Palestine in the 18th Century: Patterns of Government and Administration 9652234834, 9789652234834

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Uriel H eyd Memorial Series

PALESTINE IN THE 18th CENTURY Patterns of Government and Administration

by AMNON COHEN

Jerusalem, 1973 The Magnes Press, The Hebrew University

Distributed in Great Britain, the British Commonwealth and Europe by the Oxford University Press

© The Magnes Press, The Hebrew University Jerusalem* 1973

Printed in Israel At Central Press, Jerusalem

To M y Parents

CONTENTS PART ONE: GOVERNMENT 1.

G eneral D esc r iptio n

A. Palestine at the beginning of the 18th century.................. B. The rise and fall of p ah ir al-'U m ar .................................. C. The rule of Ahmed Jezzftr .................................................. 2.

1 7 19

R elations betw een th e R ulers o f P alestine a n d t h e C en tra l G overnm ent

A. p ah ir al-*Umar 1) The start o f his career .................................................. 2) The'Fifties and’Sixties .............................................. 3) His latter years ............................................................. B. Jezz&r Ahmed Pa$a 1) The start o f his career .................................................. 2) Attempts to remove him from office .......................... 3) His relations with the al-'A?m fam ily and his rule in Damascus ..................................................................... 4) Summary ..................................................................... 3.

Page

30 42 45 53 56 64 70

R elations betw een th e R u lers o f P alestine a n d V arious L ocal F actors

A. The beginning of the century .............................................. B. The period of p ah ir al-'U m ar’s ascendancy...................... 1) Zaydâni rule ................................................................. 2) Relations with the Bedouin .......................................... C. The period of Ahmed Jezzar’s rule 1) The final elimination o f Zaydâni rule .......................... 2) The breaking o f Metouali autonomy .......................... 3) Relations with the Bedouin .......................................... 4) Relations with the D ruzes.............................................. PART TW O: ADMINISTRATION 1. T he A d m in istra tiv e U n its a n d T h eir D evelopm ent A. The Eyâlet of Sidon 1) Administrative subdivisions .......................................... 2) Developments in the coastal area a. The rise o f Acre ...................................................... b. The development o f Haifa ...................................... B. The Eyâlet of Damascus 1) The Sancaks o f Jaffa, Gaza and Ramie a. Administrative structure and changes ................... b. Development o f J a ffa ..............................................

78 83 90 92 98 104 I ll

119 128 137

144 152

2) TheSaac& ksofLajßnand'A jlün .............................. 3) The Sancak o f Nablus ................................................. 4) The Sancak o f Jerusalem .............................................. C. Concluding remarks ............................................................. 2. Tax F arming A. Primary leasehold ................................................................. B. Sub-leasing 1) Relations betweenthe Vàll and the mttltezims ............ 2) The iltizäm system and its effect on agriculture.......... 3. T axation A. The M iri 1) Mäl-i M u k â fa a ............................................................. 2) ÈanuTùn ......................................................................... 3) F ffit ............................................................................. 4) Registration fees ........................................................ 5) Other ta x e s..................................................................... 6) Payments to the Porte ................................................. B. Taxes on the Dhimmi 1) Cizye ............................................................................. 2) Other taxes imposed on the Dhimmi .......................... 3) Road tax ..................................................................... C. Sundry other taxes 1) Cotton tax ..................................................................... 2) Olive oil tax ................................................................. 3) Tobacco tax ................................................................. 4) Other ta x e s..................................................................... D. Means of payment ............................................................. 4. The Army A. The decline of the army in Palestine in the 18th Century B. The reasons for the weakness of the army ...................... C. The utilization of mercenary units .................................. D. Naval forces ......................................................................... E. Conclusions ......................................................................... 5. T he F eudal System A. The Fiefs ............................................................................. B. The sipâhis ............................................................................. C. ThcA ld yB ey ..................................................................... D. Bedeliye-i Zu'am S ............................................................. E. Conclusions ......................................................................... PART THREE: CONCLUSION ..................................................... BIBLIOGRAPHY.................................................................................

158 164 169 172 179 191 197

204 211 216 223 225 226 249 256 258 259 261 262 263 266 270 273 282 290 291 293 298 303 306 307 311 329

LIST OF TABLES

1. Number of villages in each nâftiye of the Eyâlet of S id o n ....... 2. M âl-i miri and mal-i mu’âcele paid by the sancaks of Gaza, Ramie and Jaffa ........................................................................ 3. Afin and Mu’âcele returns for the Eyâlet of Sidon at the end of the 18th Century ..................................................................... 4. Increase in the Mâl-l M u’âcele for the muffâta'as of Jaffa, Gaza and Ramie ................................................................................. 5. M M returns from Ahmed Jezzftr’s màlikâne holdings at the end of the 18th C en tu ry ............................................................. 6. Percentage of taxes written off as non-collectable in the Eyâlet of Sidon at the end of the 18th C en tu ry .................................. 7. The Eyâlet of Sidon’s m M payments to the Ottoman Treasury at the time of Ahmed Jezzär ..................................................... 8. Cizye collected in Palestine during the 18th C entury.............. 9. Fiefs in Palestine at the turn of the 17th and the 18th Centuries 10. Fiefs in Palestine at the beginning of the 17th Century .......... LIST OF MAPS 1. Administrative division of the Eyâlet of Sidon 2. Southern Sancaks of the Eyâlet of Damascus

Page 126 1S6 185 186 199 201 240 251 293 295

FO REW O RD

Napoleon’s defeat at Acre in the year 1799 is one of the best known episodes of his career. His opponent, and the victor on that occasion, Jezzftr Ahmed Pa$a, though considerably less famous, is not completely unknown. But, spectacular and fascinating as it was, this event was only a stage, in many respects the final one, in a long historical process. We all share a general interest in the international dimensions of history, both military and political. But it seems that they represent only the small visible tip of the iceberg. Jezzär’s victory was a result of a long process which was taking place in Palestine throughout the 18th Century. A proper appreciation of many and varied factors is a sine qua non for the understanding of this important phase in the history of the Ottoman Empire and of Palestine. Among these are: internal political and military strife between different groups contending for power; the intricate relationships between the Sublime Porte and its representatives in the provinces; the blossoming economic relations with Europe; and the two outstanding personalities of the period — p ah ir al-*Umar and Jezzär. The first decades of the 18th Century witnessed a general administrative upheaval in Palestine. The Vâlis, whose duty it was to enforce law and order, were militarily incapable of and politically disinterested in doing so. The inevitable result of their shortlived and oppressive rule was a deterioration both of security and of economic conditions in the country, resulting in a decline in the well-being of its inhabitants. The French merchants, who maintained several communities in the main “échelles” of Syria and Pales­ tine, took advantage of the economic and political circumstances to develop a virtual monopoly over cotton-growing in Palestine, and over its marketing abroad. One result among many others was the gradually increasing im­ portance of a local shaykh, p ah ir al-'Um ar. Although formally only a mQltezim of the Väli of Sidon, he in fact became much more powerful and influential than his official patron. During the space of five decades he not only accumulated very substantial assets but succeeded in fostering positive and fruitful trends of economic development in the area. Although fiscally

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useful, p äh ir proved to be a political liability to the Sublime Porte, which, after repeatedly turning a blind eye to his activities, eventually decided to bring him to heel. The result was his final downfall in 1775. This administrative and political anomaly was rectified when the Sultan installed Jezzär, a stranger in the country, as the governor of Acre, and shortly afterwards as the Volt of Sidon. He followed in the footsteps of his predecessor, for example, when he made Acre his capital. He fortified the place, raised a strong well-trained army, and suppressed all dissident elements in Palestine and its vicinity. But at the same time he was very careful to fulfil his financial obligations to the Ottoman Treasury. The Eyälet of Sidon made a useful contribution to the Ottoman revenues during the last quarter of the century, much more so than in previous years. Jezzär himself grew richer, hence stronger as well, which meant, inter alia, greater security in the country. But the only real beneficiary was the Government, for the local population had to pay higher taxes. This resulted in a gradual deterio­ ration in the well-being of the population, in agriculture, and in material life, especially in the countryside. The last years of the 18th Century terminated a long process of develop­ ment in Palestine. Its relative importance within Greater Syria increased considerably; the main area of benefit from the economic, demographic and political development of the country being the coastal region between H aifa and Acre and its immediate hinterland. It is true that the first seeds were sown during the first decades of the century, but the whole process reached maturity as a direct result of the work of P äh ir and Jezzär, o f their policies and activities in this part of the world. This book is an attem pt to trace and analyse all the above processes, and it is mainly based on archival material from two sources: the Ottoman State Archives, presently in the Ba^bakanlik Arjivi, Istanbul, and the French consular reports, located both in the Archives Nationales, Paris, and in the Chambre de Commerce, Marseille. The Ottoman documents used in this research were mostly official administrative orders (firmans) which were reproduced in the MQhimme defterleri series. Particularly useful, especially for an understanding of the intricacies of the administrative and fiscal system, was the Maliyeden Müde wer series of documents originating in the Treasury and its various departments. The A^kûm-i $am, originally orders issued in response to personal complaints, turned out to carry a historical weight out of all proportion to their original aim. Unlike the Ottoman archives, the French consular correspondence with Palestine has

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been used before. But while these were used by other scholars (usually French) to describe economic developments in the area, we regard them as equally valuable for an insight into its political history. Both P àh ir al'U m ar and Jezzflr Pa$a enjoyed close relations with the French community of merchants in their ports, which resulted in a steady stream of reports on various aspects of their rule to Marseille and Paris. Arabic and Turkish chronicles, some of which were found in the libraries of Istanbul, in manu­ script form, served as another im portant source. Contemporary reports made by Jews living in Palestine were of limited value, both because of their paucity and because of their relatively minor importance. As for the long, detailed descriptions left by European travellers, these, unfortunately, could generally be given little credence, and only in a few outstanding cases were they found to be of real historical value. Whereas administrative terms are usually transliterated from their Turkish form (£-c; J*-?), place names in Palestine and the names of Arabs or their titles (e.g. shaykh) are transliterated from Arabic (In certain cases, however, administrative terms etymologically derived from such Arabic titles (q a ffî from q ä tf for example) are also given in Arabic rather than Turkish transliteration). Thus, “P&hir”, being an Arab, was rendered in this rather than in the more prevalent form, “?âhir” (thereby following his original signature rather than the way his name was probably pronounced in Northern Palestine). “Jezzâr”, being of non-Arab origin should, in accordance with the above criteria, have been rendered “Cezzar”, but we have chosen to use the former form as it is both more familiar to Western readers and was also very frequently used by his contemporaries. This book is a revised version of a Ph.D. thesis submitted to the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and carried out under the supervision of the late Prof. U. Heyd, to whom I am deeply indebted for my initial acquaintance with and abiding interest in Ottoman history and language. Special thanks are extended to Prof. G. Baer, whose advice and insight I sought on many occasions throughout the final stages of my work. I am grateful to the librarians and archivists of the Bafbakanlik Arçivi in Istanbul, the Chambre de Commerce of Marseille, and the Archives Nationales, Paris, for all their patience and help. I am also most grateful to D. Bernstein for his pains­ taking translation of the work. My thanks are due also to the Editorial Board of the BSOAS for their permission to reproduce the chapter on the army which originally appeared as a separate article in the Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, Vol. 34, Part 1, 1971. This research could not have been accomplished without the generosity of the Hebrew

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University of Jerusalem, the Israeli Association for Educational and Re­ search Funds, and Mr. Teddy Kollek, the Mayor of Jerusalem. To all of these I offer my sincerest thanks. Last but not least I would like to thank my wife, Amalya, not only for drawing the maps in this book, but also for having accompanied me throughout the different and not always easy phases of this work. A m non C ohen

Jerusalem, 1973

PART ONE: GOVERNMENT

1.

G eneral D escriptio n

A. Palestine at the Beginning o f the 18th Century The Ottoman Empire reached the peak of its power, both internally and externally, in the middle of the 16th Century. Although it is possible to point to subsequent Ottoman victories, both at sea and on land (the conquest of Cyprus and Crete, the re-occupation of Baghdad, and the defeat of the Russian Army at Pruth), these are not typical of the turn events were beginning to take during the course of the 17th Century. Ottoman forces began to suffer an ever-increasing succession of set-backs in the field, and the Sultan was no longer able to extend the frontiers of his Empire at will. Furthermore, these military defeats resulted in territorial losses which the rulers of the Ottoman state were forced to concede in formal settlements with their foes. The treaties of Karlowitz, Azov, and Passarowitz at the end of the 17th and the beginning of the 18th Centuries stand out as landmarks in the military and territorial decline of the Muslim State vis-à-vis its Christian enemies in Europe and Asia. But this territorial contraction was only part of a much wider process which was ultimately to reshape and alter the entire destiny of the Ottoman Empire — the governing and administrative machinery was in a state of steady deline, as were the army, the economy, and the social structure at all levels of the Empire. The Sultan began to take less and less interest in affairs of state, secluding himself in his palace, and harem, while his heirs began to be educated in a way which neither provided them with the necessary experience nor instilled in them the inclination to rule properly when the time came for them to assume the reins of power. SUleyman the Magnificent had already begun to transfer certain of his powers to the Grand Vezir, and this tendency increased under his successors. In the middle of the 17th Century, the Köpriilü Grand Vezirs tried to use these powers to reform the Empire, but they were exceptions. Ability did not as a rule count for much when it came to appointing the Grand Vezir — far more im portant were the aspirant’s ties with those courtiers and women who had access to the Sultan’s ear. Just as irrelevant considerations governed his appoint­ ment, so the Grand Vezir was liable to arbitrary dismissal. Thus, even if

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P A L E S TI N E I N T H E 1 8 T H C E N TU RY

he had the inclination and ability to make changes (which was extremely rare), the Grand Vezir was not generally in a position to do so. While the institutions governing the state declined, so too did the means on which these institutions depended for their very existence. When the wave of conquests lost momentum and came to a halt, an im portant source not only of revenue for the Ottoman treasury but also of recruits for the Janissary corps dried up. Muslims were recruited into the army, and this greatly diminished its fighting ability. An ever-increasing number of soldiers began to take wives and to leave the barracks, many of them supplementing their income from other sources. What is more, Ottoman officials started to enrôle their own protégés in the Janissaries, removing trained and seasoned soldiers from the roles in order to make way for them. These practices, among others, saddled the Ottoman state with an unprecedented financial burden, while the professional standard of the standing army continued to deteriorate rapidly. Although this army met with defeat after defeat in the field, within the Empire itself, and especially in the capital, it was sufficiently powerful to influence the appointment of vezirs and even to secure the dismissal of Sultans. It became a festering source of disaffection and rebellion, and did much further to weaken the Empire from within. The other arm of the Ottoman Army, made up of “feudal” units, also ceased to be of any real service to the Sultan. Here too a chain of negative developments set in: holdings came to be granted to unsuitable candidates, in return for bribes; the required number of soldiers could no longer be raised when needed; untrained and totally unsuitable soldiers were sent to the front; thcsipähis themselves began to absent themselves from campaigns, etc.1 As the granting of fiefs came to depend less and less on the sipâhVs ability or loyalty, so his interest in the welfare of his holding began to wane. Villages came to be regarded primarily as objects for taxation, whether by the sipähis themselves, or by the tax-farmers who were beginning to replace them. Furthermore, faced by ever-increasing pressure on the battlefronts, the Empire was forced to seek additional sources of revenue in order to maintain its armies. Thus, the tax-burden imposed on the peasants was greatly increased. This led to an exodus from the villages and a conse­ quent decline in agriculture — yet another blow to the Empire. The decline of the devfirme (although theoretically in force until the middle of the 18th Century, this had ceased to be implemented by the second third of the 17th Century), and the general corruption infecting the 1 For the detailed descriptions see Cevdet, Tarih (Istanbul, 1309/1891-2), Vol. 1. pp. 80-81; W. L. Wright, Ottoman Statecraft, (Princeton, 1933), pp. 142-148; M. Nuri, Netaic Ol-Vukuat (Istanbul, 1294-1327/1877-1910), vol. 3. pp. 108-109.

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machinery of state, from top to bottom, had far-reaching repercussions also in the provinces. Candidates for office in the provincial administration, hitherto products of the devjirme who received these appointments as rewards for some outstanding achievement, were now chosen according to totally different criteria. The number of candidates vieing for these posts increased greatly, and they came to resort more and more frequently to bribery and graft in order to gain their ends. It is clear that once the sum of money the candidate could or was prepared to pay became the factor governing his appointment, it was no longer necessarily the best qualified or most suitable man who was chosen. In an 18th-Century hand­ book for Ottoman officials, the author (Çari Mehmed Pa$a) stresses time and again not only that men of substance, well versed in religious as well as secular matters, should be appointed to official posts, but above all, that such appointments should under no circumstances go to the highest bidder. Such men, he writes, “(will) plunder the property of the subject people. An equivalent for the bribe which is given must be had. In addition to what is given as bribe, he must make a profit for himself and his followers.” 2 Thus, it was the population of the provinces who were the ultimate victims of this corrupt system, and it is hardly surprising that increasing numbers of cultivators began to abandon their villages in order to escape their venal overlords. These officials, constantly on the lookout for intrigues against themselves in the Sultan’s court, were obliged to make regular remittances to their sponsors in the capital, and if they wished to make good their investment, they had to exploit their tenuous term of office to the full before it came to an end. The weakening of the ruling institution had severe repercussions, there­ fore, not only in the heart of the Empire, but also in the provinces. Although the process of decline originated primarily in the capital and in the upper echelons of the state, there were a number of contributory factors (also deriving from the low ebb of the Empire’s military and political fortunes) which originated in the provinces themselves. These further weakened the authority of the vâlis (representatives of the central government), especially m the 18th Century. First and foremost, there was the military pressure exerted on the Empire, which continued unabated throughout the 18th Century and even intensified. In the second decade of the century, the Empire was alternately at was with Russia, Venice and Austria. In the 20’s and 30’s, the focus shifted to Persia and Afghanistan. In the late 1730’s, Ottoman forces were routed by the Russians at Azov, and by the Austrians in a series of battles which came to an end with the signing of the Treaty 2 Wright, op. ett., p. 39 (text), pp. 87-88 (translation).

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of Belgrade. Particularly devastating were the wars with Russia in 17681774, in the course of which Catherine the Second (obsessed with the idea of putting an end to the Ottoman Empire) managed to make a number of im portant political and territorial gains thanks to Russian victories at sea and on land. At the end of the 1780’s, the Empire once again found itself at war with Russia and Austria, and further territorial losses were incurred. These failures were disastrous for the Ottoman Empire. As the military pressures intensified, the Sublime Porte was forced to seek ways not only to repair the financial damage caused by the wars in Europe, but also some­ how to refurbish the Empire’s flagging armed might. Troops were transferred from the provinces to those fronts where the danger was greatest — thus, in addition to the qualitative deterioration already described, the Ottoman forces in the provinces underwent a quantitative decline which further reduced their effectiveness. This greatly curtailed the authority of the pro­ vincial governors, and a number of centrifugal forces began to emerge during the course of the 18th Century. The non-Muslim populations of Albania and Serbia showed incerasing signs of restlessness and rebellion, while in North Africa, local rulers attempted to assert their independence and, concerned with their own local feuds and rivalries, completely ignored the appeals of the Porte. At the beginning of the 18th Century, the Christians of Montenegro revolted. While the Porte was preoccupied with the wars against Russia, Austria and Persia, in the third decade of the century, the Kurdish and Turkoman tribes of Southern and Eastern Anatolia became increasingly restive and began to give vent to their dissatisfaction. Even more serious, rebellious units of the Ottoman army roamed the Anatolian Plateau, wreaking havoc and successfully resisting any attempt to bring them to heel — when the Porte tried to utilize them in the wars against Persia, they broke rank and deserted. A more “institutionalized” aspect of the general breakdown of central control in the provinces during the 18th Century was the emergence of the a'yän and dere-beyis as a political caste. The ayän, who were local potentates, received official recognition in the second half of the 18th Century as legitimate representatives of the population in their districts. This greatly enhanced their authority, which was considerable even prior to this, at the expense of that of the välis. The Porte had little choice in the matter, as their co-operation was essential if it was to obtain the sobers and revenues so urgently needed for the war effort. While the a'y an were found chiefly in Rumelia, the dere-beyis (“Lords of the Valley”) were more common in Anatolia. These latter were local dynasts who during the course of the 18th Century became to all intents and purposes independent rulers, tolerated and even recognized as such by the Porte because of the considerable military aid which they were

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able to provide to the Sultan in his wars against the Empire’s enemies.1*3 In the Arab provinces of the Empire, however, there was no equivalent to the a'yän of Rumelia and the dere-beyis of Anatolia. Even so, here too the deterioration of the central government was no less evident than in the other provinces of the Empire. The declining power of the standing army enabled the MamlOks to seize de facto power in Egypt, and they controlled the province much as they liked, taking no notice whatever of the vâli who, if he did not happen to appeal to them, was sent packing back to Istanbul. In Iraq as well, the influence of the central government was greatly curtailed, and by the middle of the 18th Century, a MamlQk dynasty had managed to establish itself in Baghdad, preserving only the barest semblance of subservience to Istanbul. In Damascus, the väli had greater authority, but here too he was subject to the various military elements and pressure groups (defterdärs ashräf, etc) among the local population. In all these provinces, the nomadic tribes (Kurds, Turkomans and especially Bedouin) grew increasingly uncontrollable — not satisfied merely to challenge the volt's authority, they began to menace travellers and the settled population.4 Most of the above is true also of 18th-Century Palestine. Palestine in the 18th Century was divided into two basic administrative units — the Eyâlet of Sidon and the southern sancaks of the Eyälet of Damascus; the boundary between the two eyälets ran from south of the Sea of Galilee to south of Haifa Bay. (On this, see Part Two, Chapter 1). Both in the Eyälet of Sidon and in the sancaks of the Eyälet of Damascus, there were clear signs of diminishing central control. First of all, local autonomy becames a more and more frequently encountered phenomenon: the Druzes, although in the past (under Fakhr al-Dln) enjoying even greater independence, continued to run their lives much as they pleased under their amirs; the Metoualis, in their remote mountain fastnesses, were also left to their own devices under their shaykhs; in the case of the Bedouin, not only did the väli reftain from interfering in their affairs, but he was even obliged to seek their military aid in order to fulfill his functions. This reveals another prominent symptom of the deriorating central control — increasing military impotence. The forces at the väli's disposal were limited, their loyalty was

,

1 H. A. R. Oibb and H. Bowen, Islamic Society and the West, Vol. 1, Part 1, (London, 1957), pp. 173-199; B. Lewis, The Emergence o f Modem Turkey, (London, 1961), pp. 21-39; Wright, op. cit., pp. 37-55, 87-89; 1. H. Uzuncaryh, Osmanh Tarihi, (Ankara, 1956), vol. 4, pp. 3-5, 24-27, 71-72, 316-319, 436-437; Encyclopaedia o f Islam, New Edition, (Leiden, 1960-1968), “Ayan”, “Derebey” ; Islam Ansiklopedisi (Istanbul, 1941-), “Ayan”. 4 Gibb A Bowen, op. cit., pp. 216-234; S. Shamir, “A s'ad Pasha al'Azm and Ottoman rule in Damascus (1743-58)” in BSOAS, Vol. XXVI, (London, 1963), pp. 7-15.

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dubious, and his chances of increasing their numbers were restricted. Thus, without the necessary military power to bolster his sagging authority, there was very little the väti could do to give effect to his decisions or to carry out any plans he might have. The practice of replacing välis at frequent intervals, one of the major causes and symptoms of the Empire’s decline, was apparent in Palestine as well — in the Eyälet of Sidon (about which there is abundant information for most of the 18tb Century) there were more than 40 välis in the first half of the century alone. Thus, it was not often that a vâli managed to remain in office for more than a single year,3 and in certain cases, his term of office even came to an end before the year was out. The situation was similar in other parts of Palestine (for example, in the sancaks of Jaffa, Gaza and Ramie, on which a considerable amount of information is available). It is hardly surprising, therefore, that these governors, however keen and loyal they might be, could not hope to achieve very much as long as the forces at their disposal were so limited and their terms of office so tenuous. Such an official directed all his efforts towards one primary goal: squeezing the maximum out of his province, in order to cover the expenses he had incurred in obtaining the office, and also to gain for himself as much as possible before his term of office came to an end. By making the collection of taxes his main concern, it is clear that the vâli could pay little or no attention to the development of his province or to the welfare of his subjects. They välis were quite open about this, and made no attempt to disguise their attitude. The following incident, described by Volney, is illuminating: When health conditions at Alexandretta began to deteriorate, a group of French merchants approached the local vâli and asked him to transfer the post, at their expense, to Latakia — in return for which they asked to be absolved of taxes for a certain number of years. The pafa's answer was unequivocal: “Hé! que m’importe la suite de temps? J’étais hier à M arach, je serai peut-être demain à Djedda; pourquoi me priverais-je du présent qui est certain, pour un avenir sans espérance?’’.6 Volney tells of a similar incident which took place in Ramie.7 It may be supposed that the Porte was not unaware of all this, but as we have seen, it was preoccupied with the worsening situation in Europe, and very little* * There was nothing exceptional about it: Bahir M ustafa, appointed as Grand Vezir in 1764, was replaced 18 times in different administrative posts during the preceding 18 yean (J. De Hammer, Histoire de f Empire Ottoman depuis son origine jusqu'à nos jours, (Paris, 1841), vol. 16 pp. 134—135). Compare: Cevdet, op. eit., Vol. 4, p. 286. San Mehmet Pa$a who was closely acquainted with Ottoman administration refen to this phenomenon (W right, op. cit., pp. 87, 49-50). 6 M. C. F. Volney, Voyage en Egypte et en Syrie, (Paris, 1959), p. 278. ^ ibid., p. 345.

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attention was paid to the other provinces of the Empire. Furthermore, the urgent need for additional financial resources, which became more and more critical with the continuing succession of military defeats, justified in the eyes of the Porte any means which served to replenish the depleted state coffers. The practice of continually replacing the provincial governors and basing their appointment on the size of the contribution they were able to make to the Ottoman treasury served this end. But this method had some extremely serious defects. If the Porte hoped, at least in theory, to increase its hold on the various provinces of the Empire, it was in fact achieving precisely the opposite. With regard to Palestine, these developments, while having an adverse effect on the local population and agriculture, also under­ mined the position of the central government. Inefficient and corrupt välis, holding office for very limited periods, bled the peasants white, despoiled the countryside and, as if this were not enough, mercilessly oppressed the urban population.* This wrought havoc on the local economy, affecting in turn that of the Empire as a whole. The harm done to the state went even further: the lack of interest and responsibility which marked the attitude of the volts towards the provinces entrusted to their care greatly strengthened the position of those local elements who were opposed to central rule. Worse still, it caused other such forces to emerge.9 B. The Rise and Fall o f Qàhir a l- Umar Given the growing weakeness of the Vâli of Sidon (like that of vails in other parts of the Empire), it is hardly surprising that various local elements began to show signs of increasing rebelliousness. The Metouali shaykhs of the *AB al-$aghlr family, sub-rulers in the Mulfâfa'a of Bilid Bish&ra, came out in open revolt at the end of the 17th Century (1698-9/1110). The diminishing power of the vâli, which was one of the basic causes of these revolts, forced him to rely on local elements in order to assert his authority in the eyälet. To put down the Metouali rebellion, therefore, the vâli (Arslfin Pa$a al-M utard) was driven to seek the aid of Amir Bashir I Shihäb (1697-1707). Once order had been restored, the Vâli of Sidon placed the Metouali mu]cäfa’as (Bishära, Shömar, Shaqlf, Tuffälj) and the Galilee* * When the V ill of Sidon turned to the inhabitants of Beirut and Acre he placed such great pressure on the man-power in the eyälet that it became rather difficult to find hands to serve in elementary public tasks (Letter o f the French consul in Sidon dated 20.1.1708 in France, Archives Nationales, Correspondence Consulaire au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères (AIT. Et.), BI, 1018). 9 A process which started much earlier than the 18th century, cf.: U. Heyd, Ottoman Documents on Palestine 1552-1615, (London, 1960), pp. 43-44 and notes.

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(Bilid $afad) south of these under Amir Bashir’s control. Thus, while by putting down this revolt central authority was considerably strengthened, so too was the authority of the Druze Amir of M ount Lebanon. But there was another significant aspect to this new constellation of forces: while the Metouali rebels were Yamanls, Amir Bashir was a Qaysl. Thus, the failure of the rebellion may be seen as another stage in the growing ascend­ ency of the Qaysls in Syria at the expense of the rival Yamanls; what is more, the Qaysl faction lost no time in using this victory to entrench itself further. One of the first steps taken by Bashir al-Shihäbl was to replace all YamanI governors and officials with Qaysls. The chronicler of the period states quite specifically that “Amir Bashir wanted to destroy the Yamanls and to enhance the power of the Qaysls’’, and so he “removed him (the YamanI Governor of Safed) from his post and replaced him by making the above-mentioned *Umar al-Zaydfinl, a Qaysl, shaykh (^ ).* ’io (The shaykh received the right to collect taxes (iltizâm) in a specified area, and to forward these on to the väii1*). It is reasonable to assume that the above 'U m ar al-Zaydänl was not appointed only because he happened to be a Qaysl, but also on the strength of his power and influence in the Galilee. Thus Mikhâ’il al-Çabbâgh’s contention that the Zayädina arrived in the Tiberias district only at the beginning of the 18th Century must be doubted, as this would not have given them sufficient time to establish themselves and to develop their influence in the area. W ithout this, it is highly unlikely that the väii would have made one of them his governor. 'Abbud al-$abbägh’s version, therefore, that the Zaydänl family arrived in the Galilee in the 17th Century, settling as cultivators in the Tiberias area, seems far more likely.12 It is only by assuming the family’s economic and political strength, even if this was not at first absolute, that the appointment can be under­ stood. It is possible that their effective influence was originally restricted to the Tiberias area, but by the first decade of the 18th Century, members of the Zaydänl family were regarded as key figures throughout the Galilee. As early as 1703, Shaykh 'Um ar (Qàhir’s father) was considered to be the to H aidar Ahmad al-ShihSbl, Lubnän f l 'ahd al-umarä’ al-shihdblyyln (Beirut, 1933), vol. 1, pp. 3-6; TannQs al-Shidyâq, Akhbär al-a'yän f l jabal lubnän (Beirut, 1934), vol. 2, pp. 16-17; H. Lammens, La Syrie, Pricis Historique, (Beyruth, 1921), p. 94; Y. al-Dibs, Ta'rlkh Surlyya (Beirut, 1903), vol. 7, pp. 366-367. 11 The functions of this Shaykh are very similar to those of 18th century Egypt’s shaykh al-balad. cf.: G. Baer, “The village Shaykh in modem Egypt (1800-1930)” in U. Heyd (ed.). Studies In Islamic history and Civilization, (Jerusalem, 1961), p. 129. 12 Mikhâ’il N. al-Çabbâgh. Ta'rlkh al-Shaykh ?âhir al-'Umar al-zaydänt bäkim 'A kkä wa-biläd $afad, (Hart$a, n.d.), pp. 15—18 ; 'Abbild al $abbägh, Al-rawtf al-zdhir f l ta'rlkh Pähir (manuscript BN, Arabe, 4610) in the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, pp. 1-3; U. Heyd, pähir al "Umar shalif ha-galil ba-me'ah ha-yod bet (Jerusalem, 1942), pp. 12-13.

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“paramount shaykh” in the Galilee.13 His brother, Shaykh ’All, was the most im portant shaykh in the western part of Lower Galilee, and his power, based on Shaf&’amr, extended toTam ra and ’Ibillln. A third brother, Hamza, also ruled over part of the Galilee (in the vicinity of Nazareth).14 After the death of Amir Bashir in 1707, the Vâlï of Sidon tried to remove the Metouali districts and the Galilee from the control of the Druze Amir and to re* establish his own authority in these areas. It is quite likely that at this stage the power of the ZaydinI family was curtailed, and ’Umar’s appointment revoked.19 But even if this was so, the family did not remain in eclipse for very long. Firstly, the Zayädina were associated with the Qaysl faction (which was at that time in the ascendant in Syria) and after his victory at ’Ayn Dara in 1711 the Amir of Jebel Druze, Haydar, restored the members of the family (among them Pflhir) to their former supremacy.16 Secondly, as we have seen, ’Umar’s appointment had not in fact created a new reality in the Galilee — it had merely given official recognition to an existing situation. Thus, even if he wished to, the vâlï was not in effect able to curtail the influence of the Zayidina in the Galilee, and we find that even after the death of Amir Bashir the political set-up in the Galilee remained basically unchanged — members of the Zaydftnl family continued to serve as shaykhs in the Lower Galilee (BilSd Çafad), Shaykh Nifi* in the eastern part of Upper Galilee (Näljiyat Jira), and Shaykh Najm and his cousin Shaykh Husayn in the western part of Upper Galilee (Nifyiyat Tarshlha). The vâlï did, however, on occasion consider the use of force against them. It appears that the various shaykhs, principally ’Umar and his brothers, were holding back the taxes which they were supposed to pay into the vd/fs treasury. U “Grand chek de ce pays” (Letter of tbe French vice-consul in Acre dated 20.7.1703 in Archives de la Chambre de Commerce de Marseille (ACCM), J-775). Whether it was an official title or just a descriptive one is not clear. The author tends to adopt the first possibility in the light of similar cases among the Druzes and Metoualis. Cf: p àh ir’s title "shaykh al-masha'ikh” which Abfl Dhahab promised to confer upon his son, *Ali, ('AbbOd, op. eit., p. 30); it may have been not only Pfthir’s, but his father's title as well at the beginning of the century. 14 «Safad mufcSta'âtt jayfrlert 'umar ve-karandàflari hamza ve-'alC’ (Istanbul, Ba$bakanlik Arjivi, Maliyeden M ttdewer (Maliye), 10131, p. 182) is another indication of ’Umar being the most important of all the brothers. See also: French vice-consul's letter from Acre to the above-mentioned *Ali and the latter’s reply and other documents appended to a letter of the French consul in Sidon dated 15.4.1704 (ACCM, J-773). As for shaykh Hamza, it seems that he is identical with Shaykh Amsy, referred to as influential in the Nazareth area in French consul’s letter dated 20.1.1708 (Aff. Et., B 1• 1018). « Heyd. Q ihir, p. 13. >< H. A. Al-Shihâbl, Ta'rlkh Ahmad BäsHä al-Jazzär. (Beirut. 1935), p. 97. For a description of the battle o f 'Ayn Dflra see French consul’s letter from Sidon, dated 23.5.1711 (AE. BI-1018).

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He decided to resort to arms in order to force them to settle their debts, but before doing this he requested a hujja from the Shar'i court justifying his action, and a finnan from the Porte.17 He did not have the necessary military strength, however, to take action; in any case the taxes were his due and the shaykhs were bound by promissory notes to make the required payments. The fact that the väli did not dare to go against them before obtaining the backing of the religious and secular highest authorities in the Empire is an illuminating indication of just how powerful the Galilee shaykhs had become. It is not clear whether or not the väli was in fact able to impose his will on them during this period. At all events, even if he was able to do so, it was not long before the sons of the above shaykhs were to be found serving as local governors — ’Umar’s son, P ähir, in the east, at Tiberias, and 'A ll's son, Muhammad, in the west, at Shaft *amr.18 The friction between the Väli of Sidon and several of the shaykhs who were his mültezims in Galilee continued into the second decade of the 18th Century. Punitive expeditions were organized against the shaykhs, and on occasion a few of them were even taken prisoners and held hostage until they agreed to settle their debts. While all this was part of the accepted political routine, no attem pt was ever made to unseat them or to replace them with other governors. All that has been said holds true for the Zaydänl shaykhs as well; it is not surprising, therefore, to learn that at the end o f the 1730’s a number of shaykhs of the Zaydänl family were imprisoned by the Väli of Sidon.19 These, of course, were all members of the second politically active generation of the family — Muhammad, Sa’d, and P ih ir. P ähir, being the youngest, was also the least im portant, and his name was occasionally exploited for the purpose of receiving leaseholds. It was hoped that should the need arise, punishment could be avoided by claiming that he was too young to be able to collect taxes properly. But even though P ähir was the youngest, he gradually developed into an accomplished ruler — he displayed outstanding ability in a number of fields, and this won him the support of several villages in the Galilee (among them, ’Arräba and Tiberias); he also began to build up an efficient army and, slowly but surely, extended his rule westwards from Tiberias.20 During the first half of the 17 ’Umar and his brothers owed him about 16,000 kurüj out of 35,000 kurüf, which they refused to pay. (Maliye, 10151, p. 182 and 3878, p. 440, a firman to this effect dated 14 DhO al-büia 1119/7.3.1708). 18 ’AbbGd, op. cit„ p. 7. 19 French merchants (“nation”) in Acre writing on 7.2.1714 (ACCM, J-779); Firman from Spring 1722 describing his attempts in two successive years (Maliye, 10164, p. 271); Letters of the French vice-consul in Acre dated 29.6.1730 and 25.10.1730 (Aff. Et., Bi 978). » Heyd, Qähir. pp. 16-21.

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18th Century he managed to extend his rule as far as Acre, thereby creating a political reality of entirely new proportions. It should be remembered, however, that members of the Zaydftal family had managed to establish their rule in key areas of Lower Galilee already at the beginning of the century, and had done so with the vö/fs permission and on the strength of his official nominations. Thus far, pfthir was merely carrying on a family tradition. The im portant difference lay in the fact that, for the first time, the entire area was now united under a single ruler. The establishment of a single political authority over the whole of the Lower Galilee — albeit in the name of the va/i — was an act which was to have far-reaching effects on the entire political future of the area.21 P ähir’s rise to power was, as we have mentioned, associated with the increasing ascendancy of the Qaysl faction in Syria. It was also a further indication of the general strengthening of the position of local shaykhs in the Empire as a direct result of the decreasing power of the välis. But in addition, p sh ir’s rise was due to yet another factor, no less im portant than these — the economic factor. In order to appreciate this, it will be necessary to enter into a brief description of the economic ties between Palestine and Europe. At the end of the 17th Century, the bulk of Palestine’s trade with Europe was concentrated in the hands of a number of French merchants from Marseille, who conducted their affairs, primarily from Sidon, but also from Acre. The merchants in the latter port were subordinate to their senior partners in Sidon who, in turn, were directly responsible to Marseille. The number of traders from other countries was small: Dutch trade was at a low ebb (as was that of the Italian city-states), while English traders were more interested in the northern “Levant” — i.e. the coast of Asia M inor and Aleppo. Thus, the bulk of Palestinian trade was in French hands. The chief commodity was cotton. Palestinian cotton, which was very highly regarded in Europe, was exported to France in a number of forms (carded, spun, etc.). Although cotton was grown also in the Ramle-Lydda area, the best quality fibre was considered to come from the Galilee (“Cotons d’Acre”). The increasing French demand for Palestinian cotton at the end of the 17th and the beginning of the 18th Century, and the considerable profits which were to be made from exporting this to France, encouraged the Sidon and Acre merchants to get hold of as much of this commodity as possible. Three distinct developments took place, which, as we shall see, had a considerable effect on Pfihir’s rise to power. The first (which we have already touched on) was the increasing demand for Galilee cotton; the second was 21 See below, pp. 42-45.

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the gradual loosening of ties between the Sidon and Acre merchants, the latter beginning to operate independently, changing the situation prevailing up to this time until it was restored at the insistence of the authorities in France; the third development was the attempt made by non-French traders to elbow their way into the Palestine cotton trade.2223 In the first decade of the 18th Century, a Dutch trader by the name o f Paul Maashook was appointed consul for Britain and Holland in Acre. This trader, who displayed a great deal of initiative and enthusiasm in everything he did, was determined to monopolize trade in the port. He managed to establish contact with certain of the French merchants in the town, and persuaded them to break away from their colleagues in Sidon, convincing them that by doing so they would greatly increase their incomes. With his aid, these merchants were soon able to corner a large portion of the cotton reaching Acre, and they made huge profits. But Maashook did not stop at this: in order to enable himself and his associates to acquire the bulk of the cotton crop without having to outbid their competitors, he set about obtaining control of the crop not at the marketing end, in Acre, but at the actual point of production, in the villages themselves. The three most important cotton-producing villages in the Acre district, both with respect to the quality of the fibre and to the size of the crop, were Shaft'am r, Tbillln and Tamra. Maashook got in touch with the shaykh of these villages, 'AU AbO Ibrâhîm ('U m ar al-Zaydfinl’s brother), and in return for cash advances, Shaykh ‘All undertook to sell the entire cotton crop of the area to the astute Dutchman. In like manner, Maashook gained control of cotton production in the villages in the Western Galilee (M akr, Julis, AbO Sinän, Kafr Y&slf, ‘Amqa, Tarshlha, and others) under the control of Shaykh Najm. In this way, he was able, within a few short years, to gain the upper hand over the French merchants in the entire Acre rural area. The manner in which he went about this is interesting — he would make a cash deposit with the Väli of Sidon in lieu of the miri owed by the shaykhs, receiving from them legal promissory notes (temessük, hujja) for the amount in question. The shaykhs, for whom this was a convenient and simple way of discharging their miri obligations, undertook for their part not to sell their cotton to anyone but Maashook.22 This procedure was intended primarily 22 The very rich French archival material on this subject has been only partially used, by historians whose main interest lay in the history of French commerce, like P. Masson, Histoire du commerce français dans le Levant au 18e siècle, (Paris 1911), pp. 511-324; F. Charles-Roux, Les Echelles de Syrie et de Palestine au 18e Siècle, (Paris, 1928), pp. 1-6, 40, 81-84; R. Paris, Histoire du Commerce de Marseille (5), de 1660 à 1789; Le Levant, (Paris, 1957), pp. 393-410. 23 Maliye, 7836, P. 162 (where he is erroneously named “marzQk”); Letters of the

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to wrest the cotton trade from the exclusive control of the French merchants, who both outnumbered him and were, in many ways, more powerful than he was. The village shaykhs grew accustomed to this system; it developed into an “institution” which outlived Maashook himself. As has already been mentioned, the first quarter of the century saw an increasing break between the French traders in Acre and their counterparts in Sidon, and, at the same time, a decreasing dependence of the Acre merchants on Paris and Marseille. This found expression in the intensified rivalry between the various traders in their efforts to win over the shaykhs of the cotton-producing villages. It is not surprising, therefore, that even after his death, Maashook’s methods continued to be employed, now by the French traders. However, the system was modified slightly. Instead of merely making payments to the Vàli of Sidon on behalf of the shaykhs, the French traders began to make cash advances to the shaykhs themselves. They sometimes made cash advances to the farmers as well, and on occasion were able to gain control of entire villages by discharging their miri obligations to the shaykh. The most common method, however, was to make an advance payment to the shaykh of a village, receiving from him a surety (usually the väli's tezkere for that part of the miri already paid by the shaykh) which was returned once the stipulated amount of cotton had been supplied at a price pre­ viously agreed upon. To the chagrin of the Sidon merchants and despite their violent opposition, this gradually became the accepted pattern of trade between Acre, in particular, and the principle shaykhs of the Galilee.24 The ever-increasing demand for Palestinian cotton must also be kept in mind. This resulted in a great increase in cotton cultivation, and a conse­ quent increase in the shaykhs' incomes. Furthermore, there was throughout this period a constant rise in cotton prices, which further boosted the shaykhs' incomes.23 It frequently happened that the shaykhs did not honour their agreements with the French merchants, refusing to supply the quanti­ ties or to accept the prices which had been agreed upon. Despite their anger over such incidents, the French merchants continued to trade in this way throughout the century — their over-all profits were apparently sufficiently large to off-set these losses. As for the shaykhs, all this implied a significant increase in their economic power. French consul in Sidon. dated 15.4.1704 and 26.2.1705 (ACCM. J-77S. ACCM, J-776. respectively). 24 Letter o f the French consul in Sidon dated 23.2.1715 (ACCM, J-780); Letter of a French merchant of Sidon dated 28.2.1732 (ACCM. J-783); A memorandum on the state of commerce in Palestine in the thirties (ACCM, J-1559); Letter of the French vice-consul in Acre dated 18.1.1783 (Aff. E t.; BI 979). 23 Letter of the French consul in Sidon, dated 22.1.1715 (ACCM, J-780).

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It was in this manner that the Metouali shaykhs became very wealthy in the first half of the 18th Century, and this, in turn, greatly increased their military and political strength.26 Another clear example of the link between the above economic developments and political advancement is provided by p sh ir al-'U m ar himself. We have already mentioned the contracts which Maashook had established with the ZaydSnl shaykhs in the Galilee in the early years of the century, p sh ir and the other ZaydSnl shaykhs were the chief beneficiaries of the increasing cotton production and the collaboration with the French merchants. At the end of the 1720's, the French traders paid the Väli o f Sidon more than 20,000 Kurüf in order to secure the release of p sh ir’s brother, Sa’d, from prison. The size of the sum bears testimony, among other things, to the extent of the trade (wheat and cotton) which was being conducted between p sh ir and the French at the time. At the beginning of the 1730’s, we discover for the first time debts incurred by p sh ir with the French merchants in Sidon, and when he visited the city in 1731, he received gifts for his sons from the “nation” (the French trading community) there. In the middle of the 1730’s, p sh ir owed large sums of money to two merchants in Sidon who had paid his m iri, and he undertook to settle the debt by supplying them with wheat. In 1737, the French consul in Sidon conducted joint consultations with P&hir in order to establish a uniform standard unit of weight for the whole of the Galilee. This same consul mentions the fact that p sh ir and his sub* ordinates were receiving cash advances from the many French merchants who had established ties with him.27 The chronicler of p sh ir’s regime sums up these trade relations in the following laconic terms: “All the cotton and the wheat which was grown in p sh ir’s country, he sold to them (the French 26 Within the scope of this work we cannot dwell any further on this subject, which well deserves separate treatment. At the beginning of the century (1121/1709-10, for instance) their main territory (BiUd Bishfira) was part and parcel of the iltlzäm of the dtzdir of Sidon, and even the more autonomous parts of it (Shaqlf, ShOmar) were granted to their shaykhs only after he had underwritten their financial obligations (Maliye, 3434, p. 206). By the second half of the 18th century rather substantial changes had occured. Their increasing political and military strength was to a large extent due to their success in growing the “Cottons d’Ansar" (probably named after the village Ansar in Iqllm ShOmar, which remained one of the richest villages of Jezzftr’s domains even at the turn of the century (Letter o f the French consul in Sidon, dated 4.11.1733, AGCM, J-792; Istanbul, Topkapl Sarayi Arjivi (TKS), D. 4760). 27 Letters of the French vice-consul in Acre, dated 13.4, 29.6, 23.10.1730 (AIT. Et. B I978); Debts o f M. Pousadet, a French merchant from Sidon, dated 3.11.1731 (ACCM, J-783); The accounts of the Sidon merchants “nation” for 1731 (ACCM. J-859); Letters of the French consul in Sidon dated 18.6.1737 and 4.2.1737 (ACCM, J-786 and Aff. Et., Bi 1024, respectively).

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merchants)".2* The French vice-consul in Acre, Joseph Blanc, maintained very close ties with p sh ir. From their letters it emerges that, in the early 1740’s, a vigorous two-way trade arrangement had been worked out between the two men (at the prompting of the French consul of the time who, incidentally, had a vested interest in this). In return for p ih ir’s wheat and cotton crops, Blanc would pay his miri to the vô/i and, in addition, keep him supplied with fire-arms, gun-powder, and other munitions.29 This constant supply of weapons was undoubtedly an important factor in P ih ir’s political and military rise, but far more important, surprinsingly enough, was the financial aspect of his dealings with the French — the tre­ mendous growth of his personal fortune. By the beginning of the 1740’s, the French consul in Sidon was complaining that P ähir and his ilk "were becoming too powerful and too rich”, and there is more than just a hint of ire in his references to “the shaykhs who have grown rich at our expense". At the end of 1742, this same consul has something specific to say about the actual manner in which p sh ir came by his fortune and about the effect this was having on his political standing: “This trade (i.e. the Acre cottontrade) is the prime reason for the impudence of the shaykhs: they have become rich as a result of it, and today they are able to oppose the governors sent by the Sultan to collect taxes.” A few years later, the French consul refers to “Pähir, whom their (the French merchants’) cash advances have made so powerful.’’30 The French consuls in Sidon and their deputies in Acre recognized and accepted the situation all the same and, as has already been mentioned, were not averse to themselves becoming involved in this trade with P ähir and his associates. It would appear, then, that they were the best qualified to gauge accurately the degree to which these trade relations were contributing to p äh ir’s growing economic power. Nor did these same consuls err in their evaluation of the consequences of this economic power. P ähir had managed to construct a formidable fortress at Tiberias, and this was able to withstand two attempts made by the vält in the early 1740’s to besiege and capture the town. Once he had secured his flank, P ähir transferred his base of operations to Dir Hannâ31 a ‘AbbQd. op. eit., p. 8b. One should add that the relations between the French merchants and P äh ir rested on a much more solid base than “love”, as claimed by 'AbbOd. 29 Their correspondence is appended to the letter of the French consul in Sidon, dated 20.12.1744 (Aff. Et., Bi 1026). On further relations between them as well as the supply of firearms to P äh ir there is ample evidence in the letter sent by the French consul o f Sidon on the 28.8.1752 (AE. Bi 1029). 30 Letters o f the French consul in Sidon dated 3.6.1741 (ACCM, J-789), 16.3.1741 (Aff. Et. Bi 1025), 29.9.1742 (AE. Bi 1026), 26.1.1748 (AfT. Et., Bi 1027). 31 Letter of the French consul in Sidon, dated 30.1.1749 (Alf. Et., Bi 978).

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in the central Lower Galilee, and from there continued to extend his domain westwards. By the late 1740’s, he was firmly ensconced in Acre, and this put the finishing touch to his political and military control of the entire Galilee, from the Sea of Galilee in the east to the M editerranean in the west. One should not underestimate the contribution made by P ähir’s personal prowess and by the weakness of the välis to his dramatic rise to power — but due recognition must also be accorded to the contribution made by the economic factors described above, which P ähir had exploited to the full in acquiring and consolidating his political might. In the third quarter of the 18th Century, P ähir continued to rule according to the criteria that had guided him during his rise to power. Aware that his involvement in international trade had been a vital factor in his economic and political rise, P ähir remained keenly interested in this throughout his life. He encouraged the cultivation of cotton in the western parts of the Lower Galilee, making Shafä’amr one of the im portant centres of this. His ties with the French were not entirely suspended, but they were now of a rather different nature — with the growth of his political power and prestige, it became he instead of the French who dictated prices, and these were apt to rise at regular intervals. When, in the early 1750’s, the French traders attempted to challenge P ähir and to force him to trade on their terms, he retaliated by forbidding the Galilee fanners to sell their cotton to them. As P ähir could not market the cotton himself, and his attempts to do this through English merchants failed, he was forced in the end to come to a compromise agreement with the French. But even after this, the cotton trade continued to be conducted for the most part either through traders dependent on P ähir or through his senior officials. Even more im portant — he continued to dictate prices. Although the bulk of the trade was controlled by the French traders, P ähir was also able to carry on some international trade independently of them. He established fairly extensive trade links (in cotton and wool) with M alta, Cyprus and Livorno, and his finance minister, Ibrâhîm Çâbbâgh, developed these considerably in the last years of P ähir’s life.322 22 Useful information on the conflict between P ih ir and the French merchants is to be found in the correspondence of the years 1752—1753, and most particularly in files ACCM, J-792 and AE. Bi 1029. On P ih ir’s direct commercial links with Europe see: Letter of the French consul in Sidon dated 10.2.1752 and appended documents (Aff. E t., Bi 1029); Letter of the Chamber of Commerce of Marseille dated 12.8.1757 (ACCM, B-46); Maliye, 10211, p. 302. On the monopoly of the Palestinian cotton trade established by P ih ir see the report sent by the French merchants on their meeting dated 3.2.1764 (ACCM, J-798). The merchant Grange reported on the fixing of cotton prices in his letter dated 10.10.1763 (ACCM, Lix 769).

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In order to enable the cotton trade to function smoothly, and in order to keep it as far as possible under his control, P ähir set about constructing a suitable port. He consolidated his hold over Acre33 and restored law and order in the port, which rapidly became the chief centre of trade in Palestine. As from the middle of the 18th Century, Acre was the most im portant town in Palestine both economically and politically, and p ah ir also increased its military strength. He made it his capital, and from here exercised his rule over the entire Galilee, p ah ir could in actual fact have done exactly as he pleased in the whole of the eyälet, as the väli was completely powerless to hold him in check. But it should be remembered that p ah ir was very anxious to legitimize his rule, and sought the vô/fs official sanction for every­ thing he did. From the very beginning of his career, throughout his gradual subjugation of the Galilee, right up to his final annexation of Acre, p ah ir appealed to the väli for an official mandate to rule (albeit, in each case, after the event, once the facts had already been established by force of arms). And the mandate was always granted. The outcome of all this was the absurd situation prevailing in the capital of the eyälet — while the väli continued to rule in name he was without any real power, his de facto rule being restricted to the city of Sidon, and even there his authority was far from being absolute. On the other hand, a subordinate of his, P ähir, ruled over the greater part of his province, either directly (the Galilee), or indirectly (the districts inhabited by his allies, the Metoualis), and was able to do exactly as he pleased in those areas. This state of affairs was not exactly to the välfs liking, as can well be imagined, but given his virtual impotency, he was forced to accept the situation, and hope at least to be able to derive his revenues from the province. Pähir, for his part, had no desire what­ ever to cross swords with the väli or any other official Ottoman body. It was only in the last years of his rule that he came into open conflict with his theoretical masters, the Väli of Sidon and the Sublime Porte. During the last five years of his rule, Palestine was the scene of a number of invasions and battles, in all of which P ähir was directly involved.34 The Governor of Egypt twice sent armies into Palestine. On the first occasion, 'A ll Bey dispatched his troops in two waves, the first at the end of 1770, and the second (and major wave) in the following spring. The Egyptians, aided by Pähir, trounced the army sent against them by the Väli of Damascus, conquered the whole of Palestine, and went on to take Damascus itself. P ähir had decided to lend his support to the commander of the Egyptian forces, Muhammad Abü Dhahab, as he considered him to be in the service 33 For further details see pp. 130-132. 34 On the last Stages of p sh ir’s career Heyd, pähir, pp. 46-71.

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of his ally, ’All Bey. But when AbQ Dhahab turned against ’All Bey and seized power in Egypt, he and p ah ir became deadly enemies. In the spring of 1775, Abu Dhahab marched into Palestine for a second time, defeated P âhir’s forces, and forced the latter to evacuate Acre and take to the hills. The sudden death of Abü Dhahab later that year, and the consequent with­ drawal of the Egyptian forces from Palestine, enabled p ah ir to return to Acre and reassert his authority in the Galilee. In the years between the above two Egyptian invasions, p ah ir bad successfully withstood a number of attempts made by the Porte to bring him to heel. In the spring of 1771, the Vâli of Damascus attempted to march against him at the head of a large army, but this was soundly beaten in a battle near the P ula Lake, while his Druze allies were driven back near Sidon. In June 1772, p ah ir won another decisive victory, also near Sidon, over a large army sent against him from Damascus. It is hardly surprising that p ah ir derived a great deal of confidence from these military successes, and this prompted him to attempt to extend his rule over the whole of the Eyâlet of Sidon and over Palestine. In October 1771, he took the city of Sidon and in the following year, after his victory in the Battle of Sidon, he marched against the sancaks of Southern Palestine. He met with little resistance in Ramie and Gaza, took Jaffa after a siege, and even made preparations to march on Jerusalem. All these actions were accompanied, as in the past, by attempts to obtain official sanction from the Porte, and at a certain stage it did indeed appear that he might be able to legitimize these conquests and be appointed governor over the whole of Palestine. But his increasing power, his ties with the rebel ’AH Bey in Egypt, and, above all, his open defiance of the Sultan’s army, were things that could not easily be ignored. The second Egyptian expedition against Palestine was in actual fact intended to break p sh ir’s power on behalf of the Porte, and even after Abü Dhahab’s death the Porte persisted in its objective, sending a flotilla under the command of the Ottoman Admiral (Rapudm-i DeryS) for the purpose. Detailed instructions for the operation were set out in a finnan sent to the Jfrapudän-i Deryä — he was to take Acre and the other coastal fortresses, break the power of p sh ir and his sons, and restore the Porte’s authority in the province. It is inte­ resting to note that the Ottoman Admiral was more than a little apprehensive of P ähir’s might — from the finnan it appears that similar instructions had been given in the past and not been executed. Instead of carrying out his orders, the Admiral would send various excuses back to Istanbul — a common pretext was that a large Spanish flotilla had been sent against him — requesting that the expedition be put off until the following winter (when he would automatically be absolved from the unpleasant task, anyway). This time, however, he had been provided with 3,000 soldiers

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whom he was to set ashore with orders to take Acre. The port fell, apparently with very little resistance, and by the end of August, 1775, it was in the hands of the Kapudän Pafa. pfihir himself was killed.33* C. The Rule o f Aftmed Jezzär The breaking of Pfihir’s power was part of the Porte’s deliberate policy aimed at restoring the Eyälet of Sidon to the status of a disciplined and orderly province. Although the disappearance of Pfihir from the scene did in fact remove the political anomaly described above, it did not by any means obviate the possibility of another local potentate (a member of Pfihir’s family, for example) from seizing power in the eyälet and perpetuat­ ing the impotency which had affected the institution of Väli of Sidon. It would appear that the desire to re-assert the “classical" forms of central government in the province did not derive only from theoretical considera­ tions or from the mere love of power for its own sake, but had also a purely practical and utilitarian motive — Palestine’s economic development, greatly boosted by the country’s involvement in international trade, had of course not escaped the Porte’s notice. The tremendous profits which had accrued to the various local shaykhs, and to Pfihir in particular, had also not gone unnoticed. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the Ottoman treasury began to cast covetous looks at those shaykhs who were ammassing such huge fortunes at its expense. This was not a particularly new develop­ ment, and had been in evidence for some time. But by the second half of the 18th Century, and especially during the last decade of Pfihir’s rule, the financial situation in the Empire had become critical. The Empire was in the throes of a life-and-death struggle with Russia, which was ruled at this time by Catherine the Second. N ot only did these wars result in serious territorial losses, but the sustained military effort placed an unbearable strain on the Empire’s financial resources. This did not end with the signing of the Treaty of Küçük Kainarca, which required, among other things, that the Empire pay massive reparations to Russia. The restoration of the vd/fs authority in the Eyälet of Sidon was seen, therefore, as affording an excellent opportunity to harness an im portant source of revenue to help meet the huge debt incurred in the wars with Russia and as a result of the terms o f the above treaty.36 To the above considerations must be added the Porte’s sensitivity to events in Palestine in view of the proximity of the province 33 Ba|hakanlik Arjivi, MUhimmc Defterleri (MUhimme), 1(6. pp. 381-382, finnan dated awäkhlr Jumâdha al-awwal 1189/20-29.7.1773. 36 On the financial situation in the Empire during the first years of Jezz&r's rule see Uzunçarçili, op. clt„ Vol. 4, pp. 397-602; Cevdet, op. cit., vol. 4. pp. 156-160.

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to the Hajj route, and also its hope that a powerful väli might be able to hold in check the Bedouin tribes on both sides of the Jordan. It was hoped that as a result the southern sancaks (belonging to the Eyälet of Damascus), which were being constantly plagued by these tribes and were consequently unable to contribute to the expenses of the Ifajj, would once again be a position to do so, and also that the attacks on the ffajj column itself (which had reached a peak in 1757) would be brought to an end. If the Porte wished to restore order in the Eyälet of Sidon and Palestine, accomplish all the other objectives it had set itself (described above), and also fill the political vacuum left by Pàhir, it had no choice but to appoint a strong and efficient vâli. This was also in keeping with the general adminis­ trative re-organization which the Porte was trying to implement throughout the Empire at this time. After the Treaty of KUçük Kainarca, it was dis­ covered that at least a quarter of all the välis in the Empire were totally unsuitable. It was decided, therefore, along with certain other reforms aimed at increasing administrative efficiency, to reduce the number of vezirs in the Empire.37 And so, Ahmed Jezzàr Pa$a was appointed Vâli of Sidon. Jezzär was o f foreign origin (a Bosniak), and had in his youth received a military education and training as a mamlOk in Egypt, where he achieved fame in the service of *AU Bey al-Kablr. In 1773, when the Porte wished to assert its authority over Beirut and make this a bridge-head from which the rest of the Syrian coast could be brought under its control, Jezzär was chosen for the task. He succeeded in governing the city for almost a year, despite the almost constant attacks mounted against him by the Druzes, P ähir al-'U m ar, and the Russian fleet.38 Eventually, in the absence of any support from the Porte, he was forced to surrender. But this did nothing to tarnish his image, either in the eyes of the inhabitants of Syria or in the eyes of the Porte, and shortly afterwards he was appointed governor in some other part o f the Empire (where, too, he proved very successful). With this record, Jezzär seemed to be just the man the Porte needed to implement its plans and bring the Eyälet of Sidon back under effective central rule. But if he was to do this, it was essential that his appointment should be for more than one or two years, which was the customary tenure of office for a väli at this time. Although his initial appointment was in fact for just one 37 ibid., vol. 2, pp. 12-13; Enver Ziya, Karel, Selim IHOn hatti humayuniari, (Ankara, 1942), p. 114. 3S This should be regarded as the first stage of his career in the Ottoman administration. It is worthwhile noting that throughout his entire life Jezzär affixed to all his official correspondence a seal bearing his name and the date 1187 which is equivalent to 1773-4:

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year, it was renewed each time it lapsed. Furthermore, during the first decade of his rule he gradually managed to obtain from the Porte the right to rule for life (tnâlikâne) over most of the eyâlet. Although his relations with the Porte were not entirely devoid of friction, his rule over Palestine remained unbroken for a period of thirty years (1775-1804), during which time he served continuously as Vâli of Sidon. While there were a number of differences between the regime of Jezzär, the foreign vö/f, and that of p sh ir, the indigenous mOltezim, both men based their power to a very large extent on the considerable revenues deriving from Palestine. Thus, Jezzär continued to encourage the international trade conducted by the French merchants in Acre. Although relations be­ tween the new väli and the French merchants were at first amicable, the latter soon began to complain about the numerous fines and levies which Jezzär imposed on them. Nevertheless, despite this, they continued to carry on a brisk export trade (mainly in cotton) from Acre port. In 1781, the French consul in Sidon wrote that “so far at any rate, there is no reason to complain about Jezzär; French trade is continuing as usual” .3940At the end of the same year, the French vice consul in Acre, while writing that Jezzär, “is of despotic character and recognizes no law other than his own will”, made no mention of any particular harm caused to the French merchants in the p o rt49 The French consul in the late 1780’s even maintained close social ties with Jezzär. Like Pähir, Jezzär realized that the French monopoly of trade in Palestine considerably reduced his own income from cotton and other produce. P ähir had made a half-hearted attempt to break this mono­ poly in the early 1750’s, but failed. Jezzär, however, once he felt sufficiently sure of himself, did in fact manage to rid himself of the French traders at the end of 1790, when he expelled them from both Acre and Sidon. This did not mean that he had dispensed entirely with the services of foreign traders — a short time afterwards, foreign merchants (including French­ men) were once again handling Palestine’s foreign trade from Sidon, but with JezzAr’s permission and on his terms.41 He would under no circum­ stances permit a return to the previous situation, and to the very end of his rule, he firmly resisted any attempt to re-establish a French official in Sidon. Jezzär had a number of reasons for expelling the French traders in 1790 (their support for the rebellion against him, the decline in French prestige following the Revolution, etc.). But this step can be best under­ 39 Volney, op. eit., p. 288 note 1. 40 Charles-Roux, op. eit., p. 133. 41 The French consul in Acre referred bitterly to the continuation of this trade in French vessels: “et c’est au moment ou le Patriotisme semble être l’oracle des français” (in his letter sent from Jaffa on 1.12.1791 (AOCM, J-805).

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stood in the context of Jezzär’s general economic policy, which aimed at establishing a monopoly of his own of all the trade in Palestine. JezzSr’s first step in this direction was to monopolize cotton. He deter­ mined prices, and made certain that these were enforced. He forbade the buying and selling of cotton through any agency other than his own, and when the French merchants tried to remind him that this was in contra­ vention of the capitulatory agreements, he simply retorted that in his country it was he who was Sultan. When Volney passed through Palestine (1784-5), Jezzär’s monopoly system was still a comparatively new develop­ ment, and was more or less restricted to cotton. But from a letter sent in 1785 by the head of the Ashkenazi Jewish community in Tiberias42, it appears that Jezzär had in the previous year (1784) begun to extend his monopoly also to include cereals — he had forced the farmers, who were unwilling to do so because of the drought of the previous year, to plant wheat. Due to the rains, the yield was good, but Jezzär forbade the fanners to sell their grain or to store i t The entire crop was exported, mainly to Egypt and the surrounding area. One of the results of this, typical of any monopoly, was a sharp rise in cereal prices — by as much as 400%. Jezzär stored the seed in granaries especially built for the purpose, and it was distributed to the farmers at the start of each sowing season.43 When his rule was extended to include Damascus in the mid-1780’s, Jezzär began to build huge granaries and stores here as well. These were to house the produce of Hawrän and the surrounding areas, which he had hoped to monopolize — his rule over Damascus came to an end, however, before he was able to implement this plan. Although this is nowhere actually mentioned, it appears that in his later periods of rule over Damascus and Palestine he did in fact manage to extend his monopoly to include cotton and cereals also in these areas.44 Apparently he did so by means of the new regulation promulgated by him in the middle of 1790, whereby all produce could now be sold only to his own agents in Acre and it was only from these that the traders could now buy.43 Jezzär spared no effort in making sure that his monopoly was not in 42 B. D. Hakohen, Sefer birkat ha-aretz (Jerusalem. 1904), p. 64a. 43 W. O. Browne, Travels in Africa, Egypt and Syria from the Year 1792 to 1798, (London, 1806), p. 423 remarks that “he has erected granaries, a laudable design, but deficient in the execution ; for the grain being 01 preserved... it is unprolific when distributed for seed to the peasantry” . 44 M. al-Dimashqi, Ta’rlkh bawddith al-Shäm wa-Lubnän, (Beirut, 1912), p. 4; I. alNimr, Ta'rlkh jabal Näblus wa-al-Balqä' (Damascus, 1938-Nablus, 1961), Vol. 1, p. 139. 43 Letter of the French consul in Acre, dated 13.7.1790 (Aff. Et. Bi 981). The French ambassador in Istanbul spoke of Jezzâr as “possesseur de presque toutes les plantations de Coton et adjudicatoire de toutes les fermes” having “le monopole presque général qu’il exerçait sur les malheureux habitans" (in his letter dated 17.12.1790, ACCM,

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any way circumvented. Thus, he had ships patrolling the coasts, and main­ tained a strict watch over the ports.46 Any attempt made by the French merchants to buy directly from the farmers met with a ruthless response from JezzSr, and this was one of the main reasons why he eventually expelled them.47 There is no doubt that Jezzftr’s implacable opposition to the return of a French consul to Acre and his oft-proclaimed readiness to extend aid to individual French traders derived from his determination to control all trade carried on in his territory according to his own conditions. Jezz&r managed to maintain his monopolies throughout the entire period of his rule — a traveller who visited Palestine at the beginning of the 19th Century46 reported that all the country’s produce was at this time still subject to the Pafa's control, and it was he alone who decided what crops were to be produced for export. His monopolies were merely one source of Jezzär’s income. The customs dues levied on all exports and imports were another im portant source of revenue — in 1784, for example, his income from these alone came to 500,000 kurüf.49 Then there were the special fines (Avanies) which he imposed from time to time on both foreign merchants and the local inhabitants, and his appropriations of private property for one reason or another.66 But the bulk of his income derived from the direct taxation of his subjects (the miri and associated taxes). The wide range of taxes which he levied, the efficient manner in which these were collected by his officials, and the J-170). This all-embracing monopoly is referred to by Olivier who visited Palestine in the nineties. (G. A. Olivier, Voyage dans PEmpire Ottoman, PEgypte et la Perse, (Paris, 1804), vol. 2, p. 254). Cf. Charles-Roux, op. d t., p. 134. 44 The regulation prohibiting any vessel from leaving Acre after 8 p.m. was probably intended to prevent any attem pt at smuggling contraband into the port. Some British visitors who tried bona fide to board their vessel anchoring outside the port had to retreat in great haste to avoid being sunk by the coastal batteries (E. D. Clarke, Travels In Various Countries o f Europe, Asia and Africa, (London, 1812), vol. 2a, pp. 384-385). 47 This is mentioned in a finnan citing Jezzär’s main claims against the French mer­ chants. He accused them of maintaining Catholic missionary activities, of trying to break his monopoly by purchasing cotton at low prices directly from the peasants, and of establishing a soap factory in Jaffa against his will. (MUhimme, 196, pp. 286-287 firman dated awäsit Rabl’ al-ftkhir 1206/7-16.12.1791. A similar finnan in MUhimme, 194, p. 294, dated awâkhir Jumàdhà al-awwal 1205/15-24.1.1791). 44 Clarke, op. cit., vol. 2a, pp. 389-390. 49 Volney, op. cit., p. 288. * Y. A buShaqrä, Al-barakät fi Lubndn iia "ahd al-mulafarrifiyya (Beirut, n.d.), p. 171, cites many examples of Jezzär’s acts of oppression and different methods adopted by the local population in order to avoid his tyrannies. Shihäbi, Ta'rikh, p. 76 notes: “ twrrattaba "awiTId lam takun jarat botta dhdlika al-waqt." See also E. Lockroy, Ahmed el Boucher, la Syrie et r Egypte au 18e slid e, (Paris, 1888), pp. 151-153.

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highly centralized nature of his administration all served to make Jezzär an exceedingly wealthy man. There is no way of knowing the exact extent of his fortune, for although his treasury was sent (on the Porte’s orders) to Istanbul when he died, no inventory of this has yet been found. In addi­ tion to the references made to him in numerous finnans as being a man of quite extraordinary wealth, we also have the testimony of the French consul in Acre, Renaudot, who was a close acquaintance of Jezzâr’s. He estimated that in 1792 the Papa's fortune came to 40 million kurûf.51 The French ambassador to Istanbul at the time, who must have based his estimate on the reports submitted to him by the consuls in Palestine, placed Jezzâr’s fortune in 1790 at SO million kurûf.52*For the sake of comparison, it is interesting to note that at the time of his death, P ähir’s fortune (which was by no means inconsiderable) was estimated by the Porte to be 25 million kurûf.55 Like p äh ir before him, Jezzär made use of his great economic strength in order to enhance his military might. From the very first months of his rule, and throughout his thirty years in power, Jezzär devoted himself unceasingly to the fortification of his province and the building up of his army. As an experienced and accomplished soldier himself, he was well aware of the need for a powerful army and knew just how to go about providing himself with one. The considerable financial resources at his disposal enabled him to employ mercenaries in large numbers, and he was able to weld these into a highly effective fighting force. It was thanks to this army that he was on four occasions appointed Vâïi of Damascus, and again thanks to it that he was able each time to carry out successfully the primary function of this office — protection of the IfaJJ caravan to and from Mecca. With this force at his disposal, he was capable of putting down any attem pt at rebellion anywhere in the eyälet, and was even able to break the power of various autonomous elements. There is no doubt that it was the existence of this army, and the effective manner in which it was able to carry out any task required of it, that enabled Jezzär to centralize his administration to such a remarkable degree. But it should not be forgotten that despite its undisputed merits, this was a force made up of mercenaries, and its loyalty was largely dependent on the Pafa's ability to keep it well 51 His letter sent from Jaffa, dated 1.11.1792 (Quai d’Orsay, Aff. Et., Correspondance Consulaire, St. Jean d’Acre). » Memorandum dated 23.12.1790 (ACCM, J-171). 33 The original sum of 20,000 kbe, the equivalent of 10.000,000 kurûf, was struck out by an Ottoman higher authority fixing it at 30,000 kbe, namely 25,000,000 kurûf (Bafbakanhk Arçivi, Ali Em in, Abd Ul-Hamid 1, 18629, firman dated 14 Rqjab 1189/ 10.9.1775).

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paid. Despite the fact that it was Jezzfir himself who had created and built up this army, it began to lose its loyalty to him in the 1780’s. He had ceased to lead it into battle in person, sending his ketfrüdä, Selim, in his stead.94 Thus, the soldiers came to regard Selim as their de facto commander. The Porte, meanwhile, began to fan Selim’s ambition eventually to replace his master. In the middle of 1789, while leading his troops in a campaign against the Druzes, Selim decided that the time was ripe. He came to an agree­ ment with the Druze Amir (YOsuf al-Shihfibl), promising to confirm him in office in return for men and money. Once this agreement had been reached, Selim openly raised the standard of revolt, proclaiming himself as having been appointed by the Porte in place of Jezzfir. Meanwhile, in Acre itself, the mamlalcs (who had remained behind) also revolted. A group of them led by the fjazme-där (Treasurer) who happened to be Selim’s brother, took over one of the towers of the citadel and threatened to blow up the gunpowder store unless Jezzfir agreed to let them leave the city.99 Jezzfir was left with little option (being subject also to the appeals of the M ufti and citizens of the city), and he was forced to let them go. These malmQks, together with most of the garrison, lost no time in leaving Acre and joining Selim. Süleymän Pa$a, Jezzär’s governor in Sidon, and Ibrâhîm AbO QfilOsh, who had once been his governor in Shaffi’amr, also revolted. The rebels took over Sidon before proceeding down the coast to Tyre, which they sacked, sparing neither the French merchants in the port nor their property. On June 4, 1789, the rebels arrived before the walls of Acre itself. Sehm was well aware that he could not hope to storm the walls, and he had to be content with positioning his troops without and waiting for the city to surrender. Confident in the knowledge that Jezzfir was left virtually without troops, and anticipating an easy victory, the rebel leader began to relax his guard. Jezzfir was in fact in quite a predicament — once the mamlQks had gone over to Selim, he found himself with barely 200 irregulars at his disposal. It appeared that Jezzar’s days as Väli of Sidon were num bered." But the wily Bosniak was not yet finished. On the eighth M “Salim al-saghir” or "KUçUk Selim” not to be confused with Selim Pa$a, Jezzir’s mamlfik who had come over with him from Egypt and died of the plague which broke out before the rebellion (Shihfibi, Lubnân, p. 141; Cevdet, vol. 6. p. 107; I. al-’Awra, Ta'rikh wiläyai Sulaymàn Bäshä al-'Adil (Sidon. 1936), p. 14 note 1; Lockroy, op. cit., p. 175). » Some sources mention another aspect in connection with the rebellion: Jezzär’s rather cruel reaction when he found out that during his absence some of his mamlQks had embarked upon a romantic adventure with a number of his concubines. His intention to execute them was a major factor leading to the uprising (Cevdet. vol. 6, p. 108; *Awia. p. 11, note 1; Clarke, vol. 2. p. 803). * Cevdet, vol. 6, p. 108.

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day of the siege, he mustered together many of the city’s artisans and builders, put them into uniform, armed them, and began to plan his counter-offensive. Taking advantage of the besiegers' over-confidence and lack of precaution, he slipped out of the city that night at the head of his rabble-army, set up two small cannon on the brow of a hill overlooking Selim's camp and, taking the rebels completely by surprise, opened his attack.37 His victory was total — Selim’s army broke and scattered before the onslaught. As the French consul in Acre described it, when he peered out over the wall the following morning, Selim’s camp had dispersed like a puff of smoke. Selim’s revolt drove home clearly just how completely Jezzär was de­ pendent on his army — a foreigner in the country, hated by its inhabitants whom he oppressed mercilessly, he could not hope to find any support locally, and did not even have anywhere to run to should the need ever arise. Once his army had deserted him, Jezzär was left totally defenceless and isolated. The Porte, it appears, had actually encouraged the revolt (albeit covertly) in order to break Jezzär’s power, which had become too great for complacency.38 The only foreign power with an active interest in the area at this time, France, also secretly supported the rebels. It had been a very narrow escape for Jezzär, and only his cunning and great persona) courage had enabled him to emerge victorious. Even after this narrow escape, Jezzär did nothing to bolster his position by eliminating the basic sources of his vulnerability — his entire rule had been based on the policy of keeping both the local population and the traders firmly in check and taking an obstinately independent stand vis-à-vis the Porte; his impressive economic and political strength bore eloquent testimony to the effectiveness of this policy. He also refused to change the basis of his military might, continuing to rely principally on the services of hired mer­ cenaries (not those who had proved disloyal to him, however; these he dismissed and replaced with others). Nevertheless, the rebellion had taught Jezzär that he could not afford to rely on anyone and he drew his conclu­ sions: he expelled the French traders from Acre, and refused to allow any Frenchman serving in an official capacity to return to the city, even for a limited period; although he was careful to keep his relations with the Porte correct, Jezzär would apprehend the Sultan’s emissaries from time to time,578 57 Prof. Holt’s version that Jezzär “contemplated flight by sea but a surprise night attack by his supporters dispersed the rebel forces, and abruptly ended the danger” is not supported by contemporary evidence, extensively documented in the French corre­ spondence. (P. M. Holt, Egypt and the Fertile Crescent, 1316-1922 (London, 1966), p. 131). 58 The French consul writing from Jaffa on 1.7.1791 states quite clearly that Hasan Paya was encouraging the rebel (Aff. Et., Bi 981).

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and refused under any circumstances to allow Ottoman troops into his city. Jezzfir continued to rule the inhabitants of Acre with an iron hand, while the fortification of the city proceeded apace — the revolt had taught him, firstly, that it was their fear of him alone that had kept the populace from rising against him,39 and secondly, that his only refuge, should the need ever arise, would be the fortified city. He reconstructed his army on much the same lines as before, continuing to place great emphasis on high pro* fessional standards. This time, however, he was careful to make certain that it remained strictly under his control and would never again be able to turn against him. N ot only did JezzSr’s reconstructed army serve him with the utmost loyalty, both within and without Palestine, but in the last year of the 18th Century it gave irrefutable proof of its worth as a first-rate fighting force. At the end of January, 1799, Napoleon began his advance from Egypt into Palestine. Marching at the head of an army more than 10,000 strong, he was able to advance rapidly up the M editerranean coast, and on the 19th March that same year arrived before the walls of Acre. Napoleon was convinced, in view of the ease with which he had been able to press his campaign thus far, that it would be a m atter of days before Acre, too, would fall. But this was not to be. He was forced to lay siege to the city and maintain this for more than two months before eventually abandoning it and ordering his troops to return to Egypt. An im portant factor contribut­ ing to the failure of Napoleon's Syrian campaign was undoubtedly the British military support, both from the sea and on land; also extremely important were the services of the French expert loaned to Jezzftr by the British for the purpose of supervising the fortification works at Acre. But both of these (together with certain other military factors which we shall not go into) were merely ancillary. In the final analysis, the successful defence of Acre can only be understood by reference to the defenders of the besieged city themselves, who, under the command of Jezzär, gave a fine account 39 Some of Jezzâr’s former acts indicate that he anticipated such a possibility and took a number of preventative steps: while the saray in Sidon lay within the citadel’s field of fire and therefore could easily be taken by rebellions soldiers, Jezzâr’s had his palace in Acre built in such a way that the saray was completely cut-off from the city and if needed could dominate the latter. (Letter of the French vice-consul in Acre, dated 6.7.1783, Aff. Et., Bi, 979). « X.-B. Saintine, J. J. Marcel. L. Reybaud (directeurs), Histoire Scientifique et Mili­ taire de rExpédition française en Egypte, (Paris, 1832), vol. 3, p. 423. Further descrip­ tions in Lt.-Col. Alderson, Notes on Acre and Some o f the Coast Defences o f Syria, (7,7), pp. 28-29, 36; A. Berthier, Relation des Campagnes du Général Bonaparte (Paris, An 8), pp. 83, 103; H. Plan et J. Dumaine (ed.). Correspondance de Napoléon 1er, (Paris, 1860), vol. S. pp. 420-421, 440.

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of themselves. Once they had got over the initial shock and had managed to throw back the first French attempt to breach the walls, and once they had come to realize that the conquerors of al-*Arish and Jaffa were not in fact invincible, the defenders gave no sign whatever of any undue fear or weakness. N ot only did they fight without respite in the face of constant bombardment, but Jezzär’s men even attempted to seize the initiative. Whereas the besiegers made 14 attempts to storm the walls of the city, the defenders launched no fewer than 26 attacks against the French positions. These forays, the first of which were made even before the initial French attack, continued almost without a break until the very last days of the siege.60 The extraordinary courage displayed by Jezzär’s men in carrying out these almost suicidal missions has even earned the praise of French historians.61 While it is true that in making these forays beyond the city walls the defenders derived considerable confidence from the presence of the British, the decisive factor was undoubtedly the superb fighting spirit which Jezzär had managed to instil in his army. Jezzär’s exemplary personal conduct too must have contributed much to the inspired defence of the city. He was not content merely with giving orders and urging his men on, but at critical moments during the siege he himself would appear on the walls and take an active part in the fight — this despite the fact that he was at this time at least 65 years old. On May 20,1799, Napoleon lifted the siege and ordered his army to retreat to Egypt. It should be pointed out that the manner in which Napoleon conducted the siege was also to some extent responsible for his failure. Although it is true that Bonaparte was able to mark up a number of not insignificant military victories in the course of his Syrian campaign,62 the fact remains that a powerful European army, an army which had conquered Egypt with such ease, was brought to a halt and driven back before the walls of Acre. While this was an ignominious defeat for Napoleon, it was a brilliant victory for Jezzär.62 When the French invasion began, the whole of Syria was placed under his political and

* 1 D. Lacroix, Bonaparte en Egypte, (1798-1799), (Fans, 1899), p. 327. 62 The whole subject was dealt with extensively in my “Jezzär Ahmed Paça” (unpub­ lished M.A. thesis, in Hebrew, pp. 43-52). 63 There is a certain tendency among different historians to under-estimate Jezz&r's role in the defence of Acre while Smith, the commander of the British squadron, is credited with all the glory. Having gone through some of Smith's correspondence it seems to us more than possible that the importance of Jezzär’s role was deliberately played down. (This aspect, which was dealt with in my (unpublished) JezzAr Ahmed Pa$a (pp. 49-50) will be separately elaborated in a special article.]

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military control.64 This was a clear expression of the Porte’s faith in Jezzfir as the one man it considered capable of successfully resisting the French in Syria, and the defence of Acre was ample proof that this faith had not been misplaced. Whatever Napoleon’s ultimate aim might have been when he embarked on his campaign, one thing remains certain — it was Jezzfir who had prevented him from continuing his advance in the direction of Istanbul and it was he who had forced him to withdraw to Egypt. By so doing, Jezzfir had done the Porte the greatest possible service any vâlï could. In the earlier part of the 18th Century, the Porte’s hold over Palestine was becoming increasingly tenuous; the territory was occasionally in a state of open revolt against the Sultan, and was at all times a source of unrest in one way or another. By the end of the century, not only had Palestine become an orderly, well organized province under the effective control of a powerful väli, but it was here that the Ottoman Empire was saved from conquest by a powerful and experienced European army. This, then, was the direct antithesis of the situation which had prevailed in the area at the beginning of the century, and constituted the high point in the process whereby Palestine was restored to the status of an Ottoman province effectively serving the interests of the Empire as a whole.

«4 Jezzfir was nominated at the end of December 1798 as VSH of Damascus, Tripoli and Egypt as well as Amir aJ-ffajJ and Serasker of Egypt (Bajbakanlik A rjivi, Cevdet Dahiliye, 41380 firman dated awtisif Rajab 1213/19-28.12.1798).

2.

R elations B etw een the R ulers o f P alestine a n d th e C en tra l G overnm ent

A.

pâhir al-'Umar

1) The Start o f his Career Throughout his political career, p sh ir’s official status was that of taxfarmer (mQltezim or mufçâfa'aci) to the Väli of Sidon. As such, the question of his relations with the Porte should never in fact have arisen; theoretically his was a purely internal function within the administrative framework of the Eyâlet of Sidon. But in reality, P ähir’s political weight carried far beyond the borders of the eyâlet itself. Although it was officially one of the Voll of Sidon’s duties to see to it that P ähir’s activities remained confined to the territory of his iltizäm, he proved to be too weak to do this, and the Porte was forced to turn to the Väli of Damascus for assistance. Thus, in examining the relationship between P ähir and the Väli of Damascus, it is necessary to consider this on two distinct levels: on the one hand, simply as expressing the natural rivalry between two neighbouring political forces, each encroaching on the territory of the other and as a result coming to blows, and, on the other hand, as a manifestation of the Porte’s attempt to use the only potent force at its disposal in the area (the Väli of Damascus) as a foil to an over-ambitious mültezim (Pähir) who was growing too powerful for his official position. Both these aspects are almost invariably noticeable each time the two sides came into conflict. Very often, the cause was purely local — P ähir would deliberately provoke the Väli of Damascus, who then had no choice but to react But apart from such strictly local causes, the possible role of the Porte in any action taken by the Väli of Damascus must be kept firmly in mind. P ähir began his political career as Shaykh of Tiberias, which was then a village in the Eyâlet of Sidon.1 As he was not a mütesellim (i.e. an official sent to the area by the väli in order to serve as his governor), P ähir enjoyed the support of the inhabitants at least of the village itself, and most probably of the entire district. In other words, he had the advantage of being regarded 1 “$ayda eyäletine täbi' labariya karyesi feyf/i tähir" (MUhimme, 140, p. 159, firman dated aam if R abl' al-thinl 1147/9-17.9.1734).

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as a “local boy“. In awarding him the khil'a and appointing him governor of Tiberias,2 the Vâlï of Sidon was in actual fact merely confirming and giving legal status to the de facto situation pertaining in the area. At the beginning of the 1730’s, p sh ir began to extend his activities beyond the borders of Tiberias. He started to encroach on the Safed area, eventually taking the town itself and pillaging the population, an act which brought him into direct conflict with the Vâlï of Sidon. But far more serious from the Porte’s point of view were those of his activities which openly challenged the authority of the Vâlï of Damascus. Such were his numerous forays against villages in the Sancak of Nablus and his annexation of four o f these in 1733. When the vâlï dismissed the Shaykh of Damascus,3 Qa’adSn Ibn TShir al-SalSme, and expelled him from the city, p sh ir permitted him to settle near Tiberias, and even helped him “to continue with his way­ ward schemes” . This too was an act of outright provocation on his part, as was the support (implied in a firman) he had given to those bent on undermining the vd/i’s authority in Damascus. The joint attacks made by p sh ir’s brothers and their Metouali allies on 11 villages, which they razed, burning trees and destroying crops, are also to be reckoned among those acts calculated to have provoked the Vâli of Damascus.4 It was a a result of all these undoubtedly provocative actions that the Porte eventually decided to take steps against p sh ir — the Vâli of Sidon was instructed to arrest him and send him to Damascus, where he was to be imprisoned, while similar instructions were sent to the Vâli of Damascus.5 But the Porte did not at this stage fully appreciate the seriousness of P&hir’s activities, and was easily persuaded not to press on with this action against him. The Vâlï of Sidon managed to convince the Porte that it would be expedient to postpone the arrest for the time being, pointing out that a number of mu£d/o*as belonging to the eyâlet were in the hands of the ZaydSnl family, and that any action against p sh ir should be avoided at least until the mäl-i mïrï on these mufcifa'as had been paid.6 P&hir took full advantage of the time he had thus gained, and hastened to lay his own case before the 2 Mikhâ’il, op. eit„ pp. 26-34; Heyd, Qâhir, p. 18. 3 His official title was "The shaykh of the beduins of Damascus" ÇUrbàn-i $äm jeybi) and he was mainly entrusted with the supply of camels to the boJJ caravan (MUhimme, 143. p. 148). 4 The exact location of these villages is not d ear; according to a finnan dated awdsif Rabl’ al-thinl 1147/9-17.9.1734 they were in the näfUye of AfclU (MUhimme, 140, p. 159). 3 op. ctt., p. 221, a firman dated awdkhir Jum&dha al-äkhir 1147/17-26.11.1734 dting orders previously sent to the V< of Sidon on the same matter. 6 “Ber menväl-i mafrüji 'uhd[e]Urinde okm mukdfa'âtin maUartm edä edenceyedek musàede ye rufrfat verllOp ba'd ül-edä afjz ve-mufikem bobs"... (ibid).

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Porte, managing to justify his activities and even to have these condoned.7 But this turned out to be no more than a temporary respite, and before long, he was once again at loggerheads with the Vâli of Damascus and the Sublime Porte. In the middle of 1738, a petition signed by the ’ulema and citizens of Damascus was submitted to the Porte.8 For some years past, claimed the petitioners, the Eyälet of Damascus had suffered from P ähir’s incursions into the Nähiye of Qunayfrcfi and the sancaks of Lajjûn and Nablus. In 1151/1737—8, Dähir’s audacity had in fact, reached new heights — taking advantage of the vd/Ps absence from Damascus at the time of the Hajj, he had joined forces with the former shaykh of the city, P âhir Ibn Kulayb, attacked the home of the incumbent shaykh, Dayäbl, expelled him, and replaced him with the above-mentioned Ibn Kulayb. Dayäbl was able, however, once P ähir had left the city, to reassume his office. So once again, P ähir had set out against Damascus, this time supported by the Amir Mulbim al-Shihäbl and a number of Metouali detachments. He had attacked Dayäbl and looted his property before going on to wreak havoc among the villages two-hours distant from Damascus. That same year, he had attacked the Turcoman tribes10 living in the Nähiye of tfaw rän, pillaging their property and herds. His activities extended also to the other end of the eyälet — in 1738 he had led a force of several hundred cavalry against villages in the Nähiye of Sâÿil ‘Atilt, razing a number of them to the ground. M ost of these exploits were not, it seems, very different from those of the early 1830’s, the guiding principle being gradually to encroach upon the boundaries of the territory belonging to the Vält of Damascus in those Palestinian sancaks adjacent to P ähir’s own domains. But a new trend, much more threatening as far as the Väli of Damascus was concerned, had begun to emerge — P ähir’s forays were starting to extend beyond the Jordan, coming ever closer to Damascus itself. Needless to say, this was far too serious a development for the Vâli of Damascus to ignore. Further­ more, the vital role played by Damascus in controlling and maintaining order along the Hajj route made the Porte considerably more sensitive to events in the city than it might otherwise have been. Thus, in threatening Damascus, P ähir was, in the eyes of the Porte, posing a threat to the Hajj. Accordingly, a firman was sent to the Väli of Damascus instructing him to march against P ähir and his allies, destroy their fortifications, and punishi i ibid., another finnan from the same date. • MUhinune, 145, p. 156, finnan dated awäkhir $afar 1151/9-18.6.1738. 9 Originally: “Q antara", which should be read “Qunaytra” . » •«Ifarah (sic!) (coyuniu".

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them .11 The prompt execution of these instructions was so im portant to the Porte that, not satisfied with merely issuing the firman, it sent the väli additional forces to aid him in storming the fortifications.12 The above plan was not in fact carried out, and P ähir continued to do much as he pleased. He proceeded to strengthen the fortifications at Tiberias, as he knew that an attack on the town some time in the future was inevitable.13 He also continued to carry out raids into the Nähiye of tfaw rän (“The Granary of Damascus") and to attack caravans along the routes linking Damascus with Egypt and Palestine.14 The Väli of Damascus, who reported all this to the Porte, requested permission to make an attack on Tiberias, destroy the town, and put the rebel to death.15 Although permission was granted, the väli lost his office before he was able to put his plan into effect. SUleymdn Pa$a al-'A?m was then once again appointed Väli of Damascus, and entrusted with the task of bringing P ähir to heel.16 He requested and obtained from Istanbul the experts and special equipment needed to lay siege to Tiberias.17 He even sent orders (buyuruldu) to the sancak beys of h The fortifications to be razed were those of Tiberias under p äh ir’s control, D ir tyannä under Sa*d*s, Jiddln under Qusayn ibn Khäliq. Sufcmäta under Muhammad ibn N äfi\ Jarbikha (Tarshikha? given in the distorted form) under Muhammad ibn *Ali, P ähir’s cousin (ibid.). 12 In addition to field-artillery (top) which the Väli of Damascus possessed, he was granted 5 “mortars” (frumbara bàün) with adequate ammunition as well as a military expert (bumbaract) (MUhimme, 146, p. 72. firman dated awd’il RabI* al-awwal 1151/ 19-28.6.1738). 13 He managed to acquire from Europe 4 cannons (jâbi (op), which he mounted in the fortified tower which he had built outside the town. In addition to his ceaseless efforts to fortify the place, he had a sufficient supply of food and water laid in (MUhimme, 149, pp. 42-43). 14 MUhimme, 147, p. 348 firman dated awâkhir DhU al-Qa’da 1153/9-18.2.1741. 13 This was the first time that instead of requiring that he “ be punished”, orders were given that he “be executed” (i'dàm) (MUhimme, 149, pp. 42-3, firman dated awâkhir Jumfldha al-awwal 1155/24.7-2.8.1742). This firman states quite clearly that the väli who asked for permission to attack P ähir was *Ali Pa$a. In his book Abdul-Karim Rafeq (The Province o f Damascus 1723-1783, Beirut, 1966, p. 142) suggests that the absence of clashes between him and P ähir might be, inter alia, a result of “his previous lack of acquaintance with the politics of Damascus and its dependent parts and his brief residence there” . The above-mentioned finnan makes it quite certain that as far as P ähir was concerned it was not long before this väli became very well informed of all the problems in the capital, whereas the main reason for the failure of his previous preparations to attack P ähir to materialize was his dismissal after a short while, in mid-1741. 14 This was not, therefore, “an authorization given by the Sultan to attack P ähir” (Heyd, pähir, p. 22) but rather a renewal of former orders. (MUhimme, 149, pp. 42-43). 17 Artillery (bumbaract) and demolition (lugumci) experts as well as the necessary equipment (MUhimme, 149, p. 53).

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Nablus, Jerusalem and Gaza, commanding them to raise an army and to enlist the support of the Bedouin tribes.18 The Porte was by now also determined to eliminate p&hir and destroy his military power once and for all. Thus, firman after firm an19 was issued, urging the Vâli of Damascus to pursue his plans with the utm ost vigour, and ordering the Vâli of Sidon to help him in this. During the course of the siege on Tiberias, Süleymin received constant reminders that he was to follow the campaign through to its conclusion and was under no circumstances to be satisfied with relati­ vely minor victories in isolated skirmishes or against the reinforcements coming up to relieve P&hir.20 The Porte was, however, sensitive to the fact that it was authorizing the Vâli of Damascus to operate in an area which, strictly speaking, fell under the jurisdiction of the Vâli of Sidon. Thus, Süleymin was clearly briefed to restrain his troops and to prevent them from causing any harm to the local populace or from challenging the autho­ rity of the Vâli of Sidon. He was, furthermore, instructed not to take any action liable to damage the economy of the eyälet or affect the miri revenues. Thus, it was imperative that the campaign be completed before the fla jj caravan set out for Mecca.21 It would appear from the considerable anxiety displayed by the Porte that SUleymin had intentions, once he was through with P&hir, of pushing on in the direction of Safed and other parts of the Eyälet of Sidon, a prospect that the Porte did not exactly relish. This anxiety turned out to be needless. Süleymin was unable to breach p ih ir’s fortifica­ tions at Tiberias, and at the end of 1742, he was forced to lift the siege and return to Damascus.22 While this was undoubtedly a personal failure for Süleym&n Paya, it also represented a failure of the Porte’s policy with regard to P&hir. Thus, on his return from Mecca, SUleymin was once 1» MUhimme, 149. p. 53, finnan dated awd'il Rajab 1153/1-10.9.1742. There is a very interacting and detailed description given by a Jewish contemporary source (Y. Beyrav,Zim rat ha-Aretz, Jerusalem, 1946, pp. 34-36): SUleyman Paya succeeded in hiding his intentions claiming that be was preparing himself to go out on a routine dawra. But the Jewish community in Damascus gave Pflhir an early warning as to the real intentions of their va//. i* MUhimme, 149, pp. 42-43,53.56.57,72. » Heyd, (Qähir, p. 23) wonders what it was that kept P âhir’s brother, Sa’d, from extending him any substantial help. A firman dated mid-October 1742 (MUhimme, 149, p. 72) citing a letter of SUleyman Paya explains Sa'd's behaviour in a more positive light: he had been carrying out several attacks with about 300 cavalrymen on the besieging forces near Tiberias. Substantial proof, both of the authenticity of this report and of the results of the exercise, was sent to Istanbul in the form of 11 severed beads. 21 MUhimme, 149, pp. 57,72. 22 For a detailed description of the siege: Letters o f the French consul in Sidon dated 19.9.1742; 29.9.1742; 5.1.1743 (Aff. Et., Bi 1026); A. al-Budayri, ffawOdith Dimashq atYawmiyya (Cairo, 1959), pp. 42-47; Rafeq, op. cit. pp. 157-160; Heyd, Q M r. pp. 22-25.

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again ordered to take up the cudgels against Pähir, and this time he was provided with even greater reinforcements than he had been on the previous occasion. Siege experts, together with a whole shipload of special equipment, were landed at Haifa from whence they were to proceed to Tiberias. Separate firmans were sent to the Väli of Tripoli and to the zu'am ff and timariots of Damascus, ordering them to come to SUleymän’s aid.33 And so, the latter once again set out for Tiberias, this time determined finally to put an end to P&hir. But, as fate would have it, he died suddenly on the way (at the end of August 1743),24 and the campaign was called off. These attempts to conquer Tiberias and eliminate P ähir in the early 1740’s must be seen in terms of a conflict between the central government, on the one hand, and the ambitious mültezim on the other. This conflict may be viewed from three separate angles — that of the Väli of Sidon, that of the Väli of Damascus, and that of the Sublime Porte itself. Regarding the latter, we have already seen that p ah ir’s activities had for some time been the cause of considerable uneasiness, and the Porte was not particularly averse to ridding itself of this troublesome upstart, whose forays in the direction of Damascus in the 1730’s had threatened to disturb the Hajj — something it was anxious to avoid at all costs. Instructions to bring P äh ir to heel had been issued in the past, but it was only when Süleymän al-*A?m became Väli of Damascus that the Porte saw fit (especially during his second term) to provide the means necessary to put these into effect. As far as the Väli of Damascus was concerned, his enmity for P ähir was, in the first place, the quite understandable reaction to the latter’s numerous acts of provocation, both direct and indirect. But there was another factor involved as well — the fortification of Tiberias. While Tiberias itself was not in fact within the bounds of the Eyälet of Damascus, the Väli of Damas­ cus was obliged to pass through the area in the course of his annual tax­ collecting tour (dawra to the sancaks of LajjOn, Nablus and Jerusalem. Regardless of whether he took the safer and more convenient route (by way of the Benot Ya'aqov bridge) or the one passing south of the Sea o f Galilee (which was exposed to Bedouin attacks), he had no choice but to pass close by Tiberias. This regular passage through an area officially under the jurisdiction of the Väli of Sidon had not in the past raised any serious difficulties due to the negligible importance of this border zone and the relative weakness of the above väli, which precluded any direct action on his part. P ähir’s growing strength, however, and the fortification of Tiberias, 2) MUhimme. ISO, p. 38. finnan dated AwOkUr R abi' al-th tal 1156/13-22.6.1743. For details on military aid sent to Sttleyman from Istanbul via Haifa see: Maliye, 3288, pp. 610-611. 24 U tte r of the French “nation” in Sidon dated 24.9.1743 (AOCM, J-824).

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to say nothing of the bold forays which he had begun to make into the Eyâlet of Damascus itself, radically changed this situation. The fortified town now constituted a potential obstacle to the Vâlï of Damascus’ passage through the area, while the gradual extension of p äh ir’s rule over the whole of the Galilee (through which the alternative routes from the Benot Ya'aqov bridge to the centre of the country ran) posed a serious threat to the continued operation of the dawra in the above-mentioned three sancaks.23*25 This threat to the dawra, which was a major source of his revenue, was of far greater consequence to the Vâlï of Damascus than the damage his prestige had undoubtedly suffered as a result of P ähir’s attacks on LajjQn and Nablus. Thus, from the Vâlï of Damascus’ point of view, the elimination of P ähir had become a m atter of top priority. The Sublime Porte, meanwhile, which had always attributed the greatest importance to Damascus as the starting point of the annual Hajj and to the role it played in maintaining security along the route, was no less anxious about the developments. This explains why in every finnan dealing with the problem, the Porte was so adamant that once Pähir had been taken care of, the fortifications at Tiberias were to be razed to the ground. We have dealt with the issue from the points of view of the Sublime Porte and of the Vâlï of Damascus. It remains to do the same from the point of view of the third side involved — the Vâlï of Sidon. While the latter was not, understandably enough, exactly over-enthusiastic about P ähir’s growing might, he did not display the same vehement opposition to this as the Vâlï of Damascus had done. The fortification of Tiberias, in as much as it provided P ähir with a firm base on which to build up his power and assert his inde­ pendence, must obviously have been viewed with misgivings by the Vâlï of Sidon. But at the same time, in view of the strategic position of Tiberias on the border of the eyâlet, the fortification of the town could also be seen in a somewhat more positive light. A t all events, the Vâlï of Sidon quite clearly did not feel impelled to cross swords with P ähir over the issue. Further­ more, while P ähir was often in arrears with his miri payments, he never failed eventually to discharge his obligations.26 In so far as the subject was ever mentioned in the various firmans, it always tended to be in terms rather favourable to P ähir — for example, in one such firman, instructions were given to force him to make up the arrears in his miri payments at a rate of 20% of his outstanding debt, which was certainly most reasonable 23 Fortifying Tiberias was not the only means employed by P äh ir; in the late forties he explicitly demanded that the Vâlt of Damascus refrain from passing through territories near it. (Budayri, op. clt., pp. 129-130). 26 Moreover; as far as Tiberias is concerned P ähir would usually pay even more than demanded by the Porte (Beyrav, op. cit.. pp. 34-35).

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for the period in question,27 while in another, instructions were given to delay any action against him until the miri from the Galilee had been col­ lected. No evidence has been found indicating that there was ever any need for the Väli of Sidon to take up arms against P ähir on the grounds of non­ payment, or refusal of payment, of the miri. This does much to explain why he was not especially keen to take action against him. It was the Porte that kept urging him to co-operate with his colleague in Damascus in the latter's sta n d in g feud with P&hir, in an attempt to draw him out of his general apathy regarding the matter. One final factor, of no less importance than the above, was the Väli of Sidon's total lack of concern for his army, which was, as a result, far weaker than that of the Väli of Damascus, and did not appear capable of doing much even within the eyâlet itself. This is how the French consul, writing in 1740, described the attitude of p sh ir and his fellow shaykhs towards the Väli of Sidon:28 Les cheks n’ont personne au dessus d'eux à qui on puisse avoir recours parce qu’ils se sont soustraits à l’autorité du Pacha de Seyde dont le gouvernement est très faible depuis plusieurs années. Given the above situation, it is quite clear that it was simply not within the bounds of the Väli of Sidon’s ability even to contemplate breaking P ähir’s power or razing the fortifications at Tiberias, despite the fact that the former was his mültezim and the latter fell officially under his juris­ diction. Thus, the Porte, which as we have seen was most anxious to put the troublesome mültezim in his place, turned not to the Väli of Sidon (whose function, strictly speaking, it was to act in this matter on the Porte’s behalf) but to the official it felt was both more capable of and more interested in doing so — the Väli of Damascus.29 27 A finnan dated September 1742: out of 36,141 kurûf owed by P äh ir for the mulçâfa'as of Shaft‘amr and R im a he paid the sum of 28,500 kurûf (MUhimme, 149, p. 53; the above-mentioned are mis-spelt Shafa ve-Nameh). 28 Letter of the French consul in Sidon, dated 11.4.1740 (Aff. Et., Bi 1025). Cf. the following statement made by his successor: “ils sont en état aujourd’hui de résister aux gouverneurs que le Grand Seigneur envoyé” (Letter dated 29.9.1742, Aff. Et., Bi 1026). 28 Some of the conclusions arrived at by Rafeq (op. eit., pp. 155-157) about this m atter should be modified. It seems to us, as we have tried to explain at length, that the Porte’s apprehension concerning the payments of miri was not an important reason for the attem pt to suppress P ih ir. Moreover, had the Treasury been doubtful of Pflhir’s readiness to meet its financial demands there was almost no point in the Sultan or anyone else intervening for the miri for Sidon was supposed to cover only a small portion of the Ifa ÿ expenses, and had any delay arisen in the payment, the Väli of Sidon could easily have covered this. Another reason given by Rafeq is that his two nephews, Ibrahim and A s'ad al-’Agm, successively serving as VtUb of Sidon, appealed for his help against P âhir. It does not seem improbable, but one should keep in mind that Stlleym&n’s campaign was both

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The Porte’s attempt to curtail Pfihir’s power through the Vâli of Damascus was not, in the event, particularly successful, and the wily mültezim was left to carry on much as he had in the past. He stepped up his activities in the western part of the eyälet, which he began to treat almost as though it were part of his own territory. According to the French consul in Sidon (writing at the beginning of 1745), the entire Acre region was at this time already subject to P ähir’s influence so much so, in fact, that he was even able to force the vô/fs governor in Acre to leave the port and return to Sidon.30 Once again, the Vâli of Sidon chose to ignore this blatant challenge to his authority — in the first place, he did not feel himself sufficiently powerful to take direct action against Pähir, while the latter was very careful to maintain at least the formal attributes of a loyal mültezim (i.e. he requested from the vâli an official renewal of his office each year, and never failed, despite the fact that he was often considerably in arrears, eventually to discharge his miri obligations). Though he focused his attention on Acre in the late 1740’s, this should not be taken as an indication that P ähir had been intimidated by the Vâli of Damascus into adopting a more prudent policy in the east. A firman issued at the beginning of 175231 referred to letters written by A s'ad al-'Aym in which he complained of certain “negative activities” carried out incessantly by P ähir against him­ self.32 N ot satisfied merely to voice his grievances, As’ad requested specific instructions authorizing him to set out against Pähir. Although he would have liked to undertake the campaign as far as possible on his own initiative, the experience of SUleymän Pa$a had taught him that it would be wise to request from Istanbul the aid of a fleet and other auxilliary equipment. But the Porte too had learned its lesson from the previous attempt to break P ähir’s power. In a lengthy firman, couched in rather restrained language, the Porte attempted to persuade As’ad to refrain from taking action for the time being. It acknowledged the fact that something had to be done about any ruler or governor who acted in an illegal manner and disturbed the orderly administration of the Empire. But it stressed that an attempt should first be made to bring such rulers into line by means of friendly prepared and undertaken when Y a’küb Paya, who was in no way related to him, was in office (cf. finnans sent at the second half of 1742 to Ya’kQb, MUhimme, 149, pp. 53,57,72). It is still possible that by so doing SUleymän was hoping to have Ya’kQb replaced by one of his own relatives, something he actually intended to achieve due to YaTcQb’s reluctance to help the Porte at the time of the siege on Tiberias (mentioned in a letter of the French "nation" of Sidon, dated 21.3.1743, ACCM. J-824). 30 Letter of the French consul in Sidon, dated 16.3.1745 (Aff. Et., Bi 1026). 31 MQhimme, 155, pp. 209-210, firman dated Jumädhä al-awwal 1165/17-26.3.1752. 32 Of which not the least important was the support extended by P ähir to As’ad’s rivals in Damascus (Shamir, op. cit., pp. 12-13).

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persuasion. Only once this had failed, and if the situation continued to deteriorate, affecting the security of the Empire and its subjects, should the rebel (in accordance with the Shatfa) be eliminated by force. The con­ sequences liable to arise from each step had to be carefully weighed up before any action was taken. With respect to p sh ir, the Porte pointed out that the Vâlf of Sidon had in the past attempted “to win him over (to his side) by means of wisdom“ in order to prevent “unpleasant consequences". In this way, p ah ir had been made to discharge his m m obligations with very little difficulty. As’ad al-*A?m and his brother Sa'd al-Dln, the Vâlt of Sidon, were urged, therefore, to follow a mild and restrained policy in dealing with p ah ir and to bear in mind the bitter experience o f SQleyman Pa$a as an example of how not to go about tackling the problem.33 Only by adopting a policy of appeasement towards p ah ir would it be possible to prevent harm from befalling the country and its inhabitants, and only in this way would it be possible to continue with the orderly collection of mlri in the eyälet .In order to invest these instructions with added authority, a batf-i hOmäyün was affixed to the firman quoting excerpts from the Qur'an and the ffadith illustrating the need to exercise restraint, together with a specific injunction from the Sultan that the above instructions be complied with. There is much that is surprising about this firman. After all, p ah ir was hardly the sort of man whom one would have expected the Porte to go out of its way to appease — he had several times in the past openly challenged the authority of the Vâlt of Damascus, and his plans and activities in this regard (see below) were well known to the Porte. Neither can it be claimed that the above firman was an isolated exception and, as such, cannot be taken as representative of the Porte’s general policy towards pahir. Just one year later, in the spring of 1753,34 a firman in much the same spirit was again issued — As’ad Pa$a was not only told to refrain from taking any direct action against Pfthir, but also to avoid any indirect action liable to stir up elements which were opposed to him. Both the Vâtt of Damascus and the newly appointed Vâlt of Sidon, Afimed Pa$a, were instructed to strive for amicable relations with p ah ir and even to attem pt to arrive at some sort of settlement with him. As for p ah ir himself, he was glowingly described as a man who had not displayed “the least hesitation or negligence in paying his miri dues and protecting his subjects” . It would appear, on the surface of things, that the mild and restrained language used by the 33

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Porte in referring to P ähir was due to the latter’s satisfactory behavior with regard to tax payment. But that this could hardly have been the case may be seen by examining the Porte’s miri records for the period — from a document prepared by the Vâli of Sidon in September 1752 listing the m iri debts of all mültezims in the eyälet,*5 it emerges that of the 85,000 kurüf mäl-i miri due from all his iltizäms, P ähir had only paid 15,000 kurüf. It is not surprising, therefore, that a special emissary was despatched from Istanbul with instructions to collect the massive debt owing to the state treasury. This probably explains why in another firman of the same period, P ähir was described as a man “known for some years for his crude and uncouth cJje.j) qualities”, on whom much pressure had to be applied before he agreed to settle his debts.36 In subsequent years, too, P ähir and his associates were to be found mem bered among those mültezims whose miri payments to the treasury were in arrears.37 Thus, right was clearly on the side of As’ad Pa$a when he wrote to the Porte at the beginning of 1753 branding p äh ir as a conscious and wilful tax-evader.38 p äh ir could not, then, have been considered even at this time as someone whose rule was by any stretch of the imagination a blessing to the Empire. Thus, the Porte’s attempt to pacify the Vâli of Damascus and restrain him from taking any direct action against P ähir was not only inconsistent with the logic and policy of its past actions, but could only be explained in terms o f an argument the premises of which were quite clearly false. One possible ex­ planation is, perhaps, that the Porte felt it would be more prudent to attempt to collect the outstanding debt by sending special emissaries to P ähir for the purpose, rather than risk losing the entire sum as the result of some precipitate military action against him. The French ambassador to Istanbul at the time suggested another reason — that the Porte was unwilling to come out openly against p äh ir due to the financial straits in which the Empire then found itself and because of the other, more pressing problems with which it was faced.39 But such explanations provide only part of the answer. They have to be augmented by one other extremely important factor — P ähir knew full well, as a result of As’ad Papa’s ill-fated expedition against Tiberias, that his activities were bringing him into direct conflict with the interests of the Porte. In order to obviate another, perhaps more successful, attempt on the part of the Porte to topple him, he began to seek3 33 Maliye, 10195, pp. 287-288, a document sanctioned by the Qâtfi of Sidon, dated I Dhü al-Q a'dah 1165/10.9.1752. 36 Maliye, 10195, p. 289, finnan dated 29 DhQ al-Q a'da 1165/8.10.1752. 33 Maliye, 10200, p. 289. 3> MUhimme. 155, p. 448. » Rafeq, p. 197.

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sponsors and supporters in Istanbul. As early as 1742, following the un­ successful siege that year, P ih ir had turned to his friends, the French traders, asking them to use their good offices on his behalf among the foreign ambassadors in the capital. The Jews of Istanbul, who were aware of P ähir’s sympathetic treatment of their co-religionists in Palestine, were also approached.40 At the beginning of the 1750’s, a number of high-ranking officials in Istanbul kept up a direct correspondence with pahir, primarily, it is true, in an attem pt to persuade him to make things easier for the French traders in Acre, but it may safely be assumed that this was not the only subject of mutual interest to them.41 According to *AbbQd al-Çabbâgh,42 p ah ir had managed by the end of the 1740’s and the beginning of the 1750's to cultivate a number of highly influential friends in Istanbul. His patrons in the capital, at the head of whom stood the banker Ya'qQb Aga, were all men who wielded considerable influence over the administration of the Empire. The pressure these men were thus able to exert on p ah ir's behalf, which must have cost the latter a small fortune, might perhaps help to explain the shift which took place in the Porte’s policy towards him and the considerable efforts it made to prevent A s'ad al-'Açm from taking action against him.43 p ah ir was shrewd enough not to rely solely on the support of Ya'qQb Aga and his associates. Thus, when the latter were put to death in July 1752 by order of the Sultan, p ah ir was able to find other “guardian angels” in the capital, and it was thanks to these that the Porte maintained its policy of appeasement for at least one more year.44 As will be shown below, it is plain that the Porte had never in fact abandoned its basic stand with regard to P&hir, which was clearly one of opposition to a man who was bound to be a source of trouble to the Empire. But, thanks to the circumstances prevailing at the time, Pfihir was given a most welcome respite in his relations with the Porte and its various agents. This was to have a very im portant effect on the future history of Palestine — P ähir used « Heyd, Mr. pp. 24-25. 41 Rafeq. p. 197. 42 'Abbild, pp. 10-12; Heyd. (HUr. pp. 29-30. 4) Rafeq refers to A s'ad’s attitude towards Pfihir as one of either “peaceful coexis­ tence" (p. 162), or “indifference" (p. 195). Finnans cited above do not tend to uphold this view: A s'ad’s was a policy of almost ceaseless subversive activity both in Istanbul and in Palestine (MUhimme, 155, p. 448, shows that he had contacts with ’Uthmfin, Pfihir’s insubordinate son). Pfihir himself was conscious of these links, as may be judged from his letter to the French Ministre de la Marine, dated 8 Rajab 1167/1.5.1754 (Aff. Et., Bi 1030). As'ad’s inactivity should be seen as the result of Istanbul’s pressure on him, and not attributed to a change of attitude on his part. 44 Mtlhimme, 155, p. 448, firman dated Spring 1753. On pfihir’s protagonists in Istanbul cf. Shamir, op. eft., p. 21.

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these years of tranquillity to consolidate his position in Acre, while the Porte, by maintaining peace on his borders, gave (quite unintentionally, of course) a considerable boost to the rapid development which took place in the port during the 1750’s. 2) The 'Fifties and 'Sixties During the period of ‘Uthm in Paça’s rule as VfiU of Damascus (17601771), a marked change took place in the Porte’s attitude towards p&hir. It became far less conciliatory than it had been in the past, and it was now clear that the Porte was interested, if not in breaking P ih ir’s power com­ pletely, at least in keeping it within reasonable bounds. One of the major bones of contention in this renewed power-struggle was Haifa, with the Vâli of Damascus serving as the Porte’s chief agent in carrying out its policy. Many reports record that p ih ir had managed to extend his control over Haifa as early as the end of 1757.45 Although his grip on the port did not manifest itself at this time in the establishment of some type of per­ manent fortress there, his influence in the area had certainly become para­ mount. It is known for certain that the entire area to the south and east of the Carmel range was under p ah ir’s control by the end of the 1750’s.446 The Porte was far from enthusiastic about his rapidly growing control over the coastal strip between Acre and TantQra, and it tried to stem this through the Vâli of Damascus, ’Uthm&n Pa$a. In its initial stage, the policy adopted was simply one of containment. ’UthmSn Pa$a set out on his annual dawra as usual, and in the course of this launched an attack against the fortress at TantQra, which soon surrendered.47 In order to make certain that this 4S in a finnan dated awdsif RabI' al-thinl 1171/23-31.12.1757 the Vdll of Sidon was ordered to ascertain the accuracy of reports which had arrived in Istanbul, describing the methods used by P ih ir in acquiring possession o f Haifa. He is reported to have sent there 8 Maghribi soldiers disguised as survivors of the ffaJJ caravan recently sacked by the Bedouin. The aga of the place, taken in by the story, permitted them to spend the night outside the walls and enter the city after sunrise. Having done so they killed him, captured the citadel, had its artillery transferred to Acre and installed a shaykh owing allegiance exclusively to P ih ir (MUhimme, 160, p. 58). 44 The mdlikdne of the mugHta'a of Tawafiln Z arq i' and TantQra in the Sancak of LajjQn was leased to P ih ir until the end of 1173/August 1760 (MUhimme, 163, p. 279) cf.: Maliye, 10207, p. 277. 47 TantQra was fortified by a certain *Abd al-Mubln an effort to evade payment of the increased taxes demanded by the Vâit of Damascus. Although the exact nature of the rela­ tionship between him and P ih ir is not clear, it appears to have been in some way connected with the latter’s seizure of the whole area (termed as “Sibil ’A tilt”) and the reconstruction o f TantQra (Maliye, 10203, p. 286, firman dated 17 R am alin 1174/12.4.1761).

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was not re-occupied by p&hir, he left behind a permanent garrison. (Part of the income from Haifa port was earmarked for the maintenance of these soldiers48). A t this point, the Porte made another move — Haifa and its surroundings were detached from the Eyâlet of Sidon and re-annexed to the Eyâlet of Damascus. This meant that p&hir would now have to contend, not with the weak and feeble Väli of Sidon, but with the Väli of Damascus, a far more powerful and dangerous adversary. ’Uthmän Pa$a lost no time in putting the above plan into effect. He sent a detachment of soldiers to occupy the fortress, and when this failed,49 he sent a second force which was more successful, P&hir attempted at first to obtain Haifa as an Utizâm, but to no avail. He then tried to take it by force, with little initial success. Finally, in a fit of pique, he set fire to the village of Haifa and laid siege to the fortress. This eventually fell in January, 1762, and P&hir became master of the place.50 The Porte refused at first to recognize this new reality, and continued to send Ottoman officers to Haifa. But this did not daunt P&hir in the least — he simply sent these officers back to whence they had come, Istanbul or Damascus, and appointed commanders of his own.51 When it saw that its policy to contain p&hir had failed, the Porte began to think once again in terms of breaking his power completely. This was, in fact, simply a return to the policy it had followed in the days of SiUeym&n Pa$a, as the Porte itself was quick to point o u t But a new element had now entered the picture. In a firman sent to *Uthm&n Pa$a at the end of 1764, citing many instances of P&hir’s failure to comply with the instructions of the Väli of Sidon and the Väli of Damascus, the latter was asked to * ** The garrison at TantQra was fixed at 40 soldiers for the maintenance of whom an sum of 2,2124 kurûf was allotted. * Heyd, Qdhir, pp. 39-40, based mainly on a letter of the French consul in Sidon, dated 6.6.1761 (ACCM. J-797). » TJthroin Paya did not dare to invade the territories under Pfthir’s control, and after a protracted period of threats he actually sent an officer with a number of soldiers who seized Haifa and leased it to the Shaykh of Nablus, one of p sh ir’s rivals. At first, p&hir tried to persuade the Vdil of Sidon to have him reinstated in Haifa, meanwhile proceeding to d ear the port of Acre of its ruins in order that it might serve as a possible alternative. As soon as the Väli of Sidon returned home, Pfihir resorted to direct attacks; these having failed, he blockaded the port from both land and sea, ultimately forcing the garrison to surrender. Since January 1762 “shek Daher possède ce chateau entièrement et le plus paisiblement du monde” (Letter of the French “nation” in Acre, dated 25.3.1762, Aff. Et.. Bi 1032). » He would threaten the new artillery officer sent from Damascus that if he did not obey his orders he would kill him. This uncompromising attitude caused the officer to flee from Haifa back to Damascus, upon which P ih ir appointed one of his own Maghrlbl men in his place (Bayhakanltk Arjivi, Ahkim-i $&m. 2, p. 274, dated awâsif Sha*bin 1176/24.2-4.3.1763).

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take immediate action with a view to getting rid of the troublesome upstart once and for all. But this was not to be done overtly — the contents of the firman were to remain secret, while ‘Uthmän was to attempt to deceive P ähir into believing in his friendly intentions. Then, once firm ties had been established, he was to kill him at the first possible opportunity.32 We have no information on whether or not ’Uthmän did in fact attempt to comply with these instructions. At all events, if he did, this clearly could not have been for very long. For in 1765, the Porte received a complaint from Pähir that •Uthmän had not only spurned all his attempts at some sort of rapproche­ ment, but had even displayed outright hostility towards him. What was more, ’Uthmän was even trying to turn his (Pähir’s) own sons against him,33 and this had not gone unnoticed. (’Uthmän’s attempts to exploit these internal rivalries in order to strike at P ähir were not, in the event, successful.34*) Pähir, for his part, continued to rely on the good offices of his patrons in Istanbul, who were able to see to it that a number of firmans favourable to him were sent to the Vâli of Damascus. The latter proceeded with his plans to march against Pähir, but his attempt in 1767 to put these into effect were thwarted by the Porte’s refusal to provide him with the necessary authorization.33 By the beginning of the 1770’s, relations between P ähir and the Vâli of Damascus were strained to breaking point, and it was only a m atter of time before the conflict erupted into open violence. N ot that their basic relationship had undergone some radical change — the factors behind their present enmity were essentially those which had in the past made any agreement between the two men virtually impossible. It appears, however, that P ähir’s sponsors in Istanbul had by this time fallen from favour, and the Porte now felt free to contemplate some type of direct action against him. Thus, ’Uthmän Pa$a was authorized to go ahead with his plans. As a preliminary measure, his (’Uthmän’s) son Darwlsh was made Vâli of Sidon, and not the slightest attem pt was made to disguise the fact that this had been done for the express purpose of enabling the attack on P ähir to be launched simultaneously from two directions.36 ’Uthmän even went 32 A confidential (“m ektwrf ’) firman, dated awäkhir Rabl* al-awwal 1178/18-27.9.1764 (MUhimme. 164, pp. 182-183). 33 Finnan dated awäkhir $afar 1179/8-17.8.1765 (MUhimme, 164, p. 283). On former attempts to tum P ähir’s sons against him see a letter sent by the French “nation” in Acre dated 25.3.1762 (Aff. Et. Bi 1032). For more details consult Rafeq, pp. 246-247. « Heyd, Pähir, pp. 40-41. 33 op, eit„ p. 43; Rafeq, pp. 247-248. 34 In a letter which arrived in Istanbul on 2 Muharram 1185/17.4.1771 p äh ir bitterly complained of ’Uthmän’s overt intentions, the latter having written to him claiming:

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so far as to write to Pähir, warning him of his intention to attack Acre. But the latter was not unduly concerned — he still had a very powerful ally in 'A ll Bey al-Kablr and, should the need arise, he could always appeal to Egypt for help. He did, in fact, do just this, and as a result, 'Uthmän Pa$a was forced to withdraw his forces from Palestine at the end of 1770 without carrying out his threatened attack on Acre. After the Egyptian forces (under Aba Dhahab) had gone on to take Damascus, however, they suddenly returned to Egypt. ’Uthmän Pa$a then returned to the attack, but was roundly defeated in a battle which took place at the end of 1771 near Lake Hüla.57 The Porte did not give up, and pressed on with its plans to bring the recalcitrant rebel to heel. 'Uthm än al-K uijl was dismissed, and the Syrian forces were put under the command of 'Uthm än al-Miçri, who was instructed to make every effort finally to smash P ähir’s power. He too did not succeed, and the Syrian army, augmented by a number of Druze detachments, was trounced by P ähir’s men (with Egyptian support) in a major battle near Sidon.58 3) His Latter Years Relations between P ähir and the Porte eased somewhat towards the end of his rule. This was due not so much to any fundamental change in p äh ir’s attitude as to a distinct change in tactics on the part of the Porte. Between the years 1768-1774, the Ottoman Empire was in the throes of a bitter war with Russia, and was suffering serious reverses both on land and at sea (a Russian flotilla managed to appear in the M editerranean, and in July 1770 annihilated the entire Ottoman fleet at anchor in the Bay of Çe$me). As the war with Russia dragged on, so the military burden imposed on the Empire grew heavier and heavier. Bearing in mind the dismal failure of its previous attempts to crush Pähir, it is not difficult to understand why the Porte was reluctant, if not totally unable, to contemplate at this stage any action which was liable to weaken the Empire still further. Moreover, the war was placing an unbearable strain on the meagre economic resources of the Empire, and the Porte was desperately interested in augmenting its revenues. Thus, just as in the early years of P ähir’s career, financial conside­ rations once again took precedence over the Porte’s desire to impose its authority on the various sub-rulers in the Empire. On the assumption that, “I did not take upon myself the office of Sidon out of greed, but in the hope of taking, revenge on P äh ir al *Umär" (Bafbakanlik Arjivi, Cevdet Dahiliye, 17285)* 87 For further details see: Heyd, Pähir, pp. 46-56; Rafeq, pp. 250-260, 279-282. ** Heyd. Pähir, pp. 56-59. Many details given in the correspondence of the French consul in Sidon during 1771 (Aff. Et., Bi 1035).

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by coming to terms with pfihir, it would be able to rely on the regular remittance of taxes from Palestine in the future as well as on the prompt settlement of past arrears, the Porte began to pursue a policy of rapproche­ ment. Damascus served once again as the chief link between pfihir and the Porte, with 'Uthm än al-Miçri (who bore the titles “Supreme Commander of the Army” and “ Representative of the Sultan” — “Serasker-i ' Arabistan” and “ Vekil-i Sulfän”) playing the major role in putting this policy into effect. The first attempts were made in the middle of 1772, at a time when Pfihir’s military ventures against Jaffa and Gaza were gaining momentum.59 Pfihir, for his part, was certainly not averse to a lessening of the Porte’s pressure on him. When ’Uthmfin Pa$a al-K uijl was removed from his post as Väli of Damascus, Pfihir once again tried to have himself appointed Väli of Sidon. Although he did not succeed in this, he did not give up hope, and began to cultivate the friendship of the new Väli of Damascus, Muhammad al-’A^m, in the hope of winning his support. He made his first approaches as early as the end of 1771,60 and about a year and a half later the head of the merchants in Damascus (Bâzergân Bäfi) was sent to mediate between the two men.61 The opening of negotiations did not put an end to hostilities — while negotiations were in progress, ’Uthmfin alMiçrï tried to make a direct attack on Pfihir, and the attempt in 1773 to seize Beirut, contrary to the wishes both of Pfihir and of the Druzes, must likewise be seen as a hostile act. The negotiations themselves did not proceed particularly smoothly, and on more than one occasion they were reported to have broken down.62 But the desire of both sides to arrive at some sort of settlement proved in the end to be decisive. The Porte, together with its representative in Damascus, came to the conclusion that as it was simply not possible to crush Pfihir by force, there was no option but to attempt to appease him, regardless of the fact that he was still clearly an unmitigated rebel. Thus, for example, when Jezzfir fled to Damascus in 1773 with a large quantity of livestock and equipment which he had seized from Pfihir, the latter was able to demand and get all this back. An even more substantive gesture was Muhammad al-'A^m’s willingness the follow­ ing year (1774) to sanction the rule of Pfihir’s son, A(unad, over Jabal ’AjlQn, despite the fact that the area had been taken by force and the local ruler forcibly evicted.65 pfihir, for his part, agreed to waive his initial demand39* 39 “Bulletin” dated July 20. appended to a letter of the French consul in Sidon, dated 31.7.1772 (Aff. Et., Bi 1035). *> Letters of the French consul in Sidon, dated 23.12.1771,9.11.1771 (Aff. Et., Bi 1033). *1 Letter of the French consul in Sidon, dated 14.6.1773 (Aff. Et. Bi 1036). *2 Letter of the French consul in Sidon, dated 16.8.1773 (Aff. Et. Bi 1036). « M. Breik, Ta'rlkh aJ-Shdm (1720-1782), (Harisa, 1930), p. 98; Letter of the French

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that he be appointed beylerbey by the Porte, undertook to settle all his m iri debts, and promised to toe the line in future. In return for all this,

his rule over Sidon, Acre, Jaffa and Nablus was to be confirmed.64 At the end of January, 1774, a final agreement was reached between 'Uthm än Pa$a, the Sultan’s representative in Damascus, and Pfthir. For three con­ secutive days, it was proclaimed in Damascus that the Porte had forgiven Pfihir for all his past misdemeanours and had granted him the sancaks of Nablus, Gaza, Ramie, Jaffa and ’AjlOn as iltizâm, while he was to receive the Eyälet of Sidon, as mâlikâne.6S On February 3, 1774, an emissary (ikaptci) arrived from Damascus with pfthir’s official appointment, and on February 17, a special assembly was held in Acre attended by all the local notables, who had been invtied to be present while pfthir received the khil'a, together with his official letter of appointment (buyuruldu) from the Sultan’s representative. 'Uthmftn Papa’s emissaries were then sent on to notify the Druzes and the Metoualis of the new agreement, informing them of the fact that they were now subject to Pfthir’s authority and were to obey him.66 But this agreement, as well as all the above appointments, although made in the Porte’s name, were totally without force pending the arrival of the appropriate frafH fe rif from Istanbul. ’Uthmftn Pa$a assured Pfthir that it would arrive in due course, together with his khWa. But at this point, the future of the entire agreement was thrown into jeopardy. Sultan Muçtafa III died in December 1773 and was succeeded the following month by *Abd ül-Hamld I, who promptly set about reshufflling the administration of the Empire. One of the victims of this was ’Uthmftn al-M ifri. Thus, all the above agreements, which had so painstakingly been arrived at with Pfthir, were now totally worthless and devoid of all meaning. It is not clear just to what degree ’Uthmftn al-Miçri was in fact acting in conformity with the wishes or policy of the Porte when he made such far-reaching concessions to p&hir at the begining of 1774. But at this critical juncture in the history of the Empire, with Russian military pressure at a

consul in Sidon. dated 31.1.1774and “Bulletins” appended to it. dated 31.8.1773.31.1.1774 (Aff. Et.. Bi 1036). 64 Letter of the French consul in Sidon. dated 3.7.1773 (Aff. Et.. Bi, 103043 L etten from Damascus and Acre appended to a letter of the French consul in Sidon, dated 31.1.1774 (Aff. Et.. Bi 1030m »Bulletin” dated 28.2.1774 appended to a letter of the French consul in Sidon, dated 4.3.1774 (Aff. Et., Bi 1030. to which is attached a translation o f 'Uthmftn alM isrfs buyuruldu to Pfthir of DhO al-Q a'da 27,1187/9.2.1774. 'Uthmftn made no pretence of allowing Pfthir to accomplish any more than he was entitled to: he was given the powers be had requested, subject to subsequent confirmation by the Porte. Cf. : Shihftbi, Ta’rikh, pp. 57-63; A. al-Zeyn, Ta'rikh $aydä (Sidon, 1331/1913). pp. 74-75.

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height, such an agreement could not have seemed all that unreasonable67 — Pähir, it should be remembered, had undertaken to pay into the Ottoman treasury half a million kurûf against past arrears, in addition to his miri for that year, which came to a further quarter million kurûf.6* This was no mean sum in view of the dire financial straits in which the Empire then found itself. A year later, however, the situation was very different. Not only was there a new Sultan at the helm of the Empire, but even more im­ portant, the signing of the Treaty of Küçiik Kainarca in July 1774 brought hostilities with Russia to a close. This afforded the Ottoman state a much needed respite, and the Porte was now able to turn its attention to the sadly neglected internal problems of the Empire. Although P ähir was slow in realizing it, this could only spell trouble for him. The new Väli of Damascus advised Pähir, as his previous agreement with ’Uthmän al-Miçri was no longer valid, to submit to the Porte any proposals he might have with a view to arriving at a final settlement.69 P ähir approached the Grand Vezlr, and at the suggestion of the latter, the Sultan issued at the end of January 1775 a ba(f-i fe rif completely absolving P ähir of all his past transgressions, including his rebelliousness. Pähir, for his part, was in future to discharge all his miri obligations, display complete obedience to the Porte and its various agents, collect all taxes, and remit these promptly to the treasury. In short, he was “to satisfy the Sultan in every respect” . But this time, P ähir was excluded from all sancaks belonging to the Eyälet of Damascus, including those over which he already exercised a de facto control (i.e. Jaffa, Gaza and Ramie). Neither were his expectations in the Eyälet of Sidon fulfilled. All he received, in fact, was a pardon for his past misdeeds and a confirmation of his status as mültezim to the Väli of Sidon.70 More­ over, not long after the firman arrived in Acre, it became quite clear to P ähir that this was not yet the end of the m atter — Muhammad AbQ Dhahab was advancing towards him from Egypt.71 The Porte, it appears, was determined to drive home the fact that the title it had attributed to P ähir — “The Mültezim of Acre” — was no mere empty phrase, and it was quite prepared to use force in order to make certain that his authority remained strictly confined to the area implied in the above title. Whereas in the past, the Porte had relied primarily on the Väli of Damascus in its «7 There is nothing surprising about the fact that he was accorded mâlikâne rights in the Eyälet of Sidon; at the age of 8S his tenure could not have lasted long. 6* Letter of the French consul in Sidon, dated 4.3.1774 (ACCM, J-801). w Letter of the acting French consul in Sidon, dated 5.8.1774 (AfT. Et., Bi 1036). 70 A firman dated awäkhir DhO al-Qa’da 1185/23-31.1.1775 (MUhimme, 166, p. 263), in which pfihir is addressed as "the Mültezim of Acre” (“*Akkâ mültezimi"). ?! Letter of the French consul in Sidon, dated 7.4.1775 (Aff. Et., Bi 1037).

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various attempts to curtail P ähir’s power, this time it turned to the Väli of Cairo. The reason for this, at least in part, was the fact that this väli, AbQ Dhahab, had a strong personal grievance against pähir. When the latter extended his rule in the early 1770’s to include southern Palestine, he came into direct conflict with AbQ Dhahab’s own interests in the area (Gaza and Ramie had been given to him as iltizäm in 1185/1771-72.72 It would be a mistake, however, to view AbQ Dhahab’s campaign against P ähir in 1775 merely as an attempt to regain control over an area which the latter had usurped from him — it appears to have had considerably more far-reaching aims than that. Although no specific instructions to this effect have been found (comparable to those in previous firmans to the Väli of Damascus), the basic purpose of the above-mentioned expedition does in fact appear to have been to liquidate pähir. This may be inferred from the firmans which were sent to the Druze Amir and “other shaykhs of the Sidon mountains" in June 1775 (i.e. after Jaffa was already in the hands of AbQ Dhahab) — these were asked to lend their full support to the Väli of Egypt, as he had been sent to rescue from P ähir’s hands “all that he had usurped" and was in the process of “cleansing the coastal areas, the plains and mountains” .73 It would be difficult to interpret these rather vague phrases in any other way, especially in view of the fact that it is known to us, as it was to the Porte, that once Jaffa had fallen Abü Dhahab had begun to advance in the direction of Acre, with what could only have been the intention of striking at the centre of P ähir’s power in order to eliminate him once and for all. It is possible that the Porte delibe­ rately failed to issue more specific instructions to AbQ Dhahab for fear that this would cause certain of the local elements to come to P ähir’s support. At all events, the liquidation of Pähir seems quite clearly to have been the prime aim of AbQ Dhahab’s expedition, and his actions certainly appear to confirm this. What is more, the whole affair was conducted with the full cognizance of the Porte and had received its official blessing. But once again, luck was on P ähir’s side, and the expedition was abandoned following the sudden death of AbQ Dhahab. The Porte did not give up so easily, however, and hastily set about preparing an alternative plan of action. A totally new Strategen) was decided upon — whereas in the past,7 77 Maliye. 10216, p. 286; op. eit.. 10217, p. 288; op. cit., 10218, p. 315; op. eit.. 10219, p. 202, for the years 1186-1189/1771-1775. In one case (Maliye. 3602, p. 5) this mufcâta’a is said to be a part of the iltizäm of Ibrahim Pa$a, the M utofarrif o f Jerusalem in 1188/ 1774-5; this is another case of inaccuracy in the Ottoman accounts. 73 Finnan dated awäkhir R abl' al-thfinl 1189/21-29.6.1775 (MUhimme, 166, p. 388) citing similar orders sent to the Välls of Damascus and Tripoli as well as the M utofarrif of Jerusalem.

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every attem pt to liquidate P ähir had been based on a land attack, this time the major offensive was to come from the sea, with land support.74 Accord­ ingly, a flotilla under the command of the gapudän-i Deryä, ffasan Pa$a, was dispatched to attack Acre, which fell on August 22, 1775. P ähir, attempting to flee his fallen capital, was shot and killed.73* Throughout his entire career, Pfihir’s formal status was merely that of mültezim to the Väli of Sidon. Thus, in theory, at least, not only was he meant to have been totally dependent on the above väli for his continuance in office, but by rights he should not have had any direct dealings whatever either with the Porte or with any other väli. Any such dealings should have been conducted exclusively through the Väli of Sidon. In actual fact, the situation was very different — from a very early stage in his career, P ähir was wont to do much as he pleased, both within the Eyälet of Sidon and in the neighbouring provinces. A t the same time, he did try to maintain the outward appearance, at least, of being an ordinary mufcäfa'aci16 — he re-leased his nältiyes each year, never failing to request (and receive) official written confirmation of this, and even when he established political facts by sheer force of arms (as when he ensconced himself in Acre, for example), he was very careful to legitimize these, albeit after the event, by appealing to the Porte for its official sanction. But all his actions clearly indicate a constant striving on P ähir’s part to rise above the rather modest status of a simple mültezim. A t the start of his career, he was called the “Shaykh of Tiberias". In the 1730’s, as has been related above, his influence in the Safed area grew considerably, and by the mid-1740’s, he was known as the “ Shaykh of Safed".77 These titles served to indicate his function in the above areas as tax-farmer and sub-ruler on behalf of the Väli of Sidon. A t the beginning of the 1750’s, once he had consolidated his position in Acre, P ähir tried to have himself appointed Kapici Bäfi. This would have 74 The army sent against P äh ir consisted of a flotilla under Hasan Paya in addition to a land force commanded by Muhammad al-'A?m, the Väli of Damascus aided by the Vàlls of Adana and Sidon, the M utasarrif of Jerusalem, and Jezzir. Its fear of p ih ir might have been not the least important reason accounting for the army’s lack of enthusiasm to reach Acre before it had surrendered to Hasan Pa$a (M. Ibn Ül-Seyyid Osman, Menâkib ve gazavât gâzl ffasan Pafa, manuscript 2419 in Esad Eflendi collection, SUleymaniye Mosque, Istanbul, pp. 99b-100a; Cevdet, vol. 2, pp. 36-37. 73 Osman, op. cit., pp. 79-91 ; Heyd, pähir, pp. 70-71 ; Letter of a French eyewitness from Acre, dated 19.9.1775 (ACCM. Lix 771). 7« We use “mültezim” and “mufcäfa'acr as alternative terms. Having gone through the Ottoman archives we cannot agree to the distinction made in this respect by Gibb & Bowen (vol. 2, p. 21, note 1). 77 Maliye, 10185, pp. 295-296, finnan dated awä'lt Mufiarram 1157/mid-February 1744, mentioning the debts of “$afad jeyffi zähir 'umar

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enabled him to rule Acre directly, without being dependent in any way on the Vâlï of Sidon.78 Contemporary Ottoman and French sources fail to indicate that P ähir was successful in this attempt — but even if he was in fact accorded the title of Kapici Bdfi, as one Ottoman historian claims, its significance was little more than honorific.79 The Porte, in addressing Pähir, or when it referred to him in official correspondence, always used the term “mültezim” or “mukäfa’aci”.*0 Pähir, for his part, made no attempt to assume any title not in keeping with his official status — in a number of letters written to the French Minister of State in the mid-1750’s, for example, he signs himself simply “Pfthir *Umar, present officer in charge of Acre and the whole Galilee" (VU> JJ«• op. d r., p. 173, finnan dated aw ffil R abl' al-thlnl 1190 (20-29.3.1776). 102 MOhimme. 173. p. 197.

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excerpt, taken from a firman issued at the tim e:101*103 “The Sublime Porte has been informed that the removal of the above (i.e. Jezzär) from Sidon will result in the dispersal of the army he has raised and in the renewed outbreak of rebelliousness among these blackguards”. While Jezzär was very careful at all times to display the utmost loyalty to the Porte and its injunctions, he began to be supported and encouraged in his stand by Hasan Paça, the Kapudän-i Deryâ. The latter had arrived in Acre on July 4, 1776, with part of the Ottoman fleet and an expeditionary force, the primary task of which was to add the finishing touches to the victory of the previous year, and also, possibly, to give added weight to the Porte’s instructions regarding the new order in the area, making certain that Jezzär would come to terms with it should he be reluctant to do so. Be this as it may, the fact remains that Jezzär was able to win Hasan Papa’s confidence, and the latter wrote to the Porte strongly advising that he be left in office at least until the revolt had been put down. Meanwhile, supplies, cannon and other equipment for use in the siege were landed on the coast, and Ibrâhîm, the M utafarrif of Jerusalem, was instructed to bring up 40-50 bayraks104 of his own soldiers in support of the besiegers. The noose around the rebels was growing tighter, and was drawn tighter still when part of the expedi­ tionary force joined in the siege. The whole position was beginning to look far more encouraging from Jezzär’s point of view — favourable reports concerning his loyalty and his strength had been received in Istanbul, both from Hasan Pa$a and from one of the Grand Vezlr’s emissaries in the area; P ähir’s other sons had shown up at the Ottoman camp and tendered their loyalty; his power had further been augmented by the conclusion of an alliance with two Bedouin shaykhs; and finally, the Porte had come to fear that his removal might in fact lead to an even more serious insurrection in the area. Consequently, the Porte began to re-appraise its stand vis-à-vis Jezzär, and decided in the end to reverse its original decision and leave him in office, sending Muçtafa to Iç Hi instead. At the end of June or the beginning of July, 1776, Jezzär’s re-appointment as Väli of Sidon was officially confirmed.103 A number of other attempts were made during the course of Jezzär’s long career to transfer him from the Eyälet of Sidon to some other part of the Empire. In December 1782 he was appointed volt in the Eyälet of Bosnia, 101 op. cit., p. 172. 1M 1 bayrak = 10 soldiers, approximately. 103 op. cit., p. 14S, finnan dated awàsif Jum idha al-awwal 1190/28.6-7.7.1776. His letters to Istanbul were not the only measure taken by Jezzir: he even went so far as to threaten M ustafa with death if he ever appeared either in Sidon or in Acre (Letter of the French consul in Sidon dated 1.1.1777, Aff. Et., Bi 1037).

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but refused to go, claiming that he was occupied putting down a revolt in M ount Lebanon.100 A t the end of 1784, Hasan £apûdân, together with a number of other Ottoman ministers, persuaded the Sultan to send Jezzär against the Mamluk Beys in Egypt Jezzär himself relates how he managed to avoid falling into this trap — he instigated a quarrel between two Druze amirs and regretfully informed the Porte that before he could undertake any such mission, it was incumbent upon him first of all to restore order among his own subjects.107 A t the beginning of April, 1788, the French consul in Sidon reported that Jezzär’s enemies in Istanbul, led by the K.apudän Paça, were once again working for his removal. They succeeded in having a new väii appointed to Sidon, and set about raising an army which was to support the latter in his bid to assume office. But Jezzär, who was aware of the plan, reacted immediately. He offered to pay a sum of half a million kurûf in return for his continuance in office. Should this offer be rejected, he warned, he would raise an army of 20,000 men which would resist any attempt made by the Grand Vezïr to so much as approach his territory.108 Prudence prevailed, and the Porte revoked the new appointment. In May of the same year, he was appointed Väli of Rakka (this did not, however, affect his appointment as Väli of Sidon). He was ordered to proceed imme­ diately to his new province and restore order in the area, where disturbances and unrest had broken out. But once again, Jezzär saw the trap and refused to leave Acre.109 The various attempts to remove Jezzär from the Eyälet of Sidon were not always motivated by purely practical considerations (as in the first case), but personal pressures in the capital tended also to play an important part. Just as his own patrons and supporters in Istanbul did all they could to promote his interests, so his opponents in the capital did all they could to have him removed. Jezzär’s most formidable opponent was undoubtedly the Ifapudän Pafa, Gäzl Hasan, Just why the two men should have been such bitter enemies over the years is not always easy to understand, but it is clear that their mutual hostility dates back almost to the beginning of Jezzär’s rule in Palestine. Some sources claim that this enmity stemmed initially from an agreement which Hasan had concluded in 1776 with the ruler of M ount Lebanon, Amir Yüsuf al-Shihäbl, concerning the latter’s tax payments to the Porte. Part of the sum in question was paid to Hasan Pa$a, who then weighed anchor and left Beirut for Cyprus. It appears that Jezzär did not consider this agreement between Amir Yûsuf and Hasan i°* Cevdet, vol. 3, p. 104; Uzunçarçili, vol. 4, p. 605. 107 Letter o f the French vice-consul in Acre, dated 10.11.1784 (Aff. Et., Bi 979). >°* Letter of the French consul in Acre, dated 3.4.1788 (Aff. Et., Bi 980). uw MUhimme, 185, p p .8 8 ,125,226 dated February, May and Augustl788, respectively.

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Pa$a to be binding upon himself. A t all events, he decided to take advantage of the fact that the Ottoman flotilla was no longer in Beirut, and sent an army to occupy all the Shihäbl family’s property in the port (which was at this time subject to the control of the ruler of M ount Lebanon), informing Yüsuf that he had come, in his capacity as Väli of Sidon, to collect the taxes on behalf of the Porte. Amir YQsuf quickly wrote to tfasan Pa$a informing him of this, and requested his help in accordance with the agreement that had only recently been concluded between them. Hasan soon arrived from Cyprus, severely rebuked Jezzär for his high-handed action, and forced him to withdraw his troops from Beirut, which was to remain in the hands of the Shihäbls. Jezzär had little choice but to comply — he himself returned to Acre by sea, while his soldiers followed him by land.110 As reported by the French consul in Sidon at the time (towards the end of 1776), Hasan Pa$a was deeply angered by the incident and left Palestine in a great fury.111 There is little doubt that this loss of face alone would have been cause enough to bring about a rupture in the relations between the two men. But the evidence does seem to indicate that there was also a financial dispute between the two. A finnan was sent to Hasan Pa$a in mid-1775, according to which Jezzär, on his arrival in Acre, was to receive 10,000 kurûf from treasury funds in order to enable him to cover his expenses.112 None of the sources indicate that this payment was in fact ever made, while judging by contemporary reports from the French merchants in Acre, Jezzär certainly appears to have been badly in need of money at this time. Furthermore, the following year (1776), according to instructions included in the firman appointing Mu$(afa NäbulsI Väli of Sidon in place of Jezzär, the latter was to receive an identical sum (10,000 kurûf) by way of compensation for the expenses he had incurred while in office.113 The Porte was not usually in the habit of compensating a väli who had been dismissed before his term of office had lapsed (on the con­ trary — what generally happened in such cases was that the väli in question would have to pay the Ottoman treasury a sum of money, part of the miri carefully assessed according to the amount of time he had been in office no There are several versions of this incident, all of which differ with respect to the exact place and time. Some sources explain Hasan’s anger as a reaction to Jezzär’s slighting of him (Shihäbl, Lubnäit, pp. 116-117; Shihäbl; Ta'rtkh, pp. 72-74; Sbidyäq, vol. 2, pp. 52-54; * . al-M a'lüf, “ Ta'rtkh al-shaykh jdhir ai 'umar al-zaydänl" in al-Mazhriq, 1926, pp. 552-553 ; H. al-Munayyir, “ai-durr al-marfüffi ta'rtkh al-shitf”, in ai-Mashriq, 1956, pp. 195-197; Cevdet, vol. 2. pp. 43-44; Lockroy, pp. 130-133; Letter of the French acting consul in Sidon dated 8.10.1776 (ACCM, J-802). in His letter dated 2.10.1776 (Aff. Et., Bi 1037). H2 Finnan dated 14 Jumädha al-awwal 1189/13.7.1776 (Maliye, 10219, p. 181). in See above, p. 57.

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((fisf Ql-yevm).114 It is therefore difficult to avoid the conclusion that this sum was actually offered in lieu of the money Jezzâr should have received from Hasan Pa$a the previous year. It is quite clear that the money in question was in no way connected with Jezzfir’s ntirï obligations, and could only have been some type of old debt. Thus, it may fairly safely be assumed that Hasan Pa$a did not in fact comply with the Porte’s instructions concerning this payment to Jezzâr, and, in the end, M uftafa Nâbulsï had to be asked to honour the pledge. It is also quite possible that Hasan Paça’s support for Je2Zär in 1776 (when the Porte attempted to replace him with the above Mutfafa Nâbulsï) was dependent on some type of undertaking to the effect that, in return for his re-appointment as Väli of Sidon, Jezzâr would be prepared to waive the money he was meant to have received and claim it at some later date from the Ottoman treasury. If this was indeed so, then the Beirut incident cannot be seen simply as a m atter of prestige or face, but must also be seen as an attem pt on Jezzär’s part to seize by force of arms the money he was meant to have received from Hasan Paya (regardless of whether or not he had in fact agreed to waive his claim), in which case the latter’s wrath is hardly surprising. Be this as it may, the fact remains that from 1776 ownwards, Hasan Paja considered Jezzâr to be a sworn enemy, and did all in his power to intrigue against him in the capital. Thus, in 1785, when Jezzär’s nomination as Väli of Damascus came under discussion, Hasan Pa?a stood out as the most vehement and uncompromising opponent of the proposal. He went so far as to request the post for himself, simply in order to prevent it from falling into the hands of Jezzâr; his request was turned down, however, as it was not considered desirable to have these two bitterest of enemies ruling concurrently in adjacent provinces.115 Hasan Pa$a was behind several other attempts to dislodge Jezzâr from Palestine,116 even lending support (from Istanbul) to Selim Papa’s revolt.117 The French consul in Acre at the end of the 1780’s, who was on close terms with Jezzâr, describes how the latter was thrown into a state of frenzy on learning that H asan Pa$a had become Grand Vezlr, “as this was his enemy... the only man in the entire Ottoman Empire of whom he was afraid’’.118 Thanks im For further details on “(cis( ül-yevm" see: Halil Sahillioftlu, “Sir mOItezim zimem defterine göre X V yttzyll sonunda Osmanii darphane mukataalari ”in Istanbul Universités! iktisat fakultesi meemuast, 23ncU d it, (Istanbul, 1963), p. 148. 11J Cevdet, vol. 3, p. 154. ii< As Jezzâr himself told the French vice-consul in Acre, who repeated it in his letter dated 10.11.1784 (Aff. Et., Bi 979). 117 Letter of the French consul in Acre writing from Jaffa on July 1, 1791 (Aff. Et., Bi 981). tt* Letter dated 27.12.1789 (Aff. E t, Bi 980).

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to his great cunning and considerable economic power, JezzSr was able to withstand the pressures the new Grand Vezlr brought to bear on him. But there is little doubt that as long as Hasan Paja continued to occupy top positions in the capital, Jezzär had to watch his step very carefully. The death of his arch-enemy in 1790 thus came as a great relief to him. It was only then that he dared to evict all the French traders from his territories,119 openly flouting the Porte’s instructions in this connection. Although Jezzär continued to do much as he pleased, he was acutely aware that the Porte might at any time make yet another attempt to get rid of him, and he was constantly on his guard against any such eventuality. After Napoleon had left Palestine following his failure before the walls of Acre, the Grand Vezlr, 2iya Pa$a, set out in the direction of Egypt at the head of a large army. Jezzär immediately feared that this had been sent against himself, and feverishly set about fortifying Acre. He refused to allow the supplies that had been landed in Beirut for the Grand Vezlr’s army to be forwarded on to him ,120 and even ordered his governor in Tiberias to prevent the passage of strangers in the vicinity of the town, thus causing 2iya Pa$a to change his route.121 In August-September, 1799, Jezzär gathered his levies from the entire coastal region and concentrated them in Acre, as he suspected that this was the Grand Vezlr’s primary objective.122 The Ottoman army continued, meanwhile, in the direction of Egypt, and took only indirect action against Jezzär. But, as it turned out, Jezzär’s rather elaborate precautions were not entirely without reason. The Grand Vezlr, it appears, had given encouragement to Bashir al-Shihäbl, Amir of M ount Lebanon (which was, at the time, subject to Jezzär’s control), granting him asylum in the Ottoman camp, and even promising to launch an attack on Acre once he had finished dealing with the French.123 Although he had undertaken to attack Acre, and had initially perhaps even intended to do so, the Grand Vezlr was forced to drop the idea — either as a result 119 A report appended to a letter of the French consul in Acre, writing from Jaffa on October 27, 1790 (ACCM. J-804). im Munayyir, 1957, p. 462. 121 F. B. Spilsbury, Picturesque Scenery in the Holy Land and Syria, (London, 1823), pp. 39-44. The author and companion, in attempting to pass through the area in October 1799 learned this through bitter experience. 122 I. de Testa, ( Recueil des Traités de la Porte Ottomane avec les Puissances Etrangères, (Paris, 1864), vol. 1, p. 592) citing notes made by Napoleon on a report submitted by Kléber on September 26, 1799. 123 Munayyir, 1957, p. 446. The date given by S. Dabd&b. “Eifthu al-amlr Bashir al-ûlâ ilâ Mifr” in al-Mashriq, 1920, p. 688, cannot be true. On Rajab 28, 1213 Bashir was still in his capital, unperturbed by the French invasion of Palestine which was still in its initial stages. This incident should presumably have taken place a year later.

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of JezzSr’s vigorous preparations to do battle,124 or because of unrest in the capital which required his prompt return,123 or, possibly, both these considerations played a part; he was thus obliged to resort to some other, indirect means of striking at Jezzftr. Just as he had decided to support Amir Bashir in order to curtail Jezzär’s power in the north, so the Grand Vezlr attempted to establish a similar centre of opposition in the south. Muhammad Abü M araq, a man who enjoyed close ties with 2iya Pa$a126 and who had in the past fallen out with Jezzftr, was appointed Väli of Da­ mascus and Amir al-Hajj. But before he was able to leave Palestine and take up his new post, open hostilities broke out between him and Jezzftr. The Porte decided, meanwhile, to appoint 'Abdallfih Pa$a Väli of Damascus in his stead. Muhammad AbO M araq was, however, left in control of Palestine, as mutafarrif of the Sancak of Jerusalem and Governor of Jaffa, Gaza, and Ramie.127 But even this rather more modest appointment was still that of a vezir directly responsible to the Porte. In the middle of 1801, Jezzftr laid massive siege to Jaffa, paying no attention whatever to the con­ stant stream of firmans from Istanbul ordering him to desist. The Porte adopted an unequivocal stance — supplies were sent by sea to Jaffa and the Çeyfrü 'l-Islam issued a fetva declaring Jezzftr to be a rebel against the Sultan who was not to be aided in any way and whose death was man­ datory, while a finnan to this effect was published throughout Syria.128 This was the only instance in the course of his entire career that Jezzftr was openly and publicly branded a rebel, but it did not appear to deter him in the least. He maintained the siege of Jaffa, and at the beginning of March, 1803, Abfl M araq bolted and the city fell.129 Thus once again, a political reality constituting a direct contradiction of its policy and its wishes had been foisted on the Porte by sheer force of arms. Lacking the military strength necessary to oppose it, the Porte had no choice but to come to terms with it. The proclamation branding Jezzftr a rebel was rescind12« Clarke, vol. 2b, p. 802. 123 Shihftbl, Lubnän, vol. 2. p. 368; Munayyir, 1957. p. 462. 12« ibid. 127 Shihftbl, Lubnän, vol. 2. pp. 361-363; Cevdet Dahiliye, 1396, 1271; Ali Emin, Selim m . 1136; Munayyir, 1957, p. 462. 12* MUhimme, 213, p. 57 (Turkish original) and Cevdet Dahiliye, 3652 (Arabic trans­ lation), finnan dated 9 $afar 1217/11.6.1802. Copies were sent to: YQsuf Jarrftr in Nablus, Jahjfth al-KharfOsb in Ba’albak, Ibrthlm ibn Qabalfin in Safed, Abu-Kush, Tsa ‘Amr, Amir Bashir, Amir Hasan in Jubayl, the Qä4i o f Jerusalem, the inhabitants of Hebron, cf.: Shihftbl, Ta'rtkh, pp. 159-162. 12* Jabarti, vol. 3, p. 234 citing letters Much arrived in Cairo on March 8,1803 announ­ cing the surrender of Jaffa. See also: Ali Emiri, Selim in , 1136, firman dated 7 DhO albijja 1217/31.3.1803.

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ed and, as though this were not enough, the erstwhile rebel was appointed Vâli of Damascus at the end of that same year, and a short time later (at the beginning of 1804), also Väli of Cairo.130 3) His Relations with the al-'Afm Family and his Rule in Damascus We bave seen how during the period of Pfihir al-‘Umar’s ascendency in Palestine, rulers of the al-*A?m family had done all they could to curtail his power and to extend their own authority over his domains. We also saw how, on occasion, members of this family had attempted to establish themselves concurrently as rulers in both the Eyälet of Damascus and the Eyälet of Sidon. It is not difficult to understand why, from Damascus’ point of view, it was highly undesirable that a powerful local ruler should be allowed to establish himself in the neighbouring eyälet. A part from the fact that it controlled the Syrian sea-board, the Eyälet of Sidon also stood between the Sancak of Damascus and other sancaks belonging to the Eyälet of Damascus, and this constituted a serious potential threat to orderly rule in the latter (as P ähir was effectively able to demonstrate). It is clear, then, that the Vâli of Damascus had far more than ju st a passing interest in what went on in the neighbouring eyälet, and it was during P äh ir’s period of rule that the Väli of Sidon came to learn precisely how much of a threat this undue interest on the part of his colleague in Damascus did in fact pose to his own rule in the eyälet. Jezzär took very careful cognizance of this, but, thanks to his considerable military strength, and due to the fact that the al-*A?m family was at this time in a state of decline, he was not subjected to the same pressures from the east as his predecessor had been. The Porte, for its part, had also ceased to rely as heavily on the Väli of Damascus as it had done in P ähir’s day. Jezzär, however, felt that the best way to secure his position in the east and to obviate any possible attem pt by the al-*A?ms to undermine his power would be to establish himself in Damascus, and he conducted his policy to this end. The al-'A pns had evinced an ever-increasing interest in Acre throughout the period of P ähir’s rule. Thus, when it fell in 1775, Muhammad al-'A pn tried very hard to have the port entrusted to a member of his own family, motivated by much the same considerations as had prompted the Porte to place it in the hands of an independent and separate ruler. His suggestion that Acre be placed under the control of the Väli of Sidon was rejected out o f hand by Hasan Pa$a once Jezzär had arrived in the port, and so, right iw Cevdet Dahiliye, 11832. finnan dated 27 DhQ al-qa'da 1218/9.3.1804; N. al-Turk, Mudhakkirät (Cairo. 1950), p. 260 (French translation).

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from the start, by the mere fact of his appointment, enmity had been created between Jezzär and the al-'A^ms. In the words o f an Ottoman historian, “from the very beginning, there was a coolness between Muham­ mad Pa$a (al-'Afm) and Jezzär” .131 This coolness, however, did not lead to a direct confrontation between the two sides; open hostilities, in as much as these existed at all, were restricted to the border zone separating the two eyälets. The power-struggle between Jezzär and the al-’Agms was conducted indirectly, in the Lebanon, where each side would back one or another of the rival Druze factions in an attempt to undermine the position of that supported by its opponent As a result, spurred on by these intrigues, battles would sometimes develop between the opposing factions, and when this happened, each of the amirs concerned would appeal to “his” väli for help. But this was about the limit to which the two sides were prepared to go, and by no stretch of the imagination could this be regarded as any sort of direct confrontation. It should be bom in mind, however, that most of these battles took place in the Biqä’ — i.e. in territory belonging to the Eyäiet of Damascus.132 Furthermore, the fact that M ount Lebanon itself was in the Eyäiet of Sidon meant that by establishing ties with the various Druze amirs, the Väli of Damascus was in actual fact deliberately challenging Jezzär’s authority. It is not clear to what extent the Porte was party to this subversion, which did, at all events, serve to curtail Jezzär’s power to a certain degree. Jezzär undoubtedly saw this as yet another reason to strive for control of Damascus. Another prominent sign of the hostility existing between the two sides was Jezzär’s adamant refusal to continue the Eyäiet of Sidon’s customary contribution to the IJajj. To be more precise, while he did continue to remit the cizye revenues and the kilär-i hacc (i.e. the money intended to provide supplies for the Ijlajj caravan), he ceased to provide the not inconsiderable sum which the Väli of Sidon had traditionally contributed towards part of the upkeep of the soldiers accompanying the caravan (usually between onefifth and one-quarter of the total cost — 300,000 kuritf, or more). The treasury had required this sum to be delivered to the ffazine of Damascus in the form of a promissory note (haväle) against the Väli of Sidon’s miri. It was quite obvious from the start that Jezzär would have no truck with any such arrangement, and after a few years the Ottoman treasury finally »1 Cevdet. vol. 3. p. 103; Shihfibl, Ta'rikh, p. 81. 1}2 M. al-HattQni, Nubdha ta'rtkhlyyafi al-muqäfa'a al-kisrawänlyya (n.p., n.d.), p. 195 (for the year 1778); Shidyaq, vol. 2, pp. 61-62 (for the year 1783); H. al-Munayyir, “Ta'rikh al-Rahbana” in H. Shihftbl, Ta'rikh Ahmad al-Jazxâr (Beirut, 1955), p. 452 (for the year 1797); Letter of the French consul in Sidon dated 15.12.1789 (AIT. E t., Bi 980).

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resigned itself to this fact and ceased to transfer money from Sidon’s revenues for this purpose. This was quite a display of realism on the Porte’s part, considering that its basic concern was, after all, the payment of the taxes themselves. Jezzär’s stand, it seems, derived from his desire to weaken as far as possible his political opponents in Damascus, the al-’Aptns. These had now to take upon themselves the entire burden of financing the troops accompanying the Ifajj caravan, making up the deficit from their own revenues — either that, or they would have had to cut down on the number of soldiers, thereby endangering the security of the caravan which was subject to attack by the Bedouin along the route. It is interesting to note that when Jezzär himself became Vâli of Damascus, the old practice was restored and money was once again transferred to the ffazine in Damascus, as in the past.133 In April 1783, Muhammad al-*Apn died, and Jezzär felt that the time had at last come to realize a long-cherished ambition. Within an hour of learning of Muhammad’s death, he dispatched a special messenger to Istanbul in order to stake his claim to the newly vacant post in Damascus. So certain was he of success that he even began to make definite preparations for the transfer. But Jezzär was doomed to disappointment, for the Porte had already decided to appoint someone else.134 The man of its choice, Darwlsh Pa$a, turned out to be hopelessly incompetent, and it was for this reason, one assumes, that Jezzär was prepared to accept his appointment with such good grace. It was not long, however, before the Porte too came to realize that in appointing Darwlsh it had made an unfortunate mistake. In the middle of January, 1785, the chief emissary (Mejdeci bâfi) arrived in Istanbul bearing the glad tidings of the IfajJ caravan’s safe return to Damascus. But his report went on to describe the arduous journey, the Bedouin attacks and, above all, the utter incompetence of the Amir al-Hajj, strongly urging that he should be replaced by someone more capable o f organizing and leading the caravan if the Hajj were to take place at all the following year. His remarks were even supported by the written evidence of muftis representing all the four madhähib. On January 27, 1785, the Meclis-i mafûret met in the konak of the ÇeyffO 'l-Isläm in order to discuss the m atter.133 It was decided in principle that the incumbent Vâli of Damascus would have to be replaced, and the dis113 In the year 1210/1795-6 he sent 67,438 kurüj, out of the 311,316 which went towards the preparation of the military escort which accompanied the ifaJJ to Mecca (Maliye, 10239, p. 63). 13« For a very detailed report on this issue see: letter of the French consul in Sidon dated 15.3.1783 (Aff. Et., Bi 979). in Cevdet, 3, pp. 151-157, presumably based on the historian Vâ$if.

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cussion then turned to the thorny question of just who was to replace him. The meeting was more or less split on this issue into two opposing camps — one in favour of Jezzär, and the other opposed to him. The latter put forward a number of reasons for their disapproval of Jezzär’s appointment, and then tried to stall for time by suggesting that the decision be postponed until the time when the next Ifa jj was about to take place. But this move failed, and the Grand Vezir insisted on the need for an immediate decision. Jezzfir’s main rival for the post was 'A ll Pa$a, the governor of Erzerum, Kara Çi$fir, and Trebizond. The chief argument used by Jezzär’s supporters was their candidate’s considerable economic strength. Jezzär, they claimed, was a man well able to take upon himself the financial burden of oragnizing the ffaj] without having to appeal to the central treasury for help. The meeting was not entirely convinced by this argument, but at the same time it also had certain reservations regarding 'AIL Thus no final decision was reached. Instead, the need to appoint a suitable man to the post was re­ iterated, and a fraff-i fe rif was issued requiring that an attem pt be made to sound out the possibility of finding in the camp of the incumbent väli someone who might be more adequate to the task. It was soon realized, however, that Jezzär was indeed the only candidate suitably qualified for the post, and even those initially opposed to his appointment, anxious to bring the crisis to a close, grudgingly gave their approval with the reserva­ tion that the appointment be viewed as purely probationary and be restricted to “the duration of a single year’’ (this had little real meaning, as all appoint­ ments in the Empire were in any case subject to renewal each year). Hasan Pa$a alone remained opposed to Jezzär’s appointment to the bitter end, and continued to press his own bid for the office. But the Porte, apart from being reluctant to relieve him of his function as IÇapudân-i Deryä, was, as we have already seen, determined not to have these two arch-foes serving concurrently in adjacent provinces. Jezzär was informed of his new appointment through the $urre Emmi.136 He did not confirm receipt of the appointment, but there was little doubt in the capital that he had in fact agreed to accept the post — his ambitions regarding Damascus were, it seems, common currency in Istanbul. His impressive economic strength appears to have contributed greatly towards Jezzär’s appointment. It will be remembered that this was a point stressed time and again by his sponsors in the capital in support of their candidate, but there is reason to believe that Jezzär’s considerable financial resources did more than just serve as a useful point of argument, and were put to i* “Purse commissioner” in charge o f the presents sent annually from Istanbul to Mecca (Gibb and Bowen, vol. 2, p. 58, n. 1).

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more direct use.137 His prompt dispatch of a letter through his “kapt ketjjüdâsi" (his ketfrüdä attached to the Porte), in which he requested to be appointed Amir al-Hajj, clearly demonstrates the degree to which Jezzär was aware of developments in the ruling circles of the Empire. He claimed that his request — which was made before he had been notified of his appointment as Vâlï of Damascus — stemmed solely from his desire to serve Islam and the Sublime Porte (“Dirt ve D evkt-i ’Aliye"), even to the extent of undertaking to shoulder the entire financial burden of the Hajj (above and beyond the regular contributions deducted from the revenues of each province in order to supply provisions for the caravan — “emvâl-i kilär-i face”) without recourse to the central treasury. He went on to suggest that the Eyälet of Sidon be entrusted to his ketfada so that the revenues of the province might be used to finance the Hajj. Finally, he promised to assume full responsibility for the safe and orderly conduct of the caravan to and from Mecca. A faff-i hümäyün was issued on March 12, 1785,138 appointing Jezzär Väli of Damascus and Amir al-Ijajj, his ketfadd, Selim Pa$a, governor o f Sidon, and one Mikdäd Pa$a governor of Tripoli. This latter appointment was not at all to Jezzär’s liking — he would have preferred the post for himself, or at least for one of his own men. What is more, this Mikdâd Pa$a was a man of some substance, and it was highly unlikely that he would submit meekly to Jezz&r’s dictates. It was for precisely this reason that he had been appointed, and so the Porte chose to ignore Jezzär’s complaints. Mikdäd refused, in the event, to take up the post, which was then given to one of the members of the al-'A?m family. Before the latter was able to take office, however, a new Grand Vezir came to power in Istanbul and decided to cancel the appointment in favour of Süleymän Pa§a, Jezzär’s fazme-där. This meant that Jezzär now effectively controlled the whole of Greater Syria — he himself sat in Damascus while his two lieutenants, Selim and Süleymän, were ensconced in Sidon and Tripoli respectively.139 137 Large sums of money being spent by JezzAr in Istanbul in order to attain the office are mentioned in letters o f the French consuls in Sidon and Acre dated, respectively, 23.3.1785 and 10.12.1786 (Aff. Et., Bi 1041 and Bi 979). 13S Official nomination reached JezzAr on March 19,1785 (Letter of the French consul in Sidon dated 20.3.1785 (Aff. Et., Bi 979). 139 This was actually the first time JezzAr was nominated Vâll of Damascus. There are several versions giving inaccurate dates: 1197/1783 according to Uzunçarfili (vol. 4, pp. 606-607); 1196/1782 given by ShihAbI {Ta'rtkh, p. 82); 1775 and 1780 mentioned by S. J. Shaw (Ottoman Egypt in the Eighteenth Century, the Nizamnane-i Misir o f Cezzar Ahmed Pasha, (Mass., 1962) p. 9 n. 4 and p. 7 n. 1, respectively. Cf.: MUhimme, 183, p. 9, firman dated awäsif JumAdhA al-awwal 1199/22-31.3.1785, where JezzAr is mentioned for the first time as Vâll of Damascus.

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But opposition to Jezzär in the capital was gathering force, and his heady period as ruler of all Syria was not destined to be of long duration. At the end of 1786, he was abruptly dismissed.140 He was appointed Vâli of Da­ mascus on three subsequent occasions: in 1790, when he succeeded in holding the post for five consecutive years141 ; at the end of 1798, the time of Napoleon’s impending invasion of Palestine; and, finally, in 1803.142 On each of these occasions, as indeed in the case of his initial appointment in 1785, the major consideration lying behind the Porte’s decision was Jezzär’s economic and military strength, which made him one of the few men capable of taking upon himself the efficient organization and control of the Hajj. But the Porte was very careful not to permit Jezzär to ensconce himself too deeply in Damascus, and in keeping with its general policy of never allowing a provincial governor to remain long enough in any one place to establish himself as a potential threat to the central government, it replaced him from time to time, often by a member of the al-’A?m family. At times of crisis, however, (Napoleon’s invasion, for example, or the Wahhäbi incursions at the beginning of the 19h Century) when it was essential that a strong ruler should be in control of Damascus, Jezzär was called upon once again. His relatively long period of rule (five consecutive years) in the early 1790’s probably owes much to the death of his chief opponent in the capital, Hasan Pa$a,143 as well as to the protracted efforts which were being made at this time by Sultan Selim III to put the Empire’s finances in order. Jezzär’s primary interest in Damascus was the fact that this gave him control of the Ifajj caravan, greatly enhancing his prestige and authority throughout the Empire. But at the same time, this appoint­ ment also made him master of Palestine, or more accurately, of the sancaks

140 A. Vâ$if, Mahdsin al-a'thdr wa-haqd'iq al-akhbàr (manuscript in Topkapi Sarayi library of the Archeological museum), p. 355, firman dated mid-November, 1786. 141 Cevdet Dahiliye, 10225, finnan dated 22 Mubarram 1205/1.10.1790; MUhimme, 173, p. 60; op. cit.. 178, p. 295; op. cit., 194, pp. 105, 451-452; Cevdet Dahiliye. 5608. 13125. M2 Ali Emiri, Selim III, 24490 firman dated 19 Sha’b&n 1213/30.6.1799; MUhimme. 209, p. 171 ; R. Ibn al-Qiri*, “al-wuzarâ’ al-l&dhlnbakamO Dimashq” in S. al-M unajjid, WuUU Dimashq. (Damascus, 1949), pp. 88-90; J. S. Buckingham, Travels in Palestine through the Countries o f Bashan and Gilead, East o f the River Jordan', including a Visit to the Cities o f Geraza and Gamala in the Decapolis, (London, 1822), vol. 1, pp. 127-130; Al-TUrk, pp. 198-199. Even so there is a certain degree of exaggeration in the assertion, that during his last 25 yean he was “virtual Viceroy of Syria” (P.K.. H itti, Lebanon in History, (London, 1957), p. 397). 143 Letter appended to that of the French consul in Acre from Jaffa, October 27, 1790 (ACCM, J-804).

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of Jerusalem and Nablus144*147— the sancaks of Jaffa, Gaza and Ramie were placed under his control only towards the end of his rule, independently of his various terms as Vâlï of Damascus.143. 4) Summary Jezzfir’s relations with the Porte may be viewed on two separate levels — either in terms of the outward, formal relationship between ruler and sub­ ruler, or in terms of the underlying tension existing between two more or less separate forces, each motivated by interests and ambitions of its own, and each bringing to bear on the other a degree of pressure which varied according to the balance of power obtaining between the two sides at any given time. In terms of the first level (i.e. the outward formal relationship), throughout almost the entire course of his career, Jezzär’s relations with the Porte gave every appearance of strictly conforming to that pattern of rights and obligations accepted as standard in the relationship between Pa$a and Sultan. His appointments, whether as Vâlï of Sidon or Vâlï of Damascus, were of the usual duration (a single year), and were subject to renewal every year by imperial firman. Even though he was able, during the course of his career, to convert most of his näjfiyes to mâllkdne, this never applied to Sidon itself. Jezzär’s appointment as Vâlï of Sidon, which symbolized his official control over the entire eyâlet, had to be renewed every year throughout the whole of his career. He kept in close touch with Istanbul, informing the Porte of all major developments in the territories under his control, asking advice or even offering suggestions, for which he was always careful to await official approval. In his correspondence with the Porte, Jezzâr followed the standard form, using the traditional style of a servant humbly supplicating his master, while the Porte, for its part, although it always addressed him respectfully by his official titles and applied to him all the honorifics appropriate to a vezir in the Empire, adopted the customary stance of a master issuing commands and instructions to a subordinate. It is true, however, that Jezzär’s reports were often incomplete, sometimes altogether withholding vital information (as, for example, with regard to his relations with the French traders prior to their expulsion),143 and that he often chose to ignore the Porte’s instructions, a fact bemoaned

144 Cevdet Dahiliye, 10225, finnan dated 22 Mubarram 1205/1.10.1790; Letter of the French consul from Jaffa, dated 30.12.1791 (Aff. Et., Bi 981). 143 Maliye, 10242, pp. 282, 292; Maliye. 10246, p. 268. 14« MUhimme, 196, pp. 286-287, dated awdsii Rabi’ al-thânl, 1206/7-16.12.1791. 147 Cevdet Dahiliye, 12296 dated May 1777.

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in a number of finnans.147 But all the same, despite such infringements, the general tone of the relationship remained basically unchanged, with both sides mairing every effort to conduct their relations along the traditional lines. In the field of taxation as well, Jezzftr did not always prove to be a model väli— he has gone on record as having fallen considerably in arrears, on occasion, in his miri payments, and various complaints are to be found concerning his failure to settle his ketffOdffs financial obligations in the capital.148 But in the final analysis it appears that there was little reason to complain of Jezz&r in this respect, as there is no mention or inference anywhere in the sources that he failed eventually to fulfil this most elementary of obligations. Rather, the opposite was true. If the promissory notes (havälät) submitted by him are compared with those submitted by his predecessors in Sidon, a significant point is noticeable— the large majority of Jezzär’s notes can be seen to have been honoured (though it is true that these were often as much as two or three years overdue, this does not detract from the basic fact). This is in striking contrast to those of his predecessors, only a very small proportion of which were honoured, obliging the Porte to resort to extreme measures of coercion, sometimes even to outright dismissal, in order to obtain the money owed to the state treasury. While Jezzfir’s habit of falling into arrears did undoubtably cause the Porte some inconvenience, the fact remains that he did, in the end, discharge his obligations to the full.149 There were even occasions when Jezzftr’s prompt and efficient execution of his instructions earned Him glowing compliments from the Porte, and this did much to enhance his reputation in the entire area (for example, after his successful organization of the tfa jj in 1786, for which he was able to provide effective protection for the pilgrims against the Wahhfibi attacks along the route).130 Throughout the course of his long career, only once did JezE&r’s relations with the Porte deteriorate into a state of open crisis, and even then (1802), this was of limited duration (see above, p. 63). With this single exception, the relationship was outwardly smooth and harmonious. But this outer harmony was to a large degree illusory, and concealed an 14 141 MUhimme. 200. p. 107 dated awd'il Sha'bâo 1206/4-13.3.1794 149 The total mlrl was officially recorded in the Ottoman accounts. This was then divided into a number of smaller sums, which were to be transferred in the form of “btnäUs” (cash-transfers) to different places. Each of these sums was recorded below the total m lrl together with the date on which the transfer was to be made. Once this was effected, the word “paid” (“«41 jiid") was written diagonally over the relevant item, or alternately the date of payment was inserted above it. uo MUhimme, 186, p. 220 dated awOkhir DhQ al-qa’da 1206/11-20.7.1792; Letter of the French consul in Acre dated 10.12.1786 (Aff. Et., Bi 979).

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inner tension stemming from the Porte’s growing concern about the activities of its unruly vätt in Acre. Jezzär’s economic strength and military might were well known in Istanbul, and these were what deterred the Porte from coming out in a direct assault on his position or even from attempting to impose upon him any conditions contrary to his own interests. In addition, Jezzär had a thorough grasp of the way things worked in the capital, as he once revealed in a private conversation: “the Sultan is like a coquettish maiden who will grant her favour to none but the highest bidder”.131 And he acted accordingly. The largesse he judiciously distributed in Istanbul won over to his side a number of influential supporters and sponsors, who served to counteract the efforts of his various enemies in the capitalls; and who kept him fully informed of all developments liable to affect his position, thus enabling him to anticipate any action planned against himself and to take the appropriate measures to foil it. Mention should also be made of those French ambassadors who, according to their own testimony, saw fit to “do him various services" in the capital.134Although these sponsors and supporters did much to safeguard his interests, they were not able to prevent the Porte from trying on a number of occasions to undermine his position in an attem pt to curb or break his power. In making such attempts, the Porte usually resorted to one of three main stratagems: the first was the time-honoured custom of assassination, but Jezzär, who was constantly on his guard against any such eventuality, generally managed to turn the tables on the Porte’s agents, treating them to a dose of their own medicine before they could administer it to him ;134 the second stratagem, was to attempt to remove him from the area by appointing him to another office in some far-distant province, but as we have seen, this too met with very little success; the third stratagem, and it was this that came closest to being successful, was to attempt to curtail his influence in Syria by creating or exploiting rival centres of power in the area. The al-’A pn family in Damascus was seen as one such centre, and its standing feud with Jezzär should be considered in this light. This is not to say that the power and influence of the above family grew solely out of the Porte’s attempts to bring pressure to bear on Jezzär, as the ties between Istanbul and the al*A?ms predated Jezzär’s arrival in the area by several decades. All the same,152* 151 Letter of the French vice-consul in Acre dated 7.4.1785 (Aff. Et., Bi 979). 152 Jabarti, vol. 3, p. 321; Lockroy, pp. 153-154; W. Turner, Journal o f a Tour in the Levant, (London, 1820), vol. 3, pp. 439-440; Munayyir, Ta'rlkh, p. 375; Olivier, vol. 2, p. 256; Letter of the French consul in Acre from Jaffa, dated 30.12.1791 (Aff. E t., Bi 981). *o Letter of the French consul in Acre, from Jaffa, dated 15.9.1791 (Aff. Et., Bi 981). u t Saintine. vol. 5, pp. 376-377. M2 Testa, vol. 2. p. 54.

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vital to the continuation of his power was at stake (when confronted with the challenges posed by Aba M araq and Bashir, for example) did he dare openly to flout the Sultan’s wishes. Otherwise, as one acute observer has noted, “he defied the whole power of Turkey, despised the Vizier, and derided the menaces of the Capudan Pacha; although he always affected to venerate the title and the authority of the Sultan”.163 From time to time during the course of his career, it was reported by the French consuls in Sidon and Acre that Jezzär was on the verge of severing his ties with Istanbul.164 Such predictions proved to be false — Jezzär was not, it appears, particularly interested in any such break; although he did much as he pleased in the provinces subject to his control, he went out of his way to preserve the fiction that he was no more than a loyal väli in the service of his Sultan, a mere cog in the adm inistrative machinery of the Ottoman Empire. As for the Sultan himself, he tended (as Gibb and Bowen have correctly pointed out165) not to over-emphasize the need for absolute obedience on the part of the väli, provided that provincial revenues were promptly re­ mitted and due ceremonial respect was observed. He would tolerate this minimal interpretation of the volt's obligations to himself until such a time as he was able effectively to intervene and settle accounts to his own satisfaction, politically and economically. The Sultan’s relationship with Jezzär certainly appears to have followed this pattern, almost to a T. In the early part of the latter’s career, the Porte had refrained from holding him too closely in check for fear that this would cause him to take to the hills and there raise the standard of revolt. W hat is more, Jezzär owed huge sums of money to the central treasury (which he was obviously in no great hurry to repay), and the Porte knew full well that if this debt were to be honoured at all, however slowly, it would have to handle the reluctant debtor with kid gloves.166 W ith the passage of time, however, it became quite clear that Jezzär had no real desire to come out in open revolt against the Sultan. But at the same time, it was equally clear that he had no intention whatever of relinquishing his rule in Syria,167 and a not insignificant part of his fortune found its way into the right pockets in Istanbul in order to make certain that he would never in fact have to do so. It was now no 163 Clarke, 2a, p. 362. t*4 Letter of the French consul in Acre, dated 30.6.1788 (Aff. Et., Bl 980). iss Gibb and Bowen, v o l. 1, pp. 231-232. 164 Letter of the chancellor of the French “nation” in Sidon, dated 1.10.1778 (ACCM, J-811). 167 “Everyone knew that if he the Sultan wishes to discharge him he will not leave the place, saying: I captured th is vilayet” (TKS, E 4029).

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longer the mere apprehension of how he might react that prevented the Porte from taking direct action against Jezzär. It appears that at the root of the Porte’s disinclination to take the situation firmly in hand there now lay the clear conviction, held in the highest echelons of the Ottoman ruling hierarchy,168 that the State was, at this stage, quite simply incapable of imposing its will on Jezzär. It should be remembered that the bulk of the Ottoman forces were, throughout Jezzär’s career, deployed against more serious, outside, threats to the Empire (Catherine II, and later, Napoleon).169 Thus the Porte had little choice, having assessed the power at its own dis­ posal relative to that at the disposal of Jezzär, but to come to terms with the situation and bide its time until a more opportune moment presented itself. But at this point, it would be useful to qualify what Gibb and Bowen have already said in this connection (see above), at least with respect to our own case. The Porte did not adopt an entirely passive stance vis-à-vis Jezzär — it is true that it was prepared to turn a blind eye to many instances of quite blatant disobedience or insubordination on his part, but even while it was awaiting a suitable moment to exact a final revenge, it was, as we have seen, certainly not averse to hastening this moment by exploiting every possible opportunity to undermine his position in the meantime. The fact that none of these numerous attempts to strike at his power met with much success bears eloquent testimony to Jezzär’s considerable strength, ex­ perience and cunning, as well as to the Porte’s general apathy in pursuing this policy and its total inability to achieve anything really decisive. The impotence of the Ottoman Empire was once again clearly revealed — this time in its feeble and wholly unsuccessful attempts to impose its will on a strong-headed väli, Jezzär. Weakness and impotence appear to have under­ lain almost every aspect of the Porte’s policy towards him, and it was this, rather than any conscious passivity or lack o f desire to bring pressure to bear on him, that accounts for its utter failure to deal decisively with the situation.

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Tiberias and Dir Hannä. He even began to launch forays deep into Jezzär’s territory, attacking villages in the vicinity of Safed and Tiberias. The army sent against him was soundly beaten in a battle near Sa’sa*, and it became quite clear that the w ly rebel was not to be subdued by conventional means. His great mobility made it extremely difficult to trace his whereabouts, while the support he was given by villages throughout the Galilee gave him the added advantage of being able to rely on a friendly population. As long as ’All remained at large, Jezzär considered him to be a serious threat, and he continued to hound him relentlessly. He was finally defeated by means of a clever stratagem — an officer in the service of the Väli of Damascus managed, it appears, to infiltrate into his camp, and when an opportune moment presented itself, struck him down and sent his head to Istanbul. This was in the middle of November, 1776.62 With this troublesome thorn removed from his side, Jezzär could now breathe far more easily. ’All P ähir’s revolt was the first real test which Jezzär had to face in Palestine. He was wise enough to realize from the start that this was no mere attempt on the part of the local population to preserve their autonomy, but that the Zaydänl family had indeed become deeply rooted in the Galilee, and that its claim to mastery over the area was a very real one. Considering his own rather vulnerable position as an alien ruler, newly arrived in the area and still relatively weak, Jezzär could not but view the revolt in the gravest possible light. Istanbul, too, took a very serious view of the matter. Having got rid of Pähir, the Porte was determined to reinstate the väli as absolute authority in the eyälet; this meant restoring to him all those prero­ gatives that had been usurped over the years by various local elements. This explains the extensive support which it gave to Jezzär during the course of his efforts to put down the rebellion in 1776. It also explains the Porte’s decision to recall him when he appeared to be making little headway in this venture. A t all events, as we have already seen, Jezzär emerged victorious in the end, and during the course of 1776, the last remnants of Zaydänl power were eliminated. He was now effective master of the Galilee, and had successfully overcome one of the chief obstacles to centralized rule in the eyälet. But others still remained, and it was to these that he now had to turn. *2 A letter of the French merchant May from Acre dated 16.11.1776 (ACCM, Lot 772); MUhimme. 173, p. 289; MUhimme, 174, pp. 39-40; Munayyir, 19S6, p. 200; AbO Shaqrä, p. 169; MikhSTl. pp. 161-163,179-180; M a’luf, pp. S31-3S5; Munayyir. Ta'rtkh. p. 377; ShihabI, Ta'rtkh, pp. 75-76; R. A. S. Macalister and E. W. G. Masterman, “Occasional Papers on the Modem Inhabitants of Palestine” in “Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly Statement". (London, 1906), pp. 110-111; M. K. ’Ali, vol. 2, pp. 310-311; Breik, pp. 105-106; Cevdet. vol. 2, pp. 39-40.

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2) The Breaking o f Metouali Autonomy The Metouali were at this time divided into three major groupings — the BanQ Ça'b, in the mukäfa'a of Shaqlf; the BanQ Munkir, in the muffâta'as of Shömar and al-Tuffâh; and the BanQ 'All al-$aghlr, in Biläd Bishära. The area inhabited by the Metouali extended, then, from Lake HOla in the east to the Mediterranean coast in the west (between Sidon and Ra’s alNaqqûra); the major concentration was, however, in Biläd Bishära (see map, No. 1). In this latter area they enjoyed almost total autonomy under their own shaykhs, their subordination to the Porte going no further than the annual remission of their miri tax.63 Until the 1760’s, the Metouali were regarded simply as hard-working tillers of the soil, a fiercely independent mountain folk whom the central authorities were well advised to leave strictly alone unless they wished to provoke the violent reaction that was certain to follow any interference in their affairs. Pähir, who, it seems, was never able to impose his rule on the Metoualis, served as a sort of patron to them, accepting responsibility for the maintenance of order in their areas and underwriting their miri obligations. Up to the 1770’s, they had, for the most part, been outside the mainstream of political events in the area. Even their deep hatred for the Druzes (who had dominated them in the past) had not manifested itself in any particularly active manner. But all this changed at the beginning of the 1770’s, when Pähir, badly in need of support, managed to persuade them to come down from their mountain fastnesses and join him in his struggle against the Vâli of Damascus and his Druze allies. In the Battle of the Hula (against 'Uthmän Pa$a, in September 1771) and in another battle which took place in June of the following year (1772) on the plain of al-GhäzIya, near Sidon, Metoualis constituted an important part of P ähir’s army, and acquitted themselves outstandingly in the field. These successes added greatly to their self-esteem and confidence, and from this time on, P ähir’s armed might came to depend largely on Metouali cavalry units, which now made up the core of his army. The French consul at the time has vividly described the dramatic transformation undergone by the Metoualis between 1770, when they were merely “poor, miserable On the fortunate way things turned out for 'Uthm än and Ahmad p äh ir as well as other descendants of the family see: MUhimme, 181, pp. 84, 101; Shihäbl, Ta'rtkh, pp. 69-70; Heyd, pähir, p. 73. 'U thm än was allotted in later years the Sancak of Hilda vandikAr, while Fädil, 'A li’s son, became a well-known poet, Enderuni Fazil, and even served for a certain period as the Voll of Rhodes (Cevdet, vol. 2, pp. 39-42). « Charles-Roux, p. 207; Mikhä’U, p. 11; 'Awra. p. I l l ; Heyd, Pähir, pp. 41-42. Sources refer to the Metoualis as “km lbaf", or “ravafit" and their territory as "R afitl vilayetC' (Sa'id effendi, p. 39b). Their principal shaykhs were: Näsif al-Na$»är, Ahmad al-'Abbäs, Haidar Färis, 'Abbäs al-'A li, Husayn Man?Or, Hamza MansOr, Qabalân alHasan (MUhimme, 179, p. 172 and Maliye 10223, pp. 12-13).

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peasants” , and 1772, by which time they had acquired enormous confidence in their own abilities, had become extremely aggressive, and were both willing and able to place at p sh ir’s disposal from 5,000 to 6,000 fighters whenever he needed them.64 But this, of course, is not entirely accurate — the Metoualis had always been a fine fighting people, and their sudden emergence as such in the early 1770’s should not be seen as some kind of miraculous metamorphosis. It was simply that prior to this time they had remained strictly confined to their villages and fortresses, and so, unlike the Druzes, had not had the occasion to display their innate martial qualities. This, then, would account for the French consul’s misconception. Neverthe­ less, this period did mark their emergence as a military factor of totally new dimensions as far as the balance of power in the area was concerned, and the Väli of Sidon now had to take them into consideration to a far greater extent than he had been wont to in the past. Firstly, they had become self-confident and aggressive, so that it was no longer sufficient merely to continue with the tolerant “hands-off” policy that had characterized his dealings with them up till this time. Secondly, on transferring his capital to Acre, he was now in much closer proximity to them. It is interesting to note that at no point did the central government ever use their heterodox religious beliefs as a reason or pretext for taking action against them. At the time of the siege of Dir IlannS, some Metoualis did join Jezzär’s camp. But when they heard of the fate which had befallen P ähir’s sons once their usefulness was over, they drew conclusions with respect to their own future, and decided to leave Jezzär and return to their homes in the mountains. Once things had been brought under control in the Galilee, the väli and the ffapudân Pafa turned to the Metoualis with the request that they settle their m iri accounts and raze their fortresses. Shaykh Qabalän, who as mukâfa'act of Tyre was far more vulnerable than the other Metouali shaykhs, acted as intermediary between the two sides. The Metoualis were not prepared to come down from the mountains in order to treat with Jezzär, and adamantly refused to destroy their fortresses. They were, how­ ever, quite willing to settle their taxation debt, and Jezzär decided that it would be prudent at this stage to accept this and leave them in possession of their fortresses for the time being. Therefore, when he passed through Biläd Bishära on his way to Sidon, with an escort o f4,000 soldiers, he made no attempt whatever to attack the Metoualis or provoke them into a fight, 64 For further details see: Letters of the French consul in Sidon, dated 2.6., 31.7, 28.6.1772 (+ bulletin) (Aff. Et., Bi 1033); V. de Paradis manuscript 9133, p. 63b, Shih&bl, Ta’rlkh, pp. 47-48; Shidyiq, Vol. 2, pp. 25-26, 29,42-45; Brcik p. 126; Shihâbl, LubnOn, pp. 31-34.

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hoping that this gesture of good-will would help him to win their confidence. But they remained wary, and when Jezzär requested their aid against the Druzes at the end of 1776, they blankly refused. In view of his attempt to establish an efficient, highly centralized form of government in the eyâlet, something that axiomatically precluded the continued existence of any other independent or autonomous centre of power in the area, it is clear that Jezzär could not realistically have hoped to rely on the support o f the Metoualis, who must have been fully aware of the basic incompatibility of their respective interests. Their attitude to him, then, was one of suspicion deriving from a strong instinct of self-preservation. Furthermore, it should be bom in mind that as staunch allies of P ähir in his defiance of the Sultan, the Metoualis had undoubtably incurred the wrath of the latter and they were still fearful of his vengeance. Jezzär was identified, accurately enough, with the Ottoman establishment, and so the strong possibility that he might be acting as an agent of the Sultan’s revenge for their part in Dähir’s rebellion was yet another good reason why the Metoualis should be anxious to keep him at a distance. Jezzär, for his part, was quite willing to let the problem rest for a while, as his hands were full dealing with the Bedouin and Druzes, a m atter which he considered to be of far greater urgency at the time. A t the end of September 1776, immediately after order had been restored in the Galilee, the Porte instructed him to collect the huge m iri debt of the Metoualis which had accrued over the previous few years. Jezzär and Hasan Pa$a managed to get them to agree to settle their debt as follows — 75,000 k. in September and another 75,000 k. in October, 1776, and the remaining 150,000 k. during the course of the following year (1777). Apart from this, Jezzär took no further action other than sending letters to the various M etouali shaykhs requesting them to re-affirm their allegiance to the Porte and accept its jurisdiction.63 When de Tott visited the area in 1777, he still found the Metoualis ensconced in their well-fortified mountain fortresses perched high on the peaks of the Anti-Lebanon, enjoying full internal autonomy in return for an annual payment of 200 purses.66 In other words, despite the fact that they had failed to honour the above agreement with Jezzär and the Kapudän Paja concerning the payment of their tax arrears (this will be dealt with below), no action had as yet been ts MUhimme, 173, p. 233, firman dated awâsit Sha'bän 1190/Iate September 1776; Letter of the French acting consul in Sidon dated 20.8.1776 (ACCM.J-802); Mikhâ’il, pp. 179-180; Lockroy, p. 130. 44 Baron de Tott, Mémoires sur les Turcs et les Tarlares, (Paris, 1785), Vol. 4, pp. 82-83. An indication of the extent of their autonomy is the fact that having occupied their fortresses Jezz&r found there seven moulds used to mint silver coins (MUhimme, 179, p. 172 dated awâkhir DhQ al-hÿja 1193/7-16.12.1781).

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taken against them to alter in any way the status quo arrived at in the days of Pähir. The four major reasons for the action that was eventually taken against the Metoualis are given, as follows, in a firman of the period: 1) Their rebelliousness at the time of P ähir (their collaboration with 'A ll Bey and Abû Dhahab) and their participation in the actions against the Vâli of Damascus (especially their part in defeating 'Uthm än Pa$a near the Bnot Ya'aqov bridge); 2) Their forays into the Damascus area — these were carried out by forces of 300-500 horsemen, and were initiated once their position at home had been secured by improving their fortifications and manning their fortresses with independent units of trained infantrymen; 3) Their failure to pay their miri, despite the fact that they had undertaken to do this annually; 4) Their conquest of various places in the rmdcäfa’as of Sidon, Tyre, Shafä’amr, Haifa and Acre.67 While the first two reasons were chiefly of interest to the Porte and of no great concern to Jezzär, the last two reasons (especially the fourth) were very definitely his concern and fully justified bis wishing to take the sternest possible action against the Metoualis. It is not known precisely which villages they were supposed to have attacked in the vicinity of Acre, and it might well be that Jezzär was exaggerating somewhat when he claimed that their activities had extended to this area. Nevertheless, it is quite clear that by the late 1770’s they were getting over their initial awe and fear of the new vâli, and had begun to carry out daring attacks on the major routes in the Sidon area. Towards the end of 1781, having come to the end of his tether and feeling more confident of his ability to deal effectively with them (he had managed to consolidate himself and augment his strength quite considerably over the preceding years), Jezzär finally ordered his ketfrüdä, Selim Pa$a, to lead a force o f3,000 men against the Metoualis. Against this army, NâçIfNajçâr68, the leading Metouali shaykh, pitted a force of about 1,000 cavalrymen. The two sides met on September 23, 1781, near the village of YärOn, and in a bloody battle that cost Selim almost one-third of his army, the Metoualis were put to flight, leaving their commander dead on the field.69 Jezzär went on to take the seven main fortresses70 in Biläd Bishära, which he proceeded to raze to the ground. He also took the Metouali controlled 47*9 47 MUbinune, 179, p. 172, finnan dated mid-December 1781. 68 Sometimes written also: “Nà?if” (Mtthimme, 179, p. 172), but more often “Nâ$tf” (Maliye, 1022S, pp. 12-13). 49 Letters of the French consul in Sidon dated 18.10.1780 and 2.10.1781 (Aff. Et., Bi 1038, 1039). 70 These were: HQnln, Tibnln, Yàrûn, Meis, Sarmfi, JiM ', Sham'a (MUhimme, 179, p. 172).

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port of Tyre. A desperate last stand was made at Shaqlf, under the command of Haydâr Fans, and when this fortress too had fallen,71 many of the sur­ viving Metoualis fled to Ba’albak, the Biqä* and even to the ’Akkär region, all of which were subject to the Vâlï of Damascus’ rule.72 Governors (mOtesellims) were then appointed to a number of key centres in the newly con­ quered territories. But despite the fact that he had smashed their power, overrun their land, and established his governors in their midst, Je o ä r’s control over the Metouali areas was not absolute. Thus, at the beginning of the following June (1782), on sighting an Ottoman flotilla making its way southwards off the coast of Tyre, the Metoualis immediately assumed that this was Hasan Pa$a undertaking a punitive expedition against Jezzâr and started to prepare openly for a revolt. Even before this, on October 28, 1781, a large Metouali force had successfully ambushed a party of Jezzär’s men near Ba’albak; while retribution had followed swiftly, many of those involved, including the ringleaders, had managed to make good their escape. Those Metouali fighters who had fled to Ba'albak joined forces with Amir Yûsuf, awaiting an opportune moment to return and re-take possession of their homeland. The amir, meanwhile, sent a number of them to rule in his name in the mukafa'as of Bishära and Shaqlf. Their big chance came in 1784. In that year, Jezzär’s forces suffered a severe defeat at the hands of Amir Yûsuf’s Druze warriors in a bloody battle near Sidon. The Metoualis took advantage of the opportunity thus provided to re-conquer parts of their country (including the fortress of Tibnln, where they slew Jezzär’s governor and recovered Shaykh Näslf’s hidden treasure) and even threatened to march on Acre. Although the local population received them enthusias­ tically, and lent them their full support, time was running out for the Me­ toualis. Once again, Jezzär sent his ketfrüdä against them, and it was not long before centralized rule was re-established in the area. But, despite the failure of their second bid to regain control of their country, the Metoualis remained undaunted, and Jezzär’s hold over this part of his eyälet was no more complete than it had been in the past. N ot even his attempt to maintain order through the stationing of special army units — “al-Sardala” — in 71 Mtihimme, 175, p. 351, firman dated atva’/YMubarram 1193/19-28.1.1779; Mühimme, 179. p. 161, dated awàkkir DhO al-qa'da 1195/6-15.11.1781; Volney, pp. 246-247; Munayyir, 1956, pp. 207-208; Cevdet. 3, pp. 105-106, gives two contradictory versions of the reasons for this last battle, of which only the second is relevant, the first (based on Vâsif) referring to a later event; Sa'IdEffendi, pp. 15a-b, 39b-43b summarizes the battle as a “revenge taken for the life of Abu Bakr and ’Umar” ; Letter of the French consul in Sidon, dated 22.6.1782 (Aff. Et., Bi 1039). 72 Shaykh ’Aqld ibn Shaykh Nà?If and his ketffüdâ, Shaykh M ar’y FaddOnI, were leading them at that time (MUhimme, 179, p. 172).

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the area was able to prevent certain of the Metouali notables from returning in secre. They made a number of attempts to assassinate Jezzär’s governors, and they were even able to collect taxes from the local population, much as they had done in the past (this, of course, in addition to the taxes levied by Jeoär). Their next real opportunity came when Jezzär was appointed VäJi of Damascus. The following year, while he was away on his annual dawra through the Nablus and Jerusalem areas, the Metoualis once again rose in revolt and tried to re-take possession of their fortresses, several of which (Tibnln, HQnin and Shaqif) had been levelled to the ground. But this attempt, too, was ruthlessly put down by Selim Pa§a.7î Even so, J e s ä r’s hold over Biläd Bishftra remained virtually unshaken throughout his rule. Despite the periodic attempts at rebellion (described above), which persisted for at least ten years, he continued to collect taxes regularly through his agents in the area and was able to impose his will on its Metouali inhabitants. These (according to Sebastiani, writing at the end of 1802), were to be found living a peaceful existence in their villages and had only been moved away from the coastal area. This same observer, nevertheless, saw fit to implore the väli not to harm his Metouali subjects.7374 There is little doubt that this tranquillity was achieved only as a result of Jezc&r’s relentless suppression of all resistance on the part of the Metoualis, and the fact that he had succeeded in physically eliminating a large number of them, including many of their leaders. Gibb and Bowen have remarked in their book75 that the elimination of the Metoualis “ need not evoke any excessive sympathy with the victims", as they had in the past proved to be a disruptive element in the Lebanon and Galilee. W ithout going into the moral question raised by Gibb and Bowen — i.e. whether or not the fact that they were such an element (if, indeed, they were) justified their elimi­ nation — it must be pointed out that Jezzär had managed, albeit by resorting to extreme ruthlessness and cruelty, to gain a firm grip on an unruly, mountainous area while deliberately dispensing with the services of the traditional local leadership, part of which he had wiped out and part of which had fled to M ount Lebanon and the Biqä'. In place of this Jezzär 73 Volney, p. 247; Cevdet, vol. 3, pp. 105-106; Lockroy, pp. 161-165; Shihäbl, Lubnän, p. 137; *Awra,pp. 34-35; Munayyir, Ta'rlkh, pp. 395-396; M. Mishäqa, Kitäb mashhad al-a'yän bi hawâdith Süriyya wo-Lubnàn (Cairo. 1908). pp. 38-42; M. de lam artine. Souvenirs, Impressions, Pensées et Paysages pendant un Voyages en Orient 1832-1833, (Paris. 1845). p. 547; Kurd 'A li, vol. 2. pp. 314-315; Shihäbl, Ta'rlkh, pp. 82-83; U tters of the French consul in Sidon, dated 30.5.1784. 31.12.1785 (Aff. Et.. Bi 979). 2.6.1784 (Aff. Et.. Bi 1040). 7< Testa, vol. 2. pp. 55-56. 75 Cibb & Bowen, vol. 2, p. 68.

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had established his own mOtesellims in the area, and these, with the backing of trained army units, were able effectively to control the villages in his name. In order to prevent these mOtesellims from becoming too deeply entrenched in the area, Jezzär made a point of replacing them at frequent intervals, and none were permitted to remain in the same place for any length of time.76 The population, meanwhile, remained loyal (not always entirely willingly or spontaneously) to its traditional leaders, who, despite the fact that they had been ousted from their previous positions and no longer wielded effective power in the area, continued to receive mtri from the villa­ gers, much as they had done in the past. This must have placed an unbearable financial burden on the poor peasants who had, of course, also to pay their miri to Jezzär’s official representatives. Despite his persistent efforts to do so, Jezzär had not in fact managed to put a final end to Metouali power in the area, and it was not long after his death before the traditional leaders were back once again, exercising their old functions.77 But this was only after his death — there is no doubt at all that during Jezzär’s lifetime the Metouali areas were firmly under the control of his centralized administration. The autonomy which they had' enjoyed under p äh ir had been effectively destroyed, and, from that time on, they were totally incapable of posing any serious military or political threat to Jezzär. 3) Relations with the Bedouin In the 18th Century, Bedouin tribes from the Syrian and Arabian deserts began to exert an ever-increasing pressure on the settled areas — the ’Anayza in northern Syria, the Çakhr in southern Syria, and the Wahhäbis in Arabia.78 Jezzär, whose territory bordered on or was in close proximity to these deserts, could not but come into conflict with these tribes. His persistent efforts to establish a strong, centralized form of government, something to which the nomadic tribesman, by his very nature, could never possibly reconcile himself, made this absolutely inevitable. While his contacts with the Wahhäbis belong to a later period and another part of the Empire (the Arabian Peninsular), Jezzär found himself at loggerheads with the Bedouin tribes in Palestine itself almost from the very inception of his rule in the area. In dealing with the Bedouin, Jezzär resorted to the following two courses of action: 1. Preliminary preventative measures; 2. Suppressive military 76 Letter of the French consul in Sidon dated 12.8.1783 (Aff. Et., Bi 1040). n Cevdet Maliye, 31490. 78 Gibb & Bowen, vol. 2, pp. 233-234.

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operations. As for the first type, this basically entailed the seizure of strate­ gically vital positions in those areas which, even before Jezzär’s time, had been particularly subject to the depredations of Bedouin tribesmen. Thus, as the chronicler of the period informs us, soon after he had put down 'All P ähir’s rebellion, Jezzär began to build fortresses at various key points in the area in an attem pt to stem the raids of the $aqr, 'Anayza, BanQ Çakhr and Sardiyya tribes.79 To be really effective, such fortresses had to be set up within the confines of Palestine itself, at the bottle-necks through which these tribes passed on their way into the country. The fortress at Tiberias, for example, controlled the major points of entry to the north and south of the Sea of Galilee (particularly that to the south, at the conflu­ ence of the Yarmûk and Jordan rivers), used by Bedouin tribesmen entering Palestine from the Syrian Desert.80 It was for this reason that Jezzär had insisted, in a letter to the Porte, that the above fortress be left intact after 'All p äh ir’s rebellion had been quelled. He pointed out that should it be demolished, the Bedouin would be able to pour into the Safed, Tiberias, Shafä’amr, Acre, LajjQn, Jerusalem, Ramie, Jaffa, Hebron, and Nablus areas and would even be able to interfere with traffic along the routes to Damascus. In other words, they would swamp the whole of Palestine. Such an eventuality, he continued, had to be avoided at all costs. Furthermore, as this threat had become far more than just a passing phenomenon, it was imperative to devise some permanent means of resisting it. It was not sufficient merely to rely on the present static defences at Tiberias, which were primarily intended to safeguard the town itself and its inhabitants. Also, the garrison manning these defences was made up of men drawn from the local population whose loyalty, Jezzär claimed, could not be taken abso­ lutely for granted. Their traditional ties with the Bedouin made it quite possible that they would actually come to their aid rather than resist them should they ever be called upon to defend the town and its vicinity against them. In view of all this, Jezzär offered the following suggestions: firstly, the fortress at Tiberias should be left intact; secondly, a permanent force of 50 trained infantry-men should be sent to man this fortress; and thirdly, a force of 300 cavalry men should be stationed in the town — these, by virtue of their mobility, would be able to prevent the incursion of Bedouin 79 SaTd Effendi, pp. 32a-32b. BanQ Çakhr and the Sardiyya, who up to the second half of the 18th Century grazed their herds east of the Jordan, later made use o f territory near the river as well reaching the Valley of Jezereel (M. Sharon, Ha-Bedvim Be-Eretz Israel ba-me'ot ha-shmone ‘esre ve-ha-tesha' 'esre (Jerusalem, 1964, unpublished M.A. thesis), p. 27). 19 The area is referred to in official Ottoman documents as “ Bogaz”, namely “narrow passage**.

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tribesmen into the area and would enable the local inhabitants to work their fields in peace and security. Contrary to past practice, these forces were to be made up of soldiers of Turkish origin (Jaife-i eträk). It was only by taking these steps that the area would, in Jezzär’s opinion, be made safe from the Bedouin and “without a doubt become (more) populous and prosperous ("ma"mûr") with each passing day” . It is interesting to note that the Porte agreed whole-heartedly with Jezzär’s appraisal of the situation and gave him a free hand to implement all the measures he had suggested, ignoring the fact that this was hardly consistent with its original orders to demolish all fortresses in the Galilee immediately they were taken, parti­ cularly those at Safed and ShafS'amr.81 Furthermore, the Porte instructed Jezzär to set up additional cannon in Tiberias, thereby placing it on much the same footing (in this respect) as Beirut, which, also being vulnerable to attack (from the sea), was in need of additional armament and defences. The significance of this latter instruction is that it was given at a time when all superfluous cannon in Palestine (about 70 in all, according to the Porte's estimate) were to be returned to Istanbul.82 It is in the light of Jezzär’s Bedouin policy that we must also view his sole conquest east of the River Jordan — Flq, which was taken later in his rule.83 This fortress, like Tiberias, enabled him to control the area south of the Sea of Galilee, the traditional point of entry used by Bedouin tribes coming into Palestine from the Golan and {fawrän areas. As for the other major point of entry, north of the Sea of Galilee, Jezzär deliberately left the Bnot Ya’akov bridge in a state of disrepair (at least until 1785, and possibly even later). This effectively pre­ vented both the Väli of Damascus’ armies and Bedouin tribes inhabiting the Qunaytra area from entering the country by way of the northern route.84 Jezzär was thus able to regulate the entry of nomadic tribes into Palestine, and deter any possible attacks against his domains. But the above means did not serve to put a total halt to their infiltration, nor was Jezzär able to influence those tribes already present in Palestine. Thus, the Banfl $aqr tribe continued to terrorize the settled population throughout Syria, just as in the past. On coming to power, Jezzär had warned the leader of the tribe, Zämil, and his son, Färis, against continuing with these acts of law2 Maliye. 10220, pp. 276-277 and Maliye, 10017, pp. 18-19, dated 9 $afar 1191/ 19.3.1777. 83 Burckhardt, p. 280. M Shidyâq, vol. 1, p. 235; Letter of the French consul in Acre dated 20.3.1785 (Aff. Et., Bi 979). Jezzär started the reconstruction of this bridge upon his appointment as Vâll of Damascus in 1785.

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lessness. These warnings alone could not, of course, put an end to the tribes’ deprecations in most of Syria, but they did cause the BanQ $aqr to avoid the Eyâlet of Sidon in favour of the Sancak of Nablus. They were by no means averse to striking at the Sultan’s representatives and officials in this latter area — for example, members of the tribe brazenly attacked the Ottoman party escorting Ahmed Pa$a (the rebellious former Vâli of Aleppo) to Jerusalem, where he was to be held in the citadel. In retaliation for this outrage, Jezzàr marched against them, and defeated them soundly, killing the leader of the tribe.83 In the later half of 1778, Jezzär found himself under renewed Bedouin pressure when about 20,000 tribesmen of the BanQ Çakhr and ’Anayza tribes began to encroach on the mujcâta'as of Safed, Tiberias and Shafä'amr. They pitched their tents in the above mukâfa'as, as they had done in former times, and began to interfere with the local population, demanding various taxes from the villagers and from any traveller who happened to be passing through the area. It is quite likely that this large-scale incursion had been made possible by the fact that the bulk of Jezzär’s army was at this time tied down in a campaign against the Druzes in the Sidon area. At all events, it is quite clear that there was a general deterioration in security throughout the eyâlet towards the end of that year, when Muhammad al-Husayn, one of the Acre mukâfaacts, rose in revolt against Jezzär, and considerable unrest broke out among the Metoualis and those of p ah ir’s descendants who still remained in the area. In addition to all this, the BanQ §aqr began once again to launch forays into the settled areas, and even managed to attack and destroy part of the water-works just outside Acre. Jezzär retaliated by sending part of his army against them (enjoying the support of a number of Druze shaykhs in this operation). It appears that these vigorous campaigns against the Bedouin continued into the second half of 1783, by which time Jezzär had succeeded in defeating them decisively and restoring security both in the settled areas and along the roads of the eyâlet.96 From that time on, the Bedouin ceased to be a serious threat to his regime and were no longer mentioned in his official correspondence with the Porte. While he w as able to prevent the recurrence of large-scale attacks on the settled areas, this does not mean that the Bedouin had altogether ceased to be a problem for Jezzär. In 1801, for example, a contemporary traveller reported that a state of rebellion and unrest continued to persist among « Sa'Id Effendi, pp. 37a-38b. *6 Cevdet Dahiliye, 6153, a letter sent by Jezz&r to the Sublime Porte, dated 1 Ramad&n 1192/23.9.1778; Cevdet Dahiliye, 15339, firman to Jezzär dated awâsit Ramad&n 1192/ 2-12.10.1778; MUhimme, 175, pp. 314-315, 351; MUhimme, 181, p. 265 dated awâsif Ramad&n 1197/9.-18.8.1783.

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the Bedouin in the M ount Tabor area, which led him to conclude that, despite Jezzär’s long drawn-out struggle against them, he had not in fact succeeded in imposing his will on the tribes in the lower Galilee, “a country continually overrun by rebel tribes” . Even the armed force supplied by Jezzär to escort the above traveller on his tour of the area was afraid to traverse the more mountainuous parts of this territory, and adamantly refused to ascend M ount Tabor itself. Taxes could be collected only by resorting to force and coercion — thus, Jezzär would from time to time send an armed force against the obstinate tribe with instructions to impound part of its livestock. This was then either considered to be taxation in kind or held until the leaders of the tribe concerned came to reclaim their animals, in return for which they undertook to pay the amount due.87 Although this traveller did not specify the name of the tribe to which he was referring, it would appear that it was a relatively large one (judging by the punitive force sent against it by Jezzär, which was described as numbering 5,000 men). It might well have been the Banü Çaqr, which did in fact roam the area between Nazareth and Nablus at this time. But if this was the tribe referred to, it would not be entirely accurate to claim that Jezzär “had broken their power completely”.88 Napoleon’s invasion once more brought the Bedouin problem to the fore.89 Not only did certain of the tribes openly aid the invaders, but even after the latter had withdrawn from Palestine, they continued to harass the population and disrupt orderly cultivation in the Galilee, Jaffa, al-'Arish and Damascus areas.90 The Taräbln tribesmen in southern Palestine (the Khan YOnis area) even took to looting the caravans bearing supplies for the Ottoman army which had been sent to oust the French from Egypt.91 All this provided ample justification for Jezzär’s decision to resort once again to the stem suppressive measures described above. Actions of this type are also mentioned by another source92— in 1803, Jezzär refused to allow the tribes in the Jfûla and Golan areas to graze their herds, under threat of confiscation, until they had paid him for grazing rights in these » Clarke, vol. 2a. pp. 483-505. 88 Sharon, p. 13; A. Jaubert, (“Nomenclature des Tribus d’Arabes qui Campent entre l’Egypte et la Palestine” dans ”Description de l'Egypte” Etat Moderne, Tome, 2 (Paris, 1812), pp. 258-259) estimates this tribe at about 5000-6000 men bearing arms. 89 A phenomenon not totally unexpected. Similar Bedouin uprisings followed Abu Dhahab’s retreat from Palestine in the early seventies. (A letter of the French consul in Sidon dated 10.7.1771, ACCM, J-800). 90 Cevdet Dahiliye, 14612, dated awâ'il Mubarram 1214/5-14.6.1799, a firman calling for their suppression referring to them rather unusually as “R avffii ta'lfesl 91 MUhimme, 216, p. 73, firman dated awäkhir Rabl* al-awwal 1216/1-10.8.1801.

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areas. In view of the amount of Bedouin lawlessness which broke out in the wake of Napoleon’s invasion, and the stern suppressive measures which JezzSr had been forced to take in dealing with it, it would certainly not be accurate to claim that he had crushed the tribes completely. What he had succeeded in doing, though, was to subdue them (particularly the $aqr, Çakhr, and ’Anayza) sufficiently to make certain that they would not be able seriously to threaten his rule in the area, driving many of them out of Palestine back into the Syrian Desert. On this last point, we have the evidence of a contemporary French consul in Acre (who, incidentally, tended to adopt a decidedly hostile attitude towards Jezzfir and his regime:) “Des hordes d’Arabes Bédouins qui cultivaient autrefois les montagnes de la Galilée et une partie de celle de la Judée ont été exterminés ou obligés de se réfugier dans les déserts”.93 It should be born in mind, however, that not all the tribes were expelled from Palestine and, as we have seen, those that remained still retained much of their internal strength, which JezzSr had not been able to break. Thus, with respect to at least some of the tribes, JezzSr had had no choice but to leave them largely to their own devices, only taking action against them from time to time in order to make certain that they paid the taxes which he considered his due. Were it not for such military action, there is little doubt that these taxes would not have been paid and this, after all, was the most fundamental obligation of any subject people. They did, nevertheless, recognize his power, and it was for this reason that they did not dare to threaten — at any rate, to any significant degree — the remaining population which was clearly subservient to JezzSr’s centralized rule. After centuries of Ottoman rule in the area this was the first time that a vâli had been able to impose his will on the Bedouin tribes in Palestine. Pähir, as we have seen, had had some limited success in this regard, his own Bedouin origin doing much to break down the differences between himself and the tribes and greatly facilitating his task. Jezzfir con­ tinued where Pfihir had left off, but he pursued his policy with far greater perseverance and determination. The Bedouin, for their part, saw Jezzfir (accurately enough) as an implacable foe, to whom they could not afford to give and from whom they could not expect to receive the least quarter. But here, Jezzfir’s tremendous vigour and greatly superior military strength was decisive — he was bound to come out on top in this unequal contest, and his word eventually became law among the tribes. Thus, after his first few years in office, once it had become quite clear that the Bedouin no longer posed any serious threat to his centralized rule in the area, Jezzfir was able92 ShihfibI, Lubnân, vol. 2, p. 408. » In his letter dated 10.5.1790 (ACCM, J-835).

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to relax his operations against them and to turn his attention to the task of administration. JezzSr’s Bedouin policy had a lasting effect on the area, extending long beyond his own life time. At the beginning of the 18th Century, the Vâli of Sidon had been in the habit of recruiting the aid of Bedouin tribes from across the Jordan in his various attempts to deal with rebellious mQltezims in the eyälet. It is hardly surprising, as they had been especially invited into the Galilee by none other than the vâli himself, that these tribes should then have turned to him for permission to remain in the area permanently.94 The very weakness of the vâli also served to encourage the influx of Bedouin tribes into northern Palestine, whether he liked it or not. All this was part of a process which had begun countless ages before and was to continue at least into the first half of the 18th Century, with the nomadic population of the area only assuming its final form towards the end of that century.93 It is possible that the movements of the Bedouin tribes in the Syrian and Arabian deserts also had some influence on developments, but there is little doubt that it was Jezz&r’s policy which was ultimately responsible for them. The establishment of a strong centralized form of administration in Palestine at the end of the 18th Century was not, of course, entirely able to smash the power of the tribes in the area. In the first place, throughout most of his rule, Jezzir’s authority extended only to the northern part of the country. Thus, in the Ramie-Jerusalem and Jerusalem-Hebron areas, as well as in the vicinity of Jaffa, battles between the different tribes still took place and raids were still conducted into the settled areas.96 In the Gaza district, the W a^Idit continued to reign supreme, Volney describing this tribe as being very powerful and enjoying a great deal of autonomy.97 In the second place, it was hardly possible to break down their traditional tribal structure and destroy the power of the Bedouin at one fell swoop. Many more years and a large number of far-reaching economic and political changes were needed before this could happen. Nevertheless, there is no doubt whatever that the efficient, highly centralized regime which Jezzfir had managed to establish in the area, knowledge of which spread far beyond the actual boundaries of the eyälet itself,98 did much to stem the influx of 94 A letter of the French consul in Sidon, dated 6.10.1708 (Aff. Et., Bi 1018). 93 Sharon, p. 8. 9« A letter of the French consul in Sidon dated 31.7.1772 mentions the following tribes: Sarfraf, Oilal, Bekir. 97 Volney. pp. 208-210. 9* We have not dealt in this work with the results of Jezz&r’s policy against the Bedouin along the route to Mecca, where his successful military operations served to deter further raids into western Palestine (a letter of the French vice-consul in Acre, dated 26.10.1785, A ff.Et.,Bi979). Also in another letter, dated 7.6.1785. The same source reported that when

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new tribes from the desert into the Galilee and other settled parts of Palestine, and, furthermore, forced those tribes already present in the area to fall back onto the defensive and even to retrench. This, perhaps, was one of the most significant and far-reaching of all Jezzàr’s achievements as master of Palestine, both for his own generation and for those that followed. 4) Relations with the Druzes Throughout the whole of the 18th Century, M ount Lebanon formed part of the Eyälet of Sidon. It was known as “Mtüfäfa'at Jabal al-Shüf”, and was traditionally farmed out to the Druze Amir. Although he enjoyed a great deal of local autonomy and had virtually unlimited control over the members of his sect and the running of their villages, the Amir's status was theoretically simply that of a mOltezim; thus, for example, he was placed on the same footing as p ah ir al-'U m ar (firmans of the period often referred to the two men in the same breath, clearly indicating that they were considered to be complete equals with respect both to status and to rank). The chronic impotence of the Vâli of Sidon, however, made his hold over the Mountain to all intents and purposes non-existent. While he had earlier on in the century made a number of attempts to penetrate the area and impose his will on the local population, a series of disastrous military failures finally convinced him that the game was just not worth the candle, and in later years these attempts ceased altogether." But the Druzes were not satisfied merely to be left alone, and there is evidence that even in the first half of the 18th Century they were beginning actively to challenge the väli's authority in the eyälet — one of their amirs or shaykhs, for example, would lead his men down from the Mountain, ravage the orchards in the vicinity of Sidon and even threaten to damage the silk­ worm-breeding industry in the area (sometimes actually carrying out this threat).100 They were usually met by the väli's soldiers, who would be sent out to intercept them before they reached the town, and put them to flight. But the mere fact that they dared to contemplate such raids so close to his capital is a clear indication of the contempt which the Druzes were JezzAr was appointed Vdll of Damascus and intended to undertake his annual dama in the Jerusalem area, many Bedouin tribesmen (about 30-40,000) from the Gaza-River Jordan area took refuge east of the river. 99 Letters o f the French consul in Sidon, dated 20.11.1711 and 21.3.1717 (AfT. Et., Bi 1018, 1020, respectively). 100 Described in a letter of the French consul in Sidon dated 8.7.1741 (ACCM, J-789) and summed up in a firman dated awS'U Jumfldhä al-awwal 1154/15-24.7.1741 (MUhimme. 148, p. 35).

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beginning to have for the väli's authority, and the decreasing credibility of his deterrent power. It is true that they actively supported the väli in his struggle with P ähir al-'U m âr, but this must be seen in its correct perspect­ ive — disregarding, for a moment, the theoretical or strictly formal aspect, it is clear that it was P ähir, and not the Väli of Sidon, who represented actual authority and wielded effective power in the area. Their willingness to take up arms against him, apart from expressing their loyalty to the Sultan, is also an indication of the Druzes’ increasing confidence in their own ability to come down from the Mountain and test their military prowess on the coastal plain (as they did against P ähir near Sidon, for example, or in 1773 against Jezzär, when the latter was entrusted with the defence of Beirut). This picture underwent a radical change when Jezzär became Väli of Sidon. In view of the highly complex nature of his relationship with the Druzes,101 we shall not attempt to describe this in any great detail.102 But, because Mukiäfa'at Jabal al-Shüf, like any other mu^äfa'a in the eyâlet, was subject to Jezzär’s jurisdiction as Väli of Sidon, it will be necessary at least to touch on some of the more frequently recurrent themes in this extremely intricate relationship. In the first place, one of the most fundamental differences between this relationship and those with other local factors in the eyâlet is the fact that it was Jezzär himself who was almost invariably responsible for any friction between the two sides. This is not to say that the amirs never took the initia­ tive; in the final analysis, however, it was not in most cases a m atter of Jezzär reacting to some act of provocation on the part of the Druzes, but rather the opposite. Events were without a doubt dictated for the most part of Jezzär’s initiatives and by Jezzär’s actions. His predecessors had restricted their intervention in the affairs of the Mountain to the extension of official recognition to the ruling Amir and to making certain that taxes were collected in an orderly fashion (according to the terms of the agree­ ment reached between Hasan Pa$a and Amir YQsuf when Jezzär first took up his post, this was to be the limit of his intervention as well). But Jezzär insisted on having a decisive say in the choice of candidates for the governor­ ship of the Mountain, he appointed and dismissed governors at will, and he even went so far as to interfere in the internal rivalries between the various local factions, sending his army into the area to help one or another of the sides involved. It is possible to see Jezzär’s various moves as falling tot “These follow each other with such rapidity, and are so complicated in their threads and tortuous in their course that it requires no slight strain upon the attention to follow them’’. D. Urquhart, The Lebanon (.Mount Souria): A History and a Diary, (London, 1860), vol. 1, p. 106). 102 This has been done by the author in “Jezzär Ahmed Pafa” , pp. 30-34.

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Mâl-i-Mfrl returns from Acre and the nähiye of Marj ‘Uyûn at the end of the ] 8th Century

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into some kind of fixed pattern. He would first of all demand from the can* didate standing for the post of Amir an undertaking to pay a specified sum against taxation for a pre-determined period of time. He would then send the successful candidate the khiPa (which symbolized his rule over the Mountain), an official letter of appointment, and, should this prove ne­ cessary, an armed force (usually cavalry) as protection against the machi­ nations of any disappointed or jealous rival. It was now up to the newlyappointed governor to start raising the money he had undertaken to pay Jezzär before receiving his office. The sources of direct income available to the al-Shihäbl family were extremely limited (a few villages held as bâff),10î and they were curtailed still further with Jezzâr’s seizure of Beirut. Thus, the Amir had little choice but to turn to the other Druze amirs and shaykhs, who to all intents and purposes constituted a sort of landed feudal aristocracy, and divide between them the burden of raising the sum he had pledged. As the rivalry for governorship of the M ountain increased in intensity, so the cash pledges made by the various candidates for the post grew larger and larger; this, in turn, placed an ever-increasing burden on the Druze amir class, which was expected to raise the bulk of the sum re­ quired. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that these amirs and shaykhs began to demur (even, on occasion, offering armed resistance, to the taxcollectors), and the Amir began to find it more and more difficult to honour the pledge he had made to Jezzftr. When he had reached the stage of no longer being able to meet his obligations, a new candidate would, in his turn, undertake to pay Jezzär a specified sum in lieu of taxes for a certain period, and receive the appointment from him; the previous Amir, now totally alienated from the mu^äfa'acis as well as from the väli (for entirely different reasons, of course), had no choice but to leave D ir al-Qamar and make way for his successor. Jezzär saw M ount Lebanon primarily as a milch-cow, to be milked for all it was worth. He had little compunction, therefore, about dismissing a governor soon after he was appointed (regardless of whether or not he was able to fulfil his obligations) if he happened to find a candidate who was prepared to pay him more for the post. The various rivals for governorship of the M ountain, who were perfectly well aware of Jezzâr’s attitude, would thus constantly raise the stakes in their bid for office. Jezzär, who obviously stood to gain from all this, did nothing to discourage them. An endemic rivalry existed between various families and factions on the M ountain (between the Yazbaks and the Junbaläts, for example, who invariably took diametrically opposed stands on any issue — what one side supported, the 103 103 W. R. Polk, The Opening o f South Lebanon, 1798-1840, (Massachusetts, 1963), p. 12.

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other would automatically oppose). This meant that there was always a strong core of opposition to the incumbent governor and his supporters, and this was ideally suited to, if not an essential pre-condition for, the effective application of Jezzär’s policy. He did, however, on occasion attempt to appoint a candidate to whom all the mukäfaacis were opposed. Not even the considerable forces which Jezzär would send into the M ountain were able to make such an appointment feasible, and the unfortunate governor would find it extremely difficult even to establish himself at Dir al-Qamar, let alone collect taxes from the hostile mufcifa'aas. The topo­ graphy of the Mountain greatly reduced the effectiveness of armed force as a means of enforcing policy in the area — the Druzes, familiar with every nook and cranny of their rugged homeland, were at an untold advantage over Jezzär’s highly-trained cavalry units, which were not really suitable for operations in this type of terrain. Jezzär’s chances of maintaining his hold over the M ountain by means of his army alone were, therefore, very limited. It was for this reason that he generally tended to let the choice of Amir rest with the amirs and shaykhs, merely confirming their own candi­ date (as in the case of Bashir). Alternately, he would appoint a candidate who enjoyed the support of at least some of the rmtkâfa'acis (even then, this was not always sufficient). Any attempt to impose an Amir who was not acceptable to the majority of the Druzes, or who was appointed in favour of another candidate who did have popular support among them (Bashir, at the beginning of the 19th Century, for example), invariably ended in failure.104105 There was another aspect to Jezzär’s military ties with the M ountain. The engagements which from time to time took place between his forces and those of the Druzes were frequently initiated by the latter, who, when­ ever they felt sufficiently sure of themselves, would attempt to launch raids in the direction of Sidon. On balance, however, it was Jezzär’s army which generally took the offensive. Like that of the Druzes, this too consisted of launching raids (of varying depth and duration) on to the M ountain, eventu­ ally meeting up with a local force, at which point battle would be joined and settled to the advantage of one or the other side. While Jezzär had the benefit of a professional army, the Amir had to rely on irregulars who, although their numbers (potentially) ran into tens of thousands,103 were not full-time soldiers and did not earn regular salaries. They were called upon only when the Amir needed them, and paid according to the amount of time they served. Jezzär knew this, and hastened to take advantage of 104 Volney, p. 238; Munayyir, 1956, pp. 209-210. 105 Sa’Id Effendi, p. 8; Lockroy, p. 33; Volney, p. 241.

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what he saw to be a most welcome chink in his adversary’s armour. In 1784, for example, at a time when Amir YQsuf enjoyed widespread support on the M ountain, JezzSr forced him into a long, indecisive war, the sole purpose of which was to keep his army in the field for as long as possible. Rumour even has it that a number of Druze shaykhs were party to this ruse of Jezzir’s. At all events, whether or not this was in fact so, the ruse worked — as the war dragged on, the financial burden of keeping his soldiers in pay weighed ever more heavily on the Amir, and in the end he was forced to give up the struggle and accept the wily pafa’s term s.106 As has already been mentioned, the never-ending hostilities on the Mountain were, for the most part, initiated by JezzSr himself. But, in view of his apparent inability to achieve anything really decisive by force of arms, be began to consider the possibility of attaining his goals in the area by other means. One of these was to isolate the M ountain, which he attempted to do in two ways. Firstly, he strove to have himself appointed Vâli o f Damascus, in which capacity he would (among other things) be able to cut off the M ountain in the east and thereby prevent his opponents from escaping to the JJawrSn.107 Secondly, he tried to cut off the M ountain from the coastal plain in the west by forbidding (in 1784 and 1793) all commercial ties between Beirut and Sidon, on the one hand, and the Druzes on the other. As we have already seen, his seizure of Beirut had done much to weaken the position of the al-Shihibl family in the area by denying it access to one of its major sources of direct revenue. But far more important than this, by blockading all trade from the west, JezzSr could attempt to strangle the Mountain economically — the Druzes were dependent on Beirut for a large part of their basic imports, particularly cereals, and this placed an extremely potent weapon in JezzSr’s hands. He used it to some effect, wheat becoming almost unobtainable on the M ountain, and the prices of other produce rising sharply. Total success was not possible, how­ ever, as the Druzes still had access to other supply routes (through Tripoli, for example).10* As a means of forcing the Druzes to their knees, then, this too proved inadequate. Jezzär’s relations with the Mountain should also be viewed in a regional context. In the first place, he was not the only one to have a hand in events in the area. There were also the vâlis of Damascus and Tripoli. Formally, the Jubayl region was under the jurisdiction of the Vâli of Tripoli, and the Biqfi* and Ba’albak regions under that of the Vâli of Damascus. It is hardly Volney. pp. 239-240. 107 An unsuccessful attempt is described in Cevdet (old edition), vol. 3, p. 336. 10» Shihfibl, Lubnän, pp. 168-169; Munayyir, Ta'rikh, pp. 393-396.

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surprising, therefore, that these two should also be interested in having an active say in what went on in the above areas. Consequently, they refused to co-operate with Jezzär, repeatedly turning down his requests for the return of political opponents who happened to flee to them for asylum. They even began to send troops on to the M ountain in support of those factions which claimed allegiance to them, and this inevitably led to periodic clashes, particularly between Jezzär’s men and those of the Vâli of Damascus. All this may also be viewed in terms of the perennial power-struggle between the three vâlis in the region, each of whom was continually striving for, or aspiring to, supremacy in Syria. The numerous attempts made by the vâlis of Damascus and Tripoli to undermine Jezzär’s position on the Mountain could thus quite credibly be seen as an expression of this rivalry. While the efforts of the former in this regard have already been described (see p. 65), those of the latter have not. In 1778, for example, we find the Vâli of Tripoli lending his full support (supplying money and equipment and permitting free use of the ports in his eyâlet) to the Druzes when these rebelled against Jezzär in that year and refused to pay their taxes. But as Jezzär was acting under the instruc­ tions of the Porte in suppressing this revolt, the Vâli of Tripoli was in fact committing a gross indiscretion by aiding the rebels, and he was ordered to desist immediately.109 The Porte was interested in Jezzär’s relations with the Mountain only in so far as these affected two principle issues — the religious and the economic. Jezzär was specifically ordered to prevent any Druzes or Metoualis from attacking pilgrims passing through the area on the way to Mecca or darwishes visiting the Mountain with intentions of remaining permanently,110 while the orderly collection of taxes was, as always, a major concern of the Porte. A part from the occasions of his run-in with Hasan Pa$a early in his career and the Grand VeZIr’s futile attempt at the beginning of the 19th Century to separate the M ountain from his eyâlet, the Porte did not interfere with Jezzär’s policy or activities in the area. Jezzär, for his part, took full advantage of the Porte’s apparent conviction that it was his pre­ sence in the area which alone permitted the orderly collection of taxes, never failing to draw attention to it whenever he was required to undertake some mission or assume some office which he found inimical. We have already seen how he would sometimes deliberately stir up trouble on the M ountain in order to convince the Porte that his continued presence in the area was imperative, and in this way get out of having to perform some Cevdet Dahiliye, 6153, dated 1 R aroa#n 1192/23.9.1778. no MUhimme, 175, p. 35, dated awà'il Çafar 1191/10-19.3.1777.

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distasteful task or other outside Palestine. In his letters to the Porte, Jezzir would spell things out quite plainly — his absence from the country would in every probability precipitate the collapse of his entire administration and this, in turn, would put paid to any revenues from the area. Just how fallacious this argument in fact was has already been pointed out (see p. 59). It is quite possible that the Porte’s apparent gullibility in accepting this argument derived, not only from its almost total ignorance of conditions in the area, but also from its perfectly realistic recognition of the fact that it simply did not have the ability to force Jezzftr’s hand, anyway. Be this as it may, the Porte gave every indication of accepting Jezzâr’s argument at face value. In 1783, for example, when his appointment as Väli of Bosnia was rescinded and he was re-instated as Väli of Sidon, the reason given was the need to restore order on Mount Lebanon and in the Sidon area.111 Mount Lebanon was a problem which occupied Jezzftr’s attention through­ out the whole of his rule. The military prowess of its inhabitants, the nature of the terrain, the endemic rivalry and friction which existed between the various Druze factions and, last but not least, Jezzftr’s own part in encou­ raging this rivalry, all served to keep the area in a state of constant unrest and forced him, from the very inception of his rule to the day of his death, to embark on a never-ending series of military and political intrigues on the Mountain. Although he never managed entirely to subdue the region,112 mention must be made of one lasting effect his above policy had on the future history of the M ountain. The ever-increasing financial burden which Jezzär imposed on the Amirs forced them to resort to a policy of playing the different tmJfäfaaci families (the Nakads, Tmftds, Junbaläfs, etc.) against each other. This resulted in a considerable redistribution of property (as a result of expropriations) and gave rise to a series of deep-seated internecine feuds, which eventually disrupted the political (and later, social) equilibrium that had evolved between the various elements on the M ountain over the past few centuries. While this process reached its climax only in the 40’s and 60’s of the 19th Century, it is ultimately traceable, at least in part, to Jezzftr’s policy on Mount Lebanon during the previous century.113 With regard to his efforts at centralization, Jezzär consistently attempted 111 Cevdet, 3. p. 104. 112 His original intention was to try and accomplish here what he had already achieved with the Metoualis, only the Druzes turned out to be a far more difficult nut to crack. Cf. a report of the French consul in Acre dated 15.7.1790 (Aff. Et., Bi 981): “Djezzar entiendra un conflit de puissance dans le Liban jusqu’au moment ou il pourra y com­ mander par ses Mutezelims.” Folk, pp. 13-17, Awiiing with this problem mainly from the aspect of internal relations among the families of Mount Lebanon.

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to achieve the same results on the Mountain as he had in Biläd Bishära and the Galilee. His chief incentive in pursuing this policy had been to secure the highest possible income from his eyälet, something which posited above all else the extension of his effective control over all its parts. While he was not, as we have seen, able to realize this fully on the Mountain, the extent of his intervention, as a representative of the central government, in the internal affairs of its inhabitants far surpassed anything the area had known in the past. If the situation in the area at the end of Jezzâr’s rule is compared with that at any time prior to this, one inescapable difference emerges — the Mountain had been forced, without the slightest doubt, onto the defensive. The al-Shihäbl Amir no longer interfered in the affairs of the rest of the eyälet, as he had been wont to do in days gone by, and had become, to a far greater degree than at any time in the past, subject to the wills and dictates of the Vâli of Sidon. One of the vital keys to Jezzâr’s comparative success in dealing with the Druzes had been his early acquisition of Beirut, and he did his utmost to exploit his hold over the port as a means of extending his control into the hinterland (i.e. the Moun­ tain itself). Although he was not, as it happens, able to bring this particular nâfiiye totally under his control, this does not in any way detract from the fact that he had proved eminently successful in returning the Eyälet of Sidon to the “classic" pattern of an orderly, efficiently governed province of the Ottoman Empire, something it had certainly not been throughout the 18th Century.

PART TWO: ADMINISTRATION

1.

T he A dministrative U nits a n d their D evelopment

Palestine in the 18th Century was divided into eyàlets — the Eyälet of Damascus (Shfim) and the Eyälet of Sidon. While administrative division in the Eyälet of Damascus was more or less along “classic” lines,1 this was not the case in the Eyälet of Sidon, which in the 18th Century differed con* siderably from other eyälets in the Empire. According to the “classic” pattern, each eyälet (as Gibb and Bowen have shown) was divided into a number of sancaks. Although the sancak was essentially a feudal unit, it also comprised land which was not allotted to fiefs; therefore, it could not be divided for administrative purpose according to purely feudal criteria. Some other basis had to be found. Consequently, each sancak was divided into a number of qaçlâ’s. The latter were judicial units, each under the jurisdiction of a Muslim religious judge, a qâffi. Where the q a tft was parti­ cularly large, it was further subdivided (again on a judicial basis) into a number of nâhiyes.2 A.

The Eyälet o f Sidon

1) Administrative Subdivisions As has already been said, administrative division in the Eyälet of Sidon did not, in the 18th Century, follow the above pattern. According to official Ottoman usage, the eyälet was referred to variously as the Eyälet of Sidon ("eyälet-i faydä', “faydä eyäleti”) or the Eyälet of Sidon and Beirut (faydä ve Bayrût eyäleti).3 The name “Sidon” appears in both formulas, and this town was, in fact, the seat of the väli throughout most of the 18th Century. It is interesting that the word “Acre” does not occur at all in the 18th 1 Gibb and Bowen, vol. 1, pp. 137-173; M. Belin, Du régime des fiefs militaires dans l'islamisme et principalement en Turquie, (Paris, 1870) (extrait no. 2 de l'année 1870 du Journal Asiatique), p. 88 (originally: p. 274). 2 Gibb and Bowen, vol. 1, p. 133. 2 These titles appear at the head of each finnan dealing with this eyälet. For an example of the introduction of “ Çafad” into the title of the eyälet see: MUhimme, 190, p. 171; MUhimme, 186, p. 314.

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Century, not even in the name of the district. This is particularly remarkable in view of the fact that in the later part of the century Acre was undoubtedly the most populous town in the eyälet, the centre of trade in Palestine, and, in the days of Jezzär, the permanent seat of the vâlï .It should be stressed, however, that this was not due to any deliberate attempt on the part of the Porte to play down the importance of Acre. Even Jezzär, who certainly recognized the importance of the town he chose to make his capital, did not try to introduce the word “Acre" into the name of his province. The reason, it appears, was the conservative nature of the Ottoman administra­ tion (of m y administration, for that m atter) which tended to preserve established formulas even when a change might well have been justified. The conspicuous absence of the name “Acre" in any official formula relating to 18th Century Palestine, then, was simply the result of inertia rather than an expression of some deliberate policy or attitude adopted by the central government. One of the distinguishing features of the Eyälet of Sidon in the 18th Century was the unusual way in which it was split up for administrative purposes. Like all Ottoman provinces, the eyälet was far too large to be controlled directly from a single centre, and some type of decentralization was essential. But in the case of the Eyälet of Sidon, special notice should be taken of the rather strange manner in which the province came into existence. Writing at the beginning of the 17th Century, *Ayn-i ‘All described Eyälet-i Çâm-i Çerîf as being made up of ten sancaks, among which he made specific mention of the Sancak of Safed and the Sartcak of Sidon and Beirut.4 In 1614, the Porte instructed the Vâlï of Shäm to combine the above two smcaks into a beylerbeylik (i.e. a single district under the jurisdistion of a beylerbey).5 In 1071/1660-1, as part of the reform programme introduced by the Köprülü veztrs, this beylerbeylik became the Eyälet of Sidon.6 While little emphasis was placed on the division of the new eyälet into sancaks, it is reasonable to assume that for the first few decades of its existence at least such a division did have some significance — Evliya Çelebi, who visited Palestine in the early 1670’s, has described the Eyälet of Sidon in his day as having been made up of Liwa’ (= sancak) Bayrüt, Liwa’ Çafad, Liwa’ 'Akka, Liwa" Vilâyet TürabI, Liw ff Saydâ and JJwff Jabal Ma*n.7 At all events, this does not seem to have lasted for very long, and the division

4 Belin, p. 88. * Heyd, Documents, pp. 47-48. 6 Evliya Çelebi, Seyahatname (Istanbul, 1314/1935), vol. 9, p. 425; Gibb and Bowen, vol. 1, p. 222; Rafeq, p. 3. 7 Evliya, vol. 9, p. 425.

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into sancaks is not apparent throughout the 18th Century.8 It seems that the eyälet was divided into a number of sub-units rather smaller than sancaks, known as nähiyes. But this term is very rarely encountered in the official Ottoman correspondence of the period,9 which would seem to indicate that it did not gain very wide currency in official circles. This division into nähiyes was along fiscal lines rather than according to the judicial criteria described above by Gibb and Bowen. In other words, the principle admi­ nistrative sub-unit was taken to be the mukäfa'a. N ot only were adm inistra­ tive units in the eyälet invariably referred to as “the mukâfa'a of such and such a place,*9 but in one finnan, the Eyälet of Sidon was specifically men­ tioned as being “composed of nwkäta'as”.10 It does not necessarily follow, however, that every mukâfa'a was also an administrative unit; there were rmdcafaas based on the collection of taxes within a certain economic sector (water-works, for example) in both urban and rural areas.11 But those mukäfa'as founded on a strictly territorial basis, known also (as has been mentioned) as nähiyes, were by far the more common. This division along fiscal rather than judicial lines seems to have been much more logical, at least with respect to the Eyälet of Sidon12 — administrative units are not 8 A similar process could be traced in the eyälet of Yemen and Habes (Gibb and Bowen, vol. 1, p. 147, n. 7). 9 Throughout thousands of documents of different departments in the Ottoman central and provincial administration this term reccurred only a few times: The Ndfiiye of Acre (Maliye, 10154, p. 234 for the year 1711); Tbtt Nähiyes of Jlra and Tarshlba (Maliye, 10151, p. 182 for the year 1706); The Ndhiye of Shaft [*amr] (Maliye, 10206, p. 278 for the year 1764); The Ndhiye of IqUm al-Tufftfc (Maliye. 10306, p. 205, for the year 1705). For the flexibility of the term in the 16th century see: M. T. Gôkbilgin, X V -X V l Astrlarda Edirne ve Paja livast. (Istanbul, 1952), pp. 8-9. 10 Maliye. 6282. p. 317, finnan dated 7 Rama * . I j j j

O jL * . . .

JS* OluLliu ^JLI %L>j J*J j

j j jJU C jiL* j l j O

Ijl%#

ü j \jj Ca

11 It seems to us that the above fits in nicely with Sahillioglu*s view(p. 146): “the mukâfa'a is a device intended to assure (the remittance of) revenues to the treasury**. In order to do this effectively the various nähiyes were generally (although not always) defined on a territorial basis. Belin*s view that “the mukdfa'a is an equivalent of the iltizdm**, is thus completely untenable (M. Belin, Essais sur r histoire économique de la Turquie (Paris, 1865), (extrait no. 5 de Tannée 1864 du Journal Asiatique), p. 92, n. 2). A mufçâfa'acould be allotted in two or three different ways besides iltizam (see p. 179 below). Note also Fekete*s definition of the term (L. Fekete, Die Siyaqât-Schrift in der Türkischen Finanzverwaltung, (Budapest, 1955), erster band, p. 85): “The area and bo undries of these taxation units or taxation areas were specifically defined and termed mukdfa'a’*. 12 Cevdet is wrong in attributing the division with which he was familiar in the 19th Century to the situation existing in the 18th. Qcufà' should not be confused with ndfiiye just as the Eyälet of Sidon did not consist of sancaks at the time. But, still, Cevdet is correct in his definition of "mukdfa'a" (Vol. 1, p. 313).

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determined by theoretical considerations alone, but must, above all else, justify their very raison d'être, which is, of course, to enable the central government to exercise its functions with the maximum of efficiency. Thus, it follows that any authority should have been vested in those most capable of serving the central government’s interests in the area. The mültezim, farming taxes in a certain mukäfa’a, was far better able to do this than the qä92 Maliye, 9530. p. 53. i*J Maliye. 9530, p. 54. im MUhimme, 148, p. 57.

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90’s, we find Gäzl Hasan and after him Jezzfir paying as much as 40,000 k. mäl-i mu'äcele. 195 The picture that emerges, then, is as follows — stagnation until the late 1730’s, relatively slow growth until mid-century, and rapid growth during the later half of the century. This increase in the mäl-i mu'äcele is even more remarkable in that it came about despite the fact that, territorially, the sancak shrank considerably during the course of the 18th century, losing certain areas of considerable economic importance (Haifa and the northern part of the Jezreel Valley). It can only be assumed that the mültezims’ readiness to pledge these ever-increasing sums stemmed from their con­ fidence that they would be able to recoup their investment in addition to making a substantial profit. This, of course, would only be possible if the economic development of the area kept pace with their growing obligations. Although the Sancak of Lajjûn lay outside the immediate sphere of P ähir’s and Jezzär’s activities, had no French merchants to boost the local economy, and did not even have a port comparable to Jaffa or Haifa, it was undoubtably affected by economic developments in other parts of Palestine, particularly in the north (Galilee and the coastal strip). Once it became known that high profits could be earned from the export of grain and other cash crops, districts like Lajjûn and ‘Ajlûn, where the economy was not planned from above, also began to step up the cultivation of such crops and to enjoy the concomitant economic benefits. The hold increasingly established over the area south of the Sea of Galilee, first by p äh ir (who fortified Tiberias) and after him by JezzSr (who seized control of Flq and the area south-west of the lake), did much to prevent the incursions of Bedouin tribes from east of the Jordan into northern Palestine. While the above measures were taken for the sole purpose of serving the personal interests of P ähir and Jezzär respectively, here again, the Sancak of Lajjûn and 'AjlQn stood to gain, being one of the areas which had in the past suffered most heavily at the hands of the Bedouin. A European traveller who undertook a journey from the Lower Galilee to Jenin towards the end of the century has left us an interesting contemporary account of the situa­ tion in the sancak (at least in its northern part). He points out the remarkable difference between the districts subject to the control of Jezzär, which were run-down and deserted, and the Sancak of Lajjûn, where he found “cultiv­ ated fields, gardens, and cheerful countenances.’’196 That there is a certain amount of exaggeration and not a little bias in these observations is obvious, particularly when we remember that the really thriving parts of the sancak 1« Maliye, 9530, p. S3; Maliye. 10235, p. 314 196 Clarke, 2a. p. 503.

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were at this time (the early 1790’s) controlled by Jezzär. This does not, however, detract from the general impression gained by our traveller, which remains basically accurate — the increased security throughout Palestine and the revival of agriculture in the Galilee had undoubtedly left its mark on the Sancak of LajjQn as well. 3) The Sancak o f Nablus The Sancak of Nablus (“Nablus Sancagi”), described by *Ayn-i ’All and Evliya Çelebi in the 17th Century, remained unchanged in the 18th Century (see map). In the 18th as in the 17th Century, it formed part of the Eyälet of Damascus. Here too, an attempt was made at the beginning of the 18th Century (1702) to transfer the sancak from the Eyälet of Damascus to the Eyälet of Tripoli. But if such an attempt failed in the case of the Sancak of Lajjün and ’Ajlûn, it had even less chance of succeeding in the case of the Sancak of Nablus, and after just two years the arrangement was rescinded and the sancak restored to the Eyälet of Damascus.197 Something rather peculiar emerges, though, on close examination of the mukäfa'a's official records — throughout the 18th Century, the miri returns of the sancak are recorded either as “the mal (i.e. mäl-i miri) of Mukä{a'at Nablus in the Eyälet of Safed’’198 or alternatively, “the mäl of Mulfäfa'at Nablus in the Eyälet of Sidon” .199 This appears to indicate that at some time or other (probably at the beginning of the century, as in the case of the Sancak of ’Ajlûn), an attempt was made also to append this sancak to the Eyälet of Sidon. If such an attempt was in fact made, it undoubtably failed, as throughout the 18th Century the sancak was listed in the Eyälet of Damascus’ accounts despite the rather paradoxical persistence of the above formulae. This confusion was, however, purely theoretical, as there is no doubt what­ ever that for all practical purposes, the sancak belonged to the Eyälet of Damascus throughout the entire century. It was the Vâli of Damascus who appointed the governor of the sancak (referred to variously as sancak bey, mutafarrifmütesellim or käymakäm)200. The latterexercisedhis functions from the town of Nablus — they included the maintenance of law and order in the sancak, the safe-guarding of the local population, the collection of taxes and other revenues due to the väli, and the provision of a military force to receive the returning pilgrims.201 The sancak bey, in his turn, iw Maliye, 10306, p. 197. im Maliye. 3989, p. 129b for the year 1133/1720-21. 199 j u s is the usual formula (Maliye, 10195, p. 277 for the year 1165/1751-2). 200 Nimr, vol. 2, p. 176 gives the text of an official letter informing the “notables” of Nablus of it in 1143/1731 or in 1204/1790 (pp. 176-179). “ i Nimr, vol. 2, p. 176.

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entrusted the collection of taxes in each of the seven nähiyes making up the sancak to the local shaykhs, who officially represented him in the nähiyes.2**2 Two or three months before he was due to set out for Mecca, the Väli of Damascus, at the head of a large military contingent, would pay a visit to the Palestine sancaks in order to collect the m iri. During the course of this dawra, he would pass by Tiberias, visit the Sancak of LajjOn and the Nablus Hills, and sometimes even continue on to Jerusalem. From time to time, he found it necessary to resort to force in order to collect the taxes owing to him. Such action had to be swift and decisive, as it was imperative that he would complete his rounds and return to Damascus in time for the forthcoming Hajj. Theoretically, the M utafarrif of Nablus was supposed to help him, either by collecting the sancak's miri in advance, or by supplying an armed force which would enable the väli to collect it for himself. In effect, however, the mutafarrif's authority in the sancak (and even in Nablus itself, for that matter) was to a large degree nominal, real power resting with the shaykhs of the powerful local families (the Tûq&ns and the Jarrfirs). In order to avoid this undesirable split in authority, the Väli of Damascus would sometimes appoint a member of one of these families to the governorship of Nablus (in 1771, for example, he appointed M uftafä TûqSn to the office).202203 This latter appointment raised the ire of the rival Jarrärs, who had in the past displayed far greater loyalty to the Väli of Damascus, and in order to appease them, members of the family were delegated authority in rural areas throughout the sancak. If the mütesellim happened to be an outside appointee, the task of collecting the sancak’s taxes on behalf of the väli was usually entrusted to the most power­ ful local shaykh in the area at the time (this was invariably the case when the governor was appointed from among one of the local families).204 This practice was adopted in order to prevent as far as possible any complications from arising during the course of the dawra ; it did not always prove success­ ful, however, in which case the väli had no choice but to resort to force — not, as a rule, a very satisfactory alternative. The formidable fortifications at S&nûr (in the northern part of the Nablus Hills) were designed to serve the interests of the Jarr&r family, which, as we have seen, controlled much 202 Nimr, vol. 2, p. 177-179. Nimr erroneously adds 2 nähiyes belonging to the Sancak of LajjOn (Bilfld tfirith a and al-Sha'rflwiyflt). The other nähiyes he mentions (pp. 183-184) are : Jabal Shàml, Jabal Qibll, Banl $a ‘ab, Jammâ'In, Wadi al-Shi‘r. The first three (situated north, south and west of Nablus) are mentioned in the Ottoman archives, as well as the Nähiye of D ir al-Sh’ir (including TO! K ann, D ir al-Sharaf and NQ$In). For the division in the 16th century see: Lewis, Eretz Israel, p. 171. 203 Browne, p. 417; Rafeq, p. 288. ** Volney, pp. 315, 333.

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of the countryside in the sancak; by barricading itself at SflnQr, the family was generally able to withstand quite considerable pressure.205 Thus, in the limited time available to him before having to return to Damascus, the väli was not usually able to impose his authority by sheer force of arms. That the annual dawra came to be accepted as an established institution is in itself clear indication of the Porte’s weakening hold over the sancak and the collapse of the taxation system in the area. Theoretically, taxes should have been forwarded from the villages to the centre of each näftiye which, in turn, should have remitted these to the mQteselllm or sancak bey in Nablus; the latter, in his turn, should then have forwarded the entire sum to the treasury in Damascus. The growing impotence of the muta$arrifs, however, had caused this system to break down completely by the 18th Century, and not even the practice of delegating the responsibility for the collection of the sancak's taxes to a member of one of the local families was able to rectify the situation. But in view of the fact that these taxes went towards the financing of the ffajj, the Väli of Damascus had a vested interest in assuring that they were properly collected. Thus, he himself would arrive in the area with a contingent of soldiers in order to aid the mutafarrif in his task. This arrangement proved fairly satisfactory, and the väli was generally able, in this way, to raise quite considerable sums in the different sancaks. But in the final analysis, although it did achieve its primary purpose to a greater or lesser extent (i.e. the securing of revenues to finance the Hajj), the above arrangement merely served to perpetuate the impotence inherent in the office of sancak bey without really attempting to get to the root of the problem. It was not by chance that the Väli of Damascus set out on his annual dawra immediately prior to the Hajj, as the miri revenues from the Sancak of Nablus went towards the maintenance of the military force accompanying the pilgrims to Mecca.206 But, as we have already noted with respect to the Sancak of LajjQn, by the end of the 17th Century it was found to be impossible to raise more than half the total miri owed by the sancak (in 1698-9, for example, this came to a mere 6,800 k. out of a total 12,800 it.)207 What is more, it was not long before the Väli of Damascus began to find even this reduced sum increasingly difficult to collect. A firman issued at the end of June, 1727, notes that the treasury had not managed to collect from the sancak so much as a single penny of the mäl-i muäcele (“mâlikâne mäh”) for the past 30 years, while even the miri payments had fallen into 203 203 Shihibl, Lubnân, vol. 1, p. 63 for the year 1178/1764-5. 20« Maliye, 9530. p. 14; Maliye. 10170, p. 301. 207 Maliye, 4879, p. 129.

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abeyance in recent years. The finnan goes on to describe the large-scale desertion of villages throughout the sancak, ascribing this to the growing number of local potentates and the ever increasing hardships these imposed on the villagers. Just how slight the chances were of raising any but the most minimal sum in taxes may be learned from the fact that in this same year (1727), the sancak was farmed out as mâlikâne for a mere 1,000 k. mäl-i muâcele 208. The revenue records kept by the ffazine in Damascus for the year 1114-1115209 appear to confirm the above picture in its basic essentials. The total revenues accruing to the sancak in 1727 came to 27,000 k., more than twice the original miri pledged (the Väli of Damascus had ob­ viously exaggerated somewhat in his description of the situation in the area when he submitted his request that the tax burden on the sancak be allevi­ ated). But on closer examination, it becomes apparent that the above sum was derived largely from sources other than m iri— fines imposed on private individuals or officials (the a$a), ghafar taxes (see below, p. 258), etc. The not inconsiderable sums which each of the näftiyes, and also the town of Nablus itself, had to pay each year in addition to the mîri (tanùTim: dhafrire, kudûmiye, refié), are found in this case to have accounted for no less than 14,000 k. O f the entire 27,000 k., no more than 7,000 k. can be definitely attributed to miri returns. While it is true that a clear-cut distinction between miri per se and all these other taxes was not always made, the general term miri sometimes being used to refer collectively to all revenues, the Väli of Damascus was not guilty of deception when he maintained that he was unable to collect the full mûri from the Sancak of Nablus. It is also interesting to note that the above sum is found to have been derived, without a single exception, from villages north of the line Bäqa 2 1 0 — Bayt Dajan (south of M ount Gerizim). From very early in the century, the southern (south of Nablus) and western (west of the line Bayt D ajan-Jübäs-Talflt) parts of the sancak were apparently no longer answerable to the M utafarrifof Nablus. All in all, then, it seems to be beyond dispute that the central government was not, right from the beginning of the 18th Century, able to collect more than a portion of the taxes owed by the sancak, and these from no more than part of its total area. So the Väli of Damascus’ claims in this respect appear to rest on fairly firm ground. It is hardly surprising, therefore, to find that from 1142/1730-1 on the sancak's miri obligation was very substantially reduced. In view of the fact that the sancak served as “the point of entry and an area of transit for the *» Maliye, 9530, p. 14. »» Cevdet Maliye. 15894. 21° Although Bâqa is not specifically mentioned it is indentical with Bani $a'ab (see the map of western Palestine issued by the PEF), which appears in the list of revenues.

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Bedouin tribes”, the mulafarrif was now required to pay only half the original sum (i.e. 6,400 k.). The balance (which was used to finance the training and equipping of the military force accompanying the ffa jj caravan to Mecca) was henceforth to be deducted in the form of a cash transfer (havâle) from the miri owed by the Eyälet o f Sidon.211 This arrangement remained in force until the end of the century. It should be pointed out, however, that although the mutaçarrif was now officially required to pay the Vâli of Damascus only 6,400 k., this does not necessarily mean that the latter was prepared to make do with this sum. He did not have the slightest compunction about taking advantage o f the simple fellahin, who were totally ignorant of the fact that the am ount of miri to be paid was fixed in advance by the central government in Istanbul, and that they were entitled to demand receipts from the vâli (“sebeb tahriri" — see note 42, p. 196 below), which served as official evidence that they had paid their taxes. Thus we find that in the last decade of the century the vâli was able to collect as much as 20,000 k. in taxes from the Sancak of Nablus during the course of his dawra.212 The economic situation in the sancak had undoubtably improved by the end of the century, although not quite to the same extent as in other parts of Palestine. That the vâli was able to collect far more than the sum to which he was officially entitled is not in itself particularly noteworthy, as he did much the same in all the other mukäfa'as under his control. But whereas the other sancaks had undergone considerable economic development, and the Porte had seen fit to raise their taxes accordingly, no attempt was made in the Sancak of Nablus even to restore the mäl-i miri to its original level. Assuming that the Porte did know more or less what was going on in the various provinces of the Empire, this would appear to indicate two rather significant facts about the Sancak of Nablus — that the collection of taxes was still an uncertain business in this rugged and refractory area,213 and that economic develop­ ment had been relatively slow. It should not be supposed, however, that the situation was all that desperate. Far from it — judging by evidence which has come down to us from the 1780’s and 90’s, Nablus was involved in a number of very lively agricultural and mercantile activities, and its inhabitants were considered to be among the wealthiest in the whole of

2ii Maliye, 10170, p. 301, finnan dated 23 Jum&dha al-thänl 1142/13.1.1740. This remained valid throughout the century. H 2 More precisely: 20,139 k. as reported by Jezz&r when he became on a later occasion Vâli of Sidon (Cevdet Maliye, 23042). 2 U Jezzfir met with no more success than his predecessor in this venture and he was unable to subjugate the fortress of SinQr (Browne, p. 418).

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Syria.214 This rumour, quite obviously unfounded, probably gained currency due to the fact that the inhabitants of Mount Nablus, thanks to the rugged­ ness of the terrain, were far less vulnerable to outside interference on the part of the väli than most other sancaks in the area. But rich they certainly were not — in comparison to the inhabitants of Jabal al-ShOf, an area similar in many respects to the Sancak of Nablus, they might quite possibly have appeared to be living in a veritable paradise, but this was only because the latter unfortunates were at this time suffering under the heavy hand of the new Väli of Sidon, Ahmed Jeo är. 4) The Sancak o f Jerusalem In the 17th Century the Sancak of Jerusalem (Sancak-i ÇudOs-i Çerif), according to *Ayn-i 'All, also belonged to the Eyälet of Damascus. In practice, this arrangement continued into the 18th Century — i.e., the sancak was usually included in the area entrusted to the Väli of Damascus under the terms of his letter of appointment.213 He would then send a mütesellim to govern Jerusalem on his behalf (this included collection of taxes and, in general, responsibility for the orderly running of the sancak). Like all the other sancaks which we have examined, that of Jerusalem was divided into a number of näftiyes; of these, we know for certain only of the following — the Nähiye of Jerusalem, the Nähtiye of Hebron, and the Näfriye of BanQ Hasan.216 It was, as we have already mentioned, one of the mütesellim's chief functions to collect the sancak's miri and forward this to the treasury in Damascus. But at this point, we come across something decidedly peculiar — in all official documents dealing with the 18th Century, the mukäfa'a records and the accounts of the Ijazine in Damascus, there is virtually no mention of this sancak's revenues. This is extremely puzzling, as even in those cases where taxes were not collected for one reason or another, the m iri owed by the sancak in question is always found to have been recorded. It is only at the very end of the century (the beginning of the 19th Century, in fact — 1216/1801-2) that we come across the miri owed by the Sancak of Jerusalem, 12,500 k.217 This sum is almost identical with that paid by the Sancak of Nablus, and it is possible that by comparing the two sancaks we will Browne, p. 417; Volney, p. 333. Mühimme. 138, p. 11 quotes a finnan dated early 1736: “The Sancak of &udtis-i 5ertf has long been granted to the Vâlls of Damascus as an additional district (appended to the eyälet) to which they in their turn appointed a mütesellim”. 2 i< Evliya Çelebi, vol. 9, p. 304; Cevdet Maliye 13894, mentions the Nähiye of Bant Hasan without any reference to its location. It appears later on in Macalister 1903, p. 333. Only the first two näfiiyes existed in the 16th century (Lewis, Eretz Israel, p. 171). «7 Maliye, 9330, p. 1. 213

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be able to arrive at least at a partial answer to the above “mystery” . The only copy we have of the accounts kept by the treasury in Damascus refers to the year 1114-5.21®Close examination of these reveals that of the total revenues accruing to the Sancak of Jerusalem that year (21,500 k.), just one-fifth was derived from mûri, the remainder being made up of various taxes imposed on the Christian and Jewish communities in Jerusalem. In the Sancak of Nablus, total revenues for that year came to somewhat more than the original miri before this was reduced (we have already seen how, on discovering that he was able to collect little more than the miri officially owed by the sancak — and not the substantial surplus which he had come to consider his due — the Vâli of Damascus had appealed to the Porte for the tax to be reduced). As for Jerusalem, the miri returns were so negli­ gible, and covered so small a proportion of the original sum pledged (approx­ imately one-third), that there was little point in even recording them in the treasury accounts.219 An important reason for the very low revenues accruing to the M utafarrif of Jerusalem was his virtual military impotence — more than once, in the early years of the century, he was actually expelled from the city by the local population.220 It was hardly to be expected, therefore, that he would have much authority over the hinterland. But the main reason, it seems to us, was the general political unrest and anarchy which plagued the sancak throughout this period. The never-ending Bedouin raids221 wrought havoc in the countryside, reducing the number of villages at the end of the 17th Century by as much as 50%.222 The close proximity of much of the sancak to the deserts in the south and in the east restricted the authority of the mutafarrif to little more than the hilly area between Jerusalem and Hebron.223 By the 1760’s, according to M ariti, the pafa was unable to extend his control beyond the walls of the towns them­ selves.224 Once a year, immediately after Easter, it was customary for the Pafa of Jerusalem to accompany the Christian pilgrims to the Jordan River. He was unable to do this, however, unless he first made a cash payment

u i Cevdet Maliye. 15894. 219 Even the ifitisdb tax collected in Jerusalem did not exceed 500 k. in the early twenties (Maliye, 9910, p. 521). This is a rather negligible sum if compared with the one levied in Sidon in the second half of the century, which was 12 times as great. Z» For instance: A letter dated 22.4.1704 (Aff. Et., Bt 1017). 221 MUhimme, 111, p. 574 for the year 1113/1701-2. 222 Nau, p. 6, who in 1675 thought that half of its 200 villages lay in ruins. 22) Evliya Çelebi as well, at the end of the 17th Century (vol. 9, p. 512) draws the line between the desert and the populated area near Hebron. 22« M ariti, p. 381.

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to the tribes in the area and provided himself with a heavily armed escort.225226 Although this only happened once a year, it throws considerable light on the tenor of the relationship existing between the governor and his subjects — not only was he unable to induce them to pay their taxes, but he himself was forced to pay them if he wished to move freely in his own sancak. Both the road from Jerusalem to Jericho and the road from Jerusalem to Ramie were controlled by the Bedouin. To make matters worse, there was considerable tension between the inhabitants of Hebron and the inhabitants of Bethlehem, and from time to time this erupted into fierce battles.226 No wonder Volney presents us with such a dismal view of the area, which he visited at the beginning of the 1880’s — agriculture in the Bethlehem region, like that everywhere else, was in a state of neglect, while he found Jericho to be little more than a run-down village.227 The feudal holdings also showed signs of neglect and decline during the course of the 18th Century; this process had begun some time previously, becoming especially acute in this particular sancak (see below, p. 295). In short, of all the sancaks in Palestine, the Sancak of Jerusalem was the most unruly and recalcitrant, and the degree of control which the muta$arrif was able to exert was ex­ tremely circumscribed. This, together with the alarming decline in agriculture throughout the sancak, made it impossible for the Väli of Damascus to derive from it anything like the same advantage, as far as revenues were concerned, as he did from the others in his eyälet. When it came to collecting the taxes in his sancak, his military weakness forced the governor of Jerusalem to rely to a very large extent on the Väli of Damascus. This aid took mainly the form of the annual dawra, when the väli was able to use the military force accompanying him to some effect. From time to time, however, the mutagarrif would also ask the väli to send him military reinforcements in order to enable him to collect taxes in the rural areas.228 It was only when Jezzär became Väli of Damascus (in 1785), and thus ultimately responsible also for the Sancak of Jerusalem, that any serious attem pt was made to bolster the authority of the central government in the out-lying districts. He set about doing this with his customary vigour, first of all eliminating the most troublesome local leaders in the Mount Hebron region and then dispatching Turkish governors, each supported 225 M ariti, pp. 301-303. E. Sullivan (ed.), Buck Whaley's Memoirs including his Journey to Jerusalem, (London, 1906), p. 192. 226 M. Ladoire, Voyage fa it à la Terre Sainte en r année 1719, (Paris, 1720), pp. 104-103 for the year 1719; Hasselquist, p. 147, for the forties; M ariti, p. 383 for the sixties. 227 Volney, p. 341. 222 In the year 1141/1728-9 (Cevdet Dahiliye, 14683); in the year 1203/1788-9 (MUhinune, 189, p. 27).

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by a body of soldiers, to certain key points in the area.229230This was without doubt a bold innovation, and it was not long before results were forth­ coming — according to the French consul at the time, Jezzfir’s policy did much to restore security along most of the country’s roads. Jezzär was not master of the area for long, however, and soon after he had departed from the scene, the sancak returned to its former state of lawlessness and anarchy. A European traveller who visited the area at the end of the century described the governor of Jerusalem as possessing no real power, effective control of the entire sancak being, to all intents and purposes, in the hands of the Bedouin.239 C.

Concluding Remarks

Our description of administrative divisions in the Eyâlet of Sidon is seen to hold true for all the other sancaks in Palestine as well. Just as the Eyâlet of Sidon was divided into a number of nâhiiyes, so too were the various other sancaks with which we have dealt. Below the level of nâhiye, there was no further administrative sub-division — the hamlet, village and town being merely the component parts of individual nâhiiyes. In the feudal holdings and waqf estates, however, a further sub-division was discernible; this was into hifgas (measured in terms of qirâ(s). Discounting those villages falling into the category of waqf or fräss-i hümäyün, which by definition had to incorporate some further sub-division, no administrative division below the level of the nâftiye was to be found in the rural areas of Palestine in the 18th Century. W ithout exception, the rural administrative unit was completely identical with the taxation unit. In the urban areas, on the other hand, the situation was somewhat different. While in the larger cities (Beirut, Sidon, Acre), administration was fully unified (in the hands of the vâli, mOtesellim or a$a), because of the large range of economic activity, the mukâfa’a was for taxation purposes split up into a number of sub-units. Each unit represented a different sphere of economic activity (port taxation, coffee-houses, ifttisäb, etc.). The only nâhiiye th at did not conform to the above pattern was Biläd Bishära, which was, in fact, further sub-divided into three or four smaller units (these were not known by any special ad­ ministrative term, and were alluded to simply by their geographic names). The reason for this was, it appears, not only geographic (the large size of the nâftiye), but also political (the traditional division of the region between three major local families). Although these families were later crushed by 229 A report appended to a letter of the French consul in Sidon dated 31.12.1785 (Aff. Et., Bi 979). 230 Browne, pp. 416-417 in the year 1797.

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Jezzär, he chose to preserve the traditional sub-divisions in the nähiye. Another reason, no less important, was the continued recalcitrance and rebelliousness of the Metoualis despite all Jezzfir’s efforts to bring them into line; by maintaining the division of the näfiiye into smaller, more manageable units, he hoped to be able to exercise more effective control over the area. It was this, evidently, that induced him to even increase the number of units — from three to four.231 In none of the sancaks of 18th-Century Palestine was the qatfcT found to form part of the administrative set-up.232 This is not to say that it had ceased to exist; but, as we have already seen (above, p. 121), the term does not appear to have been used in conjunction with the administration of the sancak, and certainly not with reference to an actual administrative unit. The qa&r> as the name itself implies, was simply that area subject to the judicial authority of a q ä fi.2*1 As such, it was sometimes co-extensive with the territory of an entire sancak (as in the case of the QaçkT of Nablus, for example, or the Qa#T of Lajjün). More often, however, the qatfâ' covered only part of the total area of a sancak — a couple of näfriyes, or even a single näfiiye (the q&4&s of Sidon, Beirut, Acre and Safed, for example). It was also possible for the area of a q a 0 to transcend that of a single sancak (“from the town of Nablus to the qafi? of £udüs-i ÇeriT’234) if, for example, there was no q ä fi available for the latter, or 231 The division was into three units, each of which bore an equal share of the original mlrt obligation. For the year 1178/1764-5 see: Cevdet Maliye. 17197; for Jezzftr’s days see: TKS. D 4760 p. 2. 232 Cf.: “The Qazâ, which belonged to a different system of organization rarely appears. It may possibly have coincided with the Nabiye.” B. Lewis, “The Ottoman Archives as a Source for the History of the Arab Lands**, in Journal o f Royal Asiatic Society. (London, 1951), p. 147 n. 1). This means that even prior to the 18th Century the qa1

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were in actual fact obliged to pay twice over for the upkeep of the above units — once in cash, to the vâlï, and again in kind, to the soldiers themselves. For the poor peasant, all the above developments simply meant that the tax burden he was forced to bear, already heavy at the beginning of the century, grew progressively heavier as the century advanced.3234There is no doubt whatever that under Jezzär it was far heavier than ever before, while the highly efficient system of collection instituted by the latter made evasion all but impossible. The only effective way was, in fact, for the peasant to abandon his land and flee from the area, a not uncommon occurrence at this time. While this freed the peasant from the need to pay taxes, it made at first little difference to the mOltezim, who continued to collect a pre­ determined sum from each village in his mukâ\aa regardless of the actual amount of land under cultivation at any given time or of the number of villagers left in the village. As long as anyone at all remained behind, the village continued to be collectively responsible for the original sum pledged.53 This, of course, greatly increased the burden on each individual villager who chose to remain, and finally stifled whatever little incentive he might have had — there seemed to be little point in breaking his back to fill the pockets of a rapacious mültezim.5* Thus, while the väli was able to discharge his annual obligation to the treasury in Istanbul, he did so only at the expense of agriculture and handcrafts in the eyälet (even though this might not have been immediately obvious). What is more, in the list of villages from which Jezzär collected miri dues, compiled soon after his death, relatively few are recorded as having been completely in ruins. Of those that were, the bulk are seen to have been in Bilid Bishira — it appears that for the most part these villages were deserted by their Metouali in­ habitants following Jezzir’s concerted efforts early in his rule to bring the area into the orbit of his centralized regime. There were, of course, a number of ruined villages in other parts of the eyälet as well (in Shaqlf, Shömar, Iqllm al-Tuflïh)' but nowhere near as many as in Bilid Bishira. At a first glance, this is certainly most surprising — if the tax burden imposed upon the villagers throughout the 18th Century was indeed so heavy, especially during the last 30 years of Jezzir’s rule, how are we to explain the fact that there are so few recorded cases of deserted and ruined villages? There is little reason to doubt the reliability of the above register, which was compiled by a q ä fiand a special emissary sent for this purpose from Istanbul. 32 Shaw calculated (Financial and Administrative Organisation, p. 75). that at the turn of the 18th Century about 25% of the land-taxes collected did not reach the treasury. 33 *Awra, pp. 56-57; Burckhardt, pp. 299-300. 34 As described in a firman dealing with the Nàfiiye of Gaza at the beginning of February 1735 (MUhimme. 140. p. 306).

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This defter-i müfredät lists in great detail all those villages which paid taxes into Jezzär’s treasury. The sums paid were in many cases quite considerable, so it is reasonable to assume that these villages must have been paying their way agriculturally, this being their only significant source of revenue. But how can this be reconciled with the disheartening picture left us by travellers who visited the area at the end of the 18th Century, reporting that agriculture in much of the eyâlet was in an advanced state of decline, chiefly as a result of Jezzär’s high-handed policies and iron rule?33 In order to answer this, it will be necessary to consider two separate sets of figures given in the above defter — those referring to taxes actually collected, and those referring to taxes written off as “non-collectable” :56 Table No. 6 : Percentage of Taxe* w ritten off as Non-Collectable in the Eyâlet of Sidon at the End of the 18th Century.

NdfUye

Haifa & YajQr i JOlis, Makr, M azra'a, Judeida, Samlrtyya i Nazareth G a'atôn & Na'amAn water-mills } Safed & Rama i Shaft'am r Pflhir’s property (nuskdfaa) JIra SAbil *Akk& *Akk& Betrat

Mdl-i Mirl collected Non32 15 A as compared with 13 k. each (Maliye, 10211, p. 302).

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reason, it appears, was the acute shortage o f fodder in the capital. In 1203/1788-89, for example, Jezzär’s offer to pay part of his tax in fodder (calculated at the current m arket price) was readily accepted by the Porte and he sent as part of his m in obligation fo rth at year 145,000 keyle ( 4 /) of wheat and 4,000 keyle of barley.133 Amir Haydar al-ShihSbl paid part of his m iri for the year 1709 in wool, rice and “other produce” .134*From this we learn that payment in kind did not necessarily have to be in local produce — the rice sent by Haydar, for instance, was not grown in the area but had been im ported from Egypt. Pfihir went about this on rather a grand scale. He would, for example, export fodder to M alta, and from the proceeds of this, buy up various types of wool on the island and send this on to Istanbul in lieu of taxes.133 Such payments in kind were not, at first sight, especially advantageous to the tax-payer. The fact that it was he who had to bear the cost of transporting the produce to Istanbul raised the real value of the tax he paid quite considerably (in the case o f fodder, for example, the cost of transport added fully 15% to the value o f the original tax).136 There must, however, have been some justification for the vätt deliberately choosing to make part of his tax payments in kind, as the practice persisted throughout the century. One reason, perhaps, was that the listed price of the produce concerned might have been higher than the actual price received on the market. Another reason might have been that the vôfis preferred to hang on to their cash revenues and invest this in more profitable ventures (Jezzär, as we have already seen, found that he could make a handsome profit by lending money at interest to his subjects, while p sh ir invested much o f his liquid capital in foreign trade). A clear distinction should be drawn between such payments in kind and the ffasm system prevalent in Palestine in the 16th Century, when a large part of the taxes levied in the rural areas was paid in local produce.137

133 Maliye, 10049, p. 299; Maliye, 10231, pp. 275-7. Although Jezz&r stated that he had sent 165,000 keyle to Istanbul, 10% of the whole consignment was deducted on account o f amortization. See also: Cevdet Dahiliyc, 16579. 1 keyle (of rice) — 13 kg.-Heyd, Documents, p. 133, n. 2). 134 Ibn Ul-Emin. Maliye. 7765. 1» Maliye, 10211, p. 302. 136 Maliye, 10231, pp. 275-277. Gibb and Bowen (vol. 2, p. 37) note that “In addition to the tribute payable in money certain provinces were required also to furnish products in kind” . As far as Palestine goes, all tribute was calculated on a monetary basis, and payment was made in kind and deducted from the total sum owed only when this was explicitly demanded. 137 Lewis, Eretz Israel, pp. 178-9. Lewis, Notes, p. 16. A tendency to shift from the qasm system to payments in currency was discerned as early as the end o f the 16th Century.

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In the 18th Century, payments in kind were the exception rather than the rule, and the examples we find mentioned in the sources are relatively few and far between. A t the end o f the 1730’s, the mQltezim who held Acre as iltizäm collected a small part of the m iri in his muffäfa'a in kind (barley, wheat, and oil), the bulk being paid in cash.158 In 1178/1764—5,12} ghirära of wheat was collected in lieu of taxes from the Nâffiye o f Sftfiil ’Akkfi.139 A t the end of the century, part of the tax owed by the Nâffiye o f S&fiil *A tilt was collected in kind (the ratio of tax paid in kind to tax paid in cash was 6 :1 in this nâffiye, which was characterized at this time by the fact that half the villages held as mâlikâne lay in ruins).160 It is interesting to note that at the end of the century (a period for which we have exception­ ally detailed inform ation concerning m iri payments in the northern part o f the country), apart from the six villages161 alluded to above in SSfiil ’A tilt, the tax was invariably paid in cash. It is quite clear, therefore, that by the 18th Century, although payment in kind was not completely unknown in Palestine, it was very far from being the regular occurrence which it had been under the ffasm system so prevalent during the first century o f Ottom an rule in the area. Even in those nâffiyes in the Galilee where pay­ ments were still being made in kind during the first decade of the century,162 by the end of the century tax payments were being made exclusively in cash. If we compare the taxation records for the 18th Century with those for the 16th Century, the increase in the proportion o f taxes paid in cash as opposed to those paid in kind is striking. This change was accompanied by the gradual abandonm ent of the “classical” concepts of taxation, the ffasm and the dhimôs. The latter is only mentioned with reference to the beginning o f the 18th Century, while the ffasm, when it is mentioned at all during this century, is mentioned only by way o f quotation from the taffrir records for the 16th Century, mainly in connexion with fiefs. The impression, then, is that the “natural" system of taxation in the 18th Century persisted chiefly in those villages still under feudal administration. In the iltizàm villages, as well as in the various urban muffâfa’as, the tax-farmer, who had to pay his mâi-i muffâfa'a in cash, was not interested in receiving payment in kind from the inhabitants of his muffâfa’a. In the fiefs, on the other B. Lewis, “ Studies in Ottoman Archives” in BSOAS, vol. XVI, (London, 1954), p. 491, n. 2). iss AhkAm-i Sim . 1. p. 12. !» Maliye. 10208, pp. 278-9; Cevdet Maliye, 17197. 140 Altogether 45 ghirära o f wheat and 45 gUrSra o f barley in varying measures among the different villages (TKS, D-4760). The villages were: JantO ra, Zammfaln, Burayka, 'A tilt, B iqa al-Sharqiyya, BidOs. >«2 Letter of the Preach consul in Sidon dated 31.1.1709 (Aff. EL. Bi 1019).

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hand, where all revenues went directly into the pockets of the sipâhi, it was not quite so im portant that the taxes should be paid in cash.163 The last remaining examples of taxation in kind were to be found, interestingly enough, in the most depressed parts of the country — in the muffâfa'm o f Sfibil *Akk& and Sftÿil 'A tilt, for instance, both of which are known to have been severely ravaged during the later half of the century. The feudal villages, which (certainly in the first half of the century) were in a state o f neglect and constant decline, also lay outside the areas of m ajor economic development (the Galilee, for example). It is natural, perhaps, that the stagnation and inertia which marked these more backward parts of Palestine should have extended to taxation methods as well. These were also the areas which were most exposed to Bedouin attacks, and this might be one of the m ajor reasons why the European traders displayed less interest in them than in other parts o f the country; this, in turn, might well have retarded or delayed the reformation of taxation which we have noted in the rest of Palestine. In those areas that developed most rapidly, on the other hand, mainly as a result o f the tremendous increase in cotton cultiva­ tion (the Galilee, for instance), it was only natural that the farmers should choose to grow this highly lucrative cash crop, which was in such great demand on the markets o f Europe, rather than wheat, barley and the other crops traditionally used for payments in kind. This is a particularly striking example of the effect on the area o f the increasing trade ties between Palestine and Europe, so earnestly sought and cultivated by p a h ir and Jezzär through their dealings with the French merchants. W hat is more, the ever-increasing ties with the foreign traders did much to break down the traditional patterns of trade in the area, and greatly increased the flow o f money into Palestine. As the local farmers became more and more involved with the international cotton trade, and more and more dependent on money as a means of exchange, it was only natural that taxation too should develop a more strictly monetary basis.164 While the Porte’s stipula­ tion that taxes be paid in kurûf asadi might well have had some effect on this development, it should not be forgotten that the treasury itself was at times more than willing to receive payments in kind, as we have seen.

1 0 Even in these few cases one is able to discern an increasing tendency to pay taxes in currency (Ahkâm-i §âm, 1. p. 285). M« “au moyen des argents qu’ils emploient le paysan paye des droits du G rand Seigneur” (Letter o f the French consul in Sidon, dated 23.7.1733, ACCM, J-786).

4.

A.

T he A rm y

The decline o f the army in Palestine ir. the 18th Century

One of the outstanding examples of the degeneration of the Ottom an adm inistration in Palestine in the 18 th Century was the situation in the military field.1 Army units were stationed permanently in those towns which were im portant to the Ottoman régime. The locations had been determined in the very early stages of the Ottom an conquest, but the same criteria were still being applied in the 18th Century, without being re-examined. This does not mean that the system was entirely inflexible: army units were brought to man those new strongholds (Haifa, Jaifa) which the supreme authorities decided to establish in order to strengthen the security network. But it appears, as these examples show, that this was done mainly in the coastal towns. It was there that the Ottoman régime felt itself to be exposed to the greatest danger, since it was, in one way or another, threatened by the uncertain whims of the Christian pirates. It should be noted that from the objective point of view their fears were greatly exaggerated, if not unfounded, since in the 18th Century the pirates did not even try to expand their activities beyond the harassment of merchant ships sailing along the coast. But according to the Weltan­ schauung of the Ottoman rulers this constituted a grave threat to the Muslim state. When the construction of these strongholds was ordered an additional reason for their establishment was given: the need to prevent Bedouin attacks. There was a certain am ount of truth in this story but, again, it should be regarded in correct perspective: the Sublime Porte recognized the need to curb the Bedouin raids which constituted an acute problem in the 18th Century. But if this had been the main reason it would have been necessary to establish new strongholds, or strengthen existing ones, in inland regions and on the border of the desert rather than in Haifa or Jaffa. This was not done since the Bedouin were, after all, Muslims, and according to the concepts of the Ottom an régime, could not seriously threaten the existence of the Empire, at least not to the same extent as » Cevdet, Ta'rtkh. pp. 89-108; Gibb and Bowen, vol. I. pp. 173-199; Kurd ‘All vol. 3. pp. 3-4.

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the Christian infidels. In retrospect we see that the damage which the Bedouin wrought to the Ottoman State in this period was undoubtedly greater than that caused by the Christian pirates; but, as has been stated, this was not recognized at the time. For all the above reasons we find that towns which had lost a certain am ount of their political and economic importance in the 18th Century were still being defended by considerable military forces even though the objective need for such defence had decreased considerably. On the other hand, towns which had gained in political im portance were o f less interest to the Sublime Porte. An example of the first category was Jerusalem, to which Janissary units were sent from Istanbul during the 18th Century. The number of soldiers and cannon in the city remained extremely high in comparison with other Palestinian towns and, in theory at least, larger sums were allocated for the maintenance of these soldiers. In the first decade of the 18th Century some 300 regular soldiers (kapu kullari) were stationed in Jerusalem, of whom more than one-third were Janissaries, one-third Topçuyân, and the remainder Cebeciyân. The number had not changed significantly at the end o f the century, and even though it was known in Istanbul that fewer than 300 regular soldiers were stationed in Jerusalem, the authorities continued to allocate the full regular sum.2 There can be no doubt that the religious and historical significance of Jerusalem influenced this decision. It is also true that Jerusalem lay on the border of the Judaean desert, the source of Bedouin raids, and that the routes west and south of the town were also open to attack. Jerusalem was also obliged to supply forces to aid the Amir al-tfajj on his return from Mecca. But the sancaks of LajjOn or Näblus, for example, which did not enjoy such military support from Istanbul, were also obliged to face similar pressures and demands. Furtherm ore, Jerusalem was a walled city, which could close itself against outside attack, while Tiberias, for example, or even Hebron, which were no less im portant as regards the checking o f Bedouin raids or the religious aspect, received nothing like the same alloca­ tion of armed forces. One cannot avoid the conclusion that, apart from its 2 Maliye, 5542, pp. 587,608,630,636. These are lists of the Treasury’s expenditures— mubäsrbe-i trad ve m afraf defteri — for the years 1122-6/1710-15; Maliye, 10033, p. 81, firman dated 26 R abl' al-awwal 1196/11 March 1782. The classification of the soldiers in that firman does not mention Topçuyân, and on the other hand, the number o f Janis­ saries is much greater than at the beginning o f the century: 220 as against between 105 and 125 at the beginning. This is not a change, but a clerical error, since there were Topçuyân in Jerusalem in those years as well, but for some reason the clerk added the number o f Topçuyân to that o f Janissaries. See Ali Emiri, Selim III, 8276 which declares specifically that there were 137 Janissaries guarding Jerusalem in that year.

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religious significance,3 the Sublime Porte continued to send large army units to Jerusalem mainly out of inertia and a lack of understanding o f the real needs of the times. In contrast to the situation in Jerusalem, fewer than 100 soldiers were stationed in each coastal town, and the same was true of the new strongholds set up in the 18th Century: there were 100 soldiers in Jaffa and even fewer in Haifa.4 On the other hand, as we have already noted, forces were not allocated to places where they would have been of greater benefit. From the military and adm inistrative aspect it would have been much more efficient to fortify Tiberias, Safed or some other Galilee stronghold, which could have pre­ vented Bedouin raids and, at least, defended the main routes. N ot only were these steps not taken, but when p sh ir, on his own initiative and some­ times despite the opposition o f the Sublime Porte, built strongholds in those towns, which proved their efficiency over the years, the Sublime Porte still refused to approve the maintenance of regular forces there after the event.3 In those towns in which regular forces had been stationed in the past, no re-evaluation o f the situation was carried out. During the first half of the 18th Century the im portance of the Syrian coast in general and o f the Palestinian coast and M ount Lebanon in particular greatly increased. Nevertheless we find that because the number of soldiers in the Sidon stronghold was approximately SO at the turn o f the century (and probably earlier, as well), their number was still the same in the 1780’s.6 This is even more noticeable in Acre, to which some 20 Janissaries were allocated at the beginning of the century; in the 1780’s, when the town had become an economic and political centre o f great importance, the Sublime Porte was still allocating the same number.7 This does not mean that the rulers o f these towns made do with such small numbers (see below),* * In the words o f the document (MOhimme 113, p. 373): Çudüs-i ferff mubGfiqan stTir serfutddlaro qiyäs olumtayub art-i mufcaddesede merdfcld-t enbiyd-i "ffOm ve meqähkH evllyä-i kiräm atmaglo. * Maliye, 1791, pp. 21. 30; Volney, pp. 298-299. 5 The defence of these places was left to the initiative o f the mülttrim s who ruled them. See JezzAr’s criticism in his letters from Istanbul at the end o f the 1770’s in Cevdet Maliye, 27130. 6 Maliye, 3878, p. 69, states that in mid-1707 there w en 33 Janissaries in the Sidon stronghold according to the establishment; Maliye, 4929, p. 12, which details the ÿazftw expenditures o f Damascus for the maintenance o f the troops in the various strongholds in Palestine for the year 1184/1770-1, states that there were 33 soldiers at Sidon. This was not merely a theory, since even Volney, who toured the area in the early 1780’s, writes (op. d t., 298-9) that the garrison in Sidon did not total 100 men, and had several cannons but no gunners to operate them. The number o f troops at Sidon in 1660 was 33 (Heyd, Documents pp. 190-191).

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but the conclusions to be drawn appear clear : the rigid conservative approach which characterized the adm inistration of the Ottoman State in certain fields was also clearly evident in the field o f military adm inistration in Palestine in the 18th Century. It is possible that the enlarging of the garrisons in towns such as Sidon and Acre, which would have entailed additional expenditure, was obstructed by increasing financial difficulties and the grave shortage o f soldiers. N or do we intend to go into the question of the extent to which the forces stationed in Palestine were efficient and whether their hypothetical reallocation could have solved the problems of the town rulers. It is clear, however, that their absence, against the back­ ground o f the weakness of the vails (of Sidon, for example) was an enfeebling factor which contributed to the general picture. B. The reasons fo r the weakness o f the army The military units, which were stationed in various Palestinian towns, were not homogeneous in character. The most im portant were regular army units, which included the following elements : Janissaries, gunners (Topçuyân), auxiliary units attached to the gunners and other units (‘Arabaciyân, Cebeciyän) ; while there were relatively few gunners and auxiliary units, the Janissaries constituted the main force. The latter were commanded by military officers known as the yeniçeri-tâbifi, and were stationed in the town citadel (Jerusalem, Sidon, for example). For this reason their commander was often also known as the ‘citadel commander’ (dizdär, qal'e dizdän).® In some cases the two tasks were separated and held by two different men. The Janissaries were intended to constitute the vô/fs main military support, but in fact were a potential trap for him. The citadel dizdär was not appointed by the va/i, but directly from Istanbul.9 As such he could display a certain am ount of independence, supported by his soldiers. Furtherm ore, the Sublime Porte intended the dizdär's authority to clash with that of the väli so that the two forces could neutralize one another. When the inhabi­ tants of Sidon complained that their ruler Süleymän al-'A pn was oppressing them, it was decided in Istanbul (probably for other reasons as well) to remove him from his post and confiscate his property. Instructions to this effect were sent at the end of 1730 to the yeniçeri-iâbifi and qal'e dizdän, of Sidon. It is not known whether they were obliged to employ force to 9 Cf. Maliye, 1791. pp. 21. 30. for the year 1129/1716-17 and Maliye. 4929. p. 12. for the year 1184/1770-1. * Fekete. vol. I. p. 96. notes that the a fa o f the Janissaries also served as dizdär in smaller towns. 9 O . M ariti, lstorta délia slatopresente délia eittà di Genaalemme, I. Livorno 1790. 29; Ahkim -i Çam, 1. p. 268; MUhimme, 115. pp. 375-6.

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carry out the order or whether the threat itself sufficed. But shortly after­ wards the vâli was deposed and arrested.10 In the early 1740’s we find that the Dizdär of Sidon was responsible for the arrest of the town vâli and was also obliged to release him at the order of the Sublime Porte and re­ instate him .11 On the other hand, in the early 1720’s, the ruler of Jaffa, who also held the farm of the customs there, arrested the aga of the citad­ el.12 This mutual dependence (since the vâli was, nevertheless, the supreme leader of the eyâlet), naturally did not encourage cordial relations between the vâli and the Janissary commander: the murder of the Dizdâr of Beirut on the order of the vâli of Sidon at the turn of the century was one m ani­ festation of this tension.13 The examples we have brought are to a certain extent extreme ones and m atters did not always reach such a pitch, but the basic enmity always existed. When the aga of the Janissaries refused to aid the inhabitants of Jerusalem in their struggle against the new ptça and declared that he intended to remain neutral in the conflict, he may have been displaying political wisdom. This was a lesser display of enmity than in the previous case, when the Janissaries broke into the prison and freed the elders of the city who had been arrested on the order of the paça, but it was certainly not a display of loyalty to the legal and official represen­ tative of the Sultan.14 One of the ways in which the vâli could win the support and loyalty o f the kapu kulu and their leaders was through payment: the vâli controlled the eyâlet income, some of which could serve for the maintenance o f the local Janissaries. In the 18th Century, the baväle system, (according to which the vâli was obliged by order from Istanbul to allocate from the miri tax he was forced to pay certain sums for the maintenance o f the Janissaries and other units in various towns) was widespread in Palestine as in other parts of the Empire. If the vâlis had been ordered, inter alia, to pay these soldiers from the state funds, this would have given each vâli control over ‘his’ Janissaries. But it transpired that the Sublime Porte was not interested in creating such a situation even in the 18th Century, when the vâli was weak and it was in the interest of the Empire to strengthen MUhimme, 136, p. 264. M aliye. 10183, p. 298, firman of 18 Ramacjän 1135/16 November 1742. n The accounts of the Sidon merchants’ ‘nation’ for 1724, document no. 63 (ACCM, J-857). il MUhimme. 113, p. 203. 14 F or a description of these two incidents see the letter of the French consul in Sidon, dated 25 October 1702 (Aff. E t., Bi, 1017) and a description by a priest from Jerusalem in his letter dated 22 April 1704 (Aff. Et.. Bi, 1020). The consul’s letter o f 18 M arch 1716 (Aff. E t., Bi, 1020) again describes the pressure exerted by the a fa o f the Jerusalem Janissaries for the release o f prisoners, arrested by the pafa. h

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his position. Because of the traditional tendency to strive for a balance of forces, the Janissaries continued toreceive th eir wages from various sources, all of them outside the direct jurisdiction of the väli. In the hundreds and thousands of examples of ftavälät, issued in the 18th Century to the vô/is of Sidon and to the sancak beys of Gaza and Jaffa, the same pheno­ menon occurs over and over again: the rulers were ordered to pay the wages and expenses o f the Janissaries in near and distant garrisons in the Empire, but almost always outside the area of the eyâlet. A t the same time they were not called on to pay anything whatsoever towards the mainte­ nance of the Janissaries and gunners in their own areas. When it was decided in 1197/1782-83 thatafixed sum would be allocated from the miri of the Eyâlet of Sidon for the expenses of the Acre dizdär, this was a unique case, an expression of the Sublime Porte’s reluctant acceptance of the growing strength of Jezzär and his total control of Acre. When it was determined that the vâii would supply the dizdär'8 needs, the latter became almost unconditionally dependent on him .13 But this was an outstanding arrangement even in Jezzftr’s day. Even then, when this prosperous väli encountered no difficulties in supplying the needs of the Sidon gunners, the payment of their maintenance was imposed on the Väli of Aleppo, the aim being to safeguard somehow their independence.16 All these examples prove that in the 18th Century Istanbul continued to follow a deliberate policy : to direct the loyalty of the väli's main military unit first and foremost to their immediate commander with the aim of counterbalancing the väli's power and undermining him instead of supporting him. So far we have regarded the Janissaries as a power factor, whose military support for this side or that was of great political significance. But since the political weight of the Janissaries emanated from their military power, one must examine the extent to which, in the 18th Century, they were capable of or desirous of fulfilling the functions for which they were created. In this field we encounter several phenomena: Janissaries who » Maliye, 10227, p. 273, the accounts of the expenditures o f mät-t m lrl of the Eyâlet of Sidon for the year 1199/1784-3. But as regards the above item, it is stated that it was determined in a firman two years previously. It should be noted that, there too, the Sublime Porte endeavoured to ensure a certain amount of independence: a sum (which was also paid regularly in later years) was allocated for payment of the wages i'u lü ft) of the dizdär and not for payment of the wages (mevâcib) of the Janissaries, as was generally customary. From the amount involved (some 150 kurûf) and the above phrasing, one could arrive at the conclusion that the Janissaries nevertheless continued to receive the wages from other eyâlets. 16 AhkAm-i §äm S, p. «9. of awdkhlr DhQ al-qa’da 1211/18-27 May 1797. N ot only was this established in theory but the Sidon gunners also sent a special emissary (sdliyâneci) to Aleppo to collect the sum.

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were intended to serve in certain places continued to receive payment for living in the town and defending it, but were in fact permanently absent.17 Even when it transpired that their absence from a certain location (Solo­ mon’s Pools and the aqueducts south of Jerusalem, for example) left it open to attack, this had no effect on their behaviour, nor did it persuade them to return, even temporarily, to defend the site. Furtherm ore, even when they remained at their posts, their connexions with m ilitary m atters were weakened as a result of growing concentration on basically ’civilian’ occupations. The yeniçeri-tâbifi of Jerusalem at the beginning o f the century engaged openly in commerce, while the holder of the same office in mid­ century engaged in money-lending on an extensive scale in Jerusalem and elsewhere (Jaffa, for example). The dizdär of the Beirut citadel at the beginning o f the century was active in all the economic fields and succeeded in accumulating a great deal of property.18 Janissaries and gunners in Jaffa in the 1740’s maintained various mtdfâfa'as within the town for their liveli­ hood. Those who were not satisfied with the plots given to them used to take over the property of deceased Christians by force and claim that they had been purchased legally in the past. Some Janissaries borrowed large sums of money far exceeding the sums needed for their maintenance to provide for luxuries or for commercial deals. They were, o f course, obliged to repay these loans, but were unable to do so from the wages paid to them

17 Specific phrasing which attests to the fact that this was not unknown to the Sublime Porte: Maliye, 10033, p. 81 ; cf. Volney, 272. 18 A t the turn of the century he requested and obtained the Beirut khän and the town’s (uunmam, which had been in ruins for 50 years. In partnership with a latak ian he bought the two properties from the Sublime Porte for a sum of 500 kurBj for the former and 250 for the latter (or to be exact: for half o f it, since the other half belonged to the waqf). They undertook to repair the buildings and prepare them for use, and in return obtained them as mBIk property. The same was done with several orchards of fruit-trees near Beirut, which in the past were m lrl of the M a'an family: the gardens had been neglected for years (after the end o f the rule o f Fakhr al-DIn) and most o f the trees had dried up, so that it was not worth the mBIlezIm’s while to rent them out. When Jawhar and his partner agreed to pay more than the rental and, in particular, to plant new trees, they obtained the orchards as mBIk (Maliye, 2942, p. 84 .firmans of 15 $afar 1114/11 July 1702 regarding the khän and the bammäm; Maliye, 9893, p. 168, finnan of 16 DhO alq a'd a 1116/12 March 1705 regarding orchards). From the list of Jawhar a id s property published after his death it appears that he developed these properties considerably, and that they brought him large annual sums, and also that he acquired further property (five shops, many gardens, houses for rent). On his death all these properties, which were mBIk, returned to the Ottoman State: it was specifically stated that they had ceased to be mBIk and had become mlrl once again. For extensive details regarding this m atter, see Maliye, 10151, p. 179, various finnans from the year 1119/1707-8.

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from state funds.19 It is hard to estimate the extent to which the wages of the Janissaries were sufficient to cover their wants. Since the wage did not change throughout the century, one may assume that even if the sum originally sufficed, its real value decreased because of the constant decline in the value of money. Furtherm ore, they did not receive the entire sum allocated to them. A t the beginning of the century the Sublime Porte forbade the defterdär of Damascus to deduct from the wages of the Sidon Janissaries book-keeping fees* (nudtâsebe hard), as he was accustomed to do. The Vâli of Sidon was also forbidden to deduct part of the wages as ‘census fees* (yofflama).20 This last order demonstrates the extent to which the actions of the vâli himself could weaken the Janissaries, and we can also see how all these deductions encouraged the Janissaries to supplement their wages in other ways. And finally one custom wide-spread among the Janissaries throughout Syria and Palestine should be mentioned: the sale of rifles to Bedouin, a totally despicable act.21 The acquisition of property of all kinds, the concentration on other means of livelihood and marriage-all these factors helped to distract the Janissaries from their original tasks. The custom o f switching around Janissary units was apparently not applied in the 18th Century. So as to swell the dwindling ranks, new soldiers were sometimes sent to reinforce units, but they proved to be of lim ite d usefulness: at the beginning of the century we learn of a Janissary unit sent to Jerusalem to defend the city and its environs against Bedouin attacks. After having spent two years in the city without being paid on a regular basis, they left, never to return.22 This was a drastic move: in most cases the soldiers stayed put and found other means of livelihood. The shortage of sufficient sources of income for the Janissaries led their commander, in one case, to impose a daily tax on Jerusalem shops. Every five or six shops were visited by a Janissary who collected the tax. The units thus found an additional source of income but brought about a further deterioration in their relations with the citizens.23 There can be no doubt 19 Ahkftm-i 9km, 1, p.268, firman of awäsif Rabl* al-awwal 1166/16-23 January 1753; ibid., p. 222, of awOkhir Rabl* al-awwal 1163/20-28 March 1750; ibid., p. 73, awä'il Jum&dhâ al-awwal 1157/12-21 June 1744; Maliye, 9952, p. 288. » Maliye, 3878, p. 69. 21 a finnan dated awä’il Rabl* al-awwal 1171/13-22 November 1757 describes the sale o f thousands of rifles in this way to the Bedouin, who later utilized them in their attack against the tfa jj caravan. N ot only was this prohibited commerce, but the source o f these weapons was certainly, in part at least, the stores o f the Ottoman army (MUhimme, 160, pp. 26-7). 22 Letter from the French consul in Sidon dated 12 April 1707 (Aff. Et„ Bi, 1018). 23 MUhimme, 115, pp. 375-6, firman of awäsif Jumkdha al-awwal 1119/10-19 August 1707. This tax should not be confused with the Uftlsäb tax, which was collected in Jerusalem

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that their precarious financial situation was one of the main reasons for the abandonment of military occupations and concentration on other occupations. The impression is gained that the Sublime Porte was not opposed to these developments and accepted the situation as the lesser evil. Speaking of the Janissaries in the coastal towns of Palestine in the mid18th Century, Jezzär explained that they were in a better position than those forced to live elsewhere. The reason was that they were able to make additional profits because of the very fact that they were stationed in ports and commercial centres. Neither Jezzär nor the Sublime Porte, replying to his report, expressed any reservations regarding this custom, and they regarded the situation as far better than that in which the soldiers were totally dependent for their maintenance on the allocations of the Ottom an Treasury. This attitude of the Sublime Porte displays a great am ount of financial realism, since under different circumstances the treasury would have been obliged to increase the allocations, and this would have been extremely difficult in the light of its financial problems. But from the military and even the political point o f view this attitude further undermined the vô/fs status and made it more and more valueless.24 The Sublime Porte’s neglect of the Janissary units, as described above, was also expressed in the state o f their equipment, which was meant to defend the strongholds. At the beginning of the 1740’s an examination was carried out, and it transpired that all 27 cannon in the Jerusalem citadel were unusable. Nothing, however, was done to replace them. At the begining of the 1780’s the Jerusalem notables requested of the Sublime Porte that they send new cannon and ammunition, since there was not even suffi­ cient gunpowder in the town for the firing of the R a m a d a n cannon.23 The decline in the strength of the Janissaries was both quantitative and qualitative. On the one hand the Sublime Porte ceased to send reinforce­ ments or to replace veteran units by newer ones. On the other hand there was the phenomenon of the desertion of Janissaries and other soldiers. A t the beginning of the century a citadel was established in Jaffa port and 110 soldiers were stationed there. In 1127/1715 more than a quarter once a week in accordance with a tçâtün which dated from the sixteenth century (M antran and Sauvaget ,pp. 37-8). 24 Cevdet Maliye, 27130. For similar remarks in a firman at the beginning o f the century, see Maliye, 3878, p. 69. 21 Ali Emiri, Abdill Hamid I, 20759, firmans from late 1198-early 1199/1784-5. As proof of the fact that the situation had lasted for many years, an appendix of defter-i yofclama on the situation at the Jerusalem stronghold in 1154/1741-2 is attached. An alm ost identical picture is revealed in Alexandria at the end of the century, as described by Nicola Türk, text 7. translation 9.

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had already deserted and 80 were left. A t the beginning of the 1780’s Volney reported that only 30 soldiers were left.26 The Janissary commanders were not in the habit of reporting to Istanbul, since they could continue to exploit the wages of the absentees. Furtherm ore, even when the facts came to the attention of Istanbul, other soldiers were not sent to fill the gap, and the rulers were ordered to cut the wages of the Janissaries accordingly. As in other fields, the Sublime Porte was again seeking the easy solution, instead of tackling the problem seriously. From this point of view the Sublime Porte and the Janissary commanders had a common interest, which led to the further weakening of these units. All these details add up to a miserable picture: neglect and lack of interest on the part of the Sublime Porte, and a constant decline in the quality and quantity of the Janissaries. If we recall that they were meant to constitute the main strength of the väli then it is clear that he was forced to seek soldiers from additional sources. So as to overcome the lack of forces and the decline in the quality of the regular Ottom an soldiers, Janissaries and even gunners were recruited from among the local population. These soldiers were known as ‘locals* (yerliym ). In Jerusalem the Janissary commander in the early days of the century began to recruit Muslims into the Janissary units. Since this was carried out by force in the teeth of the opposition of the population, dashes broke out between some of the dtizens and the soldiers after some 40 troops had been recruited in this way.27 This could not, of course, prevent the establishment of local Janissary units, and what is more, at the beginning o f the 1730’s these units were sufficiently strong that antagonism grew up between them and the regular Ottom an units. There can be no doubt that the acts of robbery and oppression commited by the Janissaries against the local population were one of the main causes of the actions of the yerliym against them, since the latter identified them* selves first and foremost with their place of birth.26 Another reason for the conflict between the local population and the Janissaries was the latters’ wild and unrestrained behaviour, which offended religious and m oral sen­ sibilities.29 All these reasons together led to open and armed clashes between these two elements. The yerliym , aided by part of the local population, 26 Maliye, 2964, p.374, finnan of 23 DbO al-qa’da 1127/20November 1715; Volney, 344. 27 Mtthimme, 115, pp. 375-6. 2* In this context, note the armed opposition o f the Jerusalemites to the papa's attem pt to bring into the city more than 500 soldiers at the beginning of the century (letter from the French consul In Sidon, dated 16 July 1703, Aff. Et., Bi, 1017) and the population’s participation in the attacks on the Janissaries. 2» a finnan from the beginning of 1701 prohibits the Janissaries from living within the area of the Aq$A mosque, as they had begun to do, and from desecrating this holy place through their debauched behaviour (MOhimme, 111, p. 501).

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broke into the Jerusalem citadel (if qal'e)M and drove out the Janissaries, the topçuyân, and their auxiliary units. This was done despite the fact that these soldiers had been permanently stationed in the city for the past 30 years. This illustrates the enmity between the two elements, and also the weakness of the Janissaries, who could not prevent the act and who had recourse to a firman from Istanbul in order to try and persuade the yerliyân of the justice o f their own arguments.3031 In Gaza as well, the mid-18th Century brought clashes between the Janissaries (qabüqül) and the yerliyân (yarliyya).32 The yerliyân whose task was mainly to reinforce the va/fs military strength in the face of the declining power of the Janissaries, con­ stituted a new source of tension between the various army units and further weakened the Janissaries. But the Janissaries were still sufficiently strong to make life difficult for the local population and the väli and to display rebelliousness.33 If we sum up the general picture obtained so far, we find that in the 18th Century the vâli was open to various pressures, arising from the composition and standard of his army. The dizdär and the Janissary units on the one hand and the yerliyân units on the other were power elements, stationed in the town which was the centre o f administrative rule, and their loyalty was in doubt. There was an additional element, independent in theory as well as in practice: the sipähis. Some of them, at least, dwelt in the administrative centre of the district and not on their estates and con­ stituted an additional cause o f instability.34 In addition to all these one must remember the local population. They lacked military strength, but their leaders could summon up such strength by closing the town walls against the papa's and calling in the Bedouin to their aid, by offering armed popular support to the yerliyân, or by setting the military units against one another so as to further their own interests.

T h e inner citadel’, i.e. the tower known to-day as ‘David’s Tower’. MUhimme, 138, p. 210, finnan dated awOsif Ramad&n 1144/8-17 March 1732. 32 *A. al-'Arif, Ta’rtkh Chazza, Jerusalem, 1943, 182, claims that the clashes reached an unprecedented level of intensity in mid-century. 33 See, for example, AhkAm-i §&m, 1, p. 138, on the rebelliousness o f the Janissaries in Jerusalem in the late 1740’s. It is interesting to note that on the same occasion the naqlb ai-ashräf claimed that most of the Janissaries were of the Prophet’s family (sädät) and were therefore under his authority. 34 Letter of the French consul in Sidon dated 23 October 1702 (Aff. Et., Bi, 1017) which describes the activities of the sipähis in Jerusalem at the beginning o f the eighteenth century. At the beginning of the nineteenth century they united with the citizens o f Jeru­ salem against their väli. They were still strong enough for such action, and they expelled the emissary of the Sublime Porte from Jerusalem (Cevdet Dahiliye, 3493). 30

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The pa$a growing dependence on the local element led to a further military problem : there was increasing apprehension that this element would prove more loyal to their own townsmen and to local elements outside the town (i.e. the Bedouin) than to the 'foreign* soldiers. The recruitm ent o f gunners from the local population of Jaffa, carried out, apparently, because o f the lack of professional gunners in Istanbul (as in Sidon), led in some cases to co-operation between these troops and the Bedouin tribes who attacked the town from outside. As a result the Sublime Porte issued a firman in the early 1730’s to the effect that the recruitment of persons o f Arab origin for these tasks was to cease and only persons of Turkish origin were to be accepted.33 Jezzfir pointed to a similar phenomenon in his first letters from Palestine to Istanbul, when he described the support of the local troops for the Bedouin since 'being of the same race (Jins) they (the local troops) are of no use in times of need*. He therefore thought it prefer­ able to substitute for them soldiers of Turkish origin (jä'ife-i eträk).i6 All these factors together contributed to the undermining o f the väli and pre­ vented him from ruling efficiently in his area of jurisdiction. He could not impose his will on the mQltezims under his rule, and when he did try to exert authority they faced him with military forces stronger than his own.37 In the second half of the century the number of soldiers at the disposal of the Väli o f Sidon was even further reduced. When the then väli, Muÿammad al-'A^m, fell behind in the repayment of his debts to the m iri a special representative was sent from Istanbul to ascertain the reasons. From the reports of the latter to the Sublime Porte it appeared that not only did the väli lack funds, but also sufficient soldiers. He was therefore unable to impose his wishes within Sidon on those elements which had proved re­ bellious. The solution chosen by the Sublime Porte did not entail the dis­ patch of military forces to reinforce the väli. Instead the fcapudän-i deryä was ordered to stage a display of strength opposite Sidon port, and as if this was not sufficient, to disembark and hand over to the dizdär of the stronghold three cannon and ammunition.33 This firman reveals simulta­ neously the Sublime Porte’s lack of desire to solve this basic problem and the helplessness of the väli's forces. The representative of the Sublime Porte 33 Türk ytfitlerinden olub 'Arab (â'1/esi defilier. Maliye, 9927, p. 78, finnan dated 22 M ubarram 1144/27 July 1731. Cf. Heyd, Documents, p. 107. Heyd translates 'Arab as ’Bedouin* but in our case it is d ear that the 'Arab is presented as not of Turkish origin, and therefore the classification is not only ecological. 33 Cevdet Maliye, 27130. 37 The French consul in Sidon wrote, on 28 July 1708 (Aff. Et., Bi, 1018) that the vail could not collect more than 1,000 soldiers while the mUltezims could assemble 3,000 troops against him. 3* AU Emiri. M ustafa UI, 10333, finnan dated 23 DhQ al-H üja 1181/11 May 1768.

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in Sidon asked for three cannon and gunpowder in the knowledge that they would help improve the vâ/Ps status. It appears, therefore, that he was poor not only in manpower but also in equipment, and we thus find the same picture which we have already seen in Jerusalem in the second half o f the century. This particular number of cannon, which could safeguard the vô/Ps rule over Sidon, is an indication of the relatively small-scale power needed by the vâli. When we compare it with the number of cannon which were at the disposal of P ähir, the mOltezim of Acre several years later, we find that the latter controlled in Acre, Sidon, and Haifa about 100 cannon. This only serves to emphasize the weakness o f the väli.i9 C. The utilization o f mercenary units The vâli, who was faced by many forces opposed to him, and who could not rely on real support from Istanbul, was unable to m aintain even a modicum of order and efficient rule in his region. The only alternative left to him was to recruit soldiers, paid by him and therefore loyal to him. These mercenaries existed in Palestine from the beginning o f the 18th Century and were called by various names. The mercenaries of the ruler of Jerusalem, known as levendât,40 attacked the Janissaries and the topçuyân in 1708 and killed several of them and plundered their property. This was certainly done with the knowledge of the mutafarrif, if not on his initiative. But it is interesting to note that the M ufti of Jerusalem and one of the ‘ulamff incited the levendât to attack the Janissaries, and as a result were banished from the city by the Sublime Porte. This incident is an expression not only of the enmity between the two elements, but also of the support of the Supreme Porte for the Janissaries against the attem pts o f the pafa and his men to attack them. In other cases we hear that the Vâli of Sidon, before taking up his post, gathered an army o f some 1,000 troops.41 Even P&hir, who was not a vâli but only a mOltezim, deeply rooted in Galilee life, found it necessary to rely on mercenaries. His military strength was based mainly on cavalrymen from Galilee and on Metoualis. He started out with 1,500 fighters in the early 1740’s and in the later years of his rule could summon a force of 5,000 horsemen, also Palestinians. It is possible that some of them also received régulai wages, but generally speaking they differed from the usual mercenaries because of the identity of interests with » Maliye, 10220, pp. 276-7, finnan dated 9 $afar 1191/19 M aid) 1777, which quotes the reports of Jezzfir on this m atter. P äh ir overcame this lim itation of lack o f sufficient arms with the aid o f French merchants, from whom he purchased all he needed. Jezzär did the same. 40 MUhimme, 115, p. 700, dated own'll Sha’bän 1120/16-25 September 1708; Heyd, Documents, p. 161 ; Oibb and Bowen, I, vol. I, p. 193 and note.

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their commander which went beyond the mere cash nexus, p ah ir’s rule and prosperity meant prosperity for their own families and villages, and political gain for those circles (Galileans and Metoualis) to which they belonged. But p ah ir was not satisfied with this situation and set up purely mercenary units. The main source of recruitment to the mercenary units in Syria and Palestine were the N orth Africans who came to the region to sell their services to the highest bidder. Because of their origin they were known as maghâriba (i.e. N orth Africans), p ah ir set up a unit of some 1,000 infantrymen who were, as we have stated, mercenaries in the true sense o f the word, and some of whom (Ahmed Denizli, commander of Sidon on behalf of p ah ir, for example) attained high rank.4142 We see therefore that the utilization of mercenaries was wide-spread in Palestine in the first 60 or so years o f the 18th Century, but was limited either because o f the financial problems of the vd/ts or because a ruler such as p ah ir could recruit more than two-thirds of his army from loyal local elements. Even this limited utilization helped to dem onstrate the great benefit accruing to the rulers from this system, and it was fully exploited later by Jezzär. Jezzfir began to utilize mercenaries in Palestine even before he came to power: when he was appointed muhäfiz of Acre in 1775 and ordered to conduct a siege against p ah ir, one of his contemporaries43 tells us that he was forced to delay in Damascus so as to collect armed forces. When he reached Acre and began to consolidate his position after capturing the town from p ah ir, he immediately began to set up an army. The first source for the recruitment of soldiers was the remnants of p a h ir's army, scattered all over Syria, whom he took on as mercenaries. Another imp ortant contri­ bution to his army was the disbanding of the levend units by the Sublime Porte in February 1776. Some of these units left Rumelia and wandered to Syria, where they offered their services to the local rulers. This addition of some 600 experienced horsemen with several veteran commanders con­ stituted a powerful nucleus, which Jezzar hastened to exploit in his first clashes with the Druze, and the conquest of Beirut, for example, was carried out with their aid. It should be noted that in recruiting these soldiers to his army Jezzar was in no way acting against the wishes of the Sublime Porte, as one might have thought: he saw to it that Istanbul issued a firman, 41 Letter from the French consul in Sidon dated 31 January 1709 (Aff. E t., Bi, 1018). 42 On p a h ir’s army in the 1770’s, see letter from the French consul in Sidon dated 2 June and appended bulletin dated 28 June 1772 (AIT. Et., Bi, 1035); Hammer, pp. 351-4; Volney, op. cit., 258, which, as in other cases, is based on the above letter o f the French consul cited here. On the arming of p ab ir’s troops, see letter of the French consul in Sidon. 28 August 1752 (Aff. Et.. Bi, 1029); Maliye, 10220, pp. 276-7. 43 Istanbul. MS Esad Ef. 2419, fol. 100a.

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sent to him in the second half of June 1776, granting him permission to recruit the levend troops, whose units had been disbanded by order o f the Porte.44 Foreign mercenaries continued to constitute the main strength of Jezzär’s army throughout his period of rule. He continued, like his predecessors in Palestine,43 to recruit N orth African soldiers to his units, both infantry and horsemen. These were the largest units in his army and were divided into secondary units (bayrak) of 10 men each. But Jezzir was not satisfied with chance finds in Syria and Palestine. He took the initiative himself in this m atter, and sent ships and merchants to Venice and Ragusa to recruit Albanian troops and thus succeeded by the early 1780’s in recruiting more than 1,000 soldiers of high military standard. Smaller, but even more trust­ worthy in his eyes, was the unit of Bosnian fusiliers which he established, and from which he picked his unit of body-guards.46 This unit was known as kavväsa or tOfenkçi. We have so far mentioned four types of mercenary units, established by Jezz&r: dulät (or frapim) composed of levend horsemen and others, maghâriba, Albanians, Ifavväsa. To these should be added the yerliyän units, who served mainly as garrison troops in various towns under Jezzir’s rule (see below).47 These were the five main components of Jezzär’s army, although one could enumerate several other smaller units: gunners, some of whom were mounted on camels, and who served to accompany the tfa jj caravans ; the Hawwära horsemen, who were apparently Bedouin, and who arrived in Palestine from Egypt48; some 200 Afghan soldiers, who 44 Cevdet, op. d t., n . 42; MUhimme, 173, p. 1S6, firman dated awâ'il Ju m id h i alawwal 1190/18-27 June 1776. 43 Rafeq, p. 40. 46 It is interesting to note that Jezzir himself was of Bosnian origin. At an early age he left his country; he subsequently entered a MamlQk household in Egypt, and had no contact with his fatherland. It is nevertheless possible that it was not coinddence that he regarded the Bosnian troops as the most loyal element in his army. 47 See a detailed description o f the uniforms o f these units and o f the equipment of the horsemen in Lockroy, pp. 146-9. Following on the report of the French consul, he describes the departure of the units with Jezzir to meet the Ha]] in the mid-1780’s. The original description is in the letter of the French vice-consul in Acre dated 30 April 1785 (Aff. E t., Bi. 979) and refers to the departure of Jezzir’s army on 18 April of that year. See also Volney. op. d t., 288; TKS, E 4029; French consul in Sidon, 21 July 1784 (AfT. E t., Bi, 1040); letters o f French consul in Acre dated 4 May and 13 May 1789 (Aff. E t.. Bi. 1041). 44 The commander of this unit was called Hawwära bäsht ('A w ra, p. 223). Cevdet Tim ar, 523, notes, that in mid-1796 units of 'Hawwära', employed by the mBteseUim o f G aza, were stationed, among other units, in the Gaza-Ramle area. This verifies the presence of elements o f this tribe in Palestine at the end of the eighteenth century. On the other hand another source (A. MansQr, Ta'rlkh al-Näfira, [Egypt], 1924, 56) states th at Jezzir’s 200 horsemen, known as 'Hawwära', were not of this tribe; they were part

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manned the garrison at Tiberias.49 But the five units mentioned previously were the most im portant. W hat is no less interesting than the very existence of so many mercenary units is the fact that Jezzär preserved the particular character of each unit and even tried to emphasize it. Firstly, the very establishment of units on the basis of origin or common past served as a unifying factor. Secondly, the tendency is revealed in the names of some of the units which point to the common origin of the soldiers. Thirdly, Jezzär saw to it that each unit had its own uniform, and that the uniforms differed from each other. Thus the unique character o f each unit was pre­ served during Jezzär’s rule. N ot only is this pointed out by chroniclers of the period, but there are also clear indications o f constant clashes between the various units. These were not confined to personal tension but at times ended in actual armed dashes between the units. This naturally affected th rir chances of carrying out their tasks properly,50 but from Jezzär’s point of view the situation had its advantages. It is true that all the units were paid by him and were therefore dependent on him, but there was always the fear that they might unite against him. In fostering the differences between them as well as the competitive spirit, Jezzär was safeguarding himself against such an eventuality.51 The sole case in which the units com­ bined against him, in 1789 on the order o f Selim Pa$a, was an isolated inddent in Jezzär’s career, which almost led to his downfall. It serves to illustrate the dangers to a ruler from mercenary units, and the wisdom o f Jezzär’s policy. While the types of units and their character are well known, information regarding their size is uncertain. According to the French consul, who is quoted above, there were 750 maghäriba infantry, 540 Albanians, 200 maghâriba horsemen, and 300 dulät. Round about the same time Volney estimated that Jezzär had some 1,000 horsemen and some 1,000 maghâriba infantrymen. But the same consul, Renaudot, wrote in the 1780’s that of the 'Awn tribes from the DamanhQr region in Egypt, whose shaykh had been a friend of Jezzär’s and who sent them to him in 1778 for permanent aid. 49 Buckhardt, pp. 321-2. 30 TKS, E 4029; Munayyir, p. 443, describes battles between the dulät and Albanian units on the one hand and the maghäriba on the other hand in 1794. Following these battles they were obliged to leave the area, to which they had been sent in order to collect taxes for Jezzär. 31 See, for example, Jezzär’s reaction in early 1791 when the Bosnian soldiers showed signs o f rebelliousness by appearing at his Damascus palace and demanding payment o f their wages six months in advance. Jezzär brought in his maghäriba units secretly, hid them in the palace, and with their aid succeeded in killing a large number o f Bosnians (letter from the ‘exiled* French merchants from Tripoli, dated 29 June 1791, ACCM, J-837).

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Jezzär had some 4,000-5,000 soldiers in all.32 A t the end of the 1780’s Jezzär was ordered by the Sublime Porte to send 1,000 horsemen (süväri) to participate in the war as part of the Imperial army, and elsewhere he was ordered to supply 3,000 troops.33 One may assume that the Porte would not have demanded more than part of the force which, according to its estimation, was located in the eyälet. The A rab chroniclers write that in the last years of Jezzär’s rule, he used to send forces of from 6,000 to 8,000 men to aid his supporters in M ount Lebanon34*; in one case he even sent more than 10,000 troops.33 On the eve of the war with Bonaparte, the emissary who brought Jezzär the firman appointing him Vâli of Damascus and Egypt reported that Jezzär had a total of 25,000 soldiers. It is possible that this is an exaggeration. In the same period the defterddr who visited Acre reported that Jezzär had some 8,000 soldiers there.36 All these signs point to a process of expansion in his army, which was cut short only for a brief period during the revolt of Selim Pa$a (1789). But after suppressing the revolt, Jezzär hastened to remodel his army. A t the beginning of his rule he had begun to build up an army of between 2,000 and 3,000 soldiers,37* at the time of Selim’s revolt it had reached some 10,000, and after the revolt Jezzär created an army which had exceeded this number by the turn of the century. Bonaparte’s invasion and the wars against him reduced Jezzär’s army, but in 1802, Sebastiani, himself an army man, reported that Jezzär had been able to allocate 9,000 soldiers for the siege of Jaffa.33 Since the army was based on mercenary units, to remodel and enlarge it was not difficult, and it must have totalled some 15,000 soldiers at the end o f the 18th Century.39 It should be stressed that throughout this period the cavalry element was much smaller than the infantry. The reason for this was the higher wages paid to the former, who were of greater value in battle, as well as the particular needs of Jezzär’s army, which utilized infantry for fighting in the mountainous regions of Galilee, south Lebanon, and M ount Lebanon. Charles-Roux, p. 136. 33 MUhimme. 188, pp. 8, 37; ibid., 189, p. 14; ibid., 193, p. 30; ibid., 183. p. 226. All these finnans are dated between August 1788 and April 1790. M See, for example: Shihibl, Lubnän, p. 197; Dimashql, Ta’rlkh, p. 66; Cevdet, Ta’rfkh, v. Istanbul, 1278/1861-2, 331 ; Clarke, 2b, p. 490. 33 Shidyiq, vol. I, p. 221. 56 Q att-i HUmayun, 6743-A, and H att-i HUmayun, 6788. 37 MUhimme, 173, p. 145, o f awdsif Jumâdhft al-awwal 1190/27 June-5 July 1776. 58 Testa, vol. n , p. 56. 39 One may « « '" « that Jezzär was exaggerating slightly when he threatened the Sublime Porte in early 1788 that he could gather an arm y o f 20,000 to defend him self (French consul in Sidon, 3 April 1788, Alf. Et., Bi, 980). 32

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Jezzär’s army was in constant action throughout his period of rule. This was only partly caused by the suppression of ‘AH p ah ir’s revolt, the sup­ pression of the M etoualis, and the war against Bonaparte. Over the years Jezzär was active in appointing and deposing local rulers in M ount Lebanon. When he wanted to appoint a new ruler in the face of opposition, Jezzfir would send army units, ranging in size from several hundred to several thousand to accompany him. But even when the local ruler enjoyed Jezzär’s support, he still usually had need of his master’s troops: the Amir of the M ount did not maintain a standing army,60 but when faced, at times, by the armed resistance of his subjects to his tax-collectors, he had recourse to an organized military force o f horsemen, requested from and sent by Jezzfir. The latter sometimes sent such units on his own initiative to collect unpaid taxes in M ount Lebanon or Palestine.61 He also sometimes dis­ patched forces to serve as a counterbalance to the military units sent by the V äli of Damascus to the support o f his protégés in Biqä‘, Baalbek, or Jubayl. It should be emphasized that although Jezzär’s horsemen were strong in the Biqä‘, M arj’UyOn, Beirut, and Sidon areas, they were less efficient, because of topographical difficulties, in the mountainous areas, and particularly the Druze regions. We find, in fact, that in battles in these areas, Jezzär’s army was often defeated by the local fighters, particularly when the latter had succeeded in gathering together a considerable military force.62 So far we have described how Jezz&r overcame two obstacles which had hindered the vd/is who preceded him : the lack of sufficient military force on the one hand, and the maintenance of army units, which acted independ­ ently and often against the väli, on the other. He overcame the problems by establishing a large and strong mercenary army and by encouraging competition between the various units, all of which received payment from him. But there was a third im portant innovation introduced by Jezzär into the army. We have pointed to the fact that of the few reforms in the system of defence introduced into Palestine in the 18th Century, most were connected with coastal defence. The only fortifications established inland were set up on the initiative of P ähir, who was a local mOltezim; the vd/rs did not or could not display initiative and station garrison forces in these strongholds. In the key positions of Tiberias, Safed, and Shafä ‘Amr ‘there For tom e interesting details of how the Druze amir mobilized his army in times o f crisis see Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, F.Fr., no. 4212. *t Clarice, op. cit., 2b p. 427. 2 ibid.

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in Rumelia and Anatolia, was basically both an expression and a result of the general process of decline which had overtaken the Ottoman Empire by the 18th Century. Given this background, it is necessary to view the history of 18th-Century Palestine from two distinct aspects — what did the Central Government aim to achieve in the area, and what did it actually achieve? It is clear that throughout the period under review, the Porte was primarily concerned, on the one hand, with putting a stop to the constant decline and decay into which the area had sunk and, on the other, with strengthening central authority which had by this time become extremely circumscribed. A number of attempts were made during the 18th Century with this joint aim in view — the strategic towns in the area (Haifa, Jaffa) were fortified and garrisons stationed in them; changes were made in the administrative organization of the area (the sancaks of Ramie and Gaza were detached from Jaffa, while the nâftiyes of Haifa, ‘Atilt, Maij'UyQn were appended to the Eyâlet of Sidon); fiefs which had lain vacant for several years were reassigned to sipâhh in order that they might develop them; and a local Janissary corps (the "yerliyân") was created. It is pertinent to ask at this point how all this can be reconciled with what is generally considered to have been Ottoman policy in the provinces during the 18th Century. Time and again, the central Ottoman government has been portrayed as having made no attempt whatever to improve the situation in the provinces, and, what is more, as having no interest even in making such an attempt. Gibb and Bowen have summed it up as “a government generally apathetic, unpro­ gressive and careless of the welfare of its subjects, and often arbitrary and violent in its dealings with them” .13 It is true, of course, that the central government was to a large degree apathetic about what went on in the provinces of the Empire, and displayed little interest in their development; but it is important to establish whether this apathy was in fact the cause of the situation in the provinces, or whether it emerged as a result of this (in other words, was the general backwardness and lack of development in the provinces brought about by the Porte’s unwillingness to take the situation in hand, or as a result of its inability to do so, despite its good intentions?). The Porte’s failure to take positive action is not really so hard to under­ stand, as things would have been little different even if we assume that it was, in fact, interested in the welfare and advancement of its subjects. As it happens, the Porte was quite clearly not motivated by any such noble sentiment; there is little room for surprise, therefore, at its general apathy in this respect. Its sole concern in the provinces was financial — it was 13 Gibb and Bowen, vol. I, p. 209.

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interested only in raising the largest amount possible in taxations. Time and again, we find this factor underlying the Porte’s actions in 18th-Century Palestine. This can, of course, be understood against the background of the Empire’s acute financial problems at the time — its economy was in a state of constant decline, while its expenses were increasing all the time. But at the same time, given the above economic situation in the Empire, it is reasonable to assume that the Porte would have been interested in taking steps to improve matters at least in those provinces where such measures were likely to bring financial benefit in the form of increased revenues in the future. Unlike the vâli, whose term of office was seldom more than a single year, the Porte could afford to take a long-range view of things and undertake improvements that would bear fruit only at some future date (such attempts were made in the 16th Century, when the Porte made an effort to settle vital areas in Palestine, particularly along the major arteries running through the area).14 That projects of this nature were so rarely undertaken in the 18th Century cannot be put down to the Porte’s apathy or lack of interest alone; neither can it be attributed to its unwilling­ ness to invest small sums even in areas where this was likely to prove financially advantageous. In order to succeed, such projects required the presence in the provinces themselves of elements capable of implementing them, or at any rate, the absence of all factors likely to hinder or prevent their implementation. This condition was not as a rule fulfilled, so that even when the Porte was interested in initiating development projects in the provinces, it was able to achieve very little. The välis also were generally opposed to such projects for reasons of their own (primarily the fact that their term of office was of such limited duration, their main concern being to make the utmost use of the time at their disposal to enrich themselves, and not to make improvements from which only their successors were likely to benefit). Another indispensable prerequisite for the success of any development project in Palestine was the willingness of the effective local holder of power to co-operate in its implementation. Theoretically, this was the vâli, who, despite his relative impotence, was still sufficiently power­ ful to prevent the implementation of such projects if he so desired. Thus, even when the Porte tried to initiate measures to improve the situation in the provinces, it encountered the apathy or outright hostility of the vâli. It was only when effective rule in the area passed into the hands of some­ one more powerful than the vâli — P ähir — who (for reasons of his own) was interested in making improvements, that anything could be achieved. Jezzär’s period of rule completed the picture, for here at last was a vâli 14 Heyd, Documents, pp. 100-101.

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who was both interested in and capable of undertaking the development of his eyälet, and his efforts in this direction, at least in the short run, paid handsome dividends. Haifa provides an instructive example from the early part of the century of how a development project initiated by the Porte came to naught owing to the opposition of the väli. Acre, in the middle of the century, shows how such a project succeeded due to the presence of an effective local power (Çâhir) who had a stake in its successful implemen­ tation. The developments which took place in both these towns at the dose of the century bear eloquent testimony to the fact that, with a willing väli in the area, no inherent “apathy” or “lack of progressiveness” could prevent the continued development of the Palestine coast. The will to initiate devel­ opment projects in the provinces existed, to varying degrees, at all levels of the central administration; whether or not these projects were implemented, or to what extent they were implemented, depended on the amount of local support they received. When both the central government and the effective local holders of power in the provinces themselves were able to agree and to co-operate, significant results were achieved. From all that has been said, we can conclude quite confidently that not only was the Porte distinctly interested in checking the process of dedine in the provinces, but it even took active measures in this direction. The mere dedsion to initiate development projects was not, however, enough so long as the means to implement these were lacking. As long as the vâlis in the area remained weak and virtually helpless, and their terms of office continued to be of such limited duration, they showed no interest whatever in implementing such projects, from which not they themselves but their successors would reap all the benefits. P ähir’s rise to power revealed quite unambiguously not only the impotence of the väli but also just what could be accomplished by an effective ruler over a relatively extended space of time. It is quite possible that similar examples in other parts of Syria (the al-’Açm regime in Damascus, for instance) drove the point home. At all events, the Porte was eventually convinced of the efficacy of allowing a capable and ostensibly loyal väli to remain in the same place for more than the customary year — Jezzär was permitted to remain in the area for almost three decades. What is more, he was accorded mâlikâne rights in the greater part of the eyälet. The Porte’s motivation in making this latter concession was two-fold — on the one hand, it wished to improve the lot of the inhabitants and develop the area in general (something which a ruler who knew he had a long-term stake in the area would doubtless have welcomed), on the other hand — and this was the decisive conside­ ration — it hoped that it would in this way be able to increase the revenues accruing to the state treasury (which was under particularly great pressure

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during the last quarter of the century). The numerous military expeditions undertaken by the Empire in the course of the 18th Century had depleted its coffers to such an extent that by the time the 1787 war with Russia broke out, the financial situation was critical (so critical, in fact, that the Porte was forced to approach the European powers for aid, which was not, in the event, forthcoming). Once those non-recurrent sources of revenue (one or two large legacies, expropriations, the fortune brought by Hasan Paça from Egypt) had been exhausted, the treasury was left with only its revenues from the miri.15 It is in this light that the significance of Jezzär’s period of rule in the area can best be understood. The centralizing trend, which emerged throughout the area under Jezzär and which characterized his regime, was intended, as far as the Porte was concerned, to augment the revenues accruing to the treasury at this critical juncture. In this, the Porte was to a large degree successful, for Jezzfir was able to re-impose central authority on all the various centrifugal forces which had emerged in the area (the Zaydänls, the Metoualis, and, to a lesser extent, the Druzes). Although he justified his actions to the Porte from time to time by pleading the need to put down local rebellions, and although there was at least one serious insurrection that very nearly put paid to his rule in the area, Jezzär’s period was one of relative tranquillity. His major contribution was the restoration of the väli to his former pre-eminence in the eyâlet, a pre­ eminence he had not enjoyed for a very long time. From the financial point of view as well, the treasury could have had little reason to regret Jezzär’s extended stay in the area — he would quite clearly not have been given mâlikâne rights in nähtiye after nafriye had the Porte not been certain that the state stood to gain by this. And the mäl-i mu’äcele paid by Jezzär for these rights did, in fact, come to quite a substantial sum over the years. What is more, in view of the fixed level of the mäl-i miri, it was most import­ ant that the treasury should receive these large additional infusions of tamm every year. The eyâlet's m iri payments (although occasionally in arreas and subject to some manipulation) also became far more regular and orderly, a state of affairs that continued throughout the remainder of the century, if not to the end of Jezzär’s rule. It can be claimed with a fair degree of certainty that in all these respects, during the course of the 18th Century Palestine became once again an Ottoman province of value and importance to the Empire as a whole. It was far better organized and far more orderly than it had been in the preceding period, and, above is Uzunçarçlli. vol. 4. pp. 597-600. A. ffa fl-i HBmâyün in the late eighties went as follows: “We are aware of your need for money... but you are (equally) aware o f the situation in which the treasury finds itself. This matter is causing me great anxiety day and night” (op. cit., pp. 597-598).

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all, effective power and authority in the eyâlet had at long last been restored to the lawful representative and agent of the central government, the vâli.16 The other side of the coin, however, is not so bright. There is not the slightest doubt that as far as the inhabitants of Palestine were concerned, things had taken a turn for the worse during the 18th Century. Although they did reap some benefit from the vastly improved security conditions in the area, this was more than off-set by the suffering and hardship which they had to endure under the heavy hand of Jezzär. While the mâlikâne system, which had been introduced into the area with the express purpose of increasing the tax-farmer’s interest in his farm, did, in fact, do this (certainly in Jezzär’s day), this was almost invariably at the expense of the local population. Throughout most of Pähir’s iule, the fellahin had to pay between one-sixth and one-fourth (depending on the sources) of their total income in taxes, this proportion rising to as much as one-half by the end of his rule.17 Thus, a process of rising taxation had undoubtably set in towards the end of the latter’s period of rule in the area, most probably as a result of his numerous military adventures at this time. Tax-collection under Jezzär was highly centralized and very efficient, and the sums extorted from his wretched subjects were far higher than those they were officially obliged to pay. Taxes at this time came to as much as two-thirds of the fellah’s total produce, and it was not difficult for the porte to appreciatejust how greatly their lot had deteriorated under Jezzär.18 European travellers have left descriptions of widespread destruction and desolation in many parts of the Galilee through which they passed.19 It is, of course, possible somewhat to qualify the impressions gained by these travellers by pointing out that Palestine had been sparsely populated even before Jezzär’s time, and we 18 The special characteristics o f the mtri dwelt upon in an earlier part of this work, as well as the fact that it represented only a small part of the total income of the väll. explain why although agriculture deteriorated rapidly, the state treasury did not suffer heavy losses. Volney (p. 378) was wrong in this respect. In the long run. however, he was quite right, for even though the total m tri did not decrease, one may argue that had the trend of events been otherwise, the fà 'ii and iamd’im would have been much higher. Cf. Hourani, p. 49; A. Hourani, “Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables” in W. E. Polk and R. L. Chambers (eds.) Beginnings o f Modernisation in the Middle East, (Chicago, 1968), p. 31. it MikhA’il, pp. 56.143 ; Letter of the French consul in Sidon dated 30.11.1773 (Aff. Et., Bi 1036) containing most detailed and valuable financial information, remarkably similar to that found in the official Ottoman records. « Volney, p. 377. t9 Volney (p. 378) describing a process of rural decline and depopulation in Palestine; Clarke, 2a, p. 400; Browne, p. 423.

PART

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must bear in mind that they were hardly in a position to compare what they saw in the course of their travels is the area with what had existed in the past. But at the same time, we learn from the French traders (who, having been resident in the area for extended periods, were qualified to make such a comparison) that a process of steady decline had in fact overtaken agriculture, with fellahin leaving their villages and abandoning their fields en masse. At the end of 1777, for example, one of the above traders residing in Acre described the situation in the area as follows: “ Many of the inhabitants of the villages have left to seek a more peaceful refuge elsewhere, (while) the greater part of the land is lying fallow” .20 A memorandum penned 15 years later by the French consul in Acre confirms our impression that the situation of the inhabitants of Palestine had taken a turn for the worse even towards the end of P ähir’s rule, as a result of his arbitrary methods and his numerous wars. But the bulk of the damage was done, not by Pähir, but by Jezzär: Ce beau et bon pays est maintenant dans l’état le plus déplorable. Les Mutualis qui en cultivaient une partie sont presque détruits; les Druses qui en cultivaient une autre sont asservis et repoussés dans des montagnes inaccessibles aux tirans et ingrates aux soins des culti­ vateurs. Des hordes d’Arabes Bedouins qui cultivaient autrefois les montagnes de la Galilée et une partie de celles de Judée ont été exter­ minés ou obligés de se réfugier dans les déserts. Les habitants sédantaires ont été emportés par les revolutions, par la misère et par la tiranie, ce qui en reste peut à peine cultiver le quart de ce beau pays’’21. In order to complete the picture, we can bring the evidence of Süleymän Pa$a, one of Jezzär’s erstwhile henchmen add Vâli of Sidon at the beginning of the 19th Century — a witness considerably more trustworthy even than the French merchants in the area. This is what he has to say: “To be short and to the point, (it may be said that) most of the m ukäfaas belonging in the past to the late Jezzär Pa$a are uncultivated and their (former) inhabitants have dispersed.” 22 It is, however, quite possible that when he 20 Letter of a French merchant in Acre dated 24.9.1777 and similar impressions of the French consul in Sidon in his letter dated 17.12.1777 (Aff. Et., Bi 1037). 21 A report dated 10.5.1790 (ACCM, J-835). On the extent to which conditions around Acre, Safed and Shall*Amr had deteriorated in the early seventies, see a description given by Jezzär, who did not fail to mention that many of the villagers who had taken flight before his arrival in the area were gradually returning to their old villages. (Cevdet Maliye, 27130).

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326

PALESTINE IN THE 18T H CENTURY

wrote these words, Süleymän Pa$a was out, on the one hand, to belittle JezzSr’s achievements and, on the other, to reduce his own tax obligation, so he might well have exaggerated somewhat. But that the gist of what he says is undoubtably quite accurate is confirmed by the following almost irrefutable piece of evidence — the official accounts of all taxes collected by Jezzär in his mâlikûne villages towards the end of his rule show that at least one-quarter of the land worked in the past had been abandoned or was lying fallow. Despite the fact that each village was collectively responsible for the payment of its taxes, regardless of the number of inha­ bitants who had taken flight or who had ceased to work their fields, and despite the highly efficient tax-collecting system established by Jezzär, it had become impossible by this time to collect more than part of the total sum owed by these mälikäne villages. The number of villages which were completely ruined was not very large, but decay and destruction was wide­ spread in all the nâhiyes and in all the villages. Süleymän Pa$a, in describing “most” of the mufcäfa'as as lying in ruins, was quite clearly exaggerating; but the gist of his remarks was, as we have already pointed out, fundament­ ally accurate, and his general evaluation of the situation quite sound. This should, of course, be viewed against the background of P ähir’s régime, when new land was brought under the plough, when the population in­ creased23, and when revenues rose quite considerably (enriching the Zaydänls in the process). Under Jezzär, on the other hand, just the reverse was true — land which had formerly been cultivated was left to lie fallow, while the constant drop in the incomes of both the rural and the urban population led to a net decrease in the population of Palestine24 (in all fairness, we should point out once again that this process actually began before Jezzâr’s arrival in the area, during the later part of p äh ir’s rule). The following is a contemporary description of conditions in Palestine at the end of the 18th Century23: 23 Letter of the French consul in Sidon dated 28.8.1752 (Aflf. Et., Bi 1029). 24 See the report of the French consul from the year 1790 cited above. Although he was clearly exaggerating when he mentioned that only 1/4 of the land was under cultivation, the general trend he described is fundamentally correct. Cf. *Awra, pp. 56-57. 23 “ Whereas the country at the time of Jezzâr’s death was in a state of utter desolation as a result of the oppression and tyranny which he inflicted on it during the course of his rule by plundering its resources [lit. movable and immovable properties], sequestering properties, killing its notables and most of its inhabitants, until it was reduced to a lamentable condition. The belongings and property of its inhabitants and notables who were killed was sequestered, while that of those who remained alive was plundered and expropriated as a result of this tyranny. Whoever managed to escape, fled to the country of Damascus [Dlrat al-Shdm] and settled in Jabal Nablus, Jerusalem, 'Ajlûn, Qunaytra, and other such places. [Of the original population] only a wretched 10% remained (*Awra, p. 22).

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