaginable without due recognition of England’s vital interests in Palestine—”of course without prejudice to the real independence of the Palestinian State.”72 Philby never replied, and on May 31 Armstrong wrote to BenGurion. After several long talks with “those responsible,” the Briton was at last “reluctantly” convinced that he would do only harm at present if he persisted in trying to put the Zionist leader and either the Saudi Legation in London or Ibn Saud in touch with each other to discuss Palestine’s future. Having done all he could, Armstrong closed the letter on a note of despair. “It may be that the seeds I have sown will grow into plants: it may be that they will just wither up. I find the soil very stony and barren.” For that reason, he decided to stand back. However, if at any time in the future, he could help in any way to bring the two sides closer together, “you can count on me to do everything I can.” Ben-Gurion, in turn, thanked the captain for his “kind endeavors in the cause of peace,” and expressed the conviction that “sooner or later the Arab people will come to understand that is it is in their own interests to give up sterile strife in favor of mutual effort. It may take time, but there is no reason why it should not come eventually.”73 Less sanguine, Ormsby-Gore considered the Arab-Jewish conflict regarding the “over-promised land” as an almost insoluble problem at a moment when “the deliberate policy of racial persecution of the Jews” was driving the Jews out of Central Europe. Addressing the Commonwealth nation delegates to the year’s Imperial Conference — 393 —

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on May 31, he acknowledged the reluctance of every country to admit Jewish refugees and the increasingly hostile attitude of Palestine’s two contending peoples toward each other. The Arabs’ main object was to prevent the immigration of a single additional Jew, while the Jews primarily sought to get more persecuted Jews out of Germany, Poland, Hungary, Rumania and other countries “where their future was hopeless.” Wauchope had recently summarized the position well, the Colonial Secretary observed, when expressing his belief that “in some drastic change lies our only hope of restoring good order and lasting confidence and security.” Difficult as “a clear-cut division” might prove in practice, the High Commissioner had concluded, racial feelings were now so high that carrying out the administration’s present policy would soon prove impossible except by suppressing the Arabs and maintaining “a large and permanent garrison.”74 Weizmann brought information on what that clear-cut division might be to his colleagues for review the same day. When offered a choice by Coupland the previous evening between the Galilee or the Negev, he had understandably chosen the former. Informed that Coupland also listed Haifa, Jaffa, Lod, and Ramla in the projected Jewish State, with a mandatory corridor to Jerusalem, Ben-Gurion feared this “too good to be true.” If so, he wrote to Mapai headquarters in Tel Aviv, all efforts must be concentrated on getting at least half of the Negev from the Novomeysky potash concession at the Dead Sea down to Eilat to be part of English territory (mandatory or otherwise). This thought he inserted in Rutenberg’s memorandum to the Colonial Office, which included a voluntary transfer of Arabs from Palestine to Transjordan. Ben-Gurion feared that Weizmann, focusing on the Huleh and, as Dugdale herself realized, “so tremendously pro-State,” would not listen to reservations that he and particularly Katznelson harbored. Coupland’s talk of a 2-5 year transition period until complete statehood posed another grave danger, Ben-Gurion wrote to Shertok and Ben-Zvi back home. Limiting full immigration and defense during this time, together with its strengthening a broad anti-partition front within Zionist ranks, would threaten the movement that was at present “walking on a hairsbreadth.”75 Various governments began to weigh in on the subject as well. Herr von Selzam was instructed to inform Rendel that while “Germany had sent a large number of Jewish emigrants to Palestine [sic],” Berlin — 394 —

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regarded the creation of a separate Jewish state with “regret, since it could hardly fail to constitute a focus for anti-German feeling.” Italy held the opinion that a Jewish commonwealth would become a British protectorate, Foreign Minister Count Gaelezzo Ciano told Goldmann in objecting to partition. Concurrently, the Agency’s representative at the League reported that Poland and Latvia were “vitally interested” in having a Jewish territory in Palestine big enough to absorb a large immigration of Jews from their countries; the Rumanian delegate echoed this desire “in order to normalize the Jewish question” in his country. Goldmann then announced that the Agency was prepared to negotiate over a Jewish state capable of receiving “masses” of Jews within the next 15-20 years, only to have the Poalei Mizrachi religious-Zionist workers party accuse him of breaking the Zionist-Jewish front in its war over “the wholeness of Eretz Yisrael and our rights in our land.”76 As for organized settlement outside of Palestine, soundings in recent weeks by Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs MacDonald revealed no prospects of Jewish family colonization there. Its representatives feared that “new internal competition” would be created if new “colonies” were established. Replying to a concerned Jewish activist, Labour Party leader Arthur Creech-Jones feared that “until there is more confidence in the world in regard to economic arrangements, political institutions, and foreign policy, no substantial progress in the direction of solving this very difficult problem of the Jews in Eastern Europe is likely to be made.” As for the League of Nations, High Commissioner Malcolm operated under strict instructions that he was not to concern himself with settlement and relief. And that same year, he pessimistically reported that as more refugees appeared, they faced mounting immigration restrictions. Potential refugees were now trapped in Germany, while others were wandering about Europe, “unable to alight.”77 Weizmann pressed on to rally support for partition, inviting a select group of members of parliament on June 8 to a dinner hosted by Liberal Party head Sinclair. With Wedgwood, Amery, Attlee, Victor Cazelet, and James de Rothschild, all declared Zionists, also in attendance, Churchill began by saying to Weizmann “you are our master” and “what you say goes.” Yet, dominating the conversation, he proceeded to fulminate against a Jewish state as “a mirage” and to warn that the British government, “a lot of lily-livered rabbits,” would certainly let the Zionist — 395 —

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leader down. Attlee considered the proposal a concession to violence and a triumph for Fascism. Only Amery, who had told the commission to make a “clean cut” and “take out of Palestine an ulcer”—an Arab area in conjunction with Transjordan, with the rest of Palestine to be given to the Jews, supported partition. Hearing of this the next morning at Zionist headquarters, Dugdale cautioned that the very drunk Churchill and the other guests were “in no sense a team” and “knew little or nothing about the subject.” Cazelet more than confirmed the same day her impressions of Churchill’s condition and “wild talk,” and thought that nothing useful could come of the dinner.78 “I knew we were all in your pocket,” Coupland told Weizmann two days later when told about the dinner. Without revealing the commission’s judgment, he confided that the just completed report was unanimous, and expressed his certainty that the Jews would fight over every word. In fact, Rumbold wrote his son that while he saw “glaring defects and features” in the partition plan and was disgusted at how it had been “worked out behind my back” by Coupland, “an intriguing little professor,” he decided for the sake of unanimity not to write a minority report. Hearing of Coupland’s latest information and mulling over the dinner party talk, Ben-Gurion shared with Dugdale his great fear that the Jews would receive an inadequate area, HMG would abandon the mandate, and Weizmann’s possible compromising on frontiers would impair his standing within the movement. Dugdale responded that, with a commonwealth, Zionists could settle “all parts” of Palestine and gain the strength to reach an accord with the Arabs. She exhorted that Balfour would have told the Jews “be brave. Take the risk, prove what you can do with your state—the rest will come.” Considerably heartened, he called her “our Deborah” and decided to favor the Galilee as long as the Negev remained in the mandatory area, open to Jewish settlement.79 When Weizmann next met Ormsby-Gore and declared that “this partition proposal was not his, and that he did not want it at all,” the Colonial Secretary requested that he set out what he felt might be acceptable. With only Katznelson continuing to raise objection, a final letter drafted at 77 Great Russell St. was sent off under Weizmann’s signature on June 15. The Zionist’s minimum requirements began with an area sufficient for “substantial” immigration and development, to include the whole of Galilee and the Jezre’el Valley (plus the Beisan (Bet — 396 —

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Sh’an) area); the coastal plain from Ras el Nakura to a point north of Gaza; a defensible eastern frontier; HMG’s military needs guaranteed; and the new Jewish quarters of Jerusalem, Britain to control the airfields at Lydda and Ramleh. The Negev, of considerable strategic importance with great industrial and commercial potential, should be under British control while open to Jewish development and settlement. If the British refused responsibility for this area, “we would have to claim it.” Lastly, the Jews had to enjoy full sovereignty in treaty relations with the British Empire, administration during the transition period to be mutually settled with HMG. Under no conditions were the Zionists prepared to leave control of immigration to the present mandatory authorities, “even for the shortest period.” Unless these conditions were met, Weizmann thought it “unlikely that the scheme would prove workable, and I doubt whether any responsible Jewish leader could ask his people to consider it.”80 The Revisionist-Zionists firmly dug in their heels against partition. London headquarters had already informed the Colonial Office on April 7 that any solution not conforming to the essence of Jabotinsky’s testimony before the commission in February would be “an empty formula and a travesty of statehood,” which “we shall do all in our power to prevent.” One month later, the NZO presidency publicly demanded that HMG not take any step aiming at the abrogation of the Balfour Declaration and the mandate, and instruct its officials in Palestine to maintain public order firmly and foster “a rapid Jewish immigration and colonization in the whole of Palestine.” On June 1, Jabotinsky pledged to his supporters in Harbin that the party “will struggle for the complete Eretz Yisrael.” Benjamin Akzin, chairman of the NZO presidency, sought encouragement from the established British Board of Jewish Deputies, and notified Parkinson six days later that the Jewish people as a whole and the Arabs opposed partition. The Polish and Rumanian governments would resist any part of Britain’s obstructing the full development of the Jewish National Home, he added.81 Most Arab leaders persisted as well in opposing any partition scheme. For Abd al-Hadi, it was not a question of whether there was enough room in the country for both, but a matter of authority either in Arab or Jewish hands. Abdullah favored the reuniting of Palestine and Transjordan under his rule, with the Jews restricted to their current one-third of the population, and no federation with Iraq. Iraqi — 397 —

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Prime Minister Sa’id Hikmat Suleiman warned HMG that Palestine’s Arabs would not accept partition, particularly because it would expand Abdullah’s territory, which would incur Ibn Saud’s wrath. Nashashibi supported partition in principle, provided that the Jewish area was cut to the maximum possible. Haj Amin objected to any division, telling a leader of the Syrian National Bloc that Goldmann’s recent address in Geneva proved that the Zionists were “provocative agents” seeking satisfactory borders for their cause. Syrian President Mardam rejected the Mufti’s appeal, criticized the Palestinian Arabs for not finding a way of understanding the British and the Jews, and ruled out intervention by his government as likely to be a burden to France and to the League of Nations. Haj Amin kept on, threatening Wauchope on June 14 in “refined language” that if Britain did not listen to the Arab Higher Committee’s demands, its members would be forced to resign and explain the reason to the “inflamed” Arab public.82 The Royal Commission’s report was signed on June 22. Hearing from Weizmann that this would mean Jewish sovereignty in part of Palestine, President Emil Edé of Lebanon toasted the visibly moved Zionist during their meeting in a Paris hotel as “the first president of the Jewish State that will rise!”, and requested that the new commonwealth’s first Bon voisinage agreement be signed with Lebanon. The report itself, which Coupland summarized for Ormsby-Gore the next day, secretly reached Dugdale’s hands around midnight thanks to ally Walter Elliot, now Secretary of State for Scotland. Her first reaction was positive, if hesitant: “Nothing in all this that cannot be adjusted by negotiation,” although one thing in it “might wreck all”—the recommendation that Jewish entry be limited to a maximum of 12,000 annually for five years. Her diary entry concluded: “We are only at the beginning of our troubles!” Meeting with the Colonial Secretary six days later, Weizmann and Ben-Gurion insisted on the points made in the letter of June 15. Ormsby-Gore indicated that Jerusalem would be completely under mandatory control but gave no commitment on the points they raised; Ben-Gurion stressed that strong objections to partition existed within the Zionist movement. At the end of their interview, Weizmann asked for an advance copy of the report, and Ormsby-Gore finally agreed to submit his request to the cabinet for its approval.83 Staunch Zionist anti-partitionists leveled their fire at Weizmann, who reserved his bile for private letters at the months’ end. Hearing — 398 —

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that Ussishkin, Sirkis, HaShomer HaTsa’ir’s Mordekhai Ben-Tov, and some Mapai stalwarts had lashed out against his drawing up boundaries for Ormsby-Gore’s consideration, Weizmann warned that “the Zealots since time immemorial have brought misfortune on the heads of our people.” The next Congress would decide if the “audacious proposal” was sound or not, but it was “folly to make political capital” out of the matter “before we know how it looks.” To Wise, he pleaded for unity, certain that “it is our destiny to get Palestine and this will be fulfilled someday, somehow.” If the movement were to be capable of bringing in 50,000 to 60,000 thousand Jews a year for the next twenty years or so in the area allotted, then it would have to make the best of such an opportunity as “a small sovereign state, leaving the problem of expansion and extension to future generations.” He concluded: The plan “may be either a Solomon’s judgment or a Caesarian operation; it depends on how it is carried out.” When Wise, in a telephone conversation, relayed that Roosevelt had suggested the possibility of purchasing great tracts of land in Transjordan and placing them under British trusteeship for Jewish use, Weizmann dismissed the notion by saying that the Zionists had to embody their forces and place their hope in the “new arrangement” of partition.84 Predictably, the Colonial and Foreign Offices differed in their assessments when the report came before the cabinet on June 28. OrmsbyGore strongly recommended endorsing “the particular scheme of partition” put forward, and its conclusion that the “best hope of a permanent solution” lay in “the difficult and drastic operation” of that proposal. This was the most honorable way for the Colonial Office to extricate itself from an impossible position, just to both parties and consonant with Britain’s obligations. Rendel suggested, as an alternative, that the whole Jewish State and the British and Arab enclaves within turned into a new British mandated area; Whitehall opposed the report’s proposed transfer of Arabs—by force if necessary—from the Jewish to the Arab State or out of the country altogether. Eden claimed that the very small Jewish State envisaged was not viable; the Arab commonwealth had no independent access to the sea; and Iraq and Ibn Saud would not accept Abdullah as head of the Arab State. In the end, the strong objections raised, including the new Secretary of State for India’s thought that the Arabs had been given a “raw deal,” led the cabinet to approve not the details but only the principle of partition.85 — 399 —

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General Dill’s views contributed measurably to the cabinet’s final decision. On June 14 he had telegraphed to Wauchope in London that the Arabs would likely resort to violent protest should HMG’s policy be announced in “peremptory and irrevocable terms.” It might be that the advantages of “arriving quickly at finality” on the Palestine issue would outweigh the risks in doing so, including the force of arms. The alternative would be an intervening period, lasting 3-5 years and maintaining the relative positions of the two contending races. He thought it best, for peace in the near future, to promote “a period of recuperation” before the government decided on a declared policy. Rendel seized on this letter to strengthen the case for adopting—at best—the principle of partition. The quick finality which Dill had mentioned was impossible, he added, since the League’s Permanent Mandates Commission would likely receive HMG’s conclusions with “strong criticism.” Eden pressed Dill’s communication and Rendel’s analysis while repeating his earlier objections during the Cabinet’s further discussion of the subject on June 30. The India Secretary argued that the great difficulty lay in the recommended transfer of some 250,000 Arabs from the Jewish to the Arab State. Ultimately, the members agreed that HMG’s official statement not be weakened by the words “hope” and “possibility,” and that the partition scheme be endorsed “on the general [Rendel underlined this] lines” of the commission’s conclusion.86 Ormsby-Gore decided to refuse Weizmann an advance copy of the report, leading the Zionist to rage on July 1, “So you want to strangle us in the dark?” In the bitter telephone conversation that ensued, he warned that world Jewry, for whom “it is a matter of life and death,” would fight the Colonial Secretary from San Francisco to Jerusalem, and that HMG could no longer count on the Agency’s cooperation. Dugdale smoothed things over by having Elliot talk to Chamberlain; Ormsby-Gore wrote a very cordial note to Weizmann, whom he had accompanied on horseback for six days in order to see Emir Feisal at Akaba in 1918, while urging him not to “burn your boats” or to go off “the deep end.” Weizmann replied that he had no boats to burn, and that while he would never forget their old friendship, he could not trust the system with which the Colonial Secretary had now unfortunately become identified. He would not come up with “a flourish of trumpets,” a phrase employed in Ormsby-Gore’s letter, but with one thing “which may, in the result, prove very much worse: enforced silence.”87 — 400 —

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With the report still withheld from Weizmann and Wise’s efforts in Washington to secure it unavailing, Ben-Gurion leaked a summary to the Agency’s news service after receiving one that Shertok had transmitted in a call from Cairo on July 2. Weizmann was furious at this independent action, but calmed down after the younger leader explained that he took this step so that Weizmann “could honestly say he had no foreknowledge of the affair.” Extensive publicity, he added three days later, was necessary to “quell the commotion liable to arise among the Arabs with the report’s publication … and to prepare Jewish public opinion.” Ever suspicious of British motives, Ben-Gurion also figured that the press coverage that followed had thwarted any possible attempt by HMG to bury the report.88 The last fear proved unfounded, for on July 7 the British government published the Royal Commission report, along with a statement that its recommendations would become HMG’s official policy as “the best and most hopeful solution of the deadlock.” Rendel had urged British control over the proposed Jewish area, resenting the “indecent haste” with which the Colonial Office sought to shuck its responsibility for the mandate as soon as possible. The Cabinet rejected this appeal on July 5, however, arguing that the benefit of national status was the very essence of the partition scheme for the Jews. Elliot also reflected the feeling of other colleagues when telling a skeptical Antonius and an approving Dugdale that with Nationalism running so strong today that “it grinds to powder any alien element,” it would be the same in Palestine. Consequently, just as HMG had concluded in Ireland, the only hope lay in separation.89 The Royal Commission Report, filling 404 pages, eight maps, and numerous statistical indices, presented an exceptionally clearheaded and lucid exposition of the Palestine problem. In its signatories’ view, “the primary purpose of the mandate as expressed in its preamble and its articles is to promote the establishment of the Jewish National Home.” Yet the mandate had become “unworkable.” “An irrepressible conflict has arisen between two national communities within the narrow bounds of one small country.” With the disease “so deep-rooted” and the Arabs fearing that they would be “overwhelmed and therefore dominated” by Jewish immigrants, they saw no other plan that seemed to offer at least a chance of ultimate peace than “a surgical operation”— “partition of the country into an Arab and a Jewish state.” “Half a loaf — 401 —

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is better than no bread,” posited the commissioners. The proposed Jewish State, less than one-fifth of Western Palestine and less than one-twentieth of the original mandate, would consist of a coastal strip from south of Jaffa to north of Haifa, the Galilee from the sea to the Syrian border, and the Jezre’el Valley. It would number 258,000 Jews. A permanently mandated British enclave would include Jerusalem (including 72,000 Jews in the modern area), a corridor to the sea, Acre, Haifa (with 50,000 Jews), and British bases on Lake Galilee and the Gulf of Akaba. The rest of Palestine and Transjordan was to be the new Arab State. Since 225,000 Arabs would be living in the northern area of the Jewish State, the report recommended that “sooner or later” the British should implement their transfer to the prospective Arab State with equitable compensation in an “exchange of population” (1,250 Jews to be moved to the Jewish State); “in the last resort the exchange would be compulsory.” A cantonal system, briefly discussed, was dismissed as too intricate and unwieldy. The commissioners concluded: “The drawbacks of Partition are outweighed by its advantages. For if it offers neither party all it wants, it offers each what it wants most, namely freedom and security.” If such a solution could not be achieved, however, and if the mandate were to continue, then Jewish immigration should be set by a “political high level” henceforth. The mandatory should fix that level for the next five years at a maximum of 12,000 per year, the commission added.90 The substance of the report did not surprise the fairly well-informed Zionists, but the proposal to restrict Jewish immigration to 8,000 for an eight-month transition period commencing in August, with a maximum of 12,000 annually for five years, threw their London headquarters into confusion. Ben-Gurion lashed out against “this bloody British government,” which could return the mandate to the League “or else they would have to fight for it.” He quickly apologized to Dugdale for the outburst, when a message arrived that Ormsby-Gore would see Weizmann or, if he refused, Dugdale. Weizmann went over that afternoon, to hear that the Colonial Secretary intended to resign at the end of the parliamentary session. “Blackguarded by everyone,” he could no longer carry the burden of office. As he saw it, the result of General Edmund Allenby’s World War I victories against Turkish rule in Palestine had been that HMG had incurred the hostility of the whole Arab world and now, too, of the Jews. In a private letter, Weizmann — 402 —

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actually considered the report “not bad” on the whole: skimpier boundaries than he had thought, yet also “a beginning of a new chapter in Jewish History.” The Kingdom of David was smaller, he added, which under Solomon became an Empire. “Who knows? C’est le premier pas qui compte!” That same evening Dugdale wrote in her diary “Heard that all is quiet in Palestine so far.”91 The true test of that calm would not be long in coming.

Endnotes 1

Peel’s speech, Nov. 12, 1936, Palestine Royal Commission, Minutes of Evidence Heard at Public Sessions (London, 1937), iv-v. 2 Wauchope to Ormsby-Gore, Nov. 13, 1936, PREM 1/352, PRO. 3 Julian L. Meltzer, “Six Wise Men and True,” New Palestine, Dec. 25, 1936. For Rumbold’s decrying Nazism as evil and his prescient warnings, while serving as HMG’s ambassador to Berlin, about Hitler’s implementing the aims articulated in Mein Kampf, see Gilbert, Sir Horace Rumbold, chap. 16. 4 Weizmann, Trial and Error, 383-384; Palestine Royal Commission, 30-40. 5 Vera Weizmann, The Impossible Takes Longer (London, 1967), 148-149; Baffy, 33. 6 Palestine Royal Commission, 32, 65-67, 97, 99, 216. 7 Yosef Heller, BaMa’avak LaMedina, HaMediniyut HaTsiyonit BaShanim 19361948 (Jerusalem, 1985), 171-172. 8 Wauchope to Parkinson, Dec. 16, 1936, CO 733/297/75156/5, PRO. 9 CO 733/320/75550/27, PRO; Nashashibi telephone conversation, Dec. 10, 1936, S25/22836, CZA; Abdullah-Shertok meeting, Nov. 24, 1936, file P-1056/7, ISA; A.S. memorandum, Dec. 16, 1936, J1/4139, and Abd al-Hadi to Wauchope, Dec. 18, 1936, S25/22801; both in CZA. 10 Peel to Ormsby-Gore, Dec. 20, 1936, CO 733/297/75156/5, PRO. 11 Wauchope to Ormsby-Gore, Dec. 24, 1936, CO 733/297/75156/5, PRO. The District Commissioner of Northern Palestine recommended that a “political high level” be introduced as regards Jewish immigration (Keith-Roach, The Pasha of Jerusalem, 188-189). 12 Hall testimony, Dec. 3, 1936, S25/22599, CZA. — 403 —

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13

Weizmann testimony, Dec. 23, 1936, WA; Dec. 23, 1936 notes, S25/22599, CZA. For the Agency’s earlier discussions on political parity, see JAEJ, Nov. 1, and 22, 1936, CZA. The Hagana knew of Hall’s evidence because it had succeeded in wiring the room in which closed testimony took place. Gilbert, Sir Horace Rumbold, 423. 14 Arab Higher Committee meeting, Jan. 6, 1937, file P-3221/18, ISA; Wauchope to Ormsby-Gore, Jan. 6, 1937, CO 733/320/75550/27, PRO; Robert L. Melka, “Nazi Germany and the Palestine Question,” in E. Kedourie and S. G. Haim, eds., Palestine and Israel in the 19th and 20th Centuries (London, 1982), 89-101; Auni telephone conversation, Jan. 6, 1937, S25/22836, CZA. 15 Palestine Royal Commission, 288-291. 16 JAEJ, Jan. 10, 1937, CZA. 17 Ben-Gurion testimony, Jan. 7, 1937, S25/4642, CZA. For Agency talks with Syrian leaders between July 1936 and June 1937, see Eliyahu Eilat, Shivat Tsiyon VaArav: Pirkei Iyun U’Ma’aseh (Tel-Aviv, 1974), 417-441; EpsteinSasson report, Jan. 7, 1937, A180/61, CZA. 18 Weizmann testimony, Jan. 8, 1937, WA. Coupland’s reference about splitting the child was to the judgment of King Solomon (Kings 1, 3:16-27). When Ormsby-Gore subsequently declared that Jews and Arabs had first suggested partition to individual members of the commission, Ben-Gurion provided a prominent American Zionist with excerpts of a transcript showing that Coupland had made the proposal to Weizmann (Ben-Gurion to Mack, Sept. 29, 1937, file 2/4, Harry Barnard MSS, AJA). 19 Sahar interview, Dec. 4, 1971, WA; Yigal Lossin, Pillar of Fire: The Rebirth of Israel; A Visual History (Jerusalem, 1983), 237. 20 Gilbert, Sir Horace Rumbold, 404-405; Weizmann, The Impossible Takes Longer, 152. Hammond added that, in his view, the mandatory administration had been “brought to fail from the start. It had been a case of the blind leading the blind, with no attempt at effective administration.” Hammond remarks, Feb. 8, 1938, file 8/518, Chatham House Archives, London. 21 Abdullah-Peel-Coupland interview, Jan. 9, 1937, in Cohen diary report, Feb. 8, 1937, file P-1056/7, ISA. 22 Palestine Royal Commission, 292-299; Losin, Pillar of Fire, 235. Khalidi, the mayor of Jerusalem, subsequently criticized Haj Amin’s assertion that Arab and Jew could not be placed in the same country, thinking that had the Mufti answered differently, the history of Palestine might have been altered. Jbara, Palestinian Leader Hajj Amin al-Husayni, 157. 23 Palestine Royal Commission, 309-314. 24 Palestine Royal Commission, 317, 326-327, 314, 353, 357-358. 25 Weizmann reminiscences as told to Maurice Samuel, AJA, 222; Julian Louis Melzer, “Towards the Precipice,” in M.W. Weisgal and J. Carmichael, eds., Chaim Weizmann, A Biography by Several Hands (London, 1962), 240241 (which errs by placing the meeting in February, long after the Royal Commission had left Palestine); Ya’akov Uri memoir, in R. Bashan, ed., Sihot — 404 —

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Hulin Shel Weizmann (Jerusalem, 1963), 80-82. The memoir added that when Weizmann returned to Nahalal in his first visit as president of the State of Israel, he stopped by that building, and said: “I shall always remember that day. Our doubts were many and our fears enormous. And here we have been privileged to be living witnesses to the results of that conversation.” 26 Shertok comments at Mapai Executive, Feb. 5-6, 1937, in David Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot 4 (Tel Aviv, 1974), 66; Rumbold comment, Dec. 30, 1936, in Palestine Royal Commission, 236; Ben-Gurion to Wise, Jan. 11, 1937, microfilm #26, Brandeis MSS. 27 Weizmann to Peel, Jan. 19, 1937, WA. 28 Clark Kerr to FO, Jan. 4, 1937, FO 371/20804, PRO; Cox to Andrews, Jan. 4, 1937, S25/22728, CZA; Rendel minute, Jan. 9, 1937, FO 371/20804, PRO. 29 Eden to Orsmby-Gore, Jan. 20, 1937, CO 733/332/75156, PRO. 30 Ormsby-Gore to Eden, Jan. 23, 1937, CO 733/332/75156, PRO. 31 Rendel minute, Feb. 2, 1937, FO 371/20804, PRO. 32 Baffy, 38; Ormsby-Gore–Shuckburgh–Weizmann talk, Feb. 2, 1937; Weizmann to Ormsby-Gore, Feb. 12, 1937; Amery to Weizmann, Feb. 17, 1937; Weizmann to Amery, Feb. 18, 1937; Weizmann report to Jewish Agency Executive London, Mar. 1, 1937; all in WA. 33 Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 215-216; 57-75. 34 Brandeis-Kaplan-Wise meeting, Feb. 7, 1937, file 5/24, Julian Mack MSS; Kaplan to friends, Feb. 14, 1937, A24/200, CZA; Wise et al. to Hull, Feb. 15, 1937, Memorandum Submitted to the Palestine Royal Commission on American Interest in the Administration of the Palestine Mandate, Royal Commission files, ZA. 35 Palestine Royal Commission, 369-380. For Weizmann’s characterization of Jabotinsky after this appearance as “froth and show,” “arbitrary and irresponsible and often most tactless,” see Weizmann to Sidebotham, Feb. 18, 1937, WA. 36 Rutenberg to Samuel, Jan. 15, 1937, and Rutenberg to Parkinson, Feb. 2, 1937, both in file 9003/116, Rutenberg MSS; Cox to Moody, Feb. 11, 1937, S25/22784, CZA; Cohen diary, Feb. 10 and 13, 1937, file P-1056/7, ISA; Cohen report, Apr. 14, 1937 (including Abdullah-Ibn Saud correspondence), Mizrachi-World Central Organization files, Maimon MSS; Ibn Saud to Foreign Office, Feb. 18, 1937, FO 371/20804, PRO. 37 Baggallay minute, Feb. 13, 1937, FO 371/20804, PRO; Weizmann-Vansittart talk, Feb. 4, 1937, WA; Vansittart note, Feb. 18, 1937, FO 371/20804, PRO; George Rendel, The Sword and the Olive (London, 1957), 99, 109. 38 Baffy, 39; Ormsby-Gore testimony, July 31, 1937, League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Committee, Minutes of the Thirty-Second (Extraordinary) Session (Geneva, 1937), 20; Moshe Sharett, Yoman Medini 2 (Tel Aviv, 1971), 62-68; Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 69; Baffy, 40. 39 Sharett, Yoman Medini, 50. Weizmann to Sylvester, Mach 11, 1937; “Dr. Weizmann’s comments”; Lloyd George memorandum, Apr. 12, 1937; all in — 405 —

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G/19/18/11, Lloyd George MSS. 40 Gilbert, Winston Churchill, 847-848. 41 London Times, Mar. 16, 1937; Palestine Royal Commission, 380-389; Perlzweig to Executive, Apr. 21, 1937 report, L22/19, CZA; Sharett, Yoman Medini, 90-91. 42 Bentwich to McDonald, Mar. 16, 1937, PAC files, McDonald MSS; BenGurion, Zikhronot, 86-88, 98-101; Joseph to Hall (OAG), Mar. 18, 1937, A24/200, CZA; Kohn to Graves, Mar. 23, 1937, file Jewish Agency XV/2, ZA; Meeting of Mar. 3, 1937, CAB 23/87; Ormsby-Gore note to cabinet, Mar. 11, 1937, PREM 1/352; both in PRO. An Order-in-Council, gazetted in Palestine on March 20, 1937, gave the High Commissioner power at his unfettered discretion to make regulations for securing the public safety, the country’s defense, the maintenance of public order, and the suppression of riot and rebellion. 43 Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 106-107; Jbara, Palestinian Leader, 157. A subsequent intelligence report, gathered by Agency Arabist Aharon Cohen, confirmed the Iranian consul’s information, adding that Haj Amin had told Ibn Saud that he and the Istiqlalists were prepared to work for replacing Abdullah with Feisal, Ibn Saud’s second son. This would rid the Saudi monarch of one of his sworn enemies and enable Ibn Saud’s first son to inherit the Saudi kingdom. Cohen memorandum, Apr. 14, 1937, S25/22836, CZA. Musa Alami had first revealed this plan to his Italian contact in Sept. 1936, adding that the ensuing anti-British and anti-French Arab Federation would include Syria, Iraq, Palestine, Transjordan, and the Arabian peninsula (Arielli, “Italian Involvement,” 198). 44 Baggallay memorandum, Mar. 19, 1937, FO 371/20805, PRO; Kohn to Graves, Mar. 23, 1937, file Jewish Agency XV/2, ZA; Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 106-107; Sharett, Yoman Medini, 82-84. In 1920, French-controlled Syria was awarded the sanjak (a Turkish district) of Alexandretta, shortly after the demise of the Ottoman Empire. Turkey complained to the League of Nations in 1936 that the freedoms of the minority Turks in the region were being infringed. In early 1937, the League brokered an arrangement between France (which was the mandated power in Syria) and Turkey to give the sanjak autonomy. 45 Wise to Brandeis et al., Feb. 25, 1937, file Z7, Robert Szold MSS; Warburg to Weizmann, Jan. 8, 1937 (mistakenly typed 1936), microfilm #1938, Warburg MSS; Sharett, Yoman Medini, 80-82, 91-95, 98-99. For the views of a Warburg colleague on the Jerusalem Executive, who strongly influenced the American philanthropist, see Hexter to Warburg, Feb. 26, 1937, Box 2842, Hexter MSS. 46 Ussishkin addresses, Apr. 4 and 21, 1937, microfilm #26, Brandeis MSS; Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 127-133, 135-143, 145-152, 154-155, 162-164; Katznelson remarks at Political Advisory Committee, Apr. 14, 1937, WA; Hodess memorandum, Apr. 8, 1937, A194/11, CZA; Jewish Chronicle, Apr. 30, — 406 —

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1937. As an answer to the Kishinev pogrom, Herzl had supported Britain’s offer of an area in Uganda in East Africa (now Kenya) for Jewish settlement, and presented it to the Sixth Zionist Congress in August 1903. A strong minority opposed the plan, as did local English colonists, pro-assimilation British Jews, and prominent British non-Jews. The British government dropped the proposal. Subsequently, an exploratory commission, sent with the approval of a majority vote at the 1903 Congress, found the East Africa scheme unsuitable for settlement. 47 Weizmann remarks at Political Advisory Committee meeting, Apr. 14, 1937, WA; Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 151; JTA, Sept. 14, 1936; Sharett, Yoman Medini, 109; Katznelson to Weizmann, Apr. 27, 1937, Z4/17141, CZA. 48 Sharett, Yoman Medini, 112-113, 117-118; Shertok remarks, Mar. 10, 1943, Arab-Jewish relations files, HA. 49 Minister in Jedda to FO, Apr. 1, 1937, S25/22713, CZA; Rendel to Parkinson, Apr. 13, 1937, CO 733/348/75550, PRO. 50 Ormsby-Gore minute, Apr. 14, 1937; Rendel to Downie, Apr. 26 and 28, 1937; all in CO 733/348/75550, PRO. 51 Sharett, Yoman Medini, 114-116; Wauchope to Ormsby-Gore, Apr. 27, 1937, CO 733/332/75156, PRO; Parkinson–Rosenheim–Goodman interview, Apr. 26, 1937, S25/22711, CZA. 52 Wise memorandum, Mar. 31, 1937, file 7/24, Mack MSS; Moore to Wise, Apr. 8, 1937, and Wise to Frankfurter, Apr. 12, 1937; both in Box 109, Wise MSS; Wise to Roosevelt, Apr. 22, 1937, PPF 3292, FDRL. 53 Roosevelt to Wise, Feb. 6, 1937 (reprinted in New Palestine, Feb. 12, 1937); Silverman to Roosevelt, Feb. 24, 1937, both in PPF 601, FDRL. 54 Wise to Brandeis, Apr. 28, 1937, Box 106; Frankfurter to Wise, Apr. 28, 1937, Box 109; both in Wise MSS. The same day, Roosevelt also sent a letter congratulating Wise on the thirtieth anniversary of his rabbinical service as founder of the Free Synagogue in New York City, and leading “great numbers within American Jewry on behalf of all those ideals which are a part of our country and the Jewish tradition, a great ministry.” It concluded: “You have vitalized the conception of what church and synagogue may do on behalf of our common life” (Roosevelt to Wise, Apr. 27, 1937, PPF 3292, FDRL). 55 Wise to Weizmann, Apr. 29, 1937, S25/1752, CZA. 56 Wise to Weizmann, Apr. 29, 1937, S25/1752, CZA; Gilbert, Sir Horace Rumbold, 426-427; Baffy, 41-42. The Irish nationalist leader Michael Collins, who negotiated the Anglo-Irish settlement of 1921, was assassinated the following year by a group of Republican extremists. 57 Hull to Roosevelt, May 1, 1937, OF 20, FDRL; Paul A. Freund, “Justice Brandeis: A Law Clerk’s Remembrance,” American Jewish History 68 (Sept. 1977): 17; Hull to Eden, Apr. 30, 1937, FO 371/20806, PRO. Hull also told FDR that he had asked the U.S. ambassador to Ankara to ascertain the probable reception which Turkey’s president would accord to a similar expression of views. Ambassador MacMurray answered that he did not encourage the — 407 —

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hope that this would be favorably received by the Turkish authorities, such expression more likely meeting with rebuff and impairing “the confidence and goodwill which this country now enjoys in Turkey” (ibid.). The cry “Next Year in Jerusalem” is said by Jews at the close of Yom Kippur and of the Passover Seder. 58 Hull to Adler, May 1, 1937, 861.4016/1659, U.S. State Department Records (hereafter SD), National Archives, Suitland, MD; Early to McIntyre, May 3, 1937, OF 20, FDRL; Ward memorandum, Jan. 18, 1937, 867N.01/744, Murray memorandum, May 3, 1937, 867N.00/453, Murray memorandum, July 27, 1937, 867N.01/806, all in SD; Cohen, The Year After the Riots, 184185; Palestine Royal Commission, 358-367. Isaiah Bowman, the president of Johns Hopkins University and FDR’s major advisor on refugee settlement, approvingly cited Ward’s study a few years later when advocating an anti-Zionist policy within the department. Memorandum, Mar. 3, 1944, Near East file, Isaiah Bowman MSS, Eisenhower Library, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD. 59 Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 173-174. Henry Mond, the Second Baron Melchett, served then as chairman of the Council of the Jewish Agency. An industrialist and economist, his book Thy Neighbor (1936) asserted that creating a state with 3 million Jews in Palestine would guarantee British Imperial interest in the region. 60 Memorandum, May 10, 1937, J1/4139, CZA. 61 Hall to Shertok, May 10, 1937, microfilm #1941, Warburg MSS; Shertok– Wauchope interview, May 13, 1937, A24/206, CZA. The official Agency protest came one week later. Shertok to Hall, May 17, 1937, A255/667, CZA. 62 Wise to Brandeis, May 12, 1937, enclosing Ben-Gurion-Wise telephone conversation, microfilm #26, Brandeis MSS; Brandeis to Frankfurter, May 14, 1937, in “Half Brother, Half Son,” 596-597. 63 Wise to Brandeis, May 13, 1937, Box 104, Wise MSS; Melchett to Warburg, May 6, 1937, microfilm #1939, Warburg MSS. 64 Shertok, Yoman Medini, 126-127, 133; JTA, May 23, 1937. 65 HaCohen–Hos–Abdullah meeting, May 15, 1937, file IV-104-49-1/38, Makhon Lavon; Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 174-176; Rutenberg confidential memorandum, May 20, 1937, and Rutenberg–Parkinson–Downie meeting, May 21, 1937, both in file 9011/1181, Rutenberg MSS. 66 David Ben-Gurion, Pegishot Im Manhigim Aravim (Tel Aviv, 1967), 130-137; Eilat, Shivat Zion Va’Arav, 322-325. 67 Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 179. 68 Ibid., 179-183. 69 Ibid., 183-184. 70 Philby draft, May 26, 1937, file P-1056/7, ISA. 71 Ben-Gurion draft, May 26, 1937, file P-1056/7, ISA. 72 Ben-Gurion to Philby, May 31, 1937, Judah Magnes files, AJA. 73 Armstrong to Ben-Gurion, May 31, 1937; Ben-Gurion to Armstrong, June 2, — 408 —

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1937; both in Jewish Agency files, Maimon MSS. Philby publicized his own views a few months later (H. St. J. B. Philby, “The Arabs and the Future of Palestine,” Foreign Affairs (Oct. 1937): 156-166). 74 Ormsby-Gore address (including Wauchope’s letter), May 31, 1937, FO 371/20807, PRO. 75 Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 196-207; Rutenberg to Maffey, June 5, 1937, file VII/24, Mack MSS. In 1929, Moshe Novomeysky had obtained from the British a 75-year franchise for Palestine Potash Ltd., which eventually became the Dead Sea Works Company. 76 Rendel memorandum, June 8, 1937, FO 371/20807, PRO; Goldman-Ciano interview, May 4, 1937; Goldmann-Carutzesco interview, June 8, 1937; both in L22/390, CZA; Goldmann to Wise, June 15, 1937, Box 109, Wise MSS; Poalei Mizrachi statement, June 1937, S54/224, CZA. Partition rumors elicited the first German Foreign Office reaction on the subject, which concluded in favor of Jewish emigration and against Jewish sovereignty in Palestine (von Neurath memorandum, June 1, 1937, in Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, 5 [Washington, D.C., 1953], 746-747). 77 Creech-Jones to Leftwich, June 11, 1937, A330/15, CZA; Michael Marrus, The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century (New York, 1985), 164-165. 78 Memorandum of dinner June 8, 1937, WA; Diary, June 8, 1937, Amery MSS; Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 219-220; Amery testimony, Feb. 23, 1937, and Amery to Martin, Feb. 25, 1937, both in Amery MSS; Baffy, 45. Rothschild subsequently advised the Colonial Office that if partition had to be endorsed, HMG should transfer the Arabs now living in the Jewish State area to Transjordan, and allow Jewish immigration into the strip of territory, including Jerusalem, which would be placed under British mandate. Parkinson minute, June 21, 1937, CO 733/328/75054, PRO. 79 Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 223-227; Rose, The Gentile Zionists, 148n50. Deborah the prophetess pressed the general Barak ben Avinoam to fight until victory against Sisra, the general of King Yavin of Canaan (Judges, 4-5), and then she proceeded to rule the Jewish commonwealth in Eretz Yisrael for 40 years in peace. 80 Weizmann–Ormsby-Gore interview, June 13, 1937, file XV/2, Jewish Agency files, ZA; Katznelson et al. meeting with Weizmann, June 14, 1937, file IV-104-49-1-25, Makhon Lavon; Baffy, 46; Weizmann to Ormsby-Gore, June 15, 1937, CO 733/348/75550/69, PRO. 81 Memorandum, May 18, 1937; NZO statement given to Gaster, May 24, 1937; both in A203/332, CZA. Jabotinsky to editors of HaDegel, June 1, 1937, in Jabotinsky, Mikhtavim, 333-334; Akzin-Laski interview, June 1, 1937, file E3/236, BDA; Akzin-Parkinson interview, June 7, 1937, CO 733/328/75054, PRO. Harbin in central Manchuria became a haven for Jews, mostly from Czarist lands, a community that numbered 25,000 by the 1920s. 82 Abd al-Hadi–Joseph talk, June 1, 1937, file IV-104-49-1/38, Makhon Lavon; — 409 —

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Agronsky report, June 14, 1937, A209/17, CZA; Sharett, Yoman Medini, 226227, 188-189; A.S. (Sasson) report, July 6, 1937, and Cohen report, June 15, 1937; both in J1/4138, CZA. 83 Eilat, Shivat Tsiyon Va’Arav, 310-312; Coupland to Ormsby-Gore, June 23, 1937, FO 371/20807, PRO; Baffy, 47; Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 253-255; Parkinson memorandum, June 28, 1937, CO 733/328/75054, PRO. 84 Weizmann to A. Katznelson, June 27, 1937, WA; Weizmann to Wise, June 29, 1937; Weizmann-Wise telephone conversation, June 29, 1937; both in Box 122, Wise MSS. Roosevelt’s suggestion was made to his speech writer and lawyer, the non-Zionist Samuel Rosenman (Wise to Brandeis et al., June 25, 1937, file VII/24, Mack MSS). For strong assaults on Weizmann, see Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 209-219; June 21, 1937, Va’ad HaPoel HaTsiyoni HaMetsumtsam, S5/295, CZA. 85 Ormsby-Gore memorandum, June 25, 1937, CP 24/166, in CAB 24/270; Rendel minute, June 28, 1937, FO 371/20808; Cabinet meeting, June 28, 1937, CAB 23/88; all in PRO. 86 Dill to Wauchope, June 14, 1937, which became CP 169 (37); Rendel minutes, June 29 and 30, 1937; Cabinet conclusions, June 30, 1937; all in FO 371/20808, PRO. 87 Weizman–Ormsby-Gore telephone conversation, July 1, 1937, and Weizmann to Ormsby-Gore, July 4, 1937, both in WA; Baffy, 48-49. 88 File VII/24, Mack MSS; Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 272-280, 288-289; Sharett, Yoman Medini, 231-234; Baffy, 51. 89 Palestine, Statement of Policy, Cmd. 5513; Rendel memorandum, July 2, 1937, FO 371/20808, and meeting, July 5, 1937, CAB 23/88; both in PRO; Baffy, 48. 90 Palestine Royal Commission Report, Cmd. 5479. For the “primary purpose” of the Palestine Mandate, see chap. 5, 66n. 91 Baffy, 50-51; Meeting, July 7, 1937, WA; Weizmann–Ormsby-Gore interview, July 7, 1937, S25/7563, CZA; Weizmann to Paterson, July 7, 1937, WA. For Shertok’s reaction, more moderate than Ben-Gurion’s outburst, see Sharett, Yoman Medini, 239.

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7. The Retreat from Partition

“If I had to write a motto for the new Jewish State,” Weizmann confided one day after HMG released the Royal Commission Report, “I would engrave on its door ‘Standing Room Only.’” The disappointing frontiers had to be rectified and made less vulnerable, he informed d’AvigdorGoldsmid and Laski in an interview on July 8, 1937. The modern portion of Jerusalem, with its 72,000 Jews, must be included within the Jewish commonwealth; some of the Negev could be saved; and the transition period had to be as short as possible. A transfer of Arabs from the Galilee (where they were 90 percent of the population) to Transjordan must be done by “kindness,” not force, preparing the area quickly with Jewish capital and then persuading the Arabs to occupy that land. (A similar, voluntary transfer had been proposed by Ben-Gurion to the Agency Executive eight months earlier.) The Report represented “the greatest appreciation of our work ever written,” yet it should have blamed the executants of the mandate rather than postulating erroneously that the mandate was unworkable. The future envisaged in the Report involved “a leap in the dark”, exactly as was the position when the Balfour Declaration had been issued. He went on excitedly: We shall have a Jewish army, a navy, an air force, industry, and a Jewish parliament. Undoubtedly, “a great many violent speeches” advocating rejection would be made at the World Zionist Congress next month, but the Executive would ultimately be empowered to negotiate for improving the commission’s proposals.1 For all of Weizmann’s fervent conviction and fabled charm, his listeners remained highly skeptical. D’Avigdor-Goldsmid was apprehensive about the reaction of the governments of Central and Eastern Europe, and worried that the creation of a Jewish state would present him and like-minded co-religionists with “a very considerable difficulty.” Recalling Hall’s remarks about the “reliability” of the Arab leaders, he also very much doubted whether the Jews would ever succeed in establishing “reasonable relations” with them. Laski proceeded to author a — 411 —

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memorandum which emphasized that the “fundamental cleavage” in outlook which separated Zionists from non-nationalist Jews would now have to be made clear to the world at large. This step, recalling the 1917 letter of two Anglo-Jewish leaders against the Balfour Declaration, had to be taken so that “the fruits of hard won emancipation may not be endangered by the emphasis laid on the advantages—dubious in any case—of citizenship of a Jewish state not quite the size of Devonshire and incapable even in the expectation of the most sanguine of absorbing more than two or three million inhabitants.” Non-Zionists would probably secure with ease an internationally recognized pronouncement asserting the “permanent continuity” of their equal status as citizens in the democratic countries, Laski concluded, but the position in Poland, Rumania, and Austria—not to speak of Germany—”will be far more difficult.”2 Informed of the interview with Weizmann, other prominent British non-Zionists echoed this trepidation. Lionel L. Cohen agreed with Laski that the matter of a Jewish state’s effect upon the citizenship possessed by such individuals as d’Avigdor-Goldsmid and Felix Warburg would give him “heartburning.” “Somehow,” Otto Schiff responded, “I cannot help having misgivings as to what a Jewish State will look like, considering all the cleavages in Jewry and the jealousy of different sections against each other.” Certain that a Jewish commonwealth would instantly spark an outcry in Eastern Europe and elsewhere for immediate, forced emigration, with places of possible settlement “beyond comprehension,” Lord Bearsted only hoped that “we shall not see such manifestation, which is not Anti-Semitic alone, in our country.” Considering that Zionism “is and always has been a disastrous movement for Jewry as a whole,” he feared that time would prove him correct. The Commission Report, Bearsted’s handwritten letter to Laski closed, “must be accepted, loyally accepted, but my misgivings remain.”3 Warburg and his circle, strenuously opposed to political Zionism, harbored similar anxieties. He thought the Agency Executive in Jerusalem was continuing to play “a decidedly sabotaging game” in delaying the creation of a small Administrative Committee and an Executive which would accord parity to the non-Zionists. The American Jewish philanthropist began thinking along the lines of a Peace Party in Palestine, judging that Ben-Gurion, who “evidently has Napoleonitis,” would battle against the non-Zionists and Weizmann at the next Congress. He — 412 —

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and the other non-Zionist members agreed to participate in the Agency Council and the Administrative Committee if the Congress established “normalcy” in representation. On July 8, Warburg discussed the Peel Report with Adler, president of both the Jewish Theological Seminary and the American Jewish Committee, and Maurice J. Karpf, director of the graduate school of Jewish Social Work, the three men then deciding together with colleagues Sol Stroock and Judge Irving Lehman to oppose partition. The task of preparing an alternative scheme, allowing time for the establishment “if at all possible” of a working agreement between the Jews and Arabs in Palestine before negotiating with the British, was given to Adler for presentation at the Agency Council meeting on August 18.4 Far more hostile was Sulzberger, not only publisher of the New York Times but also Adler’s cousin. After a first visit to Palestine in early 1937, he had written a private memorandum explaining why he never felt “so much a foreigner” after traveling pretty well over the face of the earth “as in this Holy Land.” He was a Jew religiously, Palestine’s Jews “racially and nationally.” Since the Arabs “have a legitimate case,” Sulzberger advocated that the Jewish population, having “enriched” the land, be increased to 40 percent of the total. This proposal, based upon his meeting in Palestine with Magnes, was spelled out in a long Times editorial on July 8. Rejecting partition, the newspaper charged that dividing the country into two states was defeatist, not solving Arab-Jewish friction but only serving British interests. Open immigration would intensify conflict in Palestine, which could never support all Jews from countries like Poland and Rumania, and block the entry of Jews into other Arab lands. The Times offered its alternative: an adequately British-enforced ten-year truce, at which time the Jews would reach 40 percent of the population, presented a better chance for Arab-Jewish conciliation than if “the sharp sword of partition falls upon their common land.” Ten days later, the Times published Magnes’s full response along these lines to the Peel Commission, a reply which “thrilled and heartened” Sulzberger.5 The American Zionist leadership considered partition “utterly out of the question,” and it joined forces with Warburg to stand firmly against the British proposal. Meeting in Brandeis’s home on July 10, Wise, Mack, Frankfurter, Robert Szold, and Israel Brodie unanimously decided that HMG had to be compelled by the League to fulfill the mandate’s terms. Suggesting partition had gone beyond the Royal Commission’s — 413 —

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terms of reference, the group noted, a move that was “still more outrageous” because specific boundary lines had been laid down without having heard expert testimony both from the Arabs and from the Jews. Assenting now to this further division of Palestine, Mack argued, would but tend to confirm the forced excision in 1922 from the mandate of what became Transjordan and place “infinite difficulties” in the way of future Jewish expansion. Two days later, he met with Warburg and Paul Baerwald, who expressed concern that some within their ranks would cut themselves completely off from the little Jewish State out of fear of dual loyalty. All agreed as to the “demerits” of the present proposal and its “complete non-acceptability,” although Warburg thought that the Jews should be prepared to negotiate.6 Jabotinsky immediately called for a World Jewish National Assembly to replace partition with Jewish sovereignty on both sides of the Jordan River. He scornfully dismissed the “worthless baubles” of projected statehood and government, and warned that the scheme encouraged “two mutually hostile irredentist States within a small territory.” Addressing a meeting at the House of Commons soon thereafter, Jabotinsky observed that the present offer of some 4,000 square kilometers out of the 116,000 in the original mandate, with all future Jewish immigration confined to this indefensible area, called to mind the restricted “Pale of Settlement” that had long been forced upon Russian Jewry. “Humanitarian Zionism” needed above all room for millions of Jews in distress, with 8-9 million eventual inhabitants (including 2 million Arabs) easily able to live in the far larger Jewish state that he foresaw. Within ten years, a Jewish majority of 2 million and 1.3 million Arabs could be settled there, with no need for a transfer of the Arab population. Such a base could provide an imperial asset, “a substantial Jewish partner standing sentinel on the most important of the Empire’s highways.” If Parliament could be persuaded to oppose haste in the matter, Jabotinsky hoped, then perhaps the Permanent Mandates Commission would follow suit. In another démarche, he and Agudas Israel president Jacob Rosenheim proposed to Weizmann that a Round Table Conference of their organizations be convened without delay to decide on the Jewish attitude towards Palestine’s future.7 Hardly oblivious to the many limitations in the partition plan, which the yishuv press unanimously attacked, Weizmann and his associates at 77 Great Russell St. spent several fitful days drawing up the vital issues — 414 —

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for negotiation regarding territory and sovereignty. He found a new point of alarm in the indefinite British occupation of Haifa, Acre, Safed, and Tiberias; the question of HMG’s thoughts regarding Arab transfer and the length of the transition period certainly had to be clarified. BenGurion’s detailed analysis observed that the Jewish State should include New Jerusalem outside the Old City walls; the corridor extended to the Dead Sea; Bet She’an province; Transjordan between the Yarmuk, the Jordan and the Sea of Galilee, thereby taking in the Rutenberg electric power station at Naharayim; the coastal plain broadened as far as the hills of Judea and Samaria; and no restrictions should be placed on sovereignty, such as construction of the Tel Aviv port. All agreed, too, that no annual subvention should be paid by decree to the Arab State. The final letter was to reach Ormsby-Gore five days before the morning of July 19, when the Colonial Secretary finally consented to receive Weizmann, and just prior to the scheduled Parliamentary Debate on Palestine.8 The Arab Higher Committee lost no time in publicly criticizing the Report’s assignment of Palestine’s most fertile and important lands to the Jewish State, and placing the holy places under British control. Given the helpful direction received in past crises from the neighboring Arab governments, the Committee also felt obligated to request these rulers’ advice on July 8 in light of “the difficult historical position.” Unanimously and with increasing militancy, the local Arab press insisted upon an independent Palestine, while Haj Amin asked Muslim leaders to rescue Palestine from British and Jewish colonization in order to protect the holy places. Three days later, a manifesto signed by 150 Palestinian Muslim clerics pronounced that all who agreed to partition would be considered religious heretics and removed from the ranks of Islam. On July 15, Haj Amin stressed to the Reich consul-general in Jerusalem “Arab sympathy for the new Germany,” and declared that “in the battle against the Jews” the Arabs hoped for support from Germany and Italy, “whose interests move in the same direction.” Statements of encouragement from Ibn Saud and especially a public one from Iraqi Prime Minister Suleiman, reported Wauchope to the Colonial Office, were “a most powerful factor” in causing the Nashashibis’ National Defense Party, which had just resigned from the Committee, to declare its opposition to the Peel Report. One week earlier, Nashashibi and Ya’qoub Farraj had told him, without being asked, that they definitely fa— 415 —

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vored the principle of partition. Abdullah, understanding approving the commission’s proposal as a step towards his dream of a Greater Syrian empire under his rule, was “most indignant” at Suleiman’s statement that any person venturing to agree to head the proposed Arab commonwealth would be regarded as “an outcast throughout the Arab world and would incur the wrath of Muslims all over the East.”9 Haj Amin’s hand, while cloaked behind the scenes, could be discerned. Reliable intelligence received by the Jewish Agency’s Arab department revealed that a conclave of the heads of the Husseini family had determined that they had no choice but to resume attacks throughout the country despite the great dangers involved, first with gathering fighters and weapons in Palestine’s northern hills. Some thought of waiting until after the Zionist Congress, but the Mufti asserted that partition, which he deemed a Zionist proposal, would not be rejected at that assembly. He sent messages on July 9 to Arab and Muslim leaders around the world asking them to rescue Palestine from British and Jewish colonization in order to protect the Muslim holy places, and called for a jihad. Haj Amin and Abd al-Hadi, Wauchope informed Under-Secretary Parkinson on July 14, were using all their influence against partition. In first announcing the Report on Palestine radio, the High Commissioner had expressed the hope that the plan “will not only end the many troubles, but create a new era of goodwill for Arabs and Jews throughout the country.” Arrangements were therefore made to arrest and then deport the Mufti aboard the H.M.S. Repulse, now stationed in Haifa, “should he in any way commit himself” by contravening mandatory law. If “rows” developed after Haj Amin’s arrest, the High Commissioner added, it would be useful to have power to send some “lesser fry” to Malta for a short period.10 Across the Atlantic, the Warburg group had begun preliminary talks with three Arabs who sought a joint campaign against partition on the basis that Palestinian Jewry not exceed 40 percent of the population and agree to renounce political Zionism. Warburg did not consider Izzat Tannous, a Husseini clan member heading the Committee’s Palestine Information Centre in London’s Trafalgar Square, together with Amin al-Ruhani and J. I. Shatara, “to be in an impossible frame of mind at all.” “If one only knew how far one could rely on them and how far their word might go!” he had added in a letter to Magnes. On July 13, the three Arabs met in the office of lawyer Lewis Strauss, who was accompa— 416 —

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nied by publisher George Backer and Waldman of the American Jewish Committee. Positing that Zionism had greatly increased antisemitism throughout the world, and that the projected Jewish State and Jews in Arab lands would be in constant danger if partition became a fact, the Arab trio confided that Bentwich privately agreed with their proposed 60-40 ratio. Waldman particularly took issue with that formula, and thought it possible to obtain modification “to the extent of non-domination of either party.” Warburg cabled Weizmann about the confidential matter, as well as his advice that insisting on New Jerusalem in the Jewish commonwealth “would bring us into conflict with the Christian world,” and asked that he consult d’Avigdor-Goldsmid and Cohen.11 Warburg’s counterparts in London had actually received a related proposal from Husseini in tandem with Col. Stewart F. Newcombe on July 14. The Commission Report having “greatly upset” Husseini and his friends, he privately put forward to Bentwich a suggestion originating with Newcombe that Jewish immigration be limited “for a period of years”; Jews and Arabs be equally represented on a cantonal basis in an autonomous government and the mandate be terminated after five years subject to the League Council’s approval; Palestine and Transjordan become a single state; and British authority in Palestine be restricted thereafter to special defense rights and to the Holy Cities of Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Nazareth and the holy places until the League Council thought unnecessary. Newcombe, who had worked with T.E. Lawrence in the Cairo Intelligence’s Arab Bureau during World War I and then helped found the Arab Higher Committee’s Palestine Information Bureau, shared the proposal with Albert Hyamson. An advocate, like Bentwich, of Ahad Ha’am’s concept of cultural (rather than political) Zionism, Hyamson thought the provisional terms “very hopeful,” and recommended to Laski that the non-Zionist view be sounded in both Parliamentary debates.12 In a public address at the Palestine Information Bureau the same day, Newcombe spelled out the terms he thought the Arabs would favor. These included a 70-30 percent ratio of Arabs to Jews; British rule to continue for a short period of years; and “a representative independent” Palestine government established similar to that of Iraq, with British interests fully protected. Once the “threat of Jewish political domination” was removed, he added, “the Arabs would cooperate with them.” Would the Jews prefer the splitting of Palestine and the denial to them — 417 —

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of any portion of Judea (“their ancient land”), or “future cooperation with the South Syrians [sic]?” Although remaining a minority, the Jews’ influence would be great in the new state, and their talents offered wider scope. As for the persecuted European Jews, all British citizens should look elsewhere for countries wide enough “to give scope to Jewish ability and enterprise,” and not put the whole burden on “our Arab friends,” “one small people whom we separated from their brethren of the rest of Syria.” Privately, Newcombe informed Hyamson that the Committee had not been consulted about the draft, but Husseini would endeavor to obtain authority to discuss the possibility of an agreement “with a reasonable prospect of acceptance.”13 The immediate response of some leading Jews to this suggested alternative proved predictable. Magnes, first to suggest the 40 percent maximum figure to Sulzberger, joined Hexter in championing some agreement with the Mufti (“a fanatic but whose word is nearly reliable”) or his party in order to moderate the partition recommendation. Warburg fully agreed with his brother Max that there should be no Jewish commonwealth “en miniature” if it could be helped, especially, so he wrote to Adler, since the whole Jewish world would be held responsible for this put up “target,” although it would have no authority to respond. BenGurion concluded, upon reading about the talk with the three Arabs, that Warburg’s fear of Jewish sovereignty deprived him from sleep and that he enlisted anyone “to be freed from this calamity.” Weizmann replied, and so informed Shertok, that while prepared to consult with Jerusalem and friends in London if the Committee turned directly to the World Zionist Organization, the WZO would sit down for discussion but not before the Congress. In any case, he added sharply, it would reject any proposal condemning the Jews to permanent minority status.14 Furious about Suleiman’s sharp attack on HMG’s declared policy for Palestine, Ormsby-Gore wished it to be made clear, as he wrote to Eden, that London would not be “deflected from pursuing it.” Despite Rendel’s argument that the government not commit itself “too definitely to unqualified support” for the commission’s particular scheme, the Colonial Secretary worried lest “any more elastic attitude” should expose Britain to “undue pressure” and “dangerous intrigues” by Jews and Arabs. Parkinson also strongly endorsed partition when informed by d’Avigdor-Goldsmid of the talk with the three Arabs in New York. Rendel told an American Embassy official on July 19 that HMG definite— 418 —

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ly had committed itself to support the commission’s recommendations, and in particular to “the principle of partition.” That same morning, Ormsby-Gore gave Weizmann the impression that all the main points in his memorandum on the proposal would be considered favorably, to which the Zionist leader said that he would then personally support acceptance of partition at the Zionist Congress. To prevent future misunderstandings, and reemphasize his theme that “sovereignty must be a reality, not a mere phrase,” Weizmann sent a detailed letter on July 20 outlining their lengthy conversation. The Colonial Secretary replied that he could not “enter into specific undertakings of any kind at this stage,” that their confidential conversation must be treated as “informal,” and that he could not give “specific undertakings” without consulting the Cabinet.15 The government had “a very rough passage,” its spokesmen offering no convincing exposition, when the Parliamentary Debate on the Report took place in both Houses on July 20-21. Samuel admonished that the two states would be “entwined in an inimical embrace like two fighting serpents,” the Peel group having picked out the most awkward provisions contained in the Versailles Treaty and placed them into a country the size of Wales. Observing that the Arabs would be required to leave the country’s most fertile regions, he advocated instead a future 60-40 percent ratio of Arabs to Jews in one commonwealth as part of an Arab Federation. Sinclair, on the other hand, objected to the Jews being established “along an indefensible coastal strip—congested, opulent, behind them the pressure of impoverished and persecuted World Jewry; in front of them Mount Zion.” Only Amery, Melchett, and the Archbishop of Canterbury, who advocated New Jerusalem (the Jewish urban area) in the Jewish State, stood strongly for the principle of partition. In the end, accepting a request to him from British non-Zionists via Robert Waley-Cohen for delay in carrying out “the policy of despair,” the strongly anti-partitionist Churchill, backed by Lloyd George, successfully proposed that the scheme first be brought to the Permanent Mandates Commission. The Cabinet would then draft a definite plan and submit it to the House of Commons for judgment.16 The lengthy additional delay led Dugdale to consider the proceedings a disaster for the Zionists and the acceptance of the principle of partition “very much less likely.” Undoubtedly, Ormsby-Gore wrote to Wauchope, they could have carried the original motion to approve HMG’s partition — 419 —

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policy by a large majority, but they did not want a party division, and especially not a Joint Select Committee as the Labour Party suggested. Opposed to a party vote, Prime Minister Chamberlain had told him that “you must get out of it as best you can.” The Cabinet was furious at the outcome, Ormsby-Gore confided to Melchett, since now there was “a very serious chance of the whole thing falling through” and the Samuel view gaining “a lot of ground.” The Colonial Secretary urged that the Permanent Mandates Commission should not be allowed to turn the proposal down, because then the government “would certainly be obliged” to reconsider the entire question. Now Namier and the others, Dugdale observed, felt that “they had done their work too well in pointing out the defects of the Partition Scheme.”17 The Arab stance presented further setbacks. Haj Amin eluded a scheduled police arrest on July 17, fleeing via the Committee office backdoor to the sanctuary of the Dome of the Rock. Six days later, a Committee memorandum to the Permanent Mandates Commission announced that the Arabs would only accept a Palestine solution based on complete independence in their own land; the end of the Jewish National Home “experiment”; the British mandate’s replacement by a treaty similar to that granted to Egypt and Iraq and that between France and Syria; and the immediate halt to all Jewish immigration and land purchases pending the negotiation and conclusion of the treaty. Ibn Saud’s representative to London asserted that every Muslim and every Arab looked on a new Jewish state as “the first step which aims at the destruction of Islam and the Arabs,” which “cannot lead to peace and tranquility.” Egyptian Prime Minister Nahas Pasha, echoing his Iraqi counterpart in support of the Committee’s demands, expressed his anxiety to British Ambassador Lampson on July 26 that the “voracious Jew” might claim Sinai next, or “provoke trouble” with the Jewish community in Egypt itself. The same day, Rendel observed that Palestine’s Arabs “will be more resentful of the Jewish State, which cuts them off from the sea, and it is difficult to see how we shall be able to prevent them from embarking on a series of raids and incursions.”18 The non-Zionists continued, nonetheless, to believe in the prospect of Arab-Jewish reconciliation. Citing Husseini’s letter to the London Times for an understanding based upon an undivided, independent Palestine, Bentwich publicly advanced the idea of autonomous cantons, and perhaps a Jewish willingness to compromise on immigration dur— 420 —

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ing a five-year probationary period. D’Avigdor-Goldsmid appreciated Weizmann’s frank confidence that while he favored the Jewish State, which “would come in time,” he was “quite prepared now” to accept a revised mandate and a united Palestine. D’Avigdor-Goldsmid and Magnes, who was convinced that Arab opposition would “kill” partition, concentrated therefore on exercising pressure upon Weizmann to enter negotiations with the Arabs for the attainment of that objective. Less trusting of Weizmann, James Rosenberg urged Warburg to embrace the creation of an Arab-Jewish peace party under Magnes’s leadership. Since the “hot-headed” nationalists on both sides sought domination, Rosenberg added, a year’s time should be given so that tension might ease and “responsible” Jews and Arabs may at least have the chance to find the way, such as the “reasonable and intelligent” Samuel proposals, of “justice, peace, progress and cooperation.”19 Unknown to them, Arab Higher Committee member Rashid Haj Ibrahim suggested to Chaim Kalvarisky on July 23 that seven negotiators from each side meet to find a way out of “the difficult situation.” Claiming to speak in the name of the Committee and Haj Amin, the Arab nationalist wanted Kalvarisky, Magnes, and Samuel to be included in the Jewish delegation. Kalvarisky reported to Shertok, who in turn requested a reply from his colleagues in London. “What impudence!” wrote Dugdale on hearing of a Mufti-proposed conference involving the presence of Magnes and Samuel; before leaving London, Ben-Gurion had sent a circular to all the Zionist organizations and parties in the world asking them to protest vigorously against Samuel’s “treacherous conduct” (Weizmann’s characterization to Hexter was a “traitorous” speech) and his advice to the Jews to remain a minority in Palestine. On July 28, the Va’ad HaLeumi issued the first protest against Samuel. The next day, Shertok relayed to Kalvarisky that the Jewish Agency was prepared to enter talks with authorized and representative Arab leaders, in Geneva during the Congress or in Palestine afterwards. To Wauchope, Shertok expressed the personal thought that these steps were “hopeless and misleading,” proving once again that the mandatory’s “strong hand” had to be continued; the Arabs were alarmed, and if the government stopped they would rise in revolt again. HMG, Shertok repeated, exaggerated its fear of Islam. In the meantime, Haj Ibrahim took ill and left for Lebanon while Shertok headed off for the Congress.20 The thirty-second “extraordinary” session of the Permanent — 421 —

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Mandates Commission, which opened on July 30, criticized the mandatory and exhibited little enthusiasm for HMG’s plan. The members charged Great Britain with undue leniency towards the Arab rebellion of the previous year, and resented the interference of outside Arabs in the “internal affairs of League territory.” Only British member Lord Hailey favored the “radical” solution of partition that Ormsby-Gore presented at great length. Frederik Van Asbeck thought that the scheme would “create more difficulties than it would settle.” Judging the territory offered the Jewish State too limited, especially if the proposed transfer of Arabs likely “proved to be impracticable,” Chairman Pierre Orts suggested the creation of two mandates with varying degrees of independence. Cantonization, in Vice-Chairman Rappard’s opinion, would prepare for partition, if that were finally decided upon to be the correct plan, or permit other solutions. Until some means were found of “eliminating or mitigating” Arab opposition, Count de Penha Garcia saw no way out of the deadlock. Finally, the Commission’s preliminary opinion at its twenty-sixth meeting, on August 16, opposed the immediate creation of two new independent states, and considered “a prolongation of the period of political apprenticeship absolutely essential” under continued British tutelage.21 Having lobbied with Orts and Rappard to modify the partition plan in order to make it “workable and acceptable,” Weizmann became its leading spokesman on behalf of the jasagers at the Twentieth Zionist Congress. In the opening address on August 4, he advocated the principle as the lesser evil compared with a crystallized minority status in a hostile Arab state or federation of states. Relying on figures from Ruppin, he argued that even in the anticipated commonwealth the cultivable soil could absorb 100,000 immigrants for the next twenty years. The status of sovereignty would also improve Arab-Jewish relations, and it alone could offer an immediate cure for “a poor people, ground down, and faced with annihilation unless we reintegrate in a national home.” Perhaps two of the six million afflicted European Jews would thus survive, the Sh’eirit HaPleita (remnant) spoken of by the biblical prophets, leaving the rest to the future, to Zionist youth: “If they feel and suffer as we do, they will find the way, B’Aharit HaYamim—in the fullness of time.” Weizmann prayed that “sacred strength” would be given the Congress to have its executive negotiate a scheme that would realize Zionism’s ideals and contribute to a solution of the “Jewish prob— 422 —

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lem,” thereby preserving “intact our national unity, for it is all we have.” The assembly instinctively rose to its feet at the closing words of what Dugdale considered “an inspired utterance,” and sang the HaTivka.22 Four nights later, Wise articulated the stance of the neinsagers, the opposition camp. Acquiescence in a “State cribbed, cabined and confined” by insecure frontiers, less than one-hundredth of the area allotted to the many Arab kingdoms since the end of World War I, would deal “an irreparable blow” to both the physical and ethical hopes of the Jewish people regarding Eretz Yisrael. If the yishuv accepted partition, its readiness was born of six months of “unchecked warfare” by the Arabs. “After less than twenty years, it is too soon to maintain that the mandate is incapable of fulfillment,” and abandoning the mandate’s promise of the Jewish commonwealth would further weaken an already shattered League. The British trustee had never truly attempted to carry out its stewardship, he charged, even interfering with attempts at an understanding between Arabs and Jews. The Arabs would not accept the suggested transfer; a microscopic Jewish state in which the Arabs almost equaled the number of Jews “[would] only increase the deadlock.” Perhaps the WZO would be compelled by force majeure to accept HMG’s proposal, but “he who consents to evil becomes the doer thereof.” Rejecting partition presented risks and dangers, but these were involved “in the pursuit of life.” Whatever the Congress’s decision, Wise announced that the neinsagers would continue to give the WZO the utmost loyal support.23 It was evident from the first that the completely anti-partitionists were in a minority, but also that the Congress would not accept the Royal Commission Report as it was. The minority resolution, seeking fulfillment of the mandate, was supported by a majority of the Group B General Zionists around Ussishkin, the Jewish State Party, HaShomer HaTsa’ir favoring binationalism, the Mizrachi Party under Meir Berlin, a small number of Group A General Zionists led by Wise and Robert Szold, and fourteen of the eighteen Hadassah women delegates. Sixtyseven members of the Labor Party, including Katznelson, Tabenkin, and Meyerson, fought concessions, but ultimately bowed to Mapai discipline and agreed to postpone actual decision until a concrete plan was presented to a new Congress. Shouting to Wise in the plenum that he would have accepted the plan “with enthusiasm” even prior to the disturbances of 1936, Ben-Gurion envisioned an immediately created — 423 —

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Jewish state as “the beginning of redemption,” one able eventually to settle “all the parts of Eretz Yisrael without interference and peacefully.” (Future Jewish sovereignty in the “land of the prophets,” he declared on August 7, mandated “one law for all residents, just rule, love of one’s neighbor, true equality.”) The majority resolution, championed by Weizmann, passed on August 12 by a vote of 300-158 and some 30 abstentions. It solemnly reaffirmed the Jewish people’s historic connection with Palestine, excoriated the Peel Commission’s “palliative proposals,” and empowered the Agency Executive to negotiate “with a view to ascertaining the precise terms of His Majesty’s Government for the proposed establishment of a Jewish State.”24 The Arabs continued to insist on an independent Palestine under their sovereignty. At a private meeting with Va’ad HaLeumi spokesman Mordekhai Eliash in Geneva, Abd al-Hadi categorically declared that the only basis on which Jews and Arab could come to terms would be that the Jews consent to being a permanent minority ruled by Arabs. At Haj Ibrahim’s request, Kalvarisky met with Jerusalem Mayor Khalidi, who suggested that the Jews make a proposal. Ben-Zvi reported that he and other Arabs on the municipality council hailed Samuel’s “compromise.” Khalidi maintained that the Mufti, “in a much more reasonable frame of mind,” favored a round table conference with the Jews; British police intelligence reported concurrently that the Arabs “are prepared to undertake major disorder” if partition would be carried out, including a possible effort to kill Abdullah. (For his part, Haj Amin continued to ask Arab and Muslim leaders, especially Ibn Saud, for help to save Palestine.) At Weizmann’s advice, Bentwich broached the possibility to Shertok of a meeting with the Arabs in Geneva, where they were told that the Jews could only negotiate on the basis that when the mandate ended the Jews should become the majority in Palestine. Husseini protested to the High Commissioner on August 12 against Weizmann’s support of partition and the Report’s attitude as “biased and discriminatory,” eventually eliciting a reply from Rendel to the League that HMG was “fully satisfied as to the complete impartiality” with which the commission members had discharged their duties.25 Warburg set off for the Agency Council meeting in Zurich, wishing Palestine to be built up, in Karpf’s formulation, as “a place of refuge and a cultural center for the Jewish people.” The British non-Zionists, so d’Avigdor-Goldsmid informed him, sought to put forward a plan — 424 —

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along the lines of Samuel’s concept of a “United States of Arabia,” with Palestine remaining under British trusteeship but as one of the “provinces.” Samuel had discussed the plan with the staunch pro-Arab Winterton; d’Avigdor-Goldsmid thought that the Jews should be willing to accept a numerical limitation on emigration, rather than any promise that the Jews remain a permanent minority in Palestine. Addressing the Council, Magnes urged the appointment of a joint committee of Zionists and non-Zionists to negotiate with HMG, the Arabs, the League, and the United States for a bi-national state in an undivided Palestine; Laski endorsed the latter possibility. On August 21 the Political Committee, with the American delegation abstaining, adopted the Congress’s resolutions. Confronted by Warburg’s threat of not going along if the Council did not “bear in mind the responsibility toward its neighbors,” it added that the Agency Executive should request London to convene an Arab-Jewish conference to explore the possibilities of making a peaceful settlement “in and for an undivided Palestine on the basis of the Balfour Declaration and the mandate.”26 The outcome was Weizmann’s triumph. The newly elected WZO president had won over the “prontras” (the waverers at the Congress who could not decide “pro” or “contra”), the many who he said recalled the woman, needing good weather for lifting the potatoes and cold to dry the land, who prayed for “a warm frost.” Ben-Gurion was moved to write Weizmann a long letter on August 22, declaring him Jewry’s born “champion” upon whom the “Shekhina” (Divine presence) of the Jewish people rested. While “our enemies have been joined by the cowards and the blind,” so had our strength, of which Weizmann was the “personal focus.” All Jews stood by Weizmann in order that he might succeed in carrying out “the stupendous task imposed on you by the historic destiny of our people—the renewal of the Kingdom of Israel.” The Zionist enterprise and vision “have beamed all their light on their supreme emissary, and this light is growing apace.” Writing as one of the 100,000 Jewish workers in Eretz Yisrael, he pronounced that “you are dear to me as the Chosen One of the people, as one of them.” Ending the highly personal communication “with faith and love,” Ben-Gurion asserted that “I must stand by you, and as one of them I pray for your success.”27 The Americans sounded no such adulatory tones. Angry that Weizmann and Ben-Gurion had personally committed the movement long before the Congress, Robert Szold considered that they could not — 425 —

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be forgiven for being “influenced by panic from the genuine but temporary difficulties, and by the glitter of the illusory state.” A year ago, he observed, Ben-Gurion was enthusiastic about the prospects of Akaba, but now championed the “glorious Jewish future from the sea.” Brandeis thought a study by Herman Weisman, advocating a unitary, progressive Palestine on both sides of the Jordan and “dedicated to faithful implementation of the mandate,” “very able” and deserving of wide circulation in the United States and abroad. Warburg, on the other hand, considered Samuel’s statement in the House of Lords “decidedly wise and to the point.” That speech and his at the Council were not “popular” with Zionists, he acknowledged to Samuel, but these critics would see in time, if not now, that the two men had taken “the only position which is dignified, and, I hope, helpful.”28 Far more damaging to Anglo-Zionist relations was the publication in mid-August of the Ormsby-Gore–Weizmann interview of July 19, first quoted by Jewish State Party leader Meir Grossman during the Congress to show that the WZO president had committed himself earlier to partition with minor modifications. Ben-Gurion immediately replied in the plenum that the Zionists had not raised the question of Palestine’s future, and that “no stolen documents, authentic or false, would change this fact.” A “very annoyed” Ormsby-Gore told fellow cabinet member Elliot that he suspected the theft of the document had been “accidental on purpose,” and informed Weizmann that he had been done “great harm and mischief’.” In a long draft on August 31 that was pared down and sent four days later, Weizmann expressed his “deep distress” for the disclosure in two British newspapers, claiming innocence about the account itself and apologizing for the theft of the verbatim account. The damage had been done, the estranged Colonial Secretary now further weakened in the personal effort to impose his views on a hesitant Cabinet.29 Other reports at the month’s end boded ill for Zionist hopes. In a brief visit to Berlin before returning home to Palestine, Hadassah founder and neinsager Henrietta Szold discovered that Jews over the age of 40 or 50 were “living corpses,” resigned to their fate that “they will rot in Germany. Their one cry is, save the young!” In Poland, following violent antisemitic demonstrations on August 15 which resembled those of a month earlier, scores of Jews were killed and many more seriously injured, with Jewish homes set afire in villages across the country. And on the evening of August 31, a terse cable from Shertok reached Ben— 426 —

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Gurion, then sailing to the United States, informing him that in the last 36 hours a Jew was killed on the road to Jerusalem and two in Karkur. Three Arabs were killed in Jerusalem, one in Tel-Aviv, one in Haifa. Two Arabs were wounded on the Tel-Aviv boundary. All were innocent. Shots had been fired on Arab buses in Jerusalem. The established newspapers called for restraint. Those rebelling against the official Zionist havlaga policy of restraint (an allusion to members of the Hagana and of the Irgun Bet, half of whose members had decided in April not to return to Hagana ranks) “were endangering the situation. Influential pressure was required that they stop.”30 The last developments in Palestine appeared to signal the renewal of Arab terrorism and guerilla attacks. The Chief Secretary refused a Committee request for a pan-Arab Congress in Palestine to discuss partition “because the country is still disturbed and crimes with violence are much too prevalent.” An Arab contact for the Jewish Agency reported that Husseini urged that the Committee immediately send a delegation of Christian Arabs to Balkan countries for support, and also announce “open rebellion” with the backing of a foreign government against HMG and the Jews. Nine Arab notables in Nablus received letters from a group called “the Black Hand,” threatening that all who accepted partition or dealt in land sales to Jews faced death. On August 31, Acting District Commissioner for the newly formed Galilee District Lewis Y. Andrews, strong ally of Jewish settlement who had earlier informed the Royal Commission that the landless fellahin numbered no more than some 300 families, reported to Wauchope that, unlike 1936, the rural Arabs might well move without the need for agitation by the townspeople. In his view, they only required instructions from Jerusalem (the Mufti) “before commencing general or sporadic outbreaks against the Government.” Both rural and urban Arabs feared partition, and the danger existed “that this fear will turn to hatred of the British government if their dread is realized.” Haj Amin, Andrews added, was reported to be keeping a tight hold on Supreme Muslim Council finances, some saying with a view to the ever present possibility of his sudden departure from the country, while others were expecting him to call “a general rising” in October. The future remained highly uncertain.31

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Despite the temporary breach in his relations with Weizmann over the Grossman affair, Ormsby-Gore continued to insist that HMG’s “most essential duty” was the strict maintenance of order in Palestine. Unless Haj Amin and his “gang” were “eliminated,” he wrote to Acting High Commissioner William Denis Battershill on September 8, Britain would never “get on top” of the Arab murder campaign and the inevitable counter-murders by Jews, “whom we are unable to protect.” As long as we allow “this black-hearted villain” to disseminate anti-British propaganda throughout the Islamic world and organize terrorism of any Arabs not subservient to him and his Supreme Muslim Council, the mandatory could not even be the de facto government of Palestine. More should be done to back Abdullah and any of the enemies of the Mufti; Haj Amin should be deported to the Seychelles Islands in the Indian Ocean as soon as it was “practicable.” The “disastrous failure” to effect his arrest in July was “still the main cause of my anxieties and misgivings,” and “I was myself to blame in not pressing for vigorous repressive action” before the Committee leaders called off the strike and disturbances. With partition clearly, “if it is ever realized,” to be “a long, slow job,” Ormsby-Gore ended, HMG had to be “supreme masters” in Palestine; “there must be no squeamishness” in the face of this renewed challenge to the authority of the British government.32 Husseini and colleague Fuad Saba protested to Battershill on behalf of the Committee that the Jewish attacks would lead to “bitter consequences,” to which he retorted that the mandatory had sufficient forces to quell all disturbances at the start, and would hold the known leaders responsible for all criminal actions. The Palestinian Arabs were preparing for a new revolt that would surpass that of 1936, sources in Nablus indicated to the Jewish Agency’s Arab Office, and militant propaganda was spreading throughout the region. The Palestine Defense Committee led by Nabi al-Azmeh, operating out of Damascus, was purchasing and distributing weapons and money to prospective fighters, with those linked to the earlier Qassam band directing terrorist activities in Palestine. The venerable Ibrahim al-Halil, a staunch Mufti opponent, was gunned down in Haifa. The revolt would erupt in October, so read a September 9 report marked “secret,” beginning around Safed and in Transjordan. Officers of the Transjordan Arab Legion would join, and Haj Amin himself would take part. The rebellion would not be limited to the British alone, but “first and foremost” would be directed against the — 428 —

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Jews and their settlements. The Mufti remained closeted in the Dome of the Rock, but he continued to send clerics to the villages near Jerusalem and Hebron in order to incite local Arabs against the partition plan.33 A Pan-Arab Congress, held at Bludan, Syria, between September 8 and 10 and planned by the Mufti when he was last in Damascus, strongly encouraged these views. Five hundred delegates took a vehemently antiZionist stand. Expenses were paid largely from Committee funds, reported HMG’s consul, and two Mufti collaborators were chosen to share the vice-presidency. Naji Suweidi, a former Iraqi premier, set the theme as president by calling Zionists “a cancer which ought to be removed from the body politic,” and hinted that the Arab nations might seek a new alliance unless the Western democracies agreed to halt Jewish immigration. Fakhri Barudi of the Syrian National bloc took a very active part in the proceedings. The final resolutions called for Palestine becoming an Arab State, the Jews permitted to live there only as a minority; the immediate prohibition of land sales to Jews and further Jewish immigration; more extensive propaganda; and the adoption of a boycott on Jewish goods, as well as one on British items unless HMG altered its policy. Appeals were also made to the world’s 400 million Muslims to support their Palestinian Arab brethren in preserving the sanctity of the Islamic holy places, and telegrams were sent to 1936 revolt commander Kaukji, India’s Pundit Jawaharlal Nehru, and Pope Pius XI.34 At this same moment, Nuri Sa’id, now Iraq’s ambassador to the Court of St. James, proposed to Whitehall his own plan for Palestine as an Arab state within an Arab Federation. The country’s Arabs would then no longer fear being “swamped by the ill-defined project of a Jewish Home,” and British essential needs in the Mediterranean area could be preserved on a treaty basis. Partition, he argued, would increase Palestinian Arab antagonism and reduce any possibility of finding a peaceful settlement with the Jews; “on the slightest cause the wound will break out again in all its soreness.” Further, the area given to the Jews under the British scheme “will prove insufficient to satisfy such a progressive industrial race.” Feisal would have been the ideal leader, but now the Palestinian Arabs’ attitude had to be ascertained. If a referendum chose Ibn Saud or Abdullah, Nuri added, Iraq would be asked to express her opinion. A conference between the representatives of the Arabs and the Jews in Palestine, “to limit their give and take,” was especially urgent. A discussion of constitutions and the rights of the Crown should follow.35 — 429 —

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Ibn Saud’s official note to “our friend, the British Government,” on September 6 would carry far more weight with Rendel and his associates. In “a spirit of moderation, sympathy and friendliness,” the desert monarch reminded Whitehall of his assistance during the “serious disturbances” in Palestine last year and the sessions of the Royal Commission. Failure to solve the Palestine question in “a satisfactory manner,” he warned, might produce “a very wide gulf indeed between the Arabs and Great Britain.” No Arab or Muslim ruler could ignore or neglect that issue without being exposed to “severe criticism,” while “the great moral responsibility” that the Arab kings and princes “willingly assumed” last year also “forced us” to take the “keenest interest” in Palestine and to urge now that HMG find “a just and permanent solution for it.” The Arabs considered this issue “one of life and death,” he emphasized. The government had already fulfilled its promise to the Jews, while partition robbed the Arabs of “their essential rights,” especially if the “unprecedented clearing out of the Arabs from the Jewish Zone” was taken into consideration. A Constitutional Government under Arab control, Jewish immigration to be regulated “so that it will never be exceeded under any circumstances whatever,” should be established. Sufficient guarantees for the holy places, insuring the rights of minorities, maintaining justice, and safeguarding Great Britain’s interests, would complete “a fair and just solution acceptable to all those whom the question may concern.”36 The rise in Palestinian Arab violence and Jewish reprisals created a situation of “gunpowder in every corner,” Shertok warned a special meeting of the yishuv’s different parties on September 5, and “every spark could cause an explosion.” The murder by the “separatist organization” (Irgun Bet) of 11 Arabs in Jewish neighborhoods because they were Arabs demanded a united front against this “wave of madness.” Yehoshua Suprasky of the General Zionists, and particularly Tel Aviv mayor Israel Rokach, countered that the dissident faction’s response had won the wide approval for the first time of the Jewish public, now “abandoned to their fate.” Golomb responded that an “iron operation” against all terror must be undertaken, lest the mandatory not distinguish in this regard between the country’s two peoples. Already, aside from the sentencing to a six months’ prison term of 13 Revisionists and Betarim, 15 Jews from Karkur and Hadera without any police record had received a year’s sentence on the charge of attacking Arabs. The rep— 430 —

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resentatives assembled unanimously issued a proclamation denouncing the wanton murder of innocents, but ineffective mandatory action other than Andrews’s strong steps against Arab villagers continued. A few days later, Agency spokesman Bernard (Dov) Joseph cautioned the Acting Chief Secretary that, under these circumstances, “large sections of moderate minded Jews” were beginning to doubt the justification of the self-restraint that had been exercised during last year’s Arab violence.37 For Warburg, this very spiral of fatal mayhem only vindicated the non-Zionists’ advocating “a real effort for a rapprochement with the Arabs” without Jewish statehood. He refused “to break a united Jewish front at this crucial point in Jewish history,” despite the skepticism of associates Rosenberg and Lazaron, while also wanting to continue the mandate and thus avoid Jewish sovereignty. Warburg applauded the World Zionist Congress’s agreement to parity in the Executive and an equal share of representatives on a Political Advisory Committee, together with the Agency Council’s resolution about seeking an ArabJewish settlement, as enhancing the possibility of success. Belgium, Switzerland, and Canada, all having effected cantonization within their separate ethnic language groups, offered a model of coexistence. If the American Zionists and non-Zionists, joined with what Weizmann ironically called “the better Jews of England,” worked out some scheme, Warburg foresaw that they could “pretty nearly force the end of the Agency, Zionists included, in Palestine.”38 Nor did Brandeis alter his anti-partitionist outlook in the light of mounting violence across the Promised Land. Wanting to continue the mandate and insisting on its fulfillment, because only thereby could Zionists obtain the opportunity of development in the whole of Palestine and achieve sovereignty, he continued to think that it ought to be possible to work out a modus vivendi, though temporary, with the Arabs. “Reason and virtue will sometime again have their sway,” he wrote to Wise; “the British, i.e., will return from their erring ways.” Ben-Gurion’s one-hour exposition during a visit to Brandeis’s home in Chatham on September 4 failed to move him. Brandeis countered with the view that the Congress had made “an egregious error of statesmanship” in not rejecting partition immediately; his guest’s judgment had probably been “diverted” by Jewry’s suffering in Eastern Europe, just as Herzl had erred in embracing HMG’s offer of Uganda in 1903, and by possible fears — 431 —

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of the yishuv. Returning home, Ben-Gurion wrote to Kaplan of Wise’s agreeing with his evaluation that the Justice underestimated the time factor, played down the Arab danger, did not appreciate that Jewish immigration also helped conquer the land, and relied too much on Britain’s shifting to favor the Zionists’ goals.39 Eden assured the League Council on September 14 of HMG’s view that partition was “the only ultimate solution,” with the reduced Jewish immigration a “purely temporary measure.” Since London was “not committed on any point of detail or to any definite scheme of partition,” he wished the Council’s general approval to work out the ultimate plan by sending a “further body” to Palestine before negotiations began. Józef Beck, Poland’s foreign minister, responded by calling for the country’s “maximum capacity of absorption” in view of his government’s concern about “the problem of Jewish emigration,” as well as Polish Jewry’s special interest in Palestine for reasons of “an historical and psychological character.” (Two days earlier, right after additional widespread antiJewish assaults in his country, Beck had indicated to Weizmann that Warsaw supported Zionism because it realized the necessity of and the rights of Jewry to a state in Palestine and because of Poland’s “surplus population.”) New Zealand representative William Jordan hoped that regard would be paid to “the necessity of finding an adequate national home for the Jewish people in that part of the world to which they originally belonged,” and expressed the desirability of bringing together in conference “and in a spirit of reason” the representatives of the Arabs and the Jews. Two days later, the Council agreed to Eden’s request while pointing out that the mandate remained in force, particularly as far as immigration was concerned.40 Not all in Geneva accepted HMG’s position, as Rendel, then accompanying Eden, quickly discovered in private conversations. Rappard declared that a partition settlement by means of negotiation was “doomed to failure,” since the Arabs had practically unanimously rejected the plan and extremists on the Arab side recently murdered moderate Arabs. If partition was Britain’s settled policy, he added, London should announce in advance its decision to impose it irrespective of any opposition. Orts firmly believed that the Balfour Declaration implied “virtually unlimited immigration where the Jews could secure ultimate complete control of the country.” France’s Ernst Lagarde worried that an Arab state would adversely affect Franco-Syrian relations, while a Jewish state, spurring — 432 —

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expulsion from antisemitic governments, would “almost certainly involve a tendency to spread into the Lebanon.” Iraqi Foreign Minister Taufiq Bey el Swaidy charged that HMG had already repaid its debt to the Palestinian Jews “many times over,” and predicted that partition would likely endanger the development of friendly relations between the entire Arab world and Great Britain, now “the most respected and best liked European country.”41 A very lengthy discussion on September 21 and 23 during two meetings of the League’s Sixth Committee, devoted to political affairs, brought the differences over Palestine to fuller light. A first group of speakers representing Norway, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Little Entente of Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia, Mexico and Uruguay, spoke clearly in favor of the Jewish point of view. Norway’s Christian Lange strongly claimed New Jerusalem and the Negev for the Jews. The Muslim states of Egypt, Iran and Iraq (Turkey keeping silent) were heard for the first time, with Taufiq Bey giving a vigorous speech calling for an undivided, independent Palestine that would not be “the victim of the difficulties connected with the Jewish people and the economic difficulties of Europe.” The third group of speakers included the Frenchman’s support of HMG, the Muslim Albanian’s advocacy of cantonization, the Haitian’s call for equality of rights in different countries to solve the Jewish question, and the Irish Free State’s Eamon de Valera bitterly attacking partition (“it would lead to the cruelest wrong which could be done to a people”), much as Britain had perpetrated upon his own country. The Sixth Committee’s resolution, absolutely non-committal, expressed the conviction that the Palestine problem would find a solution “which will take account in the largest possible degree of all the involved legitimate interests.”42 Eden’s announcement on September 14 of a new commission, which Zionists considered “a rather startling surprise,” and the League deliberations that followed, met with a mixed reception among the Agency leadership. His pinning HMG definitely to partition “gives the Jews an ace of trumps,” thought the trusting Weizmann, who believed that the instability and internal differences within the Arab world made those countries a less important factor in British policies. Far more pessimistic, Ben-Gurion worried that transferring the focal point of the debate from London to Palestine meant increasing Arab pressure and the influence of the anti-Zionist mandatory civil service; Shertok concurred. — 433 —

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For the head of the Agency’s political department, it also became clear with “irresistible force” that Geneva “will soon become a broken reed” if future attacks by independent Arab states, such as Taufiq Bey’s effective one, took place. The only answer was a Jewish state out of “dire political necessity” and to avoid further humiliation for the representatives of seventeen million Jews worldwide to “sit there dumb and outside the pale, and to hang on the lips of this goy [Gentile] or that for a word of sympathy.” Agreeing with Shertok’s assessment, Goldmann, the Agency’s representative at the League, concluded that Zionist political activities had to be enlarged in Geneva and in all the important centers of the world “in order to get as much help as possible in the League when the final decision will have to be reached.”43 The Arab Higher Committee’s representatives at Geneva were greatly disappointed at the outcome. Insisting to Palestine Post editor Agronsky that war between Arab and Jew was inevitable unless Jewish immigration to Palestine came to a halt, Abd al-Hadi asserted that no Arabs would speak with the new commission or sign a treaty with Britain based on partition. Turkey’s silence, he informed the Committee, must be the result of Abdullah’s direct intrigues with President Mustafa Kemal Attaturk. Arslan wrote the Committee that “only a huge, united cry of all the Arab kings could save the situation.” Eden’s speech and its results depressed the Committee and other Arab politicos. The majority, reported the Agency Arab Department’s Aharon Cohen, concluded that nothing could change the present situation unless “a new blood bath broke out in a wide and well organized fashion.” That same month, Rome was notified of Haj Amin’s intention to resume the revolt and have Abdullah overthrown.44 The fatal shooting at point-blank range of Galilee District Commissioner Andrews, as well as of Constable P. R. McEwan, by four assailants on the evening of September 26, just as he came out of the Anglican Church at Nazareth, dramatically highlighted this escalation. A Committee statement expressed “horror and condemnation of this painful incident,” and believed that the Arab public in Palestine would share in regret and condemnation. In fact, told by an acquaintance that the Arab masses hailed this murder, Haj Amin replied that the Committee also did not cry over Andrews’s death, but pretended at being sorry so as not to harm the Palestinian Arab cause. The British would be angry for a few weeks, he believed, but then have no choice but to be — 434 —

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reconciled. Jewish Agency sources heard that a few Qassam gang leaders who had emerged from two years in prison, resentful that Andrews advised that their prison terms be extended for one year, had planned the killing a few weeks earlier. (Other information placed responsibility for the operation, its aim to raise anew the banner of revolt, on Sheikh Farhan al-Sa’adi.) At that same meeting, the head of the Arab National Bank in Haifa agreed to collect funds secretly throughout Palestine to cover the collective fine that would undoubtedly be placed on Nazareth by the British authorities.45 The Agency immediately expressed its deep regret at the assassination, Joseph telling Battershill that the mandatory had lost one of its ablest officers, who had always been zealous in performing his duties in “a just and impartial manner.” As one more incident in the Arab “reign of terror,” he continued, the time had come to arrest or to deport the Mufti and the other Committee members. The only hope for the country was that “the evil should be uprooted at the source”; if the terrorists did not have Haj Amin’s “moral support” and the confidence that he would get them out of trouble, and they lacked the funds from Ahmed Hilmi Pasha, founder of the Arab National Bank, the police could deal with them much more effectively. To “exterminate” the evil, other major organizers of terrorism, including Haj Ibrahim, Sheikh Hasan Abu Saud, and Izzat el-Darwaza, had to be arrested. Yesterday, Joseph argued, “it had been Arabs who had been murdered, today it was British officials, tomorrow it would be us. Were we to wait until this happened?” Battershill expressed the hope that the Agency would do everything in its power to restrain the yishuv and that there would be no act of retaliation. “We were doing so,” Joseph responded, “but our task was becoming increasingly difficult.”46 HMG reacted swiftly to the unprecedented killing of a prominent mandatory official, thereby acknowledging the complete failure of Wauchope’s vacillation and lack of spine. Up to three o’clock in the morning after the murder, Battershill told Joseph, 80 people had been arrested; he also refused to receive an Arab deputation protesting that the arrest of top clerics had paralyzed the work of the Shari’a courts. The High Commissioner’s Executive Council unanimously agreed to recommend that Haj Amin be removed as president of the Supreme Muslim Council, that the Committee and National Committees be declared illegal, and that certain members of the Committee be deported — 435 —

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without delay. At a meeting called by the Colonial Office on September 28, Rendel argued against the Mufti’s arrest, claiming that hope still existed for “some sort of Arab acquiescence” and Ibn Saud would have much difficulty “holding back his tribe.” Deputy Undersecretary John Shuckburgh of the Colonial Office, receiving the strong support of Air Vice-Marshal Richard E. C. Peirse, countered that that the gangs had been “incited and encouraged” by the Mufti. It was jointly agreed that all of the Committee members should be arrested, including Haj Amin if he left his sanctuary in the Haram area; that a reward of £10,000 be given for information leading directly to those guilty of the murders; and that it be announced that the Committee was ultimately responsible for this “culminating point of a campaign of murder.” A government communiqué on October 1 would use the phrase “morally responsible.”47 On September 29, Ormsby-Gore obtained his fellow ministers’ authorization to arrest the Committee membership and the Mufti as soon as possible, and received the option to declare Martial Law in Palestine without further reference back to the Cabinet. Haj Amin was deposed as president of the Supreme Muslim Council and of his chairmanship of the Waqf Committees, and the Committee and Supreme Muslim Council were officially abolished. In the most stringent emergency regulations in its history, the Palestine government announced that political undesirables could be deported and organizations deemed “inimical to the mandate” dissolved. From that moment, scores of armed Arab youngsters from Hebron, Nablus, and Jerusalem were called to the Haram, given new handguns, and appointed to guard the Mufti day and night. A report the next day from Aharon Cohen to the Agency observed that Haj Amin had decided to fight against partition with all his power, a “war” dependent on the creation of a strong front of Arabs and Muslims to bolster his hand.48 The Palestinian Arab community united in protest against the widespread arrests, as well as the outlawing of the Committee and the Supreme Muslim Council. Delegations in Haifa and Jerusalem were told by the British District Commanders that nothing could be done. The Nashashibi party reiterated its opposition to partition. Meetings were held in numerous towns and villages, and the Arab press criticized the Hebrew papers for exploiting the murder for political purposes. Falastin went a step further, accusing Andrews of having consistently supported the Zionists, and declared that all Arabs were united in the support of — 436 —

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their national aspirations. Al-Jamia Al-Islamia remarked that the task of government is to govern not by brute force, while Al Difa’a reported that a meeting in Damascus of Arab notables, attended also by Arslan, discussed the crisis and how to more fully implement the decisions of the Bludan Conference. Retreating into the sanctuary of the Mosque of Omar along with his Sudanese bodyguards, Haj Amin expressed his satisfaction in the masses’ “faith in a great victory,” thought that the intensive crackdown was one of HMG’s “last cards,” and posited that the Muslims of the world would not permit Englishmen to intervene in their religious affairs. He was prepared to “sacrifice more” for the sake of “the happiness of the nation and the country,” the pure element of human beings, like forged metal shedding its dross, “shining ever brighter with the increasing fire that burned beneath them.”49 On October 5, the mandatory Executive Council decided by a vote of 3-1 not to favor the death penalty for the carrying of arms, whether tried in civil or military courts. All favored that penalty for discharging arms, with 3-1 preferring civil trial. The majority turned down establishing military courts at present, qualifying this by the opinion that these should be created forthwith if the civil courts proved unable to effect government’s policy. All agreed that, for the present, offenses against the Emergency Regulations (“political” offenses) not be tried by military courts. Treasurer Johnson announced to colleagues on October 6 his discovery that government checks to the now outlawed Supreme Muslim Council and Waqf Committee had been drawn for some time by Haj Amin and cashed under his order, rumors also circulating that £15,000 in cash was secreted in the “war chest” in the Haram.50 That same day, Ormsby-Gore reported to the Cabinet that a strict local press censorship had been imposed, prohibiting any reference to the Mufti, and that half of the Committee’s ten members had been arrested and deported to the Seychelles. (Husseini escaped to Syria and former Committee secretary Darwaza reached Baghdad, while Abd al-Hadi and two others were abroad.) Alami, relieved of his Senior Government Advocate post after the Peel Commission had strongly criticized his drafting the June 1936 petition by Arab mandatory officials protesting HMG’s Palestine policy, relocated to Beirut. By October 8, the Colonial Secretary could inform his colleagues that HMG’s response following the murder of Andrews, whose name “had been placed first on the Mufti’s black list,” had already had “a salutary effect.”51 — 437 —

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“Better late than never,” Ben-Gurion wrote to his wife, but would the government continue its strong policy? On October 1 Shuckburgh told Weizmann his thought that a decision would be reached the following May on the details of setting up a Jewish state, with the final arrangements taking several years, and that HMG would administer the Arab territory if the Arabs would not negotiate. Secretary for the Dominions MacDonald repeated this assurance to Weizmann one week later, reminding him of Eden’s declared commitment to partition when addressing the Permanent Mandates Commission last month. To his son Amos, Ben-Gurion confided on October 5 a personal conviction that the partial Jewish commonwealth, bringing in over two million Jews, would enable Zionists to penetrate into such empty areas as the Negev and ultimately benefit nearby Arab countries both materially and politically. “We do not wish and do not need to expel Arabs and take their place,” for there was “enough room in the country” for both. “But if we have to use force—not to dispossess the Arabs of the Negev and Transjordan, but to guarantee our own right to settle in these places—then we have force at our disposal.” A Jewish state should be erected at once, he concluded, even if not in the whole of Eretz Yisrael. In the course of time “we wish that the whole, united country be Jewish.”52 British anti-partitionists continued to disagree. Receiving Churchill’s private comment that the more he thought of the Peel Report proposal “the more sure I am it is a folly,” Samuel replied with the hope that some alternative might yet be effected if the Nashashibi faction and the Agency’s non-Zionist section could come to an agreement. Objecting to Rumbold’s spirited defense of partition as benefiting Jew and Arab, he mocked the ability of “these little States” to survive, and preferred “a proper devolution of powers” within a single commonwealth. Rejecting an appeal from the Arab Department’s Epstein for an improved partition plan that might bring a Jewish-Arab rapprochement, Newcombe persisted in his own stance. On October 7 he wrote to Hyamson, asking if Samuel, Bentwich and others could back Magnes’s proposals, which the Arabs would accept as a basis for negotiation, and then obtain “some Sassoons, Montefiore, and others” to announce their approval. Assuming that “for the time being emigration to Palestine will be considerably reduced,” Bentwich would back Newcombe’s proposal that the Royal Empire Society assist in settling Jewish refugees in the British Dominions and Colonies, although aware that the Dominion govern— 438 —

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ments had “not seen their way to give any facilities” so far for the settlement of small groups of 10-50 families as a group settlement. In a letter to the Manchester Guardian, he came out in favor of bi-nationalism for Palestine, to be linked with an Arab Federation.53 Two days later, Newcombe informed Hyamson that Mufti advisor Antonius, now in England, conveyed that “the Arab leaders” were prepared to meet “responsible Jews” and settle “the Palestine trouble.” A settlement, in their view, should be based on a National Government “more or less” of the nature sketched by Magnes in his statement to the New York Times of June 18 last. Newcombe and Hyamson prepared a draft for discussion, stipulating an independent Palestinian state guaranteeing full equality of rights, the maximum number of Jews in the country and later in Transjordan not to exceed an agreed figure of less than 50 percent of the total population. HMG would retain special rights at Haifa. Forwarding this document to the Colonial Office, Hyamson also endorsed Newcombe’s advocacy of finding other outlets for the hounded Jews of Central Europe, certain that such a proposal would find approval and support among “influential quarters in England.”54 Haj Amin’s escape in Bedouin dress on the night of October 15 from Palestine, a French patrol boat intercepting him in Lebanese waters and bringing him to Beirut, gave HMG additional vexation. A sudden outbreak of Arab terrorism between October 14 and 16, designed to distract the British police while he made good his flight, did not spark what the Mufti considered to be sufficient vigorous reactions in the Arab world. Greatly irritated, he informed friends that if he were not given permission to reside in one of the Arab states and received their support, he would return to Palestine to be arrested and ask England to deport him to the Seychelles. The French officially noted to a disgruntled Whitehall that Haj Amin, as a “political refugee,” could not be sent back forcibly to Palestine to face arrest, while the semi-independent status of Syria and the fact that police measures would have to be carried out by Syrian officials “render the present situation very delicate.” When the Mufti strongly refused to go voluntarily into exile in France, the Quai d’Orsay promised London that it would keep him under the “closest” police surveillance in the remote Lebanese village of al-Zug. The British consul reported, however, that Haj Amin received numerous visitors and moved about freely. Before long, consular dispatches from Beirut and Damascus, as well as Agency intelligence reports, indicated — 439 —

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that he was involved in the gathering of funds, weapons, and fighters to continue the Arab revolt in Palestine. Yet Rendel, pointing to strong feelings about Palestine in Arab countries, persisted in thinking that the Colonial Office overrated the Mufti’s role.55 Given these circumstances, Weizmann realized that the announced partition policy had to be carried out as quickly as possible. John Simon, now Chancellor of the Exchequeur, agreed, and confided to him on October 15 that HMG was working as quickly as possible. He hoped that by this time next year Britain might have reached the first stage of setting up a provisional government—if there was no “European explosion.” Expressing his belief to Sinclair that the Palestine Mandate could not be revived and that partition would go through, Weizmann appealed for the Liberal Party leader’s help in improving the scheme. He did not view partition as an ideal solution, the Zionist chieftain informed the Royal Empire Society, “but there was no ideal solution to any problem in the world.” Yet even stalwart ally Smuts of the Union of South Africa advised Weizmann that the Jewish State should remain under British mandate for protection against Arab enemies, at least for the present.56 Speed was essential for realizing the Agency’s hopes, Shertok soon receiving an intelligence report that continuous Arab infiltration across the northern frontier had already brought 200-300 armed men from Syria into Palestine. On October 21, Ormsby-Gore informed Parliament about the decision to send another commission to Palestine, and enumerated the steps already taken to combat terrorism and restore authority there, the mandatory’s “immediate and primary duty.” As for Weizmann’s request that HMG convene an Arab-Jewish conference to explore the possibilities of peace for an undivided Palestine on the basis of the Balfour Declaration and the mandate, Ormsby-Gore replied the same day with his opinion that “it is not practicable, particularly in present circumstances.”57 Another “bombshell” which Shertok had received on the night of October 19 involved the advanced communication of an Immigration Amendment Ordinance, due to be published in the Palestine Gazette in two days. Already approved by the Colonial Office, the draft granted the High Commissioner unfettered discretion to fix the maximum number of immigrants admissible during any period, the maximum in each category, and what proportion of these respective numbers might be “persons of Jewish race.” Shertok immediately pointed out to Battershill — 440 —

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that this “most revolutionary departure” involved abandoning the principle of economic absorptive capacity. Eden had informed the League that the new limitation of Jewish immigration had been purely temporary, he observed, and the Council resolution referred to this assurance. When confronted about the matter by Melchett, Shuckburgh remarked that nothing in the mandate articles showed that the principle cited must determine entry quotas. He agreed that the new ordinance should indicate its being subject to review after March 31, 1938, adding that the chance of determining the boundaries of the proposed Jewish commonwealth within a year would make “a radical difference,” as “entirely new considerations” would then enter into the fixing of immigration.58 In these same weeks, Whitehall received a stream of reports about widespread Arab hostility to partition. In an interview with Paris Soir’s Near East correspondent, Haj Amin warned England against “involving itself to the death” with the Arab-Muslim world, which insisted on complete independence for Palestine in order to halt “the invasion by Zionists.” Battershill indicated that the “actual gunmen” in Haifa and the north generally were being directed by Palestinians in Damascus, and the British consul in the Syrian capital found it “intolerable” that rebellion in Palestine was being “actively, almost openly planned” in Damascus under the eyes of the Syrian government and French authorities. Unruly anti-Zionist demonstrations took place at a central mosque in Cairo, while a Muslim Brotherhood demonstration in Port Said included cries of “down with the Jews.” Muslim members of the Legislative Councils in India declared to the Viceroy that Britain had “surrendered itself to the world Jewry intrigue” and wished the Cabinet ministers, “who should not lose us for the sake of foreign Jews,” to know of their sentiments; Rendel thought that this reaction would grow “stronger and more dangerous the longer our policy is continued.” (An All-India Palestine Conference the past month had warned that HMG’s “repressive and pro-Jewish policy” might well force the 80 million Indian Muslims “to act according to the dictates of Islam.”) Local protests that were centered in the mosques occurred in Tripoli, encouraged by the Italian authorities.59 Ibn Saud’s vitriol provided special grist for Rendel’s mill. On October 5, Rendel asked Shuckburgh that the king’s uncompromising views be forwarded to the new Palestine commission. Even more revealing in this regard were Ibn Saud’s remarks three weeks later when hosting Col. H. — 441 —

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R. P. Dickson, the former British Political Agent in Kuwait. For almost 90 minutes, Ibn Saud held forth with a violent diatribe. Arab hatred of the Jews dated from God’s condemnation of them for their persecution and rejection of Isa (Jesus Christ), and their subsequent rejection later of His chosen Prophet. What madness explained HMG’s destruction of traditional Arab friendship, the strict Wahhabi-Sunni Muslim continued, “all for the sake of an accursed and stiffnecked race which has always bitten the hand of everyone who has helped it since the world began”? Better that Great Britain rule Palestine for the next 100 years rather than accept partition, a policy that would “lead to war and misery.” “For a Muslim to kill a Jew, or for him to be killed by a Jew ensures him an immediate entry into Heaven and into the august presence of God Almighty.” The Jews’ final aim was the seizure of all Palestine and the land south of it as far as Medina, he asserted, hoping one day to extend to the Persian Gulf. “Godless Arab gunmen,” hired by Jewish money, committed the recent murders of officials in Palestine; Haj Amin had sworn to him by the Holy Kaaba in Mecca that he would only resort to constitutional methods in opposing the Zionist machinations, “and I believe him even today.” Ibn Saud ended: “There is no other side to this question except bargaining with Satan.”60 On October 14, Rendel launched what would become Whitehall’s campaign to sabotage partition. In a memorandum of twenty-one pages, he advanced the thesis that “the projected Jewish State is a time bomb which must inevitably explode.” The highly contested Promised Land, with foreign immigrants challenging the indigenous Arab majority, could never accommodate the masses of European Jewry. The Zionists were aware of this, and made no secret of their plan to use the partitioned commonwealth as a base from which to expand. Given the rise of Arab nationalism, British troops would be required to defend the Jewish state. The Balfour Declaration did not speak of Jewish sovereignty. The only solution, Rendel posited, was to limit the Jews to 40 percent of the population, now also advocated by Ibn Saud. As for the persecuted Jews of Central Europe, a search for settlements elsewhere should commence, including the German colonies, Madagascar, and Brazil.61 The next day, Rendel went so far as to argue that with the Jewish immigrants of “the better class,” mostly of German origin or tradition and loyal to those ideals, a Jewish commonwealth would likely acquire “a very Teutonic complexion, and it is no means inconceivable that if — 442 —

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there was some turn of the wheel in Europe, a no longer actively Jewbaiting Germany might find a ready-made spiritual colony awaiting her in a key position in the Middle East.” If trouble broke out in Europe, he wondered if HMG could rely “so completely on the friendship of the Jews of Galilee as we are at present inclined to assume.” “Our policy of creating a Jewish State in Palestine for the sake of Jewish immigrants from Poland and Central Europe,” Rendel wrote on October 20, “has provoked the uncompromising hostility of practically all the Arabs of Palestine, and of the neighbouring Arab territories.” He feared that Britain would become committed to suppressing the Palestinian Arabs and, consequently, to “unqualified and unhesitating support of the nonPalestinian Jews in their dreams of colonization.” The Middle East was one organic whole, and Battershill, like the local military authorities, erred in seeing the violence in Palestine as a local rebellion on the part of certain criminal elements. Again emphasizing his conviction that the Arab hostility to British policy was universal and deeply rooted, Rendel insisted that continuing to maintain the government’s position “can only lead to disaster.”62 The other Cabinet departments concerned with Palestine, meeting on October 29, took a markedly different view. Any reconsideration of HMG’s declared policy would be regarded as a sign of weakness, Shuckburgh argued, and he could not contemplate a change “in any circumstances.” General Robert H. Haining, the War Office’s Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, charged that British rule had been challenged by “criminals” who did not represent the Arab majority; if the mandatory took a firm line now, the future “would probably look after itself.” Speaking for the Deputy Chief of Air Ministry, Group Captain Buss sharply distinguished between “terrorists” and the bands of Arab nationalist rebels such as had operated in the hills under Kaukji last year, and stated that the present troubles were due wholly to the activities of criminal elements sent from Syria. Rendel countered that the hostility of the Palestinian Arabs toward the transfer of territory they regarded as their own to Jewish immigrants, whom they viewed as aliens, was “a deep-seated and natural sentiment which was likely to grow stronger as our policy developed.” The Arab population, known to have large supplies of weapons, supported the terrorists; it was “only a matter of time” before large-scale band activities would break out. To his superiors, Rendel concluded the next — 443 —

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day that, barring a change in policy, the British position would probably be impaired throughout the Middle East, Egypt, and the Eastern Mediterranean, “and the reactions on our foreign policy in general of our becoming involved in serious military commitments in Palestine against the Arab world are likely to be very far-reaching indeed.”63

Palestinian Arab violence increased with the murder on November 9 of five Jews, then breaking a path through the stony wilderness in order to clear the site of a new kibbutz and plant saplings for a forest near Kiryat Anavim in the Judean Hills. Speaking at the funeral, Shertok said that their blood was not only innocent blood, but also shed in vain, since it would not achieve its purpose; for the hundreds killed, thousands would come and the work would continue. Repeating his remarks made at the Histadrut Council one day earlier, he also urged the futility of retaliation, and so informed Battershill on November 10. Viewing this outrage as “tragically symbolic” of the yishuv’s whole position, Shertok told the O.A.G. that the only effective way to prevent Jews from taking the law into their hands was to create an independent Frontier Force in Palestine of British police and Jews, which would engage in the active pursuit of the terrorist bands. Permits to carry arms should also be given to all Jewish agricultural settlers applying for such, and Jews should be hired by the Railway Management to guard the line from Jerusalem to Lydda. Licensed rifles should be given to all yishuv settlements, and more Jewish supernumerary and regular police appointed. Arrests had to be made in the Haram itself, from where leading Mufti henchmen like Sheikh Hasan Abu Saud and Aref el Jaouni were directing the terrorist campaign, and more pressure brought against Lifta and other Arab villages near Jerusalem. Lastly, he suggested that Ormsby-Gore announce that for every Jew killed, 100 certificates would be issued to admit new Jewish immigrants, and “the bottom would be knocked out of the whole campaign.”64 Ever since it was confronted by the Palestinian-Arab revolt, the Zionist establishment and its dominant left-wing Mapai party had hewed to a policy of havlaga (restraint). To the Histadrut’s Davar, “purity of weapons” had to be maintained alongside the fundamental right of self-defense. A biblical “eye for an eye” response, warned Ben-Gurion, — 444 —

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jeopardized the yishuv’s hopes of securing Great Britain’s crucial support on behalf of “the state in the making.” The fate of not only the 400,000 Jews currently living in the Promised Land but that of future immigration, insisted Katznelson, demanded a focus on increased settlement and legally armed units. Hagana members had carried out a few unauthorized attacks on their own. Twice such activities received official yishuv sanction, once by Katznelson after the murder of two nurses in Jaffa in August 1936. Jabotinsky, opposed to indiscriminate retaliation, could not rein in the Irgun Tsva’i Leumi (Etzel) underground militants, Revisionist-Zionists whose numbers were augmented by many graduates of his worldwide Betar youth movement. On November 14, the Irgun commenced a series of retaliatory killings against Arabs in Jerusalem. This “first black day,” declared former Hagana Jerusalem commander David Raziel, erased “the shame” of havlaga and the Zionist Left’s “defeatist” acceptance of Britain’s current offer of a small Jewish state. Only war in this fashion, the Irgun leader stressed, could end the Arab terror and achieve “the nationalist aspirations of the Jewish people.”65 On the evening of November14, Battershill ordered the police to arrest 40 Revisionists on the “suspect list” without delay, and the Executive Council agreed to establish “punitive police posts” in some Jewish areas in Jerusalem at the cost of the residents. Meeting with his colleagues the same day, Ben-Gurion lashed out at the “biryonim” (ruffians) who jeopardized both the Agency’s effort to gain public support worldwide and the legal weapons that the mandatory had given to the yishuv’s settlements. “The land will be filled with blood” if the injunction in the Ten Commandments of “You shall not murder” went by the board, and he suggested that the institutions of the yishuv send the Jewish dissidents out of Palestine. Ussishkin and Fishman objected to his comparing this retaliation with Arab terrorism, while Ruppin cautioned that a great part of the yishuv would defend the militants against Ben-Gurion’s proposal, perhaps leading to a civil war. The following evening, Ben-Gurion also objected, unlike Hagana leader Meirov and others, to the independent resumption by Kibbutz HaMeuchad’s Zvi Shind of “illegal” immigration from Poland aboard the vessel Poseidon. One day later, the Va’ad HaLeumi, along with the Chief Rabbinate and other organization representatives, issued a call for continued havlaga and authorized the Agency to take all measures for the sake of “yishuv discipline.”66 — 445 —

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Meeting on November 15 with General Archibald Wavell, Dill’s replacement as G.O.C., Shertok applauded the new instituting of military courts. He advised, at the same time, that the sentence for hanging anyone caught with weapons should not apply to Jews carrying them for defensive purposes. Wavell replied that the courts would use “their common sense” in this regard, to which Shertok emphasized that the “national interests” of the Jews, unlike “fringe” elements of that community, were to assist in the maintenance of law and order. He noted that Ormsby-Gore’s recent statement about the new “Boundary Commission” was “unfortunate,” since it “invited trouble” by saying that further disorder might stop the dispatch of that body to Palestine. Asked about partition, Shertok felt it “a pity to cut the country up,” the only acceptable alternative being the continuance of immigration. This might be a basis for an agreement with the Arabs, but past experience did not encourage him to believe that would be practicable.67 Jabotinsky protested the arrests of his son Eri and other Palestinian comrades, arguing that reprisals would be “a spontaneous reaction” of the people “far beyond the control of any party,” and that they could only be stopped by crushing terrorism. The administration, as it had done with the arrests of September, was using the trouble arising from partition—”a super-muddle backed by no one and leading nowhere”— to settle accounts with the Revisionist-Zionist opposition. As for the Agency and Davar stating publicly that the “biryonim must be exterminated,” it appeared that they wished to start “a kind of civil war in Jewry,” but “once started it will not be confined to Palestine.” The Revisionists would go on “unimpressed by this outburst of frightfulness” and proud of its mission and of its men, Jabotinsky insisted. In fact, the Irgun’s activist response proved short-lived. Britain’s instituting military courts, including the sentence of hanging for anyone caught with arms, dictated a reassessment. Divisions within the Irgun, its limited strength, and the placing of forty-five prominent Revisionists in the Acre prison all combined to take their toll.68 Ormsby-Gore remained committed to the partition proposal even if cooperation from Arabs or Jews was not forthcoming. In a secret memorandum on November 9, he urged a policy statement that the government would not be swayed by the new wave of terrorism, hoping thus to rally Palestinian Arab moderates to the mandate authority. Convinced that the Cabinet could not consider any alternative solution once it had — 446 —

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accepted the principle of partition, he made it clear that HMG proposed to deal only with the Arabs of Palestine and Transjordan in the work of the new commission, which would be strictly confined to working out a partition scheme. Continuing the “present uncertainty” would tend “to increase Arab intransigence,” in the Colonial Secretary’s opinion, and no compromise should be tolerated with the demands of the Arab world in and outside of Palestine “which involve at the best the toleration of the Jews in Palestine as a permanent minority.” Three days later, OrmsbyGore advised Melchett that he would like the Zionists to begin gradually towards an open demand for the Jewish State to become part of the British Empire. He was satisfied that neither Iraq nor Ibn Saud were at all interested in Pan-Arabism, only the Syrians and the Mufti party, “who are ‘small beer’.”69 Rendel lost no time in rising to the challenge. A few days earlier, he had urged his colleagues to remember that Ibn Saud now realized that a Jewish commonwealth, “with some six million Jews from Central Europe desperately trying to get into it,” would mean so serious a threat to his dream of creating a prosperous Arabia “that it is his duty, as the leading independent Arab sovereign, to make almost any sacrifice to try and prevent it.” (In fact, Ibn Saud’s private secretary would soon tell the German envoy in Baghdad that his monarch expected Berlin to take steps to prevent the formation of a Jewish state in Palestine.) In a concurrent memorandum, Rendel predicted that if London persisted in its policy, “a rapid recrudescence” of terrorism would take place in Palestine, with the formation of guerilla bands, particularly in Transjordan, furnished from Syria and Iraq and supported by Saudi tribesmen. A great influx of Jews into the proposed Jewish State, bound to lead in the end to some form of eviction of the Galilee’s 225,000 Arabs, would “almost certainly” signal a new and more violent Arab revolt. A new massacre of Assyrian Christians in Iraq was “a not improbable circumstance,” leading to an Anglo-Iraqi crisis, to be joined by trouble for HMG in the Persian Gulf and Muslim India. To forestall all this, Rendel reverted to his alternative of a maximum Palestinian Jewish population of 40 percent and under continued British “guidance” as “the lesser of two evils.” Perhaps even a measure of cantonization could be granted as “a provisional step” pending the unification of the country.70 Oliver Harvey, Private Secretary and close advisor to Eden, attempted to sway the Foreign Secretary against supporting this approach. — 447 —

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Pointing out that Rendel was a Catholic and a passionate anti-Zionist who looked at the question from the Eastern Department’s perspective only, Harvey reminded Eden of another Whitehall aspect. The Balfour Declaration was issued to gain the support of international Jewry, and any suggestion of going back on or “watering down” HMG’s promises to the Jews, who “have deserved well of us,” would “excite intense indignation” in all countries where Jews lived, especially in America. Wartime pledges to the Arabs had been largely implemented by the liberation as free nations of Iraq, Arabia, and Syria. Rendel’s 40 percent alternative would be regarded as “arbitrary and unfair.” It should at least be 50 percent, but best to have constitutional safeguards secure the liberties of both parties with no cut and dried percentages at all. Sympathy for the Arabs could be overstated: all of the Arab countries but Palestine were free and vastly underdeveloped, while the Mufti’s party had killed or terrorized the moderate Arabs. The present trouble arose from the Colonial Office “fumbling” and the mandatory’s failure to keep order. The partition scheme had much to recommend it, but its prospects “were prejudiced by lawlessness and delay.” Whatever eventual decision would be taken, Harvey’s memorandum closed, the first thing required now was action against murder and intimidation, with Rendel’s plea for “further latitude” in this regard again misplaced.71 Then fully engaged in a fruitless attempt to persuade Prime Minister Chamberlain that the European dictators had to be resisted and a strong British rearmament program undertaken, Eden deferred to the Eastern Department on Palestine matters. Rendel followed up with a thirteenpage memorandum on November 11, putting forward Whitehall’s answer to Ormsby-Gore. Palestine must remain a single country, with the Arabs assured that they would no longer have reason to fear becoming the minority in their own country, “or of finding practically its only fertile portions taken from them and handed over in full sovereignty to alien immigrants.” The Jews should never reach more than 40 percent of the total population. A hostile Middle East aligned with HMG’s enemies overrode the arguments in favor of partition. Vansittart hoped that Eden would adopt this entire line. The Foreign Secretary made some small amendments, though preferring not to have any specific mention of the 40 percent figure. He expressed particular confidence in the report from Whitehall’s assistant advisor for League affairs, Roger Makins, who worried that the Middle Eastern States would work against Britain — 448 —

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at Geneva. In Makins’s opinion, their hostility would be far more serious than the possible opposition from states with large Jewish populations, such as Poland and Rumania. “I have little doubt that he is right,” Eden noted, and advised that this argument find its place in the department’s memorandum for the Cabinet.72 Rendel redrafted the document in the first person, as if Eden had written it himself, and “A.E.” presented it on November 19. In all essentials except for the 40 percent figure, it embodied the points in Rendel’s memorandum of November 11, underlining the “grave dangers” that would follow if HMG committed itself forthwith to a policy of enforced partition. The Arabs, having “a latent force and vitality which is stirring into new activity,” objected to any Jewish state. A permanent Jewish minority would be welcomed by Ibn Saud, who would probably agree to abandon his old claims to Akaba and Ma’an and his new claim to a corridor to Syria, and avoid bringing on the government “the permanent hostility of all the Arab and Muslim Powers in the Middle East,” which was “an organic whole.” Accompanied by several annexes, including the claim that the Balfour Declaration only meant Palestine as “a focus and centre for Jewish culture and civilization,” the lengthy document concluded that the new commission “should be given complete freedom to put forward whatever proposals it thinks best suited to meet the new situation which has developed since the Royal Commission issued its Report.”73 Completely in the dark about this turn of events, Shertok received a copy that same day of Hyamson’s letter of November 4 to Weizmann, which submitted the Newcombe–Hyamson October 9 draft for an ArabJewish settlement. With Weizmann on his way to Palestine, Lourie had replied to Hyamson that no “responsible Zionist” would agree to Jews remaining a permanent minority in Palestine, and asked for the names of the “representative Arabs” he had in mind. Hyamson responded that the proposal was for a limited period, and that some members of the dissolved Arab Higher Committee were involved. (Receiving a copy of the draft from Hyamson, Magnes replied that he and Hexter accepted the scheme; Samuel and Bearsted, so Hyamson told Laski, also expressed their support.) Lourie warned Laski that the draft intended a permanent Arab state, while British promises and League safeguards had not checked the sorry fate of minorities in other Arab states, notably in Iraq. With Lourie’s correspondence in hand, Shertok heard from Magnes — 449 —

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the same day of his keen interest and of the names, under the pledge of strict secrecy, of Husseini, Tannous, and Antonius, along with Haj Amin, as the Arabs in accord. Not wanting it ever said that the Agency Executive turned down any suggestion which might have helped toward an Arab-Jewish understanding, Shertok brought the “delicate matter” to his colleagues two days later.74 The Agency Executive decided to clarify the text’s exact meaning and to have a delegation meet with Magnes. They posed three fundamental questions: Who were the Arabs ready to subscribe to the scheme? Would they agree to a clause that the independent Palestine commonwealth not be an Arab state? Did the maximum percentage for Jews at less than 50 percent of the population in Palestine and Transjordan apply only “within the period of the present agreement” (and thus not impose a permanent minority)? Shertok also sought to know the specific number of years as to the period of agreement and the date of the Palestinian state’s creation, and whether the Jewish, the Arab, or the English side took the initiative in these talks. On November 23, meeting in Ussishkin’s office, Ben-Gurion, Shertok, and Ussishkin asked Magnes for replies to the three major points. He admitted that two unnamed gentlemen, one a Jew and the other an Englishman, had authored the document, to which certain Arabs had expressed their agreement. He undertook to see to it that all the questions were passed to “the other side” for reply. Magnes wrote to Hyamson to this end, adding that he had informed the trio of his own understanding that the draft meant a bi-national state, with the Arabs prepared to recognize the idea of the Jewish National Home.75 Magnes received the impression that the Agency was “perhaps readier now than it has been” to discuss the bases for mutual understanding, but Shertok thought that “the whole affair may be nothing but a pitfall,” a maneuver to defeat partition and Jewish statehood. The real aim of the agreement, he wrote to Brodetsky, was that the Jews should be content with a minority position in an independent Arab state. Yet a premature negative reply would be interpreted as “mere intransigence on our part,” and give rise to “a new legend” that the Agency had killed an opportunity of coming to an honorable peace with the Arabs. Pursuing the matter might enable the Agency to get the other side, or the intermediaries, to “lay all their cards on the table.” If the well-hidden cards at present would require the Agency to say “No,” that would be justified, and if they — 450 —

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were such as to make the proposal worthy of consideration, “then there would be no harm in taking a further step.”76 The prospects for reconciliation from the Arab side appeared slight, indeed. Agency intelligence reported that Arab moderates in Palestine had recently received death threats from Mufti supporters, while demonstrations throughout the Arab world were being orchestrated by Haj Amin. A declaration edited by him and printed in Egypt called on “the noble Palestinian Arab Nation” to stand steadfast in its “holy war” against “a Jewish kingdom.” It went on to announce that the Arab and Muslim world would be prepared to assist in “this last campaign” that would lead to victory. On November 22 al-Sa’adi was hanged in Acre prison by the British, his arrest made possible through the help of the influential ‘Abushi family of Jenin, one of whose sons he had murdered. Mounting the scaffold, he faced the hanging without flinching. His body remained hanging for an hour, then was taken to a village near Jenin and turned over to relatives for burial. The seventy-five year old Qassamite leader became the first of more than 100 Arab rebels to go to the gallows, hangings that District Commander Alec Kirkbride deemed “ineffective.” “The more martyrs who were killed,” his later memoir recorded, “the more Arabs there were ready to take their places.” Not long thereafter, having arrived in Cairo from Paris, Abd al-Hadi asserted that the only solution was an Arab state in which Jewish rights would be guaranteed.77 Eden’s memorandum, the gist conveyed in confidence by Elliot to a horrified Dugdale on November 23, led Ormsby-Gore to consider resigning over the issue. Elliot suggested that the Zionists drop the label of “State” and focus on gaining control of immigration and police in a canton while perhaps being forced to going on with the mandate. On November 26, Eden wrote a personal message to Ambassador Lindsay in Washington, indicating Whitehall’s interest in obtaining an alternative to the Peel Report “which would not give the Jews any territory exclusively for their own use.” The same day, Leo Kohn responded at length to Shertok’s request for an analysis of the Hyamson scheme. He judged the proposal a sham, “a typical product of the ‘Mayofis’ mind—insolent to the Jew and cringing before the Goy,” “the crudely majoritarian design of the agreement” setting up an Arab state with a permanent Jewish minority skillfully covered under “sweeping liberal phraseology.”78 The Colonial Office remained steadfast behind partition. On December 1, Ormsby-Gore replied to Eden’s memorandum, charging that its repu— 451 —

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diation of HMG’s July endorsement of the Royal Commission Report, of “frequently reiterated pledges” to the Jews, and of a government policy since the Balfour Declaration would spark international accusations of breach of faith. He did not see widespread hostility among the Arab rulers on the Palestine question, but even if this existed, concessions would not bring a solution. Ibn Saud’s proposal of a Palestinian Arab state and permanent Jewish minority status would stultify the government’s acceptance of the Report. Moreover, no precedent existed for representatives of foreign governments to give evidence to a commission investigating a territory under British administration.79 His subordinates fully agreed. Harold Downie, head of the Middle East Department, thought Rendel’s “constructive” proposal of a fixed 40 percent Jewish population ratio ludicrous. The Colonial Office would then be placed in the unenviable position of having “sold a pup” to Weizmann, who had just fought for this at the World Zionist Congress. Downie was “shocked by the levity with which the Foreign Office are prepared to throw partition overboard” without any “well-considered alternative to take its place.” As for the Newcombe-Hyamson draft regarding an Arab-Jewish settlement, Undersecretary Parkinson had informed Newcombe that the Colonial Office could not give him any encouragement, since the government had reached the view that partition was “the only solution.” Parkinson subsequently received corroboration from Wauchope, whose second term as High Commissioner was cut short as a result of Andrews’ murder. In Wauchope’s judgment, Newcombe could be “very impractical,” while Antonius was “a real extremist and exercised an evil influence over the Mufti, but he carries no more weight among the Muslims of Palestine than our good friend Dr. Magnes does among the Jews.” Parkinson replied: “I feel satisfied that nothing can come of his well-intentioned effort.”80 Chamberlain clearly backed Eden on December 8 when choosing to begin the Cabinet discussion on future government policy. The Prime Minister wished not to adopt any decision which might expose “good friends,” notably Ibn Saud, to the dangers of Italian and other hostile propaganda. “It was doubtful if by partition we could give much satisfaction even to the Jews, at any rate without antagonizing the Arabs”; a private letter from the Colonial Secretary could inform the commission chairman that it was within that body’s competence to say that no “workable scheme” of partition could be produced; HMG should — 452 —

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announce that no action could be taken for a long time, pending the work of the new commission, followed by reference to Parliament and the League of Nations before determining a final position. Eden also received strong support from the Secretary of State for India, who highlighted Ibn Saud’s views in the Dickson report and noted protests from Iraq, Iran, and the president of the All-India League. Other ministers agreed that the ultimate announcement should have HMG stand by its earlier statement while not tying down the commission irrevocably to partition. Ormsby-Gore insisted that all he wanted was an objective commission to work out a plan for partition, for “any idea of running away from that policy at the present time was impracticable.” The Jews and Arabs would only accept partition if they saw that there was no alternative or that the only alternative was worse; it was not necessary to suggest that Britain intended to enforce an Arab transfer from the Jewish zone. Elliot recalled Eden’s statement at Geneva that only by means of partition could HMG’s obligations be satisfied, and observed that “we should be in a position of great difficulty” if partition did not stand and part of Palestine not be kept open for Jewish immigration. MacDonald declared that a reversal would open Britain to accusations of “vacillation and weakness.” He “would take a lot of convincing that partition was not the least objectionable solution,” but agreed to “leave the door open” to the commission to say if it found it impossible to devise a possible scheme of partition. In the end, besides authorizing a personal letter (which had to receive Eden’s approval) stating that the new commission could reject partition, the Cabinet would eventually delete from Ormsby-Gore’s original terms of reference three key clauses. These had limited the commission to consider only partition, declared that a permanent Jewish minority status was incompatible with the Balfour Declaration, and stated that partition would be implemented despite any non-cooperation by either Arabs or Jews.81 The outcome delighted Whitehall officials, who had decided at a meeting the previous day that excision of these specific clauses would enable the commission to report that partition was impracticable, with an alternative policy to be forged later. A dispatch just received from Lindsay in Washington, D.C. also challenged Ormsby-Gore’s argument in Cabinet that any modification of HMG’s policy would likely cause serious negative reaction in the United States, since “a certain latent — 453 —

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anti-Semitism exist[ed],” restrictive immigration legislation persisted, and Germany was the prime “offender” in Jewish eyes. The Foreign Office discouraged a visit by Nuri Sa’id to discuss his Arab unity scheme with Abdullah, while its Jedda representative reported that Ibn Saud distrusted Nuri and continued to be anxious that a separate Jewish commonwealth would be “a most dangerous irritant.” The Saudi monarch referred to rumors that London was already considering handing over Palestine to Iraq, which would then throw Palestine open to unrestricted Jewish immigration. He was told, in turn, that this was “fantastic” and that partition remained British policy, “though no one could say what the recommendations of the Commission to be appointed would be.”82 Informed by Elliot of the latest Cabinet meeting, Dugdale feared that the final terms of reference “would probably show the muddleheadedness of our opponents.” This “new spirit” she considered “alarming,” the commission going out in the feeling, like some had interpreted the Gallipoli Expedition orders in World War I, that partition “wasn’t a very good idea, anyhow, and we will try something else!” Two days later, she heard from Zionist sympathizer Victor Cazelet MP of the Colonial Secretary’s complaint that he was also “hampered by lack of enthusiasm on the Jewish side.” Dugdale did not know that Ormsby-Gore (“a broken reed” in her judgment) sent a secret message on December 13 to Palestine, offering his view that the temporary restrictive immigration of Jews should be extended for a full year after March 31, 1938. The Jews may be expected to offer “the strongest opposition,” he declared, but there should be room for negotiation over the final figure, perhaps to 16,000 per year, including the legalization of a number of illegal immigrants with a view to the admission of their dependants. OrmsbyGore thought it premature to initiate negotiations with the Agency until the end of January, but the announcement in the near future of the appointment of the commission members to examine “the practical possibilities of partition” would undoubtedly help to create “a more favorable atmosphere” for the negotiations on this subject.83 Weizmann, entirely out of the loop after leaving London for “very severe” medical treatment in Paris, had reached Palestine at the end of November with the feeling that the position in London “was extremely satisfactory.” He did not take seriously talk of schemes involving Magnes and Hyamson—which he termed “the height of folly and perversity” to have an Arab State “guarantee” Jewish rights, provided that — 454 —

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London went forward with a definite policy and shortened the “most dangerous” transition period before Jewish statehood. At the same time, the country was full of rumors that the Foreign and War Offices wished partition to go forward very slowly, delayed two years. HMG’s “real intentions” were not clear, he wrote to Ormsby-Gore on December 10. The overall impression conveyed to a newcomer was one of “general bewilderment and confusion,” the belief widely held that partition was merely “a stratagem of the government designed to pave the way for another solution.” The welcome protective and punitive measures adopted against Arab terrorism had to be supplemented by a constructive, energetic implementation of political policy. An extension beyond March of the temporary limitation on immigration would be “a calamity” and “utterly indefensible.” Resumption of entry based on economic absorptive capacity, he closed, would restore confidence and thus aid economic recovery.84 Shertok continued to pursue the contact with Magnes, but certain facts gave him the impression that the other side was “interested only in publicity and not in real results.” Just four days after the Agency had posed its major questions, Magnes received an answer from London. The Arabs were members of the suppressed Arab Higher Committee, including Haj Amin and Husseini; the two dates in question were not identical and open for negotiation; a bi-national state was meant. Shertok replied on December 6 that the response must have come from the Jewish-British intermediaries and that their replies lacked “complete exactitude.” There was hardly sufficient time for the Arabs to have been consulted, while Lourie had deduced from certain of Bentwich’s remarks that it was a Hyamson–Newcombe draft. An unofficial meeting between the Agency and “Arabs with responsible status,” to see if there be room for negotiations or not, could alone provide clarification.85 Yet a report not long thereafter in Falastin, copied in other Arab newspapers about “negotiations,” despite Shertok’s insistence on total secrecy, seemed intended by the Arab side to defeat the Jewish commonwealth idea. An Agency Arab informant, moreover, had reported that a gathering of Husseinis in early December heard Tannous, in close touch with Haj Amin, Husseini, Arslan, Antonius, and Abd al-Hadi, tell of negotiations for a Jewish-Arab understanding. Tannous also mentioned the names of Samuel, Magnes, and Hexter. If secrecy were not kept, Shertok cautioned Magnes on December 13, it was doubtful that — 455 —

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the meeting which he had proposed could take place.86 While holding off a reply to Lourie, who had repeated Shertok’s questions to Magnes regarding the Agency’s three basic points, Hyamson got in touch with Newcombe. The Englishman, in turn, contacted Arslan and Musa Husseini, a Committee representative in London. The pair expressed a general agreement with what was now called “The Hyamson Scheme,” and sent the information by special letter to Haj Amin with Newcombe’s encouragement. The two Arabs also presented a long list from which their representatives (including non-Palestinians) could be drawn for an Arab-Jewish conference on or around January 15, 1938, and wished that non-Zionists from Anglo and American Jewry could also be included in the Jewish delegation. Hyamson reported these developments to Hexter, adding that he and Newcombe thought of a five-man delegation from each, including 3 Zionists and 2 non-Zionists, and that Chamberlain was reported not to be “very enthusiastic” about partition.87 In a separate meeting on December 15, Musa Husseini told Levi Bakstansky of the English Zionist Federation that, according to what Hyamson had told Newcombe, the Jewish Agency had “in principle agreed” with the “Hyamson proposals,” although they had addressed a number of questions to Hyamson. Musa Husseini added that he preferred Magnes’s proposals that the Palestinian entity should be an independent state and form part of a larger Arab Federation, and that he and his friends could not agree, at least for the time being, to a proportion of Jews in Palestine very much above 35 percent. Whatever the final number, he emphasized, the Jews “must never form a majority in the country, nor even approximate to parity.”88 The non-Zionists on both sides of the Atlantic were very leery of opening these negotiations, Hyamson’s assertion to Brandeis of their support nothwithstanding. Adler had warned d’Avigdor-Goldsmid that Antonius was “not dependable” and “sort of a propagandist agent” for Haj Amin, and that Hyamson was “a very nice person but quite unworldly.” In reply, d’Avigdor-Goldsmid confided that he had already told Lionel Cohen that Hyamson was “most unsuitable” as a negotiating intermediary, being persona non grata to the Jews and “having a very unfortunate manner.” Definitely antagonistic to Hyamson, the Zionists had also just received a letter from the anti-Zionist Newcombe to Epstein positing that the Jews’ claim of rights to Palestine after they had left it for 2,000 — 456 —

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years “is clearly beyond discussion.”89 Each group still wished for an Arab-Jewish Conference. Desiring to fulfill that dream as advocated by Warburg, who had died on October 20, the American opponents of Jewish statehood solicited support from likeminded Agency Council members and sought Brandeis’s help. (Warburg and Brandeis had recently agreed on a campaign to show that partition was “not only inadvisable but impracticable and even impossible.”) Karpf sent the Justice the draft of his own proposal as an alternative to partition. In this plan, the British mandate would continue for another 10-15 years. Jewish immigration to Palestine would not exceed 45-55 percent of the total in this period; two separate legislative bodies (similar to the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives) would operate alongside the High Commissioner’s veto; and a constitution, to be drawn up between both sides, would provide for the necessary democratic safeguards.90 Their British counterparts, regarding Zionism as “a surrender by the Jews to the attacks of their enemies and as an admission that emancipation has failed,” prepared a memorandum to send to the Colonial Office. Cohen, Laski, d’Avigdor-Goldsmid, and Lord Reading presented their views as the British non-Zionist members of the Political Advisory Committee, appointed by the Jewish Agency in August 1937 as a result of the last Agency Council meeting. Their document endorsed a British protectorate or a revised mandate for a single Palestine with Jewish and Arab cantons, arrived at by HMG’s encouraging talks between the Arabs and the Jews. One month earlier, Max Warburg had suggested to them the two-canton idea and that an English colony should be given to the Jewish canton, with the possibility of Palestine eventually being arranged in an Arab Federation. He ruled out partition on political, military, and economic grounds, adding that “internal and external disputes” would also make impossible the renaissance of the Jewish religion and the improvement of the whole land “which the Jews had in mind through their return to Palestine.” Tied to this, the Hamburg banker also advanced the formation of a Universal Advisory Company for the planned emigration of 100,000-150,000 Jews from Germany in the next three years and for other Jews in need.91 Eliyahu Sasson, head of the Agency’s Arab Office, provided additional intelligence to Shertok indicating that Haj Amin and other Arab nationalists wished to torpedo the partition scheme “at any price.” It — 457 —

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appeared that newspapers in Beirut and Damascus were highlighting rumors of an Arab-Jewish accord in order to show England a better alternative to partition, and to indicate that the nearby Arab countries would receive a portion of Jewish emigration. Nuri’s recent talks in Syria and Lebanon, together with those of the Syrian Abd al-Rahman Shahabander in Europe and Egypt, proposed a Palestinian Arab state within an Arab Federation that would allow for a permanent Palestinian Jewish minority and the entry of up to 2-3 million Jews into neighboring Arab States. Sasson did not know that Said Abd el-Fattah Imam of the Arab Club in Damascus, representing Haj Amin and several Syrian nationalist organizations, had been urging officials in Berlin to provide propaganda and supplies for the Arab liberation movement. In return, this emissary promised that his superiors would promote German trade in the Arab-Islamic world, fight against a Jewish state in Palestine, and exclusively utilize German capital and technical aid if the Arab independence movement achieved victory.92 On December 18, Nuri met with Haj Amin for three hours, telling him of the non-Zionists’ stance against partition and their wishes for a joint settlement. The Mufti refused his request to halt the terror in Palestine without a prior British agreement in principle to the Arab demands, or to have Arabs appear before the new commission unless HMG announced its rejection of partition, freed the five Committee members imprisoned in the Seychelles, and permitted the return of Palestinian Arabs now in Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt. The following day, a meeting of Haj Amin, Nuri, and many others authorized Nuri and Shahabander to continue their talks with the British government against partition, and insisted that Arabs would appear before the commission only after the mandatory military courts were cancelled, Arab prisoners freed, and a pardon was granted to the Seychelles exiles.93 In an attempt to set the record straight, Ben-Gurion called a press conference on December 21 to declare that the Jewish Agency had not yet received any Arab proposal, despite Arab press reports and rumors of different “wheeler-dealers” operating in Cairo, Baghdad, Paris, London, and Jerusalem concerning a joint settlement in Palestine. Any proposal based on a limitation of Jewish growth in the country, even 49 percent, would not receive the yishuv’s approval. The Zionist movement was always committed to an agreement between Arab and Jew that would benefit both. Anti-partitionists in the Zionist camp did not object to a — 458 —

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Jewish state but to a small, reduced commonwealth, as opposed to the “unworthy tactics” of those who wished to thwart the creation of the Jewish State because it would be Jewish. By a substantial majority, the last Zionist Congress had voted to explore the prospects of a detailed British proposal for partition, and no Jew could intervene with HMG and ask otherwise. Until a final offer was made, Ben-Gurion emphasized, the movement would stand by the Congress’s dual charge: defend Zionist rights in the Balfour Declaration and the mandate, and negotiate for an “agreed and improved” proposal on the basis of a Jewish state, with the next Congress to decide.94 A letter to Dugdale the next day from Elliot brought news that the draft statement for the commission had been agreed upon, and that Ormsby-Gore feared that “the Jews will find that they have got, not all Palestine, but nothing.” The Colonial Secretary considered the Zionists’ position weak because of the Foreign Office; the Arab king’s opposition; and Jewish opposition both from anti-partitionists Brandeis, Wise, and the Jewish Chronicle, and from Samuel. Certain that any Jewish state would expose the Jews to “grave dangers and possibly even to eventual massacre” by widespread Arab attack, Rendel had just advised his colleagues that it was essential to get an impartial commission membership and to forward Whitehall’s alternative views to that body.95 At least as important, the Chiefs of Staff had shifted their earlier position on Haifa’s strategic significance. In July, Admiral Alfred Chatfield, First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff, had submitted a memorandum in which he insisted that the British always had to have Haifa. Four months later, Elliot had remarked to Dugdale about HMG’s abandoning the mandate in order to retain Haifa as a naval base “and garrison it with 2 million Jews.” Expressing his confidence that HMG “is more than ever determined to carry partition to a successful conclusion,” Weizmann repeated this figure in a letter on December 5 to his colleague Lipsky of New York City. Yet twelve days later, Melchett told Dugdale that, according to Ormsby-Gore, the Defense Services were turning their attention from Haifa to Cyprus because of “the present state of Mediterranean affairs.” Mussolini had opened a great new military road running the entire length of Libya in March, where he was proclaimed the protector of Islam; the Italians left no more room for doubt that they were doing their utmost to encourage the Arab and Muslim movement throughout the region as a convenient method to embarrass the British and French — 459 —

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governments. The Duce’s joining Germany and Japan on November 6 in a pact against the Comintern (Communist International) and the Soviet Union, in particular, followed by Italy’s withdrawal from the League on December 11, led the Chiefs of Staff to record that the military situation then facing the British Empire was “fraught with greater risk than at any time in living memory, apart from the war years.” To relieve the growing threat, they would favor Whitehall’s pursuing talks with Italy, as well as ending the Arab Revolt and gradually reject partition.96 Hyamson’s reply to Lourie on December 20 greatly disturbed Shertok, who conveyed his reaction to Magnes eight days later. Shertok was “astonished” to read Hyamson’s statement that members of the Agency Executive in Jerusalem with whom Magnes had been in touch were “satisfied” with the Hebrew University president’s replies. The Agency’s letter of December 6 showed that this was not the case, a point made by Lourie as well in answering Hyamson. Further, Hyamson appeared “too hasty” in writing about the details of a place of meeting, its secretaries, and its chairman, since it was not at all clear if the meeting itself could take place. The Bakstansky-Husseini interview of December 15 also gave the incorrect impression that the Agency had given its assent “in principle” to Hyamson’s proposals, as Magnes knew, and this should have been known to Hyamson, too. More importantly, Musa Husseini explicitly had insisted then on a 35 percent Jewish immigration figure, while showing no Arab consent on the text of Hyamson’s draft agreement and speaking of an Arab Federation that was not mentioned in the draft handed to the Agency by Magnes. “I am responsible only for such things as come direct from me,” Magnes replied ten days later, expressing the hope that Shertok would hear from him in the course of the next week.97 Faced with government delay and increasing intrigues—”a veritable Witches’ Sabbath”—to liquidate the National Home, Weizmann emphasized to colleagues in New York and London that partition “offers the only practicable solution of our problem in its present phase.” Writing to Wise and Lipsky, he noted that “British policy in this part of the world seems to be designed solely to meeting those who can wield the bludgeon of blackmail and to patching up every sore spot into which the microbe of Fascist propaganda might enter.” Our friends in America had to press the view that executing British pledges “is a most important factor in maintaining that Anglo-American entente on which the future of our — 460 —

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common civilization today essentially depends,” and to spare no effort in insisting on the urgent and speedy return to the absorptive capacity principle. To d’Avigdor-Goldsmid he wondered how any responsible Jew could adopt a line of policy that would further restrict Palestine’s capacity for the “battered remnant of our people in Eastern Europe,” such as the new Octavian Goga regime’s measures against the Jewish population of provinces annexed to Rumania after World War I. Weizmann still hoped that if the Jewish people—and not least “the prominent Jewry of Great Britain”—would rise to the occasion, a solution might yet be achieved whereby Jewish Palestine would be “enshrined as a new jewel in the British Crown,” and redound to the “lasting glory of our people and of the Empire which stood by it in the hour of its greatest need.”98 On the last day of 1937, Weizmann expressed his fears to Shuckburgh about reports of the government’s wavering in regard to carrying out the partition policy adopted last July. He had been told that “under the pressure of Indian Muslims, Arab Kings, Italian intrigue and, last [but] not least, anti-Zionist Jews,” the notion was gaining ground in “high quarters” that Palestine should become an Arab state and the Jews reduced to permanent minority status. Aided by those propagating Pan-Arab unity under Italian auspices and some influential Jews who “fear the reality of a Jewish national re-establishment in Palestine,” every schemer, “self-appointed or foreign paid,” sought to hand over the country to “the clique of so-called Arab leaders who organized the disturbances of last year and from their hiding places are now running the terrorist campaign.” “Jews are not going to Palestine to exchange their German or Polish ghetto for an Arab one,” Weizmann continued, and the “supreme effort” of the yishuv “is not for the purpose of subjecting the Jewish people, which still stands in the front rank of civilization, to the rule of a set of unscrupulous Levantine politicians.” Knowing that he was “speaking to the converted,” he pleaded that reneging on partition would be “an error of the first order,” whereas HMG’s pursuing its officially declared policy with “energy and decision” would eventually meet with Arab acquiescence and lead to practical Arab-Jewish negotiations “on all sorts of matters of common interest.” Sharpening the concluding sentence from Leo Kohn’s angry assessment of the Hyamson-Newcombe draft one month earlier, Weizmann asked: “Could there be a more appalling fraud of the hopes of a martyred people than to reduce it to ghetto status in the very land where it — 461 —

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was promised national freedom?” Appealing to the British sense of fair play, he noted that “to throw us to the dogs may seem good ‘Realpolitik’ to some—it would certainly not add to the spiritual armament of the Empire.” As for the relative strategic values of Haifa and Cyprus, Weizmann observed that the oil pipelines, the airfield, and the Carmel range could not be removed to Cyprus, nor could the railway to Egypt, which served as the connection with the Suez Canal and the corridor to Baghdad. The majority of American Zionists, including Wise, would submit to Zionist discipline, while the voice of stray groups of Jewish opponents of Zionism “will not carry beyond their own narrow circle of the gilded ghetto in which they live and prosper.” With the year seeming to end “on a very gloomy note,” Weizmann closed the long epistle to Shuckburgh with an anxious hope: “It was not a blind accident which linked us together, and this connection cannot be underdone by temporary vindication—all those hopes, labour and sufferings were not and cannot be in vain!”99

Endnotes 1

2

Laski note of interview, July 8, 1937, microfilm #1940, Warburg MSS; JAEJ, Nov. 1, 1936, CZA. David Low repeated Weizmann’s critique with a cartoon in the Evening Standard on July 30 called “Standing room only.” A Jew is depicted standing on a miniscule platform with the sign reading “Jewish national home.” To his right, in front of a large area marked “Palestine,” a crouching Ormsby-Gore says: “After all, it does give you a national standing.” Laski note of interview, July 8, 1937, with attached Laski memorandum “Some Considerations Arising out of the Report of the Palestine Royal Commission,” microfilm #1940; d’Avigdor-Goldsmid to Warburg, June 28, 1937, microfilm #1942; both in Warburg MSS. On May 24, 1917, the London Times had published a letter from the presidents of the Board of Deputies of British Jews (David L. Alexander) and the Anglo-Jewish Association (Claude G. Montefiore), representing the Conjoint Committee on Foreign Affairs, — 462 —

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3 4

5

6

7

which emphatically rejected Zionism’s claim that Jews constituted a nationality and sought national self-determination in Palestine. Weizmann’s reply was printed in that newspaper four days later. Laski note, July 8, 1937, microfilm #1940, Warburg MSS; Schiff to Laski, July 9, 1937, and Bearsted to Laski, July 12, 1937, both in file E3/236, BDA. Warburg to Magnes, June 17, 1937, microfilm #1942, Warburg MSS; Adler– Warburg–Karpf to Waldman, July 7, 1937, file Jewish Agency, AJCA; Cyrus Adler, I Have Considered the Days (Philadelphia, 1945), 425-426. For Karpf’s views, see Karpf to Warburg, July 13, 1937, file VII/24, Mack MSS. Adler’s critique of the Peel Report and his vague alternative that Jews and Arabs should “endeavor to agree upon a working basis by which a fine, peaceful and prosperous state can be erected in Palestine” would appear a year later in his pamphlet Observations on the Report of the Palestine Royal Commission (New York, 1938). Sulzberger draft, Feb. 1937, L35/129, CZA; Magnes to Sulzberger, Mar. 22, 1937, and Sulzberger to Magnes, July 8, 1937, both in Palestine and Zionism files, Sulzberger MSS; New York Times, July 8 and 18, 1937; Sulzberger to Magnes, Aug. 2, 1937, Palestine and Zionism files, Sulzberger MSS. For Sulzberger’s grappling with his Judaism, see Penkower, Twentieth Century Jews, chap. 5. Mack to Friedenwald, July 12, 1937; Mack memorandum on WarburgBaerwald conference, July 12, 1937; both in file VII/24, Mack MSS; Wise to Rosenblatt, July 14, 1937, Box 118, Wise MSS. On July 17, the eve of Tisha B’Av (when Jews continue to commemorate the destruction in 586 B.C.E. and 70 C.E. of their First and Second Holy Temples in Jerusalem), 15,000 Jews marched to the “Wailing Wall” in the Old City of Jerusalem to protest the proposed partition frontiers. Kornfeld memorandum, Oct. 14, 1937, file 1942, series 130, Eleanor Roosevelt MSS, FDRL. That wall is the section of the supporting Western Wall of the Temple Mount which has remained intact since 70 C.E. It has become the most sacred spot in Jewish religious and national consciousness and tradition, the locus of mourning (hence the term “Wailing Wall”) over the two destructions of the Holy Temple. JTA, July 9, 1937; Jabotinsky address, July 13, 1937, FO 371/20813, PRO; Manchester Guardian, Dec. 15, 1937; Jabotinsky and Rosenheim to Weizmann, July 22, 1937, file E3/137, BDA. For Agudas Israel’s stance on the partition plan and on possible activity with the religious Zionists, see Penkower, Twentieth Century Jews, 221-260. In confidence, Rosenheim informed the Jewish Agency Executive in London that the majority of Aguda’s Rabbinical Council “believed in the sense of justice of the Left parties, and were prepared to accept the Jewish State idea.” He added that “we all wanted the Jewish people to live, and that as many as possible should go to Palestine, and that on these fundamentals there was no difference between us” (Rosenheim–Goodman–Brodetsky–Lourie conversation, Dec. 16, 1937, Jewish Agency Executive file, Maimon MSS). — 463 —

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8 9

10

11

12

13 14

15

Baffy, 51-52; JTA, July 9, 1937; Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot 4, 291-299, 303-306; Weizmann to Orsmby-Gore, July 14, 1937 (two letters), CO 733/352/75718, PRO. Yuval Arnon-Ohana, “Teguvat HaT’nua HaLeumit HaPalestinit L’HaTsa’at HaHaluka Shel 1937,” in M. Avizohar and Y. Friedman, eds., Iyunim B’Tokhniyot HaHaluka, 1937-1947 (Sdeh Boker, 1984), 77-78; Jbara, Palestinian Leader Hajj Amin al-Husayni, 159; Herf, Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World, 29-30; Wauchope to Parkinson, July 10, 1937, CO 733/332/75156, PRO; Wauchope to Parkinson, July 14, 1937, CAB 24/270, PRO; A.H.C. (Cohen) report, July 18, 1937, J1/4138, CZA. Report, July 9-15, 1937, J1/4138, CZA; Jbara, Palestinian Leader Hajj Amin al-Hysayni, 159; Wauchope to Parkinson, July 14, 1937, CAB 24/270, PRO; JTA, July 9, 1937. Arab terrorists also shot and wounded the influential Sheikh of Lifta, who had played an important part in the municipal elections in the interest of Ragheb Bey Nashashibi (JTA, Aug. 2, 1937). Warburg to Magnes, June 20, 1937, microfilm #1942, Warburg MSS; Strauss report, July 14, 1937, Box 5, Strauss MSS, AJHS; Backer memorandum, July 15, 1937; Warburg to Weizmann, July 12, 1937; both in microfilm #1941, Warburg MSS. The Palestine Information Centre had first been set up by Frances Newton of Haifa and other pro-Arab Britons in July 1936. Newton then persuaded the Mufti to have the Arab Higher Committee take over this task the following year. Frances E. Newton, Fifty Years in Palestine (London, 1948), 282. Hyamson to Laski, July 13, 1937, microfilm #1940, Warburg MSS; Bentwich notes, July 14, 1937, file P-3/2423, CAHJP. For Hyamson’s own initial suggestion on this subject, see Hyamson to Laski, May 26, 1937, file E3/236, BDA. For the clash between Theodor Herzl’s political Zionism and the cultural Zionism of Ahad Ha’am, see Penkower, The Emergence of Zionist Thought, 41-62. Hyamson to Laski, July 13 and 14, 1937, microfilm #1940, Warburg MSS. Warburg memorandum, July 15, 1937, file 87, Robert Szold MSS; M. Warburg to F. Warburg, July 4, 1937; F. Warburg to M. Warburg, July 13, 1937; both in file 4/6, Hexter MSS; Warburg to Adler, July 12, 1937, microfilm #1937, Warburg MSS; Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 302; Weizmann to Shertok, July 18, 1938, Magnes files, AJA. For Hexter’s viewpoint, see Hexter to Warburg, July 14, 1937, file 4/6, Hexter MSS. Ormsby-Gore to Eden, July 15, 1937, FO 371/20809; Rendel minute, July 15, 1937, FO 371/20810; both in PRO. Parkinson–d’Avigdor-Goldsmid talk, July 20, 1937, file E3/237, BDA; Rendel note, July 20, 1937, FO 371/20808, PRO (which the Zionists obtained, as per S25/22745, CZA); Weizmann– Ormsby-Gore talk, July 19, 1937, CO 733/328/75054, PRO; Weizmann– Ormsby-Gore talk, July 19, 1937, and Weizmann to Ormsby-Gore, July 20, 1937, both in file 171, R. Szold MSS; Ormsby-Gore to Weizmann, July 20, 1937, WA. For Weizmann’s specific argument for New Jerusalem in the — 464 —

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16

17 18

19

20

21

22 23 24

Jewish State, see July 19, 1937 memorandum, WA. Baffy, 53; Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, 106, cols. 597-674 (July 20, 1937) and cols. 795-782 (July 21, 1937); Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 326, cols. 2248-2381 (July 21, 1937); New Court meeting, July 19, 1937, and Waley-Cohen to Churchill, July 20, 1937, both in microfilm #1940, Warburg MSS. Churchill’s critique of partition, a policy he believed would inevitably lead to a complete British evacuation and war between the Jewish and Arab States, was sent to Roosevelt prior to its publication in the Evening Standard. See Universal Service to Roosevelt, July 24, 1937, OF 700 Palestine, Box 1, FDRL. For Samuel’s earlier appeal to the Colonial Secretary against partition, see Samuel to Ormsby-Gore, June 15, 1937, file P-649/10, Herbert Samuel MSS, ISA. The British non-Zionists greatly feared the impact of a Jewish state upon their citizenship, Anthony de Rothschild as chairman strongly in favor of demanding that full guarantees be requested upon the question of their own status. Hexter to Warburg, July 20, 1937, file 4/6, Hexter MSS. Baffy, 54; Ormsby-Gore to Wauchope, July 22, 1937, CO 733/352/75718, PRO; Ormsby-Gore–Melchett talk, July 22, 1937, S25/7563, CZA. Wauchope to Colonial Office, Aug. 16, 1937, CO 733/352/75718, PRO; Palestine Partition Commission Report, Cmd. 5854 (London, 1938), 17; Wahba to Rendel, July 20, 1937, FO 371/20809; Lampson to Foreign Office, July 26, 1937; Rendel note, July 26, 1937; both in FO 371/20810; all in PRO. Bentwich to New Statesman and Nation, July 23, 1937; d’Avigdor-Goldsmid– Weizmann talk, July 26, 1937, and d’Avigdor-Goldsmid to Laski, July 29, 1937, both in file E3/237, BDA; d’Avigdor-Goldsmid to Warburg, July 27, 1937, microfilm #1942, and Rosenberg to Warburg, July 30, 1937, microfilm #1939, both in Warburg MSS. Kalvarisky memorandum, Jerusalem 1937, A113/23/2, CZA; Shertok to BenGurion, July 24, 1937, Magnes files, AJA; Baffy, 55; Ben-Gurion, Letters to Paula, 135; Hexter to Warburg, July 23, 1937, file 4/6, Hexter MSS; Shertok note, July 29, 1937, Magnes files, AJA; Shertok–Wauchope interview, July 30, 1937, A245/467/2, CZA. Va’ad HaLeumi president Yitzhak Ben-Zvi also thought such steps “cunning,” meant to gain time for the Arabs without giving the Jews anything. Ben-Zvi to Salomon, July 30, 1937, A116/70/II, CZA. League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes of the ThirtySecond (Extraordinary) Session (Geneva, 1937), 10-80. For the Colonial Secretary’s personal view of the session, see Ormsby-Gore to Wauchope, Aug. 24, 1937, FO 371/20812, PRO. Shertok to Orts and Rappard, July 25, 1937, Magnes files, AJA; HaKongres HaTsiyoni HaEsrim V’HaMoetsa HaHaMishit Shel HaSokhnot HaYehudit (Jerusalem 1937), 1-6. HaKongres HaTsiyoni HaEsrim, 133-138. HaKongres HaTsiyoni HaEsrim, part I, passim; Political Committee meeting, Aug. 9, 10, 14, 1937, S25/435; Aug. 7, 1937, S5/1543; both in CZA. Ben— 465 —

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Gurion, Zikhronot, 371-422; Szold to wife, Aug. 11, 1937, file 10, R. Szold MSS; Szold to Mack, Aug. 16, 1937, file VII/25, Mack MSS. A thorough analysis of the arguments pro and con is in Shmuel Dotan, Pulmus HaHaluka B’Tekufat HaMandat (Jerusalem, 1980). For Ussishkin’s continued fight after the Congress, see Ussishkin to Kirschner, Oct. 3, 1937, and Ussishkin statement, Oct. 6, 1937, both in A24/209, CZA. Meirov (Avigur), Golomb, and other colleagues of the Hagana command also rejected partition as not military viable, much to Ben-Gurion’s anger (Avigur interview with the author, Aug. 19, 1976). 25 Joseph–Wauchope interview, Aug. 19, 1937, microfilm #26, Brandeis MSS; Ben-Zvi to Berlin, Aug. 11, 1937, A308/116, and Police report, Aug. 2, 1937, S25/22733, both in CZA; Jbara, Palestinian Leader, 161; Bentwich to Laski, Aug. 6, 1937, file E3/237, BDA; Husseini to Wauchope, Aug. 12, 1937; Rendel to League, Oct. 27, 1937; both in file R4076/6A/30296/668, LNA. Also see Kalvarisky speech on Kedma Mizraha activities, Feb. 6, 1938, A202/126, CZA. 26 Maurice J. Karpf, Partition of Palestine and its Consequences (New York, 1938); d’Avigdor-Goldsmid to Warburg, Aug. 13, 1937, microfilm #1942, Warburg MSS; New Judea, 13 (Aug.-Sept. 1937), 234; HaKongres HaTsiyoni HaEsrim, part II, passim; Council statement, Aug. 21, 1937, file 10/8, Samuel Shulman MSS, AJA. To satisfy Warburg’s insistence on parity of non-Zionists in representation, a 12-member Agency Executive would now include Ruppin, Karpf, Werner Senator, Hexter, Hadassah’s Rose Jacobs, and Shertok as “independents” (Mack to Brandeis-Frankfurter, microfilm #26, Brandeis MSS). 27 Baffy, 60; Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 422-426. Four years earlier, Ben-Gurion had confided to Neumann his thought that an effective coalition of all forces could take the place of Weizmann’s “personal leadership,” and that a unified organization was more important than the presidency of Weizmann. “He was in favor of doing away with the presidency altogether” (Ben-Gurion– Neumann conversation, Feb. 23, 1933, file 20, Mack MSS). 28 Szold to Mack, Aug. 16, 1937, file VII/25, Mack MSS; Brandeis to Wise, Aug. 23, 1937, A405/93, CZA; Herman L. Weisman, The Future of Palestine: An Examination of the Partition Plan (New York, 1937); Warburg to Samuel, Aug. 26, 1937, file P649/19, Herbert Samuel MSS. Weisman’s monograph was sponsored by the American Economic Committee for Palestine, and a forward signed by Mack, Flexner, Frankfurter and Stroock endorsed its thesis. 29 Files L14/197 and L14/208, CZA; Rose, The Gentile Zionists, 142-143; Weizmann to Ormsby-Gore, Aug. 31, 1937 (not sent); Weizmann to OrmsbyGore, Sept. 4, 1937; both in WA. The Colonial Secretary’s remarks to Elliot, Dugdale’s regular informant, do not appear in the published Dugdale diaries. The Zionist Congress’s Court of Honor decided not to expel Grossman from the WZO, but to disallow him for the next two years from serving as a member of the General Council or as a delegate to the Congress. Kaplan to Kirschner, June 7, 1938, S5/222, CZA. — 466 —

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30

Szold to sisters, Aug. 27, 1937, H. Szold MSS; JTA, July 19, 1937; Aug. 31, 1937 telegram, JDC Paris office to New York, Foreign Countries-Poland files, AJCA; Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 428; Ben-Ami, Years of Wrath, Days of Glory, 110. 31 Chief Secretary memorandum, Aug. 19, 1937, S25/22728; Reports, Aug. 25 and 28, 1937; both in J1/4138. Andrews to Wauchope, Aug. 31, 1937, S25/22733; all in CZA; Nadav Shragai, “HaYedid ShehNishkah,” Yisrael HaYom, Apr. 15, 2013, 14-16; Palestine Royal Commission, 27-29. 32 Ormsby-Gore to Battershill, Sept. 8, 1937, CO 733/352/75718, PRO. 33 Reports of the Arab Office, Sept. 2, 3, 9, and 10, 1937; all in J1/4138, CZA; Sharett, Yoman Medini 2, 293. For the continuing efforts of the Qassamites, see Lachman, “Arab Rebellion and Terrorism in Palestine 1929-39,” 79-81. 34 Jbara, Palestinian Leader, 162; Consul to Foreign Office, Sept. 12, 1937, S25/22713, and Shertok to Graves, Oct. 12, 1937, A24/207, both in CZA; Robert Gale Woolbert, “Pan Arabism and the Palestine Problem,” Foreign Affairs, Jan. 1938, 316-317. 35 Nuri Pasha memorandum, Sept. 6, 1937, S25/22800, CZA. Eden’s reply on Sept. 27 (Ibid.) was short and noncommittal: “I have read the memorandum with attention and interest.” 36 Ibn Saud note, Sept. 6, 1937, FO 371/20815, PRO. Rendel would make reference to this official letter when preparing the Foreign Office memorandum of Nov. 19 against partition. Ibn Saud’s strong opposition to partition “owed as much” to concern lest it deprive him of Aqaba and Ma’an, slated to be given to his rival Abdullah according to the Peel Commission’s recommendation. Aaron S. Klieman, “The Arab States and Palestine,” 129. 37 Meeting, Sept. 5, 1937, S25/4936, CZA; Sharett, Yoman Medini, 295-296; Joseph-Moody interview, Sept. 10, 1937, file XV/2-Jewish Agency, ZA. 38 Warburg to Waldman, Sept. 22, 1937, Palestine partition files, AJCA. Rosenberg to Warburg, Sept. 16, 1937, microfilm #1939; Warburg speech, Sept. 25, 1937, Lazaron to Silver, Sept. 28, 1937, both in microfilm #1940; all in Warburg MSS. Warburg to Hexter, Sept. 28, 1937, file 2/4, Hexter MSS. For Lazaron’s later anti-Zionist activities, see Penkower, Twentieth Century Jews, chap. 4. 39 Brandeis note, Sept. 4, 1937, microfilm #26, Brandeis MSS; Brandeis to Wise, Sept. 23, 1937, file 1/6, Barnard MSS, AJA; Ben-Gurion to Kaplan, Sept. 14, 1937, David Ben-Gurion Archives, Sdeh Boker, Israel; Letters to Paula, 138-143. 40 League of Nations, Official Journal (Dec. 1937), 899-907; JTA, Sept. 8, 1937; Weizmann-Beck conversation, Sept. 12, 1937, L22/390, CZA. Earlier, the head of the International Organizations Department in the Polish foreign office had appealed for an extension of the Jewish State’s frontiers and cutting down the transition period to the “barest minimum” (Aveling to Eden, July 26, 1937, S25/22728, CZA). The Polish government had asked the French at the end of 1936 to explore the possibility of Jewish emigration — 467 —

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to Madagascar, and a mixed Polish-Jewish mission that had gone there was currently drawing up a report for the French authorities concerned (Kennard to Foreign Office, Oct. 6, 1937, FO 371/20816, PRO). Warsaw’s foreign office organ, Gazeta Polska, had quickly rejected the Royal Commission report and strongly supported Jabotinsky’s evacuation plan as of “the utmost importance” (JTA, July 4, 1937). 41 Rendel talks with Rappard and Orts, Sept. 15, 1937; Rendel–Lagarde talk, Sept. 17, 1937; Rendel–Taufiq Bey talk, Sept. 17, 1937; all in FO 371/20814, PRO. 42 League of Nations, Journal of the Eighteenth Session of the Assembly (Geneva, 1937), 95-97, 138-140. Egypt’s foreign minister, Boutros-Ghali Pacha, actually misquoted Eden when saying that HMG did not think partition was the only solution, and in the Assembly on September 18 claimed that the pledge of HMG’s High Commissioner Henry McMahon to Sharif Hussein on October 24, 1915, meant that Palestine was included among the territories where Arab independence was to have been recognized. The Jewish Agency immediately replied that McMahon’s letter in question did not do so, a fact confirmed by successive British governments and by McMahon himself in a letter to the London Times on July 23, 1937 (Jewish Agency statement, Sept. 18, 1937, A24/207, CZA). Ormsby-Gore took that same position when addressing Parliament on July 21, 1937 (Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 326, cols. 2248-2249). 43 Shertok–Shuckburgh interview, Sept. 16, 1937, A24/207, CZA; Ben-Gurion to Kaplan, Sept. 24, 1937, file IV-104-49-1/44A, Makhon Lavon; Weizmann to Wise, Sept. 26, 1937, Box 122, Wise MSS; Sharett, Yoman Medini, 308, 338; Shertok to Barney (Joseph), Sept. 11, 1937, S25/1513; Goldmann memorandum, Sept. 19, 1937, A24/207; both in CZA. 44 Sharett, Yoman Medini, 324-325; A.H.C. (Cohen) report, Sept. 16, 1937, J1/4138, CZA; Arielli, “Italian Involvement,” 199. 45 London Times, Sept. 27, 1937; A.H. C. (Cohen) report, Sept. 29, 1937, and Sept. 28, 1937, both in J1/4138, CZA; Lachman, “Arab Rebellion,” 81-82. The Assistant District Commissioner, C. M. Pirie-Gordon, who was just behind Andrews and McEwan, narrowly escaped two bullets. 46 Joseph-Battershill interview, Sept. 26, 1937, file XV/2-Jewish Agency, ZA. Andrews had also helped the Zionists considerably in the purchase of the Huleh Valley (Cohen, Army of Shadows, 96n). Thousands of Jews lined the roads as Andrews’s coffin made its way from the north to the British cemetery on Jerusalem’s Mt. Zion, where the Zionist banner, draped in black, accompanied British flags flown at half-mast. A large notice by the 50 yishuv settlements in the Galilee region mourned “a friend of the workers of the soil, a man of justice and righteousness,” while the Va’ad HaLeumi declared that “ in the annals of the history of the Aretz [Eretz Yisrael] and the yishuv, Andrews’s name would be inscribed in the ranks of the holy who gave their lives for peace of the Aretz and its development” (Shragai, “HaYedid — 468 —

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ShehNishkah”). Shragai, “HaYedid ShehNishkah”; Executive Council meetings, Sept. 27-28, 1937, file M-4754/33, ISA; Meeting, Sept. 28, 1937, CO 733/332/75156, PRO; Palestine Post, Sept. 29, 1937. 48 Sept. 19, 1937, CAB 23/89, PRO; A.H.C. (Cohen) reports, Sept. 29 and 30, 1937, both in J1/4138, CZA. 49 Palestine Post, Oct. 1 and 8, 1937; A.H.C. (Cohen) reports, Oct. 1, 2, 5, and 10, 1937; all in J1/4138, CZA. 50 Meetings, Oct. 5 and 6, 1937, file M-4754/33, ISA. 51 Cabinet meetings, Sept. 29, 1937, and Oct. 6 and 8, 1937, all in CAB 23/89, PRO; Furlonge, Palestine Is My Country, 112-113. The five deportees were Hilmi, Khalidi, Haj Ibrahim, Ghusayn, and Fuad Saba. For their protest from that remote island, see Governor of Seychelles to Wauchope, Nov. 11, 1937, file S1638, LNA. 52 Shabtai Tevet, Ben-Gurion V’Arviyei Eretz Yisrael, MehHashlama L’Milhama (Jerusalem, 1985), 313-315; Baffy, 64; Sharett, Yoman Medini, 374; BenGurion, Letters to Paula, 153-157. 53 Churchill to Samuel, Oct. 3, 1937, and Samuel reply, Oct. 6, 1937, both in file P-649/19, Samuel MSS, ISA; Gilbert, Sir Horace Rumbold, 428-429; Epstein to Newcombe, Sept. 10, 1937, S25/22678, CZA; Newcombe to Epstein, Sept. 17, 1937, file XV/2-Jewish Agency, ZA; Newcombe to Hyamson, Oct. 7, 1937, CO 733/333/75156/33, PRO; Bentwich to Cust, Nov. 9, 1937, Box 6, Norman Bentwich MSS, CAHJP; JTA, Nov. 21, 1937. 54 Newcombe to Hyamson, Oct. 7, 1937; Hyamson memorandum, Oct. 11, 1937; both in CO 733/333/75156/33, PRO. 55 Jbara, Palestinian Leader, 164; Hebron letter, Nov. 1937, J1/4138, CZA; Oct. 23, 1937 report, microfilm #26, Brandeis MSS; Eden to High Commissioner, Oct. 27, 1937, and note by G., Oct. 28, 1937, both in S25/22784, CZA; Harvard to Foreign Office, Oct. 23, 1937, and minutes, FO 371/20817, and Rendel minute, Nov. 13, 1937, FO 371/20820; all in PRO. Additional, unstated factors were France’s anxiety over its continued interests in Syria; postwar Anglo-French bickering regarding what the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement had promised the Arabs (especially in Syria); and Britain’s refusal in 1925 to expel Syrian agitators who had made Palestine their center against the French authorities in Syria. Shertok advocated “a higher degree of coordination” between France and Great Britain in the Middle East. Palestine Post, Oct. 8, 1937; Shertok–Kingsley-Heath interview, Oct. 2, 1937, file XV/2Jewish Agency, ZA; Sharett, Yoman Medini, 372; Shertok to Graves, Oct. 17, 1937, A24/207, CZA. 56 W. (Weizmann)–J.S. (Simon) interview, Oct. 15, 1937, S25/7563, CZA; Weizmann to Sinclair, Oct. 19, 1937, WA; Gilbert, Sir Horace Rumbold, 429; Smuts to Weizmann, Oct. 21, 1937, A185/16, CZA. 57 Zaslani to Shertok, Oct. 21, 1937, S25/22500, CZA; Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 327, cols. 23-24, Oct. 21, 1937; Shuckburgh to Weizmann, 47

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Oct. 26, 1937, A24/207, CZA. Shertok–Battershill interview, Oct. 20, 1937, microfilm #26, Brandeis MSS; Shuckburgh–Melchett–Lourie interview, Oct. 20, 1937, Jewish Agency Confidential files, ZA. 59 JTA, Oct. 19, 1937; Battershill to Shuckburgh, Oct. 12, 1937, FO 371/20819, and Mackereth to Foreign Office, Oct. 17, 1937, FO 371/20817, both in PRO; Palestine Post, Oct. 10, 1937; Kelly to Foreign Office, Oct. 27, 1937, FO 371/20819; Protest to Viceroy, Oct. 10, 1937, FO 371/20820; Rendel note, Oct. 28, 1937, FO 371/20819; all in PRO; Jbara, Palestinian Leader, 162; Rendel note, Oct. 20, 1937, FO 371/20818, PRO. The Muslim Brotherhood, the world’s oldest and largest Islamic political group, was founded in 1928 in Egypt by the Islamic scholar and schoolteacher Hassan al-Banna. Its slogan, “Islam is the solution,” reflected the movement’s stated goal to instill the Koran and Sunnah (Mohammed’s sayings and practices) as the “sole reference point” for ordering the life of the Muslim family, the individual, the community and the state. In Banna’s view, Islam should impose its law on all nations and extend its power throughout the world. The Muslim Brotherhood started off as a social organization, preaching Islam, teaching the illiterate, setting up hospitals, and even launched commercial enterprises. As the Brotherhood continued to rise in influence, starting in 1936, it began to oppose British rule in Egypt and carried out violent killings during this period. 60 Rendel to Shuckburgh, Oct. 5, 1937, CO 733/351/75718; Dickson memorandum, in FO 371/20822; both in PRO. When Rendel received this memorandum the following month, he disagreed with Dickson’s accepting Ibn Saud’s statement about definitely not waging war with England, “the one potential ally I now have,” over Palestine. Rendel wished to pass on the report to the Cabinet, but he regretfully noted that it was “not entirely suitable for general circulation” (Rendel minute, Feb. 10, 1938, FO 371/21873, PRO). 61 Rendel memorandum, Oct. 14, 1937, FO 371/20816, PRO. 62 Rendel minute, Oct. 15, 1937, Rendel memorandum, Oct. 25, 1937; both in FO 371/20816; Rendel memorandum, Oct. 27, 1937, FO 371/20818; Rendel note, Oct. 28, 1937, FO 371/20819; all in PRO. 63 Rendel memorandum, Oct. 30, 1937, FO 371/20818, PRO. 64 Sharett, Yoman Medini, 405-413. To commemorate the five pioneers, the new “tower and stockade” village was named Ma’aleh HaHamisha, and settled from July 19, 1938, onward by members of the Gordonia youth movement from Lodz, Poland. 65 Ya’akov Shavit, ed., Havlaga O Teguva, (Jerusalem, 1983), 39-71, 82-85, 95-99; Yehuda Slutski, Sefer Toldot HaHagana, 2:2 (Tel Aviv, 1964), 671673; Aryeh Naor, David Raziel (Tel Aviv, 1990), chaps. 5-8; Yehoshua Ofir, Rishonei Etzel, 1931-1940 (Israel, 2002), 127-131; Ya’akov Eliav, Mevukash (Jerusalem, 1983), 39-45, 53-56. “Eye for an eye” appears in Exodus, 21:24. 66 Executive Council, Nov. 15, 1937, file M-4754/33, ISA; Jewish Agency 58

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Executive, Nov. 15, 1937, CZA; Moshe Basok, ed., Sefer HaMa’apilim (Jerusalem, l947), 36-37; Palestine Post, Nov. 16, 1937. Ben-Gurion’s repeated reference to the “biryonim” was clearly meant to connect the Irgun with Abba Ahimeir’s earlier “Brit HaBiryonim.” See chap. 1. The Poseidon, carrying 65 Jews from Poland, would safely reach the Palestine shore opposite Kfar Avihayil on January 12, 1938. In touch with a few wealthy British Zionists (“the family”), Weizmann arranged for Meirov to receive the significant sum of £3,000 for the resumption of Aliya Bet activity. Avigur interview with the author, Aug. 19, 1976. 67 Shertok-Wavell interview, Nov. 15, 1937, S25/8140, CZA. 68 JTA, Nov. 18, 1937; Ofir, Rishonei Etzel, 100, 147-148. 69 Ormsby-Gore memorandum, Nov. 9, 1937, CAB 24/272, PRO; Baffy, 66. 70 Rendel memorandum, Nov. 3, 1937, FO 371/20818, PRO; Hirszowicz, The Third Reich and the Arab East, 35; Rendel memorandum, Nov. 3, 1937, FO 371/20819, PRO. 71 John Harvey. ed., The Diplomatic Diaries of Oliver Harvey, 1937-1940 (London, 1970), 417-418. 72 Rendel memorandum, Nov. 11, 1937; Makins memorandum, Nov. 12, 1937; Vansittart minute, Nov. 13, 1937; Eden minute, Nov. 15, 1937; all in FO 371/20820, PRO. Something of this turn must have reached Katznelson, who heard from a “very good” source about the growing pressure from the Arab rulers and the expectation of a “Christmas gift” which “will make all our discussions about mandate and State obsolete” (Katznelson to Wise, Nov. 12, 1937, Wise correspondence files, ZA). 73 Eden memorandum, Nov. 19, 1937, FO 371/20820, PRO. Many years later, Rendel made a confession to Martin Gilbert: “I regret that I did not do more to prevent the establishment of the State of Israel” (Tom Segev, “Regrets, I Have a Few,” HaAretz, June 10, 2011). 74 Sharett, Yoman Medini, 431-433; Hyamson to Weizmann, Nov. 4, 1937; Lourie to Hyamson, Nov. 5, 1937; Hyamson to Laski, Nov. 8, 1937; Lourie to Laski, Nov. 10, 1937; all in Magnes files, AJA. “I am personally ready to yield Jewish political sovereignty in Palestine,” Magnes wrote to Rev. John Haynes Holmes at this time, “if through that I can secure—over a long period of years and over large stretches of the Arab world—the settlement of large numbers of Jews and their peaceful living and working together with the Arabs” (Magnes to Holmes, Oct. 24, 1937, file SC-5164, AJA). 75 Shertok to Magnes, Nov. 19, 1937, Magnes files, AJA; JAEJ, Nov. 21, 1937, CZA; Shertok to Brodetsky, Nov. 25, 1937, Magnes files, AJA; Magnes to Hyamson, Nov. 23, 1937, file 4/7, Hexter MSS. 76 Magnes to Hyamson, Nov. 23, 1937, file 4/7, Hexter MSS; Shertok to Brodetsky, Nov. 25, 1937, Magnes files, AJA. 77 A.H.C. (Cohen) reports, Nov. 7, 11, 18, and 23, 1937, all in J1/4138; Proclamation, Nov. 19, 1937, S25/3156; all in CZA; Lesch, Arab Politics in Palestine, 225; Lachman, “Arab Rebellion,” 82; Manchester Guardian, Nov. 29, — 471 —

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78

79 80

81

82 83

84 85 86

1937. Arab demonstrations and attacks followed al-Sa’adi’s hanging (JTA, Nov. 29, 1937). Baffy, 66-69; Eden to Lindsay, Nov. 26, 1937, FO 371/20821, PRO; Kohn to Lourie, Nov. 26, 1937, Magnes files, AJA; Kohn to Lourie, Nov. 26, 1937, file P-575/20, Leo Kohn MSS, ISA. The derogatory term “Mayofis” derives from the fact that Court Jews were forced to sing and dance to the Sabbath eve poem “Mah Yafit” (How Beautiful You Are), apparently written in the Middle Ages by Mordekhai Bar Yitzhak and sung in a sweet melody, for entertainment at the feasts of their Polish landlords. Ashkenazic Jews pronounced “Yafit” as “Yofis.” Subsequently, Jews used the term to denote fawning and obsequiousness to Gentiles and to the powerful. Ormsby-Gore memorandum, Dec. 1, 1937, CAB 24, 273, PRO. Downie minute, Nov. 20, 1937, CO 733/351/75718; Downie minute, Dec. 6, 1937, CO 733/354/75730; Parkinson memorandum, Nov. 15, 1937; Wauchope to Parksinon, Dec. 21, 1937; Parkinson to Newcombe, Jan. 5, 1938; all in CO 733/332/75156, PRO. Cabinet conclusions, Dec. 8, 1937, FO 371/20822; Cabinet decision of Dec. 22, 1937, CAB 23/90a; both in PRO. Ibn Saud had turned down Rome’s offer to ship weapons to Jedda, which would then be smuggled across the Transjordan border for the Palestinian Arab revolt, fearing both Italian designs in Yemen and British suspicions of his own conduct (Arielli, “Italian Involvement,” 195). Note of meeting, Dec. 7, 1937, FO 371/20822, PRO; Baghdad to Foreign Office, Dec. 13, 1937; London to Beirut, Dec. 22, 1937; Jedda to Foreign Office, Dec. 16, 1937; all in S25/22719, CZA. Baffy, 70, 67; Ormsby-Gore message, Dec. 13, 1937, S25/22802, CZA. An Allied expedition against the Turkish forces in Gallipoli at the eastern end of the Dardanelles, begun on April 25, 1915, was intended to capture Constantinople and open a Black Sea supply route to Russia. Originally proposed by Churchill, then HMG’s First Lord of the Admiralty, the assault proved a grievous failure and Churchill resigned his office. While confronted by strong Turkish opposition, the Allies’ cooperation was poor and there was lack of coordination between land and naval forces. After almost nine months, the Allies withdrew. More than 120,000 men had died, including 80,000 Turkish soldiers and 44,000 British (including Australian and New Zealand [ANZAC] forces) and French soldiers. Weizmann to Lipsky, Dec. 5, 1937, Box 122, Wise MSS; Baffy, 70; Weizmann to Ormsby-Gore, Dec. 10, 1937, microfilm #26, Brandeis MSS. Lourie to Hyamson, Dec. 1, 1937, with a note to Shertok, Magnes files., AJA; Magnes to Shertok, Dec. 3, 1937, Foreign Countries–Palestine, AJCA; Shertok to Magnes, Dec. 6, 1937, A158/74, CZA. Shertok to Magnes, Dec. 13, 1937, microfilm #27, Brandeis MSS. Tannous’s later reminiscences make no reference to the Jewish Agency’s skeptical approach regarding these talks. See The Palestinians, 235-236. — 472 —

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87 88 89

90

91 92

93

94

Hyamson to Hexter, Dec. 13, 1937, Foreign Countries-Palestine, AJCA. Bakstansky-Husseini interview, Dec. 15, 1937, file 4/7, Hexter MSS. Hyamson to Brandeis, Dec. 19, 1937, microfilm #27, Brandeis MSS; Adler to d’Avigdor-Goldsmid, Nov. 24, 1937, microfilm #1942, and d’AvigdorGoldsmid to Adler, Dec. 6, 1937, microfilm 1941; both in Warburg MSS; Newcombe to Epstein, Dec. 3, 1937, S25/22678, CZA. Adler further informed d’Avigdor-Goldsmid that the appointment of Antonius to teach at Columbia University as the successor to the late Richard Gottheil (Professor of Semitic languages and an early Zionist herald), proposed in 1936 by his patron Charles Crane to a sympathetic President Nicholas Butler, was staunchly objected to by Jewish students and many others. The eminent biblical archeologist William F. Albright, strongly feeling that Antonius was not a scholar and that his appointment would be “a disgrace,” cabled his views to Butler. Ultimately, the offer was cancelled. Also see Menahem Kaufman, “George Antonius and American Universities: Dissemination of the Mufti of Jerusalem’s Anti-Zionist Propaganda 1930-1936,” American Jewish History 75.4 (1986): 386-396. Brandeis to Wise, Oct. 3, 1937, Box 106, Wise MSS; Adler-Stroock-Karpf to Strauss, Dec. 9, 1937, Box 63, Strauss MSS; Meeting of non-Zionists, Dec. 4, 1937, microfilm #1941, Warburg MSS; Karpf to Brandeis, Dec. 21, 1937, microfilm #26, Brandeis MSS. d’Avigdor-Goldsmid to Adler, Dec. 23, 1937, Palestine partition files, AJCA; M. Warburg memorandum, Nov. 25, 1937, file 4/7, Hexter MSS. Sasson to Shertok, Dec. 13, 1937, J1/4138, CZA; Vilensky to Shertok, Dec. 17, 1937, Magnes files, AJA; Hiszowicz, The Third Reich and the Arab East, 3536. Another intelligence report indicated strong Palestinian Arab hostility in the southern region to Jewish statehood (Cohen to A.H.Cohen, Dec. 24, 1937, file P-776/4, ISA). Sasson to Shertok, Dec. 19, 1937, file P-1056/8, ISA; A.S. (Sasson) report, Dec. 23, 1937, J1/4138, CZA. Nuri had also informed the receptive U.S. Consul-General George Wadsworth in Jerusalem that Iraq, Egypt, Turkey, Yemen, and probably Syria would favor a Palestinian state on both sides of the Jordan River under Abdullah provided that the Jews agree to a permanent 40 percent population ratio (Simon to Szold, Dec. 22, 1937, microfilm #27, Brandeis MSS). Jewish Agency intelligence knew of Samuel’s own thoughts on “the control” of Jewish immigration after April 1, 1938 (Samuel to Ormsby-Gore, Dec. 24, 1937, S25/22802, CZA). Ben-Gurion press conference, Dec. 21, 1937, Magnes files, AJA. Three weeks earlier, he had submitted “An Amended Tripartite Partition Scheme,” which the Agency office in London considered along with its own “Federal Scheme” of an undivided Palestine with an independent Jewish state as one of its parts, instead of the cantonal pattern. Ben-Gurion memorandum, Dec. 3, 1937, A185/6/1, CZA; Baffy, 72, 97. The Agency’s Bernard Joseph emphasized the same point about a permanent Jewish minority status in a talk — 473 —

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with the lawyer Omar Saleh Barghouti and two other Palestinian Arabs, who had first broached their ideas to Kalvarisky. The trio opposed political parity and Jewish immigration according to the country’s economic absorptive capacity (Kalvarisky to Shertok, Dec. 3, 1937, and Joseph memorandum, Dec. 22, 1937, both in Magnes files, AJA). 95 Baffy, 73; Rendel memorandum, Dec. 20, 1937, FO 371/20823, PRO. 96 Baffy, 52, 66, 71; Weizmann to Lipsky, Dec. 5, 1937, Box 122, Wise MSS; I.S.O. Playfair, History of the Second World War, The Mediterranean and theMiddle East, 1 (London, 1956), 11. 97 Hyamson to Lourie, Dec. 20, 1937, Lourie to Hyamson, Dec. 21, 1937; both in Magnes files, AJA; Shertok to Magnes, Dec. 28, 1937, Magnes to Shertok, Dec. 30, 1937; both in A158/74, CZA. 98 Weizmann to Wise-Lipsky, Dec. 21, 1937, A56/23, CZA; Weizmann to d’Avigdor-Goldsmid, Dec. 31, 1937, WA. In a handwritten note to Wise attached to that letter, Weizmann expressed surprise at a press statement, allegedly from the American Zionist leader, that HMG was abandoning the partition policy. This did not tally with his information, and would contribute to the uncertainty about which he had written. Weizmann ended: “If partition fails it may do so partly through our fault. The alternative is disaster.” 99 Weizmann to Shuckburgh, Dec. 31, 1937, WA.

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8. The Woodhead Commission

On January 5, 1938, a government White Paper made public OrmsbyGore’s dispatch to Wauchope of December 23, 1937, outlining the new “technical” commission’s terms of reference for Palestine. It announced that HMG would not implement an equitable partition plan immediately, since it could take no action in this matter for several months. The commission’s functions would be “confined to ascertaining the facts and to considering in detail the practical possibilities of a scheme of partition,” taking into account any representations of the communities in Palestine and Transjordan. Its recommended boundaries had to afford a reasonable prospect of the eventual establishment, with adequate security, of self-supporting Arab and Jewish states, together with “enclaves to be retained permanently or temporarily” under British mandate. At the same time, Great Britain was “in no sense committed to approval” of the Peel Report. London rejected outright the Royal Commission’s proposal of a compulsory transfer of Arabs out of the Jewish area as a last resort; the possibility of voluntary exchanges of land and population was envisaged. The four-member commission would be headed by Sir John Woodhead, a long-time civilian official in the Anglo-Indian administration.1 Shortly thereafter, Ormsby-Gore vented his frustration with both sides in a long letter to Chamberlain. From the vantage point of personal familiarity with Middle Eastern policy for more than two decades, he considered that “the Arabs are treacherous and untrustworthy, the Jews greedy, and, when freed from persecution, aggressive.” Convinced that neither people could be trusted to govern the other, just as had been the case between Catholics and Protestants in Ireland, he had concluded that partition represented “the only hope of even reasonable peace and justice, if we are to honour our pledges under Article 22 of the League” to grant self-government. The goodwill of the United States, where Jewish “press and propaganda interests” counted; a strong proJewish bias in Geneva and an “anti-Arab” prejudice that had prevailed — 475 —

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at the League ever since Iraq’s massacre of the Assyrians; and the growth of anti-partitionism on the part of the “extreme” RevisionistZionists—all were long-range considerations worthy of note. Moreover, the Permanent Mandates Commission still looked to Palestine as the chief place where persecuted Jews from Germany, Rumania, and Poland could find a place of refuge, while all parties in the House of Commons always had a pro-Jewish majority. Realizing that Pan Islamism presented “the great danger” the Empire had to face, Ormsby-Gore continued, HMG rightly encouraged the growth of local nationalism as being the lesser danger. Promising tendencies towards secular nationalism could be found in Turkey and Iran. The “Syrians” of Palestine west of the Jordan “cannot by their make up be much of an asset to anybody,” while the Jews “are an economic asset in Palestine and elsewhere.” Haj Amin had always been primarily antiBritish and would, in the Colonial Secretary’s opinion, come to terms with the Jews if he could get the British out of Palestine altogether and realize his ambition to be King of Palestine and Transjordan and eliminate Abdullah. Britain should go as far as possible to secure Ibn Saud’s friendship, either financially or by territorial concessions. Even if they eliminated Abdullah with compensation, “I’m doubtful whether Ibn Saud or his sons could make good in Levantine Palestine west of the Jordan. It is all a damnosa hereditas,” Ormsby-Gore concluded, but he was not defeatist about Palestine. If the government vacillated, however, Arab demands would grow, Jewish bitterness against HMG would increase, “and our position will become hopeless.”2 Rendel soon retorted, pointing out that secular Arab nationalism, not Pan Islamism, represented “a growing force.” The external stimulus of a potential Jewish state in Palestine was driving the anti-clerical intellectuals of Syria and Iraq and the “fanatical puritans” of Saudi Arabia and Yemen into a condition of “acute aggressive nationalism.” A Jewish commonwealth would not, as Ormsby-Gore had argued, be “ultimately bound to be dependent” on the British Empire for its existence, “a bridge between the uncertain Arab world of Asia and North East Africa.” Rather, a large element among the Polish and Russian Jews in Palestine tended toward Communism, while the newest Jewish settlers had a long tradition of German culture. Attacks from countries “who have hitherto been our friends” against a purely Jewish state, which could hardly “achieve permanent security,” and against British strategic interests in — 476 —

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the region, would precipitate “the consequent conflagration” that “will spell the ruin of all Jewish hopes.” Whitehall had therefore urged that it would be “wiser, cheaper and more practicable in the end” to retain a transformed mandate over the greater part of Palestine, with limited Jewish immigration to continue. The Arabs, and particularly Ibn Saud, preferred this to any Jewish state, for their quarrel was “against the alien invaders” who sought to transform Palestine into a Jewish country and reduce the Arabs “to a minority in their own land.” Finally, Rendel observed, the League depended far too greatly on HMG’s continued goodwill; “the best Jewish opinion in the United States” opposed partition; and Parliament might take a more objective view of the problem if it fully understood the results of adopting partition.3 Understandably, the Jewish Agency viewed the latest British White Paper with trepidation. The policy of delay as much as possible, read the Zionists’ summary report from London, appeared to have been “converted into a programme,” with loopholes provided for the “complete abandonment” of partition. This is “as crafty a statement in ambiguity as can be imagined,” averred newly chosen Agency Executive member Rose Jacobs to Hadassah official Tamar de Sola Pool. Since Dugdale’s current visit in Palestine closed off regular contact with Elliot, the Zionists remained in the dark as to the Cabinet’s conclusions. Yet the Agency correctly sensed that the document represented a compromise between conflicting views in government circles.4 Even Weizmann, far more optimistic than his colleagues in Jerusalem, sought “clarity and a definite decision” when writing to his old friend “O.G.” on January 20. The mandate administrators, having “plunged this poor country into a state of chaos,” now “exaggerated grotesquely the Arab difficulty” in “trying to save whatever face is left to them.” British representatives in Muslim countries of the Near East overestimated the quality and force of Arab nationalism, Ormsby-Gore was told, and underestimated the actual and potential forces of the Jews in Palestine and of their supporters outside. Weizmann was confident that 95 percent of Jewry would accept an improved partition, “but they will not take a mutilated project which may be concocted in the offices of the Palestine Government!” The yishuv’s latent energies and the hopes of millions of Jews centered on Palestine “would in the end nullify any attempt to strangle us.” On the other hand, they could be made into a — 477 —

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great force “in the service of the same ideals for which the Empire and your Government, our Government, have been laboring so valiantly in the last years.” These considerations should prompt HMG “to proceed at a quicker pace and to deal with us frankly and generously,” Weizmann concluded, and he wished to put these ideas personally before OrmsbyGore, Eden, and if possible Chamberlain, before addressing himself to Jewry outside Palestine.5 In the meantime, as the Zionists pointed out, security in the Promised Land deteriorated seriously with the rise of Arab terror. Continuing atrocities had affected Rumbold, who recently wrote to Peel Commission secretary John Martin: “I wish that our military and police could round up and hang a few more Arabs ‘pour décourager les autres’.” Agency officials did not go as far as Amery, who suggested to Churchill on January 11 that “if Billy Gore had any real courage he would let it be known that every additional murder would mean an enlargement of the Jewish state,” and who wished the proposed Jewish state’s frontiers to be fixed with reference to “the numbers for whom room ought to be found if our mandatory obligation is honestly to be fulfilled.” The Agency Executive did press Wauchope for the arming of Jewish bus and truck drivers; the carrying of an armed Jewish supernumerary policeman on every bus; the establishment of stationary outposts for such police at suitable points; and a system of patrol pilot cars traveling ahead of buses. While praising the Jewish community for its “exemplary patience” and no reprisals during the past few weeks, the High Commissioner rejected taking these steps, “doubtful of both their advisability and their efficacy.”6 To Ormsby-Gore, Wauchope explained that while he personally favored placing Jewish supernumeraries on every bus, his advisors unanimously and strongly opposed this request as well. They maintained that in the present circumstances, “anything is to be deprecated which might tend, even remotely, to insert the thin end of the Jewish wedge of creating an active striking force of armed Jews for aggression against Arabs.” (One month later, they would inform Wauchope that two rebel bands were “practically in control” of the Nablus-Jenin-Tulkarm area.) The alternative course was advocated by Captain Orde Wingate, who had so zealously espoused the Zionist cause within weeks after arriving in Palestine in 1936 as a British intelligence officer that Dugdale saw this eccentric Puritan as “clearly one of the instruments in God’s hand.” Before long, yishuv leaders would dub him “HaYedid” (the friend).Yet — 478 —

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Wauchope’s experts kept for the present to arming numbers of Jews purely for defense against attack of their own settlements, and hesitated regarding another request from Shertok that Jews comprise half of any new formation of the Palestinian section of the Police Force.7 The British received various reports of the Mufti’s activities in the terror campaign. On January 5, Shertok provided Sir Charles Tegart, recently arrived to advise the mandatory on police organization, with translations of documents in Arabic showing that Haj Amin’s associates in Palestine were financing the terrorist bands. The assassin A.Y. had explicitly acknowledged the Mufti as head of the organization. Two days later, another Agency memorandum indicated whom Haj Amin had appointed to organize a new revolt in Palestine, with the head of the Syrian police cooperating in the smuggling of weapons across the border. A wide propaganda net under Haj Amin’s supervision had spread throughout the region, praising terror, recruiting terrorists, and damning the Mufti’s Arab opponents in Palestine as traitors. Italian and German support of these activities was evident. The German consul in Beirut also provided the funds and material for an Arabic translation of the Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion, together with the Arab High Committee’s memorandum in reply to the Peel Report, for circulation throughout the region.8 All this did not alter the situation. Since the information ran counter to Rendel’s entire perspective, he discounted it, as he did information along similar lines from Colonel Gilbert Mackereth, the British Consul in Damascus. On January 22, Weizmann forwarded to Ormsby-Gore an Agency intelligence report about the Mufti’s diplomatic efforts to torpedo partition, including the use of Nuri Sa’id and talks with Muslim government members at the League, along with an allegation that Haj Amin was organizing an “army” of about 2,000 people. Lacy Baggallay, succeeding Rendel in February, responded that if some truth did exist in these charges, it was because Palestine’s Arabs were still convinced that HMG intended to implement partition or create a Jewish majority.9 The Jewish Agency entertained no illusions about Haj Amin, especially after Magnes informed Shertok on January 12 that the Arab leaders in Beirut had drawn up an intransigent response to the Hyamson-Newcombe scheme, which they had never acknowledged. In fact, on December 12 last, Newcombe had written to Hyamson that, according to Musa Husseini, the Arab population would never accept — 479 —

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the Jews being more than one-third of Palestine’s population. Thinking this “of little consequence” to the Jews because their migration “will extend elsewhere” in the Arab world and the agreement was for “a limited period,” Newcombe sent Haj Amin a copy of Hyamson’s plan modified by Newcombe’s letter. (Informed earlier by Newcombe, Parkinson indicated that HMG could not endorse this communication.) Asked to reply, the Mufti sent his own draft on January 12. The changes, transmitted by Arabs who met with Magnes, deleted a reference to the League of Nations, the words “nationality” and “a Jewish National Home but not a Jewish State,” and the stipulation that the agreement should hold for an unspecified number of years and “shall be renewable.” Most significantly, Haj Amin’s draft declared that the maximum Jewish population “should be the present population,” and during the interim period envisaged, “the Arab leaders have not been authorized by [the Bludan] Congress or by the Arab kings to agree either to further Jewish immigration or to further land sales.”10 Shertok emphatically replied to Magnes, and repeated in a letter on January 13, that he saw no prospects of an agreement based on Haj Amin’s draft, and that the Agency definitely rejected the document and would not enter into discussion on it. If the Arabs still wished to meet, though knowing this reply, the Agency was willing to do so. On January 14, Magnes wrote that the Arabs saw prospects of a meeting only on the basis of their own text. He nevertheless recommended that the Agency express a willingness to meet on the basis of Newcombe’s draft, while announcing that the Agency did not agree to certain of its paragraphs. Hearing this at a Jewish Agency Executive meeting two days later, BenGurion cautioned that “there obviously was some monkey business afoot here.” Either the mediators had deceived the Agency into thinking that they spoke for the Arabs, or the Arabs were now backing out of their previous proposal. He did not suspect Magnes of “evil intentions or of deliberate deceit,” although it was hard to understand how even a man like Magnes could advise the Agency to meet the Arabs on the basis of the Mufti’s proposal; Ben-Gurion did not know the intentions of Hyamson and Newcombe. The Executive decided to demand explanations from Magnes and Hyamson as to how the original Hyamson– Newcombe text that they had submitted as coming from the Arabs had reached them.11 On January 25, Shertok wrote to Magnes that in light of what had — 480 —

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transpired, he regarded the matter “as liquidated.” He asked for clarification regarding their first talks in November, at which time Magnes claimed that Arab groups had initiated or consented to the Hyamson– Newcombe text, and the revelation of January 12 informing that they had never acknowledged that text’s plan. “A double-edged conspiracy was here at work,” Shertok further explained to Brodetsky: they aimed either to create the false impression that peace on this basis was possible and that partition was, therefore, unnecessary, or to deal the Zionists a blow in the event that partition did not come off, by creating the impression that they were prepared to buy peace at the price of accepting permanent minority status. The Arabs concerned would be “prone to indulge in this game,” but the question remained as to whether and to what extent they had been helped in this way by non-Arabs, Jews, or Englishmen. Shertok ended: The Zionists, “not yet, by a long way, through the wood of plots and intrigues,” had to “probe this affair to the bottom.”12 On another front, Nuri Sa’id independently strove to offer HMG an alternative to partition. According to what he told a sympathetic Lampson, Haj Amin felt justified about treating Magnes’s intervention with caution in light of Ben-Gurion’s pronouncement on December 21 against the principle of a Jewish minority in Palestine. In London, Nuri expressed to Hyamson the Arabs’ fear that even the undertaking of a Jewish minority for a limited time was “a trick,” noted the Mufti’s insistence that Palestine’s Arabs would “rise again to recover their birthright,” and conveyed his own concern that the position of Jews in the Arab states would be endangered in the meanwhile. Speaking with Whitehall, Nuri drew a picture of the British doctor injecting small doses of poison (“alien Jews”) into the Arab patient, which “would produce a pathological condition which might have serious results” unless the Arabs could be protected against becoming a minority.13 Nuri received a promising reception at the Colonial and Foreign Offices. Although adhering to partition, Ormsby-Gore confided to him on January 21 that the Arabs might ask for part of the Galilee since the Royal Commission had allotted “too large a part” to the Jews, along with the Arab citrus grove areas around the Jaffa area. Transjordan might be separate from the future Arab State, the Colonial Secretary added, but (unlike HMG’s position in Egypt) Great Britain “must remain in Palestine for all time with certain areas under its direct control.” — 481 —

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Whitehall Undersecretary Robert Cranborne went further the same day, telling Nuri that the government “fully realized” that partition “was not a perfect solution and that its practicability still needed to be investigated.”14 Completely unaware of these developments, the Board of Deputies of British Jews voted overwhelmingly on January 16 to “welcome a solution for the future of Palestine which will provide for the establishment of a Jewish Dominion within the British Commonwealth of Nations.” Its first two resolutions, criticizing HMG’s further delay with the Technical Commission and opposing any imposition of a permanent minority status on the yishuv, were carried unanimously. The third resolution, that of a Jewish Dominion, drew forth specific objections from d’Avigdor-Goldsmid, Cohen, and Waley-Cohen, but ultimately passed by a vote of more than 200 to 7. The BBC featured the story, politicians from all parties in Parliament expressed their support, and the Manchester Guardian quickly gave its endorsement. So did Meinertzhagen, whose letter to the London Times applauded this acknowledgment at last of the final aim of Zionism by Jews, and advised this “nation without a home” to remember always that Palestine “includes the area from Dan to Beersheba.” (Meinertzhagen had actually favored a Jewish state in Palestine eventually spreading to Transjordan and Syria.) Wedgwood, earliest advocate of a Jewish Palestine as “the seventh Dominion,” urged Lloyd George and Churchill that their support of the Board of Deputies’ declaration would bolster imperial interests, “immensely” strengthen the status of the Jews, and weaken the dictators.15 The Brandeis circle continued to stand firm against partition and favored the mandate. Informed of the Hyamson and Magnes intiative, the Justice was prepared to accept a limitation during the next 5-10 years of Jewish immigration to reach 40-45 percent of the population of Palestine and Transjordan, while informing Robert Szold that “my lack of faith in Magnes’ judgment continues and I have none in Hyamson’s or Herbert Samuel’s.” The Zionist Organization of America and Hadassah backed Ben-Gurion’s pronouncement against any imposition of a minority status upon “the Jewish people in their own Homeland,” with those against partition free to continue in affirming their opposition. Szold was particularly bitter at Weizmann’s letter of January 20 to Ormsby-Gore, pressing for partition. At the same time, Wise and Jacobs warned colleagues that the Board’s promulgation of the Dominion idea — 482 —

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was predicated on a partitioned Jewish state, with Weizmann, BenGurion, Dugdale, and the yishuv’s press, save for HaBoker (General Zionists), championing Jewish sovereignty in part of Palestine. The pro-partitionist Cazalet tried to convince Brandeis that “you can’t turn the clock back,” and asked: “What would you expect of England now?” The Justice answered: “Law, Order and Time,” emphasizing also that the Zionists had to focus on resuming immigration according to economic absorptive capacity.16 Roosevelt’s private thoughts on Palestine gave Wise additional concern. On January 22, Wise spent almost an hour at the White House to talk about the persecution of Rumania’s Jews. Following that interview, the ZOA leader informed the press that the President “of course profoundly regrets the renewed oppression, political and economic, of Jewish populations in Central and East European lands, indeed everywhere.” Yet, when Wise mentioned Palestine, FDR suddenly remarked that Palestine had room for only another 100,000-150,000 Jews. “Wouldn’t it be wiser for the Jews to find some other territory which is big and unoccupied than to have all these difficulties in Palestine?” The Zionists might as well give up any idea of obtaining Transjordan, and think rather of a place like the colonies formerly held by Germany in West Africa or acquire some new lands in Venezuela, Lower California, or Mexico. “If we can stave off war for another two years or three at most,” he declared, we will have a world conference on “re-allocation” of territories and “re-apportionment” of raw materials, where some large areas “as a second choice for the Jews” might be found. He was not offering a substitute for Palestine, Roosevelt added, but that country’s possibilities “are going to be exhausted. You ought to have another card up your sleeve.” Wise was shocked. Having heard FDR tell him on a previous visit that when he completed his presidential term he would even be prepared to join some Palestine Development Corporation in order to help the Jews, Wise now urged his host not to mention this to anyone else. Informed by Roosevelt of the talk, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr. thought the proposal “most practical.” Morgenthau added that his father, a Reform Jew of German background, had reported after a visit to Palestine years ago that “Jews should not send any more of their people to Palestine as the land could not support them.” Wise suspected that Roosevelt’s opinion was received from American Jewish Committee — 483 —

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member Samuel Rosenman, the President’s lawyer and speech writer, and he concluded that only Weizmann’s talk with FDR “will have the desired effect.”17 “Hope is not yet lost for the abandonment of the partition plan,” Nuri reported back to Haj Amin on February 4 in Beirut. His talks in London had given Nuri the impression that Italian and German activity in the Middle East and widespread Arab objection to Zionism had sparked among the British statesmen a “great tendency to become friendly with the Arabs.” Even among generally pro-Zionist liberals, doubts arose about the practicability of partition. The British “reckon too much” with the Arab factor in Palestine, Nuri asserted. Otherwise, they would not have hesitated to implement partition. Nor would they have appealed to the Arabs to assist them in “stabilizing” the Near Eastern situation, or instructed their representatives in the Arab states to explain to those governments how difficult Britain’s position was in view of the “double obligation” in the Balfour Declaration and the mandate.18 Two days later, in the company of Tannous and Dr. George F. GrahamBrowne, the anti-Zionist Anglican Bishop of Jerusalem, Nuri met with Magnes in the Lebanese capital for further talks.19 In Nuri’s view, Britain now had more important Imperial interests; partition would make the Arabs poorer and create hardships for Jews in Arab lands, as had happened in Poland and Germany; and the Technical Commission would be forced to adopt some such text as the Hyamson–Newcombe draft. Some division of the country into different Jewish and Arab administrative districts would have to occur, joined to an Arab Federation. His own draft for a settlement included that “the maximum Jewish population of Palestine shall be X percent until there [is] a further agreement between the two peoples.” Instead of this permanent arrangement, Magnes proposed ten years, at the end of which the Jews would be no more than 40 percent of the population, and then the question would have to be reopened. There was “a fighting chance,” Magnes thought, that his own proposal could overcome Jewish opposition through the aid of such American, British, Palestinian, and other Jews as were against partition, and carry among the Arabs as well. He did not think that Nuri’s clause about population ratios was “good enough yet,” but considered it “decidedly a step in the right direction.” “I am sure you appreciate,” Nuri replied one month later, that the Arabs would accept no solution that made it possible for the Jews “ever to become a majority in Palestine.”20 — 484 —

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Magnes pursued his hope for an armistice through an additional meeting in Beirut that same week with Tannous and then with Alami. According to Tannous, Husseini had favored the negotiations, but Haj Amin was “so exercised” over Ben-Gurion’s December 21 declaration that he left his house, came to Beirut, and asked Tannous, “How can we have negotiations with those people?” Tannous attempted to point out the word “permanent” in the text, but that made little difference, even with Husseini. Alami observed that the Arab demands were proving “more unbending” week by week. If in May-June 1936 a 40 percent Jewish population ratio would be talked of, the Arabs now spoke of 30 percent. In a few years, he added, it would be “either all Arabs or all Jews—i.e. a war to the death.” Alami proposed that unofficial soundings be taken of government officials, judges, and youth, perhaps finding people who regarded the Hyamson–Newcombe document to be “reasonable,” as he did. He also noted Husseini’s statement that Newcombe had drawn “too may inferences” from their conversations together, thus confirming what Magnes had informed Shertok on January 12. Two weeks later, Magnes replied to Shertok’s last letter with a lengthy report “not for publication,” and suggested a meeting with the Agency Executive to discuss Jewish-Arab relations.21 Stopping over in Cairo in early February on his return to London, Weizmann beat the tocsin for partition during a lengthy meeting with Prince Mohammed Ali. (One day earlier, Ali had requested of three influential Britons that England should support the “justified demands” of the Palestinian Arabs.) He had been authorized to negotiate on this basis by a 66 percent majority at the last Zionist Congress, Ali was informed, but the figure would have risen to at least 90 percent if the British had offered a definite “viable” proposal. Weizmann had in mind to settle an additional 1.5 million Jews in Palestine. An Arab Federation, such as the prince desired, would allay Arab fears of Jewish domination and would obtain Jewish support; the Jewish State would probably join the federation, and could assist it enormously with finance, science, and manpower. Agreeing with Ali that HMG’s interests should be protected, Weizmann noted that the yishuv might well put 100,000 men into the field, and that American Jewry was increasingly hopeful of Zionist aspirations. Islam and Judaism had cooperated in the great days of Spain and the Caliphate, and the Jews would cooperate with the Arabs to make a great port of Gaza and share Haifa harbor facilities on — 485 —

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an equal basis. He had “no bitterness in his heart” and preached the “utmost restraint” to everybody. Both men were in accord that the best view to take of the terrorists was “they knew not what they were doing.” Weizmann consented to discuss Ali’s views with London and to return for another talk in about six weeks’ time.22 Ambassador Lampson was not as receptive when meeting with the Zionist leader the next day. According to Weizmann, the Arabs would “cave in” if only they were treated firmly; even Ibn Saud was more influenced by his dislike of Abdullah than by genuine pan-Arab sentiment; Iraq counted for nothing, nor did Syrian Arabs. Weizmann indicated that he could not guarantee to control the Jews, whose patience was “well nigh exhausted,” much longer; they would be a military asset to HMG with a strong independent state. Lampson countered by noting the clear anti-Zionist feeling in the surrounding countries, and especially worried that Egypt might become “more vocal” at any moment. Although Ibn Saud was “intensely loyal” to Britain, his position on Palestine was becoming very difficult vis-à-vis his own people and especially his religious leaders. If only a “reasonable breathing space” could be given, Lampson was optimistic enough to hope that some solution acceptable to both sides might evolve. He suggested that with a given period of five to ten years, both sides could perhaps agree to maintain the current proportions of population of one-third to two-thirds. After all, the mandate had “worked out well enough until Herr Hitler and Poland took to flinging out their Jews,” and the Jews had patiently waited for two millennia. Standing still today, as the sun had done in Givon at Joshua’s command, was “death for us,” Weizmann replied. As for the ambassador’s suggestion about population ratios, “une treve de Dieu,” this might have been more practicable a year ago. However, the Zionists were now awaiting a “major operation” regarding partition; they could not raise sufficient funds for the yishuv’s unemployed without “security of tenure”; and another 500,000 Jews were threatened with expulsion from Rumania. The Arabs, Weizmann repeated, would ultimately follow whatever HMG insisted upon.23 Despite the latest turn of events, Hyamson and Newcombe persisted in their efforts. Seeing the difference between the first draft handed to Magnes and that currently in the Mufti’s hands, Hyamson noted to Newcombe that the Jews would never agree to being a permanent — 486 —

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minority; “your friends” (the Arabs) should recognize that if the Jews formally accepted that position for a limited period they would be “going a long way.” At a closed meeting in Oxford University on February 13, Hyamson expressed himself as being entirely opposed to the setting up of any sort of Jewish territory at all, state or canton. He thought it incapable of surviving, and pressed for his own scheme, although he did not agree that the Jewish percentage of the population should be limited to the present 30 percent in Haj Amin’s draft. Newcombe remarked that they were “mainly concerned with preventing the establishing of a Jewish State,” explaining rather vaguely that “once one could clear out of the way, once and for all,” the threat of a Jewish commonwealth (apparently of Jewish “domination” over any Arabs), the question of immigration could be settled by agreement. The only dissenter at the meeting was Leonard Stein, president of the Anglo-Jewish Association. Although against partition, he had voted for all three of the Board resolutions on January 16. Stein argued that the Jews did not seek to dominate anyone, and would not likely agree to any fixed proportion of the population or to an independent Arab state in the whole of Palestine. Despite the urgings of the others present, Stein doubted the value of “guarantees” to Jews, and thought that the stage for considering them would never be reached.24 One day later, the British Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee presented a report entitled “Strategical Aspect of the Partition of Palestine” to the Committee of Imperial Defense. A War Office intelligence assessment had recently concluded that the greater the delay in implementing a policy in Palestine, the greater the opportunity for foreign propaganda to consolidate Arab hostility to HMG and the more difficult it would be to control; should Britain be at war with any of the great powers, “the dangers and extent of Arab hostility might be greatly increased.” The Sub-Committee pointed out that the most probable cause of any Arab combination against the Empire would be the thought that Italy was replacing Britain in the Middle East, a danger that would require keeping sufficient forces in the region. The most serious problem would be an Iraqi threat to British forces and communications, the loss of oil from the Kirkuk oil fields, and reinforcement of the air base at Dhibban. A British garrison had to be maintained in Palestine during the transition stage, and if Arab-Jewish rivalry persisted, no reduction from the present garrison was likely to be possible. Both Arab and Jewish States — 487 —

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had to demonstrate their ability to undertake “full responsibility for internal security” before they were granted “full self-government” by the execution of treaties with Great Britain. On February 21, five days after the Italian Foreign Ministry announced that the international Jewish problem had only one solution—”the creation in some part of the world, not in Palestine, of a Jewish state,” the Sub-Committee again warned that the main dangers to HMG would come from the Arab states if partition were adopted.25 That same day, a letter drafted by Ben-Gurion about Jewish immigration to Palestine after March 31 was signed under Weizmann’s name and dispatched to Ormsby-Gore. Ben-Gurion had reached London “with a heavy heart,” given incessant Arab terror and increasing unemployment in Palestine; HMG perhaps thinking of “liquidating” the mandate; and the “dreadful plight” of the Jews in the Diaspora. On February 20, Eden had resigned over Chamberlain’s insistence on opening formal negotiations with Rome over Italy’s occupation of Abyssinia (Ethiopia) without Mussolini agreeing, as a sign of good faith, to withdraw “volunteers” fighting for General Francisco Franco’s Insurgent forces against the Republican Loyalist regime in Spain. This left Weizmann “really depressed for first time,” especially at the rumor that Lord Halifax, a man of vacillating opinions who instinctively would conciliate “in an explosive situation,” was likely to head the Foreign Office. Weizmann’s letter to Ormsby-Gore emphasized that the continued imposition of a political high-level on immigration ran contrary to the mandate, and also had “a most injurious effect” on Palestine’s economic and political situation. Only a return to the basis of economic absorptive capacity, he argued, would meet the growing distress of the Jewish masses in Central and Eastern Europe, frustrate the designs of extremist Arabs, and prove “vital to the interests of peace” by strengthening “general confidence in British good faith and in British attachment to the rule of law, and to international obligations.”26 Sir Harold MacMichael, about to depart London for his duties as Wauchope’s successor, had no definite plan as yet for the Promised Land. At a luncheon given in his honor by the Royal Empire Society the previous day, Ormsby-Gore declared that the Christian, Muslim, and Jewish worlds “all must have a share and a place” in Palestine, “a unique country the problems of which had ramifications throughout the world.” Palestine’s future depended upon Britain, “in the course of time, and it — 488 —

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might be a long time,” bringing together in peace these three worlds. The fifty-six year old MacMichael, with service as Governor of Tanganyika for the past three years, responded that besides restoring law and order—”the first essential,” he wished to make contact with the people of the country. The prospect at the moment might seem to be a “very gloomy” one in Palestine, but he chose to echo the words of a man who once had said to Dr. Johnson, “You are a philosopher. I, too, have tried to be, but cheerfulness kept on breaking through.” Sir Archibald Weigall, presiding over the gathering of nearly 200, brought the speeches to a close by assuring MacMichael and his wife that whether their experiences proved “troublesome or joyous,” the couple would carry with them the sympathy and interests of the 20,000 fellows of that society.27 Ben-Gurion talked politics with MacMichael for the first time at a dinner in Amery’s home on February 22. The meal began with Weizmann belittling the Arabs’ strength and worth, as opposed to the Jews. At one point, Cazelet asked how the Zionists’ would react if the commission under Woodhead’s chairmanship gave them a different territorial compensation instead of the Galilee. Weizmann replied that if the new commission’s conclusions would not be acceptable to the Jews, those leaders who had successfully restrained the yishuv would disappear, and “what had been prevented until now would occur.” Wedgwood reported that a large pro-Zionist delegation of MPs to 10 Downing St. had impressed the Prime Minister, although Chamberlain remarked at the time that it was an error to think that only the wealthy Arab effendi objected to Zionism. In a private conversation with Ben-Gurion that followed dinner, MacMichael confessed that he had a low opinion of Arabs from his contacts in the Sudan. To his query as to whether Palestine could solve the question of all the Jews, Ben-Gurion replied that Zionists wished in the near future to save the young Jewish generation of 2 million in Eastern and Central Europe, a plausible undertaking on which rested “the national free existence of the Jewish people.” “You are too hasty and the Arabs think that they will impede the country’s development,” MacMichael retorted, triggering the rejoinder that a large yishuv could fight and even be a support for HMG in a world war. On the other hand, “if we will be a small quantity, we are liable of being destroyed and no value would result for you as well.” MacMichael did not respond to this point, leading Ben-Gurion to suspect that the Zionists would have the — 489 —

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“habitual troubles” with him as with every Englishman, even if he was not an enemy, regarding the crucial “question of peace.”28 Just prior to that meeting, Shuckburgh expressed his sorrow to Weizmann that the White Paper announcing the Technical Commission was not a success. “It was born in sin,” Weizmann reacted, coming as it did after Halifax’s visit to Hitler. (In a report to the Agency Executive in London three days earlier, Weizmann had inferred that Foreign Office policy on Palestine was influenced by Halifax’s abortive peace mission to Berlin the previous November.) The Colonial Office’s Deputy UnderSecretary promised that, despite everything, the plan which he had fixed in November would eventually be established, and a Jewish state would be created. “What State?” asked Weizmann. Shuckburgh came back with his own question: “What will [happen] if the Jews reject the plan?” Weizmann replied, “You will have to return to the mandate.” Shrugging his shoulders in exasperation, Shuckburgh complained about the government, whose policy was turning both Arabs and Jews into enemies. He did not value the Arab countries; only Ibn Saud deserved consideration. For Weizmann, this conversation and other meager results of his talks in London led him to advise colleagues that an emergency program was needed “to buy more land, occupy it and hold it,” recalling his remark to Prince Ali about a yishuv force of 100,000 young men, in case no “satisfactory certainties” were forthcoming from Great Britain.29 Ben-Gurion’s meeting the next day with Musa Husseini at the latter’s request confirmed Arab refusal to relinquish control over Palestine. In Husseini’s view, Palestine could not solve the Jewish refugee problem and the Arabs would fight a Jewish state. The permanent one-third Jewish proportion of the country’s population, advocated in Haj Amin’s draft, could bring to a settlement, with Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia also accepting Jewish immigrants on condition that all foreign rule was eliminated. Palestine would become an independent commonwealth, eventually joining an Arab Federation that would also include the Arab countries in North Africa. Magnes accepted Nuri’s formula; the Arabs had never approved the Hyamson-Newcombe’s draft (repeating what Husseini had told Bakstansky on December 15). The Mufti did not agree to one-third even now, Husseini concluded, insisting on 7 percent as it was in 1918 at the end of the World War. Ben-Gurion, in turn, advised Husseini not to waste his time in negotiations with Jews who carried no weight among the Jewish people, and not to make proposals which no — 490 —

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one would accept. An alliance between Arabs and Jews could arise with Eretz Yisrael as a Jewish commonwealth, open to all Jews, which would be willing to join an Arab Federation. The time had not yet come for such an alliance because no Arab leader wished to hear of it, Ben-Gurion observed, but when a Jewish state was established and its strength and ability increased, “we would find a common language.”30 Ben-Gurion quickly informed Magnes of this conversation, adding that reliable information had just disclosed to the Agency that Nuri and Haj Amin got word to HMG that a number of Jews, headed by Magnes, had agreed to an arrangement with the Arabs whereby the Jews would remain one-third of the population. Reviewing the history of the negotiations in the vein of Shertok’s letter to Magnes of January 25, BenGurion went on sharply: “I would not be fulfilling my duty to you, as a man I have always honored and esteemed for his moral courage and fidelity to Jewish and human ideals, as you understand them, if I did not tell you that I regard this action as a serious and dangerous assault on our political position.” While Magnes as an individual had a complete right to freedom of opinion, his standing at the head of “the supreme cultural institution of the Jewish people” led political circles to regard him as a representative. The Executive had told Magnes that it categorically rejected Haj Amin’s insistence on discussions only if based upon a Jewish minority status, and the whole Zionist movement would regard such discussions as “undermining the Jewish people and its historic hope.” In fact, Nuri and the Mufti had already exploited his consent (if they were to be believed as saying that Magnes agreed) in order to influence the British government “to liquidate the whole policy of the National Home.” Accordingly, Ben-Gurion was forwarding a copy of his letter to the Executive in Jerusalem, together with the suggestion that it “summon you and demand that you discontinue this activity that is jeopardizing our entire future.”31 Weizmann presented his views of that future when meeting with Ormsby-Gore for an interview on the morning of February 25. The Colonial Secretary took 15 minutes to bemoan the constant struggle he continued to have with Whitehall, the senior department, where “his own name was mud” and his Zionist past was “always being thrown in his face.” Weizmann countered that he knew all about the telegrams received in London from the Arab States, and attacked the notion that “what they might think or do was fundamentally of any real impor— 491 —

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tance as regards Palestine.” Ibn Saud’s military importance was “nil.” Lampson, the WZO president added, was definitely under the influence of his Oriental Secretary, Walter Smart, whose wife was Kitty Antonius’s sister and a daughter of the publisher who put out the strongly proPalestinian-Arab Egyptian newspaper Mokattam. While HMG had “not lifted a finger” to explain what it really wished in Palestine, Weizmann continued, the Italians, Germans, and the Mufti were allowed to do whatever they saw fit. Given Nuri’s report of the Colonial Secretary compromising during their talk on the territory proposed for partition (Ormsby-Gore immediately denied these facts), was the government proposing to make the Zionists an offer “they knew would be turned down?” This included a Palestine administration plan that resembled Nuri’s in its essentials. That was Wauchope’s scheme, Ormsby-Gore confided, which was one reason why he had hesitated to send out the Technical Commission before Wauchope’s departure. To proceed in this way, Weizmann shot back, would be “an act of cruelty” toward the Jewish people and to him personally, and would “embitter their relations with their only remaining friends.” They appeared to be back again where they were last July, Weizmann pressed on. The Zionists still had friends in Parliament who would not allow them to be betrayed in this way, and there were 450,000 Jews in Palestine “who would fight to the last ditch.” Unfortunately, “there were new Pharaohs ‘who knew not Joseph’,” Ormsby-Gore replied, and those who came to Whitehall were “assimilationist Jews.” He also referred to Hyamson and Newcombe, and noted that Rendel the Papist “had done very much against us.” Weizmann warned, in turn, that if any secret terms of reference existed, there was no need for the Jews to appear before the commission. His host denied the latter, and said that as to immigration, the Jews would get “the maximum of what he had been able to fight for.” Ormsby-Gore then took Weizmann to see Shuckburgh for a short tete-à-tete. Looking “extremely grave” on hearing the gist of the previous interview, Shuckburgh suggested that Zionism’s original idea had been for Palestine to provide a center for Jewish nationalism and for Jewish immigration, but that now it had become a refuge for great masses of persecuted Jews. “We have begun it, and we shall finish,” he remarked as Weizmann took his leave. To this, the Zionist replied that “they should not waste their time, however, by offering us something which we were bound to turn down.”32 — 492 —

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Meeting on February 26 with Wauchope in Government House for the last time, Shertok sounded a different tone. He gladly agreed to fulfill the High Commissioner’s modest request for the musical notes and words to the “HaTikva,” so that the Zionist anthem might be played for him on occasion in his bachelor home in England. Then he requested that clemency be granted to four Jewish youngsters long imprisoned for carrying weapons in self-defense, and asked that financial loans be expedited for various yishuv bodies confronting the worsening economic situation. Turning the conversation at this point, he proceeded to thank Wauchope for the mutual trust and personal friendships that had been established with the Jewish Agency leadership, despite “some very serious disagreements” between them. The Agency had most especially appreciated the deep understanding shown by the High Commissioner of Zionism’s idealism and of the human and spiritual values for which that movement stood, trying as he did “to listen to the stirrings of the soul of the Jewish people.” Thanking Shertok for these words, Wauchope noted how deeply touched he had been by the affection shown to him by Jews everywhere, particularly as he knew how much people were blaming him (“quite mistakenly,” he thought) for the course of events since 1936. Only after ten years would it be possible to form a judgment, and he intimated that he hoped history would prove him right. Shertok admitted that “a sediment of bitterness” was left by the those events, but at the same time His Excellency had also done important things of lasting value, notably the Tel Aviv port, the yishuv’s legal self-defense, and the new roads. The Agency’s Political Director emphasized that “there was no likelihood on earth” of the Jews ever agreeing to remain a minority forever, to which Wauchope responded that HMG knew that to get the Jews to agree to minority status “was absolutely out of the question.” Faith, Wauchope remarked, had given the Zionist leadership stature, and they had achieved “very great things.” At the end of lunch, they retired to the drawing room. The garden, where Wauchope had planted olive trees, along with flowers and seeds gathered from all over Palestine, could be seen. Suddenly, the High Commissioner asked: “Suppose you had a shekel to bet with. Would you put it on partition or non-partition? I am not asking what your personal desire is, but what is your guess as to what is most likely to come off.” Shertok answered: “I would save my shekel.” He then added, “To my — 493 —

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regret I had not much faith in the consistency and tenacity of purpose of the British Government.” Many people felt the same way, Wauchope commented: “but I am a partitionist.”33 Shortly thereafter, the two men exchanged very cordial good wishes, and Shertok took his leave. Four days later, Wauchope gave a farewell message in a five-minute radio broadcast to the people of Palestine, accompanied by an Arabic and Hebrew translation. Admitting that the last two years of his six-year tenure would stand out in history as ones of “difficulty and disappointment,” the former commander of British forces in Northern Ireland stated his faith nonetheless “in the mercies of God and in the ultimate triumph of good.” “Patience is the key to relief,” he noted, quoting an old Arab proverb. With a few unhappy exceptions, Wauchope believed that most people now realized that “assassination is always an abomination,” and that “true progress is progress in good will and in understanding.” Confident that the coming Technical Commission would throw “much welcome light” on the solution of the difficult Palestine problem, he wished all his listeners to “look forward and not backward,” to remember that “hate and malice are born of prejudice and ignorance,” and to realize that the best hope for Palestine’s citizenry rested on “reliance on England.” The British National Anthem followed.34

By early March, a despondent Weizmann concluded that everything in British government circles “seems to be overlaid with a kind of ‘surrealism’—what in other terminology might be called the doctrine of temporary expediency [or] opportunism.” Of most concern to him, the “nuisance-value” of the Arab peoples appeared so great from the Imperial point of view that almost any concession to them was justified. On March 1, the London Times applauded London’s announcement that Sir Alison Russell, past Attorney-General in Uganda and Cyprus and Chief Justice of Tanganyika, and Alexander P. Waterfield, Principal Assistant Secretary to the Treasury, would join Woodhead on the Technical Commission. Yet even that august newspaper editorialized that the White Paper declaration of January 5 was “qualified by so many reservations and conditions as to give Oriental troublemakers the dangerous impression” that London was merely “hedging” on the question of partition. Weizmann could also point to the fact that Jewish — 494 —

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immigration to Palestine had been severely and arbitrarily restricted, and he warned at an evening reception for the WZO Actions Committee that “the more you give in to destructive forces” who were presently defying the mandatory authorities, “the greater they grow.”35 His suspicions were not fully allayed following interviews with Halifax and Chamberlain shortly thereafter. To the new Foreign Secretary, Weizmann argued on March 9 that Zionism’s opponents had exaggerated the opposing force of the Arab powers and underrated the yishuv’s constructive strengths. Faced with a possible “third destruction” of their National Home by HMG, Jews in Palestine and the world over would fight; “nothing could be done in Eretz Yisrael without our approval,” he emphasized. Never having received an appointment with Eden, Weizmann thought that Halifax might have some of the quality of understanding which Balfour used to display. That same day, however, Elliot confidentially reported to Dugdale that Whitehall had launched a fresh attack, centering on the basis for the immigration schedule due on March 31. “Why do you worry so much, why are you so uneasy? Chamberlain kept asking the WZO president on March 10. “We are committed to partition … on the general lines of the Peel report,” assured the Prime Minister. Weizmann replied: “To what partition?” Chamberlain sought to assuage his guest’s fears that Palestine might be a pawn in the Anglo-Italian talks, strongly promising that it would not be mentioned at all. “I wonder,” wrote Dugdale when informed of this assurance, noting that Rendel, the movement’s “great enemy” at the Foreign Office, had gone to Rome with England’s ambassador to Mussolini’s government.36 Ormsby-Gore felt obligated to inform Halifax that Lord Lothian, after a recent tour of India, reported firm opposition from Muslim leaders there to Palestine, and especially Jerusalem, being handed over to Jewish rule. Yet their objections would be “much eased” if Palestine would be part of an Arab Federation, and they even suggested a joint council of Arab and Jewish governments under the High Commissioner’s chairmanship. Hearing the Colonial Secretary’s developing view in favor of creating local autonomous Jewish and Arab areas together with British enclaves in order to insure “an umbrella” of an effective working society, “if only for railway administration and the like,” Lothian posed OrmsbyGore’s idea to Weizmann. The Jews would gladly take this “quasi-federal basis,” the WZO president responded, provided that “real” self-govern— 495 —

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ment, not an imposed, permanent minority status, was granted. They now understood, he went on, that the phrase “national home” meant an area where they had some responsibility for government, and not “a ghetto status.” The Jews did not wish “battle-ships and big guns,” but did want to be responsible for law and order “in some place on the earth they could call their own.”37 Elliot’s report to Dugdale of Whitehall pressure received confirmation on March 10, with Ormsby-Gore’s writing to MacMichael that the new quotas from April to September would not revert to the traditional criterion of Palestine’s economic absorptive capacity. Seeking to diminish “to some extent the element of arbitrariness which is involved under the present temporary arrangements while at the same time avoiding any considerable change in the total rate of immigration in the immediate interim period” until HMG reached a final decision on partition, London had decided that a total of 2,000 immigrants with “independent means” (a personal capital of £1,000) would be admitted. In light of continued unemployment, no more than 1,000 Jewish workers could enter, subject to the High Commissioner’s decision. “On grounds of humanity,” no numerical restrictions would be placed on dependents (defined as wives and children of immigrants) or on students. Halifax had Rendel’s successor transmit this document to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations one week later.38 The Jewish Agency’s Administrative Committee, speaking on behalf of Jews throughout the world, expressed its “very grave anxiety” that arbitrary political levels continued to determine immigration into Palestine. While acknowledging the mandatory’s recent action in attempting to restore order and end Arab terrorism, the Administrative Committee expressed its conviction that continued uncertainty of government policy represented “the principal factor” contributing to the persistence of unrest, and resulted in the deteriorating economic situation in the country. It therefore urged HMG to make “unmistakably clear, without further delay,” its determination to implement a definite policy in Palestine “consistent with its obligations to the Jewish people.” Elliot still thought the newly announced policy a victory over Whitehall, which had desired a complete “stand-still.” Privately, Ben-Gurion appreciated that Ormsby-Gore’s decision, although reducing the number of workers allowed (from 2,200 in the last eight months), had abolished for the time the overall political maximum; increased the number of — 496 —

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certificates (from 900 in the last eight months) for people with capital; and lifted other restrictions. The communication made it clear that HMG “intends to carry out the partition plan in earnest,” Ben-Gurion concluded, but “I don’t know whether the Government will stand firm all along the line.”39 The Colonial Office remained committed to partition. On March 14, Downie made this clear to Shertok: “It is the intention of His Majesty’s Government that, as soon as the boundaries of the various areas have been defined under an equitable and practicable scheme of partition, and so long as the existing mandate continues in operation, the entry of Jewish immigrants shall be regulated, so far as concerns the non-Arab areas, by the principle of economic absorptive capacity.” Ormsby-Gore was absolutely convinced that partition offered the only solution to the Palestine imbroglio that would comply with HMG’s obligations, but his hands were tied by the Cabinet’s decision of last December that he write to Woodhead giving the Technical Commission having the authority to declare partition unworkable. In a counterthrust, he proposed to Halifax the same day that if the commission so decided, a communication in that vein should be sent to the Cabinet, but not published. Realizing that this would negate its intention to have partition openly declared impracticable, the Foreign Office refused. As a consequence, the Colonial Secretary duly informed Woodhead that if the commission came to that conclusion, it must publicly explain the reasons for its judgment. Soon the new body was officially named the Palestine Partition Commission, “not altogether a tactful title” in the opinion of its secretary. Writing to Douglas G. Harris of the Palestine administration, C. S. of the Colonial Office concluded that “it probably increases the chances of non-cooperation and of their being shot at!”40 Hitler’s entry into Vienna on March 14 to a rousing public welcome, immediately followed by the ruthless extension of Nazi rule over Austria’s 185,000 Jews, accentuated the Zionists’ growing sense of powerlessness. “Who knows if we are not facing a new world catastrophe, more terrible than the one in 1914,” wrote Ben-Gurion to Paula, “but we in Palestine cannot do anything to avert it, and we must prepare ourselves for the difficult days we ourselves shall have to face.” Surrounded by a scarlet rash of swastikas throughout Austria’s capital, with Vienna City Square immediately renamed Adolf Hitler Platz, Jews became subject to German Storm Trooper looting, beatings by their neighbors, evictions, — 497 —

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imprisonment, and deportation to Dachau. “Under the scornful laughter of the Viennese,” recalled Ehud Avriel (then Ueberall), Jewish men and women were forced to scrub away election slogans of a former antiNazi party. The Mauthausen granite quarry was leased from the Vienna municipality in order to build a monumental Führer’s Square in Berlin that would memorialize the Thousand-Year Reich; a concentration camp would soon be put into operation there. On March 26, Göring, head of the Luftwaffe and in control of the economy for German rearmament, announced that Vienna had to be Judenrein (free of Jews) within four years. Thousands besieged local consulates for exit visas, often queuing up the previous evening, when only a total of sixteen Palestine immigration certificates were available for the entire Jewish community. A wave of suicides began to sweep the city.41 Israel Cohen of the WZO’s London office, arriving in Vienna at midday on March 25, provided a vivid outsider’s eye-witness account of the impact of the Anschluss (union) on Austrian Jewry. All Zionist offices had been closed by order of the Gestapo and all Zionist activities suspended until after April 10, the date fixed by Hitler for a plebiscite over union with Germany, replacing ex-Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg’s announcement on March 9 of a plebiscite on Austrian independence. That same morning, a Gestapo official named Adolf Eichmann had interrogated individually every Zionist leader, insisted that a larger number of Jews had to be “dispatched” to Palestine, and placed all Zionist work henceforth under a central direction. At the British Consulate, the woman in charge of Palestine immigration matters for the last seventeen years informed Cohen that all she could do was ask thousands of applicants to fill up forms for Palestine and the British Dominions, and wait patiently for an answer. Six out of the nine members of the Jewish community board had been arrested; the finances of the Gemeinde offices were either taken away by Gestapo functionaries or placed under a bank embargo. For the city’s 170,000 Jews, pendant in the air was “a state of terror.”42 No strong response could be expected from London to the Führer’s first major success in his ideological agenda for Lebensraum, stated unequivocally in the opening page of Mein Kampf (1925). Chamberlain had privately told German Foreign Secretary Joachim von Ribbentrop on March 11 that “once we have all got past this unpleasant affair, and a reasonable solution has been found, it is to be hoped that we can begin — 498 —

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working in earnest towards a German-British understanding.” Although an indignant Halifax had warned before the Anchsluss that a setback in relations would result from the “intolerable” pressures placed by the German Chancellor on his Austrian counterpart with a concentration of German troops on the frontier, Chamberlain agreed with Hitler’s demand that the plebiscite should be postponed, and added that “personally he understood the situation.” Ambassador Sir Nevile Henderson in Berlin informed Göring that Schuschnigg had acted “with precipitate folly” in pressing for a plebiscite on Austrian independence, much to Halifax’s consternation. Yet even Halifax, when informed of the German occupation, paced up and down his office and exclaimed: “Horrible! Horrible! I never thought they would do it!” This personal reaction, seemingly oblivious to the Third Reich’s brutal rule over the past five years, only confirmed Hamilton Fish Armstrong’s judgment that Halifax “is a dangerously well-meaning and unrealistic person.” In the House of Lords, Halifax condemned the Anschluss, but indicated that nothing could be done. Vansittart said as much to Laski on March 15, noting frankly that he could not be optimistic either concerning the Austrian situation or the developments that were likely to follow as regards the large Jewish community in Prague and elsewhere.43 Succor appeared to come on March 24 from across the Atlantic, when the U.S. State Department invited Great Britain, each of the British Dominions, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, Italy and all of the American Republics to a proposed conference. The declared intention was to facilitate the emigration of refugees from Germany and Austria, as well as to establish a new international organization to solve the larger refugee problem. At the outset it was made clear that financing would be undertaken by private organizations; “that no country would be expected or asked to receive a greater number of immigrants than is permitted by its existing legislation”; and that there was no thought of discouraging or interfering with the work of other existing agencies. All the invited governments accepted the invitation with the exception of Italy, the Union of South Africa, and El Salvador. Ultimately, the exclusive French resort town of Evian-les-Bains, the site announced by the State Department on May 9, would be the venue in early July.44 Increasing pressure on the Roosevelt administration since early 1938 explained the background of this initiative. A subsequent — 499 —

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State Department memorandum singled out the journalist Dorothy Thompson and “certain Congressmen with metropolitan constituencies” as responsible, and noted that mounting pubic demands after the Anschluss to help Jews gave every indication of becoming “both exceedingly strong and prolonged.” Herbert Feis, a Jew and Economic Advisor to the Department, became an early advocate of some emergency response; skeptical colleagues included Assistant Secretaries Adolf A. Berle, Jr., George Messersmith, and chief of the Division of Western European Affairs Jay Pierrepont Moffat. On March 18, Roosevelt suggested to his cabinet that the Austrian refugees come in under the combined quota with Germany, and that homes could be found for 10,000-15,000 families if governments appealed to different countries. Eventually, Secretary Hull, Undersecretary Sumner Welles, Moffat, and Messersmith concluded that it would be “far preferable to get out in front and attempt to guide the pressure,” primarily to forestall attempts to have U. S. immigration laws liberalized. After consultation with Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau, Welles suggested the idea of the intergovernmental meeting. FDR gave his approval on March 22, only substituting the adjective “political” in place of “religious and racial” refugees—thereby masking Jewry’s singular catastrophe.45 A steady escalation in Arab violence did not allow the yishuv the luxury of waiting for the Evian Conference, and its leadership took a dramatic step to check the infiltration of terrorist bands across Palestine’s northern border. At 4 a.m. on March 21, a long procession of trucks and cars set out from Kiryat Motzkin in the direction of Hanuta (soon changed to Hanita) on the Lebanese border. Under Hagana Field Company commander Yitzhak Sadeh and two of his deputies, Yigal Alon and Moshe Dayan, some 400 young men of the Hagana’s permanent Field Companies (Hish), including 110 uniformed Jewish supernumerary police, brought materials and lay down a by-road for the newest homa u’migdal settlement. By the day’s end, a high tower and searchlight crowned the temporary 20-dunam encampment, a dining hut was in place, long rows of tents had been pitched, and a strong barbed wire fence encircled the whole. At midnight, a band of 50-80 Arabs attacked, killing supernumerary policeman Yehuda Brenner of Petah Tikva and mortally wounding local commander Ya’akov Berger before being repulsed after a lengthy battle. Shertok, the spearhead since June 1937 in pressing for such settlements, had received MacMichael’s grudging — 500 —

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consent to proceed despite the High Commissioner’s “grave concern” in light of Hanita’s exposed location and “the continuation of unrest in the Acre sub-district.” With Ben-Gurion’s support the previous December to purchase this territory from Syrian owners, Yosef Weitz, director of the Jewish National Fund’s Development and Afforestation Divisions, felt particularly vindicated when witnessing this daring achievement.46 For the American Zionists, the projected refugee conference suggested the possibility of Britain’s lifting the artificial barriers against Jewish entry into Palestine, which had taken almost one-third of the 150,000 Jewish refugees who had fled Germany since 1933. Hailing the “historic act” of Roosevelt and Hull as “a renewal of America’s glorious tradition of asylum for victims of political oppression,” the ZOA asked Washington to make such representations to London as part of the forthcoming international negotiations to aid refugees. While thanking FDR for his “great gesture of good-will,” Wise joined Lipsky in noting to Messersmith, on March 31, that a gathering to consider the question of Jewish refugees perforce had to give consideration to Palestine. The Assistant Secretary responded that “it would be better not to raise the question at this time,” “there was no desire to create the impression that the United States is assuming the sole responsibility for the success of the conference,” and that “it would be most undesirable to create an impression of sectarian interest.” “I am not too hopeful of any considerable results,” wrote Wise to the author Ludwig Lewisohn after this visit, or that “there is such a thing as a Christian conscience to be aroused.” “The world is silent,” while HMG was thinking of a certain offer regarding Palestine “which is [an] insult and crime against us.” Whether it actually would come to pass, Wise concluded, or whether the Zionists could “kill it off before it comes to life” remained to be seen.47 Signals from British officialdom did not offer great promise. In response to a protest from the Arab Women’s Committee in Damascus against partition, MacMichael replied that HMG favored that policy, and he advised that they and their friends cooperate with the government. Yet new Arab gangs continued to come over from Syria into Palestine, leading Va’ad HaLeumi president Ben-Zvi to conclude that London was not using its influence to persuade the French to “clip the Mufti’s wings” and thereby halt the terror. In an interview with World Jewish Congress executive Maurice Perlzweig concerning the tragedy of Austrian Jewry, Halifax “oozed sympathy in the Christian-like spirit which one would — 501 —

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expect from him,” but this was “just a pleasant ‘blah-blah’ on the part” of the Foreign Secretary. Asked in the House of Commons on March 30 if London would evolve some scheme to offer Jews and other European refugees a new home in “a suitable British possession overseas,” OrmsbyGore noted that “there is no territory in the Colonial Empire where any large-scale settlement is practicable.” The governors of a number of colonies had recently been consulted in this regard, and he regretted to say that the replies received so far “show that such openings are like to be few.” In response to Bentwich, whose memorandum observed that the Jews in Germany lived with “the threat of extermination,” Dominions Secretary Malcolm MacDonald responded that he did not think “hopes were very bright” for their increased emigration to New Zealand, South Africa, and Canada.48 As for Palestine, Ormsby-Gore made clear his own views when meeting with the Palestine Partition Commission, now including fourth member J. Thomas Reid, on March 30. He remained convinced of the necessity of partition, but the country was too small to permit the creation, at least in the earlier stages, of “wholly independent units.” Rather, any workable scheme had to provide for an “umbrella” of effective machinery for cooperation between the Arab and Jewish self-governing areas and a British one. Jerusalem, permanently, and Haifa, at least temporarily, would be retained under British mandate. Since Christian churches worldwide, and particularly the Vatican, would oppose placing Nazareth in an Arab or Jewish state, that city should remain under British administration. Inclusion of the Acre Sub-District in the Jewish State might result in “its early disruption and failure for security reasons.” The Negev could never be developed by the Arabs, while its strategic importance vis-à-vis the country’s external frontiers required that it be kept at present under British mandate. To Woodward’s question about taking into account the effect of any proposals they might make regarding the Arab and Jewish world outside Palestine, the Colonial Secretary replied that the commission would necessarily have to do so, adding (as the Cabinet had instructed him) that the members had been asked “not only to evolve the best scheme of partition, but also to declare whether it was in their view a practicable one.” Ormsby-Gore agreed with Woodward that the commission should give opponents of partition an opportunity to submit evidence, but to make it clear that the group’s task was “to frame a scheme of partition — 502 —

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and not to discuss the principle of partition de novo.” A most important part of the commission’s work would be to investigate the possibilities of voluntary transfer, with substantial prospects of success in the neighborhood of Jaffa. To Waterfield’s enquiries, the Colonial Secretary did not think that British retention of the Negev would discourage Jewish investment in that area, or that “umbrella” machinery necessitated HMG’s assumption of financial responsibility for developing social services within the Arab and Jewish States. In replies to Reid, Ormsby-Gore thought that the group would certainly be justified in recommending the forms of government most suitable for adoption by the two states, but the members were not authorized to hear evidence regarding alternative schemes to partition or to suggest alternative proposals in their report. In conclusion, Ormsby-Gore asserted that his “umbrella” proposal was essential to the transition stage of an effective partition plan. He preferred that the High Commissioner should be granted limited legislative and executive powers, aided by an Advisory Body in which the three units of government would be represented. Weizmann had not been fundamentally opposed to such a conception, the Colonial Secretary noted, and both Arabs and Jews fundamentally demanded self-government, an eventuality foreseen in Article 22 of the League Covenant. Weizmann had also told him confidentially that if the Jews obtained a self-governing state, they would be “very ready” to consider entering a federation of East Mediterranean States “on equal terms.” Such a project would only become a practical possibility, however, when Syria and Lebanon, together with Arab Palestine and Transjordan, became recognized as independent states, and any such federation should give the maximum possible powers to the several units.49 Returning to his home in Rehovot, Weizmann confessed to Marks the fear that “we may be wiped out” before the British made up their mind to take action. Needing to assume that the Jewish State would come, he urged the purchase of another 14,000 dunams in the north, the growth and storage of sufficient essential foods, and the creation of a heavy chemical industry—all possible only with something in the nature of a war loan. He warned Wise and friends that “the rest of the world is closed and more than ever we shall be looking to America if salvation is at all to come to us.” Organizing a large armed force on modern lines, joined to building up an industrial base, would enable the — 503 —

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yishuv to make a real contribution to the defense of the area. Just as America’s entry had brought about victory in the Great War of 19141918, Weizmann believed that “history will have to repeat itself again if European civilization is at all to be saved.” As soon as a formidable Palestinian Jewish force “had won their spurs” fighting for the Empire, he informed a British official in Alexandria, it would be their hope and ambition to acquire “some big territory for their eventual occupation” beyond the limited borders set out in the Peel Report in order to receive Jews from the countries where they were no longer welcome. To accomplish this, Weizmann intended to go to the United States in June to “work up” the Jews there to form a para-military organization to influence the United States to join Great Britain in the event of a war.50 The idea of creating the nucleus of a Jewish army in Palestine had been suggested by Ben-Gurion to London colleagues one week earlier, but he focused on the immediate political dangers facing the movement when addressing the Mapai Political Committee in Tel-Aviv on April 4. As he saw it, the British fear of war and defeat in war, reflected also in Chamberlain’s “victory” over Eden, raised HMG’s desire to avoid “complications” in the world. London felt that it could no longer carry the “heavy burden” of Zionism, viewing Palestine as a small matter compared with the great questions like German relations that concerned the present government. The Labour Party had not one political figure of weight; its leader, Clement Attlee, was “an average man” who favored Palestine as a spiritual center, rather than seeing Zionism as a solution to the saving of the Jews. Roosevelt had become “an anti-Zionist” because he also did not grasp that connection, and doubted Eretz Yisrael’s capability of receiving millions of Jewish refugees in need. Within the next six months, Ben-Gurion concluded, 200 capitalists had to be brought to Palestine, thereby improving the economy and enabling a large immigration. As to the Jewish commonwealth, he could not say with certitude “Yes, it will rise!” Chamberlain had promised Weizmann that Palestine would not come up in the Anglo-Italian negotiations, but this also remained uncertain, especially since Rendel, whom Ben-Gurion considered “our greatest enemy in the Foreign Office,” was directly involved.51 Chamberlain confirmed Ben-Gurion’s analysis of British appeasement soon enough. On April 8, during the debate in the House of Commons, the Prime Minister explained that his government did not seek to divide Europe into two opposing, armed blocs, “which can only — 504 —

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end in war.” That policy seemed “dangerous and stupid”; “we have to live” with dictatorships, taking every opportunity “to remove any genuine and legitimate grievance that may exist.” As for the negotiations with Italy, realizing that Rome could even “tip the scale” against Britain regarding influence in Palestine, Rendel tried to get Italy to agree to a formula that was devised “mainly for window-dressing purposes.” When asked to “refrain from any attempts to create difficulty for His Majesty’s Government either in the framing of policy for or in the administration of Palestine,” the Italians balked at the clause following the word “Government.” Their experts noted that partition contradicted the mandate charter (which Italy had ratified), and they wanted wording which would safeguard Italy’s prestige in the Muslim and Arab world. Ultimately, a “verbal assurance” was given on April 16 that Italy would not create embarrassments for HMG; the British, at their end, would “preserve and protect” Italy’s legitimate interests in the Promised Land. In effect, through these “Easter Accords” London granted Rome de jure recognition of the Fascist Impero which was established in East Africa after the conquest of Addis Ababa in May 1936. In turn, Italy toned down its anti-British propaganda, halted its financial assistance to the Mufti, and dropped the plan to supply the Arab rebels in Palestine with arms.52 After “gradually picking up the threads again” in Palestine, Weizmann gave Ormsby-Gore his impressions in a long letter of April 7. As the warm season and the date of the commission’s arrival approached, he foresaw that a new “campaign of frightfulness” against the yishuv might arise on the highways and in the more remote districts of the country. One could not underrate the extent to which the peace of Palestine had been undermined by the workings of “the infernal machine” which Haj Amin had managed to build up in his place of “retirement”; both Arab villagers and effendis were tired of the terrorists and wanted peace. This evil had to be dealt with “at the root,” and the French should expel Haj Amin from Lebanon and Syria. The Arab rebels had taken heart from the January White Paper, viewing it as a triumph of their tactics. The position of the Jews “is growing daily more desperate,” and “the ever existing anti-Semitic front coincides roughly with the totalitarian front.” A Jewish state that could offer a serious defense force of 40,000 men now and a well-developed industry, joined to American Jewish support, would strengthen the democracies. The position was analogous to that — 505 —

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of 1914-1917, “if anything much more serious for everybody concerned and for us in particular.” This again presented “a very urgent reason for speed and action,” Weizmann concluded.53 That same day, Samuel informed Ormsby-Gore of his recent efforts in Palestine and Egypt to find out the prospects of the acceptance by Arabs and Jews of any alternative to partition. His own “Forty-Ten Formula” (aiming for the Jews to comprise 40 percent of Palestine’s population after ten years), first presented in his House of Lords speech of July 1937, had met with Abd al-Hadi’s retort that the only result would be to bring in 400,000 more Jews to strengthen their demand for an ultimate majority. Abd al-Hadi would only accept the formula if it were permanent, to which Samuel observed that the Jewish side would never agree to this condition, and that in any case it was useless to attempt to lay down conditions for all time. Prince Mohammed Ali agreed with Samuel, but attached great importance to a political union between Palestine, Transjordan, Syria, and Lebanon, and a sufficient guarantee of the Muslim holy places in the event of the termination of the mandate. Magnes backed Samuel’s formula, as did Winterton, now a member of the Cabinet. The Anglican bishop of Jerusalem strongly opposed any form of partition on religious grounds. Both Arabs and Jews would have to make some sacrifice if there was to be any agreement at all, Samuel continued, with a review after an interval of years. His plan would enable the present Jewish population to be doubled in a decade, apart from their possible settlement elsewhere in the Arab States. HMG was definitely committed to partition, Samuel acknowledged, and it had also stated clearly that “the door has not been closed against that possibility.” However, if the two parties were prepared to accept some alternative, such an initiative to be undertaken by the Arab princes with London’s invitation, then a desirable “fresh start along a different line” could be pursued. If the Palestine Partition Commission excluded the Galilee or a large part of it from the Jewish State, it might well tip the balance—”already wavering”—against the Zionists’ current support for partition. That would greatly worsen the prospect of any settlement on the Forty-Ten basis or anything similar, however. It seemed, therefore, that action should be taken now; there were “various intermediaries who, if encouraged, would be very glad to explore the ground on both sides.” Any alternative plan must involve a continuation of the British mandate over the whole of Palestine, This would lead to another post— 506 —

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ponement of the establishment of self-governing institutions, Samuel added, although if the crucial question of immigration were removed from controversy for a decade, the prospects even in that regard might be improved. Meanwhile, steps could be taken to strengthen communal institutions among both Arabs and Jews, perhaps following the Turkish example of a millet (district) system for dealing with matters like education and religion combined with the principle of geographical areas for the greater part of municipal administration and certain other subjects. This arrangement, he concluded, might prove “a fairly satisfactory solution of a problem for which no satisfactory solution can in any event be devised.”54 On April 8, Weizmann had his first interview with MacMichael. The new High Commissioner complained about the Mufti’s conversion of his Lebanon retreat into “something like a military base for creating trouble in Palestine” and regretted the long period of transition, which precluded essential, definite action. The negotiating by unauthorized persons with Haj Amin was not only “quite useless” but simply gave him prestige. “Partition,” in MacMichael’s opinion, conveyed something negative and destructive, as opposed to the term “Jewish State”; the Arabs, whose tactics were doing themselves “a great deal of harm,” had better take what they could get “while the getting is good.” This gave Weizmann an opportunity to repeat the gist of his thoughts to OrmsbyGore that they should focus on the yishuv’s defense and colonization, working on the assumption that “the Jewish state was already there.” He was very pleased to see his host taking up this point “with lightning rapidity,” MacMichael remarking that he realized the international implication of the Zionists’ work in Palestine and was happy to hear that Weizmann intended to go to America. In all, Weizmann found the High Commissioner “a simple, unassuming, modest man, with very little formalism about him, willing and anxious to learn and understand, and certainly firm in his views.”55 When mailing off this report to Dugdale, Weizmann also put forward his tentative emergency program, which he was anxious to carry through by the end of the summer. First, the Zionists had to buy as much land as possible, particularly in “both poles” of the future Jewish commonwealth and in the Beisan (Bet Sh’an) area, to be occupied almost immediately. Second, something like 20,000 men to start would be equipped with the most elementary weapons like rifles, ammunition, — 507 —

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and transport, and a few airplanes had to be purchased. Munitions also had to be manufactured, which would mean above all a heavy chemical industry. Finally, some reorganization of the yishuv’s agricultural work had to be undertaken, with a view of growing food and fibers so that Palestine’s Jews should not be exposed to the danger of starvation in case communication with the outside word became “impeded.” A figure of about £2 million would be required. He recalled the raising by Éamon de Valera, when he had been a rebel, of millions of dollars from his Irish compatriots in America in order to fight the English, as well as de Valera’s obtaining a war loan from America, which he was repaying then as head of the Irish Free State. While the Zionist movement’s diplomatic efforts with the British may have some effect, Weizmann thought that nothing was more impressive than “the creation of solid facts.” When HMG saw our seriousness and determination in this respect, they would value it and “perhaps appreciate it deeper than our mere talking about it, however convincing these conversations may be.” “I believe we can do it,” the letter to Dugdale ended.56 Yet Zionist fortunes appeared slim at that point. Wise was tempted to discuss Palestine at Roosevelt’s first conference on April 13 with representatives of the three major faiths to discuss the refugee issue, but decided after talking with Brandeis and Messersmith to postpone this subject until a further meeting. He also regretted that the President still spoke of “over-populated lands” and “unoccupied areas,” probably due to recent “inspiration” from the Polish Ambassador and from Jewish financier Bernard Baruch, who proposed a “United States of Africa” to take in “all refugees” from Europe. (Realizing that Baruch sought thereby to avoid making the matter a “Jewish” issue, a strongly disapproving Brandeis felt that this reflected both his lack of knowledge of the Jewish question and his fear of antisemitism, which was rising in America.) Obtaining no further information from Battershill in an interview one week later, Weizmann tried to reassure himself: MacMichael had told him that the commission’s notepaper was headed “Partition Commission”—”that must mean something!” On April 24, a UPA conference urged Hull that the Evian participants should promote the settlement of 100,000 Jews in Palestine annually for the next five years. Welles replied to Solomon Goldman, soon to be elected president of the ZOA, with the reminder that no attending country “would be expected or asked to receive a greater number of immigrants than is permitted — 508 —

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by its existing legislation.” “All practical phases of the general problem of facilitating the emigration of political refugees” would be given full consideration “within the limitations of the terms of reference,” assured the Undersecretary.57 In addition, Arab terrorism did not abate, leading three Betar members from Rosh Pina to launch a retaliatory attack on April 21 for the recent murders of ten Jews who had been traveling in the north. Avraham Schein, Shalom Zuravin, and Shlomo Ben-Yosef, the last named having arrived with fifty-three other comrades in September 1937 aboard the first Betar ship to challenge British immigration quotas, greatly admired accounts of past Jewish armed struggle by uncompromising neinsager and Hebrew University professor Joseph Klausner; the Brit HaBiryonim founders’ exhortation for national redemption by revolt against England and by unqualified sacrifice; and the Betar hymn bearing Jabotinsky’s climatic line “to die or to conquer the mountain.” As an Arab bus came by at 1:30 p.m. on the road from Safed, they fired guns and threw a homemade bomb. While Ben-Yosef’s bomb did not explode and the shots missed their mark, the driver increased his downhill speed and alerted the Rosh Pina police station. The trio made for a deserted cow shed 800 meters away. Very soon thereafter, constables arrived at their hiding place and placed them under arrest. Before being imprisoned in the Acre fortress, they proclaimed during interrogation that they had sought retribution for the killing of Jews and would go to the gallows “with joy as national heroes,” their action “a tremendous political demonstration.” Betar and the Irgun were taken entirely by surprise, since the three had acted on their own initiative. Four days earlier, an Irgun bomb that was thrown into an Arab café in Haifa left one dead and four wounded. The militant organization dissociated itself from the Rosh Pina action, announcing that none of its operations had ended with “zero results and [such] serious failure as this”; such empty gestures, independent steps, and “child’s play” were not acceptable. From an opposing political perspective, the self-proclaimed “responsible bodies” of the yishuv roundly condemned the assault. Davar’s editors went so far as to declare on April 26 that if Jewish hands were involved, then this “stabbing in the back” of the yishuv by underground, isolated elements made it obligatory to “uproot all bacteria of the destructive insanity.” For the Jewish Agency, the youngsters’ repudiation of havlaga represented “a breach of — 509 —

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national discipline.” More ominously, an official statement went on, the “morally reprehensible” attack “seriously endangers the entire yishuv, threatens its peace and progress, and embarrasses it in its fight against terrorism.”58 Reading daily reports about the spread of antisemitic persecution across the Continent led Jews to increasingly fear what the morrow would bring. A recently enacted law threatened the loss of nationality for all Polish citizens who had been living abroad for five years, and Rumania was considering similar legislation; Warsaw and Bucharest spoke of prohibiting kosher slaughter entirely. The New York Times told of fifty-one Jews from the Burgenland eastern border zone who were driven from Austria by Storm Troopers and set adrift in the Danube without food or warm clothing. They were given shelter in Czechoslovakia but then expelled within twenty-four hours and sent across the Hungarian frontier, where they were sent back to Austria and put in jail. The official Nazi organ Völkischer Beobachter announced that all Jews on German soil would face “systematic economic eradication.” Upon returning from a visit to Vienna and Berlin at the request of the British Council for German Jewry, the pro-Zionist Wyndham Deedes, first Chief Secretary under the Palestine Mandate, wrote to Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs R. A. Butler (with a copy sent to Moffat) that a Jewish community of some 4 million Jews in middle and southern Europe faced an identical fate: “bitter hostility, which may take the form in one place of social ostracism and economic boycott, in another of persecution and cruelty naked and unashamed.” “It seems to me,” wrote an anxious Wise to Goldmann, “that the Nazis will begin in Czechoslovakia even before Rumania and Hungary fall into their maws.”59 Unknown to Wise, Anglo-French talks in London on April 28-29 produced a decision to pressure Czech President Edouard Beneš to make concessions regarding Hitler’s demand for autonomy for the Sudeten Germans. Once the government of Edouard Daladier took office on April 10, with Georges Bonnet as France’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Paris moved decisively toward appeasing Berlin. Butler may have sympathetically confided in his former Cambridge University classmate Maurice Perlzweig that Hitler “had ceased to be normal” regarding the treatment of Jews, but the German Embassy reported that Butler recognized that the Third Reich would attain “her next goal” with the Czechs, though the manner in which it was done would be vital. Chamberlain — 510 —

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leaked to journalists his readiness to see the Sudetenland ceded to Germany, and harshly informed subsequent questioners in the House of Commons that he would “neither admit nor deny the truth of [these] stories.” According to a secret report that reached the American Jewish Committee, British War Minister Leslie Hore-Belisha had remarked privately that Czechoslovakia’s fate was sealed by the Anschluss and her future lay in the hands of Germany. Germany “is an insatiable power who will continue her march towards the East,” he declared, but there would be no war to “head her off” before she was satisfied by her expansion, since “democratic States do not declare war.” Hore-Belisha thought that Britain, unlike Germany, would be reasonable on the subject of colonies although, so far as he knew, Chamberlain believed that “Germany would not make insatiable demands but would be reasonable.”60

On May 1, Shertok presented a worrisome report to the Jewish Agency Executive in Jerusalem. Of the 400 entry permits that Ormsby-Gore had granted to halutzim in the new immigration schedule, only 100 were received to date; the Agency had 12,000 such youngsters in hakhshara (training) programs abroad awaiting aliya, 8,000 of them for more than four years. A maximum of 200 certificates had been fixed for “dependent relatives” other than wives and children, but the supply was already exhausted in three weeks because of the unforeseen crisis that befell Austria’s Jews immediately on the heels of the Anschluss. As for the Woodhead Commission, following its arrival on April 27 it had begun its work with a communiqué requesting written statements from all interested parties, inviting the community to give evidence in public or in private, and announcing that it would immediately go out to tour the country. The Executive did not receive from the commission any information on the itinerary of the journey. Shertok quickly informed Harris, the mandatory representative attached to the commission, that the Agency wished the group to realize that the duty with which they were entrusted “is liable to decide the fate of the country.” That decision was “impossible without the agreement of the Jewish representation,” which was why the Executive requested a meeting in order to fix procedure and to be present during the commission’s visits in some of the yishuv’s settlements.61 — 511 —

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The same day, Nahum Vilensky of the Agency’s Arab Department reported about the demonstrations against partition, timed for the commission’s arrival, which had taken place over the past three days in Cairo and Alexandria. Monies from the Mufti financed the protests. Led by Palestinian Arab students, the crowds reached into the hundreds. Some 3,000 also came to the Al-Azhar mosque for prayers in memory of “the holy martyrs in Palestine.” At a meeting in Cairo sponsored by Muslim Youth, the speakers openly called for organizing terrorist bands from Egypt to slip across the border and fight for the Arab cause in Palestine. Warning that the “grasping, lowly Jews” posed an expansionist threat as well to Iraq, Syria, and even Egypt, Dr. Shahabander called on all the forces of Islam to fight against the Jewish-Zionist danger. The hundreds in the crowd raged when Abed al-Hamid Abaza, one of Abdullah’s business associates, charged that the British had raped hundreds of Arab women, murdered hundreds of children, and destroyed tens of villages. Yet when he advocated a total halt to Jewish immigration and land purchases in Palestine, the Palestinian Arab students shouted “down with the traitor!” and “we demand immediate, full independence!” Forced to leave the hall, Abaza managed to add that, other than his suggestion, he did not see any other realistic solution. The meeting endorsed a special fund to aid Palestine’s Arabs and sending telegrams of support in the name of the Muslims of Egypt and the surrounding countries, as well as a protest to MacMichael against partition and the mandatory administration’s policy toward the Arabs of Palestine.62 A discouraged Weizmann prepared Draft III on May 3 of “Notes on the Present Political Situation.” The commission’s “real task” was still not entirely clear, and the precise procedure to be adopted also remained obscure. The situation of European Jewry had become “much aggravated” since publication of the Peel Report. That document’s transfer proposal had now become questionable, as did its inclusion (to which some local British officials objected) of the Galilee in the Jewish State. As for the “minority” problem,” Weizmann asserted that its proportion would steadily diminish because of constant Jewish immigration to the Jewish commonwealth; Jewish experience as a minority and the fact that Jews would continue to be “hostages” in almost every Arab and European country should be sufficient indication that their treatment of minorities would leave little to be desired. He principally feared that the commission would, in advance of any consultation with the Jewish Agency, — 512 —

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work out some plan “falling far short even of the Peel recommendations (as modified in my letter to Mr. Ormsby-Gore of July 20, 1937).” The Zionist leadership would be “bound to refuse” such a scheme. Any acceptable and workable partition plan would involve “difficulties and dangers,” Weizmann acknowledged. Still, he remained certain that the present crisis was one in which the “line of least resistance” must prove, in the end, to be “the most difficult, the most dangerous, and the most costly of all possible alternatives.”63 The following day, Weizmann sent a very lengthy memorandum via MacMichael to the Permanent Mandates Commission about the “period of chequered development” which the Jewish National Home had experienced during the last year. The government’s “prolonged inaction” regarding Palestine’s political future, and particularly the “state of suspense” that developed between the Royal Commission’s report and HMG’s enunciation of a new, “undefined” policy, had undermined confidence, led to the renewal of terrorist activities, and hampered economic enterprise. At the same time, nineteen new agricultural settlements were established; a second Dead Sea potash plant and the Reading Power Station at Tel Aviv were created; the Tel Aviv port was now opened for passenger traffic; and exports surpassed those of the previous year by more than £2 million. Weizmann urged that the mandatory take immediate steps to assist with long-term low-interest loans to yishuv enterprises; give Tel-Aviv and other municipalities the authority to raise loans for public works; spur the Zionists’ reclamation of the Huleh region; and especially remove without delay the “arbitrary limitations” recently placed on Jewish immigration, all the more imperative in view of the calamities that had overtaken large sections of the Jewish Diaspora. Immigration to Palestine, he declared, was at present “almost the only ray of hope in the lives of hundreds of thousands of Jews threatened with extinction.”64 Ormsby-Gore did not provide much hope in an interview with Brodetsky and Lourie on May 4. “There was no denying,” he began, in what would be his last meeting on Palestine matters as Colonial Secretary, that from Syria down to Aden, Palestine had become “a principal factor” in bringing about “strained relations” between Britain and the Arab world. The dangers posed by the Mufti were clear, including his connections with the Muslims of India. The French had not acceded to British representations about Haj Amin’s activities, however, and — 513 —

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he asked the two Zionists to furnish further evidence in writing of the Mufti’s machinations. Italy had undertaken not to “embarrass” HMG in the mandatory’s administration of the Promised Land. So far as the Evian Conference and Jewish emigration from Austria was concerned, he advised that those anxious to help make their appeal on “broad philanthropic grounds, to the British Empire as a whole,” rather than to particular territories such as Palestine. The Foreign Office was “very nervous” about raising the question of immigration to Palestine, yet “with regard to the general issue, they were our friends.” He personally had been studying the possibility of Madagascar, but the 15,000 Frenchmen there were “taking very much the line” of the Kenya settlers that “there must be no influx of foreign elements.” As for the next sixmonth schedule for immigration to Palestine, Ormsby-Gore could hold out no hope for an alteration in the principles laid down with regard to the current period.65 Weizmann’s anxiety would not dissipate. He took heart from an hour’s talk two days later with MacMichael, who again appeared “very reasonable, very modest, and friendly.” The High Commissioner advised that the Jews would get much more if they pressed for the “beginning” of the state quickly but not “finishing it”; he considered the Jewish State “a more much complex organization” which required careful handling, but “it does not matter about the Arabs”—”you can turn out a goat into the desert and it will carry on.” General Robert H. Haining, who had replaced Wavell as G.O.C. in April, told Weizmann that the “Malcolm frontiers,” extending the Peel boundaries to include land east of the Jordan and the whole Beisan Valley within the Jewish commonwealth, “are about the right ones.” Yet, Weizmann bared his soul to Dugdale, the Jews did not understand “the apocalyptic nature of the times.” The Austrian Jews had an earlier warning prior to the Anschluss and did not take it. Nor did Zionist friends in London and elsewhere realize that “every minute may bring about either annihilation or Redemption or both.” He then added in an even more despondent vein: Part of us will be destroyed and on their bones New Judea may arise! It is all terrible but it is so—I feel it even here, and can think of nothing else, but the others, even here, are much more placid when it comes to fundamentals although terribly fussy about puny matters. A — 514 —

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new leader should arise in Israel now who should sound the call; we are already old and used up I’m afraid.66 MacMichael had no doubts that the renewed wave of Arab terrorism rested primarily on the Mufti’s shoulders. Writing to Ormsby-Gore on May 12, the High Commissioner asserted that among the many factors that continued to militate against the restoration of law and order, no factor “operates more consistently and potently than the safe ensconcement of Haj Amin at Junieh” and “the impunity with which he and other Palestinian émigrés in Lebanon and Syria enjoy in plotting against this Government.” The people of Palestine (including Arab opposition leaders) concluded that since the British and French were allies, they must have arrived at an understanding to leave the Mufti and his entourage unmolested, HMG intending to bring him back at the appropriate moment in order to secure a solution for Palestine with his goodwill. Secret intelligence reports from various sources confirmed the Mufti’s role. MacMichael proposed that either Haj Amin and his supporters be removed to an inaccessible part of Syria, or he should be deported to France and his followers ordered out of Syria. He preferred the second alternative. If the French balked, Palestine’s frontiers with Syria should be sealed, as Consul Mackereth in Damascus had recommended, and the French be so informed.67 By then, the Agency had received information that the commission was in receipt of a partition memorandum by Harris indicating a “Jewish State” without Haifa and the Galilee (except the Huleh salient). Weizmann, who called this the “Wauchope Plan,” now heard that Husseini had gone to Berlin, ostensibly to consult his doctor. Writing to Col. Harry L. Nathan MP, he challenged the “very pernicious doctrine” still preached by a section of the Foreign Office that the Zionists were causing HMG a great deal of trouble. It was largely the yishuv’s achievements that had made the country what it is—”one of the most important links in the chain of Imperial communications.” The fundamental reason why the British found the Arabs “difficult” was the mandatory’s preference over the last five or six years to “defer and delay” any final decision; the yishuv was prepared to take over the defense of its allotted area, yet given small opportunity in this respect. All the Arab kings except for Ibn Saud were “merely puppets,” but Weizmann was certain that the desert ruler would acquiesce in any policy that London adopted — 515 —

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firmly. Given proper support to develop, a pro-British Jewish state could create “a reservoir of strength” that could be of “incalculable influence” on the position in the Eastern Mediterranean, particularly in times of crisis. A dozen Jewish settlements in the Galilee hills, on the model of Hanita, would make the northern frontier infinitely more secure. Weizmann doubted that the policy of the government “is determined, and is consistently and unhesitatingly applied,” however.68 Entertaining no illusions about Arab aversion to any Jewish sovereignty, the Agency leadership ordered that a plan be drawn up for the yishuv’s security. Two months earlier, Ben-Gurion had cautioned Musa Husseini that if confronted by war, Jewish youth in Palestine and from abroad could form an army of 500,000, which, if properly armed, would even be able to conquer all of Palestine. The Arab world of 80 million feared that the 2 million-strong yishuv would serve as a support for the British Empire, Husseini replied, and it would never sign a treaty with a Jewish state. “Never” did not exist in history, Ben-Gurion countered. The committee appointed in conjunction with the Agency and the Hagana high command realized that the topographical area itself assigned by the Peel Report to a partitioned Jewish commonwealth presented “difficult and complex” challenges in terms of defense. Most pointedly, the members concluded that Palestine’s Arabs, at least in the first years, would appear as a constant threat, and that the 10 million Arabs (excluding Egypt) who surrounded Palestine would “always be a serious threatening factor.” The group recommended, inter alia, that immediate steps be taken to set up a Jewish force within three years, supported by a Jewish militia of 40,000. Its report was presented to the Executive on May 15. A related memorandum about the yishuv’s future role in British Imperial defense plans found warm support in British military circles, Haining telling London Times military expert Liddell Hart that we ought “to press on with the policy of creating a Jewish State and arming it, as a bastion of the British Empire in the Middle East.”69 Some straws in the wind raised Zionist expectations. Hearing on May 16 that Chamberlain had just appointed pro-partitionist Malcolm MacDonald the new Colonial Secretary, Dugdale thought this “probably the best appointment that could be made from the Jewish point of view.” In addition, under Tegart’s command, the yishuv Solel Boneh cooperative began building a 75-kilometer barbed wire fence with forts and pillboxes to reduce the infiltration of terrorist bands across — 516 —

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the northern border. Concurrently, Wingate was busy secretly training his “special night squads,” mainly consisting of Hagana members and British soldiers under British command, to guard the Haifa-Mosul oil pipeline and go on the offensive against villages supporting terrorism. They would begin operations the next month.70 Weizmann, Ben-Gurion, Shertok, and Joseph met with the commission for the first time on May 16, to hear that only the nature of the partition plan would be discussed. Woodhead et al. indicated, at the same time, that they would not consult with the Agency during their discussions or after they had reached their conclusions. The commission agreed to disclose to the Agency the mandatory’s statistical and economic recommendations but not its political views, leading Weizmann to reply: “What business had the Administration to have political views? They have to implement Government policy.” At lunch on May 18, Haining assured Weizmann that he need not worry about the Galilee, and that the Arabs had about as much chance of securing the area south of Tel Aviv “as to bring the moon down.”71 The prospects for threatened European Jewry appeared far less promising. A decree of April 27 had ordered all Jews under Germany’s control to register their property by June 30, and authorized Göring to use this property “in conformity with the economic interests of Germany.” When Perlzweig raised the fact in Geneva that hundreds of thousands of Rumanian Jews were in danger of losing their nationality, the head of Whitehall’s Southern Department was “studiously reticent” about the World Jewish Congress getting involved in an “internal matter.” The strongly anti-Nazi Georges Mandel, France’s Colonial Minister, appeared interested to have 4,000 of his fellow Jews come to New Caledonia in the first year and 12,000 to Madagascar, but only on the condition that Great Britain would sanction the entry of at least 36,000 into Palestine, and that the United States would admit as many Jewish refugees as did France. In May, after outlawing shehita, Hungary restricted the ratio of Jews in intellectual professions to 20 percent, and maximized their number to this amount for commercial, financial, and industrial companies having more than ten intellectual employees.72 Bentwich found that Roosevelt’s proposal for the Evian Conference “mystified” League officials, who had received as yet no communication at all about the projected gathering. Further, Whitehall’s advisor on League affairs, Roger Makins, thought that London would be unwilling — 517 —

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to consider participating in any guarantee of a loan for the purposes of emigration or settlement. The League Council did express its “high appreciation of the noble initiative of the Government of the United States.” It resolved that, in order not to “hamper or prejudge” any decisions that might be reached by the meeting at Evian, “everything possible” relating to refugee matters was to be adjourned until after the Conference.73 While maintaining silence as to the administration’s specific plans for the Conference, Washington took a guarded approach. Rather than accept Welles’s suggestion that Hull and Welles head the American delegation, FDR chose Myron C. Taylor, a personal friend and a former president of the U.S. Steel Company with no experience in international affairs. Roosevelt’s message to the B’nai B’rith convention dinner on May 9 did proclaim that “except in so far as we deplore ill treatment of human beings anywhere, the domestic policies of other nations are of no concern to the United States. When, however, alien influences seek to undermine the foundations of our own institutions we become definitely concerned.” At the first meeting of the Presidential Advisory Committee on Political Refugees (PACPR) on May 16, Messersmith noted that the government was “averse” to having all the work of refugees “dumped” on the Intergovernmental Committee to be created at Evian. That Committee, at least at the outset, should only concern itself with political refugees from Germany and Austria. The government would not provide aid to emigration and prospective emigrants; “little positive action” could be expected from the country’s present quotas and visa practice. Responding to a suggestion from Wise and McDonald, the newly elected PACPR chairman, about having the British increase the immigration schedule for Palestine, Messersmith questioned the advisability of Taylor taking up the question with his British counterpart, even informally. Not surprisingly, when the Pro-Palestine Federation of America sought a message from the White House in support of open Jewish immigration into Palestine, Appointments Secretary Marvin McIntyre replied thus: “as the president has so recently shown his sympathy with oppressed minorities through the appointment of an American committee for political refugees,” it would be greatly appreciated if he could be excused.74 By then, the Woodhead Commission had in hand Abdullah’s con— 518 —

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fidential plan for solving the Palestine problem. His memorandum of May 22, shared with MacMichael the previous day, called for a United Arab Kingdom to be established for Palestine and Transjordan under an Arab monarchy “capable of carrying out its duties and executing its obligations.” A British-Arab-Jewish commission would draw up a map for autonomous Jewish areas; Jews would be represented in a parliament and cabinet proportionate to their numbers. Jewish immigration, “on a reasonable scale,” would be limited to the Jewish areas, with no land purchases beyond that territory. British forces should continue their presence for a decade. After ten years, the Arabs would have the right to permit Jewish immigration and “mixing” in their areas, by then arriving at and implementing a final decision. To Abd al-Hadi, who noted that publication of the document by Al-Ahram’s correspondent in Jaffa sullied the Emir’s name, Abdullah argued that personal religious and national duty demanded his taking this step. Only he, a pioneer in the Arab revolt against the Turks, had prevented Jewish immigration into Transjordan. Palestine, abandoned without someone to worry and to advise about the country’s well-being, was currently “breathing its last”; if “providential mercy” were not forthcoming, Arabs would have to prepare for its funeral prayer service.75 Weizmann, appearing before the commission with Ben-Gurion, Shertok, and Joseph, took up the cudgels for Zionism on May 24-25. Their more than thirty memoranda had already been submitted, except for one on transfer, which was omitted because the Agency’s Population Exchange Committee could not translate theory into practice. For an hour and a half, Weizmann first presented a tour of the movement’s history, the reality of the “Arab problem,” the reasons for the insecurity besetting Palestine from within and without, and the pressing Jewish condition worldwide. Following his impressive address, the commission members spent this and another session asking about the future Jewish State’s treatment of Arabs and other minorities; the Jewish commonwealth’s absorptive capacity; and the security of the state and its foreign relations. The group replied that their commonwealth would be a democracy, offering equal and full rights to all, but concentrating on achieving a Jewish majority in one year’s time. Arab labor and government employment would also receive favorable treatment. Although “simply worn out,” Weizmann went on to emphasize the Galilee as essential for the Jewish State, also declaring that the Negev, “certainly” — 519 —

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under British mandate, must be an area of Jewish settlement. When questioned about Jerusalem, the Zionists responded that they wanted the modern Jewish section, but would surely not contest British control of the Old City. At the end, Weizmann announced to a startled commission that he had to leave for abroad on June 2. He agreed to return if necessary.76 While the commission’s request for an Agency memorandum on transfer went unfulfilled, Edward A. Norman pursued his own daring plan. The thirty-eight-year-old Norman, treasurer of the Urban League and manager of his family’s various financial interests, maintained a keen interest in the social-cultural welfare of Palestine and its people. Without Palestine’s successful development “as the land of the Jews,” he believed that Jews everywhere would eventually be forced down once again “in a state analogous to the ghetto.” The previous summer, he had authored a memorandum suggesting “a substantial immigration” of Palestinian Arabs skilled in agriculture to strengthen Iraq’s general economy and to settle on large areas of available, uncultivated land there. Warburg and some others encouraged Norman to find a British non-Jew who would also be “persona grata” to Baghdad, and who might be able to plant the idea in the minds of leading Iraqis. Eventually, he found H. Montague Bell, former London Times foreign correspondent and later editor-in-chief of the important weekly periodical Great Britain and the East, who knew everyone of influence in Iraq. Sympathetic to Norman’s project, Bell spent January through March 1938, traveling throughout Iraq, having an audience with the king and the entire cabinet, and arousing considerable interest in the idea. Now home in England, Bell planned to write articles about Iraq’s need for immigration in the near future. If he felt that a visit in the autumn would further the scheme, Norman intended to send him back for a longer stay. At least a year must probably pass before it could be said with assurance that the Iraqi government would cooperate, Norman confidentially informed Brandeis, but indications at present were “favorable.”77 “Re-living the Middle Ages” with “everything that is inhuman, savage,” wrote Henrietta Szold to her sisters, Europe’s Jews could scarcely wait for time’s passing. In Vienna alone, at least 50,000 applications had been filled in the last two weeks with the Jewish community’s new emigration department, 9,000 with the Palestine Office, alongside an upswing in suicides and the dispatch of several hundreds to Dachau. — 520 —

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“All the while the diplomats are meeting and lying with the expertness of agelong training,” Szold went on; she deemed Roosevelt’s projected Conference “a gesture.” McDonald got his colleagues on the President’s Advisory Committee to endorse a study of the possibilities of large-scale settlement anywhere except in Palestine. Feis asked U.S. Ambassador William Bullitt to explore unofficially Paris’s view of Madagascar as an option for several million Jews while retaining that island under French sovereignty. Bullitt replied that the French were inclined to take 5,000 there if sufficient financial backing was available; Northern Rhodesia had also been bandied about as a possible refuge. However, the admission of large numbers into countries that already had substantial Jewish communities would result in “a quick flare-up” of antisemitism, Bullitt asserted. Isaac Steinberg of the new Freeland movement proposed Australia as haven. Considering the “extending persecution” of the Jews in Central Europe “a crime against humanity,” Lloyd George opined that the only chance of restoring a sense of security to the “weaker nationalities of the world” lay in a renewal and revival of the power of the League of Nations.78 The Colonial Office continued to stand behind partition. Shuckburgh remarked with some vehemence to an Agency delegation that the Jews were far more vocal in their complaints and criticisms of the mandatory power than they were with regard to the misdeeds of Germany, but he had been driven to the conclusion that partitioning “so small a country” as Palestine was “the only way.” He believed that partition would “go through”; the prolonged delay was bad, but Great Britain was “not a totalitarian state which might have settled things by a stroke of the pen.” The Negev could only be developed by the Jews, Shuckburgh added, noting that a Catholic interviewer had told him that the 20,000 Catholics in the Galilee strongly opposed its inclusion in the Jewish commonwealth and were not afraid to remain under Arab rule. Going further, Amery pressed MacDonald for a large Jewish state, including the Galilee and “eventual expansion” into the Negev area. To the receptive Colonial Secretary, he emphasized that no real comparison existed between “the quite natural” Arab resentment “at seeing their country changed, though with material advantage to themselves,” and “the agony of the Jews of Central Europe, for whom there is really no other serious alternative city of refuge.”79 The situation became especially bitter for the Jews of Palestine when, — 521 —

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on June 3, a military court sentenced Avraham Schein and Shlomo BenYosef to be hanged for their April attack on an Arab bus. Jabotinsky appealed to MacDonald and to Hore-Belisha for clemency, noting that the yishuv had exhibited “superhuman self-restraint” against Arab terror for the last two years, and that this kind of martyrdom would only serve to drive other youngsters to “release thousands of similar urges.” The London Jewish Chronicle, the Manchester Guardian, and the Palestine Post echoed a similar plea. Shertok sought from Haining commutation to life imprisonment, noting that the crime had not led to any loss of life, and that a death sentence would “cast a serious slur” on the yishuv, which consistently had refrained from retaliation and any aggression against innocent Arab civilians during the last two years; Ben-Gurion made the same argument to MacMichael. MacDonald replied to Jabotinsky that the power of reviewing sentences rested with Haining, and the Colonial Secretary could not, regrettably, intervene in such cases. Appeals to King George VI on the British monarch’s sixtieth birthday from Schein’s parents, Chief Rabbis Ya’akov Meir and Isaac HaLevi Herzog of Palestine, and the chief rabbis of Tel Aviv and Jaffa were forwarded to the Colonial Office, with no positive result. On June 7, Haining wrote to his War Office superiors that “the law was deliberately flouted: and justice may be impartial.” The two condemned young men calmly prepared for death.80 Appearing before the Permanent Mandates Commission two days later, Shuckburgh observed that the Palestine administration’s principal task since 1937 had been maintaining public security and “waging incessant war.” This had come at great financial expense, no less than £1,297,000 in the last fiscal year alone. The security position itself was “highly unsatisfactory.” Especially in Galilee and Samaria, local Arabs backed the guerilla bands; there was clear evidence of assistance given by Arab neighbors, notably in Syria and Lebanon; “one refugee in Syria” (Haj Amin) was believed to be “still responsible for a great deal of the trouble in Palestine.” “The fundamental fact was that the Arabs had rebelled against the mandate,” stated Sydney Moody, Deputy Chief Secretary to the Palestine government. The Arabs had rejected partition outright, wished Jewish immigration to cease, and refused to appear before the Woodhead Commission. The great majority of Zionists would reject a fixed ratio, say 40 percent, in an Arab state. While “the balance of criminality was overwhelmingly on the Arab side” and “all responsible” Jewish bodies strongly condemned acts of reprisal, cases of reprisals — 522 —

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had occurred on the side of the Jews; as to Schein and Ben-Yosef, “the law had to be meted out impartially.” HMG continued to view partition in principle as “the best and most hopeful solution” of the Palestine deadlock, Shuckburgh emphasized, but the transitional period envisaged by the Peel Report still required “temporary” and “arbitrary” limits to Jewish immigration. So long as the period of uncertainty prevailed, he asserted, “a certain slowing-up in various directions was inevitable.”81 The same day, Halifax expressed his anxiety to MacDonald that the attitude of the British delegation at the Evian Conference should be “positive.” An earlier memorandum by Makins had suggested that if Great Britain took the lead there, it could secure world Jewry’s sympathy and support, “which might help to ease its difficulties over Palestine”; help to allay tensions in Central Europe, thus contributing to “appeasement in Europe”; and have “a striking effect” upon world opinion, particularly in the United States. In writing to his Colonial Office counterpart, the Foreign Secretary expressed his own feeling that the Evian proceedings might well be “a prelude to an international negotiation of great magnitude concerning the future of the Jewish population in Central Europe.” He had no doubt that this problem would call for large-scale international action in which HMG would be obliged to participate, “and in which all aspects of British policy towards Jews including that aspect of it which is particularly exercising you at the moment [Palestine] will come up for consideration.” The government, Halifax added, might have to depart from its policy of recent years on the admission of emigrants to its overseas territories and financing the settlement of refugees.82 Whitehall had special grounds for anxiety in this connection. Bullard just reported from Jedda about an arrangement by the Mufti’s entourage, apparently with the consent of Ibn Saud, to purchase ammunition in Germany, nominally for the Saudi Arabian government, but in reality for the insurgents in Palestine. The British ambassador speculated that Ibn Saud might consider the Anschluss and the Anglo-Italian negotiations a heavy diplomatic defeat for HMG, and begin wondering why he should “cling to the losing party.” In a communication to the Permanent Mandates Commission, Husseini continued to demand a complete halt to Jewish immigration and acquisition of land in Palestine, and he pronounced that the Arabs of Palestine “will never agree to any proposal that requires any further political sacrifice on their part.” Not long thereafter, Sa’id Bey Thabet, president of the Palestine Defense Committee — 523 —

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in Baghdad, condemned Abdullah’s proposals to the Woodhead Commission as contrary to the Bludan Congress decisions, and declared that “no solution of the Palestine problem will be acceptable unless it secures the integrality of the country and recognizes Arab claims.”83 While Palestine’s Arabs continued to boycott the commission, Ben-Gurion informed the Agency Executive of his “lines of action” on establishing the Jewish commonwealth. He assumed that once the Jews constituted a large force after the state’s creation, “we will expand throughout Eretz Yisrael … by means of mutual understanding and Jewish-Arab agreement.” All communities living there would have full legal equality, and the state would make every effort to raise the “quality of life” of the Arab minority to that of the Jewish majority. A voluntary transfer of some Arab tenant farmers, laborers and fellahin might occur, their resettlement costs to be fully assumed by the new sovereign entity. The Jewish authorities, he averred, were obligated to rule “in such a way that will win us the friendship of the Arabs both within and outside the State.” At a Mapai Political Committee meeting, Shertok endorsed Ben-Gurion’s “evolutionary” vision of realizing these objectives in three stages, which Ben-Gurion relayed to the commission on June 10. When the Political Committee of the Zionist Actions Committee met two days later, Ben-Gurion and anti-partitionist Ussishkin reiterated their shared stand that the Peel Report’s compulsory transfer proposal, which they both thought to be morally justified because of the reduced portion of Palestine given to the Jewish State, “can only be effected by England and not by the Jews.” “On behalf of the Jews it was made clear to us,” the Woodhead Commission would ultimately report, “that Jewish opinion was opposed to the exercise of any degree of compulsion.”84 Benjamin Akzin, representing the New Zionist Organization before the commission on June 20, offered a very different perspective. An estimated 6.8 million Jews existed whose “hopeless” prospects mandated a radical solution. He vehemently protested against both the expulsion of Jews from any country and the compulsory transfer of Arabs from any part of Palestine. A Jewish state in Palestine and Transjordan, able if properly developed to support more than 11 million individuals, could meet Jewry’s dire plight without harming an estimated native Arab population of 2,250,000. Industry could be developed, without friction, in the desert areas of Transjordan (a country now hosting only 300,000 Arabs) and the Negev. The Jewish people wished to return to the terri— 524 —

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tory under the original Palestine Mandate, not to become large, strong minorities in Syria, Lebanon, or Iraq. An emigration to that state of 1.5 million Jews within ten years would relieve the pressure in “the zone of anti-Semitism,” thereby contributing to the peace of the world by eliminating one of “the most unpleasant and irritating elements of unrest existing in Europe today.” Two partitioned states, Akzin was convinced, would spark excessive arming, a desire to expand by each, and “probably a preventive war at the first favourable moment.” Pan-Arabism, which could be switched on when it concerned Palestine and off when it concerned Alexandretta, “is nothing that cannot be controlled by somebody standing at the switches.”85 Tannous made the anti-Zionist counter-argument to MacDonald, remarking that the hostility toward partition in the Arab world and Palestine was spontaneous, the Arabs opposed to HMG’s giving preference to the interests of “a new immigrant race.” The Colonial Secretary replied that Great Britain had undertaken a double obligation in Palestine, and thought that there was room there for both a large Arab and a large Jewish population. Tannous rejoined: The Royal Commission had correctly concluded that “there were two irreconcilable nationalist movements in Palestine,” and the Arabs would never consent to partition. If a Jewish sovereign entity were established, “the Arabs would only await the day when they could attack that State and drive the Jews out.” Left to themselves, the Arabs and Jews could reach a peaceful accommodation, but Jews in the outside world, apparently with HMG’s support, put on a pressure that made a “friendly settlement” impossible. Should that support continue, the traditional friendship of the Arabs for the British—”which they still felt”—would disappear. He and the government cherished that friendship, MacDonald riposted, but we did not propose to break our promise in the mandate to the Jewish people, to the Arab people in Palestine, and to the nations represented in the League of Nations. As far as MacDonald could see, the chances for an agreed solution between the Arabs, the Jews, and the British were “very remote,” leading to the probability that Britain should probably have to “impose” such a solution. The present terrorist campaign, he added, was doing the Arab case “a great deal of harm,” particularly in England.86 Weizmann received a warmer reception when received by MacDonald the next day. The government “was now doing the right thing” in responding to the rebels, the Zionist leader began. There was coordina— 525 —

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tion at last between MacMichael, the administration, and the military authorities. The Woodhead Commission, which he deemed “a body competent to do their work,” was particularly worried about the Galilee and the large Arab minority in the projected Jewish State. The former territory was indispensable, in Weizmann’s view, while the Jews would treat the Arabs well because Jews were “hostages” (the noun first used in his May 3 draft on the Palestine situation) throughout the world and the Arab countries. The mandatory authority, at the same time, was “defeatist,” “cheaply cynical,” and “generally antagonistic.” In agreement, the Colonial Secretary went even further, remarking that “our trouble all along was that we were dealing with a tenth-rate administration.” Weizmann then advocated the Peel offer with the adjustments he had suggested to Ormsby-Gore the previous July. After the Jewish State’s creation, Ibn Saud would be the best ruler for the Arabs in negotiations with the Jews. Arab terrorism would abate if London unequivocally endorsed the creation of a viable Jewish commonwealth, which could reach 1.5 million within a few years and by natural increase number 2 million “in the course of time.” The first figure, Weizmann pointed out, represented the younger generation of the five to six million Jews in Central and Eastern Europe, for whom emigration was a matter of life or death.87 Weizmann and other Zionist leaders were very much concerned that the Evian Conference might place other countries than Palestine “in the front” for Jewish immigration. Yet MacDonald, responding to Halifax’s earnest appeal, felt that he could not “hold out any hope that the Colonial Empire will be able to contribute much to the settlement of the problem.” The Governor of Kenya, Sir Henry Brooke-Popham, soon confirmed this by telling his superior that any large Jewish settlement there would be “an undesirable feature in a Colony which … should be developed on lines predominantly British.” He would not object to the “carefully regulated influx of Jews of the right type—i.e. Nordic from Germany or Austria—for agricultural settlement in reasonably small numbers.” The appointment of Winterton, who was regarded as “cold to the Jewish homeland,” as head of the British delegation to Evian worried the Zionists further. Ben-Gurion agreed with Executive associates Ussishkin and Gruenbaum that that gathering presented “immense dangers” to Zionism, perhaps removing Eretz Yisrael from international consideration as “a factor relevant to the solution of the Jewish — 526 —

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Question.” Roosevelt had said to Wise in January that as Palestine could not solve that dilemma, a different country must be found. Zionists had to see to it that this “dangerous tendency” not find expression in the Conference, Ben-Gurion insisted, and therefore he considered it essential that Weizmann, along with Ussishkin and Rupin, be present so that we “remain on guard.”88 Meeting for the first time with Winterton on June 24, Weizmann received the impression that HMG would not like to “mix up” the question of Palestine with the general refugee issue at Evian. The British would try to relax Home Office regulations and seek emigration outlets in the colonies, Winterton said, although he admitted that the results would “not amount to very much.” He admired Weizmann’s suggestion that the governments at the Conference should tell the Germans that they could not rob the Jews of their property and at the same time “throw them out,” thus making available at least a part of the necessary funds for settlement elsewhere. Hearing Weizmann praise Palestine for making the biggest contribution to date as to a haven for Jewish refugees, Winterton blamed London for not implementing the Royal Commission report: “now the whole thing has been thrown into the melting-pot again.” He was “disgusted” with the Arabs. “Even the best of them, including Nuri,” were “their own worst enemies. Today they were killing off their moderate people.” Winterton declared that he was not an anti-Zionist, and added that MacDonald had great influence and was likely to be helpful. Weizmann then departed, feeling “immensely happy” with the cordial and sympathetic interview.89 Far different was the yishuv’s mood after hearing Haining’s confirmation that same day of the court sentence of Ben-Yosef, execution set for June 29 at 8 a.m. Schein’s punishment had been altered to life punishment because of a birth certificate declaring that he was under 18. Jabotinsky immediately appealed to MacDonald’s conscience, without success. A direct cable from the yishuv’s chief rabbis, mayors, and other leaders sparked Weizmann to raise “a very painful subject” with MacDonald and ask by letter for clemency—to no avail. While the Irgun attacked Arabs near Tel Aviv, Jaffa, and Haifa, Haining’s judgment stirred the yishuv to unprecedented demonstrations. Leftist “Red” Haifa led the way on the evening of June 25, with protesters carrying signs against havlaga and Arab terror. Hundreds clashed with armed policemen on June 26 in Tel Aviv; Moshe Avigdor Amiel, the — 527 —

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city’s Ashkenazi chief rabbi, assured a mass gathering that Eretz Yisrael would rise by virtue of those prepared to die on its behalf. In the next days, thousands in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem confronted the British authorities. Injuries, arrests, and curfews were commonplace. Editorials united in calls for clemency; theatres and coffee houses spontaneously closed throughout the country. Chief Rabbi Herzog, accompanied by two leaders of the ultra-Orthodox Agudas Israel, met with MacMichael, who responded that he could “only act in accordance with the advice of the Military Courts.” Protests erupted throughout the Jewish world as well. Ben-Yosef, hitherto an anonymous prisoner with the number 3118 attached to the red clothes of the condemned in Acre’s jail, continued to maintain a steely resolve. The tall twenty-five year old, broad shouldered Betari exclaimed to visitors that “I do not think myself worthy for this great honor, to be the first Jew to be hanged in Eretz Yisrael by the government after two thousand years.” Certain that “tens, hundreds, perhaps thousands” would follow him in the war for Jewish independence, he did not expect, nor desire, a pardon. Jottings in a firm hand, written on his cell wall, in books, and on pieces of paper, reflected Ben-Yosef’s mind: “Death versus homeland is nought”; “I was a servant to Betar until the day of my death”; “What is a homeland? It is something for which it is worthwhile to live, to fight, and also to die.” In his last communication to Jabotinsky, beginning with the traditional Betar salute “Tel-Hai,” Ben-Yosef wrote that he was proud that he had the honor to sacrifice himself for “our lofty ideal.” He would go to the gallows with head raised as a Betari, and would die with Jabotinsky’s name, “so dear to me,” on his lips. “Go forth,” he went on, with your “valiant youth,” because only you are the individual who can “redeem our persecuted nation.” And he ended: “I wish that you have the privilege of seeing ‘the Jewish State on both sides of the Jordan’ in the near future…. And I clasp your hand. Long life to you. Tel-Hai. From a Betari who has the honor to die for his homeland. Shlomo Ben Yosef.” On June 28, the Va’ad HaLeumi, calling a special conference of Jewish Agency representatives, mayors, local councils, and the country’s Ashkenazi and Sephardi chief rabbis, took up Ben-Yosef’s plight as a second topic under the category “the security situation.” Following a lengthy discussion of Austrian Jewry’s grave condition under the Third Reich, Ben-Gurion, who had recently vetoed Tel Aviv mayor Israel — 528 —

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Rokah’s request to proclaim a strike, spoke for those assembled: political pressure endangered Ben-Yosef’s life and threatened the hope for needed British measures in the future against Arab terrorism. Accordingly, the Va’ad HaLeumi and the Chief Rabbinate issued a joint proclamation urging “communal quiet, not to be drawn into actions that would likely raise tempestuous winds and aggravate the situation in the yishuv.” All were required in this “grave hour,” ended the manifesto, to distance themselves from every unauthorized outbreak, demonstrations, strikes, and anything that would likely endanger the yishuv’s security. That same day, Jabotinsky made a last appeal in an interview with MacDonald, who expressed agreement with Haining’s judgment, as well as his own concern that commutation of the death sentence would encourage other Palestinian Jews to break the law. Jabotinsky immediately sent off a coded message to the Irgun: “If final invest heavily.” The secret communication conveyed that if the execution did take place, a more aggressive response from the underground group should occur. At 12:45 a.m. on June 29, a terse, coded message from MacDonald reached MacMichael: “I have considered matter further and there is no occasion to postpone execution.” A few hours later, Ben-Yosef awakened early from a deep, quiet sleep in the cell reserved for those soon to die. He washed, said some Psalms with a Jewish prison official, drank two cups of tea, combed his hair, and brushed his teeth. Proceeding resolutely at 8 a.m. to the gallows chamber nearby, he sang Betar songs all the way. As a black hood covered his face, he stood at attention, cried “Long live Jabotinsky!” and “Tel-Hai!,” and extended his neck to the hangman. Betarim buried him that afternoon in the Rosh Pina cemetery. Jabotinsky quickly accorded Ben-Yosef legendary status, cabling the NZO in Eretz Yisrael that the deceased had turned into “a source of faith and fortitude for our movement and for Palestinian Jewish youth.” On the traditional seventh day of mourning, Jabotinsky’s panegyric would reach a climax, declaring that “from his gallows a tower had been formed, from his grave—a temple, from his memory—a civil religion.” The Irgun reversed its earlier dismissal of the April 21 incident, now dubbing Ben-Yosef “the national hero” and “a symbol for fighting Palestinian Jewish youth.” Having Jabotinsky’s confidential approval for escalated operations if the hanging occurred, Yosef Katznelson and Binyamin Lubotski (later Eliav) of the NZO met with Irgun leaders — 529 —

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David Raziel and Avraham Stern to discuss coordinated steps in the future. Rather than seeing the late Betari as one hanged incidentally, the Irgun now portrayed Ben-Yosef as having “entered on the steps of the gallows the honored temple of the fighters for freedom in Israel and in the nations, who in death conquered liberty for their generations.” The yishuv, with some prominent exceptions, united as never before in grief and anger. It spontaneously closed shops and places of amusement on the day of Ben-Yosef’s hanging. Black bunting framed the Zionist flag in Haifa, Ramat Gan, Petah Tikva, Netanya, Hedera, Rehovot, Magdiel, Ekron, Safed, and Tiberias. Thousands marched through Tel Aviv; almost fifty were injured by police. Leading newspapers roundly denounced the hanging of the “kadosh” (traditional Jewish holy martyr). On the other hand, the Histadrut labor organization and the editors of Davar and HaAretz charged the Revisionists with thwarting efforts by the Jewish Agency and the Va’ad HaLeumi to help Ben-Yosef, notably Jabotinsky’s refusal to sign a declaration against revenge and demonstrations by “ruffians.” They claimed that the Revisionists’ stance damaged any hopes for clemency, their motive to attain a martyr for the political Right. Ben-Gurion proved the most uncompromising, even breaking with Labor colleagues Katznelson, Sprinzak, and David Remez in asserting that the execution day was one of “disgrace” for the yishuv, not one of mourning. He insisted that the black flag above Histadrut headquarters in Tel Aviv be taken down, allowing only the Zionist standard and the red banner of the world proletariat, the two regularly aloft that building. To the Mapai Central Committee he confessed his shame that a Jew had tried to kill innocent human beings. In vilification identical to that which he had hurled against Revisionists and Brit HaBiryonim members accused of murdering Haim Arlosoroff five years earlier, BenGurion asserted that the hanging was actually caused by the Revisionist “Nazi party.” With no end to the Arab Revolt in sight, he greatly worried that “we stood before a real civil war, and it was impossible that criminal bands within us commit despicable acts and other good people will desire to justify these actions that are done as if from a Zionist ideal.” The yishuv could not afford to lose crucial British military help and public opinion, he urged. For these combined reasons, its “responsible” bodies had to condemn terror unequivocally and embrace havlaga. Mapai’s Central Committee endorsed Ben-Gurion’s position fully.90 — 530 —

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With the Woodhead Commission yet to report, the possibility of attaining Zionist prospects appeared ever slighter. Shuckburgh’s qualified statement to the Permanent Mandates Commission suggested to the London Times that the Woodhead group might not support partition; continuance of pacification in Palestine, its editorial concluded, “will depend very largely” on the belief that HMG “will not swerve from the policy” to which it has “publicly adhered.” Addressing the Zionist Political Advisory Committee, Weizmann thought the security position in Palestine “still very precarious.” The French did not make things any easier in checking the activities of the Mufti and of the terrorist bands based in Beirut and Damascus. Moreover, possible fratricidal war over havlaga loomed in Palestine, where Shertok heard the question of one British officer: “I can understand that the Jews hate us, but why do they hate us more than they hate the Arabs?” A startling option surfaced when Weizmann made contact with Sami Gunzberg, Ataturk’s dentist, who suggested that Jewish investment in Turkey could lead to exerting a decisive influence in the Arab world. That possible opportunity was distant, however, while thickening clouds gathered over the Jews of Europe.91 On June 29, the Pro-Palestine Federation of America reported to Wise that Ambassador Lindsay thought Palestine inadequate to absorb a large Jewish immigration and contended that “the Arabs do not like the Jews.” (One day earlier, the Foreign Office received another confirmation of this sentiment from Ibn Saud, who expressed Arab conviction that the British would “annihilate” all Palestinian Arabs who did not agree to partition, “and replace them by Jews.”) Lindsay claimed that the British government was “doing everything possible” and would participate at the Evian Conference to find a solution for the refugee problem. Yet on June 30, the Colonial Office informed Whitehall that only Kenya and Northern Rhodesia might make any “material contribution to the problem,” but no colonial government would be able to provide any financial contribution towards refugee settlement. The Zionists feared that the Conference would deflect attention from Palestine, while McDonald had written to Frankfurter, “I wish I could feel that the President’s lead is likely to be more than a generous gesture.”92 Uncertainty lurked around every corner.

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Endnotes 1 2 3

Great Britain, Cmd. 5634, Jan. 5, 1938. Ormsby-Gore to Chamberlain, Jan. 9, 1938, FO 371/21862, PRO. Rendel memorandum, Jan. 14, 1938, FO 371/21862, PRO. When the BBC’s Arabic service was inaugurated in this same month, Ibn Saud and his followers shed tears upon hearing a news bulletin that an Arab in Palestine was hanged for possessing arms. “If it had not been for the Zionist policy of the British government,” the desert monarch told HMG’s ambassador, “that Arab would be alive today” (Reader Bullard, The Camels Must Go: An Autobiography [London, 1961], 205-206). 4 “Summary Report,” Jan. 10, 1938, file 20, R. Szold MSS; Jacobs to Pool, Jan. 7, 1938, Jacobs MSS. 5 Weizmann to Ormsby-Gore, Jan. 20, 1938, Box 122, Wise MSS. 6 Gilbert, Sir Horace Rumbold, 428; Martin Gilbert, Exile and Return: The Struggle for a Jewish Homeland (New York,1978), 195; Amery to Cazalet, Feb. 16, 1938, Amery MSS; Moshe Sharett, Yoman Medini 3, 14-15; Wauchope to Shertok, Jan. 6, 1938, file XV/3-Jewish Agency, ZA. 7 Wauchope to Ormsby-Gore, Jan. 11, 1938, S25/27743, CZA; Tegart to Wauchope, Feb. 28, 1938, S25/22729, CZA; Baffy, 80; Shertok to Wauchope, Jan. 28, 1938, A204/47, CZA. For Wingate’s contemporary views on building internal security and frontier defense for the Jewish state in the transition period, see his memorandum, RG 93, file 39/18, ISA. He advocated Palestine being linked “in some way or another” with the British Commonwealth of Nations. See Wingate memorandum, June 1938, WA. 8 Shertok to Tegart, Jan. 5, 1938, S25/22447; Agency memorandum, Jan. 7, 1938, S25/22656; Memorandum, Feb. 21, 1938, S25/22447; all in CZA. According to Agency sources that were considered reliable, the Mufti had suggested the book’s publication. 9 Rendel minute, Feb. 11, 1938, FO 371/21873, PRO; Weizmann to OrmsbyGore, Jan. 22, 1938, microfilm #27, Brandeis MSS; Mackereth to Foreign Office, Feb. 5, 1938, and Bagallay minute, Feb. 3, 1938, both in FO 371/21873, PRO. 10 Newcombe to Hyamson, Dec. 12, 1937, Newcombe to the Mufti, n.d., both in CO 733/333/75156/33, PRO; Haj Amin’s draft, Jan. 12, 1938, file P-1056/8, ISA. 11 Shertok to Magnes, Jan. 13, 1938; Magnes to Shertok, Jan. 14, 1938; both in A158/74, CZA. Meeting, Jan. 16, 1938, JAEJ, CZA. 12 Shertok to Magnes, Jan. 25, 1938; Shertok to Brodetsky, Jan. 28, 1938; both in A158/74, CZA. 13 Lampson to Foreign Office, Jan. 11, 1938, S25/22713, CZA; Hyamson memorandum, Jan. 16, 1938, file E3/274, BDA; Foreign Office to Baghdad, S25/22775, CZA. — 532 —

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14

Ormsby-Gore–Nuri interview, Jan. 21, 1938, FO 371/21872; Cranborne– Nuri interview, Jan. 21, 1938, FO 800/296; both in PRO. 15 London Jewish Chronicle, Jan. 21, 1938; Bakstansky interviews, Feb. 3, 1938, Z4/17043, and Bakstansky interviews, Feb. 11, 1938, S25/7564; both in CZA; Meinertzhagen to the London Times, Feb. 7, 1938; Meinertzhagen, Middle East Diary, 148; Josiah Wedgwood, The Seventh Dominion (London, 1928); Wedgwood to Lloyd George, Feb. 2, 1938, file G19/17/18, Lloyd George MSS. The British Zionist Federation had adopted this stance one month earlier, which Ben-Gurion thought premature. Weizmann had expressed a similar reservation to the Agency’s Political Advisory Committee in London. Brodetsky to Ben-Gurion, Jan. 11, 1938, A24/207; Weizmann to Political Committee, Nov. 5, 1937, L22/41; both in CZA. For Jewish sovereignty “from Dan to Beersheba” while that community lived in peace during King Solomon’s entire reign, see Kings 1, 5:5. 16 Brandeis to Szold, Jan. 16, 1938, A251/329b; Szold to Brandeis, Jan. 17, 1938, A24/209; both in CZA. Wise to Jacobs, Feb. 14, 1938, Jacobs MSS; Wise to Brandeis, Feb. 8, 1938, microfilm #27, Brandeis MSS; Jacobs to Szold, Feb. 8, 1938, Jacobs MSS; Jacobs to Szold, Feb. 9, 1938, A24/209, CZA; Pool–Brandeis interview, Feb. 24, 1938, Brandeis file, HA. Ben-Gurion soon sent Brandeis a “secret and private” account of the negotiations. BenGurion to Brandeis, Feb. 3, 1938, microfilm #27, Brandeis MSS. Jabotinsky continued to oppose partition, calling it “death to Zionism” when addressing the NZO’s first National Congress. JTA, Feb. 8, 1938. 17 Wise-Roosevelt interview, Jan. 22, 1938, A243/83, CZA; Governing Council meeting, Jan. 25, 1938, AJC; Joseph to Ben-Gurion, Feb. 5, 1938, L22/201, CZA; Jan. 24, 1938, Henry Morgenthau, Jr. Diaries, FDRL. Henry Morgenthau Sr., when serving as the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey (19131916), had arranged for critically needed funds and provisions to reach the starving yishuv, and used his influence to prevent the destruction of the yishuv by Turkish governor Jamal Pasha. In June 1917, Weizmann, dispatched by the British to counter Morgenthau’s mission on behalf of President Wilson to try and detach Turkey from the Central Powers, managed to dissuade him. Outwitted, Morgenthau never forgave Weizmann. In a letter to the New York Times on December 12, 1917, one month after the Balfour Declaration, Morgenthau paid tribute to the young settlers of the yishuv, but branded Zionism a dangerous ideology which, rather than solving the Jewish problem, could undermine the civil rights of Jews in countries of their adoption. The last chapter of his autobiography, All in a Life-Time (New York, 1922) repeated this classic doctrine of the Reform Jewish movement at the time, a position Samuel Rosenman shared. 18 Nuri-Haj Amin talk, in Sasson to Shertok, Jan. 7, 1938, file P-1056/8, ISA. 19 On September 22, 1938, a letter from Graham-Browne and three of his assistants that was published in the London Times asserted that the Jewish claim to Palestine on the basis of prophecy was declared throughout the New — 533 —

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20

21 22

23 24

25

Testament to have been abrogated. In response, besides citing the statements of the Archbishop of Canterbury, King George V, and the mandate itself in giving specific recognition to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine, Palestine’s Chief Rabbi Isaac Herzog declared that “our scattered people … has been able to survive only because of its unshakeable reliance on the Divine Promise of its ultimate restoration in Zion” (Herzog to the Editor of the Times, Oct. 4, 1938, S225/22447, CZA). Magnes diary, Feb. 6, 1938, file P3/971, CAHJP; Nuri draft, Feb. 6, 1938; Magnes to Nuri, Feb. 23, 1938 (mistakenly written 1937); Nuri to Magnes, Mar. 4, 1938; all in file P-1056/8, ISA. Nuri also claimed that in two talks he had in May 1936 with Weizmann in London, the Zionist herald had consented to a limited Jewish immigration for a period of time into a particular area, but the Agency had rejected the proposal. For Weizmann’s apparent acceptance of Nuri’s earlier terms, see chap. 5, p. 308. Magnes diary, Feb. 4 and 6, 1938, file P3/971, CAHJP; Magnes report, Feb. 21, 1938, microfilm #27, Brandeis MSS. Weizmann-Ali talk, Feb. 7, 1938, FO 371/21874, PRO. The three Britons were Rumbold, Ronald Storrs, an early Palestine Military Governor, and mandate press officer Tweedy. Rumbold continued to favor partition, while Storrs advised that the Arab demands regarding Palestine could only be implemented gradually. Tweedy then emphasized to a Jewish Agency official that Palestine was very small, and repeated the Arab argument that a Jewish majority meant an impairment of Arab rights as pledged in the second part of the Balfour Declaration. N. to Shertok, Feb. 1, 1938, file P-1056/8, ISA. Weizmann–Lampson talk, Feb. 8, 1938, FO 371/21873, PRO; Weizmann remarks, Mar. 9, 1938, at the Va’ad HaPoel HaTsiyoni (meeting in London), WA. The reference to Givon is in Joshua 10:12-13. Hyamson to Newcombe, Feb. 2, 1938, microfilm #27, Brandeis MSS; Oxford meeting, Feb. 13, 1938, file P-1056/8, ISA. Three days later, Hyamson wrote to Lourie that some Arab Higher Committee members “and others in their confidence” would accept a larger Jewish percentage than 30 percent “provided there is an agreement on other points.” He insisted that the limitation of immigration for “only a period,” at the end of which a new agreement should be reached, “was certainly intended and included in the terms to which a general acceptance was given.” Hyamson had “not given up hope of a modus vivendi,” but some speeches and resolutions advocating Jewish statehood and adopted by prominent Zionists during the negotiations had “somewhat disturbed” the Arabs leaders, and “such pronouncements … do not make an agreement easier” (Hyamson to Lourie, Feb. 16, 1938, file P-1056/8, ISA). Intelligence report, Feb. 9, 1938, FO 371/21873; Sub-Committee report, Feb. 14, 1938, FO 371/21870; both in PRO. Kahany memorandum, Feb. 17, 1938, L22/194, CZA; Sub-Committee report, Feb. 21, 1938, War Office 33/1507, PRO. — 534 —

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26

David Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot 5 (Tel Aviv, 1982), 108-110; Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon, Facing the Dictators (London, 1962), chaps. 13-14; Baffy, 84-85; Frederick Birkenhead, Halifax: The Life of Lord Halifax (London, 1965), 607; Weizmann to Ormsby-Gore, Feb. 21, 1938, A24/208, CZA. When meeting Hitler in November 1937, Halifax made this comment to his host: “Although there was much in the Nazi system that offended British opinion (treatment of the Church; to perhaps a less extent, the treatment of Jews; treatment of Trade Unions), I was not blind to what he had done for Germany and to the achievement from his point of view of keeping Communism out of his country, and, as he would feel, of blocking its passage West.” Halifax privately concluded then that the Führer struck him as “sincere,” although a fortnight earlier Hitler had confided to his Foreign Minister, War Minister, and Chief of Staff his plans for the subjugation of Austria and Czechoslovakia (Birkenhead, Halifax, 368). 27 London Times, Feb. 22, 1938. The reference was to Samuel Johnson, the eighteenth-century English literary critic and the foremost conversationalist of his age. 28 Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 112-114. 29 Ibid., 115; JAEL, Feb. 19, 1938, WA; Baffy, 83. For Eden’s later view of the Halifax mission, see Avon, Facing the Dictators, 508-516. Lord Beaverbrook, British newspaper magnate and pro-appeasement advocate, did not think that Halifax had the respect of Hitler, who called him “Christ’s brother” (A.J. P. Taylor, Beaverbrook (New York, 1972), 379). 30 Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 116-117. In 1918, Palestinian Jewry numbered 56,000. 31 Ibid., 63-65. For Shertok’s reaction, see JAEJ, Feb. 20, 1938, CZA. Nuri had, indeed, incorrectly told the British that Magnes finally accepted the formula of a 40 percent permanent Jewish minority. Baghdad to Foreign Office, Mar. 4, 1938, S25/22711, CZA. The one meeting that was subsequently held between the Executive and Magnes did not sway either side (JAEJ, Apr. 24, 1938, CZA). 32 Weizmann–Ormsby-Gore interview and Weizmann–Shuckburgh talk, both on Feb. 25, 1938, in file 156, R. Szold MSS. The reference to “who knew not Joseph” is from Exodus 1:8. Agency intelligence enabled Weizmann to know of the British-Arab cable traffic and of Nuri’s interview with Ormsby-Gore (see S25/22793, CZA), but he was unaware of the Secretary’s secret letter to the commission chairman which the Cabinet had required. The “Wauchope plan,” aiming to give the Galilee and the Arab-dominated area south of Jaffa to the Arab State (which Nuri heard in his interview with Ormsby-Gore on January 21), had been prepared by mandatory official Douglas G. Harris. See CO 733/354/75730/4, PRO. At Ormsby-Gore’s request, Weizmann sent him an aide-memoire reviewing Arab reactions to government policy in Palestine. A summary was also prepared by the Agency Executive in London and marked “strictly confidential” (Memorandum, Mar. 11, 1938, file XV/3, — 535 —

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Jewish Agency files, ZA). 33 Sharett, Yoman Medini, 47-54; Keith-Roach, The Pasha of Jerusalem, 191. 34 Palestine Post, Mar. 1, 1938. The next day, just before departing Palestine, Wauchope wrote Shertok, “his good friend,” how pleased he was to learn of the “gallant defense” of Kibbutz Tirat Zvi in the Beisan Valley against Arab assault, as well as his distress that a Jewish settler was murdered near Megiddo the day before. Still, he felt that the days of success by armed bands “are numbered,” and that cases of assassination “will also grow rarer” (Wauchope to Shertok, Mar. 1, 1938, A24/208, CZA). 35 Weizmann to Tweedsmuir, Feb. 22, 1948, WA; London Times, Mar. 1, 1938; London Jewish Chronicle, Mar. 11, 1938. 36 Weizmann address at Va’ad HaPo’el HaTsiyoni, Mar. 9, 1938, and WeizmannChamberlain interview, Mar. 10, 1938; both in WA; Baffy, 87-88. Weizmann was referring to the two destructions of the Holy Temple in Jerusalem, in 586 B.C.E. and 70 C.E. by the Babylonians and Romans, respectively. 37 Ormsby-Gore to Halifax, Mar. 9, 1938, FO 800/321, PRO. 38 Ormsby-Gore to MacMichael, Mar. 10, 1938, in League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes of the Thirty-Fourth Session (Geneva, 1938), 201-202. 39 Administrative Committee resolutions, Mar. 13, 1938, Minutes, BDA; Baffy, 88; Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 149. For his lengthy response to Ormsby-Gore’s new policy, see Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 150-166. 40 Downie to Shertok, Mar. 14, 1938, S25/22447, CZA. Ormsby-Gore to Halifax, Mar. 14, 1938; Bagallay minutes, Mar. 16, 1938; Ormsby-Gore to Foreign Office, Mar. 22, 1938; all in FO 371/21862, PRO; C.S. to Harris, Mar. 24, 1938, S25/22729, CZA. Given Colonial Office objections, Rendel’s hope that his own memoranda against partition be placed before the commission as “evidence” was rejected (Minutes, Mar. 18, 1938, FO 371/21862, PRO). 41 Radomir Luza, Austro-German Relations in the Anschluss Era (Princeton, 1975); Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 150; JTA, Mar. 25, 1938; Ehud Avriel, Open the Gates! (New York, 1975), 13-15; Roman Frister, The Cap, The Price of a Life, trans. Hillel Halkin (New York, 1999), 335; Philip Friedman, Aspects of the Jewish Communal Crisis in the Period of the Nazi Regime in Germany: Austria and Czechoslovakia: Essays on Jewish Life and Thought (New York, 1959), 211. 42 Cohen report, Apr. 1, 1938, Zionist Organization files, Box 24/29, ZA. For a memoir of the ensuing Nazi terror, see Helen Hilsenrad, Brown Was the Danube (South Brunswick, NJ, 1966), part 3. 43 Christopher Thorne, The Approach of War, 1938-1939 (London, 1967), 49-50; Diary, Mar. 14 and 16, 1938, Box 52, Herbert Swope MSS, Howard Gottlieb Archival Research Center, Boston University; Armstrong to Messersmith, Mar. 16, 1938, Box 44, Armstrong MSS; Vansittart-Laski interview, Mar. 15, 1938, file C11/6/4/2, BDA. Page one of Mein Kampf declared that “GermanAustria must return to the great German mother country.” Lebensraum, the Nazi postulate demanding “living space” for pure “Aryan” citizens of the — 536 —

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44

45

46

47

48

Third Reich, necessitated territorial expansion and, hence, eventual war. Schuschnigg resigned on March 11 and Arthur Seyss-Inquart became chancellor. The April 10 plebiscite revealed a vote of 99.75 percent in favor of the union with Germany. Achilles memorandum, Nov. 15, 1938, 840.48 Refugees/900 1/2, SD. The official in charge of immigration to Canada advised his superior to follow the lead of HMG, which recently announced that London did not intend to change British regulations regarding the admission of these refugees, “but will show sympathetic consideration where possible.” Ever since 1918, F.C. Blair added, his department had fought all along to “protect ourselves” against the admission of stateless persons without passports because “coming out of the maelstrom of War some of them are liable to go on the rocks and when they become public charges in Canada we have to keep them for the balance of their lives. It is not likely that either Germany or Austria, or any other country for that matter, will take political refugees back once they are admitted to this country” (Blair to Crerar, Mar. 28, 1938, MG26, J4, vol. 123, Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa). Achilles memorandum, Nov. 15, 1938, 840.48 Refugees/900 1/2, SD; Villard to Harry, Mar. 17, 1938, Villard MSS; Berle memorandum, Mar. 16, 1938, Box 210, Adolf A. Berle, Jr. MSS, FDRL; Diaries, Mar. 18, 21, 22, and 25, 1938, Moffat MSS; Feis to Frankfurter, Mar. 22 and 26, 1938, Box 16, Herbert Feis MSS, LC; Diaries, Mar. 18, 23, 25, 1938, Henry Morgenthau, Jr. MSS, FDRL. Thompson’s article “Refugees: A World Problem” appeared in the influential journal Foreign Affairs the following month. The editor, noting that “every day’s news adds poignancy to the situation she describes and gives new point to the proposals she makes,” gave an advance copy to Messersmith and to Labor Secretary Frances Perkins (Armstrong to Messersmith, Mar. 18, 1938, Box 44, Armstrong MSS). Also see Thompson to Hull, Mar. 29, 1938, Box 77, Armstrong MSS. Levin Information Circular, Mar. 21, 1938, JNF files, ZA; Yehuda Slutski, Sefer Toldot HaHagana, 872-880; Moti Golani, “Moshe Sharett—HaMedina’i Shel ‘Homa U’Migdal’,” in Y. and R. Sharett, eds., Shoher Shalom: Hebetim U’Mabatim Al Moshe Sharett (Tel-Aviv, 2008), 340-348; Battershill to Shertok, Mar. 14, 1938, S25/22780, CZA; Sharett, Yoman Medini, 81-91; Yosef Weitz, B’Hevlei Nahala, Pirkei Yoman (Tel-Aviv, 1951), 113, 116-118, 128, 132-140. ZOA Executive, Mar. 29, 1938, ZA; Wise to Roosevelt, Mar. 28, 1938, PPF 3292, FDRL; Wise-Lipsky-Messersmith interview, Mar. 31, 1938, A24/211, CZA; Wise to Lewisohn, Apr. 3, 1938, Box 1001, AJA. The State Department also censored references to Hitler and Mussolini in speeches by the Secretary of the Interior. Hull to Early, Jan. 20, 1938, and Feb. 10, 1938; both in OF 6, FDRL; Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes: The Inside Struggle, 1936-1939, vol. 2 (New York, 1954), 347-348, 351-352. High Commissioner to Committee, Mar. 24, 1938, S25/22793; Ben-Zvi to Myer, Mar. 31, 1938, A116/73II; both in CZA. Laski to Waldman, Mar. 30, — 537 —

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1938, Adler/Laski file, AJCA; JTA, Mar. 31, 1938; Memorandum, Mar. 24, 1938, Box 1, Norman Bentwich MSS, CAHJP; Bentwich–MacDonald interview, Apr. 7, 1938, A255/398, CZA. Bentwich himself thought in terms of an immigration of 50,000-60,000 Jewish refugees per year to places other than Palestine, which “could save a large remnant.” Bentwich to Van Tijn, Mar. 31, 1938, Box 3, Bentwich MSS. 49 Meeting in Ormsby-Gore’s room at the Colonial Office, Mar. 30, 1938, FO 371/21870, PRO. 50 Weizmann to Sim (Marks), Apr. 2, 1938, Box 2, Dewey Stone MSS, AJHS; Weizmann to friends, Apr. 3, 1938, Box 122, Wise MSS; Heathcote-Smith to Foreign Office, Apr. 2, 1938, FO 371/21875, PRO. To this end, Weizmann would write to newly elected United Palestine Appeal chairman Abba Hillel Silver, then seeking $4.5 million for settlement in Palestine, that American Jewry hasten the hour through greater financial support of the UPA so that “a ray of light may begin to disperse the blackness of Jewish life” (Weizmann message, May 11, 1938, Weizman files, ZA). 51 Mapai Political Committee, Mar. 21, 1938, S25/437, CZA; Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 169-173. 52 Gilbert, The Roots of Appeasement, 169; Rendel memorandum, Apr. 10, 1938, FO 371/21887, PRO; Arielli, “Italian Involvement,” 201. 53 Weizmann to Ormsby-Gore, Apr. 7, 1938, Jewish Agency files, AJCA. 54 Samuel to Ormsby-Gore, Apr. 7, 1938, FO 371/21876, PRO. Also see Conference with Samuel, Mar. 14, 1938, Box 121, Wise MSS; Samuel–Ali– Abdul-Hadi–Alexander meeting, Mar. 19, 1938, file P-649/20, Samuel MSS, ISA; Samuel to Magnes, Mar. 20, 1938, Box 121, Wise MSS. For Shertok’s talk with Samuel, see JAEJ, Apr. 20, 1938, CZA. When a tea was given in Samuel’s honor at the Hebrew University, Berl Katznelson refused to participate. In reply, he noted that when the Second Aliya author, Yosef Brenner, was murdered by Arabs in May 1921, Samuel as High Commissioner had hosted parties. Samuel had also appeased Haj Amin and other Arab rioters (“por’im”), justified the split of Transjordan from the original Palestine Mandate in 1922, and said that Jews must always be a minority in Palestine (Katznelson to secretary, Mar. 13, 1938, S25/22486, CZA). 55 Weizmann to Dugdale, Apr. 9, 1938, ZOA assorted files, ZA. Hexter considered “exceptionally dangerous” this emphasis on wartime support of the democracies if a Jewish state was established, and of the same order as the promise which Weizmann had made in 1916 to the effect that if the Balfour Declaration was issued, then Jews would support the Allies. Hexter viewed this as “another libel,” since Jews would back their own countries and support Democracy regardless of the creation of a Jewish state. He urged that steps be taken to disavow this new pledge, with leading members of the American Jewish Committee to be immediately informed of the matter (Hexter to Waldman, Apr. 30, 1938, ZOA assorted files, ZA). 56 Weizmann to Dugdale, Apr. 9, 1938, ZOA assorted files, ZA. — 538 —

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57

Memorandum of the Conference, Apr. 13, 1938, Box 67, Wise MSS; “Half Brother, Half Son,” 612; Weizmann–Battershill interview, Apr. 21, 1938, FO 371/21862, PRO; Goldman et al. to Hull, Apr. 24, 1938, and Welles to Goldman, Apr. 30, 1938, both in 840.48 Refugees/181, SD. For a survey of increasing antisemitism in the United States that spring, see Opinion Research Corporation report, Chronos file, AJCA. 58 An extensive description of these events is given in Penkower, Twentieth Century Jews, chap. 9. For the Artemesia Betar voyage, see Ben-Ami, Years of Wrath, Days of Glory, 129-130. Very influential was Klausner’s six-volume K’ShehUma Nilhemet Al Heiruta, Masot Historiyot (Tel Aviv, 1936, reprinted in 1939). A good summary of Klausner’s neinsager position is in Joseph Klausner, “Why Oppose Partition?” Palestine Review, June 3, 1938, 104105. He objected to the Revisionists leaving the World Zionist Organization (Klausner to Lubotsky, Feb. 25, 1936, file Peh-194/2, JA). 59 Laski-Raczinski interview, Apr. 5, 1938, file 124, Mowshowitz MSS; New York Times, Apr. 19 and 27, 1938; Deedes to Butler, Apr. 28, 1938, A24/211, CZA; Deedes to Moffat, May 3, 1938, Moffat MSS; Wise to Goldmann, Apr. 20, 1938, Box 1001, Wise files, AJA. By October, the “cleansing of Jews” (Entjudung) from the Burgenland would be completed (Milka Zalmon, “Forced Emigration of the Jews of Burgenland: A Test Case,” Yad Vashem Studies 31 (2003): 287-323. 60 Thorne, The Approach of War, 56-62; Butler-Perlzweig interview, Apr. 13, 1938, C2/69, CZA; Confidential report, Apr. 28, 1938, Chronos files, AJCA. 61 JAEJ, May 1, 1938, CZA; Shertok to Battershill, May 8, 1938, file XV/3– Jewish Agency, ZA; Palestine Post, Apr. 29, 1938. 62 Vilensky reports to Shertok, Apr. 29 and 30, 1938, and May 1, 1938; all in A24/19, CZA. 63 Weizmann Draft III, May 3, 1938, WA. 64 Weizmann to MacMichael, May 4, 1938, Box 14, J.S. Middleton MSS, Labour Party Archives. 65 Ormsby-Gore–Brodetsky–Lourie interview, microfilm 27, Brandeis MSS; Shuckburgh memorandum, May 4, 1938, S25/227432, CZA. 66 Weizmann to Dugdale, May 7, 1938, WA. The pro-Zionist James Malcolm, an Armenian businessman who had played a significant role by introducing Weizmann to key Cabinet Middle East advisor Mark Sykes in Jan. 1917, would spell out this partition plan, together with its projection of at least two million Jews in the new commonwealth, in the Zionist Review five days later. 67 MacMichael to Ormsby-Gore, May 12, 1938, FO 371/21877, PRO. Fearing “serious trouble” in Syria if the Mufti were compelled to leave for France or Madagascar (as the British proposed), the French suggested his removal to Iraq or Egypt “where His Majesty’s Government enjoy special influence” or preventing any communication with him. The Colonial Secretary considered the French alternatives “entirely unsatisfactory” (MacDonald to MacMichael, — 539 —

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July 28, 1938, S25/22784, CZA). 68 Weizmann, The Impossible Takes Longer, 162; Weizmann to Dugdale, May 14, 1938, WA; Weizmann to Nathan, May 14, 1938, Z4/1705, II, CZA. 69 Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 125-126; Memorandum, May 15, 1938, S25/53, CZA. This came right after Chamberlain informed the French that HMG “had no desire to commit themselves to sending two British divisions to France at the outbreak of war” (Rose, The Gentile Zionists, 108-110). 70 Baffy, 90; Memorandum, July 25, 1939, S25/254, CZA. The Tegart Wall was built in only three months at a cost of 100,000 pounds, with the loss of one man. Arab infiltrators were thereby forced to shift their attacks to the south of the country (Cohen to Szold, Sept. 12, 1938, A370/436, CZA). 71 Sharett, Yoman Medini, 109-110; Weizmann-Haining interview, May 18, 1938, WA. 72 Foreign Policy Bulletin, 17 (June 24, 1938), 1-2; Perlzweig memorandum, May 24, 1938, file 17A/78, WJCA; Polish Telegraphic Agency cable, May 24, 1938, Chronos file, AJCA; JTA, May 13, 1938. 73 Bentwich report, May 12-13, 1938, and Sweeter to McDonald, May 17, 1938; both in Box 77, Armstrong MSS. Only in mid-June would the American minister officially inform the League Secretary-General about the Evian Conference (Harrison to Avenol, June 15, 1938, file R5800/50/34308/34225, LNA). 74 Welles memorandum to Roosevelt, Apr. 11, 1938, OF 3186, FDRL; JTA, May 25, 1938; May 16, 1938 meeting, Myron Taylor MSS; McIntyre to Elias, May 23, 1938, file 1, OF 700, FDRL. The resolution ultimately adopted by the Federation petitioned Chamberlain’s government to open the doors of Palestine and Transjordan, their “natural place of refuge,” to “millions” of persecuted Jews, and requested the State Department to induce HMG to adopt this policy (Resolutions, May 25, 1938, Box 3, Pro-Palestine Federation of America MSS, ZA). While sending him a copy of Brandeis’s pamphlet on Zionism (1934 edition), the New York Public Library informed Taylor that, according to its Jewish division, “Zionism as such ceased in 1920” (Library to Taylor, May 3, 1938, Refugee correspondence, miscellaneous 1938-39, Myron Taylor MSS, FDRL). 75 Abdullah to MacMichael, May 21, 1938; Abdullah to Woodhead Commission, May 22, 1938; Abdullah to al-Hadi, 24, 1938; all in file P-1056/8, ISA. 76 Sharett, Yoman Medini, 114-117; Weizmann, The Impossible Takes Longer, 165. For the Population Exchange Committee, which worked from November 1937 until June 1938, see Yossi Katz, “Diyunei Va’adat HaSokhnut LeHa’avarat Ukhlusin 1937-1938 (Perek BaHakhanot HaSokhnut HaYehudit LeBitsu’a HaHaluka),” Zion 53 (1988): 168-189. 77 Norman to Brodie, Nov. 28, 1933, A251/17A, CZA; Edward A. Norman, “First Report on Iraq Scheme,” May 5, 1938, microfilm #27, Brandeis MSS. Bell was also negotiating with a company in London having a concession for cotton growing on a large area of land near Baghdad that it should import — 540 —

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500-600 Palestinian Arab families to work the land, the results to provide a “concrete example” of benefit to Palestinian Arab agricultural workers and to Iraq. Five years earlier he had publicized the benefits of Jewish settlement in Transjordan (Brodetsky–Bell interview, Feb. 20, 1933, Jewish AgencyConfidential files, ZA). 78 Szold to Bertha and Adele, May 20, 1938, H. Szold MSS; JTA, May 31, 1938; PACPR Meeting, May 19, 1938, Box 77, Armstrong MSS; Feis to Bullitt, May 18, 1938, and Bullitt to Feis, June 1, 1938; both in Box 12, Feis MSS; London Jewish Chronicle, May 20, 1938; Lloyd George to Wartski, May 27, 1938, file G/40/3/80, Lloyd-George MSS. Five months later, charging that Chamberlain’s government had “surrendered in the face of every difficulty” regarding Palestine, Lloyd George wondered if American pressure could be brought “to bear upon them before they commit themselves to another betrayal of the interests committed to their charge” (Meinertzhagen, Middle East Diary, 172-173). 79 Shuckburgh-Brodetsky-Lourie interview, May 23, 1938, A24/211, CZA; Amery to MacDonald, May 30, 1938, Amery MSS. For other Zionist interest in the Negev at this time, see A.A. (Epstein) to Yavnieli, Jan. 10, 1938, A116/751, CZA; Beloff to Machover, Jan. 16, 1938, MS 201, MACH, 4/1, J. Machover MSS, University of Southampton, England; Driver letter to London Times, Feb. 13, 1938; T. Zissu to London Times, June 18, 1938. 80 Penkower, Twentieth Century Jews, chap. 9. Zuravin was found not guilty on grounds of insanity, and ordered placed in an insane asylum until further notice. 81 Meeting, June 9, 1938, League of Nations. Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes of the Thirty-Fourth Session, June 8-23, 1938, (Geneva, 1938), 27-54. 82 Halifax to MacDonald, June 9, 1938; Makins memorandum, May 23, 1938; both in FO 371/21749, PRO. 83 Bullard to Halifax, June 6, 1938, S25/22719, CZA; Husseini to President of the Permanent Mandates Commission, June 7, 1938, file R4069/6A/6450/668, LNA; Palestine Post, June 14, 1938. 84 JAEJ, June 7, 9, and 12, 1938, and Mapai Political Committee, June 8, 1938, A245/582/5; both in CZA; Sharett, Yoman Medini, 119-129; Palestine Partition Commission, Report, 52n. At the Executive’s meeting of June 12, Shertok characterized as “utopian” Ussishkin’s idea of 40,000 Palestinian families transferred to Transjordan in a limited time as a condition prior to the Jewish government’s establishment. 85 Akzin evidence, June 20, 1938, A251/26a, CZA. 86 MacDonald–Tannous interview, June 21, 1938, FO 371/21878, PRO. 87 MacDonald–Weizmann interview, June 22, 1938, FO 371/21863, PRO, and Louis D. Brandeis microfilm no. #27, ZA. 88 Landauer to Wise, June 13, 1938, WJCA, London; MacDonald to Halifax, June 14, 1938, FO 371/21749; Brooke-Popham to MacDonald, June 18, 1938, FO 371/22534; both in PRO; J. Wise to JDC, June 23, 1938, Austria — 541 —

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general files, American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee Archives, New York City; JAEJ, June 26, 1938, CZA. 89 Weizmann–Winterton interview, June 4, 1938, S25/9778, CZA; Baffy, 91. 90 Penkower, Twentieth Century Jews, chap. 9. 91 Palestine Post, June 21, 1938; Committee meeting, June 30, 1938, Box 122, Wise MSS; Sharett, Yoman Medini, 154; G.–W. conversation, June 28, 1938, S25/10082, CZA; Baffy, 91. 92 Elias to Wise, June 29, 1938, file VII/23, Mack MSS; Ibn Saud to Bullard, June 28, 1938, FO 371/21878, and Colonial Office to Foreign Office, June 30, 1938, FO 371/22529; both in PRO; McDonald to Frankfurter, Apr. 1, 1938, McDonald MSS. Frankfurter thought that while Roosevelt “has his heart and will in the refugee problem, the decorous de-energizers in the State Department seem gradually to attenuate his endeavors. I sometimes think that the greatest values of civilization are being allowed to go by default these days through all these miserable ‘prudences’ of unimaginative and timid souls” (Frankfurter to Wise, Apr. 27, 1938, Wise MSS).

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9. Partition Abandoned

Perched on snowy mountains on the southern shores of Lake Geneva, Evian-les-Bains’ legendary Hotel Royal was inaugurated in 1909. Dedicated to King Edward VII of England, the hotel featured Belle Epoque décor under domed ceilings containing the frescoes of Gustave Louis Jaulmes. Privileged guests to this French resort continue to enjoy a choice of 153 bedrooms and suites, 4 restaurants, a spa, a themed casino, and an 18-hole golf course, all amidst 47 acres of parkland facing the Alps. In this luxurious, bucolic setting with mineral springs nearby, some 200 delegates from 32 countries convened on the afternoon of July 6, 1938, to focus their attention on what U.S. representative Myron Taylor described as “the most pressing problem of political German (and Austrian) refugees,” and on his call for a permanent intergovernmental committee that would concern itself with all refugees “wherever governmental intolerance shall have created a refugee problem.” Following this opening address, Lord Winterton urged that the country of origin (Germany) “equally assist” in enabling the emigrants to “start life in other countries with some prospect of success”; emphasized the “limited problem before us” so as not to “raise false expectations if it is believed that a policy of pressure on minorities of race and religion can force other countries to open their doors to its victims”; and referred to British overseas territories where “local political conditions hinder or prevent any considerable immigration.” Hewing to instructions from His Majesty’s Government, Winterton pointedly avoided any mention of Palestine.1 Predictably, Palestine’s contending peoples viewed the Evian Conference from sharply contrasting perspectives. While appealing to the delegates to “put an end to the process of extermination,” the Va’ad HaLeumi demanded that that country “be opened to the masses of Jewry,” a matter “vital to the Jewish people” to whom “there can be no permanent refuge other than its Homeland” and for the solution of whose problem only the “re-establishment of the Jewish State” could — 543 —

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suffice. (The International Federation of League of Nations Societies championed this stand as well.) Noting that Palestine had absorbed 42,000 of the 135,000 Jews who had left Germany since 1933, the Jewish Agency argued that only in Palestine did the Jewish immigrant create a new Jewish economic structure “embracing all branches of national life” and realize “an age-old ideal,” which alone “could call forth the strength necessary for the work which has been achieved in Palestine.” The proMufti weekly Palestine and Trans-Jordan, on the other hand, warned the delegates about “the futility of attempting to reduce one people’s pain by imposing the same pain on another,” and it saw the Conference as “a real test of democracy”: could the Jews be assisted “without bringing devastation to Palestine and its Arab population?” Matiel E. T. Mogannam, Secretary of the Arab Women’s Committee, telegraphed to the government attendees her group’s conviction that to permit further Jewish immigration into Palestine would “convert it into an inferno” by “adding fuel to already smouldering fires.”2 Zionism’s opponents need not have worried. During the next nine days, delegate after delegate limited official responses to sympathizing with the refugees and to deploring Nazi brutality. Australia’s Thomas W. White exhibited no embarrassment in asserting boldly, “as we have no real racial problem, we are not desirous of importing one.” France had reached “the extreme point of saturation as regards admission of refugees,” stated Victor Henri Bérenger, a sentiment repeated by his European counterparts. Following Taylor’s lead about the U.S. maintaining its strict quotas, the South American governments declared that their restrictive immigration laws could not be eased; the British Dominions sounded this tone as well. The League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees from Germany, whose likely loss of prestige to a new intergovernmental committee worried the British, announced that all countries were closed. The one exception proved to be the Dominican Republic, which offered to accept up to 100,000 refugees on generous terms.3 The representatives of thirty-nine organizations appeared as observers, most submitting separate memoranda; twenty-four individuals were granted up to ten minutes each over two days to speak to a subcomittee in private session. Earlier, Winterton had received the Agency emissaries “exceedingly coldly,” recorded Ruppin, intending “to make it clear to us that in actual fact we had no business to be here at — 544 —

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all.” Rivalries between Zionists and non-Zionists frustrated attempts to unify a Jewish delegation under the leadership of Weizmann. On the last day, Winterton announced that the Palestine question “stands upon a footing of its own and cannot usefully be taken into account at the present stage in connection with the general problems that are under consideration at this meeting.” Revival of large-scale Jewish immigration there was impossible until a decision was made on the issue of partition of the country. The delegates unanimously agreed to create the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (IGCR), charged with approaching “the governments of the countries of refuge with a view to developing opportunities for permanent settlement” and seeking to persuade Germany to cooperate in establishing “conditions of orderly emigration.” The final resolution employed “involuntary emigrants” for “refugees”; the words “Jew” and “Jewish” were markedly absent.4 The ultimate outcome drew mixed reviews. Winterton reported to his colleagues that the conclusion was “more satisfactory than seemed likely at the outset,” and MacDonald thanked him in the Cabinet for “the skill with which he had looked after the colonial interests involved at Evian.” The State Department’s George Warren, Executive Secretary to the U.S. delegation, considered the meeting “a personal triumph” for the hard working Taylor, who received the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee’s “deep appreciation” for his “understanding and energy.” McDonald, Taylor’s deputy, informed Frankfurter that “high hopes were only partially fulfilled.” To the State Department’s Moffat, he expressed outrage at the Britons’ “trickiness” and “their insistence on trying to dominate all proceedings, even if only for the purpose of killing them.” As a whole, the Evian Conference is a success,” wrote Goldmann to Wise, although all depended on the work of the permanent IGCR and the energy that Washington would put into the continuation of this effort. Less charitably, Ruppin described the proceedings in terms of “chaos,” where “all matters were managed with indolence.” Goldie Meyerson, outraged at not being seated among the delegates, called a press conference in the ornate dining room of the Hotel Royal the day after the gathering ended. Speaking as head of the Histadrut’s Political Department, she announced: “There is only one thing I hope to see before I die and that is that my people should not need expressions of sympathy anymore.”5 Having chosen not to attend the conference, Weizmann already sensed from a talk with MacDonald on July 4 that HMG was consider— 545 —

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ing a decision injurious to Zionist aspirations. Although still favoring partition, the Colonial Secretary indicated that its adoption would incur “intense and permanent” opposition throughout the Muslim world including India, which would lend “moral and material support” to “a considerable rebellion” in Palestine, further inducing Great Britain’s enemies in turn to “start some active aggression” and lead to war. Weizmann rejected outright his ideas for an Arab-Jewish conference and his favoring Samuel’s “Forty-Ten” formula as the best alternative, asserting that the latter would put the yishuv “into a death trap”; encourage the Revisionist-Zionists; reward Arab terrorism; leave the Jews a permanent minority; and mean “a prolongation of the agony.” Ever since the Great War ended in 1918, he added, Britain had given the Arabs “generally 90 percent of what they wanted,” and the Peel Commission proposed a new area under Arab sovereignty. When Weizmann argued that a Jewish state in Palestine could offer a reliable and strong military force to bolster HMG, MacDonald countered that “if it was also a source of trouble and friction in the Near East, to that extent it was an additional liability.” With the new, powerful Jewish commonwealth a certain ally for London, which only ran the risk of alienating the Arab peoples, Weizmann thought that Britain “should at least be prepared to try the experiment.” “I retorted,” MacDonald informed the Cabinet, “that the experiment might prove fatal.”6 The mounting rift between the yishuv establishment and the political Right after Ben-Yosef’s hanging provided additional cause for Zionist concern. In Weizmann’s view, the Revisionists were “morally responsible” for the death of “this poor misguided youth”; he deemed them “our cruelest enemies,” because Irgun attacks triggered the escalation of Arab violence, which had also just claimed the life of Weizmann’s brother-in-law. The Agency, Shertok assured Chief Secretary Battershill on July 7, would do everything to “prevent the repetition” of criminal attacks on Arab civilians, and would cooperate to the fullest in supplying men for legal defense forces. Jabotinsky, per contra, excoriated HMG for executing Ben-Yosef on “the ground of expediency,” to teach Jews a lesson, rather than to dispense justice. At a mass memorial meeting in London, the NZO president warned the British to “be careful,” since Jews were beginning to wonder whether Ben-Yosef’s path was the best: “It has happened before in history that the martyr became a prophet and graves became shrines.” Wedgwood, whose letter advocating a Jewish — 546 —

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civil revolt in Palestine the Irgun had quickly translated and plastered across the country two months earlier, added to the audience his conviction that an Englishman in Ben-Yosef’s place would have done the same; moreover, the Betar martyr’s “admirable” facing of death “must evoke pride in Jewry.”7 This alternative reading of the yishuv’s current pulse received confirmation in a secret gathering in Jerusalem of the Va’ad HaLeumi and the country’s local representatives on July 10. While those present ruled out acts of indiscriminate revenge, such as the deadly placing of explosives by the Irgun four days earlier in Haifa’s Arab market that killed 18 Arabs and 3 Jews, they also refused to accept havlaga unconditionally in light of widespread, rising Arab terrorism. Unlike the situation in the earlier meeting of June 28, ambiguity now reigned: criticism of Jewish responses did not translate into a unanimous condemnation of the Revisionists or of the Irgun, as Ben-Gurion, Ben-Zvi, and Shertok sought. Rather, a considerable number of speakers objected to the ostracism of the Right, and demanded that efforts be made to find a modus vivendi between all parties in this critical hour. Statements two days earlier of the Va’ad HaLeumi and the country’s Chief Rabbinate in favor of self-restraint notwithstanding, no joint declaration emerged against what Ben-Gurion called “false patriotic demagoguery.” With Ben-Yosef’s death hovering over the discussion, a clear majority pressed for the creation of a committee to unite the yishuv.8 No such group came into being, but a meeting between Hagana commander Eliyahu Golomb and Jabotinsky the same day suggested a step in that direction. Wanting to preserve the Hagana’s expansion as a legal force in Britain’s fight against the Arab Revolt, Golomb searched for a joint agreement on future underground operations with the Irgun in order to avoid civil war. That last phrase Jabotinsky took as a threat against the NZO and Irgun in Palestine, in response to which he warned that Revisionists in Poland and elsewhere could then retaliate against the Left. He claimed not to be able to control those of his camp who carried out revenge attacks against the Palestinian-Arab population, but noted that Ben-Yosef’s death had made an impression on all youth elements within the yishuv. To his suggestion for a Zionist round-table conference to discuss this and other issues, Golomb countered with the need to fashion together a Jewish army in this “time of war.” The worried Hagana commander concluded to his superiors that since Jabotinsky — 547 —

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apparently hoped to use “the rite” of Ben-Yosef to sow “confusion and division” within our youth, the NZO chief would continue retaliation against Arabs without being dissuaded from all the results. And indeed, speaking in Warsaw’s New Theatre five days later, Jabotinsky deemed the breaking of havlaga in Palestine “essential.”9 MacDonald “wants to settle the security situation at once,” Battershill reported back to MacMichael after a visit to the Colonial Office. With at least 76 Arabs and 35 Jews killed and hundreds injured between July 5 and 18, despite the efforts of strongly reinforced British police and soldiers, this apprehension was certainly understandable. Further, HMG Minister Sidney Waterlow in Athens admitted that the mandatory authorities had failed to catch illegal Jewish immigrants traveling on boats from Austria and Poland via Greece to Palestine, the “Af-Al-Pi” (despite all) movement pioneered by Revisionist Moshe Krivoshein (later Galili) and directed by William R. Perl. (The Council for German Jewry refused to give funds to this effort, judging it “not properly organized” and not making “proper provisions for the welfare of the emigrants.”) Since July 1, two police launches were also employed on constant patrol of Palestine’s coastal waters. Trying to staunch the illicit traffic in view of the “serious political consequences” involved, MacDonald had the Greek government informed that he could not contemplate the admission into Palestine of such refugees if they arrived on Greek soil. He also passed on to Halifax the “somewhat fantastic” suggestion from Professor Arnold Toynbee, originating from a Hamburg man sufficiently close to the Nazis that he was sent to London to try to improve German-Anglo relations, that Tanganyika become not a German colony but a Jewish state under a Jewish flag. He did not know if Berlin had officially inspired this scheme, the Colonial Secretary concluded, but perhaps it was “a fruitful idea.”10 Still committed to partition, MacDonald tried to convince the Arab Centre’s Tannous of the benefits of this proposal. It would set a limit to Jewish settlement in Palestine, he argued on July 19, thus alleviating Arab fears of domination, while HMG could be expected to aid a sovereign Palestinian Arab entity and encourage that new state’s “closer union” with other Arab countries. The Jews were “powerful and energetic” and “certainly meant to spread over the Near East,” his visitor responded; the Arabs would “nurse their grudge against the Jews” for having taken a part of their country from them, “and they would only — 548 —

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await an opportunity of re-conquering the territory.” Agreeing that there was no room for the whole persecuted Jewish population in Palestine, as HMG had made clear at Evian and elsewhere, MacDonald observed that the area to go to the Jews was “about the size of Devonshire.” Tannous demurred: the Jews had already received all that they could expect in the way of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. It had become a center of Jewish culture, “where the spirit of the Jewish people could find a resting place.” If Britain encouraged any other conception, he insisted, the Jews “would never be satisfied until millions of them had been settled in the Home.” The “very friendly” conversation ended with MacDonald observing that only “a limited number” of Jews would ever find room in Palestine, but so long as economic development afforded room for more Jews, HMG was “bound to facilitate a reasonable amount of Jewish immigration.”11 Not prepared to “leave the destinies of the Jewish people in the hands of Mr. Woodhead and Co. at this hour—nor even in the hands of Malcolm MacDonald,” Weizmann took a different tack with a letter on July 15 to newly elected ZOA president Solomon Goldman. In a message to that organization’s conclave two weeks earlier, Roosevelt had reiterated his deep interest in the rehabilitation of the Jewish Homeland, and expressed the hope that “wise counsels will be taken for constructive action toward the realization of your noble ideal.” Evian had proved “a great disappointment,” Weizmann opined, and fate had placed on American Jewry “a very heavy task, as well as a great opportunity.” Now the one great Jewish community still intact, it could play a pivotal role in bringing home to the British government and people that, undaunted by all that has happened to date, the Zionist movement was still prepared to make a greater effort than ever; this in itself “will be a political factor of the first magnitude.” To Dugdale, Weizmann explained further that, as the latest development of his “apocalyptic” program, he wished to convene in the United States a conference of world Jewry, probably in October, under the auspices of perhaps himself, Einstein, and Blum. If the Palestine negotiations with HMG were successfully over by then, such a meeting would be a tremendous pro-British demonstration. “If not—then not!”12 As Weizmann sensed, the sands of the hourglass were relentlessly running out for Europe’s Jews. On July 8, Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop informed the British Ambassador to Berlin that the ques— 549 —

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tion of transferring Jewish capital for the sake of emigration was “an internal German problem that was not subject to discussion.” The world famous ear, nose, and throat specialist Professor Heinrich Neumann, permitted by the Gestapo in Vienna to seek a favorable result at Evian for Jewish emigration, emphasized in private talks at the conference that at least 30,000-40,000 exit permits were necessary by the year’s end. Yet after they first paid a flight tax of 25 percent of their property, only 10 Marks (as in the rest of Germany) could be taken out by each individual; moreover, fully half of the Jewish population in Austria was dependent on charity. On July 14, Mussolini’s Fascist government announced that Jews did not belong to the “Aryan” Italian race. Foreign Minister Ciano soon informed U.S. Ambassador William Phillips that Jews would not be permitted hereafter to have political or social influence in Italian life. One week later, Whitehall received the welcome news that its pressure on governments to halt illegal immigration to Palestine had met with Athens instructing its own missions abroad not to issue transit visas through Greece to Jews “whatever the destination stated.” “It would be no service to Jewry to throw open the floodgates” to immigration to Palestine, editorialized the London Times: “The refugee problem can be solved only by a mixture of mercy and cool calculation, both of which were shown in excellent proportion at Evian.”13 The killing of 39 Arabs in Haifa’s melon market on July 25 by an Irgun bomb, coming four days after the murder of four Jewish workers at the Dead Sea and one day after a family of three and a woman and her young son were killed in Kiryat Haroshet at the foot of the Carmel Hills, brought opposing delegations to MacMichael’s headquarters. Reiterating their commitment to check all retaliatory attacks by Jews, Ben-Gurion and Shertok rejected the High Commissioner’s heated criticism that Zionist newspapers sought to derive “political capital” from HMG’s providing weapons to the yishuv, and sought adequate protection of their settlements for self-defense. A caravan of fifteen cars filled with Arab women immediately followed with their own protest, while the Supreme Muslim Council suggested that the mandatory impose fines on the Jews, disarm them, and deport some of their leaders. When Abd al-Hadi and Sheikh Mohieddin Abdel Shafi proposed “a generous gesture” to the Arabs, such as a temporary suspension of Jewish immigration and land sales, MacMichael recalled that until recently, all the government’s troubles in the matter of security “had emanated from — 550 —

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the Arab side”; that the Jewish Agency had opposed such attacks; and that a number of Jews who were suspected of subversive activities had recently been placed in detention. Both sides, the High Commissioner observed, had claims which Britain had to consider and, “from the purely utilitarian point of view,” the Arabs would be well advised to put an end to violence. Jew and Arab alike, MacMichael concluded, should now restrain themselves and await the outcome of the Palestine Partition Commission’s report.14 No Arab leader issued any appeal for moderation, and even an attempt on the part of Fakhri Bey Nashashibi to cooperate with the British was, in Shertok’s judgment, “doomed to failure.” Seeing that mandatory officials were unprepared to supply Fakhri Bey Nashashibi’s followers with arms or financial means in order to fight Arab terrorist bands in the villages, one of Shertok’s Arab friends secretly asked the Agency to “step into the breach.” Fakhri was prepared to fight the Mufti on the latter’s grounds, “J.A” reported to Shertok, telling villagers that he and friends were their true champions in fighting partition and Jewish immigration. The Agency had no use for such tactics, Shertok replied. It would have been a different matter if Fakhri had taken an open stand against terrorism and in favor of the restoration of peace. It was “hopeless,” he added to this personal contact, for Fakhri to try and compete with Haj Amin in terms of “Arab patriotism.”15 Twenty-seven separate Arab attacks took place against Jewish settlements in the last week of July. On July 29, Prime Minister Mohammed Mahmud Pasha warned MacDonald of the growing hostility in Egypt, as well as in the Middle East and among Muslims in India, towards Britain’s policy in Palestine. He proposed getting the Arabs and Jews around a conference table, with Jewish immigration halted during the talks; the Arabs might agree to a Jewish population of 35 percent “or something a little less.” There was no chance of the two parties agreeing to such figures, MacDonald responded, so “it would fall to the British Government in the end to make up its mind what the right policy was, and then to impose it.” The Palestinian Arabs had flatly refused to meet the Woodhead Commission, but he knew of their views from personal talks with Tannous and from MacMichael’s dispatches. Since the old policy of permitting restricted Jewish immigration into the whole of Palestine would “sooner or later … bring Arab violence,” HMG favored the Royal Commission’s solution — 551 —

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of partition. “We would never have peace,” the Egyptian retorted, and Muslim “valuable friends” beyond Palestine would be lost to Britain as well. The Colonial Secretary rejoined: Partition would, for the first time, set “a definite and severe limit to the Jewish National Home,” about the size of Devonshire. Mahmud Pasha stood firm, reiterated that partition would create permanent resentment and unrest, and expressed the hope that MacDonald would have a talk with Lampson when he came back to London, for Sir Miles agreed with him on this issue.16 Other colleagues of Lampson’s in the region would advocate unreservedly for the Arab cause. Sir Reader Bullard in Jedda warned MacDonald of alienating Ibn Saud if partition were to be adopted. The Colonial Secretary again resorted to his argument that the “comparatively small country” recommended by the Peel Commission for the Jewish State, a “minute fraction” compared to the “vast territories” of the Arab States, should dispel Arab fears of Jewish domination; otherwise, the Arabs would receive no guarantee of “any final limit to be set to Jewish expansion,” with “continual friction and trouble in Palestine” presumably to follow. Bullard doubted the efficacy of this argument, even while MacDonald assured him that HMG wished to make Ibn Saud’s position “as little difficult as possible.” Sir Houstoun-Boswell in Baghdad, certain that the Jews would back HMG in a war against Germany, would urge acceptance of the Hyamson–Newcombe proposals. That same month, Chargé d’Affaires Charles H. Bateman in Baghdad minced no words: Britain should placate the Arabs until the European crisis passed, while the Jews “are anybody’s game nowadays. But we need not desert them. They have waited two thousand years for their ‘home’ … they can afford to wait a bit until we are better able to help them get their last pound of flesh [sic].”17 At this point, all continued to remain in the dark regarding the Woodhead Commission’s stance. MacDonald and his subordinates in Palestine lacked definite information, although MacMichael had gained the definite impression that its members might present a majority and a minority report, and that they would likely exclude the Galilee (with its almost exclusively Arab population) in the Jewish commonwealth. When Brodetsky and Lourie, speaking at the Colonial Office about the commission, recalled Herzl’s remark that the best humanity could hope to achieve was “the bearable dissatisfaction of all,” Shuckburgh answered: “Bearable? Well, I’m afraid it may be worse than that.” Refusing — 552 —

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to hear anti-partitionists within the yishuv, even rejecting Ussishkin’s memorandum as falling outside of its official terms of reference, the commission did ask the Agency for a memorandum on the “stages” by which a Jewish state might be established under a partition scheme. Woodhead deftly sidestepped probes by Agronsky of the Palestine Post, although he asked if Palestine could absorb many Jews; acknowledged that Tel Aviv represented “a remarkable development”; and remarked that the trouble was, not speaking of Palestine, that there really was “no room anywhere in the world” for refugees.18 The day the commission members left Palestine, Ben-Gurion gave a lengthy address in Tel Aviv on the “three battlefronts” then facing Palestinian Jewry. First, the “national movement” reflected in the Arab Revolt of the last twenty-eight months had the support of the Arab world, which viewed Palestine as Southern Syria. “Second, an active minority” embraced Jewish terrorism, “a stab in the back” of the yishuv and of the Jewish people. Remarkably, the yishuv had witnessed the creation of a legal armed force of 5,000; built the Tegart Wall in three months; took part in the revolutionary Special Night Squads; and created twenty-six agricultural settlements. Third, Palestine was not “already in our pocket” because of the Balfour Declaration. “Quite a few international treaties and pledges have been torn up or repudiated, promises and pronouncements forgotten,” including the guarantee of Austria’s independence, the demilitarization of the Rhineland, and the restrictions upon the Reichswehr and on traffic through the Dardenelles. Possessing a biblical “pedigree document” of 3,500 years, the yishuv had to fight with “strength, intelligence, and purity” in order to strengthen and expand its achievements, Ben-Gurion concluded, appealing to the noble British nation and others until the attainment of victory.19 Seeking a firsthand view on the spot for himself, MacDonald visited Palestine on August 6-7. Discussing with MacMichael and Haining the security position and the Woodhead Commission, he expressed the wish to seek a Jewish and Arab agreement to a settlement by means of a conference in London, HMG to announce its policy soon thereafter. MacMichael favored the idea of offering a very small Jewish state in the Sharon plain, with an Arab state established after five years in the rest of Palestine and certain areas to be kept under permanent British mandate. Treasurer William J. Johnson championed the division of the country into a Jewish and an Arab reserve, other than what would remain un— 553 —

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der a British mandate, these areas ultimately becoming independent states after a decade or so. Douglas Harris felt that partition would fail, however, this in turn necessitating a return to the mandate with some modifications. Faced with their division of minds, MacDonald was still convinced that something on the lines of the Peel partition scheme—”if practicable”—offered the best solution for the next twenty years, with “further evolution” later possible in the direction of “a coming together again of the broken fragments” of Palestine and Syria. Before departing for home, he asked MacMichael and colleagues to continue doing “a great deal of hard thinking” on this problem, so that they all could discuss it further sometime in October, after release of the Woodhead Commission Report.20 The Zionist camp, with access to reliable sources of information, had grounds to be anxious about the commission. According to a report from Joseph to Shertok, member Thomas Reid thought that “Zionism was the same nationalism that we objected to in Hitler.” The Jewish problem should be solved by assimilation, as adopted by the “Bolsheviks.” If the Jews must have a state, Reid added to a friend, they should find an uninhabited territory; the 450,000 Jews of Palestine “could stay put,” but “they could not expect to establish a state in other people’s territory.” Ben-Gurion warned Weizmann that the commission appeared to accept in general the restrictive Harris plan, which the Agency had first learned of in May. Wingate, who testified in Zionism’s favor before the commission (much to the ire of his superiors in Palestine), reported that Haining had reversed himself and now advised the four-man team to remove the Galilee from the Jewish State. The Agency also knew that a “permanent British mandate” was slated for the Negev, the Jews permitted to develop that area if possible. In light of this accumulated information, the WZO had to respond before Woodhead and associates completed their report, but Ben-Gurion doubted that anything could be accomplished in London without Weizmann’s return from taking the cure at Cauterets in the Pyrenees.21 At the same time, updates on two competing proposals for Palestine’s future reached the Colonial Office. Hyamson reported that his scheme with Newcombe did not differ appreciably from that of Nuri Sa’id, which Laski thought “generally acceptable,” and that the Mufti and friends would accept Nuri’s draft if pressed by the Arab rulers. (One month earlier, the British Consul in Damascus had reported that Newcombe — 554 —

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had expressed “undue sympathy” with Arab terrorists in Palestine, and promised that he would arrange with the mandatory authorities for Haj Amin’s return.) Hyamson suggested that the scheme could either be discussed in a meeting between Jews and Arabs, or that HMG would announce a policy along these lines, with the Jews then enjoying cultural autonomy as propounded by the Zionist ideologue Ahad Ha’am; a bi-national state would be created in Palestine. A few days later, Downie received H. Montague Bell, who reported favorably on the progress of the Norman plan. Iraqi ministers, he indicated, were “inclined to nibble” at Bell’s idea of experimenting with a group of Palestinian Arabs working on the Latafia estate. In their view, this work as tenant farmers presented the possibility of greater transfers to sparsely populated Iraq in the future.22 The anti-partitionists did not concede defeat. A meeting in New York City, chaired by Robert Szold, discussed the activities of a small group that had been working in tandem since last December with various committees in South Africa, England, Holland, and Palestine. Several thousand copies of two pamphlets opposing partition had been distributed widely; an amendment to the ZOA’s latest political resolution, pledging support to Weizmann and the World Zionist executive “in their negotiations to obtain maximum terms in the proposed Partition plan,” had been withdrawn and replaced by “in resisting any infringement of Jewish rights as guaranteed by the Balfour Declaration and the mandate”; 70,000 members were put on record at the Hadassah convention against partition. Brandeis congratulated Ussishkin on his memorandum to the Woodhead Commission as “an important task beautifully performed,” eliciting a grateful reply that the commission had permitted printing the document after its own report had been made public. In Europe, Jabotinsky kept up his attack on partition, as well as on havlaga. He also warned the Jews of Poland, during an address on Tisha B’Av marking the destruction of the two Holy Temples in Jerusalem, of “the volcano which will soon begin to spew forth its fires of destruction.” They still could not see it, the Revisionist leader observed, for they were “still troubled and confused by everyday concerns.” He therefore implored “the crown of world Jewry” to “listen to my words at this, the twelfth hour. For God’s sake: let everyone save himself, so long as there is time to do so, for time is running short.”23 Returning home from his two-day trip to Palestine, MacDonald met — 555 —

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with Tannous and then a Jewish Agency delegation on August 12. He turned down flat the former’s request that the Mufti and the other exiles be returned to Palestine, making clear his conviction that they continued to encourage and authorize the terrorist campaign in general. (MacMichael had told MacDonald bluntly that if HMG chose to negotiate with Haj Amin, the government should have to find another High Commissioner.) Scores of “crimes against innocent people” by the Arab terrorists had “left a stain on the reputation of the Palestinian Arabs which it would take a long time to erase,” MacDonald asserted. He was prepared to have discussions, albeit not protracted ones, between Arab representatives and the government before British policy was finally settled, but this did not mean that he was changing his mind on partition. To the Agency representatives, MacDonald noted that in some cases the Revisionists were definitely responsible for bomb attacks. As for immigration, the issue had to await adoption by HMG of a definite stand, while the Agency’s demand for 2,000 special certificates for German Jews was awaiting the High Commissioner’s answer; he believed that the reply would be a negative one. The same day, MacDonald turned down an appeal from Palestine’s Ashkenazi and Sephardi chief rabbis that he grant a reprieve to British police officer Mordekhai Schwartz for killing a fellow Arab officer. With MacMichael’s sanction, Schwartz was hanged in Akko prison four days later.24 On August 21, MacDonald presented his tentative conclusions to the Cabinet. He still endorsed partition, and advised against abandoning this general solution “lightly.” Rumors that the wisdom of partition was being questioned in the Cabinet had encouraged the Arab terrorists, who “virtually dictate Arab policy” in Palestine. Yet the arguments in partition’s favor could be made very effective not only from the point of the Jews, but also as an answer to the neighboring Arab countries, which feared Jewish domination in the Near East. At the same time, he continued, “practical considerations” in Palestine might lead the Woodhead Commission to recommend a Jewish state so small that the Jews would reject it, while bitter hostility in the Arab countries to partition might be “so dangerous in the present international situation” that HMG was forced now to seek an alternative solution. None of the other solutions that he had explored was really satisfactory. So far as he could judge, all of them would be rejected by either the Arabs or the Jews or both: “we are faced by a choice between evils.” The government had to — 556 —

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try to find the solution, MacDonald concluded, which, while perhaps not bringing “pacification at once,” “is most likely over a period of years to heal the breach between Jews and Arabs and ultimately to create an enduring peace.”25 To explore the same objective, Hafiz Wahbah invited Ben-Gurion to meet at his home in London on August 25. Hearing the Saudi Ambassador remark that, according to the Foreign Office, Weizmann had been disposed to accept Nuri Sa’id’s suggestion for a fixed racial percentage in Palestine, Ben-Gurion stated that this was “quite unacceptable” to the Zionists, who were prepared to agree that immigration should not exceed or be below the country’s economic capacity to accept new arrivals. Wahbah mentioned the difficulty of getting any Palestinian Arab to meet Jews because of the immediate charge that he had sold himself to the Jews. In response, Ben-Gurion related that he and Abd al-Hadi had initially tried to find an agreement on the basis of a Jewish Palestine within an Arab Federation, but since the disturbances Abd al-Hadi had objected to Jewish immigration of any kind. “Yes, of course,” Wahbah commented, “everybody now is terrified of being accused of treachery.” For that very reason, Ben-Gurion proposed that the Agency would be delighted to discuss the situation with Ibn Saud, “the only personality in the Arab world strong enough and independent enough to do anything.” That would be useful, the Ambassador rejoined; he would write to the Whahabbi monarch. The two men concurred that if the Arabs and Jews reached an agreement, the British government would accept it. The “cautious but wise” Wahbah “seemed to be a pleasant man, without resentment or hatred and ready to be of help,” Ben-Gurion recorded after their secret meeting.26 Lacy Baggallay objected to MacDonald’s August 21 memorandum, feeling that a Jewish state or an autonomous and growing Jewish community would be a “constant irritant” to the Arab world, and thus unlikely ever to create what the Colonial Secretary had termed “an enduring peace.” Whitehall’s Middle East expert had seen Nahas Pasha’s most recent warning that partition would unite the whole Arab world against Britain; the former Egyptian Prime Minister felt that HMG should create a Palestinian state while assisting “as far as possible” those Jews already established in Palestine in their efforts to build a National Home. Most significantly, Saudi Crown Prince Feisal informed Baggallay in a private talk on August 31 that Ibn Saud had throughout done everything to pre— 557 —

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vent feelings of animosity among Arabs in Palestine “from going too far, and above all from doing irreparable damage to Anglo-Arab friendship.” His father’s position was very difficult, however, and Feisal trusted that everything possible would be done to satisfy the Arabs’ “legitimate aspirations.” HMG’s anxiety was not less than Feisal’s own and that of the Arabs in general, Baggallay replied. In dealing with the Palestine question, he added, the Foreign Office always kept two objects in mind: the adoption of a just solution and the maintenance of close friendship between Great Britain and the Arabs.27 HMG also had to keep in mind the threat to Czechoslovakia’s unity, with the Third Reich pressing ever since the Anschluss to annex the Sudeten region containing three million Germans. As Berlin announced huge maneuvers involving 750,000 men along the French frontier in mid-August and the British called for the concentration of most of the fleet for early September, the French prepared to call up reservists in case of war and the Czechs made ready to fight. Given this looming crisis, the Cabinet rejected a call from MacMichael and Haining, who opposed MacDonald’s suggestion that more local recruits reinforce the police, for an extra division of troops to keep order in Palestine. The British were holding down almost as many troops there as they could offer to France if a European war broke out, just when the Italians posed a threat to HMG in the Mediterranean and the Japanese threatened vital British interests in the Far East. Imperial policy dictated that obligations outside of Europe should be cut to a minimum at the least political cost, and Neville Chamberlain, as U.S. Ambassador Joseph Kennedy reported to State, particularly wished to avert war if at all possible. It appeared that the Zionists, like the Czechs, would be pressured to make concessions. Perhaps half of Europe was terrified by one question, Ben-Gurion wrote in his diary on August 31: “War or no war?” It was likely that the answer to this question rested with one man, the Agency Executive chairman added, and even he might not even know the answer at this moment— Adolf Hitler.28

At this critical juncture, as the German Chancellor was weighing the risks involved in launching a war, MacDonald’s ideas began to crystallize. On September 1, he mused to Weizmann that if the Jews refused — 558 —

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an offer from the Woodhead Commission, then partition “went by the board.” In that case, two alternatives presented themselves: a temporary Jewish–Arab–British arrangement, although the Colonial Secretary was skeptical about this possibility, or a bi-lateral Jewish-British understanding. He agreed with Weizmann that the police and administration in Palestine were “rotten,” and reported that Tegart was returning to Palestine with wide authority over security. The same day, Shuckburgh, greatly depressed that various “governmental” duties had not been turned over to the Agency since the Peel Report, asked Weizmann for his reaction to the creation of a possible “germ” or “embryo” of a Jewish state and an Arab state, with the rest of Palestine to be placed under the mandate. Weizmann responded that he would like to hear more of the idea. He soon wrote to Tegart that such a proposal might open “some vista of possibilities.” Yet it all depended upon what the Zionists could do in the mandated territory, Weizmann added. Immigration and land purchases remained the critical details to be ironed out.29 The same day, MacDonald asked Lampson if HMG’s adoption of a policy that was strongly opposed by the Palestinian Arabs would seriously damage Egyptian friendship for Great Britain. It would be harmful to some extent, he was told, and not revert to normal. Would not an anti-Zionist decision be seen as “a sign of our decadence,” giving in to terrorists and Arab opinion elsewhere? MacDonald wondered. The British were always giving way to this sort of pressure, the Ambassador observed, as in Ireland, India, and even Egypt, but our “credit was greater after the event than before. The Egyptians really knew our immense strength.” What of the Zionist argument, MacDonald asked, that the Arabs would try to get the “best bargain that they could” if Britain decided irrevocably in favor of partition and showed determination to put it through? Lampson disagreed: Arab loyalties were uncertain whatever policy HMG chose, but if they deeply resented the British decision then the Arabs would have “a great nuisance value and might be formidable” as tools in the hands of London’s enemies. MacDonald emphasized that he wished to gain the goodwill of Ibn Saud and other leaders in the region, which is why he was attracted by partition’s ability to “set severe limits to Jewish expansion.” Lampson bucked again, thinking Jewish sovereignty over any part of Palestine a great strategic error. The Jews would be of great assistance to Britain in the Eastern Mediterranean — 559 —

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theatre of war, MacDonald countered, but Lampson had doubts: who could tell “the inclinations of Polish and other Jews who would come in the future?”30 Strongly opposed to partition, Baggallay received encouragement from Newcombe’s report that he had just sent MacDonald a letter urging him to call a round-table conference, before the Woodhead Commission’s report, in order to discuss a settlement resembling the Hyamson–Newcombe proposals. British, Jewish, and Arab representatives had to do this now to avoid disaster, Newcombe thought, Arab opinion “hardening so rapidly” that even an agreement along those lines would shortly be impossible to obtain. The government could solemnly pledge that, whatever happened in ten years or at any future time, it intended that the Arabs never be subjected to Jewish domination. While giving Arabs their “legitimate rights,” Britain could secure something like autonomous areas for the Jews wherever they were in a majority. The Arabs with whom he had been in contact were amendable, as were “moderate and broad-minded English Jews” like Samuel and Laski; Jewish communities already settled in Middle Eastern countries like Turkey and Iraq would lose everything from any stirring up of Muslim fanaticism. The majority of Jews in America and Europe would gladly accept such a solution as well, Newcombe declared, but Weizmann, leader of “the Zionist clique that dominated the Jewish Agency,” presented the one obstacle. “No one could be more pro-British than he when talking to an Englishman, no one more anti-British when talking to anyone else.” The problem of Palestine would never be solved, he was certain, so long as Weizmann was accepted as “the embodiment of Jewish opinion.”31 On September 7, a Cabinet ministerial committee met to discuss Palestine against the ominous backdrop of the Czech crisis. That same day, the Nazi-inspired Sudeten National Social Party, led by Konrad Henlein, had broken off negotiations with the Prague government, talks that had been mediated since August by Lord Runciman at Chamberlain’s request. Viscount Gort, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, reported on the imminent dispatch to Palestine of a brigade from Egypt and three battalions from India, which pleased MacDonald. Sir Thomas Inskip, Minister for Coordination of Defense, doubted, however, if these reinforcements would stop the wave of terrorism. Could an advance summary of the Woodhead Commission Report be obtained? Halifax — 560 —

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queried. MacDonald would not agree to renounce partition officially before the report was submitted, but he concurred that if the Jews did not accept the commission’s recommendations and HMG consequently had to abandon partition, this would do much to “relieve” the situation.32 Weizmann, in Newcombe’s opinion “the greatest of the dangers which at present confronted” Great Britain, feared the worst. The Zionist herald did not expect the commission to produce any satisfactory solution, and his last appearance before that body on August 30 confirmed his early view that the four members lacked “any sympathy with or understanding of the Jewish Problem.” He considered MacDonald a “weak reed” and Chamberlain undependable. If the Zionists had to reject the commission’s findings, he told Ben-Gurion, the WZO Executive would have to resign and deliberate on the situation at a congress or similar gathering in the United States. At the Keren HaYesod convention in Antwerp from September 3-6, which announced a plan for a 1939 drive for £1 million, Weizmann pronounced that “we shall never countenance any solution that will rob our scattered masses of the hope of large-scale immigration” and “the ultimate attainment to national status which is essential to our rehabilitation of status among the nations of the world.” He also informed the American delegates that if the commission issued an anti-Zionist report, the principal office of the WZO would have to be moved to the United States and an American leadership constituted. Weizmann did not think that he could effectively lead the movement if it had to adopt a policy of non-cooperation with, if not open antagonism to, the British.33 The last, personal conclusion, he confided to Benjamin V. Cohen, author of New Deal legislation and presidential advisor, then in London on behalf of the U.S. government. When Weizmann asked what help could be obtained from America, Cohen replied that Roosevelt certainly sympathized with the Zionist experiment in Palestine. Yet reports of the British inability to deal with the Arab problem and the constant “whittling away” of territory available for Jewish settlement, first in Transjordan and next in the Peel Commission proposal, had raised doubts in the President’s mind as to the adequacy of Palestine as an outlet for the European refugees for whom a home had to be found. If Weizmann’s fears about the Woodhead Commission Report were corroborated, Cohen advised, it might be best to abandon the whole idea of partition as impracticable and unwise. Law and order first had to — 561 —

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be established in Palestine (as Brandeis thought), and then the movement would be in a better position to resume negotiations with both the British and the Arabs. Having served as legal counsel to the U.S. Zionists negotiating the mandate terms during 1919-1921, Cohen recalled that Weizmann had convinced him years ago of the inadvisability of talking of a Jewish state. Talk of a Jewish commonwealth, Cohen went on, should lead to restriction of its boundaries to areas exclusively Jewish, thus excluding potential settlement areas like the Huleh and the Negev, as well as great Zionist enterprises like the Palestine Potash and Palestine Electric. Cohen lost no time in informing the like-minded Robert Szold of this conversation.34 Weizmann’s fears were indeed corroborated on September 6, when Elliot gave Dugdale a copy of MacDonald’s August memorandum on Palestine to the Cabinet. It was obvious, her diary recorded, that the Peel plan “will probably be greatly reduced.” Weizmann would be confronted with the “hideous acceptance or rejection” of what Elliot called “a Tel-Aviv concentration camp.” The alternative to acceptance, she thought, would most likely be “a continuance of the mandate with all its restrictions on immigration, thus accepting a permanent minority status.” Elliot was “passionately anxious” that the Jews accept any sovereign territory provided that it backed on to sea, realizing that “since the Zurich Congress last year, Jewry is broken.” In his opinion, they had to make Tel-Aviv a second London, a city-state like Venice. “Do not think of shattered hopes—think of getting out of present Hell,” he went on. Dugdale reacted thus: “Wonderful stuff—but is it possible to bring them to it? Will it indeed be necessary?”35 In Palestine, the mounting wave of Arab guerilla operations led Shertok to warn MacMichael two days later that “things seemed to be heading straight for the official proclamation of a rebel government.” The disarming of the central police station in Jaffa, coming after successful attacks on the police stations, banks, and post offices in Nablus and in Hebron, was followed by the robbing of the municipality in broad daylight. This called for the mandatory’s swift cleaning out of Jaffa’s “infestation” by terrorists. Additional measures for Tel Aviv’s defense and the outlying quarters had still not been taken; train service between Lydda and Jerusalem must be protected rather than discontinued, since the latter decision “played straight into the hands” of the terrorists, who had killed two Jewish employers in the Lydda train station the other — 562 —

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day. While soon prepared to supply 200 men to assist the army in certain duties, Shertok continued, the Agency found it “extremely difficult” to keep “our constituents within bounds of discipline” without knowing what the administration was doing and what it intended to do. The High Commissioner interrupted only when Shertok found the government at fault for not preventing the assassination at midday on August 24 of Assistant District Commissioner Walter Moffat while sitting at his desk in Jenin’s central police station, and he accused the Agency of pressing for new settlements in order to “raise the flag.” Upon Shertok’s objection to the latter charge, MacMichael recanted, but urged that the Zionists not occupy new places that would cause difficulty to the authorities in their wish to “make order prevail” in Palestine. He then terminated the interview.36 In fact, after the shooting of Moffat’s alleged murderer when he tried to escape from custody, the British military authorities decided that “a large portion” of Jenin should be “blown up” as well. A heavily armed convoy carrying 4,200 kilograms of gelignite carried out the demolition on August 25. A government telegram concerning this mission also contained the first references to the Arab-driven “minesweeping taxis” used “to reduce [British] land mine casualties.” Shuckburgh condoned the punitive stratagem, noting that in Palestine the British were dealing “not with a chivalrous opponent playing the game according to the rules, but with gangsters and murderers.” Undersecretary of State for the Colonies Lord Dufferin wrote that, much as he disliked the implications of the “minesweeping taxi … I do not feel that we have the right to interfere. British lives are being lost and I don’t think that we, from the security of Whitehall, can protest squeamishly about measures taken by the men in the frontline.” MacDonald’s reservations notwithstanding, HMG’s authorities in Palestine continued with the use of minesweeper cars and dynamiting the houses of Arab villages from which snipers fired against British troops, claiming that it was “an essential part of our military action.”37 Unofficially, Shuckburgh continued the discussion with Weizmann on September 9. Echoing MacDonald’s thoughts to Weizmann on September 1, the Deputy Undersecretary declared that if the commission’s report did not bring a settlement, he saw the obvious alternative to be a return to the mandate with an agreement, “say for five years,” with limited and agreed immigration “possibly on an ascending scale.” — 563 —

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An immigration of 50,000 per year, Weizmann responded, was “a bare minimum” in these troubled times in order to achieve the Zionist goal of “Geula V’Hatsala” (redemption and rescue). Shuckburgh then developed the “germ idea” of an Anglo-Zionist arrangement without any Arab involvement, whereby Jewish development, including immigration, could proceed “without hindrance” over a specific area; Jewish activities would be “to some extent restricted” in the rest of Palestine. There would be full consultation with the Zionists once the report reached the Colonial Office. Until then, Shuckburgh stated that he was “only exploring all avenues.” The Arabs would not agree even to this solution, Weizmann rejoined, and he gave examples of inefficiency, demoralization, and corruption within the Palestine administration. As he had written the previous week to Tegart, Weizmann observed that “everything depends on details, measure of autonomy, financial arrangements, etc.”38 In fact, Hitler’s designs for Czechoslovakia impinged on Palestine’s unfolding fate. Runciman succeeded in getting Henlein and the Czech government to resume negotiations, both sides then agreeing to a federal system for the country on the Swiss model. Furious, Hitler denounced Runciman’s mission, and on September 12 demanded the right of the Sudetens to self-determination. His same speech at the Nazi party rally in Nuremberg noted that Palestine’s “poor Arabs are defenseless and may be left in the lurch,” and he hoped not to have to take up arms against England. The address signaled a widespread series of disorders and Prague’s proclamation of martial law the next day. A reliable source subsequently reported to Whitehall that after Hitler’s speech, Goebbels addressed an assembly of 3,000 representatives of Islam, including 100 Palestinian “Nazis,” behind closed doors. The Führer meant that it would not be necessary for Germany to fight the British, explained the Third Reich’s Propaganda Minister, since he knew that Islam would cause the Empire to “crumble in the dust” upon the day, “not very remote,” when “Mohammedans would rise up and exterminate their intruding oppressor.” The Christian powers were “effeminate and decadent” and would be “blown away like dust by the virile and red-blooded sons of the religions of Islam and Thor.” The day is approaching, Goebbels ended, when our leader “will appear to the amazed eye of the world in the blinding light of the victorious Führer of Islam in its march for a regenerated world.”39 Perhaps Hitler’s “deceptive” speech at Nuremberg would succeed — 564 —

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in separating France and England from Czechoslovakia, Ben-Gurion concluded, but it did nothing to shake his uncompromising faith in partition. Within the next two years, he had recently written to Agency Executive colleague Avraham Katzenelson, Zionism’s central task was “to fight for a Jewish state immediately.” Only thus could the movement advance in these days; everything else—fighting for security, immigration, “mandate”—was only “a defensive war.” HMG, not daring to turn all of Palestine into an Arab state or a Jewish state and unable to continue much longer in the present situation, would be forced to return to this solution. A select American Zionist committee, Ben-Gurion informed the ZOA’s Lipsky, must be created without delay in light of the anticipated struggle. The British partition would be satisfactory, he told Benjamin Cohen, because London could not afford to fight with both Jews and Arabs. He minimized the importance of a small Jewish area, and talked of a Tel Aviv with a million Jews, the Zionists selling their industrial products throughout the Near East and ultimately making peace with the Arabs.40 A letter he received from Hagana commander Golomb on September 12, speaking of a possible Hagana-Irgun modus vivendi, threatened BenGurion’s sense of certainty. Without funds and despondent after numerous arrests of Revisionists and Betarim in Palestine, Jabotinsky had advised Avraham Stern, then operating in Poland to raise weapons for the Irgun without the NZO leader’s knowledge, that the Irgun should halt activities so that it could recoup before renewing operations. Shimshon Yunitchman, however, then in charge of Betar’s “military companies” in the Galilee, contacted on his own initiative the Agency’s Eliyahu Dobkin and Shertok with an eye to some understanding between the opposing camps. This in turn led to his meeting on August 30—four days after an Irgun bomb in Jaffa’s vegetable market killed 16 Arabs and wounded 30 others—with Golomb, at which Haim Lubinski represented the Irgun.41 Their meeting proved inconclusive, but Ben-Gurion warned Golomb the same day against this “Trojan horse.” He absolutely opposed the Irgun’s wish to enter the legal supernumerary police forces of Hagana members, since Jabotinsky still did not recognize the Agency’s supreme authority. These “biryonim” (ruffians), like the Arab police, would be loyal to their own political party, acting as “provocateurs and spies.” To Dobkin he wrote that these “biryonim” copied Nazi tactics and were “enemies” who could not be restrained. Needing a maximum enlistment — 565 —

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of defensive forces in order to face “a general Arab Revolt,” he added in a second letter to Golomb, had the yishuv’s official leaders the right to jeopardize its possible political future with such an agreement?42 Concurrently, Jabotinsky tried to stem the Irgun’s growing radicalism, seeking to persuade the third Betar world conference that his youth cadres must become “the backbone of the Jewish liberation movement.” He lauded Ben-Yosef’s heroic fulfillment of Jabotinsky’s order—given now post-facto—for the mission, and hoped that the grieving delegates would be worthy of this “exalted tragedy.” The eloquent charge did not sit well with twenty-five year old Menahem Begin, a prominent Betar commander in Poland who, thoroughly identifying with Ahimeir’s stress on an actual war for independence, obliquely challenged Jabotinsky’s staunch reliance on “the world’s conscience” and on political negotiations. The mandatory’s intransigence and the Evian Conference demanded, in Begin’s view, that “military Zionism” along the examples of fighters Garibaldi and De Valera become Betar’s rallying cry. Jabotinsky dismissed Begin’s well-received speech as unrealistic “chatter,” the valueless “creaking of a door.” Israel Scheib (later Eldad) disagreed, welcoming this “creaking” as a warning signal that the “thieves of surrender and opportunism” had stolen into the national Zionist movement. Ultimately, the world conference voted down a resolution from Stern associate Uriel Halpern (later Yonatan Ratosh) declaring the Jewish State an immediately achievable aim, which he asserted was the conclusion mandated by Ben-Yosef’s example. Instead, the clear majority adopted Jabotinsky’s principle that the Jews had to constitute a majority in Eretz Yisrael first. The conference did approve Begin’s proposal that the words in the Betar vow “I will turn my hand only in defense” be supplemented by “and to conquer my land.”43 By mid-September, MacDonald privately revealed in separate talks his increasing shift away from the partition scheme. Since reliable information indicated that the Arabs were planning a large-scale revolt for the third week of October, he informed Woodhead on September 14, the sooner they could be granted relief with the end of the Peel proposal, the better. One day earlier, MacDonald had told Weizmann that he was impressed by the danger of a substantial Arab minority in the Jewish State, particularly given powerful neighbors in sympathy with that minority’s “national aspirations.” (He referred, in this regard, to the case of the Sudeten Germans). He also had to consider the dangerous — 566 —

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position created in the region and even India, with support from Italy and Germany; and a possible “conflict of policies” as revealed by a recent study of the McMahon correspondence of World War I. To Benjamin Cohen, he stated off-the-record that it might be necessary to go back to the mandate.44 While agreeing with Weizmann on September 14 about the ineptitude of the Palestine administration, MacDonald asserted that the Jews were “rather too aggressive,” and he declared that Ibn Saud’s opposition had to be reckoned with. If partition were found to be impracticable, the Colonial Secretary hoped for perhaps a ten-year agreement and the principle of absorptive capacity “on a restricted basis.” This revelatory feeler bearing out Elliot’s warning to Dugdale of September 6, MacDonald then offered his “personal and tentative view” that representatives of the Arabs in Palestine and of the Agency should meet for brief discussions after the commission report was made public, the government to make up its mind if mutual agreement was not reached. If MacDonald remained in office for another five years, Weizmann responded, he would agree to make another attempt with the mandate on these terms. Yet the future was uncertain, and an immigration policy meant to “tranquillise the Arabs is, as experience has taught us, a very dangerous procedure.”45 MacDonald’s third talk with Weizmann, Ben-Gurion also present on that evening of September 19, occurred just when Chamberlain and French Premier Edouard Daladier gave in to Hitler’s demand for annexation of the Sudetenland rather than risk a war. That arrangement “ensures peace in the world,” MacDonald began, sparking Weizmann’s retort: “Have you read Mein Kampf?” Dodging this question, the Colonial Secretary went on to emphasize that Arab fears had to be assuaged and the Jews would have to “go slow.” HMG would persuade Ibn Saud, who could “rock the Empire” if he declared “a holy war” against the Jewish State, about its continuing the National Home under a mandate. BenGurion pointed out that an army of 100,000 Jews from Palestine and abroad could check any Arab opposition, but MacDonald stood resolute. “They are going to sell the Jews also—give up Partition, for fear of the Arabs and the Germans and the Italians,” Weizmann told Dugdale after the contentious three-hour interview ended at midnight. Ben-Gurion’s first reaction, with which she concurred before resigning from the Labour Party for its failure to unequivocally oppose Chamberlain’s sur— 567 —

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render of the Czechs, was that the Jews “will fight, physically, rather than go back to the mandate.”46 At a meeting of the Agency Executive in London two days later, the most militant reaction came from Weizmann. Cooperation with Britain had always been for him the “Rock of Gibraltar,” but now his policy would be “uncompromising hostility”, and he would not negotiate again with MacDonald. Stunned at this reaction, Ben-Gurion vehemently argued for formal preliminary conversations with regard to the main lines of a partition scheme; a break with Britain, “a terrible blow” to European Jewry’s feeling that “there was one great power which was friendly-disposed towards them,” should be avoided as long as possible. The Zionist movement had to focus on a large Jewish immigration, Ben-Gurion claimed, and refuse to recognize Ibn Saud as a factor in the Palestine situation. To Shertok, Ben-Gurion stressed concern that the spectacle of Britain yielding to Hitler on Czechoslovakia would “leave a profound impression on the Arab world,” which would endanger the Empire in case of war. Indeed, MacDonald wired MacMichael and his regional colleagues on September 24 the Cabinet’s decision that if war broke out “restoration of friendly relations with Arab peoples is obviously extremely desirable,” as was support from the United States. HMG would then announce that partition and all immigration to Palestine would both be immediately suspended on grounds of security. He transmitted this decision to Weizmann and Namier, who protested strongly, four days later.47 Chamberlain’s claim to bringing back “peace with honour” by his appeasement of Hitler’s entire demands at Munich on September 30 gained the enthusiastic and overwhelming acclaim of his fellow countrymen. King George VI even invited him onto the balcony of Buckingham Palace to appear before cheering crowds, but the leading Zionists saw dark horizons ahead. While London’s distribution of gas masks and the digging of trenches in parks for air raid shelters drew to a halt, and moves to mobilization ended in Prague, Berlin, and Paris, Ben-Gurion feared that “our turn is next” and that Hitler, with increased strength, would “lunge one of these days on his prey like a raging beast.” Brandeis judged the British “unmanly, dishonorable, unwise, misled by pacifism”; Wise wrote to the Czech Ambassador in Washington of the “betrayal” by the democracies “in collusion with ruthless dictatorships.” Czech Minister to London Jan Masaryk, whose nation Chamberlain had blithely dis— 568 —

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missed with the statement over the BBC about “a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing,” had advised the steadfast Anglophile Weizmann that the two of them should purchase a house in London of three floors: the first for Ethiopia’s Haile Selassie, the second for himself, and the third for the Zionist leader. In a meeting on October 1, Weizmann now agreed with Ben-Gurion and Katznelson that “the turn of the yishuv to be sold to the Arabs is very near.” They could not yet mount armed resistance in Palestine, but could only work by every means (“all is kosher now,” Dugdale put it) to buy land, bring in men, and get weapons. In two to four years, she added, “we will bring the Jewish State into being.”48 A pogrom in Tiberias on the evening of October 2 indicated just how distant from Zionist grasp that objective appeared. After hundreds of Arab villagers had barricaded the main road to that city, a two-hour assault against the Kiryat Shmuel quarter led to the burning of the synagogue and six houses, as well as the murder of nineteen Jews, including ten children and a number of women, in cold blood. Following the massacre, the attackers celebrated in the streets before they dispersed. British troops, firing in the air, remained in their quarters. Since July, the Agency had repeatedly demanded additional supernumerary police and more rifles for them, without success. The British regional army commander, rejecting a recommendation from Galilee district administrator Alec Kirkbride, ruled out harsh measures against the neighboring villages and those involved in the outrage.49 Aware that “power politics,” rather than moral values, justice, and prior commitments, currently dominated the world arena, Ben-Gurion concluded that Zionism only had one concrete support—the yishuv’s ability to defend, even with arms, its rights in Eretz Yisrael. Writing at length on October 3 to the Agency Executive in Jerusalem, with copies sent to a few associates elsewhere, he warned that all of European Jewry, and perhaps also the Jews of Asia and the United States, would soon feel “the victory of evil” and the spread of antisemitism. In light of growing anti-Zionism from Hitler, Mussolini, and the democracies at Munich, Jewry faced “unprecedented hardship” in the future. Without cherishing illusions, the movement had to prepare for bad news with “the courage and wisdom of desperate people who are fighting for their existence with their backs to the wall.” “Virtually in a state of war,” Ben-Gurion continued, we could only — 569 —

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overcome the danger of being handed over to the Mufti or to the Arab kings by strengthening the yishuv on all fronts. MacDonald hinted ominously at a pro-Arab policy, while Chamberlain, “almost a dictator” in the Cabinet, advocated “realism.” Roosevelt did not believe that Palestine should be a haven for Jewish immigrants; after Munich, the League of Nations did not exist. Loyal Zionists, regrettably only a small minority of the Jewish people, had to be enlisted to supply the yishuv with men, means, land, and equipment. The situation could change tomorrow, so we must not despair, Ben-Gurion concluded. “Yet we must also prepare for the worst.”50 On October 5, which coincided with Yom Kippur, MacDonald professed to Weizmann, then accompanied by Lourie, that he was trying to stand firm under “renewed pressure” from the Cabinet and the Arab monarchs against any Jewish immigration. MacDonald then broached the possibility of spokesmen for Iraq, Syria, and Saudi Arabia coming to an Arab-Jewish conference. As they were more moderate than the Palestinian Arabs, in his opinion, perhaps a settlement could be reached. This stance markedly differed from mid-September, when MacDonald informed Weizmann that since it had been “a mistake” to bring in the neighboring kings during the first stage of the Arab Revolt, they would be excluded from discussions between Palestinian Jews and Arabs once the Woodhead Commission’s Report became public. A pessimistic Ben-Gurion, excluded by Weizmann from this interview, later heard Weizmann relate that the projected talks would discuss a Jewish state within the framework of an Arab Federation; whether MacDonald or Weizmann had brought up this idea was not clear to him. The Agency released a statement the same evening that while the Jewish people remained ready to cooperate with the Arabs “for the general welfare of the country,” they could consider “neither the imposition of minority status nor any arbitrary limitation of their inalienable right to return to their homeland.”51 Weizmann met the next day with Tawfiq as-Suwaidi, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, who began by saying that no settlement was possible without stopping immigration. When the minister charged that the Jews had come in “like invaders,” Weizmann remarked that he was “talking like an Arab pamphlet,” and that they would not likely get anywhere on that basis. The Jews would find it hard to defend a Jewish state in case of war, as-Suwaidi asserted, to which Weizmann cautioned that the — 570 —

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Arabs might lose in an armed conflict what they had already gained. The Iraqi first asked about a possible 35 percent Jewish population, then mentioned 50 percent. “They were getting a little nearer,” the Zionist responded to the second figure, stressing that while the Jews did not wish to dominate anybody, they would not agree to be dominated. AsSuwaidi: “But we should give you autonomy.” Weizmann: “You will give us nothing.” Nuri Sa’id, then present, kept silent.52 Shortly thereafter, as-Suwaidi conveyed his plan to MacDonald for an independent Palestinian state (possibly including Transjordan) that would be in treaty with HMG, like Iraq. Jews and other minorities would be given a large measure of local autonomy. The House of Commons, MacDonald responded, would not agree to stop Jewish immigration and commit the government “here and now” to the Jews being a permanent minority. While expressing agreement with this likely scenario in Parliament, the Colonial Secretary stated that he ultimately would stand for “whatever he thought right.” MacDonald rejected the 35 percent figure suggested by the Foreign Minister, but “he did not mean that he was in favor of the Jews ultimately becoming a majority. He did not prejudge that issue.” He intended to “wait and see how things would develop.” To Nuri’s query about how long Jewish immigration was to continue, MacDonald reverted to his line about the benefits of partition from the Arab point of view, for it would limit Jewish entry to the Jewish State and HMG would be willing to ensure that the boundaries would not be “overstepped” by Jews except so far as the Arab State might be willing to accept them. The Jews and Arabs ought to reach “a reasonable agreement,” Nuri opined, and he had tried to do so with Dr. Weizmann, “but there was great difficulty in coming to any such agreement with the Zionists.”53 An Inter-Parliamentary Arab Congress, held in Cairo during October 7-11, showed that the platform of the Bludan Conference and of the outlawed Arab Higher Committee had the support of much of the Muslim world. Izzat Darwaza of the Committee had met with some Syrians one week earlier in order to present the Palestinian Arab demands. He warned them of Zionist aspirations to expand throughout much of the Middle East; opined that in a world war Germany and Italy would support Arab nationalism; urgently called for additional support to the terrorist campaign in Palestine, particularly as the yishuv had proven its ability to defend itself; and declared that the Arabs should advocate — 571 —

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firmly for Jews to constitute no more than one-third of the country’s population. At the Congress itself, the hopes of Abd al-Hadi that the delegates would advance towards the Pan-Islamic ideal were not received with enthusiasm; a Saudi Arabian representative was markedly absent. The Iraqis disagreed with the Mufti’s proposal of Palestine’s annexation to Syria. Husseini, who derided Ibn Saud, failed to obtain a message of support to Haj Amin, the exiles, and the mujahideen. The Lebanese decided to leave when some Syrians charged that the Maronite Christians in Lebanon, “like the Jews in Palestine, were a bone in the throat of the Arab movement.” At the same time, Syria parliamentary head Faris Bey El Khoury presented demands that Haj Amin had authorized him to make, including legitimatization of the jihad in Palestine against the Jewish Agency. Most of these demands were accepted by the assembled, who declared the Balfour Declaration “null and void ab initio”; rejected partition in any form and insisted that “Palestine be maintained in its entirety as an Arab country”; demanded (against the Egyptians’ reservation) an end to further “Zionist immigration”; sought the release of all Palestinian Arab prisoners and a general amnesty; and called for the establishment of a representative Palestine Assembly to negotiate a treaty with Great Britain that would ipso facto terminate the mandate. Shortly before the Congress ended, Prime Minister Mahmud Pasha told a delighted delegation that HMG was about to find a just Palestine solution which would “satisfy the Arabs and create peace in Palestine and the entire Arab East.” An Arab Women’s Congress in Cairo soon passed resolutions similar to those of the men.54 These latest developments, including the publication in the Daily Telegraph on October 6 of as-Suwaidi’s plan for a Palestinian state with no future Jewish entry, sparked a telegram from Weizmann to the Zionist leadership in the United States. As Shertok informed the WZO Actions Committee, the Inter-Parliamentary Arab Congress and as-Suwaidi’s proposal would not likely have surfaced without Foreign Office sanction, while MacDonald’s advice that the Zionists discuss the political question with Ibn Saud, despite “the chasm of blind enmity” that separated him from the Jewish point of view, evinced an especially significant trend. “Seriously apprehensive” of a “radical reversal” in British policy, leading to the “crystallization” of the National Home, the stoppage of immigration, and even an Arab state, Weizmann asked — 572 —

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American Zionists to mobilize the press and have “the Skipper” (Wise’s adulatory term for Roosevelt) intervene via the British Ambassador in Washington. American Jewry was also requested “most urgently” to issue a statement that Jews “will not submit to [the] fate of Assyrians and give up Jewish Palestine.”55 Within twenty-four hours, the ZOA had dispatched cables to Chamberlain and MacDonald, signed by all the Zionist organizations, Adler as a non-Zionist member of the Agency, and B’nai B’rith president Henry Monsky. The telegrams indicated disbelief that these reports were true, and charged that such action would nullify the Balfour Declaration and the mandate, as well as “still further aggravate the terrible plight of the Jewish people.” In addition, protests from Protestant and Catholic Church leaders were obtained; editorials appeared in over 100 newspapers; some 100,000 telegrams and postcards flooded the White House.56 Weizmann seriously argued to his small circle of confidants in London that the Jews might do better within an Arab state for the time being than under British administration—immigration, weapons, and other matters “would be a matter of backsheesh [sic],” but he could not have imagined the extent to which MacDonald secretly abandoned partition. At a series of departmental meetings between October 7 and 12, attended by representatives of the Colonial, Foreign and War Offices together with MacMichael, Battershill and Harris, MacDonald took the lead. After discussing the breakdown of security in Palestine, the unreliability of the Arab police, and the extensive use of Jewish forces, he declared that should a Jewish-Arab settlement not emerge at a conference, immigration would cease and all land sales would be temporarily suspended. MacMichael favored a Magnes-type arrangement for Palestine and a later elimination of the Jewish Agency, and advocated that the country become part of an Arab Federation. MacDonald assented. Jews could immigrate into defined Palestine areas for the short term, in his view, as well as settle—given Arab agreement—within the Federation as a whole. The Palestinian Arab demand for self-government should be refused, however. If the Arab States were invited to the proposed conference in London, HMG could “lead and guide” the growing Pan-Arab movement. All this MacDonald, who announced that the “death of partition has been conceded,” termed “the new policy of conciliation.”57 Hoping to reverse the tide, the American Zionists also reached — 573 —

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Roosevelt directly. Besides letters to the President from a close Democratic Party ally like Governor Herbert Lehman and scores of Congressmen and Senators, in which the Pro-Palestine Federation of America played its own part, Frankfurter spoke to FDR at Hyde Park on October 11. He then reported to Cohen that Roosevelt had been “miseducated,” particularly regarding Palestine’s absorptive capacity. Unable completely to overcome this, Frankfurter therefore spoke of the significance of Palestine as a symbol, and to this FDR apparently agreed. The next evening, Frankfurter telephoned to raise the Palestine situation again with Roosevelt, who suggested that Frankfurter draft a note that Roosevelt might send to Chamberlain. Frankfurter dictated the following to Cohen, who forwarded it to Roosevelt’s secretary the following day: With increased pressure on the Jews in Central Europe the tasks of sheer humanity we set for ourselves at the Evian Conference have become even more difficult of fulfillment. Apart from mere numbers Palestine is a significant symbol of hope to Jewry. Therefore I earnestly urge that no decision may be made which would close the gates of Palestine to the Jews. Shutting the gates of Palestine to Jews would greatly embarrass efforts towards genuine appeasement because it would be interpreted as a disturbing symbol of anti-Semitism.58 The matter was discussed in the White House at the Cabinet meeting on October 14, during which Roosevelt shared Frankfurter’s draft with Cordell Hull. The Secretary of State had just told a pro-Zionist delegation, according to the Hadassah delegate’s report, that the U.S. government was “always sensitive to human suffering wherever it may occur, and that it has followed with the keenest interest and sympathy the efforts of the Jewish people to build their National Home.” Hull noted, at the same time, that “because of the delicate situation involved, it would be impossible for him to enter into detailed discussions with the delegation.” Faced with a “pressure campaign” that a veteran State expert on the Middle East would later call “the greatest ever to bear on the American Government on any issue,” the Department issued a “carefully weighed” statement, which concluded that it would — 574 —

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“continue to follow the situation closely and will take all necessary measures for the protection of American rights and interests in Palestine.” Roosevelt publicly echoed this position immediately afterward. Hull returned Frankfurter’s draft to FDR, who had it placed in the President’s Secretary’s File under “Benjamin V. Cohen.” There is no indication that FDR sent it to Chamberlain.59 At the urging of Frankfurter and Cohen, Brandeis (whom FDR often affectionately called “Old Isaiah”) was summoned by Roosevelt on October 16. Thinking that the President had done this only “to defend himself, to use me as a shield,” Brandeis was happy to report immediately to Frankfurter that “FDR went very far, in our talk, in his appreciation of the significance of Palestine, the need of keeping it whole and of making it Jewish.” The President, added Brandeis, was “tremendously interested, and wholly surprised, on learning of the great increase in Arab population since the war, and on hearing of the plenitude of land for Arabs in Arab countries, about which he made specific enquiries. Possible refuges for Jews elsewhere, he spoke of as ‘satellites,’ and there was no specific talk of them.” Frankfurter soon informed Wise of the meeting. One week later, Roosevelt went further, with Senator Robert Wagner of New York emerging from the Oval Office to say publicly that the President “was prepared to take more than normal action, that he and the United States Government were in favor of the maintenance of Palestine as the Jewish National Home without limitation, that he was watching the situation closely, and that he would do everything in the power of the Government to prevent the curtailment of [Jewish] immigration.” ZOA president Goldman quickly expressed “deep gratitude” to FDR for having “once again rendered an historic service to the saving of individual lives and to the salvaging of the Jewish people against the most ruthless onslaught on its existence in modern history.”60 This statement carried little weight with MacDonald, who had already informed the British Cabinet on October 19 that the Woodhead Commission had rejected partition as “impracticable,” and therefore a conference of the Jewish Agency with the Arabs of Palestine and neighboring countries should seek “a measure of agreement” as “fundamental” to any future scheme. The next day, he proposed to Cabinet colleagues that Jewish immigration continue on a “reasonable” scale and into certain defined areas, these areas “in due course” possibly constituting a Jewish state with settlement in parts of Transjordan as part of an Arab — 575 —

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Federation including a Palestinian Arab state. The Colonial Secretary sought a “constructive political policy,” he told Tannous, which certainly could not be found in the recent Arab Congress in Cairo. At the first meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Palestine four days later, MacDonald stressed that HMG’s adoption of partition “should forfeit the friendship of the Arab world,” while Lord Zetland added that Indian Muslims opposed “any Jewish sovereignty in the Holy Land.” Chamberlain, speaking as chairman, declared bluntly that the “Arab princes” of the region would have to be invited to the proposed conference since “Palestine had become a Pan Arab question.” All consented to Inskip’s emphasis on the need to safeguard Britain’s position in Palestine because of Imperial strategic interests. The Committee agreed that, following the release of the Woodhead Commission’s report, HMG would announce that the creation of independent Arab and Jewish States in Palestine was impracticable.61 Ever the creative juggler, Roosevelt offered the British on October 25 a personal solution for the Palestine dilemma. Drawing on his talk with Brandeis, FDR told Ambassador Lindsay that he was impressed with the increase in the Arab population there by 400,000 since the mandate’s establishment, thereby causing great pressure of population on the territory. It was also a fact, the President went on, that in the countries adjoining across the Jordan River, great quantities of water could be obtained at shallow levels by boring wells. A great program should be undertaken to make this water available for irrigation in what was then desert, the area set aside for Palestine’s Arabs. They should be offered land free, which ought to be enough to attract them; if not, they should be “compelled” to emigrate there. Palestine could thus be “relieved” of 200,000 Arabs, and so much more space for Jewish immigration provided. It would finally be necessary to prescribe that no Arab should be allowed to immigrate into Palestine and no Jew into Arab lands. The project might cost from £20-30 million, Roosevelt estimated, “but we ought to be able to find the money for the purpose.” “Rather taken aback,” Lindsay murmured in reply that the Arab immigration was due to the Jews needing Arab labor, and that the Arab grievance was against the loss of an area of Arab lands. Reporting to Whitehall, Lindsay suggested that someone prepare a short answer to this scheme in case Roosevelt or someone else interceding on his behalf reverted to this proposal.62 — 576 —

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That same day, MacDonald informed Weizmann and Ben-Gurion that the government would have to fall back on a “conservatively applied mandate” in which “a temporary retreat” for two or three years in immigration might be necessary. He spoke of a Jewish “zone” extending from Tel Aviv to Haifa, of a round-table Arab-Jewish conference in three months, and of a possible Arab Confederation in which Jews “should have their niche.” Considering that “zone” a “glorified concentration camp,” Weizmann insisted on an annual Jewish immigration of 50,000 and no minority status.63 Far more pessimistic, Ben-Gurion soon replied by letter to MacDonald at some length, rather than have it delivered by Weizmann. He began by insisting that Jews “have a right to return to the land of our ancestors, which the whole civilized world has acknowledged to be our rightful Home.” As in the Great War, Jews would be prepared to defend British prestige and British rule in their own country. Inviting Arab monarchs to the projected conference would undermine the legal and international basis of the mandate unless they were told that HMG intended to carry out its promise to the Jewish people, bringing in at least one million Jews “in the shortest possible time” and sanctioning a Jewish commonwealth in alliance with the Arab States. Finally, creating a “Pale of Settlement” in Palestine for the Jews, the only people in the world that is really “landless” and deeply attached to “the land of their prayers and their hopes,” would be “inhuman cruelty.” “I find it impossible to reconcile this,” Ben-Gurion concluded, “with any principle of fair play, or of faithful observance of international obligations, or even of elementary justice.”64 Even as the gap of non-cooperation between Weizmann and BenGurion widened, October closed with more ominous clouds hovering above European Jewry. Roosevelt’s personal appeal that Chamberlain ask Hitler to approve the “orderly emigration” of Jews with “a reasonable percentage of their property” via the Evian-created IGCR brought the Prime Minister’s rebuff: their respective ambassadors in Berlin should speak to the German government along those lines. The Foreign Office delayed and undermined the proposed mission to Berlin of George Rublee, an American lawyer then serving as director of the IGCR, fearing that it might upset Anglo-German relations. Whitehall’s specialist on refugee matters, Roger Makins, expressed extreme doubt “whether it could be said that the position of the Jews in Central Europe is in — 577 —

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any way a British interest.” “Our English friends,” concluded Rublee aide Robert Pell to State’s Moffat, “are either violently pro-German or smug and complacent.” At the suggestion of Swiss Federal Police head Heinrich Rothmund, Berlin marked new passports bearing a red “J” for all Jews, thereby stigmatizing them in foreign countries as well. The situation in Prague of the 20,000 Jewish refugees from the Sudetenland was “absolutely desperate,” the Council on German Jewry was informed, with “Aryanization” of Jewish businesses launched and expulsion orders from Berlin hanging in the air. On October 28, Germany began to deport some 17,000 Polish-born Jews across the border to Poland, seeking to meet Warsaw’s deadline that passports of its citizens abroad would not be renewed beyond the month’s end.65 Palestine’s immigration quota was cut 1,230 fewer than the previous six months, while the killings and increasing “rate of assassination” had led the Osservatore Romano to declare that the country “is in a state of permanent revolution.” Concerned that the Catholic holy sites would not be safeguarded in view of the Inter-Parliamentary Arab Congress demands, the semi-official Vatican newspaper warned that “the indefinite continuation of such a situation cannot be permitted by the peoples, who cannot disinterest themselves from a situation so contrary to the laws of good order and humanity.” (News dispatches about Arab desecration of the “Wailing Wall,” sacrilege discovered by the yishuv when the British ban against Jewish prayer there was lifted, were censored by the mandatory’s press office.) The Palestine Watching Committee of the Society of Friends in London, declaring that “the primary need for Palestine is peace,” endorsed a Jewish National Home of 35-40 percent of the population; “a generous amnesty” for political exiles and prisoners; future land sales to be leased by the mandatory according to “broad Palestinian interests”; and “the great sufferings” of the “6 million persecuted Jews in Europe” to be solved “mainly outside Palestine.” On October 28, Chamberlain repeated to the Cabinet what MacDonald had told its Committee on Palestine about the commission’s final report, and noted the antipathy of the Muslim provinces in India towards a Jewish state. “Many important sections of Jewry” opposed partition, the Prime Minister added, and it was clear from the report that that scheme was open to “very great” objections.66 Lampson continued to weigh in on Palestine, advising Halifax two — 578 —

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days later that Jewish immigration and repressive measures against the Arab Revolt should cease pending the results of the proposed conference. This most influential British representative in the Middle East asserted that HMG could legitimately claim that the Balfour Declaration had been “adequately implemented.” Finally, Lampson urged, the leaders of the Arab Revolt had to be invited to the conference, which must not be delayed: “We seem otherwise to risk the charge of fiddling while Rome is burning.”67

With no intention of fiddling, MacDonald informed the Cabinet on November 2 why the Arab kings would be invited to the conference. They were already involved; they were able and more prepared for compromise than Palestine’s Arabs; and a long-range solution probably depended on federation with the neighboring countries. If this could be accomplished, he argued, it was likely that the Arabs would agree to allow Jewish control over a larger area of Palestine “than they would otherwise be prepared to conceive.” Two days later, the Foreign Office conveyed the decision to its ambassadors in Cairo, Baghdad, and Jedda, adding that Jewish immigration would temporarily continue on a restricted basis of no more than 12,000 per year, a figure exceeded by the national increase of Arabs to Jews in Palestine of at least 15,000 annually. The Mufti, “chiefly responsible for the campaign of assassination and intimidation in Palestine,” would not be invited to the conference, but this did not rule out individuals who held “equally nationalist views” but were not directly responsible for that campaign, such as Alami and some expelled Arab Higher Committee members. A truce with rebel leaders was not intended, nor a complete stoppage of immigration pending the talks. Parliament would almost certainly object to the latter, and it was doubtful if the Jews would participate in view of “the inequitable and impossible position in which they would thereby be placed.”68 Receiving a copy of the Woodhead Commission Report one day before its public release, Weizmann concluded that it was much worse that Elliot had led them to expect. For the first time, an official document suggested “doing away” with the Balfour Declaration. This would be an “immense encouragement” to the Arabs, Dugdale recorded, and Weizmann said that he could not go to the conference unless another — 579 —

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ministerial statement disavowed the worst parts of that report. BenZvi, then in London, wrote in his diary that “we had clearly endured an absolute failure”: at a minimum, the Arab monarchs would undoubtedly demand an independent Arab commonwealth in undivided Palestine with no future Jewish growth, and Great Britain “will have to make one concession after another.” Even the London Times, while reflecting HMG’s policy, criticized the invitation of the kings and added that Saudi Arabia was not even a member of the League of Nations. The yishuv, Ben-Zvi told Shuckburgh, would not agree to any solution that will cut or delay its “organic growth.”69 The Woodhead report, introduced to the House on the afternoon of November 9, declared that its members, on a “strict interpretation of their terms of reference,” could not recommend boundaries for the proposed areas that “will afford a reasonable prospect of the eventual establishment of self-supporting Arab and Jewish states.” It offered three alternative plans. Plan C, supported by two members with strong reservations from the other two, reduced the Peel boundaries of the Jewish state to the coastal plain between Tel Aviv and Zikhron Ya’akov. At the same time, the government issued a statement declaring that partition was “impracticable,” and that HMG would continue its responsibility for governing all of Palestine while seeking alternative means of finding a solution that would meet their obligations to both Arabs and Jews. In this endeavor, representatives of the Jewish Agency, the Arabs of Palestine, and the surrounding Arab countries would be invited to confer with London as soon as possible regarding future policy. It reserved the right to refuse to receive those leaders they considered responsible (a reference to Haj Amin) for the “campaign of assassination and violence.” If the discussions did not produce an agreement within a reasonable amount of time, the statement ended, HMG would decide upon a policy, keeping constantly in mind “the international character of the mandate with which they have been entrusted and their obligations in that respect.”70 Zionist reaction to the report could have easily been predicted. Weizmann raged to MacDonald the next day that there would be no tampering with the mandate, except “over our dead bodies.” To BenGurion, the report’s anti-partition stance, based on Ormsby-Gore’s original instructions, reflected “a coarse, obvious deceit.” Officially, the Agency charged that MacDonald’s inclusion of the Arab States, which — 580 —

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had no special status regarding Palestine, created “great apprehension” about the proposed meeting. Plan C, the best Jewish State scenario offered in the document, envisaged an area of 400 square miles—less than one-twentieth of the whole of western Palestine and less than onehundredth of the original mandated area (including Transjordan). This was “a travesty” of the obligations undertaken on behalf of the League by the mandatory power, which Sir Alison Russell of the Woodhead Commission had pointed out. The four members had also stated unanimously that only Jewish immigration had made possible the high level of public service enjoyed by the Arab population, and that the country could not maintain itself without Jewish immigration. Most of the Zionist settlements and land holdings were not included in the Jewish State, leading the Palestine Post to editorialize that “Jews would be confined as in a concentration camp.” The Agency announced, in conclusion, that it could take part in the London conference only on the basis of the Balfour Declaration and the mandate.71 A few voices in the House of Commons railed against the government’s stand. One month earlier, Churchill had charged Chamberlain with only having secured at Munich that “the German dictator, instead of snatching his victuals from the table, has been content to have them served to him course by course.” Now he caustically declared from the back benches that, despite the urgency of the Palestine problem, all HMG had “been able to do in three whole years of classic incapacity is to paulter, and maunder and jibber on the Bench.” Churchill proposed a ten-year plan that involved a fixed immigration of 20,000-25,000 per year, much to Ben-Gurion’s disappointment, thereby preserving the current ratio of Jew to Arab. Yet, if the conflict remained, this Conservative Party speaker could only advise the government to find other alternatives “of upholding the mandate without incurrent heavy military responsibilities.” Wedgwood warned of “another appeasement” and a “retreat from force.” Replying for the Cabinet, Winterton asserted that the Balfour Declaration and the Jewish National Home policy “still stands.” The Marquess of Dufferin would soon repeat this tone, against rebukes of government vacillation from Lord Snell and the Archbishop of Canterbury, when summing up the debate in the House of Lords.72 Two leading members of the Peel Commission privately expressed their great disillusionment with this outcome. “By the light of what has happened,” Rumbold wrote to his son, “I have to admit that we all of — 581 —

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us wasted 10 months of our time. Well, there it is and I will never undertake Government work again.” Realizing quickly that the Woodhead Commission would have to denounce partition in view of its terms of reference, Hammond informed Hexter that with Jews and Arabs unable to live together (“the advanced civilization must kill the older”), he would have advised the transfer of some 40,000 Arab families from the Palestinian highlands to Iraq, as well as “buying out” the Arabs from Jaffa and giving them a harbor at Gaza. It was “all a dreadful tragedy of errors,” he believed, “beginning with the appointment of Samuel—a politician, not an administrator.” Since the Jewish claim rested on the Balfour Declaration, which the Arabs would not accept “at any price,” Hammond had little hope of any good coming out of the projected conference. In his view, HMG should fulfill its promise, which could only be effected by “clearing out a certain number of Arabs, and a sharper cut out would be better than the gradual process of blowing up houses, executions, and putting Arabs in jail.”73 Arab reaction to the Woodhead report and HMG’s statement could also have been foreseen. These official documents were initially printed in its Palestinian newspapers without comment under big headlines stating “we are back where we were.” Tannous argued to MacDonald that if Haj Amin were not invited, “he was afraid that no Palestinian Arabs would come” to the conference. MacDonald firmly disagreed, but he did wire MacMichael two days later to dispel the impression that “all representatives of the Mufti’s Party” would likewise be refused an invitation. This seemed to give weight to Sasson’s assumption that, from what was heard of as-Suwaidi’s talks in Damascus, Haj Amin would apparently not object to being excluded if associates like Husseini, Alami, and Rock received an invitation. The Arab Higher Committee clung to its non-compromising response, however, which Cairo weekly newspaper Al-Ahram printed in full: The “Arab Nation” did not recognize the legitimacy of Britain’s obligations to the Jews, based as these were on “exploitation and hatred” and implemented at the Arabs’ expense. The Jewish claim to Palestine was “fundamentally false,” while the “disturbances” rested first and foremost on the shoulders of the mandatory. Reiterating the resolutions of the Inter-Parliamentary Arab Congress, the Committee, in whom alone the “Arab Nation” placed its “precious trust” regarding Palestine’s future, once again demanded full independence for the Arabs in their land. The Committee, its statement ended, would continue to — 582 —

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benefit from the support of the Arab and Muslim world until achieving its “full rights with the help of the strong and righteous Allah.”74 Remarkably, Fakhri Bey Nashashibi wrote a letter to MacDonald via MacMichael on November 15 which sharply took issue with Haj Amin and the Arab Higher Committee. The murder earlier that month by Arif Abdul Abd al-Raziq’s pro-Mufti band of Hasan Sidqi al-Dajani, a prominent Jerusalemite who supported the Nashashibis, triggered this repudiation. Welcoming HMG’s abandonment of partition while noting that the conference meant further delay, Ragheb’s nephew argued that the Arab leaders opposed to the Mufti represented 75 percent of the “Arab interests in Palestine.” Many, including his uncle now in Egypt, had to seek refuge abroad because the Mufti used funds collected on behalf of the “sufferers” in Palestine “for his campaign of terrorism and for the purchase of arms and violence against the people of the Opposition.” The absentee Arab leaders, he claimed, favored cooperation with HMG, which would do well to secure their representation at the conference. Releasing his letter to the press, Fakhri also requested a reply. In a pamphlet that same month, Fakhri charged Haj Amin and his “destructive ideology” with killing 3,000 Arabs. Speaking on behalf of widows and orphans “killed at the hands of Arab assassins,” he called on the Arab kings to set up a commission to investigate the “selfish ends” of these gunmen, whose actions had also caused more than 10,000 Arabs to flee the country. “A courageous step,” rightly declared the London Times.75 Kristallnacht (“Night of Broken Glass”), which erupted a few hours after HMG issued its latest statement on Palestine, shocked Jewry and augmented its despair. This orgy of destruction and terror that swept across Germany and Austria on November 9-10 supposedly resulted from the death of third secretary Ernst vom Rath of the German Embassy in Paris, shot by seventeen-year-old Hershel Grynszpan in reprisal for the expulsion of his family (along with 8,000 other Jews) from Germany at the end of October to the small Polish border town of Zbaszyn. In fact, the Dachau, Buchenwald, and Sachsenhausen concentration camps had been readied late that summer to absorb a greater number of Jews. An official Nazi report stated that ninety-one Jews had been killed, with hundreds wounded. The Board of Deputies reported 500 destroyed synagogues; hundreds of Jewish shops and dwellings were looted and destroyed; more than 30,000 Jews were sent to concentration camps, where several hundred died. On November 12, announcing to a meeting — 583 —

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at the Air Ministry that Hitler had charged him with coordinating the Reich’s Jewish policy, Göring levied a fine of $400 million on the Jewish community as “expiation” for vom Rath’s murder. “Aryanization” of all remaining Jewish property, sold for 10 percent of tax value, was to follow. At Heydrich’s suggestion, a Central Office for Jewish Emigration would be created in Germany along the lines developed by Adolf Eichmann in Austria. Ruppin summed up the Jewish sentiment: “We have become outlawed pariahs in Germany!”76 In the face of this violent onslaught, Chamberlain, personally “horrified” but primarily concerned with the progress of Anglo-German relations, told the House on November 14 that HMG would be “taking into consideration any possible way by which we can assist these people.” Before the widespread pogrom began, Weizmann had asked Whitehall on behalf of Germany’s Jewish leaders to select some prominent nonJewish Englishman such as Lothian to go to Berlin immediately to try and prevent it. However, officials in London and Berlin agreed that the step, if anything, would make matters worse for Jews in Germany and that to meddle in “a wasp’s nest” could only detract from British prestige. Wilfrid Israel and two associates had also sought British support via Sir Michael Bruce against the impending pogrom, but instructions from Halifax ruled out any step “that might offend Hitler and his minions.” Now, during a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Foreign Policy, Chamberlain claimed that the settlement of anything like 250,000 Jewish refugees in a place like British Guiana in South America “must take a very long time,” and thought that the Dominions were most suitable for this purpose within the Empire. The doors to negotiation with Germany should be kept open and none slammed in response to Kristallnacht, he emphasized. The Prime Minister would tell the Commons, however, that there was no place in the colonial empire for immediate large-scale settlement.77 The same day, Halifax pressed his Cabinet colleagues to realize that the government would soon be confronted with “a very difficult decision, namely, was it not to be regarded as fundamental to obtain a settlement with the Arabs?” MacDonald immediately responded by acknowledging that HMG had to choose between the “extremely influential” world of Jewry, said to be 3 million in the United States, and the fact that “the British Empire itself was to a very considerable extent a Muslim Empire,” with some 80 million Muslims in India. “It was literally out of — 584 —

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the question” from the defense point of view, he added, “that we should antagonize either the Muslims within the Empire or the Arab kingdoms of the near East.” “This might very well mean,” MacDonald concluded, “that we could not contemplate even a distant future in which there could be a Jewish majority in Palestine.” A brief mention was made of possibilities in Brazil, British Guiana, and Western Australia. The next afternoon, Chamberlain told a delegation from the Council for German Jewry that the idea of a government loan for refugee maintenance in Britain was “premature, and hardly worth discussing at this stage.” He would give his “benevolent interest” to Samuel’s proposal urging the entry into Britain of children and young people up to the age of seventeen, as well as to Weizmann’s request for 6,000 young men presently in concentration camps to enter Palestine, along with 1,500 children. As for large-scale Jewish emigration, the prime minister noted that Winterton, the IGC’s chairman, had “already taken certain steps in the matter.”78 Weizmann focused on Palestine, fully aware that talk about alternate havens offered no sound alternative. Meeting with MacDonald on November 12, he asked if Iraq might not agree to “some development scheme along the Euphrates which would enable a considerably larger population to settle there.” The Jews would be prepared to raise as much as £30,000 to enable that government to take 300,000 Jews “as direct settlers” or 100,000 Arabs from Palestine (the Norman plan), “whose land would then pass to Jewish immigrants.” To the pro-Zionist parliamentary committee, presided over by Wedgwood, Weizmann urged: “Give us 100,000 Jews and we will let you take two-thirds of your army out of Palestine.” “All the fancy ‘territorialist’ projects are useless,” Weizmann wrote to Sinclair on November 20, “merely dangling false hopes before the eyes of tortured people. We could easily take now into Palestine 50,000 people if they would let us,” he continued, “but they don’t let us and here is the tragedy! Hence all the fanciful diversions.”79 These very “diversions” occupied Roosevelt’s mind after Kristallnacht. At Hamilton Fish Armstrong’s suggestion, he hurriedly “summoned home” Ambassador Hugh Wilson from Berlin for consultation, and stated at a press conference “I myself could scarcely believe that such things could occur in the twentieth century of civilization.” On the same occasion, FDR made it clear that no change in the American quota system was contemplated. Privately, he had already contacted Isaiah Bowman, — 585 —

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president of Johns Hopkins University and a leading geographer who authored Limits of Land Settlement, to provide information about settlement in Venezuela’s plateau north or south of the Orinoco River, able to colonize 50,000-100,000 refugees in each area. He dismissed British and French Guiana, telling Morgenthau that it would take the Jews from 25 to 50 years to overcome the fever there, but thought highly of the sparsely populated Cameroons. FDR also asked his President’s Advisory Committee to speed up its efforts in exploring possibilities, particularly in Latin America, under Bowman’s direction. Morgenthau pressed for Costa Rica as the best option in Central America, but Bowman cautioned Roosevelt that this might “dilute our argument respecting the Monroe Doctrine”. While considering mass resettlement unrealistic, Bowman raised the Portuguese colony of Angola (which Weizmann had already dismissed in 1934) as a good possibility. On November 23, FDR asked Taylor to return to London as his personal representative in order to help make “a special effort” to make the IGCR’s work “really effective.”80 As for Palestine, Roosevelt continued to tread gingerly. Although having accepted HMG’s insistence that the Evian Conference agenda omit Palestine in discussing rescue alternatives, he could not easily avoid the tendentious issue after Kristallnacht. The outpouring of American public indignation in response to that savagery climaxed in a mass meeting in New York City, spoken to by Governor Lehman and Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia, which called on HMG to keep Palestine’s doors open to Jewish immigration while thanking Roosevelt for reminding London “of the sanctity of international covenants and the sanctity of human life.” FDR turned down Cohen’s draft for a message proclaiming the next Sunday as a day of prayer for “the victims of Nazi persecutions,” but on November 19 did express to Brandeis, who so informed Frankfurter, his “full appreciation of the absurdity of the British Guiana proposition and the value of Palestine.”81 Hearing Wise’s report, four days later, that MacDonald would announce the next day that Palestine would admit as many as 100,000 Jewish refugees within a year, Roosevelt asked Welles to check the story. Advised to hold off until a British announcement, FDR went ahead to declare his hope at a press conference that the possibility of a “material increase” of refugees into Palestine “may be correct.” “F.F.” immediately expressed his thanks to “Frank” on the “courageous resourcefulness with which you are making the Chamberlain Government do its duty in — 586 —

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utilizing Palestine as the obvious first line of relief for the victims of the latest and largest Nazi barbarities…. Palestine is here and now—that and Trans-Jordan—as an obligation of action by Gt. Britain, instead of merely pious words.”82 MacDonald thought otherwise. To Weizmann and Ben-Gurion, who argued on November 21 that another 100,000 young Jews would mean safety to Palestine, he replied that Palestine was small, “the Arabs would flare up,” and the continued immigration might prejudice the London talks. (In fact, after the Munich agreement enabled HMG to release additional troops from the European front for action in Palestine and the British Army took over in Palestine on October 17, British forces regained control against the Arab rebels in the Old City of Jerusalem, Jaffa, Acre, and, on November 21, in Beersheba.) The Palestine situation had been “much complicated” by the recent Nazi persecution of the Jews, MacDonald informed the Cabinet the next day. While large numbers of Jews could be admitted on the grounds of economic absorptive capacity, the result might well make the London discussions “impossible.” Halifax emphasized that nothing must be done to “prejudice” the latter; Winterton noted that it had been made clear at Evian that HMG could not, “as a result of Jewish persecution,” take steps which would prejudice the changes of a Palestine settlement. The Cabinet approved this position.83 Addressing the House on November 24, MacDonald praised the yishuv’s achievements highly, but asserted that HMG did not promise that Palestine would be a home for “all Jews seeking refuge,” and that he had to protect Arabs and their fears that Jews would rule over them. The British Government had fulfilled its obligations to the Jewish people, with 250,000 Jews having established themselves in Palestine since 1922 as a right, but the horror felt by all as a result of the current Jewish tragedy should not destroy the judgment of statesmen. Hearing from the visitor’s gallery that MacDonald yielded what Rose Jacobs termed “the moral right, the legal claim and law for Palestine” to the Arabs, and after sitting through the nine hours of Parliamentary debate, Hadassah’s delegate on the Agency Executive wrote to friends in New York: “I came away as if I had been physically whipped.” Two days later, Parkinson informed Ben-Gurion that the Colonial Secretary was having “great difficulty” in light of the London Conference to grant the Agency’s request for at least 6,000 young men then in concentration camps, along with — 587 —

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1,500 children, to be allowed into Palestine. It would then be “almost impossible” for us to take part, Ben-Gurion responded in a final appeal to MacDonald before returning home, “if the very first result of these discussions were to be the wanton sacrifice of the lives and future of several thousands of children and young people who might now be saved.” That same week, the London News Chronicle published an eyewitness account of the torture and killing of German Jews in Sachsenhausen, and the Nazi SS newspaper Das Schwarze Korps spoke of Germany confronting “the hard necessity of exterminating the Jewish underworld in the same fashion in which … we exterminate criminals generally—by fire and sword.”84 For Jabotinsky, Kristallnacht signaled the vital urgency to accelerate the Revisionist-Zionists’ evacuation program and his efforts at unity with the World Zionist Organization. One month before Britain’s Palestine statement of November 9, he had declared to a Lvov audience that partition would not occur because England and other nations would realize that the only solution lay in granting all of Eretz Yisrael to the Jews. An NZO memorandum to the U.S. State Department proposed that a “Palestine Emergency Scheme” to transfer 1 million Jews within the next three years, along the model of the transfer of 1.3 million Anatolian refugees to Greece during 1923-1927, could alone provide a permanent answer to the Jewish refugee problem. The NZO would convene in Warsaw an Elected Assembly of East European Jewry towards this end. The projected time span was cut to two years after Kristallnacht, when Jabotinsky cabled Mizrachi leader Meir Berlin (later Bar-Ilan) to endorse setting up forthwith a new Comité De Salut Public, appointed by the presidents of both Zionist organizations. Once the offer was refused and the Hagana–Irgun negotiations ended that same month, owing to Ben-Gurion’s threat of resignation from the Agency Executive and Mapai, Jabotinsky called for the convocation of a Jewish National Assembly to bring to Palestine 500,000 German Jews and another half million from other “dangerous areas” within less than two years. “You and I,” he wrote to a cherished comrade, “will live and truly reach a Jewish state,” and Great Britain would “very soon” be forced to this realization after the London talks failed.85 By early December, the fate of Jews under German control appeared hopeless. A reliable source informed Raymond Geist of the U.S. consulate in Berlin that the Nazi government intended to return the Jews — 588 —

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“to the Ghetto and there encounter a form of existence through which they will inevitably perish”: Hitler and his minions were determined “to solve the Jewish problem without the assistance of other countries, and that means eventual annihilation.” Writing to Halifax from the embassy in Berlin, George Ogilvie-Forbes noted that chapter 14 of Mein Kampf spelled out Hitler’s intention to become a world power by driving east to Russia and her vassal states, and that the Führer’s persecution of Jews and press campaign against England were “symptomatic of his frame of mind.” “Not content with exterminating the Jews in their own country,” observed British Minister Basil Newton from Prague, the Germans were “determined to carry their campaign” into Czechoslovakia and have Jewish influence “eradicated wherever possible.” After a visit to Germany and Austria, Werner Senator concluded that that remaining Jewish community of 500,000 was “threatened with physical extinction”; the end would be “concentration and labor camps, in which Jews will do slave labor of the worst kind as is done already in the Buchenwald camp.” Another London report, stating that 35,000 Jews were still in concentration camps, declared that the Jews were “threatened literally with death by starvation.” Only “emigration immediately,” it ended, could save the Jews in Germany.86 The 11,000 who filled London’s capacious Albert Hall on December 1, a singular protest against the persecution of German Jewry, agreed with this last assessment. Amery, speaking for the headquarters of the Conservative Party, felt that Palestine was ready to receive thousands. “Where else can the helpless Jews find a better and more lasting home than Palestine to develop,” he queried, “which is also a British obligation towards the Jewish people?” Labour Party parliamentary leader Herbert Morrison declared that the government was duty-bound to relax the “artificial restrictions” on Jewish immigration into Palestine, especially of children, “for the sake of humanity.” Sinclair also trumpeted that solution, noting that the yishuv was prepared to absorb 10,000 children immediately. Continuous applause greeted these pro-Zionist remarks. In a separate appeal, Lord Strabolgi insisted that Palestinian Jewry “must be allowed to defend the lands they hold”; a well-equipped and trained army of 100,000 Jews could “defeat the Arab insurrectionists,” a rebellion fostered by Italy and Germany, “completely and finally.” Applauding Ussishkin’s staunch anti-partitionist stance, Wedgwood replied to the aged Zionist that negotiations not backed by force or fear — 589 —

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of force were bound to fail, and there was only one way for the Jews to talk now: “Should all hope be taken away from the Jews, should no other way face them but death, they will not perish alone …”87 While noting the Agency’s public statement about Palestine’s ability to receive 100,000 German Jews “within a short period of time,” Shertok reminded MacMichael on December 6 of the immediate request which the WZO had made of MacDonald. He had asked the Colonial Secretary on November 24 to allow the entry of an additional 10,000 agricultural trainees and youths, 10,000 children between the ages of 6 and 14 (of whom 5,000 should be allowed to come to Palestine without delay), and 2,500 relatives. Practically all the persons in the Zionist halutz training camps (hakhsharot) in Germany had been arrested en masse; many German families in Palestine had parents who were being arrested, in some cases killed. The tortures of the Buchenwald camp were “indescribable,” Shertok continued, with many women receiving an urn of ashes within days of their husbands’ arrests. Disagreeing with Shertok’s statement that even the Arab leaders would not object to the saving of Jewish children, MacMichael replied that the entire question depended on MacDonald, and the Zionists might mention the question of the children at the beginning of the London discussions. The talks might never end in a round-table conference, Shertok retorted, and, in any event, it might very well be impossible to discuss such a question first. HMG might have the duty of “imposing its policy ultimately,” and should have “the strength to fix its policy with regard to these children now.”88 The same day, Roosevelt shared with Morgenthau his own plan for resolving the Jewish refugee problem. Assuming that 500,000 from Germany and another 250,000 each from Rumania and Poland were at risk, FDR sketched in his own hand a scheme to relocate 100,000 in five annual installments. Each year, the United States could receive 20,000 from Germany and Austria, with 10,000 from other parts of Europe. The British Empire would probably take 20,000, South America 10,000, and Palestine 15,000 per annum (which Morgenthau thought was “low”). A total of about 20,000 might be settled every year in British East Africa, Uganda, Kenya, Rhodesia, and Ethiopia; an additional 5,000 would go to Angola and the French and Belgian colonial territories in Africa. Roosevelt and Welles, aided by a few ambassadors and State departmental experts, drafted a personal letter the next day which — 590 —

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Ambassador Phillips would present to Mussolini. The Duce was asked to work towards “effective international collaboration” for a prompt refugee solution “based on justice and humanity,” and thereby contribute toward “a happier and more peaceful world.” While this attempt to have Mussolini influence Hitler in a moderate direction might imply the recognition of Italy’s sovereignty over Ethiopia and enable the Italian dictator to finance the expulsion of his own Jews first, Moffat concluded that its achievement would “far outweigh these drawbacks.” It would not appeal to the Jews, he added, who clearly did not wish any of their co-religionists “to be resettled under totalitarian governments.”89 Settling Jewish refugees in Africa claimed a number of prominent American advocates. Aside from his own interest in Ethiopia, Angola, and the Cameroons, Roosevelt was attracted to what he called “the big idea” behind a plan called the “United States of Africa.” Baruch had first bandied about the possibility in April, and former President Herbert Hoover conceived of this idea after Kristallnacht. Jews would tithe themselves so that $300-500 million could be raised to establish a non-sectarian republic in the Central African highlands to eventually harbor ten million people. Roosevelt speech writer Samuel Rosenman, who had advised Taylor after Kristallnacht against recommending any change in the U.S. immigration quota provisions, approvingly forwarded the Baruch-Hoover plan to the White House on December 1 with the comment that “it is no solution to create a world ghetto instead of many local ones.” Perhaps this view from a prominent American Jewish Committee member influenced FDR in his belief that colonization projects should include only a limited number of Jews, a position that accorded with the pro-Africa views of another assimilated anti-Zionist, the eminent columnist Walter Lippmann. Newspaper publisher William Randolph Hearst thought that the Jews could develop Tanganyika and all the former German colonies, as well as the Belgian Congo and the Portuguese African possessions, into one of the “great nations of the earth.” He ruled out Lower California, much closer to his estate in San Simeon, as an arid place, whereas African jungles teemed with possibilities for “those harassed Jewish people.”90 Lord Dufferin’s announcement on December 8, stating that HMG would not permit the entry of 10,000 Jewish children into Palestine without Arab consent, drew Weizmann’s fury. Returning to London three days later from an unsuccessful trip to Turkey, during which he — 591 —

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sought to aid the Zionist cause by forging an Ankara-London alliance in return for a $250 million Jewish loan, he was absolutely prepared to make the children’s admission a test case of going into the London Conference at all. On December 12, he lectured MacDonald: The Jews were not Czechs who would give way under British pressure, did not propose to cover HMG’s retreat from the mandate by a “farcical performance,” and would fight worldwide with “the courage of desperation” for their rights in the Promised Land. MacDonald offered to receive the 10,000 in Great Britain, but the Zionist herald responded that the Jews would not accept territorial schemes, even if these included Yorkshire or London. Hearing Weizmann exclaim, “we shall fight you from here to San Francisco, and when I say fight I mean fight!” MacDonald asked: “”Do you mean I am to go to the House of Commons on Friday and announce that you will not come to the Conference?” Weizmann answered, “No—we shall have saved you that trouble.” Two days later, the Cabinet voted to permit 10,000 children into the United Kingdom—but not their parents, on condition that the refugee organizations guarantee to maintain them. In light of the impending conference, which would also discuss immigration, Shertok received official notice from Downie that his request of November 24 for 22,500 additional certificates had been turned down.91 In Jerusalem, Ben-Gurion proposed a militant response to British designs. On December 11, he told Agency Executive colleagues that the grave threat of war with Germany that led Britain to appease the Arab world, coupled with the fact that “millions of Jews are facing physical annihilation,” necessitated a fundamental turn in Zionist policy. This “catastrophic epoch” called for an “aliya rebellion,” in his view, openly bringing 1 million Jews to Palestine in a short time without the government’s approval. This would unite Jewry behind us and win world support. To counter HMG’s assembling the Arab kings in London, the Agency would announce the gathering of “the Jewish kings” in America for Zionism’s cause. The Executive should also propose to Iraq a grant of ten million pounds for the voluntary settlement of 100,000 Palestinian Arab families there (the idea being pursued quietly in the U.S. and England by Edward Norman). If the conference did not produce Arab-Jewish concord, as Ben-Gurion assumed, the yishuv should adopt a stance of passive opposition to any anti-Zionist legislation likely to ensue.92 — 592 —

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The Agency Executive chairman hammered this theme thereafter. At a secret conference of yishuv organizations, called by the Va’ad HaLeumi the next day, he warned that Kristallnacht made clear that Berlin sought “the extermination of Jewry throughout the world, including Palestine.” Given this new circumstance, coupled with the mandatory power’s increasing aim to “destroy” the Jewish National Home, the WZO would fight for mass Jewish immigration with all powers at its disposal “as a desperate people whose bridges have been burned behind them.” Only thus could Arab pressure be met, since Zionism’s “moral argument” had “no value” against London’s anxiety for the maintenance of the British Empire. In the last four months, Ben-Gurion noted, MacDonald had dramatically altered his earlier pro-Zionist position. The movement could not yield on the large-scale Jewish immigration to Palestine that Emir Feisal, while leading the Arab nationalist cause at the Versailles Peace Conference, had agreed to in his meeting with Weizmann in 1918. Non-participation in the forthcoming London talks, at the same time, would act as “a boomerang” against the Agency and be of inestimable help to Haj Amin.93 To attend or not to attend the conference—that question divided the Jewish camp. In Weizmann’s presence, Namier told MacDonald on December 14 that he had “slammed the door” on the Jews; the Zionists could have gone into Transjordan five years ago if not for Resident Cox’s opposition; Jews going into Iraq would be “like geese to be fattened and then slaughtered there.” The Jews would be making a terrible mistake if they boycotted the talks, MacDonald insisted, weakening their own case and the hands of HMG. Namier left more than ever convinced that the Zionists had nothing to gain by attending; Dugdale and others on the London Executive thought so, too. Brandeis had favored going to the talks, but changed his mind after hearing that the Va’ad HaLeumi and the British Zionist Federation urged the Agency not to participate because of the government’s refusal to admit 10,000 children into Palestine. Adler strongly objected, writing to kindred spirit d’AvigdorGoldsmid that “it was not wise and we could not afford it.” After a talk with MacDonald on December 16, Shertok remained convinced that abstention “will make our position untenable.” Although privately judging HMG “lifeless,” “immovable,” and “unsympathetic” to carrying out their pledge in Palestine, Weizmann agreed, and so these two informed the Agency Executive in Jerusalem. After much debate, that Executive — 593 —

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decided that it would not be right to abstain: as MacDonald had argued, public opinion would not understand such an attitude.94 Fully conscious that the powerless Zionists could not challenge Britain in the world of réalpolitik, Chamberlain’s Cabinet moved forward with the conviction that nothing should be done to endanger the London talks. Whitehall was even prepared “to go all the way to meet the Arabs as regards restricting Jewish immigration into Palestine.” The conference’s purpose, Halifax put it bluntly to the Cabinet on December 21, was “to ensure that the Arab States would be friendly to us.” His colleagues agreed that the WZO ultimately had to go along with an imposed settlement. When Laski, heading a Board of Deputies delegation, informed MacDonald that non-Zionists, including those on the American Jewish Committee, strongly favored the Agency’s demand for the 10,000 children, MacDonald replied that this question should be postponed until after the discussions: it was the “firm desire” of HMG to give the conference “a hundred percent chance of succeeding.” Based on a Cabinet discussion of November 16, the government would permit the entry of nearly 10,000 children into Great Britain, soon known as the Kindertransport or Refugee Children’s Movement.95 The British invested great effort to insure the conference attendance of the Arabs. Owing to French insistence, representatives from Syria and Lebanon were ruled out, the Arab Higher Committee’s protest notwithstanding. Lampson encouraged Mahmud Pasha’s efforts at selecting Palestinians not just from the Committee and whom Haj Amin would accept. Choosing not to respond to Magnes’s appeal that he and friends advocate the admission to Palestine of 10,000 Jewish children and 5,000 parents, signaling thereby “the co-operation of Arab and Jew for generations to come,” Tannous informed the Mufti of MacDonald’s willingness to have Husseini attend, provided that other Palestinians come as well.96 Ibn Saud shared with the encouraging British Ambassador his unequivocal letter to Roosevelt decrying American public support of the Jewish “crushing, flagrant injustice directed against a peaceful people in its own country.” The Saudi ruler also recorded for Bullard his persistent activity with the Iraqi government and Haj Amin not to insist on the Mufti’s presence, on Committee delegates exclusively, or on the Committee’s platform before coming to the discussions. (The receptive Bullard now advised Whitehall to put a stop to Jewish immigration, “at — 594 —

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any rate for a considerable period of years.”) London conceded on its own that the Arabs would negotiate with HMG and not with the Jews; that Palestinian Arab representation could include the Seychelles deportees; and that the Arabs could make any demand they pleased at the talks. On these grounds, the Saudi government, joining its Islamic counterparts, announced on December 23 that it would accept the conference invitation. One day later, “to restore morale,” Arabs in the mandatory administration were informed of MacDonald’s clear assertion that “the Arab case is to be given sympathetic recognition.”97 The letter to Roosevelt from Ibn Saud, the first from an Arab monarch and, in Welles’s judgment, the most important Arab ruler, particularly worried the State Department’s Division of Near Eastern Affairs. These Arabists had consistently not wished to become entangled in Palestine, viewing London as vested with sole responsibility. Wallace Murray, their long-standing chief and a strong opponent of Zionist pressure, decisively influenced Hull’s October 14 statement to reflect the Legal Advisor’s ruling in January 1937 that the 1924 American–British Palestine Convention strictly affected U.S. concerns alone. Murray’s assistant, Paul Alling, explained to the State Department’s leading officials the likelihood that the “new realism” of Chamberlain’s foreign policy along the line of “power politics” would give primary consideration to Arab interests, “which are so important strategically for Great Britain in the Near East, at the expense of the comparatively friendless Jewish interests.” The Division’s stance was buttressed by reports from Minister to Baghdad Paul Knabenshue, who thought that the “uneducated” East European Jew in Palestine stubbornly opposing partition and minority status was most to blame for disorders in Palestine—not the Arabs, and from Consul-General in Jerusalem George Wadsworth warning about the “Bolshevik-sounding proclamations [sic]” of the RevisionistZionists. Magnes’s opposition to political Zionism found a ready audience. Following a wave of anti-American sentiment that swept Arab capitals after pro-Zionist intercessions with the White House by prominent U.S. politicians and churchmen, State began instructing its missions in Arab capitals to emphasize that Washington did not discriminate in any way in favor of Jews to the prejudice of Arabs.98 Joseph Kennedy went much further. Earlier that month, the U.S. Ambassador to the Court of St. James told Laski that he agreed with Chamberlain’s appeasement of Germany, as evidenced by Kennedy’s — 595 —

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statement at the annual Trafalgar Day dinner of the Navy League in London that there was “simply no sense” in letting the fundamental differences between democracies and dictatorships “grow into unrelenting antagonisms.” “After all, we have to live together in the same world, whether we like it or not.” Political Zionism, Laski was further told, he deemed tremendously “harmful.” Jews were not “facing facts” in realizing Britain’s difficulties. They also should have seen the advantage of having a smaller number of Jews “living in contentment” with Palestine’s Arabs, rather than be a larger number “in a perpetual state of guerilla warfare.” Kennedy thought, moreover, that progress in transferring tens of thousands of German refugees to Africa and the Americas could be made quickly, provided that the funds could be supplied, if “political and personal considerations could be gotten out of the way, if the plight of the Jews would not only countenance to be subordinated, particularly in American Jewish circles, to the destiny of Palestine.” Returning home, Kennedy told Moffat that he largely blamed the sharp criticism within American public opinion of Chamberlain’s stance at Munich on “the Jews, who dominate our press.”99 Yet Roosevelt’s continued interest in the largest possible Jewish entry into Palestine and the transfer of Arabs to Transjordan, which he had first raised on October 25 with Ambassador Lindsay, remained a British concern. Hearing this repeated by FDR confidant Colonel Arthur Murray on December 16, MacDonald replied that the Arabs would be “extremely reluctant” to be moved, while the area of possible settlement in Transjordan was “really rather limited.” One week later, the British replied to the American President with an “informal memorandum” stating that, “unfortunately,” no considerable quantity of water could be obtained in the countries across the Jordan at shallow levels by boring wells. Any coerced Arab transfer would not merely be beyond London’s powers, but the morality of attempting such measures would “surely be called into question in wide-spread circles” in the United Kingdom, India, and throughout the Muslim world. Neither HMG nor anyone else could promote a settlement “primarily by economic sops or financial help however generous,” the response ended, “although after a political settlement and when feeling has cooled down economic help may be able to play its part.”100 That same day, Welles broached Norman’s Arab transfer plan to the British. An interview with Norman, who had been recommended — 596 —

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by Brandeis and Feis, so impressed the Undersecretary that he asked Wallace Murray to provide the “wise” young gentleman with letters of introduction to diplomatic contacts abroad, The Embassy’s Victor Mallet replied to Welles that the Arab rulers, Ibn Saud in particular, would object greatly. As to Welles’s statement that the Palestinian Arab population had nearly doubled since 1918, a fact first mentioned two months earlier by Brandeis to Roosevelt, Mallet observed that this increase was due to the fertility of the Arabs and the decreased death rate under the mandate. The actual figures for Arab immigration from 19221937, he added, were less than 10 percent of the Jewish immigrants. At Roosevelt’s request, Welles gave copies of both replies to Brandeis. Expressing his thanks, the Associate Justice asserted that “the British attitude is deplorable. But ultimately—if we insist—folly will yield to reason and the right.” He also enclosed for FDR a recent article in Blackwoods by a British captain fighting in the Tulkarm area against Arab terrorists. The Jewish agriculturalists were described therein as “not the hook-nosed Shylock type of Jew so dear to fiction, but, in most case, a stalwart type of man and woman, fair of face and ruddy of countenance, with blue eyes and bodies of the physical features one expects from such a life.”101 As 1938 drew to a close, the confluence of a number of factors gave the Zionists ample reason to look forward with trepidation. A “heavy pall cast by the shadow of overhanging dread” surrounded the first Jews to arrive in Jaffa port after Kristallnacht, a former Breslau physician speaking haltingly of Buchenwald’s horrors and another, still wearing his Great War military crosses, confirming that many evicted Viennese Jewish families were now herded 10-12 into one room. A survey by the JDC’s Paris office painted a harrowing picture of unwanted Jewish refugees suffering in “no-man’s lands” of Central and Eastern Europe’s frontiers. While totally unaware of Roosevelt’s search for alternative global colonization projects, Zionists looked in vain for Palestine on the New York Times magazine’s map of possible refugee settlements. BenGurion’s talk of open clashes between British forces and refugees aboard ships (to Mapai associates he even spoke of taking Haifa “by force” and declaring a Jewish state) soon aroused intense antagonism among Katznelson, Tabenkin, and members of the recently organized WZO Mosad LeAliya Bet, who were responsible for illegal immigration. And, despite the presence of 18,000 British troops and 3,000 policemen, acts — 597 —

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of individual Arab terrorism broke out again in Haifa and Jerusalem, Agency sources reporting that Haj Amin “felt it essential to maintain his pressure during the discussions by the continuation of violence.”102 As for the conference, Weizmann thought it “a great mistake.” The talks would raise Arab hopes, he told the High Commissioner for India, and HMG would “be faced with the dilemma of falling out either with the Jews or with the Mussulmans [sic].” MacDonald’s position on Palestine’s future had dramatically changed, evidenced in his invitation to the Arab kings. The Agency Executive agreed with Tegart, who confided his own opinion to Joseph on December 29 that none of the Palestinian Arab moderates would stand up to the Mufti if they went to the talks. Most distressing was HMG’s “deafness to a humanitarian appeal” about the 10,000 Jewish children to enter Palestine. Still, having no real alternative, the Agency prepared for the conference in London. If the discussions failed, Levi Bakstansky of the British Zionist Federation wrote to Wedgwood the same day, then British public opinion would likely be convinced “that we at any rate have given every evidence of a desire to reach an equitable settlement” and the immigration of the children into Palestine might well be merely postponed by two or three months.103 These slim hopes would soon be put to the test.

Endnotes 1

2

Proceedings of the Intergovernmental Committee, Evian, July 6 to 15, 1938, Verbatim Record of the Meetings of the Committee, Resolutions, and Reports (London, 1938), 12-13, 15. For the final instructions to the British delegation, see memorandum, July 5, 1938, FO 371/22529, PRO. Wadsworth to State, July 8, 1938, 840.48 Refugees/581, SD; International Federation resolution, July 3, 1938, A306/47, CZA; Jewish Agency memorandum, July 6, 1938, S46/600, CZA; Wadsworth to State, July 11, 1938, PPF 601, FDRL. Mogannam was one of the founders of the Arab Women’s Congress in October 1929, which called for abrogating the Balfour Declaration and — 598 —

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establishing “a national democratic government” in Palestine. She proposed that Palestine, its Jews to remain one-third of the population, be joined with Transjordan under Abdullah and become part of an Arab Federation. Matiel E.T. Mogannam, The Arab Woman and the Palestine Problem (London, 1937); Ellen Fleischmann, “The Emergence of the Palestine Women’s Movement, 1929-39,” Journal of Palestine Studies 29.3 (Spring 2000): 16-32. 3 Proceedings of the Intergovernmental Committee, passim; Warren to Chamberlain, July 9, 1938, Box 77, Armstrong MSS; Vincent Sheean, Not Peace But a Sword (New York, 1939), 89-94. In 1940 the Dominican Republic dictator Rafael Trujillo donated 26,000 acres of his property for settlements. The first settlers arrived in May 1940; only about 800 refugees came to Sosúa, and most moved on to the United States. 4 S. Adler-Rudel, “The Evian Conference on the Refugee Question,” Leo Baeck Institute Year Book, 12 (1968): 251-265; Diary, July 18, 1938, Arthur Ruppin, Pirkei Hayai, B’Vinyan HaAretz V’Ha’Am (Tel Aviv, 1968), 302-303; Goldmann and Ruppin to Landauer, July 12, 1938, S25/9778, CZA; Brotman memorandum, July 1938, Refugees 1938-Evian Conference, AJCA; Proceedings of the Intergovernmental Committee, 42. A post-Conference summary by a League of Nations official concluded that the number of Jewish refugees would reach 500,000 (Erim memorandum, July 21, 1938, file R5800/50/34521/34225, LNA). 5 Sherman, Island Refuge, 120-121; Warren to Chamberlain, July 16, 1938, Box 77, Armstrong MSS; McDonald to Frankfurter, July 14, 1938, McDonald MSS; Diary, Aug. 12, 1938, Moffat MSS; Baerwald et al. to Taylor, July 19, 1938, Myron Taylor MSS, FDRL; Goldmann to Wise, July 16, 1938, file 10/21, Horace Kallen MSS, AJA; Aug. 21, 1938, Jewish Agency Executive, Jerusalem, CZA; Golda Meir, My Life (New York, 1975), 159; Meyerson remarks at Histadrut Va’ad HaPo’el, July 21, 1938, file P-810/6,ISA. 6 Weizmann to Wise, July 14, 1938, Box 122, Wise MSS; MacDonaldWeizmann interview, July 4, 1938, FO 371/21863, PRO. 7 Weizmann to Shertok, July 2, 1938, S25/1716, CZA; Weizmann to Weizmann family, July 8, 1938, WA; Shertok-Battershill talk, July 7, 1938, S25/22743, CZA; Zionews, 1:21, in file 1/21-4G, JA; Wedgwood letter, May 30, 1938, A209/158/2, CZA; Irgun translation, file 125/130/2003, Arkhiyon Tzahal U’Ma’arkhot HaBitahon (hereafter ATMB), Tel HaShomer, Israel. 8 JTA, July 7, 1938; July 10, 1938 meeting, J1/2388, CZA; Davar, July 8, 1938; HaYesod, July 14, 1938. A half-hour’s pitched battle between Arabs and Jews on the evening of July 6 in Haifa led one correspondent to term this clash “the greatest holocaust [sic] since the beginning of the Arab rebellion in 1936” (JTA, July 8, 1938). 9 Golomb–Jabotinsky talk, July 10, 1938; copies in file 80/47/11, Hagana Archives, and file 35/4/1A, JA; Ze’ev Jabotinsky, Neumim, 1927-1940 (Tel Aviv, 1948), 303-326. 10 Cohen, Palestine: Retreat from the Mandate, 67; Foreign Policy Bulletin 17 (July — 599 —

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22, 1938), 2; Waterlow to Foreign Office, July 13, 1938; Downie to Waterlow, July 25, 1938; both in FO 371/21888, PRO; Lazar, Af-Al-Pi; William R. Perl, The Four-Front War: From the Holocaust to the Promised Land (New York, 1979); Stephany to New Zionist Organization, July 26, 1938, file 1/12/4-4G, JA; Thompson to Colonial Office, Sept. 17, 1938, FO 371/21888; MacDonald to Halifax, July 11, 1938, FO 800/5; both in PRO. For Krivoshein-Galili’s reminiscences, see Galili–Avneri interviews, June 11, 1968, and Jan. 5-6, 1969, Oral History Collection, Institute for Contemporary Jewry, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. 11 MacDonald–Tannous interview, July 19, 1938, FO 371/21879, PRO. For Tannous’s subsequent recollection of this meeting, see his autobiography, The Palestinians, 257-259. 12 Weizmann to Goldman, July 15, 1938, WA; Baffy, 92. Roosevelt’s message, published on July 3 in the Palestine Post, drew a pro-Mufti newspaper to editorialize that it “has had a very unfavorable impression not only upon the thousands of loyal American Arab citizens but throughout the Arab world.” Consul-General George Wadsworth, urged by the editorial to convey to FDR and the State Department “the Arabs’ feeling of dissatisfaction,” did so while reporting that U.S. prestige had not suffered in neighboring Arab countries (Wadsworth to State, July 11, 1938, PPF 601, FDRL). 13 Weizsacker circular, July 8, 1938, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Series D, 5 (Washington, D.C., 1950), 894-895; London Express, July 9, 1938; Neville Laski, The Jews of Greater Germany (London, 1938); Bentwich to Secretary-General of Intergovernmental Committee, July 27, 1938, A255/401, CZA; Memorandum, July 28, 1938, Diary, Phillips MSS; Waterlow to Foreign Office, FO 371/21888, PRO; London Times, July 16, 1938. 14 Davar, July 22, 1938; Sharett, Yoman Medini 3, 208-215; Abdul Hadi to MacMichael, July 27, 1936, and Supreme Muslim Council–MacMichael interview, Aug. 2, 1936, both in S25/22703, CZA. 15 July 21, 1938, Shertok diary, A245/682/6, CZA. Also see Cohen, Army of Shadows, chap. 6. 16 MacDonald-Mahmud Pasha interview, July 29, 1938, FO 371/21879, PRO. In a conversation with Jewish Agency officials the next day, Mahmud Pasha insisted that the intervention of the Arab kings in Palestine was “quite natural and legitimate”; agreed that the Mufti was conducting the disturbances even from exile and “more forcefully than before”; and warned of the “probability” that the Arab world would rise against England because of Palestine (Mahmud Pasha–Brodetsky–Locker interview, July 30, 1938, A24/216, CZA). 17 Bullard–MacDonald interview, Aug. 3, 1938, FO 371/21880, PRO; Houstoun–Boswell to MacMichael, Sept. 27, 1938, file P-1056/8, ISA; Bateman to Oliphant, Aug. 30, 1938, FO 371/21881, PRO. The “pound of flesh” easily recalled the denigration of the Jewish moneylender Shylock in — 600 —

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Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice. 18 Bullard–MacDonald interview, Aug. 3, 1938, FO 371/21880, PRO; Shuckburgh–Downie and Brodetsky–Locker interview, July 30, 1938, and Luke to Ussishkin, Aug. 1, 1938; both in A24/216; Stein to Weizmann, Aug. 5, 1938, and Agronsky memorandum, Aug. 22, 1938; both in A185/6/2; all in CZA. 19 David Ben-Gurion, “Sh’eilot HaBitahon V’Inyanei HaSha’a,” Aug. 3, 1938, Ben-Gurion file, Jacobs MSS. 20 MacDonald report to Cabinet, Aug. 21, 1938, FO 371/21863, PRO. 21 Joseph to Shertok, Aug. 7, 1938, file IV-104-49-1-32, Makhon Lavon; BenGurion, Zikhronot 5, 232-234. Wingate later claimed that his force of 40 Britons and 100 Jews (usually operating in squads of 10 men) had killed at least 140 Arab rebels and wounded 300 more, thus compiling a record unmatched by any British unit of similar size. By the time he left the country in May 1939, never to return, at the order of his anti-Zionist superiors in Palestine, Wingate had earned the first of his three Distinguished Service Orders (Britain’s second-highest decoration) and the lasting gratitude of Palestinian Jews. 22 Hyamson to Parkinson, Aug. 8, 1938, FO 371/21885, PRO; Consul to MacMichael, July 4, 1938, S25/22803, CZA; Downie memorandum, Aug. 13, 1938, CO 733/75156/35, PRO. For the official response to the first proposal, see Parkinson to Hyamson, Aug. 19, 1938, S25/22711, CZA. Hearing of the Norman plan a half-year earlier, Downie thought that its economic focus’s “deliberate exclusion” of the factors which were “really at the root of the trouble” made it “difficult to take this proposal seriously” (Downie minute, Jan. 26, 1938. FO 371/75156, PRO). 23 Memorandum, Aug. 2, 1938, A370/80; Weizmann to Ussishkin, Augusut 18, 1938, and Ussishkin to Brandeis, Sept. 11, 1938; both in A24/216; Report of Jabotinsky speech, S25/22732; all in CZA; Shmuel Katz, Lone Wolf: A Biography of Vladimir (Ze’ev) Jabotinsky, 2 (New York, 1996), 1, 649. 24 Tannous–MacDonald interview, Aug. 12, 1938 memorandum, FO 371/21880; MacMichael’s remarks in MacDonald report to Cabinet, Aug. 21, 1938, FO 371/21863; both in PRO. Lourie to Shertok, Aug. 12, 1938, S46/59; MacDonald to MacMichael, Aug. 12, 1938, S25/22711; both in CZA. Eliav Shohatman, “Parashat Oleh HaGardom Mordekhai Schwartz,” HaUma 140 (2000): 37-55. Schwartz, a 23-year-old Hagana member, had killed the Arab after the latter boasted that he had murdered and raped several Jews. Schwartz was buried in Haifa’s old cemetery. In a radio address upon his return, MacDonald pronounced, “the British Government will administer its trust on the basis of justice between the Jews who are building at long last a national home and the Arabs whose title in the land of their birth is indisputable. Sometimes man’s powers of conciliation and creation appear puny. They seem easily overthrown by violence and hate which he can also let loose. But there is a spirit that broods over Palestine, and with God’s help — 601 —

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peace will be restored in the Holy Land” (JTA, Aug. 12, 1938). MacDonald memorandum, Aug. 21, 1938, FO 371/21863, PRO. This memorandum included his talks with Weizmann and Tannous. Another, submitted three days later, summarized the views of the mandatory administration which he had heard while visiting Palestine (MacDonald memorandum, Aug. 24, 1938, FO 371/21863, PRO). 26 Wahbah–Ben-Gurion meeting, Aug. 25, 1938, S25/22656, CZA. That same month, James Malcolm sent Wahbah a suggestion that Saudi Arabia work with the Jews to achieve a Jewish state within an Arab Federation. Otherwise, he warned, the Jews, like the Lebanese Christians, would inevitably be forced to “throw in their lot” with the Turks or become an Italian colony like Abyssinia (Malcolm memorandum, Aug. 1938, Refugee correspondence, Myron Taylor MSS). For a Zionist report at the same moment about Syrian Prime Minister Jamal Mardam’s favoring partition, see Goldmann to Shertok, Aug. 29, 1938, S25/4144, CZA. 27 Baggallay minute on MacDonald’s Aug. 21 memorandum, Aug. 31, 1938, FO 371/21863, PRO; Alexandria dispatch, Aug. 18, 1938, and Baggallay to Trott, Sept. 5, 1938; both in file P-1056/8, ISA. 28 Cohen, Palestine: Retreat from the Mandate, 69; Berle to Roosevelt, Aug. 31, 1938, Box 210, Adolf A. Berle, Jr. MSS, FDRL; Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 239. The British Prime Minister turned down a request from Labourites Attlee, Richard Stafford Cripps, and Harold Laski that he publicly declare unequivocal support if Czechoslovakia was attacked, but supported by France and Russia, by Germany, telling them on July 29 that “a general war will mean the end of the economic system of Europe as we know it” (Laski speech, Oct. 13, 1938, Box 5, Records of Meetings, Council on Foreign Relations Archives, New York City). 29 MacDonald–Weizmann interview, Sept. 1, 1938, and Shuckburgh–Weizmann interview, Sept. 1, 1938; both in WA; JAEJ, Sept. 12, 1938, CZA. 30 MacDonald–Lampson interview, Sept. 1, 1938, FO 371/21880, PRO. 31 Baggallay memorandum, Sept. 3, 1938, FO 371/21885, PRO. 32 Cohen, Palestine, 69. 33 Baggallay memorandum, Sept. 3, 1938, FO 371/21885, PRO; Weizmann to Paterson, Aug. 23, 1938; Weizmann testimony at the commission, Aug. 30, 1938; both in WA; Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 234; Weizmann address, Sept. 3, 1938, Weizmann files, ZA; Cohen to Szold, Sept. 6, 1938, file 156b, R. Szold MSS. 34 Cohen to Szold, Sept. 6, 1938, file 156b, R. Szold MSS. 35 Baffy, 93. 36 Sharett, Yoman Medini, 263-271; MacMichael memorandum, Sept. 8, 1938, S25/22743, CZA. To Haining, Shertok emphasized the formation of additional Special Night Squads or the extension of the field of operations of those existing (Shertok to Haining, Sept. 15, 1938, Jewish Agency files, ZA). Terrorist bands also took all the weapons of the Be’ersheva police station, 25

— 602 —

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while the entire Arab police force deserted in Jericho (Simon to P.E.C., Sept. 12, 1938, Palestine Economic Corporation MSS, Box 17, New York Public Library). The number of incidents of Arab violence in 1938 (5,748) increased almost seven-fold compared with that which occurred in 1937 (Tom Bowden, “The Politics of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine, 1936-39,” Middle Eastern Studies 11 [May 1975]: 153). 37 David Horovitz, “Details of British Atrocities in Palestine Disclosed,” Jerusalem Post, Jan. 22, 1989; New York Times, Oct. 27 and 28, 1938. For Arab accounts of atrocities by British forces, see Bey to Tannous, Mar. 1, 1939, file 361/5-P, and Memorandum, June 17, 1939, file 361/4-P; both in ISA. 38 Shuckburgh–Weizmann talk, Sept. 9, 1938, WA; Shertok report at JAEJ, Sept. 18, 1938, CZA. 39 David Faber, Munich: The 1938 Appeasement Crisis (New York, 2008); Alling to Hull et al., Oct. 21, 1938, 867N.01/1329, SD; Extract from a secret report, Oct. 3, 1938, FO 371/21881, PRO. The Agency had long been aware of Nazi propaganda in Egypt. See Political Department meeting, July 13, 1938, A245/2, CZA. At the same moment as the Nuremberg rally, the Jewish Agency Arabist Eliyahu Epstein reported from India about the intense activities of the Nazis there to win over the Muslims, focusing on Mohammed Ali Jinnah and some other leaders of the Muslim League (E.E. [Epstein] letter, Sept. 10, 1938, J1/3871, CZA). 40 Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 247, 239-241; Cohen to Szold, Sept. 12, 1938, A371/436, CZA. Ussishkin told Cohen that he had always warned Weizmann against putting his confidence in the British administration. 41 Stern to Raziel, Aug. 19, 1938, and Jabotinsky to NZO Palestine, Aug. 23, 1938; both in file 6/1130/2003, ATMB; Yunitchman-Dobkin talk, Aug. 12, 1938, file 29/394P, JA; JTA, Aug. 26, 1938; Yunitchman-Lubinski-Golomb meeting, Aug. 30, 1938; file 8 Pnim/9, SHAI MSS, Hagana Archives, Tel Aviv; file 2/19/4K, JA. 42 Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 243-246. Despite Ben-Gurion’s opposition, a tentative agreement was signed a few days later (Hagana-Etzel agreement, Sept. 19, 1938, file 8 Pnim/9, SHAI MSS, Hagana Archives, and S25/22390, CZA). “Biryonim” was a clear reference to the earlier Brit HaBiryonim of the extreme Revisionist circle around Abba Ahimeir. 43 Betar’s Third World Conference Warsaw Sept. 11-16, 1938, A Report (Bucharest, 1940); transcript of conference; both in Menahem Begin Heritage Center archives, Jerusalem; Yosef Heller, “Ze’ev Jabotinsky U’Sh’eilat ‘HaHavlaga’, 1926-1939: Hashkafat Olam B’Mivhan HaMetsiut,” in T’murot BaHistoria HaYehudit HaHadasha, ed. S. Almog et al. (Jerusalem, 1988), 300-305; Yisrael Eldad, Ma’aser Rishon (Tel Aviv, 1975 ed.), 19-25. Jabotinsky also altered his 1937 poem “Kulah Sheli” (It is All Mine) to call twice for revolt and highlight the gallows, as well as to claim that Betar was “divinely chosen to rule.” For Begin’s earlier tribute to the three arrested Betarim, written one month after — 603 —

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Ben-Yosef’s death, see Menahem Begin, “Di Tat,” HaMedina, July 29, 1938. Halpern had called for this platform between July and December 1937 in a three-part series published by HaYarden. He later broke with Stern and began the “Cana’anite” movement. See Yonatan Ratosh, Raishit HaYamim, Petihuyot Ivriyot (Tel Aviv, 1962). His platform for the Betar conference is in file 2/32-2B, JA. 44 MacDonald–Woodhead interview, Sept. 14, 1938, FO 371/21863, PRO; Weizmann notes, Sept. 13-14, 1938, S25/7563, CZA; MacDonald–Weizmann interview, Sept. 13, 1938, FO 371/21880, PRO; Cohen to Szold, Sept. 19, 1938, file 156b, R. Szold MSS. Sir Henry McMahon, then the British High Commissioner in Cairo, had conducted a correspondence with the Sharif Ibn Ali Hussein of Mecca regarding future Arab independence in the region should the Arabs support HMG’s campaign during World War I against Ottoman hegemony in the Middle East. The British maintained thereafter that McMahon’s private promise excluded Palestine, while the Zionists added that the Balfour Declaration represented an official, public pledge, and therefore carried far greater weight (Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, 19-20). 45 Weizmann notes, Sept. 13-14, 1938, S25/7563, CZA; Baffy, 95-96. 46 Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 258-262; Baffy, 99-100. 47 Sept. 21, 1938 meeting, WA; Baffy, 101; Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 263-265; Baggallay minute, Sept. 23, 1938, and MacDonald to MacMichael, Sept. 24, 1938; both in FO 371/21864, PRO; Baffy, 107-108. 48 Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 279-281; “Half Brother, Half Son,” 619; Wise to Czech Minister in Washington, D.C., Sept. 30, 1938, Box 81, microfilm #2374, AJA; Katznelson to Golomb and Meyerov, Sept. 28, 1938, in “Tsror Mikhtavim,” Molad 73-74 (Aug. 1954): 327-328; Andrew Roberts, “The Holy Fox”: A Biography of Lord Halifax (London, 1991), 119-120; Baffy, 110. A riveting contemporary account of this last week of September, which joins the Czech crisis and the plight of Palestine, is in Baffy, 102-110. 49 Ben-Zvi to Tegart, Oct. 7, 1938, J1/3871, CZA; Pitelzon report on Oct. 2, 1938 events, file P575/21, Kohn MSS; Pitelson to Zaslani, Nov. 29, 1938, S25/10615, CZA. 50 Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 289-295. 51 Baffy, 111-112; Weizmann (“X”)–Namier (“L.B.N.”)–MacDonald (“B”), Dec. 14, 1938, S25/7642, CZA; Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 297-298, 307. 52 Weizmann note of interview with as-Suwaidi, Oct. 6, 1938, WA. In a talk the following week with Lord Bearsted, Nuri “dished up the old Arab case in its most aggressive form, as though it was the Mufti talking.” Lionel Cohen replied that he could not suggest to Weizmann, “so long as the campaign of blackmail and murder continued,” to participate in a round table conference. Bearsted confided in Laski that he was even willing to “go down to 35 percent in bargaining” at such a conference as “infinitely preferable to a stoppage of immigration and insecurity of the Jews in Palestine” (Laski memorandum, — 604 —

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53 54

55 56 57

58

59

60

61

Oct. 15, 1938, Palestine/1938-1941, AJCA). MacDonald memorandum, Oct. 6, 1938, FO 371/21881, PRO. Sasson to Shertok, Oct. 3, 1938, J1/3871; and Sasson Reports, Oct., 5, 7, 8, and 9, 1938; all in J1/3871, and Sasson Reports (three), Oct. 8, 1938, S25/22834; all in CZA; Resolutions, Oct. 19, 1938 report, FO 371/21882, PRO; C.I.D report, Oct. 15, 1938, S25/22732, CZA. Although Saudi Arabia attended, Yemen, Transjordan, Tunis, the Persian Gulf countries, Tripolitania, Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan did not. Shertok address, Oct. 11, 1938, A24/216, CZA; Palestine Post, Oct. 13, 1938; Z.O.A. Executive meeting, Oct. 12, 1938, ZA. Diary, Oct. 12, 1938, Moffat MSS; New York Times, Oct. 12, 1938; Palcor bulletin, Oct. 23, 1938, J112/1036, CZA. Baffy, 112-113; Meetings, Oct. 7-12, 1938, FO 371/21864, PRO. MacMichael had also recently advised MacDonald against arming several more thousand Jews, as the Agency requested, for it would intensify Arab hostility both in and outside of Palestine and, “not least, the practical pre-judgment of the political issue before the publication of the Report of the Woodhead Commission.” He argued, as well, that the Agency and other yishuv bodies markedly “make the maximum of political capital” out of the present Palestine situation and brought the mandatory “into disrepute” (MacMichael to MacDonald, Sept. 17, 1938, S25/22803, CZA). Lehman to Roosevelt, Oct. 10, 1938, PPF 93, FDRL; Szold to Brandeis, Oct. 11, 1938, Box 32A, and Szold to Brandeis, Oct. 13, 1938, file 135; both in R. Szold MSS; Freedman Roosevelt and Frankfurter, 462. Scores of pro-Zionist letters from politicians and others can be found in OF 700 Palestine, FDRL. Epstein report, National Board, Oct. 20, 1938, HA; J. Rives Childs, Foreign Service Farewell: My Years in the Near East (Charlottesville, 1969), 103. State Department press release, Oct. 14, 1938, OF 700 Palestine, Box 1; Roosevelt to Lehman, Oct. 13, 1938, PPF 93; Roosevelt to Smathers, Oct. 19, 1938, OF 700 Palestine, Box 1; PSF Benjamin V. Cohen; all in FDRL. I am grateful to Ms. Kirsten Carter of the Roosevelt Library for providing information about the fate of Frankfurter’s draft (Carter to Penkower, Sept. 24, 2010). Szold to Brandeis, Oct. 13, 1938, file 135, R. Szold MSS; Wise to Frankfurter, Oct. 16, 1938, Box 109, Wise MSS. “Half Brother, Half Son,” 620; Brandeis to Szold, Oct. 16, 1938, Box 32A, R. Szold MSS; Frankfurter to Wise, Oct. 18, 1938, Box 106, Wise MSS; Childs, Foreign Service Farewell, 105-106; Goldman to Roosevelt, Oct. 30, 1938, F38/853, CZA. Wise added to an associate that FDR spoke of partition as “a crazy quilt” (Wise to Tulin, Oct. 16, 1938, Box 121, Wise MSS). Oct. 19, 1938 meeting, CAB 23/96; MacDonald–Tannous interview, Oct. 20, 1938, FO 371/21882; MacDonald memorandum, Oct. 20, 1938 (entered as a Cabinet document on Oct. 28), FO 371/21865; Cabinet Committee, Oct. 24, 1938, FO 371/21865; all in PRO. For Tannous’s exposition to the Prime Minister, see Tannous to Chamberlain, Oct. 18, 1938, file P-2520/372, ISA. — 605 —

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62

Lindsay to Oliphant, Nov. 3, 1938, FO 371/21883, PRO. Roosevelt immediately shared this idea with Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr. and with Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle. Oct. 25, 1938, volume 147, Morgenthau Diaries; Nov. 1, 1938, Berle Diary; both in FDRL. Berle’s entry noted that FDR proposed to Lindsay that “a conference of Arab princes” be called to discuss the matter. They would “lay down say $200 million, buying a farm for every Arab who wishes to leave Palestine,” with the money chiefly to be used in digging wells. 63 Weizmann report, Nov. 1, 1938, file E3/277, BDA; Cohen to Szold, Oct. 28, 1938, A370/80, CZA. 64 Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 377-382. Ben-Gurion sent a copy to Zionist leaders in the United States, England, Poland, and Palestine. 65 Welles to U.S. Embassy London, Oct. 5, 1938, and Chamberlain to Roosevelt, Oct. 8, 1938; both in Rublee file, Hugh R. Wilson MSS, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa, FO 371/22535, PRO; Pell to Moffat, Oct. 19 and 29, 1938, Moffat MSS; Makins minute, Oct. 19, 1938, FO 371/21636, PRO; Joseph Tenenbaum, “The Crucial Year 1938,” Yad Vashem Studies 2 (1958): 49-78; JTA, Oct. 20, 1938; Council of German Jewry Meeting, Oct. 24, 1938, Box 41, Strauss MSS; Sybil Milton, “The Expulsion of Polish Jews from Germany: Oct. 1938 to July 1939—Documentation,” Yearbook of the Leo Baeck Institute 29 (1984): 169-200. 66 New York Times, Oct. 27, 1938; Osborne to Foreign Office, Oct. 13, 1938, FO 371/21882; PRO; JTA, Nov. 2, 1938; Memorandum of the committee, Nov. 4, 1938, file 4-1751, Ernst Simon MSS, National Library of Israel; Chamberlain remarks, Oct. 28, 1938, CAB 24/279, PRO. Concurrently, the Jewish Agency Executive’s Werner Senator favored a transitional period for 10 to 15 years with a 40 percent limit for the Jewish population; perhaps a cantonal system with local autonomy (along with lines suggested by Leonard Stein); and Palestine included in an “Arabistan” Federation. Senator to Weizmann, Oct. 2, 1938, file 4/6, Robert Weltsch MSS, LBI. 67 Lampson to Halifax, Oct. 24, 1938, S25/22700; Lampson to Foreign Office, Oct. 30, 1938 (two notes), S25/22775; both in CZA. The next day, an Arab translation of Mein Kampf was circulating in the Old City of Jerusalem. The edition carefully purged the passage in which the Arabs are graded fourteenth on the racial scale (JTA, Oct. 31, 1938). 68 MacDonald remarks, Nov. 2, 1938, CAB 23/96; Whitehall to LampsonPeterson-Bullard, Nov. 4, 1938, FO 371/21883; both in PRO. 69 Baffy, 117; Ben-Zvi Diary, Nov. 8 and 10, 1938, file P-1958/9, ISA. 70 Cmd. 5854, Palestine Partition Commission Report (Nov. 1938); Cmd. 5893, A Statement of Policy by His Majesty’s Government (Nov. 1938). Plan A was the Peel plan, while Plan B (favored by Russell) consisted of Plan A with the exclusion from the Jewish State of the Galilee and a small predominantly Arab area at the southern extremity of the Jewish commonwealth. 71 MacDonald–Weizmann interview, Nov. 9, 1938, WA; Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, — 606 —

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391; Jewish Agency statement (Nov. 9) and Palestine Post (Nov. 10); both cited in Palcor, Nov. 10, 1938. 72 Manchester Guardian, Oct. 6, 1938; Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 341, cols. 1987-2107, Nov. 24, 1938; Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 394-395; Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, 111, cols. 412-467, Dec. 8, 1938. 73 Gilbert, Sir Horace Rumbold, 428; Hammond to Hexter, Nov. 20, 1938, Waldman-Conferences/Israel-Palestine, AJCA. 74 Palcor, Nov. 19, 1938; MacDonald–Tannous interview, Nov. 9, 1938, and MacDonald to MacMichael, Nov. 11, 1938; both in CAB 24/652, PRO; Sasson to Shertok, Nov. 12, 1938, file 3, Jacobs MSS; Al-Ahram, Nov. 21, 1938 (Sasson trans.), J1/3871, CZA. 75 Lesch, Arab Politics in Palestine, 225n; Palcor, Nov. 16, 1938; Elishar memorandum, n.d., A430/229A, CZA; London Times, Nov. 15, 1938; Jennie Lebel, The Mufti of Jerusalem: Haj Amin el-Husseini and National Socialism, trans. P. Muench (Belgrade, 2007), 57-58. Fakhri Nashashibi would be assassinated in Baghdad on November 9, 1941 (a killing ordered by Abd al-Qadir al-Husseini). On that day Haj Amin was on his way from Rome to Berlin. The next day, the Nazis’ Radio Berlin, commenting on the killing, said: “The enemies of the Mufti will not escape their fate.” Moshe Pearlman, Mufti of Jerusalem: The Story of Haj Amin el-Husseini (London, 1947), 24-32. Abd al-Rahman alHuneidi, who helped the British capture rebels after his brother, the mayor of Lydda, was killed by Arab gangs, would be killed in October 1940. A leader of the Palestinian Arab “peace bands” against the Mufti, Fakhri Abd al-Hadi, would be murdered three years later. For Haj Amin’s sustained terror campaign against his political opponents, see Cohen, Army of Shadows, chaps. 4-5; Yuval Arnon-Ohana, Herev MiBayit (Tel-Aviv, 1981), 279-286. 76 Rita Thalmann and Emanuel Feinermann, Crystal Night, 9-10 Nov. 1938 (London, 1974); JTA, Nov. 13, 1938; Behrens letter to New York Times, Nov. 20, 1978; Karl Schleunes, The Twisted Road to Auschwitz: Nazi Policy Toward German Jews, 1933-1939 (Urbana, 1970); Reports to Hyman, Dec. 2, 1938, Germany-General, 1933-1939 files, American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee Archives, New York City; “The Excesses of Nov. 10, 1938 and Their Consequences,” Hyman to Waldman, Mar. 13, 1939, Nazism, 19381939 files, AJCA; Ruppin, Memoirs, Diaries, Letters, 296. For a contemporary account of Zbaszyn, see Nov. 10, 1938 report, file 184, Mowshowitz MSS. Göring soon confided to Hugo Rothenberg his own view that the Jews now living in Palestine could remain there in peace, “but any additional emigration should be resisted.” Bent Blüdnikow, “Goering’s Jewish Friend,” Commentary 94 (Sept. 1992), 50-53. 77 Louise London, Whitehall and the Jews, 1933-1948: British Immigration Policy, Jewish Refugees and the Holocaust (Cambridge, 2000), 97-100, 107; Lothian to Weizmann, Nov. 10, 1938, L13/165, CZA; Michael Bruce, Tramp Royal (London, 1954), 235-240; Maurice Cowling, The Impact of Hitler: British Politics and British Policy, 1933-1940 (London, 1975), 202-203; JTA, Nov. 22, — 607 —

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78

79

80

81

82

83

1938. Also see interview with Butler, Nov. 10, 1938, file E3/178/1, BDA. Nov. 14, 1938 meeting, FO 371/21865, Samuel note, Nov. 14, 1938, PREM 1/326; both in PRO; Council executive report, Nov. 17, 1938, file 93, American Council for Judaism MSS, Madison, WI. The same day, when expressing his appreciation of Ibn Saud’s offer for the “early cessation of strike and bloodshed” in Palestine, Halifax added that if HMG’s authority were reestablished and “organized activities” ceased there, HMG would “certainly give careful consideration” to the possibility of releasing some of the Arab “political prisoners” (Halifax to Bullard, Nov. 14, 1938, S25/22775, CZA). MacDonald–Weizmann interview, Nov. 12, 1938, CAB 24/652, PRO; Baffy, 116. London, Whitehall and the Jews, 100-101; Goldman report, Dec. 1, 1938, Executive Committee, ZOA files, ZA; Weizmann to Sinclair, Nov. 20, 1938, WA. To the Parliamentary Committee at the House of Commons, Weizmann explained that he objected to any Jewish refugee colonies in the Empire because it would take too long to start them; the capital would not be available; and if the Jews were to live amidst an “alien population,” they would gradually go into the towns and again become “an unpopular minority” (London Jewish Chronicle, Nov. 25, 1938). The Portuguese Department of Colonies had already ruled out Angola for mass immigration (JTA, Aug. 14, 1938). Memorandum, Nov. 15, 1938, Box 99, Armstrong MSS; Palestine Post, Nov. 17, 1938, and Roosevelt to Bowman, Oct. 14, 1938, and Nov. 2, 1938; both in Roosevelt file, Isaiah Bowman MSS, Eisenhower Library, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD; Isaiah Bowman, Limits of Land Settlement: A Report on Present-Day Possibilities (New York, 1937); Lazaron to Baerwald, Nov. 16, 1938, Box 2, Lazaron MSS; Nov. 16, 1938, vol. 151, Morgenthau Diaries, Henry Morgenthau, Jr. MSS; Morgenthau to Roosevelt, Nov. 21, 1938, and Bowman to Roosevelt, Nov. 25, 1938; both in PSF Refugees, Box 99, FDRL; McDonald to Fosdick, Nov. 21, 1938, PAC files, McDonald MSS; Bowman to Roosevelt, Nov. 25, 1938, PPF 5575, FDRL; New York Times, May 16, 1934; Roosevelt to Taylor, Nov. 23, 1938, Taylor MSS. The Portuguese Department of Colonies had already ruled out Angola for mass immigration (JTA, Aug. 14, 1938). Murray to Wadsworth, July 2, 1938, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), 1938, I (Washington, D.C., 1955), 752; Palestine Post, Nov. 14, 1938; Cohen to Missy (LeHand), Nov. 17, 1938, OF 198, FDRL; “Half Brother, Half Son,” 622-623. Welles to Roosevelt, Nov. 23, 1938, PSF Welles, State, Box 62, FDRL; Diary, Nov. 23, 1938, Moffat MSS; Freedman, Roosevelt and Frankfurter, 466. Brandeis had Cohen call FDR’s secretary to say that he thought the press conference statement, printed the next day in the New York Times, “fine” (Brandeis to Szold, Nov. 24, 1938, A251/329b, CZA). A.J.S. to Lloyd George, Nov. 22, 1938, file G22/4/17, Lloyd George MSS; Nov. 22, 1938, CAB 23/96, PRO. — 608 —

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84

JTA, Nov. 25, 1938; HaYarden, Nov. 28, 1938; Jacobs to Sackleys, Nov. 29, 1938, A375/70; Shertok to MacDonald, Nov. 23, 1938; Ben-Gurion to MacDonald, Nov. 26, 1938; all in A24/216, CZA; Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 395396; Time, Dec. 5, 1938. 85 Oct. 27, 1938 report, A24/216, CZA; NZO memorandum, Oct. 15, 1938, 840.48 Refugees/848, SD; Jabotinsky to Berlin, Nov. 14, 1938, file 1/12/4/4G, JA; Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 277-278, 280, 332-335, 341, 355-358, 359360, 383-385; JTA, Nov. 23, 1938; Jabotinsky, Mikhtavim, 289-291. The Comité de Salut Public was the first organ of the revolutionary government established by the Convention to deal with threats to the French Republic in the spring of 1793 (invasion and civil war), the second being the Committe of General Security. 86 Geist to Wilson, Dec. 5, 1938, Wilson MSS; Ogilvie-Forbes to Halifax, Dec. 8, 1938, S25/22746; Newton to Halifax, Dec. 8, 1938, A87/151; Senator report, Dec. 5, 1938, S49/111; London report, Dec. 20, 1938, L13/165; all in CZA. 87 Palestine Post, Dec. 4, 1938; Lord Strabolgi, “Behind the Conflict in Palestine,” This Week, Dec. 4, 1938, 6, 24; Wedgwood to Ussishkin, Dec. 13, 1938, A24/216, CZA. 88 Shertok–MacMichael interview, Dec. 6, 1938, file XV/3–Jewish Agency files, ZA. 89 Morgenthau-Roosevelt meeting, Dec. 6, 1938, vol. 155, Morgenthau Diaries; Roosevelt sketch, n.d., attached to Roosevelt to Mussolini, Dec. 7, 1938, Box 165, Sumner Welles MSS; both in FDRL. In “Notes for Conversation” n.d. (Box 65, Welles MSS.), Phillips was to detail for Mussolini FDR’s plan for the refugees. Therein was spelled out Roosevelt’s thoughts to Morgenthau about financing the plan, which would cost $500 million, $200 million of which to be subscribed to through selling of bonds. The U.S. would contribute $100 million, raised through private contribution, provided that the other countries would do likewise. 90 Lewis I. Strauss, Men and Decisions (Garden City, NY, 1962), 125-126; Bernard Baruch, Baruch: The Public Years (New York, 1960), 274; Box 64, Strauss MSS; Rosenman to Taylor, Nov. 23, 1938, OF 3186, and Rosenman to Roosevelt, Dec. 5, 1938, PPF 64; both in FDRL; Walter Lippmann, “The Problem of the Refugees,” New York Herald-Tribune, Nov. 17, 1938; “Mirage in the Jungle,” Jewish Frontier 5:12 (Dec. 1938): 3-4. For Lippmann’s anxieties regarding his own Jewish identity and his break with Felix Frankfurter, see Ronald Steel, Walter Lippmann and the American Century (Boston, 1980), 186-196, 329-333, 372-374. 91 Rose, Chaim Weizmann, 340-341; Weizmann, Trial and Error, 372-374; Weizmann-MacDonald interview, Dec. 12, 1938, S25/7642, CZA; and FO 371/21868, PRO; Baffy, 116; Meeting, Dec. 14, 1938, CAB 23/96, PRO; Downie to Shertok, Dec. 14, 1938, ZOA assorted files, ZA. Both the Agency Executive in London, as well as Ben-Gurion, Ussishkin, and Shertok, had — 609 —

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92 93 94

95

96 97

98

thought Weizmann’s personal mission to Turkey a waste of time. It appeared that Weizmann was trying to repeat his triumph of World War I, when the Balfour Declaration was partly a reward for his contribution to the British munitions industry. JAEJ, Dec. 11, 1938, CZA. Ben-Gurion speech at Va’ad HaLeumi conference, Dec. 12, 1938, A137/107; Ben-Gurion to Va’ad HaPoel, Dec. 17, 1938; Ben-Gurion letter to Actions Committee, Dec. 20, 1938; all in S5/312, CZA. MacDonald–Weizmann–Namier interview, Dec. 14, 1938, S25/7642, CZA; Brandeis to Szold, Dec. 13, 1938, Box 32A, R. Szold MSS; Adler to D’AvigdorGoldsmid, Dec. 16, 1938, Waldman-Conferences/Israel-Palestine files, AJCA; Shertok to Joseph, Dec. 18, 1938, S46/59, CZA; Meinertzhagen, Middle East Diary, 175; JAEJ, Dec. 18, 1938, CZA. The issue set Weizmann against Namier. Baffy, 118. Meetings, Dec. 14 and 21, 1938, CAB 23/96; Minute, Dec. 19, 1938, FO 371/21869; both in PRO. Board of Deputies-MacDonald interview, Dec. 23, 1938, file C14/15, BDA; Sherman, Island Refuge, 176, 183-184; Mark Jonathan Harris and Deborah Oppenheimer, Into the Arms of Strangers: Stories of the Kindertransport (New York, 2000). Of the almost 10,000 Jewish children who were admitted from Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Free City of Danzig, most survived World War II. Their rescue from Czechoslovakia was due to Nicholas Winton, a 29-year-old London stockbroker, who brought 669 of these children, mostly Jews, on eight train transports to England. The outbreak of the war prevented the departure of another 250, left stranded at the Prague railroad station. The Slovak director Matej Minac later made the films “Nicholas Winton, The Power of Good” and “Nicky’s Family” on this heroic effort. Al-Ahram, Nov. 21, 1938, J1/3871; Lampson to Whitehall, Dec. 15, 1938, S25/22700; both in CZA. Magnes to Tannous, Dec. 12, 1938, file P-649/20, Samuel MSS, ISA; A.H.C. (Cohen) report, Dec. 16, 1938, J1/3871, CZA. Ibn Saud to Roosevelt, Nov. 29, 1938, PSF Palestine 36, FDRL; Bullard to Whitehall, Nov. 28, 1938, FO 371/21869, PRO; Bullard to Whitehall, Dec. 13, 1938, S25/22775, CZA; Bullard to Whitehall, Jan. 2, 1939, FO 371/23220, PRO; Harrington memorandum, Dec. 24, 1938, file IV/104-491-48A, Makhon Lavon. Nuri still insisted on the yishuv being limited to its existing population, other Jews permitted to visit it for “shortest periods but without acquiring Palestine nationality or in any way becoming involved in the political life of the country.” The British Minister replied that “all this was very disappointing” (Baghdad to Whitehall, Dec. 27, 1938, S25/27719, CZA). Welles to Roosevelt, Jan. 9, 1939, FRUS, 1939, 4 (Washington, D.C., 1958), 695; chap. 6, p. 386; Alling to Hull et al., Oct. 21, 1938, 867N.01/1329, SD; Phillip Baram, The Department of State in the Middle East, 19191945 (Philadelphia, 1978), 247-251; Murray to Welles, Dec. 11, 1938, — 610 —

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867N.01/1353, SD; Childs, Foreign Service Farewell, 104-105. Rose Halprin of the Hadassah Medical Organization in Jerusalem correctly sensed Wadsworth’s anti-Zionist bent (See Halprin to Epstein, Nov. 4, 1938, London Executive files, Jacobs MSS). William Yale, who would join State as a prime advisor on Palestine matters during World War II, had already concluded that Zionism, “a parasitical growth on British imperialism,” could only be “maintained by violence and must lead to violence” (Yale to Jeffries, Dec. 30, 1936, Box 16, William Yale MSS, Sterling Library, Yale University). 99 Laski-Kennedy interview, Dec. 7, 1938, Laski files, Cyrus Adler files, AJCA; “Z” (Kennedy) interview with LL (Lipsky) and SG (Goldman), Nov. 23, 1938, Z4/17456, CZA; Michael R. Beschloss, Kennedy and Roosevelt: The Uneasy Alliance (New York, 1980), 180; Diary, Dec. 16, 1938, Moffat MSS. For subsequent antisemitic remarks by Kennedy, see Beschloss, Kennedy and Roosevelt, 187, 226, 257. Contemptuous of Churchill while Kennedy preferred Hitler to Stalin even when world war erupted, he later shared some of his views with Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal on December 27, 1945. During their round of golf, Kennedy also said that Chamberlain stated that “America and the Jews had forced England into the war” (The Forrestal Diaries, ed. W. Millis with E.S. Duffield [New York, 1951], 121-122). 100 MacDonald-Murray interview, Dec. 16, 1938, FO 371/21869, PRO; Memorandum, attached to Welles to Moffat, Dec. 22, 1938, Box 48, Welles MSS. 101 Norman to Goldman, Dec. 22, 1938, file 14/11, Solomon Goldman MSS, AJA; Welles to Murray, Dec. 15, 1938, Box 165, Welles MSS; Mallet to Oliphant, Dec. 22, 1938, CO 733 II/407/75872/14, PRO; Mallet to Welles, Dec. 27, 1938, Box 162, Welles MSS; Brandeis to Roosevelt, Dec. 28, 1938, PSF Palestine 36, FDRL. 102 Palestine Post, Dec. 13, 1938; JTA, Dec. 27, 1938; Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 402-405; Meir Avizohar, HaTsiyonut HaLohemet (Sdeh Boker, 1985), 38-39; Epstein to Jacobs, Nov. 21, 1938, A375/43, and Meeting of Jewish police, Dec. 18, 1938, S24/177; both in CZA. 103 Noon to Zetland, Dec. 14, 1938, CO 733/386/75872/26, PRO; Tegart-Joseph interview, Dec. 29, 1938, file XV/3–Jewish Agency, ZA; Bakstansky to Wedgwood, Dec. 29, 1938, Z4/17043, CZA. Tegart agreed with Shertok that HMG should have focused on suppressing the Arab Revolt before looking at the political problem, but “he was an Irishman and that the ways of John Bull were inscrutable.” Shertok-Tegart interview, Oct. 10, 1938, A24/216, CZA. For the beginning of the Mossad L’Aliya Bet, see Avneri, Meh”Velos” ad “Taurus,” chap. 3.

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10. From the St. James Conference to the White Paper

St. James’s Palace, built in the late 1530s by King Henry VIII on the site of a former leper hospital dedicated to Saint James the Less, is located at the western end of Pall Mall in the Borough of Westminster. From 1698 to 1837, the red-brick Tudor structure and its remodeled quarters became the principal residence in London of the British monarchy. Mary I died there; Elizabeth I spent the night while waiting for the Spanish Armada to sail up the Channel; Charles I took Holy Communion at the Chapel Royal on the morning of his execution; Victoria and her beloved Albert were married before that same altar. With the palace having continuously served as the sovereign’s administrative center, foreign ambassadors are still accredited to the Court of St. James, even though their credentials are presented at Buckingham Palace. It is one of four buildings in the capital where Foot Guards from the Household Division can be seen, ramrod at attention in their bright red tunics and tall bearskin caps. The main entrance, a massive gatehouse flanked by two polygonal turrets on the north side, is one of the city’s few Tudor landmarks.1 There, in the Picture Room, His Majesty’s Government (HMG) convened a conference on February 7, 1939, to determine the future of its mandate over Palestine. By this time, Hitler’s threat of war in Europe had persuaded MacDonald that Palestine must be viewed, as the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff had argued since 1937, in a regional context. Given Imperial strategic interests in the entire area and beyond, the Colonial Secretary concluded, the Jews would be required to make substantial concessions concerning their “national home.” If HMG were involved in “a war of any considerable duration,” he thought, it should announce a complete suspension of immigration into Palestine on grounds of security, especially in regard to the “Jewish Colonies” there. Actually, he had already in September expressed doubt to former Palestine High Commissioner John Chancellor that the proposed Round Table — 612 —

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Conference would result in any Jewish-Arab agreement, but this would enable HMG to then impose its own solution while showing that it had “gone to utmost limit in endeavouring to reconcile the opposing parties.” He would soon contend to the Cabinet, echoing the Arab argument, that the conditions upon which Feisal had accepted Zionist claims at the Versailles Peace Conference were not carried out (“through no fault of the Jews”), and the agreement was never confirmed by Feisal or accepted by the Arab world.2 Fully opposed to this stance, the Jewish Agency Executive reluctantly accepted that abstention from the conference would make their stance “untenable.” As late as January 22, the Executive branch in Jerusalem had voted 3-3 regarding participation, but a majority in favor ultimately carried the day. Many Englishmen would feel, as MacDonald observed to Weizmann and Shertok, that non-participation freed HMG from any obligations towards Jews, while the Arabs would make the most of the Jews’ absence. As Shertok put it, rejecting the invitation would be “fleeing the battlefield.” “We have no other choice,” he decided. As for making the Jewish delegation as representative as possible, non-Zionists Lord Bearsted and Anthony de Rothschild informed Weizmann, following the Cabinet’s refusal to allow 10,000 Jewish children into Palestine, that “a wide measure of agreement” on the question of immigration was possible. Their American counterparts on the Agency decided not to take part, however, lest they possibly “break a united front.” If the delegation ultimately clashed with the government, Weizmann acknowledged to Lord Reading and Lionel Cohen, it would be up to the non-Zionists to decide whether or not to continue participating with the Executive in “the struggle.” The Zionists undoubtedly would press on, for “Palestine was their daily bread.” Ben-Gurion put it more strongly to Hadassah’s National Board: Zionism “is no longer an ideal, it is a matter of life and death for a majority of Jews in the world and for Palestine.”3 Pinhas Rutenberg entertained other ideas. In a series of meetings with MacDonald before and after Kristallnacht, the former Russian revolutionary leader had urged that HMG institute Martial Law in Palestine prior to any discussing of political issues; suspend all Palestinian Arab mandate officials, as otherwise there would be no secrets kept from their fellow Arabs; and get the French to arrest Haj Amin and his entire entourage in Lebanon. Abdullah, with whom Rutenberg had reached an initial agreement in mid-1936 to benefit Jewish and Arab development — 613 —

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in Transjordan, should be supported; the mounting rift between Haj Amin’s forces and the rival Nashashibi faction in Palestine should also be encouraged. The immediate entry into Palestine of at least 100,000 young Jews would strengthen Britain in wartime, he asserted. A corporation to be formed by Rutenberg with a capital of £10 million, half spent for public works within the yishuv and some £3 million each to acquire land for Jewish colonization and to develop the territory of a proposed Arab Federation, could lead to Jewish-Arab understanding. MacDonald, however, doubted the Emir’s influence compared with that of the adamantly anti-Zionist Ibn Saud, rejected large-scale Jewish immigration into Palestine (a view shared by Abdullah), and insisted that the conference go forward. Ben-Gurion and Shertok, too, thought Rutenberg’s economic emphasis and hope for a “reasonable” settlement with Haj Amin’s Arab opponents unrealistic.4 MacDonald told Weizmann that Palestine’s Arabs, like the Jews, had “a strong moral case.” The Colonial Secretary agreed, as well, that the McMahon correspondence of 1915 with Sharif Hussein regarding Arab independence in the region, which the Arabs were certain bolstered their claim to Palestine, should be published by His Majesty’s Printing Office. MacDonald, his hand strengthened by the insistent MacMichael, rejected Lampson’s recommendation to invite Haj Amin to the conference. He accepted the ex-Mufti’s demand, however, that the five members of the outlawed Arab Higher Committee be released from internment on the Seychelles Islands in order to attend. Private talks with Alami regarding the conference further enlightened MacDonald about the Arab viewpoint. HMG also persuaded the French to allow the freed Committee members to visit Haj Amin for consultations prior to the London gathering.5 Ever since Fakhri Nashashibi’s pamphlet of November 1938, the National Defense Party had sharply taken issue with Haj Amin’s terrorist campaign against Arab opponents. Fakhri did not believe, he told the Agency’s Aharon Cohen, that the Arab masses could really elect their accredited representatives to the conference as long as terror reigned in Palestine. A similar list of eminent Palestinian-Arab victims was circulated from Cairo throughout the Muslim world by the Office of the League for Arab National Activity, depicting the crimes “perpetrated by the criminal henchmen of the murderous Mufti.” That charge, emerging from a conference of 50 Palestine Arab exiles under the chairmanship — 614 —

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of Sheikh Ali Shahin, the former Mufti of Jaffa, also demanded strong British action to restore peace. Not surprisingly, the Nashashibi faction claimed that its leaders should represent the voice of Palestine’s Arabs at the Round Table Conference.6 Even those Arabs released from the Seychelles, meeting in mid-January 1939 with Haj Amin and those directing the rebellion in Palestine, deplored that the attacks had deteriorated into banditry and were no longer popular within the country’s Arab populace. (A confidential War Office report, given concurrently to the British press, made the same point.) Led by Abd al-Hadi, who reportedly remarked that the revolt continued “merely for the restoration of Haj Amin to his office,” they counseled moderation and unconditional participation in the conference. Rashid Haj Ibrahim accused Izzat Darwaza of having personally planned the killing and robbing of innocent notables. Against the views of extremists Darwaza and Husseini, it was finally agreed to leave the Palestinian Arab delegates free to negotiate a face-saving compromise regarding Jewish immigration and land purchase, as well as to accept the inclusion of Ragheb Bey Nashashibi as one of the group. The resolutions published subsequently, however, indicated the radicals’ continued control, committing the delegation (Nashashibi now excluded) to the “Covenant” first adopted at the 1937 Bludan Congress: full Arab independence in the country; abandonment of the Zionist “experiment”; replacing the mandate with an agreement similar to the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty; and prohibiting Jewish immigration and the transfer of land to the Jews. British intelligence also heard that Haj Amin had extracted a promise from the delegates selected that if HMG did not meet these demands, they should immediately withdraw from the conference, and try to persuade the Arab state visitors to follow their example.7 At meetings in Cairo immediately thereafter, encouraged by the efforts of Lampson advisor and Zionists’ eminence grise Walter Smart, representatives of the Arab kings sought to moderate this position. Yet a deadlock ensued when the British authorities in Cairo insisted, as had MacMichael, that all Palestinian Arab parties be represented. Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Sa’id, Saudi Foreign Minister Fuad Bey Hamza, and Husseini (chosen to chair the Palestinian Arab delegation) flew to Syria in an attempt to persuade Haj Amin to agree to the participation of the Nashashibis. At the same time, with the support of Transjordan’s Prime Minister Taufiq Abdul-Huda, Nashashibi declared that his party must — 615 —

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have the same number of delegates as Haj Amin’s, because the former represented at least 50 percent of the Palestine Arabs and 75 percent of Arab economic interests. Eventually, Haj Amin accepted two former members of the National Defense Party—but not Nashashibi—who had dissociated themselves from Fakhri’s memorandum of November 1938.8 Internal strife within the Palestinian Arab camp persisted nonetheless. Armed clashes between the Nashashibi and Husseini forces in Hebron and Jerusalem, news of which was censored by the mandatory authorities, culminated in the destruction of Haj Amin’s own house near the Mosque of Omar. Fakhri informed the Agency political department’s leading Arabist that the Nashashibi group, headed by Nashahsibi and Fakhri as advisor, would likely go to London as a separate delegation. Fakhri had told MacMichael that they would not agree to be in the same group with the men of Haj Amin, who was responsible for the bloodshed in Palestine. Unlike Haj Amin and his partisans, the Nashashibis also wished the mandate to remain except for changes regarding land and immigration. Jewish entry, Fakhri told the High Commissioner, should not be stopped, but should not be so great as to “swamp the Arabs.” At present, his faction was not asking for an independent government: given the current reality of international relations, a Palestinian Arab state would only be “a hunting ground for the European Powers,” and would be a good field for separatist movements as was the case in Syria. Moreover, a “blood feud” between Haj Amin’s adherents and their Arab adversaries in Palestine would continue for years, and the latter were not yet strong enough to prevent his dominating such a state. Confederation would come at the proper time; no adequate common and cultural basis existed as yet between the Arab governments. The Nashashibis and the Jews could work jointly in London, Fakhri believed, their joint actions to be “crowned with success” because together they constituted the majority of Palestine’s population.9 These rifts notwithstanding, the Arabs need not have worried about MacDonald, who presented his views to the Cabinet in a lengthy memorandum dated January 18, 1939. Since the conflicting Jewish and Arab claims, laid out therein, had left tempers on both sides “sullen, hard and uncompromising,” he admitted that “the omens [were] not good” for resolving them at the conference. Various British declarations to each group during the last world conflict, “really very difficult to reconcile,” were “rather confused about the whole business.” At present, HMG — 616 —

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should clearly state that it did not contemplate now or in the future turning Palestine into a Jewish commonwealth, as well as reject the opposing claim that the country must become an Arab state. London should “keep the door open” to the possibility that, “in different circumstances at some future time,” Jews or Arabs would become reconciled to being citizens in a state in which the other party was the “predominant partner.” The Colonial Secretary then went on to present his solution. Loss of the “sympathy and friendship” of the Muslim world, which would “seriously complicate matters for us” in India, demanded that “we should be prepared to go a long way to meet the Arab representatives” at the conference. If a period could be inaugurated in which Arab tempers cooled and Arab-Jewish cooperation began, this would strengthen the Jewish National Home and might open Arab countries to some Jewish settlement in their undeveloped lands, notably Transjordan. Land sales to Jews and Jewish immigration had to be restricted. An Advisory Council of Arabs and Jews, equal in number, should be created in Palestine; a binational state or partition within an Arab Federation appeared two longrange possibilities. On February 1, the Cabinet approved MacDonald’s immigration proposal: the Jews would be permitted to reach up to 3540 percent of Palestine’s population at the end of a decade, with either a subsequent conference or an Arab veto to decide upon Jewish entry in the future.10 Confronted by the slide towards war with Germany, War Office circles echoed this rationale of appeasement. One year earlier, in decrying the government’s partition policy, a Chiefs of Staff memorandum had warned that the loyalty of the Arab states must be insured. In November 1938, Military Intelligence declared that, owing to London’s abandonment of partition and the prospects that the Palestinian Arab rebellion “will have either been brought under control or will have subsided through appeasement by April 1939,” the hostility of Arab countries to HMG should be no greater and might be much less than at present. A sub-committee report to the Committee of Imperial Defense sounded the identical tone two months later: We assume that, immediately on the outbreak of war, the necessary measures would be taken … in order to bring about a complete appeasement of Arab opinion in — 617 —

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Palestine and in neighbouring countries…if we fail thus to retain Arab goodwill at the outset of a war, no other measures which we can recommend will serve to influence the Arab states in favour of this country. The General Staff circulated this memorandum to the Cabinet, Elliot reported to Dugdale on January 18, with the Jews not even mentioned therein. “It is more and more clear,” she concluded, that “the soldiers’ view will soon dominate all others.”11 Concurrently, in an effort to offset rising pressure to regard Palestine as the natural haven for Nazi Germany’s imperiled Jews, the Colonial Office touted British Guiana in South America instead. Although admitting that this particular colony did not offer opportunities for immediate large-scale Jewish immigration, MacDonald had suggested to the Cabinet one week after Kristallnacht that the proposal “would be important politically.” Chamberlain agreed that some concrete territorial offer should be made, giving Jewish settlers there “a long lease on a peppercorn rent in order to retain some measure of control.” Still, when informing the House of Commons a few days later that the government would be prepared to lease not less than 10,000 square miles in British Guiana to voluntary organizations “on generous terms,” the Prime Minister concluded that the possibilities of settlement in general were “strictly limited.” Responding to pleas on November 21, 1938, by MPs for large-scale settlement in Palestine and elsewhere, Home Secretary Hoare reaffirmed the government’s view that this problem was an international one; the Dominions “must speak for themselves”; colonial territories were being surveyed to this end; and the particular difficulties in Palestine precluded “anything like mass immigration at the present time” to that troubled land.12 Whitehall thought the British Guiana offer, like that of Tanganyika, “largely an illusory one,” preferring Northern Rhodesia for large-scale Jewish settlement. Staff members argued that their department had a direct interest in the matter. Settlement of refugees in the Empire’s colonies would “take the pressure off Palestine”; fulfill “such moral obligations as we may be held to have towards the Jews”; make a “constructive contribution to the Central European emigration problem”; help Anglo-American relations; and increase the Empire’s prosperity. In addition, the Jewish population “now adrift” would be converted into — 618 —

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“an Imperial asset,” thereby gaining “the sympathy and gratitude of international Jewry.” The Colonial Office disagreed, noting the opposition of Northern Rhodesia’s legislative council to even admitting 150 refugee settlers.13 Weizmann spoke for all Zionists in dismissing such territorial refugee schemes as utopian. With more than 500,000 Jews needing to be evacuated from Greater Germany and millions more from Eastern Europe, he pointed out in a letter to the London Times, no country but Palestine had proven capable within the last ten years of receiving mass Jewish immigration. Failures elsewhere, including the Argentine and the Soviet Union’s Birobidzhan, lay in the fact that only in Palestine “every furrow ploughed, every tree planted, is sanctified into an act of national redemption.” The Jewish refugees should not be kept out of the one land of their “acknowledged right,” where, with adequate means, 100,000 could be settled without delay on an economically sound basis. (Beyond that number, Weizmann told the High Commissioner for India one month earlier, he thought that another 800,000 Jews could be absorbed in Palestine.) The Jews, he concluded, ought not to risk all that remained of their resources upon uncertain experiments, which were incapable of giving immediate relief and unsupported by a national idea.14 Roosevelt’s preference had shifted by then to Angola, which Bowman and Welles trumpeted as the “most favorable” option for large-scale settlement. On January 14, FDR instructed Taylor to discuss this idea confidentially with Winterton and Chamberlain; if it were thought practicable, Taylor would then approach Portuguese Prime Minister Antonio Salazar. The Jews of Central and Eastern Europe, FDR’s directive to Taylor declared, were “a racial and religious group of some seven million persons for whom the economic and social future is exceedingly dark.” The organized emigration, over a period of years, of 100,000 young persons annually “should reduce the problem to negligible proportions.” Since “it is doubtful that Palestine could absorb and maintain the necessary influx of population,” the President stated, a “supplemental Jewish homeland,” which could perhaps become an independent state, could be created in Angola. Interested world powers would provide Portugal with just compensation, eventual success making Salazar “one of the greatest figures in the history of his country and of our times.” Alexander Cadogan advised strongly against this, however. “If we can’t or won’t find room in our Empire” for the Jews, wrote the Permanent — 619 —

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Under-Secretary to his superior, “I do at least hope we shall not ask the Portuguese to do more than we are prepared to do.” Pointing to Lisbon’s extreme sensitivity on all colonial questions, Halifax commented: “I quite agree. Let the Americans do it.”15 While the Americans would not let Angola drop, the Colonial Office continued to press for British Guiana. Hearing of Chamberlain’s original announcement about possible refugee colonization, Moffat thought that “the mountain certainly brought forth a mouse and the offers of the Empire were nothing more than chicken feed.” The Prime Minister’s mention of 50,000 acres in Tanganyika, the former German East Africa confiscated by the Versailles Peace Conference, offered a truly minute area; when Berlin strongly objected, the suggestion was soon abandoned. British Guiana drew fire from Bowman and research expert David Popper of the U.S. Foreign Policy Association, who noted that virulent malaria and other difficulties made that territory unsuitable for mass settlement. Yet Winterton, while declaring to press magnate and pro-appeasement advocate Lord Beaverbrook that the British men and women who would make good settlers overseas “are urgently needed” in Canada and Australia, thought places like British Guiana “a good thing from the point of view of Colonial Development.” Despite Whitehall’s skepticism, a mixed Anglo-American commission departed for the territory in early February 1939, its mandate to report to Roosevelt’s Advisory Committee on Political Refugees about the feasibility of largescale colonization there.16 Still, whatever their quarrel concerning alternative solutions, both the Foreign and Colonial Offices agreed on ruling out one particular option. In suggesting Northern Rhodesia, Cadogan proposed to Halifax that “it would help tremendously towards an ‘Arab’ solution of Palestine if we could at the same time offer an alternative ‘home’ elsewhere.” At the first meeting on January 24 of the Cabinet Committee on Refugees, MacDonald spoke of Northern Rhodesia, suggesting that Jewish or Gentile Czech refugees would not be “anxious” to settle in Tanganyika, an ex-German colony. As for Palestine, he pointed out that, pending the results of the London conference, it “must be considered excluded from the list of countries suitable” for increased refugee settlement. Three days later, Sir Herbert Emerson, Rublee’s successor, praised the “remarkable progress” of that country’s industrial development according to a recent report from the Brandeis coterie’s Palestine Economic — 620 —

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Corporation. Winterton quickly responded that he could not commit HMG to expenditures for this purpose: “the British Empire had immense obligations and had to go carefully.”17 Roosevelt also moved cautiously on Palestine. Mussolini had just turned down his personal request that Italy settle Jewish refugees in Ethiopia, suggesting that Brazil, Russia, and “vast tracts” of unoccupied lands in North America offered better opportunities. “There was no room for Jews in Europe,” the Duce added, “and eventually, he thought, they would all have to go.” Ibn Saud’s letter required more than a “perfunctory acknowledgment,” urged Welles, who expounded to Roosevelt at length on President Wilson’s King-Crane Commission referred to therein. (Concurrently, Wallace Murray, State’s Near Eastern Division chief, brought Antonius’s views to Hull’s attention.) Choosing not to relate to the anti-Zionist report of that commission, FDR accepted Welles’s draft reply, which spoke of the interest of the American people in Palestine and closed with “Your Good Friend.” That interest, read Roosevelt’s communication of January 17 to Ibn Saud, included considerations of “a spiritual character” as well as those “flowing from the rights derived” by the United States through the Anglo-American Mandate Convention of 1924. The State Department’s statement of October 14, 1938, on the subject was attached, along with FDR’s concluding remark that “this Government has never taken any position different from what it has maintained from the beginning toward this question.” One week later, Wise, who privately thought that “the cards are so stacked against us that it hardly seems worth going at all” to the talks when the Mufti’s “unscrupulous gangsters” would be present, asked to see Roosevelt for a few minutes before departing for London. The request, transmitted through Benjamin Cohen, was denied.18 In these same weeks, the tempo of the Third Reich’s implementing its designs for the Jewish people intensified dramatically. Seeking to induce the Czechs to place their fate trustingly in his hands, Hitler, who had recently been designated “Man of the Year” for 1938 by Time magazine, met with President Emil Hacha and Foreign Minister Frantisek Chvalkovsky on January 21. To the sympathetic Chvalkovsky he avowed that “with us the Jews would be destroyed,” while the Jews in Czechoslovakia “were still poisoning the nation.” “Interested states,” the Führer advised, “might take some spot in the world, put the Jews there, and then say to the Anglo-Saxon states oozing with humanity: ‘Here — 621 —

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they are: either they starve to death or you put your many speeches into practice’.” Hitler and von Ribbentrop emphatically stated to the Foreign Minister, who soon informed the French Ambassador to Prague, that “this vermin must be destroyed,” and that Germany would seek to form a block of antisemitic states. Four days later, Berlin’s Foreign Ministry sent a circular to all of its diplomatic missions and consulates, pronouncing, “The ultimate aim of Germany’s Jewish policy is the emigration of all Jews living on German territory.” The Wilhemstrasse noted with satisfaction the spread of anti-Jewish legislation in Italy, Hungary, and Poland, as well as a marked growth of antisemitism in North and South America, France, Holland, Scandinavia, and Greece—”a wave” Germany wished to encourage.19 On January 30, Hitler brought some of his primal thoughts to the public’s attention. In a speech of more than two hours before the Reichstag, the Führer cynically observed that “it is a shameful spectacle to see how the whole democratic world is oozing sympathy for the poor tormented Jewish people but remains hard-hearted and obdurate when it comes to helping them, which is surely, in view of its attitude, an obvious duty.” The world had sufficient space for settlement, he went on, but we must get rid of the opinion “that the Jewish race was only created by God for the purpose of being in a certain percentage a parasite living on the body and the productive work of other nations.” If the “Jewish race” did not “adapt itself to sound constructive activity as other nations do,” “sooner or later it will succumb to a crisis of inconceivable magnitude.” For conclusion, Hitler decided to assume the mantle of prophecy: If the international Jewish financiers in and outside Europe should succeed in plunging the nations once more into a world war, then the result will not be the bolshevization of the earth, and thus the victory of Jewry, but the annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe!20 The Nazi hierarchy worried over the danger to “Aryan” Germany posed by a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine. That commonwealth, ideologue Alfred Rosenberg declared at Detmold on January 15, would “send extraterritorial ministers and representatives to all countries in the world and through them to promote its lust for domination.” The Nazi state had “a major interest” in the continued dispersion of Jews, — 622 —

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the Foreign Ministry’s circular pointed out ten days later, for the Jewish refugee “influx” in all parts of the world “arouses the resistance of the native population and thus provides the best propaganda for Germany’s Jewish policy.” Still, during the first working session the next month of the Committee of the Central Reich Office for Jewish Emigration, created to have the Jews “processed on an assembly line,” which had led to the emigration from Austria of 100,000 Jews because of Eichmann’s zealous efforts, SS Gruppenführer Heydrich made a significant exception. The “opportunity” of illegal Jewish transports from many other European countries to Palestine, asserted the new Committee’s director, could be “utilized” by Germany without any official participation. Foreign Ministry representatives had no objection, and expressed the view that every possibility for getting a Jew out of Germany “ought to be taken advantage of.” Helmut Wohlthat, who had recently been engaged in talks with Rublee to finance an orderly emigration of Jews, added that he had heard in London that Palestine could still absorb 800,000-1 million Jews, and that this quota would be filled from other countries in case no Jews from Germany went to Palestine.21 Extremely concerned about the rising number of illegal transports crammed with Jews fleeing Central and Eastern Europe, Whitehall increased its effort to check this traffic. On January 2, it ordered consular offices in Bucharest to take steps to swiftly suppress this traffic through Rumania, and urged the legation in Sofia three weeks later to press the Bulgarian government to “take immediate steps to put an end” to such movement via that country. The “moral satisfaction” that HMG might derive from sending more Jews to Palestine, MacDonald was told by the Central Department’s C. W. Baxter (who wrote the Sofia cable), had to be weighed against the Arabs’ “moral right” to “have some say on the question of admission of aliens into their country.” If Jewish immigration to Palestine did not stop, warned Middle East Department head Lacy Baggallay, “we shall be headed for trouble”: “If our solution displeases the Jews, they will let off a lot of hot air—particularly those in the U.S.A. If our solution displeases the Arabs, they are likely to act.” Police and naval measures were energetically taken to stem the flow of these vessels, which also spurred an appreciative letter from George VI’s Private Secretary to Halifax: “The King has heard from Gort on his return from Palestine that a number of Jewish refugees from different countries were surreptitiously getting into Palestine, and he is glad to — 623 —

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think that steps have been taken to prevent these people leaving their country of origin.”22 In the end, there would be no Round Table Conference. Yielding to the Arabs’ refusal to sit in the same room with the Jews, HMG announced that it would meet the two delegations separately at St. James’s Palace on the morning of February 7, 1939. The first meeting would be purely formal in character, Chamberlain speaking for perhaps seven minutes, with a brief reply by the leaders of each side. The confidential “business” sessions to follow would begin by giving the delegations “a clear field” to say what each liked, and then HMG would try and clarify the position, discuss the points made, and eventually define the limits of the discussions. “Bound by its international obligations and by the Mandate,” MacDonald asserted to Weizmann, Ben-Gurion and Shertok on February 1, the government would enter the talks with “an open mind.” Five days later, Lampson, supported by G.O.C. Middle East Haining, urged a pro-Arab solution on strategic grounds in the probable event of war. He also tried, unsuccessfully, to pressure the Jews of Cairo and Alexandria to accept the Arab demands.23 Weizmann, heading the Jewish delegation, expected that the conference’s outcome might well “fill the cup of Jewish bitterness.” He personally thought, as he informed London associates, that the Arabs would be “absolutely uncompromising” in the discussions, and the British would “go as near as possible” to granting them a sovereign state. If London thought the support of the Arab world more important than the material help the Jews could give in wartime, Weizmann remarked to MacDonald on February 4, “then that was that. But we should keep in mind the Jewish side of the picture.” Fundamentally, he had told Halifax two weeks earlier, any undermining of the right of Jewish immigration to Palestine would place Jewry “in an unbearable position.” The requirement of Arab consent in the matter would reduce the Jewish position to “sufferance,” rather than the “right” that HMG had pledged in the Churchill White Paper of 1922.24 Yet, at a Cabinet meeting on January 27, MacDonald sought to reinterpret that official statement to refer only to those Jews already living in Palestine. Halifax had proposed then, with Inskip’s backing, that the Jews be persuaded to surrender unilaterally their right to enter Palestine, “instead of having it forced on them.” MacDonald agreed that “the whole atmosphere might be changed for the better” if the proposed objective — 624 —

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could be accomplished. Agreeing that this should be attempted with Weizmann, he feared that the Zionist herald’s “constituents would not for a moment allow him to make it.” Lord Zetland advanced a Jewish maximum population of one-third, citing strong Indian Muslim support for Arab claims in Palestine. Elliot countered by stressing that “greater weight” should be given to the United States, but the Secretary for India responded that the issue was fast becoming a “pan-Islamic problem,” and he foresaw “serious troubles” in India if the conference ended in what was regarded as “a substantial victory for the Jews.” That same day, Elliot reported to Dugdale that Inskip “swallows whole” the military arguments for placating the Arabs, the Minister for Coordination of Defense having added that as the Jews were “utterly dependent on Britain they must take what they are given.” Elliot hinted, further, that if the Jews did not agree to terms, immigration might be stopped altogether.25 Additional information that reached Weizmann and his associates strengthened their worries. Minister Bullard in Jedda had warned Whitehall that unless Jewish immigration at the “very high mark it has now reached” were stopped, the Arabs would not be favorable or even neutral to HMG should Germany, in “a general conflict,” offer, if successful, not only to cancel the Balfour Declaration, but to eject from Palestine all Jews who had gone there since 1918. Jewish Agency intelligence also knew that Ibn Saud, who had publicly described the Balfour Declaration as Great Britain’s greatest injustice, already judged the conference “a brilliant success” for the Palestinian Arabs in light of the Arab states’ official participation. The interests of HMG and the Arabs were “identical,” he assured Bullard, and “if only the Palestine question could be got out of the way all would be well.” That same desert potentate, considered by MacDonald the most influential Arab leader, had earned the Colonial Secretary’s gratitude for insuring the attendance of all the Arab representatives at the impending talks in London. Further, on January 27, Elliot had conveyed to Dugdale the gist of MacDonald’s January 18 memorandum to the Cabinet. Warning Jews that “the shadow of Hitler would be present at next month’s London Conference on Palestine,” BenGurion concluded in his diary “we will suffer great loss from the talks.”26 Before long, his supposition became fact.

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At 10:30 a.m. on Tuesday, February 7, 1939, in the same royal residence where Great Britain had received the Palestine Mandate from the League of Nations, HMG welcomed the Arab delegation. With full-length paintings of English kings and queens staring down at the proceedings, a formal photograph was taken of the United Kingdom officials at the head table and their guests facing them from three tables arranged in a horse-shoe configuration. Saudi Prince Feisal, cloaked in brown silk with white headcloths ringed with an agal of camel’s hair, stood out among the Egyptians, Palestinians and Transjordanians in their scarlet fezes, the turbaned Yemenis in black and green, and Nuri Sa’id in top hat and frock coat. Flanked by MacDonald, Halifax, and their Under Secretaries, Chamberlain began by welcoming his guests’ cooperation in seeking a “wise settlement” that would “safeguard the rights and position of the Arabs in Palestine.” He paid particular tribute to Jewish “discipline and restraint” during “a period of extreme difficulty and danger in Palestine.” Remarking that it was “the task of statesmanship” when faced by what might appear to be a deadlock between two peoples to achieve “a compromise on the basis of justice,” he appealed for concentration on present realities, giving due weight to all essential facts and endeavoring to appreciate each other’s point of view in discussions that were to be “full, frank, and free.” In reply, Prince Abdul Moneim of Egypt and Prince Seif al-Islam Hussein of Yemen expressed their governments’ appreciation for taking part in arriving at a solution that might “bring peace and prosperity” to Palestine.27 At midday, the Jewish Agency delegation entered by a separate court so as to avoid contact with the Arabs, the conferees were photographed seated in the same table arrangement, and Chamberlain addressed the group. Welcoming the Agency Executive members and others from Palestine, South Africa, the United States, and many European countries “as a representative gathering of all Jews who are interested in the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine,” the Prime Minister reiterated his praise of the Agency’s official policy of restraint during the Arab rebellion and his emphasis on statesmanship as the best hope of resolving “our present problem.” Noting that peace in Palestine, always the Jews’ aspiration, was compatible with the maintenance of their fundamental rights, Weizmann went on to stress in reply that Jews worldwide, in “a dark hour in our history,” centered their prayers — 626 —

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and hopes with “unshaken confidence in British good faith” on these deliberations. Ben-Zvi, reviewing how the remnant of Israel had clung to the Promised Land in spite of repeated destructions, declared that the yishuv would continue its work of reconstruction while preserving peace and justice in that country. Wise echoed the hopes of American Zionists, while Lord Reading, speaking as an independent British nonZionist, expressed his wish to work toward arriving at a settlement “just to the Jews, fair to the Arabs, and worthy of Great Britain.”28 The next day, Weizmann spent two hours advancing the Jewish case. The homeless Jews had preserved their identity by never abandoning their claim to the Holy Land, he began. In every age they returned to Zion; impressive resettlement there had gone forward during the past sixty years. The Balfour Declaration, “a natural expression of the British conscience” that had been inspired by the Bible, and the mandate recognized these historical facts. The Peel Commission had noted that the Declaration indicated HMG’s realization that a Jewish state might eventually be established in the country. Any relegation of Jews in Palestine to minority status would shake the British Empire to its foundations, for “the purely moral bonds of mutual faith and belief in the security of promises” riveted it together. Territorial bases elsewhere offered little immediate relief, whereas Palestine could absorb hundreds of thousands of refugees. HMG had repeatedly acknowledged that no conflict of promises existed with regard to Western Palestine. An Arab National Government there was “not capable of realization,” since the Jews already formed one-third of the population and were responsible for two-thirds or more of the country’s economic and cultural activity. They did not wish to dominate the Arabs, but would not allow themselves to be dominated. A meeting ground beneficial to both peoples, Weizmann concluded, could only be found on the basis of implementing the mandate fully: large-scale Jewish immigration as determined by the past principle of Palestine’s economic absorptive capacity; active mutual development; and effective safeguards against minority status.29 On February 9, Husseini spoke on behalf of the Palestinian Arabs. His people believed that theirs was a case of “self-evident justice.” In continuous occupation of Palestine for over 1,300 years, they constituted the majority. They had been promised independence by HMG through the McMahon and subsequent pledges “in return for their share of the Allied victory.” Thanks to the “illegal” mandate, the Jews now possessed — 627 —

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one-fifth of the country’s available acres, purchases that had resulted in the steady dispossession of an increasing number of Arab cultivators and in rural congestion. Finding a home for homeless Jews concerned “the whole of the civilized world,” but it was “generally conceded” that Palestine could not provide a solution for “the Jewish problem.” Echoing Haj Amin’s earlier testimony at the Peel Commission hearings, Husseini demanded the recognition of the Arabs’ right to complete independence in their country; the abandonment of the attempt to establish a Jewish National Home in Palestine; abrogation of the mandate, to be replaced by a sovereign Arab state in treaty relations with Britain; and the immediate cessation of all Jewish immigration and of sales of land to Jews. The Arabs were prepared to negotiate in “a conciliatory spirit,” he concluded, the safeguarding of “reasonable” British interests, the necessary guarantee for the right of access to all holy places, and the protection of all legitimate rights belonging to the Jewish and other minorities in the country.30 The next morning, MacDonald and Ben-Gurion crossed swords for the first time. The Palestinian Arabs, declared the Colonial Secretary in presenting the Arab case, had suffered because of the deliberately “vague” Balfour Declaration; their opposition to Zionism, like that of the Arab States, was deep rooted and far embracing. The mandate provided for a safeguard of Arab political and natural rights in Palestine, their country. Not so, Ben-Gurion sharply retorted. The case was not between the Arabs and the Jews, but between the Jews and the “entire non-Jewish world.” Jews were returning to Palestine by their own right, and had been there prior to the present Arab population. Jewry had an ancient historical link to that country; there were 16 million Jews whose “only rightful home” was Palestine. A state had not been given in the mandate because the League of Nations could not compel Jews to go to Palestine, but it was clear that if Zionist immigration and settlement succeeded, then the natural outcome would be a Jewish commonwealth. Restrictions imposed by the mandatory power prevented a Jewish majority until now. The Balfour Declaration and the mandate, fully conscious of the 600,000 Arabs then living in Palestine, limited the protection of the latter to “civil and religious rights.” Since the Arabs had all of Arabia, a Jewish Palestine could not endanger the Arab people. The question was a moral one: were Jews to lose their last hope because of Palestinian Arab violence? The “self-governing institutions in Palestine” — 628 —

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foreseen by the mandate could only be established, he ended, once the primary purpose of establishing a Jewish National Home had been fulfilled. The jousting continued, with MacDonald conceding to Weizmann that Jews had special rights in Palestine according to the mandate, but that did not mean that the whole of Jewry possessed those rights. Moreover, a similar claim could be made on behalf of the Arabs, who had lived in the country for centuries. Did the delegation think that the Jewish National Home must be forced even without Arab consent? They realized, Weizmann replied, that the whole of Jewry could not settle in Palestine. Hence the formula of immigration based on the country’s “economic absorptive capacity” had been accepted by the Agency in 1922, but that did not mean any loss of Jewish rights to Palestine. Yet the mandate also spoke of “suitable conditions,” the Colonial Secretary shot back, and HMG could not admit the capacity formula to be the sole limitation. As to consent, greater development could be accomplished either by bayonets and an army of occupation, which he rejected absolutely on moral and political grounds, or by Arab consent. The second policy must be pursued, MacDonald asserted—in effect rendering the Balfour Declaration inoperative.31 MacDonald’s leanings became clear in his initial meetings with the Arab delegation. While replying to Husseini on February 10 that HMG was honor bound to recognize the Balfour Declaration and the mandate, he frankly agreed that Britain’s wartime promises made to the Palestinian Arabs had not always been emphasized sufficiently. Jewish development had benefited the Arab population, MacDonald insisted, but the government understood its fear of “eventual political domination by an alien people” if Jewish immigration had no definite limit. One of the goals of the conference would be to insure that there should be “no domination” of Arabs by Jews in that country. Although HMG continued to believe that the McMahon correspondence excluded Palestine in the general pledge given to Sharif Hussein for Arab sovereignty, it would publish a translation of all of the relevant documents forthwith, as the delegation requested. His energetic effort to settle the dispute between the Haj Amin and Nashashibi factions finally bore fruit. The claims of a united Palestinian group met with full support three days later from the Iraqi Prime Minister, who demanded that Palestine enjoy Arab self-government without further delay, as per the McMahon — 629 —

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pledge. The Jordanian and Yemeni representatives echoed these sentiments; the Egyptian delegate followed suit.32 The Jewish delegation resumed its rebuttal on February 13. Wise recalled President Wilson’s support for the Balfour Declaration and eventual Jewish statehood, Feisal’s pro-Zionist letter of 1919 to Frankfurter, and the continued interest of the United States in Zionism. Shertok gave a detailed analysis of the immigration needs of the flourishing yishuv, which would meet any restriction with “a very strong revulsion of feeling.” Weizmann forcefully refuted MacDonald’s earlier assertion that the wartime British Cabinet had been ignorant of the nature of Palestine, and stressed that an Arab revolt, which HMG should have forcefully suppressed, had attempted to destroy the Zionist achievement by terrorism. Evidently, he declared, it was a matter of Providence that the country should have remained desolate throughout the generations until the Jews returned to restore it into “a flourishing garden.” The Balfour Declaration was really a continuation of what God gave to Abraham. As for consent, England did not base its present rule of India on that principle. Palestine was never an Arab country. The Jews would not allow themselves to be treated like the Assyrians killed and displaced in Iraq, and an Arab state—unlike a Jewish state—would have to rely on British bayonets. The Jews were perfectly willing to sit down with the Arabs. “Can we go on as we have done,” Weizmann queried, “trusting in the plighted word of a great Empire?” MacDonald replied at once. Shertok’s speech about the yishuv’s needs should be borne in mind, but the Arabs were to be considered also. Weizmann convincingly “demolished” his argument regarding the Cabinet’s awareness of Palestine’s reality in 1917, yet the rapid increase of the Arab population to date presented an unforeseen factor. The Colonial Secretary had not heard of the Feisal-Frankfurter exchange of correspondence. Any “fair-minded person” had to be impressed with the actual depth of Arab feeling. He personally believed that the conflict “is not between right and wrong but between right and right.” HMG had not decided to establish an Arab state in Palestine; on the other hand, MacDonald could not say that they had decided the opposite. As to Palestine’s strategic aspects, that would be discussed with them the following afternoon.33 Imperial defense required the cooperation of the Arabs in the Middle East, MacDonald asserted to the Jewish delegation on February 14. — 630 —

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Given Arab hostility over Palestine—in certain circumstances the “Achilles heel” of the British Empire—vital air routes, the Suez Canal, the central naval base in Alexandria, lines of communication to India and the Far East, and the pipeline could not be jeopardized in time of serious emergency. Weizmann responded that Egypt and Iraq would remain faithful to England, while Shertok focused on the “unlimited devotion” that an armed and scientifically advanced yishuv could provide in any serious emergency. In Ben-Gurion’s view, the basic interests of each Arab State, not the Palestine question, would determine their particular stand in the event of war; the Arab governments, moreover, quarreled among themselves. At the moment, MacDonald countered, the Palestine question had inflamed the Arab states for the past two years, and active anti-British propaganda had swayed public opinion there. Valuable as Jewish assistance would be, he did not think that it would make up for the lack of vital support from the Arab and Muslim world. Halifax, formerly Viceroy of India, recalled that while he had to admit Gandhi’s claim in what was apparently the same clash between “administrative necessity” and “spiritual rights,” he had successfully pleaded the former. Accordingly, he suggested that the Jews, whose fate was closely bound with England’s rise or fall, voluntarily “dispose” of their rights by offering terms of conciliation.34 MacDonald further revealed his position to the Jewish delegation the next evening when raising the issue of future immigration into Palestine. After quietly listening to the pleas on this score of Palestine Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi Isaac Herzog, Rabbi Moshe Blau of the ultraOrthodox Agudas Israel, and the author Sholem Asch, he put forward the harsher January plan without having consulted the Cabinet. Emphasizing that it was his own suggestion, MacDonald proposed that the Jews constitute a certain percentage of Palestine’s total population after ten years that would definitely maintain their minority position, an Arab veto to decide the matter subsequently. The numerical percentage need not be a permanent status, he emphasized, since the veto provision might spur the Zionists to work for Arab goodwill in order to gain their agreement to further immigration into Palestine and perhaps entry into Transjordan. Ending the Arab fear of domination, the policy might obtain Arab consent, which was in the Jews’ best interest. A shaken Weizmann replied briefly that Arab agreement consigned Jews to an untenable position, but Ben-Gurion firmly picked up the — 631 —

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gauntlet. At least 90 percent of the yishuv would never accept this permanent status, which would have them live in “bondage” as they did everywhere else in the world, he postulated. The Jews felt a deep attachment to Great Britain, but even stronger was the faith in their redemption in their ancient homeland. He, like many others, had not defied a restrictive Turkish immigration policy or plowed a remote village in the Galilee with a rifle on his shoulder for defense, just as his eighteen-yearold son now did, in order to turn Eretz Yisrael into “a new exile” at the mercy of those waging a murderous war against the Zionist enterprise. MacDonald riposted that the Jewish minority might be under British mandate, in a Palestine commonwealth with a constitution on the basis of parity giving the Jews complete security, or in a partitioned Jewish area with a large measure of autonomy. Namier sped to reply, observing that the same minority conditions could be accorded the Palestinian Arabs in order to allay their anxieties about Jewish domination. The mandate, he added, could not remain forever. Regaining assurance, Weizmann noted that while the Jews wanted peace, “why have the Arabs not come to the table?” Their continued absence made him fear that MacDonald’s hopes of peace were built on sand. When the Colonial Secretary confessed that the Arab delegation was adamantly calling for a complete stop to Jewish immigration and for an Arab state, Ben-Gurion declared that only British force could secure those ends. If HMG withdrew, MacDonald answered, a bloody civil war would ensue, the results of which could not be foreseen. Before adjourning, he suggested that mandatory control should continue regarding the constitutional question, with new government organs to be created on the basis of Arab-Jewish parity. As to land sales, the British authorities should be given power to restrict Jewish purchase from Arabs in some areas and to prohibit sales in others. At the conclusion, Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs R. A. Butler privately told Shertok that he well understood that there could be no talk of a Jewish minority in an Arab state. Uncertain about this comment, Shertok wrote in his diary: “We dispersed with the feeling that we had been placed face to face with a new political reality. The dangers that we previously envisioned had materialized.”35 Chamberlain and MacDonald met at 10 Downing St. with Weizmann, Ben-Gurion, and Wise on the morning of February 16. Stating that the delegation was prepared to negotiate with the Arabs but not to accept — 632 —

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their veto or land sale restrictions, Weizmann offered to work on a development scheme that would help Jew and Arab by removing poverty— one of the main causes of unrest. Studiously avoiding this proposal, the Prime Minister, indicating that he, like his father, had great sympathy for Zionist work, suggested in turn that some measure of appeasement by the Jews would much improve chances of future progress. Wise noted the overwhelming support of American Jews and his country’s nonconformist churches for Zionism, and reiterated the delegation’s anxiety concerning land restrictions. We may have to continue criticizing the Palestine administration severely, Ben-Gurion followed, but a self-confident yishuv would stand united behind HMG in case of war. As to the future, although an agreement with the Arabs seemed very doubtful now, a strong Jewish Palestine would also contribute largely to peace and security in the neighboring Arab countries. Weizmann added that Alexandretta had been torn away from Syria in 1938 by the Turks without much Arab protest; powerful external forces fomented trouble in Palestine. He knew this, remarked Chamberlain, and hoped that better times would come in which all could get on with constructive work. A “decent man,” Ben-Gurion thought, who would not defend us in the Cabinet more than Malcolm—”a broken reed,” from whom there was “practically nothing to be hoped.”36 MacDonald’s revelations in a meeting with the Arabs the same day corroborated Ben-Gurion’s judgment. HMG thought the immediate creation of an Arab state questionable, the Colonial Secretary informed the delegation, particularly as recent events had shaken the confidence of those world powers interested in Palestine affairs about the ability of an Arab government to guarantee Jewish security. At the same time, London thought of announcing publicly that any part of Palestine should not become a Jewish commonwealth and that self-governing institutions should be begun. Husseini insisted, however, that primary responsibility for Arab uprisings in Palestine rested on the wrongs of government policy; if Arab demands were met, they could put an immediate end to the revolt. The Arabs were usually peaceful, and would guarantee to any Jews who wanted to remain the same status as others. Antonius, author of the 1938 pioneering work The Arab Awakening, serving now as the delegation’s secretary, pressed that in any country the majority prevailed. Abd al-Hadi remarked that they had been offered better terms in the Legislative Council plan of 1922 than those — 633 —

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suggested now. HMG, MacDonald responded, accepted the principle not only that no Jewish state should be established, but that the mandate should not last forever and that the government contemplated an independent Palestinian state for the first time. Only guaranteeing the rights to minorities remained an obstacle to reaching this end.37 The representatives from Iraq, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia sought a solution even before the full delegation’s next official meeting, sitting down informally with MacDonald on February 17. Fuad Hamza proposed the immediate declaration of an independent Palestine, with safeguards provided to Jews and future immigration justified on humanitarian grounds as the country’s contribution to the refugee problem. MacDonald did not accept the Saudi’s analogy of Egypt and Iraq reserving certain powers to HMG, since London had obligations to the Jews under the Balfour Declaration; the League of Nations and the United States might also object to any such conference decision. The three delegates agreed, however, that they and the Palestinian Arabs would have “no objection for a long time to come” if a British degree of control, such as the Colonial Secretary suggested, might be required by the “technical necessities of the case.” This would be acceptable even if it took many years to implement the theory in practice, they assured MacDonald, so long as the principle of independence was conceded “straight away.”38 Matters neared a head a short time later when Weizmann, speaking first for his colleagues, rejected MacDonald’s minority status formula and any submission to Arab rule. Seventy-five year old Ussishkin, who had that very same day in 1918 demanded at the Versailles Peace Conference that the nations return the sovereignty the Roman Empire had taken from the Jewish people, spoke at length in Hebrew of Zionism as a vital force in the world. It would be a great injustice, he charged, if the Arabs clung to their vast territories while the Jews, who had such a great cultural tradition, remained homeless. As president of the Jewish National Fund, Ussishkin stressed that the Jews could not agree to “pales of settlement” on the pattern of Czarist Russia. He was not “driving nails,” replied the Colonial Secretary: a British–Jewish– Arab conference might be called to decide on future immigration with full agreement. The Arabs could not be expected to renew Jewish immigration, rejoined Ben-Gurion, who noted the contradiction in MacDonald’s claim that Arabs both threatened the Empire and feared — 634 —

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the Jews. HMG might impose the new policy, he concluded, but the delegation could not accept it.39 At a private meeting the next day, Ben-Gurion asked MacDonald why he proposed what he undoubtedly knew in advance the Zionists could not possibly accept. He really thought that the delegation might agree, the Colonial Secretary answered, because the proposals offered the possibility of entry into Transjordan and peace in Palestine, which would give the Jews immigration and progress in the next few years. If, for argument’s sake, the right of Arab veto were dropped, MacDonald proposed to peg Palestine’s Jewish population at 35 percent for a period of some ten years. That would permit of the entry of 150,000-300,000 Jews. Ben-Gurion wanted a five-year period, but refused any arrangement that involved or implied “a denial of our fundamental rights.” He advanced three alternatives for a possible settlement: a Jewish state covering the whole of Palestine as part of a Jewish-Arab Federation, the ideal solution but not practical at present; Palestine’s partition into a Jewish state and an Arab state; a temporary settlement, to last five years, admitting a specified number of immigrants with no Arab veto. MacDonald favored the first, although admittedly impractical now, and suggested that partition could give the Jews a part of Transjordan. Still, he returned to the fact that the Palestinian Arabs persisted in their demand for immediate statehood. If the conference failed, he cautioned, it seemed that the government would have to impose its policy.40 The Arab delegation presented a united front to MacDonald on February 20, Egypt’s Ali Maher urging on behalf of the Arab States an “immediate, clear-cut and final” answer for the Palestine problem. If Muslim and Arab friendship was essential to the great democracy on whose strength world Jewry so greatly depended, he argued, then sovereignty for Palestine’s Arabs should be granted, providing full, immediate guarantees for the rights of the Jews in the country and safeguards for HMG’s vital interests. HMG questioned the demand for a complete stoppage of Jewish immigration, MacDonald replied. The Jewish settlement had not yet fully developed; Palestine could absorb more immigrants; both the Peel and Woodhead Commissions agreed that halting Jewish entry would harm the country’s financial and economic system; and the “great seriousness” of the Jewish refugee problem had to be taken into account. The Jews had not helped Palestine’s economy, Husseini countered, claiming that all but two of the colonies they had established — 635 —

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since the world war were bankrupt. As to the refugee issue, if all the free countries would only accept a comparatively small number of Jews, the problem would be solved. The reply drove MacDonald to lose his patience, calling Husseini’s statement both “uncompromising in matter and still more uncompromising in tone.”41 MacDonald fared no better with the Jews during what Shertok later termed “a long and tiring” encounter that evening. Weizmann again rejected the Colonial Secretary’s proposals regarding immigration and land sales, arguing that there could be no Jewish National Home without people or land. He “would rather die than give in.” The Jews were prepared to negotiate about all economic matters, Ben-Gurion remarked, but the League of Nations had already decided the political question when approving the mandate. MacDonald again spoke of the need to establish peace in Palestine and of the impossibility of breaking Arab opposition through force. Without a firm British policy against Palestinian Arab violence, Weizmann responded, no hope for peace existed. Seeing that there was no point under the circumstances in fixing the next date for discussion, MacDonald announced that the Cabinet would most likely consider matters as they now stood, and at the beginning of the next week he hoped to bring more definite proposals. For Shertok, this and every other meeting placed the Jews in the hands of a chairman who had “a free hand to irritate us and press us to the wall.”42 “It has been a difficult week,” MacDonald informed the Cabinet two days later. Both sides had ruled out his proposals. Halifax had failed in persuading the Jews to issue a statement that they were prepared to accept restricted immigration for a number of years, provided that future entry would be dependent on the consent of the three parties. Consequently, MacDonald argued, some constitutional proposals would now have to be worked out in light of the Arabs’ insistence on an independent state. These were hastily drafted by the Cabinet Committee on Palestine, where Chamberlain announced that he saw no alternative but to proceed with MacDonald’s plan. The Colonial Secretary presented his proposals to an informal meeting on February 23 between the Arab state representatives and some Jewish delegates, stating that Palestinian Arabs and Jews would be appointed to the High Commissioner’s Executive Council, obtaining ministerial status henceforth. Weizmann seemed to agree as long as immigration continued for a long transition period, during which Jews — 636 —

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would eventually achieve a majority. Ben-Gurion objected to any possible minority status in the Council, however, adding that independence could not be implemented against the wish of one of the two peoples. The Arabs insisted on full independence first, with guarantees for minorities to follow. Halifax ended the meeting with a single, highly significant observation: If an agreement would not be reached on the matter generally, it could not be reached on any point in particular.43 Over the weekend, the Jews almost walked out. On Friday, February 24, Elliott informed Dugdale that MacDonald had abandoned his position on parity of representation on the High Commissioner’s Executive Council in favor of a 3:2 ratio in deference to Arab wishes, and also cut the ten-year transition period to five years. The next day, MacDonald told Weizmann, Ben-Gurion, and Shertok that HMG would limit immigration to 10,000 per annum in the five-year period and 10,000 refugee children in the first year, rather than the 150,000-300,000 figures that he had mentioned in previous conversations, since the Arabs had to feel that they had “gained something” from the conference. When Shertok protested that negligible immigration and an Arab veto after five years was “nothing short of a death trap,” MacDonald replied frankly that public opinion would oppose the Jews, thinking that the promises given them were impossible to fulfill and that British lives and money could not be hazarded indefinitely. On February 26, Jewish Agency headquarters received HMG’s minutes of their last meeting, along with the government’s written proposal in the form of an official document. The Arab press in Palestine, having been leaked this information after the Arab delegation received a copy, crowed that an Arab state would be created after five years. “The Arabs have won!” joyfully shouted children in the Old City quarter of Tiberias; the Va’ad HaLeumi defiantly asserted that “there will not be a Jewish ghetto in Eretz Yisrael.” “The precedent of Munich is almost certain to be followed,” a gloomy Wise wrote home, “and we are to play the role of the Czechs.” “It is a complete sell-out,” concluded Dugdale in her diary.44 Hearing that the Jewish delegation intended to break off negotiations, MacDonald rushed to Weizmann’s apartment the same evening to explain that the proposal received by the Jewish Agency had been sent by clerical error, and that the plans therein were open to further negotiation. On February 27, Weizmann read the delegation’s letter rejecting HMG’s suggestions, stating that “no settlement can be considered that — 637 —

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would place the Jewish National Home under Arab rule, or condemn the Jews to a minority life in Palestine.” MacDonald reiterated that HMG intended to set up “an Arab-Jewish state,” and Halifax remarked that if the Jews withdrew, England’s hands would be weakened. Trying still to reach some settlement, MacDonald pledged to the delegation the next day that his draft proposals presented to the Arabs would acknowledge Jewish rights as prescribed by the mandate, as well as the principle of non-denomination. He also suggested that a new conference, rather than an Arab veto, decide the immigration issue after the five-year immigration period ended. Weizmann announced that there was no point in more discussions unless the government clarified its position, and the Americans had resolved to return home. He fully appreciated the circumstances, MacDonald said, and the meeting concluded without a further meeting being set.45 MacDonald’s concessions failed to sway the Palestinian Arabs, however. Speaking on March 1 for the majority, Husseini could only envision his people’s “bitter expressions and howls of disappointment” over the need for another conference, particularly as the Jews had always succeeded in “upsetting the equilibrium.” In his opinion, the present conference was competent to lay down the outlines of independence on the Iraqi model, including the creation of a provisional government to act under a High Commissioner for three years (not five), and halting immigration and land sales to the Jews forthwith. An elected assembly, set up after the transition period, would then discuss a constitution and guarantees. The British had made “an immense concession” regarding the constitutional question, MacDonald objected, giving the people of Palestine the gift of freedom. In addition, the Arab plan ignored the Jewish National Home. If an early settlement by agreement were not possible, the Colonial Secretary concluded, a unilateral announcement of policy by HMG would follow.46 Hearing from MacDonald of his limited success with both sides, the Cabinet gave its general approval on March 2 to his plan for recognizing “an independent Palestine State in due course.” U.S. Ambassador Kennedy had just told Chamberlain that Roosevelt “would not interfere against anything” that HMG chose to do. That afternoon, MacDonald stressed to the Arabs that HMG’s promise of sovereignty and strict curtailment of Jewish entry and land sales signaled a “decided change” in Great Britain’s Palestine policy. A copy of this protocol reached — 638 —

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Ben-Gurion shortly before he, Weizmann, and Wise met Chamberlain, MacDonald, and Butler.47 After Weizmann indicated that the Jewish delegation would be obliged to depart if the basis of the talks were not altered, the Prime Minister said that there was “no question” of an Arab state being created. The government had always intended that proper safeguards should be devised, and it would surely be better to discuss these together than to regard the battle as lost. Pressed by his guests, Chamberlain admitted that HMG had made an offer to the Arabs of an independent Palestine state on condition that certain guarantees were given. To MacDonald’s comment that the government might soon make a statement committing itself to this solution, Weizmann remarked: “You are committed to yourselves.” London was prepared to consider any suggestions put forward, Chamberlain concluded the interview, and he again appealed against the breaking off of the negotiations.48 MacDonald’s proposals regarding the transition period got nowhere with the Palestinian Arabs. Rather than a communal basis given to the Jews, which would result in complete deadlock, Egyptian minister in Baghdad and Jedda Abdul Rahman Azzam Bey thought of finding some guidance in the analogy of the papacy’s Vatican enclave. Even if all the Arabs were removed, he added, the Jewish National Home could not be anything but “a symbol.” The Jews claimed “more than their fair share” in Palestine, the Colonial Secretary observed, because “this was in the nature of the Jewish people”; “if they were to be brought to a normal frame of mind, it was essential that their ‘minority complex’ could be removed.” Antonius demurred: The Jews were “asking for the moon” in demanding rights beyond those of an ordinary minority; Palestinian Arabs had never recognized the mandate, and they had not come to bargain. For Husseini, “the Jew was aggressive by nature, and it was the Arabs who need protection.” If HMG ceased treating the Jews as “spoiled children,” all would be well; there was “no difficulty” with the Jewish communities in Egypt, Iraq, and India. It would be better, Husseini asserted, for the Palestinians to go back home with no agreement at all.49 The Jews continued to refuse negotiations on the basis of minority status within a sovereign Palestine. On March 6, Shertok advanced, as an alternative, that the principles laid down by the Peel Commission be implemented. MacDonald stood his ground, insisting that not progressing to a Palestine state ran counter to the mandate, which was a — 639 —

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dynamic instrument. Weizmann responded immediately: “I agree that the mandate should be dynamised. What I don’t agree is that it should be dynamited!” The Jews had put forward parity and were prepared to consider possibilities of partition, he averred, but HMG had rejected these as unacceptable to the Arabs. You are a powerful force in Palestine, the Colonial Secretary retorted; the Arabs themselves complain that the Jews are able to hinder their independence. Eventually, Shertok replied, HMG would declare an independent Palestine impossible to realize, as it had declared the mandate unworkable and the Peel plan impractical. The comment angered MacDonald, and the meeting ended without a date fixed for continued deliberation.50 The same day, MacDonald presented to the Cabinet Committee on Palestine his plan of allowing the entry of 75,000-100,000 Jews in the next five years, with an Arab veto thereafter. The McMahon correspondence excluded Palestine, opined the Lord Chancellor, Lord Maugham, but the recently uncovered Hogarth message of 1918 to Sharif Hussein, pledging that no people be subject to another in Palestine, implied that the Balfour Declaration did not mean a Jewish state. Halifax followed at length: The Jews, who had been “extremely unreasonable” during the last few days, should be told that whatever else we had meant by that Declaration, “we had not meant to smash up the British Empire for their benefit.” If the Jews looked around the world, they would see that on the whole the British were “the only great Power who were really their friends.” Chamberlain expressed his “considerable sympathy” for the Jews, but thought that a veto on immigration after the initial period was “inevitable.” As to the United States, the Prime Minister noted, a very powerful anti-German sentiment already existed there, and he did not believe that Washington would contemplate for a moment the possibility of assuming the mandate. Unanimously, the group approved MacDonald’s immigration plan.51 Before drawing up final proposals, MacDonald arranged a second informal meeting between the Jewish delegation and the Arab State representatives for the evening of March 7. Weizmann began by stressing mutual non-domination in the future regime and expansion of the Jewish National Home through immigration. Ben-Gurion, whose colleagues had just voted against his idea for immediately breaking off negotiations, next asserted that the yishuv would hold its own by virtue of its own strength. If the Arabs recognized the Jews’ right to — 640 —

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immigrate, a basis for peace existed. He appreciated the “very exalted ideal” of Zionism, Ali Maher countered, but Palestine belonged to the Arabs and the country was populated enough. The Arab population was a reality, Shertok agreed, but of no less import was the Zionist return; the Jews would not be repulsed. Ben-Gurion offered his idea of Jewish sovereignty in Western Palestine within an Arab Federation. To Ali Maher’s comment that the Jews had committed a great sin in not accepting Britain’s earlier offer of Uganda, Weizmann related his talk with Balfour in 1906 about the Jews’ historic attachment to Jerusalem. Finally, Ali Maher asked the Jewish delegates to proclaim a halt, or at least a limit, to immigration “for the sake of peace.” The British officials present, although silent, appeared to agree. “All at once a heavy atmosphere engulfed the room,” Shertok later wrote. Ben-Gurion rose to the challenge, pointing out that the Jews had not disturbed the peace in Palestine, and that its resumption depended on others. The appeal to halt Zionist work for a time, he said, could be compared to asking a woman in labor, after having been barren for many years, to stop birth. Weizmann, however, thanked Ali Maher for the appeal, and announced that the Jews were ready for negotiations. Some 50,000-60,000 persons could enter Palestine each year. “If it is suggested that we make an agreement and slow down a bit,” so Ben-Gurion recalled Weizmann’s words, “we can find a common basis.” (Shertok’s notes had Weizmann declare that the decision should be postponed; Ali Maher would come to see what the Jews had done in Palestine, and then mediate between the parties. “Perhaps we had been too hasty in the past. For the sake of agreement we shall be ready to slow down our immigration.”) “When I heard this I thought that my hair was turning white,” reads Shertok’s diary. “I felt as though an abyss had opened at our feet.” Pouncing on Weizmann’s phrase to “slow down immigration,” MacDonald welcomed the apparent common ground upon which a discussion should continue the next evening. Yet Ben-Gurion quickly interjected that the Jews were prepared for a “give-and-take” negotiation; slowing down could not be discussed. With great dissatisfaction, MacDonald announced that they would continue the talks tomorrow. A curt exchange ensued: Ben-Gurion: “Will it also be possible in continuing the discussion to put speeding up on the agenda?” — 641 —

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MacDonald: “No!” Ben-Gurion: “Why?” MacDonald: “Because on the basis of speeding up there will be no agreement.” Ben-Gurion: “I’m afraid that on the basis of slowing down there won’t be an agreement.” When a member of the British delegation remarked that sacrifices had to be made for the sake of peace, Ben-Gurion retorted that those who had disturbed the peace should put an end to the bloodshed. Halifax suggested that the question of “war blame” be set aside, to which Shertok noted that concessions by one of the parties only were not feasible. Any last hope of Arab-Jewish compromise at the St. James Conference thus vanished.52 The discussions were coming “to the end of their tether,” MacDonald told the Cabinet the next day. Both the Jews and the Palestinian Arabs had proved “very difficult.” Ali Maher’s “excellent statement” in yesterday’s joint two-hour meeting had drawn different reactions from Weizmann and Ben-Gurion, but both opposed an Arab veto on immigration after the transition period. The Arab delegates, divided over the veto issue, had suggested that 50,000 Jews come in the next five years. MacDonald wanted 100,000, certainly not less than 80,000, with an Arab veto after that interval. At the same time, a Palestinian state was dependent on Jewish consent, thereby offering the hope that both sides would arrive at a compromise. Halifax strongly endorsed his colleague’s argument. Elliott alone objected, but the Colonial Secretary argued that rejection of the plan would cause “serious difficulties” with Ibn Saud and the other Arab governments. Aware that Gandhi had just endorsed Palestine for the Arabs, the Secretary for India also pointed to trouble with the Indian Muslims on this score. Reluctantly, Chamberlain concluded that it was impossible to get a “better bargain” for the Jews. If some outbreak of anti-British feeling occurred in the United States as a result, he thought it better that this should happen now, rather than at a time of “acute international crisis.”53 The Jewish delegation, as expected, rejected MacDonald’s plan. On March 9, Weizmann stressed that the Balfour Declaration was “the governing document,” not the Hogarth statement, while Shertok made it clear that on no account would the Jews agree to artificial restric— 642 —

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tions on their attaining a majority. MacDonald insisted that the position remained “fluid.” He took issue with Weizmann’s formal letter of March 10 against the pro-Arab concessions, repeating the next day that HMG would provide guarantees and constitutional safeguards. When Ben-Gurion and Shertok stood firm, he accused them of “clinging to Britain’s skirt-tails.” The Jews were already in a position to oppose all arrangements in Palestine, MacDonald angrily declared, and would never make a real effort at compromise with the Arabs as long as they had the government behind them and no Arab veto on immigration existed. Without the new policy, HMG would be left with a continuous Palestinian Arab Revolt, which the nearby states would join, bringing disasters to Jews living there and losses to Great Britain, in turn sparking the growth of antisemitism in England. Since during the transition period the Jews had it in their power to avert Arab independence and the Arabs to stop Jewish immigration, he argued, any advance in the two directions could only be achieved by mutual consent. A federal state offering independence to both peoples might result. The plan was fraught with unavoidable dangers, MacDonald ended, but HMG thought this the best way out.54 The Jewish case got no further with MacDonald or with Chamberlain. In meeting with the group on March 12, the Colonial Secretary adhered to his earlier position, and insisted that the Arabs were required to make a major concession in giving up freedom of administration although constituting a numerical majority. He also rejected the delegation’s counter-proposals of a Jewish state in part of Palestine or committing HMG at the outset to an Arab Federation. The principle at stake, he asserted, was peace. The Prime Minister received a parliamentary delegation the next day, where Amery urged that the government, pledged to fulfill the mandate, not hamper the Zionist effort. Cazalet, who had heard Antonius say that “a section of Jews” would have to leave Palestine after independence was granted, dwelt on the country’s possibilities to meet the Jews’ terrible stress. On behalf of the Labour Party opposition, Tom Williams warned against adopting an immigration and land policy that would doom the Jewish National Home to annihilation. Speaking last, Wedgwood demanded the reestablishment of law and order, pointed to the corrupt Palestine administration, and identified the yishuv’s interests with those of the Empire. Replying briefly, Chamberlain said that the government did not intend to im— 643 —

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pose domination of the Arab majority on the Jews, and that it had not yet bound itself to any course of action.55 On March 13, MacDonald suggested to the Cabinet Committee on Palestine a Jewish immigration of 80,000, but his colleagues accepted Halifax’s position that a settlement should not break down on a dispute with the Arabs over numbers. Given some power of maneuver by the Committee, the Colonial Secretary asserted to the Arab states the same day that after the entry in the next five years of 50,000 Jews and an “additional allowance” for refugees, an Arab veto thereafter should induce the Jews to cooperate. Fuad Hamza, who three days earlier had suggested to MacDonald a maximum of 75,000 to show HMG’s willingness to meet the Palestinian Arabs’ point of view, asked that the proposal include an official commitment to stopping illegal immigration. Ali Maher wanted it understood that if the new administration worked satisfactorily, the ten-year period to independence could be shortened. MacDonald assented to both points.56 Offering his “last word” to MacDonald in a private interview the next afternoon, a bitter Weizmann charged the government with betraying the Jews. It would have been better for HMG to “reveal its cards” from the beginning, he charged, rather than go through the “tiresome” negotiations. The Jews had been abandoned to the Arabs, and the responsibility for the bloodshed to follow would be on the heads of Zionism’s opponents. MacDonald sought to explain that the line taken by Shertok and Ben-Gurion, as well as the fact that the Arabs had also relied on Britain’s word, convinced him to advance his final proposals. It was “utterly wrong,” Weizmann replied, that the government should be both the party and the judge in this dispute. He would resign his WZO presidency, and disappear from the picture. He had long relied on Britain’s pledge and support, but now all that was over. They were entering “a new epoch in Jewish history,” Weizmann observed. He had one final request, to see the Prime Minister alone the same day. MacDonald gladly agreed to arrange this.57 Seated in Chamberlain’s room in the House of Commons, Weizmann said that he had come to take his leave. He did not understand HMG’s decision, which affected him both privately and publicly. This ended his cooperation with the government. Expressing his regret, Chamberlain said that his advisers had put the matter to him in such a way that “blocked all the arguments against it.” No promise could be given — 644 —

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regarding the Arab veto on immigration, which might or might not become a reality. He did not blame Weizmann, and would understand if the Jews did not cooperate. The reverse of Chamberlain’s desire for peace would take place, answered Weizmann. The Jews were prepared for concessions, but HMG, turning its back on them, had reneged on its earlier promise of a Jewish commonwealth. His host replied: Weizmann knew full well my family’s tradition regarding the Jews, and I would be happy if I could hand over the whole of Palestine to you as a Jewish state. This was “a multifold tragedy,” remarked Weizmann, in that it was Chamberlain who served as an instrument to put a stop to the work of twenty years. Chamberlain ended the tete-à-tete by stating that he had always admired “the courage and restraint” that the Jews had shown, and he was sorry indeed to part in that way.58 On March 15, the Cabinet approved MacDonald’s proposals with some modification, and he presented them first to the Arab delegation. Fuad Hamza had informed MacDonald one day earlier that the Palestinian Arab representatives would accept a figure of 60,000 in the next five years, from which 40,000 Jewish illegal arrivals (according to MacMichael’s information) had to be deducted. Yet the Palestinians held to their recalcitrance. Although the ratio on the Executive Council had now shifted to 2:1 in the Palestinians’ favor, Husseini declared that HMG’s final plan appeared the same as the one given them ten days ago. They hoped that in time the British public might come to recognize the strength of the Arab case. Answering Antonius, MacDonald said that HMG did not contemplate full Arab independence within a specific period. In matters such as local government, he explained, it was not equitable for the Jews to be subject to Arab interference when they were a majority in some areas of the country. A National Assembly in Palestine, he added, would eventually discuss future policy. Of the 75,000 Jews to be permitted, one-third could enter as soon as the High Commissioner was satisfied that provision had been made for their maintenance. A key difference did exist from his earlier plan, the Colonial Secretary emphasized: after five years had passed, Arab consent would be required for Jewish immigration.59 Soon thereafter, MacDonald announced to the Jewish delegation that HMG thought the proposals, which were final, the “most equitable” policy that could be adopted not only from England’s point of view, but also from the Jews’ own. The government had to make its reckoning for — 645 —

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years ahead and the generations to come, and it strongly believed that the scheme would establish peace in the long run. If the proposals were not accepted as a basis for agreement, and the government did believe that the Jews and the Arabs would reject them, London would then impose its policy with certain likely amendments. MacDonald proceeded to read the text, outlining the plan for a Palestinian state, possibly of a federal nature; a National Assembly (clearly having an Arab majority) to draft the constitution with safeguards for the Jewish National Home and British interests; added representation on the Executive Council and elections for a Legislative Council; 75,000 Jewish immigrants over the next five years at a rate of 10,000 annually plus 25,000 refugees—dependent on the country’s economic absorptive capacity, with an Arab veto thereafter; strict enforcement against illegal immigration; and regulation or prohibition of land sales as determined by the High Commissioner. Although in Shertok’s eyes the delegation had entered the room like a vanquished state summoned to hear the judgment of a “lethal” peace, he had repeated to himself throughout the conference the British saying “in defeat—defiance!” As far as we were concerned, he now declared to MacDonald, the debate had ended. Asked when the final decisions would be published, the Colonial Secretary replied that the matter depended on the trend of further negotiations, if there should be any. Since the Arabs had already informed him that they would give their final answer on March 17, it could not be envisaged that publication would come before the beginning of next week. Meanwhile, however, the plan would have to be treated as confidential. With this, a silence descended on the room for some time. Finally, MacDonald and Halifax stood up and the meeting came to a close.60 “Are we going to the Last Supper?” Shertok asked MacDonald, as the conferees headed to the tea table nearby. MacDonald either missed or ignored the reference to Judas Iscariot’s act of betrayal, and said that he hoped the Jews would still come for a discussion. When Shertok noted the symbolically joined circumstance that HMG handed a judgment that ended the Jewish National Home on the very day that Hitler entered Prague in violation of his Munich pledge and destroyed the Czech state, MacDonald answered heatedly that the yishuv was already powerful, and he thought that Palestine’s Jews would reach 600,000 within five years. We approach the issue from the perspective of the Jewish people not in — 646 —

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Eretz Yisrael, Shertok countered, and since we have no hope of bringing there the seventeen million Jews worldwide, we must bring in all those for whom there is room. Unlike the Czechs, a nation crystallized and rooted in its land even if Hitler would conquer the country, the Jews were forced to fight. If the Jews did not concentrate in Palestine, he added, they would be lost. Hearing music that moment from Buckingham and St. James Palaces, Shertok wondered aloud: “Is this a funeral march for our funeral?” MacDonald responded: “Your funeral? It is my funeral.” The two men parted after agreeing that MacDonald’s statement for the press would indicate that HMG had transmitted to the Jewish delegation its final proposals, and that it was unclear if another meeting would take place.61 Sir Horace Rumbold, former Vice-Chairman of the Peel Commission, was equally bitter at Chamberlain’s appeasement policy. His own warnings of six years earlier, when as HMG’s ambassador to Germany he warned of Hitler’s uncompromising antisemitism and commitment to territorial expansion, had been ignored. “Add to this the cowardice and folly of the Government in the Palestine question and the cup is full,” he wrote to his son on March 15. In a most depressed mood, Rumbold predicted correctly in a letter to Churchill that the “northern gangster” (Hitler) may go for Memel next and “his fellow brigand in the south” (Mussolini) will try for Albania. “There is no doubt that what the Arabs would call the ‘father of appeasement’ [Chamberlain] was outwitted and followed by the “father of lies or treachery’ i.e. Hitler at Munich,” the retired career diplomat went on, and Britain’s ambassador at Berlin should be recalled on indefinite leave, as the Americans had done. Churchill replied: “It seems to me that Hitler will not stop short of the Black Sea unless arrested by the threat of a general war, or by actual hostilities.”62 Gathering on the afternoon of March 16, the Jewish delegation unanimously agreed that it could not accept HMG’s proposals as a basis for agreement, and would therefore dissolve. Weizmann then delivered the closing speech, thanking all for having worked faithfully and in full collaboration throughout, a true sign of what the Palestine ideal had wrought in Jewish life and of its unifying force. Twenty years ago, he declared, the world had desired to mete out “a small measure of justice” to the Jews with the Balfour Declaration, but that effort had “lost its power.” We need not be ashamed of our achievements in Palestine; given present world conditions, were it not for that we would be “obliterated — 647 —

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from the face of the earth.” Zionist work would be carried on with greater force than hitherto. Apart from the tragic side of the negotiations, the Jews had drawn closer in some measure to the Arab states. The greatest responsibility now rested on the Palestinian Jewish delegates, who had to guard “the iron discipline, courage and high moral level” that the yishuv had revealed during those terrible past years. The Jews always had their “ups and downs” in history; they would “find their way to freedom.” The ultra-Orthodox faith of the non-Zionist Agudas Israel members rested on a sublime declaration that existed for every one of them; it was tied up with our destiny, which “would be fulfilled!” All then rose and sang the Zionist anthem HaTikva, some unable to hold back their tears, and the group dispersed.63 Ben-Gurion conveyed his own conclusions in a long letter home. The final plan would only increase the differences between Arab and Jew. Reversing the Peel Commission’s recommendation, the government now enabled each side to interfere with the other’s objectives. He could not imagine a more “wicked, sinful and shortsighted” policy, which certainly would not last long. They had received a “hard, almost mortal blow,” Ben-Gurion continued to his wife, but no foundation existed for despair and weakness. They would have troubles, but would overcome them if a world war did not occur in the meantime. Still, the “war” during the conference in the last six weeks was not entirely for naught. For the first time in the history of Zionism and in that of the Jewish nation after the Roman destruction, they stood in a difficult struggle with a great power, and they did not only present pleas for mercy or demands for justice. They resorted to a new argument: their strength in Eretz Yisrael. When HMG’s representatives realized its truth, they were shocked and filled with anger. Their declaration with inner conviction that an Arab state in Palestine could not be established and the Arabs could not rule there made “their ears ring.” The yishuv delegates’ stance also impressed non-Zionist Lords Reading and Bearsted of the Jewish delegation. They lost this battle, but would win if the yishuv did not panic and weaken and the Jewish people aided them with what was needed for a “hard and drawn out” war, since “the road to victory is still far away.”64 On March 17, shortly after the Jews formally turned down MacDonald’s last proposals, the Arab rejection followed. While the Arab representatives recommended acceptance of the plan, the Palestinians objected particularly because (as Antonius told the press) HMG had — 648 —

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not set a definite time limit on the transition period before full independence. Following a last meeting with the Colonial Secretary, the Palestinians prevailed upon the rest of the delegation. The group had come to London, its public statement began, with “the best motives” of concluding an agreement “satisfactory to our people” and meeting “the vital needs of others.” The “others” included safeguards for the British Empire’s interests and for treating the Jews as “a permanent privileged minority,” whose rights would be guaranteed by HMG and by the Arab states. To have gone further still would have simply meant “abandoning all the rights of the majority in the country in favour of foreigners, who through continued immigration would ultimately become a dominant community.” The “apparent impossibility” of securing the “slightest reduction” of Zionist claims placed, “at any rate for the moment,” an “insuperable obstacle” in the way of agreement. The delegation was convinced that the British “instincts for justice and fair play” must prevail in the long run, and meet Arab expectations “for the good of all concerned and for the sake of enduring peace in Palestine.”65 The problem that MacDonald faced, aptly editorialized the London Times that day, was “either insoluble from the beginning or had been allowed to become so by past weaknesses and indecisions.” It now remained for the government to make “some atonement for past failures” by framing a sound policy of its own for Palestine, the newspaper stressed, preferably on a federal basis within a larger regional federation. Halifax thought otherwise, telling the Cabinet one day after the Germans annexed Memel that the current Palestine impasse arose “through no fault of the Arabs” but through the Jews’ failure to cooperate with the Arabs in the past. Whitehall cabled its Middle East representatives that a White Paper laying forth the ultimate plan might be published around March 23.66 The conference had officially come to an end.

Realizing that their best option now lay in postponing HMG’s announcement of policy, the Zionists pressed their American counterparts to sway Roosevelt. On March 16, soon after retiring from the U.S. Supreme Court, Brandeis wrote to Roosevelt in the hope that a word from the — 649 —

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White House might yet be able to avert “the folly and injustice” of the British proposals. For its part, the British Embassy in Washington quickly informed the State Department the next day that the present plan, although involving a change of policy, would not require an amendment of the mandate. Near Eastern Division chief Wallace Murray agreed, but on March 19 Welles cabled Kennedy to convey “in the right quarter” Roosevelt’s thought that “in view of the international crisis which seems to be shaping up, a short delay in the timing of publication might be of advantage.” The U.S. Ambassador immediately saw MacDonald and Halifax, who agreed to hold it up and to inform State before anything was put into effect. Informing Brandeis of a postponement until next week, Roosevelt wrote that he was trying to put it off still further. The British were very worried, he added, by the German and Italian incursions into the whole “Mohammedan area.”67 Jewish Agency London headquarters, which had some confirmation of Palestinian Arab contacts with Berlin and Rome at Haj Amin’s instructions, resolved to pursue additional lines of action. Weizmann would see Ali Maher in Egypt and Iraqi delegate Tewfiq as-Suwaidi, who privately gave Norman encouragement, in Paris. Weizmann submitted a letter to the London Times on the McMahon and Hogarth correspondence HMG had published right after the conference, and Leonard Stein set out to prepare a detailed analysis of the documentary record. While Namier proposed that a committee of the International Court at the Hague examine the Balfour Declaration, all agreed that letters should be obtained for release from pro-Zionist statesmen who had played a role in the Declaration. Questions were to be prepared for sympathizers to ask in parliament, such as the fact that Arab delegates Abd al-Hadi and Nuri Sa’id had left Palestine out of their demands when they appeared before the Versailles Peace Conference. Most important, the Zionists would concentrate their efforts in preparing for the House of Commons debate, which Brodetsky characterized as “the most important” in Zionist history, when the White Paper was to be first presented by HMG.68 Ben-Gurion, on the other hand, thought that Zionism’s fate depended from then on only on the yishuv and the Zionist movement. Writing to his Palestinian colleagues just before departing London for home, he warned that Roosevelt would not press an ally in this “hour of distress,” while the British were going to announce what was in effect an Arab state. While their sense of strength became manifest at — 650 —

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the conference, he warned against false optimism. Zionism’s political program mandated “an uncompromising war” against HMG’s new policy alongside a pro-British orientation in “the violent struggle” of the world powers; a fearless stance against Arab terror, as well as a constant striving towards mutual understanding with Arabs in Palestine and the neighboring states; and augmenting the yishuv’s strength, which was “both the means and the end” of Zionist policy. This meant, he clarified to an associate, that “the goal for which we must fight during the next phase (and this is by no means the last) is independence for the Jews of Palestine—a Jewish state.” The next World Zionist Congress should proclaim this objective as a reply to Britain’s proclamation of an independent Palestine state. Only thus could Zionism avoid falling into HMG’s “trap,” which Ben-Gurion saw as making the Jewish obstruction to an Arab state an excuse to continue British rule in Palestine.69 Husseini had left London in a “very depressed state of mind,” Antonius confidentially informed Downie, still heading the Colonial Office’s Middle East Department. Returning home on the Taurus Express, the Palestine Arab delegation chairman told HaShomer HaTsa’ir leader Mordekhai Ben-Tov (posing as an American journalist) that the terror would continue, and the Palestinian Arabs would not cooperate in the proposed councils. Still, Husseini added, they were optimistic because they discovered that England would not allow “any more bloodshed for the sake of the Jews,” and British public opinion was veering round in the Arabs’ favor. Soon after Husseini conferred with Haj Amin, the Arab Higher Committee issued a lengthy declaration in Arabic thanking the Arab State delegates for fully supporting the Palestinian Arabs’ “just and plain” demands, certain that the Arabs and the Muslim world “will not in any case let Al Aqsa Mosque and the cradle of Christ fall a prey to these Imperialist and Zionist dangerous ambitions and become a shelter for the Jewish vagrants from all parts of the world.” The Committee ended: “O believers, do you patiently wait, unite and fear Allah, as you are then likely to succeed.” That same day, Abdul Rahim al Haj Muhammad, the last major rebel commander and a leader independent of the Mufti’s Arif Abdul Abd-al Raziq, was killed in the village of Sanur near Nablus by British forces.70 Antonius, on the other hand, did not think Husseini’s attitude of disappointment justified. In his view, the frank British-Arab exchanges at the conference would have a good effect on future relations, and the — 651 —

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proposals as they stood represented “an almost startling advance” on any previous offer by HMG to the Arabs. He assured Downie on March 30 that the Palestinian Arabs would have come to terms and that peace would have been “assured” in Palestine on two conditions: the government declaring that its obligation to facilitate Jewish immigration was now discharged, in which case the Arabs in Palestine and the surrounding states would have absorbed between them 75,000 Jewish refugees, and the government giving some definite assurance of independence at the end of ten years. In reply, Downie noted that HMG also had to consider both the feelings of the Jews, who “morally” were entitled to “reasonable notice” of the complete stoppage of immigration, and the sentiments of their followers in the House of Commons. Moreover, Antonius himself strongly dissented from the suggestion of the Arab delegates that a ministerial cabinet representing a “National Government” be created forthwith, certain as he was that no Arabs in Palestine at present were capable of assuming such responsibilities. Other than a necessary period of training, Downie observed, an Arab or Jewish minister would surely have the greatest difficulty in “the present atmosphere” in finding the “just middle line” between the conflicting rights and interests of the two peoples in Palestine.71 Downie correctly surmised that Antonius had been told by Fuad Hamza of recent post-conference talks between HMG and the Arab states about a “National Government,” the most important reason for HMG’s delay in issuing the White Paper. The British sought thereby to gain either their full endorsement or their agreement to a unilateral declaration, to be followed by an appeal that the Palestinian Arabs halt the three-year revolt because most of their demands had been met. (Antonius hinted at this “narrowing down as far as possible the points of difference” in a letter to the executive director of the Institute for World Affairs, an organization financed by Charles Crane.) On March 23, Ali Maher and associates presented to MacDonald and Butler a memorandum that called for the creation of department heads in a 2:1 ratio of Arabs to Jews within the Executive Council once peace was restored. They would serve as advisors to an eventual Cabinet of Ministers, which would draft a constitution and an electoral law before five years lapsed. The transitory period would not exceed ten years, after which, or earlier if the British government so chose, the newly elected Legislative Assembly would exercise its full power. If necessary, HMG — 652 —

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could convene a conference of Palestinians, British, and Arab state delegates to decide upon postponement. The Cabinet Committee on Palestine accepted most of these demands on April 6, adding that the Palestine State might be of a federal nature, and that the Arab states would be informed if HMG resolved to delay independence.72 The Saudi, Iraqi, and Egyptian delegates meeting in Cairo after the conference received the Cabinet Committee’s proposals from Lampson. They objected to the word “federal,” and insisted that the ten-year period could not be extended without their consent. That same moment, as-Suwaidi heard Weizmann’s argument for Arab-Jewish cooperation, seeing as Italy had just conquered Muslim Albania, and for a mutual agreement that HMG issue no declaration; Ali Maher responded to Weizmann that postponement of the new policy might be a good thing, but the Jews should suspend immigration for six months as a gesture of goodwill. Lampson forwarded the Arab States’ demands, which the Cabinet Committee accepted on April 20. At that meeting, MacDonald urged publication of British policy without further delay in order to end the uncertainty and maintain Arab “benevolent neutrality” in the coming war. The Palestine problem had to be considered mainly from the point of view of its effect on the international situation, Chamberlain agreed, and “if we must offend one side, let us offend the Jews rather than the Arabs.”73 The ultimate White Paper appeared at hand. Aware of the Anglo-Arab talks in Cairo, the Zionists tried to check what appeared inevitable. Shertok requested that the Jewish Agency be informed of any signs that might be given to the Arabs of a government readiness to modify the final proposals made at St. James Palace, but only received MacDonald’s “hope” that HMG could provide the Zionists some indication of the content before any ultimate statement was made. Weizmann warned Lothian, newly appointed British ambassador to the United States, that Halifax’s stress on “administrative necessity” reflected a kind of “pharaonic blindness” suffered by the bureaucrats who for years had been “sabotaging” Zionism; it would not “go down” with the Americans or the yishuv. He also sought, via Brandeis and U.S. Ambassador to France William Bullitt, to gain Roosevelt’s intercession for postponement, warning that HMG would “bite granite” if it adopted the proposals, because the yishuv would not tolerate them at a time when millions of Jews were undergoing “a sadistic persecution such as the world has not known since the darkest ages.” With one dissent, an — 653 —

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emergency committee of the Va’ad HaLeumi endorsed Ben-Gurion’s call to continue immigration and settlement, however “illegal” this might prove to be; develop military strength; not participate in any institution intended for Arab independence; and oppose the new policy, thereby compelling HMG to use force against the yishuv, “for then Britain could not long rely on bayonets alone.”74 The intervention at the Cairo meetings of four Arab Higher Committee members, invited against London’s wishes by the Egyptian Prime Minister in order to secure their approval, derailed HMG’s expectations of a final agreement. On April 29 Ali Maher urged them to accept because the Palestinian Arab masses had “suffered tremendously” by the revolt, the continuation of which meant the strengthening of the Jews at the expense of the Arabs; the scheme placed authority in their hands; the sympathetic Arab governments would help them; and, trained in administration, they would “be more fit and adopted” to eventual independence. Instead, Haj Amin’s supporters declared that the scheme proved “the evil intentions” of HMG. They demanded, in turn, that with the restoration of peace a Palestinian cabinet be created, the British to serve only as advisors, and an assembly draw up a constitution within the next three years. The 75,000 figure of Jewish immigration would be kept, a regular census making certain that the Jews never exceeded one-third of the country’s population; land sales would be determined by “actual understanding” between the High Commissioner and the new national government.75 The British Cabinet reached its own conclusions regarding Palestine on May 3. Having been preoccupied for well over a month with possible responses against German and Italian aggression, it now turned to formulate policy on the vexing subject. (Mussolini had, indeed, recently advised Reichsmarschall Göring that in the event of a war, the prospect of the Axis “fomenting an Arab uprising” against the British “would be more favorable” than at present.) Two days earlier, MacDonald had frankly admitted to his colleagues that certain points, inserted beyond the St. James Conference proposals of March 15 in order to meet Arab pressure, “would have been omitted if the matter were looked at on strict merits.” The Cabinet agreed with MacDonald’s assessment not to grant all of the Palestinian Arab demands. Land sales would be settled after consultation, not mutual agreement, with the High Commissioner; a census — 654 —

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to insure the immigration figure of 75,000 Jews in the next five years was judged to be impractical; a Palestinian Ministry would not be created as soon as peace and order were restored, since that meant a quick departure of the mandatory administration. A firm decision was taken against Haj Amin’s return, although the White Paper would not declare (as MacMichael and Haining had urged) that he be kept out indefinitely. All the Arabs were anxious to get a settlement, MacDonald asserted, noting the Egyptian Prime Minister’s wish that British troops on loan in Palestine be returned to his country as soon as possible. The Palestinian Arabs, wanting to call off the rebellion, would see that the final proposals had removed their main fears of Jewish domination. Chamberlain agreed with MacDonald that May 15 appeared the best date from the House of Commons’ point of view to announce the new policy.76 Prepared for the worst, the two major Zionist leaders pursued last efforts against the imminent declaration. Weizmann cabled Amery and the like-minded Churchill that this policy would alienate the single group in the Middle East whose loyalty to HMG was “absolute” and whose war potential was considerable, notably 40,000 fully qualified and welldisciplined men of the yishuv capable of strengthening British forces in the region. Just before departing from Palestine for London, Weizmann also pressed Brandeis again by telegram to ask that Roosevelt try to get the British to abstain “from breach of solemn trust which [was] bound [to] produce catastrophe [in] Palestine and completely undermine all confidence in international pledges given [to] small nations.” On May 9, Ben-Gurion received full support within the Va’ad HaLeumi to oppose the White Paper’s political aims; to develop industry and settlements, including a Jewish majority in Haifa; and to conduct a general mobilization of youth from the age of 18-35. A number of prominent American Jews should also tell Roosevelt that they were leaving for Palestine immediately, he urged Solomon Goldman, the Zionist Organization of America’s activist president, to join in the struggle against British bayonets and the new regime.77 The Cabinet resolved on May 10 to move forward. The previous evening, Chamberlain, with MacDonald present, had refused a request from Labour Party opposition leaders Clement Attlee and Arthur Greenwood (encouraged by Dov Hos and other yishuv representatives then in London) for postponement because of protracted Jewish opposition. The Arabs would “go along” with the policy, MacDonald reminded — 655 —

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his associates, while Kennedy had told him that American Jews were already unpopular in the United States, and some anti-British agitation that they might arouse would not last very long. MacMichael also favored publication; delay because of the visit of the British King and Queen to America would make the Arabs, who knew the statement was ready, more suspicious. When Elliott argued for postponement so that the plan for refugee settlement in British Guiana could be advanced, the others accepted Chamberlain’s suggestion that HMG endorse the British Guiana option well ahead of issuing the White Paper. MacDonald especially appreciated this, having pressed an interdepartmental meeting on May 4 for energetic action on British Guiana “to offer some consolation to the Jews, who would be bitterly disappointed by the decision of HM Government about Palestine.” The Cabinet finally agreed that the British Guiana report would be publicized on May 11, making it clear that no government funds would be used, the White Paper to follow one week later.78 Weizmann attempted a final appeal to Chamberlain on the evening of May 11. While MacDonald generally kept silent, Weizmann asserted that the Arabs, with British armed support, would seek to destroy the “distinctive civilization” that the yishuv had created in the past twenty years, and to “attain the £90 million promised by Hitler” the Jews had invested there. A “considerably startled” Prime Minister remarked that Weizmann was surely over-stating the case, to be answered that “his mother was already preparing his trousseau for the Seychelles.” The new policy would only “drench Palestine in blood,” Weizmann went on, Haining also thinking “very little of the military value of the Arab States.” Chamberlain sharply took issue with his guest’s mention of Lampson and others having influenced the government, but otherwise remained impassive. Weizmann concluded that the yishuv would give “a good account” of itself in any emergency; the Zionists’ chief concern was the Jews who had yet to enter Palestine. Chamberlain expressed his deep regret and sympathy with the Jews, but concluded that he could not see his way to change the government’s decision.79 Weizmann loosed all his frustration and anger two days later, when accepting MacDonald’s invitation to tea for a long conversation that Saturday at his country house in Essex. His host opened by saying that the Arabs were “very much disgruntled,” stirring Weizmann to respond that this was no wonder, seeing that they had got only 90 percent of — 656 —

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what they wanted. MacDonald attempted to justify his policy, asserting that once Palestine policy had been put on a proper basis, the Jews would surely dominate the whole region in fifty years’ time and establish good relations with the Arabs. Weizmann’s one-sided assault followed. The Jews had made many attempts to reach a serious understanding with the Arabs, Weizmann began, only to be always frustrated by the administration. To MacDonald’s comment that the Jews had made many mistakes and had instilled fear in the Arabs, he answered: “Our chief mistake is that we exist at all,” and “Hitler was saying precisely the same thing; he was teaching German children to fear the Jews.” At least the German Chancellor exhibited “absolutely frank brutality,” whereas MacDonald was “covering up his betrayal of the Jews under a semblance of legality.” Indignant, MacDonald said “he knew the Jews had been calling him a hypocrite and a coward.” Replied Weizmann: “I have never called you a coward.” He challenged HMG to bring the matter to the Hague Court, pitied Chamberlain for being “the innocent victim of specious advisers,” and called all the talk of strategic necessities “just bunk.” He would go back to Palestine almost at once, to help the yishuv “bear the shock.”80 Weizmann’s emotional outburst, personifying the complete collapse in HMG’s relations with the Zionists, exercised no impact on the Cabinet in its final discussion of the White Paper on May 17. There would be “virulent” opposition to it by the yishuv, MacDonald confirmed, but MacMichael thought that the resistance would only be sporadic and not organized on a widespread scale. Samuel had told MacDonald that the Arab veto on Jewish immigration after five years ran counter to the Balfour Declaration and the mandate, but the Lord Chancellor thought otherwise. Halifax preferred if the League of Nations could be induced to either approve the new policy as being consistent with the mandate or say that the mandate would be modified to that end. MacDonald warned, however, that the Council of the League was “much under the influence of Zionist opinion,” and might wish to get the International Court’s opinion first. He wished it emphasized that Haj Amin was “not a national leader, but merely the head of a faction” whose supporters had murdered “some 370 moderate Arabs” in the last three months. (Arab investigators, a leading Palestinian sheikh later informed the Jewish Agency, concluded that most of the 15,000 Arabs killed during the 1936-1939 revolt died at the hands of Haj Amin’s followers.) Both Arab — 657 —

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and Jew would oppose the new policy, concluded the Colonial Secretary, which was “perhaps some indication that it was a just settlement.” The Cabinet approved the issue of the White Paper that evening at 7 p.m.81 London had sent a confidential summary of the declaration to the State Department two days earlier, expressing HMG’s hope that the White Paper would restore peace “in the near future” and allow the Jews, in due time, “to induce the Arabs to agree to a development in Transjordan on the lines which the President has advocated.” Murray applauded the proposals as a “reasonable compromise” in light of British strategic interests and the ominous state of international affairs, but Roosevelt greeted them with “a good deal of dismay.” One week earlier, replying to a protest from American labor leader William Green, FDR had echoed the State Department’s position that, under the 1924 Anglo-American Palestine Convention, the U.S. was unable to prevent modifications in the mandate unless American interests were directly involved. (Roosevelt concluded with the assertion that “we are giving full and appropriate consideration to all the diverse factors involved in the Palestine problem and that the unhappy plight of Jewish refugees is not the least of my concerns.”) The mandate, however, he maintained to Hull on May 17, intended—and thus “the whole world” understood in 1920—”to convert Palestine into a Jewish National Home which might very possibly become preponderantly Jewish within a comparatively short time.” FDR’s “snap judgment” was that after the 75,000 Jews arrived and the plan for administration began to work during the five-year period, the whole problem could be reviewed again and either continued on a temporary basis for another five years or permanently settled if then possible.82 Command Paper 6019, announced by HMG that evening, provided for a single Palestine state within ten years in treaty relations with Great Britain. While the mandate continued, Jews and Arabs would be invited to serve as department heads in approximate proportion to their respective populations. Participation in the machinery of government “will be carried on whether or not both sides availed themselves of it.” An elective legislature might develop. If postponement of independence proved to be necessary, HMG had to consult with the League of Nations and with the Arab states. The admission of 75,000 Jews (future illegals would be deducted from the quota) in accordance with the country’s economic absorptive capacity, to include 25,000 refugees as soon as the High Commissioner “is satisfied that adequate provision for their main— 658 —

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tenance is assured,” would bring the Jews up to about one-third of the total population in five years’ time. No further immigration would be permitted “unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it.” The natural growth of the Arab population and the steady sale of Arab land to Jews had left no room in certain areas for further transfers of Arab land, while in other areas restrictions must occur if Arab cultivators “are to maintain their existing standard of life and a considerable landless Arab population is not soon to be created.” As a result, the High Commissioner would be empowered to “prohibit and regulate transfers of land.”83 The Jewish Agency immediately issued a statement branding the White Paper a “breach of faith” and “a surrender to Arab terrorism.” The new projected regime, “devoid of any moral basis and contrary to international law,” could only be set up and maintained by force. Jewish work had benefited Palestine and all its inhabitants. The Arabs were not a landless or homeless race like the Jews, nor did they need a place of refuge. The Jewish people, while not having retaliated against Arab violence, had not submitted to it and would not in the future. A final paragraph underlined the Agency’s deep feeling of betrayal: It is in the darkest hour of Jewish history that the British Government propose to deprive the Jews of their last hope and to close their road back to their homeland. It is a cruel blow, doubly cruel because it comes from the Government of a great nation which has extended a helping hand to the Jews and whose position in the world rests upon foundations of moral authority and international good faith. This blow will not subdue the Jewish people. The historic bond between the people and the land of Israel will not be broken. The Jews will never accept the closing against them of the gates of Palestine, nor let their national home be converted into a ghetto. Jewish pioneers, who in the past three generations have shown their strength in the upbuilding of a derelict country, will from now on display the same strength in defending Jewish immigration, the Jewish home, and Jewish freedom.84

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In the House of Commons debate on May 22-23, held immediately after the announcement of the Rome-Berlin Axis’s Pact of Steel, the most eloquent assaults against the White Paper came from Amery and Churchill. Sharply criticizing HMG’s appeasement of the Arabs and its reneging on a pledge given to the Jews in the mandate, Amery lauded the Jews as “people who have felt the breath of freedom and who mean to be free.” Churchill labeled the White Paper “another Munich” and “a surrender to Arab violence,” and proclaimed that he “could not stand by and see solemn engagements into which Britain has entered before the world set aside for reasons of administrative convenience or—and it will be a vain hope—for the sake of a quiet life.” Twenty years earlier in this same chamber, he observed, Chamberlain had expressed the hope that the Zionists would “build up a new prosperity and a new civilization in old Palestine, so long neglected and misruled.” They have “answered his call” and “fulfilled his hopes. How can he find it in his heart to strike them this mortal blow?” Rising to the challenge, and certain that “nothing” in Command Paper 6109 involved an amendment of the mandate, MacDonald took the lead in defending the White Paper on the ground of HMG’s strategic interests and obligations to both peoples in Palestine. The final vote in favor of the new policy gave the government a majority of only one hundred, instead of the usual two hundred and fifty.85 In Palestine, predictable reactions to the White Paper followed. The yishuv demonstrated widely against what it dubbed “the Black Paper,” Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi Herzog tore up the document in Jerusalem’s central Yeshurun Synagogue before a crowd of 10,000, and a campaign of civil disobedience began. More than 100 Jews were wounded in a pitched battle with police in Jerusalem, which also witnessed a separate demonstration by 3,000 women. The Jewish Agency established twelve new settlements that same month. Illegal immigration by the Revisionist-Zionists and by the Agency’s Mosad L’Aliya Bet, which the British energetically sought to halt, would bring more than 14,000 Jews aboard crammed “death ships” in harrowing voyages to Palestine by September. Haj Amin rejected the White Paper because a sovereign Arab state had not emerged, and declared that Palestine would obtain its independence within an Arab Federation and “remain Arab forever.” Lobbying in Geneva, Husseini and Alami unsuccessfully requested the League to dispatch a commission to investigate alleged atrocities by — 660 —

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British troops against Palestinian Arabs, and pressed for the immediate grant of self-government. The major reaction among the Palestinian Arabs, reported Wadsworth from Jerusalem, reflected continuing distrust against HMG along with “very obvious relief” concerning the curtailment of Jewish immigration and land purchases.86 Not long after having proposed that HMG, the United States, and Poland jointly administer Palestine, Jabotinsky increasingly shifted towards acceptance of the Irgun’s armed resistance to British rule. Protesting “the proposed liquidation of Zionism,” he warned in a public manifesto that HMG “is turning a peaceful, orderly Zionism into a bitter, merciless conflict in which the Jews had nothing to lose by failure and everything to gain by success.” He applauded the Revisionists’ Af-Al-Pi campaign, which had brought more than 4,000 illegals into Palestine during the year following the Anschluss, as the hour’s major “Jewish national sport,” and publicly characterized the Irgun as his “children.” He authorized Avraham Stern to secure weapons and ammunition from relevant ministries in Poland, an effort that reaped considerable success. He also provided letters of introduction for the first delegation to seek funds in the United States for Af-Al-Pi, as well as to obtain international government support for the movement of 1 million Jews within two years from “affected areas” to Palestine. While blundering badly in deriding Nazi Germany that May as an “inflated balloon,” and then in June publicly dismissing the possibility of a global conflict, Jabotinsky was now convinced that the Irgun could carry out its rebellion with a bold plan. He and other illegals would arrive in October by boat in the heart of Palestine. While the Irgun would insure their landing, Government House in Jerusalem and other key British locations should be occupied for at least 24 hours—whatever the cost—and the Jewish national flag be raised aloft. A provisional state would be simultaneously announced in the capitals of Western Europe and the United States, which would later function as a government-in-exile. Taken by surprise, the Irgun commanders seriously considered the scheme.87 Not all the Arab leadership rejected the White Paper unconditionally. The Nashashibis’ political party issued a manifesto expressing agreement in principle, which British intelligence reported had led to orders from Arab Revolt headquarters in Syria for the assassination of Nashahsibi, Fakhri, and eleven other members. It also circu— 661 —

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lated a declaration of eight former Palestine terrorist leaders, including Mohammed Fahbi Arafat, prior general secretary of Palestine bands, endorsing Britain’s new policy and charging Haj Amin with continuing the disturbances for personal reasons and foreign interests. Antonius suggested to Whitehall some modifications in order to convince the Arab States to plead with the Husseinis to accept the White Paper, which Arabs believed “is the old wolf in a new lamb’s clothing.” Abd al-Hadi went further, telling the mandatory’s deputy inspector-general that he strongly believed the rebellion should be called off without delay. Since the White Paper proposals had, “to a great extent,” conceded Arab demands, he thought that there was no point in fighting for points of detail. Abd al-Hadi added that the Arab rulers privately shared his view, and that the Arab Higher Committee’s rejection statement had been made without his knowledge and that of his former Committee associates Ahmed Hilmi, Ghusayn, and Salah. He, too, sought some changes, giving the Arab States “an excuse” to modify their support of Haj Amin’s obduracy. (Years later, Tannous disclosed that, “for reasons which I could never fully comprehend,” only Haj Amin of the Committee executive opposed implementing the White Paper.) Not intending to alter government policy, however, MacDonald informed the Husseinis’ Arab Centre in London that HMG communicated the White Paper to the League’s Permanent Mandates Commission in Geneva merely “as a matter of course”—not for League approval.88 Zionists and their Gentile supporters across the United States protested to the White House, but Roosevelt refused to air his thoughts in public at a time when he sought to obtain Congressional repeal of the country’s arms embargo law and to inhibit the European dictators. While conveying to Berle and Murray his thought that the mandate would not be modified substantially for five years, he doubted that the present situation would last five years, and proposed that “we might cross the Palestine bridge when we came to it, instead of now.” The American President did not think that the Zionist pressure politically “amounted to anything,” and if the pressure group was on Congress, “let it stay there.” Arab anti-Zionist feeling could be “handled” by spending funds to purchase farms, wells, and the like “so that any Arab who really felt himself pushed out of the city could go somewhere else.” “A good many Arabs” had been coming to Palestine, he noted, an increase since 1917 as great as that of the Jews there. Roosevelt suggested a one-page — 662 —

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statement, echoing the State’s evasive declaration of October 14, 1938: the government’s authority to intervene regarding the mandate was limited to the rights of the United States and its nationals according to the 1924 Anglo-American Palestine Convention, but the government “has continuously manifested its sympathy for the conception of the Jewish National Home.” At most, the administration would not officially give U.S. approval to the White Paper.89 On July 12, MacDonald declared in the House of Commons that he had authorized MacMichael to announce that all legal entry to Palestine during the next six months’ schedule period from October to April 1940 would be halted because of a rise in unauthorized Jewish immigration. (Unable to accept Wedgwood’s “appeal for humanity,” the Colonial Secretary had declared to the Commons in June that the illegal traffic—”exploiting the misery of unhappy refugees”—would “create chaos and increase bloodshed, violence, misunderstanding and hatred” in Palestine.) A week later, MacDonald explained to his colleagues the decision and the reasons behind it, which led the Cabinet to reconstitute its Palestine committee and ask him for a memorandum on how he intended to implement his policy. “If I were an Arab,” he remarked in the Commons the next day, “I should be passionately against Jewish immigration,” although admitting that he “would do his best to escape Germany” if he were a German Jew. Unknown to MacDonald, a deal had just been finalized whereby Hitler’s government agreed to give Ibn Saud a gift of 4,000 rifles with 2,000 cartridges for each piece, along with consent to order war materials on credit from German firms to the value of 6 million Reichsmarks, payment to be made in seven yearly installments.90 To Ben-Gurion, suspending immigration signaled the first step in the White Paper’s implementation. “The penalty,” charged the Jewish Agency, “amounts to nothing less than the closing to the Jewish people of their homeland and the denial of the only salvation open to Jews who are doomed to extermination in the anti-Semitic inferno of Europe.” Wedgwood wrote to Halifax that the forbidding of immigration and of land purchase to Jews had neither moral nor Parliamentary justification, “for they are contrary to humanity and justice.” In reply, Halifax pontificated that the illegals, “many of them not refugees,” may have “done an injustice to thousands of more deserving people.” His Majesty’s Government, he concluded, was working on the refugee situ— 663 —

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ation “as hard as they can to find a practicable solution which will not make the general problem more complicated and distracting than it is already.”91 That same month, MacDonald’s personal presentation on June 15-17 and 20 to the advisory Permanent Mandates Commission notwithstanding, the Commission concluded by a 4-3 vote that the White Paper was not “in conformity with the mandate.” When this report appeared in mid-August, the London Economist characterized it as “a severe rebuke to Great Britain.” Yet Lord Hankey, former secretary to the Cabinet and to the Committee on Imperial Defense and now serving as the British member on the Commission, had succeeded thereby in having the matter referred to the Council of the League of Nations. (Writing as head of Whitehall’s Middle Eastern desk, Lacy Baggallay would convey to the Council on August 5 HMG’s view that, in seeking with the new policy to end the “fatal enmity” between Arabs and Jews and to fulfill the government’s obligations to both peoples, it was “pursuing faithfully the fundamental aim” of the Palestine Mandate.) According to Article 27 of the mandate, the Council’s consent was required for any change in its terms, and that body was scheduled to consider the matter in September. Brandeis remained confident nonetheless about the ultimate Jewish triumph in Palestine, he told Robert Szold on August 6, with one reservation: “If the Germans would come in with their ruthless policy of extermination, it might be a different story.”92 By then, just as German intentions took a decidedly more sinister turn, havens other than Palestine for Europe’s desperate Jews were all a chimera. In early August, the U.S. embassy in London passed on to State a report from the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee that Eichmann had ordered that Jews in the Nazi “Protectorate” of Bohemia and Moravia be prepared for emigration at the rate of 250300 per day. Bentwich soon heard from Eichmann directly that “orders have been given in the highest quarters” that the complete evacuation of Jews in the Ostmark (formerly Austria) “must be carried out in the shortest time.” An effort by the JDC’s Lewis Strauss to interest the British in Baruch’s United States of Africa scheme received a skeptical reception from MacDonald. The American isolationist mood, which explained the failure of the Wagner-Rogers bill calling for the admission of 20,000 Jewish children under the quota system even to emerge from — 664 —

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Congressional committee, as well as the Coast Guard’s barring of 930 German Jews aboard the SS St. Louis from Miami, guided Washington. The consummate politician, Roosevelt was not prepared to fundamentally challenge the country’s restrictive immigration laws at a time of massive unemployment and rising antisemitism. Other nations also kept their doors closed. “Any ordered planning becomes hopeless” concluded a unique JDC-HICEM (an emigration organization) conference in Paris on August 23. With 400,000 Jews involved, the 29 groups present announced that it would require four years for “the enlarged problem in its present dimensions” to be dealt with “in a humane and orderly way.”93 News of the Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact on August 22, 1939, signaling an imminent German attack against Poland, caused the Twenty-First World Zionist Congress to terminate its Geneva deliberations abruptly before borders closed. While Weizmann took a painful leave of the delegates, uncertain when and whether they all would meet again, the political committee reiterated that “nothing will prevent the Jews from returning to their country and rebuilding their National Home.” The Jewish Agency was authorized to “exert all its energy” toward thwarting the approval of the White Paper at the forthcoming League Council meeting. In that document’s stead, the Agency intended to propose a plan for a federal state in Palestine based on political parity, giving a large degree of autonomy in regard to immigration and international affairs to Jewish and Arab provinces; a modified mandate or a neutral authority would mediate when Jewish and Arab views were “irreconcilable.”94 With the demise of the League in the global conflict to follow, the Council would never meet to render judgment on the subject. Culminating with the White Paper, a six-week tripartite conference in the cloistered precincts of Westminster had thereby sounded the death knell of the Jewish National Home. While prepared to make some concessions during the St. James Conference, the Jewish Agency appealed to moral values, to British honor, and to history. It urged, in addition, that priority be given to the desperation of their persecuted people in Europe, a singular plight movingly captured by W. H. Auden’s contemporary lines in “Refugee Blues”—”Thought I heard the thunder, rumbling in the sky/ It was Hitler over Europe, saying: “they must die…” “Dispersion becomes dismemberment,” Martin Buber observed to Gandhi (who did not reply) — 665 —

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when asserting that Jewish destiny was “indissolubly bound up” with “the possibility of ingathering” in Palestine. For the first time in Zionist history, Ben-Gurion and Shertok could also emphasize to HMG the yishuv’s strength and firm resolve towards achieving ultimate independence. “It is a people in the integral sense of the term,” Weizmann realized upon visiting that Jewish community in April 1939 after nearly a year’s absence, the three years of Arab rebellion having produced “an awareness of realities, a sense of national cohesion and a doughty determination such as I have never met here before. The iron has entered the soul of this people.”95 The Chamberlain government, on the other hand, had Great Britain’s interests to consider. With ever darkening shadows of war clearly visible on the horizon, the tenet of appeasement that governed its stance vis-à-vis Hitler also determined its approach to the Palestine imbroglio. The first sought to avoid a potential war, the second to prepare for an inevitable one. Altered circumstances in the realm of power politics persuaded MacDonald to embrace Halifax’s doctrine of “administrative necessity,” the Empire’s strategic interests in the Middle East dictating a novel effort to win over the Arab States in the face of unyielding Palestinian Arab nationalism. It made no difference that the Arab Revolt was guttering out (the far better equipped British force of 20,000 outnumbered the rebels, who also contended with internal rivalries and some opposing village “peace bands,” by ten to one), that the economy of the now leaderless Palestinian Arabs was devastated, or that the Arabs even refused to sit at the same conference table with the Jews. While Jewish fealty in war against Germany might be safely assumed, as the Jewish Agency delegation attested during the discussions and Weizmann pledged to Chamberlain on August 29, that of the Arabs could not. Consequently, a Cabinet policy had been drawn up before the St. James Palace meetings ever began.96 Weizmann and his associates, however traumatic their sense of betrayal, knew of British intentions months before coming to the London talks in February. A chasm separated that turn from King George V’s remark to him and other Jewish leaders in 1918: “It is written in the Holy Scriptures that the Jews will return to Palestine. I am glad my government is helping.” At the same time, they never could have imagined, much less accepted, an Arab veto on immigration and a permanent Jewish minority in the biblically covenanted Promised Land. Nor could — 666 —

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they have foreseen the near destruction of their brethren under Nazi control in the horrific cataclysm that Hitler was poised to unleash, or that London and Washington would deem the Jews expendable in that same time and defer decision regarding Palestine.97 Thus, Anglo-Zionist relations fractured just as European Jewry breathed the apocalyptic air of approaching peril.

Endnotes 1

Nikolaus Pevsner, The Buildings of England: London 6; Westminster (2003), 594-601. 2 Cohen, Palestine: Retreat from the Mandate, 66-70; J. C. Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, 88-89; MacDonald to MacMichael, Sept. 24, 1938, FO 371/21864, PRO; Chancellor-MacDonald talk, Sept. 17, 1938, Premier records (PREM) 1/352; MacDonald memorandum, Jan. 18, 1939, FO 371/23221; both in PRO. 3 Shertok to Joseph, Dec. 18, 1938, S46/59, and Jan. 10, 1939, Agency London Executive, S25/1720; both in CZA; Shertok to Jerusalem Executive, Jan. 20, 1939, Maimon MSS; JAEJ, Jan. 22 and 24, 1939, both in CZA; Moshe Sharett, Yoman Medini, 4 (Tel Aviv, 1974), 9-14; Meeting, Dec. 20, 1938, Z4/20705, CZA; Adler to Osmond, Jan. 31, 1939, Foreign CountriesPalestine files, AJCA; Jan. 11, 1939, National Board minutes, HA. Thinking the American non-Zionists’ decision “a cowardly thing,” Adler decided that he would never again call a meeting of them (Adler to Hexter, Jan. 31, 1939, Foreign Countries-Palestine files, AJCA). 4 Rutenberg–MacDonald meetings, Oct. 5, 10, and 19, 1938; Nov. 17 and 18, 1938; Rutenberg to Brandeis, Nov. 25, 1938; all in file A9010/95, Rutenberg MSS; Rutenberg–MacDonald meeting, Dec. 13, 1938, CO 733/409/75872/51, PRO; Rutenberg-Abdullah meeting, Dec. 18, 1939, Rutenberg to MacDonald, Jan. 5, 1939, and Rutenberg-MacDonald meeting, Jan. 24, 1939; all in file A 9010/95, Rutenberg MSS; Executive Meeting, Jan. 10, 1939, S25/1720, CZA. For the Rutenberg-Abdullah 1936 correspondence relating to economic cooperation, see file 9011/181, Rutenberg MSS. 5 Sharett, Yoman Medini, 18; Cohen, Palestine, 63; Geoffrey Furlonge, Palestine — 667 —

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is My Country, 119-122. C.I.D. Report, Jan. 10, 1939, file 47/62, Hagana Archives; Elishar memorandum, n.d., A430/229A, CZA; JTA, Dec. 6, 1938; Palestine Post, Jan. 3, 1939; Shahin circular translation, Jan. 2, 1939, file MFA-94/5, ISA. Shahin was beaten up severely by Arabs a few days later (JTA, Dec. 9, 1938). 7 War Office release, Jan. 15, 1939, cited by American journalists, May 22, 1939, F38/853, CZA; Mackereth to Foreign Office, Jan. 19, 1939, FO 371/23221, PRO. These reports also reached the intelligence unit of the Jewish Agency’s Hagana underground military organization. See Mackereth dispatch, Jan. 19, 1939, S25/22793, CZA, and C.I.D. report, Jan. 21, 1939, file 47/66, Hagana Archives. For the Arab Higher Committee’s evocation one year earlier of the Covenant’s four principles as “the only practical solution,” see the public statements of Dec. 26, 1937, and Jan. 11, 1938, file P-343/50, ISA. 8 Jedda to Foreign Office, Dec. 25, 1938, S25/22703; Bullard to Foreign Office, Jan. 2, 1939, S25/22775; A.S. (Sasson) letters, Jan. 18-20, and 22, 1939; all in A263/18, CZA. C.I.D. report, Jan. 26, 1939, file 47/63, Hagana Archives. Smart, the Oriental Counsellor at the British Embassy in Cairo, was also the brother-in-law of the Lebanese Christian George Antonius, who would serve as the Arab delegation’s secretary at the London conference. See also Baffy, 78, 82-83. 9 Eliachar to Rutenberg, Jan. 27, 1939, A430/219, CZA; Jan. 31, 1939, Joseph diary, file IV-104-49-1/48A, Histadrut Archives, Makhon Lavon. Fakhri would subsequently leak information to the Jewish Agency about HMG’s pro-Arab stance during the conference (Dan Omer, B’Ikvot ‘Amud HaEsh’, 119-120). 10 MacDonald memorandum, Jan. 18, 1939, FO 371/23221; Meeting, Feb. 1, 1939, CAB 23/97; both in PRO. 11 Cohen, Palestine, 72, 4; Baffy, 119. 12 Sherman, Island Refuge, 172, 174, 178-180. 13 Sherman, Island Refuge, 188-192. 14 Weizmann-MacDonald interview, Dec. 12, 1938, S25/7642, CZA; London Times, Jan. 23, 1939; Noon to Zetland, Dec. 14, 1938, CO 733/386/75872/26, PRO. While noting that Weizmann had “forcibly stated” his case, the Times editorialized the same day that the Arabs could claim that their views had never been consulted by the governments involved in creating the Palestine Mandate. Reflecting MacDonald’s ideal scenario, the newspaper called for dividing Palestine into two autonomous Jewish and Arab cantons or provinces, each sovereign over immigration, within “a federal Syro-Palestine.” 15 Hull to Taylor, Jan. 14, 1939, 840.48 Refugees/1290B, SD; Cadogan minute, Feb. 1, 1939, with Halifax comment, FO 371/24097, PRO. Baruch thought in grander terms. His United States of Africa for “tens of millions” of refugees, “anxious to get away from the over-regulated, goose-stepping civilizations of Germany, Russia and Italy,” would include the British colonies, part of the

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20

21

Belgian Congo, and Angola by purchase. It would be a democratic protectorate under British sovereignty (Baruch to Strauss, Jan. 31, 1939, Box 42, Strauss MSS). Diary, Nov. 21, 1938, Moffat MSS; Peltzer to Warren, Jan. 1939, and Warren to Taylor, Dec. 15, 1938, both in Taylor MSS; David H. Popper, “Mirage of Refugee Resettlement,” Survey Graphic, Jan. 1939, 21-25; Winterton to Beaverbrook, Dec. 5, 1938, Lord Beaverbrook MSS, House of Lords Record Office, London. Cadogan to Halifax, Feb. 8, 1939, FO 371/23222; Meeting, Jan. 24, 1939, CRP 39 (1); Meeting, Jan. 27, 1939, FO 371/24085; all in PRO. MacDonald also turned down a suggestion that the lower age limit for Jewish student immigrants into Palestine be reduced from 15 to 14, pointing to “the rapid increase that has recently taken place in the rate of student immigration” (Downie to Secretary, Jan. 7, 1939, BDA). Phillips-Mussolini interview, Diary, Jan. 3, 1939, Phillips MSS; United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), 1939, 4 (Washington, D.C., 1955), 694-696; Wise to Goldman, Jan. 19, 1939, Box 110, Wise MSS; Cohen to LeHand, Jan. 24, 1939, and Roosevelt memorandum, Jan. 26, 1939, OF Palestine 700, Box 2, FDRL. Once Antonius was chosen secretary to the Arab delegations, Murray asked him, also enclosing a letter of introduction, to get in touch with the chargé d’affaires at the U.S. Embassy in London, which he did (Murray to Hull, Jan. 13, 1939, 867N.01/1392, SD; Antonius to Rogers, Feb. 15, 1939, Institute of Current World Affairs Archives (hereafter ICWAA), Alicia Patterson Foundation, New York City). Time, Jan. 2, 1939. Chvalkovsky meetings with Hitler and von Ribbentrop, Jan. 21, 1939, and French report appended; Berlin circular, Jan. 25, 1939; both in A87/151, CZA. In addition, Danzig authorities forced Jews to sign an agreement whereby the “complete evacuation” of Jews would take place before October, and the League of Nations maintained silence and did not withdraw its High Commissioner to that city (Goldmann to Congress, Jan. 21, 1939, file 214A, WJCA). Also see Bela Vago, The Shadow of the Swastika: The Rise of Fascism and Anti-Semitism in the Danube Basin, 1936-1939 (Weatmead, England, 1975). Hitler speech, Jan. 30, 1939, in N. H. Baynes, ed., The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, 1 (London, 1942), 737-741. Even Mussolini was “very well satisfied” with Hitler’s address, and he had his foreign minister get word to the Führer “that the words uttered last night have given a great deal of joy and satisfaction to all the Italian people” (The Ciano Diaries, 1939-1945, ed. H. Gibson [Garden City, NY, 1947], 19). Berlin circular, Jan. 25, 1939, A87/151, CZA; Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, 933-936. Rosenberg soon declared that all the Jews of Germany and Central Europe should be “penned in a reservation” in some sparsely populated part of the world. JTA, Feb. 9, 1939. Not surprisingly, — 669 —

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22

23 24 25 26

27 28 29 30 31 32

the German consul in Jerusalem had rejected the proposal from the Jewish Agency and the German Immigrants’ Association that he testify before the Peel Commission on behalf of continued Jewish immigration to Palestine (David Yisraeli, HaReich HaGermani V’Eretz Yisrael [Ramat Gan, 1974], 156157). For the fruitless American talks with German officials on emigration, see Monty Noam Penkower, Decision on Palestine Deferred: America, Britain and Wartime Diplomacy, 1939-1945 (London, 2002), 12-14, 17. Foreign Office to Hoare, Jan. 2, 1939, FO 371/21888; Foreign Office to Sofia, FO 371/23246; Baxter to MacDonald, FO 371/23221; Baggallay minute, Feb. 8, 1938, FO 371/23222; Hardinge to Halifax, Feb. 28, 1939, FO 371/24085; all in PRO. Baxter would take the same position when the Struma, carrying 769 Jews fleeing from pogroms in Rumania, reached Istanbul’s waters in December 1941: “If we were to accept these people, there would, of course, be more and more shiploads of unwanted Jews later!” Baxter added his strong personal feeling that “it would be unwise for us to intervene, and that our intervention would only mean more shiploads later and more suffering.” On February 23, 1942, after the Turks towed the small cattle boat five miles out of the harbor, an explosion tore the vessel apart. David Stoliar alone survived. He and one pregnant woman who was allowed to disembark earlier to deliver a baby (stillborn) were eventually admitted to Palestine as an exception on humanitarian grounds (Baxter minute, Feb. 12, 1942, FO 371/32661, PRO; Monty Noam Penkower, The Jews Were Expendable: Free World Diplomacy and the Holocaust (Urbana, 1983), 150-151). Weizmann-Shertok-Ben Gurion interview with MacDonald, Feb. 1, 1939, Confidential files–WZO, HA, and FO 371/23223, PRO; Lampson to Foreign Office, Feb. 6, 1939, FO 371/23222, PRO; Baffy, 121. Panel meeting, Feb. 5, 1939, WA; Weizmann–MacDonald talk, Feb. 4, 1939, FO 371/23223; Halifax memorandum, Jan. 24, 1939, FO 800/13; both in PRO. Meeting, Jan. 27, 1939, CAB 27/651, PRO; Baffy, 120. Bullard to Foreign Office, Nov. 28, 1938, file P-1056/8, ISA. Bullard to Foreign Office, Dec. 13, 1938, and Jan. 2, 1939; both in S25/22775; MacDonaldWeizmann interview, Sept. 14, 1938, S25/7563; Bullard to MacMichael, Jan. 29, 1939, S25/22775; all in CZA. MacDonald-Feisal talk, Jan. 31, 1939, FO 371/23223, PRO; Baffy, 120; New York Times, Jan. 17, 1939; David BenGurion, Zikhronot 6 (Tel Aviv, 1987), 121, 127. Meeting, Feb. 7, 1939, FO 371/23223, PRO; London Times, Feb. 8, 1939. Meeting, Feb. 7, 1939, FO 371/23223, PRO; Sharett, Yoman Medini, 24-27. Meeting, Feb. 8, 1939, FO 371/23223, PRO. Meeting, Feb. 9, 1939, FO 371/23223, PRO. Meeting, Feb. 10, 1939, FO 371/23223, PRO. Meetings, Feb. 11 and 13, 1939; both in FO 371/23223; Meetings, Feb. 14 and 15, 1939, both in FO 371/23224; all in PRO. For MacDonald’s earlier effort, see his talks with the Arab State delegates and Ragheb Bay Nashashibi, — 670 —

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Feb. 6, 1939, FO 371/23223, PRO. Szold to Brandeis, Feb. 13, 1939, A370/80; Shertok address, Feb. 13, 1939, A245/683/7; both in CZA. On March 1, 1919, Feisal wrote to Frankfurter, then with the Zionist delegation to the Versailles Peace Conference, that “the Arabs, especially the educated among us, look with the deepest sympathy on the Zionist Movement.” The Arab delegation in Paris, he went on, regarded the WZO’s proposals to that body as “moderate and proper,” and “we will do our best, so far as we are concerned, to help them through; we will wish the Jews a hearty welcome home.” When a Kurdish general killed some 3,000 Assyrian Christians in Iraq and displaced thousands more in August 1933, the British did not intervene despite having a powerful military presence that had been granted to HMG in the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. 34 Meeting, Feb. 14, 1939, FO 371/23224, PRO. HMG received confirmation at this time of Ben-Gurion’s point about inter-Arab government rivalries. Ibn Saud privately conveyed his suspicion about Nuri Sa’id’s reported plans to draw Palestine and Syria into the Iraqi orbit so as to “obtain preponderance” over the other Arab States. Abdullah, a rival of Ibn Saud’s, feared that Nuri wished to annex Palestine and Transjordan (Bullard to Foreign Office, Feb. 18, 1939, S25/22775; MacMichael to MacDonald, Feb. 9, 1939, S25/22777; both in CZA). 35 Meeting, Feb. 15, 1939, FO 371/23224, PRO; Sharett, Yoman Medini, 55-59. 36 Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 144-147. Prime Minister Joseph Chamberlain had offered Theodor Herzl, the founder of political Zionism, an autonomous Jewish settlement in Sinai (1902) and a self-governing territory in East Africa (Uganda) one year later, both of which the Zionist movement rejected. At a big Zionist demonstration in Birmingham in October 1918, Neville Chamberlain recalled his father’s interest in the Zionist movement, and personally hoped that if the new Jewish State to be established in Palestine should be associated with some “great and progressive people” such as those of the United States or the British Empire, then it “would only add to the dignity and influence of Jews in other countries.” File 86/1130/2003, Tzahal and the Defense System Archives, Ministry of Defense, Tel HaShomer, Israel. 37 Meeting, Feb. 16, 1939, FO 371/23224, PRO. Based on Arab archives and interviews with leading Arab personalities, Antonius’s book presented to the public for the first time a history of the rise of Arab nationalism from an Arab perspective. The book’s dedication read: “To Charles R. Crane, aptly nicknamed Harun al-Rashid, affectionately.” In his last chapter, Antonius called for Palestine to become an independent Arab state tied to Britain, giving the Jews “a national home in the spiritual and cultural sense,” arguing that the country was “too small to hold a larger increase of population. And it has already borne more than its fair share” (George Antonius, The Arab Awakening [New York, 1946 ed.], chap. 16). 38 Meeting, Feb. 17, 1939, FO 371/23224, PRO. 39 Ibid. Following the unsuccessful Bar-Kokhba revolt between 132-135 C.E. 33

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for renewed sovereignty against Roman domination, the Jewish community was exiled from Eretz Yisrael, whose name the Romans then changed to “Palestine.” The Pale of Settlement constituted a limited territory within the borders of Czarist Russia where the residence of Jews, as well as their restricted occupations, was legally authorized from the early nineteenth century until the Russian Revolution. 40 Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 149-154. 41 Meeting, Feb. 20, 1939, FO 371/23224, PRO. 42 Sharett, Yoman Medini, 67-69; Szold to Brandeis, Feb. 21, 1939, A370/80, CZA; Meeting, Feb. 20, 1939, FO 371/23224, PRO. 43 Cabinet meeting, Feb. 22, 1939, FO 371/23225, PRO; Sharett, Yoman Medini, 78-83; Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 157-159; Meeting, Feb. 23, 1939, FO 371/23225, PRO. 44 Meeting, Feb. 24, 1939, FO 371/23225; Meeting, Feb. 25, 1939, FO 371/23226; both in PRO; Sharett, Yoman Medini, 84-93; Szold diary, Feb. 26, 1939, R. Szold MSS; JTA, Feb. 27, 1939; Wise to family, Feb. 26, 1939, Box 189, Wise MSS; Baffy, 125-126. 45 Baffy, 126-127; Meeting, Feb. 27, 1939, FO 371/23226; Meeting, Feb. 28, 1939, FO 371/23227; both in PRO; Sharett, Yoman Medini, 94-100. 46 Meeting, Mar. 1, 1939, FO 371/23226, PRO. 47 Cabinet meeting, Mar. 2, 1939, FO 371/23227; Meeting, Mar. 2, 1939, FO 371/23227; both in PRO. Two days later, Elliott told Dugdale about Roosevelt’s private communication to Chamberlain (Baffy, 128). 48 Chamberlain interview, Mar. 2, 1939, FO 371/23227, PRO; Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 175-176, 185. 49 Meetings, Mar. 4, 6, and 7, 1939, all in FO 371/23227, PRO. Years later, Azzam Bey would reminisce that he and associates never thought that the Jews were “really serious about a state—only a small number.” When Weizmann rejected the Vatican proposal soon thereafter as “simply trying to create another Jewish ghetto in Palestine,” he replied: “Thank you, Mr. Weizmann. You have saved my head. I won’t bring it up again” (Azzam Bey interview with Kurzman, Box 6, Dan Kurzman MSS, Mugar Library, Boston University). 50 Meetings, Mar. 3 and 6, 1939; both in FO 371/23227, PRO; Sharett, Yoman Medini, 105-106, 112-115. 51 Meeting, Mar. 6, 1939, FO 371/23228, PRO. The final paragraph of the message delivered in January 1918 to Sharif Hussein by Commander D. G. Hogarth at the Foreign Office’s order actually read as follows: Since the Jewish opinion of the world is in favour of a return of Jews to Palestine, and inasmuch as this opinion must remain a constant factor, and further, as His Majesty’s Government view with favour the realization of this aspiration, His Majesty’s Government are determined that, in so far as is compatible with the freedom of the existing population, both economic and political, no obstacle should be put in the way of the realization of this ideal. In this — 672 —

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connexion the friendship of world Jewry to the Arab cause is equivalent to support in all States where Jews have a political influence. The leaders of the movement are determined to bring about the success of Zionism by friendship and cooperation with the Arabs, and such an offer is not one to be lightly thrown aside. 52 Meeting, Mar. 7, 1939, FO 371/23228, PRO; Sharett, Yoman Medini, 116-124; Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 186-192. As recalled by Weizmann in his memoirs, when discussing Zionism with Balfour on January 9, 1906, he asked: “If you were offered Paris instead of London, would you take it?” Looking surprised, Balfour replied: “But London is our own!” Weizmann replied: “Jerusalem was our own when London was a marsh” (Rose, Chaim Weizmann, 101). 53 Meeting, Mar. 8, 1939, CAB 23/97; Meeting, Mar. 8, 1939, FO 371/23228; Gandhi letter (which Butler thought “most important”), Mar. 4, 1939, FO 371/23226; all in PRO. 54 Meetings, Mar. 9 and 11, 1939, both in FO 371/23228; Meeting, Mar. 11, 1939, FO 371/23229; all in PRO. Sharett, Yoman Medini, 128-130, 136-141; Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 195-198. 55 Meeting, Mar. 12, 1939, FO 371/23229, PRO; Sharett, Yoman Medini, 134, 144-146, 161-152; Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 198-200. 56 Meetings, Mar. 10 and 13, 1939, both in FO 371/23229, PRO. 57 Meeting, Mar. 14, 1939, FO 371/23230, PRO; Sharett, Yoman Medini, 155. 58 Sharett, Yoman Medini, 156-157. 59 Meeting, Mar. 15, 1939, CAB 23/98; Meetings of Mar. 14 and 15, 1939, both in FO 371/23230; MacMichael to MacDonald, Mar. 8, 1939, FO 371/23228; all in PRO. MacMichael added that the figure for Arab illegal immigrants exceeded 10,000. A list of Jewish illegals who arrived by ship from 1934 onwards until September 1939 totaled 19,137, and a total of 37,298 by the end of 1944. See Avneri, Meh”Velos” Ad “Taurus,” 390-396. 60 Meeting, Mar. 15, 1939, FO 371/23230, PRO; Sharett, Yoman Medini, 161-164. 61 Sharett, Yoman Medini, 164-165. The morning that Wehrmacht forces occupied the Czech capital, Jan Masaryk met with the Prime Minister to charge HMG with deliberately betraying Czechoslovakia. When Chamberlain advised the former Czech minister to London that he could obtain a munificent salary directing the Skoda weapons factory, Masaryk replied that while he had learned to play a little music, “I’d rather play piano in a brothel than accept your offer.” Finally, Chamberlain declared: “You happen to believe in Dr. Beneš. I happen to trust Herr Hitler.” Masaryk left the room and reported the conversation to Weizmann, who found his usually high-spirited friend looking like “an aged and broken man” (Maurice Samuel notes for Trial and Error, 250, AJA; Weizmann, Trial and Error, 407-408). 62 Gilbert, Sir Horace Rumbold, 441-443. 63 Sharett, Yoman Medini, 170-171. According to Weizmann’s unpublished reminiscences, Halifax had told him that the British had always been friends — 673 —

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of the Jews, and that “the Jews have very few friends in the world now.” Weizmann understood this hint to imply that if the Jews would not obey HMG at the present time, they would likely forfeit the friendship of the one power that could hold out a “protective hand” over them. This argument had the opposite effect of what Halifax had intended, for it “welded the Jewish delegation into one unit and it began to speak with one view.” Samuel notes for Trial and Error, 246, AJA. 64 Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 203-205. 65 Manchester Guardian, Mar. 18, 1939. 66 London Times, Mar. 17, 1939; Meeting, Mar. 22, 1939, CAB 23/98, and Foreign Office to representatives, Mar. 19, 1939, FO 371/23229; both in PRO. 67 Brandeis to Roosevelt, Mar. 16, 1939, PSF Palestine, Box 36, FDRL; FRUS, 732-738; Roosevelt to Brandeis, Mar. 23, 1939, PSF Palestine, Box 36, FDRL. 68 Jewish Agency meeting, Mar. 22, 1939, Z4/302/23, CZA; London Times, Mar. 23, 1939. At the same time, an informal inquiry by British army officers among Arabs in Jerusalem’s Old City found a decided pro-German majority. Cohen report, May 23, 1939, J1/7966, CZA. Stein’s monograph Promises and Afterthoughts: Notes on Certain White Papers Relating to the Palestine Conferences (London, 1939) appeared in May. Brandeis continued to embrace the Norman plan that summer, although Magnes doubted that “many more” Jews could be settled in Palestine, and certainly not in Arab lands, “if we insist upon a Jewish state or a Jewish majority in Palestine” (Brandeis-Szold interview, Aug. 6, 1939, file 53, R. Szold MSS; Magnes to Norman, Aug. 15, 1939, file P3/207, CAHJP). 69 Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 209-218. 70 Downie–Antonius interview, Mar. 30, 1939, FO 371/23232, PRO; Ben-Tov report, Mar. 24, 1939, file 22/1, Solomon Goldman MSS, AJA; Committee declaration, Mar. 27, 1939, in both FO 381/23242, PRO, and file 47/80, Hagana Archives; Bowden, “The Politics of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine,” 157; JTA, Mar. 28, 1939. Abd al-Raziq would surrender to French military authorities in Syria the next month (JTA, Apr. 14, 1939). Hearing a rumor that Kennedy had given HMG a presidential statement against the White Paper, the Arab Higher Committee stated that Roosevelt had only a “mercenary” relationship with the Jews—their votes, whereas the relationship of Arabs to Arabs and Muslims “is one of brotherhood” (Wadsworth to State, Apr. 4, 1939, file P-343/50, ISA). 71 Downie–Antonius interview, Mar. 30, 1939, FO 371/23232, PRO; JTA, Mar. 28, 1939. 72 Ibid.; Antonius to Rogers, Apr. 6, 1939, ICWAA; Meetings, Mar. 21 and 23, 1939, Maher memorandum, Mar. 23, 1939; all in FO 371/23232, PRO; Meeting, Apr. 6, 1939, FO 371/23233, PRO. Walter Rogers headed the Institute in New York City, which sponsored Antonius’s The Arab Awakening. In July 1938 Crane sent the Mufti via Antonius “a small check for him to use — 674 —

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as he thinks best” with “my most warmest [sic] greetings”; advised Roosevelt in October that the Palestine controversy, “fundamentally a result of British imperialist policy”, would not see peace “until Arab rights are secured”; and assured Hitler in December that, to counter British efforts “to impose the Jews on Palestine,” the way “is open now” for the Germans to arrive at an understanding and “best relations with Islam.” The last letter, which Hitler acknowledged with thanks, ended with Crane’s assertion: “Your people are going to need you for a long time at your very best. With warm personal greetings and best wishes for the welfare of your people.” Crane also praised Ibn Saud highly in a letter to Roosevelt, and particularly that monarch’s gift of reconciliation with his conquered enemies (Crane to Antonius, July 20, 1938; Crane to Roosevelt, Oct. 25, 1938; Crane to Hitler, Dec. 12, 1938; Meiser to Crane, Jan. 16, 1939; Crane to Roosevelt, Jan. 21, 1939; all in Crane MSS). 73 Lampson to Foreign Office, Apr. 11, 1939, FO 371/23233, PRO; Joseph diary on Weizmann talks, Apr. 10-11, 1939, S25/43, CZA; Meeting of Apr. 20, 1939, FO 371/23234, PRO. 74 Shuckburgh–Jewish Agency meeting, Apr. 13, 1939, FO 371/23233, PRO; MacDonald–Shertok–Lourie meeting, Apr. 27, 1939, S25/9802, CZA; Weizmann to Brandeis, Apr. 19, 1936, Box 137, R. Szold MSS;Weizmann to Lothian, Apr. 27, 1939, WA; Weizmann to Bullitt, Apr. 24, 1939 (which Bullitt transferred to Roosevelt on May 4), PSF France–Bullitt files, FDRL; Apr. 19, 1939, report, A297/17, CZA; Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 250-253. Weizmann’s reference was to the biblical Pharaoh, who long refused to let the enslaved Jews leave Egypt (Exodus, chaps. 1-11). 75 Foreign Office to Lampson, Apr. 26, 1939, Lampson to Foreign Office, Apr. 26, 29, and 30, 1939; all in FO 371/23234; Summary, May 17, 1939, FO 371/23236; all in PRO. The Palestinian Arab agreement to 75,000 Jews signaled a concession, since Antonius had informed the Colonial Office two weeks earlier that Husseini mentioned informally to the Arab delegation at the conference that he would be prepared to agree to a figure of 25,000, provided that they were designated “refugees” and not “immigrants.” AntoniusShuckburgh interview, Apr. 12, 1939, FO 371/23233, PRO. 76 Ian Colvin, The Chamberlain Cabinet (New York, 1971), chap. 16; Arielli, “Italian Involvement,” 201; Meetings, May 1 and 3, 1939, CAB 23/99; MacDonald to MacMichael, Apr. 21, 1939, FO 371/23234; both in PRO. 77 Weizmann to Amery-Churchill, May 4, 1939, S25/7642, CZA; FRUS, 749; Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 287-290, 302-303; Va’ad HaLeumi meeting, May 3, 1939, S5/275, CZA. The pre-mobilization yielded 100,000 young men and women who pledged themselves to “the service of the country.” Its purpose, Ben-Zvi confided, was to enlist them for “emergency duties” arising out of the yishuv’s effort to defeat the White Paper policy (Ben-Zvi to Kisch, June 30, 1939, A116/75 III, CZA). 78 Hos diary, May 9, 1939, A24/219, CZA; Meeting, May 10, 1939, CAB — 675 —

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23/99, PRO; Sherman, Island Refuge, 231. Roosevelt’s leading advisor on refugee settlement thought that the experiment would be “an economic failure.” Bowman report, in Achilles to Warren, May 20, 1939, PAC files, McDonald MSS. Geoffrey Dawson, editor of the London Times, indicated to the American delegate on the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees that while the newspaper strongly opposed the British Guiana project, “the more the Jews in Palestine misbehaved [sic] the more the Times would be opposed to their being established anywhere inside the Empire.” At the same time, Chamberlain heard that “official American circles” questioned HMG’s sincerity in the matter, describing this action as “a ‘red herring’ drawn across the path of the Palestine White Paper” (Pell to Moffatt, May 22, 1939; Pell to Hull, June 22, 1939; both in Taylor MSS). For the weakness of the Intergovernmental Committee, see Achilles memorandum, Nov. 15, 1938, 840.48 Refugees/900 1/2, SD. HMG abandoned the British Guiana project soon after World War II broke out. 79 Weizmann–Chamberlain–MacDonald interview, May 11, 1939, S25/7563, CZA. Amery also thought that the “latest surrender” reflected Lampson’s influence. Amery diary, May 23, 1939, Amery MSS. 80 Weizmann–Macdonald interview, May 13, 1939, S25/7563, CZA. 81 Meeting, May 17, 1939, CAB 28/39, PRO; Samuel memorandum, May 1939, volume 9, Herbert Samuel MSS, House of Lords Records Office, London; Sasson to Shertok, Feb. 24, 1941, Z4/15185, CZA. 82 FRUS, 750-758; Roosevelt to Green, May 3, 1939, F38/853, CZA. In his message to a mass protest against the Passfield White Paper of 1930, Roosevelt, then governor of New York State, had declared: “It is my clear recollection that at the close of the war there was a general whole-hearted understanding, a moral agreement, from which no one dissented, that Palestine was to be set aside as a territory for the Jewish National Home. I think moral obligations rest upon those who participated in the Peace Conference in 1918 to carry through to conclusion the high purposes then decided on” (JTA, Nov. 4, 1930). 83 Palestine: Statement of Policy, Cmd. 6019 (London, 1939). 84 Statement in London Times, May 18, 1939. The British Embassy in Washington, D.C., forwarded this clipping to the State Department the next day. See 867N.01/1558, SD. While Ben-Gurion’s immediate reaction at Jewish Agency headquarters in London was to “threaten hell on the British government,” and Dugdale tried to calm him down, Weizmann exuded calm. “If Hitler wins, we all go down the drain,” he commented to a colleague, and therefore the key was to insure Britain’s victory against Hitler (Perlzweig interview with the author, Dec. 23, 1975). 85 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 347, cols. 1947-2066 (May 22, 1939), and cols. 2139-2199 (May 23, 1939); MacDonald to Tannous, June 1, 1939, file 361/4-P, ISA. For Churchill’s views on Palestine when he served as Colonial Secretary, see Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill: Prophet of Truth, — 676 —

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86

87

88

89

90

91 92

5 (London, 1976), chaps. 29-36. Manchester Guardian, May 18-19, and 22, 1939; London Times, May 1720, 1939; Palestine Post, May 18-20, 1939; Joseph diary, May 18-19, 1939, A24/219, CZA; Sherman, Island Refuge, 236-239, 241-242; S25/22701, CZA; JTA, May 23, 1939; Avneri, MehVelos” Ad “Taurus,” 390, 392-393, 394; Statement, May 30, 1939, FO 371/23237, and Phipps to Foreign Office, May 26, 1939, FO 371/23236; both in PRO; Chap. 9, 37n; FRUS, 769-771, 778-780, 787-789. The Foreign Office informed the League that HMG was “unable to accede” to Husseini’s request. Baxter to League, June 19, 1939, file R4073/6A/28362/668, LNA. JTA, May 16 and 24, 1939; Penkower, Decision on Palestine Deferred, 9-11; Ben-Ami, Years of Wrath, Days of Glory, 234; Robert Briscoe statement, Jan. 2, 1938 (should be 1939), file 8/253P, JA. Prior to 1939, Jabotinsky had rejected related proposals by acolyte Ze’ev von Weisl. See von Weisl reminiscences, 1971, file P-87/15, JA. C.I.D. report, May 24, 1939, file 47/83, Hagana Archives; JTA, June 30, 1939; Antonius memorandum, June 3, 1939, FO 371/23237; KingsleyHeath to MacMichael, July 14, 1939, FO 371/23239; both in PRO; Tannous, The Palestinians, 309, 375; MacDonald to Tannous, June 1, 1939, RG 65, file P-2834/984, ISA. For Fakhri’s continued opposition to the Arab Revolt leadership, see Aug. 22 and 24, 1939 reports, S25/4144, CZA. Fakhri Nashashibi would be assassinated in 1941 by emissaries of Haj Amin in Baghdad. Antonius would die in Jerusalem in May 1942 at the age of 50, an uncompromising opponent of Zionism to the end. Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1939-1945 (New York, 1979), 184-192; May 21, 23, 25, and 26, 1939, Diaries, Berle, Jr. MSS; FRUS, 768-769. A strong protest against the White Paper was sent by the six major U.S. Zionist organizations to Chamberlain; no reply was received (July 2, 1939 cable to Chamberlain, FO 371/23238, PRO). Reform Rabbi Morris Lazaron of Baltimore broke with his fellow Jews by endorsing the White Paper in a letter published by the New York Times and the Baltimore Sun, arguing that Jews should abandon political Zionism, build up Palestine as a cultural-religious center, and seek havens elsewhere for persecuted Jews. Reading the “very beautiful and very wise letter,” Welles privately told Lazaron that “you have rendered a very great service” (Box 3046, Morris Lazaron MSS, AJA). FRUS, 791; Baffy, 142-143; JTA, June 7, 1939; MacDonald to Cabinet, July 19, 1939, CO 733/398/75156, PRO; Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 350, cols. 762-883 (July 20, 1939); Hirszowicz, The Third Reich and the Arab East, 54-59. The German sum came to almost £500,000. JAEJ, July 16, 1939, CZA; Sherman, Island Refuge, 239-240. Baffy, 141-142; League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes of the Thirty-Sixth Session (Geneva, 1939), 69-75, 95-140, 171-186, 196-208, 286-289; MacDonald to Chamberlain, June 19, 1939, RG 72.16, file 1784/4, — 677 —

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ISA; MacDonald to Cabinet, June 28, 1939, CO 733/398/75156, PRO; Rappard to Weizmann, July 1, 1939, A508/7, CZA; London Economist, Aug. 19, 1939; Brandeis–Szold interview, Aug. 6, 1939, Box 30, R. Szold MSS. For a critique by Shertok’s Political Department assistant of MacDonald’s speech at the Commission, see Kohn to Goldmann, June 18, 1939, P575/27I, Kohn MSS. 93 Penkower, Decision on Palestine Deferred, 20-21, 14-15. Given the American public’s isolationism, Roosevelt also had felt that it would be “absolutely impossible” to repeal the Neutrality Act (E. Roosevelt to Fischer, Feb. 28, 1938, Box 10, Louis Fischer MSS, Firestone Library, Princeton University). The clandestine effort in mid-August of Congressman Hamilton Fish, Jr., an arch-isolationist and vigorous anti-Communist who attacked the White Paper, to seek support for Baruch’s plan while trying to prevent the outbreak of war angered Roosevelt (Penkower, Decision on Palestine Deferred, 22-23). Expulsions from the Reich had markedly escalated between January and August, 70,000 Jews simply “sent into the world without plan or destination” (Jacob Toury, “From Forced Emigration to Expulsion: the Jewish Exodus over the Non-Slavic Borders of the Reich as a Prelude to the “Final Solution,” Yad Vashem Studies 17 [1986]: 80-91). 94 New Judea, Sept. 1939; FRUS, 797-799. For more on the Zionist Congress, see Penkower, Decision on Palestine Deferred, 4-7. 95 Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, 293, 540; The Letters of Martin Buber, A Life of Dialogue, ed. N. N. Glatzer and P. Mendes-Flohr, trans. R. and C. Winston and H. Zohn (New York, 1991), 478-486; Weizmann to Williams, Apr. 26, 1939, WA. 96 Yehoshua Porath, The Palestinian Arab National Movement, 251-257; Yuval Arnon-Ohana, Falahim BaMered HaAravi B’Eretz Yisrael, 1936-1939 (TelAviv, 1978), 145-152; Lesch, Arab Politics in Palestine, 224-226; Yigal Ayal, HaIntifada HaRishona, Dikui HaMered HaAravi Al Yedei HaTzava HaBriti B’Eretz Yisrael 1936-1939 (Tel Aviv, 1988), 425-427; Shertok to Pownall, Aug. 25, 1939, A245/583/7, CZA; Weizmann to Chamberlain, Aug. 29, 1939, WA. Reflecting years later on the White Paper, MacDonald asserted that an additional object of that policy was “to enable the Jewish National Home in Palestine to survive the war.” A steady increase in Jewish immigration, he argued, might have led the Arab States to join Germany and Italy in World War II, possibly resulting in Britain’s defeat, which in turn would lead to Nazi Germany’s “expulsion” of the Jewish National Home. “The Jews there would have been dispersed once more from their historic homeland as they had been about 2,000 years earlier.” If, on the other hand, the British were victorious, conditions might permit Jewish immigration to Palestine to resume in accordance with the country’s economic absorptive capacity. “Indeed, the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine might be suitable, with Arab acquiescence,” he concluded (MacDonald to Bethell, n.d., RG 72.16, file 1784/4, ISA). For a thesis that the White Paper also reflected a broader move — 678 —

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97

on the Cabinet’s part toward decolonization, a trend that would reach full expression in the late 1940s, see Ronald Zweig, “The Palestine Problem in the Context of Colonial Policy on the Eve of the Second World War,” in Michael J. Cohen and Martin Kolinsky, eds., Britain and the Middle East in the 1930s: Security Problems, 1935-39 (London, 1992), 206-216. JTA, Jan. 22, 1936; Penkower, The Jews Were Expendable, passim; Penkower, Decision on Palestine Deferred, passim. For Halifax’s favoring a negotiated peace with Germany during the critical days prior to the evacuation from Dunkirk of British and French forces to safety across the English Channel, in sharp contrast with Churchill, recently selected as Prime Minister after the fall of France to Germany, see John Lukacs, Five Days in London, May 1940 (New Haven, 2001 ed.).

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Conclusion

Six and a half years separated Adolf Hitler’s ascent as Chancellor of Germany from his unleashing of World War II. During that same period, Palestine witnessed a cardinal transformation unforeseen by the British architects of the Balfour Declaration and of the League mandate. Jewish immigration from the Third Reich and other antisemitic countries in Europe accelerated rapidly, doubling the yishuv’s numbers to more than 400,000, almost a third of the population. This Fifth Aliya, settling mostly in the cities (over half in Tel Aviv) and towns, also sparked the emergence of modern industry. A steady expansion of citriculture took place as well, with the planting of tens of thousands of dunams and the rise in exports from 2.5 million cases in 1931 to 15.3 million in 1939. In the peak of immigration between 1933 and 1936, about a quarter of the 164,267 legal newcomers (24,000 from Germany) arrived with “capitalist” certificates. Almost a quarter of the £31,570,000 brought in during this time by private investors came through the special ha’avara arrangement between the Jewish Agency and the German authorities. In addition, the economic enterprises and social services of the dominant Histadrut, which claimed 100,000 members in 1937, contributed much to the strengthening of what loyalists of the Jewish risorgimento called with understandable cause “HaMedina ShehBaDerekh” (the Statein-the Making).1 Nor could His Majesty’s Government have foretold the second major change to affect the Holy Land in these years, an Arab Revolt that began in April 1936 and only guttered out in early 1939. That spontaneous outbreak from below, catching the mandatory, the Haganah military command, and the different Arab party leaders all by surprise, gathered impressive force even after the Palestine administration disbanded the Arab Higher Committee in October 1937 and deported four members of its executive. The Mufti escaped to Syria, from where he continued to direct the campaign of terror and corrosive hatred. A national resistance movement against British rule and Jewish progress took firm hold, — 680 —

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reaching its climax in the summer of 1938. The successful demands of militants in Egypt and Syria for independence from foreign rule, following the Iraqi example, played a significant role in galvanizing mass sentiment. Italy’s victory in Ethiopia, along with funds from Rome and propaganda from Berlin, encouraged these ranks further. According to a conservative British estimate, 3,074 Palestinian Arabs were killed and 110 were hanged during the armed uprising, and 6,000 incarcerated in 1939 alone.2 Yet Jamal Husseini and his colleagues, in the Palestinian Arab delegation to the 1939 St. James Conference, stridently insisted on maintaining an uncompromising stance, prevailing against the advice of representatives from Arab states that the final British proposals be accepted. Internal strife plagued the yishuv. The Labor-Revisionist rift, which widened dramatically as a result of Arlosoroff’s murder, poisoned political discourse. Demonization of opponents thwarted efforts at unity between the Left and Right, which persisted in their differences over a boycott of German goods; Palestine entry certificates; the role of the bourgeoisie and urban settlement; self-restraint against murderous Arab assault; partition of the country; the hanging of Shlomo BenYosef; and illegal immigration. With Mapai firmly in the political saddle after the 1935 World Zionist Congress, the Jabotinsky forces created an independent organization. Factionalism surfaced within each camp as well, Ben-Gurion at odds with Weizmann, Tabenkin, and Ussishkin, Jabotinsky with the Brit HaBiryonim and the Irgun. A minority that shared Magnes’s bi-nationalist views, finding adherents among an Anglo- and an American-Jewish establishment that opposed the Jewish Agency’s support of a World Jewish Congress, called for a voluntary halt to Jewish immigration. At the same time, this community overwhelmingly reached consensus as to the revival after two millennia of the Jewish nation in Eretz Yisrael. None challenged the recognition that had been given in the mandate and at the San Remo Conference to “the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine,” and to “the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country.” Few accepted the permanent minority status accorded in the Legislative Council, the Hyamson-Newcombe and Philby schemes, various Arab proposals, and the draconian White Paper of May 1939, readily recalling the recent massacre by Iraqi forces of Assyrian Christians and the thinly veiled — 681 —

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threats of Haj Amin and Abd al-Hadi before a shocked Peel Commission about the fate of present Palestinian Jews in a future Arab state. With Jews on the Continent facing both the malignant threat of dictators and the callous indifference of democracies, the latter well reflected in McDonald’s failure as High Commissioner for refugees from Germany and in the public proceedings of the 1938 Evian-les-Bains conclave, the yishuv came to insist that Palestine alone should and could serve as the hope for Jewry’s collective future. Its response included Youth Aliya, over 50 homa u’migdal settlements, and the entry of more than 15,000 “illegals” aboard 43 ships between 1934 and September 1939 which ultimately eluded five British destroyers and five smaller launchers. Palestinian Jewish youth, Anita Shapira has shown, “took up the task of fighting as the special and distinctive mission of the generation.” The three years of Arab rebellion, which claimed approximately 500 Jewish victims but only two small abandoned settlements, had produced what Weizmann aptly termed “a sense of national cohesion and a doughty determination”: “The iron has entered the soul of this people.”3 Nationalist passions coursed through the Palestine Arab community as well. The riots of October 1933, championed by the Arab Executive Committee under the prodding of the Youth Congress, marked the first attacks against the mandatory authorities. Zu’aitir and other Istiqlalists maintained a rigid opposition, while the Arab press increasingly sounded the tocsin for resistance. The police killing in November 1935 of terrorist Qassam, who pioneered the advocating of jihad as the only means of liberating Palestine from infidel Britons and Jews and transforming it into an Islamic state, proved especially significant. His iconic example awakened more Arab guerilla efforts, as Ben-Gurion had predicted. A delegation soon thereafter of five out of the six Palestinian Arab parties met with Wauchope in a common front for the first time to call for a democratic government in Palestine, a complete end to Jewish immigration, and a halt to all land purchases by Jews. Once the Arab Revolt broke out, Haj Amin spearheaded an unremitting groundswell of hatred toward the Zionist endeavor. The Royal (Peel) Commission noted that the “general beneficent effect” of Jewish immigration on the remarkable rise in the Arab standard of living far different than that in other British-ruled Arab countries, ranging from mortality rates and life expectancy to economic growth, also meant “the deterioration of the political situation.”4 Nashashibi, Alami, and other so-called moderates — 682 —

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insisted, likewise, on sovereign dominance. The Arabs even refused to sit at the same conference table in London with the Jews. An exchange of telegrams in October 1938 captured the escalating divide that had developed between the two contending communities. Nabi al-Azmeh, heading the Palestine Defense Committee in Syria, warned “the President of the Zionist Organization Jerusalem” that “obstinacy” would cause him and the Jews of the East “the greatest disaster which history has known.” “Be satisfied with those who dwell in Palestine—this is a grace accorded to you,” the writer advised. If Great Britain, he closed ominously, was prepared to protect the Zionists with bayonets, “she will not be able to protect you in all the countries of the Arabs and of the East.” In reply, Shertok noted that Palestinian Jewry’s stand in the face of the Arab onslaught of the last three years offered “eloquent testimony” that it would not be deterred by further killings. If surrounding Arab countries were to massacre Jews, they would “only disgrace themselves” just as the Palestinian Arab movement had brought “shameful stain” on its record with the recent slaughter of Jewish women and children in Tiberias. He offered “full fruitful cooperation between a Palestine embracing Jews and Arabs and the neighboring countries for the good of all,” provided that the basic rights of the yishuv were recognized. “The return of Jews to Palestine is dictated by historical necessity,” Shertok ended. “No dangers or threats can deflect the Jewish people from this path or stifle in it the urge for freedom.”5 While the yishuv increasingly reached a consensus as to its future, however, the upsurge in violence also saw far more Arabs than Jews or Englishmen murdered by fellow Arabs. According to official British statistics, 195 Arabs were killed by Arab gangs in 1936, 503 in 1938, and 414 in 1939. The comparable figures for Britons and Jews, respectively, were 37 and 80, 77 and 255, 37 and 94. Fakhri Nashashibi charged Haj Amin, whose intransigence was glossed over in Antonius’s influential The Arab Awakening, with the assassination of 3,000 Arabs and the causing of more than 10,000 to flee the country for safety elsewhere. A similar list of eminent Palestinian-Arab victims was circulated from Cairo by the Office of the League for Arab National Activity, depicting the crimes “perpetrated by the criminal henchmen of the murderous Mufti.” Palestinian Arab intellectuals requested Haj Amin in 1938 to issue a proclamation denouncing “the murder of Arabs by Arabs”—to no avail. Arabs were killed for the crime of selling land to Jews, although Abd al— 683 —

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Hadi, Alami, Ghusayn, Haj Ibrahim, Nashashibi, Rok, Mughannam, and other nationalist activists were secretly engaged in these same ventures. Arab village “peace bands,” some operating with the British authorities and with the Hagana, fought back against gang banditry and the murder of innocent villagers. Haj Amin’s vendettas did not let up, however. Fakhri Nashashibi would be assassinated in Baghdad in 1941 and peace band leader Fakhri Abd al-Hadi killed in 1943. This struggle for political preeminence, coupled with internal differences between rebel commanders, further weakened domestic cohesion at a time when marked consolidation crowned the yishuv’s efforts. Years later, Alami would express to Eliyahu Eilat (formerly Epstein) his regret that a leader of Ben-Gurion’s stature and ability did not emerge within the Palestinian Arab world at this critical hour.6 Confronted by the furies swirling in the Holy Land, London relied on Wauchope’s approach to the Palestine quagmire. Inspired by the Zionist enterprise, the High Commissioner had sought to strengthen its base while also placating Arab fears of Jewish domination. This explained his caution regarding Zionist settlement in Transjordan and awarding the yishuv a more equitable share in government works; his fears of future economic dislocation; the deduction of Jewish “illegals” from entry quotas for Palestine; and his insistence that HMG fulfill its pledge regarding a Legislative Council. When severe, pro-Zionist criticism in both houses of Parliament led the Cabinet to reject the Council, Wauchope proposed that an Arab delegation see Thomas for political negotiations. Depressed by the Arab Revolt, he procrastinated in arresting Haj Amin and associates on the Arab Higher Committee and, despite the urging of General Dill, in imposing Martial Law. The bankruptcy of Wauchope’s stance in the face of increasing Arab assaults, coupled with the Italian threat to the Mediterranean, brought about a tectonic shift in British policy. The Foreign Office encouraged an intervention by Arab kings, although they had no standing in the mandate, to end the revolt. When Ormsby-Gore heralded the Peel Commission’s revolutionary offer to partition Palestine into two polities, Eden, buoyed by Rendel’s discounting of Haj Amin’s critical role in the rebellion and his emphasizing of Ibn Saud’s unrelenting hostility to Zionism, led the countercharge. The Cabinet endorsed Whitehall’s plan that secret instructions be given to the Woodhead Commission against partition. The military chiefs, increasingly worried about the loyalty of — 684 —

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the Arab States while aware that Jewish fealty in a war against Germany might be safely assumed, weighed in heavily on the Foreign Office’s side. As early as August 1937, a new Immigration Ordinance empowered the High Commissioner “temporarily” to fix a maximum total number of immigrants for any specified period, as well as the maximum number to be admitted in any category. At the very time that the yishuv’s vitally important function as haven was needed, immigration dropped to 9,400 in 1937, rose slightly to 11,200 in the following year and 13,700 in 1939—far too little and too late for the trapped Jews of Europe.7 On January 21, 1938, the Colonial Office’s John M. Martin, past secretary to the Peel Commission, had warned his colleagues that yielding to “the extremist Arab demand” for Palestine as an Arab state with a guaranteed Jewish minority would constitute “a betrayal so dishonourable and a surrender to force so conspicuous as to earn us as much contempt as the gratitude of the Moslem world.” Before the year was out, MacDonald proposed that very possibility to the Cabinet and invited the Arab monarchs to the St. James Conference, a tripartite series of meetings that became witness to the death knell of the Jewish National Home. Accepting Halifax’s emphasis on “administrative necessity,” he and the rest of the Chamberlain government embraced the tenet of appeasement that governed its earlier stance vis-à-vis Hitler at Munich.8 The first sought to avoid a potential war, the second, by means of the 1939 White Paper, to prepare for an inevitable one. Consistently, HMG sought to deflect attention on Palestine as essential refuge just when the Jewish people faced unprecedented anguish. Despite strong appeals from various state delegates at the League of Nations, Simon made clear Whitehall’s refusal to include the Promised Land within McDonald’s jurisdiction. London lay down the same stipulation before agreeing to participate in the Evian Conference, at which the Jewish Agency submitted its plan for the rapid and constructive absorption of 100,000 refugees in Palestine. It also rejected the Agency’s request for the quick admission in November 1938 of 10,000 Jewish children into Palestine, while admitting nearly the same number (but without parents) into the island of Albion. British Guiana and Northern Rhodesia were officially touted as alternatives, although the total number of refugees from the Third Reich who entered British colonial dependencies other than Palestine from 1933 to the end of September 1939, according to the Colonial Office, was “in the neighborhood of 3,000.” — 685 —

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Weizmann’s public cri de coeur to the Peel Commission, pointing to six million Jews living East of the Rhine “for whom the world is divided into places where they cannot live and places in which they cannot enter,” fell on deaf ears.9 Echoing Arab claims, British officialdom came to refuse the right of the Jewish people to self-determination in a distinctly Jewish commonwealth. Even the sympathetic Wauchope told Ben-Gurion in July 1934 that the necessary steps would be taken to safeguard the interests of “the minority” in a Legislative Council, drawing the riposte that the mandate and the Balfour Declaration recognized Jewish rights “not as a minority but as a nation.” The Council’s fundamental defect, Weizmann wrote to Rappard in January 1936, was that the Jews were to be reduced to the status of a “national minority,” rather than the mandate’s “basic inspiration” that the Jews were “to enjoy in Palestine a status of national freedom.” Much like Husseini, Rumbold declared at the Peel Commission hearings that the “injection of an alien race into the body politic of this native race has complicated the situation very much,” leading the Agency’s outraged Dov Hos to counter that the Jews were “children returning to their country.” Agreeing with Ambassadors Lampson in Cairo, Houstoun-Boswell in Baghdad, and Bullard in Jedda when advocating unreservedly for the Arab cause until the European crisis passed, Chargé d’Affaires Bateman in Baghdad advised his superiors in August 1938 that the Jews “are anybody’s game nowadays. But we need not desert them. They have waited two thousands years for their ‘home’…they can afford to wait a bit until we are better able to help them get their last pound of flesh.”10 Patience, however, was a luxury denied to the Bible’s Chosen People. While words like “annihilation,” “destruction,” “extermination,” “starvation by death,” “elimination,” “physical extinction,” “shoa,” and “the onrush of lava” surfaced with greater frequency in these depressing years, no one could have foreseen the impending Holocaust, when Jewish hopes would be literally reduced to ashes. Ruppin spoke at Evian of an annual emigration rate of 50,000 Jews from Germany and Austria over a six-year period; Jabotinsky pressed in October 1938 for an immigration of 1 million within three years. Even Ben-Gurion’s call for an “aliya rebellion” without British approval after Kristallnacht, which he saw as “the signal for the extermination of the Jewish people throughout the world,” referred to the entry of 1 million Jews in a short time. Still, all — 686 —

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sensed the screw press of destiny inexorably tightening about the Jews of Europe and, consequently, the need for a fundamental change. Shertok wrote privately in September 1937 that the only reply to future attacks in Geneva against Jews by independent Arab States was a Jewish state out of “dire political necessity,” and to avoid further humiliation for the representatives of seventeen million Jews worldwide to “sit there dumb and outside the pale, and to hang on the lips of this goy [Gentile] or that for a word of sympathy.” Speaking in a similar vein, Meyerson told the press after Evian, “there is only one thing I hope to see before I die and that is that my people should not need expressions of sympathy anymore.” Hearing MacDonald’s comment on May 13, 1939, that the Jews had made “many mistakes,” Weizmann’s sharp retort reflected personal bitterness and his people’s angst: “Our chief mistake is that we exist at all.”11 By the close of 1938, Meinertzhagen recorded in his diary, Weizmann thought HMG and its permanent officials “lifeless, inanimate and immovable, and in addition unsympathetic to the very policy they were pledged to carry out in Palestine.” The Zionists could claim keen British kindred spirits such as Wedgwood, Sinclair, Amery, Churchill, Cazelet, Morrison, and Wingate, while public opinion in England steadily shifted to sympathy in the light of Nazi persecution. Defending large-scale immigration into Palestine, A. Duff Cooper and Sir John Halsam spoke for many when recalling in Commons on July 20, 1939, the exiled Jews’ lament by the waters of Babylon, a thousand years before the Prophet Mohammed was born, “If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, Let my right hand forget her cunning” and Palestine’s being “promised to the Jews by Lord God Almighty.” The same held true across the Atlantic, where, operating separately, the Pro-Palestine Federation of America and the ZOA garnered considerable Christian endorsement for the attainment of Zionist ideals. In the wake of Kristallnacht, 51 U.S. senators, 154 representatives, and 30 governors endorsed a petition of the ad hoc National Emergency Committee on Palestine, which pressed Roosevelt to “take action” against British obstruction of the Jewish National Home. Responding to the White Paper, 28 senators signed the American Zionist Bureau’s statement that evoked “humanitarian and Christian principles and impulses” to attack this repudiation of the “moral obligation” embodied in the Balfour Declaration; a similar protest by over 200 congressmen followed. The sporadic effort failed to — 687 —

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sway Chamberlain’s Cabinet, however.12 Roosevelt, in whom American Jewry put its unquestioning trust, hailed the Zionists’ “great work of revival and restoration” when sending an official message to Wise for the National Conference on Palestine in February 1937. That October, he received, via his wife Eleanor, the report from a former U.S. Minister to Persia in favor of extending the frontiers of the new Jewish State considerably beyond those in the Peel Commission report. In early 1938, however, FDR conveyed to Wise his understanding that Palestine only had room for another 150,000 Jews, then advised that the Zionists might as well give up any idea of getting Transjordan, and think of a place like the colonies formerly held by Germany in West Africa or get some new lands in Venezuela, Lower California, or Mexico. Brandeis played a major role in FDR’s suggestion that October to the British that a future transfer of 200,000 Palestinian Arabs to richly irrigated lands in Transjordan would enable a large Jewish immigration into the Promised Land. Yet reports of HMG’s continued inability to deal with the Arab problem and the constant “whittling away” of territory available for Jewish settlement, first in Transjordan and next in the Peel Commission proposal of a meager 2,500 square miles allotted to the Jews, had raised doubts in his mind as to the adequacy of Palestine as an outlet for Jewish refugees. Despite Senator Wagner’s public assurance that FDR wished Palestine’s doors to remain open, America’s chief executive did not send Frankfurter’s draft letter along these lines to 10 Downing St.13 The cautious Roosevelt began focusing on Angola, trumpeted by Welles and Bowman as the most “favorable option” for large-scale settlement, for Jews in dire need. He also seconded the State Department’s limited interpretation that the 1924 Anglo-American Convention regarding Palestine only enabled Washington to intercede concerning modifications of the mandate when American interests were directly affected, then asserted that “the unhappy plight of Jewish refugees is not the least of my concerns.” While telling Hull that the mandate intended “to convert Palestine into a Jewish National Home which might very possibly become preponderantly Jewish within a comparatively short time,” Roosevelt did not openly challenge the White Paper. Rather, he confided to State’s Berle and the anti-Zionist Murray his “snap judgment” that after the 75,000 Jews arrived in Palestine and the plan for administration began to work during the five-year period, the whole — 688 —

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problem could be reviewed again and either continued on a temporary basis for another five years or permanently settled, if possible.14 Presciently advising his associates that Roosevelt would not press an ally in this “hour of distress,” Ben-Gurion insisted after the St. James Conference that Zionism’s fate now depended on the yishuv and on the movement worldwide. “An uncompromising war” had to be carried out against the White Paper alongside a pro-British orientation in “the violent struggle” to come of the world powers, he insisted. Further, a “fearless stance” against Arab terror, as well as a constant striving toward mutual understanding with Arabs in Palestine and the neighboring states, should be adopted. Finally, augmenting the yishuv’s strength, which he considered “both the means and the end” of Zionist policy, represented “the goal for which we must fight during the next phase … a Jewish state.” That future commonwealth was not intended merely as a refuge. It ultimately meant, as Ben-Gurion had put it to his colleagues on the Inner Zionist Council in early 1934, to fulfill the Zionist vision embedded in the Jewish nation’s wish to establish its independence on the soil of its historic homeland, where its “national genius” had developed and been formed. Only there could they fashion the contours of their own lives, no longer rootless cosmopolitans in exile but Jews transformed via labor, and so achieve the Zionist dream of sovereign peoplehood.15 At the same time, as Ben-Gurion had also noted then, the factors leading to that realization had radically changed from 1933 onwards. The example of Hitler’s venomous antisemitism had spread throughout Europe, while the reality of Arab nationalism, in and outside of Palestine, could not be denied. Ben-Gurion’s hope for a large Jewish state aiding an Arab Federation of which it would be an integral part drew no takers in the adversarial circles that mattered. The Peel Commission had reverted to the early understanding (as Roosevelt himself acknowledged) that “the primary purpose of the mandate as expressed in its preamble and its articles is to promote the establishment of the Jewish National Home,” but London finally chose to adopt the Passfield White Paper’s conviction, adopted a little earlier by the Permanent Mandates Commission, that HMG had incurred two obligations of “equal weight” to Jew and Arab in Palestine. Ben-Gurion argued to Wauchope in July 1934 that while Palestine for the Arabs was only “a small strip in a vast territory inhabited by them,” for Jews “this country is everything, it is the only — 689 —

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corner in the world that we look upon as our homeland.” Jabotinsky made the same point to the Peel Commission four years later when observing that the Arabs would prefer Palestine to be “the Arab State No. 4, No. 5, or No. 6,” “but when the Arab claim is confronted with our Jewish demand to be saved, it is like the claims of appetite versus the claims of starvation.” For Great Britain, however, the demands of réalpolitik determined its course.16 Altered circumstances in the realm of power politics brought about the fracture in Anglo-Zionist relations on the eve of World War II. Facing what Ormsby-Gore, the members of the Peel Commission, and other British officials realized was an “irrepressible conflict” between two peoples seeking sovereignty, HMG’s Imperial strategic priorities trumped all of Weizmann’s heartrending appeals to moral values, to British honor, to history, and to international obligations. European Jewry’s singular calamity, as well as the yishuv’s novel strength and firm resolve toward achieving ultimate freedom, carried scant power in a world girding for global war. Seen in this context, the time when the Board of Directors’ deputy chairman of Lloyds’ Bank of London quoted Ezekiel’s prophetic vision of the revived dry bones of the whole House of Israel, thereby securing a £500,000 loan in 1934 to the Keren HaYesod, appeared increasingly anachronistic. Equally out-of-date was eminent Protestant theologian Reinhold Niebuhr’s eloquent plea before Hadassah’s National Convention in October 1938 that Christians “owe the Jews a haven of a national home” in Palestine at “the precise moment when it is most desperately needed to offer asylum and the chance of rehabilitation to thousands of refugees from Europe,” and that Britain could not “afford to make additional concessions to dictators without imperiling her physical integrity, just as she cannot afford to break her word without imperiling her moral prestige.”17 In the end, the Zionists’ Sisyphean efforts proved no match for a changed world in which, not far ahead, stalked remorseless, incalculable evil.

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Endnotes 1

2

3

4

5

6

Encyclopedia Judaica, vol. 9 (Jerusalem, 1971), 346, 527, 531. James G. McDonald grasped early on that Zionism’s achievements were due to “the creative force of an ideal” Supra, p.142. “The State-on-the-Way” would be the literal translation. Philip Matar, Mufti of Jerusalem: Al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni and the Palestinian National Movement (New York, 1988), 122. A figure of 5,032 Arab dead and 14,760 wounded, based upon Walid Khalidi, ed., From Haven to Conquest: Readings in Zionism and the Palestine Problem (Beirut, 1971), is given in Swedenburg, “The Role of the Palestinian Peasantry in the Great Revolt (1936-9),” in I. Pappe, ed., The Israel/Palestine Question (London, 1999), 157. Encyclopedia Judaica, 532; Perl, The Four-Front War, 165-166; Shapira, Land and Power, 257-276; supra, p. 666. The official history of the Hagana lists 80 Jewish dead between April and October 1936, and 415 between October 1937 and September 1939. Slutski, Sefer Toldot HaHagana, 2:2, 650, 801. A later evaluation puts the total number at 513. Meir Pa’il, “Hashpa’at HaMe’oraot Al Hitpathut HaHagana,” lecture for the Merkaz Ko’ah HaMagen, Hagana Archives. Palestine Royal Commission Report, Cmd. 5479. For a Zionist report about the positive effects of Jewish colonization on Palestinian Arab development in these years, these figures covering population, life expectancy, infant mortality, agricultural and industrial production, and wages, see D. H. (David Horowitz) undated memorandum, S25/2966, CZA. al-Azmeh to President of the Zionist Organization, n.d.; Shertok to al-Azmeh, Oct. 13, 1938; both in file IV-104-49-1-44B, Makhon Lavon. According to Jewish Agency intelligence, al-Azmeh was in the regular pay of the Italian and German governments in the early thirties, and served for some time as the main liaison between the Mufti and the Germans during the Arab Revolt. Not long after World War II, he served as the War Minister in the Syrian Government (Epstein (Eilat) to Mowrer, June 10, 1946, MFA 125/1, ISA). A Survey of Palestine, Prepared in December 1945 and January 1946 for the Information of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, vol. 1 (Palestine, 1946), 38, 46, 49; supra, p. 583; Zvi Elpeleg, “Why Was ‘Independent Palestine’ Never Created in 1948?” The Jerusalem Quarterly 50 (Spring 1989): 9; Kenneth W. Stein, The Land Question in Palestine, 1917-1939 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1984), 228-239; Ezra Danin with Yaakov Shimoni, Teudot U’Demuyot (Jerusalem, 1981); A. H. C. (Cohen) report, Nov. 6, 1938, S25/10615, CZA; Eliyahu Eilat, MiBa’ad L’Arafel HaYamim, 159. The latest study of Arabs killed by Arab rebels puts the total at 1,000 (Cohen, Army of Shadows, 144). For a study that sees non-elite countryside groups taking revenge against the control of wealthy Arab landlord usurers, see Ten Swedenburg, “The Role of the — 691 —

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Palestinian Peasantry in the Great Revolt (1936-9),” 130-167. This argument had been mentioned earlier in W. F. Abboushi, “The Road to Rebellion in Arab Palestine in the l930’s,” Journal of Palestine Studies 6.3 (Spring 1977): 42-43. In addition, when the Great Revolt (al-thawra al-kubra) was reaching its apogee in August 1938, the fellahin’s keffiyeh headscarf rapidly came to replace the urban-educated effendi’s tarbush. Ted Swedenburg, Memories of Revolt: The 1936-1939 Rebellion and the Palestinian National Past (Minneapolis, 1995), 32. Rashid Khalidi omits entirely the impact of this deadly civil war when properly asserting that the Palestinian Arabs entered World War II “without even the semblance of a unified leadership,” a reality that, joined with other difficulties, they “failed to overcome” when confronting “their most fateful challenge in 1947-49.” Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness (New York, 1997), 190. 7 Encyclopedia Judaica, 532. Confronted by the Goga government’s threat in January 1938 to expel 500,000 Jews from Rumania, Rendel advised his colleagues that while “it would be admirable” if “any room for Jews” could be found in either the Dominion or the Colonial Empire, he viewed the difficulty in light of “the far more immediate and dangerous problem” of Palestine. “Too many interests and prejudices would be likely to come into play if the question of doing something for the Jews within the Empire were raised at this stage …” With the situation corresponding “so closely to that existing in Poland and in certain other countries,” he ended in this manner: “Query: Bring up in a year” (Vago, The Shadow of the Swastika, 263-264). 8 Martin minute, Jan. 21, 1938, CO 733/354/75730, PRO; supra, pp. 631, 666. Years later, Martin regretted that the Peel Commission members, then “under tremendous pressure,” had not spent another six months in carefully drawing up a detailed partition plan, rather than submitting a “very quickly devised” scheme. “Given a certain faith and push,” he concluded, “you would find a way of doing it.” He dubbed the 1939 White Paper “the misguided paper,” reflecting “a failure of nerve” on the part of the British Cabinet. Martin interview with the author, June 20, 1976. 9 Sherman, Island Refuge, 255; supra, p. 356. Reporting that prospects for emigration at the close of 1937 “have become exceedingly difficult,” Bentwich warned the Hilfsverein der Deutschen Juden in Deutschland that “we are in a very desperate position as to how to face the ever growing demand of emigration in [the] future” (Bentwich to Adler-Rudel, Dec. 30, 1937, Box 6, Bentwich MSS). 10 Supra, p. 118; Weizmann to Rappard, Jan. 27, 1936, WA; supra, pp. 369, 552. 11 Daniel Frankel, Al Pi HaTehom, 286; supra, pp. 592, 434, 545, 657. An early use of “shoa,” the term later adopted in the State of Israel for the Holocaust, appeared in S. Gorelik, “Yom HaShloshim B’Yanuar,” Davar, Jan. 30, 1934. Two weeks earlier, Enzo Sereni wrote to the Histadrut about “the slow but unavoidable destruction (hurban) of German Jewry,” similar to “the slow dying” of the Jews of Poland and Lithuania (Sereni to Va’ad HaPoel, Jan. 18, — 692 —

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1934, file P145/8, Sereni MSS). 12 Meinertzhagen, Middle East Diary, 173; Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 350, cols. 762-883 (July 20, 1939); Penkower, The Holocaust and Israel Reborn, 111-114. That lament was taken from Psalms 137:5. 13 Supra, pp. 383, 483; Kornfeld memorandum, Oct. 14, 1937, file 1942, series 130, Eleanor Roosevelt MSS, FDRL; Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, reflecting the sentiments of his fellow Jews, publicly hailed Roosevelt after Kristallnacht for “his broad humanity” and his remaining “the one great leader of a great country who is aggressively championing the cause of democracy against all forms of absolutist dictatorship and tyranny” (Silver, “A Tribute to President Roosevelt,” Dec. 4, 1938, Abba Hillel Silver MSS, The Temple, Cleveland, OH). 14 Supra, pp. 619, 658. 15 Supra, p. 680; Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot 2, 71. Weizmann disciple Lewis Namier went even further, writing this in October 1933 as a conclusion to his preface for Arthur Ruppin’s The Jews in the Modern World: “Only those Jews who can build up for themselves a life as members of their nation, a nation even as all other nations, have a right to survive as Jews into the time to come.” 16 Supra, pp. 401, chap. 5-66n, 115-16, 118, 374. Weizmann poignantly captured the reality of Jewish powerlessness when seeking Mussolini’s intervention with Hitler in order to abrogate early antisemitic German legislation, observing that “the Jews do not constitute a state, but are only a people dispersed throughout the world, without organization; nobody has the right to say that he is speaking for all Jews, everywhere in the world” (Weizmann to Kobylinski, June 15, 1933, WA). For the spread of antisemitism throughout Europe, see Monty Noam Penkower, The Swastika’s Darkening Shadow: Voices before the Holocaust (New York, 2013). 17 Supra, p. 401; Morton Mayer Berman, The Bridge to Life: The Sage of Keren HaYesod 1920-1970 (Tel Aviv, 1970), 36; Ezekiel, chap. 37; Neibuhr address, Oct. 31, 1938, Hadassah Archives.

— 693 —

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— 719 —

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Index

Aaronsohn, Sarah 19, 71n11, 71n15 Abaza, Abed al-Hamid 512 Abd al-Hadi, Auni Bey 37-38, 56, 65, 115-116, 118, 132, 138, 152n75, 178, 192, 202, 207, 289, 295, 298, 300, 302, 305-306, 322, 326, 329, 334, 339n36, 340n40, 345n71, 347n94, 359, 361, 363, 366-367, 378, 380-381, 387, 389, 397, 410n82, 416, 424, 434, 437, 451, 455, 506, 519, 550, 557, 572, 615, 633, 650, 662, 682 Abd al-Hadi, Fakhri 607n75, 684 Abd al-Latif, Salah 199 Abd-al-Raziq, Arif 583, 674n70 Abd-el-Malik 150n59 Abdul Hamid II 98, 145n22 Abdul Medjid El-Kurdi 88, 143n5 Abdul Rahim al-Haj Muhammad 651 Abdul-Huda, Taufiq 615 Abdullah 16, 21-24, 26, 66, 72n18, 77n51, 90, 96, 100, 115, 155, 157, 169, 180, 192, 195, 219n93, 254, 267, 275, 298, 302, 306, 312-314, 321-322, 326, 333-334, 342n57, 344n68, 345n71, 359, 365, 374, 378, 382, 389-390, 397-399, 405n36, 406n43, 416, 424, 428-429, 434, 454, 467n36, 473n93, 476, 486, 512, 519, 524, 599n2, 613-614, 671n34 Abraham 150n59, 198, 218n80, 630 Abu Khadra, Mahmoud 335n2

Abu Kishk 164 Abu Rass, Hassan 291 Abu Ubayda boy scouts 121 Abushi family 451 Abyssinia (also see Ethiopia) 169, 185, 189, 192, 194-196, 200, 204, 238, 307, 318, 488, 602n26 Addis Ababa 298, 505 Aden, Avraham 213n30 Adler, Cyrus 76n39, 80n69, 145n22, 151n69, 153n91, 154, 211n1-2, 215n47, 220n95, 408n58, 413, 418, 456, 463n4, 473n89-91, 538n48, 573, 593, 611n99, 667n3 “Af-Al-Pi” 150n56, 548, 600n10, 661 Africa 150n64, 209, 212n12, 282n75, 356, 407n46, 476, 483, 490, 505, 508, 590-591, 596, 620, 664, 671n36, 688 Agronsky (Agron), Gershon 179180, 299, 338n26, 345n76, 410n82, 434, 553, 601n18 Agudas Israel 151n70, 206, 382, 414, 463n7, 528, 631, 648 Ahad Ha’am 38, 77n50, 417, 464n12, 555 Aharonovitz (Aranne), Zalman 42, 80n67, 127 Ahdut HaAvoda 16, Ahimeir, Abba 17-21, 36, 42, 45-47, 55, 70n7, 71n15-16, 78n56, 101, 108, 110, 133, 147n37, 155, 158, 211n3, 211n8, 333, 471n66, 566, 603n42 Ai 284n97

— 720 —

————————————————————— Index —————————————————————

Akaba 29, 97, 170, 173-174, 185186, 198, 212n18, 214n36, 249, 293, 400, 402, 426, 449 Akzin, Benjamin 397, 524-525 al Masri, Selim 291 Al-Ahram 257, 281n64, 519, 582 al-Alami, Musa 37, 65-66, 95, 109, 118-120, 122-123, 125, 136, 149n50, 304-305, 308, 313, 319, 334, 339n36, 341n45, 342n54, 343n62, 343n65, 406n43, 437, 485, 579, 582, 614, 660, 682, 684 Al-Aqsa Mosque 168, 202 Al-Azhar 512 al-Azmeh, Nabi 428, 683, 691n5 al-Banna, Hassan 470n59 Albert Hall 589 Albright, William F. 473n89 al-Dajani, Hasan Sidqi 194, 200, 583 Al-Difa’a 120, 131, 139, 152n75, 169, 173, 437 al-Din, Nasser 333 Alexander, David L. 463n2 Alexandretta 378, 406n44, 525, 633 Alexandria 257, 347n94, 504, 512, 602n27, 624, 631 al-Ghusayn, Tufiq Bey 339n36 al-Ghusayn, Ya’qub (Yacoub) 56, 173, 200, 202-203, 235, 274, 339n36, 345n71, 469n51, 662, 684 al-Haj Ibrahim, Rashid 202, 224, 421, 424, 435, 469n51, 615, 684 al-Halil, Ibrahim 428 al-Huneidi, Abd al-Rahman 607n75 al-Husseini, Abd al-Qadir 95, 287, 335n5, 607n75 al-Husseini, Jamal 36, 56, 124, 164, 167-168, 215n52, 219n93 235, 248, 265, 273-274, 285, 289, 293, 302, 308, 311, 319, 330, 334, 367, 417-418, 420, 424,

428, 437, 455, 675n75, 677n86, 681 al-Husseini, Musa Kazim Pasha 2223, 37-38, 53, 95, 120, 138, 168, 178, 182, 200, 289, 456, 460, 480, 490, 515-516, 523, 572, 582, 594 aliya 58, 69n4 aliya rebellion 592, 686 Aliya Bet 471n66, 597, 611n103, 660 al-Jabri, Ishan Bey 119, 123, 125126, 136-137, 195, 202 Al-Jama Al-Arabiya 132, 152n75, 157, 169, 202 Al-Jamia Al-Islamiya 56, 120, 139, 168, 437 al-Jihad al-Muqaddas 95 al-Kaukji, Fawzi 319, 333, 429, 443 al-Khalidi, Ahmad al-Samih 114115, 120, al-Khalidi, Husayn Fakhri 125, 179, 206, 289, 296, 313-314, 319, 324, 333, 340n40, 342n54, 345n71, 404n22, 424, 469n51 Allenby, Edmund 29, 402 Alliance Israelite Universelle 301 Alling, Paul 595, 603n39, 610n98 Al-Liwa 206, 257 Almansor 33 al-Mughannam, Mughannam 138, 684 Al-Muqattam 172 Alon, Yigal 500 al-Qassam, Sheikh Iz al-Din 7, 43, 201-202, 218n85, 223-224, 287, 300, 428, 451, 682 al-Ruhani, Amin 416 al-Sa’adi, Sheikh Farhan 287, 336n12, 435, 451, 472n77 al-Sakakini, Khalil 54, 275, 295 Al-Shabab 294 al-thawra al-kubra (Great Revolt) 692n6 —i—

————————————————————— Index —————————————————————

Alterman, Natan 124, 150n61 Al-Unsi, Mahmoud 312 Al-Zart Almoustakam 139 al-Zug 439 “An Amended Tripartite Partition Scheme” 473n94 American Economic Committee for Palestine 212n9, 212n20, 466n28 American isolationism 678n93 American Jewish Committee 27, 32, 48, 97, 113, 141, 154, 174, 179, 184, 193, 251, 260, 281n69, 288, 301, 413, 417, 484, 511, 538n55, 591, 594 American Jewish Congress 14, 19, 27, 48, 69n3, 184, 243, 260, 282n69, 301 American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC) 28, 97, 128, 232, 240-241, 251, 259-260, 281n67, 292, 301, 336n15, 545, 597, 664-665 American Jewish World 243 American Jews 63, 159, 230, 241, 373, 385, 633, 655-56 American Zionist Bureau 684 American Zionists (also see Brandeis, Frankfurter, Hadassah, Wise, Zionist Organization of America) 345n77, 677n89 Amery, Leopold 10, 225, 264, 268269, 272, 313, 325, 372, 375, 377, 395-396, 419, 478, 489, 521, 589, 643, 655, 660, 676n79, 687 Amiel, Moshe Avigdor 528 Anahnu U’Sh’kheineinu (We and Our Neighbors) 94 Andrews, Lewis Y. 427, 431, 434438, 452, 468n45-46 Anglo-American Mandate Convention (1924) 386, 621 Anglo-Egyptian treaty 347n94

Anglo-Iraqi Treaty 615, 671n33 Anglo-Jewish Association 27, 32, 48, 141, 463, 487 Anglo-Palestine Club 31, 200 Anglo-Palestine Corporation Bank 49 Angola 586, 590-591, 608n79-80, 619-620, 669n15, 688 “annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe” 622 Anschluss 498-500, 511, 514, 523, 558, 661 Antonius, George 90-92, 121, 148n44, 172-173, 197, 248, 291, 386, 401, 439, 450, 452, 455456, 473n89, 621, 633, 639, 643, 645, 648, 651-652, 662, 668n8, 669n18, 671n37, 674n72, 675n75, 677n88, 683 Antonius, Kitty 173, 492 ANZAC 472n83 Appeasement 262, 334, 504, 523, 535n29, 568, 574, 581, 595, 617, 620, 633, 647, 660, 666, 685 April boycott (1933) 27-30 Arab Agency 65, 360 Arab Awakening, The 633, 671n37, 674n72, 683 Arab Bank 157, 202 Arab Bureau 340n42, 417 Arab Centre 548, 662 Arab (Palestine) civil war 173, 333, 358, 464n10, 632, 607n75, 692n6 Arab Club 458 Arab Federation 17, 94, 109, 119, 123, 130, 132, 194, 304-305, 358, 367, 378, 380, 390, 406n43, 419, 429, 439, 456-460, 484-485, 490-491, 495, 557, 570, 573, 599n2, 602n26, 606n66, 614, 617, 635, 641, 643, 660, 689 Arab government officials’ protest 313, 342n54 — ii —

————————————————————— Index —————————————————————

Arab Higher Committee 8, 295-299, 302, 304, 311, 314-318, 324, 326, 328, 330, 333-334, 355, 359, 361, 377, 387, 398, 415, 417, 421, 434, 449, 455, 464n11, 534n24, 571, 579, 582-583, 594, 614, 651, 654, 662, 668n7, 674n70, 680, 684 Arab illegal immigration 145n21, 164, 576, 597 Arab Information Office 390 Arab kings’ intervention 325 Arab labor (laborers) 52, 64, 89, 97, 125, 131, 137, 139, 224, 519, 576 Arab mayors 60, 120, 303, 306 Arab National Bank 435 Arab National Fund 164 Arab police 252, 294, 296, 306, 314, 359-360, 565, 573, 603n36 Arab rebels hanged 451 Arab Revolt casualties 64-65, 691n2 Arab riots 8, 17, 19, 23, 65, 101, 146n23, 199, 218n81, 296, 309310, 341n47 Arab Scouts 137, 247, 273 Arab Women’s Committee 501, 544 Arab Women’s Congress 572, 598n2 Arab Women’s Federation 200 Arab Youth Congress 23, 53, 56, 137, 173 Arab Youth Organization 139 Arab Youth Party 229 Arafat, Mohammed Fahbi 662 Archbishop of Canterbury 105, 110, 179, 419, 534n19, 581 Aref el Jaouni 444 Arida, Antoine 37, 104 Arif Abdul Abd-al Raziq 583, 651, 674n70 Arlosoroff, Haim 16, 20-30, 34, 36, 38-48, 54, 71n14, 72n19, 77n51, 80n67, 88, 100, 108, 117, 152n76, 159, 178, 180, 276n2, 530, 681

Arlosoroff, Sima 42, 77n51, 78n53, 88, 100, 116 Armageddon 385 Armenians 83n84, 98, 145n22 Armstrong, Hamilton Fish 28, 32, 86, 499, 585 Armstrong, Harold Courtney 390393 Aronson, Shlomo 101-102, 110 Arslan, Amin Shakib 119, 123, 125-126, 136, 138, 169, 173, 195, 200, 217n73, 308, 434, 437, 455-456 Article 22 475, 503, “Aryanization” 193, 578, 584 “Aryans” 28, 50, 216n58 Asch, Sholem 631 Aseifat HaNivharim (Elected Assembly) 19, 106-107 as-Sa’id, Nuri Pasha 264, 308, 315, 342n57, 454, 473n93, 479, 481, 534n20, 535n31, 554, 557, 571, 604n52, 610n97, 615, 626, 650, 671n34 as-Suwaidi, Tawfiq 570-572, 582, 604n52, 650, 653 Assyrian Christians 56, 83n84, 447, 671n33, 681 Assyrian Tragedy, The 83n84 Ataturk, Mustafa Kemal 18, 281n62, 391, 531 Attlee, Clement 26, 31, 395-396, 504, 602n28, 655 Auden, W. H. 665 Auster, Daniel 179, 250, 280n53 Australia 223, 286, 355, 521, 544, 585, 620 Austria 34, 93, 104, 113, 128, 162, 171, 209, 225, 389, 412, 497500, 510, 514, 518, 526, 535n26, 536n43-44, 543, 548, 550, 553, 583-584, 589-590, 623, 664, 686 Austrian Jews 389, 498, 501, 511, 514, 528, 610n95 — iii —

————————————————————— Index —————————————————————

Avenol, Joseph 128, 226 Avigur, Shaul (see Meirov) Avriel, Ehud 498 Azarya 170, 213n30 Azzam Bey, Abdul Rahman 639, 672n49 Backer, George 417 Bacon, Francis 106 Baeck, Leo 48, 67, 80n69, 127, 176 Baer, Walter J. 196, 238 Baerwald, Paul 240, 414 Baggallay, Lacy 374, 479, 557-558, 560, 623, 664 Baker, Ray Stannard 172 Bakstansky, Levi 456, 460, 490, 598 Baldwin, Stanley 64, 204, 222, 247, 269, 271, 287, 317, 382 Balfour Declaration 8, 16, 29, 31, 45, 53, 59, 61, 63, 65, 70n70, 84n98, 91, 112, 117-118, 129132, 164, 172, 201, 203, 214n33, 237, 242, 270, 285, 290, 299, 307, 313, 320, 356, 362, 365, 371-375, 383, 397, 411-412, 425, 432, 440, 442, 448-449, 452453, 459, 484, 533n17, 534n22, 538n55, 553, 555, 572-573, 579582, 589n2, 604n44, 610n91, 625-630, 634, 640, 642, 647, 650, 657, 680, 686-687 Balfour, Arthur 15, 31, 62, 234, 372, 396, 495, 641, 673n52 Balfouria 201 BaMa’aleh 21, 30, 88 Bandak, Issa 200 Barghouti, Omar Saleh 474n94 Bari radio station 169, 339n34 Bar-Ilan, Meir (see Berlin, Meir) Bar Kokhba revolt 70n5, 78n59, 671n39 Barthou, Louis 141, 153n93 Baruch, Bernard 508, 591, 664, 668n15, 678n93 Barudi, Fakhri 429

Basle Program 31 Bateman, Charles H. 552, 686 Battalions of Royal Fusiliers 79n64 Battershill, William Denis 382, 428, 435, 441, 443-446, 508, 546, 548, 573 Battsek, Kurt 161 Baxter, C. W. 623, 670n22 BBC 327, 428, 532n3, 569 Beck, Józef 128, 270, 432 Bedouin 42, 56, 78n52, 134, 139, 164, 170, 219n88, 294, 439 Be’er Tuvia 218n81 Beersheba 53, 170, 229, 235, 482, 533n15, 587 Begin, Menahem 158, 566, 603n43 Beilinson, Moshe 30, 124, 148n42, 272 Beilis, Menahem Mendel 41, 78n55, 89 Beisan Valley (Bet Sh’an) 49, 319, 397, 507, 514, 536n34 Beit Dajan 164 Belgian Congo 591, 669n15 Bell, H. Montague 520, 540n77, 555 Ben Shemen agricultural school 15, 40 Ben-Ami, Oved 250, 280n53 Beneš, Edouard 59, 104, 141, 194, 510, 673n61 Ben-Gurion, Amos 186, 438 Ben-Gurion, David 8, 16-17, 21, 30, 35, 38-47, 57-58, 60-64, 8788, 94-95, 102-103, 106-138, 148n42, 149n52, 158-160, 164, 166, 170, 173-176, 179, 181, 185-199, 203-210, 221-222, 227, 233-236, 245-250, 258-262, 267-273, 285-292, 296, 299300, 303-311, 326-335, 337n19, 347n89, 358, 362-363, 369, 372-380, 388-398, 401-402, 411, 413-433, 438, 445, 450, 458-459, — iv —

————————————————————— Index —————————————————————

466n27, 471n66, 473n94, 480491, 496-497, 501, 504, 516-522, 524-531, 533n15-16, 547, 550, 553-554, 557-561, 565-570, 577, 580-581, 587-588, 592-593, 597, 613-614, 624-625, 628-644, 648651, 654-655, 663, 666, 671n34, 676n84, 681-686, 689 Ben-Gurion, Geula 186 Ben-Gurion, Paula 196, 497 Ben-Tov, Mordekhai 399, 651 Bentwich, Norman 20, 34, 50, 59, 90, 97, 223, 227, 251, 308, 335, 336n15, 377, 417, 421, 424, 438, 455, 502, 517, 538n48, 664, 692n9 Ben-Yosef, Shlomo 509, 522-523, 527-530, 546-548, 566, 681 Ben-Zvi, Yitzhak 16, 27, 42, 51-52, 61-62, 92, 106-107, 131, 158, 206, 247, 390, 394, 424, 465n20, 501, 547, 580, 627, 675n77 Bérenger, Victor Henri 544 Berger, Ya’akov 500 Bergman, Shmuel Hugo 71n15 Bergson, Henri 141 Berle, Jr., Adolf A. 500, 606n62, 662, 688 Berlin, Meir 47, 102, 423, 588 Berlin Orphan Fund 15 Berliner Tagblatt 86 Bessarabia 43, 292 Betar 17-21, 30, 35-36, 39, 41-47, 56, 88, 101, 109, 121, 133, 136, 158-159, 217n67, 219n88, 291, 333, 374, 431, 445, 509, 528530, 547, 565-566, 603n43 Betar World Conference 158, 566, 603n43 Bialik, Chaim Nahum 20, 35, 38, 41, 43, 54, 102, 146n28 Bible 178, 246, 362, 627, 686 Billikopf, Jacob 50-51, 68, 183 bi-nationalism 77n51, 439

674n68, 688 Brandenburg 67, 105 Brazil 183, 442, 585, 621 Brenner, Yehuda 500 Brenner, Yosef Hayim 219n88, 538n54 Bressler, David 251, 259, 336n15 Brit HaBiryonim 20, 36, 42, 45, 55, 71n15, 108, 110, 151n66, 155, 471n66, 509, 530, 603, 681 Brit Shalom 20, 71n15, 250, 280n53 Brit Trumpeldor (also see Betar) British Admiralty 135, 472n83 British Air Ministry 443 British Cabinet 29, 189, 285, 575, 630, 654, 679n96, 692n8 British Chiefs of Staff 459-460, 487, 612, 617 British Colonial Office 18, 23, 38, 50, 52, 66, 94, 107, 129, 149n50, 155, 165, 199, 205, 222, 226, 261-262, 265, 282n73, 287, 292, 311, 320-321, 325, 331, 358, 364, 371, 374, 381-382, 388, 394, 397-401, 409n78, 415, 436, 439-440, 448, 452, 457, 490, 497, 521-523, 531, 536n40, 548, 552, 554, 564, 618-620, 651, 675n75, 685 British Committee of Imperial Defense 487, 617 British Dominions 223, 439, 498499, 544 British East Africa 150n64, 282n75, 407n46, 505, 590, 671n36 British Foreign Office 38, 50, 94, 156, 162, 194, 197, 222, 226227, 230, 244, 264, 282n75, 311, 317-318, 324-325, 334, 340n42, 359, 370, 374, 378, 386, 399, 452-455, 459, 467n36, 481, 488, 490, 495, 497, 504, 514-515, 531, 557-558, 572, 577, 579, —v—

————————————————————— Index —————————————————————

Birchall, Fredrick T. 28, 105, 231 Birkat Ramadan 163 Birobidzhan 279n44, 619 “Biryonim” 18, 71n11, 445, 471n66, 565, 603n42 Black Hand, The 201, 427 “Black Letter” 71n13 Blair, F.C. 537n44 Blau, Moshe 206, 631 blood libel 41, 45, 55, 74n30, 78n55, 82n80, 105 Bludan Congress 480, 524, 615 Blum, Léon 141, 372-373, 549 Blumenfeld, Kurt 48, 129, 208 B’nai Binyamin 280n53 B’nai Brith 27, 32, 48, 184 B’nei Brak 42, 276n7 Board of Deputies of British Jews 25, 27, 32, 48, 116, 141, 281n69, 289, 301, 482 Bohemia and Moravia 664 Bonnet, Georges 510 book burning 76n40 Boothby, Robert 269 Borochov, Dov Ber 14 Boston Globe 222 Boutros-Ghali Pacha 468n42 Bowman, Isaiah 172, 408n58, 585586, 608n80, 619-620, 676n78, 688 Boxheim Documents 14 boycott of German goods 282n69, 681 Braginski, Yehuda 121 Brandeis, Louis D. 7-8, 22, 32-33, 50, 67, 72n19, 87, 97, 107, 141, 155, 164, 173, 176, 190-191, 212n20, 214n36, 232, 235, 239, 243, 299, 317-318, 341n51, 343n60, 373, 382, 384-385, 388-389, 413, 426, 431, 456-459, 482-483, 508, 520, 533n16, 540n74, 555, 562, 568, 575-576, 586, 593, 597, 608n82, 620, 649-650, 653, 655, 664,

612, 672n51, 684-685 British Guiana 584-586, 618, 620, 656, 676n78, 685 British Labour Party 26, 112-113, 148n43, 234, 264, 395, 420, 504, 567, 589, 643, 655 British Treasury 185, 253, 262, 264, 266, 285, 494 British troops 63, 294, 303, 314, 360, 442, 563, 569, 597, 655, 661 British War Office 318, 325, 331, 334, 343n63, 360, 443, 455, 487, 522, 573, 615, 617 British Zionist Federation 151n70, 252, 263, 456, 533n15, 593, 598 Brod, Max 8 Brodetsky, Selig 52, 127, 129-133, 155, 198, 205, 263, 288, 450, 481, 513, 552, 650 Brodie, Israel 413, 540n77 Brooke-Popham, Henry 526 “brown terror” 26 Bruce, Michael 584 Buber, Martin 665 Buchenwald 583, 589-590, 597 Budeiri, Ishaq 234 Bukhara 52 Bulgaria 623 Bullard, Reader 523, 552, 594, 625, 686 Bullitt, William 521, 653 Burgenland 539n59 Burla, Yehuda 79n65 Bustani, Wadi 249 Butler, Nicholas 473n89 Butler, Richard Austen 510, 632, 639, 652 C.I.D. (see Criminal Investigation Department) British Cabinet Committee on Foreign Policy 584 British Cabinet Committee on Palestine 576, 636, 640, 644, 653 — vi —

————————————————————— Index —————————————————————

British Cabinet Committee on Refugees 29, 620 Cadogan, Alexander 323, 619-620 Cameroons 586, 591 Campbell, J. F. 111 “Cana’anite” movement 604n43 Canada 194, 223, 286, 363, 431, 502, 537n44, 620 Candide 34 Cantonization 114, 254, 309, 361, 369, 374, 382, 386, 422, 431, 433, 447, 668n14 Capitalist immigration 197, 145n14, 175, 197, 221, 225, 238, 245, 253, 276n2, 330, 504, 680 Carmon, Moshe 46 Carter, William Morris 356 Carthage 160, 212n12 Catholics 73n22, 128, 144n8, 225, 475, 521 Cazelet, Victor 395-396, 454, 489, 687 Cecil, Robert 31, 59, 67, 141, 156157, 161-162, 183-184, 264, 266 Central Association of German Citizens of the Jewish Faith 14 Central British Fund 208 Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews into Palestine 93 Central Bureau of Relief and Reconstruction 48 Central Reich Office for Jewish Emigration 623 Chamberlain, Austen 269, 271 Chamberlain, Joseph 126, 150n64, 671n36 Chamberlain, Neville 382-383, 400, 420, 448, 452, 456, 475, 478, 488-489, 495, 498-499, 504, 511, 516, 540n69, 540n74, 558-561, 567-568, 570, 573-578, 581, 584-586, 594-596, 602n28, 611n99, 618-620, 624, 626, 632-633, 636-647, 653-657, 660,

666, 671n36, 673n61, 676n78, 677n89, 685, 688 Chancellor, John 20, 65, 71n13, 612 Chatfield, Alfred 459 Chesterton, Gilbert K. 112 Chief Rabbinate 111, 445, 529, 547 Christian Arabs 89, 277n16, 377, 427 Church of the Holy Sephulchre 53 Churchill,Winston 18, 21, 65, 269, 271, 375-376, 395-396, 419, 438, 465n16, 472n83, 478, 482, 581,624, 647, 655, 660, 679n97 Churchill White Paper of 1922 624, 687 Chvalkovsky, Frantisek 621, 669n19 Ciano, Gaelezzo 395, 550 Circassians 164 Clark Kerr, Archibald 264, 326 “cleansing of Jews” 539n59 Coar, John Firman 50-51, Cohen, Aharon 312, 389, 406n43, 434, 436, 614 Cohen, Benjamin V. 561-562, 565567, 574-575, 586, 608n82, 621 Cohen, Frank 73n24 Cohen, Haim 146n25 Cohen, Israel 112, 498 Cohen, Joseph L. 231 Cohen, Lionel L. 252, 412, 417, 456-457, 482, 604n52, 613 Cohen, Sam 49 Cohen, Ya’akov 71n11 “cold pogrom” 86 Collins, Michael 91, 385, 407n56 Comintern 460 Comité de Salut Public 588, 606n85 Command Paper 6019 (see White Paper of 1939) Committee of Ten 295, 302, 306, 312, 322 Communists in Palestine 43, 78n57 — vii —

————————————————————— Index —————————————————————

Concentration camps 26, 39, 51, 67, 498, 577, 581, 583, 585, 587, 589 Coolidge, Calvin 279n40 Cooper, Alfred Duff 269, 318, 325, 687 Concordat 90, 144n8 Corday, Charlotte 55, 82n81 Council for German Jewry 232, 263, 276n5, 336n15, 510, 548, 585 Council on Foreign Relations 172, 176, 241 Coupland, Reginald 356, 361, 363, 364, 367-369, 377, 385, 387, 394, 396, 398, 404n18 Cox, Henry 22-23, 140, 212n18, 275, 314, 370, 593 Cranborne, Robert 482 Crane, Charles R. 89-91, 172-173, 244, 248, 279n44, 473n89, 621, 652, 671n37, 674n72 Creech-Jones, Arthur 395 Criminal Investigation Department (C.I.D.) 35, 46, 52-54, 82n80, 88, 96, 120, 135, 169, 192, 206, 256, 265, 293, 325, 328 Cripps, Richard Strafford 369, 602n28 Crossley, A. C. 341n46 Cunliffe-Lister, Philip 23, 26, 28-30, 37, 49, 62-66, 75n34, 88-91, 96, 98-100, 116, 121, 123, 129, 134135, 152n79, 176-177, 198 Cust, Arthur 254-255, 309-310, 341n46, 369 customs union 320-321 Cyprus 58, 220n95, 459, 462, 494 Cyrus of Persia 79n59 Czechoslovakia 59, 94, 104, 128, 171, 222, 292, 433, 510-511, 535n26, 558, 564-565, 568, 589, 602n28, 610n95, 621, 673n61 Dachau 26, 33, 498, 521, 583

Daily Telegraph 572 Daladier, Edouard 510, 567 Daniel Sieff Research Institute 167 Danzig 15, 123, 136, 610n95, 669n19 Danziger, Felix 40-41 Darwaza, Izzat 374, 378, 435, 437, 571, 615 Davar 16, 21, 25, 30, 55, 88, 117, 124, 126, 444, 446, 509, 530 d’Avigdor-Goldsmid, Osmond 89, 141, 174, 187, 252, 411, 412, 419, 421, 425, 456-457, 461, 473n89, 482, 593 Dawson, Geoffrey 676n78 Dayan, Moshe 500 de Haas, Jacob 191 de Penha Garcia José 110, 422 De Sola Pool, Tamar 477 de Valera, Éamon 433, 508, 566 Dead Sea Works Company 154, 276n7, 409n75 “death ships” 660 Deborah 409n79 Decision on Palestine Deferred 9, 670n21, 677n87, 678n93, 679n97 Deedes, Wyndham 510 Dell, Robert 66-67 Denenberg, Zvi 294 Der Stürmer 14, 67, 105 Dhibban 487 Dickson, H.R.P. 442, 453, 470n60 Dill, John G. 318, 322-327, 331, 335, 360, 400, 684 Directive No. 60 56 disarmament 33, 68, 328, 346n82 displaced Arab land owners 278n30 Disraeli, Benjamin 59 Dizengoff, Meir 35, 40, 43, 102, 111, 116, 160, 301 Do’ar HaYom 18-19, 111, 116-117 Dobkin, Eliyahu 565 Dodd, William E. 50-51, 86, 90, — viii —

————————————————————— Index —————————————————————

106, 165, 176 Dollfuss, Engelbert 104, 113 Dome of the Rock 150n59, 365, 420, 429 Dominican Republic 544, 599n3 Downie, Harold F. 165, 381, 390, 452, 497, 555, 592, 601n22, 651652 Dreyfus, Alfred 55, 89 Drummond, Eric 67, 93-94 Druse 119, 169 Druyanov, Alter 43, 46, 55, 102, 695 Duce (see Mussolini) Duff Cooper, Alfred 269, 318, 325, 687 Dugdale, Blanche 234, 255, 261, 264, 269-272, 372, 375, 379, 385, 394, 396, 400-403, 419-423, 451, 454, 459, 466n29, 478, 483, 495-496, 507-508, 514, 516, 549, 562, 567, 569, 579, 593, 618, 625, 637, 672n47, 676n84 Dunkirk evacuation 679n97 Earl of Lytton 222, 276n3, 286-287 Earl of Plymouth 255 East Africa 150n64, 282n75, 407n46, 476, 505, 590, 620, 671n36 Eckhart, Dietrich 86, 143n1 Economist 664 Edé, Emil 398 Eden, Anthony 128, 222, 253, 264, 311-313, 315, 318, 323-326, 347n90, 370-371, 381, 385-386, 399-400, 418, 432-434, 438, 441, 448-453, 468n42, 478, 488, 495, 504, 684 Eder, M. David 263, 282n75 Edison Theatre 302 Edomites 213n30 Egypt 164, 169, 195, 206, 213n30, 219n93, 238, 247-248, 257-262, 269, 273-274, 293, 330, 334,

346n78, 347n94, 356, 375, 381, 420, 433, 444, 451, 458, 462, 468n42, 470n59, 473n93, 481, 486, 506, 512, 516, 539n67, 551552, 557-560, 572, 583, 603n39, 626, 631, 634-635, 639, 650, 653-655, 675n74, 681 Eichmann, Adolf 147n32, 498, 584, 623, 664 Eilat 170, 198, 213n30, 375, 394 “ein breira” (there is no choice) 333 Ein Harod 15, 92, 201 Einstein, Albert 7, 11n1, 232, 243, 549 Eiver HaYarden 16 El Khoury, Faris Bey 572 El Swaidy, Taufiq Bey 433 El Unsi, Mohammed Bey 21-22, 312 Eliash, Mordekhai 101, 111, 424 Elliot, Walter 151n73, 264, 398401, 426, 451-454, 459, 477, 595-596, 562, 579, 618, 625 Ellwangen 98 Elmalah, Avraham 206 Emek Hefer 39 Emerson, Herbert 620 Enabling Act 26 Endek 270 Epstein (Eilat), Eliyahu 170, 377378, 390, 438, 457, 541n79, 603n39, 684 Eretz Yisrael 15-16, 19, 35, 39-44, 69n4-5, 71n11, 79n59, 88, 101, 109, 126, 147n32, 148n41, 174, 208, 227, 246, 259, 273-275, 291-292, 332, 361, 368-369, 387, 391, 395, 397, 409n79, 423-425, 438, 491, 495, 524-529, 566, 569, 588, 632, 637, 647-648, 672n39, 681 Es Brent (It is Burning) 283n88 ESCO Foundation 74n24 Ethiopia 169, 227, 488, 569, 590591, 621, 681 — ix —

————————————————————— Index —————————————————————

Etzel (see Irgun Tsva’i Leumi) European Muslim Congress 217n73, 274 Evening Standard 462n1, 465n16 Evian Conference on Refugees 9, 499-500, 508, 514, 517-518, 523, 526-527, 531, 540n73, 543, 545, 549-550, 566, 574, 577, 586-587, 599n4, 682, 685-687 Evsektsii 44, 78n59 Exile 7, 79n59, 193, 206, 209, 327, 332, 387, 439, 600n16, 632, 661, 689 “extermination” 28, 34, 67, 97, 137, 298, 502, 543, 593, 663-664, 686, Fagen, Melvin 184 Falastin 56, 70n5, 89, 96, 168, 173, 201, 274, 314, 327, 436, 455 Farbstein, Yehoshua Heshel 21-22, 97 Farley, James 317 Farmers’ Federation 16, 55, 127, 280n53 Farraj, Yaqub (Yaq0ub) 137-138, 266, 416 Federal Scheme 473n94 Feigin, Rivka 45-46 Feis, Herbert 500, 521, 597 Feisal (see Hussein bin Ali, Feisal) Fellahin 54, 56, 64, 115, 138, 198, 203, 229, 235-237, 363, 427, 524, 692n6 Fellman, A. L. 165 Fifth Aliya 219n91, 680 Filastin 85n104 First Aliya 124 First Black Day 445 First Judean Regiment 79n64 Fischer, Louis 91 Fish, Jr., Hamilton 678n93 Fishman (Maimon), Jacob 227, 445 Five, The 304, 307-308, 321 Flexner, Bernard 241, 466n28

Foley, Frank E. 127, 176, 223 Foreign Affairs 28, 32, 172, 537n45 Foreign Policy Association 27, 620 Fourth Aliya 18 Forty-Ten Formula 506, 546 France 73n22, 87, 94, 103, 107, 128, 141-142, 156, 165, 169, 179, 194, 196, 209, 222, 258, 261, 292, 398, 406n44, 420, 433, 439, 469n55, 499, 510, 515, 517, 539n67, 540n69, 544, 558, 565, 602n28, 622, 653, 679n97 Franco, Francisco 488 Francois-Poncet, André 14 Frank, Jacob 150n65 Frankist movement 127 Frankfurter, Felix 33, 51, 68, 107, 116, 147n35, 241, 243, 245, 313, 317, 343n60, 382, 384, 387-388, 413, 466n28, 531, 542n92, 545, 574-575, 586, 630, 671n33 Free Synagogue 407n54 Freeland movement 521, Freier, Recha 14-15, 69n4, 92 French Guiana 586 French Reports 50, 137, 167 French-Syrian treaty 347n94 Freud, Sigmund 113 Frick, Wilhelm 114, 175 Friedländer, Saul 33 From a Fascist’s Notebook 18 Frumin plant 21 Frumkin, Gad 304 Führer (see Hitler) Fürth 98 Galilee 79n64, 218n81, 219n88, 247, 254, 367-368, 375, 394-397, 402, 411, 427, 434, 443, 447, 468n46, 481, 489, 506, 512, 515522, 526, 535n32, 552, 554, 565, 569, 606n70, 632 Gallipoli Expedition 454, 472n83 Galuth (Galut) 193, 234 Gandhi, Mohandas K. 631, 642, 665 —x—

————————————————————— Index —————————————————————

Garibaldi, Giuseppe 21, 566 Gazeta Polska 347n91, 468n40 Gebirtig, Mordechai 283n88 Geist, Raymond 588 Gelber, Yoav 49, 75n32 General Islamic Congress 121 General Zionists 17, 19-21, 43, 45, 47, 159, 189-190, 423, 430, 483 genocide 83n84 George V 38, 88 233, 534n19 George V Jubilee Forest 207 George VI 389, 522, 568, 623 Gerard, James 66 German expulsions 678n93, 678n96 German Foreign Ministry (Foreign Office) 49, 409n76, 622 German Immigrants’ Association 670n21 German influence in Muslim world 603n39, 674n68 (also see Haj Amin el Husseini) German Jewish refugees 29, 31, 59, 67, 105, 183, 210, 292 German Jews 14, 25, 28, 32, 36-37, 47, 49, 52, 63, 74n25, 75n31, 90, 93-94, 104, 106, 143n1, 193, 197-198, 208, 216n58, 223, 228232, 238-241, 244, 263, 282n69, 292, 556, 588, 590, 655 German Settlers’ Association 208 Germany, persecution of Jews 27, 30, 35, 112, 184, 369, 589 Gestapo 33, 147n32, 170, 188, 498, 550 Geula V’Hatsala (redemption and rescue) 564 Ghazi bin Feisal, King 324-326, 362, 378 Ghore al-Kibd 22, 26, 96, 140, 157 Ghusayn, Tufiq Bey see al-Ghusayn Ghusayn, Yacoub see al-Ghusayn Ya’qub Givon 486, 534n23

Gladstone, William E. 21 Glazer (Galezer), Eliyahu 136 Gleichschaltung (coordination) 33 Glickson, Moshe 21, 82n81 Goebbels, Joseph 13, 33, 67, 105, 113, 147n32, 170, 183, 564 Goga, Octavian 461, 692n7 Goldman, Solomon 508, 549, 575, 655 Goldmann, Nahum 70n8, 128, 130, 141-142, 153n94, 155, 224, 239, 260, 395, 398, 434, 510, 545, 602n26 Golomb, Eliyahu 30, 46-47, 55, 121, 158, 273, 430, 466n24, 547, 565566, 599 Gordonia 470n64 Göring, Hermann 13, 24-26, 33, 39, 50, 113, 140, 498-499, 517, 584, 607n76, 654 Gort, Viscount 560, 623 Gottheil Medal 386 Gottheil, Richard 473n89 Graham-Browne, George F. 484, 533n19 Grand Mufti of Jerusalem (see Haj Amin el-Husseini) Graves, Philip 83n83, 151n73 Great Britain and the East 341n46, 520 Great War (see World War I) “Greater Palestine” 392 Greece (Greek, Greeks) 123, 141, 211n4, 256, 267, 281n62, 548, 550, 588, 622 Green, William 658 Greenberg, Chaim 154 Greenberg, Uri Zvi 16-19, 42, 70n10-11, 71n15, 76n44, 82n81, 148n41 Greenwood, Arthur 655 Griffith, Arthur 91 Grossman, Meir 426, 428, 466n29 Gruenbaum, Yitshak 44, 47, 70n8, — xi —

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130, 148n42, 152n81, 225, 227, 270, 256 Grynszpan, Hershel 583 Guedalla, Philip 98 Gunsenhausen 98 Gunzberg, Sami 531 HaAretz 21, 43, 55, 108, 117, 211n8, 530 ha’avara (transfer agreement) 36, 38-39, 188, 207, 223-224, 540n76, 680 HaBoker 146n25, 483 Hacha, Emil 621 HaCohen, David 389, 408n65 Hadar 158 Hadassah ( National Board) 15, 95, 158, 170, 186, 190, 216n65, 259, 423, 426, 466n26, 477. 482, 555, 574, 587, 613, 690 HaEmet Kodemet LaShalom 117 Hagana 16, 46, 55, 58, 121, 124, 137, 199, 291, 294, 303, 318, 328, 334-335, 336n18, 364, 404n13, 427, 445, 466n24, 500, 516-517, 547, 565, 588, 601n24, 603n42, 668n7, 680, 684, 691n3 Hagana-Etzel agreement 603n42 Haifa 43, 53-63, 81n75, 92, 96-99, 103, 113, 121, 136, 139, 170, 173, 196, 201-202, 249, 254, 257, 266, 291, 295, 306, 319, 327, 369, 372, 379, 387-389, 394, 402, 415-416, 427-428, 435-436, 439, 441, 459, 462, 464n11, 486, 502, 509, 515-517, 527, 530, 547, 550, 577, 597598, 599n8, 655 Haifa harbor 54, 63, 486 Haining, Robert H. 433, 514-517, 522, 527, 529, 533, 554, 558, 624, 655-656 Haj Amin el-Husseini 8, 22-23, 27, 36-37, 57, 64-65, 73n21, 90, 95-99, 114, 119-123, 157, 160,

163-164, 168-169, 182-184, 192, 195, 199-202, 218n81, 229, 237, 273, 285, 289, 295-302, 308-315, 319-331, 335, 337n20, 338n26, 339n36, 340n40, 341n47, 345n71, 361, 365-366, 374, 377378, 387-389, 404n22, 406n43, 415-416, 420-429, 434-442, 450451, 455-458, 476-489, 490-491, 505-507, 514-515, 522, 532n8, 538n54, 539n67, 551, 556, 572, 580-583, 593-594, 598, 607n75, 613-616, 628-629, 650-662, 677n88, 682-684 Hajjar, Gregorius 367 hakhshara (training) 74n25, 511 Halifax, Edward 313, 488, 490, 495497, 499, 502, 523, 526, 535n26, 535n29, 548, 560, 578, 584, 587, 589, 594, 608n78, 620-626, 631, 636-646, 649-653, 657, 663, 666, 673n63, 679n97, 685 Hall, J. Hawthorne 59-60, 97, 110, 124-125, 131, 135, 186, 192, 195-200, 293, 295, 303, 309-310, 314, 342n54, 360-361, 377, 382, 388 Halpern, Uriel 566, 604n43 Halprin, Rose 611n98 Halsam, John 687 halutzim (agricultural pioneers) 22, 26, 29, 92, 121, 201, 204, 511 Hamas 218n85 “HaMedina ShehBaDerekh” 680 HaMeiri, Avigdor 42, 78n56 Hammond, Robert Laurie L. 356357, 361, 364, 404n20, 582 Hamza, Fuad Bey 390, 615, 634, 644-645, 652 “HaNeder” (The Oath) 158 Hanfstaengl, Ernst 27 Hanita 500-501, 516 HaNoteah Company 49, 280n53 Hanuta (see Hanita) — xii —

————————————————————— Index —————————————————————

HaOlam 40, 108 HaPo’el HaMizrachi 16, 108 HaPoel HaTsa’ir 16, 38, 42, 94, 127 Har HaBayit (Temple Mount) 77n47 Haram 37, 53, 77n47, 365, 436437, 444 Harbin 397, 410n81 Harding, Warren 279n40 Hardinge, Alexander 670n22 Harem-es-Sharif 309, 329 Harris, Douglas G. 286, 497, 511, 515, 535n32, 554, 573 Hart, Liddell 516 Harvey, Oliver 448 HaShomer HaTsa’ir 133, 190, 399, 423, 651 Haskell, Henry 50 HaTikva 190, 294, 493, 648 HaTor 117 Hauran 49, 135, 145n21, 164 Haurani 124 havlaga (self-restraint) 294, 333, 427, 444-445, 510, 527, 530-531, 547-548, 555, 603n43 HaYarden 102, 108, 111, 133, 171, 604n43 “HaYedid” (the friend) 479 Hayinu K’Holmim (We Were as Dreamers) 124 Hazan, Yisrael Avraham 290-291, 294 Hazit HaAm 20-21, 35, 42 Hearst, William Randolph 591 Hefer Valley 78n52 HehHalutz 92, 104, 121, 124, 136 Heine, Heinrich 33, 76n40 Henderson, Nevile 499 Henlein, Konrad 560, 564 Herzl, Theodor 31, 75n36, 150n64, 171, 191, 407n46, 432, 464n12, 552, 671n36 Herzliya 21, 276n7 Herzog, Isaac HaLevi 522, 528,

534n19, 631, 660 Hevron 17, 333, 368 Hexter, Morris 112, 124, 130, 148n42, 154, 173, 187, 190, 239240, 248, 251, 260, 406n45, 418, 421, 449, 456, 466n26, 538n55, 582 Heydrich, Reinhard 26, 147n32, 584, 623 HICEM 665 High Commissioner for Refugees (also see McDonald, James and Malcolm, Neill) 51, 59, 84n89, 226, 277n13 544, 682 Hilfsverein der Deutschen Juden 692n9 Hilmi Pasha, Ahmed 345n71, 435, 469n51, 662 Himmler, Heinrich 26, 113, 170 Hindenberg, Paul von 13 Hish 500 Histadrut 15-18, 21, 26, 30, 39-44, 49, 88, 94, 107, 120, 126-127, 132-133, 151n66, 159, 166, 188, 239, 444, 530, 545, 680, 692n11 Hitler, Adolf 10, 13-18, 21, 25-28, 32-39, 42-43, 50-51, 66, 69n2, 73n23, 90-94, 98, 104, 112-114, 128, 137, 140-143, 153n91, 155-156, 160-162, 165, 169, 175-176, 179, 183, 187-188, 193, 197, 228, 232, 261-262, 276n4, 347n89, 489, 403n3, 486, 490, 497-499, 510, 535n26, 535n29, 537n47, 554, 558, 564, 567-569, 577, 584, 589-591, 606n67, 611n99, 612, 621-622, 625, 646647, 656-657, 663-667, 669n1920, 673n61, 675n72, 676n84, 680, 685, 689, 693n16 Hitler’s Zweites Buch 69n2 Hoare, Samuel 134, 618 Hodess, Jacob 379 Hodgkin, Thomas 338n33 — xiii —

————————————————————— Index —————————————————————

Hogarth message 640, 672n51 Holmes, John Haynes 76n40, 243, 471n74 Holocaust (also see 599n8) 10, 12n4, 69n2, 74n25, 80n70, 153n94, 276n5, 600n10, 607n77, 670n22, 686, 692n11 Holy Temple 150n59, 309, 463n6, 536n36, 555 homa u’migdal 319, 500, 682, Hoofien, Sigmund 49, 80n70 Hoover, Herbert 279n40, 591 Hope-Simpson Report 57, 71n13, 137, 167 Hore-Belisha, Leslie 511, 522 Hos, Dov 46, 55, 273, 369, 389, 655, 686 Hotel Royal 543, 545 House of Commons 31, 263, 268, 297, 300, 307-308, 313-314, 341n46, 344n66, 414, 419, 465n16, 476, 502, 504, 511, 571, 581, 592, 608n79, House of Lords 162, 255-262, 266, 269, 426, 499, 506, 581, 618, 644, 650, 652, 655, 660, 663 Houstoun-Boswell 552, 686 Hubermann, Bronislaw 365 Hugo, Victor 21 Hulda 218n81 Huleh Valley 26, 30, 75n34, 99, 122, 138, 140, 154, 199, 252, 254, 277n7, 375, 394, 468n46, 513, 515, 562 Hull, Cordell 27-28, 33, 51, 165, 197, 245, 312-313, 317-318, 385-387, 500-501, 508, 518, 574-575, 595, 621, 658, 688 Humphrys, Francis 38, 57 hurban (destruction) 258, 692n11 Hussein bin Ali, Feisal 16, 24, 29, 37-38, 56, 77n49, 91, 172, 390, 400, 593, 613, 630, 671n33 Hussein, Sharif ibn Ali 16, 365,

378, 468n42, 604n44, 614, 629, 640, 672n51 Husseini, Musa (see al-Husseini, Musa) Hyamson, Albert M. 34, 51, 227, 417-418, 438-439, 449-452, 455456, 460-461, 479-487, 490, 492, 534n24, 552, 554-555, 560, 681 Hyamson-Newcombe scheme 479, 681 Hyman, Joseph C. 128 Ibn Saud, Abdul Aziz 23, 96, 109, 114, 121, 192, 195, 311, 324, 326, 331, 355, 359, 362, 370371, 374-375, 378, 381, 390-393, 398-399, 406n43, 415, 420, 424, 429-430, 436, 441-442, 447-454, 467n36, 470n60, 472n81, 476477, 486, 490, 492, 515, 523, 526, 531, 532n3, 552, 557, 559, 567-568, 572, 594-597, 608n78, 614, 621, 625, 642, 663, 671n34, 675n72, 684 ICA (see Jewish Colonization Association) Ickes, Harold L. 279n40, 537n47 “If I forget thee, O Jerusalem” 687 Ikhwan al-Qassam 201, 287 illegal Jewish immigration (also see Aliya Bet) 53, 89, 100, 135, 167, 663, 673n59 Imam Yahya 114 immigration certificates (to Palestine) 25, 154, 209, 387, 498 immigration schedule 32, 34, 51, 97, 107, 112, 120, 174, 205, 267, 310, 329, 495, 511, 518 Imperial Conference 394 India 37, 57, 63, 96-97, 134, 157, 286, 318, 332, 355-356, 381, 399-400, 428-429, 441, 447, 453, 461, 475, 495, 513, 546, 551, 559-560, 567, 576, 578, 584, — xiv —

————————————————————— Index —————————————————————

596, 598, 603n39, 617, 619, 625, 630-631, 639, 642 Innitzer, Cardinal Theodor 225 Inskip, Thomas 560, 576, 624-625 Institute for Current World Affairs 91, 172 Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (IGCR) 545, 577, 586, 676n78 International Federation of League of Nations Societies 544 Inter-Parliamentary Arab Congress 9, 571-572, 578, 582 Ionian 123 Iraq 16, 37-38, 52, 56-57, 63, 77n49, 83n84, 98, 107, 115, 119-125, 139-140, 157, 163, 169, 192, 195, 204, 247, 257-258, 264-265, 287, 308, 311, 315-321, 324-325, 334, 340n42, 342n57, 356, 362-367, 370, 375-381, 391, 398-399, 406n43, 415, 417, 420, 429, 433, 447-450, 453-454, 473n93, 476, 486-487, 490, 512, 520, 525, 539n67, 540n77, 555, 560, 570-572, 582, 585, 592-594, 615, 629-634, 638-639, 650, 653, 671n33-34, 681 Iraq Petroleum Company 52, 81n75 Ireland 204, 252, 401, 475, 449 Irgun Tsva’i Leumi 337n18, 445 Irish Free State 144n10, 433, 508 Iron Wall, The 157, 211n8 “irrepressible conflict” 690 Isaac 150n59, 218n80 Israel, Wilfrid 15, 48, 92, 98, 104, 584 Israeli constitution 144n10 Istiqlal (Party) 22-24, 37, 56, 95-96, 115, 119, 123, 131-132, 138-140, 163, 169, 173, 178, 192, 195, 200-202, 207, 248, 265, 285, 290, 294-295, 366, 378, 380, 406n43, 682

Italy (see also Mussolini) 8, 18, 58, 89, 93-94, 169, 185, 192-196, 199, 202, 217n73, 227, 238, 257, 298, 304, 307, 311, 319, 329, 339n34, 343n63, 343n65, 370, 381, 384, 395, 406n43, 415, 441, 459-461, 472n81, 479, 484, 487-488, 492, 494, 499, 504-505, 514, 523, 550, 558, 567, 571, 589-591, 621-622, 650, 653-654, 668n15, 669n20, 678n96, 681, 684, 691n Iz al-Din al-Qassam brigades 218n85 Izvestia 56 Jabotinsky, Vladimir (Ze’ev) 16-21, 30, 35-48, 54-56, 70n8, 79n64, 84n98, 88, 101, 104, 116, 123, 126, 132-133, 139, 152n76, 157-159, 166, 171, 174, 191192, 198, 211n8-9, 213n24, 257, 287, 332-333, 337n18, 371-374, 380, 397, 405n35, 414, 445-446, 468n40, 509, 522, 527-530, 533n16, 546-548, 555, 565-567, 588, 591, 602n26, 603n43, 650, 661, 677, 681, 686, 690 Jabotinsky, Eri 446 Jacobi, Shlomo 123 Jacobs, Rose 93, 216n65, 466n26, 477, 482, 587 Jaffa (Yafo) 7, 23, 36, 53, 77n50, 92, 99, 103, 114, 139, 164, 168, 192, 199, 202-203, 254-255, 265, 291, 294-297, 302-303, 307, 334, 337n19, 368, 373, 394, 402, 445, 481, 503, 519, 522, 527, 535n32, 562, 565, 582, 587, 597, 615 Jaffa port 199, 203, 296-297, 303, 597 Jamal Pasha 533n17 Janowsky, Oscar 84n89, 184 Japan 87, 183, 222, 276n3, 282n73, 370, 460, 558 — xv —

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Jasagers 422 Jaulmes, Gustave Louis 543 JDC (see American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee) Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde 331 “The Jews Are Our Misfortune” 67 Jewish Advocate 191 Jewish Agency Council 28, 190 Jewish Agency Executive 8, 16, 21, 28, 148n42, 190, 195, 391, 463n7, 606n66, 613, Jewish Agency for Palestine 9, 17, 20-21, 31, 34, 37, 46, 48, 54, 57, 59, 65-66, 70n8, 79n61, 88, 90, 101, 110, 149n50, 154, 157, 165, 169, 174, 204, 221, 224, 226, 236, 239, 256, 267, 285, 288, 294-295, 301, 304, 312, 315, 331, 339n36, 341n51, 356-361, 374, 379, 385, 408n59, 416, 421, 427-428, 435, 456-458, 468n42, 473n86, 473n93-94, 544, 551, 556, 560, 572-575, 580, 600n16, 625-626, 637, 650, 653, 657-668, 670n221, 676n84, 680-681, 685 Jewish army 411, 504, 547 Jewish casualties 327, 691n3 Jewish children 34, 292, 590, 594, 598, 610n95, 613, 664, 685 Jewish Colonization Association (ICA) 89, 224, 276n7 Jewish Commonwealth (also see Jewish State) 16, 171, 376 Jewish Dominion 482 Jewish Frontier 154 Jewish homelessness 7 Jewish illegal residents 229 Jewish immigration 8, 22, 29, 37, 52-53, 57-61, 64-68, 71n13, 77n49, 89, 100, 108, 113, 118119, 122, 131-138, 154, 157, 164-167, 191, 197, 203, 218, 221, 226, 229, 235, 247, 250, 253, 257-258, 286-293, 297-306,

310-314, 321, 326, 330, 341n47, 346n78, 357-362, 366, 369-374, 380-387, 392-397, 402, 404n11, 409n78, 414-420, 429-434, 441, 453-460, 473n93-94, 477-482, 488-495, 512-526, 531-534, 544-551, 549-551, 557, 568-594, 614-635, 643-645, 652-663, 669n17, 670n21, 678n96, 681682, 688 Jewish labor (laborers) 52, 61, 99, 103, 107, 124-125, 139, 165 Jewish Labor Committee 184 Jewish Legion 16, 19, 46, 79n64, 158, 333 Jewish National Fund (JNF) 39, 78n52, 139-140, 240, 319, 501, 364 Jewish National Home 8, 16, 31, 35, 60-67, 70n8, 84n98, 87-88, 114-120, 125, 131, 154, 160, 191, 194, 200, 206, 224, 238, 242-246, 255, 258, 263, 270, 275, 299, 317, 344n66, 357, 361370, 376, 388, 392, 397, 401, 420, 450, 462n1, 480, 513, 549, 552, 575, 578, 581, 593, 617, 626-629, 636-646, 658, 663, 665, 676n82, 678n96, 685-689 Jewish powerlessness 693n16 “Jewish problem” 31, 35, 87, 228, 256, 331-332, 356, 371, 423, 488, 533, 554, 561, 589, 628 Jewish Refugee Committee Jewish refugees 9, 26, 28-31, 52, 58-59, 64, 67, 86, 92-97, 104106, 113, 142, 156-157, 161, 171, 183, 207-210, 211n4, 223, 282n75, 292, 337n19, 394, 439, 490, 499-504, 517, 523, 538n48, 561, 578, 584-597, 599n4, 608n79, 609n89, 619-623, 635637, 644, 652, 658, 663, 685, 688 — xvi —

————————————————————— Index —————————————————————

Jewish State 11n1, 45, 72n16, 87, 93-95, 99, 115, 119-130, 139, 158, 170-171, 224, 239, 262, 275, 305, 323, 325, 330, 356, 361, 364, 368, 371-382, 387, 390, 394-402, 409n78, 411-426, 431-434, 438-450, 455-459, 463n7, 465n16, 473n94, 475491, 502-507, 512-528, 532-528, 538n55, 543-559, 562-571, 575581, 588, 597, 602n26, 606n70, 627, 630, 634-635, 638-645, 651, 671n36, 678n96, 687-689 Jewish State Party 188, 190, 224, 423, 426 Jewish Telegraphic Agency (JTA) 51, 259, 270, 281n67 Jewish Territorial Organization 282n75 Jews in Germany 27, 30, 35, 67, 183, 187-188, 216n58, 222, 270, 367, 502, 584, 589 Jews in the Modern World, The 142, 693n15 Jews revolt against Rome (see BarKokhba Revolt) Jezre’el Valley 367, 372, 375, 385, 397, 402 Jihad 95, 201, 218n85, 287, 416, 572, 682 Jinnah, Mohammed Ali 603n39 JNF (see Jewish National Fund) Johnson, Samuel 489, 535n27 Johnson, William J. 65, 146n29, 185, 437, 552 Joint Foreign Committee 27, 50, 98, 162, 171, 183, 194, 270, 282n69 Jordan River 16, 20, 22, 24, 30, 45, 291, 333, 363, 373-373, 414, 473n93, 528, 576 Jordan Valley 22, 30, 56, 99, 249, 286, 375 Jordan, William 432

Joseph, Bernard (Dov) 22, 45, 77n50, 149n50, 266, 303, 305, 431, 435, 474n94, 517, 519, 554, 598 Josephus Flavius 44, 78n59 Joshua 284n97 Judea 79n64, 170, 254, 372, 375, 415, 418, 444, 514 “Juden sind unser Unglück” (Jews Are Our Misfortune) 140 Judenrein (free of Jews) 498 Jüdische Jugendhilfe 15, 92 Jüdische Rundschau 28, 36 Kadesh Barnea 170, 213n30 Kafka, Franz 8, 12n4 Kalai brothers 163 Kallen, Horace 154-155, 260 Kalvarisky-Margalioth, Chaim 71n15, 421, 424, 474n94 Kansas City Star 50, 183 Kaplan, Dora 55, 82n81 Kaplan, Eliezer 43, 47, 111, 130, 189, 224, 227, 249, 258, 262, 306, 308, 373, 432, Karpf, Maurice J. 174, 187, 190, 251-252, 413, 424, 457, 466n26 Kasem, Milham 195 Katz, Ben-Zion 43, 54-55, 82n80, 101-102, 116-117, 152n76 Katznelson, Avraham 410n84, 565 Katznelson, Berl 16, 20, 30, 41, 43, 46-47, 124, 127, 133, 151n66, 170, 188, 246, 262, 272-273, 379-380, 394, 396-397, 423, 445, 471n72, 538n54, 569 Katznelson, Yosef 101, 529-530 Kazim, Musa (see al-Husseini, Musa Kazim Pasha) Keffiyeh 692n6 Keith-Roach, H. 73n21, 338n26, 346n80, 404n11, 536n33 Kennedy, Joseph 558, 595-596, 611n99, 638, 650, 656, 674n70 Kenya 407n46, 514, 526, 531, 590

— xvii —

————————————————————— Index —————————————————————

Keren HaYesod 25, 561, 690 Kerr, Archibald Clark 264, 326 Kfar Hasidim 201 Kfar Yehoshua 201 Khalidi, Rashid 692n6 Khalidi, Walid 691n2 Kibbutz HaMeuchad 15, 445 Kibbutz Tirat Zvi 319, 536n34 Kindertransport (also see Refugee Children’s Movement) 594, 610n95 King David Hotel 29, 359 King Solomon 150n59, 213n30, 365, 404n18, 533n15 King, Henry 89, 621 King-Crane Commission 621 “Kingdom of Israel” 18, 171, 425 Kingsley-Heath, A. J. 266-267 Kirkbride, Alec S. 347n92, 451, 569 Kirkuk 81n75, 487, Kiryat Anavim 252, 444 Kiryat Haroshet 550 Kiryat Shmuel quarter 569 Kishinev pogrom 150n64, 407n46 Klausner, Joseph (Yosef) 42, 55, 78n56, 101-102, 126, 509, 539n58 Knabenshue, Paul 245, 295 Knickerbocker, H. R. 14 Kohn, Hans 91 Kohn, Leo 91-92, 130, 144n10, 451, 461, 678n92 Kook, Avraham Yitzhak 100-102, 108-111, 116-117, 127, 146n25, 148n41-42, 159-160, 190, 192 Koran 76n40, 168, 367, 470n59 Kramer, N. 291 Kristallnacht 584-586, 588, 591, 593, 597, 613, 618, 686-687, 693n13 Krivoshein (Galili), Moshe 548, 600n10 Kube, Willam 105 Kuhn, Frederick 165

Kulah Sheli (It is All Mine) 603n43 Kurds ( Kurdish) 378, 671n33 Kuskus Taboun 192 Labor certificates 26, 28, 34, 51, 57, 301, 388 Labor Zionist 154 Lady Reading 179, 200 Lagarde, Ernst 433 LaGuardia, Fiorello 586 Lampson, Miles 248, 381, 420, 481, 486, 492, 552, 559-560, 578-579, 594, 614-615, 624, 653, 656, 676n79, 686 Land of Cana’an 70n5 land sales 22, 37, 56, 137, 157, 160, 168, 173, 203, 226, 229, 233, 235, 238, 245, 247, 253, 285, 293, 360, 372, 374, 427, 429, 480, 550, 573, 578, 617, 632633, 636, 638, 646, 654 Landau, Jacob 281n67 Lange, Christian L. 58, 433 Laski, Harold 34, 183, 602n28 Laski, Neville 32, 50, 100, 104, 128, 141, 154, 161, 187, 193, 236, 251-252, 270-271, 288-301, 331, 411-412, 417, 425, 449, 457, 499, 554, 560, 594-596, 600n13, 604n52 Latvia 121, 128, 136, 179, 395, 433 Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service 27-28 Lawrence, T. E. 378, 417 Lazaron, Morris 170, 431, 467n38, 677n89 League of Nations 8-12, 15, 31, 35, 49, 53, 70n8, 83n84, 156, 198, 204, 319, 338n27, 343n60, 365, 371, 378, 381, 392-395, 398, 406n44, 453, 480, 496, 525, 544, 570, 580, 599n4, 626, 628, 634, 636, 657-658, 664, 669n19, 685 League of Nations Council 156, 343n60 — xviii —

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Locarno Treaties 156, 261 Locker, Berl 112, 148n42, 154, 175, 189-190, 273, 337n22 London Jewish Chronicle 137, 379, 522, 608n79 London Times 50, 56-57, 62, 71n13, 83n83, 105, 113, 151n73, 162, 179, 193, 209, 222, 264, 271, 307, 315, 321, 327, 376, 380, 420, 462n2, 468n42, 482, 494, 516, 520, 531, 533n19, 550, 580, 583, 619, 649-650, 668n14, 676n78, 676n84 Lord Allen of Hurtwood 162, 183 Lord Bearsted 208, 220n95-96, 223-224, 229-232, 238-241, 244, 259, 412, 449, 604n52, 613 648 Lord Beaverbrook 535n29, 620 Lord Dufferin 563, 581, 591 Lord Hailey 422 Lord Halifax 313, 488, 490, 495499, 502, 523, 526, 535n26, 535n29, 548, 560, 578, 584, 587, 589, 594, 608n78, 620, 623-624, 626, 631, 636-646, 649-650, 653, 657, 663, 666, 668, 673n63, 679n97, 685 Lord Hankey 664 Lord Lloyd 269 Lord Lothian 162, 179, 183, 212n16, 269, 272, 495, 584, 653 Lord Lugard 49, 220n94 Lord Lytton 222, 276n3, 287 Lord Maugham 640 Lord Melchett (Mond, Henry) 48, 207, 224, 226, 236, 247, 255, 262-263, 267-269, 272, 300-332, 387-389, 408n59, 419-420, 441, 447, 459 Lord Mount Temple 31 Lord Passfield (Webb, Sidney) 71n13 Lord Peel (Wellesley, William Robert) 332, 335, 355-376, 413, 416,

Leavitt, Moses 241 Lebanon 37, 64, 104, 120, 136, 139, 195, 327, 347n94, 375, 378, 398, 422, 433, 458, 503, 505-507, 515, 522, 525, 572, 594, 613 Lebensraum 13, 156, 498, 536n43 Legislative Council 20, 36-37, 6566, 71n13, 92, 94, 100, 117-122, 125-134, 138-139, 148n43, 149n52, 151n70, 152n79, 154, 167, 172-173, 176-192, 196, 198, 202-207, 215n41, 221-225, 233, 239-242, 245, 250, 254, 259-263, 266, 272-274, 285, 288-293, 297, 304, 320-321, 387, 441, 633, 646, 681, 684, 686 Lehman, Herbert 50-51, 68, 217n78, 574 Lehman, Irving 7, 413 Lehmann, Siegfried 15 Lemkin, Raphael 83n84 Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich 18, 82n81 Levant Fair 297 Levin, “Reb” Aryeh 102 Levin, Shmaryahu 179 Lewisohn, Ludwig 501 Libya 169, 459 Lichtheim, Richard 25 Lied der Sturmsoldaten 14 Limits of Land Settlement 586, 608n80 Limno’a Tishtush 148n42 Lincoln, Abraham 21 Lindsay, Ronald 382, 451, 453, 531, 576, 596, 606n62 Lippmann, Walter 28, 591, 609n90 Lipsky, Louis 251, 301, 459-460, 501, 565 Lithuanian Jews 692n11 Lloyd George, David 64, 98, 129, 140, 153n91, 162, 187, 313, 342n53, 375-376, 419, 482, 521, 541n78 Lloyds’ Bank of London 140, 690 — xix —

————————————————————— Index —————————————————————

419, 424, 437-438, 451, 463, 475, 479, 495, 504, 512-516, 523, 544, 559, 562, 566, 580, 606n70, 640 Lord Percy, Eustace 255 Lord Reading 99, 457, 613, 627, 648 Lord Rothemere 179 Lord Runciman 560, 564 Lord Snell 255, 268, 281n61, 581 Lord Strabolgi 589, 609n87 Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal 162 Lord Winterton 320-321, 325, 331, 425, 506, 526-527, 543-545, 581, 585, 587, 619-621 Lord Zetland 318, 576, 625 Lo Ukhal L’Hahashot (I Cannot Be Silent) 54, 82n80, 102 Lourie, Arthur 60, 155, 263, 449450, 455-456, 460, 513, 534n24, 552, 570 Low, David 462n1 Lower California 483, 591, 688 Lubianker (Lavon), Pinhas 127 Lubinsky, Haim 565 Lubotsky (Eliav), Binyamin 530 Lucie-Smith, Euan William 77n50 Lufban, Yitshak 38, 42, 127 Luftwaffe 498 Luria, Yosef 250, Ma’aleh HaHamisha 470n64 Maalul 139 MacArthur, Douglas, 170 MacDonald, James Ramsay 19, 24, 63, 71n13, 89, 129, 149n52, 204, 224, 233-234, 254, 274, 344n66, 361, 371 MacDonald, Malcolm 8, 177-181, 185, 194, 198-203, 224, 234, 264, 395, 438, 453, 539n67, 567-598, 601n24-25, 605n57, 612-614, 616-620, 623-657, 660, 662-666, 668n14, 669n17,

678n92, 678n96, 685, 687 MacDonnell, Michael 296 Mack, Julian 97, 145n20, 154, 172, 184, 189, 212n20, 242, 384, 413414, Mackereth, Gilbert 479, 515, 688n7 MacMichael, Harold 488-489, 496, 501, 507-508, 512-515, 519, 522, 526-529, 548-558, 562-563, 568, 573, 582-583, 590, 605n57, 614616, 645, 655-657, 663, 673n59, MacMurray, John van Antwerp 408n57 Madagascar 442, 468n40, 514, 517, 521, 539n67 Madariaga, Salvador de 141 Madison Square Garden rally 25, 32 Magnes, Judah 91, 109, 114-115, 122, 239, 250, 291-292, 304-305, 308, 309n36, 341n45, 413, 417418, 421, 425, 438-439, 449-452, 455-456, 460, 471n74, 479-486, 490-491, 506, 535n31, 573, 594595, 674n68, 681 Maher, Ali 635, 641-642, 644, 650, 652-654 Mahmud Pasha, Mohammed 551552, 572, 594, 600n16 Makhnes, Gad 250, 280n53 Makins, Roger 449, 518, 523, 577 Malcolm, James 539n66, 602n26 Malcolm, Neill 226-227, 263 “Malcolm frontiers” 514 Manchester Guardian 34, 183, 439, 482, 522 Manchukuo 276n3 Manchuria 222, 276n3, 410n81 Mandel, Georges 517, Mapai 16, 30, 38-42, 46-47, 80n67, 88, 94, 109, 111, 114, 117, 124, 126-127, 133, 151n66, 159-160, 166, 189-190, 203, 234, 262, 272, 290-291, 372, 375, 394, 399, 423, 444, 504, 524, 530, — xx —

————————————————————— Index —————————————————————

588, 597, 681 Mapai Central Committee 30, 38, 42, 109, 111, 114, 127, 133, 159, 203, 372, 375, 530 Mardam, Jamal Bey 195, 363, 398, 602n26 mare nostrum 169 Margalioth-Kalvarisky, Chaim (see Kalvarisky-Margalioth) Marks, Simon 205-210, 220n95, 223-224, 229-232, 238-240, 244, 251, 259, 271, 503, 550 Marmorosch 292 Maronite Christians (also see Edé, Emil) 572 Martha Washington, SS 92 Martial Law 303-306, 314-327, 331, 334, 361, 377, 436, 613, 684 Martin, John M. 213n21, 364, 366, 390, 478, 685, 692n8 Marxist ideology 14, 16, 18, 24, 42 Masaryk, Jan 568, 673n61 Mauthausen 498 “Mayofis” 472n78 McDonald, James, G. 27-28, 33, 50-51, 59, 61, 67, 84n89, 86, 90, 97, 100, 104-106, 113, 116, 118, 128, 141-142, 145n20, 153n93, 156-157, 160, 162, 181-184, 187, 193, 197-198, 208-210, 222-223, 226-227, 241, 244, 247, 255, 260, 263, 276n5, 279n43, 301, 377, 518, 521, 531, 545, 682, 685, 691n1 McEwan, P. R. 434, 468n45 McFadyean, Andrew 146n29 McIntyre, Marvin 518 McMahon, Henry 468n42, 567, 604n44, 614, 627, 629, 640, 650 Megilat HaSikrikin (The Sicarii) 55 Meinertzhagen, Richard 175, 183, 482, 687

Mein Kampf 13, 32, 66, 153n91, 156, 403n3, 498, 536n43, 567, 589, 606n67 Meir, Golda (see Meyerson, Goldie) Meir, Ya’akov 100-101, 110, 127, 522 Meirov (Avigur), Shaul 46, 55, 137, 379, 445, 471n66 Memel 647, 649 Meriminski (Merom), Yisrael 111 Messersmith, George 104, 113, 176, 214n40, 500-501, 508, 518, 537n45 Mexico 433, 483, 688 Meyerson, Goldie (Meir, Golda) 127, 239, 259, 423, 687 Milikovsky, Natan 101-102, 108, 111, 116, 127, 146n26, 159-160 Mildenstein, Leopold Itz Elder von 147n32 Mills, Eric 34, 92, 114, 135, 197199, 221, 223 Minac, Matej 610n95 Mishmar HaEmek 306 Mitelfranken 98 “MiZion Tezeh Torah” 192, 216n67 Mizrachi 19, 21, 43, 47, 55, 117, 166, 188, 190, 227, 224, 395, 423, 588 Moffat, Jay Pierrepont 51, 141, 500, 510, 545, 578, 591, 596, 620 Moffat, Walter S. 563 Mogannam, Matiel E.T. 336n12, 544, 598n2 Mohammed Ali, Prince 485-486, 490, 506 Mohl, E.N. 164 Mokattam 492 Moment 41, 46, 54, 78n55 Monsky, Henry 573 Montefiore, Claude G. 463n2 Montefiore, Leonard 32, 141, 161, 183 — xxi —

————————————————————— Index —————————————————————

Montor, Henry 281n67 Moody, Sydney 522 Moore, R. Walton 382, 386 Morgen Journal 243 Morgenthau, Jr., Henry 51, 483, 500, 586, 590, 606n62, 609n89 Morgenthau, Sr., Henry 533n17 Morris, Harold 356, Morrison, Herbert 589, 687 Mosad LeAliya Bet 597, 660 Mosque of Omar 37, 122, 150n59, 163, 437, 616 Mossinsohn, Ben-Zion 107-108, 246 Moffat, Walter 563 Muhammad (prophet) 150n59 mujahideen 287, 310, 572 Munich conference 568, 570, 581, 587, 596, 637, 646, 647, 660, 685 Municipal Corporations Ordinance 92, 110 Murray, Arthur 596 Murray, Wallace 172, 386, 595, 597, 621, 650, 658, 662, 669n18, 688 Muslim Brotherhood 441, 470n59 Muslim League 603n39 Muslim Youth 512 Mussolini, Benito 18, 93, 96, 106, 112-113, 141-142, 144n14, 169, 196, 307, 343n65, 389, 459, 488, 495, 537n47, 550, 569, 591, 609n89, 621, 647, 654, 669n20, 693n16 Nablus (Shekhem) 22, 53, 60, 201202, 223, 229, 248, 254, 265266, 287, 290-291, 295, 306-307, 329, 427-428, 436, 478, 562, 651 Nadir Shah 57, 83n85 Nahalal 43, 53, 139, 155, 163, 201, 367-369, 405n25 Nahas Pasha 420, 557 Namier, Lewis B. 118, 129, 149n52, 176, 215n41, 226, 234, 255, 263,

269, 272, 325, 335, 377, 420, 568, 593, 632, 650, 693n15 Nansen Interntional Office for Refugees 156 Nansen passports 156, 211n4 Nansen, Fridtjof 211n4 Nara (see National Radical Party) Nashashibi Party 24, 119, 173, 436, 615-616, 629, 661 Nashashibi, Fakhri Bey 120, 551, 583, 607n75, 614, 616, 661, 668n9, 677n88, 682-684 Nashashibi, Ragheb 60-61, 92, 125, 131, 169, 178, 172, 182-183, 185, 192, 199-203, 206, 235, 258, 266, 274, 285, 289-295, 314, 322, 328, 333-334, 335n2, 340n40, 345n71, 346n83, 359, 387-389, 416, 464n10, 615, 661, 670n32 Nathan, Harry L. 515 Nation 222 Nation arabe, La 136 National Assembly (World Jewish) 414, 588, 645-646 National Bloc (Syria) 199, 218n81, 229, 275, 290, 398, 429 National Committees 299, 322, 345n71, 436 National Defense Party 137, 139, 168, 182, 192, 199, 206, 229, 274, 285, 290, 359, 415, 614-616 National Emergency Committee on Palestine 687 National Radical Party (Nara) 113, 270 National Workers’ Organization 132 Nazi Germany (also see Hitler, Adolf) 69n2, 83n84, 84n89, 183, 282n69, 356, 404n14, 618, 661, 678n96 Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact 665 Nebi Musa 287

— xxii —

————————————————————— Index —————————————————————

Nebi Rubin 164 Nebi Tzalach 293 Negev 119, 122, 160, 170, 174, 198, 214n36, 249-252, 286, 294, 363, 368, 372, 387, 394-397, 411, 433, 438, 502-503, 520-521, 525, 541n79, 554, 562 Nehemiah 79n59 Nehru, Pundit Jawaharlal 429 Neinsagers 423 Nesher Cement 276n7 Netanya 43, 78n52, 121, 163, 192, 280n53, 530 Netanyahu, Ben-Zion 102 Netivot 108 Neumann, Emanuel 21-22, 29, 34, 72n19, 77n51, 97, 145n20, 466n27 Neumann, Heinrich 550 Neutrality Act 678n93 New Caledonia 517 New Deal 561 New Judea 379 New Palestine 31 New York Herald Tribune 24 New York Public Library 540n74 New York Times 10, 28, 105, 165, 209, 222, 231, 413, 439, 510, 533n17, 597, 608n82, 677n89 New Zionist Organization (NZO) 191-192, 287, 233, 373, 397, 524, 529-530, 533n16, 546-548, 565, 588 Newcombe, Stewart F. 417-418, 438-439, 449, 452, 455-457, 461, 479-481, 484-487, 490, 492, 552-555, 560-561 Newton, Basil 589 Newton, Frances 464n11 Niebuhr, Reinhold 690 NILI 71n11 Non-Cooperation Congress 23 non-Zionists 17, 32, 79n61, 154, 174, 187, 190, 193, 207-208,

216n63, 224, 232, 239-240, 251-252, 259, 263, 301, 379, 412-413, 419-420, 425, 431, 456, 458, 465n16, 466n26, 545, 594, 613, 667n3 Norman Plan 555, 585, 596, 601n22, 674n68 Norman, Edward A. 520, 555, 585, 592, 596, 601n22, 650, 674n68 Northern Rhodesia 521, 531, 618620, 685 Notrim (see supernumerary police) 306 Novomeysky, Moshe 304, 308, 394, 409n75 Neurath, Constantine von 27, 409n76 Nuremberg Congress 193 Nuremberg Laws 193, 197-198, 204, 210, 241 Nuremburg 50, 68, 98, 193, 564, 603n39 Nuri Sa’id 429, 454, 479, 481, 554, 557, 571, 610n97, 615, 626, 650, 671n34 Osservatore Romano 578 Office of the League for Arab National Activity 614, 683 Ogilvie-Forbes, George 589 Oil 63, 73n24, 81n75, 90, 208, 249, 254, 319, 381, 462, 487, 517 Old City (of Jerusalem) ( see also 673n52) 53, 92, 114, 122, 126, 389, 415, 463n6, 520, 587, 606n67, 637, 674n68 “Old Isaiah” 343n60, 575 Oliver, Daniel 112, 148n44 Omayyad Mosque 54 On Adventurism 123 Oranienburg 33 Order-in-Council 118, 152n79, 261, 320, 327, 340n43, 406n42 Ormsby-Gore, William G.A. 12, 58-59, 303, 307-330, 334-335,

— xxiii —

————————————————————— Index —————————————————————

340n42, 342n54, 346n82, 356360, 370, 377, 381-382, 390, 393, 396-402, 404n18, 415, 418-422, 426, 428, 436-437, 440, 444-455, 459, 462n1, 468n42, 475-481, 488-492, 495-497, 502507, 511-515, 526, 535n32, 580, 684, 690 Orts, Pierre 110, 284n96, 422, 432 Ostmark 664 Othello 128 “Oved” 178, 219n86 Pacelli, Eugenio (Cardinal) (see also Pope Pius XII) 90, 106, 144n8 Pact of Steel 660 Palaestina 70n5 Palcor (Palestine Correspondence) 259, 281n67 Pale of Settlement 414, 577, 672n39 Palestine and Trans-Jordan 544 Palestine Arab Executive 22-23, 65, 95 Palestine Arab Party 164, 168, 228, 289-290, 293, 295 Palestine broadcasting service 275, Palestine Defense Committee 428, 524, 683 Palestine Economic Corporation 164, 212n20, 241 Palestine Electric Company 276n7, 344n68 Palestine Electric Corporation 30, 267 Palestine Endowment Fund 214n36 Palestine Executive Council 57, 121, 185, 205, 288, 305-306, 328, 435, 437, 455, 636-637, 645-646, 652 Palestine Gazette 146n23, 440 Palestine Information Centre 416, 464n11 Palestine Mandate 15, 70n8, 344n66, 367, 369-370, 373-374, 401, 658

Palestine Pavilion 7, 12n1 Palestine Post 44, 114, 117, 121, 123, 179, 201, 210, 299, 317, 327, 434, 522, 553, 581, 600n12 Palestine Potash Ltd. 276n7, 403, 409n75, 562 Palestine Zionist Executive 282n75 Palestine, Arab population 7, 20, 52, 58, 99, 115, 233, 236, 266, 306, 334, 339n39, 363, 376, 414, 443, 480, 524, 544, 547, 552, 575-576, 581, 597, 628-630, 641, 659 Palestine, Christian population 12n3 Palestine, Jewish population 7 Palestinian Arab Congress, 1919 144n9 Palestinian Arab nationalism rises 247-248, 299, 334, 666 Palestinian Jewish industry 338n27 Palestinian State 66, 393, 439, 450, 473n93, 557, 571-572, 634, 642, 646 Pan-Arab Congress 273, 427, 429 Pan-Islamic Congress 37 Paris Peace Conference 29, 169, 172 parity 20, 65, 94-95, 110, 118-119, 123, 129-131, 134, 149n52, 176181, 188, 215n41, 224, 234, 253, 261, 269, 272, 287-291, 304-305, 313, 321-325, 345n77, 361, 363, 374, 380, 392-393, 404n13, 412, 431, 456, 466n26, 474n94, 632, 637, 640, 665 Parkinson, Arthur Cosmo 23, 155, 182, 198, 236, 238, 261, 265266, 382, 390, 397, 416, 418, 452, 480, 587, 601n22 Parliamentary Committee 205, 608n79 Parliamentary Friends of Palestine 24 partition 8, 85n104, 94, 363, 368-

— xxiv —

————————————————————— Index —————————————————————

382, 387-402, 409n76, 409n78, 411-462, 463n6-7, 465n16, 466n24, 467n36, 468n42, 473n94, 474n98, 475-488, 492497, 501-508, 512-517, 521-525, 531, 533n16, 534n22, 536n40, 539n58, 539n66, 543-583, 588, 595, 602n26, 605n60, 617, 635, 640, 681, 684, 692n8 Passfield White Paper 17, 19, 57, 70n8, 71n13, 101, 113, 137, 177, 221, 254, 274, 344n66, 676n82, 689 Passover 7, 27, 30, 74n30, 75n35, 82n80, 170, 408n57 “peace bands” 607n75, 666, 684 Peel Commission (see Royal Commission) Peirse, Richard E.C. 436 Peled, Asher 199 Pell, Robert 578 Perkins, Francis 537n45, Perl, William R. 548, 600n10, 691n3 Perlzweig, Maurice 501, 510, 517 Permanent Mandates Commission 8, 12, 49, 67, 93, 100, 110, 151n73, 293, 319, 338n27, 340n42, 344n66, 400, 414, 419422, 438, 476, 513, 522-523, 531, 662, 664, 689 Petah Tikva 30, 39, 42, 164, 291, 293, 500, 530 Petition to the League 37, 260, 282n69 Petlyura, Simon 71n11, 82n81 Petra 170 Pharaoh 492, 675n74 Philby, H. St. John 381, 390-393, 409n73, 681 Phillips, William 27, 51, 106, 142, 184, 244-245, 550, 591, 609n89 Phipps, Eric 176, 197, 230 PICA (Palestine Jewish Colonization

Association) 224, 276n7 Pilsudski, Józef 104, 270, 333 Pirie-Gordon, C. M. 468n45 Poalei Mizrachi 395 Poalei Zion 16, 133 Podhorzer (Peedhatzur), Moshe 246-247 pogroms 24-25, 41, 71n11, 82n81, 86, 150, 247, 256, 269-270, 283n88, 407n46, 569, 584, 670n22 Pogrovinsky, Yohanan 38-39, 77n50 Poland 42, 44, 48, 58, 76n44, 83n84, 94, 98, 101, 109, 113, 121, 128, 136, 152n81, 153n91, 158, 171, 174, 185, 187, 209, 222, 227, 232, 247, 256, 258, 262, 270, 273, 283n79, 283n88, 286, 292, 296, 347n91, 357, 364, 376, 389, 394-394, 412-413, 426, 432-433, 443, 445, 449, 468n40, 470n64, 471n66, 476, 484, 486, 547-548, 555, 565-566, 578, 590, 606n64, 610n95, 622, 661, 665, 692n7 Poliakoff 231 Polish Jews 132, 209, 247, 292, 471n66, 555, 606n65, 692n11 Political Advisory Committee 341n50, 407n46, 431, 457, 531, 533n15 Politis, Nicolas 141 Pope Pius XI 429 Pope Pius XII 144 Pope, Alexander 344n66 Popper, David 620, 669n16 Population Exchange Committee 519, 540n76 population transfer 281n62, 380, 409n78, 541n77, 541n84 Porath, Yehoshua 73n31, 84n98, 134, 346n83, 678n96 Portugal 586, 591, 608n79, 619620 — xxv —

————————————————————— Index —————————————————————

Poseidon 445, 471n66 “pound of flesh” 135, 552, 600n17, 686 Prager Presse 222 Presidential Advisory Committee on Political Refugees (PACPR) 518 Prince Abdul Moneim 626 Prince of Wales 179 Prince Seif al-Islam Hussein 626 Promised Land 7, 26, 31, 121, 210, 228, 274, 290, 301, 356, 431, 442, 445, 478, 488, 505, 514, 592, 627, 666, 684, 688 Pro-Palestine Federation of America 171, 518, 531, 540n74, 574, 687 Proskauer, Joseph 154 Protection of Cultivators Ordinance 138 Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion 83n83, 104, 141, 154, 161, 479 Przytyk 270, 283n88 Psalms 150n61, 529, 693n12 Qassamites 451, 467n33 Quai d’Orsay 439 Rabbi Binyamin (Yehoshua RadlerFeldman) 71n15 Raczyński, Edouard 58 Radler-Feldman, Yehoshua (see Rabbi Binyamin) Rakabi, Rida Pasha 195 Ramat HaKovesh 163 Rappard, William E. 151n73, 171, 207, 209, 225, 277n9, 372, 422, 432, 486, Ras el Nakura 375, 397 Rath, Ernst vom 583 Ratosh, Yonatan (see Halpern, Uriel) Ravnitski, Yehoshua 43, 46, 55, 79n65 Raziel, David 445, 530 Reading Power Station 513 realpolitik 8, 462, 594, 690 Red Sea 170, 174 “reeducation camps” 170

Reform Party 179, 200, 234, 266, 335n2 Refugee Blues 665 Refugee Children’s Movement 594 Reichert, Fritz 170, 213n29 Reichsbank 49, 86, 165, 175, 197 Reichsbürger 193 Reichstag 13, 21, 24, 26, 86, 193, 261, 622 Reid, Thomas 502-503, 554 Religion and Philosophy in Germany 76n40 Remez, David 127, 262, 530 Rendel, George 38, 265, 323-325, 329, 354n74, 370-372, 375, 381, 395, 399-401, 418-420, 424, 430, 432, 436, 440-444, 447-452, 459, 467n36, 470n60, 471n73, 476-479, 492, 495-496, 504-505, 536n40, 684, 692n7 Repetur, Berl 30 Revisionist World Conference, 1935? 158 Revisionist petition 143n4 Revisionist Zionists 159, 188, 283n79, 397, 445, 476, 546, 588, 595, 660 “revolutionary Zionism” 20 Rhineland 261, 271, 553 Rhodesia 521, 531, 618-620, 685 Ribbentrop, Joachim von 179, 489, 549, 622, 669n19 Rice, Harry P. 40, 46, 55, 88, 149n50, 328-329 Reichspost 225 Rifkind, Simon 312 Riggs, Alfred 54, 82, 88 Riyad as-Sulh 273 Rock (Roche), Alfred 164, 266, 289, 345n71, 582 Rogers, Walter 674n72 Rokah, Yisrael 250, 280n53, 529 Roman rule 20, 672n39 Roosevelt, Eleanor 184, — xxvi —

————————————————————— Index —————————————————————

Roosevelt, Franklin D. (FDR) 28, 33, 51, 68, 106, 141, 157, 159, 172, 184, 214n33, 238, 242-245, 261, 279n41, 312-313, 317, 343n60, 373, 382-385, 389, 399, 407n54, 410n84, 465n16, 483-484, 499500, 504, 508, 517-521, 527, 542n92, 549, 561, 570, 573-577, 585-586, 590-597, 600n12, 606n60, 606n62, 609n89, 619621, 638, 649-655, 658, 662, 665, 672n47, 674n70, 675n72, 676n82, 678n93, 687-689, 693n13 Rose, Norman 71n11, 84n98, 149n52, 179 Rosenberg, Alfred 622, 669n21 Rosenberg, James 97, 100, 183184, 301, 338n30, 421, 431 Rosenblatt, Zvi 45-47, 88, 108, 110, 117, 192 Rosenblüth, Martin 25, 140, 209 Rosenfeld, Moshe 201 Rosenheim, Jacob 414, 463n7 Rosenman, Samuel 312, 410n84, 484, 533n17, 591 Rosenstein, Shlomo 88 Rosh Betar 158 Rosh Pina 509, 529 Rothenberg, Hugo 607n76 Rothenberg, Morris 26, 67 Rothmund, Heinrich 578 Rothschild, Anthony de 34, 88, 99, 197, 465n16, 613 Rothschild, Edmond de 276n7, 280n53 Rothschild, James Armand de 276n7, 395, 409n78 Rothschild, Robert de 106 Rothschild, Walter 15, 31 Round Table Conference 129-133, 151n73, 158-159, 166, 181, 271, 275, 286, 316, 414, 560, 590, 604n52, 615, 624

Royal Air Force 136, 186 Royal Commission 8, 64, 275, 287, 297, 301-303, 307, 310, 313332, 340n43, 355, 358, 361, 364, 369, 370-372, 381-384, 386, 398, 405n25, 414, 427, 430, 449, 462n2, 475, 481, 513, 525, 551 Royal Commission report 344n66, 398, 401, 411, 423, 452, 462n2, 468n40, 527 Royal Empire Society 254, 439-440, 488 Rubashov (Shazar), Zalman 107, 127, 259 Rublee, George 577-578, 620, 623 Rumania 104, 128, 171, 179, 209, 222, 227, 232, 292, 394-297, 412-413, 433, 449, 461, 476, 486, 510, 590, 623, 670n22 Rumanian Jews 128, 209, 227, 247, 267, 389, 394, 449, 483, 486, 517, 590, 670n22, 692n7 Rumbold, Horace G.M. 32-34, 356357, 360, 364-366, 369, 376, 396, 403n3, 438, 478, 534n22, 581, 647, 686 Ruppin, Arthur 35, 43, 47-49, 56, 68, 71n15, 105, 130-131, 142, 153n92, 160, 167, 233, 248-249, 272, 303, 305, 339n39, 384, 422, 445, 466n26, 544-545, 584, 686, 693n15 Russell, Alison 494, 581, 606n70 Russia 70n7, 71n11, 78n55, 83n83, 90, 94, 99, 211n4, 223, 244, 259, 279n44, 384, 472n83, 589, 602n28, 613, 621, 634, 668n15, 672n39 Russian Jews 87, 128, 174, 259, 414, 476, 672n39 Rutenberg, Pinhas 30, 52, 75n34, 99, 132-133, 267, 304-307, 320321, 337n18, 339n36, 344n68, 372, 374, 378, 390, 394, 415,

— xxvii —

————————————————————— Index —————————————————————

613-614 S.D. Party 76n44 SA (Sturmabteilung, Storm Troopers) 13-14, 27-28, 67, 113 Saar Basin 141 Saba, Fuad 345n71, 367, 428, 469n51 Sacco-Vanzetti (Sacco, Nicola; Vanzetti, Bartolomeo) 55, 82n80 Sacher, Harry 234, 238, 271 Sachsenhausen 583, 588 Sadan, Dov 46 Sadeh, Yitzhak 500 Safed (Tsfat) 17, 218n81, 247, 372, 415, 428, 509, 530 Saharov (Sahar), Yehezkel 364 Said, Abd el-Fattah Imam 458 Saint-Léger, Alexis 106 Salah, Abd al-Latif 199-203, 218n81, 235, 289, 335n2, 662 Salazar, Antonio 619 Saloniki 290 Samuel, Herbert 65-66, 84n98, 112, 208, 210, 218n81, 223, 225, 229-231, 238-244, 257, 259, 263, 283n82, 320-321, 325, 344n68, 370, 419-421, 425-426, 438, 449, 456, 459, 473n93506-507, 538n54, 560, 582, 657 Samuel, Horace B. 46, 55, 116, 143n5, 211n8 San Remo Conference 15, 94, 681 Sanballat (Sanbalatim) 44, 79n59 Sans-culottes 21, 72n16 Sargent, Orme 230 Saroyan, William 83n84 Sasson, Eliyahu 206, 257, 457-458, 582 Saudi Arabia 23, 89-90, 119, 123, 186, 258, 362, 391, 476, 490, 523, 570, 572, 580, 602n26, 605n54, 634 Schacht, Hjalmar 197, 208, 230 Schechtman, Joseph 46, 71n14

Scheib (Eldad), Israel 566 Schein, Avraham 509, 522-523, 527 Schiff, Otto 412 Schmidt, Christian 143n1 Scholem, Gershom 71n15, 83n84 Schröder, Kurt von 86 Schuschnigg, Kurt von 128, 498499, 537n43 Schwartz, Mordekhai 556, 601n24 Schwartzbard, Shalom 19, 71n11, 82n81 Schwartzbart, Yitshak 47 Scotland Yard 82n80 Second Aliya 16, 367, 538n54 Selzam von 395 Segal, Moshe 101, 146n25 Selassie, Haile 569 Senator,Werner 59, 130, 589, 606n66 Sereni, Enzo 15, 26, 692n11 seventh Dominion 482, 533n15 Seventh Dominion, The 533n15 Seventy Thousand Assyrians 83n84 Seychelles 428, 437, 439, 458, 469n51, 595, 614-615, 656 Seyss-Inquart, Arthur 537n43 Shahabander, Abd al-Rahman 458, 512 Shakespeare, William 128 Shanti, Ibrahim 169 Shapira, Anita 70n6, 72n17-18, 79n65, 347n93, 682, 691n3 Sharett, Moshe (see Shertok) Shari’a 157, 309, 331, 435 Sharon, Ariel 213n30 Shatara, J. I. 416 Shaw Commission 57, 113, 281n61, 309, 341n47 Shaw, George Bernard 18 shehita 270, 517 Sheikh al-Muzaffar 157 Sheikh Fuad Pasha al-Khatib 168 Sheikh Hasan Abu Saud 435, 444 Sheikh Mohieddin Abdel Shafi 550

— xxviii —

————————————————————— Index —————————————————————

Sh’eirit HaPleita 422 Shertok, Moshe 34, 47-52, 57-61, 66, 80n67, 81n78, 89, 92, 9598, 102-106, 111-116, 124-125, 130, 134-135, 140, 148n42, 155, 160, 163-164, 176-181, 185-188, 195-197, 204-205, 215n45, 221, 227-237, 245, 249-253, 289, 296-319, 326-328, 334, 342n54, 343n62, 344n68, 357-359, 373382, 388-389, 394, 401, 410n91, 418, 421-434, 440-451, 455-460, 466n26, 469n55, 479-481, 485, 491-500, 511, 517-524, 531, 536n34, 537n46, 541n84, 546554, 562-568, 572, 590-593, 602n36, 611n103, 613-614, 624, 630-632, 636-647, 653, 666, 678n92, 683, 687 Shiels, Drummond 18 Shimun, Mar Eshai 83n84 Shind, Zvi 445 Shirer, William L. 69n1, 148n45, 165, 261, 282n71 Shitreet, Bekhor 45-46, 55, 88, 100 Shivat Zion 192 Shlonsky, Avraham 42 Shnatayim VaHetsi HaYiti Goleh 148n41 Shoa 25, 686, 692n11 shofar 101 Shuckburgh, John E. 38, 236, 261, 436, 438, 441, 443, 461-462, 490, 521-523, 531 492, 552, 559, 563-564, 580 Shukri, Hassan 60, 306, 327 Shylock 597, 600n17 sicarri 82n81 Sidebotham, Herbert 87 Sieff, Israel 10, 96, 189, 205, 220n95, 226, 234, 238 Silver, Abba Hillel 538n50, 693n13 Simmele massacre 83n84 Simon, John 24, 27, 32, 59, 157,

161-162, 165, 176, 440, 685 Simon, Julius 187, 190 Sinclair, Archibald 264, 268-269, 395, 419, 440, 585, 589, 687 Sirkis, Daniel 43, 55, 102, 111, 126, 399 Smart, Walter 492, 615, 668n8 Smilansky, Moshe 16, 55, 82n82, 102, 250, 280n53, 304, 339n36, 378 Smuts, Jan Christian 129, 222, 313, 324, 440 Snell, Henry 255, 268, 281n61, 581 Sokolow, Nahum 19, 22, 31, 47, 99, 187-189 Solel Boneh 516 South America 160-161, 183, 207, 209, 544, 584, 590, 618, 622 “Southern Syria” 16 Soviet Union 195, 460, 619 Special Night Squads 517, 553, 602n36 Spectator 254, 341n46 Speer, Albert 261 Spengler, Otto 18 Sprinzak, Yosef 42, 262, 373, 530 SS (Schutzstaffel, Protection Guard) 26, 147n32, 170, 588, 623 SS St. Louis 665 St. Bartholemew’s Day Massacre 73n22 St. James Conference 9, 612-665, 681, 685, 689 St. James Palace 612, 624, 647, 653, 666 Staatsbürger 193 Stalin, Josef 38-39, 187, 279n44, 611n99 State of Israel 10, 75n34, 144n10, 471n73, 692n11 stateless Jews 128 Stavsky, Avraham 41, 44-47, 78, 88, 101, 108, 110-111, 116-117, 123, 127, 133, 136, 148n42, 149n50,

— xxix —

————————————————————— Index —————————————————————

159, 192 Stein, Leonard 252, 487, 606n66, 650, 674n68 Steinberg, Isaac 521 Stern, Avraham 41, 44-47, 78n57, 88, 101, 108, 110-111, 116-117, 123, 127, 133, 136, 148n42, 149n50, 159, 192 Stoliar, David 670n22 Storrs, Ronald 534n22 Straus, Nathan 78n52 Strauss, Lewis 417, 609n90, 664 Streicher, Julius 14, 27, 67, 98, 104-105 Stroock, Sol 413, 466n28 Stroock, Alan 260 Struma 670n22 Sudan 164, 195, 269, 347n94, 489 Sudetenland 511, 567, 578 Suez Canal 97, 174, 213n30, 249, 257, 347n94, 462, 631 Suleiman, Sa’id Hikmat 398, 415416, 418 Sulzberger, Arthur Hays 231-232, 261, 413, 418, 463n5 Supernumerary police 306, 328329, 478, 500, 565, 569 Suprasky, Yehoshua 47, 102, 430 Supreme Moslem Council 157, 164, 202, 218n81 Suweidi, Naji 429 Sykes, Mark 539n66, 469n55 Sykes-Picot agreement 469n55 Syria 16, 29, 37, 52, 64, 69, 89, 91, 104, 107, 112, 115, 119, 123, 135-136, 139-140, 164, 175, 180, 192, 195, 220n95, 238, 247-248, 257-262, 273-275, 291, 293, 330, 334-335, 343n57, 347n94, 356, 365, 367, 380, 384, 406n43-44, 418-420, 429, 437-443, 447-449, 458, 469n55, 473n93, 476, 482, 490, 501-506, 512-515, 522, 525, 539n67, 553-554, 570-572,

594, 615-616, 633, 661, 671n34, 674n70, 680-683 Syrian National Bloc 398, 429 Syrian Strike Committee 248 Syrian Palestinian Delegation 119 Syro-Palestine 668n14 Szold, Henrietta 15, 48, 52, 69n4, 93, 125, 144n12, 152n81, 188, 228, 275, 277n16, 284n97, 290, 297-298, 306, 327, 426, 482, 520-521 Szold, Robert, 214n36, 413, 423, 426, 482, 555, 562, 664 Tabenkin, Yitshak 30, 127, 133, 166, 379, 423, 597, 681 Tanganyika 489, 494, 548, 591, 618, 620 Tannous, Izzat 340n43, 416, 450, 455, 452n86, 484-485, 525, 548551, 556, 576, 582, 594, 600n11, 602n25, 605n61, 662 Taylor, Myron C. 518, 540n74, 543545, 586, 591, 619 Technical Commission (see Woodhead Commission) Tegart Wall 540n70, 553 Tegart, Charles 479, 516, 540n70, 553, 559, 564, 598, 611n103 Tehomi, Avraham 46 Tel Aviv 21, 30, 35, 40-43, 45-46, 56, 66, 88, 91, 101, 117, 123, 143n2, 146n28, 155, 160, 164, 192, 199, 254-255, 280n53, 290-298, 301302, 319, 327, 329, 394, 415, 427, 430, 493, 504, 513, 517, 522, 527530, 553, 562, 565, 577, 580, 680 Tel Aviv City Council 108, 75n35 Tel Aviv port 329, 338n31, 415, 493, 513 “Tel-Hai!” 47, 528-259 Tel-Hai 71n11, 203-204, 219n88 Ten Year Plan 191, 263, 333, 347n91, 581 Tenenbaum, Yehuda 46, 54-55 — xxx —

————————————————————— Index —————————————————————

Teveth, Shabtai 137, 152n84, 166 Thabit, Sa’id 265, 524 Theodoli, Alberto 67, 93 Third Reich (see also Nazi Germany) 9-10, 30, 37, 49-50, 56, 59, 6768, 86, 93-94, 112, 127, 141, 153n91, 162, 184, 191, 193, 209-210, 222-223, 228, 230, 362, 386, 499, 510, 529, 537, 558, 564, 621, 680, 685 Thomas, J. H. 204-206, 226, 233238, 249, 252, 255-256, 260-264, 268-275, 285-289, 293, 296-303, 339n34, 684 Thomas, Norman 243, 279n41 Thompson, Dorothy 176, 500, 537n45 Thon, Ya’akov 250, 280n53 “Thousand-Year Reich” 498 Thy Neighbor 347n88, 408n59 Tiberias pogrom 569, 683 Tietz, Ludwig 25 Times (see London Times) Tirat Zvi 319, 536n34 Tisha B’Av 463n6, 555 Toscanini, Arturo 365 Totah, Khalil 112, 367 Toukan, Suleiman Bey 328-329 Toynbee, Arnold 548 Transfer Agreement (also see ha’avara) 36, 49, 77n51, 80n70 Transfer of Arabs 394, 399, 411, 422, 475, 524, 541n84, 596 Transjordan 16, 22-26, 29-30, 3738, 49, 52, 62, 66, 75n34, 77n49, 77n51, 95-100, 107-110, 115123, 126, 130, 132, 140, 154155, 158, 163-164, 180, 185-186, 200, 212n18, 249, 254-256, 264-268, 271, 275, 286-291, 298, 304, 314, 320-321, 331, 342n57, 356, 364-365, 370, 373, 381, 389-399, 402, 406n43, 409n78, 411, 414-417, 428, 438-439, 447,

450, 472n81, 475-476, 481-483, 503, 506, 519, 524, 538n54, 540n74, 541n77, 541n84, 571, 575, 581, 593, 596, 599n2, 605n54, 614, 617, 631, 635, 658, 671n34, 684, 688 Transjordan Arab Legion 428 Transjordanian sheikhs 21, 29 Treaty of Lausanne 281n62 Treaty of Versailles 28, 162 Trujillo, Rafael 599n3 Trumpeldor, Joseph 19, 35, 71n11, 79n64, 203, 219n88, 333 Trusted, H.H. 149n50 Tsfat (see Safed) Tukan, Suleiman 60 Tulkarm 56, 121, 287, 290, 295, 478, 597 Turkey ( Turkish, Turks) 29, 54, 70n5, 71n11, 83n84, 145n22, 195, 256-257, 281n62, 365-366, 376, 384, 402, 406n44, 408n57, 433, 434, 472n83, 473n93, 476, 507, 531, 533n17, 560, 591, 602n26, 605n54, 610n91, 632633, 670n22 Tzavach Alshab 139 U.S. antisemitism 508, 539n57, 569, 622, 665 U.S. Coast Guard 665 U.S. Refugee Economic Corporation 161, 174 U.S. Joint Congressional Resolution, 1922 279n40 U.S. State Department 141, 157, 172, 214n33, 244-245, 382, 384, 499-500, 537n47, 540n74, 542n92, 545, 588, 590, 595, 600n12, 621, 650, 658, 676n84, 688 Uganda 126, 150n64, 379, 407n46, 432, 494, 590, 641, 671n36 Um-Rashrash 170, 212n20 Union of Orthodox Rabbis of the

— xxxi —

————————————————————— Index —————————————————————

United States and Canada 194 United Arab Kingdom 519 United Palestine Appeal (UPA) 232, 239-243, 245, 251, 281n67, 384, 508, 538n50 United States of Africa 508, 591, 664, 668n15 United States of Arabia 425 United Synagogue of America 244 United Syria 291 Untermyer, Samuel 48 UPA National Conference 239-243 Urban League 520 Uri, Ya’akov 368, 405n25 Ussishkin, Menahem 39, 126, 216n62, 227, 246, 267, 272, 292, 332, 379, 399, 432, 445, 450, 466n24, 524, 526-527, 541n84, 553, 555, 589, 603n40, 609n91, 634, 681 Uziel, Ben-Zion 101-102, 107, 110, 148n41 Va’ad HaLeumi (National Council) 15, 27, 35, 106-107, 131, 155, 206, 208, 246-252, 270, 280n58, 421, 424, 445, 465n20, 468n46, 501, 528-530, 543, 547, 593, 637, 654-655 Va’ad HaPo’el HaTsiyoni 145n14, 213n25, 534n23 Valero, Joseph Moshe 100, 110 Van Asbeck, Frederik 344n66, 422 Van Rees, Otto 49 Vanda 136 Vansittart, Robert 50, 324-325, 330, 375, 448, 499 Vatican 90, 502, 578, 639, 672n49 Velos 121, 124, 136 Venezuela 483, 586, 688 Versailles Peace Conference 89, 169, 340n42, 593, 613, 620, 634, 650, 671n33 Versailles Treaty 28, 142, 162, 261, 419

Vienna 104, 176, 191, 225, 297, 497-498, 510, 520, 550, 597 Vilensky, Nahum 512 Völkischer Beobachter 27, 141, 222223, 510 Voltaire, François Marie Arouet de 34 Wadi Chanin 164 Wadi Hawarith 39, 42, 77n52 Wadsworth, George 245, 312, 473n93, 595, 600n12, 611n98, 661 Wafd Party 206 Wagner, Robert 312, 575, 664, 688 Wagner-Rogers Bill 664 Wahbah, Hafiz 557, 602n26 Wailing Wall (also see Western Wall) 211n8, 463n6, 578 Waldman, Morris D. 113, 187, 193, 251-252, 260, 271, 288, 301, 417 Waley-Cohen, Robert 419, 482 Walker, James J. 243 Waqf 65, 95, 99, 157, 237, 327, 331, 436-437 War of Independence, 1948 75n34, 213n30 Warburg, Eric 33 Warburg, Felix 28, 33-34, 48, 61, 97, 100, 105, 112, 141, 154, 170174, 193-194, 197, 208, 216n63, 217n78, 227-228, 231-232, 239241, 250-252, 259-263, 281n59, 289, 336n15, 378-379, 412-418, 421, 424-426, 431, 457, 466n26, 520 Warburg, James 33 Warburg, Lola 73n22 Warburg, Max 48, 197, 207-208, 210, 220n95, 224, 230-231, 243, 457 Ward, F. X. 386, 408n58 Warren, George 545, 676n78 Waterfield, Alexander P. 494, 503 Waterlow, Sidney 548 — xxxii —

————————————————————— Index —————————————————————

Wauchope, Arthur 22-40, 49-54, 57-66, 89-92, 96-124, 131, 134, 137-140, 154-155, 157, 160, 163, 167-168, 176-186, 192207, 215n45, 219n93, 221-229, 232-238, 245, 249-275, 285288, 292-335, 338n26, 338n33, 339n36, 340n40, 342n54, 343n62, 355, 358-360, 370, 374375, 382, 387-389, 394, 398, 400, 415-416, 420-421, 427, 435, 452, 475, 478-479, 488, 492-494, 515, 536n34, 682 Wauchope Plan 515, 535n32 Wavell, Archibald 446, 514 Webb, Sidney (see Lord Passfield) Wedgwood, Josiah 45, 171, 204205, 264, 268, 289, 377, 395, 482, 489, 533n15, 546, 581, 585, 589, 598, 643, 663, 687 Weigall, Archibald 489 Weisl, Wolfgang von 20 Weisman, Herman 426, 466n28 Weitz, Yosef 501 Weizmann, Chaim 17-31, 36-39, 44-52, 57-67, 71n13-14, 75n3234, 79n61, 86, 89, 93-100, 104, 107, 112, 118, 126, 129, 132, 134, 141, 143n2, 145n14, 149n52, 151n70, 155, 167, 174183, 187-199, 204-210, 216n63, 224-226, 231-234, 238-243, 245274, 277n9, 280n58, 283n79, 285, 288, 296, 300, 304, 307311, 316-326, 330, 334, 338n27, 339n36, 340n42-43, 342n53, 345n73, 356-375, 378-389, 394403, 404n18, 405n25, 405n35, 410n84, 411-433, 438-440, 449, 452-454, 459-462, 463n2, 466n27, 471n66, 474n98, 477495, 503-508, 512-520, 525531, 533n15, 533n17, 534n20, 535n32, 538n50, 538n55, 545-

549, 554-573, 577-598, 602n25, 603n40, 604n52, 608n79, 610n91, 613-614, 619, 624657, 665-666, 668n14, 672n49, 673n52, 673n61, 673n63, 675n74, 676n84, 681-682, 686687, 690, 693n15-16 Welles, Sumner 500, 508, 518, 586, 590, 595-597, 619, 621, 650, 677n89, 688 Weltsch, Robert 28 Western Galilee 368 Western Wall (also see Wailing Wall) 101, 463n6 White Paper of 1939 8, 649-650, 652, 658, 660-665, 674n68, 674n70, 675n77-78, 677n89, 678n93, 678n96, 681, 685, 687689, 692n8 White Paper on Palestine, 1922 65, 84n98, 235, 624 White, Thomas W. 544 Willert, Arthur 261 Williams, Tom 643 Wilson, Hugh 585 Wilson, Woodrow 89, 172, 383, 533n17, 621, 630 Wingate, Orde 478, 517, 532n7, 554, 601n21, 687 Winton, Nicholas 610n95 Wise, Jonah 170, 260 Wise, Stephen 19, 24-25, 28, 32-33, 47-48, 50, 80n67, 141, 154, 158, 188-189, 194, 212n9, 216n63, 232, 239-245, 255-256, 263, 268, 271, 279n41, 301, 310, 312, 317-318, 343n60, 373, 382-384, 388-389, 399, 401, 407n54, 413, 423, 431-432, 459-462, 474n98, 482-483, 501, 503, 508, 510, 518, 527, 531, 545, 568, 573, 575, 586, 605n60, 621, 627, 630633, 637, 639, 688 With Coolness and Steadfastness 41

— xxxiii —

————————————————————— Index —————————————————————

Wohlthat, Helmut 623 Woodhead Commission 475-542, 551-556, 559, 575, 581-582, 635, 684 Woodhead Commission report 554, 560-561, 570, 576, 579-580, 605n57, 606n70 Woodhead, John 475, 489, 494, 497, 517, 549, 553-554, 560, 566 World Disarmament Conference 33, 68 World Jewish Congress 48, 141, 153n94, 154, 239, 252, 260, 288289, 301, 501, 517, 681 World Union of Zionist-Revisionists 16, 158, 166 World War I (the Great War) 15-16, 71n11, 79n64, 83n84, 93, 101, 143n1, 158, 287, 333, 356, 378, 390, 393, 402, 417, 423, 454, 461, 504, 546, 567, 577, 597, 604n44, 610n91 World Zionist Congress, 1903 150n64, 407n46 World Zionist Congress, 1929 159 World Zionist Congress, 1931 181, 311, 345n73 World Zionist Congress, 1933 44, 47, 54 World Zionist Congress, 1935 134, 141, 681 World Zionist Congress, 1937 384, 411, 431, 452 World Zionist Congress, 1939 651, 665 World Zionist Organization 17-20, 26, 31, 35-36, 39-42, 46, 56, 109, 127, 129, 132, 151n70, 154, 159, 166-167, 171, 178, 188, 190, 194, 196, 207-209, 217n67, 220n95, 224, 233, 238-239, 246, 249, 255-256, 259, 264, 271-272, 337n18, 339n36, 356, 371, 379, 385, 418, 423-426, 466n29, 492,

495-498, 539n58, 554, 561, 572, 588, 590, 593-597, 644, 671n33, World’s Fair (1939) 7 Ya’abad 202 Yagur 43, 201 Yale, William 611n98 Yarmukh River 30 Yassin, Yusuf 390, 392 Yeivin, Yehoshua 17-18, 20-21, 71n11, Yellin, David 102 Yellow badge (yellow star) 28, 75n31 Yemen 114, 119, 123, 164, 192, 195, 311, 320, 326, 472n81, 473n93, 476, 605n54, 626, 630 “Yes, to Break” 21 Yeshurun Synagogue 660 Yom Kippur 7, 101, 213n30, 408n57, 570 Yom Kippur War 213n30 Young Men’s Congress 23 Young, M.A. 49 Youth Aliya 15, 48, 80n68, 92, 176, 190, 228, 682 Yunitchman, Shimshon 565 Zangwill, Israel 282n75 Zaslani (Shiloah), Reuven 286 Zbaszyn 583, 607n76 Zionist Actions Committee (see Va’ad HaPo’el HaTsiyoni) ZOA (see Zionist Organization of America) Zionist Commission 282n75, 340n42 Zionist Federation of England 151n70, 252, 263, 456, 533n15, 593, 598 Zionist Federation of Germany 25, 49, 140 Zionist Organization of America (ZOA) 26, 31, 67, 109, 140-141, 173, 190, 214n33, 296, 312, 341n51, 482-483, 501, 508, 549,

— xxxiv —

————————————————————— Index —————————————————————

555, 565, 573, 575, 655, 687 Zionist Review 539n66 Zionist revolution 10 Zissu, Theodor 541n79 Zu’aiter, Akram 22-23, 201-202, 223-224, 265, 295, 302, 337n19 Zuckerman, Barukh 259 Zuravin, Shalom 509, 541n80 Zweig, Stefan 113

— xxxv —